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Madness in Context in the *Histories* of Herodotus

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Abstract

This thesis is a study of the way Herodotus uses madness in his *Histories*. It aims to examine the changing nature of madness depending on the context in which Herodotus uses it. I also examine some examples of madness in the works of Homer, the Tragedians and the Hippocratic corpus in order to illuminate the varying examples from the *Histories*. This required close reading of all works in question in the original Ancient Greek as well as examination of secondary literature on the authors and topics concerned.

Herodotus’ use of madness varies according to the context in which he uses it, so he does not have a coherent view of madness. Madness, as Herodotus employs the concept, is often violent, but not always physically; it may be verbal or may be used of a person who expresses a violent idea. Sometimes it is a divine punishment; sometimes it signals transgression against divine law. He also uses madness as a literary device to highlight themes of the various *logoi*, and to reflect not only the state of the one called mad, but the one who is using the term. His usage is similar in some ways to each of the works of Homer, the Tragedians and the Hippocratic writers.

In conclusion, madness is a device which Herodotus uses to good effect depending on what effect he wishes to make at the time, in a specific *logos*. 
Dedication

To Mum, Dad, Penny, Rodney, Tim, Esther, Terry and Yue, and family members of the feline persuasion; also to friends too numerous to mention: the people who have to deal with the underside of research and who are always there when it turns to custard. I appreciate you all immensely and could not have done this without your practical and moral support in all forms and however it is expressed.
Acknowledgments

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Introduction

Herodotus’ *Histories* are the first step in European history towards the writing of historical accounts as we know them. Born around 484 BC in Greek-speaking Halicarnassus, part of the Dorian hexapolis (although Herodotus chose to write in the Ionian dialect), he was later exiled for political reasons and died around 430 BC. In the proem, he calls his highly valuable account of the Persian wars against Greece a ‘presentation of inquiry’ (ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις). This is the starting point of his work. The account of the wars is not, however, the be-all and end-all of his work, although it comprises a large part of it and provides a strand of unification.

Herodotus’ literary style grew out of an environment where oral presentation of artistic works was the main form of transmitting them to a wider audience. In addition to this, the prevailing literary culture was largely of the storytelling kind, in which the epic poetry of Homer and others was of immeasurable influence. So when Herodotus began writing history, he did so under the influence of an oral literary background which did not necessarily deal in factual events (although it was conceived that they might have been based on actual events long past). It is therefore not surprising that Herodotus should arrange his accounts in terms of blocks, or *logoi*, which had a measure of unity in storyline, and which might then be read out to an audience as self-contained units of work. We should also accept that the way the results of Herodotus’ inquiry were often presented as an interesting story is the result of this background, and his storytelling background also affects the way he delivers his work, making use of rhetorical devices, dramatic speeches and paying attention to characterisation, for example. To expect the innovator of a new style immediately to write the way we read history now, centuries after Herodotus took the first step, is to unfairly impose our own cultural and social standards upon another culture, society and time.

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1 Gould (1989: 5-8) gives a comprehensive biography of Herodotus, including likely influences on his life and writing. See Pg. 17 for a discussion on the approximation of his birth year, Pg. 18 for approximate death date.


3 Immerwahr (1966: 19-20); see in particular Chapter 2, Style and Structure (Pgs. 46-78).
In his proem, Herodotus clearly states that he wishes to preserve the ‘things which happened by the agency of people’ (τὰ γενόμενα ἐξ ἀνθρώπων) as well as the ‘great and amazing deeds’ (ἔργα μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά) of the Greeks and barbarians. He shows from the start of his work, then, that he will not confine his work to Greeks alone, and this stance pre-figures many discussions on other peoples, personalities, politics, cultures, geography, animals and customs. As Gould notes, ‘enquiry’ for Herodotus ‘meant many things…among them and above all perhaps travel and the active pursuit of data’. Herodotus seeks, on the whole, to show what he has learnt and seen firsthand; sometimes he discusses or gives an opinion on a finding, or seeks to prove the truth of findings which are controversial; he often offers more than one version of events or an account, and does not always say which version he favours. In an effort to get to the reason why certain events occurred, he goes back a lot further than the immediate time of such an event to chart the actions of people which began the chain of events. Where his own knowledge is more limited, he records what his sources report, and notes that he does not always believe what they say, but is under obligation (ὀφείλω) to record it nevertheless; this principle, he notes, is true of his entire account. These sources are sometimes problematic, as they may well betray some bias themselves.

In this thesis I have found it best to approach the Histories as a literary work rather than a strictly historical one, and to examine the instances of madness within it on these grounds. I therefore do not often have to grapple with the issue of whether what was said was true or not, or whether the sources were positive or negative. In general I examine whether there may be a literary explanation for any of these historical questions, which are so often unknowable factors otherwise and prey to speculation.

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4 See Lateiner (1989: 13-17) for a discussion on the proem and what it promises to deliver.
6 See Lateiner’s list (1989: 84-90); see also Marincola (1987:137) for a table of ‘autobiographical’ statements.
7 See Gould (1989: 63-64), who also notes these personally motivated events (Pgs. 66-67); Lateiner (1989: 35-43).
8 7.152.3.
10 I disagree with Fehling’s (1989) approach and therefore do not use his work often.
When I first examined the way Herodotus uses madness in the *Histories*, I thought it useful to explore whether the various ‘types’ of madness could be formulated into a unified code which could be called Herodotus’ theory of madness. Unfortunately, this unified theory could not be pressed. The more I looked at the instances of madness and tried to fit them into a model of types, the more the model had to expand, until it was evident that the model I had started with was not flexible enough. At that point I had to re-think my approach, and finally decided that while a unified code did not reflect Herodotus’ use of madness, a diverse code did. It was then that I began to examine the instances of madness in their own context, in their own *logoi*, and from there began to make some sense of the uses of madness in the *Histories*.

Because Herodotus tends to deal in *logoi*, which are then linked to each other by a certain continuity of theme or topic of discussion, his use of madness in context becomes very diverse\(^\text{11}\). At most we can only say that madness very often has an element of violence in it, often enough that it should be borne in mind even if, at times, I do not specifically point it out when discussing an example. But despite this ‘general rule’, Herodotus still employs various forms of violence. Sometimes madness manifests itself in physical violence, as it does in the cases of Cambyses and Cleomenes; sometimes madness is used of people who are violent in their verbal expression or express a violent thought, as is the case with Astyages. In this way madness seems to be used as an abusive term of the person who speaks violently, or is simply used in argument.

In some *logoi*, Herodotus calls madness an illness, a νοῦσος, but in other examples he does not; in some cases madness is clearly shown to be divine punishment for transgression of *nomoi*, religious or social. In the case of Scyles the Scythian, however, his ‘madness’ in becoming an initiate of Dionysus is not a punishment from the gods but is the reason for his punishment by death, because ‘madness’ itself is a transgression of Scythian custom. Madness is also used by Herodotus to show an escalation of emotion, such as the envy of Timodemus; sometimes madness also shows a lack of understanding on the part of the one who calls another mad, as is the case when

\(^{11}\) As Dewald notes (1987:148-149), the ‘rhapsodic’ nature of Herodotus’ work means that ‘the narrative itself keeps breaking and reforming into different pieces that need to be read in different ways’. See also Myres (1953: 70-74).
the Persians call the Greeks mad at Marathon and Artemision. Wine may cause madness, but according to Amasis, the king of Egypt, so can overwork.

These varying forms of madness occur because in their own logos they are manipulated by Herodotus to serve a purpose. Often the use of madness simply emphasises themes which have already been running through the logos, or emphasises a theme which is to become important in the logos. So, for example, while Harpagus may call Astyages mad because of the latter’s violent order to kill his grandson, Harpagus’ use of madness to describe Astyages highlights the complete turnaround of Harpagus’ character: from the most trustworthy Persian Astyages knows to a man who disobeys an order. This disobedience becomes a theme in the logos and is the ultimate cause of Astyages’ downfall. So Herodotus can use madness to emphasise highpoints in a story as well.

In addition to the varying kinds of madness reflecting themes in their own logoi, madness itself has varying importance and use in different logoi. Madness in the story of Cambyses, for instance, is a focus of the story only because it becomes a moot point of which Herodotus wants to prove the truth, as he does of other points of interest in his inquiries. In the story of Cleomenes, madness is only of interest to Herodotus when he comes to the discussion of Cleomenes’ death, and wishes to lay out the possible reasons for why Cleomenes went mad and died in such a fashion. In the story of Scyles, ‘madness’ is the element which caps two stories of how Scythians punish those who adopt non-Scythian customs. Dionysiac ‘madness’ is even worse than other customs to adopt because the Scythians revile it particularly. Finally, madness may not be a focus of a logos at all: in the discussion of how Melampus obtained joint kingship of Argos, madness is the means to his end. The women of Argos go mad, and Melampus can cure them; he uses the growing need of the cure to secure the kingship. Herodotus does not always play with the use of madness.

Due to the length and importance of the accounts, as men who go mad and are said to be so by Herodotus rather than by another character in the Histories, I begin with Cambyses and Cleomenes in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 follows on with accounts of other instances of madness as it is used by Herodotus.
In order to further elucidate the way Herodotus uses madness, as well as considering some of the possible influences on his use of madness, I have included a chapter each on madness in Homer, the tragedians and the Hippocratic writers. Similarities to the way these writers perceive madness can be seen in Herodotus’ *Histories*, such as the violence of battle madness seen in Homer, the use of madness as a divine punishment in tragedy, and the perception of madness as an illness, or illness-related, in the Hippocratic writings. It is difficult to say whether Herodotus ‘borrowed’ their perceptions of madness for his own work, and I do not attempt to address this question, but what may be said is that in the literary environment of the time, Herodotus’ portrayal of madness is has similarities to all three genres.

Some elements of each genre are useful in explaining, or further explaining a particular aspect of madness as Herodotus uses it, and I have endeavoured to keep the focus on Herodotus’ work. For this reason I have started with Herodotus’ *Histories* before discussing Homer in Chapter 3, tragedy in Chapter 4 and the Hippocratic corpus in Chapter 5. I have separated these authors into their own chapters, rather than integrating them with the Herodotean chapters because they are worthy of attention in their own right, and would have lost impact in footnotes; in addition to this, they tended to vie with the Herodotean passages if they were in the main text, as I initially arranged them.

I have endeavoured to be consistent with my use of spelling particular names. For the most part I use the Latinised forms, but in some instances I have transliterated the Greek forms. All translations, Greek and otherwise, are my own.
Chapter One

Madness in Context: Cambyses

Cambyses’ madness is the most extensively described madness in the Histories, and as a result it is very tempting to think that this description should contain clues, or be a paradigm for every other occurrence of madness in the Histories. Unfortunately this is a dangerously seductive, and ultimately unfruitful, path to take. While Cambyses turns out to be our prime example for madness as involving transgressions against custom, we cannot freely transfer this principle to all other instances of madness.

Of rulers (and particularly Eastern rulers) whom we have encountered prior to Cambyses, a few demonstrate qualities which could be considered mad and madness has been used of some of them as well, whether by someone else or by the ruler himself in the demonstration of a principle. To date, Astyages and Cyrus have been called mad by someone else, while the Egyptian king, Amasis, points out that he doesn’t want to go mad from overwork; and although we might, for example, expect Candaules and Cyrus to go mad from their transgressions of custom, they do not. To be called mad by someone in the text is not quite the same as being called mad by the author of the narrative, so not only is Cambyses our first ‘author-legitimised’ madman, but he is also the first instance of someone ‘mad’ whose madness continues over a period of time and is discussed as such.

The shock-value provided by the madness in the Cambyses logos also sets him apart from other Persian kings. As readers/the audience, we have come across kings and rulers before, many of whom are despotic and tyrannical, such as Candaules, Croesus, Astyages and Cyrus. Another ‘tyrannical despot’ might become par for the course if used too often in the narrative, but Cambyses has this distinction: he is not only a tyrannical

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12 Candaules, 1.10.2-3; Astyages, 1.108.3-4; Darius, 1.187.3-5; Cyrus, 1.189.3-4.
13 Astyages, 1.109.2; Cyrus, 1.212.2-3.
14 Amasis, 2.173.4.
despot and king; he is also a mad one. This serves to make Cambyses a memorable king in a narrative which will cover the lives of many kings, who have, as Bratt has noted, a great deal in common in their portrayals.

Cambyses’ madness is reasonably simple in itself, but is complicated by many themes which converge in the logos. As will be seen in other cases of madness, Herodotus tends to use Cambyses’ mad episodes to highlight various themes found not just in the life of Cambyses but in Books 2 and 3 also. These themes will be dealt with, but the most important aspect of Cambyses’ madness is Herodotus’ attitude towards it and use of it in the context: we must always bear in mind that Cambyses’ symptoms of madness, his disregard for nomos and sacred matters, may only be clear symptoms of madness in this particular logos, because it is here that Herodotus’ sources call Cambyses mad and Herodotus lists the actions which prove this. Others who disregard such matters in exactly the same way are not called mad, nor should we assume they are to be

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16 Immerwahr (1966: 307) does not see Cambyses’ madness as the distinguishing feature of his reign, unlike Waters (1971: 54). Immerwahr says ‘Herodotus establishes the individuality of the great Eastern kings simply by developing in each case a particular aspect of the overall cycle of rise and fall. Croesus’ wealth, Cyrus’ apparent divinity, Cambyses’ legitimacy, Darius’ unlimited power, Xerxes’ “chosen necessity” at the end of a long development – these features are causes both of their successes and of their failures.’ It is true that Cambyses’ madness can’t really be called a cause of success; we might have to say that his temper was the cause of his success in Egypt, as this was the motivating emotion for attacking the country (3.1.5), and by the same token his temper was the cause of his failure in Ethiopia (3.25.1-7).

17 Bratt (1985: 8-9). He concentrates on Croesus, Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius, Xerxes and Mardonius and notes that ‘Beneath the complexity of Herodotus’ portrayal of the monarchs lie four shared elements which may be regarded as the nucleus for a cluster of other common traits…The four cardinal elements in the typical portrayal of the oriental monarchs are these: emotional extravagance and instability, aggressiveness, weakness in judgement, and failure to profit from warnings.’ He later says of the kings (Pg. 36) that ‘among the qualities which link them most directly to each other these flaws are more conspicuous than their admirable traits…magnanimity, thirst for fame, and self-awareness do not destroy the oriental monarchs…Instead, in the historian’s view their impetuousness, folly, indifference to warnings, and false hopes bring each of them in turn to his own catastrophe…the emphasis Herodotus gives to parallels among the monarchs does not obliterate the individuality of each of them’. See also n. 34, where he supports Waters’ view of the individuality of the kings. Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 20) also see Cambyses as the epitome (Musterbild) of a tyrant, albeit a ‘bad-tempered’ (launischen) and ‘distrustful’ (argwöhnischen) one. Though this piece I shall endeavour to note which of Cambyses’ actions conform to the ‘Eastern King’ or ‘Tyrant’ image.

18 See for example 1.8.4 – 1.10.2, 1.174.3 – 1.174.6, 1.183.2-3, 1.189.3-4, 3.109.1-2 (an abstract example), 4.76.3-6, 4.78.3 – 4.80.5, 4.164.1 – 4.164.4, 5.85.1-2, 5.86.1-4, 6.86α.2 – 6.866.1, 6.138.1-6.139.1, 7.35.1, 7.133.1 – 7.134.1, 7.197.1-2, 8.105.1 – 8.106.4, 9.78.3 – 9.79.2, 9.93.3 – 9.94.3, 9.116.1 – 9.120.4. These transgressions are punished, but are not always punished with madness; the one exception is 5.85. So although transgression and punishment is a consistent theory, transgression punished by madness is not. What we are likely to be expected to feel when we hear of someone transgressing custom or sacred matters is a sense of foreboding. Harrison (2000: 104) notes this theme also: ‘The idea that crimes will inevitably be punished also constitutes the moral implicit in a number of stories, such as that of Pheretime…Time and
considered as mad, unless Herodotus says so. Herodotus has decided to prove that Cambyses was mad and amasses a quantity of transgressions to do so; such proofs also serve to portray Cambyses’ character in a very negative light.

Therefore it is crucial to understand that in this *logos*, Herodotus is most interested to present evidence for the case of Cambyses’ madness, as a direct response to the statement of the Egyptians in 3.30.1, where they say Cambyses was indeed mad. This is the main reason for focussing on the madness. The mad actions of Cambyses are, in this context, just a list of proofs which demonstrate that what the Egyptians say is correct, in Herodotus’ view; such proving of points is part of Herodotus’ task as a *histór*.

As a result, Herodotus is only sometimes interested in what actions are symptomatic of

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19 Bratt notes (1985: 37) that Cambyses ‘is unique in showing no positive qualities at all’. Paterson’s study (2002: 26-27) supports the idea that Cambyses is a completely negative character: ‘Herodotus… continues to characterise Cambyses as a man who transgressed the νόμος of reciprocity in [Pg. 27] on all his relationships – a man who had no comprehension of the concept of participating in positive reciprocal relationships with others.’ Bratt also says (Pgs. 170, 171) that ‘in every case except Cambyses’ the monarch receives at least one message of encouragement to pursue the course which leads eventually to his ruin’ and ‘in all six descriptions of campaigns that end in failure the king is warned about the peril he confronts: furthermore, these warnings come repeatedly to all monarchs except Cambyses.’ This also indicates an entirely negative portrayal, if Cambyses is ‘allowed’ to go his way with no warning except that of Croesus, which was so badly received (3.36.1-4). Perhaps Cambyses needs no encouragement to continue on the path to ruin because he himself acts as his own adviser? After all, he ‘takes his own counsel’ (ἐβουλεύσατο, 3.17.1) and decides to embark on three simultaneous campaigns (Bratt, Pg. 20).

Evans (1991: 72), on the other hand, sees this negative characterisation of Cambyses as the result of ‘denigration of special interest groups’, in this case ‘the brutality of his conquest of Egypt was part of a tradition that the Egyptian priesthood promoted’. See Lateiner (1989: 171, and n. 29) for similar thoughts, although his comment that ‘Cambyses, for instance, probably respected local cults in all the provinces and probably did not kill the Apis calf’ prompts me to respond that we have no need or reason to guess at what may or may not have been the case in the lack of any other evidence. Evans’ comment that ‘Cambyses showed the ugly side of imperialism, but he was mad’ does not take into account the ‘ugly side of imperialism’ shown by all the eastern monarchs; Immerwahr (1966: 169) has a similar theory, but as Bratt has shown, most of the eastern monarchs have the same characteristics (see n.4 below), so therefore we cannot say that madness is extreme tyranny; it is not even the case that Cambyses has ‘more’ monarchical characteristic than the others, as I shall note in appropriate sections.

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20 See Introduction.
Cambyses’ madness; he is not overly interested in why Cambyses was mad, evidenced by the multiple vague explanations he gives, none of which he specifically endorses himself; what we can say is that his effort to prove the Egyptians to be correct supports their statement that it was Cambyses’ stabbing of the Apis bull which caused his madness. The statement ‘Cambyses, as the Egyptians say, went mad from then on because of this intentional offence, although he wasn’t sensible previously’ (Καμβύσης δέ, ὡς λέγουσι Αἰγύπτιοι, αὐτίκα διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδίκημα ἑμάνη, ἐὼν οὐδὲ πρότερον φρενήρης, 3.30.1) is the moot point which Herodotus sets out to prove\(^\text{21}\). He has mentioned Cambyses’ lack of normality earlier: he has been ‘mad and not sane’ (ἔμμανής τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐ φρενήρης) at 3.25.2 and ‘fairly mad’ (ὑπομαργότερος) at 3.29.1. These statements were explanatory of his behaviour at the time, but were by no means the comprehensive list of evidence which we are given after 3.30.1. Only after the Egyptians’ opinion does Herodotus seek to prove anything. At the same time, however, the earlier remarks he himself made on Cambyses’ madness are validated because he agrees with the Egyptians.

This is hardly the only instance where Herodotus seeks to prove a particular point which someone, specified or unspecified, has made. Even a set of examples restricted to the first three books is reasonably lengthy, with a marked concentration in Book 2, the Egyptian excursus. Herodotus himself says in the proem that his work is a ἱστορίης ἀπόδεξις, a presentation of his inquiry. His inquiries often involve a proving or an examining of his sources or of the facts which he chooses to present\(^\text{22}\). The first example is arguably in 1.24.8, where Herodotus mentions the statue dedicated by Arion, of a man riding a dolphin, to lend credence to the story which the Corinthians and Lesbians say really did occur (1.23.1-1.24.7)\(^\text{23}\). The numerous examples from Book 2 indicate a definite push on Herodotus’ part to prove and disprove varying reports about Egypt, to verify the truth of his accounts, or at least to offer a considered opinion on what is most

\(^{21}\) Lang (1984: 50) mentions this point, but only in passing, while discussing 3.32.2: ‘because this is one of several anecdotes proving his madness it motivates…his murder of his sister-wife.’

\(^{22}\) See further Dewald (1987:147-170, especially 159-163) and Marincola (1987:121-137).

\(^{23}\) For other discussions of Arion and his place in the Histories, see Gray (2001:11-28) and Flory (1978a: 411-421).
likely\textsuperscript{24}. The single other example from Book 3 also concerns Cambyses: In 3.2.1-2, Herodotus argues that Cambyses cannot be the son of Nititis, as the Egyptians say, because the Persians would not let an illegitimate son rule if there were a legitimate one, as the Egyptians were aware (3.2.2), and Cambyses was the son of Cassandane, not an Egyptian\textsuperscript{25}.

\textsuperscript{24} Examples: 1.57.1-3, a discussion of the reasons why the Pelasgians probably didn’t speak Greek and the Attic people must have learnt a new language.

1.192.1-4 Herodotus lists numerous attributes which prove the resources of Babylon.

2.4.2, Herodotus lists some of the things the Egyptian priests say about religious matters which they were the first to establish, and adds that ‘so these men demonstrated that the majority of things were in fact this way’ τούτων μὲν νυν τὰ πλέω ἔργῳ ἐδήλουν οὕτω γενόμενα, seemingly contrasting this evidence with that for their statement about the first Egyptian king (βασιλεῦσαι δὲ...ἔλεγον).

2.5.1-2, He demonstrates the evidence for his reason for supporting the priests’ statement in 2.4.3, that in those ancient times parts of Egypt were under water.

2.20-27, Herodotus lists three Greek theories as to the nature of the Nile floods and Etesian winds (which he brings up initially in 2.19.1-3); he disproves the first in 2.20.1-3, the third in 2.22.1-4, and the second, mentioned in 2.21.1, is scorned in 2.23.1 as being too silly to argue about. He then gives his own opinion in 2.24.1-2 and expands on the evidence for this in 2.25.1-2.27.1.

2.33.2-4, Herodotus gives his support for Etearchus’ conclusion concerning the Nile.

2.43.1-45.3, Herodotus claims the Egyptians are right about Heracles’ being one of the Twelve Gods (2.43.1-4) and describes a lengthy inquiry which proves that there were two types of Heracles (2.44.1-5). He then disproves a story the Greeks tell about Heracles in Egypt (2.45.1-3).

2.58.1, Herodotus gives his evidence for making the claim that the Greeks copied religious festivals and processions and gatherings from the Egyptians.

2.75.1-4, a reverse paradigm: Herodotus discusses the many winged-snake bones he saw in part of Arabia (2.75.1), then gives the story associated with why they are there: they are killed by ibises (2.75.3), which is why the Arabians say the Egyptians value the ibis (2.75.4).

2.104.1-105.1, He lays out the reasons why he and others believe that Colchians are actually Egyptian. 2.112.2, He discusses why he thinks the ‘Foreign Aphrodite’ sanctuary refers to Helen.

2.120.1-5, Herodotus gives the reasons why he thinks the Egyptian version of the story of Menelaus and Helen (2.118.1-119.3) is plausible.

2.131.1-3, The alternate story of Mycerinos and his daughter is nonsense, Herodotus thinks, and gives evidence for his stance in the matter of the statue hands (2.131.3).

2.146.1-2, He gives his reason for thinking that the Greeks heard of Pan and Dionysus later than other gods. 2.150.1-4, Herodotus, interested to know where the dirt excavated from Lake Moeris goes, finds the explanation that it is dumped in the Nile plausible, as he had heard reports of something similar happening in Ninus in Assyria.

\textsuperscript{25} Immerwahr (1966: 167-8) sees a broader theme in this: that Cambyses ‘derives both his greatness and his decline from the idea of legitimate succession. Loyalty to his dynasty and respect for custom (royal succession is a matter of custom, as is seen in the story of Xerxes’ succession at the beginning of Book 7) are Cambyses’ original attitudes. He reverses both, and his end is due to his disrespect for Egyptian custom, while the end of his family’s rule is caused by his murder of relatives. The first motif of the Campaign Logos of Cambyses is thus the dynastic motif, which is central to the aitia-section of that logos.’ He refers to 3.34.5, and says that this theme ‘finds its clearest expression in Crecus’ answer to Cambyses’ question as to how he compares with his father’. I suppose that I have divided Immerwahr’s ‘dynastic motif’ (of which I see little more than this first instance at 3.2.1-2 and the last epitaph at 3.66.2) into the two separate, yet similar, themes of ‘siblings’ and ‘children’. Immerwahr later says of Cambyses’ reversed attitude (Pg. 168) to custom that it ‘is so violent that it could only be understood as madness.’ It is true that Cambyses adheres to the Persian nosmos of expansionism (as set out by Evans (1991: 12)) by attacking
The proofs of Cambyses’ madness, which follow the introductory hypothesis of the Egyptians, extend from 3.30.1 to 3.37.3, and encompass: the murder of Smerdis, the murder of his sister-wife, two marriages to sisters, the possible murder of an heir at the same time as his sister’s murder, the murder of Prexaspes’ son, burying Persians alive, the attempted murder of Croesus, the execution of the attendants who kept Croesus alive, opening the tombs of the dead at Memphis and inspecting the corpses, going into Hephaestus’ sanctuary and making fun of the statue, entering the sanctuary of the Cabiri (strictly forbidden except to priests) and burning the statues. All in all, these items are piled up as evidence for Cambyses’ being mad. Herodotus himself concludes at 3.38.1 ‘so in every way it is clear to me that Cambyses was extremely mad; for otherwise he wouldn’t try to laugh at sacred things and customary matters’ (πανταχῇ ὦν μοι δήλα ἐστί ὅτι ἐμάνη μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἱροῖσί τε καὶ νομαίοις ἐπεχείρησε καταγελᾶν.)

The proofs can be divided into two sections: those transgressions based around custom, from 3.30.1 to 3.36.6; and those based on religious matters in 3.37.1-3. It is important to note, however, that this is a list of evidence to prove the truth of the Egyptians’ statement; it happens to be about madness, because that is what the Egyptians were discussing.

In this instance also we may note that Herodotus agrees with the Egyptians, because of his final statement that ‘it is clear to me that Cambyses was extremely mad’. This in turns proves that although he may have used the expression ‘as the Egyptians say’ at 3.30.1, he obviously does not use it to distance himself from their opinion at all; he uses it as a starting point for his inquiry.26

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Egypt, but this is portrayed by Herodotus as something Cambyses wanted to do anyway because he was so angry at Amasis’ tricking him. (3.1.4-5).
Actions and Explanations

The actions on the ‘proof-list’ of Cambyses’ madness sometimes interest Herodotus in their own right, particularly those involving a transgression of nomos. The first list items attract Herodotus’ interest more than the last ones, so he expands on them. This is possibly because the first transgressions are those in which Cambyses kills his closest siblings and otherwise commits outrages against those close to him; the actions are the most shocking and ‘evidential’ because of this fact.

Before the proofs are offered, however, there are a number of other actions which bear consideration as a lead-up to the proof-list, and ones which also support differing themes in the logos as much as those in the list.

In 3.1.4-5 Cambyses is portrayed as a man stepping onto the road to tyranny (or monarchy as Otanes expresses it in 3.80.2-5); he doesn’t recognise the true nature of Nitetis, the daughter of Amasis (as he supposes), until, ‘after a while’ (μετὰ δὲ χρόνον, 3.1.4), she corrects his assumption; an assumption which is fairly reasonable. Cambyses does not like being lied to (unsurprisingly, and it is the worst offence among Persians, 1.138.1), but the words of Nitetis ‘you have been deceived…I am, in truth, the daughter of Apries’ (διαβεβλημένος...ἐοῦσαν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ Ἀπρίεω, 3.1.4) are the forerunners of a theme: Cambyses’ fixation on the truth and lying. On hearing these words, Cambyses, as other tyrants do, becomes furious (μεγάλως θυμωθέντα, 3.1.5) and decides to conquer Egypt. All three characteristics – an inability to see the truth, but a

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27 I use nomos in the sense described by Humphreys (1987: 211): ‘a term for established custom which according to context may swing towards our concept of law or towards that of culture’.
28 And as Immerwahr (1966: 169) and Lateiner (1989: 180) point out.
30 Bratt (1985: 46) classes Nitetis as a Protreptic counsellor, because her words cause Cambyses to attack Egypt. These counsellors are defined (Pg. 45) as ‘those whom the historian depicts inciting the monarch to some course of action’ and (Pg. 46) ‘the distinctive aspects of protreptic counsel are its appearance at the beginning of important ventures and its prevailing stance of affirmation toward the action in question.’ These scenes (Pgs. 48-49) ‘repeatedly underscore the monarchs’ tendency to act aggressively without adequate deliberation.’ Cambyses’ anger is another feature of many Eastern monarchs, and although Herodotus often uses a vocabulary (Pg. 130) ‘which describes intense emotions’ when referring to the kings, ‘anger is the passion most often reported and most vividly differentiated’. Cambyses’ anger is listed: θυμοῦμαι: 3.1.5, 3.32.4, 3.34.3; θυμός: 3.36.1; ὀργή: 3.25.1, 3.35.1; περιημετέω: 3.64.2. Cambyses cannot, however, be considered mad on the grounds of being angry more than others: Bratt points out that ‘Xerxes is most often enraged and Cambyses comes in second...More surprising are the observations that Darius is angry almost as often as Cambyses (though his reign extends over a larger portion of the narrative
desire to seek it and its opposite, lies, and reacting (largely out of proportion) to what he hears\textsuperscript{31} – will be repeated, often less subtly than here, in the Cambyses logos. This effectively makes Cambyses look progressively worse and worse. The theme of truth telling, particularly among the Persians, also continues in the rest of the Histories; it is not confined to the Cambyses logos alone\textsuperscript{32}.

In addition to these themes, we may also note another ‘seed theme’ planted at the beginning of the logos, that of children\textsuperscript{33}. The narrative in 3.1.2-4 is based around daughters of the Egyptian kings Amasis and Apries. As will be seen, although this part

\textsuperscript{31} Benardete (1969: 70) notes that ‘Speech as a cause, rather than any material pretext, underlies most of the stories in the third book.’ He lists instances where a word (\textit{ἔπος}) causes action. He adds later of Cambyses that (Pg. 80) ‘In a perverse way, true and false speech determined everything he did: deeds had little effect on him.’ On the other hand, it is perhaps not particularly surprising that spoken words should inspire so many actions, especially given the low level of literacy at the time and the prevalence of oral report. Thompson (1996: 82) sees the theme slightly differently, in terms of hearing: ‘Herodotus elaborates on this unthinking receptivity among the Persians by underlining how the very act of hearing unduly influences their actions. He indicates that there is a direct link between their hearing and their spiritedness (\textit{θυμός}); the Persians react to words with an immediacy that precludes reflection. Xerxes eventually articulates the connection: “I would have you know that a man’s spirit (\textit{θυμός}) dwells in his ears. When he hears what is good, it fills his body with delight; when he hears the opposite, it swells with anger” (7.39). It is the instantaneous impact of upsetting speech on the Persian kings in The History that prompts them to their more savage acts of revenge. There is no predilection towards the Heraclitean insight: “The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.” In this respect, Cambyses should be conceived of not as a mad King but as a distinctly mad Persian king when he commits atrocities like his arrow experiment with Prexaspes’ son.’ So we cannot say that Cambyses becomes no longer a Persian even if he is mad and ignores his own customs. Thompson points out (Pg. 83) that Cambyses is so angry because ‘that previously he had been assured that his reputation was unimpeachable.’

\textsuperscript{32} See Thompson (1996: 71).

\textsuperscript{33} As Immerwahr (1966: 168) has pointed out: ‘Instead of producing a son, Cambyses kills his relatives. The murder of his brother Smerdis actually makes possible the Revolt of the Magi, and the murder of his wife (especially if, as one version has it, she was pregnant) results in his death “without any male or female offspring whatever” (3.66.2). Because of the importance of the destruction of offspring for the whole course of the Persian empire, Herodotus has underlined this motif by adding in Book 3 many stories dealing with the destruction of children.’ See also n. 57, where he lists the stories about children: 3.1.1, 3.3.1, 3.11.2, 3.14.2, 3.19.2, 3.32, 3.35, 3.36.1.
of the narrative is not part of the proof-list, themes for which the foundation is being laid right from the start will be supported by actions in the proof-list.

By contrast, Cambyses’ behaviour in 3.13.1-4 borders on the mild. His delegation offering a truce (ἐς ὁμολογίην προκαλελέμενος) to the Egyptians in Memphis is met with slaughter (3.13.2), but that Cambyses makes such an offer is singularly peaceable for a Persian king\(^{34}\). He is even described as φιλοφρόνως (3.13.4), although, as he is receiving tribute at the time, this may lose some of its impact; all the same, when he receives a monetary tribute which is not up to his standards, he simply throws the ‘pocket money’ to the troops rather than over-reacting as is his wont\(^ {35}\). This mellow state soon disappears: in 3.14.1-3.15.4 he is back to looking tyrannical, while he taunts the fallen Psammenitus\(^ {36}\). This is behaviour typical of the Persian kings, however; as yet he is not much different from Cyrus, Darius and Xerxes\(^ {37}\).

The treatment of Amasis’ corpse is a different matter (3.16.1), but Cambyses would not be the only Persian king to transgress custom\(^ {38}\). Cambyses wreaks his revenge

\(^{34}\) The only other who ‘offers’ such a truce is Xerxes in 8.140.2, an offer which the Athenians, distinctly mistrustful, call advising ‘us to commit impious acts while seeming to do us a favour’ (μηδὲ δοκέων χορήστα ὑποργέειν ἀθέμιστα ἔρδειν, 8.143.3) and see in terms of capitulation to their own enslavement (8.144.1). Most occurrences of ὁμολογίη are not intended to be kept, apparently: see 1.61.1-2; 4.118.1-119.4 (agreement only partially successful); 4.201.1-3; 6.85.3-6.86.61; 7.139.4 (hypothetical agreement); 7.156.1-3 (while Gelon may surprise those agreeing with his clemency, he makes use of them to enhance Syracuse’s status); 8.52.1-2, Athenians refuse terms of agreement.

1.150.1-2 appears to be an exception, along with Cambyses’ offer, which, as there is no specified intention not to keep it or atmosphere of distrust as at 8.140.a1-144.5, may well be considered a valid offer. Perhaps this is an instance which may overturn Bratt’s claim (1985: 37) that ‘Cambyses, until the “tragic recognition” of his death scene, is unique in showing no positive qualities at all: he alone attacks his counsellor, slays his siblings, and scorns the holiest traditions of his subjects…’

\(^{35}\) Paterson (2002: 27), however, sees this action as another negative one: ‘Cambyses’ rejection of the Cyreneans gift was contrary to the νόμος of reciprocity which dictates that any gift, irrespective of its value, must be accepted.’

\(^{36}\) See Waters (1971: 54). Lang (1984: 50) demonstrates that Cambyses’ treatment of Psammenitus is a ‘clever-answer motivating drama’ and is the ‘best example’ of the ‘basic’ form: ‘(1) Persian king acts in conformity with his position or despotically; (2) person affected reacts unexpectedly; (3) king makes inquiry; (4) answer produces reversal or cancellation of original action.’ Other examples are given at n. 14: 1.8.3, 1.32.4, 1.207.1; 2.120.5; 6.1.2; 7.49.5, 7.162.1, 7.237.3; 8.59.1.

\(^{37}\) Bratt (1985: 50) sees Psammenitus as an apotreptic counsellor (Pg. 49): ‘those whom the historian presents attempting to dissuade the king from some belief or action’. He lists this point as the peak of Cambyses’ career (Pg.168). Cambyses and Xerxes do have somewhat in common; Immerwahr (1966: 306-7) says that ‘Another unifying idea of Persian history is the two-generation cycle, by which two pairs, each consisting of a great father and an inferior son, reinforce the understanding of the futility of despotic rule. Thus Cambyses foreshadows Xerxes, but the whole course of absolutism is already summed up in the figure of Croesus’.

\(^{38}\) See for example Cyrus at 1.189.3-4 and Xerxes at 7.35.1.
on the corpse for the insult paid him at 3.1.4-5 by bringing it out of the tomb and having it whipped, goaded and the hairs pulled, among other insults (3.16.1)\textsuperscript{39}. This disregard for the general respect for corpses is made more emphatic by the fact that it is Amasis’ corpse, the king under whom Egypt thrived and who was the subject of a lengthy, laudatory logos in Book 2. The connection between Amasis as the adviser on how to avoid madness (2.173.3-4) and Cambyses as the madman is reasonably superficial, though\textsuperscript{40}; the most that may be confidently suggested it that Amasis’ stricture on moderation are not at all evident in Cambyses’ excessive viciousness towards Amasis’ corpse. Nevertheless, the wise and moderate Amasis does flank the Cambyses logos, appearing in 2.181.1-2.182.2 as well as 3.1.1-4, and then again at 3.39.2, and more notably at 3.40.1-4, just after the discussion of Cambyses’ madness. This flanking helps to keep the contrast between the two men alive in the narrative.

As the corpse remains inviolate, Cambyses then orders it to be set alight (3.16.2); the number of times ‘ordering’ words occur (κελεύω, ἐντέλλομαι) serves to indicate Cambyses’ imperious mood and may further emphasise his tyrannical leanings. Herodotus makes it clear that Cambyses transgresses custom in this action (3.16.2-3, 4): ‘giving impious orders; for the Persians believe that fire is a god. So burning corpses is not at all in the custom of either (Persians or Egyptians)...so Cambyses gave orders to do things which were not customarily [done] for either (Persians or Egyptians).’ (ἐντελλόμενος οὐκ ὅσια∙ Πέρσαι γὰρ θεὸν νομίζουσι εἶναι τὸ πῦρ. Τὸ ὄν κατακαίειν τοὺς νεκροὺς οὐδαμῶς ἐν νόμῳ οὐδετέροισι ἐστι…οὔτω δὴ οὐδετέροισι νομιζόμενα ἐνετέλλετο ποιεῖν ὁ Καμβύσης.) Words referring to custom (νόμος, νομίζω) are repeated in this piece, introducing the theme of violation of nomos, which provides a link to and for a focus of some of the later episodes in the proof-list\textsuperscript{41}. At this stage in the narrative, Cambyses may not be called mad, but Herodotus has

\textsuperscript{39} Harrison (2000: 108, n. 23) calls this an ‘overlap between the unjust and the unholy’, an ‘equation’ which is not confined to Herodotus alone. Hartog (1988: 332, and n. 61) notes that ‘the despotes exercises his power over people’s bodies, marking them as he will, in the first place with the whip...Cambyses has the priests of A pis whipped’ as well as here. Whipping, then, is part of the tyrannical characterisation.

\textsuperscript{40} See Chapter 2, Madness in Context: Amasis.

\textsuperscript{41} Immerwahr (1966: 168) notes the theme; he considers ‘the destruction of custom’ to be the ‘second great theme’, and points out that custom connects the ‘campaign logos’ with the ethnographic discourse on
imposed a negative judgement on actions which will be very similar to those included in the proofs of madness.

At 3.25.1-2 we have the first instance of Herodotus calling Cambyses mad; Cambyses receives the report concerning Ethiopia from the Fish-Eaters, and it makes him angry (ὄργην ποιησάμενος, 3.25.1). He immediately sets off on an ill-thought-out campaign which will end in disaster. Herodotus lays out the obstacles\(^{42}\): ‘He set out...having neither commanded any preparation of food, nor did he consider that he intended to campaign to the furthest edges of the earth; because he was mad and insane, when he heard [the report] of the Fish-Eaters, he set off, and of his Greek [troops] he appointed those who were there to remain behind, but he took the whole land-army with him.' (ἐστρατεύετο...οὕτε παρασκευήν σίτου οὐδεμίαν παραγγείλας, οὕτε λόγον ὑποστή σῷ ὑπὲρ ἔκχασα γῆς ἐμελλε ἐστρατεύεσθαι: οἶα δὲ

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\(^{42}\) Bratt (1985: 20) says that the Eastern monarchs tend to be portrayed in this light. ‘In their planning and direction of campaigns the kings often show incredible feebleness of mind; they seem to give little thought to the character of their opponent, devote slight attention to the practical questions of supply, show indifference to potential risks, and do not bother to anticipate complications which may arise...Cambyses “takes counsel with himself” and undertakes three expeditions simultaneously, only to abandon one immediately, lose another without a trace, and lead the third to disaster in the desert after launching it without provisions (3.17, 25).’ Lateiner (1989: 153) also notes the similarities between the kings: ‘Each one, whatever his virtues, eventually chooses to attack, without a provocation convincing to the reader, a relatively poor, distant, often primitive, and always unyielding foe: for Cyrus the Massagetae for Cambyses the Ethiopians and the Ammonians (3.26), for Darius the Scyths (see 4.83.1) and later the Athenians, for Xerxes the Greeks. Each meets his downfall – sometimes humiliation, disaster and death – for mounting what seems a politically senseless and morally objectionable campaign...’

\(^{43}\) This may not be terribly significant. If it were specified that the Ionian and Aeolian Greeks in Cambyses’ army (3.1.1) were the naval contingent (given their position on the Asia Minor sea-board) then it would of course make sense not to take them into Ethiopia; the only suggestion of this is the sentence at 3.25.7 where Cambyses ‘let the Greeks sail away’, but they would arguably have done this to get home whether they were naval troops or land troops. The leaving behind of some of the troops may indicate either that Cambyses didn’t take everyone he had, which would be in keeping with his lack of preparation; or, alternatively, that he did take as many as he could, leaving behind as few as possible. I am inclined to this last view: Cambyses wishes to teach the Ethiopians a lesson, and the king did suggest that Cambyses bring a large army (πλήθεϊ ὑπερβαλλόμενον, 3.21.3). The size of the army also makes the lack of food preparation for going to ‘the ends of the earth’ even more ill considered.
ἐμμανής τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐ φρενήρης, ὡς ἢκουσε τῶν Ἰχθυοφάγων, ἐστρατεύετο, Ἑλλήνων μὲν τοὺς παρεόντας αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ τάξας ὑπομένειν, τὸν δὲ πεζὸν πάντα ἄμα ἀγόμενος, 3.25.1-2.) In this instance the ‘madness’ of Cambyses is a tool to emphasise the amount of anger he feels, the extremity of his anger; although ἐμμανής τε ἐὼν καὶ οὐ φρενήρης is separated from ὀργὴν ποιησάμενος by a few clauses, the repetition of ideas in such close proximity clearly associates the anger with the madness. It is the announcement of the spies (κατάσκοποι, 3.25.1), known to be the Fish-Eaters (3.19.1, 3.20.1), which makes Cambyses angry, and this is reiterated at 3.25.2 (ἡκουσε τῶν Ἰχθυοφάγων) with their full tribe name, after the imputation of madness. This is a rare instance where madness is qualified with another noun to indicate the extent of the emotion felt; this use of ‘emotionally intensifying’ madness is not otherwise often the case in the Histories.

It is significant that Cambyses’ anger stems not just from something he hears, but also that what he hears has to do with truth and lies. His actions in this section are almost identical to those at 3.1.4-5, where, on hearing that Amasis has tricked him, he flies into a rage and attacks Egypt, and then later vents his rage on Amasis’ corpse (3.16.1-3). Some of the themes evident in the first paragraphs of Book 3 are repeated in this piece. The Ethiopian encounter (3.20.1-3.24.4) is full of plays on the themes of truth and lies; in fact Cambyses originally sent the spies to Ethiopia because he wanted to see if what was said about the Table of the Sun was ‘true’ (ἀληθέως, 3.17.2). Unlike Cambyses, the Ethiopian king can tell the truth of the men who come to see him: ‘you have come...as spies of my empire’ (ἃκετε...κατόπται τῆς ἐμῆς ἀρχῆς, 3.21.2).

44 Similarly, at 8.125.1-2 madness is qualified with φθόνος.
45 Paterson (2002: 27-28) points out that Herodotus characterises Cambyses here ‘as a man who perverted the νόμος of the ξενία relationship in his treatment of the Ethiopian king.’ The Ethiopian king’s attitude is justified: ‘although the νόμος of reciprocity dictates that one must never refuse a gift, the Ethiopian king was justified in refusing three of the proffered gifts because he knew that they had been intended to deceive him. In making a gift of the bow in return for the gift of the wine, the Ethiopian king returned Cambyses’ treacherous gifts with a gift symbolising war – a clear warning that, if Cambyses persisted in his attempt to subdue Ethiopia, the Ethiopian king was prepared to participate in a relationship of retaliatory reciprocity with the Persian king.’
The Ethiopian king is not taken in by Cambyses’ guileful approach; but his harsh scrutiny of the gifts the spies bring displays the same sort of cultural disengagement and consequent misunderstanding that Cambyses himself shows towards the Egyptians at 3.27.2-3.29.3. This theme is of importance because of its repeated occurrence in Cambyses’ actions and the discussion of custom at the end of the proof-list of Cambyses’ madness (3.38.1-4). The Ethiopian king thinks the purple cloak and the perfume are as ‘deceitful’ (δολερός) as those bearing them (3.22.1,3) despite the spies telling the truth about the murex (τὴν ἀληθείην, 3.22.1); he judges from his own knowledge, naturally, and considers the gold necklace and bracelets to be shackles (3.22.2) because his captives wear gold shackles (3.23.4). He takes a loaf of bread at face value: while it may bear a superficial resemblance to the dung (κόπρον, 3.22.4) the king calls it, it is clearly (to the Greek audience and reader) not dung at all.

Herodotus contrasts some of the Ethiopian customs, but it is not a simple matter of opposites in every respect. Although in general they take food, drink and water in a simple form (3.23.1-3), they value bronze over gold (an explanation in part of why they were not impressed with the gold ornaments the spies brought), and they paint up corpses (3.24.1-4) to look lifelike and treat them as though they were still alive for another year.

As Herodotus does not specify a particular part of the Fish-Eaters’ report which makes Cambyses’ angry, we could assume that all of 3.21.2-3.24.4 is to blame. We know from 3.1.5 that Cambyses does not take well to being deceived, but in this case we cannot suggest that either the Fish-Eaters are lying or even that the Ethiopian king is lying. Cambyses, on the other hand (as we shall soon see at 3.27.3), does not always believe people who are telling the truth. This appears to be a development of character from 3.1.5, where he did believe Nitetis. He will also have moments of belief and disbelief later on the logos (e.g., 3.30.2-3, 3.34.2 and 3.62.2). However, if we consider that the Ethiopian king’s response is effectively calling Cambyses a liar, his ‘gifts’ lies and worthless in the bargain, and telling Cambyses the truth about himself – he is not looking for friendship, but to further his own empire. This lends a particularly interesting light to Cambyses’ mad anger: Cambyses does not like being told the truth, because the truth is that he himself is a liar.
Perhaps, however, the point of the story is to represent Cambyses as a man who does not understand customs right from the beginning. Because no particular reference for Cambyses’ madness is singled out, we may be meant to look at the larger picture here than at the details: Cambyses does not like being taunted or confronted by other ethnicities. We will see this again at 3.27.2. This is an early indication of Cambyses’ ongoing violence when confronted by customs of which he does not approve. Such examples illustrate and point towards the argument Herodotus makes at the end of the proof-list, that custom is king of all, and all people consider their customs to be the best (3.38.1-4). In Cambyses’ case, he restricts the theory: what he himself does is considered best by him; all people and laws, including his own, must line up with his views. So his madness in transgressing against custom is an extreme form of the resentment for other customs practised by other people which is already in him.

The Ethiopian king also makes the taunt about the bow (3.21.3), which is a sore point with Cambyses at 3.30.1 and the root of his jealousy of his brother. On the whole though, the Ethiopian king provides a type of mirror image of Cambyses which becomes effective as soon as Cambyses returns to Egypt and confronts the priests of Apis. Both kings consider other peoples’ customs (or customary objects) ridiculous to the point of lies, but while the Ethiopian king is content to stay within the confines of his own empire (as he says a just man, δίκαιος, would, 3.21.2), Cambyses is not; and while the Ethiopian king may despise the Persian customs, he does not go any further than verbal ridicule. Cambyses, by contrast, does so often. The only gift the Ethiopian king approves of is the wine (3.22.3-4), which becomes ironic when we consider Cambyses’ later trouble concerning wine (3.34.2-3).

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46 Humphreys (1987: 214) notes in this instance that, for Herodotus, ‘keeping within the bounds of nomos is what matters, regardless of the variation of nomoi from one society to the next.’

47 As Bratt (1985: 95) points out, ‘More frequent than projections of slight gains if the campaign succeeds are dire warnings of the unconsidered risks inherent in the monarch’s plan. Some of these warnings are cryptic, such as…the Ethiopian king’s suggestion that Cambyses attack him with a massive army only when he can draw the Ethiopian bow with ease (3.21.3).’ He compares the warning of the Ethiopian king with that of Tomyris (Pg. 152) and adds that ‘it may not be coincidence that Cambyses and Darius confront similar defiant monarchs in Ethiopia and Scythia at corresponding points in their futile expeditions. All three of them deliver vehement warnings to the Persian kings; all are unheeded; and all are proved right’.

48 Hartog (1988: 169) says ‘to drink wine is the mark of a civilized man’, unless, presumably one drinks too much, as Cambyses is suggested to have done. Hartog also notes (Pg. 166) that ‘wine is the only present Cambyses offers to the king of the long-lived Ethiopians that finds favor in his eyes and is not considered to be a trap.’ This interpretation is interesting when compared with 1.211.2, where wine is precisely that.
At Thebes, on the way to Ethiopia, Cambyses sends a detachment to enslave the Ammonians, as he intended to do in 3.17.1, and to burn down the oracle of Zeus (3.25.3), another sacrilegious act; this expedition also ends in disaster (3.26.1-3). The main army soon strikes trouble, due to Cambyses’ foolish lack of planning (3.25.4): ‘But before the army had gone a fifth of the way, all of the food they had with them had suddenly ran out, and after the food even the baggage animals ran out because they were being eaten.’

Cambyses did not even have enough foresight to get the army a fifth of the way to Ethiopia, and without the baggage animals the campaign is crippled, if it ever had a chance of succeeding. Herodotus makes it clear that Cambyses is no ἀνὴρ σοφός (3.25.49) when he does not understand the danger at this point and turn back; consequently, the situation goes from bad to worse. When the men hit the desert, they proceed to decimate their own numbers for food (3.25.6). It is only at this point that Cambyses notices (πυθόμενος, 3.25.50) the problem and ‘fearing the cannibalism’ (δείσας τὴν ἀλληλοφαγίην) aborts the expedition.  

49 Bratt (1985: 138) adds that the phrase οὐδὲνα λόγον ποιέειν is used here and also of Cyrus at 1.213.1; this ‘regularly introduces a misfortune.’

50 See also μαθὼν at 3.25.5. There may be some playing with the theme of perception in connection with Cambyses but the repetition and use of verbs of perceiving, seeing and knowing is so frequent that they become less of a theme per se and simply commonly used.

51 Bratt (1985: 153) lists the campaign as another embellishment manipulated by Herodotus: ‘Cambyses did not initiate this effort without any preparation, nor was the effort a total loss, nor was the retreat as catastrophic as the historian presents it. From the fact that the expedition returned prematurely the historian has apparently drawn the conclusion that it was a failure, and from stories about dwindling supplies he has inferred the monarch’s failure to plan at all. These manipulations are probably Herodotus’, since later in his own account he acknowledges that the Persian army was not substantially diminished in the Ethiopian expedition and that some of the Ethiopians were thereafter counted among the Persian subjects (3.97; 7.9, 69).’ On the other hand, for the sake of the narrative, a failure links Cambyses to other failed expeditions of kings and allows an incident which highlights his tendency to madness, or at the very least, foolishness. Bratt does note this himself (Pgs. 160-161), ‘the historian’s elaboration of the evidence available to him consistently produces certain results: it discloses in the temperament of his chief figures common motives for aggression, common false assumptions especially about the probability of their success, common anger in frustration, and common resistance to warnings.’ As well as this ‘there is a consistent tendency in the historian’s approach to exaggerate the magnitude of some of the king’s failures – a tendency which creates some artificial parallels and punctuates the narrative with a disaster at (or near) the end of each king’s reign: Croesus fails at Sardis, Cyrus at the Araxes, Cambyses in Ethiopia. Darius in Scythia (and through his agents again at Marathon), Xerxes at Salamis, and Mardonius at Plataea. In such elaboration Herodotus is engaging in a creative process common to all historians, and his purposes are honorable: to structure his
Cambyses’ fear of cannibalism may offer another aspect of his approach to custom. Despite his own failings in respecting the human body, he does baulk at cannibalism, where the human body is turned into an edible animal. The army has to come to this acme of anomie before Cambyses takes notice, and it is perhaps an indication that although Cambyses may not respect nomos, there is a limit to how far he will go. More abstractly, Cambyses’ fear may be more to do with what the cannibalism would come to; in later events he fears for himself (δείσας περὶ ἑωυτῷ, 3.30.3) and for his empire (δείσας...τὴν ἄρχην, 3.65.3). When his army is depleted his power is also depleted; if he has no power then his life is in danger; if the army eats people then he himself may be in danger too.

On his return to Egypt (3.27.1) Cambyses encounters the festival of Apis, and the importance of this event is signaled by its in-depth treatment by Herodotus. Once again the theme of cultural misperception occurs: Cambyses misreads the festivities, ‘firmly believing that they were having these celebratory feasts because he had not been successful’ (πάγχυ σφέας καταδόξας ἑωυτοῦ κακῶς πρήξαντος χαρμόσυνα ταῦτα ποιέειν.) When told the truth by the governors of Memphis, he refuses to believe that it is merely coincidental that the celebrations and his return occurred at the same time (he notes that the Egyptians never behaved this way at other times when he visited), and puts the governors to death for lying (3.27.3). So in this part of the narrative Cambyses does not recognise the truth when he hears it, prompting a response which the audience/reader knows is out of proportion, even if it is the proper Persian punishment material intelligibly, to accentuate what he regards as significant for interpreting the data, and to intensify the dramatic interest of the story.”

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52 Benardete (1969: 78) points out that all the senses are covered in the Ethiopian logos. ‘The only one of the senses that remains unsatisfied is taste...It is not accidental that Herodotus makes us reflect, by the absence of wine among the Ethiopians, on the sense of taste...’ I don’t agree that taste is absent from the Ethiopian logos – after all, the bread and wine, meat and milk fulfil that sense. Taste is, however, highly important in Cambyses’ campaign. ‘Cambyses, who broke among many other customs of Persian and Egypt the prohibition against incest, somehow felt that to taste human flesh lies beyond the permissible; even he, the king who can do anything, must not overstep it. To find out why he put the boundary here, we must look at the customs he violated without fear (27-38). He certainly was not afraid that he himself would be eaten.’ Benardete does not clarify further why Cambyses avoids cannibalism, and I dispute that he was not afraid that he himself should be eaten; Cambyses fears for his life with even less provocation at 3.30.3. Munson (1991: 60) says that Cambyses’ fear ‘identifies one dietary prohibition that is fundamental and almost universal among men (3.25.6-7).’

53 3.27.2. Eastern monarchs tend make false judgments. See Bratt (1985: 24-29) and Pg. 137 on καταδοκέω.
for liars. All these themes were seen in 3.1.1-5 as well, except that Cambyses did believe the truth when Nitetis told it; now he does not. Perhaps the difference lies in what exactly is said: Cambyses seems strangely willing to believe he has been wronged, whether in truth he has or not; the only time when he is shown to be happy to receive the gross flattery of the Persians (3.34.4-5) is overshadowed by his later perception that they were also lying (3.34.4).

In search of the truth, Cambyses then asks the priests of Apis about the festivities, and when their explanation tallied with the governors, asks to see the Apis itself – ‘some tame god’ (θεός τις χειροήθης, 3.28.1). Herodotus then gives a description of the Apis bull (3.28.2-3), thus cementing its importance not just to the Egyptians but for the reader/audience, and building up the event so that we will be aware of exactly what kind of catastrophe Cambyses perpetrates. At 3.29.1 Cambyses seeks to prove the truth (as he sees it) to the Egyptians, by stabbing the Apis bull with his sword to show that fleshly gods are not gods at all (3.29.2). His laughter at this ‘revelatory’ experience

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54 As Munson (1991: 59) points out, Cambyses himself becomes a histör in his search for the truth: ‘Cambyses does not simply disregard nomoi, he researches, evaluates and tests them’. I think the ‘experimental’ nature of his inquiries may be pushed too far, however. Herodotus as a histör examines more than one source and weighs up what is likely. Cambyses only consults his own views; even if he asks several different Egyptians for the reason behind the festivities, he does not convert his original, uninformed ideas upon inquiry of those who are most likely to know the answer. His hypothesis is completely overturned by Egyptian evidence but he does not accept the evidence. Munson goes on (Pg. 62), ‘…Cambyses is also the perverted histor, whose derision of foreign nomoi is from the beginning inseparable from the violation of his own.’ Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 176-77) points out that ‘Cambyses proclaims his claims to the truth and grants them a great importance. But he is only an actor in a parody of research in which all the ways of knowing the truth prove themselves to be distorted, inaccurate and in the end ineffectual.’ (Cambyses proclame ses prétentions à la vérité et lui accorde une grande importance. Mais il n’est que l’acteur d’une parodie de recherche dans laquelle tous les moyens de savoir le vrai se révèlent déformés, improprets et finalement vains.) Once again, it is interesting to compare Cambyses’ responses with those of the Ethiopian king, who also did not believe the truth of the murex when told about it; the Ethiopian king does not put people to death simply because he does not understand their customs.

55 See 3.1.5, 3.27.3, 3.34.3, 3.62.2.

56 Thompson (1996: 71) states that ‘Cambyses shows how sinister it can be to equate truth and custom, to measure all of human life with a Persian calculus.’ Of the appearance of the Apis and Cambyses’ actions there, she says that ‘This event cannot be accommodated to the Persian way; Cambyses consequently takes care to expunge it.’

57 Benardete (1969: 73) sees Cambyses’ intolerance as a foil to Herodotus’ impartiality: ‘his distrust of the marvellous and unreasonable will force him to destroy everything anomalous and introduce in practice the uniformity of thought.’ It is important to note, however, that Cambyses’ thoughts are not general Persian thoughts. Lang (1984: 47) notes of Cambyses’ speech to the Egyptians (3.29.2) that his rhetorical question only reveals ‘the absurdity of the position taken by the person addressed…Such questions, although they expect no answer, have more bite than a simple declarative statement of absurdity.’ See also Pg. 48, but on Pg. 49 she adds that ‘Where there is no response, as in the case of the Egyptians taunted by Cambyses, the
demonstrates that he, at least, does not see what is in front of him: a god of the Egyptians, which Herodotus has been careful to lay out for us in matter-of-fact terms. To Cambyses, his actions are no more significant than a somewhat harsh lesson for others to learn. This is very similar to the matter of Prexaspes’ son in 3.35.2-4 in the proof-list. His reactions are similar to those of the Ethiopian king, who laughs at Persian jewellery (3.22.2, γελάσας) because he thinks it is inferior shackling; but the Ethiopian king does not attempt to prove his point of view by violence.

In addition to the fatal wounding of the Apis, Cambyses has the priests whipped, a sacrilegious act, and kills any Egyptians who continue to celebrate, again sacrilegious. Herodotus now gives the statement of the Egyptians which he intends to prove (3.30.1):

‘Cambyses, as the Egyptians say, went mad from then on because of this intentional offence, although he wasn’t sensible previously’ (Καμβύσης δέ, ὡς λέγουσι Αἰγύπτιοι, αὐτίκα διὰ τὸ ἀδίκημα ἐμάνη, ἐὼν οὐδὲ πρότερον φρενήρης.) This explanation for Cambyses’ madness, with which Herodotus on the whole appears to agree, puts the madness of this logos firmly in the realms of punishment for offences against the gods and religious custom. As to the allegation that Cambyses wasn’t sane, or ‘sensible’ prior to this incident, we would have to agree that in Herodotus’ portrayal of Cambyses to date, he has not been sensible; his actions have been characterised by over-reaction, suspicion, extreme anger, violence towards others (even corpses) and the supreme example of his foolishly unprepared expedition to Ethiopia. The burning of the oracle of Zeus (3.25.3), although we hear no more of it, and may presume the intention to be as unfulfilled as the rest of the Ammonian expedition, is nevertheless a sacrilegious intention. On the whole, though, the phrase is a rhetorical tool

58 Bratt (1985: 11-12): ‘as a rule royal pleasure in Herodotus is ill grounded or ironic. The monarch’s joy springs in these cases from his failure to understand the truth…’ On this occasion, he doesn’t understand the truth even when he is trying to prove it. Bratt adds that ‘There are several scenes in which the monarch’s laughter seems especially inappropriate. Croesus and Cyrus are not serious offenders in this regard…But the laughter of Cambyses and Xerxes is not innocent.’ See also his list (Pg. 132) on royal delight. Lateiner’s remarks (1989: 28) are similar: ‘Laughter and smiles in the histories convey not benign happiness, joy, or pleasure, but scorn, arrogance, or self-delusion. Laughter is ascribed to powerful men so pleased with themselves that they become blind and too self-assured for human security. The gesture reveals by its pattern in the Histories a character’s self-destructive tendencies. Individuals who are destined to die in peace do not laugh in the text.’
which highlights the progression of Cambyses’ mental state from a mild to a severe form of madness\(^{59}\).

The proof-list begins here (3.30.1)\(^{60}\): ‘And first of his evil deeds he killed his brother Smerdis, who was of the same mother and father [as himself]’ (καὶ πρῶτα μὲν τῶν κακῶν ἐξεργάσατο τὸν ἄδελφον Σμέρδιν ἐόντα πατρὸς καὶ μητρὸς τῆς αὐτῆς.) Herodotus displays an interest in this incident by describing it at reasonable length. This crime is against nomos and not religion per se, but there is no real difference between the two as Herodotus sees it; both transgressions are in the proof-list and both types are symptoms of madness\(^{61}\). Herodotus stresses the close fraternal relationship between the two men by adding that they have the same mother and father, and then again at 3.30.3 with ἀδελφεός. This is the first occurrence of the theme of brothers, or perhaps siblings would be more accurate, in this logos, but the theme does continue past this immediate point into the story of Periander, back to Cambyses with the usurpation of the two Magi brothers, through to Maiandrios of Samos and even into Book 4, with varying degrees of importance\(^{62}\).

Herodotus notes that Cambyses was already jealous of Smerdis (3.30.1), because he could draw the Ethiopian bow to two fingers’ breadth, and no-one else could draw it at all. This information may serve a similar purpose to that of saying ‘Cambyses was already a bit mad anyway, but then went completely mad’, with a specific reference to jealousy (‘he was jealous before, and became more so’); in this instance we have not been

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\(^{59}\) See also Euripides’ Bacchae, line 359.

\(^{60}\) Pohlenz (1973: 86) says that ‘Repetition makes an imprint on the structure of an excerpt as well’: (Wiederholung prägt auch die Gleiderung eines Abschnittes ein) and adduces 3.30-3.38 in his n. 4, but does not necessarily connect such ‘repetition’ with multiple proofs of madness. Waters (1971: 54-55) sees the deterioration of Cambyses’ ‘personality’ as being ‘demonstrated by three actions: first, the removal and eventual murder of...Smerdis...;...his marriage with a full sister...: lastly, the killing of this sister...’ without referring to any other actions in the proof-list, such as the shooting of Prexaspes’ son, the burying of living noble Persians, the attempted murder of Croesus and the religious transgressions.

\(^{61}\) In which point I differ from Munson (1991: 46-47) who sees the two aspects as distinctly separate rather than fairly vaguely interlocked, even though she notes (Pg. 58) the merging of the two at 3.38.1-4. See Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 39-40) on Herodotus’ association of hiera with nomoi.

\(^{62}\) Periander’s son and his brother and sister, although to be fair the sibling theme is rather sublimated to that of children here: 3.50.1-51.1, 3.53.1-5; Cambyses, Smerdis and the Magi brothers: 3.61.1-65.5, 3.68.4 of Atossa; Maiandrios: 3.143.2, 3.145.1-3; the origins of Scythia: 4.5.2-6.2, again, the theme of ‘children’ may be foremost; Anacharsis and Scyles and their brothers: 4.76.6, 4.80.1-5. In fact the theme goes back into Book 2 also: 2.100.2-3, 107.1-108.1, 120.4, 121.b2-e4, 127.1-3; and could be considered to continue to Book 9.107.3 f.
given much background about Smerdis, as we are about Cambyses before he goes mad. The anecdote about the bow provides a little background, enough to hint to the reader/audience that the seed of jealousy was already in Cambyses’ mind, over the small matter of the breadth of two fingers\footnote{Veen (1996: 7, n. 18) on φθόνος: he sees envy as ‘an ‘oppressive menace’ in Herodotus, but at first only potentially: in theory, its fatal outcome can be prevented. But it never is…’ Cambyses’ envy of Smerdis may not be quite the same as the envy of the gods for the prosperous, but it does nevertheless have a suggestion of bringing about Smerdis’ death. Cambyses was envious of Smerdis’ ‘prospering’ with the bow, and this seems to indicate that the foundation for his murder was already there, and the dream gave Cambyses the impetus to act on his envy. Brandenburg (1976: 79) also notes the envious nature of the murder.}. The bow is a symbol of power, however, and so Cambyses is jealous that his brother is more powerful than himself; closer, as it were, to being able to successfully attack the Ethiopians, as their king taunted him (3.21.3). The anecdote of the dream builds on this cleverly constructed background and goes further, because Cambyses is mad in this next anecdote, and will therefore not be as restrained as he was before. On the strength of a dream, in which he ‘sees’ (εἶδε, 3.30.2\footnote{Thompson (1996: 87) points out that ‘Herodotus earns the privilege of judging those who regard humanity from a more restricted perspective. The one with the most restricted viewpoint of all is the (crazed) Persian king. The King alone dictates how his subjects are to understand themselves and their world. This is his great power and great vulnerability…’}) a messenger come to him from Persia to announce that Smerdis is sitting on the throne with his head touching the sky, Cambyses fears for his life and throne – ‘that his brother might kill him and rule’ (μὴ μιν ἀποκτείνας ὁ ἀδελφεὸς ἄρχῃ, 3.30.3) – and has Smerdis killed\footnote{Bratt (1985: 12) lists fear as an emotion ‘typical of the oriental monarch as Herodotus presents them’. Sometimes this fear is ‘well grounded and does not reflect negatively upon the king, although it is interesting that Herodotus chooses to report such fears emphatically’. He notes that ‘Dreams also induce terror, plausibly enough, in Croesus, Cyrus, Cambyses, and Xerxes (1.34, 209; 3.30; 7.14). In all four cases the monarch takes actions which produce a tragic result.’ I am not sure that I agree that the fear produced by a dream is ‘plausible’ but it certainly characterises Cambyses and other monarchs as being afraid for the loss of their power. In addition to this, Bratt says (Pg. 20) that Cambyses shows feeble mindedness here: ‘In ordering the secret execution of his brother, too, Cambyses never reflects on the possible consequences – in this instance an [sic] revolt against the dynasty (3.61ff.).’ But on the whole (Pg. 29) ‘One type of warning to which the kings seem impervious is of a supernatural sort, manifested in dreams, oracles, and omens. Almost without exception the king interprets these signs inaccurately or accepts inaccurate interpretations form others, unless he makes no account of them at all…’ Harrison (2000: 108, n. 23) says that this is another instance of the ‘overlap between the unjust and the unholy’, as was his treatment of Amasis’ corpse at 3.16.2-3; he also points out (Pg. 230) that ‘misinterpretation in the Histories as a whole is so common as itself to constitute a pattern’ and adds (n. 21) that ‘This is clearly a common pattern in Greek literature generally, embodied in the story of Cassandra.’ Lateiner (1989: 180) puts it slightly differently: ‘Their pre-emptive, inhuman actions (often in response to prophecies and omens) backfire, for instance for Astyages, Cambyses, and Periander (1.108.4; 3.29-35; 3.50-2).’}.
Once again, Cambyses is presented with the truth in his dream, a truth which will not be fulfilled or recognised until 3.64.1-2, and does not understand it as the truth in fact, but as the truth in light of his jealousy of his brother. He ‘misreads’ the dream, just as he ‘misread’ the festivities at 3.27.2, and once again, this misreading causes a violent reaction. The difference is that while he was willing to kill Egyptians of all kinds in the Apis affair, in madness even his own siblings are not safe from his suspicions.

There is a double account of Smerdis’ death: Prexaspes either took him out hunting or drowned him in the Red Sea. This is extra confirmation that Smerdis really was killed; the technique will be employed again in the anecdote about Cambyses’ sister, but Herodotus uses this ‘multiplying’ of confirmatory stories very often; in fact the proof-list is itself a confirmatory mass of accounts that Cambyses was mad. That some of the accounts come from one group of people and other accounts from other ethnicities is a confirming tool to indicate that more than one race agrees on the main fact, even if they don’t agree with the details.

The second confirming story in the list of proofs is that of Cambyses’ killing of his sister (3.31.1), but this is delayed by the account of how he married her and another sister. This account serves at least two purposes: the killing of a sister is even worse because she is also his wife, and the marriage is anomos, even though Cambyses does his

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66 Benardete (1969: 79) links Cambyses’ killing of his brother with his attitude to the Apis, that the divine is non-corporeal (according to Cambyses) and the claims of the body are completely ignored in this anecdote also. I think, however, that there is a difference between the presentations of the two episodes; the Apis is a god in corporeal form, which Cambyses ignores, but he is quite happy to obey ‘the god’ of his dream and do away with his corporeal brother. So there is a mirror-image diversity between the two, which although they look similar, with both corporeal forms being killed, the motivation is different: in the first case, a distinctly non-divine motivator, in the second, a divine motivator. Benardete does note, however, that Cambyses ‘did not hesitate to have his own brother killed because he dreamt that Smerdis touched the sky with his head: a dream carried more conviction than any familiarity he might have had of his brother’s ways’.

67 Paterson (2002: 29) demonstrates how ‘Cambyses’ most serious perversions of the νόμος of reciprocity was his violation of the reciprocity of kinship – killing his brother and sister, marrying his sisters and destroying his οἶκος.’ Marrying his sisters is a transgression: ‘Incest transgresses the νόμος of reciprocity because women are the ultimate objects of reciprocal exchange through whom social, political and economic relationships are created and maintained in society.’ A man who does not adhere to this model ‘refuses to commit himself to the obligations of such a relationship. He implies that he has no need of reciprocal relationships, that no man is worthy of his friendship, and that no other man’s daughter or sister is worthy of becoming his wife. The negative reciprocal nature of incest was abhorrent to the Greeks…Cambyses’ decision to marry his two full sisters was not only contrary to Persian νόμος it was also contrary to the νόμος of the Greeks.’
best to make it *nomos*. He is described as ‘lusting after one of his sisters’ (ἡράσθη μιῆς τῶν ἀδελφῶν), where ἡράσθη indicates a desire which is usually illicit, and never has a good outcome. His lust prompts his desire to marry her, an action which Herodotus states is clearly *anomos* (or in this case, ἔωθα, 3.31.2): ‘for previously the Persians were not at all wont to live with their sisters...’ (οὐδαμῶς γὰρ ἔωθεσαν πρότερον τῇς ἀδελφῆς συνοικέειν Πέρσαι.) The same idea is repeated soon after: ‘what he intended to do was not customary’ (οὐκ ἔωθότα ἐπενόεε ποιήσειν.) For this reason Cambyses asks the ‘royal judges’ (τοὺς βασιλείους δικαστὰς, 3.31.2) ‘if there was some *nomos* telling the man who wanted to, to live with his sister’ (εἴ τις ἐστι κελεύων νόμος τὸν βουλόμενον ἀδελφῇ συνοικέειν), and they give him ‘just and safe’ answers (καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀσφαλέα, 3.31.4) by telling him that ‘there was no *nomos* they sought out which told a brother to live with his sister, but they sought out another *nomos*, that the king of the Persians could do whatever he wanted’ (νόμον οὐδένα ἐξευρίσκειν ὃς κελεύει ἀδελφῇ συνοικέειν ἀδελφεόν, ἄλλον μέντοι ἐξευρηκέναι νόμον, τῷ βασιλεύοντι Περσέων ἐξεῖναι ποιέειν τὸ ἂν βουλησθαί.) Given this license, Cambyses marries two sisters (3.31.6).

The theme of *nomos* is brought back into the narrative by this account, and Cambyses, in this proof story, is to be seen as mad. Herodotus repeats the idea of *nomos* several times to make it obvious to the reader/audience that marriage to one’s sisters is

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68 See 1.8.1 for Candaules, who even if his lust for his wife is lawful in itself, causes him to act unlawfully; Mycerinus, 2.131.1 and Xerxes, 9.108.1. Even Deioces’ more abstract lust for tyranny, 1.96.2, is lust for what is generally considered a bad thing in the *Histories*, and is what unites the Medes in the beginning of the chronology of the wars. While it is tempting to say that even in lust, Cambyses is not moderate, the lust has more to do with being a tyrant than being mad necessarily. The most we can say is that it is not surprising that Cambyses should succumb to this ‘excessive’ desire. Harrison (2000: 238) points out that ‘Love is never said explicitly to be of divine origin, but frequently, at least, has fateful consequences.’ See also his n. 34. Hartog (1988: 330) says something similar, but strangely adds that ‘For the kings, for whom *eros* cannot be a desire for power, it becomes desire for what is forbidden: Cambyses “desires” his sister...’ I disagree; I believe that in his murder of Smerdis (3.30.3), ‘fearing that if his brother killed him he would rule’ (δεῖσας...μὴ μιν ἀποκτεῖνας ὁ ἀδελφός ἄρχῃ), Cambyses clearly demonstrates a love for power which, as Herodotus emphasises, overrides blood ties. Brandenburg (1976: 80) suggests that this is a custom Cambyses borrows from the Egyptians.
against custom\textsuperscript{69}. This theme is intertwined with that of siblings, which carries on from the Smerdis account. Furthermore, Cambyses still searches out the truth about the marriage \textit{nomos}, and gets it; this time, however, the truth is rather more ambiguous, so Cambyses takes from it what he wants, and does what he ‘intended’ (\textit{ἐπενόεε}, 3.31.2) all along, secure in the knowledge that, according to the letter of the law, he is allowed to do it\textsuperscript{70}. There is, perhaps, a play on the \textit{nomos} theme here: if killing Smerdis was contrary to unwritten law, and his marriage to his sisters also, he has nevertheless been careful to keep to a written law. Cambyses, the transgressor of \textit{nomos}, can really obey \textit{nomos} after all, when it allows what he wants to do\textsuperscript{71}. Herodotus makes it obvious that the judges’ answers are sophistries offered out of fear (3.31.5): ‘So in this way they both didn’t break the law/\textit{nomos} although they feared Cambyses, and also so that they themselves wouldn’t be killed in maintaining the law/\textit{nomos}, they also sought out another law/\textit{nomos} reinforcing his desire to marry his sisters’ (\textit{oὔτω οὔτε τὸν νόμον ἔλυσαν δεῖσαντες Καμβύσην, ἵνα τε μὴ αὐτοὶ ἀπόλωνται τὸν νόμον περιστέλλοντες παρεξέυφον ἄλλον νόμον σύμμαχον τῷ θέλοντι γαμέειν ἀδελφέας,). The use of σύμμαχον gives the true nature of the law: it is an ‘ally’ to Cambyses’ desire, rather than a legitimiser of it. As Benardete puts it, ‘True speech, then, in Persia means lawful or just speech; it does not simply mean the truth.’\textsuperscript{72},

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\item As Immerwahr (1966: 319) notes, ‘Change of specific customs (\textit{metabolê}) is of particular interest to Herodotus. But on the whole, \textit{nomos} resists change and thus is an obstacle to foreign conquest. The idea is fully developed in the account of Cambyses’ conquest of Egypt.’ Lateiner (1989: 153-4) also notes the number of times \textit{nomos} comes up in this passage and says that ‘More unsettling than Persian disregard of reason and justice are the frightening caricatures of justice that the kings perpetrate. Cambyses, wishing to marry his sister, contrary to custom (\textit{οὐκ ἐωθότα θεσμοί [only here]}, called his supreme judicial council into session and asked whether a law, \textit{nomos}, permitted a Persian to marry his sister.’
\item Thompson (1996: 71): ‘On a different occasion, Herodotus again has Cambyses reveal the absurdity of the Persian habit of defining as truth whatever can be assimilated to their custom. This occurs when Cambyses seeks legal authorization to commit incest...Herodotus uses Cambyses to illustrate the hypocrisy, for if the Persian king can make incest his own law, this shows that even Persian limits have their limits, at least in the case of the Great King. All others are forbidden from taking that lesson to heart, a situation that would seem to corrupt everyone involved. Herodotus’ tales of the insane king prepare us for the reformulation of the Persian approach to truth-telling that comes with the Persian debate and the accession of Cyrus.’ So truth-telling is a theme which runs through the wider Persian narrative.
\item Humphreys (1987: 217) suggests that the difference may not be between custom and written law so much, as ‘the difference between accepted and established rules of conduct handed down from the past, whether written or not, and the formulation of new rules’.
\item Benardete (1969: 71).
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After the trouble he went to arrange his marriage to his sisters, he then kills one of them, the younger one (3.31.6). As in the account of Smerdis’ death, which Herodotus himself notes (3.32.1), there are two versions of her death which simply confirm that she was indeed killed. The first account is that of the Greeks, who say that while Cambyses and his wife were watching a puppy pitted against a lion cub, the lion cub was winning until the puppy’s brother broke its chain and came to fight alongside, whereupon the two overcame the lion cub (3.32.1). Cambyses was pleased (3.32.2), but his wife wept73. On inquiring why, she told him that ‘she wept on seeing the puppy coming to help his brother, and because she remembered Smerdis and was aware that there was no-one to avenge him.’ (ιδοὺς τὸν σκύλακα τῷ ἀδελφῷ τιμωφήσαντα δακρύσεις, μνησθεῖσα τε Σμέρδιος καὶ μαθοῦσα ὡς ἐκεῖνῳ οὐκ εἶπ ὁ τιμωφήσων.) Herodotus goes on (3.32.3), ‘because of this speech…she was killed by Cambyses’ (διὰ τούτο τὸ ἐπος φασὶ αὐτὴν ἀπολέσθαι ὑπὸ Καμβύσεω). It is no coincidence that the puppies are brothers; even in the story of the sister’s death the theme of siblings occurs. The two deaths, fratricide and sororicide, are connected to each other; the mention of one causes the other. Cambyses sees the fight differently from his wife; to him, it is pleasing and nothing more, while to her it is a symbol of the truth of the circumstances. When confronted with this truth, Cambyses cannot bear it and reacts with violence, as he did when confronted with the truth by the Ethiopian king (3.25.1)74. In cautious hindsight, the action of the puppies could be said to be a foreshadowing of the takeover of the two Magi brothers in 3.61.1-3.

73 See Konstan (1987: 69) on the possible difference in the way Cambyses views the spectacle and the way his sister-wife views it.

74 Bratt (1985: 10) notes that ‘Vehement response to criticism is most typical of Cambyses (3.32-36), but angry repudiation of wise counsel is a typical feature throughout the Histories…’ So while Cambyses may accept the least amount of criticism, he is not unique in doing so. Lang (198: 50) points out that this episode is very like the ‘clever answer motivating drama’ mentioned in connection with Psammenitus, ‘except in its result’. She says that the sister’s answer ‘should cause him to countermand his order for his brother’s murder, but because this is one of several anecdotes proving his madness it motivates instead his murder of his sister-wife. This is a good example of the way in which a normal pattern used inappropriately can point up abnormality’. I’m not sure how Cambyses can countermand an order of murder which has already been carried out, but compare 3.14.11 where he does try to spare Psammenitus’ son, only too late (3.15.1). In a way the difference in his reaction now shows his ‘abnormality’ also and his progression into madness.
The second story, told by the Egyptians, works along the same lines, but differing particulars (3.32.3-4)\textsuperscript{75}; the sister-wife, pregnant this time, removes the leaves of a lettuce (\(\theta\rhoιδαξ\)) and tells Cambyses, when he agrees the lettuce looks better with the leaves on, ‘you were once like this lettuce, but you have denuded the house of Cyrus’ (\(\tau\alphaυτη\ν \mu\epsilonντο\ι κοτ\ε \sigma\υ \tau\ι\h\nu \theta\rhoιδακα \epsilon\mu\i\m\i\h\sigma\αι\ο, τ\ο\υν \Κ\υρου \ο\ικο\ν \α\ποφιλ\l\ω\σ\αι\ς, 3.32.4.)

This illustration makes Cambyses so angry he beats her; she miscarries and dies. Again, it is the veiled reference to Smerdis’ murder which irritates Cambyses, and again the talk of fratricide causes sororicide. The suggestion that Cambyses may have killed his only heir also brings in the theme of children here\textsuperscript{76}.

The next paragraph provides an intermission between the conclusion of the familial murders and marriages and the non-familial murders which follow. This short paragraph refers back to Apis briefly (3.33.1)\textsuperscript{77}: ‘Cambyses did these mad things, either because of the Apis or even another reason, because many evils are wont to happen to people’ (\(\o\ Καμβύ\ι\ς\ις \epsilon\e\z\e\m\a\n\i\h\), \(\epsilon\i\t\e \d\i\h \d\i\a \t\o\nu \ \A\pi\i\n \e\i\t\e \k\a\i \a\l\l\a\w\o\ς, \o\i\a \p\o\l\l\a \e\o\\w\e \a\n\d\h\r\o\\w\o\p\tou\ς \k\a\k\a \k\a\t\a\l\a\m\b\a\\n\a\e\i\n\))

whereupon Herodotus relates how Cambyses was said to have had epilepsy, ‘the sacred disease’. Here Herodotus combines the two ‘explanations’ for Cambyses’ madness. His proof-list is giving the evidence for the statement of the Egyptians (3.30.1), that Cambyses went mad after his wounding of the Apis, but Herodotus is mostly interested in proving the madness rather than discussing why it happened, and this lack of interest in the ‘why’ is demonstrated by the short treatment he gives it and the vague terms in which he allows the question to rest\textsuperscript{78}.

On the whole, the doubled explanation is like those of Smerdis’ and his sister’s deaths: they simply confirm that Cambyses was indeed mad. Herodotus doesn’t ignore or discredit the Apis-caused madness; he just adds another explanation to strengthen the

\textsuperscript{75} Lang (1984: 100-103) shows that this second anecdote elaborates as well as characterising the two people concerned.

\textsuperscript{76} Although Immerwahr (1966: 168 and n.57) says that the two together bring in the dynastic motif, and points out that in the first version, the puppy has a brother and in the second the wife is pregnant; certainly, this may unify the themes.

\textsuperscript{77} Harrison (2000: 85) remarks ‘Herodotus makes plain that he considers Cambyses’ treatment of Apis a sufficient explanation of divine vengeance’.

\textsuperscript{78} As Waters (1971: 55) also points out, ‘Herodotos next stops to seek the cause of Kambyses’ madness....But this topic is soon dismissed’.
case for the affirmation of Cambyses’ madness. That this explanation happens to be physical means very little in terms of his belief in it as opposed to the religious cause. He is, however, covering two aspects which may be supposed to be factors in the madness, and if there was no religious cause (or if people were reluctant to believe that cause), well, there might have been a physical cause, and, as he says, ‘So really it was not at all unnatural, when the body was ill with a severe disease, that the mind was not sound’ (οὔ νῦν τοι ἀεικὲς οὐδὲν ἦν τοῦ σώματος νοὺςν μεγάλην νοσέοντος μηδὲ τὰς φρένας ὑγιαίνειν.) Herodotus is not necessarily concerned to come down in favour of one cause or another, because that is not where his interest lies in this case. He wants to prove that Cambyses was mad; he is vague about the reason but is, on the other hand, reasonably sure that there was *some* reason, whatever it was.

Interestingly, the verb ἔωθε is used here also, perhaps alluding back to 3.31.2, where it supported and emphasized the uncustomary nature of Cambyses’ marrying of his

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79 There is certainly nothing in the text to support Corella’s (1984: 124) statement that ‘Herodotus advances the hypothesis that he suffered from the ‘sacred disease’ ’ (Erodoto avanza la l’ipotesi che soffриссе del «male sacro») in opposition to the Egyptian view. Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 67) similarly has no reason to suggest that Herodotus ‘prefers to see it as the effect of a physical disorder and of disease’ (il préfère y voir l’effet d’un désordre physique et de la maladie). Brown (1982: 398-399) also thinks that ‘Herodotus prefers for [sic] explain Cambyses’ behaviour by his mental illness rather than to derive his mental illness from his sacrilegious deeds.’ This ignores the effort Herodotus goes to to prove the truth of the Egyptians’ opinion, as does How and Wells’ statements (1967: Vol. I, 394) that Herodotus ‘leaves us in doubt...why Cambyses became mad’ and that Herodotus ‘records, without accepting, the supernatural explanation of madness; he gives a natural one’ (Pg. 264).

80 As Harrison (2000: 114) notes, ‘The criteria by which any one explanation - the amoral Solonian explanation or the ‘moral’ explanation of retribution – is attached to any misfortune are clearly matters of which Herodotus is not entirely conscious. Only on one occasion – in seeking to understand the mad actions of Cambyses towards his family – does he explicitly apply a choice of these two explanations: Cambyses did these things, Herodotus says, ‘either due to Apis or for some other reason: for many misfortunes tend to befall men’ (3.33). *Both of these main explanations can operate simultaneously,* moreover; the phrase used of Pheretime that she ‘did not end her life well’ (4.205), or of Leutychidas that ‘he did not grow old in Sparta’ (6.72.1), are both markedly redolent of the language of Solon in Book 1; yet both their deaths are also instances of retribution.’ (My italics). G. E. R. Lloyd (2003: 117-118) appears to think that the two explanations are an example of Herodotus hedging his bets. He goes on ‘On the one hand, the order in which these stories are presented may favour the view that Herodotus’ own conclusion was that Cambyses’ complaint had a natural cause. On the other, it is clear that this does not exonerate him, in Herodotus’ eyes, for his acts of savagery are still his work.’ Munson (1991: 53) says something similar: ‘Both readings apply simultaneously, but the metatext brings the second fully to bear only after underlining the first’; she does see the two as intertwining, ‘if religious offences have caused the self-destructive manifestations of madness, it is an organic and natural dysfunction that has caused religious sins’ whereas I believe the two explanations may stand without reference to each other simply as part of the proof-list. The order of the explanations does not matter so much when we consider the greater part of the narrative given to the account of the Apis, compared with the short account of the epilepsy, and the fact that Herodotus is supporting the Egyptians’ claim about Cambyses’ madness.
sister. It is not unlikely that by re-using the verb here, albeit in a slightly different way (perhaps as a pun), Herodotus means to echo the idea of customary matters here also.

However the biggest new issue introduced in this paragraph is the idea of νοῦσος and νοσέω and therefore Cambyses’ ‘sacred disease’ as an explanatory factor in his madness. Bodily illness is here used as a possible explanation for mental illness, in an equation somewhat similar to general Hippocratic ideas of balance. As Thomas says, ‘On the Sacred Disease, for instance, has much on the relation of the disease to the patients’ mental and emotional states...Herodotus is thinking along much the same lines,

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81 Immerwahr (1966: 168-169) seems to point out an irony that ‘this “sacred disease” turned into a frenzy of destroying custom, and the offences committed against Egyptian religion resulted in a final blossoming of insanity directed against Cambyses’ own people. At the same time, this illness is nothing but an extreme form of the natural characteristics of tyranny.’ As I have noted and will note, although Cambyses may indeed show signs of tyranny, the idea that madness is extreme tyranny will not stand.

82 Rosalind Thomas (2000: 34-35, also n. 8 and n. 9). Thomas documents the possible links between Herodotus and Hippocratic treatises (see Pgs. 21-22). Of this account she says that Herodotus seems to be doing his own research into Cambyses’ case. In the discussion of the epilepsy she points out that ‘In his careful use of the expression, ‘the disease which some call sacred’ (νοῦσον...τινι ὑπερ ὑδνομικγουσι τίνες), Herodotus is surely making a clear allusion to perhaps the most famous thesis of the Hippocratic school, the theory that diseases have natural causes and that the ‘Sacred Disease’ is no more sacred than others…This is rather unexpected. He had mentioned earlier that the Egyptians thought Cambyses went mad directly because of the sacrilegious murder of the Apis bull, and he implied there that he agreed (III 30.1: ‘as the Egyptians say’). Herodotus’ mention of the Apis bull tends to attract more modern attention, but in this later chapter the bull is apparently set aside, as are Persian strictures about wine (III 34).’ I may point out that as the issue of wine comes after the discussion of epilepsy that it can hardly have been ‘put aside’: it hasn’t even entered the narrative. Thomas goes on: ‘This is one place where Herodotus seems unwilling to dwell upon divine retribution, the element of the exotic and supernatural which he may accept elsewhere. What he does linger over (with explanatory γάρ) is the interpretation we know to be Hippocratic, for he notes the hereditary nature of epilepsy. This was something that the Sacred Disease was most concerned to argue, putting ‘the sacred disease’ alongside all others in the fact that it might have a hereditary origin…I have translated Herodotus’ own expression (ἐκ γενεῆς) as inferring the hereditary nature of the disease, since in normal usage it should mean literally ‘by descent’, ‘from the family’, and since in both places where Herodotus uses it, he seems to imply a hereditary characteristic. Then Herodotus suggests a link between disease of the body and those of the mind, so linking Cambyses’ epilepsy with his madness: ‘for it is not likely that the mind should remain healthy when the body is suffering a great illness’. This view of causation, seeing madness as perhaps partly caused by the physical illness, is reminiscent of Hippocratic appreciation of their patients’ mental states...Herodotus’ remark may simply be an intelligent observation on his part: but even in that case we must recognize that it would not look out of place in a Hippocratic text, and that Herodotus is thinking along much the same lines…’ Thomas puts an emphasis on the causation of the epilepsy which I am a little uneasy with, as I tend to see the two ‘explanations’ in a similar light with Apis slightly to the fore, but we should nevertheless not disregard the importance of this second explanation and its connotations. In terms of the proof context the explanation of epilepsy is just another reason to show that Cambyses really was mad; but Herodotus is also interested in this explanation for its own sake. Munson (1991: 52) also notes the connection to the Hippocratic writers, although Jouanna (2005: 6-10) is more cautious about making such connections and disagrees with Thomas.
especially...in the relation of physical ill-health and mental well-being.\textsuperscript{83} The epilepsy can also be seen as an ‘incapacitator’ of Cambyses’ mental health; sickness in Herodotus is often seen in this incapacitatory light\textsuperscript{84}.

In addition to this, the idea of health may be a theme, although not to the degree of other themes. Thomas has amply demonstrated the interest which Herodotus has in ‘the ethnography of medicine and health’ in general\textsuperscript{85}. In 3.1.1 Cyrus sends for the best eye doctor in Egypt, who, being disgruntled about his enforced removal, makes trouble for Amasis by encouraging Cambyses to ask for Amasis’ daughter (3.1.2).\textsuperscript{86} This request begins Cambyses’ logos and is the cause of his attacking Egypt\textsuperscript{87}. The mention of his

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  \item Thomas (2000: 35). There is little substance and little evidence to support Benardete’s (1969: 79) odd remark that ‘Cambyses, in his attempt to obey only his reason, turned out to have neglected the bodily cause of his madness.’ Harrison (2000:86, n.60) also links this piece to the Hippocrates: ‘his remarks may reflect familiarity with ideas similar to those put forward by the author of de morb. Sacr. (at ch.1), that the sacred disease was no more sacred than any other.’ Brandenburg (1976: 79-80) puts it oddly: ‘The king of the Persians, Cambyses, was very likely and epileptic; Herodotus knew this too…’ (Der Perserkönig Kambyses was höchstwahrscheinlich Epileptiker: das wußte auch Herodot…). He notes the similarity between Herodotus’ mind/body relation and the maxim mens sana in corpore sano.

  \item For example, when Maiandrios falls sick, his brother expects him to die; to make his own accession easier he kills all the people who have been imprisoned (3.143.2). Maiandrios can doing nothing about this, as he is sick. If one of the Immortals of Xerxes’ select fighting unit incapacitated by illness, their place is filled by another (7.83.1). When Pharnouches is sick (7.88.1), he is relieved of the commanding of the army (7.88.2). Even when νοῦς or νοσέω is not used, the idea that sickness incapacitates is still evident in such examples as when Arcesilaus is strangled by his brother when ill (κάμνω) and drugged, and as when Miltiades can’t defend himself in court ‘for he was unable because of his necrotizing thigh’ (ἦν γὰρ ἀδύνατος ὥστε σηπομένου τοῦ μηροῦ, 6.136.2). From these examples we can see that sickness puts someone out of action and allows or necessitates someone to take their place. In Cambyses’ case, Herodotus supposes that the bodily illness incapacitates the mind as well, allowing madness to flourish.

  \item Thomas (2000: 29-30, also n.2): ‘Herodotus’ Histories show considerable interest in doctors, medicine and health…We are given in various places the whole spectrum of health care….The highly specialized medicine of Egypt contrasts with the way the Scythians believe a king’s illness is caused by false oaths and dealt with by soothsayers (IV 68-9). Much of the narrative of Book III is generated by the action of doctors: for it is the advice and the grudge of an Egyptian eye-doctor which is given as the immediate cause of Cambyses’ invasion of Egypt, the action of Democedes via Atossa which is supposed to alert Darius to the possibility of conquering Greece (III 133 ff.)…The madness and possible epilepsy of Cambyses (to which we will return) is discussed (III 33), as well as various other mental disorders…There is, then, a large amount of sheer medical and physiological detail in Herodotus’ Histories.’

  \item Veen (1996: 117) would see this as showing the significance of an insignificant man: ‘the same feature can be insignificant from one point of view and highly relevant from another, or insignificant at one moment in time and important at another…The eventual relevance of the insignificant punctuates the work from its very beginning…to the end…It is thus one of the tools by which Herodotus verifies his observation in 1.5.4 that great and small are continuously changing places’.

  \item As Benardete (1969: 69) and Thomas (2000: 29) both note.
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epilepsy is followed by his self-wounding and necrotizing of his thigh (3.64.3, 3.66.2), the cause of his death. In the next paragraph we start the list of mad things Cambyses did to other Persians. The brief introduction in 3.34.1 emphasizes Cambyses’ regard for Prexaspes, his message bringer: ‘he honoured him very much’ (τὸν ἐτίμα...μᾶλλον). This is the same man ‘who was to him[Cambyses] the most trustworthy man of the Persians’ (ὠς ἦν οἱ ἀνὴρ Περσέων πιστότατος, 3.30.3), and whom he called upon to carry out Smerdis’ murder. His son is Cambyses’ οἰνοχόος, his cup-bearer (or alternatively his wine-pourer), the first of three words, the others being φιλοινιή and οἶνος, which offer another emphasis in this paragraph: the idea of wine and madness. The position of cup-bearer is ‘also no small honour’ (τιμὴ δὲ καὶ ...σμικρὴ). The initial stress of Prexaspes’ and his son’s status in Cambyses’ eyes sets up the audience for the consequent and converse lack of regard which Cambyses displays, even towards someone whom he supposedly values.

Cambyses inquires of this most trustworthy man what the Persians think and say about him (3.34.2), and receives the answer that they praise him in all things, except they do say he is rather to much inclined to ‘the love of wine’(φιλοινιῆ). On hearing this, Cambyses gets angry (3.34.3) and says that the Persians say that ‘because I am fond of wine that I am deranged and am not sane. So then, their previous words were not the truth.’ (οἴνῳ προκέειμενον παραφρονεῖν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι νοήμονα. οὖδ’ ἄρα σφέων οἱ πρότεροι λόγοι ήσαν ἀληθέες.) An intermissionary aside (3.34.4) fills in the details of this statement: Cambyses had asked the Persians on another occasion what sort of man they thought him in comparison with his father; they answer that he is a better man. Croesus, however, says that Cyrus was the better man because Cambyses didn’t yet (κώ - perhaps the only word which prevents the sentence becoming an insult)

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88 See also 2.84.1, 2.111.2-4, 2.181.2-5, 3.99.1-2, 3.100.1, but particularly 3.129.1-134.6, where the state of Darius’ and Atossa’s health also causes a war; 3.143.2.
89 As Herodotus says in 1.133.3 that Persians ‘are very much inclined to wine’ (οἴνῳ δὲ κάρτα περισσότερα) anyway, Cambyses’ tendency is shown to be excessive even according to the Persians’ own permissive standards.
have a son like the one Cyrus left behind (3.34.5). Cambyses is pleased (ἥσθη) when he hears this.

Cambyses ‘seeks out the truth’ from Prexaspes, who can be trusted, if anyone can, to tell him the truth. Prexaspes does tell him the truth, and as before (3.25.1, 3.32.2, 3), Cambyses doesn’t like hearing it. Not only that, he ‘reinterpret’ Prexaspes’ words in an even more negative light by saying that what the Persians really mean is that he is deranged. As before, Cambyses is quite willing to believe he has been wronged, in this case exaggerating Prexaspes’ answer to make it worse; he takes the one censorious comment and ignores the (largely complimentary) rest. He is also quick to find lies in the Persians’ previous words, although the two questions he asked were not necessarily entirely comparable. The back flash shows that when he hears the truth from Croesus, he is, conversely, pleased: he takes the complimentary and ignores the censorious slur on his lack of progeny (but we, the audience, are surely meant to recall the baby which died with its mother in 3.32.4), and so the back-handed compliment is lost on the narcissistic king. Finally, the discussion about the comparison between Cyrus and Cambyses stresses the father/son relationship, which echoes that of Prexaspes and his son.

