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New Zealand’s Pop Renaissance:
A creative industry as ‘after neo-liberal’ social policy

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Abstract

This thesis argues that the popular music policies of New Zealand’s fifth Labour government can be understood as a form of ‘after neo-liberal’ social policy. In doing so, this thesis contributes to the literature on the state and popular music, work and entrepreneurship in the creative industries, and the sociology of cultural policy.

On coming to power in 1999 Labour signalled both a renewed interest in supporting the arts and culture and a new enabling role for the state in the market economy. An explosion of national cultural production ensued. Popular music was at the forefront of this ‘arts and cultural revival’ as sales, airplay, and exports rose dramatically. This thesis investigates the macro-micro dynamics of this state-supported pop renaissance.

At the macro-scale how Labour brought popular music into a strategic policy to address economic growth, employment, and national cultural identity is examined. How the state constituted an audience for Kiwi pop while simultaneously working to facilitate artists into global music markets through new institutional innovations is also explained. These policies illustrate emerging ‘after neo-liberal’ practices whereby the enabling state becomes another player in existing markets.

At the micro-scale this state facilitation of pop production sees its agencies come to act as cultural intermediaries. This feature constructs a competitive game for pop producers who seek state support. Using Bourdieu’s sociological concepts of fields and alternative forms of capital this thesis analyses how pop producing creative entrepreneurs – as entrepreneurs sans economic capital – use mostly non-market modes of exchange to construct the symbolic capital necessary to access state support.

The ‘after neo-liberal’ state also seeks to repair the social dislocations of earlier neo-liberal reform. Using Bourdieu’s concepts of new petit bourgeoisie and social trajectories it is argued Labour’s music policies offer a way to include and provide meaning to an increasing number of potentially marginalised youthful agents and is thus homologous to the inclusionary pyramid of the earlier welfare state. Moreover it is argued music policy as social policy offers youthful creative entrepreneurs a belief that they may reconvert their alternative forms of capital – via the state – into an upward social trajectory.
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Chapter One:
New Zealand’s pop renaissance

Introduction

When New Zealand’s fifth Labour government was elected in 1999 it quickly signalled renewed state engagement with the arts and culture (Clark 2000a). Also initiated in this political turn to the centre-left was a new paradigm for state-market relations. As Prime Minister Helen Clark (2002) later declared, the sixteen-year period of the defining form of political economic governance – what she labelled neo-liberalism – was over.

Legitimated by the strategic policy rationales of economic development and the promotion of national identity, the Labour-led coalition government instigated an inventive range of state-market partnerships to support the arts (Clark 2000a; New Zealand Trade and Enterprise 2006; Office of the Prime Minister 2003; Skilling 2008; Wade 2001; Work and Income 2008). Unprecedented state funding combined with tax breaks, institutional innovation, and entrepreneurial vigour produced widely celebrated results: films such as Lord of the Rings (2001, 2002, 2003) and Whale Rider (2002); the emergence of domestic haute couture under the vanguard of Karen Walker; venerated television shows such as Outrageous Fortune (2005-2009); and the Grammy-winning rock band Stereogram. Simultaneously frequent media observations of artistic success on world and domestic stages gave “ideological uplift” to the government, and served to further legitimate the expanded state support for the arts (Yudice 2003, p. 10). Commenting on this cultural explosion, then cabinet minister David Cunliffe declared New Zealand was “fizzing and buzzing” to the groove of an “arts and cultural revival” (New Zealand Herald 2005a).

Popular music was at the forefront of this revival. In 2000 Helen Clark claimed “we want young New Zealanders to be able to hear more of their country in their music, and for us all to experience the cultural and economic advantages that brings”. Duly, with state assistance, Kiwi pop emerged from the shadows cast by imported international artists. By 2005 music made by New Zealand nationals accounted for a record 20.8 per cent of music played on domestic commercial radio. This was only a 2.2 per cent rise from 2004 but a dramatic 18.2
percent increase from the 1995 domestic airplay figures of 2.6 per cent (Maharey 2005). As a result of this increased broadcasting domestic artist royalty payments from airplay doubled from $7 million in 2000 to $16.5 million in 2005 (Smith 2005). Sales boomed too. In the face of withering global demand for compact discs the sales of domestic artist music almost doubled from 5.8 percent in 2000 to 11.5 percent in 2005 (Shuker 2007, p. 27). While in 2007 more than two dozen artists sold over 60,000 albums each with growing numbers reaching gold (7,500 units) and platinum (15,000) status (Shuker 2007, p. 21). In addition to this domestic success the state has assisted the export of artists such as Flight of the Conchords, Scribe, and Bic Runga - artists who now shift hundreds of thousands of units in overseas markets (Smith 2005). Over summer domestic artists fill the burgeoning festival circuit with many fitting these performances into their international touring schedule. Admittedly New Zealand is rather small. With a population of just over 4 million it is estimated to contribute just 0.3% to the global music market (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 28). Nevertheless in a small place like New Zealand any such achievement against international odds can seem larger than life; to many, the hype was being realised: New Zealand was undergoing a pop renaissance.

Such commercial and cultural success is in stark contrast to the fortunes of domestic popular music during the 1980s and 1990s. This is not to claim there is no history of Kiwi sounds on the local or international hit parade, but despite sporadic success stories the domestic trend was one where “repertoire from overseas continued to dominate” (Shuker 2007, p. 20). Nor is it to elide the vibrant underground music scenes or to suggest there was no state support for pop prior to Labour (Bannister 2002, 2006; Howe 2000). However such a dramatic cultural shift has led Matt Heath of domestic rock band Deja Voodoo to comment:

> When I was at high school ‘New Zealand music’ was like a bad word [sic], it was a like an insult for something. If it was New Zealand music it was like ‘naaahhhhh [colloquial New Zealand English for ‘no’] sounds terrible’. Whereas now people are almost religious about it – ‘I’m going to support that because it’s New Zealand music and I’m going to make an effort to like it’ (TV3 2008).

As airplay, sales and export opportunities increase so too do the numbers of people seeking to convert music into the market and creativity into a career. Now popular music making and
its associated industries are seen by both the state and young people as valid domains of employment and endeavour, and tertiary ‘rock schools’ have mushroomed. Key music industry informants attest to the corresponding growth in the numbers of creative industry entrepreneurs. Consider the comments of an Independent Music New Zealand employee:

I get people ringing up all the time saying, ‘I’m thinking about starting up a label what do I have to do?’ It is every week or every couple of weeks someone is coming along and saying ‘I’m starting up a record label’ and it’s like ... my god, another one! (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006).

While a state bureaucrat involved in the development of the domestic music industry notes:

People are starting to see music as a pathway to employment and at earlier age they are starting to think about it as more than a hobby. The kids are gravitating to it a bit earlier and whether it’s as musicians or as other roles they are seeing it as a viable industry to move it into (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

This combination of state support for popular music and the growth in young people seeking to form music careers is best summarised by popular music researcher Roy Shuker (2007, p. 27) who asserts New Zealand’s:

Music industry and those working in it are in a very different economic and cultural space from twenty years ago. In a stronger and viable music scene than existed two decades earlier, local talent can be encouraged and musicians can make a living from their music. It is the interaction and synergy of various contextual players, policies and influences that have enabled local music to flourish.

How then should we think about these contextual players, policies, and influences? Clearly, like New Zealand’s other celebrated creative industries, the revival of popular music has not appeared through the ‘automatic’ workings of the free market or solely through a ferment of populist sentiment. Hence the core questions for this thesis focus on the why, but especially the how, of the fifth Labour government’s engagement with domestic popular music. In addressing these broad questions this thesis analyses the macro-micro dynamics of the state-
supported pop renaissance and those agents who produce popular culture. By doing so, this thesis contributes to the academic literature on state music policies, the working practices of independent pop producers, and the sociology of cultural policy.

Since the middle of the 1990s there has been growing academic and policy interest in the role of the state in promoting cultural production (Frith and Cloonan 2008; Miller & Yudice 2002; Volkering 2001; Yudice 2003). This literature – which I review more fully at several junctures in the thesis – observes how policy makers and governments have re-imagined the arts as the creative industries (Frith & Cloonan 2008; Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005; Miller & Yudice 2002; Oakley 2006). These creative industries include popular music and have been widely claimed as having potential to address pressing state concerns: sustaining economic growth, creating employment opportunities, and fostering national identity in the wake of the ideological and material forces of globalisation (Kong 2000, p. 387).

This thesis also contributes to the literature on how the state, in small, semi-peripheral nations, supports domestic popular music (Bennett 1993; Berland 1991; Breen 1999; Cloonan 1999, 2007; D’Arcy & Brindley 2002; Eling 1999; Makela 2008; McLeay 2006; Power & Scott 2004; Rutten 1991; Strachan & Leonard 2004; Wallis & Malm 1984; Wright 1991; Young 2004). In particular it addresses a number of research problems raised by leading popular music researchers Frith and Cloonan (2008). Firstly they ask how the “different ways state power is organised and understood” means state music policies become “determined by quite different ideologies of what we might call governance” (Frith & Cloonan 2008, p. 189). As a leading nation of neo-liberal state and market reform during the 1980s and 1990s New Zealand provides a unique case through which to investigate how the legacies of neo-liberal “market governance” come to influence the pop renaissance (Larner 2000, p. 5).

Following Frith and Cloonan’s (2008) interest in the contexts of governance this thesis argues that Labour’s popular music policies illustrate an emerging state form: ‘after neo-liberalism’ (Larner & Craig 2005; Lewis 2003a; Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008). Chapter Two discusses in detail this re-moulding of state governance, but by way of introduction ‘after neo-liberalism’ is a conceptual framework to understand state responses to the social and economic outcomes of neo-liberal reform (Murdock 2003; Peck & Tickell 2002). Briefly the
‘after neo-liberal’ state can be observed to be responding to the multiple social dislocations of
the ostensibly laissez faire market economy and small state in two broad ways. Firstly it
focuses on those who were in some ways marginalised by reforms and now appear as
“problematic persons ... such as young people” (Rose 2000, p. 164). This it does in the first
instance by facilitating the ‘social inclusion’ of these agents, which means inclusion in the
labour market (Levitas 1996; Porter & Craig 2004; Rose 2000). Secondly the state shifts
from a putative role as ‘night watchman’ to become an ‘enabling state’ in order to create
‘opportunity’ for agents in the market economy (Rose 2000, p. 157). This it does by acting as
a partner, facilitator and funder of production (Bevir 2005; Craig & Porter 2006; Hodgson
2004; World Bank 1997). Labour’s engagements with popular music are exemplars of ‘after
neo-liberal’ policies. In particular this thesis closely considers the ways popular music is
deployed to address concerns over youth social inclusion and the ways in which small-scale
pop producers are enabled into domestic and international markets.

Such an enabling ‘after neo-liberal’ state problematises what appears to be a durable narrative
in the popular music literature. At its most basic this is the binary between “government
intervention in the market place versus the operation of the free market” (Kong 2000, p. 289,
with pathos: “inevitably, popular music policymaking will struggle with the challenge to
create policies that intervene in the increasingly taken for granted world of the market”.
However New Zealand’s pop renaissance is a case where – rather than seeking to “defy the
market” – the state has aligned its supports to existing music market institutions, and thus
becomes another player in the market (Cloonan 1999, p. 204). This state constituted
‘institutional ecology’ (Nee 2005, p. 66) is an assemblage of subsidies, quotas, formal and
informal education programmes, and promotional activities that together constitute the pop
renaissance. In considering this ‘institutional ecology’ my study of New Zealand’s pop
renaissance goes some way to considering some of the highly inventive ways the state
‘intervenes’ to facilitate the popular music market.

This thesis tries to go beyond Frith and Cloonan’s (2008, p. 190) call for popular music
researchers to investigate the policy making process by asking what happens when Labour’s
music policies flow outwards to influence the substantive practices of pop producers.
Although the formation of Labour’s music policies will necessarily be discussed this thesis
does not analyse the global policy networks, shadowy political patronages, or inter-ministry debates that constituted state support. Nor is this thesis primarily an analysis of policy discourses. Instead this research focuses on an aspect I consider to be of greater importance: how Labour’s popular music policies have made significant social and economic impacts. The pop renaissance then seems to be a case that contradicts Volkering’s (2001, p. 446) suggestion that “it is more difficult to point to evidence of effective implementation of [cultural] policies”.

As a result this thesis investigates how state music policies come to influence the practices of small-scale pop producers, whom this thesis conceptualises as creative entrepreneurs. It is argued that because state supports are closely aligned to existing music industry institutions the state comes to act as a ‘cultural intermediary’; selecting talent and then negotiating the access of creative entrepreneurs to markets in ways previously performed within purely market contexts (Frith 1983; Negus & du Gay 2002). From this perspective this thesis then asks how New Zealand’s burgeoning creative entrepreneurs forge “the buzz” or symbolic recognition necessary to access state or private sector ‘cultural intermediaries’ (Jones 2003, p. 152). This requires an investigation of the extensive gift economies and informal, non-market modes of exchange used by creative entrepreneurs to create a ‘buzz’ (Connell & Gibson 2003, p. 8; Gibson-Graham 1996, p. 244; Murdock 2003, p. 23). Using the influential French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s (1993, 1996, 1997) concepts of the field and alternative forms of capital an analysis of what occurs in these informal markets is developed: what this thesis calls ‘capital swapping’ practices. Such an analysis brings new sociological insights to the effects of Labour’s music policies ‘on the ground’ while simultaneously augmenting the growing literature on work in the creative industries (Christopher 2008; Ellmeier 2003; Jones 2003; Kong 2000; Leadbeatter & Oakley 1999; Luckman 2007; McRobbie 1998, 2004; Menger 1999; Neff, Weisinger & Zukin; Murdock 2003; Shorthouse & Strange 2004; Tam 2002; Throsby 2001).

Another focus of this thesis is to address what Frith and Cloonan (2008, p. 190) call “the otherwise neglected question. Who is music policy for?” Cultural policy is always a melding of the cultural, economic and social aims of the state (Yudice 2003). Thus it could be readily argued music policy articulates nation-building projects or the prestige interests of music industry elites (Cloonan 2007; Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005). However in turning to the
macro-sociological scale in the penultimate chapter this thesis argues Labour’s music policy can be understood as a form of social policy intended to deal with, in part, state concerns over youth employment and social inclusion in a small, isolated, relatively low-wage, commodity dependent nation. Although Oakley (2006, p. 256) asserts “cultural policies are social policies by other means” this thesis turns away from accounts of policy contradictions to analyse how music policies function as social policies.

Yet music policy as social policy presents a paradox. If the who of music policy is primarily young people in the labour market, why then is the state enabling an industry that creates commercial failure and requires a constant oversupply of new acts? (Jones 2003, p. 148; Murdock 2003, p. 25). To answer this question this thesis analyses the creative entrepreneur as a member of what Bourdieu (1984) calls the new petit bourgeoisie. These are agents drawn to cultural production in order to produce a social trajectory: a symbolic representation of social mobility. It is argued Labour’s music policy as social policy offers New Zealand’s new petit bourgeois agents the possibility of ‘reconverting’ their alternative capitals into a social trajectory. Furthermore by seeking state support to enter the music industry these agents are also performing a mode of social inclusion. Such an analysis extends existing theoretical uses of the new petit bourgeoisie while simultaneously constructing a sociology of cultural policy (Bernstein 2007; Bourdieu 1984; Featherstone 1991; Negus 2002).

**Key terms**

The state, market, popular music, and creative entrepreneur are key concepts used throughout and thus require a conceptual introduction.

**State**

Generically the state can be seen as a complex set of historical institutions and organisations which holds legitimate power over a population within a territory (Weber 1968). Even though the state has a unique power to direct and influence economic and social action – and enact policy – within its territory, it is a complex assemblage of institutions and organisations which cannot be considered as a unified or monolithically powerful ‘thing’. Rather the state
is riven with contradictions and acts in multiple ways – although not necessarily in concert – to produce economic growth, sustain social reproduction, and maintain ideological legitimacy (Dale 1989; Jessop 2002a). Therefore when the state comes to act in a cultural arena such as the music industry, or attempts to strongly direct the economy (Wade 1990, p. 8), or seeks to influence the behaviour of its citizens, it is only one of many actors affecting social life. The concept of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state helps us understand how the contemporary state is seen to embody and manage the political reactions to the social and economic contradictions of neo-liberalism (Polanyi 1957). In enacting this response the ‘after neo-liberal’ state is strongly directive in co-ordinating and enabling agents into the market economy. It does so through a combination of ‘government at a distance’ and increasingly personalised ways of managing state projects (Rose 2000; Sennett 2006).

Market

The market is a central feature of contemporary modern life, fundamental to political economy, neo-liberal projects of governance, and the ideology of economic growth. Within the ideological ambit of neo-liberal governance this market economy is narrated as a domain of liberty, freedom and wealth generation. The ‘after neo-liberal’ state also encourages social agents (including pop musicians) to understand their life chances in relation to this market economy (Rose 2000; Weber 1968). The modern market economy can be understood as an abstract aggregate of production and consumption directed mostly by prices, the gain spirit, and monetary exchange, made knowable through territorialised accounting methods (Polanyi 1957, p. 68, 71; Rose 2000. P. 144). However this market economy does not occur naturally: it is an institutionalised process mutually constituted by the state and powerful, historical interests (Block & Evans 2005, p. 505). At the most fundamental level the market economy can be seen to be constituted through a multitude of monetary transactions – the ‘cash nexus’ (Dant 2000; Ferguson 2002). In this thesis the term ‘the market’ refers to the ‘cash nexus’ and is thus a conceptualisation of the moment where money is exchanged for a commodity, be it a good (for example, selling a recording) or service (for example, selling a concert performance). Thus the market is central to understanding New Zealand’s pop renaissance for it is the intensification, extension, and enabling of pop musicians within such monetary exchanges that state music policy seeks to facilitate. It also needs to be noted that the market is more than simple monetary exchange. In modern societies the ‘cash nexus’ is embedded in
an array of institutional and legal parameters. More importantly for this thesis is the recognition that the market economy and monetary exchange are also embedded in symbolic, sociological dimensions. As the analytical use of Bourdieu in this thesis highlights, inter-subjective and culturally specific understandings of social agents may induce or circumscribe market exchanges. This is especially relevant in a complex field such as popular music where subtle cultural understandings determine whether important exchanges such as ‘deals’ between creative entrepreneurs and cultural intermediaries, or the sale of cultural commodities, occur.

**Popular music**

Defining popular music is somewhat problematic. As influential popular music researcher Frith (2007, p. 168) suggests “pop music is a slippery concept, perhaps because it is so familiar, so easily used”. The core feature of popular music, regardless of stylistic or genre variations, is that it is “music produced commercially, for profit, as a matter of enterprise not art” (Ibid). Nevertheless although most popular music has commercial intent only a small percentage of artists make noticeable economic returns (Jones 2003). Popular music is also a contested term with some researchers arguing for the dropping of the adjective ‘popular’ (International Advisory Editors 2005). Considering these conceptual issues, popular music for the purpose of this thesis is defined as any genre of music produced and intended for sale in the market no matter how meagre the economic return. The term popular music also seeks to encompass all its forms: the range of electronic dance music; R’n’B, rap and hip hop; heavy rock and heavy metal in all its varieties; ‘mainstream’ commercial pop music driven primarily by a solo artist and their image; superstar acts; ‘indie’ or alternative rock; ‘world music’; roots and folk. For stylistic variety *pop, pop music* and *popular music* are used interchangeably throughout this thesis.

**Creative entrepreneur**

The creative entrepreneur is conceptualised as a youthful independent pop producer seeking to form a full-time creative career, for as Kirschner (1998, p. 251) observes, “virtually all rock bands that produce original music desire success in one way or another”. The term
creative entrepreneur also recognises the fragmented identities of pop producers, as one with commercial success recounts:

You’re forced into this position of being this ‘jack of all trades’. Every artist is self managing themselves, to a lot of extents. We didn’t have a manager until a year and half ago so our whole career until then was without a manager. You’re organising everything because if you don’t have your finger in the pie it’s not going to happen very well (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

For narrative variety, and to convey a sense of these multiple and fragmented identities, the term creative entrepreneur is used interchangeably with artist, music maker, or pop producer. Furthermore, it needs to be recognised that although this agent may also work in non-creative industries the pursuit of a creative career is of primary importance to their identity and sense of self.

Chapter Outline

The five chapters that follow address the research questions and issues outlined above. Chapter Two introduces the theoretical framework used in this thesis. This involves the development of what this thesis calls the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state (ANLPS) which builds upon Cloonan’s (1999) theorisation of the ‘promotional state’. This requires a review of the trajectories of liberalism, neo-liberalism and ‘after neo-liberalism’. Particular attention is paid to ‘after neo-liberal’ policies and their affinities with ‘promotional state’ interests to support domestic sounds. In New Zealand this support has been achieved through the state engagement with the market through the supply-side, the application of ‘new institutional’ thought on social connectivity, and social inclusion via the labour market.

However the development and role of the ANLPS is only one aspect of the pop renaissance. In this thesis sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts are used to analyse: the practices of creative entrepreneurs and their interactions with the ANLPS; the wider structuring of the field of pop production; and how music policy can be understood as social policy. Also in Chapter Two, Bourdieu’s social theory and key concepts of field, alternative forms of capital,
illusio, habitus, social trajectories and the new petit bourgeoisie are introduced. Finally this chapter reviews the qualitative methods used.

Chapter Three examines how and why popular music came to be included in Labour’s strategic social and economic policy. It highlights the policy trajectories of popular music through the 1980s and into the 2000s, the influence of the creative industry discourse, and the notion of ‘after neo-liberalism’ in relation to arts and cultural policy (Flew 2004; Florida 2002a; Leadbeater 2000; Oakley 2004, 2006; Smith 1998). After reviewing protagonists and critics of the creative industries this chapter describes the structural features of the music industry. This review of strategic policy development also illustrates the ways in which consultation with elite music industry actors folded these agents’ interests into Labour’s music policies.

Chapter Four explains how the programmes and organisations of the ANLPS function in practical terms. This chapter focuses on New Zealand on Air and the New Zealand Music Commission. It describes their aligned engagement with existing music industry practices within and beyond New Zealand. This chapter explains how state subsidies, quotas, and informal training created an ‘institutional ecology’ through which the pop renaissance was constituted.

Chapter Five analyses how the ANLPS influences the practices of creative entrepreneurs. Using Bourdieu’s concepts of the field and the alternative forms of capital it is argued that the ANLPS comes to function like a ‘cultural intermediary’. This structural homology reinforces existing music industry logics, compelling creative entrepreneurs to demonstrate the skills and dispositions that the state (or any cultural intermediaries) can somewhat readily convert into the market. Here Bourdieu’s symbolic capital – prestige, reputation, or fame – is paramount, for it conveys a sense of an artist’s commercial potential to ANLPS agents. The ways creative entrepreneurs accumulate this “field specific” symbolic capital (Hesmondhalgh 2006, p. 215) through ‘capital swapping’ “sans economic capital” are analysed (Ellmeier 2003, p. 11).

Chapter Six considers the ways Labour’s popular music policy can be interpreted as a form of social policy. Here we examine the substantive features of New Zealand’s neo-liberalised social policy.
labour market – such as flexible work, multiple job holding and work in the growing service sector – and how these influence the practices of creative entrepreneurs. These forces and agents are then interpreted through Bourdieu’s (1984) concepts of social trajectories and the new petit bourgeoisie. It is argued that New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs are a subaltern faction of new petit bourgeoisie due to their dominated position in both the labour market and the field of cultural production. Furthermore it is argued that state music support makes it possible for new petit bourgeois agents to ‘reconvert’ their cultural and symbolic capital into a ‘social trajectory’. It is also suggested that through this engagement with the state these youthful agents become socially included in the market economy.

The thesis concludes with Chapter Seven which reviews the main findings of this research on New Zealand’s pop renaissance. The methodological limitations are discussed along with the neglected aspects and areas for future research. The chapter concludes by considering the ways in which New Zealand’s state supported ‘arts and cultural’ revival can also be considered an emerging form of governance through culture.
Chapter Two:
The ‘after neo-liberal’ state and Bourdieussian sociology: Theory and methods

Introduction

In this thesis I adopt a somewhat novel approach to the study of cultural production. What this approach demands in terms of relative complexity I hope is compensated for by the lucid insights it provides into the relationships between Labour’s music policies, music industry institutions, and creative entrepreneurs’ practices. My intention is to develop new insights into these relationships by applying two theoretical perspectives to the analysis of New Zealand’s pop renaissance: the political and institutional economy of what an emerging literature calls ‘after neo-liberalism’ (Larner & Craig 2005; Lewis 2003a; Lewis, Larner, & Le Heron 2008) and Bourdieussian sociology.

To develop this approach requires three significant sections. Part A develops a popular music related view of the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state concept through a review of the state and popular music literature, followed by the history of liberalism, neo-liberalism, and ‘after neo-liberalism’. In this section, particular attention is given to the trajectories of neo-liberalism in New Zealand. Secondly, the ‘after neo-liberal’ policies of supply-side-ism, social inclusion, and new institutionalism are discussed. From this review the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state (ANLPS) concept is developed to illustrate the Labour government’s modes and rationales for engaging domestic pop. In Part B French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s social theory is reviewed. This section serves to introduce Bourdieu’s key concepts and suggests how this thesis applies these to the analysis of creative entrepreneurial practices within the pop renaissance. Finally, Part C reviews the qualitative methods used in this thesis.
Part A: The ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state

The state and popular music

Popular music studies have generated an emerging literature on the relationship between state policies, popular music, and the market. It appears that these inter-relations are of growing interest to researchers. In 2008 the journal *Popular Music* devoted a special issue to the state and music policy paying particular attention to the political means, and ends, of state support for popular music. In accounts of the state and popular music the state is often viewed as a relevant and important institution. It “retain[s] the potential for invention…in the global market and to help local musicians reach a wider audience than they otherwise would” (Cloonan 1999, p. 204). This thesis adds to this emerging literature by re-theorising how the state can act to promote domestic music production via the market. This is achieved by incorporating existing theorisations of state-popular music relations with empirical material from recent New Zealand experience.

Popular music research on the state coalesces around a number of themes relevant to New Zealand’s pop renaissance. These include how the state comes to support popular music through cultural policy, copyright law, and production subsidies (Biddle & Knights 2007; Cloonan 1999; Strachan & Leonard 2004). Others have focussed on how small states seek to promote domestic pop when confronted with the dominance of imported sounds (Breen 1999; Eling 1999; Rutten 1991). Another common theme is how states justify their popular music supports through cultural and economic rationales (Berland 1991; Makela 2008). It is also observed how national and local governments have deployed popular music as a form of social policy to address youth unemployment and urban regeneration (Breen 1999; Biddle & Knights 2007; Cohen 1991; Frith 1993a; Hudson 1995). Each aspect is now discussed in more detail, illuminating how New Zealand’s pop renaissance can be contextualised by these persistent themes.
Cloonan (1999, p. 203-204, 2007) develops three ideal types to describe state policy orientations to popular music. Firstly, the ostensibly free market ‘benign state’\(^1\) of core capitalist nations. Secondly, the censoring ‘authoritarian state’ of dictatorships, and thirdly, the ‘promotional state’ which designs policies and programmes to support the audibility and visibility of domestic sounds and to encourage the consumption of domestic pop. According to Cloonan (1999, p. 204) the ‘promotional state’ comes to regard popular music:

As something of a national asset. Nation-states in this category are likely to be concerned about being dominated by Anglo-American music and will try to devise policies, such as radio quotas and the promotion of domestic music, to combat this. Examples of these sorts of states would include at various times, Canada, France, and Holland.

To this list of ‘promotional states’ we can add New Zealand under the fifth Labour government.

A common theme in research on ‘promotional state’ policies is how the state supports popular music in semi-peripheral nation-states beyond the culturally and economically dominant ‘core’. Academic research on ‘promotional state’ policies has addressed such developments in Canada (Cloonan 1999; Wright 1991; Young 2004) and its music industry agents’ responses to the NAFTA free trade agreement (Berland 1991; Wright 1991). Political debates around quotas and national culture in Australia have also been researched (Breen 1999; McLeay 2006). Touring domestic pop musicians are supported by the state in the Netherlands, where pop is considered like any other cultural form (Frith 1993 cited in Kruse 1998, p. 192, Rutten 1991). In France cultural policy seeks to protect language and culture from Anglo-American influences including popular music (Elling 1999). While Strachan and Leonard (2004) review state measures to protect and support domestic music in Ireland\(^2\).

\(^1\) Although somewhat ironically, using Cloonan’s (1999, p. 204) ideal-types, New Zealand’s popular music policy during the 1990s could be typified as benign: a liberal style ‘free market’. However, the outcome for domestic pop’s audibility struggling in the wake of core cultural imperialism, commercial broadcasting disdain, and minimal state support, was, arguably, anything but.

\(^2\) See Canadian Heritage (2004) for a review of ‘promotional state’ policies around the world
At this national scale, Rutten (1991, p. 297-298) suggests such ‘promotional state’ supports are framed by three structural parameters. Firstly, the size of the domestic market which in New Zealand’s case was 1.8 million units sold in 2005 (Shuker 2007, p. 27). Secondly, the share of domestic music within the overall turnover of the domestic music market which was 11.5 percent in New Zealand in 2005 (Shuker 2007, p.27). Thirdly, the importance of domestic music within the international music market expressed as the share of domestic music within the turnover of music on the international market. New Zealand Music Industry Development Group (2004, p. 28), a quasi-state music industry think-tank, calculated New Zealand’s global contribution at $NZ103 million or 0.3% of the official world market. The four million New Zealanders are, however, relatively avid consumers of music. In 2006 New Zealand was ranked 12th with 1.5 compact disc sales per capita, putting it ahead of Netherlands and France on 1.2, but behind the UK (2.7) and USA (2.1) (International Federation of Phonographic Industries 2008a). Nevertheless, considering the comparatively small scale and scope of New Zealand’s music market, Rutten’s (1991, p. 300) typology accurately describes New Zealand’s position in the global music market. This being:

A country with a small phonogram market with a small share for local music within the turnover of the local phonogram market and a relatively unimportant role for local sounds within the international music scene.

Although New Zealand’s domestic and international sales figures fluctuate, what remains persistent is the small scale of the domestic music market. Simon Frith (1993, p. 21) describes the problems facing the ‘promotional state’ in its efforts to develop policies and programmes that support the domestic music industry:

For small states...the issue was, equally, how to sustain local music production given inadequate local markets, how to compete for international sales without losing cultural identity, how to combine cultural and industrial interests.

To negotiate popular music’s position between artistic expression and the market ‘promotional states’ frequently merge industrial and cultural goals in their policies. As this thesis describes, New Zealand’s Labour government has legitimated its popular music policies and programmes by asserting they are a domain of future economic and employment
growth. Furthermore, the location of popular music in the “creative sector” is also claimed to play “a big role in both reflecting and defining New Zealand’s unique identity” (Clarke 2007). State deployment of popular music as employment and cultural policy is not unique to New Zealand with pop having recently been positioned to these ends by the UK’s New Labour government (Cloonan 2007; Hesmondhalgh 2005; Neeland, Freakly & Lindsay 2006; Oakley 2006).

During the 1980s and 1990s the UK’s local Labour governments engaged popular music in pursuit of social and economic goals. Research on state programmes at this scale tend to investigate how pop has been deployed as an ameliorative response to unemployment in the post-Thatcher, de-industrialising towns of Northern England (Cloonan 2004; Cohen 1991; Frith 1993a; Hudson 2005). In these cases the literature suggests popular music was harnessed to urban regeneration projects, with programmes often directed towards meeting social policy goals rather than supporting pop production for the market economy. However, as Bennett (1993, p. 10) notes, popular music’s location in youth culture makes it susceptible to “incorporation into social welfare policies and programmes” directed at youth unemployment, while simultaneously thawing some of popular music’s counter cultural ‘stick it to the man’ cool. This thesis too considers the employment and social inclusion aspects of Labour’s music policies.

Having introduced some of the dimensions of the ‘promotional state’ it is judicious to refine this concept. Although a useful ideal type, Cloonan’s (1999, 2007) ‘promotional state’ does not describe in detail how or why the state is promotional. Drawing on New Zealand’s pop renaissance, a consideration of Labour’s specific policy mechanisms and motivations would enhance understandings of the ‘promotional state’. To do so, the next section argues it is useful to consider how New Zealand’s ‘promotional state’ could be understood as an ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state (ANLPS). Of particular relevance to this thesis’ argument is how New Zealand’s ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state has developed policies that are designed to facilitate popular music into the market economy through sales, airplay, and other forms of commercial success while simultaneously seeking to address the broader social and economic concerns of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state. Such a theorisation requires a review of neo-liberalism and its influence upon New Zealand’s social, political, and economic domains.
Liberalism, neo-liberalism, ‘after neo-liberalism’

England and Ward (2007, p. 7) describe neo-liberalism as the “defining economic paradigm of our time”. To the extent to which this is true the history, trajectories, and application of neo-liberalism can be expected to influence state involvement with popular music. As Lewis (2003b, p. 161) suggests, social scientists researching contemporary New Zealand “have had little choice but to examine this defining programme of social, political, cultural and economic change and to contextualise their work in these terms”. Considering neo-liberalism’s provenance, New Zealand’s pop renaissance can be understood through its relations with this political economic project and its attendant emphasis on the market economy, paid work, and entrepreneurial individualism. Firstly though, how should we define liberalism?

Liberalism

Liberalism is a political and economic philosophy that found early voice in seventeenth century British revolutionary contexts, but emerged in its most coherent form in eighteenth and nineteenth century British, European, and American political thought and practice. Liberalism is durable, maintaining a pervasive influence over contemporary political, economic, and policy thought. In constituting this doctrine in the economic and social furnace of the political and industrial revolutions its leading theorists developed philosophical treatises on “the liberal plan of equality, liberty and justice” for the (white, male) individual (Gray 1986, p. ix; Richardson 2001). Core elements include individualism, egalitarianism, universalism, and meliorism (Gray 1986) together with an enlightenment belief in human “reason, science, progress” and the right to private property secured through the rule of law (Richardson 2001, p. 18).

While complex and at times contradictory in its means, liberalism evinces a number of consistencies. It is typically individualistic in that it views society as comprised of

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3 Liberal thought of course has a longer history. Traces of liberal ideas are found in Greek and Roman philosophy, Hobbes’ “uncompromising individualism”, Locke and French Enlightenment thought. Although, as a unified and practical political project, it was industrialising Britain where liberal ideas were put into practice (see Gray 1986; Richardson 2001, p. 23-25).

4 David Hume, Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Jeremy Bentham, John and J.S. Mill, and Herbert Spencer
individuals pursuing their own self-interests. It is, on one level, egalitarian because each individual has the same rights before a strong, but formally impartial, law. On another level it is highly ideological, positing a situation (or the possibility of a normative condition) where economic actors pursue freedom through the market economy’s ‘level playing field’ regardless of their real relative economic, social, or cultural power. Within this social order liberalism’s universal human subject is the utility maximising ‘rational actor’. Liberalism is also a progressive and meliorative philosophy asserting that “society and its institutions can be improved by the application of liberal principles to produce a form of human perfectibility” (Gray 1986, p. 18). Furthermore, liberalism articulates a moralistic and productivist economic philosophy whereby commerce and economic capital accumulation in expanding markets leads to greater opulence and living standards: an ideology synonymous with the key word ‘development’ (Williams 1998p. 103; Fusfeld 1990, p. 32).

As a multifaceted political philosophy liberal intellectuals debate the means to producing a liberal society. Due to space constraints I bundle these debates into elite and social liberal ideal types (Richardson 2001, p. 50). Elite liberalism arose with industrial Britain’s new commercial classes [and elements of the working class as shown by E.P. Thompson (1963)] and emphasises negative liberty: ‘freedom from’. This includes the right to non-interference from other actors or the state leaving the individual to pursue their own interests and freedom of expression within parameters set by the, ironically elite defined, legal system (Richardson 2001, p.30; Hindness 1996 cited in Rose 2000, p. 153). Social liberalism differs though an emphasis on positive liberty: the ‘freedom to’ (Richardson 2001, p. 37). Consequently the political focus of social liberalism is egalitarian, universal and meliorist. Thus, social liberals argue for collective decision-making and “the extension of rights and freedoms to all” through welfare and education programmes intended to enable individuals to “enjoy the right and freedom to develop their potential” (Richardson 2001, p. 50).

These competing approaches to building a liberal utopia reveal an important conundrum for liberal theorists: what is the state’s role in securing liberty? Elite liberal thought argues most state attempts to promote the common good produce the inequalities it seeks to ameliorate and in doing so the state becomes economically ‘inefficient’ and ‘wasteful’ (Richardson 2001, p. 34). Considering these putative limitations of the state, elite liberals argue the price fixing laissez faire market of neo-classical economics is the primary institution “congenial to
liberal individualist society” of ‘free’ choice, liberty, and utility maximisation (Gray 1986, p. 69). In this market economy individuals are “responsible for their own condition” (Richardson 2001, p. 34) so social inequality is seen as “legitimate and perhaps inevitable” (Coburn 2000, p. 139). However, for elite liberals, the expansion of market exchange is understood to create wealth and thus ‘trickle down’ the social hierarchy to address material disadvantage (Harvey 2005, p. 65; Fusfeld 1990, p. 32-33). Thus elite liberalism frames the state as a definer and securer of legal rights that are prerequisites for the market economy and individual freedom (Harvey 2005, p. 64). Here a minimal state allows individuals to dispose of their own property and labour in order to make a profit and acquire other’s labour as they see fit through non-coercive and formal ‘free-exchange’ (Gray 1986). Therefore, elite liberalism “is not the so much the science of capitalism as its theology” (Clarke 2005, p. 51).

Social liberalism breaks with elite liberalism’s laissez faire and minimal state. This does not mean the “abandonment of liberalism, but rather its reformulation” in order to enhance citizens capabilities and freedoms in the market economy (Richardson 2001, p. 36). Through a progressive re-conceptualisation of the state’s role expanded state programmes would allow “all societies and individuals [to] progress towards the development of their potential” by “removing internal and external constraints for development” (Gibbins 1990, p. 94). Therefore, in a social liberal polity, the state is legitimate in providing welfare services and regulating the market to secure both equitable social outcomes and opportunities for the expression of individual liberty.

Liberalism has never been without its critics. Conservatives argue against the perceived moral permissiveness of liberalism and the deleterious effects of markets on institutions such as the family. Heterodox economists reject the formal autonomy of the market economy by illuminating the substantive and mutually constituted social process through which state and market economy are formed (Block & Evans 2005; Dobbin 2005; Harvey 2005; Polanyi 1947). Although socialists do not necessarily disagree with expanding freedom, they see liberalism as “sociologically naïve” for it neglects to perceive “social class as a barrier to the realization of liberal/socialist values” (Richardson 2001, p. 18). Furthermore, Mauss (1990, p. x) argued liberalism holds an impoverished conception of the independent individual. Sociologists extend this critique by analysing how liberal ideology struggles with issues of power, class, ethnicity, gender, and culture (Coburn 2000). Consequently, rather than
producing an idealised freedom, the liberal market economy draws individuals into what Marx (1970, cited in Mitchell 1990, p. 557) called the “dull compulsion of economic relations”.

Historically, liberal ideals and their hegemonic application have waxed and waned. Until the outbreak of World War One, Great Britain – and by extrapolation its Empire – experienced a “golden age of liberal theory and practice” where 

\textit{laissez faire} \ reign and government was small (Gray 1986, p. 26). World War One devastated this order and mounting criticism from across the political spectrum served to further discredit elite liberal capitalism (Richardson 2001, p. 40). Later, in response to the Great Depression, British inter-war liberals such as J.M. Keynes and William Beveridge formulated a renewed social liberalism that attempted keep the “good parts of capitalism while eliminating the bad” (Gray 1986, p. 36; Clarke 2005, p. 51). Post World War Two this social liberal state became institutionally embedded in Anglo-American mixed economies. In conjunction with the newly assembled multi-lateral trading and exchange order – Bretton Woods – and the threat of communism at home and abroad, many states enacted enabling welfare and educational tenets of social liberalism and supported full (male) employment (Jessop 2002a; Mahon 2008; Richardson 2001, p. 41). By the mid-1970s the Big Government of the Keynesian Welfare State/Fordist regulatory regime (Jessop 2002a) was buffeted by multiple external shocks. Rising energy costs and the US budget blow-out from the Vietnam War leading to abandonment of the Bretton Woods system combined to contribute to domestic stagflation (low economic growth and high inflation), in turn fraying the institutional foundations of post-war social liberalism (Harvey 2005). Of course it was more complex than this, but the scene was set for a new orthodoxy in political, economic, and social regulation.

\textbf{Neo-liberalism}

During the Keynesian era elite liberalism was an intellectual backwater (Peck 2008; Peck & Tickell 2002). Its main intellectual protagonists – Fredrick Hayek and the Mont Pelerin society, and Milton Friedman at the Chicago school of economics – were dissident voices in an age of expanding material wealth. But by the late 1970s the entrenched crisis of capital accumulation, together with calls for more social freedoms, opened a political space for the revival of elite liberalism’s small state, \textit{laissez faire} and individualistic choice ethos. This neo-liberal shift was famously enacted by the ‘new right’s’ totemic politicians: Ronald
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and New Zealand’s Roger Douglas. Simultaneously supra-national institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund structurally adjusted the ‘developing world’ to convert the elite liberal ‘more market’/small state ideations into policy (Harvey 2005; Peck 2008; Peck & Tickell 2002). Motivating this neo-liberal political economic reform was the elite liberal view that the hierarchical and bureaucratic Keynesian Welfare State was “inherently inefficient, inflexible, and unresponsive, especially when compared to the market” (Bevir 2005, p. 37).

In practice the neo-liberal revolution of the 1980s and 1990s meant state construction of new “legal, institutional and cultural conditions” (Burchell 1993, p. 274). The intention of these reforms was to create “new forms of political-economic governance premised on the extension of market relationships” (Larner 2000, p. 5). As a policy project, the state’s executive branch rhetorically emphasised *laissez faire* as the ideological co-ordinates through which to create a “good business environment” that, in turn, would revive capital accumulation and promote individual freedom (Harvey 2005, p. 70). Constructing this neo-liberalised social and economic order seemed to demand reducing the size of the state through legal and regulatory reform, but at the same time this was not an “assault on [state] power or significance” (Lewis 2003a, p. 149; see also Harvey 2005). Using this power, Keynesian demand management was dismantled in favour of capital. The market economy was now regulated through monetarist policies – controlling inflation through an independent Reserve Bank’s setting of the interest rate – and supply-side economics (discussed further below), while the international ‘free trade’ of commodities and finance was patchily applied (Harvey 2005; Hay 2004, p. 507-508; Moody 1997, p. 119-120). Together with these economic changes was a moral authoritarianism which stressed “individualism, competitiveness, and economic self sufficiency” and emphasised the place of a romanticised nuclear family as the centre of social life (Peck 2001a, p. 445). This neo-liberal turn reprised elite liberal discourses of individualism and ‘natural’ inequality with the latter presented as a social Darwinian keystone to increasing productivity and supplying a disciplined labour force to capital (Coburn 2000, p. 140). Therefore, rather than reducing the scope and influence of the state, neo-liberalism brought a “radical re-configuration of state institutions and practices” (Harvey 2005, p. 78).
New Zealand’s bellwether neo-liberal revolution was instigated in 1984 by a newly elected fourth Labour government facing a financial crisis (see Easton 1997; Kelsey 1995; Larner 1998a; Le Heron & Pawson 1996; Lewis & Moran 1998; Nagel 1998; Russell 1996). Gray (1998, p. 39) claims New Zealand is the exemplar of the costs and benefits of “reinventing the free market” due to its especially vigorous construction of the elite liberal tenants: liberalisation (the promotion of free competition); deregulation (reducing the role of the state in the economy); privatisation (selling off of public assets); internationalisation (removal of trade barriers to allow the free inward and outward flow of goods, services, and finance); market proxies in the residual public sector; and the lowering of direct taxes (to increase consumer choice) (Jessop 2002a, p. 262).

Although the fourth Labour government sought to maintain some social justice policies (Larner & Craig 2005, p. 407), by the early 1990s neo-liberalisation had become a “political certainty” (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 43). In 1991 the reform agenda was intensified with the recently elected National government’s “quest for expenditure cuts” (Boston et al 1996, p. 6-7) becoming apparent in the ‘mother of all budgets’: welfare was slashed; market rents introduced on state housing; and user pays charges for health care introduced. In further reforms the labour market was deregulated, union power attacked, and state assets sold, causing unemployment to rise to 10 percent (Boston et al 1996, p. 6-7; Clark 2007a; Larner 1998a; Waldgrave, Stephens, & King 2003, p. 197-198). The aims of this form of economic ‘shock therapy’ was ‘the well being of all’ in the long-term. Sustaining this project was the belief that the deleterious short-term social impacts would eventually be meliorated though globalisation (understood as intensifying and spatially expanding market relations) and the new entrepreneurial ethos. Moreover, it was claimed, through these reforms individuals would be encouraged and incentivised to pursue their interests in the market sans Big Government (Larner & Craig 2005, p. 421).

New Zealand’s neo-liberal revolution is also notable for being at the vanguard of state institutional reform (Boston 1991). Inspired by both market and managerialist oriented models, leading reformers applied new public management (NPM) innovations to ‘shrink’ the state and to produce a “government that works better and costs less” in what remained (Boston et al 1996; Larner & Craig 2005; Rose 2000, p. 158; Scott, G. 2001). In practice this meant state managers were to manage towards targeted outcomes. Here bureaucratic capture
was moderated through a series of innovations designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and ‘arms length transactions’ between the state and its service providers. Principal-agency theory and transaction cost analysis (see below) underpinned these reforms with neo-liberal governance coming to see “government as a complex series of contractual relationships ... [with] emphasis on performance specification, reporting and monitoring” (Boston et al 1996, p. 351). Chapter Four discusses how NPM continues to influence how the New Zealand state manages its engagements with popular music.

Substantively, the effects of the neo-liberal turn have been less sanguine. As Coburn (2000, p. 136, 140) shows, the neo-liberalised market economy “produces both higher income inequality and lower social cohesion” along with a growing social acceptance of material inequality. Moreover, for a political project intended to increase wealth, freedom, and well-being, “the main substantive achievement ... has been to redistribute [upwards], rather than to generate wealth and income” (Harvey 2005, p. 159). In New Zealand, these rising material inequalities have become entrenched as has “social polarisation, and racialised poverty” (Larner & Craig 2005, p. 407, see also England & Ward 2007; Roper 2005; Statistics New Zealand 2007a). By 2007 over fifty percent of New Zealand’s total net worth (wealth) was held by 10 percent of the population while “the bottom half of the population collectively owns a mere 5.2 per cent of total net worth” (Statistics New Zealand 2007a, p. 7-8). Across the nation mortality rates reflect this growth in income inequality (Pearce & Dorling 2006, p. 597). Furthermore, contrary to the reform rhetoric of the 1980s and 1990s, New Zealand’s openness to global markets has not realised the state objective of increasing incomes: “between 1986 and 2001, real GDP per person in New Zealand grew by 17 percent compared with an OECD average of 33 percent” (Ministry of Social Development 2003a). Although there are more complex dimensions to this economic and social malaise, this era of reform contextualised the fifth Labour government’s policy agenda and thus the pop renaissance.

‘After neo-liberalism’
In 1999 Labour was “elected partly on the platform of healing social divides evident in the wake of neo-liberal reform” (Porter & Craig 2004, p. 408). In 2002 Helen Clark publically declared “neo-liberalism is over in New Zealand” (Clark 2002), adding later “the hands off days have gone, as our government engages with a wide range of stakeholders to strengthen the economy” (Clark 2007a). For the purpose of this thesis, this ‘after neo-liberal’ turn can
be broadly thought of as a return of social liberal ideals. Here the state is to enhance agents opportunity to engage in the neo-liberal market economy in order “to advance their own economic interests” (Rose 2000, p. 165, see also Craig & Porter 2006; Mahon 2008). To do so the state re-engages agents’ through social inclusion programmes, new institutionalism, and supply-side policies. This ‘after neo-liberal state’ is qualitatively defined by the implementation of policies which are “delivered via state practices that involve partnership, collaboration and joined up government rather than strictly arms length transactions” (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 43, see also Bevir 200; Office of the Prime Minister 2003). Most visible in this shift in governance is that, rather than leaving individuals to traverse the market economy, the ‘after neo-liberal’ state engages in “the active building of new relationships, many with non-traditional economic and social actors” (Larner 2005a, p. 9) including, as this thesis illustrates, pop producing creative entrepreneurs.

Therefore, in its new relations to the productive economy, the ‘after neo-liberal’ state does not claim to function as a direct provider of economic growth. Instead the state develops institutional arrangements to facilitate market activity: enhancing agents’ social capability, generating social capital of trust and participation, entering industry and community networks to form partnerships, and instilling shared norms and values between various market actors (Porter & Craig 2004, p. 403; Rose 2000, p. 165). These micro-institutional innovations are deployed in order to ‘join-up’ atomised economic agents and firms to the market’s cash-nexus’ (Bevir 2005, p. 112). Nevertheless these defining features of the emerging ‘after neo-liberal’ state remain acquiescent to the neo-liberal faith in formal freedom and vibrancy of the market economy (Craig and Cotterell 2007, p. 504; Campbell & Pedersen 2001; Jessop 2002a, p. 465; Hay 2004, p. 519; Porter & Craig 2004). Thus ‘after neo-liberal’ promulgators regard the market economy not an end in itself, but as a means to the higher social liberal goal of widening economic opportunity and deepening social cohesion (see below, New Zealand Treasury 2001).

Arguably what makes the current state ‘after neo-liberal’ is not simply that neo-liberalism is over (post neo-liberalism), nor that there has been a “defining rupture with neo-liberalism” (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 44). The core neo-liberal institutional reforms remain: the Washington Consensus macro-economic policy settings and their deference to global financial capital, monetarist economic management through an independent Reserve Bank
targeting inflation, and social and economic policy attuned to the imaginaries of the stylised “business school hyper globalisation thesis” (Hay 2004, p. 514, see also Bevir 2005; Williamson 2000).

While such formal macro-economic policy settings are applauded by organisations such as the OECD (2007), the persistent downside of New Zealand’s radical global economic openness is the insistent movement of firms and manufacturing off-shore – “hollowing out” the economy (Larner 2005a, p. 10) – and, as noted above, increasing social fragmentation (Larner & Craig 2005; Porter & Craig 2004, p. 404). Seen in this context the primary concern of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state is finding new ways to manage the contradictions of economic growth and social cohesion (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 43), while ameliorating “inequality...the Achilles heel of the modern economy” (Sennett 2006, p. 59). Therefore Labour’s re-engagement with market actors signals, on one dimension, a modification of neo-liberalism’s “more market” and “entrepreneurial self” ethos while these new state programmes are simultaneously framed as addressing the inequalities, polarisations, and state institutional fragmentation produced by earlier reforms (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 43).

