Business Internationalization Promotion:

Comparing Developmental and Regulatory States

Nicholas Borroz

Doctoral Candidate – Management and International Business, University of Auckland

Supervisors: Natasha Hamilton-Hart and Brent Burmester

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of a Doctor of Philosophy in International Business, the University of Auckland, 2021.

Acknowledgements

This thesis would have been impossible without a great support network. I must thank my wife and dog, who moved to the other side of the world with me. My parents, grandparents, and other family members all drew out the curiosity that undergirds my academic inclinations. Many friends and colleagues have strengthened my resolve to pursue a PhD. In terms of academics, my supervisors have been tremendously helpful in shaping this thesis. So, too, have other academics who have provided many useful tips. Further back, teachers in school, college, university, and other walks of life taught me to love learning. I appreciate the people I met and interviewed during this research for taking time to speak to with me. In Thailand, many people helped me navigate the process of conducting fieldwork there. Their support strengthened my affection for Thailand, with which I fell in love over a decade ago when I volunteered in a rural village. I must also say that by meeting many New Zealanders and Singaporeans, I have come to know and appreciate these two fascinating countries about which I previously knew very little.

Table of Contents

Introduction

Do developmental and regulatory states support business internationalization differently? I ask this question because, within their own borders at least, governments in these two political economy types tend to differ in how they go about intervening in markets. By “developmental states,” I mean countries where governments intervene to coordinate the behavior of market actors in line with industrial planning (Amsden, 1989; Evans, 1995; Haggard, 2004; Johnson, 1982). In such countries, governments do not see “free markets” as necessarily producing an “optimal production structure,” but rather see a “need for the state to coordinate” economic activity (Wade, 2018). By “regulatory states,” I mean countries where governments instead see their proper role as facilitating competition among market actors (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). In these countries, governments’ goal is to help firms behave “autonomously and spontaneously” in “free markets” (Block, 2008; Wade, 2018).

There are many accounts about how governments in these two political economy types intervene differently in their own domestic markets. As detailed in the next chapter, I argue there are three main differences which distinguish their approaches to intervention: mindsets, targets, and tools. By mindsets, I mean that governments in the two political economy types have different views about what their proper roles are in terms of intervening in markets. By targets, I mean that governments channel interventions to influence different sorts of market actors. By tools, I mean governments affect market actors’ behavior by using different sorts of interventions (e.g. subsidies, information, or consulting services). Having a developmental or regulatory mindset, as described in the theoretical framework that is developed in the next chapter, importantly defines a government’s targets and tools; a government’s targets and tools will be either developmental or regulatory, depending on its mindset.

In terms of governments’ approaches to supporting business internationalization, their approaches abroad appear similar to their intervention approaches at home. For developmental states, many accounts describe governments coordinating the behavior of market actors as they go abroad in line with government plans (Carney, 2018; Chu, 2019; Doner, 1991; Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Yeung, 2002). For regulatory states, too, there are descriptions of how governments support business internationalization, though these accounts generally are not integrated into a political economy perspective (Chetty & Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Chetty & Patterson, 2002; Crick & Lindsay, 2015; Felzenstein et al., 2014; Lindsay et al., 2018; Maher, 2012; Perry, 2005). These various accounts indicate governments seem to support business internationalization in ways similar to how they intervene at home – governments in developmental states grow planned industries, whereas governments in regulatory states facilitate firms' pursuit of their own interests.

This thesis makes two contributions. First, it provides a systematic comparison of how a developmental and a regulatory state intervene in markets. Many existing accounts of government intervention in markets – whether focusing on developmental or regulatory states – make mention of the other political economy type before focusing on the one of interest (Johnson, 1982; Evans ,1995). There are also many works that compare countries of the same political economy type, particularly developmental states (Chu, 2019; Evans, 1995; Yeung, 2016). There is less work, though, which examines in-depth how developmental and regulatory states compare. I do precisely this by comparing Singapore and New Zealand, which are exemplars of each political economy type (Rodan, 1989; Easton, 1997). Using my theoretical framework that focuses on mindsets, targets, and tools, I look for evidence for expected differences in each factor. I also look for indications that mindsets define targets and tools.

The second contribution of this thesis is that I extend this comparative approach into the realm of outward economic expansion. My core phenomenon of interest is not domestic industrialization, which has often been a focus phenomenon in studies of developmental and regulatory states (MacNeil, 2013; Evans, 1995). Instead, my focus phenomenon is government support for business internationalization. Few systematic comparisons of developmental and regulatory states have focused on this phenomenon – though there are numerous accounts of support for business internationalization which focus on one of the political economy types

(Chu, 2019; Doner, 1991; Yeung, 2000b). Given this phenomenological focus, I hope my thesis will provide useful insight. To do this comparison, I focus on a particular host country, Thailand. Both New Zealand and Singapore have a substantive business presence in Thailand, and both governments have relevant organizations in Thailand which specifically focus on supporting business internationalization – New Zealand Trade and Enterprise and Enterprise Singapore.

The rest of my thesis is structured as follows. First, I provide a literature review, explaining how I derive my theoretical framework. I develop a theorized argument for focusing on mindsets, targets, and tools and for why and how governments' mindsets influence the targets and tools they use when intervening. Thereafter follows a methodology chapter, in which I explain what it is exactly that I plan to do to test my theoretical framework. Essentially, I plan to compare New Zealand and Singapore's support for business internationalization into Thailand and see if evidence supports my expectations about mindsets, targets, and tools, and if it supports my expectations about causality. I also plan to consider if evidence supports other explanations.

Thereafter are four empirical chapters in the following order: one about Singapore's domestic intervention; one about Singapore's support for business internationalization into Thailand; one about New Zealand's domestic intervention; and one about New Zealand's support for business internationalization into Thailand. In the chapters on domestic intervention, I discuss on a general level, outside of my empirical context of interest, the relevance of my theoretical framework – I describe the two governments' mindsets, tools, and targets, and I discuss the extent to which tools and targets are defined by those mindsets. In the chapters regarding support for business internationalization into Thailand, I carry the framework beyond national borders to explore if it also has explanatory power in this focus context. In all four chapters, I also include discussions about other explanations for why the two governments may intervene with their tools and targets. The thesis finishes with a concluding chapter about contributions, limitations, and an agenda for further research.

Literature review

I want to know whether developmental and regulatory states support business internationalization differently. Is there a difference between the ways that they help market actors expand into other countries? By developmental and regulatory states, I mean political economy types where governments have different “mindsets” (Thurbon, 2016) about their appropriate role in markets. In developmental states, governments see their appropriate role as guiding market actors in line with industrial planning, but in regulatory states, governments see their appropriate role as enabling competition to improve economic outcomes (Wade, 2018). In the theoretical framework developed in this chapter, I argue that mindsets help explain why governments in developmental and regulatory states intervene in markets differently – governments with developmental mindsets tend to support planned business areas with subsidies (Evans, 1995; Amsden, 1989), whereas governments with regulatory mindsets tend to promote competition and competitiveness (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013).

The framework’s emphasis on the causal importance of mindsets does not rule out other factors that also influence patterns of intervention by governments in developmental and regulatory states. These other factors, discussed at the end of this chapter, include the political context in the home country, meaning the relationships between bureaucrats intervening in markets and constellations of other actors (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1995). Another important factor is the organizational structure of government – whether agencies intervening, for example, are decentralized (MacNeil, 2013) or led by a pilot agency (Johnson, 1982). In terms of supporting business internationalization, the host country context is another important factor that likely explains how home governments provide support (Yeung, 2002; Hamilton-Hart, 2005); their support will be affected by bilateral relationships and different business cultures, for instance.

Comparing developmental and regulatory states

Developmental states

Studies of developmental states originated in 1982 to explain Japan's economic growth after World War II (Johnson, 1982). How had Japan been able to bring about such an impressive transformation? How did it transmute itself from a war-torn country into one of the most economically developed countries in the world? In his book, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle*, Chalmers Johnson attempted to explain how Japan had been able to so impressively recover from the destruction it experienced during World War II. In the book, he placed responsibility on government's intervention in markets; the government's coordination of market actors enabled Japan to carry out its impressive economic transformation (Johnson, 1982). Developmental states have since been identified in many other contexts (Amsden, 1989; Chang, 1994; Chu, 2019; Dent, 2007; Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Kang, 2002; Wade, 1990; Wong, 2011).

A core characteristic of developmental states has to do with their "mindset" (Thurbon, 2016) – government bureaucrats are "plan-rational" (Johnson, 1982), which means they see their legitimate purpose as intervening in markets to guide market actors' activities. Behind their "developmental mindset" is a belief "that investment resources are very scarce," that resources "must be carefully husbanded," and that government is best positioned to do such husbandry (Thurbon, 2016; Wade, 2018). This belief contrasts with that of bureaucrats in regulatory states, which are "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982). Market-rational bureaucrats, unlike plan-rational bureaucrats, believe government's role is instead to facilitate firms' business activity, not to tell them what to do; government should remove hindrances to firms doing business. Market-rationality rests on a belief in the power of free markets; the "justification" for market-rationality is "the claim that competition between private economic agents is the only legitimate, reliably welfare-enhancing organizing principle for human activity" (Wade, 2018). In developmental states, though, the developmental mindset means there is "no commitment to the idea that 'free markets'" will necessarily lead to good economic outcomes (Wade, 2018).

Besides their developmental mindsets, governments in developmental states are also often defined by two other characteristics: they tend to target interventions towards planned industries, and they tend to use financial incentives as intervention tools. When targeting interventions, governments in developmental states identify "strategic industries" (Thurbon, 2016) and then channel benefits to market actors with "sectoral specificity" (Yeung, 2016), helping firms that are working in those industries. This targeting is sometimes characterized as a type of "midwifery" or "husbandry" that cultivates planned industries (Evans, 1995). This targeting preference for market actors in planned industries aligns with the developmental mindset, which sees government's appropriate role as "market-steering" (Wade, 2018).

In terms of the specific intervention tools governments in developmental states use, they tend to employ financial incentives that make working in planned industries more attractive to market actors. Governments in developmental states use "selective deployment of economic instruments, such as discretionary bank loans and tax rebates, to boost investment and induce compliance with state policies" (Chu, 2019). Put differently: governments provide "private investors with a battery of incentives that, simplified, boil down to subsidies" (Amsden, 1989). A commonly used tool is "low-interest loans" from "state-owned policy banks" to "firms in strategic industries" (Thurbon, 2016). Incentives can take other forms, however, such as co-investments or grants. A key aspect of developmental tools is that they lower the cost (or conversely raise the profitability) of working in planned industries. As is the case for targeting interventions to strategic industries, the use of financial incentives aligns with the developmental mindset. The mindset believes there is a limited amount of resources and that, to ensure economic development, there is a "need for the state to coordinate" business activity (Wade, 2018). What better way for the state to do this than by financially incentivizing market actors' engagement with planned industries? Market actors are, after all, motivated by profit.

Besides the characteristics of developmental mindsets, targets, and tools, another commonly identified characteristic of developmental states is “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) – the term means bureaucrats are well-informed about the markets they are influencing (i.e. “embedded”), but they are also devoted enough to their missions to continue pursuing economic development (i.e. “autonomous”) (Evans, 1995). Bureaucrats cannot, in other words, be too removed from market realities, and they cannot be too corrupted by their own interests. To achieve such embedded autonomy, there must be “selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards” in place in order to “create commitment to a sense of corporate coherence” among bureaucrats (Evans, 1995). A key reason some developmental states fail is because their bureaucrats are either too autonomous, too self-interested, or both (Evans, 1995; Pellerin, 2020; Yang, 2005). Embedded autonomy is a necessary condition for intervention to be successful, but it is unclear if it is particular to developmental states. Indeed, other political economy types, such as regulatory states, may also have embedded autonomy (Block, 2008).

A final characteristic of developmental states often discussed is their “pilot” agencies (Johnson, 1982); such agencies are responsible for coordinating intervention efforts. Pilot agencies have been recognized in scholarship since the original formulation of the developmental state concept (Johnson, 1982), and since then the importance of pilot agencies has been identified in many other contexts (Evans, 1995; Thurbon, 2016). “Nodal” or “lead” agencies are two other similar terms which have been used to characterize the importance of developmental states having centralized organizational structures (Haggard, 2015; Tsui-Ach, 2004; Yeung, 2016).

The role of pilot agencies has been somewhat problematized; developmental states may depend on pilot agencies only “in some cases” (Chu, 2019). Government can furthermore be reorganized so “new institutions… take on the functions of [a pilot agency’s] policy consultation and coordination” (Chu, 2019). In the face of such restructuring, a developmental mindset can persist regardless of what becomes of particular agencies (Thurbon, 2016). It is moreover true that pilot agencies often face contestation from other agencies, and that pilot agencies may only have “generally acknowledged leadership” in certain “economic areas” (Evans, 1995).

Differences between developmental and regulatory states in terms of mindset – e.g. plan-rational vs. market-rational (Johnson, 1982) – are fairly clear, but it is more debatable how the political economy types compare according to other factors. Do regulatory states also prefer to target interventions to strategic industries? Do they similarly use financial incentives as intervention tools? Are regulatory states also characterized by embedded autonomy and pilot agencies? Many accounts of developmental states make mention of regulatory states in passing before focusing on developmental states (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995). There are also many works that compare developmental states (Chu, 2019; Evans, 1995; Yeung, 2016). There are fewer works which describe in detail how developmental and regulatory states compare.

Regulatory states

Turning to regulatory states, as opposed to developmental states, it must first be said that there is less consensus about what defines a regulatory state than there is about what defines a developmental state. This is because, in the developmental state literature, regulatory states have received less attention than developmental states from scholars. In this thesis, I retain the "regulatory" term used by Johnson (Johnson 1982) to describe this other political economy type (Johnson 1982). As Johnson puts it, the "regulatory, or market-rational, state concerns itself with… economic competition" (Johnson 1982). This is unlike the "developmental, or plan-rational, state", which sets "substantive social and economic goals" (Johnson 1982).

Johnson focuses on characterizing developmental, not regulatory states. Therefore, to flesh out the characteristics of regulatory states for the purposes of this thesis, I primarily refer to three pieces of scholarship about regulatory states that are written by scholars who have backgrounds in the developmental state literature (Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013). To be clear, these scholars do not describe themselves as studying "regulatory" states (they use other descriptors). However, these scholars frame their studies as focusing on the plan-rational counterparts to developmental states that are often mentioned in the developmental state literature. I compare these scholars' characterizations of regulatory states (Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013) to scholars' characterizations of developmental states (Johnson, 1982; Yeung, 2016; Evans, 1995; Wade, 2018; Amsden, 1989; Haggard, 2015). I define regulatory states according to how they differ from developmental states, per this comparison. As stated in paragraphs below, such comparison shows regulatory states differ from developmental states according to mindsets, targets, and tools, but not according to state-business relations (e.g. "embedded autonomy") or government organizational structure (e.g. "pilot" agencies).

The regulatory state in this thesis, therefore, is derived but distinct from, other scholars' work (Johnson, 1982; Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013). I use Johnson's term, "regulatory", which is the oldest descriptor in the literature for the market-rational counterparts to "developmental" states (Johnson 1982). I define characteristics of regulatory states by referring to later scholarship that studies market-rational counterparts to developmental states, even though that scholarship does not embrace the term "regulatory state" (Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013). I do not claim "regulatory" in this thesis is the same as Johnson's "regulatory", nor that Weiss, Block, or MacNeil saw themselves as studying "regulatory states".

It is important to make one more clarification before proceeding onto defining regulatory states' salient characteristics: "regulatory states" are studied in many other literatures outside the developmental state literature, notably in the literature on New Public Management (Majone, 1996; Norman & Gregory, 2003). "Regulatory", in these other scholarly traditions, has different meanings than it does in the developmental state literature. There are also many scholars who study countries that, from the perspective of the developmental state literature might be considered regulatory states, but which are conceptualized as something else, in line with other scholarly traditions – "competition states" (Levi-Faur, 1998), "entrepreneurial states" (Mazzucato, 2013), "market economies" (Vogel, 2018), or "liberal market economies" (Hall & Soskice, 2001). While I reference this other scholarship, I do not consider it as part of the developmental state literature. It thus only indirectly, if at all, defines the "regulatory state" of this thesis, since this thesis speaks to discussions in the developmental state literature.

Keeping the five characteristics of developmental states in mind, as described in the previous section, there is certainly an obvious parallel core characteristic for regulatory states in terms of mindset. Scholarship emphasizes this aspect of regulatory state intervention – the government in the United States, for instance, is uncomfortable with heavy-handed intervention: "American antistatism… helps to channel government… toward a preference" for certain kinds of intervention (Weiss, 2014). Government intervention is "largely a result of the dominance of market fundamentalist ideas" (Block, 2008). Government intervention is shaped by "ideological conditions that are implicitly hostile to state intervention in economic affairs" (MacNeil, 2013).

These descriptions of the regulatory state government's ideological stance clearly correspond a regulatory mindset that, unlike the developmental mindset, is based on "market-rationality" (Johnson, 1982); in a regulatory state government's view, its role is to facilitate, not direct, market activity. The "underlying justification" for market-rationality, again, is "the claim that competition between private economic agents is the only legitimate, reliably welfare-enhancing organizing principle for human activity" (Wade, 2018). This regulatory mindset parallels developmental states' developmental mindset, according to which governments should guide firm behavior and husband resources to ensure development (Johnson, 1982).

Besides mindsets, regulatory states are also noted for using a common set of intervention tools. These tools differ from the financial incentives used by developmental states. The regulatory state intervention tools are essentially a variety of mechanisms that support firms' "innovation," or competitiveness (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). A useful metaphor for these tools is "fertilizer" – government agencies "provide fertilizer to help new ideas grow" (Block, 2008). This support sometimes entails financial support (e.g. loans and investment), but also other forms of assistance – making introductions between market actors, providing use of specialized equipment, and awarding government contracts, for example (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). An important quality of these tools is firms must compete to access them – they must "tailor business plans" to convince government, in other words, that there will be a “payoff” (MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). Firms must also compete to maintain access to support – government can “withdraw” support from firms “who fail to show adequate progress in meeting goals” (Block, 2008). Another important quality of these tools is they support business ideas that, at least partially, originate in firms. The government is not instructing firms what to do. To return to the fertilizer metaphor, the “new ideas” are coming from firms (Block, 2008).

These tools differ from those used in developmental states, where the primary sort of tool is “financial activism,” meaning financial incentives that lower costs of doing business in planned industries (Thurbon, 2016). Put differently, governments in developmental states “set relative prices deliberately ‘wrong’ in order to create profitable investment opportunities” (Amsden, 1989). In developmental states, governments use “a battery of incentives that… boil down to subsidies” (Amsden, 1989). There can be overlap between the tools used by developmental and regulatory states; financial subsidies can lower the cost of working in a planned industry and also fuel innovation in beneficiary firms, for instance. A key difference to keep in mind, though, (and one which may perhaps be easier to conceptualize than to identify in practice) is that developmental states’ tools tend to focus on making work in planned industries cheaper, whereas regulatory states’ tools tend to focus on cultivating beneficiary firms’ competitiveness.

A third obvious characteristic which distinguishes the two political economy types relates to targeting. While developmental states prefer to target support into “strategic industries,” regulatory states have a clear aversion to “industrial policy” (Johnson, 1982; Block, 2008). A common theme in terms of targeting for regulatory states is instead that they intend for interventions is to support “innovative companies” (Weiss, 2014). Agencies want to take pre-existing entrepreneurial ideas and to cultivate them to become successful businesses; government intervention is intended to help affected firms “commercialize” their ideas, which means that they need to have ideas worth commercializing (Block, 2008). Within any particular industry on which a government agency focuses, therefore, there is great emphasis on supporting competitive firms; simply being in an industry does not merit government support.

This is the core difference between the developmental and regulatory states' targeting – in a regulatory state, the government does not simply channel "state assistance" into a particular industry; just as important a qualifier for whether a firm can access assistance, besides being in a strategic industry, is the quality of its "business plans" (MacNeil, 2013). In developmental states, on the other hand, targeting preferences are more determined by the extent to which firms fit into strategic plans. Many examples of developmental state intervention emphasize how governments create protective "greenhouses" to shield nascent industries; firms are, at least in the beginning, not competitive enough to survive without support (Evans, 1995). The classic goals of developmental states have been to build new industries from scratch, which is another indication that the firms receiving support are not competitive, at least when they first receive state support; they cannot exist without help. South Korea, for instance, cultivated "basic industries" because such industries hardly existed – the South Korean economy was in shambles after the war (Amsden, 1989).

The difference in preferences is subtle but significant. In developmental states, industrial policy is the key factor behind targeting, whereas in regulatory states, competitiveness is the key factor behind targeting. This is not to say both factors are not important in both political economy types. The point is that preferences differ in terms of relative emphasis. If a developmental state wants to build up a strategic industry and many firms align with its plans, it may prefer supporting competitive firms. Likewise, if a regulatory state agency is considering supporting many similarly competitive firms, but one of those firms most closely aligns with the relevant agency's mission, then the agency may be more likely to choose to support that firm.

Two other factors frequently noted as characterizing developmental states – pilot agencies and embedded autonomy – do not have obvious parallels in regulatory states. Regarding pilot agencies, it is first worth noting that there is no universal consensus that pilot agencies are a necessary organizational structure for developmental states – this is because a developmental state can persist despite changes to its organizational structure (Thurbon, 2016). It is furthermore unclear what regulatory states' organizational structure is. On the one hand, regulatory states' structure is sometimes described as being "radically decentralised," which clearly indicates that pilot agencies are not important. But on the other hand, there are also discussions about the importance of "key" government agencies in regulatory states (MacNeil, 2013; Block, 2008), which implies that pilot agencies are important.

Regarding embedded autonomy, it is clear that in order for developmental states to succeed, bureaucrats must have the right combination of "corporate coherence and connectedness" (Evans, 1995). For interventions to be effective, developmental state bureaucrats must be well-trained and committed to developmental missions, and they must be familiar with market realities. In regulatory states, the situation regarding embedded autonomy is less clear. It may in fact be the case that bureaucrats in regulatory states also have "embedded autonomy" (Block, 2008). In regulatory states, for example, bureaucrats "have to be deeply rooted" in industries where they are intervening (Block, 2008). Bureaucrats in regulatory states, similar to counterparts in developmental states, see "nurturing" firms as part of their "mission" (Block, 2008). At the same time, they have "expertise" in business areas where they are intervening (Block, 2008). There is little to indicate bureaucrats in regulatory states are too extreme in terms of either their "corporate coherence" or "connectedness" (Evans, 1995), and it is thus unclear that embedded autonomy is a core differentiator of the two political economy types.

There are thus three main characteristics that appear to differentiate developmental and regulatory states: mindsets, tools, and targets. In terms of mindsets, developmental states are "plan-rational," whereas regulatory states are "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982). In terms of tools, developmental states tend to use financial incentives, whereas regulatory states tend to help firms become more competitive (Amsden, 1989; Block, 2008). In terms of targeting, developmental states tend to emphasize supporting firms in strategic industries, whereas regulatory states tend to emphasize supporting firms that are competitive (Johnson, 1982; Weiss, 2014). These three factors – mindsets, targets, and tools – are rarely systematically compared, but scholarship on each political economy type, when contrasted, indicates that these factors are important in terms of distinguishing developmental and regulatory states.

Support for business internationalization

The discussion so far has primarily focused on characterizations of developmental and regulatory state governments' intervention at home, not about their support for business internationalization. When turning to accounts of developmental and regulatory state governments' support for business internationalization, there are some indications this support is similar to the governments' approaches to domestic intervention. Regarding developmental states, there has been a significant amount of scholarship about "forms of business networking" which exist in Asia (Kienzle & Shadur, 1997). There are a variety of such forms (Carney, 2005; Peng, 2002; Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Orrú et al., 1989). These networks are sometimes described as "invisible," meaning they are informally defined, and as providing "competitive advantage" or "competitiveness" to firms going abroad (Peng, 2002; Lin & Chaney, 2007; Chen & Aquino, 1998). Informal "interfirm networks" provide "market information" to internationalizing firms that helps them do business abroad (Peng, 2002; Lin & Chaney, 2007). Research describes how such networks have helped lead to the emergence of regional "production networks" (Peng, 2002). When "business actors have [gone about extending] their presence in [Southeast Asia]," they have done so with "strategies that are broadly similar to those employed in their home environments" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005).

The relevance of these accounts to developmental state governments' support for business internationalization is that, besides being comprised of private actors, business networks also include government elements; home governments are part of the networks and home governments thus influence the behavior of internationalizing firms. Firms are embedded in "political and elite networks," not just "intercorporate" ones (Nolan et al., 2016). Business networks in Asia include "linkages… between firms and governments" that affect how firms internationalize (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). An important factor in firms' approaches to internationalization is the "institutional relations" that exist in the home country – this includes "political-economic structures" – government-firm relations, in other words (Yeung, 2002).

Two cases of business networks expanding from developmental states, and the corresponding support for such internationalization from the home governments, have been the subject of significant scholarly interest: 1) Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia; and 2) Singaporean expansion into neighboring countries. In Japan's case, "relationships among Japanese firms and between Japanese firms and the Japanese government" have "facilitated the regionalization of [firms'] investment in Asia" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Often discussed is Japanese firms' cultivation of automobile parts suppliers in Thailand, though similar developments have occurred in other countries (Busser, 2008; Doner, 1991; Lecler, 2002; Katō, 2016). In this context, the Japanese government has engaged in "investment promotion efforts" that facilitate business regionalization (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Japan's multipronged economic expansion throughout much of Asia has rested on a form of "network power" (Katzenstein & Shiraishi, 1997). To use the "flying geese" metaphor, Japan's government has been a lead goose, influencing business internationalization to create regional production networks, concentrating "foreign direct investment, aid, and regional industrial strategy" (Terry, 1996; Tsui-Auch, 1999).

The descriptions of Japan's business internationalization into Southeast Asia clearly recall descriptions of the state-led quality of developmental state governments' intervention at home. Abroad, too, Japan's government has "provided coordination, infrastructure support, and access to capital, which facilitated the movement of relatively small firms, allowing them to reproduce overseas many of the conditions on which their economic success depended" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). This is similar to characterizations of developmental states' approach to domestic intervention. Just as the government financially incentivizes firms to engage with strategic industries at home, government support for business internationalization provides incentives to help Japanese firms enter new markets in key industries (Söderberg, 1996). Japan appears to be "exporting [its] developmental state," in other words (Tonami, 2018). Close "cooperation" between "bureaucracy, businesses, and politicians" defines Japan's "economic diplomacy" (Tonami, 2018). Japan's "international developmental state" is marked by close ties between "Japanese companies [and] government agencies" (Reiffenstein & Nguyen, 2011).

Singaporean business internationalization, and the corresponding support from the home government, is another case that indicates developmental states' support for business internationalization is similar to their intervention at home. As is the case for Japan's business internationalization, the government is often described as playing a leading role in affecting how businesses internationalize. In the case of Singaporean firms' regional expansion, for example, "Singaporean investment [abroad]… has been substantially government led, part of an explicit policy of regionalization launched in the early 1990s" and "a pattern of outward investment that reflects… sustained home government support for developing the 'external wing' of Singapore's economy" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). The government has "[pushed] towards the regionalisation of local companies in building the country's external economy," and by doing so has influenced the decision-making of Singaporean firms (Beng, 1994). The government has "strongly encouraged" Singaporean firms to "regionalize their operations" (Yeung, 2000b).

In several countries, the Singaporean government has led the development of industrial parks to both assist local development and also to incentivize Singaporean firms to internationalize (Perry & Yeoh, 2000). One such project, a "growth triangle" in Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia, has been the subject of much scrutiny (Grundy-Warr et al., 1999; Bunnel et al., 2006; Diez et al., 2019). It was conceptualized as a way for production networks to disperse amongst the three countries, allowing firms to take advantage of the countries' differences in terms of "relative availability of land, labour, and infrastructure" (Ho, 1994). Other similar state-developed industrial parks exist in China and Vietnam (Yeoh et al., 2007; Yeung, 2000a). Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) or other state-run investment vehicles often play prominent roles in government efforts to guide Singapore's internationalizing business (Carney, 2018).

Japan and Singapore are not the only developmental state governments whose approach to supporting business internationalization is similar to their approaches to domestic intervention. Taiwan and South Korea have also been described as having "state elites [who] coordinate industrial transformation and mediate global engagement" (Chu, 2019). These varied accounts all indicate the core characteristics of developmental states described above – mindset, targets, and tools – may characterize developmental states' support for business internationalization.

While it appears that developmental states' support for business internationalization is similar to their domestic intervention, it is less clear if this is the case for regulatory states; it is uncertain if regulatory states' support for business internationalization is similar to their domestic intervention. On the one hand, accounts of regulatory states' support for business internationalization emphasize a light-handed approach to supporting business internationalization – business internationalization often happens regardless of government support, government support is for pre-existing clusters of business activity, and government support is designed to improve firms' competitiveness (Chetty & Blankenburg Holm, 2000; Chetty & Patterson, 2002; Crick & Lindsay, 2015; Felzenstein et al., 2014; Lindsay et al., 2018; Maher, 2012; Perry, 2005). These accounts indicate regulatory states' support for business internationalization may be similar to their approaches to intervening domestically. On the other hand, however, these accounts are not integrated into a political economy perspective, and their generalizability is uncertain. While it is compelling to argue that mindsets, targets, and tools are factors that distinguish developmental and regulatory states' intervention at home, it is more tentative to claim that mindsets, targets, and tools also importantly distinguish their support for business internationalization.

The rest of this chapter develops a theoretical framework that argues mindsets, targets, and tools explain differences between developmental and regulatory states' support for business internationalization. The framework emphasizes these three distinguishing factors based on accounts of how the two political economy types intervene at home. This framework proposes that these factors also distinguish how governments from the two political economy types support business internationalization. Subsequent chapters explore in various empirical settings if evidence strengthens or weakens confidence in this framework.

The theoretical framework

There is limited research that has systematically compared developmental and regulatory states' approaches to intervention, and there is even less that directly addresses the question of whether governments in developmental and regulatory states support business internationalization differently; just because intervention at home differs, it does not necessarily follow that support for business internationalization differs. For developmental states there is good reason to think intervention abroad reflects intervention at home. Developmental states like Singapore (Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Yeung, 2000b), Taiwan (Chu, 2019), and Japan (Arase, 1994; Doner, 1991; Katzenstein & Shiraishi, 1997) support planned industries beyond their borders, similar to intervention at home. But for regulatory states, while intervention approaches at home are well understood (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014), there is less work on their approaches to supporting business internationalization.

To answer the question about whether developmental and regulatory states support business internationalization differently, this chapter develops a theoretical framework that argues mindsets define targets and tools of government intervention. According to this framework, since developmental and regulatory states have different mindsets, this causes them to have different targets and to use different tools when supporting business internationalization. Mindsets, targets, and tools are conceived as interlinking parts in a causal mechanism, visually summarized as follows:



Alternately, the causal mechanism can be described as two theorized propositions:

1) Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states.
2) Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states.

The rest of this chapter distinguishes analytically what is meant by "mindsets," "targets," and "tools." It also explains the argument for causality existing between them.

Mindsets

A core difference between developmental and regulatory states is their perspectives about what should be the proper relationship between governments and markets. One way to think about this difference is as follows: in regulatory states, government should get prices "right," whereas in developmental states, government should get prices "wrong" (Amsden, 1989).

In regulatory states, getting prices "right" means government's role is to create conditions for competition to occur between private actors (Wade, 2018). This does not mean, though, that government necessarily retreats from influencing market actors (Vogel, 2018; Weiss, 2012). Government instead intervenes with regulations to prevent market failures. This is the rationale for prudential regulation in finance, for instance, or for governments to create antitrust laws and periodically break up monopolies. Such market failures disrupt competition, and government's role is to intervene to amend the situation so that markets function properly. "Deregulation" in regulatory states is in fact accompanied by "reregulation" – making rules to ensure competition occurs in the deregulated areas (Levi-Faur, 1998; Majone, 1996).

In developmental states, governments also focus on overcoming market failures, but rather than trying to get prices "right," they instead intervene to get prices "wrong." They are not interested in letting market actors behave "autonomously and spontaneously" as in regulatory states (Block, 2008). Governments in developmental states rather see their role as guiding or coordinating market actors to overcome market failures. In the case of collective action failures, for instance, an economy's development may be hindered because market actors do not invest in important business areas according to market signals alone, perhaps because they do not have the necessary resources. In developmental states, government's role is to intervene to influence market actors to engage these business areas. By getting prices temporarily "wrong" – incentivizing work in planned business areas – government thus overcomes market failures.

Another useful way to think about the difference in regulatory and developmental mindsets is their different emphases on the benefits of markets and plans; regulatory states are "market-rational" and developmental states are "plan-rational" (Johnson, 1982). These two views differently emphasize market forces or government plans as ideal "welfare-enhancing organizing principles" (Wade, 2018). Regulatory states' "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982) perspective emphasizes markets; it sees "competition between private economic agents [as] the only legitimate" and reliable way to enhance human welfare (Wade, 2018). Developmental states' "plan-rational" view, in contrast, emphasizes planning and sees "investment" as a scarce resource (Thurbon, 2016) that "must be carefully husbanded" by government (Wade, 2018).

Not only do "plan-rationalism" and "market-rationalism" (Johnson, 1982) differently emphasize plans or markets as better organizing principles, but they are also critical of each other's principles; "plan-rationalism" sees free markets as unstable, and "market-rationalism" sees plans as problematic. From a "market-rational" perspective, "ideological conditions… are implicitly hostile to state intervention in economic affairs" (MacNeil, 2013). This is because government intervention is seen as potentially disrupting or distorting market actors' pursuit of their own interests, thus undermining competition and productivity. From the "plan-rational" perspective, on the other hand, resources must be husbanded by government precisely because scarce resources may be wasted if government does not intervene; if many market actors pursue their own interests, then they may waste scarce resources (Thurbon, 2016).

The difference between the developmental and regulatory mindsets regards feelings about how the world should be. The mindsets have different ideational starting points about appropriate relationships between governments and markets. The developmental mindset instinctively leans towards government knowing best; there is a large role for government to influence market actors' behavior. In the regulatory mindset, though, there is little need, unless forced by circumstances, for private actors to do anything other than what they want to do.

There are many possible explanations for why mindsets differ, but such explanations lie outside the scope of my interest in this thesis. It is arguable, for instance, that political circumstances explain the differences in mindsets – in regulatory states, for example, corporate interests may be better organized and thus better at asserting independence from government oversight. I will discuss some of these alternative explanations later in this chapter and in the chapters that follow. For now, however, I want to clarify that the starting point in my conceptualized causal mechanism is mindsets, not any other factors, including antecedents that influence mindsets.

Mindsets are worth exploring as a factor that explains governments' varied ways of intervening because mindsets often persist despite changing circumstances. Even as governments restructure and as global contexts change, mindsets about the appropriate role of governments in markets have shown themselves to have remarkable staying power (Thurbon, 2016). Their persistence explains common themes in governments' intervention that persevere over the decades, despite other changes (Thurbon, 2016). I believe mindsets have persisted in the countries I am studying in this thesis, which are Singapore and New Zealand. These two countries have had developmental and regulatory mindsets since at least the 1960s and 1980s (Rodan, 1989; Easton, 1997) and they continue to have them today (Chua, 2017; Kelsey, 2015).

Targets and mindsets

Developmental and regulatory states differ in another way: the targets of their intervention. What I mean is governments in each political economy type tend to target intervention to benefit certain types of market actors – developmental state governments tend to target benefits to market actors in planned industries, and regulatory state governments tend to target interventions to benefit competitive market actors or to ensure conditions allow for competition. What is more, these different targeting tendencies seem to stem from the different mindsets which regulatory and developmental states hold. This is why the first proposition is stated as follows: "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states." When intervening, governments' targeting is affected by their mindsets because they “translate” their “ambitions” into corresponding action (Thurbon, 2016). The particular forms which interventions take, including their targeting, are “largely a result of… ideas” about what proper government-market relations should be (Block, 2008). This is because “ideas give content to preferences and thus make actions explicable” (Blyth, 2003). Mindsets, in other words, significantly constrain available “courses of action” … mindsets and ideas “say a lot about how” governments will “act, irrespective of material capabilities” (Blyth, 2003).

In developmental states, governments prefer to target intervention to benefit market actors located in “strategic industries” which they plan for development (Johnson, 1982). If the government determines, for instance, that economic development depends on building up electronics manufacturing, then the government will target intervention to benefit market actors that are engaged in that industry. Governments in developmental states carry out “midwifery” or “husbandry” projects, targeting support to benefit market actors located in nascent planned industries that are not yet self-sustaining (Evans, 1995). Such “sectoral selectivity” is what defines targets of intervention in developmental states (Yeung, 2016).

This targeting of intervention contrasts with the situation in regulatory states, where governments have an aversion to “industrial policy” (Block, 2008). This is not to say that governments in regulatory states do not target intervention to benefit particular industries or business areas; they certainly do. It is clear, for instance, that certain industries in regulatory states have received significant government support – biotechnology, renewable energy, and the military-industrial complex, for instance (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014).

A common theme in regulatory states’ targeting, though, is that intervention tends to be targeted to benefit competitive market actors or to facilitate competition (Mazzucato, 2013; Vogel, 2018). To be clear, this does not mean that developmental states, in contrast, target uncompetitive firms. In developmental states, while industrial policy is an important factor for targeting, competitiveness can also be important; if the government in a developmental state wants to build a strategic industry and many market actors are in that industry, then the government may target benefits towards more competitive market actors. Indeed, governments in developmental states may withdraw support from uncompetitive firms that fail to succeed in planned industries (Evans, 1995). This is because intervention benefits, if not contingent on firms' achieving success, may become subsidies that produce inefficient rents. Continuing to support failing firms is one way unsuccessful developmental states differ from successful ones – unsuccessful developmental states continue to support failing firms, whereas successful developmental states know when to stop subsidizing struggling firms (Evans, 1995).

The difference between intervention targeting in developmental and regulatory states is that industrial policy is a relatively more important factor for developmental states than it is for regulatory states. In developmental states, a relatively more important targeting criterion that determines if firms receive support is if they are working in planned industries. In regulatory states, a relatively more important criterion by which governments determine if firms merit support is if those firms are competitive. In regulatory states, governments target interventions to take market actors' entrepreneurial ideas and to cultivate their success; interventions are intended to help market actors "commercialize" their ideas, which means that interventions are targeted towards market actors that have ideas worth commercializing; they are competitive, in other words (Block, 2008). Though any particular government agency in a regulatory state may have an industry focus, it will emphasize targeting benefits to competitive market actors; simply being in a particular industry does not mean market actors merit support.

There is good reason to argue these different targeting tendencies result from differences in developmental and regulatory mindsets. Governments' interests, and governments' pursuit of those interests, "develop from states' identities"; if a government thinks its role is to interact with market actors in a particular way, then it will target its interventions in a manner that is "explicable" according to that view (Blyth, 2003). Governments' mindsets, in other words, mean that they have their own "norms of engagement" (Blyth, 2003) – they will thus target interventions according to what they see as appropriate. A government will target its interventions in ways that are "explained in the first instance by its priorities" (Johnson, 1982).

Considering developmental states first, the developmental mindset sees a need for "the state to coordinate" economic activity (Wade, 2018). This is because development is believed to come about due to government planning, not due to market forces (Johnson, 1982). Government's appropriate role should thus be to influence market actors to behave in line with plans. It follows that government targets interventions with "sectoral selectivity," creating "greenhouses" for planned industries (Yeung, 2016; Evans, 1995). If a government does not have a developmental mindset, it is unlikely to have developmental targets; without a developmental mindset, a government would not necessarily target its intervention to benefit market actors in planned industries. This is because mindsets entail "ambitions" about government's proper role, "understandings about how best to realize those ambitions," and the formulation and execution of appropriate "developmental strategies" (Thurbon, 2016).

In the developmental mindset, the ambition is for government to accelerate industrial development by guiding markets. If government is to guide markets, this unavoidably entails prioritizing some economic areas over others. If there is no such prioritization, then there is no planning; planning means prioritizing certain areas over others. It follows, therefore, that if a government has a developmental mindset, it prioritizes certain industries for development. And when it is time for the government to carry out its "developmental strategies," then interventions will benefit market actors in prioritized industries (Thurbon, 2016). What the prioritized industries are, and thus which market actors are targeted, depends on the circumstances; the industries could be anything from shipbuilding to fine arts (Rodan, 1989; Ooi, 2010). The point is that government prioritizes industries in its plans, and it thus targets its intervention to benefit certain types of market actors related to those prioritized industries.

