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Remembering the Past, Thinking of the Present: Historic Commemorations in New Zealand and Northern Ireland, 1940–1990

Helen Alexandra Robinson

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy, the University of Auckland, 2009.
Abstract

This thesis analyses and compares two historic commemorations in Northern Ireland with two in New Zealand, in the period from 1940 to 1990. These commemorations are the Twelfth of July and Remembrance Sunday in Northern Ireland, and Waitangi Day and Anzac Day in New Zealand.

Examination of these commemorations has revealed several patterns. In the commemorations studied in this thesis, levels of public adherence generally depended on the extent to which the values that the commemoration symbolised were seen as threatened or highly needed. The commemorations which reaffirmed compelling values tended to enjoy higher levels of public support than those expressing values which were seen as either unnecessary or unthreatened. In both countries, historic commemorations were capable of uniting communities behind core values. However, in cases where there was no general agreement on what those values were or what they meant, commemorations frequently became sites of division and conflict. All four commemorations were regularly used by organisers and participants to express views on contemporary political and social issues and, on several occasions in both countries, different groups battled for the control of particular commemorations. In both countries, increased levels of social conflict often led to the increased use of the past as a rhetorical device.

The main conclusion to be drawn from this study is that these historic commemorations derived more of their meaning from their contemporary context than from the historical events which they commemorated. In particular, how the public viewed and understood the values symbolised and reaffirmed by the commemorations strongly affected their levels of support. People were most likely to observe the commemorations when they were seen as symbolising values which were widely adhered to and seen as threatened or urgently needed. The historic commemorations examined in this thesis were often strongly affected by contemporary events which were seen as relating, positively or negatively, to the values which the commemorations embodied.
Acknowledgements

This thesis could not have been started, let alone completed, without the help of many people. My supervisors Malcolm Campbell, James Belich and Aroha Harris provided invaluable guidance, especially Malcolm who was, in practice, my sole supervisor for the first half of 2008. The University of Auckland granted me a PhD. scholarship and other funding which enabled me to dedicate myself full-time to the thesis, and spend six months living in Belfast. The university’s Department of History provided me with an office, computer, photocopying and printing, and internet connection. Various people within the department helped me in a range of ways, especially Barbara Batt, Caroline Daley and Tiopira McDowell.

I was able to undertake productive research in four different cities thanks to the helpful staff at various libraries and archives in Auckland, Wellington, Belfast and London. In particular, various librarians at Queen’s University Belfast kindly bent rules concerning what materials Associate Members were allowed to access, and a Eugene O’Sullivan Theological Library librarian went above and beyond the call of duty to track down copies of the *New Zealand Tablet* in Auckland. The Ulster Society was also enormously helpful.

My stay in Belfast was made instructive and enjoyable by a huge range of friendly locals, Protestant and Catholic, who answered my questions and generally gave me insight into their communities. In particular I would like to thank Mary Clarke, Elaine Doyle and Stephen McCormick, all of whom made me welcome and helped me understand their country. Mary also rescued me when I realised that I had got the date of Remembrance Sunday 1971 wrong and consequently left Belfast with no coverage of that particularly significant event.

My husband Douglas Jones provided me with support, distraction and insight, and was enthusiastic about temporarily moving to one of the colder, stranger parts of the United Kingdom.
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<tr>
<td>AIA</td>
<td>Anglo-Irish Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>CESA</td>
<td>Catholic Ex-Servicemen’s Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGM</td>
<td>County Grand Master</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament</td>
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<tr>
<td>DUP</td>
<td>Democratic Unionist Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>IOO</td>
<td>Independent Orange Order</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>LOL</td>
<td>Loyal Orange Lodge</td>
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<td>MWWL</td>
<td>Maori Women’s Welfare League</td>
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<td>NIO</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>NZUSA</td>
<td>New Zealand University Students’ Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>People’s Democracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRONI</td>
<td>Public Record Office of Northern Ireland</td>
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<tr>
<td>PYM</td>
<td>Progressive Youth Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Returned Services Association, originally Returned Soldiers’ Association, later Returned and Services’ Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDLP</td>
<td>Social Democratic and Labour Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>Teachta Dala (Member of Parliament)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TVNZ</td>
<td>Television New Zealand</td>
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<tr>
<td>UDA</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Association</td>
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<td>UDR</td>
<td>Ulster Defence Regiment</td>
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<td>UFF</td>
<td>Ulster Freedom Fighters</td>
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<td>UUP</td>
<td>Ulster Unionist Party</td>
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<td>UUUC</td>
<td>United Ulster Unionist Committee</td>
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<td>UVF</td>
<td>Ulster Volunteer Force</td>
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<td>WAC</td>
<td>Waitangi Action Committee</td>
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Publications

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<td>AH</td>
<td>Te Ao Hou</td>
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<tr>
<td>BT</td>
<td>Belfast Telegraph</td>
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<tr>
<td>BN</td>
<td>Belfast News Letter</td>
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<tr>
<td>DST</td>
<td>Dominion Sunday Times</td>
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<td>EG</td>
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<td>MOOHR</td>
<td>Maori Organisation on Human Rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>Northern Advocate [New Zealand]</td>
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<td>NBR</td>
<td>National Business Review</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIPD</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Parliamentary Debates</td>
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<td>NISPD</td>
<td>Northern Ireland Senate Parliamentary Debates</td>
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NZJH  New Zealand Journal of History
NZL  New Zealand Listener
NZMR  New Zealand Monthly Review
NZPD  New Zealand Parliamentary Debates
NZWW  New Zealand Woman’s Weekly
ODT  Otago Daily Times
OS  Orange Standard
PT  Protestant Telegraph
TC  Tyrone Constitution
TT  Treaty Times
UKNIWM  United Kingdom National Inventory of War Memorials
WACN  Waitangi Action Committee Newsletter
Introduction

In 1986 Wellington’s *Evening Post* newspaper ran an editorial on the subject of Anzac Day:

For many – probably the majority – it is now a late summer holiday, a day for relaxation, sweeping up the leaves or attending sporting events. When attention is focused on the reason for the day being commemorated, however, the country seems… divided on the issue… The differences are so sharp that the day itself cannot be left to those with memories but must be challenged by protesters who want the past judged by the standards of today… Like Waitangi Day, Anzac Day attracts the anger of those who do not want New Zealanders to acknowledge the past simply as history but want judgments to be made on our forebears as well… This questioning is going on everywhere, but unlike other Western nations with whose citizens New Zealanders can individually identify, we do not have a long history of shared experience which can be taken for granted as something we hold in common. Neither, it seems, do we have any clear focus for loyalty which transcends divisions over the course of our future directions. Now public occasions do little more than offer a platform for those opposed to some aspect of past history or present policy. Public holidays of a commemoratory nature have become uncomfortable times to be a New Zealander and there seems little chance of our coming to peace with ourselves in the immediate future.¹

The editorial sums up the complexities of historic commemorations not only in New Zealand but in much of the world, including Northern Ireland. Like New Zealanders, the Northern Irish in the second half of the twentieth century found that their commemorations could become forums for the expression of anger at past history and present policy. Nor did they have a ‘clear focus for loyalty which transcends divisions’ or much apparent chance of coming to peace with themselves. Like Anzac Day and Waitangi Day, Northern Ireland’s commemorations were regularly turned into platforms for passing judgement. This thesis will argue that this questioning and judging is a common part of historic commemorations. It will be shown that the commemorations it examines were, in essence, much less about the past than contemporary issues and the need of national and sub-national groups to work out and express their identities and core values.

Four commemorations will be examined: two from New Zealand and two from Northern Ireland. One remembers a seventeenth-century battle, one a nineteenth-century treaty, and two focus primarily on World War I. The commemoration of the

seventeenth-century Battle of the Boyne, known in Northern Ireland simply as the Twelfth of July, or ‘the Twelfth’, is different in nearly every way from Waitangi Day, the anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. The two First World War commemorations, Anzac Day in New Zealand and Remembrance Sunday in Northern Ireland, are very similar in form and content.

Many of the Twelfth’s features date back to the late eighteenth century and, as we will see, its general form has been fairly consistent since the late nineteenth century. It commemorates the victory of William III, Prince of Orange, over James II at the Boyne Valley in Ireland in 1690. William was Protestant and James Catholic, and William’s victory cemented Protestant supremacy in Britain and Ireland, as well as ushering in constitutional reform. The events of the Twelfth are organised by the Orange Order, a fraternal organisation dedicated to upholding Protestantism and the British Crown. On the Twelfth, the Order holds dozens of parades around Northern Ireland, finishing in fields or parks, where public meetings will be held. Senior Orangemen, who are often also politicians or clergy, make speeches and pass resolutions in support of Protestantism and Britishness and against Irish republicanism. The Twelfth has always been seen as a sectarian event; the parades have frequently gone through Catholic areas and speeches have often attacked Catholicism in general and sometimes Irish Catholics specifically. Since the 1920s the day has been a public holiday in Northern Ireland, but the commemorations themselves are observed almost exclusively by Protestants.

Waitangi Day has a much shorter history. It commemorates the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi between the British Crown and various Maori chiefs at Waitangi in Northland in 1840. The question of exactly what the Treaty did in legal and practical terms has been debated ever since, but it has been generally agreed that it allowed Britain to claim New Zealand as part of its empire and gave Maori approximately equal rights under the law. The signing of the Treaty was commemorated in 1934 and 1940, and then annually from 1947. The main commemorations are held at Waitangi and have usually consisted of speeches, cultural displays by Maori and other groups, and naval ceremonies. Since the early 1970s the day has frequently been marked by Maori protest. It has been a public holiday since 1974, but most New Zealanders do little to commemorate the Treaty’s signing. Waitangi Day is different in many ways
from the other three commemorations studied here, and as such provides an interesting case study of several aspects of historic commemoration.

Anzac Day and Remembrance Sunday both originated in commemoration of the First World War. Anzac Day is the anniversary of the allied assault on Gallipoli in Turkey, in which New Zealand troops participated. Remembrance Sunday is the successor to Armistice Day, the anniversary of the end of the war. After World War II, both were broadened to encompass that war, and Armistice Day was renamed and moved to the nearest Sunday. Both events are marked by ceremonies at war memorials, featuring public worship, wreath laying and, in the case of Anzac Day, a speech or sermon. Remembrance Sunday also features special church services. In New Zealand, Anzac Day is observed by people from most backgrounds, although until the 1960s Catholics were instructed by their Church to stay away from most ceremonies due to the involvement of Protestant clergy. In Northern Ireland, Remembrance Sunday is associated with the Protestant community and there is little Catholic participation. Both countries have also observed other war commemorations: Armistice Day was observed in New Zealand between the wars, but Remembrance Sunday was never a success there. In Northern Ireland the anniversary of the start of the Battle of the Somme is also commemorated, although since the start of the Troubles the day has mostly turned from a smaller version of Remembrance Sunday into a smaller version of the Twelfth.

The four commemorations outlined above have been chosen primarily because they are the major historic commemorations in Northern Ireland and New Zealand. All have received national news coverage for most of their history and have frequently included Prime Ministers and other important dignitaries amongst their attendees. In Northern Ireland, this selection inevitably means a disproportionate focus on the unionist community, since nationalist commemorations such as the Easter Rising anniversary have been marginalised and at times suppressed. In New Zealand, too, both historic commemorations have been dominated by Pakeha. Study of these commemorations therefore provides an insight into the attempts of these two dominant groups to construct group and national identities, justify their positions of dominance and work out their relationships with other groups. Between them, the four commemorations exhibit varying levels of populism, respectability, public
participation and support, hegemonic domination, and changeability. This range of differences will allow us to see how common themes such as identity construction and maintenance, inter-group relationships, and the propagation of social values, can be expressed in very different ways according to context.

Comparative history

In his seminal article on comparative history, Marc Bloch wrote that ‘the comparative method, rightly conceived, should involve specially lively interest in the perception of differences, whether original or resulting from divergent developments from the same starting point.’ Introducing his comparative study of white supremacy in the United States and South Africa, George Fredrickson argued that ‘after a firm common ground has been established, it is differences that will compel most of the historian’s attention because of the way that they can suggest new problems of interpretation and point to discrete patterns of causation’. He was at pains to point out the many important differences between the two countries he examined, but regarded these differences as important variables which helped to explain other differences and highlight particular patterns. Similarly, Peter Kolchin argues that the fundamental dissimilarity of Russian serfdom and North American slavery makes comparison of the two ‘especially revealing’. Comparing and contrasting related phenomena from different countries helps understanding in several ways. Perhaps most importantly, it provides a test of ideas and theories; both Fredrickson and G.E.R. Lloyd argue that the only real way to discover the true relationship between various factors is to compare similar cases in different contexts. Comparison therefore encourages the development of theories which apply to more than one country. Comparative history is also a way to counter the tendency of many national histories towards parochialism, a point made

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4 Fredrickson, pp.xxi-xxiv.
Introduction

by several comparative historians. By comparing two or more countries’ histories, we can avoid the trap of seeing the flow of events in either country as natural or inevitable. Conversely, comparison also works against unjustified assumptions of exceptionalism or uniqueness. Examination of another nation provides insight into other directions in which a country might have gone, and challenges ideas of both national uniqueness and national normality.

Few historians have made the comparison between New Zealand and Northern Ireland. One exception is Keith Jeffery, who has examined the visits of New Zealand and Northern Irish Prime Ministers to each others’ countries between the world wars. Although Jeffery focuses primarily on how the two countries saw each other and presented themselves rather than on making comparisons, his article shows the extent to which people in both countries saw the two as similar, particularly in terms of their connections with Britain. There is a long history of people in both countries comparing them with each other. Irish and Maori nationalists have seen each other as being in similar positions since the nineteenth century, although the comparisons were probably most common in the 1980s, when H-Block and Waitangi Action committees sent each other messages of support. In the years after Irish partition, Pakeha New Zealanders in Northern Ireland and Protestant Northern Irishmen in New Zealand often stated that both countries were models of British loyalty, and in the 1990s expatriate New Zealand historian J.G.A Pocock wrote that he understood the anger of Ulster loyalists at being told they were not British. During the Troubles, Northern Ireland was regularly held up by New Zealanders as a dire warning of what might happen if they continued down a particular path, with some seeing the Troubles as the result of ignoring minority grievances or abusing a majority position. Others argued

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7 Kolchin, p.ix; Lloyd, pp.18-19; Fredrickson, pp.xiv-xv.
that the conflict was in fact the result of divisive identity politics.\textsuperscript{12} New Zealand was sometimes seen from both countries as a model for Northern Ireland: an example of colonised and colonisers having respect for each others’ culture and a commitment to friendship.\textsuperscript{12} There are less obvious similarities, too: in 1923 New Zealand Prime Minister and Ulster Protestant William Massey told a Belfast crowd that Maori ‘had great warlike traditions, that they never surrendered, and that they played a great part in the World War’, phrases which the crowd would have recognised as the standard description of Ulster Protestants.\textsuperscript{14}

New Zealand and Northern Ireland have several historical and contemporary features in common. Both are both British settler societies in which the indigenous minority remains distinct in a cultural if not necessarily a genetic sense, and where past injustice is seen by many in that minority as being highly relevant in the present. In both places the dominant majority kept a British identity into the twentieth century and in the 1970s were forced to come to terms with the fact that the British no longer saw them as compatriots. There are also fundamental differences. The role of religion, New Zealand’s geographical isolation compared to Northern Ireland’s intimate proximity to the Republic of Ireland, and Northern Ireland’s membership of the United Kingdom are all hugely significant points of difference. To argue that straight-forward comparisons can be made between the two countries would be misguided.

Historic commemorations in the two countries also have more differences than similarities. Waitangi Day and the Twelfth are very different commemorations which convey completely different messages and occupy different places in their respective countries and cultures. But both have dealt with the questions of how the descendants of British colonisers can justify their presence and dominance, how they should behave towards the indigenous minority, and what their relationship with Britain is and should be. Both, subtly or overtly, appeal to the past for justification of present actions, policies and opinions. Both have been the target of protests by the minority, some of whom have seen the commemorations as imperialist celebrations of their

\textsuperscript{12} New Zealand Listener (NZL), 7 November 1987, p.12.  
\textsuperscript{14} Jeffery, ‘Distance and Proximity’, p.462.
Introduction

subjugation. The commemorations deal with different situations in completely different ways, but grapple with many of the same issues. Anzac Day and Remembrance Sunday, on the other hand, are similar enough that the differences which do exist can be examined to show how common cultural forms can vary according to social and cultural context.

Analysing historic commemorations

Historic commemorations have been analysed by a range of historians, anthropologists and sociologists, but few have examined them as commemorations of historic events rather than simply as public rituals. One exception is Matthew Dennis, who has shown how various American commemorative holidays have been used to construct identities and discuss contemporary political and social issues using history as a resource and rhetorical device.\(^{15}\) However his *Red, White and Blue Letters Days* has no overarching theory, and thus is of limited use in finding meaning in historic commemorations elsewhere. Paul Connerton has also analysed historic commemorations, in this case in terms of social or collective memory. Connerton defines commemorations purely in terms of their performative aspects, but since many, perhaps the majority, of historic commemorations are performed by a relatively small group of people and the general public limited to spectatorship, this is not a helpful analysis.\(^{16}\) Since the nineteenth century, theorists including Ernest Renan and Friedrich Nietzsche have recognised the important role that ideas about the past play in nation-building and the mobilisation of nationalism.\(^{17}\) However few have examined the role played by commemorations of the national past. In order to find useful theories of historic commemoration, we must turn to wider ideas about ritual and tradition.

Perhaps the most influential thinker in the study of commemorations is French sociologist Emile Durkheim. In his book *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, originally published in 1912, Durkheim theorised that religion and its associated

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rituals are reflections of society and that any society’s religious worship is essentially worship of an idealised version of that society. Numerous sociologists have used this idea to analyse rituals both sacred and secular, especially following World War II. One of the most prominent was Robert Bellah, who argued that events such as Memorial Day and Thanksgiving were rituals in an American ‘civil religion’ which helped to unite the American people and assure them of the righteousness of their nation. Drawing on Lloyd Warner’s work on Memorial Day, Bellah wrote that the commemoration, ‘is a major event for the whole community involving a rededication to the martyred dead, to the spirit of sacrifice, and to the American vision… Memorial Day has acted to integrate the local community into the national cult.’ He argued that public rituals such as Memorial Day are powerful because they give ‘ritual expression’ to particular ideals about the worthiness of the American nation and its citizens. In the case of Memorial Day in the 1960s, these ideals included self-sacrifice and a vaguer ‘American vision’. In participating in Memorial Day ceremonies, Americans committed themselves not only to the memory of their war dead but also to a set of principles that the dead were seen as symbolising. The concept of civil religion was seriously challenged in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, which called into question the idea that Americans had any shared set of moral values. Subsequent decades did little to restore the sense of commonality which Bellah had felt in the mid 1960s. The failure of Bellah and other civil religion theorists to recognise the racially and religiously exclusive nature of American civil religion also made the theory problematic. The emergence of feminism and minority-group politics led some commentators to accuse civil religion of taking moral pronouncements at face value, rather than asking who those morals benefited. Essentially, the problem with civil religion as a theory is that it shows what happens in its ceremonies, and the basic purpose that they serve, but does not go any deeper.

23 ibid., pp.12, 18.
In order to rectify this shortcoming, we can turn to the work of Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, who analysed ‘invented traditions’ and other rituals with an eye to their relationship to broad structures of power. Hobsbawm defined ‘invented tradition’ as ‘a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual and symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition’. This is essentially Bellah’s civil religion from a different perspective. Both Bellah and Hobsbawm emphasise the ritual nature of the ceremonies and the aim of promoting a set of values. Both see public rituals as bringing a group or community, such as a nation, together. The scope of invented traditions and civil religions is somewhat different: invented traditions have some element of real or pretended continuity to the past, while civil religious ceremonies do not need this but, unlike invented traditions, do need to be of a civic or nationalist character. The point at which the two ideas cross over generally encompasses national historic commemorations. Another useful point made by Hobsbawm, which supplements Bellah’s argument, is that the values expressed in invented traditions tend to be very vague and non-specific. However, Hobsbawm goes further and deeper than Bellah by arguing that invented traditions, or civil religious ceremonies, serve to establish or legitimize power structures, particularly those of the modern state.

Bellah was right, therefore, to argue that public ceremonies such as Memorial Day are part of a wider set of cultural activities, the totality of which ritually express particular beliefs and ideals. Hobsbawm brings more depth to this idea by arguing that these beliefs and ideals are not neutral or shared equally by all, but tend to implicitly reflect and reinforce power structures or ideas about what these should be. As Anthony D. Smith points out, the concept of invented tradition derives in many ways from Marxist ideas about class manipulation. At times it suggests that the public are a ‘largely inert mass’ manipulated by the ruling classes’ control of symbolism and ritual. Apart from being perhaps overly cynical, this ignores the agency of the public in subverting, re-interpreting or simply ignoring rituals and traditions.

26 ibid., p.10.
A full acknowledgement of the complexity of ritual can be found in American sociologist Amitai Etzioni’s analysis of holidays. While broadly accepting Durkheim’s (and Hobsbawm’s) idea that holidays and other rituals serve to incorporate people into societies, Etzioni argues that the nature of this is more complex than has generally been acknowledged. He shows that holidays do not all serve to unify societies through the reinforcement of shared values. Some, which he calls tension management holidays, build social cohesion by providing a temporary and sanctioned release from normal rules of behaviour. New Year’s Eve, Mardi Gras and Purim are all given as examples. Distinct from these are recommitment holidays. Etzioni argues that holidays and other rituals may have a divisive as well as a unifying effect. This was a point made three decades earlier by Steven Lukes, using the Twelfth of July celebrations in Northern Ireland as an example. The Twelfth, Lukes pointed out, serves ‘not to unite the community but to strengthen the dominant groups within it’. However, as David Kertzer argues, the

30 ibid., pp.15-23.
32 Etzioni, p.22.
33 Lukes, p.300.
Twelfth does promote unity, but the unity of Ulster Protestants rather than the Northern Irish in general. The Twelfth is a particularly striking illustration of the power of historic commemorations and other rituals to be both unifying and divisive. In cases such as the Twelfth, unity is achieved by uniting one group in opposition to another. But many less controversial commemorations can also divide society, or the world in general, into ‘us’ and ‘them’. National holidays emphasise membership of a particular nation, and this inevitably excludes those who do not belong to that nation. The power of historic commemorations to be divisive even when they are not intended to be is not always acknowledged.

A particularly striking exploration of the power of commemorations is made by Francesca Polletta. After a brief examination of traditions of charivari and carnival, Polletta analyses the ways in which historic commemorations in a range of communist countries in the late 1980s turned into apparently spontaneous mass expressions of dissent. The commemorations were not an incongruous site for revolt, she argues, because they ‘offered up the regime’s myths for public scrutiny, focused participants’ grievances by drawing attention to the gap between ritual and reality, and in several cases, provoked sharp repression.’ As props supporting the powerful, commemorations are not only reliant on the willingness of the public to play along, but can actually encourage the criticism of unpopular regimes. The mass subversion of official events is perhaps more likely under totalitarian regimes, in which there are fewer outlets for popular dissatisfaction. However, as we will see in the case of Waitangi Day in particular, any commemoration which is seen to be hypocritically promoting ideals which are ignored in ordinary life can be a target for protest. Such protest, Polletta points out, will be especially effective in the context of commemorations and other activities which rely on the public behaving in a particular way.

None of these theories have been applied consistently or comprehensively to historic commemorations in either New Zealand or Northern Ireland. As shown above, Northern Irish parading on the Twelfth of July and other dates is sometimes used as

36 ibid., p.158.
37 ibid., p.159.
an example of the relevance or divisive power of ritual in the modern world, but
generally only in passing. Various Northern Irish writers have used theories about
ritual to discuss parades on the Twelfth and other dates, but have done little to
advance these theories, let alone show how the Northern Irish situation illuminates
wider patterns. Civil religion theory has also been applied to Anzac Day in New
Zealand, although never in any real depth. Nor have writers in either country
produced a theory capable of being applied to historic commemorations in other
places. With the exception of the Twelfth or, more specifically, Protestant parading,
historic commemorations have been a surprisingly under-researched topic in both
countries. Where they have been researched, they are generally not placed in the
wider international context of other such commemorations. A review of the literature
on each of the historic commemorations examined in this thesis will therefore be
placed in the introduction to the first chapter on each commemoration.

This introduction has noted that the Twelfth of July, Waitangi Day, Remembrance
Sunday and Anzac Day are four very different commemorations. Any theory which is
used to analyse them all must therefore be fairly broad, and acknowledge complexity
and variation. This thesis will accept the basic idea, derived ultimately from Emile
Durkheim, that public historic commemorations such as those listed above can act to
unify communities and nations by reaffirming core values. It will follow Hobsbawm
in recognising the artificiality of these activities, rather than seeing them as natural or
organic. To use Etzioni’s terminology, the four commemorations examined in this
thesis are all recommitment holidays, not tension management holidays. Some may at
times have tension management functions or characteristics, but their dominant
intended function is to inspire adherence to a particular set of values or principles. As
Hobsbawm suggests, these values may be vague and inadequately defined. It is
entirely likely that this is a strength rather than a weakness; a vague principle can be
committed to by a range of people who might strongly disagree with each other if they

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38 Dennis, p.3; Polletta, pp.160-1.
39 For example, Dominic Bryan, Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control,
London, 2000 and Neil Jarman, Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland,
Zealand Sociology, 2, 1 (1987), p.25; Stephen J. Clarke, ‘The One Day of the Year: Anzac Day in
were to discuss what such things as ‘Britishness’ or ‘love of country’ actually mean. Vague ideals, on the other hand, are easy to support.

The complexity of historic commemorations, and their meaning and socio-cultural uses, will be acknowledged and explored. Throughout this thesis it will be recognised that commemorations involve numerous groups of people, who come from different backgrounds and may play any of a variety of roles including organiser, participant, observer or protester. Groups, whether national, ethnic or religious, are not homogeneous and members will not all hold the same attitudes towards a particular commemoration even if its nature or content suggests that they should. Nor are people passive consumers of commemorations and the messages that they carry. Even when a consistent message is propagated by a commemoration, the public might accept it but may also contest, misunderstand or simply ignore it. Nor, in either Northern Ireland or New Zealand, has there ever been a homogenous elite consistently using historic commemorations to bolster its own supremacy. The messages of commemorations have frequently been mixed, contradictory and changing, as different factions take control and different ideas become current. We will see that different groups use historic commemorations in different ways. Participants may subvert official meanings while protesters may share common assumptions and ideas with organisers.

The messages sent by commemorations should not be taken as an uncomplicated expression of a group’s opinions or values. Nor should they be taken at face value. As the critics of civil religion argued, the expression of a set of values in a ritual does not necessarily mean that those values are universally accepted, even by those in attendance. However it seems likely that the fortunes of historic commemorations are linked to the popularity of the values with which they are associated. Values can be interpreted in different ways, and so a drop in a commemoration’s popularity may be the result of a new and negative interpretation of those values rather than any change in the commemoration itself. One example of this may be the impact of changing attitudes to war on war commemorations, which may be viewed in a new light despite being unchanged in form and content. The agency of different groups means that they can provide their own interpretation of a commemoration’s values and express this interpretation through their participation.
The analysis of historic commemorations in this thesis will draw on theories of ritual and tradition which encompass a broad range of activities, some with no strong link to the past. This suggests that the meaning of historic commemorations may not be strongly linked to the events which they ostensibly commemorate. In some cases revisionist history may impact on commemorations, but in other cases major shifts in historical thinking may leave a commemoration completely untouched. One of the major themes of this thesis will be the extent to which historic commemorations are about the past, and to what extent they are focussed on contemporary issues and concerns.

This thesis will make several contributions to the historiographies of historic commemorations, and of Northern Ireland and New Zealand. Historic commemorations have rarely been compared cross-nationally, especially not in a sustained fashion. This thesis will therefore suggest some common themes in the history of historic commemorations in the second half of the twentieth century. The wider applicability of ideas about commemorations, ritual and tradition, some of which have not been extensively applied to countries other than the United States, will be tested. Since New Zealand and Northern Ireland are two very different countries, any theory which works in relation to both has a reasonable chance of being applicable across the modern Western world, and potentially beyond. Such a theory would help the study of historic commemorations to break out of its pattern of single-nation studies with occasional references to other countries, and become more truly international.

The comparative aspect of this thesis should also help to cast light on some broader themes in the history of both New Zealand and Northern Ireland. Waitangi Day and the Twelfth of July each appear strange in relation to each other, highlighting the unusual natures of minority-majority relationships in both countries. Anzac Day and Remembrance Sunday, by contrast, are very similar, suggesting that both derived from a broader pan-British culture of war commemoration and public activity. The differences between the two – for example Anzac Day’s focus on a specific engagement and the relative post-war fortunes of the two – raise interesting questions about the roles and meanings of each commemoration. Light may also be cast on a range of other topics, including the development and nature of protest movements; the cultural impact of World War II; the roles of ethnic, religious and other minorities in dominant
cultural activities; and the reactions of ‘greater Britain’, including New Zealand and Northern Ireland, to Britain’s move away from empire.

At a more basic level, this thesis contributes new insight into, and research on, the historic commemorations it analyses. It provides the first history of the development of Waitangi Day, which will be informative in its own right, and also useful for understanding various aspects of race relations and national identity in New Zealand. It includes the first history of Remembrance Sunday in Northern Ireland, and one of the most extensive examinations of the day in any part of the United Kingdom. As well as adding to the literature of war commemoration in the United Kingdom and internationally, it also shows how people can use existing war commemorations in response to a contemporary conflict of a very different nature to that being commemorated. The sections on Remembrance Sunday and those on Anzac Day are amongst the few examinations of war commemorations in the decades immediately after World War II. Aspects of the Twelfth of July have been written about by numerous writers, but this thesis is one of the few works to examine the day as a whole, rather than focussing solely on one aspect such as parading. It is also unusual in tracking the changes and developments in the day from World War II through to the later Troubles. In general, this thesis provides valuable insight into the ways in which historic commemorations change and are adapted in response to major social change and, in the case of Northern Ireland, violent inter-communal conflict.

Structure

This thesis is divided into two sections. The first deals with the Twelfth of July, Waitangi Day, Remembrance Sunday and Anzac Day from 1940 until the mid to late 1960s, although the earlier history of the commemorations will also be discussed. The first five years of this period were dominated by World War II. Commemorations were encouraged or suppressed depending on whether they symbolised values useful to the war effort. The following decades were relatively peaceful and harmonious in both countries. In Northern Ireland the Irish Republican Army (IRA) remained an active force, but one with little support and few successes. Protestants dominated the Northern Irish state and the Catholic minority’s efforts to resist this were low profile
and mostly peaceful. Although the two communities lived mostly separate lives, there was some degree of inter-communal friendship and co-operation. The commemorations of the Twelfth and Remembrance Sunday enjoyed good turnouts, widespread Protestant support and limited opposition. Meanwhile, New Zealanders enjoyed unprecedented prosperity and, with the exception of the 1951 waterfront dispute, there was little social conflict. Maori were marginalised, but most Pakeha had little contact with them and saw no reason to doubt the widespread idea that New Zealand had ideal race relations. This lack of threat or conflict caused Anzac Day to stagnate and meant that few saw a strong need for Waitangi Day.

The second half of the thesis covers the period from the mid to late 1960s until 1990. In both countries this was a time of conflict, although much more so in Northern Ireland than in New Zealand. In Northern Ireland the Catholic minority became more vocal about their marginalisation and, when protests were met with a violent loyalist backlash, armed republicanism grew stronger. Protestant commemorations were caught up in the conflict, becoming targets of violence and sites for debate over how to respond to the situation. However Remembrance Sunday was also used by some to build bridges between the communities. Meanwhile, Anzac Day and Waitangi Day both became targets for protest from those who felt the commemorations symbolised the subjection of a range of peoples including Maori, women, and the Vietnamese. Both Waitangi and Anzac Days were caught up in a growing desire for national independence and a distinct New Zealand national identity, with both taking on newly nationalist meanings in the 1970s and 1980s.
Chapter One: Commemorating the Boyne, 1690-1968

The period between the end of World War II and about 1959 can be seen as a golden age for the Twelfth of July Battle of the Boyne anniversary celebrations in Northern Ireland. After their cancellation during the war, they rapidly regained high levels of participation and public observance, and the controversial parades which were an integral part of the Twelfth were barely opposed by the nationalist Catholic population. Irish nationalists and republicans continued to agitate against partition and Protestant dominance of the Northern Irish state, providing threatening rhetoric but little in the way of effective action. Protestants enjoyed dominance over nearly every aspect of Northern Irish public life, using the legal system to suppress nationalism and allow Protestant parades to proceed in safety through Catholic villages and neighbourhoods. From 1959, however, the Twelfth was increasingly beset by conflict. This came not from republicans, whose ineffective ‘border campaign’ was petering out, nor from the Catholic civil rights movement, which paid little attention to Protestant parading before the late 1960s, but from within the Protestant community. Throughout the 1960s, Twelfth meetings were marked by verbal and sometimes physical conflict as different factions argued about the liberalisation programme enacted by Prime Minister Terence O’Neill. Turnouts remained high and few Protestants opposed the Twelfth itself, but it was no longer a unifying force.

This chapter will examine the relationship between external threats and a community’s historic commemorations. During World War II Northern Ireland, and the United Kingdom in general, were bombed and threatened with invasion by Nazi Germany. From the mid 1950s to the early 1960s the Northern Irish state was targeted by a terrorist campaign by the IRA, and throughout the period covered in this chapter, Northern Irish Protestants were very aware of republican opposition to their state and the claims of the Irish Republic on Northern Ireland. The Nazi and republican threats had very different impacts on the Twelfth of July celebrations. During World War II the Twelfth was cancelled, mostly due to the need for Northern Ireland to be seen as making sacrifices for the war effort. During the 1950s and 1960s, by contrast, the republican threat seems to have boosted support for the Twelfth. The principles and ideals expressed in the Twelfth will be examined to determine how these related to the
threats faced by Northern Irish Protestants, and why the first threat caused the Twelfth’s cancellation while the second increased its support.

The relationship between the Twelfth and internal conflict will also be examined. While Ulster Protestants generally agreed on the importance of the values of Britishness and Protestantism expressed in the Twelfth celebrations, from the late 1950s there was increased disagreement about exactly what these values were. A liberal faction felt that one of the core principles of Britishness was the equality of all British citizens regardless of religion or political belief, and that Protestantism was a creed of tolerance and fellowship. To this group, the discrimination and sectarianism in Northern Ireland was a betrayal of the fundamental principles which the Twelfth supposedly represented. To hardliners, equality and tolerance were a weak and foolish response to republicanism and a powerful Catholic Church which, they felt, aimed to force Northern Ireland into a Catholic theocracy. Britishness and Protestantism were about opposing Catholic tyranny, and friendship with Catholics and concessions to the civil rights movement gave ground to these forces of tyranny and therefore betrayed everything that the Twelfth represented. Not surprisingly, the Twelfth became a battleground in the conflict between liberal and hardline unionists. Each side believed that its position represented the true values of the Twelfth, and each sought to control the rhetoric and meaning of the celebrations. As is common in times of crisis, both sides appealed to the past for support of their position.

Use of the past as a rhetorical device was not a normal feature of Twelfth of July celebrations. This chapter will explore the extent to which the Twelfth was actually about the Battle of the Boyne and other historical events. Popular stereotype holds that Northern Irish Protestants are obsessed with the past, and their habit of annually commemorating a seventeenth-century battle is often seen as evidence of this. However, it is not clear that the act of historic commemoration indicates any real preoccupation with the past; Americans annually commemorate an eighteenth-century revolution and few would argue that they are obsessed with history. The rhetoric of the Twelfth of July, principally platform speeches but also newspaper editorials and articles, will be examined to determine how much focus was on the past and how much on contemporary concerns.
The Twelfth’s core values of Britishness and Protestantism, and their constant reiteration, served to define the Ulster Protestant people who watched and participated in the events as proudly British and Protestant. This indicates that a primary function of historic commemorations may be the construction and maintenance of group identity. This is sometimes done by defining one group in relation to another, and nowhere is this more obvious than the Twelfth, in which Ulster Protestantism was defined in opposition to Irish Catholicism. In Twelfth speeches, Protestants were loyal, hard-working and righteous, while Catholics were superstitious, poor, disloyal and under the thrall of an evil Roman empire. The Twelfth united Ulster Protestants behind their core values and a positive self-identity but at the cost of marginalising and demonizing their Catholic neighbours. Historic commemorations can be both unifying and divisive, and this chapter will show that the Twelfth was a particularly strong illustration of this.

As one of the most visible and unique expressions of Northern Irish culture and sectarianism, the parades on the Twelfth of July and other dates have attracted considerable scholarly attention. In his book *Orange Parades: The Politics of Ritual, Tradition and Control*, Dominic Bryan draws on David Kertzer’s ideas about political ritual to show how parading has been used to unify the Ulster Protestant community and assert its identity and culture in opposition to Irish Catholics and to a lesser extent the British authorities. Neil Jarman, in *Material Conflicts: Parades and Visual Displays in Northern Ireland*, is more influenced by Paul Connerton’s emphasis on the physical and material aspects of ritual. Bryan and Jarman’s books, along with a

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collection edited by T.G. Fraser, are the most comprehensive studies of Northern Irish parading. There is a vast and very useful amount of information on parading, but its spread is somewhat uneven. Most importantly, the focus is overwhelmingly on recent decades. Most of those who write about parades are sociologists or social anthropologists, and thus are interested primarily in contemporary events. Since strong interest in the parades seems to be a phenomenon dating from the 1990s, that decade, and to a lesser extent the 1980s, is extremely well documented but earlier eras are not. Several writers have examined the history of Orange parading, but no one has yet done this at length. A useful thesis on nationalist responses to loyalist parades in the period from 1945 to 1993 is somewhat skewed by its wholehearted identification with the nationalist community, but is one of the few sources to investigate nationalist perspectives in any depth. Certain aspects of parading, such as the laws which governed it, have been examined historically, but others such as banners and music have had little or no historical analysis. Much work has been done on the Drumcree conflict, some of which is historical, but little on parading disputes in other locations.

It must also be remembered that parades are only one part of the Twelfth of July celebrations. In terms of contemporary politics, the meeting and speeches made afterwards were much more important, at least until the 1970s, yet very little analysis of these has been carried out. Speeches have been quoted in general histories of Northern Ireland and its politics and culture, and very brief summaries are often

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9 One of the few exceptions is in Bryan, Orange Parades, pp.72-4.
included in parading histories, but no writer has yet examined Twelfth speeches in their own right. This may be because political history is less fashionable than material culture and invented tradition; it may be because the majority of Twelfth speeches have been boring and formulaic. Either way, it is a serious gap. Even more inexplicable is the neglect of Eleventh Night. The unofficial warm-up to the Twelfth, with its bonfires, effigy burning, and drunkenness, would make an ideal subject for an anthropologist or cultural historian and yet the subject has been all but ignored.\footnote{For a brief exception see Alan Gailey and G.B. Adams, ‘The Bonfire in North Irish Tradition’, \textit{Folklore}, 88, 1 (1977), pp.21-4.}


and the years from 1963 have been covered in a recent volume by Eric Kaufmann, invaluable for its use of previously inaccessible Orange Order archives.\footnote{Eric P. Kaufmann, \textit{The Orange Order: A Contemporary Northern Irish History}, Oxford, 2007.}


Other sources provide personal perspectives on the Order and its activities from a range of standpoints including those within the Order and unhappy with it, outside it and supportive, and completely antagonistic.\footnote{Gordon Lucy and Elaine McClure, eds, \textit{The Twelfth: What it means to me}, Belfast, 1997; Edwards; Kennaway.}
The Battle of the Boyne

The Battle of the Boyne, which the Twelfth commemorates, took place in the context of the Reformation and subsequent religious wars in Europe. Protestantism was adopted in Britain in the mid sixteenth century, and attempts were made to impose it on Ireland. Partly because these were contemporary with attempts to extend English power over the island, Ireland remained Catholic. In an effort to strengthen Protestantism and English power, British Protestants were settled in Ireland, especially in the province of Ulster. This resulted in the creation of a community separate from and alien to the hostile Catholic locals.  

Protestants in both Ireland and Britain were strongly anti-Catholic at this time, seeing Catholicism as a tyrannical and superstitious force. When James Stuart, brother and heir of Charles II, publicly converted to Catholicism in the 1670s, most of his future subjects were alarmed and attempts were made to prevent him from becoming king. These failed and although on his accession he was generally given the benefit of the doubt, his high-handed rule was quickly seen as Catholic tyranny. Adding to his unpopularity was his close friendship with Louis XIV of France, which remained strong even after Louis began persecuting French Protestants. As well as alienating many of his subjects, James alarmed his nephew and son-in-law, the Dutch prince William of Orange. William was at war with France and hoped to have Britain as an ally. James was making this an unlikely prospect, and so William began working with James’ opponents in England. When, in 1688, it became clear that James had become immovably pro-Catholic and pro-French, and that a Williamite invasion would probably not be opposed by many in Britain, William made plans to invade.

William landed in England in November 1688 and a number of James’ supporters defected to him, including his daughter Anne and one of his generals. After two months of disorganisation, James fled to France and the court of William’s arch-

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20 Speck, pp.76-7.
enemy Louis. As Louis and William were still at war, it was in Louis’ interest to reinstall James, or at least use him to keep William busy.\footnote{D.W. Hayton, ‘The Williamite Revolution in Ireland, 1688-91’, in Jonathan I. Israel, ed., \textit{The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact}, Cambridge, 1991, pp.195-6; Speck, p.108.} James was dispatched to Ireland, where an Irish Catholic army had been raised for him. Most Irish Protestants supported William, especially in the north where they were holding the city of Derry against Jacobite besiegers.\footnote{Hayton, pp.198-9.} In England, William became King William III, sent an army to Ireland, and agreed to a Declaration of Rights which asserted that kings should not behave in the way that James had.\footnote{John Morrill, ‘The Sensible Revolution’, in Jonathan I. Israel, ed., \textit{The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact}, Cambridge, 1991, pp.89-91.} William then joined his army in Ireland, where it had already relieved the siege of Derry. James and William battled at the River Boyne on 1 July 1690 (under the Julian calendar, then in use in Britain and Ireland), where William received a minor wound and James’ troops were defeated. James fled back to France where he remained for the rest of his life, although most of his army fought on for another fifteen months, eventually surrendering at Limerick in 1691. In order to encourage peace in Ireland,\footnote{William was motivated, as always, by the desire to finish off the British and Irish campaigns and get back to his main task of fighting the French. He was therefore willing to concede generous terms to the Irish Jacobites if it meant that he would not have to spend any more time or money suppressing them. Hayton, pp.207-8} William promised some rights for Irish Catholics, but this was completely unacceptable to the Protestant-dominated Irish parliament, and so William’s promise was broken and new anti-Catholic Penal Laws were passed.\footnote{Hayton, pp.208-11; Padraig Lenihan, ‘Introduction’, in Padraig Lenihan, ed., \textit{Conquest and Resistance: War in Seventeenth Century Ireland}, Boston, 2001, p.20.} Later, the English parliament passed the 1701 Act of Settlement, which barred Catholics from the throne. The supremacy of Protestantism was thus firmly established in both Britain and Ireland.\footnote{Hayton, pp.210-13.} Although many historians believe that the Boyne was not the decisive battle of the war,\footnote{Donal O’Carroll, ‘Weapons and Tactics 1594-1691’, in Padraig Lenihan, ed., \textit{Conquest and Resistance: War in Seventeenth Century Ireland}, Boston, 2001, p.249; Jonathan I. Israel, ‘The Dutch Role in the Glorious Revolution’, in Jonathan I. Israel, ed., \textit{The Anglo-Dutch Moment: Essays on the Glorious Revolution and its World Impact}, Cambridge, 1991, p.158; Lenihan, p.19; Hayton, p.206.} it had strong symbolic value. It was the only battle in which both kings fought, and it offered a contrast between William’s bravery in the face of injury and James’ ‘craven flight’.\footnote{J.G. Simms, ‘Remembering 1690’, \textit{Studies}, 63, 249 (1974), pp.233-4; Jarman, \textit{Material Conflicts}, p.33.} This symbolism allowed
Irish Protestants to forget the reality of William’s fairly uninspiring kingship and remember him as an icon of Protestant victory.\footnote{29 Raymond Gillespie, \textit{Seventeenth Century Ireland: Making Ireland Modern}, Dublin, 2006, p.298.}

\section*{Commemorations to 1940}

William’s victory has been observed continuously from 1691 until the present day, but the nature of the commemorations has changed. Since they remember the victory of a Protestant king over a Catholic one, which resulted in the Protestant domination of Ireland, Williamite commemorations have always been Protestant-dominated affairs. However there has frequently been division within the Irish and Northern Irish Protestant communities over how and even if to celebrate the Battle of the Boyne. In particular, Protestant elites have often been at odds with the working classes, particularly over the often rowdy and sectarian nature of the latter’s celebrations. Catholics, while always on the periphery, have also had a changing relationship with the celebrations, at various times participating in them, watching them, ignoring them, or opposing them with methods ranging from the legalistic to the violent.

For the first two decades after the Boyne, William’s victory was celebrated by all levels of Irish Protestant society, with Dublin elites decorating a giant equestrian statue and parading through the city, and others throughout Ireland attending church services, lighting bonfires and burning effigies.\footnote{30 Simms, p.234; Jacqueline R. Hill, ‘National Festivals, the State and “Protestant Ascendancy” in Ireland, 1790-1829’, \textit{Irish Historical Studies}, 24, 93 (1984), p.35.} William’s birthday was celebrated in similar ways.\footnote{31 T.C. Barnard, ‘The Uses of 23 October 1641 and Irish Protestant Celebrations’, \textit{English Historical Review}, 106, 421 (1991), pp.893-913.} These celebrations subsequently declined, but were revived around the time of the battle’s fiftieth anniversary.\footnote{32 Barnard, pp.913-17; Kelly, pp.12-15; Simms, pp.236-7.} Shortly afterwards, Britain and Ireland adopted the Gregorian calendar, losing eleven days, and the Boyne anniversary was moved from the first to the twelfth of July.\footnote{33 The actual date of the Battle of the Boyne under the Gregorian calendar was the eleventh rather than the twelfth, because between 1690 and the adoption of the calendar in Britain and Ireland the two calendars had diverged by another day. Those who fixed the new date of the celebrations were presumably altering the date of the commemoration rather than trying to retrospectively change the date of the battle. S.J. Connolly, ed., \textit{The Oxford Companion to Irish History}, 2nd edn, Oxford, 2002,} In the late eighteenth century, Williamite
The Twelve to 1968

Celebrations experienced a brief period of liberalism in which the values of liberty were emphasised, and the celebrations used to agitate for a range of reforms including Catholic rights. The unrest of the 1790s, culminating in the 1798 Rising, increased the sectarianism of Williamite celebrations and Irish society in general. The Orange Order was founded in 1795 and proved its usefulness to the authorities by helping to suppress the Rising. Despite this, the Order was itself repeatedly suppressed during the nineteenth century as its divisiveness and blatant sectarian made British government of Ireland more difficult. In the wider British context, success in bringing many popular celebrations under respectable control over the course of the century made rowdy Williamite commemorations seem particularly uncivilized. As the elite and liberal sectors of Irish Protestantism withdrew from the celebrations, those who remained turned them into explicit celebrations of Irish defeat. Williamite celebrations and the Orange Order increasingly came under attack from two sides; from angry Catholic crowds, and from the British government and its deputies in Ireland who were trying to maintain some degree of peace between the two communities.

The general antagonism of the ruling class towards the Order was counteracted to some extent by the publication of Thomas Babington Macaulay’s *History of England*. In his lengthy discussion of the ‘Glorious Revolution’ which deposed James II and brought William III into power, Macaulay portrayed James’ reign as an unrelenting tyranny, and his Irish troops as an undisciplined ‘mob of cowstealers’ who

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35 Hill, p.36; Kelly, p.21; Simms, p.240.
36 Senior, ‘Early Orange Order’, p.38; Boyd, ‘Orange Order’, pp.18-19; Blackstock, pp.403-4; Whelan, pp.21-34.
39 Hill, pp.40-4.
40 ibid., p.45.
never worked till they felt the sting of hunger‘.42 Irish Protestants are given the sole credit for the development of Ireland, and the Siege of Derry is recounted in heroic terms. The History was immensely popular, and probably reflected the standard view of the Revolution as much as it created it. This was especially the case in Northern Ireland; the history has been called ‘a massive public relations coup for the loyalist cause… The History of England gave Ulster Protestants a central place in the myth of the unfolding British constitution’.43 Macaulay’s work had a lasting influence, not least in Northern Ireland, where it was quoted on a regular basis by Orangemen and Paisleyites into the 1990s.44 It also had a lasting influence in academic circles, with W.A. Speck writing that ‘As recently as the tercentenary of the Revolution, many historians assumed that Macaulay’s was the standard version of “1688 and all that”’.45 This was despite historiography which from the 1890s outlined the overwhelmingly negative effects of the Revolution on Irish Catholics.46

Macaulay had argued that although anti-Catholicism was reasonable in the seventeenth century, it was not so in the nineteenth. In general, the nineteenth century saw the fading of anti-Catholicism in England. This resulted in Catholics getting more rights in both Britain and Ireland, and made popular Irish Protestant celebrations seem anachronistic. In 1859 the joint thanksgiving service for Guy Fawkes Day and William’s birthday was removed from the Anglican prayer book, and William and his legacy were seen by many as irrelevant.47 The bicentennial of the revolution was barely celebrated in Britain, and those celebrations which did occur emphasised religious tolerance and expressed distaste for anti-Catholicism.48 In Ireland, by contrast, ‘popery’ was still seen by the majority of Protestants as a very real threat. Like other

43 McBride, pp.59-60.
Irish nationalist campaigns before it, the Catholic-dominated Home Rule movement made the Orange Order highly relevant and increased its membership. Parades became even more fiercely politicized, and in some areas it was difficult for any group to walk en masse without violence breaking out. By the late nineteenth century, Orange marches were attended by a geographically and economically broader cross-section of Protestant society and supplemented by increasingly professional banners and ever more elaborate arches. Large numbers of small rural processions gave way to a smaller number of large, mostly urban ones. The influx of outsiders into some areas, Derry in particular, upset delicate local understandings and tended to increase Catholic resentment towards parades.

Resistance to Home Rule was organised primarily by Orangemen, and Orange lodges played a vital role in organising militia and demonstrations. Neil Jarman argues that the Order and its ceremonies played a crucial role in the construction of an Ulster Protestant identity at this time. This had to be associated with both Britain and Ulster, while being clearly distinct from Gaelic Irishness and to a lesser extent the regional Britishness of England, Wales and Scotland. The iconography and activities of Orangeism were obvious sources to mine, and the embrace of Orangeism by previously aloof sections of Ulster Protestant society was contemporary with the retreat of unionism to Ulster. The events of the Williamite war, particularly the Battle of the Boyne and the Siege of Derry, gained relevance in the eyes of most Protestants. They became a fundamental myth of Protestant Ulster, showing how a people had struggled against the forces of darkness in the past but ultimately triumphed with the help of God, and could do so again. In the new state of Northern Ireland, therefore, the Twelfth became almost an official ritual, a ceremony in a civil religion. As in the concept of civil religion formulated by Bellah, the Twelfth was an occasion on which Northern Irish Protestants came together to reaffirm their shared principles and

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52 Bryan, Orange Parades, pp.46-9.
54 Jackson, Ireland, pp.222, 235-6; McClelland, pp.131-2; Bryan, Orange Parades, p.55.
55 Jarman, Material Conflicts, pp.69-70. See also McBride, p.80.
values. It was also supported by the power of the state: Orange and other Protestant parades were able to go more or less where they wanted while nationalist parades were banned or restricted to Catholic-dominated areas. In 1926 the Twelfth was made a public holiday and the speeches and resolutions of the Twelfth became unofficial state of the nation addresses, composed not only by politicians but also the leaders of the Orange Order. In general, the Order was hugely powerful within the new state; it had official representation on the Ulster Unionist Council, and every Prime Minister and nearly every Minister was an Orangeman.

Wartime and Post-war Twelfths

It is tempting to see the Twelfth purely as a political event: it was a clear demonstration of Protestant political power and leading politicians played an important role. This chapter will demonstrate, however, that although much of the rhetoric of the Twelfth was explicitly political, the events were just as much assertions of religious and ethnic identity as they were statements of political ideology. To be Protestant was to be unionist, loyal and British, to be Catholic was to be nationalist, Irish, and in the eyes of Protestants, disloyal. The Twelfth thus unified Ulster Protestants by presenting their differences as less important than their similarities, but did so by defining them against the Irish Catholic ‘other’. In rhetoric and in use of space, the post-war Twelfths were an assertion of Protestant, unionist and British identities, a way of telling nationalists that these identities were not aberrations to be discarded for Irishness, but things which would always be defended. As in other periods, the Twelfth was a reaffirmation of shared values. The threat of republicanism, particularly as directed against British power, meant that many Ulster Protestants felt the need to participate in or observe this reaffirmation. The Twelfth in this period also illustrates conflicts within unionism and Orangeism and shows the concerns and modes of thinking of the Protestant leadership and to a lesser extent Northern Irish Protestants in general.

57 Donohue, passim.
During the Second World War, there were no parades on the Twelfth, although church services were still held. The decision not to parade was made by the Grand Lodge, primarily for two reasons. The first was that ‘fifth columnists’ might cause problems which would require the attention of the authorities, thus distracting them from their wartime work. The other was that, in the words of Senator Joseph Cunningham, ‘English troops would misunderstand the presence of so many young men – many engaged in national work – in public procession, and it might prejudice Ulster in the minds of these English soldiers’. Cunningham was expressing a concern which was to grow stronger as the war went on: that conscription-exempt Northern Ireland might be seen as not ‘pulling its weight’ in the war. The cancellation of parades was in fact one of the few signs before the bombing of Belfast in 1941 that the region was at war. From 1941 to 1945, for example, the level of strike action in the region was between three and four times higher than the British average. Meanwhile, although the Orange-dominated government decided to work through the Twelfth, it was lethargic and ineffective, spending hours worrying about protecting former Prime Minister Edward Carson’s statue outside the parliament buildings at Stormont, while neglecting to have bomb shelters built in Belfast.

The war required pan-British unity, and although the Twelfth was in part a celebration of that unity, it reinforced perceptions of Northern Ireland as being different from the rest of Britain. For Ulster Protestants, the cancellation of the Twelfth was a potent symbol of Ulster’s wartime sacrifices. The unionist Belfast Telegraph’s coverage of the day emphasised that the men who would normally be marching instead ‘marched for the most part to their work as usual, in order to help win the war while others were doing their bit with the Forces’. The righteousness of the war effort was also asserted in the Telegraph’s equation of the struggle against Hitler with the earlier

60 Brian Barton, The Blitz: Belfast in the War Years, Belfast, 1989, p.47; Bryan, Orange Parades, p.69.
62 Barton, Blitz, pp.42-79.
63 Jackson, Ireland, p.352.
64 Northern Ireland Parliamentary Debates (NIPD), vol. 24 (1941-42), col. 1119.
66 Belfast Telegraph (BT), 12 July 1941, p.2. See also BT, 12 July 1940, p.7; BT, 12 July 1943, p.2.
struggle against European totalitarianism in the form of James II and Louis XIV. As well as the need for solidarity and unity with Great Britain, the Grand Lodge may have realised that the war effort required a sort of truce between Northern Ireland’s two communities. If they did, however, this was not a realisation shared by the Northern Irish government, which regularly allowed sectarianism to interfere with the war effort. In cancelling the Twelfth, the Orange Order symbolically committed itself to the war effort, accepting that the need for at least an appearance of pan-British unity trumped the usual need for Ulster Protestant unity against Irish nationalism. In reality, however, Northern Irish life went on in its usual sectarian way.

The festivities returned to Northern Ireland in 1945. The issue of whether Northern Ireland had ‘pulled its weight’ in the war was discussed by both communities, with each using the Twelfth to advance its opinion. The Telegraph described the marching as ‘better than in former years, due undoubtedly to the presence in the ranks of a large number of men with Home Guard experience’. The Catholic Irish News, however, claimed that the parades ‘gave thousands of Orangemen their first opportunity of marching in military formation since the war in Europe broke out in 1939’. Twelfth marchers were cast by the press of both communities as representatives of Northern Irish Protestantism as a whole: their marching was seen as conveying an important message, positive or negative, about that community’s presence in the wartime army. This shows how commemorations and their participants can be equated with a much wider group of people and, in the Irish News article, for this equation to express existing antagonism.

After the war, the Twelfth settled into what, by Northern Irish standards, was a long period of peace. The rapid growth in the number of marchers and banners, and the regular announcements of new lodges, regalia and Orange halls, all suggest high levels of unionist assertiveness and confidence, helped by television coverage from 1952. Already in 1946 the Belfast parade, with marchers three abreast, took over an

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67 BT, 12 July 1941, p.4.
68 Bardon, pp.562, 577.
69 BT, 12 July 1945, p.2.
70 Irish News (IN), 13 July 1945, p.4.
71 All information in the rest of this section from Belfast Telegraph and Irish News Twelfth of July coverage 1946-59 and Tyrone Constitution coverage 1955-9 unless otherwise stated.
72 Bryan, ‘Ireland’s Jurassic Park’, p.34.
hour and a half to pass any given point, and parades elsewhere were proportionally large.\textsuperscript{73} By the end of the decade the Belfast parade was taking over two hours to pass the \textit{Telegraph} office, and 950 busses and 47 special trains were required to transport Orangemen and their supporters around the region.\textsuperscript{74} Arches were not as common or as varied as in previous decades, but they were still a feature of most loyalist areas, especially outside of Belfast. Other forms of street decoration such as bunting and flags were popular.\textsuperscript{75} These symbolically claimed Protestant dominance over a particular area. All of this shows a community positive about and proud of its own identity, and unafraid to display it. The continued threat of Irish republicanism encouraged Northern Irish Protestants to believe that they still needed to assert pride in their identities, but the ineffectiveness of republicanism at this point, along with Protestant dominance of the Northern Irish state, meant that they felt no need to make concessions to Catholic sensibilities.

Almost as important as the Twelfth itself was ‘Eleventh Night’, on which bonfires would be lit and informal street parties held. In 1949 the \textit{Telegraph} described the events in Portadown:

\begin{quote}
More bonfires than ever were lit in the town, and at Parkmount the huge pile, over which an effigy of [17\textsuperscript{th} century traitor Robert] Lundy had been placed, was set alight by 85-year-old Mr. Thomas McBroom – one of the Borough’s oldest Orangemen.
Open-air dancing and singing held the attention of the crowds till well into the morning and in one district it was nearly five o’clock before the last of the revellers had begun to move homeward.\textsuperscript{76}
\end{quote}

Many people spent the night touring loyalist areas to admire the street decorations and bonfires, and in some areas dancing went on every night between the erection of decorations and the Twelfth. While the Twelfth was in most ways a re-affirmation holiday, to use the terminology developed by Amitai Etzioni, the Eleventh could be seen as a tension management holiday: an occasion for the relaxing of normal standards of behaviour, making people more inclined to adhere to these standards at other times.\textsuperscript{77} Some Orangemen have argued that the rowdier activities, such as effigy-burn-

\textsuperscript{73} BT, 12 July 1946, p.2.
\textsuperscript{74} BT, 12 July 1949, p.5.
\textsuperscript{75} Belinda Loftus, \textit{Mirrors: Orange and Green}, Dundress, 1994, p.43; Jarman, \textit{Material Conflicts}, pp.73-4; Jarman, ‘Orange Arch’, p.12. See also \textit{Belfast Telegraph} coverage.
\textsuperscript{76} BT, 12 July 1949, p.3.
\textsuperscript{77} Etzioni, p.11.
The composition of parades illustrates some of their functions. The marching bands that accompanied lodges played a major role in asserting unionist ‘ownership’ of the streets through which the bands passed. They could be heard from some distance, even by those who had no wish to experience the parades. Catholics could, and sometimes did, stay inside and draw the blinds, but usually could not block out the sound of the bands. Some marching drummers would beat their instruments particularly loudly when passing Catholic churches. The enormous Lambeg drums were particularly significant due to their distinct sound, their uniqueness to unionist events, and their volume. From the 1950s their use in Belfast declined as they tended to drown out other instruments, but Lambegs continued to feature in rural parades. The most popular songs were celebrations of Protestant history and culture such as ‘The Sash My Father Wore’ and ‘Derry’s Walls’. Songs explicitly insulting to Catholics, such as ‘Dolly’s Brae’ and ‘Kick the Pope’ were also played, but so too were non-sectarian tunes and contemporary pop songs. The range of songs played shows that the Twelfth was not simply a display of sectarianism or Protestant supremacy; it was also a performance of Ulster Protestant identity, which existed in the context of local traditions and British pop culture.

The Orange Order is an all-male institution, with an associated but separate Orange-women’s association. This has never held Twelfth parades, but women’s lodges can

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78 Gray, p.17.
80 Santino, p.31.
march in the parades of the male Order if invited. In this period Orangewomen participated in only a minority of Twelfth parades, usually in rural areas. Until 1955 the County Grand Orange Lodge of Belfast banned women from marching in the Belfast parade in any capacity; this was then relaxed to allow female band members. Despite the ban a number of women marched unofficially alongside the parades. A handful of female MPs were the only women to speak from the platforms during this period, with Stormont Minister Dehra Parker being the most frequent. She also led the South Derry parade in 1954. The marginalisation of women in the Twelfth shows the limited ability of many commemorations to truly unify and encompass all members of a community. Although the Twelfth was a symbol of all Ulster Protestants, it was almost always men who were the focal point, with women usually restricted to spectatorship. This shows that while an entire community may genuinely be united by a commemoration, some members will included more explicitly than others. Even with the gender bar, however, the Twelfth included far more and broader public participation, often including female participation, than any of the other commemorations studied in this thesis. To march in Anzac or Remembrance Sunday parades, for example, one usually had to have served in the armed forces; to march on the Twelfth one merely needed to join an Orange lodge or a marching band.

The parades would typically end in a field, where a service would be held, resolutions passed and speeches made by senior Orangemen and politicians who were also members of the Order. The speeches and resolutions of the Twelfth served as state of the nation addresses in which the unionist and Orange leadership would comment on the past year and on contemporary concerns, as well as reaffirming key principles. The resolutions were drafted by the Grand Orange Lodge in the weeks before the Twelfth and distributed to county lodges, which would usually adopt them to read at their meeting. Therefore, although the resolutions tended to be moved and spoken on by senior politicians, they were composed by a mostly different set of leaders. From time to time an extra resolution would be added addressing local matters, but in the

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82 Jess, p.83.
85 BT, 13 July 1954, p.6.
86 For a typical Belfast programme, see The Twelfth, 1966, pp.24-5.
vast majority of cases each demonstration would pass the same resolutions.\(^{87}\) There were usually three of these, composing a predictable pattern. The first expressed loyalty to the monarch, and the other two generally asserted Britishness and pledged allegiance to the principles of Orangeism, Protestantism and often political conservatism. Speeches were usually made in support of the resolutions, although there were exceptions. In 1953 several speakers criticised the second resolution, which claimed that some southern Irish politicians were beginning to respect the Northern constitution, on the grounds that they had not seen any evidence of this.\(^{88}\) While most commemorations are in some sense reaffirmations of shared values and core beliefs, it is rare for this reaffirmation to be as explicit as in the Twelfth resolutions. The resolutions and the requirement for the crowd to confirm them meant that the Twelfth was not simply a metaphorical recommitment to the values of loyal Britishness and Protestantism, but literally involved a mass public affirmation.

From the 1940s to the mid 1960s, the vast majority of Twelfth speeches were uncontroversial and somewhat boring. The upholding of Protestant values was a recurring theme, and clergy regularly advised the crowd to attend church more often and generally behave like good Christians. Although in some areas the events at the field were limited to a religious service and the moving of the resolutions, the majority of Twelfth events featured some kind of political speech. Most of the time these simply opposed communism or republicanism, commented on the issues of the day, called for greater unionist solidarity, or contrasted the living conditions in Northern Ireland with those in the Republic. In the lead-up to elections the Ulster Unionist Party would often be promoted, but other speakers might point out that Orangemen did not have to support any particular party.\(^{89}\) Speakers of all political persuasions tended to dwell on the threat from the Republic, and nearly every year it was reasserted that Northern Protestants wanted no part of a united Ireland. In the 1940s and early 1950s the Catholics of Northern Ireland were rarely mentioned except sometimes in suggestions that they should co-operate more with the Northern Irish state. By 1957, however, the ‘border campaign’ caused a number of Orangemen to comment on the extent of the

\(^{87}\) In 1966 the Omagh, Ballygawley and Benburb demonstrations passed a fourth resolution calling for the completion of a local motorway. The Telegraph called the addition an ‘unusual step’. BT, 12 July 1966, p.8.

\(^{88}\) BT, 13 July 1953, pp.6-7.

\(^{89}\) For formal links between the Order and the Party, see Boyd, ‘Orange Order’, p.21; Walker, History of the Ulster Unionist Party, pp.22, 288.
IRA’s support north of the border, and to say that the Catholic Church and the southern government needed to do much more to condemn and stop the violence, and that northern Catholics needed to speak out more strongly against republican terrorism.\(^90\) Only occasionally were Northern Irish Catholics in general explicitly accused of undermining or wanting to undermine Northern Ireland, and calls to choose Protestant-owned over Catholic businesses were also rare.\(^91\) The breakaway Independent Orange Order’s speeches were similar to those of the main body, although with more emphasis on religion than politics. In short, the main theme expressed by Twelfth speakers was the reaffirmation of the values of their supporters, particularly those things which they saw as being threatened: the union with Britain, Protestantism, and separation from the Republic of Ireland. We can see that the Twelfth in this period was generally less sectarian than is sometimes supposed; blatantly sectarian comments could easily have been made and would probably have been approved of by many, but extensive examination of press reports, both Protestant and Catholic, indicates that such comments were rarely made. Twelfth rhetoric united Ulster Protestants in a way which set them apart from Irish Catholics, but the latter group was usually not overtly attacked in speeches.

The limited role that the past played in the Twelfth during this period is shown by the fact that, in the national day of a people supposedly obsessed by the past, the Battle of the Boyne and William III were rarely mentioned. Nor was any other historic event regularly raised, even though it seems to have been possible for a speaker to get applause simply by mentioning the Siege of Derry.\(^92\) When historical events were mentioned, it was often claimed that there had been few fundamental changes between past and present. For example, objections to the visit of the Queen Mother and Princess Margaret to the Pope in 1959 were justified on the grounds that the Catholic Church had been responsible for the Spanish Inquisition.\(^93\) Where change was spoken of it was often a negative process, frequently involving a decline in faith. Despite Macaulay’s support for Ulster Protestants, their understanding of history was conservative rather than a Macaulayite Whig view which privileged progress.