Theoretically ‘after neo-liberalism’ reflects Karl Polanyi’s (1957) study of nineteenth century British liberalism wherein he argued the evolution of the market economy and polity in terms of a ‘double movement’5: a period of laissez faire followed by social reactions (contemporary

5 Arguably the most influential theorisation of liberalism’s dynamics in application to society is Karl Polanyi’s (1957) The Great Transformation. In this study of the British elite liberal desire to normalise a laissez faire order in nineteenth century, Polanyi describes how the deliberate application of the tenets of a small state and free markets produce unintended social consequences (Polanyi 1957, p. 141). Rather than unleashing bounty and liberty, it is argued, the market – in conjunction with industrialisation - produced unpalatable social consequences such as widespread unemployment, poverty, economic instability, and environmental destruction. Therefore, Polanyi argues that the elite liberal project to build a self-regulating market revealed the free market economy is an ideological fiction. In order to sustain the market economy it has to be embedded in particular social institutions using “protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention” (Polanyi 1957, p. 132). These institutions constitute the markets for the necessary but fictitious commodities of land, money, and labour (Polanyi 1957, p. 72). Called fictitious because they are not produced for sale in a self-regulating market in the same way as other goods are, but embedded in social, historical, and extra economic systems of reproduction, such as state regulation and social institutions (Block and Evans 2005; Polanyi 1957, p.
examples being WTO/G8 riots) to limit the scope of market expansion. Clinton’s US, Blair’s UK, Schroeder’s Germany, and Clark’s New Zealand were all observed to ameliorate, re-regulate, or “sweeten” earlier neo-liberal reforms which suggested a neo-Polanyian embedding of the market economy in a market society (Peck 2001a, p. 445). This process of “neo-liberalisation” (Brenner & Theodore 2002, p. 353) can be seen as an ongoing and improvisatory process “in motion” (Peck 2001a, p. 449). Such dynamism has lead to debates over the emerging state’s similarities and differences to neo-liberalism. Little agreement has emerged around labelling with synonyms including: ‘after neo-liberal’ (Larner and Craig 2005; Lewis 2003a; Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, ); ‘roll out’ neo-liberal (Peck & Tickell 2002); neo-statism (Jessop 2002a, p. 220); ‘inclusive’ neo-liberalism (Craig & Porter 2004); inclusive liberalism (Richardson 2001, p. 45-51); advanced liberalism (Rose 2000, p. 156-164); “neo-liberalism with a human face” (Arestis & Sawyer 2005, p. 17), and perhaps most famously Giddens’ (2000) ‘Third-way’ between social democracy and neo-liberalism (see also Callinicos 2001 for critique; Chatterjee et al 1999 for a New Zealand discussion).

Critics of neo-liberalism as an analytic frame suggest too often it is treated as a singular unified and coherent project (Barnett 2005; Castree 2006). In doing so it is argued researchers and commentators are prone to agglomerating disparate state policies and read diverse social practices under the rubric ‘neo-liberal’ thus diluting analytical specificity (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 44). However this thesis’ reading of the contemporary ‘after neo-liberal’ state does not suggest a unified, singular, monolithic state project has emerged (Harvey 2005, p. 70). Rather the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s emerging formations constitute only “partial solutions to diverse problems” while its policies remain contested and “riven with contradictions” (Larner 2005a, p. 14-15). Furthermore as the state seeks to partner non-state actors these state policies become enacted by multiple agents with multiple motivations (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008). Moreover, ‘after neo-liberalism’ is analytically productive for understanding how Labour constructed the pop renaissance particularly when contrasted with the neo-liberalism of the ‘benign state’ (Cloonan 1999).

72). Specifically the market economy, rather than being self-regulating and adaptive, needs to be embedded in a particular social order, what Polanyi calls a ‘market society’ (Polanyi: 1957, p. 71).
**Figure 1: The neo-liberal state and the ‘after neo-liberal’ state (from a New Zealand perspective)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Neo-Liberal State</th>
<th>‘After Neo-liberal’ State</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>State relation to market economy</strong></td>
<td>Increase scope of market/reduce size of state through privatisation, deregulation, free mobility of capital/trade.</td>
<td>Market economy remains central, defining institution of the economy and state policy. State’s role now to partner, enable, facilitate, negotiate, and leverage agents and firms into domestic and international markets. Targeted subsidies/public private partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State and finance</strong></td>
<td>Enforce property rights, maintain integrity of financial system, lower inflation through non-democratic Reserve Bank target. Aims to create a ‘good business’ environment. Balanced Budget</td>
<td>Enforce property rights, maintain integrity of financial system and low inflation through non-democratic Reserve Bank targets. Aims to create a ‘good business’ environment. Balanced Budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Governance</strong></td>
<td>Legalistic emphasis. State creates regulatory framework within a shrinking state. New Public Management and ‘arms length’ contractual relations with service delivery agencies</td>
<td>‘Human face’ state that is personalised and networked. State agents often acting as the state’s ‘little fingers’ (Phillips 2002): brokering deals, spreading market information and networking between diverse community and business enterprises. The state as another player in the marketplace, reducing transaction costs and accumulating social capital. Still managed by New Public Management frameworks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State discourses of citizens’ subjectivities</strong></td>
<td>Thatcher and ‘No such thing as Society’: individualisation, atomisation, self activated entrepreneurial subjects, discourses of Freedom.</td>
<td>Nationalism and social inclusion. Foster national identity in a globalised world. Create a ‘we feeling’ within nation’s citizens and the Kiwi Diaspora. Social inclusion primarily through engagement in labour market (Rose 2000, p. 161).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supply-side economic policies</strong></td>
<td>Reduce taxation. Seek to reduce wages as means to achieving international economic competition. Reducing social safety net, user pays development of skills and education.</td>
<td>Emphasis on skills, formal and informal education, and training. Instilling understanding of requirements of market economy in agents: ‘creating opportunities’. Social safety net interlinked with labour force participation (flexicurity and workfare). Tax reduction oriented to savings and business investment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
‘After neo-liberal’ policies: supply-side, new institutionalism, social inclusion

This section introduces what I consider to be the key ‘after neo-liberal’ policies: supply-side economics, social inclusion, and new institutionalism. Through an understanding of these policies the following chapters can then describe and explain how domestic popular music became aligned to the ‘after neo-liberal’ concerns of social cohesion and the enhancing of agents’ engagement with the market economy. Furthermore, these policies provide analytical insights into how state in(ter)vention stimulated New Zealand’s pop renaissance, and why popular music may be understood as a form of ‘after neo-liberal’ social policy.

Supply-side economics
Supply-side economic theory is a central institutional dimension of neo-liberalism which too has been elaborated further by the ‘after neo-liberal’ state (Mahon 2008). Notably both social inclusion and new institutional policies can be seen to operate on the supply side of the economy.

Since the 1980s, when supply-side economics gained ascendance under the Reagan administration, neo-liberal economic policy has, in general, come to argue for a “stable framework of incentives and price signals” (Tobin 1982, p. 134). In other words low inflation was understood as a necessary prerequisite to expanding and intensifying market transactions. Once this economic setting is in place supply-side economics prioritises “capital investment, saving, productivity, work effort and enterprise” over Keynesian redistribution and demand management (Krieger 1982, p. 49-50; Thompson 1990). As a loosely configured economic doctrine supply-side-ism’s intellectual roots are in Say’s Law: supply (or production) creates its own demand (Arestis & Sawyer 2005, p. 179; Fusfeld 1990, p. 45-48).

Such a supply-side framework is to be achieved through a mix of policies: monetarism to control inflation; using the tax system to create monetary incentives for private enterprise; and the provision of an appropriately skilled and educated workforce. Together these elements comprise, for neo-liberals, the “appropriate ‘real’ factor inputs to the economic process and their organisation” (Thompson 1990, p. 46). Therefore the market’s supply-side
can then be seen as a multifaceted domain, one that is amendable to state regulation and
creation to ensure:

The conditions of labour supply, such as the number and quality of workers and the
training and skill composition of the labour force, the organisational structure of the
economy and production, the role of management expertise, the level and composition
of investment and technological developments, competition policy and so on
(Thompson 1990, p. 46).

Different aspects of the supply-side have been emphasised under the neo-liberal state and the
‘after neo-liberal’ state. The neo-liberal state can be seen to have emphasised the financial
‘conditions of the labour supply’ and the institutional structure of the economy. To do so the
neo-liberal state sought to stimulate market activity and structure international economic
competitiveness through reduced welfare, liberalised labour markets, cheap labour, and tax
cuts (Bevir 2005, p. 111). As noted above New Zealand’s neo-liberal state was particularly
vigorous in its application of market incentives in the form of legislation around incomes and
transfers.

The ‘after neo-liberal’ state continues supply-side economic policies, maintaining an
emphasis on supplying the fiscal incentives for private sector investment. But the supply-side
also provides scope for adaptation to social liberal aspirations (Bevir 2005, p. 111),
particularly in the area of creating a skilled workforce and partnering agents into the market.
According to Helen Clark (2007) Labour “focus[ed] on education and skills” as these
components of the supply-side are understood as an “investment in people…and help in
transitioning to employment” while retaining the supply-side principles of market incentives
and discipline (Maharey 2003). Such supply-side policies are relevant to this thesis. As
Chapters Four, Five, and Six discuss Labour’s popular music interventions included informal
education as well as a number of credentialed music industry training programmes.

Critics of this ‘after neo-liberal’ supply-side-ism suggest that although these policies may be
effective in creating a productive and efficient labour force they do not attain the social
liberal ideals of providing “individuals with the resources for personal liberation or
fulfilment” (Bevir 2005, p. 122). For Marxist commentators such supply-side polices have a
narrow sense of human liberation as agents’ value remains assessed “on the basis of the individual’s ability to contribute to the production of surplus value and the accumulation of capital” (Clarke 2005, p. 55). In the case of the pop renaissance the ‘after neo-liberal’ state comes to value popular musicians and their creative work when they enter the market which can also been seen as a proxy for social inclusion.

Social inclusion

As mentioned above ‘promotional state’ engagement with popular music is sometimes legitimated through unemployment and social welfare concerns. Social inclusion is the ‘after neo-liberal’ discourse of social welfare. It is also the language through which popular music is frequently folded into Labour’s economic and social policies, as discussed in the following chapter and Chapter Six (Atkinson 1998; Beland 2007; Jayasuriya 2006; Levitas 1998; Lister 1998; Milliband 2006; Porter & Craig 2004; Saunders 2005; Silver and Miller-Lewis 2003). Social inclusion can also be seen to work in concert with the other buzzwords of ‘after neo-liberal’ statecraft: social cohesion, social well-being, sustainable employment, sustainable development, and so on. Seen together such discourses may be easily dismissed as a fashionable way to talk about inequality and poverty (Beland 2007, p. 127; Levitas 1998). However the social inclusion discourse has an expanded sense of poverty that is not entirely material, demonstrating a growing consensus on the multidimensional features of social disadvantage (Atkinson 2003, p. 51). Therefore, by way of introduction, social inclusion can be understood as the discourse through which the ‘after neo-liberal’ state addresses its social cohesion function by applying health, education, housing, and employment policy. In such ‘after neo-liberal’ contexts social inclusion is believed to be possible without recourse to redistributive welfare, a state intervention that would disrupt market incentives (Jayasuriya 2006, p. 13-14; Smyth, Reddel, & Jones 2004).

Social inclusion may be considered a relatively new policy paradigm yet it has a longer historical trajectory. Originating in the context of Republican and solidaristic France in the 1960s and 1970s, it then travelled to other EU nations in the 1990s through its discursive converse “social exclusion” (Beland 2007). Social inclusion has since gained contemporary provenance in the liberal welfare states (Esping-Anderson 1990) – including the UK, Australia, and New Zealand - albeit with local inflections (Bradshaw 2003; Jones & Smyth 1999; Levitas 1996; Porter & Craig 2004). Perhaps the most high profile example of social
inclusion/exclusion’s political ascendancy in the Anglophone world was when Blair’s government established a Social Exclusion Unit to address Britain’s social problems. Social exclusion, in this agency’s definition, being:

A shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown (Social Exclusion Unit 1997).

New Zealand’s fifth Labour government too deployed the social exclusion discourse, noting “social exclusion is detrimental for families, communities and economic growth” (Ministry of Social Development 2000, p. 3). Although New Zealand lacks the fiscal resources to enact the European model of social inclusion, constrained as it is by size, population, and the disciplinary pressures of global financial capital (Porter & Craig 2004, p. 404), the Ministry of Social Development claimed a focus on social inclusion would require:

Building capacity, creating opportunities, and tackling existing areas of social exclusion. Examples of such policies include measures to reduce child poverty, literacy, early childhood education, primary health care, economic development, active employment policy, and improving work incentives and making work pay (Ministry of Social Development 2001a, p. 11).

A number of philosophical conceptualisations underpin ‘after neo-liberal’ state understandings of social inclusion. Most notable was Cambridge academic Sir Anthony Atkinson’s (1998, p. 13) contribution wherein he outlined three aspects to social exclusion. Firstly, an agent’s degree of social exclusion occurs in relation to the norms and expectations of a society at a particular moment. Secondly, social exclusion occurs through the constraints placed on an individual’s agency by the actions of other individuals, groups, or institutions. Thirdly, a temporal dimension that suggests an agent’s present circumstance (for example,

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unemployment) does not imply exclusion unless future possibilities are also limited. Social exclusion recognises poverty is relational, spatial, temporal, and not exclusively monetary but nevertheless elides the persistent structural features of social class and political economy.

Such philosophical theorising resonates with Amartya Sen’s (1999, 1992) and John Rawls (1971) notions of ‘freedom and capability’. Here Sen’s social liberal ideas of “development as freedom” and “capability poverty” sees social exclusion as measured against an agent’s access to opportunities to, as Unger writes, “stand up, go forward, and connect” with the neo-liberal market economy (quoted in Amin & Thrift 2002, p. 144). Social inclusion, in this interpretation, is thus the freedom for an agent to realise the life they might choose to live, rather than enduring a mode of living forced upon them by circumstance not of their choosing (Burchard, Le Grand, and Piachaud 2002, p. 6).

Leaving aside moral legitimation, quantification and definitional problems, Beland (2007, p. 124) usefully suggests social inclusion is integral to the politics of welfare state reform. In the ‘after neo-liberal’ context social inclusion can be understood as a policy paradigm through which the perverse social problems of a neo-liberal market economy are addressed: principally the reproduction of labour power under the primacy of the market, un- and underemployment, and the attendant rise of material inequality (Beland 2007; Hayes, Gray, & Edwards 2008; Levitas 1998; McLaughlin 1994, p. 159; Porter & Craig 2004). Therefore it can be argued that the state goal of social inclusion is realised through agents’ engagement with work and the market economy (Rose 2000, p. 161; Smyth, Reddel, & Jones 2004, p. 602).

What needs to be underscored here is that social inclusion policies seek “to create new forms of social regulation that actively foster market participation by individuals” (Jayasuriya 2006, p. 13). By “creating social forms that promote enterprising subjects and values” (Jayasuriya 2006, p. 14), social inclusion also harmonises with neo-liberalism’s moral emphasis on individual responsibility and the market as the core organisational institution of modern capitalist societies (Beland 2007; Cerny 2008). This is most vividly illustrated by Blair and Brown’s dictum where ‘after neo-liberal’ welfare is now a ‘hand up not a hand out’, oriented to creating “opportunity, empowerment and security” (Porter & Craig 2004, p. 387). In this context social inclusion policies do not disrupt the elite liberal ideology that “inequality
generates economic success” (Glyn & Miliband 1994, p. 2) and thus grudgingly accepts material inequalities (Jayasuriya 2006, p. 17; Smyth, Reddel, & Jones 2004, p. 603).

Therefore social inclusion is a proxy for participation in the labour market (Jayasuriya 2006; Levitas 1996, 1998; Porter & Craig 2004). As Jayasuriya (2006, p.13) notes social inclusion is the language through which “social policy agendas are … harnessed towards creating and facilitating active participation in the world of work”. To this end, “social policy … is designed to make a productive contribution or enhance greater participation within the economy” with inclusion and citizenship defined “in terms of access to, and participation within, the market” (Jayasuriya 2006, p. 16-17; Rose 2000). Those unable to be enabled or included in the market are then offered supply-side “training or education for such inclusion” (Porter & Craig 2004, p. 405).

By placing a premium on inclusion as participation in the neo-liberalised labour market, the institutional parameters of paid work are simultaneously depoliticised. As Porter & Craig (2004, p. 392) note, social inclusion is presented as a consensual rationale which claims to act in the interests of those potentially excluded from the globalised market order. While Levitas (1996) argues that social inclusion, as participation in the labour market, elides the disparities of income and working conditions within the labour market: the ‘excluded’ are more likely to enter on a low wage work (Richardson & Miller-Lewis 2002, p. 30). Therefore social inclusion rhetoric can be seen to depoliticise debates around the distribution of wealth and the returns to labour within a labour market where power remains slanted in capital’s favour. As Beland (2007, p. 127) contends, by doing so the social inclusion discourse deflects “analytical attention away from horizontal distribution through the language of social class” and naturalises the vertical inequalities the market creates.

This brief review of social inclusion and its critiques risks reducing much of the complexity in contemporary debate and policy. However, such a review serves to introduce my reading of the salient features of social inclusion policies. The following chapters describe and analyse how Labour’s popular music policies are interwoven with these social inclusion aspirations. In particular, how the ‘after neo-liberal’ emphasis on economic development, youth as potentially socially excluded, active employment, social capital, and work incentives
were folded into creative industry policy. Now, the discussion introduces new institutionalism and how this policy framework helped form the pop renaissance.

**New institutionalism**

*Institutional thought*

Understanding the significance of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s application of new institutional thought to popular music requires a prior understanding of institutions. Institutions are a core concept in the social sciences denoting somewhat formalised or structural arrangements of some longevity, whether large or small scaled: what Berger (1977) succinctly called ‘the grooves of life’. Yet institutions are approached from an extraordinary range of perspectives and epistemologies: Political science (Bevir & Rhodes 1995), sociology (Campbell 1998; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Finnemore 1996), economics (Coase 1988; North 1991; Ostrom 1990; Williamson 1975) as well as historical, rational choice, sociological and organisational theory versions of both old and new institutionalism (Campbell 2004; Greenwood & Hinings 1996; Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lecours 2005, p. 16-17; Lounsbury 2006; Nee 2005; , Powell & DiMaggio 1991; Scott, R. 2001; Selznick, 1996; Thelen 1999). Each has different conceptualisations of institutions but, arguably, their unifying feature is an interest in understanding how the diverse array, and interplay, of social institutions comes to influence agents’ action.

Of most importance to understanding Labour’s construction of a market for Kiwi pop is institutional economics and in particular the New Institutional Economics (NIE). These schools of thought analyse how the institutional form of the economy and firms affects economic action, exchange, and ‘efficiency’ (Campbell 2004; Lane and Ersson 2000; North

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7 Despite institutions being a core theme in social sciences their peripatetic nature has led to criticism. Lecours (2005, p. 3) suggests institutional analysis “suffers from theoretical and conceptual confusion” and “lacks explanatory power”. Also, institutional thought tends to be normative and descriptive, providing little insight into power inequalities, agents strategies, and change (Lecours 2005, p. 11).

8 Institutional economics can be divided into ‘old’ (although there are contemporary variants) and ‘new’ school. The ‘old’ institutional approaches of the early twentieth century questioned neo-classical economics’ methodological individualism. In doing so, they illuminated the market economy’s inequalities in material outcomes, the manipulation of economic power by monopolies and finance capital, and the blocking of innovation through vested interests (Rutherford 1994, p. 130).
2004). To this end NIE has developed theories around the market dimensionalities of public and private institutions importantly in the area of transaction costs (Coase 1937). In NIE’s analytical focus transaction costs are the costs incurred in “running the economic system”: gaining information, making contracts, and maintaining relationships (Williamson 2000, p. 15). For Coase such time costs were a significant omission from the friction-less world of neo-classical economics and ‘perfect information’ (Nee 2005, p. 50).

Williamson (1975) developed Coase’s transaction cost theory further. Williamson advanced the NIE programme by examining organisations to view transaction costs as the costs of doing business. Missing from orthodox neo-classical economics was how the firm (and the NPM of the neo-liberal state) internally organises transactions, for it may well be more costly to engage the market than organise supply within the firm (Hodgson 2005, p. 362). This led Williamson to theorise ways that organisations can ensure some form of order and stability in production through markets (the less stable or organised form), networks (contracting or informal relations) or hierarchies (within the firm). Such theorising around transaction costs is relevant to the ‘after neo-liberal’ state. As Chapter Four explains, the state bears many costs of making contact with music industry agents which are necessary for facilitating creative entrepreneurs’ access to popular music markets.

**Hybrid New Institutionalism and the ‘after neo-liberal’ state**

If neo-classical economics privileging of markets was the intellectual thrust behind neo-liberal policies, various branches of new institutionalism provided much of the theoretical justification for the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s revised engagement with the market economy and its actors (Bevir 2005; Craig & Porter 2006; McLeod 2001; Peck 2001a; Porter & Craig 2004; World Bank 1997). Here, in general, the application of new institutional thought by the state is not in elite liberal terms, but in the somewhat more social liberal framings of the ‘enabling’ and ‘capable’ state where its institutions and organisations are oriented to producing “valuable outcomes” that “foster [a] person’s opportunities” (Sen 2000, p. 19, 142). Therefore, the ‘after neo-liberal’ state can be seen as legitimate in entering in the market economy if it is to reduce transaction costs. This social liberal framing was captured in the New Zealand Treasury’s paper the ‘Inclusive Economy’ (2001, p. 5) where it was suggested the state could engage its neo-liberalised citizens to develop “broad based opportunities to participate in society and the economy”.

36
In ‘after neo-liberal’ state application, and new institutionalist diction, institutions are not to be equated simply with organisations and laws. Instead any market transaction – such as producing a popular music concert or playing Kiwi pop on the radio – enacts, and proves to be dependent on, a range of basic but enormously significant institutions. These include “formal and informal laws, rules and conventions of exchanges (such as markets), and social phenomena informing those exchanges (such as ‘information’ and arguably ‘social capital’)” (Craig & Porter 2006, p. 101). Consequently, and in contrast to neo-liberalism’s atomised rational actor, new institutional thought understands “that people and institutions alike are embedded in wider social contexts that structure their choices, behaviour, and development” (Bevir 2005, p. 35).

The ‘after neo-liberal’ state can be seen to have two new institutional modes to enable market transactions. As British new institutionalist theorist Mark Bevir (2005) demonstrates these modes can be understood through the heuristic of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ institutionalism. In New Zealand, as elsewhere, neo-liberal NPM reforms (see Scott, G. 2001; Boston et al 1996) disaggregated state functions into decentred market transactions overseen by managers with narrow, yet highly specific, accountabilities. This vigorous application of market rationalities, fidelity techniques, and management by objective to the business of state operations we might call ‘hard’ institutionalism. In summary, ‘hard’ institutionalism influenced state practices through public choice theory to reduce vested departmental or interest group capture; the emphasis on contractual relations based upon agency theory (the division of principle and agents in funding); transaction cost analysis based upon the supply of goods either through the market or hierarchies; and NPM where managers within state organisations are given autonomy to manage. The aim was to make the state more responsive to ‘clients’ who act as surrogates in the absence of profit motive (Boston et al 1996; Rose 2000; Scott, G. 2001). Crucially these NPM reforms created a number of path dependencies, and Chapter Four and Five illustrate NPM’s continuing influence on state supports for popular music.

In contrast, ‘soft’ institutionalism is the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s inventive mode of enabling and facilitating market transactions (Bevir 2005; Craig & Porter 2006). ‘Soft’ institutional modalities include more voluntaristic modes of institutional configuration such as partnerships, trust based on social networks, and community based and local collaborations
which involve various kinds of interest group participation. In broader contexts ‘soft institutionalism’ might also include the whole panoply of the state’s ‘little fingers’ (Phillips 2002) – quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (QuANGOS) and public-private partnerships – that link the centralised ‘after neo-liberal’ state to diverse economic and social spheres. To this end the state is partially re-constituted to act as a creative, partnering institution that bears the monetary transaction costs in order to enable, facilitate, broker, partner, and occasionally fund, individuals and firms into the ‘cash nexus’ (Hodgson 2004). Chapters Three and Four will illustrate how the ANLPS created a “supportive infrastructure” to join-up pop producing creative entrepreneurs with the market (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 45).

Therefore the ‘after neo-liberal state’ claims to be “work[ing] together” to “compliment” the market economy, especially through programmes of social inclusion and community/arts mobilisation (Maharey 2003, see also Bevir 2005, p. 111; Hodgson 2004; Craig & Porter 2006, p. 103). Such a ‘soft’ institutional approach amends the neo-liberal state’s ignorance of forms of social connectivity that are essential for information sharing and the reduction of transaction costs. Perhaps more importantly, these information sharing ‘soft’ institutions can be fostered by the ‘after neo-liberal’ state without requiring recourse to legislation or the re-regulation of the neo-liberalised market economy. Furthermore this mode of state engagement with the market problematises the popular music literatures’ understanding of overt or blunt state ‘intervention’ in the market (see Chapter One).

‘Soft’ institutionalism also exemplifies a new form of government: governance. If large hierarchical government was a characteristic of the Keynesian Welfare State that neo-liberals dismantled in favour of disaggregated and marketised state services (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; Rhodes 2000) then the fragmented ‘after neo-liberal’ state is characterised by network based processes of co-ordination or governance (Newman 2005a, p. 8; Rhodes 2000). The prominent feature of this new institutional governance is its emphasis on “individuals acting in partnership held together by relations of trust” (Bevir & Rhodes 2006, p. 83), and the centralised state performing new roles in “encountering and negotiating” (Newman 2005a, p. 4) with civil society, the market, and individuals as it seeks to build social inclusion and economic growth (Larner & Craig 2005; Porter & Craig 2004). Normatively such ‘after neo-liberal’ governance perceives “networks as the preferred mode of governance, capable of
overcoming the disbenefits [sic] of both market and hierarchy” (Newman 2005a, p. 12). As Labour’s then Minister of Social Development, Steve Maharey (2003), noted; “partnership is very much the touchstone of the approach we have encouraged since taking office”. Perversely though while neo-liberalism was partly about reducing the state’s size, scope, and influence, under these arrangements power has been re-concentrated at the centre; the new network governance of ‘after neo-liberalism’ is strongly directive (Sennett 2006, p. 163).

This review of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s articulations with a market economy is central to understanding how New Zealand’s pop renaissance is constructed. Possessing an understanding of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s rationales and policy tools this conceptualisation can then be conjoined with Cloonan’s (1999) ‘promotional state’ ideal-type to form the ‘after neo-liberal promotional state’ (ANLPS). As an analytical concept the ANLPS is a way of capturing *how* and *why* popular music is aligned with the logics of market led development through the supply-side and ‘soft’ institutions, and how these policies and programmes are oriented by social inclusion concerns. The following table summarises the salient aspects of the ANLPS, noting the affinities between the popular music and ‘after neo-liberalism’ literatures.

**Figure 2: The ‘After Neo-Liberal Promotional State’ (ANLPS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘After neo-liberal’ problem</th>
<th>‘After neo-liberal’ state rationale and response</th>
<th>Promotional State concerns</th>
<th>ANLPS policies and programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with falling incomes in a ‘hollowed out’ economy</td>
<td>Creative industries – including popular music - as domains of future employment growth Enabling agents to participate in market economy Enabling creative entrepreneurs into the market economy through formal employment.</td>
<td>Youth employment Enhancing economically marginal agents income earning capacity through the arts Urban regeneration</td>
<td>Supply-side development of labour force’s skills and capacities Social inclusion: popular music as market activity Music and music industry education: either formal and/or informal Artists workfare programmes State facilitated partnerships and networks to share information and reduce transaction costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Figure 2 cont.: The ‘After Neo-Liberal Promotional State’ (ANLPS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘After neo-liberal’ problem</th>
<th>‘After neo-liberal’ state rationale and response</th>
<th>Promotional State concerns</th>
<th>ANLPS policies and programmes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion and social fragmentation</td>
<td>Re-asserting national interests/ identity</td>
<td>Dominance of imported pop over local products</td>
<td>Export programmes aligned to existing international market practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presenting Kiwi popular musicians as success stories in the domestic and global music economy</td>
<td>Concerns over ‘Cultural imperialism’, and how to foster national identity</td>
<td>Celebrating local sounds through ‘New Zealand Music Month’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing with electoral backlash of selling of state assets</td>
<td>Accessing global markets</td>
<td>Small domestic market</td>
<td>Creating markets for local sounds: targeting broadcasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>‘Grow the music business’ through partnering state alignment to existing market practices</td>
<td>Supporting domestic pop production in the face of imported pop</td>
<td>Public -private partnership funding for pop producers aligned to the hierarchical music market</td>
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Part B: Bourdieussian sociology

Introduction

Through ANLPS policies and programmes much domestic popular music enters the market economy of sales, airplay, and economic returns from intellectual property. However, as feminist political economists such as JK Gibson-Graham (1996) and Marilyn Waring (1988) have noted, the ‘official’ market economy and commodity production is “haunted” by non-market exchange (Gibson-Graham 1996, p. 244-245). This insight draws attention to how New Zealand’s pop renaissance can also be seen to be formed through multiple social practices that are non-market in nature, containing elements of symbolic exchange, and motivated by actors’ divergent interests.

To analyse these social practices necessitates a shift from the language of political economy and institutional theory to sociology. Here, as later chapters illustrate, the influential French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu offers constructive conceptual tools with which to analyse social and institutional practices within the pop renaissance. Therefore, the motivation for bringing the ANLPS and Bourdieu together is to develop a richer understanding of the relationships and articulations between the macro-structures of the state and the economy and the micro-practices of creative entrepreneurs that together form the pop renaissance. In Chapter Five, Bourdieu allows a sociological interpretation of how creative entrepreneurs traverse a field of pop production structured by the ANLPS to be developed. Important for this interpretation is how creative entrepreneurs mobilise Bourdieu’s ‘alternative forms of capital’ (Beland 2005, p. 37; Bourdieu 1977; Mutch, Delbridge & Ventresca 2006). Chapter Six uses Bourdieu’s theorisations of the new petit bourgeoisie and social trajectories to analyse popular music policy as a form of social policy.

Bourdieu’s theoretical concepts are widely utilised by social scientists investigating popular music. Studies in this area to date include an analysis of how the ‘habitus’ “disposes musician agents to play, write, record, or perform in a particular way” (Toynbee 2000, p. 36); how the pop field is influenced by state policies (Kruse 1998); how the pop field is comprised of genres (Regev 2002); how cultural intermediaries act as gatekeepers in large record labels (Negus 1999); the uses of ‘sub cultural’ capital in late 1980s ‘acid house’ club cultures
(Thornton 1997); and the use of alternative forms of capital by classical musicians in London (Cottrell 2004). Like these studies, this thesis only employs aspects of Bourdieu’s sociological theory and does not claim to be a cohesive Bourdieussian analysis of the pop renaissance. Instead, because Bourdieu is “good to think with” (Jenkins 2002, p. 176), the researcher can select pertinent concepts through which to develop sociological interpretations. Therefore, this thesis focuses on using Bourdieu’s alternative forms of capital to analyse state funding practices, creative entrepreneurs as members of Bourdieu’s new petit bourgeoisie, and Bourdieu’s concept of social trajectories in relation to emerging forms of ‘after neo-liberal’ social policy. Recognising this partial application of Bourdieu nevertheless does not mean an abdication of an overview of Bourdieu’s social theory.

Sociology can appear ‘gloomy’, negative, and pessimistic to those unfamiliar with its critical impetus. However Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 198) sees sociological knowledge as empowering: “the business of the sociologist is to denaturalise and to de-fatalise the social world, that is, to destroy the myths that cloak the exercise of power and perpetuation of domination” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 49). In his conceptualisation of the social world Bourdieu synthesises classical sociological thought by incorporating each tradition’s insights. From Marx, Bourdieu maintains the primacy of the economic sphere as having real, although not determining, effects on classed agents’ life chances. From Weber, Bourdieu incorporates concepts of status or ‘distinction’ that the cultural representations of material goods and lifestyles form. From Durkheim, Bourdieu sees society as a mythological and somewhat arbitrary symbolic construction produced by powerful social groups. These groups construct the social world through classificatory orders (the economy, state, the family) which, in turn, become internalised in sub-ordinate groups’ classificatory schemas of the social world (Jenkins 2002, p. xi; Swartz 1997, p. 38-48). Overall, all agents encounter the “social world [of] accumulated history” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 46).

In Bourdieu’s critical approach to society he seeks “access to and to explicate experiences, generic or specific, that are ordinarily overlooked or unformulated” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 206). This thesis too seeks to be critical in this way, for it argues against liberal and pluralist interpretations of the pop renaissance. That is, the music making creative entrepreneur is not just an individual pursuing material interests in the market economy but a
classed agent negotiating a social trajectory through an ‘after neo-liberal’ society. Such an analysis requires a theory of society or what Bourdieu (1984, 1985) calls ‘social space’.

For all this affinity, encapsulating such a theory for a particular analytic project like this one remains a challenge; Bourdieu’s theorising is dense, scattered, contradictory, and at times vague⁹ (King 2000). Bearing in mind these limitations, the following builds an image of Bourdieussian social space through a discussion of the key concepts: alternative forms of capital, fields, illusio, habitus, social space, social trajectories, and the new petit bourgeoisie.

**Alternative forms of capital**

Bourdieu adapts the term capital from economics to describe the material and symbolic resources actors draw upon in their pursuit of social trajectories through social space (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 47). Here Bourdieu classifies these alternative capital forms as economic, social, cultural, and symbolic. They include accumulated power resources of private agents which enable them to “appropriate social energy in the form of reified living labour” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 46). Thus, theoretically, Bourdieu’s utilisation of capitals retains Marx’s connotations of capital as integral to power relations (Bourdieu 1984 p. 113; Swartz 1997, p. 72). Yet Bourdieu’s sociological use of capitals is a “radical correction to economism” (Lebaron 2003, p. 561; Skeggs 2004, p. 16), especially as it analyses the symbolic aspects of social relations and their associated non-material exchanges in order to demonstrate a “general science of the economy of practices” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 47).

As it is the ‘dull-compulsions’ of the ‘cash nexus’ coercing the majority of the population to work Bourdieu argues it is economic capital – “income, wealth, financial inheritances, monetary assets” (Skeggs 2004, p. 16) – that dominates capitalist societies. For Bourdieu the power of economic capital also derives from its fungibility being as it is “directly convertible into money” and backed by property rights (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 47). Nonetheless Bourdieu does not seek to reduce all social action to the pursuit of material interests, yet the dominance

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⁹ Bourdieu (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 159) denies producing a “general discourse of the social world”, arguing “against theory made to be shown or seen” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 160). Instead he claims “the logic of research, which in my eyes is inseparably empirical and theoretical,” requires that social research develops iteratively between the research material and theory (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 160).
of economic capital means the other alternative forms of capital – social, cultural, and symbolic – are ultimately convertible into economic capital (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 47; Swartz 1997, p. 80).

Notions of social capital – connections, networks and group memberships (Skeggs 2004, p. 17) – have over the last twenty years spurred an academic cottage industry. While communitarian social capital advocates and state policy makers follow theorists including Robert Putnam (2000, see also Portes 1998) to narrate social capital as a consensual institution, Bourdieu (1997a, p. 51) prefers to stress power relations in his definition of social capital:

The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectively owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.

As Chapters Four and Five discuss, social capital is a resource both state agents and creative entrepreneurs generate and deploy in the production of the pop music. This discussion will also illustrate how the “reproduction of social capital presupposes an unceasing effort of sociability, a continuous series of exchanges in which recognition is endlessly affirmed and reaffirmed” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 52). In doing so, this thesis highlights the use of social capital in the non-market aspects of pop production and the ways in which the state inserts Kiwi pop into music markets.

Cultural capital has three forms: embodied, objectified and institutionalised. Cultural capital in its embodied form includes “long lasting dispositions of the mind and body” (Bourdieu

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10 Bourdieu’s conception of social capital takes a critical, class based stance to emphasise social “conflicts and the power function” (Siisiainen 2000, p. 1). In comparison, US theorists such as Putnam (2000) and Coleman (1997) approach social capital as a functional concept, emphasising consensus seeking activities between agents through “moral obligations and norms, social values (especially trust) and social networks” (Siisiainen 2000, p. 1). This functionalist interpretation of social capital is frequently narrated in state policy accounts as a generative resource states’ can develop and harness to meliorate all manner of urban, economic, and social ills (Fine 2001; Portes 1998).
This classification includes any form of ‘self-improvement’ such as a toned body, musical skill, or a cultivated fashion sense that cannot be done “second hand” or through instantaneous transmission (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 48). Therefore, embodied cultural capital is “established through the time needed for acquisition” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 49). In the objectified form, cultural capital exists “in material objects and media, such as writings, paintings, monuments, instruments, etc.” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 50). Objectified cultural capital can then be used in social trajectory struggles “in which the agents wield strengths and obtain profits proportionate to their mastery of this objectified capital” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 50). In the field of popular music objectified cultural capital may include the elements of fashion, style, and dress. Cultural capital in its institutionalised form refers to educational credentials (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 47). These credentials “impose recognition” and “establish conversion rates” that guarantee the “monetary value of a given academic capital” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 52). For example, how professional qualifications – engineering, law, and medicine, some forms of commerce – are plainly convertible into economic capital. However, as Chapter Six discusses, the ANLPS’s supply-side policies and the petit bourgeoisie strategy of investing in creative industry education (as institutionalised cultural capital) does not readily reconvert back into economic capital or a positive social trajectory (Bourdieu 1984).

Symbolic capital, the final alternative form of capital developed by Bourdieu, denotes distinctions such as “prestige, reputation and fame etc” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 230). For Bourdieu (1985, p. 731), agents possessing symbolic capital “yield a power proportionate to their symbolic capital, i.e. to the recognition they receive from a group”, with the holders of symbolic capital conferred power in the eyes of other agents. Forms of symbolic capital include awards, prizes, the prestige of accumulated economic wealth, and in the case of popular music, chart hits, record sales, media recognition, or commercially successful tours.

More importantly, for Bourdieu, symbolic capital is ‘denied’ capital for it is the “form the different types of capital take once they are perceived and recognised as legitimate” (Skeggs 2004, p. 17). By this Bourdieu is suggesting symbolic capital accumulation requires the marshalling and combining of the other forms of capital. Seen this way, symbolic capital is not ‘natural’ for it demands “recognition, deference, obedience, or the service of others” by disguising the “the underlying ‘interested’ relations” of social agents (Swartz 1997, p. 43).
Hence, symbolic capital is a powerful resource as it is “recognised [as] a ‘credit’ which under certain conditions, and always in the long run, guarantees ‘economic’ profits” (Bourdieu & Nice 1980, p. 262). Chapter Five analyses how creative entrepreneurs marshal the alternative forms of capital, and in particular symbolic capital, to access ANLPS funding and the market.

**Fields**

The concept of the field is a flexible tool for analysing social action, but is not unique to Bourdieussian social theory. Levi Martin (2003, p. 28) in an extensive review of field theory identifies three main approaches. Firstly “the field is conceived as an analytic area of simplified dimensions in which we position persons or institutions”. Secondly, and drawing upon the physical sciences, “there is a sense of a field as an organisation of forces”. Thirdly, the Bourdieussian approach which synthesises the previous conceptualisations to understand fields as social spaces of “contestation”.

Field theory operates at the meso-scale by disaggregating social space into specific social spheres – a field – in order to analyse the inter-relations between actors, organisations, and institutions within it. Therefore “field theory [is] concerned with how meaning is produced relationally, both via the play of difference among symbols and among the social agents who produce them” (Benson 1998, p. 486). As such “field theory is an excellent vehicle for making complex social phenomena intuitively accessible without relying on prejudices or “common sense” first person understandings” (Levi Martin 2003, p. 36).

Importantly field theory makes no claim to theorise causal linkages between the actors, organisations, or institutions in the field. Instead field theory interprets action within fields as involving “action at a distance” and as a result “the field itself is not directly measurable; its existence can only be proved by its effects” (Levi Martin 2003, p. 7). Furthermore it is considered that fields do not exist in isolation. For example multiple, interlacing fields influence the field of pop production: the media field, the retail field, the field of technology, the bureaucratic field, the field of music awards, to name just a few relevant to the pop renaissance. However this interrelated complexity “does not mean that external events or factors are not important to actors, but they do need to be translated into the internal logic of the field” (Levi Martin 2003, p. 23). As Chapter Five discusses, the ANLPS can be seen as
influencing and re-structuring relations within New Zealand’s field of pop production as it works to constitute the pop renaissance.

For Bourdieu (1993, p. 30) all social action takes place within fields. He explains fields as a:

Field of forces, but it is also a field of struggles tending to transform or conserve this field of forces. The network of objective relations between positions subtends and orients the strategies which the occupants of different positions implement in their struggles to defend or improve their positions (i.e their position-takings), strategies which depend for their force and form on the position each agent occupies in the power relations.

Hence Bourdieu’s (1993, 1996) field approach is analytically productive as it does not reduce action to a deterministic social script, but is produced by agents’ ‘habitus’ (see below) and their use of alternative capitals within a field. David Hesmondhalgh (2006, p. 216), in a detailed review of Bourdieu and the media field, argues that the field concept has particular utility in analysing cultural production. This is because it is:

Clearly intended to counter naïve notions of creative freedom and innovation. Instead, Bourdieu emphasizes the way that possible positions define the thinkable and the unthinkable, the do-able and the impossible for agents in the field, depending on the way that the categories of perception constitutive of a certain habitus allow them to see possible courses of action and intervention.

Consequently the field becomes a “space of conflict and competition” (Bourdieu & Waquant 1992, p. 18). In this process, contestations emerge over what and how the power dynamics of the field come to value alternative capitals. Such competition between agents for dominance within field then comes to “position actors relative to each other according to the overall amounts and relative combinations of capital available to them” (Anheier et al, 1995, p. 860). For Bourdieu (1993, p. 30) these contests and competitions are intended to “defend or improve actors position-takings” meaning agents incessantly seek to secure and ‘naturalise’ their position within the field.
Bourdieu’s language of contest, struggle, and competition somewhat obscures the fact that a field can also be an enjoyable space of play: the setting, that is, for a game. Nevertheless when creative entrepreneurs enter the field of pop production they acquiesce, in part, to its logics and power relations. These logics are codified by the dominant interests of institutions such as relatively powerful record labels, the media, and, in New Zealand, the programmes of the ANLPS (Levi Martin 2003, p. 33). Despite these power relations and structures, by entering the field the agent admits the game is worth playing. In Bourdieu’s terms creative entrepreneurs possess an *illusio* in popular music.

**Illusio**

Bourdieu (1990b, p. 195) calls this interest and willingness to risk entering a field an agent’s illusio: “the sense of investment in the game”. In other words, producing pop in New Zealand with all its heavily stacked commercial odds compels creative entrepreneurs to invest financially and emotionally in the field, its stakes and its contests. Furthermore this illusio can be seen to be cultivated through the ways the ANLPS incentivises and partners pop producers into the market economy, creating an image that art as commerce is possible and viable. Therefore, for Bourdieu (1990b, p. 194):

This is to say that a field can function only if it finds individuals socially predisposed to behave as responsible agents, to risk their money, their time and sometimes their honour or their life, to pursue the stakes and to glean the profits it proposes, and which grasped from a different point of view, may appear illusory – which is what they always are also – inasmuch as they rest on the relation of ontological complicity between habitus and field which is at basis of entry into the game and of commitment to the game.

In the case of the pop renaissance, the creative entrepreneurs’ illusio orientates their practices towards the unspoken rules or presuppositions of the field. To social agents outside the field this may appear to be a waste of effort, for pop production at low levels of success presupposes a willingness to play the game for few economic or symbolic rewards. In consequence, the creative entrepreneurs’ illusio draws attention to how the field of pop
production (or any field) is also a sphere where agents pursue social trajectories. This aspect is discussed further below.

Habitus

Habitus is Bourdieu’s ontological response to what he perceives as rational action theory’s de-historicizing of agents (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992). Although this thesis does not apply in detail the habitus concept, it is nonetheless foundational to Bourdieu’s sociology and thus requires introduction. Briefly, the habitus concept seeks to explain how the subjective dispositions that orient agents to the social world are an embodiment of their cultural and historical social life. Thus, an agent’s habitus can be understood as a set of more or less durable cognitive schemas acquired primarily through socialisation in institutions such as – although not exclusively – the family and schooling, and conditioned by his or her (classed, ethnic, religious, spatial, temporal, gendered) experiences. These inculcated beliefs then orient the agent’s sense of what is possible and impossible in the social world. Bourdieu (1990a, p. 53) sees the habitus as “an acquired system of generative schemas” which further illuminates the ways objective, pre-existing, social structures come to reside within an agent’s subjective, social psychology (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 54). Yet, the apparently deterministic structuring of an agent’s habitus – as a “practical hypothesis based on past experience” (Bourdieu 1990a, p. 55) – does not mean it is inflexible. Instead the habitus is adaptable, for it provides a cognitive template of possible responses to everyday situations which allows the practical and instinctual improvisations of social interactions. Bourdieu (1990a, p. 53) thus defines habitus as:

Structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organise practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to these without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of operations necessary in order to attain them.
Social space

Having introduced the micro-sociological concepts of capitals, fields, illusio, and habitus we can return to Bourdieu’s macro-sociological conception of society. Bourdieu (1984) broadly conceives of society or social space as a social topography. Although hierarchical it is not “rigidly vertical” or linear, but a “highly complex multi-dimensional space” comprising three vital dimensions through which agents act (Thornton 1997, p. 10). Firstly the structure of social space is differentiated by agents’ relative holdings of economic and cultural capital. On a vertical scale is the distribution of overall volumes of capital agents possess: high versus low (Bourdieu 1998a, p. 7). On a horizontal scale are the divisions between social groups’ relative holdings of economic capital and cultural capital: with economic capital to the right and cultural capital to the left (Bourdieu 1998a, p.5). Secondly there are contests within this social space. The vertical scale sets the holders of large volumes of capital in contest against those dominated groups who have low holdings of both economic and cultural capital (Wacquant 1998, p. 224). The occupational system and the position of agents in it is the foundation for this vertical, hierarchical division with professions and business owners at the top and manual labourers at the bottom (Weininger 2005). The horizontal scale depicts an internecine conflict between the dominant occupational groupings over the relative value of economic and cultural capital (Wacquant 1998, p. 224). Here the “dominant faction of the dominant class” – business owners and managers who hold economic but comparatively little cultural capital – are pitted against the cultural intelligentsia of educators, artists, and artisans. In this dimension of social space the primary struggle is over the relative value of the cultural capitals, and of appropriate taste and the markers of social status (Wacquant 1998, p. 224; Weininger 2005). Thirdly, across these contested economic and cultural divisions, Bourdieu (1984, p. 128-129) sees the principal social struggle of agents is to secure a position in this social space through what he calls social trajectories upward, downward or stagnani. That is, through this social space agents struggle to maintain or improve their status and income positions “by pursing strategies of reconversion whereby [agents] transmute or exchange one

11 In Distinction Bourdieu presents a bleak picture of social mobility for in its most abstract and deterministic form social mobility is impossible. Here Bourdieu sees agent’s habitus and alternative forms of capitals as un-shifting regardless of credentials, yet around them the forces and dynamics of market capitalism swirl, altering their relative symbolic position in the social hierarchy. Consequently, their objective class position in social space remains unaltered.
species of capital for another” (Wacquant 1998, p. 224). These trajectories involve struggles over the relative value given to economic and cultural capital and how these convert into accessing the rewards of the fields agents have an illusion in.

Therefore for Bourdieu this social space is not unified or monolithic. Instead it is comprised of multiple fields,12 or social domains, of activity: the economic field, the bureaucratic field, the education field, the health field, the technology field, the field of pop production, and so on. Hence, in Bourdieu’s theorisation, fields are sites where agents unconsciously engage in conflict, contest and struggles to secure a social trajectory (Swartz 1997, p. 63). Not everyone succeeds in realising an upward social trajectory as oftentimes agents merely reproduce their class position by doing what seems possible according to their habitus (see below and Bourdieu 1984). But more importantly for Bourdieu the cultural capital of educational credentials plays a significant function in social trajectory struggles for valued professional credentials allow easier access to economic capital. However, the education system is not neutral. It is skewed towards reproducing the dominant (bourgeois) cultural interests while the ‘symbolic violence’ of its classificatory orders legitimates social ranking which in turn manoeuvres “the dominated to accept the existing hierarchies” (Swartz 1997, p. 83, see also Bourdieu 1984, 1993).

Social trajectories and the new petit bourgeoisie

To recap, Bourdieu has a conflict and competition oriented view of social space where the motive force of social action and change occurs through agents engaging fields to pursue their interests and realise a social trajectory. Although Bourdieu (1984) analyses 1960s France in Distinction, his theory of social stratification and trajectories continues to resonate across capitalist societies and has particular salience for New Zealand’s emerging class of creative entrepreneurs. New Zealand’s homologous creative entrepreneurs – be they pop

12 Adding to social space’s complexity, Bourdieu (1993, p. 37-40) theorises that fields are not a one-dimensional aggregation. More abstractly, there are horizontal layers of ‘meta’ fields in which, for example, the economic, bureaucratic and pop fields are embedded. At the deepest, ‘unrecognised’ level is the field of power where classificatory struggles over the naming and legitimating of the social world are conducted. Within the field of power is the field of class relations where struggles over material interests take place. Therefore, as later chapters illustrate, New Zealand’s field of pop production is embedded in ‘meta’ fields where the ‘after neo-liberal’ state structures, in part, the field of power and the field of class relations.
musicians, jewellery makers, fashion designers, actors, DJs, freelance writers, graphic designers, video and film makers, artists or sculptors – arguably comprise what Bourdieu classifies as the ‘new petit bourgeoisie’. The key feature of the creative entrepreneur as an aggregated class faction of the new petit bourgeoisie is that they tend “to be younger, investing in education credentials over social origins, and moving into the rapidly growing sector of new culturally intensive operations” (Swartz 1997, p. 180). Theoretically, by entering creative fields they “aspire to a success which is denied them in the economic domain, while simultaneously their [potential] failure is a principled rejection of the base temptations of pecuniary logic” (Jenkins 2002, p. xiii).

In Bourdieu’s (1984) theory of social stratification education credentials – or their absence – play a significant role in determining social trajectories. However, in fields of cultural production it can be routinely observed that material and symbolic success has an ambivalent relation to credentials. Therefore, for those agents excluded (through devalued cultural and/or social capital) from the systematic conversion of a qualification into a secure or ‘respected’ social position, artistic work becomes a refuge from which the new petit bourgeoisie can improvise a “reconversion strategy”: the conversion of alternative forms of capital to advance a social trajectory (Bourdieu 1984, p. 125).

Consequently, the new petit bourgeoisie struggle incessantly to valorise the objectified and embodied cultural capital of new sights, sounds, fashions, and consumer sensations. But because commercial success is not guaranteed in fields of cultural production (Bourdieu 1996, p. 142) the new petit bourgeoisie come to “bank on possible futures which do not really exist for them; but it is also the reason why they do not truly accept the objective reality of their position and qualifications” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 155). Chapter Six applies a Bourdieussian approach to music making creative entrepreneurs as new petit bourgeois agents. From this, state music policy can then be interpreted as a form of social policy in relation to the larger sociological issue of social trajectories: the real, rarely acknowledged, game for those seeking to enter the pop renaissance.
Critiques of Bourdieu

Bourdieu reasons that the basis of modern science is relational and reflexive. Thus what exists in the “social world are relations” (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 97) with the relational being “the real” (Swartz 1997, p. 61). This means Bourdieussian sociology adopts a realist epistemology (Jenkins 2002, p. 94). To sum up briefly, realism understands that the objects of social science are relational for “they are what they are by virtue of the relations they enter into with other objects” such as social structures and mechanisms including markets, institutions, class, and the state (Danermark et al 2002, p. 5, 45). For example, consider how in Bourdieu’s (1984, p. 113, see also Bourdieu 1998b, p. 3-5) realist epistemology “capital is a social relation, i.e., an energy which only exists and produces its effects in the field in which it is produced and reproduced”.

Therefore, rather than understanding agents (and their occupation, age, ethnicity, sex, class), institutions, and commodities as isolated ‘things’ or ‘factoids’ in themselves these objects and social structures come into existence through co-producing social relationships. As Bhaskar (1989, p. 74) argues, in a realist epistemology it is the persistent paradigmatic relations between individuals (and groups) and “the relations between the relations that constitute the proper subject matter of sociology”. According to one of Bourdieu’s leading commentators:

These are invisible relationships to the uninitiated eye because they are obscured by the realities of ordinary sense-experience. They must be constructed by science as a space of positions external to one another and defined by their relative distance to one another (Swartz 1997, p. 61).