A similar connection exists between mindsets and targets for regulatory states, where governments also attempt to "translate" their ambitions into actions (Thurbon, 2016). In the case of regulatory states, though, government's ambition is not to guide markets. The regulatory mindset instead indicates that government should intervene in minimal ways to facilitate “competition between private economic agents” (Wade, 2018). In the regulatory mindset, market actors have a right to act as they choose. Governments must work hard to justify their interventions, usually on the grounds they enable market forces like competition.

In terms of implications for intervention targets, this means regulatory states are not comfortable targeting interventions to benefit market actors in strategic industries, as happens in developmental states (Block, 2008). This is because regulatory states’ “market-rationality” (Johnson, 1982) sees government planning as an inappropriate “organizing principle” for the economy (Wade, 2018). Government instead sees its proper role as enabling competition. As such, it does not make sense for it to selectively intervene in business areas it plans to develop. A government with a regulatory mindset does not see its role as planning development. If it does not plan development, then it does not prioritize industries, and if it does not prioritize industries, then it does not target interventions to benefit market actors in particular industries.

The regulatory state mindset indicates a different role for governments in markets: governments should intervene minimally to enable competition (Wade, 2018). This is because competition is the “only legitimate” organizing principle for economic development (Wade, 2018). In terms of implications for targeting, this means governments often translate their regulatory mindsets into action by targeting interventions to benefit competitive market actors (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). “Competitive” means market actors that are innovative, have commercializable ideas, and have good business plans (Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013). Competitive market actors do not need to have already found business success; they can, in fact, be startups. Regardless of a market actor’s stage of development, governments judge them to be competitive if they are developing novel products and services, if those products or services seem likely to meet market demand, and if the market actors are developing plans to effectively sell their products or services to other market actors.

Regulatory states also see intervening to maintain conditions for competition as a justifiable way to target interventions. In order for market forces to achieve optimal results, as the regulatory mindset envisions, there must be transparency about what is happening in the market and market power must not be overly concentrated (Hall & Soskice, 2001; Vogel, 2018). These are considered sorts of "failure" (Vogel, 2018) that undermine competition – they prevent market actors from behaving intelligently and from overcoming barriers to entry. They thus undermine competition, which in turn undermines economic efficiency and productivity. Governments in regulatory states are thus justified in targeting intervention to ensure conditions that allow market actors to compete with one another. Maintaining conditions for competition is "explicable" (Blyth, 2003) according to the regulatory mindset.

In both political economy types, the "quality" of intervention is "largely a result of… ideas" (Block, 2008). Different "rationalities" about appropriate government-market relationships lead to different ways of intervening (Johnson, 1982). One way these differences manifest is in targets, meaning where government intervenes. In developmental states, the mindset indicates government should plan economic development, so government targets interventions to benefit market actors in business areas it plans to develop. In regulatory states, the mindset indicates government should intervene to facilitate competition, so government targets intervention to benefit competitive market actors and to ensure conditions allow competition.

Tools and mindsets

The second theorized proposition in the causal mechanism states: "Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states." "Tools" means the instruments which governments use to intervene. Governments have a variety of tools at their disposal, but developmental and regulatory states tend to use different sorts of tools – developmental states subsidize engagement with planned industries, and regulatory states cultivate firms' competitiveness or intervene to ensure conditions for competition exist. These differences, I argue, come from mindsets – ideas influence governments' specific choices of tools to use. Just as mindsets cause governments to target intervention in particular ways, mindsets also cause governments to use particular tools. Governments "translate" their "ambitions" into corresponding interventions

(Thurbon, 2016), and this means that ideas about appropriate government-market relations constrain available “courses of action” (Blyth, 2003). Even if two governments are “similarly placed” in terms of “material factors,” mindset will cause them to react to circumstances “in utterly different ways” (Blyth, 2003). Mindsets “give content to state interests and direction to state actions” (Blyth, 2003). If mindsets are different, then tools are also different.

In regulatory states, a common type of tool is “pro-market regulation” (Vogel, 2018). This means the creation and enforcement of rules that ensure conditions exist for competition. Governments in regulatory states, in other words, devise “complex regulatory regimes… to promote national competitiveness” (Levi-Faur, 1998). Such regulations require, for instance, that there be certain levels of transparency via disclosure requirements, that market actors use common accounting practices, and that market power cannot be overly concentrated (Vogel, 2018). Such rules help ensure that market actors can compete against each other fairly.

While such “regulations” are important tools for regulatory states (and are perhaps the most commonly thought of tools that regulatory states use), regulatory states also employ other tools which focus on supporting specific market actors. A characteristic of these market actor-specific tools is that, rather than supporting market competition generally, they instead support the competitiveness of market actors (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). These tools act as “fertilizer” that government agencies use to “help new ideas grow” (Block, 2008). They can take many forms – e.g. investments, networking support, use of specialized equipment, introductions to other market actors, research support, or government contracts (Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). Regardless of their form, though, tools are intended to support market actors’ competitiveness – meaning how innovative they are, how commercializable their ideas are, and how viable their business plans are (Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013). If government provides an investment, for instance, it is in order to help the recipient market actor identify customers; if it makes introductions, it is to help the market actor understand existing market trends; if it awards a contract, it is to help the market actor refine its service. The purpose of tools is to upgrade market actors’ competitiveness.

Another common characteristic of these tools is that market actors must compete to access support. Market actors must “tailor business plans” to convince government agencies that there will be a “payoff” (MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014). Market actors must furthermore compete to maintain access to support – government can “withdraw” support from firms “who fail to show adequate progress in meeting goals” (Block, 2008). This means that tools are not only designed to help market actors improve their competitiveness, but that the process of accessing tools is furthermore designed to spur market actors to be more competitive. Consultancy services, for instance, if accessed, will help a market actor develop its strategy. But just to access the services, the market actor must demonstrate that it is more competitive than other market actors. The market actor must furthermore, in order to maintain access to the consultancy services, show that it is using the tools to become more competitive. Even without directly accessing tools, therefore, market actors are incentivized to be more competitive.

A final characteristic about regulatory tools relates to form – governments in regulatory states are uncomfortable with using “subsidies” (Block, 2008). Discomfort with subsidies arises from fears that subsidies prevent market actors from being “left alone to respond autonomously and spontaneously to the signals of the marketplace” (Block, 2008). It makes more sense to instead help market actors become more competitive by enabling them in other ways – helping them to better understand and connect with relevant business opportunities, for instance. Another way tools help market actors without subsidies is by helping them to “collaborate and exchange ideas” and “crucial insights” (MacNeil, 2013). Unlike subsidies, which may create dependence on government financing and undermine market actors’ autonomy, these forms of assistance are seen as better ways to develop market actors’ “innovation” and competitiveness (MacNeil, 2013).

In developmental states, governments’ intervention tools have different characteristics. The first characteristic to note about developmental tools regards their form – whereas regulatory states are uncomfortable with subsidies, subsidies are one of the most common forms which intervention tools take in developmental states. In developmental states, governments use a “battery of incentives” which “boil down to subsidies” (Amsden, 1989). Tools may focus on lowering the cost of purchasing certain goods or services (Rodan, 1989). They may also direct financing towards market actors (Evans, 1995). Tools may also lower costs more indirectly – governments may intervene to guarantee a steady stream of customers, for instance, which lowers market actors’ costs associated with finding buyers for their products (Rodan, 1989).

Another characteristic of developmental tools relates to what they are subsidizing – developmental tools are a form of “financial activism” that subsidizes firms’ engagement with planned industries (Thurbon, 2016). Governments want to develop certain industries, and they use tools to support market actors that are working in or planning to work in those planned industries. Governments can lower costs for purchasing necessary goods or services, for instance, or provide financing that market actors must then use to develop business in the planned industries. Developmental states use tools to create price advantages for market actors in planned industries, making it easier for them to earn a profit. These advantages from the tools protect market actors in planned industries, creating “greenhouses” (Evans, 1995). Developmental tools, in short, often support engagement with planned industries.

A final characteristic of developmental tools is that, even for market actors which are not actually subsidized, the tools incentivize engagement with planned industries. This is because in order to access financial support, market actors must show they are working in or are planning to work in planned industries (Evans, 1995). Market actors considering accessing subsidies, therefore, must at least consider working in the planed industries. Market actors may even actually expand into planned industries in hopes of eventually accessing subsidies. This is similar to the point about how tools in regulatory states indirectly cultivate competitiveness among market actors, even among those who do not end up being supported by the tools. The potential of accessing tools, in both political economy types, incentivizes market actors to do what tools support – either upgrading competitiveness or engaging with planned industries.

Mindsets, targets, tools, and their relationships

As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, the theoretical framework sees mindsets as affecting intervention targets and tools. It argues that the differences in terms of developmental and regulatory states' mindsets, in other words, causes them to use different tools and to target interventions to benefit different sorts of market actors. This section briefly restates the specific configurations of mindsets, targets, and tools for each political economy type. It also clarifies the relationship between mindsets, targets, and tools – specifically noting the three elements are not tautological and are analytically distinct from each other.

According to the regulatory mindset, government's role is to unleash competition (Wade, 2018; Johnson, 1982). Intervention targets and tools are defined by this mindset. Since government sees its role as unleashing competition, it generally targets its intervention in order to benefit competitive market actors or to ensure conditions exist under which market actors can compete with each other. Tools, once accessed, are designed to help market actors be more competitive, and tools are furthermore designed in such a way so that the process of accessing them incentivizes market actors to be more competitive. Though these tools take many forms, they tend not to be subsidies, which regulatory states fear create dependence on government financing and thus undermine market actors' competitiveness (Block, 2008). Tools and targets flow from the regulatory mindset – since government's proper role is to unleash competition, it naturally follows that government intervenes to spur competitiveness and help competition.

In the developmental mindset, in contrast, government's role is to guide economic activity (Wade, 2018; Johnson, 1982). Interventions are targeted in such a way so as to benefit market actors that are engaging with planned industries. Tools are designed to support market actors' engagement with planned industries. Furthermore, the process of accessing those tools incentivizes market actors to engage with planned industries. Subsidies are a common form these tools take, since they obviously incentivize market actors' engagement with planned industries by raising the profitability of doing so (Amsden, 1989). Like for regulatory states, tools and targets flow from the mindset. Since government's role should be to guide markets, it follows that government intervenes to corral market actors in line with its development plans.

To be clear, the relationship between mindsets, tools, and targets is not tautological. Just because governments use developmental or regulatory tools or targets does not inherently mean they must have developmental or regulatory mindsets. The mindsets are analytically distinct from the tools and targets. It is conceivable that a government could, for instance, have a regulatory mindset – seeing its role as unleashing competition – but use developmental tools and targets – incentivizing and supporting market actors to work in planned industries and targeting tools to benefit market actors in planned industries. One could also conceive of a government having a developmental mindset but using regulatory tools and targets. I argue these scenarios are unlikely, however, because mindsets give "direction to state actions" (Blyth, 2003); governments tend to try to "translate" their ambitions into actions (Thurbon, 2016).

I also want to emphasize that tools and targets are furthermore analytically distinct from each other. One can conceive of a government using tools that support and incentivize market actors' competitiveness (i.e. regulatory tools) but targeting those tools to benefit market actors in planned industries (i.e. developmental targets). Contrarily, one can similarly conceive of a government using tools that support and incentivize market actors' engaging with planned industries (i.e. developmental tools) but targeting those tools to benefit competitive market actors (i.e. regulatory targets). Again, I argue such scenarios are unlikely because mindsets "constrain state behavior" (Blyth, 2003). Governments' underlying "rationalities" about ideal "organizing principles" determine their interventions (Johnson, 1982; Wade, 2018).

Other explanations

Other factors likely explain why and how governments intervene. The theoretical framework developed in this chapter stresses the importance of mindset, which is an "ideational" factor as opposed to a "structural" one (Blyth, 2003) – the framework argues mindsets define tools and targets. In doing so, it indicates “materialism [plays] second fiddle to meaning” (Blyth, 2003). But, that being said, it is also true that structural factors determine forms of intervention. No matter what a government thinks about what its appropriate relationship with market actors should be, for instance, its interventions must also certainly be constrained by material factors. It is difficult to deny a government’s interventions, say, are not at least partially determined by available resources to spend on them. In discussions about developmental and regulatory states’ intervention at home and support for business internationalization, three structural factors often arise as likely having explanatory power: the political context (Evans, 1995), the state’s organizational structure (Johnson, 1982), and the host country context (Doner, 1991).

By “political context,” I mean relationships between bureaucrats and many constellations of other actors. Government interventions are shaped by these relationships. Interventions are affected, for instance, by the “relationship between the state and the private sector” (Haggard, 2004), “networks of power and influence” between elites (Barr, 2014), and “arrangements between government and business” (Thurbon & Weiss, 2019). It is arguable, for instance, that “authoritarian leaders rely on state ownership of large corporations to maintain their rule” (Carney, 2018). In such cases, politicians affect interventions; no matter what interventions are planned by bureaucrats in the agencies doing the intervention, those interventions are likely to be affected by politicians’ worries about being able to deliver benefits to interest groups whose support they need. If political leaders are unable to deliver “jobs, incomes, homes, education, security and welfare” (Low, 2001) to those interest groups, then those political leaders may apply pressure to bureaucrats to avoid suffering political setbacks. This relationship between politicians and bureaucrats – and therefore the ways in which the political context affect government interventions – likely depends greatly on a country’s political system. For example, countries that are more “pluralistic” (Blank, 1977) – e.g. democratic as opposed to authoritarian – may have political factions that more frequently rotate in and out of power. If this is the case, then this would almost certainly affect politicians’ ability to exert pressure on bureaucrats.

Bureaucrats' relationships with other groups of actors besides politicians are also relevant. The relationships which exist between bureaucrats and business groups, for instance, likely affect the forms which interventions take. If "regulatory capture" (Kelsey, 2015) is present, for instance, bureaucrats' decision-making may be overly influenced by organized business interests and cause interventions to take certain forms. Regulatory capture happens when "government-business collusion" affects "policy-making and enforcement" (You & Park, 2017). If business interest groups have influence in relevant bureaucracies, for instance, then interventions may tend to avoid negatively affecting members of those interest groups.

The state's organizational structure is likewise important. The extent of centralization, for example, likely affects the forms which interventions take. The existence of a "pilot agency" (Johnson, 1982) arguably allows for governments to better coordinate long-lasting intervention campaigns, compared to if agencies are more "decentralised" (MacNeil, 2013). The extent to which a pilot agency is "in charge" of developmental projects, meaning the extent to which organizational structures have clear lines of command with certain agencies managing interventions, is arguably one of the most "essential ingredients" (Weiss, 2000) of developmental states. Pilot agencies overseeing interventions may provide precisely "the predictability and coordination" necessary to ensure interventions succeed (Evans, 1995). Governments with fragmented and uncoordinated structures, on the other hand, may be unable to maintain any intervention campaign in the long term due to lack of planning capacity.

Another issue relevant to the state's organizational structure is bureaucrats' training. The success of bureaucracies' intervention campaigns is in part defined by the "fact that formal competence, rather than clientelistic ties or traditional loyalties, is the prime requirement for entry" (Evans, 1995). When bureaucrats are recruited in this manner, and when they are furthermore properly trained and compensated to carry out developmental campaigns, they have an "esprit de corps" (Evans, 1995) which arguably prevents them from being captured by personal or business interests; if they are not properly trained in this way, then they may care more about taking bribes than developing the economy. In this way, one can see how organizational structure issues sometimes relate back to the political context: certain structures may make bureaucracies porous, thereby affecting bureaucrats' relationships to other actors.

The host country context is also important in terms of how home governments support business internationalization. Support for business internationalization is likely affected by the fact that business networking differs across countries due to different "institutional relations" (Yeung, 2002). When going abroad, firms "adopt different strategies in different regional or national contexts" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). As they enter new markets, they negotiate with local firms in those markets; when driving "bargains," they must respond to local networking approaches (Doner, 1991). The extent to which internationalizing firms change their networking approaches depends on many factors. Furthermore, despite variation to meet local networking approaches, one can still detect "[enduring] differences among transnational firms [which] can be traced to national country of origin" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). Host country contexts also matter because business internationalization support is often tied to "economic diplomacy" (Tonami, 2018), which reflects both home and host countries' interests (Jain, 2016).

I want to clarify that by not including these other factors in the framework, I do not intend to claim they are unimportant. Far from it. The framework simply focuses on ideational foundations as an analytical starting point. Other factors likely explain some aspects of governments' interventions, but the framework sees mindset as being especially important. This framework does not compete with other more structurally based explanations. Rather, I see those other explanations as complementing this thesis's theoretical framework, as discussed in the empirical chapters.

Methodology

This thesis is structured as a comparative case study that examines support for business internationalization coming from the governments of two countries – Singapore and New Zealand. Because the theoretical framework expects developmental and regulatory states to support business internationalization differently, it makes sense to study Singapore and New Zealand; they are, as discussed in more detail below, respectively a developmental and a regulatory state. A "controlled comparison" of this kind should be framed in "terms of general variables or mechanisms," which is indeed how the framework's propositions are worded; the propositions are not "context specific" but rather describe general expectations about relationships between mindsets, targets, and tools in developmental and regulatory states (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013). By comparing cases, this research intends to "take full advantage of the wealth of detail that investigation of a small number of cases offers" (Hall, 2006). That wealth of detail is in turn "valuable for causal inference" (Hall, 2006), which is relevant since the purpose of this thesis is to test the theoretical framework's argument about causality.

In "cross-case analysis" (Mahoney, 2007), it is useful to select cases according to "typological representativeness" (Slater & Ziblatt, 2013). New Zealand and Singapore are appropriate in this respect because they represent the two political economy types described by the framework. It is furthermore important to avoid biases which may occur by selecting on the dependent variable – selecting on the dependent variable may cause relationships to "seem to exist" which may in fact by artifacts of case selection (Geddes, 2003). Singapore and New Zealand are appropriate case studies because they are chosen on the independent variable; it is clear that they have developmental and regulatory mindsets. It is fairly clear that when they intervene at home, they use developmental and regulatory tools and targets. It is less clear, though, how they compare in terms of their support for business internationalization. By selecting on mindset, the independent variable, this comparative case study will assess the theoretical framework, which argues mindsets define business internationalization support.

Case selection

Before discussing how to engage evidence to test the theoretical framework (and also other potential explanations), I want to further clarify why I have chosen Singapore and New Zealand as case home countries. They are appropriate cases because they clearly have developmental and regulatory mindsets, which is the independent variable in the framework. It is less certain, though, that they have "achieved the outcome of interest" (Geddes, 1990), meaning it is uncertain if they respectively use developmental or regulatory tools and targets when they support business internationalization. It is uncertain how their tools and targets compare when they intervene generally, and it is even less certain which tools and targets they use when they support business internationalization. As discussed last chapter, there is limited scholarship comparing developmental and regulatory states in this particular context. Selecting countries on the independent variable – those that clearly have developmental and regulatory mindsets – allows for better examination of whether the framework explains outcomes of interest.

Singapore has a typically developmental mindset. Its government sees its appropriate role as carrying out "pre-emptory interventions and controls" to guide economic activity (Chua, 2017). The government is "committed" to "forward planning" (Subramaniam, 2014), "ambitious state-building efforts" (Doner et al., 2005), and "state-led economic growth" (Deyo, 1991). Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew regularly commented on the importance of state guidance, and the following quote exemplifies his "plan-rationality" (Johnson, 1982), which continues to influence Singapore today: "I do not believe that if you are… full of competing ideas in the market place, full of sound and fury, therefore you will succeed." As expected for a country where the government has a developmental mindset, Singapore's government sees its role not as facilitating market actors' pursuit of their own interests, but rather as guiding them.

It is less clear which country with a regulatory mindset would make for an appropriate case with which to compare to Singapore. The United States springs to mind because it is the clearest example of a country with such a mindset (Block, 2008; Johnson, 1982; MacNeil, 2013;

Weiss, 2014). It would be problematic, though, to compare the United States to Singapore since superpowers are different from other countries – it is widely known, for instance, that powerful countries have more tools with which to support business internationalization (Gilpin, 1975). The United States is an architect of the global economy, whereas Singapore is an "economically vulnerable" small power with a different set of tools for engaging the global economy (Katzenstein, 1985). Another country besides the United States that also has a regulatory mindset, but which is not a superpower and is thus a better comparator, is New Zealand.

Similar to what happened in the United States in the 1980s, New Zealand experienced its own variant of "pro-market economic restructuring" (Nicholls, 2017). The "economic liberalisation" was so swift that it has been characterized as a "'crash through' approach" (Goldfinch, 2000). The government promised "to use the market to regulate resource decisions more and to rely less on government intervention" (Easton, 1997). Later, New Zealand was at the forefront of the New Public Management movement, making government more businesslike by using private-sector management models (Koh, 1997). In New Zealand, there is a widespread mindset in government that it ought to be "exceedingly light-handed" in overseeing market actors (Kelsey, 2015). Its role should be "market-oriented" (Nicholls, 2017) and there are "certain 'appropriate' paths" it should follow in its "free market quest" (Goldfinch & Malpass, 2007). New Zealand is furthermore, like the United States, a "liberal market economy" which institutionally supports market actors' pursuit of their self-interests (Hall & Soskice, 2001). New Zealand clearly has a regulatory mindset that envisions government's role as intervening minimally to unleash market forces.

Process tracing

In this thesis, process tracing is used to conduct "within-case analysis" to "locate key observations from within… individual cases" (Goertz & Mahoney, 2012). Process tracing examines "the link between an outcome of interest and an explanation based on the rigorous assessing and weighting of evidence for and against causal inference" (Ricks & Liu, 2018).

Process tracing depends on developing a framework, as done in the last chapter, which links a "theorized causal variable" (Ricks & Liu, 2018) to a "specific outcome" (Mahoney, 2012). According to the framework, causality exists between mindsets (the "causal variable") and tools and targets (the "outcomes"). This is because when governments intervene, they "translate" their mindsets into corresponding tools and targets (Thurbon, 2016); "governments' ideas," in other words, "give content to preferences and… make action explicable" (Blyth, 2003).

The second step is to establish a timeline, which means to "identify how far back in time" it is necessary to seek the cause (e.g. mindset) of the outcome (e.g. tools and targets) (Ricks & Liu, 2018). Singapore and New Zealand's mindsets have been developmental and regulatory since at least the 1960s and 1980s (Rodan, 1989; Easton, 1997). Due to framework's emphasis on mindsets, this means I expect that, since the 1960s and 1980s, Singapore and New Zealand have been intervening with tools and targets that are respectively developmental and regulatory. To explore if there is evidence to support these expectations, this thesis includes two chapters about the countries' general approaches to intervention over the decades, and also two chapters about their recent support for business internationalization into Thailand.

The third step in process tracing is to make a causal graph that shows "the hypothesized explanation and the outcome in a temporal chain" (Ricks & Liu, 2018). This causal graph, provided in the last chapter, is provided again below:



Mindsets indicate what government's role in markets should be – if the mindset is regulatory then the appropriate role is to support competition, and if the mindset is developmental then the appropriate role is to guide economic activity (Wade, 2018). Mindsets matter because when they go about intervening, governments "translate" their ambitions into corresponding actions (Thurbon, 2016). Governments with developmental mindsets thus target interventions to benefit market actors in planned industries and they incentivize and support engagement with those industries, usually via financial incentives (Evans 1996; Amsden, 1989). Governments with regulatory mindsets, on the other hand, target interventions to either ensure conditions exist in which market actors can compete, or target benefits to competitive market actors in ways that support and incentivize competition, usually avoiding subsidies (Block, 2008). The "quality" (Block, 2008) of intervention differs depending on "rationalities" (Johnson, 1982).

The fourth and fifth steps are identifying alternative events and counterfactual outcomes that are theoretically grounded (Ricks & Liu, 2018). In this thesis, given the theoretical framework, this means considering what would happen if New Zealand and Singapore, rather than having regulatory and developmental mindsets, were to have opposite mindsets. The theoretical framework indicates that having opposite mindsets would result in their using the opposite targets and tools. If it turns out, in other words, that New Zealand were to have a developmental mindset rather than a regulatory one, this would mean, according to the theoretical framework, that New Zealand would have developmental tools and targets.

The sixth and seventh steps are to find evidence for the theoretical framework and also for "rival" explanatory factors (Ricks & Liu, 2018). As mentioned in the last chapter, I exclude three factors from the theoretical framework which may explain why intervention tools and targets differ: the political context, the state's organizational structure, and the host country context (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982; Doner, 1991). Singapore and New Zealand may, in other words, use different tools and targets because of political contexts (i.e. the characteristics of relationships between bureaucrats and other actors); organizational structures (i.e. whether there is a lead agency or decentralized interagency relations); or host country contexts (i.e.

qualities about the host country and its relation to the home countries). These other factors are likely influential and are furthermore likely constantly changing with time. When using process tracing, it is important to consider such “rival” explanations (Ricks & Liu, 2018). I want to stress that I do not consider these other explanations necessarily as competitors; they may potentially be complementary to my argument, as I discuss in the empirical chapters.

There are various evidence types which allow “tests” the framework can “pass” or “fail” (Collier, 2011; Mahoney, 2012). Tests “are classified according to whether passing the test is necessary and/or sufficient for accepting the inference” (Collier, 2011). Some tests focus on “necessary” criteria – if a theoretical framework passes them it remains relevant, but if it fails them it is eliminated (Collier, 2011). Other tests focus on “sufficient” criteria – if a framework passes such tests then it is strongly supported, but if it fails them it is not necessarily rejected (Collier, 2011).

A caveat is in order before proceeding: it is unlikely that pieces of evidence – or accumulated pieces of evidence – will amount to being “sufficient” and “confirming” the theoretical framework, as those terms are used in common parlance. This is because there will always be doubts about the framework’s accuracy. For the purposes of this research, “necessary” criteria include the sort which shows that New Zealand and Singapore do indeed have the expected sorts of mindsets, targets, and tools. If, for instance, New Zealand does not have a regulatory mindset, targets, and tools, then the framework must be eliminated. “Sufficient” criteria, on the other hand, regards evidence that indicates causality. This means that if there is evidence, for instance, that indicates mindsets affect preferences and corresponding intervention tools and targets, then this would strengthen confidence in the framework. But to be clear, finding “sufficient” evidence does not mean “confirming” that the framework entirely explains outcomes. In fact, as discussed throughout this thesis, other explanations – especially those regarding “structural” (Blyth, 2003) factors like political context, organizational structure, and host country context – also likely inform why governments use particular tools and targets.

Operationalizing theorized propositions

To think about which evidence is useful for strengthening or weakening confidence in the theoretical framework, it helps to think about evidence in terms of how it could serve as a basis for the two different ways of "testing" discussed above (Collier, 2011). Some evidence can be used as the basis for testing "necessary" criteria – these tests need to be passed in order for the theoretical framework to remain relevant. Some evidence can be used as the basis for testing "sufficient" criteria – passing these tests strengthens confidence in the theoretical framework. As stated last chapter, the theoretical framework has two theorized propositions:

1) Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states.
2) Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states.

Tests that yield "necessary" criteria must be passed in order for the theorized propositions to not be "eliminated" (Collier, 2011). In the case of the two propositions, it is necessary for New Zealand and Singapore's mindsets, targets, and tools to be as expected. In other words, for the framework to remain relevant, evidence must indicate New Zealand and Singapore respectively have regulatory and developmental mindsets, targets, and tools. If evidence does not indicate the two countries have regulatory and developmental mindset, targets, and tools, this weakens confidence in the framework's argument that mindsets define tools and targets.

Tests that yield "sufficient" criteria are those which "confirm" a hypothesis (Collier, 2011). Again, to be clear, "confirm" means to strengthen confidence in the theoretical framework, not prove beyond a doubt that the framework entirely explains the outcomes of interest. Evidence upon which these tests are based must speak to causality; rather than confirming mindsets, targets, and tools are either developmental or regulatory, evidence must indicate mindsets define tools and targets. For the propositions to pass sufficiency tests, evidence must indicate that governments' tools and targets are "explicable" (Blyth, 2003) according to their mindsets; their mindsets define appropriate sorts of relationships between governments and markets, and governments thus choose tools and targets that make sense given these "ambitions" (Thurbon, 2016). Ideas "give content to preferences" and corresponding actions (Blyth, 2003).

When gathering and interpreting evidence, I must address two important issues: 1) reliability; and 2) accessibility. By reliability, I mean that I must consider how reliable the evidence is that I have gathered. To this end, it is important to consider the context in which evidence was gathered by asking various questions (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). What was the source? To whom was information presented? For what purpose was it presented? Considering these questions forces reflection on evidence and improves assessment of its reliability. Another way to address reliability is to consider sourcing. The more independent sources that point towards the same piece of information, the more reliable that piece of information is; if many sources indicate something, this is more reliable than one source indicating something.

To address accessibility requires devising strategies to overcome difficulties of accessing information. For documentation, the main issue in terms of accessibility is separating out relevant pieces of information from potentially overwhelming amounts of irrelevant information. When searching the Internet and databases, it is important to limit results to a manageable amount of relevant citations. For interviews, the main issue in terms of accessibility is identifying and contacting desired individuals. The solution to this is "cultivating relationships" (Lindlof and Taylor, 2017), which requires spending time with people. Needing to network in this way is one reason why I spent as much time in the field as I did – in Singapore, New Zealand, and Thailand.

Evidence regarding mindsets, targets, and tools

During research and fieldwork, I gathered evidence for testing criteria that were "necessary" (Collier, 2011) to the theoretical framework. I gathered evidence to better understand Singapore and New Zealand's mindsets, targets, and tools – to understand if they were developmental, regulatory, or something else. To do this, I gathered evidence from six sources:

1) government documentation; 2) interviews with government officials; 3) business documentation; 4) interviews with businesspeople; 5) media articles; and 6) academic articles. Each source gave a significant amount of information about Singapore and New Zealand's mindsets, targets, and tools. With each evidence source, different issues arose in terms of reliability and accessibility.

Government documentation was one evidence source I turned to because there is a significant amount of such documentation that describes Singapore and New Zealand's mindset, targets, and tools. It was necessary to consider the reliability of government documentation (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). This is because government agencies are often intent on advertising how effective they have been in achieving goals they see as politically important. In Singapore, for instance, the ruling party has at times suffered electoral setbacks for being perceived as supporting foreign business interests. In the wake of such setbacks, government agencies of all sorts are prone to advertising how they help Singaporeans, not foreigners. Evidence in Singaporean government documentation that describes targets of intervention, therefore, must be considered in this light – such documentation may overemphasize the extent to which government support is targeted to benefit Singaporeans instead of foreigners. In general, when government documentation seemed likely to be overemphasizing certain aspects of intervention, I turned to other sources to confirm such documentation's reliability.

In terms of accessibility issues for government documentation, I faced different issues for the two countries. For Singapore, I found there was a tendency to repackage information so the same intervention was often described in many ways, giving the appearance of more intervention than was actually occurring. "Non-financial" aid, for instance, was also sometimes listed as "financial" aid (as I discuss in later chapters). To better understand what intervention tools government agencies were actually using, I collated descriptions of tools and cross-checked them to make sure I was not double counting them. For New Zealand government documentation, an accessibility issue I faced was difficulties finding information that described the historical connections between various intervention efforts. There were few overarching explanations of how, say, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise related to predecessor agencies. To overcome this, I collected information from many sources to craft my own understanding.

Interviews with government officials were another source of evidence I used during fieldwork to gain a better understanding of each country's mindsets, tools, and targets. As was the case when using government documentation, reliability was an important issue to consider with government interviews (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Reliability issues were more of an issue with Singaporean government officials. Whereas New Zealand government officials were quite candid when describing the government's mindset, tools, and targets, this was not the case with Singaporean government officials, who were instead quite guarded. I found that an effective way to gather useful information from government interviews was to phrase questions based on insight gained from interviewing other people. These other people – former government officials, officials from other agencies, or well-connected businesspeople – clarified ways in which government officials were often incentivized to obfuscate information that could appear to contradict official agency missions. It was to be expected, for instance, that New Zealand government officials would describe the mindsets of both themselves and their agencies as regulatory – they would often describe their appropriate role in interacting with markets as unleashing market forces, something that is quintessentially "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982). I would focus questions onto other topics that forced government officials to go beyond routine explanations of their market-rationality, asking them to explain, for instance, how they saw particular tools as making sense given their underlying regulatory mindsets.

Accessibility was an issue when gathering evidence from interviews with government officials, though more so for interviews with Singaporean government officials. In both cases, it was necessary to cultivate relationships to gain access (Lindlof and Taylor, 2017). I did this in the home countries – in Singapore and New Zealand – and also in Thailand, where the Singaporean and New Zealand expatriate communities hold many regular activities and events. By attending these activities and events, I was able to introduce myself to members of the two expatriate communities, which in turn facilitated introductions to government officials from both countries. When introduced in this manner, officials were more open to speaking with me.

Another source of evidence I used to learn about mindsets, targets, and tools was business documentation. Market actors that have interacted with the two governments sometimes publish accounts of their experience, which provides useful information. A company may, for example, describe how a government agency provided it with a particular type of support. As with all evidence sources, it was important to consider reliability issues (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Most notably, some market actors tend to inflate or downplay the importance of their connections to government agencies when making documentation publicly available. In the case of New Zealand, for instance, the dairy company Fonterra is sensitive to descriptions of it being overly supported by the New Zealand government, so there is little description in documentation it publishes of the support provided by agencies such as New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. A small firm, on the other hand, exporting natural products, may inflate its prospects by emphasizing how the New Zealand government supports such exports. The main way to confirm the accuracy of such business documentation is to cross-check with other information sources. Interviews with businesspeople and officials were helpful in this respect.

I faced no major accessibility issues in terms of business documentation since searches were restricted to documentation that was publicly available – I did not, for instance, seek access to private company records which contained information about support received from government. The first step to identifying relevant business documentation was to identify potentially relevant market actors. I collected names as they arose during searches of other evidence sources (e.g. government documentation listing beneficiary companies) and also during attendance of events to gain access for interviews (e.g. attending expatriate community networking events). The second step to identifying relevant business documentation, once specific companies were identified, was to conduct general searches using search engines and to conduct site-specific searches (e.g. searching Fonterra’s website for mentions of “NZTE”).

Interviews with businesspeople were another source of evidence I used to learn about Singapore and New Zealand's mindsets, targets, and tools. I spoke with businesspeople who had either directly interacted with government agencies or with those who know about such interactions secondhand. They provided valuable insight into particular intervention tools used by government agencies. It was important when collecting information via such interviews to consider the reliability of businesspeople's accounts (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). They would often, for instance, overemphasize how much the government used particular tools, focusing on the tools with which they were most familiar. Small New Zealand firms, for instance, would often claim the government provided mostly informational support – market guides for Thailand, for instance – when, in fact, the New Zealand government provides a far greater variety of support services. The issue is that firms' access to more varied support services grows as those firms became more established; smaller firms do not have access to higher-end tailored services and thus seem to underestimate the extent of government support. For this reason, it was important, when I was attempting to develop my own understanding of which tools governments used, to collate perspectives of different sorts of market actors.

In general, I did not find accessibility to be a major obstacle to overcome with regards to interviews with businesspeople. New Zealand businesspeople, in particular, were open to sharing their experiences with government. Singaporean businesspeople were more hesitant to discuss interactions with government, particularly if they were ongoing. After networking, though, it was fairly easy to interview Singaporean businesspeople (Lindlof and Taylor, 2017). In some cases, it was difficult to access particular businesspeople. I believe the reason for this was that they perceived participating in an interview as posing very little benefit to them but potentially exposing them to risk (if they said something inappropriate about government, for instance, and if this were traced back to them). In such cases, I instead networked with businesspeople who were more removed – either they had formerly worked for firms of interest, for instance, or were outside the firms but knew of their relations with government.

The fifth source of evidence I used during fieldwork was media articles, which provide a plethora of information about Singapore and New Zealand's mindsets, targets, and tools. Again, it was important when gathering information to consider contextual issues to assess reliability (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). In particular, it was important to know what different perspectives tend to characterize certain media outlets. In New Zealand, for instance, certain media sources have more of a "pro-business" stance and are thus more likely to praise government for enabling market forces or criticize it for suppressing market forces. In Singapore, a common issue is that many outlets are government-owned, and they thus, similar to government documentation, advertise how effectively the government has been improving Singaporeans' lives; they give little criticism of how effectively interventions are bringing about economic development. It was important to compare characterizations of government interventions in various media sources – if many media outlets with a variety of perspectives all concurred with each other about a particular characterization, then I deemed it likelier to be accurate.

The main accessibility issue in terms of media articles was sorting out relevant information. As in any case of searching media citations, it is important to use Boolean operators effectively to screen out information that has already been seen (e.g. by excluding search hits that contain certain key phrases). In terms of Singaporean media citations, it was also important to be aware of citations' uniqueness; in many cases, because media outlets are government-owned, citations will be repeated, sometimes with minor alterations to give the appearance of uniqueness. This can give the illusion of something being more important than it actually is. Seeing hundreds of citations discussing a particular intervention, for instance, would not appear as meaningful as I first thought once I realized the citations are all echoing each other.

The sixth source from which I collected evidence was academic articles. This source was most helpful for my chapters about New Zealand and Singapore's general approach to intervention, rather than the chapters specifically regarding their support for business internationalization into Thailand. For both countries, there are numerous studies that provide details about mindsets, targets, and tools. In terms of reliability, one issue had to do with the empirical contexts of academic articles. Many articles focus on particular contexts – in the case of New Zealand, for instance, academics have studied government intervention in areas as varied as public transportation (van de Velde & Wallis, 2013), the film industry (Clydesdale, 2015), and fisheries (Aranda & Christensen, 2009). To identify New Zealand's general approach to intervention required reading accounts from these different areas and identifying common themes.

The main issue I encountered with accessibility for academic articles was an overabundance of information, particular for Singapore. Singapore has been the focus of study of many academics over the years, and there are thus many potentially relevant articles. For New Zealand, I found articles tended to focus on specific instances of intervention, not explicitly describing general themes in terms of mindsets, targets, and tools. To deal with the overabundance of information about Singapore required savvy use of Boolean operators to screen out repeating information. To deal with the New Zealand-related academic articles required close readings of many empirical accounts and then deriving common themes about mindsets, targets, and tools.

Evidence regarding mindsets defining targets and tools

I used the same six evidence sources to test for "sufficient" criteria, rather than "necessary" criteria, for my theoretical framework (Collier, 2011). Whereas passing a test for necessary criteria simply means the theoretical framework remains relevant, passing a test for sufficient criteria significantly strengthens confidence in a theoretical framework. Evidence for sufficiency is a "smoking gun" (Mahoney, 2012) – just as "a suspect who is caught holding a smoking gun is presumed guilty," sufficient evidence "confirms" a theoretical framework (Collier, 2011).

Sufficient evidence regards the argument which lies at the heart of my theoretical framework – I argue that governments, when they intervene, do so in particular ways because of their mindsets. Their mindsets, or "rationalities" (Johnson, 1982), provide different ideational starting points about appropriate relationships between governments and markets – they regard feelings about how the world should be. In the regulatory mindset, government's role is to unleash competition, whereas in the developmental mindset, government's role is to guide economic development. Governments thus have different "ambitions," and when they intervene, they do so by "translating" these ambitions into actions (Thurbon, 2016). Certain tools and targets are "explicable" (Blyth, 2003) according to these mindsets. If the purpose of government is to facilitate competition, for instance, it follows that government should target intervention to support conditions for competition and to benefit competitive firms; it should support and incentivize competition, usually without subsidies (Block, 2008). If government should guide economic activity, on the other hand, it naturally follows that it should target intervention to benefit firms in planned business areas, supporting and incentivizing engagement with planned industries with financial incentives (Evans, 1995; Amsden, 1989).

Each of the six evidence sources provided me with information that spoke to this causal relationship, and each evidence source also posed issues in terms of reliability and accessibility which I had to address. The first source was government documentation, which often provided explanations about why tools and targets are as they are. Such documentation rarely gave explicit causal connections; it did not, for instance, say that "this agency used these tools because they made sense given a developmental mindset." But documentation did often imply an explanation. Singaporean government documentation, for instance, would emphasize how government plans were leading to economic development. New Zealand government documentation, on the other hand, would emphasize how firms pursuing their interests leads to economic development, and that the government is facilitating firms' pursuing their interests. These descriptions imply the Singaporean and New Zealand governments have developmental and regulatory mindsets that explain their use of particular tools and targets.

Of course, reliability was an important to consider when assessing government documentation (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). It was particularly important to consider the intended audiences. Singaporean documentation intended for a foreign audience, for instance, would spend more time emphasizing the ease of doing business in Singapore, whereas documentation intended for local audiences would be more likely to describe the importance of government planning. If many pieces of documentation indicated an explanation, and if other evidence sources corroborated this explanation, I treated it as more reliable (Beach & Pedersen, 2013).

