

Decolonising Cosmopolitanism

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Abstract

Cosmopolitanism has recently become a topic on the global agenda of epistemic decolonisation. Cosmopolitanism, with its Greek etymology, is a term of art originating with Western moral and political philosophy. Yet, the term is now widely used across the humanities and social sciences, opening cosmopolitanism as theory and practice up to conceptual contestation and the revision of its political and intellectual history – both from *within* by internal critics and from *without* by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists. This thesis contributes to the double task of decolonial *deconstruction* and *reconstruction* necessary for a viable cosmopolitanism in the context of the global transition to a post-Western, post-secular order. It intervenes in the humanities and social sciences where the “global”, “cosmopolitan”, “imperial”, “postcolonial”, and “decolonial” turns intersect. My focus is on contemporary debates in historical sociology, international relations/international political economy, and philosophy, and across the spectrum of approaches and methodologies called “critical theory”. In the first part of the thesis, I continue and intervene in the existing dialogue between decoloniality and critical social theory. In the second part of the thesis, I fill a significant gap in the literature by entering Anglo-American analytic liberal cosmopolitanism into dialogue with decoloniality.

Eurocentrism is embedded in the core assumptions, categories, normative foundations, and analytical frameworks of Western cosmopolitanism – above all, in the disciplinary narrative of Western origins/cosmopolitan ends and its agent/patient binary. Cosmopolitanism will remain Eurocentric so long as non-Western thinkers and thought are marginalised; ideal-theoretical, ahistorical liberal presuppositions predominate debates about global justice; and approaches to cosmopolitanism as an historical, political-economic, or sociological category and as a set of embedded political and ethical practices exhibit colonial amnesia, and fail to theoretically integrate global coloniality and the competing memories of world history, order, and politics. Following the lead of, and having learnt from, diverse thinkers from across the globe and across the disciplines, my decolonial reconstruction of cosmopolitanism is historical (prospective and retrospective), transdisciplinary, critical, and normative. By overcoming the empirical and normative deficiencies of dominant Eurocentric paradigms, *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* equips us with tools to explain, and to identify potentials to transform ourselves and our world. My main argument is that injustice in our world involves backward-looking and forward-looking problems of interactional, structural, and, primarily, epistemic injustice. My intervention highlights the pervasive relevance of colonialism for the diagnosis of social crises and problems of justice and the prescription of policies and practices of transformative justice in transitional contexts. I argue that decoloniality can sharpen the diagnostic and prescriptive functions of cosmopolitan critical social theory and of analytic cosmopolitan accounts of justice, truth, and reconciliation in world politics.

Preface

Ki te kabore he whakakitenga ka ngaro te iwi.
– Kingi Tawhiao Potatau te Wherowhero.¹

Decolonising Cosmopolitanism is a critique of the Western-dominated order and of Western traditions of empirical and normative thought about world history, order, and politics. On what ground does this Pākehā stand to theorise decolonisation? With what right does this Pākehā speak on the topic? What is his ethic? What is his tradition? What is his *whakapapa*? Who is he? What – who! – is he doing this for? Decolonisation is an obligation on me – and every Pākehā – as a partner to *Te Tiriti*. *Kotahi te kohao o te ngira e kubuna ai te miro ma, te miro pango me te miro whero.*² Pākehā and Māori identity and futurities are interwoven. Reconciling in relations of *whanaungatanga* (kinship) and transforming the unjust basic structure and constitutional order of Aotearoa New Zealand is an obligation on Pākehā because of our structural position. In the “post-settlement era”, colonialism has not ended. In our multicultural, multifaith society, Pākehā remain hegemonic. *Tino rangatiratanga* (sovereignty) is usurped. Colonial power structures endure. The global struggle for freedom and justice against five centuries of modern colonial domination continues. In 2020, we are now at the end of the *Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism*. *Ka whawhai tonu mātou. Ake! Ake! Ake!* Decolonisation – ecological, political, economic, social, legal, cultural, linguistic, religious, spiritual, imaginary, and epistemic – is a struggle without end.³

My introduction to questions of decolonisation and positionality was through my activism in the environmental movement in Aotearoa. I base my decolonial ethos on my experiences of

¹ A *whakatauki* or Māori proverb meaning ‘without foresight or vision the people will be lost’.

² Spoken by Kingi Tawhiao Potatau te Wherowhero at his coronation: ‘There is but one single eye of the needle through which the white, black and red threads must pass’, symbolising the necessity of uniting across differences.

³ Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End*. (Auckland: Penguin, 2004). The title is taken from the proverb of Rewi Maniapoto who refused to surrender to colonial troops.

manaakitanga (hospitality) as a *manuhiri* (guest) welcomed by *tangata whenua* (the people of the land) for the *kaupapa* (collective project) of environmental protection and securing the survival of our people. My doctoral research and teaching at the University of Auckland have made me critically reflect on the ethics of doing political theory, here and now in Aotearoa. Linda Tuhiwai Smith reminds us that decolonisation is inherently political ‘because anything that requires a major change of worldview, that forces a society to confront its past and address it at a structural and institutional level that challenges the systems of power, is indeed political’.⁴ In our contemporary context, the political struggle between Māori and Pākehā practices, values, and knowledge in the formation of the basic structure and constitution of our state-society, and the rectification of historical wrongs, shape the discursive field of justice and the contemporary practice of *kāwanatanga* (governance).

We can identify objective socio-historical trends towards decolonisation, even if there is a contest over what it means and what the end is. These trends toward decolonisation coexist with counteracting trends toward neocolonialism and the enduring structural injustices of the white settler colonial state-society. The most significant of decolonising mechanisms and processes is the Waitangi Tribunal and the settling of historical grievances. As a nation, we are beginning to recognise the collective rights of *imi* (tribes) and *hapū* (extended families) to *tino rangatiratanga* over their *taonga* (treasures) – people, land, water, resources, language, knowledge, and culture – and to self-defined sustainable development, survival, and flourishing. Some of the most significant developments and events in the history of decolonisation in Aotearoa New Zealand include:

- The reversal of our diplomatic position on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and the repositioning of ourselves as a global leader on UNDRIP.
- Recognising the legal personality of Te Uruwera, a forest, Te Awa Tupua, a river, and Taranaki, a mountain in legislation.

⁴ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, “On Tricky Ground: Researching the Native in the Age of Uncertainty,” in *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research*, Third Edition, eds. Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln (Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2005), 91.

- Acknowledging the history of, and apologising for, past wrongs in legislation, including episodes such as Te Rā o te Pāhua, the crown invasion of Parihaka.
- Statutory pardons for Mokomoko and Rua Kēnana in legislation that formally restores their ‘character, *mana* and reputation’.⁵
- The success of language and cultural revitalisation programmes, including Māori media.
- The establishment and evolution of Kohanga Reo, Kura Kaupapa Māori, and Wānanga.
- Māori primary health organisations, Kaupapa Māori services providers, and Whānau Ora.
- Building the capacity of, creating spaces for, and institutionalising Kuapapa Māori research.
- The struggle over collective memory, including such achievements as legislation passed in 2019 mandating that Aotearoa New Zealand history be taught in schools by 2022;⁶ the establishment in 2016 of the annual Rā Maumahara National Day of Commemoration of the New Zealand Land Wars on 28 October; and the national conversation ‘about the past, the present and how we navigate our shared future’ generated by Tuia 250 in 2019.
- The ongoing restitution of Māori artefacts and *kōivi* and *koimi tangata* (ancestral remains) from European and North American museums.
- Government plans to revitalise Te Reo Māori as our national language by 2040.
- Recent pushes, three decades since *Pūao-te-ata-tūi*, to dismantle institutional racism across the basic structure of society, including the health, education, justice, and welfare systems.
- The Waitangi Tribunal’s Kaupapa (thematic) inquiries.

⁵ Like Mokomoko, Ngāti Rangiwewehi chief Kereopa Te Rau was statutorily pardoned in relation to the Völkner incident that resulted in the Crown incursion into Opotiki and the confiscation of thousands of hectares of land. The Ngāti Rangiwewehi Claims Settlement Act 2014 does not, however, include the legal innovation restoring the “character, *mana* and reputation” of the unjustly convicted and hanged Rangatira.

⁶⁶ Topics include: The Arrival of Māori to Aotearoa New Zealand; First encounters and early colonial history of Aotearoa New Zealand; Te Tiriti o Waitangi / Treaty of Waitangi and its history; Colonisation of, and immigration to, Aotearoa New Zealand, including the New Zealand Wars; Evolving national identity of Aotearoa New Zealand in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries; Aotearoa New Zealand’s role in the Pacific; Aotearoa New Zealand in the late 20th century and evolution of a national identity with cultural plurality.
<https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/nz-history-be-taught-all-schools>

- Government moves toward decarceration, specifying strategies to lower the proportion of Māori in prison (52%) to match the Māori share of the general population (16.5%).
- The continuation of the “long conversation” about Aotearoa New Zealand’s constitution.
- Māori business growth, increased participation in global markets, and the development and diversification of the Māori economy, estimated in 2017 to be worth \$50 billion.
- Once labelled a “dying race”, the Māori population has surpassed pre-colonisation levels, recovering from population decline in the 19th Century, and has grown to 744,800 or 16.5% of the population, up from 15% in 2013.
- Currently, every political party represented in Parliament has a Māori leader, co-leader, or deputy leader, and Māori Members comprise 23% of Parliament.

One of the slowest areas to decolonise in Aotearoa New Zealand, however, is political philosophy. The academic discipline that theorises concepts of justice, freedom, wellbeing, *etc.*, and teaches these concepts and theories to new generations of students, is largely silent on Māori struggles and our domestic settler-colonial context, and deaf to Māori theorising. This reflects a larger problem of the “whiteness” of Western philosophy, and its silence on, and silencing of, political and intellectual struggles against slavery, colonialism, imperialism, and white supremacy, and lack of engagement with the epistemic and normative issues and new topics in political thought raised by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists.

The white supremacist terrorist attack on Christchurch’s Masjid An-Nur and Linwood Islamic Centre that took the lives of 51 Muslims during *Salat al-Jumu’ah* has reopened the question of our national identity and values, and whether our increasingly postcolonial, bicultural, pluralist national identity is a premature reconciliation. The attack and the soul searching that continues has been particularly painful as a Muslim. If ‘this is not us’, then who are we? Do we still believe our own national mythology of the ‘best race relations in the world’? Are we forgetting our history? The history of what Māori have always known and remembered, like the savage massacre by British imperial troops of Tainui women and children in their homes and place of worship in Rangiorua

by burning and gunfire, in the *rohe* (region) where I was born and where I live and write. My work as the lead researcher and author of the submission to the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the Attack on Christchurch Mosques on behalf of Aotearoa New Zealand's largest Muslim association, The Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand, has made the importance and urgency of the sorts of epistemic and normative issues that I investigate in this thesis crystal clear. It has secured for me the connection between knowledge and responsibility.⁷

Decolonising Cosmopolitanism takes the perspective of the world, not the national perspective of Aotearoa New Zealand's security and wellbeing. Yet there are clear motivations for this project based on our national security and wellbeing, and implications for us. We are a *cosmopolitan nation* that strives to be a *good global citizen*. Anthony Smith argues that 'New Zealand's foreign policy needs to reflect the make-up of its society, one that was established as bicultural and is increasingly multicultural [in its] composition'.⁸ The demographic shift toward superdiversity and shifting geopolitics underlie a decolonising cultural shift from the dominant conception of ourselves as "Western" to "Pacific". We are learning that this is who we are as a people, and this is where we are in the world: demography and geography are destiny, as Damon Salesa argues in *Island Time*.⁹

Our most significant foreign policy development in recent years is the "Pacific reset". Historical context matters. The Pacific reset cannot be understood if we forget that New Zealand was both 'a colony and a coloniser in the Pacific'.¹⁰ New Zealand's colonial territories in the Pacific were the Cook Islands, Niue, Sāmoa and Tokelau. The Realm of New Zealand now includes four

⁷ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Te Kahautu Maxwell, Haupi Puke, and Pou Temara, "Indigenous Knowledge, Methodology and Mayhem: What is the Role of Methodology in Producing Indigenous Insights? A Discussion from Mātauranga Māori", *Knowledge Cultures*, 4:3 (2016): 138. See also David Fa'avae, "Tatala 'a e Koloa 'o e To'utangata Tonga: A Way to Disrupt and Decolonise Doctoral Research", *MAI Journal: A New Zealand Journal of Indigenous Scholarship*, 8:1 (2019): 5.

⁸ Anthony L. Smith "The Urgent Versus the Important: How Foreign and Security Policy Is Negotiated in New Zealand", in *Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 34.

⁹ Damon Salesa, *Island Time: New Zealand's Pacific Futures* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2017), 22-27, 229-230.

¹⁰ Steven Ratuva and Anne-Marie Brady, "Neighbours and Cousins: Aotearoa-New Zealand's Relationship with the Pacific," in *Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 147.

Pacific island states and the Ross Dependency in Antarctica. The Pacific states are the independent sovereign state of New Zealand, Tokelau, a dependent territory, and two freely associated states, the Cook Islands and Niue. The reset is not only one of Aotearoa New Zealand's foreign policy priorities in a changing world order, but of resetting the relationship with Pacific peoples based on five principles: understanding, friendship, mutual benefit, collective ambition, and sustainability. These principles can only be interpreted and put into practice through the prism of decolonisation.

A decolonial analysis of New Zealand's foreign policy also helps to illuminate the extent and significance of Māori transnational relations with other Indigenous peoples in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, including the Ainu people of Japan and the Indigenous peoples of Taiwan, Australia, the Americas, and Northern Europe. For example, in February 2020, Minister for Māori Development and Associate Minister for Trade and Export Growth, Hon. Nanaia Mahuta, and Minister for Indigenous Australians, the Hon Ken Wyatt AM, MP, signed the world-first *Indigenous Collaboration Arrangement* between Aotearoa New Zealand and Australia. The bilateral arrangement aims to promote economic, social and cultural advancement between the Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander, and Māori communities, businesses, and organisations, and 'recognises the ancestral and spiritual connections of Indigenous peoples to traditional lands and waters and their unique contributions to our nations, cultures and economies'.¹¹

A decolonial critique of Western traditions of empirical and normative thought about world history, order, and politics clearly has positive implications for our relations with China, Japan, ASEAN, and our "non-traditional" trade and security partners in the non-Western world. These relations matter more than ever as a small state with an open market economy tries to preserve and reform the rules-based international order from the destabilising geopolitical forces

¹¹ Te Puni Kokiri, accessed February 28 2020, "Indigenous Collaboration Arrangement between New Zealand and Australia", <https://www.tpk.govt.nz/en/a-matou-mohiotanga/culture/Indigenous-collaboration-arrangement>

of America’s hegemonic decline, China’s rise, Russia’s revisionism, regional hegemonic rivalries and disorder, and complex disruptors.¹² Anne-Marie Brady observes:

Maintaining the integrity of the international rules-based order is essential for the security of the small states like New Zealand, as it grants all states an equal voice and equal rights. The return of great powers attempting to carve out spheres of influence puts pressure on the efforts by New Zealand and other small states to maintain an independent foreign policy.¹³

In July 2018, the Foreign Minister, Winston Peters, stated that ‘New Zealand is at an inflection point in its history’, which ‘is not a time for intellectual timidity’ but for challenging the orthodoxies of small state foreign policy analysis.¹⁴ We, Aotearoa New Zealand, an independent Pacific power, are a *waka* (canoe) in the *moana* (ocean). How we navigate our changing, uncertain, and dangerous global environment to protect and advance the security and wellbeing of Aotearoa New Zealand is up to us as a collective. Will we act with foresight and vision? Wisdom? Patience? Justice? Piety?

¹² New Zealand Defence Force, “Strategic Defence Policy Statement”, accessed July 6 2018,

<http://www.nzdf.mil.nz/downloads/pdf/public-docs/2018/strategic-defence-policy-statement-2018.pdf>

¹³ Anne-Marie Brady “Small Can Be Huge: New Zealand Foreign Policy in an Era of Global Uncertainty”, in *Small States and the Changing Global Order: New Zealand Faces the Future*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 1.

¹⁴ Winston Peters, “Next Steps”, accessed 29 June 2018, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/next-steps>

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1. Ka Hua te Marama*

Decolonization, which sets out to change the order of the world, is, obviously, *a programme of complete disorder*.
– Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*¹⁵

What then has happened? Quite simply this: *we were the subjects of history, and now we are the objects*. The power struggle has been reversed, *decolonization is in progress*. All our mercenaries can try and do is delay its completion.
– Jean Paul Sartre, “Preface” to *The Wretched of the Earth*¹⁶

1.1 A programme of complete disorder

In 2015, Black students at the University of Cape Town (UCT) demanded the removal of a statue of the British imperialist and Anglo-Saxon supremacist, Cecil Rhodes, using the Twitter hashtag #RhodesMustFall. Now, the decolonisation of the world’s universities is an ongoing student- and teacher-led transnational struggle.¹⁷ The genealogy of the struggle is plural, and dates back to the era of formal (geopolitical) decolonisation that began in the mid-20th Century.¹⁸ Dominant Western research methodologies, academic disciplines, institutions, paradigms, epistemes, and claims to the scientific objectivity and political neutrality of knowledge production and pedagogy continue to be contested and resisted by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, critical race theorists, and internal (white, Western) critics. Epistemic decolonisation has occurred at varying rates of progress, against different degrees of institutional inertia and active resistance.

* This *mbakatauki* or Māori proverb translates as “the moon is full”, meaning for the cycle of something to have come to an end. Hirini Moko Mead *rāua ko Neil Grove, Ngā Pepeha a Ngā Tipuna: The Sayings of the Ancestors*, (Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2001), 272.

¹⁵ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press 2004 [1961]). 2.

¹⁶ Jean Paul Sartre, “Preface”, in *The Wretched of the Earth*, trans. Richard Philcox (New York: Grove Press 2004 [1961]). lx.

¹⁷ Gurminder K. Bhambra, Dalia Gebrial, and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, “Introduction: Decolonising the University?”, in *Decolonising the University*, eds. Gurminder K. Bhambra, Dalia Gebrial, and Kerem Nişancıoğlu (London: Pluto Press, 2018), 1-10.

¹⁸ See, for example, the collected essays from the “International Conference on Decolonising Our Universities” held in Penang, Malaysia from June 27-29 2011: *Decolonising the University: The Emerging Quest for Non-Eurocentric Paradigms*, eds. Claude Alvares and Faruqi Shad Saleem, (Pulau Pinang: Penerbit USM, 2011).

Charles W. Mills writes how the ‘critical scrutiny of the origins and evolution of the discipline in question; the examination of its overarching narratives, key assumptions, hegemonic frameworks, defining texts; the seeking out of the oppositional voices of traditionally excluded others; and the felt imperative of revisioning and restructuring it in the light of its problematic past, have been a common feature in a range of subjects’.¹⁹ Achille Joseph Mbembe reminds us that, while the decolonising call is not new, the project is back on the agenda worldwide, with a negative moment that takes the form of embodied and embedded critiques of dominant Western epistemologies, and a positive moment of imagining alternatives, ‘where a lot remains to be done’.²⁰ Both positive and negative moments of decolonial epistemic critique are necessary, for without reconstruction, Gurminder K. Bhambra argues, deconstruction will ‘remain illusory’.²¹

Cosmopolitanism has now become a topic on the agenda for epistemic decolonisation.²² Cosmopolitanism, with its Greek etymology, is a term of art originating with Western moral and political philosophy. Yet, the term is now widely used across the humanities and social sciences, opening cosmopolitanism as theory and practice up to conceptual contestation and the revision

¹⁹ Charles W. Mills, “Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy”, *New Political Science*, 37:1 (2015): 1.

²⁰ Achille Joseph Mbembe “Decolonizing the University: New Directions”, *Arts & Humanities in Higher Education* 15:1 (2016): 33, 36.

²¹ Gurminder K. Bhambra, *Connected Sociologies* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 146.

²² See for example: Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, Carol A. Breckenridge, and Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Cosmopolitanisms”, in *Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Carol A. Breckenridge, Sheldon Pollock, Homi K. Bhabha, and Dipesh Chakrabarty (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002). Walter D. Mignolo “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism”, in *Cosmopolitanism*, edited by Carol A. Breckenridge et. al. (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002). Paul Gilroy, “A New Cosmopolitanism”, *Interventions*, 7:3 (2005): 287-292. Eduardo Mendieta “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism”, *Ethics & Global Politics*, 2:3 (2009): 241-258. Paul Gilroy “Planetarity and Cosmopolitics”, *The British Journal of Sociology*, 61:3 (2010): 620-626. Rahul Rao, *Third World Protest: Between Home and the World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). Paul Gilroy “Postcolonialism and Cosmopolitanism: Towards a Worldly Understanding of Fascism and Europe’s Colonial Crimes”, in *After Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Rosi Braidotti, et al. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 226-264. Monique Deveaux and Kathryn Walker “Introduction: Critical Approaches to Global Justice: At the Frontier”, *Journal of Global Ethics*, 9:2 (2013): 111-114. Lea Ypi ‘What’s Wrong with Colonialism’, *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 41:2 (2013): 158-191. Julian Go “Fanon’s Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 16:2 (2013): 208-225. José-Manuel Barreto ed. *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History and International Law* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013). Steven L. B. Jensen *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016). Gurminder K. Bhambra “Whither Europe?: Postcolonial versus Neocolonial Cosmopolitanism”, *Interventions*, 18:2 (2016): 187-202. Gurminder K. Bhambra “The Current Crisis of Europe: Refugees, Colonialism, and the Limits of Cosmopolitanism”, *European Law Journal*, 23:5 (2017): 395-405. Duncan Bell ed. *Empire, Race, and Global Justice*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

of its political and intellectual history²³ – from both *within* and *without*.²⁴ *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* contributes to the double task of decolonial deconstruction and reconstruction. It intervenes in the humanities and social sciences where the “global”, “cosmopolitan”, “imperial”, “postcolonial”, and “decolonial” turns intersect.²⁵ My focus is on contemporary debates in historical sociology, international relations/international political economy (IR/IPE), and philosophy, and across the spectrum of approaches and methodologies called “critical theory”. Following the lead of, and having learnt from, diverse thinkers from across the globe and across disciplines, I argue that decolonial cosmopolitanism is historical (prospective and retrospective), transdisciplinary, critical, and normative – equipping us with the tools to explain, and to identify potentials to transform, ourselves and our world. This thesis synthesises and contributes originally to the extensive, diverse literatures in postcolonialism, decoloniality, historical sociology, IR/IPE, political philosophy, and critical social theory, and on topics of cosmopolitanism; decolonisation; transitional justice; historical, structural, and epistemic injustice; and non-ideal theory.

Decolonising Cosmopolitanism is a transdisciplinary work of non-ideal theory that combines interpretative, explanatory, and normative understandings of world history, order, and politics. The problem I take as my starting point is not that the existing world order falls short of perfect global justice, but that it is marked by interactional and enduring structural injustices and Western normative and epistemic hegemony. As Elizabeth Anderson argues, we do not need to first theorise principles and ideals for a perfectly just world.²⁶ Our present challenge is to dialogically and cooperatively transform a problematic *status quo* into a friendlier, and less unjust, unsustainable, unstable, and insecure post-Western, post-secular world order. We do not need to have knowledge

²³ Gerard Delanty, “Introduction: The Emerging Field of Cosmopolitan Studies”, in *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies*, ed. Gerard Delanty (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 1-5.

²⁴ Ernesto Rosen Velasquez, “Introduction,” in *Decolonizing the Westernized University: Interventions in Philosophy of Education from Within and Without*, eds. Ramon Grosfoguel, Roberto D. Hernandez, and Ernesto Rosen Velasquez (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), ix-xvi.

²⁵ Nelson Maldonado-Torres, “Thinking through the Decolonial Turn: Post-continental Interventions in Theory, Philosophy, and Critique – An Introduction,” *Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World*, 1 (2011): 1-15.

²⁶ C.f. Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2011), 3.

of universal ideals of perfect justice to navigate the current transition wisely and justly in the direction of the better rather than the worse – or worst. Pragmatically, this global challenge is made much less difficult by accepting the fact and value of *pluralism* in world politics, and the necessity of a greater degree, nevertheless, of *solidarism*.²⁷

For part of the problem is that Western ideas and practices of global order and justice are epistemically and normatively hegemonic. This problem can only be identified as an epistemic injustice from within a non-ideal theoretical framework that takes as its starting point and ethical orientation the lived experiences, perspectives, traditions, and struggles of the oppressed. For it matters not only *which* norms we use to explain, interpret, and transform our world, but *whose* norms and from *where* in the world and *how* they emerge in history. Genealogy and validity are inextricably linked. Moreover, as will become clear in the chapters that follow, I am deeply sceptical not only that we *should* but that we *can* abstract context-transcendent principles of ideal justice either from (pure) practical reason or (impure) practices of reasoning, or interpret and apply the abstract principles of ideal justice universally across different contexts.

We do need empirical knowledge of the actual world and a normative approach to the diagnosis of its enduring injustices and their root causes, and to the prescription of transformative – not only problem-solving, or worse, misguided – solutions. *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* makes the case for explicitly normative analyses of the deepest problems of global order grounded in the best empirical transdisciplinary social science available. Non-ideal theory and transdisciplinarity are not unfamiliar to cosmopolitans, and have powerful practitioners like Amartya Sen.²⁸ What is new is the claim that the project of transdisciplinary cosmopolitan non-ideal theory can only be realised

²⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: MacMillan, 1977). On the debate in the English School of International Relations, see William Bain, “The Pluralist–Solidarist Debate in the English School”, in *The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International Studies*, 2019. See also Andrew Hurrell, “Power Transitions, Global Justice, and the Virtues of Pluralism,” *Ethics & International Affairs*, 27:2 (2013): 189-205.

²⁸ Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (London: Penguin Books, 2009), 7. Amartya Sen, “What Do We Want from a Theory of Justice?”, in *Theorizing Justice: Critical Insights and Future Directions*, eds. Krushil Watene and Jay Drydyk, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2016), 54-55.

through uncovering and correcting for – by *decolonising* – the epistemic and normative deficiencies of Western cosmopolitanism paradigms in the humanities and social sciences.

Decolonising Cosmopolitanism is thus a work of non-ideal theory in a second, related sense identified by Anderson and developed by Mills. Non-ideal theory takes as one of its objects the structural, group-based motivational and cognitive deficiencies of agents,²⁹ including theorists of world history, order, and politics.³⁰ My project builds on recent work in analytic epistemology on concepts of epistemic injustice and white ignorance. Insofar as *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* theorises embodied, embedded, and entangled practices of reasoning, it is also a work of critical theory. Western cosmopolitanism is paradigmatically what John Hobson calls a *subliminally Eurocentric* conception of world politics.³¹ Eurocentrism is embedded in the core assumptions, categories, narratives, normative foundations, and analytical frameworks of Western cosmopolitan thought. This, I will explain, manifests in various ways in the literature.

The most general forms of Eurocentrism in cosmopolitanism are the agent/patient binary, the story of Western origins and the cosmopolitan ends of history, and Western modernity as the ideal-typical reference culture in normative institutionalist analysis. These forms crystallise vestigial biologically and culturally racist notions of teleology and hierarchy. The upshot is that Western cosmopolitan justice may, unintentionally, reproduce five centuries of interactional, structural, and epistemic injustice. My claim is obviously not an *ad hominem* attack on every scholar in the field. Western cosmopolitans are egalitarians who are deeply committed to the cause of global justice and are not apologists for, or rationalisers of, imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, or the global structural racism that endures.

²⁹ Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration*, 3-4. Charles W. Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 49-72.

³⁰ Charles W. Mills, “Global White Ignorance”, in *Routledge International Handbook of Ignorance Studies*, eds. Matthias Gross and Linsey McGoey, (New York: Routledge, 2015), 221-225.

³¹ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics: Western International Theory, 1760-2010* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1.

Part of what makes the project of decolonising cosmopolitanism worth doing is that the prospect of mutual learning, dialogue, and transformative collective action is viable. The decolonial deconstruction and reconstruction of cosmopolitanism preserves some of the strongest insights and corrects the empirical and normative deficiencies of Western cosmopolitanism. I show that decolonial cosmopolitanism is less empirically and normatively deficient than both dominant methodologically nationalist and ascendant cosmopolitan paradigms in historical sociology, IR/IPE, and political philosophy. Specifically, I argue that it can sharpen the diagnostic and prescriptive functions of critical social theory and of cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis and accounts of structural injustices and their transformation. Finally, the project of decolonising cosmopolitanism has much to contribute to processes of mutual learning and dialogue by centring new questions and topics for global justice and reframing old questions and topics.

1.2. Time of transitions

Since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), popular, professional, and academic writings on American hegemonic decline and the crisis of the liberal international order have proliferated. Diagnoses, prognoses, and prescriptions differ among scholars and schools, experts, professionals, strategists, and pundits, yet there is broad consensus that the post-WWII Western-dominated liberal international order is in a state of crisis. As narrated by G. John Ikenberry, a pre-eminent American liberal internationalist strategic thinker:

After the Second World War, the United States and its partners built a multifaceted and sprawling international order, organized around economic openness, multilateral institutions, security cooperation and democratic solidarity. Along the way, the United States became the ‘first citizen’ of this order, providing hegemonic leadership – anchoring the alliances, stabilizing the world economy, fostering cooperation and championing ‘free world’ values. Western Europe and Japan emerged as key partners, tying their security and economic fortunes to this extended liberal order. After the end of the Cold War, this order spread outwards. Countries in east Asia, eastern Europe and Latin America made democratic transitions and became integrated into the world economy. As the postwar order expanded, so too did its governance institutions. NATO expanded, the WTO was launched and the G20 took centre stage. Looking at the world at the end of the twentieth century, one could be excused for thinking that history was moving in a *progressive and liberal internationalist direction*.³²

³² G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, *International Affairs*, 94:1 (2018): 7. My italics.

Liberal international order comprises a body of rules, norms, and institutions of global governance, encompasses the Western-centred economic/financial and security orders, and embodies a set of Western liberal values associated with Enlightenment modernity. Because American hard power underwrites and enforces the liberal order, it is said to be hegemonic. Liberal internationalism emerged in the context of the post-WWII *translatio imperii* from *Pax Britannica* to *Pax Americana*, the global struggle against Soviet imperialism, and decolonisation, as the organising principle of the Western world order situated within the Cold War bipolar system.

Liberal internationalism triumphed and attained global scope at the end of the 20th Century after the collapse its world communist rival.³³ The Anglo-American imperialist wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the illegal use of torture in the War on Terror, the GFC, the United States' subsequent failure to provide global leadership during the post-GFC global financial order maintenance and reform process and global macroeconomic recovery, and the failed NATO intervention in Libya, have undermined America's liberal hegemony.³⁴ Meanwhile, the material rise of non-Western states is rebalancing the distribution of global power.³⁵ The triumphal 20th Century metanarrative of liberal international progress passed its inflection point with the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States, and the subsequent degeneration of American liberal hegemony into a vulgar imperial economic nationalism inflected with white Christian cultural, religious, sexual, and racial *ressentiment*.³⁶

President Trump issued an executive order in his first week in office to withdraw the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) megaregional trade deal designed by the

³³ Beate Jahn, *Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

³⁴ Christopher Layne, "The US–Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana", *International Affairs*, 94:1 (2018): 95-99.

³⁵ In a dissenting view, Michael Cox, writing before the Presidential election in 2016, "challenges the now dominant view that we are in the midst of some larger power shift that will change our world forever". Michael Cox, "Power Shift: Asia, China and the Decline of the West?" in *Power Transition and International Order in Asia: Issues and Challenges*, ed. Peter Shearman (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 34.

³⁶ Carla Norrlof, "Hegemony and Inequality: Trump and the Liberal Playbook", *International Affairs*, 94:1 (2018): 78.

United States and its allies to constrain and shape China's rise by excluding China and writing rules that China must later follow as its economy advances.³⁷ The United States has since withdrawn from other major agreements and institutions of multilateral diplomacy and global governance.³⁸ President Trump's explicit rejection of the legitimacy and efficacy of the governing norms and structures of the liberal international order (what he refers to as "globalism") reverses the trajectory of the United States' post-WWII bipartisan national security consensus. His "America First" agenda and abdication of American hegemony are accelerating the power transition in world order. This is troubling for America's allies, and for middle and small powers in world politics, who are threatened by the regional hegemonic ambitions of China, Russia, and Iran,³⁹ and the collapse of the rules-based international order.⁴⁰

There are two stories that can be told about the decline of liberal international order and America's global leadership. The first one is written from an external observer perspective of the tectonic shifts in the distribution of material power in the international state system and the crisis tendencies of the capitalist world system.⁴¹ The second story is written from an internal participant perspective of the *crisis of authority* in the liberal international order and American hegemony. Differently situated counterhegemonic blocs have emerged, submerged, and re-emerged during the cycle of American hegemony.⁴² Throughout its history, liberal internationalism was challenged from without by its world communist rival, and from within in different ways by Western socialist

³⁷ Min Ye, "China and Competing Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: TPP, RCEP, and the New Silk Road", *Asian Security*, 11:3 (2015): 208.

³⁸ These include, prominently, the Paris Agreement within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ("Iran nuclear deal"), the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) bilateral treaty with the Russian Federation, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHCR), and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

³⁹ Keisuke Iida, "What is the Point of the Ikenberry-Acharya Debate?", *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 16:3 (2018), 431-432.

⁴⁰ Munich Security Conference, "Post-Truth, Post-West, Post-Order? Munich Security Report 2017", accessed 8 February 2017, <https://www.securityconference.de/en/discussion/munich-security-report/munich-security-report-2017>

⁴¹ G. John Ikenberry (2018) "The End of Liberal International Order?" 17.

⁴² Amitav Acharya, *The End of American World Order* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 39-41.

and nationalist forces, and in different ways also by isolationist and unilateralist tendencies in American politics.

Andrew Hurrell argues that a major plotline in the twentieth century story of global order, yet, one elided by the dominant liberal internationalist security narrative, ‘involved the struggle of the Third World, or later the Global South, against the ongoing legacy of the Western-dominated imperialist global order of the nineteenth century’ – a political economy that Hurrell describes as ‘highly globalized, but deeply unequal in its core-periphery structure’.⁴³ Echoing Frantz Fanon, Māori decolonial theorist, Linda Tuhiwai Smith, argues that ‘imperialism and colonialism brought complete disorder to colonized peoples’.⁴⁴ The decline and fall of the liberal international order, as the successor to the old Western-dominated imperialist global order, is interpreted ambivalently from decolonial perspectives. The collapse of Soviet imperialism and world communism at the end of the 20th century was likewise an ambivalent world historical event for oppressed peoples.

The scholarly consensus gives explanatory priority to the underlying redistribution of material power in the global system, even as the rising powers experience uneven economic development and a general slowdown in the pace of GDP growth, combined with political and social crises.⁴⁵ Rising countries from the Global South, led by China, India, and Brazil, plus a materially declining post-Soviet Russia, have grown increasingly dissatisfied with their subordinate status as *rule-takers*, not *rule-makers*. The turning point was the GFC. In response to the crisis, the Group of 20 (G20) displaced the ultra-imperialist Group of 7 (G7) to become the *premier global economic governance forum*, based on a realistic assessment of the changing distribution of power within the state system.⁴⁶ The voice and representation of rising countries in the South within the existing

⁴³ Andrew Hurrell, “Beyond the BRICS: Power, Pluralism, and the Future of Global Order”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 32:1 (2018): 93.

⁴⁴ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples*, second edition, (London: Zed Books, 2012), 28.

⁴⁵ Andrew Hurrell (2018) “Beyond the BRICS: Power, Pluralism, and the Future of Global Order”, 94-95.

⁴⁶ Christopher Layne (2018) “The US–Chinese Power Shift and the End of the Pax Americana”, *International Affairs*, 94:1 (2018): 99-100.

liberal rules-based order was expanded to reflect their growing economic and geopolitical power.⁴⁷ The leaders of China, India, Brazil, and Russia, and the leaders of rising middle powers including Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Mexico, now had a ‘seat at the table’ of global governance.⁴⁸ The elevation of the status of the G20 was an element in a larger Western liberal internationalist strategy to convince China, primarily, and other rising powers, to act as *responsible stakeholders* in the existing global order.⁴⁹

The G20 global order maintenance process revealed China to be a *reformist status quo power* or a *revisionist stakeholder*, situated between the poles of *conformist status quo power* and *revisionist power*.⁵⁰ Beijing has been arguing, plausibly, that ‘the current international order is flawed’ and has several ‘unjust and unreasonable components’.⁵¹ While the United States is in decline, China has not risen to the stage in its development where it is capable of radically revising the global order as a whole, even if it were in its perceived interests to do so. But, Chinese expansionism in the East China Sea and the South China Sea reveals China to be a *revisionist regional power*, with deep implications for American regional hegemony, the maritime order, and liberal internationalist norms delegitimising spheres of influence as an organising principle of world politics.⁵² Yet, China’s neighbouring states – with their complex internal power struggles, economic competition, and historical animosities – are also rising, and it does not serve China’s national interest to create tension with its neighbours, whose support or tolerance China needs to continue to rise: narrowing China’s strategic options.⁵³ President Xi has ‘sincerely’ expressed, accordingly, that China ‘will never seek hegemony or engage

⁴⁷ International Monetary Fund, “IMF Survey: IMF Board Approves Far-Reaching Governance Reforms”, accessed 1 November 2016. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/NEW110510B.htm>

⁴⁸ Yoon Je Cho, “What do Asian Countries Want the Seat at the Table for? G20 as a New Global Economic Governance Forum,” *Geopolitics, History, and International Relations*, 3:2 (2011): 97.

⁴⁹ Andrew Fenton Cooper and Ramesh Chandra, *The Group of Twenty (G20)* (Abingdon: Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 71.

⁵⁰ Shiping Tang, “China and the Future International Order(s)”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 32:1 (2018): 32-35.

⁵¹ Ren Xiao, “A Reform-Minded Status Quo Power? China, the G20, and Reform of the International Financial System”, *Third World Quarterly*, 36:11 (2015): 2040.

⁵² David Arase “The Question of Regional Order in East Asia” in *China’s Rise and Changing Order in East Asia*, ed. David Arase (New York: Palgrave, 2016), 11-12.

⁵³ Suisheng Zhao, “A Revisionist Stakeholder: China and the Post-World War II World Order”, *Journal of Contemporary China*, 27:113 (2018): 651-654.

in expansion'.⁵⁴ Russia, on the other hand, is perceived by the West to be a revisionist power, regionally and globally, and dangerously destabilising.⁵⁵ Russia self-identifies as 'anti-hegemonic'.⁵⁶

Supporting, accelerating, and leading the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Asia-Pacific megaregional trade deal (which excludes the United States), formally led by and centred on the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN),⁵⁷ is part of China's grand strategy for restructuring the global economy. China launched the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2015 to compete with and complement the US-dominated World Bank and the Japan-dominated Asia Development Bank (ADB).⁵⁸ China has led other regional and global financial initiatives under the banner of the emerging market economies grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), namely, the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).⁵⁹ The AIIB is part of a network of Chinese development banks that will fund local projects in the (re)construction of the One Belt, One Road (OBOR) maritime and terrestrial trade corridor integrating East Asia, South East Asia, Central Asia, West Asia/Middle East, East Africa, and Europe.⁶⁰

China's construction of a Sino-centric Eurasian Community of Common Destiny differs from practices of liberal world ordering. Unlike *trade liberalisation*, which involves writing the rules of economic exchange through multilateral trade treaties, OBOR is based on *trade facilitation*, which

⁵⁴ Xi Jinping, Speech delivered by President Xi at the 2018 NPC closing meeting. China Daily, accessed 22 March 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2018-03/22/content_35894512.htm

⁵⁵ Munich Security Conference, "Munich Security Report 2019: The Great Puzzle: Who Will Pick Up the Pieces?", 9. Accessed 3 April 2019.

https://securityconference.org/assets/02_Dokumente/01_Publikationen/MunichSecurityReport2019.pdf

⁵⁶ Richard Sakwa, "Stasis and Change: Russia and the Emergence of an Anti-hegemonic World Order", in *Russia in the Changing International System*, eds. Emel Parlar Dal and Emre Erşen (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020), 17-38.

⁵⁷ Yoshifumi Fukunaga, "ASEAN's Leadership in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership", *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies*, 2:1 (2014): 103-115.

⁵⁸ Ming Wan, *The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: The Construction of Power and the Struggle for the East Asian International Order* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 58-91.

⁵⁹ European Political Strategy Centre, "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: A New Multilateral Financial Institution or a Vehicle for China's Geostrategic Goals?", *Strategic Notes*, Issue 1 (2015).

https://ec.europa.eu/epsc/publications/strategic-notes/asian-infrastructure-investment-bank_en

⁶⁰ Mike Callaghan and Paul Hubbard, "The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road", *China Economic Journal*, 9:2 (2016): 117.

develops economies using infrastructure corridors and state development policy coordination.⁶¹ The internationalisation of the Chinese Renminbi was accelerated by the inclusion of the Renminbi in the composition of the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDR) in October 2016, enhancing the roles of both the SDR and the Renminbi as international reserve assets by better reflecting the composition of world trade.⁶² In January 2017, China, led by President Xi Jinping, emerged as the self-styled champion of economic globalisation and defender of the G20-centred global economic governance regime against the Trump-led reactionary forces of economic nationalism at the assembly of global elites at the World Economic Forum, Davos.⁶³

1.3. Post-Western futures, non-Western thought

The European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the countries of the Association of South East Asian Nations ASEAN, are now cooperating to preserve and reform the rules-based multilateral trade system and create an interlocking system of bilateral and plurilateral trade and investment agreements. Their intention is to protect the rules-based character of the changing global order from perceived Chinese hegemonic ambition and American hegemonic decline, and from complex disruptors and other forces of disorder in the world system. Scholars and schools theorise different futurities for the liberal international order based on different analyses of the *sources, nature, and extent* of the crisis of authority, comparative analyses of different state-societies' security perceptions and narratives of world order, and their position and prospects within it, and analyses of 'which aspects of liberal ordering are at risk, how they are being modified, and whether there is capacity in the system to adapt and survive'.⁶⁴

⁶¹ David Arase "The Question of Regional Order in East Asia", 17.

⁶² International Monetary Fund, "IMF Adds Chinese Renminbi to Special Drawing Rights Basket", accessed 1 November 2016, <http://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2016/09/29/AM16-NA093016IMF-Adds-Chinese-Renminbi-to-Special-Drawing-Rights-Basket>

⁶³ Peter Goodman, "In Era of Trump, China's President Champions Economic Globalization", *New York Times*, January 17 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/17/business/dealbook/world-economic-forum-davos-china-xi-globalization.html>

⁶⁴ Constance Duncombe and Tim Dunne, "After Liberal World Order", *International Affairs* 94:1 (2018): 31.

Ikenberry observes that ‘[what] is striking is that despite this crisis of authority, there is a great deal of support for liberal international types of order’ – those that are rules-based.⁶⁵ Ikenberry’s argument that the rules-based international order could survive America’s hegemonic decline is based on decoupling and recombining power transition theory (the external observer perspective on the distribution of material power in the state system) and liberal internationalism (the internal participant perspective on the normative order of international society). According to power transition theory:

Order is created by a powerful state, and when that state declines and power diffuses, international order weakens or breaks apart. Out of these dynamic circumstances, a rising state emerges as the new dominant state, and it seeks to reorganize the international system to suit its own purposes. In this view, world politics from ancient times to the modern era can be seen as a series of repeated cycles of rise and decline. War, protectionism, depression, political upheaval – various sorts of crises and disruptions may push the cycle forward.⁶⁶

Within the liberal internationalist framework, the ‘rules and institutions that make up international order have a more complex and contingent relationship with the rise and fall of state power’.⁶⁷

Liberal internationalism is the exception to the generality of power transition theory. Liberal international order could survive if it is the case that rising non-Western state-societies also have an interest in the preservation and reformation of the *status quo ante*. *Ex hypothesi*, rising non-Western states-societies, such as China and India, will see becoming responsible stakeholders in the existing order as their best strategic option. This is because a global order based on agreed upon rules, not merely power, is less prone to the arbitrary domination of powerful state-societies, offering non-Western powers an otherwise unobtainable measure of security, freedom, and equality – while economic openness has been central to rising powers’ strategies of developmental economic statecraft.⁶⁸ Otherwise, ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. President Xi stated China’s commitment to maintaining the rules-based international order, continuing the dialogical process of global economic governance reform, and opposition to the principle that ‘might is right’ in

⁶⁵ G. John Ikenberry, “The Future of Liberal World Order”, *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, 16:3 (2015), 452.

⁶⁶ G. John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 32:1 (2018), 19.

⁶⁷ *Ibid*, 20

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 26.

November 2018, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) CEO Summit, in line with Ikenberry's theoretical predictions.⁶⁹ Moreover, the possession of nuclear weapons by hegemonic rivals makes the option of hegemonic war unthinkable, unlike past transitions.⁷⁰

Amitav Acharya takes aim at American liberal internationalist thinkers, like Ikenberry, who believe that rising powers will preserve and reform the existing order. Non-Western powers hold different values from the set of Western liberal values associated with Enlightenment modernity embodied in the existing order, and will therefore eventually act as revisionist powers in world politics rather than defenders of the *status quo ante*.⁷¹ Ikenberry's response is that Acharya's analysis 'confuses non-Western discomfort with American dominance in governance institutions with their more sympathetic views of the underlying principles of open, rule-based international order'.

Indeed, Acharya seems to admit this when he observes that the existing governance system is not just an 'American order' but one that has been built over the decades by the push and pull of many states, ideologies, and agendas. The future will not be a multiplex but something more like the *Hagia Sophia* in Istanbul, which is one large complex but bears the architectural markings of various cultures and religions.⁷²

Shiping Tang agrees with Ikenberry's assessment that the future post-American and post-Western world order is likely to be rules-based, and shares his vision of the future of world ordering as an 'enterprise contested by multiple actors and ideas, with overlapping regional, subregional, and global governance'.⁷³ Hurrell argues that the current crisis of authority is unique because of the multiplicity of state and non-state actors with the capability of being active subjects and agents in global politics and different forms of ordering at different governance levels.⁷⁴

Despite the current convergence of systemic crisis and legitimation crisis, no viable and attractive alternatives to liberal international order have been articulated that propose friendlier,

⁶⁹ Xi Jinping, "Full text of Chinese President Xi's Speech at APEC CEO Summit", *Xinhua*, 17 November 2018. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/17/c_137613904.htm

⁷⁰ Daniel Deudney, "Hegemony, Nuclear Weapons, and Liberal Hegemony," in *Power, Order and Change in World Politics*, ed. G. John Ikenberry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 195-232.

⁷¹ Amitav Acharya, "After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order", *Ethics & International Affairs*, 31:3 (2017): 271-285.

⁷² G. John Ikenberry (2015) "The Future of Liberal World Order", 454.

⁷³ Shiping Tang (2018) "China and the Future International Order(s)", 41-42.

⁷⁴ Andrew Hurrell, "Beyond the BRICS: Power, Pluralism, and the Future of Global Order", 94.

less unjust, and less unsustainable, unstable, and insecure ways of ordering our connected world. Non-Western state-societies disagree within and among themselves about what a post-Western, post-secular order should look like, despite general dissatisfaction with the *status quo ante* and resentment of the special privileges that the United States retains as hegemon. Hurrell argues that, nevertheless, ‘we have to recognize that large parts of the world have sought to reject or revise the Western-dominated order because it was built around their marginalization and around structured patterns of hierarchy and inequality, and it saw them suffering consistently at the hands of U.S. and Western intervention’.⁷⁵ Furthermore, is now within this same situation of subordination to Western order that state-societies in the Global South and Indigenous peoples are ‘faced by powerful Western political forces proclaiming new versions of the very old ideologies of racist, religious, and civilizational superiority’.⁷⁶ Whatever shape the future takes, the majority of the world’s peoples are non-Western, and have diverse cultures, religions, languages, scholarly traditions, and histories that inform state and non-state actors’ conceptions of domestic, regional, and world order. For Hurrell, pluralism is both factual and normative. From his perspective, pluralism ‘is the sort of conception of global order that has purchase in the policies, traditions, and practices of many countries in the Global South’, and that ‘emerging powers have long stressed the need for pluralism and for recognition of difference and diversity’.⁷⁷

Acharya and Buzan argue that while the discipline of international relations ‘has pretensions to be about all times and all places, in fact it is a rather parochial expression of the short period in world history when the West was dominant... [The] discipline would look very different if it had been invented in China, India or the Islamic world’.⁷⁸ The Western discipline of international relations was formed in the context of modern European capitalist expansion,

⁷⁵ Andrew Hurrell, “Beyond the BRICS: Power, Pluralism, and the Future of Global Order”, 95.

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 96.

⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 99.

⁷⁸ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 17 (2017): 355.

colonialism, and imperialism, and this ‘relation between content and context was not contingent but central to the shaping of disciplinary knowledge’, Branwen Gruffydd-Jones argues.⁷⁹ Robert Vitalis likewise describes how the discipline formed at a time when ‘international relations meant race relations’ within a world system characterised by ‘the world hegemony of whites’.⁸⁰ As a consequence of the redistribution of material power away from the West, Western theorists and practitioners of world politics accustomed to our epistemic and normative hegemony must now consider issues from a variety of non-Western perspectives.⁸¹

Global scholars in subaltern positions relative to Western epistemic and normative hegemony are raising their voices and including themselves in current debates on world order, while Western scholars are critically examining the parochialism and exclusions of our traditions.⁸² Questions are being raised within the Western academy and beyond of the generality and explanatory adequacy of theories, paradigms, perspectives, frameworks, and approaches that were developed by and for the white, male-dominated, liberal, secularised Christian, Western world.⁸³ Our collective challenge now, as a transnational community of scholars, is to practice an open, inclusive, decentred, dialogical study of world history, order, and politics by recognising the irreducible and incommensurable diversity of foundations.⁸⁴

On the converse side of the problem of the exclusiveness of the normative and empirical study of world history, order, and politics, Acharya and Buzan argue that future studies ‘cannot be a conversation among the likeminded’, and the project of inclusion is ‘more likely to fail if it does not draw in the broadest group of scholars, including those in the Western mainstream’.

⁷⁹ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Definitions and Categories: Epistemologies of Race and Critique”, *Postcolonial Studies*, 19:2 (2016): 173.

⁸⁰ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015), 1.

⁸¹ Barry Buzan, “How and How Not to Develop IR Theory: Lessons from Core and Periphery”, *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 11:4 (2018): 397.

⁸² Robbie Shilliam, “The Perilous Terrain of the Non-West”, in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism, and Global Investigations of Modernity*, ed. Robbie Shilliam (London: Routledge, 2010), 12-26.

⁸³ Andrew Hurrell, “Can the Study of Global Order be De-centred?”, 1.

⁸⁴ Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies”, *International Studies Quarterly* 58:4 (2014): 648.

In this context, the idea of a ‘post-Western IR’, with a more radical agenda to *disavow* and *displace* the existing knowledge of Western IR, is highly problematic. The problem is how to both invent a Global IR and still engage with those schooled in the existing IR traditions in a meaningful two-way dialogue?⁸⁵

Rather than autonomously developing non-Western Indigenous knowledge to displace dominant Eurocentric theories of world politics, Yong-Soo Eun argues that scholars need to promote dialogue between Western and non-Western thinkers and thought to enable mutual learning, with the aim of ‘creating complementary understandings of our complex world’.⁸⁶ The “global” or “cosmopolitan” revolutions in the humanities and social sciences promise greater openness and inclusion, and the potential to transcend the epistemic limits of parochial understandings of world history, order, and politics. Yet, Western cosmopolitanism is entangled with Western imperialism and problematically Eurocentric.⁸⁷ I argue, therefore – entering the debate – that cosmopolitanism must be decolonised if it is to be a viable approach to the study of world history, order, and politics in our critical and dangerous times. Beyond openness and inclusion, we must grapple with the difficult questions of the colonial normative and epistemic foundations of our theory and practice.

1.4. The Western cosmopolitan project

The revival of cosmopolitanism in Western political philosophy in the 1990s and 2000s tracked a conscious shift in subjectivity that transformed scholarship across disciplines. Topics of politics – competition; cooperation; conflict; contestation; governance; statecraft; legislation; trade; finance; development; (dis)order; (in)justice; (in)security; identity; culture; solidarity; activism; and struggle – became global *to a greater extent* than in any previous historical era.⁸⁸ Western academic scholarship has focussed on contemporary topics of: global governance; global security; American hegemony;

⁸⁵ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, “Why is There No Non-Western International Relations Theory? Ten Years On”, 354.

⁸⁶ Yong-Soo Eun, “Beyond ‘the West/non-West Divide’ in IR: How to Ensure Dialogue as Mutual Learning” *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 11:4 (2018): 449.

⁸⁷ Andrew Hurrell, “Can the Study of Global Order be De-centred?”, 22-23.

⁸⁸ Samir Amin, “The Ancient World-Systems versus the Modern Capitalist World-System”, *Review (Fernand Braudel Center)*, 14:3 (1991): 349. Patrick Manning, *Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 163-165.

liberal international order; liberal interventionism and state-building; global financial capitalism; multinational corporations; global supply chains; human rights; human security; international law; global identities, cultures, and solidarities; transnational capitalist and working class formations; transnational non-state actors and activity; transnational advocacy networks and movements; global civil society; global aid and development; and deterritorialised non-traditional security threats or global risks: *viz.*, transnational crime; terrorism; illicit global trade in drugs and weapons; environmental degradation; climate change; resource depletion; global financial instability; communicable diseases; corruption; tax evasion and avoidance; extreme inequality; poverty; irregular migration; people smuggling; modern-day slavery; human trafficking; and global injustice. The revival of Western cosmopolitanism occurred in the context of this global turn.

This revival was accelerated by the collapse of world communism; the end of apartheid; the second era of capitalist globalisation; the expansion of the liberal international order and the practice of liberal interventionism under American hegemony; and the resurgence of nationalisms and other particularisms in world politics.⁸⁹ The New Cosmopolitanism was transdisciplinary from the start, engaged with contemporaneous academic developments in law and the social sciences, and connected to political projects, global transformations, and social movements.⁹⁰ Proposals for democratising global governance;⁹¹ reversing climate change;⁹² sustainable economic, social, and human development;⁹³ ending absolute poverty;⁹⁴ satisfying basic needs;⁹⁵ reducing wealth and

⁸⁹ Partha Chatterjee “Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism: Some Observations from Modern Indian History”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 36:2 (2016): 330. Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty.” *Ethics* 103:1 (1992): 48.

⁹⁰ Onora O’Neill, *The Bounds of Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1.

⁹¹ David Held and Daniele Archibugi, *Democracy and the Global Order: from the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).

⁹² See for example Simon Caney, “Cosmopolitan Justice, Responsibility, and Global Climate Change”, *Leiden Journal of International Law*, 18 (2005): 747–775. Darrel Moellendorf, *The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, Poverty, and Policy*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

⁹³ Martha Nussbaum, *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 2011). Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, *Women, Culture, and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Anchor Books, 2000).

⁹⁴ Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).

⁹⁵ Gillian Brock, *Necessary Goods: Our Responsibilities to Meet Others’ Needs* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998).

power inequalities;⁹⁶ protecting human security;⁹⁷ enforcing human rights;⁹⁸ fighting transnational tax minimisation and corruption;⁹⁹ and reforming global migration;¹⁰⁰ were theorised as correctives to the deficiencies, dysfunctions, and injustices of neoliberal globalisation, Western imperialism, and post-colonial and post-Soviet nationalisms and authoritarianisms.¹⁰¹

Debates between cosmopolitans and their nationalist critics are primarily intra-liberal. Contemporary Anglo-American liberal cosmopolitan political philosophy emerged from the evolution of thought about the *scope, principles, and elements* of liberal theories of distributive justice by way of critical and constructive philosophical argument.¹⁰² Rawls's 1971 magnum opus, *A Theory of Justice* inspired a generation of liberal political philosophers who extended the scope of its distributive justice framework globally.¹⁰³ Despite the initial enthusiastic extension of the scope of Rawls's influential account of justice as fairness to the stark inequalities of opportunities and primary goods in the real world, Rawls's treatise on world politics, *The Law of Peoples*, first published in 1993, and later expanded and republished in 1999, was even less utopian than it was realistic. Rawls limits the scope of his theory of justice as fairness to liberal democratic state-societies, and his minimal account of justice and order in world politics, while inspired by Kant's *Perpetual Peace*,

⁹⁶ Darrel Moellendorf, *Global Inequality Matters* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

⁹⁷ Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane, "The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal", in *Global Institutions and Responsibilities: Achieving Global Justice*, eds. Christian Barry and Thomas Pogge, (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2005), 253–79.

⁹⁸ Kok-Chor Tan, "Military Intervention as a Moral Duty", *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 9:1 (1995): 29-46. Simon Caney, *Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 226-257. Catherine Lu *Just and Unjust Interventions in World Politics: Public and Private* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Gillian Brock, *Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 172-187. Cécile Fabre *Cosmopolitan War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

⁹⁹ Gillian Brock, "Taxation and Global Justice: Closing the Gap between Theory and Practice", *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 39 (2008): 161-184. Gillian Brock, "Reforming our Taxation Arrangements to Promote Gender Justice", *Philosophical Topics*, 37 (2008): 85-101. Gillian Brock, "Reforms to Global Taxation and Accounting Arrangements as a Means of Pursuing Global Justice", *Global Social Policy*, 11:1 (2011): 5-21.

¹⁰⁰ Gillian Brock and Michael Blake, *Debating Brain Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration?* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).

¹⁰¹ Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, "Introduction" in *The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1-2.

¹⁰² Gillian Brock "Equality, Sufficiency, and Global Justice", in *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies*, ed. Gerard Delanty (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 341.

¹⁰³ The first of these was Charles Beitz, *Political Theory and International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). The second was Thomas Pogge, *Realizing Rawls* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

is self-described by Rawls as anti-cosmopolitan (although if draw an analytic distinction between moderate and extreme cosmopolitanism, we can view it as a kind of moderate cosmopolitanism).

While normatively theorising a *realistic utopia* in world politics against the amoral, positivist realism of Cold War foreign policy, Rawls argued for a minimal world order necessary for peace and stability instead of maximal justice. To these ends, Rawls prescribed to liberal democracies foreign policies for their mutual interaction and their interactions with illiberal but *decent hierarchical societies*, as well as *outlaw regimes*, *burdened societies*, and *benevolent absolutisms*. Claiming that the poverty or prosperity of a political community and its internal distribution are causally explained primarily by endogenous factors like institutions and political culture, Rawls argued against liberal cosmopolitan proposals for global redistribution.¹⁰⁴ He did, however, argue that a liberal foreign policy should include financial support for burdened societies to become decent societies, which would be fairly demanding on the rich world.¹⁰⁵ Rawls therefore defended ‘an account of what justice in the international domain consists in which appears to be quite at odds with the account of domestic justice he famously endorses’, and to cosmopolitans, ‘this has seemed puzzling’.¹⁰⁶ Some liberal interventionists argued that Rawls was too tolerant of illiberalism, bargaining with oppressor states for the sake of global stability – which they argued is self-defeating logic.¹⁰⁷

Cosmopolitan arguments often began by critiquing or extending Rawlsian liberalism, and by rejecting many of Rawls’s moderate positions for (apparently) more progressive positions.¹⁰⁸ Post-Rawlsian debates in Western political philosophy between liberal cosmopolitans and their critics were centred on the validity of extending the scope of distributive justice beyond the borders of Western liberal nation-states.¹⁰⁹ Western liberal cosmopolitans have debated internally the

¹⁰⁴ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge: Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 108.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Gilliam Brock, “Equality, Sufficiency, and Global Justice,” 342.