The realist epistemology understands the objects under social scientific observation cannot be grasped by positivist accounts of substances, events and appearances, nor from a perspective of methodological individualism. In consequence, the “objective material structure of relations” in the social world cannot be directly observed so must be explained by the theoretical structure of material relations (Jenkins 2002, p. 94). Thus, for realists, social theories provide significant insight into perceiving what is going on in the social world (Bhaskar 1989, p. 76; Jenkins 2002, p. 94).
However realism is criticised for its reliance on theory. For positivists there is no ‘scientific’ way of ‘disproving’ realist accounts such as psychoanalysis or Bourdieussian social analysis as their interpretations depend on reference to theory (Jenkins 2002). Nevertheless realism, unlike positivism, is interpretative and can create accounts of causes and determinations, and can generate understandings of why and how things happen in the social world (Danermark et al 2002, p. 54). Therefore what needs to be noted is that there is no ‘God’s eye’ in any science. All modernist science is culturally specific, partial, and never impartial, and therefore only ever incomplete representations, interpretations, and narratives of the social world.

There are other criticisms of Bourdieu’s social theory. His writings are dense and voluminous revealing shifting use of concepts and their occasionally imprecise application. Some main criticisms include a perceived social reductionism with Bourdieu constructing an ‘over’ socialised conception of human behaviour (Jenkins 2002). Others sense an economic reductionism that over-emphasises material interests to become an Althusserian social theory of “economic determinism in the last instance” (Caille cited in Swartz 1997, p. 68). Furthermore Bourdieu’s importation of economic terminology – capital, interest, investment – into sociology leads to an ontology of a universal rational actor bent on pursuing interests and the accumulation of power, albeit conditioned by the habitus and field (Caille cited in Swartz 1997, p. 68; Lebaron 2003).

Bourdieu’s capitals (which at times range from political and educational to the more standard alternative forms) are critiqued for inducing conceptual inflation. To this end, DiMaggio (1979, p. 1469) suggests “as the number of capitals increases, the metaphorical currency undergoes inflation and its value declines accordingly”. Additionally, Bourdieu’s use of fields is not particularly novel for it is built upon a Weberian conceptualisation of society as inter-related and interlocking domains such as law, the economy, religion, and politics (Jenkins 2002).

In Bourdieu’s defence, his concepts are flexible thinking tools in the hermeneutics tradition that seek to make “intelligible connections in its subject matter” by connecting the part to the whole and the whole to the part (Bhaskar 1989, p. 66). Furthermore, Swartz (1997, p. 5) argues Bourdieu’s social theory is “not designed to respond in the first instance to the rigidly
formal canons of internal consistency, generalisability, etc.” of positivistic social science. Therefore, rather than being socially and economically reductionist, I would argue a Bourdieussian approach allows the researcher to explore the appropriately socially constructed nature of the phenomenon under investigation.

**Conclusion**

The dual theoretical approach of the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state and Bourdieussian sociology structure this thesis. In Chapters Three and Four state policies, programmes, and organisations are investigated. These discussions focus on Labour’s ‘after neo-liberal’ framings of popular music – Frith and Cloonan’s (2008, p. 189) “ideologies of...governance” – and how the state has facilitated domestic popular music into the market. Here particular attention is given to the use of ‘soft’ institutional partnerships, supply-side training and funding of pop producers, and social inclusion in the labour market. Bourdieu’s social theory comes to the fore in Chapter Five where it is used to analyse creative entrepreneurs’ non-market ‘capital swapping’ practices and how these are oriented to accessing state supports and the wider field of pop production. Then, in Chapter Six, New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs as a new petit bourgeois faction pursuing a social trajectory is considered. This replies, in part, to Frith and Cloonan’s (2008, p. 191) *who* of music policy. Overall, by bringing the ‘after neo-liberal’ state and Bourdieu together, the pop renaissance can then be interpreted as a form of social policy.

**Part C: Methods**

This thesis is a case study of the pop renaissance that draws inspiration from Burawoy’s (1991, p. 271-290) “extended case method”. This qualitative approach investigates how external social forces shape social situations, with the case being significant for what it tells us about “the world in which it is embedded” (Burawoy et al 1991, p. 281). That is, what does the pop renaissance tell us about the ‘after neo-liberal’ state and social experience in ‘after neo-liberal’ contexts? Importantly, the extended case method reflects how the social sciences operate at the intersections of humanities and natural sciences. Here the use of the extended case method seeks to develop understanding through participation in, and
observation of, social structures while producing explanations through a dialogue with theory and data (Burawoy et al 1991, p. 3; Danermark et al 2005; Jenkins 2002, p. 94).

In this thesis, New Zealand’s pop renaissance is explored using multiple qualitative methods, foregrounding the constructed and interpretive nature of social accounts of the world. Therefore, and in contrast to some positivistic social scientific methods, qualitative designs such as the extended case method are ‘naturalistic’ to the extent that the research takes in real world settings and the researcher “does not attempt to manipulate the phenomena of interest” (Patton 2002, p. 39). Furthermore the case study is a useful research strategy as it “involves an empirical investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robinson 1993, p. 5). In this thesis these extensive sources include a diverse range of unstructured and detailed empirical material such as (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, p. 248): participant observations; in depth semi-structured interviews; official statistics; state creative industry seminars; state documents; popular media articles; and ephemera such as band websites, Internet chat groups, and posters (Patton 2002). In addition the scale, scope, and methodical approach of this thesis were influenced by existing research on New Zealand’s creative industries. Other researchers have already conducted large-scale quantitative studies of arts practice, participation, and work in the creative industries (Creative New Zealand 2003; New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 2002; Statistics New Zealand 2006a; Taylor, Baines and Newall 2004,).

My entry point to this research came through biographic experiences with the domestic and international popular music industry during the 1990s and early 2000s (see Eggleton 2003). During this time I experienced state funding (approximately $100,000 from both New Zealand on Air and Creative New Zealand), international touring and record releases, and participated in, and contributed songs to, the jubilant beginnings of the pop renaissance (see Neill 2002). Therefore as a former pop producer I am researching from both a post-practice and ‘after neo-liberal’ position. This unique entry point adds insight to this research for it exhibits C. Wright Mills’ (1959, p. 8) celebrated ‘sociological imagination’ as I seek to connect “the personal troubles of the milieu” to “the public issues of social structure”. Further influencing this thesis is that the bulk of the writing took place in Australia where I observed a larger cultural economy while reflecting on New Zealand’s pop renaissance.
Harnessing my prior experiences, the research initially developed using an ethnographic insider participant observation perspective. Although there are diverse traditions in ethnography (de Laine 1997, p. 20) and no rigid orthodoxy (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, p. 249), what follows could be classified as what Burawoy et al (1991) call ‘natural sociology’. That is, this thesis attempts to capture and interpret the everyday culture and experience of the pop renaissance. This means the following research is partly an “ethnography of one’s own group” (Reed-Danahay 1997, p. 2) where I have “shared a common world with those I study” (Burawoy et al 1991, p. 291), coupled with a “being-in-the-world characteristic of [ethnographic] researchers” (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, p. 249). Importantly, as a participant, I was able to work through and experience the “social structures” of popular music production at low levels of success in a semi-peripheral cultural economy (Burawoy et al 1991, p. 3).

This experience as a participant also provided access to social networks and insider information. This application of social capital – along with observations of the pop renaissance at concerts, festivals, rehearsals, and other mediatised performances – provided material for incorporation into dialogue with a research journal from the beginning of the research process (Burawoy et al 1991, p. 294). Such a research method is characteristic of the extended case study method for it allows sustained reflection between existing research, empirical material, theories, and observations (Burawoy et al 1991, p. 3). As a quasi-participant the agents who informed me knew of my position as a researcher, diminishing problematic power relations between observer and participant as we were “inhabitants of a shared social and cultural field” (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, p. 256). Nevertheless at times I observed social situations where my position as researcher could not be disclosed, for example at concerts or state seminars.

Important among the primary empirical material used for this study were formal in-depth interviews with twenty-one information-rich music industry agents. To generate interview subjects the ‘snowballing’ method of purposive sampling was used. According to Patton (2002, p. 40) the snowballing sampling method focuses upon accessing agents who possess specific, relevant, and illuminating experiences to the research questions for these agents offer “useful manifestations of the phenomena of interest”. The snowballing sampling method was practical as the music industry and the state are often insular fields, arguably due
to the sensitive nature of sales, incomes, and reputations. Therefore by ‘snowballing’ recommendations from interviewees generated new expert informants disposed to contribute to the study. In recruiting these informants the researcher had the advantage of existing (although by no means exhaustive) networks and contacts within the domestic popular music field.

Participants included four state organisation informants, fourteen creative entrepreneurs, four music industry contractors/administrators, and three multinational label employees. This scope of participants is reasonable because they are exemplars of their positions as key decision makers and observers, and as holders of expert knowledge and experience. In addition most of these informants represent relevant culture and leisure occupations from the Australian and New Zealand Standard Industry Classification: music performers, music composers, music publishers, and record companies (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2000).

Interview participants were drawn from Auckland, where many record labels and broadcast media are based, and Wellington, the capital city where state organisations reside. Once contact was made with informants semi-structured interviews were conducted until saturation point was reached: the point where little or no significant new information was being produced. This took anywhere from one and a half to three hours. The interview schedule was consistent for the interviews with music making creative entrepreneurs, industry informants, and state informants13, while the semi-structured approach provided flexibility to probe themes that arose during the interview. The interviews were tape recorded with the permission of the interviewees and the tapes were transcribed. Then for the purposes of data analysis I worked from these transcriptions. Furthermore, when the voices of these agents appear in the thesis I have chosen to not to edit their language too closely. My reason for this is that I hope to convey a sense of these agents’ illusion in popular music that can best be represented through their language.

13 Questions, however, varied depending on the agent’s area of knowledge and the intent of the interview. For example, interviews with creative entrepreneurs focussed on creative practice, how they understood the pop field, and how they earned an income. In contrast, interviews with key state informants focussed upon state programmes and how they operate. Interviews with contractors concentrated on what their work involved, their organisation’s function in the music industry, and how they perceived the pop field. Interviews with independent label owners and domestic MNC’s also discussed how new technologies such as file sharing are reconfiguring the field of pop production.
Other qualitative material augmented these interviews included: state policy documents, Labour party press releases, media interviews and commentary, websites, and internet chat rooms. These provided further rich empirical material on the perspectives and contested nature of the pop renaissance. Such a methodological approach has affinities with Geertz’s (1973, p. 25-26) ‘thick’ interpretation. The strength of assembling a plurality of voices and perspectives in this way is that the researcher can identify the connections and general patterns necessary to analyse a certain social context.

The strength of this qualitative research approach is that it gains access to those operating on the ‘inside’. This allows for an interpretation of the pop renaissance ‘from below’ where informants can talk about the experiences and perceptions of popular music and state support. Therefore, like most qualitative research, the limited sample size of this research remains “aimed at insight about the phenomenon, not empirical generalisations from a sample population” (Patton 2002, p. 40). Nevertheless, as Geertz (1973, p. 20) in a reply to the hegemony of positivistic social science asserted, “you don’t need to know everything to know something”.

Although this qualitative approach generates abundant and insightful empirical material it needs to be treated with caution. As Swartz (1997, p. 57) notes the problem with using informants’ subjective accounts is that these:

Assume too much and are too general for the kinds of details needed by researchers to uncover the underlying principles of practices. More importantly, however, informant accounts are likely to be oriented with an eye for the unusual rather than the mundane, to impress the researcher. And they tend to employ normative constructs rather than provide the descriptive detail needed to reconstruct the sequence of practices.

Jenkins (2002, p. 53) notes other problems with interviews. These include a discourse of familiarity where informants take more for granted in their descriptions of everyday life. Also interviewees tend to be “outsider orientated” and thus avoid providing the detail the researcher wants: the “discourse of informants reflects a ‘semi-theoretical disposition … [as] the informant wants to demonstrate a mastery of the topic in question” (ibid). Thus, although
informants are unable to articulate the theoretical detail of what happens in social situations, interviews provide raw material that can be triangulated with existing literature and official documents and then analysed using social theory.

From this methodological basis this thesis has three broad objectives. Firstly, like all qualitative research the purpose of this study is transferability rather than generalisability. Transferability refers to how the research resonates across settings and communities. Hopefully this thesis will resonate with research and experiences of state supported creative production in other ‘after neo-liberal’ settings. Secondly, as “applied research” this thesis seeks to illuminate the youthful new petit bourgeoisie, their creative work practices, and the experiences of social inclusion in ‘after neo-liberal’ New Zealand (Patton 2002, p. 213). And thirdly, other researchers working within the sociology of popular music (or other creative industries) may find the theoretical and methodical approach outlined above “equally fruitful” (Bulmer 1984, p.261).

Finally, all research is a construction reflecting the “presuppositions and socio-historical circumstances of their production” (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, p. 252), not only of the phenomenon under investigation but of the researcher’s positionality. Consequently this thesis is acknowledged as a partial representation and interpretation of New Zealand’s pop renaissance. Thus circumscribed, this thesis is motivated by an interest in adding to disciplinary knowledge through the “production of knowledge” which is “valuable for its own sake”, rather than for the solving of a practical or state defined social problem (Atkinson & Hammersley 1994, p. 253-254). The intention of this piece of critical research is to open space for debate over the pop renaissance so we can, perhaps, more vigorously contest some of the social contexts surrounding New Zealand’s celebrated ‘arts and cultural revival’.
Chapter Three:  
The New Zealand State and the Music Industries

I believe it is – and has always been – the destiny and the calling of our amazing country to lead the world, to adventure, to compose music not just new to English ears but to the ears of all the world (Peter Biggs, CEO Creative New Zealand 2002).

Introduction

Why did the fifth Labour government seek to engage the popular music industries and musicians? To answer this question this chapter describes the policy milieu and “ideologies of...governance” (Frith & Cloonan 2008, p. 189) through which the fifth Labour government came to engage popular music. It does so by, firstly, giving a brief history of popular music in New Zealand’s state policy, noting what can be seen as persistent ‘promotional state’ problematics. Secondly, the fecund creative industries discourse and its critiques are reviewed. This section also includes an introduction to the structural features of popular music as a creative industry. Thirdly, how Labour folded the creative industries into its strategic economic and social policy is described. And fourthly, the Creating Heat policy document is discussed to highlight how Labour’s incipient ANLPS agencies would engage the popular music market and creative entrepreneurs.

This focus on state policy serves to illustrate how popular music was constructed as meeting broader, ‘after neo-liberal’, aspirations (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008). Although this thesis is not a discourse analysis it can be noted that discourses are linguistic representations of ‘the social’ and are heterogeneous and multi-voiced. Therefore this chapter is a narrative of a narrative and thus is a selective description of the contested state representations of popular music within emergent ‘after neo-liberal’ policy contexts (Mills 1997).
A brief history of popular music and the New Zealand state pre-‘after neoliberalism’

In contrast to recent celebrations of local sounds and pop producers New Zealand’s popular music and musicians have historically been discredited as talentless and tasteless by many elite commentators. In post-punk 1980, the domineering conservative Prime Minister Robert Muldoon (1975-1984) famously pronounced that popular music was not ‘culture’ “in its normal sense” (presumably the Arnoldian sense of culture as ‘the best’ and pinnacle of modern civilisation (Williams, 1976, p. 92)). While in 1990 multi-millionaire commercial property developer and part-time politician (for the 1982 election) Bob Jones characterised Kiwi “rock musicians as ‘diverse mobs of wailing and bellowing factory hands’” (Pickering & Shuker 1993, p. 33). If popular music was rhetorically discredited by New Zealand’s power elite during the 1970s and 1980s such attitudes were also manifest materially (Dubber 2007). Recordings by what Muldoon called those “horrible pop groups” attracted a 40 percent sales tax (Shuker & Pickering 1994, p. 263).

When popular music did make fleeting appearances in state policy it is perhaps not surprising this occurred through the discourses of the economic and the cultural; the arts as generators of market exchange and the arts as constitutive of national identity. Therefore policy discourses surrounding New Zealand’s popular music and the market economy did not arise solely with the fifth Labour government. Instead the beneficial relationship of the arts to the economy has been the subject of a resilient – although not prominent – policy narrative since the early 1970s (Volkering 2001, p. 438). Recognising this chequered policy history of popular music the following outlines the state supports and key music industry reports prior to the fifth Labour government.

During New Zealand’s post World War Two long boom the Queen Elizabeth the Second Arts Council of New Zealand (QEIIACNZ) was the state organisation charged with funding and supporting the (high) arts. By the early 1980s QEIIACNZ elitist discourses of ‘quality’ as the rationale for state arts funding were slowly interpenetrated by more instrumental ends, such as the contribution of the arts to the economy (Skilling 2005, p. 25). During this time popular musicians had access to piecemeal QEIIACNZ funding. From 1979 this state body made small financial ($500 – $3,000) recording grants available for demo recordings or an EP and...
small touring grants were also offered (Key State Informant Interview 2006). Although somewhat parsimonious compared to subsequent ANLPS funding the QUEIIACNZ provided some support in covering the recording costs for musicians and independent labels operating at low levels of success. Nevertheless these ‘promotional state’ supports made little impact on enhancing domestic sales or subverting the dominance of imported sounds, nor were they intended to as pop was, in great part, a symbolically discredited cultural form (Shuker & Pickering 1994, p. 268).

In 1994 QUEIIACNZ was transformed into the arts funding agency Creative New Zealand (CNZ) and continues to disburse recording and touring grants. CNZ’s funding of pop production remains oriented by the somewhat elite values of ‘quality’ and ‘national identity’. However, since the fifth Labour Government, the market dimension of CNZ funding has grown in prominence to merge with traditional funding criteria. A CNZ music manager describes this rationale as: “we are interested in supporting what we deem excellent, professional quality or potential for exports by emerging artists” (Key State Informant Interview 2006). See Appendix 1 for a longer discussion of Creative New Zealand’s funding of popular music.

During the 1980s and 1990s the arts slid down the policy agenda as the Labour (1984-1989) and National (1990-1999) governments carried out the deep neo-liberal restructuring of New Zealand’s economic and social domains (Shuker & Pickering 1994; Skilling 2005; see also Chapter Two). Although the neo-liberal state and its agents were “anxious to avoid measures that could be seen as State interference in the market-place” this is not to suggest there was no arts or popular music funding (Shuker & Pickering 1994, p. 268). It has been suggested that this is because the “political consensus” at the time saw the arts as “unsuited to the ravages of the market [and thus state funding] was never completely dismantled” (Skilling 2005, p. 25). For example, concurrent with the de-regulation of broadcasting through the 1989 Broadcasting Act was the establishment of New Zealand on Air (NZOA) through which popular music gained new forms of state support. This state agency and their activities are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

At the apex of what has been called the ‘New Zealand Experiment’ (Kelsey 1995) in neo-liberal reform arts funding – although not dismantled – withered under the rationales of
shrinking the state’s direct involvement in the productive economy (Skilling 2005). Funding for the arts from taxation was replaced in part by Lottery Board funding while New Public Management (NPM) reforms sought to bring “new accountabilities and openness” (Skilling 2005, p. 26). Now state support for the arts was managed through the technologies of “criteria, standards, and objectives” (ibid). These managerial practices placed “a new emphasis on the financial accountability of the recipients of public funding, and on justifying support in terms of the demand that is met” (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 1998, p. 40). This neo-liberal re-institutionalisation of state arts patronage substantially changed the state’s involvement with the arts. Although the state “continued to … subsidise the production and presentation of artistic work” these activities were now conducted “through ‘arms length’ agencies” (Ministry of Cultural Affairs 1998, p. 40). Such NPM technologies of governance continue to structure state programmes, as Chapter Four illustrates.

As neo-liberal programmes of de-regulation, privatisation, free-trade, and state marketisation unfolded popular music became included and legitimated within the policy agenda through the language of the market. Towards the end of the fourth Labour government’s term the New Zealand Trade Development Board (1989) (NZTDB) produced a report entitled *New Horizons for the Arts Business: The foreign exchange earning potential of the arts in New Zealand*. Arguably *New Horizons* is an important state document in the trajectories of later ANLPS’s programmes particularly in its articulation of ‘promotional state’ concerns. It is also significant for the growing prominence of global markets in policy discourses which increasingly stated foreign exchange earnings were the “cornerstone of our economic recovery” (Crocombe et al 199, p. 9).

Anticipating the creative industries discourse (see below), *New Horizons* noted a range of potential economic benefits from the arts that would be of interest to the government. Firstly, the arts’ economic multiplier affect whereby artistic production stimulates demand for ancillary services and thus promised to boost income generation and market exchanges beyond the time and place of the artistic event; be it a concert, painting, or a theatre performance (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 47). Here the arts’ forward and backward linkages into other industries included print, transport, and retailing was noted. Secondly, the generally low capital-to-labour ratio of the arts was noted implying cultural production had the potential to stimulate employment through small scale enterprises that do not require
large capital investment. Thirdly, tourism and leisure consumption were seen as a means to inserting the arts into the market while also enhancing tourists’ experiences and developing a ‘national image’. Fourthly, the arts were noted as a domain through which regional unemployment could be ameliorated, as at the time state asset sales were causing unemployment to rise above five percent (Department of Labour 2006, p. 2; Russell 1996). Fifthly, the arts were ideated as a potential domain for foreign earnings in the newly deregulated trade environment (New Zealand Trade and Development Board 1989, p. 7-9).

Despite the economic and cultural potentialities of the arts NZTDB made a sober assessment of the arts as market activity. These cautionary notes pre-empt many ANLPS supply-side innovations as *New Horizons* asserted any state supports would also “require a more business-like approach to the marketing of the country’s arts products” (New Zealand Trade and Development Board 1989, p. 9). *New Horizons* made particular mention of artists who perceived themselves as romantic creators and whose cultural production was not influenced by the discipline of commercial considerations (ibid, p. 11). Such dispositions, it was asserted, presented a supply-side barrier to the entry of the arts into the ‘cash nexus’. As Chapter Four illustrates ANLPS actors and programmes have been notably focussed on exposing creative entrepreneurs to the logics and insider knowledge of the music industry as market activity.

If *New Horizons* narrated an incipient culturalisation of the national economy then popular music was at the forefront. In *New Horizons* popular music was claimed to be “the only field ready for immediate significant expansion in international markets” (New Zealand Trade Development Board 1989, p. 11). By ideating popular music through the frame of export development *New Horizons* was an example of policy makers attempting to understand how the state could ameliorate the persistent ‘promotional state’ concerns regarding domestic market size, export promotion when dominated by imported sounds, youth employment, and the business skills of artists in market settings. Foreshadowing the role of the enabling ‘after neo-liberal’ state the report suggested that market engagement would require “a co-operative strategy by this industry [to] achieve significant growth in the medium term” (New Zealand Trade Development Board 1989, p. 11, author’s emphasis).
Although domestic popular music was narrated as a potential export commodity there were a series of global market threats identified. *New Horizons* observed potential difficulties for state engagement with the high risk music business, including: mitigating the social and geographical barriers confronting domestic music entrepreneurs wanting to access overseas markets and industry actors; illegal copying (on cassette rather than digital piracy); and the resilient narrative of a contracting international music market (see Hesmondhalgh 2008 for recent assessment). These market features were compounded by the inability of domestic pop producers to access economic capital from labels and other investors due to the small domestic market. Furthermore *New Horizons* claimed domestic actors had poor entrepreneurial skills including a lack of understanding of marketing principles (New Zealand Trade and Development Board 1989, p. 10, 35). While at the bottom line for any state involvement in popular music exports was the territorialising of economic returns as contemporary New Zealand musicians who made significant economic returns were often contracted to foreign domiciled Multi-national Corporations (MNC) (New Zealand Trade and Development Board 1989, p. 35-36). Overall the NZTDB (1989, p. 36) suggested the domestic popular music industry had economic potential, but the outlook was bleak considering New Zealand based firms had no track record of successfully exporting a popular music artist:

> With the continuing internationalisation of music and the economies of scale available in the production and marketing of recorded music [prior to relatively cheap recording software and internet distribution systems] it is possible that a New Zealand based recording industry may never have the opportunity to become competitive internationally.

Despite being faced with economic constraints domestic pop was narrated as ‘world class’, with New Zealand’s burgeoning multiculturalism framed as a strategic asset. Substantively, as the state sought to enhance popular music’s foreign exchange earnings, the NZTDB enacted sporadic financial support for domestic independent labels looking for export opportunities (Shuker & Pickering 1994, p. 269). For example in 1992 the NZTDB – “more accustomed to marketing sheep meats and wool than music” – subsidised $4,000 of the costs for a trade delegation to attend the influential New Music Seminar conference in New York (Reid 1991, p. 67). For music commentator and journalist Graham Reid (1991, p. 67) the
attendance of local labels was a result of “the sudden self-recognition of New Zealand’s expanding music scene … [with the state now] publicly acknowled[ing] the sound of its own backyard”. However, as we will see below and in Chapter Four, this state co-operative strategy towards exporting popular music had to wait until the fifth Labour government for substantial financial partnership.

As Wellington’s technocrats ideated the arts as an export sector an argument over the cultural value of domestic pop emerged. In 1989 Labour MP and jazz musician Graham Kelly introduced a private member’s Bill advocating a small domestic radio airplay quota of 15 percent increasing to 20 per cent over two years (Shuker & Pickering 1994, p. 270). Its introduction saw frenzied debate sweep over Parliament and the popular press leading to a cultural confrontation between domestic pop advocates and commercial broadcasters (Pickering & Shuker 1993, p. 26). In Bourdieussian terms this can be seen as a conflict in social space over the relative valuation of cultural and economic capital. Supporters of the Bill cited the national economic gains of keeping royalties within New Zealand, asserting a quota would increase opportunities for developing domestic talent and thus export opportunities (Pickering & Shuker 1993, p. 28-32). The Bill’s advocates also deployed nationalistic, cultural imperialist, and economic rhetoric to portray resistant radio broadcasters as smug rent seekers who wanted to control the newly de-regulated airwaves for private gain using the ‘sure fire’ hits of imported pop. Meanwhile broadcasters blithely retorted that domestic pop producers were ‘amateurs’ whose songs were melodically and sonically inferior, and therefore “not as good as international repertoire” (Dubber 2007, p. 26). At the most extreme New Zealand’s radio programmers claimed “nobody likes local music” (ibid). In 1990 the newly elected National government dissolved the radio quota debate, dismissing the Bill by invoking the neo-liberal mantra that any quota intervenes in the efficient workings of the market (Shuker & Pickering 1994, p. 270). New Zealand audiences and musicians would have to wait until Labour returned to power for a radio quota (see Chapter Four).

Considering these neo-liberal policy developments it could be argued that in the 1990s New Zealand’s pop producers were left, for the most part, as atomised agents pursuing their freedom in a marketplace governed by a “benign state” (Cloonan 1999, p. 204; Shuker &

14 See Pickering and Shuker 1993 for a discussion and analysis of this Bills passage.
Pickering 1994). Despite such benign neglect during the 1980s and 1990s it could also be argued there existed a vibrant independent music scene although domestic commercial ‘hits’ remained sporadic (Bannister 2006; Shuker & Pickering 1994). At the same time there was a murmuring of state support for popular music as NZOA began to develop financial supports such as video grants and gained some access to commercial radio for domestic sounds (see the following Chapter for a discussion of NZOA programmes). Nevertheless domestic sounds remained on the whole commercially and culturally marginalised. It was this context, succinctly summarised by Pickering and Shuker (1994, p. 261), which would later confront the ‘promotional’ fifth Labour government:

The local scene remains insufficient to support full-time professional performers, there is still only limited radio and television exposure for local artists, and initiatives to support the industry remain extremely limited … the prospects for the mid-1990s are less positive given the continued depressed state of the economy, with high levels of unemployment, a growing foreign debt and a general lack of consumer and business confidence.

The rise of the creative industries

By the turn of the millennium the neo-liberal project appeared to be ideologically exhausted. As noted in Chapter Two New Zealand’s putatively transparent and ‘distortion free’ market economy in many ways failed to deliver expected returns, producing mixed results in its efforts to unleash the wealth and bounty of the world economy (Office of the Prime Minister 2003; Roper 2005; Statistics New Zealand 2007a). A defining feature of the 1999 general election was vigorous debate over the state’s role in supporting the productive economy. Labour, in contrast to the neo-liberal National Party, advocated “providing more state-funded financial support for companies seeking to develop new products and export markets” (Vowles 2002, p. 136), and was a policy that later extended to the arts and cultural sector. Labour also campaigned on socio-economic issues that, in part, highlighted the social dislocations of the ‘New Zealand Experiment’. Popular music too was brought into the election campaign. Labour made a naked appeal to the youth vote through a pledge to introduce a domestic radio quota. Speaking at a later date, but summarising Labour’s stance, Helen Clark (2007) asserted:
The rationale for the government’s social policy programme, and the steps which we had taken away from the legacy of the 1990s with its high unemployment, surge in poverty, and sense of social exclusion ... [suggests] The era of neo-liberalism had left us as a divided society where many had little hope of success. Our aim has been to give all New Zealanders a stake in society, and to ensure that the benefits of economic growth can be more widely shared.

To these ends high on Labour’s legislative agenda were a number of ‘hard’ institutional reforms oriented by broadly social liberal values. These included labour law reform that recognised collective bargaining (and Labour’s historical constituency), raising the minimum wage, re-instating housing subsidies for low income earners, introducing ‘in work tax credits’ for families, and increased health and education spending (Clark 2007b; Vowles 2002, p. 136). Overall these policies were intended to promote opportunity and the conditions for personal fulfilment in the market economy. Labour also signalled a renewed interest in promoting the arts and culture. This move gaining symbolic cachet when Helen Clark (2000a) took on the Arts, Culture and Heritage portfolio and articulated three strategic aims; the state to enable the building of domestic audiences, enhancing national identity through the arts and culture, and:

The building of strong creative industries which provide rewarding employment, opportunities for creative entrepreneurs, and good economic returns. Indeed the creative sector has the potential to be among the key growth industries of the twenty first century. Worldwide, there is huge growth in the service sector around industries based on creative talent. New Zealand with its large pool of talented people has the potential for its creative sector to do exceptionally well, and make an even larger contribution to our economy.

Thus there was another ubiquitous and highly influential discourse co-terminus with Labour’s interest in the arts and the re-configuration of the state’s role in the economy: the creative industries. Considering this confluence of Labour coming to power and the prominence of the creative industries in state policy what follows is a brief review of the creative industries discourse, its key arguments, and critiques. Such a review is necessary for it was in this ideational milieu that Labour developed policies to support domestic popular music.
The creative industries discourse: protagonists and critics

Between the mid-1990s and the early 2000s politicians, policy makers, popular theorists, and economists in the ‘developed’ world advocated greater policy attention be given to the economic potential of the creative industries. Also at this time management gurus were creating noticeable celebrations of ‘creativity’ as a vital human capacity (when linked to the competitive market), while there was also a burgeoning literature on ‘creative cities’ that featured vibrant arts and cultural scenes (Florida 2002a; Gibson & Klocher 2004; Harley 2000; Hesmondhalgh 2002; Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005; Howkins 2001; Kong 2000; Landry 2000; Leadbeater 2000; Oakley 2004; Peck 2005; Smith 1998; Volkering 2001). These strands coalesced in a virulent creative industries discourse which held increasing appeal for states seeking new policy directions in the wake of neo-liberal reforms.

According to Stuart Cunningham (2004, p. 109) the “creative industries are coterminus with the arts” albeit with an overt orientation towards the arts as market activity. In the UK and New Zealand state commissioned reports defined the creative industries through the liberal paradigm of the individual and market, and re-worked a 1970s understanding of what was then called the culture industries (Hesondhalgh 2002). The arts redefined as creative industries are “those industries which have their origin in individual creativity, skill and talent and which have a potential for wealth and job creation through the generation and exploitation of intellectual property” (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 2002, p. 1, author’s emphasis). Consolidating what are distinct activities (Oakley 2004, p. 72) the creative industries were understood to include advertising, software and computer services including leisure ware such as computer games, publishing, television and radio, film and video, architecture, design, designer fashion, music and the performing arts, and visual arts (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 2002, p. 1, author’s emphasis). A common feature of these creative industries is that they require a strong state to uphold intellectual property law and thus sustain the market incentives for creators and rights owners (Garnham 2001; New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 2002; New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004).
These creative industries are also content industries supplying not only cultural commodities for sale but ‘flow’ to broadcasters and cultural meanings to the marketing of more utilitarian products (Murdock 2003, p.23). However art as commerce is a high-risk activity as the market is defined by “fluid and unpredictable trends” that make it “hard to protect intellectual property” (Power & Scott, p. 6; Hesmondalgh 2002, p. 17). To attempt to manage this market uncertainty the creative industries, and in particular popular music, rely on a large supply of aspiring artists and a concentration of large distributional companies who create “artificial scarcity” through the formats of “stars and genres” while maintaining “tight control of distribution and marketing” (Hesmondhalgh 2002, p. 17).

The rapid turnover of fashions and trends means new commercial opportunities constantly appear for creative entrepreneurs and the legal owners of creative material, and this demand is met, in most cases, through flexible post-Fordist production systems. Hence most creative industries are further characterised by many small-scale labour intensive sub-contractors linked to larger distributional firms. These flexible features of most creative production manifest intense competition between the “swarms of small producers” who “stimulate experiential reactions in consumers” in their attempts to access larger networks of finance and distribution (Power & Scott 2004, p. 6, 3). Power and Scott (2004) also discuss how the creative industries and their power elites agglomerate in core industrial districts such as Hollywood, London, Nashville, Stockholm, and in New Zealand’s case, in central Auckland and Wellington. Perhaps of greatest consequence to art as commerce is how cultural goods are subject to Ernst Engels’ law where rising disposable incomes lead to the increased consumption of services and non-necessities such as commoditised forms of art and culture (Power & Scott 2004, p.3).

The creative industry discourse illustrates acquiescence to the logics of the market economy. This is far removed from Adorno (2005, p. 106) and the Frankfurt School’s critique of capitalism as culture industry wherein the “naked profit motive” transforms art into “eternal sameness” and carries out the ideological purpose of mass deception. While in a more intellectually orthodox vein Sadler (1997) notes how economists historically derided the creative industries as insignificant, claiming the arts produced little worth compared to the production of commodities embodying utility over status distinctions. This position changed in the late 1990s when the emergent cultural industries were found to be “the main areas of
production that gained” in size and scope during neo-liberal era of restructuring (Harvey 2005, p. 159). Furthermore capitalism was becoming increasingly culturalised. As Alan Scott (1997) noted “an ever-widening range of economic activity is concerned with producing and marketing goods and services that are infused in one way or another with broadly aesthetic or semiotic attributes” (see also Amin & Thrift 2004; Du Gay & Pryke 2002; Lash & Urry 1994).

In 1997 the creative industries as policy concern were famously ushered in when the United Kingdom’s newly elected Prime Minister, Tony Blair, invoked ‘Cool Britannia’ to capture the zeitgeist of the nation’s newfound cultural assurance. In the wake of this proclamation New Labour established a Creative Industries Taskforce that deployed partnerships with private sector agents, such as Creation records founder Alan McGhee and Richard Branson, to develop creative industry policy (Jones 1999, p. 22). The interest in the hip and sexy creative industries was spurred further by Blair’s then Minister of Cultural and Heritage, Chris Smith (1998). Smith reasserted the function of the arts as market activity by proclaiming that a new industrial era was emerging based on the creative industries. Smith’s affirmations were supported by Leadbeater’s (2000) celebration of what he saw as the UK’s new class of creative industry entrepreneurs. Both protagonists argued this ‘new economy’ based on digitised technologies, flexible work practices, and the imagination driven creative industries had surpassed Britain’s ‘old economy’ of steel and coal, a point reinforced by the estimation that the UK’s creative industries contributed at least 5% to GDP statistics (Oakley 2004, p. 70). Further supporting these claims were employment statistics that suggested since 1995 employment in UK’s creative industries had increased at three times the rate of total employment with 1.3 million employed in creative sectors 2001 (Selwood 2001). Such statistics led to a situation where the demonstrable “growth of the cultural industries … add(ed) legitimacy to the idea that national and local economies can be regenerated through the cultural industries” (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005, p. 5). Popular music was also at the forefront of the UK’s creative industry celebrations, as according to Jones (1999, p. 24):

The music industry is in the van of the ‘modern’ industries [sic] ‘New Labour’ envisages as economic leaders in the next century – it is not labour intensive, there are no trade unions to deal with, it is an industry that has been keen to embrace new technologies, it is economically ‘flexible’ in all the various ways that modern
economies recognise the definition of the term, and, last but certainly not least it produces huge profits.

Yet British public intellectuals, ministers of state, and bureaucrats did not hold a monopoly over the creative industry discourse. Simultaneously, on the other side of the Atlantic, a millennial creativity imperative emerged from a literature peddling a highly idealised discourse of human creativity, creative workers, and the creative industries (Peck 2005). The key protagonists – Richard Florida (2002a), John Howkins (2001) and Charles Landry (2000) – argued that the neo-bohemian creative class of artists, designers, and IT mavericks (in sociological conception, Bourdieu’s new petit bourgeoisie) were fashioning the creative industries as the fulcrum of the new urban economy. Through these agents’ creative enterprise, it was claimed, a new ‘creative age’ was being ushered in (Florida 2002b).

Leading ‘creative city’ and ‘creative class’ advocate Florida (2002b, author’s emphasis) was more forthright in the causal linkages between the arts, commerce, and urban development: “cities without gays and rock bands are losing the economic development race”. Briefly, Florida’s (2002a) influential ‘creative class’ thesis argued cities who attract talent, display tolerance to cultural difference, and embrace high technology (the three T’s) while supporting a funky arts and cultural scene through ‘affordable’ real estate are going to prosper. Florida’s worldwide appeal unquestionably lay in his work being part pop textbook for urban planners to apply a romanticised ‘creativity’ to social space, part bourgeois manifesto for the transformative powers of an idealised human creativity, and part rational system for predicting a city’s future competitiveness (Peck 2005). Florida also appealed to a liberal sensibility. He celebrated urban diversity and heterogeneity, and saw a symbolic value in material inequality. Such diverse elements form the fabric of the creative city, a place where, notably, popular music is an integral part of the flaneur’s experience:

Places are also valued for authenticity and uniqueness. Authenticity comes from several aspects of a community - historic buildings, established neighbourhoods, a unique music scene, or specific cultural attributes. It comes from the mix – from urban grit alongside renovated buildings, from the commingling of young and old, long-time neighbourhood characters and yuppies, fashion models and "bag ladies". An authentic place also offers unique and original experiences. Thus a place full of chain stores,
chain restaurants, and nightclubs is not authentic. You could have the same experience anywhere (Florida 2002b, author’s emphasis).

In a similar register creative city protagonists Landry and Bianchini (1995, p. 47) suggested “the presence of artists and other cultural producers in declining urban areas helps restore vitality, develop a positive image, create additional employment and break cycles of decline”. Concurrent with these creative industry /creative class /creative city discourses was a joyful and idealistic celebration of human ‘creativity’. Although creativity conveys a multitude of human practices involving human making and creation (Williams 1976, p. 84), the creative industries protagonists appeared to narrate ‘creativity’ as an intangible, supply-side, source of competitive advantage to be fostered in individuals and organisations (Flew 2004) and harnessed by cities (Florida 2002a). Furthermore this discourse somewhat formalistically claimed that favourable state policies could unleash the population’s latent ‘creativity’ to generate economic growth (Florida 2002a; Leadbeater 2000; Smith 1998). Peter Biggs (1999), CEO of Creative New Zealand and advertising firm Clemenger BBDO, was a leading protagonist in Labour’s turn to the arts as creative industry and perhaps best illustrates some of the ‘creativity’ hyperbole:

Imagination, fuelled by creative insight, is the spark that leaps over conventional thought with the power to transform individuals and organisations, as well as the economy … It is my belief that the only way New Zealand will become a healthy and prosperous nation is by fostering a creative society which has, at its heart, not knowledge but the imagination.

For policy makers the creative industries appeal appeared to lie not only in its purported economic and employment benefits but also in its alignment to ‘after neo-liberal’ concerns over social inclusion (Oakley 2004, 2006; Osborne 2003). For governments searching for governance driven urban regeneration strategies based on small scale, low capital intensive enterprises to perform social inclusion these narrations of the creative industries and their youthful, hipster workers were particularly alluring. For example in the UK the creative industries became an ever-present discourse through which pressing ‘after neo-liberal’ economic and social issues could be addressed with consultants and advisors “often
present[ing the creative industries] as the last great hope of cities with economic or social problems” (Oakley 2004, p. 68).

Such creative industries rhetoric and policy applications proved to be highly malleable and highly mobile as they travelled to be incorporated into many state’s policies. Nations as diverse as Singapore (Kong 2000), Ireland, the Netherlands (Peck 2005), and New Zealand (see below), states such as South Australia (Landry 2003), and cities from Auckland to Tampa Bay (Peck 2005) all imported creative industry experts to implement programmes with the intent of producing ‘creativity’s’ propounded economic and social benefits. While, in a telling example of place boosterism, the Wellington City Council recently branded itself as New Zealand’s ‘creative capital’ (or colloquially, ‘Wellywood’ following the success of the *Lord of the Rings* trilogy).

By the mid-2000s a range of critiques of the creativity discourse emerged. Arguably these critiques expose the intents and purposes of the discourse. Firstly, as noted above, the creative industry discourse is formalistic and thus able to travel easily between political territories. Jamie Peck (2005a) critiques the creativity policy phenomenon fuelled by Richard Florida’s *Rise of the Creative Class* arguing creative industry discourse is a ‘fast policy’ (Peck 2002). Specifically this involves quick transfer of social and economic policy through tight networks of global bureaucrats and policy fix consultants, reifying the creative industries into a ‘one size fits all’ “cookie cutter” approach to economic and social development (Oakley, 2004, p. 73). Peck (2005a) argues such ‘fast policy’ transfer ignores, or at best only has a cursory understanding of, the substantive political economy of where these policies land. Thus creative industries, as a technocratic policy fix, become disembedded from the original spatial and historical context in core capitalist nations which then allows these to travel in shallow and essentialised forms (Peck 2005, p. 37).

Secondly, there are a range of critiques questioning the acquiescence of the creative industry discourse to the market economy’s neo-liberalised co-ordinates. Gibson and Kong (2005) query the presentation of the creative industries as an ameliorative policy prescription, for this neglects the uneven spatialisation and power interests of the creative industries as capitalist enterprise. Yudice (2003) sees an underlying pliability to the creative industries discourse that readily harmonises with social inclusion policies with job creation via the
creative industries framed as a cure to many social and economic ills by bringing agents into
the formal freedom of market exchange. Yudice (2003) also questions whether the ‘creativisation’ of social policy has real effects on individual and collective well-being. In practical application, when states acted in the name of creativity for employment and enterprise creation – for it was argued these were ‘community’, micro-entrepreneurial, and thus ‘sustainable’ jobs less reliant on the vicissitudes of the global economy – this co-opted and depoliticised resistance to top down forms of neo-liberalisation (Yudice 2003, p. 184). Furthermore the flexible work practices of the creative industries were celebrated for providing the sector with an innovative and dynamic edge (Oakley 2004, p. 70; see also Chapter Six).

Thirdly, in practical policy making terms, difficulties in measuring and defining the polyvalent creative industries abound: it is a broad industrial sector comprising many different organisations and occupations. Statistically capturing such polyvalence, however, is a crucial element in making the creative industries governable as an object of state policy (Rose 2000, p. 144). But the vertical and/or horizontal linkages of the flexible, post-Fordist creative industries render statistical capture problematic and fuzziness abounds. Incomplete data and definitional problems make classifying creative industry occupations contentious leading to debates over their economic contribution. Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005, p. 6) suggest creative industry protagonists and policy makers had “an extremely inclusive approach to argue that the sector is perhaps more economically significant than it really is”. For example café workers in museums become counted as part of the creative industries workforce (Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005; Pratt 1997).

Fourthly, the creative industries discourse could be described as everything and nothing: a malleable, and expedient, quasi-social-economic programme (Cunningham 2004). To this end Oakley (2004, p. 68) perceives a “widening gap between rhetoric, which continues to grow, and the evidence base that supports these policies, which is small to non-existent”, while states developing creative industries policies did so through a “blind belief” in their economic and social benefits15. As Miller and Yudice (2002, p. 20) wryly summarise

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15 However, this suggests there were no connections between the content producing creative industries and new industries such as IT. According to Marxist critic David Harvey (2005, p. 159) the link was powerful and
creativity and the creative industries were called upon by protagonists and policy makers alike to “enhance education, salve racial strife, reverse urban blight through cultural tourism, create jobs, reduce crime, and even make a profit”.

The music industry as creative industry

As a creative industry popular music has a number of structural features requiring elaboration for it is to these features that Labour’s music policies are aligned. As Hirsch (1972, p. 640) noted in the early 1970s before new pop songs or artists reach consumers they are filtered through organisations who bear the costs of converting art into a market commodity. In this process MNC and small independent labels and their Artist & Repertoire representatives, radio programmers and lawyers, managers and promoters, journalists and media all come to act as “cultural intermediaries” (Negus 1999, p. 18). That is these agents make assessments of the commercial viability of aspiring pop producers and thus function as distributors and gatekeepers of creative ‘talent’ (Burnett 1996; Jones 1999, 2003; Negus 1992; Scott 1999a; Toynbee 2000).

This structural feature leads to an hourglass model of the music industry, and possibly other creative industries (Cunningham 2004; Hesmondhalgh 2002). In this heuristic at the bottom of the hourglass is a mass of independent producers struggling to convert art into commerce and by doing so create an extended body of cultural texts (pop songs and images) against which cultural intermediaries can assess and evaluate new pop production. Jones (1999, p. 23) also describes this sphere of creative outpouring as the domain where aspirant artists simultaneously create an identity for themselves. This is an aspect of the pop renaissance investigated further in Chapter Six.

At the top of the hourglass are potentially large groups of, albeit market segmented, consumers. Cultural intermediaries mediate between the two domains and select artists from the massed talent pool for the opportunity, not the guarantee, to enter the market. It appears that Power and Scott’s (2004) ‘swarm’ is a fitting term to describe this mass of small scale producers and aspiring artists. In the UK, Jones (1999, p. 24) estimates there is one pop ideological; it was the “hype around these sectors [that] diverted attention from the failure to invest in basic physical and social infrastructures” during the preceding era of tax cuts and laissez faire.
group for every thousand people giving an approximate total of 56,000. Extending this logic to New Zealand there would be, plausibly, 4,000 popular music acts existent at any moment. However there is a high attrition rate with only a small percentage of acts selected by cultural intermediaries. As Jones (2003, p. 148) recounts: “1/8 of one percent of all pop acts extant at any one time enjoys appreciable success – the rest, sooner rather than later, fail”. Therefore even if a pop act gets to sign a contract the company then decides which artists to mass market, and of these only a fraction will turn a profit (Jones 1999, p. 23). Perversely for state music policies alleged to create opportunities and employment via the market, “the music industry generates failure rather than success” (Toynbee 2003, p. 51).

In the face of such odds, and despite the re-configuration of the music industry post digital file sharing (Leyshon 2001; Leyshon et al 2005; The Economist 2007), “signing ‘a deal’ remains a mantra for all new pop acts” (Jones 1999, p. 24). As Sara Cohen (1991) and Ruth Finnegan (1989) illustrate in their ethnographies of local pop production in the UK all aspiring bands fantasise about ‘making it’. Adam Holt (Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005), former CEO of Polygram New Zealand, surmises these logics when stating the ‘swarm’ of artists starting out are just “sperm trying to get to the egg”. Chapter Five analyses these structural features and dynamics, in conjunction with ANLPS supports, in more detail.

**Popular music and Labour’s creative industry policy**

The fifth Labour-led government appeared to take the creative industries discourse seriously. In the early 2000s the creative industries were the new game in town. In one dimension, however, this was not solely a case of ‘fast policy’. Labour had an enduring interest in developing the arts as evidenced in 1987 when Prime Minister David Lange “claimed arts, culture and heritage [are] essential in developing a New Zealand identity” (Skilling 2005, p. 24).

Therefore how the creative industries, including popular music, and the ‘after neo-liberal’ state coalesced in New Zealand requires explanation. In some respects the creative industry discourse can be seen as a policy ‘Trojan horse’: the best ideological shell for ‘joining-up’ the state, the arts, and the market economy after neo-liberalism. Moreover it seems that the malleability and global profile of the creative industries allowed Labour to practically stitch
the arts to the economy and national identity – and to address some of its election pledges. Perhaps for this reason, and like Blair’s UK, the state policies developed in New Zealand at this time stressed the creative industries were an emerging industrial domain able to generate new occupations and economic growth, and thus act as a mode of social inclusion (Larner 2005b, p. 10). Creative New Zealand (2003, p. 6) clearly articulated this coupling of the arts and the market when it stated “economic development for New Zealand” and “art development” can be “complementary goals”.

In this light this section describes how the creative industries appeared in strategic policies. It also serves to illustrate Labour’s emerging ‘after neo-liberal’ rationales for engaging creative entrepreneurs and the market. As we will see predominant in these policies are the uses of ‘soft’ institutions and supply-side education and training which sought to expand and enhance agents’ opportunities and capacities to convert creative production into the ‘cash nexus’. Notably these policies can also be understood as forming the institutional foundations and orientations of the ANLPS and thus the pop renaissance.

As this research seeks to highlight the creative industries as market activity, Labour’s interest in the arts as contributing to national identity can only be briefly noted here. As Cunningham (2004, p. 17) observes when brought into the ambit of the state arts and culture become “predominantly a nation-building policy framework”. Consequently, under the fifth Labour government, state documents frequently claim the creative industries “contribute to a common sense of nationhood as well as to New Zealand’s economic development” (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 5). While Helen Clark (2000a) hoped that under Labour she would see “a stronger sense of New Zealand identity develop from the flowering of New Zealand's creative talent”. Such posturing around the creative industries as national identity builders underscores Hobsbawm’s assertion that “it is the state which makes the nation, not the nation the state” (cited in McCrone 2000, p. 86). However, as this thesis illustrates, representations of national identity often occur through market measures (such as charts and sales) inducing Labour to engage the arts and the market.

**The Cultural Recovery Package**
The first step in Labour’s re-engagement with the arts after years of benign neglect was a review of the state’s role (Skilling 2005; Volkering 2001). This review fulfilled one of Labour’s pre-election promises and resulted in the announcement of the ‘Cultural Recovery Package’ in May 2000. Significantly this $NZ 86.8m fiscal injection into state art and cultural agencies amounted to three and a half times Labour’s pre-election pledge (Edwards 2000). This was because, it was claimed by Helen Clark (2000a), the outgoing National party left a funding shortfall of the national museum, orchestra, and ballet, although this injection of financial support also went to establishing new initiatives to fund film and music (see Chapter Four).

The ‘Cultural Recovery Package’ also paid for a further review of the arts and cultural sector with the aim of developing a strategic plan. Written by arts, culture, and economics experts the Heart of the Nation report reassessed the role of the arts funding agencies and how they should be structured (Volkering 2001, p. 447-449). In tracing the relations between the subsidised field of ‘high’ artistic production and the more market driven creative industries Heart of the Nation argued there needed to be one state agency bridging the gap between the two domains (ibid). However Heart of the Nation’s recommendations were never implemented. Helen Clark rejected “the findings, complaining that the report did not include any strategic recommendations and that the proposed structural reforms were inappropriate” (Volkering 2001, p. 447). Perhaps the authors misrecognised the neo-liberal parameters of the market economy and how the state could, legitimately, be aligned to its existing logics. To this end, Clark (2000a) asserted:

Support for arts and culture is best developed these days as a partnership. In that partnership, the state will be dominant in some areas, particularly in the support of the national institutions and organisations, but in others private philanthropy and patronage, and increasingly corporate sponsorship, will play a big role.