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\(^{90}\) BT, 12 July 1957, pp.1, 5-7; TC, 19 July 1957, p.3; BT, 12 July 1958, p.6.
\(^{92}\) TC, 14 July 1961, p.7.
\(^{93}\) BT, 13 July 1959, p.6.
The extent to which Catholics of this period objected to the Twelfth is difficult to
gauge. The occasional violent conflict over parading makes it clear that some had
serious objections to the parades travelling through their areas. However, parades
regularly proceeded through other, equally Catholic, areas without violence. There is
considerable evidence from contemporary and from Catholic sources of Catholics
watching parades, milking cows for Protestant neighbours away for the Twelfth,
Catholic and Protestant bands borrowing each others’ instruments, and similar acts of
friendship and neighbourliness.94 A number of Northern Irish Catholics, including
republicans, have confirmed that as children they genuinely enjoyed the Twelfth.95
The celebrations could also deliver significant economic benefits to Catholic business
people.96 During the Troubles, especially during parade disputes, Orangemen and
their supporters frequently recalled this apparent Catholic acceptance of parading, and
used it to argue that the parades were not a problem in the past and therefore Catholic
criticism was disingenuous.97 Apart from the likelihood that most Catholics did not
watch parades, lend instruments or otherwise support the Twelfth, we cannot assume
that apparent Catholic support of or tolerance for the parades indicates genuine
acceptance of them, especially amongst adults. Agnes Caldwell’s research has shown
that although it was fairly common for Catholics to watch Protestant parades, in some
cases this happened because employers or landlords were marching, and it was felt
best to keep on the right side of them.98 Likewise, although few Catholics living in
mixed neighbourhoods or working in mixed workplaces objected to the red, white and
blue decorations that usually went up in July, this did not mean that they did not mind.
Rather, they knew that they would lose their jobs or be harassed if they voiced their
opinions.99 Eric Kaufmann has noted that cross-cultural co-operation only occurred

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94 Ciro de Rosa, ‘Playing Nationalism’, in Anthony D. Buckley, ed., Symbols in Northern Ireland,
Belfast, 1998, pp.108-9; Lucy and McClure, The Twelfth, pp.114-15; IN, 14 July 1956, p.3; TC, 20 July
1956, p.3; BT, 12 July 1971, p.6.
95 Peter Taylor, Behind the Mask: The IRA and Sinn Fein, New York, 1997, p.47; Caldwell, pp.103-4;
Lucy and McClure, The Twelfth, pp.29, 33; Santino, pp.34-5.
96 Sarah Nelson, Ulster’s Uncertain Defenders: Loyalists and the Northern Ireland Conflict, Belfast,
1984, p.69; Santino, p.35; IN, 13 July 1954, p.3.
Ward, Women, Unionism and Loyalism in Northern Ireland: From ‘Tea Makers’ to Political Actors,
Dublin and Portland, 2006, pp.65-7; Lucy and McClure, The Twelfth, p.25; Nelson, p.69; Santino, p.34;
Bryan, p.69; Edwards, pp.340, 342; Moloney and Pollak, pp.80-1, 304; BT, 10 July 1971, p.6.
98 Ibid., pp.111-12, 122.
99 Ibid., pp.105, 109, 115.
when it was not seen as giving any ground. The Protestant band leader who lent a Catholic band a drum might still oppose that band marching through the centre of town, and his Catholic equivalent might feel the same about an Orange band marching through a Catholic neighbourhood. The attitudes of individual Catholics towards the parades probably also differed according to whether they saw Orangemen in terms of specific people who were friends, co-workers and neighbours or in terms of Orange-ism in general and its associations with sectarianism and oppression.

It is also difficult to determine the amount and significance of actual conflict surrounding the Twelfth. There were sometimes violent incidents, including rioting, occasioned by the smaller parades and the general atmosphere of the weeks leading up to the Twelfth. However, the majority of parades and associated events went by without violence and, based on newspaper reports, the Twelfth seems to have been almost completely free of serious physical conflict in the twenty years after World War II. The weeks around the Twelfth saw numerous petty incidents such as the hoisting of Union Jacks on nationalist-associated buildings, things being thrown at parades, and sectarian insults being shouted. Such incidents were not necessarily common: the Irish News’ report on the vandalism of a Catholic church wall in July 1953 noted that this was not normal and that it had ‘caused considerable astonishment amongst the Catholic community of this peaceful village’. In some communities there was an increase in minor harassment, but in many cases the increased tension only took the form of normally friendly neighbours avoiding each other. As the previous paragraph indicates, the Twelfth was divisive in the 1950s, but less so than in later periods.

The relative calm of the marching season in the 1940s and 1950s was underpinned by the legal system. Catholics seem to have sometimes been punished more severely for sectarian behaviour than were Protestants, although there was also at least one
instance of a Protestant who made a sectarian remark being convicted and fined equally with the Catholic who assaulted him in response.\textsuperscript{106} Without an extensive study of court and police records, most of which are still closed, it is impossible to move beyond anecdote, but there was at least some policing discrimination against Catholics.\textsuperscript{107} One area in which there was a clear bias was the law governing parades. Parade disputes initially came under the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act 1922, and from 1951 the Public Order Act. The Special Powers Act enabled the Minister of Home Affairs to do virtually anything he saw as necessary to preserve or restore public order, but this was public order of a particular kind. The vast majority of the nearly 100 parades and meetings banned under the Act were republican or anti-partitionist, and in 1948 the Home Affairs Minister said that the Twelfth of July parades posed no risk to public order because no Republican flag would be carried.\textsuperscript{108}

From 1951, parades were regulated primarily through the Public Order Act, which in practical terms required parade organisers to ask the permission of the police to go ahead. Apart from funerals, the only exceptions were ‘public procession[s]… customarily held along a particular route’.\textsuperscript{109} If the police considered that a non-customary parade might cause a breach of the peace, it could be banned, and there was no legal recourse. The term ‘customarily’ was not defined, but in practice the Act clearly privileged Orange and other Protestant parades, which had historically been allowed to range outside their own areas.\textsuperscript{110} A good example of this was to emerge in Portadown in the 1980s: Orange and Black parades had gone through Catholic areas for decades, despite the wishes of residents, and were therefore traditional, while a Catholic accordion band had never been allowed down a Protestant-dominated road which linked two Catholic areas, and was therefore ‘non-traditional’ and opposed on these grounds by local Protestants.\textsuperscript{111} The Flags and Emblems Act 1954 also reinforced this inequality, because although contrary to popular belief it did not create a right to parade with the Union Jack, nor did it ban the Irish tricolour, it did protect the

\textsuperscript{106} BT, 12 July 1958, p.8. See also BT, 12 July 1960, p.2.
\textsuperscript{108} Donohue, p.1093 ; NIPD, vol. 32 (1948-49), col. 2625.
\textsuperscript{109} Public Order Act (Northern Ireland) 1951, clause 1, 1.
former while allowing for the removal of any flag deemed likely to lead to a breach of the peace. 112

Political interference with unionist marches, whether in the form of bans or re-routing, inevitably raised a major outcry from the Order and its supporters, and at least two Ministers of Home Affairs were removed from the job, and later retired from politics, as a result of their interference with loyalist parades. 113 In the case of W.W.B. Topping, who lost the Home Affairs portfolio after he re-routed a band parade in 1959, the antagonism came not from the Order’s leadership, which passed a resolution supporting his actions, but from hardliners – including Ian Paisley – who argued that loyalists should be able to parade where they liked. 114 The lengths to which unionist politicians would go to support Protestant parades, and the fact that this was still not far enough for some, indicates the importance of parading in Ulster Protestant culture. Orange Order and similar parades symbolised the wider culture and to a certain extent the people themselves, and so restrictions on parading were seen not as means to prevent disorder but as capitulation to the forces of popery and tyranny, a weakening of the Ulster Protestant people.

Protestant and Catholic attitudes towards the issue varied geographically. In some heavily nationalist areas, Orangemen and their supporters were forced to acknowledge that nationalists controlled particular towns. In 1954 Garvagh District Lodge wrote to the Minister of Home Affairs to complain that they were compelled to take a long detour around the heavily republican town of Swatragh. The Minister replied that they should be able to travel through by bus, but it would be impossible for the police to protect them, and they should thus avoid doing anything remotely provocative, such as stopping in the town. 115 In some mixed areas an uneasy truce existed, by which the loyal orders stayed out of Catholic areas in return for Catholics restricting their

114 Kaufmann, p.24.  
115 RUC County Inspector to Minister of Home Affairs, 8 April 1954; Private Secretary to Gilmour, 4 May 1954, HA/32/2/3, PRONI.
parades to those neighbourhoods. In other areas, however, loyalists were determined to assert their supremacy in response to challenges from nationalist majorities. In 1954 a large Twelfth gathering was held in Catholic-dominated Newry in response to what the Irish News called ‘recent anti-Unionist happenings’. The procession took an hour and a half to pass any point on its way to the field and its Lambeg drums were so loud that several bands could not hear themselves and had to stop playing. Local attempts to stop a small march through a Catholic part of Ballyvea led to that area being chosen as the site of the following year’s county Twelfth demonstration, in which about 15,000 Orangemen marched, protected by at least 200 police officers. Sometimes the Twelfth’s reaffirmation of the core values of Protestantism and loyalty simply meant the reading of loyal resolutions and speeches. Often, though, it meant asserting the Protestant and British sovereignty over all of Northern Ireland, including those parts inhabited mostly by Catholics.

Winds of change: 1959-68

In her study of Ulster unionist political thought from 1920 to 1972, Jennifer Todd points out the contradiction between the belief in religious and civil liberties and the concurrent belief that it was necessary to restrict the rights of Catholics in order to preserve peace and the existence of the state. Although there was a distinct strand of liberal or ‘constructive’ unionism within the Unionist Party and to a lesser extent the Orange Order, even the liberals tended to believe that Catholics could not be full members of Northern Irish society, at least until partition ceased to be an issue. Both the liberals and the ‘hardliners’ at the opposite end of the unionist spectrum faced problems caused by the contradiction between the two key beliefs of unionism. Hardline government ministers needed to avoid obvious tyranny and thus were com-

116 County Grand Secretary, Cookstown District LOL to Minister of Home Affairs, 24 November 1950, HA/32/1/663, PRONI; Walker, History of the Ulster Unionist Party, pp.118-19; NIPD, vol. 35 (1951), col. 1571.
117 IN, 13 July 1954, p.3.
118 ibid.; IN, 13 July 1955, p.3.
120 For an attempt to reconcile the two beliefs, see Brian Maginess’ speech on the Public Order Bill. NIPD, vol. 35 (1951), cols 1540-2.
pelled to govern for Catholic as well as Protestant citizens, for example providing funding for Catholic schools. Liberals, on the other hand, could fall between two stools, as O’Neill eventually did, by being too liberal for most Protestants but too conservative for most Catholics. During the 1950s the differences within unionism had been easily contained, but in the 1960s unionists increasingly became polarised at opposite ends of the liberal/hardline spectrum. For a time, the Twelfth continued to act as a unifying force, but by the mid 1960s divisions in unionism could no longer be contained or suppressed. Although both sides attempted to claim the symbolism of the Boyne and seek legitimacy from the past, liberals increasingly came to reject the tradition altogether. In contrast to its role as a banal and relatively benign reaffirmation ceremony in the 1950s, the Twelfth was required during the 1960s to hold together a deeply divided community. By the end of the decade it had lost the ability to do this, and divisions were manifested violently at the Twelfth itself. In addition, Northern Ireland in general was becoming increasing divided along religious lines, resulting in increased nationalist attacks on parading.

From about the late 1950s, there was a slowly growing international trend towards greater liberalism and secularism and against institutionalised discrimination. We will see that this began to impact on Waitangi Day commemorations in New Zealand from 1959, and the Twelfth began to be affected at the same time. From the late 1950s many unionists began to feel that the region needed to move beyond parochialism and sectarianism. The Telegraph began campaigning for unionism to be modernised, and some within the Unionist Party called for it to try to transcend religious boundaries and appeal to Catholics as well as Protestants. These ideas ultimately failed; the liberals lacked proper organisation and there were too many unionists who saw Protestantism, unionism and loyalism as the same things.121 This clash of attitudes had a major impact on the Twelfth in 1959 and 1960. In 1959, Minister of Home Affairs W.W.B. Topping had, with the support of most local Protestants, denied a Protestant marching band permission to parade through Catholic Dungiven in the lead-up to the Twelfth.122 That year’s commemorations saw unprecedented scenes as an attempt was

122 Kaufmann, p.23.
made in Coleraine to pass a resolution in support of the band, and Topping was seriously heckled in Belfast. This was the first skirmish in a campaign for the control and meaning of the Twelfth, and one which the hardliners would ultimately win against those who advocated liberalism and tolerance. The following year – under a new Home Affairs Minister, Brian Faulkner – the band and several lodges were allowed through Dungiven, resulting in minor skirmishing between police and locals, the hospitalisation of one man after being batoned, and further fighting on Eleventh Night. That year the Belfast demonstration was limited to a religious service only, and the tradition of a prominent member of Government making a speech there was broken. Although the politicians returned to the Belfast field the following year, throughout the early to mid 1960s there was much discussion of the appropriateness of the Orange Order’s close connection with the Ulster Unionist Party. From the late 1950s, speakers also frequently spoke on the issue of whether the Orange Order was a political or religious organisation or both. Cracks were showing in the façade of Protestant unity presented at the Twelfth.

As well as the international liberalising trends mentioned earlier, the growth of liberalism within the Order and the Unionist Party was encouraged by two other factors: the petering out of the IRA’s border war due to active opposition from the southern government and loss of support from northern Catholics; and later the Catholic Church’s Second Ecumenical Council, known as Vatican II, which went some way towards liberalising Catholicism and softening its stance towards Protestants. With the dual threat of republicanism and Catholicism apparently receding, Ulster Protestants could afford to introduce a theme of tolerance to Twelfth speeches. In 1959 a speaker had accused the crowd at one Twelfth gathering of hypocrisy over the Dungiven issue because they did not want nationalist parades in non-nationalist areas but wanted their own side to parade down non-unionist streets. In 1961 several politicians called for the principles of civil and religious

123 BT, 12 July 1959, p.1; BT 14 July 1959, p.3.
124 BT, 11 July 1960, p.8; BT, 12 July 1960, p.2; TC, 15 July 1960, p.3.
125 BT, 12 July 1960, p.1; IN, 13 July 1960, p.5.
126 All information in this section from Twelfth coverage in the Belfast Telegraph, Tyrone Constitution and Irish News, 1959 to 1968, unless otherwise indicated.
128 BT, 14 July 1959, p.3.
liberty to be practised as well as preached. They included generally hardline Home Affairs Minister Brian Faulkner, who also spoke against those who ‘are so blinded by prejudice that they think the Order has no political responsibility’. The same year Major Robin H. Reade – who was not a politician – made the astonishing statement, for an Orangeman, that Protestants and Catholics ‘believe basically the same faith’ and that there should be more tolerance and co-operation. Similar sentiments of tolerance were also expressed in following years. In 1965 the Grand Master of Ireland welcomed the work of the Vatican’s Ecumenical Council, saying that it should lead to better understanding between people of different beliefs. The Irish News seemed to reciprocate these sentiments, shifting from its previous hostility towards the Twelfth to a flattering report in 1962 which praised Orange organisation and dress sense. The report also included a quote from a bystander: ‘If the flags, the party tunes and perhaps the bowler hats were eliminated, the “Twelfth” might turn into an annual festival that we could all take part in’. The News’ newfound ability to give Orange-men some credit indicates the new mood of conciliation, but the quote shows its limits. Just as some Protestants were prepared to accept Catholics on the condition that they stopped being nationalists, Catholics were prepared to accept the Twelfth only if it was stripped of its Protestant and unionist associations, making it almost meaningless.

The limits of conciliation can also be seen in the activities of Prime Minister Terence O’Neill, and Protestant reactions to them. During his term O’Neill made numerous gestures of friendship towards the Irish Republic and the Catholic community in the North, including meeting southern politicians, visiting a Catholic school, and being photographed with nuns. Even these acts, heavy with symbolism but light on substance, were opposed by many Protestants, who were also opposed to any conciliation of the new civil rights movement. The anti-O’Neill and anti-civil rights faction included evangelicals who believed that the Catholic Church was an evil empire; the

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129 BT, 12 July 1961, pp.6, 8.
130 ibid., p.8.
131 ibid., p.7.
132 BT, 12 July 1963, p.7; BT, 13 July 1964, p.5.
133 BT, 12 July 1965, p.4.
134 IN, 13 July 1962, p.3.
less religiously committed who distrusted the Republic for political reasons; working-class loyalists who refused to believe that Catholics were any more disadvantaged than the badly housed, irregularly employed and often impoverished Protestant working classes; and middle-class unionists who were insulted by the idea that they or the institutions they supported were sectarian or unfair. O’Neill’s actions, and the support he received from other unionist politicians and senior Orangemen, led to widespread Protestant dissatisfaction with their leadership. Many turned to evangelical preacher Ian Paisley, who already had a long history of opposing the leaders of the Protestant community by accusing them of insufficient loyalty and Protestant rigour. He had split from the Presbyterians in 1951 and left the Orange Order in 1962, accusing both groups of insufficient commitment to the Protestant cause. Even after leaving the Order, and despite his continued attacks on the Orange hierarchy, Paisley continued to be a popular speaker at Orange events. Many of his supporters in the mid to late 1960s seem to have followed him primarily because he was a high profile and unimpeachably loyalist Protestant leader rather than because of his specific beliefs. The actions taken against him by the unionist leadership and the state, particularly his imprisonment in 1966, helped Paisley enormously by allowing him to present himself as an opponent of powerful ‘Lundies’, and a martyr for Protestantism.

Eric Kaufmann argues that there is a major division in Ulster unionism between ‘rebel’ and ‘traditionalist’ modes. The former is populist, militant and has an emphasis on dissent, while the latter has great respect for authority and tradition, and a stronger sense of Britishness. In the 1950s these divisions had had limited practical effect, but in the following decade they became much more obvious. This

139 Walker, History of the Ulster Unionist Party, p.158.
141 Bruce argues that this was a consistent reason for Paisley’s popularity throughout his political career. Bruce, Paisley, pp.254-5.
142 Bruce, God Save Ulster!, pp.85, 87-8. Robert Lundy was the governor of the City of Derry during the siege, and advised its surrender to Jacobite forces. Amongst Ulster Protestants his name is a synonym for a traitor. Kaufmann, p.12.
split can be seen in the increased intolerance of some sectors of unionism for populist celebrations such as Eleventh Night. Although most objections to the massive bonfires traditionally lit on the night were made by Catholics, some middle class Protestants now publically voiced their distaste for them. Most unionist politicians, however, realised the need to support working class loyalism on at least a symbolic level, and several years of parliamentary questions on the issues were met with glib comments that they posed no danger, it was ‘unreasonable’ to expect police to enforce either the nineteenth-century law against them or the Clean Air Act, and that they also burned on the 15th of August for the Catholic celebration of Lady Day.

As this indicates, the coexistence of the different strands of unionism was becoming somewhat uneasy. In 1964, one of the resolutions appeared to offer friendship to Catholics, and was reported by the Telegraph as doing so, but in fact was an assertion that the Order was not bigoted and that it welcomed the opportunity to share ‘the truth of the Holy Word’ with Catholics. Events at Lisburn showed that many in the Order had no interest in sharing anything with Catholics: a Catholic ice-cream vendor was driven from the field amid threats of violence. The festivities surrounding the Twelfth were also affected by the tension. In 1965 several mill workers accepted dismissal rather than remove Union Jacks and bunting from their machines, prompting a walkout by another thirty workers. One of them claimed that in her twenty years at the firm the mill had always been decorated in July, which indicates that management had decided to break with tradition, presumably in a spirit of anti-sectarianism. That spirit was perhaps inspired by O’Neill’s efforts in that direction, which were commented on by numerous speakers at the 1965 Twelfth. That year’s third resolution supported O’Neill but warned that the Order would resist any ‘assault on our Constitutional position’. The equivocal message of the resolution reflected the mixture of opinions within the Order. While O’Neill said that Christianity ‘is nothing if not a code for living together’, Norman Porter spoke of ‘a great and imminent danger in this ever increasing age of good neighbourliness and friendship. It can be overdone,

147 BT, 13 July 1964, p.4.
148 IN, 14 July 1964, p.1.
150 BT, 12 July 1965, p.3.
leading not only to compromise but to betrayal’. Meanwhile, Grand Master George Clark was booed and called a Lundy because he did not support naming a new town after former Unionist Prime Minister James Craig.

Tension increased the following year. Motivated by the pressure of Paisley and his allies, one of the resolutions condemned recent church ecumenism, referring to ‘marked departures within Churches from the Protestant faith’ and calling upon Orangemen to ‘resist any encroachment upon their heritage regardless of the cost or consequence’. The resolution was attacked by numerous Orange chaplains, including one who boycotted the Belfast demonstration because of it. Another resolution praised the government for its economic work, but suggested that they pay similar attention to preserving the constitution. This placed government ministers due to speak at the Twelfth in an awkward position. At Cullybackey it was decided that it would be ‘inappropriate’ for O’Neill to speak on either the political or religious resolution and so he would take the unusual step of speaking without direct reference to the resolutions. The compromise resolution of the previous year had been replaced with one of a more conservative slant, further splitting Ulster Protestants as liberals became increasingly alienated from traditional cultural forms.

Because of the controversy, the 1966 Twelfth had a record turnout in several places, and the divisions within Protestant Northern Ireland were now impossible to ignore. Most speakers were in favour of O’Neill and his policies, and he was cheered and applauded at Cullybackey. However his name provoked boos and heckling at several other locations, and Unionist MP and O’Neill supporter Roy Bradford was jostled and kicked by some of the crowd at Kilkeel. Despite the attacks on Protestant extremists such as Paisley and the loyalist paramilitary Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) by a number of speakers, including the Orange Order’s Grand Master, crowds in several locations shouted in support of Paisley and waved copies of his Protestant Telegraph newspaper. A few speakers also attacked the Unionist and church leadership for

151 BT, 12 July 1965, p.4.
152 ibid., p.8.
153 Moloney and Pollak, p.133,
156 BT, 12 July 1966, p.7.
ignoring what they saw as justified concerns over government policy. The religious resolution was supported whole-heartedly by speakers and crowds at most locations.158 Meanwhile, the normal summer antagonism had intensified. Presumably the petty incidents of the 1950s and early 1960s continued, but there were also more sinister events. The three murders sometimes considered the first of the Troubles occurred in May and June 1966, all committed by loyalists, and there were several non-fatal shootings in the province.159 The murders were widely attributed to Paisley’s direct or indirect influence, and senior members of the Unionist Party became determined to calm their supporters and turn them against the extremists.160

In an apparent attempt to minimise the dissension of the previous year, many of 1967’s Twelfth demonstrations were religious services only and most Cabinet Ministers were absent from the platforms.161 In any other year, the resolutions would have been uncontroversial: the first paid tribute to the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh, the second welcomed brethren to Northern Ireland for an Orange world council meeting, the third affirmed adherence to Protestantism and acknowledged the need for churches to work together but warned against any sacrifice of Protestant tradition or freedom of conscience, and the fourth paid tribute to O’Neill.162 Nevertheless, they caused conflict. Officers of the Fermanagh County Grand Lodge took the highly unusual step of formally omitting the fourth resolution from their meeting, which was subsequently boycotted by one of their key speakers.163 The *Protestant Telegraph* claimed that the resolution was dropped at another two demonstrations.164 At Belfast and Fintona it was read without mention of O’Neill, but in Belfast was still greeted with booing and shouting, making it unclear whether it had actually been passed.165 Anti-O’Neill heckling was also heard at several other demonstrations, and at Coagh the Westminster MP for Mid-Ulster, George Forrest, was pulled off the platform and

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158 BT, 12 July 1966, pp.1-2, 6-9; *Belfast Newsletter* (BN), 13 July 1966, pp.1, 5, 8; IN, 13 July 1966, p.5; TC, 15 July 1966, p.8.
159 NIPD, vol. 64 (1966), cols 652-3; David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney and Chris Thornton, *Lost Lives: The Stories of the Men, Women and Children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland Troubles*, Edinburgh, 1999, pp.25-9. Although all three deaths occurred in June, one was the result of an incident in May.
161 BT, 12 July 1966, p.9.
162 Ibid., p.7.
163 BT, 11 July 1967, p.1; BT, 12 July 1967, p.1
kicked unconscious after threatening jeering spectators with a chair. The next day it was revealed that the Prince Albert Temperance Lodge – possibly including a sitting Stormont MP – had stopped outside Crumlin Road Gaol to convey ‘fraternal greetings’ to convicted sectarian murderer Gusty Spence. Although senior Orange officials condemned the action it was clear that Spence had not been dismissed from the Order.

As Northern Ireland descended towards chaos, community leaders increasingly began to appeal to history in support of their own stances. The 1967 speeches featured an unusually large number of references to the past, particularly from hardliners. Reverend James Johnston asked the crowd at Ballymena whether a succession of Protestant and unionist martyrs and heroes were wrong for standing up for Protestantism and liberty, before answering ‘no, a thousand times, no’. Meanwhile in Tandragee, MP Dinah McNabb argued that the founders of the Orange Order and Apprentice Boys of Derry had won immortality by taking action when their homes and families were threatened. Another MP, Harry West, argued that ‘the type of Unionism which is being advocated to-day would not have been accepted by our forefathers. If this type of diluted Unionism had been common in 1920 then it is doubtful if Northern Ireland would have been born at all’. A few liberals also appealed to history, with one reminding the crowd that William of Orange had hated intolerance. Most, however, argued instead that Ulster Protestants had a dangerous over-attachment to the past. The Telegraph urged readers to ‘Remember 1967’ rather than 1690, MP Jack Maginnis claimed that visitors would believe that ‘we were living in the Stone Age’ because of recent behaviour, while O’Neill argued against ‘dig[ging] up the long-dead bones of the unhappy and violent past’. This abandonment of the past by many liberals shows how divorced liberal unionists had become from the Twelfth and other unionist traditions. Rather than attempting to claim the commemorations as their own, most surrendered them to their opponents.

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169 ibid.
170 ibid., p.9.
171 ibid., p.4.
172 ibid., pp.1, 7.
This abandonment of tradition also reflected a longer-standing pattern of the neglect of history by those whose main aim was to maintain cross-community harmony. The majority of both Protestant and Catholic schools virtually ignored Irish history, and when it was taught, anything remotely controversial was often avoided.\textsuperscript{173} The vacuum would not go unfilled. Republicans and loyalists alike have recalled how they learnt no Irish history at school, but instead from sources including the IRA’s youth wing and historic commemorations such as the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Larne gun-running.\textsuperscript{174} The Orange Order also published numerous booklets on Irish history, one of which sold 40,000 copies on its first printing.\textsuperscript{175} The traditionalist and political dominance of popular history allowed extremists to perpetuate their versions of the past virtually without competition.

The 1968 Twelfth was relatively peaceful. However it was still clear that there were major divisions within unionism and that traditional unionism was under pressure from several directions. Debate continued on ecumenism and there was disagreement over the extent to which Orangemen could be tolerant of Catholicism, and in particular whether they could ever attend events such as Catholic funerals.\textsuperscript{176} Tolerance was a theme of many speeches but so too was defiance. At Ballyclare, the Reverend William Thompson told his audience that they were in a battle between Protestantism and Catholicism.\textsuperscript{177} Imperial Grand Master L.P.S. Orr warned British Prime Minister Harold Wilson that he would interfere with the government of Northern Ireland ‘at his peril. We will resist any such attempt with the last breath in our body’.\textsuperscript{178} Meanwhile the Order was attacked verbally in the Westminster parliament, textually in a \textit{Telegraph} editorial, and physically in the Catholic majority towns of Sixmilecross and Coalisland, where Orange Hall windows were smashed and a Union Jack stolen, and

\begin{itemize}
\item [\textsuperscript{175}] Todd, p.204.
\item [\textsuperscript{176}] BT, 12 July 1968, pp.1, 5; TC, 19 July 1968, p.5.
\item [\textsuperscript{177}] BT, 12 July 1968, p.5.
\item [\textsuperscript{178}] \textit{ibid.}, p.1.
\end{itemize}
Dungiven, where a sit down protest stopped a parade and led to 12 prosecutions, including three for assault on marchers.\textsuperscript{179}

The Twelfth began as an assertion of Protestantism and loyalism against Catholic Irish nationalism. Over time it broadened into a more general cultural ritual, helping to unify the Ulster Protestant community despite denominational and political differences. By the 1950s it had become the de facto national ceremony of Protestant Northern Ireland, and an annual state of the nation address in which core principles of Protestantism, loyalty to the Crown and opposition to Catholicism and republicanism were reaffirmed. When these principles appeared to be challenged from the late 1950s, division and dissension began to appear at the Twelfth. For several years the Orange Order’s leadership was able to contain this division, often by supporting liberal politicians against the opinions of much of the rank and file. By the mid 1960s, however, division within unionism had grown so strong that it seriously impacted on the Twelfth itself. Not only was the ritual unable to unify the community, but divisions were manifested in its form and content.

This chapter has shown the effects which various kinds of conflict can have on historic commemoration. Conflict with an external group, in this case Irish republicans, can have a positive effect, making reaffirmation of the values expressed in the commemoration seem more vital. However, conflict within the commemorating group can have a negative impact as different factions compete for control of the meaning and message of the commemoration. A unified community can commemorate its past behind shared values, while a divided community may damage its own rituals with arguments about what those values mean. In the case of the Twelfth, we can see that this division ultimately resulted in the commemoration losing its ability to unify the entire community, as liberals rejected the idea that the past should be commemorated. Meanwhile, the increased levels of conflict led to a higher frequency of appeals to the past as various factions sought legitimacy. The Twelfth’s descent into verbal and physical violence forcefully illustrates the point that historic commemorations may be much more about contemporary political and social issues than history. It was these

\textsuperscript{179} BT, 13 July 1968, p.3; Harvey to ACC ‘D’, 29 April 1971, HA/32/2/46, PRONI.
issues, not the past, which split Ulster Protestants and turned their central ritual into a forum for conflict.
Waitangi Day is the newest of the historic commemorations examined in this thesis. It did not become an annual public celebration until 1947, although groups in London and Wellington organised events before this, and one-off public events were held at Waitangi in 1934 and 1940. From 1947 to 1967 the Waitangi ceremonies grew from a small naval event into a night of pomp, ceremony and cultural display. In general, the rhetoric of Waitangi Day was dominated by Pakeha, who recommitted themselves and New Zealand to the principles of equality and inter-racial brotherhood, and claimed that race relations were and generally always had been exemplary. Maori were somewhat marginalised but sometimes managed to make their voices heard. They often supported the ideas expressed by Pakeha speakers, but also occasionally contradicted them. Waitangi Day did not become a national public holiday until the mid 1970s, and before this there seems to have been widespread ignorance of the day’s significance. Except in Northland, the day lacked the popular resonance of both the semi-sacred war commemorations in New Zealand and Northern Ireland, and the populist Twelfth of July.

In the context of the other three commemorations examined in this thesis, Waitangi Day is unusual in that it is centred on a particular place. There have always been Waitangi Day events in places other than Waitangi, and commemorations of Treaty signings on other dates in other places, but the events at Waitangi on the sixth of February have generally attracted the most attention. In part, this is because Waitangi Day is the only commemoration in this thesis which remembers an event which happened in the country where that commemoration is held. If the Boyne Valley was in Northern Ireland or Gallipoli in New Zealand then these locations would probably be at the centre of the commemorations. Indeed, affordable air travel has increased Anzac Day focus on Gallipoli. What makes Waitangi Day unusual is not that the highest profile events are at Waitangi, but that events at other locations have generally been low key. This is especially so when Waitangi Day is compared to the local events held on all three of the other anniversaries. That Pakeha and the media focused almost exclusively on Waitangi illustrates that, unlike the other commemorations, Waitangi Day was not an event observed at a grassroots level in most communities across the country, but one which most people had little direct connection with.
More than anything, the early years of Waitangi Day demonstrate the limitations of historic commemorations to capture the imagination of the public and gain their support. Anzac Day was at its strongest in its early decades, but Waitangi Day initially struggled even for the awareness of most New Zealanders, let alone their support. The ideals reaffirmed at Waitangi Day, racial equality and partnership, were in theory ones which virtually all New Zealanders supported; after all, Waitangi Day speakers regularly claimed that New Zealand had exemplary race relations. But while New Zealand did lack much of the blatant racism of some other countries, the reality of New Zealand’s race relations was the marginalisation of Maori, cultural hegemony, and widespread discrimination in housing and employment. Inter-racial brotherhood, it seemed, was an ideal which Pakeha liked to pay lip service to, but little more. It is not surprising, then, that a ceremony which reaffirmed this ideal should fail to gain widespread support. Maori were more aware of the day and often more supportive of it, but because the ancestors of only a few iwi had signed the Treaty at Waitangi on the sixth of February, Waitangi Day was perceived by many as being the property of Northland Maori. To Maori whose forebears had signed at other times and places, or not signed at all, Waitangi Day might have been a useful forum for the expression of Maori views, but it lacked significance in itself. The previous chapter illustrated the idea that a historic commemoration will do well if it symbolises compelling principles. This chapter shows that when a set of values are not strongly believed in or widely held, historic commemorations which reaffirm them will lack public support.

Waitangi Day also strongly suggests that some historic commemorations are primarily about contemporary concerns rather than the past. Most of the Maori politicians who spoke at Waitangi had no ancestral connections to those who had signed the Treaty at Waitangi on the sixth of February, and their local commemorations, if they held them, would probably have been on the anniversary of their forebears’ signings, not those of Nga Puhi. Yet these politicians, and Maori groups such as the Maori Women’s Welfare League, supported the Waitangi ceremonies and agitated for the sixth to be a public holiday. This was because Waitangi Day had become a useful forum and a symbol of things which they wanted to promote, such as equality and respect for Maori culture.
The ceremonies at Waitangi received some support, albeit limited, from Pakeha politicians. These politicians had no particular love for the Treaty, or real political commitment to it, but were obliged to pay it lip service. Part of this obligation arose from the New Zealand mythology of ideal race relations, and so the history of Waitangi Day shows that historic commemorations can be, in part, tools with which groups construct identities for themselves. For much of the twentieth century, Pakeha self-image, especially as reflected in popular historiography, included the idea that Pakeha settlers had been benevolent colonists, and that present day Pakeha lived in perfect equality and brotherhood with Maori. Events such as Waitangi Day reinforced this idea.

Waitangi Day rhetoric can be used to illustrate the competition which often occurs for control of a commemoration’s message. In this period, Waitangi Day was dominated by Pakeha and their messages, but Maori were sometimes able to make their own views heard. While some Maori encouraged the creation of a New Zealand self-image of fairness and equality, perhaps in the hope that it would be self-fulfilling, others attempted to show that the values reaffirmed at Waitangi Day were not upheld elsewhere. Meanwhile, many Pakeha speakers argued that the principles of the Treaty had been amply fulfilled, and so Maori should be content.

The Treaty of Waitangi itself must be one of New Zealand’s most debated topics. A search of the National Library of New Zealand catalogue reveals nearly 600 sources under the subject heading ‘Treaty of Waitangi (1840)’. Given this, and the huge international literature on commemorations, it is surprising to discover how little academic work has been done on commemorations of the Treaty’s signing. The Waitangi Days of 1940 and 1981 have been closely examined, as has media coverage of the event from 1990 to 1995, but very little has been done to investigate the ongoing history of the commemoration. Waitangi Day in general is addressed only in parts of

the final chapter of Claudia Orange’s *The Treaty of Waitangi* and a spectacularly inaccurate chapter in an American book on national commemorations.³ The former source is a reasonable overview of how Waitangi Day developed, but because neither the twentieth century nor the commemorations are Orange’s focus, her coverage of the topic is brief.


### The Treaty and its commemoration before 1940

Regular European contact with Maori began in the 1770s, and from around 1800 large numbers of sailors, traders, adventurers and missionaries, mostly from Britain and Australia, began visiting and settling in New Zealand.⁴ In general, contact was mutually beneficial, with both sides gaining from trade, and Maori taking a strong interest in Christianity, literacy and other cornerstones of British culture. Maori were divided amongst numerous competing and sometimes mutually hostile tribes. The introduction of muskets led to a period of intense inter-tribal warfare from the 1810s to the 1830s, creating an impression amongst Europeans of an anarchic land in which the natives would soon wipe each other out. In addition, neither the divided Maori nor the relatively small number of Europeans had much power to act against European criminals, and British authorities were worried that the French had designs on the country. Britain had formally recognised New Zealand as independent territory, but during the 1830s civil service and political opinion moved towards British annexation as the best option for everyone in New Zealand. The decision to bring New Zealand into the British Empire was hastened by the New Zealand Company, which set out to establish colonies there. Influenced by natives protection groups and missionaries, the British government was insistent that British sovereignty should not be declared without the informed consent of Maori chiefs. It was in this context that naval captain William Hobson was sent to New Zealand to negotiate the transfer of sovereignty. On the fifth of February 1840 Hobson, with the aid of interpreters, explained the nature of the

⁴ All information in this and the following paragraph from Orange unless otherwise stated.
proposed treaty to a large group of Maori chiefs at Waitangi in the Bay of Islands, then the main centre of Maori-European contact. After discussion amongst themselves and with local missionaries, most of the chiefs signed the Treaty of Waitangi the following day, despite some misgivings. Over the next few months copies of the Treaty were taken around the country to be signed by more chiefs, the total eventually reaching around 500 signatories.

Under the English version of the Treaty of Waitangi, Maori chiefs ceded their sovereignty to Queen Victoria but kept ‘exclusive and undisturbed possession’ of their land, forests, fisheries and other properties, while gaining the rights of British subjects. In the Maori translation, however, ‘sovereignty’ was rendered as ‘kawanatanga’ or governorship, and the chiefs were promised continued ‘tino rangatiratanga’, or absolute chieftainship, over their lands and other treasures. It was thus not made clear that the new governor would have real power over the chiefs. What power the Treaty actually had and exactly what Maori thought they were agreeing to has been hotly debated since even before the Treaty was signed. Further confusion arises from the several declarations of sovereignty made by Hobson, not all of which relied on the Treaty.

For the next two decades, New Zealand governors assured Maori audiences that the Treaty would be adhered to, but these promises were generally not kept. In 1860, for example, a large meeting of Maori was called at Kohimarama, where attendees were assured that the Treaty would not be ignored. In reality, however, this is exactly what happened. Pakeha gained control over more of the country, the Maori population declined, that of the settlers exploded, and most land passed out of Maori ownership, so Pakeha now had very little need for the Treaty. The humanitarian principles which had led to its drafting, along with formidable Maori military strength, prevented genocide or large scale blatant land theft. Maori gained four seats in parliament and, on paper at least, had most of the same rights as Pakeha. But the promises of the English version of the Treaty, let alone the Maori version, were not kept. That the Treaty

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existed at all was somewhat problematic to Pakeha, however, and in 1877 Judge James Prendergast declared it to be ‘a simple nullity’: neither a real treaty nor a document which put any obligation on the state.7 The Crown had gained sovereignty because Maori had not been capable of possessing it in the first place. In 1877, the Kingitanga and Tuhoe were both asserting their sovereignty over their lands, and in practical terms doing so with some success. Legal historian Paul McHugh argues that in this context Prendergast’s judgement was an assertion of the absolute sovereignty of the Crown over Maori, rather than simply a comment on the case before him.8

By the early twentieth century practical Crown authority had been generally established and, possibly as a result, there was some evolution in legal understandings of the Treaty. Several judgements concluded that it was a valid treaty of cession, although all maintained that it had no legal power as it had not been given effect by statute.9 Constitutional historians of the period tended to agree with this, although they also argued that Britain could have easily claimed New Zealand by right of discovery and settlement.10 New Zealand law was referred to as standing under the Treaty in a 1902 Privy Council judgement, but this was greeted with outrage by New Zealand judges and lawyers, and subsequently ignored.11 At this time there was a growing Pakeha interest in the Treaty as part of a general interest in early New Zealand history. There were a number of reasons for this, including the fiftieth anniversaries of many settlements, and the passing of the early generation of pioneers.12 Factors which may have been particularly significant for the Treaty included the end of armed Maori resistance to colonisation, and the widespread perception that Maori

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were dying out.\textsuperscript{13} In this context, the Treaty was seen as less of a threat to Pakeha dominance, and so could be celebrated as the device by which New Zealand became part of the British Empire. In the growing body of New Zealand historiography, the Treaty was represented as an act of benevolence towards Maori which brought New Zealand into the British Empire and the rule of law into New Zealand.\textsuperscript{14} It was usually not seen as any kind of binding document, or even as a particularly good idea, but it was a way of illustrating the benevolence of British colonisation and thus portraying New Zealand and Britain in a favourable light. The differences between the various Pakeha understandings of the Treaty can be understood in terms of what different groups were trying to do. Judges and constitutional historians were concerned with New Zealand’s constitutional bases; to include the Treaty as one of these would have (in their eyes) unfortunate implications for the law, even if Maori now lacked the ability to seriously challenge Crown sovereignty. Popular historians were more interested in what the Treaty represented, which for them was the benevolence of British colonisation and the advance of civilisation. Since this could not be symbolised by a false treaty which the British had presented as real, the Treaty of Waitangi must have been not only wise but true. However, this idea did not mean that the Treaty had to be adhered to; it was a nice symbol but little more.

Despite the general Pakeha neglect of the Treaty, from the late nineteenth century many Maori increasingly viewed it as a tool for preventing and reversing loss of land and autonomy.\textsuperscript{15} This was perhaps less because of the Treaty’s actual effectiveness than because other options, primarily disengagement, armed resistance, and armed support for the settlers, had all been tried and found ineffective.\textsuperscript{16} Little was achieved in this period, but most Maori retained their faith in the Treaty; it was one of their few available tools and many, particularly Nga Puhi, felt an obligation to their forebears

\textsuperscript{16} Orange, p.185; Belgrave, pp.66-71.
who had signed. Although there was never a consistent philosophy, the general Maori view of the Treaty in the late nineteenth century seems to have been that although it had given the Crown sovereignty over New Zealand, this was a limited sovereignty which allowed Maori communities to retain their autonomy. Maori saw the Treaty as creating not a monolithic Pakeha-run nation but a partnership in which each race would rule itself under the protection and guidance of the Crown. The various plans for Maori parliaments and councils put forward in the late nineteenth century reflect this view. In the 1920s Maori politician Apirana Ngata, feeling that Maori were over-reliant on the Treaty as a political tool, wrote a commentary which adopted the contemporary Pakeha historical view, presenting the Treaty as the basis of British sovereignty and the government’s right to run the country, and as something which ended a period of anarchy and inter-tribal violence. He also presented the translation as unproblematic, even claiming that the English word for kawanatanga was ‘sovereignty’, even though kawanatanga is a transliteration of ‘governorship’. This explanation was written in Maori to a Maori audience, so was not a case of Ngata telling Pakeha what they wanted to hear. It is possible that he genuinely believed that the Treaty was an unproblematic transfer of sovereignty; in any case he clearly thought it was not worth arguing anything else. Like Pakeha understandings, the various Maori views of the Treaty were primarily utilitarian but, as with Pakeha, also influenced by the desire to present one’s forebears in a positive light. The dominant Maori understanding of the Treaty was based on the idea that it was the most useful tool available to them, and that continued support for it enhanced the mana of those who had signed it. Ngata’s view was also based on practical considerations, namely the idea that Maori would achieve more if they attempted to work for Maori aims.

17 Orange, p.197.
18 Belgrave, pp.72-3; Orange, pp.193, 200.
22 Ngata, p.19.
23 Orange, p.228.
through other channels such as the parliament which, he argued, the Treaty gave the right to govern.

As well as having different understandings of the Treaty, Maori and Pakeha also commemorated it in different ways. Maori did not commemorate the date of the signing, but did return relevance to the place where this had happened. The actual site of the signing had been in Pakeha hands since before 1840, but Tii Point, where Maori had debated the Treaty amongst themselves before signing it, remained Nga Puhi property, and there was a marae there.25 From the 1870s, as the Treaty became more central to Maori political consciousness, Te Tii marae was the site of a series of hui to discuss the Treaty and Maori unity.26 A hall built in 1875, and its 1881 replacement, were named after the Treaty and used for these hui, and a monument to the Treaty was erected.27 These structures and events were not historic commemorations as such, but can be seen as important precursors to Waitangi Day. Most significantly, they reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty and Maori commitment to it. Although dominated by Nga Puhi, they were also an important step in uniting Maori of all tribes behind the Treaty, and served as an attempt to remind Pakeha of the partnership they had entered into. At this stage, Pakeha commemoration of the Treaty was limited to the attendance of a few hundred of them at the 50th anniversary commemoration of its signing. This was held at Russell on the twelfth of February 1890 and was on a small scale compared to the anniversary celebrations of various other founding dates elsewhere in the country; the ‘national anniversary’ was the date of Hobson’s arrival although this was not accepted south of Auckland.28 It is unclear who the Russell event was organised by, but it was a local rather than a national event; the only Maori in attendance were the local Nga Puhi, and the only high ranking Pakeha present were the local Member of the House of Representatives, a captain of the Royal Navy and, for some reason, Sir John Thurston, the Governor of Fiji. About 700 other people,

27 Orange, pp.196-8, 217, 225, 231.
Maori and Pakeha, were also present. As well as reflecting low levels of interest, the small scale of the events may also illustrate the limits of Maori unity at this time.

We have seen that in the early twentieth century there was an increased Pakeha interest in New Zealand history and the Treaty. One of the manifestations of this was New Zealand Day. This was an event founded by the New Zealand Society in London in 1933, and annually held on the eighth of February, the anniversary of the first celebrations of British sovereignty in 1840. The choice of date indicates the Society’s emphasis on links with Britain; New Zealand Day reaffirmed the importance of British sovereignty rather than the means by which New Zealand had acquired it. The event’s rhetoric tended to focus on the British link and the desirability of preferential Empire trade, although the partnership between Maori and Pakeha was occasionally mentioned. Another sign of Pakeha interest in the past was the campaign for state purchase of James Busby’s former residence and its grounds, where the Treaty had been first signed. This campaign was unsuccessful until 1932, when Governor-General Charles Bledisloe the property bought and donated it to the nation. The Waitangi Trust Board was then established, consisting of politicians, representatives of Maori and Pakeha, and descendants of various early settlers and pro-Treaty chiefs. The property was established as a National Reserve, and its dedication in 1934 was the occasion of a huge gathering of Maori, as well as many Pakeha dignitaries.

Maori participants in the dedication had a variety of motives, and the meaning of their presence also varied. As well as taking the opportunity to discuss grievances and other issues with important Pakeha, many Maori wanted to foster a greater degree of pan-tribal co-operation. The most fundamental expression of this commitment to Maori unity was the composition of the gathering, which was the most representative in history. The presence of the Maori King was particularly significant; most tribes did not recognise him as their monarch and the movement had tended to stay away from
gatherings in which his followers were in the minority.\textsuperscript{36} Another important symbol of Maori unity was the laying of the foundation stone for a meeting house, intended to represent all the tribes, in the Treaty grounds. The meeting house, in its position next to the Treaty house, was also intended to be symbolic of the partnership of Maori and Pakeha.\textsuperscript{37} This reflected the Maori view of the Treaty as being a meaningful partnership between Maori and Pakeha as separate peoples, each with their own identity and autonomy. That the foundation stone was laid by the Governor-General was somewhat subversive, although this subtext was not noticed by Pakeha.\textsuperscript{38} In general, the message sent by Maori in the 1934 commemoration was more complex that Pakeha realised. It is difficult to know exactly what was said by Maori at Waitangi, since we now have only the paraphrases and translations which Pakeha chose to reproduce. What we can see is that expressions of loyalty and dissatisfaction were both present; the same haka could (and did) mention both lost land \textit{and} allegiance to the Crown.\textsuperscript{39} The reaffirmations of loyalty reinforced the idea that Maori had been faithful to the Treaty and implied that Pakeha should be too. Even the high turnout was probably more a show of support for Apirana Ngata than one of gratitude to Bledisloe or loyalty to the Crown.\textsuperscript{40} Ngata and his Native Affairs Department were at this time embroiled in a scandal over sloppy accounting practices and possible misappropriation of money. These attacks were seen by many Maori as racially motivated, and only pleas from Ngata himself prevented a boycott of the events.\textsuperscript{41}

Despite these problems, Maori initially seemed positive about the new developments at Waitangi. The involvement of the Maori King was a historic occasion, and Nga Puhi sacrificed some of the land at Te Tii marae to provide road access to the grounds.\textsuperscript{42} This enthusiasm later faded as Maori began to see Waitangi as ‘purely a Pakeha undertaking’, but for the time being the project had Maori support.\textsuperscript{43} For Maori, the 1934 commemorations were useful for several reasons. They could reaffirm their loyalty to the Crown and the Treaty, and in doing so attempt to create a

\textsuperscript{36} Walker, \textit{Tipua}, p.272.
\textsuperscript{37} Balneavis to Langstone, 9 December 1938, ACGO 8333 IA1 2025 62/25 part one, Archives New Zealand, Wellington (ANZW).
\textsuperscript{38} T. Lindsay Buick, \textit{Waitangi: Ninety-four Years After}, New Plymouth, 1934, p.12.
\textsuperscript{39} NZH, 6 February 1934, p.11.
\textsuperscript{40} Belgrave, p.78.
\textsuperscript{41} Walker, \textit{Tipua}, p.271.
\textsuperscript{42} Lovell-Smith, p.78; Walker, \textit{Tipua}, p.272.
\textsuperscript{43} V.H. Reed to Judge Shepherd, 28 May 1947, ACGO 8333 IA1 2026 62/25/1, ANZW.
moral obligation for Pakeha to reward this loyalty. The importance of the Treaty could also be reaffirmed and what Pakeha interest there was could be supported. The commemorations encouraged the co-operation of Maori as a pan-tribal force, united by the Treaty. The event was also a useful forum for the expression of grievances and other issues to Pakeha dignitaries, including the Governor-General and Prime Minister.

The main aim of Pakeha participants in the commemorations seems to have been the reaffirmation of the idea that colonisation was a positive thing. Bledisloe, Prime Minister George Forbes, and Opposition leader Michael Joseph Savage all claimed that the Treaty had been more or less adhered to, and was respected as much by Pakeha as by Maori. There had been some problems, but these were characterised as ‘misunderstandings’, and according to Bledisloe, the passage of time had soothed all wounds. The critical and subversive subtexts of much of what Maori were saying and doing went unnoticed, with most Pakeha seeing the huge turnout of Maori as evidence of friendship between the races and Maori contentment with the outcome of colonisation. T. Lindsay Buick later wrote that the time and effort Maori put into the celebrations were ‘surely not the contribution of an ill-used, disgruntled or rebellious people.’ Both of Bledisloe’s speeches emphasised Maori loyalty to the Crown. Explicit messages of Maori dissatisfaction were simply dismissed; when Taite Te Tomo requested that the government give Ngata all the money he required, he was described by Buick as succumbing ‘to his propensity for humour’. For Pakeha, the event was a chance to reaffirm the idea of New Zealanders as being a united people with no serious problems of inequality or injustice. Participants also recommitted themselves to the British Empire, as celebration of the Treaty was in part an assertion that British imperialism was benevolent and beneficial. Many of these themes would be reaffirmed in 1940, for the centennial of the Treaty’s signing.

44 NZH, 6 February 1934, pp.11, 13.
46 NZH, 6 February 1934, p11; NZH, 7 February 1934, p13.
47 Buick, Waitangi, p.22.
49 Buick, Waitangi, p.85.
1940: The Centennial

The outbreak of World War II gave additional importance to the centennial celebrations of the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. We have already seen that commemorations which did not help the war effort and its ideals might be cancelled, as was the case with the Twelfth of July in Northern Ireland. We will also see that those, such as Anzac Day, which promoted ideals helpful to the war effort could increase in popularity. The Waitangi centennial’s themes of unity and inter-racial brotherhood would probably have been stressed even if the war had not occurred, but the war gave them an extra urgency; they were required for an effective response to the war and threatened by the racist ideology of Nazism. However, attempts to unify New Zealanders through commemoration were less successful in 1940 than in 1934.

The Treaty centennial was part of a much wider programme of centennial commemorations, which occurred across the country throughout 1940. In this wider context the irrelevance of the Treaty, and indeed of Maori, to most Pakeha can be seen. The centrepiece of the celebrations was an exhibition in Wellington which only had a Maori aspect added at the last minute. The absence of a book on Maori from the Centennial series of histories was not entirely the fault of the organisers, but the absence of the Treaty from a history of New Zealand government and constitution speaks volumes. However, the Waitangi event was a major part of the celebrations. Considerable sums were donated towards the building of canoes and meeting houses, and the meeting house at Waitangi was substantially funded by the state. As early as 1936, government ministers saw the commemorations at Waitangi as an important part of the centenary. On the sixth of February 1940 about 10,000 people were in attendance, including Governor-General George Galway, representatives of the

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52 Ngata was supposed to write this, but was too busy, and no other suitable author was found. Rachel Barrowman, ‘History and Romance: The Making of the Centennial Historical Surveys’, in William Renwick, ed., Creating a National Spirit: Celebrating New Zealand’s Centennial, Wellington, 2004, pp.173-4.
53 Leicester Webb, Government in New Zealand, Wellington, 1940.
54 Heenan to Minister of Internal Affairs, 8 February 1939, and Under Secretary to Minister of Internal Affairs, 26 May 1939, ACGO 8333 IA1 2026 62/25/1, ANZW.
55 Parry to Reed, 10 July 1936, ACGO 8333 IA1 2025 62/25 part one, ANZW.
United Kingdom and Australia, numerous politicians, and foreign consuls, as well as many Maori leaders. Many more people listened to the nationally broadcast radio coverage. The scale of the event can be seen in the amount of food required for the Maori visitors’ camp alone: this included two tons of sugar, 20 pounds of pepper, and 28 pounds of candied lemon peel.

Maori responses to the event were mixed. The Maori King and his followers boycotted the ceremonies, essentially because of the government’s refusal to acknowledge his status as more than just a respected citizen. While the Kingitanga drew attention to outstanding grievances by staying away, others achieved this by participating. Like many Maori, Nga Puhi were concerned by government plans to take ‘surplus’ Maori land but, as the tangata whenua of Waitangi and the descendants of the original signatories, a boycott was unlikely. Instead they made their protest by wearing red blankets like those given to Maori at the Treaty signing. To ensure that Pakeha did not miss the significance of this, Ngata drew attention to it in one of his speeches. This statement was probably motivated by awareness that Pakeha might not understand subtle symbolism. Ngata’s own symbolism was much more obvious: the Maori Battalion had a prominent role in the celebrations, acting as the Governor-General’s honour guard. Several Maori speakers pointed out that the Battalion amply demonstrated Maori loyalty to the Crown; that Pakeha needed to do something in return was never explicitly voiced but was a clear implication. The speeches of the four Maori Members of Parliament voiced grievances more explicitly. Paraire Paikea, Eruera Tirikatene and Haami Ratana’s sentiments were similar to those expressed in 1934: Maori are loyal to the Crown and the Treaty, and the Maori Battalion proves this, but there are still some outstanding problems. Ngata’s speech, which was longer than those of the other three combined, was much more forceful.

‘Where are we today?’ he asked. ‘In retrospect, what did the Maori see? Lands gone,
the powers of the chief crumbled in the dust, Maori culture scattered – broken. What remains at the end of the one hundred years after the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Your Excellency? What remains of all the fine things then?\textsuperscript{65} Ngata tempered his strong words with the claim that no native race had been so well treated by a European people as Maori, but the bulk of the speech was not so generous.\textsuperscript{66}

In contrast to this, Pakeha speeches at Waitangi expressed the patriotic and rosy view of history which had emerged earlier in the century. Historic injustices was acknowledged by both Galway and Deputy Prime Minister Peter Fraser, but these acknowledgements were overpowered by exhortations to forget the past, and claims that problems had been or soon would be remedied. Both men minimised the extent to which injustices had occurred, presenting them as ‘mistakes’ or unfortunately inevitable.\textsuperscript{67} Acting Native Affairs Minister Frank Langstone described Crown representatives of the colonial period as ‘high-minded, thoughtful, earnest men who [had] made the welfare of the Maori and the safeguarding of native rights their first care.’\textsuperscript{68} Rather than seeing the Maori Battalion as creating an obligation to Maori, all three speakers saw it primarily as a shining example of inter-racial brotherhood.\textsuperscript{69} In their editorials on the celebration, the print media also expressed this complacent view of history. Heavily influenced by Buick, the \textit{Otago Daily Times} editorialised that apart from Waikato and Ngai Tahu, who had some legitimate complaints, Maori had every reason to be grateful for Pakeha actions since 1840.\textsuperscript{70} The \textit{New Zealand Herald} acknowledged that Maori and Pakeha had fought against each other and that some grievances remained outstanding, but claimed that New Zealand’s record was still ‘remarkably good’.\textsuperscript{71} In response to Ngata’s speech, the \textit{Herald} recognised that he had stated numerous grievances, but chose to emphasise his few compliments to British colonialism. The reader comes away with the impression that Ngata had said that colonisation had been mostly good but with a few mistakes, rather than his actual message, which was the opposite.\textsuperscript{72}

\textsuperscript{65} NZCN, 1 April 1940, p.26.  
\textsuperscript{66} ibid., pp.26-7.  
\textsuperscript{67} ibid., pp.29, 30. Prime Minister Michael Joseph Savage was too ill to attend.  
\textsuperscript{68} ibid., p.32.  
\textsuperscript{69} ibid., pp.29, 30, 32.  
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Otago Daily Times} (ODT), 6 February 1940, p.6.  
\textsuperscript{71} NZH, 6 February 1940, p.6.  
\textsuperscript{72} NZH, 7 February 1940, p.10. The \textit{Evening Post}’s report on the speech had a similar effect. EP, 7 February 1940, p.13.
Another way in which the complacency of the period was expressed was in the re-enactment of the Treaty signing. This was very faithful to its source material, and included missionary William Colenso’s concern that some of the chiefs ‘had no idea whatever as to the purport of the Treaty’. He was dismissed by Hobson, who said, in the re-enactment as in history, that Maori would have to trust the missionaries. To the twenty-first century eye, this clearly calls the validity of the Treaty, and therefore the transfer of sovereignty, into question: if Maori did not understand what they were signing over, what right did the Crown have to take it? But even if the re-enactment was scripted by a pro-Maori subversive, it was obviously not seen as problematic in any way. Maori incomprehension of the Treaty was so unimportant that it could be displayed to a crowd of thousands without any official concern. Pakeha attitudes also manifested themselves in the form of the celebrations, which tended to ignore Maori protocol. The day began with a displacement of the tangata whenua, when two waka were greeted at Waitangi by a beachful of Pakeha in period costume. And while Maori tradition and common sense would dictate that the welcome be made upon the arrival of dignitaries, this happened later, after the re-enactment.

The culture clashes and contradictions at Waitangi came about through the meeting of thousands of Maori with thousands of Pakeha, and the need for speakers from each group to at least attempt to respect the other’s sensibilities. A simultaneous event in Wellington was more straight-forward. It was held by the Founders Society, an organisation sprung from the growing Pakeha interest in history and made up of descendants of early settlers. Since every important Maori was either at Waitangi or boycotting the commemorations, speakers could fully express a patriotic and imperialist view of history. Society President Cheviot Bell claimed that the British people ‘have always won in the past… [because] it is our invariable practice to fight for what is right’. While perhaps typical of World War II patriotism, the statement would have taken on an entirely different meaning if preceded by a speech such as Ngata’s at

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73 The main source was missionary William Colenso’s account of the signing. *Centennial of the Treaty of Waitangi, 6 February 1940: Souvenir Programme*, np, 1940, pp.7, 23.
74 ibid., p.23.
75 NZH, 7 February 1940, p.13; Centennial Programme, p.3.
77 *Dominion*, 7 February 1940, p.6.
Waitangi. In Wellington, however, the might of the British Empire could be praised without qualification.

The Waitangi Centennial of 1940 shows that the struggle for control which underlies many commemorations may have an impact on their content even if alternative views are marginalised or silenced. Maori and Pakeha each sought to use the celebrations to send their own messages about the state of New Zealand race relations. The difficulty that Maori had in doing this is illustrated by the reporting of Ngata’s speech; it could be argued that the Kingitanga’s strategy of disengagement was more effective. Although challenged by Maori, the Pakeha message that New Zealand was a land of harmony and brotherhood dominated the centennial, especially as it was reported in the newspapers. However the contrast between events at Waitangi and in Wellington shows that the presence of Maori did have a tempering effect. At Waitangi, Pakeha speakers were forced to acknowledge problems, and although they tended to gloss over these, the admission was still a contrast to the British jingoism of the Founders Society.

Annual Waitangi Days, 1947-1959

Annual Waitangi Days began in 1947, and arose from the Waitangi Trust Board’s inability to afford the installation of a new flagstaff. Hearing of this, and with the approval of the Board, Captain C.R.V. Pugh, Naval Officer in Charge at Auckland, persuaded the Navy to erect the flagpole and establish a ceremony celebrating their role in New Zealand’s founding. The 1947 ceremony became the basis of several decades of Waitangi Day celebrations, although new additions were made on a regular basis. With a naval ship in the Bay of Islands, a Navy guard of honour marched through the Treaty grounds to the flagstaff, led by a marine band. Officers representing the Navy, Army and Air Force assembled in front of the saluting base, whereupon Pugh and Commodore G.H. Faulkner, Chief of the Naval Staff, arrived by car. The general salute was given by the guard of honour, which Faulkner then inspected. At 11 o’ clock, supposedly the time of the signing of the Treaty, ‘God Save

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78 Reed, Gift of Waitangi, pp.49-50.
79 NZH, 7 February 1947, p.9; Reed, Gift of Waitangi, pp.50-2.
the King’ was played and the Union Jack was raised while the entire gathering stood to attention. The event was concluded with a speech by Faulkner, and witnessed by about 300 people, of both races. Although it shared some features with the 1934 and 1940 celebrations, in many ways it had more in common with the 1940s commemorations in London and Wellington. As was the case in those cities, Maori did not participate in the first annual Waitangi Day, which was subsequently described by the Secretary of the Te Akarana Maori Association as akin to ‘the Shakespearean play “Hamlet”, but minus Hamlet’. The *Herald* reported that the absence was ‘the subject of comment by many of the visitors’. The Navy justified the absence of Maori participants by saying that the ceremony was intended ‘to commemorate the services to New Zealand of its first naval Governor, and not the Treaty of Waitangi in particular’. The 1947 event was not intended to be a national day or even to relate to New Zealand in general; it was simply a naval commemoration of an important officer. The emphases were on reaffirming New Zealand’s connection to Britain and celebrating the Navy’s involvement in linking the two countries. It would have given the sailors and officers, as well as non-naval observers, a sense of the Navy’s past and traditions, and created the impression of an organisation which played an important role in the world.

Although the event was about the Navy rather than the Treaty, it was widely considered to be a commemoration of the latter and as such of wider significance to New Zealand. In the Waitangi Trust Board and the Department of Internal Affairs there was some concern that Maori were showing little interest in the meeting house and the Treaty grounds in general, apparently regarding them as Pakeha affairs. Possibly as a way to counteract this, Maori were included in Waitangi commemorations from 1948, and the cast of speakers and participants grew throughout the 1940s and 1950s, including the Governor-General from 1952 and the Prime Minister on a semi-regular basis from 1958. In 1954 the responsibility for the day was transferred from the Navy

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80 NZH, 7 February 1947, p.9.
81 Memo to Under Secretary of Internal Affairs, 28 February 1947, ACGO 8333 IA1 3001 158/67, ANZW.
82 NZH, 7 February 1947, p.9.
83 ibid.
84 Reed to Shepherd, 28 May 1947 and Heenan to Under-Sec, Native Department, 5 November 1947, ACGO 8333 IA1 2026 62/25/1, ANZW.
to the Waitangi Trust Board. The function of Waitangi Day, as reflected in the official speeches, shifted from celebration of the Navy’s role in early New Zealand to the reaffirmation of more general sentiments. From the 1950s Pakeha speeches at Waitangi tended to follow the patterns set in 1934 and 1940, emphasising Maori loyalty; friendship and equality between Maori and Pakeha; and the symbolic importance of the Treaty.

Despite the new ceremony, Pakeha indifference to the Treaty continued to be evident. The Waitangi Trust was underfunded to the point where it was forced to turn the Treaty grounds into a sheep farm. In 1952, the year that the Governor-General made his first appearance at the annual Waitangi Day celebrations, the native bush which had been regenerating behind the Treaty House was burnt off, and sheep grazed on the lawn, necessitating a wire net around the memorials. Despite this, increasing numbers of people turned out to watch the ceremonies, with 5000 attending in 1958. Pakeha attitudes are partially revealed by the fact that their leaders regarded racial equality and Maori loyalty as important enough to spend a few hours making a public commitment to them through the ceremonies. The treatment of the Waitangi property, however, shows that this commitment was limited; Pakeha did not regard Waitangi or the Treaty as much more than inspiring but somewhat irrelevant symbols. Maori had other views, but exactly how these were expressed at Waitangi Day in this period is difficult to find out. There was only ever one Maori speaker per year, generally a Trust Board member ‘representing the Maori race’. Their speeches were not always reported, and never substantially reproduced. The fragments that were reported generally expressed loyalty to the Crown, and occasionally a request for Waitangi Day to be made a national holiday. It is possible that Maori speakers were critical but not reported. We have also seen that expressions of loyalty might have subversive undertones.

85 A. Griffiths to Executive Officer, Council for Maori and South Pacific Arts, 10 August 1981, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 2, ANZW.
86 All information on the form and rhetoric of Waitangi Days is from general New Zealand Herald coverage unless otherwise stated.
88 Reed, Gift of Waitangi, pp.126-9.
89 NZH, 7 February 1958, p.8.
A national day will ideally work to unify a country despite internal differences. Early Waitangi Days, and the 1934 and 1940 commemorations, saw some efforts made in this direction, as Pakeha speakers argued that the Treaty made all New Zealanders equal citizens. This rhetoric reaffirmed the principle of individual equality, in contrast to the Maori ideal of the equality and distinctiveness of the two main cultures. However, from the late 1950s, issues of race relations became more prominent both in New Zealand and internationally. In New Zealand this initially manifested itself in the Hunn report and protests against the exclusion of Maori from the All Black tour of South Africa. Waitangi Day could have been used as a forum for the frank discussion of this issue, but this would have gone against one of the fundamental purposes of national ritual, which is to unify the country behind shared beliefs and values. Since Maori and Pakeha tended to have different views about actual levels of discrimination in New Zealand, honest discussion of racism would not have achieved this. Instead some Waitangi Day speakers chose to use the day to restate their and the country’s commitment to racial equality, and to promote the belief that New Zealand had exemplary race relations.

The day could also be used to reaffirm this belief in the face of contrary evidence, thus working to prevent the disunity which could result if it was widely believed that racism was common in New Zealand. Waitangi Day 1959 is a good example of this. A week before, Dr. Harry Bennett had been refused service in an Auckland bar because he was Maori. This caused a widespread scandal, especially when media reports revealed that such discrimination was fairly common. The story was still a hot topic on the seventh of February, and in the Herald reports on discrimination shared the page with Waitangi Day coverage. The latter revealed that racial equality was a major theme of that year’s speeches. Prime Minister Walter Nash, for example, stated that ‘We are going to keep Waitangi in being, showing the world that we New Zealanders, comprising two races, can live together in amity.’ In 1953 a similar

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91 NZH, 7 February 1953, p.10; NZH, 7 February 1959, p.16.
93 NZH, 7 February 1959, p.16.
94 Racial equality was a common theme in Nash’s speeches, and appears in his speech notes, dated the day before the Bennett story broke. However virtually every speaker at Waitangi Day 1959 mentioned equality, and the Herald’s headline further emphasised the theme. Notes for Prime Minister, 3 February
assertion, made by Maori Affairs Minister Ernest Corbett, had apparently been made as a simple statement of fact. In 1959 it was clearly defensive. Maori representative James Henare did his best to reaffirm Maori loyalty and the idea of New Zealand’s exemplary race relations, saying that ‘the Maoris will remain loyal to the Crown and we will live in equality and unity in the country evermore.’ Although the need to recommit to racial equality was growing, it was becoming harder to convincingly claim that true equality had been achieved. Maori and Pakeha Waitangi speakers alike worked to keep the day conveying the idea that New Zealand had good race relations, even if it also had some minor problems.

We can see that in 1959 Waitangi Day and the Twelfth had both reached a similar rhetorical point, although via very different paths. In both cases discrimination and bigotry was spoken against, but where Twelfth speakers had come to this from a culture which acknowledged discrimination but saw it as necessary and right, Waitangi Day speakers had always been against discrimination, at least in principle, but were only now beginning to admit that it existed in their country. In both cases, the historic commemoration was used to argue that discrimination was both bad for the nation and a violation of the principles which the commemoration reaffirmed. New Zealanders were urged to live up to their professed ideals while Northern Irish Protestants were asked to reconsider what their ideals truly meant.