Cambyses then proposes a test to Prexaspes (3.35.1): ‘Now find out for yourself whether the Persians are telling the truth’ (σύ νυν μάθε [αὐτὸς] εἴτε λέγουσι Πέρσαι ἀληθέα Πέρσαι ἀληθέα) or whether the Persians are deranged. If Cambyses can hit Prexaspes’ son in the heart with an arrow, this proves the Persians are wrong; if he misses, they are...
telling the truth and he is not sane (3.35.2)\textsuperscript{95}. On killing the child (3.35.3), Cambyses observes (σκέψασθαι) the wound and when he finds that it hit the heart, ‘he said, laughing and excessively pleased, to the father of the boy “There you are, Prexaspes, is it clear to you that I am not insane but the Persians are deranged? And now tell me, who have you seen of men before now who shoots with such good aim?”’ (εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν πατέρα τοῦ παιδός γελάσαντα καὶ περιχαρέα γενόμενον. Πρηξάσπεα, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ τε οὐμαίνομαι Πέρσαι τε παραφρονέουσι, δῆλα τοι γέγονε· νῦν δέ μοι εἰπέ, τίνα εἶδες ἣδη πάντων ἀνθρώπων οὕτως ἐπίσκοπα τοξεύοντα; 3.35.3-4) Prexaspes, ‘seeing an insane man and fearing for himself’ (Πρηξάσπεα δὲ ὄρωντα ἄνδρα οὐ φρενήρεα καὶ περὶ ἑως ὑπερηφανάς δειμαίνοντα), says that the god couldn’t do better\textsuperscript{96}.

Cambyses supposedly wants to find out the truth (ἀληθής is repeated several times) about the Persians and about himself, and wants to teach Prexaspes the truth too (μάθε), just as he did with the Apis bull and the priests (3.29.2). His acting as a histōr mirrors Herodotus’ own efforts to lay out the proofs of Cambyses’ madness in order to

\textsuperscript{95} Cambyses’ speech conforms to Bratt’s analysis of monarchical speeches (1985: 119), which ‘most closely resemble apotreptic discourse are their use of ethical arguments and their posing of alternatives…But when one scrutinizes closely the antitheses of the monarchs’ speeches one finds many false choices of the sort which characterize protreptic argument. When Cambyses poses a test to determine the validity of criticisms made against him (“if I hit the boy with an arrow they are liars, but if I miss him I’m not sane,” 3.35.2), the alternatives themselves are mad.’

\textsuperscript{96} See Harrison (2000: 173 and n. 63) for the use of ὁ θεός and why we shouldn’t assume this god is Apollo. See Linforth (1928: 222-223) for the analogy of ‘the god’ to our use of ‘the doctor’. Lang (1984: 116-117) has some interesting remarks on the speech pattern of this anecdote. She comments that the ‘Herodotean parallel (iii.34-35) is interrupted in mid-speech by a historical parenthesis that explains a reference in the speech, thus providing a splendid example of the way in which Herodotus includes material only as and when it becomes necessary…The parenthetic triad is made up of indirect question and answer with directly quoted “synthesis” that is actually antithetic to the answer: Cambyses had asked how he was in relation to his father, and his counsellors had answered that he was better, but Croesus said, “Not the equal, since you have not had a son such as he had.” The triad is not necessary to the point of the pentad anecdote except in explaining the reference to the previous conversation, but Herodotus may have been struck by the contrast between the cleverness of Croesus’ answer and Prexaspes’ inept truthfulness. The triad-pair order here may not be an intentional reflection of Cambyses’ unbalanced state, but in view of the pentad pattern’s consistency elsewhere in the Histories, this reversal of pair and triad contributes to the anecdote’s general feeling of perversity. Moreover, although Cambyses may give expression to his madness in a pseudo-rational synthesis, the only safe conclusion to the episode for his victim is a careful acquiescence.’
prove the truth to his reader/audience. He takes care to examine the wound and to ‘find out’ (ἐὑρεθῆναι) the accuracy of the shot which he thinks demonstrates ‘clearly’ that he is in the right and is sane. Ironically, Prexaspes does learn the truth: he ‘sees’ Cambyses for the madman that he is, even if Cambyses does not. The familial relationship of Prexaspes and his son is also stressed by the juxtaposition of the words ‘father’ and ‘child’ as Cambyses turns to ask Prexaspes his opinion of the shooting; Herodotus deliberately underlines Prexaspes’ fundamental role as father to the now deceased son, and does not even call him by name.

As a postscriptum to the killing of Prexaspes’ son, Herodotus also notes that Cambyses at another time buried 12 eminent Persians, while living, up to the neck (3.35.5) ‘for no adequate reason’ (αἰτίῃ ἀξιοχρέῳ). This anecdote is very unadorned compared to previous ones, and is just one more proof in the list; it does, however,

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97 Benardete (1969: 79) thinks that ‘Cambyses’ insistence on telling the truth compelled him to translate it into action; he wanted everything to be open and manifest, including the heart...The sanity of his mind (σωφρονεῖν) was tested by the steadiness of his hand; he confounded, in short, the soul and the body and believed that they were interchangeable. His zeal on behalf of truth made him forget the ineradicable privacy of the body, something that cannot be reduced to the terms of true and false.’ This takes Cambyses’ seeking of the truth to a level which I am not sure is sustainable. Cambyses does not always tell the truth (3.17.2, 3.19.1, 3.21.2), and he doesn’t want everything to be ‘open and manifest’ or else he would not have concealed his brother’s murder, for a start (3.65.1, ἔκρυπτον). He does not even like it when he is told the truth on occasion (3.32.3-4, 3.34.2-3, 3.36.1-4). We must remember that Cambyses’ examining of the heart is in order to prove his own twisted and misjudged truth, and that the whole episode shows Cambyses’ complete lack of awareness of any impropriety in his ‘proving’ his sanity on the son in front of the father. He cannot really be said to have confounded the soul and the body here because he does not see Prexaspes’ son as a soul and hardly even as a body, but a target whose heart is only as good as a bull’s-eye. The point is that he does not see the son as anything much at all.

98 Killing (or maiming) a son in front of the father is usually reserved for particularly pointed revenge, for example Hermotimus and Panionius in 8.106.4, and Artayctes in 9.120.4. Neither Prexaspes nor his son, in this instance, has committed any crime. 3.36.1 makes it clear that there is no real reason for taking such an action.

99 Munson (1991: 54, 59) thinks that they were buried ‘heads down’, which is possible, though I think the emphasis here is on the fact that he had no reason and that they were also alive. I disagree that they ‘are the objects not of tyrannical punishment but of an experiment in an unconventional burial procedure.’ See How and Wells (1967: Vol. I, 265, s.v. 35) for options as to whether the heads were down or up. Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 70) call this an act of ‘pure despotism’ (reiner Willkür). Bornitz (1967: 142) says that the emphasis on ἀξιωχρέῳ shows ‘that Cambyses does not punish without reason, but rather that punishment and offence are out of proportion to each other.’ (daß Kambyses grundlos straft, sondern daß Strafe und Vergehen in einem Mißverhältnis zueinander stehen.)
quickly tell the reader/audience that the mad acts were not just confined to Prexaspes, and
is a reference point for Croesus’ speech in the next paragraph\textsuperscript{100}.

3.36.1-2 is the ‘wise adviser’ scene in which Croesus attempts to steer Cambyses away from the course he is taking\textsuperscript{101}. Croesus tells him ‘don’t give in completely to youth and temper, but restrain yourself and get yourself under control!’\textsuperscript{102}, (μὴ πάντα ἡλικίῃ καὶ θυμῷ ἐπίτρεπε, ἂλλ’ ἴσχε καὶ καταλάμβανε σεωτόν, 3.36.1). He points out that Cambyses is killing ‘your own citizens…and children’ (ἀνδρῶν πολιήτας...δὲ παιδας) for no good reason. He advises being ‘forward-looking’ (πρόνοον), saying that ‘prudence is wise’ (σοφὸν δὲ ἡ προμηθίη), and suggesting that if he carries on in this fashion ‘see to it that the Persians don’t revolt from you’ (ὅρα ἧκως μὴ σευ ἀποστήσονται Πέρσαι, 3.36.2). He concludes by mentioning that Cyrus, Cambyses’ father, had authorised him to give Cambyses’ advice on ‘that which I might consider good’ (ὅ τι ἂν εὑρίσκω ἄγαθόν).

Here we find the theme of ‘typical tyranny’ coming to the fore. Croesus refers to youth and temper, two characteristics which are associated with tyrants\textsuperscript{103}. He tells Cambyses the truth about his actions by putting them in terms of his own subjects and children (as opposed to a target). Croesus also uses the plural here, surely another

\textsuperscript{100} Paterson (2002: 32) notes Cambyses’ ‘failure to observe the reciprocal obligations implicit in the relationship between a king and his people. His negative attitude to others, which is attested by his quick temper and his tendency to hold a grudge, identifies him as a king who had no understanding of the concept of forming positive reciprocal relationships with his subjects.’ She contrasts him with Darius, who was, on the other hand, ‘a king who was grateful to those who did him favours an generous when it came to repaying debts – a man who, in fulfilling his reciprocal obligations, formed many positive relationships.’

\textsuperscript{101} Bratt (1985: 49) would call him an apotreptic counselor, ‘those whom the historian presents attempting to dissuade the king from some belief or action’. Apotreptic advice is (Pg. 51) ‘the most common type of advice offered to the eastern kings.’ It is also, on the whole (Pg. 53), ‘unsolicited, unwanted, and unpleasant from the monarchs’ point of view’. Croesus counsel does unify various previously mentioned incidents and themes, as Bratt says such counsel often does, and ‘foreshadows subsequent developments’ such as the revolt of Cambyses’ steward. Croesus also uses (Pg. 90) the ‘direct approach’ which is ‘most common to protreptic speeches’, but here Croesus ‘bluntly warns Cambyses not to kill men without cause lest his people revolt (3.36).’

\textsuperscript{102} We might say ‘get a grip on yourself!’.

\textsuperscript{103} Xerxes is young also, see Bratt (1985: 14): ‘…a fact he cites himself in explanation of his fickleness (7.13).’ Immerwahr (1966: 179) also mentions the youth of these two: ‘The youth of Xerxes, and possibly also the youth of Cambyses, are thus not features of historical tradition, but rather natural inferences from the idea that these kings were the sons of famous fathers.’ Of Darius, he notes ‘his youth is not an important element in the account of accession…By contrast, Xerxes’ youth is explanation of several unfavourable character traits’. The same could be said of Cambyses. For temper, see Bratt, Pgs. 9-15 and Pgs. 130-132.
advisory reference back to the child who died with its mother (3.32.4, 3.34.5). The child theme is capped with the reference back to Cambyses’ own father, which is also an echo for Prexasps’ plight. Croesus suggests another way for Cambyses to act, but we may recall that he was not σοφός before; similarly, the adjective πρόνοος may remind us that Cambyses thought that the Persians called him οὐ νοήμων. Cambyses’ fixation on ‘seeing’ is given a new twist: Cambyses will ‘see’ the future truth of his subjects revolting if he isn’t careful; Croesus offers him something new to look at with the imperative ‘see to it’ (ὁρα). Finally, although it may not be regarded as a theme, the word ἀγαθόν which finishes Croesus’ speech is loaded with inferences of morality, goodness, nobility and ‘proper behaviour’ – all the things Cambyses doesn’t possess or demonstrate.

Cambyses does not appreciate Croesus’ demonstration of goodwill (εὐνοίην φαίνων, 3.36.2), and retorts (3.36.3) that he wonders at Croesus giving him advice when Croesus’ advice to Cyrus resulted in Cyrus’ death, and when Croesus had lost his own empire anyway. He then tries to shoot Croesus (3.36.4) but Croesus escapes and Cambyses orders his attendants to kill him if they find him. The attendants keep Croesus alive because they ‘understood his (Cambyses’) character’ (ἐπιστάμενοι τὸν τρόπον αὐτοῦ, where τρόπον, ‘turn’, is particularly descriptive of Cambyses’ changing nature) and thought that Cambyses might change his mind and then reward them (3.36.5). Cambyses does change his mind ‘not a long time after this’ (οὐ πολλῷ

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104 ἀνήρ σοφός, 3.25.5.
105 For the style of the monarchs’ speeches, see Bratt (1985: 115-117). Harrison (2000: 43) says of Croesus that he ‘survives to provide a useful narrative foil to Cyrus and to Cambyses, in whose careers in turn the same ideas are reproduced with variations.’ Of Cambyses’ accusations he remarks that ‘Cambyses is clearly not an unquestionable witness, but the fact that such doubts are aired at all is perhaps significant. Whether Croesus’ failure as an adviser reflects his own inability to learn the lessons of Solon or simply the inability of any man to avert fate remains an open question.’ Lang (1984: 94-95 ) classes the speech by Croesus and Cambyses’ response as ‘Pair Pattern Three’. This is described : ‘A pair of speeches rather than a single speech is used also to prefigure disaster when there is explicit rejection of positive advice or command rather than simple failure to heed a negative warning. That is, the future failure of a person undertaking action can be prepared for with one speech of warning to which he pays no attention; but if his failure is to result from his refusal to take a recommended action, two speeches are required. iii.36.1-3. Cambyses’ rejection of Croesus’ advice to behave more moderately not only explains his effort to kill Croesus but also, by characterizing his irrationality, prefigures and helps to justify his final fate.v.72.3.’

106 Bratt (1985: 37) notes that Cambyses is the only king who attacks his adviser.
but when the attendants learn about the change of heart (μαθόντες) and produce Croesus, despite ‘sharing their happiness’ (συνήδεσθαι) that Croesus is still around, Cambyses nevertheless has the attendants killed for disobeying orders (3.36.6)\(^\text{107}\).

Cambyses hears the truth from Croesus and cannot bear hearing it without having a violent reaction, as has occurred previously (3.25.1, 3.32.2, 3, 3.34.3). He accuses Croesus of causing Cyrus’ death, an allegation which is unjust even if it is not entirely unjustified. Croesus may have advised Cyrus to cross the Araxes, but Cyrus was the one who decided to attack the Massagetae in the first place (1.207.1-5, 1.204.1-2)\(^\text{108}\). In attacking Croesus, Cambyses attacks a man his own father authorised to act as a guardian and who is really the only father-figure mentioned. Rather than heeding the advice not to kill children – with the shooting of Prexaspes’ son fresh in the narrative – Cambyses turns his bow on Croesus in a literal attempt to shoot the messenger. His later regret is fairly typical of tyrants\(^\text{109}\). But in this anecdote it is not Cambyses who ‘learns’ so much as the attendants: they ‘understand’ Cambyses, and realise that he might change his mind, but they only ‘understand’ half the picture; when they ‘learn’ about Cambyses’ regret they also learn that they didn’t understand him fully after all.

Herodotus appears to play with the verb λαμβάνω and its compounds in this anecdote, although it does not really constitute a theme in itself. Croesus begins by

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\(^{107}\) Bratt (1985: 13-14 ) points out that ‘As prominent as their tendency to anger, fear, and ironic pleasure is the monarchs’ emotional instability in Herodotus’ picture of them…Cambyses’ shifts of mood are those one would expect from a madman.’ He then notes, however, that ‘The most unstable of Herodotus’ monarchs is King Xerxes.’ So Cambyses can’t be called mad on account of his mood-shifts; they are part of the nature of the Eastern kings. In this we might be better to say that such shifts are expected of the kings, rather than madman necessarily, as surely if Xerxes is more unstable than Cambyses he should, by rights, be called mad also, and yet is not.

\(^{108}\) Bratt (1985: 25) says that ‘In blaming Croesus for his own misfortunes and for Cyrus’ death, for example, Cambyses betrays a complete misunderstanding of the facts (3.36): Croesus has actually warned both men against the excesses which destroy them’, and this denotes a ‘failure to learn from experience’ which characterises the kings. In addition to this, Bratt says (Pg. 122) that while ‘Outright falsification of the facts is not too common’, this is an instance of it. But Cambyses uses the aorist (ὤλεσος, 3.36.3) to refer to Croesus’ destroying of Cyrus: such a concrete tense suggests rather than Cambyses really does believe what he is saying. There is no real suggestion here by Herodotus himself to support the notion of Cambyses lying, as there is at 3.19.1 and 3.20.1, so we should take his accusation more as a misjudgement of the facts, to which the kings are prone. Bratt’s statement at Pg. 25 was a better summary of the situation.

\(^{109}\) See Bratt (1985: 25); this is one of the few instances where the regret does not come too late, which highlights all the more the ingratitude of Cambyses towards the attendants who are able to fulfil his present wish.
telling Cambyses ‘get control of yourself!’ (καταλάμβανε σεωυτόν, 3.36.1), and
Cambyses then threatens ‘I was wanting an excuse to get hold of you!’ (ἐς σὲ
προφάσιος τευ ἐδεόμην ἐπιλαβέσθαι, 3.36.3). So Cambyses takes the idea of
‘getting hold’ of his own actions and turns it over by revealing what he really would like
to get hold of: the person telling him to restrain himself. He then ‘was seizing his bow
and arrows’ (ἐλάμβανε τὰ τόξα, 3.36.4), where the use of the imperfect tense could
here be used inceptively, ‘he started seizing’, or could indicate a prolonged groping
around for his weapons while Croesus wisely takes the opportunity to disappear.
Cambyses continues to demonstrate a desire to ‘come to grips’ with Croesus: ‘he gave
orders to his servants to grab him and kill him’ (ἐνετείλατο τοὶσι λαβόντας ἀποκτεῖναι
λαμβόντας μιν ἄποκτείναι, 3.36.4). Finally, and rather ironically, his attendants keep
Croesus hidden, so that ‘when they revealed [him] they would get a reward for keeping
Croesus alive’, (οἱ δὲ ἐκφήναντες ἀυτὸν δῶρα λάμψονται ζωάγρια Κροίσου,
3.36.5). From the three previous uses of λαμβάνω we have enough evidence to wonder
at what sort of ‘reward’ the servants are likely to ‘get’, and, sure enough, they pay for
their disobedience with their lives (3.36.6).

The final paragraph of the proof-list is reasonably succinct; Herodotus does not
appear to be particularly interested in these events in their own right, and is most
concerned in stacking up the proofs of Cambyses’ madness. He summarises the
previous account by saying that ‘So (Cambyses) did these sort of mad things to the
Persians and his allies’ (ὁ μὲν δὴ τοιαῦτα ἐς Πέρσας τε καὶ τοὺς συμμάχους
ἐξεμαίνετο, 3.37.1). The narrative then returns to the idea of Cambyses’ religious
transgressions, describing the way he opened up ancient tombs in Memphis (the scene of
the wounding of the Apis) and examined (σκεπτόμενος) the corpses, laughed at the
(pygmy-like) statue of Hephaistos in the sanctuary (3.37.2), entered the sanctuary of the

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110 Evans (1991: 53-54) notes the similarity between Astyages’ treatment of Harpagus ‘for disobeying an
order that no longer mattered’ (1.119.1-7) and Cambyses’ treatment of the guards here ‘even though he
himself had already repented of the order.’ They are ‘unbalanced autocrat[s]’, ‘Both are examples of
despotism beyond reason.’

111 Oddly, Evans (1991: 56-57) appears to take these examples only as evidence for Cambyses’ madness.
Cabiri (said to be the sons of Hephaistos), forbidden to all but the priest, and after mocking these (pygmy-like) statues also, burnt them (3.37.3).

Cambyses is still shown to be a histōr, in this anecdote ‘examining’ ancient Egyptian corpses, although his reasons for doing so are not stated. At any rate, in fulfilling his desire to ‘look at’ such things he offends the largely universal respect for the dead. He has no respect for the sanctuaries of Hephaistos or the Cabiri, in the latter case going where no person apart from the priest has gone before. His disrespect for the short (and possibly deformed - Hephaistos was meant to be lame, after all) god and his sons is very like that of his disrespect for Apis (3.29.2); Hephaistos was apparently not god-like enough, in Cambyses’ opinion.

Finally Herodotus concludes by giving it as his opinion (3.38.1) ‘so in every way it is clear to me that Cambyses was extremely mad; for otherwise he would not have decided to laugh at sacred things and customs’ (πανταχῇ ὦν μοι δῆλα ἔστι ὁτι ἐμάνη μεγάλως ὁ Καμβύσης· οὐ γάρ ἄν ἱροῖσι τε καὶ νομαίοισι ἐπεχείρησε καταγελάων.) This neatly sums up both types of transgression under the same heading. The use of ἱρα recalls previous examples of Cambyses’ irreligious behaviour, such as in 3.28-29; the use of νόμος recalls 3.16 and 3.31, and the idea is also expanded in this paragraph, with the word νόμος and the verb νομίζω used in high frequency. The use of καταγελάω here and γέλωτα in 3.38.2, where he says ‘so it is not reasonable that some (person) other than a mad man would laugh at such matters’ (οὐκ ἄν οἰκός ἐστι ἄλλον γε ἢ μανόμενον ἄνδρα γέλωτα τὰ τοιαύτα τίθεσθαι, 3.38.2), harks back not just to the episode with the statue of Hephaistos

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112 Harrison (2000: 190) compares this section with 9.65.2 and comments that ‘Herodotus speculates over ‘divine matters’ in the same breath as he expresses concern over the validity of such speculation. It is not then that Herodotus considers any attempt to venture an opinion concerning the divine worthless…only that such an opinion requires some accompanying statement of reservation, that speculation should be attempted in the sure belief that certain knowledge is impossible. A similar caution is reflected elsewhere:…in his observation that Cambyses must have been mad to mock the ‘sacred things’ and the customs of the Egyptians…” Harrison usually specifies that the Egyptian customs are the ones violated – possibly more overtly so, but as I hope I have shown, there is reason to believe that Herodotus is suggesting that Cambyses violated his own customs also.
but also to the killing of Prexaspes’ son (3.35.3), and further back to the act which may have triggered the complete madness, the stabbing of the Apis (3.29.1-2).

Herodotus discusses custom briefly (3.38.1), emphasising the importance of custom to all people; if you were to tell all mankind to pick out the best customs: ‘after a complete examination each would choose their own; in this way each consider their own customs to be the best by far.’ (διασκεψάμενοι ἂν ἐλοίατο ἐκαστοι τοὺς ἑωυτῶν· οὔτω νομίζουσι πολλόν τι καλλίστους τοὺς ἑωυτῶν νόμους ἐκαστοι εἶναι.)

This is why only a madman would laugh at such matters. There is a play on the idea of ‘seeing’ here: Cambyses likes to examine and observe various things, and ‘sees’ matters in a false light reasonably often, but everyone else, ‘after a complete examination’ would say their own customs were best. Cambyses gives many things a thorough examination, but the only time he ‘examined’ his own customs (3.31.2) he got the royal judges to do the work, and even then took the custom which suited him (3.31.5); in this sense, his own custom was best. But Cambyses prefers it when he can make custom conform to his wishes, rather than conforming himself to custom.

Herodotus proceeds to give an example of the universal respect for the dead (or one’s dead parents, at any rate) by relating how Darius made the experiment of asking (3.38.3) some Greeks how much money they would take to eat their dead parents, and asked the same question of the Kallatia Indians, who did eat their dead parents (3.38.4), how much money they would take to cremate them instead. Both peoples are horrified at the very idea. Herodotus finishes by saying that ‘Pindar seems to me to put it right (when he says) custom is king of all’ (ὦρθως μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα εἶναι).

There are several points to be made about this last paragraph. Herodotus deliberately chooses one of many examples to show that people have the greatest respect for their own customs, and his chosen example discusses respect for the dead. This may remind us of Cambyses’ lack of respect for the dead, demonstrated in 3.16.1-3, 3.35.3

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113 The Apis, 3.28.1; dog fights, 3.32.2; wounds, 3.35.3; corpses, 3.37.1; statues, 3.37.2-3.
114 3.27.2, 3.30.2, 3.32.1-2.
and 3.37.1, a selection which spans from near the beginning of Cambyses’ *logos* to this comment at the end of the study of his madness.

Furthermore, the point that custom is king of all is curiously evocative; even Darius, though a king, could not sway the different peoples from their favoured method of dealing with the dead. The contrast between Darius, the subsequent king, and Cambyses, the current, mad king, is clearly made. Darius is shown here to be a better king because he recognises that there is a king which rules even himself: custom. Cambyses not only does not respect other peoples’ customs, but tries to get around his own Persian customs when they don’t suit him (3.31.1-6). It is perhaps not by coincidence that Darius asks the Greeks ‘how much money would they want’ (ἐπὶ κόσῳ ἄν χρήματι βουλοίτο, 3.38.3) for them to eat their dead parents; Cambyses’ favoured law is the one which allows him to do τὸ ἄν βουληται (3.31.4). The Greeks wouldn’t take any amount to make them change; Cambyses does not want to change his law either, although it allows him to transgress all sorts of customs. Herodotus shows us a king who considers himself to be the king of all custom, and then finishes this part of the *logos* with the pithy quote that turns Cambyses’ perception on its head.\(^\text{115}\)

So we can see that in the mad actions of the proof-list, Herodotus uses such actions to highlight different themes which run through the whole Cambyses *logos*, such as truth and lies, seeing and understanding, and customs; and even some which have

\(^{115}\) Harrison (2000: 212), while discussing divinities, comments that ‘Herodotus appears to conceive of a finite number of deities, revealed to different peoples rather in the manner of an advent calendar: any given people has knowledge of a number of these deities; none has knowledge of all. Parallel to this process of identification is the moral, expressed most clearly in Herodotus’ judgement on Cambyses that men should respect the gods revered by others’; he adduces 3.38.1. However, he goes on (Pgs. 214-215) to say that ‘This picture of a tolerant universalism must be qualified…On a number of occasions in the *Histories*, it appears to be the gods themselves rather than their shrines that distinguish the Greeks from foreigners; the principle of identification, so deep-rooted elsewhere is momentarily forgotten. In many of these cases, the apparent lapse can be explained by its context. Apis is described as ‘the god of the Egyptians’ even as, through Cambyses’ fatal injury, he shows his orbit to be unlimited (3.64.3).’ He also notes the universality of Apollo’s power, and points out (Pgs. 216-217, see also n.32) that ‘Though Herodotus’ judgement on Cambyses may reveal then a belief that men should not actively mock or violate the sacred customs of others…disapproval is still apparently an available option: indeed the designation of a god as local seems itself a mark of disapproval. Herodotus’ remarks on Cambyses have been described by John Gould as ‘an argument for respecting the traditions of all cultures’, but this should not be mistaken for an all-out cultural relativism.’ He refers to 1.199.1 as an example. Harrison is citing Gould (1994: 93), ‘Herodotus and Religion’, in S. Hornblower (ed.), *Greek Historiography* (Oxford), 91-106.
wider applications in the *Histories*, such as what tyrants are like, children and siblings and customs among other peoples. In this way the madness supports important messages in and outside the *logos*, even if the type of madness itself is fairly straight-forward and the proof-list is in answer to the question of whether Cambyses was really mad or not.

In other instances of madness in the *Histories*, the one calling another person mad often does not understand why the ‘mad’ person is doing what they are doing. In Cambyses’ case, Herodotus indicates that he does not understand why Cambyses would contravene custom and sacred matters. Even more intriguing are the hints we get that *Cambyses* does not understand or care a great deal about his own customs, apart from his favoured law, and the indications that he possibly hardly knows even his own mind. Not only do we have his firing of Amasis’ corpse, which Herodotus specifies as being against both Persian and Egyptian custom (3.16.2-4), but his marriages to two of his sisters are not customary for Persians (3.31.2), even if the royal judges offer Cambyses a way of doing what he wants because they fear them (3.31.5). Normally, a Persian would want to have sons (1.136.1) as it proves their manliness (*ἀνδραγαθίη*), but Cambyses supposedly killed his only offspring and ignored the advice which would make him *ἀγαθός* (3.36.2). He drinks enough wine to cause even the Persians, heavy wine-drinkers, to comment (1.133.3, 3.34.2), and although Persians consider lying to be the worst thing (1.138.1), Cambyses ‘lies’ to the Ethiopian king by sending spies under the guise of offering friendship (3.17.1, 3.19.1, 3.21.1-2). He murders Prexaspes’ son, despite the honour he has for both of them, and does not adhere to the custom (praised

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116 See especially 6.112.2, 8.10.1 and 8.77.1.
117 Munson (1991: 62) notes that his ‘derision of foreign nomoi is from the beginning inseparable from the violation of his own.’
118 It is possible to take from the generic use of παῖδας not just sons but children; however at 3.66.2 ἀπαίδα, childless, is qualified by the extra phrase ‘male and female offspring’ (ἐρότενως καὶ θήλεως γόνου), as though the extra clarity is needed, and at 5.48.1 ἀπαῖσ is used of Cleomenes, but qualified with ‘a daughter only’ (θυγατέρα μούνην). This indicates that ‘sons’ is the probable connotation of παῖδας.
119 Cambyses treats Croesus in a similar fashion: although Cyrus charges him to treat Croesus with honour at 1.208.1, this order has been forgotten by 3.36.3. People who are honoured in the *Histories* have rather mixed lots. Darius honours Megabazus (4.143.3), and treats him consistently (5.1.1-2.2, 10.1, 12.1, 14.1-2, 17.1, 23.1-4.1; 7.108.1); Xerxes honours Artemisia (8.69.1), but doesn’t take her advice; Xerxes honours the fatal martyrdom of Boges, (7.107.1); and while he is Macedonian rather than Persian, Alexander says that he ‘honours’ the Persians (5.20.4), right before he has them slaughtered.
by Herodotus, 1.137.1) that ‘no-one, not even the king himself, kills because of one charge, nor do any of the other Persians do permanent harm to their own household servants for one charge; but if, after working it out, he discovers that the injustices are more and greater than the services rendered, then he deals in anger.’ (μὴ μιῆς αἰτίης εἶνεκα μήτε αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα μηδένα φονεύειν, μήτε μηδένα τῶν ἄλλων Περσέων μηδένα τῶν ἐωυτοῦ οἰκετέων ἐπὶ μὴ αἰτίη ἀνήκεστον πάθος ἑρθείν· ἀλλὰ λογισάμενος ἢν εὐφύσικη πλέω τε καὶ μέζω τὰ ἁδικήματα ἐόντα τῶν ὑποργημάτων, οὕτω τῷ θυμῷ χρᾶται.) Prexaspes is merely passing on what the Persians say, in answer to Cambyses’ inquiry, when he tells him that the Persians think him rather overly fond of wine (3.34.2); even if this were an offence, among the ‘services rendered’ Prexaspes murdered Smerdis at Cambyses’ request (3.30.3). These factors do not appear to matter to Cambyses, who ‘deals in anger’ without the bother of reckoning up whether it is truly just or not, and is perfectly happy not just to kill on one charge (3.27.3, 3.29.2, 3.32.3-4), or on a paltry charge (3.35.5), but here on no charge at all (3.35.1-3)\(^{120}\). Prexaspes’ son is so innocent a bystander that he doesn’t even get a spoken role.

Cambyses, in addition to not understanding or caring about his own customs, doesn’t always know his own mind very well\(^{121}\). He torments Psammenitus (3.14.1-6) but changes his mind (too late to be of any effect) when Psammenitus’ explanation for his stoic behaviour makes Croesus and the other Persians weep and makes him pity the deposed king himself (3.14.10-11). Although he is using guile in his dealings with the Ethiopian king, the spies nevertheless report that ‘the king of the Persians, Cambyses, wishing to be friendly ’(βασιλεὺς ὁ Περσέων καμβύσης, βουλόμενος φίλος...γενέσθαι) has sent them (3.21.1), but this wish (if it was ever true to start with) is soon replaced with anger (3.25.1) when Cambyses gets the report back. He may well

\(^{120}\) There is no real basis for Hartog to say (1988: 337) of Cambyses that ‘In his madness he no longer even knows who he is; he is not Egyptian and is no longer Persian.’ Cambyses was never an Egyptian anyway – Herodotus refutes this at 3.2.2-3. As to not being Persian, Cambyses may disregard Persian custom, but he has many marks of the Persian kings; the difference lies perhaps in his attitude: he consciously ignores Persian custom and yet is portrayed as instinctively acting like an eastern monarch. See Thompson (1996: 82).

\(^{121}\) See Bratt (1985: 24-25) on indecisiveness in the monarchs.
lust after (ἡράσθη, 3.31.2) his sister and want to marry her (βουλόμενος αὐτὴν γῆμαι), but having lived with her long enough for her (theoretically at least) to have gotten pregnant, he doesn’t appreciate her or the fulfilment of his desire enough to prevent him from killing her (3.32.1-4). He attempts to kill Croesus, but this desire doesn’t last long before he wants the adviser back, and his changes of mind (even if they have not been specified) are common knowledge to the attendants who decide to hide Croesus away in anticipation of such a change (3.36.4-6). Finally, he later repents of having Smerdis killed (3.64.2), although this has more to do with his ‘sobering’ than with his inability to know his own mind.

**Cambyses’ pathei mathos**

An interlude ensues, dividing the madness of Cambyses from his later ‘recovery’, although some of the themes of the earlier logos may still be seen in the later one. The intermission covers the constant good fortune of Polycrates and Amasis’ advice on how to even it out (which, as it is not followed properly, does not work, 3.39.1-3.43.2); Polycrates’ campaign against Samos and some history of the Samians (3.44.1 – 3.49.2) which diverges into the logos on Periander (3.50.1-3.53.7) and returns to Polycrates against the Samians and more of their history (3.54.1-3.60.4).

At 3.61.1 the narrative returns to Cambyses and the revolt of the two Magi brothers. This happened ‘while Cambyses was spending time in Egypt and was deranged’ (Καμβύση...χρονίζοντι περὶ Αἴγυπτον καὶ παραφρονήσαντι); one of the brothers, Cambyses’ steward, was aware that Smerdis, son of Cyrus, was dead, but that the knowledge was not common. Co-incidentally (3.61.2), he himself had a brother who looked like the dead man, ‘the one that Cambyses killed, even though he was his own brother’ (τὸν ὃ Καμβύσης, ἔόντα ἐωτοὺ ἀδελφεύν, ἀπέκτεινε), and whose name was also Smerdis. So Patizeithes, the magus steward, installed his brother on the throne and sent messengers out to announce that ‘Smerdis, the son of Cyrus had to be
listened to...and not Cambyses’ (Σμέρδιος τοῦ Κύρου ἀκουστέα εἶη...ἀλλ’ οὗ Καμβύσεω, 3.61.3).

At least three themes from the previous logos about Cambyses are continued here. One which becomes rather more major in this later logos is that of brothers. This is clearly marked by the intertwining ideas of the brother whom Cambyses killed (again Herodotus adds the slightly horrified comment ‘his own brother!’), as at 3.30.1) and the brother of Patizeithes, who is uniquely placed to assist in the coup. It is because Cambyses had Smerdis murdered and the fact has been concealed (another ‘lie’ on Cambyses’ part) that the coup, ironically, can be accomplished and accomplished completely bloodlessly.

The themes of ‘truth and lies’, and to a certain degree that of ‘understanding’, also feature here. This is unsurprising given the nature of the logos and the discovery of Smerdis’ death and the plotting of the revolt of the Magi. The Magus ‘learns’ (μαθών, 3.61.1) that Smerdis is dead and that most Persians didn’t ‘understand’ (ἐπιστάμενοι) this. He sees the truth of the situation. His brother ‘resembled a great deal the appearance’ (οἰκὼς μάλιστα τὸ εἶδος, 3.61.2) of Smerdis, a thought which is repeated in the next sentence also, ὅμοιος εἶδος, as well as the same name. So Herodotus emphasizes the look of the Magus Smerdis, and thereby the hinge upon which the coup rests: someone who appears to be the son of Cyrus, but who is not. The image is true but at the same time false.

122 Both Bratt (1985: 20) and Immerwahr (1966: 168) note the irony that Smerdis’ murder means that the Magi have the opportunity to revolt at all. Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 20-21) note the same but later suggest that it is Cambyses’ madness (Wahnsinnstaten) which gives the Median Magi the chance to revolt (Pg. 69), as does Bornitz (1967: 201).

123 Benardete (1969: 83) is correct when he states that ‘The two main props of ordinary trust by which one identifies things are cut away: appearance and name’ and ‘The trust in sight and hearing breaks down’. He goes on, however, to expand the idea: ‘Nature and convention seem to have conspired together to make uncertain everything one takes ordinarily for granted; just as the dream of Cambyses that warned him of his brother’s ambition proves to have been about another Smerdis; and the oracle that predicted Cambyses’ death in Agbatana turns out to have meant another city of the same name in Syria…the public world assumes the appearance of a dream.’ We should not lose sight of the way in which Herodotus has crafted the narrative precisely so that the irony of the situation is at the fore: Cambyses killed his brother because of the dream, the false Smerdis can usurp the throne because Cambyses killed his brother and concealed it. The problem is not that the dream or the oracle have assumed some ability to hide the truth deliberately from Cambyses; the crux of the matter is that Cambyses misinterprets, or indeed, ‘takes for granted’ in this instance, the truth of the dream and oracle, a truth which was always there. Herodotus is the concealer of the facts, in this case: he doesn’t want to tell us about the false Smerdis when he introduces the dream at
The message goes out and eventually reaches Cambyses himself, who was not in Egypt, as expected, but in Syria, at Ecbatana (3.62.1). When Cambyses hears the report he ‘supposed that he was telling the truth’ (ἐλπίσας μιν λέγειν ἀληθέα, 3.62.2\(^{124}\)), assumes he has been betrayed (προδεδόσθαι) and asked Prexaspes if this was how he carried out the ‘matter’ (πρῆγμα) put to him. Prexaspes assures him that ‘this is not the truth’ (οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ἀληθέα, 3.62.3), as he buried Smerdis with his own hands, and suggests that they inquire of the messenger as to from whom he heard (ἀκούειν) these orders (3.62.3).

The false Smerdis is able to deceive even Cambyses for a while, but this is mostly because on ‘hearing’, Cambyses believes the message to be the truth. Cambyses is prone to believing bad reports (3.1.3-4, 3.34.2-3), and does so again. In this case, he is wrong, just as he was wrong to disbelieve the reports of the governors at Memphis (3.27.3). Cambyses is rather erratic: sometimes he hears the truth and disbelieves it, but here he hears a lie and believes it. Prexaspes, on the other hand, knows the truth to some degree; he knows, at least, that it can’t be Smerdis, son of Cyrus, on the throne.

Cambyses likes Prexaspes’ suggestion (ἤρεσε γὰρ Καμβύσῃ, 3.63.1), so they have messenger recalled and Prexaspes asks the man to tell the truth (εἴπας τὴν ἀληθείην), whether Smerdis himself was actually seen (φαίνομενος ἐς ὀψιν) or whether he gave such orders through one of his attendants. The messenger relates that he hasn’t seen (οὐκώ ὄπωπα, 3.63.2) Smerdis, Cyrus’ son, since Cambyses marched to Egypt, and that the Magus steward gave the orders, ‘saying that Smerdis the son of Cyrus was the man who ordered these things to be said to you.”’ (φας Σμέρδιν τὸν Κύρου εἶναι τὸν ταῦτα ἐπιθέμενον εἶπαι πρὸς ὑμεῖς.) The man was ‘not making anything up’ (οὐδὲν ἐπικαταψευσάμενος, 3.63.3), and Cambyses apologises (for the

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3.30.2 because his object there is to highlight the terrible action of fratricide. The episode about the false Smerdis is suitable to be emphasised later, in a narrative where he discusses Cambyses’ revelations of the truth and his belated and ineffective conversion to sanity.

\(^{124}\) Bratt (1985: 136-138) lists this as a false assumption, common among the Oriental kings.
first time) to Prexaspes\textsuperscript{125}: ‘you are a fine man, you did what you were ordered and are free of blame’ (σὺ μὲν οἷα ἄνὴρ ἀγαθὸς ποιήσας τὸ κελευόμενον αἰτίην ἐκπέφευγας). One question puzzles him, as to who can be using Smerdis’ name, and Prexaspes again clarifies the issue by saying ‘I think I understand’ (ἐγώ μοι δοκέω συνιέναι, 3.63.4) that it is the Magus Patizeithes and his brother Smerdis.

Prexaspes’ understanding has the effect of demonstrating that he knows better than the king. This emphasises Cambyses’ ignorance of his own people and kingdom, and such emphasis is crucial for building up to the highpoint of Cambyses’ revelation. Two other points are noteworthy: Cambyses is ‘pleased’ with Prexaspes’ suggestion at 3.63.1, and in the proof-list this would normally indicate a macabre or short-lived and violently overturned pleasure\textsuperscript{126}. In this instance, however, no such nuances apply, possibly because the verb ἀρέσκω is used only here to describe Cambyses, but possibly too because in this part of the logos Cambyses is hardly a madman at all. This change of pleasure may indicate his progress on the way to self-knowledge. Finally, Cambyses calls Prexaspes a ‘fine man’ (ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς), a phrase which also has two connotations. Cambyses has never complimented anyone before, and doing so now makes it rather novel as well as indicating, along with his ‘pleasure’ at Prexaspes’ suggestion, that Cambyses in this logos is a different man from the one in the proof-list. Cambyses did not appreciate people before; perhaps he is doing so now. The phrase also reminds us, however, that in the proof-list, Cambyses was not an ἄνὴρ ἀγαθὸς, because he ignored Croesus advice on how to be one (3.36.2). Yet in this logos he can recognise such a man.

Prexaspes’ summary of the situation produces a dramatic effect on Cambyses (3.64.1). ‘When Cambyses heard the name ‘Smerdis’ the truth of both the words and the dream hit him’ (ἐνθαῦσαντα Καμβύσεα τὸ Σμέρδιος οὔνομα ἔτυψε ἠ ἅληθεια τῶν τε λόγων καὶ τοῦ ἐνυπνίου). Herodotus recaps the dream for the reader/audience and returns to Cambyses, who ‘when he realised that his brother had

\textsuperscript{125} Although, as Bratt (1985: 111) notes, ‘Cambyses agrees not to hold Prexaspes guilty of treason, but only after proof of his innocence is produced.’ Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 178) points out that Cambyses ‘is as easily persuaded of Prexaspes’ innocence as he was of his culpability.’ (il est aussi facilement persuadé de l’innocence de Prexaspe qu’il l’a été de sa culpabilité.)

\textsuperscript{126} See 3.32.2, 3.34.5, 3.35.3, 3.36.6.
perished in vain, wailed for Smerdis, and, having started wailing and getting incensed by the whole disaster’ (μαθὼν δὲ ὡς μάτην ἀπολωλεκὼς εἰη τὸν ἁδελφον, ἀπέκλαιε Σμέρδιν, ἀποκλαύσας δὲ καὶ περιημεκτήσας τῇ ἀπάσῃ συμφορῇ, 3.64.2), he leapt onto his horse with the intention of going straight to Susa and making war on the Magus. His sword, however, stabs him in the thigh (παίει τὸν μηρόν, 3.64.3), and Herodotus makes the coincidental resemblance to his dealings with the Apis clear by pointing out that ‘he was wounded at this [part] where he struck the god of the Egyptians, Apis’ (τρωματισθείς δὲ κατὰ τούτο τῇ αὐτὸς πρότερον τὸν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων θεόν Απίν ἐπληξε)127. Considering the wound mortal, he asks the name of the place and is told that he is in Ecbatana, whereupon he has a second revelation (3.64.4), that an oracle foretelling he would die in Ecbatana meant Ecbatana in Syria, not Ecbatana in Media, where ‘he thought that he would die an old man’ (ἐδόκεε τελευτήσειν γηραιός)128. ‘He found out the name of the city, and although he had been bewildered by the disaster, both that of the Magus’ making and the wound, he came to his senses, comprehending the oracle’s message’ (ἐπύθετο τῆς πόλεως τοῦ τῶν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων θεοῦ τοῦ Απίν ἐπληξε, ὑπὸ τῆς συμφορῆς τῆς τοῦ τοῦ τῶν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων θεοῦ ἐπληξε, 3.64.5)129.

The theme of truth and lies is a major part of this section. Cambyses ‘hears’ the name Smerdis and on doing so is ‘hit’ by the truth130. In the previous logos, when Cambyses heard the truth he was the one who tended to strike out at others131; now the violence is reserved for himself. This is literally true when he hurts himself with his

127 As Harrison (2000: 85) emphasises, ‘That this coincidence proves that his death was retribution for his injury to Apis is only implied in this instance.’ Gould (1989: 75) sees the wound placement as ‘both an example of reciprocal action and an uncanny event’.

128 Bratt (1985: 137) gives this instance as another kingly false assumption. Harrison (2000: 139) points out that ‘when a detail of an oracle or dream is misunderstood, as when Cambyses thought that he would die an old man in Median Ecbatana rather than a Syrian village of the same name (3.64.3-4), this adds an additional authority to its fulfilment: ‘there’, Cambyses called aloud, ‘Cambyses, son of Cyrus, is destined to die’ (ἐνθαῦτα Καμβύσεα τὸν Κύρον ἐστι πεπρωμενον τελευτᾶν, 3.64.5).’

130 Lateiner (1989: 28) says of this phrase that ‘emotion transcends or precludes articulate response’ and therefore ‘allows Herodotus to manipulate the dramatic techniques of epic’.

131 See 3.27.3, 3.32.3-4, 3.34.2-3.35.3, 3.36.1-4. The most significant instance is at 3.29.1, where he wanted to ‘hit’ (τύψαι) the stomach of the Apis but missed.
sword. Cambyses finally understands the truth for two matters, the dream and the oracle. He had ‘misread’ both of these (as do many people in the Histories who are vouchsafed such visions). Cambyses’ actions do hark back to his impetuous behaviour in the previous logos, as when he realises the truth he sets of immediately to do something about it\textsuperscript{132}. Cambyses’ characterisation has not completely changed, then: he is still impetuous. His attempt to settle matters with the Magus, though, is even more fruitless and ill-prepared than his expedition against Ethiopia, and is severely curtailed by his own action when he stabs himself in the thigh.

Naturally enough, the theme of ‘understanding’ is prevalent in this piece, connected as it is with that of realising the truth, although its importance is probably minimal given the frequency of such verbs. Cambyses ‘learns’ that he had Smerdis killed for ‘no adequate reason’, to borrow a phrase from Herodotus (3.35.5, 3.36.1), and while it didn’t bother Cambyses before, it does now. This is another indication that he is coming to his senses. He ‘thinks’ the wound is mortal (οἱ καιρίῃ ἔδοξε, 3.64.3), and turns out to be correct; he ‘thought’ he would die old in Media but was wrong. He ‘found out’ the name of the city and ‘comprehended’ the oracle, also correctly. The multiple ‘thoughts’ Cambyses’ has have the effect of aftershocks, echoing back to the original shock of the truth hitting Cambyses. Cambyses does ‘comes to his senses’ (ἐσωφρόνησε, 3.64.5), the climax of the scene, and does so after these ‘aftershocks’ of learning\textsuperscript{133}.

\textsuperscript{132} As he does in anger at 3.1.4-5, 3.25.1-2, 3.27.2-3, 3.32.4. Although the verb is different here, περιημεκτέω, it generally produces enough angry emotion to warrant dramatic gestures when it is used elsewhere. See 1.44.2, 1.114.4, 1.164.2, 4.154.4, 8.109.1.

\textsuperscript{133} Bratt (1985: 144) says that this episode is a false embellishment by Herodotus, who ‘has adopted a report about Cambyses’ death which is strongly influenced by a Greek notion of retribution for his impiety against the Apis bull; this version conveniently allowed for the king’s “tragic recognition” on his deathbed. It is possible that Herodotus knew but excluded an alternative account: that the king died by suicide.’ See also n. 22, where Bratt cites A. R. Burn, (1962: 90, n. 37). Burn remarks on the ambiguity of the phrase which might denote Cambyses’ suicide. Bratt says that ‘The Behistun inscription, an official version from the reign of Darius, seems to confirm that Cambyses died by suicide’, where the operative word is ‘seems’. I should like to suggest that Darius is as capable of producing propaganda to the point as anyone, including Herodotus, is; simply because he had the work carved in stone makes it no more ‘true’ than the claims of any other man who has successfully claimed the throne. So far as it goes, Herodotus’ account is also well-enough crafted to suggest that the interpretation of Cambyses dying ‘by his own hand’ is completely possible. It is not so surprising that Herodotus would favour a ‘Greek notion of retribution’, but the point Cambyses’ speech dwells on is his brother and his murder, which are mentioned seven times in total as opposed to the single mention of the coincidentally-placed wound which reminds us of the Apis (3.64.3). Harrison (2000: 43, n.34) points out that unlike Croesus and Cyrus, Cambyses’ ‘period of lucidity’ is just before his death; the others experience their revelations at an earlier period in their lifetime.
It is fitting that in a piece where major emphasis is placed on Cambyses’ becoming sane that his original sins should also be revisited. Cambyses sees his murder of his brother, the ‘first of the mad things he did’ (3.30.1), in a new light, and is sorry for his actions. The Apis affair, after which he became totally mad (3.30.1) is also drawn in, with the stab wound on Cambyses’ thigh corresponding with the one he inflicted on the bull\(^{134}\). Herodotus does not dwell on the two issues, but gives sufficient references back to the previous *logos* to attach this present one to the earlier, as well as rounding off the ‘sane’ *logos* with the references back to a time when Cambyses was insane.

Herodotus does not add much more in connection with Cambyses’ madness, logically enough, seeing as Cambyses has recovered his senses. As Lang shows, Cambyses’ whole speech demonstrates his *pathei mathos*\(^{135}\). To finish off the *logos*, however, Cambyses gives a speech to the Persians, and his new-found wisdom is a foil to his madness. At the same time we should bear in mind that Cambyses is coming down the wheel of fortune, so his attitudes here are along the same lines as those of Croesus when he lost his kingdom (1.86.3-1.91.6)\(^{136}\). The only real difference is that Cambyses

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\(^{134}\) Incidentally, Cambyses does not appear to be repentant about the Apis incident, and his worry is still for his power; perhaps the operative word in connection with Smerdis’ murder is μάτην: if it hadn’t been ‘in vain’, would he have still committed the murder? Although we must weigh against this his speech at 3.65.1-7 in which he expresses grief for his actions. Brown (1982: 401) also points out the lack of regret Cambyses has for the stabbing of the Apis, but then says that Cambyses is ‘not to blame, not does he feel remorse’ for that action because it sprang from the sacred disease. This does not take into account the proof-list supporting the Egyptians’ point and the fact that Herodotus never specifically associates the stabbing of the bull with the epilepsy, so neither should we. Furthermore, the only action Cambyses is sorry for is the murder of his brother: none of the other murders or sacrilegious acts are mentioned, and so the mention of the Apis is an ironic reminder of this unregretted action which sparked off the other mad actions. Brown says that Herodotus’ comment on the coincidence of the wound with that of the Apis ‘weaks his otherwise rational interpretation’, but this is only true if we assume, as Brown does, that Herodotus does not believe in the sacred transgression causing madness.

\(^{135}\) Lang (1984: 84). See also Shapiro (1994: 349-355) on learning through suffering in the cases of Croesus, Cyrus and Artabanus. Cambyses is not really mentioned, but in his case, suffering really is the only way in which he gains wisdom (see Pg. 354).

\(^{136}\) As Bratt (1985: 25) points out, ‘Even in those scenes where monarchs see their earlier error and accept the truth (e.g. 1.45, 3.64, 4.134., 8.101), their “tragic recognition” is too late to remedy disaster.’ Evans (1991, Op. Cit., Pg. 65) compares several monarchs also: ‘Croesus had acquired wisdom from his vicissitude, and even Astyages and Cambyses achieved a clear grasp of reality in their final scenes. But suffering taught Xerxes nothing…’ Harrison (2000: 51) links Cambyses with ‘The Persian’s prophetic remarks on the imminent death of Xerxes’ army echoes Xerxes’ conversation with Artabanus on the brevity of human life, at the time of his review of his troops (7.46.2). Similar sentiments on the impossibility of avoiding fate are expressed by the Pythia and the dying Cambyses (1.91.1, 3.65.3); this is also the lesson said by Herodotus to have been learnt by Amasis from the story of Polycrates’ ring (3.43.1).’ The lesson is all the more potent because of the relatively close juxtapositioning of 3.41.1 and 3.65.1-5.
knows he is going to die soon\textsuperscript{137}, and (unlike Croesus) has not been a friend of the gods enough to be saved from this end.

Cambyses summons the most important Persians twenty days later and announces that ‘what has befallen me, which of all matters I kept very much a secret, this I reveal to you’ (καταλελάβηκέ με, τὸ πάντων μάλιστα ἐκφυπτόν πρηγμάτων, τὸῦτο ἐς ὑμεῖς ἐκφήναι, 3.65.1). He tells them about his dream (3.65.2) and says that out of fear he acted ‘more quickly than wisely; for in the nature of men there is not [the ability] to turn away what is destined to happen’ (ταχύτερα ἢ σοφώτερα ἐν τῇ γὰρ ἀνθρωπημὶ φύσι οὐκ ἐνήν ἄρα τὸ μέλλον γίνεσθαι ἀποτρέπειν, 3.65.3). He describes himself as ‘absurd’ (μάταιος) for having Smerdis killed, but after ‘such an evil deed’ (κακοῦ τοσούτου) he assumed he was safe. He realises now that this was not the case, and points out the irony of the situation: ‘By mistaking everything that was destined to be I am both a brother-killer, which was not at all necessary, and I have been robbed of nothing less than my kingdom’ (παντὸς δὲ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἐσεσθαι ἀμαρτῶν ἀδελφοκτόνος τε οὐδὲν δέον γέγονα καὶ τῆς βασιληίης οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐστέρημαι, 3.65.4). This irony is further highlighted by Cambyses when he says that ‘Unfortunately for you, the Magi are in control of the kingdom, both the one I left as a steward of my house and his brother Smerdis. And the man who ought to help me most of all for the shameful things I have suffered from the Magi, this man has died from an impious death by the agency of his own closest relations’ (οἱ δὲ υἱῶν μάγων κρατέουσι τῶν βασιληίων, τόν τε ἐλιπον ἐπίτροπον τῶν οἰκίων καὶ ὁ ἐκείνου ἄδελφεος Σμέρδις. τὸν μὲν νυν μάλιστα χορὴν ἐμέν αἰσχρὰ πρὸς τῶν μάγων πεπονθότος τιμωρεῖει εἰμοί, οὗτος μὲν ἀνοσίῳ μόρῳ τετελεύτηκε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐωυτοῦ ὅρκηματῶν...3.65.5). Then he charges the Persians to wrest the kingdom

\textsuperscript{137} Bratt (1985: 152) also notes the similarities to Croesus and says that ‘The difference, of course, is that Cambyses does not survive to share his new-found wisdom with another headstrong monarch.’
back by whatever means necessary, and calls on the gods to reward them if they do so, to curse them if they do not and that they would die as he does (3.65.6-7)\(^{138}\).

This speech, the longest Cambyses has, is well structured in terms of the themes it covers; these follow one another in a fairly clear-cut order, like a series of points. Such careful structuring is not seen in the madness list, where the themes tend to weave in and out; it therefore now has the effect of portraying Cambyses in a lucid, rational manner, whether by design or not. After all, in the other, relatively short, speeches Cambyses has given there is not a great deal of structure required\(^{139}\); it is, however, quite noticeable here.

The first theme picked up on is that of ‘revealing the truth’; Cambyses had hid the truth of Smerdis’ death from the Persians, but now tells them what really happened\(^{140}\). In the previous logos, Cambyses’ attempts to reveal the ‘truth’ tended to be violent and said more about his lack of respect for others than making the truth clear\(^{141}\). Now that he is sane, he talks through the truth without the need to prove it by actions, and any violence is verbal and reserved for himself. The second theme he deals with is sight: what he saw (εἶδον ὄψιν, 3.65.2) in his dream, which he wishes he had never seen (μηδαμὰ ὤφελον ἰδεῖν), and what it seemed to show him (ἐδόκεον δέ μοι). From his ‘false’ sight of the meaning of the dream he goes on to wisdom and foolishness\(^{142}\): he was more

\(^{138}\) Interestingly, despite Cambyses’ new-found σωφροσύνη, his speech at 3.65.6-7 follows the characteristics of monarchical speech set out by Bratt (1985: 115-117). This gives cause to suppose that Cambyses’ reformation only goes so far, and would be in keeping with the comments on Cyrus’ conversion made by Hans-Peter Stahl (1975: 22, ‘Learning through Suffering’, YcIS 24, 1-36, cited by Harrison, 2000: 44), that it ‘must now appear as an empty lie, a beautiful idealization which does not stand up to the reality of human behaviour.’ See also n.7, and Shapiro’s comment (1994:352) that Cyrus ‘does not forget his wisdom because he never really learnt it in the first place.’

\(^{139}\) See 3.14.9, 3.29.2, 3.34.2-3, 3.35.1-2, 3.35.4, 3.36.3.

\(^{140}\) Gould (1989: 74) points out that ‘the idea of what was ‘going to happen’ is associated with the idea of discovery, with the realization of a general truth about human experience.’ So Cambyses doesn’t just reveal the truth of his dealings with Smerdis, but also the truth of human limits or human experience.

\(^{141}\) See 3.2.1-2, 3.35.1-4, 3.37.1-3.

\(^{142}\) Bratt (1985: 35) notes that among the positive qualities of the kings (Pg. 32), ‘the monarchs of the Histories occasionally show flashes of genuine insight into themselves: σοφροσύνη in its broadest meaning. Ironically such insights are invariably transient, too late, or ineffectual…Cambyses may boast that he is sôphrôs before trying to prove it by shooting Prexaspes’ son (3.35), but he is truly sôphrôs only at the point of death, when he can no longer persuade his council of the truth (3.64).’ Immerwahr (1966: 169) notes that ‘Cambyses, shortly before his death, reinterprets his former actions as the excessive precautions of a cautious ruler, and in understanding their futility he comes to his senses. This does not quite agree with the picture of the mad Cambyses as the destroyer of custom and of his own dynasty, as shown in the Campaign
fast than wise (σοφώτερα, 3.65.3), he was ‘absurd’ (μάταιος) and he mistook
(ἀμαρτών, 3.65.4) what was going to happen; his phrase on the ‘nature of man’ is quasi-Solonian. As a result of this, the irony of the situation is that he killed the brother (the third theme) whom he now needs, and the Magus brother, who will have to be killed, is alive and was able to take over the kingdom.

Cambyses finally bewails the whole state of affairs (ἀπέκλαιε πάσαν τὴν
ἔωστοι προήξιν, 3.65.7), whereupon the Persians, seeing him (εἶδον, 3.66.1), tore their
clothes and ‘used abundant wailing’ (οἰμωγὴ ἀφθόνῳ διεχρέωντο). Cambyses’
thigh and bone went gangrenous and rotted (3.66.2); Herodotus gives him this bald
epitaph: ‘it carried off Cambyses the son of Cyrus, who had been king for seven years
and five months in all, and who was completely without children – of male and female
offspring.’ (ἀπήνεικε Καμβύσην τὸν Κύρου, βασιλεύσαντα μὲν τὰ πάντα
ἐπτὰ ἔτεα καὶ πέντε μῆνας, ἀπαιδὰ δὲ τὸ παράσπαν ἐόντα ἔρσενος καὶ θήλεος
γόνου.) Not only this, but the Persians seem to have adopted one of Cambyses’ own
practices (3.66.3): they had quite a lot of underlying disbelief (ἀπιστίη πολλὴ)
ὑπεκέχυτο about the Magi, and ‘understood’ (ἠπιστέατο) that Cambyses was
speaking slanderously (ἐπὶ διαβολῇ εἰπεῖν) about Smerdis’ ‘death’ in order to cause a

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143 See 1.32.1. Evans (1991: 24) says that while physis could refer simply to the physicality of a human or
animal, or its life cycle, there was ‘such an entity as human physis: the “nature of man,” which defined
human competence, as Cambyses discovered to his cost. He slew his brother Smerdis…and then he
learned of the revolt of the magos by the same name, and realized that he had acted with greater haste than
wisdom, “for it is not in the physis of mankind to turn aside whatever is going to be.” The natural condition
of mankind was constrained by limits that were beyond the power of even kings to change.’

144 As Veen (1996: 31) wryly notes ‘In 3.66.1, when Cambyses has bewailed (ἀνακλαύσαντα) his
predicament, the bystanders take the hint and start moaning profusely too’; the Persians deliberately copy
Cambyses, presumably in an attempt to stay on his good side, a small but significant indication of their lack
of trust in him or loyalty for him. Veen sums up, ‘whereas δακρύειν is an impulsive reaction, κλαίειν is
preponderantly the stylised and intentional demonstration of grief.’

145 Lateiner (1989: 142) comments that ‘Seven violators of supra-national nomoi are said to be childless, at
least in the male line: Astyages, Cambyses, Cleomenes, the elder Miltiades, son of Cypselus, Stesagoras,
son of Cimon, and the legendary Polubus and Cephreus. The five historical figures who die childless are
strongly condemned for such actions as religious impiety or murder of kin, outlaw behaviour condemned
by universal nomos, not local nomoi…Cambyses’ crimes were legion: incest with two sisters, murder of
one of them, and his senseless imperial aggression appear as outrages that seem to cause him to die ἀπαῖς,
childless.’
civil war, because they ‘understood that Smerdis the son of Cyrus had been appointed king’ (ἡπιστέατο Σμέρδιν τὸν Κύρου βασιλέα ἐνεστεώτα, 3.67.1)\textsuperscript{146}. Now the Persians are the ones who don’t believe what they hear, and their ‘understanding’, in spite of them being so sure in themselves that they know the truth, is false (as Cambyses was at 3.27.2-3 and 3.30.2-3). So the one time when Cambyses really means what he says is post-scripted by the knowledge that, by this stage, the Persians are used to distrusting what he says.

Cambyses’ madness then, while fairly simply a matter of violation of custom and sacred matters in itself, acts as a way to make Cambyses stand out from other Persian rulers. Although he shows signs of being tyrannical, and these may be considered by some to constitute his madness, other tyrants do similar things and are not called mad at all. Herodotus seeks to prove a statement of his sources, that what the Egyptians say about Cambyses’ madness is true; he does this by setting out a list of proofs, including anecdotes from Greeks and Egyptians, to ‘multiply’ the number of examples and to demonstrate that as more than one set of people had anecdotes about the matter, it must be true. The mad acts in the proof-list also highlight, at different points, various themes which run through the narrative on Cambyses but which also have a wider application throughout the rest of the Histories. In this way Herodotus draws our attention to particular themes in which he has an interest.

\textsuperscript{146} Benardete (1969: 83) also points out that ‘Even when Cambyses informs his advisers of the deception, they do not believe him; for they “know” that Smerdis the son of Cyrus was king’. See also n. 30: ‘Herodotus often uses ἐπίσταμαι to mean “have the conviction (falsely)”, clearly connecting it with πίστις (cf. Plato Cratylus 437a2-b2), in this book at 36.5; 61.1; 66.3; 67.1; 139.3; but uniquely at 61.1 οἶδα has the same sense; Book III and VII have the most (ἐξ)ἐπίσταμαι, 25 and 24 respectively…’ His broad statement, on the other hand, that (Pgs. 83-84) ‘Among the Persians knowledge and trust almost merge’ is misleading; in this instance Herodotus makes it clear that the Persians are trusting in false knowledge, which has been a theme of this particular narrative, as Benardete’s own note shows. So we should be careful in applying the same statement to ‘general Persian behaviour’, because Herodotus works in context, of which we should be constantly aware.
Madness in Context: Cleomenes

In his account of Cleomenes’ madness, Herodotus has a different focus from that of the account of Cambyses’ madness, where he was proving that what the Egyptians said about Cambyses being mad was actually true. Herodotus makes very little effort, on the other hand, to prove that Cleomenes was mad. It seems to be a given fact which does not need to be discussed. Herodotus is interested in why Cleomenes went mad, rather than confirming if he was or not.

Before the reasons for him going mad are discussed, however, I wish to cover the aspect of Cleomenes’ madness as a disease, because this sheds some light on the way the madness is portrayed here.

The metaphor of madness as disease in 6.75.1 is not a simple one. Cleomenes’ madness comes on suddenly, without much indication, if any, that he was going to go mad. Herodotus tells us relatively early on ‘Cleomenes, so it is said, was both mentally unsound and on the brink of madness...’ (ὁ μὲν δὴ Κλεομένης, ὡς λέγεται, ἣν τε οὖ φρενήρης ἀκρομανής τε... 5.42.1) but no evidence is given (unlike with Cambyses) as to why he was mad then or what he did to warrant being called mad. At least when Cambyses and Charileōs are called υπομαργότερος, ‘fairly mad’, we have some indication as to why they are described this way

147 Cambyses’ state of mind is not referred to after this until 6.75.1 when it presents as a fully formed case of madness. The best indication of madness comes only at 6.74.1-2, where he wanted to have the leading Arcadians swear on the waters of the Styx, which will be discussed in the next section. But although this action and that of his arranging of the Pythia’s response in 6.66.2-3 (and the subsequent long narrative about Demaratus’ true semi-divine parentage from 6.67.1 to 6.69.5) gives us reason to believe Cleomenes may go mad, it is not explicitly said by Herodotus at this point. So despite the ‘early warning’ that Herodotus gives us, the long delay before the madness occurs means that the madness comes suddenly to the reader/audience, and is a deliberate arrangement of Herodotus’.

147 Cambyses’ treatment of Amasis’ corpse in 3.16.1-3 and his anger-inspired foolish attempt to invade Ethiopia in 3.25.1-7; Charileōs’ ill-considered attempt to fight the Persians who had invaded Samos in 3.146.1-4.
Herodotus says of Cleomenes (who had been stirring up trouble in Arcadia in 6.74.1-2) that the Spartans brought him back home and he ruled as he had done previously (6.75.1). Herodotus continues (6.75.1-2): ‘When he had returned, an insane illness suddenly seized him, who even beforehand had been fairly mad; for whenever he happened to meet some man of the Spartiates, he used to shove his sceptre into their face. When he did these things and had become deranged his relatives tied him up in the stocks...’ (κατελθόντα δὲ [αὐτὸν] αὐτίκα υπέλαβε μανίη νούσος, ἐόντα καὶ πρότερον ὑπομαργότερον· ὅκως γὰρ τεῳ ἐντύχοι Σπαρτιητέων, ἐνέχραυε ἐς τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ σκῆπτρον. ποιεῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν ταύτα καὶ παραφρονήσαντα ἔδησαν οἱ προσήκοντες ἐν ξύλῳ...).

Winnington-Ingram, although referring to tragedy, makes the remark that a theme of nosos may be developed where there is a logical ‘contrast between sickness and soundness of mind’\textsuperscript{148}. Cleomenes’ madness cannot be called a nosos theme, but the contrast of soundness of mind is shown by the way his relatives treat him, by putting him in the stocks (ἔδησαν οἱ προσήκοντες ἐν ξύλῳ, 6.75.2). In this way, the stocks are a kind of ‘cure’ for the madness, because they restrain the madman and prevent his violence on others. That the relatives of the Cleomenes took this step is an indication that it is not a punishment but a restraint. This is the same sort of restraint that Socrates thought it would be profitable for friends to arrange for the mad (τοὺς...μαινομένους ὃτε συμφερόντως ἀν δεδέσθαι καὶ ἐαυτοῖς καὶ τοῖς φίλοις)\textsuperscript{149}.

Another possible suggestion as to why madness is called illness here is tied up with the use of ὑπολαμβάνω. Herodotus also uses this verb in connection with disease a little while before this episode; in 6.27.2 he describes how some Chian boys went to Delphi but only two came back, ‘but an epidemic seized the other ninety-eight of them and carried them off...’ (τοὺς δὲ ὁκτὼ τε καὶ ἐνενήκοντα αὐτῶν λοιμῶς


\textsuperscript{149} Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.50. Interestingly, Thrasyboulos mentions tying or restraining ‘biting dogs’ (δάκνοντας κύνας) with a wooden collar in Xenophon's Hellenica, 2.4.41. The collar is the canine equivalent of the stocks which restrain the otherwise uncontrollable Cleomenes. This example is particularly interesting considering the connections between dogs, wolves and λύσσα. See Chapter 2, Aristodemus, and especially Chapter 3, λύσσα in Homer.
The sudden violence of this epidemic is suggested in the activity of ‘seizing’ and ‘carrying off’. Perhaps it is not entirely surprising that Herodotus uses the same verb then a little later in the book when referring to Cleomenes; this madness acts like other epidemics or diseases in its active seizing of Cleomenes, and in the emphasised suddenness of αὐτίκα. This sort of active behaviour of illnesses is prevalent in the Hippocratic corpus as well; so Herodotus’ use of υπολαμβάνω with νοῦσος could well be medical language. Cleomenes’ madness then manifests itself in the assaults against Spartiates.

Perhaps the effect Herodotus wants to convey with the use of not only υπολαμβάνω but also υπομαργότερος and the repetition of υπό is the idea that Cleomenes has an underlying tendency to madness, which lies dormant beneath the surface but which can rise up suddenly and ‘seize’ him. This concept of madness is further confirmed by comparison with the work of the Hippocratic writers, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.

**Herodotus’ Interest In Why**

If Herodotus’ interest in Cambyses’ madness is to prove that he was indeed mad, his interest in the madness of Cleomenes is not whether he was mad or not, but why. Herodotus tells us that Cleomenes is mad long before we are given any reason to believe that this is true (5.42.1), and as has been mentioned prior to this, the use of υπό in various compounds (6.75.1, υπέλαβε, υπομαργότερον) helps to indicate a madness to which Cleomenes is inclined by nature but does not necessarily exhibit in most of his actions until it breaks out when he returns to Sparta.

Herodotus makes it clear to us, by dwelling in detail on the manner of Cleomenes’ death at 6.75.2-3, that Cleomenes goes mad. He doesn’t list the mad things Cleomenes did, as he does with Cambyses, because that is not the feature in this account. Herodotus

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150 Interestingly, Cambyses’ gangrenous thigh also actively ‘carried him off’ (3.66.2).
151 A similar violently swift madness can be seen in 9.34.1-2.
152 See Chapter 5. Jouanna (1999: 335) notes the active nature of disease in the Hippocratic writings. See his n. 51 on the frequency of λαμβάνω.
is more interested in listing the reasons why Cleomenes went mad and died so horribly, and these he sets out much as he did the list of proofs for Cambyses. The search for an explanation of Cleomenes’ madness also serves to indicate not just a general interest but a specific interest occasioned by the speedy onset and violence of Cleomenes’ ‘mad illness’. The inquiry into the madness after the fact suggests the lack of forewarning symptoms.

As for the reasons which are given for Cleomenes’ madness, most are along the lines of religious transgression, and will be discussed. As with Cambyses, the explanation for madness is reasonably simple in itself.

The Background and Portrayal of Cleomenes

Putting the matter of disease aside briefly, an examination of Cleomenes’ life helps to demonstrate, rather like Herodotus’ two explanations for Cambyses’ madness at 3.33, that there is perhaps more than simply the νοῦσος in the question. Cleomenes’ birth was rather irregular in itself, and we must examine the account of Demaratus so as to understand the full implications of Herodotus’ later statement that Cleomenes went mad as ‘a penalty’ (τίσις) for his treatment of Demaratus (6.84.3).

Cleomenes was the son of Anaxandridas, a Spartan king, who, when his wife did not conceive, was advised to marry someone else; but he refused to part from his wife (5.39.1-2). It was then arranged that he should bring in another woman as well, to try and beget an heir (5.40.1-2). Herodotus says (5.40.2) ‘so after that he had two wives and lived in two homes, acting in a completely non-Spartan way’ (...μετὰ δὲ γυναῖκας ἔχων δύο διξὰς ἱστίας οἰκεῖ, ποιέων οὐδαμῶς Σπαρτιητικά.) That is to say, Anaxandridas is acting against Spartan custom; Cambyses did the same when he married his sisters and Herodotus said, somewhat similarly, that ‘…previously the Persians were not at all wont to live with their sisters...’ (οὐδαμῶς γὰρ ἐώθεσαν πρότερον τήσιν ἀδελφεῖς συνοικεῖν Πέρσαι, 3.31.2). From the very beginning, then, the king’s second marriage is shown to be a transgression of the customary Spartan way.
This new woman became pregnant with Cleomenes and when she had produced
him, the first wife became pregnant with Dorieus (5.41.1). She later gave birth to two
other children after him (5.41.3), while the second wife had Cleomenes only.

Cleomenes’ madness is first mentioned at 5.42.1, where it is stated that he was
made king, because he was the eldest, although ‘Cleomenes, so it is said, was both
mentally unsound and on the brink of madness, but Dorieus was first among all the men
his age, and he knew for certain that by reason of his masculine excellence he would have
the kingship’ (ὁ μὲν δὴ Κλεομένης, ὡς λέγεται, ἣν τε οὐ φρενήσης ἀκρομανής
te, ὁ δὲ Δωριεὺς ἦν τῶν ἡλίκων πάντων πρῶτος, εὐ τε ἠπίστατο κατ’
ἀνδραγαθίην αὐτὸς σχήσων τὴν βασιλείην.) Unfortunately, Dorieus’ eminent
suitability was passed over in favour of Cleomenes’ age.153

The madness is brought up so early in the narrative for other reasons than to
discuss the madness itself, which although mentioned at the outset, does not actually
come to fruition, as it were, until 6.75.1, where it is discussed. The introduction of it at
the start serves one main purpose: to underline the unsuitability of Cleomenes as king,
thereby highlighting the respectability of Dorieus. It also casts Cleomenes in a
negative light which, because of the close proximity of the story of his birth, also reflects
negatively on Anaxandridas’ second, unlawful marriage. Herodotus never says it
directly, but by the close juxtaposition of the account of the unlawful marriage and the

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153 Griffiths (1989: 53-54) demonstrates how the substitution of εἰ for οὐ at 5.48 solves the seeming
discrepancy of the length of Cleomenes’ reign and how that Dorieus ‘had…only to sit tight and look both
ways when crossing the road in order to succeed to the Agiad throne.’ For the opposing view that
Herodotus got it all wrong, see How and Wells (1967: Vol. II, 347-353, Appendix XVII), particularly Pg.
348.

154 As Bornitz (1967: 69) also points out. For other brothers in Herodotus, of whom one is mentally
inferior, see Lycophron and his brother (3.53.1) and Maiandrios and Charileôs (3.145.1). Even Scyles and
his brother could be seen in this way (4.79.4-4.80.1). There may be an upscaling of the motif to highlight
the differences as we progress through the Histories: if Lycophron’s brother is rather stupid, Charileôs is
rather mad, Scyles ‘acts’ in a mad fashion and Cleomenes is mad, as it will be revealed. On the other hand,
if we consider Cambyses and Smerdis (3.30.1), the theme may be circular rather than linear.

155 Griffiths (1989: 54) points out that ‘Spartan tradition…regarded Kleomenes as a king who was only
semi-legitimate.’ Cambyses is also said to have had trouble ‘from birth’ with epilepsy (3.33). Immerwahr
(1966: 192) also notes that ‘Cleomenes’ birth and accession had both been irregular’ and calls ‘the Spartan
idea of irregular marriages’ a ‘local motif’ connected with Spartan mythology and the rape of women. He
adds ‘This motif is joined with another, the hatred of the two royal houses of Sparta for each other’ and
discusses the stress Herodotus puts on the irregular marriages and the resulting rulers (Pgs. 197-198).
subsequent birth of a ‘nearly mad’ child, we are surely meant to infer that the unlawfulness of the first account results in the deficiencies of Cleomenes.\footnote{Benardete (1969: 141-142 ) notes the same point, and adds that ‘if Anaxandridas had been willing to divorce his first wife, the legal would have been preserved and, the story implies, Cleomenes would not have been mad.’}

The characterising of Cleomenes as mad only really occurs when Herodotus wishes to bring it to our notice; he doesn’t portray Cleomenes as consistently mad. So in the first instance, at 5.42.1, to say Cleomenes is mad is a way to show the unfairness of his being chosen above Dorieus and to suggest that he is the faulty product of an uncustomary marriage. An examination of other episodes in the Cleomenes logos will serve to show, in negative relief, that Cleomenes is not mad.\footnote{Evans (1991: 125) also notes the patchy characterisation, although he attributes this to differing source material: ‘Cleomenes, son of Anaxandrides, who is first introduced to us in the Histories as a man of integrity whom Maiandrius of Samos could not bribe, has become deranged when Herodotus relates the traditions of the royal family about him. His reputation had no doubt suffered from the resentment of his half brothers (the sons of Anaxandrides’ first wife, whom Cleomenes had displaced), one of whom was to succeed him. But the pejorative treatment on Cleomenes, even with the backing of the royal house, failed to win complete consensus, and his portrayal reveals a mixture of unflattering and favorable recollections.’ Immerwahr (1966: 192) points out that the ‘story of Cleomenes forms…a particularly vivid account, despite the fact that it has to be pieced together from separate logoi.’ He considers, for example, such anecdotes as the dealings with Aristagoras and Maeandrius to be ‘outside the main logos’ (n. 10). Lateiner (1989: 254, n. 51) may well attribute the ‘erratically ungenerous treatment’ of Cleomenes to hostile sources, though his claim that it ‘was a result of Herodotus’ failure to recognize’ their hostility does not take into account Herodotus’ contextual use of themes and characters, even though he himself notes, at one point (Pg. 122) that ‘A glance at Hude’s Index Nominum will show how, for instance, King Cleomenes…[and others] weave in and out as wanted.’ I think it highly likely that their characterisation may change in a similar fashion, ‘as wanted’, and need not necessarily be due to opposing sources but to Herodotus’ interest in portraying one facet of a character or another, depending on what the story requires. Paterson (2002: 54-55) says that in terms of reciprocity, and in particular reference to bribes, ‘During the early years of his reign Cleomenes endeavoured to fulfil his reciprocal obligations, particularly those to his people. But over time his true nature, imposed upon him by the irregular circumstance of his birth asserted itself, and his behaviour degenerated until, finally, he breached all his reciprocal obligations. And, through his self-inflicted death, he paid the price for his own transgressions and for the transgressions of his father…By using the reciprocity of the bribe, Herodotus can characterise Cleomenes in terms of his observance or transgression of his reciprocal obligations.’ Her argument is persuasive, and demonstrates an underlying deterioration which lends continuity to Cleomenes’ character.}

Unlike Cambyses, whose behaviour in attacking the Egyptians, Ethiopians (with no provisions) and the Apis is distinctly strange and impetuous, Cleomenes does very little which could be construed as ‘odd’, let alone mad. Herodotus may have other imperatives demanding a certain portrayal of Cleomenes in these accounts, but to show him as mad is not one of them.

In the very first reference to Cleomenes in 3.148.1-2 (preceding by many paragraphs the discussion of his birth) Cleomenes is portrayed as a moral man who
refuses to be corrupted by the offered riches of Maiandrios and suggests to the ephors that Maiandrios leave before other Spartiates are corrupted. Cleomenes also refuses to help Aristagoras free the Ionians (although he was supposedly considering it, 5.50.1-3) when he hears that the Spartans would have to journey inland for three months from the Ionian coast, and tells Aristagoras ‘Milesian guest, remove yourself from Sparta before the setting of the sun, for you address no agreeable statement to the Lacedaemonians’ (ὦ ἥξεῖνε Μιλήσιε, ἀπαλλάσσεο ἐκ Σπάρτης πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου· οὐδένα γὰρ λόγον εὐεπέα λέγεις Λακεδαιμονίοισι). After delivering these remarks, Cleomenes then goes home (5.51.1). Both the accounts therefore show Cleomenes to be a moral man who has the best interests of Sparta at heart.

Aristagoras tried to talk Cleomenes into the expedition again at 5.51.1, this time as a suppliant, and offered a bribe. Cleomenes refused it, but as the amount went up his daughter Gorgo, who was in the room, told Cleomenes ‘Father, the guest will corrupt you, unless you remove yourself and go.’ (πάτερ, διαφθερέει σε ὃ ἥξεινος, ἦν μὴ ἀποστὰς ἵης.) Cleomenes took the advice despite the fact that Gorgo was only eight or nine at the time (5.51.2-3). Whether this would reflect badly on Cleomenes is debatable, because he was acting for the good of Sparta, but he was not perhaps strong enough to refuse higher sums of money, and had to be reminded by his young daughter – whose age

158 Veen (1996: 62) makes the connection between Maiandrios’ earlier attempt at justice and the contrast with Cleomenes here: ‘whereas Maeandrius wished to become the most righteous of men’ (3.142.1) Cleomenes became the most righteous of men’ (δικαιότατος ἀνδρῶν γίνεται, 3.148.2). Now Cleomenes earns the laudatory qualification because ‘he did not think it just (οὐκ ἐδικαίου) to take what was offered’ (ib.) or to have other accept it, although his resolve is strongly challenged by Maeandrius’ repeating the offer (ib.). Herodotus qualifies him as ‘the most just of men’ simply because he based his decision on ‘the just’, δίκη...So we see that the difference between the two men is formulated in terms of their firmness in matters of δίκη: Maeandrius could not become righteous because he had no wish to resist the temptation to violate it, Cleomenes became righteous because he did.’ He contrasts this behaviour with Cleomenes’ later actions: ‘Both here and in the matter of Aristagoras’ request for help (5.51), he is adamant and will not be corrupted. But in the end a slur is cast on this glorious record as well. Cleomenes’ obituary mentions three possible reasons for the insanity which leads to his extremely unpleasant suicide – the most popular one being that he had bribed the Pythia (6.75.3).’ Waters’ (1971: 29) statement that Maiandrios caught Cleomenes ‘in one of his righteous moods’ does not take this comparison of justice into account; Cleomenes’ righteousness here is not a ‘mood’ so much as characterisation which may not occur elsewhere to the same extent.

159 For childlessness or lack of male heir among ‘violators of supra-national nomoi’ see Lateiner (1989: 142). Dewald (1981: 107) notes that Gorgo is portrayed here as an active family woman, whose role is ‘to remind her son, father, brother, or husband of prudent considerations or of social norms that he is in danger of ignoring’.

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and sex would normally be against her – of what would be best. This may be a sign of burgeoning weakness in Cleomenes, that his young daughter has to remind him of his moral duty, but it also comments on Gorgo’s precociousness; madness, on the other hand, is not at all in evidence here.

In 5.64.2 Cleomenes leads a Spartan force successfully into Athens to besiege the Pisistratid tyrants there, at the divine behest (as the Spartans thought) of the Pythia which was that the Spartans should free Athens (5.63.1). In fact the Alcmaeonidae used to persuade (ἀνέπειθον) the Pythia with money (χρήμασι) to say this to any Spartans who came to consult the oracle. This led eventually to the invasion of Cleomenes, which was for the benefit of Athens, as Herodotus points out shortly after (5.66.1). Nor was this the last time Cleomenes was involved in Athenian power struggles, because not long afterwards he was asked by his friend Isagoras to help strengthen Isagoras’ weaker political position (5.70.1). At Isagoras’ instigation, Cleomenes sent a message to the effect that the opposing party was under a curse (5.70.2). At the same time (5.70.1) Herodotus mentions that since helping with the tyrant situation, Cleomenes and Isagoras had been friends, and ‘he held Cleomenes responsible for conducting an affair with Isagoras’ wife.’ (τὸν δὲ Κλεομένεα εἶχε αἰτίη φοιτᾶν παρὰ τοῦ Ἰσαγόρεω τὴν γυναῖκα.)

This passage is an odd mix of good and immoral; Cleomenes was given Herodotus’ stamp of approval by the comment that his earlier invasion was for the good of Athens, but his meddling in another city’s politics, although it was for the good and at the instigation of his friend, is edging towards immoral. His affair with Isagoras’ wife is

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160 After all, he did leave as soon as he had told Aristagoras to depart originally, but now has to be reminded to do the same again. Paterson (2002: 57) considers Cleomenes’ true nature to be asserting itself here: ‘But it is apparent from Herodotus’ narrative that Cleomenes was sorely tempted by Aristagoras’ offer of wealth and power and resisted only because of the intervention of his daughter.’ Her n. 37 points out that the use of διαφθείρω ‘encompasses, not only bribery, but all forms of personal corruption. It foreshadows Cleomenes’ many violations of the νόμος of religious reciprocity including his bribery of the Delphic oracle – the ultimate act of corruption.’

161 Veen (1996: 104-105) points out that ‘Cleomenes brings freedom to Athens by expelling the Pisistratids, and that action is called a ‘liberation’ by Herodotus more than once (5.65.5 and 78, cf. 64.2 and 91.1-2). So we see that the Spartans, too, are credited with a dedication to freedom, both for themselves and for the Greek community.’
certainly immoral\textsuperscript{162}. But none of these immoral actions, whatever the degree of immorality was considered to be\textsuperscript{163}, are called mad or give any cause to assume that they may be mad.

Cleomenes then entered Athens with a small army and expelled seven hundred of these ‘cursed’ Athenian families, tried to dissolve the council and ended up being besieged in the Acropolis for two days but was allowed to go on the third (5.72.1-2). This fulfilled an omen he had received while there. ‘For when he went up to the acropolis, intending to seize it’ (ὡς γὰρ ἀνέβη ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν μέλλων δὴ αὐτὴν κατασχῆσειν) he went to the temple to address the god; but the priestess told him, before he could enter, to ‘go back again and don’t enter the temple, for it is not lawful for Dorians to go there!’ (πάλιν χώρει μηδὲ ἐσιθι ἐς τὸ ἱρὸν· οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν Δωριεύσι παρίεναι ἐνθαύτα, 5.72.3). Cleomenes objected that he was an Achaean rather than a Dorian\textsuperscript{164} and, ‘not observing the omen, both made the attempt and then was expelled with the Spartans’ (τῇ κλεηδόνι οὐδὲν χρεώμενος ἐπεχείρησέ τε καὶ τότε πάλιν ἔξεπιπτε μετὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, 5.72.4)\textsuperscript{165}.

This episode may seem, on the surface, to be a prime example of religious transgression, but on closer scrutiny the effect is rather more blurred. It is true that Cleomenes does not appear to think that the prohibition of entering the temple applies to him. But what, exactly, does ἐπεχείρησε apply to? Applying the rule of nearest previous reference, we should say that Cleomenes went through the temple doors (5.72.3) to address the god. The following clause does not assist by referring to Cleomenes being

\textsuperscript{162} Evans (1991: 29) suggests that ‘Aitia here is an accusatory morsel of gossip, not, to be sure, without moral connotations, which people suggested as the reason for the claim Isagoras had upon Cleomenes.’ On the other hand, if we consider that Cleomenes has some characteristics of a Persian king, this sort of behaviour is demonstrated by Cambyses and Xerxes (3.31.1-6, 9.108.1-2), and is one of the marks of the tyrant which Otanes discusses (3.80.5).

\textsuperscript{163} Paterson (2002:187-188) sees this in terms of Cleomenes’ obligation to Isagoras. Herodotus ‘implies that Cleomenes was given hospitality by Isagoras during the time the Spartans were besieging Hippias on the Acropolis and, apparently, Isagoras’ wife was included in the hospitality.’ As to the political interference, the instigator is usually recognised as the guilty party in the \textit{Histories} (see for example 6.1.2 and 6.75.3 – Cleomenes himself is held responsible for bribing the Pythia because it was his plan, even though Cobon was his agent), so Isagoras would be held responsible for bringing Cleomenes into the city.

\textsuperscript{164} Griffiths (1989: 74, n. 15) discusses the possible pun on Dorieus’ name.

\textsuperscript{165} Lang (1984: 94-95) describes this speech format as Pair Pattern Three, a prefuring of a later event by means of a command, appeal or advice which receives a negative response. She suggests that ‘Cleomenes’ refusal to heed the priestess’ command to go out of the temple justifies his failure to take the acropolis.’
expelled, along with the other Lacedaemonians, because only Cleomenes was desirous of entering the temple, as far as we are told. The second clause makes much better sense if it refers to Cleomenes’ intention to seize the acropolis at 5.72.3; that is to say, he went ahead with his plan to seize the acropolis and was subsequently thrown out. We are left with the conclusion that Cleomenes may not have entered the temple against the priestess’ warning; certainly we are not told that Cleomenes did enter after all. Furthermore, the ‘omen’ applies (in true riddle fashion) to the seizing of the acropolis if we give the acropolis its title of ‘temple’. So Cleomenes is transgressing a religious prohibition after all; but the transgression is the seizing of the acropolis and not the entering of the temple to address the god. Cleomenes would not be the first to misread an omen in the Histories, but this instance parallels that of Arcesilaus, who forgot what the Pythia told him not to do (4.163.2-3, 4.164.1-3) and ended up being murdered by the people of Barca (4.164.4), with the final epitaph that ‘Arcesilaus, then, since he either intentionally or unintentionally mistook the oracle, fulfilled his own fate.’ (Ἀρκεσίλεως μὲν νυν εἴτε ἐκὼν εἴτε ἄκων ἀμαρτῶν τοῦ χρησμοῦ ἐξέπλησε μοίραν τὴν ἐωτοῦ). Although no such allusion is made to Cleomenes’ seizing of the acropolis, it is the sort of action which results in punishment of some kind; we may well wonder if his madness will follow this action, but it does not, or not at this point.

The seven hundred families expelled by Cleomenes were promptly recalled by the Athenians and the thought of fighting the Spartans causes them to make an alliance with Persia (5.73.1). Cleomenes, ‘feeling that he had been treated shamefully in word and deed by the Athenians’ (ἐπιστάμενος περιυβρίσθαι ἔπεσιν καὶ ἔργοισι ὑπ Ἀθηναίων, 5.74.1), proceeded to mount an expedition against the Athenians in order that he might establish Isagoras as tyrant. While facing off with the Athenians, however, the Corinthians suddenly decided that they weren’t acting justly (ποιοῖεν τὰ δίκαια, 5.75.1), and left, as did the other Spartan king, Demaratus the son of Ariston, which led to bad feeling between the two kings. This reflects badly on Cleomenes, in that he did not see the ‘injustice’ of the occasion the way others did. Despite this, Cleomenes is not acting like a madman, although he is a little like Cambyses here, in attacking the
Athenians because of his own personal anger at them\textsuperscript{166}. Herodotus, however, is more interested at this point to begin the account of how Athens flourished\textsuperscript{167}; the abortive attack of the Spartans and Corinthians is the first of a few accounts of Athens’ troubles with attacks from neighbours\textsuperscript{168}. This is also the first example of the acrimonious dealings which the Spartan kings will come to have with each other\textsuperscript{169}.

In 5.97.2 Herodotus repeats how Cleomenes refused to countenance the views of Aristagoras, saying that ‘For it seems that it is easier to deceive one person than many people, if he was not able to deceive Cleomenes the Lacedaemonion [when he was] alone, but he did this to thirty thousand men of the Athenians.’ (πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μοῦνον οὐκ οἶός τε ἐγένετο διαβάλλειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Αθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο.) When the persuaded Athenians sent off twenty ships in aid to the Ionians (5.97.3), Herodotus states that ‘these very ships became the beginning of troubles for both Greeks and non-Greeks (barbarians)’ (αὗται δὲ αἱ νέες ἀτχὴ κακῶν ἐγένετο Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι). This reinforces the perspicacity of Cleomenes on the occasions when he refused to listen to Aristagoras.

Cleomenes does not make an appearance in the narrative for quite some time, until he sails to Aegina to arrest those who had given earth and water to Darius (6.49.1-6.50.1). His attempts failed due to Demaratus suggesting to one of the inhabitants that Cleomenes’ mission was illegal, because he did not have Demaratus with him and must therefore have been bribed by the Athenians and not acting with the permission of the Spartan authorities. We are also told in 6.51 that Demaratus ‘was slandering Cleomenes’

\textsuperscript{166} Compare Cambyses’ actions at 3.1.5, 3.25.1, 3.32.2-4, 3.35.1-3.
\textsuperscript{167} See 5.78.
\textsuperscript{168} See 5.77.1-2, 5.81.1-3, 5.84.1-5.89. The Spartans themselves decide to attack Athens again, partly because of some oracles Cleomenes had picked up in the sanctuary of Athena (5.90.1) which held that the Athenians would do terrible things to the Spartans (5.90.2), partly because they found out about the trick with the Pythia (5.90.1) and partly because they did not want Athens to challenge their own position of power (5.91.1). This proposed attack is shot down by their allies (5.91.2-5.94.1). The matter of Cleomenes picking up the oracles is paradoxical: he transgressed religious νόμος in entering the sanctuary in the first place (5.72.4) but then finds oracles which are of warning to Sparta. His actions in taking them back to Sparta are not mad.
\textsuperscript{169} Boedeker (1987: 185-201) has an excellent discussion on Demaratus. She notes that this quarrel causes a new νόμος (5.75.2), and that the way the Tyndarids who accompanied the kings into war were also split by the νόμος that only one king could go (Pg. 188). This ‘marks the importance’ of the split between Demaratus and Cleomenes.
(διέβαλε τὸν Κλεομένεα) back in Sparta, even though he himself was ‘of the inferior house’ (οἰκίς...τῆς υποδεεστέρης) of kings.

Once again, the object here is not to show Cleomenes as mad but to demonstrate the inner power struggles of the Spartan kings, and our empathy is probably going to be for Cleomenes in this instance, who is acting in a manner calculated to protect Sparta (and Greece in general) from the Persians making alliances on their back doorstep. His mission is stymied by Demaratus’ slander (although he accomplishes his object when he goes a second time, 6.73.2)\textsuperscript{170}.

After an excursus on Spartan customs, dwelling particularly on the kings’ role and privileges (6.52.1-6.60), the narrative resumes at 6.61.1. Herodotus himself says that Cleomenes was at Aegina ‘working for the common good of Greece’ (κοινὰ τῇ Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον), thereby arguing in Cleomenes’ favour in this section.

Demaratus, on the other hand, is said to be slandering Cleomenes ‘indulging in jealousy and envy’ (φθόνῳ καὶ ἄγῃ χρεώμενος) rather than out of care for Aegina. Cleomenes decided to overthrow Demaratus (literally ‘remove Demaratus from the kingship, τὸν Δημάρητον παῦσαι τῆς βασιλείης, 6.61.1).

Up to this point, we can see that the only instances where Cleomenes displays anything comparable to the mad acts of Cambyses is in his seizing of the Athenian acropolis, despite being warned by the priestess not to do so, and in his attacking the Athenians again because he was offended. These acts are not called mad. Seizing the acropolis, when warned against it, is the sort of act which could lead to punishment; and because Herodotus has already primed the reader/audience at 5.42.1, we may well be disposed to think that Cleomenes will go mad from this transgression. But this does not occur, or at least not yet, and in fact is not even mentioned later as a reason for his madness in the list of reasons.

\textsuperscript{170} Paterson (2002: 61) sees this as the beginning of Cleomenes’ deterioration: ‘It is apparent in Herodotus’ narrative that Cleomenes did not accept a bribe to go to Aegina. Herodotus put the accusation of bribery into Crius’ mouth, not because his interest was in the accusation itself, but because Crius’ words were the cause of Cleomenes’ belief that he had been greatly insulted by the Aeginetans. And this insult, together with Demaratus sabotaging his mission, were the catalysts through which Cleomenes’ true nature asserted itself.’
Demaratus and Cleomenes

Herodotus gives it as his opinion that Cleomenes’ madness and death was a penalty he paid to Demaratus (6.84.3). As Herodotus gives a long discourse on Demaratus and Cleomenes’ dealings with him, it is worth examining in order to fully understand Herodotus’ rather laconic phrase.

Cleomenes and Demaratus had somewhat in common: both their fathers had multiple marriages, and in an uncustomary fashion. Anaxandridas may have been forced by lack of heirs to take a second wife in a bigamous arrangement; Demaratus’ father, Ariston, had had two wives without producing an heir and decided to marry for a third time ‘since he did not admit that he himself was to blame for these things’ (οὐ γὰρ συναγινώσκετο αὐτὸς τούτων εἶναι αἴτιος, 6.61.1-2). Herodotus mentions that the second wife was divorced as soon Ariston managed to acquire the third (6.63.1), so we may assume that in this respect, at least, the marriage was legal.

Ariston lusted after his friend Agetus’ wife, who was the most beautiful woman in Sparta. He tricked Agetus into swearing an oath to give him whatever of his possessions Ariston asked for, and then asked for Agetus’ wife (6.62.1-2). She gave birth within ten months to Demaratus (6.63.1), but when Ariston was told this he counted up the months, swore, and said in the presence of the ephors ‘He may not be mine’ (οὐκ ἄν ἐμὸς εἴη, 6.63.2). He later changed his mind and believed that Demaratus was indeed his child.

So both Cleomenes and Demaratus were the products of uncustomary, or in Ariston’s case, unethical marriages. Cleomenes goes mad, and Demaratus ends up being exiled and having no children living in Sparta. In this light, it is ironical that Cleomenes attacks Demaratus on the matter of his birth, seeing as his own birth was, in a way, even more irregular: his father was still married to his first wife at the time.

Cleomenes arranges with Leotychidas, of the same line of Demaratus, that Leotychidas will be king in Demaratus’ place and accompany Cleomenes on another.