Coterminus with this increased state funding for the arts was a situation where state actors began folding the creative industry discourse into Labour’s policy programme. Echoing global trends it was asserted the creative industries are “part of transforming our economy away from its reliance on commodities towards new sectors driven by technology, skills, and talent” (Clark 2000b). At the same time the associate Minister for the Arts, Culture and
Heritage, Judith Tizard (2000), asserted the creative industries “have yet to reach their full potential to contribute to the wealth of New Zealand. They have the potential to be much greater employers of people doing the jobs they love, and to boost GDP and export earnings”. In other words the creative industries could become domains of social inclusion via the labour market while contributing to economic growth.

**Creative industries symposia in New Zealand**

Before the state could strategically direct and partner the domestic creative industries towards economic and social goals the domestic creative industries needed to be made “intelligible as a sector” (Lewis & Prince 2004). A significant feature of the early 2000s was a myriad of state facilitated creative industry conferences, symposia, and reports. At these events imported guest speakers (mostly from the US and UK), authors, and policy experts joined the local cultural cognoscenti with the intention of “invent[ing] a creative society in New Zealand” (Lewis & Prince 2004). Some examples included the ‘Cool Aotearoa’ forum and the ‘Creative Industries Forum’ in 2000, ‘Resonate: inserting musicians into global markets’ in 2003, and in 2004 ‘New Zealand’s Creative Economy’ and ‘Creativity to Productivity’ (Lewis & Prince 2004). A common theme of these events and reports was the assertion that the creative industries were a leading source of value in the globalising ‘new economy’.

Concurrent with the domestic creative industry symposiums was the ‘mapping’ of the domestic creative industry’s economic contribution. As Du Gay and Pryke (2002, p. 2-3) emphasise in governmentality terms to govern is to represent and then act upon. In 2001 Wellington think-tank, the New Zealand Institute of Economic Research (NZIER), was contracted by the government to measure the creative sector’s input into the national economy. Drawing inspiration from the UK’s Department of Culture, Media and Sport’s 1998 mapping document (Oakley 2004; Selwood 2001), *Creative Industries in New Zealand: economic contribution* calculated the domestic creative sector – classified as advertising, software and computer services including leisure ware, publishing, television and radio, film and video, architecture, design, designer fashion, music and the performing arts, visual arts – contributed 3.1 % to New Zealand’s GDP and employed 3.6% of the labour force (NZIER 2002). Figures comparable, the report noted, to the education sector.
Music’s economic contribution in *Creative Industries in New Zealand* illustrates persistent definitional and statistical problems. Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) suggest music is made to appear relatively significant within national economies by being subsumed within the broader ‘performing arts’ category. Such a classification includes state subsidised organisations such as the national symphony orchestra and the ballet. Despite these drawbacks NZIER calculated music generated $146 million, of which education services contributed $30 million (New Zealand Institute of Economic Research 2002, p. 16). To reach this figure music is defined as “the activities of, or made possible, by the work of creative artists who are New Zealand residents composing or performing music”, although the ‘black box’ of other activities “made possible” is not defined. Yet, as an aspect of the measured national economy, the domestic creative and music industries need be placed in context. Domestic egg production contributes $NZ 160m (Statistics New Zealand 2006b), while tourism and related activities imparts a significant $NZ 2.9b to the GDP figures (Statistics New Zealand 2006c). Therefore, unlike their core economy counterparts, New Zealand’s creative industries had yet to surpass the ‘grass economy’ and tourism foundations.

Amongst this spate of creative industry symposia and reports was a document specific to popular music. In 2001 the state agency Industry New Zealand commissioned a Wellington recording studio owner, the flamboyantly monikered Rocky Douche, to assess the economic potential of domestic popular music by canvassing music industry agents. The result, *The NZ Music Industry: A scoping review of the contemporary music industry*, echoed the importunate structural issues raised by *New Horizons* over a decade earlier: a small domestic market; a lack of broadcasting quotas to grow the domestic industry; the need to enhance business skills through training and seminars; and the need for export incentives to increase low investment levels (Douche 2001, p. 11). Reiterating *New Horizons* 1989 assessments *The NZ Music Industry* noted there were areas of economic potential with opportunities to develop niche export markets through state assistance, once again legitimated through the narrative of the originality of domestic musicians (Douche 2001, p. 25-26). Despite these opportunities *The NZ Music Industry* (2001, p. 7) noted that the diverse domestic music industries lacked cohesion and focus, and the state should act to address these structural limitations by contributing:

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16 Agriculture and horticulture
Its business acumen and assistance. It could do this by taking a proactive role with the application of business-oriented mentoring and support packages. If it did so, Industry New Zealand could play a pivotal part in growing the contemporary music industry and helping it to reach its full export and employment potential.

Labour has since enacted many of *The NZ Music Industry’s* recommendations. As the discussion below and in Chapter Four describes broadcast quotas, skills and training seminars, financial support packages, and export development are prominent features of ANLPS supports. Further legitimating the roll-out of these state supports and programmes was the inclusion of the creative industries, including popular music, in Labour’s strategic policy.

**The Growth and Innovation Framework and Opportunity for All New Zealanders**

Following the spate of symposia and reports the creative industries coalesced in two high profile policy documents: The *Growth and Innovation Framework* (2003) and *Opportunity for All New Zealanders* (2004). The *Growth and Innovation Framework* (GIF) was explicitly orientated to returning “New Zealand’s per capita income to the top half of the OECD rankings and maintain that standing” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 6). To achieve this Labour envisioned expanding production and thus wealth generation by engaging and supporting the ‘new economy’ sectors. *Opportunity for All New Zealanders* outlined how Labour intended to foster ‘social inclusion’ through health and welfare innovations, and by enabling agents into the labour market. Both documents were the “Co-ordinating frameworks” that underpinned what Labour called its “Government Vision for a [economically, environmentally, socially and culturally] Sustainable New Zealand” where “economic and social development go hand in hand” (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 12, 13).

**The Growth and Innovation Framework**

The *Growth and Innovation Framework* documents what at the time was a palpable sense that Labour’s partnering policies and rhetoric might make real impacts on the domestic economy. In Prime Minister Helen Clark’s opening statement she declared the *Growth and
Innovation Framework responds to the “need to continue to transform the New Zealand economy” by addressing “those structural failings in order to improve real incomes” that, in turn, would finance the provision of ‘first world’ social services (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 5). Once again reflecting increasing inter-departmental collaboration and partnerships with market actors the Growth and Innovation Framework was formulated by the Ministry of Economic Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and the private sector’s Boston Consulting Group and LEK consultants.

To pursue the objective of creating “growth rates in excess of our historical economic performance” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 12) the GIF asserted the role of the ‘new economy’ industries: ICT, biotechnology, and the creative industries. Together these industries were narrated as re-orienting New Zealand from a reliance on the ‘grass economy’ and tourism to what were narrated as innovative, technologically advanced, and “globally connected” industries (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 6). Thus the GIF’s industrial triumvirate were ‘selected’ for their horizontal linkages across the economy as it was asserted “productivity improvements in the target area [will] have spill-over effects in many others” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 51). Here ICT and biotechnology appear to be targets of state assistance based on the rationale of their being “market led” in the sense that the government takes its cue from “existing strengths” in the domestic economy (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 51). Furthermore ICT, biotechnology, and the creative industries were claimed to be less reliant on fluctuating world commodity prices or large-scale capital investment. Thus as “knowledge, Intellectual Property Rights” industries these were frequently alleged to be “the future for a small economy” (Southeran 2006) that is also geographically isolated (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 15).

The rationales for bringing the creative industries into the Growth and Innovation Framework’s ambit may reflect the then existing ‘blind belief’ in their economic powers. In this 43 page document the creative industries are allocated three paragraphs with only one page of examples. In contrast, biotechnology has four pages, ICT two. Despite the paucity of ‘hard’ economic evidence the GIF repeated the global creative industries discourse by presenting economic rationales for the incorporation of the arts and culture in strategic policy. At the same time, the GIF re-narrated the now ubiquitous appeals that the arts were a source of national identity. Unlike the detail provided for ICT and biotechnology, the Growth and
Innovation Framework’s presentation of creative industries shifts from the language of substantive economic development to ideological aspiration through the language of promise and potential. Like many preceding symposia and reports the Growth and Innovation Framework claimed the creative sector could “leverage off New Zealand’s unique cultural capabilities, which international competitors can’t replicate. It therefore has the potential to generate wealth on a sustained basis” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p.56). In relation to the market economy the Growth and Innovation Framework echoes the discourse surrounding the mythical powers of ‘creativity’. It claimed “creativity is at the heart of innovation and… [The] creative industries input into many other sectors” such as design and niche manufacturing while popular music linked into film and television soundtracks, advertising, digital media, and fashion (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 56).

Importantly for this thesis the Growth and Innovation Framework clearly articulated the enabling role of the ‘after neo-liberal’ state in partnering firms into the market economy. It was envisioned the state would take a “middle way” of “neither…the extremes of heavy government involvement in the economy, or of very little government involvement in the economy” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 19). Specifically the Growth and Innovation Framework (ibid, p. 6) revealed the growing influence of ‘soft’ new institutional processes whereby the state “will work co-operatively with other sectors” to identify market opportunities. Nevertheless core neo-liberal institutions and individual entrepreneurial dynamism remain as “the intention is to unleash the productive potential of the private sector not to replace it” (ibid, p. 22), all within a “stable economic framework, an open and competitive micro-economy” (ibid 2003, p. 6). Supply-side human capital development appeared too and was narrated as foundational to “a modern cohesive society, a healthy population, [and] a highly skilled population” (ibid, p.37).

With “global connectivity... critically important to economic growth” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 15) the GIF’s objective was enabling ICT, biotech and creative industry entrepreneurs into the voluminous profit margins of the global technology and content industries. To do so a co-operative but hierarchical state model called “Working with Business” set out how “government programmes and initiatives” would fund and enable small businesses to move from a ‘start up’ enterprise to established domestic business and then on to international business (ibid, p. 20). Such a lock-step strategy revealed how ‘after
neo-liberal’ state funding and support would depend upon commercial success at each stage. As below and the next chapter explain, this model of continued state support measured on market success also imbues Labour’s popular music programmes.

Opportunity for All New Zealanders

Concurrent with the *Growth and Innovation Framework*’s ideations of how the state could support export-led ‘development’ *Opportunity for All New Zealanders* set out Labour’s broadly social liberal aims for what it called a socially cohesive society. The creative industries are also an aspect of this policy. Written by the Ministry of Social and Economic Development *Opportunity for All*’s (2004, p. 12) ‘after neo-liberal’ aim was “to increase economic growth, reduce inequality, and improve the standard of living of all New Zealanders in a manner that is environmentally, socially, culturally and economically sustainable.”

To facilitate this *Opportunity for All* works through a range of familiar social liberal themes: social cohesion, barriers to participation in labour markets, equality of opportunity for young people and ethnic minorities, and the moral value of paid work. In this document the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s intention is clear, aiming to “build a more unified and socially cohesive society. We want to lift everybody’s chances without leaving anyone to fall behind” (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 11). Expressly this document claimed the state would tackle “disadvantage [to] promot[e] equality of opportunity for all New Zealanders” as “we do not want New Zealand to become a country where there is extensive poverty and disadvantage” (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 11). To address such ‘after neo-liberal’ social problems a dual economic and social rationale is recounted albeit it through the supply-side of the market economy:

Reducing inequalities is critical for economic growth. The prosperity of our country depends on improving the productivity of all our citizens. Educational under-achievement, chronic poor health, unemployment and crime are all barriers to economic participation and prosperity (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 11).

Yet conceptions of the individualised liberal subject still suffuse *Opportunity for All*’s (ibid) aspirations, as it is the atomised individual who carries:

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Much of the responsibility for their own well-being. Whether we fulfil our potential, prosper and participate in our communities and wider society depends largely on personal choices, including beliefs, attitudes, and values we express through our behaviour.

Following the neo-liberal ideations of the market economy as an economic and moral domain Opportunity for All narrates “hard work” and discipline rather than privilege, race or luck as the means for providing material wealth and social contact (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 14). Such ‘social inclusion’ in the labour market was to synchronise with the GIF’s efforts to ‘join-up’ agents and firms to the globalising economy. As Chapters Five and Six analyse such policy emphasis on work and market activity can be seen to be an important aspect of New Zealand’s pop renaissance: ANLPS funding and supports require creative entrepreneurs to demonstrate “hard work”.

The creative industries feature briefly in Opportunity for All. Most significant for this thesis’s argument on music policy as social policy are the ways Opportunity for All ideates the creative industries as spheres of ‘sustainable employment’ and ‘social inclusion’. An exemplar of the creative industries as a “funky [form] of supply side intervention” (Peck 2005, p. 740) is the previously unemployed creative entrepreneur Nathan Kerr. Kerr, a stilt walker, is depicted as having realised his creative industry ambitions by gaining employment – through enabling welfare assistance (see Chapter Six) – with “Stalker, one of the world’s best stilt-based performing arts companies” (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 46).

Viewed together the Growth and Innovation Framework and Opportunity for All New Zealanders illustrate how Labour officially understood the how the creative industries related to the market economy. The creative industries discourse, in part, served to get domestic popular music significant state attention and funding. Concurrent with these policy ideations was much ideological effort with popular music frequently invoked as an archetype of how the state was partnering the creative sector. For example Associate Minister of Arts, Culture and Heritage Judith Tizard (2002) stressed “New Zealand music is world-class and the music industry is a significant growth industry. It makes good economic sense to support it”. While the then Minister of Broadcasting, Steve Maharey (2005) could claim, following the release of domestic airplay figures:
New Zealand music is moving from strength to strength. We can all celebrate this important milestone [reaching the radio broadcast target as discussed in the following chapter], but we need to keep up the momentum. The government will keep working with musicians to help them achieve their goals, both here and overseas.

Figure 3: Development of Popular Music Policy in New Zealand

1970s/80s
Pre-neo-liberalism

1984-1999
Neo-liberalism

1999-
‘After neo-liberalism’

QUEIIACNZ: Arts funding for high culture
Popular music ‘not culture’ (Robert Muldoon)
1979: small funding for pop recordings and tours
40 per cent tax on vinyl records
Emerging acknowledgement of popular music as having economic benefits

State Impetus:
Privatisation
De-regulation
Trade openness
Shrinking state in the economy, reduce tariffs and subsidies
(1984 – 1999)

Arts/Popular Music

New Horizons (1989): report notes the economic potential of the arts and popular music’s
Arts seen not suitable to exposure to ‘market forces’
NPM
Broadcasting Act 1989: Founding of NZOA, which funds videos and ‘Kiwi’ radio shows

Creative cities, Creative Industries, and ‘Creativity’ Discourse

State Impetus:
Supporting productive sector and global connectivity through ‘soft institutions’
Social cohesion after neo-liberal atomisation of the social domain

Creative Industry discourse and ‘fast policy’ transfer

Cultural Recovery Package (2000)

Arts/Popular Music

Creative industry Symposium
‘Cultural Recovery Package’
Outcomes:
2001 NZMC formed
2004 Creating Heat (music export report)
Expanded music funding through CNZ and NZOA

Strategic Policy:
Opportunities For All New Zealanders (2004)
Creating Heat

Following the *Growth and Innovation Framework* and *The NZ Music Industry* reports, 2004’s *Creating Heat, Tumata Kia Whita!: a strategy to ignite the economic and cultural potential of the New Zealand music industry* was a report whose core recommendations can be seen to strongly influence subsequent state supports for domestic pop. Building on the policy parameters set by the GIF and *Opportunity for All*, *Creating Heat* advised Labour on a long-term music industry strategy. In particular, it articulated how the Labour government needed to “support our global aspirations” by continuing “to expand our domestic capability” (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p.4).

Replaying the partnership model of other contemporary reports the state organisation Trade and Enterprise New Zealand convened the New Zealand Music Industry Development Group to author *Creating Heat*. Chaired by the CEO of SONY Music New Zealand and former copyright lawyer Malcolm Black, the group comprised 17 industry professionals from MNC labels, independent label owners, managers, and the experienced but faded stars of yesteryear. Such diverse actors reflect that, rather than being a unified entity, the music industry is comprised of many interlaced industries – recording, promotion, media – each with their own logics and competing interests (Williamson & Cloonan 2007). Furthermore, as Lewis, Larner and Le Heron (2008) note, by bringing such market agents into the formulation of policy the state draws on not only the pre-existing experience of private sector actors, but also their interests.17 Or in Bourdieussian terms, the habitus and illusio of these agents comes to imbue state policy.

*Creating Heat’s* stated aims were to “develop a music export strategy, to address the issues inhibiting domestic growth and to set strategic goals for the New Zealand music industry” (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p.5). In considering these iterations between domestic music production and globally connected industry growth *Creating Heat* highlighted the following for state attention: technical-legal matters around

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17 David Harvey (2005, p. 77) critiques such partnering forms of neo-liberal governance, asserting such state-market co-operation depoliticises “the boundary between the state and corporate power [and] has become more and more porous”.

securing copyright law; increasing access to broadcasting and live performance opportunities (such as a co-ordinated touring circuit); legal advice for musicians; and the up-skilling of managers. Therefore, in Creating Heat’s (ibid, p. 6) logic, prior to an artist becoming ‘export ready’ the state should facilitate domestic pop recordings and export opportunities to improve:

The processes that nurture and develop local artists of all styles, genres and niches, [by doing so] not only do we provide more quality content to the local market, we also increase opportunities for international success.

To reach this objective state-industry partnership would need to be adapted to existing market structures. By adopting this form of state support it was claimed export earnings – estimated at $5million – could be multiplied by ten (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 22-23). In working towards this goal the state was recommended to develop policies that would connect creative entrepreneurs to the “informal networks of specialists” in the local and international music industry (ibid, p. 15). The expertise and social connectivity of these ‘cultural intermediaries’ would then facilitate international ‘hit’ rates and thus trickle down to grow the domestic pop industries (ibid, p. 22-23). Such a policy objective of domestic and export development would require a “new and innovative approach to exporting our music to the world” (ibid, p.5). To legitimate this strategy Creating Heat argued, like New Horizons before it, that:

Music touches everyone on the planet. It transcends language; expresses emotions and desires; reflects culture, history and identity. Music is also a business. It is bought and sold and used to sell products, ideas and concepts. By its very nature, the global music industry is multileveled, dynamic and highly creative…The Export Development Group has developed a new and innovative approach to exporting our music to the world. The key is ‘global connectedness’ (ibid, p. 4).

Therefore in its recommendations Creating Heat echoed the GIF’s rationales for the state partnering of market actors: “the New Zealand Music Industry and Government can work together in partnership to enhance the export potential of New Zealand” (ibid, p. 5). Here the deployment of ‘soft institutional’ social connectivity through state managed social networks
could be mobilised to connect domestic music producers to influential actors, such as labels, managers and publishers, at home and abroad. Even though such ideations work with the existing, and arguably highly exploitative, structures of the music industry the intention was to increase the returns to national economic accounts through copyright ownership by New Zealand citizens. This, rather than enabling corporate power to exploit domestic musicians for the economic returns to then flow to core economies as had occurred historically, was the primary aim (Douche 2001; Shuker & Pickering 1994). Other notable rationales for state support echoed New Horizons and the creativity discourse. These included enhancing creative entrepreneurs’ skills, reinforcing “pride in New Zealand music domestically”, and the branding of New Zealand as “at the forefront of global creativity” (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 22-23).

Yet like earlier music industry reports Creating Heat noted the fraught nature of entering the popular music market. The authors of Creating Heat argued current state export efforts were “ad hoc, isolated, irregular and the process is often random” (ibid, p. 16). Therefore a state “co-ordinated and focussed export strategy” should seek to minimise “the barriers to entry into the global music networks such as distance, knowledge, contacts and resources” in order to “improve our chances of repeating our isolated successes” (ibid). To overcome these barriers Creating Heat advocated – like the GIF’s “Working with Business” model (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 20) – a hierarchical three stage approach. This strategy would nurture ‘export ready’ artists within the domestic music industry. As such it was understood as working through lock-step formulae whereby enhancing domestic artists’ ‘quality’ through performance and recording opportunities would then flow through to export success. In an artistic conditioning exercise New Zealand on Air, Creative New Zealand, and the New Zealand Music Commission (organisations explained in more detail in the following chapter) are understood to play strategic funding and facilitating roles. These agencies could incentivise pop producers to create for the domestic and international market with state subsidies narrated as “a risk mitigation tool [which] also greatly encourages private investment” (Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 6).

The first stage in Creating Heat’s export strategy was ‘market scoping’, and this required drawing upon ‘in market’ expertise in international markets. Therefore Creating Heat recommended in the tacit ‘soft institutional’ tones of social connectivity:
‘Plugging in’ to the existing infrastructures and expertise is the best approach to export success … [as] selling music internationally is facilitated by groups of interdependent and informal network of specialists…entry into a network usually means one or more of these individuals identifying a particular artist as having the potential to earn money and committing to their development in that market.

The second stage involved “performance support” that connected to “existing global infrastructure” (Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 15). Here the state’s role is imagined to require further subsidies to sustain domestic artists’ contacts once they enter international markets (ibid, p. 15-16). Sustaining this social connectivity is necessary for:

Experienced contacts in the international markets help create the heat for them, ensuring once they have sparked the flame, there is professional support network around the artist to fan those flames into the fire of a sustainable career (ibid, p. 14).

Once an overseas market was accessed Creating Heat imagined a third stage of extensive ‘market infiltration’. This would require partnered state-industry “funding to break into that market” (ibid, p. 16). To legitimate such ‘after neo-liberal promotional state’ involvement in the global music market a ‘top-down’ cultural imperialism/hyper-globalisation narrative was mobilised (Hirst & Thompson 1999). Here Creating Heat claimed the social and economic processes of globalisation had bred cultural uniformity and slowed cultural innovation. Consequently New Zealand’s semi-peripheral position was a strategic asset with Creating Heat re-asserting that domestically produced pop emerged from a distinctive “cultural mix” (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 5). Drawing on this image Creating Heat suggested state export supports could generate commercial success comparable to Sweden – “now considered a key territory for pop music in the world” (ibid, p. 23) – and appealed again to the idealistic creativity discourse when asserting:

New Zealand offers a different and completely fresh source of creativity and is one of the world’s most desirable countries...we are well positioned to offer unique musical experiences to the world.
Such a narrative is not solely bluster. Many of New Zealand’s popular musicians have secured their fifteen minutes or more on the global stage. Consider the artists who have enjoyed recent state assisted commercial success and/or media attention in the UK, USA, and Australia: SONY Music priority artist Bic Runga, retro rockers the D4 and the Datsuns, Grammy winners Stereogram, Trans-Tasman rapper Scribe, multi-platinum selling ‘popera’ star Hayley Westernra, the Blackseeds, Shihad, Brooke Fraser, Elemeno P, BBC lauded Fat Freddy’s Drop, The Checks, Cut off Your Hands, Die Die Die, the Brunettes, Liam Finn (son of Neil from Crowded House), and The Ruby Suns (to name a few).

Moreover Creating Heat’s concerns are broader than promoting the domestic industry: the report also weaves ‘after neo-liberal’ social concerns into its music policy recommendations. Running parallel to the export and economic development narrative are the range of now familiar supply-side benefits: the formation of creative entrepreneurs’ career paths, sustainable employment, and social and cultural development. For example, Creating Heat suggested enabling state support would “create career paths for young New Zealanders”, as:

Limiting success to New Zealand solely due to the small population base limits the potential income for New Zealand artists and industry professionals. The creation of viable export pathways will create feasible career paths for New Zealanders. The strategy will also allow artists to not only realise their creative dreams, but also earn a realistic income from their creativity (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 23).

Thus Creating Heat imagined a virtuous cycle of sustainable, market oriented economic growth stimulated through ‘hard working’ state partnered agents. To support these processes state agencies would co-ordinate the ‘joining-up’ of creative entrepreneurs to domestic and overseas markets, while this strategy was legitimated through the social liberal ideal of expanding opportunity for agents. Overall Creating Heat further illustrates how the fifth Labour government – in partnership with private sector elites – used the creative industries’ zeitgeist to integrate popular music into a discourse of economic growth, employment, and social inclusion.
Discussion

By 2008 the creative industries discourse and the *Growth and Innovation Framework* were slowly removed from high-level policy documents and replaced by the discourse of ‘economic transformation’. Under the rubric ‘economic transformation’ the national labour force, regardless of what industry it worked in, is now imagined as ‘creative’ and able to “apply its skills, ideas”, while workplaces are extolled to “provide the environment, incentives, and opportunities for people to be innovative, creative and responsive to change” (Ministry of Economic Development 2007a). Although Labour (and state agencies) came to distance themselves from the creative industries discourse they still maintained noticeable support for the film, design, and popular music industries (Maharey 2007; Southeran 2006). Nevertheless, in cases of political expediency, the creative industries discourse is occasionally revived albeit depending on the audience. Former cabinet minister Steve Maharey’s (2007) address to a Humanities conference remarked “the humanities have a key role in fuelling what’s been called the real currency of our creative industries – the content”. Yet in early 2009 following the election of the National government state intents for New Zealand’s creative industries remain unclear.

This chapter has described the policy trajectories of popular music in New Zealand, illustrating why the fifth Labour government sought to engage pop through the discourses of economic growth, employment, and national identity. By focusing on the continuities in state thought this chapter elides some of the contests in the development of popular music policy. Nonetheless the primary purpose has been to highlight how Labour’s durable interest in the arts and culture was woven into its ‘after neo-liberal’ re-engagement of the productive sector. Somewhat intriguing in this policy formation was how the partnered interests of the private sector became visible in creative industry policies. With this background in mind the next chapter explains how these state policies work ‘on the ground’ to construct the pop renaissance.
Chapter Four:
Programmes of the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state (ANLPS)
and the pop renaissance

*Parts of this chapter appeared in Popular Music 2008, Vol. 27. See Appendix Two.

Introduction

How did Labour’s ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state (ANLPS) stimulate the airplay and sales success of the pop renaissance? To answer this question this chapter explains how ANLPS organisations and their programmes are central to the conversion of domestic pop producers into market actors and domestic sounds into the ‘cash nexus’. Here it can be observed that such enabling state support involves the constitution of an “institutional ecology” through which the symbolic and economic success of the pop renaissance is produced (Nee 2005, p. 66).

Building on Chapter Three this chapter explains in detail how the state enacted the recommendations of the Growth and Innovation Framework, Opportunity for All, and Creating Heat. This will illustrate how under Labour’s broadly social liberal aspirations state popular music supports were oriented towards expanding opportunities for the musical production of creative entrepreneurs to enter the market economy. Empirically the focus is on the two main ANLPS organisations and their enabling programmes. The first section examines the domestic promotional work of New Zealand on Air (NZOA). The second section investigates its ‘sister’ organisation, the New Zealand Music Commission (NZMC), and how it works to export pop and educate and inform creative entrepreneurs. In order to round out the range of state supports for domestic popular music arts funding agency Creative New Zealand is discussed in Appendix 1.

Overall the following discussion highlights the innovative application of new institutional thought designed to marry “enabling forms of state power with market rationality” (Peck 2007, p. 46). To recap new institutional thought influences state engagement with the productive sector for it assumes “economic…success derives from stable relationships
characterised by trust, social participation, voluntary associations, and friendships” (Bevir 2005, p. 39). Such ways of state acting do not rely solely on legislation, ‘arms-length’ bureaucracy, or leave agents to pursue their interests in isolation. Instead, as we will see, the state is ‘in the trenches’ with pop producers, busily working to facilitate domestic sounds into potential market exchanges within and beyond New Zealand’s borders. We will also see how the ‘little fingers’ (Phillips 2002) of the state work in highly personalised ways to broker, facilitate, partner, and ‘join-up’ domestic pop producers with market opportunities. Here the state deployment of social networks, trust, and importantly, funding are aligned to existing music industry practices (Bevir 2005, p. 107, 112; Office of the Prime Minister 2003; World Bank 1997). Consequently this explanation of state supports replies, in part, to Breen’s (2008, p.6) suggestion that “inevitably, popular music policy making will struggle with the challenge to create policies that intervene in the increasingly taken for granted world of the market”. The pop renaissance illustrates a situation where the state works ‘with the grain’ of the market.

The organisations and programmes of the ANLPS

New Zealand on Air (NZOA)

The fifth Labour government’s countering of the dominance of imported sounds is perhaps the most celebrated aspect of the pop renaissance. NZOA is the main state funder of domestic pop production, and therefore arguably one of the main actors co-producing the pop renaissance. NZOA was established under the 1989 Broadcasting Act. The intent of this legislation was to ensure local content on radio and television during New Zealand’s era of neo-liberal inspired privatisation and deregulation, and during which the radio-broadcasting spectrum was sold off through competitive tendering (Dubber 2007, p. 23). Within this newly de-regulated broadcasting field NZOA was given the task of subsidising domestic television and radio production in order to guarantee a modicum of local content. To this end and in respect to popular music, section 37d of the Broadcasting Act requires “reasonable provision is made to assist in the production of… and in the broadcasting of New Zealand Music” (New Zealand on Air 2006a, p. 9). This is an imprecise definition as to what institutional mechanisms could be used to reach this cultural objective; accordingly, it was this mandate that allowed NZOA to expand and intensify its facilitation of domestic pop production.
following the $28 million injection from the *Cultural Recovery Package* which placed “a particular emphasis ... on music” (Clark 2000a, see also Chapter Three). Three elements comprise NZOA’s success in leveraging local artists onto the airwaves: a voluntary radio quota (*The New Zealand Music Code*); tiered pop funding schemes attuned to commercial radio airplay (the market); and the use of ‘pluggers’ to establish relations of trust with commercial radio programmers (social connectivity). Each is discussed in turn below.

**The New Zealand Music Code**

The concentration of state resources towards commercial radio is a significant aspect producing the airplay figures of the pop renaissance. Brendon Smyth, the manager of NZOA’s music section since the agency’s inception, describes NZOA’s role as: “we are not actually in the music business … we are in the airplay business” (Key State Informant Interview 2006). Importantly, for ‘after neo-liberal’ alignments to existing market rationalities, radio airplay is “central to the success the of the music industry” (Neill 2002, p. 61). This is because through radio broadcasting copyright holders receive royalties and artists gain access to larger audiences and thus increased sales. Therefore, in the words of a NZOA radio plugger, “it would be a cultural gain and a commercial gain if we had more New Zealand music on those commercial stations” (Key State Informant Interview 2006). Such an orientation can be seen to be drawn directly from the fifth Labour government’s rationale of constituting the creative industries as a mode of economic development and creating larger domestic audiences (Clark 2000a).

NZOA’s focus on commercial radio, however, emerges from the legacy of New Zealand’s neo-liberal de-regulatory era. The scope of broadcasting deregulation – and the strength of competition and the extent of market niche development that followed – has been an important factor. New Zealand now has more radio stations per capita than any other nation: 1 station for every 5,250 people (Shanahan and Duignan 2005, p. 19). Although this figure includes many narrow casting community stations the main commercial stations compete for advertising and thus the focal point of these stations’ playlists are mainstream/mass audiences. Drawing on the advice of American radio consultants most music directors, since the 1990s, have opted for international hit songs to capture 80 percent of the listening audience (Dubber 2007, p. 23-25). Therefore NZOA has specifically targeted commercial radio stations as domestic content is a given on student, state, and community radio. As
Brendon Smyth states NZOA “is committed to getting more [domestic sounds] in the mainstream where there is not enough but where most of the people are listening” (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

How the state accessed commercial radio can be seen to be influenced by historical events. In 1999 Labour made an election pledge to legislate a 20 percent domestic free to air quota. This political use of popular culture have been variously interpreted as an electoral ploy to woo the youth vote – and a counter to National’s advocacy for a Youth Radio Network (Dubber 2007, p. 26) – or a component of Labour’s “commitment to nation building and promoting both New Zealand’s culture and cultural industries” (Kelsey 2003, p. 5).

However once in office Labour found its quota aspirations stymied. Specifically any legislated quota would be constrained by audiovisual regulatory agreements on “market access and national treatment provisions” in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Closer Economic Relations (CER) agreement with Australia (Kelsey 2003, p. 5; Neill 2005, p. 163). Under GATS articles XVI and XVII the use of quotas or national preferences for producers are prohibited under the neo-liberal ideology of applying a putatively ‘level playing field’ to cultural markets (Pauwels & Loisen, 2003, p. 298). This was a trade arrangement to which the preceding elite liberal “National Government entered [with] no reservation in acceding to GATS on the issue of culture” (Clark 2002, cited in Kelsey 2003, p. 6). Such globally regulated circumstances confronted NZOA’s efforts to access commercial radio, as Brendon Smyth recounts:

There was talk at the time that introducing a [radio] quota would be difficult because of international treaty obligations. We were signatories to GATS and a number of other international trade agreements and if we wanted to introduce a quota – a legislated quota – the government would be obliged to go back to the GATS partners and say ‘can we seek an exemption’. What they were afraid of is that they would be allowed the exemption – no problems – but all the other GATS parties would say ‘oh well while we are about it lets talk about butter, let’s talk about meat or let’s talk about wool or let’s talk about wine and so on’, [some of New Zealand’s main export earners] and it would open up the government to pressure to make other changes to GATT [General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade] (Key State Informant Interview 2006).
Such supranational constraints set in motion innovative attempts to circumvent this regulatory framework. Undaunted by trade rules the then Broadcasting Minister Marian Hobbes asserted territorial regulatory power to meet Labour’s cultural and economic goals when she “assured the [broadcasting] industry that the Government reserves the right to legislate if necessary” (Kelsey 2003, p. 6). This potential threat of legislated quotas convinced the Radio Broadcasters Association (RBA), an industry body representing commercial radio, to approach the government, urging, in the words of Brendon Smyth: “Don’t legislate for quotas; don’t tell us what to do. Tell us what you want and we will give you what you want but we will do it our way - in effect a voluntary agreement” (Key State Informant Interview 2006).18 A move that Dubber (2007, p. 29) describes as a “tremendous display of goodwill on [the RBA’s] part”.

Through the gradual application of trust and partnership a voluntary 20 percent domestic content quota was established. This New Zealand Music Code is negotiated between the government, (through the office of the Minister of Broadcasting) and the Radio Broadcasters Association (on behalf of the commercial radio industry). However the Music Code did not become established in a short time frame. As a negotiated agreement on local content the code’s percentage has increased over successive years since 2002. It has focused on expanding opportunities for the airplay of contemporary popular music rather than simply replaying domestic pop’s history on ‘classic hits’ radio (Dubber 2007) (see Table 2). Moreover the Music Code provides a new public management (see Chapter Two) style target for governing NZOA’s performance and funding systems.

18 New Zealand is not alone in having a voluntary quota. Australia too has 25% local content quota on commercial stations. Other nations with legislated quotas include Canada, France, South Africa, and Sweden.
Table 1: NZ Music Content on Commercial Radio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NZ Music Code Local Content Targets</th>
<th>NZ Music Content on Commercial Radio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(all types of music, Commercial Radio)</td>
<td>(% Target)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>13.00</td>
<td>15.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>14.50</td>
<td>17.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>16.00</td>
<td>18.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>17.50</td>
<td>20.77</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
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<td>19.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>21.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>20.00</td>
<td>19.34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: New Zealand on Air (2006a); New Zealand on Air (2007, p. 9); New Zealand on Air (2008, p. 10).

Funding pop

Although this voluntary quota can be seen as creating the highly visible and audible success story of the pop renaissance – not least because radio “creates hits far more than it follows the taste of its audiences” (Dubber 2007, p. 29) – the percentage of local content continues to fluctuate over each reporting quarter. According to an NZOA radio plugger this is because NZOA needs to manage the supply of commercially appropriate acts to meet this target: “it ... depends on the supply of songs coming through and at the moment we have a lot of artists coming through so we should be able to improve on that” (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

To develop commercially viable content to meet the Music Code’s new public management logics NZOA significantly expanded its range of funding and promotional schemes. This expansion of popular music funding is again coterminus with Labour’s increased fiscal commitment to the arts (see Chapter Three). Under Labour NZOA was funded through the Ministry of Culture and Heritage with the music arm receiving $NZ 5.5 million of its total $NZ 100 million budget. From this the music arm finances its public-private partnership production subsidies, the employment of two full-time staff, and three contracted radio pluggers (New Zealand on Air 2008). As a policy mode public-private partnerships are an omnipresent feature of state popular music supports. As we see below and in later chapters, these are imbued with the social liberal ethos of a shared moral responsibility: a hand up into
the creative economy, not a hand-out. Or what elite state actors colloquially refer to as ‘leaving some skin in the game’ (Southeran 2006).

NZOA’s public-private partnership production subsidies mirror what Frith (1978, p. 160) calls the ‘Rock Ideology’, where after years of dues paying and starvation musicians are rewarded with “making it, the time of stardom” (Frith 1978, p. 160). In this hierarchy the artist starts out from ‘the swarm’ by releasing a single recording: probably after honing their skills on the squalid club circuit or during late night sessions in the home studio (Power & Scott 2004, p. 6). If this single gains airplay, sales, or critical recognition the artist then goes on to make an album, tour, and possibly export.

In state application of this ‘Rock Ideology’ to funding, step one in the hierarchy is NZOA’s New Recording Artists scheme. This funds 20 single song projects per year at $10,00019. It is intended to meet recording costs and the production of a music video for artists on independent or MNC labels. In this public-private partnership these labels are to match NZOA’s funding while also paying for packaging, distribution, and marketing costs. To be eligible for New Recording Artists the artist must have no previous NZOA funding and the song must be deemed by NZOA as having commercial potential.20

Market imperatives are reiterated in the application process. NZOA funding at this stage is for “only one song – the song that you [the artist] believe could be a commercial radio hit” (Stellar Night Productions 2006, p. 20). For Brendon Smyth this means: “we want artists to give us something before we give them something; they need to give us the confidence they can write songs that we can get on radio…it is all about the song” (Auckland City Council 2005, p. 86). Illustrating state uses of partnership to meet the Music Code NZOA ‘pitches’ applicants’ songs to radio programmers in order to assess commercial potential: a process which then influences the final funding decision. Such state uses of pre-testing are a common feature of contemporary cultural production intended “to fit the product as closely as possible to [perceptions of] popular tastes”, and thus mitigate the commercial risks (Murdock 2003, p. 28). In the case of domestic pop production this ‘ear test’ is highly

19 Prior to 2006 the New Recording Artists provided 40 artists with $5,000 to record a single.
20 By May 2006 213 grants were dispensed and 158 presented to radio. 95 percent have registered on the Radioscope New Zealand Airplay chart, 50 per cent made this chart’s Top 40 and 40 percent the Top 30.
effective. State facilitated connectivity to the workings of commercial radio have resulted in 80% of New Recording Artists gaining significant airplay, thus making the grant a desirable and attainable way for domestic artists to begin a career (New Zealand on Air 2008, p. 10). To those who miss out on New Recording Artists funding NZOA provides feedback described by one musician as: “stuff like not really radio friendly, sort of along those lines – not catchy enough, not poppy enough, and things like that” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). Moreover securing this NZOA support, like accessing any ‘deal’ in the music industry, is also a highly competitive process: there are over 500 applications for each bi-annual funding round.

**Figure 5: NZOA funding**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Programme</th>
<th>Funding for</th>
<th>Criteria/rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. New Recording Artists grant</td>
<td>$10,000 public-private funding to produce single and video</td>
<td>Assessed as having commercial radio potential by radio programmers and NZOA pluggers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Music Video Grants</td>
<td>$5,000 public-private funding to produce a music video</td>
<td>To gain radio airplay, support record releases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Radio hits rebate</td>
<td>$5,000 grant to artist’s record label</td>
<td>Securing a Top 30 song as measured by chart compiler Radioscope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. ‘Phase Four’ album recording grant</td>
<td>$50,000 public-private funding to record an album, repaid at $1 for every unit sold</td>
<td>Two Top 30 songs as measured by chart compiler Radioscope over a two year period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. ‘Phase Five’ international radio promotion</td>
<td>$20,000 public-private partnership to funding radio promotion in UK, US, Australia, or Canada</td>
<td>Artists deemed export ready, with existing ‘in market’ support and record releases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Music Video grants constitute stage two of the funding hierarchy available to pop producers. Introduced in 1992 these public-private partnerships provide $5,000 towards filming a music video with the state dollar to be matched by the record company. Nevertheless the formal public-private funding mix is not always adhered to, as an independent label informant observes:
I know theoretically it’s meant to be matched, but sometimes it is and sometimes it isn’t. But then the label can say we’ve put X amount in to the band already to promo them up to this point for this song so that could be considered [by NZOA] (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006).

Each year NZOA funds 160 music videos chosen from over 750 applicants, with over 900 videos produced since 1990 (New Zealand on Air 2008, p. 10). This grant is available to any artist regardless of genre although selection is also “based on a panel of commercial radio programmers expressing the likelihood of play listing the tracks proposed” (Dubber 2007, p. 30). So, for Brendon Smyth:

The value of the music video is as a marketing tool and as a sort of way of building a vibe for a band which will hopefully translate into radio play. So when NZOA funds a music video the payback we are looking for is radio airplay by kind of quirk (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

To further facilitate domestic music video broadcasts NZOA part-funds popular music television. New Zealand has four music channels at the national scale and popular music is a regular feature on community television stations in the main centres. Again, in public-private partnership mode, NZOA subsidises local music video broadcasters who transmit nationally. For example, in 2006 C4 – a youth orientated station owned by Canadian MNC Canwest – received $300,000 per year and had 25-30 percent domestic content (Smyth 2006), while Juice TV – part of the SKY television network – received $100,000 to produce a show dedicated to Kiwi pop (New Zealand on Air 2006b, p. 63).

Regardless of NZOA’s financial assistance to music video broadcasting commercial radio remains the medium determining pop producers’ access to further NZOA funding. For an artist to progress up the funding hierarchy ‘significant airplay’ is a pre-requisite. This is defined as entering Radioscope$^{21}$’s (the airplay chart compiler) Top 30. This airplay chart is

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$^{21}$ Radioscope (2007) is “primarily involved in data collection and analysis for the radio and music industries”. This is done by collecting “information of various forms about the local music industry from a wide variety of sources each week, providing a bit of a statistical glimpse at the state of musical play. The resulting data and analysis is used in a multitude of forms, some in a widely recognised formats like the Official NZ Top40 and
compiled from over 140 radio stations airplay logs, and to enter the Top 30 requires approximately 600 ‘rotates’ of the song across multiple radio formats over a week (Radioscope 2007). Even though there is some murkiness and political sensitivity in the application of ‘significant airplay’ as a new public management (NPM) metric – it can be wrought from the plethora of airplay charts, some of which have fewer listeners such as the local content chart – this still comes to act as proxy for an artists’ commercial potential.

Charts are an institution holding particular importance in the pop renaissance and the music industry, and thus require elaboration. According to Attali (1989, p 108) “charts give value, channel, and select things that would otherwise have none that would float undifferentiated”. For Hesmondhalgh (2006, p. 222) pop charts act as “institutions of consecration” functioning as a template for comparing, valuing, and ordering pop artists while simultaneously governing and animating music industry agents in their struggles to move up places and thus signal their success. Yet pop charts reify polyvalent music industry practices into a “complex signifier of relationships among business, musicians, music and consumers” (Hakanen 1998, p. 95, 97) and, despite ostensibly shrinking markets for recorded music, charts arguably remain a “simulacrum of mass consumption” (Hakanen 1998, p. 97). Furthermore Hakanen (1998, p. 95) claims charts are ever expanding and serve to both constitute and capture the increasing diversity in music genres and markets. Such a trend is echoed in New Zealand with national chart complier Radioscope measuring 15 official charts: single, album, compilation, DVD, Radioscope 100 (airplay chart), most added (on radio), New Zealand top 40 airplay, pop radio, rock radio, alternative radio, AC radio, easy listening radio, and music TV charts for each station: C4, Juice and MTV. Add to this Recording Industry Association of New Zealand’s official sales chart, independent record store charts, online sales charts, and website hit accounts, there is a multiplicity of charts attributing value to domestic sounds.

Significantly though, it is radio airplay charts as a market proxy that animates New Zealand on Air funding. An example of this is the Radio Hits Rebate: an NZOA funded financial reward to record labels whose artists enter the Top 30. This programme was introduced in 1992 and is a $NZ 5,000 grant to “recover the costs of recording and releasing songs” with

RadioScope Airplay Charts, but more often in a behind-the-scenes capacity in reports on industry growth and decline, trend tracking, market share analysis, local content rates, format / genre changes and all sorts of other lies, damn lies and statistics.”
NZOA automatically making quarterly rebates to the top five most played local acts (Stellar Night Productions 2006, p. 21). However if the artist already has NZOA funding under another programme they do not receive a rebate. Consequently almost half the rebates go to smaller independent labels (Dubber 2007, p. 28).

If an artist gains two Top 30 hits on the Radioscope New Zealand Airplay Chart within a two-year period they become eligible for a Phase Four Album Recording Project grant. This $NZ 50,000 public-private partnership subsidy is “for making and marketing music” (Smyth 2006) and is to be matched dollar for dollar by the record label. Unlike the NZOA’s other funding schemes which don’t need to be repaid the Phase Four is tied to compact disc sales and is repaid at a rate of $1 for each unit sold – a mechanism Smyth adopted from the Canada’s FACTOR programme (Key State Informant Interview 2006). However, and in contrast to FACTOR, domestic artists signed to MNCs are eligible for Phase Four funding. Up to 25 album projects are funded each year and these are intended to create “recordings that will find popular [sales] and airplay acceptance” (Dubber 2007, p. 28). Therefore funding is based upon the criteria that the album will yield another four hits (as judged by NZOA in consultation with radio programmers through demo format) and that the label’s application includes a “convincing recording and marketing plan” (Stellar Night Productions 2006, p. 20). By 2006 approximately 56 albums had been released under Phase Four. 44 of these contributed 194 ‘significant airplay’ songs to commercial radio and their combined compact disc sales reached 881,806 (Smyth 2006). In 2008 95 percent of the 25 artists funded went on to gain ‘significant airplay’ (New Zealand on Air 2008, p. 10).

In 2005, following the recommendations of Creating Heat (see Chapter Three), NZOA’s radio promotion programmes expanded into the global music market. The Phase Five promotion and funding scheme aims to address the structural problem that outside New Zealand “radio is impossible and expensive” (Simon Baeyertz, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). The Phase Five programme, drawing on state narratives of ‘global connectedness’, seeks to facilitate artists’ to access international radio ‘tastemakers’. To this end NZOA has developed the Five-by-Five sampler – a promotional disc that contains the songs and videos of five artists – for distribution in the target territories: UK, USA, Canada, and Australia. In conjunction with these samplers NZOA’s Phase Five programme includes a $NZ 20,000 public-private partnership to allow “New Zealand repertoire owners to split the costs of a
radio plugging campaign in one of the four Phase Five target territories” (New Zealand on Air 2006b, p. 9, 64). That is to hire overseas tastemakers and public relations consultants to influence radio programmers.

As the music industry becomes less physical commodity driven and more reliant on returns to the holders of Intellectual Property Rights radio remains a relatively stable source of potential export earnings (The Economist 2007). Recognising this NZOA, through Phase Five, follows the ‘aggressive export’ recommendations of the Growth and Innovation Framework and works to facilitate the ‘connectedness’ of pop producers to overseas markets (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 20). Phase Five also co-supports artists with the NZMC’s Outward Sound funding and is an aspect discussed further below. Yet, at the time of writing, the commercial impact of NZOA’s international radio plugging campaign remains negligible: Greg Johnson, Steriogram, Savage, and Brooke Fraser have only achieved “small but symbolic milestones” on US radio (New Zealand on Air 2008, p. 11). This relative lack of international market success, however, is in marked contrast to NZOA’s engagements with domestic radio.

**Promoting Pop**

Radio is a relationships industry. It is hard to find someone outside NZOA who will walk the record in (Kirk Harding, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005)

NZOA’s hierarchical funding system is designed to supply content to meet the New Zealand Music Code. Perhaps the most crucial component in this system are NZOA’s radio pluggers, for it is through these agents’ social connectivity that state funding, the decision making processes of radio programmers, and pop producers become ‘joined-up’. Since 2002 NZOA’s three contracted radio pluggers have enacted the ‘soft institutional’ functions of social networking, building trust, and information sharing with radio broadcasters. This process sees NZOA creating another mimetic isomorphism with private sector methods. Mimetic isomorphism is a pertinent concept for understanding the organisational structures and practices in the music industry. This is because, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 151), “uncertainty is also a powerful force that encourages imitation [for] ... when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates symbolic uncertainty, organisations
may model themselves on other organisations”. Therefore the state had to become attuned to existing market practices as an NZOA plugger describes:

Getting on commercial radio was something you needed to think about because you couldn’t step in radio’s doors and go ‘Hi I’m from New Zealand on Air, a government body and we want to force New Zealand Music on your station’. [Smyth] had to play the game. And the game is that every [MNC] record company has a promoter in New Zealand, because they have product they are trying to sell and the best way to do that is marketing it to radio stations. So that was already established, that’s how radio stations got their music and he saw that the only way to do this was to actually join the queue and meet with those radio people every week (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

Even with a voluntary quota and NZOA access to commercial radio programmers in place there are further obstacles to increasing domestic content. Radio programming arrangements add to the complexities of getting domestic artists onto broadcasters’ playlists (for New Zealand examples see Neill 2002). These arrangements include song rotation practices whereby, depending on radio stations’ telephone research with its target audience, a new song works through a hierarchy of rotations: low to high, off-peak to peak and back again over the song’s ‘lifespan’. Any new song presented for addition to the playlist is considered in relation to how it would ‘fit’ a rationalised programming mix and balance (the ‘airflow’)22. In the field of radio broadcasting the “principle product is the schedule rather than an individual program” (Murdock 2003, p. 23). In addition US and UK charts influence New Zealand radio programmers, while each week 40 new domestic and international songs are released all vying for a limited number of airplay slots (Neill 2002, p. 60).

So that reduces the chances of New Zealand music getting on the playlist and increases the chances of it being the lowest researching song [from radio station’s telephone research]. When [the domestic song] doesn’t work that’s because the [audience] research has been conducted at radio. So these overseas songs have a lot going for

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22 Neill (2002, p. 62-67) reviews the playlist selection processes of New Zealand Programming Directors (PD). Most important in the selection criteria is the PD’s own instinct, song hook (the riff or chorus that makes the song recognisable), and how the song fits in playlist balance to achieve the ‘airflow’ so that the balance of ballads, up tempo pop, or dance tracks fit within the radio station’s market identity.
them in terms of the overseas research supporting the label’s pitch. So really, for a [domestic] song to work it needs have a kind of mass of promotion and events happening around it to get the song going (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

Artist videos, tours, and media profile all aid NZOA’s pitching of songs to programmers. However the process of aligning domestic songs to playlist spots is also, at times, an iterative process that sees NZOA pluggers carrying information through their social networks. As noted above NZOA liaises between radio programmers and funding disbursement by going “out to the end user to test songs and get feedback before final selection” (Smyth in Auckland City 2005, p. 86). Such networked information is tightly aligned to commercial radio’s cultural codes which emphasise:

The chorus, the most hooky part of the song. There is nothing like sitting in an environment that is quite intense and you are playing a song you really love and they’re just not really getting it. So one of the things that stands out in a song is how quickly they come into the chorus, how long the song is … radio is all about people driving in their cars listening to a song and what it’s going to mean for them: it is what the singer is saying and things like that. I went to see this band and they had actually received funding in a previous round and they played it to me, and it was great, but it went for four minutes 20. And the first thing I said was ‘can you cut that song down?’ And then there was a look of horror, y’know, which is what I expect but when I play it [at a programmers meeting] someone will go “that’s a really long song we need to cut this”. It has to work for all parties … you go into those meetings and regardless of whether you really, really like a song you have to be prepared to deal with people who see what they do as a business, which is where misunderstandings happen, when artists have different perceptions of their song (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

For example, a pop producer recounts how information on playlist balance carried by a NZOA plugger came to influence an artistic decision:

NZOA were dealing with [a large commercial station] and a spot came up on play list which our song had a chance for adding as they said that station was playing wacky
stuff at the moment. But we needed to cut the middle eight – they said radio isn’t doing bridges at the moment (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Such song writing advice emerges from an institutional context. Pluggers work under the *Music Code*’s new public management targets and thus these quasi-market measures are brought to bear on pluggers’ performance. Therefore to further secure the supply of songs with commercial radio potential, and to meet the NPM logics of the *Music Code*, pluggers occasional song writing advice is based upon what they think programmers listen for. Such rationality appears to render the boundaries between creativity, commerce, and the state increasingly opaque.