¹⁰⁷ Darrel Moellendorf, *Cosmopolitan Justice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002). 27-8.

¹⁰⁸ Gilliam Brock, “Rethinking the Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism Debate: *An Introduction*”, in *Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism: Critiques, Defenses, Reconceptualizations*, ed. Gilliam Brock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 342.

¹⁰⁹ See for example: Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1996). Onora O’Neill, *Bounds of Justice*. Kok-Chor Tan,

appropriate principles of global distributive justice and whether opportunities and primary goods, human rights, or some other metric of interpersonal comparison, such as needs or capabilities, best answers the questions: *equality of what?* and *what's the point of equality?* or *why does equality matter?*¹¹⁰ But the central question is that of scope: *is justice necessarily or contingently universal?* and *are Western liberal conceptions of justice universal or particular?*

Cosmopolitan is taken to imply theses about (1) identity, culture, and self-constitution, and (2) the scope and content of justice. Samuel Scheffler argues that the *extreme cosmopolitan thesis* about identity, culture, and the constitution of the self is opposed to the *extreme contextualist antithesis* that subjectivity and agency normally depends on their membership in a community of practice with reasonably clear boundaries and reasonable stability and cohesion.¹¹¹ Cosmopolitans see the extreme contextualist antithesis proposed by nationalists and fundamentalists a misunderstanding of identity, culture, and the constitution of the self.¹¹² Cosmopolitans maintain that cultures are always in a state of flux, for change is the normal modality for living cultures. Peoples will almost always, except in the limiting case of remote uncontacted tribes, have multiple forms of contact with other peoples and their ways of life, ideas, languages, practices and institutions, religions, commodities, and technologies. Further, the peoples in whom traditional ways of life are inherent and upon whom structures and institutions supervene are intergenerational, which creates the conditions for historical change – whether this change is judged to be progressive or regressive. Further, the responses of a people to the external conditions of life – war and peace, migration, disease, climate change, environmental change, natural disasters, *etc.* – and to technological change, ‘are then absorbed into, and thus serve to modify, the culture’s history and self-understanding’.¹¹³ The *extreme cosmopolitan thesis* about justice totally negates particularism about the source of value

Justice Without Borders: Cosmopolitanism, Nationalism, and Patriotism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
Darrel Moellendorf, *Cosmopolitan Justice*.

¹¹⁰ Gillian Brock, “Equality, Sufficiency, and Global Justice”, 340.

¹¹¹ Samuel Scheffler, “Conceptions of Cosmopolitanism”, *Utilitas*, 11:3 (1999): 256.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 257.

and salience of associations, and considers the source of value to be the universal moral equality of human beings. This is the foundational normative premise of all forms of rational justification, including the justification of particular normative orders: justice is therefore necessarily universal. Moderate cosmopolitans are pluralists about the source of value: there is, contingently, scope for particular conceptions of justice.

Liberal cosmopolitans characteristically hold that every individual human being has equal global stature as the ultimate (but not the exclusive) unit of moral concern, irrespective of their citizenship, nationality, identity, or affiliations.¹¹⁴ *Moral cosmopolitans* or *humanists* argue, based on this premise affirming universal moral equality, the impartialist conclusion that local obligations do not ‘crowd out’ our obligations to distant strangers.¹¹⁵ The scope of justice is *necessarily universal*. However, liberal non-cosmopolitans typically argue that the logical connection between affirming universal moral equality among human beings and the strong impartialist conclusions drawn by liberal cosmopolitans about the content and demandingness of our duties to non-compatriots or non-nationals is weak. While liberal non-cosmopolitans agree that we may have some duties of justice to non-compatriots or non-nationals, these are differentiated in principle from the duties that we owe to our compatriots or conationals, less of a priority, and less demanding. They claim that the prioritisation and demandingness of duties is generated and justified by our participation in associations, and the features of those associations are taken to be salient to justice, whether these features are theorised as solidarity, identity, coercion, cooperation, or involuntariness.¹¹⁶ These varieties of liberal positions are categorised as *statist* or *nationalist* non-cosmopolitanisms.

Institutionalist and *associativist* cosmopolitans argue alongside liberal statist and nationalist non-cosmopolitans against the humanist or moral cosmopolitan claim that impartial cosmopolitan

¹¹⁴ Gillian Brock, “Cosmopolitanism” in the *Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy*, eds. William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 582.

¹¹⁵ Gillian Brock (2015) “Rethinking the Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism Debate: *An Introduction*”, 1.

¹¹⁶ See for example, Will Kymlicka, *Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 239-40. For an overview of non-cosmopolitan positions, see Gillian Brock, “Rethinking the Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism Debate: *An Introduction*”, 5-7.

principles of distributive justice follow from the affirmation of universal moral equality without ‘consideration of the nature of the association in which people are related’.¹¹⁷ However, they argue in different ways against statist and nationalist non-cosmopolitans that a global institutional structure or association exists, is organised in the relevant ways, causally and morally relates us in relevant ways, or impacts upon our first order interests to a sufficient degree to generate demanding redistributive obligations of cosmopolitan justice.¹¹⁸ For institutionalist and associativist liberal cosmopolitans, irrespective of their internal differences, the scope of justice is *contingently universal*, insofar as justice is understood as a property or prime virtue of political institutions and associations.¹¹⁹

Western nationalism is linked to the morally noxious ideologies and sentimentalities of racism, sexism, fascism, and xenophobia, and practices of imperialism, colonialism, mercantilism, slavery, terrorism, and genocide. Yet, some Western philosophers have defended nationalism as an important source of meaning and identity in the lives of individuals, and as a necessary source of shared meaning and solidarity that grounds and limits liberal democracy.¹²⁰ Most contemporary cosmopolitans recognise that for most people in the world, national, political, religious, or cultural affiliations and identities are highly valued, and so theorise the legitimate scope for such partiality. A moderate cosmopolitan thesis about identity, culture, and self-constitution has as an implication a moderate cosmopolitan thesis about justice. Intra-liberal debates between cosmopolitans and their nationalist and statist rivals over the basic premises of liberal political thought and their implications, tensions, and contradictions have endured and flourished. Arguments on both sides

¹¹⁷ Darrel Moellendorf, “Global Distributive Justice: The Cosmopolitan View” in *Global Political Theory*, eds. David Held and Pietro Maffettone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 63.

¹¹⁸ Gillian Brock (2015) “Rethinking the Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism Debate: *An Introduction*”, 6.

¹¹⁹ Darrel Moellendorf, “Cosmopolitan Justice’ Reconsidered”, *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory*, 104 (2004): 204. Darrel Moellendorf, “Equal Respect and Global Egalitarianism”, *Social Theory and Practice*, 32:4 (2006): 601, 612. Darrel Moellendorf, *Global Inequality Matters*. 44.

¹²⁰ For a discussion of two prominent views, see Gillian Brock, *Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Account*. 248-264.

have become more nuanced through dialogue.¹²¹ While attempts at reconciliation have been made by both sides, the range and depth of disagreements on a variety of topics continues to increase.¹²²

Liberal cosmopolitans have argued against liberal statist and nationalist positions on different grounds. Cosmopolitans typically hold the view that the modern state is merely one institution in the global order (the state system) and that its boundaries are as much up for critique and vindication as any other institution, as these may constitute unjust and arbitrary institutions that maintain inequalities and undeserved privileges. Furthermore, theoretical and empirical attention to global history and to *other* powerful actors and governance and distributive institutions that comprise the global order would reveal that ‘not all important institutions are, or need to be, territorially bounded’.¹²³ For cosmopolitans, the deterritorialisation of the domain of politics and the emergence and evolution of global governance make liberal statist and nationalist conceptions of justice anachronistic. Anti-statist cosmopolitans, like Simon Caney, go further in denaturalising, conventionalising, and historicising the modern state as a political form. The state:

has not been a permanent feature of the world. For long periods of time, and, in many parts of the world, the state—or at least the state as we now know it—has not existed. Many states date their rise to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. As numerous scholars have brought out, political power has historically taken many different forms. We should not then simply assume that a system of states is the only option; and we have reason to consider others to see whether they are better or worse.¹²⁴

Other cosmopolitans see the modern state as a relatively fixed political form that is likely to be an enduring feature of the global order in foreseeable future, and theorise the cosmopolitan project in a way that is feasible, *viz.*, in which the state continues to perform core political functions and remains central to political life.

Functional, just states have a significant role in ‘promoting or retarding human beings’ prospects for flourishing lives’, and have a ‘very large share’ of the responsibilities ‘for ensuring

¹²¹ Gillian Brock, “Rethinking the Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism Debate: *An Introduction*”, 1.

¹²² *Ibid.*, 2.

¹²³ Onora O’Neill (2000) *Bounds of Justice*, Cambridge. 185.

¹²⁴ Simon Caney, “Global Governance: Procedures, Outcomes, and Justice” in *Institutional Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Luis Cabrera (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 107.

core ingredients necessary for a good life are devolved to states', Gillian Brock claims.¹²⁵ She argues that cosmopolitan principles are appropriate to governing our global institutions, in order that the global basic structure recognises and treats individuals as moral equals irrespective of their citizenship, nationality, other identities, arbitrary attributes, or associations. Once nation-states have fulfilled their external duties of cosmopolitan justice by creating and maintaining the background justice of the global order, in theory it is possible that cosmopolitan justice need not clash with individual duties to their compatriots, conationals, coreligionists, or whoever.¹²⁶ On Brock's theoretical account, cosmopolitanism need not therefore interfere illegitimately with the defensible scope of nationalism or undermine goods of national importance, like authentic democracy or national self-determination.¹²⁷

Creating more 'meaningful space for self-determination', and attempting to minimise the impact of the neocolonial global forces that 'currently threaten it', is a core commitment of at least some contemporary varieties Western cosmopolitanism.¹²⁸ There is a real concern, however, that the idea of self-determination can be abused as a 'front to allow repressive but powerful regimes to terrorize their citizens or enable others to do so'.¹²⁹ Thomas Pogge claims that *individualism* is universally affirmed by Western cosmopolitans.¹³⁰ Representative agents in Darrel Moellendorf's single cosmopolitan construction procedure are more 'concerned with the freedom and ability of persons to pursue their own conceptions of the good life within a fair system of cooperation' than they are with the collective interests of peoples, for example.¹³¹ In typical cosmopolitan views, human rights set the limits of state sovereignty and national self-determination. The adequacy of protection for individuals to live decent lives is the limit of national self-determination for Brock,

¹²⁵ Gillian Brock, "Global Justice, Cosmopolitan Duties and Duties to Compatriots: The Case of Healthcare", *Public Health Ethics*, 8:2 (2015): 113.

¹²⁶ Gillian Brock, *Global Justice*, 290.

¹²⁷ *Ibid*, 84-110.

¹²⁸ Gillian Brock, "Self-Determination and Global Justice: Mutually Reinforcing rather than in Tension", *Public Affairs Quarterly*, 26:1 (2012): 57.

¹²⁹ *Ibid*, 58.

¹³⁰ Thomas Pogge, "Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty", *Ethics*, 103:1 (1992): 48-49.

¹³¹ Darrel Moellendorf, *Cosmopolitan Justice*, 17.

beyond which ‘considerable discretion can be allowed to communities about how they are to lead their group lives as they most desire’.¹³² Brock’s cosmopolitan account of global justice closes the gap between the dialectical positions of cosmopolitans and non-cosmopolitan critics considerably. However, she argues strongly against the nationalist view that obligation diminishes with distance – that is, beyond the inner core of our intimate social relations with others such as family, friends, and local communities – and destabilises the moral significance of the distinction between the nation’s insiders and outsiders.¹³³

What all liberal cosmopolitans agree on, whatever their family disputes, is that the scope of justice is *universal* – whether necessarily or contingently, and whatever its appropriate principles and metrics. The scope of justice extends beyond borders, and may question the justice of the nation-state as a political form. Liberal cosmopolitans believe that state borders and other putative boundaries on the scope of justice, are, if not unjust, historically contingent institutions which ought to be reformed or abolished, barriers to recognising and fulfilling our impartial obligations to all in the global community. Today, most Western political philosophers hold cosmopolitan views about the equality of human beings, and the existence of at least some demanding obligations that transcend national borders. Brock observes that in the ongoing debates between Western cosmopolitans and their critics, ‘contemporary non-cosmopolitans also claim to agree’ with ‘core positions that were once identified as distinctively cosmopolitan’.¹³⁴ David Held and Pietro Maffettone claim that Western political philosophy has reached a *cosmopolitan plateau*.¹³⁵ This is something to be celebrated, yet there are two problems with Western cosmopolitanism that must urgently be resolved: the entanglement of cosmopolitanism with imperialism and Eurocentrism.

¹³² Gillian Brock, *Global Justice*, 294.

¹³³ *Ibid*, 275.

¹³⁴ Gillian Brock (2015) “Rethinking the Cosmopolitanism versus Non-Cosmopolitanism Debate: *An Introduction*”. 1.

¹³⁵ David Held and Pietro Maffettone, “Introduction”, in *Global Political Theory*, edited by David Held and Pietro Maffettone (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). 7-8.

1.5. Imperialism and cosmopolitanism

A *leitmotif* in the history of Western cosmopolitan thought, from Marcus and the ancients, to Kant and the moderns, to the New Cosmopolitans of the 1990s and 2000s, writing as imperial subjects of the metropolitan core countries of the neocolonial capitalist world system, is the contradiction between the universalism of the perspective of imperality, and the injustices, inequalities, and indignities of imperial projects. Western cosmopolitanism has as its condition of possibility the imperial location of its subjects of knowledge.¹³⁶ As it was in Kant's times, wherein the different 'peoples of the earth' had 'entered in varying degrees into a universal community', which through commerce and colonisation had developed to the stage where 'a violation of rights in *one part* of the world is felt *everywhere*',¹³⁷ contemporary Western cosmopolitanism is entangled with empire and globalisation – the "keywords of our times".¹³⁸

Western thought has historically legitimated the imperial project and rationalised the white, Western-dominated world order.¹³⁹ The liberal tradition of normative political philosophy and political-economic theory and practice has a complex relationship with Western imperialism, advancing powerful arguments both for and against the imperial project. Duncan Bell argues that while 'individuals from all points on the political spectrum offered arguments in favour of empire, the most rigorous theoretical accounts, as well as the most ambitious visions, tended to emanate from self-described liberal writers'.¹⁴⁰ It is this entanglement with imperial power that raises the concern that Western cosmopolitanism is just the latest version of liberal imperialism.¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Eduardo Mendieta, "From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism", 246.

¹³⁷ Kant, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch," in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991 [1794]), 107-108.

¹³⁸ Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Robert Post (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006): 17-18.

¹³⁹ Duncan Bell, *The Idea of Greater Britain: Empire and the Future of World Order, 1860–1900* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007).

¹⁴⁰ Duncan Bell, "Empire and Imperialism", in *The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century Political Thought*, eds. Gareth Stedman Jones and Gregory Claeys (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 865.

¹⁴¹ Duncan Bell, "Introduction: Empire, Race and Global Justice" in *Empire, Race, and Global Justice*, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 5.

Held insists that it would be a mistake to reject cosmopolitanism ‘because of its contingent association with the historical configurations of Western power’.

The bottom line is that we can no longer ignore our common problems. We need a framework of moral and political interaction in order to coexist and cooperate in the resolution of our shared (and pressing) problems: from ecological disasters to financial meltdowns, there is no other solution but to find a way forward in common. If this is correct, then a cosmopolitan approach is not, as is sometimes argued by non-Western critics, a form of Western yearning for a form of ideological dominance or imperial control. Rather, it is a framework of ideas and principles that can guide us towards the governance of the challenges we face, however difficult.¹⁴²

The fear that cosmopolitanism is just ‘another way to justify the relentless spread of capitalism throughout the globe’ and that the ‘liberal discourse associated with cosmopolitan values is nothing more than global capitalism’s useful handmaiden’ is misplaced, Brock protests, and fails to understand the diversity of cosmopolitan thought and practice.¹⁴³ On the contrary, ‘the critical mass of scholars actively working on the topic [of cosmopolitanism] today endorse forms of egalitarianism that would be quite antithetical to the neo-liberal agenda’.¹⁴⁴ Brock argues that the moral force of cosmopolitanism can be best appreciated when we understand what it rules out, *viz.* ‘positions that attach no moral value to some people, or that weight the moral value some people have differentially according to their race, ethnicity, or nationality’.¹⁴⁵ Eduardo Mendieta argues that the Western cosmopolitan project cannot be read as providing ‘fodder for the canons of neo-liberal globalism and Western neo-imperialism’ and comprises ‘absolutely indispensable’ works that we must critique, extend, and supplement.¹⁴⁶ The main problem is that it is Eurocentric.

1.6. Eurocentrism and cosmopolitanism

Eurocentrism is subliminally embedded in the core assumptions, narratives, normative and analytical frameworks, and categories of Western cosmopolitanism. Eurocentric conceptions of

¹⁴² David Held, “Cosmopolitanism in a Multipolar World”, in *After Cosmopolitanism*, eds. Rosi Braidotti, *et al.*, (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 82. My italics.

¹⁴³ Gillian Brock (2011) “Cosmopolitanism”, 585.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Gillian Brock (2011) “Cosmopolitanism”, 586.

¹⁴⁶ Eduardo Mendieta, “From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism”, 251.

world history, order, and politics are typically combinations of the themes of rationality, progress, enlightenment, emancipation, evolution, development, advancement, modernisation, capitalism, liberalism, socialism, democracy, civilisation, and cosmopolitanism. Gruffydd Jones argues that Eurocentric paradigms in IR/IPE typically include ‘the construction of a hierarchy that places the European above the non-European; the construction of an evolutionary historical teleology that places the European ahead of (and therefore a suitable guide for) the non-European; and, underpinning both hierarchy and teleology, selected criteria of difference upon which to distinguish between European and non-European peoples, social forms, relations and practices’.¹⁴⁷ These criteria of difference are variable across time, across Western societies, across different Western theorists of world history, order, and politics, and across disciplines.

The normative criteria for differentiating civilised societies from barbarianism may have been *modern Western imperialist perceptions of a society’s religious orthodoxy and orthopraxy; levels of scientific and technological advancement; economic dynamism; legal and political institutions; gender and sexual norms; individual moral, intellectual, and rational capability; or their manners, dress, and customs.* Racial hierarchy and teleology may have been explained as either biologically determined or cultural. Criteria of colonial difference typically included combinations of factors. The hierarchical binary opposition between the civilised and the barbarian permitted gradations within each category. As Bell argues, these criteria allowed for the classification and hierarchical ordering of the ‘civilised’ states. China, Japan, Russia, the declining Ottoman Empire, the independent republics of Latin America, and the countries of Southern Europe were thought of in the nineteenth century as civilised, but not to the same extent as Western European societies and their white settler colonial progeny in North America, Southern Africa, and Australasia.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “‘Good Governance’ and ‘State Failure’: Genealogies of Imperial Discourse”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 26:1 (2013), 50.

¹⁴⁸ Duncan Bell “Empire and Imperialism”, 870.

Eurocentrism is a hegemonic story about *origins* and *ends*. Bhambra defines Eurocentrism as ‘the belief, implicit or otherwise, in the world historical significance of events believed to have developed endogenously within the cultural-geographical sphere of Europe’.¹⁴⁹ Narratives of global modernity centred on the French and American revolutions and the industrial revolution in Britain exclude the *connections* across societies that *generate* and *constitute* these processes and events, and epistemically disavow the world historical significance of the Haitian revolution, she argues.¹⁵⁰ The dominant disciplinary narrative of the origins and evolution of cosmopolitanism as both idea and reality – Greece/Rome/Enlightenment/1945/now¹⁵¹ – is explicitly Eurocentric. Greek and Roman philosophers are said to have originated cosmopolitanism. Kant then revived the Stoic cosmopolitan legacy during the European Enlightenment through his abstract universal morality and quasi-empirical universal history. The post-WWII liberal international order began to realise Kant’s cosmopolitan vision by embedding human rights norms. Now, global progress originating in Europe and North America has generated our nascent cosmopolitan condition – along with antagonistic social forces and complex social crises. The Western cosmopolitan project emerges in this context. This dominant Eurocentric disciplinary narrative reifies and privileges Western civilisation as a location of knowledge production; excludes the non-Western origins and geneses of cosmopolitan thought and practices; and precludes global connections, including those of Western imperialism, slavery, colonialism, and mercantilism, as generative or constitutive of actually existing forms of cosmopolitanism, and relevant to the central topic of global justice.

Eurocentrism is also a story about *agents* and *patients*. The pioneering works in the Western cosmopolitan canon misrepresent the “global poor” or the “developing world” as “objects” or “beneficiaries” of global justice, while simultaneously marginalising non-Western and Indigenous

¹⁴⁹ Gurminder K. Bhambra, *Rethinking Modernity: Postcolonialism and the Sociological Imagination* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 5.

¹⁵⁰ Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Undoing the Epistemic Disavowal of the Haitian Revolution: A Contribution to Global Social Thought”, *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, 37:1 (2016): 3-8.

¹⁵¹ David Inglis, “Alternative Histories of Cosmopolitanism” in *Routledge International Handbook of Cosmopolitan Studies*, ed. Gerard Delanty (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), 12.

agency, thinkers, and thought.¹⁵² The “agents” of global justice are Western subjects and states, and global governance institutions, empowered to intervene, sometimes militarily, in the South.¹⁵³ Western cosmopolitanism rarely refers to the self-understandings and struggles of the “patients” of global justice in the non-Western world.¹⁵⁴

From India, Neera Chandhoke argues that the limitation of contemporary debates on global justice to Western intellectuals is explained by the concentration of these theories on the duties of justice that the rich North owes to the poor South, which excludes others from the debate as if by ‘definitional fiat’.¹⁵⁵ The main problem is that Western conceptions of cosmopolitanism misrepresent the global poor ‘as if they do not possess moral agency or the capacity to make their own histories, or as if they are mere recipients both of processes as well as obligations that emanate from elsewhere’.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, I add, while Western cosmopolitans have extended the scope of justice beyond the borders of our state-societies, we are yet to learn what it might mean to theorise in the reverse direction from the global to the domestic context, particularly in relation to the causal and constitutive functions of imperialism, mercantilism, slavery, and (neo)colonialism in the production and reproduction of Western state-societies. Western thought is always unidirectional.

The Eurocentric agent/patient binary in Anglo-American cosmopolitanism is written into the subliminal metanarrative of white saviours, civilising missions, and cosmopolitan crusades. Makau Matua intervenes decolonially in contemporary human rights discourse, which he argues rests on a three dimensional Eurocentric savages-victims-saviours construct. The story of human

¹⁵² Neera Chandhoke, “Who Owes Whom, Why and to What Effect?” in *Global Justice: Critical Perspectives*, eds. Sebastiano Maffettone and Aakash Singh Rathore (New Delhi: Routledge India, 2012), 145. Monique Deveaux “Beyond the Redistributive Paradigm: What Philosophers Can Learn from Poor-Led Politics” in, *Ethical Issues in Poverty Alleviation*, eds. Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger, and Clemens Sedmak (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2016), 233. Monique Deveaux, “The Global Poor as Agents of Justice”, *The Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 12 (2015): 146. Alison M. Jaggar, “Saving Amina”: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue”, in *Real World Justice*, eds. Andreas Follesdal and Thomas Pogge (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 60-61. Margaret Kohn, “Postcolonialism and Global Justice”, *Journal of Global Ethics*, 9:2 (2013): 187-200.

¹⁵³ Margaret Kohn, “Globalizing Global Justice”, in *Race, Empire, and Global Justice*, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 179-180. Martha Nussbaum, *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 314.

¹⁵⁴ Andrew Hurrell, “Can the Study of Global Order be De-centred?”, *PRIMO Working Paper 2* (2015): 23.

¹⁵⁵ Neera Chandhoke, “Who Owes Whom, Why and to What Effect?”, 145.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

rights is one of an ‘epochal contest pitting savages, on the one hand, against victims and saviors, on the other’.¹⁵⁷ Western agents are cast as the saviour who redeems, protects, vindicates, civilises, and liberates, victims from savages.¹⁵⁸ The white, Western saviour figure is crystallised from the residue of European Enlightenment universalism and Christianity’s missionary zeal.¹⁵⁹ An early internal critic of Western liberal feminist global justice discourse, Alison Jaggar, focuses our attention on the images of Amina Lawal, ‘a beautiful African woman, holding a beautiful baby, looking at first sight like an African Madonna’, that were circulated online in the West in the 2000s.

[Amina’s] head is covered, her eyes downcast, she looks submissive, sad and scared. Portrayed in bare feet and described as illiterate, she epitomizes the image of the oppressed Third World woman described by Chandra Mohanty. Her image has also been widely regarded as epitomizing the barbarity of Islamic fundamentalism. Such images encourage Western feminists to take up the supposed white man’s burden of “saving brown women from brown men” (Spivak 1988: 296).¹⁶⁰

Kohn argues that images and metaphors of saving the world in Western cosmopolitanism strip non-Western subjects of their agency and dignity, and reproduce modern/colonial racist tropes of non-Western passivity, neediness, helplessness, backwardness, ignorance, poverty, victimisation, savagery, and barbarianism.¹⁶¹ Furthermore, Jaggar and Hobson independently warn, the opposite extreme of suggesting that Western ‘hyper-imperial agency’ and ‘neocolonial domination’ are the cause of all the problems in poor countries is problematically Eurocentric insofar as it portrays subjects and rulers of these countries as passive victims, denying their agency and responsibility.¹⁶² For its all its virtues, the Eurocentric limitations of the Western cosmopolitan project thus become apparent when it is understood in the global historical context of colonial modernity.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ Makau Mutua, *Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 10.

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, 11.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 31.

¹⁶⁰ Alison M. Jaggar, “Saving Amina”, 60-61.

¹⁶¹ Margaret Kohn, “Postcolonialism and Global Justice”, *Journal of Global Ethics*, 9:2 (2013): 187-200.

¹⁶² Alison M. Jaggar “Saving Amina”, 56. John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 141, 234.

¹⁶³ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Anti-racism and Emancipation in the Thought and Practice of Cabral, Neto, Mondlane and Machel”, in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity*, ed. Robbie Shilliam (London: Routledge, 2010), 50.

1.7. Conclusion

The Western – predominantly intra-liberal – cosmopolitan debate has excluded or marginalised Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists, and non-Western struggles, experiences, traditions, theories, and practices. The critical questions asked by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. in their introduction to *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice* are pertinent to the project of decolonising cosmopolitanism.

Who has voice and who doesn't? Are voices interacting with equal agency and power? In whose terms are they communicating? Who is being understood and who isn't (and at what cost)? Who is being believed? And who is even being acknowledged and engaged with?¹⁶⁴

Cosmopolitanism in the humanities and social sciences is Eurocentric, and will remain so as long as non-Western thinkers and thought and ethics and practices of cosmopolitanism are excluded or marginalised,¹⁶⁵ the ideal theoretical presuppositions of ahistorical liberalism are predominant in debates about global justice,¹⁶⁶ and the epistemically and normatively hegemonic conception of cosmopolitanism is framed by the metanarrative of European Enlightenment modernity while eliding global coloniality.¹⁶⁷ As Mills argues, global justice thus has as a necessary prerequisite the ending of epistemic injustice, in particular the structural, group-based motivational and cognitive deficiency he terms 'global white ignorance'.¹⁶⁸ *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* begins with this insight. Eurocentric cosmopolitanism is no longer an option: we need new ways of thinking.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁴ Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., "Introduction" in *The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice*, edited by Ian James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr. (New York: Routledge, 2017), 1.

¹⁶⁵ On canonical Eurocentrism in cosmopolitanism, see Farah Godrej, *Cosmopolitan Political Thought: Method, Practice, Discipline* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

¹⁶⁶ Jeanne Morefield, "Challenging Liberal Belief: Edward Said and the Critical Practice of History" in *Empire, Race, and Global Justice*, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 186.

¹⁶⁷ Zeynep Gulsah Capan, "Decolonising International Relations?", *Third World Quarterly*, 38:1 (2017): 3.

¹⁶⁸ Charles W. Mills, "Global White Ignorance", 225.

¹⁶⁹ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 239. Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2011), 285.

1.8. An overview of the thesis structure

The remainder of my thesis is structured as follows. §1. *Kia Whakatōmuri te Haere Whakamua*, continues and intervenes in the existing dialogue between decoloniality and critical social theory.¹⁷⁰

The global third generation of the Frankfurt School is marked off from the second generation by its participation in dialogue with postcolonialism and decoloniality. However, there is little dialogue between Anglo-American political philosophy, postcolonialism, and decoloniality, conversely. Kohn argues that while earlier debates in Anglo-American cosmopolitanism invoked problematic analogies and lacked empirical analysis, contemporary debates have focused on global order and governance, political-economic structures, and the legacies of colonialism.¹⁷¹ This amounts to a partial decolonisation of cosmopolitanism *from within*, but what is needed now is a more radical decolonisation of cosmopolitanism *from without* – an epistemic intervention. So, to fill this gap, in §2. *Kia Tūbono te Pono me te Tika*, I enter dialogue between cosmopolitanism in the Anglo-American analytic tradition of liberal political philosophy and decoloniality.

My thesis structure invites two kinds of objection from Western theorists. The first is that Anglo-American cosmopolitanism emerged in the 1990s and has since developed in relative isolation from the research topics and methods of continental philosophy and critical theoretical approaches to cosmopolitanism. From the perspective of at least some of these “mainstream” analytic liberal cosmopolitans, the weight I give to the first section may seem disproportionate or even irrelevant to their research interests. Secondly, a quite different objection is that this diptych structure may seem odd at a time when the divisions between Anglo-American and continental traditions are increasingly outmoded, and when the third generation of the Frankfurt School of critical social theory is polycentric – now as likely to be practiced in Anglophone countries as it is in Germany – and analytic philosophy is flourishing in continental Europe. Further, one of the

¹⁷⁰ Gurinder K. Bhambra, *Connected Sociologies*, 118.

¹⁷¹ Margaret Kohn, “Globalizing Global Justice”, 163-164.

theses that I defend is that traditions are open and connected. Clearly there is a large and increasing degree of interconnection between Anglo-American and continental traditions, and a degree of conceptual and methodological convergence has occurred.

The degree of convergence, I think, is made more apparent by the structure of my thesis, which illuminates the increasing methodological rapprochement between critical social theory and transdisciplinary non-ideal theoretical analytic political philosophy and social, feminist, and virtue approaches in analytic epistemology. Another reason in defence of my structure is that because decolonising cosmopolitanism is already a process underway, I want to intervene in the ongoing dialogue between decoloniality and critical social theory, which necessitates reconstructing these debates felicitously. Thirdly, I want to make decolonial critique accessible to Anglo-American cosmopolitan political philosophy – my “own” tradition – by intervening in contemporary debates. Finally, my primary reason is to decolonise modern Western political philosophy *root and branch*.

My intervention targets Habermas and his followers on the one side, and Rawls and his followers on the other. The modern Western political philosophical themes on which the two sides are variations are explicitly traced back from Habermas and Rawls and their followers to Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Habermas and his followers are influenced by the Nietzschean, Freudian, Weberian, and Heideggerian legacies. Rawls and his followers are influenced by the classical liberalism of Locke and Smith, the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, the legal positivism of Austin and Hart, and the analytic philosophy of Wittgenstein and Quine. Additionally, Rawls draws on the resources of liberal contractarianism. Both Habermas and Rawls take up the legacy of Rousseau and Kant in attempting to synthesise the *liberties of the ancients* emphasised by the classical republican tradition and the *liberties of the moderns* emphasised by the classical liberal tradition by deriving both elements from the ideal of autonomy and working out the dialectical relation between private and public autonomy.¹⁷² While I do not decolonise modern Western political

¹⁷² Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s *Political Liberalism*”, *The Journal of Philosophy*, 92:3 (1995): 127-131.

philosophy completely, or work through every problem that the tradition has failed to resolve by its own lights, I make a strong start.

By naming §1. *Kia Whakatōmuri te Haere Whakamua* after a well-known *whakatauki* in Aotearoa New Zealand (often abbreviated to *ka mua, ka muri*), I focus postcolonial and decolonial critiques of progress and Eurocentrism on the metanarrative I call *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends*. The *whakatauki* translates as ‘I walk backwards into the future with my eyes fixed on the past’, signifying the presence of the past within a Māori ontology, epistemology, and phenomenology. This Māori conception of history expresses the same orientation to historicism as first generation Frankfurt School critical theorist, Walter Benjamin, a Jew writing in the context of Nazism, in *Theses on the Philosophy of History*. He illustrates his ninth thesis by interpreting Klee’s *Angelus Novus*.

An angel is depicted there who looks as though he were about to distance himself from something which he is staring at. His eyes are opened wide, his mouth stands open and his wings are outstretched. The Angel of History must look just so. His face is turned towards the past. Where *we* see the appearance of a chain of events, *he* sees one single catastrophe, which unceasingly piles rubble on top of rubble and hurls it before his feet. He would like to pause for a moment so fair to awaken the dead and to piece together what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise, it has caught itself up in his wings and is so strong that the Angel can no longer close them. The storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the rubble-heap before him grows sky-high. That which we call progress, is *this* storm.¹⁷³

Contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory has revisited the historicity of thought and the entanglements of universal history, progress, development, modernity, imperialism, colonialism, racism, slavery, emancipation, enlightenment, and Eurocentrism.¹⁷⁴

What is missing from these postcolonial, decolonial, and contemporary critical theoretical genealogical critiques of historicism is that cosmopolitanism is the *telos* that gives universal history its hypostatized progressive form: the *end of history*. Cosmopolitanism is the final act in the Eurocentric metanarrative of modernity, whether the form that the cosmopolis takes is Kant’s

¹⁷³ Walter Benjamin, *Theses on the Philosophy of History*, 1940. Thesis IX.

<https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/benjamin/1940/history.htm>

¹⁷⁴ Susan Buck-Morss, “Hegel and Haiti”, *Critical Inquiry*, 26 (2002): 821–865. Susan Buck-Morss, *Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009). Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics: Thinking the Present* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008). Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power: Analyzing Social Orders of Justification* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015), 70. Amy Allen, *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016).

liberal idealist conception of the *Foedus Pacificum*, or Marx's historical materialist conception of stateless communism. This metanarrative, in which Western civilisation is the origin of the idea and the agent of the realisation of cosmopolitanism, is explicit or implicit in cosmopolitan paradigms in IR/IPE, historical sociology, and critical social theory. These paradigms theorise cosmopolitanism not as an abstract ideal, but as an historical, political-economic, or sociological category and as a set of embedded political and ethical practices.

2. *Encountering the Other* intervenes in the contemporary debates within the global third generation of the Frankfurt School and with their postcolonial and decolonial interlocutors. I begin with the performative contradiction Amy Allen reads in Jürgen Habermas's advocacy of open and inclusive dialogue about the post-Western, post-secular future of world order, and his grounding of his strong context-transcendent conception of rationality in a progressive reading of Western modernity. Allen argues that to enter dialogue with the other, we must first attain metacritical distance from "our" post-Enlightenment normative order by reflecting our late modern norms of openness, inclusion, and, above all, autonomy, onto their metanormative status through the performance of problematising genealogical critique. I argue that Allen's condition of possibility for cosmopolitan dialogue is insufficient, but (as Allen herself claims) it is *not unnecessary*. Cosmopolitan dialogue necessarily involves shifting the geography of reasoning at the West's epistemic frontiers, I argue, following the lead of decolonial theorists.

3. *Western Origins/Cosmopolitan Ends* shifts the geography of reasoning to deconstruct and reconstruct cosmopolitan paradigms critical social theory. I illustrate the various ways in which Frankfurt School critical theorists problematically rationally reconstruct our nascent cosmopolitan condition as the outcome of progressive social and institutional learning processes simultaneous with global systemic transformations. By decentering the West, we remember that non-Western, pre-modern forms of life were always already interconnected, and that Western imperial political formations were generative spaces of cosmopolitan thought and practice. This worldly perspective

illuminates the ruinous and catastrophic aspects of global modernity/coloniality, *and* empowering transformative practical possibilities for rupturing with the past *here and now*.

Intervening decolonially in Anglo-American cosmopolitanism, I take up the same topics of cosmopolitan dialogue, the existing world order, transforming our world, and the unity of the normative and the empirical in §2 *Kia Tūhono te Pono me te Tika*. This *wbakatauki* means ‘let truth and justice be joined’. The unity of truth and justice is a recurring theme in this section. My point of departure is the critique and extension of Rawls’s fundamental idea of the basic structure as the subject of justice. But why Rawls? How can Rawls be of any use to decolonising cosmopolitanism? This choice may seem odd given that Rawls claims to not be a cosmopolitan, and his arguments are ahistorical and Eurocentric.¹⁷⁵ As Jacob Levy and Iris Marion Young, in their introduction to *Colonialism and Its Legacies*, point out, Rawls’s framing of international political theory, which projects backwards into the past a methodological nationalism completely *untrue* to global history, is part of a larger pattern of mystification in contemporary Western political thought that serves to reproduce deeply entrenched *injustices*.¹⁷⁶

My first reason for this choice is to be true to intellectual history of Anglo-American cosmopolitanism, which I have already explained emerges from the critique and extension of the Rawlsian paradigm. There is also a strategic decolonial intention. Institutional cosmopolitans in the Rawlsian liberal tradition take institutions and structures to be the primary ‘subject of justice’. Decoloniality critiques the Western-dominated global institutional order, conceived decolonially as modernity/coloniality, intervenes in institutionalist analysis in IR/IPE, and aims to deconstruct five centuries of enduring global structural racism. Secondly, Rawls sees reconciliation as a primary function of political philosophy, and this is a major, recurring theme in the context of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide. While Rawls’s method of realistic utopianism is adopted and

¹⁷⁵ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 287-295.

¹⁷⁶ Jacob T. Levy and Iris Marion Young eds., *Colonialism and Its Legacies* (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2011), xii–xiii.

adapted by analytic liberal cosmopolitans, its connection with reconciliation is not theorised. However, we must conceive the Hegelian theme of reconciliation differently to Rawls, I argue.

4. *Global Order as Subject* decolonises Thomas Pogge's cosmopolitan critique of Rawls's methodologically nationalist institutionalist analysis. I draw on the methods and results of recent decolonial scholarship in IR/IPE to deconstruct and reconstruct cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis along lines of argument suggested by Mills. Decolonising cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis corrects the empirical and normative deficiencies of Anglo-American cosmopolitanism. Next, I critique and extend Iris Marion Young's non-ideal reformulation of Rawls's account of the basic structure as the subject of justice to theorise structural injustice, to equip us with a decolonial analysis of enduring global structural racism. Finally, in 5. *Reconciliation*, I take as my point of departure Mills' claim that cosmopolitanism is a 'premature reconciliation' in the historical context of five centuries of global white supremacy.¹⁷⁷ Following Fanon's decolonial expropriation of Hegel's master/slave dialectic, I reframe reconciliation as the subjective and objective disalienation of subjects subordinated to the white, Western world order. My main aim is to reconstruct a cosmopolitanism that constitutes, conversely, a mature reconciliation. I first clarify the concept of transitional justice and its relation to global justice. I then connect Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice and Young's account of structural and interactional injustice to theorise justice, truth, and reconciliation in the global transitional context.

¹⁷⁷ Charles W. Mills, "Race and Global Justice" in *Race, Empire, and Global Justice*, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 119.

§1. Kia Whakatōmuri te Haere Whakamua

2. Encountering the Other

For [human community] *consists of reason and speech, which reconcile men to one another, through teaching, learning, communicating, debating and making judgements, and unite them in a kind of natural fellowship.*
– Cicero, *On Duties*.¹⁷⁸

Frontiers mark the limits of civilization. Beyond that there is barbarism, of all kinds... However, when the barbarians on the other side of the frontier begin to talk, and talk the language of civilizations, but from the experience and knowledge and memories that civilization despises, that is the moment in which borderlands and border thinking emerges. Border thinking is thinking of and by the barbarian.
– Walter Mignolo, in *Critical Epistemologies of Global Politics*.¹⁷⁹

The great challenge of this century, both for politics and social science, is that of *understanding the other as such.* The days are long gone when European and other Westerners could consider their experience and culture as the norm toward which the whole of humanity was headed, so that the other could be understood as an earlier stage on the same road that they had trodden.
– Charles Taylor, “Understanding the Other”.¹⁸⁰

2.1. The barbarians at the gates

As I argued in the previous chapter, there is an emerging scholarly consensus that open and inclusive cosmopolitan dialogue is the most *utopian* way out of the current crisis and only *realistic* response to ‘the radical call for the rediscussion and renegotiation of the core Western-centric and liberal assumptions upon which the normative structure of international society is today based’.¹⁸¹

The Frankfurt School critical theorist, Jürgen Habermas, has proposed that in the context of the ‘continuing vitality of world religions’, cosmopolitan dialogue ‘about the foundations of a more just international order can no longer be conducted one-sidedly’.¹⁸² Habermas claims that the pragmatic presuppositions of cosmopolitan dialogue and mutual learning are that these processes

¹⁷⁸ Cicero, *On Duties*, eds. M. T. Griffin and E. M. Atkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 21.

¹⁷⁹ Walter D. Mignolo, “Interview with Walter D. Mignolo”, in *Critical Epistemologies of Global Politics*, eds. Marc Woons and Sebastien Weier, (Bristol, England: E-International Relations, 2017), 20.

¹⁸⁰ Charles Taylor, “Understanding the Other: A Gadamerian View on Conceptual Schemes,” in *Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer*, ed. Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 279.

¹⁸¹ Michális S. Michael and Fabio Petito, “Imperial Monologue or Civilizational Dialogue?” in *Civilizational Dialogue and World Order: The Other Politics of Cultures, Religions, and Civilizations in International Relations*, eds. Michális S. Michael and Fabio Petito (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009), 10-11.

¹⁸² Eduardo Mendieta, “A Postsecular World Society? An Interview with Jürgen Habermas”, *Social Science Research Council*, accessed 1 February 2018, <https://tif.ssrc.org/2010/02/03/a-postsecular-world-society/>

are open and inclusive, with “the West” as ‘one participant among others’, and that all participants must be ‘willing to be enlightened by others about their respective blind spots’.¹⁸³

In this chapter, I intervene in the debates within the global third generation of the Frankfurt School and with their postcolonial and decolonial interlocutors over the impurity of practical reason and cosmopolitan dialogue about global modernity/coloniality. These debates are the latest iteration of the detranscendalisation of the Kantian critique of reason. Thomas McCarthy explains that reason must be ‘understood as embodied, culturally mediated, and interwoven with social practices’ and therefore ‘the critique of reason has to be carried out in conjunction with social, cultural and historical analysis’.¹⁸⁴ The critique of the conditions of possibility and limits of reason necessitates modes of ‘sociohistorical inquiry... that go beyond the traditional bounds of philosophical analysis’.¹⁸⁵ Amy Allen stresses that if reason is ‘embodied and embedded in history, culture, society, and language, and so on’, then it is problematically entangled with power relations, with serious implications for the emancipatory potential of critical reason.¹⁸⁶

Thomas McCarthy writes in general of contemporary Frankfurt School critical theory that it contains elements of immanent, transcendent, and genealogical critique. Critique is:

“immanent” in that it starts from values, ideas, and principles embedded in the cultures and societies it analyzes; (context-) “transcendent” in that it reconstructs these values, ideals, and principles in terms of a general, discourse-ethical account of practical reasoning; and “genealogical” in that it is self-reflectively metacritical of the historical and contemporary forms of existing reason that it seeks to reconstruct as critical resources.¹⁸⁷

Critique must ‘draw on the normative resources of modernity’, Allen argues¹⁸⁸ (or later, that these resources are at least *maybe useful* for decolonial struggles), even as it is metacritical of their status.

The ideas of reason, our conception of rationality, our normative ideal of autonomy: these are all ideals that we must posit from within the horizon of modernity, ideals that are constitutive of our form of

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Thomas McCarthy, *Ideals and Illusions: On Reconstruction and Deconstruction in Contemporary Critical Theory* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 1.

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 44.

¹⁸⁶ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 161.

¹⁸⁷ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 14n26.

¹⁸⁸ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves: Power, Autonomy, and Gender in Contemporary Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 149.

life, and yet, as McCarthy acknowledges, they harbor pernicious illusions of the eradication of power relations and the fantasy of self-transparency that we must continually expose and subject to critique.¹⁸⁹

The contemporary debates among the third generation students of the Frankfurt School focus on Eurocentrism, imperialism, colonialism, and racism, and work through the complex relations between reason, progress, context, and power. These theorists are attempting, in different ways, to deconstruct and reconstruct Frankfurt School critical theory.

“Reconstruction” is used by Habermas and his successors in two distinct senses. The first sense is that of Habermas’s methodology of rational reconstruction and relatedly of what he calls the reconstructive sciences. The second sense of reconstruction is one also used by Habermas when he speaks of the reconstruction of Marx’s historical materialism or the postmetaphysical reconstruction of Kant’s transcendental idealism: ‘taking a theory apart and putting it back together again in a new form in order to attain more fully the goal it has set for itself’.¹⁹⁰ In this latter sense, Allen tries to reconstruct critical theory by deconstructing its strategy for grounding normativity, arguing that ‘the demand for a decolonization of critical theory *follows quite straightforwardly from the very definition of critical theory*’.¹⁹¹ If the Frankfurt School is to be ‘truly critical’, then the contemporary practice of critical theory must reframe its research program and conceptual framework to centre ‘decolonial and anti-imperialist struggles and concerns’, Allen argues.¹⁹² McCarthy describes his project in *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, as a dual one of the deconstruction of the metanarrative of modern progress as problematically entangled with ideologies of racism and imperialism, and the reconstruction of development as disaggregated and decentred.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid*, 150.

¹⁹⁰ Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991 [1976]), 95.

¹⁹¹ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 4. My italics.

¹⁹² *Ibid*.

¹⁹³ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 18.

Decoloniality is a particular kind of critical social theory.¹⁹⁴ Mignolo cautions, however, that the Frankfurt School of critical theory is not ‘the norm or the master paradigm against which all other projects should be compared, measured, evaluated and judged’.¹⁹⁵ Decolonial thinkers *reiterate* the post-Kantian detranscendentalisation of the critique of reason, *from without*, from beyond the West’s epistemic frontiers. Reason, *ex hypothesi*, is impure not only insofar as it is immanent in specific power-laden sociohistorical contexts, but insofar as it is ‘geographical in its historicity’.¹⁹⁶ Decolonising cosmopolitanism, I argue, involves moments of deconstruction and reconstruction. Yet, the approaches to immanent critique modelled by the third generation of the Frankfurt School fall short of the demands of decolonisation, I conclude. Dialogical openness and inclusion are insufficient conditions of possibility for cosmopolitan dialogue and mutual learning, and may, grammatically and pragmatically, reproduce a Eurocentric geography of reasoning.

The principal concern of this chapter is the encounter with the other in the contemporary situation of dialogue over the post-Western, post-secular future of world order. The colonial encounter is a key trope of postcolonial theory.¹⁹⁷ It is highly problematic, euphemising the actual historical processes of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide that were involved in the making of the connections that condition and constitute global modernity.¹⁹⁸ In 2019, Aotearoa New Zealand marked the 250th anniversary of Captain James Cook’s violent arrival to these lands, initiating the process of European colonisation. Official celebrations of the anniversary were given the name *Tuia – Encounters 250*. They centred Aotearoa New Zealand’s Pacific voyaging heritage, and acknowledged the first onshore encounters between Māori and Pākehā. *Tuia 250* was intended by Government and Māori and Pākehā civil society leaders to be an ‘opportunity to hold honest

¹⁹⁴ Walter D. Mignolo, “Decolonizing Western Epistemology/Building Decolonial Epistemologies”, in *Decolonizing Epistemologies: Latina/o Theology and Philosophy*, eds. Isasi-Díaz and Ada María (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 41.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁶ Walter D. Mignolo, “The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 101:1 (2002): 67.

¹⁹⁷ Charlotte Epstein, “The Postcolonial Perspective: An Introduction” *International Studies Perspectives*, 13:2 (2012): 302.

¹⁹⁸ Gurinder K. Bhambra, “Undoing the Epistemic Disavowal of the Haitian Revolution”, 12.

conversations about the past, the present and how we navigate our shared future'.¹⁹⁹ Consider the opposition to the “encounters” frame articulated by Anahera Herbert-Graves (Ngāti Kahu).

[Cook] was a barbarian. Wherever he went, like most people of the time of imperial expansion, there were murders, there were abductions, there were rapes, and just a lot of bad outcomes for the Indigenous people. He didn't discover anything down here, and we object to *Tuia 250* using euphemisms like “encounters” and “meetings” to disguise what were actually invasions.²⁰⁰

What this teaches us is that if power pervades contexts of reasoning, then cosmopolitan dialogue across contexts over the past, present, and future of world order is even more fraught with danger. I intervene in these debates within the global third generation of the Frankfurt School and with their postcolonial and decolonial interlocutors with this lesson in mind.

2.2. The nexus of history and normativity

Allen's oeuvre explores the possibilities and limits of the Frankfurt School of critical theory for theorising sexism, imperialism, colonialism, and racism.²⁰¹ *The End of Progress* is the most important and comprehensive intervention into the current debates between critical theory, postcolonialism, and decoloniality. Her radical point of departure is the performative contradiction she reads in Jürgen Habermas's advocacy of open and inclusive cosmopolitan dialogue about the foundations of a post-Western, post-secular world order and his rational reconstructivist strategy for grounding the normativity of his strong context-transcendent conception of practical reason immanently in the modern European normative order. This strategy is common to the second generation of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, of which Habermas is the leading proponent, as a cognitivist solution the dilemma of foundationalism and relativism about normativity.

Allen targets Habermas's conception of reason, which he claims is context-transcendent both across different societies and different ages within the same society. Habermas reforms

¹⁹⁹ Te Aniwa Hurihanganui, “Captain Cook replica banned from docking in Mangonui during commemoration”, *Radio New Zealand*, 16 September 2019. <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/te-manu-korihi/398912/captain-cook-replica-banned-from-docking-in-mangonui-during-commemoration>

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

²⁰¹ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 124.

Kant's transcendental philosophy as the postmetaphysical procedure of reconstructing the tacit or pre-theoretical knowledge – know-how – of competently speaking, acting, and judging subjects. Habermas argues that communication oriented toward mutual understanding pragmatically presupposes context-transcendent validity criteria for propositions. Anyone who participates in rational argumentation has already accepted certain substantive normative conditions, to which, Habermas claims, there are no alternatives. *Ex hypothesi*, engaging in argumentation forces these substantive normative conditions on subjects on pain of performative contradiction.²⁰² As soon as one enters dialogical relations with the other, aimed toward mutual understanding, communicative reasoning presupposes implicit transcendental rational standards of validity, which Habermas identifies as the universality requirement (U) in the case of normative rightness.²⁰³

(U): For a norm to be valid, the consequences and side effects that its general observance can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the particular interests of each person affected must be such that all affected can accept them freely.

The structure imposed on argumentation by (U) necessitates that each participant adopts the perspectives of all affected others in determining the validity of proposed or criticised norms, as it is the bearing of the proposed or criticised norm upon the needs and interests of those affected that is decisive for normative validity. The universality requirement contrasts with the kinds of inequalitarian social relations reproduced by strategic reasoning, which aims not at rational consent and consensus, but irrational coercion and domination.²⁰⁴

(U) is a context-immanent standard of practical reasoning, embedded in everyday life and communicative action, but it is opposed to contextualism about practical reason. Insofar as it is a pragmatically presupposed universal and necessary standard of reasoning, it is transcendental. Habermas's discourse ethics, by justifying (U), rejects the relativist proposition that the validity of moral judgments is determined by the standards particular to a form of life.²⁰⁵ Yet, empirically,

²⁰² Jürgen Habermas, "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action", in *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*, trans. Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990 [1983]) 130.

²⁰³ *Ibid*, 137. *cf.* the validity criteria of truth/objectivity and truthfulness/subjectivity.

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, 133.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid*, 121. My italics.

practices of reasoning are intelligible – *i.e.* not performatively contradictory – even if they do not meet the discourse ethical criteria of reciprocity and generality packaged in (U).

Allen charges that Habermas’s ‘claims for the context transcendence of validity claims are themselves not only *rooted in* but also *limited to* a particular context, the context of late modernity’.²⁰⁶

Habermas anticipates the charge of metatheoretical closure.

The contextualists insist that behind the allegedly general and neutral explanations of the moral point of view and the perspective of justice there are always concealed particular world interpretations informed by specific evaluative languages and traditions. This context dependency contradicts the asserted independence of the general from the particular and the consequent priority of the right over the good.²⁰⁷

Can the hermeneutical circle be escaped? Habermas’s argument for the possibility of critical theory – that is, a practical theory of the socio-historically situated capacity for transcending the prevailing normative order (and therefore a recursive theory of its own limits and conditions of possibility) – depends on his reconstructivist accounts of the formation of the modern subject and the process of social evolution by which modern societies came into being. Habermas claims to explicate how “traditional” or “pre-modern” socially embedded practices of reasoning are developmentally inferior to modern practical reasoning.

The account that Habermas gives of subject formation has common premises with the communitarian critique of the atomistic liberal individual, arguing that ‘my development unfolds against a background of traditions that I share with other persons; moreover, my identity is shaped by collective identities, and my life history is embedded in encompassing historical forms of life’.²⁰⁸ Practical reason is embedded in the lifeworld, which is largely inaccessible to reason and very difficult to problematise. Where Habermas departs from communitarianism and hermeneutics is in his characterisation of the lifeworld as inherited from the past, but nevertheless transformable.²⁰⁹

²⁰⁶ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Ourselves*, 137. My italics.

²⁰⁷ Jürgen Habermas, “Remarks on Discourse Ethics”, in *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 91-92.

²⁰⁸ Jürgen Habermas, “On the Pragmatic, the Ethical, and the Moral Employments of Practical Reason”, in *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 6.

²⁰⁹ Jürgen Habermas, “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action”, 135.

The lifeworld, then, exists as both a cache of normative resources for the successful coordination and completion of our projects, and as the collective product of our rational activity and learning.

The critical distance from our lifeworld necessary for discourse ethics has as its *historical* condition of possibility the differentiation of contexts of justice and so the autonomisation of morality (the right) from ethics (the good).²¹⁰ Habermas argues that the context-transcending moral point of view embodying (U) can only emerge from within the context of a post-conventional socio-historical stage of social evolution that facilitates practical discourses in which norms, laws, institutions, and policies, *etc.*, are justified to all participants as being in the general interest – *viz.* modernity.²¹¹ The moral point of view is acquired *intersubjectively*, Habermas theorises, by being socialised within a modern discursive community that has developed through learning processes involving role taking and perspective sharing, and through collective problem solving.²¹²

The problem, Allen explains, is that Habermas's argument 'threatens to be self-sealing'.²¹³ There is no *a priori* or context-transcendent reason why "our" modern, post-conventional moral point of view and our rationalised lifeworld is the reference point for human development, and not mastery of a tradition, the virtues of that form of life, and submission to God, for example.²¹⁴ Habermas counters that reservations about the circular character of this verification process are unfounded, and argues, metatheoretically, for coherentism in the reconstructive sciences, and the relatively weak validity criterion of empirical corroboration rather than falsification.²¹⁵ He argues

²¹⁰ Seyla Benhabib, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* (New York: Routledge, 1992), 41.

²¹¹ Habermas "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action", 177-178.

²¹² Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*. 47, 219.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 22.

²¹⁴ *C.f.* Thomas McCarthy, *Ideals and Illusions*, 139-143: 'Charges of ethnocentrism and of scientific and rationalistic bias have, of course, been leveled against cognitive-development paradigms in general. Habermas has not given adequate consideration to these charges, nor indeed to the host of other criticisms – metatheoretical and methodological, empirical and theoretical – that have been directed against the Piagetian and Kohlbergian programs in particular. And yet it is clear that his empirical-reconstructive approach to universals must prove itself precisely in the face of these sorts of objections... The end-state toward which the developmental process is construed as heading is clearly Western in conception... The point is that without an adequate understanding of the "end states" of development in other cultures, and thus the modes of thought and types of knowledge valued by those socialized in other cultures, *we are determined before the fact to construe their performances as exhibiting a more or less deficient mastery of our competences rather than as expressing a mastery of a different set of skills altogether.*' Emphasis added.

²¹⁵ Jürgen Habermas "Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action", 118.

that ‘any universalistic morality is dependent on a form of life that *meets it halfway*’ for there has to be ‘a modicum of congruence between morality and the practices of socialization and education’.²¹⁶ Therefore, at the metatheoretical level, reconstructivist programmes in moral philosophy and moral psychology are ‘implicated in a hermeneutic circle in which they must complement each other’.²¹⁷ But it is this internal coherence that threatens, at the second-order, the universality of the first-order principles that Habermas supposes ‘break through the hermeneutic circle in which the *Geisteswissenschaften*, as well as the interpretive social sciences, are trapped’.²¹⁸

The post- or decolonial version of the charge of hermeneutical circularity against Habermas’s progressivist reconstruction of modernity is that the idea of progress is inextricably linked to the violent colonial encounter. Allen explains, reading Gurminder K. Bhambra, that at its core the developmental reading of history is based on a *normative decisionism*: non-Western societies were ‘*first* judged to be inferior to – more primitive, less civilized, less developed – Europeans and then, in a second step, that inferiority was explained by means of a developmental or stadial theory of history’.²¹⁹ Enlightenment theorists, in the imperial context, decided that they were more civilised, developed, *human*, and then embedded this false assumption into the social and natural sciences of the day. The major classical sociologists, Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, all assumed that a civilisational divide between the active, masculine, dynamic, progressive, modern, cosmopolitan, Enlightened Occident and the passive, feminine, static, backward, traditional, inward, despotic, Orient was at the foundation of world history.²²⁰ Material and cultural contributions to the making of the world order from beyond the West, and international or transnational relations between other peoples are ‘repressed, marginalized, or simply overlooked’,

²¹⁶ *Ibid*, 207.

²¹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, “Lawrence Kohlberg and Neo-Aristotelianism”, in *Justification and Application: Remarks on Discourse Ethics* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 116.

²¹⁸ Jürgen Habermas “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action”, 118.

²¹⁹ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 20.

²²⁰ Steven Seidman, “The Colonial Unconscious of Classical Sociology”, *Political Power and Social Theory*, 31 (2013): 46.