One of the few complaints made by Maori speakers at Waitangi in the 1950s was that the day was not a holiday. The suggestion that it should be was first made at Waitangi Day 1953 by Henare and repeated by Riri Maihi Kawiti at Waitangi Day 1955, and by Maori Labour MPs Eruera Tirikatene and Tiaki Omana in parliament in 1957. Consequently, Labour’s 1957 election manifesto pledged that a holiday would be created, and recently elected Prime Minister Walter Nash repeated the promise at Waitangi Day 1958. New Zealand embassies and high commissions were instructed

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1959, AECB 18701 TO3 12 INF 18/17/9, part one, ANZW; Keith Sinclair, Walter Nash, Auckland, 1976, p.349.
95 NZH, 7 February 1953, p.10.
96 NZH, 7 February 1959, p.16.
to celebrate Waitangi Day instead of Dominion Day.\textsuperscript{99} In New Zealand, a council and a Committee of Caucus were set up to investigate the holiday idea, but by June 1958 caucus had decided that Waitangi Day would not become an additional paid holiday, although it might replace the provincial anniversary holidays.\textsuperscript{100} The holiday was still desired by many Maori, and the National Party saw the Waitangi Day pledge as one of many promises Labour had failed to keep. After much prodding inside Parliament by their own Maori MPs and the National opposition, and outside it by the Maori Women’s Welfare League, Labour introduced a Waitangi Day Bill on 25 August, just three months before the next election.\textsuperscript{101} This did very little; it only provided for regions to replace their provincial anniversary holiday with a Waitangi Day holiday, which Northland did in 1963.\textsuperscript{102} However some Maori were hopeful that this would be a first step towards the ratification of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{103}

Annual commemorations at Waitangi had an unpromising beginning as a naval ceremony which reaffirmed little more than New Zealand’s British connections and the historical importance of the navy. Despite this, the general public assigned their own meaning to the ceremony, relating it to the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and questioning the absence of Maori. As a result, subsequent commemorations involved a wider range of people and reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty. This reaffirmation was contradicted by general and political indifference towards the Treaty grounds and the possibility of a public holiday, but does indicate some interest in the Treaty, particularly amongst Maori. Maori and Pakeha shared a view of the Treaty as symbolising friendship, partnership and equality between the two races, although they had different ideas about what these things meant. Waitangi Day thus became a recommitment to racial equality, especially once such issues became more generally prominent. The day was an attempt to unify Maori and Pakeha in the face of evidence that the two were not receiving equal treatment, and an assertion that New Zealanders

\textsuperscript{99} NZH, 7 February 1959, p.16.
\textsuperscript{100} Proposed ‘N.Z. Day’ Council: Minutes of Exploratory Meeting, 23 February 1958, ACIH 16036 MAW2459 163 19/1/50 part 1, ANZW; Secretary of Cabinet to Prime Minister, 10 June 1958, AAFD 811 W3738 1336 CAB 262/1/2 part 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{102} Waitangi Day Act 1960; Waitangi Day Amendment Act 1963.
had exemplary race relations and treated each other with fairness and dignity. The day was not generally observed anywhere other than at Waitangi and, from 1959, New Zealand embassies, indicating that few people felt a desire to publicly reaffirm their commitment to equality, partnership or the Treaty. Ironically, Waitangi Day itself may have contributed to this by sending the message that racism did not exist in New Zealand; if the principle of racial equality was not under threat, then there was no particular need for ordinary citizens to commit themselves to it. As will also be shown in the discussion of Anzac Day, commemorations may fail to resonate not so much because people do not believe in the ideals which they reaffirm, but because these ideals are not seen as being under threat.

Further growth, 1960-67

By 1960 Waitangi Day had become a significant event, formally acknowledged in legislation and usually attended by both the Governor-General and the Prime Minister. During the 1960s the day grew further, and in 1963 was attended by the Queen. The events presented an image of New Zealand as a harmonious land in which Maori and Pakeha were friends and equals. Behind the scenes, however, there was considerable competition as to whether Maori or Pakeha would determine the form and content of the ceremonies. The situation was further complicated by the Maori desire to express concerns and put forward their own understandings of the Treaty without embarrassing respected dignitaries such as the Queen with public dissent, and by Pakeha uncertainty about the nature and extent of the Treaty’s importance. Waitangi Day continued to reaffirm the principle of racial equality, but in the 1960s there was greater awareness that this had not been fully achieved in New Zealand.

By this stage the numbers attending the Waitangi commemoration each year were such that it was transformed from a strictly ceremonial occasion into a night of public entertainment. The celebrations were shifted to the evening and now included the floodlighting of naval ships in the bay and a concert featuring a Scottish pipe band and several groups (including one of Pakeha women and one of Maori sailors from the Navy) performing haka and action songs. The concert culminated with singing of ‘Now is the Hour’, first in Maori and then in English. The day was taking on more
aspects of a national day rather than simply a historic commemoration. Maori and Pakeha took part in each other’s cultural activities, and non-Maori minority cultures began to be represented in the form of the pipe band. Despite a good turnout, including about a thousand ex-servicemen who were attending a Maori Battalion reunion at Te Tii, the new-look Waitangi Day was not a complete success. The *Herald* reported:

A rival Maori concert party competed with the official entertainers at Waitangi on Saturday night.

The 92-year-old chief of the Ngapuhi tribe, Mr Rawene Anihana, could at times scarcely be heard as he chanted an ancient Maori greeting before a crowd of nearly 7000. After a sortie by some officials the rival concert – Maori songs and rock-'n'-roll – ceased.

The loudspeaker system broke down and the crowd upset the arrangements for floodlighting the Treaty House by surging around the entire lawn. But the concert was still a success, if a highly informal one.104

The format remained the same for the next two years, and the ceremonies continued to be plagued by poor organisation.105 By 1962 this had become the subject of wide criticism in official circles. There were Pakeha as well as Maori critics who felt that the concert was an inappropriate event to commemorate the birth of a nation. That the Maori cultural performances were usually done by primary school children was also felt to be inappropriate, and it was suggested that adult groups be invited to Waitangi.106

Both the new ceremony and the criticism of it indicates the growing importance of Waitangi Day. From a simple naval ceremony, it had grown into an important occasion, the organisation of which was of national significance. However the message sent by the entertaining and informal celebrations was that the event was not an especially serious one, and that the principles being reaffirmed did not warrant the solemnity of events such as Anzac Day. The position of Maori, heavily involved in the ceremonies yet unable to fully determine even the form of the Maori cultural elements, indicates that in the 1960s Maori were visible but usually lacking in power. The growth of Waitangi Day also reflected a growing awareness of the Treaty and

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104 NZH, 8 February 1960, p.10.
106 McDowell, Gerard, and ‘Waitangi National Trust Board: Notes and Minutes of Meeting held on 1st March 1962 at the Office of the Commodore at Auckland Naval Base’, ACIH 16036 MAW2459 163 19/1/50 part 1, ANZW.
Increased interest led to better attendance at Waitangi, but also made some feel that the Treaty was not being commemorated properly.

Historical awareness was also shown by two other innovations of the early 1960s. The first was the exhibition of the Treaty at the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington, where it ‘attracted a constant stream of visitors’ for at least a week after its unveiling on Waitangi Day 1961. The second was the introduction of official Waitangi Day messages, from 1964. This idea seems to have originated with the Waitangi Trust Board, but was enthusiastically received by the Education Minister. Each year a prominent New Zealander – usually also a Trust member – composed a Waitangi Day message to be read in schools. The first was written by Governor-General Bernard Fergusson, and was typical of Pakeha Waitangi rhetoric, urging children of each race to learn from and about each other and to follow the spirit of Waitangi. Subsequent Pakeha Waitangi messages also tended to be similar to contemporary Pakeha speeches at Waitangi, although without the acknowledgment of problems. For an audience of children, simple reaffirmation of the values of equality and co-operation were seen as more appropriate than raising awareness of inequality.

At Waitangi itself, rhetoric was evolving in response to Maori urbanisation and the problems that this both caused and exposed. Much of this was documented in the Hunn report on Maori affairs, which promoted the integration of Maori into Pakeha society. The report was highly influential, not least on Maori Affairs Minister Ralph Hanan. Based heavily on the report’s findings and principles, Hanan’s 1961 Waitangi Day speech appealed to Pakeha to give Maori ‘a fair go’, if they did not want contemporary inequalities to become a ‘racial problem’. He also revealed signs that there was already a racial problem: Maori were over-represented in crime.

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108 NZH, 7 February 1961, p.1; Taylor to Secretary for Internal Affairs, 15 February 1961, ACGO 8333 IA1 3001 158/67, ANZW.
109 Minister of Education to Gerard, 7 March 1963, and Minister of Education to Minister of Lands, 30 October 1963, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part one.
110 Fergusson, Waitangi Day message 1964, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part one.
111 Education Gazette (EG), 1 February 1966, supplement; EG, 1 February 1967, supplement.
113 Harris, ‘Dancing with the State’, pp.124-5.
statistics and under-represented in education, for example.\textsuperscript{114} The following year Prime Minister Keith Holyoake made similar points.\textsuperscript{115} The earlier themes that New Zealand’s race relations were an example to the world and that the Treaty had been more or less adhered to continued to be voiced, but they were now considerably tempered.\textsuperscript{116} It was in this context that the phrase ‘He iwi tahi tatou’ (we are one people) became a regular feature of Waitangi Day.\textsuperscript{117} Although the expression was used by Hobson in 1840, it was not prominent in commemorations before the 1960s. Footage of its use by Cobham in 1960 was featured in newsreel coverage of the ceremony, and the phrase was to recur regularly at Waitangi Day from then on.\textsuperscript{118} This can be seen as an affirmation of integration, then being heavily promoted via the Hunn report.\textsuperscript{119} Earlier policy had often recognised and to a certain extent preserved the cultural distinctiveness of Maori, in keeping with Maori ideas of the Treaty as being a partnership between two different but equal peoples. Newer policies were more in keeping with Pakeha understandings of the Treaty as making Maori and Pakeha equal as individuals and giving no particular recognition to Maori ways of life. In this context, ‘we are one people’ meant not that Maori and Pakeha co-exist as citizens of one country, but that differences should be minimised. Although the Hunn report was careful to promote integration rather than assimilation, in practice the former had a tendency to shade into the latter.\textsuperscript{120} Speeches at Waitangi generally did not overtly reflect the policy, although the speaker at the unveiling of the Treaty in Wellington argued that Maori needed to ‘adapt’.\textsuperscript{121} Pakeha speakers at Waitangi were more likely to emphasise that New Zealanders were ‘all one people’ without explicitly stating what they meant by this. While some Maori were enthusiastic about the ‘one people’ idea, others were less impressed.\textsuperscript{122} At the Waitangi Day ceremonies in 1966, the Reverend Rua

\textsuperscript{114} NZH, 7 February 1961, p.2.
\textsuperscript{115} NZH, 7 February 1962, p.3.
\textsuperscript{116} NZH, 8 February 1960, p.10; NZH, 7 February 1961, p.1; Speech notes for Prime Minister (no date, 1964), AECB 18701 TO3 12 INF 18/17/9, part one, ANZW; NZH, 7 February 1966, p.3; EG, 1 February 1967, supplement.
\textsuperscript{117} ‘He iwi tahi tatou’ can be translated in a variety of ways, but this was the one generally used at Waitangi Day.
\textsuperscript{118} National Film Unit, \textit{Pictorial Parade} No.99, ARNZ 18828 RV 299, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{119} Harris, ‘Dancing with the State’, pp.115-41.
\textsuperscript{121} NZH, 7 February 1961, p.1.
\textsuperscript{122} Extract from Waitangi National Trust Board minutes of Annual Meeting of 5 October 1965, AECB 18701 TO3 12 INF 18/17/9, part one, ANZW.
Rakena made a veiled criticism of integrationist policies by pointing out that unity was not synonymous with uniformity.\textsuperscript{123}

In 1963 Queen Elizabeth II took part in Waitangi Day. Maori and Pakeha alike responded to the Queen’s visit with great enthusiasm, but behind the harmonious façade there was a struggle for control as Maori sought to receive the Queen on their own terms while Pakeha civil servants and politicians resisted any steps towards separatism. The New Zealand Maori Council was ‘far from enthusiastic’ about the Waitangi plans, and wanted a separate Maori hui at Rotorua or Ngaruawahia.\textsuperscript{124} This reflected the idea of partnership between two distinct peoples, and also shows that many Maori did not regard Waitangi Day as a Maori affair. In general, Maori felt that there should be at least one Maori-controlled reception for the Queen.\textsuperscript{125} Those organising the tour treated Maori as just one group of citizens, capable of providing distinct cultural entertainment but not constituting a people apart from other New Zealanders. Maori sought to use the Queen’s visit to reaffirm their cultural distinctiveness and assert their existence as a people separate from general New Zealandness or Britishness. On the other hand, Pakeha wanted to reaffirm the unity of all New Zealanders based on the shared principle of loyalty to the Crown. Maori saw the events as a chance to express their own identity; Pakeha saw them in terms of national unity. By 1963 most Pakeha felt that a vital part of this national unity was the real equality of all New Zealanders, but one Maori group threatened to undermine this by presenting a petition to the Queen at Waitangi, calling for recognition of the Treaty and the restoration of Maori land.\textsuperscript{126} Only a last minute intervention by Maori Council President Turi Carroll prevented an potentially embarrassing scene.\textsuperscript{127} Waitangi Day, especially with the Queen attending, was also in part a celebration of New Zealand’s links with Britain. Behind the reaffirmation of these links and the friendship between the two countries lay considerable worry and anger at Britain’s attempts to join the European Community. This discontent led to a widespread belief that the royal tour was intended as a token gesture to quiet New Zealand complaints about being aban-

\textsuperscript{123} Te Kaunihera Maori (KM), February 1966, p.2. See also KM, November 1964, p.1.
\textsuperscript{124} Hunn to Minister of Maori Affairs, 19 September 1963, ACHH 16036 MAW2459 163 19/1/50 part one, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{125} H.K. Ngata to Hunn, 27 November 1962, ACGO 8333 IA1 3413 198/42 part 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{126} Robson to Director of Royal Visit, 23 January 1963, and Hunn to Minister of Maori Affairs, 31 January 1963, ACGO 8333 IA1 3413 198/42 part 2, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{127} Hunn to Minister, 31 January 1963, ACGO 8333 IA1 3413 198/42 part 2, ANZW.
doned by the mother country. Such beliefs were not publicly expressed; historic commemorations and other rituals are usually celebrations of an ideal rather than frank examinations of reality.

The day’s speeches had more in common with those of the 1950s and earlier than those of 1960 onwards. Given the Queen’s presence it is perhaps not surprising that New Zealand’s connection and loyalty to Britain were reaffirmed, as was Maori loyalty to the Crown. Prime Minister Keith Holyoake also claimed that the spirit of the Treaty had been ‘substantially fulfilled’, although he did acknowledge that the past 123 years had ‘not been without difficulty’. The Queen pledged her loyalty to the Treaty but reminded listeners that ‘these pledges are given on behalf of the self-governing people of New Zealand and her democratically elected Government’. According to the state-funded Maori magazine Te Ao Hou, the Queen’s pledge received the loudest cheers of the day. The British High Commissioner later reported that the New Zealand government had intended this speech to ‘reduce the pressure for this demand for recognition of the Treaty’s legal validity’. If anything, it had the opposite effect. The New Zealand Maori Council Newsletter reported the pledge but failed to include the qualifying statement, thus giving the impression that the Queen might take steps to ensure the Treaty was honoured. Carroll spoke as the Maori representative, and his speech was also paraphrased in such a way as to alter its overall meaning. He announced a post-graduate scholarship, renewed requests for Waitangi Day to be made a national holiday, and expressed ‘the desire of the Maori people to press for the embodiment of the Treaty in the country’s statutes’. In their reports of the speech, the Herald, the Evening Post and the Press all left out Carroll’s call for the statutory recognition of the Treaty. The format of the celebrations was designed in the wake of the criticism of the early 1960s Waitangi Days. It was pre-approved by the Maori Council and included a wero (ceremonial challenge), and

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128 Francis Cumming-Bruce to Secretary of State, 29 March 1963, p.2, DO 161/73, National Archives, Kew, London.
130 Te Ao Hou (AH), March 1963, p.28.
132 New Zealand Maori Council Newsletter (NZMCN), September 1963, p.5.
135 Souter to Minister of Maori Affairs, no date [probably late 1963], ACIH 16036 MAW2459 163 19/1/50 part 1, ANZW.
alternated speeches with Maori cultural performances. Not all the recommended changes were made – challenges and performances were done by young teenagers rather than adults, for example – but the new format and the Maori Council’s involvement show that the Trust had become more willing to listen to Maori.

Waitangi Day 1963 can be contrasted with the Twelfth of July commemorations around the same time. In both cases there was a significant split between two groups, both of whom attempted to use the commemorations in support of their own positions. Because the Twelfth had many grassroots elements, this competition for control of the day frequently became public, and was also reflected in the changing nature of the resolutions. Waitangi Day was much more elite driven, so all the conflict occurred behind the scenes. In Northern Ireland, the Twelfth was hugely important in symbolic and political terms, and in any case Ulster Protestants were more concerned with determining political direction than with presenting a good image. Therefore, control of the Twelfth was important enough to be publically fought for. In New Zealand, by contrast, Waitangi Day had some symbolic but little real importance, and at this stage differences in ideology were not considered to be worth public disorder, especially given the presence of the Queen. Had she attended the Twelfth, Ulster Protestants may have presented a similarly respectful façade of loyal unity.

Although Maori lacked the power to turn Waitangi Day into a reaffirmation of their values and principles, many still did what they could to shift the meaning of the day. In particular, the need for greater recognition of the Treaty and the resolution of grievances was reaffirmed. In the official Waitangi Day message for 1965, Trust member Hepi Te Heuheu slightly undermined the view of history usually presented at Waitangi by writing that ‘Governments in the past have not always been mindful of the Treaty’. Another example comes from the Waitangi Day commemorations of the same year, when Carroll appealed to the Government to do more for Maori education. It is possible that Maori expressed grievances more often than this, or in stronger terms. We have seen that in 1963 Carroll’s call for recognition of the Treaty

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137 NZH, 7 February 1964, p.3; NZH, 8 February 1965, p.14.
138 EG, 1 February 1965, supplement.
139 NZH, 8 February 1965, p.14.
was ignored by the Pakeha press, so it is likely that in at least some years similar statements were made and ignored. However, statements such as Carroll’s in 1965 show that criticism could be reported if it was expressed, and there is no evidence that Maori made stronger statements at Waitangi during this period. What Maori definitely were doing was commemorating the Treaty outside the narrow bounds of the official Waitangi Day ceremonies. In 1966 the Tai Tokerau District Maori Council offered the Te Tii marae to the Maori people as a whole, to be governed by a committee including the four Maori MPs.\textsuperscript{140} There were also Maori-organised celebrations of the Treaty in Auckland and Wellington, with the Auckland events of 1967 being a multi-cultural occasion featuring a re-enactment of the Treaty signing, a hangi, police dog trials, a parade of national costumes, and folk dancing.\textsuperscript{141} This can be seen not only as a reaffirmation of the importance of the Treaty for Maori, but also an assertion of its importance for New Zealanders of all backgrounds and cultures. The Auckland Maori Progressive Cultural Association, which organised the Auckland commemorations, was attempting to unify the nation behind the ideals symbolised by the Treaty. These were not necessarily shared or widely believed in, but the festivities show that the Association knew that rituals and public celebrations can have the power to encourage particular ideals.

Despite all this, only a minority of Pakeha shared in the growing interest in history, the Treaty, and Waitangi Day, with the majority remaining ignorant or indifferent. A 1965 survey showed that half of secondary schools and 20\% of primary and intermediate schools did not observe Waitangi Day in any way, which is fairly high considering that they had been required to observe it since 1941.\textsuperscript{142} The \textit{Herald} reported that on the sixth of February 1967, ‘most shoppers in Queen St were oblivious, or only vaguely aware, that [the day] had historic significance.’\textsuperscript{143} Pakeha indifference to Waitangi Day reflects attitudes to the values which the day reaffirmed. The responses to allegations of discrimination in the late 1950s and early 1960s indicate that most Pakeha supported racial equality in principle, but many opposed it in

\textsuperscript{140} NZH, 7 February 1966, p.5.
\textsuperscript{141} NZMCN, February 1964, p.1; NZH, 6 February 1967, p.5.
\textsuperscript{142} Campbell to Gerard, 15 October 1965, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part one, National Archives, Wellington; EG, 1 December 1941, p.250.
\textsuperscript{143} NZH, 7 February 1967, p.1.
practice and few would have felt the need to formally reaffirm their commitment to this ideal.

One of the original purposes of Waitangi Day was the reaffirmation of loyalty to Britain and the Crown, but with Britain now showing very little loyalty to the Commonwealth, this would not have been something which many New Zealanders felt like celebrating either. Nor was the British link strong enough to result in defiant assertions of Britishness despite what the British thought, as occurred in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. Another factor in Pakeha indifference was the weakness of national identity; at this stage Waitangi Day was not generally promoted in terms of nationalism. Some Pakeha were campaigning for the day to be a true national day and national public holiday, but even here the arguments leaned more towards embarrassment at not having a national day than patriotism. Possibly Pakeha were caught between two identities at this stage; not really British but not sure they wanted to be just New Zealanders either. In Etzioni’s terms, Waitangi Day was a ‘recommitment holiday’ but at this point it was not truly a holiday, the question of what exactly was being recommitted to was not settled, and those values which were being promoted were not seen as vital, threatened or evocative enough to need public reaffirmation.

From 1947 to 1967, Waitangi Day grew from a simple naval ceremony intended only to commemorate the navy’s role in early New Zealand to a large and complex commemoration with many aspects of a national day. Throughout these two decades, Waitangi Day was generally an elite-led occasion, although Maori groups sometimes organised their own events. It was this elite domination, along with the constant behind the scenes competition for control of Waitangi Day’s meaning, which caused the day’s forms to undergo almost constant revision. As we can see in the history of the other commemorations examined in this thesis, those which take the form of numerous grassroots-organised events tend to change very slowly, although attendance may fluctuate significantly. Because Waitangi Day in this period was usually one event, organised by a small group of people, it was easy to change and often was changed. Although by 1960 the day was seen by many as a national day, the growth of nationalism and national identity had little obvious impact on Waitangi Day

in this period. It is likely that the continued cultural and political links to Britain played more of a role; we have seen that precursors to Waitangi Day focussed on these links and that the biggest boost to the day came with the visit of Queen Elizabeth, New Zealand’s British head of state. Waitangi Days of this period were thus a reaffirmation of Britishness more than New Zealandness. This was helped by the Maori desire to reaffirm their loyalty to the Crown which, as well as expressing genuine support for the Queen, sent the message that Maori should receive something in return. As this indicates, the evolving nature of race relations also impacted on Waitangi Day. The commemorations were used to reinforce an image of New Zealand as a land of racial equality and harmony. These principles were reaffirmed at Waitangi Day but, especially before 1959, the message was also sent that Pakeha did not have to do anything to make relations better; they were already exemplary. Maori attempted to use Waitangi Day to respectfully draw attention to the fact that this was not the case, but their voices were usually not heard. Waitangi Day worked to promote the unity of Maori and Pakeha, but this image disguised significant inequalities as well as dissent.
Chapter Three: War Commemorations in Northern Ireland, to 1966

In 1940, Northern Ireland’s main war commemoration, other than the Twelfth, was Armistice Day. This was the anniversary of the end of World War I, and was observed throughout the United Kingdom. At the end of World War II a need was felt for a day of remembrance which could encompass both wars, and so Armistice Day was transformed into Remembrance Sunday. In the rest of the United Kingdom, Remembrance Sunday lacked the popular appeal of Armistice Day, but in Northern Ireland it achieved respectable levels of observance. This was despite it being observ-ed mostly by Protestants, as was the anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, Northern Ireland’s other war commemoration. The Somme anniversary, and to a lesser extent Remembrance Sunday, focussed primarily on the Protestant-dominated 36th (Ulster) Division. In general, Catholics did not participate in Northern Irish war remembrance, although the Jewish community did. Catholic abstention was caused partially by their Church’s prohibition against attending services featuring non-Catholic clergy, but primarily by political factors. War commemoration was seen as support for the contemporary British Army, a view reinforced by the use of British symbols such as the Union Jack and national anthem in many remembrance ceremonies.

The history of war remembrance in Northern Ireland provides further evidence for the idea that historic commemorations are primarily about contemporary concerns rather than the past. Thousands of Irish nationalists fought and died in World War I, but they were not formally remembered in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s because their memory did not fit in with the political agendas of either Northern Irish community. To most post-war Irish nationalists, the enlistment of Catholic Irishmen in the British Army was an embarrassment best forgotten. Many Ulster unionists, meanwhile, focussed their commemoration almost exclusively on the Ulster Division, since the Division’s sacrifice at the Somme provided a compelling illustration of Ulster’s loyalty to Britain. Although many attendees at Remembrance Sunday commemorations would have been simply remembering their dead, the varying levels of observation in Protestant and Catholic Northern Ireland, and in Great Britain, show that participation depends on more than simply experiencing loss in wartime. The 50th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme in 1966 also illustrates the political power of commemorations, as that anniversary in combination with that of the Easter Rising
helped harden the attitudes of Northern Ireland’s two main communities towards each other.

That Remembrance Sunday fared better in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom indicates again that historic commemorations do best when they reaffirm values which are seen as needed or under threat. In the post-war decades the people of Great Britain experienced no serious challenge to their Britishness and, despite the Cold War, probably saw military readiness and the need for defence in somewhat abstract and impersonal terms. The Soviet threat was very real, but it was not on their borders and would be warded off by military technology, not by personal vigilance. To Northern Irish Protestants, by contrast, the threat of Irish republicanism was immediate and personal. War commemorations, which honoured those who had fought and died, and which tended to reaffirm the need for military readiness, were therefore much more relevant to them than to their compatriots in England, Scotland and Wales. Like the Twelfth of July, Remembrance Sunday and the Somme anniversary reaffirmed Britishness and, to a lesser extent, Protestantism at a time when both were seen as being threatened by republicanism. War remembrance had the added advantage of being more respectable and orderly than the Twelfth and could therefore be supported by those who abhorred the sectarianism and rowdiness of the Twelfth.

This chapter will show that, like other commemorations, Remembrance Sunday and the Somme anniversary were used to construct group identities. In remembering Ulstermen who had fought and died for Britain, Northern Irish Protestants created a self-image as a people who were loyal to Britain, and would fight and die for a righteous cause. Rhetoric did not just emphasise self-sacrifice, however, but also the military prowess of the Ulster Division. Ulster Protestants would not only fight, they would do so better than anyone else. Unionist and Protestant identities were also reinforced by the forms of war commemoration. Most ceremonies involved Protestant clergy, often very prominently, and unionist symbols such as the Union Jack and the British national anthem usually also featured. These symbols helped to unite Ulster Protestants, but also served to exclude Catholics, even those who had fought in the British armed forces.
This thesis is the first in-depth scholarly examination of Remembrance Sunday in Northern Ireland, and one of the few examinations of British commemorative ceremonies in the period after World War II. International research on war commemorations has tended to focus on the physical traces of memory such as books and war memorials, possibly because these are somewhat easier to research than events, which are by their nature unrecoverable. Catherine Switzer’s book on unionist war remembrance in Northern Ireland and Bob Bushaway’s article on remembrance in England are unusual in addressing material and active remembrance as an organic whole.¹ The history of war commemoration ceremonies in the United Kingdom has been examined by several writers but few address any period after World War II.² The only works on Remembrance Sunday, which Armistice Day became after that war, are an account of the Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen, a collection of personal reflections on the day, and a published copy of a Ministry of Defence report on British modes of war remembrance originally written for the Japanese government.³ There is also a chapter in a book on the Armistice which covers the entire history of Armistice Day and Remembrance Sunday, which is helpful, but too short to be anything more than a summary; and a history of the British Legion which includes useful information on commemorations.⁴ In the area that became the Republic of Ireland, the memory of World War I became controversial while the war was still being fought, primarily because of the Easter Rising of 1916 and its aftermath. The war became associated with imperialism, and its commemoration was opposed by many republicans. This has made it an interesting subject for investigation, and in recent years several writers have examined the memory of World War I in that country.⁵ In Northern Ireland, the war and its memory became the ‘property’ of the

unionist majority. Despite this, it lacked the overt sectarianism of other unionist events such as the Twelfth, and thus its ongoing history has been largely ignored. Several writers have examined the immediate reactions to the Somme, but the only extensive work on Northern Irish war commemorations is Switzer’s book, which covers the period from 1914 until 1939.

The Somme, the Armistice, and their commemorations in Northern Ireland to 1939

The first day of the Battle of the Somme, 1 July 1916, was and still is the single bloodiest day in British military history and arguably the worst British military disaster until the fall of Singapore. The British offensive was intended to push the entrenched Germans back and relieve pressure on Verdun, where huge German and French forces were fighting. Reluctant to try their inexperienced troops with complex tactics, British commanders planned to demolish the German defences with several days of artillery barrage, allowing the allied troops to simply walk across no-man’s land to the crippled German defences and easily deal with any survivors. However the British were not ordered out of their trenches until the bombardment had lifted, allowing the German defenders, who had mostly been safe in deep bunkers, to return to their machine gun posts and mow down the oncoming soldiers. In addition, the lack of any effective technology for battlefield communication meant that the more successful units continued forward without any support, while others were shelled because their artillery did not realise where they were. Nearly half the British forces

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7 Gregory’s *The Silence of Memory* and Peter Liddle’s ‘Britons on the Home Front’, in Hugh Cecil and Peter H. Liddle, eds, *At the Eleventh Hour: Reflections, Hopes and Anxieties at the Closing of the Great War, 1918*, (Barnsley, 1998) sporadically include Northern Ireland, and Jane Leonard’s booklet *The Culture of War Commemoration* (Belfast, 1996) covers the commemoration in Ireland of various conflicts, north and south.


10 Terraine, p.118.
were killed, wounded or captured on the first day of the battle. One of the more successful units was the 36th (Ulster) Division, an almost entirely Protestant unit formed mostly from the Ulster Volunteer Force, a unionist militia set up to resist Irish Home Rule.\textsuperscript{11} The Ulster troops had left their trenches before the barrage was lifted, and were therefore able to reach the German trenches before the defenders could take up their machine gun posts. In addition, the bombardment had done particularly heavy damage to the trenches that they were attacking.\textsuperscript{12} The Ulster Division progressed further than any other division, taking five lines of German trenches and establishing a foothold, but because they were now far ahead of the rest of the army they were very exposed, and were forced back to the German first line. Of the Division’s 12,000 men, 2,000 were killed and another 3,000 wounded.\textsuperscript{13}

In Ulster – Northern Ireland did not yet exist – the initial commemorations took place on the Twelfth of July. Normal Twelfth celebrations had already been cancelled due to the war, and at noon all work and traffic stopped for five minutes’ silence.\textsuperscript{14} Numerous church services were also held.\textsuperscript{15} Although the silence was apparently widely observed in Belfast, and other observances held elsewhere in Ulster, the commemorations were widely seen as Protestant occasions by both communities.\textsuperscript{16} This was partially due to the fact that it was the Protestant-dominated Ulster Division which had been massacred, but Catholic ambivalence about the war also played a part.\textsuperscript{17} Even at this stage, the Ulster Division’s role in the war was presented in Orange rhetoric, with the date of the battle – the anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne in the Julian calendar – being seen as particularly significant.\textsuperscript{18} Possessing an archetype that Pakeha New Zealanders lacked, Ulster speakers compared their Division to the men who had fought at the Boyne and to the defenders of Derry.\textsuperscript{19} The sacrifices of other units and of Ulstermen in other battles were downplayed as Northern Irish war commemoration became in large part commemoration of the Ulster

\textsuperscript{13} Horne, p.16.
\textsuperscript{14} Switzer, pp.30-7. Most accounts of the Twelfth 1916 claim that parades were cancelled because of the events on the Somme, but Switzer shows that they had in fact been cancelled before this, and that many Orangemen were unhappy about it.
\textsuperscript{15} Officer, p.175.
\textsuperscript{16} Switzer, pp.35-6.
\textsuperscript{17} Officer, pp.175-6.
\textsuperscript{18} Loughlin, ‘Mobilising the Sacred Dead’, p.135; Beiner, p.380; Switzer, p.29.
\textsuperscript{19} Officer, pp.176-7, 180. See also Bryan, \textit{Orange Parades}, p.56.
Division at the Somme, and therefore commemoration of northern Protestants. Somme iconography was used in the service of unionism and the desire of Ulster Protestants to remain part of the United Kingdom. The associations of the battle with Protestantism were further entrenched by special church services on its first anniversary, which fell on a Sunday. The Catholic Church was generally not involved in war remembrance; it held few commemorative services, and Catholic parishes in Ireland rarely compiled rolls of honour. The churches were not the only organisations to organise Somme commemorations. In many areas local councils established traditions of wreath-laying and open-air services. The end of the war on 11 November 1918 was generally marked with celebration across the British Empire, including many parts of Ireland. In Dublin, however, there were clashes between unionists and republicans and in some areas, both unionist and nationalist, there was weary indifference.

In Northern Ireland, as in the rest of the United Kingdom and much of the British Empire, Armistice Day was annually observed on 11 November. The main features of the day were wreath-laying ceremonies, usually at temporary or newly built war memorials, and two minutes of silence at eleven o'clock. In Belfast it was said of the silence that ‘The sudden hush of great industrial works could almost be felt’. As this indicates, the silence was particularly striking because Armistice Day was not a public holiday and so the effect of normal commerce and industry coming to a halt was particularly pronounced. The ceremonies were usually organised by local councils, but involved wreath-laying from groups including Orange lodges, the Salvation Army and, on at least one occasion in the 1930s, Italian fascists. There was prominent participation by clergy of the major Protestant churches and, in Belfast, the local rabbi. Special church services were also part of the day; the Anglican liturgy for

22 Officer, p.177.
23 Switzer, p.18.
24 ibid., pp.94-5.
25 Liddle, pp.80-1; Switzer, pp.41-5.
26 Belfast Telegraph, quoted in Gregory, p.13.
27 Richardson, pp.352-3.
28 A Day of Remembrance: Armistice Day: 11th November 1934, LA/7/16BA/5, PRONI.
29 BT, 11 November 1938, p.17.
Armistice Day was concerned with sacrifice and redemption rather than victory, and it is likely that other churches followed a similar pattern. Armistice Day was an event shared across the British Empire, and for Ulster unionists (and many New Zealanders) this would have been a major part of its significance. Armistice Day was not a local or parochial remembrance but rather one which transcended borders and brought together the entire British ‘family’ in honour of those who had died under the Union Jack. It was therefore a reaffirmation of Britishness as well as a commemoration of the dead.

Despite the already major importance of the Somme in Northern Irish Protestant culture, formal commemorations of the Somme anniversary in the inter-war period were little more than a scaled down version of Armistice Day, without the two minutes’ silence. The biggest difference was that the Somme anniversary tended to focus exclusively on the Ulster Division, with the programme and resolution from Belfast’s 1934 ceremony neglecting to mention any of the other divisions which had fought and died in the battle. Ceremonies and rhetoric also tended to focus on the first day of the battle, on which the Division did most of its fighting, ignoring the fact that the battle continued for more than four months after this, and involved the nationalist 16th (Irish) Division in its later stages. It has been argued that World War I commemorations were in the tradition of Orange commemorations. This is not true with regard to the official ceremonies, which usually had much more in common with war commemorations in other places than with events such as the Twelfth. But the official events were only one part of the Somme anniversary. From 1919 the day was marked ‘not only by church services and solemn wreath-laying, but also by the noise and spectacle of parades and marching bands’. The Battle of the Somme and its anniversary became part of loyalist iconography, with murals depicting the Ulster Division appearing immediately after the war, and parades and banner unveilings

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30 Bushaway, pp.152-3.
31 Switzer, p.101. Northern Irish Prime Minister Sir James Craig actively avoided establishing any specifically Northern Irish form of remembrance, saying that ‘I am sure other citizens throughout Northern Ireland will be quite satisfied with the arrangements laid down by His Majesty’. Switzer, p.152.
32 Compare Day of Remembrance with The Ulster Division: Anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, City Hall, Belfast, 2nd July 1934, LA/7/16BA/5, PRONI.
33 Switzer, p.109.
34 Johnson, Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance, pp.70-1.
35 Switzer, p.96.
Northern Irish war commemorations to 1966

regularly held on the first of July. The date’s location in the middle of the ‘marching season’ was obviously a factor here, but at least some of these events genuinely commemorated the war; numerous banners depicted the Somme, for example. As this indicates, the Orange Order was prominent in unofficial Somme commemorations. As well as laying wreaths during the official ceremonies on the first, Orange lodges often paraded to Somme memorial services on the Sunday closest to the anniversary. Memorial lodges and lodges for ex-servicemen were also formed, the first in 1919. The commemorative nature of Somme parades did not change most Catholics’ perception of them as sectarian, and they were sometimes attacked if they went through nationalist areas.

Part of the Catholic problem with war remembrance was that, as in the rest of the United Kingdom, commemorations tended to incorporate symbols of the state such as Union Jacks and the national anthem. In most of the United Kingdom, and indeed most parts of the ‘white’ British Empire including New Zealand, this was generally unproblematic and would have seemed natural to most people. In Northern Ireland, however, such symbols were seen as representing only the unionist and Protestant community. This association with unionism inevitably put many nationalists off participation in commemorations, even when there was no partisan intent. In addition to this, some commemorations were organised with partisan intent, and consequently boycotted by nationalist veterans’ groups. This occurred as early as the initial celebrations of the Armistice and the following year’s peace treaty. In subsequent years, Catholic veterans, particularly those of the 16th (Irish) Division, were occasionally excluded from various events. Not surprisingly, the level of Catholic participation in war commemorations was much lower than that of Protestants.

Catholic abstention from war commemorations was not an issue specific to Northern Ireland, however. In the 1928 papal encyclical Mortalium Animos, Pope Pius XI

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36 Jarman, Material Conflicts, pp.182-3; Johnson, Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance, p.71; Switzer, pp.96-7.
37 Bryan, Orange Parades, p.64.
38 Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War, p.133; Bryan, Orange Parades, p.56.
39 Bryan, Orange Parades, pp.66, 68
40 Morris, p.122; Switzer, p.106.
41 Johnson, Ireland, the Great War and the Geography of Remembrance, p.72; Switzer, pp.43-53.
42 Leonard, Culture of War Commemoration, pp.19-20; Jeffery, Ireland and the Great War, p.132.
wrote that Catholics should not participate in non-Catholic religious assemblies as this would falsely imply that all churches were equal and ‘would be countenancing a false religion quite alien to the one true Church of Christ.’\(^{43}\) Therefore Catholics could not attend remembrance services, or even remembrance ceremonies, if there was any Protestant clerical participation. This did not prevent Catholics from holding their own memorial services, which they did in other parts of the United Kingdom and in Australia.\(^{44}\) In Northern Ireland, similar services were initiated by Primate of All Ireland Joseph MacRory despite his Sinn Fein sympathies, but such ceremonies were not common.\(^{45}\) Northern Catholics did participate in public commemorations from time to time. For example, the unveiling of the Portadown war memorial in 1924 was attended by Catholic priests, Catholic as well as Protestant ex-servicemen made speeches, and wreaths were laid by both the Orange Order and the nationalist Ancient Order of Hibernians.\(^{46}\) In 1928 the unveiling of Enniskillen’s war memorial featured a Catholic band which incorporated drummers and fifers from the local Orange band and played the British national anthem.\(^{47}\)

The memory of Northern Ireland’s troops was also perpetuated in numerous books. Several of these discussed the Somme from a political perspective. For example, Michael McDonagh’s *The Irish on the Somme*, published in 1917, took a nationalist view and hoped that the shared sacrifices of Protestant and Catholic Irishmen would unite them.\(^{48}\) A more prescient view may be found in Ella Porter’s intensely jingoistic *The Red Hand of Ulster*, which places the Somme firmly in the context of Ulster Protestant historical myth.\(^{49}\) The work of more scholarly historians, most of whom had been serving officers, can also be seen in a political light, particularly regarding their explanations for the British failure. Cyril Falls blamed the disaster on inadequate anti-machine gun technology, inadequate artillery, and ‘the fighting qualities of the

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\(^{47}\) Leonard, *Culture of War Commemoration*, p.20.


German soldier’, and there is some evidence that in the decades immediately after the war Falls presented a more flattering image of the military command than he knew to be justified. Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers historian, journalist and imperialist Frank Fox simply blamed the French, arguing with some justification that if the British had been fighting alone the battle would have been conducted differently. Neither author blames the British; Philip Orr argues that to have done so would have undermined the unionist project by distancing ‘Ulster’ from ‘Britain’. He argues that this element of Northern Irish war historiography reflected the reluctance of Northern Irish Protestants ‘to question the true nature of their link with Britain’. Perhaps the biggest imbalance in Ulster and Irish war historiography, however, was the disproportionate focus on the Ulster Division. There were several histories of the division, written with varying degrees of professionalism, but the role of most of the other Irish divisions in the war was neglected, especially the 16th (Irish) Division, which did not get a professional history until 1992.

Like many other communities, the Protestants of Northern Ireland were devastated by the slaughter of their young men in World War I. Like other peoples, one of the ways that they dealt with this trauma was with the creation of rituals, in this case based on a combination of the standard religiously-derived forms of war remembrance used elsewhere, and local traditions. Like the 1950s Memorial Days studied by Bellah and Warner, Northern Irish war commemorations of the inter-war period recommitted a people to the memory of their ‘sacred dead’ and to a broad set of principles for which the fallen were said to have died. The commemorations tended to be unionist-dominated, and therefore expressions of Britishness, while Northern Irish war historiography often made much of Ulster’s loyalty and refrained from blaming British commanders for the massacre of its soldiers. The involvement of the Protestant churches also turned the commemorations into reaffirmations of Protestantism.

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although this was generally not made as explicit as it was on the Twelfth. Like the Twelfth, Armistice Day and the Somme anniversary united Ulster Protestants behind a common set of values. Remembrance Sunday did this without specifically setting them apart from their Catholic neighbours, who sometimes also participated. However the unionist and Protestant nature of Northern Irish war commemorations, especially the Somme anniversary, meant that few Catholics felt able to do so.

Commemorating the First World War during the Second

In times of war the need for ‘civil religions’ which raise morale and otherwise aid the war effort is particularly pronounced. We have seen that the Twelfth of July celebrations were cancelled during World War II in part because they represented principles which did not accord well with the needs of the war effort. In Great Britain, Armistice Day was also cancelled for similar reasons. Until some point in the 1930s, World War I had been regarded by many as ‘the war to end all wars’: it was believed that its scale and horror had been such that there would never be another big war. Armistice Day, marking the end of that war, was associated with the desire for continued peace. The outbreak of war therefore stripped the day of much of its meaning, and this was a major factor in the cancellation of ceremonies in Great Britain. As Adrian Gregory points out, ‘if Armistice Day had been a celebration of patriotism and national strength, it is inconceivable that it would have been cancelled in November 1939, just when it was necessary to evoke those emotions. But it was cancelled.’55 This shows how the wartime context tended to reduce the complexity of commemorations and class them simply as helpful or un-helpful to the war effort. The Twelfth in Northern Ireland and Armistice Days in Great Britain were unhelpful and were cancelled. In New Zealand, Waitangi Day was helpful and went ahead and, as we will see in the next chapter, so did Anzac Day.

In Northern Ireland, war commemorations tended to symbolise British pride as well as remembrance, and had limited associations with pacifism, since the inter-war period had been far from peaceful there. In many parts of the region, therefore,

55 Gregory, p.172.
commemorations were toned down rather than cancelled. On Armistice Day 1939 wreaths were laid and the two minutes’ silence observed in Belfast and many other towns, and in some places special services were held. In others no formal ceremonies were held, but wreaths were privately laid and poppies sold.\textsuperscript{56} Parades were cancelled in Belfast and some other areas, but continued in others.\textsuperscript{57} In some years the absence of a signal for the start and end of the silence meant that it was less widely observed than previously.\textsuperscript{58} On the 1940 Somme anniversary, those wishing to lay wreaths in the city were advised to ‘make their stay at the Cenotaph as short as possible’ and not to bring bands with them.\textsuperscript{59} By 1941 Armistice Day was beginning to be thought of as concerning the contemporary war as well as the past one: an advertisement for the Poppy Appeal stressed that it was for men and women of ‘all ranks, all services, all wars’.\textsuperscript{60} The appeal showed record returns during the war years.\textsuperscript{61} By 1943, with the threat of bombing or invasion receding, some of the cancelled public ceremonies were restored.\textsuperscript{62} The continuation of remembrance during the war shows that, for most Northern Irish Protestants, the ceremonies still had meaning despite the new war.

Despite widespread participation of Irish Catholics, north and south, in both world wars, the neutrality of the Irish Free State in World War II meant that commemoration of World War I came to be seen by unionists and nationalists alike as support for Britain’s contemporary war efforts.\textsuperscript{53} This was the result both of nationalist rejection of war remembrance and Protestant domination of it. In Dublin, Armistice Day parades were banned as being in violation of the neutrality policy, and in Northern Ireland the commemorations became even more closely associated with Protestantism and unionism.\textsuperscript{64} During the war, every Northern Irish Remembrance Sunday (the Sunday before the eleventh of November) and every Armistice Day was marked with special services at numerous Protestant churches, but if there were any such services at Catholic churches these were not mentioned by either the \textit{Telegraph} or the Catholic \textit{Irish News}. Ostensibly non-denominational organisations such as the British Legion

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56} BT, 11 November 1939, p.9.
\item \textsuperscript{57} BT, 1 July 1940, p.6.
\item \textsuperscript{58} BT, 11 November 1943, p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{59} Belfast City Hall, ‘Notice’, June 1940, PM/6/70, PRONI.
\item \textsuperscript{60} BT, 10 November 1941, p.2.
\item \textsuperscript{61} Harding, p.279.
\item \textsuperscript{62} BT, 11 November 1943, p.3.
\item \textsuperscript{63} Jeffery, \textit{Ireland and the Great War}, pp.134-5.
\item \textsuperscript{64} Leonard, ‘Twinge of Memory’, pp.102-3; Jeffery, \textit{Ireland and the Great War}, p.135.
\end{itemize}
returned servicemen’s association, the Local Defence Volunteers (the home guard) and the 10th Royal Irish Rifles Memorial Association either paraded to Protestant churches or had special services there. In addition, the Orange Order laid wreaths in many areas and paraded to Remembrance Sunday services. Catholics seem not to have been involved in wreath-laying, with the exception of a group of Jewish and Catholic Gibraltar evacuees in 1944.

A survey of reported sermons on Remembrance Sunday 1940 shows that they sometimes reaffirmed the values of inter-war Armistice Days, for example expressing disappointment that another war had started or arguing for more equality in the post-war world. Others preferred to explicitly reaffirm the righteousness of the British Empire. For example, one speaker at the St. Anne’s Cathedral Remembrance service said that:

Now our Empire stands almost alone as the defender of the rights and liberties of mankind. We may well believe that God has raised us up for such a time as this. He is calling to the British people to stand for the liberty of the world, for the truth of His Gospel, to stand against the dark, enslaving power that has triumphed over so many nations.

The unionism of Remembrance Sunday and Armistice Day, however, was not as pronounced as that of the Somme anniversary, in which the Orange Order was heavily involved. On the Sunday before the first of July, numerous churches and halls were given over to Orange Order services. Parades were often incorporated into Orange commemorations, either to the church service or from it to a war memorial, where a wreath would be laid.

Wartime commemorations reaffirmed a number of values. Some of these, such as loyalty to Britain, were those explicitly rejected by most Irish Catholics. However other principles, such as the need to fight German aggression, were supported across communal divisions, not least by the thousands of Catholic Irishmen who joined the British Army. Catholic non-involvement in wartime remembrance events said less

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65 BT, 11 November 1940, pp.2, 6; BT, 11 November 1942, p.2; BT, 11 November 1944, p.3; Lurgan Urban District Council Minute Book, January 1943 – December 1945, p.154, LA/51/26A/12, PRONI.
66 BT, 11 November 1940, p.2; BT, 11 November 1943, p.3.
67 BT, 11 November 1944, p.3.
68 BT, 11 November 1940, p.2.
69 BT, 1 July 1940, p.6.
about Catholic attitudes to either the First or Second World War than their attitudes to the unionists who dominated war remembrance. Many Irish Catholics could and did commit themselves to Britain’s war effort, but their community felt unable to join in with Ulster Protestant reaffirmations of British righteousness.

Post-war remembrance

World War II was a conflict on a much larger scale than World War I, which had supposedly been ‘the war to end all wars’. This inevitably altered the meaning of war commemorations, and in the United Kingdom and elsewhere their form was changed to acknowledge the second war. We will see that the impact of World War II damaged war commemorations in New Zealand, fatally in the case of Remembrance Sunday. In Northern Ireland, however, war commemorations reaffirmed principles, such as pride in the Ulster Division, military readiness, unionism and British loyalty, which were seen as highly relevant by many Protestants. As a result, Remembrance Sunday and the Somme anniversary continued to unify the Ulster Protestant community, although at the cost of alienating many Catholics. Having said this, neither commemoration was as divisive, sectarian or political as the Twelfth of July, and Remembrance Sunday in particular usually involved some non-Protestant participation. This came primarily from the Jewish community, but some Catholics were also involved. Despite widespread Protestant respect for the day there seems to have been considerable cynicism about what had happened at the Somme, and by the mid 1960s there was concern that people were forgetting the sacrifices of the First World War.

In 1945, full Armistice Day ceremonies were reinstated throughout the United Kingdom, but the day’s future was uncertain. The need for an annual occasion which would commemorate the dead of both wars was widely felt, but the truly global nature of the Second World War meant that there was no obvious day on which to mark the entire war, let alone one which could encompass the earlier conflict as well. 70 Eric Hobsbawm’s concept of invented tradition implies that new rituals have a much better chance of acceptance if they appear to be based on tradition, and an instinct for this

70 Richardson, p.358; Gregory, pp.215-21.
may have deterred planners from creating a completely new commemorative day.\(^{71}\) After various alternatives were discussed, ‘the eleventh of November re-remerged as the only date on which there was consensus, or at least a minimum of dissent’.\(^{72}\) That date, however, was too obviously linked to the First World War. The continuation of church services on the Sunday prior to Armistice Day combined with the wartime cancellation of events on Armistice Day itself provided a solution: the extension of ‘Remembrance Sunday’ to peacetime commemoration of the dead of both world wars. That Armistice Day 1945 was a Sunday must have helped enormously: when full Armistice Day ceremonies were reinstated they were naturally on a Sunday, and from then on they could be kept there. In Northern Ireland, the eleventh continued to be marked in at least some Protestant schools and by a few ex-service groups, and the day was acknowledged at the Stormont parliament, but in general the focus shifted to the second Sunday in November.\(^{73}\)

The unprecedented scale and horror of World War I, especially compared to anything else which had happened to the British since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, meant that its impact on British culture was enormous, strongly affecting many aspects of society and culture.\(^{74}\) Coming so soon afterwards and featuring generally better conditions and a significantly lower casualty rate, World War II arguably had far less of an impact. We will see that in New Zealand this had serious effects on Anzac Day, and although Northern Irish Remembrance Sundays did not undergo any crisis, the cultural impact of World War II was still less than that of the previous war. This is most clearly indicated by the United Kingdom National Inventory of War Memorials, which shows that, in Northern Ireland, World War I is commemorated by nearly twice as many war memorials as World War II. The Orange Order’s memorials show an even stronger disparity, with nearly three times as many World War I than World War II memorials.\(^{75}\) Many memorials commemorated both wars, but many erected for the first conflict were not updated after the second; the one in Enniskillen did not have the names of the 214 local people killed in World War II added to it until 1995, for

\(^{72}\) Richardson, p.358.
example.\textsuperscript{76} However there were still numerous memorials to the World War II dead, and the rededication of old memorials and the unveiling and dedication of new ones, particularly in churches, was a part of Remembrance Sunday as late as 1970.\textsuperscript{77}

Remembrance ceremonies attracted respectable numbers: in 1957 an estimated 3000 spectators watched the wreath-laying ceremony at Belfast’s cenotaph, and a thousand ex-servicemen and women paraded.\textsuperscript{78} In 1960 the \textit{Telegraph} estimated that 15,000 people marched in a hundred parades across Northern Ireland.\textsuperscript{79} This stands in contrast to the situation in the rest of the United Kingdom, where the British Legion had been concerned about fading observance of Remembrance Sunday since the late 1940s, and where by the 1950s the two minutes silence no longer occurred except as part of formal ceremonies.\textsuperscript{80} The day’s relative strength in Northern Ireland suggests that the principles of remembrance were seen as more compelling there than in Great Britain. The republican threat probably gave increased significance to values such as military preparedness and the potential need to defend one’s country. In addition, we will see that Remembrance Sunday was in many ways a Protestant and unionist occasion, and therefore a reaffirmation of those identities for a people waging a propaganda and sometimes physical conflict against Irishness, Catholicism and republicanism.

Remembrance Sunday did not explicitly reaffirm the righteousness of Protestantism, as the Twelfth did. However, in most cases it was an explicitly Protestant occasion. Its ‘Sundayised’ nature inevitably gave it religious overtones, and the indifference of the Catholic Church in Ireland to the commemoration meant that ‘religious’ equated in practice to ‘Protestant’. Even when a service was held at a war memorial, the ceremonies there would usually either be preceded by a parade from a Protestant church or churches, or followed by one to church services.\textsuperscript{81} John Dunlop describes a

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{76} McDaniel, p.116.
  \item \textsuperscript{77} TC, 13 November 1970, p.4.
  \item \textsuperscript{78} BT, 11 November 1957, p.6.
  \item \textsuperscript{79} BT, 14 November 1960, p.10.
  \item \textsuperscript{80} Harding, pp.212, 218; Richardson, pp.358-9.
  \item \textsuperscript{81} All information on Remembrance Sunday commemorations taken from \textit{Belfast Telegraph} coverage 1945 to 1965 and \textit{Tyrone Constitution} coverage 1955-65 unless otherwise indicated. Some information also taken from minute books in Local Authority collection of the Public Records Office of Northern Ireland (PRONI).
\end{itemize}
ceremony which was typical of the post-war period despite being held in a Catholic-dominated town:

We would leave Sunday School early and make our way together from Sandy’s Street Presbyterian Church to the Cenotaph near the Stone Bridge in Newry… I remember the absolute stillness of the large crowd, the sound of the bugles as I watched the ceremonial. Wreaths were laid carefully and respectfully on the War Memorial where they remained for weeks.82

The nature of the ceremony is unclear in this case, but would almost certainly have had some role for a Protestant minister. In some cases he would have only pronounced a benediction, but in other areas a religious service would be held at the memorial, and the wreath laying, silence and other features incorporated into this. In many of the smaller towns and villages, especially those with a Catholic majority, the only commemorations were those held in the Protestant churches. These services were timed to encompass the two minutes’ silence at eleven o’clock, and often included the laying of wreaths on a memorial inside the church or in its grounds. In these towns, those who wanted to remember the dead but felt unable to participate in a Protestant church service were limited to private remembrance. Remembrance services, often Protestant in nature, were also held in many workplaces, including railway stations, Queen’s University, the courts, and the Belfast Gasworks. Remembrance Sunday was not sectarian as such, but its forms still served to exclude Catholics.

Apart from the ceremonies, the other main feature of Northern Irish Remembrance Sundays was the veterans’ parade. These parades were a common part of British war commemorations, and although parading took on a different meaning in Northern Ireland, it seems to have been widely accepted that Remembrance Sunday parades were not sectarian in the way that Orange parades were. There are no reports of these parades leading to trouble in the post-war years, nor did the Irish News, a fierce critic of other forms of Protestant parading, have anything to say against those on this occasion. This was despite the parades occasionally taking on sectarian characteristics. Bands of the sort commonly associated with Orange parades might sometimes participate; one called ‘No Surrender’ played at the 1957 Derry commemoration, for example.83 In a few places the Orange Order paraded as a group, but this does not

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82 Lucy and McClure, Remembrance, p.60.
83 BT, 11 November 1957, p.6.
Northern Irish war commemorations to 1966

The Somme anniversary, which was observed on the first of July and the prior Sunday, was even more unionist. In some areas the Somme commemorations were essentially the same as those for Remembrance Sunday, minus the two minutes’ silence. Parades of ex-servicemen were held, wreaths laid and, on the Sunday, Protestant church services held. However, focus tended to be on the Protestant-dominated Ulster Division. Throughout the post-war period, just before the ceremony, the Belfast City Corporation would pass a motion expressing gratitude to ‘the brave men of the 36\textsuperscript{th} (Ulster) Division, who by their glorious conduct on that day made an impressive name for themselves and the Province to which they belong, and whose heroism will never be forgotten so long as the British Empire lasts’. By 1963 the durability and indeed the continued existence of the British Empire had become doubtful, and it was declared that the Division’s memory would last as long as the British Commonwealth. This resolution was read at the Cenotaph ceremony. While Remembrance Sunday was primarily a solemn day of mourning, the Somme anniversary was in large part a reaffirmation of pride in Ulster and its Protestant sons. For this reason, the Orange Order was much more prominent in Somme commemorations than in Remembrance Sunday. Orangemen laid wreaths at many ceremonies, and in Belfast the County Grand Lodge’s wreath laying was an official part of the city’s ceremony; the Lodge was the only non-military group to be given this privilege. As on Remembrance Sunday, the official ceremony was followed with wreath-laying by private organisations, but the range on the Somme anniversary was much more

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84 For one example, see TC, 11 November 1955, p.3.
85 IN, 10 November 1951, p.5; IN, 8 November 1952, p.5; IN, 9 November 1963, p.7.
86 All information on the Somme anniversary taken from Belfast Telegraph coverage, 1945-1965, unless otherwise stated.
87 Compare National Day of Remembrance, 13\textsuperscript{th} of November 1960: The City of Belfast’s Tribute to those who Died in the Great War 1914-1918 and the World War 1939-45, LA/7/16BA/5, PRONI with The 36\textsuperscript{th} (Ulster) Division, Anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, Belfast, 1 July 1963, Ulster and Irish Studies Collection, Belfast Central Library.
88 BT, 2 July 1945, p.4. See also 1 July 1957, p.6.
89 36\textsuperscript{th} (Ulster) Division, p.3.
limited. In 1963 it consisted of just six groups: one from the British Legion, four Orange lodges and one Royal Black lodge.\textsuperscript{90} In contrast, the 1960 Remembrance Day ceremony, which did not feature any Orange wreath-laying, was followed with wreath-laying by 43 separate groups, primarily ex-service organizations as well as one Orange Lodge.\textsuperscript{91}

Despite the unionist and Protestant nature of Remembrance Sunday and to a greater extent the Somme anniversary, neither day was overtly political. Unlike Anzac Day, neither event featured speeches or public sermons, so the potential for them to be used to argue political points was limited. Where politicians were given an opportunity to speak, for example at ex-service dinners or memorial unveilings, they usually focussed on relatively neutral issues such as ex-servicemen’s welfare, the Cold War and general social issues. Occasionally, however, commemoration of the war dead shaded into commemoration of the pre-war militias which had helped make up the Ulster Division. In 1951, for example, a restored and framed Young Citizen Volunteers flag was dedicated by the Mayor of Belfast and the Minister of Local Government, who said that she hoped that ‘some day another battalion of YCVs of Belfast might be formed’.\textsuperscript{92} Although this dedication was made in the context of Remembrance Sunday and intended to emphasise the Volunteers’ participation in World War I, it was still a state-sponsored commemoration of a partisan militia. This kind of borderline sectarianism was unusual, however, at least in terms of what was reported in the newspapers.

Because of the limited opportunities for politicians to speak, Northern Irish remembrance rhetoric tended to be dominated by newspapers and the clergy. Newspaper editorials and cartoons were preoccupied by the possibility of another war, probably between communist and capitalist countries. In 1950 the editor of the \textit{Belfast Telegraph} wrote that ‘the life of a generation appears to have been spent in making war, recovering from war and preparing for war. Is there to be no escape from this tragic circle of events?’\textsuperscript{93} Clergy also raised this question, but also had a range of other themes. One was the need for recommitment to the Christian values said to be

\textsuperscript{90} ibid., p.5.
\textsuperscript{91} \textit{National Day of Remembrance}.
\textsuperscript{92} BT, 12 November 1951, p.5.
\textsuperscript{93} BT, 11 November 1950, p.4.
exemplified by past soldiers, and for which they had fought and died; this would ensure that the evils that Britain had fought against in the past did not re-emerge. Many preachers also worked war memory into Christian mythology. Remembrance Day sermons might have titles such as ‘Beyond the Tomb! Shall we meet our loved ones again?’ or ‘Thy dead men shall live’. In 1964 the Anglican Bishop of Clogher went as far as to say that ‘no man who lays down his life in a great cause is needful of compassion. Let us just remember him. Death is not the end of living – it is the beginning.’ These ideas were encapsulated in the hymn, ‘What Are These’ which was popular in post-war services. This depicted those who had suffered for a righteous cause standing nearest the throne of God in heaven. Linked to this theme of righteous soldiers rewarded by God were the ideas that war was the result of people forgetting Christian principles, and that a new war could only be prevented by people turning to Christ. In the 1960s, issues of sectarianism began occasionally to be raised, mostly by Presbyterians, in a range of ways. In 1961 one minister warned about control passing into Catholic hands while another told an Orange service that Orange-men should love their Catholic fellow man. Four years later another Presbyterian used his Remembrance Sunday service to call for an end to religious discrimination, ‘remembering that in the war we fought shoulder to shoulder’. Clergy were not different from other speakers at historic commemorations in that they frequently used the principles of remembrance in support of their own positions.

Like the Twelfth of July, Remembrance Sunday was a day on which nearly the whole Protestant community could put aside theological differences and come together for a single purpose. Only in Belfast were there always separate services for each denomination. However, the extent to which the entire community actually participated can easily be overstated. In 1950, 215 churches advertised services in the church pages of the eleventh of November edition of the Belfast Telegraph, of which only 83, just over a third, mentioned Remembrance services. The three main denominations – Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and Methodist – dominated these, with most of their
churches holding a Remembrance service. The evangelical churches were the least inclined to make time for war remembrance. Ian Paisley and his brother Harold both preached on Remembrance Sunday, both on other subjects. A decade later the picture was similar, although the percentage of Remembrance services had declined slightly. As in 1950 the three main denominations were the most likely to host such services, although a few Salvation Army and Baptist churches also did so. Once again Ian Paisley had other things on his mind, preaching on the election of John F. Kennedy. In addition, of course, many nominal Protestants would have attended no services, memorial or otherwise, on Remembrance Sunday.

The absence of Catholics from remembrance ceremonies was partially due to their unionist character, but also the Catholic Church’s pre-Vatican II position on other denominations, discussed earlier in this chapter. Between the wars Catholic churches sometimes held memorial services on Armistice Day, but there is little evidence that these were held in more than a tiny number of Catholic churches in Northern Ireland. Religious issues, then, were only a minor part of the Catholic aversion to war commemoration. The more serious problem was the fact that in Northern Ireland the religious divisions of Protestant and Catholic generally corresponded to the political divisions of unionist and nationalist. Remembrance ceremonies often featured Union Jacks and the British national anthem, and there was usually wreath-laying by the enforcers of Northern Irish and British law such as the police, special constabulary, the armed forces, and the Northern Irish parliament. Although the ceremonies theoretically commemorated all those who had fought and died in British uniform, the Somme anniversary focussed almost exclusively on the Ulster Division, and even Remembrance Sunday ceremonies ignored the different ideals for which most Irish Catholics had fought. The absence of Catholic and nationalist councillors from Belfast’s Somme commemorations could be, and sometimes was, justified purely in terms of politics rather than religion. Catholics in Great Britain observed Armistice Day and later Remembrance Sunday in their own churches. But the relationship of most British Catholics with the British state was relatively unproblematic; not so for

100 BT, 12 November 1960, pp.10-11.
102 IN, 2 July 1963, p.3.
Catholics in Northern Ireland. Despite the participation of many Irish Catholics in both world wars, remembrance was seen as the property of the unionist community, and most nationalists had no desire to reclaim it.

There was some Catholic involvement in post-war Remembrance Sundays, but this was sporadic and limited to a few small towns, mostly with balanced populations. In Dungannon in the 1940s, Catholic ex-servicemen paraded with their Protestant comrades before going to a special remembrance Mass while the main ceremony took place in a Protestant church. Remembrance services were also held in a Ballymoney Catholic church in the 1950s and possibly later. In Catholic-dominated towns, Remembrance events seem to have been rare. In 1951, a British Legion group from the heavily Catholic village of Coalisland attended the remembrance ceremony in Dungannon rather than holding its own. However, Dungiven, which was later the site of violent protest over Orange marches, successfully hosted a Remembrance parade and Protestant service in 1953. According to the Telegraph, ‘the main street was crowded with people who had assembled to watch the procession’ which was said to have been the first of its type ever held in the town. No mention was made of any disorder, nor was any significant police presence noted.

A major change in the relationship between Catholics and the rest of the world took place in late 1964, with the release of the Vatican’s Decree on Ecumenism. A result of the Vatican II Council, the Decree acknowledged that the Catholic Church shared important beliefs with the ‘separated’ (non-Catholic) churches, and that non-Catholics could in fact be Christians. While the church had previously been hostile towards the ecumenical movement, the Decree cautiously embraced it. The Church still hoped that non-Catholic Christians would one day see the error of their ways and rejoin Catholicism, but argued that this would only come about through friendly dialogue and mutual understanding. Crucially, the Decree stated that ‘in certain special circumstances… it is allowable, indeed desirable that Catholics should join in prayer with

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103 BT, 11 November 1946, p.5; BT, 11 November 1947, p.5.
104 BT, 12 November 1956, p.6; BT, 10 November 1958, p.9.
105 BT, 12 November 1951, p.7.
106 BT, 9 November 1953, p.6.
their separated brethren’.\textsuperscript{107} Exactly what these special circumstances were was left to the discretion of local bishops, and as a result there was wide regional variation in terms of what Catholics were allowed to become involved in.\textsuperscript{108} In Northern Ireland there was cautious acceptance of the Decree’s principles and from 1965 some Catholic clergy and local council members began to participate in Remembrance ceremonies.\textsuperscript{109}

We will see that the Vatican’s new stance on ecumenism made a significant difference to the relationship of New Zealand Catholics with Anzac Day. In Ireland, however, Catholic objections to war remembrance had more to do with politics than theology. This was especially so in the south, where Armistice Day was marginalised and often marked by conflict.\textsuperscript{110} In 1963, when discussing a hoped-for visit to Northern Ireland by President John F. Kennedy, Prime Minister Terence O’Neill defended his decision to make the Giant’s Causeway the focal point of the visit by saying that ‘I could have asked him to visit the American Hall of Remembrance in the new War Memorial which is going up on Waring Street, but I specifically chose something entirely non-political and non-religious so as not to give offence to his hosts in the South of Ireland.’\textsuperscript{111} That the visit of an American president to a memorial to American troops could be considered political, religious or offensive speaks volumes about the associations of war memory in Ireland, but the world wars were still less contentious than other historical events. In 1965 nationalist Stormont MP Gerry Fitt criticised the Unionist government’s proposals to name a new bridge after unionist leader Edward Carson and suggested ‘the Somme Bridge’ as an acceptable alternative.\textsuperscript{112}

Another illustration of the nationalist aversion to war remembrance can be seen in the Catholic community’s attitude towards the Earl Haig Fund’s Poppy Appeal, which sold artificial poppies to raise funds for ex-servicemen. As Damien Gorman remembers of his Catholic childhood, ‘one of the many rituals, or non-rituals, that I didn’t

\begin{footnotes}
\item[108] Stransky, p.115.
\item[109] BT, 15 November 1965, p.3; IN, 15 November 1965, p.1.
\item[111] NIPD, vol. 54 (1963), col. 730.
\item[112] NIPD, vol. 65 (1965), col. 1555.
\end{footnotes}
quite understand was that we never bought poppies. We refused them. We avoided the poppy-seller.' Tony Canavan’s work on Irish nationalists and war remembrance suggests that this was common in the Catholic community. Perhaps because of this Catholic antipathy, the Northern Irish Protestant community supported the poppy appeal with particular enthusiasm. In the early 1950s, Belfast’s tally of money collected for the appeal was the third highest of any city in the United Kingdom, which is remarkable considering that nearly half the population actively avoided supporting it. According to the *Tyrone Constitution*, the poppy appeared ‘on car bonnets, in hats and caps, shop windows and even, on [Remembrance Day], showing bright in the caps of our policemen all over the Province’.