Access to government documentation was not a major obstacle, since I focused on publicly available documentation; I was not seeking internal confidential documents, for example. Information overload was an accessibility issue I faced for government documentation because, whereas it is comparatively easy to search for information about mindsets, tools, and targets, it is a less straightforward task to identify explanations about causality. It is more difficult to include or exclude search terms that will yield search results that discuss causality. I focused on identifying documents that provided overarching descriptions of intervention programs, and then I skimmed those descriptions for explanations of why government uses tools and targets.

The second source, interviews with government officials, was enlightening. When describing how government agencies go about intervening, officials would also often explain why such agencies intervene the way they do. Often, when providing such explanations, they would refer to mindsets. New Zealand government officials, for instance, described how the role of government was not to tell market actors what to do, and that this restricted tools and targets. Similarly, Singaporean government officials described how market actors needed government guidance, and that this justified government's use of particular tools and targets. Of course, I had to consider reliability during such interviews (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Were government officials simply telling me what they thought they should be saying? It was important when speaking to officials to consider what incentives they might be facing to communicate "appropriate" narratives about why intervention was the way it was. Even when considering potential incentives, though, repeated themes about mindsets' causality indicated what the different governments' mindsets were – justifying tools and targets as making sense according to different views on "appropriate" government roles gave insight into underlying mindsets.

For interviews with government officials, accessibility was sometimes an issue. Networking helped to get to the point of actually having an interview (Lindlof and Taylor, 2017), but even if officials were willing to be interviewed, some topics were more off-limits than others. Explanations of why tools and targets were the way they were, for instance, were more sensitive than straightforward descriptions of those tools and targets. What I mean is that if I asked for more details about a particular type of tool, say, a business development loan, officials would be fairly comfortable providing those details. But if I asked for an explanation of why the tool was the way it was, particularly if potential inconsistencies with the professed mindset arose, then officials would sometimes become uncomfortable. The more effort I had put into networking with an official, the more willing they were to talk through the explanation of why the tool or target was the way that it was. But if I had not done enough networking, the topic would become off-limits and I would need to move the interview onto other topics.

Business documentation was a third evidence source I turned to for explanations of why governments use particular tools and targets. While I found business documentation to be useful for testing necessary criteria, I found it to be of little use for testing sufficient criteria. This is because business documentation I accessed during research rarely described why governments intervened in the ways that they did. Instead, business documentation tended to describe the type of support firms received – a New Zealand firm, for instance, might describe itself as having received support to help it become more competitive. Since this is a tool that I would expect a “market-rational” government to use (Johnson, 1982), such information would be useful for testing necessary criteria (e.g. it gives me information about a tool). It would not, though, be useful for testing sufficient criteria; it would not help me assess my theoretical framework because it does not provide explanations about why government used that tool.

Perhaps accessibility was an issue that stymied the usefulness of business documentation for testing sufficient criteria. I only sought publicly available business documentation during my research and fieldwork. If I had sought and gained access to private documentation, such as confidential correspondence between firms and government agencies, for instance, this would likely have provided more insight into why governments use the tools that they do. I believe it was more effective to not pursue that avenue, since I was able to interview government officials and businesspeople who likely gave as much insight as I could gain by other means.

Interviews with businesspeople were a fourth source of evidence which taught me about why governments use particular tools and targets. As was the case with interviews with government officials, I found these interviews with businesspeople to be enlightening in terms of testing sufficient criteria. With both sorts of interviews, I was able to ask and receive explanations for why governments use the targets and tools that they use. It is true, of course, that reliability was an important issue to consider when interviewing businesspeople, as it was when interviewing government officials (Beach & Pedersen, 2013). The most notable reliability issue was that businesspeople often had strong views about government support, and it was important to be aware of these views in order to interpret information. Small New Zealand firms, for instance, were prone to complain about the government only caring about large firms; that is the reason, they argue, why government targets benefits towards large firms. In combination with information from other sources, though, the explanation, I believe, is more nuanced. In fact, government prefers to target support to benefit competitive firms, and this often, though not always, manifests as supporting large firms (which are seen as competitive).

Accessibility was not a major issue with regards to interviewing businesspeople and learning about why governments use particular tools and targets. Singaporean businesspeople were somewhat reticent to speak, though I could usually overcome this with networking (Lindlof and Taylor, 2017). With New Zealand businesspeople, the issue was akin to that which I faced with documentation: there was almost too much information. Many businesspeople, particularly those from small firms, wanted to use interviews as an opportunity to air grievances about the ineffectiveness of government support. The information they provided was useful but repetitive. Eventually, I became more exclusive with the sorts of businesspeople I interviewed in order to access unique accounts of why the governments intervene as they do.

The fifth evidence source I used was media articles. These were useful because they oftentimes provided descriptions of how tools and targets fit into general government approaches to intervention, which in turn indicated causal explanations for those tools and targets. There was significant media fanfare, for instance, when the new business internationalization support agency Enterprise Singapore was formed in 2018. Media articles about the agency noted it combined aspects of internationalization support abroad with innovation support at home. It was portrayed as part of a broader effort by the Singaporean government to spur innovation among small and private technology-focused firms, in contrast to previous government-led development of large conglomerates. These descriptions indicated that the tools and targets of Singapore's support are driven by its "plan-rationalism" (Johnson, 1982); they frame tools and targets as "realizations" of government "ambitions" to guide the economy (Thurbon, 2016).

Reliability and accessibility were issues I kept in mind when accessing information from media articles. In terms of reliability, most media outlets have typical stances. Many Singaporean outlets are government-owned, for instance, and it is therefore expected that they would describe internationalization support tools and targets as being part of another successful government-led economic development campaign. When encountering such descriptions, I would seek corroboration from other evidence sources – interviews with businesspeople, for instance. Accessibility was not a major issue regarding media articles. The main accessibility issue was effective use of Boolean operators to separate relevant from irrelevant citations.

Academic articles were the sixth data source I turned to for collecting evidence regarding causal links between mindsets and targets and tools. There were many accounts of causality in academic literature about Singapore – I found many descriptions of why and how its government intervenes as it does. For New Zealand, I found a significant number of accounts of its "pro-market economic restructuring" (Nicholls, 2017) starting in the 1980s, and many of these accounts described how the government's "market-oriented" (Nicholls, 2017) perspective defines tools and targets. The main issue I found in terms of reliability regarded tendencies in scholarship to characterize both political economies in certain ways – essentially indicating that

Singapore and New Zealand's respectively developmental and regulatory mindsets do indeed result in corresponding tools and targets. While this confirmed my expectations, I wondered if there might be a self-reinforcing tendency to characterize the two countries in typical ways. It was therefore useful to identify accounts that questioned aspects of standard narratives – New Zealand radically opening up its economy in the 1980s (Goldfinch & Malpass, 2007) or Singapore influencing the behavior of firms (Yeung, 2016) – but which still reinforced the importance of mindsets affecting tools and targets. Even among more unconventional accounts, there was evidence for the causal flow between mindsets, tools, and targets.

Accessibility was not a major issue I encountered when gathering evidence from scholarly articles. The main issue was identifying relevant articles – ones that not only described Singapore and New Zealand's mindsets, targets, and tools, but which also gave explanations about why targets and tools were the way they were. It was easier to use Boolean operators to find the first sort of articles. I would extract information from articles which spoke to causality, and then I would compile information to identify major themes about potential causal links.

Other explanations

My theoretical framework, as discussed in the last chapter, emphasizes the importance of mindset. It focuses on "ideational" as opposed to "structural" explanations for why governments support business internationalization as they do (Blyth, 2003). That being said, there are other explanations which instead emphasize structural factors that may explain why governments use the tools and targets they do when supporting business internationalization. Process tracing entails using evidence to "test" not only the main theoretical framework, but also these other explanations (Ricks & Liu, 2018). In each of the empirical chapters that follows, therefore, there are discussions about the extent to which collected evidence supports these other explanations. In all likelihood, given that government intervention is "complex… different explanations may not be mutually exclusive" (Ricks & Liu, 2018); my own theoretical framework, in other words, though I argue it offers an important explanation for why governments use targets and tools as they do, does not dismiss these other factors' relevance.

The host country context is one explanation I exclude from my theoretical framework which likely partially explains why New Zealand and Singapore support business internationalization differently. I chose Thailand because it is a significant market for business from both Singapore and New Zealand. That being said, Thailand is also fairly unassuming in terms of its relationship with New Zealand and Singapore; it is neither a superpower like China nor a "hinterland" of Singapore (Bunnel et al., 2006) like Malaysia or Indonesia, issues which make questionable those countries' appropriateness as a host country. China's superpower status likely affects the ways Singapore and New Zealand support business internationalization into China. Malaysia and Indonesia, on the other hand, are closely linked to Singapore, which likely affects Singaporean support. For these reasons, I do not think that comparing business internationalization support into China, Malaysia, Indonesia would show how Singapore and New Zealand typically differ in terms of their support for business internationalization. Among possible host countries, Thailand also has the benefit of having been a focus host country in scholarship about business internationalization (Busser, 2008; Doner, 1991; Goldstein & Pananond, 2008); findings from this research may support future scholarship that studies Thailand as a host country. Another reason I chose Thailand is I am familiar with it, having lived there and being able to speak Thai.

My choice of Thailand may very well affect Singapore and New Zealand's tools and targets when it comes to supporting business internationalization. Singapore is much more proximate to Thailand than New Zealand is; Thailand and Singapore are geographically close and are both ASEAN member countries. The two countries' type of business presence in Thailand is also different – Singaporean businesses tend to invest in a wide variety of sectors in Thailand, whereas primary goods exports dominate New Zealand's business presence in Thailand. During fieldwork, I gathered some evidence which indicated tools and targets were indeed affected by the different relationships between Thailand and the home countries. Singapore's government, for instance, sees its economic development as being linked to integration with Southeast Asia. This leads the government to target benefits to firms internationalizing into the region instead of other parts of the world. In the empirical chapters, I provide more thoughts about how evidence speaks to the host country context as a factor that explains tools and targets.

Political contexts are another potential explanation for why New Zealand and Singapore use the tools and targets they do. Countries may differ, for instance, in terms of their “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995), meaning the extent to which bureaucrats intervening in markets are influenced by constellations of other actors like politicians or business interest groups. If bureaucrats are heavily influenced by politicians – for instance, by politicians who intervene in order to achieve outcomes that help them maintain their own rule (Carney, 2018) – then this may affect the way bureaucrats intervene in markets. Surely, the fact that Singapore and New Zealand have very different political systems may affect such relationships that exist between bureaucrats and politicians. Bureaucrats’ relationships with business interest groups are also important. In Singapore, for instance, an often-cited explanation for tools and targets is that the government is relatively immune from market actor pressure. Singapore’s “industrial bourgeoisie” are noted for their “political passivity” (Thompson, 1996). It may be that market actors in New Zealand exert more pressure on government agencies, which explains why New Zealand government intervention is noted for its “light touch” (Mayes, 2015). In the empirical chapters, I consider how evidence speaks to the importance of political contexts.

Organizational structures are another potential explanation for why New Zealand and Singapore use the tools and targets that they do. Developmental states like Singapore are often noted for having lead agencies that coordinate interventions (Johnson, 1982). In regulatory states, on the other hand, government’s organization is more “decentralised” (MacNeil, 2013). The fact that developmental states have lead agencies is often used to explain their approaches to intervention (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982), though it is also true that approaches persist despite reorganizations (Thurbon, 2016). During fieldwork, interviewees sometimes mentioned the different organizations of the two governments as likely having an effect on their approaches to intervention. In the empirical chapters of this thesis, I review the extent to which evidence speaks to organizational structures as a factor that explains tools and targets.

Singapore's approach to intervening in markets

In this chapter, I introduce Singapore as a developmental state and discuss the factors of interest to my theoretical framework – mindset, targets, and tools. I discuss Singapore's intervention in markets since the 1960s to test my theoretical framework. This chapter is not concerned with Singapore's recent support for business internationalization into Thailand; I test my framework in that particular context in the next chapter. In this chapter, instead, I summarize evidence regarding Singapore's mindset, targets, and tools in a variety of contexts since the country gained independence in the 1960s. A significant amount of evidence describes the mindset, targets, and tools as "developmental," as I define them in my theoretical framework. Evidence also shows, in line with theorized propositions in my framework, that the mindset of Singapore' government explains why it intervenes with particular targets and tools.

Singapore's mindset

My theoretical framework expects Singapore to have a developmental "mindset" (Thurbon, 2016). What I mean by this is I expect the government sees its proper role as guiding market actors' behavior. I expect that Singapore's government is "plan-rational" (Johnson, 1982), which means that it sees "investment" as a scarce resource that "must be carefully husbanded" by public officials (Thurbon, 2016; Wade, 2018). From this perspective, government planning, not market actors pursuing their interests, is an ideal "welfare-enhancing organizing" principle (Wade, 2018). The government sees its proper role as intervening in markets to get prices "wrong" (Amsden, 1989), incentivizing market actors to follow government industrial planning.

The Singaporean government certainly meets expectations in this regard. From the perspective of the government, market failures may occur without government leadership, and government's proper role is thus to guide economic activity. In Singapore, "government" has for many years been nearly synonymous with the leading party, the People's Action Party – the PAP has been the controlling party since independence. After independence, it advocated its “right to exclusive and unquestionable power to determine the course ahead” (Rodan, 1989). It established the “functional necessity” of government guidance over market activity (Rodan, 1989). It established its “sole right” to determine the “national interest”; to this end, it saw its appropriate role as coordinating Singapore’s market actors, even if that meant those actors had to temporarily put aside pursuit of their personal interests (Rodan, 1989). Only through such coordination could Singapore “be successful in” a “highly competitive world” (Rodan, 1989).

Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s long-serving prime minister, spoke extensively about this developmental mindset. The following quote from Lee, made shortly after independence, well captures the party’s perspective on government’s right to guide markets:

> “Societies like ours have no fat to spare. They are either lean and healthy or they die. We have calculated… our best chances lie in a very tightly organized society” (Rodan, 1989).

The PAP continues to be Singapore’s controlling party, but even if it falls from power, the “right of the state as an active entrepreneur” has arguably become an “enduring” part of Singapore’s political economy (Chua, 2017). Regular elections, though “often underestimated” (Chua, 2017) as a democratic guise for authoritarianism, reinforce that whichever party is in power, it must deliver results. Citizens endorse the PAP because of its “efficiency and effectivity”; it is popular because it improves “material lives of ordinary Singaporeans” (Chua, 2017). The government’s role is to deliver “jobs, incomes, homes, education, security and welfare” to Singaporeans, and the government largely does this by devising and executing industrial development plans (Low, 2001). Government’s legitimacy depends on satisfying “most citizens’ basic human needs” (Joshi, 2012) and “achieving economic security” for the population (Cho & Chong, 2018).

There has been “cultural liberalization” in recent years, but this “does not mean that the… government accepts the development of political liberal pluralism” (Chua, 2017). Government does not see “visible… public contestations on different issues” as appropriate (Chua, 2017).

Decision-making about which economic development route Singapore should take still rests in the hands of government, not in the hands of disparate market actors. Liberalization in cultural areas – less repressive censorship, for instance – is "reasonable within the general framework of governance" but is "unlikely to change" the underlying developmental mindset about the appropriate sort of relationship that should exist between government and markets (Chua, 2017). Government still sees its role as guiding markets, as indicated by the following quote from prime minister Lee Hsien Loong (Prime Minister's Office, 2009), who is the son of founding prime minister Lee Kuan Yew:

> "… we do not believe that the Western liberal democracy model, which really is something which has developed only in the last half-century since the War, is the pinnacle of human achievement and the solution for the whole of the world."

In this quote, the prime minister reaffirms that the government continues to see itself "as operating within and against the global ideological environment" (Chua, 2017) of pluralism, which is closely related to the belief in markets' ability to self-govern with minimal government oversight. The prime minister is emphasizing, in other words, that the government still has a developmental mindsight that sees its proper role as guiding the behavior of market actors. In Singapore, "economic strategies" continue to be "largely conceived by state government ministers and bureaucratic and civil service elites or technocrats" (Subramaniam, 2014).

There is some contention that Singapore's government does not have a developmental mindset and that its approach to intervention is instead characterized by "strategic pragmatism" (Schein, 1996). This means the government is not ideologically disposed towards intervention or free markets per se, but instead intervenes in whatever ways are necessary to advance Singapore's development. The government "demonstrates a willingness to use hybrid (and pragmatic) approaches in responding to… challenges" – it can varyingly adopt a developmental or regulatory mindset, whichever is suitable (Subramaniam, 2014). This argument claims the government is “scientific and rational” (Rodan, 1989), not ideological, when intervening. It is summarized in the following quote from a PAP representative shortly after independence:

> “A distinct ideology does not help to solve real problems such as modernization… We are more a problem-solving party. Our philosophy is based on what we do” (Rodan, 1989).

In fact, I see this perspective about “pragmatism” as being consistent with the developmental mindset. The claim that “rationality” means there is no “ideology” creates a “false dichotomy between rationality and ideology” (Rodan, 1989). This is because while the “pragmatic” perspective does indeed emphasize “problem-solving” without ideology (Schein, 1996), it still sees such problem-solving as rightfully being in the province of government. Government, in other words, still has the right to coordinate market actors, or at least has the right to decide whether it should coordinate them. This perspective on intervention still indicates that market actors should, as Lee Kuan Yew put it, be “tightly organized” (Rodan, 1989) by government.

Singapore’s developmental mindset appears to have arisen from a particular combination of historical conditions. One of these conditions was “systemic vulnerability,” meaning government’s sensitivity to “popular pressures” – this made government feel compelled to intervene heavy-handedly in markets to ensure benefits reached a “restive mass public” (Doner et al., 2005). Another condition was the international environment – geopolitical insecurity during the Cold War (Stubbs, 2005) led to an ideology of “survivalism” (Chua, 2017) which justified the government’s intervening to make sure Singapore did not suffer an existential crisis. Another condition at the time of independence, and also arguably today, was the existence of “elitism” in Singapore which “resonated” with the governed population (Barr & Skirbiš, 2008). I will discuss other factors that may explain Singapore’s approach to intervention in more detail in the concluding section of this chapter.

Singapore's mindset and targets

Singapore's mindset is developmental, which means the government believes it should guide markets; it sees government planning as an ideal "organizing principle" (Wade, 2018) for the economy. According to my theoretical framework, this developmental mindset has implications for how Singapore's government goes about intervening. Singapore's mindset indicates that the government will prioritize some industries over others and that when Singapore's government intervenes, it will target interventions to benefit market actors in those prioritized industries.

Singapore's targets

There is indeed evidence to indicate Singapore's government has targeted interventions to benefit market actors in prioritized industries. Such evidence is "necessary" for my framework because it prevents it from being "eliminated" (Collier, 2011). This maintains my framework's relevance because the framework expects government to target benefits to market actors in prioritized industries. I will explain in the next section what indications there are of mindset causing the government to target its interventions as it has. Before discussing this causality, though, I first provide an overview of some of the government's major intervention campaigns.

The government prioritized the manufacturing industry shortly after independence. Before independence, Singapore was known as a trading entrepot (Barr, 2018; Rodan, 1989). In the 1960s and 1970s, though, the government intervened and targeted benefits to market actors in the manufacturing industry – frequently to foreign manufacturers investing in Singapore and to Singaporean market actors who worked with those foreign manufacturers (Rodan, 1989; Pereira & Tong, 2005). In the 1980s, the government furthermore targeted benefits to Singapore-based manufacturers that were expanding to Malaysia and Indonesia (Pereira & Tong, 2005). By the 1980s, Singapore was no longer simply a trading entrepot, but a manufacturing hub.

Another industry which the government has prioritized for growth is the biotech industry, meaning commercial products based on next-generation technologies with life science applications (Wong, 2011). The government began targeting intervention benefits towards market actors in this industry as early as the 1990s, and it began doing so in earnest in the 2000s (Finegold et al., 2004). “Market actors” in this case means firms that produce and sell biotech products. As happened following government support for the manufacturing industry in previous decades, the biotech industry in Singapore has grown significantly, with measurable growth in R&D expenditures, trials, and foreign investment (Hsieh & Löfgren, 2009).

Venture capital is another industry which the government has prioritized for growth and whose market actors have benefitted from government intervention. Prioritization of the venture capital industry has coincided with prioritization of the biotech industry, beginning in earnest in the 1990s but continuing today (Koh & Wong, 2005; Klingler-Vidra, 2018). At first, the government targeted benefits towards foreign venture capital firms that had a presence in Singapore. This was similar to how the government in the 1960s and 1970s targeted benefits towards foreign manufacturers that had a presence in Singapore. With regards to the venture capital industry, though, the government’s focus has shifted so that it now primarily targets benefits to domestic firms that work in the venture capital industry (Klingler-Vidra, 2018).

The “knowledge economy” (Sidhu, 2009) is a fourth prioritized industry whose market actors have benefitted from government intervention. Admittedly, the knowledge economy is less usually characterized as an “industry” than are manufacturing, biotech, or venture capital. And the “market actors” within the knowledge economy – universities and research institutes – are also not typically thought of as such. It is fair to say, however, that the knowledge economy is an industry populated by market actors; it is a defined area of business in which organizations seek to make a profit. Certainly, in accounts of the government’s prioritization of the knowledge economy, emphasis is put on how government interventions benefit universities and research institutes in terms of improving their “profitability” (Sidhu et al., 2011).

A recently initiated intervention campaign that appears to be ramping up in Singapore – one which has not yet been analyzed by academics to the extent of the previously described campaigns – relates to "Industry 4.0." This term describes "automation powered by data" that performs "everyday tasks" (SGInnovate, 2020). It puts emphasis on using machine learning to make a wide variety of business areas more efficient. The Economic Development Board, Singapore's largest economic planning agency, describes Industry 4.0 as allowing the "gearing up" of other industries – manufacturing, for instance – to become more competitive (Economic Development Board, 2017). Government-linked companies and various government agencies have correspondingly initiated programs to develop Industry 4.0 (including in the realm of business internationalization support, as I discuss in the next chapter) (Industrial Automation Asia, 2020; Infocomm Media Development Authority, 2020). These interventions, if they continue, will likely be viewed in the future as yet another prioritized industry into which the government has targeted intervention.

Indications that Singapore's mindset defines its targets

There is good reason to believe that the targets described above stem from Singapore's underlying developmental mindset. This is what I expect given my framework's second proposition, which states: "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states." Indications of causality are important for strengthening confidence in the theoretical framework (Collier, 2011). They show that Singapore's government does indeed "translate" (Thurbon, 2016) its ambitions into corresponding action, specifically in terms of targeting.

When the government has targeted benefits to market actors in the prioritized industries mentioned above, this has amounted to "industrial planning" (Wade, 2018). This means the government has clear plans for growing particular industries in order to develop the economy; it thus uses "strategic interventions" (Thurbon, 2016) to support those industries. In targeting benefits to market actors in prioritized industries, Singapore's government has been "translating" its "ambitions" about state guidance into action (Thurbon, 2016), as the theoretical framework expects. Because Singapore's government sees its proper role as "carefully [husbanding]… scarce resources" (Wade, 2018), it is not content to let market actors pursue their own interests. It sees development as depending on planned industries' growth, and it feels it should intervene to target benefits to market actors in those industries. Without such intervention, from Singapore's perspective, market actors may waste scarce resources; there is thus a "need for the state to coordinate" economic activity (Wade, 2018).

When targeting intervention benefits towards market actors in manufacturing, for example, this was clearly an instance of industrial planning. Interventions, which mostly occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, were designed and executed to transform Singapore's economy from "dependence on trade" to manufacturing (Pereira & Tong, 2005). Singapore, like other developing countries, thought its economy could capture more value through manufacturing. Instead of building up an ecosystem of local manufacturing firms like many other developing countries, however, Singapore chose to host foreign firms that would export manufactured goods to other markets from Singapore. Singapore's strategy was atypical because, during the Cold War, many developing countries tended to pursue development of local industry, not hosting foreigners. In comparison to Singapore, for instance, this is what South Korea did – it implemented schemes to establish "internationally competitive local companies" (Shin, 2007).

Singapore, on the other hand, focused instead on developing "complementary assets" (Shin, 2007) to attract international firms into Singapore. To this end, the government targeted numerous benefits to foreign manufacturing firms investing in Singapore (Rodan, 1989). The development of manufacturing capabilities rested on the "role of the state… as the prime agent to formulate and implement" industrial planning (Shin 2007). Singapore ultimately succeeded in this endeavor; it came to be known as a hub for foreign manufacturers exporting to many other national markets. There was a "rapid influx of foreign enterprises" (Rodan, 1989) into various industries in Singapore, notably Japanese "shipbuilding and repair" companies first, and then later American "electrical machinery" firms (Yeung, 2016). By the end of the 1960s, programs to build up these complementary assets had led to "impressive gains" in exports of manufactured goods; the “role of international capital,” attracted to Singapore by the complementary assets, “was fundamental” to these gains (Rodan, 1989). The strategy was effective, in other words.

In the 1990s and 2000s, when targeting benefits to market actors working in the biotech industry, this was another instance of industrial planning on the part of Singapore’s government. The government again perceived the growth of a particular industry, in this case biotech, as important for national development. The rationale this time was that there is a limit to how far Singapore can develop economically by simply being a hub for foreign manufacturers. Much of the high-value innovation that fuels manufacturers’ value remains in other countries; it does not come to Singapore (Shin, 2007). In order to capture more value and to continue improving Singaporeans’ quality of life, Singapore must produce the intellectual property behind manufacturing; it must cultivate local firms who not only manufacture but design underlying technologies. Singapore needs to be not just a host for manufacturers but to be the source of technological design for manufactured products. Many industries convert innovative intellectual property into manufactured products. One of them is biotech. Singapore’s government decided to focus on biotech as a prioritized industry (Wong, 2011).

Singapore’s “state-led biotech development” (Tsui-Auch, 2004) has entailed “throwing resources” at market actors in the industry (Wong, 2011). The government has played an “active role” (Lee & Lee, 2009) in “building a bioeconomy” and advancing “biomedical sciences” (Ho et al., 2014). Especially since the 2000s, Singapore has pursued “upgrading” its biotech sector (Wong, 2011). The government is now clearly “spearheading” development in the biotech sector (Lee & Lee, 2009). The approach first focused on developing “supply chain linkages” to global markets for “local SMEs in the biomedical sector” (Wong, 2011). It then encouraged “the inflow of foreign investment from global biomedical firms” to fuel “growth in Singapore’s indigenous” firms (Wong, 2011). The government is intent on “catching up” in biotech (Hsieh & Löfgren, 2009). This is expected, given that the underlying developmental mindset often focuses “on a desire for national techno-industrial catch-up” (Thurbon, 2016).

Venture capital is another industry the government has prioritized as an instance of industrial planning; it sees the growth of venture capital as important for Singapore's economic development, and it thus targets benefits to market actors in the industry (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). The government's support for market actors in venture capital in fact relates to its support for market actors in biotech – technology-focused firms typically need venture capital in order to develop their business. Commercialization of research and development requires the sort of financial backing that venture capital provides (Wong, 2011). Like many countries, Singapore has sought to develop its venture capital industry to support technology-focused market actors who need investment that takes years before making returns (Klingler-Vidra, 2018).

A goal for the government has been to incentivize "top-tier international venture capital firms to locate their regional operations in Singapore" (Koh & Wong, 2005). The purpose of attracting such firms was to "catalyze knowledge transfer" from the multinationals to local firms (Koh & Wong, 2005). To this end, the government provided various incentives to "attract international firms" to set up operations in Singapore (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). Later, once foreign venture capital firms established a presence in Singapore, the government incentivized their cooperation with local firms to develop the local sector. The government planned the growth of venture capital as one would expect of a developmental state – it envisioned the importance of the industry and then it intervened to coordinate market actors' behavior. Because planning is the ideal organizing structure for the economy from the developmental perspective (Wade, 2018), the government did not permit the venture capital industry's growth to be left to chance; rather than let market actors independently identify the industry as an attractive area in which to work, the government actively targeted benefits to market actors in the industry.

The knowledge economy – like manufacturing, biotech, and venture capital – is another industry the government has prioritized for development and to whose market actors it has targeted intervention benefits. The rationale for developing the knowledge economy, like the rationale for developing venture capital, relates to biotech. It helps for market actors in the biotech industry to be situated in an environment with strong research capabilities; it is upon such research that commercialized technologies are based. This is because biotech products are informed by clinical awareness of shortcomings and research expertise. Singapore is in general attempting to develop its reputation as an "education hub" (Sidhu et al., 2011), and it is specifically focusing on developing its reputation in educational areas related to biotech. The government has, for instance, created "public research institutes dedicated to life sciences research" (Wong, 2011), it has run clinical trials to learn more about common ailments (Holden & Demerritt, 2008), and it has supported the building of consortia of several research organizations to study how various factors affect common diseases (Waldby, 2009).

The government's strategy has been "to transform Singapore into a knowledge and innovation hub," which clearly "complements" (Sidhu et al., 2011) more explicitly business-focused intervention efforts (i.e. biotech and venture capital). By targeting benefits to universities and research institutes, Singapore's government has sought to create more research which can be commercialized as intellectual property, and which leads to the creation of biotech products. The government has focused on developing "basic science research and downstream linkages towards commercialization" (Wong, 2011). Targeting benefits to universities and research centers furthermore develops the human capital which is necessary to run firms in the biotech industry; the individuals working in biotech firms need relevant skillsets, which they develop at universities and research institutes. The government's targeting of benefits to universities and research institutes clearly stems from its underlying developmental mindset. The government's "economic planners" (Wong, 2011) have identified the knowledge economy as an area that must grow for the economy to develop, and government is targeting benefits towards it.

I want to stress that it is implausible to argue that mindset alone enables targeting. In the cases above, the state also needed financial and political resources to target its intervention as it did. Other factors are also arguably important for the government to be able to target interventions. The larger political context, for instance, is an important factor. The context needs to be such that government is connected to markets in a way that makes it aware of economic realities but not so configured that government succumbs to regulatory capture or is distracted by rent-seeking. Government needs to have “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995), in other words. The organizational structure of government is also likely important. The role of pilot agencies (Johnson, 1982) that coordinate interventions may be a prerequisite for targeting interventions towards planned industries. I will discuss these other factors at the end of this chapter, but for now want to say what I stated before: I do not consider explanations emphasizing these other factors are competing, but rather as complementing my argument.

Singapore’s mindset and tools

Since Singapore has a developmental mindset, this means that, according to my theoretical framework, I expect Singapore will also use developmental tools. Its developmental mindset means Singapore has certain “ambitions” it will “translate” into interventions (Thurbon, 2016). Tools, I expect, will have certain characteristics which make sense given the government’s views about its proper role being to guide market activity. I expect that mindset importantly explains why a developmental state like Singapore will support market actors’ engagement with planned industries. Also, I expect that mindset will explain why tools incentivize market actors to engage with planned industries and why tools often take the form of subsidies (Amsden, 1989). As I discuss at the end of the chapter, my argument does not reject other arguments that emphasize the importance of factors like the political context (Evans, 1995) or organizational structure (Johnson, 1982). Rather, I see these arguments as complementing each other.

Singapore’s tools

Evidence does indeed indicate Singapore’s tools are developmental. This is important for maintaining the relevance of my theoretical framework; it is “necessary” to show that tools are developmental because if they are not, then my framework would need to be “eliminated” (Collier, 2011). The tools Singapore’s government has used in the industries I discuss in this chapter – manufacturing, biotech, venture capital, and the knowledge economy – support market actors working in planned industries, incentivize other market actors to consider entering those planned industries, and very often come in the form of financial subsidies.

Manufacturing

In manufacturing, the government used several tools in its efforts to develop the industry. The "response of international capital to [these tools] was extremely positive" (Rodan, 1989). Major tools included: lowered tax rates for export-related profits; duty-free imports of relevant equipment, machinery, and materials; and accelerated depreciation allowances (Rodan, 1989). As expected, these tools are essentially financial incentives that support foreign manufacturers which were already setting up shop in Singapore or which were planning to do so.

To further support and incentivize engagement with manufacturing, the government suppressed labor activism. This is not a direct financial incentive, but it is an indirect one: it "[represented] considerable savings to employers in direct and indirect payments to labour" (Rodan, 1989). This is understandable if one considers that appeasing a restive workforce imposes costs on employers (not to mention production delays, which also lower profits). A docile workforce is cheaper, in other words. The government ensured this "industrial peace" in many ways: it reduced workers' rights to strike; it increased working hours; it reduced holidays, rest days, sick leave, and annual paid leave; and it reduced benefits (Rodan, 1989). Other schemes "[expanded] the rights of management and [limited] the occasion for resettling agreements… [weakening] the scope for industrial action" (Rodan, 1989). To further reduce labor activism, union leaders were also co-opted into government planning (Rodan, 1989).

Another tool the government used to attract foreign manufacturers was funding via government-linked companies (GLCs). These were "established to catalyze the industrialization process" (Ramírez & Tan, 2004) and "served as the cornerstone of the… industrialization program" (Yeung, 2017). Relevant GLCs included the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), the International Trading Company (Intraco), Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), and Jurong Town

Corporation (JTC). The DBS provided long-term low-interest loans for projects involving foreign investment, and sometimes took equity in specific companies or projects "as a means of stimulating" foreign investment (Rodan, 1989). Intraco, on the other hand, also occasionally took equity in companies and projects (Rodan, 1989). Again, these incentives support or incentivize market actors' engagement with planned business areas, as my framework expects.

The GLCs' activities also provided more indirect financial incentives that supported or incentivized engagement with the manufacturing industry. JTC, for instance, supplied land for development; it ensured foreign manufacturers could buy land at a low price (Rodan, 1989). NOL, on the other hand, which was a shipping company, "[ensured] lower freight rates" for exports from Singapore; it lowered export costs for the foreign manufacturers who had set up factories in Singapore (Rodan, 1989). Intraco, besides sometimes taking equity in firms, also negotiated "bulk buying" of Singapore-originated exports with governments in "centrally-planned economies"; in other words, Intraco ensured that Singapore-based manufacturers would be able to sell the products they manufactured in Singapore abroad (Rodan, 1989).

Other tools also indirectly lowered the cost of foreign manufacturers doing business in Singapore. The government established statutory boards, for instance, which are a type of government entity; three in particular helped attract foreign manufacturers (Rodan, 1989). First was the National Productivity Centre, which educated workers and ensured "harmonious labor" relations (Ohno & Kitaw, n.d.). Second was the Engineering Industries Development Agency, which trained local workers (Public Service Division, 2015). Third was the Singapore Institute for Standards and Industrial Research, which ensured products made in Singapore met international standards (and could thus be easily exported) (National Archives of Singapore, 2016). The government also established universities and state enterprises overseeing essential business services for exports like shipping and shipbuilding (Rodan, 1989).

One can argue these various tools were all indirect financial incentives because they increased foreign manufacturers' certainty; they allowed foreign manufacturers to better plan operations, knowing they could buy inputs and sell outputs. Foreign manufacturers felt certain, for instance, that they could find appropriately skilled workers, and that they would not have to deal with regular strikes. Firms felt certain that the products they manufactured in Singapore would reach and comply with standards in export markets. Certainty translates into profitability because less resources have to be devoted to dealing with adverse events (e.g. insurance or contingency planning). These tools, along with the more explicit financial incentives previously described, made Singapore's manufacturing industry more profitable. The tools supported market actors already in manufacturing, and incentivized others to consider working in it.

Biotech

In its efforts to develop a biotech sector, Singapore's government has used tools that are typically developmental – it has used subsidies designed to support market actors already in the industry or to incentivize other market actors' engagement with the industry. As early as the 1980s, government entities like the EDB invested in biotech firms (Finegold et al., 2004). It was in the late 1990s, though, that the government began focusing in earnest on the biotech industry. A high-profile instance of early investment was EDB's "strategic alliance" with a foreign biotech company to form a local "drug discovery" firm in which the foreign biotech firm was given a "significant ownership stake" (Finegold et al., 2004). This was clearly a developmental tool – a financial incentive which government used to support and incentivize engagement with the biotech industry. It spurred a foreign firm to invest more than it otherwise might have in a local firm, and it supported a local firm's biotech business by providing it with significant financing.

Singapore's government has created various vehicles responsible for allocating billions of dollars to market actors working in Singapore's biotech industry (Finegold et al., 2004). Early funds included Life Sciences Investments, PharmBio Growth Fund, and Singapore Bio-Innovations. These funds' goal was to "make investments in local start-ups and Singapore-based joint ventures, and provide financial incentives to attract MNCs to Singapore" (Finegold et al., 2004). Starting in 2006 with the publication of the Science and Technology Plan 2010, which lasted for the next four years and under which there was significant emphasis on biomedical sector, Singapore allocated S$13.5 billion to support tech-oriented market actors, including those in biotech (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2006). This included support for private-sector R&D, principally via a co-funding grant scheme for investments in Singapore and for firms employing scientists and engineers. Scholarships and fellowship grants were also made available for firms to develop human resources. All of these measures lowered the costs of doing business in the biotech industry, which is as one would expect for a developmental state like Singapore that uses financial incentives to intervene.

Another sort of tool the government has used to support and incentivize engagement with the biotech industry is physical infrastructure development (Finegold et al., 2004). Singapore's high-quality infrastructure (e.g. transportation and telecommunications) is reputed to attract foreign firms to use the country as a regional business hub, and the government has specifically been developing infrastructure to benefit market actors in the biotech sector. It has built the Tuas Biomedical Park, for instance, which houses facilities to support "bioscience manufacturing" (Finegold et al., 2004). The government built another park, the Biopolis, to "attract biomedical MNCs, start-ups, and support services such as lawyers and patent agents" (Finegold et al., 2004). Such infrastructure is essentially making it cheaper for market actors to engage with the biotech industry, as one would expect of tools used by a developmental state like Singapore.

The government put other, more indirect measures in place in the early 2000s which lowered the costs of working in the biotech industry. It created education programs, for example, to give local workers relevant skillsets necessary for the biotech industry (Finegold et al., 2004). Singapore's attempts to grow the biotech industry has also included tax credits (though the credits apply not just to biotech firms but rather to many sorts of tech-oriented businesses). Tax exemptions have applied to profits for five to ten years, depending on the size of investment and "technological sophistication" (Hsieh & Löfgren, 2009). Like previous breaks offered to foreign manufacturers, these breaks lower the cost of engaging in an industry the government is planning to develop. Another indirect incentive is Singapore's intellectual property regime. Although it was not specifically designed for the biotech industry, firms in the industry obviously benefit from Singapore's strong intellectual property laws. Such firms are, after all, fundamentally in the business of commercializing IP – they are attracted to working in a country which has well-developed regulations which protect IP (Hsieh & Löfgren, 2009).

Venture capital

In its efforts to build up a local venture capital (VC) industry, the government has used three groups of financial support schemes: the Technopreneurship Investment Fund (TIF); the Early Stage Venture Fund (EVSF); and other vehicles (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). The TIF was explicitly a subsidization scheme; it was established in 1999 to "attract international venture capitalists" to Singapore (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). The government invested US$ 1 billion in various VC firms, the majority of them foreign. The fund was designed to "encourage foreign venture capital firms to set up operations in Singapore," though it is unclear what formal requirements there were for firms to have a presence in Singapore (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). TIF representatives "courted" and later invested in foreign VC firms. The purpose was for the firms "to have regional headquarters in Singapore, as the EDB had done with MNCs over previous decades" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018).

The ESVF, launched in 2008, was designed to "capitalize Singapore-based VC managers" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). Unlike the TIF, whose purpose was to attract international VC firms to Singapore, the ESVF was used to provide funding to VC firms already in Singapore or alternatively to VC firms that were investing in Singapore-based companies. The EVSF had three rounds. In the first round, it co-invested with "mostly domestic" VC fund managers that were "required to invest in local start-ups to ensure impact on the Singaporean start-up ecosystem" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). In the second round, started in 2013, the ESVF supported international VC funds, as long as they invested in "local entrepreneurs" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). In the third round, started in 2015, the ESVF "had an explicitly local character" that supported "local-local" investments; it co-invested with Singapore-based VC funds, requiring investments be in "local start-ups" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). Like the TIF, the ESVF is the sort of tool my framework expects a developmental state to use when intervening; subsidies were used to support and incentivize engagement with venture capital, a planned industry.