Julian Go argues.²²¹ The formation of sociology reproduced the colonial difference between the dynamic, active West, and the static, passive East – the “object” of anthropology.²²² This process of discipline formation informed sociological theories of modernisation, to which contemporary critical theorists now appeal to corroborate their claims about historical progress.²²³

The method of rational reconstruction thereby leaves Habermas open to the argument that the validity criteria of discourse ethics are intractably Eurocentric and informally imperialist, insofar as the late modern Western post-traditional form of life and the moral point of view are posited as the outcome of social evolution, and so an advance over non-modern forms of life.²²⁴ Allen sees that any rational reconstruction of “our” form of life as the outcome of social evolution, which supports Habermas’s claim to the context-transcending emancipatory potential of reason, necessarily represents the West’s others as cognitively and normatively inferior to “us”.²²⁵

As Kimberly Hutchings reflects on Habermas’s recent statement that ‘other cultures do not initially confront us as alien societies, since their structures remind us of previous phases of our own social development’,²²⁶ the image of the encounter with the non-Western other is one of *non-simultaneity* – an image ‘deeply ingrained in much of Western thought’.²²⁷ The metanormative belief in the developmental superiority of late Western modernity therefore ‘places insuperable cognitive obstacles on Western participants in intercultural dialogue’, Allen argues, for viewing the other in this way ‘is not conducive to adopting a stance of dialogical openness and inclusion’.²²⁸ Allen states that her primary *positive* aim is limited to decolonising Frankfurt School critical theory

²²¹ Julian Go, *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 92.

²²² Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Sociology after Postcolonialism: Provincialized Cosmopolitanisms and Connected Sociologies”, in *Decolonizing European Sociology: Transdisciplinary Approaches*, eds. Encarnación Gutiérrez, Rodríguez, Manuela Boatcă, and Sérgio Costa (Ashgate, 2010), 34-6.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 22.

²²⁴ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 39.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 79.

²²⁶ Jürgen Habermas and Eduardo Mendieta, “A Conversation about God and the World,” in Jürgen Habermas, *Time of Transitions*, ed. and trans. Ciaran Cronin and Max Pensky (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006): 157.

²²⁷ Kimberly Hutchings, “What is Orientation in Thinking? On the Question of Time and Timeliness in Cosmopolitical Thought”, *Constellations*: 18:2 (2011): 190.

²²⁸ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 74.

by deconstructing and reconstructing its strategy for grounding normativity, in such a way as to open up this tradition to the aims and concerns of post- and decolonial thinkers and thought.²²⁹ This involves radically reconceptualising the nexus of history and normativity, in particular the internally related ideas of modernity, progress, and development, by coming to see history as complex story of simultaneous progress and regress.²³⁰

Allen argues that ‘any theory that purports to be critical should be extremely wary of such robust claims to progress as a historical “fact,” that is, to backward-looking conceptions of progress that understand history as a learning process that has led up to “us”’.²³¹ The global third generation of Frankfurt School critical theorists remains committed to ‘historically informed diagnoses of the present with an eye to practically possible futures’ for transforming global order.²³² The question for the Frankfurt School is, if such ‘ideas of progress and development have served ideological uses in the past and may well continue to do so, does that mean that they are *merely* ideological and thus should be rejected?’²³³ Allen argues not.

Quoting Adorno, Allen maintains that ‘progress occurs where it ends’ – as an imperative guiding our action toward future, not as an historical “fact”.²³⁴ Allen argues that jettisoning the backward-looking story about historical progress does not imply abandoning hope for progress in the future, but it does force “us” to be radically open to revising what future progress consists in.²³⁵ For Allen, progress, at the highest level of generality, refers to ‘improvements within a specific domain and measures those improvements by appealing to standards that are themselves historically and contextually grounded’.²³⁶ For Axel Honneth, historical progress is irreducible.²³⁷

²²⁹ *Ibid*, xii.

²³⁰ *Ibid*, 166.

²³¹ *Ibid*, 98.

²³² Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 133.

²³³ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 25.

²³⁴ *Ibid*, 5.

²³⁵ *Ibid*, 226.

²³⁶ *Ibid*, 228.

²³⁷ Axel Honneth, “The Irreducibility of Progress: Kant’s Account of the Relationship Between Morality and History” in *Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory*, ed. James Ingram (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 1-18.

McCarthy insists that progressivism is an ‘irrepressible and irreplaceable mode of thought’, and concludes that the ‘trenchant criticisms of universal-historical thinking’ produced by Western and non-Western thinkers that have ‘accumulated over the past century’ point toward ‘chastened and decentered ways of going about it: modest hopes for troubled times’.²³⁸ Rainer Forst argues that postmodern, poststructuralist, post- and decolonial critiques of progress, viewed dialectically, are ‘sustained by thinking in terms of progress that seeks clarity about itself’.²³⁹ Compared to McCarthy and Forst, Allen is the most critical inheritor of the Habermasian project among third generation theorists of the Frankfurt School. Allen excavates an alternative way of thinking through the history-normativity nexus to the reconstructivist approach to immanent critique – one that Allen promises offers “us” a ‘more radically reflexive and historicized critical methodology’ that ‘understands critique as the wholly immanent and fragmentary practice of opening up lines of fragility and fracture within the social world’.²⁴⁰

2.3. Post-traditional, hyper-reflexive discourse

Critical of the coloniality of discourses of development and modernisation, and thereby sceptical of the second generation’s rational reconstructivist strategy for grounding the standards of critique, McCarthy argues that the basic features of post-traditional forms of life are ‘practically unavoidable presuppositions of contemporary discourse’.²⁴¹ Moreover, interacting with the global infrastructure of modernity and responding to its ‘macrohistorical challenges’, whether through resistance or adaptation, is inevitable.²⁴² Critics of modernity pragmatically presume the context-transcendence of practical reasoning that makes possible critical reflection and thus a stance of critical distance from inherited practices, institutions, beliefs, values, norms, and roles, and ascribed individual and

²³⁸ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 133.

²³⁹ Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 70.

²⁴⁰ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 201.

²⁴¹ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 156-158.

²⁴² *Ibid.*

group identities, McCarthy argues.²⁴³ Occupying this stance, “we” must, ‘on pain of incoherence’, judge non-modern and traditional worldviews to be cognitively and normatively inferior insofar as these have not attained “our” degree of reflexivity about their status as worldviews.²⁴⁴

I agree that interacting with the globalised infrastructure of modernity and solving the governance problems of increasingly complex and functionally differentiated state-societies and advanced technologies are practical necessities. More so when the ways in which state-societies have been integrated into the capitalist world system are violent and unequal. As McCarthy argues, ‘the choices a society faces are quite different if it is situated (today) in a nexus of neoliberal globalization dominated by neoimperial powers or, as some hope (one day), in a more law-governed, cosmopolitan world order’.²⁴⁵ But not all the practical problems that McCarthy claims are unique to global modernity are new from non-Western perspectives. Non-Western traditions have had centuries of experience and learning with practical problems like accommodating ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity in a single, coherent set of social institutions and maintaining the political unity and legitimacy of pluralistic state-societies. These have been enduring features of non-modern forms of life in many parts of the world. They are not necessarily *modern problems requiring modern solutions*. Perhaps there are, on the contrary, solutions to practical problems that revitalise once forgotten, subalternised, and devalued pre-modern knowledges, such as the Islamic tradition of economics and finance which prohibits destabilising and exploitative financial practices (interest and speculation), and embeds markets in law-governed social relations – or Indigenous practices of environmental protection, agriculture, and resource management.

McCarthy’s strongest argument begins with the fact of global discourse about modernity ‘carried on at a critical-reflective level’ which ‘simultaneously opens up *an inexhaustible, ever-shifting horizon of possibilities for reasonable disagreement*... about what is progressive and what is regressive in

²⁴³ *Ibid*, 155-156.

²⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 156.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 162.

capitalist modernization'.²⁴⁶ This reflexivity about notions of progress and development follows from the presuppositions of post-traditional practical discourses, insofar as it is not only claims to universal validity that 'have to stand up to transcultural scrutiny' but 'claims to progress as well', for they imply improvement over traditional and non-modern forms of life.²⁴⁷ If post-traditional practical discourses are Eurocentric, they also contain within themselves, dialectically as it were, the modern solution to their modern problem, *viz.* making the discourse of global modernity more open and inclusive of non-Western voices.²⁴⁸ Learning how 'best to be modern in a world in which "we are now all moderns"' will require going beyond Eurocentric modernity by going forward, that is, by superseding it both in theory and in practice', McCarthy argues.²⁴⁹ We witness this openness and inclusivity already in discourses about global modernity, and already the effect of this contest occurring can be felt in contemporary debates – *e.g.* among third generation Frankfurt School critical theorists. McCarthy observes that in our world, 'representatives of historically oppressed and excluded groups are quite often more adept with the weapons of critique than their opposite numbers: the virtuosos of reflexivity in our time come disproportionately from such groups'.²⁵⁰

Allen reads in McCarthy an 'all roads lead to the same end logic' to his argument, even if he grants that 'societies take different paths along the way and instantiate capitalist economic and democratic legal and political institutions in very different cultural forms of life'.²⁵¹ Allen takes issue with McCarthy's assumption that 'openness to postcolonial difference requires mainly that the normative universals that were developed in European modernity must now be opened up to contestation by those who were previously excluded from them – but always, to be sure, on terms set by the demands of posttraditional, hyperreflexive, modern discourse'.²⁵² For the first item on

²⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 160-162.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 161.

²⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 225.

²⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 165.

²⁵⁰ *Ibid*, 155.

²⁵¹ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 30.

²⁵² *Ibid*.

the agenda, as it were, of postcolonial, decolonial, Indigenous, Islamic, non-Western, and subaltern voices in global dialogues about modernity and world order is to reframe modernity as coloniality.

The spread of Western universals through centuries of imperialism and colonialism has been traumatic and culturally and epistemically genocidal. Postcolonial, decolonial, Indigenous, Islamic, non-Western, and subaltern voices in global dialogues about modernity and world order contest the claim that modern Western practices of knowledge production and standards of reason are objective or superior. The *struggle without end* is for cultural and epistemic survival and revival in the context of coloniality: if decolonial and postcolonial discourses are hyper-reflexive, it is because they are made acutely self-aware by the epistemological crisis of coloniality.²⁵³ If the ‘energy, vibrancy and creative cultural dynamics that emerge from such demanding circumstances’ are *positive*,²⁵⁴ they are not thereby conceived as *developmental advances* over pre-colonial forms of life. Ancestors and their traditional practices may be coherently thought of as normative in different dimensions that are salient to judgments of social progress and regress – whatever matters to “us” and “our” survival and flourishing, to our success in this world and the next.

When we decentre Western civilisation and remember that non-Western civilisations have, for the most part, their own local histories of encountering other non-Western civilisations prior to and independently of the violent encounter with modern Western empires, naval explorers, colonial administrators, and settlers, and sometimes profound revaluations and reconstructions of normative orders caused by cultural exchange, technological innovation, disaster, conflict, peace, learning, voyages, migrations, and religious conversion,²⁵⁵ we cannot read the encounter with global modernity as a story of backward, static peoples becoming modern, mature, or civilised.

²⁵³ C.f. ‘Challenging the colonial world is not a *rational confrontation of viewpoints*. It is not a discourse on the universal, but the impassioned claim by the colonized that their world is fundamentally different.’ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 6.

²⁵⁴ Robert J. C. Young, “What is the Postcolonial?”, *ARIEL*, 40:1 (2009): 14.

²⁵⁵ Consider, for example, the profound revaluation of the normative order and social transformation of societies emerging from ignorance (*jahiliyyah*) upon the revelation of Islam. “And when it is said to them, “follow what Allah has revealed,” they say, “Rather, we will follow that which we found our fathers doing.” Even though their fathers understood nothing, nor were they guided?” (Quran 2:170, Sahih International).

This ‘collusion of reason with historicism’ still implicit in McCarthy’s account of posttraditional, hyperreflexive discourse frames contemporary traditional subjects as the ‘human embodiments of the principle of anachronism’, as Dipesh Chakrabarty says.²⁵⁶ Rather, the encounter with modernity is a survival story – one of struggle. The terms *postcolonialism* and *decolonisation* signify that there is no going back, as it were, to a time *before* the epistemic fractures of colonialism and modernisation. Yet, they clearly do not signify resignation to the modern world, but *resistance*.

McCarthy never quite gets beyond the imperial ideology he critiques. His subtle argument that, yes, granted the violent mechanism of its diffusion, and the abuses of developmental thinking to justify the violent practices of modern/colonial capitalist empires, the discourse of modernity is nevertheless a developmental advance over traditional societies, has a *but what about the railways?* quality typical of imperial apologetics.²⁵⁷ It is symptomatic of the persistence of myth of colonial “gift-giving” in which the critics are, through interpretive trickery, forced into acknowledging the “mixed” blessings of colonialism.²⁵⁸ It is a sublimated version of the imperial justification narrative of the pedagogical, civilising role performed by colonial powers in emancipating the natives from their childlike immaturity. *Reasonable disagreement* over conceptions of progress and regress might decouple normativity from modernisation, or global modernity could be theorised as a regressive threat to centuries of accumulated social learning and forms of practical reason immanent in traditional forms of life. If debates about the post-Western, post-secular future of world order are always already on non-negotiable modern terms, then this is a pre-discursive power move that prevents open and open-ended dialogue about global modernity, and silences dissent. Who has the power to open the conversation and include others, and enforce the rules of debate?

²⁵⁶ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 238.

²⁵⁷ Sashi Tharoor, “‘But what about the railways ...?’ The myth of Britain’s gifts to India”, *The Guardian*, 8 March 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/08/india-britain-empire-railways-myths-gifts>

²⁵⁸ Kamal Mustapha Pasha, “The Bandung Within”, in Quỳnh N. Pham and Robbie Shilliam eds. *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions* (New York Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016), 202.

2.4. Immanence/transcendence

Power is complex and multiple. Different uses of the concept of power bear a family resemblance, and power cannot be given an essential definition or its varieties reduced to one essential species. Contemporary critical theory has advanced beyond the postmodern and poststructuralist impasses of the twentieth century insofar as power is theorised as normatively neutral, not one-sidedly as *domination* or *empowerment*.²⁵⁹ Power has both positive and negative aspects. To understand the differences between domination and empowerment we need a critical theory of the exercises of *power-over*, *power-to*, and *power-with*.²⁶⁰ Power can be exercised over others in ways that create relations of domination and subordination, and yet, even subordinated subjects have the power to creatively resist, including through options that are made available only through subordination, and have the power to exercise power in solidarity with others and build coalitions and social movements.²⁶¹

Power-over, whether structural or relational, is a more general concept than domination. Domination is thus distinguished by an appropriate normative criterion. For Allen, the appropriate normative criterion is that power-over is used to nontrivially constrain the choices of an agent to their disadvantage. For Forst, *contra* Allen, the appropriate normative criterion is that power-over is used without proper justification. Forst does not (explicitly) ground the context-transcending validity criteria of discursive justification in any historical reconstruction of Western modernity as a story of progress, but in a cosmopolitan variety of Kantian constructivism. As I will explain, Forst's account of the nexus of reason and power is untenable because it fails to fully account for the different manifestations of power, particularly its direct effects on embodied subjects, and thus the pervasiveness of power in contexts of practical reasoning. Allen argues successfully against Forst that practical reason is too impure to do the work Forst thinks it can do to make power fully transparent and justification free from the effects of power.

²⁵⁹ Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 37.

²⁶⁰ Amy Allen, "Rethinking Power", *Hyppatia*, 13:1 (1998): 21-40.

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, 32-33.

Forst conceives power as *noumenal* insofar as it operates in the space of reasons, in contrast to force, violence, and forms of hard power (economic, diplomatic, financial, military), because it rests on recognition and acceptance of reasons.²⁶² This definition of power lets Forst speak of the *power of justifications*.²⁶³ When B accepts a reason given by A for action or belief that causes B to act or believe otherwise than he otherwise would, this is a purely descriptive matter. Whether the reason is accepted because it is in a normative sense a sufficient reason is no matter to the normatively neutral definition of power. When we study how power works, we must count equally as exercises of power what from our normative perspective we consider “good” reasons and the uncritical acceptance of ideological justifications or subjection to strategic manipulation – “bad” reasons. Forst claims that conceptual clarity and analytical rigour about power enables us to bracket and normatively analyse the criteria that then, as a next move, enable us to judge between good and bad justifications, and thus justifiable and unjustifiable forms of power.²⁶⁴

Forst argues that his normatively neutral account of noumenal power provides the conceptual clarity and analytical rigour to distinguish different forms of power, including rule, coercion, and domination.²⁶⁵ While all forms of power have a cognitive character, Forst argues, ‘there is a spectrum of kinds of acceptance’ of justifications, with the normative variety being that of ‘explicit acceptance based on critical reflection and evaluation’.²⁶⁶ Forst uses the example of kidnapping to clarify what he means by defective forms of justificatory power. The threat of violence is used to coerce the kidnapped person into behaving otherwise than she otherwise would. Yet, the kidnapper’s power over the kidnapped person disappears once a threat is no longer seen

²⁶² Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 38.

²⁶³ *Ibid*, 38.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid*.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid*, 41.

as serious, Forst claims. The kidnapper ‘can still use brute force and kill the kidnapped person, but that is rather a sign of having lost power’.²⁶⁷

The phenomenon of noumenal power can take the form of an isolated event as in the case of kidnapping, but for the purpose of elaborating his critical social theory, Forst focusses on the ‘general social situation or structure in which certain social relations are regarded as justified, whether reflexively or not’, which he characterises as a normative *order of justification*.²⁶⁸ *Ex hypothesi*, noumenal power manifests in orders of justification, where socially effective justifications are integrated into *justification narratives*.²⁶⁹ Forst’s distinction between socially effective justifications and “good” justifications preserves an immanent connection between social theory and normativity.²⁷⁰ Forst maintains that any socially embedded practices of reasoning involving historically crystallised sets of reasons and conceptions of what counts as reasonable, can be ‘expressions of hegemonic forms of thought and possibly of an ideology, masking the unjustifiable as justified’.²⁷¹

In the post-metaphysical absence of a transcendental categorical-imperative test for the universal validity of substantive moral norms, Forst charts a constructivist course between foundationalism and relativism by locating normative justification in an open and open-ended process of reciprocal rational argumentation.²⁷² Forst’s Kantian constructivist reconstruction of the Frankfurt School of critical theory is explicitly a cosmopolitan or moral universalist reconstruction of Rawls’s political constructivism. Reasoning beings socialised into practices have practical knowledge of orders of justification.²⁷³ However, Forst theorises the context-transcending moment of justification differently to Rawls, for whom, in a crucial way, justification

²⁶⁷ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard “Power and Reason, Justice and Domination: A Conversation”, *Journal of Political Power*, 7:1 (2014): 12.

²⁶⁸ Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 42.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

²⁷¹ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard, “Power and Reason, Justice and Domination”, 11.

²⁷² Rainer Forst, *The Right to Justification: Elements of a Constructivist Theory of Justice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 176.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*, 21-22.

remains contextual. Forst extends Rawls's logical distinction between justification *within* and *of* a practice by arguing that justification occurs in differentiated (partly nested, partly overlapping) contexts of justice – ethical, legal-political, and moral.

This argumentative move – differentiating nested contexts of practical reasoning – enables Forst to reconstruct Rawlsian constructivism along Kantian moral universalist lines, without sacrificing Rawls's sensitivity to context. Whereas Rawls's political liberalism concerns the justification of the legal-political context of the basic structure of liberal democratic state-societies from within, Forst holds that the moral context, where justification is directed to the unlimited community of all moral persons, is ultimate.²⁷⁴ Forst's contextualised Kantian moral universalism imposes the negative discipline on communities that their legitimacy hangs on the justification of their normative order to the members of the community, and that they cannot violate the universal norms of the moral context that recognise the status of all human beings as persons.²⁷⁵

Forst's critical cosmopolitanism takes as its point of departure the 'existing forms of subjugation and exploitation, of structural asymmetries and arbitrary rule'.²⁷⁶ Contexts of justice exist wherever there are social relations.²⁷⁷ Addressing contemporary neocolonial power relations, Forst argues that whereas justification in moral contexts conforms to the 'all affected principle', justification in contexts of justice conforms to the 'all subjected principle'. Forst explains that subjection includes formal (legal and political) relations of subjection, as well as informal (economic, social) relations of subjection. Moreover, power relations can be positive or negative, in the sense that they are uncooperative or asymmetrical.²⁷⁸ Forst sees the primary task of cosmopolitan justice as the creation of corresponding transnational and supranational structures

²⁷⁴ Rainer Forst, *The Right to Justification*, 196.

²⁷⁵ *Ibid*, 171–172.

²⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 167.

²⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 166.

²⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 32.

of justification that can transform complex relations of domination into egalitarian relations of reciprocal justification.²⁷⁹

Forst claims to identify a *single* root that forms the normative core of talk of justice in and across all contexts: the *right to justification*.²⁸⁰ Corresponding to the right to justification is the normative status of the person.²⁸¹ The *principle of justification* holds that in moral contexts, persons have an equal right to justification of all norms to which she is subject.²⁸² The dignity of the person consists in her recognition as an end in herself insofar as she is represented as an equal justificatory authority of moral norms.²⁸³ Forst claims that the form of constructivism implied by this is not political but discourse-theoretical: '*constructivism* because here norms are constructed in accordance with a principle of reasonable justification, *discourse-theoretical* constructivism because the emphasis is on the voice of every single moral person as a free and equal justificatory authority'.²⁸⁴

As with any constructivist account of justice, whether political or discourse-theoretical, the weight of normativity is carried by the conception of the person and the internally related conception of practical reason upon which grounding the account is constructed. Forst tries to navigate between relativism and foundationalism by constructing a thin account of practical reason that works recursively and discursively within actual contexts, building upon Onora O'Neill's Kantian constructivist account of practical reason.²⁸⁵ Forst claims that his account of nested contexts of practical reasoning overcomes the problem of empty formalism that troubles O'Neill's constructivist account of practical reason by connecting formal universalism and substantive contextualism through the idea that universal principles are reiterated in different ways in the local contexts of different communities, 'in their self-understandings, practices, and institutions'.²⁸⁶

²⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 165.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, Vii.

²⁸¹ *Ibid*, 19.

²⁸² *Ibid*, 29.

²⁸³ *Ibid*.

²⁸⁴ Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 29.

²⁸⁵ Rainer Forst, *Contexts of Justice: Political Philosophy Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 176.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 167.

Participants in discursive practices of reasoning are pragmatically committed to providing others justifications for our actions and norms, which are constrained by the context-transcendent validity criteria of reciprocity and generality, *ex hypothesi*.²⁸⁷ Good justifications are *general* and *reciprocal* in contrast to bad justifications. If justifications are reciprocal, then this means two things. Firstly, no one may raise claims that she refuses to grant to others (reciprocity of contents). Secondly, no one may assume that others share their conception of the good or their interests, and reason thus (reciprocity of reasons).²⁸⁸ If justifications are general, then this means that no one can be excluded from the ‘community of justification’.²⁸⁹ Practical reasoning *fails to justify* unless it is reciprocal and general, Forst argues. The validity criteria of reciprocity and generality are taken to be context-transcendent insofar as validity claims can be used *within, between, and beyond* orders of justification to radically critique social norms, practices, institutions, and justification narratives.²⁹⁰

Forst has made his reconstructive project the defence of the possibility of radical critique since *Contexts of Justice*, where he intervened in the debate between liberals and communitarians. ‘Settled ethical life is the *object* of criticism, not its *ground* or *limit*...’, he argues, so critical theory cannot jettison the context-transcendent emancipatory power of reason, by limiting reason to the contextual boundaries of what is thinkable.²⁹¹ Forst’s defence of the possibility of critical theory continues Habermas’s critique of hermeneutics by affirming the context-transcendent power of practical reason.²⁹² Forst claims, echoing Habermas’s account of socialisation, that only someone who can question ‘the reified forms of normativity of established ethical life in a well-founded way was properly socialized into the space of reasons’.²⁹³ He adds the *third nature* of the reflected ethical life to the second nature of conventional ethical life, thereby completing, he thinks, the account of

²⁸⁷ Rainer Forst, *The Right to Justification*, 28-29.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 15.

²⁹¹ Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 5-6

²⁹² *Ibid.*, 3-4.

²⁹³ *Ibid.*, 24.

the practice of normativity.²⁹⁴ Forst's Kantian constructivist account of reason, he claims, overcomes the dialectic of "contextualist" vs. "transcendental" or "historical" vs. "ahistorical".²⁹⁵

Allen responds that once we acknowledge that we are socialised into ethical and political communities as subjects occupying positions of dominance or subordination, we are forced to reckon with the question our socialisation. Are we being socialised into a practice of reasoning that enables us to attain a universal, context-transcendent, critical perspective on any sociohistorical form of life, including our own? Or, insofar as we think of ourselves as having such a perspective, are we in fact internalising the biases of a particularly modern, Western, post-Enlightenment form of life (one that is marked by deeply embedded norms of sexual, racial, and civilisational hierarchy)? Allen argues that if the latter is the case, then Forst's constructivist account of practical reason implicitly assumes the superiority of the post-Enlightenment Western form of life in which it is contextually grounded, and so on the kind of reconstructivism that Forst claims not to practice.²⁹⁶

I argue that Forst idealises the modern Western conception of practical reason rather than abstracting what is common to all practices of reasoning insofar as his constructivist account is internally related to the idea of the autonomy of morality. Forst first clarifies that by *morality* he means a formal system of categorically binding norms, and corresponding rights and duties, which hold reciprocally and generally among humans 'in our capacity as moral persons', and which do not presuppose belonging to any thicker context of interpersonal or communal relations, such as family, friendships, or political community.²⁹⁷ He then explains that by the *autonomy* of morality he means that he is working with a conception of morality that is free from traditional content and grounds of validity, insofar as participants in this practice of reasoning take a hypothetical attitude toward them. On this account, the content and categorical nature of moral obligations is not based

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard, "Power and Reason, Justice and Domination", 22.

²⁹⁶ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 144.

²⁹⁷ Rainer Forst, *The Right to Justification*, 89.

the supreme will of God, the authority of a secular sovereign, or an established form of life.²⁹⁸ Forst then claims that the autonomy of morality, viewed historically, is the ‘result of a complex and conflict-laden history’.²⁹⁹ Forst explains further that ‘it was Kant who invested the idea of an autonomous morality with the meaning not only that it must be independent regarding the substantive justification of norms, but also that it requires a motive of its own, free from religious or secular notions of happiness or the promise thereof’.³⁰⁰ Forst’s Kantian constructivism therefore does not abstract from practices of reasoning in general, but idealises the secularised reasoning practices of post-Enlightenment, late-modern Western subjects. Viewed historically, as Forst encourages, the autonomy of morality is a result of the provincial history of Western Christianity.

We can agree with much of Forst’s detranscendentalised account of reason in terms of contingent, social practices of reasoning without agreeing to the proposition that across contexts, all practices of reasoning have the right to justification as their deep grammar. Seyla Benhabib argues that his Kantian rigourism ‘places a burden on his theory that it cannot bear’.³⁰¹ The practice of reasoning is a feature of any human society insofar as we are a language-using, reasoning species. Yet, Forst’s formal-pragmatic argument that by participating in practices of reasoning we are committed to neo-Kantian conceptions of moral autonomy and the autonomy of morality fails. Forst’s argument fails because, while the generality condition is ‘clear and uncontroversial’, the reciprocity of content and reasons criteria import too much *substantive content* into what were supposed to be *formal criteria*.³⁰² Allen asks wryly: doesn’t Forst’s constructivist move just shift the problem of how to ground normativity back to the level of the conception of practical reason?³⁰³

²⁹⁸ *Ibid*, 91-92.

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*.

³⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 91-92.

³⁰¹ Seyla Benhabib, “The Uses and Abuses of Kantian Rigorism: On Rainer Forst’s Moral and Political Philosophy,” *Political Theory* 43:6 (2015): 778.

³⁰² *Ibid*, 783.

³⁰³ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 136.

My addendum, returning the focus to the encounter with the other, is that this substantive content is imported from post-Enlightenment Western practices of reasoning. If the moral context is based on ‘the moral autonomy of reasonable persons who bring forth a realm of normativity’, then this conception of reason is culturally imperialist and intolerable to Muslim subjects and other monotheistic subjects who submit to the will of God. To the West’s others, it is potentially culturally and epistemically genocidal. An unanalysed part of this conflict-laden history is the imperial and colonial violence through which secular modern subjectivity and liberal personhood have been enforced through imperialism and interventionism beyond the European core.³⁰⁴

Forst turns around the charge of Eurocentrism and argues that the core of social struggles against oppression is the demand for justification. Therefore, the ‘language of emancipation and of no longer wanting to be denied one’s right to be a participatory equal is a universal language spoken in many tongues’ – it is not bound to the historical-geographical context of the contemporary West.³⁰⁵ Allen responds that while the language of justification may be an important weapon in the struggle against oppression, acknowledging this insight does not commit us to accepting Forst’s neo-Kantian constructivist account of practical reason.

[We] can acknowledge that practices and languages of justification are used in a variety of different historical, cultural, and social contexts, and that although these practices are embedded in particular social and cultural forms of life and in the webs of value that suffuse such forms of life with substantive normative content, these forms of life are also open and porous and entangled with one another.³⁰⁶

There is no overarching – informally imperialist – moral context of justification, only intersecting orders of justification each with their own practices of reasoning, entangled with power relations. Allen argues against Forst that if reasoning is a practice, and if, as Forst argues, ‘our social practices and institutions are structured by relations of power, domination, and oppression’, then practical reasoning will ‘necessarily be entangled with power’.³⁰⁷ Allen argues that this insight is why ‘any

³⁰⁴ C.f. Onora O’Neill’s recognition of this violent history through which these ideas have been made apparently universally accessible in her version of the Kantian constructivist project in *Justice Across Boundaries*. 91.

³⁰⁵ Rainer Forst, *Justice, Democracy and the Right to Justification: Rainer Forst in Dialogue* (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014), 184.

³⁰⁶ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 156-157.

³⁰⁷ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 222.

and all claims’ – particularly by normatively and epistemically hegemonic theorists³⁰⁸ – ‘to have accessed a categorical normative point of view unsullied by and unentangled with power relations and reflective of a genuinely universal conception of practical reason can so easily seem like a power play’.³⁰⁹

The problem with Forst’s attempted resolution of the dialectic of reason and power becomes more acute when we study examples of real world contexts of injustice. Allen adds further details, examples, and qualifications to our theorising of power relations. She reminds us that power acts directly on the body or is internalised in the form of affective investments and desires that reproduce hierarchical social relations, in ways that bypass reason, and that reason is embedded in power structures that persist independently of whether collectives subject to them view them as unjustified and their justification narratives as incoherent or baseless. By complicating the contextualist picture of traditions as both enabling and constraining of our agency (power-to) through analyses of the ways that processes of subject formation are entangled with power, Allen shows us that power and tradition are co-constitutive of subjectivity.³¹⁰ Our problem: ‘If reason serves both to stabilize hegemonic structures of domination and to critique such structures of power, then how can an appeal to reason enable us to distinguish between benign and objectionable forms of power?’³¹¹

2.5. Embodied subjects

Habermas primarily theorises power in terms of his colonisation of the lifeworld thesis, which he uses to diagnose both the pathologies of reason in modern Western societies and the potentials for emancipation latent in our everyday communicative practices. Defenders of the Habermasian

³⁰⁸ For more on this point, see Lois McNay, “The Limits of Justification: Critique, Disclosure, and Reflexivity”, *European Journal of Political Theory*, 0:0 (2016): 18.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 158.

³¹⁰ Amy Allen, “The Power of Disclosure: Comments on Nikolas Kompridis’ Critique and Disclosure”, *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 37:9 (2011): 1030.

³¹¹ *Ibid*, 10.

communicative rationality paradigm argue that Habermas's theory of systematically distorted communication accounts for 'the repressive and exclusionary effects of unequally distributed social power' and of 'structural violence'.³¹² Habermas maintains that modernisation as the progressive rationalisation of the lifeworld involves overcoming systematically distorted communication.³¹³ Habermas's view is that, while practices of reasoning are always embedded in contexts and entangled with relations of power, good and bad, context-transcending validity criteria are not, and can provide the criterion for distinguishing between good and bad justifications of power.³¹⁴

Strategic and communicative rationalities can be mixed in real world contexts of practical reasoning (moreover, in actual colonial contexts). In a paradigm example, Nelson Mandela accused F. W. de Klerk and the National Party-led Apartheid Government of having a 'double agenda' in dialogue: 'They are talking peace to us. They are at the same time conducting a war'.³¹⁵ In another, Tuvaluan Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga called Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison's attitude during regional dialogue over the Tuvalu Declaration at the Pacific Islands Forum 'neocolonial'.³¹⁶ 'You are concerned about saving your economy in Australia. I am concerned about saving my people in Tuvalu'.³¹⁷ Mark Haugard reminds us that, for Habermas, 'the most effective form of instrumental manipulation takes place when instrumental action *appears as communicative interaction*. Thus, the success of this kind of manipulative instrumental action is parasitic upon, and *presupposes*, genuine communicative action'.³¹⁸ Cheating requires that people generally play by the rules.

³¹² Matheson Russell, *Habermas and Politics* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), 52.

³¹³ Amy Allen (2017) *The End of Progress*, 219.

³¹⁴ *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ Nelson Mandela, "Response by Nelson Mandela, African National Congress President, to speech by State President, FW de Klerk, at first session of CODESA", *Speeches by Nelson Mandela* (1991), accessed 1 February 2019, http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1991/911220_codesa1.htm see also: Nelson Mandela, "Keynote address by Nelson Mandela at the ANC National Consultative Conference", *Speeches by Nelson Mandela* (1990), accessed 1 February 2019, http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1990/901214_consult.htm

³¹⁶ Jamie Tahana, "Australian PM's attitude 'neo-colonial' says Tuvalu", *Radio New Zealand*, 20 August 2019, <https://www.rnz.co.nz/news/pacific/396972/australian-pm-s-attitude-neo-colonial-says-tuvalu>

³¹⁷ Melissa Clark, "Pacific leaders, Australia agree to disagree about action on climate change", ABC News, 16 August 2019, <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-08-15/no-endorsements-come-out-of-tuvalu-declaration/11419342>

³¹⁸ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard, "Power and Reason, Justice and Domination", 8.

For Habermas, ‘the task of justification, or, in other words, the critique of validity claims carried out from the perspective of a participant, cannot ultimately be separated from a genetic consideration that issues in an ideology critique’ – a metacritique of our critical-hermeneutic resources carried out from a third-person perspective on the system, of the ‘mixing of power claims and validity claims’.³¹⁹ Matheson Russell argues that the kind of polemical speech delivered by Mandela against de Klerk and Sopoaga against Morrison, although it breaks with the ‘spirit of mutual respect and cooperation’ that is characteristic of the deliberative stance, ‘is the appropriate discursive means’ at the disposal of truthful and just participants in dialogue to ‘oppose the social forces of falsehood and injustice’.³²⁰

For Allen, the problem of systematically distorted communication is deeper than anything that the *courage of truth* might overcome. Although with his colonisation of the lifeworld thesis, Habermas ‘admits that systems of power and the lifeworld can and do interpenetrate, this does not amount to a recognition of the ways in which core domains of the lifeworld are *themselves* structured by power relations’.³²¹ Allen’s argument, briefly, is that communication is systematically distorted by racialised, colonised, and gendered subjectivities.³²² Behind the unforced force of the better argument are the ‘smouldering conflicts’ that arise from racialised, colonised, and gendered power asymmetries.³²³ Such inegalitarian relations are pervasive in modern Western societies, with our long durational structural injustices born of violent histories of slavery, colonialism, racism, and women’s subjugation – and so the systematic distortion of communication is the norm, not

³¹⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 323-324.

³²⁰ Matheson Russell, “Polemical Speech and the Struggle for Recognition”, *Parrhesia*, 26 (2016): 170. *C.f.* ‘We may in the same way come to understand the new tone which swamped international diplomacy at the United Nations General Assembly in September, 1960. The representatives of the colonial countries were aggressive and violent, and carried things to extremes, but the colonial peoples did not find that they exaggerated. The radicalism of the African spokesmen brought the abscess to a head and showed up the inadmissible nature of the veto and of the dialogue between the great powers, and above all the tiny role reserved for the Third World.’ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 76-77.

³²¹ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 101.

³²² Amy Allen, “Systematically Distorted Subjectivity? Habermas and the Critique of Power”, *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 33:5 (2007): 641.

³²³ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 104.

an aberration. The situation is even more acute in our contemporary neocolonial context: 'let us return to that atmosphere of violence, that violence which is just under the skin', Fanon enjoins.³²⁴

Allen argues that, because, for Habermas, linguistically mediated intersubjectivity is the possibility and limit of our capacity for critical self-reflection, which in turn makes possible and limits our 'capacity to reflect critically on relations of power', he must appeal to the notion of communicative action to 'distinguish between interactions that are genuinely communicative and those that are merely apparently so (when in fact latently strategic)'.³²⁵ However, this raises an insurmountable problem for Habermas. If reason is entangled with power, then how can we ever trust practical discourses to be self-correcting?³²⁶

Consequently, norm-testing practical discourses are not reliable procedures for reaching valid conclusions. Any consensus produced may well reinforce an unjust and unworthy *status quo*. However, Allen does not take this to imply that a reasoned critique of power is impossible or strategically ineffectual. Her reconstruction of the Frankfurt School draws on the resources of French poststructuralist thought, decentering the Cartesian transcendental-phenomenological subject occupying a 'foundational and constitutive role *vis-à-vis* knowledge and meaning' through a Foucauldian genealogical investigation into the ways in which the subject has been constituted.³²⁷ To understand how power operates pervasively in the lifeworld, we must turn to Foucault, for whom the social is entangled with power relations, Allen proposes, whereas for Habermas, it is 'structured in terms of mutual, reciprocal recognition'.³²⁸ This basic disagreement brings us back to Habermas's theoretical distinction between system and lifeworld, and his conception of power as operative at the systemic level.³²⁹ Foucault, rather than studying the ways that power functions in the state or the economy, *i.e.* the domains of systems theory, uncovers through his genealogical

³²⁴ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 70.

³²⁵ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 105.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ *Ibid.*, 46.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*, 111.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*

method how power permeates the lifeworld, our everyday practices, habits, dispositions, behaviours, actions, beliefs, perceptions, desires, fantasies, tastes, projects, identities, and so on, and the socialisation processes by which humans are constituted as individual subjects.³³⁰

Habermas's account of individualisation through socialisation, Allen explains, 'overlaps, at a purely descriptive level, with Foucault's Nietzschean account of the role that the internalization of disciplinary power plays in the constitution of the subject'.³³¹ Except, Habermas regards this process as the normal socialisation of autonomous critical subjects, not as the conditioning of subjectivity in ways that for differently socialised subjects within prevailing hierarchical power relations may limit their critical powers.³³² Habermas, Allen claims, 'is overly sanguine about the implications of this'.³³³ Allen agrees with Judith Butler that negatively socialised subjects in hierarchical social formations become attached to dominant and subaltern subject positions, and may possibly come to understand their social identities as empowering, even though these may be objectively alienating and oppressive. A child typically cannot understand the normative difference between subordinating and non-subordinating modes of attachment. A child is inclined to attach to painful and subordinating identities rather than not attach because some kind of attachment is 'necessary for psychic survival and social existence'.³³⁴ Therefore, a subject's psychic attachment to subordination through her socialisation may be prior to and formative of the development of her capacity for reasoning.³³⁵ The motivation of subjects formed in social contexts of domination to maintain stable identities, secure attachments, and self-realisation becomes a mechanism for the reproduction hierarchical social relations. Critiquing hierarchical power relations thereby takes the form of an ontological threat to the integrity of the subject. Allen regards this hypothesis as an

³³⁰ *Ibid.*

³³¹ Amy Allen, "Systematically Distorted Subjectivity?", 644.

³³² *Ibid.*

³³³ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 123.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*

³³⁵ *Ibid.*

important extension of Foucault,³³⁶ and explains that it is this dimension of subject formation and the psychic costs of subordination and liberation on which Habermas's account of individuation through socialisation is silent.³³⁷

The critical powers of subjects in subordinate positions are limited by pervasive resistance to taking on a hypothetical attitude toward norms integral to our identities. To explain, sometimes power imprints directly on the bodies of subaltern subjects and becomes, moreover, internalised in the forms of our affective investments in subordinating identities and relationships and our unconscious desires. Allen's examples in *The Politics of Ourselves* centre women's subjectification. She switches to examples of racialised embodiment in *The End of Progress*. Allen draws on Fanon's psychoanalysis of the 'intertwined dynamics of recognition, subjection, and subordination' that develop the 'inferiority complex' of the 'black man' in the colonies.³³⁸ Fanon's diagnosis: *the black soul is a white man's artefact*.³³⁹ We see this generally in the socialisation of individuals into the subject positions of master/slave, settler/native, coloniser/colonised, white/non-white under structural conditions of a global capitalism that is racialised, gendered, and (neo)colonial. For Fanon, decolonisation is a struggle waged 'on both levels': objective and subjective.³⁴⁰

The analysis that I am undertaking is psychological. In spite of this it is apparent to me that the effective disalienation of the black man entails an immediate recognition of social and economic realities. If there is an inferiority complex, it is the outcome of a double process:
primarily, economic;
subsequently, the internalization – or, better, the *epidermalization* – of this inferiority.³⁴¹

Fanon diagnoses the syndrome of the subjective alienation that arises through the internalisation or epidermalisation of the inferior status conferred upon them through their political identities, and prescribes therapeutic interventions for becoming effectively disalienated: firstly, to become

³³⁶ *Ibid*, 124.

³³⁷ *Ibid*, 25.

³³⁸ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 143.

³³⁹ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lamm Markman (London: Pluto Press, 2008 [1952]), 6.

³⁴⁰ *Ibid*, 4.

³⁴¹ *Ibid*.

conscious of the unconsciously internalised inferiority complex and to work through it *subjectively*, ‘but also to act in the direction of a change in the social structure’ to achieve *objective* disalienation.³⁴²

So how does subjectification systematically distort communication, limiting the potential for subordinated subjects to achieve subjective and objective disalienation? Brendan Hokowhitu recounts first personally how in ‘my hometown of Ōpōtiki, physical conquests, especially in sport, gave me confidence and allowed me to strive for success without facing ridicule. In contrast, academic achievement was at best acknowledged but usually derided’.

Males had to be extremely confident in their physicality *or face social ostracism*. So embroiled in this masculine culture was I, that I believed it defined all New Zealand men, both Māori and Pākehā [whites]. Looking back, however, I realize that while physicality was a common definer of New Zealand males, Māori boys often faced barriers to the nonphysical realm that Pākehā boys did not... my self-limitation to a vocation in physical education points to the social constraints on which many young tāne [men] base their life decisions. Being a lawyer, a doctor, or an academic were not options I considered even plausible. I had the *desire to succeed* but ultimately only within the physical realm.³⁴³

Hokowhitu describes how ‘understandably, many tāne resist higher education because they see it as tantamount to assimilation into Pākehā values and attitudes’.

The monocultural nature of mainstream education in New Zealand means that Māori who succeed educationally are often viewed by other Māori as inauthentic or “plastic.” Thus, I have found it almost impossible to discuss with other Māori men the theory and critical notions that underpin my work, because the language I speak is viewed as a Pākehā language, and the higher level of theoretical thought involved contrasts with the silent, tough, and practical Māori masculinity that is distortedly common. In many Māori contexts, to talk of theory is perceived as whakahīhi (conceited).³⁴⁴

His genealogy of the historical construction of Māori male physicality deconstructs *one* of the dominant (neo)colonial discourses surrounding Māori men - ‘a discourse that was constructed to limit, homogenize, and reproduce an acceptable and imagined Māori masculinity, and that has also gained hegemonic consent from many tāne’.³⁴⁵

Hokowhitu problematises the (neo)colonial construction of Māori masculine physicality which has crystallised in the contemporary image of “the natural Māori sportsman” by analysing ‘the racially based traits, such as physicality, imposed on tāne in the precolonial and early colonial

³⁴² *Ibid*, 74. I discuss objective and subjective disalienation further in *6. Reconciliation*.

³⁴³ Brendan Hokowhitu, “Tackling Māori Masculinity: A Colonial Genealogy of Savagery and Sport”, *The Contemporary Pacific*, 16:2 (2004): 259-260. My italics.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid*, 261.

³⁴⁵ *Ibid*.

periods, and the role New Zealand State education has played in perpetuating this construction'.³⁴⁶ *The Māori body is the Pākehā's artefact.* As Hokowhitu argues, although the (neo)colonial construction of Māori masculinity limits the critical powers of tāne, it does so through 'hegemonic consent'. His personal narrative reveals how he was socialised in his school and home environments to internalise this (neo)colonial representation at the level of desire, bypassing reason: despite being naturally intellectually gifted as an academic, it was his natural physical gifts as a sportsman that he *identified with* in his 'desire to succeed', because that is what is *normal* for tāne. Intellectual pursuits are abnormal, and so socially sanctioned: 'ridiculed', 'derided'. Moreover, in his capacity as an Indigenous Māori critical theorist, he has experienced how other tāne who have had the same negative socialisation resist using their critical powers to decolonise themselves and our society. Colonial power has been 'written upon' the bodies of Māori men, psychically internalised, and given sub-rational hegemonic consent. Systematically distorted discourse is the consequence.³⁴⁷

Allen theorises that it is 'because they bypass the reasoned consent of subordinated subjects, such forms of power are even more subtle, stable and effective than power that rests on reasoned acceptance'.³⁴⁸ Therefore, if our collective struggle is to 'dismantle and transform those relations of dominance and subordination, we will need to be armed with something more than the force of good reasons; we will also need some account of how it is possible to transform our embodied dispositions and practices and affective investments and desires'.³⁴⁹ This focus on transformation through technologies of the self threatens the autonomy of morality.

Hokowhitu, for example, argues that it is through Māori men's 'own culture that they will find what it truly means to be a Māori man, freed of the dominant construct, and permeated instead

³⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 262-275.

³⁴⁷ Brendan Hokowhitu, "Haka: Colonized Physicality, Body-Logic, and Embodied Sovereignty", in *Performing Indigeneity: Global Histories and Contemporary Experiences*, eds. Laura R. Graham and H. Glenn Penny (University of Nebraska Press, 2014), 295-296.

³⁴⁸ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard, "Power and Reason, Justice and Domination: A Conversation", 16-17.

³⁴⁹ *Ibid*. Cf. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 44.

with humility, intelligence, creativity, love, and compassion'.³⁵⁰ The focal points of transformation are the Indigenous body, practices of childrearing and schooling, countering negative media representations and narratives, 'living beyond' Māori identities constructed by Pākehā,³⁵¹ and healing from the 'genealogical scarring inflicted by colonization'.³⁵² The 'complexity of the historical and contemporary Indigenous condition' should be 'critically' and 'strategically' analysed through the 'genealogical inscription upon the everyday material reality of the Indigenous body'.³⁵³ Indigenous cultural practices like haka, instead of being temporally 'constructed as a "traditional" performance to be viewed by an audience, its impassioned bodily properties in conjunction with its often politically verbalized cultural elements [*ibi*, *wehi*, and *wana*] should be recognized' and its experience felt *now*.³⁵⁴ The power of reframing Indigenous practices 'beyond the categorization of Indigenous cultures within the premodern, "traditional," and/or "to be preserved" frames', is to actualise the 'temporal decolonization of the Indigenous body'.³⁵⁵ Hokowhitu analyses haka as an *enactment* of sovereignty, in which 'Indigenous bodies exude a political presence that moves Indigenous liberation beyond rational thought'.³⁵⁶ The Indigenous body is decolonised in its '*immediate materiality*'.³⁵⁷

2.6. The possibility of a reasoned critique of power

The oppressed exhibit different psychic responses to their objective and subjective alienation, ranging from internalisation, to violent rage, revenge fantasies, or successfully working through and healing from the trauma, and collectively resisting racial and colonial oppression to achieve

³⁵⁰ Brendan Hokowhitu, "Haka", 277.

³⁵¹ *Ibid.*

³⁵² *Ibid.*, 297-298.

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, 296.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 296. Talisa Kupenga, "PM talks to politics raised on Te Matatini stage", *Maori Television*, 25 February 2019, <https://www.maoritelevision.com/news/politics/pm-talks-politicsraised-on-te-matatini-stage>

³⁵⁵ Brendan Hokowhitu, "Haka", 298.

³⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

objective disalienation through decolonisation.³⁵⁸ As Fanon observes, ‘the settler can only achieve a pseudo petrification’.³⁵⁹ The argument that the reasoned critique of power is *insufficient* for dismantling inegalitarian social relations does not imply that such a reasoned critique of power is *unnecessary* or *impossible*. Because there is no outside to power, resistance must take the form of transforming existing relations of power and subjection in a transformative way.³⁶⁰ Fanon, Allen, and Hokowhitu all practice critical theory, with varying degrees of scepticism about the emancipatory potential of reason. Fanon ultimately determined political struggle to be necessary for objective and subjective disalienation, for decolonising the colonial world order.³⁶¹ Hokowhitu takes up Māori male physicality, and thus existing relations of power and subjection, in a radically transformative way, prioritising subjective over objective disalienation, *contra* Fanon.

Instead of purifying reason of its entanglements with power relations, Allen’s strategy is to take up the impurity of reason. Allen’s strategy does not entail *reducing* all forms of knowledge or reason to power and counter-power. Allen remains committed to, but realistic about, the emancipatory potential of practical reasoning. She claims that reason can both rationalise our naturalised thought and practice to both the oppressor and the oppressed alike, and empower subordinated subjects to resist, individually and collectively.³⁶² Moreover, genuine, non-strategic, communicative rationality and the critical-hermeneutical resources generated by subordinated subjects are needed for collective struggles to explain and transform ourselves and our world.³⁶³

What can no longer be maintained if we accept Allen’s normatively neutral account of *power-over*, *power-to*, and *power-with*, is Habermas’s ‘commitment to the context transcendence of

³⁵⁸ C.f. Margaret Kohn “Globalizing Global Justice”, 170.

³⁵⁹ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 53. Consider the words of 16-year-old Travelle: ‘My background is mixed, but I mostly identify with “black British”. *Society will always see me as black*. Being a black boy in London now can be frustrating, as everyone thinks the worst of you. I feel judged daily, by everybody, young and old. *Some of us conform to what’s expected, others fight it.*’ Emphasis added. “‘I feel judged daily, by everybody’: 16-year-old boys in pictures”, *The Guardian*, 9 March 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/gallery/2019/mar/09/i-feel-judged-daily-by-everybody-16-year-old-boys-in-pictures>

³⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 63

³⁶¹ Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 174.

³⁶² Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard “Power and Reason, Justice and Domination”, 9.

³⁶³ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 69.

validity claims and his staunch moral-political universalism'.³⁶⁴ What Allen's metacritique of our critical-hermeneutical resources rules out is the informally imperialist assumption that that our modern secular Western conception of practical reason is context-transcendent.³⁶⁵ Allen concludes that critical theory must be reconstructed on the basis of a form of contextualism that 'emphasizes our need both to posit context-transcending ideals and to continually unmask their status as illusions rooted in interest and power-laden contexts'.³⁶⁶

Forst's parting shot against Allen is that 'if we are "immanent" critics today and want to argue for social change, what are the criteria by which we choose which norms of "our" tradition we should appeal to' given that it is 'heavily marked by norms' of, *e.g.*, imperialism, nationalism, racism, and coloniality?³⁶⁷ Why choose norms of openness and inclusion over white supremacy? Why choose norms of cosmopolitanism over nationalism? Why choose norms of decolonisation over neocolonialism? To make the choice of immanent normative resources we must 'appeal to certain standards of justification that transcend that very context' even as we criticise our own critique if it 'reproduces new forms of one-sided and false justifications (as it possibly would)'.³⁶⁸

For example, when New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern presented the image of our country as peaceful, open, inclusive, and tolerant after the white supremacist terrorist attack that took the lives of 51 Muslims during Salat al-Jumu'ah on 8 Rajab 1440, she drew on our highest ideals by proclaiming "this is not us". Yet, as Māori public intellectual Moana Jackson observed, "we" are a white settler colony, and claiming that "this is not us" involves 'a deliberate misremembering of history that has obscured the reality of what colonisation really was and is'.³⁶⁹ There is a dangerous kind of arbitrariness involved in identifying with our nation's highest ideals

³⁶⁴ *Ibid*, 125.

³⁶⁵ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard "Power and Reason, Justice and Domination", 10.

³⁶⁶ Amy Allen, *The Politics of Our Selves*, 148.

³⁶⁷ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard "Power and Reason, Justice and Domination", 21.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid*, 11.

³⁶⁹ Moana Jackson, "The connection between white supremacy and colonisation", *E-Tangata*. March 24 2019, <https://e-tangata.co.nz/comment-and-analysis/the-connection-between-white-supremacy>

of peace, openness, inclusion, and tolerance, that can serve the ideological function of forgetting or misremembering the fact that ‘racism and white supremacy are the seminal papa, or foundation, of colonisation’, and endure in our ‘current constitutional, political and economic structures’.³⁷⁰

The sincere belief and sentiment that “this is not us” expresses ‘the “us” that ought to be, rather than the reality that the legacy of colonisation has left’.³⁷¹ While we are surely right to identify with the ideals of peace, openness, inclusion, and tolerance, immanent in Aotearoa/New Zealand’s contemporary form of life, and to reject white supremacy, the choice of normative resources must be vindicated. We must have grounds for judging between opposing ontological-normative claims to *who we are* in the sense *who we are struggling to become*, and opposing ontological-historical claims over *who we are* in the sense *how we came to be*. Both ontological moments must be integrated into a coherent narrative identity that enables “us” to explain and transform ourselves.³⁷²

Forst argues that “immanence” is ‘not a sufficient criterion for normative social criticism’, for without valid criteria for determining which of the norms of “our” tradition we can rationally appeal to, immanent critique may take on dangerous forms.³⁷³ Yet, ‘otherworldly transcendence or pure reason is not available either’ given the fact of reasonable pluralism and the need to reason across contexts, and so, Forst concludes, it is only the reflexive function of a fallible reason, embedded in concrete contexts, that has the power to critique justifications that is available to us as finite beings.³⁷⁴ For Allen, the issue is not whether we need rational standards of critique to struggle against unjust forms of power, but *the metanormative status of those standards*. Allen doesn’t ‘abandon the ideal of practical reason’ and its emancipatory power, however limited in reality, but argues that we must ‘conceptualize it differently, in a more humble, contingent, and modest or

³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁷¹ *Ibid.*

³⁷² David C. Atkinson, “It’s time for Australia and New Zealand to confront their white nationalist histories”, *The Washington Post*, March 15 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/03/15/its-time-australia-new-zealand-confront-their-white-nationalist-histories>

³⁷³ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard “Power and Reason, Justice and Domination: A Conversation”, 10.

³⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 22.

self-effacing way'.³⁷⁵ Any context-transcending standards of reasoning we appeal to in 'making our critical analysis will themselves be socially and historically situated, and thus bound up with relations of power'.³⁷⁶

2.7. Haere ki tua o te Paewai o te Rangi³⁷⁷

Allen argues that critical theorists must 'understand the normative status of the resources handed down by *our tradition* in a more modest and contextualist way than, for example, Habermas tends to do, with his stronger notion of context-transcendence'.³⁷⁸ So, how do we begin? For Allen, this task of unlearning falls on modern Western participants in global dialogues. This task involves a metacritique of our inherited Enlightenment philosophical conception of history as *History* – that is, as 'continuous, dialectical, and, above all, progressive',³⁷⁹ by philosophising the nexus of history and normativity – containing within it ideas of modernisation, development, historical progress, and sociocultural learning processes – with a hammer, fracturing lines of fragility.³⁸⁰ Allen proposes that to perform this task of unlearning, 'critical theory will need normative and conceptual resources other than those afforded by the left-Hegelian theory of historical progress and sociocultural development as a "fact"'.³⁸¹ The Frankfurt School of critical theory must draw on the immanent critical resources of its tradition, particularly its first generation, and from adjacent traditions, particularly genealogical analysis. By returning to Adorno and Foucault, Allen

³⁷⁵ Amy Allen (2017) *The End of Progress*, 155.

³⁷⁶ Amy Allen, Rainer Forst, and Mark Haugaard, "Power and Reason, Justice and Domination", 11.

³⁷⁷ Meaning to go beyond the horizon, where the ocean meets the sky and the terrestrial meets the celestial. To take this path is to follow Tāne's ascension to the heavens. Implies transcendence of the limits of knowledge. Kia ora Rangi Matamua, *Te Whānau Marama*, accessed 1 October 2019, https://prezi.com/wvika9_hrkvb/te-whanau-marama/

³⁷⁸ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 27. My italics.

³⁷⁹ Andreea Smaranda Aldea and Amy Allen, "History, Critique, and Freedom: The Historical A Priori in Husserl and Foucault", *Continental Philosophy Review* 49:1 (2016): 6.

³⁸⁰ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 1-36.

³⁸¹ *Ibid*, 31.

demonstrates that there are ‘resources immanent to the project of the Enlightenment that, when inherited in a radically transformative way, can be useful for this kind of learning to unlearn’.³⁸²

Allen clarifies that the aim of Foucault’s genealogical analytical method is not merely to subvert or vindicate – although it contains both subversive and vindictory moments – but to problematise our *historical a priori*.³⁸³ Genealogy problematises by demythologising the historical process of emergence, denaturalising the present, and understanding the contingent formation of our *historical a priori* as the product of both *continuous* and *disruptive* changes occurring along multiple interrelated vectors. This mode of analysis contrasts with the (progressive) generation or the (regressive) corruption of an original, essential, timeless, ahistorical, universal, unchanging form.³⁸⁴ Thus retelling the story of the emergence of late Western modernity without presupposing its victory is to ‘de-naturalize it by revealing its rootedness in so many contingent events, to analyze the historical conditions of possibility for thinking, being and doing, thereby opening up the space for thinking, being, and doing otherwise’, making us estranged from our socio-historical context.³⁸⁵

The real import of genealogy for decolonising the normative foundations of critical theory consists in its unmasking of the epistemic violence contained within modern Western values and conceptions of practical reason.³⁸⁶ Foucault’s method of problematising genealogy performs a metacritical function in decolonising critical theory by ‘revealing to us the contingency of our beliefs and normative commitments and showing us the ways that those beliefs and commitments have been contingently made up of complex relations of power, domination, and violence’.³⁸⁷

Fanon polemicalises:

The violence with which the supremacy of white values is affirmed and the aggressiveness which has permeated the victory of these values over the ways of life and of thought of the native mean that, in revenge, the native laughs in mockery when Western values are mentioned in front of him. In the

³⁸² *Ibid*, 209.

³⁸³ *Ibid*, 31.

³⁸⁴ Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History”, in *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984 [1977]), 77. Colin Koopman, *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2013), 44-45.

³⁸⁵ Andreea Smaranda Aldea and Amy Allen, “History, Critique, and Freedom”, 8.

³⁸⁶ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 32. My italics.

³⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 209.

colonial context the settler only ends his work of breaking in the native when the latter admits loudly and intelligibly the supremacy of the white man's values. In the period of decolonization, the colonized masses mock at these very values, insult them, and vomit them up.³⁸⁸

Allen's reconstruction of the method of immanent critique through her reading of Adorno and Foucault is meant to make possible the sort of cosmopolitan dialogue about the post-Western and post-secular future of world order envisaged by Habermas, by helping us to attain a stance of epistemic or metanormative humility that enables openness and inclusiveness toward the other. Only by becoming alienated from our *historical a priori* by recognising our knowledge, thought, imagination, rationality, subjectivity, and agency as limited to the possibilities inherent in our contemporary form of life, and the violence through which our present time was constituted, is it possible for "us" to open up to and include others in global dialogue.³⁸⁹

Allen's approach to grounding the normativity of critique delinks our first-order normative commitments from any claim about whether our post-traditional, hyper-reflexive form of life in which our norms are embedded is developmentally superior to traditional and non-modern forms of life.³⁹⁰ Allen's *metanormative contextualism* is internally related to the corrective epistemic virtues of humility and modesty, insofar as it is the reflection of "our" post-Enlightenment first-order normative principles – openness, inclusion, hyper-reflexivity, equality, autonomy, etc. – on to the metanormative order.³⁹¹ These values demand of us, Allen claims, an awareness of the violence inherent in them and so an attitude of modesty or humility regarding their status and authority.³⁹² Allen claims that this stance does not imply rejecting the 'reflexivity afforded to us by the epistemic and normative resources of modernity', but is the 'further elaboration of it'.³⁹³ The relentless immanent auto-critique of late Western modernity by the performance of genealogical

³⁸⁸ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 42.

³⁸⁹ Amy Allen, "Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress: Critical Theory in Postcolonial Times", in *Critical Theory in Critical Times: Transforming the Global Political & Economic Order*, eds. Penelope Deutscher and Cristina Lafont (New York: Columbia University Press, 20017), 197.

³⁹⁰ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 229.

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, 218.

³⁹² *Ibid*, 202. My italics.

³⁹³ *Ibid*, 31.

problematisation, Allen concludes, is the ‘fuller realization’ of the ideal of autonomy inherited from the European Enlightenment.³⁹⁴ Because traditions or forms of life are open and interconnected, we don’t have to think of ourselves as limited to these particular critical-hermeneutical resources, nor should we think of the Enlightenment inheritance as uniquely “ours”.³⁹⁵

Allen comes perilously close to making the ‘tacit assumption that the Western archive is sufficient alone for the task’ of problematising the self/other relation, which Robbie Shilliam sees as typical of postmodernism and poststructuralism: ‘one does not need to leave home to know the world; the world comes into view once we have already constructed a (European) worldview’.³⁹⁶ Enlightenment ideas of History, civilisation, progress, modernisation, and development have long been the targets of postmodern and poststructuralist auto-critique,³⁹⁷ and the entanglements of postmodernism and post-/structuralism with the colonial context and with postcolonial thought are well studied.³⁹⁸ Western thought, its periodic critical turns against itself, and its divisions and reunifications, is a local history. Modernity *qua* coloniality poses a different set of strategic, ethical, political, and philosophical problems for the West’s others or geo-cultural outsiders.

Decolonial thinkers respond to local and planetary struggles, needs, and hopes that are not necessarily those that ‘prompted the thoughts of modern, postmodern, and poststructuralist European thinkers’.³⁹⁹ Decoloniality is not limited to the critical deconstruction and reconstruction of historicist/modern Western thought, or history as *History*, from within its limits. We must set out from the other side of History, in Ranajit Guha’s formulation.⁴⁰⁰ George Ciccariello-Maher, for example, draws this same conceptual distinction between decolonisation from within and from

³⁹⁴ *Ibid*, 208.

³⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

³⁹⁶ Robbie Shilliam (2010) “The Perilous Terrain of the Non-West”, 22.

³⁹⁷ Ramón Grosfoguel, “Decolonizing Post-Colonial Studies and Paradigms of Political-Economy”, *Transmodernity Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic World* 1:1 (2011): 2.

³⁹⁸ See Robert J. C. Young, *White Mythologies: Writing History and the West* (New York: Routledge, 2002). See also Sebastiano Maffettone, “Post-modern Post-colonial Theory versus Political Liberalism: Avoiding the *Liason Dangereuse* in Global Justice and IR Theory” in *Global Justice: Critical Perspectives*, edited by Sebastiano Maffettone and Aakash Singh Rathore (New Delhi, Routledge India, 2012), 176-192.

³⁹⁹ Walter D. Mignolo, “Decolonizing Western Epistemology/Building Decolonial Epistemologies”, 29.

⁴⁰⁰ Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 8.

without, arguing that this spatial formulation points toward the unity of content and method of decolonial critique: ‘the question of geographic and epistemic “exteriority” is itself a central foothold for building a truly decolonial critical theory’.

Whereas the first, more internal approach centers on “Critical Theory” (a proper noun), the second brings critical theories (a plural, common noun) of race and colonialism to bear both *on* the European canon and beyond it. Whereas the first pulls us back toward an immanent critique that builds on fractures and potentialities *internal* to the Frankfurt School, I argue that to put weight on the second leg is to open up that far more ambitious horizon that Nelson Maldonado-Torres calls – in a decolonial détournement of Habermas – the “unfinished project of decolonization”.⁴⁰¹

Mignolo explains that the metaphor of exteriority does not mean ‘lying untouched beyond capitalism and modernity, but the outside that is needed by the inside... the *borderland* seen from the perspective of those “to be included”, as they have no other option’.⁴⁰²

Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutical concept of horizon registers thought in the temporality of *past* (tradition, history), *present* (culture, society), and *future* (expectations, projects).⁴⁰³

Decolonial theorists conceptualise the limits of thought spatially as frontier or border rather than as horizon. Whereas horizons are “fused” and “transcended”, in the (neo)colonial encounter with the other, the West’s frontiers are “bordered”, “policed”, “surveilled”, “militarised”, “securitised”, “crossed” (legally or illegally). Frontiers are sites of conflict and war. Frontiers are the advancing borders of the expansion of white settlers in to Indigenous territories.⁴⁰⁴ Frontiers are sites of imperial conquest and transferrals of sovereignty claims over Indigenous populations and their lands, water, and resources.⁴⁰⁵ Borders are political technologies of self-constitution by exclusion. Mignolo argues that *border thinking*, thinking on the borders of the modern/colonial world is the necessary condition to think decolonially. These are not the borders of nation-states or the European Union, but ‘epistemic and ontological borders’.⁴⁰⁶ As Fred Dallmayr argues,

⁴⁰¹ George Ciccariello-Maher, “Decolonizing Theory from Within or Without? A Reply to Baum”, *Constellations*, 23:1 (2016): 133.

⁴⁰² Walter D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis”, *Public Culture*, 12:3 (2000): 724.

⁴⁰³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).

⁴⁰⁴ John Mack Faragher, “Commentary: Settler colonial Studies and the North American Frontier”, *Settler Colonial Studies*, 4:2 (2014): 181-191.

⁴⁰⁵ Robert Jackson ed., *New Views of Borderlands History* (Albuquerque, University of New Mexico Press, 1998).

⁴⁰⁶ Walter D. Mignolo, “Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing”, 276-277.

reconceiving the image of the horizon as border or frontier enables Western thinkers as equal participants in cosmopolitan dialogue to avoid relapsing into the ‘particularly Western temptation’ to leap into meta-theory (as Allen does), ‘encouraging the pretense of a “superior” standpoint’.⁴⁰⁷ If “we”, are to enter into dialogue with non-Western subjects about the post-Western, post-secular future of world order, then we must *shift our geography of reasoning* from imperialism to decoloniality.⁴⁰⁸

2.8. Immanent, all too immanent?

Allen set out to overcome the performative contradiction she read in Habermas’s advocacy of open and inclusive dialogue about the post-Western, post-secular future of world order, and his grounding of his strong context-transcendent conception of rationality in a progressive reading of Western modernity. Yet, her immanent critique through the *fuller realisation* of the normative content of Enlightenment modernity is insufficient to undermine security of the epistemic frontiers of Western thought reinforced by Habermas’s subjective certainty of the orientation that ‘overcoming Eurocentrism demands that the West make proper use of *its own* cognitive resources’ – *Westernising Western thought*, as it were.⁴⁰⁹ Allen pre-empts the criticism that her deconstruction and reconstruction of the Frankfurt School of critical theory is ‘just another Eurocentric critique of Eurocentrism’, insofar as she is too committed to ‘a kind of decolonization from within... when what is needed is a more radical decolonization from without’.⁴¹⁰ Allen responds to her critics that her modest ambition was to decolonise the normative foundations of the Frankfurt School. Allen claims that she does not ‘pretend to develop either a critical theory of imperialism or of decolonization, nor... a fully decolonized critical theory, much less a decolonial critical theory’.⁴¹¹

⁴⁰⁷ Fred R. Dallmayr, “Borders or Horizons? Gadamer and Habermas Revisited”, *Chicago-Kent Law Review*, 76 (2000): 850-851.

⁴⁰⁸ Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity*, 285.

⁴⁰⁹ Jürgen Habermas and Eduardo Mendieta, “A Conversation about God and the World,” 155-156. My italics.

⁴¹⁰ Amy Allen, “Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress”, 202. My italics.

⁴¹¹ Amy Allen, “Decolonization, Normativity, and the Critique of Capitalism: Reply to Critics”, in *Liberating Critical Theory: Eurocentrism, Normativity, and Capitalism: Symposium on Amy Allen’s The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, *Political Theory*, (2018): 22.

To be sure, Allen does recognise the need for decolonisation from without, and is only arguing that decolonisation from within is a condition of possibility for Western subjects to enter open and inclusive cosmopolitan dialogue with others. Allen's careful response is that the kind of Eurocentric internal decolonial critique that she performs is 'insufficient for the project of fully decolonizing critical theory', yet, 'not unnecessary'.⁴¹² The proposition that auto-critique is not unnecessary is plausible given Allen's claim that the metanormative commitment of critical theory to progress as a "fact" is an insuperable obstacle to open and inclusive cosmopolitan dialogue. Allen rightly argues that those who epistemic injustice privileges are responsible for performing the ethical task of unlearning and cultivating the virtues that make us open to it. By restricting her primary positive aim to decolonising the normative foundations of the Frankfurt School's critique of global modernity, Allen practices the epistemic humility and modesty she preaches.

Performatively, Allen's enlightenment about the blind spots of the Frankfurt School has come from beyond the Western canon, modelling the unlearning made possible by a stance of openness 'from within to the kind of post- and decolonial theorizing that it needs to take on board if it is to be truly critical'.⁴¹³ The image of the fracture on the front cover of *The End of Progress* is taken from Gayatri Spivak's postcolonial challenge 'to reopen the epistemic fracture of imperialism without succumbing to a nostalgia for lost origins',⁴¹⁴ and Dipesh Chakrabarty's postcolonial insight that 'the subaltern fractures from within'.⁴¹⁵ Allen draws extensively on the critiques of History, Orientalism, Eurocentric knowledge production, and Third World nationalism performed by the Subaltern Studies Group and its literary cousin, postcolonialism, with their insider/outsider status in relation to Western thought.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹² Amy Allen, "Adorno, Foucault, and the End of Progress", 202.

⁴¹³ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 6.

⁴¹⁴ Gayatri Spivak, "Three Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism," in *Feminist Postcolonial Theory: A Reader*, eds. Reina Lewis and Sara Mills (Hoboken, N.J. : Taylor and Francis, 2013), 321.

⁴¹⁵ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*, 94.

⁴¹⁶ Dipesh Chakrabarty, "Subaltern Studies and Postcolonial Historiography", *Nepantla: Views from The South* 1:1 (2000): 9-10.

The text opens with Edward Said's postcolonial critique of the Frankfurt School for its false universalism and stunning silence, given its explicitly stated ethical and political solidarity with the struggles of the suffering and oppressed, 'on racist theory, anti-imperialist resistance, and oppositional practice in the empire' – a silence motivated by the *idea of empire*, nourished by a 'philosophical and cultural imaginary that justifies the subjection of distant territories and their native populations through claims that such people are less advanced, cognitively inferior, and therefore naturally subordinate'.⁴¹⁷ Allen draws on Spivak's postcolonial feminist analysis of the complexities of discourse between hegemon and subaltern. On Allen's reading, Spivak reveals how 'narratives of progress and development... have typically served to make some voices audible while silencing or drowning out others', which 'allows us to see how the issues of practical reason, discursive justification, and narratives of progress are deeply intertwined'.⁴¹⁸ Spivak's analysis of the 'vast differences of power and privilege across the (post)colonial divide, but also to the vast differences of power and privilege *within* the category of postcolonial subjects' forces us to 'critically interrogate the power investments and normative exclusions of our own practices and languages of justification', on Allen's reading.⁴¹⁹

Allen's engagement with postcolonialism, and the prior engagement of postcolonialism with the European canon, remind us that traditions are connected, not autonomously constituted, and changing. The antithesis of internal and external critique is a false and misleading one, on my reading of Allen. The frontier, border, or limit of sociohistorically contingent traditions in which practices of reasoning are embedded, is an *opening*.⁴²⁰ However, Shilliam cautions that the solution to the impasses of postmodern and poststructuralist critiques of colonial modernity is not to appropriate 'non-Western thought into the expanding archive of the Western Academy, for that

⁴¹⁷ Amy Allen (2017) *The End of Progress*, 1.

⁴¹⁸ *Ibid*, 154-155.

⁴¹⁹ *Ibid*, 159.

⁴²⁰ *C.f.* Habermas on Hegel's dialectic of the limit. Jürgen Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method*", in *Understanding and Social Inquiry*, eds. Fred Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), 335.

is a continuation in the intellectual sphere of imperial expansion and colonial rule'.⁴²¹ The metaphor of the epistemic frontier highlights the perils of the norm of inclusion. Does the inclusion of the other continue the colonial enterprise? Is the cost of openness and inclusion intellectual appropriation and the annexation of Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholarship, and critical race theory to a hegemonic agenda?⁴²² The ethical corrective to problematic scholarly exclusions, Shilliam argues, is rather to 'undermine the security of an epistemological cartography that quarantines legitimate knowledge production of modernity to one (idealized) geo-cultural site'.⁴²³ On this count, the ambitions of Allen's project are too modest. By intervening in the debates between the global third generation of the Frankfurt School over the complex relations between reason, progress, context, and power, and the implications for cosmopolitan dialogue, I have argued that decolonisation *from within* is insufficient for the tasks of deconstruction and reconstruction. How, then, should we decolonise cosmopolitanism?

2.9. Deconstruction and reconstruction

Western cosmopolitanism is clearly entangled in an *ironic* relationship with global coloniality, and has moments of closure and exclusion that straightforwardly *contradict* "our" post-Enlightenment modern ideals and liberal discourse.⁴²⁴ The dominant paradigms, narratives, frames, and canonical texts in international relations scholarship silence non-Western voices and ignore the archives of non-Western histories, values, traditions, practices, struggles, and thought.⁴²⁵ Yet, even the boundary policing between Western and non-Western thought 'raises the question of how we are defining our terms' when understood in global historical context. Mills reminds us:

⁴²¹ Robbie Shilliam, "The Perilous Terrain of the Non-West", 24.

⁴²² *C.f.* Patricia Hill Collins, "Critical Interventions in Western Social Theory: Reflections on Power and *Southern Theory*", *Decentering Social Theory*, ed. Julian Go (Bingley: Emerald, 2013), 140-141.

⁴²³ *Ibid.*

⁴²⁴ Julian Go, "Fanon's Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism", *European Journal of Social Theory*, 16:2 (2013): 211.

⁴²⁵ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "Introduction: International Relations, Eurocentrism, and Imperialism", *Decolonising International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 1-9.

From modernity up to the mid-twentieth century what we know as the “West” was a series of empires that, by the beginnings of the twentieth century, jointly occupied most of the planet. So from the modern period onwards to the second half of the twentieth century, Western political rule gradually extends over, and is contested by, people who, at least in this juridical sense, are part of the West, if rarely given substantively (and often not even nominally) equal rights within it. The oppositional political texts they produce are to that extent “Western” also, and can be excluded only at the cost of admitting that the canon is constructed primarily of the rationalizers of the existing order, not its opponents... Marcus Garvey and Mahatma Gandhi, by virtue of being Jamaican and Indian, were subjects of the British Empire; Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon, by virtue of being Martinican, were citizens of overseas France. In that sense, these are “Western” political theorists, engaged in debate with the Western polity imposed on them, even if one-sidedly so, and getting no or little response.⁴²⁶

Postcolonialism deconstructs binary oppositions of identity and alterity, interiority and exteriority, inclusion and exclusion, openness and closure. These binary oppositions are replaced by concepts of connection, relationality, and contrapuntality, in recognition of the mutual constitution and interdependence of master and slave, oppressor and oppressed, coloniser and colonised, civilisation and barbarism, modernity and tradition, metropole and colony.⁴²⁷ Thus, one option, suggested by the general tendency of postcolonialism is toward notions of hybridity, métissage, and créolité,⁴²⁸ is that cosmopolitanism could be *reconstructed* to be more open and inclusive in order to attain more fully the goals it has set for itself. Openness and inclusion are needed for our theory and practice to be “truly cosmopolitan” – and this task could be seen to follow straightforwardly from the very definition of cosmopolitanism, as if *decolonising cosmopolitanism* were merely the fuller realisation of Western cosmopolitanism: *cosmopolitanising cosmopolitanism*.⁴²⁹

One compelling argument for *globalising global justice*, is that despite the moral commitment of cosmopolitans to powerful visions and theorisations of global justice, the sustained engagement with the epistemic and normative issues raised variously by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists that is necessary for global justice, has not occurred.⁴³⁰ As Krushil Watene argues, it follows from a serious ethical commitment to ‘pursuing and realising justice in our world today’, that scholars ‘must accept that much more

⁴²⁶ Charles W. Mills, “Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy”, 7.

⁴²⁷ Robert J. C. Young “What is the Postcolonial?”, 13-15.

⁴²⁸ Paul Gilroy, *The Black Atlantic* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 3.

⁴²⁹ Matheson Russell, *Habermas and Politics*, 119: ‘this line of criticism is ultimately not a repudiation of the Habermasian conception of discourse but rather an attempt to more adequately realise its ideal.’ C.f. 196.

⁴³⁰ Margaret Kohn, “Globalizing Global Justice”, 163.

cross-cultural and intercultural conversations about justice are urgently required'.⁴³¹ Brock argues that global justice debates need to cross disciplinary boundaries, and become more inclusive of a wider range of different perspectives, for example.⁴³² Yet, Western thinkers have been resistant to reading the texts of Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists and listening to and learning from subaltern others. Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride remark that this is 'particularly remarkable considering how many of the more vibrant issues in contemporary political thought – such as global justice, multicultural citizenship, and human rights – would be enriched' by the inclusion of the other.⁴³³ While this argument is compelling, we can conclude from my intervention into the debates between the third generation of the Frankfurt School and their decolonial interlocutors, that it is insufficient for Western cosmopolitanism to open up and include non-Western thinkers and thought.

The image of “two-way” dialogue between Western and non-Western thinkers and thought, in contrast to the “one-sided” monologue on world order, reproduces Eurocentrism. Mignolo excavates the complex and planetary genealogy of the norm of inclusion. The emergence of the norm of inclusion is a story with *Christianising* (Spanish and Portuguese), *civilising* (French and English), and *modernising* (American and European) moments corresponding to phases in the development and expansion the capitalist world system, and the location of its hegemonic states.⁴³⁴ The inclusion of the other is co-original with the modern/colonial world order emergent from the Atlantic commercial circuit built on the African slave trade, centred on *orbis universalis christiannus*.⁴³⁵

⁴³¹ Krushil Watene, “Indigenous Peoples and Justice”, in *Theorizing Justice: Critical Insights and Future Directions*, eds. Krushil Watene and Jay Drydyk (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2016), 147.

⁴³² Gillian Brock, “Some Future Directions for Global Justice”, *Ethics*, 10:3 (2014): 255.

⁴³³ Margaret Kohn and Keally McBride, *Political Theories of Decolonization: Postcolonialism and the Problem of Foundations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 1. Or rather, we should say, because there is globally already a richness of counter-hegemonic Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial thought, and critical race theory contemporary with, and on the borders of, Western political philosophy, the latter is impoverished by its limited Eurocentric perspective and disciplinary exclusions.

⁴³⁴ Walter D. Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis”, 732.

⁴³⁵ *Ibid.* See also: Walter D. Mignolo, “Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference” in *Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the Postcolonial Debate*, eds. Mabel Moraña, Enrique D. Dussel, and Carlos A. Jáuregui, (Durham, Duke University Press, 2008), 226, 228, 248 and Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 27.

Habermas's vision of cosmopolitan dialogue is a variation on this theme.⁴³⁶ While Allen argues that Habermas's reconstructivist strategy for grounding the normativity of critique is an insurmountable obstacle to realising this vision, she preserves and radicalises the idea that the West needs to open up from within, and include the other. The issue is that norms of openness and inclusion pragmatically and grammatically presuppose that the one who is open and inclusive is already within the centre from which it is possible to think and practice openness and inclusion.⁴³⁷

Extending this line of thought, Bhambra argues that discourses of openness, inclusion, pluralism, and multiculturalism in global or cosmopolitan sociology naturalise closures and exclusions as 'issues of identity, not methodology or disciplinary construction'.⁴³⁸ This 'ahistorical, or perhaps even wrongly historical' framing limits the potential for dialogue and mutual learning.⁴³⁹ The hopeful picture of open and inclusive cosmopolitan dialogue and mutual learning is thus deeply problematic – ahistoricising and depoliticising reason in ways that are fundamentally contested by epistemic decolonisation. Decoloniality is not the opening of closed Western systems of thought and the inclusion of the excluded other from within Western thought, but the external critique of Western discursive practices of knowledge production.⁴⁴⁰

Transformation must come from without, by silenced and marginalised voices bringing themselves into decentred cosmopolitan dialogues. These thinkers are not waiting to be included by the hegemonic West.⁴⁴¹ The West's epistemic frontiers must be questioned, rethought, and opened up *from without* by geographically-situated scholarly traditions and embodied knowers.⁴⁴² We must act on Fanon's imperative for imperial subjects and white settlers to 'change sides' at the frontiers between the 'two zones' reproduced by the Western-dominated world order:⁴⁴³ zones of

⁴³⁶ Walter D. Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis", 731.

⁴³⁷ *Ibid*, 736-737. My italics.

⁴³⁸ Gurinder K. Bhambra, *Connected Sociologies*, 93.

⁴³⁹ *Ibid*.

⁴⁴⁰ Zeynep Gulsah Capan (2017) "Decolonising International Relations?", 9.

⁴⁴¹ Walter D. Mignolo (2002) "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis", 741.

⁴⁴² Zeynep Gulsah Capan, "Decolonising International Relations?", 8-9.

⁴⁴³ Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 2-7, 235.

being and non-being divided by what W.E.B. Du Bois called the ‘global color line’.⁴⁴⁴ This shift in our geography of reasoning is a different approach to cultivating the corrective epistemic virtues to approaches that open and include others in the zone of being, rather than rezoning the world.

Decolonising Cosmopolitanism therefore adapts Mills’s project in *The Racial Contract*. It abolishes the borders between the mainstream, white, Western cosmopolitan tradition, and the ‘world of Native American, African American, and Third and Fourth World political thought, historically focused on issues of conquest, imperialism, colonialism, white settlement, land rights, race and racism, slavery, jim crow, reparations, apartheid, cultural authenticity, national identity, indigenismo, Afrocentrism, etc.’.⁴⁴⁵ Paul Gilroy describes the reconstruction of cosmopolitanism as an act of ‘conceptual and political salvage’, and as ‘a delicate operation with several elements’.⁴⁴⁶ This is not a ‘different interpretation of the *same* ideas, but the bringing into being of *new* understandings’, Bhambra elaborates, new understandings of cosmopolitanism ‘reconfigure our existing perceptions of the world, as well as inform the ways in which we live in the world’.⁴⁴⁷ Decolonial cosmopolitanism is not just a matter of recognising value pluralism, appropriating non-Western perspectives into the Western canon, or fully realising latent Western ideals of openness and inclusion. It involves questioning the legitimacy and validity of the previously accepted parameters of scholarship,⁴⁴⁸ primarily, the frontiers of Western thought.

2.10. Conclusion

My decolonial intervention into the contemporary debates within the global third generation of the Frankfurt School and with their subaltern interlocutors has revealed what it means for practices

⁴⁴⁴ Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda and Robbie Shilliam, “Confronting the Global Colour Line: an Introduction”, in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*, eds. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015). 1-16.

⁴⁴⁵ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 4.

⁴⁴⁶ Paul Gilroy, “Postcolonialism and Cosmopolitanism”, 256.

⁴⁴⁷ Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Cosmopolitanism and Postcolonial Critique” in *The Ashgate Companion to Cosmopolitanism*, eds. M. Rovisco and M. Nowicka (Ashgate, 2011), 323.

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 326.

of reasoning to be embodied, embedded in sociohistorical and geographical context, and entangled in power relations. Allen's modest conclusion that there are immanent resources within the horizon of Western modernity that are useful, particularly to Western participants in dialogue and mutual learning processes, for decolonising critical theory, has merits. But openness and inclusion are insufficient tools for decolonising cosmopolitanism. Allen's fuller realisation of the unfinished project of modernity is problematic. We must deconstruct the West's epistemic frontiers, and reconstruct a decolonised cosmopolitanism. Who we are and how we are positioned determines the work that we must do. Cosmopolitans must identify our positionality within the modern colonial global power structure, shift our geography of reasoning, and question, rethink, and open the frontiers of Western thought *from within and without*.

Cosmopolitanism must be reframed, reimagined, reinterpreted, and reinscribed in the light of the negative decolonial critique of the Eurocentric frames, narratives, limits, and exclusions of Western cosmopolitanism. As Monique Deveaux and Kathryn Walker, a 'truly critical approach to issues of global inequality and injustice' must be conscious of the historical legacy of Western imperialism and colonialism as scholars endeavour to reimagine and reconceive justice from new perspectives and by asking different questions.⁴⁴⁹ This task of deconstruction and reconstruction means including new voices in existing debates and revising old topics from new perspectives and on new terms, and examining new topics proposed by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists – such as land and water rights.⁴⁵⁰ In the remainder of §1. *Kia Whakatōmuri te Haere Whakamua* I grapple with the transdisciplinary and historical critical social theoretical questions of decolonisation that Allen leaves unanswered, and continue, as Jakeet Singh puts it, the 'actual work of deep engagement, dialogue and learning across subaltern difference', gestured toward by the third generation of the Frankfurt School.⁴⁵¹

⁴⁴⁹ Monique Deveaux and Kathryn Walker "Critical Approaches to Global Justice: At the Frontier", 114.

⁴⁵⁰ Anke Graness, "Is the Debate on 'Global Justice' a Global One? Some Considerations in View of Modern Philosophy in Africa", *Journal of Global Ethics*, 11:1 (2015): 137.

⁴⁵¹ Jakeet Singh, "Colonial Pasts, Decolonial Futures: Allen's *The End of Progress*", *Theory & Event*, 19:4 (2016): 4.

3. Western Origins/Cosmopolitan Ends

I hear the storm.

They talk to me about progress, about ‘achievements’, diseases cured, improved standards of living. *I* am talking about societies drained of their essence, cultures trampled underfoot, institutions undermined, lands confiscated, religions smashed, magnificent artistic creations destroyed, extraordinary *possibilities* wiped out...

Europe is responsible before the human community for the highest heap of corpses in human history.
– Amelé Cesare, *Discourse on Colonialism*.⁴⁵²

If you stick a knife in my back nine inches and pull it out six inches, there’s no progress. If you pull it all the way out that’s not progress. Progress is healing the wound that the blow made. And they haven’t even pulled the knife out, much less healed the wound. They won’t even admit the knife is there!

– Malcolm X, March 1964.

A construction of history that looks backwards, rather than forward, at the destruction of material nature as it has already taken place, provides dialectical contrast to the futurist myth of historical progress (which can only be sustained by forgetting what has happened).

– Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing*.⁴⁵³

In its original formulation, philosophy presupposes not merely belief in progress but the conviction that the march of time is never detached from European tutelage. What happens when the barbarians at the gates either wish to reject pedagogical dependence or elect to construct alternative spatio-temporal horizons?

Liberated from colonial entrapment, both as physical confinement and mental incarceration, received rules may not appear so attractive.

– Kamal Mustapha Pasha, “Decolonizing the Anarchical Society”.⁴⁵⁴

3.1. A renewed critical social theory with decolonial cosmopolitan intent

In this chapter, my main aim is to deconstruct and reconstruct cosmopolitan critical social theory.

The Frankfurt School of critical social theory is methodologically distinct from analytic political philosophy insofar as its method of rational reconstruction of prevailing normative orders is one side of an analytical lens that has as its converse side an explanatory-diagnostic function through which the findings and methods of the social sciences are appropriated to analyse the crisis

⁴⁵² In Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman, *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (London: Routledge, 2013), 178.

⁴⁵³ Susan Buck-Morss, *The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), 95.

⁴⁵⁴ Kamal Mustapha Pasha, “Decolonizing the Anarchical Society” in *The Anarchical Society at 40: Contemporary Challenges and Prospects*, eds. Hidemi Suganami, Madeline Carr, and Adam Humphreys (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 105.

tendencies of the present.⁴⁵⁵ Critical social theory must be responsive not only to the struggles and wishes of the age, but also to the contemporary developments across the academic disciplines.⁴⁵⁶ Normativity cannot be freestanding. Critical theory, Benhabib explains, without an empirical explanatory-diagnostic dimension, would dissolve into mere normative political philosophy.⁴⁵⁷ Conversely, without the anticipatory-utopian dimension, critical theory would be indistinguishable from traditional social theory.⁴⁵⁸ Traditional theory, including mid-range theory, is marked by what Robert Cox termed a problem-solving approach that serves powerful interests in the reproduction of existing social and world orders. Critical theory, by contrast, ‘allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world’.⁴⁵⁹ Theory, indeed, ‘is always *for* someone and *for* some purpose’.⁴⁶⁰

Allen’s immanent decolonial critique was limited to the normative foundations of the Frankfurt School. She did not deconstruct and reconstruct the explanatory-diagnostic dimension of critical social theory, which has led some anti-imperialist critics to charge her with advancing a ‘dematerialized and culturalist conception of colonialism’⁴⁶¹ or a ‘problematically idealist portrait of imperialism... as pertaining to a specific epistemic stance, especially one associated with making “universal claims” that are false, self-congratulatory, or both’.⁴⁶² Robert Nichols argues that Allen’s decolonial critique of the left-Hegelian strategy for grounding the normativity of critique is not a

⁴⁵⁵ Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 142.

⁴⁵⁶ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 41.

⁴⁵⁷ Seyla Benhabib, *Critique, Norm, and Utopia*, 142.

⁴⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁵⁹ Robert Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory”, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 10:2 (1981): 130.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 128-129.

⁴⁶¹ Yves Winter (2018) “Formally Decolonized but Still Neocolonial?”, in *Liberating Critical Theory: Eurocentrism, Normativity, and Capitalism: Symposium on Amy Allen’s The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, Columbia University Press, 2016. *Political Theory*. 17.

⁴⁶² Robert Nichols “Progress, Empire, and Social Theory: Comments on The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory”, in *Liberating Critical Theory: Eurocentrism, Normativity, and Capitalism: Symposium on Amy Allen’s The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory*, *Political Theory* (2018): 10.

‘very convincing picture of anything that might actually conform to imperialism as a form of social and political domination’.⁴⁶³ He argues that to explain and transform our world, we need to reconstruct ‘an alternative social theory, one that has better explanatory power over [global social] processes, their tendencies and contradictions’.⁴⁶⁴ Allen’s focus on normative foundations leads her to adopt her own kind of ‘political philosophy as applied ethics’ method that sacrifices the methodological distinctiveness of the Frankfurt School of critical theory.⁴⁶⁵ While, unlike Forst, Allen does not split the constructive and the critical tasks of theory, her oeuvre is part of the same shift away from critical theory as an historical and transdisciplinary research agenda and theoretical paradigm in social theory. Forst’s neo-Kantian constructivism and Allen’s poststructuralist critique of normativity are the two fronts that threaten to weaken the link between analysis and normative critique integral to the left-Hegelian project.⁴⁶⁶

In McCarthy’s formulation, the rational reconstructivist diagnosis of contemporary social pathologies has the form of a ‘prospective retrospective from vantage points opened up by a practical interest in the future’.⁴⁶⁷ The agenda of the Frankfurt School changes with the times. Allen’s hyper-reflexivity about the normative foundations of the Frankfurt School responds to some of the contemporary challenges of our neocolonial reality, and to the struggles, voices, perspectives, and thought of the oppressed, more adequately than many of her contemporaries. As Allen argues, a central target of postcolonial and decolonial critiques is the developmental, evolutionary, or progressive (mis)reading of universal history to which the left-Hegelian reconstructivist research programme remains committed.⁴⁶⁸ This is the central historiographical

⁴⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶⁴ Robert Nichols, “Progress, Empire, and Social Theory”, 13.

⁴⁶⁵ Allen diagnoses a much clearer instance this problem in Forst’s Kantian constructivist reconstruction of the Frankfurt School in *The End of Progress*, 16, 125, 150, 160, 161.

⁴⁶⁶ Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi, *Capitalism: A Conversation in Critical Theory* (Medford: Polity Press, 2018), 12-17.

⁴⁶⁷ Thomas McCarthy, “History and Evolution: *Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus*” in *The Habermas Handbook*, eds. Hauke Brunkhorst, Regina Kreide, and Cristina Lafont (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 331.

⁴⁶⁸ Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*, 24.

struggle of our time.⁴⁶⁹ Yet, as a result of Allen's decolonial intervention, the internal connection between the explanatory-diagnostic and the anticipatory-utopian dimensions of critical theory are considerably weakened against the standard set by the second generation of the Frankfurt School and upheld by her contemporaries, notably Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi. Must the rejection of the idea of progress as fact underwriting the left-Hegelian reconstructivist research programme necessarily weaken the unity of actuality and normativity? Of analysis and critique? Taking *the end of progress* as a new beginning for critical social theory, I argue not. Decolonial and postcolonial interventions into, and expropriations of, contemporary humanities and social sciences, have not had this consequence for the struggle to explain and transform ourselves and our world.

Contemporary social theory must be critical, historical, transdisciplinary, and cosmopolitan if it is to be responsive to the major social trends and crises of our times.⁴⁷⁰ For methodological nationalism lacks explanatory power over global and transnational 'interdependences, processes, power relations, and causalities'.⁴⁷¹ The nation-state itself is not a natural, static, autarkic, independent object but 'entity-in-motion that is embedded within, and formed by, wider flows, circuits, and networks' that can only be understood at global and macrohistorical levels and scales of analysis.⁴⁷² But, once we move beyond the national frame to global historical sociology, we are 'inevitably forced to rethink Eurocentric epistemological assumptions about temporal linearity' and progress.⁴⁷³ Yet, even cosmopolitan critical social theory paradigms are marked by a retrograde and insidious methodological Eurocentrism that can no longer serve as a viable framework for scholarship on empirical and normative grounds. There is therefore a need for a second, decolonial moment of critique to overcome the Eurocentric limitations of cosmopolitan critical social theory.

⁴⁶⁹ Julian Saurin, "International Relations as the Imperial Illusion; or, the Need to Decolonize IR" in *Decolonising International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 37.

⁴⁷⁰ Daniel Chernilo, "Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory", in *The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory*, ed. Byran S. Turner (Blackwell Publishing, 2009), 544.

⁴⁷¹ Ulrich Beck, "Toward a New Critical Theory with a Cosmopolitan Intent", *Constellations*, 10:4 (2003): 461.

⁴⁷² Julian Go and George Lawson, "Introduction: For a Global Historical Sociology", in *Global Historical Sociology*, eds. Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 13.

⁴⁷³ *Ibid.*

As Gilroy argues, a reconstructed cosmopolitanism may enable social theory to transcend its Eurocentric limits and contribute a new worldly reflexivity to a cosmopolitanised public sphere.⁴⁷⁴

If it can be done, then decolonising cosmopolitanism shows one viable way forward for an historical and transdisciplinary cosmopolitan critical social theory that preserves the unity of actuality and normativity after the collapse of the left-Hegelian project under the weight of postcolonial and decolonial critiques of modern progress and Eurocentrism. The central issue is that the unity of actuality and normativity in cosmopolitan critical social theory paradigms is sustained by a story that I call *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends*. Salvaging a decolonial cosmopolitan critical social theory necessitates rethinking the unity of actuality and normativity integral to the methodology of critical social theory. This involves intervening in five topics concerning the *critical* status of decolonial cosmopolitanism that are central to the actual critical and dialogical encounters between critical, decolonial, and postcolonial theorists. These interventions are necessary but I do not claim that they are sufficient, or that my (inevitably) summary treatment of these topics is all that can or must be said. My aim is to inform *future* work in the field of cosmopolitan studies.

The first is the critical theoretical reconstruction of our *cosmopolitan condition*. The problem is that these stories of the emergence of a cosmopolitan normative order emanating from the West, simultaneous with global economic, technological, and scientific transformations, are untenable. Rational reconstructions of twentieth century moral progress are sustained by a colonial amnesia that performs the ideological function of deepening global white ignorance, which in turn obscures the *ineluctable contingency of the present* and the *accumulation and intensification* of the coloniality of power. The next topic is the significance of the idea of cosmopolitan Europe. This idea is integral to the self-understanding of European critical social theorists, such as Jürgen Habermas, Ulrich Beck, and Gerard Delanty. Of course, any interest in Europe is, in a trivial sense, Eurocentric, but decolonial cosmopolitans, notably Gilroy, Bhabra, and Shilliam, have argued that our practical

⁴⁷⁴ Paul Gilroy, "Postcolonialism and Cosmopolitanism", 256. My italics.

interest in Europe's cosmopolitan heritage must theoretically integrate Europe's past and present connections with the rest of the world if cosmopolitan Europe is not to be neocolonial.

What is the normative content of decoloniality, and what is its relation to actual history? For the normativity of decolonial cosmopolitanism cannot be freestanding, or else our approach will be one of 'political philosophy as applied ethics', and not distinctively critical social theoretical. The normative content of decolonial cosmopolitanism does not consist in abstract principles that are divorced from social reality that they critique. Rather, they are articulated by social actors in specific socio-historical-geographical contexts.⁴⁷⁵ The third topic is *provincialising cosmopolitanisms*. Decentering cosmopolitan Europe and the Western tradition of universal history to which contemporary cosmopolitan critical social theory is heir is intended by decolonial cosmopolitans to perform the hermeneutical task of transforming our perceptions of the world and our ways of being in the world and relating to the world and to each other. Yet, provincial cosmopolitanisms are insufficiently firm grounding for the normative perspective of decoloniality. As Delanty argues, any cosmopolitanism without a *common* ethical-political orientation that 'a shared world is possible', loses normative force. The fourth and fifth chapters concern the reconstruction of this orientation. The fourth topic is colonial empires as generative contexts of cosmopolitan thought and practice that reach their zenith in the planetary decolonisation struggle. The fifth closely related topic is the decolonisation of human rights discourse and the consequent normative reordering of the world.

3.2. The nexus of history and normativity, again

The dominant disciplinary narrative of the origins and evolution of cosmopolitanism as both idea and reality – Greece/Rome/Enlightenment/1945/now – is explicitly Eurocentric.⁴⁷⁶ According to the dominant disciplinary narrative, the idea of cosmopolitanism originates with the Cynics and

⁴⁷⁵ C.f. Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage: A Critical Reinterpretation* (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2018), 72.

⁴⁷⁶ David Inglis, "Alternative Histories of Cosmopolitanism," 12

Stoics in ancient Greece and Rome, is then revived by Kant, becomes institutionalised in the post-WWII international order, and has, since 1989, become embedded.⁴⁷⁷ Cosmopolitan sociologist, David Inglis, attributes the disciplinary dominance of a corrupted version of the ancient Greek and Roman origin story of cosmopolitanism that centres on the history of ideas to Analytic political philosophers like Martha Nussbaum bringing ancient Western cosmopolitanism into contemporary debates.⁴⁷⁸ Ancient cosmopolitanism is made to seem to involve ‘the abstract and utopian schemes of a tiny group of philosophers, either socially marginal as in the Greek case, or occupying positions of power but mouthing empty platitudes about universal brotherly love, as in the Roman context’.⁴⁷⁹ Inglis argues on the contrary that cosmopolitan ideas ‘were rooted in, and helped to develop, broader visions of the world as a complex, increasingly interconnected whole that were common in Hellenistic Greece and the Roman empire, not just among the philosophical minority but among varied social strata’.⁴⁸⁰

The dominant disciplinary narrative omits a second stream of Western cosmopolitan thought with origins in ancient Greece and Rome: the emerging discipline of universal history, which ‘adapted cosmopolitical philosophy for historiographical purposes’.⁴⁸¹

Universal history took as its subject matter not particular political entities such as city-states or empires, as previous historiography had, but rather the whole ‘inhabited world’ (*oikoumene*), endeavouring to narrate the intermeshed affairs of the whole world, not just parts of it...

As Stoic political philosophy is transformed into – and through – historiography, the focus radically shifts from *potentials to actualities*. It is wrong to regard ancient Stoicism as a purely abstract, non-empirical affair, as the standard narration alleges, for when we broaden the horizon to include Stoic-influenced historiography as well as political theory, we see that the *normative and empirical could be fused together and were not always wholly separated*.⁴⁸²

Inglis reads Kant’s cosmopolitanism in the alternative Western tradition that unites political theory and universal history and argues that ‘Kant is both cosmopolitan philosopher and early theorist of

⁴⁷⁷ See for example, Jürgen Habermas, “A Political Constitution for the Pluralist World Society?” in *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays*, trans. Ciaran Cronan (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2008), 312.

⁴⁷⁸ David Inglis, “Alternative Histories of Cosmopolitanism,” 13.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸¹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸² *Ibid.*, 15. My italics.

globalisation'.⁴⁸³ Further, according to Inglis, classical economics and sociology had cosmopolitan dimensions before the Western imaginary was finally limited by the characteristic methodological nationalism of twentieth-century thought.⁴⁸⁴ Inglis's genealogical act of unearthing alternative histories of cosmopolitanism buried by orthodoxy is meant to contribute critically to forming the self-consciousness of the emerging transdisciplinary field of cosmopolitan studies, to open up 'opportunities for developing fresh foci and forms of thinking'.⁴⁸⁵ His epistemic intervention is a welcome corrective to the unproductive disciplinary division between *cosmopolitan political philosophy* and *sociological cosmopolitanism*.⁴⁸⁶ However, the alternative history of the Western origins and evolution of cosmopolitan thought and practice that he writes is problematic. Inglis's alternative, more accurate history of ancient and modern Western cosmopolitanism does not overcome the Eurocentric limitations of the traditional canon, of which he is aware, or regard this as essential to the double task of the deconstruction and reconstruction of cosmopolitan critical social theory.⁴⁸⁷

Cosmopolitanism is the final act in the Eurocentric metanarrative of modernity, whether in the form of Kant's liberal idealist conception of the *Kingdom of Ends* or Marx's historical materialist conception of *stateless communism*. Kant's cosmopolitanism is inextricably linked to his teleological philosophy of history. The end of the international, intergenerational, antagonistic process of human development, understood as the actualisation of the faculty of reason through humanity's emancipation from self-imposed immaturity, is a future cosmopolitan world order.⁴⁸⁸ Kant advocates for the establishment of a global federation of republican states in his 1784 essay "Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose". The *cosmopolitan condition* generated by the global federation is hypothetically imperative for the security and stability of its constituents,

⁴⁸³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 18-22.

⁴⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 11.

⁴⁸⁶ David Inglis, "Cosmopolitans and Cosmopolitanism: Between and Beyond Sociology and Political Philosophy", *Journal of Sociology*, 50:2 (2014): 102.

⁴⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 103.

⁴⁸⁸ Pauline Kleingeld, "The Development of Kant's Cosmopolitanism", in *Politics and Teleology in Kant* eds. Paul Formosa, Tatiana Patrone, and Avery Goldman (Caerdydd, Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2014), 59.

which is in turn categorically imperative to make possible the full development and exercise of the human faculty of reason and our talents. For Marx, the *withering away of the state* is a function of the inner dialectic of historical materialism, marking the transition from socialism to communism. While like many Enlightenment thinkers, Kant and Marx were critical of the injustices of European imperialism and colonialism, they both saw Europe as the vanguard of historical progress, globalisation, and human development, and thought modern civilisation diffused from Europe to the world unidirectionally through the practices of imperialism and colonialism.⁴⁸⁹

The unity of actuality and normativity in ancient and modern Western cosmopolitanism is preserved in contemporary varieties of Western cosmopolitanism. As in ancient and modern times, contemporary Western cosmopolitanism is not exclusive to philosophers and the global elite, but is thought and practiced by varied social strata and across the humanities and social sciences. Cosmopolitanism in IR/IPE, historical sociology, and the Frankfurt School of critical theory is theorised not merely as an abstract ideal, but as a methodology, and as a detranscendentalised or postmetaphysical historical, political-economic, or sociological category, and as a set of embedded political and ethical practices.⁴⁹⁰ As the inheritors of Kant, Hegel, and Marx, critical social theorists analyse the crises, contradictions, and injustices of globalisation by *retrospectively* rationally reconstructing the progressive social and institutional learning processes simultaneous with global systemic transformations, through which the world order has evolved, *ex hypothesi*, up to our

⁴⁸⁹ For discussion of Kant on the tensions between European practices of colonialism and cosmopolitanism, see Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism” in *Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives*, eds. Katrin Flikschuh and Lea Ypi. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 43-67. See also Partha Chatterjee “Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism: Some Observations from Modern Indian History”, *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 36:2 (2016): 331. Chatterjee writes: “[Kant’s] distinctive contribution was the argument that the unfolding of actual historical events revealed the natural progression of European forms of republican government and law of nations to ultimately encompass all of humanity. Kant admitted that European conquests by war of overseas territories were unjust, but the federation of nations must accept the historical result of those imperial conquests as naturally given and not attempt to resist or undo them.’

⁴⁹⁰ Inglis’s intervention is only minimally engaged with critical social theoretical cosmopolitanism, and misrepresents cosmopolitan political philosophy as disengaged from empirics, giving the appearance of a greater divide between actuality and normativity in contemporary varieties of Western cosmopolitanism than exists in fact.

prospective cosmopolitan condition.⁴⁹¹ This *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends* metanarrative, I argue, is intrinsically and irredeemably Eurocentric, and it must be jettisoned by critical social theorists.

3.3. Reconstructing our cosmopolitan condition

Critical social theorists reconstruct the history of the juridification of international relations and the constitutionalisation of international law; the institutionalisation of cosmopolitan norms of justice in the post-WWII liberal international order; the subordination of international law to the evolving discursive practice of human rights; the technologically accelerated globalisation of economic flows and communications; the enlargement of liberal democracy after the Cold War; and the post-national transformation of the Westphalian international state system, exemplified by European integration. The emerging global normative order, as the inheritor of the project of European Enlightenment that has a particular conception of rational autonomy or social freedom at its core is defended on the grounds of progress, or the historical reality of social evolution or sociocultural learning processes having occurred.⁴⁹² Critical social theories of cosmopolitanism explain our world and analyse the immanent possibilities for transforming the global political and economic order in our critical times, anticipating the *cosmopolitanism to come*.

For critical historical sociologist, Ulrich Beck, against cosmopolitanism as an abstract philosophical idea or idealisation of the experiences of a global elite, *cosmopolitanisation*, as a process, ‘is not about ethics but about facts’.⁴⁹³ Contemporary human rights practice defines, for Beck, the ‘second age of modernity’. He argues that the ‘principle that international law precedes human rights which held during the (nation-state) first age of modernity is being replaced by the principle

⁴⁹¹ Davide Schmidt (2017) “The Poverty of Critical Theory in International Relations: Habermas, Linklater and the Failings of Cosmopolitan Critique”, *European Journal of International Relations*, 24:1. 205-206.

⁴⁹² Jürgen Habermas, “The Kantian Project and the Divided West,” in *The Divided West*, trans. and ed. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006): 115–193.

⁴⁹³ Ulrich Beck, “Redefining the Sociological Project: The Cosmopolitan Challenge”, *Sociology* 46:1 (2012): 8.

of the (world society) second age of modernity, that human rights precedes international law'.⁴⁹⁴ Benhabib likewise believes that since the *United Nations Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), framed in the aftermath of the European Holocaust, international norms of justice, which arise through agreements among sovereign nation-states that govern international relations, have given way to cosmopolitan norms of justice, which arise through legal structures that invest individuals with rights *vis-à-vis* states.⁴⁹⁵

For Habermas, cosmopolitanism is both a *technical necessity* of the functionalist logic of *systems* opened and transformed by expanding economic and technological forces originating in the advanced capitalist West, and a *political necessity* for the *lifeworld* to be reorganised and enclosed at a higher level of rationality and universality than the nation-state.⁴⁹⁶ Habermas differentiates the system from the lifeworld insofar as the former is viewed from an external observer's perspective, and the latter an internal participant's perspective, and recombines both perspectives on the social formation or totality.⁴⁹⁷ Habermas's unique contribution to social theory is the hypothesis that modernisation consists not only in the rationalisation and differentiation of the lifeworld into three value spheres – *art and literature, morality and law, science and technology* – and the increasing functional complexity and internal differentiation of systems causing the genesis and growth of subsystems. Modernisation, theorised as a process of *social evolution*, also consists in an uncoupling of the system from the lifeworld: the system becomes more complex, and the lifeworld becomes more rational.⁴⁹⁸ This dialectical uncoupling enables the *colonisation of the lifeworld* by disembedded subsystems,⁴⁹⁹ resulting in the functionalist rationalities of subsystems and the strategic rationalities of interested

⁴⁹⁴ Ulrich Beck, "The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity", *British Journal of Sociology* 51:1 (2000): 83.

⁴⁹⁵ Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 16.

⁴⁹⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union: A Response*, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 113.

⁴⁹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), 153.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 141-3.

social actors, mediated by money and power, turning back destructively upon the lifeworld.⁵⁰⁰

Habermas's historicised practical philosophy, which developed in the movement of German Enlightenment thought from Kant through Marx, is summed up by McCarthy in English as an 'empirical philosophy of history with a practical (political) intent'.⁵⁰¹

The Habermasian post-metaphysical conception of progress is therefore contingent rather than necessary – regression is possible – and disaggregated rather than total – progress in one area can occur simultaneously with regress in another.⁵⁰² The Eurocentric world-historical process of Enlightenment exhibits a double movement: 'the rationalization of the lifeworld makes possible a heightening of systemic complexity, which becomes so hypertrophied that it unleashes system imperatives that burst the capacity of the lifeworld they instrumentalize'.⁵⁰³ Only by reconstituting politics at a supranational level can the dynamics of socio-economic evolution be stabilised, and the legitimation crises of increasingly ineffectual democratic nation-states be resolved, given the tendencies of the advanced capitalist system toward greater global economic integration and technological innovation.⁵⁰⁴

Benhabib observes that post-national politics do not signal clearly that human history is progressing in a cosmopolitan direction, however. Whether cosmopolitans aim to transform or transcend the nation-state, in actuality, the devolution of the state's capabilities is occurring largely because of the imperatives of global capitalism.⁵⁰⁵ Often this structural transformation is led by nation-states limiting their legitimate powers in the interests of the transnational capitalist class.⁵⁰⁶ These regressive historical trends are contemporary with progressive trends that Benhabib refers to as *democratic iterations*. These are forms of popular empowerment and political struggle through

⁵⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 186.

⁵⁰¹ Thomas McCarthy, "Translator's Introduction" in Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991 [1976]), ix.

⁵⁰² Amy Allen, *The End of Progress*. 9.

⁵⁰³ Jürgen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action Vol 2*, 155.

⁵⁰⁴ Jürgen Habermas, "The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a Constitution for World Society", *Constellations*, 15:4 (2008): 444-445.

⁵⁰⁵ Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 176.

⁵⁰⁶ *Ibid*.

which she hopes that peoples would ‘appropriate the universalist promise of cosmopolitan norms in order to bind forms of political and economic power that seek to escape democratic control, accountability and transparency’.⁵⁰⁷ This echoes Habermas’s postmetaphysical dialectic of openness and closure, but emphasises the potentially transformative agency of civil society.

Habermas’s interest is in the legitimisation problems and stabilisation of dysfunctioning and disintegrating social formations through their transformation. Habermas normatively theorises the legitimacy conditions of a cosmopolitan constitution and of a functionally differentiated multilevel world society governed by autonomous democratic states; of a world domestic politics; and of supranational policing institutions mandated with the global enforcement of human rights.⁵⁰⁸ Individuals, irrespective of their nationality, citizenship, ethnicity, religion, or other identities and affiliations, *qua* world citizens, would be recognised as subjects of the cosmopolitan constitution, as would states. Habermas’s normative theory of cosmopolitanism is then rationally reconstructed as the outcome of moral-practical learning processes: twentieth century global transformations meet the Kantian project of the constitutionalisation of international law halfway.⁵⁰⁹ Directly facing up to the charge of Eurocentrism, Habermas remains committed to a progressive reading of modern history and the rational reconstructivist research programme.⁵¹⁰

3.4. Colonial amnesia

The selection of which archival materials are *included* or *remembered* in the Eurocentric metanarrative of *Western origins/ cosmopolitan ends*, and which are *excluded*, *misremembered*, or *forgotten*, is predetermined by the theoretical assumption that present being reconstructed is the actualisation of rationality. The parts of the history of the present that were excluded, misremembered, or forgotten through Eurocentric metanarratives about origins and ends and agents and patients have come under

⁵⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 177.

⁵⁰⁸ Jürgen Habermas “The Constitutionalization of International Law”, 448-451.

⁵⁰⁹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, trans. Cairan Cronin (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2006), 172-173, 177.

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid*, 72.

increasing scrutiny.⁵¹¹ These include the ‘epistemic disavowal’ of world-historical events in the making of global modernity, typical of Western scholarship, such as the Haitian revolution,⁵¹² and of world-constituting connections and circuits prior to and independent of European hegemony.⁵¹³ Go argues that much more is at stake than simply cataloguing the omissions from dominant disciplinary narratives, for ‘these elisions render inadequate the theoretical categories by which social thinkers seek to apprehend modernity’.⁵¹⁴

Such progressivist readings of history to ‘the retrospective whitening-out, the whitewashing, of the racial past in order to construct an alternative narrative that severs the present from any legacy of racial domination’, according to Mills.⁵¹⁵

Racism as idea and ideology, racism as national and global system, racial atrocity and racial exploitation, are collectively denied or at least causally minimized. Not merely in terms of factual account, but conceptual framework, a fanciful history is constructed whose upshot is the denial or downplaying of the extent of the violence and subordination of the previous epoch of formal Euro-domination, its structural and long-term shaping of systemic white advantage, and an accompanying white “innocence” about the role of racial exploitation in making the world what it is today, particularly its transcontinental distribution of “Northern” wealth and “Southern” poverty, but also its national racial patterns of white-over-nonwhite privileging. If the past few hundred years have been marked by the hegemony of white racist ideology and by global white domination with enduring effects, then the shape of the world needs reconsideration and remaking.⁵¹⁶

As Mills makes clear, the problem is not simply one of leaving out parts of the story of the present, but the narrative structure of the story itself. This progressive narrative performs the ideological function of concealing the darker side or coloniality of global modernity, and thereby reinforcing global white ignorance. In *Against Race*, Gilroy frames the challenge to dominant narratives as one firstly of centering the duality of modernity as progress *and* catastrophe, civilisation *and* barbarism in our thought, and, secondly, of transforming our command of those dualities by understanding

⁵¹¹ Zeynep Gülşah Çapan, “Enacting the International/Reproducing Eurocentrism” *Contexto Internacional*, 39:3 (2017): 656.

⁵¹² Gurinder K. Bhambra, “Undoing the Epistemic Disavowal of the Haitian Revolution”, 1-16.

⁵¹³ Janet Abu-Laghdou, *Before European Hegemony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1989).

⁵¹⁴ Julian Go, *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory*, 91. See also Gurinder K. Bhambra, “Historical Sociology, International Relations and Connected Histories”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 23:1 (2010): 139-140.

⁵¹⁵ Charles W. Mills, “Global White Ignorance”, 219.

⁵¹⁶ *Ibid.*

how racisms are integral to them.⁵¹⁷ What does this alternative history of the present mean for us? Habermas acknowledges the ‘barbaric reverse side’ of the Enlightenment, but remains normatively committed to completing the *unfinished project of modernity*.⁵¹⁸ I now show that the belief in the global diffusion of moral progress from the West cannot be sustained when imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and non-Western ideas, practices, experiences, and agency are theoretically integrated.⁵¹⁹

My focus is on the twentieth century part of the story of *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends*, centred on the two major liberal international order-building moments that occurred after the end of WWII and the Cold War, the major two hegemonic wars of the twentieth century. Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, of the English School of International Relations, argue that the existing world order was the product of Europe, and that ‘because it was in fact Europe and not America, Asia, or Africa that first dominated and, in so doing, unified the world, it is not our perspective but the historical record itself that can be called Eurocentric’.⁵²⁰ To their credit, Bull and Watson characterise the Eurocentric diffusion of modernity and emergence of liberal international order as one of domination enacted by Western imperialism. Prior to WWII, liberal internationalism was indisputably built on civilisational, racial, and cultural hierarchies: it was a ‘creature of the western white man’s world’, Ikenberry claims.⁵²¹ While Wilson-era liberal internationalism did not challenge Western imperialism and racial hierarchies, the subsequent post-WWII phase of liberal world ordering, he continues, saw a transformation of racialised, hierarchical conceptions of world order into progressive discourses of human rights, modernisation, and development.⁵²²

This disciplinary history sanitises the origins and evolution of the post-WWII international order of the struggles over imperialism, colonialism, and race that were generative and constitutive

⁵¹⁷ Paul Gilroy, *Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000), 95. My italics.

⁵¹⁸ Jürgen Habermas, *Religion and Rationality: Essays on Reason, God, and Modernity*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 130.

⁵¹⁹ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Anti-racism and Emancipation in the Thought and Practice of Cabral, Neto, Mondlane and Machel?”, 51.

⁵²⁰ Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, *The Expansion of International Society* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 2.

⁵²¹ G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, 14-15.

⁵²² *Ibid.* Cf. Paul Gilroy, *Against Race*, 138.

of the present. Narratives of international moral progress diffusing from the Western core fail to make sense of enduring practices of colonial subjugation and racial oppression by the white, Western powers, and imperial campaigns of counter-revolutionary terror.⁵²³ For the post-WWII era of post-fascist liberal democratic enlargement was also the era geopolitical decolonisation. Declining and disintegrating European colonial empires and a rising American liberal empire fought against anticolonial nationalist forces in Central and South America, Asia, and Africa to preserve colonial rule where possible, or to preserve neocolonial geographical patterns of political-economic dependence to secure world capitalism. The Western ultra-imperial capitalist powers and the Soviet empire, both cloaked in the rhetoric of modernity, would overtly or covertly intervene in postcolonial state-societies throughout the 20th Century. This practice continues to be central to the statecraft of the West and of post-Soviet Russia in the 21st Century.