NZOA’s pluggers also represent the ANLPS at its most personalised. Through their face-to-face encounters, sensitised as these are by market pressures, domestic pop songs are leveraged into markets. Yet the securing and peddling of the ‘right song’ is only one aspect of the pluggers’ job. Like private sector MNC pluggers NZOA’s pluggers become embodiments of new institutional thought: they carry market information developed through trust and friendships with broadcasters and other music industry elites. Such social bonds require constant affirmation. Recognising the role of commercial radio in constituting the pop renaissance NZOA presents plaques to stations that help ‘break’ Kiwi pop acts. As Durkheim (1893) suggested social solidarity comes from re-affirming rituals, shared cultural customs, and sacred symbols. The maintenance of social bonds occurs informally too. For example a domestic MNC plugger networking with radio programmers states: “it is about building a relationship, going out to lunch with them, playing golf with them” (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006). These same logics of social connectivity apply to NZOA’s pluggers:

It’s about seeing them [radio programmers] out, it’s about getting drunk with them, and it’s about knowing that their birthday is in a week. We want to know how they’re doing, how their relationship is. It is very personal and that’s the way it works really. For example [a NZOA plugger] is in [a Pacific island] at the moment, at a music director’s wedding. So she is there for 10 days with all these [radio] people, going surfing and talking about the new [NZOA funded] Black Seeds track that’s coming out … it is absolutely a business. (NZOA informant – Interview 2006)
The *Music Code* in conjunction with NZOA’s funding and promotion framework is an exemplar of the state’s alignment to existing market rationalities. Through the co-production of a broadcasting market for domestic pop the *Music Code* and NZOA programmes come to circumvent supra-national constraints on domestic radio content. Using the ‘soft’ institutions of trust and shared objectives (backed-up by the threat of ‘hard’ institutional regulatory power inside its borders) the *New Zealand Music Code* is a negotiated market institution between the state and private sector commercial radio broadcasters. No legislation or directive state intervention is required, something which suits both the state and broadcasters, for according to the Radio Broadcasters Association (2008) “a return to government regulation [is something] none of us want”. Moreover through this state directed creation of a domestic market the financial outcome is increasing royalties for domestic artists (Smith 2005, see also Chapter One).

Within this supply-side framework NZOA – through its agents and funding programmes – becomes mimetically isomorphic with existing broadcasting market practices (DiMaggio & Powell 1983). Here NZOA illustrates a nimbleness not usually ascribed to state agents. The state becomes a player in the music market, but is not strongly directive, intervening, or altering of existing music industry practices. Radio programmers still decide which acts are broadcast as NZOA’s funding programmes work on the supply-side, informing pop producers of market practices and then ‘pitching’ appropriate sounding artists to programmers. Such a ‘soft’ institutional approach based on social connections allows the state to work between, and underneath, the rigid legal frameworks of supranational trade agreements to promote domestic airplay and thus stimulate economic returns to local pop producers through royalties, compact disc sales, and concert receipts.

**New Zealand Music Commission (NZMC)**

Working in concert with NZOA’s programmes to increase Kiwi pop’s cultural and commercial acceptance is the New Zealand Music Commission (NZMC). The NZMC too deploys supply-side public-private partnerships, networks, relations of trust, and social participation. This section examines the NZMC’s formation and intents, its supports for pop
exports, its supply-side capacity building programmes, and the New Zealand Music Month promotional campaign.

Formed in 2000 the NZMC is a popular music promotion agency enacting Labour’s commitment to the arts and cultural industries for as Helen Clark (2000a) asserted “popular music has a key role in our culture”. NZMC’s mandate is to grow the “NZ music business, at home and overseas” (New Zealand Music Industry Commission 2007). It is to do this by “fostering the composition, performance, recording, and marketing of New Zealand popular music, [and by] advocating for the industry” (Clark 2000a). As in many ‘after neo-liberal’ initiatives the state partners market actors and consequently the NZMC – as a commission enacting state authority – is governed by a board drawn from domestic music industry elites: MNC label heads, artist managers, lawyers, indie label representatives, promoters, and publishers (New Zealand Music Industry Commission 2007).

Reflecting the gritty and street-wise image of the creative industries the NZMC’s low rent office is located within Auckland’s ‘creative industries hub’ and is in close proximity to MNC and independent label offices, venues, broadcast media, and recording studios (Auckland City 2005). At this location an NZMC informant with extensive experience in college radio broadcasting and music journalism explained the agency’s market oriented and enabling rationales (after arriving late to the morning interview and looking appropriately dishevelled for a rock’n’roll bureaucrat):

There was this explicit [government] belief that music had an economic value to it, and not to disregard the artistic value as well, but as something that could be leveraged for national economic benefit. Companies could be assisted to work smarter. One, so they don’t disappear. Two, so they can actually go on to make some money. What it all comes down to is that notion that a body should exist that can increase the viability of the business side of the ledger because the cultural side of it was being looked after, really quite well at that point (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

The NZMC is directly funded through the Ministry of Arts and Culture and received NZ$ 2 million in establishment funding from the Cultural Recovery Package (Clark 2000a).

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23 The NZMC’s education programmes are funded through the Ministry of Education.
Relative to other arts funding agencies the NZMC’s budget is relatively small: $NZ 5 million over three years\(^\text{24}\) (2005-2007) which includes $NZ 700,000 for the *Outward Sound* export programme. In comparison the New Zealand Film Commission received $NZ 22 million in the *Cultural Recovery Package*. Accordingly the Music Commission is not exploiting the largesse of the public trough with a Key State Informant (Interview 2006) asserting the organisation: “represent[s] really good value for money as it’s a really small office with really small overheads and we do a lot of different projects with a high rate of success with a lot of small budgets”. Employing eight staff to carry out its mission the NZMC has four main enabling functions that ensue from *Creating Heat’s* (see Chapter Three) recommendations:

1. Export assistance – through the *Outward Sound* programme the NZMC sets out to generate social networks with the global music business and fund expanded market opportunities for pop producers.
2. Supply-side capacity building – using informal education to orient creative entrepreneurs towards commercial considerations, foster business skills in management and touring, and attune music production to music market logics including copyright law.
3. The ‘New Zealand Music Month’ promotion – working in partnership with media, broadcasters, and retailers to boost the audibility, visibility, and sales of domestic sounds.
4. Education – supplying school music curricula with teaching resources such as DVD’s on song writing and mentoring of secondary school bands using domestic pop producers.

The following discussion concentrates on NZMC’s first three functions, the music curricula being beyond the scope of this study. In these promotional state functions the NZMC can be seen to enact the *Growth and Innovation Framework*’s policy recommendations: namely to

\(^{24}\) Also within this budget is a funding allocation for the ‘shadow state’ QuANGOs Independent Music New Zealand (IMNZ) and the Music Managers forum. Formed in 2001 IMNZ serves to represent the interests of small micro-entrepreneurial independent labels. This funding initiative was also a recommendation of *Creating Heat* (see Chapter Three). The Music Managers Forum represents artist managers. Notably both QuANGOs have, since 2003, offered supply-side “professional development and networking opportunities both nationally and internationally” (Music Industry Development Group 2004: 45, 47).
“positively improve productivity across the economy” by “developing skills and talents” and “increasing global connectedness” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 7).

**Exporting Pop**

Through its relatively small budget the NZMC is the main state organisation attempting to forge ‘soft’ institutional links of social connectivity with overseas market actors. Illustrating this strategy, the then Minister of Economic Development Jim Anderton (2004), declared “our exporters [including pop musicians] need to be driven by the demands and requirements of customers in global markets”. Therefore to ‘grow the music business’ through exports NZMC puts into practice many of *New Horizons*’ and, more specifically, *Creating Heat’s* recommendations. In particular the NZMC intends to “manage and nurture relationships with international networks” by “provid[ing] market research and strategic information to music exporters” while also offering financial support “to connect artists and their support groups with international contacts … in the most appropriate markets” (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 17).

Arguably New Zealand’s pop producers are geographically and culturally isolated from the decision making centres of the music industry. New Zealand’s spatial isolation precludes constant observation of local acts by labels, investors, and A&R representatives. As the President of V2 Records, Andy Gershon, noted in response to a question as to why MNCs were not raiding New Zealand’s then burgeoning hard rock scene for talent: “as much as there have been [A&R] invasions of Detroit, Chicago, Seattle or Sweden, no… I think it's the distance” (Hochman 2003). Viewed from the other direction the Anglo/global music industry power elites tend to agglomerate in the core cultural economy particularly Los Angeles, New York, and London (Scott 1999b). Therefore travel costs and nuanced cultural and business barriers circumscribe the export opportunities for New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs (Negus 1999). In 2006 NZMC instigated the *Outward Sound* programme to address these geographical and social barriers facing pop exporters.

Initially the *Creating Heat* export strategy recommended Labour allocate $NZ 3.5 million per annum over a ten year period to pop export (see Chapter Three). The rationale for such unprecedented state support was that only investment of this magnitude could increase popular music’s return to the national accounts from an estimated $5 million in 2004 to $50
million by 2014 (Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 22; Selby 2005). However, when *Creating Heat*’s recommendations transpired in the *Outward Sound* programme, the budget was reduced to $NZ 700,000 per annum. This decrease possibly reflected the political sensitivity of state arts funding at a time when the popular media attacked Labour’s creative industry programmes claiming excessive largesse, poorly defined outcomes, and lax accountability (Selby 2005).

From this downsized budget *Outward Sound* funding is dispensed quarterly. It is another public-private partnership calculated to enable creative entrepreneurs to develop social connections with international cultural intermediaries or “tastemaker networks” (Selby 2005). In effect this means the creative entrepreneur – be they a recording label, manager, or the artist – must match the level of state subsidy. A number of caveats apply to accessing this funding. Firstly the creative entrepreneur’s project proposal must demonstrate some ingredient of ‘tastemaker’ interest. Secondly the proposal has to demonstrate an “economic benefit to New Zealand” and therefore only legal entities registered in New Zealand for tax purposes are eligible (Outward Sound 2006, p. 1). This caveat reflects the persistent state concerns with the repatriation of royalties which were noted in 1989’s *New Horizons* report (see Chapter Three). Thirdly are commercial considerations such as “the initiative must have the realistic potential to increase the applicant’s commercial viability and sustainability” while “the marketing initiative must add value to the applicant’s existing business” (Outward Sound 2006, p. 1). Therefore to receive *Outward Sound* funding the creative entrepreneur’s application must demonstrate connectivity with global music market; the potential to meet state economic development goals; and be aligned to the hierarchical stages – or phases in *Outward Sound*’s terms – of a music career.
Figure 6: Outward Sound Funding Phases

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Public-private funding</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Market-scoping</td>
<td>Meeting ‘in market’ professionals</td>
<td>Up to $10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance orientated support</td>
<td>Showcase performances</td>
<td>Up to $30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market infiltration</td>
<td>International Tour support</td>
<td>Up to $60,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

The first phase funds up to $10,000 for a creative entrepreneur to undertake a ‘market-scoping’ mission. Lifted directly from *Creating Heat* ‘market-scoping’ can be seen to refer to the social processes whereby the creative entrepreneur builds social networks, contacts, and trust with overseas tastemakers “whose credentials have been checked and endorsed by NZMC” (Outward Sound 2006, p. 2). Funding is available for the broadly defined activities of “in-market presentations” such as: publicity and promotions; attending showcases and trade fairs; market research; and meeting ‘tastemakers’ – record labels, artist managers, promoters, publishers, producers, and broadcasters (Outward Sound 2006, p. 1). To access this funding the creative entrepreneur submits an overall business plan from which NZMC agents evaluate the artist’s ‘export readiness’. This assessment is based upon local success including sales, airplay, media interest, or perceived artistic development.

In the second phase, ‘Performance orientated support’, public-private funding increases to $30,000. This funding is for the artist to tour or showcase (through live performance) in an overseas territory. In the ANLPS’s new public management alignments to the music market this subsidy is available to “applicants that have demonstrable evidence of interest and connection in the territory proposed and will be submitting an application with a full business and marketing plan” (Outward Sound 2006, p. 2).

‘Market-infiltration’ is the third phase and funds sustained touring in overseas territories. At this phase *Outward Sound’s* contribution to the public-private partnership reaches a maximum of $60,000. Crucially these grants are closely aligned to private sector investment and are:

Made available only to applicants who have achieved investment ‘buy-in’ from experienced in-market professionals and tangible support of the industry within that
In each phase *Outward Sound*’s emphasis is on facilitating opportunities for the development of new commercial projects and thus new market transactions in the content hungry creative industries. In this aspect a broad range of costs can be included in applications: airfares; paying for in market expertise such as public relations agents; booking agents fees; advertising material; commissioned market research; legal fees; and equipment insurance (*Outward Sound* 2006, p. 4). In monitoring the effectiveness of this funding the creative entrepreneur is required to submit to NZMC business plans and post-overseas activity reports describing what commercial activities or social networks were generated. As Murdock (2003, p. 27) notes “market rhetorics and logics” are now frequently installed at the heart of cultural policy.

At the time of writing approximately 51 artists and record labels received *Outward Sound* funding (muzic.net.nz 2008). Most grants have been dispensed for the ‘market-scoping’ phase which includes funding for independent labels to attend music trade shows (see below). ‘Performance oriented support’ subsidies have funded artist performances and tours in Europe, the United States, Canada, and Australia - “the first export market” for New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs (Lewis, Larner, & Le Heron 2008, p. 48). While commercially successful artists with MNC backing – including Breaks Co-op, Bic Runga, and Brooke Fraser – have received ‘market infiltration’ subsidies (Tizard 2006).

However, NZMC’s export function is not solely concerned with the management and disbursement of funding. More indicative of ANLPS efforts to ‘grow NZ music business’ are the ways NZMC’s agents become involved in generating social networks, trust, and partnerships with global music industry actors. The focus of NZMC’s connections to international markets are the prominent music industry trade shows: South by South West.\(^\text{25}\)

\[^{25}\] SXSW started in 1987 and has grown to have over 10,000 attendees with “over 130 companies from around the world exhibit[ing] in the Music Trade Show to promote today's talent and represent the music business of the twenty-first century”. According to its website “SXSW's original goal was to create an event that would act as a tool for creative people and the companies they work with to develop their careers, to bring together people from a wide area to meet and share ideas”. SXSW has offices in “Ireland, Germany, Australia and Japan who help bring SXSW registrants to Austin” (South by South West 2008).
SXSW we’ve been going for the last four years. What basically the Music Industry Commission presence does is once we’ve got a list of bands\textsuperscript{28} that are going we get in touch with them…[and] what we do – two or three staff members – is we get over there a couple of days before the festival kicks off. There is a trade show component to it but business is not done there: it’s about representation as much as anything else. We have a stand, so it’s a place where people can come and find the Kiwis, a place where bands can organise meetings in a little booth - that kind of thing. So it’s very much the visibility part of it. Most of the business is actually done out at gigs and afterwards in the bar. And the people you meet are just ridiculous. I was having a natter to someone and someone else said ‘that’s Duran Duran’s manager’ – ‘shit should have got his card!’ So everyone’s dressed down, you’ve got no idea who you are talking to – it’s quite egalitarian in that respect – it is really not industry segregated. We also throw a NZ music party on the opening night of the festival which is great because the delegates swoop into town and get ready for the next day and we have a party in the park that is across the road from the Hilton Hotel, which is kind of the biggest Hotel at SXSW. So

\textsuperscript{26} College Music Journal’s (CMJ) Music Marathon is another music industry festival featuring over 1,000 indie artists. The organisers of CMJ claim it “offers numerous opportunities for your company or organisation to showcase its products, services and artists to the professionals who will shape the future of music and entertainment and the fans who will devour it” (College Music Journal 2008).

\textsuperscript{27} MIDEM, ‘the world’s music market’ claims “never has there been such demand for music”. It is a conference to “do deals, network, learn and check out new talent” and is attended by “nearly 10,000 music and technology professionals from over 90 different countries” (MIDEM 2008).

\textsuperscript{28} Bands are “selected by the SXSW organisation which is interesting because basically it is kind of a random bunch of acts really. It cuts through any expectations the local industry or ourselves [sic] might have about who is ready to go. It is quite interesting to see who makes that list because there are always some ‘randoms’ that a lot of people haven’t heard off that make it in. Whether it is Coco Solid or Jakob, often people below the industry radar so it quite exciting to get to work with some of those acts that are at that stage of their career” (Key State Informant Interview 2006).
in terms of numbers...we had up to 5 or 600 people this year. So it is a really successful event and we’ve used that in the past as a showcase for all the Kiwi bands who then go and play their official showcases. Then we run through the week manning the trade show during the day and then running around trying to help everyone as much as possible with exposure over there. Because you’ve got 4 or 5 days to really maximise the number of people that see you, how they see you, and even who they are. So we help getting media appearances, just go around plugging hard to get people to come to these shows that we think might be ones they’re interested in (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

Figure 7: Networking at SXSW

Here we have a description of the ANLPS in ‘soft institutional’ mode at the micro-scale of the pop renaissance. This personalised state action is much more than the “common development of such things as export support mechanisms and state-subsidised trips to US trade fairs” that Frith and Cloonan (2008, p. 189) seem to dismiss as unimportant aspects of music policy. Instead what should be of more interest to popular music researchers is how state agents come to command and deploy social capital necessary in securing ‘deals’ for Kiwi artists. Such social connectivity is a feature of the music industry and as Murdock (2003, p. 26) notes this is “an even more important resource in securing entrees, opportunities, and advancement”. However such networking behaviour is clearly not unique to New Zealand’s state agents. That is, the NZMC’s social connectivity is once again
mimetically isomorphic to other private sector firms seeking to facilitate market transactions in the inherently high-risk music industry (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, p. 151).

Consequently state agents come to act like other market actors. The NZMC faces the same uncertainty in securing ‘deals’ as other music firms and artists attending these trade shows. Working in a difficult context where the valuation of a popular music’s commercial potential is persistently fraught – as fashions and tastes are constantly changing – such state-mediated social capital enables information sharing. These informal networks also serve to convey market information between the state, artists, and commercial backers such as labels, publishers, and broadcasters. As “selling music internationally is facilitated by groups of interdependent and informal network of specialists” (Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 13), the NZMC comes to collect market information and thus become part of this informal network. As a NZMC employee elaborates:

Our international network of people we know quite well is constantly growing every year. So that is the first bunch of people that we target [before going to a trade show]: the existing network and talk about what they like and what we’ve got, and then it’s just really casting the net as much as we can. So the trade show element is the same for all the other people that have got stands as it is for us. So we can go to the Spin Magazine stand and go ‘hi how’s it going, here’s a book of our acts, here’s a CD with some of our stuff – ‘oh I went to your party and saw Chris Knox’ – ‘yeah, he’s on here’. So kind of just meeting people and getting the promo stuff we produce into hands and saying ‘This Coco Solid, she’s kind of a Peaches-y hip-hop and I know that you’re into that, why don’t you check this one out?’ But at parties is the most effective way of doing that because it is an opportunity for people to see the bands and once that’s happened they start to really sort of feed out that information themselves. Because it really is an environment where everybody’s playing Chinese whispers about bands, people want to look cool about it (In whisper) ‘I’ve got the hot tip, this instrumental band from New Zealand they’re called Jakob – yeah, like Mogwai’. There is a lot of that sort of stuff going on (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

Tax payers paying for parties in Texas in the name of economic development? Such activities might raise the indignation of small state, regulatory-focussed neo-liberals, but when viewed
from a new institutional perspective the NZMC is finely attuned to the realities of accessing music industry ‘tastemakers’: “there is no substitute for hospitality and conversation” (Murdock 2003, p. 26). Central to “being there” is the state funding of both artist travel and NZMC’s agents’ “face work” (Murdock 2003, p. 26). Here the ANLPS understands that social networks, although not sources of direct economic return, create opportunities for the future encashment of domestic pop producers. Thus enabled into international networks tradeshow attendance creates opportunities for artists to perform in front of, and meet, cultural intermediaries:

SXSW and CMJ are really band-orientated performance based events. You get 12 to 15 hundred bands rolling through town over a four day period. It’s pretty over the top but that’s really an opportunity for acts make an impression on audiences off shore. It’s really hard work and it’s a very competitive environment … We haven’t had an overnight success from SXSW. And then you get situations like Goodshirt who were there in 2002 or 2003 and they were getting a record deal in Japan when their album came out … It was a serious offer, but took a year to come to fruition and that’s the kind of most direct success out of it. But [for acts] like The Datsuns it’s really a launching pad for them as you’ve got this concentration of media and industry people there and if you put on a good show and people come along it’s going to have trickle down effects worldwide – particularly in the United States and UK where there is an appetite for new bands (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

If NZMC agents’ and kiwi pop acts’ attendance at SXSW and CMJ is about accessing ‘tastemakers’, MIDEM is, in contrast, pure market exchange. At this European trade show New Zealand’s popular music is immediately inserted into the ‘cash nexus’:

It’s in a giant conference centre and everyone’s got stalls and [creative entrepreneurs] hit stalls. That’s what you do for days: walk around this conference centre and it’s more of an opportunity for [domestic] music businesses who have product that’s ready to be picked up. For instance those sorts of companies who have got a catalogue, it can work really well for them … it’s basically people walking around with chequebooks that want to pick up catalogue: they’re not there to scout, they’re there to do business so it has quite a different buzz to it.
Interviewer: They do deals?

Yeah, they do deals at the stands … [and] there are quite a few producers walking around looking for stuff they want to get synchs for [for example, films, computer games, advertising]. They’re charging pretty low figures per synch or bed music then you can do pretty well out of it even if it is 100 Euros [taking into account the exchange rate]. So once you’ve done the circuit it all adds up. But for the Kiwis it is mostly about the catalogue that you’ve already got established and as such it is a really big export opportunity. I think the biggest target for the Kiwis over there would be the big distributors who are always looking for more products. That is the sort of thing we work on because it would grow the music business and offers great opportunities for New Zealand companies and bands to capitalise on (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

The NZMC and Outward Sound enacts the Growth and Innovation Framework’s export policy recommendation: to support small firms (such as domestic record labels) through “aggressive export promotion” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 44). Furthermore these examples of the NZMC’s practices illustrate how the ANLPS does not seek to defy market logics but becomes another player in the market. By enacting new institutional thought within a promotional state context the state bears, in part, the significant transaction costs of entering music industry networks. This is also a performance of an industry specific type of ‘aggressive exporting’, although the state assisted minimisation of spatial and social distance does not guarantee making economic returns. However such exporting activities are only one aspect of the NZMC’s enabling of domestic pop producers. Another aspect involves supply-side engagements to foster business skills and entrepreneurial dispositions.

Supply side capacity building: raising productivity, creating opportunity

As discussed in Chapter Two the ‘after neo-liberal’ state seeks to expand market opportunities for agents through the economy’s supply-side and emphasises “education, training, and work” (Bevir 2005, p. 42). Thus state policies seek to supply the appropriate factor inputs such as the skills and dispositions of the labour force. These, in human capital terms, form the “productive members of society” and are the prerequisite for “a successful economy in the 21st century” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 37). Further illustrating
this supply-side emphasis Labour’s Steve Maharey (2003) reasoned “government investment in people through training programmes, education ... help[s] in transitioning to employment”. Professions and trades are not the only skills brought into the ambit of education and training policies. Popular musicians, artist managers, and independent label owners become the objects of the NZMC’s efforts to convert creativity into the market.

Nevertheless old images of the auteur die hard. As New Horizons in 1989 and Creating Heat in 2004 articulated, policy makers perceived that many artists lacked relevant business skills which in turn constrained their commercial viability. To address this apparent problem the NZMC organises informal education programmes. These seek to attune pop producers to the music industry’s structure and operations with the intent of enhancing these agents ‘capacity’ to operate in the popular music market. In this sense these state programmes can be seen to develop “small business capabilities, nurture entrepreneurial impulses, generate social capital and business linkages and provide a supportive infrastructure targeting and refining creative talents” (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 45).

The NZMC’s informal education programmes emerged from the spate of creative industry symposiums which explored how the state could enhance the economic contribution of the arts (see Chapter Three). Prescient in the trajectories of informal music industry education was the 2003 British Council sponsored ‘Resonate’ conference. Held in Auckland it brought “seriously big [music industry] players into direct contact with local practitioners” to advise “young, emerging and mid-career artists” on “recording techniques and processes, song writing, performance skills, legal issues and intellectual property, media skills and artist management” (British Council 2003). Following ‘Resonate’, according to a Key State Informant (Interview 2006), the “first thing we realised was they had a really good calibre of international guests but ... they couldn’t take it that last step and bridge it to local experience ... they couldn’t cross it over”.

To provide insights into the global music business and ‘cross it over’ into local contexts the NZMC drew on the Kiwi Diaspora working in the international music industry. Such an approach, again, reflects ‘after neo-liberal’ thought on economic development. The Growth and Innovation Framework recommended mobilising the Kiwi Diaspora, through the ties of nationalist sentiment, as these agents were claimed to possess “expertise that might be usefully harnessed to assist in the growth of New Zealand firms” (Office of the Prime
Minister 2003, p. 43). The *Growth and Innovation Framework* further recommended accessing this ‘talent’ pool by arranging “inbound and outbound missions and seminars aligned with the economic development strategy both to increase New Zealand’s exposure to international thinking and to encourage the development of more strategic partnerships” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 43). Here the ANLPS collects the Diaspora’s expertise and distributes this arguably scarce knowledge though informal seminars. This is in contrast to benignly leaving atomised pop producers to negotiate the highly social aspects of the music industry using only their own resources and knowledge.

‘Warrant of Fitness’ Seminars

The NZMC’s yearly ‘Warrant of Fitness’ seminar series is archetypal of the uses of informal education. First held in Auckland and Wellington in 2005 the ‘Warrant of Fitness’ seminar has since expanded to include New Zealand’s third city, Christchurch, in its annual cycle. At the Auckland seminar on October 3 and 4 2005 – which the author was able to attend – panellists were drawn from the Kiwi Diaspora working in the international music industry or were émigrés from the core’s music industry now residing in New Zealand. The audience comprised approximately 40 managers, musicians, and journalists at different stages of career development: some with international experience, some neophytes with demonstrably little domestic experience. This fragment of “the swarm”, for the most part, sat impassively listening to the experts’ insights into the machinations of the popular music business (Power & Scott 2004, p.6).

The seminar’s informal discussion panels were arranged thematically and reiterated what artists needed to know to become ‘export ready’. Professionalism was addressed first with panellists describing how to prepare to enter overseas markets. This involved conducting market research and then ‘subtly’ starting to network from New Zealand to develop contacts with key music industry agents. Reiterating *Outward Sound* Simon Baeyertz, Director of International Affairs at V2 records, stated if “there is no interest before you go that is a sign you are not ready” (Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). Furthermore, overseas markets were described as intensely competitive and as a sphere where creative entrepreneurs had to “play

29 This type of economic development policy applies Robert Wade’s (1990) research on Taiwan’s emergence as a ‘Tiger’ economy that mobilised its Diaspora of entrepreneurial networks.

30 The title is a play on New Zealand’s car road worthiness test.
To ‘play the game’ artists and their managers were urged to mobilise social connectivity. Illustrating this, a recurring theme was that pop producers should be “accessing one [person] in a label that can make things happen” (Emily Crowther, International Promotions manager Universal Music UK, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). These industry ‘champions’ self-interest in advancing their own music industry career was narrated as ensuring a commitment to ‘breaking’ the artists. Commercial success generated by these ‘champions’ was seen to flow from one market territory onto others in a process whereby the artist “knocks down one territory at a time” (Kirk Harding, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

Playing the game also required Goffmanesque (1959) ‘backstage’ preparation with an artists’ image seen as a vital component. Somewhat counter-intuitively for an industry romantically based on aural pleasures panellists noted how “the first thing that pops out of an A&R rep’s mouth at meetings is ‘what do they look like?’” (Kirk Harding, Executive Vice President of Street Records Corporation, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). While Simon Bayertz (Director of International Affairs at V2 records, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005) stated: “if you have to think about it [image], you haven’t got it”.

In a later session panellists discussed international touring as an aspect of ‘playing the game’. Difficulties in preparation for such a practice required getting a “feel for which market suits your artist” (Campbell Smith, Bic Runga’s former manager, CEO Recording Industry Association of New Zealand, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). Touring and live performance were also described as a crucial element in forming a pop career at low levels of success. One panellist noted “bands that have been signed in the last ten years have built up a following” (Simon Bayertz, Director of International Affairs at V2 records Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). Meanwhile domestic touring was narrated as “good to get your shit together” prior to conducting international showcases (Teresa Paterson, NZMC agent, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

Additionally seeking deals required servicing ‘tastemakers’. Servicing in music industry parlance refers to the generating of industry contacts using promotional material such as
demo recordings and press material. Advice included how to identify “what is your story” and the artist’s unique selling point (Emily Crowther, International Promotions manager Universal Music UK, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). At the same time the financial aspects of servicing were noted. A domestic hip-hop label was cited as distributing 9,000 12-inch vinyl recordings for free to US DJs “and that’s just a start” (Kirk Harding, Executive Vice President of Street Records Corporation, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

In the summary the panellists’ message was working harder and smarter. Notably “having a goal and not letting the little things get you down” as it may take “10 years to become a new band” (Emily Crowther, International Promotions manager Universal Music UK, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). While NZMC’s General Manager Cath Anderson stated there are “big New Zealand networks overseas” that artists should try and access (Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). But in doing so pop producers were urged to “keep things simple” (Kirk Harding, Executive Vice President of Street Records Corporation, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005), and to be “realistic of where you are at” in the struggle to access a ‘deal’(Emily Crowther, International Promotions manager Universal Music UK, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

NZMC’s use of informal, seminar-based training is not only for artists seeking to export. Other seminar series address local market conditions including music law. These smaller scale seminars occur in the main centres of Auckland, Wellington, and Christchurch, and again harness the knowledge of the private sector by taking:

People that work in the industry around the country to speak on particular matters [such as law, touring, performance skills] …It’s about working smarter and working smarter is definitely one of the things we try to encourage throughout everything we do (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

Explicit in the NZMC’s enactment of informal education programmes is the understanding that such seminars will enhance the success rate of pop producers in the market. Here these seminars can be understood as working subtly on the supply-side by “changing cultural habits through information and persuasion” (Bevir 2005, p. 51). Importantly the state seeks to persuade inspired artisans to see themselves as creative entrepreneurs with a product to sell.
New Zealand Music Month

The NZMC also manages New Zealand Music Month. This annual promotional campaign occurs in May and serves to raise the profile of domestic sounds. It also enacts Labour’s interest in promoting national pride in, and consumption of, domestic culture (Clark 2000a). In some respects Music Month is isomorphic to MNC artist based promotional campaigns albeit in this case directed to supporting national culture. For example, during Music Month news bulletins abound, the media daily dissect domestic musicians’ global and local activities, and the airwaves are crammed with numerous live performance broadcasts. In addition to generating media copy there is a concurrent NZMC managed advertising campaign. This includes branded merchandise such as t-shirts, badges, coffee mugs, point of sale promotions, and A1 size promotional posters plastered around urban streets. Bolstering this celebratory spirit is the annual music industry awards ceremony, the Tuis, which further recognises the commercial success of domestic artists. Thus, for the NZMC, Music Month is:

The big centrepiece driving things. We monitor radio targets and it will also be the month where we get our best kind of figures for New Zealand music sales. So we see a spike in activity of public exposure to New Zealand music that’s strongest at that point. So that’s a big part of what we do domestically because if you are increasing public exposure it’s good for the business side of things (Key State Informant Interview 2006)

An illustrative example of Music Month’s emerging cultural cachet occurred at its 2005 launch. The NZMC organised platinum selling heavy rock group Shihad to play a free concert in Aotea Square, downtown Auckland. Such was the Durkheimian (1912) collective effervescence31 of the four thousand young people in attendance that their moshing inflicted structural damage on the square’s subterranean car park. This event provided further media content as the concert was broadcast and re-broadcast on youth music channel C4, and corresponded with the release of Shihad’s new album.

Through such events and media strategies Music Month is a pivotal state project increasing the visibility, audibility, and sales of domestic pop. Its success in stirring an appreciation of

31 What Durkheim (1912, p. 276) sees as over excitement caused by collective – originally religious - rituals
domestic sounds led the Associate Minister of Arts Judith Tizard (2007) to declare at Music Month’s official launch “it is great to see how strongly New Zealand has responded to hearing and making their own music”. And unlike the marginal impact of Britain’s National Music Day promotion New Zealand’s Music month has significant commercial influence (Cloonan 1999, p. 200). For example, at the end of May 2005 eleven domestic albums were in the Top 40 sales charts eight of which were platinum status or more (15,000 units), two were certified gold (7,500 units), and eight had secured international release. In 2004 15 domestic albums were in the Top 40, nine reaching platinum status. In contrast no New Zealand albums were in May 2000’s Top 40 and only three in May 2001 (Recording Industry Association of New Zealand 2005b). This growth in sales is further reflected in domestic pop’s increasing share of the album market which grew from six percent in 2001 to 29 percent in 2007 (Recording Industry Association of New Zealand 2005a; Tizard 2007). However this rise in sales also corresponds with the application of NZOA’s Phase Five programme. In addition many domestic artists seek to leverage off Music Month’s profile by releasing recordings or touring during May: activities which further contribute to its commercial and cultural success.

Initially New Zealand Music Month was a ‘New Zealand Music Week’ promotion. It was instigated in 1997 by a the Kiwi Music Action Group, a loose coalition of interest groups comprising New Zealand on Air, copyright collector Australasian Performing Rights Association, the Radio Broadcasters Association, and the Recording Industry Association of New Zealand. This event ran until 1999 and focused exclusively on boosting local sounds on “commercial radio [as] it did not have official support from television or retailers” (Scoop 2005). Since 2001 the NZMC has organised Music Month in partnership with the above listed organisations, and now also includes the New Zealand Managers Forum. Under the NZMC’s direction – and following the increased commercial airplay for domestic sounds – “the public focus increased to become the campaign, which different people from around the country feel like buying into: it represents values that they want to be seen to be supporting and to be part of themselves” (Key State Informant Interview 2006).
Discussion

NZOA’s and NZMC’s programmes are dynamic like the music industry to which they are attuned. The growing importance of internet media in the music industry now sees NZOA using websites to promote domestic pop (see kiwihits.co.nz). In 2009 NZOA will conduct a review of its music programmes in relation to digital technologies and the programmes described above may well change.

As they stand there are numerous perversities and interest groups captured within this support system. For example Fat Freddy’s Drop, the biggest selling domestic act of 2006-2007 (and all time), only received NZOA video funding post factum (Dubber 2007). Other pop producers cite the NZOA “gravy train, y’know money tends to come your way through various forms of funding” once an artist has a history of significant airplay which makes it “hard to break into” the funding system (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). And while social connectivity is venerated in policy and action, such networks also exclude as an industry informant explains:

> It’s a very closed shop. Everybody knows everybody else involved in funding. It also creates a whole bunch of insider networks and they’ve already worked with each other and they trust each. It is quite hard for anybody genuinely new to break into ... the major labels, NZOA and government funders have very, very mainstream taste (Key Music Industry Informant 2006).

There are numerous criticisms of these programmes too. Internet chat sites and blogs overflow with diatribes against NZOA’s commercial radio focus. Such state alignment to commercial radio imperatives sees music funding closely fitted to radio genres: “a couple of alternative style artists in each round and then they will have some for urban radio, some for the easy listening market, some for the rock market” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). This creates two notable perversities. Firstly, it is argued in some quarters this market relationship leads to a somewhat aurally bland cultural product (Dubber 2007). Secondly, NZOA’s funding system disrupts Creating Heat’s policy rationality of enhancing local quality for international success (see Chapter Three). As a Key Music Industry Informant (Interview 2006) notes, overseas territories have “got their own mainstream...
industries, they want niche stuff which is innovative and interesting … and that hasn’t necessarily been funded so far”

Conversely the alignment of NZMC programmes to international ‘tastemakers’ allows innovative artists to access support. This is a strategy an IMNZ representative asserts precludes the “same old guys” from getting “the funding”, after initially thinking independent labels “were going to miss out which hasn’t been the case” (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006). Meanwhile an incipient backlash to NZMC’s Music Month can be discerned. Conservative media are now questioning its relevance now that domestic sales and airplay have become embedded features in the cultural landscape (TV3 2008). Of course there are more criticisms to review, but this has not been the object of this chapter. Perhaps it is best just to note, as Bourdieu (1993, 1996) does, all fields of cultural production are contested between the agents carrying the logics of art for art’s sake versus la grande commercial production (see Chapter Five).

The intention of this chapter was to explain how the state organisations NZOA and NZMC created opportunities for domestic pop producers to access music related ‘cash nexuses’ or to compete more efficiently in the market. These organisations demonstrate how the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state’s engagements with the economy’s productive sector use “enabling forms of state power with market rationality” (Peck 2007, p. 46). No longer is domestic pop production in this small, semi-peripheral nation left to ‘the free market’ (Cloonan 1999). Yet these ANLPS programmes are not the promotional state programmes of directive legislation or dramatic interventions in the market’s logics (Cloonan 1999). Instead, following the Growth and Innovation Framework, NZOA and the NZMIC enact the dictums of “working co-operatively” to “unleash the productive potential of the private sector not to replace it” (Office of the Prime Minister 2003, p. 22). What such co-operative supports show is that “the critical space between the state and market” is rendered increasingly opaque (Peck 2007, p. 42). Arguably this blurring, along with the Labour’s financial commitment to the arts, has been central to the rise in domestic content on radio, the corresponding increase in domestic artist sales, and the surge of domestic acts entering overseas markets.

Therefore the pop renaissance’s commercial and cultural success can be seen to have been constituted through an ‘institutional ecology’ (Nee 2005, p. 66): a “novel assemblage” of
interpenetrated agents, organisations, policies, and practices between the state and the market (Rose 2000, p. 163). Nevertheless such an ‘institutional ecology’ is also the pop renaissance’s performative system for it “brings it into being or enacts that which it names” by producing what it intends and measures: airplay and sales (Butler 1993, p. 134; Lyotard 1984). Therefore it could also be observed Kiwi pop’s domestic dependence on state support means it is also an ‘enclaved commodity’ which is reliant on an ‘institutional ecology’ to guarantee significant economic returns (Appuradi 1994, Featherstone 1990).

Through this blending of state and market the ANLPS can be observed to act in ways homologous to a 1990s style record label: selecting and recording artists, promoting them, and seeking export deals. Therefore in new institutional diction the ANLPS can be seen to carry the extensive transaction costs involved in pop production. In NZOA’s case most musicians and independent labels are ill able to afford the time, green fees, or expense accounts required to transact with radio programmers. Meanwhile the NZMC bears the considerable costs of generating social contacts with the global music industry’s spatially and culturally distant agents.

Simultaneously the ANLPS works on a much broader supply-side project that would be beyond a 1990s record label’s ambit. Converting music industry knowledge into public information is clearly a task beyond private interests. Here the ANLPS uses its “little fingers” to guilefully reach down and mould pop producers to the realities of the market (Phillips 2002). This supply-side work simultaneously encourages domestic market elites and the Kiwi Diaspora to distribute information out of a shared sense of national pride. This then is a somewhat new and certainly subtle elaboration of the state’s role in the provision of cultural goods requiring deft institutional affinity to market agents and practices. Such ‘human face’ programmes are therefore at considerable odds with the image of lumbering inefficiency often promulgated in neo-liberal critiques of state involvement in the market.

Yet the neo-liberal creed might argue the state is crowding out private enterprise. However, as MNCs shed labour some of those dislodged from labels have become promoters, advisors, managers, label owners. Now a domestic artist can hire a private plugger for $NZ 1,000 to ‘walk the record into radio’. More research is needed on the proliferation of this type of work and the relations between music industry dynamics and state aspirations. Useful too, but
beyond this thesis’ interest, would be a detailed content analysis of which artists receive ANLPS funding and their consequent commercial trajectories.

In the domains of ideology and legitimation the ‘institutional ecology’ creates for the state a nationalistic feel good story to deploy in speeches and reports. Such mutable state uses of popular culture are prosaically summarised by Mike Chunn the former CEO of APRA and founder of song writing charity ‘Play it Strange’: “It is the job of the state to stand up and celebrate its successes... I don’t think it is all about giving out money” (TV3 2008). Although now we can see the two are irretrievably connected. Thus the uses of popular culture in ‘after neo-liberal’ nation building projects requires further research.

What then of music policy as ‘after neo-liberal’ social policy? Through the above alignments to market rationalities the state creates “artificially arranged forms of entrepreneurial and competitive conduct … organised around the promotion of innovative, competitive activity” (Watson 2004, p. 587). This entrepreneurial ethos is a central feature of the liberal sensibility while the eliciting of entrepreneurial behaviour is a feature of post-welfare state policies. The music industry also requires pop producers to act in an entrepreneurial way when seeking a ‘deal’. As the next chapter analyses Labour’s incentivising state supports also impels entrepreneurial conduct.
Unknown Local Band Reportedly “Pissed” At Missing Out On Funding (Again)  
16/03/06 17:39

NZOA and Prime Minister Helen Clark blamed by party goers for increased incidences of Band-Pain.

AUCKLAND—Unknown local band, Svelte, are reportedly pissed at missing out on a New Zealand on Air grant (again). “It’s clear a great injustice has occurred.” says a source close to the band. “I heard people at a recent party telling guitarist Ben Sciascia he was a local legend and that singer, Tim Stewart has a really beautiful voice”. “One guy even said that Helen had a lot to answer for.”

Prime Minister Helen Clark, who is a big supporter of New Zealand music was reportedly blamed by party goers for introducing the grants. “Drummer, Jamie Woolright made some valid points, saying that if they hadn’t started the grants, he wouldn’t be so disappointed” the source added.

Despite failing to qualify, the band plans to apply for more grants in the future, but is apprehensive saying: “Waiting to hear about a grant is just another stress that quite frankly bands don’t need”. Calls from the industry for more grants to help lower the incidents of Band-Pain are already falling on deaf ears.

Source: Svelte 2006
Introduction

How do the organisations and programmes of the ANLPS influence the practices of creative entrepreneurs? To answer this question this chapter ‘lifts the rug’ on official presentations of the pop renaissance to analyse how music makers stitch together a popular music career (Gibson-Graham 1996). This micro-sociological analysis uses Bourdieu’s concepts of fields and alternative forms of capital to foreground how the domestic field of pop production impels pop producers to accumulate the symbolic capital of reputation, prestige, fame, and recognition. It is argued that symbolic capital is a crucial power resource in the efforts of creative entrepreneurs to present themselves as possessing the skills and dispositions valued by the field’s cultural intermediaries, be they state or private sector (Negus 1999; Nixon & Du Gay 2002).

Although Bourdieu is an almost omnipresent theorist in studies of culture, the use of his concepts around symbolic capital have not been highly elaborated in relation to pop production. Trondman (2004) applies Bourdieu’s symbolic capital to an analysis of youth music tastes and class distinctions in Sweden, but it is Entwistle (2002) who comes closest to this chapter’s understanding of the uses of symbolic capital in cultural production. In a study of male fashion models in what she calls an “aesthetic economy” Entwistle (2002, p. 329) suggests high status modelling assignments “lends symbolic capital, in the form of prestige and celebrity, which can, potentially at least, translate into economic capital at some future”. The following analyses how symbolic capital is accumulated by pop producing creative entrepreneurs and exchanged into state or private sector support.

This chapter understands the creative entrepreneur as the entrepreneur “sans economic capital” (Ellmeier 2003, p. 11). The term creative entrepreneur also serves to convey a sense of “the swarm of small producers” (Power & Scott 2004, p. 5) operating in an “artisanal mode of production” in the creative industries (Toynbee 2000, p. 17). Most creative entrepreneurs are therefore “pop stars in waiting” as they struggle to gain initial signs of commercial success or ‘tastemaker’ interest (Jones 2003, p. 153). This chapter focuses on how creative entrepreneurs bear the “high costs of origination ... [and] repeated performance and image building” using alternative capitals and how through these practices they accrue symbolic capital (Toynbee 2000, p. 16).
Consequently this discussion of creative entrepreneurship and popular music production at low levels of success does not require an explanation of the mechanics of pop production per se. That is to say it does not require an explanation of song writing and recording processes, marketing planning, or access to the media or broadcasting (for this see Hesmondhalgh & Negus 2002; Longhurst 2007; Neil 2002; Shuker 2005; Toynbee 2000, 2003). Instead the following discussion examines how creative entrepreneurs accumulate symbolic capital through what this thesis calls ‘capital swapping’: how creative entrepreneurs exchange their alternative capitals to accumulate symbolic capital. Such an analysis of capital swapping provides insights into what occurs within the extensive informal sectors and non-market modes of exchange that support cultural production (Connell & Gibson’s 2003, p. 8; Gibson-Graham’s 1996, p. 244; Murdock 2003, p. 29).

The chapter is structured as follows. Firstly, the entrepreneurship and creative entrepreneur literature is reviewed. Secondly, the contemporary features of the field of pop production and the logics of symbolic capital within this are described. Thirdly, the creative entrepreneur’s struggles to accumulate symbolic capital sans economic capital are discussed in relation to live performances and recordings. Fourthly, creative entrepreneurship as capital swapping is analysed using illustrative examples from the pop renaissance. In conclusion, the combined influence on the pop renaissance of symbolic capital accumulation, capital swapping, and state supports are reflected upon. In particular it is considered how the struggles of creative entrepreneurs to accrue symbolic capital are central to state efforts to ‘grow the music business’.

Entrepreneurship/creative entrepreneurship

The keyword entrepreneur derives from the French term *entreprendre* denoting ‘to undertake’. The term has a chequered history in the orthodox economics literature. First theorised by Cantillon in the late 18th Century as referring to an agent who buys low and sells high it was introduced to the English speaking world through the social liberalism of J S Mill, later conflated with the capitalist by Karl Marx, and then cut as a heroic figure that is the dynamo of capitalism by Joseph Schumpeter (Blaug 1986). In classic economic theory the entrepreneur has many roles ranging from: the manager of uncertainty and risk (Cantillon,
J.S Mill, Von Mises); the co-ordinator, leader, industrial superintendent, and decision maker in a firm (Marshall, Weber, Walras, Schumpeter); a market or industrial innovator (Schumpeter, Sombart); a person who supplies financial capital (Adam Smith, Turgot, Pigou); or a contractor (Bentham) (Grebel 2004, p. 4). More recently Lipsey (1983), extrapolating Schumpeter’s theories of entrepreneurship, represented the entrepreneur as an agent who introduces new products or finds new ways of making old products.

Beyond these economic conceptualisations the orthodox economic sociology literature understands the entrepreneurial agent as a powerful node in social networks of trust and reciprocity that underpin the market (Coleman 1997; Granovetter & Swedberg 1992; Putnam 2000; Swedberg 2003). Economic sociology’s conceptions differentiate ‘routine’ entrepreneurship (the day to day management of an enterprise) from Schumpeterian entrepreneurship (the development of new enterprises and products under conditions of uncertainty) (de Bruin & Dupuis 2003). Furthermore Loundsbury and Glynn (2001, p. 546) theorise entrepreneurship as a cultural process where the distinctive skill is telling stories to access the economic capital of investors as “stories serve to function to identify and legitimate new ventures”.

In New Zealand contemporary research on entrepreneurship emanates from the disciplines of Management and Economic Sociology (Du Bruin & Dupuis 2003). Interestingly this research notes that if the statistical classification ‘self-employment’ is taken as a proxy for entrepreneurial behaviour most entrepreneurs tend to be women and from racial minorities (Massey & Lewis 2004). Furthermore, and of particular relevance to this research, Massey and Lewis (2004, p. 217) claim: “too little is known about New Zealand youth and their attitudes to enterprise and entrepreneurship”. As New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs tend to be young the following discussion augments this literature.

Overall economic theorisations of entrepreneurship connote a figure central to the dynamism of the market economy. To behave in an entrepreneurial manner is to suggest some kind of endeavour directed towards market activity and financial gain. The practices of creative entrepreneurs could be interpreted through this literature. For example the development of musical micro-enterprises (bands, solo careers, record labels) and products (songs) involves risk, investment, contracting, and the development of new products. However on one vital
dimension the creative entrepreneur stands in marked contrast to orthodox conceptualisations of the industrial or merchant entrepreneur - they are entrepreneurs sans economic capital (Ellmeier 2003, p. 11). This is not to claim the creative entrepreneur is unable to draw upon credit, loans, or other financial advances. Nevertheless, such cash injections are for the creation of opportunities to accrue symbolic capital in the field rather than large-scale investment in plant and equipment.

It also needs to be noted that the entrepreneur concept has travelled from economics to sociology albeit (although not always) in a more critical usage (Fine 2001; Portes 1998; Thornton 1999). In a significant departure from economic understandings this strand of contemporary social thought has sought to trace neo-liberalism’s dual emphasis on markets and individualism and how these elicit entrepreneurial dispositions. Therefore, this literature also examines how entrepreneurial outlooks are applied to the problems of everyday life (Du Gay 1996; Gokariksel & Mitchell 2005; Peters 2001a; Rose 2000; Skeggs 2004; Walkerdine 2003). Du Gay (1996) calls this new subjectivity the “enterprising self”. Personal attributes ascribed to such agents include: a flexible, resilient, and adaptable disposition; the willingness to take risks in seeking material gain; and to be an entrepreneur of the self by maximising health, wealth, and well-being (and thus reducing the burden on the welfare state) (Rose 2000, p. 160; Skeggs 2004, p. 73-77).

This new entrepreneurial subjectivity also appears in ‘after neo-liberal’ state policies. Ruth Harley (2000), the former chief executive of Creative New Zealand, described the drivers of the market-oriented creative industries as “innovation, creativity, and entrepreneurialism”. This discourse is echoed in the Growth and Innovation Framework’s broad supply-side intention to “encourage enterprising attitudes and values” (Office of Prime Minister 2003, p. 19) as “growth depends on entrepreneurship” (New Zealand Treasury 2001, p. 29). Such a concertina of entrepreneurial dispositions into social, economic, and cultural policy is noted by Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005, p. 4) who suggest that states are now “stimulating a more entrepreneurial approach to arts and culture”.

Emerging at the intersections of economics, sociology, and creative industries is a literature more closely focussed on creative industry entrepreneurship. This has tended to describe the practices of neo-artisanal creative production within the constraints of post-industrial and
neo-liberalised labour markets. As a mostly European and British based literature it highlights the risks, gendered aspects, self-exploitation, dense social networks, identity investments, high failure rates, and multiple-job holding, that are enduring features of cultural production at low levels of success (Creigh-Tyte & Thomas’ 2001; Eikhof & Haunschild 2006; Ellmeier 2003; Enwistle 2002; Leadbeatter & Oakley 1999; Menger 1999; McRobbie 1988, 1999 and 2004; Murdock 2003; Shorthouse & Strange 2004; Tam 2002). To manage these conditions Ellmeier (2003, p. 26) characterises the European creative entrepreneur as “on average…multi-skilled, flexible person, psychologically resilient, independent, single, unattached to a particular location who jumps at whatever opportunity there is to be had in the field of art, music, or the media”. However such a description neatly frames the creative entrepreneur as an ideal-typical, neo-liberalised, enterprising self. It also narrates the creative entrepreneur as the ‘perfectly’ mobile worker of neo-classical (and hence neo-liberal) labour market theory.