For the other tools besides the TIF and the ESVF which the government used to support the venture capital industry, several related to taxes. In the 1998 budget, for example, tax exemptions were extended "on a case-by-case basis" for VC funds (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). Profits were also made eligible for tax breaks (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). Other tax schemes allowed tax deductions on losses, thus "[reducing] venture capital investors' downside risk" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). These tax-related schemes are also financial incentive schemes, though indirect ones: they lowered the tax costs associated with VC activity, either by allowing firms to pay less taxes on profits or to counterbalance losses with tax deductions. Another scheme, not tax-related, had to do with permanent residency: in exchange for investing in certain "approved VC funds," individual investors could acquire permanent residency in Singapore (Klingler-Vidra, 2018).

Knowledge economy

To develop the knowledge economy, the government has used typically "developmental" tools, as described in my framework. Part of the S$13.5 billion budget of the Science and Technology Plan 2010, for instance, besides supporting biotech firms, funds research institutions, public universities, and hospitals (Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore, 2006). The government has also established "public research institutes dedicated to life sciences research" (Wong, 2011). These institutes have engaged in various large-scale studies (Holden & Demerritt, 2008; Waldby, 2009). A notable entity supporting research institutes is A*STAR, which was established in 2002 to replace its predecessor agency, the National Science and Technology Board. A*STAR has implemented many financial schemes designed to promote research and development in four "strategic technology domains," one of which is biomedical science (National Research Foundation, 2019). A*STAR's support schemes have benefitted "more than 20 research institutes" in Singapore (National Research Foundation, 2019). Its funding schemes have had the effect of attracting “internationally renowned scientists to set up research labs in Singapore” (Finegold et al., 2004).

As indicated before, the purpose of supporting the knowledge economy is to help business development in industries like biotech. To that end, A*STAR finances “joint laboratories” between institutes and corporations that have a presence in Singapore (National Research Foundation, 2019). Research institutes are furthermore often located in parks designed to house biotech firms, in the hopes of spurring joint “public and private biomedical innovation” (Waldby, 2009). The government has also put in place “liberal legislation” to make Singapore a relatively attractive location for certain areas of biomedical research (Hsieh & Löfgren, 2009). Often discussed, for instance, was Singapore’s decision to allow embryonic stem cells to be cultivated at a time when similar research faced regulatory hurdles in the United States (Hsieh & Löfgren, 2009). This opened a niche in Singapore for research institutes interested in cultivating stem cells (Finegold et al., 2004).

Research institutes are encouraged to collaborate with universities (Waldby, 2009). To this end, the government, specifically the EDB, has “invited… world-class universities” to “offer their programmes in Singapore” (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011), sometimes with financial support. In the case of the Yale-NUS College, for instance, which provides students with coursework partially developed by Yale, the college’s operations were “financed entirely by the Singapore government” (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). Besides Yale, the government has supported the expansion into Singapore of “brand-name” international universities like the Johns Hopkins University and the University of New South Wales (Sidhu, 2009). Research centers associated with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology have also been established in Singapore (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). The benefit to foreign universities is twofold: they can attract more students to their home campuses, and they improve their reputations as being globally influential by having a presence in a regional education hub (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011).

The Singaporean government also funds domestic universities: the National University of Singapore; Nanyang Technological University; Singapore Management University; the Singapore University of Technology and Design; and the Singapore Institute of Technology (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). The last two were established recently, coinciding with "a great deal of policy foment" about burnishing Singapore's higher education credentials (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). The government is the "major source of funding" for the domestic universities, though they are sometimes "corporatised" (as in the cases of NUS and NTU, for instance), which means they "actively seek alternative sources of funding" (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011).

Indications that Singapore's mindset defines its tools

I expect a government's mindset about its proper relationship with markets will "translate" (Thurbon, 2016) into corresponding ways of intervening. Having a developmental mindset, in other words, will result in using developmental tools. I summarize this in one of my theoretical framework's propositions: "Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states." The reasoning for this expected line of causality is that, in the developmental mindset, government's purpose is to guide market actors' behavior; its purpose is not to simply enable market actors to do as they wish. Making and executing plans is how the government guarantees national economic development will occur (Wade, 2018). The characteristics of developmental tools make sense from this perspective about how government-market relations should be. The tools are typically financial incentives which are designed to support or incentivize market actors' engagement with business areas the government plans for growth. Such tools have a clear influencing effect: they lower the costs of doing business in planned industries, making the industries more attractive to market actors that are working in or considering working in them. The point of tools is to "attract" market actors to do what the government wants (Rodan, 1989; Wong, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2018; Gopinathana & Lee, 2011).

For example, Singapore's mindset led to its use of developmental tools when intervening in the manufacturing industry after independence. Singapore's government, as one would expect of a government with a developmental mindset, often identifies growth in certain industries as important. Manufacturing was one such industry which the government saw as “strategic to the country’s development” (Shin, 2007). The government, seeing its proper role as influencing market actors rather than permitting them to pursue their own interests, sought to “influence the pattern of international capital investment in manufacturing production” (Rodan, 1989). It wanted foreign manufacturers to invest in Singapore, in clear contrast to the other countries’ development strategies of import substitution industrialization (Shin, 2007). It needed to “attract industrial capital” (Rodan, 1989). It did this by providing “fiscal incentives and subsidies in discriminatory fashion to promote particular forms of industrial activity” (Rodan, 1989).

The government intervened in various ways to lower costs of doing business or to increase profitability, which influenced foreign manufacturers to invest in Singapore. The government recognized that market actors are to a large extent interested in pursuing profit, and that their decisions to invest in Singapore depended on their perceptions of potential profits to be reaped. To make profitability likelier in the manufacturing industry, the government needed to intervene; it was not content with “letting market forces dictate the running of the economy” (Shin, 2007) and it would not wait and hope that market actors, on their own, would see that investing in the manufacturing industry was profitable. Singapore’s developmental mindset is antithetical to such “market-rationality” (Wade, 2018). The government thus attracted “investments from all over the world” by creating attractive “complementary assets” and by assuming “the role of investors” (Shin, 2007). The various tools it used, predictably, were mostly financial incentives that supported firms already working in manufacturing, or which incentivized other firms to enter the industry.

In biotech, similarly, one can trace a line of causality from mindset to tools. The government, as happened with manufacturing, identified biotech as a strategic industry. It saw growing the biotech industry as a way for Singapore to advance economically, becoming a country that is one of the “technology creators,” not one of the “astute imitators” (Wong, 2011). To ascend and capture more value, Singapore now needs to “generate novel and commercially viable products and services" (Wong, 2011). To this end, the government has used developmental tools to support and incentivize market actors to engage with the biotech industry. The government "has poured billions of dollars" into the industry, essentially "betting on biotech" (Wong, 2011).

The government has not been content to let market actors engage with biotech on their own. As a government with a developmental mindset, it does not see such facilitation as its proper role. Rather, government's proper role is to influence market actors. It needs to "attract" firms with incentive schemes to alter their behavior (Wong, 2011). It naturally follows that, similar to its efforts to develop the manufacturing sector, the government has used typically developmental tools to bring "global biomedical firms to Singapore" in the hopes of "positive externalities for domestic life sciences industries" (Wong, 2011). The government intervenes in ways that directly affect the decision-making of firms – it makes Singapore a more profitable place to do business for international firms, it subsidizes their engagement with local firms, and it supports local emergent biotech firms (Finegold et al., 2004). Whether the intervention is tax breaks, human capital development, infrastructure creation, or co-investment, the effects are similar: Singapore becomes a more profitable place to do business in the biotech industry.

With the venture capital industry, also, the government intervened via typically developmental tools that are defined by Singapore's underlying developmental mindset. The government "picked" the venture capital industry as "a winning sector" that needed to grow (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). It then created and used tools to "attract" (Klingler-Vidra, 2018) firms to work in the industry – the government lowered costs of doing business and increased profitability. As one would expect of a government with a developmental mindset, these tools made little attempt to align with a "market-rational" perspective (Johnson, 1982) – the tools were rather designed to influence market actors' behavior, not to enable them to pursue their own interests. To this end, the government created funds and tax breaks to make the industry more profitable. The government, when deciding how to intervene, studied venture capital in other countries and how other governments had developed it (Klingler-Vidra, 2018).

A striking aspect of the tools Singapore used to grow venture capital is their sequential nature. First, foreign firms were incentivized to come to Singapore. Then, those firms were encouraged to work with local firms. Finally, local firms were the primary beneficiaries of support (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). In fact, this sequence of tools mirrors the sequence of tools used to grow the biotech industry (Finegold et al., 2004), and the sequence of tools in both industries reflects the earlier sequence of tools used by government when it was growing the manufacturing industry (Wong, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2018). The government had not only identified venture capital as an industry whose growth was critical to development, but it created a plan with multiple steps to realize that growth. The tools subsidized business activities according to these steps, supporting market actors in the venture capital industry and incentivizing other market actors to enter it.

In its efforts to grow the knowledge economy, as has been the case in the other industries discussed above, the government has used tools that are typically developmental. The government clearly plans to develop its reputation as an "education hub" (Sidhu et al., 2011). This entails, as the government sees it, building the capacity to produce "basic science research" with "downstream linkages towards commercialization" (Wong, 2011). The government is not comfortable leaving the possibility of growth in the knowledge economy to autonomous institutes and universities; its role is not to let them chart their own course but to intervene to influence their behavior to ensure the industry grows. The financing of prestigious Western universities' expansion into Singapore is a clear reflection of this mindset; the government uses financial incentives to lure market actors to behave in line with industrial planning (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). As it has done in other business areas, the government uses its tools to "attract" market actors to the industry (Gopinathana & Lee, 2011).

The tools the government has used to grow the knowledge economy essentially lower the costs or increase the profitability of working in it. The government knows that market actors seek to make a profit, and this means that, in order for the industry to grow according to its plans, the government must intervene to make the industry more profitable and thus attract market actors. It provides funds, reduces regulatory and legal barriers, and locates institutes and universities close to firms (Waldby, 2009). The government designs these tools to influence market actors' decision-making. This use of typically developmental tools – financial incentives which support preexisting activities in the industry or incentivize entering it – flows from the underlying mindset of Singapore's government. Since the government's purpose is to guide market actors, it uses tools that make the planned industry more attractive to market actors.

Other explanations for targets and tools

According to my theoretical framework, intervention targets and tools are defined by Singapore's developmental mindset; in the cases described above, I have argued that the government has targeted its interventions and used particular tools because doing so makes sense given its "plan-rationality" (Johnson, 1982). Since the proper role of government, according to the developmental mindset, is to coordinate market actors, then government naturally "translates" (Thurbon, 2016) these ambitions into specific actions that are "explicable (Blyth 200) according to its mindset. The government expectedly targets benefits to market actors in planned industries, and it uses tools that incentivize engagement with those industries. If Singapore had a different mindset, it would intervene differently.

I believe mindset is important, but I do not think that it is the only relevant factor. There are other explanations for why Singapore uses the targets and tools that it does when intervening. Two explanatory factors which are likely important are: 1) the political context, meaning the relationships between various constellations of actors and the officials who are intervening in markets (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1995); and 2) the organizational structure of government, meaning the relationships between and extent of centralization of various agencies (MacNeil, 2013; Johnson, 1982). It is implausible to argue that mindset, to the exclusion of these other factors, solely defines Singapore's approaches to intervention.

By political context, I mean the “the nature of the relationship between the state and the private sector” (Haggard, 2004). In order to effectively plan and carry out intervention campaigns characterized by the targets and tools described above – targeting benefits to firms in planned industries and using corresponding financial incentives – it is likely that government workers need “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995). The government workers, in other words, need to have a particular sort of relationship with market actors that is close enough to allow them to understand how to best intervene, but is autonomous enough so that they do not succumb to advancing business interests instead of government plans. If they are too “embedded,” then government workers will be susceptible to regulatory capture or rent seeking. If they are too “autonomous,” then they will not understand market realities.

Singapore arguably has an appropriate configuration in terms of “embedded autonomy” that accounts for why it has been able to carry out successful developmental campaigns. It stands out compared to other governments in other countries that have wanted to be developmental, but which have failed because they are either too autonomous or too embedded (Evans, 1995); in those other countries, “corrupt business-government relations” undermine developmental campaigns (Haggard, 2004). Singapore’s bureaucrats seem secure from undue outside influence, though, due to their “elitism” (Barr & Skirbiš, 2008) and “technocratic” mode of thought (Neo 2010). They are independent and skilled enough, in other words, to design and implement economic development campaigns that are not undermined by business interests. Singapore’s “industrial bourgeoisie” are furthermore noted for their “political passivity” (Thompson, 1996), which may insulate government workers from business interests.

The relationships between bureaucrats and politicians also seems likely to have affected how interventions have occurred. There is little division between political and bureaucratic communities in Singapore’s government. This appears to be in large part due to the longstanding rule of the Political Action Party; there has been a “politicization of bureaucrats” that blurs divisions between bureaucrats and politicians (Hill & Lian, 1995). It is likely easier in Singapore to design and execute plans than it is in more “pluralistic” countries (Blank, 1977).

It makes sense to think that the political context in Singapore has informed the government's approach to carrying out interventions. By comparing Singapore's experience to the experience of failed developmental states like India or Brazil (Evans, 1995), one can see that if the relationship to market actors were different, then Singapore would have had more difficulty committing itself to its developmental campaigns. One can also imagine that if the relationship between bureaucrats and politicians were different, so too would interventions be different.

Another important factor that likely affects how Singapore's government intervenes is the state's organizational structure. Being centrally organized is arguably an important factor that allows Singapore to intervene as it does. It helps, or indeed it may be necessary, for interventions to be organized by a "pilot agency" (Johnson, 1982). If government agencies work independently from each other, then this arguably undermines the coherence and consistency of interventions. Centralized organizational structures in developmental states like Singapore are sometimes contrasted against "decentralised" (MacNeil, 2013) organizational structures in regulatory states like New Zealand. Indeed, from this perspective, (de)centralization is a reason why developmental and regulatory states intervene differently (MacNeil, 2013; Block, 2008). Singapore certainly appears to have been centrally organized. Notable pilot agencies include the EDB, which coordinated campaigns to develop the biotech industry and the knowledge economy (Finegold et al., 2004; Gopinathana & Lee, 2011).

As is the case with the political context, it is easy to see why state organizational structure is important. If the organizational structure were more fragmented, then this would hinder the government's ability to create and execute developmental campaigns. Even if the government has a developmental mindset, being more decentralized would likely undermine the effectiveness of intervention campaigns that financial incentivize market actors' behavior.

As said earlier, the theoretical framework's argument – that mindsets define intervention targets and tools – does not necessarily compete with these alternative explanations. It rather complements these other explanations; it is possible to say that mindsets matters, and to also say that political contexts and organizational structures also matter. An interesting line of future research would be exploring interconnections between mindsets, political contexts, and organizational structures. It is possible, for instance, that mindsets partially explains political contexts and organizational structures being the way they are. There is evidence to indicate, for example, that a government's "capacity" (Geddes, 1994) to carry out interventions relies on the perspectives of individuals working in government. If bureaucrats, in other words, did not see creating particular organizational structures as being in their interest, then they will not build them (Geddes, 1994). The particularities of Singapore's organizational structures, therefore, may be at least in part be a product of bureaucrats' developmental mindset.

Political context is also likely linked to mindset. As mentioned before, Singapore's political economy is marked by an "elitism" that has "resonated" with the governed population (Barr & Skirbiš, 2008). There may be a link between this societal acceptance of elitism and the developmental mindset. Lee Kuan Yew, for instance, certainly had a developmental mindset and also was elitist (Chua, 2017); he saw that society needed to be "very tightly organized society," and that elites in government were obviously well-placed to do such organization (Rodan, 1989). The mindset and the acceptance of elitism may come together, either because mindset affects acceptance of elitism or vice versa. If the mindset affects acceptance of elitism, then the mindset may also affect market actors' "political passivity" (Thompson, 1996). The relationships between these various factors are unclear, but it is plausible that Singapore's developmental mindset may affect its political context, just as it is plausible that Singapore's developmental mindset may affect the organizational structures.

One last note to make regarding mindset's explanatory power is this: Even if political context and organizational structures are important, which they almost certainly are, it is still implausible to argue that they alone are important enough to make Singapore use developmental tools and targets. Political context and organizational structures may very well be critical enabling conditions – meaning that without them, the government would not have the capability to intervene in a developmental fashion. But without also having a developmental mindset, it is farfetched to argue the government would intervene with developmental tools and targets. Even if government workers had perfectly attuned "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995), and even if there were centralized organizational structures with leading "pilot agencies" (Johnson, 1982), this does not mean the government would intervene as described it intervening in this chapter.

Consider the counterfactual. If Singapore's government were to have a different mindset, say a regulatory one like New Zealand, then it would feel repulsed by the concept of "industrial policy" (Woo-Cumings, 1999). It would similarly be uncomfortable with using "subsidies" (Block, 2008). If Singapore's government believed, like other governments with regulatory mindsets, that its proper role is to enable "free markets" (Wade, 2018), then developmental approaches to intervention would be unacceptable. Regardless of the political context in Singapore, and regardless of the state's organizational structure, if the government had a regulatory mindset, it seems unlikely that it would intervene as described in this chapter. It would not target benefits to planned industries, and it would not subsidize firms' engaging with those industries, because it would not envisage its role as planning industries' growth.

Singapore’s support for business internationalization into Thailand

This chapter discusses Singapore’s recent support for business internationalization into Thailand to test the theoretical framework in that particular empirical context. It summarizes evidence regarding Singapore’s mindset, targets, and tools with regards to supporting business internationalization into Thailand. It also summarizes other explanations for why Singapore’s targets and tools are as they are. As will be discussed, a significant amount of evidence aligns with expectations: Singapore’s mindset, targets, and tools are indeed “developmental,” as defined by the theoretical framework. Evidence also indicates, as the framework’s theorized propositions expect, that there is a causal link between Singapore’s developmental mindset and its particular targets and tools.

This chapter expands the framework’s relevance to the context of support for business internationalization into Thailand. It explores if the framework not only explains why Singapore’s government intervenes as it at home, but also if the framework explains why the government intervenes as it does beyond its borders. It covers well-trodden ground to argue a causal relationship exists between mindsets, targets, and tools at home (Evans, 1995; Johnson, 1982). Arguing a similar causality affects support for business internationalization abroad, however, is more novel. In this chapter, I take my framework for understanding the developmental state’s interventions at home and study if it also explains support for business internationalization. This chapter looks for indications of the domestic political economy projecting outwards; it looks for signs that this affects how firms internationalize.

Contextualizing Singapore’s support for business internationalization into Thailand

Before describing the mindset, targets, and tools that characterize Singapore’s support for business internationalization into Thailand, I first provide some contextual information: what is already known about Singapore’s support for business internationalization; state organizations supporting business internationalization and how they have evolved over time; and an overall description of the general character of Singapore's business presence in Thailand.

In fact, Singapore's support for business internationalization is well-covered by scholarship; numerous scholars have written about Singapore's developing the "external wing" of its economy, specifically into Southeast Asia (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). This "regionalization" is often characterized by "substantial direct investments" and "sustained home government support" (Hamilton-Hart, 2005). A major focal point of efforts has been the government's creation of "trans-border industrialisation enclaves" in the hopes that associated business activity will "eventually supplement Singapore's national economy" (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008).

Since the 1990s, a major focal point for the government has been attempts to create a "growth triangle" between Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Grundy-Warr et al., 1999; Bunnel et al., 2006; Diez et al., 2019). The triangle is seen as a way for production networks to disperse regionally, letting firms take advantage of the differences that exist in terms of those countries' "relative availability of land, labour, and infrastructure" (Ho, 1994). The government has pursued similar projects in China and Vietnam (Yeoh et al., 2007; Yeung, 2000a). Such projects make sense for developmental planning because, as Singapore has developed economically, it has lost some of the advantages which allowed it to become a manufacturing hub. Notably, for instance, the cost of labor in Singapore has risen. Another lost advantage has been space – the island city-state can only host so many industrial facilities. Singapore's population has furthermore been growing, which creates competition for land. Regionalization has allowed Singapore-based firms to take advantage of nearby markets' land and labor.

Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) or other state-run investment vehicles often play prominent roles in the government's efforts to internationalize Singapore's business (Carney, 2018). Temasek is the most notable SWF (it has a presence in Thailand, as will be discussed later). In Singapore, there are many so-called government-linked companies (GLCs) in which Temasek or other statutory boards hold more than 20% of the voting shares (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008).

These GLCs have played an important role in pushing “toward the internationalisation of Singaporean firms… under the guise of GLCs’ investments in a variety of sectors, including industrial estates, utilities and other services” (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008). These “state-engineered projects have succeeded in enlarging the industrial estate area for Singaporean investors” (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008). They create “Singapore-like facilities” abroad into which Singaporean firms feel comfortable internationalizing (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008).

Other tools the government has used to promote business regionalization have included state partnerships with or ownership in Singaporean firms, customs streamlining, grants and tax incentives, and training programs (Rodan, 1993). The tools, in other words, financially incentivize the sorts of business activity that the government wants to develop. This is similar to the tools described last chapter that the government has used when intervening domestically. It is also as I expect of a developmental state like Singapore, since I argue its developmental mindset will lead the government to subsidize engagement with planned business areas.

Although Singapore’s regionalization efforts have often been described as government-led, they have also been characterized as having “widespread consultation with the private sector” (Rodan, 1993). Singapore’s bureaucrats, in other words, are in touch with the business communities which interventions are designed to affect. This reflects the “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) that is often discussed as a key aspect of developmental states like Singapore; bureaucrats are reputed to be “autonomous” enough to remain committed to their developmental missions, but also “embedded” enough so as to understand business reality.

In its support for business internationalization, Singapore’s government has “felt that it had to become a key entrepreneurial agent” (Pereira & Tong, 2005). This squarely lines up with expectations laid out in the introduction about the “plan-rationalism” (Johnson, 1982) which undergirds Singapore’s developmental mindset. According to this mindset, firms, if left to behave “autonomously and spontaneously” (Block, 2008), risk Singapore’s economy not developing. The government instead sees “investment” as a scarce resource which it must husband “carefully” to ensure development (Thurbon, 2016; Wade, 2018). When supporting business internationalization, the government has a developmental mindset and believes that it knows best; the government sees its proper role as influencing business internationalization.

In terms of relevant government agencies that are involved in promoting business internationalization, Enterprise Singapore (ESG) is the one most explicitly linked to supporting Singaporean businesses going abroad. It was only recently formed in 2018 by merging two preexisting organizations: International Enterprise Singapore and SPRING (Singapore Accreditation Council, 2018). ESG’s mission – to support business internationalization, particularly that of SMEs, as I discuss in more detail later in this chapter – builds off the missions of ESG’s two predecessor organizations. International Enterprise Singapore was focused on internationalization, not on general business development. SPRING, on the other hand, worked domestically to grow small and medium sized enterprises; it only incidentally supported firms’ internationalization. With the two organizations having been brought under one roof, ESG’s strategy now integrates business development into internationalization; ESG provides a variety of grants that start with business development but, as firms increasingly mature, support expansion into other markets (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-a).

Another government organization besides ESG that supports business internationalization is the Economic Development Board (EDB). The EDB complements ESG – whereas ESG supports Singaporean business internationalization, the EDB attracts foreign businesses into Singapore (Economic Development Board, n.d.). The EDB has played a central role in economic transformations at home, as discussed last chapter, and it also indirectly supports Singaporean firms going abroad. This is because there are spillover effects of attracting international business into Singapore that help Singaporean firms internationalize. The EDB, for instance, devised incentives to attract venture capital firms to invest in Singapore. One reason to attract foreign venture capital firms was to spur the emergence of a domestic venture capital firms by encouraging knowledge transfer from the foreign firms to local ones (Klingler-Vidra, 2018). Those local venture capital firms will assumedly invest not just in Singapore but in various markets. In this way, the EDB indirectly plays a role in supporting internationalization; it attracts foreign firms into Singapore, and this international business presence helps facilitate the emergence of internationally active Singaporean firms.

The Singaporean government has many funding organizations, such as SGInnovate and the Early Stage Venture Fund, that incentivize activities in particular business sectors. These organizations are not necessarily internationally-focused; they instead target funding towards growing local capacities in a particular industry or business areas. But often there is an international aspect to the businesses that these funds support – interviewees repeatedly mentioned that local SMEs regularly expand beyond Singapore's borders, so any domestically-focused business cultivation indirectly creates firms that may someday internationalize.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is another government entity involved in supporting business internationalization. It negotiates trade deals, promotes business ties between Thailand and Singapore, hosts ministers when they visit, and participates in Singapore-related events (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-a). The relationship between ESG and MFA is indirect; ESG is under a separate ministry, the Ministry of Trade and Enterprise (gov.sg, n.d.), which does not have offices in Thailand (Ministry of Trade and Enterprise Singapore, n.d.). ESG and MFA are furthermore not co-located in Thailand, unlike New Zealand's corresponding ministry and business support agency, which are co-located. MFA's office in Bangkok is small; it has 11 staff, according to interviewees and searches of LinkedIn. Until 2019, the ambassador had served for seven years. She was the longest-serving ambassador in Thailand. As the senior-most diplomat, she spoke on behalf of other ambassadors to King Vajiralongkorn during his coronation (The Government Public Relations Department, 2019).

Besides MFA and ESG, the other government organizations described above do not have a presence in Thailand – this is according to interviewees and searches of other available information sources like LinkedIn. The EDB does not have an office in Thailand, although it does have offices in other countries in Asia – in China, Indonesia, India, Japan, and South Korea.

Likewise, SGInnovate and the Early Stage Venture Fund do not have offices in Thailand – they only have offices in Singapore. And neither does Temasek or GIC, which is another SWF.

ESG has an informal working relationship with the Singapore-Thai Chamber of Commerce, as described by interviewees. Sometimes it refers firms it supports to the chamber, and sometimes it informs chamber members about events it is holding – in 2019 during fieldwork, for instance, on at least two occasions it invited chamber members to attend events it was holding for visiting Singaporean firms. Although the chamber is not a government organization (and many of its council members are in fact not Singaporean), some chamber members spoke of a sense of "continued national service" that makes them receptive to government requests. The chamber's mission statement furthermore states the chamber is dedicated to cultivating close ties with Singaporean government agencies. The chamber does not provide any sort of formal support services. Rather, members assist newcomers by sharing tips about how the Thai market operates and also by making introductions to other people who may be able to assist.

The chamber, based on interviews with Singapore's expatriate community, is the primary focal point of interaction between the Singaporean government and Singaporean businesspeople. Its Board of Directors regularly interacts with other Singaporean businesspeople at events, and it also interacts with ESG and MFA. Aside from this crossover point, though, I was impressed during fieldwork with the fact that, for most Singaporean businesspeople, there is littler interaction with government organizations. Particularly once firms establish themselves in Thailand, they are on their own; government support does not affect day-to-day operations.

To contextualize discussions about empirical findings, I want to provide more context about the general characteristics of Singapore's business presence in Thailand. According to the World Bank, in terms of export destinations, Thailand is the seventh largest destination country for Singaporean exports (World Integrated Trade Solution, n.d.-a). In 2018, the total value of exports was US$15.5 billion (World Integrated Trade Solution, n.d.-a). Since 2010, World Bank statistics indicate Thailand has fluctuated between being the 7th and 9th largest export destination (World Integrated Trade Solution, n.d.-b). The most significant types of exports from Singapore, in order of value, are machinery and electronics, capital goods, consumer goods, intermediate goods, and chemicals (World Integrated Trade Solution, n.d.-c).

Singapore invests a significant amount of capital in Thailand. In ASEAN, Thailand is Singapore's third largest investment destination after Indonesia and Malaysia, which have been described as Singapore's economic "hinterland regions," given extensive cross-border business (Ooi 1995). From Thailand's perspective, Singapore is the second largest provider of FDI, providing less than only Japan (Santander, n.d.). According to SingStat, Singapore in 2016 had S$23 billion in direct investment stock in Thailand in the following sectors, in order of the total value: manufacturing; construction; wholesale and retail trade; accommodation and food service; transport and food storage; information and communication; financial and insurance services; real estate; professional, scientific and technical, and administrative and support services; and other sectors (SingStat, n.d.).

When conducting fieldwork, Temasek came up repeatedly in conversation. Temasek is one of Singapore's SWFs, and it has been increasingly investing "globally in various types of assets" (Carney, 2018). Temasek's target sectors include financial services, telecommunications, real estate, transportation, and energy (Temasek Holdings, 2020a). In Thailand, Temasek's presence largely exists through shareholding; it does not list itself as having an office in Thailand, nor – according to a review of LinkedIn – do any Temasek employees list themselves as being based in Thailand.

Temasek's most notable investment in Thailand is InTouch, the parent company for AIS, the largest mobile phone operator in Thailand (Bangkok Post, 2020). Temasek until recently was InTouch's largest shareholder (42%) (Dollars and Sense, 2015). In 2019, Temasek reduced its shares and now holds only 9% (The Straits Times, 2019a; Temasek Holdings, 2000b). No other Temasek investments were brought up during discussions with interviewees. Most citations about Thailand on Temasek's website regard InTouch, but some mention investments in other sectors, including healthcare, health and beauty retailing, life insurance, and banking (Temasek Holdings, 2006; Temasek Holdings, 2014; Temasek Holdings, 2019; Temasek Holdings, 2003).

The InTouch holding is notable because InTouch is a rebranded version of Shin Corporation, which was founded by Thaksin Shinawatra, the exiled former Prime Minister of Thailand (Fernquest, 2014). When Temasek purchased its stake in Shin Corporation in 2006, five months before the coup that ousted Thaksin, there was a popular backlash in Thailand against the purchase. Criticisms were twofold. First, the sale was seen as bypassing regulations to enrich Thaksin and his family: they were seen as "cashing out without having to pay taxes" (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008). Second, a firm in a "strategic" industry like telecommunications being "sold to foreign investors… angered many nationalistic Thais, and the fact the acquiring firm was wholly owned by a foreign government further enraged this opposition" (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008).

Today, unlike in the 2000s, InTouch's connections to Thaksin and Temasek are rarely mentioned in media. But several interviewees mentioned that Temasek, and Singaporean government organizations more generally, are sensitive to the impressions this acquisition left in Thailand. Singaporean government workers are reluctant to engage in any conversations that indicate government organizations like Temasek, ESG, or MFA are somehow manipulating business activity in Thailand in ways that benefit Singapore to the detriment of Thailand. As I will discuss at the end of this chapter, this sensitivity may be an important factor that helps explain some aspects of ESG's approach to supporting business internationalization into Thailand.

Both Singapore and Thailand are member states of ASEAN and are also thus both party to the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), which has eliminated intra-ASEAN import duties on 99.65 percent of tariff lines (ASEAN, n.d.-a). The AFTA categorizes various tariff lines according to eight-digit codes, which allow businesses to determine the tariffs, controls, and rule of origin that apply to goods they are trading. If a Singaporean business is considering exporting to Thailand, for instance, then it would first need to determine the preferential tariff rate by looking up the eight-digit code for the good it plans on exporting. It must then determine whether the exported good accords with rules of origin. If the manufacturer of the good registers its factory with Singapore Customs and obtains a Preferential Certificate of Origin, the exporter can use this certificate to obtain the preferential tariff rate for exporting to Thailand.

Despite these trade deals, trading between Singapore, Thailand, and other ASEAN countries is still difficult because of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) such as sanitary, phytosanitary, or technical requirements (The Business Times, 2019). Oftentimes, NTBs have a basis in public health or consumer protection, but governments may use them in protectionist ways. ASEAN, compared to other liberal trade areas like the European Union, is known for having a stifling amount of such NTBs. There are also relevant attempts to advance economic integration attempts with the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), an initiative established in 2015 (ASEAN, n.d.-b). The initiative envisages harmonizing regulatory requirements, which would address NTBs, as well as promoting connectivity, creating regional intellectual property frameworks, and eliminating tariffs (ASEAN 2015). Progress in regional integration under the AEC initiative has been notably delayed (Menon and Melendez, 2017). Besides the AFTA and the AEC, Singapore and Thailand also have a double tax avoidance agreement in place (Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore, 2015). The agreement provides relief from double taxation for individuals and companies that reside in both countries and are subject to income tax in both countries.

Singapore’s mindset

Having provided some context about Singapore’s support for business internationalization into Thailand, I will now explore how well the theoretical framework describes empirical findings. The framework expects that Singapore, in its support for business internationalization into Thailand, will have a developmental “mindset” (Thurbon, 2016). As discussed in the last chapter, I have already found that Singapore’s government seems to have such a mindset when it goes about intervening at home – the government sees its proper role as planning particular industries for development, targeting benefits to firms in those industries, and using subsidies to incentivize activity in the planned industries. According to the framework, when supporting business internationalization into Thailand, Singapore's government, specifically its most relevant organization Enterprise Singapore (ESG), will be similarly "plan-rational" (Johnson, 1982). ESG will, put differently, see its role as husbanding resources to coordinate market actors in line with plans (Thurbon, 2016).

The theoretical framework expects Singapore to have a developmental "mindset" (Thurbon, 2016) when supporting business internationalization into Thailand. This means the government will see its proper role as guiding market actors' behavior. Another way of putting this is the government will be "plan-rational" (Johnson, 1982), which means it sees government planning, not market actors pursuing their interests, as an ideal "welfare-enhancing organizing" principle (Wade, 2018). According to this mindset, "investment" is a scarce resource which "must be carefully husbanded" by government (Thurbon, 2016; Wade, 2018). Another way to frame expectations about Singapore's mindset is that the government will see its proper role as getting prices "wrong" (Amsden, 1989), incentivizing market actors to act in line with government plans.

One indication that, in its support for business internationalization into Thailand, Singapore does indeed have a developmental mindset, is interviewees' descriptions of the proper role of ESG. One former ESG worker, for instance, described the mindset of ESG as "paternalistic in that if someone approaches us with a request, we may say – you know, this is what the industry is doing. Ought you to tweak your approach a little?" Another worker elsewhere in government who has worked with ESG explained the agency sees its role as coordinating market actors because it has a better understanding of economic matters. Whereas firms focus on individual goals, ESG's goal is "to assess holdings and identify synergies to create ecosystems. [Government agencies like ESG] are not just interested in returns, but in national interests." An ESG employee stated: "The mission is to help enterprise development through innovation and internationalization. The larger strategy is to make… the Singaporean economy more competitive." A businessperson who received ESG support confirmed the agency acts as a "supervisor" – not "championing" any one firm but rather coordinating firms in line with plans.

In a developmental state like Singapore, the developmental mindset values government planning because it is does not see "free markets" as necessarily achieving "optimal" (Wade, 2018) economic outcomes; coordinating market actors is legitimate because is advances development. In line with expectations, then, ESG justifies its interventions by demonstrating their positive economic impacts. As one employee put it, "ESG needs to show taxpayers it's doing good stuff." ESG's website, to this end, describes how it is "creating good jobs" for Singaporeans. The site features stories about beneficiary firms. It repeats stories from state-run media outlets about the macro-level benefits of ESG intervention (Leow, 2020a). In 2019, for instance, ESG intervention reportedly resulted in over S$17 billion of value and over 20,000 jobs. In the previous year 2018, state media reported ESG benefits reached 76,000 of Singapore's 200,000 firms, and that it supported 570 overseas projects (Wei, 2019). Of course, the causality and significance of these numbers is open to debate – did ESG really benefit over a third of all companies in Singapore in 2018? The point, though, is ESG perceives its legitimacy as resting on its claim to be improving economic outcomes.

According to discussions with individuals working for the Singaporean government, ESG has a developmental mindset, at least in part, because its workers believe, as do workers in other government agencies in Singapore, that Singapore as a small city-state has little room for error in its developmental path. A few bad years economically could cause irreparable harm. The country's status as a prosperous international business hub is vulnerable. Potential failure cannot be left to chance. ESG, like the rest of government, is thus "obsessed," as one employee put it, with intervening to grow the economy. This is precisely as the framework expects of an agency with a developmental mindset – it is "plan-rational" instead of "market-rational," meaning it believes government must intervene to ensure development (Johnson, 1982).

ESG’s goal abroad, especially in nearby markets like Thailand, is not just to increase exports, but to establish a more embedded presence; in line with its developmental mindset, ESG believes it must intervene to ensure that this outcome occurs. It sees investing abroad as benefitting Singapore more than simply exporting. Similar to how the government cultivates high-value business activity at home (Wong, 2011), ESG sees cultivating an entrenched business presence abroad as strengthening the national economy. The expansion of manufacturing into Malaysia is an archetype (Grundy-Warr et al., 1999): Singapore-based manufacturers expanded there, employed locals, and thus helped Singapore ascend the value chain. One ESG employee described the focus on investment abroad as follows: “KPIs are not just to increase exports, but also to show firms have gained access… registering, making partnerships, and hiring locals.”

Many interviewees thought entrepreneurialism and risk-taking originate in government, not in business. Decisions about expanding into new business areas are government-, not firm-driven. This is as the framework expects – in the developmental mindset, market actors’ behavior should be set not by them behaving “autonomously and spontaneously” (Block, 2008), as happens in regulatory states. Instead, their behavior should be influenced by government; government’s role is to “attract” firms to behave in particular ways (Rodan, 1989; Wong, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2018; Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). This influence naturally extends to supporting business internationalization. As a former ESG worker stated, “In Singapore, entrepreneurial thinking is in government.” An experienced businessperson summarized many interviewees’ views about firms’ perceived lack of entrepreneurialism: “Singaporean businesspeople are good at execution, sure, but not at problem-solving.”

Expectations about risk-taking originating in government stem from ESG’s developmental mindset: government needs to coordinate firms to take risks in frontier markets. Without support, firms might be too risk-averse to go abroad. As one executive stated, “Not many Singaporeans go abroad. They’re comfy here – they prefer to host global as opposed to go global.” From this perspective, government must drive firms’ decisions to go into countries like Thailand. Without government intervention, the proposition of expanding abroad could be too risky for many Singaporean firms to consider. Unlike firms, the government recognizes business opportunities abroad and has the risk tolerance to pursue them. Only with its encouragement will firms act.

Media citations indicate ESG's developmental mindset and its view of itself as a source of guidance for internationalizing firms. The ESG chairman, for instance, stated, "given the size of our market, Singapore enterprises cannot afford to not seek out opportunities globally. In fact, [risks abroad] make it even more critical for enterprises to diversify their businesses and markets" (Leow, 2020a). In state media, ESG's deputy chief executive was cited as arguing that "despite a global growth slowdown and disruption from trade tensions… companies [should still] expand overseas" (Leow, 2019). These quotes reflect ESG's view of itself as an astute economic guide that understands best what firms should be doing, even if the firms do not recognize it themselves.

When intervening to support business internationalization, ESG perceives and frames its interventions as cooperating with other agencies' interventions, which is consistent with expectations for an agency in a government that has a developmental mindset; government agencies are expected to influence market actors' behavior in line with overarching economic development plans (Johnson, 1982). The government has plans for coordinating market actors' behavior, and ESG's interventions are just one component of these larger plans. A prominent instance of cooperation with other agencies regards EDB, which attracts foreign firms into Singapore. EDB aims to facilitate knowledge transfer to local firms and ESG helps local firms go abroad. EDB's efforts thus create stronger local firms, and ESG supports their going abroad. The two agencies are working in tandem with each other. Many individuals during fieldwork, both in Singapore's public and private sectors, commented on the two agencies' cooperation.

SGInnovate is another government entity with which ESG frames its interventions as cooperative. This is because one particular type of business ESG is interested in supporting is next-generation technology firms, and SGInnovate fills a funding gap for such firms. As one

SGInnovate worker put it, “the venture capital cycle as it is too short for deep tech. You need a longer development cycle, and thus a longer investment cycle, for deep tech. SGInnovate can do that.” SGInnovate’s interventions support next-generation technology firms, and ESG wants to support the internationalization of such firms (more on this in the next section). Workers at both agencies were aware of how their interventions complemented each other. Perceptions of cooperation among government agencies’ interventions is typical of a government with a developmental mindset; since government coordinates market actors in line with plans, agencies’ interventions are simply elements of overarching development plans (Evans, 1995).

ESG cooperates with other government entities not just at home but also in Thailand. A notable instance of this is the Global Innovation Alliance, a joint ESG-EDB initiative. The initiative creates linkages between business communities in Singapore and 10 host countries, including Thailand. The GIA initiative in Thailand includes an ACE Innovation Centre (Bhunia, 2018); ACE, which is short for Action Community for Entrepreneurship, is an organization founded by ESG’s parent ministry MTI (Action Community for Entrepreneurship, n.d.). To support Singaporean firms in Thailand, ACE works in conjunction with the Finlab, which is another government entity, run jointly by SGInnovate and the large private Singaporean bank UOB (Bhunia, 2018). Besides ACE and the Finlab, there is also a designated local GIA partner in Thailand: RISE, a Bangkok-based accelerator that provides various services, including business trips in Thailand and Singapore, access to co-working spaces, and access to networking services (Akhaya, 2019). ESG in Thailand thus cooperates with other government agencies to influence market actors. Such cooperation matches with expectations for an agency in a government with a developmental mindset.