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171 See 6.62.1; 6.61.3-4 is a description of how she became so beautiful when she had been a very ugly child. The change wrought by ‘Helen’ is the first supernatural occurrence in this woman’s life. See Boedeker (1987: 188-189) for various motifs in the story of Demaratus.
172 Or, alternatively, ‘He can’t be mine’, ‘He is probably not mine’.
successful, expedition to Aegina (6.65.1). Leotychidas was happy to do this, because Demaratus, in an action which argues for Ariston’s paternity, had stolen Leotychidas’ betrothed bride, Percalus, and done Leotychidas out of a wife (6.65.2). Leotychidas therefore took his oath against Demaratus (κατόμνυται, 6.65.3), as Cleomenes wished, saying that Demaratus was not the rightful king since he was not the son of Ariston, offering as proof of this Ariston’s words before the ephors when he heard of his son’s birth, and producing the ephors themselves. Since there were quarrels about the matter, the Spartiates decided to put the question ‘is Demaratus the son of Ariston’ to the Delphic oracle (6.66.1). This was all to the purpose for Cleomenes, who made friends with the most powerful man in Delphi, Cobon, and had him persuade (ἀναπείθει) the Pythia to say what Cleomenes wanted her to say (6.66.2). So, when asked, the Pythia ‘gave it as her considered opinion that Demaratus was not the son of Ariston’ (ἐκρίνε μὴ Ἀρίστωνος εἶναι Δημάρητον παῖδα).

This Pythia is the only one who ‘judges’ (ἐκρίνε), or ‘gives her considered opinion’. This may be significant. Cobon supposedly persuaded her ‘to say’ what Cleomenes wanted her ‘to say’, but she ‘gives her opinion’. I do not want to push this too far, but most other uses of κρίνω in the Histories involve a personal judgment based on information which is often physical, but may be a judgment argued from various facts. What I wish to suggest here is that Herodotus may be subtly signalling that,

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173 Paterson (2002: 72) says of the three men that ‘Herodotus portrays the three kings as negative characters, linking them in a chain of retaliation driven by the personal motives of hatred, envy and the desire for revenge and power. The conflict between these kings led to their acting in their own interests rather than the interests of their πόλις.’

174 Harrison (2000: 235) points out that Cleomenes himself is an agent of divine justice: ‘Men, as we saw in Chapter 4, may be the agents of divine retribution;…As evidence of the proposition that Ariston’s chance remark ‘was bound to come to light and put an end to Demaratus’ kingship’, Herodotus adduces the hatred of Cleomenes for Demaratus – Cleomenes, of course, the engineer of Demaratus’ deposition through his bribery of Delphi.’ Paterson (2002: 62) emphasises how ‘The bribery of the Delphic priestess demonstrates the change in Cleomenes’ character from an honest man who refused a bribe to a corrupt king who violated the νόμος of religious reciprocity by bribing the Delphic oracle. When he committed this heinous crime he transgressed against his fellow-king, the god and his people. And, because he undertook this action in his role as king, he implicated Sparta in his offence against Apollo’.

175 See in particular 1.214.1, 3.20.2, 4.142, 9.26.3, 5.22.2, 4.64.2, 5.6.2, 6.123.2, 6.129.1, 6.128.2. There is not often any indication of whether such judgment is right or wrong. At 1.30.4 Croesus is rather incredulous when he asks why Solon thinks Tellus to be most fortunate, but in such instances there is usually some indication from the surrounding narrative to suggest some ‘wrong headedness’ on the part of
Cobon or not, the Pythia made a judgment based on information, and told the truth as she saw it, which happened also to be what Cleomenes wanted her to say. The fact that Cobon later fled Delphi and she lost her position when these things became known (6.66.3) may point, on the other hand, to a definite lie on her part; or it may just indicate the disapproval held for priestesses who, by being party to bribery even if she were telling the truth, called the veracity of the god’s oracle into question.

In terms of Cleomenes’ madness, however, the attempt to bribe to Pythia, whether what she ended up saying was the truth or not, would be considered enough to send him mad, as most of the Greeks later thought. Similarly, it did not matter that Cobon was the briber or Leotychidas the agent of Cleomenes’ plot and slander; the fault would be perceived to lie with Cleomenes. This impious action is made even worse by the fact that, as a king of the Spartans, Cleomenes was also meant to be a religious leader.

the ‘judge’; see also 8.123.2 and 8.124.1 where Themistocles is obviously the bravest Greek even if the other Greeks vote him second. While the Pythia’s response could be thought to fit in best with ‘judgment’ of dreams and omens, only two such uses are given by Powell (1938: 200 sv. κρίνω). Of these two one is a correct interpretation of Astyages’ dream (1.120.1) and the second is wrong, or at least only partially correct (7.19.1, 2): The Magi interpret the first half of the dream accurately, the part which Xerxes will no doubt find pleasing, but do not interpret the second half, which is clearly left to the reader/audience, as it indicates in obvious ways that Xerxes’ venture will fail. Finally, at 2.167.1 we have a negative example: Herodotus can’t make a judgment on where a Greek attitude came from because, conversely, of the wealth of information – many people have the same attitude.

Although Harrison (2000: 143) thinks that this would not be an issue. He appears to suggest that the Pythia might be telling the truth also: ‘The prophecies bandied about by Cleomenes or by Hippias might also themselves be authentic – the Corinthians do indeed come to suffer distress from the Athenians – but it is the use, the presentation of these prophecies that is suspect. The Alcmeonids’ bribery of Delphi, or Cleomenes’ subsequent bribery to ensure the deposition of Demaratus (6.66.2-3), likewise need not have had any effect on the credulity of the oracle itself. The priestess Periilla serves as a scapegoat, deposed from her post (6.66.3). Cobon, Cleomenes’ intermediary, fled from Delphi. Cleomenes’ madness and death, Herodotus later reveals, were the price for his bribery of Delphi (6.75.3, 84.3). No stigma is attached to the institution itself.’ See also his n. 77. Burkert (1965: 174) has a similar view: ‘May the Delphic oracle, bribed or not, have spoken the truth’ (Mag das Delphische Orakel, bestochen oder nicht, die Wahrheit gesprochen haben)? See also the story of Glauccus, whose thought (6.86.a2-8), though unfulfilled, to keep what was not his was enough to warrant his divine punishment and destruction. The fact that this story comes so soon after the discussion of Cleomenes’ madness and death may be significant.

Benardete (1969: 164) is right to say that Cleomenes’ piety is mixed up with his impiety, ‘for his bribery of the Pythian oracle does not prevent him from consulting it’ and adduces 5.72.3-4. I would add 6.81 as well.

As pointed out by Immerwahr (1966: 192) ‘The central motif of the stories of Cleomenes is his impiety; for the Spartan kings, as Herodotus of course knew, were religious leaders, and the Spartans in general...were considered by Herodotus a particularly religious people. Cleomenes’ acts of impiety were largely committed during his campaigns; his greatest crime lay in his disregard for Spartan moderation in
So Demaratus was deposed (6.67.1). He later left Sparta for Darius’ court, but before doing so he sacrificed a bull to Zeus and sent for his mother (6.67.3). When she arrived (6.68.1), he asked her to tell him about the truth of his birth and who his father was, giving her the viscera of the ox he had just killed to hold while doing so, thus ensuring the solemnity of the occasion as well as her truthfulness, which she and Demaratus mention several times.\(^{179}\)

His mother explains (6.69.1-4) that three nights after she had first come to Ariston’s house (as his wife) a ‘phantom’ (φάσμα) in the form of Ariston came to her, slept with her, then gave her the garlands he had been wearing and left. Later, the real Ariston came in, and after protesting that he hadn’t just slept with her and given her the garlands, and after she had sworn oaths (κατωμνύμην, κατομνυμένην) to the fact that he had slept with her and given her the garlands, he worked out that there was divine power at work. For a start, the garlands were clearly from the image of the hero Astrabacus, whose statue stood by the doors of the courtyard; and seers confirmed that it was indeed this hero. She conceived Demaratus that night, so, as she tells him, ‘your father is Astrabacus the hero, or Ariston’ (καὶ τοι πατηρ ἐστι Ἀστράβακος ο ἢ Ἀρίστων). As for Ariston’s exclamation that Demaratus couldn’t be his son (6.69.4-5), that was said in ignorance of gestation periods, and he didn’t know that children could be born at seven months, as Demaratus was, and he later retracted the statement.

Demaratus’ mother twice uses the verb κατομνυμαι, which occurs only here and in 6.65.3. She ‘swore an oath’ that Ariston, as she believed him to be, had slept with her and given her the garlands only a short while before the real Ariston came in (6.69.2),

\(^{179}\) See 6.68.1, 6.68.3, 6.69.1 (x2) and 6.69.5 where his mother caps her speech with the superlative ἀληθεότατα. From the sacrifice of the animal and making his mother hold the entrails I don’t think we are meant to call the veracity of what she says into question; this is only strengthened by the number of times ‘truth’ is mentioned. Burkert (1965: 167) also notes the ‘most solemn form’ (in feierlichster Form) of Demaratus’ questioning of his mother.

\(^{180}\) Benardete (1969: 174) notes that Astrabacus was the god of muleteers. This would make sense of the rumour at 6.68.2 that Demaratus’ mother had an affair with a muleteer. How and Wells also mention this (1967: Vol. II, 90-91, s.v. 68). Burkert (1965: 167-174) explores the legend of Astrabacus as well as the similarity of the affair to the Amphitryon/Zeus/ Heracles legend and the relation of both to Sparta.
and when the real Ariston saw that she swore an oath he realised that the matter was
divine (6.69.3). The only other person who swears such an oath is Leotychidas, when he
swears against Demaratus being the son of Ariston. I am not certain that we are meant to
assume from this that, for instance, Leotychidas is lying and Demaratus’ mother is not;
the rare occurrence of the verb here is meant to signal the seriousness of both the
allegation of illegitimacy as well as the seriousness surrounding truth which Demaratus’
mother later tells. The irony of the situation lies in the fact that Leotychidas believes that
Ariston is not Demaratus’ father – it is grist to the mill that he has reason to dislike the
man anyway – and that it is very likely true; the problem is, the mother swears, just as
solemnly (and with more authority), that even if Ariston didn’t father Demaratus, the
divine hero Astrabacus did.

From this story it is quite clear that Herodotus considers that at the very least
there is the possibility of Demaratus having divine (or semi-divine) parentage, and his
narrative comes down in favour of Demaratus being the hero’s child rather than
Ariston’s, as it was definitely the hero who is mentioned to have slept with the mother the
night she conceived, whereas we are left to assume that Ariston must have as well (and in
the three-day window of opportunity suggested since their marriage), and Astrabacus is
named first as Demaratus’ father, with the possibility of Ariston being the father tacked
on the end of the sentence, without so much as an ‘either’ in the previous sentence to
even out the probability. This puts Demaratus on a level, as Burkert notes, ‘comparable
only to Heracles’ and for whom ‘the paternity of the hero isn’t a booby-prize for his
deposition but rather expression of one of the highest claims advanced.’ As Boedeker
points out, ‘the deposition of Demaratus involves ominous perversions of truth and divine
order.’

So this puts Cleomenes in the unenviable situation that he has not only attempted
to bribe the Pythia, but has also slandered and deposed a fellow king because of his
parentage, which turns out to be divine. Even Cleomenes’ own kingly parentage cannot
compete with semi-divine heroes.

den Gestürzten, sondern Ausdruck eines aufs höchste gesteigerten Anspruchs.’
Cleomenes’ Death

After deposing Demaratus, Cleomenes went back to Aegina (6.73.1), ‘having a terrible grudge against them because of the insult’ (δεινόν τινὰ σφι ἕγκοτον διὰ τὸν προσπηλακισμόν ἔχων) which he had received the first time. This time he is met with acquiescence, and hands over ten men (including the originally fractious Crius) to be looked after by the Athenians (6.73.2). Cleomenes could be said to resemble Cambyses’ here, in being so angry at the Aeginetans and carrying out his revenge, but the argument is not strong. Cleomenes is, after all, only fulfilling what he intended to do in the first place, before Demaratus spoiled the plan. He may even rightly hold a grudge for Crius’ insult. The madness of Cleomenes is still ambiguous here.183

It is in 6.74.1 that we really perceive anything strange about Cleomenes. Herodotus says that his ‘underhanded conniving against Demaratus was detected’ (ἐπάϊστον γενόμενον κακοτεχωήσαντα ἐς Δημάρητον), a phrase which clearly shows Herodotus’ disapproval of his treatment of Demaratus, a disapproval which he did not express in so many words in the discussion of the deposition.184 Cleomenes ‘took fear of the Spartiates’ (δεῖμα ἔλαβε Σπαρτιητέων) and slipped off to Thessaly.185 This fear is something like Cambyses might feel, when his power is threatened.186 Cleomenes proceeds to ‘do damaging things’ (νεώτερα ἔπρησσε πρήγματα) in Arcadia, whipping up the Arcadians against Sparta and ‘he had other oaths for them as well, and one that they would follow him wherever he might command, and furthermore

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183 Paterson (2002: 71) demonstrates that Herodotus ‘portrays Cleomenes as a man who held a grudge and was intent on taking revenge on those who had insulted him.’ In n. 81 she points out that this is similar to Cambyses.

184 Although he does say, at 6.72.1, that Leotychidas ‘paid the following penalty to Demaratus’ (τίσιν τοιήνδε τινὰ Δημαρήτω ἔξετεισε) – a phrase almost identical to the one he later uses for Cleomenes at 6.84.3 (τίσιν ταύτην...Δημαρήτω ἐκτείσαι). Leotychidas does not go mad, however; he is exiled from Sparta and his household demolished (κατασκάφη, 6.72.2). This ‘demolition’ only occurs here and at 7.156.2, where Gelon demolishes the town of Camarina and removes all its citizens to Syracuse instead, and enrols them there to strengthen the city. This wholesale destruction and removal to another place is consistent with the destruction of the oikos, as Paterson (2002: 52) points out also occurs to Ariston, for his treacherous dealings with Agetus: ‘Ariston was not punished in his lifetime but, after his death, he suffered the punishment meted out by the gods to those who swear falsely – his οἶκος, although not destroyed, was uprooted from Spartan society.’

185 Although Griffiths (1989: n. 22) thinks Thessaly is a misreading.

186 See 3.30.3, 3.65.3.
he was eager to take the leading Arcadians to the city of Nonacris to get an oath out of them by the water of the Styx.’ (ἄλλους τε ὄρκους προσάγων σφί ἣ μὲν ἐψεσθαί σφεας αὐτῷ τῇ ἄν ἐξηγήτα, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Νώνακριν πῶλιν πρόθυμος ἢν τῶν Ἀρκάδων τοὺς προεστεώτας ἀγινέων ἐξορκοῦν τὸ Στυγός ὕδωρ, 6.74.1-2). As Griffiths points out, only gods could swear on the Styx; for Cleomenes to wish to do so characterises him as a man who may consider himself to be a god, or as a man mad enough to commit the religious transgression, as Cambyses was mad enough to stab the Apis.

The Spartans, when they found out what Cleomenes was doing, brought him back because they were afraid, and he ruled on the same conditions as he had before. It is at this point that his madness really comes to the fore: ‘When he had returned, an insane illness suddenly seized him, who even beforehand had been fairly mad; for whenever he happened to meet some man of the Spartiates, he used to shove his sceptre into their face. When he did these things and had become deranged his relatives tied him up in the stocks.’ (κατελθόντα δὲ [αὐτὸν] αὐτίκα ὑπέλαβε μανίη νοῦσος, ἐόντα καὶ πρόσερον ὑπομαργότερον· ὅκως γὰρ τεῳ ἐντύχοι Σπαρτιητέων, ἐνέχραυε ἐς τὸ πρόσωπον τὸ σκῆπτρον. ποιεῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν ταῦτα καὶ παραφρονήσαντα ἐδῆσαν οἱ προσήκοντες ἐν ἤμελῳ, 6.75.1-2). As mentioned above, the sudden, violent onset of this madness is why it is called a disease here. The madness consists of a misuse of the kingly symbol of authority against those whom he rules and as such

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187 Griffiths (1989: n. 23); specifically goddesses, although Homer and Hesiod assume both sexes may swear. Griffiths (Pg. 60) says that the Styx incident is ‘probably a motif designed to pin on him the accusation of divine megalomania’. Benardete (1966: 163) also discusses this aspect of the Styx: ‘In Homer and Hesiod only the gods swear by the Styx, and according to Hesiod if a god swears falsely “he lies breathless for a full year, nor does he ever approach ambrosia and nectar, but lies without breathing and speechless in bed, and an evil slumber covers him,” and after this “disease” he stays away for nine years more from the other gods (Theogony 775-806).’

188 Powell (1938: 186, sv. κατάγω) categorises the meaning for this verb as bringing home exiles. Herodotus has not said that Cleomenes was exiled for his part in Demaratus’ slander, and he ‘slipped off’ (ὑπεξέσχε, 6.74.1) to Thessaly seemingly of his own accord. He does, however, seem to indicate now that there had been some reduction in his powers (this may explain why he was afraid at 6.74.1).

189 The use of this verb in the Hippocratic seems to indicate a wandery delirium (see Chapter 5); Munson (1991: 54-55), in her discussion of its use with reference to Cambyses, calls it hallucination.
deserve rather more respectful treatment\footnote{Benardete (1969: 165) says that ‘The sceptre that merely signified his authority became in his hand a weapon, with which he literally exacted punishment’.}. Herodotus gives no reason for why exactly Cleomenes might attack his subjects in this fashion (apart from being mad, of course)\footnote{Griffiths (1989: 61) calls his actions ‘gratuitous sadism’.}; Cleomenes is not said to be angry, necessarily; he was afraid of the Spartiates at 6.74.1, and this may be the only vague suggestion as to why Cleomenes acts this way. But Herodotus does not really need to give an explanation. Cambyses, for instance, killed Prexaspes’ son for no more reason than to prove his skill in shooting\footnote{See 3.35.1-4. Griffiths (1989: 62-70) also uses an anecdote about Cleomenes written by Stephanos of Byzantium in which Cleomenes digs up the bones of an ancestral hero and flays off the skin, in acts similar to Cambyses’ behaviour with Amasis’ corpse (3.16.1) and his flaying of the judge Sisamenes for taking a bribe (5.25.1-2).}. He was neither angry nor afraid of Prexaspes’ son. Cleomenes needs no other explanation than that he is mad; in fact such a lack of emotional explanation makes him appear all the more mad.

While in the stocks, Cleomenes persuaded the only guard to give him a knife, with which he began to mutilate himself from the shins up\footnote{The only other use of λωβῶμαι is in connection with Zopyrus’ self-mutilation; see 3.154.2, 3.155.1 and 3.156.3.}. This mutilation is further defined: ‘For cutting the length (of his legs) he proceeded from his shins to his thighs, then from the thighs to his hips and his flanks, until he got to his stomach and while mincing this up he died in such a fashion...’ (ἐπιτάμνων γὰρ κατὰ μῆκος τὰς σάρκας προέβαινε ἐκ τῶν κνημέων ἐς τοὺς μηροὺς, ἐκ δὲ τῶν μηρῶν ἐς τὰ τὰ ἱσχία καὶ τὰς λαπάρας, ἐς δὲ τὴν γαστέρα ἀπίκετο καὶ ταύτην καταχορδεύων ἀπέθανε τρόπῳ τοιούτῳ...). This differs from a ‘normal’ suicide in Herodotus only in that it is prolonged compared to other people who commit suicide very quickly\footnote{See for example Adrastus, 1.45.5; Orthryades, 1.82.8 and Spargapises, 1.213.1. Lateiner (1985: 93) says of suicide that it is an extreme ‘outward form to an inward state’, which ‘conveys…a message of incurable despair, for instance Adrastus, Cleomenes, Pentites the Spartan. For these men, doing something is better than talking about it.’ I think this statement presumes on Cleomenes’ mental state: we only have the suicide as evidence for this ‘incurable despair’ and nothing else in the text to support this analysis; unlike in the case of Adrastus, where we are told be Herodotus that he considered himself very unfortunate (1.45.5).}. It differs also from the willing self-mutilation of Zopyrus in that Zopyrus’ injuries, while horrible, did not kill him; nor, indeed, were they intended to\footnote{See 3.154.1-3.160.2. Even so, it is interesting to note that Darius told Zopyrus that ‘Surely you have not taken leave of your mind since you have destroyed yourself?’ (κῶς οὖκ ἔξεπλωσας τῶν φρενῶν σεωυτὸν διαφθείρας; 3.155.3)}. Zopyrus’
actions had a purpose\textsuperscript{197}: they would ‘verify’ to the Babylonians that he was a deserter with a grudge and a willingness to assist them against Darius. Cleomenes seems to have no purpose in cutting himself this way: it does not get him out of the stocks, for example. He does not even seem to have a definite purpose in his suicide; the eventual occurrence can almost be construed as accidental\textsuperscript{198}.

There is no discussion on Herodotus’ part, however, of whether Cleomenes was really mad or not. Clearly Herodotus thought he was, and his actions here are to be seen as mad. They are mad, perhaps, because the reader/audience, and very likely Herodotus himself, cannot understand why someone would inflict such injuries on himself to so little purpose.

\textsuperscript{197} Griffiths (1989: 61) compares the story of Hegesistratos at 9.37.2, another Spartan who hacks himself up while in the stocks and then escapes to Arcadia. Cleomenes did it the other way around. Griffiths considers that the stories should be catagorised as ‘mythical anecdotes involving locked-room mysteries’. He himself does say of Hegesistratos, however, that his attacking of his foot ‘is for a positive purpose’; this is the difference between his actions and Cleomenes’, who seems to have no purpose in cutting himself up. His cutting of himself does not have the immediate connotations that Cambyses’ self-wounding does; it does not recall any incident where Cleomenes cut up something or someone. Not, that is, until we get to the Argive version (6.75.3) and hear that Cleomenes ‘chopped up’ (κατέκοπτε) the Argives as they came out of the sanctuary. Such a back reading, however, is only applicable in terms of the proximity of Cleomenes’ death and the Argive explanation. Although Griffiths (Pg. 61) compares Cleomenes’ death with Cambyses’ he does not offer a reason for his later statement that both ‘expire in circumstances symbolically retributive of their capricious cruelties’ (Pg. 70). He explanation of the flaying of Anthes (Pgs. 65-70) may well be correct, but except for the Argive massacre, Herodotus himself has not suggested any parallelism with another action, unlike the coincidental parallelism of Cambyses’ and Apis’ wounds, which he draws specifically. Munson (2001: 67-68) also notes the similarities between Cleomenes and Hegisistratus, and the difference in purpose.

\textsuperscript{198} I see little in the text to support Benardete’s claim (1969: 163-4) that Cleomenes’ madness involved ‘not seeing himself as himself but as another. He literally did not know himself. His madness began when he no longer recognized the Spartiates as Spartiates, but thrust his sceptre into their faces as though they were helots, even as Odysseus had beaten Thersites with the sceptre of Agamemnon. [n. 10, Iliad II. 265-269; cf. Xenophon Memorabilia I.ii.58.] His failure to recognize distinctions of rank finally led to his failure to recognize himself.’ Hartog (1988: 337-338) says something similar. Cleomenes is aware enough to threaten the helot on guard with what he will do to him when he gets out of the stocks (6.75.2). We could therefore argue that he knew, at any rate, that he was a person of enough standing to be able to threaten and punish a helot. Lateiner (1989: 29) says that Herodotus records such threats as an advertisement of ‘the unlimited power of potentates’, and this is true of Cleomenes’ semi-tyrannical characterisation; the interesting point is that Cleomenes has been limited, but this does not appear to affect his own view of his power.
The Reasons For Cleomenes’ Madness

Directly after the description of Cleomenes’ death, Herodotus begins his list of reasons attributed to the madness and death (6.75.3)\(^{199}\). The Greeks say it was ‘because he persuaded the Pythia to say those things about Demaratus’ (ὅτι τὴν Πυθίην ἀνέγνωσε τὰ περὶ Δημαρήτου [γενόμενα] λέγειν); the Athenians say that it was ‘because when he attacked Eleusis he cleared the trees from the sacred precinct of the gods’ (διότι ἐς Ἐλευσίνα ἑσβαλὼν ἔκειρε τὸ τέμενος τῶν θεῶν); the Argives say it was ‘because he lured down from their temple of Argos and massacred those of the Argives who had taken refuge from the battle and set fire to its grove since he held it in disregard’ (ὅτι ἐξ ἱροῦ αὐτῶν τοῦ Ἀργοῦ Ἀργείων τοὺς καταφυγόντας ἐκ τῆς μάχης καταγινέων κατέκοπτε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἄλσος ἐν ἀλογίῃ ἐχὼν ἐνέπρησε). This story is expanded fully from 6.76.1 – 6.84.1. Even if this is not the version which Herodotus himself supports, the story does offer some interesting parallels with the life of Cambyses and is worth examining. The three explanations do, however, clearly locate the cause of Cleomenes’ madness in some form of religious transgression, and in the case of the Athenians and Argives, a transgression particularly near to or in their territory\(^{200}\). Therefore the multiplying of reasons in this instance indicates firmly that not only was Cleomenes clearly mad, but he had become so through divine retribution for his

\(^{199}\) Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 98) say that ‘a legendary tradition has dramatically superelevated the story of the king’ (Eine legendäre Tradition hat die Geschichte des Königs…dramatisch überhöht). They consider that Herodotus’ portrayal of Cleomenes’ ‘failure’ (Scheiterns) and death ‘recalls, in a striking way, the fateful circumstances’ (erinnen die schicksalhaften Umstände…auf frappante Weise) of both Sophocles’ mad Ajax and Herodotus’ own ‘gripping explanation’ (packende Erzählung) of Cambyses’ death.

\(^{200}\) Harrison (2000: 107) points out that ‘Cleomenes’ death and madness are presumed to be in retribution for some act of impiety or injustice: the question is what that might have been. That Herodotus offers, even if only to reject, a non-divine explanation for Cleomenes’ end in parallel to the divine causes still has important implications: the conclusion that a vengeful deity lies behind a particular misfortune is made as a result of a process of deduction that could just as easily have ended in an exclusively human cause; a disaster that is divinely motivated looks no different from one that is not.’ Immerwahr (1966: 193) sees the explanations slightly differently: ‘The common Greek versions thus stress Cleomenes’ impiety, while Herodotus blames his violation of the royal succession, and the Spartan story refers to Cleomenes’ expansionist interests. Together, these three motifs explain the rise and fall of Cleomenes.’
transgression of religious customs. The only matters people differ on are the details of the particular transgression.

Cleomenes was given an oracle to the effect that he would seize Argos (6.76.1), so he and some of the Spartiates set off, but at the river Erasinus Cleomenes did not receive favourable omens for crossing. He said that the river was not going to betray its citizens, but that they would not go in peace all the same and, after sacrificing a bull to the sea at Thyreae, they sailed around to the area of Tiryns and Nauplia instead (6.76.2). The Argives came to stand against them near Tiryns (6.77.1-2), wary of being taken by guile, because of an oracle from the Pythia which warned against their downfall. This oracle seemed to suggest that if the ‘female’ (presumably ‘Sparta’) triumphed over the ‘male’ (‘Argos’) that this would be catastrophic for Argos.\[201\]

For this reason they copied what the Spartan herald announced the army should do (6.77.3). This tactic unfortunately backfired when Cleomenes realised what was happening (6.78.1), and ordered his men to attack the Argives when the herald next announced ‘breakfast’, thus catching the Argives unawares while they were having breakfast (6.78.2)\[202\]. Many managed to take refuge in the grove of Argos, though, which the Spartans then surrounded with guards.

Up till this point Cleomenes is still sane and has even demonstrated a certain respect for religious matters in his acceptance of the Erasinus river’s refusal to let them pass. He obviously believes the oracle as well, and sets off in an effort, seemingly, to

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\[201\] The oracle: ‘But if ever the female, having triumphed over the male
Drives him out and lifts up glory among Argives,
Then she will render many Argive women scratched on both cheeks.
Thus some day someone of future mortals will proclaim:
A dreadful thrice-twisted snake was destroyed after being subdued by a spear.’
(ἀλλ’ ὅταν ἡ θήλεια τὸν ἄρσενα νικήσασα ἐξελάσῃ καὶ κύδος ἐν Ἀργείωισιν ἀφήσαι,
πολλὰς Ἀργείων ἀμφιδρυφέας τότε θήσει.
ὡς ποτὲ τίς ἔρεει καὶ ἐπεσσομένους ἀνθρώπων·
δεινὸς ὄφις τριέλικτος ἀπώλετο δαμασθεὶς.)

\[202\] This stratagem is considered by Griffiths (1989: 57) to be a regular stand-by ‘of ancient textbooks of stratagemata and later became ‘a theme of popular folklore’. Griffiths’ identification in the story of ‘all-purpose anti-tyrant folklore’ (Pg. 56), while certainly apparent, does not take into account that Herodotus does not think that the events in this account are the reason why Cleomenes went mad. So we should maybe expect large numbers of folkloric motifs. Benardete’s (1969: 165) comparison of the Argives to Cleomenes (‘the Argives are as wrong as Cleomenes [in his interpretations of the oracle about Argos] ; indeed, they are as mad as he’) is pointless and cannot be supported by the text.
fulfil it. Although he does not wonder whether he should not perhaps reconsider when the Erasinus won’t let him pass, misinterpretation of oracles is rife in the Histories and it is not surprising that Cleomenes is one of the many who mistake one. On the other hand, the Argives have not, so far as we are told, done anything to provoke an attack. In this respect Cleomenes is rather more like a Persian king.

Cleomenes then inquired of men who had defected to him, and, having received information from them, he proceeded to have a herald announce to those in the grove that he had their ransom of two minas each (6.79.1). ‘So then as Cleomenes called each out [of the grove] he killed them - about fifty Argive men.’ (κατὰ πεντήκοντα δὴ ὄν τῶν Ἀργείων ὡς ἐκάστους ἐκκαλεύμενος ὁ Κλεομένης ἔκτεινε.) This would have gone on, except one man in the grove climbed a tree in order to see what was happening outside the grove, and after that no-one else left the grove. Cleomenes then ordered all of his helots to stack wood around the grove, and proceeded to set fire to it (6.80.1), pausing only to ask a deserter, when the fire was already burning, which god the grove belonged to. The answer was ‘Argos’, at which point ‘when he heard this, he groaned.

Although he could also be ‘led on’ to destruction by an oracle, as happened with the Cymeans (1.158.1 – 1.159.4), the mistaken oracle is far more frequent an occurrence. Bratt (1985: 8-9) notes that ‘The four cardinal elements in the typical portrayal of the oriental monarchs are these: emotional extravagance and instability, aggressiveness, weakness in judgement, and failure to profit from warnings.’ Cleomenes, particularly in the actions which supposedly led to his madness, would fit into this mould. For instability, we could cite his near change of mind about Aristagoras or his activities in Arcadia; aggressiveness not just in his attacking of Spartiates but his attack on Argos and even earlier in the narrative, Athens; for weakness in judgment, his needing to be reminded by his daughter as to the moral path, and his inability to see anything unjust in his second, aborted attack on Athens; and a failure to profit from the warnings of the priestess in Athens and the priest at Argos (5.51.2, 6.74.1-2, 6.75.1, 5.72.1, 5.51.2-3, 5.74.1). Bratt also expands on the aggressiveness of the kings (Pgs. 15-19): ‘Most of the campaigns are unprovoked and, viewed abstractly, unnecessary’, ‘Another motive for aggression in the Histories, somewhat less frequently adduced than that of vengeance, is the aspiration to fulfill glorious destiny’ – this could be said of Cleomenes’ desire to fulfill the oracle which said he would capture Argos. Evans (1991: 12 ) says ‘expansionism was a Persian nomos’; Lateiner (1989: 153) notes that the Persian kings all end up attacking another country with little provocation. The Persian king ‘type’ looks very like Griffiths’ ‘archetypal war criminal’ (1989: 57), so it is not surprising that Cleomenes should be characterised at this point – after he has been shown to be mad – in a manner similar to the eastern kings and be said to commit atrocities which they also commit. Hartog (1988: 338-339) also sees the similarities between the Persian kings and Cleomenes, and says there is a ‘typical image’ for tyrants. Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 80-81) say the same: Cleomenes is closer to ‘barbarian dictators’ (barbarischen Machthabern) like Cambyses. At any rate, if we see Cleomenes in a similar light to the Persian kings, his shifting character may be further explained. Persian kings tend to have both negative and positive qualities, as Bratt notes (1985: 31 following). He also points out (Pgs. 37-38) that ‘the typical elements of the royal personality appear with varying strength in different sections of the narrative. Herodotus does not impose the parallels inflexibly on all the events he records. …the typical elements of the monarchs’ characterization are found occasionally in other personalities in the Histories’. So it is possible that Cleomenes may have similar traits to Persian kings.

203 See Griffiths ( 1989: 73, n. 9) for other immolations.
loudly and said, “Oracular Apollo, you have certainly deceived me greatly, saying that I would seize Argos; I suppose that my oracle is fulfilled.” *(ὡς ἤκουσε, ἀναστενάξας μέγα εἶπε· ὦ Άπολλον χρηστήριε, ἢ μεγάλως με ἡπάτηκας φάμενος Άργος αἱρήσειν. Συμβάλλομαι δ’ ἐξήκειν μοι τὸ χρηστήριον)*\(^\text{205}\).

This of course has parallels with the realisation of Cambyses that his interpretation of the oracle was wrong\(^\text{206}\). Cleomenes, however, has a slightly different attitude: he doesn’t admit that he misinterpreted the oracle, but that the oracle misled him. Like Croesus, Cleomenes blames the oracle, and he also eventually gets an answer which shows that the oracle was not wrong, but rather his interpretation of it\(^\text{207}\). Cleomenes is not able to reverse what he has done, and despite being distressed at the discovery of what the oracle really meant, he has still overstepped his limits by setting fire to the sacred grove.

Unfortunately, in an effort to do the right thing he goes even further over the limit. Unlike Cambyses who, having become \(σῶφρων\), is lucid ever after, Cleomenes proceeds to commit two more transgressions\(^\text{208}\). Having sent most of his men back to Sparta (6.81) he took the top thousand with him to sacrifice to Hera, but the priest

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\(^{205}\) Lang (1984: 100, 103) categorises these speeches as Triad Pattern One, where a question elicits an answer which causes a third speech which explains, elaborates or characterises the speaker, while also acting in some instances as a kind of conclusion.

\(^{206}\) See 3.64.1, 3.65.2-3. Cambyses also groans aloud, 3.64.2. See also Griffiths (1989: 58, 70-72) for similarities between Cambyses and Cleomenes; Harrison (2000: 139, n. 61) also connects the two incidents.

\(^{207}\) Croesus: 1.90.3 – 1.91.6. Cleomenes later goes back to Sparta, where those hostile to him arranged to have him charged on the suggestion that he accepted a bribe not to take the city of Argos (6.82.1). His reply – which Herodotus says he doesn’t know if it was true or not - was that he considered the oracle fulfilled when he took the sacred enclosure of Argos, and inquired of the favour of the gods as to whether he should attack the city or not, and had had a sign (6.82.2): a flame shot out of the breast of the statue in the temple of Hera, indicating to him that he need do nothing more; if it had come from the head, he would have taken it as a sign that he would take the city from the acropolis downwards. This was apparently a good enough explanation for the Spartiates and he was acquitted. See Griffiths (1989: 58-60) for this section; he notes that here Cleomenes is shown ‘as a pious mortal accepting the limits to action ordained by heaven’.

\(^{208}\) Cambyses dies reasonably soon after of course, since his wound, inflicted in the heat of the moment before his revelation, goes bad (3.66.2). So there is more narrative point to keeping him sane before his death so that his speech to the Persians is not made negative by a ‘mad backdrop’. The complete horribleness of Cleomenes’ death and madness would, on the other hand, be mitigated by any sort of ‘return to sanity’, so by keeping Cleomenes on an escalating scale of transgressions, Herodotus keeps the madness as a focus in our minds.
forbade him (ἀπηγόρευε), when he wanted to make the sacrifice, saying that it was not lawful for a foreigner (οὐκ ὁσιόν εἶναι ξείνῳ) to make a sacrifice there. Thereupon ‘Cleomenes ordered his helots to take the priest away from the altar and whip him, and he himself made the sacrifice’ (ὁ δὲ Κλεομένης τὸν ιρέα ἐκέλευε τοὺς εἰλωτας ἀπὸ βωμοῦ ἀπαγαγόντας μαστιγῶσαι καὶ αὐτὸς ἔθυσε).

The words of the priest at Argos recall the words of the priestess at Athens: ‘it is not lawful for Dorians to go there!’ (οὐ...θεμιτόν Δωριεῦσι παριέναι ἐνθαῦτα, 5.72.3)\(^\text{209}\). Both ὁσιός and θεμιτόν have overtones of ‘holy’ about them, and both times Cleomenes ignores the implicit warning in favour of his own wishes. The ill-treatment of the priest also echoes Cambyses’ treatment of the Egyptian priests of Apis (3.29.2)\(^\text{210}\). While Cleomenes may have had only one priest whipped, as opposed to multiple priests, this mitigating factor is lost in the fact that it is a priest of his own religion he is insulting; this lack of respect for his own religious customs is similar to Cambyses’ transgressing his own custom at 3.16.2-3. On the other hand, the priest calls Cleomenes a foreigner, so this transgression should perhaps be seen in direct comparison with Cambyses’ treatment of the priests of Apis\(^\text{211}\).

The final list entry as to what caused Cleomenes’ death and madness is what the Spartans themselves say (6.84.1). According to them, ‘Cleomenes wasn’t mad because of a god, but because he had associated with Scythians and had become a drinker of undiluted wine, and since then he had been mad.’ (ἐκ δαιμονίου μὲν οὐδενὸς μανῆναι Κλεομένεα, Σκύθῃσι δὲ ὠμιλήσαντά μιν ἀκρητοπότην γενέσθαι καὶ ἐκ τούτου μανῆναι.) This is a characteristic which Cleomenes supposedly shares with

\(^{209}\) As Griffiths (1989: 58) also notes and adds ‘we may suspect some recycling.’

\(^{210}\) Hartog (1988: 332) sees the similarity to the despotes here: ‘the despotes exercises his power over people’s bodies, marking them as he will, in the first place with the whip…Cambyse has the priests of Apis whipped. Only one Greek, on one occasion, uses a whip, and he is Cleomenes, the king of Sparta.’

\(^{211}\) Griffiths (1989: 58) adduces 6.127.3. Paterson (2002: 60) notes of Cleomenes’ actions here in the preceding narrative that ‘His deceiving the Argives into leaving a place of sanctuary so that he could kill them, and his burning of the grove so as to kill the suppliants who were taking refuge there, was a violation of the νόμος of ἱκετεία and an offence against Zeus Hiketesios – an offence which would be punished by the gods. And having the priest dragged from the altar was an offence against the νόμος of religious reciprocity.’
Cambyses. The Scythians came, at one stage, to the Spartans, wanting to make an alliance to ‘pay back’ Darius for his Scythian invasion (6.84.2). Cleomenes ‘...associated with them excessively, and because he associated more than was seemly he learnt to drink undiluted wine from them; and as a result of this the Spartiates think that he went mad.’ (ὁμιλέειν σφι μεζόνως, ὁμιλέοντα δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ἰκνεομένου μαθείν τὴν ἀκρητοποσίην παρ’ αὐτῶν· ἐκ τούτου δὲ μανῆναι μιν νομίζουσι Σπαρτῖται.)

The Spartan suggestion of a natural rather than supernatural cause serves two purposes: it reduces Cleomenes’ madness to something more mundane while simultaneously intimating that he didn’t commit the religious crimes which non-Spartans suggest he did. Whatever the Spartans thought of Cleomenes, their ‘natural’ explanation has the opposite effect of the one the Athenians use at 5.85.2, where their going mad makes their defeat a face-saving supernatural occurrence rather than a lack of good planning. Conversely, the Spartans save face here somewhat by suggesting that while their king might have been happier in his choice of companions, he did not, at least, do anything wrong in religious terms.

This explanation does have another, interesting connotation. Drinking wine is not the problem – Herodotus says the Spartans do so themselves (6.84.3), and we would be surprised if they did not. The trouble seems to be that Cleomenes did it a lot and drank it stronger a lot. Thus Cleomenes obtains the disapproval of the Spartiates for spending far too much time with savages and picking up bad habits which are carried to excess; the repetition both of the comparatives μεζόνως and μᾶλλον as well as ὁμιλέω indicates that the problem is how much time he spent with the Scythians; just as ἀκρητοπότην and ἀκρητοποσίην emphasise the strength of the wine. The Spartan disapproval for

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212 See 3.34.2.

213 Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 98) point out that Cleomenes’ ‘psychopathic ambition extends ostensibly’ (krankhafter Ehrgeiz angeblich...reichte) to the point where he would make a campaign into Persia with the Scythians, which, whether it occurred or not, demonstrates a disregard on Cleomenes’ part for the limits of ‘the ancestral area of reign’ (des angestammten Herrschaftsbereichs); this is a trait common to the Eastern kings.

214 Linforth (1928: 237) suggests that the use of ἐκ δαίμονοισιν οὐδενός at 6.84.1 in this instance is one where ‘the significant thing is the very vagueness of the expression for the divine’, and that the reference is not to ‘a divine agent, but a divine act’.
such behaviour is clear, so while they clear Cleomenes of religious transgression, they do imply they he was not your average Spartan and had leanings which were not Spartan. Thus in a way the Spartans are saying that Cleomenes was not Spartan enough because he did not stick to Spartan behaviour and custom\(^{215}\).

Herodotus’ final statement is his own opinion (6.84.3): ‘It seems to me that Cleomenes paid this reckoning to Demaratus.’ (ἐμοὶ δὲ δοκέει τίσιν ταύτην ἔκτεῖσαι)\(^{216}\). This is not exactly the same as what ‘many of the Greeks say’ (6.75.3), that it was because he persuaded the Pythia to say what she did about Demaratus, as Herodotus does not mention the Pythia at all\(^{217}\). Perhaps he felt he did not need to. But his statement encompasses not just the bribing of the Pythia but the entire deposition of Demaratus, and therefore covers the matter of his divine parentage. Boedeker states the position succinctly: ‘Apparently it is Herodotus’ view that injustice

\(^{215}\) Benardete (1969: 165) suggests a similar interpretation: ‘It might seem at first glance that the Spartan account has nothing to do with the gods, and in the strict sense that is true; but if we consider that the Spartans accuse Cleomenes of having learnt an alien custom, we realize that the merely replace the violation of sacred things with the violation of law.’ This provides a reason for the discussion of wine which How and Wells (1967: Vol. II, 97-98, s.v. 84) rather facilely claim is ‘a spiteful bit of gossip invented to explain the term ἐπισκυθίζειν.’ While Hartog (1988: 169) states that ‘to drink wine is the mark of a civilized man, but to drink wine undiluted is the mark of a savage and represents a transgression. One dabbles in this transgression as soon as one alters the normal ratios of wine and water’, I see just as much transgression emphasised by the time spent with the Scythians as in the strength of the wine.

\(^{216}\) Harrison (2000: 25-26) employs this section to disprove the ‘distancing’ or ‘cautionary’ use of λέγεται, to good effect. As he points out, ‘Herodotus presents a number of alternative explanations for the death of Cleomenes (6.75.3, 84):...Nothing in Herodotus’ reporting of the alternative versions of Cleomenes’ death suggests his own view except this final statement...in the absence of any similar expression of preference...we may not presume to know either which version Herodotus would have preferred or indeed that he would have preferred any.’ The only addition I would suggest is that the length of the description of Demaratus’ true parentage (6.62.1-6.63.3 and 6.68.1-6.69.5) is a clue to Herodotus’ own view.

\(^{217}\) Lloyd (2003: 119) notes the wording also: ‘Herodotus concludes his whole account by giving his opinion on the matter, namely that ‘Cleomenes came to grief as a punishment for what he did to Demaratus’. That is not the precise wording of what he had said ‘many of the Greeks’ believed, but it certainly supports the view that his madness was a result of divine retribution. Herodotus is evidently inclined, on occasion, to endorse the traditional belief that being afflicted with disease – physical or mental – may be the gods’ doing, the retribution they exact for some offence to them or other wrongdoing. The Cleomenes story shows both how widespread some such idea was...and also that there was frequent disagreement about particular cases. Even if a lot of Greeks diagnosed divine punishment, they certainly did not agree about what that punishment was for exactly.’ Corella (1984: 198), on the other hand, seems see no divine allusions in Herodotus’ wording, but rather a ‘moral concept’ (un concetto morale).
done to Demaratus is in the same category, at least in terms of requital, as wrong done to a god or hero.\textsuperscript{218}

The characterisation of Cleomenes does have a great deal in common with that of Cambyses, as scholars have noted before; on the other hand, Herodotus himself never compares the two. Griffiths notes the ‘sheer extent of the overlap’ and says that ‘If one rejects the possibility that these two kings were genetic clones doomed from birth to mimic each other’s behaviour, it is clear that there exists a case for claiming that either one king’s story has been transferred to the other, or that both draw on a repertoire of classic ‘wicked ruler’ tales.’\textsuperscript{219} What is interesting, to my mind, is not just the similarities but the differences between Herodotus’ treatment of two people who could appear to be cut from the same cloth. Cambyses is portrayed as a tyrant from the beginning, when he attacks Egypt in revenge for Amasis’ trick (3.1.4-5), has a brief moment of generosity at 3.13.1-4 and proceeds, from 3.16.1 onwards, to act in offensive ways until he is finally categorised as ‘mad’ by Herodotus at 3.30.1, with a list of actions and reasons to prove it (3.30.1-3.38.1). His later actions (3.61.1-3.66.2), on the other hand, have little madness about them. Cleomenes’ characterisation also changes. Flawed from birth because of an unlawful marriage on the part of his parents (5.39.1-542.1), he appears to do nothing really mad for a good deal of Book Five and some of Six\textsuperscript{220}. The actions he takes which might be construed as ‘leading to madness’ are reasonably few: his ignoring the priestess at 5.72.3, his plan to depose the semi-divine Demaratus at 6.61.1 and subsequent bribing of the Pythia at 6.65.3-6.66.2, and his actions in Arcadia (6.74.1-2). Thereafter, he is called mad (6.75.1), and the actions he takes are to be seen as mad, either in his manner of death or in the numerous reasons given by different people which Herodotus lists (6.75.2-6.84.3). So anecdotes related after his death in the narrative are to be seen as leading to his madness at that point when Herodotus has made it clear that Cleomenes was mad. Simply put, Cleomenes is only really portrayed as mad by Herodotus in parts of the narrative where his madness is an issue. In other parts of the logos (if we can call such an erratic role as Cleomenes has a logos) Cleomenes is sane

\textsuperscript{218} Boedeker (1987: 190).
\textsuperscript{219} Griffiths (1989:70).
\textsuperscript{220} See 3.148.1-2, 5.50.1-3, 5.51.1-3, 5.64.1-2, 5.70.1-2, 5.72.1-2, 5.74.1-2, 5.76.1, 5.90.2, 5.97.1-2, 6.50.1-6.51, 6.61.1, 6.73.1-2.
because he is not playing his ‘mad role’ and needs, for the purposes of the narrative, to be fairly normal. Even Cambyses is more consistently mad in his narrative, although that is probably because he has a definite logos. Even so, Herodotus is interested in proving Cambyses’ madness, but takes Cleomenes’ madness as a fact which doesn’t need proving and instead concentrates on the reasons why Cleomenes might have gone mad.

Because of the interest in the causes of madness in this narrative, we get a certain amount of evidence to prove, fairly conclusively, that most people – ‘many’ Greeks, Athenians and Argives - considered Cleomenes’ madness to have a divine cause due to his religious transgressions of one sort or another. Only the Spartans do not believe this, but they don’t dispute the madness, only the reason. They may suggest that Cleomenes broke away from his own customs and doing this caused him to go mad; but their natural explanation absolves Cleomenes of religious wrongdoing.

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221 As Benardete (1969: 164) also notes: ‘These three explanations, which differ in the enormity of the crime they attribute to Cleomenes, agree that some violation of the sacred was involved’. Evans (1991: 16) also points out that ‘Retribution was part of the moral and intellectual baggage that Herodotus had inherited from the epic and the whole tradition of Greek mythopoeia…Zeus exacted great penalties from proud men who worked evil [n. 26, Works and Days, 238-45]. On the level of popular theology, Herodotus was not far removed from that view. He recorded that, in the general opinion of the Greeks, Cleomenes, king of Sparta, went mad as retribution for sacrilege (the Spartans were the exception: they attributed his madness to heavy drinking). But Herodotus himself thought his insanity was retribution for his unjust treatment of Demaratus.’ Harrison (2000: 106-107) cautions against getting side-tracked by the ‘natural’ explanation: ‘Cleomenes’ madness and subsequent death by self-mutilation provoke Herodotus to speculate on what might have been the cause. Although he reports one possible non-divine explanation…in the event Herodotus chooses one of three explanations that imply a divine origin, though one might not suppose so from many modern interpretations of this passage’. See also his n. 13.
Chapter Two

Madness in Context: Astyages (1.109.2)

The *logos* concerning the downfall of Astyages, king of the Medes, at the hands of his grandson, Cyrus, starts at 1.107.1 and finishes at 1.130.3. Astyages himself is a character of note; Immerwahr suggests that ‘Astyages’ failing is his excessive cruelty (he is *pikros*, 1.123.2 and 130.1)\(^ {222} \). While Astyages is indeed cruel, and a violator of *nomos* with it\(^ {223} \) (as evidenced by one example of signal importance in the narrative: his cooking and serving to Harpagus the remains of Harpagus’ only son, 1.118.1-119.7), his failings begin much earlier than 1.123.2.

It is not his cruelty which causes his downfall entirely, but his misplaced trust (a characteristic shared by Harpagus). Veen, whose in-depth study of the Astyages *logos* is of great interest,\(^ {224} \) points out (referring to his handing the baby Cyrus to Harpagus at 1.108.4) that Astyages has ‘…an unthinking attitude, here: taking his own trust at face value, effects a counterproductive method.’\(^ {225} \) The same characteristic is evident in Harpagus as well: he trusts too much in his bodyguards to do the work at 1.113.3 and 1.117.5, ‘so that he is not able to ascertain the identity of the dead child for himself and misses the opportunity of redress...Like Astyages, Harpagus thinks unverified trust is an effective means of promoting his interests.’\(^ {225} \) This ‘unverified trust’ runs parallel to another, related, characteristic that Astyages and Harpagus both share: a tendency to see life through the ancient equivalent of rose-coloured glasses; ‘ignoring the possibility of

\(^ {222} \) Immerwahr (1966: 162). He goes on ‘How completely the king has been misled is emphasised when he is described as 'bewildered' when the identity of Cyrus dawns on him: this is the one occurrence he had never expected to happen...(1.116.2) ’

\(^ {223} \) The violation of *nomos* is a theme in the *logos*; while Astyages is not the only violator, he is the one who violates the most. Konstan (1983: 1, 7) remarks that the king ‘reduces man to beast’ by serving up Harpagus’ son and making a cannibal of Harpagus (Pg. 8), and Harpagus himself ‘elevates a beast to the status of a bearer of language’. It is to be remembered that although mad people are often violators of *nomos*, far more violators of *nomos* in the *Histories* are not called mad at all; see note 18.

\(^ {224} \) Veen (1996: 34).

\(^ {225} \) Veen (1996: 34-35). See also Dewald (1981: 110). She puts in slightly different terms: ‘The whole account of the birth of Cyrus is structured to emphasize an improper devolution of authority…’
something less pleasant...,' they see reality as they wish to, and do not ‘probe beyond the surface.’ So while Astyages may be the ‘embedded focalizer of the events’ in the logos, he prefers, rather ironically, to see only what he wants to see. Madness will be used by Herodotus to highlight the theme of trust in the logos.

In addition to these facets of the character of Astyages, he is called ‘mad’ by Harpagus in 1.109.2. If we look closely at the surrounding sentence we could think that Astyages’ madness consists of an unnatural desire to kill his grandson. Veen notes that ‘in Greek eyes, too, Astyages' behaviour is the opposite of the conduct considered normal - which makes his motive look all the more compelling’. Other scholars have also commented on this unnatural aspect of Astyages’ behaviour. Evans says that trying to escape his fate is ‘a peculiarly irrational effort, for Astyages was an old man without a heir.

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226 Veen, (1996:37). There is a slight problem with Veen’s theory: Astyages’ dreams at 1.107.1 and 1.108.2. The way Astyages interprets these are a very unpleasant form of ‘reality’. That he misinterprets them is perhaps the answer, that the most pleasant reality for him is to retain his kingship for himself. Veen does point out the dreams could have been a comfort rather than a threat (Pg. 25): ‘...the prediction does not specify the time and circumstances of the succession, so that one is led to believe that the dreams might also have had a reassuring effect upon the royal mind.’ That is to say, if Astyages were concerned about an heir.

227 Munson (2001: 23, also n.12).

228 Other examples of Astyages’ unverified trust are at 1.108.4-5 and 1.127.3, which will be discussed. In addition to this, 1.121.1 is rather interesting. Astyages brings Cyrus, having survived and now 10 years old, before him and says ‘Child, since I treated you unjustly because of an unfulfilled dream vision and you are still live through your own fate...’ (ὦ παῖ, σὲ γὰρ ἐγὼ δι’ ὄψιν ὀνείρου οὐ τελέην ὁδὸν, τῇ σεωτοῦ δὲ μοίῃ περίεις-) and proceeds to send him back to his blood parents in Persia. Gould (1989: 73) suggests that this use of moira is a ‘passing remark...to dismiss further consideration of why the thing in question happened...no more needs to be said by way of explanation for Cyrus’ survival and the story moves on.’ This is of course part of the reason why Astyages uses the phrase; it is also a way to gloss over the results of his unverified trust but naturally he will not admit to that failing; misinterpreted dreams are fairly standard, perhaps a ‘cut-price’ apology. The use of moira here then adds to Astyages’ character. The example of Astyages’ use of moira is also a little different from the other examples Gould uses (4.164.4 and 3.142.3), which refer simply to someone’s death. Astyages on the other hand is clearly not dead; that is the irony. Therefore it is hardly surprising if the use of moira by Astyages here is a rather more loaded literary device.

229 Veen (1996: 24). See also n. 67, where Veen points out the contrasting (and normal) attitude of Procles in 3.50.2, who happily receives his daughter’s children.

230 Harrison (2000: 58). As he notes, ‘The death of one’s children is on the Solonian model an archetypal misfortune...’ See also Lateiner (1989: 142), ‘The extirpation of the house of the aggrandizing wrongdoer is a consequence (τίσις) that Herodotus is fond of noting. Seven violators of supra-national nomoi are said to be childless, at least in the male line: Astyages, Cambyses, Cleomenes, the elder Miltiades, son of Cypselus, Stesagoras, son of Cimon, and the legendary Polybus and Cepheus...Astyages...tried to kill his grandson Cyrus, against the universal custom of respect for blood-ties and inheritance...’ (my italics).
son, and Mandane, the mother of Cyrus, was his heir...231, thus equating the ‘irrationality’ with the attempted murder of his grandson (or his heir’s son). Scholars tend to gloss over the madness of Astyages and what it consists of; but if they make any mention of irrational behaviour, they generally associate it with his killing of blood kin. While the desire to exterminate one’s heirs is indeed unnatural, it is not the only reason why Harpagus describes Astyages as mad; the full answer is in the wider context of Astyages’ speech and of the logos itself.

Parricide and Madness

There is a slight problem with simply saying that parricide equals madness, because in the Histories this is hardly ever the case. Other people kill their relatives or attempt to, and only one of these is called mad. Cambyses has his brother killed after a dream similar to Astyages’ (3.30.1), not to mention the killing of his sister-wife and their unborn baby (3.32.1-4), and we are told that he is mad at the time: at 3.30.1 ‘the Egyptians say...he went mad’ (λέγουσι Αἰγύπτιοι...ἐμάνη). His killing of his siblings and child are the first items in the list which proves his madness232. This is the sole example which reliably demonstrates that to kill one’s relatives is a mad thing, even if the fear that the relative in question may depose the murderer is genuine and legitimate.

In opposition to the example, however, we have four times as many examples of the murder or attempted murder of a relative (remembering that although Smerdis, Cambyses’ sister and her unborn child were killed, Cyrus was not) where the murderer is not called mad. So while it might be tempting to suggest on the basis of the Cambyses episode that Herodotus may see the killing of one’s relatives as madness, it is not a view which is consistently pressed233.


232 While this reported speech could be perceived as distancing Herodotus from the veracity of the statement, according to Lateiner (1989: 22), it is well to consider what Harrison (2000: 25) has to say about such expressions: ‘The important point that needs to be made is that neither of these phenomena necessarily suggests doubt or distance on Herodotus’ part...we cannot presume that Herodotus intends by reporting it in this way to signal doubt.’

233 The murder of his brother committed by Adrastus (1.35.3) can be discarded from possible comparison. Adrastus describes his killing as ἀέκων, ‘without intending’, and so differs from the intentional and
In partial support of the idea that those who want to harm their own family members are not normal, if not specifically mad, in 8.116.2 a Thracian king dug out (ἐξώρυξε) the eyes of his six sons because they marched with the Persians against his wishes, ‘but they disagreed, or else they had a desire to see the war...’ (οἱ δὲ, ἀλογήσαντες ἢ ἀλλὰς σφὶ θυμὸς ἐγένετο θείσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον...). But although they came back unharmed (ἀσινέες), their father punished their ‘desire to see’ by treating them in this fashion. Herodotus introduces the story by saying that this king ‘did an extraordinary deed’ (ἐργον ὑπερφυὲς, 8.116.1), indicating that whether this deliberate killings of Cambyses and Astyages. The other examples used are not always perfect replicas of the same situation as that of Astyages or Cambyses, however, and this will be taken into account. None of the following are called mad. The brother of the Egyptian king Sesostris attempts to kill him and his family, in 2.107.1-2; Sesostris later punished his brother (πεισάμενος τὸν άδελφον). We are not told how. A thief caught in a trap (2.121.β2) has his head cut off by his brother, but the trapped brother requested this action in order that he not be recognised and so bring destruction on his untrapped brother. The act is a form of self-protection, as is that of Astyages and Cambyses (in the case of Smerdis at least), but it differs from the others in that the action was requested by the trapped brother. Octamasades cuts off his brother Scyles’ head at 4.80.5 and there is no suggestion that he is mad (in fact Scyles is the one called mad at 4.79.4); the point of the story is to demonstrate how thoroughly the Scythians deal with anyone who adopts non-Scythian customs. Arcesilas the Cyreanean, while ill and drugged, is strangled by his brother Learchus (4.160.4). The emphasis of this and surrounding passages (4.157-160) is on the conflict experienced by the Cyreanean colonists, including this intra-familial conflict. The ruler of Eion, Boges, when the city was besieged by the Athenians (7.107.1), made a pyre and butchered his children, wife, concubines and servants before throwing them onto the pyre and then himself (7.107.2). This is not an act of self-preservation but of preservation of honour. By destroying himself and his family before his city is taken, Boges retains his standing in the eyes of Xerxes. Ameinocles is said to have killed his child in 7.190.1. Of Ameinocles Herodotus says ‘a horrible homicide/disaster of having killed a child grieved him’ (τοῦτον ἄχαρις συμφορὴ λυπεῦσα παιδοφόνος), thereby displaying a remorse not shown by Astyages. Cambyses, at the end of his life, expresses remorse for having killed Smerdis unnecessarily as it turns out (3.64.2, ‘he bewailed Smerdis’, ἀπέκλαιε Σμέρδιν; 3.65.3-5, 7, ‘...saying these things Cambyses bewailed all his fortune/his every deed’, εἴπας ταῦτα ὁ Καμβύσες ἀπέκλαιε πᾶσαν τὴν ἐωυτοῦ πρῆξιν.). On investigation as to whether Ameinocles murdered intentionally or not, results are inconclusive. No word such as ἀέκων (as at 3.53.3) is offered to suggest that the killing was unintentional, and in the preceding sentence, ‘but with regard to other matters he didn’t prosper, although by his findings he became a very rich man’ (ἀλλ’ ουκ εὐτυχέων εὐφήμαισι μέγα πλούσιος ἐγένετο, going on to explain about the child-killing), even the use of εὐτυχέω does not necessarily suggest that the killing was a bit of ‘bad luck’ rather than a deliberate killing. The point, however, is that deliberate murder or not, Ameinocles is not called mad either. Xerxes himself has his brother and his brother’s sons killed in 9.113.2. He sends an army to kill them in Bactria, a case which parallels Cambyses’ actions in sending Prexaspers to kill his brother (3.30.3), although it should be noted that Cambyses nevertheless considers himself to be a ‘brother killer’ (ἀδελφοκτόνος, 3.65.4). Masistes, Xerxes’ brother, was trying to cause trouble for Xerxes in Bactria (9.113.1), so one can argue that he was killed for issues of self-defence despite the lead into this story (Xerxes’ wife tricking Xerxes into letting her mutilate Masistes’ wife, 9.110.2-3, 9.112.1). This is no different from Astyages and Cambyses killing out of self-defence, except that Xerxes is not described as mad whereas the other two are. The case of Cypselus (5.92.γ1 following) will be discussed in the main text.
was perceived as horrible or not\textsuperscript{234}, it was at least ‘not normal’. On the other hand, this king did not kill his sons (nor did he appear to want to kill them) and therefore is not an exact comparison with Cambyses and Astyages.

The closest examples to what Astyages wishes to do are the killing of his unborn child by Cambyses (3.32.4), who is mad, and the attempted murder of Cypselus by his kinsmen. Other people kill their siblings or relatives in adulthood; these are the only cases where babies are killed or the attempt is made. The Bacchiadae plot to kill the newborn Cypselus in 5.92.γ\textsubscript{1} because of two oracles suggesting that he would be a danger to Corinth (5.92.β2-3). The men couldn’t bring themselves to kill Cypselus when he smiled at them (5.92.γ3), and were later foiled by Labda, Cypselus’ mother, finding out their plan and hiding the baby (5.92.δ1-2) so that he couldn’t be found. This situation is very like that of Astyages, who after having a dream about Cyrus tries to do away with him, but whose orders are not carried out\textsuperscript{235}. Astyages is called mad, but these men are not. The discourse on Cypselus is part of a larger speech on the horrors committed by tyrants (5.92.1-η5), and once again the killing of Cypselus is a kind of self-preservation for the Bacchiadae, as he is the first Corinthian tyrant.

The kinsmen are related to Cypselus but are not of the close familial link of Astyages and Cyrus. They feel compassion for the helpless baby, and this foils their first attempt, and Labda foils the second. Astyages and Cambyses feel no such compassion, and their link to the child is closer: respectively grandfather and father. Cambyses has no reason to kill his child apart from anger at the mother. Astyages acts out of self-preservation, which is a reason of sorts, and as much of a reason as other parricides demonstrate who are not called mad, although they conduct their attempts against adults. It is possible to push the idea that Astyages is specifically called mad in this context because of his close blood-link to Cyrus combined with the helplessness of the baby. So Astyages may be the only parricide called mad because, in this logos, Herodotus wants to emphasise the closeness of the grandfather and grandson and the disparity of the power struggle. This is a possible case, but there is another, stronger, simpler reason for Harpagus to call Astyages mad, which will be discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{234} LSJ (1992: 1870) suggests ὑπερφυής can mean ‘monstrous’; s.v. ὑπερφυής.
\textsuperscript{235} Gray (1995: 186) notes the ‘conventional patterning’ of these stories.
One of the illogicalities with calling parricide madness in this case is that Harpagus himself is a blood-relative of the baby. In 1.109.2, when Harpagus’ wife asks him what he will do with Cyrus, whom Astyages has ordered killed (1.108.4) due to prophetic dreams that the child will rule in his stead (1.107.1, 1.108.1-4), Harpagus answers: ‘Not that which Astyages commanded, not if he becomes worse deranged and mad than he is (mad) now/his present madness, I will not assent to the plan, nor will I serve him in this kind of murder.’ (οὐ τῇ ἐνετέλλετο Ἀστυάγης, οὐδ’ εἰ παραφρονήσει τε καὶ μανέεται κάκιον ἢ νῦν μαίνεται, οὐ δ’ ἐγὼν προσθήσομαι τῇ γνώμη οὐδὲ ἐς φόνον τοιοῦτον υπηρετήσω.) It could well appear that Harpagus calls Astyages mad because of his order to kill his own grandson.

But Harpagus goes on to explain that for several reasons he won’t do away with the child (1.109.3-4): the child is a relative to himself, and Astyages is old, with no male heirs. Not only that, but if the tyranny transfers to the only female heir, Mandane, on Astyages’ death, she won’t take kindly to the fact that Harpagus killed her son. The child must be done away with in the meantime, for Harpagus’ safety, but he refuses to commit the murder himself.

These explanations for Harpagus’ refusal to kill the child shed an unsteady light on why he calls Astyages mad. By having Cyrus killed, Astyages is destroying his grandson. The explanation about Astyages’ age and lack of male heir only emphasizes the ‘madness’ of the action in destroying his own line in terms of the tyranny. But if Astyages is mad because he wants to destroy his own relatives, then Harpagus must be in the same category: as we are told from 1.109.3-4, Harpagus is also related to the child, and the only reason he won’t kill Cyrus himself is out of self-preservation. By handing the child over to Mitradates (1.110.3) he is as much a murderer as Astyages is. Harpagus is never called mad though, which gives reason to doubt whether Astyages, who is called mad, is really mad due to parricide (attempted or fulfilled) or not. The only possible reason for the difference is the closeness of the familial link between Astyages and Cyrus.

Perhaps we are indeed meant to think, briefly, that because Harpagus calls Astyages mad, he will save the baby Cyrus; that Harpagus recognises the ‘madness’ in
destroying one’s own relatives and refuses to do so\textsuperscript{236}. This thought can only last until we read/hear the rest of Harpagus’ speech and realise that he is not motivated by kindness for the child at all (1.109.4): ‘If, when this man dies, the tyranny passes to this daughter, whose son he now kills by means of me, is there anything left for me after that other than the greatest of dangers? So then, for my own safety this child must die, but one of the men of Astyages himself must be the murderer and not (one) of mine.’ (εἰ δ’ ἐθελήσει τοῦτο τελευτήσαντος ἐς τὴν θυγατέρα ταύτην ἀναβήναι ἡ τυραννίς, τῆς νῦν τὸν υἱὸν κτεῖνει δι’ ἐμεῦ, ἀλλο τι ἡ λείπεται τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν ἐμοὶ κινδύνων ὁ μέγιστος; ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἀσφαλέος εἶνεκα ἐμοὶ δεῖ τοῦτον τελευτᾶν τὸν παῖδα, δεῖ μέντοι τῶν τινα Αστυάγεος αὐτοῦ φονέα γενέσθαι καὶ μή τῶν ἐμῶν.) From this speech we are clearly shown that the person uppermost in Harpagus’ mind is Harpagus himself; a little later in the narrative Cyno will save the baby Cyrus (1.112.1-3)\textsuperscript{237}. It is not the child-murder that bothers Harpagus in particular, as he states bluntly that ‘this child must die’, but the fact of his own safety\textsuperscript{238}. He objects to killing it himself partly because Cyrus is a relative but mostly, as we can deduce from the greater part of the speech dedicated to the discussion, because of possible danger from Mandane later. As we will discover in an ironic twist of fate, Harpagus’ concern for his future safety shouldn’t have been based on Mandane at all, but on Astyages. His fear of the possible harm he might receive from her blinds him to the definite harm he will receive from Astyages if Astyages finds out, as of course he does.

\textsuperscript{236} In fact we have to wait for Mitradates and in particular Cyno. Veen (1996: 28-29) comments extensively on the use of the ‘insignificant’ Cyno and her husband how ‘the protective disposition of these people concerning their family’ is a foil to the attitudes of both Astyages and Harpagus. Veen observes (Pg. 29) that, ‘the various developments of the story are told in terms of family relationships...’ Dewald (1981: 110) points out that ‘Cyno is the only actor in the entire account who is willing both to give voice to the full range of practical and moral considerations that, in her opinion, govern the situation and to accept responsibility for acting on them.’

\textsuperscript{237} Veen (1996: 40): ‘Cyno's emotional impulse to save the infant...is controlled and redirected by rational deliberation, and so she obtains what she wants: her own baby is buried and the living child remains alive to be raised by her...’ Although Dewald (1981: 110) credits Cyno and her saving of Cyrus as being the person who ‘sets in motion the events that will destroy Astyages’ kingdom (1.110 ff.)...’, the chain of events starts with Astyages and Harpagus both assuming that someone else will do their dirty work for them. Cyno plays a major part in the fall of Astyages’ kingdom, but the person at whose feet most of the blame can be laid is really Astyages himself.

\textsuperscript{238} As Veen (1996: 25) points out. ‘Harpagus' motive is equally explicit...he is guided by considerations of safety...'Safety' is thus the crucial issue in Harpagus' decision to have the order executed, and to have it executed by a slave of Astyages'.
So while there is a case for Astyages being called mad for having his infant grandson killed, it is rather shaky. Fortunately, there are other reasons for his being called mad.

**Madness in Context: Astyages and Harpagus**

Astyages may be called mad for several reasons, and this will be seen if we look at the wider context of the *logos*.

The narrative of Astyages and Cyrus begins in 1.107.1-2 where Astyages’ daughter Mandane is married off to a Persian of lower rank, because Astyages had a dream that she urinated and flooded Asia\(^\text{239}\). Fearing (ἐφοβήθη, 1.107.1, δεδοικώς τὴν ὀψιν, 1.107.2) the interpretations the Magi gave him, this marriage to a social inferior (and one disposed to peace) was an attempt to forestall her influence.

Sometime after she married, Astyages had another dream about Mandane (1.108.1): ‘It seemed to him that a vine grew out of this daughter’s genitalia, and the vine overshadowed all Asia.’ (ἐδόκεε οἱ ἐκ τῶν αἰδοίων τῆς θυγατρὸς ταύτης φῦναι ἄμπελον, τὴν δὲ ἄμπελον ἐπισχεῖν τὴν Ἀσίην πᾶσαν.) The Magi (1.108.2) interpreted the dream to mean that Mandane’s child was destined to rule instead of Astyages, and because of this Astyages wanted to destroy the child when it was born\(^\text{240}\).

This passage indicates, among other things, the care which Astyages takes: ‘When she (Mandane) arrived he watched over/guarded her, wanting to destroy the baby born from her’ (ἀπικομένην δὲ ἐφύλασσε βουλόμενος τὸ γεννώμενον ἐξ αὐτῆς διαφθείραι ...1.108.2); he is also described as ‘being wary/guarding’ (φυλασσόμενος, 1.108.3). After the child is born and Harpagus gets his orders to dispose of it, Harpagus too says (1.108.5) ‘we will be on guard in case in the time afterwards as well anything

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\(^\text{239}\) Immerwahr, (1966: 163) says the vine represents ‘the beneficent aspects of royal power and should be connected with the wine motif of Cyrus’ campaign against the Massagetae’; on the other hand, Fornara (1971: 53) doubts there is any symbolic significance.

\(^\text{240}\) Dewald (1981: 97) compares the two ‘explicitly sexual dreams’ about Mandane to the story of Cypselus (5.92γ-δε), observing that ‘[t]he chest in which Labda hides her child from his would-be murderers is a suggestive equivalent of the uterine imagery in the Cyrus story. Both indicate the mother’s involuntary role as the destroyer of her own family heritage.’
transgresses against you.’ (φυλασσόμεθα δὲ ἐς σὲ καὶ ἐς τὸν μετέπειτα χρόνον μηδὲν ἐξαμαρτεῖν.) From the repetition of φυλάσσω we get the impression that Astyages and Harpagus (who speaks in the plural, perhaps indicating the unity of his forces which is also suggested at 1.113.3) have a veritable police state formed for the strict purpose of preventing this baby from causing Astyages harm. We may find this excessive paranoia because of a child somewhat amusing, but such emphasis is laid precisely to highlight Astyages’ obsessive state. Astyages’ fear, also mentioned twice in 1.107.1-2, informs his actions regarding Cyrus; this is the emotion uppermost in his character at the time of Cyrus’ birth.

Then we are told in 1.108.3-4: ‘Astyages, calling Harpagus, a man both related [to him] and most trustworthy of the Medes and a steward of all his (Astyages’) belongings, and said the following such things to him: “Harpagus, whatever matter I demand of you, don’t neglect it or gamble with me/with my life and don’t choose others and thereby bring out your own destruction later. Get the child Mandane gave birth to, take him to your (place) and kill him. Then inter him – in whatever way you want.”’ (ὁ Ἀστυάγης...καλέσας Ἅρπαγον, ἄνδρα οἰκήιον καὶ πιστότατόν τε Μήδων καὶ πάντων ἐπίτροπον τῶν ἑωυτοῦ, ἔλεγε οἱ τοιάδε∙ Ἅρπαγε, πρῆγμα τὸ ἀν τοι προσθέω, μηδαμῶς παραχύῃ, μηδὲ ἐμὲ τε παραβάλῃ καὶ ἄλλους ἐλόμενος ἐξ ὑστέρης σοι αὐτῷ περιπέσῃς. λάβε τὸν Μανδάνη ἔτεκε παῖδα, φέρων δὲ ἐς σεωυτοῦ ἀπόκτεινον∙ μετὰ δὲ θάψων τρόπῳ ὀτεῖ ρω αὐτὸς βούλεαι.) Because we have been informed about Astyages’ measures to guard himself from the baby, his speech is not a surprise, and builds on his characterization: from paranoid old man to paranoid, tyrannical and demanding old man. The depiction of Harpagus as the most trustworthy steward is, along with Harpagus’ own speech, a set up for his unthought-of disobedience. But Astyages’ speech is revealing also. Apart from his first and last clauses, every verb is an imperative (even the subjunctive is a prohibitive aorist subjunctive with μηδαμῶς);

241 Gray (1995: 193) notes that Astyages’ desire for keeping his power is ‘the motive for the king’s offence’; she compares this story with those of Candaules (1.107.1 f.), Xerxes (9.108.1 f.) and Ariston (6.62.1 f.), where the desire is for a woman rather than power, but the desire still causes an offence (Pgs. 188-193).

242 See Veen (1996: 32-33) for other instances of Astyages’ fear.
Astyages expects to be obeyed and lays out the consequences if Harpagus ‘chooses others’. The phrase is sufficiently ambiguous to cover not only his subsequent ‘choosing’ not to kill Cyrus himself, but also his ‘choosing’ of others to do the job for him.

In contrast, Candaules’ speech to Gyges, when he wants him to attend to a matter the servant is somewhat wary about, is quite soothing. Candaules says to Gyges (1.9.1): ‘Courage, Gyges, and don’t be afraid of me, that I’m making this suggestion to test you, nor of my wife, in case some harm might come to you from her; for I will arrange it all in such a way that she doesn’t realise she has been seen by you.’ (θάρσει, Γύγη, καὶ μὴ φοβεῦ μήτε ἔμε, ὡς σεο πειρώμενος λέγω λόγον τόνδε, μήτε γυναῖκα τὴν ἐμὴν, μὴ τί τοι ἐξ αὐτῆς γένηται βλάβος· ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐγὼ μηχανήσομαι οὕτω ὡστε μηδὲ μαθεῖν μιν ὁφθείσαν ὑπὸ σεῦ.) Here, while there are two imperatives, they are imperatives designed to soothe, ‘take courage’ and ‘don’t be afraid’. While the use of the subjunctive after φοβεῦ is normal, it does make the possibility of harm just that: a possibility rather than a certainty. Furthermore, Candaules says that he will arrange the scheme; this contrasts with Astyages who orders people to do what he wants and doesn’t particularly care as to how the matter is accomplished, only that it is accomplished.

Harpagus replies to the king (1.108.5), ‘King, in other times you have not yet seen any fault in this man at all, and we will be on guard in case in the time afterwards as well anything transgresses against you. But if this (action) is so pleasing to you, it is of course necessary that my task be performed properly.’ (ὁ δὲ ἀμείβεται∙ Ὡ βασιλεῦ, οὐτε ἄλλοτε κω παρείδες ἀνδρὶ τᾶδε ἄχαρι οὐδὲν, φυλασσόμεθα δὲ ἐς σε καὶ ἐς τὸν μετέπειταχρόνον μηδὲν ἐξαμαρτεῖν. ἄλλ’ εἰ τοι φίλον τοῦτο οὕτω γίνεσθαι, χοὴ δὴ τὸ γε ἐμὸν ὑπηρετέσσει τὸ πεπίτηδεως.) This speech seems to indicate that Harpagus is willing to go ahead with what he has to do; although the inclusion of κω could be taken as an indicator to the contrary (‘you have not yet seen any

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243 Veen (1996: 25, n. 68): ‘In transmitting his order he disobeys the explicit order of Astyages.’ Gray (1995: 204) points out that both Astyages and Harpagus employ ‘despotic compulsion of inferiors’. Also note the littering through the speech (surely not entirely co- incidental) of pi, tau and sigma, and the prevalence of epsilons in conjunction with these and other harder sounds (gamma, delta). This gives the effect of someone alternatively spitting or barking out their orders and threats in barely-contained fright.
fault’), and the last sentence is almost ironical. Familial love is often described with φίλος; but here the action of killing what in normal circumstances would be φίλον to a grandparent is the action φίλον to Astyages. Finally, Harpagus says that ‘it is necessary’ that his task be done; this could indicate a reservation on his part, along with the doubting ‘if this action is pleasing to you’. Harpagus says ‘my task’ but he is not the grammatical subject performing the task. Harpagus sounds obedient enough, but there could be reason to doubt his willingness to perform this deed himself\(^{244}\).

At any rate, the preceding depictions of Astyages’ fanatical protection of his own position, his forceful speech, Harpagus’ reputation as a most trustworthy person and even to some extent Harpagus’ own speech all point up the enormity of Harpagus’ disobedience when it occurs, immediately after his seemingly compliant speech.

It is at this point that Harpagus, wailing\(^{245}\), goes home with the baby Cyrus and, when his wife asks what he will do\(^{246}\), replies (1.109.2): ‘Not that which Astyages commanded, not if he becomes worse deranged and mad than he is (mad) now/his present madness, I will not assent to the plan, nor will I serve him in this kind of murder.’ (οὐ τῇ ἐνετέλλετο Ἀστυάγης, οὐδ’ εἰ παραφρονήσει τε καὶ μανέεται κάκιον ἡ νῦν

\(^{244}\) Lang (1984: 92-93). As Lang notes, this is a ‘carefully ambiguous response that does not commit him to acting in his own person…’ She also describes how this section fits the pattern of paired speeches which follow the form of having a speech, in this case a command speech, followed by a second speech in ‘partial agreement expressed in such a way as to condition, explain, or set the scene for subsequent action…’ At 1.108.4-5, ‘Astyages’ command that the baby be killed motivates the killing…’ but Harpagus’ speech sets the scene for turning the matter over to Mitradates.

\(^{245}\) Veen (1996: 31) discusses the difference between Harpagus’ wailing (κλαίων, 1.109.1) and Cyno’s weeping (δακρύσασα, 1.112.1), making the useful distinction that ‘...Δακρύειν has no other function than to air one's feelings of sadness…whereas Δακρύειν is an impulsive reaction, κλαίειν is preponderantly the stylised and intentional demonstration of grief.’ Demonstrations of κλαίειν: Psammenitus, 3.14.7, 9; Cambyses and bystanders, 3.66.1; Intaphrenes' wife, 3.119.3. Demonstrations of δακρύειν: Croesus and the Persians respond to Psammenitus’ answer 3.14.11; Cambyses’ sister, 3.32.2; Xerxes, 7.46.2.

\(^{246}\) Lang (1984: 95-96), categorises this section as ‘Pair Pattern Five: Explanation by Question and Answer.’ The second speech is the more effective one; ‘[i]ts effectiveness and function is the explanation and interpretation of past actions or present states of mind rather than the motivation of future scenes.’ 1.109.2 is given as an example: ‘Only in response to a natural wifely question about what he will do can Harpagus give expression to the inner debate that explains his quandary.’
Harpagus’ reasons for calling Astyages mad (1.109.2) are related to Astyages’ demanding speech. As has been mentioned, Astyages speaks in imperatives and gives the order to murder his grandson. Harpagus reacts to the violence of Astyages’ order and expression of it, and the use of madness points to this. So madness is a way of indicating the violence in Astyages’ demand for murder and his forceful manner, which may stem from his fear of being deposed.

Madness also acts as an emphasising literary device to give clues to the reader/audience about Astyages’ mental state and orders, as viewed by Harpagus. This mental state, or the attempt of Astyages to have Cyrus killed, is the impetus for the logos; without this, there would be no logos, or at least it would be different. ‘Madness’ therefore signposts this extremely pivotal point in the logos.

Calling someone mad, however, doesn’t just reflect on the mad person but also on the one who calls them mad. So at the same time as ‘madness’ highlights Astyages’ violent intention, it also highlights the speech in which Harpagus expresses his dangerous disobedience, which is a recurring theme in the logos. Harpagus’ disobedience is the first disobedience, and as one of the most important acts of disobedience it is appropriate that it is given the extra emphasis. It is also logical, in this perspective, that this first disobedience is the one which is punished by Astyages. Madness is therefore also used as an abusive term for Astyages. Harpagus will not quarrel with Astyages to his face, but out of his presence he expresses his true feelings, which are the very opposite to what Astyages expects; his complete turn-around from what we might expect is shown in his use of the term. So madness indicates Astyages’ expressed violence, and shows the great degree of Harpagus’ change of mind, as well as pointing up the theme of disobedience in this action.

The idea of Astyages being mad also offers Harpagus a semi-justified reason for

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247 Although Veen (1996: 24, n. 66) thinks breach of confidence (or disobedience) is not the main theme of the logos: ‘…it is rather subsidiary to the wider idea, that nothing, least of all reliability, can be taken for granted.’ I would agree with this assessment, while adducing that disobedience is an important motif.
248 Evans (1991: 53) says Astyages couldn’t tolerate Harpagus’ insubordination because ‘it was a challenge to his autocracy.’
his disobedience, an excuse to do what he wants. After all, if Harpagus were to say ‘Astyages is very afraid – but I won’t do what he says’ we are left wondering why he doesn’t obey. So we can see that madness also highlights the danger of Harpagus’ disobedience; if it is dangerous to disobey someone when they are violently afraid, how much worse is it to disobey someone who is mad?

So in this instance when Harpagus calls Astyages mad, the idea of madness highlights in particular two motifs which keep occurring in this story: the motif of Astyages’ obsessive protection of his kingship, which in Cyrus’ case extends even to murder\(^249\); and the disobedience of Harpagus, and the perilousness of his choice to disobey. It also reflects the violence of the order for murder which Astyages gives.

Astyages is also the victim of another sort of madness: he gets a message from Cyrus to the effect that Cyrus is on his way to see Astyages (with an army of disaffected Persians, 1.127.1-2), and (1.127.2) ‘hearing this Astyages armed all the Medes and as their general (because he was deprived of his common sense [or ‘god-damaged’]) he appointed Harpagus, disregarding the things he had done to him.’ (ἀκούσας δὲ ταύτα ὁ Ἀστυάγης Μήδους τε ὠπλίσε πάντας καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ὡς τε θεοβλαβής ἐὼν Ἅρπαγον ἀπέδεξε, λήθην ποιεύμενος τὰ μιν ἔόργεε). θεοβλαβής here supplies the reason for this otherwise unfathomable mistake on Astyages’ part\(^250\), and this is emphasised also by the explanatory use of ὡς\(^251\). Astyages seems to exhibit a misplaced placed trust in Harpagus’ loyalty (a reoccurring motif); the notion that he and Harpagus are ‘even’, finished with their reciprocal acts, is not one which is presented to the reader/audience. We are told in 1.123.1 that Harpagus cultivated a friendship with

\(^{249}\) Veen (1996: 30). Veen says Herodotus ‘highlights the influence power and the will for self-preservation have on a man's mind as he shows it overturning one's sense of the most basic values’, such as harming one’s friends, or in this case, relatives.

\(^{250}\) As madness sometimes appears to do; Cleomenes’ madness at 6.75.2 explains an otherwise pointlessly violent death to some degree.

\(^{251}\) Harrison (2000: 54) says that ‘Astyages was θεοβλαβής, blinded by the gods (1.127.2)’ and thus brings out the more supernatural meaning of the word, as does Evans (1991: 53, “blinded, as it were, by a god”) but neither gives any further explanation, although Harrison does comment in n. 57 that ‘the same word is also used of the king who offered Perdiccas the sun in place of wages, the sun that constituted his sovereignty, 8.137.4.’. How and Wells (1967: Vol. I, 111 s.v. 127) claim that Herodotus ‘believes ‘Quem deus vult perdere prius dementat’; but while madness and Astyages’ harm from the gods have aspects in common, not least that they are from the gods and are explanations for a non-rational act, I’m not sure we should go so far as to say that they are the same.
Cyrus, ‘wanting to make Astyages pay’ (τείσασθαι Ἀστυάγεα ἐπιθυμέων), and are given a long description of how Harpagus went about undermining Astyages’ position (1.123.1 – 1.124.3). This makes us all the more astonished when Harpagus is appointed general; θεοβλαβής is the only semi-logical answer for this blunder.

**Madness in Context: Tomyris and Cyrus (1.212.2-3)**

In 1.212.2-3 the queen of the Massagetae, Tomyris, rebukes Cyrus for tricking the army of the Massagetae into laxity. Croesus had advised Cyrus (1.207.6-7) to set out a large feast for the Massagetae, including (1.207.6) ‘bowls liberally (filled) with undiluted wine’ (κρητῆρας ἀφειδέως οἶνου ἀκρήτου) and then withdrawing the best men of the Persian army. This done, a third of the Massagetae (1.211.2) attacked the weak remaining troop and overcame it, then settled down to the prepared feast. Unfortunately, being unused to wine (Herodotus says they are milk drinkers, 1.216.4), the Massagetae ‘...now drink wine but, their ignorance rendering the trick doubly effective, they will drink it undiluted.’ Having had their fill they went to sleep, thus allowing the strong Persian contingent to take the opportunity to slaughter the sleeping enemy (1.211.3). Many were taken prisoner though, including the son of Tomyris, Spargapises.

It is at this point that Tomyris sends the aforementioned rebuke to Cyrus: ‘Cyrus, Insatiable for Blood, do not be at all puffed up by this performance which occurred, if with the fruit of the vine, by which as you fill yourselves up you go so mad that when the wine goes down into your body, evil words sail up to your surface, with such a drug you snared and then overcame my son, but not by power in battle. So now

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252 Gould (1989: 33) writes ‘It is a measure of the difficulties that we have in coming to terms with the oral tradition on which Herodotus draws that it is with shock that we encounter the same Harpagus, eater of his own son’s flesh, as the general in command of the Persian army which carried out the certainly historical subjection of the Ionian Greek cities in about 540 BC (1.162ff.) ’ This may be so; in the text however, the reader/audience in this case are signaled by the use of θεοβλαβής precisely to explain and indeed encourage the shock at the two, so disparate, roles Harpagus plays and is made to play.

253 Dewald (1981: 111) compares Tomyris and Artemisia. ‘Tomyris presides over the death of Cyrus in book one (1.205 ff.), and Artemisia presides over Xerxes’ defeat in the last books of the Histories. Both of these queens, like other women we have noted, take pains to articulate the moral and political basis for their actions. Both see, as their Persian and male counterparts do not, that human power has its limitations; both predict defeat for the Persian if he oversteps these bounds.’

follow my advice, because I am cautioning (you) well: Give me back my son, and then go away from this land unscathed, after ridiculing a third of the Massageta army. But if you do not do this, I swear to you by the sun, the master of the Massagetae, that I will choke/saturate you – yes, even though you are insatiable for blood.’ (ἀπληστε αἰματος Κῦρε, μηδὲν ἐπαρθής τῷ γεγονότα τῶν ἐπήγαματ, εἰ ἀμπελίνῳ καρπῶ, τῷ περ αὐτοὶ ἐμπιπλάμενοι μαίνεσθε οὕτως ὡςτε κατιόντος τοῦ οἴνου ἐς τὸ σῶμα ἐπαναπλέειν ύμιν ἔπεα κακά, τοιοῦτῳ φαρμάκῳ δολώσας ἐκράτησας παιδός τοῦ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ οὐ μάχη κατὰ τὸ καρτερόν. νῦν ὅν ἐμέ έν παραινεύσης υπόλαβε τὸν λόγον ἀποδοὺς μοι τὸν παιδὰ ἀπίθη ἐκ τῆς χώρης, Μασσαγετέων τριτημορίδι τοῦ στρατοῦ κατυβρίσας, εἰ δὲ ταῦτα οὐ ποιήσεις, ἦλιον ἐπόμνυμί τοι τὸν Μασσαγετέων δεσπότην, ἦ μέν σε ἐγώ καὶ ἀπληστον ἐόντα αἰματος κορέσω.)  Cyrus ignored her message, and Spargapises, when he had thrown off the effects of the wine and realised the situation, asked to be unchained and upon release killed himself (1.213.1).

Tomyris massed her forces and joined battle with Cyrus, and eventually the Massagetae annihilated the vast part of Cyrus’ army, including Cyrus himself (1.214.1-3). At this point Herodotus recounts a story which he considers to be the most believable of stories about Cyrus’ death (1.214.4-5): ‘After filling up a wineskin with human blood Tomyris looked for Cyrus’ corpse among the Persian dead, and when she found it, she pushed his head into the wineskin; as she maltreated the corpse she spoke these words to it: “You - although I am living and have conquered you, you destroyed my son, taking him by means of a snare; but I, just as I threatened, will choke/saturate you with blood.” ’ (ἀσκὸν δὲ πλήρασα αἰματος αὐθωπησιον Τόμυρις ἐδίζητο ἐν τοῖσι τεθνεῶσι τῶν Περσέων τὸν Κύρου νέκυν, ὡς δὲ εὗρε, ἐναπῆκε αὐτοῦ τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐς τὸν ἄσκὸν· λυμαινομένη δὲ τῷ νεκρῷ ἐπέλεγε τάδε· «Σὺ μὲν ἐμὲ ζώουσάν τε καὶ νικώσάν σε μάχῃ ἀπώλεσας παιδα τὸν ἐμὸν ἐλὼν δόλῳ σὲ δ’ ἐγώ, κατὰ περ ἦπειλησα, αἰματος κορέσω.)

Despite the gap between the logoi of the beginning of Cyrus’ life (1.107.1-1.122.3) and the end of it (1.205.1-1.214.5), there are a surprising number of connecting
themes between the two logoi. Strangely, Cyrus’ death seems to attract a lot less scholarly attention than his birth, and yet they function as ‘bookends’ to his life; his death is almost a backwards-looking comment on his birth. At any rate, themes which occur at his birth also occur at his death. While madness is not necessarily a theme, it is also mention in both his birth-logos and death-logos.

Two important themes which connect both logoi and have associations with madness as Tomyris expresses it are sons and mothers, and wine. In fact the two themes are combined in the dream Astyages has concerning his daughter: a vine grows out of her genitalia, indicating her pregnancy as well as the vine (1.108.1). Immerwahr makes the connection between the vine in the dream and the ‘wine motif’ in the Massagetaan

255 Although Konstan (1983: 8-10) covers it and mentions the analogies between Cyrus’ birth and death; he discusses the dreams, among other themes which will follow. He suggests (Pgs. 9-10) that ‘the main point is that the violation of the innermost circle, that of the nuclear family, is associated with the violation of the outermost circle, defining the boundary between humanity and bestiality.’

256 Precognitive dreams which predict the devolution of the empire onto another (1.107.1, 1.108.1, 1.209.1, some of the words are repeated); offspring in general (1.108.1, 1.112.2, 1.114.3-5, 1.119.1-7, 1.136.1-2, 1.137.2, 1.208.1, 1.209.1, 1.210.1-3, 1.211.3, 1.213, 1.214.5); bad advice but good advice from women (1.120.3, 1.112.2-3, 1.206.1, 1.207.4-6, 1.212.3). Croesus’ advice to Cyrus to cross the Araxes into Tomyris’ territory causes him to act in a way commonly considered to be hubristic and therefore the precursor to a fall. His plan involving the wine may work but causes the war in which Cyrus dies. Harrison (2000: 43) points to Cambyses’ sarcastic remarks to Croesus at 3.36.3, regarding the matter of Cyrus’ last campaign: ‘Croesus had hardly made a good fist of looking after his own affairs, nor had his advice to Cyrus to cross the Araxes been obviously successful (3.36.3). Cambyses is clearly not an unquestionable witness, but the fact that such doubts are aired at all is perhaps significant.’ He considers Croesus to be a failure as an adviser. For hubristic border crossing, see Immerwahr (1954: 28): ‘the river is a boundary in Ionian geography, but to Herodotus it is also a moral boundary.’ See also Konstan, (1983: 4), discussing the abuse of boundaries as related to nomos, ‘For Herodotus, every violation of nomos finds its compensation in a further and more drastic disruption of borders, extending finally to the boundaries of empires’; Lateiner (1989: 126-44); Stadter (1992: 794-795); Munson (2001: 10-11, 50). Tomyris has the clearest vision and gives him the best advice, by twice warning him to give up the idea and leave. As Shapiro (1994: 350-351) points out, Cyrus never considers this option: ‘The very form of Cyrus’ question (as is emphasized by his advisers’ response) implies that he is considering only whether he should cross the river or allow the Massagetae to do so. Tomyris’ first request does not even receive consideration. It is within this context that Croesus, who is also present on the expedition, offers his own advice.’ A further nuance is that the wineskin is made from an animal’s hide, thus making Cyrus the child of an animal, as he had been reputed to be after his discovery (1.122.3), another blurring of the boundaries between humanity and bestiality. See Veen (1996: 46-49), who comments significantly on the consideration of Cyno as a dog – ‘...her name, which means bitch, is that of an animal (Pg. 46)’ - and concludes that two associations would have been made with her name: ‘total disregard for status’ and ‘determined protection of offspring’ (Pg. 48). See Konstan (1983: 4-10) for the numerous examples of the phenomenon of animals in the first book of the Histories; which offers the possibility of the wineskin being bestial in addition to uterine. Pg. 7 discusses Cyrus’ therianthropic qualities. Cyrus’ ‘drinking’ of blood also mirrors Astyages’ earlier experiment with unwitting cannibalism; see Konstan (Pg. 9). Another important theme is that of empires, kingship and rule: (1.108.2, 1.114.1-3, 1.120.1-6, 1.205.1, 1.206.1, 1.207.3-4, 1.208.1, 1.209.3, 1.210.1, 1.210.2, 1.214.3).
campaign\textsuperscript{257}. Wine is a repeated motif in the Massagetan campaign, because it by means of wine that Cyrus overcomes a third of the Massagetan army\textsuperscript{258}.

Another connection between mothers and wine/vines is the use of ‘uterine imagery’\textsuperscript{259}. Even more explicit than the vine from the genitalia is the manner in which Tomyris (1.214.4), the vengeful mother, shoves Cyrus’ head into a container full of blood; in this instance the wineskin\textsuperscript{260} not only echoes the theme of wine in the logos, but also reverberates with the themes of sons and mothers, because the wineskin becomes a uterus. Cyrus ends up where he started, with some major differences\textsuperscript{261}: the obvious change from baby to man; his death as opposed to his birth, both bloody; he begins with such promise and ends with such degradation; a mother bears him, a would-be mother saves him, and a son-less mother destroys him\textsuperscript{262}. The weaving of so many themes into

\textsuperscript{257} Immerwahr (1966: 163) says the vine represents ‘the beneficent aspects of royal power and should be connected with the wine motif of Cyrus’ campaign against the Massagetae’. In fact he believes that the wine motif is the central motif of the Massageta logos (Pg. 166).

\textsuperscript{258} 1.207.6-7, Croesus’ plan; 1.211.2-3, the Massagetae attack and are overcome in their drunken sleep.

\textsuperscript{259} As mentioned in the account on Astyages, Dewald (1981: 97) notes the two ‘explicitly sexual dreams’ about Mandane, and relates them to the story of Cypselus (5.92γ-δε), but although she connects these two logoi, she doesn’t connect the ‘uterine imagery’ to the death of Cyrus as well. I am, however, most indebted to her wording for giving me the thought. In addition, while Dewald calls Mandane and Labda involuntary destroyers of their own family heritage, Tomyris is (effectively) the deliberate destroyer of Cyrus’; although his ‘heritage’ continues briefly in Cambyses, it is hardly a magnificent or prolonged sequel.

\textsuperscript{260} Tomyris’ use of a wineskin to soak Cyrus’ head is deliberate, and not merely for the practical reasons of transporting the grisly contents across the battlefield. In English the connection with wine and the previous rebuke from Tomiris are clear, but in the Greek there is no specific mention of wine, merely the word ἄσκος, which in itself has no etymological connection with wine, and refers rather to skin (for example of animals) which are made into a container. One of the meanings of the word is ‘wineskin’; ἄσκος is used nine times by Herodotus, seven of which refer to wineskins (1.214.4 (twice); 2.12181 (twice, specified as filled with wine), 4, 5; 6.119.3) and twice the word is qualified with what it is made of, and what it is filled with (camel skins filled with water 3.9.1, the skin of Marsyas 7.26.3). Thus we can safely assume that some connection with wine will have been inferred by the audience, given that Herodotus states in other places when the skins do not contain wine, as is apparently the normal use. In fact, Herodotus qualifies the wineskin here by saying that it was filled with blood.

In Avery’s delightfully ironic words (1972: 540): ‘Here the results of Cyrus’ excess of desire are painted in particularly lurid colours, but the point is unmistakable: Cyrus had wanted much and he got more than he had expected.’

\textsuperscript{261} Some scholars think that Cyrus’ head was severed before being shoved into the wineskin; there is no evidence for this, although there is little evidence to the contrary. I should imagine, however, that the use of νέκυς at 1.212.4 would indicate a whole body, and there is no discussion of decapitation. It is completely possible for the head to be inserted into the wineskin while still attached to the body, and in light of the argument I and others have made about birth motifs, it makes greater sense to assume the head is attached. Dewald herself (1981: 111) mentions severed heads. I would be delighted if I could support my thought that the wineskin full of blood has a tantalising allusion to menstruation, and thus the rejection
one act is a masterful composition.