In 1955 up to 300 poppy sellers were reported to be on the streets of Belfast, with the *Telegraph* making the somewhat unlikely claim that ‘few shoppers in the centre of Belfast went without their Remembrance Poppy’. Like attending a commemoration ceremony, buying and wearing a poppy was a visible reaffirmation of the values of Remembrance Sunday, and so was, in Northern Ireland at least, a political statement.

The one group which was a consistent exception to the Protestantism of Northern Ireland’s Remembrance Sunday was the Jewish community, whose position rewards closer examination. Belfast’s rabbi was in most years the only non-Protestant religious leader to participate in that city’s official Remembrance Sunday and Somme anniversary ceremonies, and every year the synagogue held a special Remembrance service. The Association of Jewish Ex-Servicemen also observed the day, not only attending the synagogue service but also holding a reunion dinner and, from at least 1956, marching in Belfast’s parade. While the rest of the parade usually travelled to one of the main Protestant services, the Jewish contingent broke off and marched to the synagogue. Jewish participation in Remembrance Sunday was probably due to a desire to remember the Jewish dead of two world wars – services in the late 1940s sometimes warned against trusting Germany – and the desire of a small community to take part in the cultural life and rituals of its country. This participation is not especially remarkable or surprising. What is notable is the attitude of the Christian

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113 Lucy and McClure, *Remembrance*, p.84.
114 Canavan, passim.
115 BT, 8 November 1952, p.1.
116 TC, 6 November 1964, p.3.
118 BT, 10 November 1956, p.1.
communities, both of which paid particular attention to Jewish remembrance. In the Telegraph the participation of the Jewish community was always noted, and the rabbi’s sermon usually given column space, even in some cases when the sermons of Protestant clergy were not. The unionist hierarchy took care to acknowledge Jewish remembrance, with the Northern Irish government sending representatives, including the Governor in 1963, to the Jewish remembrance dinner, and in 1959 the Jewish contingent were chosen to lead the ex-service parade. The Irish News also paid particular attention to the Jewish Remembrance Service; in some cases this was the only or main Remembrance Sunday event covered by the News. Although the Jewish community ‘was well represented in the British forces during the war’, in 1947 there were only 1,474 Jews in Northern Ireland, a number which subsequently declined. The profile of the Jewish community in Northern Irish Remembrance Sundays was therefore disproportionately high in relation to their numbers.

The Jewish community’s participation in Remembrance Sunday appears to have been highlighted because it was a useful device for both Christian communities to express their views about the day. For Protestants, Jewish participation could be a subtle stick with which to beat the Catholic community. To many Protestants, Jewish involvement appeared to counter the Catholic claim that Remembrance Sunday was ‘too Protestant’ for them, although this of course ignores the fact that there was no Jewish prohibition on services involving non-Jewish clergy. Protestant emphasis on Jewish involvement served to highlight Catholic non-involvement, and reaffirmed the principle that minorities should not refuse to be involved in majority-dominated events or reject majority culture. For the Irish News, the tendency of rabbis to speak out against the oppression of minorities must have encouraged editors to reproduce their sermons. However the main reason for the News’ emphasis on Jewish participation may have been that it allowed the paper to present itself as being against Britishness rather than against war remembrance. The News often covered Remembrance Day events in Dublin and sometimes in other parts of the world, as well as minority events in Northern Ireland such as the Jewish service and the French community’s wreath.

119 BT, 10 November 1947, p.5; BT, 9 November 1959, p.4; BT, 11 November 1963, p.5.
120 IN, 12 November 1945, p.3; IN, 11 November 1946, p.3; IN, 8 November 1948, p.3; IN, 12 November 1951, p.4; IN, 10 November 1952, p.4.
laying in the Catholic Milltown cemetery. Unlike the Twelfth of July, Remembrance Sunday was rarely criticised, although cynicism made an occasional appearance. Northern Irish war commemorations were imbued with Protestantism and unionism, but the participation of Catholics and nationalists in both world wars made it difficult to criticise remembrance of them. The News might risk comparing the extensive public remembrance of the ‘official’ war dead with the banning of Easter Rising commemorations. But this was unusual; normally the paper stuck to endeavouring to cover Remembrance Sunday without covering anything Protestant in nature; in this the Jewish community was highly useful.

As distance from the last major war grew, there was concern that remembrance was dying out. In particular, it appeared that younger people did not know what Remembrance Sunday or the Poppy Appeal were about. Bill Barbour writes that when he began teaching in 1951, the time since the last war was short enough that the ‘old boys’ named in the school’s Armistice Day ceremony were easily remembered by the teachers. But as time went on, ‘Masters who could remember the personalities behind the names became fewer and fewer, while to the current pupils the names increasingly meant less and less’. Alex Kane remembers something similar:

My earliest memory of Remembrance Sunday is of trooping out from Sunday School to stand around the cenotaph in Armagh and then shivering with cold while very old people, wrapped in black and with what looked like Christmas tree trinkets pinned to their coat laid red wreaths and wiped reddened eyes. Along with my class I followed those shuffling snuffling ranks to church and drifted into my own world as the minister droned on and on and on about sacrifice and the not forgotten. I was twelve years old. What was I supposed to remember?

By the mid 1960s the idea of the ceremony had come under challenge, primarily from those who felt that it glorified war. This idea was rebuked at several reunion dinners in 1964. We will see that Anzac Day experienced similar problems, but earlier and with greater severity.

122 For example, see IN, November 11 1946, p.2.
123 IN, 9 November 1953, p.2.
125 TC, 6 November 1964, p.3.
126 Lucy and McClure, Remembrance, pp.11-12.
127 ibid., p.106.
128 BT, 9 November 1964, p.2. See also BT, 7 November 1964, p.6.
In remembrance rhetoric, the battle of the Somme, and World War I in general, were rarely put into historical context. For most preachers and editorial writers it was enough that the fallen and the returned had offered their lives for a good cause, and time need not be spent on exactly what that cause was or whether it had been worth it. It was unusual for the Somme or the war to be discussed as actual historical events. Much was said about bravery and about the ideals that the fallen had supposedly died for, but at least as far as speeches and sermons were reported it was unusual for the facts of trench life, the place of the Somme in wider strategy or any other concrete realities to be mentioned. The 50th anniversary of the Somme prompted a flurry of new historiography in the form of books, pamphlets, lectures and newspaper articles, which in Northern Ireland mostly reaffirmed old pieties. R.J.C. Broadhurst opened his history of the Ulster Division with the mistaken claim that it was entirely Protestant. In a lecture to soldiers at Thiepval Barracks in Lisburn, J.T. Sleator prefaced his account of the Ulster Division at the Somme with a brief history of Ulster, including the formation of the UVF, and argued that the actions of the Division showed their ‘overwhelming wish to remain part of the United Kingdom’. Like earlier writers both Broadhurst and Sleator presented the Division as heroic, advancing across no man's land ‘as if on parade’, and inspired by the anniversary of the Boyne. Sleator blamed the carnage on factors such as terrain and difficulties in communication, rather than poor leadership or bad strategy.

Some popular historiography was much more iconoclastic. In particular, the Belfast Telegraph, which we saw in an earlier chapter was attempting to modernise unionism, ran a series of articles on the 50th anniversary of the Somme which challenged much of its mythology. It was pointed out that Irish nationalists had enthusiastically enlisted and that several nationalist leaders had been killed at the Somme. A range of veterans wholeheartedly adopted a narrative similar to the revisionist history then being published elsewhere, either because they had always been angry about their experience or possibly because new ways of seeing war had changed their

129 R.J.C. Broadhurst, Souvenir Booklet commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, np, 1966, p.3. For evidence of Catholics in the Ulster Division, see Orr, p.74.
131 Broadhurst, p.7; Sleator, pp.19-20.
132 Sleator, pp.21-3.
133 BT, 29 June 1966, p.8; BT, 30 June 1966, p.10.
The horrors of trench warfare were recounted and the Somme described as ‘a terrible blunder’ and ‘a battle in which we never had a chance’. In a short article, former officer H. Malcolm McKee attacked British commander General Haig and described the soldiers as ‘locked in chains for execution’. He also debunked some of the Ulster-specific mythology, such as the idea that the men had been inspired by the anniversary of the Boyne. ‘How many would have known the Boyne was fought on the First of July? I don’t know why they plaster such incidents on our battle. Nothing was further from my mind than the Boyne on the Somme’. However he did reinforce one piece of Ulster mythology: ‘the Somme won Northern Ireland for the [United] Kingdom’.

Much of this was in keeping with the revisionist histories of World War I which were written in the 1960s. These were inspired by the anti-militaristic mood created by the Vietnam War, the popularity of Marxism in some academic circles, and the associated rise of the history of the working classes and other marginalised people. A mythology emerged of ‘lions led by donkeys’: the idea that ordinary soldiers had been betrayed by upper-class twit officers who had thrown away their troops’ lives for no good reason. In reality, the British upper classes lost proportionately more of their young men than did the working classes. Despite this, the ‘lions and donkeys’ view of the war seems to have had popular resonance in Protestant Northern Ireland as well as in less ‘loyal’ parts of the United Kingdom. Growing up in working-class North Belfast in the 1960s, Geoffrey Beattie heard the saying ‘a hundred times’.

Throughout the United Kingdom, Remembrance Sunday suffered from its association with what was now seen as a pointless war characterised by the slaughter of the young and working-class on the orders of the old and rich. As well as the class aspect, Beattie’s recollections of the Somme mythology received by working-class Ulster

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137 Simkins, p.298.


139 Richardson, p.359.
Protestant children emphasise the bravery of the Ulster Division: ‘Every boy in Belfast knew something about the Somme: the men not turning back, walking to their deaths in the service of the Crown, a true blood sacrifice, perhaps one of the greatest blood sacrifices of all’. As this indicates, the mythology focussed almost exclusively on the Somme, and on the Ulster Division’s role in it. As a child, Beattie read Michael MacDonagh’s *The Irish on the Somme*, written as an Irish nationalist reminder of how both Irish communities had fought together. Beattie, perhaps like most other Northern Irish Protestant boys, was only interested in the chapter on the Ulster Division, and as a result ‘always thought of the Somme as a battle fought just by Protestant Ulster on the British side’.

Chapter One showed that the Twelfth of July was particularly important to Ulster Protestants because it reaffirmed ideals and principles of Britishness and Protestantism threatened by Irish republicanism. Remembrance Sunday and the Somme anniversary both served a similar function, although not quite in the same way. Their ideals enabled Northern Irish war commemorations to maintain fairly strong public support while those in New Zealand, as we will see, suffered severe declines in attendance and support after World War II. Despite a widespread feeling that the British had let their boys be killed unnecessarily, Ulster Protestants used war remembrance to reaffirm their British identities and loyalty to Britain. This reaffirmation was not so chauvinist as to completely exclude Catholics, as the Twelfth did, but its presence was enough to make war commemoration in Northern Ireland an almost entirely Protestant matter. The latent sectarianism of these commemorations was usually far below the surface, but in 1966 rising tensions combined with the 50th anniversaries of the Somme and the Easter Rising to exacerbate communal divisions and help spark the Troubles.

1966: Commemorations and fear

The 1960s saw the 50th anniversaries of several important events in the modern history of Ulster: the Ulster Solemn League and Covenant, the formation of the Ulster

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140 Beattie, p.44.
141 Beattie, p.133.
Volunteer Force, and the Larne Gun-Running, all of which were used by the increasingly popular Ian Paisley to bolster his view of history as an ongoing struggle between the evil empire of Catholicism and the forces of righteousness embodied by himself. 1966 was particularly important; it was the 50th anniversary of two of the most iconic events in modern Irish history: the Battle of the Somme and the Easter Rising. Both were commemorated in Northern Ireland, but along strongly sectarian lines. Protestants remembered their people’s sacrifices for Britain at the Somme while Catholics commemorated the republican uprising of Easter 1916. From the unionist perspective, there could be no meaningful comparison between the two anniversaries: one commemorated brave acts in support of the sovereign power while the other dredged up a foolhardy act of treason. Nationalists, on the other hand, tended to see the Easter Rising as a courageous act of patriotism, the Battle of the Somme as a unionist irrelevance, and the First World War in general as an exercise in imperialist violence in which the British had been at least as bad as the Germans. Since unionists controlled the government of Northern Ireland, the two events were not, of course, commemorated equally. Although the government resisted calls to ban the Rising commemorations, they were monitored by the police, and train travel from the Republic was restricted around Easter 1966.142 In contrast, the anniversary of the Battle of the Somme was marked by large official ceremonies. The commemorations reflected contemporary power divisions far more than any analysis of the events they remembered.

According to Roy Garland, the anniversaries of the early to mid 1960s were ‘crucial in heightening tensions and the sense of impending crisis… The celebration of former heroic, if illegal, activities was to form part of an elementary historical education about Ulster’s past which had been denied to most working class Protestants’.143 At the grass-roots level, the commemorations served to harden the attitudes of each community towards the other. In his autobiography, Terence O’Neill argued that ‘the co-operation which had started with the visit of Sean Lemass in 1965 had… been shattered by the insistence of the Belfast Catholics in celebrating the 50th anniversary

143 Garland, p.159.
of the Dublin Rebellion’.144 This is somewhat misleading since the commemorations themselves were peaceful, despite widespread unionist fears that they would be accompanied by an IRA bombing campaign.145 They acted as a catalyst in the sense that they were a source of resentment for the Protestant community, resentment which was built up and built upon by Ian Paisley, who owed much of his subsequent high profile to the events of 1966.146 He staged numerous counter-demonstrations, held a thanksgiving for ‘the defeat of the 1916 rebels and the salvation of Ulster from Papal domination’, and used the mood of opposition to the commemorations to launch his Protestant Telegraph newspaper.147 The fear of a renewed IRA campaign in conjunction with the Rising anniversary may have also been a reason for the formation of the first of the many loyalist paramilitary groups which emerged over the following decades – the Ulster Volunteer Force.148

The name of this group shows the importance of the 50th anniversary of the Somme. As one of the few non-seditious events with a significant anniversary in the early to mid 1960s, it allowed unionists to contrast the loyalty of their forebears with the treasonous behaviour of republicans. The Ulster Division’s role in the Somme also allowed unionists to excuse the illegal activities of Ulster paramilitaries before the war. The focus on the Division and the Somme, rather than on World War I in general, also allowed many to forget – or prevented them from finding out – about the enlistment in the British Army of thousands of nationalists. The association of the original UVF – like their successors, a sectarian paramilitary group – with the heroism of the First World War allowed the new version to make claims to historical and moral legitimacy normally inaccessible to such organisations.149 Despite its pedigree, the UVF name was tainted not long after its re-formation, when it was implicated in a series of murders in May and June 1966.150 It was banned by O’Neill on his return from a Somme commemoration in France, the trip itself being a claim to the legacy of

146 Bruce, pp.80-1; Taylor, Loyalists, p.35.
147 O’Callaghan and O’Donnell, p.206.
150 Taylor, Loyalists, pp.40-44.
the Ulster Division.\footnote{Bardon, History of Ulster, p.635.} The use of the UVF name was widely decried by mainstream unionists: O’Neill said that there was no connection whatsoever ‘between men who were ready to die for the country on the fields of France, and a sordid conspiracy of criminals prepared to take up arms against unprotected citizens’.\footnote{O’Callaghan and O’Donnell, p.215.} Brian Faulkner described the new UVF as ‘a newly emerged band of thugs masquerading under the once honourable title’.\footnote{NIPD, vol. 64 (1966), col. 328; Garland, p.12. See also BT, 30 June 1966, p.7.} The legacy of the UVF was valuable property for which unionists from all over the political spectrum competed.

There were a number of official commemorations of the Battle of the Somme, including the laying of a wreath at the Ulster Tower at Thiepval on the Somme by O’Neill, and a pilgrimage to the site by almost 200 Northern Irish Somme veterans.\footnote{BT, 27 June 1966, p.3; BT, 30 June 1966, p.8.} The Orange Order, which had always been prominent in the remembrance of the battle, also held special commemorations. On the Sunday before the first of July, three large services were held in Belfast alone, preceded by parades of Orangemen and women.\footnote{BT, 27 June 1966, p.3.} At one of these services a speaker recalled that many Irish republicans had sided with Germany in both world wars and warned his audience that ‘the danger remains that some Irishmen will continue to side with the enemies of England, thinking to further their own causes… [they] side with the devil rather than God, yet pray to God for help’.\footnote{ibid.} Many non-Orange commemorative events were used to appeal for an end to sectarian division.\footnote{BT, 2 July 1966, p.2.} In Banbridge a war memorial service was conducted by ministers from the Church of Ireland, Presbyterian, Methodist and Catholic churches, with the Catholic priest reading the lesson and the Methodist minister saying that ‘we have to be peace makers’. Government Chief Whip James Chichester-Clark, speaking at a service in Magherafelt, appealed to his listeners to respect religious differences, and criticised the new UVF, calling it a desecration and insult to the historic Ulster Volunteer Force. Although the Derry service was conducted in an Anglican cathedral, the Bishop of Derry and Raphoe emphasised in his address that, at the Somme, men from north and south had ‘flung aside their internal differences and divisions and had united to serve a cause of transcending magnitude’. There was
strong competition for the meaning of the Somme, similar to that for the meaning of the Twelfth at the same time.

One of the biggest events was held at the Balmoral Show Grounds in Belfast and was attended by the Queen and Duke of Edinburgh.\(^\text{158}\) Although there was a parade of veterans, the commemoration consisted primarily of a religious service conducted by Methodist, Presbyterian, Anglican and Catholic chaplains with participation from ex-service Unionist Party MPs Norman Stronge and O’Neill.\(^\text{159}\) The event was un-Protestant enough for one person to write to the *Belfast Newsletter* to complain that it had included ‘non-scriptural’ prayers for the dead; a feature of Catholic worship anathema to many Protestants.\(^\text{160}\) However this and the participation of the Catholic chaplain was not enough to prevent the ceremony appearing to be an overwhelmingly unionist celebration. Garland remembers watching it and identifying with ‘the men of 1912’, which is interesting considering that it commemorated of the men of 1916; perhaps the unionist nature of the event made it easy to confuse of the Ulster Volunteer Force with the Ulster Division.\(^\text{161}\)

We have seen that in times of crisis, it is common for people to appeal to the past in support of their positions and actions. In 1966 Northern Ireland was not yet in crisis but it was clear that it was heading in that direction. As a result, there was heavy competition for the legacy of the Ulster Division, a unit formed partially out of the sectarian militias formed to resist Irish Home Rule. Since 1916, war commemoration in Northern Ireland had focussed primarily on the Ulster Division and its role in the Battle of the Somme. This emphasis on and glorification of a mostly Protestant division with sectarian origins allowed extreme loyalists to stake a claim to this legacy. While the majority of Northern Irish war commemorations were not sectarian and, as we have seen, allowed and even encouraged participation by non-Protestants, the ceremonies were nevertheless reaffirmations of Britishness and Protestantism. This tradition, combined with the heightened tensions which accompanied the 50th

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\(^\text{158}\) BT, 12 July 1966, p.10.
\(^\text{159}\) *Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, 4th July 1966*, Ulster and Irish Studies Collection, Belfast Central Public Library; *Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, July 1916 – November 1916: Order of Divine Service*, found inside Broadhurst, *50th Anniversary of the Somme*, Ulster and Irish Studies Collection, Belfast Central Public Library.
\(^\text{160}\) BN, 12 July 1966, p.4.
\(^\text{161}\) Garland, p.160.
anniversary of the Easter Rising, played a crucial role in the origins of the Troubles, strongly indicating that historic commemorations are more about the present than the past.
War commemorations in New Zealand were at least as culturally important as those in Northern Ireland. Northern Irish Protestants took immense pride in the achievements of the Ulster Division on the Somme, and New Zealanders generally had similar feelings about the Anzac campaign at Gallipoli. The emphasis on the Anzacs was such that it was Anzac Day, the anniversary of their landing at Gallipoli, rather than Armistice Day which was the main war commemoration in New Zealand. Armistice Day was always a junior cousin to Anzac Day, and did not survive its transformation to Remembrance Sunday in New Zealand. After World War II Anzac Day was also altered to commemorate the dead of both world wars, but quickly suffered a significant drop in attendance. By the late 1950s, there were widespread calls for the day to be less sombre and restrictive, and even for the public holiday to be abolished. Despite this, the day was observed by a broad cross-section of New Zealand society; in contrast with the other commemorations studied in this thesis, members of virtually every community participated in Anzac Day ceremonies.

We have seen in earlier chapters, particularly that on Waitangi Day, that for a historic commemoration to be successful, it is not enough for the values it reaffirms to be widely believed in. They must also be perceived as urgently needed, under threat, or both. Anzac Day reaffirmed the values of military readiness, self-sacrifice, and dedication to country, but although most New Zealanders were concerned about communist and nuclear threats, the country was never in imminent danger after 1945. This meant that although many New Zealanders supported Anzac Day in principle, few saw the need for the strict restrictions on commerce and entertainment which characterised the day until the 1960s. New Zealand’s Remembrance Sunday fared even worse. Like Anzac Day, it suffered from a widespread perception that war commemorations reaffirmed values which were neither threatened nor urgently needed. In addition, Remembrance Sunday lacked Anzac Day’s additional patriotic meanings and, as was the case elsewhere, the advent of World War II and the Cold War had stripped its predecessor Armistice Day of its message of peace.

Despite the widespread indifference to war commemorations, Anzac Day does illustrate the concept of historic commemorations as unifying forces. By the 1950s,
only a minority of New Zealanders attended Anzac Day ceremonies, but it was a broadly representative minority. Maori, Pakeha, women, men, Catholics, Protestants, Jews, and others all participated. Until the mid 1960s, Catholic participation was limited, but in contrast to Northern Ireland this was for religious rather than political reasons. Whereas Waitangi Day tried and mostly failed to unite New Zealanders behind the principles of inter-racial brotherhood, Anzac Day succeeded in uniting a small but broad cross-section behind shared values such as remembrance of the dead, self-sacrifice and dedication to country. These values may not have been compelling for most New Zealanders, but they were respected across ethnic, religious and gender lines, and at least some New Zealanders from most backgrounds were willing to make an effort to reaffirm them.

As in the other commemorations examined in this thesis, Anzac Day’s values were expressed mostly in terms of contemporary concerns rather than history. The past was discussed at Anzac Day perhaps more than at any other historic commemoration studied here, but the rhetoric still demonstrates that it was more about the present than the past. The Anzacs were frequently mentioned in Anzac Day speeches, but often this was in order to contrast them with contemporary New Zealanders. Anzac Day audiences were frequently urged to live up to the Anzac example and to ensure that the fallen had not died in vain. The history of the Gallipoli campaign was frequently mined for reasons to support contemporary defence policies, including Compulsory Military Training and military alliances with Australia and the United States. The past was of interest because of how it related to the present, not for its own sake.

The previous chapter showed that, in the United Kingdom, war remembrance ceremonies are an under-researched area of study. New Zealand is little better. Although several historians have published important work on the history of Anzac Day,1 no overall history has been written other than the entry in the Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History, and the period after 1939 has been covered only in this entry, one article, and a single MA thesis.2 This contrasts with the large amount

of work on Anzac Day in Australia, where it occupies a similar place in culture and society. The day has been examined on local and state levels, as have specific aspects such as the religious and gendered dimensions, and the late twentieth century revival.\(^3\) As in New Zealand, however, attention has been focussed overwhelmingly on the foundations and early history of Anzac Day, with the post-war period particularly neglected.

Gallipoli, the Armistice and war commemorations in New Zealand to 1939

The Gallipoli campaign was a response to the deadlock which had developed on the Western Front by the end of 1914.\(^4\) In order to create another front in the war, British First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill planned an attack on the Dardanelles, the strait separating the Aegean Sea from the Sea of Marmara. Control of the strait would allow a naval attack on Constantinople, the capital of German ally the Ottoman Empire. The initial plan was for the attack to be carried out solely by the Navy, but initial efforts were unsuccessful and so plans were made to take the high ground around the strait using a land force. The attack was a strategic novelty, arguably the first major amphibious campaign in modern warfare.\(^5\) Part of the British force was the combined New Zealand and Australian Division, which landed on 25 April 1915.


and the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, or Anzacs, as they became known, were landed too slowly and on the wrong beach, consequently having to face very difficult terrain. After an initial assault, the Anzacs were beaten back and entrenched themselves on the peninsula. Within weeks the conditions on the Western front had been all but replicated at Gallipoli, with a trench-based stalemate and occasional unsuccessful frontal assaults. New Zealand troops temporarily captured a hill called Chunuk Bair, but the British forces who relieved them were driven off by a massive Turkish counter-attack. The allied troops remained on the peninsula until mid-December, when lack of progress and harsh weather led to the start of evacuations. The campaign was a failure, but had no effect on the outcome of the war, which would be decided on the Western Front.

New Zealand’s first Gallipoli commemoration took place as soon as news of the battle and its casualties reached the public, on 30 April 1915. A half day holiday was declared, flags flown, and patriotic meetings held. Further commemoration services were held on Empire Day (24 May), but the next major event was on the anniversary of the Gallipoli landings, when a half day holiday was gazetted. Already called Anzac Day, commemorations were held around the country and were ‘remarkably uniform in their form and content’. Processions of returned soldiers took place, with the soldiers sometimes joined by reservists and in a few cases the fire brigade and local school children. The parades would end at the Town Hall or a park, where local dignitaries and clergy would make speeches and a religious service was often held. The bravery and valour of the troops was emphasised, and speakers also expressed pleasure that the Dominion’s troops had shown themselves worthy of the motherland; a crucial test had been passed. In 1918, the Armistice was observed in many parts of New Zealand with ‘wild celebration’, tempered in some cases by the realities of the influenza epidemic and sensitivity to those who had lost loved ones in the war.

7 Sharpe, p.100; Sinclair, Destiny Apart, p.182.
8 Worthy, ‘Debt of Honour’, p.188. For a mention of ‘Anzac Day’ from 1916, see ODT, 15 April 1916, p.4.
As in Northern Ireland, Armistice Day, including the two minutes’ silence, was annually observed in New Zealand on 11 November. In Auckland, ‘pedestrians who had been hurrying on their way stood still suddenly, as if turned to stone’. There do not appear to have been many official Armistice Day ceremonies, although there were numerous one-off ceremonies for the unveiling of war memorials; in the inter-war period it was the second most popular date for this, after Anzac Day. Once a memorial was unveiled, it became a site for the Armistice Day laying of wreaths by individuals and private groups. The major theme seems to have been the sacrifices made, and this time of the year was used to raise funds for returned soldiers and war memorials. Artificial roses were sold for this purpose from 1924, and the Returned Soldiers’ Association (later the Returned Services Association, generally known as the RSA) would provide collectors for Rose Day for several decades, with funds going to a range of beneficiaries, some of them ex-service organisations.

Also in common with Northern Ireland, New Zealand war remembrance was not limited to Armistice Day but commemorated an iconic battle as well. In contrast to Northern Ireland, however, Armistice Day was the smaller commemoration. In the inter-war period, Anzac Day ceremonies drew crowds of thousands to the Auckland Cenotaph compared to the hundreds who attended Armistice Day wreath-layings there. The Anzac Day Act 1920 specified that the day commemorated ‘the part taken by the New Zealand troops in the Great War, and in memory of those who gave their lives for the Empire’ rather than those who fought at Gallipoli specifically. However, the selection of Anzac Day for a public holiday rather than Armistice Day shows the importance of Gallipoli in the national psyche. The forms of Anzac Day remembrance drew from a shared, pan-British culture of war commemoration. In

12 NZH, 12 November 1919, p.9.
14 NZH, 12 November 1923, p.9.
18 Anzac Day Act 1920, section 2.
contrast with Northern Ireland’s Somme anniversary, with its banners and Orange parades, there was little or no use of pre-existing local forms. Maureen Sharpe and Scott Worthy show how the ceremonies initially took a strongly religious form as organisers mined the existing rituals of church services and funerals for appropriate-seeming forms. In 1920 Anzac Day had been made a public holiday on which all commerce and entertainment was halted, and from 1922 trading and licensing restrictions were the same as those for a Sunday, indicating the quasi-sacred nature of the day. The RSA sold fund-raising poppies on the day in adaptation of the British Armistice Day practice. New Zealand remembrance was not solely derived from British models, however: other Commonwealth countries could also provide inspiration. Just before the outbreak of World War Two, the dawn service ceremony was introduced from Australia, becoming an enduring feature of the day.

The somewhat religious nature of Anzac Day meant that it was affected by the Catholic Church’s ban on its adherents attending ceremonies involving other churches’ clergy. Michael King wrote of his childhood that ‘we were not to attend Protestant services – whether baptisms, weddings, funerals or Anzac Day parades – unless we had dispensation from our parish priest’. Although he was discussing the period after World War II, there is no reason to believe that the Church’s general attitude was any different between the wars. There were some exceptions, though. From 1930, Catholic ex-servicemen marched in Auckland’s Anzac Day parades and attended the public service, which had been altered to reduce clerical participation to a level acceptable to the Catholic Church. As well as being Protestant-dominated, most commemorations were also dominated by Pakeha, although Maori were involved. New Zealand’s first World War I memorial seems to have been organised by Northland Maori, and there are several specifically Maori memorials on marae, in churches, and in Wanganui’s Moutoa Gardens.

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20 They were initially the same as those of Christmas Day and Good Friday. Sharpe, p.104; Anzac Day Act 1920, clause 3; Anzac Day Amendment Act 1921-22, section 2.
21 Sinclair, Destiny Apart, p.183.
24 Clarke, p.92. Sharpe attributes the change to the influence of John A. Lee. Sharpe, p.105.
At Anzac Day services it was common for speakers to assert that New Zealand had become a nation at Gallipoli. Early accounts of the New Zealand role in the campaign, many of them written by its veterans, tend to support the idea of an emerging New Zealand identity and patriotism, although usually in the context of the British Empire. These New Zealand soldiers saw themselves as different from the British soldiers who they encountered, and appropriated Maori phrases and motifs in order to assert a New Zealand identity. Despite this, they still specifically identified as British, though few if any explored the notion of what Britishness actually was and who it included.²⁶ Some felt that New Zealand had become a nation during the war, although not necessarily at Gallipoli.²⁷ Early Anzac Days reaffirmed many of the same values as early war commemorations in Northern Ireland: pride in one’s countrymen and how they had fought, a broad and somewhat vague Britishness, remembrance of the dead, and the essentially worthwhile nature of what they had died for, even though they had not been immediately successful.

Commemorating the First World War during the Second

In earlier chapters we saw that a historic commemoration’s wartime prospects depended mostly on whether it was of use to the war effort. In Great Britain, Armistice Day was cancelled because it was more about pacifism than patriotism, whereas in Northern Ireland its patriotic connotations meant that it was only toned down. Although inter-war Anzac Days were primarily remembrances of the dead, like Northern Irish commemorations they were also expressions of pride in the nation’s soldiers. Because of this, Anzac Day continued throughout World War II, attracting large crowds in the early years of the war.

The idea that New Zealand had become a nation at Gallipoli was reaffirmed during the Second World War. In doing this, Anzac Day speakers and editorialists supported

New Zealand’s involvement in the new conflict and thus made Anzac Day a propaganda tool for the war effort. The Gallipoli campaign and the original Anzacs were seen as symbolising dedication, self-sacrifice and fighting spirit, and so Anzac Day was a rededication to these ideals, vital in a time of war. At Anzac Day ceremonies and in editorials, New Zealanders were exhorted to ‘live up to the spirit of Anzac’ through war work, support for the poppy appeal and, ideally, signing up to fight in the new war.\(^{28}\) Anzac Day provided New Zealanders with a standard to live up to, and also gave them a sense that the war was winnable, because they had won in the past.\(^{28}\) Anzac Day editorials frequently presented a glowing image of the Gallipoli campaign, claiming that it was a success because allied troops had chosen to leave rather than being driven off. It was regularly asserted, especially by the RSA, that the new troops were upholding the Anzac tradition, and on Anzac Day the RSA usually sent a message to them saying this. As well as praising the quality of New Zealand’s soldiery, Anzac speakers and writers reaffirmed the broader qualities of justice and freedom by claiming that the war had been caused by a failure to commit to these principles.

Despite some in New Zealand wondering whether they should follow Britain’s lead and cancel public commemorations, the war’s initial impact on Anzac Day was relatively minor, partly because the first wartime Anzac Day was the 25\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Gallipoli landings.\(^{29}\) The need for the values reaffirmed on Anzac Day seems to have been felt most strongly in the early years of the war, with 30,000 people attending the 1941 Auckland daytime ceremony.\(^{30}\) In the Wellington area that year, at least 27 separate Anzac services and other ceremonies were held.\(^{31}\) This desire for appropriate ritual can also be seen in the high church attendances of 1940, and in the Anzac Day services held by New Zealand and Australian prisoners of war.\(^{32}\) In 1942 the threat of Japanese invasion following the fall of Singapore caused the cancellation of

\(^{28}\) All information from *New Zealand Herald* and *Evening Post* Anzac Day coverage and editorials, 1940 to 1945, unless otherwise indicated.

\(^{29}\) Various letters to and from Internal Affairs, ACGO 8333 IA1W2578 229 158/36 part 2, ANZW.

\(^{30}\) NZH, 26 April 1941, p.11.

\(^{31}\) EP, 24 April 1941, pp. 8, 9.

dawn services, but these were reinstated the following year. Attendance at Anzac services dropped as the war went on, with only 8000 attending the Auckland daytime ceremony in 1944, including about a thousand returned servicemen and 300 American soldiers. This perhaps indicates war-weariness or growing cynicism about the patriotic idealism inherent in such commemorations.

Peter Lineham has shown that in New Zealand there were no significant differences between the main churches’ attitudes to World War II; all supported the war effort and all prayed for peace. On Anzac Day 1940 in Wellington, Catholic returned servicemen held their own parade, followed by a Requiem Mass for the war dead. Attendees would have been discouraged by their clergy from attending either the dawn service or the citizens’ service in the afternoon, conducted by the Anglican Primate of New Zealand and Bishop of Wellington respectively. Protestant clergy also played a role in various suburban services in the Wellington area. In Auckland, the citizens’ service would not have caused problems as it did not involve clergy, but the dawn service featured an Anglican chaplain. In general, Anzac Day was much more religious than is sometimes asserted, with some non-clerical speakers expressing strongly religious views. For example, in 1940 RSA President William Perry sent a message to the New Zealand troops stating that they were ‘the new Crusaders’, fighting against ‘the would-be destroyers of all religion’. Some Anzac services seem to been little more than conventional church services with a few commemorative motifs, and many of the smaller ones consisted mostly of hymns and other religious forms such as prayer and benediction. Even the Auckland citizens’ service involved

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34 NZH, 26 April 1944, p.6.
38 EP, 26 April 1940, p.5.
39 NZH, 26 April 1940, p.11.
41 EP, 26 April 1940, p.5. See also EP, 26 April 1941, p.11.
two hymns as well as God Save the King. Anzac Day itself was seen by many in quasi-religious terms; in 1943 it coincided with Easter Sunday and this was described as highly appropriate, since both were about sacrifice, hope, and ‘triumph over death’.

Armistice Day also continued to be observed during the war, but in a very muted form. In Wellington, it was observed ‘as usual’ in 1939, with two minutes’ silence, a wreath laying attended by about 200 people, and a small parade of ex-servicemen. The following year’s ceremonies in Wellington consisted only of the silence, said to have been ‘generally observed’, a service at the Dominion Farmers’ Institute, and a small RSA wreath-laying attended by 200 to 300 people. At later points in the war, wreaths were laid by representatives of some allied nations. The day was also used for events such as the unveiling of rolls of honour. Beyond the silence, which may not have been as widely observed as the newspapers reported, Armistice Day was an event which few New Zealanders acknowledged during World War II. This indicates serious problems with the day, the biggest of which was that it commemorated the end of ‘the war to end all wars’ at a time when an even bigger war was in progress.

As in Northern Ireland, existing commemorations came to be seen, early in the war, as honouring the newly dead and returned as well as those from World War I. In Auckland, representatives of the armed forces laid wreaths on Anzac Day 1940 for this reason. By 1943 the RSA had adopted as official policy the idea that Anzac Day should commemorate the fallen of both world wars. It was widely considered that the new war had given additional significance to Anzac Day, particularly for those too young to remember the First World War. As in Northern Ireland, those unable to emulate the deeds of earlier soldiers could contribute to their welfare and that of their successors by donating to the poppy appeal, which showed record returns during the

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43 Auckland Returned Services’ Association, ‘The Cenotaph, Auckland War Memorial Museum, Anzac Day, Sunday, 25th April, 1943’, ACGO 8333 IA1 2999 158/36/1 part 1, ANZW.
47 Cooke, All Formed Up, p.90.
48 Anzac Day Commemoration Committee of the Auckland City Council, meeting, 1 April 1940, Various Minutes, July 7 1938 – November 8 1948, ACC 182/4/106913, ACA.
war years.\textsuperscript{50} Rose Day, associated with Armistice Day in New Zealand, also did well.\textsuperscript{51} This provides further evidence that the ideals and principles promoted by war commemorations were strongly related to the contemporary conflict. In peacetime, the principles of sacrifice and support for those who had served were considered important but were probably not compelling for many. The war context made it easy to relate these ideals to real and often familiar people who were seen as embodying many of the commemorations’ core values.

Commemorations in crisis

It seems logical that the commemorations of one major war would be boosted by participation in a second and even larger war, primarily against the same enemy and with most of the same allies. In New Zealand, however, the aftermath of World War II saw the collapse of one World War I commemoration and a significant decline in another. Possible reasons for this include a sense of relative national security, which made recommitment to many of the values expressed in war commemorations seem unnecessary, and World War II stripping World War I commemorations of much of their meaning. This was especially the case with Remembrance Sunday, as Armistice Day became. Lacking Anzac Day’s patriotic connotations and not serving any purpose not fulfilled by that day, Remembrance Sunday quickly died in New Zealand. Anzac Day was healthier, but the restrictions on commerce and entertainment on the day came to be seen as unnecessary as widespread belief in its sacredness faded. As was discussed in the introduction to this thesis, Robert Bellah described civil religious ceremonies as reaffirming core values and in some cases honouring the ‘sacred dead’. Anzac Day broadly fits this description. Like actual religious ceremonies, however, in the second half of the twentieth century it saw a serious decline in belief and adherence.

As with Armistice Day in Britain, consideration was given to replacing Anzac Day with a new day or days less closely connected to the First World War.\textsuperscript{52} Even the

\textsuperscript{50} NZH, 27 April 1942, p.4; EP, 27 April 1942, p.6; Cooke, \textit{All Formed Up}, p.85.
\textsuperscript{51} Cooke, \textit{All Formed Up}, p.85.
\textsuperscript{52} Rev. Yule to Fraser, 9 August 1946, ACGO 8333 IA1 3000 158/55/1 part 1, ANZW; Clarke, p.60.
RSA was not sure whether Anzac Day should continue, advising the Prime Minister in 1946 that it should commemorate the dead of both wars, but internally debating the issue the following year.\(^{53}\) In 1949 the dedication of Anzac Day to those who had fought and died in both world wars (and the Boer War) was passed into law, formalising ‘what the position has been in practice over the last few years’.\(^{54}\) The day was always observed on 25 April even when the date fell during a weekend and, as the result of an RSA campaign, the Act banned the granting of holidays in lieu if this happened.\(^{55}\) Anzac Day was to be a day of remembrance, not a day of recreation – an attitude which would later have an unfortunate effect on public attitudes to the day.

The nature of Anzac Day ceremonies, particularly in suburban areas, tended to follow a typical pattern, as described by the *Herald* in 1951:

Servicemen gathered and, led by a band, marched to war memorials, where wreaths were laid. In some places where there was no proper monument, the flowers were set on stands and later taken to the soldiers’ cemetery at Waikumete. After the laying of wreaths, services were held either at the monuments, as at Newmarket, Devonport and Otahuhu, or in nearby halls and cinemas, as in Papatoetoe, Papakura, Onehunga and Takapuna.\(^{56}\)

The pattern was more or less the same in the Wellington region seven years later.\(^{57}\) In small towns the ceremonies were similar, with possibly more participation from women and children.\(^{58}\) Rural observances could be more emotional than those in the cities, since many of the participants would have had connections to most of the names on the war memorial.\(^{59}\) Although suburban and small town ceremonies seemed fairly simple, they took considerable time and money to organise: in 1961 the local Anzac Day ceremony cost the Onehunga Borough Council £113/6/3, for example, more than half of which was wages for council staff.\(^{60}\) Services were also held in many schools, either on the day itself or on the schoolday before.

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53 Harrison to Prime Minister, 27 August 1946, ACGO 8333 IA1 2999 158/36/1 part 1, ANZW; Clarke, pp.62-3.
55 Patterson, pp.22-3; Clarke, pp.64-5; Anzac Day Act 1949.
56 NZH, 26 April 1951, p.10.
58 For example, see Herb Jensen, ‘Personal Record’, 1940, F62404, and Claude Butler, ‘Personal Record’, 1955, F58942, NZFTA, for small town Anzac Day ceremonies.
59 Clarke, p.22.
60 Memo for Councillor Beeson, OHB 115/1-5/7/396870/1960-66, ACA.
honour, a guest speaker, and two minutes’ silence followed by a ‘thunderous drum-roll’ which was ‘regarded as an important test. If you did not flinch at the crash of drums, but stood unmoved, eyes unblinking, then the odds looked good – you could take gun-fire’. After public services, the day could become very informal, and a number of somewhat disreputable soldier traditions were renewed. The dawn service was usually followed by the distribution of coffee ‘strongly laced with rum’, and the gambling game two-up would often be played. Such things received approval from those who might normally frown on drinking and gambling: the rum was usually distributed by the women’s branch of the RSA or by female ex-auxiliaries, and in 1948 the first two-up coins were tossed by Prime Minister Peter Fraser. There seems to have also been widespread drinking at RSA clubrooms and other venues, but as this was not publically discussed until the 1960s, when it became a major focus of criticism, it is difficult to determine the extent or nature of this aspect of the day.

Anzac Day ceremonies in the immediate post-war years were strongly supported, and it initially appeared that war commemorations would continue to hold the same social and cultural power as in the years after World War I. Large crowds turned out for the first post-war observance, with 30,000 attending the daytime ceremony in Auckland and a larger venue required in Christchurch. Public ceremonies were held all over the Wellington region, with the number reaching 25 in 1948. By 1957, 153 new war memorials had been completed, with another 210 in the planning or construction stage. These were frequently unveiled or dedicated on Anzac Day. Despite this, from the early 1950s, RSAs across New Zealand complained of declining attendances at daytime Anzac Day services. In 1951 the Auckland RSA altered the time of its citizen’s service from 11am to 3pm in an attempt to counter ‘a regrettably large falling off in the number of ex-servicemen and women on parade and also a decline in the number of spectators’. In 1958, the Wellington RSA moved their citizens’ service from 3pm to 10am, citing similar problems with attendance, and Christchurch

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63 EP, 26 April 1948, p.8. The two-up tradition was fading by the early 1960s. EP, 26 April 1962, p.11.
64 NZH, 26 April 1946, p.9; Clarke, p.48.
67 Auckland RSA Secretary to Acting Town Clerk, 24 September 1951, ACC 275/51-45/347/460653, ACA.
made a similar change the following year. The service at Te Horo in Otaki was cancelled in 1962 due to poor attendance, and that at nearby Manukau was also under threat, although in these two cases population drift from small towns to cities may have been a factor.

Daytime services were seen as being particularly endangered, and this was partially attributed, both at the time and since, to the growing popularity of the dawn service. It is difficult to gauge the actual public attendances at Anzac ceremonies, partly because these were not always reported, but mostly because of the inconsistency of methods used to estimate crowds. The New Zealand Herald and the Evening Post’s estimates of the crowd at the 1966 Wellington daytime service, for example, were 5000 and 2000 respectively. However, we can assume that estimates were at least wrong in a consistent way within newspapers. They might not tell us how many people actually attended a particular service, but they indicate the relative turnouts at services within the same city. From 1950 to 1965, both Auckland and Christchurch showed a steady increase in numbers at the dawn service. In Christchurch there was a corresponding decline in citizens’ service crowds, which the increase at the dawn service did not make up for. In Auckland and Wellington, reported numbers for the citizens’ service fluctuated without any obvious pattern, and in Wellington the dawn service seems to have declined in popularity. In all three cities the citizens’ service usually attracted more members of the public than that at dawn.

The dawn services were not attracting the public at the expense of the daytime services. It is not even clear that there was any consistent decline in overall attendance figures in the 1950s and 1960s. What, then, was the cause of the RSA’s anxiety over the day? One answer may be that the point of comparison was 1946, when huge crowds attended most citizens’ services. After this the drop in numbers was quite dramatic – from 30,000 in Auckland in 1946 to just 5000 two years later. It was echoed by a decline in RSA membership from a peak of over 136,000 in 1947 to just

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68 EP, 24 April 1958, p.7; Clarke, p.73.
70 Clarke, p.73.
71 NZH, 26 April 1966, p.3; EP, 26 April 1966, p.16.
under 93,000 in 1953.\textsuperscript{74} Another problem may have been the attitudes of the public outside the core group of attendees. As the 1950s and 1960s progressed, there was increasing opposition to the restrictions of Anzac Day, and a growing feeling that the day was unnecessarily gloomy, or perhaps just unnecessary. These feelings would have come mostly from those who would not have attended Anzac Day anyway, but perhaps led Anzac Day’s supporters to believe that since the public were complaining about the day, its crowds must be dropping.

One problem with post-war Anzac Days was lack of enthusiasm from many World War II veterans. In the 1940s and 1950s it was frequently noted that in Anzac Day parades they were often outnumbered by veterans of the earlier war.\textsuperscript{75} They also seem to have been more likely to favour the liberalisation of Anzac afternoon; the first areas in which councils allowed sport and films on Anzac afternoon were those with a high percentage of young families, and in these places liberalisation usually had the approval or active involvement of local RSAs.\textsuperscript{76} This suggests that many who fought in World War II did not see Anzac Day as sacred to the same extent as their fathers’ generation. It is also likely that they saw it as being primarily about the First World War, and Gallipoli in particular, and therefore not particularly relevant to the war that they had fought in. They had good reason to feel this way. Gallipoli veterans often occupied a special place in Anzac Day: they sometimes headed Anzac parades while other veterans marched by battalion or branch of service, and from 1958 they held their own parade in Wellington.\textsuperscript{77} When representatives of Turkey were in New Zealand, they were also given places of honour; for example in 1954 several Turkish officers were present at Wellington’s citizens’ service, at which a Turkish flag was flown.\textsuperscript{78} On the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the battle a reunion parade in Rotorua was led by New Zealand and Turkish veterans.\textsuperscript{79} It was sometimes necessary to remind people that the day commemorated the dead and returned of all wars, with one writer arguing that it would not endure if the focus was exclusively on Gallipoli.\textsuperscript{80} In specially

\textsuperscript{74} N.P. Webber, The First Fifty Years of the New Zealand Returned Services Association 1916 to 1966, np, nd, p.6.
\textsuperscript{75} EP, 26 April 1948, p.8; ODT, 26 April 1950, p.6; NZH, 26 April 1951, p.10; EP, 27 April 1953, p.8; NZH, 26 April 1955, p.12; Clarke, p.20.
\textsuperscript{76} Clarke, pp.82-3.
\textsuperscript{78} Clarke, pp.82-3.
\textsuperscript{80} EP, 26 April 1954, p.8.
honouring the Gallipoli veterans, commemorators inadvertently marginalised others who had fought.

The most obvious trigger for antagonism towards Anzac Day was the restriction placed on activities on the day. The Anzac Day Act 1949 required the day to be observed ‘as if it were a Sunday’, and local councils banned virtually all organised Anzac Day leisure. Questions about the day’s future first arose in 1953, when it fell on a Saturday, thus ruining the week’s main day for sport and other entertainment. The debate quickly petered out, but emerged again with more force in 1959, when Anzac Day was again a Saturday. Suggested changes included moving it to the nearest Sunday; restricting observances and the ban on organised recreation to the morning; and cancelling the public holiday. Although the morning-only idea had been suggested as early as 1946, by the Dunedin RSA, it did not become popular until 1959. It quickly received support from the Herald; the Auckland branch of the Labourers’ Union; the Otago Trades Council; and the majority of people questioned by the Otago Daily Times. Many people, including RSA members, criticised the apparent hypocrisy of some ex-servicemen, who spent the day drinking and gambling while their organisation campaigned to stop ordinary people from playing sports or seeing a film. In 1960, Minister of Labour Tom Shand told an Anzac Day ex-service breakfast that the day should be solemn in the morning and joyful in the afternoon. ‘We should think of our mates who have gone and act as if they were still with us. That is what they would wish us to do.’ Shand used the conventional rhetoric of Anzac Day itself, and the memory of the dead, to argue his case. By arguing that the war dead ‘would wish us’ to enjoy the afternoon, he positioned himself as an upholder of their wishes rather than as one who would reduce or ignore their memory. This shows that appealing to the past is not the exclusive preserve of conservatives; agents for change may also mobilise the memory of the sacred dead.

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81 Clarke, pp.69-70.
82 NZL, 20 February 1959, p.10; Clarke, pp.61, 75.
84 Clarke, p.61.
85 NZH, 24 April 1959, pp.14, 16; Clarke, p.76.
87 NZH, 26 April 1961, p.3.
From 1960, moves were made towards a more liberalised Anzac afternoon, with sporting events and special film screenings becoming normal in most areas by the middle of the decade. By 1964 many RSA leaders supported liberalisation, arguing that young people and their own members wanted to be able to enjoy the freedom won in war, particularly to play and watch sport. Some people continued to oppose the idea, which they saw as turning the day into ‘just another holiday’.

Amongst this group, there were views that it would be better to cancel the day than turn it into one of revelry. A few wanted to get rid of Anzac Day regardless of how it was observed, with several war veterans and people who had lost loved ones in war telling the newspapers that the day caused them too much pain. A wide range of people felt that the day had already become little more than an excuse for ex-servicemen to get drunk, and felt that if people still wanted to observe the day they could go to a dawn service before work.

The range of meanings which people placed on Anzac Day is evident. To many, the sole purpose of the day was remembrance of the dead, but even this implied different things to different people. To some, Anzac Day was a solemn day of mourning or nothing. Others found the involuntary remembrance brought on by the commemorations unbearable. To numerous people, including many ex-service-men, the day involved remembrance but also appreciation of the things won in war, such as the freedom to enjoy themselves. All of these groups understood the day in terms of its established meanings, but interpreted them differently.

The debate on liberalisation also occurred within the RSA, and by the early 1960s many within the organisation felt that Anzac Day would die if changes were not made. Referendums were conducted by various regional branches, showing that in Wellington about two-thirds of members supported change, with the overwhelming majority wanting to liberalise Anzac afternoon. Other national organisations were surveyed, eleven favouring change and eight opposing it, with the most popular

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89 NZH, 27 April 1964, p.12.
91 Ashburton Women’s Council, Questionnaire, National Council of Women, MS Papers 1371-344, ATL.
94 Clarke, pp.81-82.
alternatives to the status quo being morning observance with a more relaxed holiday in the afternoon, and shifting the day to the nearest Sunday. A large number felt that the decision should be left up to the RSA. In 1965, the RSA Dominion Council requested that the government amend the Anzac Day Act to allow sport and entertainment in the afternoon, with Anzac Day Trusts set up to prevent commercialization of the day. The idea of compulsory donations to the trusts was vetoed by the government, but in 1966 a new Anzac Day Act was passed, allowing activities normally permitted on a Sunday to be held on Anzac Day afternoon.

Anzac Day had been saved through a combination of pragmatism, recognition of the inevitability of some kind of change, and a widespread commitment to maintaining the day in some form. By this stage, however, nothing could be done for the other commemorative day, Remembrance Sunday. We have seen that Armistice Day’s conversion to Remembrance Sunday went reasonably well in Northern Ireland. In the rest of the United Kingdom it had not fared so well; by 1948 British Legion members were already concerned about declining participation. The two minutes’ silence, which had interrupted commerce and industry and made Armistice Days so striking, now occurred at a time when most people were in church or at home. As a result, its public observance faded and by the late 1950s the silence had generally ceased to occur except as part of formal ceremonies and church services. New Zealand had followed Britain’s lead in transforming Armistice Day into Remembrance Sunday, but the commemoration immediately ran into trouble. A Remembrance Sunday ceremony in Wellington’s town hall in 1946 attracted only about 200 people, most of whom were civic, armed forces or consular representatives. The two minutes’

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95 ibid., pp.84-89.
96 Questionnaire from RSA re. Anzac Day (1964), National Council of Women, MS Papers 1371-344, ATL.
97 Clarke, pp.92-4.
98 Clarke, p.95; Anzac Day Act 1966.
100 Richardson, pp.358-9.
101 Minister of External Affairs to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 3 February 1946, ACGO 8333 IA1 3000 158/55/1 part 1, ANZW; Brigadier, Adjutant-General, ‘Remembrance Day’, 6 November 1946, ABFK 483 W3592/13 72/3/5 1, ANZW.
silence was, at best, unevenly observed the following year. By 1948 even the RSA was saying that Anzac Day was the ‘one day of the year’ set aside to remember the fallen of the world wars.

As a Sunday observance, Remembrance Day was kept alive primarily by the churches, but by 1958 even they were questioning the wisdom of having two commemorative days. In 1950, only 25% of Wellington churches, 20% of Christchurch and 12.3% of Auckland churches advertising in the newspapers announced Remembrance services, which is not high even if we allow that this probably underestimates the actual number. By 1960 the percentage had dropped further, to 7.7% in Wellington, 10.5% in Christchurch and 8.5% in Auckland. By contrast, in 1950 43% of Auckland churches advertising in the Herald mentioned Easter, and in 1960 27.5% did so – more than three times as many as advertised Remembrance services. This suggests that many churches did not advertise their special services, but also shows the relative unimportance of Remembrance Sunday. The advertising was not evenly spread across the denominations; the Catholic churches did not advertise in the mainstream press, and the Protestant churches did not all observe Remembrance Sunday. By 1960 Anglicans were barely keeping Remembrance Sunday in New Zealand; only one Anglican church in Auckland and one in Wellington advertised a Remembrance service. As in Northern Ireland, the evangelical churches appear not to have participated at all, meaning that many of the most passionately religious – and therefore probably the most likely to actually go to church – were also the least likely to go to a church which observed secular memorial days.

In 1956 an Internal Affairs report stated that ‘Since the adoption of Remembrance Sunday in 1946 the general public has lost all interest in the day and what it was intended to represent. Services at local war memorials on this day are poorly attended,

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104 Auckland RSA President to Ellerslie Borough Council, 19 March 1948, ELB 118/15-1/65/362830/1948-60, ACA.
105 New Zealand Inter-Church Council on Public Affairs, Annual Report 1958, ACGO 8333 IA1 3000 158/55/1 part 1, ANZW; NZH, 27 April 1959, p.10.
107 NZH, 12 November 1960, s.4 p.11; EP, 12 November 1960, p.8; Press, 12 November 1960, p.17.
108 NZH, 8 April 1950, p.5; NZH, 16 April 1960, p.27.
not only by the public, but by members of the Returned Services’ Association. The government continued to ask that the two minutes’ silence be observed and the traffic stopped for this, but the request seems to have been widely ignored. On Remembrance Sunday 1952, for example,

there were not twelve people present at the Wellington Citizens’ War Memorial for the brief ceremony; the traffic was not stopped for the two minutes’ silence; and the people wended their way without the slightest recognition of the fact that these two minutes’ silence were meant to be for remembrance of those who served and gave their lives in the two World Wars.

Efforts were made to improve observance, with the wreath-laying at Wellington’s citizens’ war memorial expanded from an RSA-only affair to one in which various senior politicians and consular and armed forces representatives also laid wreaths. The RSA felt that the day could be fully revived if it was transferred back to the eleventh of November, efforts were made to stop traffic, and a new form of ceremony introduced. However both Cabinet and Internal Affairs felt that the public would not be interested regardless of the form or date of the commemoration. A survey of RSAs around the country revealed that in 1955 public ceremonies were held in Auckland, Dunedin, Nelson and Masterton, but in several other regions even the RSA did not formally observe the day. Only in Dunedin was there any attempt to halt traffic for the two minutes’ silence, and this appears to have only affected the area around the cenotaph. Even the Ministry of Defence did not organise or participate in any special ceremony. The state of the day is indicated by a report on the record high attendance at Lower Hutt’s public ceremony – 60 people. In 1966 the Evening Post summed up the situation in an editorial which said that Remembrance Day’s

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109 E.T. O’Connor, ‘Remembrance Sunday’, 17 July 1956, ACGO 8333 IA1 3000 158/55/1 part 1, ANZW.
110 Holland, ‘Remembrance Day 1950’, 26 October 1950 and Shanahan to PM, 22 October 1953, ACGO 8333 IA1 3000 158/55/1 part 1, ANZW.
111 Minister of Internal Affairs to Cabinet, 1 February 1955, AAFD 811/113D CAB 262/1/3 part 1, ANZW. See also EP, 12 November 1951, p.9.
113 O’Connor; Minister of IA to Cabinet; Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Internal Affairs, 16 February 1955, AAFD 811/113D CAB 262/1/3 part 1, ANZW.
114 ‘Remembrance Day 6:11:55’, ACGO 8333 IA1 3000 158/55/1 part 1, ANZW; ODT, 13 November 1950, p.4.
115 CR, note, 21 November 1955, ABFK 483 W3592/13 72/3/5, part 1, ANZW.
‘very name is contradicted. Much of the community does not remember it and there are far too many who do not have the slightest idea of what it is all about anyway.’

There are many possible explanations for the demise of Remembrance Sunday in New Zealand. One is that the day was too religious, which would make sense if Anzac Day was, as it is sometimes perceived, an essentially secular occasion, its associations with Christianity being ‘coincidental’, and clergy being ‘invited guests rather than essential elements of the whole celebration’. Unfortunately for this theory, although Anzac Day was less religious than Remembrance Sunday, it still had considerable Christian form and content. Of the 21 locations hosting public Anzac Day ceremonies in the Wellington region in 1958, for example, all but two held some kind of Christian service, with four holding both a dawn and daytime service. In the Auckland region in 1960 and 1966, every reported Anzac Day event included a Christian service. These services typically included prayers as well as hymns such as ‘Abide with Me’, ‘O God our Help in Ages Past’ and ‘All People who on this Earth do Dwell’, all of which convey specifically Christian messages. Clergy were the primary speakers at nine out of the nineteen Auckland events in 1960 in which a speaker’s name was reported. Anzac Day rhetoric could be highly religious, with secular as well as religious speakers and writers stressing specifically Christian ideals. On 24 April 1958, for example, the Evening Post built an editorial around the 127th Psalm, which teaches that ‘except the Lord keep the city, the watchman waketh but in vain’. Five years later Governor-General Bernard Ferguson concluded his citizens’ service speech in Auckland with ‘God bless the church universal and bring us all to the unity of Christ in truth, God save the Queen and her realms and give us peace through Jesus Christ our Lord’. This does not necessarily prove that New Zealanders were strongly or deeply religious, but does strongly indicate that most did not object to

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120 NZH, 23 April 1960, p.20; NZH, 23 April 1966, p.6.
121 Politicians spoke at another five events, military speakers at three, and there were two speakers whose significance is unclear. NZH, 23 April 1960, p.20.
124 NZH, 26 April 1963, p.3.
religion in war commemoration. Religion was not responsible for Remembrance Sunday’s problems.

The main reason for the failure of Remembrance Sunday was probably competition from Anzac Day. We saw in the previous chapter that it is possible for one people to maintain two war commemorations; in the 1960s both Remembrance Sunday and the Somme anniversary were reasonably healthy in Northern Ireland. However these two anniversaries were observed in different ways and served different purposes. Remembrance Sunday was a respectable, church-based commemoration in which Ulster Protestants could join with their compatriots in the rest of the United Kingdom in simultaneous remembrance; one minister in the village of Trillick in County Tyrone even brought a radio into church so that his congregation could hear the Last Post and Reveille from London, and join in with the national silence.\(^{125}\) The Somme anniversary, by contrast, was a more local occasion focussing specifically on the Ulster Division and involving Orange as well as ex-service parades. In New Zealand, Remembrance Sunday fulfilled no purpose not also satisfied by Anzac Day. With Armistice Day’s recommitment to peace undermined by the outbreak of the Second World War and then the Cold War, Remembrance Sunday did not have any strong meaning other than the remembrance of the dead to which Anzac Day was also dedicated. In addition, New Zealand’s distance from Britain meant that the simultaneous commemorations enjoyed in Trillick were impossible in New Zealand; while church-going New Zealanders observed the two minutes’ silence, the British were celebrating Saturday night. Nor did Remembrance Sunday have any of the nationalist connotations of Anzac Day; it was not a New Zealand commemoration, yet its links to Britishness were weak.

Remembrance Sunday therefore died primarily for reasons specific to itself, but we have seen that there was a general loss of vitality in New Zealand war commemorations after World War II. In the 1950s and 1960s it was widely assumed, and stated in editorials, sermons and speeches, that the decline was inevitable given the lengthening period since the last major war.\(^{126}\) The recent resurgence in interest in Anzac Day

\(^{125}\) TC, 13 November 1970, p.4.
proves that temporal and geographic distance from major wars does not render war commemoration obsolete. However, as the time since the last war grew, some of the principles reaffirmed in war commemorations did suffer from lessening relevance, as was also the case in Northern Ireland. In 1964 Major General Lindsay Inglis, speaking at the Auckland citizens’ service, explained what he saw as the dual purpose of Anzac Day. This was commemoration of all who had served in the armed forces, and remembrance of the dead. He explained that the first purpose had increased in importance because most young people now had no experience of war, and so ceremonies such as Anzac Day were necessary to inform them of the sacrifices of those who had served. He also argued that since the vast majority of young people could not have known anyone killed in war, and it is impossible to mourn someone you have never met, their remembrance was a tribute rather than an act of mourning.\textsuperscript{127} Although some young people did attend Anzac Days in the 1950s and 1960s, it is unlikely that many of their generation, particularly those with no bereavements in the immediate family, would have felt the need to go out of their way for either of these purposes. To most baby-boomer youth, the idea of spending the morning of a public holiday paying tribute to people like their fathers – and in many cases their fathers would have been amongst the parading ex-servicemen – would have been distinctly unappealing. Their fathers’ involvement in war would generally not have been enough for Anzac Day to have much personal resonance, and indeed may have made the day seem to be the property of the older generations, of little relevance and appeal to those born after the end of World War II.

Some of the key purposes of Anzac Day would have faded even for those old enough to remember war. Most of those who had lost loved ones would have found the pain lessening over the decades, and by the 1960s there were fewer surviving parents of men killed in World War I. Scott Worthy argues convincingly that early Anzac Days were substitute funerals for those whose bodies remained in Turkey or France and which in some cases had never been found.\textsuperscript{128} Funerals are not annual events, and so the need for such substitutes would have only been temporary. Another major purpose of Anzac Day was the reunion of ex-comrades, and although this continues into the present day it perhaps grew less important as distance from World War II grew, and

\textsuperscript{127}NZH, 27 April 1964, p.12.

\textsuperscript{128}Worthy, ‘Debt of Honour’, p.191.
former soldiers found new identities in their careers and families. The steep decline in RSA membership after the 1940s supports this. In addition, the veterans of the First World War were now approaching old age and thus becoming less able to attend reunions or march in parades. Many of the original needs fulfilled by Anzac Day and other commemorations were fading, and new needs had not replaced them.

The continuation of Anzac Day, however, indicates that it still fulfilled some purposes. One of these was the reaffirmation of the values and principles for which the war dead were said to have fought and died. Perhaps the most common theme of Anzac Day was the desirability of emulating those who had served and died in the world wars. Like secular saints or Jesus without the resurrection, the Anzac dead had shown qualities, most often named as service and self-sacrifice, which the living should emulate in order to make themselves worthy of having had someone die for them. These ideas were encapsulated in the Anzac Dedication which was recited at most dawn services throughout this period. It read:

At this hour, upon this day, Anzac received its baptism of fire and became one of the immortal names in history. We who are gathered here think of the comrades who went out with us to the battlefields of two great wars, but did not return. We feel them still near us in the spirit. We wish to be worthy of their great sacrifice. Let us therefore once more dedicate ourselves to the service of the ideals for which they died. As the dawn is even now about to pierce the night, so let their memory inspire us to work for the coming of the new light into the dark places of the world. We will remember them.129

Typically, the crowd would echo this last sentence, committing themselves to the promise of the Dedication. Paul Connerton argues that mass participation such as this is crucial in terms of making ordinary participants in rituals feel involved and committed to the values that the ritual expresses.130 By saying ‘we will remember them’ en masse, the Anzac and Remembrance Day public linked themselves not only to the returned servicemen who also said the phrase, but to the deceased and to traditions of commemoration. This perhaps explains some of the aura of sacredness which attaches to many war commemorations. The recital of a special phrase en masse transforms a crowd of observers into something more akin to a congregation, responding to the speaker in much the same way as a church congregation will provide the appropriate response to a preacher.

129 NZH, 26 April 1946, p.9.
Returned servicemen also recommitted themselves to their fallen comrades and to the ideals and traditions of the day. They did this not only by saying particular words, but also through their physical participation in parades. In Auckland in 1949, the dawn parade was cancelled due to rain, but several hundred returned servicemen marched anyway.\footnote{NZH, 26 April 1949, p.8.} For both returned servicemen and the public, to attend outdoor commemoration services despite bad weather was a show of solidarity with those who had fought and died, a willing acceptance of suffering. This link between past and present was further emphasised by the public announcement at the Auckland dawn service, as the parade approached the cenotaph. Repeated most years, in 1959 it ran in part: ‘At this hour 44 years ago, an assault was made on the heights of Gallipoli. The footsteps that you hear are the marching feet of the veterans of the Great Wars arriving at the Cenotaph, the steps of the present echoing the march of the past’.\footnote{NZH, 27 April 1959, p.10.} The unchanging nature of most ceremonies also reinforced this sense of timelessness.

Anzac Day rhetoric frequently set the Anzacs up as an example to live by; for example arguing that people should live up to the example of the Anzacs by living moral lives and caring for the less fortunate.\footnote{All information from New Zealand Herald and Evening Post coverage and editorials, 1946 to 1966, unless otherwise indicated.} This illustrates the point that even when the past is discussed in commemorative ceremonies, it is often a tool by which to comment on the present rather than a topic in its own right. For example, in 1949 Brigadier F.M. Hanson told a Wellington crowd that if a new war caught New Zealand unprepared ‘then surely there will be no margin on the side of victory next time, and we shall have proved unworthy of the heritage handed down to us by those who we honour today’.\footnote{EP, 26 April 1949, p.6.} This said little about those being honoured, and much about what contemporary defence policy and public attitudes should be. On a similar note, Anzac Day attendees were often warned not to underestimate the communist menace, and the necessity of the Anzus alliance with the United States and Australia was sometimes asserted. The generation gap was also illustrated with reference to the Anzacs, with speakers divided on whether young people would be able to pass the test of war as ably as past generations. Again, this was more of a comment on young
people than on past generations. Ideals of self-sacrifice, personal service and readiness for war would probably have been considered important by most New Zealanders of this period. The possibility of a new war, this time involving nuclear weapons on both sides, preoccupied editorial writers as well as Anzac Day speakers. But there is unlikely to have been much feeling of immediate threat to New Zealand. Protection was seen as lying in the Anzus alliance, not in the actions of individual citizens. Ideals of self-sacrifice and self-defence were somewhat abstract, especially for those too young to remember war. This absence of threat meant that New Zealanders, unlike Ulster Protestants, felt no pressing need to recommit themselves to militaristic ideals, nor did they feel the need to publically reaffirm their identities and fundamental principles.

This thesis argues that most historic commemorations involve a recommitment to a particular set of values shared by the wider community. These values may be broad and vague and thus mean different things to different people. But whatever people believe freedom or self sacrifice or any other value to mean, in order to want to recommit to it they must see it as being under threat, urgently needed, or both. In New Zealand in the post-war period, none of the ideals reaffirmed in Anzac Day were widely seen in this light. Military leaders and some members of the RSA felt the need for military readiness and the qualities which this required, but despite widespread unease about the Cold War, few New Zealanders felt the sense of real and immediate threat experienced by their Ulster Protestant contemporaries. Some still felt the need to remember dead friends, family members and comrades, but their numbers were diminishing, and as time grew since the last war this need became less urgent. A minority continued to observe Anzac Day and regard its principles as important; we will now investigate the composition of this minority.