In sum, ESG’s mindset is developmental, as the framework expects. The foremost indication of this is that ESG is “paternalistic,” in the words of one former ESF worker, in that it sees its proper role as coordinating market actors. ESG’s workers generally expect that the government leads innovation, and they expect that their agency will lead firms’ internationalization. Such expectations and views exemplify the developmental mindset (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995). ESG justifies its interventions by showing they bring about economic development, which is also in line with expectations for an agency with a developmental mindset; government coordinating market actors is legitimate because it brings about economic development. ESG furthermore frames its interventions as cooperating with the interventions of other government agencies, as is to be expected of a government agency in a developmental state like Singapore.

Singapore's mindset and targets

In its support for business internationalization into Thailand, Singapore's mindset is developmental. This means the government believes economic development results from planning. From the government's perspective, planning is an ideal "organizing principle" for the economy; its proper role is to guide market actors, not to enable them to pursue their interests (Wade, 2018). The theoretical framework indicates that this developmental mindset means the government targets its interventions in a developmental fashion when supporting business internationalization into Thailand. The framework states, "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states." This means the government primarily targets benefits market actors in planned industries, and that it uses subsidies to support and incentivize engagement with planned industries. The last chapter showed how this causal pathway links mindset to targets exists at home. This section explores if the causal pathway linking mindset and targets also exists in the Singaporean government's support for business internationalization into Thailand.

Singapore's targets

Before discussing why Singapore's government targets its support for business internationalization as it does (and thus discussing if that targeting results from an underlying developmental mindset), I first discuss themes regarding ESG's targeting. The types of market actors to which Singapore's government prefers targeting benefits include firms either owned by or employing Singaporeans; internationalizing small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs);

firms developing or using next-generation technologies; market actors expanding to other Asian countries; and local SMEs that do not yet plan to internationalize but may someday do so. The first targeting preference, based on conversations carried out during fieldwork, is ESG apparently prefers to target benefits to firms that are locally owned by Singaporeans or which employ Singaporeans. There are many firms in Singapore which, although they are registered in Singapore, are owned by or employ foreigners; nearly a third of Singapore's total population is composed of foreigners (Strategy Group, 2018). Many interviewees mentioned this preference for "local" firms. One businessperson stated, for instance, "We applied for ESG assistance, but we haven't gotten support," musing this was because the firm employed many foreigners.

Another businessperson complained about how an application for ESG support failed because, compared to the other firms that were applying, their firm employed more foreigners. "We participated in a pitch competition and never heard back. When we asked why we didn't win, there was no answer. It was a kangaroo court." The pitch went positively, but the committee provided no explanation for why the firm did not win the support, nor did the committee respond to the firm's requests for more information. The firm that ultimately won support reportedly employed more Singaporeans. Another businessperson had a similar experience applying for assistance from SPRING, which is one of ESG's two predecessor agencies:

> "We knew someone on the committee. He said our pitch was 'fantastic.' We were supposed to get an answer within days, but it took weeks. Eventually, they said, 'Sorry, but we can't support this.' We were the only all-foreigners company… Of course, they didn't say this was the deciding issue, but it seemed to us like it was."

The preference for targeting benefits to local firms was confirmed by a government contractor, who described ESG as having a few "key metrics" that it generally uses to assess its success: "The number of jobs and employment numbers are important – specifically the number of full timers, even more specifically the number of additional Singaporean full timers."

SMEs are another type of market actor to which ESG prefers targeting benefits. As ESG's Chairman Peter Ong put it in a speech in 2019, ESG is "investing more efforts to help a broader base of SMEs that are keen to grow, take that first step overseas" (Enterprise Singapore, 2019). A businessperson agreed, summarizing ESG's preferences as follows: "Big firms oftentimes don't need support" and as such ESG often puts "more emphasis on support for the little guys." This preference for smaller firms was confirmed by a longtime ESG worker, who said the agency provides "broad base services that help build up capacity in Singapore before going abroad." In other words, the support is generally not for large firms with capacity to go abroad but instead for small firms that want to. One can see this preference on government news websites, which regularly feature stories about how ESG support is helping SMEs internationalize (Tan, 2020a; Wong, 2019).

The Enterprise Financing Scheme, which is one of ESG's principle loan schemes, has a clear SME focus (The Online Citizen, 2020). I identified no clear summary of the total value of loans distributed under this scheme, but, as discussed later in this chapter, it entails six loan programs, one of which appears to distribute approximately S$1 billion per year. Of the six EFS loan programs, two target SMEs. Five of the six programs have preferential terms for "young companies" (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-b), meaning firms that have formed within the last five years and that have 50% or more equity owned by individuals. The SME emphasis is also evident in the grant options listed under ESG's "financial assistance" offerings (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-a). Two options are for SMEs: Startup SG Founder and Startup SG Tech. Investment support options also target SMEs – two of the three listed investment support options are specifically focused on assisting SMEs: Startup SG Equity and SEEDS Capital (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-c). One of the main forms of "non-financial assistance" ESG offers is the Scale-up SG program, an accelerator program that matches SMEs to consultants which then help the SMEs to grow their business (Lai, 2019).

Several of ESG's joint initiatives with other government agencies target SMEs. The Tech@SG program, which ESG jointly implements with EDB, for instance, is intended to support SMEs

(ASEAN Briefing, 2020). Two other joint initiatives – Grow Digital with IMDA, and GlobalConnect@SBF with the Singapore Business Federation – are designed to support SMEs expanding into Southeast Asia (Baharudin, 2020a). ESG furthermore works with the Monetary Authority of Singapore to run Slingshot, an international startup pitch competition that connects small firms to potential investors (Chong, 2019a).

In Thailand specifically, ESG's initiatives often have an SME focus. The aforementioned GIA initiative in Thailand, for instance, features access to co-working spaces, support from the ACE innovation center, and internship opportunities – all of these services are targeted at SMEs as opposed to larger firms. To facilitate business networking in Thailand, ESG has also supported the expansion of a Thai accelerator into Singapore – again, this support is clearly of more relevance to SMEs (in this case for both those from Singapore and from Thailand) than it is to larger, established firms (Akhaya, 2019). The Finlab, which is one of ESG's partners for the GIA initiative, held an event in Thailand that was focused on providing networking activities for SMEs, not large firms (UOB, 2019).

A third type of market actor to which ESG prefers targeting benefits is firms developing or using next-generation technologies. This is because, as an analyst at Temasek Holdings put it, the government has a "thesis" that developing "tech 4.0" will strengthen Singapore's economy. The analyst is referring to technologies associated with the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution – a trend towards automation, AI, and data exchange as epitomized in business areas such as Internet of Things, smart cities, and precision farming. ESG's preference for supporting next-generation technologies thus reflects this more general government preference. One government contractor indicated that an important determinant of whether a firm is able to secure ESG funding is if it is developing "some sort of next-generation technology that advances the total sector." Another ESG worker confirmed that "tech 4.0 gets a lot of attention."

ESG's website and government media outlets also indicate this next-generation technology preference is important. The ESG site states, for instance, "We want to enable companies to develop new technologies or adopt technology solutions to create their own intellectual property" (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-d). ESG's strategic plan furthermore highlights the preference: "Companies need to change the way they manage their business operations as we move towards a more labour-constrained environment." It continues to say, "Our focus will be on helping more SMEs adopt digitalisation, technology and automation as a means to uplift productivity from the get-go." ESG's website highlights support for next-generation technology firms, such as a manufacturer that uses automation, a baker that uses automation, and various businesses that use "unmanned stores" (Huang, 2020; Zengkun, 2020; Heng, 2019). It has furthermore supported an e-commerce developer, subsidizing firms' use of the platform (Chan, 2019). It has developed the Grow Digital initiative with the Infocomm Media Development Authority to help firms with "innovating, digitalising and venturing overseas" (Baharudin, 2020a).

In Thailand specifically, ESG also prefers supporting next-generation technologies. The Global Innovation Alliance, for instance, represents this preference. GIA provides support to startups of all sorts, but it has a specific "focus on technology and innovation" (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-e). Some ESG offices abroad have regional directors who oversee ESG support on a regional level, but the office in Bangkok is unique because of the GIA initiative – beyond hosting a normal regional director, it also hosts a regional director specifically for GIA. The ESG office in Bangkok thus is exceptional in that it has two regional directors – one for normal services and one for GIA services.

According to a Singaporean businessperson whose firm does next-generation technology work and has a presence in Thailand, aligning with ESG's next-generation technology preference facilitates assistance: "We are investing in a company in Thailand. We can receive government funding, but only if it falls in line with their larger prioritized areas, otherwise it's difficult." ESG supports business trips to Thailand, such as its "Thailand 4.0: Seeing is Believing" in August 2018, that specifically emphasize opportunities for next-generation technologies (Singapore Business Federation, n.d.). The profiled industries on ESG's page about Thailand include

“Industry 4.0” and “digital innovation” (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-f). ESG also supported a Thailand-based accelerator to run an AI accelerator program in Singapore (The Straits Times, 2019b).

Another type of market actor to which ESG prefers targeting benefits is geographically defined: ESG, in line with government preferences more generally, prefers supporting firms expanding to Southeast Asia. Several individuals commented on this preference during interviews. ESG’s website provides evidence for this preference – it has more countries listed for the Asia-Pacific than for any other region. Its Global Ready Talent program, for instance, which subsidizes sending employees and students abroad, has a clear Asia focus – the website lists “Southeast Asia, China and India” as focus countries for “overseas work placements” (Global Ready Talent Programme, n.d.). State-run media reports that ESG support is “largely focused” on China and Southeast Asia. GlobalConnect@SBF, an ESG initiative, supports firms “expanding and deepening their presence” in Southeast Asia (Leow, 2020a; Baharudin, 2020a).

Another business area to which ESG prefers targeting benefits is domestic SME activity in Singapore that may someday benefit or lead to international business activity. This stems from ESG’s genesis: it was formed from the merger of International Enterprise Singapore, which supported international business activity, and SPRING, which supported domestic business development. ESG’s mission is more holistic – it helps firms “build capabilities, innovate and internationalise” (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-g). Sometimes its support direct links to potential business internationalization, but sometimes there is no clear link; some of the local SMEs will grow and internationalize, but it is not always clear how ESG’s support for domestic SMEs directly guides them to internationalize.

ESG is involved in several initiatives which are not core support programs featured on its site and which are intended to benefit domestic businesses. ESG contributes, for instance, to the Heartland Enterprise Upgrading Programme, which modernizes “mom-and-pop” shops (Tan, 2020b). It collaborates with the Ministry of Manpower to upgrade firms’ human resource operations (Human Resources Online, 2018). ESG moreover supports the SkillsFuture Enterprise Credit program, which gives employers S$10,000 in co-financing for upgrading (Tan, 2020c; Tan, 2020d). It additionally created a financial management toolkit for SMEs (Human Resources Online, 2018). In 2020 ESG launched the Enterprise Leadership for Transformation Programme to train SMEs, and the "Executive-in-Residence" program to fund trade associations and chambers in Singapore (Lam, 2020; The Straits Times, 2020a). ESG is also involved in designing a tax rebate scheme for commercial property owners, related to its arbitration role resolving a dispute between retailers and landlords (Leow, 2020b; Tay, 2020). Sometimes these initiatives are framed as likely having benefits for internationalization, but the initiatives' core beneficiaries are firms in Singapore that will not necessarily internationalize.

Several of ESG's core support programs also do not solely support internationalization. This is true, for instance, for Scale-up SG, one of ESG's most discussed "non-financial assistance" programs (ESG divides its support into "financial assistance" and "non-financial assistance" programs, to be discussed in more detail below). Scale-up SG is characterized in state media as an "accelerated growth programme" with few references to beneficiary firms going abroad (Lai, 2019). On ESG's website, the program description for Scale-up SG lightly mentions internationalization; the focus is instead "high growth local companies," some of which may ultimately end up going abroad (Lai, 2019). In terms of financial assistance options, several of the grants, loans, insurance, tax incentives, and investment programs are open to firms that are only operating domestically.

Indications that Singapore's mindset defines its targets

Does ESG's targeting as described above stem from an underlying developmental mindset? This is as the theoretical framework would expect, given one of its propositions states, "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states," and given that ESG clearly has a developmental mindset. Below, I discuss indications of a mindset-targeting causality link behind each of the targeting preferences discussed above. Indications of causality for these preferences strengthen confidence in my theoretical framework (Collier, 2011).

In terms of targeting benefits to firms which employ or which are owned by Singaporeans, this targeting preference clearly flows from Singapore's developmental mindset. The proper role of government in the developmental mindset is to coordinate market actors' behavior to achieve economic development (Wade, 2018). Targeting, in other words, is expected to align with government plans about which business areas need to grow to develop the economy. ESG's preference for targeting benefits to firms employing or owned by Singaporeans is indeed justified as a way to advance Singapore's economic development; as many interviewees brought up during conversation, there has recently been concerns that government intervention has overly benefitted firms that employ or are owned by foreigners.

Such concerns came to a head in the last decade, when there was public dissatisfaction with foreign firms "overcrowding" the business landscape, in the words of one businessperson whose firm has received ESG assistance. While targeting benefits to foreign firms has historically been important for developing Singapore's economy, there is a common perception now that continuing such targeting may be stymying the growth of domestic business. The extent to which Singapore can capture value is limited by many businesses being foreign-owned or employing foreigners. The end goal of government intervention is to improve the "material lives of ordinary Singaporeans" (Chua, 2017). Supporting foreign businesses can be a means to this end but it is simply a means – improving foreigners' prosperity is not the goal.

To this end, ESG now puts significant emphasis on targeting benefits to "real" Singaporean firms, in the words of one businessperson who has applied for ESG assistance. The businessperson stated, "Being able to play up the Singaporean identity helps" unlock business internationalization support from ESG. Several interviewees working in firms that have received ESG support stressed that, though this preference is sometimes formalized (i.e. applications may require showing proof a firm has a substantive presence in Singapore), the preferences are often informal. All else equal, ESG will choose to support the firm that appear to be "more Singaporean." ESG feels compelled to show that its efforts pay off in terms of securing valuable jobs for Singaporeans. This is why it made significant fanfare about the benefits of its first full year of operations in 2019, claiming it helped secure 20,000 jobs for Singaporeans (Lai, 2019).

Another targeting preference ESG has is for SMEs, which, again, stems from the government's developmental mindset. In terms of domestic market actors, Singapore's economy has been dominated by government-linked companies (GLCs), large conglomerates which have been criticized because they "compete with the private sector and potentially crowd out private businesses in new markets, products and technologies" (Milhaupt & Pargendler, 2017). GLCs are still valued as instruments for government intervention in markets, as many interviewees affirmed, but there is recognition that more SMEs should be cultivated. One particular reason for this is that SMEs are deemed to be more innovative and entrepreneurial, which is important for the development of "strategic areas" (Johnson, 1982) like biotech (Wong, 2011).

ESG is a government entity whose recent formation in 2018 reflects this emphasis on supporting SMEs instead of large firms. It was formed by merging International Enterprise Singapore, a business internationalization promotion agency, and SPRING, an enterprise development agency. SPRING historically had a focus on assisting SMEs to develop, whereas International Enterprise Singapore historically had a focus on supporting large firms internationalize. One ESG worker contrasted the two agencies' missions as follows:

> "I used to be in International Enterprise Singapore… Our role was to look at the [large companies] and help them go overseas.... SPRING helped small guys with 'capacitation', and then they would go to International Enterprise Singapore."

The reason for the merger, according to the ESG worker, was that there was a greater governmentwide emphasis on the importance of cultivating SMEs, and that in order for SMEs to achieve "domestic growth… growing abroad is important." According to this logic, Singaporean firms, regardless of their size, need to expand abroad in order to achieve business success. ESG targeting benefits to SMEs thus aligns with larger economic development plans: the government sees cultivating SMEs as important for economic development, and SMEs need to internationalize to succeed. ESG thus targets benefits to SMEs.

Another ESG targeting preference which stems from Singapore's developmental mindset is the preference for targeting benefits to firms using or developing next-generation technologies. This targeting relates to the perceived vulnerability of Singapore's economy. Singapore does not have enough resources to support its economic status – both in terms of producing and consuming products and services. In the era of globalization, this is true for all countries, but especially so for Singapore – it depends on imports for basic primary goods (e.g. food and water), manufactured products (e.g. consumer electronics and heavy machines), and human labor (e.g. construction workers and bankers). Next-generation technologies are a "thesis" for the government, in the words of one Temasek employee, because developing such technologies helps Singapore overcome a variety of dependencies. More automation in precision farming, for instance, means less dependence on imports of primary goods, manufactured products, and migrant labor. An ESG worker described the preference as follows:

> "We have grants in… automation… because Singapore has labor issues; we have an aging population and rely on foreign workers, but we also have local dissatisfaction with foreigners. Supporting automation basically lessens reliance on foreign human labor."

Another type of targeting – channeling benefits to firms expanding to other Asian countries – also stems from Singapore's developmental mindset. The focus on supporting such firms is part of government plans about what sorts of business areas must grow in order to ensure economic development. Deepening ties with neighboring countries has been a longstanding focus of government intervention in Singapore (Yeung, 2016; Hamilton-Hart, 2005). The focus continues today because Singapore's economic status is seen as being interconnected with that of the surrounding region. The expansion of manufacturing into Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, allowed Singapore to selectively concentrate higher-value activities in Singapore, outsourcing lower-value activities to those countries (Grundy-Warr et al., 1999). Many interviewees noted this is one reason why the Singaporean government pushes for developing the ASEAN Economic Community; more interconnectedness will hopefully increase regional productivity and in doing so position Singapore to capture higher-value economic activity.

The basic rationale for supporting business connectivity with neighboring countries has to do with Singapore being a "hub" of business activity in Southeast Asia. For individuals in the region with international business interests, or for businesspeople from further afield who would like to work throughout the region, Singapore is an attractive location from which to work. Despite Singapore's "hub" status, though, several interviewees – including those in several government agencies – commented that Singaporeans do not understand the rest of Southeast Asia well. This is a problem because it means Singaporean firms are missing out on business opportunities in the region. Individuals commented that Singaporeans rarely speak local languages of other Southeast Asian countries, and that although Singaporeans regularly travel in the region, this does not equate to them having in-depth understanding of local business environments.

The last type of market actor to which ESG targets its intervention benefits are local SMEs that do not yet plan to internationalize but may someday do so; this targeting preference, like the others discussed above, stems from Singapore's developmental mindset. An overarching goal of the Singaporean government is to cultivate more local SMEs – there is a common view that, to date, the government has overly emphasized supporting either foreign companies or local government-linked companies (GLCs). ESG, to rectify the situation, is supporting SMEs as they internationalize their business. This ties to ESG's support for local SMEs that have no immediate plans to internationalize because the more SMEs there are in the domestic market, the more SMEs there are that may someday internationalize. ESG, by targeting benefits to local SMEs – along with other government agencies – is creating SMEs that may someday internationalize.

In summary, the various prioritized business areas to which ESG targets benefits all appear to relate back to its developmental mindset in that ESG sees growing those business areas as important for Singapore's overall economic development. This is what the theoretical framework expects – that the developmental mindset leads to developmental targets. Whether it be supporting the internationalization of SMEs or next-generation technology firms, there is a clear government planning rationale behind the prioritization of each of these business areas. In line with the developmental mindset, ESG plans growth in these business areas to advance national economic development, and it thus targets interventions to affect market actors in those areas. It is "translating" its ambitions into action (Thurbon, 2016).

Singapore's mindset and tools

Since Singapore has a developmental mindset, the framework expects this means it will also use developmental tools. Just as the mindset "translates" into developmental targets, it will also "translate" into developmental tools (Thurbon, 2016). In a developmental state like Singapore, the framework expects tools that support and incentivize market actors' engagement with planned business areas. It furthermore expects the government generally uses subsidies (Amsden, 1989). The last chapter indicated this causality from mindset to tools and targets exists in the domestic context; Singapore's government uses developmental tools, apparently because of its developmental mindset, to "attract" firms to behave in particular ways (Rodan, 1989; Wong, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2018; Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). This section explores the extent to which a causal link also exists between developmental mindset and tools in terms of the government's support for business internationalization into Thailand.

Singapore's tools

Evidence does indeed indicate that the tools Singapore uses when supporting business internationalization are developmental. In its support for business internationalization into Thailand, in other words, Singapore uses tools which align with expectations – subsidies are used to support and incentivize market actors' engagement with planned industries. This is important for maintaining the framework's relevance because it is "necessary" to show tools are developmental; if they are not, then the framework must be "eliminated" (Collier, 2011). When supporting business internationalization, financial incentives are the main tools ESG uses to intervene – incentives include loans, grants, investment, and tax breaks. Most interviewees who have worked with ESG emphasized such incentives are the principal tools of intervention. From a private-sector perspective, many Singaporean businesspeople confirmed the centrality of incentives. One interviewee in Thailand said, "ESG provides easy access to grants." Another interviewee with business interests in Thailand stated, "If you want anything… [ESG] will direct you to see what grants are available." They recounted that they recently decided to not apply for ESG support, however: "We didn't really think about looking for [ESG] assistance because we had significant private investment from the get-go." This explanation is illuminating: it shows the extent to which the interviewee thinks of ESG support as purely financial.

ESG's website shows that financial incentive schemes do indeed feature prominently. On the website, ESG highlights two forms of assistance which it provides to support firms' business internationalization: "financial assistance" and "non-financial assistance," Some of the "non-financial assistance" is, in fact, arguably financial, as will be discussed later. For now, though, I review details about ESG's "financial assistance," which is divided into four categories:

1) Grants – There are 11 grant schemes. Beneficiaries include SMEs, local companies, and other entities. For SMEs, grants support early funding and developing technologies (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-a). For local companies, grants support technology adoption, internationalization, business upgrading, international collaboration, land use, and human capital development. For other entities, grants support trade associations, chambers, consortia, and incubators.

2) Loans and insurance – There are six loans and insurance schemes for a variety of business activities (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-h). They assist firms that: are seeking

financing to fuel growth; are seeking financing to deal with cashflow issues; are engaged in regional infrastructure development; are seeking insurance against borrower insolvency (this is for banks and financial institutions); are seeking political risk insurance (as they go abroad); and are seeking insurance against non-payment from buyers (this is for exporters).

3) Tax incentives – There are four tax incentives for firms that are internationalizing, are engaged in international trade, or are involved in fund management, venture capital, or private equity. Incentives include tax deductions and zero-rated tax relief (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-i).

4) Investments – There are three investment schemes that coinvest in either tech startups, firms with “strong” intellectual property, or firms in various key industries (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-c).

It is difficult to know how much financial support is channeled to recipients via these various financial incentive schemes, but the dollar amount appears to be in the billions. ESG claims its support in 2019 led to over S$17 billion in value, though I found no detailed breakdown for how this number was distributed amongst the schemes (Leow, 2020a). That being said, media citations and interviews provided more information about the values of three schemes in particular: the Market Readiness Assistance Scheme, the Enterprise Financing Scheme, and Startup SG. As described below, these three incentive schemes appear to collectively dispense over S$1 billion in annual incentives. The total amount of ESG financial assistance is likely more, given these schemes constitute a minority of the “financial assistance” ESG lists on its website.

- The first ESG financial incentive scheme often highlighted in media and interviews is the Market Readiness Assistance Scheme. (Baharudin, 2020b; Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-j). It provides grants to SMEs in the process of internationalizing. ESG reported (The Straits Times, 2020b) that in 2019 at least 1,500 firms benefitted from this scheme, which awards eligible SMEs with up to S$100,000 for three types of activities: up to S$20,000 for market promotion, up to S$50,000 for business development, and up to S$30,000 for market setup. It is unclear how much a firm typically receives when it applies for MRA grants. That being said, even if firms typically only receive S$20,000 of the possible S$100,000, and if ESG did indeed help 1,500 firms via this scheme in 2019, then this means ESG awarded at least S$30 million in total via MRA grants in 2019.

- The second commonly mentioned ESG financial incentive scheme is the Enterprise Financing Scheme (The Online Citizen, 2020), which is actually composed of six different loan schemes: the SME Working Capital Loan scheme; the SME Fixed Assets Loan scheme; the Venture Debt Loan scheme; the Trade Loan scheme; the Project Loan scheme; and the Mergers and Acquisitions Loan scheme. The loans' values range from S$1 million to S$50 million with repayment periods ranging from five to fifteen years (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-k; Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-l; Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-m). The lowest-value loan is under the SME Working Capital Loan scheme and is intended for single firms (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-k). Larger loans under other schemes are for "borrower groups" composed of multiple firms (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-b). It is unclear how much financing these various loan schemes provide recipient firms. That being said, the number is almost certainly in the billions – the SME Working Capital Loan scheme alone, for instance, provides approximately S$1 billion in funding annually; between 2016 and 2019 it enabled loans of approximately S$2.5 billion, and between October 2019 and March 2021 it was scheduled to enable loans of approximately S$1.8 billion (Sen, 2019; Kit, 2019).

- The third commonly mentioned financial incentive scheme is Startup SG, which has several "pillars." Four pillars are listed on ESG's website as "financial assistance": three grant schemes and one investment scheme (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-a; Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-c). The first pillar, Startup SG Founder, gives funding for financial, mentorship, and business networking purposes. It provides up to S$30,000 to beneficiary firms, which must raise and commit S$10,000 as a "co-matching fund" (Startup SG, n.d.-a). The second pillar, Startup SG Tech, provides funding for "fast-track commercialisation of scalable in-house [technology] solutions." Grants are capped at S$250,000 or S$500,000, depending on how advanced a firm's technology is (Startup SG, n.d.-b). The third pillar, Startup SG Accelerator, is for incubators and accelerators that house SMEs; it is unclear for how much this scheme's grants are. The fourth pillar, Startup SG Equity, co-invests in technology-focused firms along with private third-party investors (National University of Singapore, n.d.). It provides up to S$4 million for "general tech" firms and up to S$8 million for "deep tech" firms, and it appears to distribute over S$100 million annually. ESG reported that in 2019 1,000 firms benefitted from Startup SG (Wei, 2019). In February 2020, ESG announced S$300 million would be channeled through the Startup SG Equity scheme, spread out over three years (Quek, 2020; Cordon, 2020); this equates to approximately S$100 million per year (excluding third-party investment). In 2017, ESG announced Startup SG Founder would have a budget of S$20 million, apparently over five years (Chan, 2017; Loh, 2017); this equates to S$4 million in grants per year.

The various financial tools described above are precisely what the theoretical framework expects of a developmental state like Singapore. All the tools mentioned so far (and it was these tools which were most mentioned by interviewees when discussing ESG) subsidize firms' working in or entering planned business areas. The tools lower the costs of working in the planned business areas by subsidizing associated activities. Since the government intends to cultivate more next-generation technology firms, for instance, it uses co-financing from Startup SG Equity to support firms that are developing "general tech" and "deep tech." Since ESG supports SMEs' internationalization, for example, it uses several tools that specifically finance startups. These tools directly support market actors that are already engaged in the planned business area (e.g. tech-focused firms or SMEs that are internationalizing) and furthermore incentivize market actors to enter those areas (e.g. firms considering developing technology).

ESG also uses a variety of "non-financial" tools, though in fact many of them are arguably financial, at least from beneficiary firms' perspective – the tools subsidize their engagement with planned business areas. On its website, ESG lists nine categories of "non-financial assistance" that are sub-divided into nearly 30 items (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-n). Many items are informational (e.g. market guides or lists of incubators) (Startup SG, n.d.-c), but of the more substantive (i.e. not informational) items, several subsidize particular types of business activities which the government is trying to cultivate: Startup SG Talent funds internships and other work experiences (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-o); the Growth Partnership Program subsidizes acceleration and growth training programs (Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-p; Enterprise Singapore, n.d.-q); and the "talent and attraction development" category, besides linking to Startup SG Talent funding, also subsidizes professional development training (My Careers Future, n.d.). These tools are admittedly different from the more explicitly "financial assistance" tools. Education and training services are in a sense public goods – there are positive externalities from trainings which firms do not totally capture, so firms will tend to underinvest in them, and hence there is a strong case for government intervention.

Several of the "non-financial assistance" items on ESG's site simply link to "financial assistance" items already listed elsewhere on the site. The "supporting your startup journey" category of "non-financial assistance," for instance, links to three items which are already listed as "financial assistance" items: Startup SG Infrastructure, Startup SG Loan, and Startup SG Investor. The "network of partners" category of "non-financial assistance," on the other hand, links to Startup SG Founder, a type of "financial assistance" listed elsewhere on the site.

Indications that Singapore's mindset defines its tools

There is evidence to indicate that, not only are ESG's tools developmental, but that they are developmental because of ESG's developmental mindset. This supports expectations; recall that the theoretical framework states, "Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states." Below, I discuss these indications of such causality, which are important for the theoretical framework because they strengthen confidence in it (Collier, 2011).

The framework expects a developmental mindset to lead to the use of developmental tools because the role of government, in the developmental mindset, is to coordinate market actors' behavior – developmental tools make sense from this perspective because they support coordination. The goal of government is not to let market actors pursue whichever business areas they already find attractive. The goal is rather to incentivize market actors to engage with business areas which government deems are important. Developmental tools support this coordinating role – they are financial incentives which make it easier for market actors to work in planned business areas or which incentivize market actors to enter those business areas. Developmental tools "realize" the government's "ambition" to coordinate market actors (Thurbon, 2016).

Interviewees' accounts supported this causal explanation that ESG uses the tools it does because they effectively coordinating market actors' behavior in line with economic development plans. As one ESG worker stated, ESG uses "financial support" to "sweeten deals" and influence firms to pursue planned business areas. Another interviewee, a businessperson with interests in Thailand who has received ESG support, stated, "You can receive [ESG] funding, but only if it falls in line with [its] larger prioritized areas." Other businesspeople's accounts similarly show they know that, in order to access incentives, they must engage planned business areas. ESG uses the tools that it does precisely because they enable it to support and incentivize market actors' engagement with planned business areas.

The tools create incentive structures designed to take advantage of market actors' profit-seeking to draw them into planned areas, which is in line with expectations about the developmental mindset leading to developmental tools. Several interviewees stated it is still "ultimately up to" the firms to decide how they respond to ESG's tools; the government creates incentives but lets firms decide how to respond to them. This is as expected because, in the developmental mindset, government's role is to coordinate market actors' behavior by changing incentive structures. Government does not intervene to change market actors' motives, per se; they are still profit-seeking. Financial incentive frameworks instead take advantage of market actors' motives, using them to manipulate market actors' behavior in line with government's developmental objectives. This is similar to how Singaporean government agencies have, on many occasions, sought to "attract" market actors into planned business areas (Rodan, 1989; Wong, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2018; Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). As one ESG worker states, ESG has many employees "who are essentially… grants people," making schemes to attract firms to engage certain industries.

Many interviewees noted that accessing financing depends on firm initiative, which aligns with expectations that the government will focus on creating incentives designed to manipulate market actors' behavior. "When [firms] get to a certain size," said one ESG worker, "they start seeking out grants," emphasizing that accessing tools depends on the firms' initiative. Several interviewees emphasized that ESG workers will not go out of their way to give firms access to support – they do not act as internal "champions" for firms but are instead hands-off. It is up to the firms to pursue support. One ESG worker described the hands-off process as follows:

> "You apply through the portal. If you meet certain basic requirements, the portal will give you a case officer who you probably won't meet. They check to see how well you fit their metrics… They might give feedback. After their decision, you can apply for appeal."

Another businessperson who has received ESG assistance stated, "If you want anything, you have to look for it yourself. They'll direct you to the site to see what grants are available." Another businessperson similarly emphasized that firm initiative is important, stating:

> "There are lots of people [in ESG] with inside information. If they had a way to leverage that in the form of a champion, that would be great… Assign a champion to a firm. Unfortunately, that's not how it works. Project managers are supervisors."

This emphasis on firm initiative was corroborated by other individuals who work for or who previously worked for ESG. “We don’t really bring up grants unless companies ask for them,” said one interviewee, continuing to say that, “For firms to access support, they need to approach or send an email. They share their plans, and then this allows ESG to figure out what forms of assistance it can provide.” Another interviewee stated, “The situation is 90%-10% in that 90% of the time firms have to approach the government.” Another ESG worker stated that “firms generally access services by initiating on their own.” A common theme in discussions with these ESG workers is that government does not generally intervene specifically to support any particular firm because that is not its role. Government’s role is to shape the overall economy, using incentives to prioritize growth in certain areas instead of in others.

Many interviewees described ESG as using tools because they directly coordinate market actors’ behavior, and also because they support and incentivize engagement with planned business areas more indirectly. Receiving government financing reportedly facilitates market actors’ ability to access further financing. This is because other financial services providers pay attention where government directs its financing; if the government finances next-generation technology firms, for instance, then private financiers will be likelier to support next-generation technology firms, also. This means that the initial effects of the government tools – financial incentives like subsidies and grants – are multiplied to become more influential.

This multiplier effect occurs for two reasons, interviewees said. First, there is significant social pressure in Singapore to support government development plans, so if the government is pushing to develop a certain business area, then market actors are expected to provide a “pound of flesh” in “continued national service” to support the development of that business area. The second reason is if a firm receives financial support from ESG, then it is seen as being likelier to succeed. There is a common perception that once the Singaporean government starts investing in firms or business areas, then those firms or business areas are likelier to succeed. For private financial services providers, therefore, they take queues from government about where to channel financing. As one businessperson put it, “Government assistance is important. It helps with unlocking support from Singaporean venture capital firms… they see you have received even just a symbolic amount, and they’re likelier to give further investment.” Given that government wants to coordinate market actors, these indirect effects make developmental tools even more useful from the government perspective; not only do subsidies and incentives directly influence market actors’ behavior, but they also do so indirectly.

Some interviewees indicated that, once firms access ESG support, there is strong oversight to account for how firms use the funds, which aligns with expectations for a government agency whose mindset dictates it should coordinate market actors’ behavior in line with economic development plans. The point of providing incentives is, after all, to coordinate market actors so that they engage with business areas which the government plans to grow. The government would naturally monitor market actors to make sure they are using funds in line with economic development plans. As an ESG worker put it, “The account manager is definitely concerned with accountability. How are the firms using the money?” One businessperson stated:

> “With ESG, I had a similar experience as what I had with SPRING [an ESG predecessor agency]. SPRING was obsessively concerned with monitoring expenditures that were using grant money. As a startup, you have to make a lot of pivots. Clients change, you have to repurpose plans. But for SPRING, you had to get a half dozen sign-offs just to make RAM upgrades or get new workstations – just for around S$5k of expenditure!”

Besides the financial assistance schemes listed above and the other ones that it features on its website, ESG also involves itself in several other incentive schemes that it jointly administers with other government agencies. The fact that agencies join forces in designing and implementing tools is as expected for a developmental state – the point of developmental tools, after all, is to support and incentivize desired types of market activity, and those desired types of market activity are determined according to government plans. It thus makes sense that ESG, when intervening to support business internationalization, would cooperate with other agencies. The following incentive schemes were often mentioned in media citations and by interviewees as important: ESG is cooperating with the Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) on an initiative called Grow Digital (Infocomm Media Development Authority, n.d.); ESG is cooperating with the Housing Development Board, the Housing Board, and Heartland Enterprise Centre Singapore on a financial incentive scheme called the Heartland Enterprise Upgrading Programme (Tan, 2020b); and ESG is working with SkillsFuture Singapore on a program called Enterprise Leadership for Transformation (Tan, 2020c).

Another government agency with which ESG works is the Singapore Corporation Enterprise, established in 2006 by ESG's parent ministry MTI and now an "integrated arm" of ESG (Singapore Cooperation Enterprise, n.d.-a). SCE's mission is to "respond" to foreign interest in "Singapore's development experience" (Singapore Cooperation Enterprise, n.d.-a), which in practice means that SCE supports study visits, training programs, and advisory services in Singapore for foreign governments (Singapore Cooperation Enterprise, n.d.-b). Relevant to ESG's support for business internationalization, SCE also supports public-private partnerships involving Singaporean firms abroad (Singapore Cooperation Enterprise, n.d.-c). One interviewee who works for such a firm stated, "SCE helps firms go abroad and get government contracts or sign MOUs with foreign governments." Other agencies with which ESG works are EDB and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). ESG and EDB administer the Tech@SG program (ASEAN Briefing, 2020), which lets firms hire foreign workers. With the MAS, ESG established a regional infrastructure development forum and organized a startup competition to match firms with financing (Infrastructure Asia, 2019; Infrastructure Asia, n.d.; Chong, 2019b); both initiatives help ESG's mission by creating international business opportunities.

In line with expectation from the theoretical framework, the tools ESG uses to support business internationalization appear to stem from its underlying developmental mindset. Not only does it predominately use financial incentives to intervene, but it uses them specifically to incentivize and support market actors' engagement with planned business areas. Since ESG has a developmental mindset and sees its proper role as coordinating market actors, it uses tools that help achieve this end. They are designed to "sweeten" business areas and manipulate market actors' profit-seeking motives. ESG focuses on creating attractive incentives and then letting market actors choose how to respond to them. ESG knows that its tools not only directly influence market actors' decision-making, but also indirectly by helping unlock more financing. It furthermore designs and uses tools in coordination with other government agencies. All of this aligns with expectations and indicates that ESG uses its tools because of its mindset.

Other explanations for targets and tools

In this chapter so far, I have argued that in its support for business internationalization into Thailand, Singapore conforms to the framework's expectations for a developmental state: it has a developmental mindset, meaning it sees its role as guiding market actors in line with plans; it uses developmental tools, meaning it subsidizes engagement with planned business areas; and it has developmental targets, meaning it targets interventions towards market actors in planned business areas. I have also argued that there is causality – that Singapore's developmental mindset is what causes it to use its developmental tools and targets.

There are also other factors, not accounted for in the framework, which likely explain why Singapore supports business internationalization as it does. As mentioned before, that these other factors are necessarily alternative explanations; it is not the case that only they can have merit, or that only my framework can have merit. Rather, they can be complementary. These other factors, as well as Singapore's developmental mindset, likely explain tools and targets. Three other factors in particular which likely inform Singapore's tools and targets are: the political context in Singapore, meaning the relationships that exist between relevant government organizations and other actors; the government's organizational structure, meaning how various government organizations relate to each other; and the host country context, meaning characteristics specific to Singapore's business presence in Thailand.

The first factor, the political context, is recognized generally as being important for developmental states' approaches to intervention (Evans, 1995). Bureaucrats need to be connected to the communities of market actors which their interventions affect, but they must not be so connected as to become beholden to business interests. This is what differentiates governments in successful developmental states like Singapore from governments in other countries which want to bring about development, but which fail to do so (Evans, 1995). In the case of Singapore's support for business internationalization into Thailand, this means ESG personnel would be well aware of what is happening in terms of the bilateral economic relationship with Thailand, but also that they would be somewhat hands-off from firms.

This "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995) is precisely how fieldwork indicated the relationship between ESG and market actors to be. In terms of bureaucrats' embeddedness, interviewees noted ESG has numerous "grants people" in Singapore with intimate understanding of the business areas that the grants they make are intended to affect. Based on their awareness of market realities, these workers create incentives which effectively influence market actors to behave in line with government plans (e.g. subsidizing the internationalization of "local" Singaporean firms that are using next-generation technologies). It is also true that ESG bureaucrats appear to be autonomous; several interviewees mentioned, for instance, that the process of accessing financial incentives is formal. ESG staff do not internally "champion" firms which they prefer, as one businessperson put it; it would be difficult for a firm to use a personal relationship with a bureaucrat to secure access to subsidies.

The second factor, organizational structure, may also explain why Singapore supports business internationalization as it does. Developmental states like Singapore are often described as having "pilot" agencies (Johnson, 1982) that coordinate intervention and make sure that interventions stick to a plan. Developmental states' centralization, as opposed to the "decentralised" (MacNeil, 2013) nature of regulatory states, may explain differences between the two political economy types' approaches to intervention. In the case of Singapore's support for business internationalization into Thailand, ESG certainly appears to be the pilot agency.

When discussing how the Singaporean government supports business internationalization into Thailand, interviewees almost exclusively mentioned ESG as being the relevant agency. ESG's mission, based on the missions of its two predecessor agencies, is to support innovation of small local firms in Singapore and to then help them expand their business abroad.