Sons and mothers, as suggested above, are two other motifs which occur both at Cyrus’ birth and death. In the *logos* of Cyrus’ death, the most emphatic examples of mother and son are displayed in Tomyris and her devastation at the loss of her son Spargapises. We could even extend the themes to fathers and sons: Konstan adduces that the dreams of Astyages and Cyrus result in a king ordering ‘a father to do violence to his son’, or in the case of Harpagus, the violence which passes Cyrus by is finally enacted on Harpagus’ son. In both accounts a son dies and is the propelling factor in the action which follows.

Given the large number of correlations between the two *logoi*, it is gratifying that madness also is a repeated accent. But while some similarities made be drawn between the two instances, there appear to be a greater number of discrepancies. This phenomenon merely supports the hypothesis that madness is used as a literary device and has its own meaning in its own context. This is not to say that the instances of madness in both the account of Cyrus’ birth and that of his death are not a deliberate inclusion on Herodotus’ part; as demonstrated by the numerous correlations above, Herodotus is supremely clever at incorporating echoing features and they do not lose their potency for being deftly manipulated into a slightly different form in the second

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263 See Long (1987: 152-3), on the prevalence of the word παῖς and derivatives in the *logos* of Cyrus’ birth. Pp. 153, ‘The repetitions…drive home the point that within this short section a child is the central figure and the discovery of his identity the central action.’ Arieti (1995: 194) notes that Spargapises’ suicide reminds us of the only preceding suicide, Adrastus’, who killed himself after accidentally killing Croesus’ son Atys. ‘Here too thematic links connect the two parents.’ We might also remember that Veen (1996: 29) considers that the Astyages *logos* is developed around family relationships.

264 Immerwahr (1966: 92) says that ‘the campaign proper is a highly organized dramatic *logos* dealing with a mother’s vengeance for the murderous slaying of her son…’

265 Konstan (1983: 9). He also offers the following equation: ‘Astyages plots against Mandane’s son Cyrus; he fails, but: He brings about the death of Harpagus’ son. Cyrus plots against Hytaspes’ son Darius; he fails, but: He brings about the death of Tomyris’ son.’

266 Immerwahr (1966: 57) comes close to this when he says ‘Herodotus’ style thus adapts itself to the subject matter’, and again (Pg. 152) where he suggests that ‘The patterns of rise and fall, or of cooperation and war, are thus irregular patterns, when seen as historical time sequences, rather than as moral or religious patterns of crime and punishment or the like. Each pattern is an individual one, and it does not necessarily coincide with other patterns, although there is sometimes a partial connection.’
logos\textsuperscript{267}.

Madness is used in both instances (1.109.2, 1.212.2) to describe a king of the Medes and Persians. There the similarity ends, because in the second logos the verb is in the plural, thus referring not only to Cyrus but to all Persians either in the army or in general. The fate of a child/son is in the question, but once again there is little else to compare: Astyages gives the violent order for Cyrus’ murder, whereas Tomyris asks for her son’s life.

Harpagus called Astyages mad as an abusive term in response to the violent order given, and doing so emphasised his own disobedience. In Tomyris’ case, her calling the Persians mad also reveals her emotional state and assists in her characterisation as the ‘vengeful queen’\textsuperscript{268}: as Astyages did, she gives orders (μηδὲν ἐπαρθῇς, 1.212.2; ὑπόλαβε, 1.212.3; ἀποδοῦς here can function almost as another imperative; ἄπιθι and adds the threatening use of the future tense as the final touch (κορέσω)\textsuperscript{269}. But she calls the Persians mad; she is not called mad herself despite having this sort of speech in common with Astyages. Her use of madness is also an abusive term for the Persians, and indicates her extreme anger at the plot which tricked her son; their violence towards her army results in her calling them mad.

Of greater interest is the way Tomyris uses wine in connection with madness. Her words offer a contrast between how wine affects the Persians and how wine affected her son. It makes the Persians mad, but it is a drug which snares her son and allows him to be overpowered. She despises this deceitful manner of conducting warfare, which to her is no kind of warfare at all. Her speech displays ‘her noble, almost Achillean, scorn of Cyrus’ deviousness’\textsuperscript{270}. Dewald notes of Tomyris that she ‘conducts her military

\textsuperscript{267} As Immerwahr (1966: 51-53) says, ‘a complex action, when told as a series of individual items, will show emphasis at different points, among which the beginning and end tend to stand out (Pg. 51)...in the historical narrative Herodotus tends to emphasize the end of a unit more than its beginning (Pg. 52)...introductory statements may correspond to the types of summary statements at the end (Pg. 53).’

\textsuperscript{268} See Flory (1987:42-43) on Tomyris as a vengeful queen. He compares her to Candaules’ wife and notes that she is specific in her revenge of filling Cyrus with blood as he filled her son with wine.

\textsuperscript{269} All her imperatives have a pi in them; while pi and kappa are not the most prevalent consonants in this speech, an average number of these combined with the high occurrence of sigma and tau, and the way three of them are in the first adjective of the speech, ἀπληστε, indicates their importance in conveying Tomyris’ spitting rebuke. It seems to be a truth universally acknowledged that Tomyris is, indeed, angry, as Bichler and Rollinger note (2000: 20) , she is ‘the furious sovereign’ (die furiose Herrscherin).

\textsuperscript{270} Dewald (1981: 111).
campaign in a Homeric fashion', and points out the irony that ‘Tomyris, the rude savage, is not only more civilised but more manly than her enemies’. Tomyris’ attitude to wine is also Homeric, in that she offers two aspects of what wine may do to a person: either increase their μένος, strength, to make them mad, or to take it away. Tomyris points out that for her son, wine weakened, but that for the Persians it has the opposite effect: their μένος is strengthened to the point where it becomes madness. In this way she strengthens the case for her own people’s civilised behaviour and the lack of it in the Persians. Furthermore, her persistent use of the present tense (ἐμπιπλάμενοι, μαίνεσθε, κατιόντος, ἐπαναπλέειν) indicates her view that they get drunk often.

Madness is therefore also used in Tomyris’ speech to demonstrate her deep disapproval of the trick played on her son, which involved wine. It is hardly coincidental that madness highlights at least two recurring themes in the logos (and ones which occur in the logos of Cyrus’ birth): sons and wine. In addition, the ‘trick’ is a motif which figures fairly prominently at the beginning and end of the Massagetan logos (though not in the earlier account).

Thus, when Tomyris gives her speech at 1.212.2-3, she brings together three themes or motifs which occur in the logos: sons and wine, as previously mentioned, and by dwelling on wine (which is highlighted by the madness and the extra clauses devoted to it) as the trick, this theme converges with the others also. Her speech is only made more important by these factors, becoming the unifying expression of a trio of concepts. This speech is the turning point in the section, and indeed the whole logos; matters go rapidly downhill for Cyrus from this point (as has been prefigured for us from 1.210.1). Because the seizure of her son by deceit rather than fighting is the action which drives

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272 See Iliad 6.258-267: Hecabe says that ‘wine increases great μένος in a tired man’ (ἀνδρὶ δὲ κεκμηῶτι μέγα ὦνος ἀέξει, 6.261), but Hektor declines wine ‘in case my μένος is made weak, and I forget my might’ (μὴ μ´ ἀπογνωσώσῃς μένεος, ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι, 6.265).
273 See 1.205.2 – δόλος begins the logos of Cyrus death; his own δόλος ultimately causes his own death. The logos is finished with a reference to trickery by Tomyris at 1.214.5. Trickery frames the account.
274 Lang (1984: 161, n. 8) puts it in this way: ‘the use of alternatives backed by their potential for good and evil serves both to provide arguments for and against the two courses of action and to define the issues at stake and so to clarify the situation.’
Tomyris into such a furious state, emotive language is crucial at this point; μαίνεσθε helps to provide it.

**Wine, Madness, Drugs and Trickery**

This is the first of three instances in the Histories where madness is connected to wine; the other two examples are, maybe unsurprisingly, Cambyses and Cleomenes. We have seen that in their cases, Cambyses, although he connects wine with madness, is not drunk when he ‘proves’ that he is not mad (1.34.2-4, 1.35.2-4). Similarly, although the Spartans suggest that Cleomenes went mad due to excessive drinking of undiluted wine, this is only one of four explanations for his madness (6.84.1-3), and not the version which Herodotus supports (6.84.3). Tomyris’ suggestion that the Persians are mad because they drink wine frequently is, however, along similar lines to the Spartan reason for Cleomenes’ madness.

Tomyris is, however, the only person who connects madness with wine as a drug (φάρμακον). It is through her mouth that we also receive an elaboration on how this wine madness manifests itself, and this elaboration has medical overtones which will be discussed fully in Chapter 5. Her use of wine and madness as a state which provokes ‘evil words’, or ‘bad language’ (ἐπεα κακά, 1.212.2) is very reminiscent of how the Hippocratic writers describe madness.

Wine is clearly marked as a drug by Tomyris. In the given context, we can suggest that a φάρμακον is a trap and an incapacitator. It is a trap in this sense, that the wine (and food) set out for the Massagetae was enticing. It is an incapacitator, because it allowed Spargapises to be weakened and therefore caught. The use of the word φάρμακον elsewhere in the Histories supports these suppositions.

In 3.85.1-2, Darius and his groom arrange for Darius’ horse to be the first to neigh when the sun rises, in order to establish him as king. Darius tells the groom, Oibares, ‘So then, if you have some trick, arrange for it so that we may get the position and not anyone else.’ (νῦν ὅν εἰ τινα ἔχεις σοφίην, μηχανῶ ὡς ἂν ἴμεις σχώμεν τοῦτο τὸ γέρας καὶ μὴ ἄλλος τις. 3.85.1). Oibares replies ‘Be confident and assured about
this, because no one else will be king but you; I have these sort of remedies. ’ (…θάρσεε τούτου εἶνεκεν καὶ θυμόν ἐχε ἀγαθόν, ὡς βασιλεὺς ὑπεδεῖς ἀλλος πρὸ σέο ἐσται· τοιαῦτα ἔχω φάρμακα. 3.85.2), whereupon Darius says ‘If you really do have this sort of trick, arrange for it at the right time and don’t delay…’ (εἰ τοίνυν τι τοιοῦτο ἔχεις σόφισμα, ὄρη μηχανάσθαι καὶ μή ἀναβάλλεσθαι …). It is made very clear in this episode that Oibares’ φάρμακα are the same as Darius’ σοφὶς and σόφισμα; the last is doubly explicit because of the repeated demonstratives in front of each word: τοιαῦτα φάρμακον and τοιοῦτον σόφισμα. Apparently a trick is still a trick, whether it is called φάρμακον, σοφὶς or σόφισμα.

As for incapacitation, in 4.160.4, Learchos strangles his brother Arcesilaus ‘while he was ill and had taken a drug/medicine’ (κάμνοντα τε καὶ φάρμακον πεπωκότα), but in turn ‘the wife of Arcesilaus killed [him] by trickery’ (ἡ γυνὴ Ἀρκεσίλεω δόλῳ κτείνει). Arcesilaus is incapacitated by both being ill and because of the drug, obviously a liquid, given the use of πίνω; this is also a connection to wine insofar as wine is a potable liquid. That both circumstances aid the strangulation is clear from their being joined by τε and καί. Finally, while the use of δόλῳ here may indeed be completely incidental, it is interesting to note that in these three logoi where φάρμακα appear, we also have trickery involved, whether it is called δόλος or σοφὶς/σόφισμα275. Calling wine a drug, then, emphasises the effects of incapacitation and underlying trickery connected with the supplying of wine.

Fittingly, when Tomyris gets her revenge, she uses a wineskin filled with blood to drive various points home. The wineskin points back to her disgusted view of the trick with the wine, and by filling the wineskin with blood, she fulfils her threat of 1.212.3.

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275 All three also involve females: Oibares’ trick depends on Darius’ stallion favouring a particular mare, (3.85.3), although none of the females employ the ‘drugs’. Eruxo, Arcesilaus’ wife, is the only one who uses trickery; but very like Tomyris, she avenges the death of her husband (in this case) who had drunk something which incapacitated him. As will be discussed later with Melampus and has been discussed with Cleomenes, sickness or νοῦσος is also seen as a sometime incapacitator, and νοῦσος is used to describe madness on occasion. See 3.143.2, 7.83.1, 7.88.1-2 and 6.136.2 for those incapacitated by sickness. The one instance where a female ‘drugs’ a man is at 2.181.3, where the impotent Amasis accuses his innocent wife of drugging him. Drugs are still ‘incapacitatory’. He is cured by his wife’s desperate prayer to Aphrodite.
Immerwahr describes how ‘the vine, a life-giving plant, becomes symbolically the instrument of Cyrus’ death. The imagery shows how Cyrus’ original conditions turn against him and cause his destruction.\textsuperscript{276} Wine could be taken to be equated to blood; Hartog notes, ‘The scene is based on the assumption that it is easy to pass from the one drink to the other. In Tomyris’s eyes, Cyrus the drinker of wine is in truth a drinker of blood, so he will be served blood just as if it were undiluted wine.’\textsuperscript{277} This statement oversimplifies the action which Tomyris takes, in that while wine and blood are both red liquids, and can be substituted for each other, the significance of blood is rather greater. Wine is the weaker version of blood; blood is the grim reality. The piece has mirror-image symmetry to it: Cyrus tricked the Massagetae with wine, then slaughtered some and also caused the death of the Queen’s son; when the Massagetae have slaughtered Cyrus’ troops, and Cyrus himself, Tomyris pays back the trick by soaking Cyrus’ head in blood from a wineskin. She could have used wine herself, but the use of blood heightens the gravity of the action. Her actions echo the sentiments of her previous speech, with talk of Cyrus’ insatiability for blood and the madness which wine causes. Cyrus’ transgression of honourable forms of battle is surpassed by the abnormal ‘drinking’ of blood which the victorious Tomyris forces on him\textsuperscript{278}.

\textbf{Madness in Context: Amasis (2.173.3-4)}

Amasis’ theory of madness is consistent with the context of his story as well. The supposition that madness is related to the amount of work one does is not a theory propounded anywhere else in the \textit{Histories}. The theory does, however, have a great deal in common with Amasis’ own life and world-view; it differs from other instances of madness precisely because Amasis is the man who discusses it.

In several instances Amasis displays a bipartite quality\textsuperscript{279} which could be described as loosely embodying the concepts of inclusion and exclusion in one man;

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Immerwahr (1966: 167).
\item Hartog (1988: 167).
\item Konstan (1983: 4): ‘For Herodotus, every violation of \textit{nomos} finds its compensation in a further and more drastic disruption of borders…’
\item Lateiner (1989: 124) sees ‘bipatite periodization… in the Egyptian \textit{logos’}. Amasis could be symbolic of Egypt altogether, or at least the ‘topsy-turvy’ Greek view of Egypt.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
another way to describe this quality would be ‘changing alliance’ or, most simply, ‘reversal’. Veen, who notes Amasis’ ‘exceptional position’ in the *Histories*\textsuperscript{280}, considers that Amasis is the character in whom the relevance of the irrelevant is united\textsuperscript{281}. Müller, who examines the relation between Amasis as a rogue and simultaneously a king and wise adviser, also notes that, of the Egyptian kings, Amasis occupies a highly peculiar position which has no parallel even in relation to the non-Egyptian sovereigns in the *Histories*\textsuperscript{282}. Other scholars do not comment so much on this aspect, for the most part being more interested in his dealings with Polycrates (which are of course an important part of the portrayal of his character)\textsuperscript{283}, but Gould describes Amasis as ‘the paradigm of a man profoundly aware of human vulnerability’\textsuperscript{284}, Lateiner is of the opinion that we have a ‘flattering portrait’ of Amasis, who is one of the few to die in peace because he also recognises ‘man’s circumscribed powers’\textsuperscript{285}. While Flory does, by contrast, refer to Amasis in some unflattering terms\textsuperscript{286}, he nevertheless acknowledges that Amasis is ‘an efficient and competent ruler’, ‘a wise adviser’, ‘a man of the people’ and ‘a remarkably good ruler’\textsuperscript{287}.

Amasis is first described as bringing the resident Ionians and Carians down to Memphis (2.154.3). They had been given land on either side of the Nile, where they stayed for some time (2.154.1-3), but ‘later on King Amasis shifted these people from there and settled them at Memphis, making them his guard against the Egyptians’

\textsuperscript{281} Veen (1996: 117), noting too Veen’s comment that ‘the paradox in Amasis’ kingship has not been fully realised.’
\textsuperscript{282} Müller (1992: 5): ‘Unter den Königen Ägyptens nimmt der Amasis des Herodot eine höchst einartige Stellung ein, zu der es auch unter den außerägyptischen Herrschergestalten seines Geschichtswerks keine Parallel gibt.’
\textsuperscript{284} Gould (1989: 80), with particular reference to 2.169.2.
\textsuperscript{285} Lateiner (1989: 275 n.28) adds that this favourable portrait is ‘probably because of his personal popularity in Egypt and his position as the last monarch during Egypt’s final period of national independence. Herodotus’ informants had no complaints of him, and Herodotus, since no control was here available, repeats what he had been told.’ The other two Lateiner lists as dying ‘off-stage’ or peacefully are Artabanus and Solon (Pg. 194).
\textsuperscript{286} Flory (1987: 139, 142). These terms include ‘a bad man’, ‘a scoundrel’, ‘the worst [of men]’, ‘a rogue’, ‘a hedonist’. This negative view is surprising considering not only Herodotus’ praise of Amasis, but also the many other tyrants in the *Histories* who are open to far bloodier charges than theft or usurpation of a (sometimes incompetent and cruel) king’s throne. Perhaps flatulence is a subtle indication of ultimate evil.
\textsuperscript{287} Flory (1987: 139, 140, 141, 142).
Amasis ‘includes’, or ‘allies himself with’, the Greeks in Egyptian circles (although they had a part beforehand) by shifting them closer to himself and having them act as his bodyguard. In this way Amasis also ‘excludes’ the Egyptians (or excludes himself) by placing Greeks in between himself and his own countrymen. This is a ‘reversal’ of the normal order. Nevertheless Amasis is still ‘included’ automatically among the Egyptian people because he is their king.

Although this is an innocuous beginning, the theme persists throughout the portrayal of Amasis, to a greater or lesser extent. In 2.162.1 the Pharaoh Apries\(^\text{288}\) sends Amasis (of whom we are told nothing more than his name) to prevent a rebellion by talking matters over with the rebels. The rebels crown him king instead\(^\text{289}\), which he accepts and gets ready to march against Apries (2.162.2)\(^\text{290}\). Apries sends the respected Patarbemis to bring Amasis back, but Amasis gives his famously flatulent answer\(^\text{291}\) and tells Patarbemis to take that back (2.162.3); he apprises Patarbemis of his intention to

\(^{288}\) Gould (1989: 80) points out that Apries’ disability is ‘the assumption that nothing, not even a god, can destroy the power and prosperity of the great’, which then brings out the irony of his deposition by Amasis, ‘who himself is the paradigm of a man profoundly aware of human vulnerability’.

\(^{289}\) Flory (1987: 140) thinks that this ‘chance event…gives Amasis a sudden idea to act on his own ambitions’. See Müller, (1992: 7) for the opposing argument that, in view of Amasis’ ignorance of the meaning of the symbolic helmet, Amasis can’t really have been thinking about a coup.

\(^{290}\) Harrison (2000: 54) states that Apries’ entrusting the subduing of the rebellion to Amasis is ‘folly’ and ‘parallels that of Astyages in appointing Harpagus against Cyrus in spite of the treatment Harpagus had received from Astyages.’ This is not quite the case; only in retrospect is Apries foolish, but we know nothing of Amasis and are not to suppose that he will not act as instructed; nor has he been treated badly by Apries to any extent that we know of. Furthermore, in the case of Astyages and Harpagus, the \textit{logos} emphasizes Harpagus’ trustworthiness and therefore increases the enormity of Harpagus’ disobedience. No such emphasis occurs here, and disobedience is not a highlighted theme in the \textit{logos}. By leaving out disobedience, Herodotus instead emphasizes the complete random suddenness of Amasis’ ascension. Müller (1992: 6) notes this phenomenon as well: ‘Wieso schickt Apries ausgerechnet ihn?…Herodot spart die Antworten an dieser Stelle seines Berichtes aus…’ (Why does Apries send him, of all people?…Herodot omits the answers to these questions from his account) but then falls into the same trap (Pg. 6) by suggesting the likelihood that Amasis, ‘der Übermütige und Einfallsreiche’ (the cocky and imaginative) offered himself as a negotiator when none of the other courtiers were willing to take on the dangerous job.

\(^{291}\) As mentioned by Lateiner (1989: 28): ‘Sometimes words are insufficient to express the scorn and contempt one party feels for another. Characters in Egyptian stories in the \textit{Histories} especially…tend to be uninhibited this way…’ 2.30.4 and 2.162.3 are given as examples. Müller (1992: 6) notes as well that Amasis is ‘kein adeliger Höfling’ (no noble courtier), as this scene demonstrates ‘mit der derben Pointe des unflätigen Scherzes’ (with the crude point of the offensive joke).
‘present himself’ (παρέσεσθαι) to the pharaoh (2.162.4). When Patarbemis returns without Amasis, Apries gives him no time for explanation but orders Patarbemis’ ears and nose cut off (2.162.5). This cruel treatment of one so highly esteemed is the deciding factor for the defection to Amasis of all the Egyptians who had been on Apries’ side (2.162.6).

Amasis is ‘included’ by Apries, or allied with him, to begin with, but is ‘excluded’ when he is included by the rebels instead. He in turn excludes Patarbemis and Apries, by respectively ignoring Patarbemis’ orders and marching against Apries. Apries excludes Patarbemis and by this the rest of the Egyptians loyal to him, who then wish to include, or ally, themselves with Amasis. In other terms, Amasis experiences a sudden reversal in status which allows him to scorn Patarbemis, whose later misfortune causes a reversal in the opinion of the Egyptians who support Apries.

Herodotus points out the irony of the subsequent war (2.163.2): Apries, the Egyptian king, has no Egyptian troops he can call his own, and must therefore depend on the foreign mercenaries he employs to fight his own people. Amasis, the rebel king, therefore fights against foreigners in his own country, because the Egyptians support him rather than the incumbent. Amasis causes this reversed, upside-down manoeuvre; he is allied, or included, with the Egyptians (and they with him); they are all excluded from their own country by a foreign army allied with Apries.

Unsurprisingly, when Amasis is victorious he obtains the palace which used to belong to Apries (2.169.2); their positions are reversed, and this results in the changed ownership of the palace. Amasis acts, as we (and apparently the Egyptians) might consider, against the natural order by treating Apries well (2.169.3)292, until the Egyptians complain that Apries was their worst enemy; Amasis eventually turns Apries over to them, whereupon he is strangled and buried.

Perhaps the most symbolic indication of Amasis’ embodiment of inclusion and exclusion is in the positioning of his tomb. Herodotus tells us in 2.169.5 that Amasis’

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292 Flory (1987: 139) sees the Amasis *logos* as an exploration by Herodotus of ‘a case where even a bad man proves to be an efficient and competent ruler.’ He is more interested in Amasis as a type of philosopher king, seeing the *logoi* of Deioces and Amasis as ‘mirror images’, and in Herodotus’ demonstration ‘that under certain conditions monarchy, even if the king is a scoundrel, may still be the best system of government.’
tomb was in the sanctuary along with those of other kings, but his was set apart from the others. Although this seems to be a mere note in passing, it does serve to indicate Amasis’ special role; he is included with the kings of Egypt but at the same time is excluded from being completely united with them, even (or perhaps especially) in death.

Amasis himself deliberately emphasizes his own reversal of fortune when he is ‘excluded’ by the Egyptians because of his common birth (2.172.2), and this in turn reverses their previously sneering opinion of him. Herodotus highlights the episode by dwelling on it in detail, and also by having Amasis himself speak. Amasis takes a gold footbath (2.172.3), formerly used for not just washing feet but also for vomiting and urinating (2.172.4) and turns it into a statue of a god (2.172.3); the Egyptians venerate this statue and Amasis finally informs them that the subject of their worship used to be a footbath (2.172.4). He uses the analogy of the footbath to explain that he too, is of undistinguished origins. Flory says that Amasis ‘directly confronts the Egyptians with his commonness and does so, in a characteristic way, by a crude joke…he calls attention to [his humble origins]. Amasis does not try to hide what he was in his effort to spell out the situation: ‘he had been a commoner previously, but was now their king’ (...πρότερον εἶναι δημότης, ἀλλ’ ἐν τῷ παρεόντι εἶναι αὐτῶν βασιλεύς...) and as such is deserving of their respect rather than their contempt. ‘In this way then he won over the Egyptians and as a result they thought it right to be his subjects.’ (τοιούτῳ μὲν τρόπῳ προσηγάγετο τοὺς Αἰγυπτίους ὡστε δικαιοῦν δουλεύειν). Amasis inveigles the Egyptians into ‘including’ him, or perhaps more subtly, he arranges matters so that they end up being ‘included’ by him while still coming to the idea of their own

293 Müller (1992: 7 ) illustrates the contrast in this manner: ‘Amasis war…niemand…Wenn er seine neue Rolle als König im folgenden so glänzend und souverän speilt, dann ist das eben die Überlegenheit des Erwählten, der sich des Erfolges sicher sein darf.’ (Amasis was…no-one/a nobody…When he plays his new role as king so splendidly and supremely well in the following [passages], then that is precisely the superiority of the one chosen, which allows him to be sure of the success.)

294 Veen, (1996: 122), on this episode: ‘The point here is not only the contrast between the outside and the essence, but also that between two moments in time - exactly the point of Herodotus’ Methodenkapitel which makes the instability of great and small the basis of his writing.’ Veen makes this point in response to Müller, see his n. 310.

296 Flory (1987: 141): ‘Amasis…uses a blasphemous practical joke to convince his subjects that even though he is no better than they, he deserves to rule.'
accord. Müller describes the connection between the two forms, as well the connection between this episode and a previous one: ‘Der komische Einschlag der Geschichte, der die Extreme des Ordinärsten und des Erhabensten in eins zusammenfallen läßt, paßt zu dem Spiel, das Amasis zuvor mit dem Gesandten des Apries getrieben hatte.’ Amasis, too, was very ordinary but as king, became very exalted; as Müller suggests, we should not separate the two now that they are ‘collapsed together.’

The *logos* continues with another detailed analogy and speech from Amasis, this time dealing with complaints about how he organises his daily affairs. Müller considers this a ‘highpoint’ of the Amasis *logos* to which Herodotus has been building up, and lists the themes of wisdom, insight or recognition and right behaviour. Some of his friends suggested (2.173.1-2) that his arrangement of working for the early morning until midmorning (or forenoon, before midday; τὸ...ἀγορῆς, 2.173.1) and then drinking and fooling about with his drinking mates (ἐπι...καὶ κατέσκωπτε) was not suitably king-like. We note that once again, the Egyptians would ‘exclude’ Amasis because of his daily activities; he, on the other hand, is careful to ‘include’ kingly duties for the morning but ‘exclude’ them in the afternoon so that he can ‘include’ some leisure instead; he ‘reverses’ his activities.

Amasis’ answer then is in keeping with the idea of exclusion and inclusion, or reversal, which has already been expressed in previous paragraphs, not this section alone (2.173.3-4): ‘Those who have bows, whenever they need to use them, they string them, but whenever they are at ease, they unstring them. For if they were indeed strung all the time, they would break, with the result that at a time of need they would not be able to use them. The state of a man is this way also; if he were always wishing to take himself seriously and not to release part of himself to carefree recreation, he would unwittingly become either mad or have a stroke. Because I understand these matters I allocate a part to each [state].’

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297 Müller, (1992: 9), (The comical impact of the story, which allows the extreme of ordinary and the most elevated to collapse into one, fits with the game that Amasis had before with the ambassador of Apries.)
298 Müller (1992: 9), Mit Weisheit, Erkenntnis und richtigem Verhalten hat er auch die nächste Episode zu tun, die Herodot sogleich anschließt und die unter den über Amasis erzählten Geschichten den Höhepunkt bildet.
This ‘wise and witty speech’ defends Amasis’ position²⁹⁹. Because Amasis’ life and his role in the Histories demonstrates the themes of inclusion and exclusion, or changing alliance and reversal, it is consistent that his theory of madness reflects these themes also³⁰⁰. Because Amasis embodies the two differing qualities of commonness and royalty, as he points out in the previous section, his theory on what makes one mad has the same elements. One must have balance, or a reversal in activity, in order to stay sane; one must learn to exclude duty, or over-seriousness, in order to include some leisure and fun. Amasis doesn’t say that one should try not to be too taken up with leisure by including some duty as well, but a demonstration of his own activities serves to show that Amasis does take his duties seriously enough, if not as seriously as others would wish. The end of this story, notes Müller, offers a paradoxical legitimising of joking, playing and a lively zest for life as an equally rightful form of human behaviour as opposed to the work of the king’s governmental business³⁰¹. Amasis’ theory is also, to some extent, airily self-flattering: to stay sane, one should do as Amasis does; he might as well say ‘to be sane, one has to be me.’

The function of the madness in Amasis’ theory is to emphasize not only the theme of reversal but also the dire consequences of not behaving as Amasis does, of having a reversal of activity. One would not merely become ill, as though that were bad enough, but to become mad puts into perspective the vital importance of being earnest about leisure. Therefore madness as a lack of ‘reversal’ not only fits into the context but is naturally formed from the context as well.

²⁹⁹ Flory (1987: 140): Amasis ‘shows his intelligence by dividing his days between work and relaxation, a way of life he justifies in a wise and witty speech’.

³⁰⁰ Müller (1992: 10) sees Amasis’ theory as a consequence of his ‘rogue’s philosophy’ (Schelmen-Philosophie), which ‘appears as an expression of overlying wisdom’ (als Ausdruck überlegener Weisheit erscheint) in his dealings with those who advocate a more traditional approach to the kingly duties.

³⁰¹ Müller (1992: 9), ‘…so ist…das Telos dieser Geschichte die paradoxe Legitimierung von Scherz, Spiel und ausgelassener Lebenslust als gleichberechtiger Form menschlichen Verhaltens gegenüber den Aufgaben der Regierungsgeschäfte des Königs.’
The episodes of the fart, footbath and his working hours also show another important aspect of Amasis’ character: his ‘unkingly’ side\textsuperscript{302}. As Flory states, ‘Amasis neither isolates nor elevates himself by means of guards or ceremonials but remains a man of the people who continues to pursue the friendship of his old friends.’ It is this down to earth element of his nature which allows him to escape the hazards into which other kings fall\textsuperscript{303}. Amasis is ‘perfectly capable of putting his importance into perspective’ and ‘imposes such limits on himself so as to avoid envy’\textsuperscript{304}. In this way he avoids the φθόνος which befalls others\textsuperscript{305}.

Amasis does not lose his double/reversible nature in the extracts which follow, although they are of somewhat less importance. His treatment of oracles is also against the natural order (2.174.1-2); due to times in the past when Amasis had thieved to keep up his drink- and fun-loving lifestyle, he knew which oracles were genuine or not\textsuperscript{306}. Some had convicted him and some had not. Rather than taking his revenge on those which had convicted him, now that he had the chance\textsuperscript{307}, ‘he took the greatest care of

\textsuperscript{302} See also Flory (1987: 141), and Müller (1992: 5-15). Müller specifies (Pg. 8) that although Amasis reveals himself, first and foremost, as ‘the rogue, who is very resourceful’ (der Schelm, der sich zu helfen weiß), he also reveals himself, on the other hand, as ‘the wise man, who shatters the presumptuous pride of the nobility. Indeed, the two belong together…’ (der Weise, der den anmaßenden Stolz der Vornehmen zunichte macht. Doch gehört beides zusammen…).

\textsuperscript{303} Veen (1996: 119): ‘Obviously, for Amasis dignity and respect for position have no relevance ...And that is exactly what makes him so important. His total lack of dignity indicates the sharpest conceivable contrast with the megalomaniac kings whose sole concern is with power and magnificence.’

\textsuperscript{304} Veen (1996: 119) Demonstrations of this limiting of himself are given as 2.175, with reference to the building of the temple at Saïs. Unlike many other kings and tyrants, Amasis is ‘...not only...capable of recognising the limit - he also respects it... he is alert to possibly ominous signs and quick to react if he thinks one has occurred.’ See also Veen’s summary on Pg. 135.

\textsuperscript{305} Veen (1996: 120); see also Pg. 121: ‘...from Herodotus’ picture of Amasis, the paradoxical view would seem to emerge that the only safe way to be a king is not to behave like one...This is what we have called the literary function of ‘the small’, as presented by Solon: unworthy elements serve to highlight the worthy ones by contrast.’

\textsuperscript{306} As mentioned by Flory (1987: 142), ‘Amasis publicly acknowledges his life of crime...but also demonstrates his justness’.

\textsuperscript{307} A brief survey of some other kings and tyrants, for the most part preceding the logos on Amasis, shows that they are rather vengeful in general and avenge themselves with murder, particularly if their own family members have been killed (Candaules’ wife’s revenge 1.10.1-12.2; Cyrus sacking Sardis 1.88.1-3; Cyrus avenges himself on Astyages 1.124.1-125.4; Harpagus’ revenge 1.129.1; Cyrus avenges himself on river Gyndes 1.189.1-4; Tomyrus avenges herself on Cyrus 1.214.3-5; Nitoctis avenges her brother 2.100.1-4; Sesosistris avenges himself on his brother 2.107.1-108.1; Pheros has all the unfaithful women killed 2.111.1-3; Psammetichus avenges himself on the kings who exiled him 2.151.1-152.5; Cambyses attacks Egypt after being insulted 3.1.1-5 and 3.3.1-3 albeit disbelieved by Herodotus; Cambyses decides to go easy on Psammenitus, 3.14.1-11 but is too late to save his son from execution, 3.15.1, and Psammenitus himself suicides after fomenting rebellion against Cambyses, 3.15.4; Cambyses with Amasis’ corpse 3.16.1-4; Maiandrios avenges himself on gainsayers 3.142.1-143.2). Of these, the ones most comparable to Amasis’
these because they had trustworthy oracles’ (τούτων...ἀψευδέα μαντήμα παρεχομένων τὰ μάλιστα ἐπεμέλετο. 2.174.2). Logically enough, although not naturally so, the convictions for theft convince Amasis of the veracity of some oracles, and despite the personal awkwardness it must have caused at the time, his respect for these is greater than for those oracles which let him off. Reversal in Amasis’ status does not affect his respect for truth. His new status allows him to benefit those oracles which did not, on the face of it, benefit him in the past. He ‘includes’ them in his beneficence, and ‘excludes’ those which let him off the charge of thievery.

These themes are rather more indistinct with regard to his ‘faultless’ (ἀμώμος, 2.177.2) law, if they exist in this context at all. Amasis arranged it that every Egyptian had to report each year how they made their living; the penalty for not doing so, or for not being able to prove that they made an honest/upright living (δικαίην ζόην) was death. Herodotus tells us that Solon took this law for the Athenians as well, because it was a ‘faultless’ law. Amasis ‘includes’ every Egyptian in this legislation, and ‘excludes’ those who don’t abide by it. In this instance as well, the reversal of his own fortune does not necessarily make him lenient on those who lived the way he himself did. Amasis had been a thief of sorts, but as in connection with the oracles, he doesn’t seem to approve of what he did, even going so far as to reward the oracles which convicted him of theft. His law suggests that dishonesty is not to be favoured by him, even though in the past he was guilty of it. Herodotus also mentions (2.177.1) that Egypt was particularly prosperous at this time, so prosperity is linked with the honesty of living, or the personal responsibility of individuals, which Amasis instigates.

Amasis’ ‘inclusiveness’ is also demonstrated in his being a ‘philhelle’ (φιλέλλην, 2.178.1), and thereby ‘including’ them in his kingdom; he gave the city of

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position are Cyrus (versus Astyages), Psammetichus and Maiandrios, who originally are in a position to do little but who come to a position which allows them to take revenge as they like. In the minority are Sesostris, who respects those who fight bravely against him (2.102.1-5), and Darius, who repays Syloson for the cloak he was given when he (Darius) was powerless (3.139.1-141.1). 308 Veen (1996: 120) says this is ‘no accident’; Amasis is one of the few people in the Histories who approach ‘happiness’ as described by Solon to Croesus (1.32.6-9), so he is also one of the few capable of producing a ‘faultless law’ which Solon himself took to Athens’. Arieti (1995: 51) also mentions the possibility of Amasis discussing envy, in particular, with Solon.
Naucratis to the Greeks as a place for them to live in Egypt. He also gave very generous
donation towards the restoration of the Delphic temple (2.180.2).

This philhellenism demonstrated itself in Amasis’ marrying of Ladice, an
eminent Cyrenean woman (2.181.1-2), ‘either because he had a desire for a Greek wife,
or for the sake of friendship with the Cyrenes’ (ἐἴτε ἐπιθυμήσας Ἑλληνίδος
gυναικός, ἐἴτε καὶ ἄλλως φιλότητος Κυρηναίων εἴνεκα). His marriage also
demonstrates the themes of reversal and inclusion/exclusion\textsuperscript{309}. Amasis is unable to have
intercourse with Ladice (2.181.2) although it is not a problem with his other wives (or
women)\textsuperscript{310}. After this sad state of affairs had gone on for a while, Amasis said to his
wife ‘Wife, you have drugged me, and there is no way that you won’t die in the worst
way of all women!’ (ὦ γύναι, κατὰ μὲ ἐφάρμαξας, καὶ ἕστι τοι οὐδεμία μηχανή
μὴ οὐκ ἀπολωλέναι κάκιστα γυναικῶν πασέων, 2.181.3), whereupon his wife has
the presence of mind to pray to Aphrodite, asking that if Amasis could have intercourse
with her that very night, she would dedicate a statue to her (2.181.4). This prayer effects
a lightning cure on Amasis: ‘Immediately Amasis had sex with her’ (αὐτίκα οἱ ἐμίχθη
ὁ Ἄμασις) and Ladice is not only spared death but ‘after that he loved her very much’
(κάρτα μιν ἔστερξε μετὰ τοῦτο).

Amasis’ affections undergo a radical and sudden change. From threatening his
wife with death because of his impotence he becomes, in an instant, particularly fond of
her. The reversal in the circumstances of his prowess cause a reversal in his attitude to
his wife; from ‘excluding’ her altogether, as implied by the death threat, he ‘includes’ her
in his affections to the reverse degree. This is all underlined by the way in which Amasis
has ‘allied’ himself with the Cyrenes by marrying Ladice in the first place. The themes
which have been expressed in the earlier art of the logos are also expressed in this

\textsuperscript{309} Harrison (2000: 77, n. 40) sees another facet of this marriage, in that ‘[t]he relationship between Ladice
and Amasis, we may guess, mirrors - if it is not actually a product of – that between Amasis and Cyrene.’

\textsuperscript{310} Arieti (1995: 186), thinks that this story is merely a sexuality-based ‘framing device’, which Herodotus
‘seems fond of’. He considers that the history of Egypt is ‘framed between the stories of the potent
Sesostris (2.102) and the impotent Amasis (2.181). Perhaps such tales and customs help Herodotus to
identify responsibility and define character.’ This story does help define Amasis’ character, or consolidate
an aspect of it which has already been revealed earlier in the logos.
discussion of his marriage. Incidentally, the use of ἐφάρμαξας is interesting in the context (and the only use of this verb in the Histories). Whatever ‘drug’ Ladice has supposedly used, it incapacitates. Whereas drugs have been associated with trickery to date, and while Amasis says ‘there’s no way you won’t die’, where the use of μηχανή suggests a clever scheme, Ladice’s ‘scheme’ of prayer is supremely simple but also supremely effective.

When Amasis has to deal with Cambyses, the themes of exclusion/inclusion, alliance and reversal make another appearance. Cyrus had asked for the best eye doctor in Egypt, who was duly sought out and sent by Amasis (3.1.1). The doctor resented his removal from his family and devised a scheme to discomfort Amasis. Veen might say that this is another instance of the significance of the insignificant. The doctor suggests that Cambyses ask for Amasis’ daughter, knowing that Amasis will be discomforted to hand her over, and discomforted by Cambyses if he does not hand her over (3.1.2). Amasis does indeed have qualms about doing so, knowing that his daughter would not be Cambyses’ wife but his concubine. He manages to negotiate the dangerous waters by sending Apries’ daughter instead, clothed and bejewelled as if she were his own. This ruse works until the girl, realising that Cambyses is unaware of her true patronage, reveals the trick which has been played (3.1.4). It was for this reason that Cambyses attacked Egypt, according to the Persians (3.1.5).

Amasis is careful not to ‘exclude’ Cambyses, on the face of it, and appears to preserve a rather uneasy alliance. Unfortunately, he ‘excludes’ the Egyptian eye doctor when he allies himself with Cyrus by doing him a favour. This is the ‘exclusion’ which causes the trouble. The scheme with Apries’ daughter seems to ‘include’ her, albeit falsely, in his own family, until she reveals the reality of her ‘exclusion’ from Egypt and Amasis’ household. Amasis effects a ‘reversal’ of her fortune and preserves that of his own daughter by allowing Nitetis, Apries’ daughter, to be made a concubine. The revelation of the truth causes a reversal in Cambyses’ attitude to Egypt: the alliance is broken. Amasis’ scheme has worked well enough, however: his daughter does not become a concubine of the violent Cambyses, and indeed he himself doesn’t live to see

311 See the previous section, ‘Wine, Madness, Drugs and Trickery’.
Cambyses’ subjugation of his country (3.10.1-2). His epitaph is admirable: ‘Amasis died, having been king for forty-four years, in which no great terrible thing happened to him’ (βασιλεύσας ὁ Ἀμασίς τέσσερα καὶ τεσσεράκοντα ἔτεα ἀπέθανε, ἐν τοῖσι οὐδὲν οἰ μέγα ἀνάρσιον πρήγμα συνηνεῖχθη...3.10.2).

Even the violation of his corpse at 3.16.1 is a rather empty victory for Cambyses, because the mummified corpse (in a strangely active fashion) ‘resisted’ (ἀντείχε, 3.16.2) the whipping, goading and hair-pulling and ‘didn’t disintegrate at all’ (οὐδὲν διεχέτο). The burning of the corpse is unfortunate, but even then Herodotus places more emphasis on the fact that Cambyses was violating both his own and Egyptian nomos by doing so (3.16.3). During his lifetime, Amasis does not suffer, and even in death has an integrity which refuses to succumb to ill-treatment. He is still ‘inclusive’ as a corpse. In fact Amasis has so completely won over the Egyptians, apparently, that they doubt if it really was his corpse at all (3.16.5). This is quite a reversal from the trouble he had with them initially (2.172.2). Although Herodotus is sceptical of the idea (3.16.7), it would be the ultimate trick played by a consummate trickster, to disappear after death and have, in reversal, an unknown corpse of ‘some other man of the Egyptians’ (ἄλλος τις τῶν Αἰγυπτίων, 3.16.5) occupy his famous tomb.

The arrangement was (according to the Egyptians, 3.16.6) that Amasis had learnt from an oracle (and here we recall that he only supports true oracles) what was to happen to his corpse, and avoided the treatment by having the corpse of this unknown Egyptian placed inside his tomb, at the doors, while his own corpse was put in the most recessed part possible. This is another demonstration of reversal and inclusiveness: by including another corpse, Amasis excludes the violation of his own; he installs the unknown 

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312 Veen (1996: 120) points out that these are two of the elements which make him come ‘close to the terms formulated by Solon for ‘happiness’ ’.
313 Although Harrison (2000: 54) disagrees: ‘Misfortune, contrary to Solon’s wisdom, may strike even after death.’ He connects this to Cambyses’ defiling of Amasis’ body at 3.16.1-2.
314 See Harrison (2000: 240), ‘Human infringements of nomoi are often characterized as impious. So, for example, Cambyses’ order to burn the body of Amasis was, Herodotus says, ‘impious’ (3.16.2-4) as it breached both the Egyptian and the Persian nomos. It has been suggested on the basis of this passage that Herodotus may have believed only universal nomoi to be divine: what distinguishes Cambyses’ crimes was that they breached the customs of more than one people.’ See also n. 44.
Egyptian right at the front, while he is installed right at the back. Even though Herodotus
doesn’t necessarily believe the story, it does fit in with the themes already prevalent in
the logos of Amasis.

A little later on, Amasis comes back into the narrative in the role of a wise adviser
for Polycrates, a role which Flory observes is unique among the kings in the Histories
and once again the themes of alliance and reversal appear in conjunction with the logos.
Amasis and Polycrates form an alliance, or ‘make an agreement of mutual friendship’
(Εἰςινίην...συνεθήκατο, 3.39.2), which involves the exchanging of presents. Polycrates
prospers in his military endeavours (3.39.3-4), and this excellent fortune comes to
Amasis’ notice, whereupon he sends Polycrates a letter (3.40.1-3): ‘Amasis says the
following to Polycrates: It is pleasing to find out about a dear man and guest friend doing
dowell, but your great successes don’t please me, because I understand that divinity is
jealous. In reality I want, both for myself and for whomever I care about, some success in
[our] affairs, but some misfortune too, and in this way to pass life, doing alternatively
[successfully and badly] rather than having success in everything. Because I have heard
and know of no-one who in the end didn’t perish utterly miserably, who also had success
in everything.’ (Ἄμασις Πολυκράτεϊ ὡδε λέγει. ἤδυ μὲν πυνθάνεσθαι ἄνδρα
φίλον καὶ ξείνον εὖ πρήσσοντα, ἐμοὶ δὲ αἱ σαὶ μεγάλαι εὐτυχίαι οὐκ
ἀφέσκουσι, ἐπισταμένῳ τὸ θείον ὡς ἐστί φθονερόν. καὶ καὶς βούλομαι καὶ
αὐτὸς καὶ τῶν ἀν κήδωμαι τὸ μὲν τι εὐτυχέειν τῶν πρηγμάτων, τὸ δὲ
προσπταίειν, καὶ οὔτω διαφέρειν τὸν αἰῶνα ἐναλλαξ πρῆσσων ἡ εὐτυχέειν
τὰ πάντα· οὐδένα γάρ κω λόγῳ οἶδα ἀκούσας ὃστις ἐς τέλος ὡς κακῶς
ἐτελεύτησε πρόφριξος, εὐτυχέων τὰ πάντα.) He then advises him on what to do
(3.40.4): ‘Have a think about it and work out whatever is of greatest worth to you and
which by losing will give your soul the greatest pain. Then throw it away in such a way


316 Lattimore (1939: 26) calls Amasis a ‘tragic warner’ type. He also notes the unusual role which Amasis
plays here: ‘Amasis is a striking departure from Herodotus’ usual conception of royal character, and his
shrewd, vulgar, easy-going disposition is a natural protection against the besetting sin of ὤβρις. He can be
a king and yet be wise.’
so that it never will come [back] among mankind. If after this your successes don’t turn out to alternate with suffering, set it right in the way which you have been advised by me.’ (φροντίσας τὸ ἂν εὐρής ἕν τοι πλείστου ἄξιον καὶ ἐπ’ ὃ σὺ ἀπολομένῳ μάλιστα τὴν ψυχήν ἀλγήσεις, τούτῳ ἀπόβαλε οὕτω ὄκως μηκέτι ἦξει ἐς ἄνθρωπος, ἢν τε μὴ ἐναλλαξ ἢδη τῶπο τούτου αἱ εὐτυχίαι τοι τήσι πάθησι προσπίπτωσι, τρόπῳ τῷ ἐξ ἐμεῦ ὑποκείμενῳ ἀκέο.)

Amasis ‘includes’ his ally, Polycrates, by offering him the benefit of his advice, and as Amasis (we have seen) has experienced reversal in his life and bases his theory of madness and work on it, it is not so surprising that his theory for how to really prosper has the same basis. He wants alternating success and misfortune, not just for himself but others also, because without this reversal in success a person is bound to end in a terrible way. His theory of madness was similar: alternate work and play, because without this madness or death awaits. This is not to say that Amasis is wrong just because he has a pet theory for most occasions; in fact the point of the Polycrates logos is rather to intimate that Amasis is quite right.

Amasis is not just a theorist, however, but is good enough to suggest a cure for this dangerous unbroken success by arranging for misfortune oneself. Polycrates appears to take the advice, but as Veen clearly shows, he doesn’t follow the advice to the letter and therefore does not succeed in his attempted misfortune. Polycrates makes a stab at working out what would make him rather downcast to lose, rather than something which

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317 As Flory (1987: 140) notes: ‘The advice he gives to Polycrates about curtailing ambition contains the same tragic perception of life as we hear from Croesus... But Amasis does not, like Croesus, have to suffer defeat and lose his throne to acquire wisdom...’ See also Harrison (2000: 226); on Pgs. 62-63 he discusses the ‘principle of the instability of human fortune’ around which the Histories revolves, remarking on the similarity between the proem (1.5.3-4), Solon’s words to Croesus and Amasis’ advice to Polycrates; ‘the same themes are picked up also in the very last chapter of the Histories (9.122)’.

318 See Veen (1996: 135) on Amasis’ wisdom regarding the gods: ‘In Amasis toont Herodotus hoe belangrijk is de kleine in de verticale relatie tussen mens en goden: bescheidenheid beschermt de mens tegen φθόνος. Immers, in de woorden van Artabanus (7.10e): de god staat niemand dan zichzelf grote pretenties toe; wat klein is, is veilig.’ (In Amasis Herodotus shows how important the small is in the vertical connection between men and gods: modesty protects men against φθόνος. For, in the words of Artabanus (7.10e): the god allows no-one [other] than himself great pretension; that which is small, is safe.)

319 Veen (1996: 122) observes the contrast between the two kings: ‘By opposing Amasis and Polycrates, Herodotus defines his paradox of kingship - that in order to retain his greatness, a king has to remain within the limits of the small.’
will cause his ‘soul the greatest pain’\textsuperscript{320}. He settles on his signet ring (3.41.1), throws it into the sea (3.41.2), but a fish swallows it and the fish is given to Polycrates as a present by a fisherman (3.42.1-2). Thus the ring is rediscovered (3.42.3).

When Amasis hears about this new piece of good luck he realises that Polycrates is indeed ‘destined not to end well…because he had success in everything, who even found the things he’d thrown away’ (οὐκ εὖ τελευτήσειν μέλλοι…ἐυτυχέων τὰ πάντα, ὃς καὶ τὰ ἀποβάλλει εὑρίσκει, 3.43.1). Accordingly he dissolves his friendship with Polycrates (3.43.2), taking his own advice ‘so that when great, terrible misfortune befell Polycrates, he himself would not be pained in his soul as [he would be] about a guest friend’ (ἵνα μὴ συντυχήσῃς δεινῆς τε καὶ μεγάλης Πολυκράτεα καταλαβούσης αὐτὸς ἀλγήσει τὴν ψυχήν ώς περὶ ξείνου ἀνδρός.). The repetition of the phrase ἀλγήσει τὴν ψυχήν points back to the advice Amasis gave Polycrates to start with. Polycrates didn’t manage to accomplish his preventative misfortune, but Amasis ‘throws away’ Polycrates while he can, so as to prevent his own ‘pain of soul’ in the future. He ‘excludes’ Polycrates, and by doing so ‘excludes’ his own pain.

The themes which have been termed ‘alliance’, ‘inclusion/exclusion’ and ‘reversal’ are therefore seen throughout the logos on Amasis, and even after, in the logos of Polycrates. They may not be as distinct in some sections as in others, but as the later sections contain speeches and letters by Amasis himself, they are of particular importance for the consistency of the themes. Because his own life illustrates such elements, they infiltrate his theories on life and his own actions, whether it be as a demonstration of why the Egyptians should respect him, to how too much work can lead to madness, to his dealings with his Greek wife, to avoidance of the jealousy of the gods. His theory of madness can therefore not be separated from his other theories and actions, because they all have the same basis in the context of the logos.

\textsuperscript{320} Veen (1996: 6-22) on Polycrates, and Pgs. 7-12 in particular.
Madness in Context: Charileōs (3.145.1)

Charileōs has the dubious distinction of only being ‘fairly mad’ (ὑπομαργότερος, 3.145.1) rather than totally mad, but has this in common with other people who are called mad, that he is determined to attack the superior-numbered Persians who have invaded Samos with no organized resistance on the part of the current tyrant, his brother Maiandrios. Why Charileōs is ‘fairly mad’ is left for us to deduce, as we aren’t given any pertinent information prior to this point (as occurs with Cleomenes and his madness at 5.42.1; both Cleomenes and Cambyses are called ὑπομαργότερος, as will be discussed). Charileōs’ semi-madness does explain his later actions though; if Charileōs weren’t fairly mad we would be left wondering why he wished to throw himself away on the Persians, for the sake of a brother whose conduct he despises.

In fact, the ‘fairly mad’ Charileōs seems to be favourably contrasted with his brother in many ways. This is a surprising new use of the idea of madness, in comparison with what Herodotus has given us so far: madness has been completely bad. Perhaps this new ‘type’ of madness is a fore-runner for the madness which crops up relatively frequently in the later books, where people fight greater numbers than their own; it is, by any consideration, a distinct difference to the madness of Cambyses which has been discussed in detail earlier in the same book. Herodotus keeps the reader on their toes, where madness is concerned; having given us a full account of Cambyses’ terrible behaviour, we are now presented with a man who is called ‘fairly mad’ but whose behaviour not only is nothing like Cambyses’, but is also of greater nobility than his (sane) brother’s. By the same token, however, the more positive characterisation of Charileōs serves to make the negative characterisation of Maiandrios even more so.

321 Immerwahr (1957: 319) says little on the ἔλογος about Maiandrios and Charileōs, and nothing about Charileōs at all, despite his statement (Pg. 322) that the Samians ‘are an important example of the struggle between freedom and slavery which is a fundamental theme of Herodotus’ work’; Maiandrios and Charileōs both contribute, in their different ways, to freedom, but their attempts result in enslavement. Raaflaub (1987: 221-248) does not mention Charileōs either.

However, the use of the word ὑπομαργότερος as opposed to the previous use of μαίνομαι/μανίη may not signal quite the same responses in the reader/audience. ὑπομαργότερος is used twice in other sections of the Histories: in 3.29.1 where it describes Cambyses and in 6.75.1 of Cleomenes. Both times it is explanatory of a madness which suddenly gets worse: both men were ὑπομαργότερος before, but at these points their madness becomes even more violently manifest. The word appears to denote a tendency, which then escalates. We have no reason to assume, on such admittedly limited evidence, that Charileōs will not also adhere to the model, although he does not go on to be called mad as both Cambyses and Cleomenes are. It is true that Charileōs is called ‘fairly mad’ at 3.145.1 and goes on to express his desire to fight; he accomplishes his wish (3.145.2, 3.146.3), which is an ‘upscaling’ of his verbal violence to physical violence.

Every expression of ὑπομαργότερος is in Herodotus’ own mouth, rather than that of any other figure in the logos, so we can conclude that we are to accept this ‘partial madness’ as a truth in their logoi. Other instances of people (usually Greeks) being called mad for attacking larger forces, as Charileōs does, come from the mouths of the enemy, who underestimate the attacking force. This is the only case where a small force attacks a larger one and is called ‘fairly mad’ by Herodotus himself, rather than by someone who is blinded by their own power, which may explain why the account of Maiandrios and Charileōs is less clearly cut than other instances of madness where people attack larger forces than their own. There is an ambiguity to Charileōs’ portrayal in this logos; whereas other Greeks who attack greater forces are always brave and noble, Charileōs is not just brave and noble but also foolhardy and foolish in his attempt to defeat the Persians. This is made clear in 3.146.1, when Maiandrios accedes to Charileōs’ request to be given mercenaries, in order to repel the Persians: ‘Maiandrios accepted the suggestion...not because he had reached this (level) of idiocy that he thought his own power to be superior to (that of) the king....’(Μαιάνδριος δὲ ὑπέλαβε τὸν λόγον...οὐκ ἐς τὸν ἀφροσύνης ἀπικόμενος ὡς δέξας τὴν ἐωτοῦ δύναμιν περιέσεσθαι τῆς βασιλέως...). Maiandrios may well be portrayed as cowardly and self-serving, but he is also smarter than Charileōs, whose assault is ill-informed and
causes mass bloodshed of his own people; Charileōs has reached the ‘level of idiocy’ which Maiandrios has not\textsuperscript{323}. Herodotus could well be signalling Charileōs’ ambiguous nature, noble but foolishly disposed to violence, by calling him υπομαργότερος\textsuperscript{324}.

The madness of Charileōs should be seen as an ironic foil to his brother Maiandrios, a working example of the mild tyrant (in his case, a man wishing to be just) who turns into a terrible tyrant and, most importantly, is the focus of this logos. On the other hand, the mad Cambyses would seem to have more in common with the tyrant Maiandrios than with the ‘fairly mad’ Charileōs; and while the audience may have been suitably appalled at Cambyses, there is also reason, in this story, to be appalled not at the madman but at the tyrant who so quickly swings from the extreme of wishing to be just to throwing people into prison because they oppose him. Veen, one of the few to pay much attention to Charileōs, says of this logos that ‘it would seem pertinent to say that this is a story of the perverting effect human nature has on ideals called righteous, when we see these being shattered to pieces by the experience of violence and by envy (and its close correlate, reluctance to abandon power to another man). In short, we see the perversion of good intentions by basic human characteristics.’\textsuperscript{325} This statement is true of Maiandrios in particular, but also of Charileōs\textsuperscript{326}. His ‘righteous ideal’, a patriotic notion of resisting the take-over by the Persians, would be seen as a virtue by the Greek audience (and indeed by a modern one), but this ideal comes to nothing in the violence-provoked slaughter of the Samians which follows\textsuperscript{327}. We can also see that the characterisation of Maiandrios is shown in part in his dealings with Charileōs: in addition to going from ‘most just’ to ‘tyrant’ and coward, he deliberately allows Charileōs, his own brother, to go on a suicidal mission against the Persians, in order to fulfil his irritation at the peaceful takeover. Charileōs uses the plan, which is formed on faulty

\textsuperscript{323} It is foolish; see Veen (1996: 57).
\textsuperscript{324} A similar ambiguity is at work in the portrayal of Cleomenes, though on a larger, more diffuse scale.
\textsuperscript{325} Veen (1996: 61).
\textsuperscript{326} As Veen (1996: 64, n. 163) points out Charileōs’ name, ‘pleaser of the people’, ‘has a grimly ironic flavour in view of the ensuing massacre…’
\textsuperscript{327} Veen (1996: 57): ‘The expedition does not achieve its end (and Darius’ gift is nullified) because of another annulled expectation: Charileōs’ misguided expectation that he will be able to ‘punish’ the Persians for their arrival (3.145.3) because they are ‘so easy to attack’ (3.145.2). Now the Persians are so easy to attack, because they ‘had not expected’ anything like an attack (3.146.3), since they ‘had supposed a full agreement had been made’ (ib.) - a dire mistake, once more.’ Charileōs’ assault does succeed initially, but only initially: ‘The violent methods, used for aims never achieved, succeed too: the incarceration and slaughter of the prisoners, and the bloody attack on the Persian officers…’
knowledge of the Persian force, knowledge which Maiandrios does not correct, out of spite.

Veen also points out the number of ‘annulled intentions and expectations’ which fill this *logos*, of which the ‘the invalidation of Darius’ gift of a pristine Samos to Syloson is only the most striking instance\(^3\). Maiandrios’ intention of ‘equal law’ is nullified by his reaction to the reaction of the Samians (3.142.5-3.143.1)\(^3\), and Charileōs’ intention of repelling the Persians is invalidated by the Persians themselves\(^3\): ‘The savage reprisal by Otanes proves the 'foolishness' of Charileos' expectation (ἀφροσύνη, 3.146.1)\(^3\). In the end the only intention which has any success is Maiandrios’ desire to pass Samos on in a sullied state\(^3\).

Charileōs’ noble intentions are annulled because of his restricted view of whom exactly he might fight. After Maiandrios’ attempted *isonomia* was rebuffed (3.142.3-3.143.1)\(^3\), he suddenly changed his mind and decided he might as well be tyrant after all, and began by throwing his detractors into prison\(^3\). It is after this that he falls ill, his

\(^3\) Other instances listed by Veen (1996: 56-57) are Maiandrios’ incarceration of his enemies, ‘because he intends to remain in power (3.143.1), but the arrival of the Persians makes his this ambition unfeasible. The same observation applies to Lycaretus, who killed the prisoners, 'so as to gain power more easily on Samos' (3.143.2) after Maeandrius had fallen ill; for 'he expected Maeandrius to die' (ib.). Both expectations are overtaken by facts, as the Persians arrive and Maeandrius recovers...Finally, Maeandrius fails to bribe king Cleomenes into giving him succour (3.148.2).

\(^3\) Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 73), Maiandrios, Polycrates’ Nachfolger, zog die eigene Tyrannis auf Kosten der Bürgerfreiheit der potentiellen Tyrannis eines anderen vor und seine Pläne, in Samos die Isonomie einzurichten, bleiben eitel (III 142-143). Die Samier mußten schließlich zu ihrer inneren Unfreiheit hinzu die gewaltsame Unterjochung durch die Perser erdulden (III 144-149). (Maiandrios, Polycrates’ successor, prefers his own tyranny at the cost of the people’s freedom to the potential tyranny of another, and his plans, to establish *isonomia* in Samos, remain futile. The Samians must finally submit to their internal lack of freedom as well as the violent subjagation at the hands of the Persians.)

\(^3\) Veen (1996: 57): ‘So all the explicit intentions and anticipations in the story are a total failure - except one. For Maeandrius refuses to surrender the island to his rival without a blow, and he 'was prepared to make power over Samus as weak as possible and surrender it in that condition' (3.146.2), and this scheme succeeds.’

\(^3\) Hart (1982: 60) claims that ‘Herodotus takes his proclamation of ‘isonomia’ at face value’ but there is no reason why we shouldn’t take Herodotus himself at his word; he is making the point that Maiandrius changed completely.

\(^3\) Veen (1996: 58 n. 148) illustrates some errors made over Maiandrios’ choice: ‘ Waters 1971, 29 neglects the text saying that Maeandrius “made a show of ‘restoring the commonwealth’ in the best manner of dictators”. Hart 1982, 60 makes a similar mistake. Hart also misses the point when he states that Maeandrius ‘was obliged to safeguard his position by turning it into a tyranny’ – (my italics); likewise Immerwahr 1957, 319: ‘the Samians force [Maeandrius] and his brothers to become tyrannical.’ This, I
brother, Lycaretos, has the prisoners killed, in expectation of his own ascension\textsuperscript{335}; the Persians arrive and Maiandrios immediately agrees to leave the island to them (3.143.2-3.144.1).

Charileōs comes into the narrative at this point and castigates Maiandrios for his pathetic attitude; he himself had been thrown into prison by Maiandrios, for some offence (τι...ἐξαμαρτών, 3.145.1), and it is from this location that he sees the Persian takeover. It is significant that his sole view of the Persians is when they are passive (3.144.1): ‘When Otanes had consented to these [arrangements/conditions] and ratified them, the most highly-ranked of the Persians had had chairs put down and were seated over by the acropolis’ (καταινέσαντος δὲ ἑπὶ τούτοις Ὀτάνεω καὶ σπεισαμένου τῶν Περσέων οἱ πλείστου ἔξοι θρόνους θέμενοι κατεναντίον τῆς ἀκροπόλιος κατέατο) thus apparently putting themselves within Charileōs’ line of sight. This is stressed again in the next paragraph (3.145.1): ‘and then when he heard both what was being done and stooping to look out through the [window] of the prison, when he saw the Persians sitting peacefully, he shouted…’ (καὶ δὴ τότε ἐπακούσας τε τὰ πηησόμενα καὶ διακύψας διὰ τῆς γοργύρης, ὡς εἶδε τοὺς Πέρσας εἰρηναίως κατημένους, ἐβόα...). So Charileōs sees the Persians ‘sitting peacefully’, and furthermore only sees the ones who are seated, the higher-ranking officials.

Charileōs’ restricted view of the Persian forces informs his words to Maiandrios, with whom he insists on speaking (3.145.2): the Persians are ‘so easy to conquer’ (οὐτω δή τι ἔντας εὐπετέας χειρωθῆναι). Although he is brought to see Maiandrios, we are to assume, I believe, that it is a private conversation, given the content, and that

\textsuperscript{335} This earns him Water’s remark (1971: 29) that he ‘was even more openly tyrannical’ than Maiandrios. Hart (1982: 60) seems to think that ‘Like the Peisistratidae, Maeandrius and his brothers worked as a team, for the mentally unstable Charilaus may have had some military responsibility before being locked up…’ This unlikely arrangement can only be refuted by the lack of communication between the three brothers and the debacle which subsequently occurred. I would argue that a farce of such massive proportions would only be possible if the opposite situation were the case. Charileōs himself does not have much praise for being imprisoned by Maiandrios (3.145.2-3).
Charileōs therefore does not get the opportunity to see exactly what he would be facing, and Maiandrios does not choose to enlighten his brother. Maiandrios knows about the forces the Persians have, since he was not willing to face them himself (3.144.1): ‘No-one raised a hand against them, and under truce they said that they were ready, both the backers of Maiandrios and Maiandrios himself, to leave the island.’ (οὔτε τίς σφι χείρας ἀνταείρεται, ὑπόσπονδοι τε ἐφασαν εἶναι ἐτοιμοί οἱ τοῦ Μαιανδρίου στασιῶται καὶ αὐτὸς Μαιάνδριος ἐκχωρήσαι ἐκ τῆς νήσου). He keeps his brother ignorant, however, in order to use his ‘madness’ for his own spiteful going-away present to the Persians. He is the one who restricts his brother’s vision of the Persians, first by putting him in prison, from where he can only see a certain area, and then by allowing him to remain unknowing of the actual situation.

Charileōs’ plan is initially successful, but ultimately fails due to his miscalculation. The armed mercenaries are sent out against the Persians, ‘who weren’t expecting any such event and thought that everything had been agreed on’ (οὔτε προσδεκομένους τοιούτο οὐδὲν δοκέοντάς τε δὴ πάντα συμβεβάναι, 3.146.3), thus having the element of surprise. The Persians do conform to Charileōs’ expectations: ‘The mercenaries fell on the Persians who were being carried in litters, and who were of the greatest estimation, and killed them’ (ἐμπεσόντες δὲ οἱ ἐπίκουροι τῶν Περσέων τοὺς διφροφορεμένους τε καὶ λόγου πλείστου ἐόντας ἐκτείνον). On the face of it, Charileōs’ estimation was correct: the Persians are indeed easy to defeat, but only because the ones Charileōs knew about were the high-ranking ones who did not even walk around. It is at this point that the unforeseen occurs: ‘the rest of the Persian army stepped into the breech, and since they were pressed hard the mercenaries got trapped back in the acropolis’ (ἡ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιὰ ἡ Περσικὴ ἐπεβοήθεε, πιεζεύμενοι δὲ οἱ ἐπίκουροι ὑπὸ ὀπίσω κατειλήθησαν ἐς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν). Unlike those ‘of greatest estimation’ (λόγου πλείστου), ‘the rest of the Persian army’ (ἡ δὲ ἄλλη στρατιὰ ἡ Περσικὴ) is a force with which to be reckoned, and the rather large factor which Charileōs didn’t take into account.
Charileōs may be called ‘fairly mad’ for his foolish violent attempt on the Persians, but he is also violent and argumentative in speech, both in his expression and in the content. Charileōs calls Maiandrios the ‘worst of men’ (ὦ κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν, 3.145.2)\(^\text{336}\), and notes in his speech that he himself has ‘done no wrong (or ‘nothing unjust’) worthy of imprisonment’ (ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ, 3.145.2), where a play on the δικ- stem is a contrast to Maiandrios’ former aim to be ‘most just’. Clearly, if Maiandrios throws people into prison who have done nothing unjust, then he himself is distinctly unjust\(^\text{337}\).

Charileōs’ speech to his brother only contains one imperative\(^\text{338}\), albeit an important one; he calls his brother names and castigates him for his behaviour (3.145.2): ‘he (Charileōs) both abusing him and calling him a coward persuaded him to attack the Persians, by saying the following things: “Worst of men, you think me worthy of prison, chaining up your own brother and (one) who has done no wrong worthy of imprisonment, and you watch the Persians both expelling you and making you homeless and you don’t dare to punish them, when they are so easy to conquer? But if you really have a dread of them, give me your mercenaries, and I will punish them for coming here; and I am willing to send you yourself away from the island.”’ (λοιδορέων τε καὶ κακίζων μιν ἀνέπειθε ἐπιθέσθαι τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι, λέγων τοιάδε· ἐμὲ μέν, ὦ κάκιστε ἀνδρῶν, ἔόντα σεωυτοῦ ἀδελφεῖ καὶ ἀδικήσαντα οὐδὲν ἄξιον δεσμοῦ δήσας γοργύρης ἠξίωσας, ὅρεὼν δὲ τοὺς Πέρσας ἐκβάλλοντάς τε σε καὶ ἀνοικον ποιέοντας οὐ τολμᾶς τείσασθαι, οὕτω δὴ τι ἐόντας εὐπετέας χειρωθήναι; ἀλλ’ εἶ τοι σὺ σφεας καταφρωδήκας, ἤμοι δὸς τοὺς ἐπικουρόνους,

\(^{336}\) We should remember that at 3.142.1 Maiandrios wished to be ‘the most just of men’ (τῷ δικαίοτάτῳ ἀνδρῶν βουλομένῳ).

\(^{337}\) Veen (1996: 62) states that a similar comparison occurs between Maiandrios and Cleomenes also: ‘…whereas Maeandrius wishéd to become the most righteous of men’ (3.142.1) Cleomenes became the most righteous of men (δικαιότατος ἀνδρῶν γίνεται). Now Cleomenes earns the laudatory qualification because ‘he did not think it just (οὐκ ἐδικαίου) to take what was offered’ (ib.) or to have other accept it, although his resolve is strongly challenged by Maeandrius' repeating the offer (ib.). Herodotus qualifies him as ‘the most just of men’ simply because he based his decision on ‘the just’, δίκη...So we see that the difference between the two men is formulated in terms of their firmness in matters of δίκη: Maeandrius could not become righteous because he had no wish to resist the temptation to violate it, Cleomenes became righteous because he did.’

\(^{338}\) Unlike Astyages’ speech to Harpagus, which was characterized by imperatives (1.108.3-4).
Charileōs speaks roughly to his brother and pulls no punches when discussing Maiandrios’ behaviour; he lists his grievances forcefully. The contrast between himself and his brother is also highlighted by the use of the personal pronouns. Veen emphasizes the discrepancy between place and subsequent action, and associates the madness with this as well: ‘Charileos…literally emerges from a sewer to perform his sally, and the fact is emphasized by his words to Maeandrius…(3.145.2). We are not told if Charileos’ estimation of his transgression is correct - what we are being told is that he is cast away in the humblest of places. Historic action literally begins in the gutter here, and it is started by a madman at that… Once again, the contrast between Maiandrios and Charileōs is clear: the tyrant, all-powerful, is not willing to do anything; the imprisoned (though narrow-visioned) ‘half mad’ man is. Maiandrios is clearly using Charileōs’ madness for his own purposes, because although Charileōs offers to get Maiandrios off Samos, Maiandrios doesn’t need his help: he already has an escape route arranged (3.146.2): ‘…and knowing that there was a safe escape from the island for him whenever he wanted; for he had had made for himself a hidden channel going from the acropolis to the sea.’

339 If we dismiss the vowels, there is a prevalence of sigma and tau in his speech, and a lesser prevalence of nu and kappa. In these calculations we can also include xi. Charileōs’ speech would appear to be full of sibilant spitting. Waters’ (1971: 29) only comment on Charileōs is that his ‘eccentric’ intervention ‘led to some resistance and subsequently to Persian reprisals, 3.149….good anecdotal material especially in the case of Syloson and of Charilaos – the latter looking like an eye-witness account.’

340 Hohti (1976: 36) is mainly interested in Charileōs’ speech as a causative one; it changes the course of action. He discusses the speech a little more under ‘Speeches as a means of personal participation in the course of action’ (Pg. 82). ‘When Herodotus emphasizes the influence an individual exercises on the historical action by means of a speech, he focuses the narrative on the speaker, the speech and the effects it has…Now emphasis lies in influencing instead of being influenced. The speech is again preceded by information about the speaker and why he speaks in terms of personal participation. The speeches outline an action, which is accepted by the person addressed…We may take first Charilaos’ speech to Maiandrios in the section on Samos (III 145). Herodotus first presents the speaker, the half-insane Charilaos, brother of Maiandrios and gives us the reason for his speech: ἐπακούσας τὰ πρησσόμενα ὡς ἔδει. The speech is based on facts which Charilaos has heard or seen and ends in a plan, which Maiandrios accepts.’

Apart from this angry speech and his - in this instance uninformed - insistence on fighting superior numbers, there is very little else in his manner to confirm or illustrate why Charileōs is meant to be ‘fairly mad’. We could assume that Charileōs is fairly mad because he has been put in prison – Maiandrios might not really need any other reason to put his brother away, whatever misdemeanour was committed; Herodotus is vague on that point, saying merely that Charileōs had ‘after committing some wrong’ (ὁ τι ἐξαμαρτὼν, 3.145.1) been imprisoned. On the other hand, Maiandrios does put people into prison simply to make his tyranny easier.

It is the fairly mad Charileōs who has the foolhardiness (ignorant courage) and pride to attack the Persians with the mercenaries Maiandrios has to hand but doesn’t use. He doesn’t even give Charileōs the mercenaries for reasons of Samian pride, but for his own petty reasons (as Herodotus thinks, 3.146.1-2): ‘...rather because he was envious of Syloson if without trouble he was going to get back the city unharmed. So because he was irritated at the Persians he wished to make the Samian powers as weak as possible and to hand them over that way, knowing very well that if the Persians suffered they would be nasty to the Samians...’ (...φθονήσας μᾶλλον Συλοσῶντι εἰ ἀπονητὶ ἐμελλε ἀπολάμψεσθαι ἀκέραιον τὴν πόλιν. ἐφεθίσας ὡν τοὺς Πέρσας ἰθελε ὡς ἀσθενέστατα ποιησαι τὰ Σάμια πρήγματα καὶ οὕτω παραδιδόναι, εὑ ἐξεπιστάμενος ὡς παθόντες οἱ Πέρσαι κακῶς

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342 As Socrates says would be of benefit to the mad in Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.2.50); although they are bound (δεδέσθαι) rather than imprisoned necessarily.

343 Hart (1982: 60-61, 118 ) seems little interested in Charileōs except as a subsidiary figure who offers ‘violent intervention’ which allows Maiandrios to escape and whose actions prevented Sylosos’s bloodless coup.

344 Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 125). Darbo-Peschanski mentions the ‘psychological explanation’ for Maiandrios accepting the plan, but doesn’t mention the psychologically suspect Charileōs: Quand il entreprend de montrer pourquoi, selon toute vraisemblance, Maiandrios, régent de Samos après la mort de Polycrate, accueillit favorablement les discours vengeurs de son frère Charilaos qui l’engageait à repousser les Perses amenés par Sylosos (III, 146), l’explication psychologique prend d’amples proportions (quotes 3.146.1-2). (When he undertakes to show why, in all probability, Maiandrios, regent of Samos after the death of Polycrates, favorably welcomes the vengeful speech of his brother Charilaos who urges him to repulse the Persians brought along by Sylosos, the psychological explanation takes vast proportions...)

προσεμπικρανέσθαι ἔμελλον τοῖσι Σαμίσι„). According to Herodotus, Maiandrios is not entirely complacent about the invasion of Persians, but neither is he willing to do anything to risk himself; he doesn’t care about the Samians themselves particularly, and his solution is designed to be irritating, fostering discontent and grievance on both sides, while he gets away scot free (3.146.2). His envy determines two major events in the logos: Maiandrios’ decision to become tyrant and the destruction of Samos. It is another irony of the logos that, although Maiandrios is ‘the pivot-point of the action’, his ‘action’, when action is proposed, is a passive agreement with his brother’s misguided plan.

Another point which Herodotus seems to be making is that familial in-fighting and political instability are detrimental to the greater good of those around. In 3.143.2 Lycaretos has all those Maiandrios put in prison killed, in order to clear the way for his own tyranny in the event that Maiandrios dies of a illness (3.143.2). The trouble between Maiandrios and his own family seems to distract Maiandrios from the greater threat of the Persians. This theory is also specifically stated elsewhere by Herodotus (8.3.1): ‘For an internal faction is worse than a unified war just as war (is worse) than peace.’ (στάσις γὰρ ἐμφύεται πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσοῦτον κάκιόν ἐστι ὁσῳ πόλεμος εἰρήνης.)

The climax of the story comes in 3.146.3 where after all the discussion of Maiandrios’ behaviour (‘I’m taking my toys and leaving, but first I’ll spit in the sandpit’) which is no small achievement. Hart (1982: 194, n. 100) says that ‘Apart from the opening commendation of M’s motives, however, I question that H’s portrait of M is over-favourable; he comes out a total failure.’ The comment is reasonable, but Maiandrios does, on the other hand, escape unscathed, unlike Charileos and many others.

345 Which is no small achievement. Hart (1982: 194, n. 100) says that ‘Apart from the opening commendation of M’s motives, however, I question that H’s portrait of M is over-favourable; he comes out a total failure.’ The comment is reasonable, but Maiandrios does, on the other hand, escape unscathed, unlike Charileos and many others.

346 Veen (1996: 60-61) on envy: ‘Now we have seen that envy was a vice considered by Otanes to be typical of tyrants (3.80.4); but not of them alone: Otanes holds that ‘envy is engrained in man from the beginning’ (φθόνος ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπῳ, 3.80.3). So we see that Maeandrius is overcome by his nature, both as tyrant and as a human being. He behaves true to type…and the emotion which determines the grim outcome of the story is put into the more general setting of human nature: envy belongs to the human repertoire. So in the end it is not Maeandrius’ social background (stressed by Sylosen) or depravity (stressed by Telesarchus and Charileos) which explains his performance, but a feature identified as commonly human.’ And again at Pg. 66, Maiandrios’ envy as ‘a violent form of give-and-take’. Myres (1953: 50) prefers ‘retribution’ as a translation, and although this section is not mentioned in his list, ‘retribution’ would fit quite well with Maiandrios’ actions to some extent.

Charileōs comes out fighting. His active role is made more noticeable because of Maiandrios’ near-apathy; his ‘madness’ explains why he would take on the Persians and why he was so angry at Maiandrios; calling him ‘fairly mad’ in the context of this story highlights his fighting spirit and contrasts him all the more strongly with Maiandrios’ lack of spirit. His ignorance of the true nature of the Persian force and disposition is contrasted with Maiandrios’ complete knowledge and self-preserving cunning. But at the same time we must be careful to note that his ‘fairly mad’ behaviour, while fool-hardy and unable to accomplish his purpose, is also, in this context, not to be seen in a completely ill light, in opposition to that of the fore-running Cambyses. Charileōs’ madness must stand apart from that of Cambyses.

**Madness in Context: Scyles (4.79.3-4)**

Scyles is described as mad in 4.79.4 by a Borysthenite who taunts the Scythians with their king’s behaviour. Although it is possible to see some sign of madness in the way Scyles ignores an omen from the god (4.79.2), the main reason for calling Scyles mad is to provoke the Scythians; the sections from 4.76.1 to 4.80.5 comprise a discourse, the main theme of the *logos*, on the dislike Scythians have for anyone who adopts customs other than Scythian ones, and especially Greek customs (4.76.1). This discourse also makes use of the themes of borders and limits, possibly because a Scythian is more likely to adopt other customs if they are on a border and therefore in a position to come into contact with other customs than their own. Anacharsis and Scyles are no ordinary Scythians; they are respectively the king’s brother and the king himself. Even their rank is not sufficient to protect them from punishment when the Scythians discover their secret worship.

The first example of what happens to a person who does adopt Greek custom is narrated from 4.76.2 to 4.77.2; this is the story of Anacharsis, who adopted the worship of the Mother of the Gods \(^{348}\). The narrative lays out how he went about adopting the

\(^{348}\) Munson (2001: 119) suggests that the reader would feel more sympathy for Anacharsis than for Scyles ‘...the narrator underlines for his audience the horrible fate of a wise and pious man, caused by the ferocious intransigence of a savage people’.
custom, but his ending is disconcertingly swift: someone sees him and reports it to Anacharsis’ brother, who, having seen Anacharsis in action for himself, shoots and kills him (4.76.5) \(^{349}\).

This is a conclusive example of the way Scythians treat those who adopt Greek customs, and any other example would be hard pressed to better this story. Herodotus does so with the story of Scyles: is it longer and more involved, and it tops the Anacharsis tale in that not only does the king of the Scythians himself adopt Greek custom, but he adopts a custom which the Scythians particularly revile \(^{350}\).

Considering the contempt the Scythians feel for Scythians who adopt other customs, it is a little surprising that Scyles should be king at all: his father was Scythian but his mother had been an Istrian and had taught him the Greek language and writing (4.78.1). Despite being made the Scythian king (4.78.3) on his father’s death, and having a Scythian wife of his father’s to be his wife also, ‘he was much more inclined to Greek ways’ (πολλὸν πρὸς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ μᾶλλον τετραμμένος ἦν). Whenever he took the army to the city of Borysthenes, he would leave the army outside the city but would go in himself (4.78.4-5, with the gates carefully guarded in case he should be seen by his army) and proceed to live for a month as a Greek, living in a house with his local wife.

Already we can see that Scyles is an ambivalent character in terms of his double heritage and his crossing of Scythian and Greek borders. Hartog comments that ‘Anacharsis and Scyles in effect “forget” the frontier between the Greeks and the Scythians and suffer the consequences.’ \(^{351}\) There is also a physical border: ‘The

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\(^{349}\) Benardete (1969: 119) thinks that the Anacharsis and Scyles logoi are about forgetfulness: ‘Anacharsis becomes corrupted: he forgets his own gods. In thanksgiving for the preservation of his life, he fails to preserve Scythian customs. The memory of what is his own falls away at the sight of an alien festival, dedicated to a goddess whose rites are orgiastic. He adopts a worship that makes one forget oneself. His lack of sobriety in forgetting his own seems to be occasioned by the very spectacle he watches.’ Of the two logoi he notes that (Pg. 120) ‘Both forget their own customs only to practice cults which make them forget themselves’. This is close to Hartog’s point (1988: 61) that ‘Anacharsis and Scyles in effect “forget” the frontier between the Greeks and the Scythians and suffer the consequences.’ On the whole, Hartog is more convincing; Scyles doesn’t forget his own Scythian heritage because he is trying to avoid it some of the time. He does forget the borders, however. Benardete overuses the theme of forgetfulness, and introduces a constant theme of drunkenness, which is absent from the text. See Pgs. 119-120, and the astounding statement that ‘the Scythian imagination is always intoxicated.’

\(^{350}\) Harrison (2000: 217) notes, with reference to this passage, that ‘When foreigners do attempt to propitiate Greek gods, it is frequently the case that no good comes of it.’

\(^{351}\) Hartog (1988: 61).
Ister…clearly represents a frontier between the Scythians and the Thracians.’

Scyles feels he can move between the two worlds, preferring the Greek, but even though it is the Scythian world which destroys him, the Greek world is, ironically, the one which betrays him in this instance.

Scyles is described by Herodotus in grim tones (4.79.1): ‘it was fated that he would perish miserably’ (ἔδεέ οἱ κακῶς γενέσθαι). This prophetic statement in the Histories has been variously interpreted. Gould says that in this instance ‘it is a human decision, not an unmotivated chance event, that is ‘explained’ by the statement that it ‘had to be’… a momentous or fatal event, which in some sense not easily defined does not ‘fit’, is given the ‘explanation’ that it had to happen precisely because no ‘ordinary-language’ explanation seems to be available. Harrison says that such comments reveal Herodotus’ fatalism, and ‘occur characteristically in the context of an event, insignificant in itself, deemed to be significant in the light of its consequences. Hohti considers that in the case of Anacharsis and Scyles, the deciding factor is given in the contradiction between the desire to be initiated and the general Scythian religious views. ‘Here as well we find necessity explained with νόμος. Darbo-Peschanski says that such supernatural explanations are backed up by other explanations as well, so that Scyles dies since his own people kill him because he abandons his own customs when he is initiated into the cult of Dionysus, and Herodotus adds the explanation that he was

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352 Hartog (1988: 65) also discusses the animal qualities of Scythia: ‘Scyles...moves to and fro between the ethea of the Scythians (the word denotes an animal’s lair...) and the town of the Borysthenites, namely, Olbia. He leaves the Scythian space, a space more animal than human, where he feels ill at ease (he detests the Scythian life-style) and sets off for the town...he leaves his train on the outskirts (toi proasteioi), in the intermediary zone outside the domain of ethea but not yet in that of the astu.’

353 Gould, (1989: 74). He goes on to say ‘It was not to be expected that Kandaules or Skyles or Arkesilas would do the things they did, and the idea of inevitability substitutes for the missing explanation...the idea of what was ‘going to happen’ is associated with the idea of discovery, with the realization of a general truth about human experience.’ Certainly Anacharsis and Scyles are ‘discovered’. The general truth may be along the lines that life can change, and indeed be taken away, in the twinkling of an eye.

354 Harrison, (2000: 231), see also n. 22. The insignificant event being the seeing of Anacharsis and Scyles in their secret worship, which becomes significant when they are killed because of their worship.

355 Hohti (1975: 34): ‘Das Entscheidende ist aber in dem Widerspruch zwischen dem Begeh r eingewehlt zu werden und der allegemeinen skytischen religiösen Anschauungen gegeben. Auch hier finden wir also die Notwendigkeit mit νόμος erklärt.’
destined to perish miserably, which settles the matter before he illustrates the occasion at which the event occurred.\endnote{356}

Scyles wishes to be initiated into Dionysus (4.79.1), which Hartog considers to be the factor which tips the balance. Previously, Scyles was very careful to keep the two parts of his life separate, but ‘...initiation makes a lasting, irreversible change of status... So even if Scyles readopts the Scythian costume...he remains an initiate of Dionysus Bacchus for all that. The Scythians cannot tolerate that: it is an “overlapping” and thus must be punished.’\endnote{357} Scyles tips the balance too far into the Greek side and so the Scythian side demands recompense.

This situation demonstrates a form of Amasis’ theory of madness,\footnote{358} in which he suggested that if a person were not to divide their time between work and leisure, they would go mad or have a stroke. Scyles perhaps demonstrates the other side of the coin, the danger of having too much ‘leisure’, or too much enjoyment in the Greek side of his life. The king of the Scythians has duties to attend to, but as the ‘free Greek’ Scyles has few obligations and can even go around without the trappings of kingship (4.78.4, οὔτε δορυφόρων οὔτε ἄλλου οὐδενός). If his initiation makes him more Greek than Scythian, it could also make him mad, as the Borysthenite reports in 4.79.4, and perhaps not just by Dionysus’ influence. Before the initiation took place, however, Scyles’ house was struck by a lightning bolt.\footnote{359} Hartog suggests the wall is struck rather

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\item[358] See the previous section and 2.173.4.
\item[359] Hartog (1988: 73) states that Zeus was the god who struck the house: ‘“the god,” that is to say, Zeus...’); Hohti (1975: 34) does too: ‘Gerade im Moment der Weihe sendet Zeus einen Blitzstrahl, der sein Haus verbrennt’ (At the same moment as the ordination, Zeus sends a lighting bolt, which incinerates his house). Harrison rightly disagrees (2000: 171, n. 54), ‘Attribution to a particular god on the basis of traditional characteristics cannot, however, be taken for granted in the light of e.g. 7.129.4 …Cf. also the destruction of the palace of Scyles by lightning, 4.79.2, ascribed by Linforth to Zeus (1928:219), though Scyles was also on the verge of initiation into the rites of Dionysus.’ It seems logical for ‘the god’ in a discourse on Dionysus to be Dionysus, lightning bolt non-withstanding. Harrison does reserve judgement
than the house\(^{360}\), and because of this he suggests further meaning: ‘...the thunderbolt, by destroying this wall, does away with the separation between the two spaces...the initiation, for which he is preparing himself, in a sense abolishes the distance between Greek space and Scythian space; and this transgression of one space upon another is a serious matter.\(^{361}\) I suggest that in fact Herodotus is referring to the whole enclosure and house\(^{362}\), and that the most important matter is that the house/enclosure was entirely destroyed by the lightning bolt. Rather than destroying the borders between Scythian and

later (Pg. 218) where he refers to ‘the god responsible for the destruction’ of Scyles’ palace. Hartog sees the lightning-bolt as an omen which emphasizes the importance of the initiation as the destruction of the borders between Greek and Scythian (Pg. 74), rather than as a negative sign from Dionysus that the initiation ought not to take place (Pg. 73): ‘On the “Greek side,” the solemnity of this initiation is indicated, in the narrative, by the intervention of the gods. To put it more clearly: the text appears to purvey two opposed points of view at the same time. On the one hand, this initiation is simply “the occasion, the pretext” for punishing Scyles, for whom “it had to be that evil should befall him” in any case; on the other, it is something solemn, since immediately before it the god sends an “extremely impressive omen [phasma megistos].”’ However, this opposition is resolved to the extent that the two expressions do not operate on the same level: the first is an interruption arranged by the narrator, made by the anonymous voice of destiny and tragedy: the second is an assertion, within the narrative, of the importance of the initiation.’ There need not be two opposing views if we consider the lightning-bolt as another sign that Scyles will be destroyed, since ‘it had to be that evil should befall him’. Hartog notes that (Pg. 80) ‘...Dionysus was considered to be outside the city itself, mention has often been made of the fact that even when the god has been adopted, he does not enter the town. When the places in which mysteries take place are mentioned, it is always a matter of a wild place in the agros; remember, too, that the people of Smyrna celebrate his festival “outside the walls [exo teicheos]” (Hdt. 1.150); and consider, finally, the name by which he is sometimes known, propoleos, “in front of the town”.’ He does not, however, seem to consider this wildness of Dionysus as inappropriate for Scyles to celebrate in the necessary confines of the city and as a reason for the disapproving lightning-bolt, even though he himself says that in Olbia ‘it must be admitted that here the initiation and procession take place inside the town’.

\(^{360}\) Hartog (1988: 73, n. 43). Hdt. 4.79: ‘es tauten seems to me to refer to the surrounding walls rather than the house itself.’


\(^{362}\) Considering his words in 4.78.5: ‘He used to do these things often, and he built himself a house in Borysthenes’ (ταῦτα ποιέεσκε πολλάκις καὶ οἰκία τε ἐδείματο ἐν Βορυσθένει...). This is the house (οἰκία) he refers to in 4.79.2 when he says: ‘In the city of the Borysthenites he had an enclosure of great, expensive house, the one I also made a mention of a short (while) before these (events), and both sphinxes and griffins of light-coloured stone stood around it; at this the god flung a bolt of lightning.’ (ἡν οἱ ἐν Βορυσθενείτέων τῇ πόλι οἰκίας μεγάλῆς καὶ πολυτελέος περιβολῆ, τῆς καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ πρότερον ταύτων μνήμην εἶχον, τὴν πέριξ λευκοῦ λίθου σφίγγες τε καὶ γρῦπες ἔστασαν ἐς ταύτην ὁ θεὸς ἐνέσκηψε βέλος.) While Herodotus may use the word περιβολῆ in the preceding clause, he refers back to the oἰκία as well in the next sentence, and while ἐς ταύτην may well refer to περιβολῆ, being the nearest noun in the nominative, there is at least as much evidence to suggest that Herodotus was referring back to the house, enclosure and all.
Greek\textsuperscript{363}, the destruction of the house/enclosure as a whole has a much more portentous meaning for Scyles. The consequent betrayal of Scyles means that Scyles is homeless.

Herodotus adds the rather incredulous comment ‘although the whole was burnt down, Scyles as far as this (was concerned) nonetheless celebrated the rites’ (καὶ ἡ μὲν κατεκάη πᾶσα, Σκύλης δὲ οὐδὲν τούτον εἶνεκα ἥσσον ἐπετέλεσε τὴν τελετήν, 4.79.2), signalling that Scyles was not wise to ignore the omen\textsuperscript{364}. Indeed, as Harrison points out, ‘the god responsible for the destruction of his palace appears to be of the same mind as the majority of the Scythians’ and takes an active role in discouraging Scyles from his course of action\textsuperscript{365}.

The lightning bolt begins the first climactic part of the story (4.79.1-5), which includes the revelation of Scyles’ initiation to the Scythians and the discussion of madness. The second climax comes in 4.80.5 where Scyles is caught, after fleeing, and is beheaded then and there by his own brother.

Herodotus now gives the specific reason why Scythians revile Bacchic frenzy in particular (4.79.3)\textsuperscript{366}: ‘...for they say that it is not sensible to seek out this god who incites people to go mad.’ (...οὐ γάρ φασι οἰκὸς εἶναι θεὸν ἐξευρίσκειν τοῦτον ὡς τις

\textsuperscript{363} Hartog (1988: 73-74): ‘Just as the thunderbolt, by destroying this wall, does away the separation between the spaces, so the initiation, for which he is preparing, in a sense abolishes the distance between Greek space and Scythian space...’

\textsuperscript{364} Munson (2001: 119-121) discusses the contrast between the sympathetic portrayal of Anacharsis and that of Scyles: ‘...rather than promoting sympathy for Scyles' piety, here the text sends negative signals. The narrative, for its part, reports a sign of divine disapproval...this power objects to an individual's asocial adoption of a religion not his own by nomos and repulsive to his people as a whole... Scyles lacks a good motive for his initiation and disregards a divine sign, and the Scythian criticism of Dionysus sounds reasonable even from a Greek point of view. All these factors force the listeners to blame Scyles as they would not have blamed Anacharsis.’ Hohti (1975: 34) agrees on the negative construction of the lightning bolt and Scyles’ actions (‘Gerade im Moment der Weihe sendet Zeus einen Blitzstrahl, der sein Haus verbrennt, Skyles aber kümmert sich nicht um dieses Zeichen. Hier ist also festgestellt, was Skyles tat und es ist mit dem Wunderzeichen negativ gefärbt’). Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 56) think both logoi are ‘tragic tales’ and that the secret cults appear in an unfavourable light (Durch diese tragischen Geschichten geraten auch die ekstatischen Geheimkulte selbst in ein Zwielicht (IV 76-80)).

\textsuperscript{365} Harrison (2000: 218). Whereas Hartog (1988: 63) believes that Dionysus and the Mother of the Gods in these episodes are ‘simply the mute object[s] of a cult: the narrative does not tell us whether or not these deities appreciate the cult of their new devotees.’ This view is only possible if one assumes Dionysus is not the author of the lightning-bolt, otherwise it is turned completely on its head.

\textsuperscript{366} Hartog (1988: 83, n. 90): ‘Hdt. 4.79: “they say that it is not reasonable to set up a god who leads men on to madness.” So this is clearly an intervention on the part of the author.’ Bichler and Rollinger (2000: 56) call this statement ‘a bit of cult-criticism in the tradition of a Heraclitus’ (ein Stück Kultkritik in der Tradition eines Heraklit an (Fragment B 14 Diels-Kranz)).
The Scythians call Bacchic frenzy ‘madness’; Herodotus made it clear that they consider there to be no difference between the ‘Bacchic frenzy’ he discusses (τοῦ βακχεύειν, 4.79.3) and the ‘madness’ (μαίνεσθαι). This equation highlights their wish to remain aloof from such customs. If they have this rite in especial distaste, as we are told, then the discovery of their king practising it will be all the more shocking; this is exactly what occurs.

A Borysthenite, for the sole purpose (seemingly) of sneering at the Scythians who have sneered at their custom, reveals Scyles’ activities (4.79.4), and by doing so provides impetus for the action that follows:\(^{367}\): “You jeer at us, Scythians, because we go into Bacchic frenzy and the god seizes us; now this divine force has seized even your king, and he is both in Bacchic frenzy and is made mad by the god...” (ἡμῖν γὰρ καταγελᾶτε, ὦ Σκύθαι, ὅτι βακχεύομεν καὶ ἡμέας ὁ θεὸς λαμβάνει· νῦν οὕτως ὁ δαίμων καὶ τὸν υμέτερον βασιλέα λελάβηκε, καὶ βακχεύει τε καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ μαίνεται.) Both the Anacharsis and the Scyles logos have the motif of sudden discovery by someone. This person, so insignificant in terms of identity, is vastly important in terms of the action, because they are the means of discovery and thereby destruction. They signify, in their way, the unwelcome unexpected event on which life hangs. Hartog comments that ‘Through the metaphor of looking, the narrative conveys the spatial ambiguity of the Hylaia and Olbia: even when you are screened by the forest or the fortifications, a look, whether a chance one or one with intent to harm, may at any time discover you.’\(^{368}\): Both Anacharsis’ and Scyles’ sincere attempts to hide their activities become useless in the light of one person’s fatal observation. Scyles’ logos has

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\(^{367}\) Lang, (1984: 80). See also Pg. 82, Table 1, on motivating speeches. Both Lang and Hohti (1976: 37) note the causative nature of this speech, as does Beck (1971: 22); she compares this section 1.74.2-3, where an eclipse loses its factual worth and becomes a means of motivating the reaction of the people involved (Die Sonnenfinsternis hat damit ihren objektiven Tatsachenwert verloren und wird zum Mittel, das die Reaktion der Beteiligten motiviert. Herodot selbst ist der Beteiligte II 156, wo er die Wirkung, die die swimminge Insel auf ihn hatte, beschreibt. n. 65, Pg. 104, Ähnlich...IV 79 4-5...)