Habermas, for example, briefly describes how the ‘broad inclusion of the [United Nations] member states, which was a result of the post-1945 process of decolonization, finally shattered the framework of European international law and ended the West’s monopoly on interpretation’.⁵²⁴ Progressive developments to the global normative order such as the *United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1963) are explained as ‘a result of increased sensitivity to racial, ethnic, and religious differences’, which has ‘extended mutual perspective-taking’ into new domains.⁵²⁵ But this critical interpretation of these historical events is not integral to his account; it is an *addendum*. Nor does it challenge his rational reconstructivist conceptual framework; framed thus, it corroborates his rational reconstruction. Yet it was African Americans and colonised peoples, not white, Western state and non-state actors, who were the agents whose discursive practices of norm entrepreneurship and counter-hegemonic world ordering extended,

⁵²³ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Anti-racism and Emancipation in the Thought and Practice of Cabral, Neto, Mondlane and Machel”, 51-52.

⁵²⁴ Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, 166.

⁵²⁵ *Ibid.*

strengthened, and broadened the formulation and institutionalisation of human rights.⁵²⁶ White, Western state and non-state actors – *ex hypothesi*, Enlightened subjects engaged in the unfinished project of modernity – often performed the historical role of *antagonist*, opposing, weakening, or abstaining on the counter-ordering efforts of the peoples who they had subjugated and oppressed to institutionalise cosmopolitan norms of justice. For example, the nine countries that abstained from the *United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* (1960) included the major Western colonial powers, Belgium, France, Portugal, Spain, United Kingdom, and three white settler colonies Union of South Africa, Australia, United States (the United States was and remains a colonial power, and South Africa and Australia were Mandatory powers after the post-WWI divestiture of Imperial Germany’s overseas colonies).

It is equally unclear that the post-Cold War expansion of the liberal hegemonic world order could be understood as marking the beginning of a new millennial progressive humanitarian era that ruptured with the imperialist and racist values of the nineteenth century.⁵²⁷ This historical narrative of rupture rather than continuity can only be sustained if the *imperial difference* between West and East is remembered, but the *colonial difference* between North and South is misremembered or forgotten. The archives of international knowledge must include ‘competing memories and understandings of international events’, Siba Govogui proposes, for the ‘East–West standoff was by no means exhaustive of the violence of modernity’.⁵²⁸

Specifically, the architecture of the cold war did not mediate the relationships between the proverbial West and the Rest. Long before the Reagan doctrine, for instance, the Monroe and Jules Ferry doctrines had adopted *historical forms of violence as political rationality* toward African, Asian, and Latin American entities. These doctrines and others preceded the cold war and were likely to survive it.⁵²⁹

Grovogui argues that the end of the Cold War marked the beginning of a ‘unipolar era in which a single hegemonic power had near absolute control in political, economic, and military matters’.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁶ I discuss this and its implications for the normative content of decolonial cosmopolitanism further this in 3.8.

⁵²⁷ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Order*, 285.

⁵²⁸ Siba Govogui, *Beyond Eurocentrism and Anarchy: Memories of International Order and Institutions* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 8.

⁵²⁹ *Ibid.* 2-3 My italics.

⁵³⁰ *Ibid.* Cf. Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, 183.

The post-Cold War unipolar world order was more interventionist, securitised, and pre-emptive than any time in history.

What is to be made of the American-led West's renewed hegemonic leadership during the era of unipolarity? For Habermas, that the post-Cold War expansion of liberal order is a product of American hegemony is read as 'a highly ambivalent constellation'.⁵³¹ Habermas argues that the Western cosmopolitan project of the universalisation and enforcement of human rights norms and the constitutionalisation of international law is 'doomed to failure without American support, indeed American leadership'.⁵³² The question he puts to the United States is whether it should abide by the rules-based order, acting as a historical pacesetter for the constitutionalisation of international law, or whether it should act unilaterally as a liberal hegemon, and marginalise or take an instrumental approach to international law.⁵³³ Habermas takes a normatively neutral stance toward American political, economic, and military power that can only be sustained by forgetting the violence by which the United States came to be, and the structural and direct violence against non-white, non-Western peoples and bodies that American power enacts. From the other side of the colonial difference, the post-Cold War expansion of the liberal international order marked the continuation of Western rule and unruliness, and of the subordinate status of non-Western peoples as rule-takers excluded from or marginalised in the discursive practice of rule-making in the economic/financial, military/security, and culture/knowledge spheres of structural power.

What is to be made of the technological transformations that meet moral progress halfway? Hutchings argues that for critical theorists of cosmopolitanism, neoliberal globalisation signifies an epochal change in world history because capitalism has transnationalised, challenging the public autonomy of the nation-state from all directions.

But from whose perspective is such a change epochal? In order for it to be so, there needs to have been a Westphalian sovereignty phase as norm, which is then threatened by globalization. But this does not correspond to the experience of most states or civil societies. For most states, global neoliberalism is

⁵³¹ Jürgen Habermas, *The Divided West*, 179.

⁵³² *Ibid.*

⁵³³ *Ibid.*

simply the latest in long line of ways in which the terms of debate about justice and democracy are set elsewhere. This is not to say that Fraser's historical analysis is necessarily inapplicable beyond what used to be called the 'First World', but it is to suggest that her account of globalization, the current 'postnational constellation', predominantly reflects First World experience.⁵³⁴

The opening and closing of borders is never complete, for borders are porous filters. Borders – physical, biometric, and electronic – are biopolitical governance technologies for surveilling and regulating flows of goods, services, resources, data, ideas, and capital into and out of the territory and for managing the population. Undesirable or illicit flows are prohibited and disabled while desirable or legal flows are permitted and enabled. Globalising processes and neoliberal policies have curtailed or limited the powers of sovereign states to unilaterally regulate cross border flows of goods, services, resources, data, ideas, and capital. But regulating migration remains within the power of nation-states as 'aspects of state sovereignty are being dismantled chip by chip' and nation-state jurisdiction and territoriality are being disaggregated.⁵³⁵

The post-Cold War era of neoliberal globalisation had resulted in the most *intensive* and *extensive* bordering processes in global history. Wendy Brown, in *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty*, theorises the (re)construction of physical walls and barriers as the 'theatricalized and spectacularized performance of sovereign power'.⁵³⁶ Borders are increasingly theorised not as a fixed line, but as mobile, and bordering as processual.⁵³⁷ The (re)construction of physical walls and barriers is only one of several related long term trends in the practice of bordering, alongside the development and deployment of advanced security and military technologies, including surveillance drones and sensors, attack helicopters, and armoured vehicles.⁵³⁸ Our present time is symbolised by the violent reinforcement of walls and borders that police and securitise the

⁵³⁴ Kimberly Hutchings, "Whose History? Whose Justice?", *Theory, Culture & Society*, 24:4 (2007): 60.

⁵³⁵ Seyla Benhabib, "Borders, Boundaries, and Citizenship", *Political Science and Politics*, 38:4 (2005): 676.

⁵³⁶ Wendy Brown, *Walled States, Waning Sovereignty* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2015), 24.

⁵³⁷ Christine Agius, "Ordering without Bordering: Drones, the Unbordering of Late Modern Warfare and Ontological Insecurity", *Postcolonial Studies* 20:3 (2017): 1.

⁵³⁸ Reece Jones and Corey Johnson, "Border Militarisation and the Re-articulation of Sovereignty", *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 41:2 (2016): 187.

differences between the nation's insiders and outsiders, and between the transnational categories of white/non-white and Western/non-Western.⁵³⁹

Recall that the Habermasian post-metaphysical conception of progress is contingent rather than necessary, in the sense that regression is possible, and disaggregated rather than total, in the sense that progress in one area can occur simultaneously with regress in another. Does adducing these pathological historical phenomena and events and non-Western histories and experiences, constituting the barbaric reverse side of modernity, upset this conception? One possibility is to interpret these as regressions within a decentred and disaggregated narrative of historical progress. But, as Hutchings argues, this would be to 'reduce the significance of such phenomena for the purposes of diagnosis and prediction by subsuming them under a master narrative of time, so that the idea of an alternative temporal perspective on world politics becomes literally unintelligible'.⁵⁴⁰ The hegemony of the temporality signified by *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends* renders impossible comprehension of and dialogue about the significance of historical developments and events.

Partha Chatterjee argues that we can no longer assume that nationalism, internationalism, and cosmopolitanism comprise the normative temporal sequence that structured the hegemonic narrative of world politics during the post-Cold War era of liberal triumphalism, and so we must now 'engage in the critique of each or all of those conceptual terms against the background of that normative sequence'.⁵⁴¹

Suddenly, we now have a powerful wind of change blowing across Europe and North America, and threatening to sweep the rest of the world along with it, that is not only turning cosmopolitanism into an object of laughter and derision but also questioning the relevance and utility of long-standing international institutions. The nation-state, and that too with the exclusion of recent migrants, is becoming the exclusive object of political life.⁵⁴²

⁵³⁹ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 284.

⁵⁴⁰ Kimberly Hutchings, *Time and World Politics*, 159.

⁵⁴¹ Partha Chatterjee, "More on Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 37:2 (2017): 243.

⁵⁴² *Ibid.*

Chatterjee draws from this experience of illiberal nationalist reaction in West, the lesson of the ‘ineluctable contingency of any history of the present’.⁵⁴³ There is no directionality in the present toward the cosmopolitan – to be sure, post-metaphysical – end of history. The sense to be made of our critical and dangerous time of transitions is not fixed by the Eurocentric metanarrative of *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends*. By reflecting on the ineluctable contingency of the present and the darker side of modernity, the history of the present cannot be reconstructed as *progress* toward our cosmopolitan condition, but as the *accumulation and intensification* of global modernity/coloniality.⁵⁴⁴

3.5. Cosmopolitan Europe

Habermas continues to represent Europe as the vanguard of universal history and normative reference culture for human and social development. While European colonial empires may no longer ‘legislate for the whole world’,⁵⁴⁵ the European Union is the model of post-national politics, and is the vanguard of the world-historical development and democratisation of transnational and global governance ‘without government’, heralding a more expansive cosmopolitanism to come.⁵⁴⁶ Completing the process of European integration as economic globalisation and technological innovation open and transform obsolete social formations takes ‘the civilisation of the exercise of power one step further’.⁵⁴⁷ While a practical interest in the European project is obviously Eurocentric in a trivial sense, there are problematic senses in which the rational reconstruction of European integration with a cosmopolitan intent can be Eurocentric. Bhambra identifies two principle ways in which European cosmopolitanism can be problematically Eurocentric.

First, there is a refusal to acknowledge that there have been cosmopolitan practices and the development of cosmopolitan ideas in other parts of the world outside of European contact, in relation

⁵⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴⁴ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Le Malentendu International: Remembering International Relations with Jean-Marie Teno”, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political* 40:2 (2015): 140. Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Slavery, Finance and International Political Economy”, 64-5, 59-61. See also, on this Benjaminian neo-cyclical conception of history, Ian Baucom, *Spectres of the Atlantic: Finance Capital, Slavery, and the Philosophy of History* (Durham, Duke, 2005), 3-172.

⁵⁴⁵ Kant, “Idea for Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose”, in *Kant: Political Writings*, ed. Hans Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1991 [1794]), 41-53.

⁵⁴⁶ Jürgen Habermas, *The Crisis of the European Union*, 11.

⁵⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 20.

to European contact, and not subordinate to it... Second, there is no engagement with the problematic tension brought to the fore when we (*if, we*) address contemporaneous European domination over much of the world as the very real *negation of the idea and ideals of cosmopolitanism* otherwise put forward.⁵⁴⁸

Non-Western forms of cosmopolitanism predate European integration, as I discuss further in 3.6. Other regions are now practicing post-national forms of politics differently to Europe with no grounds for assuming convergence with the European model, or judging their performance against the standards set by the European Union.⁵⁴⁹

The dominant conception of cosmopolitan Europe is made possible by ignoring non-Western forms of cosmopolitanism, misremembering or forgetting Europe's connections to the rest of the world through histories of imperialism, colonialism, and slavery.⁵⁵⁰ This wider global historical context is made marginal to dominant social scientific accounts of European integration, and yet these connections are significant to Europe's cosmopolitan heritage. Delanty reminds us:

It is often forgotten in the narrative of European integration as one of peace and cooperation that in this period the major European powers were desperately hanging onto their colonial possessions and that Europe was in fact not quite so European. With the exception of Germany, most of the founding countries were still running overseas colonial empires. In the case of France, Algeria was an integral part of the French state. While achieving peace in Europe, Europe was at war with many other parts of the world... *the Western European nations that set out on the path of peace in Europe were anything but peaceful when it came to holding onto their empires* and resorted to war where that was necessary.⁵⁵¹

Against such a view that in embarking on the project of European integration, Western European imperial nation-states 'sought to separate their relations with other European powers from their colonial relations',⁵⁵² Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson explain that colonialism was not simply the enterprise of individual states, but, in relation to Africa, integral to the imagination, justification, and constitution of the European integration project.⁵⁵³

Europe constitutes itself spatially as a continental political formation – as Habermas says, the “old European biotope” – on the condition of possibility that colonial amnesia ‘has allowed –

⁵⁴⁸ Gurminder K. Bhambra (2011) “Cosmopolitanism and Postcolonial Critique”, 315.

⁵⁴⁹ Amitav Acharya, “Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds”, 654-655.

⁵⁵⁰ Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Whither Europe? Postcolonial versus Neocolonial Cosmopolitanism”, 193.

⁵⁵¹ Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage*, 163-164.

⁵⁵² *Ibid*, 164.

⁵⁵³ Peo Hansen and Stefan Jonsson, *Eurafrica: The Untold History of European Integration and Colonialism* (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014).

and continues to allow – the majority of European commentators and policymakers to conceive of the European project as... post-fascist democratic enlargement segregated from struggles over Europe’s colonial empires’.⁵⁵⁴ The framing of the European integration project as *cosmopolitan* rather than as *imperial* requires misremembering and forgetting the decolonial cultural, political, and philosophical projects and struggles of the same era, Shilliam argues.⁵⁵⁵

Europe cannot be understood separately from the world, because of the entanglements of European imperial and colonial projects.⁵⁵⁶ Cosmopolitan Europe must be reframed within larger spatial and temporal scales of global historical sociology, analysing larger units than the European continent, such as the *Atlantic biotope* connecting the continents of Europe, Africa, and the Americas,⁵⁵⁷ or Western colonial empires. There are two reasons. The first is that only then can cosmopolitan Europe theoretically integrate the complex and volatile imperial, colonial, postcolonial, and neocolonial dynamics of its relationship to the rest of the world.⁵⁵⁸ Yet, as Delanty cautions, the global contextualisation of the legacy of cosmopolitan Europe with ‘colonialism at its core’ must not be ‘overgeneralised’ so to account for the diversity of colonialisms and not to overemphasise the external dimension to the neglect of the endogenous dimension, ‘since not everything can be accounted for by colonialism, as for instance internal divisions and precolonial histories’.⁵⁵⁹

The second is that the larger spatial and temporal scales and units of analysis necessary for analysing imperial processes, structures, and connections are also necessary for understanding the contemporary multicultural constitution of European societies.⁵⁶⁰ Forgetting the colonial empire reframes human mobilities within post-imperial spaces within the discourse of hospitality, suffused

⁵⁵⁴ Robbie Shilliam, “The Crisis of Europe and Colonial Amnesia: Freedom Struggles in the Atlantic Biotope” in *Global Historical Sociology*, eds. Julian Go and George Lawson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 125.

⁵⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 140.

⁵⁵⁶ Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage*, 160.

⁵⁵⁷ Robbie Shilliam, “The Crisis of Europe and Colonial Amnesia”, 128.

⁵⁵⁸ Paul Gilroy, “Postcolonialism and Cosmopolitanism”, 255-256.

⁵⁵⁹ Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage*, 8.

⁵⁶⁰ Gurminder K. Bhambra, “Whither Europe? Postcolonial versus Neocolonial Cosmopolitanism”, 193.

with hostility, whereupon ‘in the domain of the juridico-political, limits are set, boundaries are established and protected with violence; asylees are turned away; refugees are denied entry and aid; citizens are denaturalized’.⁵⁶¹ The denial of Europe’s connections to the former colonial world leads to fortifying the European frontier beyond which live and die the former colonial subjects that the European Union pretends to legitimately *exclude* as Other.⁵⁶² Bhabra hopes that by theoretically integrating the histories of imperialism, colonialism, and slavery that constitute the wider context for the project of European integration, and reconceiving associated concepts of European citizenship and rights, could enable the articulation of less exclusive and unjust postcolonial cosmopolitan Europe that fulfilled and extended its human rights commitments to asylum seekers, refugees, and migrants.⁵⁶³

Europe is many projects, and is the product of many legacies. Cosmopolitan Europe coexists with imperialist Europe, monarchical Europe, republican Europe, democratic Europe, liberal Europe, capitalist Europe, fascist Europe, communist Europe, and the Europe of nations. As Delanty argues, the European heritage is a *conflict of interpretations*.

This perspective is a necessary corrective to the emphasis on the ‘dark side’ of European history and to approaches that see in the European past only the legacy of colonialism (for example Mignolo 2011). While no approach to the European past can neglect these dimensions, it is important that an interpretation of the European heritage is sufficiently broad to be able to grasp the different and frequently contrary currents within it.⁵⁶⁴

From a decolonial perspective, this creates a difficult problem: cosmopolitan Europe must be defended against resurgent fascism from within at the same time as it must be attacked for its Eurocentrism from without. While the most promising option for European self-understanding is the cosmopolitan legacy, in the historical context of resurgent fascism, no single narrative identity has dominance.⁵⁶⁵ How can Europe’s cosmopolitan legacy be vindicated without a transcendental

⁵⁶¹ Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 157.

⁵⁶² *Ibid*, 197.

⁵⁶³ Gurminder K. Bhabra, “The Current Crisis of Europe”, 405.

⁵⁶⁴ Gerard Delanty, *Formations of European Modernity: A Historical and Political Sociology of Europe* (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing 2013), 294-295.

⁵⁶⁵ Gerard Delanty, *The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 294-295.

guarantee or a postmetaphysical rational reconstruction of the cosmopolitan directionality of European integration?

There are nevertheless better and worse accounts and a variety of metrics against which to test rival accounts' respective explanatory and normative merits.⁵⁶⁶ Rival traditions produce rival explanatory accounts of phenomena that will be more or less parochial, ethnocentric, superficial, accurate, parsimonious, methodological, and comprehensive.⁵⁶⁷ The cosmopolitan framework of analysis has advantages over its rivals insofar as it is comprehensive of plural European heritages and, methodologically, integrates the connections and entanglements of global history, including those of colonialism and pre-colonial encounters.⁵⁶⁸ As a consequence, cosmopolitan Europe is less parochial, ethnocentric, and superficial, and more accurate than its nationalist rival. Further, it is less Eurocentric insofar as the 'entanglement of different traditions, histories, and cultures produces common reference points and a space for dialogue' that produce 'counter-memories and the possibility that societies can learn from such encounters'.⁵⁶⁹

Beck argues that the conception of 'cosmopolitan Europe is the European tradition's institutionalized internal critique'.⁵⁷⁰

It is at this point that cosmopolitan Europe generates a *genuinely European inner contradiction*, legally, morally, and politically. The traditions from which colonial, nationalist and genocidal horror originated were clearly European. But so were the new legal standards against which these acts were condemned as crimes against humanity and tried in the spotlight of world publicity.⁵⁷¹

But we have learnt that such a *Europeanising Europe* move will be insufficient. As Bhambra argues, external decolonial and postcolonial critique of social theory is necessary for deconstructing and reconstructing the legacy of cosmopolitan Europe to avoid perpetuating 'at best, a parochial form

⁵⁶⁶ Lois McNay (2016) "The Limits of Justification: Critique, Disclosure, and Reflexivity", 18.

⁵⁶⁷ Charles Taylor "Gadamer on the Human Sciences", in *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*. ed. Robert J. Dostal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 135.

⁵⁶⁸ Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage*, 11.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

⁵⁷⁰ Ulrich Beck, "Understanding the Real Europe: A Cosmopolitan Vision", in *The SAGE Handbook of European Studies*, ed. Chris Rumford (London: SAGE Publications, 2009), 9.

⁵⁷¹ *Ibid.*

of cosmopolitanism and, at worst, a form of neocolonial cosmopolitanism'.⁵⁷² As Gilroy argues, any viable cosmopolitanism must be sensitive to 'the wrongs, shortcomings and ambiguities of the bloody colonial past'.⁵⁷³ Reckoning with this global history is vital if Europe is to renegotiate its 'conflicted relationship' with a world that it unjustly dominated, 'the world which may now be leaving [Europe] behind'.⁵⁷⁴

3.6. Alternative spatio-temporal horizons

So far, in 3. *Western Origins/Cosmopolitan Ends*, I have intervened in contemporary social theoretical scholarship on cosmopolitanism as an historical concept and activity that, for the most part, limits our understanding to Western intellectual and political traditions.⁵⁷⁵ I now switch sides at the frontier, and shift the geography of reasoning to open cosmopolitanism from its closure by the definitions of the Western tradition.⁵⁷⁶ By 'adducing new empirical data on the variety of cosmopolitanisms and the new problematics that accompany them, decentering the conventional locus, and investigating from a wide range of scholarly perspectives', Pollock *et. al.* argue, 'new and post-universalist cosmopolitanisms', have the potential to emerge.⁵⁷⁷ Pluriversality, Mignolo hopes, 'shall replace and displace the abstract universal cosmopolitan ideals (Christian, liberal, socialist, neoliberal) that had helped (and continue to help) to hold together the modern/colonial world system and to preserve the managerial role of the North Atlantic'.⁵⁷⁸ Mignolo sees the *Ummah* or the transnational community of Muslims as a paradigm example of actually existing cosmopolitanism that emerges from beyond the Western context and prior to global modernity.⁵⁷⁹ Muslim cosmopolitanism reminds us that cosmopolitanism is always plural, and that unmodified

⁵⁷² Gurinder K. Bhambra, "Whither Europe? Postcolonial versus Neocolonial Cosmopolitanism", 199.

⁵⁷³ Paul Gilroy, "Postcolonialism and Cosmopolitanism", 228.

⁵⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 255-256. My italics.

⁵⁷⁵ Sheldon Pollock *et. al.*, "Cosmopolitanisms", 8. Italics added.

⁵⁷⁶ *Ibid*, 1-2.

⁵⁷⁷ *Ibid*, 9-10.

⁵⁷⁸ Walter D. Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis", 182.

⁵⁷⁹ Walter D. Mignolo, *The Darker Side of Western Modernity*, 292-293.

references to cosmopolitanism really denote post-Kantian (liberal, Marxist, or post-modern) forms of Western cosmopolitanism.

Following the lead of Mignolo and Pollock *et. al.*, Bhabra argues that our task now is to archive a ‘provincialized cosmopolitanism that can learn from others where we recognize that what they contribute is not a confirmation of what we *already know*, but the bringing into being of new understandings relevant to the worlds we inhabit together’.⁵⁸⁰ Provincialising cosmopolitanism involves excavating actually existing cosmopolitanisms made peripheral to the ‘otherwise canonical frame of reference’ that originate in non-Western contexts.⁵⁸¹ Provincialising cosmopolitanism enables us to move global dialogue beyond the ‘stultifying preoccupations of Western philosophy’ and for the ‘possibility of capturing the wider range of cosmopolitan practices that have actually existed in history’.⁵⁸² This *pluriversal history with a cosmopolitan purpose* makes possible a more complete deconstruction and reconstruction of cosmopolitanism as an historical, transdisciplinary, critical, and normative approach to the humanities and social sciences gestured towards by Inglis – one that overcomes the Eurocentric limitations of the story of Western origins/cosmopolitan ends.

The power of provincial cosmopolitanisms to reconfigure our existing perceptions of the world and inform the ways in which we live in the world and relate to the world and to each other lies in the repressed memory that peoples and cultures were never in stasis, and never were alone.⁵⁸³ So nor must we be held captive by a Eurocentric conception of the traditional past as pure, static, uncontacted, and unconnected. Theories of culture are always entangled power laden contexts that they try to explain.⁵⁸⁴ Linda Tuhiwai Smith writes how in settler colonial state-societies:

The identity of “the native” is regarded as complicated, ambiguous, and therefore troubling even for those who live the realities and contradictions of being native and of being a member of a colonized and minority community that still remembers other *ways of being, of knowing, and of relating to the world*. What is troubling to the dominant cultural group about the definition of “native” is not what necessarily troubles the “native” community. The desires for “pure,” uncontaminated, and simple definitions of the native by the settler is often a desire to continue to know and define the Other, whereas the desires

⁵⁸⁰ Gurinder K. Bhabra (2011) “Cosmopolitanism and Postcolonial Critique”, 323. Emphasis added.

⁵⁸¹ *Ibid*, 325.

⁵⁸² Gurinder K. Bhabra, “Sociology after Postcolonialism”, 43

⁵⁸³ Brendan Hokowhitu, “A Genealogy of Indigenous Resistance”, 215.

⁵⁸⁴ Paul Gilroy, *Against Race*, 271.

by the native to be self-defining and self-naming can be read as a desire to be free, to escape definition, to be complicated, to develop and change, and to be regarded as fully human. In between such desires are multiple and shifting identities and hybridities with much more nuanced positions about what constitutes native identities, native communities, and native knowledge in anti/postcolonial times.⁵⁸⁵

The authoritarian desire to define the pure identity of the native is not exclusive to white settlers, but exists among some anti-colonial nationalists, too, in the name of “authenticity”.⁵⁸⁶ Modernity, Pollock *et. al.* argue, ‘is just this contradictory, even duplicitous, attempt to separate and purify realms... that have never been separate and pure, and still are not’.⁵⁸⁷

What the new archives, geographies, and practices of different historical cosmopolitanisms might reveal is precisely a *cultural illogic for modernity that makes perfectly good non-modern sense*. They might help us see that *cosmopolitanism is not a circle created by culture diffused from a center, but instead, that centres are everywhere and circumferences nowhere...* This ultimately suggests that we already are and always have been cosmopolitan, though we may not have always known it. Cosmopolitanism is not just – or perhaps not at all – an idea. Cosmopolitanism is infinite ways of being. To understand that we are already cosmopolitan, however much and often this mode of being has been threatened by the work of purification, means to understand these ways in their full breadth through a disciplinary cosmopolitanism.⁵⁸⁸

Decoloniality remembers and reinterprets the connections that generated and constituted worlds prior to European hegemony that existed in their own time independent of the chronology of the modern/colonial world system.⁵⁸⁹

Smith writes how under ‘European imperialism Indigenous peoples were positioned within new political formations which ruptured previous relations, strategic alliances, trade routes and ways of communicating with other Indigenous nations’ which ‘effectively shifted the focus of Indigenous international relations to a colonizer/colonized relationship’.⁵⁹⁰ On the analytical scale of world systems theory, prior to European hegemony during the Atlantic cycle of accumulation beginning in 1492, Afro-Eurasian regionalisation emerged from patterns of transnational and transcontinental trade, migration, communication, scholarship, and technological transfer, centred on flourishing Chinese and Islamic civilisations.⁵⁹¹ Creative historical activities, like mathematics,

⁵⁸⁵ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, “On Tricky Ground: Researching the Native in the Age of Uncertainty”, 86.

⁵⁸⁶ Paul Gilroy, *Against Race*, 271.

⁵⁸⁷ Pollock *et. al.* “Cosmopolitanisms”, 12.

⁵⁸⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸⁹ Samir Amin, *Global History: A View from the South* (Dakar, Senegal: Pambazuka Press, 2011), 12.

⁵⁹⁰ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 116-117.

⁵⁹¹ Janet Abu-Laghdou, *Before European Hegemony* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 1989). See also John Hobson, “The Eastern Origins of the Rise of the West and the ‘Return’ of Asia”, *East Asia*, 32 (2015): 242-243.

logic, philosophy, and the natural sciences, crossed the frontiers of Afro-Eurasian civilisations.⁵⁹² The ancient Silk Road ‘mixed peoples, languages, cultures, and religions for fifteen centuries’, and so the Afro-Eurasian zone has *always been* ‘dynamic, fluid, and multiple’.⁵⁹³ The transcontinental spread of the great world religions dates back even further in history. Fanon and Smith share the view of colonialism as the *closure* of forms of life that were previously dynamic, reflexive, open, and connected to the world; and yet, he argues, a colonised people is not alone, for their epistemic and geopolitical ‘frontiers remain open to new ideas and echoes from the world outside’.⁵⁹⁴

Provincialising cosmopolitanism opens up our understanding to plural, non-Western conceptions of cosmopolitanism as perspective, practice, and ethic. There is, recall, no overarching meta-context or foundational conception of pure practical reason on which to base a context-transcendent or universal conception of global justice. So, there is no transcendental ground, or (so far) any constructivist procedure disentangled from power relations that can justify the assumption that the content of global justice is universal. We are not left with *incommensurable, incommunicable, and irreconcilable particularisms*, but with plural ways of being in the world and relating to the world and to each other. There are many borders – times and spaces *between* plural worlds – that can be opened and crossed in different directions to create and sustain connections, relations, and entanglements, and from which to live and dwell and think and act in a cosmopolitan mode.

So then how far does provincialising cosmopolitanism advance us toward the decolonial deconstruction and reconstruction of a *common* ethical-political orientation and set of *common* rules, norms, and meanings for solving our *common* problems and living together on our *common* planet? Decoloniality today, as a critical social theory of global modernity/coloniality, is concerned with explaining and transforming racialised and gendered global inequalities and economic injustices.⁵⁹⁵

⁵⁹² Marshall G. S. Hodgson, “The Interrelations of Societies in History”, in *Rethinking World History: Essays on Europe, Islam, and World History*, ed. Edmund Burke III (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 17.

⁵⁹³ L. H. M. Ling, “Journeys Beyond the West: World Orders and a 7th Century Buddhist Monk”, *Review of International Studies*, 37 (2010): 237-238.

⁵⁹⁴ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 69.

⁵⁹⁵ Walter D. Mignolo, “Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing”, 274.

Does decolonial critique not thus presuppose the context-transcending norms of truth and justice? Taking seriously pluriversality about the perspectives, worldviews, ontologies, epistemologies, and methodologies of scholarly enquiry and political praxis⁵⁹⁶ would seem to put decoloniality as a cosmopolitan critical social theory of global modernity/coloniality in an impossible position.⁵⁹⁷ Provincialised cosmopolitanisms perform the hermeneutical task of transforming our perceptions of the world and our ethical ways of being in the world and relating to the world and to each other. However, these excavated hermeneutical resources are of limited use for the reconstruction of the normative content of decolonial cosmopolitanism – if it is not performatively self-contradictory. Next, in 3.7., I argue that Western imperialism is a generative and constitutive context of decolonial cosmopolitan thought and practice that can supply the context-transcending normative content of decolonial cosmopolitanism.

3.7. The normative content of decoloniality

Decoloniality ‘pulls us inexorably back into the whirlpool of discourse’⁵⁹⁸ – the reciprocal exchange of meanings and reasons and processes of mutual learning and teaching across ‘philosophical, disciplinary, institutional, inter-generational, territorial and community’ boundaries of reasoning.⁵⁹⁹ There is also a question of auto-critique: Hokowhitu reminds us that epistemic challenges ‘do not merely migrate West’.⁶⁰⁰ So, there is a need for reconstructive moment to return to the ‘matrix of rational dialogue and reasoned agreement and disagreement’ and normative judgement after the deconstructive moment.⁶⁰¹ We must go beyond deconstruction, or problematising genealogy, which may forget or render invisible the (often partial, incomplete, and reversed) victories, and the

⁵⁹⁶ Gurminder K. Bhambra, Dalia Gebrial, and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, “Introduction: Decolonising the University?”, 2.

⁵⁹⁷ Kimberly Hutchings, “Decolonizing Global Ethics: Thinking with the Pluriverse,” *Ethics & International Affairs*, 33:2 (2019): 118.

⁵⁹⁸ Matheson Russell, *Habermas and Politics*, 196.

⁵⁹⁹ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Te Kahautu Maxwell, Haupi Puke, and Pou Temara “Indigenous Knowledge, Methodology and Mayhem”, 132.

⁶⁰⁰ Brendan Hokowhitu “Indigenous Studies: Research, Identity, and Resistance”, 11-12.

⁶⁰¹ Thomas McCarthy, *Ideals and Illusions*, 7.

lessons in the losses, of the planetary anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and anti-racist struggles to which we are the inheritors. Decoloniality derives its normative content from forms of practical reasoning that emerge from the global context of decolonisation and which are embedded in practices of transnational solidarity, global and transnational institutions, and the emergent discursive practice of human rights that constitutes the core of the normative order. This pluriversal cosmopolitan ethic and conception of justice is the continually revisable and contestable product of ongoing practical engagement and dialogue between worlds.

I take as my point of departure Go's overcoming of the analytic bifurcations of sociology to study modern Western colonialism as a 'sociopolitical structure of interaction between the West and the Rest, between Europe and its subjugated others' and the postcolonial cosmopolitanisms that emerge from within modern/colonial contexts.⁶⁰² If we are constituted through connections, then the connections made through imperialism, colonialism, and slavery would seem to be key sites for the production of cosmopolitan thought and practice. Go explains that empire and colony, not the nation-state, are the dominant political formations of modern history, and reminds us that it was not until the era of decolonisation beginning in the 1960s when empire and colony gave way to the nation state as the dominant political formation in the world system.⁶⁰³ Yet, contemporary historical sociologies of actually existing forms of cosmopolitanism focus not on colonialism, but primarily on post-WWII liberal international ordering and neoliberal globalisation, as generative and constitutive of cosmopolitanism.⁶⁰⁴

If we are to take seriously the nexus of dwelling and thinking, then colonial empires might be the relevant geopolitical formations within which subjects and forms of historical consciousness are formed, and the appropriate form and scale relevant for understanding a form of thought.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰² Julian Go "Fanon's Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism", 209

⁶⁰³ *Ibid.* C.f. Gerard Delanty, *The European Heritage*, 160.

⁶⁰⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁵ Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the Future of the World* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 10.

Colonialism is not a temporary deviation in an otherwise linear progressive narrative towards our cosmopolitan condition, or a purely negative force contradicting cosmopolitanism. Go argues that although colonialism contradicts cosmopolitan ideals, cosmopolitan scholars should also rethink how the ‘historical and institutional dynamics, contradictions, or fissures’ of Western colonialism have generated cosmopolitan thinking in colonial subjects ‘rather than only acting as a fetter’.⁶⁰⁶ Go reads Fanon’s postcolonial cosmopolitanism based on solidarity among the oppressed and excluded archetypally as ‘a form of cosmopolitanism that aimed to negate colonialism’s contradictions and thus realize the ideals which Europe had pronounced but failed to realize’.⁶⁰⁷ For Go, Fanon’s postcolonial cosmopolitanism occupies the space of connectedness between the West and the non-West, and ‘always keeps the West, and its history of imperialism, in full view’.⁶⁰⁸ Following Go’s postcolonial critique of analytic bifurcation in social theory, my understanding is that decolonisation was not a process that occurred in spaces exterior to the European continent – the territories of the Americas, Africa, and Asia, and in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific oceans – but in *transcontinental spaces* generated and constituted by imperialism, colonialism, and slavery. Decolonisation was a planetary struggle that transcended local contexts and histories.

If actually existing forms of cosmopolitanism are conceived as socio-historical changes in which the epistemic and normative horizons of societies are opened, expanded, and fused, then decolonisation is a paradigm case.⁶⁰⁹ Just as the revival of Western cosmopolitanism at the end of the twentieth century tracked a conscious shift in subjectivity, decoloniality tracked other forms of context-transcending historical consciousness earlier in the same century. Decolonial scholars have written extensively in recent years on *planetary humanism* and the *spirit of Bandung* that animate

⁶⁰⁶ Julian Go “Fanon’s Postcolonial Cosmopolitanism”, 209.

⁶⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 220.

⁶⁰⁹ C.f. Gerard Delanty, “A Cosmopolitan Approach to the Explanation of Social Change: Social Mechanisms, Processes, Modernity”, *The Sociological Review*, 60:2 (2012): 350.

the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist struggles of the twentieth century.⁶¹⁰ The era of formal decolonisation opened up counter-hegemonic cosmopolitan public spheres.⁶¹¹ Foremost was the 1955 Conference on Afro-Asian Solidarity in Bandung, during which the political and epistemic foundations of decoloniality were constructed.⁶¹² Oppressed nations forged a *common* language with which to deconstruct the Western-dominated world order and reconstruct an alternative order.⁶¹³

Nelson Maldonado-Torres explains that the significance of the Bandung conference is that it was the moment that the world became self-conscious of the *unfinished project of decolonisation*.

Anti-colonial and decolonial political, intellectual, and artistic expressions existed before, but not necessarily in the same amount, or with the same degree of *self-awareness and regional and global exchanges* as in the twentieth-century, when one can refer to an *increasingly self-conscious and coalitional effort* to understanding decolonization, and not simply modernity, as an unfinished project.⁶¹⁴

The principal decolonial cosmopolitan ethical, intellectual, diplomatic, and institutional legacies of Bandung include the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM); the 1966 Tricontinental Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in Havana;⁶¹⁵ the Group of 77 (G77); the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the New International Economic Order (NIEO); the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and the North-South Dialogue.⁶¹⁶ This constellation constitutes a form of actually existing cosmopolitanism.

⁶¹⁰ Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Legacies of Bandung: Decolonization and the Politics of Culture" in *Making a World after Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher Lee (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2010), 45-68. Anthony Bogues "Radical Anti-Colonial Thought, Anti-Colonial Internationalism and the Politics of Human Solidarities" in *International Relations and Non-Western Thought: Imperialism, Colonialism and Investigations of Global Modernity*, ed. Robbie Shilliam (London: Routledge, 2010), 197-213. Siba Grovogui, "A Revolution Nonetheless: The Global South in International Relations", *The Global South*, 5:1 (2011): 175-190. Mustapha Kamal Pasha, "The 'Bandung' Impulse and International Relations" in *Postcolonial Theory and International Relations: A Critical Introduction*, ed. Sanjay Seth (London: Routledge, 2013): 150-1. Quỳnh N. Pham and Robbie Shilliam eds. *Meanings of Bandung: Postcolonial Orders and Decolonial Visions* (New York Rowman & Littlefield International, 2016).

⁶¹¹ Susan Bayly, *Asian Voices in a Post-Colonial Age: Vietnam, India and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

⁶¹² Walter D. Mignolo, "Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing", 273-274.

⁶¹³ Mustapha Kamal Pasha, "The Bandung Within", 203.

⁶¹⁴ Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Thinking Through the Decolonial Turn", 2. Emphasis added.

⁶¹⁵ Manuel Barcia, "'Locking horns with the Northern Empire': Anti-American Imperialism at the Tricontinental Conference of 1966 in Havana", *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*, 7:3 (2009): 208-217. Robert J. C. Young, "Theoretical Practices of the Freedom Struggles: Guevara, Castro and the Tricontinental" *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 211-6.

⁶¹⁶ Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner "The Non-Aligned Movement" in *Routledge Handbook of Diplomacy and Statecraft* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 274-289. Robert J. C. Young "Theoretical Practices of the Freedom Struggles: China, Egypt, Bandung" *Postcolonialism: An Historical Introduction* (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2016), 191-2. Giuliano Garavini, *After Empires: European integration, Decolonization, and the Challenge from the Global South 1957-1986*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Omar Dahi and Firat Demir *South-South Trade and Finance in the Twenty-First*

Decolonial cosmopolitanism is not the only interpretation of the ambivalent twentieth century anti-imperial, anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles. Chatterjee argues plausibly for the orthodox interpretation that anti-colonial nationalism, not decolonial cosmopolitanism, emerged in the twentieth century by ‘owning the virtues of universal modernity but asserting that imperial rule is universally the principal obstacle to attaining those virtues. This is what was announced at international conferences such as the one at Bandung in 1955’.⁶¹⁷ Gary Wilder counters that to recognise the cosmopolitan world counter-ordering dimension of anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and anti-racist struggles forces scholars of world history, order, and politics to abandon the ‘dubious but entrenched assumption that during decolonization many in the West thought globally while colonized peoples thought nationally, locally, concretely, or ethnically – and those that didn’t were somehow inauthentic’.⁶¹⁸ The leaders of the liberation struggles of the twentieth century did not intend only to secure a stronger position for their nations within the existing Western-dominated world order of sovereign nation states and white supremacy, but envisioned its ultimate transcendence through which humanity could realise itself more fully.⁶¹⁹

Gruffydd Jones discloses the cosmopolitan dimension of decolonisation by closely reading anti-colonial poetry and art and the speeches of revolutionaries and statesmen in the great debates over the nature of the enemy and the form of state and society to be constructed once the colonial state-society complex was to be defeated. She argues that the deliberate framing of the struggles of the age in universalist terms demonstrate that these ‘do not simply counter but seek to transcend the logics of imperialism, racism, exclusion, and domination’, bringing to life through their revolutionary practice a ‘far broader inclusive vision, a vision of solidarity and human unity’.⁶²⁰ Gilroy records how the planetary humanism articulated in Léopold Sédar Senghor’s poem, *Tyaroye*,

Century Rise of the South or a Second Great Divergence (London: Anthem Press, 2016), 18-25. Chris Alden, Sally Morphet and Marco Antonio Vieira eds. *The South in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁶¹⁷ Partha Chatterjee, “More on Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism”, 239

⁶¹⁸ Gary Wilder, *Freedom Time*, 8.

⁶¹⁹ *Ibid*, 12.

⁶²⁰ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Conclusion: *Imperatives, Possibilities, and Limitations*”, 226-7.

was ‘used later by other leaders of the Bandung generation’ of intellectuals, revolutionaries, artists, and statesmen ‘to indict the ruthless logic of capitalist economic development and the failures of complacent and stubbornly color-coded liberal traditions of understanding politics’.⁶²¹ This concept of planetary humanism evolved through Negritude movement, in cosmopolitan public fora such as the Congress of Negro Writers and Artists (*Congrès des Écrivains et Artistes Noirs*) in 1956 (Paris);⁶²² the All-African Peoples’ Conferences of 1958 (Accra), 1960 (Tunis), and 1961 (Cairo); and the First World Festival of Negro Arts, 1966 (Dakar), and the subsequent pan-African festivals of 1969 (Algiers) and 1977 (Lagos).⁶²³ The 1966 Dakar festival was described at the time by – now President of Senegal – Senghor, as ‘the elaboration of a new humanism which this time will include all of humanity on the whole of our planet Earth’, and was a world-historical moment at the intersection of the global anti-colonial and anti-racist struggles.⁶²⁴

Western colonialism was generative and constitutive of actually existing cosmopolitanisms embedded in networks and practices of transnational solidarity and the connected struggles to irreversibly transform the Western, white supremacist, colonial world order. Planetary humanism and the spirit of Bandung are paradigmatically expressed today in acts of transnational solidarity with the continued struggles of the oppressed – for example, the Palestinian cause.⁶²⁵ The history of the decolonisation struggle is one of short-term victories – formal geopolitical decolonisation – and long-term disappointments and defeats – of the NIEO, the Doha development round of World Trade Organisation trade negotiations, and visions of socioeconomic transformation, cultural renaissance, and religious revival. These have left behind a cache of normative resources with which to critically analyse the crises of the present and transform ourselves and our world.

⁶²¹ *Ibid*, 288.

⁶²² Reiland Rabaka, *The Negritude Movement: W.E.B. Du Bois, Leon Damas, Aime Cesaire, Leopold Senghor, Frantz Fanon, and the Evolution of an Insurgent Idea* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015).

⁶²³ David Murphy ed., *The First World Festival of Negro Arts, Dakar 1966: Contexts and Legacies*, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2017).

⁶²⁴ Anthony J. Ratcliff, “When Negritude was in Vogue: Critical Reflections of the First World Festival of Negro Arts and Culture in 1966,” *Journal of Pan African Studies*. 6.7 (2014): 167.

⁶²⁵ Paul Gilroy, *After Empire*, 89-92.

These include, principally, in addition to the ethical, intellectual, diplomatic, and institutional legacies of Bandung, the collective-developmental human rights fought for and won by the South.

3.8. The struggle for, and over, human rights

I now argue that the decolonial cosmopolitanism that emerged from Bandung was institutionalised through the critical-hermeneutical struggle to reconceive and realise universal human rights and thereby challenge the normative order of the world. This struggle was waged in the theatres of international civil society and the United Nations. I advance a “political” conception of human rights as the evolving, contested norms of an historically contingent discursive practice at the core of the global normative order rather than a reflection of an independently existing moral reality. Charles Beitz argues the global discourse of human rights constitutes a practice in the sense that it consists of a set of norms and rules that regulate the behaviour of a class of agents, a generally shared belief that these rules and norms are valid, and a set of institutions, mechanisms, and informal processes for their propagation and implementation.⁶²⁶ Understanding the purposes of the discursive practice of human rights in the global normative order and the modes of action it mediates is essential to understanding what human rights are.⁶²⁷ For the purposes of my argument, I assume and do not defend a practice-based conception of human rights against naturalistic and other rival conceptions, although what I say here about the practice adds to the weight of arguments in its favour.

The discursive practice of human rights is the most structured, most formal element of the emerging global normative order. We must draw a distinction between normative and legal force to understand how the global normative order functions. Viewed as the core element of the global normative order, human rights have a normative force that *precedes* and *exceeds* their enforceability. As Beitz explains, ‘the nature and weight of our reasons to comply with any particular norm are not

⁶²⁶ Charles Beitz, *The Idea of Human Rights* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 42.

⁶²⁷ *Ibid*, 103-104.

settled by determining whether it is properly considered to be a rule of law'.⁶²⁸ Although the UDHR was adopted as a mere declaration, without “binding” legal force, it is a normative standard of evaluation of State conduct and, as the preamble reads, ‘a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations’. Human rights are, for the most part, claim-rights that impose correlative duties on other agents. The primary addressee of human rights is the State. Many of the provisions of the UDHR have acquired the status of customary international law. The States that have ratified the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (ICCPR) and the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (ICESCR) – the *International Bill of Human Rights* – are legally “bound” by them, but there is no enforcement mechanism or world police force to coerce compliance.

International human rights law creates legally binding duties on States to respect, protect, and fulfil human rights. *Respecting* human rights means that States must refrain from any actions that would violate or lead to a violation of human rights. *Protecting* human rights means States have a responsibility to protect individuals and groups against human rights abuses. *Fulfilling* human rights means that States must take actions that progressively enable the full enjoyment of human rights. In the absence of a world police authority, States that ratify human rights treaties establish domestic legislation and policy measures compatible with their treaty obligations. The domestic legal system provides the principal legal protection and enforcement of international human rights law. If domestic mechanisms and procedures fail to address human rights abuses, mechanisms and procedures for individual and group complaints are available at the regional and international levels to help ensure that human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled.

Gilroy observes that the dominant story of the progressive development and entrenchment of human rights in the global normative order is ‘often told ritualistically as a kind of ethno-history’ that forms part of a larger story of the ascendancy of Western civilisation.⁶²⁹ In this narrative, human

⁶²⁸ *Ibid*, 210.

⁶²⁹ Paul Gilroy, *Darker Than Blue: On the Moral Economies of Black Atlantic Culture* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2010), 55.

rights discourse reaches its apotheosis with the ICCPR and the ICESCR becoming international law in 1976. Anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist struggles are erased from the history of the universalisation and institutionalisation of human rights, which limits our imagination of the global transformations that the struggle to realise human rights could accomplish.⁶³⁰ On the “political” conception of human rights that I advance, the discursive practice of human right is *emergent*, not the progressive realisation of an original Enlightenment ideal of autonomy. The remaining task is now to reconstruct the global normative order, emphasising the contributions of non-Western agency in a more adequate account of the emergence and content of the discursive practice of human rights.

Recent revisionist scholarship on the intellectual and political history of the emergence of the discursive practice of human rights has begun to decolonise the archives.⁶³¹ This genealogy of cosmopolitanism draws on constructivism in international relations theory with its emphasis on the normative power rather than the relative material powerlessness of the nations that emerged from decolonisation. Past paradigms in IR/IPE have privileged Western norm entrepreneurship and discursive practices of global ordering and rule-making, and represented non-Western societies and actors as passive subjects of Western hegemony and rule. The global turn in IR/IPE has enabled understanding of the roles of non-Western state and non-state actors at different levels in the normative ordering of the world, their active interpretation, adaptation, and iteration of global norms into a *hybrid normative matrix*, according to their own beliefs, values, and aspirations, and their defence of global norms against the ‘the hypocrisy of the major powers or the incompetence

⁶³⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶³¹ See: Shelley Wright, *International Human Rights, Decolonisation and Globalisation: Becoming Human*, (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2001). ‘Abd Allāh An-Na’īm ed. *Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa* (New York Zed Books, 2002). Roland Burke, *Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010). Bonny Ibhawoh, *Imperialism and Human Rights: Colonial Discourses of Rights and Liberties in African History* (New York: State University of New York Press, 2011). Daniel Maul, *Human Rights, Development and Decolonization: The International Labour Organization, 1940-70* (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Steven Jensen, *The Making of International Human Rights: The 1960s, Decolonization, and the Reconstruction of Global Values*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

of global institutions'.⁶³² Furthermore, anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, and anti-racist movements and leaders attempted to reorder the world through global norm entrepreneurship.⁶³³

This revisionist history more adequately accounts for the normative power exercised by state and non-state actors at global, regional, national, and sub-state levels. The new approach contrasts with earlier constructivist approaches, which privileged Western practices of world ordering and the unidirectional diffusion of norms and socialisation processes in world society.⁶³⁴ This corrective does not deny that the existing world order is unjustly Western-dominated. Yet, while constructivism has begun to decentre Western norms and norm protagonists, it continues to elide or downplay issues of global structural racism and marginalise pre-Westphalian, non-Western civilisations and conceptions of order and justice that could bring new perspectives and challenging ideas into the study of world history, order, and politics.⁶³⁵

Some of this revisionist scholarship on the intellectual and political history of the genesis of human rights contests the origin story of the UDHR by accounting for the role of small powers and non-Western states as norm entrepreneurs in the framing of draft versions, proposed amendments, and the final document. Other recent work has revised the prehistory of the UDHR, for example the anti-colonial resistance to the conquest of the Americas in the 16th and 17th centuries and later waves of national independence won by colonies throughout the Americas, and the transcontinental struggles to abolish African slavery, and their climax in the Haitian revolution. Another focus is the subsequent evolution of the human rights paradigm during and after the global era of decolonisation. In this narrative, the decolonisation struggles in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and the Middle East in the twentieth century are human rights struggles.⁶³⁶ Historical work on the intersection of the Cold

⁶³² Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (2014): 655.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, 647–659.

⁶³⁴ *Ibid.*

⁶³⁵ Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, "Why is there no Non-Western International Relations Theory? 10 Years On", 344–345.

⁶³⁶ José-Manuel Barreto, "Imperialism and Decolonization as Scenarios of Human Rights History", in *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History, and International Law*, ed. José-Manuel Barreto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 140.

War politics of decolonisation with Black civil rights and liberation struggles in the United States and the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa has unearthed the archives of anti-racist thinkers and movements in the making of the contemporary discourse of human rights.⁶³⁷ A related focus is on the late twentieth century struggles against fascist and communist dictatorships and totalitarianisms in Latin America and the former Communist bloc.

My interest here is not in the historical details, for which I redirect the reader to this growing body of specialist literature, but in the critical-hermeneutical implications of this genealogy of the emergent discursive practice of human rights for deconstructing and reconstructing cosmopolitan critical social theory. As a discursive practice of counter-ordering, the planetary decolonisation struggle caused the most significant global transformation to the global normative order of the twentieth century. Major victories in the transformation of the global order include the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* (1960), the *Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1963) followed by the *International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1965), the *Declaration on Establishment of a New International Economic Order* (1974), the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States* (1974), and the *Declaration on the Right to Development* (1986). These together constitute the collective-developmental turn in human rights, which function to *transition* from an unjustly Western-dominated world order to an alternative order.

The Western practice of colonialism and the standard of civilisation in international law were officially delegitimised by the anti-colonial norm entrepreneurship of decolonising states at the 947th plenary meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. The 1960 *Declaration on the*

⁶³⁷ Carol Anderson, *Eyes Off The Prize: The United Nations and the African American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Peniel Joseph ed., *The Black Power Movement: Rethinking the Civil Rights-Black Power Era*, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Taylor and Francis, 2006). Besenia Rodriguez, “‘Long Live Third World Unity! Long Live Internationalism!’: Huey P. Newton's Revolutionary Intercommunalism”, *Souls*, 8:3 (2006): 119-141. Roderick Bush, *The End of White World Supremacy: Black Internationalism and the Problem of the Color Line* (Philadelphia, Temple University Press 2009). Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). Nico Slate, *Colored Cosmopolitanism: The Shared Struggle for Freedom in the United States and India* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012). Sohail Daulatzai, *Black Star, Crescent Moon: The Muslim International and Black Freedom beyond America* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012). Anne Garland Mahler, “The Global South in the Belly of the Beast: Viewing African American Civil Rights through a Tricontinental Lens”, *Latin American Research Review*, 50:1 (2015): 95-116.

Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples reinterpreted and reinscribed human rights norms by equating the ‘subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation’, with the denial of fundamental human rights.⁶³⁸ The *Declaration* proclaimed the ‘necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations’. Critically, the Eurocentric standard of civilisation was to no longer serve as a justification for colonial rule and the denial of self-determination. The *Declaration* stated that the ‘inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’, and called for immediate steps to grant independence to colonised peoples ‘without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom’.⁶³⁹

The subsequent *Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* proclaimed that racial discrimination was ‘scientifically false, morally condemnable and socially unjust’ and could not be justified ‘in theory or in practice’. It proclaimed that State policies of racial discrimination, superiority, and hatred are not only denials of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and violations of the UDHR, but obstacles to friendly and peaceful relations among nations that threaten global peace and security. The *Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*, the *Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States*, and the *Declaration on the Right to Development* together constitute a rights-based approach to establishing and maintaining a ‘just and equitable economic and social order’ based on the general principles of:

- a. Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of States;
- b. Sovereign equality of all States;
- c. Non-aggression;

⁶³⁸ Catherine Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility and Contemporary Redress”, in *Political Theory Without Borders*, eds. Robert E. Goodin and James S. Fishskin (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2016), 237-238.

⁶³⁹ United Nations, 1960 *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, accessed 1 October 2019, [https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1514\(XV\)](https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/1514(XV))

- d. Non-intervention;
- e. Mutual and equitable benefit;
- f. Peaceful coexistence;
- g. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- h. Peaceful settlement of disputes;
- i. Remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force and which deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal development;
- j. Fulfillment in good faith of international obligations;
- k. Respect for human rights and international obligations;
- l. No attempt to seek hegemony and spheres of influence;
- m. Promotion of international social justice;
- n. International co-operation for development;
- o. Free access to and from the sea by land-locked countries within the framework of the above principles.

In the twenty first century, the *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UNDRIP) was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on September 13 2007, after two decades of deliberation by Member States and Indigenous groups. UNDRIP was the product of the centuries of struggle by Indigenous peoples over land, water, culture, and autonomy, and contemporary social movements against the social and environmental destruction wrought by global capitalism and its State, corporate, and financial agents.⁶⁴⁰ The decolonisation struggle for and over the emergent discursive practice of human rights is the concrete resolution of the dialectical relation between private and public autonomy through processes of dialogue and mutual learning in the power-laden global context of colonial modernity. These “third-generation rights” challenge not only the prevailing

⁶⁴⁰ José-Manuel Barreto, “Introduction: Decolonial Strategies and Dialogue in the Human Rights Field”, in *Human Rights from a Third World Perspective: Critique, History, and International Law*, ed. José-Manuel Barreto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 23.

norms of the Western-dominated, white-supremacist world order, but the Eurocentric nexus of temporality and normativity articulated as the unidirectional global diffusion of moral progress from the West as history's vanguard (of which the chronology of generations of rights is an expression).

By reconstructing the normative content of decoloniality, we learn that cosmopolitanism is not a *future* end state, originating in the West and realised by Western agency, but a normative and critical perspective, practice, and ethic *present* in the tradition of the oppressed. It is witnessed in the moments of successful and failed rupture with the progressive conception of history articulated by the metanarrative of *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends*. The history of the decolonisation struggle is itself a cache of critical-hermeneutical resources with which to think and act together here and now. Revising the intellectual and political history of the emergent discursive practice of human rights by recentering non-Western agency and thought, and the continued post-Western and post-secular contestation and iteration of human rights,⁶⁴¹ could reconceive what it means to be a cosmopolitan citizen of the world as both a thesis about identity and justice.⁶⁴²

3.9. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have deconstructed the metanarrative that I call *Western origins/cosmopolitan ends*. The rational reconstruction of the history of the West's post-WWII liberal international ordering and the technological and practical global transformations of the second age of modernity is explanatorily and normatively deficient insofar as it whitewashes modern history and sustains colonial amnesia and global white ignorance. I argued that by shifting our geography of reasoning beyond the West's epistemic frontiers to unearth the archives of provincial cosmopolitanisms, and,

⁶⁴¹ 'Just as religions such as Islam must adopt a posture of restraint with respect to the political enforcement of their doctrines to secure the kind of international order envisaged by the UN, so too must human rights advocates adopt a restrained understanding of the scope of human rights so that it is clear that it is not an attempt to regulate directly the content of Islam or of any other religious doctrine'. Mohammad Fadel, "Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Islamic Happiness: Islam and Human Rights", in *The Islamic Tradition and Human Rights Discourse*, ed. H. A. Hellier. (Atlantic Council, 2018), 13.

⁶⁴² Walter Mignolo, "The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis:", 739.

moreover, by studying Western colonial empires and commercial circuits as generative and constitutive geographies of cosmopolitan thought and practice, we can disrupt progressive history, and reveal the contingencies and indeterminacies of the present.

The *unfinished project of decolonisation* was the most significant global transformation of the twentieth century.⁶⁴³ The decolonisation struggle generated a new global historical consciousness: *planetary humanism* or the *spirit of Bandung*. Decolonisation was not only a national struggle to overthrow imperial and colonial masters, but a planetary struggle involving the entrepreneurship and institutionalisation of anti-colonial and anti-racist norms and counter-hegemonic discursive practices of cosmopolitan world ordering.⁶⁴⁴ Gilroy writes that we can no longer ‘skip over the historical impact of the impure, vernacular and sometimes anti-European cosmopolitanism that once graced the radical salons of Bandung and Paris as well as the sizzling pages of tricontinentalist initiatives like the African diaspora journal *Présence Africaine*’.⁶⁴⁵ Unearthing this archive of ‘cosmopolitan mentalities nurtured by the tri-continental network of anti-colonial struggle that culminated in the overthrow of apartheid’, can generate an ‘alternative sense of what our networked world might be and become, a new cosmopolitanism centred on the global south’.⁶⁴⁶

The anticolonial battles in Indo-China, South Asia, and Africa that ended the French and British empires were world-historic, global events that specified a different global citizenship from the one that Kant had dreamed about. They saw our world becoming a different kind of object. Think, for example, of Nelson Mandela’s travel to Algeria for military training. What network of solidarity and cross-cultural connectedness made that association possible?⁶⁴⁷

The critical-hermeneutical resources of the anti-imperial, anti-colonial, and anti-racist legacies of the past, both victories and losses, enable moments of rupture with imperial time.