It is hard to argue that ESG being a pilot agency does not affect how Singapore supports business internationalization. Consider, for instance, what the implications would be if interviewees mentioned several government organizations as being important for supporting business internationalization. If so, then Singapore's tools and targets would likely reflect a combination of the missions of those different agencies. Instead, the tools and targets which Singapore uses reflect ESG's mission. According to interviewees, before ESG was formed by the merger of SPRING and International Enterprise Singapore, the latter organization was the one primarily responsible for supporting business internationalization and it did not have as much of an emphasis on SMEs as ESG does (this aspect of ESG's mission is informed by the mission of SPRING, which encouraged "enterprise formation and growth") (Kompass, n.d.). International Enterprise Singapore focused more on large firms, and interviewees said it targeted its support to larger firms; in order to access services, firms needed to be of a certain size, and tools used to support large firms were furthermore different than tools used to support SMEs. The transition from International Enterprise Singapore to ESG, and the corresponding changes in terms of Singapore's targets and tools, shows that organizational structure does indeed matter.

The host country context is a third factor not included in the theoretical framework which likely explains how Singapore supports business internationalization. It is well-known that, as firms internationalize into other countries, their approaches to doing business vary in response to the host country context, as do their home governments' approaches to supporting them (Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Doner, 1991). In the case of Singapore's business presence in Thailand, a common issue mentioned by interviewees was Singaporean government workers' wariness of being perceived as intervening too heavily in Thailand. This wariness is partially a consequence of the experience of the sovereign wealth fund Temasek; as discussed before, it was exposed to political risk by investing in a company owned by an ousted former prime minister (Goldstein & Pananond, 2008). Temasek ultimately divested its controlling stake in that company (The Straits Times, 2019a). Interviewees asserted, though, that there continues to be sensitivity in Singapore's government about being perceived as too heavily intervening in Thailand.

Another issue regarding Singapore's business presence in Thailand mentioned by interviewees as potentially influencing Singapore's tools and targets is the following: there is some wariness in Thailand's government about Singapore intending for itself to host high-value business activity in ASEAN. Singapore often leads efforts to economically integrate ASEAN (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.-b). Its apparent objective in these efforts is to become a hub for business in the region, with high-value activities being located in Singapore and with low-value activities being located elsewhere (Tay & Wau, 2020). This has indeed been the objective of Singaporean government-led efforts to create the so-called "growth triangle" between Singapore, Indonesia, and Malaysia (Grundy-Warr et al., 1999; Bunnel et al., 2006; Diez et al., 2019). Interest groups in Thailand do not want the country to be relegated to hosting low-value business activity. Singaporean bureaucrats know about this wariness about Singapore taking all the high-value business activity, and this reportedly is another reason, according to interviewees, why they do not want to be seen as intervening too heavily in Thailand.

These contextual factors may partially explain why Singapore uses some of the tools and targets that it does when supporting business internationalization into Thailand. ESG may prefer supporting SMEs, for instance, because doing so is less likely to provoke negative reactions in Thailand than supporting the expansion of large government-linked companies. ESG may prefer targeting business areas because they align with Thailand's own economic development ambitions. Targeting support to firms using next-generation technologies, for instance, aligns with the ambitions of Thailand's economic planners, who are promoting "Thailand 4.0" (Singapore Business Federation, n.d.). ESG may perceive such targeting as less likely to provoke local dissatisfaction.

These other factors – political context, organizational structure, and host country context – all seem likely to have some explanatory power. It would be interesting to conduct further research to study how they compare to mindset in terms of their explanatory power, as well as how they relate to each other. The host country context and Singapore's mindset seem likely to be relatively independent of each other. The host country contextual issues mentioned above – Singapore's wariness about repeating a Temasek-like exposure to political risk, and Thailand's sensitivity to simply hosting low-value business activity – are informed by many factors besides Singapore's developmental mindset.

Singapore's political context and organizational structure, though, may be more influenced by its mindset. Regarding the political context, numerous interviewees stated that government's proper role is to be "entrepreneurial." Singaporean firms are seen as not entrepreneurial and as needing to take the lead from government. This perspective, which is essentially that of the developmental mindset, may explain the autonomous reputation of ESG workers; they see their proper role as coordinating business activity, and intricating themselves with interest groups would be inappropriate. In terms of organization, it has been argued that a government's "capacity" (Geddes, 1994) to carry out developmental campaigns relies on the motivations of individuals working in government. This implies bureaucrats will not create particular organizational structures if they do not align with their interests, which may in Singapore's case may be defined by developmental mindsets. ESG is the pilot agency that leads support for business internationalization, and this organizational structure may result from Singaporean government workers' view that an agency with such a mission is appropriate.

New Zealand's approach to intervening in markets

In this chapter, I introduce New Zealand as a regulatory state and discuss the factors of interest to the theoretical framework – mindset, targets, and tools. The chapter explores New Zealand's approach to intervening in markets since the 1980s to test the framework. This chapter is not concerned with New Zealand's recent support for business internationalization into Thailand; that particular context will be the focus of the next chapter. This chapter, instead, summarizes evidence regarding New Zealand's mindset, targets, and tools in a variety of other contexts. It furthermore explains why New Zealand's targets and tools are as they are; there is a significant amount of evidence to indicate that New Zealand's mindset, targets, and tools are "regulatory," as defined in the theoretical framework. There is also good reason to believe, in line with expectations from the theoretical frameworks, that the mindset of New Zealand's government explains why it intervenes with particular targets and tools.

New Zealand's mindset

The theoretical framework expects New Zealand to have a regulatory "mindset" (Thurbon, 2016). This mindset sees government's proper role as enabling market actors to pursue their interests; its role should be to unleash competition. One way of thinking about this mindset is that it is "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982), meaning it sees economic development as resulting from market actors behaving "autonomously and spontaneously" (Block, 2008). This does not mean, though, that government retreats from influencing market actors (Vogel, 2018; Weiss, 2012). Government's role is to instead ensure that "market forces… determine… prices" (Rodan, 1989). In the regulatory mindset, government should intervene to create and enforce rules that ensure market actors can fairly compete with each other (Levi-Faur, 1998; Majone, 1996).

In the 1980s, New Zealand experienced a significant "pro-market economic restructuring" (Nicholls, 2017) led by "ideologically committed senior officials within Treasury, the Reserve

Bank and the State Service Commission" (Kelsey, 2015). The reforms have variously been described as a "'crash through' approach to economic liberalisation" or a "package of extreme-right neoliberal economic policies" (Goldfinch, 2000; Challies & Murray, 2008). Such was the intensity of these reforms that they are sometimes likened to the "shock therapy" reforms implemented in Chile during the 1980s (Challies & Murray, 2008). The reforms were catalyzed by perceived poor economic performance, which worsened in 1973 when the UK joined the European Economic Community and New Zealand exporters lost favorable tariff rates. (Easton, 1997; Challies & Murray, 2008; Goldfinch, 2000). To rectify the situation, the incoming Labour government promised to "liberalise the economy; that is, to use the market to regulate resource decisions more and to rely less on government intervention, especially with regard to border protection" (Easton, 1997). It floated the currency; deregulated financial markets; reduced the fiscal deficit; designed monetary policy to encourage deflation; deregulated labor markets; reduced trade protection; and corporatized or privatized public entities (Goldfinch, 2000). New Zealand has since become known as a "poster child for market-based reforms" (Ardern, 2019).

As the theoretical framework expects, the New Zealand government does indeed often frame its proper role as helping market actors pursue their interests. The government sees its appropriate role as enhancing rather than changing market actors' decision-making; it wants to help them do what they already want to do. The government, for instance, perceives New Zealand's "small size and long distance from [foreign] markets" as "handicaps" that New Zealand market actors must overcome; the government sees New Zealand market actors as relatively unsophisticated in a global context (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005). The government is thus justified in helping firms develop business savviness to overcome these handicaps.

To enable market actors to pursue their interests, the government sees one of its principle roles as preventing market power concentration. The government's goal in preventing market power concentration is to make sure that no market actor becomes so powerful as to disrupt competition; such a situation is perceived as a "market failure" that prevents markets from producing “an efficient outcome” (Commerce Commission, 2016). The Commerce Commission is the main government agency “responsible for enforcing laws relating to competition” (Commerce Commission, n.d.) and its establishment was a “key element” of New Zealand’s shift to “‘light-handed’ regulation of competition in the 1980s” (Evans et al., 1996). Breaking up or preventing market power concentration (e.g. stopping mergers that form monopolies) is a legitimate form of government intervention. This is as expected, given that the regulatory mindset sees government’s role as enabling competition.

The government is uncomfortable, on the other hand, imposing “restrictions” on market actors; this has been the subject of debate in many areas of government intervention, such as intervention in public transport markets (van de Velde & Wallis, 2013). The government does not want to impose requirements that radically alter market actors’ strategies (i.e. forcing public transport operators to only compete for “subsidized” government-initiated contracts). Also related to transport, though in this case regarding personal vehicles, the government has resisted intervening in ways it sees as constraining decision-making. For instance, despite committing to greenhouse gas emission reductions, the government has opposed restricting which sorts of cars can be imported and has furthermore shown little interest in changing road networks to minimize use of personal vehicles (Stephenson et al., 2018). The government prefers a “laissez-faire approach” rather than achieving “transformative impact” (Stephenson et al., 2018).

The government generally wants the direction of economic development to be determined by market actors acting in self-interested ways; it does not want to tell market actors that they should pursue a particular area of business. In the transport sector again, for instance, the government prefers “market-led solutions” (Stephenson et al., 2018). In the context of the film industry, the New Zealand Film Commission has “supported a very wide range of subjects and styles, as it considered this the best way for the industry to find its strengths… [this] was a conscious decision for the industry to determine its own development” (Clydesdale, 2015).

To the extent the government does promote particular business areas, it prefers to build off pre-existing activity. In Auckland's regional governance, for instance, development initiatives "came into existence not through a targeted and planned process, but rather emerged as a combination of relatively independent events and processes that consequently became variously and tentatively connected and aligned" (Wetzstein, 2008). In cluster development initiatives, pre-existing business activities are often canvassed and then, once strengths are identified, the government supports them. This is a bottom-up approach to economic development that prioritizes areas where market actors already have pre-existing interests.

The government believes that rules governing market behavior should, at least in part, be designed and implemented by market actors; this makes sense in the regulatory mindset, because growth happens when market actors behave "autonomously and spontaneously" (Block, 2008), and rules designed without market actors' input may prevent them from pursuing their interests. In "environmental management practices" in the agricultural sector, for instance, rules to a large extent depend on "farmers' willingness and ability to adopt" them (Knook et al., 2020). In the financial sector, the government gives market actors authority in terms of deciding on and enforcing industry standards; the government focuses on requiring transparency via disclosures, which then enables "private sector monitoring" (Mayes, 2015).

Related to the above points, and as expected of a government with a regulatory mindset, the government often sees its appropriate role as giving market actors more choice – it should be intervening to allow market actors to be able to pick and choose from many options rather than be constrained to a few products or services. One of the major perceived benefits of government intervention in the financial sector, for instance, has been increasing market actors' "access to new products and technologies" that are of better quality than previous alternatives (Singleton & Verhoef, 2010). In the power sector, also, the justification for government intervention was to improve "choice for customers" (Hooks & Tooley, 2015). In telecommunications, intervention was designed so that "the 'long-term benefit of end-users' would be served" (Thompson, 2014). A similar logic can be seen in the government's intervention in labor markets; the government believed “capital and labour should have greater choice in their relationship with each other, in particular employers should have greater flexibility to affect wages and conditions in accord with specific… conditions” (Morrison, 2004).

The government sees enabling “free markets” as a way to produce “optimal” (Wade, 2018) outcomes, so much so that the government has made its own internal organization more businesslike. In line with New Public Management (NPM) reforms, government entities are “thermostat-like”; they are rewarded for pursuing “clearly [specified] objectives and… generate quality information about progress” in meeting those objectives (Norman & Gregory, 2003). “In the NPM model, ministers are expected to be discerning purchasers of public services on behalf of electors who want to see costs kept down… ‘outputs’ are the primary focus of accountability for results” (Norman & Gregory, 2003). This approach exists in the schooling sector, for instance, where schools are left to implement “centrally mandated” goals and are then audited to make sure they are delivering outcomes (Court & O’Neill, 2011).

In summary: the government is comfortable enabling existing business activity; it is uncomfortable constraining it; it wants economic development to be driven from the bottom up; it wants rules governing market behavior to be designed and implemented by market actors; and it wants market actors to be able to choose what they want to do. The government believes that market actors will “sort themselves out” most effectively when government “really steps back” (Turner et al., 2016). The collective behavior of self-interested market actors is ultimately beneficial. Economic development is most likely to come about, in line with the regulatory mindset, when market actors are given the freedom to do as they please.

The New Zealand government believes that enabling market actors’ pursuit of their interests makes sense because doing so leads to economic growth. Economic growth, whether thought of in terms of total value or efficiency of activity, is often the rationale for government’s facilitation of competition. In agriculture, for instance, the goal of government intervention was “enhanced productivity changes” (Sandrey & Vink, 2007). In the power sector, a goal of intervention has been to “improve economic efficiency,” indicated by falling “real price levels” for end users (Hooks & Tooley, 2015; Abbott, 2010). With regards to interventions relating to employee-worker relations, government intended to “promote an efficient labor market” (Morrison, 2004). In the film industry, government intervention reportedly led to “far higher levels of efficiency and productivity” (Clydesdale, 2015). In the transport sector, intervention is envisioned as supporting “the growth of our economy” (Stephenson et al., 2018).

New Zealand’s mindset and targets

New Zealand’s mindset is regulatory, which means that the government believes economic development results from market competition; from the government’s perspective, competition, not government planning, is an ideal “organizing principle” for the economy (Wade, 2018). According to my framework’s second theorized proposition, “Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states.” Because the government sees its proper role as supporting competition, it naturally follows that it will target its interventions in particular ways. I expect this means the government will target benefits to market actors that are competitive; though different government agencies will support business areas that align with their missions, the agencies will specifically focus on supporting market actors within those business areas which the agencies perceive as being competitive. It also follows from the regulatory mindset that New Zealand’s government will target interventions in business areas where it perceives intervention as necessary to enable more general competition throughout the economy; it will break up monopolies, for instance, or ensure critical business areas are functioning so that market actors throughout the economy can compete with each other.

New Zealand’s targets

Before discussing why the New Zealand government targets its interventions as it does (and thus exploring if its regulatory mindset defines those targets), I first briefly summarize some of the main areas where it has tended to target its interventions over the years. The situation is different than in Singapore, where the government has clearly targeted its interventions to develop a series of industries whose growth it sees as critical to economic development. New Zealand's government is more varied in its targeting. It has targeted interventions towards some industries, yes, but it has also targeted interventions in other ways, such as towards geographically defined business areas or particular sorts of market actors.

In terms of targeting interventions towards particular industries, the government has indeed targeted interventions into critical industries in a manner that, on the surface, appears similar to how governments in developmental states carry out "industrial planning" (Wade, 2018). Targeted industries have included transportation (Stephenson et al., 2018); the financial sector (Mayes, 2015; Kelsey, 2015); telecommunications (Thompson, 2014); agriculture (Vavra, 2011); the power sector (Hooks & Tooley, 2015); and fishing (Aranda & Christensen, 2009). When intervening in these industries, the government focuses not on influencing any particular market actor but rather on creating and enforcing rules affecting activity in those industries. The government will intervene, for instance, by creating and enforcing rules about how market power is divided among firms in the industry (Vavra, 2011; Aranda & Christensen, 2009).

The government has also targeted intervention in business areas – meaning distinct realms of business activity – that are defined not as pertaining to particularly industries but instead in some other way. The government has, for instance, intervened to support geographically defined business areas, such as in Auckland (McArthur, 2017) or other regions (Perry, 2005; McArthur, 2017; Wetzstein, 2008). The target of intervention in these cases is geographically defined – communities of market actors located in a certain geography. The government has also intervened in business areas that are defined neither by industry nor geography. It has, for instance, intervened to create and enforce rules regarding labor relations (Morrison, 2004), and to create and develop support programs for firms exporting abroad (Turner et al., 2016).

Another way the government has targeted its interventions is not so much in terms of particular business areas, but instead in terms of particular types of market actors. Notably, the government has intervened to support firms that it perceives as being on the cusp of success. Beneficiary firms can be either groups of firms or individual firms (Perry, 2005). Support can be targeted to firms according to their business activity – i.e. exporting (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005) – or as defined in other ways – by industry or geography, for instance (Perry, 2005). The government has also targeted support to firms according to their ethnic identity, as happens for Māori firms (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005). The common theme is that the government targets benefits to firms that are in the process of developing their business, but which have not yet succeeded; support is framed as providing the assistance firms need to succeed.

Indications that New Zealand's mindset defines its targets

There is good reason to believe that the targets described above stem from New Zealand's underlying regulatory mindset. This is as expected, according to the theoretical framework's second proposition, which states: "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states." Indications of causality are important for strengthening confidence in the framework (Collier, 2011). They show that New Zealand's government does indeed "translate" (Thurbon, 2016) its ambitions into corresponding action, specifically in terms of targeting.

Much of the industry-focused targeting, for instance, appears to be driven by a belief inside government that these industries are critical and that they need to function properly because market actors throughout the economy require them to be functioning well – market actors need transportation, financing, telecommunications, and power, for instance. The government intervenes in these industries by creating and enforcing rules that it believes improves competition in those industries, thus increasing their efficiency and supporting businesses throughout the rest of the economy.

Transportation falls into this category of critically important industries. A key strategy document outlining the government's approach to intervening in the transport sector indicates the government aims to achieve "an effective, efficient, safe, secure, accessible and resilient transport system that supports the growth of our economy" (Stephenson et al., 2018). The critical nature of transportation is implied at the end of sentence – a well-functioning transport sector ensures economic growth. In order for the economy to function, factors of production (e.g. capital and people) and also products (e.g. consumer goods) should face little hindrance to being bought and purchased. A well-functioning transport system removes one sort of hurdle. Transport systems indirectly affect market actors in essentially all other business areas, given that factors of production and products must be transported from one location to another.

Another industry often portrayed as critically important and thus justifying intervention by the government is the financial sector. A well-functioning financial industry essentially lowers the cost of money, which enables more market interactions and thus more growth. If everything costs more because an uncompetitive financial sector raises the price of money (e.g. banks are not competing to offer cheaper loans), this hinders economic growth. An underregulated financial sector also threatens economic growth, because if financial institutions overly leverage themselves in their efforts to compete for customers, this can lead to financial crises. The government thus tries to intervene to achieve this tightrope walk (Mayes, 2015; Kelsey, 2015).

Telecommunications is another industry in New Zealand's economy whose critical importance justifies government intervention. The government has intervened to affect market actors' activity in this industry out of concerns that New Zealand's "digital infrastructure was not keeping up with developments in other OECD countries" (Thompson, 2014). The government's "zeal" for intervening in telecommunications rested on the belief that "New Zealand's economic standing depended on developing its information and technology sector"; not developing the telecommunications sector puts New Zealand's "way of life and standard of living… at risk" (Thompson, 2014). As countries ascend the value chain, there is generally a greater emphasis on creating value through information-based services. The importance of telecommunications networks, which facilitate the flow of information, is thus critical.

Another industry the government perceives as critically important and which thus justifies intervention is the power sector. Power is important because electricity generation, transmission, and distribution is something upon which all market actors depend. If electricity prices rise due to inefficiency, virtually all business becomes costlier, which threatens economic growth. The point of intervention in the power sector is to reduce "inefficiency" and "excessive profits" by making a more "competitive market" (Hooks & Tooley, 2015).

The reason New Zealand's government targets these industries is different than the reason Singapore's government targets particular industries. In Singapore, as discussed in previous chapters, the reason for targeting industries is because the government wants them to grow; the government has a plan about how the national economy should grow, and it channels benefits to market actors in industries which it prioritizes as part of its plans. Singapore's targeting stems from its "plan-rationality" (Johnson, 1982), which sees a "need for the state to coordinate" (Wade, 2018) economic activity. In New Zealand, although the government sometimes targets interventions towards particular industries, it does so for different reasons, based in its "market-rationality" (Johnson, 1982). It believes it must maintain competitiveness in important industries to support their efficiency, because market actors' competition throughout the economy depends on those important industries functioning.

A similar rationality exists in some of the government's geographically defined targeting preferences. In the case of targeting interventions to affect Auckland-based market actors, for instance, the government sees the city as an "engine room" that drives the rest of "New Zealand's economic growth" (McArthur, 2017). Interventions in Auckland's business community have been "justified by imperatives for international competitiveness" (McArthur, 2017). If Auckland's economy suffers, so does all of New Zealand's. The government is thus justified when intervening to, for instance, stimulate construction of more houses (McArthur, 2017).

Labor is yet another business area, neither defined in terms of industry or geography, where the government has intervened because it sees doing so as important for supporting competition throughout the economy. Again, this is in line with expectations of a government with a regulatory mindset. If contracts between employers and employees are inefficient and raise the price of labor, this is problematic for economic growth since most economic activity depends on labor as a factor of production. The government has intervened in labor markets to essentially increase their efficiency and thus lower the cost of the factor of production, similar to what it has done regarding power, finance, or transport (Morrison, 2004).

Several of the governments' other targeting preferences stem from the its regulatory mindset. The government intervenes to support business areas – regional development initiatives (Perry, 2005; McArthur, 2017; Wetzstein, 2008) or communities of exporters (Turner et al., 2016) – because those business areas have proven their competitiveness. The regulatory mindset sees government's role as supporting competitiveness, not just by ensuring conditions enable competition but also by rewarding market actors that are competitive. Central government intervention in regional development initiatives, for instance, often happens after a regional business area has emerged as being competitive without central government support. With the central government's Cluster Development Program, for instance, it only intervened to support local clusters once they became established without support (Perry, 2005). Similarly, the central government only began "[showing] greater interest" in Auckland "as the region showed strong economic growth" (McArthur, 2017). The government's interest in supporting Auckland began once local business communities proved their competitiveness (Wetzstein, 2008).

Targeting intervention to support exporters also stems from the regulatory mindset – exporters had proven their competitiveness, justifying government support. When the government "set the goal of doubling the value of New Zealand exports as a share of gross domestic product by 2020" (Turner et al., 2016), its attention to exports as an important business area appeared to be a function of the already-extant importance of exports; put differently, if exports were not already an important business area, it seems likely the government would not have targeted exports for growth. Exporters had shown they were competitive, thus justifying support.

As mentioned above, the government also sometimes frames its interventions as targeting benefits to market actors that are on the cusp of success; these market actors have competitive ideas, and the government perceives that by intervening, it can help them succeed. This aligns with the government's regulatory mindset; the government's role is to cultivate competition, including to support firms that have competitive business ideas. Government support for such firms is sometimes described as helping them overcome "handicaps" that prevent them from succeeding (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005). Regularly cited handicaps are New Zealand's small size and distance from markets; these factors mean that market actors do not face enough competition at home and thus may not be savvy enough to succeed globally, and also that firms face disproportionate logistical obstacles to overcome when going abroad. It is implied that the firms would succeed were it not for these handicaps. The government is thus justified when intervening to help these firms become savvier or overcome logistical obstacles.

Support for Māori businesses can also be seen in the light of supporting firms that are on the cusp of succeeding. Similar to the support for firms that face "handicaps" going abroad, the support for Māori firms is often described as overcoming structural disadvantages; the government has sought to "provide Māori and Pacific peoples with opportunities to control their own development and to achieve their own objectives" (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005).

The government justifies some of its other interventions, for instance those which are focused on regional cluster development, because market actors desire it; the government intervenes to support firms that seek government support. This makes sense in the regulatory mindset, which sees economic growth flowing from market actors pursuing their interests. If government is to intervene and support firms, it is justifiable to do so when the firms themselves see such intervention as valuable; it would be more questionable, on the other hand, for the government to intervene against the wishes of market actors. In cluster development initiatives, for instance, "Participation in projects has been at the initiative of the target businesses. Public agencies seeking to promote a group have worked with the firms showing interest in the project" (Perry, 2005). Put differently, "public agency efforts have not been directed to encouraging cluster formation on the basis of statistically identified concentrations of national significance" (Perry, 2005). Government's intervention in particular business areas, in other words, besides depending on market actors' competitiveness, also depends on their desiring government involvement.

New Zealand's mindset and tools

Since New Zealand has a regulatory mindset, this means that, according to the theoretical framework, that it will also use regulatory tools. Its mindset means New Zealand has certain "ambitions," which it will naturally "translate" into corresponding actions (Thurbon, 2016). Tools, in particular, will have certain characteristics which make sense given that the government sees its proper role as enabling competition. Tools in a regulatory state like New Zealand are expected to support and incentivize market actors' competitiveness – helping them innovate, commercialize products, and make viable business plans. Tools are also expected to support the conditions for competition – for example ensuring that market power is not overly concentrated or requiring transparency so firms can behave intelligently. In terms of specific forms of interventions, the framework expects the government to be uncomfortable with subsidies, which it sees as distorting market actors' behaving "autonomously and spontaneously" (Block, 2008).

New Zealand's tools

There is indeed evidence that the tools New Zealand uses when intervening align with expectations. This is important for the theoretical framework because if the tools are not "regulatory," then there would be little reason to expect they result from the regulatory mindset. The framework would thus be of little relevance (Collier, 2011). Before delving into why the tools are the way they are (and thus discussing whether causality exists between New Zealand's mindset and tools), I first briefly describe tools New Zealand uses. First, I discuss tools that affect particular firms or communities of firms (e.g. networking support services or financial support). Then, I discuss tools which more generally affect business practices (e.g. requiring market power be dispersed or information to be transparent).

In terms of ways the government intervenes to affect particular firms, one common tool is networking support. The government promotes "reconnections" among firms with shared interests (Wetzstein, 2008). To this end, its networking initiatives highlight "connectedness," "learning," and "cooperation" (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005). One initiative, the Cluster Development Programme, sought to build "skills, knowledge and expertise"; overcome "barriers to collaboration"; build "capacity and capability for collaboration"; and assist "stakeholders to identify and exploit opportunities for growth" (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005). Another initiative, the Regional Polytechnic Development Fund, encouraged "polytechnics to collaborate with regional industry" (Nischalke & Schöllmann, 2005).

Government-led networking services have varying degrees of formality – they can be "hard" networks in which members have formal stakes, or they can be "soft" networks in which members are only loosely affiliated with few requirements (Chetty & Patterson, 2002). The government often emphasizes networking activities should be led by market actors. In the realm of cluster development, for instance, activities have "membership fees or project-specific contributions" – market actors must see value in being part of the cluster (Perry, 2005).

Another common tool of government intervention that affects firms is publication and distribution of market information, designed to help firms become more knowledgeable about market opportunities and how to take advantage of them. Information can also be tailored to specific types of firms; government agencies sometimes, for instance, "supply… information regarding investments and regulations, facilitation of site visits and site selection, and advice on other forms of government assistance, local suppliers and local contacts" (Nel, 2015).

The government also provides more hands-on consultancy-like services to help firms become aware of market opportunities and how to take advantage of them. One can see such services, for instance, in the case of the “innovation agency” Callaghan Innovation, which is the government entity most explicitly focused on helping market actors develop their business. Callaghan’s five main branches of support services are: Access to Experts, which helps connect firms to other market actors; Technology and Product Development, which informs firms about ways to improve products and processes; Innovation Skills, which provides professional training; R&D Funding, which supports product development; and Scale-Up NZ, which is a service that links local companies, investors, “hubs” (e.g. accelerators), and multinationals. The emphasis of these services is enabling firms to better take advantage of market opportunities.

The government sometimes acts as a “venture capitalist,” making bets on market actors in the hopes of making returns. This has happened in the film industry, for instance (Clydesdale, 2015). To increase the likelihood of earning returns, the Film Commission introduced measures to “tighten the link between funding and markets” – funded film projects were required to achieve benchmark figures in offshore markets, box office receipts, and net earnings (Clydesdale, 2015). There have been some notable successes. The experience of director Peter Jackson, for instance, “is an example of a government agency successfully performing the coaching and building roles of a venture capitalist” (Clydesdale, 2015). His early government-financed work paved the way for his internationally successful Lord of the Rings trilogy. That trilogy in turn arguably brought growth to the film and tourism industries and the economy more generally.

The government also sometimes intervenes by purchasing services from market actors. In transportation, for instance, it buys “services and fares [it] consider[s] appropriate” – it may see as necessary a bus service to connect one area of a city to another for a particular fare (van de Velde & Wallis, 2013). In this context, the government puts out contracts to buy services from the most competitive contractor. There is also another tier of “unsubsidised” services that are initiated not at government request, but at the initiative of private operators (van de Velde & Wallis, 2013).

The government also intervenes more generally to define the rules of business, not just to affect particular firms. One tool of this more general variety regards making New Zealand an easy place to do business. In its Doing Business Report, the World Bank has ranked New Zealand first among all countries for four years in a row (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 2019). The report covers 12 areas of business regulation such as starting a business, dealing with construction permits, and accessing electricity (Doing Business, n.d.). Regulations are wide-reaching, but sometimes the government goes out of its way to reduce obstacles for certain high-growth business areas; in the space sector, for instance, the government allows firms to use American permits to launch from New Zealand (Borroz, 2020).

Another way the government intervenes with tools that have more general as opposed to firm-specific effects is by creating and enforcing rules that divide market power so that it does not concentrate in any one actor. In the electricity sector, for instance, the government "introduced competition into the wholesale and retail segments of the industry," unbundling "distribution and retailing" (Abbott, 2010; Hooks & Tooley, 2015). In dairy, the "export monopoly power" of Fonterra's predecessor was disbanded (Vavra, 2011). When devising a quota system for fisheries, the government "imposed a 20% limit in ownership for inshore stocks and a 35% limit for deep-water stocks" to prevent monopolistic behavior (Aranda & Christenson, 2009).

Another more general tool the government uses is public disclosure and information transparency requirements. In the financial sector, for instance, the government's "principal tool for influencing bank behaviour" has been "public disclosure [requirements] and not the traditional intrusive supervision" (Mayes, 2015). Another relevant business area is regional development: the government provides "reliable and accurate data" to "assist investment decisions" in regional clusters (Nel, 2015). A third area is fisheries, where the government has invested in technologies that allow better monitoring (Aranda & Christensen, 2009). In the power sector, also, the government publishes reports about the state of national infrastructure and planned upgrades, which allows market actors to better plan (Jalal & Bodger, 2011).

In summary, the government uses various tools to intervene in markets. In terms of intervening to specifically affect particular firms, the government supports networking, publishes and distributes market information, provides various services that help firms take advantage of market opportunities, invests in firms which it deems competitive, and purchases services from firms according to how competitively those firms can offer the services. More generally, the government intervenes by making New Zealand an easy place to do business, by dividing market power among firms to avoid monopolistic activity, and by requiring firms to be transparent and disclose information about their activities. These tools all certainly seem "regulatory," as envisioned by the theoretical framework. The tools support competitive firms or help ensure conditions that allow for competition. There is little evidence of widespread use of subsidies, which is also as expected. The following section explores the extent to which causality exists between New Zealand's regulatory mindset and these tools.

Indications that New Zealand's mindset defines its tools

The framework expects a government's mindset about its appropriate relationship with markets will "translate" (Thurbon, 2016) into corresponding ways of intervening. Having a regulatory mindset, in other words, will result in a government using regulatory tools. This is summarized in one of the framework's propositions: "Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states." As discussed below, there is good reason to believe that New Zealand's regulatory mindset does indeed explain the tools it uses when intervening.

Considering the government's firm-specific intervention tools, for instance, there are indications that their use is caused by the government's regulatory mindset. When intervening to provide networking support services to market actors, for example, the government's goal is to help firms share ideas and become more competitive. By supporting networking among firms, the government expects them to become "innovators, problem-solvers and co-constructors of new knowledge" (Knook et al., 2020). The hope is to encourage "interfirm collaboration" on projects which firms see as benefitting their interests (Perry, 2005). The rationale for providing networking support services is that bringing firms together leads to better business plans because different market actors see opportunities differently. One market actor, for instance, may have good technological expertise for developing a product, whereas another market actor may understand consumer preference trends. Together, these two market actors could form a better business plan than they would be able to by themselves.

By fomenting entrepreneurialism in this way, the government hopes to help market actors be more competitive. In the regulatory mindset, economic growth depends on market actors' competitiveness – more competitive market actors can better pursue their objectives and, in the process, grow overall economic activity and make it more efficient. An appropriate way for the government to intervene, therefore, is by improving market actors' competitiveness; networking support is one way to do this, since it makes market actors more aware of potential business opportunities and equips them with better knowledge to pursue those opportunities. When justifying its networking support services, the government emphasizes their purpose is to help firms meet and devise their own ideas about how to proceed; the government is not telling firms what they ought to do. The government is "keen to present itself as catalyst to encourage [market actors] to come together" and devise their own plans (Clydesdale, 2015).

Similarly, when publishing and distributing market information, the goal of government is not to tell market actors what to do. The point is rather to help firms intelligently "select the most appropriate" business strategies going forward (Nel, 2015). The government arms them with information about opportunities and advice on how to take advantage of them; it is up to the market actors to decide how to act. Likewise, when providing firm-specific consultancy services, the goal is also to help firms identify and pursue opportunities; government's goal is to "empower innovators" (Callaghan Innovation, n.d.-a), facilitating their competitiveness and improving their capacity to devise and pursue goals. This rationale aligns very much with expectations for a government with a regulatory mindset – the point of intervening is to facilitate competition, not to coordinate market actors to pursue any particular business area.

This emphasis on boosting competitiveness is widespread, whether through networking, information, or consultancy services. A likely reason why this emphasis exists is "knowledge formation" is perceived as "less risky than mobilising resources for entrepreneurial activities" (Turner et al., 2016). The emphasis relates, in other words, to the government's discomfort with subsidies' potentially market-distorting effects. Firms know what their interests are. Government's appropriate role should only be to help them pursue them more competitively.

The government generally avoids using subsidies. This aligns with what I would expect given its regulatory mindset, according to which subsidies are seen as potentially distorting market actors' activity (Turner et al., 2016). One industry that exemplifies this discomfort with subsidies is agriculture (Turner et al., 2016). Until the 1980s, agriculture was heavily subsidized. Reforms' success is often measured in terms of how many subsidies were removed (Vavra, 2011; Knook et al., 2020). Today, New Zealand's agriculture sector is "held up as the classical 'farming without subsidies' example" (Sandrey & Vink, 2007). The Cato Institute, a US think tank that promotes "limited government" and "free markets," describes the agricultural sector as a "Miracle Down Under" (Cato Institute, n.d.; Lambie, 2005). Skepticism about subsidies persists throughout government, and not just regarding agriculture.

This skepticism about subsidies explains why the government often wishes to see market actors commit their own resources towards projects before providing any assistance. In the regulatory mindset, "entrepreneurial activities" are generally expected to be at least partially "self-financed" since business should be driven by market actors pursuing their interests, not government manipulating their interests (Turner et al., 2016). The government is comfortable providing support when it becomes apparent market actors are committed to their projects. This is a criterion for support from Callaghan Innovation and New Zealand trade and Enterprise, for instance – as many online descriptions of service offerings indicate, to access support, firms must include in their applications information showing how advanced their business plans are.

One can see evidence for the government's preference to support self-financed firms in the context of regional development activities. The central government has on several occasions intervened to support cluster development initiatives, as mentioned above. But generally, it does so only after there is a certain level of self-organization among the potential cluster. This is why "local communities have had to look inward to their own resources and capacities to ensure" economic development (Nel & Stevenson, 2014). It is only once momentum comes from below that the government will intervene to support such initiatives. This is as expected for a government with a regulatory mindset; the point of intervention is to help firms do what they want, and it makes sense to wait to support them until they clearly want something.

The tools the government uses to intervene are also designed to spur competition among firms, which is as the framework expects for a government with a regulatory mindset. Grants from Callaghan Innovation and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), for instance, are often competitive – to access Callaghan's Growth Grant Funding, firms must provide evidence that their project is eligible, with a significant emphasis on showing how competitive their business plans are (Callaghan Innovation, n.d.-b). (In Singapore, too, firms must compete for grants, but – as discussed before – a more important criterion in the Singaporean context is demonstrating alignment with planned business areas.) A prime example of the competitive nature of firm-specific support from government is the Endeavour Fund run by the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (which is Callaghan and NZTE's parent entity). The fund provides millions of dollars annually to firms to commercialize scientific innovation. To access that funding, however, firms must compete to prove they have competitive business plans for commercializing innovation (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, n.d.).

Another way the government intervenes is by contracting market actors to provide public services. When doing so, the government emphasizes that those market actors must deliver certain outputs, and the government frames itself in such bids as just another market actor seeking to buy a good from the most competitive seller. In education, for instance, the government pays market actors to provide desired outputs (e.g. participation and enrollment numbers) (Everiss et al., 2017). Other business areas where the government puts out bids for services are transportation (van de Velde & Wallis, 2013) and telecommunications (Thompson, 2014). When the government built national telecommunication networks, for instance, it did so by making tens of millions of dollars available to market actors (Thompson, 2014). To access funds, they needed to compete and show they were providing the government's desired output (i.e. connecting rural schools). The government framed itself not as a subsidizer but as a market actor, shopping to find the most attractive seller of the product or service it was looking to buy.

Operationally, the government often gives contractors leeway in terms of deciding on details regarding delivery of contracted service – in the case of kindergarten providers, for instance, they determine their own "location of services, opening hours, cost and the age range of the children who attend" (Everiss et al., 2017). This approach to contracting seems intended to give leeway to firms to compete. The government is affecting market actors' behavior by buying services from them, but it does not mandate who provides what; it allows competition to continue to be an important factor. Giving leeway keep firms competitive. The government seeks to minimize dependence on government contracts and by giving firms leeway in competing for contracts, minimizing the contracts' distortionary effects.

The government's use of more general tools, as opposed to those that target specific beneficiary firms, also appears to stem from the underlying regulatory mindset. Making it easier to do business in New Zealand is a way to spur competition among market actors, which is precisely as one would expect of a government which perceives its role as facilitating competition. Making New Zealand an easier place to do business reduces barriers to entry, which otherwise hinder competition. Barriers to entry, such as startup costs, mean that already-established firms have a distinct advantage over newcomers. By making it easier to start up operations in New Zealand, the government thus facilitates competition among firms.

Dividing markets up so that market power does not concentrate with any one actor – this is another tool the government uses which appears to be a result of the government's underlying regulatory mindset. When unbundling “distribution and retailing” in the electricity industry, for instance, the purpose of doing so was to introduce “competition into the wholesale and retail segments of the industry” (Hooks & Tooley, 2015; Abbott, 2010). In the dairy industry, similarly, the rationale for limiting “export monopoly power” and putting price controls in place was to ensure Fonterra did not use its market power to price gouge other market actors in the industry (Vavra, 2011). When devising fishery quota management systems, the stated purpose was to prevent monopolies and encourage competition (Aranda & Christenson, 2009).

Another tool the government uses when intervening on a general level is requiring public disclosure and information transparency; again, this seems to stem, from the government perceiving its appropriate as spurring competition. The rationale is that firms can better compete when they understand what is happening in the market. Transparency and disclosure requirements are precisely the sort of “pro-competitive… marketcraft” that is expected of a government with a regulatory mindset (Vogel, 2018). In order for market actors to compete, they must know what is happening in the market. For market forces to work, there must be transparency, as transmitted by the price mechanism. Naturally, if the government sees its role as facilitating competition, therefore, then it makes sense to impose information transparency requirements. This is a necessary condition for market competition to function.

Other explanations for targets and tools

There is good reason to think New Zealand’s regulatory mindset results in its using the tools and targets that it does. Before New Zealand’s government became “committed” (Kelsey, 2015) to its regulatory mindset, its approach to intervention was notably different. Before the economic reforms of the 1980s (Goldfinch & Malpass, 2007), New Zealand was noted for a series of “Think Big” projects (Challies & Murray, 2008). In these projects, the government, similar to how governments in developmental states intervene, planned certain industries for development and then used extensive financial incentive schemes to develop them (Challies & Murray, 2008). Since the 1980s, though, intervention tools and targets have been regulatory.

Besides mindset, however, there are other potential explanations for why New Zealand's intervention is characterized by regulatory targets and tools. Two factors particularly stand out as likely having explanatory power: the political context, meaning the relationships between constellations of actors and the officials intervening in markets (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1995); and the organizational structure of government, meaning the relationships between and extent of centralization of various agencies (MacNeil, 2013; Johnson, 1982). Neither of these two explanations replace or compete with my argument; they rather complement it.