It is probably more productive to consider the structural and relational position of creative entrepreneurs within the creative industries. Arguably the defining feature of artistic work (as opposed to technical or managerial work in the creative industries) is that creative labour markets are oversupplied with artisans who frequently overestimate their chances of success in high risk industries – the swarm (Trowse 2001). Despite the high risks and intense competition there is a continuous supply of aspiring artists willing to enter the creative industries. Consequently the overarching feature of creative entrepreneurship at low levels of success is that of a tournament labour market:

Stage 1. You must start at the bottom to have a shot at the top. 2. You must be willing to work long and hard for substandard wages. 3. In order to advance in the tournament, you must prove yourself not merely above average but spectacular. 4. And finally, once you come to the sad realisation that you will never make it to the top you will quit the tournament (Levitt and Dubner 2005, p. 106-017.)

This tournament is a durable feature of many creative industries from theatre to fashion, film making to popular music. For example Frith (1978, p. 203) observes that positioned at the bottom end of the music industry’s hourglass there is an oversupply of artisanal contenders: “a reserve army of rock musicians”. Miege (1989, p. 30) calls this feature a “fish tank”
where there is a “reservoir of workers ready to work without the need to pay them wages”. In this domain, “sustained only by dreams”, aspiring musicians move “desperately and sporadically” between low paying live performances and self-promoted recordings through the “years of dues paying” (Frith 1978, p. 160).

It is from this position that creative entrepreneurs attempt to gain the attention of cultural intermediaries and ‘tastemakers’. How then do New Zealand’s pop producing creative entrepreneurs meet the costs of ‘origination’ and access cultural intermediaries? Using Bourdieu to analyse these processes requires an understanding of the field of pop production.

**The field of pop production and the logics of symbolic capital**

Chapter Four explained how the organisations and programmes of the ANLPS are tightly aligned to existing music industry practices. Bourdieu’s field concept can be used to further understand the nuances of this state ‘institutional ecology’ and its combination of state, market, and popular music logics. This peripatetic section re-introduces Bourdieu’s field concept and the fields of cultural production, explores the influence of new digital technologies on the field of pop production, and then considers how these features influence the relations between creative entrepreneurs and cultural intermediaries through the concept of symbolic capital.

The field approach allows social domains at the meso-scale to be understood as an organisation of forces wherein organisations and persons are positioned and through which meaning is produced (Benson 1998, p. 486). This conceptualisation is useful for it directs attention to how the structure of New Zealand’s field of pop production positions and then shapes the practices of creative entrepreneurs. Thus for Bourdieu a field:

> May be defined as a network, or a configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential situation (situs) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to specific profits that are at stake in the field (Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 97).
Bourdieu (1993, 1996) has also theorised the functioning of fields of cultural production. He suggests all cultural production is contested between two broad orienting poles. One pole is occupied by agents who seek to assert the value of ‘art for art’s sake’ “restricted production” which has only a small audience (Bourdieu 1996, p. 143). Agents working around this pole can be seen as possessing high amounts of field specific cultural capital but relatively little economic capital. This feature leads these artisans to overtly shun economic logics (Bourdieu 1996; Hesmondhalgh 2006, p 214-215). Opposing this ‘restricted’ pole is what Bourdieu (1993, p. 38) calls la grande pole of production. Here cultural production is explicitly “destined for the market” (Bourdieu 1996, p. 143). It is the domain of culture as commerce that sees “the trade in cultural goods becoming just another trade” and is attuned to short production cycles, existing consumer demand, and commercial networks (Bourdieu 1996, p.142). This logic then ensures “the accelerated return on profits by a rapid circulation of products which are fated to rapid obsolescence” (ibid). Consequently for Bourdieu (1993, p. 37-38) the tensions between these two poles establishes struggles over the value of ‘art for art’s sake versus commercial art. Although some cultural production – from theatre to pop music – is relatively autonomous from market logics, most creative endeavour remains dominated by the over-riding narratives of success: sales, critical acclaim, or awards.

Bourdieu’s theorisations are empirically based on the comparatively rigid literary fields of the nineteenth and twentieth century. Building upon Bourdieu’s field heuristic in a more contemporary analysis Hesmondhalgh (2006, p. 222) argues “restricted production has become introduced into the field of mass production”. This means the contemporary relations between the poles are arguably more fluid, blended, and blurred (Hesmondhalgh 2006). In no area is this more the case than in popular music. Here cultural intermediaries seek to convert emerging sub-cultural trends into economic capital and ‘mass’ markets. Therefore it can be seen that all popular music, regardless of the restricted or mass intentions of its producers, is potentially “commercial in some way” (Connell & Gibson 2003, p. 7).

Such a blurring of the poles is highly relevant for the pop renaissance. Concurrent with expanded state support la grande pole of pop production has been re-structured by a vicious cycle of Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’. Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter (1950, p. 83) was a theorist of the dynamics of capitalism and argued entrepreneurial and
technological innovation instigates new markets, new modes of producing and distribution, and new consumer technologies. An initial phase of destruction brings chaos to markets as internecine competition spreads amongst market participants. This phase is followed by the creation of relatively stable production and consumption relations, and renewed capitalist growth.

New digital technologies such as P2P file sharing, ‘ripping’ software, and CD burners together with cultural changes in consumption patterns have instigated a new period of ‘destruction’ in the field of pop production (Alexander 2002; Jones 2002; Katz 2005; Leyshon 2001; Leyshon et al 2005; Oberholzer-Gee & Stumpf 2007). Following a ‘golden age’ when recording industry revenues peaked in 1999 popular music’s commodification via the compact disc medium now faces a very uncertain future (Hesmondalgh 2007). This is because digital technologies have increasingly allowed consumers to bypass the price mechanism – and the artificial scarcity – necessary to convert music into a consumer commodity (Hesmondhalgh 2002, 2007; Katz 2005; Leyshon et al 2005; The Economist 2007).

In the grip of this technology induced ‘destruction’ the recording industry shrank 15 percent in 2007. Media reports described MNC labels as at “their lowest ebb, creatively and financially. Band rosters have been cut dramatically. Regular staff lay-offs are common” (Murfett 2007, p. 1). As a former MNC employee observed: “no one’s got any money and no one wants to sign anyone anyway” (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006). Academic research, however, suggests a somewhat more complicated field. As compact discs sales declined the sales of MP3 players contributed to increasing digital downloads while the MNCs recorded significant profit increases in the wake of “cost cutting and roster-reduction of 2001-3” and the rise of Chinese and Russian consumption (Hesmondhalgh 2007, p. 19). Furthermore new digital technologies allow the expanded exploitation of “musical properties as baskets of rights” in advertising, soundtrack, ringtone, and computer game synchronisations (Frith 1993b p. ix; Frith 2007, p. 117; The Economist 2007). Nevertheless for all this dynamism the big players in the field remain the big players. For example, in New Zealand the top twelve selling artists for 2007 apart from one recent independent release (Fat Freddy’s Drop) were all signed to domestic MNCs (Shuker 2007, p. 21).
Dialectically if new technologies are destructive they are also ‘creative’ as they instigate new modes of music production and consumption. The most notable outcome for pop is the upsurge of music related blogs websites such as youtube and myspace with the latter growing by “1.5 million users (the majority of which are youth aged 16-24) each week” (Cote & Pybus 2007, p. 88). Connell and Gibson (2003, p.251, 261) argue these new digital technologies induce a “decentralising effect” on the field of pop production which allows spatially dispersed creative entrepreneurs access to a distribution system. The result is “a profusion of unsigned, un-promoted artists” that attempt to create an audience or become “lost in a ‘sea’ of digital noise” (Connell & Gibson 2003, p. 261). Thus the activities of the ‘swarm’ of small scale creative entrepreneurs are now highly visible and audible online.

Nevertheless it can be suggested the role of cultural intermediaries in the field of pop production is not disrupted by ‘creative destruction’ (Anand & Peterson 2000; Hesmondhalgh 2007; Murfett 2007; The Economist 2007). Cultural intermediaries and the investors they work for continue to make assessments of the commercial potential of aspiring creative entrepreneurs. But ‘creative destruction’ has altered their perceptions of artist selection. As Vicky Blood, a former BMG employee who oversaw the multiple platinum selling UK pop group Steps, suggests in the post-digital era of “downsized departments” cultural intermediaries want to see “the whole package walk through the door” especially as there is “no longer the level of internal support” available (Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

Now the creative entrepreneur is pressed to present themselves in a highly nuanced manner as the liabilities of artistic and audience development become “shedded to outside the market” (Harvey 2005, p. 67, see also Jones 2003, p. 152). These features of the field of pop production amplify a durable relationship between creative entrepreneurs and cultural intermediaries and this sharpened transference of artist development is underscored by the importance of ‘buzz’ (See Chapter Four). Jones (2003, p. 152-153) notes that there is no secure definition of music industry ‘buzz’, but it can be understood as arising from communication between music industry ‘tastemakers’:

The formal and informal reactions of journalists and radio producers to the act and its material; the interpretation of crowd reaction at live shows; the feelings and opinions of significant others in the “music industry”.
Reiterating this durable feature of the field Paul McKessar, a domestic artist manager with extensive international experience with independent labels, describes how for artists seeking to gain the interest of cultural intermediaries and ‘a deal’ pop production is ultimately “about creating interest in your act” through ‘buzz’ (Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). This involves the formation of “the story you as an artists are developing, some unique selling point they can tell over and over again” (Paul McKessar, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

At low levels of success arguably all pop production is oriented to creating this ‘story’ and the mythical music industry ‘buzz’. Theoretically these features resonate with Bourdieu’s symbolic capital, this being the power resource of: “accumulated prestige or honour” (Bourdieu 1996, p. 142); “recognition” (Bourdieu 1997b, p. 237); “reputation and fame” (Bourdieu 1991, p. 230); becoming “a veritable credit, and capable of assuming under certain conditions and in the long term, ‘economic’ profits” (Bourdieu 1996, p. 142). Hesmondhalgh’s (2006, p. 215) review of the media field and cultural production highlights the importance of symbolic capital in what he calls “the sub-field of small scale production … involv[ing] very low levels of economic capital, and very high levels of field specific symbolic capital”. Hence it can be suggested that the accumulated ‘field specific’ symbolic capital of creative entrepreneurs communicates ‘buzz’ to “significant others in the music industry” (Jones 2003, p. 152).

Moreover by accumulating ‘field specific’ symbolic capital the creative entrepreneur is transmogrified into what Skeggs (2004, p. 64) calls a “subject of value”. Under the logics of symbolic capital accumulation as ‘buzz’ the creative entrepreneur seeks to transform “oneself into a marketable product, into a commodity” (Skeggs 2004, p. 73). This in turn signals “that they, as workers, have the right dispositions, affects and attitudes” which cultural intermediaries can leverage into the market (ibid). As Skeggs (2004, p. 15) clarifies in a review of Bourdieu’s social theory by bifurcating the market in this way is to recognise that it is “not just monetary organisation, but also the systematic organisation of the symbolic, which enables exchange and the attribution of value across a range of fields”. Thus symbolic capital held by the creative entrepreneur gains power in the field and serves to make their market potential “calculable and meaningful” (Entwistle 2002, p. 322). An artist manager
provides an example of how the symbolic capital of recognition converts into economic capital:

It makes it a hell of a lot easier if your band has a little bit of success without any other support, people then realise that it’s great band, going, ‘oh yeah we remember the name’. With one of my bands their music is so out there [in the market] that it is easier now because people love it and give us more support than I experienced in the past … people say ‘oh wow they must be good’ or having [won a talent quest] ‘oh my gosh, they might be a good band’. So all these incidents give people a sense of our talent … that’s what I realised when I got phone calls back from sponsors saying ‘Oh yeah, we would be interested’ [in co-funding a tour] (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Symbolic capital is therefore, in many respects, the dominant alternative capital form in the field of pop production. This is, in part, because it is the form most readily convertible into economic capital: ‘a deal’ for the artist or the ‘cash nexus’ for investors. In practical terms the construction of this symbolic capital at low levels of success requires what Kruse (2003) and Longhurst (2007) call ‘Do it Yourself’ (DIY) production. Here the creative entrepreneur creates, produces, records and releases their own recordings and organises their own media and performance schedule. What one domestic creative entrepreneur recounts as “coming to do everything off your own bat” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). In the age of downsized departments even elite music industry actors advocate pop producers take the “punk rock blueprint [of DIY] and bring it into your own genre” (Kirk Harding Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005).

Yet it would be tenuous to claim the conversion of the DIY accrued symbolic capital of pop producers into the market by cultural intermediaries is a new practice. The popular music business is “essentially conservative…devising ways of making more money out of people doing what they already do” (Frith 2007, p. 86-87; Harvey 2005, p. 160). Creating a ‘buzz’ is a durable strategy with many celebrated pop producers converting this into “licensing and/or financing deals” with ‘independent’ record companies” or larger labels (Hesmondhalgh 2006, p. 222, see also Murdock 2003, p. 25; Peterson & Berger 1975). Further illuminating such
logics, a domestic MNC informant who is developing online marketing strategies describes this appropriation of creative entrepreneurs’ DIY status, prestige and fame:

We are on about communities and artists, and how they get together a community of fans … all we want to do is jump on that band wagon and say ‘yeah, cool, great’ – how can we make money out of this? (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006).

The downloading of symbolic capital accumulation onto creative entrepreneurs can be seen to acquire intensified significance under state auspices and its successful leveraging of artists into the market. The incentivising funding structures of the ANLPS thus come to act as a set of “determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents or institutions” of the field (Bourdieu Wacquant 1992, p. 97). In other words the state too requires creative entrepreneurs to accumulate ‘field specific’ symbolic capital to present themselves as ‘subjects of value’. In a way a state constructed Goffmanesque (1959) script for creative entrepreneurs to perform. Observing this feature of state – creative entrepreneur relations, a musician observes: “artists who already have some sort of commercial profile get New Artists Funding” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006, see also Chapter Four). While another perceives that in accessing state support:

The biggest hoop that people have to jump through is that they have to present themselves in the right way – it is all about marketing ... it has to be all very managed … rather than being people chucking in their demo and it being judged on artistic criteria” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview).

Like private sector cultural intermediaries the agents of the state form judgements and valuations about artists. They come to understand the creative entrepreneur in relation to their symbolic capital and how, as a form of social energy, this can be deployed in the market. Such symbolic capital operates not only in accessing state support, but also in buttressing this support once accessed. For example, Creative New Zealand gives funding preference to artists who can demonstrate evidence of performances or tours, a media profile, and possibly a self-released recording (Key State Informant Interview 2006). Much of NZOA’s funding is referenced through airplay charts: chart success is a form of symbolic capital that provides ordinal access to state funding within NZOA’s tiered funding system.
While accompanying NZOA’s pitch of Kiwi songs is the artist’s DIY accrued forms of recognition. As an NZOA plugger recounts a song has a greater potential to be playlisted on radio if it is accompanied by “video clips and print media, tours and stuff like that ... it kind of has to have all that marketing behind it” (Key State Informant Interview 2006). Furthermore the NZMC’s ‘Outward Sound’ programme for export assistance requires the creative entrepreneur to demonstrate overseas contacts and interest: a form of recognition its new public management logics understand. According to Bourdieu (1997b, p. 237) such co-forming power relations allows the pursuit of symbolic capital to gain its fullest expression as it is “perpetuated through knowledge and recognition”, meaning:

The dominated have to share with the dominant the schemes of perception and appreciation through which they are perceived and through which they perceive them; they have to see themselves as they are seen.

Yet even as creative entrepreneurs attempt to present themselves ‘as they are seen’ the exchange of field specific symbolic capital into state support remains non-ordinal. At low levels of success pop production remains “a matter of luck as much as talent, of manipulation as art, of image as much as music” (Frith 1978, p. 121). A pop producer notes these disjointed conversion rates even when his group is presented as a ‘subject of value’ with ‘the whole package’:

We still want to have catchy music but in our style and I’m not sure if our style is what [NZOA] are looking for at the moment and I’m hoping for the next single to have a really good chance of getting funding because the last single got lots of airplay and video airplay and hopefully [NZOA] realised that we could do it. They should be funding us because we can get airplay. We’ve done it all ourselves, we’ve paid for it all ourselves, and I don’t know why they don’t fund us (Key Creative Entrepreneurs Informant Interview 2006).

**Constructing the subject of value sans economic capital**

In the field of pop production economic capital is necessary to cover the ‘high costs of origination’. This is because economic capital is generally the most powerful form of capital
in social life for it “gives immediate access” (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 54) to agents’ social interests as “some goods and services can be obtained directly and immediately” (Swartz 1997, p. 80). However one of the least startling but most enduring aspects of pop (or any cultural) production at low levels of success is the persistent difficulty in converting cultural products into economic capital (Leadbeatter & Oakley 1999, p. 19). As a creative entrepreneur states: “financially cash is never an option because that is what we need most” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). This section discusses some of the constraints economic capital scarcity places upon creative entrepreneurs’ DIY practices of symbolic capital accumulation.

New Zealand occupies a unique and contradictory position in the capitalist world system: it is a “small, isolated, commodity dependent” trading nation that can be also considered “advanced” (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008, p. 45). The small domestic market and, arguably, the relatively low-wage economy shape how creative entrepreneurs can access economic capital (these are points discussed further in Chapter Six). Even with access to enabling ANLPS funding making pop commodities remains a fraught process:

If you don’t have money you’re going to have a hard go … the money that we get from the government is ridiculous … it’s not even the catering budget of one of those videos overseas (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006)

However such constraints are similar for all pop producers in the ‘swarm’ regardless of geographical location. As a domestic artist manager with extensive global experience within MNC record labels observes in relation to her dealings with New Zealand artists:

In the UK bands don’t have money … I think the danger is thinking that’s unusual. I just think that is how it is. They start at the bottom. I don’t see how that would be any different in the UK or in Germany. Bands will have to struggle to make things happen. But here they want things to happen on someone else’s money … I think here there is the most ridiculous impatience (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006).

As Chapter Four recounted the ANLPS seeks to mitigate the small market and provide access to economic capital by deploying ‘soft’ institutional networks and public-private funding. Yet
securing such state support is a competitive process which requires symbolic capital accumulation primarily through live performances and self released recordings. As a musician states in relation to struggles to access state support: “there is so much you have to do to get into the picture” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). Other sources of field specific symbolic capital that may be included in an artist’s ‘story’ are media or critic recommendations (Frith 2002; Gans 1999; Hirsch 1972; Kammen 1999; Klein 2005; Lyons 1989 cited in Jones 2002, p. 6; Shuker 2005); band competitions and awards (see SmokeFree Rockquest 2008); charts (see Chapter Four); and famous musician recommendations (see New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 16). These secondary sources are not discussed here for, although relevant, live performances and recordings are more readily accessible means to gain prestige, reputation, and fame.

**Live performances**

Live performances are a central institution in the field of pop production. They act as a ‘proto-market’ through which cultural intermediaries can attempt to predict future commercial success (Toynbee 2003, p. 52). In the logics of the field, live performances allow the creative entrepreneur to present themselves as a subject of value by “demonstrating important relations between artist and audience” (Frith 1992, p. 175). For example Simon Baeyertz (Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005), head of International Affairs at V2 records, draws on extensive international music industry experience when stating “live performances are a crucial element”, particularly for rock bands where the symbolic capital of a “good live reputation is essential”. Live performances thus serve a dual function in the construction of the artist’s symbolic capital. Firstly, audiences, their size and their response, attract the interest of cultural intermediaries. Secondly, “as record stores have closed” in the wake of ‘creative destruction’ live performances become an avenue for directly converting self-released recordings into economic capital (Baeyertz, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). Even so these durable, global logics are circumscribed in New Zealand, as a pop producer with radio play, domestic multi-platinum sales, and NZMC supported international tours recounts:

It’s a small country; it’s a frustrating country to a certain extent. You can’t tour all the time, twice a year and all those other peripheral shows and that’s what most artists want
to be doing: they want to be playing shows (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

While in a Catch-22 situation the production of live performances as an element contributing to symbolic capital requires economic capital. For many creative entrepreneurs domestic touring and live performance sans economic capital is a precarious undertaking:

[The band I manage] go on tour and they are lucky if they cover the cost. If not they come out in minus and if not at least they cover petrol, food and accommodation – if they don’t sleep on somebody’s floor. But you don’t want to carry on like this forever (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Problematising further DIY live performances as a means to construct the ‘subject of value’ is, as Chapter Three noted, Ernst Engel’s law: wherein increasing disposable income allows for the consumption of non-necessities such as commoditised forms of popular culture. In the practice of touring inside and outside New Zealand’s main urban centres the harsh realities of disposable income, demographics, and recognition confront the creative entrepreneur. According to a band manager seeking access to state funding:

If you have a local act people get upset if it is five dollars or seven – ‘oh, don’t you dare to do that!’ And the worst is if you leave Auckland … that is a common frustration I found amongst bands and management or whoever is involved in touring new bands because people don’t understand what costs are involved to go on tour. Then you see the punters going to a shop and buying alcohol or cigarettes or whatever and their money is all of a sudden … loose! (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Furthermore live performance as a mode of symbolic capital accumulation in the international domain also demands significant volumes of economic capital. As an artist with state supported accesses to export markets attests:

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32 The title of Joseph Heller’s 1961 novel and is defined by the Oxford Dictionary as a term to “describe a difficult situation from which there is no escape because it involves mutually conflicting or dependent conditions”.
Our touring is always done off our own bat. Pretty much just raise some money for airfares either from the government, concerts, royalties, or from advances from overseas record companies and tour, and invariably make up the short fall when we come back [to New Zealand] (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

This anecdotal evidence on the fraught conversion of live performances into economic capital is supported by Statistics New Zealand (2006, p. 15, 19). This state research finds music is the most consumed form of cultural activity while singers and musicians are amongst the lowest paid creative industry workers. However these contextual factors also allow for entrepreneurial agency and innovative practices. Capital swapping, as discussed below, is one of the social means for offsetting the inherent costs of origination at low levels of success.

**Self-released recordings**

DIY produced pop songs are central to accruing symbolic capital. Self-produced and self-released recordings are the primary means of communicating a creative entrepreneur’s talent, potential for future success, and marketability (Bockstedt, Kauffman & Riggins 2006; Gopal, Bhattacharjee & Sanders 2006; Jones 2000). New digital technologies have facilitated this practice by circumventing the costs involved in vinyl and CD production and distribution as the Internet offers more or less instant access to de-territorialised fans and ‘tastemakers’. Reflecting on the emerging importance of these new technologies in converting a creative entrepreneur’s symbolic capital into the market a cultural intermediary states: “bands and albums have been broken by the Internet” (Kirk Harding, Warrant of Fitness Seminar 2005). Some recent venerated examples of pop acts to emerge from this “sea of digital noise” include My Chemical Romance, KT Tunstall, OK!GO, and the Arctic Monkeys (Connell & Gibson 2003, p. 261).

For domestic pop producers the ‘creative’ dimension of new digital technologies allow the DIY logics of self-released recordings to be transposed with relative ease onto the Internet. Therefore when converted into the logics of creating a ‘buzz’ fan websites, blogs, download sites, social networking sites, and chat rooms circulate information about popular music and create virtual, de-territorialised communities through which artists can accrue recommendations, status, and prestige (Brown & Dubber 2008). As domestic MNC cultural
intermediary Adam Holt (Warrant of Fitness 2005) claimed, this process involves “starting out from myspace sites and putting stuff out without [cultural intermediaries] knowing…Duncan [from a domestic band] is on there 24/7 building up friends and a fan base”. This community of fans in turn offers the potential to be converted into consumers. Accordingly, a domestic pop producer sees these “decentralising effects” of new technologies as meaning (Connell & Gibson 2003, p. 251):

Anyone one can make a demo now on the computer and – bang! – upload it and start working other angles. Like getting people into music through myspace: You want to buy our tunes? Go to this site – bang! Fantastic! And all of a sudden there’s a huge distribution mechanism that used to cost people so much money and now it doesn’t. And all the artists upload the stuff themselves so it’s completely organic and the site’s just going to grow and grow and grow because it doesn’t rely on anything but a band (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Some domestic music makers see the democratising space of the internet and large, relatively accessible audiences as a formal realisation of romantic notions of artistic control over the sale and distribution of their production. The democratising effects of new internet distribution cannot be questioned yet the source of economic capital returns from such practice remains uncertain. Oberholzer-Gee and Stumpf (2007, p. 40) point to the fact that much on-line pop is released without – or at a low – price: “for new bands that are about to launch their career, the probability of success is so low as to make the expected income from producing music virtually zero, so file sharing will not change the relevant incentives”. In contrast Kretschmer, Klimis, and Wallis (2001, p.429, 430) suggest artists who retain their rights – and are able to generate enough symbolic capital to sell directly to an audience, such as Radiohead’s 2007 online release (Danicki 2007) – are able to command economies of scope in the digital market place. Nevertheless self-released recordings on the internet need to be seen within the broader logics of the field and the processes of symbolic capital accumulation. For example:

Artists know that if they get hugely popular; let’s say a million people downloaded my song tonight, that’s not a problem, that’s a story … that’s my ticket! Sure I won’t make whatever money I’m meant to make off those million downloads but then some radio
station is going to play it, it might become a hit, people will come to my shows, it will get played on radio and TV and you obviously get [mechanical royalties] so that’s how it all works. The Internet is converting music into a service driven industry as opposed to a product driven industry (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Self-produced recordings can also, depending on the creative entrepreneur’s strategy, be converted directly into the ‘cash nexus’: being made for sale on compact discs or on download websites. So although the internet offers opportunities for generating a ‘buzz’ in New Zealand’s small market a contradiction emerges between the symbolic capital bestowed by online sales charts and economic returns. For example a domestic pop producer deploying the DIY strategy of independent releases and online sales illustrates this disjunction between symbolic and economic capital: “Our song went top 30 on the national singles charts. But we only had to sell 250 copies on-line over that week, from which we get 52 cents per copy” (Musician informant pers. corrs. 2007). Although this recording was funded by a $10,000 NZOA new artists recording scheme grant, the return of $130 from sales is clearly not enough to cover the real costs of music origination. Nevertheless due to significant airplay the creative entrepreneur received a $5,000 NZOA airplay rebate and also gained performance royalties through APRA. Economic capital was accrued although not through the market transactions of commodity exchange.

The presence of the state in the field of pop production arguably haunts many self-released recordings. Here the production and release of songs is a performance: a necessary means for ‘getting in the picture’ and gaining reputation but not an end in itself in the market. For example, consider how the following may be a common experience of creative entrepreneurs yet to gain access to the ANLPS’ programmes:

*Myspace* was a good enough way to build a ‘buzz’, but if you set your song for download you’re just throwing away your rights giving away your music for free and you spent however much to make that, so it’s not really fair. So when we took a look at the [online sales site] it looked like an awesome opportunity. So we put our song straight up there and now we’ve got about three songs up including our new single. Then using *myspace* and [online sales site] together we’d send bulletins on *myspace* to
'hey go and check out [online sales site]. We got number 1 on the charts for ages and we were the third most looked at band out of all the bands on there.

I: How many downloads do you get?

Well…it is not as much as you would think…Um, we’ve had 50 [stutters] downloads paying two dollars per download, but the revenue we get from it is 62.5 cents for each sale. So if you sell 100 copies you get 62 dollars fifty.

I: What do you think of this?

It is a good cut compared to what you can get from CD sales but at the same time it is never going to be our main form of income because there is not enough exposure in New Zealand, there is not enough fans who are actually willing to buy music … it’s really sad I know … Even a big [local] band on [the online sales site] has only sold like 75 copies and so it’s strange.

I: It is a very strange situation at the moment in terms of trying to make money out of music.

I’m not so worried about getting money off [online sales site] I would just rather get the [NZOA] new artists funding

The production of pop *sans* economic capital, either as a live performance or self released recordings, sees these practices embody a paradox. Paraphrasing Offe (1984, p.153) the creative entrepreneur can neither exist with or without these pop commodities. This is because the pop commodity is, from one perspective, inevitably destined to require more self-invested economic capital than the commodity will return; what Bourdieu calls the “incommensurability of the specifically cultural value and economic value of the work” (Bourdieu 1996, p. 120). Yet under the logics of the field these things are fundamental to the construction of a ‘buzz’: songs, videos, performances are not ends in themselves but the price of entry to the field and the chance to ‘play the game’. They are vital material performances in the process of symbolic capital accumulation.
However to claim that New Zealand’s ideal-t ypical creative entrepreneur is completely devoid of economic capital would be an overstatement. They are relatively sans economic capital. But by describing New Zealand’s pop producing creative entrepreneur as functioning sans economic capital conveys a sense of the small scale, contradictory, and under economically capitalised processes that go into symbolic capital accumulation. This is in marked contrast to orthodox accounts of heroic larger scale entrepreneurs with fungible assets, more readily accessible consumers and credit, or relatively stable markets.

Nor is it to suggest economic capital cannot be accumulated in New Zealand’s pop renaissance. For domestic artists who have successfully converted and amplified their symbolic capital via the state and labels into the market economic capital can be generated from multiple sources: festivals, concerts, tours, royalties from broadcasting and sales (if the recording contract is beneficial to the artist), and merchandise such as t-shirts. However it could also be considered that some of this income retires debt from earlier phases of origination or serves to facilitate a round of new projects to sustain the presentation of symbolic capital and the artist as a ‘subject of value’ (Skeggs 2004).

To mitigate relative economic capital scarcity at low levels of success creative entrepreneurs may also draw upon earnings made in their ‘non-creative’ work. Other sources of economic capital include familial relations and private loans for co-terminus with the era of the pop renaissance was a uniquely loose money market (an aspect discussed further in Chapter Six). However, as we will see below, access to loans and credit occurs in a personalised – and therefore a neo-liberalised and individuated way – often without recourse to material assets (see also Leadbeatter & Oakley 1999, p. 41). This feature of domestic pop production sans economic capital is, in part, because creative entrepreneurs tend to be young. As a demographic, the young historically and structurally receive a relatively lower market income and hold fewer material assets (see Statistics New Zealand 2007a, p. 97; Richardson & Miller-Lewis 2002). As a pop producer performing in three small scale bands seeking ANLPS support attests:

We’ve paid for everything ourselves out of our own pockets. At one point we all took out five grand loans each to pay for like our EP, video and tour. It’s pretty hard …
I: How is it going with paying it off?

It’s pretty good. I’m doing all right; I’ve had a whole bunch of other loans. We’re pretty useless with money (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

With these fraught aspects of symbolic capital accumulation in mind how then are the economic capital costs of ‘origination’ mitigated? The above description suggests economic capital scarcity often orients the creative entrepreneur to alternative social resources to assist in the production of recordings and live performances. Here Bourdieu’s alternative forms of capital become productive in analysing the array of convoluted non-market exchanges woven through the pop renaissance.

**Creative entrepreneurship as capital swapping**

This section goes further behind the official representations of the pop renaissance. The aim is to illuminate the multitude of micro-scale practices induced by state involvement in the field of pop production. It does so by investigating how the cost of producing pop commodities, and from these the representations of field specific status, reputation or fame, becomes mitigated through the practice of ‘capital swapping’.

In Bourdieu’s epistemology all alternative forms of capital – symbolic, social, and cultural – are, with relative degrees of difficulty, convertible into economic capital in some instance. These alternative forms can be understood as a cultural currency that endows agents with power and agency. As New Zealand’s popular music makers are not a homogeneous group they bring different composites of economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital to the field, its struggles and contests. Consequently, and in contrast to neo-liberal thought which often presents the monetary exchanges of the market as a neutral or flat space where “everybody competes from an equal position”, Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of alternative capitals sees agents endowed with differential material and cultural resources (Skeggs 2004, p. 63). As the creative entrepreneur literature and examples above suggest many pop producers lack access to any field altering repositories of economic capital. This objective feature of the field together with the co-determinations imposed by the logics of symbolic capital accumulation
suggests creative entrepreneurs readily deploy Bourdieu’s social and cultural capitals in the process of ‘origination’.

Social capital comprises social obligations, contacts, and networks between agents. It is convertible into economic capital under certain conditions with the size and density of the social network determining the potential volume of economic capital available (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 51). Illustrating this an independent label manager states “…it is who you know in this industry. You have to get out there and meet the people who make the decisions if you want to be part of it really” (Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006). Yet social capital, like the economic form, is unevenly distributed with some agents being more able to invest the time and sociability necessary to generate larger or better-connected networks with tastemakers and cultural intermediaries.

Social capital has little value in the field if the creative entrepreneur lacks cultural capital. Recalling Chapter Two, according to Bourdieu (1997a, p. 47) cultural capital can be seen to exist in three modes: embodied, objectified, and institutionalised, which too are convertible into economic capital in “certain conditions” (ibid). In its embodied form cultural capital includes dispositions or deportments such as ways of speaking and acting. In relation to creative entrepreneurs embodied cultural capital might include genre specific musical skills, ways of performing, and ‘cool’ or disinterested hipster dispositions. In its objectified state cultural capital relates to cultural goods such as image and fashion sense (Skeggs 2004, p. 16). Institutionalised cultural capital primarily takes the form of educational credentials and is the mode most readily converted into economic capital (Bourdieu 1997a, p. 47).

Cultural capital is vital in constructing the creative entrepreneur as a subject of value and in any style of popular music is field specific (Thornton 1997). For example an artist’s image, musical ability and dispositions are constantly assessed by cultural intermediaries and audiences alike for aligning with the expectations and conventions of any genre specific style. Creative entrepreneurs’ conversion of field specific cultural capital – examples here could include the embodiments of genre appropriate tattoos and piercing, hairstyles, or fashion clothing – into economic capital is, however, somewhat ‘stickier’ than the conversion of a professional degree into economic capital. Although the following analysis recognises agents possess varying degrees of cultural capital necessary to ‘play the game’, the analytical
centrality of social capital is reinforced by a musician dripping in the cultural capital of musical virtuosity and urbane fashion sense:

For making things happen it’s about getting that network, expanding that network, and then presumably those skills you’ve been working on all your bloody life are, y’know, going do the job. It’s a feeling of I know I can do what is required but how to find the right path of letting people know that I can do it or make them become aware that I’m here to do extra (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006)

Such a focus on social capital’s uses in the accrual of symbolic capital is reasonable: this capital form is an omnipresent feature of the creative industries. Power and Scott (2004, p. 6) suggest this greater reliance on social capital is a response to the unstable and fluid features of creative production: “intensive social networking activities” are necessary to find “collaborators, customers and employees”. Creating Heat (New Zealand Music Industry Development Group 2004, p. 21, see also Chapter Three) tacitly acknowledges social capital’s role in pop production. It suggests the official statistics measuring market transactions do not capture the full value of the exchanges and labour power incorporated in the production of popular music:

The huge amount of ‘favours’ carried out by musicians, engineers, video directors and other associated industry players who undertake work for little or no remuneration, purely for the love of music or the artists they choose to help … these additional investments are likely to make a significant contribution to the industry.

Further concrete evidence of the uses of social capital to defray the costs of pop production comes from an independent label informant. Even when an artist is brought into the enabling ambit of the ANLPS and its public-private funding the processes of ‘origination’ oftentimes remains reliant upon non-monetised social exchanges. For example:

In terms of getting a record out or just getting it off the ground? Hard work and favours: you get a mate to produce it [the song] or whatever. Music videos in particular everyone gets their friends to make music videos for them. If you do get one of those $5000 grants from New Zealand on Air – even that is not very much – you still have to
call in a lot of favours to get anything done. You get your mates from film school to help you out or whatever (Key Music Industry Informant 2006).

Sociologically the utilisation of social capital can be seen to support and facilitate the exchange of ‘favours’ that are integral to the field’s over-arching logics of symbolic capital accumulation. Yet it would be premature to affirm Creating Heat’s or creative entrepreneurs’ ‘commonsense’ interpretation of creative production as undertaken ‘purely for the love of music’. By bearing the costs of origination in a mostly non-monetised way the exchanges induced by agents’ illusio and social capital highlights what could be called ‘capital swapping’: the mutual exchange of alternative capitals wherein both parties in the exchange accrue another ‘chip’ of capital that comes to present the creative entrepreneur as a ‘subject of value’. Conceptually what needs to be stressed is that it is not the production of the creative commodity that is important in the ‘capital swap’: be that the poster, website, video, live performance, or recording. Instead it can be considered that through the making of a pop commodity agents’ in the exchange tacitly appropriate the other’s social and cultural capital and, most importantly, the promise held out by the commodity as future marker of symbolic capital by association. This transaction and connection then becomes a potential “resource – in propertising of the self” – for future market exchanges and ‘capital swaps’ in the field of cultural production (Skeggs 2004, p. 158). Moreover, through the appropriation of others’ capitals this exchange in turn enhances creative entrepreneurs’ own struggles to “create themselves as a marketable product, to be sold and re-sold in a rapidly changing market” (Skeggs 2004, p. 73). Such capital swapping between homologous creative entrepreneurs – musicians, designers, filmmakers, promoters – can be illustrated through three instructive cases.

**Case 1: the artist manager**

This artist manager worked with two bands seeking to emerge from the ‘swarm’ and access state funding. At the time of the interview her acts – both playing a style of melodic hard rock – had gained some domestic recognition: national tours, prestigious support slots, band competition placings and some, albeit low rotate, commercial airplay. Her working life involves what could be seen as a self-exploitative double shift of a day job (as a service worker in the creative industries) with artist management. Therefore she recounts how during evenings and weekends “a lot of time is spent with meetings, concerts of your bands,
organising them, photo shoots: if it’s happening it’s always at the weekends” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). Like most creative entrepreneurs every opportunity is tacitly assessed in relation to the potential capitals it can generate, recounting: “sometimes I spend my private time at a concert of somebody else’s band or I go to a party where I know there might be important people around. You always have to network. Always ...” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). She then goes on to state:

First of all you need contacts and communication. If you know the right people at the right time then you can get whatever you want. But that is not always easy if the band is unknown because the industry is not very supportive of new acts mainly because there are too many and there are also overseas acts who people concentrate on, of course (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Such social capital has generated opportunities for her acts to gain a modicum of symbolic – and economic – capital:

The thing is in this country a lot of times you get asked to do something for free because you have the exposure which is fine if you balance it, if you weight it up. I’m a big supporter of weighing it up and see what comes out for the band. But there are far too many things – I’m really over hearing its good promotion. The bands really need to get something back for what they are doing. Anyway we just did a surf DVD for an Australian TV channel [Where music is synched to footage of surfing]. There is no money ’cos the guy does it completely by himself. So we don’t get any money but it means somebody might listen to the music, someone in Australia who might want to buy the album: it might be two people, it might be ten (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

In capital swapping terms such a ‘free’ exchange can be seen to construct both creative entrepreneurs as ‘subjects of value’. The band’s exposure to a niche audience in Australia (which too might lead to opportunities to perform and access NZMC funding) can be seen as a form of symbolic capital: the recognition and status amongst peers of an ‘international release’ that becomes part of the artist’s ‘story’ as well as the opportunity to access an audience. In turn, although this aspect is somewhat small scale, it is understood there is a
possibility to make economic capital returns from sales. For the film maker the band’s
grinding ostinato riffs demonstrate a cultural affinity with surfing sub-culture. But more
importantly, through this swap, the film maker can use the DVD’s broadcast and sale as a
propertised form of symbolic capital to be deployed in generating future opportunities in the
field of video or film production.

Case 2: DIY Musician
Jerry is a guitarist and songwriter in a pop-rock band seeking to access (and since the
interview, has achieved) NZOA and NZMC funding. Although the act had gained some
airplay and supported a couple of international touring acts they possess ambitions concurrent
with many aspiring artists with an illusio in the field:

We want to go play overseas ... a lot of New Zealand bands seem to have a real laid
back attitude but we are assertive and we want things to happen rather than sit back and
wait around in New Zealand (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

His band’s symbolic capital accumulation strategy works in a number of commonly
interwoven ways: DIY live performances combined with self-released recordings. Firstly,
social capital is used to defray the costs involved:

We are lucky enough to have a friend who works for … I’ve no idea of what company
he works for … but he designs our posters and prints them out. We get a 100 printed
out for free. That’s pretty cool (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

And secondly, economic capital investment from income sources combines with social
capital:

To make the next single we split the costs between the four [band members]. We all put
in however much it was – about 400 bucks each – and the video was real cheap as well.
We’ve got real good contacts with a film producer and he’s done a few small movies
and he’s only done like two music videos which have never gotten into the mainstream
… [so] he now wants to get into music video. This is his first music video where he
knew he had the chance to get it on to the mainstream: onto [music channels] Juice and
C4 and stuff. He put his whole [self into it], three weeks, four weeks of dedication, everything was about us and organised everything. Got people to work on the set for free, got all these contacts to come in. Got Hell’s Pizza [pizza chain store] to come in and give us pizza on the day and he spends so much time on the post-production (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Seen as an example of ‘capital swapping’ the video maker – himself a creative entrepreneur in another field – leverages the construction of himself as a ‘subject of value’ through the band’s music video. His reputation is enhanced and appropriated by recognition of the video through broadcasts and websites. This chip of symbolic capital then becomes a resource to be leveraged into future creative projects and opportunities to accrue economic capital. For the poster designer another product is added to a portfolio and if the band is ‘successful’ the symbolic capital of association may lead to further design opportunities. For the band the appropriation of another creative entrepreneur’s cultural and social capital – his embodied video making skills and social contacts to make things happen ‘for free’ – assists in transforming the pop song into the interpenetrated symbolic capitals of chart positions, airplay, on line sales, media exposure, and further performance opportunities. In turn these events might access music industry cultural intermediaries or demonstrate to ANLPS agents the group’s commercial intent.

Case 3: ANLPS funded musician

Even for commercially successful artists with ANLPS funding social capital is vital in ‘playing the game’. The Phoenix Foundation, a platinum selling Wellington band who have international licensing deals, wrote the sound track for celebrated ‘arts and cultural revival’ director Taika Waititi’s film Eagle vs Shark. Although operating at a relatively greater level of commercial success this exchange too illustrates a ‘capital swap’; conditioned as it was by economic capital scarcity and the strategy of turning chance encounters into durable contacts. As band leader Luke Buda recounts:

Well, as I say, [Wellington’s] a small place, man! I’d met Taika a couple of times, Sam [Phoenix Foundation member] had met him a couple of times: he was mates with my mates. I made a mix of soundtracky stuff to give to someone at my work, which was an art house theatre, and Taika was a guest lecturer at the film school. I thought, ‘I can
give this CD to my work friend tomorrow so I may as well give it to Taika since I don’t know when I’ll see him next’. But he actually came up to me and said, ‘I wanna use some of your songs in my movie’ and then I went, ‘Let us do the soundtrack, let us be the dudes’. I think he bumped into Sam within a week and Sam said the same thing and then it happened! (McLennan 2008, p. 26)

Such social capital iterated back onto the construction of the Phoenix Foundation as a collective ‘subject of value’. Appropriating Taika’s social capital then allowed for an NZOA funded video to be produced for below market costs. Luke Buda again: “they went to Park Road Post, which is Peter Jackson’s incredibly flash multi-multi-multi-million dollar studio complex ... he did a fucking exceptional job” (McLennan 2008, p. 26). While on the other side of the exchange Taika appropriated the prestige of the Phoenix Foundation writing the soundtrack to create a ‘story’ around the film’s release.

These capital swapping examples are necessarily only suggestive of the myriad of quasi-economic-social exchanges within New Zealand’s pop renaissance. What they serve to highlight is the multitude of mostly non-monetised capital swaps that is arguably an improvised response to the field’s co-construction by the ANLPS and durable DIY practices. What could be readily suggested then is that the state’s incentivising presence in the field reinforces creative entrepreneurs’ illusion in the field which in turn impels the construction of the ‘subject of value’ through the accumulation of ‘field specific symbolic capital’. In performing this presentation of the self capital swapping processes take on a serious candour and intensified application. Again, this is not to suggest linear or frictionless processes of accumulating symbolic capital or the attendant conversion of this capital to influence cultural intermediaries: these practices do not translate into “simple ordinal structures of direct determination” (Bourdieu’s 1984, p. 107). Trowse (2001) is more forthright asserting ‘nobody knows’ what it takes to be commercially successful. But the question is not how do artists become successful. Rather the above highlights that ‘playing the game’ necessitates these improvised capital swapping practices to accumulate symbolic capital and create a ‘story’ and a ‘buzz’. An artist manager reiterates this fraught practice:

We are so frustrated about [not getting funding]. I have the feeling that we could actually be on there [NZOA funding and radio]. Then you see who actually gets
funded and you think why them and why not us? It is a controversial area in the unsigned band industry and a lot of bands get frustrated by it … it’s like playing a lottery: even though you know you're good enough you still don’t get it … then it’s like – bang! – OK they fund you (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Admittedly the above conceptualisation of capital swapping repeats Caillies’s critiques of Bourdieu (see Chapter Two). By emphasising exchange and self-interest this application of Bourdieu’s theorisation re-enforces a mode of rational actor analysis (see Chapter Two). Nevertheless when considering creative entrepreneurial practices in the field of pop production it is plausible that, although not a consciously rational calculation, creative entrepreneurs’ capital swapping practices entwine with symbolic capital accumulation as the tacit logics and means for securing the rewards of the field. Importantly ANLPS supports simultaneously offer and enable access to these rewards.

Conclusion

This chapter’s focus on the influence of the ANLPS on the field of pop production, and thus on creative entrepreneurs’ struggles to accumulate symbolic capital, suggests a number of insights into the creative industries and the pop renaissance. By exploring creative entrepreneurship ‘from below’ this research draws attention to the fraught, socially intensive, quasi-economic practices producing pop, even when brought to interaction with ‘market enabling’ organisations and programmes of the ANLPS. Such an approach offers an initial intervention into the literature on the lived experiences within New Zealand’s ‘arts and cultural revival’ while simultaneously augmenting studies of the non-market practices of cultural production. This, I think, is important for if popular music researchers confine their sites of investigation to the ‘top down’, corporate/industry/market and state policy interests of the real/official/measured economy, the lived realities underneath such a consoling ‘rug’ risk becoming elided.

From the perspective of this chapter – one that looks in the shadows, the grey twilight where the logics of cultural production and commerce collide – a bifurcated field of pop production comes into view. On one dimension there is an ‘official’ field: the domain of state support, broadcasters, record labels etc. Yet existing in parallel is its ‘other’: a symbolic economy of
pop production that is tangentially oriented to this dominant field. The ‘official’ field of pop production imposes on creative entrepreneurs the game of symbolic capital accumulation which is in turn improvised through intensive capital swapping practices. With luck, this symbolic performance links at certain moments and through particular network nodes into the dominant logics of *la grande* pole and its ‘cash nexus’.

Consequently the pop renaissance as an actually existing ‘after neo-liberal’ project can be unpacked further. The ANLPS is oriented by the discourse(s) of market-led economic development. To achieve this policy goal new institutional policies and programmes (discussed in Chapters Two, Three, and Four) in their ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ guises create markets, reduce economic transaction costs into the ‘official’ economy, and shape entrepreneurial, market-oriented music makers. Yet as state programmes are crucial holders of economic and social capital they become sites orienting the practices of creative entrepreneurs. So, while the state programmes and organisations formally reduce the transaction costs of inserting popular music into the market, substantively it can be understood as re-inscribing the perversities of the creative industries. That is, as well as being partnered and enabled, the high and often intangible economic and symbolic capital costs of pop production at low levels of success are further displaced onto the ‘swarm’ of creative entrepreneurs. *Opportunity for All*’s ‘hard work’ (see Chapter Three) is elicited and becomes the ‘sunk’ costs or price of admission to the field.

From this insight we can trace how the ANLPS and its aligned music industry logics come to shape the practices of creative entrepreneurs: the domain of capital swapping by entrepreneurs *sans* economic capital. By using Bourdieu the social dimensions of capital swapping as the mobilisation and appropriation of “composites of capitals” becomes apparent (Bourdieu & Wacquant’s 1992, p. 99). Importantly these capital swaps are not the instantaneous cash exchange of the economic capital economy; they are much less exact than that, in terms of what gets exchanged. They resemble more, then, gift economies of reciprocity in a common endeavour of creative entrepreneurs to, at some time in the future, ‘make it’. They involve concrete (and therefore monetised) time, the misrecognition33 of the

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33 Bourdieu might use the term misrecognise: “the process whereby power relations are perceived not for what they objectively are but in a form which renders them legitimate in the eyes of the beholder”, which also involves the link between recognition and ratification (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990, cited in Jenkins 2002: 104).
gift economy, and a great deal of culturally mediated symbolic exchange. Therefore through the creative entrepreneur’s capital swapping practices, the time contributions and economic transaction costs are not recognised in the market price of the commodity; be that a concert, download or compact disc sale, MP3 file, radio airplay royalties, or myspace traffic. Thus the significant transaction costs of symbolic capital accumulation are not measured nor monetised: they all happen within hybrid exchange economies in which the misrecognition of the nature of the transaction is crucial. Nor are these costs recognised when Labour appropriates artists’ prestige in its celebrated representations of ‘the arts and cultural revival’. Consequently creative entrepreneurs convoluted production practices present a very different form of entrepreneurial market activity to that of the economics literature or ‘after neo-liberal’ understandings of entrepreneurship and the creative industries.

Conversely the coalescence of the ANLPS and the durable logics of the music industry encourages – indeed establishes – the performance of neo-liberal subjectivities of entrepreneurial, competitive conduct. This has material consequence. As Labour explicitly intends to ‘grow the music business’ – an aspiration articulated from the 1989’s New Horizons through to 2004’s Creating Heat (see Chapter Three) – its market-affined organisations come to draw out, and upon, youthful music makers’ deeply held illusio. By incentivising this ‘swarm’ of creative entrepreneurs to suspend the more or less certain commercial failure that comes from ‘playing the game’ the state also creates monetary transactions. Consider the 2,000 or so demo recordings sent to NZOA each year as proxy for the multitude of capital swaps intimated in this chapter. These swaps also require some economic capital with fractions invested in producing the songs either in studios or at home. The artist’s application may be supported by the symbolic capital of videos made, posters printed, live performances organised and ‘put on’ (and hire equipment and technical personnel paid), websites maintained and accessed, alcohol consumed and so on. Each event can be seen as an aspect of symbolic capital accumulation embedded in multiple market economy transactions, occurring prior to popular music entering interactions with cultural intermediaries. Therefore although Labour’s music industry policy is ‘after neo-liberal’ in its orientations and engagements with la grande pole or upper end of the music industry’s hourglass, at the lower end – in the domain of the ‘swarm’ – the impelling of individualised entrepreneurial behaviour remains all very neo-liberal. This in turn materialises one of this
doctrine’s imperatives: to intensify and extend the scope and frequency of market transactions – the moments where cash is exchanged (Ward & England 2007, p. 6).

What then of this ‘swarm’ of capital swapping creative entrepreneurs sans economic capital? How can these agents as a social group be understood in relation to New Zealand’s ‘after neo-liberal’ context? And more importantly why is the state involved in an industry that often generates failure rather than success and requires convoluted capital swapping practices, the costs of which are rarely realised in the market? The next chapter addresses these questions by turning to analyse popular music as a form of social policy.
Chapter Six:
Popular music as social policy

Maybe there are too many people thinking that they are musicians
(Key Music Industry Informant Interview 2006)

The whole thing for me is to play music, be happy and experience life. And to me this
is my preferred and favourite way of doing it. Another thing I learnt from MAINZ [a
rock school] was all the music industry horror stories and stuff. I guess then I was a bit
shocked … ‘oh reality!’ But now I guess hearing that stuff it puts a bit of perspective
on what you are doing. I would like to ‘make it’ and playing music would be ‘it’. But I
guess now I can be happy doing other things if I wanted, but I will always be playing
music.
Musician, hundreds of CD sales (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006)

Introduction

How can music policy – and by extension broader creative industry policies – be understood
as social policy? More specifically how can Labour’s popular music engagements be
interpreted as a form of social inclusion? To explore these questions the following sets in
relief Chapter Five’s micro-sociological analysis of popular music makers’ capital swapping
practices against a macro-sociological analysis of the creative entrepreneur. This macro-
sociological analysis sees the creative entrepreneur as constituting a (small and emergent)
faction of Bourdieu’s (1984) new petit bourgeoisie: the group of cultural producers in
differentiated societies. Such an approach is pertinent since social class is the pivot point
around which much social policy is oriented and enacted. By investigating the classed
dimensions of the pop renaissance this analysis tacks away from a relatively narrow liberal-
pluralist interpretation of popular music policy as promoting a benign national culture (see
Shuker 2008). Thus this chapter seeks to interpret popular music making practices in relation
to wider contextual factors: political economy and ‘after neo-liberal’ policy concerns over
youth employment and social inclusion. In doing so this chapter also replies, in part, to what
Frith and Cloonan (2008, p. 190) call the “otherwise neglected question. *Who* is music policy for?”