Anzac Day and hegemony

In the previous chapter we saw that Northern Irish war commemorations were dominated by Protestants, although some non-Protestants also participated. New Zealand was not divided to the same extent as Northern Ireland, and members of virtually all communities observed Anzac Day. But to what extent did middle-class,
Protestant, Pakeha men dominate war commemorations? In general, this group, and especially the elites amongst it, did hold privileged positions in commemorations, but the picture is more complicated than this. In Onehunga in 1963, for example, the women’s section of the local RSA was one of just five groups which laid wreaths as an official part of the Anzac Day ceremony. Groups which laid wreaths afterwards included the local League of Mothers, workingman’s club and football club, as well as two Orange lodges (one men’s, one women’s), a lodge from the fraternal and vaguely pagan Ancient Order of Druids, and five schools.135

As in other countries, New Zealand Catholics in the post-war period were forbidden to attend ceremonies involving clergy from other churches. Instead, they held their own remembrances, usually in the form of Requiem Masses to which ex-servicemen paraded.136 In Wellington, cadets from St. Patrick’s College paraded to the cenotaph to lay wreaths a few hours before the citizen’s service, and the college also provided buglers for the Gallipoli veterans’ wreath-laying.137 In Auckland, Catholic schools were amongst those which formally received the old flags from the Cenotaph on Anzac Day.138 Immediately after World War II, some Catholics attempted to have the public services changed to allow their participation. A group of Catholic chaplains met with the RSA in 1946, saying that Catholic ex-servicemen wished to attend the public services but could not do so because of their ‘denominational character’. The Auckland civic service, which was not conducted by clergy and which Catholics had been attending since 1930, was cited as an example of a public service which the Catholic hierarchy could approve of its flock attending.139 The RSA leadership was supportive, but the main Protestant churches strongly opposed any removal of religious elements from Anzac Day, and no changes were made.140 Despite this, the Catholic hierarchy seem to have made occasional allowances; the 1946 Wellington dawn service featured a Catholic priest, for example, even though clergy from other churches participated.141 Although Catholic clergy sometimes clashed with main-

135 Wreaths layed [sic] at Onehunga War Memorial 1963, OHB 115/1-5/7/396870/1960-66, ACA.
138 For example St. Benedict’s Convent School in 1954. NZH, 26 April 1954, p.10.
140 The Orange Order also weighed in. For an account of the general debate on the issue, see Clarke, pp.55-9.
stream society on religious issues, on political and military subjects they were usually in harmony with the majority. At an Anzac Day Mass in 1957, for example, Father T. Duffy told the congregation that Christianity was fully compatible with patriotism and praised Compulsory Military Training. Most ex-service Catholics were probably also in step with majority views even if they chose not to be in step with them in Anzac Day parades. Michael King’s father, a naval officer during World War II, ‘would never share the ambivalence towards England that our Irish background and Catholicism inculcated from other directions… he continued to seek and enjoy the friendship of former comrades-in-arms through organisations such as the Returned Services Association, the United Services Officers’ club, and the Navy League’. The idea that New Zealand Catholics did not participate in mainstream Anzac Days because, as Duncan Waterson argues, of their ‘attachment to the myths and politics of… Old Ireland’ is simply not plausible.

In 1956 the Anzac Day service at the Dunedin suburb of Green Island was made non-denominational, a change credited with raising attendance from about 20 the previous year to more than 350. Similar changes were made in Blenheim in 1960 and Wellington in 1961. In Wellington the change, involving a reduction in clerical participation, was credited with producing the best attended citizens’ service in several years. These examples suggest that changes in the religious nature of Anzac Day could be prompted by crises in attendance figures as much as religious tolerance. To many non-Catholic ex-servicepeople, recommitment to remembrance was seen as more important than religious considerations. In the mid 1960s, however, the issue of Catholic attendance was resolved by the Vatican’s Decree on Ecumenism, explained in the previous chapter. By 1965 the Wellington service was again conducted by clergy, but now Catholics were full participants, with a Catholic priest leading the service that year. In Christchurch the Anglican and Catholic Bishops of Christchurch shared the dais, and in Lower Hutt the dawn service was jointly conducted by

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144 Waterson, p.145.
145 Clarke, p.70.
New Zealand war commemorations to 1966

Protestant and Catholic clergy, with the Sacred Heart Girls’ Choir singing at the daytime service. This again indicates that Catholic abstention from Anzac Day had been the result of religious rather than political concerns.

New Zealand’s Jewish community also observed war memorial days. In 1949, for example, Anzac Day was used to unveil a roll of honour at Wellington synagogue. Speaking at the event, Jewish former Chief Justice Michael Myers emphasised that New Zealand’s Jews were loyal British citizens, a sentiment noted with approval by the editor of the *Evening Post*. The Jewish community was successfully using Anzac Day to signal its commitment to mainstream values. Jewish heroes were also equated with Anzac heroes; for example the Wellington synagogue’s 1954 Anzac Day service also commemorated the Warsaw ghetto uprising. Two years later an Auckland rabbi argued that the spirit of Anzac was also the spirit of the Jews of Palestine, thereby aligning his people firmly with the dominant mythology. It has been claimed that New Zealand Jews, like Catholics, were unable or unwilling to attend public Anzac Day ceremonies because of their religious elements, but there is little evidence for this. Although there was a Jewish Ex-Servicemen’s Association, Jews were also prominent in the RSA, with one, Bertram Joseph Jacobs, serving as Dominion President from 1942 to 1947. Another was President of the Otago RSA. As in Northern Ireland, it is clear that the Jewish community was using majority commemorations to both express its own identity, and to position this within the mainstream of respectable society.

Maori were another minority group involved in war remembrance, in many cases prominently. Former Maori Battalion officers spoke at numerous Anzac Day services, including that at the exclusive Marsden Collegiate girls’ school in 1946, and the Wellington dawn service in 1957. Maori Battalion veteran and MP Eruera Tirikatene played a prominent role in several major Anzac ceremonies, speaking at the

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151 NZH, 26 April 1956, p.15.
Christchurch citizens’ service in 1951 and laying a wreath on behalf of the government in Wellington in 1960.\textsuperscript{155} Maori Anzac Day speeches of the 1950s tended to have much in common with those at Waitangi Day in the same period; emphasising Maori loyalty to the Crown and the unity of Maori and Pakeha under the British flag.\textsuperscript{156} However, by the late 1950s some were beginning to suggest that, just as Maori and Pakeha had shared equally in war, they needed to ensure that the fruits of peace were also equally shared.\textsuperscript{157} Maori war remembrance was strongest in areas such as the Bay of Plenty, from where a disproportionate number of Maori soldiers had come, and which had a tradition of pro-British sentiment. On or shortly before Anzac Days from 1948 to 1953 at least three specifically Maori war memorials were unveiled in the Rotorua area alone.\textsuperscript{158} The memorials were often the end-point of parades, at least some of which seem to have had Pakeha as well as Maori participants.\textsuperscript{159} Otaki was another centre of Maori commemoration, with close links being formed between the Raukawa Marae and the local RSA, which at one point had a Maori President.\textsuperscript{160} Maori involvement in remembrance was not confined to ‘loyal’ areas. Memorials were erected and Anzac ceremonies held by separatist tribes such as Tuhoe, and Maori were active members of the RSA in areas such as Taranaki which had fraught histories of inter-racial conflict.\textsuperscript{161} Even in Matamata, where there had been limited Maori involvement in the world wars and a nearby Ratana settlement had been accused of pro-Japanese sympathies during World War II, there were Maori in Anzac parades.\textsuperscript{162} As Maori became more urbanised, they became increasingly visible in urban ceremonies.\textsuperscript{163} In 1958 a Maori Battalion Association was formed, and the Battalion veterans marched as a body in Auckland’s Anzac Day parade for the first time.\textsuperscript{164} Duncan Waterson and Stephen Clarke both argue that the Pakeha division of Maori into ‘what were termed “good” (i.e. respectable, loyal, hard-working and thrifty) and “bad” (feckless, discontented, in ill-health and politically suspect)’ was

\textsuperscript{155} Press, 26 April 1951, p.8; Principal Private Secretary to Secretary for Internal Affairs, 17 March 1960, ACGO 8333 IA1 2999 158/36 part 3, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{156} NZH, 24 April 1950, p.8; EP, 26 April 1957, p.6.
\textsuperscript{157} EP, 26 April 1957, p.6.
\textsuperscript{158} NZH, 26 April 1948, p.8; NZH, 26 April 1950, p.8; NZH, 27 April 1953, p.10.
\textsuperscript{159} NZH, 26 April 1948, p.8; NZH, 26 April 1949, p.8.
\textsuperscript{160} Kerr, pp.46-9; NZH, 24 April 1965, p.2.
\textsuperscript{161} AH, December 1955, p.36; AH, July 1956, p.43; AH, May 1957, p.2.
\textsuperscript{162} Waterson, p.145.
\textsuperscript{163} NZH, 26 April 1963, p.3; Clarke, p.30.
\textsuperscript{164} NZH, 24 April 1958, p.12; AH, December 1958, pp.9-10.
reinforced at some Anzac Days. However neither provides much evidence for this, except in the sense that Maori who participated in Anzac Day were ‘good’ more or less by definition. Like the Jewish community, Maori used mainstream commemorations to express their identity and at the same time commit themselves to mainstream values. However, Maori war remembrance also served traditional purposes such as the reaffirmation of respect for one’s forebears, and celebration of military prowess.

Anzac Days tended to be male-dominated. This is not surprising, since they commemorated war, and the vast majority of those who had served and died were men. As in Northern Ireland, the general position of women in New Zealand society reinforced the male dominance of commemoration. As well as being barred from combat, women could not become clergy and were rarely politicians or holders of any other position of power. As a result, there were few female speakers at Anzac Day events of this period. Female politicians laid wreaths, as did other women in their capacity as returned war nurses and auxiliaries, representatives of various women’s and occasionally other groups, and as bereaved relatives. Ex-servicewomen marched in some Anzac parades, and in 1966 a woman was elected president of the Fairlie sub-branch of the RSA. At most Anzac Day ceremonies ex-servicewomen did not march, but occupied privileged positions near the war memorial before and during the service. Bereaved women, particularly elderly mothers, might also be given reserved seating. Anzac services were held at some girls’ schools, and Girl Guides and similar groups participated in many ceremonies. Women played vital roles in preparation for Anzac Day, particularly the poppy appeals. But in general the day was male-dominated, and focussed almost exclusively on male activity, past and present.

165 Waterson, p.145, Clarke, pp.30-1. The quote is Waterson’s, but reproduced in Clarke.
166 Waterson’s ‘evidence’ is that Maori who had served overseas were considered ‘good’ and encouraged to march. Clarke quotes a speaker in Milton who said that Maori were ‘New Zealand’s No. 1 social problem’ and that, because of Maori war service, Pakeha had a duty towards them. Although this is unflattering and somewhat paternalistic, it does not actually categorise any Maori as ‘bad’.
167 Principal Private Secretary to Secretary for Internal Affairs, 17 March 1960, ACGO 8333 IA1 2999 158/36 part 3, ANZW.
168 Press, 26 April 1956, p.7; Kerr, p.47; Waterson, p.146; Review, May 1966, p.16.
169 Waterson, p.146; Clarke, p.42.
170 EP, 26 April 1946, p.9; Kerr, p.47; Waterson, p.147; Clarke, p.44.
171 Clarke, p.42.
War commemoration literature has sometimes argued that commemorations tend to be dominated by ‘elites’, sometimes at the expense of returned servicemen or bereaved family members. The extent to which working class people were marginalised in Anzac Day is perhaps best indicated by the 1951 ceremonies, which occurred during the waterfront industrial dispute of that year. Speakers in Auckland and Wellington talked of the need for unity and to ‘resist disruptive elements and to discourage anything which makes for sectional strife’. In a broadcast Anzac Day message, Prime Minister Sid Holland was blunter: ‘If our institutions are allowed to be weakened by internal sabotage, by disaffection and disunity, we betray not only the men that died but our own Anzac ideals’. Anzac Day meaning was deployed against the watersiders, who had no public opportunity to counter this with their own interpretations. The middle classes also dominated Anzac Day in less divided years. Memorial services on Anzac Day were commonly held at elite schools such as Auckland Grammar and King’s College, although more working-class schools such as Seddon Memorial Technical College and Otahuhu College also held services, as did perhaps the majority of schools on the school day before Anzac Day. However major dignitaries such as the Prime Minister and Governor-General seem to have been more likely to speak at ‘grammar school’ services and to lay stones for or unveil their memorials. Apart from clergy, speakers at Anzac Day services tended to be politicians, military officers, or ambassadors from appropriate countries such as Australia or the United Kingdom. Members of these groups who also had military experience were clearly preferred – probably the majority of clergy officiating at major Anzac Day services in the 1940s and 1950s had been armed forces chaplains – but there was a general preference for an important person who had never been to war above an ordinary person who had. In part there must have been practical reasons for this. People generally wanted their speakers to be good at it, which made someone with public speaking experience preferable. There may have also been a reluctance to elevate any one ex-private above those of the same rank if he had not clearly distinguished himself. In some cases, social importance was clearly elevated above military service. In 1954 the Cambridge RSA was angered at a civic service which required

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173 EP, 26 April 1951, p.8; NZH, 26 April 1951, p.10.
174 NZH, 26 April 1951, p.10.
175 NZH, 26 April 1950, p.8; NZH, 26 April 1961, p.3; Clarke, p.43.
Anzac Day was supported by members of a wide variety of groups, and although it was dominated by middle-class Protestant Pakeha men, other groups frequently used the forms and meaning of remembrance for their own purposes. Maori and Jews in particular used commemorations to express their own identities while simultaneously recommitting themselves to values shared with other New Zealanders. This illustrates the complexity of historic commemorations. Anzac Day united New Zealanders across ethnic, class, religious and gender lines yet did not erase these distinctions, and indeed could be used to reinforce minority identities. But although the values of Anzac Day were respected by a wide cross-section of New Zealand society, few from any background found them truly compelling. This chapter has shown that a historic commemoration may reaffirm widely accepted values and still stagnate. For a commemoration to achieve mass participation, the principles it represents must be seen as threatened, urgently needed, or both.

178 EP, 27 April 1959, p.9; NZH, 27 April 1959, p.9; NZH, 29 April 1959, p.12.
Chapter Five: The Twelfth, 1969-1990

The Twelfth of July 1969 was characterised by conflict. Nationalists protested against the parades and in several places attacked Orange halls. In Dungiven, police responded with baton charges, resulting in the death of a 67 year-old man. A month later, an Apprentice Boys of Derry parade sparked several days of fighting later known as ‘The Battle of the Bogside’. Conflict then spread to Belfast, where seven people were killed and hundreds driven out of their homes, prompting the Northern Irish government to call the British Army onto the streets.¹ From that point on, the parades required extensive army and police protection, and the marching season was frequently marked by riots and other violence, especially in the 1970s. Despite this, the Twelfth was never cancelled or even toned down, nor did the British or Northern Irish governments ban it. Levels of disorder fluctuated throughout the 1970s and 1980s, calming somewhat from the late 1970s before erupting again in the mid 1980s due to a parading dispute in Portadown. In most years the Twelfth platforms were vehicles for the expression of unionist and loyalist political views and dissent. Other commemorations examined in this thesis took much of their meaning from contemporary issues and events, but few were as inextricably entwined with them as the Twelfth.

The continuation of parading during the Troubles requires an explanation. This chapter will show that the main reason Twelfth parades were not cancelled or banned was that they had come to symbolise, not just the core values and principles of Ulster Protestantism, but the Ulster Protestant people themselves. We will see that during the Troubles many Protestants saw attempts to restrict parading as attacks on their culture and by extension on themselves. Criticism of parading from Irish nationalists and some English people easily shaded into criticism of wider Ulster Protestant culture and often Ulster Protestants in general. This is not to say that all Ulster Protestants favoured unrestricted parading on the Twelfth, or were united by the commemorations. Many middle class and liberal Protestants distanced themselves from the marching season, and the Orange Order was happy to impose restrictions on other loyalists in order to retain its own parading rights. Despite this, the Twelfth maintained a

¹ Bardon, pp.666-72.
symbolism which went far beyond that of the Orange Order. It no longer unified Protestants as it had in the 1950s, but it continued to reaffirm the principles of Britishness, Protestantism and resistance to Irish nationalism which the majority of Ulster Protestants still found highly compelling.

This chapter will again use the Twelfth to show that historic commemorations can be simultaneously unifying and divisive. The Troubles led to stronger nationalist opposition to parading, partially in the context of the civil rights movement and partially in response to the increasingly sectarian loyalist displays which often accompanied marches. The Twelfth therefore contributed to the increased antagonism between Protestant and Catholic. It also showcased continued divisions within the Protestant community. In the 1970s, Twelfth meetings were frequently used by members of various factions to verbally attack other unionists. Conflicts over loyalist paramilitaries, power-sharing with Catholics, and the possibility of independence from Britain were all given expression on Twelfth platforms. However, the Twelfth did not suffer any noticeable drop in participation or attendance; despite the community’s internal divisions, many Protestants still wished to publically recommit themselves to the Twelfth’s principles.

The frequency with which the Twelfth was used for political speeches provides further evidence that historic commemorations may be more about contemporary issues than history. The Twelfth is sometimes seen as evidence that Ulster Protestants are obsessed with the past at the expense of the present but, as in earlier decades, Twelfth speakers paid far more attention to contemporary politics than to history. Indeed in most years the only reminder that the Twelfth was a historic commemoration, rather than simply a political ritual, were the banners depicting William III, and we will see that even these had strong political connotations. Only in 1990, the 300th anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, was history discussed at length, and here again it was used as a tool to argue for contemporary political positions.
The period between the Battle of the Bogside in 1969 and the imposition of direct rule in 1972 was extremely chaotic. Paramilitary groups emerged from both the Protestant and Catholic communities, and the Protestant community in particular was extremely divided over how to react to the violence. Historic commemorations have the power to unify communities, but this unification depends on the community agreeing on the meaning of its core values. At the end of Chapter One we saw that from the mid 1960s the Twelfth was expressing and exacerbating the Ulster Protestant community’s internal divisions rather than minimising them. This expression of division on the Twelfth continued into the 1970s. Twelfth speakers expressed conflicting ideas about how the community and the security forces should respond to the civil rights movement, and later IRA terrorism. There was increasing pressure from the Northern Irish and British governments for parades to be re-routed or cancelled, and the Orange Order showed itself willing to restrict other Protestants in order to maintain its own right to parade. In addition, the increased levels of violence in the marching season, and the security force reaction to this, further divided the Catholic and Protestant communities from each other. The events of 1690 were all but ignored as Twelfth rhetoric and action focussed almost exclusively on the contemporary crisis.

The Twelfth of July 1969 came after nearly a year of upheaval, protests and violence. There had been no fatalities since 1966, but the civil rights movement and the loyalist response to it had clearly pushed Northern Ireland into a period of violence and severe disorder. In October 1968 and January 1969 civil rights and People’s Democracy marches had been viciously attacked, in both instances at least partially by the police. Rioting subsequently broke out in several areas. Heavily pressured by the British government on one side and unrepentantly anti-Catholic unionists on the other, Prime Minister Terence O’Neill announced a five-point reform plan which disappointed many nationalists and liberals, yet angered hardline unionists. He resigned five months later, but his replacement, James Chichester-Clark, announced that the reforms would go ahead unaltered.  

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This was the atmosphere in which the Battle of the Boyne was commemorated on the Twelfth of July 1969. It was clear that it would take strong and wise leadership to prevent the province from descending into something approaching civil war, but this was leadership that only a few within the Protestant community attempted to provide. Earlier in the month, Home Affairs Minister Robert Porter had advised marchers of all kinds to stay out of areas in which the majority disagreed with them, and on the Twelfth Chichester-Clark asked Orangemen to be disciplined and not take the law into their own hands. However, most other Twelfth speakers expressed the widespread feeling that the civil rights movement was simply a front for the old enemy of violent, Catholic, republicanism. Ian Paisley went further, arguing that the conflict was not unionism against republicanism but ‘biblical Protestantism against Popery’, ‘popery’ being seen as an evil political force rather than a form of Christianity. Northern Ireland was thus portrayed as two monolithic and fundamentally opposed factions; the divisions within both communities were ignored.

Some nationalists were doing their bit to reinforce this idea of two violently opposed factions: a bomb was thrown at an Orange Hall in Lurgan on Eleventh Night, and a parade in Dungiven was faced with protest and stone-throwing. In Derry the return of Orangemen from a parade sparked two days of serious rioting. A month later, an Apprentice Boys parade in Derry led to running battles there, and violence which spread to Belfast and other areas. In July and August, ten people were killed; nearly 900 injured, 154 of them with bullet wounds; and 170 homes destroyed. The British Army was called in to patrol the streets. Although initially welcomed by most Catholics, the army failed on several occasions to protect Catholic areas from loyalist mobs. Catholics increasingly turned for protection to the Provisional IRA, formed after a split from the Marxist and essentially dormant Official IRA.

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4 BT, 12 July 1969, p.1, 4; TC, 18 July 1969, p.4; Moloney and Pollak, p.269.
9 Bardon, p.671.
10 Taylor, Behind the Mask, pp.60-86.
Despite the violence which now accompanied the marching season, the Orange Order and other Protestant parading organisations resisted suggestions that the parades should be banned, cancelled or significantly re-routed. Eric Kaufmann shows that most Orangemen considered parading a more fundamental issue than security; they were willing not only to compromise local security by diverting police and the army from their usual tasks, but also to risk their own lives.\(^{11}\) This demonstrates that the parading issue was about much more than the right to walk down a road, or the importance of remembering seventeenth-century history. For many Ulster Protestants, parading was a vital symbol of their identity and their position in Northern Ireland. Unionist senator John Andrews said in 1970 that asking Orange men to give up the Twelfth would be like asking Americans to abandon Independence Day, portraying the event as a fundamental symbol of an entire people rather than merely the activities of one organisation.\(^{12}\) For one District Lodge secretary, parading where they wanted was ‘our right, won ferociously at the Boyne and the Diamond’.\(^{13}\) To abandon this right would be to betray those who had fought and died in these conflicts, and to give up a cherished birthright to pacify those who had neither understanding nor respect. Some Protestants saw attempts to ban parades not as a reasonable response to the security situation but as an attack on them and their culture by their enemies. This viewpoint was supported by some of the rhetoric in favour of a parade ban. For example, British Labour peer Lord Stonham described Orangemen as ‘these ridiculous little men with their sashes and absurd bowler hats jammed down on to their shiny faces… capering about the streets’.\(^{14}\) Opposition to the parades easily shaded into the ridicule and belittling of marchers and, by extension, Ulster Protestants in general. Parading despite danger and opposition was a reaffirmation of pride in Ulster Protestant identity, and so not something to be given up, lightly or otherwise.

Understanding the cultural and symbolic importance of parading, the Stormont government was generally reluctant to impose restrictions on Protestant marches if any other options were available. In early August 1969, under pressure from Westminster, the Stormont Cabinet twice considered a total parade ban, but decided

\(^{11}\) Kaufmann, p.53.
\(^{12}\) Bryan, Orange Parades, p.87.
\(^{13}\) Kaufmann, p.54.
that it would be impossible to enforce and might bring down their government. Instead they decided to hold talks with parading groups and experiment with methods other than a complete ban. Measures considered by Cabinet included ‘the diversionary effects of really good TV programmes’ and a bonfire ban, both of which seem to have been dismissed as impractical. A temporary parade ban was imposed after the Battle of the Bogside but lifted again before the start of the next year’s marching season, a pattern which would be repeated over the next few years. In general, the government tried to focus on keeping parades safe rather than restricting them. In 1971, newly appointed Prime Minister Brian Faulkner told a delegation of loyal order representatives that ‘our strategy is founded and operated on the basis of minimising to the utmost any threat to traditional parades’. From 1970 barbed wire barriers were erected around Catholic suburbs in Belfast on the Twelfth, protecting the parades at the cost of imprisoning entire communities. Parading law was also amended to further protect traditional marches, making it an offence to prevent or hinder any lawful procession, or to take part in an unlawful procession. Despite the problems which traditional parades had caused, they continued to be exempt from the requirement to seek permission from police, and indeed when deciding whether or not to re-route, the police were now required to ‘have regard… to the desirability of not interfering with a public procession customarily held along a particular route’. Total parade bans were imposed for periods in and around the winters of 1969-70, 1970-71 and 1971-72, but mostly at times of year when there were few major Protestant parades. The two exceptions were the Apprentice Boys’ main parade in August, which was banned in 1970, and those on Remembrance Sunday, which fell within the ban period on each occasion but were exempt from it in 1970. Where the Orange Order had not voluntarily re-routed around contentious areas, the government became slightly more willing to ban or compulsorily re-route, and several small parades were

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15 Conclusions of meetings of the Cabinet at Stormont Castle, 3 August 1969 and 5 August 1969, CAB/4/1455 and 1457, PRONI; Peter Rose, How the Troubles came to Northern Ireland, Basingstoke, London and New York, 2000, p.161; Callaghan, p.33.
16 Conclusions of meetings of the Cabinet, 7 and 9 July 1970, CAB/4/1532 and 1533, PRONI.
18 Speech by Faulkner at a meeting of representatives of the Orange Order, the Royal Black Institution, the Royal Arch Purple and the Apprentice Boys, 28 June 1971, HA/32/2/43, PRONI.
21 ‘Future policy on processions’, December 1970, p.9; ‘Extract from Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet held at Stormont Castle on Thursday 18 January 1972’, HA/32/2/44, PRONI.
re-routed and two banned on the 1970 Twelfth. In general, though, the government gave a higher priority to allowing the parades to go ahead as usual than to conventional security factors.

Although there were few parade restrictions, they still divided the Protestant community, as did other issues. In particular, a substantial portion of the Protestant public was antagonistic towards the Unionist government which ostensibly represented it. As in earlier years, a supposedly unifying commemoration instead displayed and exacerbated communal divisions. At the 1970 Twelfth, the government came under attack from numerous speakers, and for the first time in decades there was no resolution in support of it. Dissident Unionist MP Harry West illustrated the extent to which parades were equated with unionism by warning that if ‘the enemies of Ulster’ succeeded in stopping parades, ‘the Unionist Party would disintegrate and Northern Ireland would cease to exist’. In Belfast, some Orangemen wore ‘I’m Supporting Paisley’ badges in protest against Orange leaders who had campaigned against him in the Bannside by-election earlier in the year. While many Orangemen had ceased to support the government, the government was divided over support for the Order. Some had been questioning whether the Ulster Unionist Party should maintain its formal links to it. In relation to the Twelfth, Commerce Minister Roy Bradford argued in a Cabinet meeting that since the British Home Secretary had asked the Order to cancel the parades altogether, ‘ministers should not embarrass the Westminster government by taking part’. Other ministers were more mindful of their standing with Protestant voters. Several walked with their lodges, and two spoke from the platforms. Chichester-Clark, Bradford and Porter spent the day at an army base, from where they occasionally observed the parades from helicopters. At the 1971 Twelfth the government was again attacked in speeches, and in Portadown the meeting ended in disarray after two Unionist MPs were shouted down by hecklers. The most important ritual of Ulster Protestant culture, instead of uniting the

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24 BT, 13 July 1970, p.3.
25 Kaufmann, p.59.
27 Conclusions of a meeting of the Stormont Cabinet on 9 July 1970, CAB/4/1533, PRONI.
community in its time of need, was dividing the government from the people, and the
government from within.

Antagonism towards Protestant parading exacerbated other divisions within Ulster
Protestantism. Parading was symbolically important to a majority of Protestants far
larger than the actual membership of the Orange Order. When Orange parades were
forcibly re-routed, rioting usually ensued and, despite his years of conflict with the
Order, Ian Paisley made several threats about what might happen if its parades were
cancelled. 30 Despite this, the Order was almost exclusively concerned with its own
ability to parade, rather than with the general expression of loyalist culture. As Prime
Minister, Chichester-Clark played on this in negotiations with the Order, saying that
the government did not want to ban parades but was worried about trouble-making
spectators. 31 The Order continued to resist calls to re-route, but was happy to impose
various restrictions on bands, ‘hangers-on’ and other rowdy elements. In Belfast the
number of parade stewards was tripled in an attempt at crowd control. 32 Spectators
were asked ‘not to give opponents of the Order any apparent grounds for complaint’. 33
Several parades were voluntarily re-routed, some minor parades discouraged, and a
planned march in commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of Northern Ireland can-
celled. 34 To a certain extent such restrictions were sensible precautions which helped
to reduce violence and provide evidence that a ban was unnecessary. However the
Order was much more ready to allow the toning down of broader loyalist culture than
it was to accept restrictions on the routes and number of its major parades. During the
parade ban in late 1970, senior Orangemen discussed defiance of the ban, but were
worried that this would encourage ‘undesirable people’ to hold rowdy parades. 35 The
Order was not concerned about loyalist parading in general, much less a universal
‘right to march’, but about respectable parading by itself and similar groups, particu-
larly on major dates such as the Twelfth. Attacks on parading, rather than uniting
Ulster Protestants, produced a ‘divide and rule’ effect as the Orange hierarchy dis-
tanced themselves from other loyalists in an attempt to salvage what they could of
their own commemorations. The Ulster Protestant community’s internal divisions

30 Bardon, pp.677-8; Sunday Times, p.206; Bryan, Orange Parades, p.91.
31 Kaufmann, p.53.
33 Kaufmann, p.57.
34 ibid., pp.56, 68; Bryan, Orange Parades, p.88.
35 Kaufmann, p.61.
prevented the Twelfth from being a unifying force. Instead the commemorations exacerbated division.

The marching season had always intensified the division between Protestant and Catholic in Northern Ireland. However, as we have seen, the amount of actual conflict in the post-war years was relatively low due to Catholic lack of power or willingness to engage in serious civil disobedience. By the early 1970s this had changed; Catholics were better able to get their voices heard and a significant minority were willing to oppose parades with force. It was not that Catholics as a community disliked the Twelfth or parading much more than before; rather, they were more willing to express this dislike, and more people were willing to listen. From an Orange point of view, however, it seemed as if a community which had previously not had a problem with parading was taking advantage of the security situation to invent unjustified offence. Catholics were accused of going out of their way to see parades for the specific purpose of being ‘provoked’ by them, and it was often assumed that protests were the work of republican agitators rather than reflective of general Catholic feelings. Republican opposition to the parades was evident in 1971, when several bombs were laid near the route of the Belfast Twelfth parade and an Orange hall blown up.

Once the Troubles began and the divisions between the two communities widened, the number of Catholics who watched the parades must have declined significantly, for two main reasons. Firstly, fewer parades would have gone past Catholic houses, both because the ability of the loyal orders to parade through heavily nationalist areas was declining, and because Catholics were being forced out of Protestant majority areas. Secondly, the level of violence would have made most Catholics feel unsafe and unwelcome in such a Protestant environment, and may have made them more antagonistic towards Protestants and their culture. At the Twelfth fields, Catholic traders were made increasingly unwelcome. Catholics also pressured the Orange Order to stop parading; the largest Catholic parading group, the Ancient Order of Hibernians,

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36 For example, see *Northern Ireland Senate Parliamentary Debates*, vol. 54, no. 28 (1970), p.1254.
37 OS, August 1973, p.2; *Protestant Telegraph* (PT), 12 July 1975, p.8.
38 *BT*, 12 July 1971, p.3.
39 Caldwell, p.263.
offered at several points to cancel its own parades, ostensibly to prevent trouble but probably also because this would hurt the Orange Order more than it hurt them.\footnote{K.P. Bloomfield, ‘Processions and marches’, HA/32/2/44, PRONI; PT, 26 June 1971, p.10; Jarman, Material Conflicts, p.139.} We have seen that in the post-war period it was possible – although probably not very common – for Catholics to make cross-community gestures of friendship by watching the parades, helping neighbours build bonfires and lending band instruments. Such actions were now highly dangerous, and this forced distancing drove the two communities further apart. At no point was the divisive power of commemorations so obvious.

One reason for increased Catholic opposition to the marching season was the increasingly belligerent and sectarian nature of loyalist culture. The early 1970s saw the formation of the paramilitary Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and hardline political groups the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Vanguard.\footnote{Gordon Gillespie, ‘Loyalists since 1972’, in D. George Boyce and Alan O’Day, eds, Defenders of the Union: A Survey of British and Irish Unionism since 1801, London and New York, 2001, pp.251-2; Dixon, pp.120-1. For some Orange opinions of the government, see Kaufmann, pp.63, 64.} Crowd control had become less effective: in Belfast the crowd watching the parades repeatedly sang ‘Kick the Pope’ and similar songs at the Catholic-dominated Unity Flats, and had to be restrained by the police.\footnote{IN, 13 July 1971, p.1.} In Portadown, parades began to be followed by groups of stone and bottle throwing hangers-on.\footnote{Caldwell, p.173.} The Orange Order grew more reluctant to re-route parades, as they were now strongly suspicious that any withdrawal from traditional routes would be taken as a permanent retreat rather than a temporary response to the security situation.\footnote{Gilliland, ‘Note on a visit to Derry, July 2’, 5 July 1971, HA/32/2/45, PRONI; ‘Meeting between PM, Orange, Black, AB and Purple’; K.P. Bloomfield, ‘Processions and marches’, HA/32/2/44, PRONI.} Re-routing was seen as the first step towards a complete ban.\footnote{OS, August 1973, p.2.} On the streets, Union Jacks had mostly been replaced with the previously unpopular Ulster banner, and loyalist songs began to move from expressing Britishness to articulating an Ulster identity, as many Protestants rejected respectable Britishness in favour of populist loyalism.\footnote{BT, 12 July 1971, p.6; TC, 14 July 1972, p.1; Bill Rolston, ‘Music and Politics in Ireland: The Case of Loyalism’, in John P. Herrington and Elizabeth J. Mitchell, eds, Politics and Performance in Contemporary Northern Ireland, Amherst, 1999, p.35; Loftus, p.41.} Some districts were still calm, however, and there Orange leaders remained conciliatory. The Tyrone District Master

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\footnote{41 K.P. Bloomfield, ‘Processions and marches’, HA/32/2/44, PRONI; PT, 26 June 1971, p.10; Jarman, Material Conflicts, p.139.}
advised brethren not to provoke their neighbours, ‘for no amount of flag flying or drum beating would get [unionists] anywhere.’

In 1972, apparently at the insistence of British Prime Minister Edward Heath, the Stormont government moved for the first time to extend the parading ban over spring and summer, meaning that it would cover both the Twelfth and the Catholic and Protestant parades at Easter. At Easter both communities paraded anyway, demonstrating that the ban was unenforceable. The police and army suggested alternative solutions such as removing the privileges of traditional parades from the Public Order Act, controlling parading routes, and banning ‘feeder parades’ in which lodges marched from their neighbourhood to the start of the main march. However, by this time the Northern Irish parliament had been suspended, and so the ban was simply lifted and parading law went unchanged. The suspension meant that no changes would be made to parading law before the peak of the 1972 marching season. However it would also deprive Ulster Protestants of their main source of power, and turn the Twelfth from a de-facto national day and occasion of high political importance to an increasingly irrelevant spectacle displaying Protestants’ lack of power.

The Twelfth under Direct Rule

Throughout the 1970s the Orange Order, and unionists generally, were split over a range of issues. In its refusal to officially condone paramilitarism, the Orange leadership angered hardliners, and in its ‘no surrender’ attitudes it drove away liberals and moderates. As a result, we might expect to see a decline in support for the Order and for the Twelfth. In fact the Order’s membership was in decline, although the exact reasons are unclear and may be unrelated to the political situation. The Twelfth, however, remained popular in terms of both participation and attendance. The reason for this, arguably, was that Orange parading, and the Twelfth in particular, occupy a

49 ‘Extract from conclusions of meeting of the Cabinet held at Stormont Castle on Tuesday 18 January 1972’, HA/32/2/44, PRONI; Faulkner, p.120.
50 ‘Future policy for processions’, 11 April 1972, p.2, HA/32/2/44, PRONI.
51 ‘Future policy’, 11 April 1972, p.2; ‘Future policy for processions’, 19 April 1972, HA/32/2/44, PRONI.
52 Kaufmann, pp.271-84.
much larger place in Northern Protestant culture than does the Order itself. The parades were a crucial feature distinguishing Ulster Protestants from other British and Irish peoples, and thus continued to be widely supported by most unionists, regardless of what they thought of the Orange leadership. For perhaps the majority of Ulster Protestants, participating in or watching the Twelfth parades was not a message of support for the Orange Order, it was a reaffirmation of pride in their own identity. This cultural importance did not extend to the Twelfth meetings which, in the mid 1970s, continued to reveal divisions within unionist politics. Subsequently, the meetings decreased in importance in a reflection of the community’s lack of power.

All the main events of the Twelfth were run by the Orange Order. Its actions in the early Troubles, when it disavowed marches by rowdier and less organised loyalist groups in order to preserve its own parades, indicate that the Order regarded marching as something which ‘belonged’ to it and similar groups rather than being the property of unionists in general. While there could be considerable diversity on the platforms, the Twelfth was not a pan-unionist festival; it was an Orange Order event. Nevertheless, many Ulster Protestants saw the Twelfth in broader terms than this. We have seen that the Twelfth remained popular despite the divisions of the 1960s, and except in 1972, when the late lifting of the parade ban and safety concerns affected band turnouts, there is no evidence of a significant decline in participation in the Twelfth during the Troubles. This is despite a decline in Orange Order membership from the mid 1970s. The strength of the Twelfth as a cultural form independent of the Orange Order can be seen in the activities of groups which were estranged from the Order yet celebrated the Twelfth using virtually the same forms as those of the Order’s celebrations. Since 1902, the Independent Orange Order has held its own celebrations on the Twelfth; these have generally been identical in form to the main Order’s, including parades, speeches and resolutions. In 1973, loyalist prisoners in Long Kesh prison camp held their own Twelfth celebrations, including a bonfire on the Eleventh night and a parade on the Twelfth, complete with orange sashes, a flute band and a King William banner. These groups were not allied with the Orange Order, but nevertheless used its ceremonial forms, demonstrating the cultural power of the Twelfth.

The suspension of the Stormont parliament in March 1972 and its abolition the following year was a major blow for the Orange Order and other unionists, despite their disillusionment with the Northern Irish government. While the government had shown itself increasingly ready to restrict Protestant parades and had not, in the opinion of many unionists, taken a strong enough stand against the IRA, it was still a government composed primarily of Orangemen. Even if they did not always do what most Protestants wanted, they did understand them and their culture, and were dependent on their votes for re-election. British governments were not always well informed about the Northern Irish situation, especially the unionist side, and although they might sometimes need the support of Ulster unionist MPs, they were primarily answerable to a British public which was even more ill-informed and generally antagonistic to the unionist cause.\(^{55}\) The implications of this for parading became clear in the mid 1970s, when the Order could do nothing at all about police decisions to ban the Dungiven parade for good and re-route another in Derry.\(^{56}\)

The imposition of direct rule had done nothing to calm the marching season. July and August 1972 were the most and fourth most deadly months of the entire Troubles, with 96 and 55 people killed, four of them on the Twelfth of July.\(^{57}\) In the lead-up to the Twelfth at least 2000 Catholics crossed into the Republic as refugees, and Donegal Orangemen fled in the opposite direction after being driven out of their homes.\(^{58}\) Eighteen thousand soldiers, plus police officers and Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) men, were required to guard the parades from harm.\(^{59}\) In Portadown, Orange lodges were still allowed to march along Obins Street, which had been problematic for years, despite warnings from the IRA that they would take action against the parade and the still-legal UDA warning that they would take counter-action.\(^{60}\) The parade itself went ahead without violence, flanked by masked UDA men, who had earlier paraded through the area, but three people – one Protestant and two


\(^{56}\) Kaufmann, p.98.

\(^{57}\) McKitterick et al.

\(^{58}\) BT, 12 July 1972, pp.1, 9.

\(^{59}\) IN, 13 July 1972, p.4. The Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) was a British Army battalion raised in Northern Ireland and used for security tasks there. It was intended as a less sectarian replacement for the special constabulary, and was controlled by British Army command.

\(^{60}\) BT, 11 July 1972, p.1.
Catholics – were murdered in Portadown that day. Later in the month both the IRA and loyalist paramilitaries exploded bombs in the area, and there was a gun battle involving both sets of paramilitaries and the security forces. The UDA’s involvement in the parading dispute made a lasting impression on Portadown nationalists and is probably a major reason for their vehement opposition to Orange parades in later decades. Although the parades had escaped a ban, across Northern Ireland they suffered from the effects of security measures and the climate of danger. Fewer bands were on parade, partially because many members had not realised that the ban would be lifted and had booked holidays away, but also because the dangers of going out at night and problems with transport had made it difficult to organise rehearsals. At the field, many speakers condemned the British government and some supported the UDA, although the second resolution urged Protestants not to let ‘the enemies of Ulster’ provoke them into retaliatory violence.

Throughout the twentieth century, the Twelfth was an assertion of Ulster Protestant identity. Until the 1970s this was primarily a British identity, expressed particularly through the extensive display of Union Jacks and red, white and blue bunting. In the early 1970s, however, the Twelfth instead asserted a distinctly Ulster identity, in some cases explicitly rejecting Britishness. The suspension of Stormont had theoretically brought Northern Ireland closer to Britain but, as explained above, it stripped Ulster Protestants of much of their power and privilege and made them directly subject to a parliament which had little understanding or sympathy for them. On the 1972 Twelfth, the Orange Order’s third resolution called for Stormont to be restored and condemned the ‘betrayals’ of Westminster. As the Telegraph pointed out, many of that year’s platform speeches ‘were characterised by a bitterness and a defiance of Her Majesty’s Government and Ministers at Westminster’. The paper editorialised that the British could easily respond by abandoning Northern Ireland. To some loyalists, however, this was not much of a threat, since the British government had been a ‘liability’ in the

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61 BT, 12 July 1972, p.4; McKittrick et al., pp.219-20.
63 Jess, p.101; Caldwell, p.155.
64 BT, 12 July 1972, p.7.
65 ibid., p.9; TC, 14 July 1972, p.1.
66 BT, 12 July 1972, p.7.
fight against IRA terrorism.\textsuperscript{68} The terms ‘unionist’ and ‘loyalist’ became less descriptive as some within the community openly wondered about independence.\textsuperscript{69} New and clearly Ulster-oriented banner subjects emerged, such as Ian Paisley’s Martyrs’ Memorial Church, and the Ulster Special Constabulary, which had been abolished because of its sectarian tendencies.\textsuperscript{70} We saw that in 1971 Union Jacks had been replaced with Ulster banners, and in 1972 symbolic gestures on the street were accompanied by separatist rhetoric even from Ulster Protestant political leaders. The rhetoric of the Twelfth, once a solid reaffirmation of Britishness, now rejected that very quality.

Working-class Protestants, who suffered disproportionately from republican violence and were least able either to get out or formulate an intellectual response to it, felt particularly betrayed by the British. They were angered at descriptions of them as privileged oppressors when they lived in substandard housing and faced high unemployment.\textsuperscript{71} These feelings of betrayal, besiegement and confusion led to changes in the working-class Protestant culture displayed during the marching season. Most obviously, open sectarianism increased, with loyalist songs and publications describing republicans, and often Catholics in general, as ‘animals’ and explicitly advocating violence against them.\textsuperscript{72} Populist aspects of loyalist culture such as painting kerbstones red, white and blue, and the formation of rowdy ‘Kick the Pope’ or ‘Blood and Thunder’ marching bands, constructed and expressed loyalist identities defined in opposition to Irishness and Catholicism.\textsuperscript{73} In particular, blood and thunder bands, which usually had no connection to any of the loyal orders other than marching in their parades, became a popular way for young Protestant men to express their identity.\textsuperscript{74} Usually consisting only of flutes and drums, blood and thunder bands were cheap and easy to join, exclusively male, and, unlike Orange lodges, had no requirements of respectable behaviour or religious belief, other than nominal Protestantism.\textsuperscript{75} Many openly associated, and some had overlapping membership, with paramilitary

\textsuperscript{68} BT, 12 July 1972, p.9.
\textsuperscript{69} BT, 13 July 1972, p.1.
\textsuperscript{70} BT, 12 July 1972, p.9.
\textsuperscript{72} Gray, pp.251-2; Rolston, ‘Music and Politics’, passim; \textit{Loyalist News}.
\textsuperscript{73} Bryan, ‘Ireland’s very own Jurassic Park’, p.28; Bell, p.23.
\textsuperscript{74} For an exploration of band culture, see Bell, pp.97-141.
\textsuperscript{75} Racioppi and O’Sullivan See, p.11; Kaufmann, pp.150, 282.
groups. Indeed, the UDA magazine *Loyalist News* sometimes carried advertisements from lodges looking for bands. Young Protestants who belonged to neither a band or a lodge could also express their sectarianism by following a day of parade-watching with rioting and intimidation of Catholics. Thus, while the Orange Order tried throughout the Troubles to maintain an image of respectability, their parades frequently featured rowdy and paramilitary elements due to the nature of many of the bands and spectators. Ulster Protestant alienation from the rest of the world helped create a more distinct and separate sense of identity, expressed most clearly on the Twelfth, but this exacerbated the alienation and tarnished those sections of the community which were attempting to stay respectable.

Although anti-British sentiment was quickly abandoned by most Protestant leaders, it seems to have remained strong amongst ordinary Protestants, judging by the number of times Orange speakers attacked it. In 1974, former MP Jack Maginnis warned Orangemen in Tandragee that Ulster nationalism was allied with communism and fascism, and played into the hands of Irish nationalists. Other speakers made similar claims. The following year, various speakers conceded that the British government had failed Ulster Protestants, but cautioned against anti-British sentiment. It was necessary for one of the 1977 resolutions to state that the Orange Order was opposed to Ulster independence. That year MP Harold McCusker reaffirmed the principle of Britishness against Ulster nationalism, saying that he was neither an Irish nor an Ulster nationalist. ‘If I’m not British then I’m nothing.’ Meanwhile, Belfast County Grand Master Thomas Passmore invoked the cultural memory of the 1912 resistance to Irish Home Rule against Ulster independence, saying that Orangemen of 1977 were as determined as their fathers and grandfathers to have nothing to do with Home Rule, even if it was limited to Ulster. This is somewhat ironic, since the Stormont parliament which the Order was agitating to have reinstated was essentially a form of ‘home rule’.

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77 LN, 5 June 1971, p.4.
79 BT, 12 July 1974, p.3.
80 BT, 12 July 1975, p.3.
81 BT, 12 July 1977, p.9.
As well as reaffirming Britishness against an Ulster identity, official Twelfth rhetoric reaffirmed truly religious Protestantism against secular loyalism. Ulster Protestant identity, it was argued, should be based primarily on actual, Bible-based, churchgoing Protestantism rather than an irreligious opposition to Irish nationalism. Orange Imperial Grand Master the Reverend Martin Smyth criticised loyalist leaders who did not truly believe in the tenets of Protestantism, saying that ‘they have forfeited the right of support by the Ulster Protestant community’. To Smyth and others, the Twelfth was primarily a reassertion of Protestant belief; without that belief, nothing was worth following. Similarly, County Derry Grand Master Alfred Lee attacked ‘pagan Protestantism’: the assertion of a Protestant identity not backed up by actual religious belief. The values of Protestantism were also invoked against paramilitarism, with the second resolution of the 1975 Twelfth calling on Orangemen to ‘denounce anti-Christian attitudes which have brought death and destruction, sickness and injury, in their train’. The resolution could be understood as condemning sectarianism, and in keeping with this, a minister in Sixmilecross called for all Christians to recognise what they had in common. Although Catholicism was not specifically mentioned, he was severely heckled. The principles of Protestantism in opposition to secular loyalism were regularly reaffirmed although, as we can see from the Sixmilecross incident, there was little consistency on exactly what true Protestantism, or true Christianity, actually was. To some, Protestantism primarily meant opposition to Catholicism and Irish nationalism rather than one’s own beliefs; to others, such as the Sixmilecross minister, it was a creed of brotherhood and tolerance. To most Orange chaplains, however, it seems to have simply meant the basic beliefs and actions of religious adherence, particularly church attendance. The details of what Protestants believed were less important than whether they went to church, read the Bible, and accepted the basic tenets of their religion.

Throughout the 1970s, the Ulster Protestant community was split over a range of issues. Perhaps the most divisive was the question of how Northern Ireland should be run. Over the course of the decade, the British government searched for a solution to
the Northern Ireland problem, preferably one which would allow it to withdraw the army without the province collapsing into civil war. Each of the proposed solutions involved compulsory power sharing between the two communities and some degree of involvement by the Irish government, and each proposal split the unionist community. Brian Faulkner’s support for the power-sharing executive which came out of the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement cost him the leadership of the Unionist Party, and unionist opposition, culminating in a general strike in May 1974, brought down the first power-sharing assembly. A Constitutional Convention in 1975 was at first cautiously welcomed by many in the Orange Order, but was later derailed by the United Ulster Unionist Committee’s (UUUC) insistence on a return to simple majority rule; a stand which was applauded in one of the resolutions at the following year’s Twelfth. Hardliner William Craig, who had taken the unexpected step of advocating voluntary coalition, was forced out of both Vanguard and the UUUC, and on the Twelfth made an unprecedented platform attack on the Orange Order for its support of the UUUC hardliners. The same year the Unionist Party was criticised and Smyth heckled in Belfast for holding talks with the Catholic-dominated Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP).

Ulster Protestants were also divided over their own community’s paramilitaries, with the Orange and Unionist Party leadership generally opposed to them. In 1973, for example, Faulkner told Orangemen that the British government needed to crush terrorism regardless of which community it came from. This was not an opinion held by all unionists. The Reverend Donald Gillies told Belfast Orangemen at the 1972 Twelfth that, while it was normally wrong for people to take the law into their own hands, in cases where the authorities have ‘abandoned the law in favour of evil-doers then one can only expect citizens to rise to their own defence.’ The next year, various Orangemen marked the Twelfth by dropping off messages to loyalist prisoners. Ex-Orangeman and released loyalist prisoner Winston Rea staged an annual

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87 Gillespie, p.255.
88 BT, 12 July 1975, p.3; TC, 18 July 1975, p.2; BT, 12 July 1976, p.9.
90 TC, 15 July 1977, p.4; OS, August 1976, p.5.
93 BT, 12 July 1972, p.9.
94 BT, 12 July 1973, p.4.
Twelfth of July protest on the Shankill Road against the Orange leadership’s attitude towards imprisoned loyalists, accusing them of inspiring their violence and then ignoring them once they were jailed.95 Most Orange leaders did not intend to inspire loyalist paramilitarism, and many made repeated public statements against it. However the rank and file, and some speakers, were more sympathetic. Again we can see a split between populist loyalism, which tended to be tolerant of violence, and respectable unionism, which was more concerned with obedience of the law.

In times of crisis people become more likely to appeal to the past for support of their own actions and positions, and in Northern Ireland the 1970s were nothing if not a time of crisis. It is a cliché in Northern Irish politics to call those who want to negotiate with nationalists ‘Lundy’, after the seventeenth-century governor of Derry who tried to surrender the city to the Jacobites, and in this period the term was used against Faulkner, amongst others.96 Meanwhile, the UDA compared themselves to Derry’s defenders, rhetorically asking why Ulster Protestants who took up arms to defend themselves and their people in 1690 were hailed as heroes, while those who did the same in the 1970s were labelled murderers, shot by the army, or imprisoned.97 The period before World War I, when Ulster Protestants had formed the UVF and other groups to resist Irish Home Rule by force of arms, was frequently drawn upon. In 1974, for example, Craig argued that ‘Ulster’s heritage and future’ were more at risk than in 1912.98 In the wake of a major loyalist strike that year, platform speeches were full of proposals for Protestant militia, which MP Harold McCusker saw in the tradition of the UVF and the special constabulary.99 Because of the often highly religious nature of Orangeism, some speakers drew lessons from biblical as well as Irish and British history. In 1976, for example, the Derry City Grand Chaplain compared the contemporary Northern Irish situation with that in Palestine in 1226 BC. He argued that ‘the circumstances were remarkably similar’, citing violence, religious apathy, and authority figures with ‘neither the courage nor the desire to put down evil and uphold the things which were right and good’.100

95 BT, 12 July 1978, p.1; IN, 13 July 1985, p.3.
98 BT, 12 July 1974, p.3.
99 ibid.; IN, 13 July 1974, p.1.
100 BT, 12 July 1976, p.9. See also BT, 12 July 1980, p.11.
The late 1970s saw an easing of the Troubles. From 1978 to 1980, deaths per month were usually in single figures and only rose above twenty on two occasions, both of which were mainly due to single IRA bombings killing a large number of people.\footnote{The La Mon House bombing which killed twelve in February 1978 and the Warrenpoint bombing in August 1979 in which killed 18 British soldiers. Statistics from McKittrick et al.} In 1978 the barriers around Short Strand, a Catholic enclave in Protestant east Belfast, came down, although other Catholic Belfast suburbs remained sealed off on the Twelfth.\footnote{IN, 13 July 1978, p.1.} Twelfth parades returned to Rosnowlagh in the Irish Republic for the first time since they were driven out in 1972.\footnote{ibid.} The marching season became calmer, and even the 1981 Twelfth passed relatively calmly, despite the death of a hunger striker that morning.\footnote{Bryans, Fraser and Dunn, available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/csc/reports/rituals3.htm; BT, 13 July 1981, pp.1, 3; OS, September 1981, p.3.} Nationalists in Portadown and Coalisland held protests against local Twelfth parades, but these did not lead to violence even though they caused a re-routing of the Coalisland parade.\footnote{BT, 12 July 1982, p.1.} It is likely that by this stage of the Troubles parading had ceased to be a prominent issue. Nationalists still opposed Protestant parades, but they were no longer a symbol of Stormont tyranny. Extremists on both sides would have been far more motivated by the violence committed by their opposite numbers than by parading issues, and ordinary people would likewise have had more serious things to worry about. The marginalisation of parading as a political issue may be behind the relative calmness of the marching season at this time.

The less fraught nature of the Twelfth is also illustrated by the form of its meetings. By the late 1970s, most took the form of religious services at which the resolutions were moved, and politicians spoke from few platforms, especially if they were not also clergy or officers in the Orange Order.\footnote{BT, 12 July 1978, p.4.} While this prevented a recurrence of the heckling and disorder which had plagued the Twelfth from the mid 1960s to the early 1970s, it also removed much of the interest from the meetings. In 1978 one minister criticised those who saw the Twelfth purely as a parade and ignored the speeches, resolutions and service.\footnote{Caldwell, p.225, IN, 14 July 1981, p.5.} Two years later speakers at Newtownstewart struggled to prevent bagpipers from playing during the speeches, with the District Master...
complaining that ‘this happens every time’. Meetings which still had political speeches regularly featured calls to take a harder line on terrorism, but there were nearly as many mentions of domestic issues such as unemployment, education, and in 1980 the price of coal and electricity. The political resolution, which had once been little more than a motion of confidence in the Stormont government, had since the mid 1970s become a list of grievances against the British government, especially the continued lack of a devolved parliament or an adequately firm stand against terrorism. That the same grievances continued to be voiced each year shows how few listened to them, and how little power those few possessed. In some senses, the Twelfth had regained its purpose of unifying Ulster Protestants, in that it continued to attract large crowds and was no longer a site of serious conflict. However it had also become less meaningful. It was no longer an assertion of Protestant ‘ownership’ of Northern Ireland but in its rhetoric was an illustration of a people’s powerlessness.

From the suspension of the Stormont parliament in 1972 until the early 1980s, Ulster Protestants struggled to find a response to the crisis in which they found themselves. The Twelfth was frequently a site of division as various solutions were debated. Clear splits emerged over the issues of power sharing and paramilitarism, reflecting an underlying division between populist loyalism based primarily on an Ulster identity and more respectable British unionism. Religion was another point of contention, with religious leaders deploiring the tendency of self-described Protestants to see this identity purely in terms of loyalism rather than Christianity. Orange leaders frequently used the Twelfth to reaffirm the principles of Britishness and Protestantism against Ulster nationalism and purely nominal religious affiliation. Until the late 1970s, when the amount of political rhetoric declined, the Twelfth did not unite Ulster Protestants but instead exacerbated and displayed their divisions. From this point the Twelfth became less divisive and generally calmer, but this was primarily an indication of its irrelevance.

During the 1980s the Northern Irish political landscape underwent major change. Following the election of imprisoned hunger striker Bobby Sands to the Westminster parliament, the IRA and its Sinn Fein political wing embarked on a ‘ballot box and Armalite’ strategy of combining electoral politics with a continuing terrorist campaign. The party rapidly achieved electoral success, which many Protestants interpreted as Catholic support for the IRA’s terrorist campaign. Ulster Protestant discomfort increased further in the mid 1980s, when the British government entered talks on Northern Ireland with its Irish counterpart. The resulting Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was opposed by virtually all unionists, who saw it as giving a foreign government power over British citizens. Simultaneously, a new parading policy was developed by the police, resulting in the re-routing of Protestant parades in the town of Portadown. These changes unified Ulster Protestants to perhaps the greatest extent since the 1950s, led to increased levels of violence, and gave the Twelfth renewed relevance as platforms were used to express rage at these new developments. As in earlier periods, the Twelfth was an explicitly political event in which the historical events supposedly being commemorated were barely mentioned. In 1990, the 300th anniversary of the Battle of the Boyne, the past was widely discussed but, on the Twelfth at least, almost exclusively in terms of the present.

The rise of Sinn Fein led to an increase in tensions from the early 1980s; this was based on the party’s rhetoric as well as its association with the IRA. For example, in 1982 Sinn Fein spokesman Richard McAuley described Orangeism and loyalism as ‘incompatible with progress and freedom’ and added that Sinn Fein would ‘continue to strive to eradicate that philosophy from our country.’ Once again, the Twelfth and things associated with it became a proxy for Ulster Protestants in general; McAuley’s attack was taken, and may have been meant, as an attack on all unionists rather than just a sub-group. The intensification of divisions between Protestant and Catholic was not accompanied by a rise in the Troubles death rate, but there seems to have been an increase in non-fatal loyalist violence, especially during the marching.

110 Bruce, God Save Ulster!, p.118; Gillespie, pp.256-7.
111 Gillespie, p.257.
112 ibid., pp.257-8; Bardon, pp.768-70; BT, 14 July 1986, p.9.
season. In 1983 the Twelfth was marked by rioting in Derry, and mob attacks on Catholic homes in Ballynahinch and Belfast’s Short Strand.\textsuperscript{114} The following year Catholic homes were again attacked, this time in Limavady.\textsuperscript{115} Paisley, speaking as usual at an Independent Orange Order gathering, did nothing to calm the situation, calling for the Battle of the Boyne to be refought.\textsuperscript{116} Blood and thunder bands grew rowdier, leading the police to issue new Force Orders to deal with ‘overt and unruly displays of sectarian bitterness’ from bands.\textsuperscript{117} The Orange leadership also grew increasingly concerned at some of the behaviour which now accompanied their parades, and set up a committee on the behaviour of bands and marches.\textsuperscript{118} At most places, however, the Twelfth conveyed an image of Protestant unity, with speeches and resolutions carrying on the trend of focussing on domestic matters as well as opposition to a united Ireland, moral laxity, and what was seen as a weak government stand against terrorism.\textsuperscript{119}

The tense situation of the early 1980s erupted in the middle of the decade, partly because of the AIA but also because of a major conflict over parading in the County Armagh town of Portadown. The town has been the site of clashes over Protestant parades since the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{120} It is close to the site of the Orange Order’s founding, and since 1807 Orangemen have paraded to the Church of the Ascension in Drumcree.\textsuperscript{121} Since then a large Catholic population has built up in Portadown, concentrated around Obins Street and Garvaghy Road between the Drumcree church and the Portadown town centre. For decades, Orange parades would walk along Obins Street, a route which was bitterly resented by many local Catholics, especially since their own parades were confined to a very restricted area.\textsuperscript{122} After an incident in 1985 when a police-sanctioned Catholic band parade was blocked by a unionist sit-down protest, Protestant parades were re-routed from Obins Street to Garvaghy Road.\textsuperscript{123} The re-routing was part of a wider policy on parading developed by the police, but

\textsuperscript{115} BT, 12 July 1984, p.1; IN, 13 July 1984, p.1.
\textsuperscript{116} BT, 12 July 1984, p.8.
\textsuperscript{117} Bryan, ‘Drumcree and “the Right to March”’, pp.197-8.
\textsuperscript{118} IN, 10 July 1985, p.1.
\textsuperscript{121} Jess, p.99.
\textsuperscript{122} Caldwell, pp.106-8, 218.
\textsuperscript{123} ibid., pp.224-5; Kaufmann, p.155; Jess, p.98.
was widely seen by Protestants as Dublin interference resulting from the AIA. In addition, lobbying by Sinn Fein local politicians led many to believe that the party had created opposition where none had previously existed. In the following weeks there was serious violence in Portadown and elsewhere, and loyalists turned on the police in a concerted way for the first time, driving officers out of homes which had been previously safe because they were in Protestant areas. Over the next twelve months there were numerous parading disputes in Portadown, culminating in March 1986 in a last-minute ban on an Apprentice Boys parade. The ban sparked rioting which left 50 people injured, one of them fatally.

Unionists were now more united than they had been in decades, with most of the Orange Order and the Independent Orange Order opposing the re-routing. Despite this, the Orange Order continued to be more concerned with its own ability to parade than with loyalist culture as a whole. Portadown lodges accepted conditions which stopped their bands from playing sectarian songs and prevented parade followers from accompanying the march down Garvaghy Road. One of the resolutions also condemned attacks on the police, failing to recognise that the Order’s hardline policy on parades was partially inspiring them. Once again there was a conflict between the Order’s reaffirmation of respectability and its supporters’ concern for the more fundamental, if unofficial, principles of the Twelfth, primarily the idea of the ‘right to march’ – at least as this applied to Protestants – and staunch opposition to Catholicism and Irish nationalism. From 1986, bands were required by the Order to sign a contract which brought them fully under lodge control, allowed flag-carrying only at the discretion of lodge officers, and forbade a number of things including ‘shouting in an unseemly manner’ and drinking on parade. In this case the division was minimal, mostly because the new rules were not properly enforced. Four years later there

126 Kennaway, p.756; Ryder, *RUC*, p.323; BT, 12 July 1985, p.3; BT, 13 July 1985, p.1; IN, 13 July 1985, pp.1, 3; Bruce, *God Save Ulster!*, p.140.
130 ibid., p.3.
were still allegations that bands in Orange parades played more loudly when going past Catholic churches. In several areas the Order sought to improve its public image and reclaim the Twelfth from other loyalists by holding festivals around the Twelfth, featuring events such as barbecues, pop concerts and drumming competitions. This can be seen as an attempt to reposition the Twelfth as a community festival rather than a recommitment to hardline loyalist principles.

Meanwhile, the Northern Ireland Office responded to the Portadown chaos with a Public Order Order which repealed the Flags and Emblems Act, deprived traditional parades of their privileged status and compelled their organisers to give police seven days’ notice. Despite the fact that the Order was still allowed to parade through Catholic majority areas such as Garvaghy Road and the town of Keady, this law change angered the Orange Order, with the Mourne District Master claiming that it proved that the AIA’s promise of reconciliation was a lie. In Portadown, the district chaplain boycotted the 1987 Twelfth parade because it had complied with the law and given advance notice. The parade, however, passed without trouble, with lodge protest consisting only of the handing over of a letter of complaint to the police blocking the march from Obins Street. Despite the restrained nature of this protest, Ulster Protestants in general were highly aggrieved by the new restrictions. As has been noted, Orange and similar parades were an important symbol of Ulster Protestant culture and people, and so interference with parading was widely seen as affecting the community as a whole, not just the Orange Order.

The marching season as a whole was also a source of conflict. Flags and similar symbols were particularly problematic, with some British and Ulster symbols coming to be associated with working class loyalism rather than Northern Irish Protestants in general. There were several disputes about whether Union Jacks and red, white and blue bunting should be hung in workplaces and streets, and loyalist flags were

133 IN, 11 July 1990, p.6.
134 OS, August 1987, p.2.
137 BT, 13 July 1987, p.4.
138 ibid., p.1.
sometimes attached to Catholic churches.\textsuperscript{139} Disputes over bunting and Union Jacks caused problems at the Short Brothers aircraft factory in the mid 1980s, with loyalist workers staging a walk-out in 1987 over the removal of bunting traditionally hung in the factory.\textsuperscript{140} As this split between management and workers indicates, class was a major line of division. In 1990, for example, the residents of a ‘yuppie development’ in Belfast were angered when bunting was put up on their street without their permission, saying that it created the wrong atmosphere but they were afraid to remove it.\textsuperscript{141} Kerbstone painting was also used around the Twelfth to denote ‘ownership’ of particular areas, and this was sometimes presented as a harmless part of the festivities, despite police efforts to stop the practice.\textsuperscript{142} From the early 1980s murals, which had declined in number since before World War II, underwent a revival.\textsuperscript{143} They were frequently amateurish and inexpertly painted, often featured paramilitary imagery, and were criticised by the \textit{Orange Standard} as ‘an affront to decent Protestantism’.\textsuperscript{144} A better image was created by the practice in some working class and rural areas of white-washing and generally cleaning and tidying the fronts of houses in early July.\textsuperscript{145}

Information about these activities is patchy, but what can be gathered reflects the changing nature of unionist culture since the 1960s and 1970s. The prominence of the Union Jack in flag disputes indicates that the flag had recovered from its unpopularity of the early 1970s. Since there had been no improvement in Northern Ireland’s relationship with the rest of the United Kingdom, this was perhaps an assertion of Britishness in the face of British indifference and hostility, and almost certainly reflects a decline in Ulster independence sentiment. Most significantly, with the partial exception of Protestant-dominated towns in the east of the province,\textsuperscript{146} loyalist cultural displays were now primarily undertaken by working-class people, while the middle classes tended to distance themselves from them.\textsuperscript{147} This is illustrated most clearly by the yuppie bunting dispute, but also by the refusal of Short’s management

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{IN}, 11 July 1985, p.1; \textit{BT}, 1 July 1987, p.1; \textit{IN}, 2 July 1987, p.2.
\textsuperscript{141} \textit{BN}, 7 July 1990, p.11.
\textsuperscript{144} \textit{OS}, May 1984, p.2.
\textsuperscript{145} Larsen, p.278.
\textsuperscript{146} Jarman, \textit{Material Conflicts}, p.13.
\textsuperscript{147} Cecil, p.153; Larsen, p.288.
to support their loyalist workers on the flags issue, the Standard’s criticism of murals for aesthetic as well as moral reasons, and by the proliferation of inexpensive forms of loyalist expression such as frontage-cleaning and kerbstone and amateur mural painting. Whereas in the 1950s and 1960s the Twelfth had united Ulster Protestants across class lines, it now exacerbated class divisions as many in the Protestant middle class distanced themselves from a loyalism which was increasingly working class in expression.