The proliferation of works like David Scott’s *Omens of Adversity*, register a demand for a ‘new sensibility of time, politics, and justice’ for our present as ‘ruined time’, marked by futures

⁶⁴³ Robert Vitalis, *White World Order, Black Power Politics*, 120.

⁶⁴⁴ Amitav Acharya, “Who Are the Norm Makers? The Asian-African Conference in Bandung and the Evolution of Norms Source”, *Global Governance*, 20:3 (2014): 405-417.

⁶⁴⁵ Paul Gilroy, *After Empire*, 255-256.

⁶⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 290.

past and pasts present.⁶⁴⁸ The end of liberal triumphalism and communist determinism force a rethinking for cosmopolitans about the nexus of history and normativity. Our catastrophic *now*, conceived as *ruined time*, does not anticipate a *cosmopolitanism to come*.⁶⁴⁹ Walking backwards into the future, we witness the historical accumulation of catastrophe and ruin and the intensification of neocolonial oppression, environmental destruction, climate change, land and water dispossession, vice, impiety, injustice, and violence.⁶⁵⁰ Gruffydd Jones argues that a tragic reading of twentieth century history is compelling when we account for ‘the disappointments and defeats suffered by anticolonial visions’, and yet there are also other ways in which these histories of unfinished struggles and partial or reversed victories can ‘resonate with our times’.⁶⁵¹

The historical legacies of decolonisation inform present-day decolonial struggles ‘to make history and at the same time to be free from it, to be historical subjects without being subjected to its determinist logic’, in which the colonised appears as the European pre-modern past and modern Europe represents to the colonised its own future.⁶⁵² In the intellectual and political decolonial struggles *for* and *over* human rights we can see the possibility of transforming ourselves and our world into citizens of a ‘pluricentric world built on the ruins of ancient, non-Western cultures and civilizations with the debris of Western civilization’.⁶⁵³ These normative resources, I conclude, are the materials for renewing critical social theory with a decolonial cosmopolitan intent after the end of progress.

⁶⁴⁸ David Scott, *Omens of Adversity: Tragedy, Time, Memory, Justice* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 10.

⁶⁴⁹ C.f. Seyla Benhabib, *Another Cosmopolitanism*, 177.

⁶⁵⁰ Branwen Gruffydd Jones (2019) “Time, History, Politics: Anticolonial Constellations”, *Interventions*, 21:5. 597.

⁶⁵¹ *Ibid*, 611.

⁶⁵² Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, *Foucault in Iran: Islamic Revolution after the Enlightenment* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2016), 188-189.

⁶⁵³ Walter Mignolo, “The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis:”, 183.

§2. Kia Tūhono te Pono me te Tika

4. Global Order as Subject

If you begin by conceiving of society as a cooperative venture, which rules out structural oppression and systemic exploitation; if you continue by assuming the recognized moral equality of all humans, which rules out the actual normative subordination of the majority of the population; if you postulate autarkical nations, which rules out the history of imperialism; if you take ideal theory to legitimate ignoring both gender and race, whose very existence shows that they are *constitutive of the basic structure* you are supposed to be prescribing for; then how after all that can you possibly afford to pay any attention to the real world, when every assumption you have made is so flagrantly contradicted by it?
– Charles W. Mills, “Realizing (Through Racializing) Pogge”.⁶⁵⁴

[Once the racialised] pattern of global uneven distribution of power had been established, *racial discourse was no longer necessary*... [The] massive impoverishment of the majority of African peoples today, as well as millions in Asia and Latin America – normalised as a question of development – is not simply a humanitarian tragedy, but, in part, the product of *a racialised international order, a form of global structural racism*.
– Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Race in the Ontology of International Order”.⁶⁵⁵

The greatest and most significant achievement during the last decades has been the independence from colonial and alien domination of a large number of peoples and nations which has enabled them to become members of the community of free peoples... However, the remaining vestiges of alien and colonial domination, foreign occupation, racial discrimination, apartheid and neo-colonialism in all its forms continue to be among the greatest obstacles to the full emancipation and progress of the developing countries and all the peoples involved... It has proved impossible to achieve an even and balanced development of the international community under the existing international economic order. The gap between the developed and the developing countries continues to widen in a system which was established at a time when most of the developing countries did not even exist as independent States and which perpetuates inequality.
– *United Nations Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order*⁶⁵⁶

4.1. Analytic liberal institutional cosmopolitanism

In §2. *Kia Tūhono te Pono me te Tika*, I intervene in the contemporary debates in the analytic liberal tradition of cosmopolitanism, dominant in Anglo-American political philosophy. By joining truth and justice, I focus on the same major topics of cosmopolitan dialogue, the existing world order, transforming our world, and the unity of normativity and actuality that I previously focused on in §1. *Kia Whakatōmuri te Haere Whakamua*. I previously intervened in the contemporary debates

⁶⁵⁴ Charles W. Mills “Realizing (Through Racializing) Pogge” in *Thomas Pogge and His Critics*, ed. Alison M. Jaggar, (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 169. Emphasis added.

⁶⁵⁵ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Race in the Ontology of International Order”, *Political Studies*, 56 (2008): 924-925. Emphasis added.

⁶⁵⁶ United Nations General Assembly, *Declaration on Establishment of a New International Economic Order*, 1 May 1974. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/218450/files/A_RES_3201%28S-VI%29-EN.pdf

between decoloniality and the Frankfurt School of critical theory to elucidate the epistemic dimensions of coloniality and the critical epistemology of decoloniality. My intention in this section is to make epistemic decolonisation accessible to analytic liberal cosmopolitans, and to make progress on the non-ideal theoretical issues of white ignorance, colonial amnesia, and epistemic injustice that must be resolved to make possible consensual and conciliatory dialogue and thus justice, truth, and reconciliation in world politics.

Institutions are central topics for both analytic liberal cosmopolitan political philosophy and decoloniality. Institutions feature in these two bodies of thought in complex ways that make for fruitful dialogue. Given the lack of actual dialogue between analytic liberal cosmopolitans and decolonial theorists, in contrast to the more extensive dialogue networks of critical social theorists and decolonial theorists, identifying such a significant area of common interest has the potential to open constructive future dialogues for sharing perspectives, experiences, and knowledge, and coproducing new insights. My original contribution is to help decolonise the tools of normative cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis and the analytic liberal *institutional cosmopolitan* understanding of the global order as the subject of justice. I do this by following and extending lines of argument initiated but not fully developed by Mills, drawing on the methods and results of recent decolonial scholarship in IR/IPE.

The mode of access for my decolonial intervention into analytic liberal cosmopolitanism in §2. *Kia Tūhono te Pono me te Tika* is the critique and extension of John Rawls's fundamental idea of the basic structure as the primary subject of justice.⁶⁵⁷ Rawls is not a cosmopolitan. For Rawls, the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice, and not the global institutional order, because of his:

1. politically liberal contextualist account of practical reasoning;
2. institutionalist account of the poverty and prosperity of different state-societies.

⁶⁵⁷ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2005 [1971]), 6.

The basic structure of society comprises the interlocking institutions that form the background of common rules, norms, and meanings within which individual and collective agents act and interact. It includes political and legal structures including the constitution, law, state, market, civil society, family, and so on. It is the subject of justice insofar as its effects on the lives of individuals are pervasive and immediate.⁶⁵⁸ The basic structure is pervasive insofar as it sets rules that subjects must follow in the setting and pursuing of their ends, creates and assigns different social positions and rights and duties, and shapes the division of advantages and disadvantages of social cooperation.⁶⁵⁹ This is most clear in the case of the state institutions of law and order and the modern state's characteristic powers of enforcement by the use of violence.⁶⁶⁰

Sociohistorically contingent positive forms of constitution, crime, injury, right, property, contract, corporation, firm, market, labour, family, state, office, citizenship, and social position create the possibilities and limits of rational agency. Peoples' interests, talents, capabilities, characters, ambitions, final ends, and prospects are informed by the basic structure.⁶⁶¹ Part of what Rawls means by *political liberalism* is that the rational choices of lives, actions, and interactions made possible within these limits are not directly governed by the principles of justice. Within the sphere of right, once background justice is preserved, individuals are free to form, revise, and pursue their conceptions of the good.

Institutions matter in various ways to analytic liberal cosmopolitan political philosophers. Recall the distinction made earlier between *moral cosmopolitans* or *humanists*, who argue that the scope of justice is *necessarily universal*, and *institutionalist* or *associativist cosmopolitans*, who argue that scope of justice is *contingently universal* because a global institutional structure or association exists, is organised in the relevant ways, causally and morally relates us in relevant ways, or impacts upon

⁶⁵⁸ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 82. John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, ed. Erin Kelly (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2001), 10.

⁶⁵⁹ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 258.

⁶⁶⁰ Louis-Philippe Hodgson, "Why the Basic Structure?", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 42:3/4 (2012): 314.

⁶⁶¹ John Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, 269. Samuel Freeman, *Liberalism and Distributive Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 234-235.

our first order interests to a sufficient degree to generate demanding redistributive obligations of cosmopolitan justice. Institutional and associativist cosmopolitans follow Rawls in conceiving justice a property or prime virtue of political institutions.⁶⁶²

Moral cosmopolitanism, for which justice is also a property of social relations, not only, or even primarily, of institutions,⁶⁶³ may yet have institutionalist implications. Brock, for example, describes her moral cosmopolitan view, articulated in *Global Justice*, as at least ‘quasi-institutional’.⁶⁶⁴ Agnostic about the *extent* of global political-economic integration demanded by her cosmopolitan account of global justice, Brock asks about the existing global institutional order:

Do current arrangements associated with [productive activity, trade, and other matters related to the global economic order] promote global justice? Do they enable all to meet their basic needs? Do they protect our basic liberties? Do they reflect fair terms of cooperation in economic endeavours? Is the global economic order currently helping us make progress in the right direction?⁶⁶⁵

Luis Cabrera, in his introduction to the 2018 edited volume, *Institutional Cosmopolitanism*, thus takes the term institutional cosmopolitanism to encompass the full range of analytic liberal cosmopolitan interests in institutions. These range from quasi-institutionalist moral cosmopolitan arguments, like Brock’s, which are ‘focused on assessing global institutional practices, and on reforming states and other collective institutional agents’, to integrative institutional cosmopolitan arguments advocating full global political integration, up to the limit of the world state.⁶⁶⁶ I take institutional cosmopolitanism to mean any approach that takes institutional orders or basic structures *at all levels* as subjects of justice (not necessarily primarily), and which justifies global political-economic integration, coordination, and cooperation *to any extent*, moderate or extreme.

⁶⁶² Darrel Moellendorf, *Global Inequality Matters*. 44.

⁶⁶³ ‘Justice is a relational, as well as an institutional, virtue’. Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 165.

⁶⁶⁴ Gillian Brock, *Global Justice*, 316.

⁶⁶⁵ *Ibid*, 290.

⁶⁶⁶ Luis Cabrera, “Introduction”, in *Institutional Cosmopolitanism*, ed. Luis Cabrera (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 5.

Distributive justice has been the main strand of institutional cosmopolitan theorising about global justice.⁶⁶⁷ Rival liberal theories of justice as the first virtue of institutions are mostly variations on the theme of distributing kinds of goods to classes of individuals in accordance with some principle of justice. An exclusive focus on redistribution, Rainer Forst argues, diverts our attention from the crux of the matter, *viz.* deep structural injustices and unjust power relations.⁶⁶⁸ Brock draws a distinction between *relational* and *distributive* varieties of cosmopolitanism, and takes her own view to be relational.⁶⁶⁹ What matters to relational conceptions of justice is that individuals stand in relations of equality with one another. On her account, this involves a focus on abolishing oppression in trying to realise an egalitarian social order.⁶⁷⁰ The focus of cosmopolitan theorising about global justice should be on inequalities of power that diminish crucial aspects of the lives of human beings subjected to exploitation, domination, and other specific forms of oppression, Brock argues.⁶⁷¹ So, cosmopolitans should be concerned primarily with eliminating inequalities of respect, recognition, and, power, not with redistributing resources *per se*.⁶⁷² Distributive justice matters only insofar as distribution has implications for ending inegalitarian social relations and creating and sustaining egalitarian social relations.

In Forst's view, any cosmopolitan theory of global justice that fails to theoretically integrate the structural and relational injustices that mark our neocolonial global capitalist era are especially deserving of criticism. For any such ideal theory would either be based on a mischaracterisation of international and transnational relations as positively cooperative, or would aim to equalise the distribution of resources and human capabilities for flourishing lives, or to satisfy basic needs, when the real struggle of global justice is to bring enduring structural and relational injustices to

⁶⁶⁷ Gillian Brock, *Global Justice*, 317. Rainer Forst, adapting one of Wittgenstein's aphorisms in the *Philosophical Investigations*, argues that Western political philosophers have been held captive by an Aristotelian picture of justice qua distributive justice. *Contexts of Justice*, 20.

⁶⁶⁸ Rainer Forst, *Contexts of Justice*, 20.

⁶⁶⁹ Gillian Brock, *Global Justice*, 317.

⁶⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 304.

⁶⁷¹ *Ibid*, 313.

⁶⁷² *Ibid*, 318.

an end and transform our world.⁶⁷³ The vast inequalities between people living in the Global North and those living in the Global South, between whites and non-whites, the global rich and poor, and capitalists and workers, are both distributional and relational. A more equitable distribution of the Earth's opportunities and resources is therefore necessary if we are to transition to a friendlier, and less unjust, unsustainable, unstable, and insecure post-Western, post-secular world order.⁶⁷⁴

The most dynamic developments in institutional cosmopolitanism have been non-ideal theoretical approaches that take subnational, national, international, transnational, and global structures and relations of *negative* cooperation, including legal, political, economic, or cultural forms of domination, oppression, or exploitation as contexts of justice.⁶⁷⁵ Global structural injustices and relational inequalities within and between societies have been emphasised more in the contemporary literature. Analytic liberal cosmopolitans have developed greater capacity for normatively analysing the global institutional order and its history, agents, parts, characteristics, and consequences – informed by, and informing, empirical work in the social sciences. Programmes of critique and reform of the global order and practices of global governance are the most promising and the most important research trajectory in analytic liberal cosmopolitanism.⁶⁷⁶ This space opens up topics of dialogue between analytic liberal cosmopolitanism and decoloniality.

As a first move, decolonising analytic liberal institutional cosmopolitanism necessitates reiterating, from a decolonial perspective and with a decolonial practical intent, Thomas Pogge's cosmopolitan critique of the methodological nationalism of Rawls's institutionalist account of the poverty and prosperity of different state-societies. As Mills argues, because of his colonial amnesia about the 'past and present relations of colonialism and neocolonialism, which have created both, Rawls offers us a vision of autarkical polities whose respective levels of development are the result

⁶⁷³ Rainer Forst, *Normativity and Power*, 12

⁶⁷⁴ Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 97. Monique Deveaux and Kathryn Walker, "Introduction", 111.

⁶⁷⁵ See for example, Sabrina Martin, "A Non-Ideal Global Basic Structure", *Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics*, 10:2 (2016): 11-26.

⁶⁷⁶ Gillian Brock and Harry Brighouse, "Introduction", 8-9.

not of a *transnational* and *intranational* (for the United States) system of extraction and exploitation, not of empire, but of different *national* cultures and traditions'.⁶⁷⁷ Rawls's methodologically nationalist explanation of the prosperity and poverty of state-societies elides the historical connections between the material and institutional development of the modern West and its histories of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, and obscures the inequalities produced and reproduced by the neocolonial capitalist world system.⁶⁷⁸

Pogge's powerful critique of the methodological nationalism of institutionalist analysis, including Rawls's explanation of levels of development by local factors, is incomplete. If we are to reconstruct institutional cosmopolitanism then we need a decolonial epistemic critique of the methodological Eurocentrism of institutionalist analysis. Simply *adding* global factors to the explanatory account of social problems and crises in some countries in the Global South without *rethinking* residual Eurocentric conceptions of hierarchy and teleology in international relations and international political economy (IR/IPE) is insufficient for the tasks of explaining and transforming our world. Recent decolonial interventions in IR/IPE show us a viable way forward for deconstructing and reconstructing cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis.

As a second move, I turn to current non-ideal theoretical approaches to analytic liberal institutional cosmopolitanism that take structures and relations of *negative* cooperation as the starting point for theorising interactional wrongs and global structural injustice. I take a different approach to Mills's racial contractarianism for analysing white supremacy as the core institution constituting the global basic structure of colonial modernity. There is an alternative way to reconstruct the dominant Rawlsian paradigm. I critique and extend Iris Marion Young's account of structural injustice, and reconceive what it is for the basic structure to be the subject of justice when the basic structure is non-ideal and the racialised (and gendered) subjects that it constitutes

⁶⁷⁷ Charles W. Mills, "Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy", 18. My emphasis.

⁶⁷⁸ Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism* (London: Pluto Press, 2015). As they argue, we need an approach to global historical sociology that 'captures the geopolitically interconnected and sociologically co-constitutive nature' of the emergence of capitalism. 43.

are not free and equal. The problems of justice that decolonial cosmopolitanism must respond to are both backward-looking and forward-looking. This chapter opens new and challenging problems of the nexus of justice, truth, and reconciliation that I address in 5. *Reconciliation*, when I take the global order as a transitional context of justice.

4.2. Rawls's inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations

For Rawls, the scope of justice as fairness as the principle governing the distribution of opportunities and basic goods is limited to the boundaries of liberal democratic state-societies, theorised ideal-typically as closed, self-sufficient intergenerational systems of cooperation that persons enter only by birth and leave only by death.⁶⁷⁹ Rawls restricts the scope of justice based on causal claims he makes about the prosperity and poverty of peoples, and the pervasive effects of the basic structure on the lives of individuals.⁶⁸⁰ Arguing against early cosmopolitan proposals for expanding the scope of distributive justice to all individuals in the world, Rawls provides an endogenous explanation of the prosperity and poverty of political communities. That is, an explanation in terms of local factors, rather than global factors.

I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members... *The crucial elements that make the difference are the political culture, the political virtues and civic society of the country.*⁶⁸¹

Rawls's position is not implausible, and has many virtues. In many ways, Rawls's position on the explanation of the development paths of state-societies pre-empted the ascendant institutionalist approach to good governance, state failure, and development in economics and political science.

In recent decades, development discourse has embraced issues of good governance.⁶⁸²

Global development agencies such as the World Bank have shifted from a pro-market stance

⁶⁷⁹ Onora O'Neill, "Bounded and Cosmopolitan Justice", *Review of International Studies*, 26 (2000): 49.

⁶⁸⁰ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 108-110.

⁶⁸¹ *Ibid*, 108

⁶⁸² Ha-Joon Chang, *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective* (London: Anthem Press, 2002): 69.

informed by methodologically individualistic neoclassical economics, to one recognising the critical functions performed by governance at all levels. The World Bank's 2002 edition of its annual flagship *World Development Report on Building Institutions for Markets* marked a paradigm shift in global developmentality more firmly into the realm of institutional economics through an understanding that markets could not function optimally for inclusive development without strong institutional underpinnings. As the report explained, institutions perform three functions pertinent to the actual functioning of markets: channelling information, defining property rights and contracts, and increasing or decreasing market competition. Optimally functioning markets necessitate a strong and capable state, while corrupt states could impede market development.⁶⁸³

Neoclassical economic analysis assumes that economic behaviour can be mathematically modelled as maximising or minimising solutions to constrained optimisation problems faced by ideal-typical economically rational, utility-maximising agents.⁶⁸⁴ In "History versus Equilibrium", Joan Robinson argues that equilibrium modelling in neoclassical economics lacks application, because the abstract models exist in logical time, not historical time, and the special features of human history are pervasively relevant to the analysis of economic behaviour under conditions of fundamental uncertainty.⁶⁸⁵ This is what Keynes means by *generality* and *actuality*, in contrast to the *special case* that occurs in logical time.⁶⁸⁶ Robinson contrasts the approach of comparing equilibrium positions in logical time with the analysis of different historical processes of capital accumulation. Economic analysis in historical time requires an investigation into the basic structure of society – 'the rules of the game in the type of economy under discussion'.⁶⁸⁷

⁶⁸³ Roumeen Islam, "Building Institutions for Markets", *World Development Report*, (New York: Published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press, 2002).

⁶⁸⁴ Paul Samuelson, *Foundations of Economic Analysis* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947).

⁶⁸⁵ Joan Robinson, "History versus Equilibrium", *Contributions to Modern Economics* (New York: Academic Press, 1978), 128.

⁶⁸⁶ John Maynard Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, (Cambridge: Palgrave MacMillan, 2018 [1936]), 3. my italics

⁶⁸⁷ Joan Robinson, "History versus Equilibrium", 136.

Contemporary institutional economics is the reconstruction of classical political economy, which was the holistic, historical, and empirical study of the economic life of society through the manifest image of human beings. Institutions, governance, customs, laws, traditions, virtues, vices, sentiments, and so on, were not alien to the ontologically rich social reality studied by the classical political economists. Adam Smith was a brilliant virtue ethicist, and his terribly misquoted and misinterpreted *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, far being from the canonical text of *laissez-faire* free-market fundamentalism, pictures a *commercial society* embedded in *civil society*. Rawls's focus on the political culture, the political virtues and civic society of the country in the explanation of economic prosperity is firmly embedded in this tradition.

Emphasis is placed in institutionalist approaches to development economics on those elements of good governance that comprise the rule of law. Critical aspects of the rule of law include the protection of private property rights, law and order, social and political stability, anticorruption, and effective regulation. Where the rule of law is an embedded governance norm, investment in innovation, entrepreneurship, education, healthcare, and infrastructure flows, and the impacts of these investments are widely shared by the people. Conversely, corruption, weak property rights, lawlessness and disorder, instability, and weak states are drivers of poverty. Corruption undermines developments that matter to people, which prevents people from meet their basic needs and sustains high levels of poverty.

Sustainable development discourse therefore emphasises the functions played by efficient, accountable, transparent, and inclusive institutions, anti-corruption, and good governance, in view of the interconnections and interdependencies between the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of the sustainable development. Goal 16 of the United Nations 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (SGD16) is to 'promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, promote access to justice for all, and build effective, accountable, and inclusive

institutions at all levels'.⁶⁸⁸ Key indicators of SGD16 include: the promotion of the rule of law; ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision making at all levels; and reducing all forms of corruption and bribery. Cosmopolitans – concerned with ending poverty, protecting human rights, and achieving sustainable development – may thus be interested in the justice, integrity, and functionality of the interlocking institutions constituting the basic structure of state-societies, not only the justice, integrity, and functionality of the global institutional order.⁶⁸⁹ Moreover, decolonial cosmopolitans, who, like Rawls, are *pluralists about forms of life*, and who are relatively *culturalist* compared to the *materialist* or *economistic* tendencies of world systems theory and dependency theory, have strong reasons to be interested in practices, institutions, and virtues at these lower, more local levels, in a variety of ways. These include cultural survival and flourishing.

Rawls's institutionalist analysis of the nature and causes of the wealth of a people in terms of local factors such as their political culture, work ethic, human capital, and technology, and the religious, philosophical, and moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, was intended to be anti-cosmopolitan. Yet, institutional cosmopolitans have critiqued and extended Rawls's theoretical framework in different ways to defend cosmopolitan conclusions about the scope and content of justice. As I explained earlier in *1. Ka Hua te Marama*, contemporary Anglo-American analytic liberal cosmopolitan political philosophy emerged primarily from the evolution of thought about the *scope, principles, and elements* of Rawls's theory of distributive justice. Some influential arguments for the validity of extending the scope of distributive justice beyond the borders of Western liberal nation-states took the line that Rawls's institutionalist analysis of the nature and causes of the wealth of a people is flawed. The ideal theoretical assumptions Rawls made about the closure and self-sufficiency of state-societies cannot be sustained if our normative theorising begins with the stylised facts of real world history, order,

⁶⁸⁸ United Nations, "Sustainable Development Goal 16", accessed 1 November 2017,

<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/sdg16>

⁶⁸⁹ Gillian Brock, "How Does Equality Matter?". *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 42:1 (2011): 82.

and politics, and is to be practical in intent. The most prominent of these views is Thomas Pogge's. Yet, I will argue, the unexamined Eurocentric theoretical assumptions of Pogge's cosmopolitan reconstruction of institutionalist analysis also threaten its claim to theoretical and practical truth.

4.3. Pogge's explanatory cosmopolitanism

While institutionalist analysis is superior to the *methodologically individualistic* neoclassical paradigm, it remains, for the most part, *methodologically nationalistic*. Pogge's cosmopolitan critique and extension of institutionalist analysis corrects for the explanatory and normative deficiencies of methodological nationalism.⁶⁹⁰ Pogge argues against Rawls's unrealistic view of a world of relatively closed, independent political communities, and claim that economic development and prosperity can be explained by endogenous factors.⁶⁹¹ Pogge claims that the contemporary situations of the global poor and the affluent were caused by a 'dramatic period of conquest and colonization', which as a 'single historical process... pervaded by massive, grievous wrongs', and is today reproduced by the Western-dominated global order.⁶⁹²

This historical account of global structural injustice is not Pogge's main line of argument. Rather than historicising global structural injustice, Pogge's point of departure is the epistemic and normative critique of the methodologically nationalist presumptions of institutional development economists and the analysis of global poverty as 'a set of national phenomena explainable mainly by bad domestic policies and institutions that stifle, or fail to stimulate, national economic growth and engender national economic injustice'.⁶⁹³ Pogge states that 'this dominant view is quite true on the whole'.⁶⁹⁴ Yet, the dominant institutionalist view is explanatorily and normatively deficient

⁶⁹⁰ Thomas Pogge, "Human Flourishing and Universal Justice." *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 16 (1999): 365. Pogge also accuses mainstream neoclassical development economics of the same. See Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, Section 5.3.

⁶⁹¹ Gillian Brock (2011) "Cosmopolitanism", 589-91.

⁶⁹² Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 203.

⁶⁹³ *Ibid*, 145-146.

⁶⁹⁴ *Ibid*. 146.

insofar as it 'holds fixed, and thereby entirely ignores, the economic and geopolitical context in which the national economies and governments of the poorer countries are placed'.⁶⁹⁵

Endogenous explanations 'leave open why national factors (institutions, officials, policies, culture, climate, natural environment, level of technical and economic development)' are the cause of actual outcomes and not others that are possible under different a global institutional order.⁶⁹⁶ Critically, endogenous explanations fail to account for 'why national factors are the way they are in the first place'.⁶⁹⁷ This is not to absolve anyone or any state of responsibility for wrongdoing.

Now it is for purposes not only of explanation, but also of moral analysis, that these two levels should be kept distinct: Faulting institutional factors for a high murder rate need not at all exonerate the criminals, nor is denouncing all murderers tantamount to endorsing laxity of gun control. It is fully consistent both to hold each and every murderer fully accountable for his act, and to criticize a legal order that lacks effective handgun legislation on account of the additional homicides it engenders.⁶⁹⁸

Pogge argues that the primary concern of Rawls's theory of distributive justice is not redistribution, but to make right an unjust basic structure and the institutions that constitute it and generate unjust distributions over time.⁶⁹⁹ As Rawls states, the main problem that a theory of distributive justice tries to solve is the choice of a social system.⁷⁰⁰ The solution is not the amelioration of suffering and poverty, or the division and allocation of some antecedently produced bundle of goods, income, wealth, or opportunity, but the structural transformation of the interlocking institutions constituting the basic structure.⁷⁰¹ Extending this Rawlsian vision of distributive justice, rather than arguing for global redistribution of primary goods to realise egalitarian principles of global justice, Pogge morally and causally implicates liberal democratic capitalist Western state-societies in the reproduction of poverty through the institutional design of the global order.⁷⁰² Moreover, these global institutions incentivise corrupt rule and unjust seizures of state power, and help to explain

⁶⁹⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁶ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁹⁸ Thomas Pogge, "Rawls and Global Justice", *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 18:2 (1988): 229.

⁶⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 228.

⁷⁰⁰ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 242.

⁷⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁷⁰² Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights*, 6.

weak or failed governance institutions, corruption, instability, and tyranny in some postcolonial (and, we should add, post-Soviet) state-societies.⁷⁰³

From the imperial perspective of the West, Pogge argues that Western citizens are not merely *capable* of alleviating the poverty and suffering of the global poor, but that we are causally implicated in their situation insofar as we are ‘supporters of, and beneficiaries from, a global institutional order that substantially contributes to their destitution’.⁷⁰⁴ Pogge’s core argument is that absolute poverty is a systematic and catastrophic human rights violation caused by the global institutional order coercively imposed upon weaker states by powerful states and corporations, and we, Western citizens, are causally and morally responsible.⁷⁰⁵ Pogge’s argument is based on the *negative duty* to not enact foreseeable and avoidable harm. The systematic violation of human rights could be avoided if the global order ‘had been, or were to be, designed differently’.⁷⁰⁶ Pogge argues counterfactually that the possibility of feasible alternatives to the actual global institutional order demonstrates that it is unjust, and that, therefore, ‘by imposing it, *we* are harming the global poor by foreseeably subjecting them to avoidable severe poverty’.⁷⁰⁷ The solution is to reform the global order that reproduces inequalities, not merely to redistribute primary goods to the global poor. Pogge claims that minor reforms to the global economic and political order ‘would suffice to eradicate most present human rights deficits’.⁷⁰⁸ The details of Pogge’s institutional reforms, such as a redistributive global resources tax of approximately one percent of global GDP to fund poverty alleviation and development programmes for the world’s poorest are well known, so I will not repeat them here.

⁷⁰³ *Ibid.* Sections 4.9, 6.3, 6.4.

⁷⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 117

⁷⁰⁵ *Ibid.* 148.

⁷⁰⁶ Thomas Pogge, “Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 19:1 (2005): 55.

⁷⁰⁷ *Ibid.* Emphasis added.

⁷⁰⁸ Thomas Pogge, “Responses to the Critics,” in *Thomas Pogge and His Critics*, ed. Alison M. Jaggar (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 208.

The methodological cosmopolitan critique of institutionalist analysis, Pogge argues, can push social scientists, and development economists especially, beyond analysing social problems including acute issues of poverty and hunger exclusively in terms of endogenous causal factors. Pogge argues that we must retain the core methodological insights of Rawls's institutionalism, but abandon the ideal-theoretical assumptions of closure and self-sufficiency. This modification of the Rawlsian theoretical framework turns theoretical attention to the unjust global institutional order. Pogge's institutional cosmopolitanism that takes the global basic structure as the subject of justice shows us a different set of problems and solutions from a normative institutionalist perspective. Does this go far enough? Mills has argued, forcefully, that while Pogge recognises the fundamental tensions in Rawls's ideal-theoretical framework, 'he does so without drawing the appropriate conclusion, *viz.*, that this whole approach needs to be jettisoned'.⁷⁰⁹

4.4. The racial contract as method?

According to Mills, analytic liberal political philosophy must self-consciously undergo a paradigm shift from ideal to non-ideal theory. Mills's approach involves a genealogy of the liberal tradition that reveals the racialisation of historical liberalism behind the raceless ideal-theoretical representation of the person as free and equal. From his socio-historical-geographical situation and embodiment in the context of Black Atlantic modernity,⁷¹⁰ Mills reveals the racialisation of liberalism from its origins throughout its historical evolution into its contemporary 'colour-blind', 'post-racial' forms, and its liberal cosmopolitan 'global conceptual equivalent'.⁷¹¹ Mills's critique of liberalism is genealogical in Thomas McCarthy's sense.⁷¹² It is meta-critical of the historical and contemporary forms of existing reason that it reconstructs as critical-hermeneutical resources, and

⁷⁰⁹ Charles W. Mills, "Realizing (Through Racializing) Pogge", 154.

⁷¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 156.

⁷¹¹ Charles W. Mills "Race and Global Justice", 118.

⁷¹² See 2. *Encountering the Other*.

aims at an ideological critique of the pernicious illusions of the eradication of power relations.⁷¹³

Mills's radical liberalism does not, however, reconstruct a general, discourse-ethical account of practical reasoning from the critical-hermeneutical resources of Anglo-American liberalism.

Rather, his normative perspective is reconstructed from the liberal contractarian tradition.

Mills's argument is based on three basic claims: existential, conceptual, and methodological. The existential claim is that white supremacy, local and global, exists and has existed for centuries. The conceptual claim is that white supremacy should be understood as a political system that operates at local and global levels – not just an ideology. The methodological claim is that white supremacy can be enlighteningly theorised through the idea of a racial contract *between whites*.⁷¹⁴ White supremacy can be modelled as a collective and individual contract between whites to recognise each other as free and equal moral persons, rational agents, or subjects, and to recognise non-whites as unequal subpersons, 'collectively and appropriately known as "subject races"', who can be legitimately exploited or expropriated for the collective or individual benefit of whites.⁷¹⁵ The non-ideal racial contract performs its critical work not through the values of racial hierarchy, 'which are detestable', but through the actual histories of Western liberal imperial nation-states and settler colonies and 'how these values and concepts have functioned to rationalize oppression, so as to reform them'.⁷¹⁶

Unlike Rawls's ideal-theoretical social contract, Mills's non-ideal racial contract is not a device of representation, but an explanatory-diagnostic tool that reveals the existing injustices of an ill-ordered society and points toward their transcendence in an anticipatory-utopian way.⁷¹⁷ Racial contractarianism is a theoretical method for understanding the inner logic of transnational white racial domination and how white supremacy structures the politics of Western state-societies

⁷¹³ Thomas McCarthy, *Race, Empire, and the Idea of Human Development*, 14n26.

⁷¹⁴ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 7.

⁷¹⁵ *Ibid*, 16-17.

⁷¹⁶ *Ibid*, 4.

⁷¹⁷ *Ibid*, 91.

and the world order. The state and other institutions (like the market or the family) are properly analysed and critiqued in the long *durée* of global white supremacy.

For political philosophy, the central political unit of the modern period is the nation-state, which, in the Anglo-American field over the past forty years, has primarily been conceptualized, following Rawls, as the contractarian nation-state. So whether one is located in the former colonizing polities, or the Euro-settler states created by European expansionism, this concept is supposed to constitute the common political framework within which debates about political philosophy are supposed to take place. But such a concept cannot capture the crucial difference between those polities which were the rulers and those which were the ruled, nor the distinct histories of colonizers and colonized, settlers and Indigenous, free and enslaved, in the colonial world. To ignore this history and this set of central political divisions in the name of an abstraction ostensibly innocent only serves to guarantee that the experience of the white political subject, whether Europeans at home or Europeans abroad, will be made the standard-bearer of political modernity itself. It is to erase a history of domination which needs to be formally recognized as itself political and leaving a political legacy that can only be properly addressed through being acknowledged at the abstract conceptual level *at which philosophy operates*.⁷¹⁸

Mills argues that the white supremacist state ideal type – a category not restricted to the recognised *rassenstaats* of Apartheid South Africa, Nazi Germany, and the Jim Crow American South – is as ‘real and important historically’ as other ideal types ‘formally acknowledged in the Western political canon (aristocracy, absolutism, democracy, fascism, socialism, etc.)’.⁷¹⁹ If the critical-hermeneutical resources of actually existing state-societies are to be reconstructed, then it makes all the difference at the meta-critical genealogical level whether these state-societies are conceived in advance as liberal democratic or white supremacist, and who counts fully as a free and equal person or a liberal democratic citizen, and who does not.

Anglo-American cosmopolitan philosophers might argue that their contracts – particularly their cosmopolitan constructions – are hypothetical, subjunctive exercises in ideal theory that can be used in real world contexts of injustice to diagnose their normative deficiencies and prescribe structural reforms. Liberal ideals can be used against white supremacist realities. Rawls states that the goal of his ideal theory of justice is to ‘eliminate injustice and to guide change towards a fair basic structure’.⁷²⁰ Mills counters that if our political philosophy is practical, oriented to change, then it will depend in part on empirical claims and generalisations about the past and present, and

⁷¹⁸ Charles W. Mills “Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy”, 8-9.

⁷¹⁹ Charles W. Mills (2003) “White Supremacy”, in *A Companion to African-American Philosophy*, eds. Tommy L. Lott and John P. Pittman (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.), 273.

⁷²⁰ John Rawls, “The Basic Structure as Subject”, 66

theoretical reflections on power.⁷²¹ Rawlsian idealisations of free and equal persons and society as a cooperative venture exclude and marginalise racism, and sanitises, whitewashes, and forgets European imperialism, colonialism, genocide, and slavery, and the transnational connections between societies they created, violating the theoretical assumption that the basic structure of closed, self-sufficient state-societies is the subject of justice.⁷²² The ideal theoretical method in analytic liberal political philosophy is deeply flawed and misleading – ideal theory is ideological in Marx’s pejorative sense.

The problem is that this not only idealises rather than abstracts from the ethical form of life of liberal democratic state-societies, limiting the scope of liberal practical reason, but that it ‘obfuscates rather than illuminates’.⁷²³ By contrast, imperialism, colonialism, genocide, slavery, and white supremacy are abstractions, but while they enlighten, they do not idealise. Rather, these abstractions accurately map the ‘crucial realities that differentiate the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe’.⁷²⁴ Anticipating the wave of white supremacist reaction currently engulfing the Western world after decades of liberal racial progress, Mills argues that a non-ideal approach to liberalism is also superior to ideal theory in being better able to realise liberal ideals of freedom and equality, ‘by virtue of realistically recognizing the obstacles to their acceptance and implementation’, including ‘how people’s social location may both blind them to important realities and give them a vested interest in maintaining things’.⁷²⁵ Finally, we need a non-ideal theory of ill-ordered – because white supremacist – state-society to distinguish forward-looking from backward-looking justice. Transitioning from white supremacist to well-ordered state-societies and global society requires the identification and analysis of the injustices that need to be corrected.⁷²⁶

⁷²¹ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 121.

⁷²² Charles W. Mills, *Black Rights/White Wrongs: The Critique of Racial Liberalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 73.

⁷²³ To use a distinction Mills makes in *Black Rights/White Wrongs*, 81.

⁷²⁴ *Ibid*, 83.

⁷²⁵ *Ibid*, 90.

⁷²⁶ Charles W. Mills, “*The Racial Contract Revisited: Still Unbroken After All These Years*”, *Politics, Groups, and Identities*, 3:3 (2015): 548.

Mills constructs a valid *pro tanto* argument for the viability of the racial contract as method. ‘Insofar as contractarianism is thought of as a useful way to do political philosophy...’ – well, it is certainly one useful way to do Anglo-American political philosophy and to engage with that restricted audience. However, for present purposes, we must ask whether liberal contractarianism is the best paradigm available to us for decolonising cosmopolitanism. Mills’s methodological claim about the racial contract is plausible, and his argument is enlightening. By reconstructing the critical-hermeneutical resources immanent to the Anglo-American liberal tradition – connected with Marxism, the Black Radical Tradition, and critical race theory – Mills’s *liberalising liberalism* move fails for analogical reasons as Amy Allen’s *criticalising critical theory* and McCarthy’s *modernising modernity* reconstructions of the Frankfurt School of critical theory, which set out to attain more fully the goals that the school has set for itself. Mills’s racial contractarianism may provide useful critical-hermeneutical resources in lived struggles to transform racialised Western liberal state-societies,⁷²⁷ but it is empirically and normatively inadequate for the deconstructive and reconstructive tasks of decolonising cosmopolitanism. Mills’s *radical* reconstruction of the liberal tradition is the conceptual equivalent of *cosmopolitanising cosmopolitanism*. To decolonise cosmopolitanism, we can, however, set out to attain more fully the goals Mills has set for himself. While I propose an alternative to Mills’s methodological claim about racial contractarianism, I maintain and defend Mills’s existential and conceptual claims about the existence of white supremacy *as* the global basic structure ‘that has made the modern world what it is today’.⁷²⁸

There is an alternative way to take up Rawls’s institutionalism to critically and normatively theorise the white supremacist global basic structure and the transition from an ill-ordered state and global society which abandons the liberal contractarian tradition. There are decolonial analytical tools in IR/IPE that provide stronger explanatory power and normative force than

⁷²⁷ Charles W. Mills, “The Racial Polity”, in *Blackness Visible: Essays on Philosophy and Race* (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1998), 119-138.

⁷²⁸ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 1.

Mills's racial contract methodology for deconstructing and reconstructing an institutional cosmopolitanism up to the task of explaining and transforming the white supremacist global basic structure. Mills himself has remarked biographically on his transdisciplinary research interests and the location of 'fruitful resources' beyond the disciplinary limits of Western academic philosophy, particularly in critical international relations theory and international political theory.⁷²⁹

I now critically engage with recent decolonial literature in IR/IPE in order to demonstrate an alternative approach, in the spirit of Mills's project, to realising (through *decolonising*) Pogge – that is, critiquing and extending the Rawlsian legacy in liberal cosmopolitan political philosophy from a decolonial perspective. My point of departure is Mills's conceptual claim that white supremacy is a global political system.⁷³⁰ The categories of white and non-white became transnationalised through European imperialism, colonialism, and slavery, and are today reproduced by institutionalist analysis.⁷³¹ While racism has been – or was – officially discredited, 'milder culturalist versions' of white supremacy survive, 'whose ultimate point is the same: the uniqueness of the West and the denial of the role of exploitation and structural constraint in accounting for the fate of the Rest'.⁷³² As Mills argues:

The point is, then, that there is nothing at all new about such claims [of deficient national cultures], which merely repeat in more abstract and nominally de-raced form assumptions of European specialness that go back for centuries. *Pogge's critique of contemporary versions could be sharpened by greater advertence to their long history and originally overtly racist incarnation.*⁷³³

I now take up the latest developments and methods of IR/IPE to decolonially reiterate Pogge's cosmopolitan critique of institutionalist analysis in two related ways. The first is intervene in the Western imperialist discursive practice of world ordering in order to deconstruct and reconstruct

⁷²⁹ Charles W. Mills "Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy", 9. Charles W. Mills, "Unwriting and Unwhitening the World", in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*, eds. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 203. Charles W. Mills (2015) "Global White Ignorance", 221.

⁷³⁰ Charles W. Mills (2010) "Realizing (Through Racializing) Pogge", 164.

⁷³¹ *Ibid*, 165.

⁷³² *Ibid*, 166.

⁷³³ *Ibid*, 167.

the epistemic and normative foundations of institutionalist analysis, and the second is to focus the attention of institutional cosmopolitanism on long durational structural injustices.

4.5. The Western imperialist discursive practice of world ordering

Global white supremacy is itself a global institutional order, and the racist imagination of the Western discursive practice of global ordering lives on in contemporary institutionalist analysis. The pre-WWII Western imperialist world order was overtly white supremacist. Mills identifies the vetoing of Japan's proposal at the 1919 post-WWI Versailles conference that a racial equality clause be inserted in the League of Nations' Covenant by the Anglo-Saxon nations (Britain, United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa), as the episode in world history that definitively summarises the racialisation of the approximately 400-year-old, at that time, Western imperialist world order.⁷³⁴ Mills remarks that in the aftermath of a world war in the name of liberal democracy, hundreds of years deep into Enlightenment modernity, 'racial equality – not socialism, not even decolonization – is so controversial, so threatening to the planetary order, that it must be vetoed'.⁷³⁵

Overt white supremacy was the norm as late as the 1940s, when most of the planet and its people were formally controlled by the European empires. Peoples racialised as white ruled over peoples racialised as non-white, globally, while whites were dominant politically, economically, and culturally in the independent settler-colonies. Racial domination was the explicit principle of the basic structure in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Rhodesia, and more implicit in the mestizo Latin American republics after achieving their independence from Spain and Portugal in the nineteenth century.⁷³⁶ Mills argues that after centuries of apparent white success and non-white failure, from hegemonic positionalities, explanations for why things are the way they are will inevitably reproduce, albeit in a sublimated form, ideas of Western supremacy

⁷³⁴ *Ibid*, 159.

⁷³⁵ *Ibid*.

⁷³⁶ *Ibid*, 164-165.

and non-Western inferiority.⁷³⁷ Post-1945 IR/IPE is marked by what John Hobson refers to as *Eurocentric-institutionalism* rather than the *scientific racism* of the previous Western imperial era.⁷³⁸

When Pogge argues that methodologically nationalist institutionalist explanations for social phenomena, however ‘valid and useful’, must be ‘complemented by substantial inquiries into the comparative effects of global institutional factors’, he misses the point.⁷³⁹ The cosmopolitan critique of institutionalist analysis is limited on this view to the addition of a new level of analysis, or a change in analytical scale, not the critique of the normative and epistemic foundations of institutionalist analysis. From a decolonial perspective, the point is not that nationalist explanations must be *complemented* by cosmopolitan explanations in terms of global institutional factors, but that institutionalist analysis is methodologically Eurocentric. This produces normatively and empirically deficient diagnoses and prescriptions, and reproduces the Western racialised ordering of the world. While normative and empirical institutionalist analysis at all levels and scales is necessary, the theoretical framework must be epistemically decolonised.

Recent IR/IPE decolonial literature has targeted contemporary discourses of state failure, good governance, and development. These discourses do not carve the world up at the joints, but socially construct and reproduce a Western-dominated world order in which Western civilisation and its institutions, political culture, political virtues, and civic society, are assumed in advance to be the normative reference culture.⁷⁴⁰ For example, although Rawls admits decent societies as full members of the Society of Peoples, he is clear that the normative reference culture is the liberal democratic West and that decent societies fall short of the ideal.⁷⁴¹ This is a highly sublimated iteration of the general tendency in Western IR/IPE scholarship to represent non-Western societies in negative terms of lack, deficiency, failure, deviance, noncompliance, corruption, or

⁷³⁷ *Ibid*, 166.

⁷³⁸ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 186.

⁷³⁹ Thomas Pogge, *Politics as Usual: What Lies Behind the Pro-Poor Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 22-23.

⁷⁴⁰ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 15.

⁷⁴¹ *Ibid*, 288.

underdevelopment against the Western norm. Decolonial critics agree with mainstream liberal institutionalist analysts in different disciplines that social problems exist, and that our world is marked by deep and enduring injustices, but both their diagnoses of the problems and their prescribed solutions differ from mainstream institutional analysts. As Gruffydd Jones summarises, the problem of institutionalist analyses of state failure and good governance is not with the attempt to empirically identify social, economic, and political crises, but with how these are analysed and explained, and therefore the solutions that are proposed.⁷⁴²

No just person can sensibly stand for tyranny, bad governance, violence, or corruption, or against the rule of law or just and functional institutions – to defend what Rawls calls *outlaw states*. The interlocutors in the debate are good people with an interest in just and functional institutions, and who agree with the core institutionalist insight that (good and bad) institutions have (positive and negative) effects on individual and collective fates. They disagree with mainstream liberal scholars and practitioners over the epistemic and normative foundations of institutionalist analysis. As Pogge argues, if some state-societies are badly governed, it is made possible because of global rules that the West imposes and from which the West benefits greatly, the security and military technology provided to outlaw states by Western states and corporations, and the trade revenues they earn from the sale of natural resources.⁷⁴³ Like Pogge, decolonial critics of institutionalist analysis do not absolve corrupt or inept agents or national institutions of moral and causal responsibility for injustice, insecurity, and suffering. Beyond Pogge, they analyse the crises and contradictions of postcolonial state-societies in the *longue durée* of global coloniality and in the wider context of the structural injustices of the neocolonial capitalist world system, and account for the lingering effects of Western imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide – including in the formation of disciplinary knowledge in IR/IPE and global historical sociology.

⁷⁴² Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “The Global Political Economy of Social Crisis: Towards a Critique of the Failed State Ideology”, *Review of International Political Economy*, 15:2 (2008): 181-4, 198-9.

⁷⁴³ Thomas Pogge, “Symposium: World Poverty and Human Rights”, *Ethics & International Affairs*, 19:1 (2005): 7.

Siba Govogui argues in parallel to Pogge's institutional cosmopolitanism that the mode of institutionalist analysis involved in discourses of state failure, good governance, and development brackets the effects of the international order on African and other postcolonial state-societies, and 'treats the problems that arise in them as internally created'.⁷⁴⁴ The issue facing normative institutionalist analysis is a dual one of diagnosis and prescription, 'because the underlying model through which analysts simplify the complexity of the world exerts a significant effect on where injustice is identified, how responsibility is assessed, and what types of remedy are proposed'.⁷⁴⁵ Zubairu Wai argues that the methodological nationalism of institutionalist analysis rests on colonial amnesia of 'imperial relations of power, past systems of exploitation, in essence past colonial regimes of violence and domination, appropriation and exploitation'.⁷⁴⁶ The contemporary discourses of state failure, good governance, and development thus become a 'discursive ploy, a legitimating trope, and political strategy that is deployed in the service of the hegemonic global systems of control, power, violence, and domination'.⁷⁴⁷ When problems in non-Western countries are diagnosed in terms of state failure, poor governance, or underdevelopment, powerful Western neo-imperial states and international institutions intervene.⁷⁴⁸

Gruffydd Jones argues that discourses of state failure, good governance, and development are 'situated specifically in the post-Cold War era when the prospect of a revolutionary alternative to liberal capitalism is no longer plausible', functioning to normalise and legitimise the spectrum of Western interventions in African and other non-Western societies.⁷⁴⁹ Practices of liberal interventionism include, in addition to overt and covert intervention by military or security forces,

⁷⁴⁴ Siba Govogui, "Regimes of Sovereignty: International Morality and the African Condition", in *Readings in the International Relations of Africa*, ed. Tom Young, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015), 37

⁷⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

⁷⁴⁶ Zubairu Wai "International Relations and the Discourse of State Failure in Africa", in *Recentering Africa in International Relations: Beyond Lack, Peripherality, and Failure*, eds. Marta Iñiguez de Heredia and Zubairu Wai. Palgrave Macmillan. 53-54.

⁷⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁷⁴⁸ Zubairu Wai, "Africa in/ and International Relations: An Introduction" in *Recentering Africa in International Relations: Beyond Lack, Peripherality, and Failure*, edited by Marta Iñiguez de Heredia and Zubairu Wai (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International, 2018), 18.

⁷⁴⁹ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "'Good Governance' and 'State Failure': Genealogies of Imperial Discourse", 62.

non-military hard power and soft power mechanisms of coercing or enticing state-societies to adopt neoliberal governmentalities, make progress toward secular modernity, replace traditional social relations with capitalist relations, democratise the nation-state, and grow capitalist markets.⁷⁵⁰

Antony Anghie argues that across the spectrum of forms of liberal intervention, ‘the basic task is that of reproducing in the non-European world a set of principles and institutions, which are seen as having been perfected in the European world and which the non-European world must adopt if it is to make progress and achieve stability’.⁷⁵¹

As Mills argued, Pogge’s critique of methodologically nationalist intuitionist analysis could be sharpened by a genealogical meta-critique of this mode of thought and its originally explicitly racist formulation. For as Gruffydd Jones argues, the ‘present contains and is structured by the past; the present exhibits an accumulation and intensification of the past’.⁷⁵² IR/IPE is the inheritor to the assumptions, imaginations, and epistemologies of classical political economy, which shared and developed the European enlightenment narrative of progress through successive stages of development from the savage to the civilised. Liberal, humanitarian, and developmental rhetoric was integral to the *civilising mission* invoked to justify the territorial expansion of modern colonial national capitalist formal empires, secularising the earlier Christian salvationist rhetoric of Western settler colonialism in the Americas.⁷⁵³

Hobson argues that IR/IPE has ‘long moved on from the vocabulary of civilization, primitivism and savagery’. Nevertheless, the ‘essential imagination’ of world history as a singular linear progressive trajectory ‘along which different countries travel at different speeds (advanced, developing, less developed) remains an implicit, sometimes explicit assumption of much

⁷⁵⁰ Susan L. Woodward, *The Ideology of Failed States: Why Intervention Fails* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), esp. 26-50.

⁷⁵¹ Antony Anghie, “Decolonizing the Concept of ‘Good Governance’” in *Decolonizing International Relations*, ed. Branwen Gruffydd Jones (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 114.

⁷⁵² Branwen Gruffydd Jones “Slavery, Finance and International Political Economy: Postcolonial Reflections”, 64-5, 59-61. Ian Baucom, *Spectres of the Atlantic*, 3-172.

⁷⁵³ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “‘Good Governance’ and ‘State Failure’: The Pseudo-Science of Statesmen in Our Times” in *Race and Racism in International Relations: Confronting the Global Color Line*, eds. Alexander Anievas, Nivi Manchanda, and Robbie Shilliam (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), 66-71.

contemporary social science'.⁷⁵⁴ Explicit talk in IR/IPE of 'civilizations versus barbarians', or of 'whites versus non-whites' has become impolitic, yet post-1945 Western theoretical conceptions of formal and informal hierarchy and gradated sovereignty encode a 'subliminal Eurocentrism'.⁷⁵⁵ Underlying Eurocentric notions of hierarchy and historical teleology in contemporary IR/IPE are 'criteria of difference' between European and non-European peoples, social forms, social relations, practices, and institutions.⁷⁵⁶ The criteria of difference in the Eurocentric epistemology and ontology are now based on governance capacity. Good governance has replaced earlier, explicitly racialised, global hierarchies which connected the capacity to rule over oneself and others with race, class, and gender. The historical teleology of modernisation has replaced social Darwinism and pseudo-scientific ideas of human cultural and biological evolution, improvement, competition, and eugenics, sustaining the false and dangerous belief in Anglo-Saxon or Aryan cultural and biological superiority and national destiny.

White supremacy is inextricably linked to the institution of sovereignty. The Western imaginary of sovereignty that ordered civilisations and human faculties was based on the ideal-type of European modernity.⁷⁵⁷ The assumption of the cultural and biological superiority of Western imperial nation-states was codified in the nineteenth century international legal doctrine of the standard of civilisation, which bestowed on European powers the right to colonise other societies, govern their development, and Westernise their institutions. Critically, the standard of civilisation maintained that European powers had the right to determine when non-European societies had matured sufficiently to be *recognised* as sovereign and admitted to the European society of states, thus subject to the ground norm of non-intervention, whether over a period of decades or

⁷⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁵⁵ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 186.

⁷⁵⁶ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "'Good Governance' and 'State Failure': Genealogies of Imperial Discourse", 50.

⁷⁵⁷ Siba Grovogui, "Regimes of Sovereignty", 40.

centuries depending on their perceived level of social, political, and economic development, measured against the normative referent culture of Western modernity.⁷⁵⁸ Hobson argues that:

[This] normative formal hierarchical conception of gradated sovereignty rewards European states with hyper-sovereignty and the privilege of non-intervention on the grounds that they are deemed to be civilized. By contrast, because Eastern polities are deemed to be either 'barbaric' (the second world of Oriental despotisms), or 'savage' (the third world of anarchic societies residing within a domestic state of nature), so they are deemed to be unworthy of, and hence denied, sovereignty.⁷⁵⁹

Amitav Acharya reminds us that this 'self-serving, ahistorical, and brazenly racist formulation by the European colonial powers ignored the fact that even the most sophisticated forms of statecraft already existed in many early non-Western civilizations'.⁷⁶⁰

Eurocentric conceptions of governance continued to transform through the normalisation of the nation-state and realisation of ideals of self-determination during the abortive post-WWI phase of liberal international ordering. Critical to this genealogy was the creation of the mandated territories in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire and the former colonial possessions surrendered by Germany.⁷⁶¹ The mandate system was established under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which entered into force on 28 June 1919, and which was replaced after WWII by the United Nations trusteeship system. The rationale for the mandate system was that the colonies and territories which, because of the war, had 'ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them', were 'inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world', and thus 'there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a *sacred trust of civilisation*'.⁷⁶²

The 'tutelage' of such 'backward' non-Western peoples was to be 'entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best

⁷⁵⁸ Andrew Linklater, "The English School Conception of International Society: Reflections on Western and non-Western Perspectives" *Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies* 9 (2015): 1-13.

⁷⁵⁹ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 33.

⁷⁶⁰ Amitav Acharya, "Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds", 651.

⁷⁶¹ Partha Chatterjee, "Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism", 324.

⁷⁶² Susan Pedersen, "Appendix I: Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations" in *The Guardians: The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 408-409.

undertake this responsibility'.⁷⁶³ The mandatory powers were tasked with creating the conditions of sovereignty that would then normalise the status of the mandated territories as nation-states and equal sovereign members of world society. The mandated territories were graded into A, B, and C types according to 'the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances'.⁷⁶⁴ The mandate system reproduced the Eurocentric ideas of Enlightenment progress normatively underpinning the civilising mission and the related paternalistic *trusteeship* conception of imperialism articulated at the 1884 Berlin Conference, which created the European colonial division of Africa.⁷⁶⁵

The connection between the mandate system and institutionalist analysis was created by the major effort of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations to construct a science of political administration, using comparative empirical methods, to assist the design of governmental policies suited to a people's level of development. Partha Chatterjee argues that the organised production of knowledge based on massive sets of standardised information on the social, economic, and political institutions of the mandated populations brought into being 'a single comprehensive conceptual scheme' in which vastly different state-societies could be measured up to an ideal-type of the modern European nation-state. Institutions and policies could then be designed in accordance with the unique abilities and needs of a given people, in order to bring it closer to the ideal-type of the modern European nation-state.⁷⁶⁶

Institutionalist analysis – and comparative methods based on ideal-types – manifest a racialised imagination deeply entrenched in Western thought,⁷⁶⁷ despite the official repudiation of the practice of colonialism and the standard of civilisation by the *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* in 1960. Western knowledge production techniques of

⁷⁶³ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁴ *Ibid.*

⁷⁶⁵ John Hobson, *The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics*, 166-167.

⁷⁶⁶ Partha Chatterjee, "Nationalism, Internationalism, and Cosmopolitanism", 324-325.

⁷⁶⁷ Branwen Gruffydd Jones, "'Good Governance' and 'State Failure': Genealogies of Imperial Discourse", 50.

categorising, ordering, and comparing different societies are deeply Eurocentric. Linda Tuhiwai Smith argues that imperialism ‘provided the means through which concepts of what counts as human could be applied systematically as forms of classification, for example, through hierarchies of race and typologies of different societies’, which in conjunction with imperial power and social science, came to shape coloniser/colonised international relations.⁷⁶⁸ These techniques of categorising, ordering, and comparing different societies live on in contemporary discourses of weak and failed states, good governance, and development. Gruffydd Jones links contemporary institutionalist analysis in IR/IPE with global governance technologies of ranking, quantification, calculation, indexing and ‘visualization using numbers, tables, colour and other increasingly complex graphic forms’ common to financial capitalist management practices.⁷⁶⁹

What are the implications of this genealogical meta-critique of institutionalist analysis for institutional cosmopolitanism? The conclusion is not that institutionalist analysis is hopeless and should therefore be abandoned. The deconstruction and reconstruction of institutionalist analysis, Grovogui concludes, ‘requires an appreciation of the domestic institutions that corrupt public life but also of their broader context – the complex instantiations of power relations that manifest themselves temporally and spatially as international regimes’.⁷⁷⁰ The cosmopolitan reconstruction of institutionalist analysis, which refocuses analysis on larger spatial and temporal levels and scales, is incomplete if it does not transform our understandings of the abstract categories of social scientific analysis by situating these, meta-critically, in the same long durational global history as the object of analysis. *The problems and social crises in the Western and non-Western worlds, and the abstract categories through which they are diagnosed and solutions are prescribed, are both the products of the same history of global white supremacy.* The cosmopolitan critique of methodological nationalism must also be a decolonial critique of methodological Eurocentrism. A decolonised cosmopolitan institutionalist

⁷⁶⁸ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 27.