\(^{368}\) Hartog (1988: 69).
this additional irony, that despite his protection against the Scythians, the betrayal comes from inside, from a Borysthenite.\footnote{\textsuperscript{369}}

The Borysthenite seems to miscalculate slightly the way Scythians feel about the rite: he thinks they have a laugh (καταγελᾶτε) at the Greeks’ expense, as a sign of their contempt\footnote{\textsuperscript{370}}, whereas they are said by Herodotus to revile (ὀνειδίζουσι) the custom. Contempt is not quite the same as disgust. He emphasizes that for all their scorn, their very own king is affected, and repeats the word used by the Scythians just prior to this incident as a way of needling them. The double use in his speech of βακχεύει τε και...μαίνεται may be little more than giving the Greek view of the rite (βακχεύει) along with the Scythian (μαίνεται); but since two words describing madness are used relatively often in the \textit{Histories}\footnote{\textsuperscript{371}}, their use here is not necessarily of singular importance. Hartog suggests that ‘...when the Borysthenite seeks [the Scythians] out, he pretends to speak their language, as an expression of his scorn for them: he repeats the words that Herodotus ascribes to the Scythians in explanation of their conduct, and even goes so far as to refer to Dionysus as a \textit{daimon}’.\footnote{\textsuperscript{372}} He goes on to comment that the Scythians ‘do not differentiate between, for example, feathers and snow, and call what they should call snow feathers, just because snowflakes “resemble” feathers; similarly, they cannot distinguish between being afflicted with mania and being a Bacchant,'
because the two appear to be one and the same thing.\textsuperscript{373} Although I agree that ‘...mania is...different from Bakcheuein (sic)\textsuperscript{374} I question whether the emphasis of the speech is on pretending to speak someone’s language; the choice of μαίνεται is surely not just a reference to the Scythians’ disgust for Dionysus but a deliberate use of the word designed to irritate the Scythians the most. Similarly, since it does not matter what words the Borysthenite uses because the Scythians cannot differentiate between them, the double use of βακχεύει as well as μαίνεται is simply emphatic, to aggravate the Scythian listeners a little further.

So μαίνομαι is used here by Herodotus to emphasize several points: the schadenfreude of the Borysthenite, who chooses the words especially designed to hit a sore spot; the complete eschewing of this custom in particular by the Scythians, which was mentioned previously, echoes here with the attendant horror the Scythians feel. Besides, this is their king, not (as Anacharsis was) the king’s brother, so the infraction is even more serious. The whole scene sets up the ensuing action of Scyles’ vain attempts to flee and his prompt decapitation as soon he falls into Scythian hands.

Whether the Borysthenite really means anything by calling Dionysus a \textit{daimon} is also debatable. While Hartog connects the use with the scornful ‘repeating’ of the Scythian theory about Dionysus\textsuperscript{375}, Harrison notes that ‘Herodotus uses \textit{‘daimon’} for the most part interchangeably with ‘god’’, as indeed the Borysthenite does in his speech.\textsuperscript{376} He does go on to say, however, that \textit{daimon} may have ‘pejorative overtones’ and the Borysthenite ‘possibly switches from describing Dionysus as a god to describing him as a daimon in order to remind the Scythians sarcastically of their low estimation of the god (4.79.3).\textsuperscript{377}

\textsuperscript{373} Hartog, (1988: 84).
\textsuperscript{374} Hartog, (1988: 83).
\textsuperscript{375} Hartog, (1988: 83), ‘he repeats the words that Herodotus ascribes to the Scythians in explanation of their conduct, and even goes so far as to refer to Dionysus as a \textit{daimon}.’
\textsuperscript{376} Harrison (2000: 164). See n. 24 for Harrison’s study.
\textsuperscript{377} Harrison (2000: 166-167).
The horror the Scythians conceived at seeing Scyles acting in this way was such that they organised his brother, Octamasades, to rebel against Scyles’ rule (4.80.1). Scyles fled to Thrace (4.80.2, his mother’s homeland), and Octamasades marched against it. At the Ister (4.80.3-4) he and the Thracian leader, Sitacles, arranged to swap Scyles for his brother (also Octamasades’ uncle) rather than go to war. This was accomplished (4.80.5), ‘and Sitacles after taking charge of his brother took him away with him, but Octamasades cut off Scyles’ head right there. In this way the Scythians

Munson (2001: 121) with regard to the Scythians in the narrative at this juncture: ‘It represents the humiliating mockery to which they are subjected by a foreigner (4.79.4), the grief they experience in the face of their own king's display of madness (συμφορήν μεγάλην ἐποίησαντο, 4.79.5)...’ This causes an empathic reaction to the Scythians which would not be felt with the logos of Anacharsis: ‘By the time the characteristic ferocity of the Scythians even against family members is fully brought back to the fore with Scyles’ decapitation, the Scythians have emerged almost as a civilized and earnest community, concerned with preserving (περιστέλλειν) their order and integrity.’ Scyles’ actions demonstrate (Pg. 122) a ‘transition from nomadic king to Greek polites’ which is ‘made to resemble a climb to despotic rule in the monarchical pattern of the history’. Hartog’s sympathies lie more with Scyles (Pg. 67): ‘As in the case of Anacharsis, Scyles’s piety occasions his death, for what is piety for the Greeks is the height of impiety for the Scythians.’

I would like to make something of the use of the verb σημαίνω. It may not have any special connotations; it can just mean ‘tell’. It is, however, used both at 4.79.5 for how the Scythians make Scyles’ deeds known to others, and also at 4.76.5 for how the Scythian who sees Anacharsis makes his deeds known to Saulios. It is tempting to consider the meaning in this narrative as ‘sign/indicate’ rather than ‘tell’, because (especially in the Scyles tale) the people who are given speeches are Greeks; because there is no argument or justification offered by the perpetrators, nor is there any chance for explanation offered by their executioners. A Scythian who adopts Greek custom may have no justification, and their discovery and execution take place in a disapproving silence. In the Scyles tale there could be another shade of meaning to this silence: The shock of seeing Scyles in Bacchic frenzy renders the Scythians mute. The pre-eminent men of the Scythians secretly observe Scyles in the Dionysiac procession and ‘they considered it a very great catastrophe, and after going out they indicated to the whole army what they had seen.’ (κάρτα συμφορήν μεγάλην ἐποίησαντο, ἐξελθόντες δὲ σημαίνον πάσῃ τῇ στρατιᾷ τὰ ἰδοὺν.) From the speech of the Borysthenite (4.79.4) and the Thracian king (4.80.3) to the beheading of Scyles, no Scythian speaks. The two times indirect ‘speech’ is suggested, in 4.79.5 and 4.80.4, the verbs offer ambiguity as to whether actual speech was employed: the first example being ἐσήμαινον, as discussed, and the second being ‘and Octamasades agreed to these (conditions)’ (ὁ δὲ Ὀκταμαςάδης καταίνει εἰς ταύτα). Agreement may not necessarily be verbal. In other places ‘commands’ are given though signs of various sorts (see 1.116.4, Astyages threatens Mitradates and at the same time (άμω) signals for the guards to seize him ; 4.113.2, an Amazon ‘talks’ with her hands because she can’t speak the language; 5.35.2-3, the tattoos on the head ‘signal’ what Aristagoras should do ). However σημαίνω is used as a verb of saying in 4.127.2 and 9.42.4 for instance. Obviously some ambiguity exists around the verb, which Herodotus may be playing with in the Anacharsis and Scyles logos. Scythians indicate a lack of verbosity at other points, as in 4.131.1-2; from 4.120.1-125.6 they avoid contact with the Persians for a long time before having to talk to them; on the whole they appear to prefer action to dialogue. This is perhaps why the joke can be made that Anacharsis got on well with the Spartans (4.77.1-2), who inspire the word ‘laconic’. For other views see Hartog (1988: 71 ) and Benardete (1969: 119-120).
maintain their customs, but they give this sort of reward to those who appropriate extra foreign customs.’ (καὶ Σιτάλκης μὲν παραλαβὼν τὸν ἀδελφεὸν ἀπήγετο, Σκύλεω δὲ ὁκταμασάδης αὐτοῦ ταύτῃ ἀπέταμε τὴν κεφαλὴν. οὕτω μὲν περιστέλλουσι τὰ σφέτερα νόμαια Σκύθαι, τοῖσι δὲ παρακτωμένοισι ξεινικοὺς νόμους τοιαύτα ἐπιτίμια διδοῦσι.) The murdering of Anacharsis and Scyles by their own brothers shows that Scythian nomos wins out even over blood ties. Anacharsis is so summarily shot that he seems not to have glimpsed his killer.

Once Scyles is made homeless the two sides of his life cannot be reconciled. He tries to go back to his haunts (the ἤθεα in Scythia) but discovers that his brother has been instated instead; he flees to Thrace but is handed over to the Scythians at the nearest opportunity. Neither the Scythians nor the Greeks want Scyles. While the Greeks are not going to kill Scyles, the Scythians have a more drastic measure to deal with a man who adopts other customs, and so he is beheaded (rather symbolically) at the border of Thrace and Scythia, in between Greeks and Scythians but a part of neither, wanted and claimed by neither despite his heritage.

In the context of this narrative, madness is a bad thing (as opposed to the more noble madness of Charileōs in the preceding Samian logos), and madness is used as an indication of the revulsion the Scythians have for the religious rite of Dionysus, thus making their horror all the more clear when they discover their own king participating in these very rites. The whole theme of the two episodes of Anacharsis and Scyles is that of the Scythians’ distaste for other customs, particularly Greek, and how they treat those who adopt them.

380 Hartog (1988: 74) thinks that the brothers in both cases ‘are the closer relatives to Anacharsis and Scyles respectively, and they are also their doubles. But these are the doubles that represent the good side. In contrast to their brothers, they remained totally faithful to the Scythian nomoi, and it is consequently they who are most appalled by the transgression. They are without doubt the best qualified to punish and eliminate the guilty ones…’ I consider their blood relation as a device to emphasise the extreme dislike for those who adopt other nomoi. Hartog’s point is also somewhat nullified if Munson (2001: 118-121) is consulted ‘…the Scythians’ dislike of foreign nomoi manifests itself in the summary violence that characterizes their culture as a whole. The two narratives that show this ferocious protectionism differ, however, in one important respect: the story of Anacharsis promotes identification with the victim; that of Scyles, with the Scythians.’ If we identify with Anacharsis, it is harder to perceive his murderer as ‘good’.

381 As I take from Herodotus’ statement of 4.76.6, ἱστω ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδελφεοῦ ἀποθανόν. Ἰδάνθυρσος γὰρ ἦν παῖς Σαυλίου…For another view see Benardete (1969: 120). ‘Herodotus’ fear of forgetfulness applies even to the dead; he reminds Anacharsis of who killed him: “Let him know that he died at the hands of his brother.” Even in Hades, it would seem, a Scythian might forget his own murderer (cf. 46.1).’
who adopt such customs; the madness of the second tale is used to build on the first tale and thereby to emphasise this theme.

**Madness in Context: Greeks in Aegina (5.85.2)**

In 5.85.1, an Athenian trireme is sent to Aegina to retrieve two stolen statues. The narrative must be taken back to 5.82.1-3, however, where the origins of these statues are discussed. The Epidaurians consult the Pythia on how to get their land to produce, and she tells them to set up statues of Damia and Auxesia (who are otherwise undescribed) and the land will prosper. The statues are to be made of olive wood, which necessitates obtaining wood from the Athenians. The Athenians agree to let them have the wood if in return the Epidaurians agree to present offerings to Athena Polias and Erechtheus each year.

Later the Aeginetans revolt (5.83.1-3) from the Epidaurians, make off with these statues and establish the same worship as had been the custom at Epidauros. The Epidaurians (5.84.1-2) took this opportunity to stop fulfilling the agreed conditions with Athens, and when the Athenians complained, replied that when the statues had been with them, they had fulfilled their obligations, but as the Aeginetans now had the statues, the Athenians should exact payment from them. The Athenians sent to Aegina and demanded the statues back, but the Aeginetans told them that it was none of their business.

The Athenians (according to the Athenians, 5.85.1) then sent a trireme to Aegina, and proceeded to try to forcibly remove the statues, first by tearing them off the pedestals, and when this did not work (5.85.2), by throwing ropes around the statues to pull them off. At this point ‘both a thunderclap and an earthquake at the same time as the thunderclap then occurred for them as they dragged; but the trireme-crew who were

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382 Beck (1971:12-13) gives the passages from 5.85.1-87.1 as examples (n. 39, n. 43) where the ‘finishing formula’ of the first version is ‘allied’ with the ‘introduction formula’ of the second version, which is itself ‘allied’ with the third section (5.87.1). This section in turn ‘has no actual finishing sentence, but rather only a general finishing sentence’ (so hat das letzte keinen eigenen Schlußsatz, sondern nur einen allgemeinen Schlußsatz ) which closes off the foregoing links and reaches back to the first introduction sentence.
dragging went out of their minds because of these things, and while suffering this they killed each other as if (they were) enemies, until out of everyone one man was left remaining, who went back to Phalerum. (σφι ἐλκουσι βροντήν τε καὶ ἁμα τῇ βροντῇ σεισμόν ἑπιγενέσθαι· τοὺς δὲ τριηρίτας τοὺς ἐλκοντας ὑπὸ τούτων ἀλλοφρονήσαι, παθόντας δὲ τούτο κτείνειν ἀλλήλους ἀτε πολεμίους, ἐς ὦ ἐκ πάντων ἕνα λειψθέντα ἀνακομισθῆναι αὐτὸν ἐς Φάληρον.)

The divine phenomena occur while the Athenians are dragging at the statues with ropes. The reason for its occurring at that point may be because the statues were in danger of being removed (a point made clearer in 5.86.3). While the statues apparently resist the attempts to remove them from their bases, the dragging method would appear to be more successful: the Athenians were in the act of dragging when the phenomena occurred.

Despite the superficial similarities between this and the Scyles logos, the divine signs have different functions, just as the madness does. The lightning bolt which destroys Scyles’ house (4.79.2) is specific to his house and is a warning, signalling his eventual destruction, before the event of the initiation; his ‘madness’ is in the mouth of his betrayer. The thunder and earthquake, on the other hand, signal and provoke the immediate destruction of a specific group of people, although not everyone who hears the thunder and feels the earthquake goes mad (if we assume, logically, that the island was inhabited); Herodotus makes it clear that the madness affected only those who were dragging the statues, not everyone who was nearby. Harrison notes that the ‘implication of some significance to natural phenomena is so often no more than a matter of narrative timing’; the thunder and earthquake serve as ‘some divine drum roll’, as well as, in this case alone, being the source of the madness, which is evident from the phrase ‘they went out of their mind because of these things’ (ὑπὸ τούτων ἀλλοφρονήσαι), referring back to the thunder and earthquake. Furthermore, the Athenians are telling this story about themselves. As they will naturally wish to put their actions in the matter in the best

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383 Thomas (2000: 30) lists this in n. 2 as another example of mental disorder but does not otherwise comment on the passage.

possible light, the madness will have to be used for some other reason than purely for the sake of derision.

The verb used of the madness of the Athenians is ἀλλοφρονέω, ‘to be, or to become differently minded’. There are only two instances of the verb in the Histories, here and in 7.205.3, where it describes the mind-set of the Thebans whom Leonidas recruits. Even so, there are differences in each contextual use: the Thebans at 7.205.3 send troops to aid Leonidas ‘although they had other plans/thought differently’ (ἀλλὰ φονέοντες), and these ‘different plans/thoughts’ are made clear later when the Thebans are said to be reluctant to fight but are forced into it, and then finally hand themselves over to the Persians when they see that the Persians have the upper hand. This is not entirely surprising, since Herodotus lists the Thebans as being among those who gave earth and water to Xerxes (7.132.1), but the description of them as ἄλλα φονέοντες is used to foreshadow their betrayal of the Greek cause and at the same time reminds the reader/audience of their own interests. In the logos of the statues, on the other hand, while the Athenians do ‘betray’ each other in one sense, the betrayal is instantaneous, therefore unpresmeditated; the madness is imposed upon them, rather than being of their own thought processes; they ‘suffer’ (παθόντας), a phrase reminiscent of the vocabulary of sickness (and through this, madness), and the phrase ‘they killed each other as if (they were) enemies’ (κτείνειν ἀλλήλους ἀτε πολεμίους) qualifies the particular manifestation of their ‘other mindedness’, illustrating the involuntary but indiscriminately destructive nature of their madness. There is also the distinction that the Thebans were already untrustworthy, but there was no reason for the Athenians to suspect treachery in any of the crew, who up to that point had been completely cooperative in their efforts to remove the statues.

The Aeginetan version (5.86.1) is that the Athenians did not bring merely a single ship but many, whereupon the Aeginetans waived any attempt at a sea battle (5.86.1-2) in

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385 How and Wells (1967: Vol. II, 47, s.v. 85) note various other uses of ἀλλοφρονέω. See also Chapter 3, ἀλλοφρονέω in Homer.
386 7.222.1, 7.225.2 and in particular 7.233.1-2.
order to wait for their Argive allies to arrive (5.86.4)\textsuperscript{387}. In the meantime (5.86.3), the Athenians tried to remove the statues with ropes (as in the Athenian version), which caused the statues to fall to their knees\textsuperscript{388}. At this point the Argives arrived (5.86.4), the Athenians were slaughtered and the thunderclap and earthquake occurred. There is no mention in this version of madness.

It is clear from the phenomena of the thunderclap and earthquake that the Athenians were transgressing religious bounds by trying to remove the statues, and their going mad is the third sign to confirm their transgressing if there were any remaining doubt. Although their madness exhibits a self-destructiveness which is similar to other (alleged) battle madesses in the \textit{Histories}, this madness does not involve a true enemy, but rather causes mistakes to be made over the identity of ones fellow crew members.

This symptom of mistaking one’s compatriots for one’s enemies is not a common symptom of madness in other parts of Herodotus, although when Cambyses kills his own brother, sister-wife and countrymen (3.30.3, 3.32.3-4, 3.35.5) and Cleomenes starts shoving his sceptre into the faces of Spartiates (6.75.1) there is a similarity between the

\textsuperscript{387} Virgilio (1975: 107) makes no comment on the matter of the madness, but is concerned with whether the Argives were allied with Aegina or their mercenaries (gli Argivi furono alleati di Egina o suoi mercenari?).

\textsuperscript{388} Fehling (1989: 106-107) considers that the two versions in this \textit{logos} demonstrate ‘party bias’, which is correct. He does find that 5.85-7 is a ‘less clear’ example of the principle of the two-version \textit{logos} offering the original and then the rationalised version of a miracle (Pgs. 109-111), which he seems to suspect of fictitiousness simply because there are two versions. He notes that ‘Each of the two versions contains a miracle of its own, and the miracle in the rival version is in one case ignored and in the other case rationalised’; the first miracle is offered, I would suggest; ‘ignored’ is not a suitable description. He notes the lack ‘expression of approval’ in this case for the superiority of the ‘realistic’ version (Pg. 112), and comments that ‘the reasons are obvious’. The obvious reasons being, I imagine, the painful siding with the Aeginetans/Argives. Harrison (2000: 26) argues persuasively to the contrary, that where alternative versions are concerned ‘in the absence of any similar expression of preference...we may not presume to know either which version Herodotus would have preferred or indeed that he would have preferred any’ and that (Pg. 30) ‘Even presuming that alternative versions do reflect a degree of distance or reserve, to prove that there is any correlation between such strategies and the presence of supernatural explanations is, at very least, a difficult proposition.’ Herodotus may not side with either the Aeginetans/Argives or the Athenians, he is simply presenting two sides of the story. The fact that he doesn’t necessarily believe the part where the statues fall to their knees doesn’t mean that he doesn’t believe supernatural explanations, because, after all, he says nothing about the supernatural madness. Bornitz (1967: 84 ) comments, ‘Herodot läßt so die Entscheidung, ob es das Eingreifen einer Gottheit...oder ob es das Eingreifen der Argeier gewesen, das zum Untergang der Athener führte, zunächst offen.’ (Herodotus leaves the decision open for the time being, whether the intervention was of a divinity...or whether it was the intervention of the Argives, which resulted in the destruction of the Athenians.) This is true enough, as far as it goes, but both interventions have an element of the supernatural about them, even if we discount the statues falling to their knees; the phenomena lend a divine justice to the Aeginetan/Argive sally.
situations. Cambyses and Cleomenes are mad *individuals*, however, and mass madness and mass mistaking of friends for enemies has had very little precedent in the *Histories*. In fact to find a similar situation we have to turn to tragedy, where Ajax thinks he is killing the Argives, rather than the captured sheep and cattle, the Bacchae tear humans apart, thinking that they are animals, and Heracles kills his family, thinking that they are the enemy. Even then, both Ajax and Heracles are individuals; the Bacchae are the only ones to display group madness of this sort.

In the Athenian version, the use of madness lends a somewhat defensive ring to the *logos*. Considering that the Aeginetan/Argive version has the Athenians annihilated by the cunning and preparation of the thoughtful Aeginetans/Argives, the Athenian version saves face somewhat by claiming it was the gods who caused the destruction. Herodotus goes on to point out this difference between the two versions himself, saying in 5.87.1-2: ‘So these things are said then by the Argives and the Aeginetans, and they agree also (with the things said) by the Athenians that only one of them came home safe to Attica; but the Argives say that when they themselves destroyed the Attic army this one man survived, but the Athenians (say that) when the divine being/nature (destroyed the Attic army this one man survived)’. (λέγεται μὲν νῦν ὑπ' Ἀργείων τε καὶ Ἀιγινητέων τάδε, ὁμολογεῖται δὲ καὶ ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων, ἕνα μοῦν τὸν ἀποσωθέντα αὐτῶν ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν γενέσθαι· πλὴν Ἀργείοι μὲν λέγουσι αὐτῶν τὸ Αττικὸν στρατόπεδον διαφθειράντων τὸν ἑνα τοῦτον περιγενέσθαι, Ἀθηναίοι δὲ τοῦ δαίμονίου.)

By their version, the Athenians may lay claim that it was not a rout by the Argives and Aeginetans at all, but a divine occurrence, madness, which wiped out the crew of the one trireme they sent, hardly an army of triremes. This explanation makes the destruction almost acceptable, in that humans against gods are never good odds, that it (almost) might happen to anyone and that there is no way to fight against the will of the gods. Furthermore, all the crew are dead, so that if they did wrong in sending the trireme,

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390 Linforth (1928: 236-237) considers that ‘τοῦ δαίμονίου may be the power which caused the thunder and earthquake, or it may be the thunder and earthquake themselves as phenomena caused by divine agency’.
then they have surely received their punishment. This repentant-sinner pose may not recover the title of ‘noble’ for the Athenians, but there are worse alternatives which would necessitate agreeing with the enemy to some degree: either that they had sent just the one trireme, but their lack of preparation combined with the preparation of the Aeginetans/Argives caused the deaths of the crew\(^\text{391}\), or that they had indeed sent many triremes with a sea battle in mind but again, due to the cunning of the enemy, had been destroyed on land, in the middle of their task. Neither of these alternatives show the Athenians in a good light. The Aeginetans and Argives, in their version, get to claim that their falling on the Athenian crew was also a divine act, or at least divinely supported by the thunderclap and earthquake which confirm ‘the justice of their deaths’\(^\text{392}\).

The difference between the two versions is interesting, because the madness occurs only in one version. Its function in this context is to explain the unforeseen destruction of the crew while saving as much face as possible. Madness here is used as sickness is used in other parts of the *Histories*, with explanatory force.

Another aspect of the use of madness in the Athenian version may be to cast aspersions on the Aeginetans for not protecting their statues well enough. Since the islanders weren’t coming to the rescue, the statues, or a divinity working on their behalf, would appear to have activated a type of (inbuilt or otherwise) self-protective alarm in the from of madness-causing thunder and an earthquake. In the Aeginetan/Argive version, they themselves are the heroes who arrive on the scene in time to save the statues, acting as the instruments of the divinities and providing the needed protection for the statues – hence the thunderclap and earthquake in their version when they come on the scene, and hence also the lack of need for the statues or gods to initiate madness. 

Finally, there is the question of the statues falling to their knees in the Aeginetan/Argive story (5.86.3). Although Herodotus admits that he doesn’t believe the story (ἐμοὶ μὲν σὺ πιστὰ λέγοντες), this version does illustrate a point which is glossed over in the Athenian version, that the statues were in some sort of danger; whether of being broken or simply taken from their place. The action of falling to one’s knees is indicative of weakness, given that knees were considered to be the seat of

\(^{391}\) Bornitz (1967: 84) calls them ‘careless Athenians’ (sorglosen Athener) with reason.

strength\textsuperscript{393}, and given the many examples in Homer alone where knees are mentioned as either a source of strength or, conversely, that strength goes out of them\textsuperscript{394}. The statues are not acting as suppliants, despite sharing the aspect of kneeling; such submission would be extremely uncharacteristic\textsuperscript{395}.

The Athenians, in this version, seem on the other hand to be performing a perverse form of supplication themselves. The ropes they attach to the statues could well stand in for the ‘ritual significance of physical contact’ Gould stresses is necessary in such situations\textsuperscript{396}. He discusses the connection of the account in the Histories 1.26.2, where the Ephesians dedicate their city to Artemis by attaching a rope from her temple to the city wall, with the account in Plutarch\textsuperscript{397} of how those who conspired with Kulôn attached a spun thread (κρόκην κλωστὴν) to the ἑδος, the seated statue of the goddess, to maintain their supplicatory position as they proceeded down to trial. The thread broke on their way down, whereupon Megacles (who had persuaded them to come down from the temple) and the other archons considered the supplication annulled and had the majority of the conspirators killed. As Gould points out, the account, ‘whether historically accurate or not, preserves an essential element in the ritual’ by keeping the physical contact between the suppliants and the supplicated\textsuperscript{398}. Just as importantly, the episode in 1.26.2 gives us a precedent in the Histories themselves with which to compare the logos of the statues, so that the ropes around the statues may echo the idea of the city dedicated to Artemis by the use of ropes. In this instance however, the Athenians are not suppliants, but transgressors of religious νόμος, and the statues are the ones in need of assistance, divine or otherwise. Thus the Athenians appear to be performing what looks

\textsuperscript{393} And regeneration also; see Onians (1954: 174-193).
\textsuperscript{394} For example, Iliad 17.386; 21.114, 425; Odyssey 4.703; 5.297, 406; 22.68, 147; 23.205; 24.345.
Onians also associates γύια, limbs, with the knees and strength (1954: 187), and this makes a logical progression to the consideration of the many times in Homer where people die or are weakened because their limbs are ‘loosened’, or show weakness by the shaking of their limbs; for example in the Iliad alone: 4.469; 5.811; 6.27; 7.12, 16, 215; 8.452; 10.95, 390; 11.240, 260; 13.85, 435, 512; 14.506; 15.435, 581; 16.312, 341, 400, 465, 805; 17.524; 18.31; 19.165-166 especially; 20.44; 21.406; 22.448; 23.63, 627, 691, 726; 24.170.
\textsuperscript{395} See Gould (1973: 74-103), particularly Pgs. 76-77 and 94-97 on the need for physical contact, an aspect which will be discussed presently.
\textsuperscript{396} Gould, (1973: 78).
\textsuperscript{397} Plutarch, Solon, 12.1.
\textsuperscript{398} Gould, (1973: 78).
like the ‘rope supplication’ but in reverse. Whether the statues fall to their knees or not, the act is still reprehensible, and both *logoi* seem to indicate that their annihilation was their due, whether by madness or the agency of the Aeginetans and Argives.

**Madness in Context: Ionians (6.12.3)**

The Ionians call themselves mad when they have been practising manoeuvres, according to their agreement, for seven days under the direction of Dionysius of Phocis (6.12.1-2). Dionysius had persuaded them to this course of action (6.11.2-3) on the grounds that if they wanted to be free of Persia, they would have to put in work now for the long-term benefit, whereas if they did nothing they would be punished by the Persians anyway because of their insurrection. The Ionians manage for a week under his command, but

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399 Fehling (1989: 225) thinks that the number seven, ‘particularly common in fabulous and novelistic contexts’ is ‘suspicious’ in this historical *logos*; the use of the number seven need not be fabulous here, but simply an indication of the short amount of time for which the Ionians are capable of working, as Masaracchia emphasises (1976: 36): ‘The Ionians, however, endure the harsh discipline of Dionysios only (my italics) for seven days’ (Gli Ioni però resistono solo per sette giorni alla dura disciplina di Dionisio). Scott (2005: 102) also notes the convention of using the number seven and says that even if it is not precise, it reflects that they trained for several days.

400 Hohti (1976: 47) notes that Dionysios’ argument ‘continues the theme of the previous speech: slavery. The antithesis is now freedom’. In the Ionians’ later speech, ‘the theme of slavery re-appears with a new antithesis: it is opposed to slavery brought about by Dionysios. The Ionians decide to choose the slavery which the Persians would inflict on them.’ He also points out (Pg. 122) that these two speeches are ‘the only cases were Herodotus gives us the speech that gains acceptance, while the cases where the opposing speech is emphasized are more numerous’. The two speeches are similar to ‘one speech sections’, in which (Pg. 89) ‘they may give the cause behind the action, which in turn may be the first link in the chain of events. Secondly, they indicate the cause as created by the intentions of the persons involved in the actions…the speakers indicate to the listener what in his opinion the latter should do…A speech including a plan precedes the action, where the plan is later implemented.’ Masaracchia (1976: 22-23) also notes this speech as ‘the most solemn and clearest affirmation of liberty as the objective of the revolt’ (La più solenne e più netta affermazione della libertà come obiettivo della rivolta), with ‘the clear identification of the ethical-political purpose with the useful: fighting for liberty is, for the Ionians, now the only means of avoiding the punishment of the king ’ (la chiara identificazione del fine [purpose] etico-politico con l’utile: lottare per le libertà è per gli Ioni ormai l’unico mezzo per evitare la punizione del re). Lang (1984: 58) also gives 6.11.2 as an example (n.8) of a speech which presents alternatives in order to ‘give fair warning of disaster if one of the two is chosen’. She discusses (Pg. 63) Dionysios’ use of the maxim ἐπὶ ξυροῦ...ἀκμῆς...ἔχεται ἡ πρόμαχος as well, which, like other Herodotean maxims, is ‘concerned with the uncertainty or instability of the human condition’.
then start to complain (6.12.3)\textsuperscript{401}: ‘Are we enduring these evils because we have offended one of the gods?’\textsuperscript{402} Because we were deranged and had sailed clean out of our minds to have handed ourselves over to a boastful Phocean man, who provided three ships; since he took us over he mistreats us with incurable indignities, and in fact many of us have fallen sick, and many others would appear likely to suffer the same thing; instead of these evils (it is) preferable for us to suffer even anything else, even to endure/wait around for the impending slavery which will occur, rather than to be tangled up with this present (slavery).’ (τίνα δαιμόνων παραβάντες τάδε ἀναπίπταμεν; οἵτινες παραφρονήσαντες καὶ ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου ἀνδρὶ Φωκαιὲ ἀλαζόνι, παρεξεχομένῳ νέᾳ τρεῖς, ἐπιτρέψαντες ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἐχομεν; ὁ δὲ παραλαβὼν ἡμέας λυμαίνεται λύμῃσι ἀνηκέστοις· καὶ δὴ πολλοὶ μὲν ἡμέων ἐς νούσους πεπτώκασι, πολλοὶ δὲ ἐπίδοξοι τῶν τὸ τοῦτο πείσεσθαί. πρὸ τε τούτων τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν γε κρέσσον καὶ ὁ τι ἄλλο παθέων ἐστι, καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν δουληίην υπομεῖναι, ἢτις ἐσται, μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ παρεούσῃ συνέχεσθαι.) Just as Dionysios’ speech motivated the Ionians to action, so this speech motivates them to stop the action of training\textsuperscript{403}.

The emphasis of the narrative starting from 6.6.1 is on the consequences of the Ionian uprising, the decision to fight the Persians and the raising of an Ionian fleet. Lang comments on the speech at 6.9.3-4\textsuperscript{404}, which ‘introduces the Ionians refusal to listen to the tyrants and their persistence in the revolt. And that persistence is exemplified in the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{401} Beck (1971: 11) gives 6.12.3 as an example (n. 37) of a change in direction framed by introducing and closing formulae which are very like each other and indicate an enclosed unity. Beck comments that these framing formulae ‘seem particularly common in the speeches, but also with oracles and inscriptions’ (Sie erscheinen besonders häufig in den Reden, aber auch bei Orakeln und Inschriften.)
\item\textsuperscript{402} As Harrison (2000: 169, n. 42) says, ‘their question is surely rhetorical’. That they would even ask the question seems to build again on their portrayal as weak and apathetic; they are unable to take responsibility for their own decision to practice the manoeuvres, blaming first the god and then their ‘madness’. Lang (1984: 42) gives this as a parallel to rhetorical questions in Homer, which ‘focus attention on the speaker’s argument… Most come at the beginning of the particular speech to introduce the argument’.
\item\textsuperscript{403} See Lang (1984: 82, Table 1).
\item\textsuperscript{404} Lang, (1984: 56-57).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
story of the Phocaean general’s insistence on their training for battle for long hours under the hot sun...when all of them rebelled against this toil, some were ready to listen to their deposed tyrants and abandon the revolt.’ She considers that the first alternative predicts the future defection of the Samians and the failure of the revolt, ‘while the second alternative introduces a near-distance example of Ionian persistence that, by a kind of backfire, is the apparent cause of abandoning the revolt. This is narrative prestidigitation by which the illusion of historical causation is achieved through what is chiefly a convenient and patterned form of transition.’ The events of 6.12.1-4 are the first rumblings not merely of discontent but of the failure that is to come: by 6.18.1 the Persians have soundly defeated the few exceptions of bravery in the Ionian fleet.

In this context, the ‘madness’ of the Ionians is not of primary interest in the narrative. What is of interest is the way madness supports the theme of the narrative. It may or may not be significant that the ‘violent madness’ verb μαίνομαι is not used here; rather the verb associated with wandery delirium, παραφρονέω. This is followed by ἐκπλέω, a pun on the Ionians’ activities (διέκπλοος, 6.12.1), and also not a particularly violent verb, if active. It is ironic to note that even in ‘madness’ the Ionians lack spirit, and this is very likely a deliberate construction on Herodotus’ part. The pun about ‘sailing out of their minds’ is another example of the way Herodotus adapts even a metaphor for madness to suit the context of any narrative in which he uses the concept.

The ‘madness’ of the Ionians underscores the reason why the Persians are able to defeat the Ionians. That they ascribe their momentary lapse into patriotic self-defense to madness shows that they hold such ideals in very low regard. It shows themselves in an extremely poor light; that they think they were deranged to have taken on such a task demonstrates an apathetic laziness which is supported by their further complaints. The work which freedom requires is too tiresome for them; the thought of slavery to the

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405 As noted also by McQueen (2000: 94), ‘ἐκπλώσαντες ἐκ τοῦ νόου: literally ‘having sailed out of their minds’, a particularly apt metaphor in the context’ and How and Wells (1967: Vol. II, 69, s.v. 12), ‘strinkingly appropriate’. Although the other use of the verb in this sense at 3.155.3 doesn’t seem to have any special significance in its context.

406 Hohti (1976: 47, n. 3) comments that the Ionians ‘do not demonstrate cowardice, but disorder’. To a certain degree perhaps, but I suggest ‘apathetic laziness’ is more accurate.
Persians is preferable to freedom; Herodotus depicts the Ionians in a way which would be anathema to the vast majority of self-respecting Greeks. The Ionians, incidentally, are the only people who call themselves mad in the *Histories*, and by doing so they emphasise a supreme lack of self-consciousness about their inability to endure hard labour. That they were ‘mad’ is their way to explain how wrong they were to have made the decision to fight for freedom and why they made it in the first place. Madness acts as an incapacitator which indicates why, in their ‘mad’ state, they could be influenced to make this uncharacteristic decision. This is similar to their use of sickness, which they highlight by repeating the concept: they endure ‘incurable’ indignities (*λύμῃσι*), an adjective taken from the language of sickness, and if madness was their excuse for why they took on the work, sickness is their excuse for giving up on it. They complain about the effect the hours of work in the sun has had: ‘in fact many of us have fallen sick, and many others would appear likely to suffer the same thing…’(*καὶ δὴ πολλοὶ μὲν ἠμέων ἐς νούσους πεπτώκασι, πολλοὶ δὲ ἐπίδοξοι τῶντο τοῦτο πείσεσθαί*)

Their sickness explains why they want to stop working, but also plays once again on the notion of their weakness, because they cannot work for a week without falling sick; their immediate ‘sickness’ blinds them to long term slavery.

This negative portrayal of the Ionians is obvious early on in the *Histories*, seemingly due in part to the very pleasant climate they enjoy (1.142.1) which naturally makes them rather soft, according to the Herodotean theory of climate and peoples. In 1.143.2 he calls them the weakest and the smallest in estimation

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407 Masaracchia (1976:23) says that Herodotus points out ‘with typical humour’ the paradox ‘that the Ionians, impatient with the harsh discipline of Dionysius, are now inclined to prefer the future slavery under the Persians rather than that which they put up with under their present leader’ (che gli Ioni, insofferenti alla dura disciplina di Dionisio, sono ormai inclini a preferire la futura schiavitù sotto i Persiani piuttosto che quella che subiscono sotto il loro attuale capo).

408 Scott (2005: 103) notes the ‘florid language’ of their speech and suggests that the sickness is an exaggeration. This is in keeping with the portrayal of the Ionians.

409 Although Thomas, (2000: 105) points out that ‘Though the rest of Book 1 might suggest that he would want to link this beneficent climate with way of life more generally, his stringent criticism of the Ionians’ unwillingness to undergo *ponoi* during the Ionian revolt is in connection with their miserable attempt at military training (VI 11, esp. 11.2)’ and compares this attitude with the Spartan training ‘enforced by *nomos*’.

410 This is evidenced throughout the *Histories*, where the best fighters, like the Ethiopians and the Scythians (3.21.3, 4.127.1- 4.128.3), live in fairly harsh conditions; the last paragraph of the *Histories* (9.122.3-4) sums up this theory also.
(ἀσθενέστατον...καὶ λόγου ἔλαχίστου) of the Greek races, and says that the Ionian name carries an embarrassing stigma (1.143.3); they might fight well enough but they endure slavery rather than leaving (1.169.1); they are given good advice on how to unite and avoid slavery (1.170.1-3) but they do not take the advice; Ionian tyrants are easily persuaded to give up the idea of fighting for democracy because they will lose their power with Darius (4.137.1-3). Scythians think that Ionians make useless free men but are exemplary as slaves (4.142.1-3).

Evans points out that the battle of Lade is not the only time the Ionians changed their minds about joining the Greek cause: when they guard the Danube for Darius (4.136.3-142.1) they ‘chose servitude’; even though Dionysius laid out the situation for them, they ‘repeated the response they had made at the Danube bridge. They rallied first to the cause of freedom and then they changed their minds.’

Thomas comments that their weakness came from their ‘easy life’, being governed by tyrants and having to fight for the Persians, and that the story of the Ionian Revolt ‘may be meant partly as an indictment of the system of Ionian tyrants’. The Ionians are ‘not prepared to bear sufficient hardship at the time of resistance (VI 11-12)’, but this does not necessarily exclude them from being able to have democracy: ‘It is possible for barbarians and perhaps there is a hint also that had the Ionians had democracies they too would have been better at armed resistance.’

Thus by calling themselves mad for working for their freedom the Ionians emphasise the apathy and weakness which has characterised their portrayal to this point and has been a theme of this logos; this also indicates to the reader/audience that success in the venture is unlikely, a truth which is borne out soon after the complaints.

**Madness in Context: Greeks (6.112.2, 8.10.1, 8.77.1 – oracle, 8.140.a3)**

The Greeks in both the battle of Marathon and the sea-battle of Artemisium are thought to be mad by their Persians opponents; the situations are very similar and so is the

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411 Evans (1991: 35), and again on Pg. 144: ‘The Ionians vacillated, their leaders were inadequate, and when they did find one such as Dionysius of Phocaea who knew what was needed for victory, they were unwilling to cooperate with him.’

wording. In both cases the madness ascribed to the Greeks serves to emphasise their bravery and highlights even further the impact of their victory over the overconfident and greater numbered Persians, and marks these high-points of the narrative as such.

The narrative covering the battle of Marathon starts at 6.102.1 and ends at 6.117.3. The madness of the Greeks is mentioned at a crucial point, just as the Greeks start their charge. The Greek victory at Marathon cannot really be seen as a surprise to the Greek audience or readership; what Herodotus does is lay out for the reader/audience the difficulties associated with the battle. The Spartans will not come (6.105.1-6.106.3) because the timing is wrong, but this disadvantage is followed by an omen in disfavour of the Persians (6.107.3-4). The Athenians toss up whether to fight or not, with the tide turning against those who are for fighting, when Miltiades persuades Callimachus, the war archon, to break the tie by voting for war (6.109.1-6). Finally Herodotus tells us the formation of the army, noting that (6.111.3): ‘although the army was the same (length) as the Persian army, the middle of it was over lines of fewer soldiers, and here the army was the weakest, but each wing was reinforced with numbers.’

Herodotus keeps up the suspense by not giving an entirely optimistic view of the Greek army; by employing such words as ὀλίγας and ἀσθενέστατον he indicates the disadvantages of the Greeks. Even if we know the Greeks will win, Herodotus manipulates us into thinking the battle could go either way. It is at this point that the Greeks charge (6.112.1-2): ‘And the Persians, seeing them coming at a run, prepared themselves to receive them, and supposed the Athenians to be both mad [lit. ascribed

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413 Some of the scholarship in connection with this piece is more interested in the tactical connotations, such as McQueen (2000: 200) who discusses the possibilities of Persian and Athenian cavalry, and How and Wells (1967: Vol. II, 112, s.v. 112), who discuss unmentioned archers. Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 53) sees the manoeuvre as the start of a movement which surrounds and encloses ‘a clumsy and blundering enemy’ (un ennemi pataud et maladroit). Bornitz (1967: 18) is more interested in the contrast between the behaviour of the Greeks under the Peisistratids and then at Marathon.

414 McQueen (2000: 200) takes ἐπέφερον to be an inchoative imperfect.
madness to the Athenians] and entirely destructive, seeing that they were few, and that these people were coming at a run not using either their cavalry or archers first.’ (οἱ δὲ Πέρσαι ὄρωντες δρόμῳ ἐπιόντας παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς δεξόμενοι, μανίην τε τοῖσι Αθηναίοισι ἐπέφερον καὶ πάγχυ ὀλεθρίην, ὄρωντες αὐτοὺς ἐόντας ὀλίγους, καὶ τούτους δρόμῳ ἐπειγομένους οὔτε ἰπποῦ ὑπαρχούσης σφί οὔτε τοξευμάτων.)

By giving us the Persian point of view just before the armies come to grips with each other, Herodotus makes us see them as arrogant, very confident of their victory, and while they are not entirely contemptuous of the Greeks they are surprised that the Greeks bother to fight such a great army as their own – once again ὀλίγους underscores the numerical weakness of the Greeks. Some scholars have noted this ‘culture clash’ aspect of the use of madness here, and the reflected view of the Persians, although they have differing ideas as to what exactly is at work in this piece. To date, Avery has done the most extensive study on the issue of this sort of madness, although the point of his discussion is to determine whether or not the Persians had any cavalry to deploy at Marathon. While his conclusions about the use of madness in the Histories are not always the same as those drawn in this study, his reflections on the ‘battle madness’ narratives are insightful. Leaving aside Avery’s thought that what is not nomos is mad, he does comment that ‘In Herodotus we find that one group (or individual) considers another group (or individual) mad when the actions of the latter deviate from the norms of the former to such an extent that the behaviour of the latter is not comprehensible to the former.’ The idea of the imputation of madness reflecting what the speakers are thinking is a very important one. Avery adds, ‘the Persians make this

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415 Avery (1972a: 15-22), Pgs. 20-21 for Avery’s conclusion: ‘when the Persians enumerate the reasons why the Greeks exhibit a complete and destructive madness in their attack at Marathon they are thinking not only of the circumstances under which the Greeks are advancing but also of the circumstances under which they themselves would attack. The reasons the Persians give for the madness of the Greeks are at the same time a list of the conditions which they deem necessary before they – sane men in their own view – would launch an attack...’

416 I disagree with Avery’s picture (1972a: 19-20) of the madnesses at 1.109.2, 1.212.2, 2.173.4, and 4.79.3-4, and have reservations about some of his conclusions, particularly his manner of grouping the madnesses. These reservations have been and will be discussed under the relevant sections.

417 Avery (1972a: 19).
judgement because the Greeks are doing things which, under the same circumstances, the Persians themselves would not do.\textsuperscript{418} That is, attacking an army of such magnitude as the Persian one from a position of such weakness, both aspects of which have been underscored several times in the narrative (6.106.3, \textit{ἀσθενεστέρη}; 6.109.1, \textit{ὀλίγους}; 6.111.3, \textit{ὀλίγας, ἀσθενέστατον}; 6.112.2, \textit{ὀλίγους}).

Benardete feels that the Persians’ attitude has more to do with their ‘rationality’: ‘The Persian error seems to arise from their trust in \textit{λόγος} at the expense of what appears before them.’\textsuperscript{419} Darbo-Peschanski says that the dash into battle ‘startles and puts the barbarians out of countenance’, a precursor for the next tactical manoeuvre\textsuperscript{420}. She notes, however, that it is the enemy’s ‘absolute faith in his strength which makes him incapable of understanding the tactic of the Greeks, made out of cunning and bravery’ and this attitude causes him to call the Greeks mad and also make a tactical error\textsuperscript{421}. Evans argues along similar lines to Benardete, but clearly sets outs to prove that \textit{nomos}, rather than rationality, is the hurdle. He also cites Xerxes’ discussion with Demaratus about the Spartans (7.209.1), and remarks on the irony: ‘the Persians borrowed alien customs most readily of all men, and yet their kings failed to comprehend the authority of \textit{nomoi}.’\textsuperscript{422} He rightly considers the imputation of madness to be another sign of this fault, and goes on to say that the ‘This failure of the Persians to comprehend the \textit{nomos} that commanded

\textsuperscript{418} Avery (1972a: 20).
\textsuperscript{419} Benardete (1969: 175). See also Pgs. 174-176; Benardete cites 6.112.2-3, 8.10.1 as well as 7.209.1, and adduces that ‘The Persians’ utter reasonableness, on the other hand, in adopting from others what they think better than their own customs, leads to their underestimating the political importance of tradition.’ He does, however, suggest that ‘The Persians are so ‘rational’ in their reasoning that it has the same effect as the excessive imagination of the Ionians, who likened themselves to madmen when they were sane…They do not understand the connection between lying and justice. It is the Persians’ failure to see that lying might be necessary for justice that constitutes part of their madness.’ These statements take the matter of the Ionians (6.12.3, discussed above) completely out of context, and in addition the Persians never call themselves mad – which would make a point worth comparison to the Ionians. Herodotus never suggests that the Persians are mad, except through the medium of the oracle at 8.77.1, which will be discussed; he merely suggests, at this point, that they are very different from the Greeks.
\textsuperscript{421} ‘c’est…sa foi absolue en la force qui le rend incapable de comprendre la tactique des Grecs, faite d’astuce et de bravoure’, Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 53). Bornitz (1967: 18) makes the same point about the trust Xerxes has in his numerical superiority.
\textsuperscript{422} Evans (1991: 25-26, also n. 65). He makes the point that ‘the Persians themselves were actuated by a \textit{nomos} too – one that forbade them to remain inactive’, and gives 7.8 as an example.
the Greeks to resist is a leitmotiv which continues as far as their defeat at Plataea, where Mardonius led his men in a disorderly pursuit of the Spartans, imagining that they were running away!'

Thompson is of the opinion that the Greeks are political, ‘prone to great swings in behaviour’, and the Persians apolitical, as well as literal-minded, ‘ever rational and steadfast’; ‘consequently they are baffled by the opponents, who so unexpectedly charge them in battle’. Thompson is correct in her conclusion that this is about characterisation of both parties, and that the ‘remark that the Persians believed the Athenians to be mad is the core of the portrait, for Herodotus is pointing to the vulnerability of the authoritarian regime. She compares the Persian propensity for quantifying goods, and the opposing Greek way of not thinking of strength in terms of numbers, and remarks that ‘The Persians in The History never do get a grasp on the Greek mind, and it is their inability to adapt to such foreign behaviour that unnerves them in crisis…The puzzlement with which the Persians regard the Athenians at Marathon is, in Herodotus’ depiction, to continue throughout the course of the war.

The bravery of the Greeks is hammered home by Herodotus in 6.112.3, where the fighting begins. In direct contrast to what the Persians thought, the Athenians ‘fought worthy of estimation’ (ἐμάχοντο ἀξίως λόγου), and were the first of the Greeks

\[423\] Thompson (1996: 39, 40).

\[424\] Thompson (1996: 40, 43), ‘These characterizations are consonant with the Herodotean picture of the Athenians as a people for whom authority ascends from the people, and where discord and dispute are the rule; and of the Persians as a people for whom authority descends from the Great King, and descends predicably and uniformly.’

\[425\] As does Evans (1991: 62). He disuses Xerxes’ preoccupation with numbers: ‘his confidence was swollen by the size and brilliance of his armament. When the Persians captured three spies whom the Greeks had sent to Sardis, Xerxes saved them from execution and freed them, saying that it was better that the Greeks should know how vast his army was: they would then surrender the more speedily. [7.146-47] Size and appearance were what mattered to him; they were the yardsticks by which he measured his forces, and he could not believe that he would encounter resistance from an enemy as small and weak as he imagined the Greeks to be.’ Konstan (1987: 62-63) also discusses the delight or preoccupation for the Persians of ‘looking things over’. Xerxes, in particular, takes ‘comfort from superiority in numbers’, even to the measuring of time as a quantity (Pg. 64).

\[426\] Thompson, (1996: 43). She goes on, ‘Indeed, this first manifestation anticipates the role that Demaratus will soon play for the Persians, that is, the role of the unheeded interpreter of Greek, and specifically, Spartan, custom.’ See also Boedeker (1987: 197).

\[427\] Harrison (2000: 75) says that Herodotus’ ‘frequent use of superlatives… the first, the greatest and so on…’ reflects the way in which he traces ‘the margins of human experience’ as cited in the Proem. N.33 mentions 6.112.3 as one of these instances of ‘firsts’.
who charged at a run and stood up to the Persians despite their strange clothes (although
this claim might seem amusing to a modern reader, the physical evidence of the Persians’
otherness is in their clothes). Herodotus remarks, ‘Up to that time the Greeks had a fear
to even hear the name “Persian.”’ (τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἑλλησι καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ
Μήδων φόβος ἀκούσαν.) We take the point that the Greeks at Marathon were not
facing just the name but the human presence.

The madness therefore serves three purposes in the narrative: it arrests the
reader/audience’s attention at this extremely important, even symbolic, point; madness
underscores the bravery and courage of the Athenians; and, because they do not
understand the Greeks, madness characterises the Persians themselves. The battle can be
seen not just a clash of people, but a clash of the values those people have. Persians do
not need courage, because they are many; they are servants of the king, and therefore
do not understand democracy; they are willing servants, and therefore the concept of
freedom is foreign to them; they walk all over the notion of borders and limits, and
therefore appear unable to process the idea of a small country’s defense and defiance.
Because the Persians think the Greeks are mad, as opposed to angry or brave, we are
invited to see that the Persians have no understanding of the Greeks at all, as Thompson
says.

A similar structure is used with regard to the sea battle at Artemisium. Discussion of the fleet begins at 8.1.1, and the battle begins in 8.10.1 and finishes at 8.11.3, but only because night falls. It restarts at 8.15.1 but with an enhanced Greek fleet (8.14.1) and a rather more wary (and depleted) Persian fleet (8.15.1), and finishes at 8.18.1, whereupon both fleets withdraw and the Greeks later put in at Salamis (8.40.1), which will furnish the scene of the next famous sea battle.

428 Boedeker (1987: 197) says of Demaratus’ and Xerxes’ conversation that they emphasise the difference between Sparta and Persia and ‘focus especially on the issues of Spartan nomos, which involves a kind of courage and freedom that Demaratus describes eloquently, in implicit contrast to Persians fear and slavishness, but which Xerxes cannot accept or understand’. Such scenes (e.g. 7.103.1) are pre-figured and almost personified in the clash of war where the Persians call the Greeks (not just the Spartans) mad. As Humphreys (1987: 212) points out in that instance, and as could be said in this instance also, ‘nomos is a special type of rule which singles out free Greeks from the barbarian subjects of an oriental despot.’
429 Konstan (1987: 59) notes the Persians’ ‘slavish submission to the caprices of despotic power’.
430 Konstan (1987: 60) mentions the contrast of societies ‘in terms of reason versus passion, or love of freedom versus innate servility’.
431 Avery (1972a: 19), Benardete (1969: 174) and Evans (1991: 26 n. 66) classify the two sections together.
Problems crop up before Artemisium as well: firstly, the allies threaten to botch the campaign unless a Spartan is the leader of the fleet (8.2.2), and the Athenians gave way in favour of unity (8.3.1). Then the Greeks took fright at the numbers of Persian ships, but the Euboeans bribed Themistocles to stay, and Themistocles bribed the other commanders (8.4.1-8.5.3, as Miltiades persuaded those at Marathon). We then get a glimpse of the Persians, who are confident of their abilities (8.6.1-2), and who send off a detachment in order to trap the Greeks when they fight (8.7.1-2). To offset this trap, their plans are relayed to the Greeks (8.8.3), who after waiting for a while decide to attack first (8.9.1), whereupon Herodotus introduces the action in much the same way he did for the battle of Marathon, and by employing madness signals that this part of the action is a high point (8.10.1): ‘But when both the other soldiers of Xerxes and the generals saw them (the Greeks) sailing against them with few ships, supposing them to be entirely mad they also set sail themselves with their ships, hoping to take them (the Greeks) easily, hoping a very reasonable (hope), seeing that the Greeks’ ships were indeed few, but their own (ships) were both many more in number and sailed better.’

The same reasons for having the Persians think the Greeks are mad as they attack at Marathon are applicable here. The Persians are over-confident in their many ships, and the courage of the Greeks is evident; Herodotus offers us the contrast of the weakness of the Greek fleet, the superiority of Persian numbers and better quality of their ships, but it amounts to much the same thing, because either way the Greeks come out as supremely courageous. The pro-Greek Ionians (unwillingly fighting on the Persian side) are the ones who worry about the situation (8.10.2): ‘…[they] considered it a great disaster when they saw them being surrounded and imagined that none of them would return home; the
power of the Greeks seemed to them to be so weak.\(^{432}\) (συμφορὴν τε ἐποιεύντο μεγάλην ὀρθῶντες περιεχομένους αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐπιστάμενοι ὡς οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν ἀπονοστῆσι, οὐτὶ ἀσθενέα σφι ἐφαίνετο εἰναι τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρήγματα.)

The operative word here is ἐφαίνετο with the infinitive\(^{433}\), indicating that this is a perception only and not really the true situation.

A slight contrast between Marathon and Artemisium is the marginally greater respect the Persian fleet has for their opponents. In 6.112.3 we were told that the Greeks ‘fought worthy of estimation’ (ἐμάχοντο ἄχιως λόγου) but even before the fighting truly begins at Artemisium the Persians are keen to be the first to seize Attic ships in particular (for which they will be rewarded by the king, 8.10.3), ‘For they had a very great estimation for the Athenians throughout the camp.’ (Ἀθηναίων γὰρ αὐτοίσι λόγος ἦν πλείστος ἀνὰ τὰ στρατόπεδα.) Even though the Persians want the ships as trophies, their greater regard for the Greeks is perhaps another tremor in their make-up which pre-figures their defeat at the end of the Histories.

Although the Greeks don’t win a concerted victory in this first ‘round’, Herodotus makes sure that we know that the Persians didn’t either. The Greeks’ accomplishments are listed (8.11.2): ‘...they seized thirty ships [of the barbarians], as well as Philaon the son of Chersis, the brother of Gorgos the king of the Salaminians...An Athenian man seized an enemy ship first of the Greeks, Lukomedes the son of Aischraios, and this man took the prize for bravery.’ (...τριήκοντα νέας αἱρέουσι [τῶν βαρβάρων] καὶ τὸν Γόργου τοῦ Σαλαμινίων βασιλέως ἀδελφεὸν Φιλάονα τὸν Χέρσιος...πρῶτος δὲ Ἑλλήνων νέα τῶν πολεμίων εἶλε ἄνήρ Ἀθηναίος, Λυκομήδης Αἰσχραίου, καὶ

\(^{432}\) Veen (1996: 17) comments on the use of συμφορὴ: ‘When Herodotus wants a phrase containing συμφορὴ to convey the emotion of distress after an infelicitous occurrence, he employs συμφορὴν (μεγάλην) ποιέεσθαι, and he does so frequently (sixteen times). We can readily perceive that this locution indicates emotion in cases like 8.10.2 and 8.69.1...The difference between the two phrasal combinations can be inferred from the basic meaning of the two verbs, χρᾶσθαι signifying ‘to use/experience’, ποιέεσθαι ‘to make for oneself’. Accordingly, in combination with χρᾶσθαι, συμφορὴ indicates the accident itself, whereas the combination with ποιέεσθαι shows the subject ‘considering something an accident’, i.e. grieving.’

\(^{433}\) Goodwin, (1992: 342, paragraph 1592).
τὸ ἀριστήριον ἔλαβε οὗτος.

Persian accomplishments are not mentioned at all, and the only inclusion of their affairs in this paragraph sounds like dignified Greek disdain (8.11.3): ‘...and the barbarians [sailed back] to Aphetae, having battled much against their expectations.\(^{434}\) (...οἱ δὲ βάρβαροι ἐς τὰς Ἀφέτας, πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν ἀγωνιζόμενοι.)

As in the battle of Marathon, the main object or theme of the Battle of Artemisium is the courage of the Greeks in facing the Persians; by having the Persians call the Greeks mad Herodotus focuses our attention, at this particularly crucial point, on all parties and their characterisation; the Persians, secure in their numbers, and the Greeks, smaller, but braver, and ultimately successful.

The next occurrence of madness is in an oracle, which attracts a variety of scholarly debate\(^{435}\). Harrison demonstrates that we shouldn’t discount this piece merely

\(^{434}\) Harrison (2000: 61) points out: ‘While a certain sort of Solonian ‘knowledge’ or ‘understanding’ seems almost invariably to be vindicated (1.96.2, 2.152.3, 6.17; cf. 1.3.1), hopes and expectation are – equally invariably – confounded (7.168.2; 8.10.1, 24.2, 77.1, 140.3; cf. 8.12.2).’

\(^{435}\) Quite a few scholars comment on the fact that Herodotus introduces this oracle by saying that he can’t say anything against the truth of oracles (8.77.1-2). Thomas (2000: 264-5) sees in the wording a connection with the contemporaneous practice of opposed speeches on various topics: ‘For instance in his declaration that he cannot deny the validity of oracles, there are expressions curiously reminiscent of Protagoras’ Αλήθεια ἢ καταβάλλοντες (Truth or Refutations).’ She also adduces that such phrases occur not just in Protagoras but also in the Hippocratics, such as Nat. Man (chapter 1) and On Diseases (chapter 1, vi 140, 1 ff. Littre). ‘After all, the practice of antilegein was wider and reminiscent of more than Protagorean debating...It may also be relevant here that Herodotus is fond of words of opposition and in some contexts it is hard to see them as reflective merely of an older and simpler sense of balance and opposition.’ Beck and Darbo-Peschanski seem more concerned with Herodotus’ belief in oracles. Beck (1971: 53) says of the inclusion of the oracle ‘Whether Herodotus wants to use it here as a sign or as an example is not clear to determine’ (Ob Herodot es hier als Zeugen oder als Beispiel verwenden will, ist nicht klar zu entscheiden.) I would suggest that it can be seen as both: a sign, or pre-figuring at least, of the Persian defeat and an example of a true, clear oracle; why should we have to choose? This would not be the only instance where a piece of narrative has more than one function, witness the use of madness in the Histories. In the face of such condemnation we should observe what Harrison (2000: 73) says of such phenomena: ‘There is no single pattern of the miracle then. A miracle may also be an omen; it may double as an instance of divine retribution. The miraculous element of an event may consist in its timing...or in the unlikely coincidence of a number of factors...’ Beck (Pg. 53) remarks that there are two logical mistakes in the submission of the oracle: ‘an incorrectly induced ending’ (ein fehlerhafter Induktionsschluß), ‘because a fulfilled oracle can’t be evidence for a legality’ (weil ein erfülltes Orakel nicht Beweis für eine Gesetzmäßigkeit sein kann) and a vaticinatio ex eventu. Following Pohlenz she says that ‘Herodotus is ruled here by his faith and doesn’t need any logically conclusive evidence.’ (Herodot hier von seiner Gläubigkeit geleitet und keinen logisch zwingenden Beweis braucht. ) All the same, Herodotus does give us a lot of other evidence, not based on oracles, for why the Greeks won. Later (Pg. 87) she suggests that Herodotus’ personal belief bars the completely investigated evidence, and ‘a belief is of course not dependant on the laws of logic’ (ein Glaube ist ja nie abhängig von den Gesetzen der Logik), and that 8.77.1-2 is an example of this. Darbo-Peschanski (1987: 79) also comments on the value Herodotus places on oracles, and that he allows ‘a form of divine causality in the chain of human events’ (une forme de
on the count that it is an oracle\textsuperscript{436}: ‘How did Herodotus sustain a belief in the validity of divination, that is in the belief that divination provided a genuine means of eliciting knowledge from the gods? The answer that Herodotus himself gives...is a very simple one: prophecies are worth taking seriously because they are true’, to which he adduces this oracle. The oracle, which foreshadows the outcome of the battle of Salamis\textsuperscript{437}, says that the Persians have a ‘mad hope’ (8.77.1-2):

‘But when the sacred shore of Artemis of the golden sword
And sea-side Cynosura they bridge with ships,
With a mad hope after sacking brilliant Athens\textsuperscript{438},
Glorious Justice will snuff out Mighty Insolence, the son of Violent Arrogance,
As lusting fearfully he thinks to trust everything always\textsuperscript{439}.

\textsuperscript{436} Harrison (2000: 130). See also his chapter on \textit{Oracles and Divination}, Pgs. 122-157. In his conclusion he remarks (Pgs. 155-156) that ‘it is important to emphasize that the various turns of argument by which belief in the fulfillment of oracles and other forms of divination is maintained do not constitute a consciously developed system but rather a set of \textit{ad hoc} strategies for answering the questions that a belief in divination inevitably throw up.’

\textsuperscript{437} Hohti (1976: 66 ) notes the balance of this piece in his section on 8.74-83: ‘The anticipation of the Greek victory in the oracle is ‘a counterpart to the portent of the defeat of the Persian fleet.’

\textsuperscript{438} Harrison (2000: 262) comments, with reference to the etymology of names: ‘Most ideologically charged of all, however, is the name of the Persians themselves, meaning in Greek ‘destroyers’, something picked up on in Aeschylus’ \textit{Persians} as well as in two of the most famous oracles of the time of the Persian wars (7.221.4, 8.77.1, Aesch. \textit{Pers}. 65).’

\textsuperscript{439} There is a slight textual problem in the last line of 8.77.1, in that while the text says δοκεὐντ’ ἀνά πάντα πείθεσθαι, it makes very little sense (I have made what I can of the existing text but am not happy with the translation). Under the entry πείθω in Powell’s Lexicon, this phrase is called ‘meaningless’ (1938: 298), and Hude’s textual notes (1927: Vol. ii, 289) list three other possibilities: πείθεσθαι (B), τίθεσθαι (C) and πιθέσθαι (Duentzer). While πείθεσθαι makes as little sense as the existing text given that it is the same verb but a present rather than an aorist infinitive, τίθεσθαι is not a lot better, although it
For bronze will contend with bronze, and Ares with blood
Will stain the sea red. Then Greece’s freedom day
(Will) the broad-seeing Son of Cronos and honoured Victory bring in.\textsuperscript{440} ‘

\(\text{ἀλλ'}\) ὅταν Ἀρτέμιδος χρυσαόρου ἱερὸν ἁκτήν
νησί γεφυρώσωσι καὶ εἰναλίην Κυνόσουραν,
ἐλπὶδι μαινομένη λιπαρὰς πέρσαντες Αθῆνας,
diā Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν Κόρον, ὡβριος υἱόν,
δεινὸν μαμώσοντα, δοκεύντ' ἄμα πάντα πίεσθαι.
χαλκὸς γὰρ χαλκῷ συμμίξεται, αἰματι δ' Ἀρης
πόντον φοινίξει. Τότ' ἐλεύθερον Ἑλλάδος ἧμαρ
ἐυφύστα Κρονίδης ἐπάγει καὶ πότνια Νίκη.

Avery comes to grief with this section because it does not ‘not fall into the
categories discussed’ in his article\textsuperscript{441}. This is merely another demonstration that madness
in the \textit{Histories} cannot be categorised. Perhaps as a result of this trouble, Avery turns
\((ἐπίδι μαινομένῃ)\) into ‘a vain hope’, rather than a mad one, which loses somewhat of
the impact. He adds, ‘Here insanity characterizes the hopes of those who oppose the will
of the gods. In any case this passage was not written by Herodotus and does not
represent his own usage.’ While this is true, Herodotus is fully capable of employing
starts to make some sense. We could have ‘thinking to administer for himself throughout everything’, or
‘thinking to make (a way) for himself throughout everything’. Of all of these \(πιέσθαι\) makes the most
sense, ‘thinking to drink up everything’, or ‘thinking he would drink up everything’, but there is the
question of whether \(ἀνά\) would be used in this sense with \(πίνω\). Contextually \(πίνω\) fits in well with the
mention of the sea and blood, and as this is a sea-battle which Xerxes is going to lose, the idea of drinking
up the sea but having it turn to blood is quite striking in a metaphor. Fortunately the problems with the text
do not overly affect the use of madness, because conclusions can be drawn from the rest of the oracle.

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{440} Evans on the oracle (1991: 35): ‘This oracle attributed the Persian defeat to “divine Dike” which
quenches Koros, the son of Hybris. There is a close parallel in the second stasimon of the \textit{Oedipus Tyrrannus}:
there Hybris begets Koros, and the result is disaster. Sophocles’ chorus here portrays the
traditional unrighteous man who is the victim of Hybris, Koros, and Ate. Guilt which is described in this
Aeschylean fashion does not sound like the involuntary guilt of a man who has acted in ignorance. The
oracle of Bacis which Herodotus quotes does not suggest any such thing, and since Herodotus held up this
oracle as an example of divine prescience, I do not think he saw it that way either. At some point, the
Persians made a choice.’
\textsuperscript{441} Avery (1972a: 19, n. 14).
\end{footnotesize}
such an oracle for his own use in this context; it is also true, however, that this sort of madness has Homeric overtones.\textsuperscript{442}

The madness of the Persians differs slightly from that of the Greeks; their ‘madness’ was courage seen through the eyes of the complacent and overconfident. The Persians’ madness is similar to that which they ascribed to the Greeks: fighting despite the massive odds. In the Persians’ case, the odds laid out in the oracle are superhuman immortals, and this aspect gives their madness a negative connotation. The first three lines of the oracle seem to emphasise the strength of the Persians, but in the forth line Justice (\(\Delta\io\)) personified is going to be more than a match for the mad hopes of Xerxes and his army, and merely ‘snuffs out’ his great power. Justice is followed by of Ares, Zeus, and Victory (\(\Ni\)), so that the second half of the oracle is more about the might of the gods. Although the audience at the time knew that the Persians would lose, the inclusion of the oracle makes (rather like the Argive attack on the Athenians at 5.86.4) the Greeks at Salamis the instruments of the divine will of the gods, punishing the transgressor of limits and destroyer of temples.

The narrative from 8.140.\(\alpha\)1 to 8.144.5 sets out the speeches of Persian, Spartan and Athenian representatives, with the Persian envoy trying to persuade the Athenians to make an alliance with Xerxes, the Spartan envoys trying to dissuade the alliance, and the Athenians refusing the alliance and rebuking the Spartans for ever doubting them.\textsuperscript{443}

\textsuperscript{442} See for example \textit{Iliad}, 8.354-356; 413-414; 15.128-129. In the first instance Hera wishes to put a stop to the madness of Hector, which consists of his ability to kill without himself being particularly susceptible to wounding; the last two instances comprise imputations of madness to those, even other gods, who would try and circumnavigate the will of Zeus. See further Chapter 3.

\textsuperscript{443} Hohiti (1976: 126) says that this and the council of the Persians at 7.8-11 are ‘the two most important councils of the latter part of the \textit{Histories}.’ Of 8.140 he says the emphasis is on ‘the resolution of the Athenians…endorsed by the speech of the Spartans, which, however, is not needed to persuade them, since they already have a negative attitude to the proposal of Alexandros.’ He suggests that the two replies the Greeks give (8.143-8.144) ‘together make a stronger point than those of Xerxes and Mardonios’. Lang (1984: 111) insists on calling the section of narrative from 8.140-144 ‘Thucydidean’, noting that the structure of challenge/challenge/response/response ‘fits least neatly into the chiastic-tetrad pattern in which the first Athenian response should be to the second [Spartan] challenge. But for the sake of both drama and ideology the patriotic manifesto must come last.’ See Pgs. 138-139 for her comparison of this piece with that of Thucydides 1.66-88, and her comment that ‘there is sufficient similarity between the two conferences to suggest the possibility of a rhetorical pattern if not of actual influence’ and the useful point that ‘Herodotus was concerned to show that it was the Athenians who held the key to victory (for the Persians if they medized, for the Greeks if they held firm)’. In such speeches, she argues persuasively (Pg. 161, n.8), ‘the use of alternatives backed by their potential for good and evil serves both to provide arguments for and against the two courses of action and to divine the issues at stake and so to clarify the situation. The order in which the alternatives and their potential results are presented depends as much on
Through the various speeches there is a subtle play on not just madness, but ‘sense’ and ‘disposition’.

First Alexander, speaking for Mardonius, reports Xerxes’ winning offer of canceling the Athenian wrongs, giving back their land with more should they desire, and letting them govern themselves (8.140.α2). He then gives Mardonius’ speech (8.140.α3): ‘Why are you being mad now by making war with the king? For you would neither overthrow him nor will you be able to hold out against [him] for the whole time. For you perceived the number and deeds of Xerxes’ expeditionary force, and you are also learning the existing force now with me, so that even if you were to overthrow us and defeat us, of which there is no hope for you at all if you are at all in your right minds, another (force) many times larger will come.’ (νῦν τί μαίνεσθε πόλεμον βασιλεΐ ἀνταειρόμενοι; οὔτε γὰρ ἂν υπερβάλοισθε οὔτε οἷοὶ τέ ἐστε ἀντέχειν τὸν πάντα χρόνον. εἰδεῖτε μὲν γὰρ τῆς Ξέρξεω στρατηλασίας τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὰ ἔργα, πυνθάνεσθε δὲ καὶ τὴν νῦν παρ᾽ ἐστατὸν δύναμιν, ὡστε καὶ ἣν ἣμέας υπερβάλησθε καὶ νικήσητε, τοῦ περ ὑμῖν οὐδεμία ἐλπὶς εἴ περ εὗ φρονέετε, ἄλλη παρέσται πολλαπλησίη.)

Mardonius equates the ‘madness’ of the Athenians with their desire to fight Xerxes, despite the greater power Xerxes wields. He sets out the reasons why the Athenians shouldn’t put up a fight, reasons which ‘in their right mind’ they would agree to be significant. As with the battles of Marathon and Artemisium, calling the Athenians mad in this context and setting out the odds against them so clearly has the effect of highlighting the courage of the Athenians and pointing up the inability of the Persians to

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Avery (1972a: 18-19) says little about this section except to include it with 6.112.2 and 8.10.1. Of all three he comments ‘In all three cases events prove the Persians estimation of Greek sanity to be wrong since the Greeks win decisively at Marathon and Platea and they come off unexpectedly well in the encounter near Artemisium (8.11.3). Clearly the Persians have misjudged the situation on each of these occasions.’ Beck (1971: 77) mentions that Mardonius’ speech (8.140α3-4) combines the reasoning on reality and possibility.
understand this quality and the Greek dedication to the *nomos* of freedom, as well as providing a punchy introduction to this important speech, which demonstrates the true nature of Xerxes’ offer. As Bratt points out, Mardonius’ ultimatum is foolishly optimistic \(^{445}\), given past events, and ‘is based on a complete misrepresentation of the Persian record in Greece as well as a total misreading of the Athenians’; but his blindness to the reality of the situation is part of his characterisation as a representative for Xerxes at this point in time \(^{446}\). We should, however, bear in mind the last line of Mardonius’ speech, ἄλλη παρέσται πολλαπλησίη - an ominous note to finish on, because the Athenians have no guarantee that this may not indeed be the case.

Herodotus has already told us that this is an attempt on Mardonius’ part to divide and conquer by getting the Athenians, and their well-managed fleet, on his side (8.136.2-3). Thus we are primed to greet these speeches with scepticism and suspicion but also with the knowledge that the Persians will use any leverage they can get. Xerxes’ smooth, smarmy approach is never going to be taken at face value; Mardonius’ ‘big stick’ speech, a foil to Xerxes’, is angling to dishearten and discourage, but finally to offer the easy way

\(^{445}\) Bratt (1985: 21-22). Of the ultimatum, ‘a transparent bluff’, he notes that Mardonius ‘seems unprepared for an Athenian refusal and apparently has no clear plan to follow up: impulsively he retakes Athens, abandons it, attacks the Megarid, withdraws, and ultimately returns to his original position (9.3, 13ff.). As his last battle nears Mardonius supposedly attacks his own allies first (9.17f.) belatedly assaults Greek supply lines (9.38f.), completely misconstrues the meaning of a shift in enemy positions (9.48), and even proposes a duel to resolve the conflict (9.48f.). At the end he stubbornly insists that the Spartans are cowards despite his experience of their fighting, and he leads the last assault is disregard of all his counsellors, falsely believing that the enemy is in flight (9.58f.). These derogatory implications no doubt misrepresent the actual intelligence and planning of the eastern kings’ but they do ‘help to create an expectation that their expeditions will end in failure.’ Again (Pg. 26), ‘Mardonius’ memory of the past is so distorted that he cites his own campaign against the Greeks – one that ended in defeat for him (6.43ff.) – as proof of their weakness (7.9).’

\(^{446}\) Bratt (1985: 172, 26): ‘This motif of blindness to the truth is best developed in the stories of Croesus, Xerxes, and Mardonius; but its appearance in all six major *logoi* links them strongly with each other’ and ‘It is not only the past which the eastern kings consistently misapprehend in the narrative of Herodotus; they also operate under illusions about the present and the future.’ Like other eastern monarchs, Mardonius uses the future-more-vivid condition (Pg. 116), which the kings ‘often use it to issue threats or express unsupported predictions of success. The king sometimes even uses future-less-vivid and potential constructions with negatives to deny any other possibility than the outcome he predicts’, to which Bratt adds 8.140.a3 as an example. This piece is also an example of the use of (Pgs. 122-123)’ false conclusions from the facts and false applications of historical analogies.’ Bratt does think that Herodotus’ suggestion that Mardonius believes in the possibility of an Athenian acceptance is rather implausible (Pg. 159), and that ‘The arguments he attributes to Mardonius during these negotiations are weak in the extreme’, given Mardonius’ past experiences with the Greeks, but he concedes (Pgs. 159-160) that ‘These speeches (8.140-144) do, however, have an important relationship with the other great council scene of 7.8-11’, as does Hohti (1976: 126).
out; Alexander’s piece is that of the worried, concerned friend who also suggests the easy way out is in the Athenians’ best interest. Mardonius’ abusive use of madness is therefore entirely in keeping with his role as the military leader who points out the obvious. Talk of madness in Xerxes’ speech would have ruined his approach; Alexander would not think to call the Athenians mad because he is not only a benefactor but also wishes to persuade. Mardonius also wishes to persuade, but he has no scruples about doing so with the equivalent of a club.

Mardonius’ speech merely heightens the effect of the Athenian refusal to cooperate with Xerxes. As in the other two episodes, much is made of numbers; in this instance the superiority of the Persian forces rather than the inferiority of the Greek ones, as well as the idea of force. πλῆθος, στρατηλασία, δύναμις and πολλαπλήσιος are all lined up in an attempt to impress upon the Athenians the utter futility of getting in the way of such an unstoppable force. Even Alexander in his speech tries to persuade the Athenians to give in because ‘the power of the king is superhuman and his hand is very long’ (δύναμις ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον ἡ βασιλέως ἐστι καὶ χεὶρ ὑπερμήκης, 8.140.β2)⁴⁴⁷.

The moods also reflect the Persian point of view: verbs in the indicative are used to refer to the Athenians unenviable position: they are mad, they will not be able to hold out, they know Xerxes’ power, they are learning about Mardonius’ and a greater army will come (μαίνεσθε, οἷοί τέ ἐστε, εἴδετε, πυνθάνεσθε, παρέσται); whereas the use of the subjunctive and optative demonstrate the remoteness of their overthrowing and conquering the Persians (ὑπερβάλεσθε, ὑπερβάλησθε, νικήσητε). And although εὖ φρονέετε is indicative, scepticism is suggested by not only the conditional nature of the clause but also by the use of περ which twice emphasizes their inability to conquer and the unlikely possibility that the Athenians are sane.

⁴⁴⁷ Harrison (2000: 177 n.72) compares this sort of expression with those like ‘sharing somewhat in the divine’ and notes that such expressions ‘make clear [that] where τὸ θεῖον is used there is a much sharper sense of the judgement that divine intervention has taken place as a considered an rational deduction from events... τὸ θεῖον is a term applied to the diagnosis of divine intervention in the world.’ In this case, the description of the king as superhuman serves as a warning sign that divine intervention, as propounded in the oracle of 8.77.1-2, will catch up with Xerxes, who has over-reached his human limits.
The Spartans appear to doubt the Athenians’ sanity to a certain extent as well, when they give their advice (8.142.5): ‘But it (being like Alexander) need not be done by you, if you really happen to be in your right minds, understanding that for barbarians nothing is either reliable or truthful.’ (ῡμῖν δὲ γε οὐ ποιητέα, εἰ περε ἐν τυχχάνετε φρονέοντες, ἐπισταμέννοις ὡς βαρβάροισι ἐστι οὐτε πιστὸν οὗτε ἀληθὲς οὐδὲν.) Like Mardonius, the Spartans use εὖ φρονέω to describe the Athenians, and by using the verb in a conditional clause they show their own view of the likelihood, or in this instance, the unlikelihood, of the Athenians’ sanity. Compared with Mardonius, however, they do show more confidence in the Athenians than he does: they don’t suggest the Athenians are mad outright, as he does, and their conditional clause, unlike Mardonius’ at 8.140.α3, has no second περ to emphasise the remote chance that the Athenians are in their right mind.

The Athenian reply to Xerxes, Mardonius and Alexander (8.143.1-2) firmly turns down any offer of capitulation (noting the repetition in μὴ ὀμολογήσαι, μήκοτε ὀμολογήσειν and μὴ ἀνπείθηειν, οὐ πεισόμεθα); to the Spartans they say (8.144.1): ‘The fear of the Lacedaimonians that we might reach an agreement with the barbarian was entirely natural. But you seem to be afraid because you know the Athenian disposition very badly, that there is neither so much gold anywhere on earth nor land greatly surpassing in beauty or abundance, which we would take and be willing by medizing to enslave Greece.’ (τὸ μὲν δεῖσαι Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ ὀμολογήσωμεν τῷ βαρβάρῳ κάρτα ἀνθρωπίην ἔνυ. ἀτὰρ αἰσχρῶς γε ἐοίκατε, ἐζευπιστάμενοι τὸ Αθηναίων φρόνημα, ἀφροδῆσαι, ὅτι οὔτε χρυσός ἐστι γῆς οὐδαμόθι τοσοῦτος οὔτε χώρη κάλλεϊ καὶ ἀρετῆ méγα ὑπερφέρουσα, τὰ ἰμεῖς δεξάμενοι ἐθέλομεν ἂν μηδίσαντες καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα.) The

448 Benardete (1969: 199-200) suggests of 8.143.2 that their resistance ‘depends on the divine rather than the human’, ‘the part being stronger than the whole’, because their gods are ‘Greek gods, peculiar to the land of Greece; they are not universal gods like the Persians’; they are as local as the Greek language. γλῶσσα prevents λόγος from being the only consideration: difference of tongue excludes sameness of λόγος.’
Athenians’ pointed use of φρόνημα is their answer to any slurs on their sanity, which is clearly a running theme in the speeches, and a play on the Spartans’ (and Mardonius’ to a lesser extent) use of εὖ φρονέω. Where they suggest that the Athenians are not in their ‘right mind’ the Athenians come back with ‘you don’t know our mind’, and spell out that they know exactly what they would be doing if they capitulated and are therefore not willing to ‘medize and enslave Greece’, deliberately choosing two emotive verbs (μηδίσαντες καταδουλώσαται) to enforce their negative view of dealings with Xerxes and his minions. In this way they prove that they are indeed perfectly sane.

In three out of the four cases where madness is referred to in the context of battle – real or potential, madness is used as a device to highlight Greek bravery, despite the superior numbers of the enemy; it is this bravery which is seen as madness by the Persians. This in turn indicates the differences between Greeks and Persians, in that Persians can’t understand the bravery of this small country because they see only their own power; they don’t understand freedom and democracy because they don’t have them. The Athenians in particular have been shown to be the ‘saviours of Greece’ by Herodotus, and he builds on this characterisation. In one case, though, madness is applied to the Persians themselves, in an oracle. Their madness has more to do with attacking Greece against the odds of the gods who will overcome them, and therefore turns the Greeks who defeat them into the instruments of the gods.

**Madness in Context: Timodemus (8.125.1)**

The narrative from 8.123.1 to 8.125.2 deals with the issue of honour and envy concerning Themistocles after the battle of Salamis. Immerwahr is one of the few who acknowledges that the topos of envy ‘is central to the famous anecdote of Themistocles and Timodemus of Aphidna’, and goes on to note that ‘the story of Salamis ends in discord, but not without reference to the greatness of both Themistocles and Athens. Immerwahr (1966: 286). Fornara (1971: 66) says that Themistocles’ character is distinguished by ‘cleverness and foresight on the one hand, and greed and unscrupulousness on the other’. Blösel (2001: 179-197) continues this notion and suggests that in Themistocles Herodotus has combined various good and bad traits of the Athenians, and sums up (Pg. 197) : ‘On to his Themistocles Herodotus has even
The ‘madness’ of Timodemus in this context supports and highlights the two themes of honour and envy. The Greeks vote to decide who should get the prize for bravery (ἀριστήια, 8.123.1-2), but this is somewhat inconclusive because all the generals doing the voting (οἱ στρατηγοὶ διέφερον τὰς ψήφους, 8.123.2) vote for themselves first. The one who receives most of the second votes, however, is Themistocles. Lateiner remarks that this sort of disagreement is part and parcel of democracy: ‘The paradoxical advantage of non-autocratic governments is, Herodotus believes, that envy, strife, and disunity – among men and nations – promote human freedom and perpetuate a fruitful diversity for the human race’, and he points out that, in fact, this ‘verbal contention concerning the Greek combatant who most advanced the Hellenic cause best illuminates Themistocles’ services.’

Having clearly set out that Themistocles is worthy of honour, Herodotus then introduces the envy which prevents these honours from being accorded (8.124.1): ‘The Greeks [we may presume this refers to the generals] didn’t want to settle on these things out of envy, but sailed away to their own (cities) without making a decision, but all the same Themistocles was reported and was reputed to be the most clever man by far of the Greeks throughout all Greece.’ (οὐ βουλομένων δὲ ταῦτα κρίνειν τῶν Ἑλλήνων

projected the envy which by their accomplishments the Athenians aroused among all the other Greeks’, with a reference to this passage, but he does not otherwise discuss this aspect in his account.

451 Many scholars discuss aspects of Themistocles’ characterisation in the Histories, but as a rule they don’t mention the incident with Timodemus, or if they do it is generally to quote the account but to make few comments, other than to point out the differences between Herodotus’ account and those of Plato (Rep. 329e-330a), Cicero (Cicero, De Sen. 3.8) and Plutarch (Apophth. Them. 185C no. 7). See Evans (1982: 128); Frost (1980: 8 (also n.2), 171); Green (1996: 214); Lenardon (1978: 219); Podlecki (1975: 28, 80); Strauss (2004: 239). Blösel (2001: 179-197), Erbse (1992: 106-112), Evans (1991: 75-80) and Keaveney (2003), do not discuss the incident at all. In Keaveney’s case this is understandable as his book deals with ‘with that part of Themistocles’ career between his finally leaving Athens for exile and his death some years later as a refugee in the Persian Empire’ (Pg. 1). Bornitz (1967: 135) doesn’t mention this incident either, and is more interested in the portrayal of Themistocles hinting at his further career; Pohlenz (1973: 152) mentions the incident only in vague terms.


фθόνῳ, ἀλλ’ ἀποπλεόντων ἑκάστων ἐς τὴν ἑωυτῶν ἂκρίτων, ὡμος Θεμιστοκλῆς ἐβώσθη τε καὶ ἐδοξώθη εἶναι ἀνήφο πολλὸν Ἑλλήνων σοφότατος ἀνὰ πάσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

Thus the ideas of honour and envy are interwoven in the narrative: Themistocles is obviously highly deserving of honour but does not get it because of envy, although as Bichler and Rollinger note, the envy of the envious cannot detract from his merit as commander-in-chief. The insult is made worse by the fact that those who should, by rights, be bestowing Themistocles’ honours are his peers: the Greek generals who had fought with him at Salamis. This is made clear in Herodotus’ statement at 8.124.2: ‘But since - although he had won - he was not honoured by those who had fought the sea battle at Salamis, directly after this he came to Sparta, wishing to be honoured. (ὅτι δὲ νικῶν οὐκ ἐτιμήθη πρὸς τῶν ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχησάντων, αὐτίκα μετὰ ταῦτα ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπίκετο θέλων τιμηθῆναι).

The Spartans honour Themistocles (the verb τιμάω litters this passage) and Herodotus dwells on the long list of honours he receives from them (8.124.2-3): ‘...and the Lacedaimonians entertained him genially, and honoured him greatly. They did give the prize for bravery to Eurybiades, a wreath of olive, but [the prize] of cleverness and most cunning to Themistocles, and a wreath of olive to him; and they presented him


455 Strauss (2004: 238) notes ‘He had not received [formal recognition] from his comrades at Salamis nor was he likely to get it from his fellow citizens at Athens.’ See also Bornitz (1967: 135), ‘Envy directs their action’ (Mißgunst bestimmt ihr Handeln.)

456 Strauss (2004: 239) offers an explanation for the Spartans’ behaviour: ‘If this seems strange, remember that the more Sparta glorified Themistocles, the less it had to honor its own hero, Eurybiades. Spartans liked the cult of personality no more than Athenians did. So they chose the perfect gesture to force Themistocles and Eurybiades to share their glory: they gave each of them an olive wreath, Eurybiades for bravery and Themistocles for wisdom and dexterity. It was as much as saying that neither man could quite have won the victory alone.’ I’m not sure that this angle is one we are encouraged to consider by Herodotus, whose main point in this piece is to indicate the Themistocles was more honoured out of his own city than in it. Erbse (1992: 107) notes that ‘The unparalleled honour, which fell to the Athenian statesman in Sparta after the triumph of Salamis, is in accordance with this Herodotean admiration of the man’ (Die einzigartige Ehrung, die dem athenischen Staatsmann nach dem Siege von Salamis in Sparta zuteil geworden ist (8,125), entspricht dieser herodoteischen Hochschätzung des Mannes.)
with a chariot - the finest in Sparta. After giving him much praise, three hundred selected
Spartiate men escorted him when he went away, the men who are called the ‘Hippees’
(Knights), up to the Tegean border. Only this man of all men whom we know did the
Spartiates escort.’ (...καί μιν Λακεδαιμόνιοι καλῶς μὲν ὑπεδέξαντο, μεγάλως δὲ
ἐτίμησαν. ἀριστήμα μὲν νυν ἔδοσαν Εὑρυβιάδη ἐλαίης στέφανον, σοφίης δὲ καὶ
dεξιότητος Θεμιστοκλεί, καὶ τοῦτο στέφανον ἐλαίης- ἐδωρήσαντό τε μιν
ὀχὼ τῷ ἐν Σπάρτῃ καλλιστεύοντι- αἰνέσαντες δὲ πολλά, προέπεμψαν
ἀπιόντα τριηκόσιοι Σπαρτιητέων λογάδες, οὗτοι οἵ περ ἵππες καλέονται,
μέχρι οὕρω τῶν Τεγεητικῶν∙ μοῦνον δὴ τούτον πάντων ἀνθρώπων τῶν
ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Σπαρτιῆται προέπεμψαν.)

Herodotus emphasises the fact of the honours and that Themistocles was indeed
worthy of them precisely by listing them. Irony lies in the dichotomy that, while his own
peers were too envious to accord Themistocles his dues, the Spartans, who at best are
rivalling allies and whose relationship with the Greeks is generally fraught with tension,
recognise his merit to an unprecedented degree. Immerwahr notes, however, that
Themistocles still doesn’t get the prize for valour, which he says Herodotus considers
‘the only true ἀριστήμον’; even with the Spartans, Themistocles only got the second
prize.\(^{457}\)

By setting out the ironic nature of Themistocles’ Spartan honours, Herodotus
prepares the reader/audience for the ultimate insult which caps the theme of envy
(8.125.1-2)\(^{458}\): ‘When he came from Lacedaemonia to Athens, Timodemus the
Aphidnaian, who was among the enemies of Themistocles, but was not otherwise among
the noteworthy men, being insane with envy jeered at Themistocles, criticising his
journey to Sparta, (saying) that (it was) thanks to Athens he had the honours from the
Spartans, but not thanks to himself. But Themistocles, when Timodemus didn’t stop

\(^{457}\) Immerwahr (1966: 286, see also n. 139).

\(^{458}\) Hohti (1976: 130, cf. n. 4) lists this speech in those of ‘non-causative function’ and says of this type that
‘the dialogues form the structure of the whole account. This fact reveals that the speech constitutes the
basic historical account, in other words the speeches contain something special which is worth telling; they
are memorable.’
saying these things, said, ‘This is indeed the case; were I from Belbina, I would not have been honoured so by the Spartiates, but you would not [have been honoured by the Spartiates] either, my dear fellow, although you are an Athenian.’ (ὡς δὲ ἐκ τῆς Λακεδαίμονος ἀπίκετο ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας, ἐνθαῦτα Τιμόδημος Ἀφιδναῖος, τῶν ἐχθρῶν μὲν τῶν Θεμιστοκλέος ἑών, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ τῶν ἐπιφανέων ἀνδρῶν, φθόνῳ καταμαργέων ἐνείκεε τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα, τὴν ἐς Λακεδαίμονα ἀπιξεῖν προφέρων, ὡς διὰ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἑχοί τὰ γέφεα τὰ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλ’ οὐ δι’ ἑωυτόν. ο δὲ, ἐπείτε οὐκ ἐπαύετο λέγων ταῦτα ὁ Τιμόδημος, εἶπε· οὕτω ἔχει τοι· οὔτ’ ἂν ἔχω ἕων Βελβινίτης ἐτιμήθην οὐτώ πρὸς Σπαρτητέων, οὔτ’ ἂν σύ, ἄνθρωπε, ἕων Αθηναῖος.)

The word for madness used here is καταμαργέων, which is used only once in the Histories and so affords no direct comparison, but in all other respects acts as μαίνομαι does in terms of having a literary function in the context. Timodemus’ insanity here is modified with the noun φθόνῳ, repeating the word used in 8.124.1 to explain why the Greeks didn’t acknowledge Themistocles’ valour. The same theme is continued here: Timodemus does not wish to honour Themistocles either, and the

459 Pohlenz (1973: 151, 152) suggests that these ‘unheard of honours’ (unerhörten Ehren) were earned ‘not as a representative of his father-city, but rather as a brilliant individual’ (nicht als Exponent seiner Vaterstadt, sondern als geniale Einzelpersönlichkeit), whereas Themistocles is made to say himself (οὕτω ἔχει τοι) that being an Athenian did help.


461 A similar, though more extended, modification occurs in 3.25.1-2, with ὀργή.

462 Frost (1980: 168) says of Timodemus’ madness: ‘Herodotus specifically stated that he was “enraged by envy,” which would seem to indicate that his passion was neurotic, not politically inspired.’ While the lack of political motive is true, Timodemus’ madness is, in this case, only a nervous affliction in terms of being a way to demonstrate the magnitude of his envy and the difference in the status of both individuals. Lenardon (1978: 99) says the ‘hostility here seems to be more personal than general’ which is also true enough, but note that Timodemus was one of a group of ‘enemies of Themistocles’, so the ill-feeling may be more general than it first appears, not to mention the original envy of the generals after Salamis. Rather inexplicably, Podlecki even seems inclined to doubt Timodemus’ hostility (1975: 28): ‘Themistocles was attacked by a certain Timodemus of Aphidna, whom Herodotus, the first to recount what was to become the most famous of all Themistoclean anecdotes, calls “one of Themistocles’ enemies” (8.125), although it is uncertain whether there was any evidence for the assertion beyond the tenor of the man’s remarks.’ I question whether any more evidence than the man’s remarks is needed.
difference between the two men is made very clear by Herodotus. Themistocles’ honour roll is followed by the description of Timodemus as being ‘among the enemies of Themistocles, but...not otherwise among the noteworthy...’. From being dishonoured by the Greek generals, Themistocles has come to being dishonoured by a nobody (just one of those hostile to Themistocles), and what is more, a nobody from Themistocles’ own city – where he should be fêted as a hero. Timodemus takes the envy of the generals to an even higher level; partly because he is so lowly, and partly because Themistocles has now received extensive honours from the Spartans. This new level is signalled by calling him ‘insane with envy’ (φθόνῳ καταμαργέων); Herodotus uses the phrase in this context to push the theme of envy, which has been a topos in the narrative, as well as emphasising the discrepancy between the positions of Timodemus and Themistocles; positions which have been carefully cultivated by Herodotus in order that, at this high point of the logos, we should see clearly exactly how insulting Timodemus’ statement is.

The madness in this sense also assists in the build-up to the climax, or as Lang has it, the ‘dramatic “punchline”’ of the scene\(^{463}\), because the ‘ultimate insult’ receives what could be termed the ‘ultimate retort’\(^{464}\), when Themistocles manages to sum up in a pithy statement the enormity of Timodemus’ remarks\(^{465}\). In one sentence he combines his honours from the Spartiates, which are partly because he is an Athenian, and the absence of any such honour due to Timodemus, Athenian or not.

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\(^{463}\) Lang, (1984: 98). See also Pg. 97 for the ‘mixed pair’ category ‘made up of announcements and responses’ and the three other examples of this type ((i.45; vi.63.2; viii.5.2) which also have the “punchline”. Hohti (1976: 70) is of a similar opinion: ‘in the account of the envy of Timodemus for Themistocles, the speech provides the culmination of the story.’

\(^{464}\) As Green (1996: 214) notes, a ‘cutting personal gibe’; Hohti (1976: 70), a ‘biting answer’.

\(^{465}\) Hohti (1976: 115) says of this passage that it is heavily stressed to characterise Themistocles. He compares this piece with Pausanias’ rejection of Lampon’s proposal to decapitate Mardonius’ corpse (9.78.1): ‘Both dialogues are intended to illustrate the greatness and moral rectitude of these generals.’
Madness in Context: Women of Argos (9.34.1-2)

Herodotus tells the story of Melampus’ cure of the mad women of Argos at 9.34.1-2. This λόγος caps that of Teisamenos in 9.33.1-5: both relate how two men, Teisamenos on one hand and Melampus on the other, got not just what they wanted but more, because of the desperation of those wishing to hire their services. This technique is similar to that used at 4.76.1-4.80.5 where Herodotus first sketches the murder of Anacharsis and then that of Scyles, using madness in the second example; it is also similar to the account of Timodemus and Themistocles, where, in a logos about envy, Timodemus’ mad envy ratchets up the level of envy portrayed (8.125.1). A background sketch of Teisamenos, the Greek diviner, is in turn matched by one of Hegesistratus (9.37.1-9.38.1), the diviner for the Persians, both of whom foretell failure if they attack (involving crossing the Asopus river, a potent symbol of limit and a boundary, 9.36.1, 9.37.1); Hegesistratus gives in quicker and lets the Persians do what they like (9.41.4), thus securing their failure. The reference to the women of Argos is therefore part of an important point in the narrative, and bolsters the story of the Greek diviner; this is significant because it is the opinion of the diviners which will determine who attacks and thus who will lose. On the whole, however, Herodotus does not display much of an interest in playing with the idea of madness in this case, where its function is simply the means by which Melampus gets what he wants. This is unlike his treatment of madness in the Scyles logos, where the madness intensifies the theme of Scythian nomos breakers.

The story of Teisamenos, given in 9.33.1-5, is a significant diversion which serves to show Teisamenos’ abilities and provenance. He is introduced with the significant statement that the Spartans had made him a fellow citizen (λεωσφέτερον, 9.33.1). This is a complete aberration of normal Spartan policy (Herodotus later points out that only Teisamenos and his brother were ever made Spartan citizens of all the people in the world, 9.35.1) and therefore a startling starting point which is elaborated on. His reputation is enhanced by an oracular proclamation that he ‘will win five very great contests’ (ἀγῶνας τοὺς μεγίστους ἀναιρήσεσθαι πέντε, 9.33.2). He takes this to

466 In a rather odd omission, Thomas (2000) makes no mention of this section.
mean Olympian victories and applies himself to athletics for a while, but the Spartans realised the oracle meant ‘martial contests’ (ἀρηίους ἀγῶνας, 9.33.3) and offered money to get him to be a war leader. But he, seeing that the Spartiates considered it very important to secure him as a friend, when he learnt this, he raised the price, indicating to them that if they would make him their citizen and gave him a share in everything, he would do these things, but for no other payment. (ὁ δὲ ὤρων περὶ πολλοῦ ποιευμένους Σπαρτιήτας φίλων αὐτὸν προσθέσθαι, μαθὼν τούτο ἀνέτιμα σημαίνων σφι ὡς ἢν μιν πολιήτην σφέτερον ποιήσωνται τῶν πάντων μεταδιδόντες, ποιήσει ταῦτα, ἐπ’ ἄλλῳ μισθῷ δ’ οὔ, 9.33.4). The Spartiates refused to meet these conditions, until finally their fear of the Persian invasion caused them to give in (9.33.5), at which point Teisamenos ‘when he found out that they had changed their minds said that he was no longer so satisfied with these (conditions) alone, but that it was necessary in addition that his brother Hagias become a Spartiate on the same terms which he himself had also become [a Spartiate].’ (γνοὺς τετραμμένους σφέας οὐδ’ οὕτω ἐτὶ ἐφῆ ἀφίκεεσθαι τούτοις μούνοις, ἀλλὰ δεῖν ἐτὶ τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἑωυτοῦ Ἁγίην γίνεσθαι Σπαρτιήτην ἐπὶ τοῖσι αὐτοῖς λόγοις τοῖσι καὶ αὐτὸς γίνεται.)