Overall Catholic responses to the parades in the 1980s are difficult to gauge, although the Irish News claimed that most viewed them with ‘resentment and fear’. Even in the ‘Upper Tullagh’ – a pseudonymous rural area which became the object of study because of its unusual peacefulness – some Catholics resented the local Orange parade despite it involving only about twenty Orangemen and an accordion band. While some Protestants believed that Catholics went out of their way to be offended, some Catholics believed that the parades, especially those through Catholic areas, were intended primarily to annoy and intimidate them. Normally friendly Protestants continued to snub their Catholic neighbours during the marching season. However, there is anecdotal evidence of Catholic support for local parades and bands, for reasons including personal friendship, local pride and the desire to support a business’ customers. Neighbourliness of the kind which supposedly characterised earlier periods, such as Catholics driving elderly neighbours to the parades, was occasionally reported. For Catholics, gestures of this kind could send a powerful message about inter-community friendship. However such actions were uncommon, as was shown in 1989 by reactions to a claim by British Agriculture Minister John MacGregor that 10% of the bands in the Twelfth parades and nearly all the food and drink vendors at the fields were Catholic. Orange leader Martin Smyth said that while ‘we have some Roman Catholics in our processions’, the percentage in bands was unlikely to be as high as ten, and although there were Catholic vendors there were

\[148\] IN, 11 July 1990, p.6.
\[150\] IN, 13 July 1985, p.4; IN, 12 July 1990, p.7.
\[151\] Larsen, p.287.
\[152\] Jennings and Durran, p.77; Edwards, p.110; Buckley, Gentle People, p.140; Bell, Acts of Union, p.128.
\[153\] Buckley, Gentle People, p.131.
Protestant ones as well.\textsuperscript{154} Martin O Muilleoir of Sinn Fein, meanwhile, said that most Catholics would be ‘too afraid to go out of their homes, never mind actually taking part’.\textsuperscript{155} Other evidence supports the claim that a significant number of vendors were Catholic, but also shows that they sometimes received a hostile response.\textsuperscript{156} For those who opposed the parades, one reaction to the Twelfth continued to be attacks on Orange Order property.\textsuperscript{157} Another response, which emerged from the mid 1980s in various Catholic suburbs, was the organisation of sports days and festivals for children in order to provide them with something to do and keep them away from trouble.\textsuperscript{158} Despite the Northern Ireland Office’s efforts to restrict Protestant parades, the marching season continued to cause serious tension between Northern Ireland’s two communities.

For most of the 1980s, historical rhetoric played a minor part in Twelfth speeches, although various anniversaries were noted in the resolutions.\textsuperscript{159} From 1988, the 300\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of the Williamite Revolution, history became more prominent. Many new banners were commissioned, most of which depicted William III, and the 1990 parades featured people in historical costume and a float representing the ship which relieved the Siege of Derry.\textsuperscript{160} On the platforms in the late 1980s and in 1990, some speakers mentioned William’s lack of prejudice, and his desire for his subjects to live in peace with one another.\textsuperscript{161} Illustrating the range of uses to which history can be put, others contrasted events and themes of the Revolution with contemporary political events, accusing the British government and Northern Ireland Office of subjecting Northern Protestants to ‘a system of government which is as unjust as any plot perpetrated by James II’.\textsuperscript{162} Various speakers also highlighted what they saw as a clash between the principles of the Revolution and the reality of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and Paisley argued that the European Union was reducing British sovereignty, meaning that everything fought for at the Boyne and later European

\textsuperscript{154} BT, 12 July 1989, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{155} IN, 13 July 1989, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{156} IN, 14 July 1984, p.1; Edwards, p.6.  
\textsuperscript{157} IN, 13 July 1990, p.3.  
\textsuperscript{158} IN, 13 July 1984, p.5; IN, 13 July 1985, p.3; IN, 14 July 1987, p.3.  
\textsuperscript{159} BT, 12 July 1983, p.5; BT, 12 July 1984, p.8; BT, 12 July 1986, p.3.  
\textsuperscript{161} TC, 19 July 1990, p.11.  
\textsuperscript{162} BT, 12 July 1988, p.4. See also British House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, 5 July 1990, cols.1177-8.
battlefields had been lost. In 1989, Orange leader Martin Smyth used history to justify parading in the face of Catholic opposition, admitting to the *Belfast Telegraph* that some people found the parades offensive, but arguing that it was only because of William’s victory at the Boyne that they had the freedom to express their opposition. The next year he wrote a *Telegraph* feature which was a similar mix of concession to Catholic views and assertion of Protestant opinion. After the Boyne, he wrote, ‘some political self-seeking Protestants’ broke William’s promises of toleration and mistreated Irish Catholics. However, they also mistreated Presbyterians, who ‘nevertheless lived faithful Christian lives until they won full citizenship as loyal people. So any who espouse full citizenship must share responsibilities as well as claiming rights’. Once again the past was brought to bear on the present.

Smyth’s views on the Northern Irish past would probably have been widely held by Protestants, partly because of the sources available to the general public. During the Troubles period few books on the effects of the Williamite Revolution on Ireland were published, and the historical articles which had appeared frequently in the Northern Irish press before the Troubles had all but vanished. Nor were children exposed to much history in schools. Irish history remained a neglected subject, and textbooks used in the 1970s were often old and unappealing. From around that point newer and better texts began to be published but Irish history was given little attention in most schools before the sixth form, and many teachers remained unaware of historiographical developments. This meant that educating the general public about the Revolution and the Boyne fell almost exclusively to loyalist groups, particularly the Orange Order. They and some of the loyalist media often presented straightforward and factual accounts of the events without much interpretation or editorialising, and credited Patrick Sarsfield and other Jacobite leaders (although not James) with bravery and heroism. We should be wary about seeing this as a true

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compliment to the Catholic forces; as James Belich points out in *The New Zealand Wars*, praising your enemy is a well established way of making your own side look good.\textsuperscript{169} The *Loyalist News* and *Protestant Telegraph* in particular tended to have an inflated idea of the Revolution’s importance, arguing that it marked the triumph of freedom over tyranny.\textsuperscript{170} There was also a tendency to see any questioning of the greatness of the Revolution and the Boyne as a plot by Irish nationalists, humanists, and other villains.\textsuperscript{171}

Another way in which loyalists expressed their understandings of the past was through the huge and colourful banners carried by most lodges. These portray a range of historical, religious and local subjects, most commonly William of Orange but also including a crown on a Bible; local landmarks; deceased lodge officers; and biblical and historical scenes. It has been argued that even the apparently non-religious banners convey religious ideas: the Siege of Derry is an allegory for the Christian’s fight against sinfulness; King William on his white horse is a stand-in for Christ the King; and so forth.\textsuperscript{172} One major theme is the necessity of staying faithful and defending that faith, regardless of the danger to oneself.\textsuperscript{173} Most of the historical banner subjects can be related to this: nearly all which do not depict William III feature Ulster Protestants standing up for what they believed was right, in subjects ranging from the Siege of Derry, to nineteenth-century Orangeman William Johnston, who campaigned to repeal laws banning Orange parades, to the Battle of the Somme. Banners showing imperial subjects such as Britannia or Queen Victoria can be seen as statements that Britain was great when it was faithfully Protestant.\textsuperscript{174} Even the depiction of local landmarks can be interpreted as a statement that the place is Protestant territory. Banners can have multiple meanings, with religious subjects also having

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\textsuperscript{171} OS, February 1988, p.1; Wallace, *King William*, pp.3-4, 13.


\textsuperscript{173} Smyth, pp.16-20.

\textsuperscript{174} Campbell on ‘The Secret of Britain’s Greatness’, Crown and Bible, and Britannia, no page numbers.
political meanings, as Anthony D. Buckley has shown with regard to Royal Black
to the British monarchy and faithfulness to God, but is also an assertion of difference
from Irish Catholics, who are seen as disloyal and ignorant of scripture. Religious
metaphors which equate William with Christ, and the besieged citizens of Derry with
Christians beset by sin, inevitably equate the Catholic armies faced by William and
the people of Derry with sinfulness and evil. Taken collectively, the banners are an
assertion of Ulster Protestant identity and culture, defined against Irishness and
Catholicism.

The Twelfth of July 1990, like Waitangi Day of the same year, was one event in a
year-long celebration of a major anniversary, for which planning had begun many
years previously.\footnote{OS, December 1982, p.2; OS, September 1987, p.1.} Outside of Northern Ireland, there had been few tercentenary
celebrations of the Williamite Revolution, which the Orange Order naturally
attributed to ‘the hand of Rome’.\footnote{OS, February 1988, p.12.} The Order organised numerous events, including
the burial of a time capsule, evangelical meetings, concerts, sports days, history
lectures, banner unfurlings and a bus trip to various Williamite sites. Although the
programme ran throughout 1990, most events were concentrated in the months lead-
ing up to the Twelfth.\footnote{OS, February 1990, pp.9-10.} Other loyalist groups also commemorated the anniversary.

An Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) mural was painted in Belfast’s Sandy Row featur-
ing King William, one of his soldiers, a UFF paramilitary, and the words ‘We the
loyalist people of Sandy Row remember with pride the anniversary of the Battle of the
Boyne, No Surrender, signed UFF’. As Jarman points out, this is not the champion of
liberty promoted by respectable unionism but rather a warrior king, a leader of gun-
men.\footnote{Jarman, \textit{Material Conflicts}, p.221.} The differing ways in which various loyalist groups commemorated the
Boyne show that shared traditions do not imply shared political opinions or world-
views, or even the same understandings of the past.

While Waitangi Day 1990 was a much bigger and more elaborate event that the
commemorations of previous years, the Twelfth 1990 was much the same as in other
years, and in terms of size the Twelfth parades were eclipsed by one held, for no clear reason, in September. ¹⁸⁰ A few changes did occur on the Twelfth. Water from the Boyne River was poured across the start of the Belfast parade route, prompting the headline ‘Orangemen to walk on water’. ¹⁸¹ Northern Ireland Secretary Peter Brooke became ‘the first Northern Ireland Secretary to escape traditional Twelfth criticism’ and platform anger was instead directed at Irish Taoiseach Charles Haughey, who was seen as interfering with Brooke’s work.¹⁸² A last-minute ‘emergency resolution’ condemning Haughey was added to the resolution list; this was the first time that this had happened in at least fifty years.¹⁸³ Smyth was given a large opinion piece in the Irish News, in which he argued again that the British and Irish people owed their freedoms to William’s victory at the Boyne.¹⁸⁴ Another innovation was a suggestion by Irish TD (MP) and former Stormont nationalist MP Austin Currie that the Irish parliament should be commemorating the Battle of the Boyne. While the idea was warmly received by the Telegraph, it is in fact more revelatory of how little most Irish politicians wished to embrace Northern Protestants.¹⁸⁵ Currie’s suggestion was not taken up by any other TD, and avoided mentioning by name either the battle or the Protestant community, referring instead to ‘an event which occurred 300 years ago, which was of… particular significance to a section of people of a different tradition in Northern Ireland’.¹⁸⁶ This suggests the ways that commemorations can be used to build bridges between acrimonious groups, but also shows the limitations of this strategy, especially when the commemoration in question is controversial.

From 1969 to 1990, the Twelfth was inextricably bound up with contemporary events. Protestant parading was heavily affected by the republican terrorist campaign and the shift of power from Stormont to Westminster. The Ulster Protestant community was seriously divided over how to respond to these crises, and this division was frequently and forcefully expressed in the Twelfth celebrations of the 1970s. There were also serious divisions between various kinds of respectable unionism and populist loyalism. The Orange Order leadership revealed itself to be more concerned about its own

¹⁸³ ibid., p.12.
¹⁸⁴ IN, 12 July 1990, p.6.
ability to parade than wider loyalist culture, aspects of which it often opposed, and middle-class Protestants distanced themselves from loyalist symbols such as bunting and flags. From the mid 1980s, however, the combination of Sinn Fein’s electoral successes, the Anglo-Irish Agreement, and a change in parading policy unified most of the Protestant community. There continued to be serious division between populist and respectable unionism, but both sides could agree on their opposition to the AIA and, to a lesser extent, re-routing. These, and not the Boyne or King William, were the primary topics of Twelfth speeches; the Twelfth was not a remembrance of the past but a forum to respond to the present.
In 1968, Waitangi Day was something of a de facto national day in New Zealand, albeit with limited status. The ceremonies still essentially reaffirmed the idea that New Zealand’s race relations, although not perfect, were nevertheless something to be proud of. By 1990 the day was a public holiday and portrayed by the media mostly as a forum for protest. The intervening years had seen the rise of a Maori protest movement which often focussed on the Treaty as a cause of, and possibly a solution to, many of New Zealand’s racial problems. Attempts had also been made, particularly by the Norman Kirk-led Labour government of the 1970s, to use Waitangi Day to construct a New Zealand national identity which encompassed New Zealanders of all cultural backgrounds. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Treaty of Waitangi was transformed from a nice but essentially irrelevant symbol to a document with real power.

As well as examining the evolution of Waitangi Day, this chapter will also explore the changing meanings of the Treaty of Waitangi, showing how these influenced the commemorations of the signing.

The previous chapter showed that historic commemorations which symbolise sufficiently compelling ideals can maintain high levels of participation even when participation is dangerous. In many ways Waitangi Day is the opposite of the Twelfth, although both were plagued with controversy in this period. The history of Waitangi Day suggests that historic commemorations need to clearly and consistently reaffirm popular ideals in order to achieve widespread popular observance. As in earlier decades, the principles reaffirmed at Waitangi Day were not always widely or deeply believed in. Nor was it always clear which principles would be reaffirmed, as these changed according to political fashion. At various points, Waitangi Day reaffirmed the principles of racial equality, the importance of the Treaty, the benevolence of British colonisation, the partnership of Maori and Pakeha, and a distinctly New Zealand national identity which encompassed people of all ethnic origins. Many of these were at least somewhat controversial and none were values which the majority of New Zealanders felt the need to publicly commit themselves to. Waitangi Day was further complicated by activist allegations that it reaffirmed things such as imperialism and the subjugation of Maori. Throughout this period, Maori and Pakeha
competed to influence and control the meaning and message of Waitangi Day: which values would be reaffirmed and how they would be expressed.

The meaning of Waitangi Day was contested by numerous groups, despite popular indifference, because as New Zealand’s national day it had major symbolic power. Like other historic commemorations, it sent messages about a particular group of people, in this case New Zealanders, particularly Pakeha. Traditionally, Waitangi Day had constructed an image of New Zealanders as a fair-minded people who had come together through benevolent British colonisation and now lived in a state of racial equality. Maori protesters challenged this, using Waitangi Day to assert their view of New Zealand as a stolen land in which Maori had been marginalised by Pakeha imperialism. The symbolism of Waitangi Day was altered by the Kirk government, which used the ceremonies to portray a multi-ethnic country in which all people were equal citizens but maintained their distinct cultures. A return to an increasingly anachronistic traditionalism in the late 1970s to the mid 1980s was countered by an increasingly angry protest movement which characterised New Zealand as a country built on fraud and land theft. Throughout this period, the message sent by Waitangi Day was mixed, changeable, and highly contested, a sign of a nation strongly divided and uncertain of its identity.

This thesis has argued that the meaning of historic commemorations can be best understood in relation to contemporary issues rather than the past. In some ways, Waitangi Day appears to be an exception to this, since the Treaty of Waitangi was discussed regularly and sometimes in depth by speakers, editorialists and protesters. The nature of British colonisation and the New Zealand past were also regular topics of discussion. However, as in other commemorations, these things were of interest primarily because of their impact on the present. Understanding the nature of colonisation was vital to forming an opinion on Treaty settlements and Maori complaints of land alienation. Likewise, the Treaty was discussed not so much as a historical object but as something which might be relevant in the present. This is clear even in the historiography of the Treaty, most of which was clearly written with at least one eye on contemporary political concerns. As in the 1990 commemorations of the Battle of the Boyne, even when history was widely discussed it was in terms of contemporary utility, not for its own sake.
In chapter two, we saw that the form and content of Waitangi Day was determined mostly by Pakeha, despite recurrent Maori attempts to alter it. From 1968, Maori became more vocal in their challenges to the conventional meaning of Waitangi Day. Across Maori society, from Northland tribal elders to young urban protesters, Maori views of Waitangi Day, the Treaty of Waitangi, and contemporary race relations were publicly voiced. We can see a parallel with Twelfth of July ceremonies of the 1960s, when division within Ulster Protestantism reached the point where the community's main historic commemoration became a forum for the venting of disagreement and political division. In 1968 most Pakeha, including most politicians, were indifferent to Waitangi Day, perhaps indicating that few felt a strong commitment to the ideals which the ceremony reaffirmed. The high profile protests which took place at Waitangi from 1971 drew increased Pakeha attention to the day and the Treaty, and sparked debate over the significance of the Treaty and the nature of New Zealand's past. As is often the case, many appealed to the past for support of their positions. At this stage conservative Pakeha were especially prone to this, probably because their views were supported by most contemporary historiography.

Maori urbanisation in the post-war period had exposed existing racial inequality and led to increased tensions, which were an undercurrent of Waitangi Days in the 1960s. That decade also saw the rise of mass protest movements in many countries; the civil rights movement in Northern Ireland was one of these. New Zealanders, too, took to the streets over many different issues. The 1968 opening of parliament was picketed by a wide range of protest groups, including those for and against the Vietnam War, against nuclear testing, trade unionists wanting a wage rise, housewives against rising prices, and Maori against the Maori Affairs Amendment Act.¹ This last issue was the catalyst for the emergence of a clearly defined Maori protest movement owing its form and much of its rhetoric to international activism.² In the mid 1960s the National government proposed to reduce the amount of under-utilised Maori land through

automatic transfer of some land to a Pakeha system of land ownership, and the
compulsory purchase of ‘uneconomic’ interests. The Maori Affairs Amendment Act
1967, as it became, generally allowed greater state interference in Maori landholding,
and was widely seen by Maori as yet another Pakeha land grab. The plans were
strongly opposed by virtually every Maori group and organisation, including suppose-
dedly conservative bodies such as the Maori Women’s Welfare League and the New
Zealand Maori Council. Despite this, the Act was passed with only minor modifi-
cations.

From the late 1960s Maori became increasingly willing to speak frankly and publicly
about injustices in the present and the past. Traditional Pakeha views of the New
Zealand past were described as ‘fairy stories’, and the view began to emerge that the
Treaty had been deliberately mistranslated in order to win Maori acceptance. A
promotional letter for one early Waitangi Day protest, in 1968, said that the Maori
Affairs Amendment Act would 'enhance robbery of Maori Lands. History repeats it-
self – do not lie down and take it’. Despite this, protests were initially very restrained.
The one that the letter promoted was a small demonstration at parliament at which
Labour MP Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan told the crowd that Maori should attempt to
consolidate their land titles and make them workable, thus rendering the Act irre-
levant. The one protest at Waitangi was a boycott of the ceremonies by Ngati Hine
elder Walter Kawiti. The Tai Tokerau [Northland] District Maori Council debated
whether to follow suit, finally voting to attend with two dissensions. For all their
restraint, these protests mark an important turning point. Previously, Maori had con-
tested the meaning of Waitangi Day by staying away or making mildly critical
speeches as part of the official ceremonies, and Northland Maori had supported
various anniversary celebrations since at least the 1890s. Explicit Maori challenges to
the messages of Waitangi Day had always taken place behind the scenes, and a facade

3 Walker, _Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou_, p.139.
4 Harris, _Hikoi_, p.24.
5 Walker, ‘Genesis of Maori Activism’, pp.276; Harris, _Hikoi_, pp.35, 38, 40. For example see _Maori
6 Douglas Sinclair in Overseas Programme Exchange Service, ‘The Maori Programme’, MPT 187,
Radio New Zealand Sound Archives (RNZSA); See also Douglas Sinclair, ‘The Maori Affairs
7 NZH, 1 February 1968, p.10.
8 EP, 6 February 1968, p.10.
9 Overseas Programme Exchange Service, ‘The Maori Programme’, MPT 187, RNZSA; NZH, 7
February 1968, p.3.
of inter-racial harmony was generally preserved. These protests mark the point at which Maori became willing to publicly contest Waitangi Day's message of good race relations and benevolent colonisation.

This new mood began to impact on the ceremonies. In 1969 official Maori speaker and Waitangi National Trust Board member N.P.K. Puriri asked in his speech if ‘there [is] anything in the Treaty today that I can celebrate with you? The answer is “very little”, for my people have seen their lands and their fishing rights dwindle before their eyes, their mana, their language and their authority eroded.’\(^{10}\) Although this was not the first time the official Maori speaker had expressed a grievance, Puriri's speech seems to have been the harshest critique of colonisation since Apirana Ngata's in 1940. Waitangi Day had become a forum for the expression of explicitly political views. There were limits to how much Maori could do to truly contest the dominant meaning of Waitangi Day, however. Of Puriri’s speech, the *Herald* reprinted one quote: ‘Together we are witnesses to a ceremony, representing both our cultures and the culture that is the fusion of the two – ours’.\(^{11}\) The speech was completely ignored by other major newspapers, although radical Maori newspaper *Te Hokioi* congratulated Puriri for his ‘courageous speech’.\(^{12}\)

The Maori challenge to the dominant meaning and message of Waitangi Day could not be ignored in 1971, when protest group Nga Tamatoa (The Young Warriors) staged the first disruption of Waitangi Day. At the evening ceremony they chanted, slow handclapped and performed a haka during Deputy Prime Minister Robert Muldoon’s speech, and earlier in the day had pulled the white navy ensign off the Waitangi flagstaff and attempted to set it on fire.\(^{13}\) The group challenged Waitangi Day’s reaffirmation of the idea that New Zealand had good race relations. Instead, they argued, it should be a day of mourning.\(^{14}\) The protests were widely reported, and made it impossible for Pakeha to continue believing that all Maori were happy with the outcome of colonisation.\(^{15}\) The dominant messages of Waitangi Day had been

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\(^{10}\) N.P.K. Puriri, ‘Waitangi Day Speech’, 1969, AECB 18701 TO3 12 INF 18/17/9, part 1, ANZW.

\(^{11}\) NZH, 7 February 1969, p.1.

\(^{12}\) *Te Hokioi*, February / March 1969, p.3.

\(^{13}\) NZH, 8 February 1971, p.3; *Te Maori*, October / November 1971, p.7.

\(^{14}\) MOOHR, January 1971, p.8; NZH, 8 February 1971, p.3.

\(^{15}\) *Te Maori*, April / May 1972, p.6.
decisively challenged. A number of responses to this challenge emerged, most of which would set a pattern for the following decades.

An immediate response was the divide and rule strategy of marginalising the protesters by portraying them as a tiny minority at odds with Maori custom. However a number of leaders publicly agreed with the protesters. P.W. Hohepa of the Auckland District Maori Council described the celebrations as a ‘useless ritual for a covenant which has already been broken’. Even the official Waitangi speakers expressed anger. In 1971 Pei Te Hurinui Jones – generally a conservative, according to Michael King – said that there were ‘strong feelings… of frustration’ within Maoridom at neglect of the Treaty. As is common in times of crisis or major debate, the past was frequently drawn upon in support of political stances. A survey of letters to the *New Zealand Herald* in the days after Waitangi Day 1971 shows that many who opposed the protests argued that Maori had not suffered any injustices in either the past or present. It was claimed that the British had saved Maori from annihilation through inter-tribal warfare and had fairly purchased land which Maori had not been using. Just five days after the Waitangi protests in 1971, a letter appeared in the *Herald* displaying all the symptoms of ‘Treaty fatigue’. This condition, characterised by hostility towards any mention of the Treaty, would become endemic to New Zealand, but this is perhaps its first recorded case. These letters were not so much analyses of New Zealand history as justifications for present day action and opinion. If Maori had not suffered any past injustice, then there was no need for Pakeha to feel guilty or make any kind of amends. Their privileged position in New Zealand was earned through the hard work of their settler ancestors rather than gained through land theft or the marginalisation of Maori, therefore this position did not have to be relinquished or shared.

18 NZH, 8 February 1971, p.3; King, *Being Pakeha*, p.127.
19 This was an argument also made by Governor General Arthur Porritt at Waitangi Day 1972, but this was not typical of Waitangi Day rhetoric. NZH, 7 February 1972, p.3.
21 NZH, 11 February 1971, p.6.
These attitudes were largely supported by contemporary historiography. Even in the mid 1970s, the demand for historiography which acknowledged Maori points of view was met only by reprints of earlier books.\(^{22}\) T. Lindsay Buick’s *The Treaty of Waitangi* was reprinted in 1976, and remained the only full length work on the subject until 1987.\(^{23}\) Ngata’s essay on the Treaty was still ‘recommended reading’ in the early 1980s.\(^{24}\) Most of the general histories available in the 1970s were simply earlier books which had been slightly updated; they did not reflect new trends in historiography.\(^{25}\) These trends were led by Ruth Ross, particularly her article on the Treaty in the *New Zealand Journal of History*.\(^{26}\) Ross argued that due to shoddy translation, Maori understandings of the Treaty were radically different to those of Pakeha.\(^{27}\) In her eyes this diminished the worth of the Treaty, which meant different things to everyone.\(^{28}\) Ross’ point that Maori and Pakeha had different understandings of the Treaty was taken up by numerous activists and politicians, most of whom ignored her conclusion about this reducing its worth.\(^{29}\) In the historiographical sphere, the article can be seen as marking the point where revisionism became an important – although not yet dominant – force, and Maori views of the Treaty began to get real attention from Pakeha historians. This can be seen by contrasting histories written before and after the article’s publication. Ian Wards’ *The Shadow of the Land*, a history of early colonisation published in 1968, challenged the idea that the annexation of New Zealand was motivated by humanitarianism, but virtually ignored Maori understandings.\(^{30}\) Later


\(^{24}\) Waitangi National Trust Board – Minutes of Meeting held in Old Government House, Wellington, on Wednesday 23 September 1981, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 2, ANZW.


\(^{29}\) Belgrave, p.52.

histories, such as those written by Alan Ward, Peter Adams and Tony Simpson, go much further in attempting to understand Maori views of the Treaty and history in general.\textsuperscript{31} This change in historiography can be seen as a major factor in later changes of attitude, but at this stage the absence of Maori understandings from popular historiography allowed many Pakeha to see Maori activists as no more than a discontented minority, out of touch with reality and the majority of Maori. This increased the divisiveness of the protests and of Waitangi Day generally.

If Waitangi Day and the debate surrounding it only became controversial in 1971, this was because, before that point, few paid attention to it. Pakeha attitudes to Waitangi Day before 1971 show that the values of racial equality and partnership reaffirmed in the ceremonies were not ones which many found compelling. Government ministers were accused of dodging the duty of being principal speaker, ‘until in the end it was amazing that any Government representative turned up at all’.\textsuperscript{32} The ceremonies were described by civil servant Peter Gordon as badly organised ‘society gathering[s]’ rather than a fitting celebration of the founding of a nation or the partnership of two people.\textsuperscript{33} In 1969 the cultural party had been kept waiting in the rain and then mostly excluded from the meeting house, and the following year only a few of the party were invited to the official reception.\textsuperscript{34} Partially as a result, Maori ‘seem to think the present form of… observance is a Pakeha gimmick which only coincides with their own, more heartfelt remembrance’.\textsuperscript{35} The word ‘gimmick’ suggests a shallow and meaningless thing, and the shallowness of Pakeha regard for Waitangi Day is also suggested by their ignorance of it. In a 1973 parliamentary debate, MP Allan McCready said that he had ‘asked 16 people on Lambton Quay if they knew what day the Treaty was signed. Only one person could tell me the date. The dates I was given ranged from January to December’.\textsuperscript{36} As in earlier decades, the official ceremonies


\textsuperscript{32} Acting Principal, Information and Press Section, to Clayton, 29 April 1969, AECB 18701 TO 3 66 IPS 18/17/9 part 3, ANZW.

\textsuperscript{33} Peter Gordon, note, February 1969, AECB 18701 TO 3 66 IPS 18/17/9 part 3, ANZW.

\textsuperscript{34} Gordon, note; Waitangi National Trust Board, minutes of meeting held at Government House, Wellington, on 8 September 1970 at 10.30am, AECB 18701 TO 3 66 IPS 18/17/9 part 3, ANZW.

\textsuperscript{35} G. Wills Johnson to Minister of Lands, 15 October 1970, AECB 18701 TO 3 66 IPS 18/17/9 part 3, ANZW.

Waitangi Day, 1968-1990

presented an image of ‘one people’ unified by the Treaty and living in happy partnership. Behind this image was the reality of a nation divided, with Pakeha willing to pay lip service to the principles of equality but reluctant to go out of their way to do so, or make a serious effort at putting the principles into practice, and Maori little more than performers and guest speakers in a Pakeha ceremony. The principles of equality were reaffirmed in the rhetoric of Waitangi Day but not in practice, even on the day itself.

New Zealand Day 1974

Waitangi Day 1974, or New Zealand Day as it was officially known, was marked by greater than usual spectacle, emphasising different values to earlier ceremonies. This was in part an attempt to deal with the race relations and Treaty issues which had dominated perceptions of Waitangi Day over the previous few years. It was also a conscious attempt to construct and define a new New Zealand identity which would function in the 1970s, a decade in which Britain moved decisively away from its former colonies and into the European Economic Community (EEC), and when Pakeha were struggling to come to terms with this, combined with increased Maori visibility caused by urbanisation, and also higher rates of non-white immigration. The national identity expressed at Waitangi Day was at times contradictory, and did nothing to address the specifically Pakeha identity crisis. Waitangi Day 1974 was particularly significant because for the first time it was a national public holiday. The campaign for this had been driven partially by a Maori desire for recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi, but in greater part by a desire amongst some Pakeha for a stronger sense of nationhood. In keeping with this, Waitangi Day was renamed New Zealand Day. Behind the scenes and in public, Maori and Pakeha continued to compete for the meaning and message of the events.

In 1974, Pakeha were in need of nationalism and national identity for several reasons, but perhaps the most serious was linked to Britain’s move away from its former empire and towards the EEC. James Belich has convincingly argued that from the 1890s to the 1970s New Zealand was a ‘recolonial’ nation, technically independent in
most senses but culturally and economically still a colony of Britain.\textsuperscript{37} This was not inconsistent with a New Zealand identity; as Belich has argued, British and New Zealand identities were generally seen as compatible, with ‘New Zealander’, like ‘Welsh’ or ‘Scottish’, being a subset of ‘British’.\textsuperscript{38} Britain's growing interest, from the 1960s, in joining the EEC caused considerable concern in New Zealand. New Zealand produce had unrestricted access to Britain, its largest market, and European Union trade policy meant that this was unlikely to continue.\textsuperscript{39} Perhaps more upsetting for the New Zealand psyche, Britain also changed its immigration policy so that Commonwealth citizens no longer had unrestricted access to the mother country. Although there was some preferential treatment, particularly for those with recent British ancestry, Britain essentially began to treat New Zealanders as foreigners.\textsuperscript{40} Until this time, Pakeha could see themselves as different from the British but some kind of Britons nonetheless; Britain’s retreat from Empire made this much less feasible. A new identity was needed.

Complicating the Pakeha search for identity was New Zealand’s changing demography. The number of New Zealanders born on other Pacific Islands or in Asia increased dramatically between the 1950s and 1970s, although they continued to be small minorities.\textsuperscript{41} Combined with the increased visibility of Maori, especially in urban areas, it was clear that New Zealanders were not all ethnic Britons any more than they were legal Britons. Both the increased ethnic diversity and the growing cultural and political distance from Britain created problems for any New Zealand national day, since a number of New Zealand’s national symbols were British. These included the national anthem, the head of state, and part of the New Zealand flag. Waitangi Day itself revolved around the Governor General, the Queen’s representative. In 1974 the day was overhauled, not only in an attempt to better express the reality of New Zealand in the 1970s, but also to create an ideal of New Zealand

\textsuperscript{37} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, passim but especially pp.53-86, 394-404.
\textsuperscript{38} ibid., pp.76-86. Keith Sinclair also inadvertently provides substantial evidence for this, although he argues that a New Zealand identity replaced a British one. Sinclair, \textit{A Destiny Apart}, pp.3-14.
\textsuperscript{40} Rieko Karatani, \textit{Defining British Citizenship: Empire, Commonwealth and Modern Britain}, London, 2003, pp.164-6. This legislative change was due to concern over non-white immigration rather than having anything to do with the European Union, but can still be seen as part of Britain’s move away from empire.
\textsuperscript{41} Belich, \textit{Paradise Reforged}, pp.532-3.
nationalism which New Zealanders of all backgrounds could identify with and unite behind.

The changes made to Waitangi Day were part of a wider Maori Affairs programme enacted by the third Labour government. Initially led by Norman Kirk and in office from 1972 to 1975, the government took several steps to address Maori grievances. Matiu Rata became the first Maori Minister of Maori Affairs since Ngata in the 1930s, and was also made Minister of Lands. This sent a clear signal that the government was sympathetic to Maori issues, and indeed it modified Maori land law to give Maori more control over their land and better protection against its loss. This was a major factor in the dramatic slowing of Maori land loss in subsequent years. The government also set up the Waitangi Tribunal to investigate breaches of the Treaty. Although this had limited effect until the 1980s, it was nonetheless an important step in recognition of the Treaty, giving it legal status for the first time.

Another initiative was to make Waitangi Day a national holiday. This had become an increasingly popular idea from the late 1960s onwards. As well as Maori organisations, supporters of a Waitangi Day holiday included most newspapers and local councils, watersiders and paper mill workers (who took unpaid days off on Waitangi Day in the early 1970s), and the Employers’ Federation. In 1971 a poll showed that at least 60% of the general population supported replacing the provincial anniversary holidays with a Waitangi Day holiday. Despite this, the second National government, in power from 1960 to 1972, was reluctant to introduce a holiday, or support the private member’s bill on the issue introduced by Matiu Rata in 1971. The lack of support was partially because of the loss of productivity a new holiday would have.

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42 Margaret Hayward, *Diary of the Kirk Years*, Queen Charlotte Sound and Wellington, 1981, p.102.
48 ‘Heylen Poll Results’, January 1971, AAAC 7536 W5084 228 CON/9/3/4, ANZW.
create,\textsuperscript{49} and partially because then Maori Affairs Minister Ralph Hanan felt that introducing legislation would encourage ‘certain vocal sections of the Maori people’ to agitate for ratification of the Treaty.\textsuperscript{50} National days are generally set up to encourage a sense of national unity, and Hanan rather presciently realised that giving greater status to Waitangi Day was likely to have the opposite effect. Most of those in favour of the national holiday did not feel this way, with some specifically arguing that Waitangi Day would unify the country and create a sense of ‘nationhood’.\textsuperscript{51}

Pakeha advocates of the holiday did not believe that New Zealanders would unify behind a recommitment to the Treaty; in fact they generally gave the Treaty little thought. Many seem to have regarded the signing of the Treaty simply as the best available founding moment rather than anything of significance in and of itself.\textsuperscript{52} In introducing the New Zealand Day Bill, Internal Affairs Minister Henry May expressed the hope that the day would focus on nationhood and other principles which he felt were symbolised by the Treaty, rather than the actual signing.\textsuperscript{53} Similarly, Labour MP Anthony Rogers said that he saw the Treaty simply as ‘a convenient peg on which to hang some remembrance or significance.’\textsuperscript{54} It is likely that if New Zealand had had another, less contentious, founding moment, this would have been chosen instead. Certainly ideas about race relations, while sometimes mentioned, were usually secondary to the need for nationhood.\textsuperscript{55} In essence, New Zealanders were to be unified behind the ideal of patriotism, not support for the Treaty or good race relations. Maori who advocated a public holiday also used the rhetoric of nationhood, but were more likely to argue that the nation was bicultural.\textsuperscript{56} They also wanted Waitangi Day to be a reaffirmation of the Treaty’s importance, and hoped the holiday would encourage Pakeha interest in it.\textsuperscript{57} Some felt, however, that unless the Treaty was given legal


\textsuperscript{50} Hanan to Minister of Internal Affairs, 23 May 1969, ACGO 8333 IA1W3042 8 88/22 part 2, ANZW.


standing, a public holiday would be pointless.\(^{58}\) When Waitangi Day was made a public holiday, it was not a reaffirmation of the Treaty's importance. Instead it was a commitment to the construction of a New Zealand nationalism. Waitangi day, like other commemorations, was not a statement about the past, but rather about the present and New Zealand’s future as a nation.

The desire for stronger nationalism was behind the change of name from Waitangi Day to New Zealand Day. The Kirk government hoped that the name New Zealand Day was one which would help unite New Zealanders of all ethnicities.\(^{59}\) Waitangi Day had been perceived by many non-Maori as a Maori affair of little relevance to other New Zealanders, particularly those of non-British ancestry. New Zealand Day would, many hoped, have resonance for everyone.\(^{60}\) Despite these good intentions, the name change could serve to marginalise Maori concerns and the Treaty itself. National MP David Highet was probably not alone in hoping that the name change would stop the day being ‘an occasion for airing Maori discontents… it is far better that we should call it New Zealand Day and try to come together and live as one people’.\(^{61}\) Many of the groups which had campaigned for the holiday were disappointed by the name change. The Maori Women’s Welfare League and other organisations felt that ‘Waitangi Day’ was more meaningful as it recognised the Treaty’s significance.\(^{62}\) The name was changed back to Waitangi Day by the Muldoon government in 1976.\(^{63}\)

New Zealand Day’s nation-building aims were best expressed by the evening entertainment. A pageant depicted the history of New Zealand from the arrival of Maori to the 1970s, with particular emphasis on the immigrant origins of all New Zealanders.\(^{64}\) As the scene shifted through the arrival of the missionaries, the signing of the Treaty,

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64 Information on New Zealand Day drawn from NZH, 7 February 1974, pp.1,3; Auckland Star, 7 February 1974, p.9; ODT, pp.1, 5; Press, 7 February 1974, pp.1-2.
pioneering, the establishment of the welfare state and other historical landmarks, a
dozen cultural groups performed, representing the arrivals of groups including
Germans, Tongans, Danes, Chinese and Indians. This marked the first time in which
groups of neither Maori nor British origin had participated in Waitangi Day, and was
intended to reaffirm the principle that people from all ethnic backgrounds were
equally New Zealanders. The idea was to help all New Zealanders to feel and be
seen as part of the New Zealand nation, and would also emphasise that ethnic and
cultural minorities had much in common with other New Zealanders. The pageant
was a rare example of a reasonably successful combination of multi- and bi-
culturalism. Along with the dozen non-Maori culture groups, fifteen Maori groups
participated; seven from Northland and the rest from around the country. Previous
Waitangi Days had tended to focus primarily on the relationship between Maori and
Pakeha. Instead of constructing a national image as a country in which two people had
come together in peace and harmony, New Zealand Day constructed an image of a
culturally diverse land, in which Maori had a special place but in which all peoples –
even those not involved in the Treaty signing – were true members of the nation.

Outside of the pageant, however, New Zealand Day's message about nationhood was
somewhat confused. The central figure was Queen Elizabeth II, a foreign monarch
and an obvious reminder of New Zealand's continued constitutional links with Britain.
Her very presence contradicted the idea that New Zealand had moved on from its
colonial past, and her right to be in the country was contested by a small group of
republican protesters. The New Zealand Herald and Northern Advocate, meanwhile,
both focused their editorials not on nationhood, but on the continued love of New
Zealanders for the royal family. The government had attempted to make her less of
an anachronism by passing a bill changing her title within New Zealand from ‘Queen
of the United Kingdom and New Zealand’ to ‘Queen of New Zealand’. This was

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65 Souvenir Programme of Celebrations to Mark the First New Zealand Day, Wellington, 1974 pp.38-
41.
66 New Zealand Labour Party Eastern Maori Labour Representation Committee to Kirk, 5 June 1973,
and Meeting of New Zealand Day Celebrations Steering Committee, 2 October 1973, ACGO 8333
IA1W1918 210/32/1 part 1, ANZW.
68 Souvenir Programme, 1974, pp.33-7.
69 Northern Advocate (NA), 7 February 1974, p.1.
70 NA, 5 February 1974, p.2; NZH, 6 February 1974, p.6.
71 Royal Titles Act 1974.
signed into law by the Queen herself on Waitangi afternoon, on her yacht in the Bay of Islands. For the first time the flag raised at Waitangi during the ceremonies was the New Zealand blue ensign rather than the Union Jack. These changes, along with the change to the name of the day, were the most obvious ways that the government had tried to transform Waitangi Day from a semi-imperialist to a nationalist celebration. However the presence of the Queen meant that this was at best a mixed message, and to some New Zealanders the day still reaffirmed New Zealand's links with Britain and its royal family.

If New Zealand Day sent a somewhat confused message about who New Zealanders were, it sent no message specifically about Pakeha, the nation's biggest ethnic group. The previous year, Kirk had asked why Pakeha had not developed a specifically New Zealand culture but, beyond the suggestion that Pakeha were good at living with people of other cultures, no attempt was made to depict or construct a Pakeha culture through the day’s events. There were numerous things shown in the pageant which could be seen as part of a Pakeha culture, such as rugby, the armed forces and welfare, but all of these were depicted by a half-Maori, half-Pakeha cast. It could be argued that this simply meant that Maori had adopted aspects of Pakeha culture, but some of these things had been incorporated into Maori culture to the extent that they were Maori as much as Pakeha property. The section representing education showed it as a bicultural process, beginning with Maori learning to read and write and ending with Pakeha learning Maori. A Nga Puhi spokesman was pleased with the pageant because he felt that some of its (supposedly ‘New Zealand’) themes were Maori themes. Features of the pageant that were not specifically ‘cultural’ were intended to represent New Zealand as a whole and, while most of them had European origins, they were also things with which Maori as much as Pakeha identified. The other way of looking

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72 Notes of Discussion, Meeting of New Zealand Day Celebrations Steering Committee, 2 October 1973, ACGO 8333 IA1W1918 210/32/1 part 1, ANZW.
73 Hayward, p.132.
74 Several of the Maori cultural groups had Pakeha members and group leaders were uncertain as to what to do with them. It was eventually decided ‘that this question be left to individual group leaders but that any particularly blond members should wear dark wigs and, possibly, body make-up’. Meeting on 29 November [1973] of leaders of Maori groups invited to participate in New Zealand Day celebrations, ACGO 8333 IA1W1918 210/32/1 part 1, ANZW.
75 Johnstone to Minister of Maori Affairs, nd (1973), ACGO 8333 IA1W1918 210/32/1 part 2, ANZW; NA, 17 December 1973, p.1.
at this is to see Pakeha culture as being so dominant as to be invisible. These views are not incompatible. If Pakeha culture was dominant, then it would hardly be surprising for Maori to adopt elements of it, and from there adapt them to their own needs. The culture, while still being Pakeha dominated, thus belonged to other people as well. It was therefore the very dominance of Pakeha culture which prevented Pakeha from truly having a culture of their own: you cannot have sole possession of something which you impose on others.

The presence of the Queen, for whom most Maori had considerable respect, may have minimised the amount of public debate over the commemoration's meanings. The only dissident Maori voices were those of a small number of protesters. However, this was partly because, for the first time since 1947, there was no official Maori speaker. Organisers had told Maori that time constraints meant there could only be two speakers: the Queen representing the Crown and the Prime Minister representing New Zealand. Perhaps inadvertently, this reflected a view of the Treaty which fit neither contemporary nor 1840 understandings: that it was a compact not between Maori and Pakeha or Maori and the Crown but between the Crown and New Zealand. Leaving aside the problem that arguably there was no New Zealand until the Treaty had been signed, this extended the ‘we are all one people’ ideology to the point where Maori were not even a Treaty partner in their own right. Maori of all backgrounds had challenged this idea since the early 1960s; that it continued to be reaffirmed at Waitangi indicates the control Pakeha retained over the day.

Despite this lack of autonomy, many Maori were supportive of the changes to Waitangi Day. The new ceremony drew attention to the Treaty and acknowledged Maori participation in nation-building, and the celebrations could also be seen in the positive context of the Kirk government’s increased acknowledgement of the Treaty

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78 Meeting on 19 December 1973 of the Leaders of the Maori Groups invited to participate in the New Zealand Day Celebrations, ACGO 8333 IA1W1918 210/32/1 part 2, ANZW. In the early planning stages, the Leader of the Opposition was also to speak, with him and the Prime Minister ‘representing through the institution of Parliament the totality of the New Zealand people’. Secretary for Internal Affairs to Minister of Internal Affairs, 8 October 1973, ACGO 8333 IA1W1918 210/32/1 part 1, ANZW.
and Maori culture. Some felt that changes had not gone far enough, and this feeling increased and found expression the following year with a huge march on parliament. But in 1974, it seems that most Maori were satisfied that progress was being made, and were prepared to let Pakeha have their celebration. Walter Kawiti ended his seven-year boycott of the ceremonies, citing recent political developments as a sign that ‘things are changing to the better’. Commenting on the celebrations, writers Ranginui Walker and Witi Ihimaera both argued that they reflected the myth rather than the reality of a multicultural society. But, both men argued, this in itself could be useful as New Zealand now had a new myth to try and live up to. ‘The myth has been paraded before us’, wrote Walker. ‘I for one will work to hold the Pakeha to it’. Here reaffirmation of principles was hoped to be self-fulfilling.

New Zealand Day 1974 was a conscious attempt to promote a New Zealand identity and affirm a new set of values behind which New Zealanders of all backgrounds could unify. We have seen that the ceremonies successfully sent the message that New Zealand was a multicultural nation in which Maori had a special place. Despite the marginalisation of Maori, especially Maori voices, the organisers also succeeded in winning the support of many Maori for the changes. New Zealand Day sent a confused message, however, especially about New Zealand and Pakeha identity. Despite the multicultural message of the pageant, the presence of the Queen and the attention paid to her was a reminder that New Zealand was not fully independent from Britain, constitutionally or culturally. In addition, Pakeha were not presented as a distinct people with their own culture. New Zealand Day reaffirmed a positive New Zealand identity but inadvertently revealed that its dominant ethnic group still lacked an identity of their own.

Years of Anger, 1975-1984

The reforms of the mid 1970s, at Waitangi and elsewhere, were not maintained. After Labour was defeated in 1975, its progressive initiatives, such as the Waitangi

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80 NZL, 16 March 1974, p.31; Ihimaera, p.22.
Tribunal, were allowed to lapse into irrelevance. From 1975, when control of the day was returned to the Waitangi National Trust, the mood, format and rhetoric of Waitangi Day immediately returned to that of earlier years. This conservatism was met with increasingly disruptive protest, especially in the early 1980s. Protesters argued that the Treaty was a fraud, to use the slogan of the time, and attempted to bring the Waitangi Day ceremonies to a halt. These efforts were strongly opposed by some conservative Maori, and even within the protest movement there were serious divisions. We saw in the chapters on the Twelfth that internal divisions can have negative effects on historic commemorations, and this was also the case at Waitangi Day. New Zealand, Maori, Pakeha, and the protest movement all contained deep divisions, and these led to chaos at Waitangi. As with other commemorations, the divisions were not simply about the past, although most groups appealed to the past for support of their positions. The divisions were over contemporary issues, most prominently what the position of Maori in society was and should be.

We saw that New Zealand Day 1974 was a conscious attempt to construct a New Zealand identity based on multiculturalism. By contrast, any national identity expressed at Waitangi from 1975 to 1984 was one based at least partially on the benevolence of British colonisation. David Lange described the 1975 ceremony as ‘a peculiar evocation of another place and time with a great deal of military pomp and no real feeling about what it meant to be a New Zealander’. The Governor General, often decked out in uniform and medals, dominated the evening ceremonies along with the navy during this period, although traditional Maori performances and challenges were also a major part of the occasion. The complacent view of history expressed in earlier decades reappeared. In 1976 Prime Minister Robert Muldoon told schoolchildren that ‘the knowledge of what has been done in that 136 years [since 1840] should make every New Zealander proud’. At Waitangi, Governor General Denis Blundell credited the Treaty with bringing order to an anarchic country. As in earlier decades,
Waitangi Day reaffirmed the ideas that colonisation had been a beneficial process and that present day Maori had nothing to complain about. Muldoon's statement about the previous 136 years was less about 1840 than it was about 1976; Pakeha had nothing to apologise for, nor were they obliged to make any concessions to Maori.

It would be easy to blame the conservatism of Waitangi Day on Muldoon, one of New Zealand's more conservative leaders. But control of Waitangi Day lay with the Waitangi Trust Board, of which Muldoon was just one member and, as Lange’s quote indicates, the change preceded Muldoon’s prime ministership. For the 1974 celebrations, control of the day had been temporarily transferred to a committee of politicians, civil servants and a professional theatre director. It was always intended to be a unique occasion in celebration of the new national public holiday, with control reverting to the Trust Board thereafter. This was a fairly conservative body consisting of the Prime Minister, the Governor General, various Ministers and Maori and Pakeha representatives, and descendants of missionaries and signatory chiefs. With the exception of the ministerial and vice-regal positions, membership seems to have been for life or until voluntary retirement, and some members remained on the board for many decades. The end result was a conservative Board, concerned about activist criticisms of Waitangi Day, but reluctant to listen to ‘radicals’ or make significant changes. The views of more conservative Maori groups such as the Maori Women’s Welfare League were also ignored.

The Board's attitude indicates the divisions within Maoridom over Waitangi Day; it was often the Maori members who most readily rejected radical views. Throughout this period, conservative Maori, particularly those of Northland iwi Nga Puhi, attempted to control the expression of Maori views at Waitangi Day, marginalising or silencing protesters and other radicals. In 1978, Nga Tamatoa handed out leaflets and

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88 To take the most extreme example, James Henare was a Board member from 1940 until his death in 1989. Another member, Tom Reed, had been on the Board for more than 30 years in 1986. Puna McConnell and Robin C. McConnell, ‘Henare, James Clendon Tau 1911 – 1989’, *Dictionary of New Zealand Biography*, updated 7 April 2006, http://www.dnzb.govt.nz/; NZH, 7 February 1986, p.3.
89 For example, see Waitangi National Trust Board meeting minutes, 5 February 1978, Waitangi National Trust Board, Minutes of Meeting held in Busby Room, THC, Waitangi, on Friday 5 February 1982, and Elworthy to Reeves, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part one, ANZW.
shouted slogans, repeating their assertion that the day should be one of mourning, and asking when the Treaty would be honoured. Meanwhile, Waitangi Trust Board member James Henare defended the Treaty and colonialism, saying that New Zealand had been lawless before 1840. What percentage of Maoridom agreed with Henare and what percentage with the protesters is unknowable, but Henare’s message was given extensive press coverage while that of Nga Tamatoa was dismissed in a few sentences.\textsuperscript{91} This was probably not so much because the press thought his was the more interesting or valid one but because he was an official speaker and Nga Tamatoa were marginalised, reduced to shouting and handing out leaflets outside the marae. Waitangi Day organisers could thus control the ceremony so that the voices of conservative Maori got the most attention. Groups within Maoridom were competing to determine the meaning of Waitangi Day, but conservatives such as Henare, with the Waitangi Trust Board and most Pakeha behind them, had an overwhelming advantage.

We have seen, particularly in the chapters on the Twelfth, that internal divisions can produce chaotic commemorations. The initial effect can be reduced if one faction has complete control over the ceremonies, as was the case here, but this is unlikely to work as a long term solution. This conservative silencing of protest inevitably led to conflict. This was exacerbated by new levels of cynicism about the Treaty in the early 1980s, exemplified in the idea that ‘the Treaty is a fraud’. This used a traditional Pakeha view of the Treaty’s nullity to argue that if it was not a ‘real’ treaty then there was nothing on which to base Crown sovereignty, and therefore the New Zealand parliament, police and other tools of Pakeha dominance were illegal.\textsuperscript{92} According to Donna Awatere, whose book \textit{Maori Sovereignty} was the closest the movement had to a manifesto, Maori had not signed away their sovereignty but had been robbed of it through fraud and violence.\textsuperscript{93} They therefore needed to re-achieve nationhood, and it needed to be recognised that New Zealand was a Maori country.\textsuperscript{94} To many radicals,

\textsuperscript{91} NZH, 7 February 1978, pp.1, 3; EP, 7 February 1978, p.3.
\textsuperscript{92} Hazlehurst, ‘Ethnicity, Ideology and Social Drama’, p.85; WAC News, September 1981, no page numbers.
\textsuperscript{93} Donna Awatere, \textit{Maori Sovereignty}, Auckland, 1984, pp.12-13.
\textsuperscript{94} TVNZ, \textit{Koha [Waitangi Day 1983]}, 2000.0656, NZFTA; Awatere, \textit{Maori Sovereignty}, passim.
including some Pakeha, the Treaty was a symbol of oppression.5 Those who argued this were mostly young and urban, while older and more traditional Maori tended to oppose the idea.6 The divisions within Maoridom came to a head in 1981, when the investitures of Whina Cooper and Graham Latimer on the Waitangi marae were disrupted by protest.7 Cooper was a widely respected leader who had led an iconic march on parliament in 1975, but her acceptance of a damehood from the Crown led radicals to see her as a sell-out to Pakeha power. Perhaps no incident so clearly illustrates the divisions over Maori issues and Waitangi Day: not only within New Zealand and within Maoridom, but also within the protest movement which Cooper had once led.

The view that the Treaty was fraudulent led to significant changes in the nature of Waitangi Day protest. Whereas the protesters of the 1970s had aimed to raise awareness of grievances, from 1980 their intention was to halt the commemorations altogether.8 This goal, while never successful, led inevitably to more confrontation, which spiralled into violence on several occasions.9 Waitangi Days also saw protests in other parts of the country.10 The atmosphere was soured further in the aftermath of the 1981 Springbok Tour. Police officers and protesters who had faced each other at acrimonious and sometimes mutually violent anti-Tour protests faced each other again at Waitangi Days from 1982.11 This led to increasingly heavy-handed policing, including the possibly unlawful arrest in 1983 of about fifty protesters before they had even reached the Treaty grounds.12 Waitangi marae trustees and Tai Tokerau elders attempted to calm the atmosphere by cancelling the marae welcome and initiating

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8 Hazlehurst, ‘Ethnicity, Ideology and Social Drama’, p.83; Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou, p.221; Waitangi Action Committee Delegation to Elworthy, 22 July 1983, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 1, ANZW; NZL, 4 February 1984, p.16.
festivals and hui.\textsuperscript{103} This did little to reduce protests, but attendance at Waitangi Day remained high, with 4000 attending in 1982 and 1983.\textsuperscript{104}

Another consequence of the Springbok Tour protests was an increased level of Pakeha protest at Waitangi. During the tour, some Maori protesters had accused Pakeha of focussing on international race issues at the expense of those in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{105} Although this caused serious friction within the protest movements, many Pakeha began to take a greater interest in Treaty issues, and some Pakeha protesters began to target Waitangi.\textsuperscript{106} By 1983 the range of groups – brought together under the banner of People Opposed to Waitangi (POW) – was so broad that tensions were inevitable. As activist and writer Bruce Jesson explained later in the year, ‘POW was a largely Pakeha organisation with a Maori leadership and an anti-white perspective, and so contained within itself the racial and political divisions that it was set up to combat’. Division quickly emerged along lines of race, gender and sexuality.\textsuperscript{107} Churches were also divided on the issue, and the several activist clerics who protested at Waitangi were strongly criticised by their colleagues and parishioners.\textsuperscript{108} Pakeha protesters in general were attacked by conservatives – both Maori and Pakeha – for leading Maori astray.\textsuperscript{109} We can see that the protest movement and reaction to it was focussed less on the past, although both sides appealed to the past for support, than on the present, and in particular contemporary relationships between Maori and Pakeha. People Opposed to Waitangi were not opposed to the Treaty as a document, but to what it seemed to stand for in the early 1980s.

\textsuperscript{103} Hazlehurst, ‘Ethnicity, Ideology and Social Drama’, pp.98, 109; NZH, 23 January 1982, p.2; Skinner to Waitangi National Trust Secretary, 11 November 1981, ABWN 7613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 2, ANZW; T.T.P.B. Puriri to Highet, 11 October 1982, AAAC 6015 W4946 19 200/93/58, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{105} Poata-Smith, p.105.
\textsuperscript{107} Bruce Jesson, To Build a Nation: Collected Writings 1975-1999, Auckland, 2005, p.130. The passage was originally published in the December 1983 issue of the Republican.
Waitangi Days from 1975 to 1984 were plagued with protest and rancour. This was not simply conservative Pakeha versus radical Maori, but also conservative Maori versus radical Maori, radical Maori versus radical Pakeha and radical Pakeha versus conservative Maori and Pakeha. This thesis suggests that historic commemorations function best as unifying devices, bringing people together by emphasising their core values and shared ideals. It was clear in this decade of turmoil that New Zealanders did not have a shared set of values which they held in common, particularly not in the area of race relations. Muldoon and the Waitangi Trust Board can certainly be criticised for abandoning the new style of Waitangi Day developed in 1974, but it is not clear that any ceremony could have united New Zealanders at this point. Where Waitangi Day was concerned, both Maori and Pakeha had splintered into disparate groups who could agree on little and had trouble working together even when theoretically aiming for the same goals. There was no chance of Waitangi Day reaffirming ideals which most, let alone all, could agree on. Rather than being a unifying force, therefore, it simply exacerbated these divisions.

Rethinking Waitangi Day, 1985-1989

In July 1984 one of New Zealand’s more conservative governments was replaced by one of its most radical: the fourth Labour government, led by David Lange. One of the government’s major reforms was of the Waitangi Tribunal, which in 1985 was given research powers and a mandate to investigate Treaty breaches back to 1840.\(^{110}\) This, and several important legal judgements, brought the Treaty to the fore of public attention and gave it real political power and significance for the first time.\(^{111}\) Ironically, this led to a reduced focus on Waitangi Day by protesters, politicians and the public alike, as the idea that the Treaty was a fraud became less tenable, and the focus of Treaty discourse shifted from Waitangi to the Tribunal, parliament and the courts. In addition, new attempts to transform Waitangi Day from a site of protest into a true national day saw official ceremonies staged away from the Treaty grounds. Once again

politicians tried to give Waitangi Day meanings which could be committed to by all New Zealanders, and to turn the day into a reaffirmation of nationhood.

The new Labour government sought to reduce the acrimony at Waitangi and turn the events into something more positive. Partially in order to bring this about, an inter-tribal hui at Te Tii marae was sponsored for the days before Waitangi Day 1985. This was a follow-up to another, bigger hui at Ngāruawahia the previous September. It had called for greater recognition of the Treaty, and for the commemorations at Waitangi to be abandoned until this happened. The Waitangi hui also called for the celebrations to be cancelled, although not unanimously. Despite the hui resolutions, Maori continued to be divided over the issue, with Northland Maori being generally in favour of continued celebrations. Pakeha were also divided. Both those for and against the ceremonies heavily lobbied the government, each side claiming that the majority of Maoridom agreed with them. There was no agreement even on why the events should be cancelled or continue; some wanted the events cancelled because racial inequality meant there was nothing to celebrate, while others wanted to end a ‘debacle’ in which important people were regularly insulted. Nor was there any agreement on what form the celebrations should take or where they should occur.

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112 Orange, Treaty of Waitangi, p.249; NZL, 23 March 1985, p.54.
113 ‘Resolutions of the National Hui on the Treaty of Waitangi, Turangawaewae Marae, Ngāruawahia, 14-16 September 1984’, ABWN 1613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 3, ANZW.
114 Treaty of Waitangi Hui, Waitangi 4-6 February 1985: Report of Proceedings, ABJZ 869 W4644 54 19/14/2 part 6, ANZW.
116 Tapsell to Deputy Prime Minister, 20 March 1985, Wetere to Deputy Prime Minister, 24 June 1985, ABJZ 869 W4644 54 19/14/3/86 part 1, ANZW; Secretary of Maori Affairs and Director General of Lands to Minister of Maori Affairs and Lands, 1 October 1984, ‘Resolutions of the National Hui on the Treaty of Waitangi, Turangawaewae Marae, Ngāruawahia, 14-16 September 1984’, Tupinia Puriri for Waitangi Marae Committee to Minister of Lands, 16 November 1984, Minto to Minister of Maori Affairs, 22 November 1984, Secretary of NZ Maori Council to Waitangi National Trust Board, 24 January 1985, ABWN 1613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 3, ANZW; Stevens to Secretary, 13 October 1988, AAAC 7536 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/2, ANZW.
117 Secretary for Maori Affairs and Director General of Lands to Minister of Lands and Maori Affairs, 1985, ABJZ 869 W4644 54 19/14/3/86 part 1, ANZW; Brash to Minister of Lands, 22 November 1984, Riddell to Secretary of Waitangi National Trust Board, 24 January 1985, ABWN 1613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 3, ANZW.
was clear that no matter what happened, Waitangi Day would continue to exacerbate divisions.

The government eventually decided to continue observing Waitangi Day, but as a ‘commemoration’ rather than a ‘celebration’ and to hold the official event away from Waitangi. A state reception would be held at parliament, while Tai Tokerau Maori would commemorate the day at Waitangi along Maori ceremonial lines. The state reception would be multi-cultural but feature a Maori welcome, while the Waitangi event would be Maori-run and thus dominated by Maori culture. As in 1974, this reaffirmed the principles both of multiculturalism and the special place of Maori. Like New Zealand Day, it also shifted emphasis away from the Treaty, in this case by moving the ceremonies away from the site of its original signing, and towards New Zealand nationhood. It was hoped that protest would be minimised as it was physically easier to exclude protesters from parliament than Waitangi, and they would be reluctant to disrupt the exclusively Maori-run events at the Treaty grounds. Neither event worked as a solution. Protesters were absent from Waitangi for the first time in years, but only because they had gone to Wellington, where they chanted at arriving dignitaries and used various noisemakers to attempt to disrupt the event. Several protesters also managed to infiltrate the reception, at one point taking the stage and shouting slogans before being removed by police. At Waitangi numerous Maori leaders, including Whina Cooper, criticised the Prime Minister and Governor-General for staying away. Cooper and others said they had been invited to Wellington but would not leave Waitangi, and even the Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere, publicly said that the ceremonies should return to Waitangi. The following year two official ceremonies were held, one at Waitangi and one in Wellington. Division over Waitangi Day had reached the point where the ceremonies themselves were divided.

The splitting of the official ceremony between Waitangi and Wellington was, however, somewhat in keeping with the government's other innovation of encouraging regional commemorations of Waitangi Day. The introduction of a national public holiday in 1974 had resulted in the creation of some regional celebrations, and from

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119 Parore to Head Office, Maori Affairs, 10 January 1985, BBDL 1030 2206b 2/168 part 3, ANZARO.
120 NZH, 7 February 1986, p.1.
121 NZH, 7 February 1986, p.3.
1987 these were further encouraged by the government as a way to promote nationhood and disperse the focus of Waitangi Day from Waitangi. Other areas were encouraged to hold events and, in a letter to local councils, Internal Affairs Minister Michael Bassett said he hoped local Waitangi Days would ‘develop into special acts of commemoration, important to our sense of nationhood and imbued with a feeling of communion, similar to that which characterises… Anzac Day ceremonies’.

This was an exaggeration of the power of Anzac Day, and this nation-building effort was not entirely successful either. Many local councils did nothing, citing a lack of Maori in the area, the feeling that Waitangi Day was the responsibility of central government, or fear that events would encourage protests. Others tried and failed to arrange something with local Maori. However, a significant number successfully took up the challenge, initiating events including barbecues, sports days, hui and multicultural festivals. Guidance had not been given on how Waitangi Day should be celebrated, enabling the day to take on a range of meanings, from a fun family day out to a chance to seriously examine race relations. Some of these events were supported by the attendance of the Governor-General, who went to Parihaka in 1986 and Okains Bay in 1988.

Where these regional events focussed on the Treaty, it was in many ways the document that was being commemorated rather than its signing. The Treaty was signed on different dates around the country, and if it was the act of signing which was being commemorated than these regional dates would have been far more appropriate than the sixth of February. The focus on that date shows that what was being commemorated was not so much a historic event as the Treaty itself, especially as a symbol of nationhood and partnership. Waitangi Day in this period was focussed on a document rather than an event, at a time when that document had become more relevant than at any point since the 1840s.

Despite the progress made on Treaty issues, Waitangi Day continued to express and exacerbate division, especially within Maoridom. In 1986, for example, the Okains Bay commemorations were disrupted by a clash between protesters and the paddlers.

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122 Bassett to local authorities, 29 November 1988, AAAC 7536 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/2, ANZW. See also Minister of Local Government to Mayors and County Chairmen, November 1987, AAAC 7356 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/1 part 1, ANZW.

123 See various letters from local authorities to Internal Affairs, AAAC 7536 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/2, ANZW.

124 Press, 7 February 1986, p.5; NZH, 6 February 1988, p.4.
from a participating waka. Protesters returned to Waitangi with the Governor-General in 1987, ‘solely to show their contempt for proceedings’, according to the Listener, and insulted the welcoming party and the marae itself. The following year, conscious efforts were made to reduce this division by incorporating protesters into the ceremony; they were given speaking rights and seated in amongst other participants to avoid creating an ‘us and them’ mentality. This helped to build a more peaceful atmosphere. The navy continued to participate at Waitangi, at the specific request of Tai Tokerau organisers, although some other Maori were uncomfortable with this. Government representation continued to be kept to a minimum. Relative lack of spectacle, along with official emphasis on nationwide commemorations, meant that spectator numbers dropped from the thousands earlier in the decade to about 700 in 1988. Despite continued protests, some Waitangi Day speakers still saw the Treaty as a force for unity. In 1987, Opposition leader Jim Bolger said he wanted a nation with ‘no distinction between those who arrived early and those who arrived late’, and was ‘booed with special vigour’ by Waitangi protesters. Waitangi Day failed as a unifying force because New Zealanders had little common ground in their views on the Treaty.

Despite their lack of effective unifying force, Waitangi Days continued to reaffirm ideals of nationhood. The encouragement of events outside of Waitangi was an attempt to make the day a nation-wide occasion, and tied in with efforts to make all New Zealanders more aware of the Treaty. A new ideal of New Zealand was put forward for affirmation; a bicultural country, based in some way on the Treaty of Waitangi, in which all citizens felt valued regardless of culture or where they lived.

125 NZH, 7 February 1986, p.1; NZH, 7 February 1987, p.3.
126 NZL, 28 February 1987, p.10. See also NZH, 7 February 1987, p.3.
128 Stevens to Secretary, 13 October 1988, AAAC 7536 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/2, ANZW; Minister of Maori Affairs to Cabinet, 28 October 1986, ABJZ 869 W4644 54 19/14/3 part 4, ANZW.
129 Secretary of Cabinet to Prime Minister, 7 December 1988, AAAC 7536 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/2, ANZW.
130 NZH, 8 February 1988, p.4.
131 NZH, 7 February 1987, p.12.
132 NZL, 28 February 1987, p.11.
133 Director General of Lands to Minister of Lands, 14 September 1984, Secretary of Maori Affairs and Director General of Lands to Minister of Maori Affairs and Lands, 1 October 1984, ABWN 1613 W5021 964 WNT 1/11/1 part 3, ANZW; Minister of Local Government to Mayors and County Chairmen, November 1987, AAAC 7356 W5084 229 CON/9/3/4/1 part 1, ANZW.
Although this marked a break from previous ideas about the nation, this ideal was not one which was widely adopted. Many local authorities were either uninterested in nation-building exercises or could not see Waitangi Day in this light, and protesters continued to demand Maori autonomy. A range of people felt that another date should be chosen as the national day; one which would not be characterised by protest.\footnote{Director General of Lands to Minister of Lands, 27 February 1985, Bush to Lange, 1986, ABJZ 869 W4644 54 19/14/3/86 part 1, ANZW; Wyeth to Lange, 3 September 1987, AAAC 7536 W5084 228 CON/9/3/4, ANZW.}

Some who had neither British nor Maori origins felt the Treaty and therefore Waitangi Day had no relevance to them,\footnote{Switalla to Dunne, 1 April 1987, AAAC 7536 W5084 228 CON/9/3/4, ANZW.} and within groups which did feel the Treaty was relevant there was no agreement on what this relevance was. Waitangi Day now had a more coherent message and reaffirmed a more consistent set of values, but although many Maori found these compelling Pakeha were not convinced.