With regards to the political context, one potential argument for New Zealand's hands-off approach to intervening in markets is that it results from the particularities of the relationship between bureaucrats and the private sector. One critical view put forward, for instance, for why the government has a relatively hands-off approach is that New Zealand may be experiencing a form of "regulatory capture" (Kelsey, 2015) – business interests may be influential enough to stop the government from intervening heavily. In the area of finance, for instance, this may explain why the government has been uncomfortable putting requirements in place that reduce financial institutions' risk exposure and lower potential profits (Kelsey, 2015). Government workers may be uncomfortable putting such "restrictions" (van de Velde & Wallis, 2013) in place because they are sensitive to the concerns of lobbyists and other "interest groups" (Kelsey, 2015).

It may also be that New Zealand's government experiences a "rotating door," as some interviewees brought up in the context of New Zealand's support for business internationalization – individuals working in government often have private-sector backgrounds, and after briefly entering the government as bureaucrats or officials, they return to the private sector. Similar to regulatory capture, this issue – if it is indeed a major one, which is difficult to say – means that government workers may be putting business interests ahead of bureaucratic missions. They would not, in other words, have the type of "embedded autonomy" (Evans, 1995) that allows them to remain independent from business interests.

Another aspect of New Zealand's political context regards the "pluralistic" (Blank, 1977) quality of its political economy – politicians come and go as different combinations of factions form different governments, and there is little long-term consensus regarding policy. An issue in such a pluralistic society is that, due to the presence of "broadly based interest groups" (Blank, 1977), there is little movement towards creating and executing long-term economic development plans. Such pluralism arguably limits the capacity to carry out planning in New Zealand. One example of a specific instance of pluralism potentially undermining the government's commitment to developmental planning is the electoral system – it has been argued this system slowed economic liberalization reforms after the 1980s (Lockhart, 2015).

In terms of the organizational structure of government, this could also explain the tools and targets of New Zealand's government when intervening. In a regulatory state like New Zealand, there is likely less centralization than exists in a developmental state like Singapore. This leads to a less coordinated approach to intervening, which in turn may undermine the capacity to execute long-term economic development plans. Unlike in a country like Singapore, where lead agencies command the various agencies to intervene in various ways in line with a governmentwide plans, in New Zealand government organizations may be acting more independently. This decentralized quality may make intervention "hidden" (Block, 2008), which in turn may make it more difficult for the government to create and execute planning.

Both types of explanations – those regarding the political context and the government's structure – likely explain some of the tendencies described above regarding New Zealand's tools and targets. While New Zealand's regulatory mindset may partially explain, for instance, why the government supports competitive firms by helping them pursue their own interests, this approach may also partially be explained by issues such as regulatory capture, rotating doors, and decentralized organization. Such issues undermine the government's capacity to intervene as happens in developmental states like Singapore; even if New Zealand's government wanted to coordinate market actors, these issues would make it difficult to do so.

Future research may compare these other arguments' explanatory power and study how they relate to the importance of mindset in determining the targets and tools governments use when intervening. All three factors – mindset, political context, and government structure – likely affect the ways governments intervene in markets. To a certain extent, I would argue that political context and government structure may very well be endogenous to the mindset. The political context and the government structure, in other words, may be influenced by underlying mindsets. If a government has a particular sort of mindset, then this may make certain political and structural arrangements more or less palatable.

There is indeed evidence to indicate that a government's "capacity" (Geddes, 1994) to carry out developmental campaigns relies on the perspective of individuals working on governments. If they do not see creating particular organizational structures as being in their interest, for instance, then they will not build them (Geddes, 1994). If a government's mindset is regulatory, and if government workers correspondingly see it as in their interest to facilitate competition rather than to guide it, then this may partially explain why New Zealand has strong interest groups, why government workers rotate in and out of private sector, and why agencies are decentralized. If the government sees its role as facilitating competition among market actors, then New Zealand's political context and government structure may derive from this mindset.

New Zealand's support for business internationalization into Thailand

In this chapter, I examine New Zealand's support for business internationalization into Thailand. Whereas the last chapter described how New Zealand's government has intervened in various contexts at home, this chapter instead looks at intervention abroad. It finds that, when New Zealand's government supports business internationalization into Thailand, its mindset is regulatory, as are its tools and targets – just as is the case when it intervenes in markets at home. There is furthermore good reason to think the government's mindset leads it to use its particular combination of tools and targets when supporting business internationalization – just as there is good reason to think this causality exists in the context of domestic intervention.

The framework's relevance is expanded by its capability to explain how and why the New Zealand government supports business internationalization into Thailand. It is not trailblazing to argue a causal relationship exists between mindsets, targets, and tools when governments intervene at home (Evans, 1995; Block, 2008). It is more novel, however, to argue that a similar causality characterizes government's support for business internationalization abroad. This chapter finds the framework's expectations are relevant not only for intervention at home, but also for support for business internationalization. It looks for indications of the domestic political economy projecting outwards and affecting how firms internationalize.

Contextualizing New Zealand's support for business internationalization into Thailand

Before describing the mindset, targets, and tools that characterize New Zealand's support for business internationalization into Thailand, I first provide some contextual information to help make sense of subsequent discussions about empirical findings from fieldwork. The paragraphs that follow give brief descriptions about what is already known about New Zealand's support for business internationalization; about which state organizations are involved in supporting business internationalization; and about the general features of New Zealand's business presence in Thailand.

Regarding what is already known generally about New Zealand's support for business internationalization, one aspect is that the government focuses on facilitating rather than guiding internationalization, similar to the hands-off nature of intervention at home. Support for business internationalization is often framed as unimportant for many internationalizing firms; they internationalize regardless of government interventions (Felzenstein et al., 2014). When the government does intervene, it often does so by helping firms better understand opportunities and risks of internationalization (Homewood, 2009; Chetty & Patterson, 2002; McNaughton & Bell, 2001). The government arms firms with knowledge to help them behave more intelligently; intervention's goal is to improve firms' "international competitiveness" (McNaughton & Bell, 2001). This general characterization of support for business internationalization aligns with expectations, since the framework expects a government with a regulatory mindset will see its proper role as helping firms to act "autonomously" (Block, 2008).

Domestically, the government has at various times focused on creating networks among communities of exporting firms. The communities are often defined around particular industries or regions (Chetty & Patterson, 2002; McNaughton & Bell, 2001). The goal of networking support is to act as a "catalyst" that helps firms "expedite" business internationalization (Chetty & Patterson, 2002). These programs have sometimes been characterized as "soft" (Chetty & Patterson, 2002), in that there are limited official requirements from firms to participate in the networks; the government has rarely succeeded in creating "hard" networks with formal requirements. The networks' purpose is to "emphasize creating awareness among companies of the benefits of exporting" (Chetty & Patterson, 2002). Such awareness is meant to address the fact that many companies are "relatively inexperienced at exporting" (Chetty & Patterson, 2002).

Abroad, too, government support for business internationalization has had a similar networking emphasis (Homewood, 2009). Support in host countries emphasizes the provision of "knowledge" about particular "markets" (Homewood, 2009). Based on that knowledge and an understanding of the issues particular companies face, New Zealand government workers abroad help firms to network (Homewood, 2009). Sometimes this support takes the form of "trade missions" or "trade surveys" that support groups of firms (Homewood, 2009). At other times, this networking support is more directly tailored to a particular firm's needs. Making "introductions" to potential buyers of products, for instance, and lending "high-level representation" to companies has been "helpful… for opening up opportunities" for New Zealand firms abroad (Crick & Lindsay, 2016).

The extent to which firms receive government support depends on those firms' perceiving a need for it; when internationalizing, firms choose how much they "utilize" the support provided by government agencies (Lindsay et al., 2018). Involving firms in business internationalization support programs depends on the government identifying a "common interest" (Perry, 2006) around which support can be provided; if firms are not interested in receiving support, the government will not impose it. The more comfortable that firms are with a particular market or challenge to business internationalization, the less they will rely on government support. Government support for business internationalization is, in other words, intended to help firms to "develop… competencies" (McNaughton & Bell, 2001). Once the government can no longer help firms develop competencies they desire, there is no more need for support.

Regarding New Zealand's state organizations that support business internationalization, first and foremost is New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. NZTE is the government's "international business development agency" and it has a presence both in New Zealand and in many key markets around the world, including Thailand (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-a). The types of services NZTE offers are similar to the types of services provided by private sector consultants, as will be discussed later in this chapter. Firms that receive support are referred to as "customers." NZTE's "Customer Managers" learn about difficulties that firms face abroad, and they then provide customized support to the firms. NZTE provides networking, informational, and financial support to firms.

Customer Managers are rarely formally affiliated with any particular sector, as discussed in more detail later. A major component of NZTE is the Beachhead advisor program, which puts firms in touch with various contracted professionals who have relevant market or sector expertise (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-b). As Customer Managers help firms create strategies in markets, these advisors are brought in to lend insight based on their experience. Besides helping firms to internationalize (usually by exporting), NZTE also provides support to firms that are investing abroad or in New Zealand.

Besides NZTE, interviewees often cited two other government agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Callaghan Innovation, as playing complementary roles to NZTE in terms of supporting business internationalization. A salient and simple summary of NZTE and MFAT's complementarity was provided by an NZTE worker: "MFAT kick doors down, and we walk in." MFAT, in other words, creates trade deals that facilitate exports, and then NZTE helps exporters navigate the markets which those trade deals "open." Another way to think of NZTE and MFAT's complementarity is to see MFAT as focused on government relations whereas NZTE is focused on business relations. One businessperson in Thailand who has engaged extensively with both agencies described this way of thinking about their complementarity as follows:

> "MFAT is more government-to-government… when there is an opportunity, they will get involved is quotas and tariffs. They will on a periodic basis come into Thailand, meet with the Thai government, and try and negotiate up some of the quotas… [For NZTE], I think they are interested in having New Zealand businesses in key countries and having those businesses successful in the right way to promote the best of New Zealand… If it's a healthy business and it's doing the right things, they'll want to help to continue that."

The relationship with MFAT is not just complementary but coordinated. "MFAT is a valuable partner for NZTE to have," said one interviewee, because MFAT can "open doors that might not be available to the trade commissioner." MFAT also assists by "posting events, for instance, or building visibility." Interviewees confirmed that when NZTE staff assist firms, oftentimes their “main contacts” in-country are individuals working for MFAT or other partner agencies. The support flows two ways. NZTE staff, for instance, also help support MFAT in its mission to decrease barriers to trade: “When we see trade activity impacted or diminished through confusion around regulations, non-tariff barriers, or consumer perception issues, we would feed that info into MFAT and work together to ensure trade continues.” The two agencies furthermore jointly sponsor events in Thailand, attend conferences, and host visiting New Zealand dignitaries. (NZ Herald, 2018; New Zealand ASEAN Business Alliance, n.d.; Flickr, n.d.).

This coordination is to be expected, given the organizational linkages between NZTE and MFAT. Both MFAT and NZTE report to the Trade and Export Growth ministerial portfolio. Furthermore, the two agencies are co-located in Thailand, as they are in many other countries. As a result, the two agencies “interface regularly” and are in “close contact,” in the words of one interviewee in Thailand. The ambassador is furthermore the highest-ranking New Zealand government official in Thailand. This means that, though technically the ambassador and trade commissioner report to separate superiors outside Thailand, in practice the trade commissioner will take cues from the ambassador about what NZTE ought to be doing.

The two agencies “respect” each other’s missions and largely stick to their distinct areas of specialization. MFAT, for instance, “would not do anything [about supporting business in Thailand] without feeding it to an NZTE person. They would immediately respect that and funnel it back through NZTE.” One interviewee put it as follows: “If you’ve got an FTA, MFAT is doing the negotiations and the review… But then NZTE is working with that agreement once it’s in force with businesspeople to utilize it. That split is quite clear.” Another interviewee stated, “NZTE and MFAT seem to be clear on boundaries. They don’t trip over each other. MFAT is about policy and NZTE is about implementation.” A businessperson confirmed: “MFAT deals with policy and NZTE deals with execution. There is a good demarcation. It’s quite clear to us to not turn to MFAT for assistance with entry. They can provide diplomatic support, soft power.”

Callaghan Innovation is the other New Zealand government entity often described as working with NZTE. Both NZTE and Callaghan report to the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, which sets policies for both and monitors their performance. Callaghan grows business innovation at home, sometimes supporting business internationalization, whereas NZTE cultivates internationalization, sometimes supporting innovative business practices. NZTE and Callaghan have complementary missions and their staff know this. One interviewee described an "enabling activity" of NZTE as its support for "innovation, meaning new products, processes, and markets – Callaghan is our main partner there." Another interviewee, someone working for Callaghan, described the "crossover" between the two agencies as follows:

> "The crossover with NZTE is that sometimes we work with the same firms. Sometimes we get involved in the international side of things. We can either complement or join forces with NZTE. I mentioned the delegation abroad… That was in partnership with NZTE. We enlisted their cooperation… It was a joint effort… An easy way to coordinate with another agency is to pick up the phone. Customer relationship management databases are tools… Callaghan enters information and records interactions in its database, which is not shared with NZTE for privacy and confidentiality reasons."

As the above indicates, coordination is not as intimate as with MFAT, where the agencies are co-located in Thailand and where the ambassador and trade commissioner are in regular contact. Rather, Callaghan and NZTE reach out to each other and sometimes pool their resources to support activities that align with both their missions. Another similarly informal coordination was described by an interviewee who stated the two agencies "compare lists to make sure they are communicating with worthwhile firms." This hands-off relationship between the two agencies is not particularly surprising, given that NZTE focuses on providing support outside New Zealand, whereas Callaghan focuses on providing support in New Zealand.

There is one program in which NZTE and Callaghan formally and regularly pool resources: the Regional Business Partner Network (Regional Business Partner Network, n.d.). NZTE and

Callaghan appoint 14 Regional Business Partners throughout New Zealand to assist firms. After consulting with the RBPs, firms may receive “vouchers” that subsidize a variety of business development services: marketing strategies, business planning, capital raising, business systems, finance, managing resources, business sustainability, governance, lean manufacturing, lean business operations, or export (Regional Business Partner Network, 2017). As an example, ATEED, the RBP in Auckland, facilitated vouchers for the cider firm Zeffer, which ultimately started exporting to Thailand (Auckland Unlimited, 2018). When firms approach NZTE for assistance but do not appear to be well developed enough to receive NZTE assistance, NZTE will often direct them to RBPs. In turn, once firms are prepared for internationalization, RBPs direct them to NZTE.

The description above of NZTE, MFAT, and Callaghan only refer to the current organizational arrangement. There have been many changes throughout the entities’ organizational histories regarding both their own remits and their relationships with each other. To take NZTE as an example, it is the result of many decades of complicated mergers and reorganizations. One of its predecessors, the New Zealand Trade and Development Board, also referred to as Trade New Zealand (Packer, 1998), was created in 1988 by merging the trade commissioners’ service (also called Tradecom) and the Marketing Development Board (Maher, 2012). Tradecom, since the late 1800s, has undergone numerous reorganizations and was associated with numerous different ministries or departments, though a continuous theme was providing assistance to firms in foreign markets (McLean, 2009). The Marketing Development Board, on the other hand, was a private sector organization (Maher, 2012). In 2003 by NZTE was formed by combining Trade New Zealand and another government entity called Industry New Zealand (Perry, 2006; Beehive.govt.nz, 2003).

NZTE, when it was first established, was known for providing support via its so-called “Cluster Development Program” (Perry, 2006). Under this program, “local authorities sponsored economic development agencies” and “support was given to encourage businesses to form cluster groups” (Perry, 2006). This was largely a legacy of the incorporation of Industry New

Zealand, which had more of a domestic focus (Perry, 2006). NZTE later promoted "a top-down, sector-focused… approach" to supporting exports "on the basis of a new Growth and Innovation Framework" (Wetzstein, 2008). Focus thus shifted from providing regionally based support to sector-specific support (i.e. targeting export growth for some industries). The emphasis now, as discussed later in this chapter, is neither defined by industry nor geography – the emphasis instead is now more generally on supporting and incentivizing competitiveness.

MFAT and Callaghan have likewise experienced changes over the years that affect either their own activities, their relationship to NZTE (or its predecessors), or both. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of MFAT's predecessors, for instance, "shared" staff with Tradecom (Jenner, 2009), though now NZTE and MFAT do not share staff (despite sometimes sharing office space). Callaghan was formed through a merger of various entities and the combination of staff from other entities, including NZTE itself (Eskow, 2013). The descriptions above, therefore, of the three agencies – NZTE, MFAT, and Callaghan – are a snapshot of the present. They describe NZTE's support for business internationalization and the complementarity between this support and the roles of the other two entities. This relationship, however, has changed over the years.

The last bit of context that to provide in this section is an overview of New Zealand's business presence in Thailand. Thailand is an important export market for New Zealand – the latest statistics available on MFAT's website indicate New Zealand exports approximately NZ$825 million annually to Thailand (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.-a). Stats NZ reports that in 2019, Thailand was the 13th largest destination for exports; the value of exports was similar to that to both Malaysia and Indonesia (Stats NZ, 2020). Many interviewees noted that Thailand is more developed than other countries in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) and that New Zealand business often therefore thinks of it as a useful regional hub; it is common, according to these accounts, for New Zealand firms to establish an on-the-ground presence in Thailand and then to simply distribute to the other GMS countries.

The “top exports” to Thailand are dairy products, according to MFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.-a). Though there are many New Zealand companies exporting dairy products to Thailand, the largest by far appears to be Fonterra, a New Zealand dairy cooperative that is one of the largest companies in New Zealand and is one of the largest exporters of dairy ingredients and products in the world. I did not find numbers defining the extent of Fonterra’s business in Thailand, but interviewees indicated its activities in Thailand are various. According to these interviewees, Fonterra employs nearly 70 people in Thailand; it imports ingredients and consumer products; it hires third-party facilities to make products to export elsewhere; and it uses the Bangkok office to oversee business in neighboring countries.

A recurrent theme arose during conversations with interviewees regarding Fonterra: there is concern in Thailand that, given how large New Zealand’s dairy sector is, an overwhelming number of dairy exports from New Zealand will hurt local producers. The trade agreements between New Zealand and Thailand are lowering tariffs on dairy products, and there is a fear that this will result in more dairy exports to Thailand, and that exporters will outcompete local dairy farmers in Thailand. Interviewees described there being regular discussions between MFAT and its Thai counterparts about accelerating tariff reductions; it would be in the interest of New Zealand dairy exporters to be able to export more products to Thailand, but Thai authorities are reticent to accelerate the tariff removal for fears of the effects this would have on Thai farmers; agricultural workers are an important political bloc in Thailand (Walker, 2012).

New Zealand’s business presence in Thailand, besides dairy products, is varied. MetraWeather, for instance, is a New Zealand government-owned meteorological and oceanographic services company with a representative office in Thailand. MetraWeather’s main service offerings abroad relate to TV broadcasting. Another large firm in Thailand that is outside dairy is the engineering firm Beca, which has approximately 150 employees, most of which are Thais. Beca’s presence in Thailand in fact resulted from a joint venture between Beca and Warnes, an engineering company founded in Thailand by a New Zealand engineer. A full list of members of the New Zealand Thai Chamber of Commerce is not publicly available (New Zealand Thai

Chamber of Commerce, n.d.), but fieldwork indicated there is a wide variety of sectors represented in the community.

Most New Zealand companies in Thailand are small, and many New Zealanders in Thailand do not work for New Zealand-based companies. Added to this, the New Zealand Thailand Chamber of Commerce is a fairly small chamber; many individuals spoken with estimated membership numbers were just over or under 100. Many New Zealand businesspeople express little to no interest in being part of the chamber or in cooperating with other New Zealand firms that are working in Thailand. In summary, the New Zealand business community is composed mostly of small firms or individuals, many of which are unaware of each other's work.

A notable aspect of the New Zealand business community is there are several false positives – companies appear at first glance to be New Zealander but in fact are not. Three high-profile firms used to be New Zealander but have since been purchased by firms from other countries: the fruits and vegetables exporter T&G is owned by the German company BayWa; the appliance manufacturer Fisher & Paykel is owned by the Chinese firm Haier; and the sports clothes company Canterbury of New Zealand is owned by Pentland Group, which is based in London. There is also often confusion about firms from Australia being New Zealander; several interviewees believed, for instance, that the logistics company Toll Group is from New Zealand. (In any case, Toll Group is now owned by Japan Post Holdings, which is based in Tokyo.)

New Zealand businesses sometimes also consider Thailand as a destination for investment, particularly for production purposes. Fisher and Paykel, for instance, opened a plant there (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, 2007). Fonterra, on the other hand, according to commentary from interviewees, hires third-party contractors to run plants in Thailand. The factories of international business in Thailand tend to be located on the eastern seaboard (Reuters Plus, 2020); the Thai government, principally through the Board of Investment, promotes an incentive scheme to bring foreign investment into that region. As an indication of how much investment the eastern seaboard attracts, interviewees indicated it is the second most popular location, after Bangkok, for foreign chambers to hold networking events.

New Zealand and Thailand have two trade agreements in place: the New Zealand-Thailand Closer Economic Partnership (CEP); and the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA). The former is bilateral and mostly focuses on trade barriers, whereas the second is multilateral and puts more emphasis on reducing non-tariff barriers to trade. Firms doing business in Thailand can consult both agreements to decide which one has better benefits; interviewees mentioned using both, depending on the circumstances. The CEP was put into effect in 2005. As of January 2015, 65% of New Zealand's exports to Thailand were duty-free. Tariffs and quotas for all of New Zealand's exports are in the process of being progressively eliminated, with final elimination to occur in 2025. A major area of uncertainty in the plans for progressive trade barrier elimination is dairy products. According to the plans for progressive elimination, New Zealand firms will be able to export dairy products duty-free.

To qualify for preferential rates under the CEP, exporters do not need Certificates of Origin; instead, all that is required is a declaration. This is useful from the perspective of exporters, since it minimizes the time and cost associated with being able to reap the benefits of the agreement. There are furthermore various measures in place in the CEP to address potential non-tariff barriers like sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical regulations. If such regulations are not harmonized, then there will be additional efforts required of a firm trying to conduct international trade; the firm will need to take additional steps to ensure the products it is trading conform to both regulatory systems, an additional effort that costs time and money. The agreement also makes it easier for New Zealand business travelers to temporarily enter Thailand; a "national treatment" rule means investors from the other country are treated like local investors, and a dispute settlement process exists for disagreements about the CEP.

The second agreement, AAZFTA, is multilateral and is in the process of being upgraded (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.-b). Other signatories are Australia and all ten ASEAN member states, including Thailand. From New Zealand's perspective, tariff reductions are primarily intended to benefit exports not to Thailand, but to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. One unique aspect of AAZFTA is it allows for "cumulation," meaning New Zealand products used in ASEAN countries or Australia are considered local content, and thus make New Zealand products attractive for manufacturers in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.-c). AANZFTA includes other mechanisms to reduce non-tariff barriers, primarily by harmonizing countries' regulatory frameworks for customs procedures, sanitary and phytosanitary standards, technical regulations, conformity assessment procedures, electronic commerce, and intellectual property. It furthermore has provisions to facilitate business travel and investment protection and commitments to expand education ties.

New Zealand's mindset

Having provided some context about New Zealand's support for business internationalization into Thailand, it is now time to explore how accurately the theoretical framework describes my findings. The framework expects that New Zealand, in its support for business internationalization into Thailand, will have a regulatory "mindset" (Thurbon, 2016). As discussed last chapter, the New Zealand government seems to have such a mindset when it goes about intervening at home – the government sees its proper role as supporting firms' competitiveness, not as guiding them to engage any particular industry in line with development plans. The framework expects that New Zealand's government, specifically its international support agency New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, will be similarly "market-rational" when supporting business internationalization into Thailand (Johnson, 1982). NZTE is expected to see its proper role as helping firms to behave "autonomously and spontaneously" (Block, 2008).

NZTE does indeed have a regulatory mindset as expected. Indications of this mindset arose most frequently during interviews when discussions turned to NZTE's aversion to "picking winners." In the eyes of NZTE, "picking winners" is precisely what the agency should not be doing. The agency should be enabling competitive firms to succeed abroad; it should not be giving unfair advantages to any particular firms. Firms should succeed, in other words, because they are competitive, not because the government helps them. This aligns with expectations of an agency in a government with a "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982) view about government's proper role in markets. As said by one NZTE worker with significant experience in Thailand:

> "NZTE is uncomfortable with 'intervening.' That's probably the best way to describe it. It's very much a government body that doesn't want to go too far. Even if we see a way we can add value, we don't want to take the risk of going down a path that goes too far in terms of intervention… we take the firms a certain way and then we let them free."

Respondents put forward many reasons for this aversion to "picking winners." One is a belief that government subsidies create economic problems; they are seen as slippery slopes. True, they can "seed" certain business activities, but they can also entrench addiction to incentives, leading firms to, over the long term, adjust their business models to depend on them. "Funding can be corporate welfare that leads to co-dependency," explained one NZTE worker. For this reason, NZTE focuses on building "firms' capability to do business themselves. Otherwise, we are building reliance on NZTE." There is a perception in NZTE that subsidies are ultimately often removed, and that when they are removed this leads to economic shocks that hurt firms who were dependent on those subsidies. Even in the unlikely case the subsidies are never removed, subsidies may create inefficiencies, heighten overhead costs, and delay decision-making. These factors "may make the funding cost more than it's worth," said an NZTE worker.

Another reason put forward by respondents for NZTE's aversion to "picking winners" is a belief that firms do business better than government. Government's role is to allow firms to pursue their interests, not to tell firms what those interests are. Firms are the source of innovation, not government. This relates to worries about dependence on subsidies; NZTE workers believe that if government overly directs firms' business plans, this can lead to economic problems. As one NZTE worker succinctly put it: "Public servants aren't good at picking winners." A second worker stated NZTE does not want to intervene too much because, if it does, firms may say: "I made my strategy based on what you said, but it didn't work!" A third individual close to NZTE described this perspective as follows: "The challenge to doing international business well is to make aggressive, innovative approaches, and the government isn't good at innovation."

NZTE's aversion to "picking winners" is, in the minds of respondents, also conceptually linked to bribery and corruption, phenomena which NZTE dislikes because they undermine efficient business. This is an indication of a regulatory mindset, which sees markets as functioning when firms compete with each other for customers; in the regulatory mindset, "free markets" work because market actors' decisions about entering into transactions with other market actors do not depend on personal connections (Hall & Soskice, 2001). Personal connections should, in line with this view, play no part in defining the government's interactions with any particular firm. According to one worker, "We have our rules and regulations about what we can and can't do. Bribery is something with which NZTE will not get involved. We will advise firms to not get involved with that, either." One businessperson described this sensitivity as follows:

> "I'm sure there are things NZTE is uncomfortable doing – things with political implications, for instance. We didn't encounter any of those in our work. Certainly, they'd be uncomfortable doing anything inappropriate. They are clear about not being involved in any inappropriate or corrupt deal. They're very clear about that."

When supporting firms abroad, whether in Thailand or elsewhere, NZTE insists it is not giving firms unfair advantages. Rather, it conceives of its support as helping firms overcome disadvantages that prevent them from doing business abroad. As one interviewee put it, "NZTE is an enabler… It helps get businesses through issues." From this perspective, therefore, NZTE is not unfairly helping firms – it is rather restoring fairness by "levelling the playing field" for New Zealand firms. As one interview put it, "Because New Zealand is small and doesn't have a lot of domestic competition, firms need to be toughened and prepared for the larger market." One former NZTE worker described this perspective as follows:

> "NZTE services often need to be rationalized in terms of fixing a market failure. For instance, New Zealand has small firms that internationalize while they are still immature, so they don't have the necessary capabilities and NZTE helps equalize that problem. That's a justification based on the idea of fixing a market failure."

NZTE sees its proper role as "toughening" firms, in the words of one staff member. It believes that it can do this because many of its staff are individuals with international business experience; NZTE staff often have significant private-sector career experience (this is true for both the current trade commissioner in Thailand and also his predecessor) (Smylie, 2014; New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-c; New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 2004). Job descriptions for NZTE positions emphasize applicants should have "strong commercial experience" (Facebook, 2018). Furthermore, after working for NZTE, staff often leave to rejoin the private sector (Smellie, 2011). The Beachhead advisors, which are a network of professionals with industry- and market-specific expertise, are often currently active businesspeople (New Zealand India Trade Alliance, 2018). NZTE staff, in other words, are not career bureaucrats who specialize in policymaking; their expertise lies precisely in using their private-sector experience to help New Zealand firms "toughen up" to overcome inexperience abroad.

To grow business internationalization, NZTE sees it as important to help New Zealand firms overcome dependence on any particular market. New Zealand firms should be "toughened" so that, when they are pursuing their interests, they can expand to whichever market makes most sense for them to expand to. They should not simply internationalize to a particular country because it seems easiest; NZTE wants to enable firms to have more choice in choosing markets. NZTE similarly does not prioritize any particular industry (though in practice, as discussed below, some industries do end up receiving more support than others). This lack of industry prioritization is because NZTE wants to help firms pursue their interests, whatever those interests are. All firms should be given more capacity to internationalize as they see fit. This is precisely as expected for a regulatory state agency; the mindset is "market-rational," and the goal should be to help firms "autonomously" (Block, 2008) pursue their interests.

New Zealand's mindset and targets

In its support for business internationalization into Thailand, New Zealand's mindset is regulatory. This means the government believes economic development results from competition. From the government's perspective, competition is an ideal "organizing principle" for the economy; its role is not to tell market actors what to do, but to enable them to pursue their interests (Wade, 2018). According to the framework, this regulatory mindset means the government will target support business internationalization into Thailand in a regulatory fashion. The theoretical framework states, "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states." This means that the government is expected to primarily target benefits to market actors that are competitive (as opposed to targeting benefits to market actors in planned industries, which is what happens in Singapore). The last chapter discussed how this causal pathway linking mindset to targets exists at home. This section discusses if the causal pathway also characterizes support for business internationalization into Thailand.

New Zealand's targets

Before discussing why the government targets its support for business internationalization as it does (and thus discussing whether that targeting results from an underlying regulatory mindset), I first discuss five general themes in terms of NZTE's targeting: 1) it targets support to exporters; 2) it lacks sector-specific targeting; 3) it targets support to large firms; 4) it targets support to firms it perceives as "competitive"; and 5) it targets support to individual firms. The first theme regarding NZTE's targeting is its preference for supporting exports instead of other sorts of international business, such as foreign investment. This targeting preference is evident even without interviews. Many citations about NZTE refer to its "assisting exporters," as opposed to other sorts of firms (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 2004). Many services listed on its website specifically support export activities. One interviewee, who does not export but invests abroad, stated, “I spoke to someone from NZTE. They said they’re only interested in exports from New Zealand to Thailand.” This businessperson, like many others, indicated NZTE shows little interest in supporting FDI into Thailand. I did identify instances where NZTE has supported New Zealand firms investing into Thailand, but in those cases, it is usually for firms that are large exporters. Only rarely does NZTE support just investment (Pharmaceutical Society, 2009). Exports come first, and support for exporters’ investment may come thereafter. Such is the preference for exports that NZTE supports firms that are not New Zealand-owned but are located in New Zealand (e.g. BayWa-owned T&G) (T&G, n.d.; Martin, 2014).

The second targeting theme is straightforward: NZTE’s targeting lacks formalized sector-specific preferences. Though some informal preferences exist, particularly for “tech” and “high value” firms, as was mentioned during interviews by people who work for or who have worked for NZTE, these are not formalized. Some sectors receive more support than others, but this is not due to formal targeting. One interviewee described the lack of sector targeting as follows: “We don’t organize by sector or industry… I tend to focus on one sector, where my networks are strongest. But I am not formally organized around that.” Many people made similar remarks.

Another aspect of NZTE’s targeting is its clear preference for supporting firms that are large, not small. Again, this targeting preference is obvious, even without conducting interviews. NZTE emphasizes on its website that it focuses on supporting a top-tier segment of customer firms that are suitably large. This segment has undergone various definitional shifts but is now called the “Focus” customer group and has approximately 700 members. To become a member, a firm must meet several criteria, including revenues of at least NZ$3 million, “existing momentum” in overseas markets, and “potential for growth on a scale that benefits New Zealand” (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-c). These requirements are listed under the “export assistance” section of NZTE’s site, indicating that the preferred type of business “momentum” abroad has to do with exports, not investment.

Many interviewees confirmed NZTE targets support to large firms. “NZTE gears towards big companies,” said one interviewee. “It seems the mechanism is if firms are large enough and warrant time, then they get support,” said another. A third stated, “NZTE is very focused on lifting the economic performance of those top 700 companies.” A fourth stated that NZTE “ranks effort based on the size of the company.” A fifth interviewee stated, “NZTE has its top 700, and those firms will get support. If not, they’ll fit you in where they can.”

A significant amount of commentary about NZTE’s targeting support to large firms highlighted the contrary point: NZTE targets limited support to small firms. Small firms “have difficulty accessing resources,” stated one NZTE interviewee. As one businessperson put it, when seeking substantive assistance from NZTE, “small firms face an enormous hill.” A second businessperson said, “NZTE isn’t interested in small companies.” A third stated, “NZTE is not focused on SMEs or mum-and-dad operated businesses.” Many businesspeople concurred NZTE’s “remit is to deal with the big companies.” As one person in close contact with NZTE in Thailand put it:

> “We’ve known smaller firms who have wanted to export products from New Zealand to Thailand. NZTE says ‘you’re too small,’ in effect… the smaller companies are effectively being ignored. I would take a deep breath before asking a contact if they’ve spoken to NZTE… For the few I know who have reached out, they get no response or are told to reach out to chambers… I’ve never heard a positive word from the SME end.”

Another theme regarding NZTE’s targeting preferences is it prefers targeting support to firms it sees as having competitive business cases. Even if firms have not yet proven themselves to be internationally successful, they can still sometimes access substantive support by convincing NZTE staff that their business plans are competitive and are worth the agency’s time and resources. In fact, interviewees noted NZTE may support firms even as they expand into new business areas, if they can prove they have solid business cases. As one individual put it,

> “With NZTE, if a firm is looking to assess a market, this is when it needs the most assistance, and then there will be more intense engagement. Then NZTE will drop off after the firms has made inroads. The firm won’t have much to do with NZTE regarding Thailand until they decide to change strategy or invest in a new stage of growth.”

Of course, it is unlikely that NZTE staff would admit to me that they support firms with weak business cases. But the perception of staff that NZTE targets support to competitive firms is worth noting, given what it reveals NZTE’s underlying regulatory mindset – to be discussed in the next section. How NZTE goes about identifying “competitive” firms depends on particular NZTE staff members’ views; a NZTE staff can “champion” business plans they believe in. As one businessperson described in their experience of receiving NZTE support:

> “They choose on a series of factors. Scale is one, meaning revenue, size, and profit. Also important is the ability win. I remember once an engagement manager telling us he decided to work with us because we had the ability to get across the line. If there’s profit to be had, then it’s a sustainable investment from the government’s perspective.”

Several businesspeople confirmed NZTE sometimes provides support because staff see firms’ business cases as competitive and take interest in them. The more an NZTE staff member learns about plans and sees them as competitive, the better a firm’s likelihood of accessing resources. According to one businessperson, NZTE was “invested in understanding the plan… That was part of their process in which they provide the funding; they need that level of detail about what we’re doing.” Regular conversation and “close relationships” lead to “advantages” in terms of garnering NZTE support. “Different customer managers have different perspectives on how [firms] can add value, and sometimes they are more or less interested in the product.”

A final theme regarding NZTE’s targeting is that it prefers to target support to individual firms. Many of the service offering listed on NZTE’s website are for individual firms, and many individuals working for NZTE brought this up in conversation. Most of the cases I identified of substantive NZTE support for firms internationalizing into Thailand did indeed have single beneficiary firms. The agency is sometimes involved in general networking activities – sponsoring business trips or chamber meetups in Bangkok, for instance. But in terms of its key support services, they are usually targeted towards individual firms. NZTE sometimes supports "coalitions" of firms, but this appears to occur on an ad hoc basis (Voxy, 2019). Interviewees confirmed that such coalitions are by far the exception rather than the norm.

Indications that New Zealand's mindset defines its targets

I want to know if NZTE's targeting as described above stems from an underlying regulatory mindset. This is as the framework expects, given one of its propositions states, "Mindsets define the targets of developmental and regulatory states," and given that NZTE clearly has a regulatory mindset. Below, I discuss indications of a mindset-targeting causality link behind each of the five targeting themes discussed above. Indications of causality are important for the framework since they strengthen confidence in it (Collier, 2011).

NZTE's targeting support towards exporters appears to be informed by its underlying regulatory mindset. One of NZTE's goals is to grow exports as a percentage of New Zealand's GDP, which translates to key performance indicators for staff. "NZTE absolutely cares" about meeting KPIs like "how many distribution deals they sign in a 12-month period." An interviewee with business interests in Thailand who is close to NZTE clarified how KPIs affect targeting, assuming the view of an NZTE staff member:

> "As an NZTE staff, I help you with a deal. You sell to Villa, a grocery store in Thailand. That's now recognized on my KPI. Come next year, you've now already sold 100 million to Villa last year and Villa thinks you're awesome. Now we need to do this, this, and this to get your sales up to 200 million. The focus is always on new exports."

KPIs explain NZTE's preferences for supporting exports, but beyond this, there are also indications that the KPIs are informed by a regulatory mindset. The case for arguing for such causality is as follows: NZTE supports exporters because it believes New Zealand firms have a competitive advantage in exporting, as interviewees commonly mentioned in discussion. New Zealand has historically enjoyed a reputation of exporting quality products, and New Zealand firms are still perceived as having a competitive advantage in exports (particularly for certain types of exports, like primary goods). By supporting firms that are exporting to Thailand, therefore, NZTE is helping firms pursue competitive advantages in a way that is consistent with the regulatory mindset; "free markets" (Weiss, 2012) entail firms pursuing competitive advantages to create economic value. New Zealand firms have proven themselves to be competitive at exporting, and since NZTE's regulatory mindset means it will support competitive business areas, it naturally follows that NZTE targets supports to exporters.

NZTE's lack of formalized sector preferences clearly stems from NZTE's regulatory mindset. The purpose of government in the regulatory mindset is to enable firms to pursue their interests, not to coordinate them in line with government plans for how the economy should develop. Whereas "industrial policy" (Woo-Cumings, 1999) is the norm for developmental states like Singapore, enabling "free markets" (Weiss, 2012) is the norm in regulatory states like New Zealand. Selecting certain industries for development is antithetical to the regulatory mindset. A businessperson characterized NZTE's aversion to targeting particular industries as follows:

> "NZTE wants to support New Zealand… not provide preferential attention to any particular… industries. They want to be keeping a level playing field for New Zealand firms – that's the core of what they're doing. As long as it's helping New Zealand, that's fine. If it's too close to helping a business interest, they'll move away from it."

It is noticeable that NZTE, in Thailand specifically, targets significant support to Fonterra and other exporters of primary products. This gives the appearance of NZTE supporting firms in primary industries (e.g. dairy products and produce). In fact, I believe this relates to NZTE's preference for targeting support to large firms, regardless of their sector (discussed in the next paragraph). It just so happens that New Zealand's business community in Thailand is dominated by primary goods exporters. If the expatriate business community were focused on a different industry besides primary goods, then NZTE support would likely target support to that industry.

As alluded to above, NZTE's targeting preference for large firms also clearly ties to its regulatory mindset. The logic is as follows: NZTE, as a government agency with a regulatory mindset, prefers targeting support to firms it sees as competitive, and it sees large firms, all else equal, as being more competitive. This is because large firms have already proven their competitiveness; they have already demonstrated their competitiveness by building a successful presence abroad. This line of reasoning about large firms being more competitive was captured in the following quote from a businessperson in Thailand:

> "The top 700 firms are not necessarily measured by the size of their revenue, but more by their potential in market, how well they understand and plan, and how likely they are to be successful. Some big companies can't succeed. Some small ones can. So, it's more about likelihood of success. But generally, the bigger ones have higher likelihood of success. NZTE is focused around likelihood of success. So yes, there is clear favoritism towards likelihood of success, which is skewed towards bigger firms."

Many other interviewees agreed with the above-quoted businessperson, whose company has received significant support from NZTE in Thailand. This view of large firms as being more likely to succeed explains, as many interviewees noted, why NZTE thinks "Fonterra is a good exporter." It exports significant amounts of product, and supporting such an apparently competitive firm makes sense from the perspective of NZTE's regulatory mindset. Whereas supporting firms with no history of success could be construed as intervening to "pick winners," which many NZTE workers insisted is something to which the agency is opposed, targeting support to large firms more clearly aligns with NZTE's goal of supporting competitive firms.