This is the point at which the story of Melampus and the mad women of Argos ties in, because Teisamenos uses the same principles as Melampus, although Herodotus points out that Melampus used his influence on a greater scale, and asks for kingship rather than citizenship ‘In saying these things he was imitating Melampus, if asking for kingship and asking for citizenship are to be compared’ (ταῦτα δὲ λέγων οὕτος ἐμιμέετο Μελάμποδα, ὡς εἰκάσαι βασιληῖν τε καὶ πολιτηῖν αἴτεομένους, 9.34.1). Both Masaracchia and Munson take this statement to mean that

467 As Munson (2001: 59-60) points out, the story of Teisamenos ‘serves to anticipate prophetically the outcome of the battle, because it mentions Plataea as the first of the five victories Tisamenus was destined to win for the Spartans (9.35.2).’

468 Fehling (1989: 185 n. 4) notes the ‘imitation motif’ and adds 1.3.1 as another section for comparison.
Herodotus sees the two as equal, and that we also should see them as such.\footnote{Although I myself see the two rather on terms of equality only with regard to the difficulty of achieving either. Masaracchia (1976: 155): ‘…gli Spartani, così gelosi delle loro prerogative, sono alla mercé di un indovino straniero, che ottime dignità pari a quella dei re. Il racconto della storia di Melampo serve a mostrare, per analogia, che di fatto Tisameno, chiedendo la cittadinanza oltre alla funzione di ἡγεμών offertagli dagli Spartani, ha preteso e ottenuto dignità regale.’ (The Spartans, so jealous of their prerogatives, are at the mercy of a foreign seer, who obtains dignity equal with that of the kings. The narrative of the story of Melampus serves to show, by analogy, that in fact Teisamenos, while asking for the citizenship as well as the office of ἡγεμών offered to him by the Spartans, has demanded and obtained royal dignity.) Munson (2001: 61-62) says of the logos that ‘By using Melampus to interpret Tisamenus, the text…paradoxically transforms his achievement of citizenship into a metaphor for the acquisition of kingly power’ and ‘Inserting the Melampus story through explicit comparison establishes that the audience should imagine (ἐικάσαι) a vertical analogy between one who became king in a literal sense and one who became “king” in a figurative sense, because the narrator himself reads his material in this way.’ I lean more towards Cragg’s view (1976: 201), that Herodotus indicates ‘that kingship and Spartan citizenship are not totally comparable’.}

Masaracchia comments on the ‘humour which runs through the account, which is not favourable to either the seers or to Sparta’.\footnote{Masaracchia (1976: 155), ’…l’umore che corre per la narrazione, che non è favorevole né agli indovini né a Sparta.’ Munson (2001: 61), too, considers that the seers are portrayed slightly negatively: ‘An emergency places both individuals in a de facto position of power so that they obtain an exceptional political advantage that violates the city's integrity’ and ‘By using Melampus to interpret Tisamenus, the text emphasizes the invasive character of Tisamenus' request…’ Erbse (1992:144) also uses provocative language when he says ‘Herodotus points out that he [Teisamenos] blackmailed the Spartans just as Melampus once [blackmailed] the Argives, when their women were struck with madness’ (Herodot macht darauf aufmerksam, daß er die Spartaner ebenso erpreßte wie einst Melampus die Argeier, als ihre Frauen vom Wahnsinn befallen waren.)}

He remarks that ‘it emerges that the Spartan seer is a man who has demonstrated total incapacity in interpreting an oracle which concerned him’ and notes that ‘the seer can’t manage to understand the real significance of the Pythia’s reply and is beaten in this by the Spartans’, who on the other hand gain no advantage from working out the meaning of the oracle because they still ‘have to give in to the will of Tisamenus’.\footnote{Masaracchia (1976: 155): ‘emerge che l'indovino spartano è un uomo che ha mostrato totale incapacità nell’interpretare un oracolo che lo riguardava.’ ‘L’indovino non riesce a intendere il vero significato della risposta della Pizia ed è battuto in questo dagli Spartani. Questi poi, mentre sembrano per un momento i più intelligenti, debbono arrendersi alla volontà di Tisameno.’}

While I agree on the presence of humour, I question whether we are to see the seers or the Spartans in any kind of light except for that of advantage taken in the face of desperation. The Spartans, after all, are surely to be commended for their obtaining the winning abilities of Teisamenos at this crucial time, even if four of the five ‘contests’ were against other Greeks (9.35.2). Herodotus has used this technique before, in the characterisation of Themistocles, who was an
advantage for the Greeks at Salamis, but who could still take bribes, extort money from others and double-deal with Xerxes (8.109.5, 110.1-112.3).

Herodotus gives the tale of Melampus (9.34.1-2): ‘For indeed Melampus on his part, when the women in Argos went mad, when the Argives hired him from Pylos to give their women rest from the disease, he proposed a payment of half the kingship. The Argives would not put up with this but went away, and when [far] more of the women went mad, they then agreed to the (conditions) Melampus proposed and went to give these to him. But he then asked for more, seeing that they had changed their minds, saying that if they did not also give his brother Bias a share, the third part of the kingship, he would not do what they wanted.’ (καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ Μελάμπους τῶν ἐν Ἀργεί γυναικῶν μανεισέων, ὡς μιν οἱ Ἀργεῖοι ἐμισθοῦντο ἐκ Πύλου παύσαι τὰς σφετέρας γυναικάς τῆς νούσου, μισθὸν προετείνατο τῆς βασιληίης τὸ ἡμισυ. οὐκ ἀνασχομένων δὲ τῶν Ἀργείων ἀλλ’ ἀπιόντων, ὡς ἐμαίνοντο [πολλῶ] πλεῦνες τῶν γυναικῶν, οὕτω δὴ ὑποστάντες τὰ ὁ Μελάμπους προετείνατο ἡμισαν δώσοντες οἱ ταῦτα. ὁ δὲ ἐνθαῦτα δὴ ἐπορέγεται ὁρῶν αὐτοὺς τετραμμένους, φάς, ἢν μὴ καὶ τῷ ἄδελφῳ Βίαντι μεταδῶσι τὸ τριτημόριον τῆς βασιληίης, οὐ ποιήσειν τὰ βούλονται.)

Madness here is called a νοῦσος, only the second time it has been so unequivocally linked with disease (the first is at 6.75.1 of Cleomenes). The reason for calling madness a disease here is probably in its action, in that it spreads, epidemic-like, to those previously unaffected, as evidenced by the phrase ‘when [far] more of the women went mad’ (ὡς ἐμαίνοντο [πολλῶ] πλεῦνες τῶν γυναικῶν) Another clue to its qualification may be that there is the possibility of Melampus (as a seer and priest-figure) curing the affliction, as a doctor cures a disease. Herodotus does not qualify of what exactly the cure consists, but as Vandiver remarks, ‘since the reason for the Argive women’s madness was well known, the reference to that episode would bring Melampus’

472 This is the only note Avery (1972a: 19, n. 17) makes of this piece.

473 Although, as Brandenburg notes (1976: 82), Melampus is not a doctor but a ‘non-medical practitioner’ (“Heilpraktiker”).
connection with Dionysus into the readers’ mind.”\textsuperscript{474} Melampus has already made an appearance in the Histories: at 7.221.1 he is mentioned as an ancestor of Megistias of Acarnania, and at 2.49.1-2 there is a longer discourse on him and his role in bringing the rites of Dionysus from Egypt to Greece.\textsuperscript{475} He is not specifically mentioned in Hesiod, or at least, not in the fragments we have, although a scholiast has appended his name to a fragment on the daughters of Proteus.\textsuperscript{476} Vandiver suggests that by linking Melampus with Megistias in 7.221.1, Herodotus ‘verifies Megistias’ own prophetic abilities at the same time as he reiterates the seer’s prediction of the coming disaster’, and that this mention is recalled at 9.33.4, just before the discussion of Melampus’ demand. As she says, ‘This evocation of a seer serving with the descendants of Heracles in a battle against the Persians sets the scene for Melampus’ reappearance; he is, in effect, made to serve as Tisamenus’ ancestor, just as he was Megistias.\textsuperscript{477} In this case, however, the comparison is more positive, because both Teisamenos and Melampus get what they ask for, and by having Tisamenus, the Spartans are bound to succeed, unlike at Thermopylae.

\textsuperscript{474} Vandiver (1991: 67-68). See also n.1, Pg. 68, for the method of curing the madness.

\textsuperscript{475} Vandiver (1991: 154-157) comments extensively on this section.

\textsuperscript{476} Hesiod is given as the author of the fragment of The Catalogue of Women and Great Eoiae, Children of Inachus (Solmsen, Merkelbach and West 1983: 151): 131. Ps. Apollod. Bibl. ii. [26] 2.2: ‘Acrisius is king of Argos, and Proetus (is king) of Tiryns. Acrisius has by Eurydice, the daughter of Lacedaemon, (a daughter) Danae, but Proetus has by Sthenboia “Lysippe and Iphinoe and Iphianassa” These women went mad, as Hesiod says, because they did not receive the rites of Dionysus.’ (Ἀρκίσιος μὲν Ἀργοὺς βασιλεύει, Προῖτος δὲ Τίρυνθος. καὶ γίνεται Ακρισίω μὲν εξ Εὐρυδίκης τῆς Ἀρκεδαίμονος Δαναί, Προῖτο δὲ ἐκ Σθενεβοία Λυσίππη [τε] καὶ Ίφινόη καὶ Ἰφιάνασσα αὐταί δὲ...ἐμάνησαν, ὡς μὲν Ἡσίοδος φησιν, ὃτι τὰς Διονύσου τελετὰς οὐ κατεδέχοντο.) Although it is unclear whether the women referred to are all the aforementioned daughters or only the daughters of Proteus (αὐταί is feminine plural and so could refer to all females previously mentioned in the nominative, but the use of δέ may signify only the ones mentioned after Προῖτο δὲ), we at least have some record of a story of mad women in association with refusing the rites of Dionysus. In fact, a scholiast has appended to the piece: Probus in Verg. Ecl. vi. 48: ...These women, because they despised the divine majesty/will/command of Juno, having been made wild with madness, who believed themselves to have been made (into) cows, moved away from their native country Argos, and were later restored to sanity by Melampus, the son of Amythaon... (...has, quod lunonis contemperant numen, insanias exterritas, quae crederent se boves factas, patriam Argos reliquisse, postea a Melampode Amythaonis filio sanatas...) This qualification was added centuries later and may have been a mix up with the story from Herodotus anyway. See also How and Wells (1967: Vol. II, 302, s.v. 34) for discussion of the legend.

\textsuperscript{477} Vandiver (1991: 55).

\textsuperscript{478} Vandiver (1991:68). Vandiver adds, ‘In either case, the hero serves as a precedent for a seer going into battle with the Spartans, and provides a link between Thermopylae and Platea, the first of Tisamenus’ five battles.’
Melampus may be working on a larger return, but this does not necessarily suggest that curing the mad women of Argos was of greater or lesser value than warding off the Persians. The emphasis is on the desperation which causes both parties, the Spartiates on one hand and the Argives on the other, to concede to the terms proposed. The kingship demanded by Melampus is the equivalent of the Spartan citizenship, in its way, because both are so hard to acquire; both demands are so great that despite the initial need, the Spartans and the Argives rethink their requests on receiving the terms; both the Spartans and the Argives have to become completely desperate to consider giving Melampus and Teisamenos what they want.

Because Melampus is working on the level of kingship, the madness of the Argive women is a spur to the concession of the Argives (just as fear of the Persians is the spur for the Spartans). Madness is used in this context simply because it is the ‘fear producer’ which Melampus, and he alone, can cure. Melampus has a skill which happens to be needed; he uses the need as a fulcrum to assist himself even as he agrees to assist others. Teisamenos too has a skill which is needed, in his case, the talismanic ability to win five battles. In the context of war, this is a useful talent, just as having the ability to cure madness is supremely useful in the context of madness. The two situations are similar, and both make the same point: in time of need, a smart man can benefit himself as well as others; but at the same time, the two accounts are different because in each context it is a different skill which is useful. It just happens that one of those contexts is madness.

Thus madness in the story of Melampus is used precisely because Melampus is who he is: the man who can cure madness. That the madness in this instance is described as a νοῦσος is an indication that it may spread like other diseases, but, like them, can also be cured.
Madness in Context: Amompharetus (9.55.2)

The leader of the Spartan Pitanate contingent, Amompharetus, is called mad in 9.55.2. His ‘madness’ is similar to the madness of the Greeks in 6.112.2, 8.10.1 and 8.140.α3: in all cases the ‘mad’ people are threatened with fighting a enemy greater than themselves, either in the immediate present or the near future. Amompharetus is in a similar situation, but rather than being called mad by the enemy, as happens in the three previous examples, Amompharetus is called mad by his own commander, Pausanias, which ‘only adds a certain piquancy to the situation’. Amompharetus’ ‘madness’ has a lot to do with being a Spartan; in his case he is called mad not because he wants to attack the enemy exactly, but because he refuses to retreat with the rest of the army. Immerwahr notes that the scene between Pausanias and Amompharetus ‘…shows not only the internal divisiveness of Sparta…but also reaffirms true Spartan valor against the behavior of Pausanias’. So unlike examples where ‘battle madness’ has been a fight

479 A taxarch (9.253.2), to be exact. Cragg (1976: 116) takes from this piece that taxarchs ‘had enough independence of command to allow Amompharetus to refuse an order’ and later (Pg. 140) ‘Herodotus had apparently been told that subordinate officers in the Spartan army could argue with the commander-in-chief over an order. Such an idea is clearly contrary to the tradition of Spartan discipline and is rare in any army.’ While this is possible, we should also note that both Euryanax and Pausanias are very upset at Amompharetus’ stand (9.53.3, δεινὸν…ἐποιεῦντο τὸ μὴ πείσθεσθαι ἐκεῖνον σφίσι), and that as Herodotus does make quite a lot of the argument, this would suggests that such disagreement was an unusual occurrence. The phrase δεινὸν ἐποιεῦντο is very like that commented on by Veen (1996: 17), συμφορή ποίεεσθαι. This phrase, he suggests, conveys the emotion of distress after an infelicitous occurrence’ that can mean ‘grieving’. Perhaps then we should consider that δεινὸν ἐποιεῦντο means something more along the emotional lines of ‘they were horrified’ or ‘they were distressed’ than ‘they considered it terrible’ or ‘they were indignant at’. Hohti (1976: 117) notes that ‘The subordinate position of the Amompharetus episode is shown by the fact that on his return the Athenian envoy should report what he has seen: 9.55.2 τὸν Ἀθηναίων κήρυκα…λέγειν [ὁ Παυσανίης] ἐκέλευε τὰ παρεόντα σφί πρήγματα.’

480 Avery (1972a: 20). Avery does think that the imputation of madness is what changes Amompharetus’ mind: ‘Amompharetus refuses to yield to the enemy in any way until Pausanias in exasperation calls him insane (9.55.2).’ This is not the case; they are still arguing at dawn (9.56.1, ἀνακρινομένοις πρὸς ἔσωτος τῆς κατελάμβανε), and Amompharetus only moves when he sees Pausanias is serious about leaving him behind (9.56.1-9.57.1).

for freedom, a *nomos* unrecognised by Persians, here the *nomos* which Pausanias has difficulty understanding is that of his own people.

This narrative is a relatively small part of the description of the preparations before the battle of Plataea. The leaders of the army decide, for various reasons, to shift base (9.50.1-9.51.4); the army ends up at Plataea, although that was not necessarily the plan (9.52.1). Amompharetus, who leads one of the Spartan contingents, doesn’t know about the plan and isn’t willing to abide by it (9.53.2). The other Spartan leaders try to persuade Amompharetus differently (9.53.4-9.54.1), while the Athenians send back messengers to see what the Spartans are going to end up doing (9.54.2).

The messenger arrives as the attempt to persuade Amompharetus descends into argument, because neither Eurynax nor Pausanias can persuade him at all (οὐκὼν ἔπειθον, 9.55.1) that his company will be in great danger if they face the Persians alone. The argument comes to a head when (9.55.2) ‘... Amompharetus, arguing, takes hold of a stone with both his hands and, placing it in front of Pausanias’ feet said that this voting pebble was his vote not to flee the foreigners [meaning the Persians]. And (Pausanias), calling him mad and deranged, ordered the Athenians’ herald, who was asking the things he had been ordered to say, (to tell) them (the Athenians) the existing problems...’

By introducing madness into the narrative at this point, Herodotus accomplishes several objectives. Because the effect of Pausansias using such an abusive term towards his own ally is rather shocking, the madness acts as a marker, emphasising the argument as a whole and in particular this climactic point of Amompharetus’ refusal to move which is literally done in stone. It is this refusal which complicates and delays the army’s retreat (a manoeuvre which has been dwelt on extensively by Herodotus since 9.50.1) for

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482 Lang (1984: 131) calls this an explanatory speech. Hohti (1976: 74) sees Amompharetus’ speech as causative, and says that purpose of the scene is ‘to characterize the grim fight against the barbarians’.

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the next two paragraphs, ending with the sudden clash of the (eventually) whole army with the Persians’ cavalry at 9.57.3483.

Another function of the madness is to indicate just how angry Pausanias is to be using this term of abuse. Herodotus drives home the arguing of the three protagonists by repeating ἐς νείκεα twice (9.55.1) and νεικεῶν (9.55.2) in short order. The madness in this sense not only underlines the arguing but also shows the height of emotion it takes for one Spartan to give this kind of label to another. Conversely, the use of the two epithets, μαινόμενον καὶ οὐ φρενήρεα, has little extra value, as Herodotus often ‘doubles up’ such phrases484; the most that can be said is that the double use draws a little more attention to the phrase.

From previous examples where Persians have called Greeks mad, the epithet also casts light on the attitudes of the one who uses it. In this case, Pausanias is shown to be angry, but his anger and his calling Amompharetus mad are based on Amompharetus’ insistence on obeying the Spartan credo of standing to fight the enemy485. Given that Pausanias is not able to appreciate Amompharetus’ stance, this may be a seed planted by Herodotus to foreshadow Pausanias’ later conversion to Persian custom. Furthermore, Pausanias is the only Greek who calls his allies mad, whereas the Persians do so three times; this could also serve as a clue to Pausanias’ later defection to Persia486. Spartan

483 Von Fritz (1967: 271) points out that ‘…this little intermission is not mentioned as reason for the later delay in so many words…’ (...dieses kleine Intermezzo nicht etwa als Grund der späteren Verzögerung mit dürren Worten erwähnt...wird). Blösel (2001: 184) makes a point which could well be cogent here: ‘The Greeks’ permanent desire to retreat in the face of the overwhelming superiority of the Persian forces [n. 19, Hdt. 7.173.4, 183.1, 297, 219.2; 8.4.2, 18, 49.2, 56, 57.2, 74.2, 75.2.] is a Herodotean topos, the literary purpose of which is to emphasize all the more strongly the miraculous salvation vouchsafed at Salamis.’ So too may Amompharetus’ desire not to retreat emphasise the ‘salvation’ at Plataea to some extent.

484 Such as at 1.109.2, 3.34.3, 3.35.4, 4.79.4, 5.42.1 and 6.12.3.

485 As Avery (1972a: 20) also notes: ‘Amompharetus in refusing to move with the rest of the army is deviating from the human norm, but at the same time he is acting just as a Spartan is supposed to act…All the same, the normal urge for self preservation makes it possible to think of the Spartan ideal as verging on insanity.’ As I will suggest, this latter consideration reflects more on Pausanias than on any general view of the Spartan code in the Histories.

486 Immerwahr (1966: 297-298) says of Herodotus’ portrayal of Pausanias that ‘The praise of Pausanias implied in these anecdotes [such as his refined behaviour at 9.76.3, 9.79.1-2] is in glaring contradiction with his later tyrannical behavior at Byzantium, a deterioration of character well known to Herodotus....Herodotus admits the possibility of change into the opposite. The picture of Pausanias is deliberate.’
ethics have been the subject of some extended discussions in the *Histories*. Xerxes inquires about Greeks and Spartans from Demaratus at 7.101.1-104.7; in particular at 7.104.4-5 we are told about the *nomos* that Spartans obey, which Amompharetus’ speech paraphrases as well⁴⁸⁷: ‘For a master commands them: law, they fear it by far more even than your people do you. At least they do whatever it commands; and it always commands the same thing, forbidding fleeing any number of men out of a battle, but by remaining in their post to overcome or be destroyed.’ (ἐπεστὶ γὰρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ύποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ· ποιεῦσι γὰν τὰ ἀν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγη· ἀνώγει δὲ τῶντό αἰεί, οὐκ ἐὼν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλήθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξῃ ἐπικρατεῖν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι).

In the lead up to the battle of Plataea also Mardonius makes derogatory comments about the Spartans at 9.48.1-4 and 9.58.2-3, taunting them about retreating: ‘you are said to be the bravest…but of this [what people say] nothing is true at all!...We see you running away and leaving your post…’ (ὑμεῖς δὴ λέγεσθε εἶναι ἀνδρείς ἀριστοι...τῶν δ’ ἀρ’ ἦν οὐδὲν ἀληθές...φεύγοντας καὶ στάσιν ἐκέλευσοντας ὑμέας έιδομεν...9.48.1-2); ‘You…told me that the Spartans didn’t flee from battle…but now under the cover of the past night we see all of them have run off too…’ (ὑμεῖς...ἐλέγετε Λακεδαιμονίους οὗ φεύγειν ἐκ μάχης... νῦν τε ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα καὶ οἱ πάντες ὄρῳμεν διαδράντας...9.58.2). Amompharetus’ stance could be seen as a vindication of the Spartan code at which Mardonius has poked so much fun.

Finally, in the cases where the Persians call the Greeks mad, the Greeks are either actively attacking or are accused of making war (6.112.2, δρόμῳ ἐπιόντας; 8.10.1, ἐπιπλέοντας; 8.140.α3, πόλεμον ἀνταειρόμενοι). In the instance of Pausanias and Amompharetus, Amompharetus’ vote is ‘not to flee the foreigners’ (μὴ φεύγειν τοὺς ξείνους) so in this sense, pedantic though it may be, Amompharetus is not called mad for attacking the Persians, but for not retreating⁴⁸⁸. Von Fritz considers

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⁴⁸⁷ As Lateiner (1989:21) puts it, ‘...the Spartan creed and ethos’.
⁴⁸⁸ Von Fritz (1967: 271) gives the false impression that the stone is the marker from which Amompharetus will not move: ‘...he took a big stone, put it in front of him on the ground and said that he would not give
that in this episode ‘the difference between Athenian and Spartan ἐλευθερία is characterised in the clearest way.’ He says that although both sides have the same intention not to submit to such a regime as the Persians have under any circumstances, ‘with the Spartans this intention finds its concrete realisation in absolute obedience in the face of the law, or better, custom, as well as in determination.’\(^{489}\) So by adhering to his custom in his fight for freedom, Amompharetus is called mad by the frustrated Pausanias.

Some scholars find this section odd, for various reasons. Cragg calls it a ‘confusing incident’\(^{490}\); Burn says that the quarrel and the details cannot be regarded as an ‘indubitable ‘public fact’’, but then speculates as to the ‘real’ details of the quarrel\(^{491}\); von Fritz describes it as ‘a little Satyr-play’\(^{492}\); Green is scathing of the piece: ‘a circumstantial but highly dubious story’ and ‘jejune…implausible’\(^{493}\). Some of the problems they have with the logos are the Spartan vote\(^{494}\), the existence of a Pitanate

\(^{489}\) Von Fritz (1967: 271): ‘…wird…der Unterschied zwischen athenischer und spartanischer ἐλευθερία auf das deutlichste charakterisiert.’ Auf beiden Seiten steht der gleiche Wille, sich unter keinen Umständen einem despotischen und arbiträren Regime zu unterwerfen. ‘..bei den Spartanern findet dieser Wille seine konkrete Verwirklichung in dem absoluten Gehorsam gegenüber dem Gesetz oder besser dem Brauch sowie in der Entschlossenheit…’ As he points out, the Spartan ideal of fighting to the death if necessary ‘would, with greater likelihood, have actually come to it, if the Athenians had not been there’ (mit größter Wahrscheinlichkeit tatsächlich gekommen wäre, wenn die Athener nicht gewesen wären).

\(^{490}\) Cragg (1976: 140).
\(^{491}\) Burn (1962: 532): ‘Since Amompharetos’ battalion finally remained as a rearguard, there may well have been some fairly urgent last-hour discussion as to his exact assignment.’

\(^{493}\) Green (1996: 263).
\(^{494}\) Considered spurious by Burn, (1962: 532, n.53): ‘the Spartans did not vote with pebbles, but by acclamation.’ Green (1996: 263 n.16) calls it a ‘glaring mistake’. Both cite Munro (1939: 335), whose work says nothing on the matter of Spartan voting, although n.1 conjectures that ‘the monument shown to Pausanias the Periegetes on the right of his road into Plataea as the tomb of Mardonius represented a warrior uplifting a rock in front of an august person, and was alternatively interpreted as Aeimnestus braining Mardonius, who was killed according to Plutarch by a stone, or Amompharetus recording his vote.’ Munro’s section is not in the second edition of the CAH. Thucydides is the source for acclamation, but this is only mentioned once, and in a situation where the acclamation is inconclusive, and appears only to be mentioned because of this problem, which persists until the voters are asked to divide themselves bodily, thus casting an ineffective light on the proceedings (1.87.1-3). The language for Spartan voting is still the same as that of other states: ψηφίζω/ψηφίζομαι (e.g. Thuc. 1.20.3 [where he argues against Herodotus’ claim that the Spartan kings have two votes; Thucydides says they have only one], 1.86.5, 1.88.1, 1.119.1, 1.125.1). On the other hand, the Athenians do not always vote with pebbles either in Thucydides, but occasionally by a show of hands (3.49.1, 6.13.1), where it is also specified that they are voting. If Thucydides is our only source for Spartans voting by acclamation, I would hesitate to make subjective leaps of logic to ascribe the truth to one historian’s word over the other. In partial support of
lochos\(^{495}\) and Amompharetus’ supposed rearguard\(^{496}\). While most note that Amompharetus is adhering to traditional Spartan principles\(^{497}\), others appear to doubt his bravery and principles\(^ {498}\). Green thinks that ‘There is only one reason for anyone, let alone Herodotus, to concoct so monumentally silly a story, and that is to explain why the Spartans and Athenians delayed so long in evacuating their respective positions (a delay which does, admittedly, call for explanation of some sort)’\(^{499}\). This is not so; Herodotus usually has several reasons for any given story, and in this case the argument serves to show the division of the Spartans\(^{500}\), highlight Spartan bravery and build the suspense.

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\(^{495}\)Green (1996: 263, n.16) notes of the section that ‘Thucydides…picked up an error of fact in it (1.20.3): there was no such unit as ‘the Pitane lochos’.’ The same argument for n.262 applies: it is one historian’s word against the other.

\(^{496}\)Burn (1962: 532), Cragg (1976: 140, although to a lesser extent than the others) and Green (1996: 264) all assume that Amompharetus’ unit was really acting as a rearguard.

\(^{497}\)See Avery (1972a: 20), Immerwahr, (1966: 296) and Masaracchia (1976: 167). Von Fritz (1967: 271) agrees, and says that ‘the story only has the purpose …to emphatically confirm the traditional idea of what characterises Spartans’ (…hat die Geschichte nur den Zweck…die traditionelle Vorstellung vom Spartanertum nachdrücklich zu bekräftigen.)

\(^{498}\)Green (1996: 263) acknowledges that Amompharetus is honourable, but still goes on to brand him a ‘pigheaded fire-eater’. The whole problem, however, is that Amompharetus is exactly the opposite of a fiery radical; on the contrary, what he is arguing for is staunch Spartan traditionalism. Masaracchia (1976: 167) suggests that because Amompharetus was forced to change his mind that ‘he doesn’t prove to be consistent with his threatening statements, and when he is left alone, retreats without protesting anymore’. (…egli non si dimostra coerente con le sue minacciose dichiarazioni e, quando è lasciato solo, si ritira senza più protestare.) This trivialises Amompharetus’ stance: he cares enough to argue about retreating and stays until it is clear to him that Pausanias means to carry out the plan of leaving him behind with his one company (9. 57.1); surely this is an indication that he realises Pausanias is serious and wouldn’t make such a move without good grounds for doing so. Amompharetus’ is not a mere token resistance. If we attribute such weakness and ‘inconsistency’ to Amompharetus, we must say the same of Pausanias, who didn’t really mean to abandon Amompharetus (9.57.2). Von Fritz describes Amompharetus in a better way: ‘…he finally comes around to following the others…’ (bequemt er sich schließlich, den andern nachzukommen.).

\(^{499}\)Green (1996: 263).

\(^{500}\)As Hohti and Immerwahr suggest. Hohti (1976:117): ‘Like the dialogue between Croesus and Cambyses, the quarrel between Amompharetus and Pausanias is inserted into a speech section (IX 55), in order to provide evidence of the situation in the Spartan camp’; Immerwahr (1966: 295-296): ‘…shows…the internal divisiveness of Sparta…’
before the battle, which, as most of the audience/readers would already know, had been won by the allied Greek forces. It does explain the delay, but this delay is demonstrated to be simply a matter of chance rather than the deliberate military manoeuvre others think it to be. When Green comments that such a manoeuvre, moving off at first light, because they have to *be seen to retreat*, is *against every rule in the military handbook*\(^\text{501}\), he assumes that the move was a clever, deliberate ploy. The reason why it is against the rules is more likely that it was not a deliberate military move in the first place, but a *snafu* which was turned around at the last minute. The clever, deliberate ploy is on Herodotus’ part, in making the fact of the victory of the Greeks, which the audience knew had occurred, into an exciting, nail-bitingly close encounter.

As Flower and Marincola point out, Herodotus ‘seems to have considerable sympathy for Amompharetus’, noting the ‘honourable mentions’ of him at 9.71.2 and 9.85.2; they suggest that to rationalise the account ‘is to miss the ‘heroic’ cast of the incident’\(^\text{502}\). Herodotus also makes a point of recording that ‘of the Greeks, although both the Tegeans and the Athenians were brave, the Spartans surpassed them in valour’, and that they ‘overcame all those who were opposite themselves’ (Ἑλλήνων δέ, ἀγαθῶν γενομένων καὶ Τεγεητέων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ύπερεβάλοντο ἀρετῇ Λακεδαιμόνιοι; ἀπαντες..οὖτοι τούς κατ’ ἐωυτοὺς ἐνίκων, 9.71.1, 9.71.2)\(^\text{503}\).


\(^\text{502}\) Flower and Marincola (2002: 201).

\(^\text{503}\) Such accolades are not at all consistent with arguments of ‘anti-Spartan’ feeling in the *logos* of Plataea. Von Fritz (1967: 271) believes something similar: ‘It was surely not Herodotus’ intention, as it is believed, to bring the martial prowess of the Spartans into question. On the contrary, he explicitly approves them shortly after, that they outdid all the other Greeks by far in it, including the Athenians and Tegeans’ (Gewiß war es nicht die Absicht Herodots, wie man gemeint hat, die kriegerische Tüchtigkeit der Spartaner in Frage zu stellen. Er bestätigt ihnen im Gegenteil kurz darauf ausdrücklich, daß sie alle anderen Griechen einschließlich der Athener und Tegetae darin bei weitem übertroffen haben ). For the opposite view, see Cragg (1976: 140): ‘the Amompharetus episode represents an attempt to transfer the blame to the perfidious Spartans…Yet the untrusting Athenians are willing to take orders from the perfidious Spartan general (9.54): Clearly some important information had been distorted or omitted.’ This last statement presupposes that Herodotus had no literary purpose in writing the section as he did. See also Masaracchia (1976: 109 -110, n.111), who believes that the narrative is ‘clearly anti-Spartan’ (chiaramente antispartano), and says, contrary to 9.71.1, that ‘The account of the battle of Plataea then exalts above all the Athenians and Tegeans: the Spartans, if nothing else, clearly cover themselves with ridicule, as in the episode of Amompharetus’ (La narrazione della battaglia di Platea esalta poi soprattutto Ateniesi e Tegetai: gli Spartani, se non altro, si coprono di chiaro ridicolo, come nell’episodio di Amonfareto.). Given the tension inherent in the incident, I am not convinced that the Spartans ‘cover themselves with ridicule’, nor
Despite the fragmented start to the battle, the battle itself appears to be a monument to Spartan, Athenian and Tegean (in that order) co-operation and bravery. The scene of the argument is simply a means to keep up the suspense before the battle.

Madness has several roles in this narrative, then: to emphasise the fact of argument within the Spartan camp and the climactic placement of Amompharetus’ large voting stone, which is symbolic of his refusal to retreat, as well as to reflect back on Pausanias and suggest that his attitude to his allies and customs is not entirely what it should be. In the context of the argument, madness reflects the anger felt by Pausanias, and points up the refusal of Amompharetus to retreat and thereby betray Spartan principles.

**Madness in Context: Aristodemus (9.71.3)**

It is perhaps fitting that this last case should come after that of Amompharetus, because Aristodemus is also a Spartan who has issues with Spartan behaviour. This case is the only one in which the verb λυσσαινω is used; it does not appear elsewhere in the Histories. While the verb is only used once, it does appear to have a slightly different connotation than other words for madness which have been used, but this may simply be due to the context.

Aristodemus was the sole survivor of the Battle of Thermopylae, and as such was reviled by his fellow-Spartans when he got back to Sparta. Whichever version of the story Herodotus tells, the underlying truth remains the same: Aristodemus did not fight in the battle (either because of a bad eye infection or because he was out delivering a...
message and dawdled), but someone else (a fellow-Spartan or another messenger) in the same position made sure that they fought despite the obstacles (7.229.1-230). For his lack of moral fibre, Aristodemus was shunned and called a coward when he went home (7.231).

At the Battle of Plataea, however, Herodotus gives it as his opinion that Aristodemus was ‘the best by far’ (ἀριστοτέλειός...μακρῷ, 9.71.2) of those outstanding Spartans who fought. The Spartans, however, did not honour him as they did Poseidonius, Philokyon and Amompharetus, other valiant heroes who also died (9.71.4). This was because those who had fought with him said that ‘he was clearly wanting to die, because of the charge he had [of cowardice (7.231)], so he went mad and abandoned his position and performed great deeds’ (βουλόμενον φανερῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρεούσης οἱ αἰτίης, λυσσῶντα τε καὶ ἐκλείποντα τὴν τάξιν ἔργα ἀποδέξασθαι μεγάλα, 9.71.3).

The difference between Aristodemus’ λύσσα and Amompharetus’ charge of μανία is that λύσσα is clearly a madness in battle, whereas Amompharetus’ μανία is not confined to battle alone. On the other hand, there is only one occurrence of the verb λυσσαίνω, so it is a facile distinction. Both nouns have a violence about them; there is no real defense between the use of λυσσαίνω here and the way the Greeks are called mad by the Persians when they charge in battle from a weak position (6.112.2), except that the Persians are puzzled where the Spartans are disapproving.

The reason for this disapproval seems to be because Aristodemus’ λύσσα causes him to do what Amompharetus is trying not to do: betray the Spartan code. At 7.104.4-5 the Spartan nomos is laid out for Xerxes’ benefit:

‘They do whatever it commands; and it always commands the same thing, forbidding fleeing any number of men out of a battle, but by remaining in their post to overcome or be destroyed.’ (ποιεύσι γὰρ τὰ ἀν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγητος ἀνώγητος δὲ τώοιτο αἰεῖ, οὐκ ἐών φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῇ τάξι ἐπικρατεῖν ἡ ἀπόλλυσθαι). So staying at one’s post is important; this was what Amompharetus was trying to do. By not retreating in front of the enemy (or apparently
‘fleeing’) he was staying at his post, to overcome or to be overcome. Aristodemus may have made the magnificent effort which Herodotus clearly admires, but the Spartans find his madness and the leaving of his post enough to deny him the prize of valour. Rather like the case of Themistocles (8.124.1), Herodotus suggests that the Spartans denied Aristodemus the prize out of envy (9.71.3).

The λύσσα and the leaving of his post allow Aristodemus to accomplish his great deeds, but both the state of mind and the action were motivated by a death wish. This makes him different from the Homeric heroes who experience λύσσα (see Chapter 3). His death wish is the factor which denies him the prize for valour: wanting to die while fighting is apparently not Spartan, although dying while fighting is.

Aristodemus’ death is also a little similar to that of Cleomenes. Cleomenes may or may not have been intending to kill himself (6.75.3), but he did do deliberate harm to himself: he did, apparently, want to hurt himself. Perhaps this is why the Spartans say that he was overly influenced by the time he spent drinking with the Scythians (6.84.1-3): it is a way of saying that Cleomenes had abandoned Spartan ways, since no true Spartan would want to take a knife to himself in the way the mad king did, and no true Spartan would have a death wish.

So λύσσα in the context of Aristodemus’ story is a frenzy that comes on in battle and causes one to fight well, but not in approved Spartan fashion by keeping to one’s post.
Chapter Three

To understand the matrix from which Herodotus’ use of madness is developed, we must look at the literary background of its use. To this end I have chosen to look at madness in Homer, Tragedy and in the Hippocratic writers. Herodotus appears to formulate his use of madness in a similar way to all of these sources, while at the same time being identical with none of them.

Homer

As the founding-stone of Greek literature, Homer’s Iliad and Odyssey are highly influential works which leave their marks on many writers, and Herodotus is no exception. Homer employs the concept of madness in ways which Herodotus also uses, although the latter often adopts his usage to the context in which he writes, which lends his use of madness a certain fluidity. Homer often uses madness in the context of battle, which may influence Herodotus’ own use of madness in this context at times. Homer also appears to use madness as a way of highlighting transgression of social custom and ritual, and this use is seen in the Histories also. In Homer there is usually a sense of instability and/or violence associated with madness, which Herodotus often seems to echo in his use of madness. Violence is not perhaps a surprising attribute of madness when in the battle context, but it is not restricted to battle alone. Wine is also associated with madness in both Homer and Herodotus, though not to a high degree in either. Finally, although it will not be treated as a separate subject of its own, madness in Homer is very often from the gods, as it is in Herodotus’ work. This aspect will be discussed in the relevant episodes.

The episodes from Homer which follow are chosen mainly for their use of μαίνομαι or μανία, as these are the forms Herodotus uses most frequently. Some other episodes have been included, however, if they have words for madness which are used in both authors. There are no instances of παραφρονέω in Homer. Homer uses ἀλλοφρονέω twice, compared with once in the Histories; he also uses λύσσα for
madness, although this form is used only once in Herodotus; I have included two occurrences of μάργος, as Herodotus uses ύπομαργότερος three times in the Histories. With these others I aim to observe if their use differs much from that of μανία and μαίνομαι.

Madness in Battle

It would seem that the idea of madness in battle is an idea which Herodotus draws from Homer, although not without changing the motif to some degree. Herodotus associates madness and battle situations at 6.112.2, 8.10.1 and 8.140.α3; often the madness is attributed by the enemy to the people (usually Greeks) who are putting up a fight despite the superior numbers of the enemy forces. The use of madness in this context in the Histories often highlights the difference between the two nations: the Persians cannot understand why the Greeks are fighting as they do because they do not understand the concept of freedom. This angle is not exactly mirrored in Homer, although there is often a reflection onto the one who calls another mad which shows their own particular prejudices, even if these are not to do with freedom per se. Madness in the battle context in Homer usually has the connotation of superhuman, powerful fighting and killing ability. This type of madness can be relatively simple at times, so a study of Diomedes and the way madness is used in connection with him will provide sufficient examples.

In Book 5 of the Iliad, Diomedes has his aristeia, spurred on by Athene to fight (5.124-132). Pandaros has shot him in the shoulder (5.98-100), but he prays to Athene and she enables him to go back into the fight and says (5.127-128):
‘I took the mist from your eyes as well, which before was over (them), so that you may distinguish well both god and man.’
(ἀχλὺν δ’ αὖ τοι ἀπ’ ὀφθαλμῶν ἔλον ἧ πρὶν ἐπῆεν, ὁφρ’ εὖ γιγνώσκης ἦμὲν θεόν ἦδε καὶ ἄνδρα.)

505 The other examples of madness in a battle context which will not be explored in this study are 5.714 - 718, of Ares; 15.605-606, of Hektor; 16.241-245, of Patroklos’ hands and 21.1-5, of Hektor.
After being strengthened, Diomedes promptly sets out and accomplishes four double kills, six of whom are brothers (5.144, 148-151, 151-155, 159-160). It is not long after this exploit that Pandaros calls him mad; when Aineas encourages him to fire (another) arrow, and wonders whether this man is indeed man or god, such is his martial accomplishment. Pandaros replies that he thinks the man is Diomedes, the son of Tydeus (5.181-183), but adds (5.183-187)

'I don’t know for certain if it is a god.

But if it is a man, he whom I believe [it is], the bellicose son of Tydeus, He does not act so madly without a god, but nearby one

Of the immortals stands, enveloping his[the god’s] shoulders with a cloud,

Who turned my swift arrow from him to another (direction) as it touched. ' (...σάφα δ’ ούκ οἶδ’ εἰ θεός ἐστιν.

εἰ δ’ ὁ γ’ ἀνήρ ὁν φήμι δαΐφρων Τυδέος υἱὸς

οὕχ ὁ γ’ ἀνευθεὶς θεοῦ τάδε μαίνεται, ἀλλά τις ἄγχι

ἔστηκεν ἀθανάτων νεφέλῃ εἰλυμένος ὠμος,

ὅς τούτου βέλος ὡκύ κιχήμενον ἠτραπεν ἄλλη.)

In this example Diomedes’ madness in his manner of fighting is closely linked to both his ability to kill and the power/presence of the gods. Athene gives Diomedes μένος at 5.2 and 5.125, and by 5.136 is has become an active force: ‘three times as much strength seized him’ (μιν τρὶς τόσσον ἐλευν μένος). This ‘furious urge to action’, as

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506 Fenik (1968: 10) says of the beginning of Book 5 that ‘The encounter begins with a fully typical introduction in which Athena gives Diomedes μένος. Divine aid of this kind is too common in the Iliad to require any discussion here, but Athena’s action has a special importance for E. She helps Diomedes twice more within this same book, and each time this initiates a new and important phase of the action – E 121 and 783.’ Griffin (1980: 35) also notes the way madness comes from the gods here.

507 He at least does not know who Diomedes is (5.174-178).

508 Clarke (1999: 111) points out the closeness of μένος to μανία, and what he says of μένος is very similar to the way μανία in battle is portrayed in Homer. ‘The clue is that as a quality of character or mood, μένος represents a furious urge to action that can tend eventually to frenzy and self-destruction (see esp. VI. 10-1, 407, XVII. 20-3). ... The mood of the fell warrior is one of impetuous motion... the god incites the hero to surging aggression when he impels him to battle...Given this almost abstract character it makes sense that unlike other mental substances μένος can also be communicated from outside when a god breathes it into a man, ἔμπνευσε μένος (e.g. XV. 262 =XX. 110, XXIV. 442; more vaguely VIII. 335, XV. 594, XVI. 529).’ See also n. 127, where he adds that ‘μένος is cognate with words in other
Clarke puts it, is what Pandaros sees as ‘madness’. To Pandaros, the madness lends Diomedes an immunity which is given by the ‘veiled’ presence of a god. Such madness is not considered to be any form of disease or something to be despised; rather it is to be feared, because with it comes an almost superhuman ability to kill the enemy and to (seemingly) avoid harm. This kind of power is part of Diomedes’ aristieia; he would not be able to excel in this way if Athene had not strengthened him. In fact, although she ‘took the mist from his eyes’, it appears that while he might be able to distinguish between gods and men, the enemy can’t quite distinguish him from a god.

In the Histories, this sort of action is seen at 6.112.2, 8.10.1 and 8.140.α3, where the Athenians charge the Persians at Marathon, the Greeks sail against the Persian fleet at Artemisium and the Greeks take a stand which will lead to battle against the Persians at Plataea. In all cases they are called mad by the Persians. But whereas in Diomedes’ case his μένος fuelled ‘madness’ is god-given, in Herodotus’ work the inspiring force which causes the ‘madness’ of the Greeks is an ideal, the nomos of freedom. They show μένος in their rushing charges (on foot or using ships). Conversely, the madness of Cambyses and Cleomenes, although ‘god-given’, is a punishment, not, as it is in Homer, a gift for those favoured by a god or goddess in order to assist their allies in battle. Madness as the Persians see it does assist the Greeks in battle, but the Greeks do not see their impetus for

languages that approximate to ‘mind’: Latin mens, Irish menmae, Sanskrit manasa. In Greek the word appears to have shifted in meaning so that it refers to fierce, vigorous motion of various kinds, including volatile psychological movement of the kind that can tend to ferocity or madness, μανία, another reflex of the same root. The occurrence of μένος in Books 5 and 6 is noticeably higher than in Books 1-4 (8 times between them compared with 9 times in Book 5 and 5 in Book 6.) Other books with high occurrences of μένος are Books 8, 16, 17, 23 and 24.

509 Clarke (1999: 111). Hershkowitz (1998: 143-144, also n. 60) also discusses μένος, with similar conclusions to Clarke’s. She says μένος ‘can be variously thought of as a force within the spirit (such as strength), a force acting on the spirit (often anger or aggression), or, in a sense, the spirit itself.’ Again, ‘the insertion of μένος can be understood as the addition of an external force and/or a topping up of an internal quality from an external source’. She too notes its links with μαίνομαι, see in addition n. 64.

510 As Seaford (1994: 331) points out, ‘frenzy in general is rarely to be found in Homer – except when directed against the alien group, the frenzy of battle’.

511 Hershkowitz (1998: 140) carefully points out that judgements of madness in Homer do not always seek to understand the ‘mad’ person’s behaviour: ‘Odysseus does not strive to grasp Hector’s motivation for raving on the battlefield.’ She points out that this is a problem for the reader (n.53), ‘who makes judgements about madness on the basis of behaviour, thus explaining the widely varying interpretations of certain actions: cf. e.g. J. Griffin (1980), 92 (‘We are not dealing with berserkers in the pages of Homer’) and Hainsworth (1993), 48 (‘A berserker is etymologically a frenzied Norse warrior, but battle frenzy (often illustrated by comparisons with ferocious animals, as in the Iliad) infects most heroes’).’

512 See 3.29.1-3.30.1; 6.75.1-6.84.3.
fighting as madness; to them it is *nomos*. So in the *Histories* there exists a dichotomy between madness, as seen by the enemy, which assists in terms of fighting as it does in Homer, and madness given by the gods as a punishment, an aspect which is absent in Homer.

Nevertheless, from the two times μένος is used in the *Histories*, we can see that it resides with gods. At 7.220.4 Herodotus gives the oracle from which Leonidas took his stance at Thermopylae, which suggests that the Spartans can either be destroyed by the Persians or lose one of their kings. It goes on, ‘For the strength of bulls or of lions, force against force, will not restrain him; For he has the strength of Zeus’ (οὐ γὰρ τὸν ταύρων σχῆσει μένος οὐδὲ λεόντων ἀντιβίην· Ζηνὸς φὰρ ἔχει μένος.), reiterating that the king will have to die before the Persians can be stopped. This indicates that to have the μένος of Zeus is to be unstoppable, no matter how strong the opposing force. The μένος in bulls and lions (in Homer, at least, often a reference to warriors, and there is no reason why we should not see similar overtones here) is not enough to make a difference when the μένος of Zeus, divine force, is the opponent.

The Homeric concept of great μένος being madness is useful in terms of Herodotus’ work when we are considering the fundamental connection of madness and violence, and to some degree immunity. As μένος can manifest itself in physical action or in a more psychological manner as ‘spirit’\(^{513}\), this helps to explain why madmen such as Cambyses are violent in nature and may quickly be provoked to violent action as well as violent speech\(^{514}\). Cleomenes also demonstrates violence in his attacks on Spartiates as well as in his orders to have people whipped or killed, but perhaps the most interesting application of excess μένος in his case is the way it gives him immunity to his own self-inflicted violence, so that he is able to withstand the way he carves himself up until the


\(^{514}\) See 3.25.1-2, 3.27.3, 3.29.1-2, 3.32.3-4, 3.35.5, 3.36.1-4.
point where he dies\textsuperscript{515}. Psychological μένος also helps to explain why madness can be applied to those who either are arguing, those who are expressing violent speech, and may even be used by those who are themselves arguing and expressing violent speech\textsuperscript{516}.

Diomedes is called mad again in Book 6. Helenos persuades Aineas and Hektor to oppose the Argives and tells Hektor to get his mother to lay a robe on Athene’s knees and promise to make an offering if she will assist the Trojans by holding back Diomedes (6.75-98). Helenos says of Diomedes (6.99-101):

‘We never feared Achilleus in this way, first among men, Whom they say was born of a goddess; but this man is inordinately Mad; no one is able to match him in terms of strength.’

\begin{center}
(οὐδ’ Ἀχιλῆά ποθ’ ἂδε γ’ ἐδείδησεν ὀρχαμον ἀνδρῶν, ὃς ἐδείδησεν ἄλλος ὄμη μαίνεται, οὐδὲ τίς οἱ δύναται μένος ἰσοφαλίζειν.)
\end{center}

Diomedes’ madness is once again a fearsome state; his μένος is unequalled. Here Helenos associates μένος directly with madness: this excess of μένος is madness; or rather, the madness is translated into ‘unequalled μένος’. This is slightly different from the previous example where Pandaros saw Diomedes’ tripled μένος and called it madness: Helenos sees ‘inordinate’ madness and ‘unequalled’ μένος as similar, possibly identical, concepts. His astonishment and fright at the violence of Diomedes’ onslaughts leads him to compare Diomedes with Achilleus\textsuperscript{517}. His speech indicates that were Diomedes of divine descent the way Achilleus is, his power might be more easily explained, but as he is quite mortal the only explanation Helenos can offer for Diomedes’ ability to overcome the opposition is an imputation of madness. Furthermore, to suggest that someone may be better at killing Trojans than Achilleus is to indicate the extreme

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[515] See 6.75.1, 6.79.1, 6.81, 6.75.3.
\item[516] See 1.109.2, 1.212.2-3, 3.145.1, 8.140.13, 8.125.1, 9.55.2.
\item[517] Zanker (1994: 74) looks at this differently: ‘When Helenus compares Diomedes with Achilles, he claims that Diomedes is “excessively” battle mad, implying that Achilles is not.’ He goes on to explain that Achilleus had previously shown kindness to the enemy, accepting ransom for Isos and Antiphos, 11.101-12, and Lykaon, 21.34-48, 21.76-77, cremating Eéion without stripping the armour, 6.414-19. On Pg. 75 he notes the difference later of Achilleus’ rejection of Lykaon’s appeal.
\end{itemize}
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fright into which Diomedes throws the Trojans; the comparison to the pinnacle of fighting ability makes Diomedes’ ability sound on an impossible level\(^{518}\).

Helenos’ imputation of madness is a little different to the imputations of madness in the *Histories*. On seeing ‘madness’ Helenos is horrified enough to ask Hektor to get the women to present Athene with a robe and the promise of sacrifices in order to obtain her aid. The Persians who call the Greeks mad are not frightened when the Greeks charge, they simply do not understand why the latter should attempt resistance in the face of the odds, because they themselves do not understand the *nomos* of freedom which drives the Greeks to resistance. In Herodotus’ hands, then, madness in battle becomes less frightening, more puzzling, than it is in Homer, although no less powerful.

Later in Book 6 Diomedes has become a little more wary of whom he fights. He tells Glaukos that he won’t fight him, if he is a god (6.119-131), and tells him about Lycurgus (6.132-140)\(^{519}\):

‘Who once chased those who nursed mad Dionysus Down hallowed Nysios and all their bacchic instruments cascaded together onto the ground, as by man-murdering Lycurgus they were struck with an ox-goad; but Dionysus, being afraid, dived down through the wave of the sea, and Thetis sheltered him on her lap while he was frightened; for a powerful trembling held him from the man’s shouted threats.

But then the gods who live effortlessly were angry with him and the son of Cronus made him blind; nor, moreover, did he then for a long time live, since he was hated by all the immortal gods.’

\[\text{(ὅς ποτε μαινομένοι Διωνύσοι τιθήνας σεῦε κατ' ἠγάθεον Νυσήϊον∙ αἳ δ' ἂμα πᾶσαι θύσθλα χαμαί κατέχευαν ὑπ’ ἀνδροφόνοιο Λυκούργου)}\]

\(^{518}\) Kirk, (1990: 168) says of this piece that while Diomedes is a ‘fierce fighter’, this description of him ‘as strongest and most formidable of all Achaeans, including even , exceeds anything in the rest of the poem, where Akhilleus is always supreme. The poet has set out in Diomedes’ *aristeia* to show him as ultimately formidable, a true substitute in terror for the sulking Akhilleus, but here he makes Helenos go beyond that.’

\(^{519}\) Fenik (1968: 109), discusses the way this section is used as a ‘fill in’ pattern, which fills in the time while Hektor is going into Troy.
The story is told in the context of battle, but this use of μαίνομένου to describe Dionysus is slightly problematic. Although Kirk appends ‘so described according to Aristarchus, Arn/A, either because he makes others mad or because he is himself envisaged as filled with bacchic frenzy...’, there is very little in the context to illuminate why Dionysus should necessarily be associated with frenzy here. As Hershkowitz points out, ‘the issue is complicated by the fact that, other than these references, there is no mention of Dionysiac madness – and only scant mention of Dionysus himself, a marginalized figure in the Homeric pantheon – in the Iliad and the Odyssey.’

I wish to suggest that in the context which we have here, Dionysus is associated with madness in battle rather than with bacchic revelling.

In the Iliad to date, madness has been associated with fighting (5.185, 6.101 and 5.717). So we should consider whether this sort of madness might not be just as applicable to the situation as the bacchic frenzy to which the audience may automatically assume the poet is referring. In the context, Dionysus as a god who is mad in battle

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520 Kirk (1990: 174). Although Griffin (1980: 21) points out that ‘The ecstasy of Dionysiac cult is excluded from the Homeric poems as scrupulously as the eating of raw flesh, but Dionysus’ name is found on the Pylos tablets, and Homer knows all about him and his maenads (6.130 ff., 389; 22.460). The only ecstasy permitted by the Iliad is that associated with fighting’.

521 Hershkowitz (1998: 135). She is referring to 6.389 and 22.460 as well. See also Seaford (1994: 329), who explains Dionysus’ near absence in this way: ‘Dionysus and his festivals are older than the polis, but it is only with its development that he acquires a central importance. This is because the new political unity and its basic contradiction with the powerful household is accompanied, as we have seen, by a network of ritually expressed contradictions: the binding of wild periphery to urban centre, the transformation of identity in mystic initiation, intrafamilial sacrifice, the lone victim saving the city, the subversion of wedding ritual, the destruction of the powerful household, gender conflict. These often painful contradictions are imposed, in the imagination of the citizens, by a god, who is frequently Dionysos. Each one of these contradictions is largely or entirely absent from Homer.’

makes a great deal of sense. After all, Diomedes is facing Glaukos, wishing to know if he is a god before he fights him, and tells the story of Dionysus and Lycurgus to illustrate his point. As we have two men about to challenge each other, and one unsure about doing so, a story about a man and a god fighting each other is not unnatural, and indeed is less unnatural than a story where one challenger cavorts in a fawn skin.

Furthermore, the wording of the piece has distinct correlations with formulae which have been used in a battle context, and anything which would help us see Dionysus and his nurses as revelling is conspicuously absent. Lycurgus chases Dionysus’ nurses, who drop their θύσθλα on the ground when he lays into them with the ox-goad. This offers us a picture very like stricken soldiers dropping their weapons\(^{523}\), particularly if θύσθλα is a form of thyrsus\(^{524}\). In fact, the enjambment of the lines 133-134, αἰ δὲ ἄμα πᾶσαι / θύσθλα χαμαὶ κατέχευαν is a slightly longer adaptation of the formula ἐκ δ’ἀρα πᾶσαι χαμαὶ κατέχευαν / χῦντο χαμαὶ χολάδες seen at 4.525-526 and 21.180-181, scenes in which the intestines of the wounded warrior fall out onto the ground. The sanitised adaptation used for Dionysus’ nurses harks back, nevertheless, to this rather more graphic formula in Book 4 and makes Lycurgus a threat rather than a killer in this scene, but at the same time we are left no illusions as to his nature: he is ἀνδροφόνος, man-murdering (6.134).

The use of κατέχευαν is a metrical adaptation of lines with various meaning but which have a form of καταχέω spanning the second and third feet. When Athene slips off, or ‘abandons’, her robe at 5.734 and 8.385, she is described as πέπλον μὲν κατέχευεν, where the spondee of the first foot has been changed in 6.134 to a dactyl. This second adaptation has to do with a goddess, rather than the nurses of a god, but the divine aspect

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\(^{523}\) Or, depending on the type of activity, another object: 5.583, a stricken horseman drops his reins; 13.530 and 13.578, a helmet is dropped; 14.418, a spear is dropped; 16.803 a shield is dropped and a spear becomes useless; 21.51, Lykaon has dropped his helmet, shield and spear in weariness; 22.448, Andromache drops her shuttle when she hears the mourning cry.

\(^{524}\) As the word is hapax legomenon in Homer we can’t draw references from his own works. Kirk (1990: 174) says of θύσθλα that ‘the precise meaning of the term is obscure, branches, vine-shoots or thyrsi being alternative interpretations recorded by bT. The last is probably correct, i.e. from *θύρσ‐θλα according to Chantraine, Dict.’ (P. Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque, (Paris 1968-80) cited by Kirk.) As we know, later in the Bacchae Euripides has the bacchantes use their thyrsi as spears, which wound their opposes as if they were real spears (761-764). Although the θύσθλα could be the one indication that the group was reveling, it is an unsound clue if we see the nurses as ‘warrior nurses’; bacchantes may carry thyrsi as a matter of course, revels or not.
of both lines is apparent, and the poet offers the ironic parallel of a goddess in a hurry to get into battle dress (as she does, 5.736-747) and the nurses of a god anxious to get out of battle.

Therefore Dionysus as mad in terms of battle fits into the context very well, and this interpretation is only slightly modified by the consideration of Dionysus as a young god – young enough to need nurses still\textsuperscript{525}. Nurses are only mentioned four times in the \textit{Iliad}, and not at all in the \textit{Odyssey}. Apart from this instance, the other three appearances of \textit{πιθήνη} refer exclusively to Astuanax\textsuperscript{526}, who is apparently too young to speak (6.389, 6.467, 22.503). From this Dionysus may be supposed to be a very young god, as well as his apparently being small enough to be comforted by Thetis on her lap.

While Dionysus does not appear to exercise his madness, or the excessive \mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\zeta which causes him to be called mad, the story Diomedes tells turns on the point that Lycurgus fights with a god, who, even though he is still a baby, has power which a human cannot, ultimately, overcome. Lycurgus fights with Dionysus and his nurses, but reprisal is not far off: in the space of two lines the gods get angry (6.138) and Zeus blinds Lycurgus (139)\textsuperscript{527}. It does not matter whether Dionysus is perceived as using his great \mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\zeta in particular to avenge himself on his foe; by being a god, whatever his age, he has more power than a human can ever have and has the \mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\zeta of other gods on his side also. This is the culmination of Diomedes’ speech: it is not wise to set yourself up to fight against the \mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\zeta of a god, particularly when that god has a family to protect him,

\textsuperscript{525} Alden (2000: 128) makes this point: ‘He [Diomedes] proceeds to his account of Lycurgus, who did fight with a god, even if only a small one, and who came to no good as a result’, and again at Pg. 130, ‘Lycurgus fought against a god and he did not escape consequences.’ Fornaro (1992: 16) says that ‘Dionysus appears as a diminished god’ (Dioniso appare come un dio sminuito), which does not take into account his youth, or the power which even a young god possesses.

\textsuperscript{526} A reference which will be highly significant later, in the discussion of Andromache.

\textsuperscript{527} Both Hershkowitz (1998: 135, see also n. 34) and Seaford (1994: 330-331) note that Zeus blinding Lycurgus is different from other versions of the same tale, where Dionysus himself exacts his revenge. Seaford (Pg. 330) says that ‘In classical vase painting, which probably reflects the Aeschylean version, Dionysos imposes on Lykourgos a frenzy in which he kills his wife and son. But in the Homer narrative (as in Eumelos’ Europa) Lykourgos drives Dionysos away and is in return blinded not by Dionysos but by Zeus. Typically Homeric here is the exclusion of intrafamilial violence and of Dionysiac power, in particular the power to impose the frenzy that causes intrafamilial violence.’
equally full of μένος. Therefore it is in Diomedes’ best interests to determine whom he fights against.\textsuperscript{528}

This sort of madness is very similar to the madness of the Greeks against the Persians at 6.112.2, 8.10.1 and 8.140.a3. There, the enemy called the Greeks mad for their inexplicable attempt to stand against them. Dionysus is called mad to indicate his great power. In both genres the ‘mad’ people are the ones who overcome the opposition, even if this is delayed slightly in Dionysus’ case, and the ‘mad’ people are initially perceived to be the smaller/weaker force. The Persians calling the Greeks mad, however, has the additional function of characterising them as unable to understand the nomos of freedom, whereas calling Dionysus mad simply indicates his power. Homer has no indication that Lycurgus is mad for fighting the superior force of the gods, as sometimes happens in Herodotus. In the oracle at 8.77.1 the Persians’ hopes are called ‘mad’ because they are fighting against the power of the gods. The Athenians who attempt to drag the statues of Damia and Auxesia off their bases go mad and kill each other in one version which Herodotus reports (5.85.2). This aspect of madness is absent from the episode of Dionysus and Lycurgus. On the other hand, as the oracle at 7.220.4 says, the gods are full of μένος. Knowing that the gods have this kind of power helps us to

\textsuperscript{528} Alden (2000: 128) says of Diomedes’ speech that ‘There is no regular pattern for the verbal exchanges between warriors before engaging in battle: generally the effect of preliminary taunts is to spur the addressee to fight, but there are instances where he thinks better of it, and this battlefield exchange between Diomede and Glaucus ends with the challenger retreating from his initial challenge.’ The challenger in this instance, of course, does not retreat out of fear but rather because he and Glaukos discover that they are xeinoi from their father’s days (6.215). This is a rather anticlimactic end to the episode. See Alden on Diomedes’ arrogance (Pg. 130), her criticism of Kirk (n. 31), both which I find slightly shaky at points: Diomedes adheres strictly to Athene’s orders (5.815-824, 5.826-834) and as he is not punished at all for ‘fighting gods’, even Apollo (5.433-439), we must find some reason for why this is so; it may be that he was not regarded as fighting him. My own thought is that Diomedes is making feints to get at Aineas for the armour (5.435), not that he is wanting to fight Apollo himself, and Apollo seems to treat him fairly gently (5.437, compare 16.788-805), even warning him not to proceed (5.440-442). If Diomedes had crossed the line, so to speak, retribution would have been swift. Hershkowitz (1998: 141) has some interesting remarks on this piece: ‘Diomedes, when he is no longer in the midst of his inspired aristeia, notoriously remarks that οὐκ ἂν ἔγωγε θεοῖσιν ἐπουρανίοισι μαχοίμην (‘I myself would not fight with gods who dwell in the heavens’, Il. 6.129): Diomedes speaks against the very action he has just performed, an action which was called mad by others. Instead of taking this statement as a glaring inconsistency, it can instead be taken as reflecting the contrast between Diomedes’ mad behaviour and the more prudent, more understandable behaviour in which he normally engages, indicating that, in a sense, Diomedes’ mad behaviour is incomprehensible even to him when he views it more objectively, as an external judge.’
understand the way that people who transgress against the gods set themselves up for punishment.

In Book 8, Diomedes tells Nestor to get into the chariot with him and see what Trojan horses can do (as he had taken the chariot and horses from Aineas (8.102-108)). In this instance it is not a person who is mad, but an object (8.109-111):

‘Let … the two of us
Drive straight at the horse-taming Trojans, so that even Hektor
Will know if my spear is mad in my hands.’

(…τώδε δὲ νῶϊ
Τρωσὶν ἐφ’ ἱπποδάμοιοι’ ιθύνομεν, ὁφρα καὶ Ἑκτωρ
eἰσεται εἰ καὶ ἐμὸν δόρυ μαίνεται ἐν παλάμησιν.)

Janko gives further explanation of this phenomenon: ‘Spears are imagined to have wills of their own and to be loth to stop; they ‘long to be glutted with flesh’ (11.574).’

This spear is mad, apparently displaying the same violent, superhuman force which characterises ‘mad’ warriors in battle. The power of Diomedes has been transferred to his spear, which though it is an extension of himself, has now taken on Diomedes’ attributes for itself.

The transference of the power of madness to a weapon is not really evident in the Histories, although in some interesting incidents mad people use weapons in way which demonstrates that they are mad, or are about to become so. Cambyses stabs the Apis bull (3.29.1) and shoots Prexaspes’ son (3.35.2-3.); Cleomenes whipped a priest (6.81) and ended up cutting himself to pieces with a knife (6.75.3). There is, however, a correlation, whether intended or not by Herodotus, between the incident at 3.35.1-3 and the episode

529 Janko (1994) 102. Griffin (1980: 34-35) says something similar: ‘We read often of spears ‘longing to glut their appetite for men’s flesh’, ‘sticking in the earth before they could enjoy the white flesh’, and ‘eager to sate themselves on men’s flesh’;’ (he gives 21.168, 11.574, 15.317 and 21.70 as examples in n. 88) ‘and we remember that this terrible temptation was present to the hero himself; we find too that Ares, god of war, is to be ‘sated with blood’, αἵματος ἆσαι Ἀρηα. Ares can be called ‘insatiable for war’, ἄτος πολέμοιο (5.388, 863, 6.203); so can heroes (Achilles, 13.746; Hector, 22.218; the Trojans, 13.621, etc.).’

530 See a very similar use of madness possessing a spear in Book 16.74-75, where Achilleus talks to Patroklos, urging him to take Achilleus’ armour and go out to save the Argives (16.64-73), because Diomedes’ spear is not going mad in his hand ‘to ward off destruction from the Danaans’ (Δαναῶν ἀπὸ λοιγὸν ἀμύναι).
from the *Iliad*. Both Diomedes and Cambyses tell a second party what someone will know; in Diomedes’ case, he says that Hektor will know if the spear goes mad in Diomedes’ hands. In Cambyses’ case, he tells Prexaspes (3.35.1): ‘Now find out for yourself whether the Persians are telling the truth’ (σὺ νῦν μᾶθε [αὐτὸς] ἐίτε λέγουσι Πέρσαι ἀληθέα). He is talking about his own madness, and intending to disprove it by shooting Prexaspes’ son accurately through the heart, where Diomedes seeks to prove his ‘transferred madness’ to the enemy. So in Herodotus, madness becomes a condition to disprove, particularly if it is not in the battle context, whereas in Homer the negative connotations are only seen from the point of view of the enemy who is subject to it531. In these examples, even though they are based mainly on Diomedes and his ‘madness’ in a battle context, we can see that madness in Homer seems to indicate an excess of μένος, power or strength often god-bestowed, which enables the fighter to kill and avoid hurt himself. The gods themselves possess the greatest μένος, and are able to grant it to a favoured human. This is a contrast with Herodotus’ work, in which madness

531 I disagree somewhat with Hershkowitz’ argument (1998: 144-146, see also n. 67) that the difference between μαίνομαι and μενεαίνω is that the former has negative connotations and the latter positive. The statements that the two verbs ‘share the meaning ‘to experience a heightened amount of μένος’, that μαίνομαι seems to be used as a way of ‘describing an action resulting from a high level of (μένος - fuelled) emotion, most often anger’, and that ‘There seems to be an inherent excessiveness attached to actions described by μαίνομαι which is generally missing from those actions described by μενεαίνω’ are reasonable. However, I find the additional qualification that μαίνομαι bestows ‘strongly negative rather than (even mildly) positive connotations’ does not quite fit with the frequent use of it in battle context. In other contexts, it is true that ‘madness’ has negative connotations (e.g. *Iliad* 5.831, 8.413-414, 15.128-129, 24.113-116, 24.134-136, *Odyssey* 18.406), but where it assists the hero to slay the enemy it becomes a strongly positive action for his side. It is strongly negative for the enemy, naturally, but as we can see from the examples of Diomedes alone, ‘madness’ in battle is to be desired in terms of killing ability, and is sometimes an excess of god-given μένος. While, from a modern point of view, Diomedes’ excellence in dealing death to Trojans might not be a desired feature on his *curriculum vitae*, in terms of the epic an ability to kill brings a hero glory and riches. This might be the only ‘mildly positive’ aspect of μαίνομαι. We must also remember that when the imputation of ‘madness’ comes from the enemy, it will have negative connotations. What is the difference between Hektor, at 15.503-6, for whom (Pg. 146) ‘surging μένος results in his being in a state of excessive energy, emphasized by forceful, repeated use of μαίνεσθαι by the epic narrator and by the out-of-control images in the simile (notably that of raging fire, reflecting the very thing Hektor, striving to set the Achaean ships alight, wants to achieve); …he cannot channel his energy in a directed, positive way, and so he μαίνετο instead of μενέαινεν’ and Diomedes at 6.99-101, whose strength cannot be matched and causes the enemy to compare him to Achilleus, a negative ‘admiration’ of a sort? Diomedes has certainly directed his energy with positive results for the Greeks. And we can hardly say that Achilleus is praying (at. 16.241-245) that Patroklos will not direct his energy in a positive way, for the Greeks, when he asks that Hektor may know if Patroklkos’ hands go mad in the battle.
is not a gift but a punishment from the gods. But when the Greeks are called mad in a battle context in the *Histories* they have the same overcoming power which is manifested in the heroes in Homer. Those called mad in the *Histories* also may demonstrate qualities of violence, physical or verbal, which are consistent with possessing great μένος, and Cleomenes even shows the sort of immunity to attack that Diomedes does, when he is able to cut himself to pieces without apparently suffering pain.

**Superiority of Power**

In some cases of madness in Homer which are not in a battle context, madness has not so much to do with killing and invincibility as with the idea of the mad person challenging someone who is very powerful. By contrast to the previous section, where the mad person had the superiority of power, in this section the examples show that the mad person has the lesser power. This is similar to the way the Greeks are called mad at 6.112.2, 8.10.1, and 8.140α3, and the way the Persians are called mad in 8.77.1 in Herodotus’ *Histories*. It is also a little like Timodemus’ attack on Themistocles at 8.125.1, in that Timodemus’ mad envy caused him to verbally attack someone so much superior than himself. In Homer, however, envy is not the qualifying aspect of this sort of madness.

The next three instances of people being called mad deserve special attention in that they relate to each other, and the idea of madness, and who exactly is mad, is bandied around. Because of this playing with madness, other sorts of madness come into the episode; it finishes, however, with an instance of madness consisting of a challenge to Zeus’ power, so I have included it in this section. The sequence begins in Book 8 when Hera encourages Athene to help the Argives, seeing Hektor causing havoc among them (8.335-349, 350-353). She does this despite Zeus’ threat issued against any god who would disobey his edict not to help either the Trojans or the Argives in a physical way (8.5-27). Zeus stresses his strength twice: ‘Then they will know the great extent to which I am the strongest of all the gods...’ and ‘So great am I both among gods and among men’ (γνώσετ’ ἐπειθ’ ὡςον εἰμὶ θεών κάρτιστος ἀπάντων, 8.17; τόσσον ἐγὼ περί τ’ εἰμὶ θεών περί τ’ εἰμ’ ἀνθρώπων, 8.27). Not only that, but Hera tries at first
to talk Poseidon around to helping the Greeks (8.198-207), and he replies, ‘greatly distressed’, μέγ’ ὀχθήσας, (8.208-211):

‘Hera, unafraid in speaking, what sort of plan did you speak?
I certainly would not be willing for the rest of us to fight Zeus, the son of Kronos,
When he is by far the more powerful.’

(‘Ηρη ἀπτοεπὲς, ποίον τὸν μῦθον ἔειπες;
οὐκ ἄν ἔγωγ’ ὑθέλοιμι Διὶ Κρονίωνι μάχεσθαι
ήμεας τοὺς ἄλλους, ἐπει ἦ πολυ φέρτερός ἐστιν.
)

These stern words do not put Hera off for long. At 8.354-356 she comments to Athene that

‘These men, filling up a cruel doom, would perish
By the onslaught of one man; and he goes mad no longer acceptably now
Hektor, the son of Priam, and has done many cruel things indeed.’

(οἵ κεν δὴ κακὸν οἶτον ἀναπλήσαντες ὀλωνται
ἀνδρὸς ἑνὸς ῥιπῇ, ὃ δὲ μαίνεται οὐκέτ’ ἀνεκτῶς
Ἐκτωρ Πριαμίδης, καὶ δὴ κακὰ πολλὰ ἐφοργε.)

Hektor’s madness is clearly to do with his ability to kill and fight in battle. In this
instance his violent onslaught on the Argives stirs Hera to want to put a stop to it. In
Book 5.714-718 she wished Athene to stop ‘mad’ Ares from encouraging the Trojans, but
this is the first case where a god or goddess wishes to stop a human’s madness; so far the
gods have not taken much interest in human madness in battle expect when they wish to
inspire it. That they take an interest now is indicative of the strength of Hektor’s ferocity,
if even the gods are worried by its effects. It is also worth considering that since the gods
can incite madness in battle, they can presumably take it away again532.

Athene replies to Hera that if it weren’t for Zeus, Hektor would already be dead
(8.357-359). She proceeds to complain (8.360-363):

‘By my father is crazy in his unsound reasonings
Uncaring, always offensive, frustrating my purposes;
Nor yet does he remember them, the very many times for him his son

532 As is explored in the Odyssey at 23.11-14.
I saved when he was worn out by Eurystheus’ quests.’
(ἀλλὰ πατήρ ὁ ἐμὸς φρεσὶ μαίνεται οὐκ ἀγαθῆσι σχέτλιος, σιεν ἀλτρός, ἐμῶν μενέων ἀπερωεύς: οὐδ’ ἐτὶ τῶν μέμνηται, ὅ οἱ μᾶλα πολλάκις υἱόν τειρόμενον σαόεσκον ὑπ’ Εὐφυσθής άέθλων.)
Kirk comments that ‘the transition to another who is mad or raging, μαίνεται, is abrupt, and that Zeus should be the new subject surprising.533’ Athene takes the idea that Hektor is mad and transfers it to Zeus as an indication of how annoyed she is at his attitude. As with Ares, the way she calls Zeus mad emphasises her own discontent that he does not allow her to have her way.

We have the added nuance of Zeus being ‘mad’ and ‘frustrating my μενεύων’.
Whereas in 6.101 Helenos appeared to equate excessive μένος with madness, here Athene suggests that Zeus’ madness is more powerful than her μένος in the plural. ‘Purposes’ hardly translates the force of the fiercely directed movement of Athene’s wishes; μένος here is just as powerful as μένος in fighting heroes, but it is applied to intangible desire rather than concrete movement. Athene says, then, that although she has μένος to spare, Zeus’ ‘madness’ is still too much for her, even if (in her opinion) his ‘reasonings’ are ‘unsound’ compared with hers. This will contrast with Iris’ use of madness below. Zeus’ madness is like that of warrior madness in battle, in that it is a powerful force, but here it is applied without the killing ability, in the context of a battle of wills.

Athene’s complaints about Zeus are reminiscent of her complaints about Ares at 5.831, where she also uses a line of vitriolic adjectives (τοῦτον μαινόμενον, τυκτὸν κακόν, ἀλλοπρόσαλλον), and in the way she brings up past events and expresses her annoyance that they are not doing what she wants. She complains about how Ares said he would help the Argives, but now has forgotten about them (Book 5.832-834), just as she complains that Zeus doesn’t remember the way she helped his son Heracles in the past. This is in fact a rather serious point: if Zeus is indeed not repaying her for the

533 Kirk (1990: 328).
favours she did him in the past, he is breaking reciprocal custom. Thus she also
associates his madness, in part, with the breaking of social norms (a type of madness
discussed below).

The idea of who is mad is in turn taken up by Iris, whom Zeus sends to speak to
Hera and Athene (8.397-408) in order to turn them from their purpose. Iris rebukes the
goddesses (8.413-414):
‘Why do you exert yourselves? Why does your heart/do your hearts go mad in your
reasonings?
The son of Cronus does not allow you to defend the Argives.’

(πῆ μέματον; τί σφῶσιν ἐνὶ φρεσί μαίνεται ἕτορ;
οὐκ ἐἀεί Κρονίδης ἐπαμυνέμεν Ἀργείοισιν.)

Iris delays the reported speech until she has had a word herself534. While Zeus himself
does not say they are mad, he threatens them with his aforementioned powerful wrath
should they decide to continue in the course they propose to take. His warnings that he
will lame their horses, toss the goddesses from the chariot and that they won’t heal for ten
years of the wounds his lightning causes (8.402-405) are bad enough, but Iris adds her
comments as an observer (not necessarily impartial, but somewhat more objective). To
her mind, Hera and Athene are mad in that they oppose the will of Zeus, or rather that
their hearts are mad to have a desire which opposes that of Zeus. Iris seems to consider
that not only are they mad to so oppose Zeus, but their plans are fruitless as well, because
to oppose Zeus, ‘the strongest among gods and men’, is to set oneself up for failure.

So while Athene said that her father’s madness is strong enough to block the
μένος of her wishes, Iris turns the idea around and uses the madness of those who
attempt to match μένος with Zeus.

An interesting feature here is the way the idea of madness is used of three subjects
in turn, in three different uses of madness535. Hera says ‘Hektor is mad, in a battle

534 Kirk (1990: 330) notes with 399-408 that this is ‘no doubt to ensure that her mission as a whole is
successful’. See also Pg. 331, s.v. 412.
535 Hershkowitz (1998: 136-137) does however point out that ‘The double use of μαίνομαι to express
divine behaviour in these two instances [referring to 8.358-61 and 8.413-14] is an emphatic expression of
the extremity which the other gods assign to the behaviours in question; it is also, in effect, an exchange of
insults’. 
context’, Athene counters ‘Zeus is mad because he can overcome my fierce wishes’ (battle context madness applied to intangible desire) and Iris overrules ‘No, you two are the ones who are mad, to oppose the strongest of gods.’ The idea comes around almost in a circle among the gods, the unit of discussion formed by Hektor (although silent), Hera and Athene changes to Hera, Athene and Zeus (silent) and then to Zeus and Iris back to Hera and Athene (silent). The circle of complaint and blame is only stopped when Zeus’ power overrules.

This last sort of madness, which consists of an attempt to oppose a superior power, is evident in the Historiess. At 6.111.3 Herodotus tells us that the Greeks had fewer numbers and were weaker, just before they charge and the Persians call them mad (6.112.2). At 8.10.1, when the Greek fleet sails against the Persian one and the Persians think the Greeks are mad, Herodotus again says that the Greeks had fewer ships, and the Persians ships weren’t just more numerous but sailed better as well. When Mardonius calls the Greeks mad at 8.140.α3, he makes a great deal of the Persian numbers. The Persians themselves are called mad in an oracle (8.77.1) because they are opposing the will of the gods. Finally, Timodemus is called ‘mad with envy’ at 8.125.1 partly because he verbally attacks Themistocles, who has been awarded unprecedented honours by the Spartans, when he himself is of no note. In three of the examples, 6.112.2, 8.10.1 and 8.140.α3, Herodotus simultaneously employs two aspects of madness which can be seen in Homer, who does not use them simultaneously: The Greeks are mad in battle and this gives them the power to overcome, but at the same time, the Persians’ calling them mad and Herodotus’ own emphasis on the weakness of the Greeks and the strength of the Persians brings in the idea of madness as posing opposition to a superior power. This is not just a fond hope on the Persians’ part: they do have superior numbers. By calling the Greeks mad the Persians also demonstrate how powerful they consider their own army to be. But where Homer uses one type of madness and then another, Herodotus uses two types together. In Homer, the superior power would win, but Herodotus incorporates the power of madness in battle to demonstrate the winning force of the Greeks.

The next mention of madness is in Book 15 where Athene remonstrates with Ares (15.123-127) who has vowed to avenge the death of his son Askalaphos (15.115-118). This follows on from events in Book 14 where Hera seduces Zeus to take his eyes off the
goings on of the war (14.159 f.) which provides an opening for Poseidon to stir up the Argives (14.363 f.). When Zeus realises he has been beguiled he rebukes Hera and reminds her of the time he strung her up in the sky with anvils on her feet (Book 15.14-25). He then reiterates his plans for the fighting (15.59-71), and remarks that he won’t allow any god to stand against these plans by helping the Argives (15.72-77). When Hera returns to Olympus she comments on the futility of opposing Zeus when it seems that he doesn’t care what they think, and that each god should put up with the consequences, mentioning the death of Ares’ son in the process (15.104-112). But Ares ignores the warnings of Zeus and Hera in the fervour of his desire for revenge. Athene rebukes him (15.128-129):

‘You madman, wandering in your wits, you are deranged. Truly then for such as you It is possible to hear with your ears, but your mind and your honour has failed.’

(μαινόμενε φρένας ἥλε, διέφθορας· ἂ νυ τοι αὐτῶς οὐατ’ ἀκουέμεν ἐστί, νόος δ’ ἀπόλωλε καὶ αἰδώς.)

The context is very similar to events in Book 8 where it was, conversely, Hera and Athene who faced Zeus’ wrath. Once again the gods have been warned of what will come to them if they cross Zeus, but in his fury and grief Ares forgets this. The narrative underlines the folly of his move by saying that Zeus’ even greater anger would have fallen on the gods if Athene hadn’t taken action (15.121-122). Once again the desire to stand against Zeus is futile and equivalent to madness, particularly when the consequences of doing so have already been laid out not long before. Athene has been pulled up on this point herself, and now she is the one who stops Ares before he faces the full fury of Zeus’ wrath. Her words are well chosen to set out clearly what Ares’ problem is: he can hear what Zeus has said, but his mind does not process the information. Her

536 Janko (1994: 242) says of this section (Book 15.128-129) that ‘one of Ares’ traits is martial frenzy...’ but in this instance it is not martial frenzy which cause Ares to be called mad, but the danger in which he puts himself (and the other gods) by in the heat of emotion considering disobeying the orders of Zeus. Nor it is necessarily martial frenzy which causes Ares to want to go into battle at this stage, but a desire to avenge his son’s death. The fact that emotion stirs him to such action which causes him to be called mad by others puts Ares in a similar category to Andromache in Book 6.389, whose emotion, in part, causes her to be called mad when she rushes onto the walls.

537 Ares is not the only god to be in the situation of having a son die in battle: Zeus mentions that his own son Sarpedon will die at Patroklos’ hand before Achilleus is ready to come back into the fight (15.67). While he does later consider whether he might steal Sarpedon out of the battle before he dies (16.433-438),
calling him mad is also a way of measuring the great extent of his emotion, which causes him to forget, even for a time, what Zeus has said; Athene also uses madness as a term of abuse.

This casts a little light on such cases in the *Histories* as 6.112.2 and 8.10.1, where the Greeks charge the Persians and are called mad, or at 8.140.a3 where Mardonius tells them that they are mad to oppose Xerxes. We are meant to see the Greeks as being spurred by something so powerful that they ignore the odds against them, and it becomes clear that this ‘powerful emotion’ is the desire for freedom. We are to see their desire for freedom as something as powerful as Ares’ grief and fury about his son’s death. Similarly, we are to see Timodemus’ envy as something so all-consuming that he feels no qualms about verbally abusing a man so much greater than himself (8.125.1); and Amompharetus can be seen as a man so determined to adhere to Spartan *nomos* that he even refuses to obey his commander (9.55.2).

Sometimes, then, Homer uses madness as a way to show the futility and dangerousness of opposing someone stronger than oneself. This is rather contrary to his use of madness in battle, where madness confers winning strength. Madness in these cases also helps to indicate the excess of emotion which causes such opposition.

**Madness as Transgression of Custom**

When madness in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* is not associated with fighting or opposition to greater power, it may be associated with a transgression in custom. This aspect of madness is also very important in Herodotus’ *Histories*: many of Cambyses’ symptoms of madness on the ‘list of proofs’ are transgressions of custom (3.30.1-3.37.3). Cleomenes also transgresses religious custom at 6.80 and 6.81.

In Book 6, Hektor goes looking for Andromache inside Troy. He accosts a woman caretaker (380-387), who informs him of where he may find his wife (388-389): ‘She, making haste toward the wall, arrived

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it is a fairly brief moment as he considers the two paths he could choose for Sarpedon. Even Zeus will not go against his own decisions (although he is tempted to), and here the difference between Zeus and the hotheadedness of Ares is clear. Ares’ reaction may be understandable, but the circumstances in which it occurs cause him to be called mad.
Like a woman going mad; and a nurse with her carries the child.’

(ἡ μὲν δὴ πρὸς τεῖχος ἐπειγομένη ἀφικάνει μαυνομένη ἐϊκυῖα· φέρει δ’ ἀμα παϊδα τιθήνη.)

Scholarship on the subject has discussed whether what is meant here is simply ‘madwoman’ or ‘maenad’. Arthur, Kirk and Seaford consider this reference to be specifically to a maenad, given the additional, echoing reference in 22.460. Richardson more cautiously suggests that ‘Perhaps, however, we are wrong to attempt to draw a distinction between ‘madwoman’ and ‘maenad’.

Textual evidence in support of Andromache’s similarity to a maenad includes the earlier reference Diomedes made, in the same book (6.132), to a ‘mad’ Dionysus and his nurses (τιθήνας), a word which only occurs four times in the *Iliad*, and three of those times in connection with Andromache and Astuanax.

Arthur and Seaford’s arguments in favour of Andromache’s’ acting like a maenad cite her ‘dislocation’ from her social role: she is not at home and she has not gone to be part of the sacrifice to Athene which the other women are making: she has abandoned her ‘traditional activities’ as maenads do when they rush off to the mountains. Not only that, she abandons the traditional role to become, in a sense, a warrior – as maenads sometimes do - and offers Hektor tactical advice. Seaford also notes the way Andromache does not take part in ritual: she does not sacrifice with the other women, confusing gender roles, and the way the wedding ritual is ‘perverted’, particularly in Book 22, but its roots start here, in the prayer for Astuanax. There is a ‘contradiction’, in addition, ‘between household and community’, because if Hektor performs his ‘duty

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539 Richardson (1993: 156 ad loc.).
540 Apart from the reference to Dionysus’ nurses at 6.132 and the reference here, there is a further reference at 6.467 and Andromache’s own reference, at 22.503, to the privileged childhood Astuanax has enjoyed which she sees rapidly disappearing. See also Arthur (1981: 30, n. 28), Seaford (1994: 332) and Segal (1971: 47, n.31).
542 Seaford (1994: 333).  See also Arthur (1981: 31): ‘Andromache, for her part, gives Hector advice about the conduct of the war, a move so inappropriate as to have led Aristarchus to athetize the passage on the grounds that it was unfitting for Andromache “to compete with Hektor’s generalship” (*antistratēgein*).’ 543 Seaford (1994: 337).  Andromache’s’ ‘centrifugal maenadic exit to the wall is accordingly contrasted by her maids with the centripetal procession of women to the temple on the acropolis.’ 544 Seaford (1994: 334-335).
to the community’ he is in danger of dying, ‘thereby causing the destruction of his household. Hence Andromache’s maenadic frenzy. 545 So Andromache anticipates (and fears) the destruction of her household, and reacts by displaying the tendencies of a maenad, one whose household has been destroyed or ‘altered’.

Andromache, then, is propelled by madness from her traditional place in the city out to the walls. Hektor, too, is propelled by madness out of his role of warrior into the city, except it is Diomedes’ madness which provides the impetus for his dislocation, rather than an inner source 546.

Against the argument of Andromache being seen as a maenad is the previous demonstration that Dionysus’ madness is to do with μένος, not frenzy (6.132-140); although the mention of his name might be enough to make the association, it is weak. So if Dionysus is not frenzied, but does have great μένος, we should not necessarily consider Andromache to be frenzied; we should consider instead that she is demonstrating μένος. Furthermore, Andromache’s abandoning of her traditional role is consistent with madness as such and need not be particularly associated with maenadic behaviour. Andromache exhibits warrior-like μένος in her rushing movement; she may take on male characteristics with her assuming of warrior-strength. As Segal notes, she does so in Book 22, the counterpart to this piece in Book 6 547. Her rush is caused by great emotion, and this emotion makes her behave in a way that she would not normally behave. As we saw Ares called mad at 15.128-129 for his great emotion which caused him to want to challenge Zeus’ power, so Andromache’s great emotion causes her to act

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546 As Arthur points out (1981: 30-31), it is not just Andromache who is dislocated. ‘Hector and Andromache move toward one another, then, by a process in which each dissociates himself from the world to which he or she normally belongs, and assimilates himself to the sphere of the other. At the same time, a tension is developed as the narrative focuses on the abnormality of this process: Hector enters the world of Troy but does not really belong there; Andromache’s ability to function in this world, which is her proper sphere, is temporarily suspended. The climax comes at the wall, when Hector removes his helmet in order to embrace his son. Since one of his principal epithets is korythaiolos (“of the shining helmet”), and since it is used of him frequently in VI, the act takes on symbolic importance, and marks the moment of Hector’s furthest distance from the world of the battlefield.’
against the power of custom. Andromache can act against custom when mad; she need not be a maenad to do so – Ares is not.

Unsurprisingly, there may be some similarities between the supposed maenadic behaviour of Andromache and the madness which warriors express in battle. Andromache’s violent movement, indicative of excessive warrior-like μένος is mentioned twice (6.388, 6.394). Hershkowitz points out that there appears to be a move away from the masculine concept of strength-based μένος and more an idea of the sort of ‘heightened amount of energized emotion’ which Andromache displays here. She associates ‘Dionysiac’ madness with this ‘feminine madness’, but notes that it ‘contrasts but does not conflict with the more typical masculine-gendering of Homeric madness’. But whereas a god may induce μένος-fuelled madness in warriors, it is emotion which induces this ‘madness’ in Andromache, a combination of fear and love which in most clearly expressed in her speech to him when he finds her (6.407-439).

On the whole, though, Andromache’s madness propels her out of her traditional sphere, thereby breaching the custom for a female of her high status, a status which comes with tighter strictures on her range of allowable activities. This breaching of custom is true of maenads also: when they leave their homes and hunt on the mountains they are acting against established custom. The uncharacteristic action which Andromache now takes is underscored not just by the imputation of madness, but by 6.374 as well, where Hektor looks for his ‘faultless’ (ἀμύμων) wife where she ought to be: μαινομένῃ ἐϊκῦια indicates that this is simply an appearance an not the real person, in which case Andromache can be seen as simply appearing mad without actually being so. The phrase is a variant of a line used at 3.386, γρηῒ δὲ μν ἐϊκυία, of Aphrodite appearing to Helen as an old woman; see also 19.350, ἥ δ’ ἀρπη ἐϊκυία τανυπτέρυγι λιγυφώνω, of Athene as a hawk, and 22.227, Δηφόβῳ ἐϊκυία δέμας καὶ ἀτειρέα φωνήν, of Athene appearing to Hektor as Deiphobos. Both times it is used of a goddess; this need not be significant. We would have reason to doubt that Andromache’s ‘maenadic’ or just ‘warrior-like’ behaviour is more than a fleeting instant: her actions soon become what a Greek would regard as essentially ‘feminine’: 6.405-406, she cries and holds onto Hektor’s hand; 6.482-484, she cries but smiles and takes Astuanax into her arms; 6.495-496, she goes home, looking back over her shoulder and crying, before mourning with her attendants, 6.498-502.

549 Hershkowitz (1998: 136). See also Pg. 138, where she says of Andromache in Book 22.460 that ‘By using these madness terms, the narrator calls attention to the heightened emotional state of the distraught wife in a time of extreme crisis.’ There is no reason the same statement cannot be true of her actions in Book 6. Arthur (1981: 30) agrees that μαίνομαι demonstrates heightened emotionality.
be: at home. This is emphasised again by the caretaker’s list of places where Andromache is not (6.382-385)\textsuperscript{551}.

The use of madness in the context of breach of custom is also used by Herodotus. But a breach of custom in the Histories may either lead to a person becoming mad or be a symptom of madness, or both. This ‘sustained’ madness is not true of Andromache; she goes back home (6.495), back to her traditional role; she does not remain mad. Cambyses transgresses against religious custom by stabbing the Apis bull, and thereafter becomes mad (3.29.1, 3.30.1). In the list of proofs Herodotus gives to show that Cambyses really was mad, there are numerous transgressions of custom, religious or not: marrying two of his sisters (3.31.1-6), burying people alive (3.35.5), laughing at and destroying religious statues if they did not meet his approval (3.37.1-3). Cleomenes also transgresses religious custom by bribing the Pythia (6.66.1-3, 6.75.3); he tries to get some Arcadians to swear on the Styx (6.74.1-2); other versions accuse him of burning down the sacred grove at Argos, or at Eleusis (6.75.3), whipping the priest of Hera at Argos who told him he was not allowed to sacrifice at the altar, and then going ahead and sacrificing anyway (6.80, 6.81); even by adopting the Scythian custom of drinking strong wine (6.84.1). These are explanations given for his going mad.

On the other hand, it seems that Herodotus is using madness in the context of transgression against custom in a more extreme way than Homer does. On the whole, the list of various transgressions of either Cambyses or Cleomenes involve very serious matters and violence against other people. Andromache’s temporary excursion in the male realm hardly compares with Cambyses marrying one of his sisters, to take one of the tamer examples.

So while Andromache is called ‘mad’ for her forceful breach of custom and Herodotus also uses breach of custom to show madness or reasons for someone becoming mad, in Homer the people who transgress against custom do so only briefly. Their madness is not incipient or long-lasting.

Andromache’s ‘madness’ at 22.460 is very similar to that of Book 6, since the incidents are related and much of the pathos of Book 22 comes from the remembered meeting of Hektor and Andromache in Book 6. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, in

\textsuperscript{551} Compare the modest Penelope at Odyssey 18.184.
Book 22 Andromache has a lot more warrior-like language surrounding her actions\textsuperscript{552}. This may help to indicate whether there is any real difference between the use of \textit{μαινομένη ἤκυσθα} at 6.389 and \textit{μαινάδι ἥση} at 22.460\textsuperscript{553}.

Hektor has already perished at the hands of Achilleus when Andromache, in the women’s quarters, hears Hekabe and fears that Achilleus may have isolated Hektor away from the fighting (22.450-459). Having already told two female attendants to come with her to the walls to see what is happening, she leaves for the walls (22.460-461).

‘So saying she rushed from the women’s quarters like a madwoman, Her heart thumping; and her attendants went with her.’

(\textit{ὡς φαμένη μεγάροιο διέσσυτο μαινάδι ἥση παλλομένῃ κραδίην∙ ἁμα δ’ ἀμφίπολοι κιον αὐτῆ.})

As in Book 6.389, Andromache’s madness consists of a violent movement which forces her from her allotted space onto the walls, where she last saw Hektor and was told to return to her work (Book 6.409-493). Andromache is wrenched away from her household activities by strong emotion, in this case fear, and propelled to the walls; she displays \textit{μένος} as heightened emotion and movement.

However, her madness may not, in this instance, be a breach of custom. In Book 6, she was noted for being in none of the places where she ought to be; in Book 22 she is noted for being in her traditional sphere when Hektor is dead. Priam, Hekabe and the rest of Troy know that Hektor is dead (22.412-436) and are mourning him before his wife ever knows. As the audience, we know that her fear that Achilleus might have cut Hektor off from the city is too optimistic (22.455-459); we know that the fall of Troy is only a matter of time. Perhaps this is the reason why Andromache is called \textit{μαινάδι} rather than \textit{μαινομένη}; in Book 6, she thought her household was destroyed, although it was not; now we know is has been destroyed in truth, although she does not. It is possible that she can be called a maenad here because her household is destroyed: the comparison is complete rather than an illusion. This may also explain the amount of warrior epithets

\textsuperscript{552} Segal (1971: 41-50).

\textsuperscript{553} The difference may simply be metrical convention.
which are now applied to Andromache, but as mentioned before, the mere application of warrior-μένος to Andromache may invite other warrior attributes.

When Andromache goes out to the walls this second time, and faints when she sees Hektor’s body being dragged about the plain (22.461-466), although there is a crowd of men on the wall (22.462) we are also told that ‘around her stood her sisters-in-law and the wives of her husband’s brothers Who held her up among themselves as she was distraught to the point of death’ (ἀμφὶ δὲ μιν γαλόω τε καὶ εἰνατέφες ἄλις ἔσταν, αἱ ἐ μετὰ σφίσιν εἶχον ἀτυζομένην ἀπολέσθαι, 22.473-474).

This time, then, Andromache is hardly the only female on the wall; she was breaching custom more when she was in her house than when she comes out to mourn with the rest of the city. So her madness here is not about breach of custom anymore; it is about her violent movement, caused by her fear, and is associated with the complete destruction of her household.