As a result of the increasing power of the Treaty, in-depth discussion of the Treaty emerged from Maori, radical and legal circles to become something of a national obsession. According to the National Library of New Zealand catalogue, 94 books, reports and other resources directly relating to the Treaty were published in the five years from 1985 to 1989, more than in the entire twentieth century to 1984. A further 56 Treaty publications were produced in 1990.\footnote{Based on a search of the National Library of New Zealand catalogue, http://nlnzcat.natlib.govt.nz/cgi-bin/Pwebrecon.cgi?DB=local&PAGE=First, using ‘Treaty of Waitangi’ as a subject heading, on 26 October 2006. These figures should be treated as a rough estimate only as they include pamphlets, sound recordings, education kits, reports and souvenir programmes as well as books, and count multiple editions of the same book separately. In addition, not all publications on the Treaty will be in the library, especially those in Maori and from the earlier decades of the century. Nonetheless, it is inescapable that the growth of Treaty literature in the late 1980s was extraordinary.} Many of these addressed the Treaty’s role in contemporary New Zealand, and even the histories were, as Andrew Sharp points out, written with one eye on contemporary issues.\footnote{Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: Maori Claims in New Zealand Political Argument in the 1980s, Auckland, 1990, p.19. See also J.M.R. Owens, ‘Historians and the Treaty of Waitangi’, Archifact, April 1990, p.18.} Despite all this, there remained widespread ignorance about the Treaty. Polls in the late 1980s found that only 18% of the adult population had actually read it, and only 6% of Pakeha and 7% of Maori had read it carefully.\footnote{Dominion, 6 February 1990, p.9; Whatarangi Winiata, ‘Untitled Speech’, in New Zealand Planning Council, ed., Pakeha Perspectives on the Treaty, Wellington, 1988, p.70.} From 1989, efforts were made to ensure that all schoolchildren were taught about the Treaty, but this was not entirely successful.\footnote{Alison Derbyshire, ‘Anyone’s But Our Own: The Teaching of New Zealand History in New Zealand Secondary Schools 1925-2000’, MA thesis, University of Auckland, 2004, pp.72-3.}
The result seems to have been the worst of both worlds, with some children still not taught any New Zealand history, and others fed a repetitive and boring diet of ‘the Treaty’ at the expense of other areas of national history.140

Maori and Pakeha alike continued to hold a range of views on the Treaty, although the idea that it was fraudulent was mostly abandoned from the mid 1980s.141 It is likely that this reflects the Treaty’s newfound usefulness; although the change slightly predates the Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act, it came after several important Tribunal reports in the early 1980s. It was probably also a result of efforts by protesters and elders to work together; the latter may have convinced the former that the relevance of the Treaty was that the ancestors had agreed to it, not what Pakeha had or hadn’t done with it.142 Certainly the Kotahitanga (unity) march in 1984 and the Ngaruawahia and Waitangi hui, in which the generations came together, expressed a unified desire to honour rather than reject the Treaty.143 While most Maori now supported the Treaty, there was no consistent view on what it meant in the present day. ‘Honouring the Treaty’ might simply mean acknowledging breaches, but could also encompass increasing tribal autonomy, recognition and support for Maori language and culture, increased tribal autonomy, and greater Maori participation in local and national decision making.144 The Treaty was not only a tool for fixing problems from the past, it was a map for the future, and understandings of it were heavily influenced by contemporary developments.

The Treaty was also supported by a wide range of Pakeha, from the radical Pakeha Treaty Action group to writers for the National Business Review.145 Views on exactly what it meant varied considerably. A poll taken in 1989 showed that 61% of Pakeha

141 Treaty of Waitangi Hui, Waitangi 4-6 February 1985: Report of Proceedings, ABJZ 869 W464 54 19/14/2 part 6, ANZW; Sharp, p.98. For an exception, see Arahura Maori Komiti, ‘Self Determination and Territorial Title for the Indigenous People of Aotearoa’, Race Gender Class, 3 July 1986, pp.1-5.
142 Belgrave, p.47.
143 Sharp, pp.88-9; Resolutions of the National Hui on the Treaty of Waitangi, Turangawaewae Marae, Ngaruawahia, 14-16 September 1984, Treaty of Waitangi Hui, Waitangi 4-6 February 1985: Report of Proceedings, ABJZ 869 W464 54 19/14/2 part 6, ANZW.
saw it as a symbol of national unity and understanding. 146 However, many felt it lacked contemporary relevance, with some of its supporters wanting it to be updated or renegotiated.147 The majority of those who responded negatively to the Treaty in the poll did so because they felt it was not relevant to the present day.148 Not all Pakeha who opposed the new powers of the Treaty opposed the Treaty itself; some, such as Bolger, argued that new interpretations were incorrect and the Treaty’s real significance was that it gave the Crown the right to govern.149 It was not so much the Treaty that Pakeha had a problem with, but Maori understandings of it. This helps explain why many Pakeha were so annoyed with Maori disruption of Waitangi Day; the day had been a pleasant, although not compelling, symbol of nationhood and good race relations until Maori had ruined it by challenging their understandings of the Treaty. Pakeha had not felt any particular affinity for the older Waitangi Days, but they had not opposed them either. The new ceremonies' emphasis on the importance of the Treaty alienated many Pakeha, further reducing the day's utility as a unifying event.

The initiatives of the fourth Labour government had reduced much of the rancour which had surrounded Waitangi Day in the decade before 1985. Protest continued, but on a smaller scale, and less disruptively. The day had always been an important venue for expression of ideas about the Treaty and race relations, and much of the discourse on Waitangi Day continued to express and construct particular ideas about these issues. From the mid 1980s, real changes were made to the Treaty's legal status and therefore to the position and power of Maori. This ironically made Waitangi Day less important, since these issues could now be pursued in a more tangible form, particularly through the Waitangi Tribunal. The new power of the Treaty sparked considerable debate amongst both Maori and Pakeha, without which attitudes to Waitangi Day cannot be understood. These ideas about the contemporary meaning of

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146 1990 Director of Advertising and Communications to 1990 Commission, 24 October 1989, AAAC 7873 W5084 20 1990/1/11/1, ANZW.
the Treaty determined much of the form and content of the sesquicentennial Waitangi Day in 1990.

Waitangi Day 1990

While Waitangi Days from 1986 had been low key and not especially focussed on Waitangi, the 150th anniversary of the Treaty signing could not have been anything other than a large, grand event at Waitangi. The return to Waitangi met the political and nationalist needs of both Maori and Pakeha, but also reignited some of the problems with the traditional ceremonies. As the Prime Minister and huge crowds returned to Waitangi, so too did many protesters, despite extensive security. The change in the Treaty’s significance over the course of the 1970s and 1980s meant that a feel-good nationalist ceremony was all but impossible; not only the protesters but also some of the official speakers acknowledged wrongdoing, some in strong terms. As in other years, Waitangi was the site of division as different groups competed to determine the meaning of the day, and assert the own ideas about the values reaffirmed by the commemorations. These values were in themselves somewhat confused as well as contested.

Organisers strongly emphasised that – as in previous years – Waitangi Day would be a ‘commemoration’ rather than a ‘celebration’. This expressed the idea that the day would not reaffirm the righteousness of colonisation and the benevolence of British imperialism, nor would it pretend that New Zealand's race relations history had been ideal. It was, in short, an explicit rejection of the values of post-war and Muldoon-era Waitangi Days. However this change of message was not entirely successful, for two reasons. Firstly, many people continued to call the events ‘celebrations’ (including many Tai Tokerau Maori). Secondly, most activists required more than a change of terminology. A cartoon in the activist periodical Treaty Times summed this up, with a character saying that ‘there’ll be the same colonial activities as usual – we’re just changing the word celebration to commemoration’. This shows that organisers of

150 Abel, p.29.
151 Abel, pp.30, 44; NZH, 7 February 1989, p.9.
152 TT, July 1988, p.6.
commemorations do not have unlimited control of their commemoration’s message; however strongly they push a particular line, others will insist on their own interpretations.

Further confusing Waitangi Day's message, as in 1974, was the Queen, who was once again a central figure in the commemorations. The press focussed on her less than in 1963 or 1974, but she was still depicted as a highly important figure. As in 1974, her role in New Zealand was questioned, but whereas in that year this had been done only by a small group of protesters, in 1990 the idea of the Queen's irrelevance was expressed by the *Frontline* television programme. Her presence could also be understood as a reaffirmation of the Treaty's importance, since she was a descendant of one of its original parties and the living symbol of one of its contemporary parties. The importance of the Treaty was a theme of the commemorations: it was the main subject of most of the speeches and of protestor rhetoric, its signing was re-enacted, and the 1990 Commission published full page advertisements of the texts of the Treaty in several major newspapers on the day. The Christchurch *Press* also ran the texts on its editorial page, although without a translation of the Maori text, implying it was not significantly different to the English version.

Waitangi Day 1990 was also a reaffirmation of multicultural nationhood. This was symbolised by such things as the range of craft in the Bay of Islands, which included the waka fleet, navy ships, Polynesian outriggers, surf life saving boats, and dragon boats. As in 1974, this suggested multiculturalism and the immigrant origins of all New Zealanders. Nationhood was also the major theme of Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer’s speech: he hoped New Zealanders could ‘celebrate New Zealand, united in pride and hope’. Ironically, given that he was addressing the Queen, he declared that ‘New Zealand no longer lives in the shadow of another culture. We have our own… an imagination, a spirit and a heritage which is unique’. The Treaty was a major part of all this, as was acknowledgement and rectification of past injustice. Even protest

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155 NZH, 6 February 1990, pp.16-17; *Dominion*, 6 February 1990, pp.6-7.
waitangi Day, 1968-1990 216

was a part of New Zealand’s proud heritage: Palmer claimed that this was a right granted by the Treaty. 158 Protest could, however, stunt national self-discovery: presumably in response to hecklers, he announced that ‘New Zealanders want to get on with the task of nation-building and they don’t want to have their right to listen to me interfered with by those who would have no one listen at all’. 159 Palmer reaffirmed the ideals of national and cultural independence, unity, nationhood and freedom; ideals which could be shared by virtually all New Zealanders even if they disagreed on specifics. In concert with the Commonwealth Games in Auckland, which had finished just days before, the Waitangi Day ceremonies do seem to have caused a widespread feeling of national pride and unity. 160 In common with New Zealand Day 1974, the Commonwealth Games opening ceremony had portrayed New Zealand as a nation of immigrants, all arriving and making their contributions to New Zealand. 161 The ‘feel good’ factor of the Games seems to have carried over into Waitangi Day, overwhelming the protests and Pakeha annoyance at them. 162 The mood was reinforced by television coverage, which stressed unity and harmony. 163 Tom Scott expressed this mood in a cartoon of an ordinary Pakeha bewildered by unexpected feelings of national pride and affinity with Maoritanga. 164

This feeling of unity, however fleeting, occurred despite considerable conflict at Waitangi. There was a large turnout of protesters, despite stringent security measures. 165 Many simply walked in as general members of the public and made their views clear through chanting and booing at the speakers. Others managed to smuggle in surprisingly large banners under their clothes, while a group of about 150 waded around a headland to the Waitangi jetty to shout abuse at the Queen while chest deep in the bay. 166 A wet cloth was also thrown at the Queen at one point, narrowly missing her. The central message of the protesters was that the Treaty had still not been honoured, and until this happened Maori had nothing to celebrate. Many of these

158 This view was reinforced by some television news coverage. Abel, p.83.
159 NZH, 7 February 1990, p.9.
162 Abel, pp.30-1, 44.
165 Radio New Zealand, Morning Report, 7 February 1990, MR900207a, RNZSA.
166 ibid.; Dominion, 7 February 1990, p.3.
protesters had never been satisfied with the promises surrounding the Waitangi Tribunal; the Treaty could be honoured only by a real sharing of sovereignty.\textsuperscript{167} Others may have initially been happy with the Tribunal but had become disillusioned by its inadequate funding and the government’s focus of the ‘principles’ of the Treaty at the expense of granting rangatiratanga to Maori. Still others may have simply seen the event as a good chance to remind people that there was still progress to be made. Either way, a significant number of people, Pakeha as well as Maori, and elders as well as protesters, were not going to let the day go by as a celebration of the Treaty and of New Zealand.\textsuperscript{168} Again we can see the struggle for the meaning of Waitangi Day.

Even the official speakers were not unified in their messages, although all reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty. All four speakers – the Queen, Palmer, Bishop Whakahuihui Vercoe and Maori Council chair Graham Latimer – praised the Treaty as the founding document of the nation and the basis for partnership between Maori and Pakeha.\textsuperscript{169} They differed, however, on the extent to which this partnership had actually happened. Palmer and Latimer mentioned breaches of the Treaty only in terms of their rectification. Both emphasised that great strides had been made in recognising the Treaty and solving differences.\textsuperscript{170} The Queen also mentioned this, but added that ‘the Treaty has been imperfectly observed’.\textsuperscript{171} Vercoe was the most blunt, saying that:

\begin{quotation}
I want to remind our partners that you have marginalised us. You have not honoured the Treaty. We have not honoured each other in the promises we made on this sacred ground. Since 1840 the partner that has been marginalised is me – the language of this land is yours, the media by which we tell the world who we are is yours.
\end{quotation}

This marginalisation had extended even to the organisation of Waitangi Day. ‘The 1990 Commission has been bombarding me for 18 months with how I should behave, how I should celebrate, commemorate, how I should do things in 1990. And they did not tell me by what process and why I did these things’. He also criticised the
government’s emphasis on the principles of the Treaty. Vercoe’s speech was greeted with jubilation by protesters at Waitangi. Radio coverage of the speeches records them booing and jeering at all the other speeches, and at the start of Vercoe’s, and then cheering and applauding once they realised what he was saying. Elsewhere, reactions were more negative, with at least two major newspapers condemning the speech. On television, quotes from the speech were used selectively to reduce its impact, and one interviewer clearly had difficulty accepting that Vercoe’s church was in agreement with what he had said. We can see that, as in earlier decades, the scope for Waitangi Day to be used to express dissident views was still very restricted.

Waitangi Days of the 1970s and 1980s revealed a deeply divided nation in which the dominant group struggled with questions of identity. It was frequently revealed that New Zealanders lacked a common mythology or set of core values which all could unite behind, and that both Maori and Pakeha were divided within themselves over what these values could be and how they might be expressed. Other groups, as well as many Pakeha and some Maori, felt completely alienated from the events. The third and fourth Labour governments attempted to change Waitangi Day so that it would be more inclusive and less likely to be characterised by protest. However, the changes often served simply to draw further attention to these underlying problems. Protesters were less than impressed by most changes, seeing them either as hypocritical and superficial or as attempts to stifle debate on the Treaty and related issues. Waitangi Day had no generally agreed-on meaning; possibilities included a tribute to Treaty signatories, a celebration of New Zealand, a reaffirmation of racial equality or partnership, a hypocritical charade, a celebration of imperialism, and a forum for protest. There was no consensus about what principles or values were being reaffirmed, and those which the official ceremonies seemed to promote changed regularly. In short, Waitangi Day was a highly contested site, as Maori and Pakeha, radicals and conservatives, politicians and protesters all competed for control of the day’s meaning. The reform of the Waitangi Tribunal had some effect in reducing protest, but fears that the Treaty was still not being honoured meant that protest never

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172 NZH, 7 February 1990, p.9.
173 Radio New Zealand, Morning Report, 7 February 1990, MR900207a, RNZSA.
175 Abel, pp.110-18.
disappeared, and the belief that Waitangi Day 1990 was a celebration of 150 years of colonisation led to particularly vocal protest, expressing New Zealand's deep disunity.
The previous two chapters have shown that, from the mid 1960s, historic commemorations in Northern Ireland and New Zealand became major sites of conflict. We have also seen that, even during the calmer decades of the 1950s, Northern Irish war commemorations had strong religious and political connotations. Despite these factors, in the 1970s and 1980s Remembrance Sunday was the least conflict-ridden of the four commemorations studied in this thesis. The ceremonies suffered one major attack and were caught up in sectarian and political arguments on several occasions, but the day was never targeted by protests as other commemorations were. Some Catholics, and from the early 1980s some Protestants, instead used war memory to try to connect the two communities through shared commemoration. Ironically, this tendency was boosted by the IRA’s bombing of a Remembrance Sunday ceremony in 1987. Meanwhile, the Somme anniversary became more akin to the Twelfth than Remembrance Sunday, as its loyalist and Ulster patriotic elements were emphasised at the expense of remembering the war dead.

Throughout this thesis it has been argued that historic commemorations owe more of their meaning to contemporary political concerns than the past. This was the case with Remembrance Sunday: the memory of the war dead was repeatedly used to support a range of contemporary political opinions and stances. However there was also widespread antagonism towards blatant political use of war commemorations. The most obvious example of this was the aftermath of the Remembrance Sunday bombing, when Catholics as well as Protestants were appalled by the idea of a war commemoration as a legitimate target. Several groups of Protestants were also criticised for politicising war remembrance. It must be noted that many of those who criticised this politicisation were open to similar accusations; in some cases one sort of politicisation was seen as normal or acceptable, or simply not seen as political, while others were seen as inappropriate. We will see later that this also occurred on Anzac Day in New Zealand.

Chapters one and five showed that the Twelfth of July is a classic example of a commemoration which sets two communities against each other. This chapter will show that Remembrance Sunday, by contrast, is one which acted to bring them
together, demonstrating that commemorations can be unifying as well as divisive. Although it often had clear political undertones and was generally associated with the Protestant community, Remembrance Sunday was usually seen as non-sectarian and uncontroversial, at least by Northern Irish standards. This made it a useful tool for Catholics who wished to signal that they did not hate Protestants or oppose all aspects of British or Ulster Protestant culture. Many of the Catholics attending Remembrance Sunday ceremonies may have believed in at least some of the ideals which the ceremonies reaffirmed, but it seems likely that their attendance was primarily a reaffirmation of the ideal of cross-community friendship. Likewise, most of the Protestants who emphasised Catholic military participation and commemorated nationalist First World War soldiers did this from a desire to create a shared commemoration which could encourage the two communities to set aside their differences.

This thesis has argued that the historic commemorations it examines have tended to retain public support when they were seen as reaffirming compelling ideals. Since Remembrance Sunday was held in memory of the British Army’s war dead, it is not surprising that it was given additional relevance by the Troubles. From the early 1970s, remembrance ceremonies incorporated the memorialisation of security force members killed in Northern Ireland, and the conventional forms of war remembrance were adopted by a range of groups in remembrance of civilian, paramilitary and security force dead. Remembrance Sunday could also be a symbol of the desire for peace and the futility of violence. Northern Irish war commemorations thus had a range of meanings, including remembrance of the dead of many different conflicts, support for the Ulster Protestant community, support for the British Army or for unionism generally, cross-community friendship, and the need for peace. Many people from different groups considered at least some of these things to be important enough that they were willing to publicly affirm their commitment to them.

**Politicised remembrance**

From the late 1960s, Northern Ireland experienced greatly increased levels of violence. This, and the strong divisions within the Protestant community, led to some
particularly fraught Twelfths as various factions attempted to gain control of the commemorations and determine their meaning. Northern Irish war commemorations did not become political platforms to the same extent, but did become more politicised. The Somme anniversary changed significantly as participants increasingly emphasised its messages of Britishness and loyalism, eventually transforming the day from a smaller version of Remembrance Sunday to a smaller version of the Twelfth of July. Remembrance Sunday was more contested, as various factions within Ulster Protestantism, and some Catholics, competed for the symbolism of war commemoration. Support for Remembrance Sunday was often seen by members of both communities as support for the contemporary British Army, and the forms and rhetoric of war remembrance were utilised in memory of the Troubles dead.

The increase in tensions from the mid 1960s seems to have led to a defiant increase in Orange parading, particularly on the Somme anniversary. The first of July 1969 saw thousands of Orangemen parade at two separate events in Belfast, and another 2000 Orangemen with 20 bands march through the nationalist town of Coalisland.\(^1\) Although these and similar parades were ostensibly in memory of the Somme, there were few signs that they were anything more than another part of the marching season. Most ‘Somme’ marches had little or no memorial content and were not obviously different from those on the Twelfth.\(^2\) In 1971, SDLP Stormont MP Austin Currie argued that the Coalisland parade had developed from a small traditional one ‘into a mini-Twelfth which as far as the citizens of Coalisland are concerned is in fact a demonstration of Protestant superiority and ascendency to an area where they are not wanted’.\(^3\) Somme parades of this kind were objected to in a way that other war commemorations generally were not. In 1970 they were attacked in Lurgan and Coalisland, with serious rioting breaking out in the latter area after a band was trailed by a group of about 100 jeering nationalists.\(^4\) In a Northern Irish parliamentary debate about the Coalisland march the following year, Currie and fellow MP Gerry Fitt described it as ‘provocative’.\(^5\) That these marches were seen as simple assertions of Britishness and Protestantism rather than acts of remembrance is best indicated by the

\(^1\) BT, 2 July 1969, p.3.
\(^2\) BT, 1 July 1968, p.4; BT, 2 July 1969, p.3.
\(^3\) NIPD, vol. 82 (1971), cols 353-4.
\(^5\) NIPD, vol. 82 (1971), cols 348, 349.
fact that five columns of debate on the issue are recorded before anyone mentioned that the parade commemorated the Somme, and in an earlier debate on the issue, no one had mentioned this.\(^6\) The first of July continued to be marked by official ceremonies at Belfast’s City Hall and the handful of marches and ceremonies organised by the British Legion and various old comrades’ associations, but these received little attention.\(^7\) The Somme anniversary had always had a dual meaning in Northern Ireland: it was both a commemoration of the dead and an assertion of unionist and Protestant identity. Feeling under siege and wanting to assert their identity and pride in the face of republican attacks, the Orange Order and other loyalists began to emphasise the latter aspect of the day, beginning the transformation of the first of July from a lesser Remembrance Sunday into what came to be called the ‘mini Twelfth’.\(^8\)

By the mid 1970s this transformation was all but complete. In 1976 the Secretary of the Grand Lodge of Ireland claimed that the ‘mini Twelfth’ had become almost as big as the Twelfth itself. In Belfast alone, 50 lodges paraded on Sandy Row and another 54 in the eastern suburbs. That year, the first of July was chosen for the ceremonial illumination of a huge Orange arch in Lisburn, and a Lundy effigy was burnt in Portadown. In contrast, the biggest event which specifically commemorated the Somme was a parade and wreath-laying by one Royal Black and three Orange lodges in Belfast.\(^9\) In 1988 an angry letter appeared in the *Telegraph* from an Orange Order chaplain, saying that there had been a large turnout of brethren for a recent parade in Whiterock, but at the Somme commemoration service the following day ‘up to 80pc of these men were missing, as per usual’. It should not be assumed that the chaplain was unhappy about neglect of the war dead as such; this issue was not mentioned and his main concern was neglect of God and ‘Protestant heritage’.\(^10\) The first of July was not completely dominated by the Orange Order’s activities, however; the British Legion still held its own commemorations in many areas.\(^11\)

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\(^7\) BT, 1 July 1968, p.8.; BT, 2 July 1969, p.3.
\(^8\) For example, BT, 2 July 1976, p.3. Judging by the *Telegraph’s* coverage, by this stage the day seems to have become generally known as the ‘mini’ or ‘wee’ Twelfth, rather than the Somme anniversary.
\(^9\) BT, 2 July 1976, p.3.
\(^10\) BT, 13 July 1988, p.9.
\(^11\) BT, 1 July 1974, p.6; BT, 2 July 1975, p.6; BT, 2 July 1977, p.3; BT, 2 July 1979, p.5.
Probably because it was shared with the rest of the United Kingdom rather than being a specifically Northern Irish commemoration, Remembrance Sunday was less explicitly loyalist. However it was still sometimes used for clearly political purposes. This was especially true in 1971, when heightened tensions and a visit from Shadow Home Secretary James Callaghan led to perhaps the most tense and politicised November commemorations in Northern Irish history. The central issue was the parading which preceded or followed many areas’ ceremonies. When parades had been banned earlier in the year, a specific exception was made for traditional parades by ex-servicemen on Remembrance Sunday.\(^\text{12}\) As Remembrance Sunday drew closer, however, it became clear that the day would take on a strongly political aspect. On 25 October, the Catholic Ex-Serviceman’s Association (CESA), a vigilante group, wrote to the police to inform them that the organisation would parade on Remembrance Sunday.\(^\text{13}\) By the eleventh of November it had been told by police that, because its parade was not traditional, it could not be granted permission. The CESA agreed not to march ‘in the interests of community relations’, although it maintained its parade was legitimate.\(^\text{14}\) The British Legion had already cancelled its own parades, claiming that it wanted to reduce demands on the security forces and that its decision was purely voluntary.\(^\text{15}\) Several other ex-service organisations followed suit, although not all were happy about it.\(^\text{16}\) The only remaining ex-service parade was now one organised by Ian Paisley, who was pressured by police and the Prime Minister’s office to cancel the march, but refused.\(^\text{17}\) Tensions were further raised on the eleventh, when loyalists used Armistice Day and Callaghan’s visit to stage an enormous protest and remembrance rally at Belfast’s City Hall.\(^\text{18}\) Although the rally involved wreath laying at the cenotaph, in terms of purpose it had less in common with traditional Armistice Days than with icons of loyalist history such as Carson’s iconic ‘Ulster Day’ City Hall rally of 1912.\(^\text{19}\) Rallies were also held at war memorials in Donaghadee, Dundonald,}

\(^\text{13}\) General Organiser, Catholic Ex-Serviceman’s Association, to RUC Headquarters, 25 October 1971, HA/32/2/43, PRONI; McKittrick, et al., p.1519.
\(^\text{14}\) IN, 11 November 1971, p.1.
\(^\text{15}\) BN, 3 November 1971, p.5.
\(^\text{18}\) BN, 12 November 1971, p.8.
Lisburn and Larne. The rallies were heavily criticised by some ex-servicemen and others as a desecration of the war memorials and of war memory, especially in the organizers’ apparent assumption that all the war dead would have supported unionism and loyalism. The next day Prime Minister Brian Faulkner removed the Remembrance Day exemption, banning all parades on that date. As with the Somme anniversary, we can see that the unionist aspects of Northern Irish remembrance could be emphasised to turn commemorations into overtly political rituals. But because Remembrance Sunday had tended to be relatively respectable and apolitical, the overtly political use of its forms, even if not on the day itself, was bound to attract criticism. To many Protestants, Remembrance Sunday was primarily a tribute to the dead, and it was offensive to use their memory for narrow political purposes.

Use of Remembrance Sunday to comment on the contemporary situation was not limited to loyalist politicians. We saw in chapter three that one of the themes of Northern Irish remembrance rhetoric in the post-war years was the threat of another war. It should not be surprising, then, that when conflict broke out in Northern Ireland itself this became a theme of war commemorations. Preachers addressed the contemporary situation by relating it to the established values and principles of war commemoration. One of these was the immorality of armed conflict, and appeals to peace were made in ‘almost every sermon preached from the pulpits of churches, cathedrals and synagogues’ on Remembrance Sunday 1971. This had been a theme since 1966, when the Moderator of the Presbyterian Assembly in Northern Ireland said that a mockery was being made of the sacrifices of the war dead, who had fought for peace for future generations. The appeal for contemporary peace remained a theme of Northern Irish remembrance sermons into the 1980s. Others compared the situation with World War II, although this could be done in a number of ways. In 1968 the Anglican Bishop of Derry compared Ian Paisley’s followers to the Nazis, and in a 1974 sermon the Reverend Joseph Parker argued that the situation in

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21 BN, 10 November 1971, p.9; BT, 17 November 1971, p.5.
24 BT, 14 November 1966, p.2.
Northern Ireland was a collective insanity akin to that of Hitler’s Germany. To the UDA, by contrast, the strongest similarity was between the IRA’s murder of Protestants and the Nazi extermination of the Jews. To clergy, especially in the first decade of the Troubles, the lesson of war and the significance of war commemorations was the importance of peace and the immorality of violence. To the UDA, the vital lesson was that if military force was not used against evil men, an entire people could be exterminated. As is common in times of crisis, both sides appealed to the past for support of their present day positions.

Even when Remembrance Sunday was not used to comment on contemporary issues, the commemoration was widely seen in that context. One of the fundamental principles reaffirmed in nearly all war commemorations is the idea that the nation’s soldiers had fought and died for righteous principles. Even if the war in which they had fought comes to be seen as pointless or wrong, ordinary soldiers can still be presented as having fought for noble reasons such as duty to country. This creates the paradox that while war commemorations are frequently anti-war, they are almost always pro-soldiers. The presence of the British Army on the streets of Northern Ireland from 1968 therefore had repercussions for war commemorations there. For many unionists, the presence of the army was another reason to honour the memory of its dead, especially once soldiers began to be killed in the province. In remembrance sermons, analogies were drawn between the soldiers of the world wars and those on the streets outside. According to the chairman of the Belfast Poppy Day Appeal, ‘the killing of British soldiers in Northern Ireland should bring home to us more than ever before the selflessness of soldiers who fought during the first and second world wars and in conflicts in many other parts of the world since then’. In 1971 the Remembrance service in St Anne’s Cathedral in Belfast was altered to include security force members killed in the Troubles, and from the mid 1970s wreaths were laid for them at various commemorations, while clergy commonly paid them tribute in their Remembrance Sunday sermons. By the late 1980s, commemorations

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27 ‘Hitler’s genocide - Europe’s Jews; Sinn Fein's genocide - Ulster's Protestants’, Poster, NIPC PPO1066, Linenhall Library.
28 BT, 10 November 1969, p.3.
29 BN, 6 November 1971, p.2.
31 See Belfast Telegraph and Tyrone Constitution Remembrance Sunday coverage from 1973 on.
illustrated the toll that the Troubles had taken on the security forces and on some communities; at the 1987 Remembrance Sunday service in the small town of Castlederg, for example, fifteen wreaths were laid by the families of local soldiers and police officers killed in the Troubles. Commemoration of the Troubles dead was much less common on the Somme anniversary, perhaps because of its more specific historical connotations. Most unionists seem to have seen the inclusion of the security forces in pre-existing war commemoration as unproblematic, but for others the security forces added a note of irony to the war commemorations. The army’s presence in Northern Ireland was, in the words of Methodist minister Eric Gallagher, ‘a visible and shameful reminder to each side of the community that we have failed to win the peace for which so many died’.

While unionists tended to see the army’s presence in Northern Ireland as another reason to observe war commemorations, for many nationalists it was another reason not to. The army’s arrival was initially welcomed by many nationalists, who saw it as a sign that the police and the hated special constabulary had been defeated. At this stage the army was also seen by many Catholics as a relatively neutral force capable of defending them from loyalist mobs. This honeymoon period ended after a few months, however, as Catholics began to feel they were being unjustly harassed and their neighbourhoods disproportionately targeted. The re-emergence of the IRA led to gun battles between it and the army, increased security force targeting of Catholic communities, and greater hostility on both sides. In the early 1970s the army killed a number of innocent Catholics, most notoriously on ‘Bloody Sunday’ in January 1972, when thirteen people were killed. The killings gave the IRA new recruits and increased support, and turned the majority of Catholics firmly against the British Army. Even before Bloody Sunday, some nationalists had targeted war memorials and other forms of remembrance as symbols of the army and Britishness. In 1969, wreaths were removed from the Derry war memorial a week after Remembrance

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32 TC, 12 November 1987, p.17.
33 For an exception, see BT, 2 July 1988, p.5.
34 A point also made by a Tyrone Constitution columnist and by the Belfast Telegraph in an editorial the following year. TC, 7 November 1969, p.10; BT, 7 November 1970, p.1.
35 Bardon, pp.669-86.
36 McKittrick et al., pp.52-5.
37 Edward Daly, Mister, Are you a Priest?, Dublin, 2000, pp.199-200; Bardon, pp.686-8; McKittrick et al., pp.143-9.
Sunday ‘to avoid desecration and the risk of an offensive incident’. Remembrance wreaths in Newry were wired to the war memorial after being laid, but this did not prevent their theft in 1973. Catholics who continued to donate to the poppy fund often refused to take or wear poppies because of the possible reaction of their co-religionists. Despite the regular use of Remembrance Sunday to honour contemporary British soldiers, unionists were usually outraged by disrespect for war commemoration, seeing it as an insult to the World War dead rather than a response to the present day situation.

The politicisation of war memory extended to written discourse, and understandings of the Ulster Division, in particular its UVF origins, tended to vary according to writers’ views of contemporary events. An account in the *Orange Standard*, for example, described the Ulster Division as ‘ideal’ because its origins had united ‘the whole Province’ – ignoring the large Catholic minority. In contrast, a review of a book on the Somme in the relatively liberal *Belfast Telegraph* praised the Division but described the UVF as ‘questionably motivated’. Other people’s interpretations of the war were also seen in a political light. A 1976 BBC programme about the Battle of the Somme which only mentioned the Ulster Division twice attracted considerable anger from unionists. One wrote that the Ulster Division had played such an important part in the battle that its near-absence must have been intentional, and that other British peoples would care more about the Northern Irish people if they were aware of the sacrifices they had made. In the eyes of at least some unionists, the sacrifices of the Ulster troops in World War I created obligations for Britain, and ignorance of those sacrifices was simply an excuse for Britain to renege on these obligations. This was a view which tended to be most strongly expressed by hard-line loyalists, although it could also be expressed in liberal unionist forums such as the *Telegraph* editorial column. Paisleyites asked if Ulster’s youth had died in vain or whether Britain would remember its debt. The UVF and UDA, meanwhile, attempted to

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40 BT, 15 November 1976, p.6.
42 BT, 1 July 1971, p.8.
45 BT, 1 July 1971, p.11; PT, 1 July 1972, p.12.
construct historical continuity leading directly from the original UVF through to the Troubles-era paramilitaries. Magazines such as the UDA’s *Loyalist News* conflated the original UVF with all Ulstermen who served in both world wars and all nationalists with the men of the Easter Rising.

The symbolic power of war commemorations in Northern Ireland is shown by the speed with which their forms and rhetoric were adopted to memorialise the Troubles dead. Organisations as diverse as the ecumenical Witness for Peace movement, the Orange Order, the CESA and the IRA all constructed their own commemorations from traditional forms of war remembrance. War commemorations assert the righteousness of the dead and the cause for which they died, and sometimes the injustice of their death. When those being remembered were combatants, the commemorations implicitly legitimate their violence. In deciding who would be remembered, therefore, each of these groups made a statement about the Troubles and the morality of each group within it. Witness for Peace, seeking to unify Northern Ireland in shared mourning, planted crosses at Belfast City Hall for each victim of the Troubles regardless of background. The CESA, coming from a dual ex-service and nationalist perspective, honoured ‘all those Irishmen who died in the cause of freedom and justice in every age, in every land and in every army’. This included republicans and British Army soldiers, emphasising Ireland’s tragic history and seeking to create true Irish unity. The Orange Order’s annual memorial service in West Belfast, by contrast, mourned civilians, police and soldiers killed in the area. They were described as having been ‘murdered by terrorists’, ‘murdered by the enemies of Ulster’ and ‘innocent victims’. Exactly who was counted as ‘innocent’ is not recorded, but the rhetoric of the service clearly served to distinguish the security forces, whose violence was seen as legitimate, from republican paramilitaries, whose violence was seen as murder. The presence of the UDA in 1972 suggests that the violence of loyalist para-

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48 BT, 4 November 1972, p.1; IN, 9 November 1974, p.3; IN, 18 November 1974, p.1.
49 CESA to RUC; IN, 11 November 1971, p.7.
50 BT, 15 November 1971, p.7; IN, 6 November 1972, p.1.
militaries was also seen as legitimate. The service was sometimes used by the Orange Order to call for stronger government action against the IRA, again asserting the legitimacy of state violence against the IRA’s unlawful terrorism. The UDA also used the imagery of conventional remembrance in its Loyalist News magazine, sometimes to commemorate dead paramilitaries, sometimes to commemorate First World War dead, sometimes ambiguously. In using these forms and imagery, these groups expressed the seriousness of the conflict and, in the case of the Orange Order especially, equated the Troubles dead with war victims killed by enemy forces. All of these ceremonies illustrate the ubiquity of war remembrance, which provided a readily accessible set of forms from which to create new traditions.

War commemoration has powerful symbolic meaning. More than anything, it reaffirms the idea that the commemorated dead are worthy of remembrance, and often the ideas that their violence was legitimate, and that they had died in the service of something righteous. In the context of the Troubles, traditional war commemorations took on a new meaning in Northern Ireland. Those which remembered the British Army’s dead could not help suggesting, implicitly or otherwise, that to fight and die in the British Army was a good thing. This was inevitably seen by many people from both communities as a comment on the contemporary army and its actions in Northern Ireland, and was therefore supported by most unionists and opposed by most nationalists. The Somme anniversary’s emphasis on the Ulster Division meant that it easily shaded into a celebration of loyalism, quickly becoming little more than a ‘mini Twelfth’. Meanwhile, numerous groups used the conventional forms of war commemoration to remember their own dead, equating them with the respected dead of World War I.

Religion and war remembrance

Northern Irish war remembrance was heavily associated with the unionist and Protestant community. Such associations may paradoxically be used to heal division between groups, as acceptance of a commemoration can serve as a proxy for

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54 BT, 12 November 1979, p.9.
acceptance of the commemorating community. Attempts to do this were made in the 1970s and 1980s, as a small number of Catholics, particularly priests, began participating in war commemorations. However, Catholic involvement in war commemorations was sometimes greeted with hostility from evangelical Protestants, who had a complicated relationship with war remembrance. Many were happy to use the symbolism and cultural importance of remembrance for political purposes, as we saw in the parading dispute of November 1971, but evangelical churches were not usually involved in ordinary war commemorations.

In chapter three we saw that Irish Catholics had occasionally participated in war commemorations since the end of World War I, but that this was not common. This abstention was due partially to the political connotations of remembrance in Northern Ireland, but also because until the mid 1960s Catholics were forbidden to attend any service which included non-Catholic clergy, ruling out most war commemorations. Once this ban was lifted, small numbers of Catholic priests began participating in public remembrance services in various towns around Northern Ireland. From 1973 a chaplain represented the Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor at the Belfast cenotaph on Remembrance Sunday, and from about 1978 the Bishop attended in person. That year the Lisburn Remembrance Sunday police wreath was laid by a Catholic ex-service police officer, and in Irvinestown the parade began at a Catholic primary school and stopped at two churches, one of them Catholic, to lay wreaths. There is little evidence of Remembrance Sunday services being held in Catholic churches, although it is possible that they were simply not reported. Unless they were far more widespread than the newspaper coverage indicates, the rarity of Catholic war memorial services suggests that Catholic participation in mainstream services did not reflect any strong desire to commemorate the war dead. Instead, participation may have been an attempt at cross-community friendship, and a signal that not all Catholics were anti-Protestant or against all aspects of British culture.

58 BT, 1 July 1974, p.6.
59 TC, 17 November 1978, p.11; TC, 14 November 1980, p.15.
60 For an exception, see BN, 11 November 1968, p.5.
In most cases, the participation of Catholic priests seems to have been uncontroversial, and it is likely that it occurred more often than is indicated above. However the potential of this issue to erupt into sectarianism is illustrated by a dispute in Ballymena in the mid 1970s. As in some other areas, the commemoration service at the local war memorial involved several local clergy, including in this case former naval reserve member, chaplain and Catholic priest Reverend Hugh Murphy. In 1976 the service was boycotted by three councillors from Ian Paisley’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in protest at Murphy’s involvement. This seems to have made little impact; there was a large turnout at that year’s ceremony. The following year, however, the DUP achieved a majority on the Ballymena Borough Council, and one of its councillors became mayor. An earlier council had decided that the service would be conducted by different ministers on a four-year rotating basis. In the first three years of the cycle, ministers from the three main Protestant churches would take turns to lead the service, and on the fourth year the British Legion would choose a minister. In 1977 the Legion chose Murphy, leading to threats by the DUP council majority that they would boycott the ceremony. The DUP councillors’ stand was widely reviled within the Protestant community, with Belfast DUP councillors publicly pleading with them to call off the boycott as ‘it could be misconstrued as an insult to relatives of the people who died during the last two wars’. One of them was also quoted as saying that he had attended remembrance services every year since being elected eight years previously and there had always been a Catholic priest present. One ex-serviceman told the Telegraph that ‘if I had thought I was fighting for people like the Mayor of Ballymena and his party colleagues I wouldn’t have bothered. Many of their Roman Catholic brethren proved their loyalty with their lives. All they [the DUP] ever do is proclaim their loyalty and fight the Crown.’ To this man, Remembrance Sunday was at least partially a reaffirmation of duty and loyalty, and Catholic servicemen had shown these qualities far more than those who merely called themselves loyalists.

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63 Ibid.
64 BT, 11 November 1977, p.11. See also other letters on the same page, and BT, 10 November 1977, p.3; IN, 10 November 1977, p.4.
The Ballymena Council invited the local Council of Churches to appoint a substitute minister, and when they refused, brought in an Independent Methodist minister from nearby Kells to run the service. The British Legion then announced that it would be holding its own service, with Murphy presiding. Both services went ahead on Remembrance Sunday, at the same memorial but at different times. Both played ‘O God Our Help in Ages Past’, and featured the same Army and UDR representatives laying wreaths, the same UDR bugler sounding the Last Post, and the same cenotaph guards. Murphy seems to have made a considerable effort to maintain the British nature of the remembrance service, including the Queen in prayers and leading the singing of the British national anthem. The only significant differences, according to the *Telegraph*, were the ‘lustier’ singing of hymns at the Council service, and the turnout, estimated at 2000 for the Legion service, including Ballymena’s nine non-DUP councillors, and 1000 for the Council service. Both of these numbers were significantly higher than usual, with one ex-serviceman estimating the usual attendance at 400 to 500. The opposition to the DUP’s actions indicates that, to at least some Protestants, Remembrance Sunday was a reaffirmation of ideals and principles which had little to do with the finer points of theology. To the DUP councillors and their supporters, those ideals may have been valuable but were much less important than the principle of avoiding any contact with what they saw as Rome’s evil empire. The relatively high turnouts at both services show that significant numbers of people wished to either assert their version of what Remembrance Sunday was about, or send a message to the other group about what they stood for: religious tolerance in the case of those at the Legion service and opposition to Catholicism for those at the council service. Participation at any historic commemoration tends to convey a message about the attendees’ values and principles, but rarely is this so explicit.

The extent to which the DUP’s attitudes to the service and Murphy’s participation in it were about politics and religion, rather than war memory, is indicated by the general relationship between evangelicals and remembrance. In 1970 and 1980 the number of evangelical churches and missions which held Remembrance Sunday services was

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68 BT, 14 November 1977, p.9.
Northern Irish war commemorations, 1967-1990

extremely low. Although Paisley’s church did hold remembrance parades in the early 1970s, such as the one which led to the 1971 Remembrance Sunday parade ban, these appear to have been more for Troubles dead than the fallen of the world wars. A Remembrance Sunday notice in the Paisleyite Protestant Telegraph, for example, emphasised security force members killed by terrorists rather than the dead of the world wars. It was not until 1986 that Paisley’s Free Presbyterian Church was represented at the Belfast Somme commemoration, twelve years after the Catholic Church started sending a representative. Evangelical Protestantism had affected Remembrance Sundays before: in 1973, for example, a Boys Brigade group had boycotted the Ballymoney Remembrance Sunday parade in protest at drinking and bingo at the local British Legion club. The DUP was not united in considering sectarian issues more important than war remembrance, but it is telling that even the DUP councillor who objected to his Ballymena colleagues’ actions had only started going to remembrance events once he was elected to the council.

Despite evangelicals’ general disdain, war commemorations were essentially Protestant occasions. In 1980 the Telegraph covered 23 public commemorations on Remembrance Sunday, all but two of which involved a religious service of some kind. The services were nearly evenly split between those in Protestant churches and those at war memorials (fifteen and fourteen respectively) and eight communities held both. As we have seen, the majority of clergy involved in these services were Protestant. The figures show the continued strong association of commemoration with religion, and the specific association with Protestantism is demonstrated by the fact that in a significant minority of areas the church service was the only formal ceremony of remembrance. The figures probably underestimate the Protestantism of Remembrance Sunday, since the Telegraph generally did not report special church services if they were not accompanied by parades or wreath-laying. A better indication of the role of Protestantism can be found in the newspaper’s church services columns, which advertised 69 separate commemorative services on Remembrance

69 BT, 7 November 1970, pp.8-9; BT, 8 November 1980, p.4.
70 PT, 13 November 1971, p.2.
71 BT, 1 July 1986, p.2.
72 IN, 12 November 1973, p.3.
73 BT, 10 November 1980, p.11.
Sunday, a figure which probably excludes many services outside of Belfast. This strong connection between commemoration and religion is a reflection of the high levels of religious observance in Northern Ireland as well as the inherently religious nature of Remembrance Sunday. It also suggests that many people would have understood the principles represented by Remembrance Sunday in religious terms, both because this was how many understood the world in general, and because their main source of remembrance rhetoric was the clergy. This as well as the Ballymena controversy illustrates the importance of religion in Northern Ireland and the extent to which it was intertwined with politics. The role of religion in Remembrance Sunday therefore shows how historic commemorations can reflect, intensify, but also on occasion help heal societal divisions.

Revival and controversy

In the 1960s and 1970s there was concern that observance of Remembrance Sunday seemed to be in decline, although this was less of a problem in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom. From the early 1980s, there were some signs of a revival. As well as an increased numbers of church services held and wreaths laid, Ireland’s participation in World War I gained more attention both from intellectuals and the general public. Catholics and Protestants alike took an increased interest in nationalist First World War soldiers, and several groups explicitly attempted to create modes of remembrance which people from both communities could share. Remembrance Sunday continued to be used for political purposes, but division over this was now primarily within the Protestant community. Attempts to use war commemorations to comment on the Anglo-Irish Agreement or nuclear proliferation were criticised by many unionists as inappropriate politicisation.

In the 1960s there had been concern throughout the United Kingdom that Remembrance Sunday had become neglected and irrelevant, especially to young people, and the war dead forgotten. Attempts were made to revitalise the commemoration with a new form of Anglican service featuring ‘an act of commitment to serve

74 BT, 8 November 1980, p.4.
75 BT, 12 November 1967, p.3.
God and all mankind in the cause of peace and for the relief of want and suffering’. 76 In the words of the Telegraph it ‘evoke[d] the spirit of penitence for sins that twice have brought mankind into conflict and keep it divided still’. 77 Some churches in Northern Ireland and elsewhere introduced pop music and readings from figures such as Martin Luther King and Bertrand Russell into their services in an effort to attract young people. 78 The evidence on the extent to which Remembrance Sunday continued to be observed in Northern Ireland is mixed. Of the 238 churches advertising services in the Telegraph the day before Remembrance Sunday 1970, 27.7% mentioned remembrance services, down from 33.5% in 1960, which itself had been a decline from 1950. 79 A letter to the Telegraph in 1969 claimed that it was ‘usual at this time of year [for] people… to argue that Remembrance Sunday should be scrapped’. 80 However, the two minutes’ silence was still observed in Omagh in 1966, and although it was said to have generally disappeared by 1979, in that year police were still stopping traffic in Belfast at 11am on Remembrance Sunday. 81 Judging by collection totals from the poppy appeal, Remembrance Sunday seems to have been stronger in Northern Ireland than elsewhere in the United Kingdom. In the 1970s and 1980s Northern Irish donations were consistently amongst the highest in the country per capita, with some regions donating two or three times the United Kingdom average, despite high unemployment. 82

Poppy appeal takings increased from the early 1980s, when the amount raised nationwide, adjusted for inflation, began to rise for the first time since World War II. 83 In 1980 the percentage of Protestant churches advertising Remembrance Sunday services was, at 37.7%, the highest since the 1950s. 84 The revival is also illustrated by the Tyrone Constitution’s coverage of Omagh’s remembrance service: declining attendances were reported every year from 1971 to 1974, but in 1978 an increased

76 Times, 22 August 1968, p.10.
78 BT, 11 November 1968, p.5.
81 TC, 19 November 1966, p.7; BT, 10 November 1979, p.4; BT, 13 November 1979, p.9.
82 BT, 15 November 1976, p.6; BT, 9 November 1987, p.6; Harding, p.389.
83 Harding, p.447.
84 BT, 8 November 1980, p.4.
turnout was noted and by 1986 37 wreaths were laid, compared to 22 in 1973. In Belfast the official 1984 Remembrance Day service attracted about 800 people despite ‘appalling’ weather. One reason for this may have been the dwindling number of World War I veterans; only fifteen Somme survivors attended the battle’s anniversary service in Belfast in 1981. It was perhaps felt that such men should be honoured while there were still some left.

The easing of the Troubles, as measured by the number of fatalities, may have been another factor. The decreased threat would have made attendance at commemorations feel less risky, and also contributed to a desire to connect the Protestant and Catholic communities by finding a shared heritage which both could embrace. The participation of both communities in World War I began to be seen by many in the Protestant community as something which could do this, and several organisations began developing forms of remembrance which specifically acknowledged nationalist soldiers. For example, in 1980 the British Legion paid a Remembrance Sunday tribute to those from both sides of the Irish border who had fought in the World Wars.

Starting in 1983, the Belfast-based Farset youth organisation took groups of young people from the north and south of Ireland to visit Irish war graves and memorials in France and Belgium, by 1987 including both the Ulster Tower memorial at Thiepval and the monument to the 16th (Irish) Division at Wyteschaete. This was also done by at least one Northern Irish primary school. In 1986, plans were announced for a Somme museum in Northern Ireland and for the restoration of the Ulster Tower, an initiative begun by Farset. In support of the plans, Ian Paisley suggested that all of Northern Ireland could share in remembering the Somme because many nationalists had fought in the British Army. The restored Ulster Tower, complete with visitors’ centre, was re-dedicated on the first of July 1989, and the following year the Somme Association was founded to run and look after the Tower and to ‘co-ordinate research into Ireland’s part in the First World War and to provide a basis for the two

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86 BT, 12 November 1984, p.7.
88 BT, 10 November 1980, p.11.
90 BT, 1 July 1989, p.12.
91 BT, 2 July 1986, p.15.
communities in Northern Ireland to come together to learn of their common heritage’.\(^2\) There was increased tolerance of and interest in remembrance in the Republic, with representatives of the Irish government and defence forces attending the Remembrance Sunday service in St. Patrick’s Anglican Cathedral in Dublin in 1984.\(^3\) The increased interest in commemorations was also occurring in Irish literature and historiography, which began to examine various aspects of World War I and remembrance of it.\(^4\) The international rise of cultural and literary histories of the war, a trend begun by Paul Fussell’s *The Great War and Modern Memory*, probably contributed to this, and indeed one of the earliest manifestations of renewed Irish interest in the war is not a work of history but a play, Frank McGuinness’ *Observe the Sons of Ulster marching to the Somme*.\(^5\) Attempts were also made to uncover the facts behind the mythology surrounding Ulster’s participation in the war.\(^6\) However, the 75\(^{th}\) anniversary of the Somme prompted a renewal of earlier interpretations. Interwar histories such as Cyril Falls’ book on the Ulster Division were reprinted, and sections of this were reproduced in other books.\(^7\)

The work of some Protestants to create cross-community acts of remembrance was at least partially cancelled out by the extent of Remembrance Sunday’s unionist and British state links. In nationalist-dominated Armagh in 1980, for example, wreaths were laid by the police, police reserve, UDR, the special constabulary association, prison staff and army cadets as well as the council, the post office, the Orange and Black orders and the Protestant churches.\(^8\) While few of these organisations, or their equivalents, would have appeared out of place at commemorations in other countries, in Northern Ireland their participation served to reinforce the unionist nature of the ceremonies. Less prominent, but much more damaging, were the associations of the day with loyalism, which suggested to many Catholics that war commemorations were more about reaffirming Britishness than remembering the dead. We have seen

\(^{2}\) BT, 1 July 1989, p.1; Hall, pp.15-17; Jeffery, *Ireland and the Great War*, p.137.
\(^{3}\) Harding, p.325.
\(^{7}\) Cyril Falls, *History of the Ulster Division*, Belfast, 1991; *The Deathless Story of the Somme and the Immortal Bravery of the Ulster Division*, Belfast, nd, p.2.
\(^{8}\) BT, 10 November 1980, p.11.
that the UVF attempted to claim the legacy of the 1910s organisation of the same name and, by implication, the Ulster Division. An important part of this was the use of war commemorations. On Remembrance Sunday 1981 three men laid a wreath on behalf of the UVF on Belfast’s cenotaph after the main ceremony had ended. Council staff moved it to a less prominent position but did not remove it. From at least the mid 1980s, the UVF began using the forms and rhetoric of conventional war commemorations in murals honouring their own dead, and in 1987 they commemorated the 75th anniversary of their namesake’s formation with several murals in honour of the original UVF. The Orange Order continued to hold its peace line service, which in 1982 attracted about a hundred onlookers. Belfast County Grand Master Thomas Passmore linked the Troubles dead to those of the world wars and the recent Falklands War, attacking the British government for refusing to recognise the Northern Irish conflict as a war even though it had gone on for longer than the two world wars combined and killed more soldiers than the Falklands. In 1991, the 75th anniversary of the Battle of the Somme, numerous commemorative murals were painted in loyalist areas, many of them linking the original UVF, and in some cases the entire Ulster Division, to contemporary loyalist paramilitaries. The loyalist connections encouraged some nationalists to respond to war remembrance in the same ways as to other manifestations of loyalism. In Derry and Belfast, war memorials were splashed with paint in the weeks before Remembrance Sunday 1983 and, in an echo of similar problems with wreaths the previous decade, the crosses in the Newry garden of remembrance were thrown into the river. This continued to be a problem into the 1990s. Although the SDLP Mayor of Derry condemned the vandalism in his city, he declined to attend its remembrance service.

The next chapter will show that from the late 1960s Anzac Day was regularly targeted by protest, usually from various anti-war and anti-nuclear groups. This also occurred in other parts of the United Kingdom at this time. The white poppy, a 1930s symbol

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100 Jarman, Material Conflicts, pp.217, 224.
102 Rolston, Painting and Politics, pp.44-5.
104 Lucy and McClure, Remembrance, p.139.
106 Richardson, p.360.
of pacifism, re-emerged in the 1980s.\textsuperscript{107} The Northern Irish associations of war remembrance with the unionist community, and the focus of most of the population on more pressing military issues, meant that such protests were rare in Northern Ireland. From time to time, however, they did occur, sometimes combining general anti-war sentiment with agitation for peace in Northern Ireland. Commemoration ceremonies at Queen’s University in 1982 and 1983 and the Belfast cenotaph in 1986 were all affected by the expression of pacifist sentiments such as the wearing of white poppies and display of CND symbols.\textsuperscript{108} This was condemned as politicisation by some students and councillors. In response, it was argued that the ceremonies were already political. SDLP councillor Brian Feeney justified his absence from a Somme commemoration by arguing that the occasion had been politicised by unionists and ‘hogged’ by the Orange Order.\textsuperscript{109} Alliance councillor John Montgomery, criticised for wearing a white poppy to a Remembrance Sunday ceremony, said that he was not denigrating the war dead, but was ‘concerned at the amount of empty rhetoric and nationalism which pervades at Remembrance Day services’. In criticism of anti-AIA politicians, he said that ‘People have given their lives for peace but to-day at the Cenotaph we have people who are calling for mobilisation and openly walk side by side with those who advocate violence’.\textsuperscript{110} Here we can see that the line between appropriate and politicised remembrance is not clear or objective. To some, the display of pacifist symbols was, as the Queen’s students association argued, a fitting memorial for the war dead, while to others it was clearly a political statement.\textsuperscript{111} Decisions by various groups to attend or stay away was also seen in a political light, with unionists tending to see any absence as an insult to the dead and nationalists seeing the presence of groups such as the Orange Order as politicising the ceremonies.

Unionist antagonism to the Anglo-Irish Agreement impacted on Northern Irish war remembrance as strongly as it did on the Twelfth. From 1985 to 1988 first of July parades in Belfast were accompanied by rioting, fighting and attacks on police.\textsuperscript{112} The following year the unionist majority on the Belfast City Council banned the Northern Ireland Secretary of State from council property and therefore from commemorations

\textsuperscript{107} Harding, p.323.  
\textsuperscript{109} IN, 2 July 1986, p.3.  
\textsuperscript{110} IN, 10 November 1986, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{111} BT, 12 November 1983, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{112} BT, 1 July 1985, p.6; BT, 2 July 1986, p.15; BT, 2 July 1987, p.12; BT, 2 July 1988. p.5.
at the city’s cenotaph. After the 1986 Somme anniversary, DUP Mayor of Belfast Sammy Wilson said that the Secretary’s presence at the ceremony would have been an insult to ‘the brave Ulstermen who died in Britain’s cause and have now been betrayed by Britain’. Later, at that year’s Remembrance Sunday he went further, stating that the British government had ‘destroyed democracy’. The President of the Belfast Central branch of the British Legion countered that the council’s action was ‘disgraceful. It is bringing Remembrance Sunday right into the field of politics where it should not be at all’. Wilson was also accused by Alliance Party councillor Fred McDowell of insulting the memory of soldiers killed in Belfast, while the *Telegraph* editorialised that he was debasing the memory of the fallen. This conflict illustrates that historic commemorations can have a wide variety of meanings, even within a community. To Wilson, war commemorations were a reminder that Ulster had always been loyal to Britain, and the AIA was an insult to those who had given their lives for this loyalty. To others, however, the intrusion of politics into remembrance was itself an insult to the dead, as it took attention away from their memories and used them as tools in a political squabble. McDowell countered Wilson’s claims about Britain’s lack of reciprocal loyalty by pointing out that British soldiers had died in Northern Ireland during the Troubles; Britain had paid back their debt of blood to Ulster with blood of their own.

As in earlier decades, many different factions competed to use and control the symbolism of Remembrance Sunday. There was now an increase in the number of people attempting to use this symbolism to unite the Northern Irish – and the Irish in general – across religious and community lines. The effectiveness of this was somewhat limited by the continued associations of war commemoration with the British state and, to a lesser extent, loyalism. Despite the political connotations of the day, there was widespread resistance to the use of war commemorations for clearly political purposes. Various people used the memory of Northern Ireland’s war dead in support of their positions, but opinions differed as to the point at which this became

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113 BT, 1 July 1986, p.2.
114 IN, 2 July 1986, p.3.
115 BT, 7 November 1986, pp.1, 6.
116 ibid., p.1.
117 ibid., pp.6, 9.
inappropriate. Commemorations may have been more about the present than the past, but the dead were still seen at least partially as people rather than political tools.

The Enniskillen Bombing

The ultimate expression of Northern Ireland’s divisions over war remembrance was the Remembrance Sunday bombing in the County Fermanagh town of Enniskillen in 1987. An IRA bomb was detonated in a nearby building just before the start of the town’s commemoration, killing eleven people and injuring 63.118 The IRA was somewhat apologetic for the killing, claiming that the bomb had gone off at the wrong time and was targeted at crown forces ‘on patrol in connection with the Remembrance Day services but not during it’.119 The denial that the group had intentionally bombed the service was probably a response to the intense and worldwide outrage at the incident. It was strongly condemned by politicians and media throughout the world, including the Soviet news agency Tass, which was usually in favour of any attack on the British state.120 There also seems to have been widespread Irish Catholic shame over the bombing, and the condemnation from the Irish Catholic Bishops was so strong and unequivocal that it was given a glowing tribute in the Orange Standard.121 Reactions to the bombing can be examined to show the attitudes towards, and understandings of, Remembrance Sunday held by a range of people in Northern Ireland and elsewhere. In particular, the extent of the disgust and anger shows that most people, Catholic as well as Protestant, respected the commemorations and regarded them as being a completely illegitimate target.

The close association of Remembrance Sunday with the Protestant community meant that the bombing was widely seen as a sectarian attack. This impression was reinforced by the discovery of another, unexploded, bomb near another Fermanagh Remembrance Sunday event.122 SDLP justice spokesman Seamus Mallon described the bombing as ‘obviously sectarian, because those who planted the bomb knew the

118 McKittrick, et al., pp.1094-5.
119 BT, 10 November 1987, p.4.
120 Bardon, pp.776-7; BT, 9 November 1987, p.6.
121 IN, 9 November 1987, p.5; BT, 11 November 1987, p.9; OS, December 1987, p.5.
122 BT, 11 November 1987, p.4; McDaniel, pp.119-20; OS, December 1987, p.5.
vast majority of people at the service would be of Protestant faith’. Evangelicals were especially prone to seeing the bombing as an attack on Protestantism. For example, a tract published by Free Presbyterian minister Ivan Foster described the ‘murder of eleven Protestants and the injuring of scores of other Protestants’, seeing the victims purely in terms of religion. Foster and others in his church, including Ian Paisley, alleged that the building in which the bomb was planted was not searched because it belonged to the Catholic Church and the security forces were afraid of the reaction if they searched it. The police responded that the building had not been searched because security forces would not be near it and it was therefore not considered a risk. Loyalist paramilitaries also saw the bombing as an attack on their community, and responded accordingly. The day after the bombing, five Catholic teenagers were injured in an apparent retaliation shooting in Belfast, and a Protestant teenager was later killed by the UDA in a revenge attack after being mistaken for Catholic. An Irish News reporter wrote that ‘As friends and relatives of the 11 dead and 50 wounded made their way silently into The Erne Hospital, the poppies in their lapels marked them as yet another Protestant community which had been inflicted with an atrocity to grieve over, to remember and to harbour in their hearts… it will take more than condemnation to convince them of Catholic shame at this sacrilege.’

The term ‘sacrilege’ is indicative of the way that this bombing was seen as different from other terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland. It suggests that Remembrance Sunday was seen as something special and perhaps sacred; killing innocent people while they attended a Remembrance Sunday service was widely perceived as different from killing equally innocent people as they ate dinner, travelled to work or drank in a bar. The idea that Remembrance Sunday and other war commemorations might be ceremonies in ‘civil religions’, to use Robert Bellah’s term, generally means that such ceremonies express and reaffirm particular values, spiritual or otherwise. However, some of the rhetoric used in response to the bombing suggests that war commemo-

123 BT, 9 November 1987, p.4.
124 Foster, p.1.
125 Foster p.1; BT, 9 November 1987, p.4. This was also considered as an unproven possibility by the Orange Standard. OS, December 1987, p.4.
126 BT, 9 November 1987, p.4.
127 BT, 9 November 1987, p.13; McKittrick et al., pp.1098-9.
128 IN, 9 November 1987, p.5.
rations were actually understood in religious terms. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the *Times* described the bombing as a ‘desecration’, while Mallon used the term ‘sacrilegious’ and the Archbishop of Canterbury spoke of ‘blasphemy’. One of the bomb survivors, who had been orphaned by the attack, said his parents had always regarded the service as a religious occasion. ‘The terrorists might as well have placed the bomb in a church’. In the aftermath a few local politicians and clergy went further, describing the bombing or the IRA itself as ‘satanic’ – a term which would have been taken very seriously in the strongly Christian countryside of Northern Ireland. It is possible, however, that religion simply provided useful metaphors. The most common rhetoric was not that of religion but of civilisation, which was contrasted with ‘barbarism’ and ‘savagery’. This probably does not indicate that war commemorations were seen as the pinnacle of civilisation, but rather that ceremonially remembering the dead was understood as a basic part of it, something which only the most barbaric would fail to respect.

The central figures of the Enniskillen service, as in most other war commemorations, were war veterans and to a lesser extent serving UDR soldiers. Despite this, the bombing was widely understood as an attack on a group of old men. The U2 singer Bono expressed this with the most pathos when he asked ‘Where’s the glory in bombing a Remembrance Day parade of old-age pensioners, the medals taken out and polished up for the day?’ From combatants in a major war, the ex-servicemen at the centre of most services had become a group of ‘old-age pensioners’; they had long ceased to be combatants and so to kill them was not only not glorious but completely reprehensible. Several other commentators noted that most Remembrance Sunday events of this period were dominated by the old and the young. This was a point made by Irish Catholics in particular; as members of a community containing supporters of the IRA’s goals, they may have felt the need to emphasise that those killed in the bombing were not legitimate targets. Killing children and the elderly was

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129 BT, 9 November 1987, pp.4, 9; BT, 10 November 1987, p.4. See also McKittrick et al., p.1095.
130 IN, 13 November 1987, p.11.
131 BT, 9 November 1987, p.4; BT, 10 November 1987, p.12.
132 BT, 9 November 1987, pp.4, 5, 9; IN, 9 November 1987, pp.4, 5.
133 Quoted in McDaniel, p.181.
134 Most Remembrance Sunday ceremonies involved youth groups such as cadets, Boy Scouts and Girl Guides. IN, 9 November 1987, p.4; IN, 9 November 1987, p.5; IN, 9 November 1987, p.6; OS, December 1987, p.3.
well outside the norms of combat, and therefore should be as unacceptable to republicans as to anyone else. Although they participated in Remembrance Sunday by virtue of their war experience, by virtue of their age ex-servicemen were now portrayed as helpless civilians. They were seen, in other words, in terms of their present form rather than their past roles.

Just as it was emphasised that war veterans were no longer combatants and therefore not legitimate targets, it was also argued that the IRA were not honourable soldiers like those who had fought for Britain in the world wars. The Telegraph editorialised that 'a greater contrast between those who went to their deaths on the battlefields of France, and those who crept into a community centre to plant a deadly bomb, could hardly be imagined.'\textsuperscript{135} While the Telegraph presented the IRA as cowardly terrorists rather than brave soldiers, others compared them with those who were soldiers, but in the service of evil and tyranny. Several people, Protestant and Catholic, explicitly compared them to the Nazis,\textsuperscript{136} while Labour leader Neil Kinnock said that the dead had been ‘honouring those who fought to get the very freedom that terrorism wants to destroy’.\textsuperscript{137} Kinnock and others used the established rhetoric of Remembrance Sunday against those who would attack it, further reinforcing the legitimacy of remembrance and the immorality of the attack. As often happens in times of crisis, appeals were made to the past for support of present positions.

The victims were also seen in terms of war, and especially in the terms often used about the dead of conventional warfare. The Tyrone Constitution wrote that those at the ceremony had come to pay tribute to the dead of two world wars. ‘But in a cruel irony it was their own town that took on a scene reminiscent of wartime’.\textsuperscript{138} In the aftermath of the bombing, war memorials and commemorations were co-opted to commemorate Enniskillen’s dead. On the eleventh of November – three days after the bombing and on Armistice Day, coincidentally or not – memorial services for the bombing victims were held at war memorials all over Northern Ireland, with thousands attending the Belfast ceremony.\textsuperscript{139} The speed with which these events were

\textsuperscript{135} BT, 9 November 1987, p.9.  
\textsuperscript{136} BT, 10 November 1987, p.12; BT, 11 November 1987, p.9.  
\textsuperscript{137} IN, 9 November 1987, p.4.  
\textsuperscript{138} TC, 12 November 1987, p.1.  
\textsuperscript{139} BT, 11 November 1987, p.1; IN, 13 November 1987, p.11.
organised suggests that war memorials were widely seen as appropriate locations to mourn those who had died in Enniskillen, even though they had not been killed in combat or even technically in war. It is notable that although the period around Remembrance Sunday had become a common time to remember those killed in the Troubles, few if any commemorations specific to Troubles dead had been held at war memorials, even though many of the dead were soldiers. In being killed while remembering the war dead, the Enniskillen victims appear to have been granted honorary membership in their ranks. This was made explicit in the ways in which the Enniskillen war memorial became a symbol of the bombing; images of its mourning, head-bowed soldier in front of the ruins of the bombed building were reproduced in newspapers and on television screens all over the world. In 1991 the memorial was altered so as to commemorate the bomb victims; their names were added, as were eleven bronze doves representing the eleven killed.

War commemorations were also used to memorialise the bomb victims. Enniskillen’s Remembrance Sunday service was re-staged two weeks after the bombing, and although it was intended simply a chance for locals to hold the ceremony which the IRA had stopped earlier in the month, it was widely seen as a memorial for those who had been killed in the bombing. The service was attended by 5000 people, including Thatcher, and broadcast on live television throughout the United Kingdom and in the Republic. The majority of non-locals were probably not attending to commemorate the dead of the world wars. Rather, they were present as an act of solidarity with the people of Enniskillen and to show the IRA that they could not stop people from commemorating their war dead. Despite this co-option, however, Enniskillen’s postponed ceremony also illustrates the importance of war commemoration to the local Protestant community. This was such that while people were still being dug out of the rubble, a group of uninjured survivors, including the local British Legion president, gathered at another memorial and laid their wreaths while a bandsman played the Last Post.

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140 McDaniel, p.136.
142 OS, December 1987, p.4; McDaniel, p.88.
143 BT, 23 November 1987, p.3; McDaniel, pp.88-9.
144 McDaniel, pp.28-9.
Northern Irish war commemorations, 1967-1990

Many Catholics were amongst those using existing war commemorations to honour those killed in Enniskillen. In Northern Ireland, and to a greater extent the Republic, the biggest impact of the bombing on war commemoration may have been that it inspired many Catholics to reconnect with it. On hearing of the attack, for example, Northern Catholic journalist Tom Collins recalls ‘being ashamed that day that I did not have a poppy. Since then I have worn a poppy each Remembrance Sunday. It is a small gesture, pitiful almost. But even small gestures have their place’. In their own churches, at public ceremonies, and sometimes in Protestant churches, Catholic clergy and laypeople remembered the dead of Enniskillen and, often for the first time, the world wars. In the Republic, the already changing perceptions of World War I and its remembrance were further altered. War memorials were restored, British Legion branches re-opened, commemorations re-established, and from 1988 poppies were sold and worn on the streets of the Republic for the first time since 1970. In many cases, Catholics were not so much joining in with remembrance of war dead but, like many others in the aftermath of the bombing, using existing war commemorations to remember and in a sense apologise to the dead of Enniskillen. It must be noted that not all Catholics and nationalists took this opportunity: there was no representative of the Catholic Church at a memorial service at Enniskillen’s Anglican cathedral, and no representative of the Irish government at the rescheduled Remembrance Sunday service. The poppy continued to be controversial; Irish television host Gay Byrne’s promise to wear one on air had to be broken after protests and threats, and in 1988 a Catholic teenager who wore a poppy to an interdenominational service at a Protestant school was beaten up on the way home.