To develop this analysis a range of inter-related but rarely articulated literatures are brought together over three sections. In the first, the confluence of social inclusion policies, supply-side credentialism, and youth transitions through the labour market are reviewed. Together these contextual elements form ‘the creative condition’: a situation where youthful creative entrepreneurs combine creative production at low levels of success with somewhat less exciting work in the service economy as they seek access to the state supported field of cultural production.

The second section aligns the creative entrepreneur to Bourdieu’s (1984) theorisations of the new petit bourgeoisie and social trajectories. It does so by building on this description of the realities of engaging in pop production while reproducing labour power in a highly commoditised form. This conceptualisation of creative entrepreneurs as members of a social class involves recognising a blind spot in the existing core-centric theorisations of the new petit bourgeoisie. That is, the secondary literature on the new petit bourgeoisie literature has tended to focus on elite creative industry agents. To augment these existing understandings, it is suggested the ‘swarm’ of creative entrepreneurs can be understood as a subaltern faction of the new petit bourgeoisie.

Even though this analysis focuses on pop producing creative entrepreneurs the conceptualisation of the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie developed here resonates with the experiences of other creative entrepreneurs operating at low levels of success. This homologous group of neophyte creative entrepreneurs includes a range of agents seeking to enter New Zealand’s ‘economically transforming’ ‘arts and cultural revival’: actors, DJ’s, fashion designers, freelance writers, quasi-independent graphic designers, jewellery makers, popular music makers, sculptors, video and film-makers, and so on. In short all those agents Labour’s policies and media celebrations interpellate as subjects potentially joined-up to expanding global and domestic markets for the arts (Lewis, Larner & Le Heron 2008; Porter & Craig 2004, see also Chapter Three).
The third and final section brings these social aspects of the pop renaissance together to interpret popular music as a form of ‘after neo-liberal’ social inclusion. It is argued the ANLPS re-creates a market-affined and ever-expanding pyramid form of social inclusion. This argument is developed by considering the relationships between the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie and the increasingly flexible conditions of the contemporary labour market. It is suggested state music policy creates a mode of culturalised social inclusion that harnesses both existing music industry logics and what young people would be doing anyway. Thus in numerous tangential and incentivising ways the ‘swarm’ of creative entrepreneurs are offered an avenue to convert their alternative forms of capital into an upward social trajectory (Bourdieu 1984). By noting how young people are sustained in low wage service work through an imaginary of a future creative self, this interpretation of popular music as social policy adds a cultural dimension to social inclusion debates.

The creative condition: social inclusion, the labour market, and slash-working

As Chapter Five argued the primary struggle of creative entrepreneurs is to construct and accumulate ‘field specific’ symbolic capital. Through the practice of capital swapping they come to present themselves to state and private sector cultural intermediaries as a ‘subject of value’ (Skeggs 2004). Concurrent with these struggles are the more mundane but pressing concerns of reproducing labour power. Historically, from the 1970s through 1990s, the popular musician may have sought welfare state support, reconciling such dependency as an ‘artists’ dole’ (Bannister 1999, Shuker 2008, p. 278) within a labour market where “unemployment...seemed destined to bottom out at no lower than six per cent” (Clark 2002). However in the wake of neo-liberal welfare reform a social and moral premium is placed on paid work and its attendant disciplinary and wealth generating effects (Baker & Tippin 2002; Bevir 2005; Humpage & Craig 2008).

As Chapter Two reviewed in ‘after neo-liberal’ policy contexts paid work acts as a proxy for social inclusion. Bolstered by the creative industry discourse Labour’s Growth and Innovation Framework and Opportunity for All New Zealanders asserted state ‘enabled’ creative industries could create jobs (see also Chapter Three). This social inclusion discourse
together with the broad state concerns over youth employment presents an entry point to understanding music policy as a mode of ‘after neo-liberal’ social policy.

Social inclusion

Youth or young people (aged 15-24 and it may be readily be argued, beyond) are a category narrated by policy makers and academics as vulnerable to social exclusion (Barry 2005; Fergusson 2002; Higgins & Narin 2006; Jeffery & McDowell 2004; Maguire & Thompson 2007; Savelsberg & Martin-Giles 2008; St John 2004; Williamson 2004). Much of this research on youth social exclusion highlights how young people experience higher levels of unemployment and under-employment; are more susceptible to the vagaries of low wage work; and many lack the education, skills, or training to secure more permanent or well paid work (Department of Labour 2007b; McKnight 2002; Ministry of Social Development 2004; Richardson & Miller-Lewis 2002). In the words of a European Union report policy makers are interested in youth for they are a “marginalised, insecure and vulnerable group ... excluded from social and economic life ... unable to find a foothold in the economy” (European Social Policy 1994 cited in Levitas 1996, p. 8 authors emphasis).

Such state interest in youth can be seen to be, in great part, due to the contemporary extension of young people’s transition to accessing the symbols of ‘respectable’ adulthood: car, job, family, house. The colloquial neologism ‘adultesence’ captures this temporal enlargement of consumerist youth culture and lifestyle up and down the age range. It also conveys a sense of the delaying of adult commitments. As Cohen and Ainley (2000, p. 90) notes this expansion of adolescent lifestyles becomes an “encroachment on childhood, and prolonged into adulthood” and suggest this is “both culturally driven and required by the economic collapse of earlier stages”. Therefore the social contours of adultesence correlate with the decline in fulltime, securely-tenured occupations, universal welfare and the emergence of neo-liberalised flexible labour markets, globalised economic forces, and the intensified culturalisation of capitalism.

Real and imagined problems presented by ‘youth in transition’ are addressed through social inclusion policies. Notably a ‘foothold in the economy’ is understood as engagement in, or preparing for entry to, the labour market (Levitas 1996, Porter and Craig 2004). In New
Zealand, to this end, “appropriate education, training, work or other activities leading to long-term economic independence and wellbeing” orient youth social inclusion policies to employment, education and training programmes (Ministry of Social Development 2004, p. 27, see also Maguire & Thompson 2007). Youth who are NEETers (Not in Education, Employment or Training) are primarily targeted through a policy strategy which corresponds with the ‘after neo-liberal’ ethos that the maximising of human potential occurs via the market.

Under the fifth Labour government there was a perceptible proliferation of what Jamie Peck (2005a, p. 740) calls “funky forms of supply-side intervention” such as education and training programmes in the arts and creative industries (Bill 2005). This expansion reflects the enactment of supply-side human capital policies but applied to the creative industries. Articulating this joining-up of young people to creative industry policy Helen Clark (2002) recounted that:

A national tertiary education strategy is being developed for the first time to get better alignment between tertiary education and New Zealand's development goals. A new Tertiary Education Commission will implement the strategy and make funding allocations in line with it.

The lines of causation in New Zealand’s tertiary education policy are necessarily more complex than can be accounted for here, but it can be noted the neo-liberal reforms of the 1990s introduced ‘user pays’ logics and sought to open up higher education to previously excluded cohorts. This widened the conferring of credentials beyond traditional academic, professional and trade qualifications and providers (Bill 2005; Shaw & Eichbaum 2005; Peters 2001b; Peters & Marshall 2001). Therefore not only was the ANLPS working informally to attune creative entrepreneurs to market practices – as discussed in Chapter Four – but there was a broader policy setting to supply appropriately skilled labour to the creative industries.

Arguably a number of interpenetrated contextual elements have brought forth the recent rise in degree level creative industry enrolments (Bill 2005). The “ideological uplift” brought by the ‘arts and cultural revival’, combined with the supply of creative industry courses to meet
Labour’s national development goals, offered a ‘career pathway’ to less academically inclined NEETers (Yudice 2003, p. 10). Popular music credentialism was the upshot. By 2005, for example, 28 contemporary performance credentials were offered across New Zealand along with five courses in music management and production and 14 diplomas in audio production (New Zealand Musician 2004). Sonya Waters (New Zealand Musician 2006, p. 8-9), a domestic musician and NZMC employee whose career began during punk rock’s heyday, reflects on the dramatic changes from the early 1980s and the 1990s: “Back then....University courses in anything to do with rock music were unheard of”. Notably such up-skilling has consequences for the standards of musicianship, recording expertise, and business savvy. No longer ‘wailing and bellowing’, many enthusiastic amateurs were refined through these music industry courses into talented instrumentalists, sound engineers, and other credentialized cultural actors.

Advertisements for these popular music credentials exhorted would-be musicians to: “Do what you love…” (Taiohi 2006, p. 15); to “dream big and aim high” (ibid, p. 9); or in the ultimate assertion of idealism, “your focus determines your reality” (ibid, p. 8). While music performance courses elicit the creative education consumer to: “do it, be it” (New Zealand Musician 2004, p. 2); to “kick start your career in the music industry” (ibid, p. 6); or just to be “jamming” (ibid, p. 3) with the assistance of “govt. loans and allowances” (ibid, p. 1). Similar quixotic appeals were made to other neophyte ‘creatives’ in design, fashion, and art, and courses were vigorously promoted to school-leavers through a range of career fairs and government websites (Bill 2005).

Yet New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs who emerge as credentialised and indebted subjects have often misrecognised the future value of their degrees and diplomas in the market. Commonly it can be observed this transition from social inclusion in education to inclusion in the creative industries labour market is fraught. Here the “successful worker identity”, where education credentials readily transpose into market power, is problematised when confronted with New Zealand’s labour market realities (Nairn and Higgins 2007, p. 264). As one musician seeking ANLPS support who took a performance course notes:
The course was great as far as a music education goes. I met heaps of people, which was an awesome way of making contacts. But in terms of getting a job, nah, it was pretty useless (Key Creative Entrepreneur Information Interview 2006).

While another creative entrepreneur who moved from a performance degree to a related career as a sound engineer, song writer and performer in an ANLPS funded group suggests:

[Tertiary education] is such a sheltered environment ... it’s great for setting up these goals, and gives you the skills of aiming for something and achieving it ... but it doesn’t give you any experience, especially on what you’re going to have to do to try and earn some money … (Key Creative Entrepreneur Information Interview 2006).

Further rich, anecdotal evidence on supply not always creating its own demand followed a boosterist New Zealand Herald article celebrating the creative industries as a source of employment growth. A terse letter to the editor rebuked: “My 2003 classmates, each with a degree in design, are still working in cafes, warehouses, and so on” (New Zealand Herald 2005b, p A16). How then does this swarm of homologous credentialised creative entrepreneurs become included in a labour market where the economic returns from pop and other forms of creative production are persistently tenuous?

**Creative entrepreneurs in labour markets**

There are class, cultural, and gendered dimensions influencing youth transitions and the performance of social inclusion. During ‘adultesence’ state and family supports contribute to social inclusion through public and private wealth transfers (including board and lodging), direction to education training or work through family social networks (Vaughn 2005, p. 182). Prescinding these sociological aspects this section follows the critical literature’s emphasis on social inclusion via the labour market to examine the position of youth in New Zealand’s labour market and how this conditions artistic work at low levels of success. This is an initial reply to Shuker’s (2008, p. 283) suggestion, following a review of Labour’s music policies, that “there is...a lack of systematic ethnographic investigation of the operation of the local industry and the working practices associated with it”.
Although the state narrates paid work as central to inclusion in society “it no longer constitutes the major source of identity for young people; instead music, fashion and leisure may be more important” (Vaughn 2005, p. 182). This substantive cultural turn within ‘the social’ is widely recognised to coincide with the end of the male breadwinner and stable employment under the national Keynesian welfare state (Beck 2000a; Bauman 1998; Jessop 2002a; Sennett 2006). Walkerdine (2003, p. 240) summarises the new realities of the contemporary world of work and the entrepreneurial self required to traverse it:

Jobs for life are being replaced by a constantly changing array of jobs, small business and employment contracts. In such an economy, it is the flexible and autonomous subject who is demanded to be able to cope with constant change in work, income and lifestyle, and with constant insecurity. It is the flexible and autonomous subject who negotiates, chooses, succeeds in the array of education and training forms that form the new ‘lifelong learning’ and the ‘multiple career trajectories’ that have replaced the linear hierarchies of the education system of the past and the jobs for life of the old economy.

Atkinson (2005) usefully describes the trends towards increasingly flexible work practises in OECD nations as part of a shift to a ‘U’ shaped labour market. The ‘U’ is a heuristic to conceptualise the concentration – at one pole of the ‘U’ – of jobs in relatively low paid, flexible, temporary, de-skilled service work in ‘backward’ firms with limited prospects for career development (Fines 1998, p. 120-121). While at the other pole there exist relatively secure, higher paid and skilled occupations involving technological, bureaucratic, financial and symbolic management skills. The bow of the ‘U’ is where the combined forces of political-economic and technological change, along with capital flight to low-wage, lightly regulated, manufacturing regions has ‘hollowed out’ the middle-income occupations of middle management, administrators, and skilled production workers.

This ‘U’ characteristic is recognisable in New Zealand’s contemporary labour market. Following ‘open up and hope’ neo-liberalism there are “11,000 fewer jobs in manufacturing” in 2002 compared to 1987 (Department of Labour 2003, p. 12). This figure continues to fall as New Zealand’s manufacturing sector slowly gravitates to lower cost locations (see New Zealand Herald 2007a). In addition, Spoonley and Davidson’s (2004, p. 29-32) review of
work in New Zealand observes the expansion between 2001 and 2006 of non-standard (part-time, contract, casual, few legal benefits) work in the archetypal low-wage service sector of wholesale, retail, restaurants and hotels (see also Department of Labour 2007a).

This ‘U’ labour market also reflects, and arguably reinforces, New Zealand’s highly uneven distribution of national wealth. Like other deeply neo-liberalised OECD nations over fifty percent of New Zealand’s total net worth (wealth) is held by the top 10 percent of the population while “the bottom half of the population collectively owns a mere 5.2 per cent of total net worth” (Statistics New Zealand 2007a, p. 7-8). This in an ‘advanced’ national economy where the officially measured median full-time income is $NZD 32,400 and the median for all employed people is $NZD 27,700 (Statistics New Zealand 2006a, p. 14). This highly unequal distribution of wealth is another notable legacy of neo-liberal reforms as “between 1986 and 1999, New Zealand's real GDP per capita grew by 9.5 per cent, compared to an OECD average of 29 per cent” (Clark 2002). Labour was active in seeking to address this material inequality and oversaw the rise of the adult minimum wage from $7 an hour in 1998 to $12 an hour in 2008 (Department of Labour 2008). The economic literature on wages in New Zealand argues that, on one hand, the “economic upswing” between 1999 and 2007 actually “depressed real average earnings” as new workers entered low productivity industries in the service sector (Mare & Hyslop 2008). On the other hand, Hyslop and Yanapath (2005) suggest income inequality fell over a similar period with low wage workers being noticeable beneficiaries of this economic upswing. Neither mentions the effects of the credit bubble, debt, or rising rents on the standard of living.

The expanded service sector at the lower end of the ‘U’ shaped labour market has particular relevance for youth and social inclusion and the work practices of ‘adultescent’ creative entrepreneurs. Admittedly many youthful agents are included in education and training; nevertheless, a Department of Labour (2007c, p. 6) report on youth employment between 2001 and 2006 observes:

The pattern of youth employment by industry differs from that of the population as a whole. In the year to June 2007 the industry with the largest share of youth workers was the retail industry which employs 25.2% of those aged 15-24 compared to only 12.9% of all workers. Youth were also overrepresented in the accommodation, cafes &
restaurants industry with 12.3% of youth employed in this industry, far greater than the 4.8% of all ages. Youth were also slightly overrepresented in the high growth construction industry.

Not only are young people concentrated in the service sector, New Zealand’s youth are also concentrated in cultural occupations (Statistics New Zealand 2006a, p. 8). Statistics New Zealand’s Cultural Indicators report notes that despite structurally low incomes creative workers can be seen as relatively well paid: “Part-timers in creative occupations earned a median of $14,000 which was 122 percent of the median for all part-timers ($11,400)” (Statistics New Zealand 2006a, p. 14). While fulltime creative workers earned more than the median for other sectors (ibid). Also notable in Cultural Indicators was that most creative workers cluster in the large urban centres of Auckland and Wellington where there is a not only a concentration of audiences and creative industry firms but also the opportunities to find flexible work in cafes, bars, warehouses, and construction.

Incomes of creative industry workers, according to Statistics New Zealand’s Cultural Indicators (2006), also mirror the occupational features of a ‘U’ shaped labour market. Perhaps not surprisingly those at the bottom of New Zealand’s creative industry income hierarchy are at Bourdieu’s (1993) pole of ‘arts for art’s sake’ production: actors, painters and sculptors, and singers. Singers classified and counted by state data are the lowest paid of all creative occupations ($13,800) despite increasing royalty and sales returns (Shuker 2008). While instrumentalists – a category including classical musicians – receive a median income of $17,500 (Statistics New Zealand 2006a, p. 15). In contrast creative industry occupations at the upper end of the ‘U’ tended to be professionals such as project managers, architects, and broadcasting technicians. Such a feature reflects Bourdieu’s theorisation of the reconversion of institutionalised cultural capital such as credentials into economic capital. The middle-income bands of the creative industries were occupied by what Bourdieu (1984, p. 160) calls the semi-bourgeois occupations which are relatively unregulated by professional associations or credentials and are cultural capital-intensive: photographers, fashion designers, and landscape architects.

The reproduction of creative entrepreneurs’ labour power is also conditioned by state welfare policies. Esping-Andersen (1990) categorises New Zealand, along with Australia, Canada,
US and the UK, as a liberal welfare state. These nation-states, in the main, expect individuals to derive most, if not all, the economic capital necessary to reproduce their labour power from engagement with the market economy. In this context work provides economic independence and social inclusion and thus these states have, in general, only a few forms of targeted household transfers (in New Zealand primarily through Labour’s Working for Families tax credit scheme, see Humpage & Craig 2008). Yet problematising such a moral economy is the herding of welfare recipients and new workers into officially recognised employment for it is assumed low-paid “employment is an antidote to poverty” (McDaniel 2006, p. 799; Peck 2001b). However research by Baker and Tippin (2002, p. 354) suggests that as the formerly unemployed and recently credentialised are absorbed by the lower end of the ‘U’ these agents become the ‘working poor’: a pool of casualised, “flexible and exploitable workers who often can obtain only part-time and temporary jobs”. Moreover these jobs offer few opportunities to move to higher paying and higher skill occupations. Furthermore, increasing the supply of credentialised labour power does not resolve the working poor dilemma. Here labour market researchers Richardson and Miller-Lewis (2002, p. 64, 69) observe demand for labour does not rise to meet the increased supply of skilled labour and a downward occupation spiral sets in where the credentialised take lower skilled jobs.

**Slash-working**

Recalling Chapter Five the defining feature of artistic production – as opposed to technical or managerial work in the creative industries – is that creative labour markets are oversupplied with artists who overestimate their chances of commercial success in a highly risky industry (Caves 2000; Menger 1999; Throsby 1996). In order to manage the reproduction of labour power and creative production creative entrepreneurs often undertake multiple job holding at the lower end of the ‘U’. This double shift of ‘regular’ and ‘creative’ work is a recurrent

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34 In 2002 the multiple job holding segment of the overall labour force was calculated to be 4.4 percent (Department of Labour 2003, p. 28). The Department of Labour (2003, p. 28) comments on multiple job holding as an emerging livelihood strategy:

Some of these multiple job-holders enjoy the flexibility or increased earning potential. Yet, for others, holding down more than one job may not be a rewarding option: it may be the only option. Moreover, there may be some health issue tied up in this, like stress, fatigue and increased chance of injury.
theme in the sociological literature on creative work (Benhamou 2003; Menger 1999; McRobbie 1999, 2004; Osbourne, Warren, & McClintock 2006; Taylor, Baines & Newall 2004; Trowse 2001). Augmenting this literature Osbourne, Warren, and McClintock’s (2006, p. 11) research reveals how New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs undertake up to six part or flexi-time activities (paid and non-paid) around which they develop their creative career, concluding: “multiple job holding is a well established practice in the creative sector” (ibid). It has been suggested such multiple job holding is a strategy to “generate adequate levels of income for households, and that work is able to be accommodated around domestic responsibilities” (Spoonley & Davidson 2004, p. 29). For the adultscent creative entrepreneur unburdened by family commitments non-creative work is accommodated around creative production commitments (Tams 2002).

Such multiple job holding and its relationship to creative production has been colloquially referred to as ‘slash-working’. A young creative entrepreneur neatly summarises New Zealand’s ‘creative condition’ stating “everyone in Auckland is a slash something – waitress slash DJ” (Smith & Nippert 2005). By extrapolation: café worker slash songwriter; courier slash drummer; colour consultant slash painter; administrator slash jewellery designer, and so on. Moreover such ‘slash-working’ is not limited to artists at low levels of success. Luke Budda of the platinum selling Phoenix Foundation states: “I work in a café…imagine that, a musician working in a café!” (McLennan 2008, p. 26). While artist manager Campbell Smith notes the financial impact of digital file sharing on domestic artist incomes:

> My company manages 11 high-profile major New Zealand artists. Of those 11, eight have had to take day jobs to sustain themselves; they can’t survive off music. In the mid-90s, through to the end of the 90s, every artist that I managed survived off being a full-time musician (New Zealand Herald 2007b).

In another example a creative entrepreneur with multi-platinum sales and ANLPS funding notes how his band have taken up other means of sustaining their creative work:

> It’s still a struggle and … there are other things you have to supplement your income with generally speaking. We have good times and we have bad times but musicians get paid in unusual and weird ways. There is a lot of fuzzy mathematics involved in how
you get your money and it comes late or takes a long time to get it ... You never know when it’s going to turn up and it’s always a month or two later than you would have liked it to be. Then musicians aren’t exactly famous for their time management or money management skills otherwise they would all be accountants! So it is still a struggle but you can do it (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Other illuminating examples of the ‘slash-working’ and credentialised creative entrepreneur within New Zealand’s ‘arts and cultural revival’ come from the management magazine Employment Today. This observes homologous creative entrepreneurs including:

A double-degreed [sic] library assistant who chose his job because it allows him to concentrate on producing comics. An aspiring fashion designer who takes on office temping work to support her true interest, and to avoid unwanted stress (Bell 2006, p. 14).

Additional examples of ‘slash-working’ include “Marcus” who “has a decent job as a multimedia designer” but whose employer provides flexible hours providing an “ideal situation for him as it allows him to pursue his preferred vocation as a guitarist in two bands” (ibid, p. 16). There is also “Dan” a musician accruing the symbolic capital of media recognition through his self-financed and self-produced recordings by working labouring and translating jobs (ibid). Notably such statements render problematic Shuker’s (2007, p. 27) bold claim that since Labour increased music funding and support “musicians can make a living from their music”.

Statistics New Zealand’s (2006) Cultural Indicators provides further evidence of ‘slash-working’. This report suggests that as an occupational group musicians are likely to hold multiple jobs if part-time creative work assumes part-time work in another sector. Cultural Indicators (2006, p. 9) observes:

Some occupations were characterised by particularly high proportions of part-timers, including instrumentalists (60 percent), clowns, magicians, acrobats and related workers (59 percent), singers (55 percent), actors (38 percent), sculptors, painters and related artists (35 percent) and authors and critics (34 percent).
Yet there remains statistical uncertainty over the scope of this multiple job holding, ‘slash-working’, due to data collection methods (Spoonley & Davidson 2004). As Taylor, Baines and Newall (2004) suggest official statistics tend to underestimate the multiple job-holding figures due to legal issues such as disclosure of taxable income. In a further twist to the state’s positivistic data collection and classificatory schemas café workers – the archetypal service worker – often state their main occupation as something other than café worker: artist perhaps? (Taylor, Baines, & Newall 2004, p. 123).

If supply-sidism, expanded state supports, and creative industry education have reduced the ‘wailing’ aspect of local musicians, arguably many remain homologous ‘factory hands’ in the post-industrial service economy. This nonetheless has advantages as the flexibility of contract or service sector work allows time for creative pursuits (McRobbie 2002). Domestic labour market researchers Inkson and Alach (2004, p. 135) argue this is because artists’ ‘regular’ work is “an appropriate counterpart to ... major artistic ... pursuits ... central to their identity and self esteem”. So too do aspiring pop producers, as an artist with self-released recordings and tours but no ANLPS support comments:

I’m pretty lucky. [Another band member] works there as well and we’re really lucky to have a cool boss who, if we do take time off and give him enough warning, is like ‘cool, no worries, sweet’ – like time off for gigs and going on tour. Since we’ve been there it’s added up two months of doing shows and touring. It’s pretty good being able to come back to jobs … and being able to pay for drumsticks. Y’know stuff like that. The only reason I’m still at that job is that they are so cool with me going away. Y’know the only reason I am there is because of the band. (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006)

‘Slash-working’ also provides important economic capital for investment in producing pop commodities and thus symbolic capital necessary to access ANLPS support and ‘tastemaker’ interest. A domestic pop producer describes this interdependence of ‘regular’ work and creative production:
We all work part-time somehow. I work at [a restaurant] and so does Marty but we only work 25 or so hours per week on typical part-time wages and so it’s not that much money. I have been working my whole life at the same time as doing music and busking as well so I have saved up a good amount of money. So the three hundred or whatever dollars I earn a week get spent on my general spending – rent, food, cigarettes, alcohol – but I try to save some of the money. I am relying on the money I have saved so when it comes to spending for the next single [we split the costs] (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006)

Although creative entrepreneurs can be seen as having a few different jobs or engaged in flexible work to stitch together an income it is creative work – and thus creative identity – that is often recounted as of primary importance. Another pop producer recounts how the subordination of immediate access to economic capital allows him to engage in the capital swapping necessary to construct himself as a ‘subject of value’:

I’ll use the guitar in any way I possibly can from teaching. I don’t try to promote myself as a teacher too much because I don’t want to get stuck with a lot of students ... I would rather have less money and be more creative and have time working on other people’s music or my music and pursue that creative goal of being a producer, or composer, or whatever (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Also of note within this experience of the creative condition is how the ‘slash-working’ pop producer often engages in a ‘double shift’: albeit a second ‘creative’ shift often without pay. Here the field of pop production dictates a necessary blurring of work and leisure in the processes of ‘origination’. For example in the week the interview was conducted a pop producer’s ‘slash-working’ included:

Unfortunately a lot of the time is working. But say in the last week just been: Work Monday day, Monday night went to [music television station] for an interview. Tuesday day work, Tuesday night band practice. Wednesday day work, and then Wednesday night band practice with my other band. Thursday work and then a gig, Friday day work and then there is a party. Saturday all day is band practice and then
another party and then Sunday is rehearsal with my other band in the afternoon (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Yet creative entrepreneurs’ labour power reproduction is not always left solely to the market. Although Labour maintained a liberal welfare state emphasis on agents’ labour market engagement it has also offered a form of artistic ‘workfare’ (Peck 2001b): the ‘Pathways to Arts and Cultural Employment’ (PACE). PACE is also another example of creative industry policy transfer and has similar intents to New Labour’s UK equivalent the ‘new deal for musicians’ (Cloonan 2002, see also Chapter Three). While these affinities and policy networks cannot be discussed in detail here, the stated aim of the PACE programme was: “to assist job seekers willing and able to pursue a career in the arts and creative industries to move towards sustainable employment and self-sufficiency” (Work and Income 2008).

PACE is a 24 month time-limited income subsidy for artisans seeking to create a fulltime creative industry occupation or small scale business and involves informal training and monitoring by welfare agency Work and Income. Shuker (2008, p. 278) proposes “it is difficult to document precisely, [but] anecdotal evidence shows that a number of local musicians have used” PACE, including five of the interview subjects in this research. A creative entrepreneur recounts his experience of PACE as workfare, stating it was:

Helpful because it was suited to people who needed that little kick and what wanted to try and have a crack, ‘cos no one wants to be on the benefit because you get so much shit [from Work and Income] and also it’s fuck-all money anyway. It’s just that little extra to keep you afloat because that 30 or 40 dollars makes all the difference a week. Well 100 dollars makes a difference a week.

When the PACE programme started in 2001 approximately 2,500 artists registered (Barker 2002; Manson 2001). Not surprisingly right wing politicians immediately attacked PACE as largesse. Rising to its defence was the Associate Social Services and Employment Minister Rick Barker (2002) who asserted “the pathway to a career in the arts is not as clear-cut as someone wanting to become a builder or electrician, but why should artists be denied the chance to excel in their chosen field?” However, like most liberal welfare state programmes, the intention of PACE is to eventually insert recipients into the socially inclusive (creative) labour market. Yet the state evidence suggests most agents, on completion of the PACE
programme, enter the labour market in ‘non-creative’ occupations (Barker 2002). Nevertheless, there are ‘success stories’ as a pop producer with ANLPS assisted platinum sales recounts:

I basically needed someone to prop me up while I was off chasing this crazy dream. And y’know the more time you can put into it the better, obviously. So yeah, I worked just enough hours at this café as well earning what I was allowed to earn when I was on the PACE programme for two years until I earned enough to get off it. And I was so excited when I called them up: ‘Yo, I don’t have to be on the PACE programme anymore’ and I wanted them to blow some whistles and have a party but they were like [puts on dour voice] ‘what’s the name of your employer’ and I’m like ‘I’m not really employed but I’ve got a band and it’s making enough money so I don’t have to be on it’. I was so excited because I felt like it worked. I felt it was important because money is a very distracting thing, even now it’s a distracting thing because it distracts you in many cases from what you are meant to be doing with your life and if you feel like I know we do, what we’re meant to be doing is writing songs and getting better. It’s tricky when you’re just trying to survive (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

Theorising the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie

The preceding peripatetic description of the ‘creative condition’ concurrent with the pop renaissance reiterates a common theme in research on creative industry work practices: the combining of artistic production with flexible livelihood strategies to pay the bills (Ellmeier 2003; Entwistle 2002; Meneger 1999; McRobbie 1999, 2004; Neff, Wissinger, & Zukin 2005). Building on this descriptive material it is now possible to go some way towards forming a sociological analysis of the creative entrepreneur in New Zealand’s ‘after neo-liberal’ context. This section considers how Bourdieu’s new petit bourgeoisie and social trajectories concepts can be used to analyse popular music policy as social policy.

Turning to Bourdieu adds a new dimension to New Zealand-based studies of cultural production. Researchers theorising New Zealand’s ‘arts and cultural’ revival and the neoliberalisation of youth identities have tended to draw on the governmentality literature
(Lewis, Larner, & Le Heron 2008; Larner, Molloy, & Goodrum 2007; Nairn & Higgins 2006). This literature readily notes the affinities between neo-liberalism and entrepreneurial subjects, and how agents craft their subjectivities within the discourses of freedom, choice, and empowerment (Larner 2003, p. 511; Nairn & Higgins 2006). However this governmentality approach is often recognised as being prone to a ‘top-down’ view of power and so is useful in examining “the creation of subject positions, but not that of acting subjects” (Larner 2003, p. 511). Concurrently some descriptions of creative work celebrate the identity investments and personalised negotiations contemporary artisans make within labour markets (Inkson & Alach 2004; Luckman 2007; Shorthouse & Strange 2004; Vaughn 2005). In *Employment Today* Bell (2006, p.15), for example, uses the euphemistic and common sense language of career ‘low flying’ to describe the creative entrepreneur as ‘happily under-employed’ as they come to reject (some of the) “the pressures and stress which come with the life of a career slave” (ibid). Yet such interpretations downplay the ways the lifestyles of the (relatively) poor and (relatively) obscure are also a “practical expression of the symbolic dimensions of class relations” that are produced in relation to particular political-economic and institutional contexts (Swartz 1997, p. 163). To add a new interpretation somewhere between existing governmentality and agency privileging identity accounts I want to approach New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs through Bourdieu. Such an approach, as discussed below, directs attention to the personal social struggles youthful creative entrepreneurs bring to the ‘arts and cultural revival’.

**Bourdieu, social class, and social trajectories**

Class is a persistently debated and often maligned concept in the social sciences. Like any concept its fluid definitions, epistemological foundations, and conceptual boundaries are a source of constant deliberation (Olin Wright 2005, Skeggs 2004). As leading class researcher Goldthorpe (1995, p. 314) notes the persistent conceptual “slippage between accepted practice – as indeed is likely to occur in any kind of empirical research – cannot be avoided”, but this does not necessarily preclude the analytical utility of the class concept. As a concept social class – and thus hierarchically ordered social stratification – has a close analytical association with Marxian political economy, discourses of exploitation, and deterministic institutional and social structures. These features see the social class concept criticised by some cultural studies academics, pluralist theorists, and neo-liberal commentators who adopt
more idealistic and agency privileging interpretations of human action and subjectivity (Harvey 2005). But despite these cultural critiques the abstract category:

Social class, alongside gender and race remains one of the most powerful factors in the shaping of our lives and dealing out ‘life chances’ [and notably] ... the work we do ... has been the backbone of stratification schemes since the 1950s” (Walkerdine, Lucey, & Melody 2004, p. 99).

In general sociologists enter class analysis through two broad theoretical positions. Firstly, the neo-Weberian strand which places an analytical emphasis on the individual, their life chances in relation to the distribution of resources through the market economy, and their culturally conferred status (Breen 2005, p. 32). Recent notable theorists from this perspective are Giddens (1991) and Beck (1992) who both place a reflexive, choosing (middle class?) individual at the centre of their arguments. Although both were writing in the intellectual climate of post-communist ‘end of history’ and the academy’s cultural turn, by approaching class from a neo-Weberian position they came to emphasise cultural and status aspects. In this perspective agents’ consumption and identity construction is relatively autonomous from income earning opportunities in the market (Savage 2000). Secondly, Marxian inspired theorisations see class as an agents’ objective structural relationship over-determined by capitalism, exploitation, and antagonistic interests: the extraction of surplus value or profit from the working class by the capitalist class (Sorensen 2005, p. 119). However recent neo-Marxian approaches to class are increasingly reflexive. These suggest an analytical refocusing from an historical emphasis on exploitation [“a causal connection between advantage and disadvantage” (Sorensen 2005, p. 120)] to a position that understands labour as being “based on the knowing self who rents out his or her labour” (Skeggs 2004, p. 66). In this theoretical stream Olin Wright (1985) and Sorensen (2000) see labour power as an asset in the market economy so that rather than an exploited proletariat the reflexive agent consciously and rationally sells their labour power.

Bourdieu’s class schema conveys a synthesis of Marx’s emphasis on the material power of the economic and Weber’s stress on status and identity. As Chapter Two introduced, Bourdieu’s (1984) class schema positions agents in social space through their relationship to three vital components: their volumes of economic capital and cultural capital, their relative
holdings of these capitals, and social trajectories. Firstly, on a vertical scale an agent is positioned in relation to their volume of economic and cultural capital. In some respects this reflects an occupation/income hierarchy with professions at the top and manual labourers at the bottom and replays the durable Marxian relationship between the dominant and dominated in the economic domain (Wacquant 1998, p. 224; Weininger 2005). Secondly, on the horizontal opposition, the social contest is between relative values of cultural and economic capitals and “is the source of differences in dispositions” and lifestyles (Bourdieu 1998b, p. 7). Here agents are positioned in relation to each other through their contests over cultural capital with the “dominant faction of the dominant class” – business owners and managers who hold economic but comparatively little cultural capital – pitted against the cultural intelligentsia in struggles over appropriate taste and the markers of social status (Wacquant 1998, p. 224; Weininger 2005). For Bourdieu (1998b, p5-7) this roughly translates into political differences between the left and the right. Thirdly, it is through this uneven topography of social space that agents struggle to maintain or improve their status and economic incomes. This process occurs as “individuals and families continually strive to maintain or improve their position in social space by pursing strategies of reconversion whereby they transmute or exchange one species of capital for another” (Wacquant 1998, p. 224). Bourdieu (1984, p. 125) calls this deployment of agents’ alternative forms of capital in these status and incomes struggles “reconversion strategies”.

Bourdieu (1984, p. 128-129) sees the primary social struggle of agents as the pursuit – and securing – of a position in social space: what he calls an agent’s or group’s social trajectory upward, downward or stagnant. There exist institutional dimensions to social trajectories. Noticeably the reconversion rate of alternative capitals is regulated through the combined factors of access to “education credentials, the labour market, and inheritance laws as each class faction seeks to impose the hierarchy of capital most favourable to its own endowment” (Wacquant 1998, p. 224, see also Weininger 2005, p. 123). Furthermore as Jenkins (2002, p. 143) notes the “notion of social trajectories – ideal typical in the case of collectivities and categories, to some extent empirical for individuals – is of importance to Bourdieu’s understanding of class”. Social trajectories and reconversion strategies are also a way, as we will see below, of interpreting music policy as a form of social policy.
Overall these reconversion strategies are pursued in order to maintain or advance an individual, family, or group’s social position over time while holding off the spectre of a downward social trajectory (seen as either occupational or cultural capital devaluation). Class theorist Olin Wright (2005, p. 1) confers with this theoretical assessment noting agents are acutely aware of how class position – as a combination of cultural and economic capital – is intimately linked with “social status, esteem, and respect; to be “reclassified” down the hierarchy is seen as demeaning”. More significantly for the creative entrepreneur are how struggles over the construction of a positive or upward social trajectory are “nowhere more apparent than in the middle ranks of the system, the petite bourgeoisie” (Jenkins 2002, p. 142).

**Bourdieu’s new petit bourgeoisie**

Bourdieu’s account of the new petit bourgeoisie builds upon earlier theories of this class faction. Marx and Engels (1955) are arguably the initial theorists of the petit bourgeoisie in recognising a social group occupying a contradictory position between bourgeois industrialists, financiers, executives, professors and the proletariat of trades, manual workers, and farm labourers (Weininger 2005, p. 123). Between these two great classes is “the petty bourgeoisie [who] also own the means of production, but within simple commodity production they control their own labour activities and do not exploit labour” (Boreham et al 1989, p. 78). Small shopkeepers, trades people and self-employed artisans are the archetypes of what has been called the ‘uneasy stratum’ (Bechhofer & Elliot 1981).

By the 1960s and 1970s the unfolding of bureaucratised Fordist and welfare state capitalism saw radical sociologists reconceptualise the petit bourgeoisie. Adding the ‘new’ appellation they sought to account for the growing middle strata of white collar state and private sector bureaucrats, managers and professionals who occupied another contradictory position in the Marxist schema: these agents were neither raw, industrial, labour power but still somewhat dominated in their work, for although receiving relatively high salaries they were not owners of firms (Goldthorpe 1980). At this time neo-Marxist conceptualisations broadly considered how this new petit bourgeoisie functioned as a class of cultural mediators and ideological legitimaters by “helping to bring workers to accept powerless positions because of their (socially) promoted ignorance” (Ross 1978, p. 173, see also Poulantzas 1979; Olin Wright
In these neo-Marxist theorisations the new petit bourgeois was analytically demarcated from other social classes by significant investments in education “but also [by] a degree of culture which allows him [sic] to see himself as different from, and superior to, the worker” (Ross 1978, p. 173). Furthermore this new petit bourgeois faction was understood as prioritising occupational careers for it held a strong belief in meritocracy, consequently making “the [new] petit bourgeoisie even more individualistic and competitive” (ibid). As discussed below, such accounts of the new petit bourgeoisie as educated and competitive were subsequently incorporated into Bourdieu’s conceptualisations; possibly because they were formulated in the same intellectual climate.

Bourdieu (1984) has a somewhat different conceptualisation of the new petit bourgeoisie. He sees this as a class comprised primarily of agents entering – and creating – the cultural occupations within the increasing culturalisation of late capitalism (Featherstone 1991, Lash & Urry 1994, Scott 1997). Although based on research completed in 1960s and 1970s France Bourdieu’s theorisation of the new petit bourgeoisie resonates with the experiences of New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs. Consider how the preceding accounts of pop producers align with Bourdieu’s (1984, p. 141) observation of the new petit bourgeoisie as:

All those vendors of cultural goods and services seeking to prolong the fusion of leisure and work … [using] their ambiguous occupations … as a way of obtaining the best return on cultural capital in which technical competence is less important than … a mastery of the signs and emblems of distinction and taste.

Contemporary examples of Bourdieu’s new petit bourgeoisie include not only the bohemian artistic occupations – painter, actor, writer, musician – but, by extension, contemporary cultural occupations such as media pluggers, landscape gardeners, fashion designers, colour consultants, DJs, computer game testers and so forth. According to Swartz (1997, p. 180) this class group tends “to be younger, investing in education credentials over social origins, and moving into the rapidly growing sector of new culturally intensive operations”. Or, in the more prosaic language of Leadbeatter and Oakley (1999, p. 41), “the cultural industries are fashionable sectors with low barriers that attract young entrepreneurs”. Importantly these ‘creative’ occupations and pursuits allow agents greater scope in improvising reconversion strategies using the alternative forms of capital and, thus, their pursuit of a social trajectory
Accordingly the fields of cultural production – such as popular music – are attractive for they are:

Intensive yet relatively unregulated or standardised, specialising in the production of symbolic goods and services. They permit the maximum of “cultural pretension” since they do not represent types of knowledge with well-established standards through professionalisation and education. [Such agents] are on a social trajectory to become the “new taste makers” of the art of consuming, spending, and enjoying (Swartz 1997, p. 160, see also Bourdieu 1984, p. 155).

Nevertheless the new petit bourgeoisie remain an ‘uneasy stratum’ incessantly struggling to valorise the cultural capital of new sights, sounds, fashions, and consumer sensations in order to produce “new [self-employed] occupations more closely aligned to their pretensions” and desired social trajectory (Bourdieu 1984, p. 150). Consequently Bourdieu sees creative pursuits as a refuge for “those sons and daughters of the middle and working classes who have not obtained the rewards which their academic qualifications would have guaranteed in an earlier state of the market” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 150). In this interpretation Bourdieu is probably considering arts and humanities graduates rather than specific tertiary creative industry courses. Nevertheless the social consequence is the same. Undercut by market realities these new petit bourgeois agents “are likely to settle into subordinated spaces within the institutions of cultural production and exchange” (Bernstein 2007, p. 477). This is arguably because such work allows for “maintaining vagueness in the images of the present and future of one’s position” in social space (Bourdieu 1984, p. 156). However this is not to accept defeat over the pursuit of a social trajectory. As Bourdieu (1984, p. 180) notes these youthful agents’ habitus disposes an “optimistic progressivism’ towards their future chances in the modern world”, as a pop producer recounts:

I enjoy myself, I have a good lifestyle. You get low and think what am I doing sometimes but then you do that anywhere. It’s the feeling for me of being in control of my own destiny. Really in control which is good and I sort of believe that like anything else you put time in and work hard at it you will have results. It’s not so much of lottery, but for someone like me I’ve still got to prove that on a small scale over the next couple of years (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).
Contemporary new petit bourgeoisie literature

The literature building on Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the new petit bourgeoisie has developed in two directions. Firstly, scholars have used the new petit bourgeoisie to analyse occupational roles in contemporary consumer capitalism, most notably cultural intermediaries. Secondly, there are studies of the new petit bourgeois disposition towards life which emphasises the ethic of “pleasure as duty” (Nixon & du Gay 2002, p. 497). Both are relevant to re-thinking New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs as a faction of the new petit bourgeoisie and to understanding Labour’s music policy as social policy.

A recurring theme in studies of cultural production is the equation of the new petit bourgeoisie with what Bourdieu (1984, p. 359) called the ‘new cultural intermediaries’. This phrase was originally intended to “refer to a new type of new petit bourgeois profession associated with cultural commentary in the mass media” (Hesmondhalgh 2006, p. 226). The literature extending this conceptualisation has evolved from research on the cultural industries in the core economies. Featherstone (1991, p. 21) suggests the new petit bourgeoisie is a “fraction within the new middle class, the cultural specialists and intermediaries”. Lash and Urry (1987) describe the new petit bourgeoisie as agents working in the new service class and includes “those [professionals and managers?] in media, design, fashion, advertising, and ‘para’ intellectual information occupations” whose jobs entail performing “services, marketing and dissemination of symbolic goods” (Featherstone 1991, p. 19; Felski 2000, p. 42). Negus (2002, p. 503) aligns the new petit bourgeoisie to the cultural intermediary: “the suits’ in-between creative artists and consumers, and who work at a point of connection and articulation between production and consumption”. Many of these scholars note the contemporary expansion of creative industry occupations, with Negus (2002, p. 502) arguing this new petit bourgeois group “has grown in size and influence since the middle of the twentieth century”. While Nixon and Du Gay (2002, p. 497) observe how the contemporary usage of the new petit bourgeoisie is used “to capture ... changes in social structure that have undeniably seen an expansion of the ‘social middle’”.

There is, however, noticeable conceptual slippage between the uses of the new cultural intermediaries and the new petit bourgeoisie. Hesmondhalgh (2006, p. 226-227) asserts that
the main writers on cultural intermediaries – Negus (1992, 2002), Nixon (1997), Featherstone (1991) – have conflated the cultural intermediary occupations with the new petit bourgeoisie as a whole. Hesmondhalgh (2006, p. 226) also notes that by equating the occupations involved in producing (mass?) symbolic goods – the advertising executives, record label A&R representatives, cultural facilitators – with the new petit bourgeoisie therefore only captures “a small sub-set of that class”. For example, an advertising executive on a salary of 70,000 pounds sterling, stock options, and a cocaine habit can hardly be considered ‘small’ or even ‘middling’ (Thornton 1999). Considering the ‘slash-working’ creative entrepreneur can also be seen as a faction of the new petit bourgeoisie this existing conceptualisation is somewhat partial, and, for the purpose of analysing popular music as social policy, unsatisfactory.

The second conceptual iteration of Bourdieu’s new petit bourgeoisie directs analytical attention to styles of life and the “morality of pleasure as duty” of its members (Nixon & du Gay 2002, p. 497). Featherstone (1991, p. 21) sees the new petit bourgeoisie, through their position in the processes of cultural production, as persistently inventing and “suggesting alternative pleasures and desires, consumption as waste, excess, and disorder”. Examples of new petit bourgeois lifestyles include regular recreational and designer drug use, loud music, avant-garde fashion, and all manner of ludic pleasures. Such a “more hedonistic and expressive lifestyle” is, as one researcher observes, “heavily reliant on credit” (Felski 2000, p. 42). By embracing the pursuit of pleasure the new petit bourgeois agent comes to reject the old petit bourgeoisie values of sobriety and thrift and thus see social failure in terms of the inability to have fun (Bernstein 2007, p. 477).

In seeking to enter fields of cultural production the new petit bourgeois agent is provided the opportunity to, in part, conduct a negotiated performance of pleasure, freedom and fun. Such an inclination to an “emancipatory life” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 370) sees the new petit bourgeoisie blur work and leisure, and attempt to create a “‘practical utopia’ through experimental combinations of economic and cultural practice” (Banks 2006, p. 458, see also Bernstein 2007, Taylor 2005). Concurrent with this mostly pleasurable struggle is the more serious project of constructing a social trajectory through reconversion strategies. Recalling Chapter Five’s analysis of creative entrepreneurs and symbolic capital accumulation in the
domestic pop field, a pop producer recounts the intersections of this pleasure ethic with his music career:

I just love sleeping on people’s floors and things like that. Y’know you get to go away on tour with your best friends, play music, party, and travel. I love it. It is my passion (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006).

How then can the existing conceptualisations of the new petit bourgeoisie be more productively aligned with the substantive experiences of New Zealand’s creative entrepreneur? This, it is suggested, requires a re-consideration of the creative entrepreneur ‘from below’ to assess their relationship to economic capital and their pursuit of a social trajectory. Negus (2002, p. 503) intimates such an approach proposing the new petit bourgeois “faction implies a certain meeting or point of connection between the disaffected, educated, bohemian middle class and the upwardly mobile, newly educated working class”. This statement acknowledges how the new petit bourgeoisie has been recognised in relation to the evolving post-industrial and flexibilised work practices of contemporary capitalism. Yet this approach requires further theoretical elaboration for previous new petit bourgeoisie scholars tended not to examine the interrelations between the creative entrepreneurial faction and economic capital. This aspect requires redressing considering the “major sociological pre-occupation of the 21st century [is] the intersection of agency with rapid, often global, structural change in markets and the ways livings are made” (McDaniel 2006, p. 796, author’s emphasis).

**The creative entrepreneur as subaltern new petit bourgeoisie**

To develop an analysis of popular music as social policy the pivotal congruence in re-conceptualising the new petit bourgeoisie – pop producer = ‘slash working’ creative entrepreneur *sans* economic capital = faction of the new petit bourgeoisie – requires elaboration. Bourdieu and other scholars can be observed to have placed a greater emphasis on the improvised cultural dimensions of new petit bourgeois occupations. But when viewed in light of the creative entrepreneur’s economically dominated position in the ‘U’ shaped labour market *and* culturally dominated position in the creative industries it could be
suggested – at the risk of syncretism – that the ‘swarm’ of creative entrepreneurs could be conceptualised as the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie.

The subaltern approach has various uses in the critical social sciences. Its intellectual history can be traced to Antonio Gramsci (1992) who uses the militaristic term subaltern to refer to “positions of sub-ordination or lower status” and “social groups or classes” who are subordinate to “a ruling group’s policies or initiatives” (Green 2002, p. 2). The conceptual use of the subaltern gained further critical inspiration from E.P. Thompson’s (1968) *The Making of the English Working Class* which developed a social history ‘from below’. In more contemporary application the subaltern is an organising theme for Indian post-colonial scholars. This work seeks to “rectify ... colonial elitism, and bourgeois nationalist” histories of Southern Asia by making visible the heterogeneous voices and concerns of peasants: those often marginalised in official, technocratic discourses (Ludden 2002, p. 15).

New Zealand’s creative entrepreneur can perhaps be best understood ‘from below’ as the subaltern faction of the new petit bourgeoisie. Specifically, such a conceptualisation stresses how as a group creative entrepreneurs are social agents who are, for the most part, subordinate to both ANLPS programmes and the directives of private sector cultural intermediaries (these agents comprise what could be called the elite or dominant faction of the new petit bourgeoisie). Also important is how the ‘slash-working’ creative entrepreneur, in great part, occupies a subaltern position at the lower end of the ‘U’ shaped labour market. These agents possess relatively fewer economic capital resources and yet to be reconverted, field specific, cultural capital.

Nevertheless, although subordinate to the institutional and substantive parameters of the neoliberalised labour market the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie faction maintains many elements of Bourdieu’s conceptualisation: the pursuit of pleasure; seeking to construct creative occupations that offer the opportunity for cultural capital to be deployed to maximum effect; and a faith in credentials and human agency in constructing a ‘creative’ self. Hence the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie concept is useful for abstractly capturing the contradictions embodied in adultscent agents who seek to produce a reconversion strategy and a social trajectory via the creative industries: an industry grouping that requires a steady
supply of young, unattached entrepreneurial agents who, in turn, sustain their *illusio* through multiple-job holding.

In turn it can be suggested the somewhat ‘dull compulsion’ of the ‘U’ shaped labour market objectively encountered by New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs becomes subsumed to, and managed through, the stylisation of life. This stylisation serves as a symbolic rehabilitation of subaltern new petit bourgeois (temporary? potential?) social position in relation to the “adult commitments”, most notably the accumulation of economic capital (Thornton 1997, p.103). Therefore by acting as a creative entrepreneur this becomes, at times, “a principled rejection of the base temptations of pecuniary logic” (Jenkins 2002, p. xiii). Understood in this way the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie display a partial “renunciation or disinvestment” of the dominant social order allowing them to reconcile their material position in social space and “make do with what they have” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 110-111). Hence according to Bourdieu (1984, p. 366), at his most penetrating but least scientific his new petit bourgeoisie, like New Zealand’s subaltern faction, are:

> Obliged to live out the contradiction between their messianic aspirations and the reality of their practice, to cultivate uncertainty as to their social identity in order to be able to accept it and therefore condemned to a questioning of the world which masks an anxious self-questioning.