Herodotus uses madness in this way to some extent; Cambyses destroys his own household and is said to be mad at the time (3.30-3.32.3). He has his brother murdered, marries two sisters and kills one of them, who, in one version, was pregnant with his heir. But Cambyses is mad when he does this; Andromache is ‘mad’, not because she herself has destroyed her household, but because it has been destroyed. The closest similarity between examples of madness in the Histories and this second ‘madness’ of Andromache are the women of Argos in 9.34.1-2, who go mad and are cured by Melampus. Herodotus does not say specifically that they became maenads, although this tradition was apparently well known. The Argive men are disturbed enough to ask Melampus to cure the women, and though they refuse his terms the first time, they become so disturbed that they agree to even more extravagant terms the second time. Even in this case, we are left to assume the disruption of the household is because of the maenads, because Herodotus’ narrative does not give details about this aspect, which is not the main point of his logos. This similarity only works if we assume that the Argive women become

maenads, and as such they destroy their households rather than becoming maenads because their household was destroyed, as Andromache appears to do.

Seaford writes extensively on the maenadic subversion of the marriage ritual which Andromache acts out in Book 22 and mentions in her speech. The throwing off of her veil symbolises the undoing of her marriage, and the ‘undoing of Andromache’s marriage here finds symbolic expression in the reversal of an element in the ritual process’; she speaks of Hektor being led to the house of Hades, as a bride is led to the house of her husband, as she herself is described at 22.471-472. Segal also discusses at length the way the language of this piece constantly reminds the reader of the ‘contrast between the fateful exposure of Hektor and the enclosed, sheltered world of Andromache, now, however, also brutally opened to the harshness of war.’ He elaborates on the ‘confrontation between war and peace, battles and domesticity’ in the language of the piece, where language is used in new ways to evoke various responses. Andromache effectively becomes the ‘stricken warrior’. In this she is similar to the nurses of Dionysus, who also drop items onto the ground (6.133-134) as Andromache drops her shuttle (22.448). This could be another connection with maenadic behaviour, or just an extension of the warrior characteristics that she took on with her display of μένος.

The next example of madness as a transgression against custom comes in Book 24, where Achilleus is keeping Hektor’s body unburied. Zeus sends Thetis to speak to Achilleus about his treatment of the corpse (24.104-112). He instructs her (24.113-116):

‘Tell him that the gods are angry with him, and that I in particular of all The immortals am enraged, that by his maddened reasonings He keeps Hektor by the curved ships, nor does he let him go, If he fears me at all he may let Hektor go.’

(σκύζεσθαι οἱ εἰπὲ θεούς, ἐμὲ δ’ ἔξοχα πάντων ἄθανάτων κεχολώσθαι, ὧτι φρεσὶ μαινομένησιν Ἦκτορ’ ἔχει παρὰ νηυσὶ κορωνίσιν οὐδ’ ἀπέλυσεν,

557 Segal (1971: 33-57, see particularly Pg. 43 f.).
558 Segal (1971: 55).
αἱ κέν πως ἐμὲ τε δείσῃ ἀπὸ θ Ἕκτορα λύσῃ.

Thetis repeats this message almost verbatim to her son at 24.134-136.

In this episode Achilleus’ madness consists of his refusal to restore Hektor to his family. This is somewhat similar to Andromache’s madness of Book 6 in that Achilleus ignores the customary practice of leaving the body once the person has been killed. While his actions demonstrate the depths of Achilleus’ grief for Patroklos, and his anger at Hektor, the situation is an abnormal one. In most cases, once someone is killed in battle, the only concern of the victor is to get the armour of the fallen, rather than further to outrage the body of the dead man. Achilleus therefore displays an obsession with Hektor’s corpse which no one else displays in the Iliad.

There is also the hint that Achilleus’ madness may cause him to oppose the will of the gods, thereby incorporating two sorts of madness in one episode. Achilleus’ actions also display both grief and anger simultaneously, thereby displaying ‘madness’ in terms of heightened emotion, as Andromache does in Books 6 and 22.

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559 Seaford (1994: 331) says of this passage that the significance ‘is not just that Achilles is also said to be acting like a wild animal (41) but more importantly that his frenzy replaces death ritual with the disfigurement of the corpse…Achilles’ frenzied, isolating, excessive vengeance and the consequent negation of death ritual are both ended in his surrender of the corpse to Priam for the public funeral that concludes the poem (Chapter 5). We have also seen a comparable closure in version of the Odyssey that ended at 23.296: the prolonged feasting of the suitors subverts the due ritual of the wedding, which is restored by the reunion of Odysseus with Penelope (Chapter 2).’


561 The people who do concern themselves with the body of the fallen are the comrades and family of the fallen man; these make every effort to retrieve the body for burial, even if the armour is no longer on the corpse. See Book 5.297-298, Aineias protects Pandaros’ body in case the Greeks make off with it; 5.573-574, Menelaos and Antilochos drag the bodies of Orsilochos and Krethon back to the Argives; Book 7.77-86, Hektor challenges the Achaians to a duel, with the conditions that whoever wins can strip the armour of the other, but will give the body back to his companions; Book 11.248-261, Koon attempts to retrieve the body of his brother Iphidamas, but is himself killed; Book 13.383-388, Idomeneus starts to drag Othryoneus away but is prevented from doing any more by Asios; Book 13.650-659, Meriones kills Harpalion, whose body is taken back to Troy for his father; Book 17 is an extended discourse on the effort the Achaians, Menelaos in particular, make to retrieve the body of Patroklos.

562 Zanker (1994: 148) explains Zeus’ motivation in his message to Achilleus: ‘The suggestion of the other gods to Hermes should steal the corpse (23f.) is something he will not allow, because he wishes to preserve Achilleus’ κῦδος, the glory, that is, of giving back the corpse of his own volition, to preserve Thetis’ continuing αἰδός and φιλοτές (107-11).’
Achilleus’ ‘madness’ in this instance, in the specific transgression of custom by
the mutilating of a corpse, is similar to Cambyses’ actions in the Histories. Cambyses
shows little respect for bodies even while alive, but in 3.16.1-2, although he has not yet
been called mad, he has Amasis’ corpse taken out of its tomb, whipped, goaded and the
hairs pulled, before he has it set alight. Later, when he has been called mad, he shoots
Prexasps’ son and then observes the wound to see if he hit the boy in the heart (3.35.3).
He also buries some Persians alive (3.35.5). Cleomenes mutilates his own body until he
dies (6.75.3) although he does not mutilate corpses as such. All these behaviours can be
said to be against custom.

The Cyclops is called mad in Book 9 of the Odyssey, when Odysseus offers wine
to him (347-350):
‘Cyclops, take, drink wine, since you ate human flesh,
so that you may know what kind of drink this is our ship conceals;
Besides, I brought it for you as a libation, if you took pity on me
And sent me homewards; but you are unbearably mad now.
Merciless man, how may any other man of many come to you in future?
For you did not act rightly. ’
(‘Κύκλωψ, τῇ, πίε οἶνον, ἐπεὶ φάγες ἀνδρόμεα κρέα,
ὁφρ’ εἰδής, οίνον τι ποτὸν τόδε νηὺς ἐκεκεύθει
ἡμετέρῳ· σοι δ’ αὖ λοιβὴν φέρον, εἰ μ’ ἐλεήσας
οὐκαδε πέμψειας· σὺ δὲ μαίνεαι οὐκέτ’ ἀνεκτῶς.
σχέτλιε, πῶς κέν τίς σε καὶ ύστερον ἄλλος ἱκοῖτο
ἀνθρώπων πολέων; ἐπεὶ οὐ κατὰ μοῖραν ἐρεξαῖς.’)
Odysseus relates the madness of the Cyclops to the lack of his hospitality. This lack is
demonstrated in its most extreme form by the Cyclops’ anthropophagy, which Odysseus
refers to in the same speech. So Odysseus calls the Cyclops mad because of his
transgression of customary hospitality to strangers.
However, as in other imputations of madness563, we must also take into account possible exaggeration, and in this case Odysseus’ cunning. He was prepared for danger, and had suggested sending an advance party to find out if the Cyclopes are savage (ἄγριοι) or friendly to strangers (φιλόξεινοι, 9.172-176), as well as bringing the wine since he feared he might meet ‘a savage, who did not acknowledge justice or laws’ (9.213-215), (ἄγριον, οὔτε δίκας εὖ εἰδότα οὔτε θέμιστας). The wine, then, may have been meant for a libation, as Odysseus claims in his speech to the Cyclops, or as a gift to soothe the savage, as it was particularly fine and potent (9.196-211). When the Cyclops reveals himself to be a man-eater, Odysseus formulates a plan in the Cyclops’ absence from the cave, prepares the stake with which he will blind Polyphemos and then (after more companions have been devoured) offers the wine to the Cyclops in order to get him so drunk and sleepy that the blinding can be accomplished (9.318-374).

So while Odysseus may call the Cyclops mad because of his transgression of custom, this epithet is in the context of Odysseus trying to deceive the Cyclops in order to effect their escape from the cave; the reader has been informed of this plan. Furthermore, Odysseus’ wording, ‘you are unbearably mad now’ is indicative of decisive action. Similar phrases have been used in the Iliad and Odyssey564, usually indicating an imminent change or the need for change and action. That Odysseus uses the phrase now indicates his intention of action once again to the reader, although not necessarily to the Cyclops.

Later in the Odyssey, Telemachos addresses the suitors as mad (Book 18.405-408). Eurumachos has thrown a footstool at Odysseus (but hit the cup-bearer instead) and the suitors mutter to themselves as to how the feast has been spoiled by Odysseus’ arrival and subsequent unpleasantries (387-404). Telemachos then says to them: ‘My excellent men, you are mad and no longer concealing with your mind either meat or drink; someone of the gods is stirring you up now.

But since you have feasted well, go home with a wish to sleep...’

δαίμόνιοι, μαίνεσθε καὶ οὕκετι κεύθετε θυμῶ

563 See Hera of Hektor at 8.354-356, Odysseus of Hektor at 9.237-239, although these exaggerations are for the purpose of persuasion.
564 See especially Iliad 8.355, 10.118, 11.610; Odyssey 20.223.
As the audience, we are in the position to know that the ‘beggar’ Telemachos has brought home is his father, Odysseus, and that Telemachos himself is aware of the fact. We know that Odysseus is home and that vengeance will soon be his; this lends greater emotional depth to the insults which Telemachos and Odysseus endure from those who are unaware of Odysseus’ true identity. Eurumachos’ insult is in fact the last of three insults Odysseus bears in Book 18, in an order of increasing influence: first Iros the beggar tries to turn Odysseus away, and Odysseus beats him in a fight for the privilege of eating in his own house (18.10-110); the maid Melantho scolds Odysseus when he tells her and the other maids to go back to Penelope and do work (18.313-336), and her words are echoed by Eurumachos (18.389-393), the second most powerful of the suitors and Melantho’s lover. Both of them tell Odysseus
‘…you are saying a lot/ such things
Presumptuously among many men, nor are you at all alarmed in your spirit;
Wine really has hold of your wits, or else your mind
Is always this way, you man who talks piffle.’

Both Melantho and Eurumachos imply that Odysseus is not in his right mind to be saying the things he does among the present company. They offer two explanations for his inability to know his place: he is drunk or is always this way. In their opinion, Odysseus, a beggar to their perception, should not be so bold in company; presumably he should be grateful for the place he has won as a beggar and should efface himself before his betters. So they suggest that Odysseus is not in his right mind to be breaking the social hierarchy, and thereby break with custom, after a fashion. That wine is one reason given for this behaviour will be discussed under the relevant section, but it should be
noted that wine is supposedly a factor in the madness of Cambyses and Cleomenes (3.34.2-3, 6.84.1-3).

Telemachos settles the disgruntled mutterings of the suitors in the wake of Eurumachos’ argument with Odysseus \(^{565}\). While Melantho and Eurumachos, ignorant of Odysseus’ return, rebuke him for speaking out and imply that he is not in his right mind, Telemachos knows Odysseus’ identity and proper place in his own house. He in turn calls the suitors mad for the way they are acting and talking; these actions and discussions have been rude and unwelcoming to Odysseus \(^{566}\). As Amphinomos (whose name is apt) points out to the suitors soon after, in support of Telemachos’ speech, the ‘beggar’ is a stranger and ‘he has come to a friendly house’ (...)φιλόν ἵκετο δῶμα, 18.421), Odysseus’ house. He therefore reminds them once again (as at 18.419) that they are also in Odysseus’ house, not their own. Odysseus, beggar or not, has only been accorded erratic φιλία upon his arrival \(^{567}\); this lack, or breach of the customary welcome to strangers is the root of Telemachos’ imputation of madness to the suitors \(^{568}\). The knowledge granted to the audience, that Odysseus is being so insulted in his own house, where he has the highest place, simply heightens the impact of their rudeness. They may think Odysseus does not know his place, but Telemachos points out that they do not know theirs.

Furthermore, he throws the imputation of drunkenness back at the suitors. Melantho and Eurumachos suggested that Odysseus was drunk; Telemachos does the

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\(^{565}\) Seaford (1994: 331) points out that, as the ‘negation of death ritual’ of Achilleus’ madness at 24.114 is ended by the return of Hektor’s corpse and his funeral, so the ‘due ritual of the wedding’ of Odysseus and Penelope is subverted by the suitors’ ‘prolonged feasting’. He then notes that the ‘culmination of this subversion is marked by Telemachos’ accusation to the suitors: μαίνεσθε at 18.406. So the suitors are not just breaking the custom of welcoming strangers, but are preventing the custom/ritual of the ‘wedding’, or reunion, of Penelope and Odysseus.


\(^{567}\) Not that the suitors can be accused of considerate behaviour in general; see Book 1.113-124, 158-165; Book 16.117-128 for example. Telemachos appeals to their better natures, and they pretend that they have better natures.

\(^{568}\) Hershkowitz (1998: 150) notes of Odyssey 20.351-7 that ‘The suitors’ behaviour does not fall within social norms of decency and decorum, and by being outside these norms can be considered extreme. In this way their behaviour is not only wrong but also, in the Homeric sense, mad, much as Achilleus’ maltreatment of Hector’s corpse, by going beyond the accepted boundaries of human and divine standards of behaviour, is called mad by Zeus... (II. 24.114-15).’ This comparison is just as, if not more, appropriate to 18.406-409, where μαίνεσθε is used to make the transgression of custom explicit.
same of the suitors. As Melantho and Eurumachos do, he also offers two reasons for his calling them mad because of their lack of customary courtesy: either they are drunk or some god is stirring them up. This appears to be, in part, a diplomatic way of avoiding the suggestion that Melantho and Eurumachos made of Odysseus, that he was naturally presumptuous. As the audience, we have been shown that the suitors really are this rude by nature. But in addition to their normal behaviour, we are told at 18.346-348 that Athene did not allow them to restrain their ‘outrageous behaviour’ (λώβης, 18.347), so they are being stirred up by a goddess to some degree.

Herodotus gives multiple explanations for madness as well; both Cambyses’ and Cleomenes’ madness have numerous reasons attached (3.30.1, 3.33; 6.75.3, 6.76.1-81, 6.84.1-3). Herodotus’ example of Cambyses’ madness is, however, an inverted form of the one given in the *Odyssey*. Whereas Herodotus sets out to show that Cambyses is mad, because he stabbed the Apis bull, by then listing the mad things he did (3.30.1-3.37.3), Telemachos calls the suitors mad, because of what they are doing, before listing possible reasons for their madness.

From these examples from the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, we can see that Homer sometimes uses ‘madness’ to highlight a transgression of custom, and that Herodotus uses madness in the same way to some extent.

**Instability**

At times, Homer uses madness to point up instability in a person, or rather, a god, Ares. In the *Histories*, while mad people may be unstable, their instability is part of the madness rather than, as Homer seems to use it, the madness itself.

Athene expresses her annoyance about Ares in her speech to Diomedes at 5.829-834. She promises her help to Diomedes in putting Ares out of action (5.826-828), and says:

‘But come, steer your solid-hooved horses against Ares first,
And strike at once, do not fear rushing Ares
This crazily acting, fashioned for evil, wavering turncoat,
Who a short while ago made a show to both myself and Hera of declaring
He would combat the Trojans, and would pledge allegiance to the Argives,
But now he socializes with the Trojans, and the [Argives] he has forgotten.’

\((\text{'ἀλλ' ὁγ' ἐπ' Ἀρηὶ πρώτω ἔχε μῶνυχας ἵππους,}

tύψον δὲ σχεδίην μηδ' ἀξεο θούρον Ἀρη.
tοῦτον μαίνόμενον, τυκτὸν κακόν, ἀλλοπρόσαλλον,
δός πρώην μὲν ἐμοὶ τε καὶ Ἡρη στεῦτ' ἄγορεύων
Τρωσι μαχησεσθαι, ἀτὰρ Αργεῖοισιν ἀρήξειν,

νῦν δὲ μετὰ Τρώεσσιν ὀμιλεῖ, τῶν δὲ λέλασται.\)

As is the case at 9.237-239, calling someone mad in the context of encouraging
someone else to fight is a persuasive device which can involve some exaggeration. So,
for example, there is no record in the preceding text of the conversation Athene says she
and Hera had with Ares. While she persuaded Ares to sit out the fighting at 5.31-34,
they agreed to let whichever side win as Zeus desired. There was no discussion at that
point of Ares assisting the Argives. This ‘selective memory’ can be seen as part of the
exaggeration of Ares’ assistance.

569 Kirk (1990: 145) points out that ἄλλοπρόσαλλος is used only here and at 5.889 where Zeus rebukes
him on his return to Olympos.
570 As Kirk (1990: 145-146) notes, the ‘earlier promise’ is mentioned at 21.413f. as well. Kirk says that ‘It
may be an ad hoc invention, since, despite Ares’ mythical connexions with the foundation of Thebes, his
affiliations as Thracian are Trojan rather than Achean’, as well as siding with Aphrodite. He goes on, ‘the
salient fact may be that he represents a different and more savage view of warfare than Athene, and is
unlikely to remain for long as her accomplice.’
571 Hera does something similar at 5.714-718 when she draws Athene’s attention to Ares’ work; Ares has
encouraged the Trojans (5.464-470) and is with them at 5.506-511; he and Apollo are mentioned again at
5.518. He leads the Trojan troops, wielding his spear (5.591-594), and Diomedes recognises him (5.603-
604). By 5.699-702 the Argives are giving ground because ‘they perceived that Ares was with the Trojans’
(ἐπύθοντο μετὰ Τρώεσσιν Ἀρη, 5.702). The poet lists those whom ‘Hektor, the son of Priam, and
bronze Ares’ (‘Ἐκτωρ τε Πρώμοιο πάϊς καὶ χάλκεος Ἀρης, 5.704) slaughtered; there are seven in all.
This is an impressive number, although Diomedes slew eight after being strengthened by Athene (5.144-
160), and Odysseus slew seven Lykians (5.677-678) without any divine help. While there is no indication
how many Ares slew by himself, or whether the phrase is simply an indication that Ares is with Hektor and
is lending him strength, Ares is nevertheless associated with killing here. Ares is also called βροτολοιγός
five times in Book 5, the most concentrated use of the epithet, which refers to his killing abilities,
‘death/destroyer of men’. So even if Ares does not kill many men specifically by himself, we are not
allowed to forget his fundamental capabilities in this regard. Hera calling him mad may be a slight
On the other hand, whether we allow for an unrecorded conversation or not, Athene’s complaints are clear. Her irritation at Ares is caused by his going back on his insistence that he would fight on the same side which Hera and Athene supported. His madness to her consists of his instability; he does not continue to listen to reason – her reasons\textsuperscript{572}. He is mad because he will not be fully persuaded to Athene’s way of thinking; if he is persuaded at one point he cannot, apparently, be depended on to stay persuaded. So it would seem that Ares can be easily persuaded to a course of action by any god\textsuperscript{573}; this renders him untrustworthy and undependable.

Caution must be taken when madness is applied to Ares, because his madness is not always of the same type. Kirk discusses this passage and says that ‘His madness, i.e. in indiscriminate killing, is a standard criticism, e.g. at 717...\textsuperscript{574}. Of the four times Ares in called mad in the \textit{Iliad}\textsuperscript{575}, two instances refer to his ability to kill (5.717, 15.605-606), one refers to his attempt to oppose the will of Zeus (15.128), and this instance in 5.831 refers to his madness as instability. Indiscriminate killing, then, is not always the point of calling Ares mad.

Those who are called mad in the \textit{Histories} sometimes show instability as well, although the madness in their case is usually already established in the narrative and the

\footnotesize{exaggeration on her part, but nevertheless reflects his ability to fight and kill, whether real or perceived in this episode.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{572} Hershkowitz’ comment (1998: 146) of \textit{μαίνομαι} and \textit{μενεαίνω} is particularly appropriate in this context: ‘I would propose that this suggested imbalance of \textit{μένος} anticipates the notion of internal disorder which comes to dominate the meaning of \textit{μαίνεσθαι}, in which the concept of \textit{μένος} loses its force, but the idea of an internal imbalance remains.’}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{573} As he is by Apollo at 5.455-459, using similar language, particularly the exact repetition of the address \textit{Ἄρες Ἄρες βροτολογεῖ μιαιφόνε τειχεσπλῆτα}, but also the repetition of \textit{οὐκ ἂν δὴ} in the next line and the mention of \textit{πατὴρ Ζεὺς / Διὶ πατρὶ} in the third line.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{574} Kirk (1990: 145). Janko (1994: 294-295) says of warriors: ‘Others go berserk too...Such warriors are often likened to Ares, one of whose traits is madness.’ Griffin (1980: 35) makes a similar statement, saying that Homer often compares heroes to Ares, ‘and not least in their fighting fury’ and adds, in omniscient fashion, ‘A warrior in his berserk rage is like Ares – Hector, we read, ‘raged in madness, as when the warrior Ares or destructive fire on the hills rages’ (15.604)’. But while other warriors may indeed be likened to Ares when they are being particularly successful in battle, \textit{only} Hektor is likened to a mad Ares at 15.605-606; so we have a single instance in Homer where madness and Ares are linked to a human. In addition, while it makes sense for Ares to be mad in battle, since he is a god and filled with \textit{μένος} we should be careful to keep in mind that this type of madness is ascribed to Ares twice alone in the \textit{Iliad} (5.717, 15.605-606), and of the 20 instances of madness in the 24 books of the \textit{Iliad}, only four relate to Ares.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{575} Hektor and Diomedes are also called mad four times each, so Ares is not especially favoured by the epithet.}
instability is just a symptom of it. Cambyses, for example, has already been called mad (3.30.1) when he gets angry at his wife’s comments and kills her (3.32.1-4), gets angry at Prexaspe’s answer to his question (3.34.2-3), gets angry at Croesus’ advice and tries to kill him (3.36.3-4), changes his mind later and misses him (3.36.6). Cleomenes, too, could be called unstable in his subversive activities in Arcadia before his recall to Sparta and the true onslaught of his madness, which included hitting Spartiates in the face with his sceptre (6.74.1-3, 6.75.1-2). The Athenians who go mad and kill each other at 5.85.2 could be said to demonstrate instability; but most interestingly, perhaps, Amasis, the common king, has a theory that if one did not balance out kingly duties with some leisure, one would go mad or have a stroke (2.173.3-4). The idea of instability as linked to madness is present, then, in Herodotus, although not as explicitly as in Homer.

When, in the *Odyssey*, Odysseus speaks with the dead, he tells Achilleus about Neoptolemos and his exploits at Troy (11.505-535), and relates that his son was not (11.536-537) ‘… struck in the fray, as / happens many times in war; and Ares is confusedly mad.’ (οὔτ’ αὐτοσχεδίην οὐτασμένος, οία τε πολλὰ / γίνεται ἐν πολέμῳ ἐπιμίξ ἔτε μαίνεται Ἀρης.) This example uses madness as heightened μένος in the context of battle, but the use of ἐπιμίξ gives Ares’ madness an edge of instability as well.

This is the only place in which ἐπιμίξ appears in the *Odyssey*. It does, however, occur four times in the *Iliad*, and these examples may give us a better idea of what exactly is meant by the phrasing in this episode. Three of the four occurrences speak of the ‘mixing up’ of men and horses (11.525, 21.16, 23.242), and in three cases the mixing up’ is due to pursuit (of Telamonian Ajax, 11.525-526; and of Achilleus, 21.16) or of the prevailing of the opposition in battle (the Trojans prevail, 14.60). In addition to this, all the verbs associated with ἐπιμίξ are passive rather than deponent like

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576 Griffin (1980: 34) takes this statement as a reason to state that ‘Fighting is a madness, and the god of war is mad, even proverbially – ἐπιμίξ ἔτε μαίνεται Ἀρης, ‘Ares rages indiscriminately’ (xi. 537), is evidently a cliché.’ Given the unique use of the phrase, I feel its use as a ‘proverb’ is on unstable grounds; it is only the third time in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* where Ares could be said to be mad in terms of battle. Hershkowitz (1998: 134, see also n. 30 and n. 31), following Griffin and others, says of the phrase that ‘The proverbial quality of Odysseus’ remark points to the idea that battle-frenzy is Ares’ major occupational qualification, that the war-god’s behaviour is mad because war is mad.’
μαίνομαι, so ἐπιμίξ is something that happens to people rather than them doing it. The Trojans ‘are thrown into disorder, both men and horses’ (ὄρινονται ἐπιμίξ ἵππων τε καὶ αὐτοῖ, 11.525); the Greeks ‘are killed wholesale’ (ἐπιμίξ κτεῖνονται, 14.60); the waters of the Xanthos ‘are filled with a disorderly disturbance of horses and men’ (πλῆτο ρόος κελάδων ἐπιμίξ ἵππων τε καὶ ἄνδρων, 21.16); Trojans on Patroklos’ pyre ‘are burnt, both horses and men all mixed up’ (καίοντ’ ἐπιμίξ ἵππο τε καὶ ἄνδρες, 23.242). Ares, then, when he is described as ἐπιμίξ μαίνεται, either demonstrates the sort of ‘madness’ in battle which causes disorderly behaviour in the enemy, or else he ‘is wholesale mad’, indicating the random, disorderly confusion of battle in general. This confusion is unstable by nature, so Ares shows madness in battle and instability simultaneously.

We should not necessarily assume, however, that Ares’ madness is ‘indiscriminating’ in the sense that he does not care whether he kills from one side or the other, that ‘it becomes impossible to say which side he is fighting for or against, because his only aim is slaughter’.577 In the Iliad, Ares is shown in the narrative to be consistently on the side of the Trojans; even Athene’s accusation that he promised to support the Greeks (a conversation which is unrecorded) is based on his ‘return’ to the Trojan fray (5.829-833)578. Ares’ aim may well be only slaughter, but only for the side he opposes.

578 The way Ares may be easily persuaded from one side to another is only evident here, and is not the same as killing anyone from any side for the sake of killing. Despite Vernant’s comment (1991: 255) that ‘The inability to stay firmly on one side is linked to the “frenzy” of Ares mainomenos, not just in the specific case that gives rise to Athene’s rebuke when Ares choose to fight for the Trojans after having committed himself to supporting the Greeks’, I would suggest caution in applying Ares’ instability to more than this specific case. His grief-and-anger-fuelled madness at 15.128-129 demonstrates a certain instability – presumably he agreed to Zeus’ commands not to assist before the death of his son – and he is persuaded, in addition, by Athene’s words to calm down. However, this could be considered an exceptional circumstance. Vernant’s assimilation of Diomedes into a mad alloprosallos is hampered by the fact that this epithet is never applied to Diomedes, but to Ares, and then twice in the same book (5.829-834, 5.889) with reference to the same apparent defection from the Greeks back to the Trojans; the epithet looks very much like one applied to Ares in a particular circumstance, rather than a general one used to indicate a common characteristic. Furthermore, although Vernant (Pgs. 254-255) cites the simile at 5.85-92 as an example of the fierceness of Diomedes’ madness making it impossible to tell whether he is with the Greeks or the Trojans, this anomaly is solved in the next lines (5.93-94) where the Trojans flee before him. This shows that it is not the Diomedes changes sides, as Ares is supposed to have done, but that he is not in the ὅμιλος of the Greeks, or of the Trojans, he is a lone man with such magnificent strength that he needs no
There may be another nuance to ἐπιμίξις, in that the ‘indiscriminate’ confusion of men and horses in the Iliad may be mirrored in the ‘indiscriminate’ slaughter of soldiers, who are not all equal: some have armour worth taking; some warrant a description of some sort when named on their deaths, either a verbal epitaph or a description of their death; others are simply named; some, the great heroes, have not only armour to be coveted by the victor but the more intangible kudos of having killed someone great. Ares may not care whether he kills a hero or just ‘lists’ of named soldiers, and this notion is supported in the Iliad by his (supposed) killing of Periphas and a desire for his armour (5.842-844) as well as the ‘list’ of men he and Hektor killed (5.705-706). Clarke offers another view again: ‘It follows that the personal Ares represents the frenzy of the whole action of battle from the point of view of both parties.

Instability, then, is occasionally the sort of behaviour which results in Ares being called mad in Homer. Herodotus sometimes associates instability with madness in the Histories, though it tends to be portrayed as the behaviour of one already mad. Amasis is the clearest example of a man who realises that instability, in the form of a lifestyle where duty is not balanced with leisure, may lead to madness rather than simply being a tic in the behavioural repertoire of the mad.

**Madness with Wine**

There is an interesting introduction of the concept of madness in connection with wine in the Odyssey, in a single example. This is different from the use of madness in the Iliad, although the odd reference may be construed as possible beginnings for such an

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580 Clarke (1999: 270) also cites 15.605-606 as an example of this.
introduction. In the Histories, the connection of wine with madness is also made explicit in a few cases.

Antinoös replies to Odysseus’ proposal that he himself try to string the bow (Book 21.274-294) by saying that his wits have been muddled by wine to even suggest that he might have such a privilege, and warning him how that (21.293-298):

‘Sweet wine is damaging you, which has harmed others as well, Whoever guzzles it and doesn’t drink it properly. Wine also mislead the Centaur, renowned Eurition,

In the palace of great-minded Perithoos,

Having come to the Lapiths; but he, when his wits were misled with wine,

As he went mad did damage throughout the house of Perithoos.’

(οἶνός σε τρώει μελιηδῆς, ὃς τε καὶ ἄλλους βλάπτει, ὃς ἀν μιν χανδόν ἠλη μηδ’ αἰσιμα πίνη.

οἶνος καὶ Κένταυρον, ἀγακλυτόν Εὐρυτίωνα,

ἀασ’ ἐνὶ μεγάξῳ μεγαθύμου Πειριθόου,

ἐς Λαπίθας ἐλθόνθ∙ ὁ δ’ ἐπεὶ φρένας ἀασε οἶνω,

μαινόμενος κάι’ ἐρεξε δόμον κάτα Πειριθόου.)

Madness in this case is caused by drinking wine, and causes Eurytion to do damage where he would normally be observant of social niceties. The use of this passage is also ironical in that Antinoös is cautioning Odysseus (whom he thinks is drunk) on being careful in case the suitors, out of anger, cause Odysseus harm (21.299-311). The reader/audience knows that it is going to be the other way around: Odysseus will surely string his bow and then cause havoc; he himself will inflict well-

§§ Seeford (1994: 331, n.8) points out that this is a rare application of μαίνομαι to non-humans.

§§ Alden (2000: 79) notes that ‘the Lapith wedding feast is probably the backdrop’ for this story. She goes on, ‘Antinous tells the story of Eurytion in the context of suggesting that Odysseus would never have asked to string the bow if he had not been drunk, and that he should be quiet now (and not ask to string the bow and compete to carry off the bride) if he wants to avoid a fate like Eurytion’s.’ She points out that the unspecified ‘wicked deeds’ of the drunken centaur are given in other versions (see also n. 18) as attempts to rape the bride and other women. Alden says that ‘This is not particularly edifying information, and the poet generally avoids gratuitous allusion to sexual misbehaviour.’ But in terms of Antinoös warning Odysseus off Penelope, it makes reasonable sense, particularly when Odysseus will, after a fashion, get the ‘bride’. The suitors, however, are the ones in the centaur’s position. Odysseus will remove them by force from his wife, rather than removing his wife by force.
deserved damage upon the suitors. It is not Odysseus who is truly in danger of transgressing the social niceties; the suitors have already been rebuked by Telemachos for their ‘mad’ behaviour towards the stranger (18.405-409).

Wine in the *Iliad* is not associated with madness as such. Achilleus accuses Agamemnon of being drunk (οἰνοβαρές) at 1.225, a derogatory term in answer to Agamemnon’s speech, in which he tells Achilleus to go home if he wants, because he isn’t needed, and that he himself is going to take Briseis (1.173-187). Achilleus in turn suggests that Agamemnon’s words and intended actions are abnormal enough for him to be drunk. This, however, is the only link in the *Iliad* between wine and wrong-headedness.

Interestingly, however, wine is associated with μένος, just as madness is an excess of μένος. Hektor and Hecabe each put a case for the properties of wine at 6.258-267: Hecabe is of the view that ‘wine increases great μένος in a tired man’ (ἀνδρὶ δὲ κακμηῶτι μένος μέγα οἶνος ἀέξει, 6.261), but Hektor counters her offer; he doesn’t want wine ‘in case my μένος is made weak, and I forget my might’ (μή μ’ ἀπογυιώσηις μένεος, ἀλκῆς τε λάθωμαι, 6.265). So wine, on the one hand, may give one μένος, but may, on the other hand, take it away, presumably by its relaxing properties. These two qualities of wine in the *Iliad* help to illuminate an example in the *Histories*. When Tomyris makes the accusation that the Persians are mad for drinking wine (1.212.2), it is just after her own people have drunk the wine set out by the Persians and have gone to sleep (1.211.2). Here again we have two ways in which wine can affect the drinker: as a soporific, or, according to Tomyris, as maddening. Homer’s example helps us to see that wine was considered to have these two effects due to its effect on μένος, so Tomyris is not showing any moral inconsistency when she does not mention the effect on her people but abuses the Persians. In the *Histories*, the effects reflect the

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583 Alden (2000: 82) compares Odyssey 21.295 to Iliad 1.259-273, after Achilleus has called Agamemnon oινοβαρές. This accusation of drunkenness is ‘taken up and developed in Nestor’s use of the story of the Lapith victory over the drunken, bride-stealing centaurs. In this reading, Agamemnon corresponds to the drunken Centaur who wishes to steal a women, and Achilles to the Lapiths, who succeeded in preventing bride-stealing by taking Nestor’s advice.’
‘civilised’ behaviour of the Massagetae, who go to sleep, and the ‘barbarous’ behaviour of the Persians, who use underhanded tricks and go mad.

Diomedes suggests, after a fraught meeting of the Greek leaders in which Odysseus has to tell Agamemnon that Achilleus is still angry (9.676-692), that they all go off to sleep (9.705-706), ‘since our dear hearts have been cheered By food and wine; for it is strength and might.’

( τεταρπόμενοι φίλον ἠτορ σίτου καὶ οἶνοιο· τὸ γὰρ μένος ἐστὶ καὶ ἀλκή.) Odysseus says the same to Achilleus at 19.161; when Achilleus would plunge straight into the fighting, Odysseus advises him to let the men have food and wine first, ‘for it is strength and might’. He goes on to explain that a hungry, thirsty man will not be able to fight all day, no matter how much he wishes (19.162-166), whereas a man who has had food and wine has a confident heart in his φρένες, wits or breast, and does not tire (19.167-170). So according to Odysseus, wine (and food) affects the φρένες and heart of a man, making him tireless and confident.

In the Iliad, then, we have the beginnings of an association of wine with wrong-headedness and the ability to give μένος to a person, as well as the other side, in which wine may simply make one relaxed or sleepy, and in this way remove μένος. Madness is also associated with μένος, so it is not so strange that madness and wine will eventually become associated. In the Odyssey, this association is made directly by Antinoös when he calls the feasting suitors mad at 21.297-298, but there is also a distinct increase in the association of wine with mind-altering properties. Odysseus gives wine to the Cyclops in order to make him drunk and sleepy, and ‘the wine went round [his] wits’ (περὶ φρένας ἤλυθεν οἶνος, 9.362), allowing Odysseus to fool Poluphemos that his name is ‘Nobody’ (9.364-367). Elpenor, one of Odysseus’ companions, gets drunk and falls to his death off the roof of Circe’s house because ‘an evil share of fate and breathtaking wine misled me’ (ἆσέ με δαίμονος αἶσα καὶ ἀσθέσφατος οἶνος, 11.61).

Odysseus suggests that wine has prompted him to tell Eumaios and his companions about a fictitious (or embroidered) expedition in Troy, with the object of getting a cloak off one of them (14.459-461). He claims that wine urges him to do so and
lists some character-altering qualities of wine, such as causing thoughtful men to yodel and shy men laugh and dance (14.463-466). Even if Odysseus is obfuscating his own condition, he nevertheless attributes to wine the ability to take away inhibitions to the point of impropriety. This point is the one which both Melantho and Eurumachos consider Odysseus to have reached (18.327-336, 18.389-393), when he speaks out in the ‘noble’ company of suitors in his house, while disguised as a beggar: he speaks boldly, despite his lowly position, so ‘wine really has hold of your wits’ (...ἡ ὃς σε οἶνος ἔχει φρένας, 18.331, 18.391). Finally, we have the speech of Antinoös, in which he not only suggests that Odysseus’ request for the bow is so inappropriate as to warrant a charge of drunkenness (21.293-294), but goes on to describe the centaur, who became drunk to the point of madness (21.295-298).

Madness is also associated with wine at times in the *Histories*. Both Cambyses and Cleomenes are said to have been over fond of wine, or overindulgent in strong wine. Cambyses, when his ‘inclination to the love of wine’ is brought up by Prexaspes (3.34.2), immediately jumps to the conclusion that the Persians must think him ‘deranged and not in his right mind’ (παραφρονέειν καὶ οὐκ εἶναι νοήμονα, 3.34.3) if they accuse him of such an inclination. The Spartiates don’t think there was any divine reason for Cleomenes to go mad, they think it was his excessive drinking of strong wine which he learnt off the Scythians (6.84.1-3). Tomyris, as has been mentioned earlier, has a theory about wine with which she rebukes Cyrus, when her son is caught in an ambush relying on the Massagetae being unaccustomed to wine (1.212.2): ‘as you fill yourselves up you go so mad that when the wine goes down into your body, evil words can sail up to your surface, with such a drug you snared and then overcame my son, but not by power in battle.’ (αὐτοὶ ἐμπιπλάμενοι μαίνεσθε οὕτως ὡστε κατιόντος τοῦ οἴνου ἐς τὸ σῶμα ἐπαναπλέειν ύμῖν ἐπειὰ κακᾶ, τοιοῦτω φαρμάκω δολώσας ἐκράτησας παιδὸς τοῦ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλ’ ὦ μάχῃ κατὰ τὸ καρτερόν.) Rather like the instances in the *Odyssey* in which wine is associated with a loosening of inhibitions and inappropriate speech, Tomyris sees wine as something which makes one mad and brings up ‘evil words’ to where they can be heard. Cyrus has used wine inappropriately, in battle; wine
is a ‘drug’ which incapacitates the Massagetean drinkers, but which makes the Persians ‘mad’ and say evil words.

Wine is connected with madness in one explicit episode in the *Odyssey*, but the connection appears to be the last chain in a series of connections beginning in the *Iliad*, of wine with μένος, with wrong-headedness, and with inappropriate behaviour and speech. Herodotus connects wine with madness in three instances in the *Histories*, and although he does not specifically endorse the madness of Cambyses or Cleomenes as stemming from wine, the connection is there nevertheless, and is significant in that regard. Tomyris, in her speech to Cyrus, also links wine directly to madness and inappropriate words.

**ἀλλοφρονέω in Homer**

There is a distinct difference between the use of ἀλλοφρονέω in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* and the way Herodotus uses it in the *Histories*. This study is circumscribed by the fact that the verb is used once only in each work. Homer appears to use ἀλλοφρονέω in ways unconnected with madness, whereas Herodotus’ use of the verb is very much in the format of madness inflicted by the gods.

In the *Iliad*, Epeios knocks out Eurualos in the boxing, and Eurualos’ friends ‘led him out of the contest area with his feet dragging, Spitting copious blood, his head dangling to the side; And since he was still woozy when they brought him back and sat him down with them, They went and got the two-handled goblet.’

(οἵ μεν ἄγον δι’ ἀγώνος ἐφελκομένοισι πόδεσσιν αἷμα παχὺ πτύοντα κάρη βάλλονθ’ ἐτέρωσε∙ κάδ δ’ ἀλλοφρονέοντα μετὰ σφίσιν εἰσάν ἄγοντες, αὐτοὶ δ’ οἰχόμενοι κόμισαν δέπας ἀμφικύπελλον, 23.696-699).

There is no suggestion in this episode of madness on Eurualos’ part. ἀλλοφρονέω in this instance does have to do with an altered mind, but in this case a mind which is ‘other’ than Eurualos’ normal state because he has been punched in the face (23.689-
Normally such a man would be able to take himself out of the contest and claim his prize for himself, but ἀλλοφρονέω here indicates that Eurualos is not in a fit state to do either of these things.

In the *Odyssey*, Circe finds that her potions will not work on Odysseus, and in a state of truce she invites him to a meal. Odysseus describes the scene (10.371-374):

‘A modest housekeeper brought bread and set it out,
Putting out much more food besides, giving generously of what was there;
And told us to eat – but it did not placate my spirit,
And I sat, my mind elsewhere, my spirit visualising evil things.’

Odysseus in this instance is not pleased by what has been done in order to please him. Circe’s acceptance of his presence, and the provision she makes for him, are not enough to placate him, because in this ‘truce’ he continues to think ‘evil things’. He is literally ‘thinking of others’, as he explains to Circe later (10.383-387), because he cannot face food and relaxation while his companions remain in their porcine state. Here again there is no suggestion of madness about Odysseus, and unlike Eurualos, Odysseus is capable of thought. The problem is simply that what is supposed to please him is not what does please him, given his privileged position in Circe’s house and the unfortunate position of the companions in the sty outside.

In the *Histories*, the Athenians go out of their minds at 5.85.2, when they are trying to pull the statues of Damia and Auxesia off their bases in Aegina. The trireme of men sent to retrieve the originally Epidaurian statues hear a thunderclap and experience an earthquake while they try to drag away the statues, and ‘went out of their minds because of these things, and while suffering this they killed each other as if (they were) enemies, until out of everyone one man was left remaining’ (ὑπὸ τούτων ἀλλοφρονήσαι, παθόντας δὲ τοῦτο κτείνειν ἀλλήλους ἀτε πολέμιους, ἐς ὁ ἐκ πάντων ἕνα λειψάντα). Unlike the examples in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the
Athenians display signs of madness when they are described as ἀλλοφρονήσει. They are violent, they appear to think that their fellow crew-members are enemies, and the divine phenomena indicate the divine imposition of this state of mind upon the crew. They slaughter themselves down to one man, another indication of the ferocity of the madness, a ferocity which is absent in the examples from the Iliad and Odyssey. Furthermore, their transgression of religious custom, in pulling the statues off their bases, is similar to other madnesses in the Histories which are inflicted because of divine disapproval.

It appears that Homer uses ἀλλοφρονέω as a way to indicate a state of mind which is ‘other’ than normal or ‘other’ than what it might be expected to be, but does not take the meaning any further to connect it with madness. Herodotus does use the verb in a context where the sailors of the trireme go mad, seemingly from divine affliction for their sacrilegious deeds.

λύσσα in Homer

The use of λύσσα and its permutations occurs several times in the Iliad, although not with the frequency of μαίνομαι. It does not appear in the Odyssey at all. The form is used once in the Histories. Like μαίνομαι, λύσσα is used of warriors in battle situations in Homer, except for one example. Herodotus uses λύσσα in a battle context also, and in Homer, at least, λύσσα and μαίνομαι have such similar functions that they might almost be used interchangeably.

Teukros, ‘the top Greek archer’, complains to Agamemnon, when the latter compliments him and encourages him to go on shooting as he has been (8.281-291), that (8.297-299):

‘I shot eight long-pointed arrows,

584 For example, Cambyses (3.30.1) and Cleomenes (6.75.3-81).
585 Padel (1995: 142) notes that he ‘can hit every Trojan except Hector’. She goes on, ‘Hector in killing rage is mad and (like) mad-dog’. Hektor is, however, human, which gives us the clever dichotomy of Hektor, the mad dog, in derogatory terms, from Teukros, and Hektor, the invincible human in the narrative. See also Lincoln (1975: 105): ‘It is only when a domesticated species begins to act wolfish that something is wrong – unless of course, the species in question is man himself, in which case his λύσσα is regarded as heroism and not disease.’
All were into the bodies of vigorous men, swift as Ares;  
But I cannot hit this mad dog.’

(أهمية δὴ προέηκα τανυγλώχινας οἰστούς,  
πάντες δ’ ἐν χροῒ πῆχθεν ἀρηϊθόων αἰζηῶν·  
τοῦτον δ’ οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσητήρα.)

He then tries to shoot Hektor, the ‘mad dog’, once again, but although ‘his spirit was  
longing to hit him’ (βαλέειν δὲ ἐ ὤτοθυμός, 8.301) Teukros misses and kills  
Gorgythion instead, another of Priam’s sons; he tries again, with the same longing  
(8.310) and kills Hektor’s charioteer, Archeptolemos (8.312).

It is not the case that Hektor is necessarily faster than the men who were shot  
down: they were ‘swift as Ares’. Nor is it the case that he has done anything particularly  
‘mad’ in recent narrative; he has shouted at Diomedes and rallied the troops (8.160-183).  
He has, however, been granted κῦδος by Zeus (8.141), as Nestor points out to Diomedes,  
whose spear throw missed Hektor and hit his charioteer, Eniopeus (8.118-120). This is  
phrase is repeated at 8.216. It is this κῦδος which allows him to besiege the Greeks in  
their own fortifications and threaten the ships (8.212-217). A brief, Zeus-allowed, rally  
of the Greeks (8.245f.) is the context in which Teukros seeks to shoot Hektor.

While Hektor is not demonstrating μανία madness in the narrative, the episode is  
very like that of Diomedes in 5.180-187, whom Pandaros calls mad (μάινεται, 5.185)  
while explaining to Aineas that some god warded Pandaros’ arrow off Diomedes. Hektor  
demonstrates ‘madness’ in terms of battle in this regard, and his being λυσητήρ is, in  
this situation, as identical to μανία as makes no difference: he has the power of Zeus  
allowing him to succeed against the Greeks and have a ‘force field’ about him which  
protects him from projectile weapons.

Teukros’ statement is also the beginning of a series of comments made about  
Hektor’s ‘madness’. After wounding Teukros (8.326-334), Hektor drives the Greeks  
back into their fortifications, and is described as a dog chasing a wild boar or a lion
(8.338-342), and at 8.349 is said to have ‘the eyes of a Gorgon or Ares, the bane of men’ (Γοργοῦς ὃμματ' ἔχων ἡ βροτολοιγοῦ Ἀρηος, 8.349). Hera goes on to call him mad (8.355), and to stir up Athene to oppose him (8.357-380).

The pairing of λυσσητήρ with κύων, although the phrase is unique, is explicable as a conscious or unconscious association of λύσσα forms with wolves or dogs. As Lincoln convincingly argues, λύσσα is formed from λύκος, and harks back to the donning of wolf-skins by warriors with a view to donning the ‘wolf nature’ at the same time. Despite the two diverse forms of λύκος-related λύσσα and μένος-related μανία, the words appear to be used in similar ways to describe a hero when he is demonstrating god-given success in battle and the concurrent ability to avoid harm.

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586 The dog simile is not derogatory in this instance. Antilochos (15.579) and Achilleus (22.189) are both likened to dogs.
587 Lussa is described as having Gorgon attributes in Euripides’ Heracles also (883). This will be further discussed in the following example.
588 Dogs may or may not be despised; Book 8 alone has four more references to dogs. In 8.368, Athene mentions Cerberus; she then threatens to have Trojan bodies feed the birds and dogs by the Achaean ships at 8.379; Zeus says to Hera ‘there is nothing more like a dog than you’ (οὐ σέο κύντερον) at 8.483, citing her annoyance at his plans for the Trojans to win for a time; Hektor calls the Greeks dogs at 8.527.
589 Lincoln (1975: 98-105, particularly Pgs. 98-99, 103-105). Lincoln points out (Pgs. 104-105) that in Iliad 10.334, Dolon puts on a wolf-skin cloak but is unable to assume the nature.
589 Hershkowitz (1998: 147, see also n. 77), notes that λύσσα is ‘a non-μένος-, and in fact non-human-, based word’. The non-humanity of λύσσα compared with the ‘humanity’ of μένος-based madness shows that Padel’s proposal that madness is a demonstration of the animal in the human (1995: 141-142) will not work in Homer; although she refers chiefly to tragedy, she includes an example from Homer (8.299). λύσσα works but μένος madness does not, though it has, on the other hand, a non-human aspect to it: the gods have the most μένος and can instil it in others. Seeing as the words for these two ‘types’ of madness are used in the same way, we cannot say it is animal behaviour alone which invites the label of madness, but either animal or divine: simply ‘not human’, and the two appear to mix freely, as we shall see in 9.237-239. Padel is referring to ‘daemons’, or the Erinues, when she says (Pg. 142) ‘Madness has a nonhuman cause, and nonhuman effects. Both the maddening daemon and the maddened person are nonhuman. Daemonic causes of madness may be part animal.’ The divine aspect of madness is partially evident in the daemons, but these are under the jurisdiction of ‘higher’ gods: Hera uses Lussa to send Heracles mad (831-832); the Erinues stop hounding Orestes at Athene’s verdict (Aeschylus, Eumenides, 805-1057). Redfield (1994: 202) says that ‘lussa is the heat of menos raised to a pitch of fever’ without elaborating on the philological leap need to make this connection. Although μανία and λύσσα may be used in the same way, we should not ignore they divergent origins. He goes on, ‘λυσσα is the highest peak of the warrior’s power, yet it is also a disease.’ μανία should be added to this ‘peak of power’, but although μανία, too, could be considered a disease, Homer does not use it as such. We should therefore be very careful about ascribing disease-tones to λύσσα as well.
from the enemy. Lincoln also notes that the pairing of λυσσητήριον with κύων ‘makes it seem highly likely that the usage [of λύσσα] as “rabid” was known to Homer.’

Herodotus uses λύσσα only once, but in the context of battle, as Homer does. While discussing the heroes of Plataea, he says that in his opinion, Aristodemus was the most valiant (9.71.2), the only Spartan to have remained alive of the Three Hundred at Thermopylae. The Spartans, however, did not honour him as some other heroes who had also died in battle (9.71.4), on the grounds that ‘he was clearly wanting to die, because of the charge he had [of cowardice (7.231)], so he went mad and abandoned his position and performed great deeds’ (βουλόμενον φανερῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρεούσης οἱ αἰτίης, λυσσῶντα τε καὶ ἐκλείποντα τὴν τάξιν ἔργα ἀποδέξασθαι μεγάλα, 9.71.3). Aristodemus, then, is a hero in battle, and so has λύσσα in common with Hektor and Achilleus; at face value the two incidents look quite similar. Unlike the Homeric heroes, however, he appears to have a death wish which motivates his λύσσα and his ‘great deeds’ before he is killed. From another angle, we could say that his ‘charge’, the αἰτίη of cowardice, caused the λύσσα. The cause of Aristodemus’ madness then is not divine aid, as it is in the case of Hektor and Achilleus; it is more like the ‘god’ of nomos of which Demaratus tells Xerxes (7.104.4-5). Hektor and Achilleus do not wish to die while under the influence of λύσσα; although Odysseus may suggest, obliquely, that Hektor would die if he challenged Achilleus in the confidence of λύσσα (9.304-306), his emphasis is on Hektor’s confidence in his own strength, not on the outcome of the hypothetical fight. In addition, there is no suggestion of ‘rabid’ or diseased overtones in Herodotus’ use of λύσσα.

In Book 9 Odysseus toasts Achilleus (9.223-224) and tells him the state of the Trojan army (9.232-237) in an effort to entice him back to fighting. He describes Hektor (9.237-239):

‘And Hektor, exulting greatly in his power,
Goes terrifyingly mad while he depends on Zeus, nor does he properly regard either men or gods; but a violent frenzy has possessed him.

(Διί Ἕκτωρ δὲ μέγα σθένεϊ βλεμεαίνων μαίνεται ἐκπάγλως πίσυνος Δι, οὐδ’ ἐτι τίει ἀνέρας οὐδὲ θεούς- κρατερὴ δὲ ἑ λύσσα δέδυκεν.)

This description of Hektor is to be taken a little cautiously; Hainsworth remarks on Odysseus’ exaggeration of Hektor’s strength593, and it is necessary to remember that Odysseus is trying to persuade Achilleus at this point and so will want to make an impression on him of the severity of the situation, even if it means embroidering the truth a little594. For example, when Hektor was last seen he was sacrificing to the gods (Book 8.526-528, 8.548-550) even if they didn’t acknowledge it at the time. This cannot be described as ‘improper regard for the gods’. Odysseus appears to contradict himself in lines 9.238-239, saying first that Hektor depends on Zeus, and then that he doesn’t have proper regard for men or gods. All these factors warn the audience that we should be taking Odysseus’ words with a degree of caution.

There is some strength to his being called ‘mad’, however. Odysseus has not been the only person to say so: Teukros was not able to get an arrow to hit him, and called him a ‘mad dog’ (κύων λυσσητήρ, 8.299). Hera also calls Hektor mad at 8.355, although again in the context of encouraging someone, in this case Athene, to do something about the state of the battle595. Hektor is shown as harassing the ranks of the fleeing Argives with the Zeus-strengthened might of the Trojans (8.335-349), killing the stragglers (8.342596); he is described as ‘having the eyes of a Gorgon or Ares, the bane of men’ (Γοργοῦς ὄμματ’ ἔχων ἥ βροτολοιγοῦ Άρηος, 8.349). While some scholars

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593 Hainsworth (1993: 96 s.v. 236-43, 239). And, as Hershkowitz notes (1998: 137), ‘Name-calling is an obvious form this pejorative use of the language of madness takes: Hektor includes γυναιμανές (‘woman crazy’, ll. 3.39=13.769) in the list of insults aimed at Paris, and himself is referred to as a κύνα λυσσητήρα (‘mad dog’, 8.299) and λυσσώδης (‘frenzied’, 13.53); Antinous is called μάργε (‘raging’, Od. 16.422.).
594 Hershkowitz also notes this (1998: 139): Odysseus’ calling Hektor mad is ‘designed to pressure Achilles into returning to battle to meet the over-confident…Trojan prince’.
595 Fenik (1968:48) mentions that gods are ‘often incited into action by others’ and adduces 5.454-460, 5.714, 8.353 and 21.331. Hershkowitz makes the same comparison (1998: 139): ‘Hera’s complaint about Ares’ mad behaviour in battle is also encouragement to Athena to enter the fray’.
596 An unusual activity, in that only Agamemnon does the same at 11.178; all the same, despite the killing, neither of them is called mad for it at these points.
suggest that having the eyes of a Gorgon is in itself a mark of madness\textsuperscript{597}, in the \textit{Iliad} the only two other places which mention the Gorgon (5.741, 11.36) dwell on the horrifying nature of her head, which usually is associated with such words as φόβος, δεινός, τέρας and δειμός\textsuperscript{598}. So we should associate Hektor’s ‘Gorgon likeness’ with his ability to strike fear into the enemy. Madness does this also; we should perhaps think of the Gorgon metaphor and the madness as working in tandem for terror, as such multiplying occurs in other appearances of the Gorgon, rather than turning the aspects around to suggest that madness is associated with the Gorgon. Interestingly, however, while the poet describes Hektor with the terror-striking Gorgon metaphor, other people then describe him as mad, which takes the ‘terror’ aspect of Hektor onto the invincible, superhuman level\textsuperscript{599}.

\textsuperscript{597} Alden (2000: 277, n.236) cites 8.349, 8.355, 9.239 and 9.305 as ‘symptoms of madness displayed by Hector’. She does concede that such signs may however ‘relate to his overconfidence’. This is an aspect of Hektor which Alden draws convincingly (Pgs. 277-278): ‘Hector is never described in so many words as the victim of ἄτη, but he grows overconfident, and fails to appreciate the circumscribed nature of the success he is granted. The process by which he is led to suffer from overconfidence begins almost as soon as he returns to battle after refusing to agree to the requests of the women he met in book 6: on the strength of an assurance from his brother, Helenus, that he has heard the gods say that Hector is not yet fated to die, Hector challenges the Greeks to provide a champion to fight him in single combat. Hector concludes his challenge with boastful words (\textit{Il}. 7.87-91) which caused the scholiasts to censure him as a braggart.’ She makes the important point, in n. 237, that it is ‘after he has rejected the appeals of the women in book 6 the verb μαίνομαι (to be mad) begins to be used of Hector: \textit{Il}. 8.355; 9.238; 15.605, 606; 21.5.’ On the other hand, this is somewhat unsurprising given the way the tide turns for the Trojans in 8.68-77. Hershkowitz (1998: 133) also points this out: ‘Hector would not be qualified by many as an irrational character, let alone as a madman, yet the terminology of madness is ascribed to Hector more times than to any other Homeric character. This is not to suggest that Hector is a madman, but the fact that this is definitely not the conclusion the reader draws is a significant statement about the role played by madness in the \textit{Iliad}. References connecting Hector and madness occur within the context of his activities on the battlefield, particularly during his \textit{aristeia}.’ Fenik (1968: 118-119) also notes that Hektor is called λυσσώδης at 13.53, 8.299, 9.239 and 15.605. He adds, ‘Other men are also described as “maddened” when the battle fury is upon them: Diomedes at Z 100 and Achilles at Φ542’ and later notes (Pg. 227) Hektor’s ‘wild, demonic appearance’ at 8.348 and 15.605-10.

\textsuperscript{598} See 5.738-742, noting the triple use of δεινός, and 11.36-37.

\textsuperscript{599} Hershkowitz (1998: 139) says something similar: ‘the use of madness words can also serve to goad the opposition into action …the fact that a judgement of μαίνεσθαι or λύσσα is always pronounced by other is significant. It suggests that madness is always an external attribute in the \textit{Iliad} and the \textit{Odyssey}, and as such has little bearing on one’s understanding of the internal state of the individual. What counts is someone’s behaviour, as seen and judged by others, not the psychological condition underlying it’.
Topping off Odysseus’ description of Hektor is the phrase ‘λύσσα has possessed him’ (ἐ λύσσα δέδυκεν, 9.239)⁶⁰⁰. Odysseus has a basis for calling Hektor mad which is supported by the text at this stage⁶⁰¹, but he also uses two types of madness as a means to get Achilleus’ attention and to emphasise, even to exaggerate the power of the foe in order to make Achilleus feel guilty enough to come back into the fight. This is shown by his repetition of the idea of Hektor’s madness: not only is he mad (μαίνεται) but in addition λύσσα has possessed him. This cunning ploy is typically Odyssean; a judicious mix of truth and untruth is more convincing, in general, than complete exaggeration. All the same, it is worth noting that Odysseus still associates madness, even in this persuasive context, with the gods: Hektor goes mad ‘while he depends on Zeus’. Since λύσσα is mentioned in a separate clause it is difficult to say whether the divine aspect of μαίνεται is carried over onto λύσσα, but as μαίνομαι and λύσσα have, so far, been used in similar ways, a god-given λύσσα may be more probable than possible⁶⁰². There does not appear to be any conflict in the juxtaposition of the ‘animal’ λύσσα madness and the ‘divine’ μένος madness; each supports the other in Odysseus’ picture of Hektor, a use which argues their similarity rather than their diversity.

Odysseus culminates his persuasive speech to Achilleus with another reference to Hektor’s λύσσα (9.304-306):

‘For now you might seize Hektor, since he might come very near to you
While he has complete madness, since he says there is no-one like

⁶⁰⁰ As Hershkowitz (1998: 148) notes, ‘Odysseus, describing Hector to Achilles, builds up a portrait of the Trojan’s self-confidence…The culmination of the image of Hector is the mention of λύσσα. As Lyssa will enter (δυσόμεθα) Heracles’ house and Heracles himself, so the force of λύσσα has entered (δέδυκεν) Hector.’ The description of Hektor having Gorgon’s eyes is also similar to the description of Lussa in Euripides’ Heracles (883). ‘Possession’ for δύω may or may not be the right word here; for a discussion of whether Lussa possesses or not see Hershkowitz (1998: 148-149) and Lincoln (1975: 100-101); and for Padel’s view (1992: 125, 162-163; 1995: 17, 142). δέδυκεν can also mean ‘attack’ or ‘invade’, or, in a delightfully disease-laden overtone, ‘infest’. However, as Lincoln says (Pg. 105), since λύσσα as disease is not associated with humans, we should steer away from ‘infest’.

⁶⁰¹ All the same, Hektor will not really start to have his extensive aristeia until Book 15.262, when Apollo heals and strengthens him after Ajax wounds him with a boulder (14.412).

⁶⁰² This makes the personification of Lussa in tragedy the next logical step. Hershkowitz (1998: 147) points out that λύσσα in Homer is not dissimilar in action to the Lussa of tragedy, although less dramatic.
Himself among the Danaans, whom the ships brought here.’

(νῦν γάρ χ’ Ἕκτορ’ ἔλοις, ἐπεὶ ἀν μάλα τοι σχεδὸν ἐλθοὶ λύσσαν ἔχων ὀλοῆν, ἐπεὶ οὗ τινὰ φησιν ὤμοιον οἱ ἐμεναι Δαναῶν οὐς ἐνθάδε νῆς ἐνεικαν.)

λύσσα here makes Hektor (as Odysseus puts it, trying to convince Achilleus to fight) supremely confident in his own ability to fight, even to surpass Achilleus, since he supposedly says no-one among the Danaans can match him. This over-confidence would cause him to want to fight Achilleus, at which point Achilleus would have the opportunity to kill him, thereby winning glory and the gratitude of the other Achaeans (9.301-303).

Hektor’s madness here is similar to Diomedes’ actions in his aristeia of Book 5, particularly of his stabbing Aphrodite (5.335-337) and his attempts to get at Aineas despite Apollo’s opposition (5.432-439). Apollo warns him off in words which Odysseus’ may echo(5.440-442):

‘Beware, son of Tydeus, and back away, nor to the gods Wish to consider yourself equal, since the race of immortals and gods is never the same As that of men who walk on the ground.’

(φράζεο, Τυδεΐδη, καὶ χάζεο, μηδὲ θεοῖσιν ἵσε ἐθελε φρονεεῖν, ἐπεὶ οὗ ποτε φύλον ὤμοιον ἀθανάτων τε θεῶν χαμαι ἐρχομένων τ’ ἀνθρώπων.)

5.441 occupies the same metrical line as 9.305, as well as having ἐπεὶ οὗ …ὄμοιον in common. While Diomedes is not called mad at this point in Book 5, he is demonstrating similar high confidence to Hektor, and has been called mad previously (5.185). Even more similar to Hektor’s λύσσα is the description which Helenos gives of Diomedes, while speaking to Hektor at 6.99-101, if not in wording then in content:

‘We never feared Achilleus in this way, first among men, Whom they say was born of a goddess; but this man is inordinately Mad; no one is able to match him in terms of strength.’

(οὐδ’ Ἀχιλῆά ποθ’ ὧδε γ’ ἐδείδημεν ὀφχαμον ἀνδρῶν,
Helenos sees Diomedes, in his ‘madness’, as unmatchable; he is even worse than Achilleus. Odysseus says that Hektor claims he has no equal, and in his λύσσα would attempt to fight Achilleus himself. Once again λύσσα and μαίνεται appear to have very similar functions, despite the difference in root meaning; one could be used for the other.603

There is a slight difference in perspective between the two episodes, however: because Hektor, according to Odysseus, sees himself as invincible, he comes across as over-confident rather than truly fearsome604, as Diomedes appears to be. Stressing this ‘over-confidence’, in the mouth of the Greeks, is another persuasive tool.

Poseidon takes the likeness of Kalchas and speaks to the two Ajaxes (13.43-46), to stir them up against Hektor, who, along with the Trojans, wants to fire the Greek ships (13.39-42). He is not so worried about the wall (13.49-51), he says(13.52-54):

‘But I fear that we might suffer something most terribly there,
Where that madman, like a flame, leads:
Hektor, who maintains that he is the mighty son of Zeus.’

Hektor’s λύσσα is still similar to μαίνομαι; his violent force is enough to worry even a god, as it did at 8.355-356. The mention of flame is naturally a link to Hektor’s desire to set fire to the ships. Hektor is still demonstrating over-confidence, according to Poseidon, and in this instance later events show that his comments were not

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603 As Padel (1995: 21) says that paranoia, anoia, oistros, lussa and mania are ‘roughly interchangeable’ in tragedy, ‘not different sorts of madness but different words for the same thing’, so μανία and λύσσα appear at least to work the same way in Homer.

604 See Alden (2000: 277-278). She does not point out the numerous occasions on which Hektor’s over-confidence is put in the mouth of his enemies, but there are plenty of examples even if we remove these. Hershkowitz also notes (1998: 149) that ‘Odysseus concludes his speech to Achilles by reiterating his picture of the over-confident Hector’.
unjustified. To claim that he is the son of Zeus is a supremely over-confident boast, as much as saying he is equal with the gods, for which Apollo rebuked Diomedes’ implicit thought at 5.440-442. We could safely argue bias on Poseidon’s part, except that Hektor, in his own words, later makes a very similar boast (13.825-827). As Alden notes, ‘If Hektor earlier (Il. 8.540) wished to overstep human limitations, this is worse than ever.’

It is not necessarily the case, however, that λύσσα is always an indicator for over-confidence. Teukros is not accusing Hektor of over-confidence at 8.299, and Achilleus will not be over-confident at 21.542. Nor is over-confidence absent from Diomedes, for example, when he tries to get around Apollo’s protective custody of Aineas (5.433-442), when he has the backing of Athene, although he is not called mad; or at 8.109-111, where he and Nestor charge the Trojans, and he himself calls his spear mad. Hera and Athene could be accused of over-confidence when they try to circumvent Zeus’ rules of combat, and Iris accuses them of being mad (8.413-414). Although, proportionally speaking, over-confidence appears more with λύσσα, this is the matter of a few examples, and may be coincidently used when Hektor is the subject; he is an over-confident character. Rather we should consider that god-given power and invincibility can be taken for granted, as a kind of insurance, and may be abused, even by the gods themselves.

As a counter-example to the over-confidence of the λύσσα-filled Hektor, Achilleus is described in similar terms at 21.542-543:

‘[The Trojans] fled; but he pursued them vigorously with his spear, and madness Always had hold of his heart, and he strove to seize glory.’

(φεῦγον∙ ὃ δὲ σφεδανόν ἐφέπ’ ἐγχεῖ, λύσσα δὲ οἱ κῆρ αἰὲν ἔχε κρατερή, μενέαινε δὲ κύδος ἀφέσθαι..

Achilleus’ λύσσα is used like μαίνομαι: it demonstrates violent, superior fighting ability, particularly as this is Achilleus’ aristeia. Hershkowitz thinks the difference

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605 Of this section Alden rightly says (2000: 279) that Hektor’s boast ‘could be an exaggeration by Poseidon of Hector’s desire (Il. 8.538-40) to be honoured like Apollo and Athena, and it is certainly of a piece with Hector’s behaviour in what is coming.’

606 Alden (2000: 280, see also n. 242).
between Hektor’s over-confident λύσσα and Achilleus’ λύσσα, which is uncoloured by any such tones, is in the use of μενέαινε at 21.543. This, she proposes, indicates Achilleus’ control of the λύσσα and Hektor’s lack of control, a ‘directed channeling of energy which μενέαινε implies’. If, however, we consider the over-confidence of Hektor while under the influence of λύσσα to be a hazard of the occupation of the warrior currently favoured by the gods, whether Achilleus channels his λύσσα is not necessarily the matter at stake, but rather that he has not succumbed the hubris which having λύσσα may invite. She also makes a distinction between Achilleus’ and Hektor’s actions, saying that Achilleus is successful in the grip of λύσσα, but although this is a true statement as far as it goes, we ought to compare him to Hektor, who is also successful in that he avoids harm (8.299), prompts Odysseus to try and get Achilleus back into the fray (9.239, 9.305), and causes Poseidon to step in to help the Greeks (13.53). There is no difference between the λύσσα of one hero and another.

Hershkowitz follows Redfield, who claims that λύσσα is ‘a source of weakness’ for Hektor but ‘for Achilleus it is a source of strength’. Redfield’s example of Hektor’s weakness is 9.304-6, where he does not take into account the context of Odysseus trying to persuade Achilleus. Furthermore, Hektor’s ‘weakness’ in λύσσα may be a tendency to the over-confidence which he is prey to in other instances, but on the face of it his supposed willingness to prove himself against Achilleus is hardly

608 Hershkowitz (1998: 149). Though she does point out that ‘whether it is viewed as a harmful or helpful attribute, λύσσα always has an out-of-control element to it, brought out, in art, by the ambiguity of its possession of and/or by the heroes.’
609 Achilleus did try to fight the river-god, Skamandros (21.233-271), but in desperation called on the gods for help (21.272-283). The weakness/wounding of the hero in an aristeia who is strengthened by the gods is, on the other hand, standard.
610 Hershkowitz (1998: 145-146). She also says (Pg. 145) that Hektor in his madness (μαίνεται,15.605) cannot break through the Achaean at 15.617, and therefore he does not channel his energy positively, which is why μαίνεται is used rather than μενέαινεν. However, Hektor does break through the Achaean very shortly after (15.635-637); Zeus takes some 30 lines to work Hektor into a sufficiently powerful state. I am dubious as to whether we should call this a lack of positive channelling. Furthermore, by having Hektor mad (15.605) Homer can emphasise the strength of the Achaean in being able to withstand the onslaught briefly.

‘weakness’. Redfield also claims that the hero ‘becomes a distorted, impure being; great in his power, he is at the same time reduced to something less than himself.’ If, however, μανία, or the manifestation of excessive μένος, comes from a supportive god, and λύσσα is seen in heroes who are enjoying the current favour of the gods, the heroes are only less of themselves in terms of having more divine input. They are less human because the favour of the gods lends them a little more divinity; they are in no way ‘reduced’, as the numerous occurrences of the phrases δαίμονι ἴσος and ἱσόθεος φώς attest.

Vernant suggests that the madness of warriors in battle in the Iliad causes them to overstep boundaries, referring to lussa and furor although not to μανία:

‘...when...possessed by Ares...the condition of furor does not merely blur the order of battle but also erases the boundaries between the two sides and even between mortals and immortals; it breaks the sacrosanct barrier that usually prevents men from attacking the gods.’

It is true that Diomedes, in his aristeia, tries to circumvent Apollo in an attempt to get at Aineas (5.432); it is also true that Achilleus has an argument with the river-god Skamandros (21.233-272). Hektor, however, to whom λύσσα is applied the most, never attacks a god; if any of the heroes should do so under λύσσα, it ought to be Hektor. Furthermore, in the instances where Diomedes and Achilleus have run-ins with gods, when not specifically told by another god to attack, they do not fight as they normally would.

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613 δαίμονι ἴσος: of Diomedes, 5.438, 5.459, 5.884; of Patroklos, 16.705, 16.786; of Achilleus, 20.447, 20.493, 21.18, 21.227. ἱσόθεος φώς: of Euryalos, 2.565; of Priam, 3.310; of Menelaos, 4.212; of Ereuthalion, 7.136; of Patroklos, 9.211; of Sokos 11.428; of Ajax, 11.472; of Patroklos, 11.644; of Melanippos, 15.559; of Meriones, 16.632; of Menelaos, 23.569; of Euryalos, 23.677. In addition, numerous heroes are called ἀντίθεος. Strangely, none of these epithets is applied to Hektor; this does not necessarily indicate, however, that he is ‘less than human’ because of his λύσσα. He is also the only hero who likens himself to the gods (8.538-540, 13.54, 13.825-827): this is more symptomatic of his general over-confidence than of the specific instances where he is gripped by λύσσα. He is, on the other hand, likened to a god by Priam, but posthumously (24.258).
615 Athene gives her express permission to Diomedes to attack Aphrodite at 5.129-132 and 5.330-340; and to attack Ares at 5.826-830 and 855-859. These Diomedes stabs at just as he would a normal opponent.
When Diomedes and Apollo face each other (5.431-444), Diomedes knows exactly who he is facing, but does not attack Apollo as he would another opponent. His aim is to kill Aineas and to get Aineas’ armour, and for this he makes his four attempts. While he rushes forwards, there is no mention of actual attack on Apollo, and the idea of rushing feints is more apparent than any mention of spears and his desire to harm the god. Rather, his entire attention is focussed on the armour: ‘Three times then he rushed, eagerly desiring to possess fully...’ (τρὶς μὲν ἐπειτ’ ἐπόρουσε κατακτάμεναι μενεαίνων, 5.436), where the use of κατακτάμεναι indicates his aim is possession rather than injury to Apollo. Furthermore, Apollo bats Diomedes’ shield away three times at 5.437; this indicates that the only weapon Diomedes specifically uses against Apollo is not a weapon at all, but his instrument of defence; Apollo himself does not appear unduly threatened by Diomedes’ feints, merely thrusting the hero off and chiding him by telling him not to try to be a god (5.440-442).

I do not include Diomedes’ wounding of either Aphrodite at 5.334-342 or Ares at 5.846-861 because these actions are explicitly endorsed by Athene (5.131-132, 5.829-830); Diomedes is her instrument. Diomedes does get called ‘mad’ for these two god-sanctioned acts (μαργαίνειν, 5.882), by a peeved Ares, which will be discussed in the next section. Diomedes’ dust-up with Apollo is never called mad.

As Kirk (1990: 105) states.

The use of μενεαίνων here gives the heightened μένος without the madness, although it is dubious whether Hershkowitz ‘positive’ aspects of μενεαίνω should apply here (1998: 144-145); I rather think not. I am unsure that we should say that Diomedes ‘attacks’ Apollo, but what I wish to convey is the idea that Diomedes is not mad here, does not treat Apollo as he did Aphrodite and Ares, but all the same is treading highly dangerous ground. Diomedes may well be accused of having a lack of respect for Apollo (as Kirk notes, 1990: 105), and of displaying hubris, but μανία remains unmentioned, and actual attack is questionable. If attack is questionable, then the boundaries between human and immortals are not crossed, although in this case it is a near thing, as Apollo does have to restate his position to bring Diomedes into line. Vernant (1991: 255, see also n. 24) is on steadier ground when he argues that Diomedes is ‘...led astray by a hubris that makes him break every norm and most particularly, blinds him to the distinction between human and divine.’ In this, hubris and madness in Homer have something in common, in that they cause people to break social norms sometimes. However, as madness is not mentioned at this point in the poem, it cannot be assumed that madness is the cause for Diomedes’ behaviour. Nor can Diomedes be called blind to the distinction between human and divine, in that he (presumably) sees Apollo and knows (γιγνώσκων) that he is a god (Book 5.433).

Compared with the way Apollo treats Patroklos in Book 16, this is positively gentle. There Apollo strikes Patroklos so hard that his eyes were spun around (...πλῆξεν...στρεφεδίνηθεν δὲ οἱ ὀσσε, 16.791-792), flings Patroklos’ helmet off his head (...ἀπὸ μὲν κρατὸς κυνέην βάλε, 16.793), shatters Patroklos’ spear (...ἄγη...ἔγχος, 801), causes Patroklos’ shield to fall to the ground (...ἄσπις...χαμαι πέσε, 16.803) and his breastplate to be released (λύσε δὲ οἱ θώρηκα, 16.804). Apollo is quite capable of chastising Diomedes more forcefully than he does.
As for Achilleus’ ‘fight’ with Skamandros, whom we must recall is on the Trojan side, he first agrees to the request not to foul the waters any further (21.216-226) although he refuses to stop killing Trojans. He leaps into the waters at 21.233-234, whereupon the river attacks him with waves (21.240), and when Achilleus tries to get out, δείσας, fearing (21.248), the river tries to catch him again (21.248-264), flowing at Achilleus’ back as he flees. Sometimes he ‘began to stand against’ (ὁρμήσειε…στῆναι ἐναντίβιον, 21.265-266) the river, which implies a defensive pose rather than full attack. Certainly Achilleus is on the back foot and does not fight Skamandros as he fights Asteropaio, for example (21.161-182).

So at times when Diomedes and Achilleus fight gods, and are liable to the charge of λύσσα, they do not fight the gods as they do other humans. Furthermore, Diomedes and Achilleus are called mad (either λύσσα or μανία) at 5.185 and at 21.542, which are reasonably far away from the ‘god-fighting’ incidents; if λύσσα or μανία were truly involved with fighting the gods, they should occur rather closer to such incidents.

The last example of λύσσα is at 22.70, where Priam appeals to Hektor not to fight Achilleus but to come inside the walls (22.38-76). He paints a picture in which Troy has fallen and he has seen his sons killed, his daughters and daughters-in-law dragged off by the Greeks (22.62-65), and then describes his own fate (66-71):

‘And as for me, last of all, at the front doors my dogs, Eating my raw flesh, may tear me, when someone with sharp bronze Has struck me, or hit me, and taken my spirit from my body; [The dogs] which I raised in my palace to attend me at the table and as watchdogs These, when they have drunk my blood, maddened in their spirits, Will lie in front of the gates.’

(αὐτὸν δ’ ἂν πύματόν με κύνες πρώτησι θύρησιν ὡμησται ἐρύουσίν, ἐπεὶ κέ τις ὀξεὶ χαλικῷ τύψας ἥ βαλὼν ὄεθέων ἐκ θυμὸν ἐλήται)

Cunliffe (1988: 128, s.v. ἐναντίβιος) notes of this example ‘to face the danger’; there is no mention of fighting per se.
Seaford points out that this is the only example of λύσσα which occurs outside of battle621. As at 8.299, a form of λύσσα is associated with dogs. In this instance the dogs are maddened by the result of battle rather than being in battle themselves. Nevertheless, battle is on the periphery of their ‘madness’. This madness causes them to ignore any past associations they had with their master, and revert to the ‘wolfish’ nature at their hearts622. They are violent in their madness, so violence is common to all occurrences of λύσσα, and in this case their madness is a little like the madness of the Cyclops (9.347-350), the centaur (21.295-298) and the suitors (18.405-409) in the Odyssey, who do not observe, or forget, their customary obligations. The dogs, in their madness, ‘forget’ their ‘obligations’, the jobs Priam trained them for, and instead turn on the king’s corpse and sleep by the gates which they were raised to protect. So just as μαίνομαι can indicate a breach of custom, so λύσσα appears to indicate a breach of custom, or of breeding at any rate.

In conclusion, λύσσα and μαίνομαι are used in very similar ways in Homer, since λύσσα is used in the context of battle to show fighting ability and the favour of the gods. Violence is associated with λύσσα, whether in humans or dogs; dogs are mentioned twice in connection with λύσσα, which hints overtly at the fundamental connection between dogs, wolves and λύσσα. Herodotus uses λύσσα only once in the Histories, and in a battle context; there are, however, subtle differences between the two genres, as Herodotus appears to associate λύσσα with a suicidal fighting frenzy, an aspect largely absent from the Homeric heroes.

621 Seaford (1994: 332) also points out that ‘It is significant that here again, as with Achilles, the frenzy is in the maltreatment of a corpse, the negation or perversion of death ritual. And it is also one of the rare cases on Homer of violence inflicted (albeit by dogs in this case) on another member of the same household.’

622 See Lincoln (1975: 105) on domestic animals acting wolfish. Redfield (1994: 200) calls the dogs’ actions ‘a form of social rot or cancer of the social organism; the proper superordinate-subordinate relation between man and dog is destroyed in the sack of the city, and the structure consumes itself.’
The use of μάργος in Homer does not differ significantly from the use of μαίνομαι, although it appears once only in the *Iliad* and twice in the *Odyssey*, so it is difficult to judge. In the *Iliad* it appears in a battle context; in the *Odyssey* the nuances change from battle to social transgression and god-given madness. The adjective ὑπομαργότερος is also used by Herodotus three times, of both Cambyses and Cleomenes as well as Charileōs.

In the *Iliad*, the wounded Ares speaks to Zeus about Athene and her encouragement of Diomedes; she has sent him out (5.882-884):

‘To keep making mad attacks at immortal gods.
First he wounded the Cyprian near the hand, on the wrist,
And then he rushed even at myself, like a god’

Like μαίνομαι and λύσσα, μαργαίνειν here has a violent quality to it and is used in the context of battle. There is a definite overtone here that the action is not just sanctioned, but in a way unleashed by Athene, as λύσσα and μανία often are as well. It is true that Ares is using the verb in a speech of complaint, and is therefore likely to exaggerate the actions he finds objectionable, but the violence of the action is not questionable, given the scenes at 5.335-342 and 5.846-861 and, in Ares’ speech, the stabbing of Aphrodite’s wrist. It may, on the other hand, be significant that the only time one of the gods complains about Diomedes ‘madness’ in connection with his ‘fighting’ the gods, he refers to the stabbing of Aphrodite and Ares alone, specifically so as to complain about Athene’s part in these actions. The episode with Apollo is not mentioned at all with any connection to madness (5.432-444).
In the *Histories*, Cambyses is designated ὑπομαργότερος at 3.29.1 as a partial explanation for his stabbing of the Apis bull. It is interesting that the only occurrence of a form of μάργος in the *Iliad* is to do with stabbing a god, as this is exactly the same case with Cambyses. Cleomenes is called ὑπομαργότερος at 6.75.1, and the little indication we are given before the imputation seems to suggest two things: the underlying tendency towards madness in Cleomenes, and his odd, treasonous actions in Arcadia (6.74.1-2), which include trying to get the leading Arcadians to swear an oath on the Styx, something which the gods alone do. So part of the reason for Cleomenes being called ὑπομαργότερος is to do with an attempt to ‘be like a god’. Then he is described as shoving his sceptre into the faces of the Spartiates soon after Herodotus calls him ‘fairly mad’ (6.75.1). Finally, Charileōs is also called ὑπομαργότερος at 3.145.1, and rapidly reveals himself as a man with an eagerness to fight the Persians (3.145.2), an eagerness of which his tyrant brother allows full rein (3.146.3). Unfortunately, Charileōs’ violent plan is ill-informed and causes a massacre of his fellow-citizens (3.147-1-2). In all these examples there is an element of violence, which is in keeping with the use of the word in Homer, and in keeping with the use of μαίνομαι and λύσσα as well.

In Book 16 of the *Odyssey*, Penelope remonstrates with Antinoös when she hears of his plan to do away with Telemachos (16.409-420). She castigates him (16.421-423):

> Mad attacker, just why do you devise death and doom for Telemachos, nor do you care for suppliants, to whom Zeus is a witness? It is not lawful to devise evils for each other.’

Although Antinoös’ plan was confounded by Amphinomos disagreeing with killing Telemachos, not only because of his noble birth but also because they have not consulted...
the gods on the matter (16.400-405), this does not mitigate Penelope’s wrath. As she points out, he is acting in a fashion which Penelope describes as not ὀσίη, a word loaded with connotations of service to the gods and divine law; furthermore, Penelope goes on to describe at 16.424-433 how his own father was in Odysseus’ debt for protecting him when he might have lost everything, yet now Antinoös wastes Odysseus’ substance, solicits favours from his wife and plans to murder his son (16.424-433).

The violence associated with μάργος is here implicit rather than a fact. Antinoös did not attack Telemachos, but only because he did not have the chance. Penelope names the violence of his intention μάργος. Penelope also suggests that Antinoös’ actions are against custom, thereby using μάργος as μαίνομαι is sometimes used, to indicate a transgression of custom. Her story of Antinoös’ suppliant father emphasises the lack of reciprocity in Antinoös’ actions.

μάργος is used slightly differently at 18.2, where the adjective is used to describe a stomach. The narrative begins (18.1-3):
‘Then there came a common beggar, who went through the city Of Ithaka begging, noted for his raging stomach –
He ate and drank excessively...’
(ἦλθε δ’ ἐπὶ πτωχὸς πανδήμιος, ὃς κατὰ ἀστυ
πτωχεύεσθι’ Ἰθάκης, μετὰ δ’ ἐπρεπε γαστέρι μάργη
ἀζηχὲς φαγέμεν καὶ πιέμεν).
There is no association of μάργος with violence here, which makes this example unique. There is, on the other hand, a connection with excessiveness, which is common to the excessive μένος seen in the examples of μαίνομαι. We could also say that the idea of ‘insatiability’ is common to λύσσα and μαίνομαι, in view of the unlimited revenge of Achilleus on Hektor (24.113-116) and his unlimited capacity for killing (21.542-543). Indeed, in the example from the Iliad above (5.882), there is a certain ‘insatiability’ or ‘unstoppable’ quality to Diomedes’ attacks: the use of the present tense infinitive indicates a continuous flurry of attacks. The ascribing of a state like madness to a part of

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624 Even λύσσα may have this connotation at Iliad 22.70.
a human also occurs when λύσσα ‘holds’ Achilleus’ heart at 21.542-543 (λύσσα δὲ οἱ κηρ...ἐχε), but this is the first time that the adjective μάργος has been used in reference to a human part. On the whole, this an unusual example, but μάργος as a kind of insatiable violence will become more prevalent in tragedy.

Penelope also uses the same word in Book 23 when Odysseus’ nurse announces to her that Odysseus is back and has killed the suitors (23.5-10). Penelope answers (23.11-14):

‘Dear nurse, the gods made you mad, who are able
To make witless one even who is very mindful,
And they bring the feeble-minded to soundness of mind;
They have struck you, even; your wits were reasonable before.’

In this example, μάργος has only a loose connection with violence. There is an implicit violence in the nurse’s announcement that Odysseus has killed the suitors (ἔκτεινεν, 23.8) who treated Penelope’s son with violence (βιώσωντο, 23.9). The nurse, on the other hand, is not violent in her actions and simply reports violence. Penelope does not believe Eurukleia; to her the report is far from the realms of possibility (23.15-17). She appears to use μάργος in this instance to address what she supposes to be an incredible, violent day-dream on the nurse’s part. In addition to the unbelievable, violent aspect of the nurse’s statement, Penelope compares the nurse’s ‘madness’ with her former ‘reasonableness’ of wit. To Penelope, the nurse is acting out of character, rather than outside social custom, by telling her the news of Odysseus 625.

Penelope does, however, ascribe the nurse’s madness to the gods, which is in keeping with the use of μαίνομαι and λύσσα from the Iliad and the Odyssey. In this instance, the madness is not a madness which manifests itself in battle, but in the violent

625 Andromache could be said to be doing the same at Iliad 6.389 and 22.460.
picture Eurukleia presents to Penelope. Gods, as can be seen in Homer, can influence humans to various actions\textsuperscript{626}, but Penelope introduces the idea that the gods can make one mad or sane. This is a new concept in Homeric terms, but is also a concept expressed and explored in tragedy, where for example Heracles kills his children in an insanity sent by Hera, and then becomes sane again and, in understanding what he has done, provides the tragedy\textsuperscript{627}.

Penelope’s notion of the gods’ ability to turn the human mind to madness or sanity is a little like the concept of wine which Odysseus espouses at 14.463-466, where he states that it can change a man’s behaviour. In this example, however, the gods may work in two ways, whereas wine only works to release inhibitions, and not to enforce them.

There does not appear to be a particularly special meaning for μάργος as opposed to μαίνομαι and λύσσα. The adjective is used in slightly different ways, often being associated with violence; Herodotus uses ύπομαργότερος in connection with violence also. Where not associated entirely with violence μάργος in Homer may be other connotations common to μαίνομαι and λύσσα, such as excessiveness, transgression of custom or being given by the gods. Penelope introduces the idea that the gods may not just give madness, but may take it away; this is a new concept in Homer. The idea of μάργος in terms of battle madness only occurs once.

\textsuperscript{626} Some examples: 1.54-56, Hera influences Achilles to call an assembly; 1.204-214, Athene dissuades Achilles from killing Agamemnon; 3.413-420, Aphrodite forces Helen to see to Paris; 4.104 Athene persuades Pandaros to shoot Menelaos to break the truce; 5.829-830 Athene tells Diomedes to attack Ares; 13.43-58 Poseidon persuades the two Ajaxes to stop Hektor by the ships.

\textsuperscript{627} Euripides, \textit{Heracles}, 867-1015, 1089-1162.
Chapter Four
The Relevance of Tragedy

Tragedy contributes to the understanding of Herodotus’ use of madness in some significant ways, and has a great deal in common with the way Herodotus uses madness. Where Homer helps us to understand the violence of madness in the portrayal of heightened μένος, tragedy brings in the concept of madness as something fearful, even for those who are mad, something that is sent from the gods as punishment. In Homer the idea of madness as punishment does not occur, but it is an important part of the Herodotean form of madness. Tragic madness may also manifest itself as disrespect towards the gods, violent behaviour (which is common to all three genres) and violent verbal abuse. All these manifestations also occur in the Histories.

Some associations of madness are very common in tragedy, so common that to discuss every example of such is to overstate the case. For this reason I shall be limiting examples of madness in tragedy to where they assist in our reading of Herodotus’ Histories. One area where tragedy assists consistently is in the association of madness with illness, and this section will be expanded. As to the concepts of madness as divine punishment, madness as disrespect to the gods, madness as violence and madness as verbal violence, I shall discuss one or two examples of each, chosen for their clear statement of the case, and shall confine any other similar examples to footnotes.

Divinity and Violence

Madness as divine punishment is a concept common to the three tragedians: Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides. Cambyses and Cleomenes, as well as the Athenians who try to remove the statues of Damia and Auxesia from Aegina, are all said to have gone mad because of their treatment of the gods and the property of the gods. This concept is therefore present in both genres, whereas it is not present in Homer.

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628 For the influence of tragedy on Herodotus see Myres (1953: 76-80)
629 See 3.30.1, 6.75.3 and 5.85.2.
At the beginning of the *Bacchae*, Dionysus says that he will concentrate on bringing his worship to Thebes first of all, because his mother’s sisters there refused to believe that Semele had been impregnated by Zeus himself and rather claimed that it was all a ruse arranged by Cadmus, for which lies Zeus had killed Semele (*Ba*, 26-30).

Dionysus explains (*Ba*, 32-38):
‘So in consequence I tormented these same women out of their homes with stinging madneses, and they live on the mountain, with minds deranged; and I forced them to hold the instrument of my rites, and all the female offspring of the Thebans, as many as were women, I maddened from their houses...’

From the very start of the play it is set out clearly that the madness of Cadmus’ daughters is punishment from Dionysus for their refusal to believe that Dionysus was the son of Zeus, and presumably to some extent for their comments about the situation. As for the rest of the women of Thebes, they have definitely been maddened by Dionysus, but their situation is more ambiguous; they are the means to introduce the worship of Dionysus to Thebes and a sort of city-wide punishment at the same time. They are, however, spared the punishment of killing their own children in madness, even if they assist in the killing of Agaue’s.

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The madness of the women is in part manifested by their leaving of their homes in a violent fashion (ἀφατοσισα, ἐξεμήνα), and this connection of madness with the breaking of custom is interesting when we consider the madness of Cambyses, also a divine punishment which often manifests itself in acting contrarily to customs.\(^{631}\)

Madness in tragedy can also consist of a disrespect towards the gods which is likely to end in punishment, but madness is not the punishment itself; it is the irreverent attitude of the ‘mad’ person. In the Antigone, the Chorus relate the fate of the ‘sharp-tempered’ (ὀξύχολος, A. 955) Lycurgus (A. 955-964):

‘…he was bound by Dionysus
As a result of his mocking rages
He was shut up in a rock prison.
In this way the terrible growth and strength of his madness dripped away.
He recognised
That he was attacking the god in mad, mocking tongue.
For he used to stop the god-possessed
Women and the bacchic fire…’

Lycurgus’ madness is shown as consisting of his abusive verbal attacks on Dionysus, twice emphasised by κερτομίοις ὀργαῖς and κερτομίοις γλώσσαις. His punishment for this madness in such disrespect towards the god is to be ‘shut up in a rock prison’.\(^{632}\)

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\(^{631}\) See 3.31.1-6, 3.35.5, 3.37.1-3.

\(^{632}\) Griffith (1999: 290, s.v. 960-2) says that ‘it is not clear whether Lycourgos’ madness was the cause of his punishment, or was itself the punishment…Probably the former, since madman rarely ‘recognise’ the
So, as Padel says, madness in tragedy ‘both is, and is a punishment for, human transgression of divine law.’ Unlike Semele’s sisters, his punishment is not madness, but it is his madness in opposing Dionysus which causes him to be punished. His madness, even in its verbal form, is associated with heightened μένος, as it is in Homer, ἀνθηρόν indicates a burgeoning which is contrasted with ἀποστάζει, ‘drips away’.

This sort of verbal madness seems to be a concept which Herodotus plays with in the Histories: Timodemus is said to be ‘mad with envy’, and this causes him to verbally attack Themistocles (8.125.1-2). Themistocles is not be a god, so Timodemus’ punishment is a verbal set down, but the use of violent language against a god as madness is taken a step down, onto the entirely human level. Violent language is still associated with both madnesses, but Herodotus changes ‘madness against a god’ to ‘madness against a prominent leader’.

Even madness which is not punishment per se is still from the gods. When Teiresias is explaining Dionysus’ attributes to Pentheus, he mentions what the god can do in battle situations (Ba. 303-305):

‘for an army which is in full armour and at their positions – fear strikes them with panic before they touch a spear. And this also is madness from Dionysus.’

(στρατὸν γὰρ ἐν ὀπλοῖς ὀντα κἀπὶ τάξειςιν φόβος διεπτόησε πρὶν λόγχης θιγεῖν. μανία δὲ καὶ τούτ’ ἔστι Διονύσου πάρα.)

truth.’ I think the wording makes it quite clear that Lycurgus was ‘mad’ to oppose the god and as a result he was punished, whereupon his realisation of what he had been doing shows the passing of his madness. Madmen do recognise the truth to some degree: Cassandra is thought mad but knows the truth of the Atreidae, past and future; Pentheus sees things ‘properly’, according to Dionysus, when he is under Dionysus’ sway; see Padel (1992, Op. Cit., Pgs. 72-73, and n. 86). However, this is not necessarily true of Sophoclean mad characters. Hogan (1991:166 s.v. 954-63) thinks that ‘it seems possible that madness is the medium through which Lycurgus comes to know, too late, the divinely mad Dionysus’. The wording does, however, suggest more clearly that while imprisoned Lycurgus ceased to be mad; it is more likely that punishment is the means by which Lycurgus recognises Dionysus, a pathei mathos.

634 See Chapter 3, Madness in Battle.
635 Winnington-Ingram (1980: 103-104) also associates Lycurgus’ madness with that of Creon somewhat earlier (A. 765), since both opposed gods of ‘madness’: Lycurgus opposed Dionysus and Creon opposed Aphrodite in opposing the love of his son for Antigone.
Dionysus is able to manipulate the emotions of people, in this case an army, and is able to send a fear of such degree that even trained men are not immune. Teiresias says that this onslaught of extreme fear is ‘madness from Dionysus’. The origin of this madness is clearly divine, but it consists of the emotion of fear rather than violence towards others.

Madness in tragedy often manifests itself in violence, as it does in Homer and Herodotus, and violent behaviour in turn is called madness. The Chorus in Antigone describe the attack of Kapaneus, one of the Seven, on Thebes, and his end (A. 134-137): ‘when he was sent flying he fell onto the echoing ground, flaming torch in hand, who before with mad assaults had in frenzy breathed out the howlings of hostile gales.’

Kapaneus’ madness is shown to be in the violence he inflicted on Thebes; there is little else about his madness. It is not associated with the divine or illness; the madness is simply in the violence of his attacks. Although Kapaneus may be described as βακχεύων, this does not necessarily denote any particular connection with Dionysus, as Griffith points out.

In Aeschylus’ Agamemnon, the Chorus call Clytemnestra mad for her violent killing of her husband (Ag. 1428-1429):

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Griffith (1999: 150-151, s.v. 137) comments that Kapaneus’ breathing may well connote ‘the laboured breath of extreme emotion: e.g., anger (A. Cho. 33, κότον), battle-lust (Homer, μένεα passim; El. 610, μένοι), madness (A. Prom. 883-4, λύσσα), and ‘moods’ in general (OC 612, πνεῦμα).’

638 Griffith (1999: 150, s.v. 136).
‘...with blood-dripping bad fortune your mind is mad; 
a slick of blood is easily seen on your eyes.’
(...φονολιβεῖ τύχαι φρήν ἐπιμαίνεται;
λίπος ἐπ’ ὀμμάτων αἵματος εὖ πρέπει.)

Clytemnestra’s bloody revenge is clearly part of the reason why the chorus call her mad; 
she describes how she killed him (Ag. 1372-1392) and both she and the chorus mention 
him again soon before this speech (Ag. 1400, 1404-1406, 1414-1421). The repeated use 
of blood in the speech also recalls the violence of the murder, revenge for the sacrifice of 
Iphigenia (Ag. 1417-1418). The Chorus calls such violent behaviour mad. Although the 
queen later claims that she has done the house of Atreus a good deed, because she has 
ended (so she thinks) the curse of reciprocal relative-murder which plagued Agamemnon 
as well as his father and uncle (Ag. 1576), she little realises that she herself is 
perpetuating it. This piece is complicated by the uncustomary actions of a wife towards /her husband, which may also account for the Chorus’ use of madness.