The bombing appears to have boosted the renewal of Remembrance Sunday across Northern Ireland. In 1988 many areas saw much higher than usual attendance at Remembrance Sunday services, with that at Derry’s war memorial being the biggest in about a quarter of a century, and thousands attending Enniskillen’s service.

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145 Lucy and McClure, p.39.
149 Leonard, p.100; BT, 14 November 1988, p.4.
Numbers increased in some areas the following year, with about a thousand attending in Armagh and a service held in the heavily nationalist town of Coalisland.\(^{151}\) Despite this, some nationalist politicians still felt unable to attend commemoration services. Belfast SDLP councillor Joe Hendron said that he had attended the Enniskillen memorial service at the cenotaph and had ‘nothing but respect’ for the war dead, but also felt that Remembrance Sunday was associated with ‘the British-Unionist tradition’.\(^{152}\) To many unionists, such as Belfast mayor Sammy Wilson, attendance at war commemorations now not only signalled remembrance of war dead but also showed support for democracy against terrorism.\(^{153}\) By 1990 some of the politicking surrounding earlier Remembrance Sundays had returned, with unionist Belfast councillors still refusing to invite the Northern Ireland Secretary of State to their remembrance service. In this case, however, he simply attended the service in Derry, to which he had been invited by the city’s Independent Unionist mayor.\(^{154}\) The politicking had never disappeared from the Somme anniversary, and in 1988 SDLP member of the Magherafelt District Council Paddy Sweeney caused outrage by saying that the Ulster Division were ‘idiots’ for going to the Somme and that ‘no one belonging to him had gone there’. Official Unionist councillor John Junkin described Sweeney as a sectarian bigot and pointed out that both Protestants and Catholics had fought at the Somme.\(^{155}\) SDLP and Sinn Fein Belfast councillors were absent from the 75th anniversary Somme commemoration in 1991, although the SDLP councillors sent apologies.\(^{156}\) The deep divisions within Northern Ireland were still expressed in relation to war commemorations, but the extent of this was far less than in previous decades.

Throughout the period from 1967 to 1990, Northern Irish war commemorations were heavily influenced by their political contexts. This further illustrates the idea that historic commemorations derive more of their meaning from the present than from the past. However, Troubles-era war commemorations also show that there are limits to politicisation or, more exactly, limits to how much politicisation people will accept. The quasi-sacred nature of war remembrance means that many find its explicit

\(^{151}\) BT, 13 November 1989, p.12.  
\(^{152}\) BT, 14 November 1988, p.4.  
\(^{153}\) Ibid.  
\(^{154}\) BT, 12 November 1990, p.4.  
\(^{155}\) IN, 1 July 1988, p.1.  
\(^{156}\) BT, 1 July 1991, p.6.
politcisation offensive. Most war commemorations contain a fine and shifting line between reaffirmation of core values, generally seen as an appropriate part of remembrance, and politicisation, which tends to be regarded as inappropriate. Relating contemporary events to these values is considered inappropriate in some cases but not others. In the next chapter we will see that this was also a dilemma for participants in Anzac Day in the 1970s and 1980s. As in Northern Ireland, what seemed appropriate to one group was seen by others as dragging remembrance into the sordid arena of politics.
Like Remembrance Sunday, Anzac Day from the mid 1960s to 1990 was strongly affected by its contemporary political, military and social context. Throughout the period examined in this chapter, Anzac Day was regularly used by speakers, editorialists and protesters to comment on contemporary military issues, particularly New Zealand’s Anzus alliance with Australia and the United States. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Anzac Days were often targeted by protesters against New Zealand’s involvement in the Vietnam War. After the Vietnam War ended, Anzac Day continued to be affected by anti-nuclear, feminist and other protests. In the mid to late 1980s, debate over Anzus came to dominate Anzac Day rhetoric. Inspired by a growing desire for national identity and independence in the 1980s, a small group of writers began to re-examine the Gallipoli campaign. As in Northern Ireland, there was ongoing debate about what actions and rhetoric were appropriate in the context of war commemorations.

We have seen throughout this thesis that the success of a historic commemoration depends primarily on the extent to which it reaffirms values which the public finds compelling. The values reaffirmed by Anzac Day, such as remembrance, military preparedness, self-sacrifice and dedication to country, were not considered compelling by many New Zealanders, and were actively opposed by some. From the early 1980s a small group began to take an increased interest in Anzac Day, but for new reasons. This group, composed mostly of writers, saw in the Gallipoli campaign and therefore in Anzac Day the ideals of national independence, distrust of powerful allies, and a distinct New Zealand national identity. These ideals would come to fruition under the fourth Labour government, which banned nuclear ships from New Zealand waters and thereby asserted the country’s independence from its American superpower ally. Seeking legitimacy from the past, supporters of this policy drew on the Gallipoli campaign, but so too did supporters of the nuclear alliance.

The use of Anzac Day to discuss the Anzus alliance and other issues further illustrates that historic commemorations tend to derive their meaning primarily from their contemporary context rather than from the events which they commemorate. This was the case even in commemorations such as Anzac Day, in which the past was often
discussed. Many of those making Anzac Day statements – whether for or against – devoted more time to contemporary issues such as Vietnam and Anzus than to military history. When the Gallipoli campaign and other episodes were mentioned, they were often used to supply evidence in favour of a particular stance. Like nationalists in Northern Ireland, Anzac Day protesters saw war commemorations less as solemn remembrances of the dead than as celebrations of militarism, giving support for contemporary military actions. As in Northern Ireland, those who objected to the form or content of war commemorations were often criticised for politicising the day. We have seen that, in Northern Ireland, those making this criticism sometimes introduced their own political elements into the commemorations, or approved of those with whom they agreed doing so. Some kinds of politicisation were seen as normal, natural, or not really political, while others were regarded as inappropriate.

Those who opposed the Anzus alliance, and to a certain extent those who supported it, drew on ideas about who New Zealanders were. This chapter will argue that Anzac Day was frequently used to make statements about group identity, in this case that of New Zealanders as a people. Throughout this period, supporters of military alliances argued that New Zealand was a country which stood by and supported its allies, and also one which lacked the ability to defend itself from aggressors. Anzus opponents countered that it was a country which had painfully learnt the dangers of blindly following powerful allies, and that New Zealanders were a people who had always supported the principles of justice and freedom rather than military aggression. Within the nation, other groups frequently used Anzac Day to make statements about themselves, for example that they shared important values with mainstream New Zealanders. Anzac Days of the 1970s and 1980s grew increasingly diverse as a range of ethnic, religious and sexual minorities used the commemorations to ally themselves with mainstream values while still maintaining their own distinct identities.

Anzac Days and the Vietnam War

In 1965 Prime Minister Keith Holyoake announced that New Zealand combat troops would be sent to Vietnam. The conflict would become increasingly unpopular in New
Zealand and elsewhere, leading to the emergence of anti-war groups. In an echo of 1930s pacifists, anti-Vietnam War activists often saw Anzac Day as a glorification of militarism and war, and although some were open to the idea of commemorating the dead of past wars, most felt it was more important to ‘mourn the human sacrifice going on right now’. From 1967, possibly earlier, anti-war and other groups attempted to use Anzac Day to commemorate the dead in Vietnam and draw attention to the anti-war cause. They frequently came into conflict with more conservative participants, particularly members of the RSA. In this struggle for the meaning of Anzac Day, the RSA was in a much stronger position, but was damaged by the conflict partly because its determination to maintain control repelled some moderates.

During New Zealand’s involvement in Vietnam, various groups used Anzac Day to comment on the conflict. Especially in Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch, anti-war and student groups formally remembered those killed and suffering in the Vietnam War; sometimes those on all sides, sometimes the Vietnamese or the communist Vietcong specifically. Most used the conventional forms of Anzac Day, such as wreaths with memorial cards attached, whereas others, particularly the Progressive Youth Movement (PYM), used the forms of protest such as marches and placards. Reaction varied. Most of the time the RSA allowed protest wreaths as long as they primarily expressed feelings of mourning or remembrance rather than criticism of military policy. In some cases, the use of Anzac Day for consciousness-raising was strongly opposed by the RSA and also sometimes by the police and politicians. In Auckland in 1970, the PYM planned an Anzac Day march from Queen Street to the Auckland cenotaph to lay a wreath. These plans were met with veiled threats of violence. In Christchurch the same year, the PYM laid a bunch of flowers and a placard depicting dead Vietnamese civilians on the war memorial. These were removed by Christchurch mayor Ron Guthrey. Over the next two years, Christchurch’s Anzac Days were marked by conflict between the RSA and the PYM, culminating in 1972 when the RSA formed a cordon around the war memorial to prevent unauthorised tributes. Several protesters attempted to break the cordon, leading to scuffles between

1 Locke, pp.193-5.
them and returned servicemen. The new mayor had already boycotted the ceremony in protest at the RSA’s restrictions. The conflict and debate over the place of Vietnam remembrance in Anzac Day was essentially debate about the values and principles of the day. What was Anzac Day really about? What principles and ideals did it reaffirm, and how broad were these? What principles should it affirm? At this time, the RSA essentially controlled the forms and meaning of Anzac Day ceremonies. Its conflicts with protesters were in many ways a struggle to retain this control in the face of protester attempts to change or broaden the day’s meanings. Examination of the protests and the reactions to them is therefore an unusually good opportunity to find out what people thought Anzac Day meant and what it could or should mean.

To the RSA and others, the primary purpose of Anzac Day was the remembrance of New Zealanders who had been killed in war, particularly the two world wars. In the aftermath of protests, several letters to the Christchurch *Press* argued that protesters had every right to express their views about Vietnam, but Anzac Day was not an appropriate time or place to do this. Following Christchurch’s particularly fraught 1970 Anzac Day, for example, one N. Smith wrote that ‘Anzac Day is to commemorate the dead Australians and New Zealanders in all war, not Vietnamese civilians and soldiers’. The Vietnamese could be remembered on another day. The *Press* editorialised that a PYM placard depicting dead Vietnamese civilians was ‘an affront to those who had gone to the ceremony to recall the sacrifice of New Zealanders at war’. Some commentators felt that Anzac Day could legitimately be used to remember the Vietnamese dead, as long as such remembrance was sincere and respectful. The PYM’s use of non-conventional forms of remembrance – for example, laying a placard and bunch of flowers rather than a wreath and card – were often cited, along with their unkempt appearance, to argue that their remembrance was insincere. As in Northern Ireland, there was dispute over what was appropriate in the context of war commemorations. One way of determining this was to focus on remembrance. Some felt that only New Zealanders and Australians could be remembered on Anzac Day, while others argued that anyone could be remembered as

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long as this was done sincerely. Sincerity tended to be judged on the extent to which the conventional forms of remembrance were adhered to. Attempts to broaden these forms, whether the novelty was in the people remembered or the form of remembrance, were widely assumed to be publicity seeking rather than genuine commemoration.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the distinction between non-political remembrance of the war dead and the use of war commemorations for political purposes is arguably a false one. Even when they supposedly commemorate past events, most historic commemorations take much of their meaning from their contemporary context. Often the rhetoric of commemoration explicitly addresses contemporary issues, and this was the case with Anzac Day. The predominance of politicians and military officers amongst the official speakers meant that the pro-war side dominated the ceremonies. In 1967, for example, a small group in Wellington were prevented from laying a wreath ‘to the dead and dying on all sides in Vietnam’, while official speakers at the Wellington, Rotorua and Auckland ceremonies all stressed the righteousness of New Zealand’s participation in the war.\(^\text{11}\) In Wellington, Chief of Naval Staff J.O’C. Ross argued that the real pacifists were the soldiers fighting for peace in Vietnam, while in Auckland Major-General W.S. McKinnon argued that New Zealand’s contribution of troops honoured the Anzacs. The wreath-layers, by contrast, were convicted of disorderly behaviour.\(^\text{12}\) New Zealand’s presence in Vietnam was defended in other years, although some speakers also spoke against involvement in the war.\(^\text{13}\) The discussion of Vietnam by official speakers was rarely criticised even when it was not related to the wars which Anzac Day commemorated. As in Northern Ireland, the idea of ‘appropriate’ remembrance rhetoric tended to favour conservatives and shut out pacifists and protesters. The PYM’s actions, particularly their disruption of the Christchurch ceremony in 1972, suggest that if they wanted to remember the dead of Vietnam it was in order to raise awareness about the war, not for its own sake. However, the PYM were hardly alone in using Anzac Day for political purposes. Discussion of contemporary issues was usually not considered inappropriate in itself; the speaker’s stance on those issues was what counted.

\(^{11}\) NZH, 26 April 1967, p.3.  
\(^{12}\) Locke, p.252.  
One of the ideals regularly reaffirmed by Anzac Day was that of freedom. It was often argued that the fallen of Gallipoli and elsewhere had died so that future generations could be free, and Anzac crowds were often asked if they were making the best possible use of this freedom. This trope of freedom was frequently used in discussion of Anzac Day protests. Speakers and commentators argued about what this freedom actually meant, how far it went, and how it could be used. Those who were opposed to the protests tended to argue that freedom was not absolute or unrestricted.¹⁴ For example, Minister of Marine Allan McCready spoke in 1970 of a minority who ‘abused the freedom’ won by the war dead.¹⁵ In response to the dispute over the PYM’s proposed march in Auckland, Labour leader Norman Kirk similarly accused the PYM of ‘abusing’ the freedom won in war, but also said those threatening the marchers had gone against the principles of freedom and the rule of law for which so many had died.¹⁶ Kirk’s statement illustrates the two main ways in which the trope of freedom could be used. On the one hand, protesters could be accused of misusing the gift of freedom won by the war dead; the Anzacs had not died for the right to be disruptive and so to be disruptive was to insult them. On the other hand, it could be argued that freedom included the freedom to protest. Those who attempted to stop protests were accused of betraying the principles for which the war dead had fought.¹⁷ In 1970, N. Illingworth of Remuera wrote to the Herald that Anzac Day commemorated those who gave their lives for freedom. ‘And this freedom… includes the right to hold minority views, even views as unpopular as those held by the PYM.’¹⁸ It was also argued that young people could not be expected to die for freedom in any future war unless they themselves had real freedom.¹⁹ In short, both sides agreed that Anzac Day was a reaffirmation of the principle of freedom, and that this was important, but there was no agreement on what freedom actually meant. To one faction, the war dead were mocked or betrayed by those who used their gift of freedom to disrupt the remembrance of others while, to the other side, freedom was meaningless unless it was fully granted to everyone.

¹⁴ For example NZH, 26 April 1968, p.3; NZH, 27 April 1970, p.3.
Those for and against the Vietnam War could both agree that Anzac Day rhetoric reaffirmed the importance of freedom. There were major differences, however, in ideas about what else Anzac Day stood for. Amongst young people and anti-war activists Anzac Day was commonly regarded as a celebration of militarism, military service and perhaps even war itself. There was a tendency to interpret Anzac Day practices in the worst possible light; a report on youth attitudes to the day reported that for many young people one of the most objectionable aspects of the day was the wearing of medals, which they saw as rewards for killing people. Some young people were bewildered by the apparent inability of veterans to see the evil of war, not considering that full understanding (and indeed experience) of the evils of war might be compatible with remembering it. Others understood that war commemorations could act to remind people of these evils; the Secretary of the Christchurch Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament argued that Anzac Day should be dedicated to peace. True remembrance, some argued, involved critically examining the origins of war and trying to prevent new ones. In 1970, for example, Fred Dierck wrote to the Press that ‘it is hoped that when we remember these men [who died in war] we will contemplate the follies that led to their death’. Campaigning for peace would continue the tradition of the fallen of the Second World War, argued an ‘Angry Housewife’ in another letter. ‘The students’ message reminds us that these men died in an attempt to bring about world peace.’ Across the anti-war movement there was a broad desire for Anzac Day to emphasise the horrors of war and the desirability of peace.

Those who had been directly affected by war were often seen as having a particular right to comment on Anzac Day, showing the tendency of some commemorations to become particularly associated with a fairly narrow group of people. A record of service or a relationship with a person killed in war was often mentioned in letters to the editor on the issue. The Herald argued that those who had not been to war had no right to criticise those who had; a point made more forcefully by some Christ-
church ex-servicemen who physically opposed PYM’s actions. Similarly, some argued that young men such as the PYM members had every right to comment on war because if a major one broke out they would be conscripted for it. Conflict on and about Anzac Day in this period can be seen as the competition of various groups for the control and meaning of the day. The RSA, especially in Christchurch, sought to preserve their special position as ‘keepers’ of Anzac Day, particularly in relation to those whose politics and modes of remembrance they disagreed with. This ‘ownership’ was contested by protesters intent on expressing their own views. However the RSA’s position was also challenged by some moderates who argued that the protesters had a right to express their views and the RSA should not exclude them. Many of those who attempted to challenge the RSA or make contrary voices heard claimed status as members of a group with a particular right to remembrance, such as ex-servicepeople or those with friends or close relatives killed in war.

The Anzac Day protests and the reaction to them had far-reaching and divisive effects. There was severe disagreement within the RSA about the organisation’s reaction to protest. In Wellington, some members saw protest wreaths as sacrilegious and insulting to the dead, and were therefore annoyed that the RSA had allowed them to be laid, while others criticised the organisation for its conservatism and its support for the Vietnam War. The conflicts had alienated some members from Anzac Day itself; three remits were submitted to the 1973 RSA conference calling for the observance to be abolished or moved to the nearest Sunday. In chapter four we saw that Anzac Day lost much of its power to unite New Zealanders in general after World War II, and by 1973 it had seemingly also lost its power to unite war veterans, the group most closely connected with the observance. The RSA’s reaction to the protests also helped widen a gap between the organisation and the rest of New Zealand, particularly young people. By the mid-1970s many youths had become indifferent or hostile towards the RSA and everything associated with it, including Anzac Day and the poppy appeal. Of course, not all young people felt this antagonism; perhaps the majority respected the conventional forms of Anzac Day. But even amongst this

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28 Cooke, p.144-5.
30 NZH, 24 April 1974, p.6; Patterson, p.5; Cooke, p.145.
group, large numbers did not feel any real connection to the day, and stayed away unless they were obliged to attend by family or community.\footnote{Assistant National Council of Churches chaplain, Lincoln College to Gnanasunderam, 13 October 1971, National Council of Churches MS Records 90-387-15/1, ATL.}

During the Vietnam War period Anzac Day and responses to it became deeply divisive. This division went beyond that between protesters and the RSA; there were also divisions within the RSA, within the protest movement, and between people who were neither protesters nor RSA members but felt that one or both groups had behaved inappropriately. We can also see the power of the conventional forms of remembrance; even the PYM used some of these rather than normal methods of protest. Although Anzac Day had already lost much of its active public support, the widespread and continued respect for the day is shown by the efforts of most protesters to respect its conventions and the reaction of many ordinary people to the protests. However this respect did not necessarily imply acceptance of the RSA’s understandings of the day; many felt that the RSA itself had forgotten the meaning of Anzac Day in attempting to suppress protesters’ freedoms. In general, debate about Anzac Day and protests tended to draw on contemporary issues and the values and ideals which Anzac Day was seen as reaffirming.

Who will we remember? Identity politics and Anzac Day

The mid 1970s saw the rise of ‘identity politics’ in New Zealand, with women, ethnic minorities and gay people all demanding recognition of their identities and cultures, and fairer treatment by the dominant group. Some of these groups, particularly women and Maori, had a long history of participation in Anzac Day, although women’s participation was often marginal. Other groups had not been identifiably involved, and now sought to be. There were two ways in which marginalised groups made themselves visible on Anzac Day. One was by doing what Maori and women had been doing for decades, and participating specifically as members of a particular group, thus reaffirming their group’s commitment to the values of Anzac Day. The aim of this was usually to draw attention to the group’s wartime contribution and to present members as good citizens who should be accepted by the mainstream. The
other way was to challenge and attempt to change the meanings of Anzac Day from the group’s perspective. Perhaps because women had been visible participants in Anzac Days for decades, some sought to break out of the roles into which they had always been placed. Servicewomen and ex-servicewomen increasingly began to participate in the day in the same ways as men. Feminist and Maori activists, meanwhile, disrupted Anzac Day in protest at the negative values which they felt the day celebrated. This section illustrates the range of Anzac Day’s potential meanings and the competition for them amongst different groups.

In 1974 the President of a Polish ex-service club wrote to the RSA magazine Review to explain why he and other Polish ex-servicemen marched on Anzac Day. ‘The reason simply is that we [Poles and New Zealanders] both believe in the same ideals – that is to say “That the mighty do not have the right to overpower the not so mighty”… Today [our children] are Polish New Zealanders and we, their parents, try to be good New Zealand citizens’.32 This encapsulates the reasons why many minority groups participated in Anzac Day not as anonymous individuals but as members of their group. Like the Polish ex-servicemen, the Pacific Islanders and Seventh Day Adventists who provided choirs and the Baha’i, Adventists, Pacific Islanders, gay people and other groups who laid wreaths at suburban Anzac Days were signalling their support for the ideals and principles symbolised by the commemorations, and their general desire to be and be seen as ‘good citizens’.33 Like the Catholic Anzac Day services and parades, which continued into this period, this participation asserted a distinct identity within a wider sense of shared New Zealandness.34 For ethnic and religious minorities, participation sent the message that although they may have been different in some ways from mainstream New Zealanders, they had many important things in common with them. They were able to use Anzac Day to incorporate themselves into the majority and create an image of many different kinds of New Zealander united behind common values.

For other minorities, Anzac Day also served this purpose, but participation also carried more complex messages. At Wellington’s 1981 Anzac Day service, a group of young men dressed in black with pink armbands laid a wreath dedicated to all gay people who had died through acts of aggression. They or a similar group were still laying wreaths in 1985, when their card read ‘In remembrance of all gay women and men from the Wellington region who served and died in wars fighting for freedom, and in remembrance of all gay victims of wars and intolerance’. As with other minority wreath-layings, this act signalled that gay people shared common values with other New Zealanders and had played their part in the fight for freedom. In addition, at a time when male homosexual acts were still illegal in New Zealand, the group sought to align gay people with the victims of war, and equate homophobic violence with the aggression of New Zealand’s wartime enemies. The gay wreath-layers therefore sought to use the meaning of Anzac Day in support of their own cause, arguing that the essential values and principles, particularly freedom and tolerance, were the same.

The involvement of women in Anzac Day was also complex. As in previous decades, women usually played minor roles in Anzac Day ceremonies, but women’s participation did grow. It seems to have become more common for women to march in parades, and in 1982 ex-servicewomen led the Auckland citizens’ service march. Choirs from girls’ secondary schools sometimes sang at services, and the Auckland Ladies’ Pipe Band provided music for at least one citizens’ service. Women also filled more traditional roles: in Stratford the Women’s Division of Federated Farmers organised an Anzac Day lunch, for example. The features on warfare and war veterans which commonly appeared in the newspapers around Anzac Day included some on war nurses and female war workers as well as male soldiers. As women gained more of a presence in politics and the armed forces, female speakers became more common; in 1987 the main speaker at the Auckland citizens’ service was Major

36 EP, 26 April 1985, p.3.
38 EP, 26 April 1971, p.8; NZH, 26 April 1971, p.3; NZH, 26 April 1974, p.3.
39 Private Secretary for Thompson to Private Secretary to Minister of Defence, 24 February 1972, ABFK 7494 W4948 71 35/1/2 1, ANZW.
Maureen Hunt of Devonport Naval Hospital, who said that women’s role in war must be remembered.\textsuperscript{41} Two years later the army guard of honour at the Mount Roskill ceremony consisted entirely of women.\textsuperscript{42} Within the conventional forms of Anzac Day, military women were sending the message that they too were part of the Anzac tradition.

While Hunt and other military women included themselves in the conventional forms and rhetoric of Anzac Day, others such as the Stratford women aimed only to support the remembrance of men. Another group sought instead to challenge conventions, partly by raising awareness of the damage done to women in war but also by challenging what they saw as an inherently sexist glorification of male violence.\textsuperscript{43} As a result, women in Wellington in 1980 and in Auckland in 1983 disrupted dawn services, in Wellington chanting ‘women died, we care, women were raped, we are angry’ during the minute of silence and asking ex-servicemen who tried to keep them back how many women they had raped.\textsuperscript{44} Feminists who attempted to participate in Anzac Day more conventionally were often stopped from doing so; a card in memory of women killed, raped and mutilated in war was confiscated by Auckland police in 1978 despite the Auckland RSA president saying he did not find it offensive, and the following year the Wellington RSA stopped a similar card from being laid because it had ‘political overtones’.\textsuperscript{45} In other years feminists were able to prevent interference with their wreaths and cards, or laid them without incident.\textsuperscript{46} These women regarded Anzac Day as ‘a celebration of male “power and glory” regardless of how sombre and tragic it appeared on the surface’. In laying the wreaths they wanted to present war as ‘an obscene corrupt act’ rather than a glorious one.\textsuperscript{47} In this sense they were carrying on the challenge to Anzac Day begun by anti-war groups such as the PYM. However, as Deborah Tyler has argued in relation to a similar series of protests in Australia, by participating in Anzac Day, even in an iconoclastic fashion, feminists risked legitimating its other messages and therefore marginalising their own.\textsuperscript{48}

\textsuperscript{41} NZH, 27 April 1987, p.15.  
\textsuperscript{42} Clarke, p.147.  
\textsuperscript{43} EP, 26 April 1985, p.3.  
\textsuperscript{44} EP, 26 April 1980, p.3; NZH, 26 April 1983, p.5.  
\textsuperscript{45} NZH, 26 April 1978, p.3; Broadsheet, June 1978, pp.5, 7; EP, 26 April 1979, p.2.  
\textsuperscript{46} NZH, 26 April 1980, p.3; NZH, 26 April 1984, p.5; EP, 26 April 1985, p.3.  
\textsuperscript{47} Broadsheet, June 1978, p.7.  
\textsuperscript{48} Tyler, pp.24-33.
and principles of Anzac Day were broad enough to encapsulate mourning for female war victims without necessarily negating other messages, such as the legitimacy of New Zealand’s military violence.

Maori were also occasional protesters. In 1979 a group of Maori activists disrupted the Auckland dawn service by shouting during the benediction that the dead had died in vain. A fight threatened to break out between the protesters and some war veterans, but the situation was calmed by an ex-serviceman who spoke to the protesters in Maori. The protesters later laid a wreath in memory of Maori who had died in ‘capitalist wars’.49 Maori protesters were also present on Anzac Day 1981.50 However, more typical of Maori involvement in Anzac Day was the subject of another newspaper story in 1979: Tumanako ‘Aunty Hope’ Rewiti, a 76 year-old poppy seller, wreath layer and Maori Women’s Welfare League representative.51 In 1971 the Auckland citizens’ service included hymns in Maori sung by pupils from Queen Victoria School and St. Stephens’ College, both historically Maori secondary schools.52 Former Maori Battalion officers continued to give speeches at Anzac Day services. Speaking in Hamilton in 1974, Captain G. Marsden contrasted wartime cooperation between Maori and Pakeha with the chaotic race relations worldwide and to a lesser extent in New Zealand.53 Many Maori were intensely proud of their own and their people’s war service, seeing it as a total commitment to New Zealand and ‘to being accepted by the dominant group… not as a noble savage but as a person with rights and privileges which one has bought through being involved in that war’.54 This shows that a range of views were held by Maori on war and its remembrance. At one end of the spectrum, some held a view somewhat akin to that of Irish republicans and radicals from many backgrounds: Maori who had fought in Britain’s wars had been duped by capitalist imperialism. Others were more reminiscent of Ulster Protestants in their remembrance, believing, like many Pakeha, that their loyal war service had earned them particular rights. Anzac Day thus took on very different meanings for different people within the same group.

49 NZH, 26 April 1979, p.16.
50 NZH, 26 April 1981, p.3.
51 NZH, 24 April 1979, p.1.
52 NZH, 26 April 1971, p.3.
53 NZH, 26 April 1974, p.3.
Anzac Day crowds had never been a homogenous mass of people; they had always included ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. However the conformist nature of New Zealand society for much of the twentieth century, combined with the demographic dominance of Pakeha, especially in the main centres, meant that few of these minorities were visible as members of minority groups, rather than just members of a crowd. Before the 1970s the main exceptions were Catholics, who as we have seen were for many decades compelled to organise their own events rather than participate in those of the Protestant majority. After World War II, groups of immigrant ex-servicemen often participated in Anzac Day, but from the 1970s visible minority participation went beyond this. New Zealand’s increasing diversity led to more diverse Anzac Days. Ethnic, religious and sexual minority groups sought to declare their allegiance to the values and traditions of mainstream New Zealand without abandoning their minority identities. Some aimed to broaden or challenge the meaning of Anzac Day, either by including people like themselves as victims equally worthy of remembrance, or by attacking the conventional meanings of the day.

Our place in the world: Anzac Day and international relations

National historic commemorations usually send messages about national identity, national ideals, and the nation’s place in the world. Anzac Day was no exception. Since at least the 1920s it has been argued that the Gallipoli campaign made New Zealand a ‘true’ nation, an idea connected with principles of international responsibility and national identity. International responsibility has often been seen in terms of the need to contain or fight against the forces of tyranny and to defend freedom and democracy. We have seen that the Vietnam War affected the rhetoric of Anzac Day. Other issues of international relations, particularly the Anzus alliance, have also provided much of Anzac Day’s rhetoric and meaning. In the 1980s, reassessment of New Zealand’s place in the world led to a reassessment of the Gallipoli campaign and its meaning, and of Anzac Day. Not only do commemorations generally derive more of their meaning from their contemporary context than their past, but understandings of the past can be altered by this context.
Despite being a day shared with only one other country, Anzac Day often had a significant international aspect. As we saw in the previous section, the columns of marching ex-servicemen included some, such as the Polish veterans, from very different military traditions. Nor were New Zealanders the only war dead to be remembered. Chris Maclean and Jock Phillips’ examination of Anzac Day wreaths in the late 1980s showed that those being directly commemorated included the Welsh Guards and the people of East Timor, amongst others. Even old enemies could be included. In the post-war period Turkish visitors were often honoured guests at Anzac ceremonies, and this privilege was sometimes also extended to veterans of the German Afrika Korps. In 1971 two Afrika Korps generals participated in Anzac Day as guests of the RSA. Auckland RSA President R.B. Reed told the Herald that they had had no complaints about the Germans’ visit and that ‘we admired Rommel and the Afrika Korps as soldiers and we are doing for them what they would do for us’. On Anzac Day, RSA President Hamilton Mitchell said that it was ‘right and proper’ that former enemies should come together to mourn their dead. ‘The spirit of Anzac demonstrates to the world that nations can and do live together in harmony’. Some complaints about the visit had in fact been received from RSA members, and the visit was seen by some younger people as further proof that Anzac Day was a celebration of warfare rather than commemoration of those who died for a just cause. The RSA found some former enemies were harder to forgive; a Counties vs. Japan rugby match held on Anzac Day 1974 was criticised by one RSA member because of Japan’s war record. The internationalism of New Zealand remembrance partially reflects the nature of immigration in the post-war period, but primarily indicates a recognition that the principles of Anzac Day were not unique to New Zealanders. The inclusion of Afrika Korps veterans perhaps indicates that some of the less emphasised values, such as bravery and other qualities of a good soldier, were recognised in enemies as much as allies, but only as long as these enemies conformed to normal western standards of morality. The Afrika Korps, often seen as relatively honourable, were acceptable; the Japanese were not.

56 NZH, 23 April 1971, p.2.
57 NZH, 26 April 1971, p.3.
58 Cooke, p.145; Irons, ‘Youth Opinion’, p.6, Records 90-387-15/1, ATL.
As in the Vietnam era, some wished to broaden the scope of Anzac Day to commemorate all war dead and to acknowledge the horror and immorality of war. This was a goal of feminist protesters against Anzac Day, and some intentionally disrupted the ceremonies in pursuit of their aims. Peace and anti-nuclear activists also wished to raise awareness of the horrors of war, but generally showed respect for those participating in conventional commemorations. Protesters against nuclear ship visits and other militaristic acts laid wreaths, held overnight vigils and made silent protests. In one case anti-nuclear campaigners quietly attended the Anzac Day service in Devonport before holding a protest at the nearby naval base. Those opposed to war and, in particular, New Zealand’s involvement in military alliances, were usually relegated to the sidelines of conventional remembrance, while those who supported the alliances dominated speaking positions. One exception was in 1984, when one of the participants in the Devonport protest, Reverend Rinny Westra, was nominated by the Presbyterian Church to deliver the sermon at Auckland’s dawn service. The RSA was not aware of his background and reacted with anger to Westra’s message that the nuclear alliance was ‘totally at odds’ with the teachings of Jesus. Westra also criticised New Zealand’s armed forces as potential agents of repression and said that New Zealanders should remember Maori who had died in defence of their lands and women who had been raped in war. The reactions to the sermon were similar to the responses to PYM’s protests in the early 1970s. Auckland RSA President R.F. Hanna said that Anzac Day was no place for politics and that Westra had abused the freedom of speech which soldiers had died for. In contrast to his Christchurch counterparts of a decade before, however, Hanna said he would not start vetting Anzac Day speeches, as this would be ‘losing the one thing we fought for.’ He thus showed an appreciation of the complexities of Anzac’s meaning; while he saw Westra’s rhetoric as an abuse of freedom he nonetheless recognised that freedom meant little if it was limited to people the RSA agreed with. Letters to the Herald in subsequent days were split on the issue, with some criticising Westra’s politicisation of Anzac Day and others, including an ex-serviceman, agreeing with what he had said. We can see that many people still felt that speakers who supported

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60 All information in this section from New Zealand Herald and Evening Post Anzac Day coverage, 1972 to 1990, unless otherwise indicated.
61 NZH, 26 April 1983, p.5.
the military in Anzac Day speeches were not political, whereas those who objected to contemporary military policy were guilty of bringing politics into an inappropriate arena. Although Anzac Day had become less divisive than in the early 1970s, division continued over what Anzac Day meant, what values it represented and how these should be expressed.

Showing that historic commemorations take more meaning from the present than the past, contemporary international relations were a common theme of Anzac Day speeches. The commemoration of an overseas campaign which New Zealand took part in as a member of the British Empire naturally lent itself to discussion of current alliances and international responsibilities. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Anzac Day speakers frequently stressed the importance of international partnerships such as the Anzus alliance with Australia and the United States. The participation of the other Anzac country, Australia, in Anzus meant that Anzac Day was often seen as an appropriate time to express support for the alliance. In 1972, for example, Vice Admiral Peter Phipps told an Anzac Day breakfast gathering that in the past New Zealand Prime Ministers had said that where Britain goes, New Zealand goes. ‘The phrase should be, “where Australians go, we go”’. As well as showing friendship for Australia, Phipps’ statement also indicates New Zealand’s growing distance from Britain. Ten years later Brigadier L.W. Wright argued in Christchurch that New Zealand was ‘entirely dependent on international friends and arrangements such as Anzus’. Anzus became a major theme of Anzac Day speeches in the mid 1980s due to the fourth Labour government’s ban on nuclear ships, and the subsequent crisis in Anzus relations. Numerous speakers argued that international alliances were vital to New Zealand’s security and that, as Rear Admiral Lawrence Carr told the Auckland citizens’ service in 1988, New Zealand must show where its loyalty lay by accepting nuclear ship visits.

We have seen in both New Zealand and Northern Ireland that in times of crisis it was common for speakers at historic commemorations to discuss the crisis and appeal to the past for support for their positions, and this was the case here. Various supporters

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of Anzus argued that if the country lost its security because of its withdrawal from the alliance, then all that had been fought for in two world wars would be lost, and those who had died would have done so in vain. Speaking in Wellington in 1984, for example, Chief of Defence Staff Ewan Jamieson recognised that anti-nuclear campaigners had good intentions, but argued that in opposing the democratic world’s defence arrangements, they were giving support to evil powers. Two years later Wellington’s mayor claimed that the spirit of Anzac included the ability to preserve national freedom. The nature of this spirit, and the meaning of the Gallipoli campaign, was further discussed in 1989, when Prime Minister David Lange made a speech in the United States on 24 April, but reported on Anzac Day in New Zealand, saying that Anzus was ‘inoperative’. This was widely criticised as insensitive in its timing. Opposition leader Jim Bolger said that the war efforts commemorated on Anzac Day were shared by ‘the ally [Lange] now spurns’, although the United States had been neutral at the time of the Gallipoli landings. Lange (who had not anticipated this reaction to the speech) countered that the commemoration of Gallipoli ‘ought to be a classic reminder of the risk in having New Zealand’s interest determined by other people’. On the eve of the 75th anniversary of the landings, the Herald argued that Gallipoli had been such a disaster partly because of inadequate peacetime defence planning. Anzac Day became a battleground in the Anzus debate, a site which both sides attempted to take control of, using history as a weapon.

Anzac Day was sometimes used to discuss New Zealand society more broadly. In particular, the question of what the Anzacs had died for, and whether it was currently being maintained, was regularly raised. At a dawn service targeted by protesters, the Anglican Bishop of Auckland brought up the contentious issue of freedom, saying that ‘the conflicts we face now are conflicts of freedoms claimed selfishly by separate groups and individuals against the equally valid freedoms of others. Freedom is not an arrogant demand for rights… We must see again the quality of commitment learned at

70 NZH, 26 April 1989, p.1.
71 Lange, pp.270-1.
Similarly, in 1986 Overseas Trade Minister Mike Moore said at a school service that New Zealanders did not die at Gallipoli so that people could indulge in disruptive protest, but nor had they died so that ‘selfish folk could play sport with others who don’t practice all we fought and still stand for – equality, freedom, rooted in natural respect and tolerance’, a clear reference to the controversial Cavaliers rugby tour of apartheid South Africa. Later, the idea that the Anzacs had ‘died for freedom’ was questioned by some writers, but this iconoclasm was not widespread; most who disagreed with Anzac mythology tried to broaden rather than demolish it.

A major part of this Anzac mythology was the idea that New Zealand had become a nation at Gallipoli. In 1969, for example, Charles Hutchinson told the crowd at Manurewa that ‘although war was brutal and stupid’, New Zealand had become a nation at Gallipoli because a tradition had been created of self-sacrifice, courage, initiative and determination. In 1984 the Evening Post, with the Anzus alliance clearly in mind, argued that:

> Our first sense of national pride sprang from [the Anzacs]… New Zealanders and Australians can walk with self respect because we come from countries who have given as well as received in the cause of freedom. We have stood by as allies, interpreted our obligations generously and fulfilled them promptly.

However, by this time some were beginning to question the idea that Gallipoli had given New Zealand its nationhood. In a 1981 military history, Michael King described this as a myth. Other writers argued that although the campaign had given New Zealand some sense of national identity, it was very limited. At the same time, another group of writers began to revive the argument that it was at Gallipoli that New Zealanders began to see themselves as different from the British. This was an argument which had been made during and shortly after World War I by various...
soldier-writers.\(^{82}\) It had later been somewhat superseded by the claim that nationhood had been achieved through a demonstration that New Zealand soldiers were as brave and capable as those from older countries. Writers such as Maurice Shadbolt revived the idea of perceived difference and combined it with the idea, taken from revisionist British history, that the British military leadership in World War I was criminally incompetent. It was now argued that New Zealanders had begun to see themselves as different from and superior to the British, and realised the folly of following after a superpower rather than being independent. This embryonic identity was seen as somehow gestating until the 1980s, when New Zealand at last broke away from its dependence on overbearing superpowers.\(^{83}\)

Much of this reconsideration came from baby boomers, who by the 1980s were taking over from the World War II generation in government and other leadership roles. As they reached middle age and the last big group of veterans approached old age, many who had opposed Anzac Day as militaristic began to re-examine the day and what it commemorated. As journalist Tom Scott wrote in 1985, his generation was realising ‘that acknowledgement of the contribution of old soldiers doesn’t make anyone a warmonger.’\(^{84}\) This led to an increased number of books and articles on Gallipoli, including the first scholarly history of New Zealand’s role in the campaign.\(^{85}\) Another product of this reconsideration was Maurice Shadbolt’s play *Once on Chunuk Bair*, conceived after a visit to Gallipoli during which Shadbolt was struck by Gallipoli’s absence from New Zealand literary and artistic culture.\(^{86}\) Like Frank McGuinness’ *Sons of Ulster*, written around the same time, *Chunuk Bair* is less about World War I than contemporary politics and identities. Whereas McGuinness – an Irish nationalist – suggested that the experience of the Somme had narrowed and stultified Ulster unionist identity, Shadbolt presented Gallipoli as the beginning of New Zealand as a nation, when New Zealanders learnt that the British could not be relied on, and involving ‘New Zealand being bullied by larger nations and finally left in the lurch’.\(^{87}\) Why this had taken 70 years to influence foreign policy was not explained, but just as

\(^{82}\) For example, ‘Anzac’, p.1; Waite, pp.299-300; Burton, pp.87-8, 120-1.


\(^{84}\) Clarke, p.131.


McGuiness’ confused and culturally confined Ulstermen fit his Irish nationalist views, Shadbolt’s nationalist Anzacs fit the desire for a more independent New Zealand.

We have seen throughout this thesis that historic commemorations reflect and draw more of their meaning from contemporary issues than from the past. In the 1970s and especially the 1980s, Anzac Day rhetoric was dominated by discussion of contemporary foreign policy. Speakers and commentators related the Anzus alliance to the Gallipoli campaign, with one side arguing that to withdraw from Anzus would be a betrayal of the Anzac ideal, and the other countering that the lesson of Gallipoli was the necessity of national independence. Again we see that in times of crisis the past becomes a quarry from which to mine support for one’s own position. We have also seen that the debate over international relations helped redefine understandings of Gallipoli, with supporters of greater independence seeing the roots of this independence in the Gallipoli campaign. To supporters of Anzus, Anzac Day was a reaffirmation of the values of international co-operation and loyalty to allies, while to its opponents it reaffirmed national independence and the strength to resist overbearing superpowers.

Fall and rise? Public attitudes to war remembrance

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s Anzac Day was a regular site of protest and controversy. Activists used the day to raise awareness for a range of causes, while speakers debated international relations and the meaning of remembrance, and historians, journalists and other writers reconsidered the Gallipoli campaign itself. While all this was going on, how did the general public regard the day in the wake of the 1966 Anzac Day Act? It is clear that at some point in the late twentieth century there was a major revival of war commemoration, but when did this begin? In his entry on Anzac Day in the *Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History*, Ian McGibbon writes that Anzac Day underwent a ‘renaissance’ in the 1980s, which he credits to ‘the burgeoning mood of nationalism’ in that decade, and the increased relevance given to the day by protesters. He also writes of ‘increasingly large numbers of
young people attending the services’. There seems to have been a similar revival in the United Kingdom at this time. In New Zealand, historians and other writers were paying increased attention to the First World War and its remembrance, but was this renewed interest really shared by the general New Zealand public?

In 1966 a new Anzac Day Act was passed, allowing activities normally permitted on a Saturday, which in 1960s New Zealand primarily meant sport and other entertainment. The mood of the new Anzac Day was generally positive. Large crowds were reported at race meetings all over the country, and at many sporting events, especially the rugby. Over the following decade Anzac Day race meetings would develop wartime themes, with individual races named after the Anzacs, particular battles, famous soldiers and other military symbols. Although this may have been meant as a genuine tribute, it was hardly in keeping with the solemn observances of previous decades. Other disreputable pleasures were popular in Auckland on the first ‘new’ Anzac Day, with nearly a hundred people waiting for one city hotel to open the doors to its bar, and pubs elsewhere in the city also crowded, as were eating-houses in Oamaru. Elsewhere cinemas were less well attended than expected, and pubs in Wellington less than full. However the Evening Post reported that the new look ‘was approved by seemingly everyone… nobody was heard lamenting the change’. In Auckland, the Western Suburbs RSA President spoke positively of the inclusiveness of the changed day. Turnout at ceremonies seems not to have been significantly affected except in areas, such as Oamaru, where people had been accustomed to going to country services in the morning and the main regional service in the afternoon.

The changes did not stop criticism of Anzac Day, or suggestions for further change. The idea that the day was just an excuse for ex-servicemen to get drunk was still current, and remained so into the 1970s. Some people objected to the social pressure

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91 NZH, 26 April 1967, p.3; ODT, 26 April 1967, p.23.
93 EP, 26 April 1967, p.3.
94 NZH, 26 April 1967, p.3.
95 Press, 26 April 1967, pp.3, 18 (North and South Canterbury editions); ODT, 26 April 1967, p.23.
from some quarters to wear a poppy, especially as applied to children.\textsuperscript{97} In 1967 the Auckland RSA proposed abolishing the citizens’ service and replacing it with a march up Queen Street, saying that the service was ‘losing its appeal with the general public (especially the youth) and therefore is catering to a diminishing part of it.’\textsuperscript{98} Ceremonies in some areas were reduced in scope; in 1973 the citizens’ services in Timaru and Greymouth were abolished.\textsuperscript{99} Especially in the years after the new Act was passed, but also up to the late 1970s, various people, including at one point Governor-General Arthur Porritt, continued to argue for the holiday to be cancelled or moved to the nearest Sunday. A frequent argument was that the day was losing its relevance and the changes had turned it into nothing more than an opportunity for recreation.\textsuperscript{100} Even amongst those who supported the day, there was a widespread belief, especially in the 1970s, that Anzac Day was losing its meaning and would eventually die out.\textsuperscript{101} Remembrance Sunday, meanwhile, was all but dead. Although there was theoretical support from the RSA and the general public, few from either group attended ceremonies, and by 1980 few if any public services were held.\textsuperscript{102} Remembrance Sunday was still acknowledged on air if not on the ground; several radio stations and TV2 played appropriate items on the day and the two minutes’ silence was marked on National Radio.\textsuperscript{103} A few instances of flag-flying were reported, but these were unusual.\textsuperscript{104} Even the churches barely acknowledged the day’s meaning; in 1980 only one Remembrance service was advertised in Auckland and one in Wellington, and none in Christchurch.\textsuperscript{105} The best indication that Remembrance Sunday had finally

\textsuperscript{98} Secretary Manager, Auckland RSA to Air Commodore T.F. Gill, 24 July 1967, ABFK 7494 W4948 71 35/1/2 1, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{99} Press, 26 April 1973, p.18, mid and south Canterbury and West Coast editions.
\textsuperscript{103} Ian Cross to Secretary for Internal Affairs, 17 December 1979, AAAC 7536 W5084 230 CON/9/3/8, ANZW.
\textsuperscript{104} EP, 10 November 1980, p.4.
\textsuperscript{105} NZH, 8 November 1980, p.20; EP, 8 November 1980, p.42.
and completely died in New Zealand came in the early 1980s, when the day was used for Wellington’s Santa parade. However, the government continued to maintain the fiction that the day was of memorial significance, annually publishing a notice in the *New Zealand Gazette*, although from 1980 this no longer included a request for traffic to stop. From 1985, references to the two minutes’ silence and memorial services were also removed. Citizens were simply requested to ‘observe’ Remembrance Sunday, and the churches were trusted to arrange recognition of the day in their morning services.

The rules concerning commerce on Anzac Day continued to be debated. In 1980 an amendment to the Shop Trading Hours Act confirmed the restricted nature of the day, allowing Saturday trading but keeping it illegal on Anzac afternoon. Throughout the 1980s, as legal retail hours were extended, the RSA campaigned successfully to keep shops shut on Anzac morning. However there were many businesspeople who felt that the day unnecessarily interfered with commerce and industry, particularly when it came shortly before or after Easter or in the middle of the week. When, in 1984, Anzac Day fell on the Wednesday after Easter, some employers called for the holiday to be moved to the nearest Monday or Friday. As the New Zealand economy was liberalised from the mid 1980s, retailers increasingly resented, or simply ignored, the restrictions. In 1986 the *Evening Post* carried an advertisement for an Anzac Day furniture sale which began at 9am, in blatant disregard of the law. The next year a chain of timber and hardware shops announced that it would open three shops on Anzac Day at 11am. Managing Director Malcolm Edwards said that he found it ironic ‘that people can drink themselves silly and gamble on this day – but someone who wants to hammer in a nail or do any sort of family chore is banned’. The same year a Wellington auctioneering firm held an auction on Anzac Day, saying that they planned to donate a portion of profits to ex-servicemen affected by Agent Orange and that if they were fined then the fine would come out of the donation

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109 Clarke, pp.136-7.
110 NZH, 26 April 1984, p.8.
112 NZH, 24 April 1987, p.2.
Rather than rejecting the idea that Anzac Day was important, these retailers suggested that they were reaffirming the day’s principles. Edwards carefully allied himself with family and work, and against the Anzac Day drinking and gambling which had been the subject of disapproval for decades. The auctioneers, meanwhile, positioned themselves as the true allies of ex-servicemen, daring the authorities to take money earmarked for them. This rhetoric shows that Anzac Day’s core values could be put to a range of uses.

In terms of public interest, there is some evidence for a renewal from the late 1970s. Dawn parades began on Auckland’s North Shore in 1978 and in 1984 a new war memorial was built in the Porirua suburb of Titahi Bay to give the community a focus for its Anzac ceremonies. In 1981 a record poppy appeal collection was reported, and from 1978 there were occasional reports of ‘record’ Anzac Day crowds. These reports should not be taken at face value, however. In an article on the revival of Anzac Day in Australia, Graeme Davison comments on the persistent tendency of reporters to ‘talk up’ attendances, perhaps with the encouragement of the Returned and Services League. A similar phenomenon seems to have occurred in New Zealand, since the newspaper crowd estimates do not show a revival, especially if the 1950s and 1960s are used as a point of comparison. Between 1950 and 1966, when Anzac Day was widely considered to be suffering from low turnouts, the crowd at the Wellington daytime service was never reported as fewer than 1000 people, and the smallest in Auckland was 3000. Neither figure included parading returned service-people. In contrast, newspaper estimates for Wellington in 1981 and Auckland the following year were 500 and 600, the latter figure including about 300 ex-service-people. The tone of the Wellington coverage indicates that 500 was a relatively good turnout. Neither the Herald nor the Evening Post reported increased attendances later in the decade. An increased number of young people at ceremonies was frequently commented on, but this was virtually an annual claim from the 1960s. For this to have been true every year there would have had to have been a very low starting point, which is unlikely given the regular involvement of scouting and similar groups,

[^114]: NZH, 24 April 1978, p.2; Maclean and Phillips, p.158.
rising to the point where youth dominated the services. It seems more likely that the
general indifference and antipathy of some young people to the day, and the older
generation’s assumption that they all felt this way, meant that the presence of even a
small group of young people was seen as notable, even if it actually occurred every
year.

As we have seen, during the 1980s there were several new books and a play written
about the Gallipoli campaign. There were also numerous magazine and newspaper
articles as well as television and radio documentaries on subjects related to Anzac
Day.\textsuperscript{118} However this does not necessarily mean that the general public were em-
bracing the day. In 1989 Maurice Shadbolt said that his play \textit{Once on Chunuk Bair}
had not been particularly popular, because New Zealanders, ‘possibly don’t believe
that a dozen soldiers on a Turkish hilltop have much to say to them’.\textsuperscript{119} Two years
later radio reviewer Brett Riley wrote of walking through the Southland village of
Mataura on Anzac morning:

\begin{quote}
A few sad-looking wreaths leaned on the war memorial in the middle of the road. A
handful of cars was parked outside the RSA. Anzac Day didn’t seem to make much
of an impression on Mataura, or probably any other New Zealand town for that
matter. Observers could be forgiven for concluding that the diminished fraction of
the population that wanted to remember its wars has been nearly eclipsed by the
rest who don’t give a stuff.
\end{quote}

Riley went on to say that this would be wrong, because ‘radio was awash with dawn
services, memories, recollections, interviews with veterans and wartime songs’.\textsuperscript{120}
This idea that radio programming is a better indication of general sentiment than ob-
servances in small-town Southland is dubious. We have seen that the airwaves were
the one place where Remembrance Sunday continued to be regularly observed, and so
the fact that Anzac Day gave media programmers something to focus on says little
about public attitudes to the day.

If there was a beginning of a revival at this time, it was not noticed by many
contemporaries. Writing for a 1990 publication, Jock Phillips, who like McGibbon
arguably overstates the strength of Anzac Day in the 1950s, mentioned nothing about

\begin{footnotes}
\item[118] Clarke, pp.128-9.
\item[119] Mann, p.15.
\item[120] NZL, 23 May 1987, p.88.
\end{footnotes}
a revival of the day, although he did note the increased historical interest. The idea that social memory of Gallipoli was fading was still current in 1991, with a Metro writer claiming that it ‘is becoming nothing more than a series of images – lists in history textbooks – quaint and disjoined sepia photographs from 75 years ago’. A 1986 television talkback show revealed considerable antipathy towards the day. Several callers felt that it should be cancelled or moved to the nearest Sunday, and a few, including an ex-serviceman, opposed the very idea of war commemoration.

In an article on the revival of Anzac Day in Australia, Jenny Macleod puts it in the context of the ‘new nationalism’ emerging in the 1970s and fostered by the Whitlam government in particular. Anzac Day was used to build and express independent Australian nationhood. In New Zealand, there were similar moves towards a better expressed and more independent nationhood, made especially by the Kirk government, in power for the same period as that of Whitlam. In New Zealand, however, it was Waitangi Day that became the anniversary at the centre of this nationalism. Indeed, New Zealanders from across the political spectrum specifically stated during the 1970s that Anzac Day was not New Zealand’s national day. The RSA, having just been through several years in which Anzac Days were marred by protest, were enthusiastic about Waitangi Day becoming the national day, perceiving rather presciently that this and not Anzac Day would now be the major focus of protests. With the national day now defined, Anzac Day would no longer have this as a de facto role and focus could be returned to remembrance of the dead. Arriving at a similar conclusion from a different direction, some young people argued in the early 1970s that the public holiday on Anzac Day should be cancelled and replaced with one on Waitangi Day, which was considered to be more widely meaningful.

The 75th anniversary of the Gallipoli landings was widely marked in New Zealand and elsewhere. There were museum exhibitions, television specials and newspaper articles about virtually every aspect of the campaign. The Herald cookery page even ran a

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121 Phillips, ‘75 Years since Gallipoli’.
123 TVNZ, Sunday, 27 April 1986, F91658, NZFTA.
124 Macleod, p.167.
126 Irons, ‘Youth Opinion’, p.9, Records 90-387-15/1, ATL.
recipe for Anzac biscuits.¹²⁸ A ‘huge’ crowd was reported for the Auckland dawn service, although the estimated figure of 2500 was significantly smaller than most of those from the period when Anzac Day was widely believed to be in crisis.¹²⁹ Peter Cooke, the historian of the Wellington RSA, argues that the anniversary was ‘subsumed by the sesquicentennial celebrations marking New Zealand’s 150th birthday’.¹³⁰ There was certainly a lot organised and considerable media attention paid both to the Anzac anniversary and to history, especially compared to the 50th anniversary in 1965. This reflects the increased scholarly and intellectual interest in those topics, but probably also a greater elite desire for nationalism, and changed media practices, particularly the hugely increased space for feature articles in newspapers. The beginnings of a revival of Anzac Day can be seen, if one looks hard enough. But if the books, plays, radio programmes and newspaper articles of the 1980s do mark the beginning of the revival, it was a revival led by the media and intellectual elites. At this stage the general public showed little interest, and it would be several years until a popular resurgence in the day emerged.

Like the other commemorations examined in this thesis, much of the rhetoric on and surrounding Anzac Day had much more to do with contemporary social and political issues than with the actual commemorations, or the events and people they remembered. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Anzac Day was caught up in debates about the Vietnam War, and later by the rise of identity politics. From the mid 1980s New Zealand’s division over the Anzus crisis impacted on Anzac Day in a range of ways, prompting not only heated exchanges but also critical re-examination of the Gallipoli campaign. As in Northern Ireland, how people felt about contemporary military activities, and the armed forces in general, strongly influenced views about war commemorations. But while Northern Irish war remembrance could be used to heal division, in New Zealand Anzac Day simply expressed and exacerbated divisions between conservatives and liberals, and to a lesser extent between old and young. However, while most New Zealanders were at best somewhat indifferent to Anzac Day in the 1970s and 1980s, most showed some degree of respect for the day and its ideals.

¹²⁸ NZH, 24 April 1990, s.2, p.7.
¹²⁹ NZH, 26 April 1990, p.2.
¹³⁰ Cooke, p.175.
Conclusion

This thesis has demonstrated that the historic commemorations it examines are much more about contemporary political, social and cultural concerns than about the historic events which they ostensibly commemorate. All four commemorations re-affirm particular values or principles, and in doing so attempt to construct and define identities and inter-group relationships. The success or failure of these historic commemorations in the period examined depended primarily on public attitudes towards the values they reaffirmed. When these values were widely seen as under threat or urgently needed then, generally speaking, the commemorations were widely observed. When the values were not seen as compelling, then the commemorations usually survived, but without widespread public observance. Historic commemorations which did have widespread public adherence could unite a group of people, whether a nation or an ethnic or religious community, behind its core values, and could also help these groups link to others through reaffirmation of shared ideals. But the commemorations could also divide groups from each other by emphasising differences, and divide groups from within, especially when there was disagreement over the meaning of the group’s core values. The commemorations studied here could suppress or minimise internal differences as the commemorating group united behind its shared and core values, but could also exacerbate these divisions as different factions used the commemoration to support their own positions.

The idea that historic commemorations can be less about the past than contemporary concerns is demonstrated throughout this thesis, but most clearly in the case of the Twelfth of July celebrations. Ulster Protestants are supposedly a people obsessed with the past, and yet the rhetoric of their main historic commemoration barely mentioned the people and events which were ostensibly being commemorated. Even in 1990, the tercentenary of the Battle of the Boyne, when the past was widely discussed, it was explicitly seen in terms of its relevance to contemporary issues, rather than on its own terms. Similarly, in both sets of war commemorations, Gallipoli and the Somme were often mentioned, but were often little more than devices with which to comment on the present. The ghosts of World War I were summoned to pass judgement on the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Anzus alliance, or to show the relative inadequacy of contemporary generations, nor for their own sake. Even Waitangi Day, which can only
be fully understood in terms of changing understandings of the Treaty of Waitangi, was more about the present than the past. Politicians and activists seemed at times to be obsessed with the Treaty, but it was seen as something which could be used to understand the present and determine the future, rather than a historic artefact. Throughout this thesis we have seen that even when people talked about the past, they were usually concerned with the present.

In general, the success of the commemorations examined in this thesis depended on the extent to which the public found their values compelling. This is particularly well demonstrated by a comparison of war commemorations in post-war New Zealand and Protestant Northern Ireland. In both places, war remembrance reaffirmed values such as self-sacrifice and dedication to country. New Zealanders and Ulster Protestants both respected these ideals, but after 1945 few New Zealanders found them especially compelling. In Northern Ireland, Irish republicanism was a real and immediate threat, but while New Zealanders were concerned about communism and nuclear war, any military danger to their country was far away in South East Asia. Both peoples saw a real possibility of another war in the near future but, unlike New Zealanders, Ulster Protestants faced the likelihood that it would be literally on their doorsteps. To them, therefore, the principles of self-sacrifice, loyalty and military readiness were particularly compelling. Remembrance Sunday thus fared better in Northern Ireland than in the rest of the United Kingdom, and far better than in New Zealand, where its transformation from Armistice Day was a failure. Anzac Day managed to survive, but with low attendances for most of the period examined in this thesis. Meanwhile, the Twelfth of July, with its explicit reaffirmations of loyalty to the British Crown and the Protestant religion, maintained consistently high levels of adherence in a community which felt these core values to be under serious threat. By contrast, the values reaffirmed by Waitangi Day were not believed in either deeply enough or widely enough for the day to achieve popular adherence. The historic commemorations, in short, were supported only by those who felt so strongly about the ideals they symbolised that they were willing to go out of their way to recommit to them.

Recommitment to core values helped to define the people making the commitment, by showing what they stood for. The Twelfth of July was a powerful statement that Ulster Protestants were fervently British and Protestant, and felt that they would never
abandon these identities no matter how much they suffered in their defence. Waitangi Day, meanwhile, was an attempt to construct an image of New Zealand as a land of racial equality in which Maori and Pakeha lived together in partnership. These identities are sometimes defined in contrast to other groups; for example, the Twelfth defined Ulster Protestants in contrast to Irish Catholics. However, minority groups sometimes used historic commemorations to construct identities which were distinct from but still within mainstream society. Thus we saw that minorities in both New Zealand and Northern Ireland participated in war commemorations at least partially to signal their membership of the nation and adherence to majority values. The relationship between identity and historic commemorations can also be used as a weapon against the commemorating group. As we saw in chapter eight, commemorations can be characterised as celebrations of destructive values such as military aggression, and the participants therefore viewed in a negative light. Commemorations may come to be associated with a particular group to the point where the ceremonies are seen as a proxy for that group and attacked or defended accordingly. This was most obvious in regard to the Twelfth, which was defended and attacked as a key symbol of Ulster Protestantism. To coin a phrase, people are what they commemorate.

This thesis has examined four commemorations, touching on others, in two very different countries across a period of fifty years. Several themes and patterns, outlined above, have emerged from this, forming a theory which could be more widely applied. Numerous other writers have developed theories of tradition, political ritual and similar practices but, as the Introduction outlined, few if any of these have been systematically applied to a range of ceremonies across any significant time period. It is not clear, therefore, that these theories are applicable beyond the limited contexts in which they have been developed. This thesis shows that there are themes and patterns which reoccur in a popular but sectarian Ulster Protestant commemoration of a seventeenth-century battle; an unevenly observed and sometimes controversial New Zealand commemoration of a nineteenth-century treaty; and several commemorations in both New Zealand and Northern Ireland of events in World War I. Without further testing it would be premature to argue that these ideas apply to all historic commemorations, even in the Western world. However, their presence such a range of events strongly suggests that they can cast real light on any event which commemorates the past.
The study of historic commemorations can be very revealing. This thesis has shown that they usually have multiple and layered meanings. Especially on a surface level, they are about past events and so will often indicate a community’s understandings of its history and its concepts of the past in general. As we have seen, commemorations are frequently used to express views about contemporary concerns, and so can be examined to discover public and elite attitudes to a range of social, cultural and political issues. In addition, study of historic commemorations can cast useful light onto group relationships, particularly the place of the marginalised. Commemorations can also show us what values a community has in common, and to what extent these values are actually seen as important or needed.

Since historic commemorations are more meaningful in terms of the present than the past, the ideas developed in this thesis raise questions and suggest paths of investigation for the study of other rituals. Occasions such as saints’ days and wedding anniversaries remember the past at least as much as most historic commemorations, and also make statements about the people celebrating them and their core values. Non-commemorative public rituals tend to share many of the features of historic commemorations, particularly the implicit or explicit reaffirmation of core values. Even informal and non-ritualistic occasions such as farmers’ markets can be analysed in this way. Farmers’ markets reaffirm ideals such as sustainability, the importance of good food, and the inherent worthiness of traditional food production, and those who shop at the markets may be doing so as a conscious recommitment to these values. State rituals are a perhaps the richest ground for this kind of analysis, however. Robert Bellah undertook some examination of the ritual meaning of American presidential inaugurations in the 1960s, and Barack Obama’s inaugural speech was nothing if not a conscious recommitment to the core and founding values of American mythology. Just as some groups use historic commemorations to define themselves in relation and opposition to other groups, Obama selected values which set him in contrast to the previous presidential administration. The meaning of inaugurations, like that of historic commemorations, goes beyond rhetoric; simply attending the inauguration was a recommitment on the part of many spectators to particular ideals of what America could be. This brief analysis shows that ideas about historic commemorations set out here have a utility beyond historic commemorations; they can tell us much about the intended and perceived meanings of a huge range of events.
This thesis examines events based on anniversaries of historic occasions. It has shown how history can be used to support contemporary political views, define the values and nature of nations and other groups, and work out the relationships between groups. The ideas developed here could therefore cast light on other uses of history, for example historiography itself, both popular and academic; costume dramas and other historical entertainments; archaeology; the politics of tradition; and heritage tourism. Many popular uses of history, particularly on a local or personal scale, work in much the same way as the historic commemorations examined in this thesis. Genealogy, for example, helps define an individual or a family through use of the past and, as in historic commemorations, particular parts of the past and interpretations of them are emphasised because they can construct or reinforce particular ideals and identities. Similarly, local history societies attempt to construct and define an identity for the area in question, and in doing this work the society members define themselves as people with a particular and meaningful attachment to that place. It is generally accepted that popular uses of history tend to say at least as much about the present as the past, but this thesis provides a framework with which to fully understand this.

In general, this thesis has provided insight into the ways that history is used and understood. Maori, Pakeha, and the Irish of both religious traditions have often been stereotyped in terms of their views of the past: Maori and the Irish are characterised by some as obsessed with the past, in particular with past injustice, at the expense of looking to the future. Pakeha, by contrast, are sometimes stereotyped as ignorant of the past and contemptuous of tradition. While there are some elements of truth in these stereotypes, this thesis has shown a more complex reality. Based on the stereotypes, for example, we might have expected Twelfth of July rhetoric to be almost exclusively concerned with the past, and Pakeha commemorations to be either nonexistent or blatantly dedicated to contemporary concerns. Instead we have seen that the Twelfth had the least historical rhetoric of any of the commemorations studied here, and that Waitangi Day often featured Maori talking about contemporary concerns and Pakeha talking about the Treaty signing and colonisation. Each community talked of the past, but all seem to have had their minds on the present.
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Glossary

Maori words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maori Word</th>
<th>English Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Haka</td>
<td>Fierce rhythmical dance, often used as a ceremonial challenge.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwi</td>
<td>Tribe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kawanatanga</td>
<td>Governorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kotahitanga</td>
<td>Unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marae</td>
<td>Meeting area of tribe or family group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nga Puhi</td>
<td>The name of a tribal group based in the northern peninsula of the North Island.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakeha</td>
<td>New Zealander of European descent. Can also mean any white person or any non-Maori.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Powhiri</td>
<td>Welcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rangatiratanga</td>
<td>Chieftainship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tai Tokerau</td>
<td>Northland, New Zealand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tangata whenua</td>
<td>Indigenous people (literally ‘people of the land’).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tapu</td>
<td>Sacred and/or forbidden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waka</td>
<td>Canoe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wero</td>
<td>Ceremonial challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whare runanga</td>
<td>Maori assembly house</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Maori nouns do not have differing singular and plural forms.

Irish and British terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>British Legion</td>
<td>The main ex-servicemen’s and women’s association in the United Kingdom and in Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacobite</td>
<td>Supporter of James II and/or his descendants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyalist</td>
<td>In Northern Ireland, someone who is loyal to the British Crown. The term usually implies support for some degree of Protestant supremacy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>An advocate of a unified Ireland with no constitutional links to Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP)</td>
<td>A Northern Irish political party, Catholic-dominated and constitutionally Irish nationalist.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stormont</td>
<td>Location of, and common name for, the Northern Irish parliament.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taoiseach</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachta Dála (TD)</td>
<td>Member of the lower house of the parliament of the Republic of Ireland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Defence Association (UDA)</td>
<td>A loyalist paramilitary group, founded in 1971 and banned in 1992. Its terrorist acts were carried out under the name Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR)</td>
<td>An infantry regiment of the British Army, recruited from Northern Ireland and used for security there.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)  Initially a militia set up in 1912 to resist Irish home rule. The name was used again by a loyalist paramilitary group formed in 1966.

Unionist  One who supports Northern Ireland (before the 20th century, all of Ireland) remaining in the United Kingdom. Can also mean a member of the Ulster Unionist Party.