⁷⁶⁹ Ranajit Guha, *History at the Limit of World History*, 64.

⁷⁷⁰ Siba Grovogui, “Regimes of Sovereignty”, 46.

analysis could thereby sharpen the tools of diagnosis, policy prescription.⁷⁷¹ This could greatly improve future transdisciplinary cosmopolitan work on existing issues of sustainable development, poverty, intervention, corruption, and the reform of the global institutional order, and so on, and on new issues raised by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists across the globe and across the disciplines.

4.6. Global structural injustice

My critique has so far been focused primarily on the Western discursive practice of world ordering. Gruffydd Jones argues that a genealogical critique of the contemporary discourses of state failure, good governance, and development ‘provides a vital but incomplete exposure of the centrality of race to the modern international order, and is insufficient for explaining the stubborn endurance of racialised power, racial inequality and oppression’.⁷⁷² For the latter, we must reconstruct a cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis up to the task of explaining and transforming long durational structural injustices. For the vast inequalities of resources, opportunity, and power in the world are produced and reproduced by global structural racism. *De facto* global white supremacy persisted through the economic/financial, military/security, and culture/knowledge spheres of structural power after the defeat of the Nazis in World War II, and after the global decolonisation struggle caused the dissolution of the Western colonial empires and end of *de jure* global white supremacy in international law.⁷⁷³

Analytic liberal institutional cosmopolitanism must be decolonised not only by critiquing the normative and epistemic foundations of institutionalist analysis, but by normatively analysing the white supremacist global basic structure as the subject of justice. Global white supremacy is an apt context of justice insofar as this form of domination is constituted by structures and relations

⁷⁷¹ Siba Grovogui, “Regimes of Sovereignty”, 46.

⁷⁷² Branwen Gruffydd Jones, “Race in the Ontology of International Order”, 911.

⁷⁷³ Charles W. Mills, “White Supremacy”, 270.

of *negative* cooperation. White supremacy is a racialised power structure of formal and informal rule, of racialised subjectivities, socioeconomic positionalities and privileges, and naturalised norms and socially effective ideological justification narratives for the differential distribution of resources and opportunities, the benefits and burdens of negative social cooperation, and rights and duties. The inequalities of wealth, income, and power between the Global North and South that are the focus of cosmopolitan proposals for distributive justice are, in fact, racialised, for they map differentials directly descended from the global institutional order constructed by five centuries of Western imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide. Michael Walzer argues that if analytic liberal political philosophers were to theoretically integrate the history of imperial wars, conquests, occupations, and interventions, the West's informal imperial and colonial political control of trade, and so on, 'then we are likely at the end not only to be morally troubled but concerned specifically about the injustice of the resulting inequalities'.⁷⁷⁴

Pogge knows this. He argues that international inequalities were for the most part built up in the colonial era, 'when today's affluent countries ruled today's poor regions of the world: trading their people like cattle, destroying their political institutions and cultures, taking their lands and natural resources, and forcing products and customs upon them'.⁷⁷⁵ He maintains the Rawlsian ideal/non-ideal distinction between distributive and rectificatory justice. Pogge explicitly states that his institutional cosmopolitan argument for global distributive justice is not that 'we', the North, 'must make good for colonial plunder, slavery, and exploitation'.⁷⁷⁶ We can decolonise institutional cosmopolitanism without racial contractarian methodology if we base it on a non-ideal theory of rectificatory justice, and draw the accurate Rawlsian conceptual distinction between structural and interactional injustice within the category of backward-looking justice to clarify what 'making good' means in relation to structural and interactional injustices. Armed with analytic conceptual clarity

⁷⁷⁴ Michael Walzer, "Response", in *Pluralism, Justice, and Equality*, eds. David Miller and Michael Walzer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 292.

⁷⁷⁵ Thomas Pogge "Symposium: World Poverty and Human Rights", 2-3.

⁷⁷⁶ Thomas Pogge, "Rawls and Global Justice", 247.

about the concepts of structure, agency, institutions, relations, and interactions, we can reconstruct a decolonial institutional cosmopolitanism that is up to the tasks of explaining and transforming long durational global structural injustices.

To attain this analytic conceptual clarity, I follow Iris Marion Young in arguing that a conception of justice needs to revise the Rawlsian understanding of the (global) basic structure as the subject of justice. Young maintains that normative judgments that take structures as subject are different in principle from normative judgments that take individual interactions as subject.⁷⁷⁷ Structural and interactional injustices differ in relation to the attribution of moral and causal agency and responsibility, and in the *kind* of responsibility attributed and the salient problems of agency.

Some harms arise not from the isolatable actions of individual or institutional agents, but rather from the normal, ongoing structural processes of the society... Those who contribute to structural processes with some unjust outcomes should not be blamed for these injustices, nor do they owe damages because they have been at fault or must assume a strict liability. Instead, our shared responsibility is a more forward-looking one of organizing ourselves to change the structures so their outcomes will not be so harmful.⁷⁷⁸

Young's 'social connection' model of moral and causal agency and responsibility pushes beyond distributive justice paradigms that make static comparisons between individuals, and interactional accounts of rectification for past and present wrongs, toward *structural* and thus *historical* understandings of injustice with both backward-looking and forward-looking dimensions.

It is not possible to tell this story of the production and reproduction of structures without reference to the past. The most important reason for the social connection model of responsibility to be concerned with historic injustice is in order to understand present injustice as structural.⁷⁷⁹

Young claims that while unjust structures privilege individuals or groups, it is a marker of this kind of injustice that it is not usually possible to isolate the causal responsibility of individual agents.⁷⁸⁰

For Rawls, recall, the basic structure is the *primary* subject of justice, in the first instance, because its effects on the lives of individuals are pervasive and immediate. It contains the different social positions and that subjects are born and socialised into and the political traditions of society,

⁷⁷⁷ Iris Marion Young, *Responsibility for Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 71.

⁷⁷⁸ *Ibid*, 175

⁷⁷⁹ *Ibid*, 185.

⁷⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 180.

and it informs the interests, talents, capabilities, characters, ambitions, final ends, and prospects of individual subjects. The basic structure thus creates the possibilities and limits of rational agency. Pogge argues that critical and normative analysis of institutions is most clearly and urgently necessary when they ‘establish morally objectionable positions or distinctions’.⁷⁸¹ Mills argues that the global institutional order is not only marked by transnational gender and racial domination; *ontologically*, gender and race are the *social constructs* of the global basic structure.⁷⁸² The transnational categories of white and non-white constructed by the white supremacist global basic structure constrain the agency of subjects racialised as non-white, and privilege subjects racialised as white. The white supremacist global basic structure socially constructs racialised and gendered subjects, and reproduces complex inequalities through negative socialisation.⁷⁸³

Structures are recursive: the rules and resources that constitute structures exist only in the practical knowledge that individual agents in society have of practices and institutions, and so in agents actually seeing these as creating the modalities of action situations (possibilities and limits), and mobilising these rules and resources in their interactions with others.⁷⁸⁴ Young conceives social structures as the ‘accumulated outcomes’ of the actions and interactions of masses of individuals living their own lives with minimal coordination, which condition the action situations of others, limiting their agency in ways not typically intended by the individual agents.⁷⁸⁵ Structures are thus spontaneous and organic, to the extent that their production and reproduction is subconscious until the rules constituting structures are explicitly questioned.

Young illustrates her account with the example of the position of vulnerability to housing deprivation. The creation of structural positions of vulnerability to housing deprivation ‘is an unintended but unjust consequence of the actions of millions of differently positioned individuals

⁷⁸¹ Thomas Pogge, “Rawls and Global Justice”, 228.

⁷⁸² *Ibid*, 156. Italics in the original.

⁷⁸³ *Ibid*, 158.

⁷⁸⁴ Iris Marion Young, *Responsibility for Justice*, 59-62.

⁷⁸⁵ *Ibid*, 62-63.

– consumers, investors, government officials, lenders, and so on – all usually acting on normal and accepted rules and drawing on the resources normally available to people in those positions’.⁷⁸⁶ So, in cases of structural causation, ‘one cannot for the most part trace a direct lineal causal relationship between particular actions or policies and the relatively disadvantaged circumstances of particular individuals or groups’.⁷⁸⁷ White supremacy and the resulting racialised patterns of inequality are reproduced by the normal workings of self-interest, rule-following, and the mundane thoughts, feelings, beliefs, behaviours, dispositions, and habits of agents, even if they are not overtly racist,⁷⁸⁸ and even if they occupy subordinate racialised (and gendered) subject positions.

This ontology of structures or institutional orders as recursive and subconscious does not imply the existence of imperialism without empires or imperialists, colonialism without colonisers, racism without racists, and capitalism without capitalists: *oppression without oppressors*. The production and reproduction of orders and structures can also be intentional, which makes possible and limits collective agency. Structures and institutional orders can be formed, reformed, deformed, and transformed by intentional action. The production and reproduction of the global basic structure is in many ways unintentional and irreducible to agency. The global institutional order is also produced and reproduced (instituted, governed, reformed, and secured) through the intentional actions and interventions of governments (or concerts of governments) and multinational corporations representing the (sometimes aligned, and sometimes conflicting) interests of the transnational capitalist class. Actions and policies that produce and reproduce structures and institutional orders are exercises of agency and therefore *power-over* (subordinated subjects, classes, nations, social elements, or markets and governments), *power-to* (enact policies, regulate industries, intervene in markets, act and transact in global markets), and *power-with* (the other members of the transnational capitalist class, other whites, or other governments).

⁷⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 64.

⁷⁸⁷ *Ibid*, 185.

⁷⁸⁸ Charles W. Mills “Race and Global Justice”, 114.

The important realisation is that the subject matter of *praxis* – agency, subjectivity, action, interaction, relations, order, and structure – is and always has been *that which could be otherwise*. Structures can, within natural and historical limits, be restructured, and orders can be reordered. The agency involved in producing and reproducing orders and structures means that agents can intentionally transform unjust structures and orders. Responsibility in relation to structural injustices is based on our positionality within social structures *vis-à-vis* others, and on acting within these positions, and, unlike the individualised liability model of interactional injustice, is generalised and shared.⁷⁸⁹ The question *who wronged whom?* collapses moral responsibility into causal responsibility for wrongdoing, the dyadic language of victims and perpetrators, and juridical ideas of blame and guilt associated with this discourse.⁷⁹⁰

However, the point of Young’s forward-looking social connection model is not to isolate agents responsible for past or present wrongs, but to share moral responsibility and empower differently positioned subjects with causally effective agency to transform unjust structures through collective political action.⁷⁹¹ Richard Miller argues for differentiated negative moral responsibilities in the global context, for example, ‘to make good the defects of exploitation, inequity, domination and widespread violence’, with primary moral responsibility attributed to the citizens of the American empire in virtue of their causal responsibility for (ongoing) wrongdoing.⁷⁹² While rectifying wrongs is *necessary*, in my view, Young rightly argues that it is *insufficient* for ending structural injustices, which necessitates collective empowerment and transformative action.

Young uses the example of slavery to argue that identifying governments of state-societies as the agents responsible for historical wrongs and thereby morally responsible for reparations is an inadequate approach to rectificatory justice. The liability model of interactional injustice as

⁷⁸⁹ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹⁰ Chandran Kukathas, “Who? Whom? Reparations and the Problem of Agency”, *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 37:3 (2006): 330-341.

⁷⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 179.

⁷⁹² Richard Miller, *Globalizing Justice: The Ethics of Poverty and Power* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 238.

responsibility for historical wrongs is not appropriate for assigning responsibility for ending structural injustices. Her defence of the United States against liability based on its mixed historical record is implausible, as is her general argument against reparations based on the difficulties of identifying victims and perpetrators.⁷⁹³ However, her pragmatic claim that reparations discourse makes us think of governments as distinct agents from the societies that they govern lets societies and individual agents ‘off the hook too easily’ is an important insight for thinking about moral and causal agency and responsibility for the production and reproduction of structural injustices.⁷⁹⁴ While I think that any *comprehensive* non-ideal theory of rectificatory justice must account for structural *and* interactional injustices, and so questions of strict liability and reparation *in addition to* questions of collective political action, I agree with Young’s argument that these are distinct concepts that must be analysed separately to attain clarity. I also agree that the topic of structural injustice is larger, primary, and more urgent, and that rectifying historical wrongs is not sufficient to end or transform unjust structures.

Young argues that every subject that participates in structures that recursively reproduce injustices shares responsibility for ending structural injustice and transforming our subjectivities. However, the different subject positions that structures create, our resulting empowerment or disempowerment, our interests in the stability or change in our situation, and our capabilities for collective agency determine the degrees and kinds of responsibility we share. In the context of the paradigm structural injustice of American white supremacy, Young argues:

Those who are beneficiaries of racialized structures with unjust outcomes, however, can properly be called to a special moral and political responsibility to recognize our privilege, to acknowledge its continuities with historical injustice, and to act on an obligation to work on transforming the institutions that offer this privilege, even if this means worsening one’s own conditions and opportunities compared to what they would have been.⁷⁹⁵

⁷⁹³ I discuss this further next in 6. *Reconciliation*.

⁷⁹⁴ Iris Marion Young, *Responsibility for Justice*, 177.

⁷⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 187.

Mills' account of the moral psychology of racialised subjects highlights 'both the extent of our socialization by the existing oppressive social order and the ways in which, nonetheless, many people resist and struggle against this oppressive social order'.⁷⁹⁶ Oppressive structures that create social relations of oppressor and oppressed can be transformed by the oppressed and by subjects occupying oppressive or neutral social positions who act on the collective responsibility to abolish oppression and realise a just basic structure.⁷⁹⁷ As I argue in the next chapter, *6. Reconciliation*, structurally empowered subjects willingly fail to even reflexively identify our social biases and privileges because of our psychic investments and material interests in preserving our power. Moreover, the lesson learnt from the history of white racial terrorism – state and non-state violence – is that some whites who recognise their structurally dominant social position and normalised privileges and advantages in global, regional, and national contexts will take individual or collective action to preserve rather than end white supremacy. Further, the lesson learnt for diplomatic history is that Western powers will take individual or collective action to preserve Western-dominated global institutional order.

Grovogui argues that the necessary global restructuring to prevent the catastrophic accumulation and intensification of social crises and systematic violations of human rights in some formally decolonised state-societies was led by the Third World, but that it was resisted by the reconstituted Anglo-American imperium of the 1970s. The Third World agenda for transforming the Western-dominated global institutional order included the proposal for a New International Economic Order (NIEO); maintaining strategic non-alignment during the Cold War; fair global governance of the sea, air, and space; redistributing resources from the production of the means of destruction to the satisfaction of basic human needs; preserving and advancing the cultural and

⁷⁹⁶ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 316. Mills' mistaken opposition of this account of negatively socialised subjects' resistance to unjust power relations with Foucault's account of subject formation rests on the common misreading of Foucault. This is almost exactly Foucault's mature position – see *2. Encountering the Other*.

⁷⁹⁷ Indeed, 'If you are neutral in situations of injustice, you have chosen the side of the oppressor.' – Desmond Tutu. Moreover, 'The ultimate tragedy is not the oppression and cruelty by the bad people but the silence over that by the good people.' – Martin Luther King Jr.

scientific achievements of humanity, and redefining these endeavours in the human interest; *etc.*⁷⁹⁸

The weakening of the Global South's institutional mechanisms for collective empowerment and transformative action – *e.g.* the Non-Aligned Movement, OPEC, and the G77 – and the kinds of reactionary collective empowerment and conservative action that Western states and multinational corporations mobilised to resist global transformative change show the difficulties of Young's social connection model of responsibility. Maintaining flexible solidarity despite ideological, political, economic, social, and cultural pluriversality has proven difficult for the Global South. The individuals and state-societies of the Global North have been reluctant to recognise and discharge our special responsibility, on the social connection model, to recognise our structural privilege, to acknowledge its continuities with historical injustice, and to transform the global institutional order that reproduces this inequality. That these problems can be understood through the paradigm is not a weakness but a strength of the decolonial reconstruction of institutional cosmopolitanism that centres long durational global structural injustices.

4.7. Conclusion

In 4. *Global Order as Subject*, I have synthesised the methods and results of recent decolonial interventions in IR/IPE and explained their significance for deconstructing and reconstructing cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis and for our understanding of institutional cosmopolitanism. I have argued that decolonial interventions in IR/IPE have the power to sharpen the analytical tools of diagnosis and prescription, and that institutional cosmopolitanism can in turn contribute to a normative analytical perspective in IR/IPE. Mills's argument for 'realising through racializing Pogge' contained in it the seeds of a more promising approach to decolonising cosmopolitanism and ending global white supremacy than racial contractarianism. I hope to have extended and provided support for Mills's claim that Pogge's critique of Rawls's methodologically nationalist

⁷⁹⁸ Siba Grovogui, "Regimes of Sovereignty", 45.

normative institutionalist analysis could be sharpened by genealogically analysing contemporary discourses of good governance, state failure, and development in the *longue durée* of global white supremacy. I have synthesised Mills's theorisation of white supremacy as a global institutional order with Young's social connection model, and used these results to make an original contribution to explanation and transformation of ourselves and our world. In the final chapter, I continue to deconstruct and reconstruct Rawls by analysing the global order as a *transitional context of justice* and theorising the backward-looking and forward-looking problems of justice, truth, and reconciliation in world politics.

5. Reconciliation

The idea of *political philosophy as reconciliation* must be invoked with care. For political philosophy is always in danger of being used corruptly as a *defence of an unjust and unworthy status quo*, and thus of being ideological in Marx's sense. From time to time we must ask whether justice as fairness, or any other view, is ideological in this way; and if not, why not? Are the very ideas it uses ideological? How can we show they are not?
– John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*.⁷⁹⁹

We emphasize that remembering the crimes or wrongs of the past, wherever and whenever they occurred, unequivocally condemning its racist tragedies and telling the truth about history are essential elements for *international reconciliation* and the creation of societies based on justice, equality and solidarity.
– *United Nations Durban Declaration and Programme of Action*.⁸⁰⁰

[The] adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples [is] a triumph for Indigenous peoples around the world, a historic moment when UN Member States and Indigenous peoples have *reconciled with their painful histories and are resolved to move forward together on the path of human rights, justice and development for all*.
– 8th United Nations General Secretary, Ban Ki Moon.⁸⁰¹

We can only deconstruct five centuries of structural racism and discrimination by working together.
– 6th United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein.⁸⁰²

5.1. Deconstructing five centuries of structural racism

In 2019, we witnessed the 400th anniversary of the landing of the first enslaved people in Virginia, North America, from West Africa. The *New York Times* marked the occasion with the publication of the *1619 Project* – a radical retelling of United States history that recentred black experience and struggles in the American narrative.⁸⁰³ 1619 was a critical juncture in the historical evolution of the transatlantic slave trade that had originated a century earlier. The triangular trade was created by the Spanish and Portuguese colonial empires after the New World 'discoveries' of 1492 and the

⁷⁹⁹ John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, 4. Fn.4.

⁸⁰⁰ United Nations, "World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (2001)", accessed 1 November 2018, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Durban_text_en.pdf

⁸⁰¹ Ban Ki Moon, "Statement", 13 September 2007, cited in *Conversations About Indigenous Rights: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Aotearoa New Zealand*, eds. Selwyn Katene and Rawiri Taonui (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2018): 15.

⁸⁰² Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, "'Racism is deeply rooted in colonialism and slavery' says UN human rights chief", 4 December 2015, accessed 1 November 2018, <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/brasilia/about-this-office/single-view/news/racism-is-deeply-rooted-in-colonialism-and-slavery-says/>

⁸⁰³ Nikole Hannah-Jones, "The 1619 Project", *The New York Times Magazine*, 14 August 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/14/magazine/1619-america-slavery.html>

genocide of the Indigenous peoples of the Americas at the onset of the world systemic transition to global modernity/coloniality.⁸⁰⁴ More than 15 million men, women, and children were victims of the transatlantic slave trade. They are memorialised by *The Arc of Return* at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. The monument, designed by Haitian-American architect, Rodney Leon, was officially unveiled on the International Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Slavery and the Transatlantic Slave Trade on 25 March 2015.

In the context of the global history of slavery, and particularly the transatlantic slave trade, the *Report of the United Nations Human Rights Council Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its Mission to the United States of America*, released in 2016, urged the United States to seriously consider applying the analogous elements of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Ten-Point Action Plan for Reparatory Justice, which was endorsed by CARICOM Heads of Government in March 2014. The CARICOM Reparations Commission, led by Professor Sir. Hillary Beckles, was mandated to prepare the case for reparatory justice for the Caribbean region's Indigenous and African descendant communities victimised by the atrocities of genocide, slavery, slave trading, and racial apartheid perpetrated by European colonial empires and corporations.⁸⁰⁵

The Working Group encouraged the U.S. Congress to pass H.R. 40 – the Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act – which would establish a commission to examine enslavement and racial discrimination in the colonies and the United States from 1619 to the present, and to recommend appropriate remedial measures.⁸⁰⁶ The Working Group observed that the legacy of colonial history, enslavement, racial subordination and segregation, white racial terrorism, and racial inequality in the United States ‘remains a serious challenge, as there has been

⁸⁰⁴ Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu, *How the West Came to Rule*, 121.

⁸⁰⁵ “10-Point Reparation Plan”, CARICOM Reparations Commission, accessed 2 April 2020.
<http://caricomreparations.org/caricom/caricoms-10-point-reparation-plan/>

⁸⁰⁶ UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Working Group of Experts on People of African Descent on its mission to the United States of America”, 18 August 2016, accessed 1 February 2020.
<https://www.refworld.org/docid/584073d34.html>

no real commitment to reparations and to truth and reconciliation for people of African descent'.⁸⁰⁷

The Working Group concluded that 'past injustices and crimes against African Americans must be addressed with reparatory justice'.⁸⁰⁸

Beyond redress for historical injustices and crimes against individuals, the Working Group was concerned that, while federal civil rights legislation, put in place in the 1960s and 1970s, did result in moderate progress, it has not been 'sufficiently effective to overcome and transform the structural racial discrimination against African Americans'.⁸⁰⁹ In addition to substantive reforms to specific policies and practices, and symbolic reconciliatory acts such as the erection of monuments, memorials, and markers, and the passing of legislation to recognise the racist wrongs of history, the Working Group emphasised the role of 'constructive and open dialogue... to address the crisis being experienced by American society'.⁸¹⁰ The report echoed the passionate argument made by Ta-Nehisi Coates in his "Case for Reparations", published in *The Atlantic* magazine in June 2014.⁸¹¹

In light of these and related developments in world politics, Charles W. Mills describes any cosmopolitan account of global justice that fails to prescribe the backward-looking measures of rectificatory justice necessary for ending global white supremacy as a 'premature reconciliation'.⁸¹² The five hundred year history of global white supremacy 'can only be transcended by facing and working through it, not by evading it and pretending to have sublated it', Mills argues.⁸¹³ Mills gives as examples of backward-looking measures of rectification: reparations, official apologies, recognising historical wrongs as wrongs, moral condemnation of perpetrators, rewriting dominant historical narratives, reaffirmation of the moral personality of oppressed and persecuted racialised

⁸⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 16.

⁸⁰⁸ *Ibid*, 16, 19.

⁸⁰⁹ *Ibid*, 19.

⁸¹⁰ *Ibid*, 19-20.

⁸¹¹ Ta-Nehisi Coates, "The Case for Reparations", *The Atlantic*, June 2014.

<https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/>

⁸¹² Charles W. Mills, "Race and Global Justice", 119.

⁸¹³ *Ibid*, 118-119.

populations, memorialisation of catastrophes,⁸¹⁴ and ‘real dialogue of equals’.⁸¹⁵ Other real world examples from recent years include changes to public memorialisation practices – who and what is memorialised, and how. This includes modifying or removing statues glorifying imperialists, colonialists, slavers, and the perpetrators of genocide and other atrocities, renaming things like institutions, buildings, streets, parks, cities, and countries, replacing Columbus Day with Indigenous Peoples’ Day, and memorialising unjustly uncelebrated heroes such as Harriet Tubman – as well as the repatriation of stolen artefacts and human remains from museums and private collections, the opening and repatriation of colonial archives, the uncovering of the fate of the disappeared, and the identification of mass graves.

Mills’s critique of liberal cosmopolitanism contributes to the growth of recent philosophical work at the intersection of global justice and transitional justice.⁸¹⁶ In this chapter, I continue to decolonise institutional cosmopolitanism. My objective is to reconstruct a decolonised cosmopolitanism as a *mature reconciliation*, conversely, in the global transitional context of justice, to be achieved through cosmopolitan dialogue about world history, order, and politics – and by transforming ourselves and our world through action. Like Catherine Lu, I clarify the conceptual distinctions and relations between conceptions of backward-looking justice in transitional contexts, and conceptions of social and global justice.⁸¹⁷ I do so by continuing to deconstruct and reconstruct Rawlsianism. The *principle of transitional justice* and the non-ideal theoretical problem of transitioning to well-ordered national and international societies are central themes of Rawls’s *Law of Peoples*.⁸¹⁸ Rawls neglects imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, and the endurance of racialised structural and institutional injustices, and contrasts his principles of transitional justice, which have a target, with cosmopolitan principles of global justice, which demand continuous

⁸¹⁴ *Ibid*, 117-118.

⁸¹⁵ Charles W. Mills, “Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy”, 23.

⁸¹⁶ Especially Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). Göran Collste, *Global Rectificatory Justice* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014).

⁸¹⁷ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 8-9.

⁸¹⁸ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 90, 188.

intervention. Yet, there are powerful tools in his political philosophy that can be expropriated for decolonising the Anglo-American cosmopolitan tradition.

In the previous chapter, like Lu, I adapted Iris Marion Young's conceptual distinction between interactional and structural injustice to theorise coloniality. In this chapter, also like Lu, I adapt Frantz Fanon's decolonial expropriation of Hegel to analyse reconciliation as *objective and subjective disalienation*. I contrast my account with Rawls's treatment of the fundamental idea of political philosophy as reconciliation in connection with his realistically utopian method and his forward-looking conceptions of transitional justice in national and international contexts. Following Mills, I argue that racialised and gendered *epistemic injustices*, coined by Miranda Fricker, are major constraints for achieving justice, truth, and reconciliation in the global transitional context through a real dialogue of equals. By drawing on different resources, I reach different conclusions to Lu about the problem of epistemic injustice in the global context, and the conditions of possibility for, and the limits of, open-ended cosmopolitan dialogue about world history, order, and politics. I argue that reconciliation is *unsettling* – disalienation is alienating – but resolving repressed conflict and trauma and rectifying injustices enables a higher order disalienation – a mature reconciliation – both subjectively and objectively.

5.2. Global transitions, global justice

Ruti G. Teitel, who coined the concept, defines transitional justice as 'the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes'.⁸¹⁹ The twentieth century intellectual and political history of the concept of transitional justice closely mirrors that of liberal cosmopolitanism, but the relationship between the two concepts is unclear and undertheorised. The emergence of the discursive practice of transitional justice is an important part of broader political developments in

⁸¹⁹ Ruti G. Teitel, "Transitional Justice Genealogy", *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 16 (2003): 69.

recent global history. Transitional justice discourse is a component of the post-WWII (phase I) and post-Cold War (phase II) American-led Western practice of liberal international ordering. Emerging during the Nuremburg and Tokyo Trials after WWII, the discursive practice evolved in the 1980s, and peaked in the 1990s and 2000s as an element in the post-Cold War constellation of human rights norms, democratisation, the enforcement of international humanitarian law, and liberal interventionism.⁸²⁰

Milestones in the political history of transitional justice include South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and the wave of democratic transitions in Eastern Europe, Africa, and Central America that followed the collapse of Soviet imperialism.⁸²¹ The post-Cold War era witnessed the historical trend toward the entrenchment and institutionalisation of the norms and mechanisms of transitional justice, including the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The most significant symbol of this trend was the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 1998 by the Rome Statute, mandated with the obligation to prosecute the 'most serious' crimes, *viz.*, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.⁸²² Transitional justice discourse conceptualises justice in terms of criminal liability. As Teitel explains, in normal times, 'law provides order and stability', but in exceptional times, 'law is called upon to maintain order, even as it enables transformation'.⁸²³

Western cosmopolitanisms, as I discussed in previous chapters, likewise emerge from this same post-Cold War liberal internationalist constellation. Liberal cosmopolitans have taken an interest in these developments. Gillian Brock, for example, cites the establishment of the ICC as a progressive development that has an important function in guaranteeing of rule of law, ending impunity for serious crimes, and protecting basic liberties, and as empirical evidence of the

⁸²⁰ Ruti G. Teitel, "Transitional Justice Genealogy", 72-78, 89-92.

⁸²¹ International Center for Transitional Justice, "What is Transitional Justice?", 2009.

<https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Global-Transitional-Justice-2009-English.pdf>

⁸²² Ruti G. Teitel, "Global Transitional Justice", *Human Rights, Global Justice & Democracy Working Paper No. 8* (2010): 16.

⁸²³ Ruti G. Teitel, *Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 96.

feasibility of the cosmopolitan project.⁸²⁴ The connection between the two discourses remains undertheorised, however, perhaps because of the legalism of transitional justice discourse and the dominance of backward-looking problems of justice, and the dominance of the forward-looking distributive paradigm in analytic liberal cosmopolitan political philosophy. Transitional justice was a central theme of the non-ideal theoretical part of Rawls's *Law of Peoples* and of his argument against liberal cosmopolitans who wanted to extend the scope of forward-looking liberal principles of distributive justice universally. Liberal cosmopolitans who rejected Rawls's arguments mostly left unaddressed the problems of transitional justice. If, as I argued in the previous chapter, we shift the institutional cosmopolitan paradigm from redistribution to rectifying interactional and structural injustices in the wider historical context of global modernity/coloniality, then new possibilities open for theorising the connection between transitional and cosmopolitan justice.

The field of transitional justice is in a period of sustained critique and extension, with greater emphasis now placed on the varieties of transitional contexts and transformative justice.⁸²⁵ Our understanding of transitional justice is limited by the arbitrary choice of democratic transitions as historical reference points and by the subliminal Eurocentrism of transitional justice discourse.⁸²⁶ The ideal typical transitional context to which practices, institutions, and norms of transitional justice apply is abstracted from a one-sided diet of historical examples, and by idealising liberal democracy. For example, Jon Elster's *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (2009) analyses approximately thirty cases of transitional justice, that with three exceptions, all took place in transitions to liberal democracy in the twentieth century.⁸²⁷ There is an implicit assumption about the *agents and patients* of transitional justice – that the West is the

⁸²⁴ Gillian Brock, *Cosmopolitan Justice*, 166-169, 330-331.

⁸²⁵ Paul Gready, "Introduction" in *From Transitional to Transformative Justice*, ed. Paul Gready and Simon Robins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 1.

⁸²⁶ It is widely known that the ICC has been criticised as neocolonial due to its Eurocentrism, the *de facto* exemption of Western countries and leaders from its jurisdiction, disproportionate focus on Africa, and the reproduction of the subliminal association of blackness with criminality, lawlessness, violence, barbarism, animality, deficiency, lack, and incapability of self-rule constructed through the racist justification narratives for slavery and colonialism.

⁸²⁷ Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 47-76.

‘locus and agent of justice and human rights that needs to respond to the conflict and abuses occurring in non-Western states’ – and about the *origins and ends* of transitional justice – that liberal democratic societies are the desired ‘end points’ of transitional justice.⁸²⁸ As Teitel explains, the ‘point of departure’ in post-Cold War transitional justice discourse is ‘the presumption that the move toward a more liberal, democratic political system implies a universal norm’.⁸²⁹ But clearly transitions *to* independence *from* colonial rule were the biggest transitions in the twentieth century in number and historical significance – not transitions *to* democracy *from* authoritarianism or conflict. Eurocentric ideological assumptions and colonial amnesia distort our understanding.

Let us continue to take 1945 as the beginning of our story. When the United Nations was founded in 1945, 750 million people, nearly a third of the world’s population at the time, were colonised by Western and Japanese imperialist powers. Now, no more than 2 million people live under direct colonial rule in the 17 remaining non-self-governing territories. In 1945, there were 51 original member states in the United Nations; there are now 193. Until the 1990s, transitions to independence from colonial rule were the primary means by which new states were formed and integrated as members. (Arguably, although I will not argue it, the post-Soviet creation of independent states was a special case of – incomplete – transition from colonial rule by the Russian imperial metropole in Moscow, rather than a general case of – abortive – transition to democracy.)

Further back in history, independence from Spanish, Portuguese, British, and French colonial rule in the Americas in the 18th and 19th centuries, and in the 20th, the independence of the white dominions of the British Commonwealth, provide further empirical historical support for the proposition that political transitions to independence from colonial rule are paradigmatic – not democratic transitions. These examples show the empirical variety of transitions to independence from colonial rule, their complex relations to processes of decolonisation and democratisation,

⁸²⁸ Jennifer Balint, Julie Evansy, and Nesam McMillan, “Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach”, *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 8 (2014): 194-195.

⁸²⁹ Ruti G. Teitel (2014) *Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays*, Oxford. 96.

and their varying degrees of justice, truth, and reconciliation. Yet, few theorists in the transitional justice field deal with decolonisation as a paradigmatic transitional context, and so do not theorise the appropriate ways and means of rectifying the injustices of colonialism, making the truth public, and reconciling societies both internally and externally with their former colonial rulers and with the modern/colonial world order generated by Western imperialism.⁸³⁰ This has been ruled out in advance by confusing a special transitional context for the general kind.

This unhistorical focus on democratic transitions as contexts of transitional justice has caused the neglect of the injustices of colonial rule. As Lu observes, the ‘relative lack of accounting for injustices committed in contexts of colonial rule is striking’.⁸³¹ Hakeem O. Yusuf argues that the tenuous engagement of transitional justice with the ‘injustices of the colonial past leaves victims of those injustices unacknowledged and sustains continuing structural injustice’.⁸³² Accounts that exclude ‘stable democracies’ are particularly deserving of criticism. Stable democracies are, for the most part, Western post-imperial or neo-imperial nation-states, white settler colonies, and former slave state-societies, with white supremacist basic structures and historical wrongs that include land theft, genocide, torture, and racial terrorism.⁸³³ There has been an increasing focus in the transitional justice literature on justice, truth, and reconciliation for Indigenous peoples and the living decedents of enslaved people in the white settler colonies of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.⁸³⁴ Reflecting this trend, Stephen Winter draws a distinction in the concept of transitional justice between the practices of polities emerging from war or massive and systemic human rights abuses under authoritarian rule – the original paradigm transitional context

⁸³⁰ Hakeem O. Yusuf, “Colonialism and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Nigeria”, *International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 12 (2018): 259-262.

⁸³¹ Catherine Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility and Contemporary Redress”, *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 19:3 (2011): 264.

⁸³² Hakeem O. Yusuf, “Colonialism and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Nigeria”, 262.

⁸³³ Catherine Lu, “Review of Colleen Murphy, *The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice*”, *Criminal Law and Philosophy*, 13 (2019): 548.

⁸³⁴ Hakeem O. Yusuf, “Colonialism and the Dilemmas of Transitional Justice in Nigeria”, 259-260.

– and the practices of ‘established’, ‘mature’, or ‘stable’ democracies – the new paradigm.⁸³⁵ However, this conceptual distinction does not challenge the liberal and Eurocentric assumptions of the original paradigm.

I propose an expansion and clarification of the concept of transitional justice, and a different taxonomy that is not based on an *idealised* ideal type of liberal democracy that elides the connected histories of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, or of transitional contexts as transitions *to* liberal democracy *from* authoritarianism or conflict. The first analytic differentiation of the concept of transitional justice is between subnational, national, international, transnational, and global transitional *contexts of justice*. The second analytic differentiation is between normal and exceptional *circumstances of justice* in transitional contexts. It is a mistake to identify *transitional contexts* with these *exceptional circumstances*, and to limit *transitional justice* to the applicable norms, principles, practices, institutions, mechanisms, and procedures of justice in these exceptional circumstances. Transitional contexts of justice, then, are those contexts where there is a transformative change involving backward-looking problems of justice, truth, and reconciliation arising from interactional and structural injustices. Contexts may be subnational, national, international, transnational, or global, and the circumstances of justice in these transitional contexts may be normal or exceptional. My concern here is with *global transitional justice* – the global order as a context of transitional justice.

Transitional justice discourse is state-centric insofar as transitions are predicated of states. Teitel, for example, claims that transitions signify ‘a normative shift in the principles underlying and legitimating the exercise of state power’.⁸³⁶ The global order is a transitional context that has undergone transformative normative shifts in the principles legitimating the discursive practice of world ordering, including the global shift to liberal internationalist principles after the Cold War. The liberal internationalist project of transitional justice is an expression of this normative shift.

⁸³⁵ Stephen Winter, “Towards a Unified Theory of Transitional Justice”, *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 7 (2013): 244.

⁸³⁶ Ruti G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 213.

That the global order is a context of transitional justice is implicit in the self-understanding of the project of transitional justice. Moreover, transitions are not merely shifts in the normative order, *contra* Teitel, but shifts in the underlying distribution power whether at the subnational, national, international, transnational, or global level. As I argued in *1. Ka Hua te Marama*, the post-Cold War global transition from a bipolar order to a unipolar liberal international order under American hegemony is now ending. We are now living through an even larger global transition from 500 years of global modernity/coloniality to a post-Western, post-secular world order. The post-WWII transition from the Western imperialist world order, meanwhile, is incomplete and unreconciled, and global white supremacy endures.⁸³⁷ These are circumstances of the global transitional context.

Orthodox transitional justice scholars might insist that the discursive practice is specific to contexts of state-societal transitions to liberal democracy, and that practices of reconciliation in settler colonial contexts are the maturation of stable democracies – *democratising democracy*, as it were. Other contexts, the counterargument might go, have other forms of justice appropriate to them. But this is just conceptual definition by scholarly fiat. A more challenging argument against my conceptual clarification of transitional justice is that the circumstances immediately after conflict or regime change are *exceptional*, and that my argument *normalises* transitional justice, thereby losing sight of what is strategically and normatively significant about transitional contexts.

Perhaps a realist scholar of world politics pressing this counterargument is willing to concede that liberal democracy is not the defining aim of transitional justice. Rather, the minimalist aim of transitional justice is, and ought to be, peace-building and maintaining the rule of law and national security in exceptional circumstances.⁸³⁸ This realist scholar is open about the implication that this aim would limit the ambit of the search for truth, justice, and reconciliation for the sake of peace-building and maintaining the rule of law and national security in post-conflict and regime

⁸³⁷ My hope is that learning and applying the lessons of transitional justice in the global context of decolonisation might help to prevent global conflict, rather than resolve issues truth, justice, and reconciliation involved in an order-building moment following a future hegemonic war.

⁸³⁸ Ruti G. Teitel “Transitional Justice Genealogy”, 69.

change situations. The realist could argue further that liberal internationalists are misguided in their attempt to moralise world politics: the liberal internationalist political project of universalising and institutionalising liberal norms through the discourse of transitional justice is counterproductive. Our realist might now point to the wave of illiberal nationalist reaction and democratic backsliding as evidence of the normative and strategic failures of the West's post-Cold War liberal imperialism. Amoralism about transitional contexts in world politics, she might conclude, is not at all immoral.

This argument, at its best, is for a clear conceptual distinction between the *circumstances* and *contexts of justice*, between *normal* and *exceptional circumstances of justice*, and between *forward-looking* and *backward-looking justice*. The elementary concepts of circumstances of justice and contexts of justice, exceptionality and normality, and forward-looking and backward-looking justice are in common usage by political philosophers and theorists of transitional justice. The meanings of, and the distinctions and relations between these concepts are unclear and contested. I have been using the concept *contexts of justice* to refer to the orders, structures, practices, institutions, relations, and interactions to which a conception of justice applies, and in which context the conception of justice is made meaningful by a community of common languages and practices. The circumstances of justice are the properties of a context of justice that are the enabling and limiting conditions on practical possibility that generate the problems to which a conception of justice is responsive.

Colleen Murphy, in *The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice*, also uses the language of 'circumstances' and 'contexts' of transitional justice, but collapses the distinction that I am making. For Murphy, the relevant distinction is that assumed to exist between transitional and stable democratic societies, which she theorises as the two poles of a continuum.⁸³⁹ She claims that her aim is 'in analytic clarification, not in determining the appropriate empirical characterization of any specific political society',⁸⁴⁰ but her collapse of the conceptual distinction between context and

⁸³⁹ Colleen Murphy, *The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 42.

⁸⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

circumstances gives us less not more analytic clarity. Murphy identifies the four circumstances of transitional justice that must obtain for a society to be transitional as pervasive structural inequality, normalised collective and political wrongdoing, serious existential uncertainty, and fundamental uncertainty about authority.⁸⁴¹ By contrast, the circumstances of justice in stable democracies are limited structural inequality, deviant individual and personal wrongdoing, minor existential uncertainty, and narrow uncertainty about authority.⁸⁴² Murphy's construction of these ideal types rules out the possibility of stable democracies being transitional contexts, limits transitional justice to the context of individual state-societies, and assumes that transitional contexts are exclusively transitions *to* democracy *from* conflict or authoritarianism under exceptional circumstances.

Transitional contexts each have particular constellations of circumstances, including the involvement of state and non-state actors and influence of subnational, national, international, and transnational processes that will never recur in the exactly same way. The circumstances of justice in transitional contexts thus necessitate particularised norms, principles, practices, institutions, mechanisms, and procedures of justice, truth, and reconciliation – such as the transitions from apartheid, fascism, communism, and colonialism – to respond to particular problems of justice. Exceptional circumstances, as occur during the transitions from conflict and authoritarian rule, create special problems of justice that transitional justice scholars and practitioners have developed significant expertise in.⁸⁴³ But exceptional circumstances are not *constitutive* of transitional contexts.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁸⁴² *Ibid.*

⁸⁴³ Theorising the norms, principles, practices, institutions, mechanisms, and procedures appropriate to exceptional transitional contexts of justice, and the strategic and normative significance of what I am calling the circumstances of justice in transitional contexts, has been the main activity of scholars in the interdisciplinary field. There remains a need for specialist theoretical and empirical scholarship and jurisprudence on the practices of political communities emerging immediately from the end of conflict and authoritarian rule, and the special functions of the law and appropriate standards of justice for peace-building and maintaining law and order and national security in exceptional circumstances. There is also a need for specialist theoretical and empirical scholarship on the decisions made by conflicting parties in transitional contexts about whether to participate in these processes, or to hold out for total victory and risk total destruction. It is in these areas where the imagined realist's concern for the strategic and normative significance of exceptional circumstances of transitional justice matters most.

What makes a context of justice transitional is not its exceptional circumstances, but that the problems of justice arising in that context involve a backward-looking orientation to time. Ontologically, orders and structures are temporary objects. Their existence in time is limited, and they are dynamic, not static. They rise and fall. For Western realist scholars of world history, order, and politics, this insight into ontology of orders and structures is definitive of the ancient tradition, originating with Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War*.⁸⁴⁴ Periods of stability and normality may extend for long periods and create the illusion of permanence, but societies are always already in a state of either slow or rapid transition.⁸⁴⁵ Periods of instability, crisis, and rapid transformation may or may not generate exceptional circumstances, and exceptionality might obtain in periods of relative stability to govern perceived national security threats, such as terrorism or migration.

Our conception of normal circumstances must be one that does not naturalise or normalise the *transitory status quo*, and repress the unresolved conflict, violence, and trauma in the substrata of civilisation, and the struggles of the oppressed. The lived realities of state and non-state direct violence and the 'everydayness of ongoing structural violence rooted in settler colonial societies', including violations of, among other human rights instruments, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, bring into question 'the alleged exceptionalism of violence'.⁸⁴⁶ However, there is nevertheless a core and penumbra of meaning, and that we can make sense of the analytic distinction between normal and exceptional circumstances.

⁸⁴⁴ The temporary nature of the state, evident in the cyclical political theories Plato and Aristotle, is also the ontological insight at the root of the republican tradition, and Marx's historical materialism.

⁸⁴⁵ This includes the capital accumulation, societal learning, and political development phase of intergenerational state-societies, for Rawls, during which time the transitional principle of just savings has application, until the end of the transitional process has been reached, and the just society can be materially maintained. The demands of the just savings principle are that each generation must 'not only preserve the gains of culture and civilization, and maintain intact those just institutions that have been established, but must also put aside in each period a suitable amount of real capital accumulation'. Each generation thus carries its fair share of the burden of realising and maintaining a well-ordered state-society. John Rawls, *Theory of Justice*, Harvard. §44, 285-289.

⁸⁴⁶ Sarah Maddison and Laura J. Shepherd, "Peacebuilding and the Postcolonial Politics of Transitional Justice", *Peacebuilding*, 2:3 (2014): 263.

If we abstract from a larger universe of cases, then *transitional contexts of justice* can be differentiated from transitions (simpliciter) by the normative criteria that the agents acting in these contexts to bring about the transition are self-consciously aiming to transition *from* unjust *to* just orders or structures and rectify historical wrongs, and are self-conscious of the need for justice, truth, and reconciliation to move forward from the past. Justice in transitional contexts involves recognising the interactional wrongs of the past and the historical dimension of structural injustices, and working through these using the appropriate norms, principles, practices, institutions, mechanisms, and procedures for rectifying interactional and structural injustices and for reconciling with the world and with each other. These acts intentionally create a discontinuity and rupture with the past, signifying a normative shift in the governing conception of justice.

Transitional justice might occur under normal or exceptional conditions, and in different contexts with different contextualised conceptions of justice (not limited to liberal democracy) involved in the normative shift from the old order to the new order. This backward-looking orientation to time differentiates transitional justice from varieties of forward-looking conceptions of justice, which may be ahistorical or utopian ideals, or immanent or naturalistic critical standards. There are other varieties of justice that have a backward-looking orientation to time, such as the justice of acquisition, rectification, compensation, restoration, retaliation, and retribution, but these varieties respond to different problems of justice in different contexts of justice, and are thus differentiated from transitional justice (but may, as a contingent matter, be involved in it).

I believe my conceptual distinctions between the *circumstances* and *contexts of justice*, between *normal* and *exceptional circumstances of justice*, and between *forward-looking* and *backward-looking justice* enable us to map the evolving field of transitional justice, and to understand the terms of the contemporary debates in the literature. There is an increasing emphasis in the literature on the conceptual distinction between rectifying interactional wrongs and rectifying the structures that enable and condition interactional wrongs, and victimise structurally disadvantaged, vulnerable,

and marginalised groups. In contexts of structural ‘injustice’,⁸⁴⁷ ‘inequality’,⁸⁴⁸ and ‘violence’,⁸⁴⁹ where individual or corporate agents cannot be identified and brought to justice, or where doing so does not end the structural disadvantage, vulnerability, and marginalisation of victimised groups, the problem of transitional justice is one of *structural transformation*.

5.3. Reconciliation as objective and subjective disalienation

At the forefront of these contemporary debates, Lu has recently made a powerful transdisciplinary contribution to theorising the nexus of justice, truth, and reconciliation and the decolonisation of analytic liberal cosmopolitanism. In *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, she demonstrates how different normative and empirical analyses of the injustices of colonialism generate different ways of thinking about problems of the moral and causal agency and responsibility of contemporary subjects to address and redress colonial injustices of the past, and the ongoing structural injustices rooted in the colonial world order in the present. As Lu states:

To the extent that such structural injustices, organized around race, class, gender, majority- minority, or core-periphery distinctions, continue to pervade our social structures and relations at international and transnational levels, the moral and political responsibility to eliminate them constitutes the unfinished work of the political struggles for structural justice and reconciliation in international and transnational relations, especially as they relate to the legacies of empire, slavery, and colonialism.⁸⁵⁰

Lu’s approach is to clarify the analytical distinction and relation between concepts of justice and reconciliation for thinking through the implications for the transformation of the world order of projects of justice and reconciliation in response to colonial injustice. Justice and reconciliation are analytically distinct and mutually irreducible concepts, yet ‘the normative aims and political struggles over justice and reconciliation’ should be analysed and formulated together.

⁸⁴⁷ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 144-181.

⁸⁴⁸ Colleen Murphy, *The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice*, 119-159.

⁸⁴⁹ Rosemary Nagy, “Transitional Justice as Global Project: Critical Reflections,” *Third World Quarterly*, 29:2 (2008): 275-289. Rosemary Nagy, “The Scope and Bounds of Transitional Justice and the Canadian Truth and Reconciliation Commission,” *The International Journal of Transitional Justice*, 7 (2013): 52-73. Matthew Evans, “Structural Violence, Socioeconomic Rights, and Transformative Justice,” *Journal of Human Rights*, 15:1 (2016): 1-20. Matthew Evans and David Wilkins, “Transformative Justice, Reparations and Transatlantic Slavery,” *Social & Legal Studies*, 28:2 (2019): 137-157.

⁸⁵⁰ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 26.

Lu first clarifies a conceptual distinction between interactional and structural injustice, following the lead of Iris Marion Young. Interactional injustice, recall, is marked by a particular question of agency: *who wronged whom?* Rectifying interactional injustices involves identifying victims and perpetrators, whether individual and corporate. Possible rectificatory measures involve accountability, retribution, and reparation. Lu argues that in the context of colonial injustices, rectifying historical interactional wrongs is necessary (yet, sometimes impossible) but insufficient. We need a comprehensive account of the injustice of colonialism that includes both interactional and structural injustices in subnational, national, international, transnational, and global contexts. A structural injustice approach to the moral and empirical analysis of colonialism expands the scope of our thinking beyond catastrophes, the legalistic language of victims and perpetrators, and idealised forms of individual and state agency and responsibility, typical of orthodox transitional justice discourse, to the institutional, normative, discursive, and material conditions in which individual and state agents interact.⁸⁵¹ Our focus shifts to the structural injustices implicated in, constitutive of, or produced by colonial injustice that mediated, conditioned, or enabled interactional wrongdoing.⁸⁵² A normative structural analysis of the injustice of colonialism does not ‘displace’ judgments of individual or corporate (particularly state) liability for wrongful actions, but, following Young, helps us to identify other agents who contribute to the reproduction of structural colonial injustices, without necessarily perpetrating interactional wrongs, and helps us to determine their – our – remedial responsibilities.⁸⁵³

Take, for example, Canada’s residential school system. Colonial policies and practices amount to official wrongdoing.⁸⁵⁴ Yet, even in this case, agency was complex and distributed, involving not only the settler colonial government but the Roman Catholic, Anglican, United,

⁸⁵¹ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 19-20.

⁸⁵² *Ibid.*, 252.

⁸⁵³ Catherine Lu, “Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility and Contemporary Redress”, 238.

⁸⁵⁴ Stephen Winter, “Legitimacy, Citizenship and State Redress”, *Citizenship Studies*, 15:6-7 (2011): 801.

Methodist, and Presbyterian Churches.⁸⁵⁵ The residential school system was correctly analysed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada as part of the structural processes of European imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide.⁸⁵⁶ Viewing colonialism primarily as a structural injustice, and not an historical interactional injustice between coloniser and colonised, or particular individual or corporate agents, Lu argues, requires us ‘to examine the nature of the responsibilities of those who participated in unjust social structures but who were not direct perpetrators, as well as identify categories of persons subject to unjust vulnerabilities beyond those who are victims of direct interactional wrongs’.⁸⁵⁷ Moreover, Lu argues, because interactional injustices are made possible and conditioned by social, economic, political, and legal structures, ending structural injustice is a powerful way of preventing future interactional injustices.⁸⁵⁸

The view of colonialism as a structural rather than simply interactional injustice helps to make sense of the claim that colonialism is not over. Enduring unjust structures originated in the colonial past, and have mutated into their present form.⁸⁵⁹ Lu’s conceptual distinction between interactional and structural injustice in her analysis of colonialism mirrors the decolonial distinction between colonialism, which ended with formal geopolitical decolonisation, and global coloniality. The reproduction of neocolonial structural injustices mean that the backward-looking problems of transitional justice are closely tied to the forward-looking problems of structural transformation. On Lu’s account, contemporary agents have a responsibility to learn about, understand, and address, and where possible, redress historical wrongdoing as part of the collective political project of reconstructing a mutually affirmable and affirmed global order by ending enduring structural injustices.⁸⁶⁰ This collective political responsibility falls on all subjects that participate in the

⁸⁵⁵ “Residential School Settlement Agreement”, accessed 10 January 2020.

<http://www.residentialschoolsettlement.ca/settlement.html>

⁸⁵⁶ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, *Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future*, 2015, 43-44.

http://www.trc.ca/assets/pdf/Honouring_the_Truth_Reconciling_for_the_Future_July_23_2015.pdf

⁸⁵⁷ *Ibid*, 142.

⁸⁵⁸ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, Cambridge, 19.

⁸⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 178

⁸⁶⁰ *Ibid*, 180.

reproduction of unjust structures, ‘even if this means worsening one’s own conditions and opportunities compared to what they would have been’.⁸⁶¹

So far, this mirrors my conclusion in *Global Order as Subject*. Lu, following Fanon, theorises reconciliation as disalienation, and sees disalienation as closely tied to decolonisation. For Fanon, recall, decolonisation is a struggle waged ‘on both levels’: working through both the objective (‘primarily, economic’) and subjective (‘subsequently, the internalization – or, better, the epidermalization – of this inferiority’) dimensions of alienation, through transformative collective and individual action.⁸⁶² Lu differentiates interactional, structural, and existential manifestations of alienation and its converse, reconciliation.⁸⁶³ These three distinctive forms can be mapped onto the Fanonian distinction that I first made in *2. Encountering the Other* between objective and subjective alienation and disalienation (which I also read in Rawls and Mills, who both draw on the same thought of Hegel and Marx, as I explain below).

Lu uses the same language of the ‘objective and subjective components’ of alienation and disalienation to reconstruct the concept of reconciliation as the ‘construction of a mutually affirmable and affirmed social/political order’.⁸⁶⁴ Lu defines existential reconciliation as disalienation from the ‘internal or self-alienation of agents that typically accompanies some forms of relational and structural alienation’.⁸⁶⁵ Lu’s conception of existential reconciliation therefore maps directly onto my Fanonian conception of subjective disalienation. Objective alienation and reconciliation are divided by Lu into interactional and structural subtypes, adapting Young’s analytic distinction between interactional and structural conceptions of injustice. This seems to me to be helpful, given that we both adopt and adapt Young’s conceptual framework for analysing

⁸⁶¹ Iris Marion Young, *Responsibility for Justice*, 187.

⁸⁶² Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, 4.

⁸⁶³ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 183, 188-193.

⁸⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 190.

⁸⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

colonial injustice, so I will continue to differentiate relational and structural subtypes of objective alienation and disalienation.

While Lu and I share some analytical frameworks, methods, and results, they perform different functions in our larger argument structures, and we reach different conclusions. For me, they function to decolonise post-Rawlsian analytic liberal cosmopolitanism, by helping me to theorise the conditions of possibility for a cosmopolitanism that enables a ‘mature reconciliation’. For Mills, this implies the transformation of ‘white moral psychology and consciousness’.⁸⁶⁶ I will argue that this is only part of the problem: the subjectivities of the oppressors and the oppressed both must be transformed, and the decolonisation struggle must be waged at once on both levels, subjective and objective (both interactional and structural subtypes), to achieve justice, truth, and reconciliation in world politics. We must reconcile with our social world, each other, and ourselves.

5.4. A premature reconciliation

In transitional contexts, agents bringing about the transition intentionally rupture with the tragic past through the public construction of transitional narratives and projects of collective memory and identity formation that divide political time into a “before” and “after”.⁸⁶⁷ For David Scott, liberal transitional justice discourse is an omen of a new global time-consciousness of catastrophe and ruin, and marks the epistemic and normative disavowal of the spirit of Bandung and revolutionary alternatives to the liberal capitalist form of life.⁸⁶⁸ From the side of the vanquished anti-imperialist revolutionaries, ‘what we are left with are *aftermaths* in which the present seems stricken with immobility and pain and ruin; a certain experience of temporal *afterness* prevails in which the trace of futures past hangs like the remnant of a voile curtain over what feels uncannily like an endlessly extending present’.⁸⁶⁹ The future-oriented politics of the 20th century have been,

⁸⁶⁶ Charles W. Mills, “Race and Global Justice”, 119.

⁸⁶⁷ Ruti G. Teitel, *Globalizing Transitional Justice*, 110.

⁸⁶⁸ David Scott, *Omens of Adversity*, 1-3.

⁸⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 6.

since the end of the Cold War, replaced with a past-oriented politics of ‘truth and reconciliation and its central idiom of “forgiveness”... for an age characterized by being stranded in the present’ – at the end of history.⁸⁷⁰ While liberal transitional justice theorists were focussed on injustices *past* after the Cold War ended, liberal cosmopolitan justice theorists were focussed on a *future* justice. These two liberal discourses had opposite orientations to time.

Anglo-American liberal cosmopolitans took the end of the Cold War and the triumph of liberal democracy and liberal international order to be a transitional phase, not an end state, in the realisation of a future liberal cosmopolitan order. The forward-looking cosmopolitan conceptions of global justice that they gave accounts of, however, failed to reckon with the interactional and structural injustices that created backward-looking problems of justice in the transitional context of constructing the New World Order after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the wider global historical context of the transition from colonial rule to independence in the Global South. They sought instead to realise a liberal cosmopolitan conception of global justice, the substance of which was up for debate, as I outlined in *1. Ka Hua te Marama*.

Analytic liberal cosmopolitans sought to realise Rawls through critiquing and extending his arguments. Yet, while they for the most part adopted Rawls’s *realistic utopianism*, they abandoned his internally related idea of *reconciliation*. They objected to Rawls’s argument for a duty of assistance on well-ordered peoples to aid societies burdened by unfavourable circumstances to transition to well-ordered regimes,⁸⁷¹ because Rawls’s institutionalist analysis of the poverty and prosperity of peoples was methodologically nationalistic, ignored normatively salient connections and relations between national contexts of justice, and the effects of the global basic structure on nations, as I explained previously in *4. Global Order as Subject*. Rawls’s non-ideal theoretical principles of transitional justice are internally connected to his fundamental ideas of realistic utopianism and political philosophy as reconciliation. What was lost by defending forward-looking cosmopolitan

⁸⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 14.

⁸⁷¹ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 89-90.

principles of global justice against Rawls's non-ideal theoretical transitional principles was the possibility of reconstructing the Rawlsian framework to respond to the backward-looking problems of justice in national and global transitional contexts of justice. This is a powerful way to normatively theorise rectifying historical wrongs, transforming the global order to end five centuries of white supremacy, and thereby achieving a mature reconciliation in world politics – and to make these arguments accessible to Anglo-American political philosophers.

Reconciliation must be conceived differently than it is in Rawls's left-liberal gloss on Hegel, however, if it is not to be premature. Rawls's fundamental idea is that 'political philosophy may try to calm our frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing us the way in which its institutions, when properly understood from a philosophical point of view, are rational, and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form'.⁸⁷² Rawls relates the fundamental idea of political philosophy as reconciliation to his method of realistic utopianism: 'probing the limits of practical possibility'.⁸⁷³ We become reconciled to actually existing forms of liberal democracy because we recognise that they, in their present, rational forms, contain within them the practical possibility of realising a future utopian form of liberal democracy.