Violence of action is not the sole expression of madness; people who are violent 
in their verbal expression, either in their mode of speaking or the content of their speech, 
are also called mad with reasonable frequency; Lycurgus was called mad for his verbal 
expression of μένος in Antigone 955-964. The Chorus of the Seven Against Thebes 
lump all their attackers into the category of madness when they say (Se. 483-485):
‘As they speak skitingly against the city
With mad minds, so may
Zeus the judge increase his hatred of them.’
(ὡς δ’ ὑπέφραυχα βάζουσιν ἐπὶ πτόλει
μαίνομέναι φρενί, τῶς νίν
Zeús νεμέτωρ ἐπίδοι κοταίνων.)
The attackers of Thebes are often depicted as threatening the city with their words; even 
the devices on their shields have words which state the intentions of the enemy bearer.639

finds in this passage the ‘matrix of Antigone 127-8’. He also notes that κόμπος, boasting, and similar 
words ‘provide and insistent ground-bass in the description of the attackers and their shield devices’, which 
points to the saving of Thebes because Zeus hates boasting.
It is in keeping with this portrayal then that the Chorus ascribe madness to those who employ violent language against the city. It is this sort of verbal expression of μενός which is sometimes portrayed in the Histories; the ‘mad’ may express something violently; madness can be used as an abusive term in argument either of those or by those who are quarrelling. So madness in tragedy often has associations with the divine and with violence, either physical or verbal. Many examples of madness draw in more than one such association, depending on their context, and may have unique features in their context.

**Associations with Illness**

Tragedy uses madness in reasonably diverse ways, as does Herodotus, but few examples from tragedy are of much assistance in illuminating the examples from the Histories. One useful concept which arises from tragedy and is used in by Herodotus as well is the consistent portrayal of madness as an illness. This concept is evident in the works of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, but is absent in Homer. Madness as a symptom of illness is a concept seen in the Hippocratic writers, which will be discussed in Chapter 5, but as some of the tragedians, notably Aeschylus, pre-date the Hippocratic writers, their use of madness as an illness is just as important an influence on Herodotus’ use of madness.

Io’s madness is depicted as a sickness soon after her appearance in Prometheus Bound. While her ailment is not called μανία, λύσσα or μάργος at this point, there is reference to the οἰστρος, the gadfly which Padel says is used almost interchangeably with other words for madness. I would suggest that this is Io’s personal personification of madness. Io starts to describe her trouble at Pr. 595-608: she has a ‘god-sent illness’ (θεόσυτον...νόσον), it wears her out with the scraping of ‘the fitful stings’ (κέντροισι φοιταλέοισιν), and being constantly on the run gives her ‘starving

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640 See 1.109.2, 1.212.2-3, 3.145.1, 4.79.3-4, 8.125.1, 8.140.a3, 9.55.2.
torments’ (νήστισιν αἰκείασ); she is distressed (μογέω) and has an expectation of further suffering (ἐπαμμένει παθεῖν). She finishes by asking (Pr. 606-608):

‘what arrangement, or what drug is there for the illness?
Reveal it, if you know,
Shout it out, tell the girl who wanders in pain.’

(τί μῆχα ἢ τί φάρμακον νόσου;
δεῖξον εἴπερ οἴσθα,
θρόει, φράζε τἀ δυσπλάνωι παρθένῳ.)

The language of sickness clearly pervades Io’s speech, not only in the specific reference to νόσος at 596 and 606, but also in her desire for a drug or medicine (φάρμακον) to cure her and in the δυσ- prefix of δυσπλάναι. Her νόσος is from the gods, but as Griffith points out, there is a doubled or even tripled nuance to the word, since it can refer to the madness, the physical pain or the love-sickness of Zeus which began the whole affair.642

Io later refers to madness multiple times as she is moved by the oistros to move on again (Pr. 878-886):

‘Once again the convulsion and mind-thrashing
Madnesses ignite under me, and the unforged barb of the gadfly
Scrapes me
And my heart pounds my wits with fear,
And my eyes roll spinning,
I am fetched outside
By the crazed command of mad flight, of uncontrolled tongue,
Agitated words smack randomly
On the waves of loathsome delusion.’

(ὑπὸ μ’ αὖ σφάκελος καὶ φρενοπληγεῖς
μανίαι θάλπους’, οἰστροῦ δ’ ἀρδίς
χοίει μ’ ἀπυρός

642 Griffith (1983: 199 s.v. 596). He points out that both Zeus’ love and the madness are θέοσυτος.
κραδία δὲ φόβωι φρένα λακτίζει,
τροχοδινεῖται δ’ ὕμμαθ’ ἐλίγδην,
ἐξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι λύσσης
πνεύματι μάργωι γλώσσης ἀκρατῆς,
θολεροὶ δὲ λόγοι παίουσ’ εἰκῆ
στυγνῆς πρὸς κύμασιν ἀτης).

μανία, λύσσα and μάργος all make an appearance here, tripling the number of
madness words to emphasise the extent and severity of Io’s ‘sickness’. There is no real
difference in the use of μανία, λύσσα and μάργος; all have violent connections,
although the description of madness as lighting a fire under her is slightly unusual643.
Sickness still characterises Io’s madness somewhat, or madness characterises the
sickness; Io speaks of ‘convulsion’ (σφάκελος), and the physical descriptions of her
eyes, tongue and φρένες have the ring of a list of symptoms644.

643 Padel (1992: 116-117, also n.10) says that emotions ‘burn’, but this is not restricted to μένος and
μανία; indeed Aristophanes connects λύσσα with burning in the Themophoriazusae 680. But fire and
μανία both contain μένος, so the connection here has a smooth overlap. See Padel (1992: 25); n. 53 cites
Iliad 6.182 and Aristophanes’ Archanians 665-666.
644 The association of madness and sickness with Io also occurs in the Suppliant Women (Su. 556-564):
‘because of a dart
from an injecting winged herdsman
she arrived at Zeus’ all-nourishing grove,
she came into a meadow which is snow-fed
in the strength of Typhoon and the water of the Nile untainted by disease,
since she was mad with the dishonoured deeds
and stinging pains, a victim of Hera.’
(ικνεῖται δ’ εἰσικνουμένου βέλει
βουκόλου πτερόεντος
Δίων πάμβοτον ἄλσος,
λειμῶνα χιονόβοσκον ὄντ’ ἐπέρχεται
Τυφῶ μένος ὤδωρ τε Νείλου νόσοις ἀθικτον,
μαινομένα πόνοις ἀτί-
μοις ὀδύναις τε κεντροδα-
λήτισι θυιας Ἡρας).

It is fitting that Io in her madness should come to a meadow which is associated with the μένος of
Typhoon, on the one hand, and is not diseased, on the other. See also Johanssen and Whittle (1980: 439-
440, s.v. 558-9). Io’s madness has to do with wandering, and intermittent, violent movement which is
related to μένος; her madness is also an illness, however, and the place of her ‘cure’ (Su. 574-578) is
suitably untouched by this. See further Johansen and Whittle (Pgs. 462-464, s.v. 578-9).
Io’s madness, which is shown, in its gadfly form, to be something which comes and goes, is the first instance in non-medical literature of the possibility of an intermittent madness. While it is true that in Homer the madness which the gods give is not always in evidence, neither is it a frequent occurrence: heroes are occasionally favoured by excess μένος, but they can by no means depend on the favour. In addition to this, the occasional madness of heroes in Homer is never associated with sickness, and this is logical given that μανία in Homer is a strengthened state, not the weakened or ‘faulty’ one implied by madness as sickness. So the kind of madness which Io demonstrates is the first step in the direction of explaining why Cleomenes may be called mad at 5.42.1 but does not do anything vaguely mad until 6.74.1.

Orestes’ madness, in Euripides’ play of the same name, is similar to Io’s, in that it comes and goes, and is in the physical form of the Erinues. His madness, like that of Io, fleshes out the picture we have of Cleomenes’ madness.

Orestes’ madness is portrayed as a kind of sickness, accompanied with physical manifestations of sickness as well as mental disturbances. From the beginning of the play, the madness is linked with sickness; Electra introduces her brother and sets the scene by announcing (Or. 34-37):

‘From that time, dissolving with a savage illness,
Poor Orestes fell here on his bed
And continues to lie, the blood of our mother chases him round
With madnesses…’

(ἐντευθεν ἀγρίᾳ συντακείς νόσῳ
τελήμων Ὀρέστης ὥδε πεσὼν ἐν δεμνίοις
κεῖται, τὸ μητρὸς δ’ ἀἷμα νιν τροχηλατεῖ
μανίαισιν…)  

She goes on to describe how Orestes does not eat, hardly sleeps, and has periods of sad lucidity interspersed with wild behaviour (Or. 39-45); this is all due to the Eumenides, who are mentioned at 38, and Willink notes that Maniai is also an attested cult name, so that the allusion to madnesses is both a reference to the goddesses and descriptive of the
ment of Orestes. So Orestes’ madness and sickness are presented as twin weapons of the Eumenides, since the madness is accompanied by illness in a physical sense. We should make the distinction here that although the linking of illness and madness is reasonably natural in Greek thought, in this case illness and madness are associated because both are used by the Erinues to plague Orestes, a double scourge rather than the single one of Lussa in the Heracles. As Willink points out, Orestes is still sick even if he is not having a raving fit.

Orestes describes his madness as an illness at Or. 227-228:

‘Lie me back down on the bed; whenever the illness
Of madness dies down, I am boneless and weak in the limbs.’

Orestes’ madness takes him in fits and starts, and leaves him exhausted; it is portrayed very like a fever which comes and goes. This is brought out by Electra at Or. 254, when she comments on quick change to madness (ταχὺς δὲ μετεθοῦ λύσσαν) and back to sanity (σωφρονῶν). The Chorus at Or. 326-327 also suggest the ‘fits’ of madness when they pray to the god to let Orestes forget his ‘craziness of mad fits’ (λύσσας μανίάδος φοιταλέου), where φοιταλέου describes not only the dashing about of the mad (such as Oedipus in Sophocles’ O.T. 1255-1258) but also the ‘coming and going’ nature of the madness itself.

Menelaos treats Orestes’ madness as sickness when he inquires on what day the madness started (Or. 401); Orestes is concerned that Pylades will not be able to manage his madness (οἴστρος, Or. 791) because ‘it’s disgusting to touch a sick person’ (δυσχερές ψαύειν νοσούντος ἀνδρός, Or. 792), and that he ‘should take care in case you get any of my madness’ (εὐλαβοῦ λύσσης μετασχεῖν τῆς ἐμῆς, Or. 793), where Orestes implies that his madness is of a kind which can be caught by others in proximity.

In Iphigenia in Tauros Orestes’ madness is specifically called a ‘fit’ (I.T. 307-308): ‘When the foreigner let go his fit of madness he fell, his chin dripping with foam’

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645 Willink (1986: 87, s.v. 37).
646 Willink (1986: 123, s.v. 227-8).
(πίπτει δὲ μανίας πίτυλον ὁ ξένος μεθείς, στάζων ἀφρῷ γένειον…). The πίτυλος, the ‘fit’, is said by Platnauer to be ‘a pulse’ and to be a nautical metaphor, ‘used particularly for the rhythmic beat of the oars’ ⁶⁴⁷. This may be possible, although the bucolic occupation of the herdsman might argue against it, along with the bucolic metaphor at I.T. 300 where the sea ‘blooms’ (ἐξανθεῖν) with blood. We should rather consider another meaning for πίτυλος: either shower/torrent, to keep the pastoral note, or fit/attack. Even if we prefer shower/torrent, the idea of a sudden onslaught which passes is still present.

So in Euripides’ work too we have a madness which keeps coming and going. When Electra first tells us about her brother’s madness, he is asleep and exhibiting no signs of madness. These are shown to us later, although we may expect them. In the same way, although stretched out over a longer section of narrative, Herodotus may well tell us that Cleomenes is on the brink of madness but then feels no need to have him show his madness until there is cause to do so in the narrative. Just as Io and Orestes only ‘go mad’ when the gadfly or the Erinues torment them, so Cleomenes may only ‘go mad’ when Herodotus decides that he should, in furtherance of the narrative. A person may be mad, apparently, without actively demonstrating it constantly. As Willink says of Orestes, so Cleomenes may be perceived of as mad even when not in violent fit, simply because he has been said to be mad ⁶⁴⁸. Orestes and Io are relatively normal except when actively in the throes of their god-inflicted insanity, and Orestes shows lucid concern that Pylades not catch his madness (Or. 793) at a time he himself is sane. While he could be alluding to a future fit of madness, the use of the aorist infinitive (μετασχεῖν) rather than the future would argue against this. Orestes appears to indicate that his madness may be caught at any unspecified time, therefore it is present at any time in order for it to be contagious ⁶⁴⁹. So Cleomenes’ madness may be present also at any time, but is not

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⁶⁴⁷ Platnauer (1956: 87, s.v. 307).
⁶⁴⁸ Willink (1986: 123, s.v. 227-8).
⁶⁴⁹ Hermione also says that mad sickness is catching, although she is talking about gossip. In the Andromache (948-950) she says warns against having visitors to the house because of their talk: ‘The woman who weaves wants [other women] to be sick with her, and many others [are sick] with madness and later the households of their husbands get sick…’
always manifest. This view is supported by evidence from the Hippocratic writers, discussed in Chapter 5, in which people are thought to be, by nature, prone to some illness which may not always be evident in the patient but is there.

Orestes’ theory of the contagious nature of madness shows that the madness of the women of Argos in the Histories is not just an isolated incident. In 9.34.2, Melampus is desired to cure the madness of the women, called a νοῦσος at 9.34.1, because more of the women had gone mad. Although the use of νοῦσος with madness was suggestive of the contagion of sickness, a separate example from another genre is useful in confirming that we should the madness of the women as something catching. This widespread madness is also evocative of the mass madness of the Athenians at 5.85.2, but in their case there is no mention of νοῦσος, and they are perceived to go mad all at the same time rather than catching madness off each other.

When Prometheus declares his hostility to the gods, Hermes calls him mad and refers to illness (Pr. 975-978):

Prometheus: ‘In simple language, I am an enemy to all the gods Who, although they experienced good from me, are doing me wrong unjustly.’

Hermes: ‘It sounds to me that you are mad - not a trivial illness.’

Pr.: ‘I may be sick, if sickness is to loathe your enemies.’

(Pr.: ἀπλῶι λόγῳ τοὺς πάντας ἐχθαίρω θεοὺς ὅσοι παθόντες εὐ κακοῦσι μ’ ἐκδίκως.

He.: κλύω σ’ ἐγὼ μεμηνότ’ οὐ σμικράν νόσον.

Pr.: νοσοίμι ἃν, εἰ νόσημα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς στυγείν.)

Hermes specifically calls madness ‘not a trivial illness’, and Prometheus turns the idea of illness to mean not madness but ‘to loathe your enemies’, which in turn points up the logic of loathing one’s enemies and emphasises Prometheus reasonableness rather than his ‘madness’. Hermes is of course relating Prometheus’ so-called madness to his lack of

(ἳ δ’ ἐμπλακοῦσα συννοσείν αὐτῆι θέλει, πολλάι δὲ μαργόττηι κάντευθεν δόμοι νοσοῦσιν ἀνδρῶν...).
respect for the gods, and Prometheus’ easy agreement to the insult shows his lack of respect for Hermes also.

The smooth transition of the dialogue from madness to sickness offers us not only the concept of madness as sickness but also the close relation of madness and sickness. It is this closeness which is revealed in the Histories in such instances where the mad are also sick. So when Herodotus says that he would not be surprised if the rumour that Cambyses had epilepsy were true, and that such an illness may well affect the mind (3.33), he is likely making the same sort of connection between the mad and other sickness as is made in Prometheus Bound. Orestes’ madness, too, is connected with a sickness of the body which is not madness in itself. Herodotus’ discussion of epilepsy in particular is interesting in the light of what Io says about convulsion (σφάκελος, Pr. 878), and the varying ‘fits’ of madness of both herself and Orestes (Pr. 597, Or. 327). While Herodotus may not tell us anything about epileptic fits, the fact that fits are common to both epilepsy and madness is suggestive.

Prometheus’ ‘madness’ is similar to the madness of the Ionians at 6.12.3, who ask themselves which god they have offended to be stuck doing manoeuvres – they were out of their minds to agree to the plan and now they are falling sick. The Ionians ascribe their ‘madness’ in agreeing to practise sailing manoeuvres to their offending ‘some god’, and once again the madness is connected with sickness. In the case of the Ionians, the ‘madness’ leads to the sickness, and the ‘incurable indignities’ (λύμῃσι ἄνηκέστοισι) they feel they suffer. In this example also, we can see that madness is related to other sicknesses.

The association of madness with sickness occurs in the works of Sophocles. Athene calls the madness of Ajax ‘illness’ (Aj. 59-67):

But I, as the man tore fitfully about with mad illnesses,
I goaded him on, perverting him towards evil snares.
…And now at his home he is torturing those [animals] who were tied together.
But I will show this obvious illness to you as well,
so that when you have observed it, you may declare it to all of the Argives.
(ἐγὼ δὲ φοιτῶντι ἄνδρα μανιάσιν νόσοις
ἀτρυνον, εἰσέβαλλον εἰς ἓρκη κακᾶ.)
Ajax’s madness is here twice called an illness: at 59 and 66; the Chorus also say that his attack on the beasts is a divine illness (Aj. 186), uniting the conception of madness as both sickness and from the gods, and Tecmessa does so again at 207. Ajax’s mad illness is manifested in the violent savagery he inflicts upon the flocks. Sickness is not simply used as a ‘gloss’, it is an association of madness and illness which is attested to in Aeschylus as well, and a reasonably standard way of viewing madness. Sickness and madness are particularly relevant in the Ajax, in which, as Winnington-Ingram points out, there is a ‘nosos-theme’ developed, and there is a logical ‘contrast between sickness and soundness of mind (nosein and phronein)’. He goes on to say of Tecmessa that she ‘describes his loud cries of lamentation which were followed by silent dejection and by the refusal of food and drink – symptoms of disease.’

Athene uses language of sickness in associating madness with νόσος. φοιτάω indicates the fitful nature of Ajax’s actions, as well as the fitful nature of the madness; ἐλώφησεν may be used of the abating of an illness as well as of the cessation of activity. So Athene indicates by her use of language that this madness waxes and wanes, in this case the ‘waxing’ is manifested in Ajax’s wild attacks on the animals, and the ‘waning’ when he stops this activity for the less violent one of tying up the animals and taking them to his tent. Once there, he goes back to violent activity, and it is this which Athene calls the ‘obvious illness’ (περιφανῆ νόσον) which she will show to Odysseus to prove Ajax’s madness.

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650 The way in which Ajax mistakes the animals for men is also somewhat more loosely connected, but mistaking something for something else is a part of the madness: Padel (1995: 75) says that ‘The mad see twisted. The twist may go either way. A good thing...seen as...a bad thing. Or a bad thing...seen with glee...Animals seen as people, people see as animals.’

651 Hesk (2003 :137): ‘Not for the last time, she [Tecmessa] glosses this madness as an illness...’ Jebb’s commentary (Pearson, 1957: 59, s.v. line 59) passes over the sickness altogether, preferring ‘throes’.


653 See also Pr. 597, O.T 1255 and Or. 327.

654 See Plato, Phaedrus 251c; Laws 854c.
This piece adds to what has been said about Cleomenes’ madness: if the concept of madness as illness contains the idea that there is a waxing and waning, and that the waxing is when the madness is ‘obvious’, then it becomes less and less strange that Herodotus should call Cleomenes mad at 5.42.1 but not refer to it again until 6.75.1, with the qualifier νούσος when it becomes quite ‘obvious’ that there is something wrong with Cleomenes’ violent attacks on Spartiates.

Ajax himself repeats the idea of madness and illness (Aj. 450-453):

‘Now the gorgon-eyed goddess of unconquerable Zeus
...Knocked me over by tossing in a mad illness,
So that my hands would make bloody slaughter among these sorts of beasts.’

(νῦν δ’ Ἑις γοργῶπις ἀδάματος θεὰ
...ἔσφηλεν ἀμβαλούσα λυσσώδη νόσον,
ῶστ’ ἐν τοιοῦδε χείρας αἰμάξαι βοτοῖς’)

Ajax casts some light on the use of madness as an illness: the wrestling metaphor of ἔσφηλεν suggests that the illness ‘tossed’ in by Athene is a way of causing the wrestler to topple over. Illness in this sense is something that weakens the wrestler, although conversely the madness of the illness causes the slaughter of the animals, hardly the actions of a weak person. But Ajax points out that his purpose was not to kill the animals; the illness foiled his intention of killing the Atreidae. So although Ajax is not physically weakened by the mad illness (rather the opposite, it seems) his purpose is ‘weakened’ when he inflicts the damage on the beasts which he intended for the humans; it is changed and unfulfilled. This is similar to the way sickness in Herodotus’ Histories is used as an incapacitator; it weakens the patient to the point where they cannot fulfil their normal duties. In this way sickness also explains the weakness, and ‘mad illness’ explains the at the same time the unfulfillment of Ajax’s original plan (illness) and its bloody expression (madness)\(^655\).

\(^655\) This sort of weakness is another explanation for Hesk’s view that Ajax becomes feminised as he comes out of his madness (2003: 56): ‘Ajax’’s realisation of what he has done leads to uncharacteristic behaviour: he has been tearing out his hair and moaning (310-21). He does not moan deeply (like a ‘bellowing bull’) as he usually would (322). These shrill cries are not Ajaxian: ‘He always considered such wailing the mark of a cowardly (kakou), low-spirited man’ (319-20). The implication here is that Ajax’s mad actions have reduced him to the position of a woman. Ajax may be returning to some form of sanity but he is not
Mad illness also incapacitates Cleomenes. When he becomes ‘obviously’ mad, he must be restrained by his relatives (6.75.2), and such madness requiring restraint does not allow for the fulfilment of his kingly duties. In fact, Cleomenes’ mad illness ends up incapacitating him in a permanent manner, as a result of cutting himself up while in the stocks. Cambyses, on the other hand, seems to manage being king in his unique fashion until his death, and his madness is not said to be sickness.

The Chorus also associate Ajax’s madness with sickness (Aj. 609-611):
‘And Ajax is with me – waiting in reserve, hard to cure,
 alas, alas,
 cohabiting with divine madness.’

By calling Ajax ‘hard to cure’ they link illness to his madness – although separated in the structure of the verse, δυσθεράπευτος works in conjunction with μανία better than ἕφεδρος or ξύναυλος because of the connection of μανία and sickness. Ajax is ‘hard to cure’ in two respects: firstly because Tecmessa and the Chorus have not been able to talk him out of committing suicide, now that he has returned to his senses and realised what he has done (Aj. 349-595), and secondly because the only ‘cure’ (ἄκος, Aj. 363) Ajax can think of is death. The ‘painfulness’ of the cure is also hinted at in the δυσ- prefix. This sort of cure is comparable to the cures of Cleomenes and Cambyses; for Cleomenes, death is the cure of his madness, as it is for the Athenians who go mad on Aegina (5.85.2), and for the Scythians it is the ‘cure’ for Scyles after he has been initiated into the cult of Dionysus, the custom of all Greek customs which they revile the most (4.79.4-5, 4.80.5). Cambyses, too has a cure of a sort when he stabs himself in the thigh (3.64.3), although it is the realisation of his impending death which brings him back to himself.’ Hesk also notes that ‘Ajax’s struggle for sanity is thus also a struggle for speech.’ Both of these developments may be explained by the weakening effects of madness-as-illness: if Ajax is weakened and made vulnerable, he is naturally placed in a situation more like that of a woman, and his inability to speak articulately is another symptom of weakness, vulnerability, and perhaps even the hint that he is not quite human (let alone feminised), or at any rate a civilised man at that point.
sanity (3.64.5). The only mad people who are cured by a means other than death are the women of Argos (9.34.2), and this is fitting because they are cured by the seer Melampus, and are the only ones who consult a ‘doctor’ figure for their mad sickness.

In the *Women of Trachis*, Heracles experiences an intense pain which he calls madness. After his son has reported how the treated tunic Deianeira sent him burned him alive (*Tra*. 749-812), rather than effecting a return of his former regard for her, Heracles appeals to Zeus (*Tra*. 993-995) as he agonises onstage (993-1002):

‘You put me into such a ravaged state, such a state;
If only I had never looked, stupid man,
with my eyes, looked down on this unassuageable bloom of madness.
For what singer, what man of skill
In the art of healing is there, who will charm away this destruction
Except Zeus?’

(ἡν μὴ ποτ’ ἐγὼ προσιδείν ὁ τάλας
ὡφελον ὀσσοίς, τόδ’ ἀκήλητον
μανίας ἀνθος καταδερχῆναι.
τίς γὰρ ἀοιδός, τίς ὁ χειροτέχνης
ιατορίας, ὃς τίνῳ ἀτην
χωρὶς Ζηνὸς κατακηλήσει)

Heracles’ references to looking at or down at ‘the bloom of madness’ suggest the tunic which embodied the pain he now suffers. The tunic is not mad in itself, but it brought great pain when worn, and it is this extreme pain to which Heracles now refers to as ‘mad’ in order to emphasise the degree of it. He wishes for someone to heal him, and can only think of Zeus. This is suggestive, considering the discussion of the women of Argos above: their doctor was a seer who, in tradition, served Dionysus. The only cure for madness must be perceived to come from a divine agent, at the least, if not a divinity.

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656 Although Jebb (Davies, 1921: 159, s.v. 997ff.) suggests the phrase is metaphorical: ‘Though the malady is his own, he can be said ‘to look upon it,’ in the sense of experiencing it...’
Madness is sometimes referred to as illness in Euripides; we have already seen some examples from the *Orestes*. Teiresias sees Pentheus as mad and sick in the *Bacchae*; he warns Pentheus that force does not have power over human affairs, ‘and do not, if you think, but your thought is sick, think that it is sound thinking’ (μὴ δ’, ἦν δοκήσαι μὲν, ἢ δὲ δόξα σου νοσῇ, φοροῦν δόκει τι, *Ba.* 310-312). This unsubtle reference to Pentheus’ attitude is made even more explicit at the end of Teiresias’ speech, where his punch line also refers to madness and illness (*Ba.* 325-327):

‘…and I will not fight against gods and be persuaded by your words. For you are mad in the most painful way possible, and you may find healing neither with drugs, nor are you sick without these.’

This last statement, while clearly linking madness with illness, is not without its own complications. By telling Pentheus that he is mad in ‘the most painful way possible’, and that he will find no healing in drugs or medicine (φάρμακα), Teiresias treats Pentheus’ madness as a kind of illness, but not an illness which can be cured by conventional medical means of the time. This is the main point of the statement; the insertion of drugs/medicine extends the concept of madness and illness. The issue is not whether Pentheus has really taken drugs, but the fact that Pentheus cannot be healed conventionally, and that he is sick, but not sick in a way which a doctor can heal.

Given the earlier discussion of cure in other plays, it is likely that we are meant to see

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657 As Dodd notes (1986: 112, s.v. 326-7), the φάρμακα are more likely to be metaphorical; they are little more than a stand-in for ‘anger’, but go well in the context here, given the use of illness.

658 Padel (1992: 122-123) suggests that poison might alluded to, and that ‘maddening drugs seem to be mentioned in the *Bacchae*… “You are painfully mad,” Teiresias tells Pentheus, “and no drugs will heal you, though you are sick because of them.”’ There has been no discussion of Pentheus taking drugs before this point and there is no need to assume he has been now. Teiresias does mention φάρμακα at *Ba.* 283, at the start of this speech to Pentheus, but he is referring to wine and the ‘medicinal’ use for easing ‘suffering/pains/distresses’ (πόνων). There has been no suggestion that Pentheus has been drinking wine; the only implication we should perhaps take from the two occurrences is that Pentheus is not going to be cured by anything Dionysus has to offer because he sees no value in it. Teiresias says that Pentheus will *not* get healing from drugs, and casts doubt on the idea of poison, given that Padel herself mentions the Greek idea of healing like with like (1992: 69). So even if Pentheus takes medicinal drugs, he will not be healed of his madness.
Teiresias’ statement as an indication of the extreme degree of madness which he sees in Pentheus: he is so mad that he cannot be cured. Furthermore, the use of sickness gives Teiresias a reason not to be persuaded by Pentheus: as he said earlier, if the thought is sick, it isn’t a good thought. If Pentheus were of ‘healthy’ mind, his words would be more persuasive, but he is not.

Tomyris calls wine a ‘drug’ which makes the Persians so mad that they get abusive (1.212.2-3), but the two instances are not very alike.

Phaidra is dying from her love for Hippolytus, and this love is characterised by illness several times before Phaidra comes onstage (Hi. 40, 176, 179-180, 186). Even before then we are given a clue as to her state of mind: Aphrodite says that she is ‘driven out of her mind by goads of love’ (κάκπεπληγμένη κέντροις ἔρωτος). When Phaidra speaks, the Nurse uses madness to characterise the wildness of her speech. The ailing Phaidra cries out, wishing for pure water from a spring and to lie in grassy meadows (Hi. 208-211), and the Nurse replies (Hi. 212-214):

‘My child, why are you crying out? Don’t say these things in front of the crowd, throwing out words borne on madness.’

(ὦ παῖ, τί θροεῖς; οὖ μὴ παρ’ οὐξλωι τάδε γηρύσηι, μανίας ἔποχον ὑπτουσα λόγον.)

As Barrett points out, the Nurse is shocked at such words, since ‘no respectable Greek matron, much less a queen, could dream of such behaviour.’ The Nurse’s shock is reflected in her calling Phaidra’s words mad. She also notes the wildness of Phaidra’s utterance: she cries out (θροεῖς) and ‘throws out’ words (ὑπτουσα), as well as the uncustomary content of the speech itself. In her sickness, Phaidra desires violent movement, quite against customary female behaviour (not to mention voiced in public) and her mode of expression is violent; therefore, according to the Nurse, the words are mad.

659 Barrett (1964: 210, s.v. 212-4).
Phaidra’s words get even wilder when she expresses a desire to go on the hunt or horse-racing (215-219, 228-231), and the Nurse calls her deranged, or delirious, (παράφρων, Hi. 232). But these episodes are explained by Phaidra herself a little later (Hi. 239-248):

‘Wretched woman that I am, whatever was I doing?
Where did I stray from a good mind?
I was mad, I fell because of the destruction of a divinity…
Nurse, cover my head once more,
for I am ashamed of what I have said...
For that the mind should be restored is painful,
but being mad is evil…’

(δύστηνος ἐγώ, τί ποτ’ εἰργασάμην;
ποί παρεπλάγχθην γνώμης ἀγαθῆς;
ἐμάνην, ἔπεσον δαίμονος ἄτηι...
μαία, πάλιν μου κρύψον κεφαλήν,
αἰδούμεθα γὰρ τὰ λελεγμένα μοι...
tο γὰρ ὀρθούσθαι γνώμην ὀδυνάι,
tο δὲ μαινόμενον κακόν•)
Phaidra explains her violence of speech and uncustomary desire by calling it madness. She blames it on a divine cause, but characterises her wildness of speech as madness. Like Heracles and Ajax, Phaidra feels pain on her return to sanity and regrets what she has said, but she points out that madness is evil, implying that the pain, for all it is hard to bear, is better than being mad. In this way she also links sanity, rather than madness, with illness, because sanity brings pain. Barrett points out that ‘sanity, with the consciousness of her plight, is intolerable, but unconsciousness at the cost of insanity is abhorrent; best then that unconsciousness should move over into death.’

The same concept is evident in Cambyses’ return to sanity (3.64.1-5), when he realises that he had his brother killed in vain. In his madness he had this violent deed committed (3.30.1-3), and now regrets it. Although Phaidra may express merely

660 Barrett (1964: 208, s.v. 247-9).
uncustomary thoughts in a violent way and quickly feels shame for what she may have said, the two examples are quite similar. Cambyses’ violent desires are also uncustomary – the killing of one’s close relatives is hardly ever customary, after all – and he takes longer to feel any regret, but in essentials the two are very close. For Cambyses, sanity and realisation of his folly is quickly followed by sickness and the death Phaidra desires (3.66.2).

Phaidra’s madness also demonstrates the principle that actual manifestation of madness comes on in fits but Phaidra is always sick. Phaidra’s mad episodes are not violent in their form – she does not leap off her bed and attack people - but her expression of her desires for violent movement are violent.

So madness as sickness in tragedy helps us to understand that madness may wax and wane, but may be always present, not only at times of violent outbreak. Madness as sickness incapacitates a person in terms of their wishes or normal behaviour, but may still manifest itself in violence. Madness may be contagious, and madness may be cured; a cure from the gods may leave one alive, but death is the other option.

**Illuminating Examples**

The following examples are chosen for their assistance in corroborating and illuminating various examples of madness in the Histories.

In the *Agamemnon*, Cassandra does not speak at all, and this is what causes Clytemnestra to call her mad. It should be noted that Clytemnestra’s reading of Cassandra’s lack of speech is probably faulty; nevertheless we can draw conclusions about madness from what Clytemnestra says. The Chorus comments, when Cassandra doesn’t respond to the queen’s direct address (*Ag*. 1062-1068):

Chorus: ‘The foreign woman seems to need a smart interpreter; her manner is as that of a newly-caught wild animal.’

Clytemnestra: ‘Or she is mad, in fact, and obeys her defective mind, she who after leaving her ‘newly caught’ city has come, but is not capable of carrying the bridle before foaming away her bloodied spirit.'
Well, after wasting (my words) I’ll not be further snubbed.’

(Ch.: ἐρμηνέως ἔοικεν ἡ ξένη τοροῦ
deίσθαι· τρόπος δὲ θηρός ὡς νεαιρέτου.
Cl. ἥ μαίνεται γε καὶ κακῶν κλύει φρενῶν,
ήτις λιποῦσα μὲν πόλιν νεαιρέτον
ήκει, χαλινὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φέρειν
πρὸν αἵματηρόν ἐξαφοίζεσθαι μένος.
oὐ μὴν πλέω ῥίψασ’ ἀτιμασθήσομαι."

Clytemnestra sees Cassandra as fighting futilely against her position as a captive and victim; the word δοῦλος was emphasised in Clytemnestra’s address to Cassandra (Ag. 1035-1046) 661 Their relative positions require a degree of respect for the most powerful woman in Mycenae; the queen may not be a goddess, but she has far more power than Cassandra does. Clytemnestra sees Cassandra as mad and full of μένος (Ag. 1067); this is at odds with Kassandra’s lack of speech and, presumably, movement. The captive’s stillness and presumed intransigence is translated, by the queen, into a stubborn refusal to accept her lot and is turned into a violent metaphor662. We have here two kinds of madness at work: violence in one’s spirit which may not be translated to physical movement, and the turning of this violence against one more powerful than oneself; the metaphor of the frenzied horse with the bloodied bit is all the more striking given the ‘frozen’ nature of Cassandra at this point. In addition to this, the use of madness is in the context of abuse; Clytemnestra’s anger at Cassandra prompts her to say something derogatory about the prophet, even if her reasoning is not quite correct.

This sort of use of madness as a device which highlights the misunderstanding of the speaker is very useful in interpreting various examples of madness in the Histories. The madness which the Persians attribute to the Greeks is also due to a misunderstanding of the Greek dedication to the cause of freedom (6.112.2, 8.10.1, 8.140.a3). Clytemnestra, by contrast, does not understand Cassandra’s unacceptance of slavery

661 As Goldhill (1984: 82) points out, Clytemnestra already intends Cassandra to be a sacrifice. This also gives another meaning to the Chorus’ calling her a newly-caught animal.
662 Goldhill (1984: 83) also notes that Cassandra’s silence, ‘the indication of lack of reception’, helps to emphasise ‘the process of utterance’ which is a feature in this scene.
when the Trojan has no other option. This example is also interesting when compared with those of Herodotus, as the Persians in a position of strength are attacked or defied by the Greeks, who are in a position of weakness. In each it is the person in the higher position who cannot understand why the person in the weaker position chooses to act the way they do.

In Sophocles’ *Electra*, Clytemnestra herself is said to be mad when she shouts at her daughter. Electra complains of how her mother treats her (*El. 287- 299)*

‘For this high-minded woman

Groans loudly and rebukes me with words such as these evil ones:

“You hateful thing, a pain to the gods, has your father alone

Died and no one else among mortals been in mourning?

May you perish miserably, and may the gods of the underworld

Never put a stop to your constant bawling!”

She says these rude things; except whenever she hears from someone

That Orestes will come – and then she gets mad

And comes up to me and screams: “Aren’t you the cause of these things for me?

Isn’t this your work, since you stole

Orestes from my hands and spirited him away?

But just you watch out, because you will pay an appropriate penalty!”

She barks these sort of things…”

(αὕτη γὰρ ἡ λόγοισι γενναία γυνὴ

φωνούσα τοιάδ’ ἐξονειδίζει κακά,

ὡ δύσθεον μίσημα, σοι μόνη πατήρ

tέθνηκεν ἄλλος δ’ οὔτις ἐν πένθει βροτῶν;

κακῶς ὀλοιο, μηδὲ σ’ ἐκ γόων ποτὲ

tῶν νῦν ἀπαλλάξειαν οἱ κάτω θεοὶ.

tάδ’ ἔξυβρίζει· πλὴν ὅταν κλῆσι τινὸς

ἡξοντ’ Ὀρέστην· τηνικαύτα δ’ ἐμμανής

βοᾶ παραστᾶς’, οὐ σὺ μοι τῶνδ’ αἰτία;
οὐ σὸν τὸδ’ ἐστὶ τούργον, ἱτίς ἐκ χερῶν
κλέψασ’ Ὀρέστην τῶν ἐμῶν ὑπεξέδου;
ἀλλ’ ἰσθι τοι τείσουσά γ’ ἀξίαν δίκην.
τοιαῦθ’ ὑλακτεῖ...)  

Clytemnestra ‘goes mad and shouts’ (ἐμμανὴς βοᾷ); her ‘madness’ then is to highlight her excessive shouting, because her words in both the preceding and following reports are not very different in tone. On the other hand, both are full of vitriolic invective against her own daughter, whom she first wishes were dead and then deliberately threatens with some undisclosed ‘penalty’ (δίκην). The madness could well signal the escalation of emotional tension in Clytemnestra’s vague wishing to her much more immediate threat. We must always bear in mind, of course, that the queen and Electra share a mutual hatred; Electra will use the most evocative language possible (ὑλακτεῖ, for example) to convey her disgust for her mother, so in this hostile context Electra’s own abuse of her mother by calling her mad is not surprising.

Madness as verbal abuse provides a way of understanding some examples in the Histories where madness is used as a term of abuse towards a person who has expressed a violent desire or has expressed themselves in a violent manner. When Astyages expresses his violent order to to his loyal servant Harpagus, saying that he is to kill Mandane’s newborn son (Astyages own grandson, 1.108.4), Harpagus calls the tyrant mad when discussing the situation with his wife (1.109.2). The use of madness to abuse Astyages highlights Harpagus’ unprecedented disobedience and Astyages’ own violent desire. Clytemnestra is spurred by fear to scream at Electra; this may also be true of Astyages, who, in fear of the loss of his tyranny, expresses a violent order to Harpagus. Both are called mad.

Tomyris’ abuse of Cyrus may also be seen in this light to a certain degree. His capture of her son and his army contingent by means of a trick resulted in the loss of large numbers of that part of the Massagetean army (1.211.3). It is in response to the underhanded warfare of Cyrus that Tomyris verbally attacks the Persian king and calls

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663 March (2001: 160), however, quotes Kamerbeek, suggesting that this is a weak threat.
the Persians mad (1.212.1-2). Her abuse of Cyrus and Persians reflects not only their violence but her own heightened anger.

The concept of madness as escalating, not just heightened, emotion is also useful in considering the madness of Timodemus. Herodotus uses Timodemus’ madness to show the escalating scale of envy among the Greeks, of whom Timodemus is the most envious. His great envy leads him to verbally attack Themistocles – a level which the other envious Greeks do not reach.

In Sophocles’ *Oedipus the King*, when the Chorus first see Oedipus after he has stabbed his eyes, they jump to the conclusion that a god has caused the violent, self-harming action (*O.T.* 1299-1302):

‘What madness came upon you? What bounding Divinity, greater than the greatest, Brought on you this miserable fate?’

(…τίς σ᾿.../προσέβη μανία; τίς ὁ πηδήσας μαίζονα δαίμων τῶν μακίστων πρὸς σῇ δυσδαίμονι μοίρᾳ;

Oedipus later explains that he did the deed himself (αὐτόχειρ, *O.T.* 1331), but still connects Apollo with his suffering, since the god foretold the events which led Oedipus to fulfil them unwittingly (*O.T.* 1329-1330). Nonetheless, the initial reaction of the Chorus portrays madness as coming from the gods. Hogan may call this a ‘time-honoured explanation for a mistake or self-harming act’ but in fact madness has only been associated with self-harm once before, and that in Aeschlyus’ *Seven Against Thebes* (781), where the Chorus are, again, discussing Oedipus.⁶⁶⁴ What we may say is that Oedipus could well be the starting point for the ‘madman’ who harms himself. Ajax commits suicide as a way to escape the shame of his fit of madness, but even though his madness is inextricably linked to his suicide, there is never a direct connection of the two concepts: no one ever says ‘suicide is madness’. This connection is made in *Iphigenia in Aulis* by Euripides, discussed below, but seemingly not before.

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⁶⁶⁴ Hogan (1991: 70, s.v. 1300).
This kind of deliberate self-harm which may be interpreted as some god-inflicted madness is very like the self-harm of the mad Cleomenes in Herodotus’ *Histories* (6.75.1), who also deliberately cuts himself up while in the stocks, to the point where he cuts into his stomach and dies (6.75.3). In his case, his madness is said to have been because of some religious transgression (6.75.3), and his madness was so great that he did not just stop at the eyes, as Oedipus did (even in his ‘madness’, Oedipus shows a control which Cleomenes lacks), but starts at his feet and works his way up. So if Oedipus is called mad for his attack on his eyes, Cleomenes should be perceived as even more mad. This excessive madness is shown by Herodotus in the way Cleomenes has to be confined (6.75.2), as well as in Herodotus’ statements that he was ‘seized by a mad illness’ (6.75.1), demonstrating the onslaught of the violent ‘fit’ of the madness, and that ‘he had been fairly mad before’ (6.75.1). That is to say, if he was mad before, this illness was worse. This sort of statement will be discussed below also.

Teiresias calls Pentheus mad when the king sends out his men to catch ‘the stranger’, Dionysus; the king announces that the ‘stranger’ will be tied up and stoned, and Teiresias retorts (*Ba.* 359):

‘You have already gone mad – and before you were out of your wits.’

(μέμηνας ἤδη· καὶ πρὶν ἔξεστης φρενῶν.)

The seer has called Pentheus mad before, with regard to his disrespect for the god665; in this instance his stubborn and outrageous proposal to have Dionysus stoned prompts Teresias to call Pentheus mad again. Even if Pentheus does not know that Dionysus is the stranger, the move is nonetheless directed against the person Pentheus suspects of being the ringleader of the new worship. It would not matter whether the stranger were not Dionysus, the disrespectful nature of Pentheus’ words would still have the same effect. Dodds points out that the use of the perfect μέμηνας ‘clearly means that Pentheus’ state of mind as revealed by his last speech is worse than before’666 – when he was said to be ‘mad in the most painful way possible’ (μαίνῃ γὰρ ὡς ἄλγιστα, *Ba.* 326). It is certainly true that Pentheus has gone from telling his grandfather to stop playing at such nonsense, and being rude to Teiresias (‘if you weren’t so old, I’d have

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665 See *Ba.* 326.
666 Dodds (1986: 115, s.v. 359).
you imprisoned’, *Ba.* 248-262), to threatening to put to death the stranger whom we know is Dionysus himself. But Dodds notes that the difference lies more, perhaps, in the ‘temporary loss of control’ of μαίνη being revealed as a ‘permanent state of derangement expressed by the perfect μέμηνας’.

The rhetorical way in which Teiresias employs these terms helps us to understand similar terms in Herodotus’ *Histories*. Teiresias notes an escalation in Pentheus’ madness: by saying he was out of his wits but now is mad, he effectively says (noting Dodds’ comments on the tenses) ‘you have crossed the line between a bit mad and very mad’. So this type of comment appears to be a rhetorical device used to show a comparative degree of madness.

Herodotus uses this device also. When the Egyptian priests bring the Apis to Cambyses, Herodotus gives the quick aside ‘since he was fairly mad’ (ἐὼν ύπομαργότερος, 3.29.1) before Cambyses stabs the bull. He then goes on to give the list of proofs for Cambyses’ madness, beginning ‘Cambyses, as the Egyptians say, went mad straight away because of this intentional offence, although he wasn’t sane previously’ (Καμβύσης δέ, ὡς λέγουσι Αἰγύπτιοι, αὐτίκα διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ἀδίκημα ἐμάνη, ἐὼν οὐδὲ πρότερον φρενήρης, 3.30.1). So Herodotus wishes us to see Cambyses as ‘not sane’, or ‘fairly mad’ at the moment of stabbing the Apis, but then being ‘very mad’ in the proof list. He wishes to show an escalation of madness. This is also true of Cleomenes, of whom Herodotus says that ‘he was seized by a mad illness, although even before he was fairly mad’ (ὑπελαβε μανίη νοῦσος, ἐόντα καὶ πρότερον ύπομαργότερον, 6.75.1). Herodotus wishes to point out the sudden escalation of Cleomenes’ madness: like a low fever, or an illness which he is prone to be nature, Cleomenes was always mad, but now he is ‘madder’, or ‘very mad’, and it bursts out in violent manifestation where it may never have been evident beforehand.

Heracles’ madness is associated with the killing of his children while in the belief that they are his enemies’. Naturally enough, madness is not mentioned until Iris and Lussa herself come onstage (*He.* 822f.), so there is no warning as to what it going to

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667 Dodds (1986: 115, s.v. 359).
occur. Iris introduces herself and Lussa (He. 822-824) and orders the latter (He. 835-840):

‘…thrust madnesses on this man and child-killing
Disturbances of mind and stir bounding leaps for his feet,
Throw out the bloodied sounding-line,
So that when he has ferried his wreath of beautiful child(ren) across the strait of Acheron
By family-slaying murder
He may know what sort of wrath from Hera is on him…’

Although we are specifically told that Heracles’ madness is due to Hera’s wrath, the emphasis throughout the second half of the play is on the killing of the children, signalled from the very beginning of Iris’ speech. In these six lines murder is mentioned three times: παιδοκτόνους (835), φόνιον (837) and φόνῳ (839). Euripides is not going to let us forget of what exactly this madness consists. Lussa herself mentions the matter again, soon after (He. 865-866):

‘…and he who slaughters them will not know that
He killed the children whom he fathered, until he throws off my madnesses.’

Lussa does not use many words for madness in her speeches, and this is the first (and arguably only) relevant usage, because although οἶστρος is mentioned at He. 862, Lussa is saying at that point that even the stinging fly which breathes pain can not match her, in a negated sense, and furthermore the word is dubious\(^{668}\). So Lussa, the personification of

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\(^{668}\) Bond (1981: 290-291, s.v. 862). Bond explains why οἶστρος does not fit the ‘natural phenomena’
madness, using λύσσα in a speech where this is the only occurrence of a 'mad' word is going to be more striking than if she constantly used such words; pairing the word with the death of the children takes the emphasis further.

This madness which consists of the killing of children or family is highly contextualised; while still violent, it is directed against the family. The madness of Heracles assists our interpretation of two cases of madness in the *Histories*. In the first case, Astyages demands that Harpagus kill the baby Cyrus, in case this new grandson takes over his kingdom as Astyages fears he will (1.108.4). Harpagus calls the king mad when he talks to his wife later (1.109.2), and while this use of madness emphasises the violence of Astyages’ speech and content of the speech, as well as highlighting Harpagus’ disobedience, madness may also be used of Astyages in the killing of his own grandson, particularly one so helpless. While various other people kill their relatives in the *Histories*, the only other who is definitely mad when he does so is Cambyses, to be discussed below. But given Herodotus’ propensity for contextualising madness, and given that Euripides did the same, Astyages may be the one man called mad for his desire to kill his grandson. If we compare the example of Astyages with that of the Bacchiadae at 5.92.γ1, we can see that in Astyages’ case he shows no softness of heart for the baby whatsoever, whereas the kinsmen who come to kill the baby Cypselus because he may be a danger to Corinth couldn’t bring themselves to kill Cypselus when he smiled at them (5.92.β2-3, 5.92.γ3). In addition to this, the kinsman never show any signs of violent behaviour in their arrival or speech (5.92.γ1-3), whereas Astyages shows violence in both his expressed desire and his use of imperatives (1.108.4). Astyages acts differently from the Bacchiadae, and is called mad; his violent attitude towards his own baby grandson may cause him to be called mad, and this attitude is scarcely mitigated by the 10 years in which he thinks his grandson dead (1.116.1), as he transfers the violence from the grandson to those who kept him alive (1.116.4-5, 1.119.3-5). On the other hand, there are further reasons for Astyages being called mad which are discussed in Chapter 2.

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discussed here and suggests that reading οἰστός, an arrow, is the ‘simplest solution’.

669 Some other examples of those who kill (or attempt to kill) their relatives but are not called mad: 2.107.1, 4.80.5, 4.160.4, 7.107.2, 9.113.2. There is often an element of rivalry over a kingdom.
Cambyses also kills his heir by beating his pregnant sister-wife in anger until he miscarries the child and dies herself (3.32.4). But he is already expressly said to be mad when he does this (3.30.1), unlike Astyages. All the same, the comparative example of Heracles may show two slightly differing concepts: in the tragedy, that a man made mad kills his children, and in the Histories, that a man already mad kills his only heir.

The final example is useful for illuminating the concept of madness as incomprehensibility, as well as connecting madness and suicide. In the Iphigenia in Aulis, Iphigenia does not understand why anyone would long for death, particularly as she herself is faced with it and does not want it. She expresses this incomprehensibility by saying ‘He who prays for death is mad’ (μαίνεται δ’ ὃς εὔχεται/θανεῖν, I. A.1251-1252). This example shows the way madness is used to express great incredulity, although it sheds little light on the matter of suicide and madness in the Histories.

Herodotus also uses the terms of madness to express varying degrees of disbelief or lack of understanding. In the case of the Persians who call the Greeks mad, they cannot believe that the Greeks would bother to stand up to so great an army when their own position is so inferior, but they do not understand the great desire the Greeks have for freedom (6.112.2, 8.10.1, 8.140.α3). The Ionians, on the other hand cannot believe that they ever agreed to practice fighting maneuvers, and this betrays their essential apathy and weakness of resolve to be free (6.12.3). In the matter of madness and suicide, the Histories generally show suicide as the last noble resort of those backed into a corner, but that of Cleomenes is rather different. It is true that he has come to a sorry pass, confined in the stocks (6.75.2), but Herodotus never suggests that there is any motive for suicide in terms of sense of shame. Cleomenes is mad and his madness is shown to have caused his death, rather than him committing suicide and being called mad for it. His madness is demonstrated rather in the self-directed violence which continues over a period of time, in his excessiveness of μένος which is almost Homeric fashion, allows him to make mincemeat himself from the shins upwards when pain would overcome the average person and cause them to stop.

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670 See 1.45.3, 1.213.1, 1.82.8, 7.232.1, 3.15.4, 3.75.2-3, 7.167.1.
Chapter Five
The Hippocratic Writers

Madness in the Hippocratic writings varies from being a disease in itself, to being a form of delirium. The Hippocratic writers use madness with rather more specificity than Herodotus does, and this is only to be expected given the exactitude of the Hippocratic discourse in a medical context compared with Herodotus’ looser, literary style. The concept of madness in the Hippocratic corpus helps to elucidate the way Herodotus sometimes uses madness in the Histories.

The Hippocratic writers seem to refer to madness (μανίη) in the most part as a kind of violent delirium. This is not a strict rule, on the other hand, and as a way of separating the various uses of παραφροσύνη and μανία, I have translated the former as ‘delirium’ and the latter as ‘madness’, although in some examples μανία will clearly refer to violent delirium, as opposed to the gentler παραφροσύνη, which appears to indicate a confused state of mind without the violence; but even παραφροσύνη may be violent on occasion. On the whole, however, μανία tends to appear towards the end of illnesses, when the patient is worsening, and this would suggest that μανία is a stronger form of delirium, perhaps even encompassing the notion of fits 671.

Madness is either an illness among the Hippocratic writers, or a further symptom of illness in terms of delirium. This concept of madness as an illness is also seen in Herodotus’ Histories: Cleomenes’ madness is called a νοῦσος (6.75.1), as is the madness of the women of Argos (9.34.1-2).

The writer of The Sacred Illness is convinced that madness has a purely physical cause, just as the sacred illness (epilepsy) itself does. The writer makes a statement about madness in the first section of the work, suggesting various conditions which are just as amazing as epilepsy but which no-one considers to be sacred, of which one is madness

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671 Littré Vol. 2 (1962 : 70), Epidemics 1.13.8, 2; Epidemics 1.13.9, Pg. 704; Vol. 3, Epidemics 3.4, Pg. 46; Epidemics 3.2.17.16, Pgs. 146, 148; Vol. 5, Epidemics 7.5, Pgs. 372-374.
The Sacred Illness: ‘I see people who are mad and delirious from no apparent reason, who do many troublesome things, and I know many who wail and shout in their sleep, and others who choke, and still others who leap up and bolt outside and are delirious until they wake up, when they are healthy and in their right mind just as [they were] previously, although they are both pale and weak, and furthermore [they do this] not once but many times...’ (...ὄρεω μαίνομένους ἀνθρώπους καὶ παραφρονέοντας ἀπὸ οὐδεμιῆς προφάσιος ἐμφανέος, καὶ πολλά τε καὶ ἀκαίρα ποιόντας, ἐν τε τῷ ὕπνῳ οἶδα πολλοὺς οἰμώζοντας καὶ βοῶντας, τοὺς δὲ πνιγομένους, τοὺς δὲ καὶ ἀναίσσοντάς τε καὶ φεύγοντας ἐξω καὶ παραφρονέοντας μέχρις ἂν ἐπέγρωνται, ἐπείτα δὲ ὑγιέας ἐόντας καὶ φρονέοντας ὡσπερ καὶ πρότερον, ἐόντας τ’ αὐτέους ὀψχοῦς τε καὶ ἀσθενέας, καὶ ταῦτα οὖχ ἀπάξ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις...) So according to the writer, madness is no more from the gods than the sacred disease, and those who say so ‘disguise the matter and advance divinity as the pretext for their helplessness in not restraining that which they declare they will help, and since they obviously don’t understand it at all, they believe this condition to be divine...’ (οὗτοι τοίνυν παραμπεχόμενοι καὶ προβαλλόμενοι τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀμηχανίης τοῦ μὴ ἵσχειν οτι προσενεγκαντες ώστε ήσσον οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενοι, ιερὸν εὐσκόμας τοῦτο τὸ πάθος εἶναι...). Although the writer is referring mainly to epilepsy, his use of madness and delirium (μαίνομαι and παραφρονέω) as counter-examples of amazing illnesses which are ‘no less divine’ (οὐδὲν ἔσσον...ιεροὺ εἶναι) than epilepsy demonstrates that, just as he goes on to prove that he does not consider epilepsy divine, so madness and delirium cannot be considered divine either. His use of ‘no less divine’ is therefore a rhetorical sarcasm in a vitriolic attack on those who call epilepsy divine.

672 Littré Vol. 6 (1962 : 354). See also Pg. 352 for the argument that epilepsy is not divine at all.
673 The Sacred Illness 1, Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 354). Jouanna (1999: 184-185) compares this scathing attack on the ignorance of charlatans to Oedipus’ attack on Teiresias (Sophocles, O.T. 387-388). He considers that the fierceness of the attack shows that the author’s opponents ‘were not in fact as insignificant as he would have had his readers believe’.
674 The Sacred Illness 1, Littré Vol. 6 (1962 :354).
This physical grounding of madness as an illness which is not at all associated with the gods would appear to conflict with Herodotus’ portrayal of madness as a state which often has to do with divine transgression. Herodotus, however, seems to meld the two ideas at times. This is helpful in elucidating why Herodotus says of Cambyses that his madness was caused, according to the Egyptians, by his disrespectful treatment of the Apis bull (3.30.1), and then goes on to say that Cambyses may have had epilepsy as well. He remarks that he would not be surprised that such a serious illness of the body might also affect the mind (3.33). Herodotus mixes the two explanations, divine and physical, simply as extra proof that Cambyses was indeed mad. The two causes are not mutually exclusive in his mind; the physical illness corroborates the evidence that Cambyses was mad\(^{675}\).

Herodotus explains the madness of Cleomenes in a similar way, relying on both the physical cause, ‘he was seized by a mad illness’ (ὑπέλαβε μανίη νοῦσος, 6.75.1), as well as the religious causes listed in 6.75.3 to clearly categorise Cleomenes’ mental state as mad\(^{676}\). The Hippocratic view of illness also assists us to interpret Herodotus’ delayed portrayal of Cleomenes’ madness as something which was always there but

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\(^{675}\) Herodotus does not appear to consider epilepsy to have divine causation; although his phrase ‘the (illness) which some call sacred’ (τὴν ἱρὴν ὀνομάζουσί τινες, 3.33) may allude to The Sacred Illness according to Thomas (2000: 34), unfortunately we must take into account that Herodotus may not necessarily be making an indication of his own opinion either way from the use of ὀνομάζουσί alone. That he specifies the physical nature of epilepsy (τοῦ σώματος) rather than the divine, combined with ὀνομάζουσί τινες, is a firmer indication of his opinion that epilepsy is not divine. If he considered it to be so, the divine nature of epilepsy might fit in well with the divine cause of Cambyses’ madness, but the physical explanation diversifies the causes and thereby confirms the madness on two levels. Herodotus also offers a physical explanation for Cleomenes’ madness (6.84.1-3), even if he himself does not agree. Jouanna (2005: 6-10) also discusses this passage and suggests that ‘the disease which some call sacred’ need not necessarily be referring to Hippocratic writing, because there was no technical term for epilepsy at the time. He also is cautious about the use of ἐκ γενεῆς as a Hippocratic reference and cites Herodotus’ use of τὰς φρένας for the thinking part of the mind, which is contrary to what the author of The Sacred Illness thinks. This is contrary to Thomas (2000:34-35, also n.9). He points out that ‘one has to be careful not to overinterpret the historian’s text under the pretext of explaining it by a comparison with medical technical literature’ (Pg. 9). He does not, however, see the proof-list of madness from 3.30.1-1.37.3 as such; he desires to find a relation for the two causes (Pg. 7) when Herodotus is simply providing extra confirming reasons. But he does note that Herodotus has a certain flexibility when it comes to causation which is not consistent with the views of Hippocratic doctors, and believes in divine causation, which is inconsistent with Hippocratic rationalism (Pgs. 12, 25).

\(^{676}\) As Jouanna notes (1999:335), the Hippocratic writers seem to picture disease as ‘an animate being, rapid and powerful, who abruptly establishes his hold over the patient in the manner of a warrior over his adversary, or of a wild beast over his prey’. See also n. 51 and the frequency of ἄλημβάνω. So when Herodotus refers to illness ‘seizing’ Cleomenes, as well as the Chian boys killed by an epidemic in 6.27.2, he appears to use medical language.
which arose at a certain time. We do not need to wonder if Herodotus is being erratic in this instance if we understand that in the medical procedures of the time, it was believed that some people had a natural disposition to a particular illness, which might manifest itself under the right circumstances. This explains why Herodotus need not feel that he must consistently show Cleomenes as mad from the first mention of madness (5.42.1) to the actual outbreak of madness (6.75.1).

Among the Hippocratics there is the recognition that some people are ‘predisposed’ to types of illness. As Herodotus might have been familiar with some of the writings\textsuperscript{677} it is possible that he has this theory in mind when writing about Cleomenes. \textit{Epidemics} 1.2\textsuperscript{678} has the following observation: ‘Early in the beginning of summer, and through summer and during winter, many of those who for a long time now were declining slowly with wasting illnesses (consumption) took to their beds; while even for those who had it uncertainly, in many it then presented certainly; and for others who had it, it first began then, [in those] whose nature was inclined towards the wasting illness. Many died and these [latter] most of all...’(πρῶῒ δὲ τοῦ θέρεως ἀρξαμένου, καὶ διὰ θέρεως καὶ κατὰ χειμῶνα, πολλοί τῶν ἣδη πολὺν χρόνον ύποφερομένων φθινώδεες κατεκλίθησαν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖσιν ἐνδοιαστῶς ἔχουσι, πολλοίσιν ἐβεβαιώσε τότε· ἐστὶ δ’ οἰσιν ἥξεσθαι πρῶτον τότε, οἰσιν ἔφεσεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τὸ φθινώδες. ἀπέθανον δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ πλείστοι τοῦτον...).

A case study in \textit{Epidemics} 3.2.6\textsuperscript{679} contains the note: ‘There was also some predisposition, wasting illness’ (ἥν δὲ τι καὶ ξυγγενικὸν, φθινώδες). ξυγγενικὸς also has the meaning ‘hereditary’ or ‘congenital’; but at any rate these examples show that some people were considered to be particularly susceptible to some illnesses; their ‘nature’ inclined them to a particular illness which under certain circumstances would take hold. So from this evidence it is not unreasonable to think that Herodotus might consider Cleomenes’ madness to be of this type; the way he introduces it first at 5.42.1 but has no further discussion of it until 6.75.1, when it suddenly reappears in full form, is suggestive of this type of ‘predisposition’ to a particular illness.

\textsuperscript{677} See Thomas (2000: 34), although Jouanna (2005:8-10) suggests caution.
\textsuperscript{678} Littré Vol.2 (1962: 604, 606).
\textsuperscript{679} Littré Vol. 3 (1962: 52).
Furthermore, the Hippocrates also mention the way a person with an illness may have symptoms which appear sometime after the onset of the illness. In *Epidemics* 1.1.1\(^{680}\) the writer discusses a delayed development in an illness ‘not a long time after – but for others it was after a while – [there were] painful inflammations to a testicle on one side, but for others to both [testicles]...’ (οὐ μετὰ πολὺ, τοῖσι δὲ καὶ μετὰ χρόνον, φλεγμοναὶ μετ’ ὀδύνης ἐς ὀρχὶν ἑτερόῤῥοπαι, τοῖσι δὲ ἐς ἀμφοτέρους...). This idea could also be applied to Cleomenes’ madness and the delay of symptoms which are related to it.

The Hippocratic writers also knew that some illness were protracted in general, sometimes with relatively normal periods of health. Although an illness lasting days is not the same as an illness lasting years, at least two people have illnesses which last for 120 days before ending in death or crisis (*Epidemics* 3.3.17.1 and 3.3.17.9\(^{681}\)) Others have periods of no desperate sickness before the crisis, sometimes up to forty days (*Epidemics* 1.3.13.6, *Epidemics* 3.1.3\(^{682}\)); one illness is described as ‘of long days’ (*χρόνια, Epidemics* 3.3.12\(^{683}\)). From this we can assume the Hippocrates and their contemporaries were familiar with the idea of fairly long-term illness. So when Herodotus talks about Cleomenes’ madness, it is highly possible that he means us to think of the madness as an enduring afflication which may not show up until under certain circumstances\(^{684}\).

Finally, fevers can not only wax and wane but may also be fairly low-grade until near the crisis of the illness, when they may break out fiercely. One type of fever breaks out in a cycle (*Epidemics* 1.2.4\(^{685}\)): ‘But all these from the first attack had four cycles [or ‘bouts of intermittent fever’]; and in seven there was finally a crisis, nor were there recurrences for any of these people.’ (εὐτάκτως δὲ τούτοις πᾶσιν ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης λήψεως, τέσσαρας περιόδους ἐν ἐπτὰ δὲ τελέως ἐκριναν, οὐδ’ ὑπέστρεψαν οὐδενι τούτων.) This indicates that the fever has periods when it is in evidence, and


\(^{681}\) Littré Vol.3 (1962: 106, 130).

\(^{682}\) Littré, Vol.2 (1962: 698, 700); Vol. 3, Pg. 44.

\(^{683}\) Littré Vol.3 (1962: 92).

\(^{684}\) This sort of idea can also be seen in tragedy. See Chapter 4, Associations with Illness.

some periods when it is apparently not in evidence. Cleomenes’ madness could be seen in a similar fashion; that it has times when it appears and times when it doesn’t. Even more suggestive of Cleomenes’ type of madness is a different type of fever in *Epidemics* 1.3.11
d86: ‘These have a gentle and submerged beginning, but they increase more and more and become stronger each day, and around the crisis and with the crisis, they burst out enough/in abundance’ (ἐστὶ δ’ οἷσιν ἀφ’ έκθεται μαλακὸς τε καὶ ύποβρύχιος, ἐπανδιδοῖ δὲ καὶ παροξύνεται καθ’ ἡμέρην ἑκάστην, περὶ δὲ κρίσιν καὶ ἀμα κρίσει, ἀλίς ἐξέλαμψεν...). This model is particularly close to what occurs with Cleomenes’ madness, that if it is in evidence, it is only for a short time before it reveals itself in a violent and startling manner; we could compare Cleomenes’ frenzy in the stocks with a crisis which ends in death rather than healing. Note also the use of the ύπο prefix on ύποβρύχιος, a word that indicates the hidden – but nevertheless present quality of the fever.

On the whole then, Cleomenes’ madness does conform to various principles set out by the Hippocratic writers and to the portrayal of other diseases in the *Histories*. The Hippocratics recognise that an illness may lie dormant for some time before breaking out; and they recognise that some people are prone to a particular illness. Whether Herodotus means us to think that Cleomenes is inclined towards madness when he first reports at 5.42.1 that ‘Cleomenes, so it is said, was both mentally unsound and on the brink of madness,’ (ὁ μὲν δὴ Κλεομένης, ὡς λέγεται, ἣν τε οὐ φρενής ἄκρομανής τε...) is of course debateable; but given Herodotus’ probable knowledge of some Hippocratic concepts and the existence of theories which could easily be applied to Cleomenes’ madness, it is highly probable that Herodotus did intend something of the sort.

The concept of madness as caused by imbalance is prevalent in the Hippocratic writers, and has an interesting correspondence to Herodotus’ representation of Amasis’ very specific theory of madness as an imbalance. Violence and lack of control are also associated with madness in the Hippocratic corpus, more with μανία than

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παραφροσύνη, but sometimes μανία is not violent and παραφροσύνη is; the concept appears to be rather fluid.

In the Hippocratic corpus, imbalance connected to madness is grounded in purely physical realms. Both παραφρονέω and μαίνομαι compounds and variations are used to denote delirium, often accompanied by fever, but they usually describe different types of delirium. παρα‐ compounds appear to denote an inoffensive delirium or wandering in mind, whereas μαίνομαι variations denote a more violently disturbed delirium. Both these forms of delirium often have connotations of imbalance: when the brain overheats with bile or phlegm\(^\text{687}\), when the brain fills up\(^\text{688}\), when the blood is corrupted and therefore moves in an unaccustomed way\(^\text{689}\), or when the blood heats up, also with bile or phlegm\(^\text{690}\). If the patient lies on their belly when they don’t usually do so they may be mad or delirious, or if they grind their teeth when it isn’t a habit usually\(^\text{691}\), and if they have over‐indulged in wine and/or sex\(^\text{692}\). They can become insatiably thirsty and hungry at times, alternate between being quiet and being uproarious; they may sleep during the day but not at night\(^\text{693}\). Even characteristics such as varicose veins on bald people, baldness and bile together and being squint‐eyed can denote a tendency to mania\(^\text{694}\).

The writer of The Sacred Illness considers that more moisture than normal in the brain causes it to move, and that this is why people go mad\(^\text{695}\). Sometimes the imbalance associated with madness or delirium appears to manifest itself in excessive pain\(^\text{696}\). In some cases, the excessive pain which causes the madness is ‘normalised’ by fluid coming

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\(^{687}\) Littré Vol. 7 (1962: 10) Illnesses 2.3; Vol. 5, Pg. 144, Epidemics 4.1.2.

\(^{688}\) Littré Vol. 7 (1962: 118, 120) Illnesses 3.2.

\(^{689}\) Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 204) Illnesses 1.34. ‘They are continually delirious with the illness, given that the blood has been corrupted and is being moved in an unaccustomed movement; and given that they are delirious, they don’t take what is brought to them anymore, which is something worth noting…’ (παραφρονέουσιν ἐν τῇ νοσῷ διὰ παντὸς, ἀτε τοῦ αἵματος ἐφθαρμένου τε καὶ κεκινημένου οὐ τὴν ἑκομήλα κίνησιν· καὶ ἀτε παραφρονέοντες, οὐκέτι τῶν προσφερομένων δέχονται, ὅ τι ἄξιον λόγου...)

\(^{690}\) Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 200) Illnesses 1.30.


\(^{692}\) Littré Vol. 3 (1962: 146, 148) Epidemics 3.3.17 (Sixteen Illnesses); Vol. 5, Pgs. 152, 154, Epidemics 4.1.15.

\(^{693}\) Littré Vol. 5 (1962: 382, 384) Epidemics 7.1.11.


\(^{695}\) Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 386, 388) The Sacred Illness.

out the ears, whereupon the patient ‘becomes sane’ (ἐμφρων γίνεται) again\(^{697}\). In another case, the writer warns against ‘cleaning’ the head of the feverish with medicine, because the heat of the medicine combined with the heat of the fever causes madness\(^{698}\). An excessive dose of mandrake root may also cause madness, and the writer cautions against such doses, although a lower dose may help control convulsions and those who are suicidal\(^{699}\).

Amasis’ theory of madness is that a person needs a balance between work and leisure so that one does not go mad or die (2.173.4). While this concept of madness is specifically applicable to Amasis as the man of two parts, common and royal, there is nevertheless an interesting correlation between the balance of action or inaction needed to prevent madness, according to Amasis, and the very physically specific balance of humours needed in the brain to prevent madness, according to the Hippocratic writers.

Violence is a common association with madness in the genres of epic and tragedy, as well as in Herodotus’ *Histories*, and this association is evident in the Hippocratic writings also. People who experience violent delirium can’t restrain themselves (*Epidemics* 1.3.13.8\(^{700}\); they may shout, jump up, fight, swear at people, leap about and cry out (*Epidemics* 3.3.17.13\(^{701}\), *Epidemics* 4.1.15, *Epidemics* 7.1.11, *Epidemics* 7.1.25\(^{702}\)). The association of violence, sometimes verbal, is made most often when μανία is under discussion, whereas παραφροσύνη is generally associated with or

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\(^{698}\) Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 324) *About the Places Throughout a Man*, 3.33. ‘Do not clean the head of someone who has a fever, so that they don’t go mad; for the medicines which clean the head cause heat; the heat from the medicine, when added to the heat from the fever, causes madness.’ (πυρεταίνοντι κεφαλήν μὴ καθαίρει, ὡς μὴ μαίνεται: θερμαίνουσι γὰρ τὰ τὴν κεφαλήν καθαίροντα φάρμακα∙ πρὸς δὴ τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ πυρετοῦ θερμὸν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ φαρμάκου προσελθὸν μανίην ποιεῖι.)

\(^{699}\) Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 328-330) *About the Places Throughout a Man*, 3.39. ‘Regarding the distressed and the sick and those who want to hang themselves, give them a drink of mandrake root – less than causes madness. It is possible to treat convulsions in this way: light a fire on either side of the bed, and give them a drink of mandrake root – less than causes madness – and place hot poultices on the backs of the Achilles tendons.’ (τοὺς ἀνιωμένους καὶ νοσόντας καὶ ἀπαίχευσθαι βουλομένους, μανδραγόρου ὰίζαν πρωὶ πιπίσκειν ἐλασσὸν ἢ ὡς μαίνεσθαι. σπασμὸν ὄδε χορή ἰάσθαι· πῦρ παρακαίειν ἐκατέρωθεν τῆς κλίνης, καὶ μανδραγόρου ὰίζαν πιπίσκειν ἐλασσὸν ἢ ὡς μαίνεσθαι, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς τένοντας τοὺς ὀπισθίους σακκία προστιθέναι θεμά.)


\(^{701}\) Littré Vol. 3 (1962: 138, 140).

\(^{702}\) Littré Vol. 5 (1962: 152, 154; 382, 384; 394, 396).
verbal wandering or confusion. This distinction is, however, a general rule, and not every writer of works in the Hippocratic corpus agrees on how either madness or delirium are caused. This results in varying portrayals of what παραφροσύνη and μανία may consist.

The writer of *The Sacred Illness* appears to espouse the concept that the fluxes in the brain cause both madness and delirium (*The Sacred Illness*, 14703): ‘And by this same thing (the brain and/or the fluxes in it) we also go mad and become delirious, and horrors and fears come to us, some at night, but others during the day, and insomnia(s) and troublesome uncertain fits, and improper thoughts, and ignorance of customs and inexperience and clumsiness. And all these things we suffer because of the brain…’ (τῷ δὲ αὐτῷ τούτῳ καὶ μανίν καὶ παραφροσύνη, καὶ δείματα καὶ φόβοι παρίστανται ἣμῖν, τὰ μὲν νύκτωρ, τὰ δὲ μεθ’ ἡμέρην, καὶ ἀγνωσίαι καὶ πλάνοι ἄκαιροι, καὶ φροντίδες ὑπὸ ἰκνεύμεναι, καὶ ἀγνωσίαι τῶν καθεστῶτατων καὶ ἁθρίαι καὶ ἀπειρίη. καὶ ταῦτα πάσχομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου πάντα…). Here both μανία and παραφροσύνη are mentioned as having the same cause, and the various actions which follow, although possibly not directly indicative of the manifestation of μανία or παραφροσύνη, nevertheless show a distinct division. Fears, horrors and troublesome fits have more innate violence than the improper thoughts and clumsiness. Interestingly, the writer mentions ‘ignorance of customs’, which the mad Cambyses manifests in a violent form, rather than the more cerebral form mentioned here.

This division of two types of madness is explained later by the same writer, and he calls both types μανία rather than μανία and παραφροσύνη. This would appear to indicate that παραφροσύνη is specifically used to refer to delirium, even if it has the same cause as madness. The writer says (*The Sacred Disease*, 15704): ‘The destruction of the brain happens by moistness and bile; you will know each one in this way: those who go mad due to phlegm are quiet and neither vociferous nor riotous, but those who [go mad] due to bile are bellowers and malefactors and are not calm, but are always

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703 Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 386, 388).
704 Littré Vol. 6 (1962: 388).
doing something troublesome. So then if they are continually mad, these are the reasons/causes.’ (γίνεται δὲ ἡ διαφθορὴ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου ύπο φλέγματος καὶ χολῆς· γνώσει δὲ ἐκάτερα ὁδε· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ύπο τοῦ φλέγματος μαίνομενοι ἠσυχοὶ τέ εἰσι καὶ οὐ βοηταί οὐδὲ θορυβώδεες, οἱ δὲ ύπο χολῆς κεκράκται τε καὶ κακούργοι καὶ οὐκ ἀπτεμαίοι, ἀλλ’ αἰεί τι ἀκαίρων δρώντες. ἦν μὲν οὖν συνεχῶς μαίνονται, αὕτα τι προφάσισέ εἰσιν•) So madness may be either quiet, due to phlegm, or violent, due to bile. This is another possible explanation for Cleomenes’ madness not manifesting until 6.75.1: madness might change from being the quiet kind to the violent kind; but this is not suggested by Herodotus or the writer of The Sacred Illness, and should be viewed as a speculative possibility only.

By contrast, the writer of Illnesses says that παραφροσύνη is also caused by the imbalance, or excess, of bile or phlegm (Illnesses 2.3): ‘Another illness: great pain holds the head, and there is bilious vomiting, and painful urination, and delirium. This illness has great pain because of the excessive heat of the head, and there is delirium whenever the blood in the head gets over-heated by bile or phlegm and moves more than is customary.’ (ἐτέρη νούσος· περιωδυνίη τὴν κεφαλὴν ἵσχει, καὶ ἐμέει χολὴν, καὶ δυσουρέει, καὶ παραφρονέει. οὕτως περιωδυνέει μὲν ύπο τῆς ὑπερθερμασίας τῆς κεφαλῆς, παραφρονέει δὲ όταν τὸ αἷμα τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ ύπὸ χολῆς ἢ φλέγματος ὑπερθερμανθῇ καὶ κινηθῆ μᾶλλον τοῦ εἰωθότος). There may be differences between writers, but what is common is that madness, whether referring to μανία or παραφροσύνη, is caused by imbalance in the humours.

Madness and delirium in the Hippocratic corpus also embrace the quality of lack of control. Patients who are mad are occasionally said to be unable to restrain themselves. The verb most often used for this is κατέχω. Patients may have

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705 One patient is ‘bilious to the point of madness’ (χολώδης ἐς μανίην). Littré Vol. 5 (1962: 144) Epidemics 4.2.
706 Littré Vol. 7 (1962: 10).
convulsions (σπασμοί)\textsuperscript{708}; some people have trouble controlling their lips and head
\textit{(Epidemics} 2.5.2, \textit{Epidemics} 7.1.5\textsuperscript{709}), and in one case, παραφρονέω is used to describe
someone who can be diagnosed as delirious because their flatulence is passed noisily and
unwittingly \textit{(Prognostic} 11\textsuperscript{710}).

This aspect of madness and delirium is interesting when we consider what
Croesus says to Cambyses in 3.36.1: ‘Restrain and get hold of yourself!’ (ἵσχε καὶ
καταλάμβανε σεωυτον). Croesus does not use κατέχω, but ἵσχω is an old form, and
the κατα- prefix on λαμβάνω offers some similarity. In the context of the list of
actions proving Cambyses’ madness, Herodotus uses similar language as the Hippocratic
writers. His choice of language may be very natural in the context, and we cannot go so
far as to say that Herodotus is quoting the Hippocratic writings to some degree. What
may be said is that the words in Croesus’ mouth may have medical overtones, given the
context of madness.

The patient may alternate between states for various reasons. In the case of
tetanus, the patient may stretch themselves backwards, shout, and be unable to close their
legs or reach out their hands\textsuperscript{711}. They also experience severe pain, and this causes a
change of state\textsuperscript{712}: ‘…and sometimes [the patient] talks nonsense, and is not able to
restrain themselves, but sometimes leaps up, whenever they are in pain; and whenever the
pain relaxes, they are calm; sometimes they also become speechless at the same time as
they are seized or they are mad and melancholic.’ (...καὶ φλυηρέει ἐνίοτε, καὶ οὐ
dύναται ἑωυτόν κατέχειν, ἀλλ’ ἀναϊσσει ἑνίοτε, ἄταν ἡ ὀδύνη ἔχει; ὅταν δὲ ἄνη ἡ ὀδύνη,
ἔφωνοι γίνονται ἃμα ἄλισσομενοι ἢ μανικοὶ τε καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ.) In this instance the pain causes a change in behaviour.
It is tempting to assume that because speechlessness is offered as an alternative to
madness, the madness consists of shouting. At any rate, the pain may cause a variety of
states, one of which is madness, but when the pain goes, these behaviours cease.

\textsuperscript{708} Littré Vol. 3 (1962: 46) \textit{Epidemics} 3.4.

\textsuperscript{709} Littré Vol. 5 (1962: 128; 374).

\textsuperscript{710} Littré Vol. 2 (1962: 138).

\textsuperscript{711} Littré Vol. 7 (1962: 132) \textit{Illnesses} 3.13.

\textsuperscript{712} Littré Vol. 7 (1962: 132, 134) \textit{Illnesses} 3.13.
Other patients proceed from mild delirium to violent behaviour, sometimes simply in a verbal sense. The writer of *Epidemics* 3 notes that one patient\(^\text{713}\) ‘…was a little wandery in speech; forgetful of everything he said; he was away with the birds. Around the fourteenth day… he went to bed and went mad; shouting, distress, many words, and then settling again, and then he went into a deep sleep.’

(…σμικρὰ παρέλεγεν· λήθη πάντων, ὁ τι λέγον παρεφέρετο. περὶ δὲ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτην…ἐξεμάνη βοῆ, ταραχῆ, λόγοι πολλοί, καὶ πάλιν ἱδρυσις, καὶ τὸ κῶμα τηνικαῦτα προσηλθεῖν.) Other patients go from delirious rambling to madness, then back to lucidity\(^\text{714}\). One woman, in a state of madness, verbally abuses those present, and even before the madness is mentioned she is reported to have menaced her son in a manner foreign to her normal behaviour\(^\text{715}\). Sometimes


\(^{714}\) Littré Vol. 3 (1962: 140) *Epidemics* 3.2.17.14. Vol. 5, Pgs. 382, 384, 386, *Epidemics* 7.11: ‘On the fifth and seventh day and until the ninth, roughly, delirium, and she was babbling to herself again, words half-completed, after deep sleep; …in the early days there were passionate outbursts, and wailings like that of a child, and shouting, and fears… On the fourteenth day, it was hard work to restrain her, she jumped up and cried out suddenly and excessively, as if from blows and terrible pain and fear, as someone held her down to restrain her for a short time; then after that she was quiet again…she alternated between both states, agitation and calm, frequently, roughly for the whole of this day…on the fifteenth day, acute tossing about, and the fears, and the shouting became were less strong, but wildness followed closely, as well as fury and weeping, unless whatever she wanted was done quickly for her; and she recognised everyone and everything from the early days directly thereafter; but the madness came from time to time, and the shouting, and the change mentioned followed onto coma;…on the seventeenth day…she was more feverish…severe thirst; after drinking, she would ask for more, and would seize [the cup] and drink furiously, it was not possible to detach her.’ (πέμπτῃ καὶ ἐκτῇ καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐνάτης σχεδὸν παραλήρησις, καὶ αὐτῆς πρὸς ἐνυτίνη ἐλάλη, μετὰ χωμάτος ἡμιτελέα…ήσαν δὲ ἐν τῇ πρόσθεν ἥμερῃ ἑξεμάνην ἀκρισιολογίαν, καὶ κλαυθμοὶ οὐκο σπαθίας, καὶ βοῆ, καὶ δειμμάτα…τῇ δὲ τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτῃ ἔργον κατέχειν ἦν, ἀναπηδῶσαν καὶ βοώσαν ἐξαίφνης καὶ συντόνως, ὥσπερ ἀν έκ πληγής καὶ δεινῆς ὀδύνης καὶ φόβου, ὡς καταλαβὼν τις αὐτῆς κατάσχοι χρόνον ἀλίγον· εἶτα πάλιν ἱδρυσιν…μετάβαλλε δὲ ἐς ἀμφότερα θόρυβον τε καὶ ἱδρυσιν πυκνὰ, σχέδον ὅλην τὴν ἡμέρην ταύτῃν…τῇ δὲ πεντεκαιδεκάτῃ, οἷς οἰκτίσμοι· καὶ οἱ φόβοι, καὶ η βοή ἐγίνετο ἡμίος, παρηκολούθηε δὲ τὸ ἀγχοῦσθαι καὶ τὸ θυμαίνειν καὶ κλαίειν, εἰ μὴ οἱ ταχέως· ὅ τι βουλοῦτο, ἐξείθει· καὶ ἐπεγίνοσθεν μὲν πάντας καὶ πάντα ἤδη μὲτὰ πρώτας εὐθὺς ἡμέρας…ἡ δὲ μανίη παρὰ καίροιν, καὶ η βοη, καὶ η μεταβολή η εἰρημένη παρηκολούθηε ες τὸ κῶμα…ἐπτεκαδεκάτῃ…ἐπυρέτηγεν μᾶλλον…ἡ δίψα ἵσχυρος· πίεουσα, πάλιν ἠτει, καὶ ἠρπαξε, καὶ λαύρως ἐπινε, ἀποσπάσαι δὲ οὐκ ἤδηναι…)
madness or delirium appears to be associated with sudden change in state\textsuperscript{716}, to the extent that pulsation is considered indicative of delirium\textsuperscript{717}.

This change of state is useful for elucidating Herodotean madness. Such changes occur in Cambyses’ behaviour: love turns to murderous anger, pleasure to displeasure, anger at a person to missing that same person\textsuperscript{718}. Apparently Cambyses is predictable enough in his unpredictability that his servants secrete the threatened Croesus in order to get a reward if Cambyses changes his mind about his adviser\textsuperscript{719}. What is more interesting is, once again, the distinct possibility that Herodotus means us to see Cleomenes’ madness as something which has a changing state. Just because Cleomenes does not act madly at 5.42.1, this does not mean that Cleomenes may not be mad: madness changes, and madness may change enough to manifest itself. It is also interesting to consider the reasonable number of times that a mad person in the Hippocratic corpus is described as abusing people or shouting\textsuperscript{720}; madness in the \textit{Histories} is sometimes ascribed to those who are shouting, or as term of abuse in a quarrel\textsuperscript{721}.

Finally, the association of wine and madness is made in the Hippocratic writings, on at least two occasions. In one of these instances, the word used is πότος rather than

\textsuperscript{716} Of wounds, Littre Vol. 5 (1962: 118, 120) \textit{Epidemics} 2.3.18: ‘If swelling does not appear with wounds, even though they are severe, it is a great evil; [if the wounds are] spongy, it is good, [if] they spread upwards, it is worse. Those who have swellings in their wounds do not get convulsions or go mad; but when these things appear suddenly, for some towards the back, there are convulsions with distresses, and for others towards the front, there is either madnesses, or acute pains of the sides, or bloody dysentery…’ (τρωμάτων ἢν ἰσχυρῶν ἐόντων οἴδημα μὴ φαινίται, μέγα κακόν· τὰ χαῦνα, χρηστόν, τὰ ἄνω νεμόμενα, κάκιον. οίσιν οἴδηματα ἐφ’ ἐλκεσιν, οὐ μάλα σπώνται, οὐδὲ μαίνονται· τούτων δὲ ἀφανισθέντων ἐξαίφνης, οἴσι μὲν ἐς τὸ ὀπίσθεν, σπασμοὶ μετὰ πόνων, οἰσὶ δὲ ἐς τοὐμπρόσθεν, ἡ μανία, ἡ ὀδύναι πλευροῦ ὀξέαι, ἡ δυσεντερίη ἐρυθή…)

\textsuperscript{717} Littre Vol. 2 (1962: 126) \textit{Prognostic} 7: ‘And if there is a pulsation in the midriff area, it indicates gurgling, or delirium…’ (εἰ δὲ καὶ σφυγμὸς ἐνείη ἐν τῷ ὑποχονδρίῳ, θόρυβον σημαίνει, ἢ παραφροσύνην…).

\textsuperscript{718} 3.31.1-332.4, 3.34.5-3.35.2, 3.36.3-3.36.6.

\textsuperscript{719} 3.36.5.

\textsuperscript{720} Littre Vol. 3 (1962: 138) \textit{Epidemics} 3.2.17.13; Pg. 140, \textit{Epidemics} 3.2.17.14; Vol. 5, Pgs. 152, 154, \textit{Epidemics} 4.15; Pg. 384, \textit{Epidemics} 7.11; later her voice is hoarse from the shouting, Pg. 386; , Pg. 396, \textit{Epidemics} 7.25.

\textsuperscript{721} Of Astyages, 1.109.2; Tomyris of the Persians, 1.212.2-3; Persians of the Greeks, 6.112.2, 8.110.1, 8.140.a3; Of Timodemus, 8.125.1; Pausanias of Amompharetus, 9.55.2.
οἶνος, but this is of little account, as πότος usually refers to wine-drinking. A young man gets sick because of long-term carousing and sexual activity: ‘…On the tenth day, he was out of his mind in a calm way, he was well-behaved and quiet…On the fourteenth day, everything aggravated; driven out of his mind, much delirious talk. On the twentieth day, he went mad; tossing about; no urine at all; small amounts of drink brought him back. On the twenty-fourth day, he died.’ (δεκάτῃ, παρέκρουσεν ἄτρεμέως, ἢν δὲ κόσμιος τε καὶ ἰσχυρὸς...τεσσαρεσκαιδεκάτῃ, πάντα παρωξύνθη· παρεκρούσθη, πολλὰ παρέλεγεν. εἰκοστῇ, ἐξεμάνη· βληστρισμός· οὐδὲν οὔρει· σμικρὰ ποτὰ κατείχετο. τῇ εἰκοστῇ τετάρτῃ, ἀπέθανεν.) This case study demonstrates the principle that a small amount of what causes the sickness could be helpful, at least in the short term, but more interesting for our purposes is the way excessive wine causes sickness, and this sickness later turns to παραφροσύνη and μανία.

Another case study makes this direct connection, and although οἶνος is not used, the use of ἄκρητος points directly to wine: ‘…this man went out of his mind, I think, on the eighth day, in an unbridled way, he got up, fought, used foul language forcefully, although he is not this sort of man [normally]. In this way, after much continual, thin urine had come from refraining, a prolonged sleep occurred, and sweat, seemingly critical but instead was not of this sort, perhaps around the tenth day; then he both went mad again and died quickly, on the eleventh day. The cause, I think, was that he drank much unmixed [wine] before he went mad. He was not very old, around 20.’

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722 Homer, Odyssey 2.340-341, the wine is called πότος; wine is called πότος in 9.204-205 and 9.347-348, so it is not necessary to qualify it again at 9.354; Xenophon, Anabasis, 1.10.18, πότος is qualified soon after as wine; sweet drink which gives a headache is undoubtedly wine, Anabasis 2.3.15; πότος fills a drinking horn, but has no other identifying features, Anabasis 7.3.26; πότος in a list of pleasures is likely to be wine, Aristophanes, Clouds 1073; Lysistrata, 1227, οἶνῳ συμπόται; Plato, Protagoras 347c-e, refers to πότος and later qualifies this as οἶνος.

723 Littré Vol. 3 (1962: 146, 148) Epidemics 3.2.17.16.

ἐλθόντων λεπτῶν ἔς ἐπισχέσιος, ὑπνὸς ἐγενέτο ἀνεκήθη, καὶ ἱδρὼς, κρίσιμος δοκέων ἐς οὐ τοιοῦτον, ἱσως περὶ δεκάτην ἐπείτα ἐξεμάνη τε αὐθις, καὶ ἀπεθανε ταχέως, ἐνδεκαταῖος. προφάσιος, οἰμαί, πιεῖν ἄκρητον συχνὸν, πρὶν ἐκατηνήμαλ. ὅλιγα ἔτεα αὐτῷ, εἴκοσιν ἐγγύς.) The loose nature of the madness and delirium is seen here, where παρέκρυσεν, 'he went out of his mind', and the violent actions and speech of the man, specifically contrasted to his usual behaviour, is later referred to in the sentence 'he went mad again' (ἐξεμάνη τε αὖθις). The cause of the madness is given as undiluted wine, with the strength of the wine suggesting an imbalance, or excess, which is a factor in the madness.

In these terms it is possible to reconsider the association of wine with madness in the Histories. Tomyris’ accusation to Cyrus seems almost medical in her theory of how wine works (1.212.2-3). While it is true that the Iliad already proposes the theory that wine may act in two different ways, by strengthening the μένος which in excess brings madness, or by taking it away725, Tomyris also combines the idea of wine as a φάρμακον and, in particular, the way wine brings ‘evil words’ (ἐπεα κακά) to the surface of those made mad by it. Not only her use of φάρμακον but also her theory of the way wine works signals almost a medical diagnosis of Cyrus’ state. Tomyris’ use of such language also indicates her own sanity and destroys any perception of her as an ignorant barbarian. She is not just a warner, she begins to look like a doctor, who tells Cyrus what his problem is and how to cure it if he does not want to die.

Cambyses and Cleomenes are also connected to wine in their madness. The Persians supposedly consider Cambyses to be praiseworthy in all things, although they suggest he is very much inclined to the love of wine (3.34.2). As soon as Cambyses hears this report he translates it to mean that the Persians are saying that because he is fond of wine that he is deranged (παραφρονέειν, 3.34.3). Cambyses initially connects what is almost certainly excessive drinking with derangement, but goes on to ‘prove’ that he has no loss of perception because he can hit his adviser’s son with an arrow through the heart (3.35.1-3). It is interesting that Cambyses chooses to show that he has not lost

725 Iliad 6.258-267.
control of his physical ability: he is not παραφροσύνη because, effectively, he can control himself as the deranged cannot. But Croesus has to point out that shooting innocent children is not control: he tells Cambyses to control himself (ἰσχε καὶ καταλάμβανε, 3.36.1).

Cleomenes is also reported by the Spartans to have been mad because he drank undiluted wine a lot (6.84.1, 3). This is a reaction to the divine causes for his madness which other Greeks espouse (6.75.3-6.82.2); the Spartans deny that the cause was anything other than physical, but their reasoning is very similar to the concept in Epidemics 4.15 that a lot of undiluted wine can cause madness. Taking Cleomenes’ predisposition to madness (mentioned in 5.42.1) into consideration, we are perhaps meant to see excessive amounts of strong wine as a factor which could unbalance a man already on the brink of madness (ἀκρομανής) enough to tip him over the edge.

By looking at the works of the Hippocratic writers, we can see that Herodotus uses similar concepts when working with madness. Change of behaviour, violence and loss of control feature in both genres. The Hippocratic ideas of imbalance of humours, or excess of one over another, leading to madness are enlightening when we consider the particularly balanced theory of avoiding madness to which Amasis adheres. In addition to this, madness and abuse are often paired in both genres, as well as wine and madness. The most helpful application of the Hippocratic writings to the Histories is, however, the way they can be used to explain the delayed onset of Cleomenes’ madness, an illness to which he is predisposed and which only needs the right circumstances to manifest itself in all its violence. As Thomas says of the discussion of Cambyses’ epilepsy, but also applicable to many of these cases in the Histories, ‘Herodotus’ remark may simply be an intelligent observation on his part: but even in that case we must recognize that it would not look out of place in a Hippocratic text, and that Herodotus is thinking along much the same lines’.

726 Thomas (2000: 35).
Conclusion

Herodotus uses madness in the *Histories* in various ways, depending on the context of the *logos* in which it appears. Sometimes madness is feature of a *logos*, as it is in the cases of Cambyses and the death of Cleomenes, and sometimes madness is used to point up a theme which has been occurring, or will become important, in the *logos*. What becomes evident is that Herodotus does not have one single use for, or portrayal of, the concept of madness.

In his narration of the life of Cambyses, madness becomes a focus of the account when Herodotus treats the Egyptians’ report of the madness as a point which must be proved. Herodotus lists the numerous mad acts of Cambyses, many of which transgress *nomos*, in order to prove that the Egyptians are right. By contrast, madness only really becomes an issue at Cleomenes’ death, despite being told that he is ‘on the brink of madness’ (*ἀκρομανής*) at 5.42.1, because at his death Herodotus wishes to discuss why Cleomenes went mad and died so horribly. The general consensus is that he transgressed religious *nomos* in some way, although the Spartans think that he transgressed his own Spartan *nomoi*. Herodotus can delay the onset of the madness in this way because it is conceived to be the sort of sickness which may not show itself until a particular time.

In the story of Astyages and Harpagus, madness is used to highlight Harpagus’ surprising refusal to obey the king’s violent order to have the baby Cyrus killed. As a finishing touch to Cyrus’ story, madness makes an appearance around his death as well, when Tomyris expresses her anger at his use of wine and trickery to ensnare her son and his army. Amasis’ theory of madness reflects his own portrayal as a man of two parts, common and royal; he suggests that madness comes if a person does not have the sort of balance he has between work and leisure.

In the story of Charileōs, madness is used as an active, violent foil to the spiteful indifference of Maiandrios. In this instance the half-mad Charileōs has a nobility which his brother lacks, but cannot match him in self-preservation. Scyles, the king of Scythia, finds that his position does not protect him from death when he adopts the worship of Dionysus, a custom reviled by the Scythians above all other foreign customs. The
Athenian trireme crew, who try to retrieve two statues of gods from Aegina unlawfully, are sent mad for this transgression and slaughter one another while under the impression that they are the enemy.

Later on in the *Histories*, the clash between the Greeks and the Persians offers more scope for the application of madness in a battle situation. However, during the preparation for their part in the battle, the Ionians decide that they were mad to even consent to such rigorous manoeuvres. Their suggestion that they sailed out of their minds reflects Herodotus’ adaptation of madness to their activities in the context. The Greeks, on the other hand, are called mad by the Persians when they attack despite their inferior numbers, and Herodotus uses the imputation of madness as a way of showing the Persians’ lack of understanding, their trust in their own superiority, and the Greeks’ dedication to the *nomos* of freedom. The Persians themselves are called mad in an oracle because they are shown to be attacking the gods, which demonstrates madness as violence as well as madness as religious transgression.

The mad envy of Timodemus causes him to verbally attack Themistocles, and his excessive envy is the pinnacle of a *logos* about the Greeks’ envy of Themistocles. In the case of the women of Argos, madness is simply the means by which the cunning Melampus negotiates a share in the kingship of Argos. Finally, Amompharetus is called mad by his own ally and commander, Pausanias, because he insists on obeying Spartan *nomos* and refuses to retreat. This emphasises both Amompharetus’ degree of obedience to the creed as well as suggesting that Pausanias might not have quite the same belief in the *nomos*.

Madness in Homer is also often in a battle situation, although transgression of *nomos* is suggested on occasion as well. Madness is shown to be given by the gods, as a sign of divine favour, because it gives a hero the excessive μένος needed to excel in battle. In Homer we are also given the formula linking madness with wine, because wine also increases μένος, although sometimes it has the opposite effect.

In tragedy madness is a punishment from the gods, not a sign of divine favour but of divine opposition. Sometimes people are called mad for their disrespectful attitude towards the gods, and this also invites punishment. Madness is often seen as an illness in tragedy, and as such may be a phenomenon which is present all the time but only
manifests itself now and again. Tragic madness is also very often violent, either physically or verbally manifested, and sometimes causes the death even of close family members.

From the Hippocratic writings we can see that madness, or violent delirium, is a symptom of sickness and may not necessarily be from the gods at all. Here, too, is the suggestion that sickness may be present in a person who is naturally inclined to it, but may not manifest itself until a particular time. Madness in the Hippocratic writings is also sometimes associated with verbal abuse, and is perceived to be as a result of an imbalance of the humours.

Herodotus’ uses of madness have something in common with all these genres at various points, and this is a reflection of the literary culture of the time. Because Herodotus’ work is influenced by his background, his use of madness as not only a state of mind but also a literary device is not as unusual a combination as we might think it to be when it occurs in a historical document.
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