Nevertheless it would be too soon to suggest such fraught and indeterminate social positions are uncritically accepted, or resigned to, by subaltern new petit bourgeois agents. This is because agents’ entry into fields of cultural production remains animated by an *illusio* in the rewards of creative work and the haunting of a possible downward social trajectory. Such cognate motivations and investments anchor the ‘slash-working’ creative entrepreneur in, according to Bourdieu (1984, p. 150), a symbolic limbo. Here a waiter’s potential social trajectory is that of jet-setting DJ, the warehouse worker is ready to ‘rock’ the world given the lucky break, the administrative assistant is preparing – after ‘work’ – a piece of jewellery for entry in a competition that will confer symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu (1984, p. 150) this means:
Flying above his [sic] real trajectory like a projectile carried on by its own inertia, describes an ideal trajectory that is no less real, or is at any rate in no way imaginary in the ordinary sense of the word. This impossible objective potentiality, inscribed at the deepest level of their disposition as a blighted hope or frustrated promise.

Empirically pop producers’ statements uphold Bourdieu’s insight. For example; “I would like to make it and playing music would be ‘it’ but I guess now I can be happy doing other things if I wanted but I will always be playing music” (Key Creative Entrepreneur Informant Interview 2006). Or, “if I ever find out I can do music full-time, I would give up my job in a second” (Bell 2006, p. 16). Therefore Bourdieu’s (1984, p. 155) theorisations may be a way of understanding how subaltern new petit bourgeois agents psychologically manage the “indeterminate futures” offered by creative ‘slash-working’ and ANLPS support, allowing them to reconcile their social position as identity and making it:

Possible to treat the present as a sort of endlessly renewed provisional status and to regard one’s ‘station’ as an accidental detour, like the painter who works in advertising but continues to consider himself [sic] a ‘true’ artist and insists that this mercenary trade is only a temporary expedient that he will abandon as soon as he has put by enough money to be independent.

However, this is Bourdieu observing an elite new petit bourgeois occupation in Fordist, state-welfarist, leftist, 1970s Paris. It is plausible New Zealand’s ‘slash-working’ wages or returns from cultural production do not generate enough economic capital for the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie to gain independent means. That is, to place the all too real pressures of the market economy (rent, food, bills) temporarily at bay. For Bourdieu (1984, p. 156) new petit bourgeois social trajectories are performed by “maintaining vagueness in the images of the present and future of one’s position [and] is a way of accepting limits”. Therefore credentialised creative entrepreneurs often come to “bank on possible futures which do not really exist for them; but it is also the reason why they do not truly accept the objective reality of their position and qualifications” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 155). In this context the fluidity and indeterminacy offered by creative entrepreneurship and ‘slash-working’ – and the general belief creative work is undertaken on the new petit bourgeois agent’s own terms –
sees such identity investments as a way of presenting the image of an upward social trajectory: the artists’ next project or ‘break’ is always before them.

Faced with uncertainty in the labour market and the fields of cultural production it could be argued the subaltern new petit bourgeois “continuously [transform] necessities into strategies, constraints into preferences … the set of ‘choices’ constituting lifestyles” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 175). Bourdieu (1984, 1993) and Thornton (1997, p. 102-103) assess the allure of creative pursuits as these ‘ill-defined’ occupations offer unceasing lifestyle improvisation that permit a “reprieve from necessity”. In other words, adultscent agents drawn to the creative industries often deny – for they are denied – economic and market power and by doing so “avoid acknowledging” material limits, which is also “a way of refusing them” (Bourdieu 1984, p. 156). However this is again only one reading of creative entrepreneur as counter cultural subject in a particular historical and geographic context. In contrast, within New Zealand’s ‘after neo-liberal’ milieu of the state enabled ‘arts and cultural revival’ youth identity, music, fashion, and leisure are more than ends in themselves. Instead these expressions of embodied and objectified cultural capital become the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie’s primary resources in their reconversion strategies. Hence the pursuit of an upward social trajectory is the real – although rarely acknowledged – animating force for many subaltern new petit bourgeoisie agents seeking to enter the creative industries.

**Music policy as social policy**

Considering these theorised dimensions of the creative entrepreneur as a subaltern new petit bourgeois agent, how then can New Zealand’s popular music policy be understood as a form of social inclusion policy? Four aspects are relevant here. Firstly, as McRobbie (2004) noted, in the UK the creative industries gained economic and employment significance as manufacturing declined. So too in New Zealand as the national economy is ‘hollowed out’ the creative industries became a celebrated policy domain for its promise to alleviate the pressing governmental concern of youth employment. Secondly, creative industry policies – from trade strategy to the enabling ANLPS to expanded creative industry credentialism – can be seen as performative: drawing forth the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie to be the burgeoning class of ‘our creative people’ (See Chapters One and Three). Thirdly, combining point’s one and two, New Zealand’s emerging subaltern new petit bourgeoisie is confronted
with what Sennett (2006, p. 27) calls the “prospect of drift” and are haunted by the “spectre of uselessness” at the lower end of the ‘U’ shaped labour market. Here creative pursuits offer symbolic rehabilitation of social position. Fourthly, while the ANLPS and Labour’s creative industry policy works with the competitive and individualised grain of the neo-liberalised market economy, these programmes expediently harness utopian images of popular culture and its seductive image of liberty, freedom and expression. Thus creative activities such as popular music become symbolic refuges for youthful agents to create a social trajectory through what Sennett (2006, p. 77) describes as the “moral prestige of cutting edge labour”.

With these aspects in mind Labour’s creative industry policies can be interpreted as channelling the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie’s incipient and already existing interest in the cultural occupations. Such cognate interests see the ANLPS enact social liberal thought by fashioning a mode of quasi-labour market social inclusion. Through these market-aligned state supports opportunities are created for youthful agents to reconvert their alternative capital into an upward social trajectory (Bourdieu 1998b p. 38). But when seen in this way it is not actually existing upward social trajectories that are important but the maintenance of the subaltern new petit bourgeois illusio that, in some way and at some point in time, state support may convert their alternative capital into a social trajectory represented by sales, honours or appointments. Of course this only works because the ANLPS actually succeeds in constituting commercially successful artists: Op Shop, Bic Runga, Shihad, Brooke Fraser, Black Seeds, Anika Moa, Mint Chicks, the Feelers, Nesian Mystic, P-Money, Scribe, Goodnight Nurse and so on.

Therefore the state supports can be seen to facilitate the subaltern new petit bourgeois pursuit of a social trajectory across two Bourdieussian dimensions. Firstly, there is potential vertical movement through occupational space. This can be seen as a positive trajectory via ANLPS assisted economic gains to a position as a commercially successful musician. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly considering the high rates of commercial failure, the ANLPS allows the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie to have a ‘transverse’ or horizontal movement where the cultural capital generated through their creative practice allows for the symbolic formation of a new lifestyle category as New Zealand’s creative people – albeit endlessly provisional and constructed with lower holdings of economic capital. Furthermore, and somewhat unintentionally, the ANLPS’s presence and influence on the field of pop
production allows those agents who reject its market logics to construct a social trajectory using cultural capital that is robustly defined through a denunciation of what state support for pop represents.

More importantly popular music as a mode of ‘after neo-liberal’ social inclusion in the market economy retains a striking affinity with the pyramid structure of Fordist era bureaucracies. The post-war embedded liberal capitalism (Ruggie 1982) included agents and supplied meaning and security in stable bureaucratic structures and a welfare state. As Sennett (2006, p. 30) notes “structures of this sort can become obese for the sake of social inclusion”. Under this logic the inclusion of agents in the pyramid becomes privileged over ‘rational’ economic efficiency: for the Keynesian Welfare State then so too for the ‘after neo-liberal’ state. Therefore the perverse and unintended consequence of Labour’s popular music policy and programmes is to reproduce the pyramid structure of the welfare state, albeit transposed into a tumescent ‘swarm’ of aspiring subaltern new petit bourgeois agents drawn forth by state incentivising. The ANLPS also perversely harnesses the existing logics of the music industry – the need for a large and incessant supply of contenders – and thus allows evermore less-powerful people to become included and given a place in a hierarchy (Sennett 2006, p. 30). Consequently, the ANLPS transmogrifies the pyramid structure into a potentially ever expanding form of social inclusion and meaning making – and all for a relatively small entry in the national Budget (Sennett 2006, p. 30).

The ANLPS then, in a somewhat distal way, can then be seen to be fabricating the pop renaissance as an ‘after neo-liberal’ response to the social dislocations caused by earlier reforms. This is because, for Sennett (2006, p. 30), social inclusion is also pacification; “the avoidance of strife by giving everyone a place”. Here it could be suggested this occurs through the ANLPS encouraging the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie to seek a place in the pop renaissance, and discouraging concerns over the dull political-economic realities of the labour market to which the fiscally disciplined and globally monitored state has few practical options in addressing. Therefore popular music as an aspect of the enabling ‘after neo-liberal’ state is, in great part, enabling subaltern new petit bourgeois agents to form social and cultural reconciliations with New Zealand’s market economy.
Conclusion

This chapter has sought to illuminate how New Zealand’s pop renaissance can be interpreted as a form of social policy. Starting from ‘after neo-liberal’ social inclusion discourses the realities of the ‘creative condition’ – credentialism, ‘U’ shaped labour markets, and ‘slash working’ – underpinning the pop renaissance were discussed. These features were then analysed through Bourdieu’s concepts of the new petit bourgeoisie and social trajectories, noting how the creative entrepreneur can be considered as a subaltern faction of the new petit bourgeoisie due to their dominated position in labour markets and the field of pop production.

Bringing these empirical and theoretical aspects together it was argued the ANLPS and Labour’s creative industry policies formed a mode of social inclusion through a market-affined and potentially ever-expanding pyramid structure that draws on existing creative industry logics and agents’ pre-existing desires. This feature of the pop renaissance offers the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie opportunities to reconvert their alternative capital into a state assisted social trajectory.

Clearly such a mode of social inclusion is precarious. Labour’s ‘after neo-liberal’ institutionalisation of the pop renaissance depends on a state ‘institutional ecology’ to form a market for domestic sounds. Moreover the effectiveness of these institutional alignments in raising incomes and ‘economic transformation’ remains uncertain: undercut as the recording industry is by ‘creative destruction’; the persistent competitive structure of the music industry that creates more losers than winners; and a small (but expanding) domestic market. Therefore it could be argued that even though the ANLPS has created the symbolic capital of a pop renaissance its music policies are thin, improvised, and politically circumscribed supply-side interventions incapable of addressing New Zealand’s structural inequalities.
Chapter Seven: Governance through culture

This concluding chapter has three sections. Firstly the findings to the focus questions guiding this research on New Zealand’s pop renaissance are reviewed. Secondly the methodological and analytical limitations of this thesis are discussed and directions for future research noted. Thirdly I consider what this research may tell us about the frontiers of what could be called governance through culture.

Findings

This thesis has created a sociological account of New Zealand’s pop renaissance by investigating why, and especially how, the fifth Labour government supported domestic popular music. It has considered the political-economic, institutional, class, ideological and governance dimensions to argue that Labour’s music policies were highly influential in creating Kiwi pop’s recent commercial success. Although its policies and supports were contested and unstable at times, the state was able to manage and elicit thousands of pop producers, hundreds of industry functionaries, and numerous media boosters to co-operate in the creation of a mass domestic audience. In this aspect it may be readily suggested that Labour’s music policies were a success as they produced, for the most part, their intended outcomes.

How the pop renaissance was constituted illustrates inventive forms of state relations to the market economy. In this respect this thesis adds to the literature on how the ‘promotional state’ in non-core cultural economies supports domestic sounds (Cloonan 1999). This thesis also questions what appears to be a common understanding in the popular music literature: that state music policy often requires some form of overt ‘intervention’ in the market (Breen 2008; Cloonan 1999; Shuker 2005). To refine this understanding this thesis examined how the pop renaissance in New Zealand was formed through state policies that ‘worked with the grain’ of existing music market institutions. Here it was observed how state organisations became another player in the market by interceding in artist-market relations in ways isomorphic to private sector agents. Such a finding again illustrates how markets – such as
those for domestic popular culture – are mutually constituted through both state and private interests.

In many ways these state practices could be considered an ‘intervention’, but not in the heavy handed sense often promulgated by neo-liberal critics of state involvement in the productive economy. Instead New Zealand’s pop renaissance is an example of how the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state (ANLPS) acted in highly nimble ways. Using social connectivity the state was able to bypass supra-national trade agreements to create a voluntary radio quota. New Zealand on Air’s increased funding grew the supply of commercially appropriate acts to meet the quota – as judged in partnership with commercial radio programmers. The New Zealand Music Industry Commission created social networks with international industry actors, funded artists into international trade shows, promoted local sounds through Music Month, and provided informal training to attune creative entrepreneurs to the logics of pop as commerce. It was through this multifaceted and state-facilitated ‘institutional ecology’ that domestic pop producers where enabled into the ‘cash nexus’. Further supporting these processes were a handful of committed state employees who, through increased budgets and legislative power, worked to ‘join-up’ creative entrepreneurs to the market. Also important in the construction of Labour’s music policy were consultations with elite music industry actors. This involvement materialised the habitus of these agents in Labour’s music policies which were in some ways mimetically isomorphic to a 1990s record label – albeit promoting all genres in the name of national culture.

The thesis also argued that New Zealand’s pop renaissance needed to be contextualised within the longer political economic trajectory of neo-liberalism: a history in which New Zealand is widely recognised as the leader of state-market reform. Consequently this thesis responds to Frith and Cloonan’s (2008, p. 189) call for more research into how the structure and ideology of particular formations of governance influences state music policy. In many ways the above policy responses were conditioned by preceding neo-liberal reforms. But on another policy dimension Labour had a longer interest in the economic and social benefits of the arts. Under the fifth Labour government the arts were presented as a means to partly address declining middle incomes and the problem of youth social inclusion within a growing service economy ‘after neo-liberalism’. By harnessing the creative industries zeitgeist Labour folded the arts and popular music into the strategic aim of raising New Zealand up the
OECD rankings. Pop supports were then legitimated through claims that its export would create jobs and thus social inclusion, as well as foster a unique sense of national identity.

This thesis also investigated the pop renaissance ‘from below’. This micro-sociological aspect focussed on relations between the state’s ‘institutional ecology’ and the production practices of creative entrepreneurs. In doing so this research was drawn to explore how the creative entrepreneur produces pop commodities through non-formal and non-market modes of exchange: exchanges which “haunt” the pop renaissance’s market based representations of success (Gibson-Graham 1996, p. 244, see also Connell & Gibson 2003). It was argued that the growing influence of the state on the domestic field of pop production saw it come to act as a ‘cultural intermediary’ that regulates artists’ access to the market. Although the state’s market-aligned funding system is relatively accessible it nevertheless reinforces the durable music industry logic of creating a ‘buzz’. Consequently it can be seen that the field impels creative entrepreneurs to construct themselves as ‘subjects of value’ (Skeggs 2004). This requires displaying the appropriate dispositions, skills, and ‘field specific symbolic capital’ necessary to access either state or private sector support (Hesmondhalgh 2006). In this situation the creative entrepreneur – as the entrepreneur sans economic capital (Ellmeier 2003) – struggles to create the symbolic capital of sales, honours and appointments by exchanging and appropriating social, cultural, and symbolic capital with homologous creative entrepreneurs in design, fashion, sound engineering, video production and so on. Through these swaps the creative entrepreneur constructs themselves as a ‘subject of value’ that can be leveraged into the market economy, state supports, or other seemingly endless capital swaps that constitute creative production at low levels of success. In this interpretation of ANLPS induced ‘capital swapping’ such music policies retain the hue of neo-liberal ideology: they draw upon the “bourgeois virtues” of rewards for entrepreneurial initiative wrapped in the liberal ethos of “equality of opportunity in the market” (Harvey 2005, p. 181).

Advancing Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of the new petit bourgeois as an agent drawn to the social indeterminacy of cultural occupations it was suggested the creative entrepreneur can be considered a subaltern faction of this class group. This subaltern position can be seen to be due to creative entrepreneurs dominated position in relation to both economic capital and cultural capital. In the labour market these agents are often ‘slash-workers’ in New Zealand’s expanding service economy while in fields of creative production they possess yet to be
consecrated – by the state, market, or tastemakers – cultural capital. It is from this position in expanding and mutable fields of popular cultural production that they seek to create a positive social trajectory. The implication of this conceptualisation of the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie is that music policy can be interpreted as a form of social policy as the state provides these agents an opportunity to reconvert their alternative capitals into a social trajectory.

This aspect of the thesis replied to Frith and Cloonan’s (2008, p. 190) “neglected question”: who are music policies for? Here it was argued state music policy is a form of social policy creating a quasi-market, quasi-cultural mode of ‘social inclusion’. This form of social policy has perverse features. The ANLPS, through its ‘institutional ecology’, is able to incentivise an ever expanding number of subaltern new petit bourgeois agents into ‘playing the game’ of creative production – albeit a game where commercial failure is the norm. Consequently state supports for pop can be seen to be somewhat homologous to the obese inclusionary structure of the bureaucratic/Keynesian Welfare State. Both forms of inclusion allow an ever growing number of agents to be included at the bottom of the hierarchy and offered social meaning (Sennett 2006, p. 28-34). But more importantly in the ‘after neo-liberal’ context such a mode of social policy only registers a relatively small entry in the national budget. Music policy as social policy is also qualitatively different to older welfare forms of inclusion. The pop renaissance illustrates how the state can be seen to harness young people’s own interests and in doing so displace the material cost of inclusion and ‘opportunity’ in the market economy onto the youthful individual and their alternative forms of capital. Such realities were for the most part, it seemed, generally accepted by interview subjects. They had a clear sense of the logics of the field of pop production and seemingly accepted the requirements of ‘playing the game’ that were reinforced by the ANLPS.

This thesis also argued popular music as social policy is pacification of those who enter the inclusionary pyramid at the bottom (Sennett 2006, p. 30). This can be seen to occur in two ways. Firstly, the unintended innovation of the enabling state supports was that they make it possible for New Zealand’s youthful subaltern new petit bourgeoisie to form a relationship with the structural features of the neo-liberalised labour market by eliciting and enacting an illusio in forming an identity and lifestyle as a creative entrepreneur. Secondly, such pacification can be observed in the internecine conflicts of the subaltern new petit
bourgeoisie over the who’s and the how’s of music policy: this, rather than articulated
discontent over the wider political economic context, has become the field of contestation.
Not being critically contested, to any great extent that is, are questions as to why there is low
wage ‘slash-working’, seemingly futile credentialism, and incipient indebtedness coterminus
with the celebrated ‘arts and cultural revival’.

At the time of writing New Zealand has a newly elected centre right government. There are
suspicions from progressive critics that this National government has an un-reconstructed
neo-liberal agenda and is actively seeking rationales to shrink the state, trim bureaucracy, and
sell state assets. The extent and intensity of this agenda and thus the future of Labour
instigated music policies remain unclear. The trajectories of the current global economic
financial crisis might determine whether the organisations of the ANLPS are completely
dismantled or only scaled back. We could speculate on the possible outcomes if the current
promotional state transforms back into a benign state and leaves Kiwi pop to the market.
Perhaps the diverse agents in the domestic field of pop production have been so enabled the
state could now retire and allow the social connectivity accrued under Labour to work in new
directions. Recalling here that recently redundant MNC agents are now contracting to walk
songs into radio, develop marketing strategies, or mobilise – for a fee – their social and
cultural capital to run promotional campaigns for aspiring acts. Export programmes, due to
relative lack of success, may well be dissolved, but it would seem ill advised to dismantle the
radio quota and New Zealand on Air funding. In economic terms these supports are arguably
the most direct source of economic capital to pop producers and the ancillary services of the
domestic music industries – concert promoters, publishers, hire companies, recording studios,
video makers, and so on. That is only if the current government considers these services still
in need of indirect state funding in the age of low cost digital production and DIY self-
promotion. If these domestic oriented supports are dissolved it might perhaps signal a reprise
to more underground and abrasive forms of cultural production as state-market commercial
considerations wither. Either way domestic popular music will not be in jeopardy, there will
always be a supply of aspiring acts, but it will be interesting to observe the cultural forms that
pop may take without intense state support.
Limitations and future research

As a ‘gloomy sociologist’ I have sought to challenge uncritical assessments of the pop renaissance. An example might include Shuker’s (2008) celebration of state support as creating a ‘viable music scene’. I have sought to question such interpretations by indirectly asking viable for whom and in whose name? I have also sought to open a space for critiquing the ‘after neo-liberal’ promotional state and its influence on aspects of contemporary social life.

This research and analysis of New Zealand’s pop renaissance also presents areas for further research. Firstly, the measurement of the social aspects of the pop renaissance requires collection. This is in part due to a lack of ‘rigorous’ quantitative data that captures the size, scope, and geographical location of New Zealand’s subalern new petit bourgeoisie and their economic returns from creative practice. Secondly, longitudinal research is required on the subalern new petit bourgeoisie social trajectories with a focus on how these are produced in relation to their credentials, the labour market, and various state supports. Thirdly, detailed ethnographic research on creative entrepreneurs’ habitus and illusio would provide material for richer theoretical insights on how the subalern new petit bourgeoisie negotiate social trajectories through the state structured field of pop production, and how they understand and thus seek to use ANLPS supports (see also Bourdieu & Wacquant 1992, p. 104-105). Fourthly, too little is known about the gender and ethnicity composition of agents in the pop renaissance and how these sociological dimensions influence their experiences. Further research and interview series would be needed to create a sufficient data set to adequately consider these issues and hopefully the preceding analysis has at the very least highlighted the need for such empirical research.

Methodologically there remain shortcomings. The use of interview material allows academic accounts to be constructed from fleeting exchanges with agents who, during the interview, manage their self-presentation (Silverman 1993, p. 97). Therefore within the qualitative research tradition there is a tendency to select anecdotal evidence or field empirics that fit with the “ideal conception of the phenomenon”, or those that are “conspicuous because they are exotic, at the expense of the less dramatic” (Silverman 1993, p. 153). Furthermore the level of detail in description and analysis is circumscribed by the questions asked. This left
some arguably significant aspects of the pop renaissance only cursorily dealt with. These limitations include: the machinations of music policy development under Labour; the influence of digital technology and ‘creative destruction’ on the field of pop production; emerging contests over copyright law; and in-depth and extensive detail on the livelihood strategies of creative entrepreneurs. In short what these methodological limitations suggest is that with a different theoretical approach or researcher positionality a different interpretation of the pop renaissance could be written using the same interview material.

Despite these limitations the *raison d’être* of qualitative methods is the transferability of results, theoretical development, and resonance across homologous fields of experience. Importantly this research was not solely descriptive by taking agents’ accounts at face value. Rather the stories and experiences of agents were set in relief against state policies and broader societal structures ‘after neo-liberalism’. Here Bourdieu’s sociological concepts were used to develop explanations of capital swapping and music policy as social policy that are hidden from common sense awareness. Thus what may be most useful about this research is its potential resonance for understanding the practices of pop production at low levels of success and the experiences of the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie in other promotional state contexts.

Analytically this thesis’s interpretation of music policy as social policy has limitations. Perhaps in some dimensions it echoes a Mertonian functional analysis for it examines the perversities between intentional or manifest functions and unintended or latent functions (Merton 1957). This thesis re-narrates the state’s creative industry policies as having the manifest function of economic and employment growth, and national identity formation. Latently such policies and programmes are interpreted as forming an inclusionary pyramid for the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie within which struggles over social trajectories could be performed. While such an interpretation has shortcomings, not least eliding the conflicts amongst agents, like much theoretically informed realist interpretations this thesis adds a new aspect to interpreting the ways popular culture has been deployed to political ends via the market economy.

This thesis also left some dimensions of the pop renaissance un-discussed. In particular it did not consider in detail Labour’s political incentives for supporting cultural production. This
meant the ways in which Labour – and Helen Clark in particular – were feted for their supports for the arts were not analysed. Nor was it researched how Clark’s appearances at music industry awards, launching Music Month, or appearance in photo opportunities with hipster creative entrepreneurs transmuted into a reflected glory for the Labour government. However, it must also be noted that the “ideological uplift” of the ‘arts and cultural revival’ was materially reinforced by an ‘economic upswing’ (Yudice 2003, p. 10). Expanding household wealth, apparently rising wages, a balanced national budget, and a consumption frenzy that flowed in the wake of loose and expanding global credit all added to New Zealand’s apparent ‘fizzing and buzzing’.

Popular music and the pop renaissance were also woven into a greater ideological project of national identity. To some extent this thesis did not consider how the interviews with creative entrepreneurs’ reiterated state inspired nationalistic discourses. This is an omission considering these agents were constantly interpellated as New Zealand’s amazingly ‘creative people’ who were the envy of the world. How such consolations worked when packing up after a concert no one came to, working late at night over social network sites, preparing for another early or late start in the service economy, or following the refusal or acceptance of state funding were not researched. That is, this thesis did not explore how New Zealand’s creative entrepreneurs wrapped, adapted, or refused to wrap themselves in the meanings and uses of national cultural identity.

Perhaps this thesis has elided some of the contests and multiple voices within the pop renaissance and broader ‘arts and cultural revival’. This was necessary in order to describe, explain, and analyse what is (was?) a unique and highly inventive way for the state to support popular music via the market. Perhaps this research has overstated the economic dimensions of cultural production at low levels of success. Yet if this thesis had stressed the contested cultural and ideological dimensions what then would have been elided is how Kiwi pop was ‘joined-up’ by the state to diverse domains. Firstly, how pop was ‘joined-up’ to the market institutions of popular music. Secondly, and more importantly, how youthful subaltern new petit bourgeois agents became ‘joined-up’ to the labour market and ‘social inclusion’ via a relationship with creative production. Thirdly, how the identities of the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie as New Zealand’s celebrated ‘creative people’ came to be circularly ‘joined-up’ to the rhetoric and images of the ‘arts and cultural revival’. Therefore, in some ways, this
thesis’s interpretation reinforces the coherence of the pop renaissance as a state influenced social phenomena.

Simultaneously this thesis has sought to illuminate disjunctions and contradictions. Not so much in the contested meanings of the policies and intents but in the disjunctions between state projects to enable the market economy and the substantive practices these induce in ‘after neo-liberal’ contexts. So when interpreted through Bourdieu popular music policy as social policy can be seen as one that allowed youthful subaltern new petit bourgeois agents to pursue a social trajectory as New Zealand’s creative people; to be offered the opportunity to move in social space through the capture and deployment of whatever alternative capitals they could readily muster in state influenced fields of cultural production. And thus the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie were able to symbolically improvise the continuing – and possibly increasingly pressing – disjunctions between the relative values of economic and cultural capital ‘after neo-liberalism’.

Emerging from this analysis of New Zealand’s pop renaissance is a number of areas for future research. Firstly, a comparative study of ‘promotional state’ policies and their ‘institutional ecologies’ could assess the path dependencies, geographies, and governance rationales behind different promotional state regimes in different cultural economies. Secondly, at a theoretical level, the promotional state could be further analysed as Bourdieu’s (1999) ‘meta-capitalist’ state. That is as a state which acts to consecrate, value, and reconvert agents’ alternative capitals into fields of (popular) cultural production. This approach might add deeper insights into the contemporary fields through which youth social trajectories are performed while analysing the state’s function in ascribing value to various forms of cultural capital. Thirdly, in-depth ethnographic research on the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie, their work and ‘capital swapping’ practices in other cultural economies would add to the literature on artistic production at low levels of success. Such a study could extend the analysis of how cultural production is embedded in social networks of trust by focussing on how creative entrepreneurs bring their own interests to these reciprocal acts. Fourthly, a theoretical discussion explicating the differences between the elite, subaltern, and counter-cultural factions of the new petit bourgeoisie could be developed. Such conceptual work may allow greater analytical specificity when investigating how agents negotiate the contemporary, market oriented, creative industries. Fifthly, in a governmentality vein, a closer investigation
of the ways popular culture is deployed by the state would add to accounts of the frontiers of social policy. It is to the speculative aspects of governance through culture that we can consider in conclusion.

**Governance through culture**

This thesis’s analysis of the pop renaissance has pointed to its highly contradictory outcomes: winners, losers, struggles, orthodox economic inefficiencies, and the conferring of much symbolic capital on the state. However when we step back from the mechanics of ‘after neo-liberal’ market governance and the workings of pop production at the micro-scale it could be suggested that the pop renaissance is at the frontier of an emerging from of governance through culture and identity. As Rose (2000, p. 168) notes:

> Government through identity can be seen as an application to the political sphere of contemporary commercial rationalities for governing conduct through consumption in the name of culture and life style, together with a much more wide spread emphasis on the significance of autonomy and freedom of individuals in the shaping of their forms of life.

When viewing the pop renaissance as a form of governance through culture a number of questions are raised about the ‘after neo-liberal’ state’s relationship with governance, political economy, and class. The pop renaissance was overseen by a left leaning government holding out the means for agents to form a valued identity as one of New Zealand’s celebrated ‘creative people’ (Bourdieu 1998b, p.5-7). Arguably it did this by bolstering and consecrating the value of field specific cultural capitals which transmuted the artisan into an increasingly venerated position in social space. As Labour was unable to significantly address issues around the living wage and low productivity ‘after neo-liberalism’ youthful agents were governed by harnessing their own interests in forming an identity. In retrospect, in one dimension, perhaps Labour’s broad creative industry policies were also a way to harness agents’ refusal of what they are refused (economic capital) and worked by rehabilitating, consecrating, and inflating the value of the cultural capital latent in popular culture. Perhaps then Labour’s turn to governance through culture is a new way of sustaining
agents’ relationship to the globalising market economy by placing the sharpening demands of the ‘cash nexus’ at a culturally mediated distance?

Arts and culture policies can also be seen to serve a dual function. Liberalism holds a deeply productivist ethos: the making and exchanging of ‘things’ is seen as the source of wealth and an agent’s moral value. Here the unremitting energies required by fields of cultural production seamlessly align with the ‘after neo-liberal’ moral emphasis on ‘hard work’ and ‘leaving some skin in the game’. Therefore the incessant ‘busyness’ of creative production becomes a polyvalent form of governing through culture: it harnesses agents’ own interests; it stimulates some market exchange; it creates a celebrated social identity for potentially marginalised agents; and it also requires an involuted performance of production. But moreover by incentivising agents into ‘playing the game’ of creative production (which often requires ‘slash-working’) these agents come to appear within the systems of state governance as employed, productive, disciplined agents. The inverse of such self-disciplined, self-exploitative, productive, creative activities is the opening of another frontier of value. However this value is not to accrued to the creative individual but constructed and appropriated by the state and holders of economic capital through the technical, rational systems of economic governance (such as employment figures). Here, at a new frontier of class relations, we might start to question how the inverted value of the subaltern new petit bourgeoisie’s representation in technical, rational systems of governance allows for more prosaic forms of global, private, economic capital accumulation to continue relatively unquestioned.

Governance through culture also suggests a further question about ‘the who’ of cultural and music policy. In the wake of the ideology of hyper-globalisation it could be argued that mobility, movement, and flow now suffuse the new dynamics of class (Skeggs 2004). Rather than the relatively rigid material security of the Keynesian Welfare State the ‘after neo-liberal’ state is in some ways obliged to make true on neo-liberalism’s ideological promise of freedom and mobility. If young people have a sense of entitlement to physical and symbolic movement through geographical and social space (via the market) the ‘after neo-liberal’ state is required to build an institutional architecture through which the performance of mobility can be played out. Cultural policy as social policy then entwines with the images and ethos of social movement and must offer the subaltern new petit bourgeois agent the opportunity to
claim a position as a new tastemaker. Here cultural policy gives bearings for such social movement – possibly through the rhetoric of the ‘creative’ nation – for if some are to move then those who are unable to do so need to be fixed place. Therefore ‘after neo-liberal’ policies govern through culture and identity by simultaneously serving to mobilise and aspire, and fix and reconcile those who come into its inclusionary ambit.
Appendix One:
Creative New Zealand

Creative New Zealand’s (CNZ) domestic pop engagements are not as high profile as the NZMC or NZOA\(^{35}\). Nevertheless its funding role should be briefly considered as it supports popular music styles that fall outside the remit of the NZMC and NZOA’s. CNZ’s music manager Rose Campbell explains the logic of these funding divisions:

> You see NZOA have a one pager really. That is they will fund what will be played on commercial radio and they’ve got quite a sizable budget to do that. CNZ would be foolish to be getting into that area as well, so we keep right away from that because there is a whole lot of other stuff that needs to be supported … From time to time there might be a band we fund who also got NZOA funding, but usually we always would have funded a different component of the project. If you are trying to spread the government funding and make sure that you are sort of able to target a wide range of stuff it makes sense (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

Formally CNZ is the state organisation charged with encouraging, promoting, and supporting all art forms. CNZ’s rationales for supporting popular music reflect its institutional evolution from the QEIIACNZ (see Chapter Three). As Rose Campbell recounts CNZ is “an art form development agency so that’s the driver” (Key State Informant Interview 2006). Nevertheless its policy documents are also imbued with elements of the creative industry discourse (as described in Chapter Three). For example it is stated that CNZ is “a catalyst for the development of a flourishing arts environment” and “will invest in dynamic New Zealand artists … acknowledged for innovation and quality” (Creative New Zealand 2007, p. 8). CNZ’s mandate also sees it funding the national symphony and ballet as well as theatre, visual artists, and literature. In terms of music funding CNZ claims to:

> Support all styles of music, including blues, classical, classical contemporary, country, dance music, early music, electronica, folk, hip hop, jazz, Māori, Pacific, indigenous,

\(^{35}\) see Skilling 2005 for a history of Creative New Zealand
pop, rock, sound art music that crosses cultural boundaries, and styles that cross musical genres. (Creative New Zealand 2005a)

Like other state cultural agencies CNZ’s funding increased following Labour’s Cultural Recovery Package (see Chapter Three). In 2000 CNZ received $NZ 2 million per annum growing to $NZ 15.5 million by 2006 (Clark 2006). In addition to this direct funding through the Ministry of Arts, Culture and Heritage CNZ receives state lottery funding (approximately $NZ 18 million per annum at the time of writing). From this budget $650,000 is allocated to contemporary music production.

CNZ’s funding differs from NZOA and NZMC’s public-private partnership logics: CNZ’s grants go directly to the artist rather than a label. When compared to the other state programmes CNZ’s popular music funding is primarily directed towards small-scale recording projects. To this end the grants dispensed range between $NZ 3,000 and $NZ 25,000 (Creative New Zealand 2009a, p. 51). Funding is also dispersed on the understanding that production costs (such as compact disc packaging and distribution) would be covered by the artist’s record label.

As CNZ’s supports for pop production are primarily premised on cultural criteria rather than immediate market potential and funding decisions are based on ‘expert knowledge’. This involves a peer review process with CNZ contracting out the assessment of applications. A group of five music experts from across the country are chosen to assess the 130 or so proposals that arrive in CNZ’s Wellington office each tri-annual funding round. These experts are chosen for being conversant with a range of styles – “from improvised jazz, folk, rock, classical, that whole range” (Key State Informant Interview 2006). These experts are sent the applications and they:

Read it all through and mark it against very clear criteria that we’ve given them – so a mark out of ten and we come up with a ranked list. We then bring that group of people to Wellington for a day and half and we work through the ranked list because sometimes when they get together and discuss things they might change their view because it might be something in an area they don’t necessarily have expertise that another member on the committee might have, so there is a quite a discussion. We’ve
got a pool of money available for [music] and they will come up with a must fund list then the next group down is should fund, and then what would you fund if you could (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

This competitive application process is premised upon the pop producer having already made steps towards developing an artistic career. Notably applications for new album funding are more likely to be successful if the artist can demonstrate performances, a media profile, and possibly a self-released recording (a process discussed in Chapter Five). In addition to demonstrating career development pop producers are encouraged to frame their applications in terms of sales potential of the music. Therefore although CNZ’s official statements privilege art over commerce pop producers are required to provide comprehensive marketing plans. As CNZ’s music director Rose Campbell related:

The criteria that we are particularly focussing upon are professional artists and sustainable careers, professional arts organisations, and international markets for New Zealand work … we also focus on quality [for] we are interested in supporting what we deem excellent, professional quality, or potential for exports as in emerging artists. So we actually give [artists] a definition of what they might look like if they came through the door. We don’t really have the capability to support people for their hobbies … because of the limited amount of funding we have to decide where we think we can make the most difference. We think that is in professional practice and at the high end of the quality spectrum. So that’s the real driver (Key State Informant Interview 2006).

In addition to recording grants CNZ also funds domestic and international touring. For example in 2008 CNZ worked in partnership with the NZMC to send 14 domestic artists to World music trade expo WOMEX in Spain (Creative New Zealand 2009a, p. 51, Creative New Zealand 2009b). In contrast to recording grants, tour support disbursement depends upon additional funding from the artist and/or private sector sponsors (Creative New Zealand 2005b).
Appendix Two:
The networked state: New Zealand on Air and New Zealand’s pop renaissance

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Abstract
When New Zealand’s ‘third-way’ Labour government came to power in 1999 it placed a greater policy and funding emphasis on the arts and culture. Like other ‘promotional states’ (Cloonan 1999) the Labour government sought to support the domestic popular music industry through a voluntary radio quota. Drawing on qualitative research, this article describes the ways in which the state, through New Zealand on Air, negotiates and leverages domestic popular music artists onto commercial radio. In this process, state agents mobilise social networks to ‘join-up’ commercially appropriate artists to radio programmers. The success of this programme is based upon state agents developing an institutional isomorphism with existing music industry practices. Even so, popular music makers contest New Zealand on Air’s sympathetic policy settings by citing forms of institutional exclusion.

Introduction
New Zealand’s pop music has entered a period of unprecedented audibility and visibility, with radio broadcasting more ‘Kiwi’ pop than ever before and domestic sales now comprising 25% of what remains a contracting market (Dann 2006). There is a strong correlation between the Labour-led coalition government’s increased pop funding and this pop renaissance. This state engagement with pop music is, however, just one aspect of a wider creative industries policy drive (see Growth and Innovation Framework 2003), the effects of which roused the Minister of Immigration, David Cunliffe, to claim New Zealand is ‘fizzing and buzzing’ to the groove of an ‘arts and cultural revival’ (New Zealand Herald 2005).

Elsewhere in this issue of Popular Music Shuker illustrates how New Zealand’s state can be understood as a ‘promotional state’ that views pop as ‘something of a national asset’ in producing this arts and cultural revival (Cloonan 1999, p. 204). However, New Zealand’s promotional state has a distinctive mode of engaging pop music: it seeks to ‘join-up’ pop producers with the market’s ‘cash nexus’ (Bevir 2005; Craig and Porter 2006). In this process, according to former Minister of Research, Science & Technology, Pete Hodgson (2004), the state acts as a ‘leader, a partner, a broker, a facilitator, and, occasionally, a funder’.

The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the partnering, facilitating and brokering practices that state agents engage in to produce New Zealand’s pop revival, and in doing so show how far the New Zealand state has bent towards both market and the cultural forms of
music production. Specifically, I show how New Zealand on Air (NZOA) uses pluggers to manage the supply of domestic artists to meet the voluntary 20% commercial radio quota and let the pluggers’ own words describe how these processes work. I also show, briefly, how pop producers that seek access to this state-mediated network perceive NZOA. In doing so, I draw upon interview material with eight key music industry informants that has been collected as part of a larger research project on the New Zealand state’s role in the music economy. My own restricted commentary begins a wider task of framing these occurrences in a small range of terms derived from institutional analysis: networks, partnerships and, notably, isomorphism, which DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 149) describe as ‘a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of environmental conditions’, while simultaneously being mindful of the ways ‘after neoliberal’ (Larner and Craig 2005) governments attempt to achieve state goals by developing ‘networks of institutions and individuals acting in partnerships held together by relations of trust’ (Bevir 2005, p. 45).

**New Zealand on Air**

Due to New Zealand’s small domestic pop market the state is a major funding source for pop production, with NZOA’s public-private subsidy system facilitating recording and video production at the commercial end of the pop field. Here ‘the government has seen it as legit (sic) to intervene because it is in effect not commercially viable and secondly, it’s because the government sees contemporary popular music as a vital part of national culture and identity’ (Smyth, interview 2006). To realise the state’s now linked cultural and economic aspirations, NZOA has developed an entrepreneurial role where it liaises with radio broadcasters to get ‘Kiwi’ pop on the airwaves. Institutional change in the government has brought NZOA closer to the market in a number of aspects, while at the same time wrapping itself in the new institutional language of partnership (see Bevir 2005).

As a legacy of the 1980s’ and 1990s’ deregulationist zeal, New Zealand has more radio stations per capita than any other nation: 1 station for every 5,250 people (Shanahan and Duignan 2005, p. 19). Radio, therefore, is a central institution in New Zealand’s pop renaissance and, as in larger, core nation cultural economies, plays a pivotal role in breaking new acts and sustaining the success of established ones (Neil 2002, p. 61). Recognising these conditions, Brendon Smyth (interview 2006), NZOA’s music manager asserts, ‘we are actually not in the music business, we are in the airplay business’.

NZOA’s involvement with commercial broadcasting can be traced to Labour’s 1999 election pledge to legislate a 20% domestic radio quota. Such legislation, while it strove to move beyond raw market neoliberalism, would remain constrained by supra-national trade agreements:

> There was talk at the time that introducing a quota would be difficult because of international treaty obligations. We were signatories to GATS [General Agreement on Trade in Services] and a number of other international trade agreements and if we wanted to introduce a legislated quota the government would be obliged to go back to the GATS partners and say ‘can we seek an exemption?’ What they were afraid of is that they would be allowed the exemption – no problems – but all the other GATS parties would say ‘oh well, while we are about it let’s talk about butter, let’s talk about meat or lets talk about wool or lets talk about wine and so on’, [New Zealand’s main export earners] and it would open up the government to pressure to make other changes to GATT [General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade]. (Smyth, interview 2006)
Nevertheless, the potential threat of legislated quotas convinced the Radio Broadcasters Association (RBA), who represent 80% of commercial stations, to approach the government, saying ‘don’t legislate for quotas, don’t tell us what to do, tell us what you want and we will give you what you want but we will do it our way, in effect a voluntary agreement to get to 20 per cent’ (Smyth, interview 2006). Since 2002 the New Zealand Music Code has acted as a voluntary quota, negotiated between the state, via the office of the Minister of Broadcasting, and the RBA. Such lighthanded market legislation fits neatly with government approaches across a number of sectors. However, in music, it appears to have been relatively substantial and successful. Under the Code’s local content targets, domestic content has risen from 13% in 2002 to 20% in 2005. These targets have been exceeded every year except 2006 when local content dropped to approximately 18% (NZOA 2006, p. 8). Although:

It fluctuates each quarter, it has been down as low as 14 percent and as high as 23 percent but for us at the moment it also depends on the supply of songs coming through and at the moment we have a lot of artists coming through so we should be able to improve on that. We have a target at New Zealand on Air, which is always 2 percent above what the actual local content is. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

To meet the Code’s quota, NZOA contracts four radio pluggers to promote domestic pop at commercial radio, creating a mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 151) with existing industry practices:

Getting on commercial radio was something you needed to think about because you couldn’t go to radio, step in those doors and go ‘hi I’m from New Zealand on Air, a government body and we want to force New Zealand Music on your station’. [Smyth] had to play the game. And the game is that every major label in New Zealand has a promoter because they have product they are trying to sell and the best way to do that is marketing it to radio stations. So that was already established, that’s how radio stations got their music and he saw that the only way to do this was to actually join the queue and meet with those radio people every week. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

And for some domestic artists this process is aided by local multi-national companies (MNCs):

Record companies have also started investing in New Zealand music a lot more. They wouldn’t just be pushing the new Madonna single but also their latest local releases. So what would happen is that EMI for example would be pushing a song by someone like the Black Seeds and New Zealand on Air would also be pushing that single so suddenly radio stations are getting bombarded with Kiwi music. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

Through this state-leveraged access to commercial broadcasting, domestic artists’ sales and performance royalty cheques have increased:

I’ll give you an example: Pluto with their second album it sold 4,000 units and then they presented the song ‘Long White Cross’ to radio, and they’ve now sold 29,000 albums . . . Of course there is all this digital stuff, downloading stuff, myspace type things out there but radio is still the most influential commercial medium when it comes to selling albums. (MNC informant 3, interview 2006)

Supplied with domestic tracks, frequently produced through NZOAs tiered funding system, pluggers meet to convince programmers of a domestic song’s merit. This process operates within the constraints of radio’s technocratic rotation policies, reified audience research, rationalised programming mix and balance, and in New Zealand, the influence of US and UK audience research and charts (Neill 2002). Add to this the release of forty songs each week, all-vying for a limited number of airplay slots.
To improve the chances of getting domestic pop on commercial radio state agents organise the ‘management and exploitation of talent’ (Frith 2000, p. 388). In an iterative process, NZOA’s pluggers calculate the song’s chance of gaining airplay and then, depending on the situation, mediate between commercial play lists’ opportunities and artistic decisions:

NZOA were dealing with [a large commercial station] and a spot came up on play list, which our song had a chance for adding as they said that station was playing wacky stuff at the moment. But we needed to cut the middle eight – they said radio isn’t doing bridges at the moment. (Musician informant 1, interview 2006)

NZOA’s network also partners commercial radio programmers, who are involved in selecting artists for the New Artists Recording Project subsidy. In this case, NZOA goes ‘out to the end user to test songs and get feedback before final selection’ (Smyth in Auckland City Council 2005, p. 86). For those unsuccessful in their funding applications NZOA provides feedback: ‘Stuff like, not really radio friendly, sort of along those lines – not catchy enough, poppy enough and things like that’ (Musician informant 4, interview 2006). In other cases, NZOA pluggers provide advice in order to secure the supply of songs with commercial radio potential. These suggestions are based upon what programmers listen for:

The chorus, the most hooky part of the song. There is nothing like sitting in an environment that is quite intense and you are playing a song you really love and they’re just not really getting it. So one of the things that stands out in a song is how quick they come into the chorus, how long the song is. I went to see this band and they had actually received funding in a previous round and they played it to me and it was great but it went for four minutes twenty. And the first thing I said was ‘can you cut that song down?’ And then there was a look of horror, which is what I expect but when I play it [programme directors] will go ‘that’s a really long song we need to cut this’. It has to work for all parties. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

However, this is not to claim NZOA pluggers dictate to all artists in its funding ambit how to produce songs. Instead, they make suggestions on how to broker a song onto commercial radio, so:

When artists come to me and say that [commercial radio] is not creative, it’s not artistic, I just say ‘that is cool, you are the artist’ you come to us when you have made that decision that you want to be a commercially successful band, then go and write the songs for radio’. And it is hard; it is an art to write those songs. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

Having the right song is one aspect of the pluggers’ job; the other is the need to sustain relationships of trust with commercial programmers. Radio promotion, as a MNC plugger explains, is ‘about building a relationship. Going out to lunch with them, playing golf with them’ (MNC plugger, interview 2006). As NZOA’s pop promotion function becomes isomorphic with existing MNC practices – the state’s organisational form is mimetic of other organisations dealing with the uncertainty of inserting pop into the broadcasting field (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, p. 151) – pluggers become embedded with programmers:

It’s about seeing them out, it’s about getting drunk with them, and it’s about knowing that their birthday is next week. We want to know how they’re doing, how their relationship is. It is very personal and that’s the way it works really. It is a business. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

Overall this businesslike approach means pluggers’ time is spent both managing the supply of artists and relationships with broadcasters:

I tend to spend the first part of the week on email contacting people, regional radio people just to see how they are going, where a song is at with them or if they have spaces in play list coming up. So that is the main part of my job, the other part is listening to new applications and basically liaising with record companies and artists about songs and what they are up to. I
spend a lot of time chasing up after people and then every three months we have new applications coming for the single and video grants. Then the last part is spending time having songs assessed at radio, and once a song is chosen I spend time liaising with that artist to prepare their marketing strategy. (NZOA plugger, interview 2006)

Music makers and New Zealand on Air

NZOA’s mediation between the funding of pop production and commercial radio is a powerful system producing the symbols of the pop renaissance, such as airplay figures and sales. This performative system (Lyotard 1984), however, is not without its criticism from music makers seeking state assistance. Like all artistic labour markets New Zealand has an oversupply of under-capitalised music makers (Towse 2001) for whom ‘cash is never an option because that is what we need most’ (Artist manager, interview 2006). This need for cash is reflected in NZOA’s New Artists Recording Project, which has over 1,000 applicants for twenty annual grants. This resonates with other forms of state instigated partnership, where rhetoric outweighs substance and the bulk of the costs of the pop renaissance remain born by music makers (see Larner and Craig 2005). According to one musician: ‘NZOA is not set up to find new artists, it is set up as a facilitator to get artists to market in a more acceptable form. And that is the problem. New artists have got to do so much to even get in the picture’ (Musician informant 5, interview 2006).

Furthermore, NZOA makes no distinction between MNC and independent artists, so who receives funding becomes:

A very controversial area especially amongst the independents as a lot of labels that have applied feel they should’ve supported them but they haven’t. I think there is a contradiction with [NZOA’s] mandate [which] is to get New Zealand music on commercial radio, which excludes the [college radio network], which is where a lot of indies get their play. The other thing is there is a lot of disgruntlement when too much money is given to the Majors. Sure they’ve got to earn money too but they are not as hard up as the indies are. . . . Multi-Nationals shouldn’t be getting funding from the New Zealand government. (Independent label informant, interview 2006)

And for musicians seeking to establish a pop career using NZOA funding:

It is becoming a lot more difficult for artists to get on to the NZ on Air money wheel because there are so many artists now with established track records. If you look at the funding for a particular round, a substantial per cent, up to 50% is for artists who’ve already had funding and an artist whose had one sort of funding from NZ on Air is likely to receive other funding . . . So what happens is once you get on to that gravy train money tends to come your way through various forms of funding, and it is quite hard to break into it if you don’t already have some sort of profile. (Musician informant 2, interview 2006)

Added to access issues are the imbrications between radio genres and funding decisions:

It seems as though NZOA has a genre criteria as well. They seem to fund a certain number of artists from each genre that fits with the radio demographic. A couple of alternative, [College Radio] style artists in each round and then they will have some for [R’n’B radio], some for the easy listening market, some for the rock market. (Musician informant 2, interview 2006)

The networked state

These examples illustrate how New Zealand’s pop renaissance is managed through a partnership between the state, via NZOA, and commercial radio. Within this state-mediated ‘institutional ecology’ (Nee 2005, p. 66) of pop production, commercial radio programmers,
formats, and genres influence which artists receive NZOA subsidies and plugger assistance. Therefore, NZOA is a node in a state network that ‘joins-up’ the supply of domestic pop to meet the voluntary quota by becoming ‘a conduit, a liaison between the artist and their radio career’ (NZOA plugger informant, interview 2006). As most musicians and small labels are unable to afford the time, green fees, or expense accounts required to transact with programmers, NZOA takes the form of a quasi-record label; institutionalising ‘networks, connexity, and social capital’ (Bevir 2005, p. 47).

More importantly though, in the process of managing pop for the Music Code’s New Public Management style targets, NZOA’s funding is not a subsidy dispensed under the idealistic Arnoldian logics of ‘culture’, which leaves the artist free to create. Instead, as NZOA manages the supply of artists in partnership with both labels and broadcasters, subsidies become a calculated state investment conditioned by the economic and cultural logics of the commercial broadcasting field. And if musicians on the neo-patronage ‘money wheel’ neglect the commercial (and political) imperatives which underpin the exchange of talent for funding, state agents may reach out to remind them of the game, all the time with one eye on playlist opportunities, and the other on the Music Code’s targets.

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