In national contexts of justice, justice as fairness is meant to justify the basic structure of modern liberal democratic society to its subjects *qua* citizens, thereby guaranteeing its theoretical stability for the right reasons. Rawls argues that a modern liberal democratic society, because of the 'fact of reasonable pluralism', is not and cannot be a 'community', meaning, for Rawls, 'a body of persons united in affirming the same comprehensive, or partially comprehensive, doctrine'.⁸⁷⁴ On Rawls's account, traditional forms of identity and solidarity do not completely wither away with liberal capitalist modernity, but are enduring features of the social world. We become *subjectively alienated* because our modern personalities are split between our institutional identities

⁸⁷² John Rawls, *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*, 3.

⁸⁷³ *Ibid*, 4.

⁸⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 3.

and solidarities as mutually independent free and equal citizens in liberal democratic society and our non-institutional identities and solidarities as, *e.g.*, Muslims. Moreover, Rawls takes seriously Marx's critique of the ideological function possibly performed by the liberal democratic conception of mutually independent free and equal citizenship, of mystifying the 'will to dominate and oppressive cruelties, abetted by prejudice and folly', and thereby the *objective alienation* of oppressed, persecuted, excluded, expropriated, and exploited social classes and elements.⁸⁷⁵

For Rawls, we must be *reconciled* to our institutional identities as liberal democratic citizens, to the fact of modern pluralism, and to the freestanding politically liberal conception of justice that will regulate the basic structure, from the perspectives of a plurality of non-institutional identities and solidarities.⁸⁷⁶ The political conceptions of the citizen, of the basic structure as the subject of justice, and of a well-ordered society, are enough, *ex hypothesi*, to limit pluralism to what is *reasonable*, and it is the mere fact of reasonable pluralism that matters. Through the *public use of reason* to construct a political conception of justice that rationally justifies the practices and institutions of liberal democracy, we can become reconciled to, or objectively and subjectively disalienated from, actual liberal democratic societies.⁸⁷⁷

Relying on a 'thin theory of the good', Rawls claims that rational and reasonable citizens would accept liberal principles of justice that prioritise the right over the good by creating and preserving background conditions that permit all citizens to each live out their freely chosen rational life plans, informed by their comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrines. By attaining a *wide reflective equilibrium* for each person through the construction procedure, the resulting freestanding political conception of justice as fairness and our political identities as free and equal citizens can be understood not as alien to their own reasoning, imposed from without, but as the extension of each persons' comprehensive religious, moral, or philosophical doctrine.⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 3-4, 37-38.

⁸⁷⁶ *Ibid.* 5-12, 22-23.

⁸⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 3.

⁸⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 33.

This durable unity out of reasonable pluralism is termed a *stable overlapping consensus*.⁸⁷⁹ In a society that obtains a stable overlapping consensus about the freestanding conception of justice, ‘not only is there a public point of view from which all citizens can adjudicate their claims, but also this point of view is mutually recognized as affirmed by them all in *full reflective equilibrium*’.⁸⁸⁰ For Rawls, such a liberal society is not (yet) actual, but the best we can reasonably hope for: a *realistic utopia*.⁸⁸¹ Its possibility is immanent within actually existing modern, pluralistic, liberal democratic societies, and recognising this possibility reconciles us, here and now, to our non-ideal social world.

The fundamental ideas of realistic utopianism and reconciliation are made more explicit by Rawls in *The Law of Peoples* as motive and method. In its minor backward-looking dimension, the *Law of Peoples* aims to end the ‘great evils of human history’ that result from political injustice, and in its major forward-looking dimension, it aims to establish just basic structures by liberal and decent peoples for ordering national and international societies.⁸⁸² This constitutes for Rawls a realistic utopia in world politics that, unlike for Kant, Hegel, and Marx, is a non-metaphysical end of history in the sense that it is *possible* but not *necessary* – ‘It establishes that such a world can exist somewhere and at some time, but not that it must be, or will be’.⁸⁸³ This possibility of realising a future minimal conception of global justice is sufficient to reconcile us to the world, insofar as its possibility is ‘not a mere logical possibility, but one that connects with the deep tendencies and inclinations of the social world’⁸⁸⁴ – reality ‘meets it halfway’, Habermas would say. By illuminating the feasibility of a just and well-ordered world society, political philosophy helps to reconcile us to the world by providing us with ‘a long-term goal of political endeavour’, that by working towards it ‘gives meaning to what we can do today’ – Kant’s ‘reasonable hope’.⁸⁸⁵

⁸⁷⁹ *Ibid*, §11.

⁸⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 31.

⁸⁸¹ *Ibid*.

⁸⁸² John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 6-7, 126.

⁸⁸³ *Ibid*, 127.

⁸⁸⁴ *Ibid*, 128.

⁸⁸⁵ *Ibid*.

Reconciliation in world politics has two limitations, Rawls argues. The first of these is that secular and religious fundamentalists of various doctrines (including sectarian liberalism) cannot be reconciled to Rawls's *politically liberal* realistic utopia because they cannot tolerate the fact of reasonable pluralism in both domestic and world politics. The second is that because it makes the world safe for liberal democracy, Rawls's realistic utopia, by upholding the equal freedom of both liberal and decent societies (recall, these include common good societies governed by religious and communitarian conceptions of justice), permits that citizens of liberal democratic societies may lead vicious lives, suffer misfortune and isolation, and be anguished by a deeper form of spiritual alienation from their human nature and from God.⁸⁸⁶

Rawls's framing of the problem of alienation that his forward-looking, realistically utopian conception of justice tries to solve in terms of reasonable pluralism excludes another relevant kind of alienation. This is that kind of alienation experienced by the enslaved and colonised and their decedents as the traumatic loss of identity, severance of connections with the people and the land, cultural and epistemic genocide, and as subordination, expropriation, and exploitation. In Rawls's own sociohistorical context, Indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans were forcibly included into liberal democratic white settler colonial state-societies into subordinate subject positions for the purpose of being expropriated and exploited, and excluded from free and equal citizenship. Indigenous peoples, enslaved Africans, and their descendants thus have objective reason to be subjectively alienated from liberal democratic citizenship.⁸⁸⁷ Their subjective alienation is based on their objective alienation – their colonisation and enslavement, the expropriation and exploitation of their property in the land and water or in their bodies and labour, and their removal from their native territories and homelands across oceans and continents.

The subject positions of contemporary Indigenous peoples and the decedents of enslaved Africans have improved in some respects and worsened in others within the basic structure of the

⁸⁸⁶ *Ibid*, 126-127.

⁸⁸⁷ *C.f.* Stephen Winter, "Legitimacy, Citizenship and State Redress", 803.

liberal democratic white settler colonial state-society. They remain subordinated and vulnerable to structural injustices – state and non-state violence; dispossession; impoverishment; exploitation; incarceration; welfare intervention; child removal; state abuse; housing deprivation; ghettoisation; physical and mental health issues; inaccessible, unaffordable healthcare; substance abuse; suicide; lower life expectancy; maternal, perinatal, and infant mortality; educational deficits; miseducation; segregation; exposure to pollution, environmental hazards, and climate change impacts – *and so on*. Reflection on the basic structure of the liberal democratic white settler colonial state-society reveals not its rationality but its injustice. Rawls does not assume that actual liberal democracies are ideal,⁸⁸⁸ only that the possibility of realising political liberalism is immanent. Recognition that this utopia is a realistic prospect reconciles us to actuality, but does not resign us to its injustices, *ex hypothesi*. Rather, liberal democracy gives us an end to make progress towards. But this is not sufficient to disalienate Indigenous peoples and the descendants of enslaved Africans, for whom the problem is one of backward-looking justice – of transitioning *from* an unjust and unworthy status quo.

Reconciliation, from the positionality of Indigenous peoples in settler colonial contexts, cannot be determined *in advance* to constitute their legitimisation of the liberal democratic state and identification with liberal democratic citizenship as the subjects of its sovereignty over a colonised territory and population.⁸⁸⁹ There is a danger that discourses of reconciliation can ‘work as a project of neocolonial affirmation’, Courtney Jung argues.⁸⁹⁰

There are reasons to believe that reconciliation will look more like adaptation and integration into the status quo than a transformation of the status quo. At its worst, it may mean that Indigenous people will be enabled, or compelled, to reconcile themselves to existing realities.⁸⁹¹

As Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang explain, the desire to reconcile on the part of the settler is ‘just as relentless as the desire to disappear the Native; it is a desire to not have to deal with this (Indian)

⁸⁸⁸ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 75.

⁸⁸⁹ Courtney Jung, “Reconciliation: Six Reasons to Worry”, *Journal of Global Ethics*, 14:2 (2018): 256-257.

⁸⁹⁰ *Ibid*, 262.

⁸⁹¹ *Ibid*, 254.

problem anymore'.⁸⁹² For example, former New Zealand Prime Minister John Key explained the motivation of the National Party's 2008 election campaign pledge to conclude 'full and final' Treaty settlements by 2014 thus: 'We are impatient to stop looking in the rear-view mirror at grievances past, and to instead shift our eyes to the challenges of our shared future as New Zealanders'.⁸⁹³

There is a pathological desire on the part of the settler population to unite and order the reconciled political community under an ahistorical forward-looking conception of justice based on liberal ideals of individualism and formal equality by resolving the legitimization problems raised in white settler colonial contexts by historical wrongs of colonisation and slavery. This limited view of justice, truth, and reconciliation in settler colonial contexts as the rectification of historical wrongs is premature and incomplete without structural transformation, however, which involves backward-looking and forward-looking problems of justice. For example, the Treaty settlement process in New Zealand, with a total value of only \$2.2 billion, does little to address and rectify the structural issues of systematic violations of the Treaty and human rights of Māori and the structural and institutional racism that is endemic to our society and government.⁸⁹⁴

Conceptually, the process of reconciliation as subjective and objective disalienation from the alienation caused by interactional and structural injustices, 'does not need to presuppose a fixed account of a morally ideal social/political order' that is to be the end-state of transition, Lu argues.⁸⁹⁵ This contrasts with Rawls, for whom non-ideal theory presupposes an ideal theory of justice, at least in outline, to determine which 'policies and courses of action that are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective' for solving the problems of realising the ideal.⁸⁹⁶ Rawls, by ignoring colonialism, fails to see how presupposing a liberal ideal

⁸⁹² Eve Tuck and Wayne Yang, "Decolonization is Not a Metaphor", *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education, and Society*, 1:1 (2012): 9.

⁸⁹³ John Key, "Beyond Grievance – Waitangi Day Speech 2010", <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/beyond-grievance-waitangi-day-speech-2010>

⁸⁹⁴ Margaret Mutu, "Behind the smoke and mirrors of the Treaty of Waitangi claims settlement process in New Zealand: no prospect for justice and reconciliation for Māori without constitutional transformation", *Journal of Global Ethics*, 14:2 (2018): 208-209.

⁸⁹⁵ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 193.

⁸⁹⁶ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 90.

of justice makes a mature reconciliation *impossible* in transitional contexts like ours. Lu characterises reconciliation as ongoing engagement in ‘open-ended, meaningful, and respectful struggle for a mutually affirmed social/political order’.⁸⁹⁷ In the contemporary context of Aotearoa New Zealand, for example, justice, truth, and reconciliation demand an open-ended dialogue, based on the *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* and UNDRIP, about constitutional transformation that is not foreclosed by taking as given the legitimacy of the liberal democratic settler colonial state and the Westminster constitutional order,⁸⁹⁸ and which is serious about ending two hundred years of structural and institutional racism. The project of reconciliation is not one of resolving the legitimisation crises of settler colonial liberal democracies.

Rawls likewise fails to theorise the conditions of a mature reconciliation in world politics in *The Law of Peoples* because he does not theoretically integrate the global history of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide. The problem of reconciliation in global context is again framed as one of *pluralism*, as it was in the domestic context. Rawls argues that members of the Society of Peoples have a duty toward societies burdened by unfavourable circumstances of justice to assist them to become well-ordered, and that this duty does not imply transitioning all burdened societies to liberal democracy. It is sufficient for admission to the Society of Peoples that burdened societies become well-ordered by developing liberal *or decent* institutions comprising their basic structure. (This nod to realism would be met with approval by our imagined critic in 5.2.) Further, Rawls defends pluralism in world politics by arguing that forms of life are inherently valuable, and that liberal peoples should ‘try to encourage decent peoples and not frustrate their vitality by coercively insisting that all societies be liberal’.⁸⁹⁹ Interventionism is only justified, *ex hypothesi*, in outlaw states to end violations of Rawls’s limited list of human rights.⁹⁰⁰

⁸⁹⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸⁹⁸ Moana Jackson and Margaret Mutu, *He Whakaaro Here Whakaunumu Mō Aotearoa: The Report of Matike Mai Aotearoa – The Independent Working Group on Constitutional Transformation*. Auckland: The University of Auckland and National Iwi Chairs Forum, 2016. <https://nwo.org.nz/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/MatikeMaiAotearoa25Jan16.pdf>

⁸⁹⁹ John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 62.

⁹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 81.

Rawls avoided the complex and intractable problems of backward-looking justice that arise in transitional contexts, especially under exceptional circumstances. Rawls's forward-looking transitional principle of justice in the context of burdened societies is ahistorical, as is his general transitional principle of just savings, of which the duty of assistance is a special case. The principle of just savings concerns the accumulation of capital and the development of human capabilities, knowledge, and technology necessary for the development and maintenance of just institutions. Once just institutions are 'firmly established', the net capital accumulation required falls to zero, and the end of society as a fair system of social cooperation becomes the maintenance of the material base and just institutions.⁹⁰¹ The principle of just savings is one of transition, for Rawls, insofar as it is the transition from a dynamic stage of political development to a static stage, which he models on Mill's steady-state political economy.⁹⁰² This is a forward-looking conception of justice in transitional contexts, concerned with what we are transitioning *to*, not transitioning *from*. It does not concern Rawls that in his own context, for example, the growth and development of the United States was the product of colonial territorial expansion and slave labour. Rawls, recall from 4. *Global Order as Subject*, explains the circumstances of burdened societies by endogenous factors, not by exogenous factors such as the decimation of Africa's population by the slave trade, or the destruction of India's textile industry, or the ongoing effects of the global institutional order.

When we focus on the backward-looking problems that arise from the circumstances in contexts of transitions from colonialism, then our understanding of the forward-looking problems of transitioning to a well-ordered society is transformed – and thus the problems of reconciliation. In reconciled well-ordered societies, individuals may be related by the solidarist categories of religion, nationality, tribe, community, or family, and not by the individualist category of mutually independent liberal democratic citizenship. Liberal cosmopolitans might object that this is potentially too tolerant of oppressive forms of life. Decolonial theorists are acutely aware that

⁹⁰¹ John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 285-287.

⁹⁰² John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 107-108.

‘there are internal relations of power, as in any society, that exclude, marginalize, and silence some while empowering others’.⁹⁰³ In the struggle to end apartheid, for example, the self-understanding of Nelson Mandela was one of reviving Indigenous African ethical and political traditions under ‘the demands of the present epoch’, which implied reconstructing their egalitarian principles.⁹⁰⁴ The difference with Rawls is that the notion of a *decent society* depoliticises the backward-looking and forward-looking problems of transitional justice, whereas the notion of a *decolonised society* politicises the processes of justice, truth, and reconciliation.

We cannot, in theory or practice, achieve a mature reconciliation through political philosophy, but only through actual open-ended dialogue of equals and struggles for objective and subjective disalienation. This consensual and conciliatory dialogue is made problematic by the subjective alienation of subjects and entire peoples whose ‘social and moral frames have been disrupted, and even rendered inoperable or unintelligible’, through historical processes of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide.⁹⁰⁵ Lu argues that:

Understanding the project of reconciliation as involving genuine communication assumes that the agents involved in the dialogue have the capacity to exercise authentic agency. *But if Indigenous peoples are leading inauthentic lives, then whatever reconciliation is achieved will be illusory.* Instead of signaling genuine social unity, dialogues of reconciliation could signal only resignation and dependency. Such reconciliation cannot be considered progressive, and may even amount to a form of false consciousness as well as continued internalized oppression and alienation.⁹⁰⁶

Subjective disalienation is a precondition for consensual and conciliatory dialogue on Lu’s account because when objectively and subjectively alienated subjects and peoples struggle for justice, truth, and reconciliation, their identities, perceived interests, and conceptions of justice may reproduce structural injustices and global coloniality.⁹⁰⁷

⁹⁰³ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, “On Tricky Ground: Researching the Native in the Age of Uncertainty”, 86.

⁹⁰⁴ Nelson Mandela, “Black Man in a White Court (1962)”, accessed 10 September 2019.

https://www.un.org/en/events/mandeladay/court_statement_1962.shtml

⁹⁰⁵ Catherine Lu, “Decolonizing Borders, Self-Determination, and Global Justice”, in *Empire, Race, and Global Justice*, ed. Duncan Bell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 269.

⁹⁰⁶ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 205. My italics.

⁹⁰⁷ *Ibid*, 279.

The process of justice, truth, and reconciliation through open-ended dialogue may itself be distorted by the West's normative and epistemic hegemony. As the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada explains, reconciliation is an ongoing process of establishing and maintaining respectful relationships.

A critical part of this process involves repairing damaged trust by making apologies, providing individual and collective reparations, and following through with concrete actions that demonstrate real societal change. Establishing respectful relationships also requires the revitalization of Indigenous law and legal traditions. *It is important that all Canadians understand how traditional First Nations, Inuit, and Métis approaches to resolving conflict, repairing harm, and restoring relationships can inform the reconciliation process.*⁹⁰⁸

If the procedures of justice, truth, and reconciliation are Eurocentric, then the substance of justice, truth, and reconciliation that are the outcomes of these procedures will only reproduce colonialism. Krushil Watene, for example, drawing on Māori conceptual frameworks, emphasises the individual and collective activity of healing from intergenerational trauma. Beyond dialogues with the settler colonial state-society about justice, truth, and reconciliation, objective and subjective disalienation *as healing* involves reconstructing Indigenous subjectivities and forms of life that survived cultural and epistemic genocides, developing individual and collective capabilities, reconnecting with each other and nature, and living flourishing lives together in our human and natural environments.⁹⁰⁹ Lu is mistaken about the order and sequencing of the process of disalienation, however, when she argues that disalienation is a necessary precondition for the participation of alienated subjects in 'genuine communication about global justice and reconciliation' with each other and the world.⁹¹⁰ If we are to realise justice, truth, and reconciliation, then there is no alternative but to start from where we are now: *alienated* from ourselves, from each other, from our world – and from God. Starting from our current subject positions requires working through non-ideal theoretical issues of epistemic injustice.

⁹⁰⁸ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, *Canada's Residential Schools: Reconciliation*, 2015, 11.

http://www.trc.ca/assets/pdf/Volume_6_Reconciliation_English_Web.pdf

⁹⁰⁹ Krushil Watene "Indigenous Peoples and Justice", 138-145.

⁹¹⁰ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 277.

5.5. Global epistemic injustice

According to Miranda Fricker, who coined the term epistemic injustice, there are two kinds of epistemic injustice that distort the epistemic practices of a community: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. The central case of testimonial injustice occurs when a hearer discounts the credibility of a person's testimony due to a group-based prejudice against her social identity.⁹¹¹

Hermeneutical injustice occurs when subordinate social groups are at a harmful and wrongful structural epistemic disadvantage in relation to dominant social groups who are structurally privileged in the creation of social meaning. Hermeneutical injustices prevent subordinated groups and individuals within a community of language and practice from accessing the interpretive resources they need to *make sense* of critical aspects of the suffering or injustice they experience.⁹¹²

As Mills argues, 'concepts are crucial to cognition... they help us to categorize, learn, remember, infer, explain, problem-solve, generalize, analogize', while conversely, 'the *lack* of appropriate concepts can hinder learning, interfere with memory, block inferences, obstruct explanation, and perpetuate problems'.⁹¹³ Hermeneutical injustice is structural in the sense that no agent is individually responsible for perpetrating it. The agencies involved in producing and reproducing epistemic injustices are complex and distributed.

Both species of epistemic injustice are ultimately produced because of the prejudicial group identity-based marginalisation of subordinated social groups from meaning-making activities. Fricker's conception of *social power* is 'a practical socially situated capacity to control others' actions, where this capacity may be exercised (actively or passively) by particular social agents, or, alternatively, it may operate purely structurally'.⁹¹⁴ *Identity power* is the primary form of social power, exercised by members of dominant groups over members of subordinated groups based on shared conceptions or schemas of social identity. These shared meanings structure our social relations,

⁹¹¹ Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 28.

⁹¹² *Ibid.*, 158-159.

⁹¹³ Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract*, 6-7.

⁹¹⁴ Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Justice*, 13.

norms, practices, and institutions, and are internalised by subjects in our embodied habits and patterns of thinking, feeling, acting, seeing, hearing, and communicating through our socialisation. But where there is power there is resistance, and this comes to the consciousness of subordinated subjects as the experience of dissonance, which leads to conceptual innovation.⁹¹⁵

Epistemic injustice is ubiquitous in the global context of colonialism. Rajeev Bhargava argues that epistemic injustice occurs when ‘the concepts and categories by which a people understand themselves and their world is replaced or adversely affected by the concepts and categories of the colonizers’.⁹¹⁶ The critical-hermeneutical resources of Indigenous peoples and enslaved Africans were destroyed or distorted by state-sanctioned cultural and epistemic genocides and through the control techniques of European slave traders and owners breaking in slaves.⁹¹⁷ Indigenous and African cultures have partially survived and adapted to conditions of repression in white settler colonial contexts, which targeted subjects’ identities; languages; institutions; laws; traditions; religions; values; customs; habits; memories; knowledges; arts; objects; social and material structures; and relations constituting collective forms of life. As Pogge argues, ‘the North Atlantic states have, rather brutally, imposed a single global system of military and economic competition, destroying in the process the social systems Indigenous to four continents’.⁹¹⁸ So it is difficult to imagine how, from our current starting point, a real dialogue of equals is possible.

Bhargava’s framing of the problem highlights not only the *destruction* of Indigenous critical-hermeneutical resources, but their *replacement* with hegemonic concepts. Western world ordering, and the Western academic disciplines that are complicit in the project, create understandings of

⁹¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 167-168. Another open possibility, in reference to Fricker’s example, is that conceptual innovations to supply missing hermeneutic resources may also interfere violently with the ontogenetic process of subject formation – e.g., by misidentifying with or fixating upon characteristically transient desiderative element of the soul, or, (postmetaphysically stated) certain sexual behavioural habits or practices, or by arresting the youth’s moral-cognitive development by failing to sublimate and civilise his desires (learning to delay its gratification, correct its object, subject his behaviour to law, prioritise competing desires or higher order ends, or direct it toward good activities).

⁹¹⁶ Rajeev Bhargava, “Overcoming the Epistemic Injustice of Colonialism”, *Global Policy*, 4:4 (2013): 414.

⁹¹⁷ Albert J. Raboteau, *Slave Religion: The Invisible Institution in the Antebellum South* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 43-92.

⁹¹⁸ Thomas Pogge, “Rawls and Global Justice”, 247.

our social world that, insofar as they reflect hegemonic perspectives, are ill-fitted to rendering intelligible and communicating the lived experiences of the oppressed, to themselves, each other, and to their oppressors, putting the oppressed at a structural epistemic disadvantage. José Medina argues that even in adverse hermeneutical contexts, there are nascent conceptual innovations and struggles to make sense of ‘negative experiences of suffering that are silenced’ as well as ‘positive experiences and life-affirming situations’ for oneself and others.⁹¹⁹ These include the innovative decolonial concept of modernity/coloniality or the concept of global white supremacy originating with Black radical tradition and critical race theory, which help us to make sense of the deeper levels of global order that are obfuscated by idealising abstractions, like ‘liberal international order’, ‘good governance’, and ‘state failure’, which reflect hegemonic perspectives and serve hegemonic racial, national, and transnational class interests.

Mills argues that when we apply the concepts of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice to global white supremacy, both varieties are mutually reinforcing: ‘a general skepticism about nonwhite cognition and an exclusion from accepted discourse of nonwhite categories and frameworks of analysis’.⁹²⁰ Racialised subjects and their critical-hermeneutical resources will be ‘denied credibility and the alternative viewpoints that could be developed from taking their perspective seriously will be rejected as a priori wrong’.⁹²¹ The tradition of the oppressed is refused entry ‘into the legitimized realm of political philosophy’.⁹²² If political philosophers, in working out the content of the public reason of world society – its ideas, principles, and standards – exclude these normative resources then the communicative interactions of a plurality of communities, each with their own contextual reasoning practices, then their results will be superficial, and not conducive to a mature reconciliation.⁹²³ This is the biggest problem with Rawls’s *Law of Peoples*.

⁹¹⁹ José Medina, “Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities”, *Social Epistemology*, 26:2 (2012): 209.

⁹²⁰ Charles W. Mills (2015) “Global White Ignorance”, 222.

⁹²¹ *Ibid.*

⁹²² Charles W. Mills, “Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy”, 10.

⁹²³ C.f. John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples*, 57.

The conditions of possibility for ‘a real dialogue of equals’, Mills argues include first, the ‘rethinking of familiar categories’, such as modernity, liberal international order, or cosmopolitanism, ‘in the light of their imperial genealogy’, second, ‘the admission of new categories’ such as global white supremacy and global coloniality, ‘that illuminate structures of domination not registered in the official lexicon’, and ‘the complicating of standard narratives’, which exhibit colonial amnesia.⁹²⁴

Medina thus argues that more deeply pluralistic account of hermeneutical injustice than Fricker’s is needed, which is capable of accounting for the ‘communicative dynamics of a plurality of publics that are internally heterogeneous and contain multiple voices and perspectives’ and differential access to interpretive resources and practices of reasoning.⁹²⁵ Medina, following Mills, argues for an expanded conception of hermeneutic injustice by reflecting on *white ignorance* – viz. ‘the kind of hermeneutical *inability* of privileged white subjects to recognize and make sense of their racial identities, experiences, and positionality in a racialized world’.⁹²⁶ This kind of case is quite difficult for Fricker’s conceptualisation of hermeneutical injustice. White ignorance explains the ways in which dominant social groups are made cognitively dysfunctional by the very social meanings they create, and by the lacunae in collective hermeneutical resources. Medina agrees with Fricker’s restriction of hermeneutical injustices to cases where epistemic disadvantages are not only ‘harmful but also wrongful’.⁹²⁷ White ignorance is harmful and wrongful, but not to the epistemically disadvantaged white subjects. Rather, the hermeneutical harms are wrongful to social groups that are systematically subordinated and pervasively negatively impacted by the global system of racial oppression, white supremacy, which white ignorance is integral to reproducing.

Fricker responds that white ignorance, as a motivated cognitive bias, is ‘clearly a wrongful epistemic dysfunction’, but argues that for conceptual clarity and analytical rigour, white ignorance

⁹²⁴ Charles W. Mills, “Decolonizing Western Political Philosophy”, 23.

⁹²⁵ José Medina, “Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism”, 202.

⁹²⁶ *Ibid.* My italics.

⁹²⁷ *Ibid.*, 213. Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Justice*, 151.

should not be categorised as a hermeneutical injustice.⁹²⁸ White ignorance is best understood as a ‘neighbouring category of injustice within the epistemic’.⁹²⁹ However, there seems to me to be no good reason to decide in advance that the ‘central case of hermeneutic injustice’ is the one where ‘relations of unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experiences, whereas the powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social experiences through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in the effort to render them intelligible’.⁹³⁰ Perhaps both oppressor and oppressed are epistemically disadvantaged, and neither have appropriate understandings of their experiences. And perhaps this situation for the oppressor becomes even more acute when the oppressed innovate the hermeneutical resources they need to explain and transform the world, or revive Indigenous forms of life and languages, and the oppressor can *no longer understand* the world they thought they had created in their image.

Fricker’s examples come from the history of the (white) women’s movement in the advanced capitalist Western countries. This choice of examples is obvious for a leading theorist of analytical feminist social epistemology. However, if the very exercise we are engaged in by theorising hermeneutical injustice is making sense of the lacuna in our conceptual scheme in analytic philosophy where the concept of hermeneutical injustice should be,⁹³¹ then there is a practical contradiction in defining the category in a way that marginalises other examples of epistemic injustice against racialised and colonised subjects, involving the inability to make sense of ourselves and our social world to ourselves and others, and thus belonging to the category of the hermeneutical, that have an equal *prima facie* claim to be paradigmatic.

⁹²⁸ Miranda Fricker, “How is hermeneutical injustice related to ‘white ignorance’? Reply to José Medina’s ‘Hermeneutical Injustice and Polyphonic Contextualism: Social Silences and Shared Hermeneutical Responsibilities’”, *Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective* 2:8 (2013): 50.

⁹²⁹ *Ibid*, 53.

⁹³⁰ Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Justice*, 148.

⁹³¹ *C.f.* Gail Pohlhouse Jr., “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a Theory of ‘Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance’”, *Hypatia*, 27:4 (2012): 724.

Moreover, Fricker's example of sexual harassment that filled the lacuna in the shared hermeneutical resources of men and women in the past, from which she builds her central case of hermeneutic injustice, may actually better approximate the analytical structure of white ignorance. As Fricker herself points out, 'harasser and harassee alike are cognitively handicapped by the hermeneutical lacuna – neither has a proper understanding of how he is treating her – but the harasser's cognitive disablement is not a significant disadvantage to him. *Indeed, there is an obvious sense in which it suits his purpose*'.⁹³² Quite rightly, Fricker argues that the disadvantaged epistemic position that the harassee, and women generally, are put in constitutes an epistemic injustice, and the cognitive dysfunction of the harasser, and men generally, *is not an epistemic injustice against him* (but it is an intellectual component of the vice of injustice *qua* character trait, we might think). Fricker goes on to claim, plausibly, that our 'interpretive efforts are naturally geared to interests'.⁹³³

Re-examining Fricker's example of sexual harassment brings into question Fricker's formulation of the central case of hermeneutical injustice as that in which the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their experiences. The definitional contest between Fricker and her friendly critics, like Medina and Mills, is resolvable. Fricker claims that hermeneutical injustice is a 'purely structural notion' insofar as no agent is the perpetrator and is individually responsible for its occurrence.⁹³⁴ The general idea of a purely structural notion is implausible, and the specific case of the lacuna in our conceptual scheme for sexual harassment in the recent past is surely better understood, in Fricker's own terms, as the internalised norms of gender relations and roles in Western societies that are embodied in habits and patterns of thinking, feeling, acting, seeing, hearing, and communicating through negative socialisation processes. This would follow from Young's non-ideal theorisation of the (re)production of structural injustices as *recursive*.

⁹³² *Ibid*, 151. Emphasis added.

⁹³³ *Ibid*, 152.

⁹³⁴ *Ibid*, 159.

Boys are socialised into sexually predatory behaviour and other traits of toxic masculinity (a new and useful critical-hermeneutical resource) and both boys and girls are socialised endorsing stereotypical gender norms.⁹³⁵ This was/is *normal* and *normalising*, and therefore boys and the men they become may not be motivated to challenge harmful gender norms such as sexual predation.⁹³⁶ The understanding of structures as recursive, and the attention to processes of subject formation under unequal social relations that it entails, coheres better with Fricker's later, and much more interesting claim that the 'primary harm of hermeneutical injustice, then, is to be understood not only in terms of the subject's being unfairly disadvantaged by some collective hermeneutical lacuna, but also in terms of the very construction (constitutive and/or causal) of selfhood'.⁹³⁷ Hermeneutical injustice is structural insofar as no agent is responsible for perpetrating it. But the effects of power on our embodied dispositions and practices, affective investments and desires, and our identities, explain conservative epistemic tendencies such as *motivated ignorance*.

Privileged epistemic agents, *ex hypothesi*, continually and culpably will not enter into egalitarian epistemic relations with subordinated subjects, are unwilling to do the work of learning from alternative hermeneutic resources or unlearning one's own, or exploit subordinated subjects rather than doing the hard work of unlearning for oneself,⁹³⁸ and are unwilling to cultivate the corrective virtues of epistemic justice.⁹³⁹ The powerful willingly fail to even reflexively identify our social biases and privileges because of our psychic investments and material interests in preserving hegemonic whiteness and masculinity. The result is a tendency for inegalitarian social relations to be reproduced, and resistance resisted. Because of *epistemic vice*, particularly motivated ignorance, inegalitarian social relations tend to be reproduced, and counterhegemonic epistemic struggles

⁹³⁵ Anna Kågesten *et. al.*, "Understanding Factors that Shape Gender Attitudes in Early Adolescence Globally: A Mixed-Methods Systematic Review", *PLoS One*, 11:6 (2016): 1-36.

⁹³⁶ Avni Amin *et. al.*, "Addressing Gender Socialization and Masculinity Norms Among Adolescent Boys: Policy and Programmatic Implications", *Journal of Adolescent Health*, 62:3 (2018): S3-S5.

⁹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 168.

⁹³⁸ Nora Berenstain, "Epistemic Exploitation", *Ergo*, 3:22 (2016): 569-590.

⁹³⁹ Gail Pohlhouse Jr., "Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice", 724.

– counterframing, countermemory, counterarchives, and counternarratives – and non-Western conceptions of justice and order, tend to be resisted, ridiculed, and ruled out, or wilfully ignored.

As Lu argues, pursuing the political project of objective and subjective disalienation from each other and our world simultaneously is therefore fraught with danger. For agents whose ‘identities and beliefs about themselves, others, and the world are called into question in the process of decolonization may experience a subjective sense of alienation’.

While redressing the morally objectionable alienation of the oppressed is demanded by the obligation to rectify structural injustice, we should also care about the subjective alienation of those who may feel threatened by structural change, mainly because the stability and sustainability of progressive structural transformation depends upon strategies of immanent and external forms of critique and self-reflection that can reorient those whose alienation stems from the repudiation of problematic identities, beliefs, norms, and other social structures. To the extent that these problematic identities, beliefs, norms and practices persist, *the possibility of genuine communication and the durability of structural change may be undermined*.⁹⁴⁰

As Sartre argues, ‘we too, peoples of Europe, we are being decolonized: meaning the colonist inside every one of us is surgically extracted in a bloody operation. Let’s take a good look at ourselves, if we have the courage, and let’s see what has become of us’.⁹⁴¹ *Unsettling whiteness* is a necessary part of the decolonisation process.

Because Lu theorises disalienated subjectivities as a normative ideal, she overlooks that in transitional contexts, becoming alienated from our oppressor/oppressed subjectivities is necessary for disalienation. Disalienation is initially alienating, and may heighten and intensify repressed social conflicts and the premature reconciliations of the past that were based on a formal or informal ‘pact of forgetting’ and national silences, by ‘stirring up bones’, and by raising the dead.⁹⁴² In *Argument and Change in World Politics*, Neta C. Crawford analyses this kind of subjective alienation brought on by dialogue as *denormalisation*, which is necessary for rendering problematic structures and subjectivities problematic to subjects for whom they are considered to be normal and good.⁹⁴³

⁹⁴⁰ Catherine Lu, “Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Social Transformation”, *Ethics & Global Politics*, 11:1 (2018): 55-56. My italics.

⁹⁴¹ Sartre, “Preface” to *The Wretched of the Earth*, lvii.

⁹⁴² Almudena Carracedo, “No more silence: Franco’s victims raise their voices”, *The Observer*. 20 October 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/film/2018/oct/20/no-more-silence-my-mission-to-let-franco-victims-be-heard>

⁹⁴³ Neta C. Crawford, *Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 101-102.

Lu warns that authentic dialogue can also be subjectively alienating for oppressed subjects. Communication can be systematically distorted by the material and psychic investments of colonised and racialised subjects in nationalist narratives of victimhood and innocence, for whom acknowledging the complex and distributed agencies involved in the production and reproduction of colonial injustices can be ‘deeply unsettling and disorienting’. Lu argues that a normative and critical structural analysis of past and present structural injustice cannot sustain a simplistic moral division of empires and colonies into perpetrators and victims.⁹⁴⁴

If a new politics of mutual respect is the goal of those societies sharing a colonial past – as colonizer or colonized – it will only be born through a painful labor that forsakes ancestors, avoids soothingly self-serving narratives, and faces the unpleasant, humbling, and complicated, but agency-sensitive and thus potentially liberating, truths revealed by understanding the many faces of colonial structural injustice.⁹⁴⁵

Divisions and intermediates exist within these binary oppositions. Social classes, elements and individual subjects are positioned differently within colonial structures. For example, colonial elites may use their privileged position and resources to dominate their conationals, and colonised and racialised men may dominate colonised and racialised women, just as rich whites may dominate poor whites, and white men may dominate white women in Western state-societies. Some classes, elements, and individual subjects materially benefit from the wealth and power dividends of colonialism, and some tribes or nations may attain levels of status, power, wealth, and security over their historical rivals under colonialism. Grave wrongs may have been perpetrated by national heroes, ruling parties, families, tribes, *etc.*, against their conationals in the decolonisation struggle. This transitional state of alienation is a necessary precondition of justice, truth and a sublimated or mature reconciliation. Even if we are internally at peace, oppressor and oppressed subjectivities are objectively alienating. This is the *negative peace* of living an untrue, unjust, and unreconciled life. Resolving repressed internal and external conflict enables a higher order subjective disalienation.

⁹⁴⁴ Catherine Lu, *Justice and Reconciliation in World Politics*, 130.

⁹⁴⁵ *Ibid*, 142.

Like Fanon, we should have a healthy degree of scepticism about the emancipatory potential of rational argument in world politics, and not be naïve about reality. Oppressed subjects are ‘far less sanguine about the benefits of dialogue’ with their oppressors.⁹⁴⁶ A real dialogue of equals and forms of coalitional collective action that include allied elements of powerful and structurally advantaged groups who are willing and able to do the work of decolonisation are necessary for structural transformation in subnational, national, international, transnational, and global transitional contexts. This involves navigating the ambiguous and dangerous spaces in and beyond the liberal state-society complex, like museums, universities, schools, libraries, archives, cities, media organisations, publishers, galleries, international non-governmental organisations (Amnesty, Greenpeace, Oxfam, *etc.*), charities, religious organisations, national and regional human rights institutions, bureaucracies, agencies, local government, courts, federal and regional bodies, and, above all, the United Nations. The appropriate conclusion is that decolonised cosmopolitan dialogue and scholarly mutual learning processes about the past, the present, and the post-Western, post-secular future of world ordering are necessary, but insufficient – possible, but limited – strategies for decolonisation as subjective and objective disalienation.

5.8. Conclusion

In September 2019, *Rumors of War*, a statue by artist Kehinde Wiley, was unveiled in New York, before it was transferred to Richmond, Virginia. There it will stand permanently in front of the Virginia Museum of Fine Arts. The museum, which commissioned the work, is located only blocks away from a collection of statues of Confederate generals on Monument Avenue. *Rumors of War* inverts the legacy of Confederate imagery and celebrates the aesthetics of the black male body.⁹⁴⁷

⁹⁴⁶ Patricia Hill Collins, “Critical Interventions in Western Social Theory”, 145-146.

⁹⁴⁷ Philip Kennicott, “With a brass band blaring, artist Kehinde Wiley goes off to war with Confederate statues”, *The Washington Post*, 28 September 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/museums/with-a-brass-band-blaring-artist-kehinde-wiley-goes-off-to-war-with-confederate-statues/2019/09/27/178bbb04-e16c-11e9-be96-6adb81821e90_story.html

The Southern Poverty Law Center has identified approximately 1,700 Confederate monuments remaining in the United States as of 2019. Most were erected between the 1890s and the 1920s under Jim Crow laws and the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans, with more erected in the mid-20th century in reaction to the desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces and the Supreme Court’s landmark decision to integrate public schools in *Brown v. Board of Education*.⁹⁴⁸ Two years prior, on 11-12 August 2017, white supremacists descended on Charlottesville, Virginia, to defend a statue of Confederate general Robert E. Lee that the city planned to remove from Lee Park, which was also to be renamed Emancipation Park.

The removal of the statue and renaming of the park were a local part of a national response to the white supremacist terrorist attack on the Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015. This response also included the renaming of Jackson Park, named after Confederate general Thomas Jackson, to Justice Park, and the removal of a statue. The Blue Ribbon Commission on Race, Memorials and Public Spaces recommended that the two parks be given neutral names, but the political leadership of the city determined that a direct confrontation with the city’s racial history was necessary for justice, truth, and reconciliation. Emancipation Park was to be a place of celebration, while Justice Park should be one for reflection and lamentation. The “Unite the Right” white supremacist rally to resist these changes descended into deadly street violence, and the murder of 32-year-old Heather Heyer and injury of 19 others, when a white supremacist drove his car into a crowd of counter-protestors. Additionally, two state troopers were killed in a helicopter crash while patrolling the rally.⁹⁴⁹ The parks were renamed again in July 2018, in response to the public petition of African American activist, Mary Carey, who argued that it was inappropriate to retain the new names while the Confederate statues

⁹⁴⁸ Hannah Natanson, “There’s a new way to deal with Confederate monuments: Signs that explain their racist history”, *The Washington Post*, 23 September 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/09/22/theres-new-way-deal-with-confederate-monuments-signs-that-explain-their-racist-history/>

⁹⁴⁹ Paul Duggan, “Charlottesville’s Confederate statues still stand — and still symbolize a racist legacy”, *The Washington Post*, 10 August 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2019/08/10/charlottesvilles-confederate-statues-still-stand-still-symbolize-racist-past/>

remained there. In May 2019, a Virginia Judge ruled that local authorities in Charlottesville cannot remove the two Confederate statues because they are war memorials protected by state law.⁹⁵⁰

Examples like these show that this trajectory in the global discourse of justice, truth, and reconciliation opens new limits and new dangers for reason. Justice, truth, and reconciliation in the global transitional context of the long durational structural injustices and historical wrongs of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide must become a core area for cosmopolitan studies. I have argued that the fundamental ideas of reconciliation and realistic utopianism in Rawls's political philosophy, and his arguments in the *Law of Peoples* for non-ideal theoretical principles of transitional justice in national and international contexts, can be deconstructed and reconstructed to decolonise Anglo-American cosmopolitanism. Normatively theorising the transition from global white supremacy and colonial state-society complexes to reconciled, well-ordered domestic and world societies, and the subjective and objective disalienation of subordinated subjects, brings up important, urgent, and difficult non-ideal theoretical problems of epistemic injustice. I argued that there is no alternative to starting from where we are now, and that, because of the vicious motivated ignorance of powerful subjects who are materially and psychically invested in their dominant subject positions in the gendered and racialised global power structure, the prospects for a real dialogue of equals are limited. Nevertheless, consensual and conciliatory dialogue is possible and necessary, but insufficient for decolonisation as objective and subjective disalienation.

The decolonisation struggle is complex and multiple. There will continue to be victories and losses on different fronts and in different arenas. Non-ideal theory, recall, is concerned with the actions that are morally permissible, politically possible, and strategically effective in bringing about the transition from the old order to the new order, which forces us to reckon with the questions of the cognitive and motivational deficiencies of actual agents and other circumstances of contexts of justice. It is no shortcoming of non-ideal theory that it alerts us to the forces of

⁹⁵⁰ Liam Stack, "Charlottesville Confederate Statues Are Protected by State Law, Judge Rules", *The New York Times*, 1 May 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/us/charlottesville-confederate-statues.html>

reactionary violence that aim to preserve white supremacy, and recommends strategic patience and the far sightedness of just, wise, and pious statesmen. The non-ideal abstraction of decolonisation, involving moments of justice, truth, and reconciliation as objective and subjective disalienation, reconciles us to the realities of the world by providing us with an open-ended and contestable aim to work towards, and different means to transform ourselves and our world here and now.

Although he neglects the global history of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide, and the forms of alienation and backward-looking problems of justice that these have generated, Rawls is correct that reconciling with the fact of irreconcilable differences in comprehensive conceptions of religion, justice, and the good, and so of reasonable disagreement in world politics, is a necessary condition for living together in peace and justice in a finite world. *To you is your religion, and to me is mine.* Transitioning from the *status quo* to a friendlier, less unjust, unsustainable, unstable, and insecure post-Western, post-secular world order, with the requisite solidarity for solving urgent and complex global governance problems like climate change, is made easier by reconciling with the fact of pluralism. The global context does not demand a strong cosmopolitan or solidarist conception of justice and order. A moderate cosmopolitan or solidarist conception of justice and order is necessary and sufficient. Critically, this is pluralism *about conceptions of justice and order*, not pluralism about social and political orders that ought to be respected *per se*, irrespective of whether they are just or unjust. There are further questions to be answered about whether intervention can be justified, which agents have the right and duty to intervene, under what circumstances, with what normative constraints, and to what ends, and what transnational solidarity with the oppressed demands of us in their righteous struggles for freedom, justice, and dignity.

Between the poles of an overlapping consensus, which is not possible in the global context, and a *modus vivendi*, is *conviviality*. The etymology of conviviality as it is used today in the humanities and social sciences stems from the Spanish term *La Convivencia*, which was a term of art innovated to characterise the pluriversal “living together” of Muslims, Christians, and Jews in the medieval Umayyad caliphate centred on Qurtuba in al-Andalus, now the city of Córdoba in modern Spain.

This period ended decisively with the expulsion of the Jews in 1492, the year that marks the onset of modernity/coloniality with the colonisation of the Americas. The point is not to romanticise the history of Muslim rule in Spain – or to forget the role of Muslims in the global slave trade – but to reconstruct the pluriversal form of life and the forms of cultural interaction, exchange, and hybridity fostered by such proximity on a planetary scale.⁹⁵¹

⁹⁵¹ See Oscar Hemer, Maja Povrzanović Frykman, and Per-Markku Ristilammi, “Conviviality Vis-à-Vis Cosmopolitanism and Creolisation: Probing the Concepts” in *Conviviality at the Crossroads: The Poetics and Politics of Everyday Encounters*, eds. Oscar Hemer, Maja Povrzanović Frykman, and Per-Markku Ristilammi (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave MacMillan, 2020), 1-14.

6. Ānō ko te Marama kua Ngaro, kua ara Anō*

The struggle for universal human rights has always and everywhere been the struggle against all forms of tyranny and injustice: against slavery, against colonialism, against apartheid.

It is nothing less and nothing different today.

– 7th United Nations General Secretary, Kofi Annan (8 April 1938 – 18 August 2018)⁹⁵²

The very right to be human is denied every day to hundreds of millions of people as a result of poverty, the unavailability of basic necessities such as food, jobs, water and shelter, education, health care and a healthy environment. The failure to achieve the vision contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights finds dramatic expression in the contrast between wealth and poverty which characterises the divide between the countries of the North and the countries of the South and within individual countries in all hemispheres.

– 1st President of South Africa, Nelson Mandela (18 July 1918 – 5 December 2013)⁹⁵³

6.1. Summary of central findings

In this thesis, I have contributed to the decolonisation of cosmopolitanism by deconstructing and reconstructing Western conceptions of cosmopolitanism in the humanities and social sciences. *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* intervened in the humanities and social sciences where the “global”, “cosmopolitan”, “imperial”, “postcolonial”, and “decolonial” turns intersect. My intervention targeted contemporary debates in historical sociology, IR/IPE, and philosophy, and across the spectrum of approaches and methodologies called “critical theory”. I followed the lead of, and learnt from, Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists across the globe and across the disciplines. My decolonial reconstruction of cosmopolitanism was historical, transdisciplinary, critical, and normative. It centred new questions and topics for cosmopolitanism and reframed old topics – including dialogue, historical progress,

* ‘Just like the moon that disappears and rises again’. Hirini Moko Mead rāua ko Neil Grove, *Ngā Pepeha a Ngā Tipuna: The Sayings of the Ancestors*, 17.

⁹⁵² Kofi Annan, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines and illuminates global pluralism and diversity, Says Secretary-General on the 50th Anniversary of the Declaration”, 10 December 1997, accessed 10 September 2019. <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/1997-12-10/universal-declaration-human-rights-enshrines-and-illuminates-global>

⁹⁵³ Nelson Mandela, “Address by President Nelson Mandela at the 53rd United Nations General Assembly”, 21 September 1998, accessed 10 September 2019. http://db.nelsonmandela.org/speeches/pub_view.asp?pg=item&ItemID=NMS631&txtstr

the cosmopolitan theses about identity and justice, the meaning of moderate cosmopolitanism, actually existing cosmopolitanisms, the unfinished project of decolonisation, the spirit of Bandung, the origins and evolution of human rights discourse, the conceptual analysis of transitional justice, backward-looking and forward-looking problems of justice in transitional contexts, and the nexus of justice, truth, and reconciliation. The historical background to *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* was the transition to a post-Western, post-secular world order, and the need to decentre the dialogical study of world history, order, and politics.

My main transdisciplinary non-ideal theoretical argument was that injustice in our world involves both backward-looking and forward-looking problems of interactional, structural, and, primarily, epistemic injustice. My intervention highlighted the pervasive relevance of colonialism for the diagnosis of social crises and problems of justice and for the prescription of policies and practices of transformative justice in transitional contexts. I argued that epistemic decolonisation can sharpen the diagnostic and prescriptive functions of cosmopolitan critical social theory and analytic cosmopolitanism. I deconstructed the various ways in which Eurocentrism is embedded in the core assumptions, categories, normative foundations, and analytical frameworks of Western cosmopolitanism, primarily in its disciplinary narrative of Western origins/cosmopolitan ends and its agent/patient binary. By overcoming the empirical and normative deficiencies of dominant Eurocentric paradigms, decolonial cosmopolitanism equips us with the tools to explain, and to identify potentials to transform, our always already interconnected world.

In §1. *Kia Whakatōmuri te Haere Whakamua*, I intervened in the debates within the global third generation of the Frankfurt School and with their postcolonial and decolonial interlocutors over the topics of progress, reason, context, and power. By doing so, I brought out the analytical distinction between the *internal* and *external* spatial dimensions of decolonial epistemic critique, and the salience of the West's epistemic frontiers in the context of cosmopolitan dialogue about the past, present, and future of world ordering in 2. *Encountering the Other*. By turning against the second generation of the Frankfurt School's left-Hegelian rational reconstruction of progress, back to the

tradition of the oppressed on which the first generation based its critique of modernity, and by shifting the geography of reasoning beyond the West's epistemic frontiers, I then theorised the prospective and retrospective aspects of decolonial cosmopolitanism.

Cosmopolitanism in IR/IPE, historical sociology, and critical social theory is theorised not merely as an abstract ideal, but as an explanatory framework, as a historical, political-economic, or sociological category, and as a set of embedded political and ethical practices. However, these varieties of Western cosmopolitanism, which unite actuality and normativity, analysis and critique, are Eurocentric, and cannot be sustained. In *3. Western Origins/Cosmopolitan Ends*, I showed how the *end of progress*, argued for by Allen, which undermines the Frankfurt School's left-Hegelian reconstructivist research programme, need not weaken the unity of actuality and normativity, or of analysis and critique. Decolonial and postcolonial interventions into, and expropriations of, contemporary humanities and social sciences have not had this result. I focused decolonial and postcolonial critiques of progress on Western conceptions of cosmopolitanism, bringing to light an often overlooked connection between Eurocentrism and cosmopolitanism. I argued, following the lead of decolonial and postcolonial social theorists, that reconstructing cosmopolitanism involves unearthing the forgotten archives of pre-modern and non-Western *provincial cosmopolitanisms* and returning to imperial geographies as generative contexts of cosmopolitan thought and practice. I retold the story of the genesis of actually existing cosmopolitanism and discourses of human rights to reveal immanent possibilities for transforming our world in the *unfinished project of decolonisation*.

§2. *Kia Tūhono te Pono me te Tika* engaged Anglo-American analytic liberal cosmopolitanism in dialogue with decoloniality. This filled a substantial void in the literature, and made up for the lack of serious and sustained scholarly engagement with the issues raised by Indigenous, Muslim, non-Western, postcolonial, and decolonial scholars, and critical race theorists. Analytic liberal cosmopolitanism has decolonised partially from *within* through the ongoing work of critiquing and extending paradigms of distributive justice. I intervened in institutional cosmopolitanism by

critiquing and extending Rawls's fundamental idea of the basic structure as the subject of justice with a decolonial intent, drawing on the latest advances in IR/IPE by decolonial scholars.

In 4. *Global Order as Subject*, I helped to decolonise normative cosmopolitan institutionalist analysis and the analytic liberal institutional cosmopolitan understanding of the global order as the subject of justice. My work developed lines of argument and suggestions made by Mills for reiterating Pogge's cosmopolitan critique of Rawls's methodological nationalism, and was presented as a plausible alternative to Mills's method of racial contractarianism for decolonising the Anglo-American liberal tradition.

In 5. *Reconciliation*, I intervened in the evolving field of transitional justice at the intersection of this field with cosmopolitanism on the topics of structural 'injustice', 'inequality', and 'violence', and the nexus of justice, truth, and reconciliation. I helped to clarify the terms of the contemporary debate by drawing analytic conceptual distinctions between the *circumstances* and *contexts of justice*, between *normal* and *exceptional circumstances of justice*, and between *forward-* and *backward-looking justice*. I decolonised post-Rawlsian analytic liberal cosmopolitanism by theorising the conditions of possibility for a cosmopolitanism that enables a 'mature reconciliation' in world politics by addressing the backward-looking and forward-looking problems of justice that arise in the global transitional context – what we are transitioning *from* as much as what we are transitioning *to*. I argued that the necessary cosmopolitan dialogue for justice, truth, and reconciliation in world politics involves questions of epistemic injustice, and theorised the possibilities, limits, and dangers of facing up to and working through the past. The potential of resolving repressed internal and external conflict is subjective and objective disalienation from ourselves, each other, and our world.

6.2. Conclusions

Ānō ko te Marama kua Ngaro, kua ara Anō, the title of my final chapter, translates as 'just like the moon that disappears and rises again', meaning for the cycle of something to begin anew; rebirth. This *whakatanki* should be read with and against the title of my first chapter, *Ka Hua te Marama*,

which, recall, translates as ‘the moon is full’, meaning for the cycle of something to have come to an end. The proverb in the introduction provided intellectual form or structure to the narrative of the present hegemonic transition toward a post-Western, post-secular world order, and the crisis of the rules-based liberal international order. At a higher level of abstraction, these *whakatauki* read together symbolise the deconstructive and reconstructive moments of my decolonial critique of cosmopolitanism, and at higher level still, a conception of the nexus of history and normativity from beyond the frontiers and freed from the limits of Western secular modern/colonial thought.

In *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism*, I have made a humble, modest contribution to the double task of decolonial deconstruction and reconstruction necessary for making cosmopolitanism a viable framework in the humanities and social sciences for collectively thinking through and debating the most urgent and difficult topics of our critical and dangerous time of transition to a post-Western, post-secular world order:

1. Cosmopolitan dialogue;
2. The existing world order;
3. Transforming our world.⁹⁵⁴

Decolonial cosmopolitans hope that open and inclusive – *because decolonised* – dialogues about the future of world order might help us to answer the big questions of our critical times: ‘How can we overcome the present disorder? Are there alternatives to the present chaos? How can we find pathways pointing in the direction of a more just and sustainable world order? In short: What are the ways out?’⁹⁵⁵ As Ken Booth argues, the present convergence of systemic and legitimization crises calls for ‘big-picture thinking and grand theorising’.

An era of question marks about our planetary future requires more than reductionism, micro-narratives, cultural relativism, anti-metanarrative metanarratives, ethnocentric worldviews, middle-range theorising, and the rest. We need a global brainstorm to think how the levels and pieces of world politics fit together, re-exploring under new conditions the relationships between units and systems, agents and

⁹⁵⁴ Abdulaziz Othman Altwajri (1436/2015) “The Alliance of Civilizations and Building a New World Order”, *Publications of the Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (ISESCO)*. 13.

⁹⁵⁵ Walter D. Mignolo (2017) “Decoloniality after Decolonization; Dewesternization after the Cold War”, in *A World Beyond Global Disorder: The Courage to Hope*, edited by Fred Dallmayr and Edward Demenchonok. Newcastle Upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 39.

structures, parsimony and holism, reductionism and systemic approaches, material and ideational considerations, international and global systems, and national and world histories.⁹⁵⁶

A decolonised cosmopolitanism that is at once historical, transdisciplinary, critical, and normative has much to contribute to this global brainstorm about how to navigate human societies through the converging global challenges of the decades ahead. There is an emerging scholarly consensus that open and inclusive cosmopolitan dialogue and mutual learning are the best way to navigate the current transition. However, cosmopolitanism, as a normative approach to the study of world history, order, and politics, must be decolonised before it could be the basis of a friendlier, less unjust, and less unsustainable, unstable, and insecure post-Western, post-secular world order.

6.3. Limitations

A central topic in this thesis is the ways in which language, tradition, and power make possible, limit, and condition practices of reasoning. This applies to myself first and foremost, and I have grappled with ethical and epistemic questions of positionality. I have learnt a lot from theorists who write from complex positions in relation to Western thought, often writing in the English language and working in Western universities. My limited linguistic capabilities have been an obvious limitation on my research. As critical as I am of Eurocentric critiques of Eurocentrism, *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism*, by *deconstructing* and *reconstructing* Western cosmopolitanism paradigms, *preserves* and *sublimates*, rather than *displacing* and *disavowing*. The danger for this kind of project is that the reconciliation it sets out to achieve is still premature.

6.4. Future directions for the transdisciplinary field of cosmopolitan studies

As vital as a big picture thinking and grand theorising project like *Decolonising Cosmopolitanism* is, the real strength of the approach will be demonstrated in the future by transdisciplinary contributions

⁹⁵⁶ Ken Booth (2011) "The Inconvenient Truth", in *Realism and World Politics*, edited by Ken Booth, Routledge. 339.

to focus areas, like corruption, intervention, climate change, global financial order, global security, global ethics, human development, capabilities, migration, and health, where the most interesting and advanced work, breaking down the distinction between theory and practice, is happening.⁹⁵⁷ Cosmopolitans can not only improve our own work through interdisciplinary dialogues and by learning from developments in adjacent disciplines, Gillian Brock argues, we can also contribute in a transdisciplinary way to shaping those developments.⁹⁵⁸

Another future direction for the transdisciplinary field of cosmopolitan studies opened by epistemic decolonisation is theorising in the reverse direction from the global context to the domestic context, particularly in relation to the causal and constitutive functions of imperialism, colonialism, slavery, and genocide in the production and reproduction of Western state-societies. Mills remains a lone soldier in this project in the mainstream of Western political philosophy. Beyond the West's frontiers, there is also exciting future work to do by critically and normatively theorising social, economic, political, and legal justice in non-Western contexts, theoretically integrating the transdisciplinary analysis of subnational, national, transnational, international, and global structures, processes, and connections.

By practicing the corrective virtues of epistemic justice, if nothing else, I have shown that the unfinished project of decolonising cosmopolitanism in theory and practice started long ago.⁹⁵⁹

⁹⁵⁷ See for example Gillian Brock, *Justice for People on the Move: Migration in Challenging Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁹⁵⁸ Gillian Brock, "Some Future Directions for Global Justice", 255.

⁹⁵⁹ Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies*, 218-219.

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