Moreover, supporting large firms obviously helps NZTE meet its KPIs. Even marginal improvements in Fonterra's performance, for instance, would significantly increase New Zealand's export numbers. A small gain by Fonterra would grow exports as a percentage of GDP more than numerous smaller companies growing their exports. One interviewee who is familiar with NZTE's operations in Thailand succinctly stated that NZTE focuses on large firms "because the goal is to get exports up to 40% of GDP." Another person who has worked for NZTE stated:

> "The preference for big firms comes down to the metrics. If Fonterra increases by one percent, NZTE's metrics are done for the year. The same might also be achieved by 20 small firms… but that's a lot more work."

NZTE's targeting support to firms it sees as competitive also aligns with expectations, given its regulatory mindset; the framework expects it will target support towards competitive firms. This is the same rationale behind NZTE's targeting support to exports and large firms, which are seen as competitive. The point here is to say NZTE also sometimes extends its views on what a "competitive" firm is beyond just exporters and large firms. Sometimes, if NZTE staff see a firm as showing particular promise, then they will go out of their way to support that firm.

To convince NZTE of their competitiveness, firms need to "sell to NZTE at the New Zealand level," which means they must "convince NZTE that what they are doing is good for New Zealand." If a firm can convince NZTE it has a competitive business case that will ultimately benefit New Zealand exports, in other words, then it may be able to access support. Several interviewees in Thailand who regularly work with NZTE confirmed this. They emphasized NZTE's preference for targeting support to firms that are "ready to go" or that have "a healthy business." If a firm can convince NZTE of its competitiveness, then "NZTE will want to help." This is precisely as the framework expects in terms of the regulatory mindset affecting targeting.

Targeting support to individual firms, as opposed to groups of firms, also seems to stem from NZTE's underlying regulatory mindset. The reason is that without heavy-handed government intervention to incentivize cooperation, most interviewees believed that New Zealand firms do not want to form coalitions. Since government's purpose, in a regulatory mindset, is to facilitate firms' pursuing their interests, it is inappropriate to intervene and radically change those interests, for instance by incentivizing them to work as a group when they are disinclined to do so. Intervening to the extent of convincing firms to work together would amount to the coordination one sees in developmental states like Singapore. Such intervention makes sense from a "plan-rational" perspective, but not from a "market-rational" one (Johnson, 1982).

The fundamental reason NZTE tends to not support groups of firms, according to interviewees, is firms see little reason to participate in collective efforts. Firms must contribute time and effort, but they are not certain that they will benefit as a result. As one interviewee, an individual with significant business interests in Thailand and experience with NZTE, put it:

> "Where there are synergies, there are sometimes coalitions of the willing… My question though, is what are the real benefits? How are prizes divvied up? It's not clearly articulated or measured. It should be, 'I put in this much, and I get this much.'"

It is inappropriate for NZTE to "corral a group of companies… and point them towards the Thai market" without firms already having "individual interest in taking that forward," said one member of New Zealand's expat business community. NZTE's mission is to enable, not direct business; NZTE only supports firms that are "willing" to receive support, as one NZTE staff said. NZTE will support trade fairs or networking sessions, which require limited cooperation among participating firms, but in terms of its core consultancy services, these are almost exclusively for individual firms. Many interviewees, in government agencies and private companies, stated that in New Zealand's expat community, firms see each other as rivals, not as teammates. NZTE thus finds it easier to provide "individual-based services." One interviewee expounded the implications of this competitive streak in the New Zealand business community as follows:

> “New Zealand firms marketing the same product have an inability to work together… They constantly undercut each other. It’s a failing of the… mentality. So much potential success is upended by petty jealousy… For… the agencies, then, it’s easier to focus on one firm. Supporting a group of firms is like trying to herd sheep walking backwards.”

The above explanations convincingly links mindset to targeting. Interviewees provided various justifications, explanations, and rationales for NZTE’s targeting preferences that link it back to its underlying regulatory mindset. It is not the case that NZTE happens to have a regulatory mindset and then also happens to target its support to internationalizing firms as it does. NZTE “translates” (Thurbon, 2016) its ambitions into reality when supporting business internationalization; it sees its role as supporting competition, and to that end, it thinks it should target support to competitive, individual firms – particularly, though not exclusively, exporters and large firms – and not have any industry-specific targeting.

New Zealand’s mindset and tools

Since New Zealand has a regulatory mindset, the framework expects this means it will also use regulatory tools. Just as the mindset “translates” into regulatory targets, it will “translate” into regulatory tools (Thurbon, 2016). Tools in a regulatory state like New Zealand are expected to support and incentivize market actors’ competitiveness – helping them innovate, commercialize products, and make viable business plans. The government is furthermore expected to be uncomfortable with using subsidies, since it sees them as potentially distorting firms’ behavior (Block, 2008). The last chapter discussed indications of this causality in the domestic context; New Zealand’s government uses regulatory tools, apparently because of its regulatory mindset, when intervening at home. The paragraphs below discuss if this causal link between mindset and tools also exists in the government’s support for business internationalization into Thailand.

New Zealand's tools

Evidence does indeed indicate that the tools New Zealand uses when supporting business internationalization are regulatory. In its support for business internationalization into Thailand, in other words, New Zealand uses tools which align with expectations – tools support and incentivize market actors' competitiveness, and the government notably avoids using subsidies. NZTE variously does this by providing consulting services, market information, and networking services, which are all typically regulatory tools; they help firms develop capacity and are unlike tools in a developmental state, which incentivize firms to engage business areas government plans for development. NZTE also provides some financial support, which is slightly surprising given expectation that governments in regulatory states avoid subsidies. This financial support, though, is intended to drive competitiveness and thus aligns with expectations.

The first thing to note about NZTE's tools is that they are tiered. NZTE provides various services, there are three tiers of "customers" (Start, Build, and Focus), and each progressive tier gets more access to more services (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-d). Firms must register to become "customers," in NZTE parlance, and they are then assigned to one of these tiers. As firms progress from one tier to the next, which essentially is determined by firms' having a larger and more successful international business presence, they gain access to more services. Generally, as firms ascend tiers, they gain access to NZTE services that are more customized (e.g. strategic consulting to support market entry); lower-tier firms are only able to access services that are instead more general (e.g. publications with information about sectors or markets). Interviewees described relationships in the Focus tier as "real partnerships," "gold level," and "intensive." An NZTE worker who has served customers in all tiers described the relationship with Focus customers as follows:

> "If they are in the top category of companies that work closely with NZTE, we will have a serial relationship with them. We will work with them as they progress towards their goal, and we will keep updating each other on what's going on. We will sit down and

> discuss whether the goal has been met or not, and what might need to change. If they're not in the Focus category, exchanges might be more ad hoc."

One sort of tool which NZTE uses when supporting firms going abroad is consulting services. These services are similar to what one would find in a strategic consultancy firm like Deloitte or PwC; the point is to help firms develop and execute more competitive business plans as they internationalize. These services are generally reserved for mid- to high-tier firms, not low-tier ones. In some cases, services come in the form of pay-to-access workshops, in which a particular sort of obstacle to internationalization is the focus of support (Export Essentials, n.d.); in such workshops, the time and sort of service is clearly defined. In other cases, consulting services become much more customized and in-depth (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-e). The focus of services in such cases is for NZTE to gain familiarity with the issues facing a firm, and to then, sometimes over timeframes of several months or years, to help the firm devise and execute plans to advance its business.

Although firms sometimes pay for NZTE services, a major difference between NZTE and consultancies is that NZTE's motivation, unlike that of private consultants, is not to earn a profit. According to one NZTE worker, "That differs us from the Big Four [consultancies], which are projects- or transaction-based. We are in it for the long haul, not just to execute. For the Big Four, the relationship stage is fast, and the execution is quick. Our approach is longer-term."

Interviews confirmed NZTE customer managers, in Thailand and elsewhere, see themselves as consultants. One obvious verbal cue is that NZTE staff call firms they support "customers." One interviewee, for instance, stated, "The support we wrap around the customer is fully intended to support their meeting those objectives. If the objectives weren't being met, we work with the customer to understand what challenges are impeding them from being successful." A second interviewee, also someone who works for NZTE, stated, "we want to understand what the customer's next objective is in the market and what room there is for NZTE to support or add value." A third interviewee, a businessperson, stated, "NZTE is trying to give information to their customers about how to do business and about opportunities for doing business."

Several interviewees stressed that NZTE staff have business backgrounds that enable them to provide useful consulting services. "The focus nowadays is management consultant skills," said one interviewee. "We are consultants," said another. One interviewee directly compared NZTE to private consultancies: "Firms can also go through private providers like PwC, the Big Four, or other smaller consultancies in New Zealand that are run by former NZTE or MFAT colleagues." Another interviewee similarly stated, "We play the side of the Big Four [consultancies]." A major component of NZTE support, including in Thailand, is Beachhead advisors, external contractors with significant country- or sector-specific business experience (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-f). Trade commissioners and staff often publish pieces or speak at events with tips about markets and business; demonstrating their market expertise (Rotherham, 2014; Krause, 2012; Anderson, 2012). In Thailand, several trade commissioners have published pieces or participated in events, thereby burnishing their consultant credentials (Campbell, 2017; Davis, n.d.; ASEAN New Zealand Business Council, n.d.).

The approach to helping customer firms is very much in line with what one would expect of the approach of a professional consultant: assistance usually comes in a "help me help you" process, in which the NZTE staff assigned to a firm builds up their understanding of that firm's particular set of circumstances and challenges. Only after developing such an understanding is support provided. As one former NZTE staff put it, "we canvass firms' strengths, weaknesses, penetration strategies, and other factors. From that canvassing, we pitch them the most relevant services." Another interviewee described the effort that goes into identifying what sort of support would be most useful: "We will ask for the criteria from the company first. Before we search, we will get the criteria. What type of distributor? What type of products? What is their background? Give us a set of criteria so we can search. After we search, we share."

Firms share significant amounts of information with NZTE because, as one businessperson put it, to provide effective consultancy services, NZTE "needs to understand enough about our circumstances… The more we give, theoretically the better they'll be able to assist." Put differently, "firms must give sufficient information to NZTE so it can determine the best approach to supporting them." Sometimes NZTE staff work so closely with customer firms that they become "part of the team," implying they gain deep insight into certain aspects of company strategy. The relationship can become so close that NZTE staff actually help their contact points in customer firms manage relationships with other stakeholders within the same company, "speaking to the board," for instance, about strategies jointly developed by NZTE and the contact point. In such situations, the NZTE staff are so deeply embedded in company operations that they gain significant access to information about companies' strategies.

Particularly with firms in its Focus customer segment, NZTE's consultancy support transcends any particular transaction. Any particular instance of support, in other words, is seen as just a part of a larger, long-lasting relationship. Several interviewees provide detail on this "serial" sort of engagement. One NZTE staff member said, "If we are working closely with a customer and they're engaged with us, as part of the operating model, it's a serial or ongoing engagement, with a strong line of sight on what's happened in the past and planning around objectives and expectations on both sides." Different staff members estimated that meetings are monthly at a minimum for Focus customers. An interviewee from the business community stated, "NZTE supports continuously. They don't just support at one point and then leave firms alone." Another businessperson stated they have discussions with low-level NZTE staff on a "day-to-day" basis, and with high-level NZTE staff "every few months to check on progress." The following quote captures the serial nature of NZTE's engagement with Focus customers:

> "NZTE is continuous and progressive. We have regular meetings. We share with them our business circumstances and our longer-term strategies, and they try and understand how they can help. We then set up initiatives to try and move that forward. Later, we

> review whether it's working. If not, we find something else to evolve off that. I'll have quarterly meetings with NZTE… There will be a desire to want to make it progressive."

Another aspect of in-depth support for customer firms which are active in several markets is that NZTE's perspective is not only long-term, but also wide-ranging geographically. Progress is thought of globally, not in terms of any particular market. A relative lack of activity in one market does not mean the relationship is inactive, since there may be significant activity in other markets. NZTE staff in New Zealand are responsible for thinking about the relationships on this global level. As one businessperson put it, "We are looking at entry and development in Australia, expansion and development in Singapore, and are regularly conducting various new market assessments… on an entity-to-entity level [with NZTE], there is a lot of interaction."

In the context of discussions about such information exchange, NZTE staff, similar to consultants, mentioned that maintaining confidentiality is extremely important. "It's a private activity between NZTE and the company," said one interviewee. "Outsiders don't see the details." It was noticeable, in fact, that during fieldwork NZTE staff rarely provided identifying information about customer firms. Most information about customer firms instead came from discussions with members of the business community. NZTE staff were obviously uncomfortable with sharing substantive information about customer relationships.

Another similarity between NZTE's services and those of consultants is their advisory nature; NZTE refrains from telling firms what they ought to do, and instead focuses on providing intelligence and situational awareness. "NZTE is a source of useful information," said one staff member. Another stated, "We don't tell [firms] what to do, but we do provide them with information about available options." Another interviewee put it as follows: "It's not a partnership in terms of splitting profits or sharing liability. NZTE is an enabler… it helps get businesses through issues." It is still, in other words, up to the firm to make decisions. NZTE helps firms to "construct strategies," but firms still "make their own decisions" about how to proceed based on NZTE's input. One interviewee from NZTE went into detail on this matter:

> “As an advisor, if I see a company that’s coming in and they see this distributor who has the bells and whistles, but that distributor is interested in distributing a different sort of product than what they want to export to Thailand, I can’t tell them, ‘this distributor is not for you.’ I have to let them discover it. That has impact. The firm comes in, we identify two distributors. One distributor would be a great fit but doesn’t present itself very well. One is a good distributor but not into distributing the New Zealand company’s product. We can’t stop them from choosing to go with the second distributor.”

Another tool NZTE uses when supporting business internationalization is networking. Sometimes, NZTE’s networking assistance ties directly to its consultancy services. NZTE puts significant effort, for instance, into identifying in-market partners and connecting them to firms. “Matching with contacts,” “identifying partners,” “developing contacts,” “setting up meetings,” and “introducing” were all commonly mentioned by interviewees as services NZTE provides its customer firms. Given the focus on promoting exports, it is no surprise interviewees reported such introductions as chiefly being made to “importers” or “distributors” in Thailand.

NZTE staff regularly network with relevant business communities in host countries such as Thailand (The Baxter Brenton, 2017). Due to their market expertise, NZTE staff can oftentimes “straightaway know who target customers” ought to be for customers; some New Zealand businesspeople acknowledged that NZTE staff “have a wider network of Thai businesses than we have.” Beyond simply making customers aware of potential partners, NZTE staff can furthermore leverage their networks to broker introductions. One interviewee, for instance, described how NZTE staff “would come along” with customer firms to broker meetings with potential customers. Several other interviewees confirmed that it is common for NZTE staff to broker introductions in this way.

Interviewees said that NZTE making introductions on firms’ behalf can significantly help those firms’ ability to network and pursue business opportunities. This is because, as a government agency, being associated with NZTE improves the firms' reputations. To network, it is important to have a positive reputation. An introduction by NZTE improves a firm's reputation because if NZTE is willing to make an introduction, this indicates to potential partners that NZTE thinks the firm is legitimate. NZTE introductions thus not only directly connect firms to potential partners, but they also improve the receptiveness of potential partners to the firm. As one interviewee put it, "NZTE can get you into places you can't get by making formal requests. That works. If they send a letter, you will be received. If you're just a little firm wanting to meet, you wouldn't get past the front gate. NZTE is comfortable using government authority to get introductions."

Networking support can also be more general. This includes free events that are for certain customer tiers, invite-only events, and introductions between customers and members of pre-selected lists of "service providers" (e.g. NZTE can help a firm identify service specialists they are looking for, like tax law consultants) (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-g; New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-h; New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-I; New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-j). Oftentimes in Thailand, as in other countries, NZTE supports networking in the form of business trips, participation in trade fairs (letting firms feature products), or in-country meetings like those organized by the chamber of commerce. Aside from these direct networking services to individual customer firms, NZTE, usually with MFAT, organizes group activities that improve New Zealand firms' reputation, thereby facilitating networking. These activities are explicitly focused on promoting New Zealand exports; they include, for instance, stands at trade conferences or trade missions for visiting firms. In 2018 and 2019, for instance, NZTE and MFAT jointly hosted Winston Peters, New Zealand's Foreign Affairs Minister, at food export events in Thailand (NZ Herald, 2018; Luxury Society Asia, n.d.). NZTE has also led many trade missions – in 2006, 2009, 2013, and 2015, for instance (Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, 2006; Harris, 2009; Mako Networks, 2013; AvoScene, 2015). According to interviewees, firms are likelier to be included in these activities if they belong to NZTE's Focus customer segment.

Some events have general benefits because they promote New Zealand products' quality and improve the reputation of New Zealand exports, something all exporters can leverage. This general benefit builds over time as NZTE and MFAT hold more events. As one businessperson put it, "at every event I've been to, NZTE always starts with a video about the benefits of New Zealand – clean water, land, innovation, clear thinking, etc." In one high-profile instance, the ambassador gave out apples at an event commemorating the death of Thailand's last King. There is evidence these promotional activities have an impact – many Thai businesspeople during interviews, without being prompted, praised the quality of New Zealand exports.

NZTE networking services can also specifically promote certain firms that are featured in them (the firm whose apples the ambassador distributed, for instance). As is the case with NZTE-brokered introductions, NZTE featuring firms helps those firms "gain trust and credibility, which helps getting to and through new doors." This has happened on many occasions in Thailand. Recently in 2018, for instance, NZTE hosted the Auckland University of Technology, which is expanding into Thailand (Auckland University of Technology, 2018). The university has since then opened a campus in Bangkok for English-language instruction. Though fieldwork identified no indication of NZTE providing the university with significant advisory services to support expansion into Thailand, the hosting event in 2018 boosted the university's reputation and likely helped it network with partners in-country.

Besides consultancy and networking services, another tool which NZTE uses is informational. NZTE publishes various market guides, oftentimes focusing on particular sectors (e.g. manufacturing). NZTE provides, in the words of one businessperson, "research, and desk survey advice," further explaining that these informational products are "not active support to get [firms] into market." This information is made available to firms in the lowest tier, but given the tiered nature of NZTE's support, firms in all tiers can access these publications. Such informational tools are in line with expectations; a typical regulatory tool is something that facilitates firms' pursuing their business, and market information enables precisely that.

A final sort of tool NZTE uses to support business internationalization – besides consulting, networking, and information – is financial. This support is reserved specifically for Focus customers – being in the Focus tier is necessary for "unlocking" access to the International Growth Fund, a co-investment program that supports firms' "international growth projects that are considered beyond business-as-usual" (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-k). One interviewee who worked for a Focus firm described receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars via the IGF to expand into Asia. The co-financing was "helpful" and was accompanied by "a lot of access to NZTE staff."

NZTE also combines networking support with investment services in that it puts investors in touch with firms or the other way around. NZTE, in other words, does not just financially support firms by directly investing in them. It furthermore helps more indirectly with networking and preparing firms for their "capital raise." NZTE staff, based on "extensive private-sector experience," "make the right connections" between firms and "investor networks." In 2016, for instance, NZTE organized an event in which firms pitched to investors (Stuff, 2016). In 2014 and 2015, it introduced firm to investors to help the firms expand internationally (Stevenson, 2018; NZ Herald, 2015). Such support for connecting firms to international investors is sometimes noted in local media (MacManus, 2018).

Indications that New Zealand's mindset defines its tools

There is evidence to indicate that, not only are NZTE's tools regulatory, but that they are regulatory because of NZTE's underlying regulatory mindset. This supports expectations; recall that the theoretical framework states, "Mindsets define the tools of developmental and regulatory states." Below, I discuss these indications of such causality – for services relating to consultancy, networking, information, and financing. Indications of causality for these tools are important for the framework since they strengthen confidence in it (Collier, 2011).

Regarding NZTE's consultancy services, there are clear indications that their particular forms are defined by NZTE's regulatory mindset. As indicated in the previous section, NZTE staff put great emphasis on how, when providing these services, NZTE acts as an "enabler." NZTE's purpose is not to tell firms what to do, but rather to help identify issues they are facing and then to jointly "construct strategies" with them. These strategies are not prescriptions; as an NZTE staff member said, firms still "make their own decisions" about how to proceed based on NZTE's input. Several interviewees stated that the point of NZTE consulting services is to provide information and opinions, but the firm is the one deciding what to do. Ultimately, NZTE is external to firms' decision-making. NZTE wants firms to be independent, which makes sense given its "market-rational" (Johnson, 1982) perspective; NZTE staff are uncomfortable intervening to explicitly guide market actors' behavior, unlike their Singaporean counterparts.

A related point about consulting services, which also illuminates the underlying regulatory mindset it, is that the extent of NZTE consulting support depends on a firm's interest in receiving support. NZTE does not decide that a firm should be supported and then intervenes to provide it with consulting services, in other words. Rather, it provides consulting services to a firm only if that firm wants it. Several interviewees mentioned this during discussions. One individual who works for a firm that receives NZTE support stated that the decision to continue receiving consulting support "is down to us." Another interviewee concurred that consulting depends on firms' interests: "Once the relationship is there, it is ongoing until the company no longer needs the relationship." Another interviewee from NZTE stated, "We want commitment from companies to achieve the goals together." NZTE, in other words, will give support only if the firm shows interest in receiving it. This characteristic of NZTE consulting – supporting firms that want support rather than imposing it on firms – makes sense given NZTE's regulatory mindset. If government's proper role is to help firms act "autonomously and spontaneously" (Block, 2008), government should only provide consulting support if firms decide they want it.

NZTE's networking services, including both services targeted to individual firms and more general services for the expatriate community writ large, also appear to be defined by NZTE's regulatory mindset. In terms of networking services for specific firms, these are similar to the consultancy services in that NZTE sees them as enabling business activity, not directing it. When working with a firm, if NZTE sees a firm is struggling with networking, then it will provide networking assistance. NZTE will, for instance, introduce a firm to potential distributors. Like the consultancy services, though, firms are under no obligation to cultivate relationships with counterparts to which NZTE introduces them. As one NZTE staff stated, "I can't tell them" which distributors to work with after making introductions. It is up to firms, in other words, to decide how to act. The leeway given to firms seems to stem from NZTE's regulatory mindset. Firms pursuing their own interests leads to "optimal" economic outcomes (Wade, 2018). Government's role is to support firms' competitiveness, not to direct them. NZTE thus introduces firms to counterparts and lets firms decide what to do with those introductions.

Regarding more general networking services – business trips or stalls at fairs, for instance – these also appear to stem from NZTE's regulatory mindset. As one businessperson in Thailand put it, NZTE is "comfortable" with general networking services because they benefit many firms; it is comfortable with them because they do not favor any particular firm. Such services provide reputational benefits to all New Zealand firms – those directly involved in the events, and arguably all New Zealand firms in Thailand. They help New Zealand compete. The businessperson said NZTE is "less comfortable" advertising firm-specific networking support. It is true, in fact, that NZTE advertises firm-specific networking services less than it advertises general networking services. NZTE, as the businessperson indicates, seems to be wary about appearing to provide "preferential attention to particular companies." Firm-specific networking support is usually for high-tier firms about which NZTE has confidence in their competitiveness. Such firm-specific support is justified in the regulatory mindset because, since government's role is to support and incentivize competitiveness, competitive firms merit NZTE's support.

The informational support which NZTE provides is also justified in NZTE's regulatory mindset. The information NZTE publishes is widely available, unlike many of the consultancy or networking services, which are reserved for higher-tier firms who have arguably already proven their competitiveness. In the regulatory mindset, for firms to effectively pursue their interests, they must be well-informed. This is why intervention in regulatory states often emphasizes transparency and disclosure – so that firms may understand opportunities in the marketplace (Vogel 2008). Similarly, in order for firms to understand and take advantage of opportunities as they internationalize to other countries, they need to be well-informed. NZTE publications cover various aspects of doing business in Thailand or other countries (e.g. taking advantage of "digital channels" for business development) (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 2020). The purpose of such reports is to "share insights" so that New Zealand firms can "maximize" the benefits of expanding into foreign markets (New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, n.d.-m). Similar to networking and consulting services, firms are not obliged to do anything with this information; it is up to them to decide how to incorporate it into their decision-making.

Regarding provision of financial support, the way NZTE goes about doing this also appears to be defined by its regulatory mindset. It is at first surprising that NZTE provides financial support at all, given the framework's expectations that government agencies in regulatory states are concerned about subsidies' distortionary effects. In the case of the financial assistance NZTE provides internationalizing firms, though, the emphasis seems to clearly be on supporting and incentivizing competitive firms. NZTE's IGF financing, the main tool by which NZTE directly finances firms, is mostly for firms in the Focus tier, meaning firms that have already proven their competitiveness by establishing a large business presence. Since tools used in regulatory states are expected to support or incentivize competitiveness, this matches expectations.

The more indirect sorts of financial support that NZTE offers, meaning helping firms and financiers to network and become aware of each other, also clearly makes sense from the perspective of a regulatory mindset. The purpose of government intervention, in the regulatory mindset, is not to tell firms what they ought to be doing in line with any sort of government planning. The purpose of government is rather to facilitate competition; it is to create an environment with conditions that allow for competition, and to support and incentivize competitiveness (Wade, 2018). Putting financiers and firms in touch with each other, similar to

NZTE's other networking and informational tools, helps firms compete more intelligently. It helps them become aware of opportunities they can take advantage of, if they so choose.

It is worth noting that, while financial support services exist, they are not featured prominently on NZTE's website. During fieldwork interviews, financial support mechanisms were rarely discussed by respondents – including both those inside and outside government – as being a significant component of NZTE support. Consulting services were almost always emphasized by interviewees as the main type of support. It is fair to say that NZTE does not want to advertise itself as a financier; financial support is only available to firms it sees as competitive or is something it indirectly facilitates via networking.

As another indication of NZTE's reluctance to provide financing, several interviewees noted that NZTE's direct financial support is not particularly useful because of customer segmentation. This is because larger funding streams are only "unlocked" when a firm enters the Focus tier. The issue is that "by the time you're in the top 700, you don't really need NZTE's support… The further along you are, the lower the risk and the less you need venture capital." In short, small firms cannot access investment but need it, and large firms can access investment but do not need it. As one businessperson said, "There are funds available, but my personal observation is that accessing them is a difficult process… I'm unaware of us tapping into any NZTE funds." This, combined with the emphasis on other services over financing, indicates that NZTE is reticent to intervene financially, and when it does so, it wants to make sure it is not radically altering firms' strategies. This makes sense from the perspective of a regulatory mindset; NZTE sees its role as supporting competition by ensuring firms act "autonomously and spontaneously" (Block, 2008).

Other explanations for targets and tools

There is good reason to believe that when New Zealand's government goes about supporting business internationalization, as is the case for intervention at home, its regulatory mindset leads it to use the tools and targets that it does. There are other explanations, however, for why support for business internationalization is characterized by certain tools and targets. In this concluding section, I briefly discuss some of these other explanations. Three factors in particular seem likely to influence New Zealand's targets and tools: 1) the particularities of the economic relationship with Thailand (Doner, 1991); 2) the political context, meaning the relationships between constellations of actors and the officials who are intervening in markets (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1995); and 3) the organizational structure of government, meaning the relationships between various agencies (MacNeil, 2013; Johnson, 1982). To reemphasize what I stated earlier, I do not see these alternative explanations as competing with my own; all of them are valuable and complement, not compete with, my theoretical framework.

One way to think about NZTE's tools and targets is that they may be affected by the particularities of the bilateral economic relationship between the two countries (Doner, 1991; Yeung, 2000a). New Zealand's business presence in Thailand is dominated by dairy products, which are the largest group of exports to Thailand, and Fonterra is likely the largest exporter of such products. NZTE's stated goal is to increase the value of exports, so the most obvious firms it should support are large exporters of dairy products like Fonterra. NZTE targets support to competitive firms, and its primary tool is tailored consulting support for competitive (which often simply means large) firms. These targets and tools essentially mean NZTE will, in the context of Thailand at least, tend to support large dairy exporters because such firms have demonstrated their competitiveness and are thus eligible for support. The fact that NZTE tends to help exporters of primary products is thus arguably influenced by the particularities of the economic relationship with Thailand. The influence of this bilateral economic relationship may be just as important as the influence of the regulatory mindset.

The second factor which may explain why NZTE's targets and tools are as they are is the political context, meaning the constellation of actors from and in New Zealand that interact with NZTE. It is arguable that NZTE may support large firms, for instance, simply because of rotating doors and the influence of industry groups. Certainly, there are arguments that New Zealand has experienced regulatory capture in other contexts (Kelsey, 2015). If NZTE's “embedded autonomy” (Evans, 1995) is such that NZTE workers’ commitment to their mission is undermined by the influence of business interest groups, this could explain why NZTE uses its targets and tools. On the surface, this would seem to offer a potential explanation for why NZTE tends to support large firms that are already well-established – they are influential. As mentioned above, NZTE staff often have private-sector backgrounds and also sometimes return to the private sector after working in NZTE, which is an obvious pathway for business influence.

In fact, I found little evidence that government workers are particularly influenced by business interest groups. Admittedly, the focus of my fieldwork was in Thailand, not in New Zealand, and it is possible that lobbying efforts are likelier to occur back in New Zealand. Also, it is unlikely that interviewees would indicate to me that corporate interests influence NZTE’s targets and tools, since that would connotate “corruption,” an issue about which NZTE is uncomfortable. (As one businessperson stressed, NZTE is “very clear about not being involved in any deal that is corrupt or has any sort of inappropriateness.”) It is certainly the case that larger firms more regularly interact with NZTE staff; small firms often complained about their inability to access consulting services, which entail regular interaction between NZTE staff and customer firms. I found little indication, though, that this more regular interaction leads NZTE to favor the larger firms. Larger firms are simply seen as more competitive, and since NZTE’s role is to support competitive firms, it makes sense for it to use targets and tools that benefit large firms.

The last explanatory factor which seems likely to influence NZTE’s targets and tools is the organizational structure of the New Zealand government. The structure of government – in a wide variety of contexts, not just support for business internationalization – likely affects how governments intervene (MacNeil, 2013; Johnson, 1982). In the case of supporting business internationalization into Thailand, NZTE very much appears to be a pilot agency (Johnson, 1982). Its role is to support New Zealand firms which already have or which are planning to have a business presence in Thailand. There is some crossover with other agencies, but only tangentially so – MFAT creates trade agreements and Callaghan supports firms in New Zealand, sometimes to the point of helping firms expand abroad. The fact that NZTE is a pilot agency for business internationalization and is relatively independent likely explains its tools and targets. If the organizational structure were different and if NZTE had different relationships with other state organizations, this would likely affect the way it provides business internationalization support. If NZTE shared staff with MFAT, for example, as was formerly the case (Jenner, 2009), then this would likely influence the way NZTE supports business internationalization.

Regardless of the importance of these other factors, though, it seems hard to deny that the mindset is still important. The particular ways in which government builds up its “capacity” to intervene depends on the interests of individuals working in government (Geddes, 1994). Those interests matter because if a regulatory mindset is widespread, then bureaucrats will want to intervene in ways that help market actors behave “autonomously and spontaneously” (Block, 2008). Support will be characterized by targets and tools helping competitive firms or facilitating competition, regardless of other more “structural” (Blyth, 2003) factors like the bilateral economic relationship, the political context, or the organizational structure.

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have compared Singapore and New Zealand's approaches to supporting business internationalization. Doing so has been a useful exercise. I did not decide to compare these two countries at random simply to give myself a double workload; there was a point to carrying out this focused study. The point was to systematically compare governments in a regulatory and a developmental state to clarify what important differences exist between their approaches to intervention, and to extend this comparison abroad to see if the differences also characterize their approaches to supporting business internationalization.

This thesis shows the two countries' business internationalization support agencies, Enterprise Singapore (ESG) and New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (NZTE), have significantly different ways of operating. These differences moreover correspond to what the theoretical framework expects: NZTE and ESG have different mindsets, targets, and tools, and their different mindsets appear to lead them to use the targets and tools that they use; they "translate" their "ambitions" (Thurbon, 2016) into corresponding actions that are "explicable" (Blyth, 2003) according to their mindsets. The agencies' mindsets about their appropriate relationships with market actors are quite different. In the words of a former ESG worker, which were echoed in other information sources as described in previous chapters, ESG has a "paternalistic" view about its relationship with market actors. NZTE, in contrast, is "uncomfortable with 'intervening,'" as a businessperson in Thailand close to the agency put it. ESG sees its role as guiding market actors, whereas NZTE sees its role as helping firms to pursue their interests. These two contrasting views correspond to the "plan-rational" and "market-rational" perspectives that the framework expects them to have (Johnson, 1982).

In terms of targets, ESG channels benefits to market actors in business areas the Singaporean government has planned for development. This is similar to how the Singaporean government has planned industrial development at home and channeled benefits accordingly (Rodan, 1989; Wong, 2011; Klingler-Vidra, 2018; Gopinathana & Lee, 2011). In supporting business internationalization, ESG targets benefits to firms that are working in business areas that align with government plans. Because of its developmental mindset, ESG prioritizes industries pertaining to governmentwide plans for achieving "growth," as an ESG worker put it. The government has various "theses," in the words of a government analyst, about which sectors' development will help Singapore's overall economy grow. These theses define targeting.

NZTE, on the other hand, targets interventions according to its perceptions about firms' competitiveness; competitiveness, not industrial planning, is the more important factor by which NZTE determines if firms deserve its help. Because of its regulatory mindset, NZTE does "not provide preferential attention to any particular… industries," in the words of a businessperson familiar with the agency. Instead, NZTE targets interventions to affect "healthy" businesses with a high "likelihood of success," as described by government workers and businesspeople. Mostly, this means large firms that have already demonstrated their competitiveness, but in some cases it means small firms in which NZTE workers see promise. These targeting differences are as the theoretical framework expects: developmental states target interventions with "sectoral selectivity" (Yeung, 2016), whereas regulatory states target not to develop planned industries but instead to help firms "commercialize" (Block, 2008).

ESG's and NZTE's tools are also different from each other, and these differences furthermore seem to be defined by the agencies' different mindsets. ESG, on the one hand, favors using financial incentives which subsidize engagement with planned industries. NZTE, on the other hand, favors providing assistance – most notably in the form of consulting services – that helps firms develop their capacity to compete. The agencies' preferences are often justified by government workers' underlying mindsets about what appropriate relationships should look like between governments and markets. Since in developmental states, government's appropriate role is to guide market actors, ESG uses financial incentives to "sweeten" the attractiveness of engaging with planned industries, in the words of an ESG worker. For NZTE, on the other hand, it sees itself as an "enabler," in the words of several interviewees. Given this view, it naturally makes sense for it to assist firms by helping them improve their ability to “construct strategies,” as described by a businessperson who has received NZTE assistance. Again, these differences are as the theoretical framework expects. Regulatory states use tools as a form of “fertilizer” to “help new ideas grow” (Block, 2008), whereas developmental states instead use a “battery of incentives” that essentially “boil down to subsidies” (Amsden, 1989).

This thesis has shown not only that the theoretical framework accurately describes how New Zealand and Singapore’s governments support business internationalization, but also that the framework describes how the governments intervene at home. In the chapters about Singapore and New Zealand’s interventions at home since the 1960s and 1980s, respectively, I discussed evidence that indicates the governments differ according to mindsets, targets, and tools, and that the mindsets appear to define the targets and tools governments use when intervening. It is an important finding that the same theoretical framework is useful in both contexts – it explains intervention at home as well as support for business internationalization into Thailand. Many scholarly studies have described how developmental or regulatory states intervene either at home or abroad (Block, 2008; Carney, 2018; Chu 2019; Evans, 1995; MacNeil, 2013; Weiss, 2014; Yeung, 2016). There are fewer studies which systematically apply a single framework to compare one developmental state and one regulatory state, both in their intervention efforts at home and in their business internationalization support efforts abroad. The framework’s applicability in both settings means it may have relevance in other contexts.

As mentioned in the opening chapter, there is less consensus about what constitutes regulatory states compared to developmental states; many scholars in the developmental state literature have studied developmental states, but few scholars in the literature have focused studies on regulatory states (Weiss, 2014; Block, 2008; MacNeil, 2013). This thesis offers one conceptualization of regulatory states, distinguishing them from developmental states by mindsets, targets, and tools. There are certainly numerous other ways to conceptualize how the two political economy types differ. If this thesis spurs more comparative work, whether it be criticisms of or agreements with this thesis’s conceptualization, that will likely help to refine conceptualization about what defines regulatory states, perhaps creating more consensus.

This thesis has limitations that make the relevance of the framework in other contexts questionable. First among these limitations is that the context of focus is highly specific. Perhaps these findings are only relevant to New Zealand and Singapore supporting business internationalization into Thailand; if other home or host countries were studied, for instance, perhaps there would be little evidence to support confidence in the framework. Another limitation is the framework does not define its relationship to other explanatory factors, specifically those noted many times in preceding chapters – the home country political context (Evans, 1995; Weiss, 1995), the organizational structure of government (Johnson, 1982; MacNeil, 2013), and the host country context (Yeung, 2002; Hamilton-Hart, 2005; Doner, 1991).

There are a few ways in which future research could address this thesis's limitations and thereby refine the framework to strengthen its usefulness. This thesis studies the framework in a particular empirical context, but the framework could be studied in other contexts. Future research could, for instance, compare how New Zealand and Singapore support business internationalization into other host countries besides Thailand. Another way to study the framework in other contexts would be to continue studying Thailand as a host country, but to compare different developmental and regulatory states that support business internationalization into it. A third way would be to compare an entirely different set of home and host countries. Expanding contexts would mean that future research could strengthen or weaken confidence in the theorized relationships between mindsets, targets, and tools.

Another interesting area for future research could be to study if the theoretical framework is relevant for home countries that are not clearly identifiable as developmental or regulatory states. The framework describes mindsets as defining tools and targets, but only for developmental or regulatory states. Might it also be true that mindsets more generally affect targets and tools that governments use when supporting business internationalization, regardless of the home countries' political economy type? This would be an interesting finding because it would expand the usefulness of the theoretical framework. Rather than simply explaining support for business internationalization in clearly recognized developmental or regulatory states, of which there are few, the framework could be applied in more contexts.

Another area of future research could study in more depth the relationship between this theoretical framework and some of the other explanatory factors discussed in preceding chapters. The political context, organizational structure, and host country context, for instance – how do they relate to the theoretical framework? In the preceding chapters, I have discussed how there is some indication that these other factors appear to explain some aspects of New Zealand and Singapore's interventions. It would be interesting to explicitly theorize how they relate to the theoretical framework. Are political context and organizational structure, for instance, defined by mindset, or do they in turn define mindset? Or is the relationship between them more complex than that? Does the host country context act as an intervening variable between mindsets on the one hand and targets and tools on the other hand? If so, what aspects of the host country context are relevant, and what effects do they have on targets and tools? Answering questions like these, particularly if combined with studies in new empirical contexts, would significantly improve the usefulness of the framework developed in this thesis.

References

Abbott, M. (2010). The long term development of New Zealand's electricity supply industry. *New Zealand Economic Papers, 44(1)*, 75-89.

Action Community for Entrepreneurship (n.d.). *About*. https://ace.org.sg/about-us/

Akhaya T., P. (2019, July). *Thai corporate innovation firm RISE expands AI accelerator program to Singapore*. e27. https://e27.co/thai-corporate-innovation-firm-rise-expands-ai-accelerator-program-to-singapore-20190718/

Amsden, A. H. (1989). *Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Anderson, B. (2012, June). *Small Business: Ben Anderson - taking your business to the US*. NZ Herald. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/small-business-ben-anderson-taking-your-business-to-the-us/FLOZTA6DGMTKL2JD3F6GCLWG3I/

Aranda, M., & Christensen, A.-S. (2009). "The New Zealand's Quota Management System (QMS) and its Complementary Mechanisms." In Hauge, K. H., & Wilson, D. C. (Eds.), *Comparative evaluations of innovative fisheries management global experiences and European prospects* (19-41). London, UK: Springer.

Arase, D. (1994). Public-Private Sector Interest Coordination in Japan's ODA. *Pacific Affairs, 27(2)*, 171-199.

Ardern, J. (2019, January). *Opinion: An economics of kindness*. Beehive.govt.nz. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/feature/opinion-economics-kindness

ASEAN (2015, November). *ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together*. https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/images/2015/November/KL-Declaration/ASEAN%202025%20Forging%20Ahead%20Together%20final.pdf

ASEAN (n.d.-a). *ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement*. http://investasean.asean.org/index.php/page/view/asean-free-trade-area-agreements/view/757/newsid/872/asean-trade-in-goods-agreement.html

ASEAN (n.d.-b). *ASEAN Economic Community*. https://asean.org/asean-economic-community/

ASEAN Briefing (2020, March). *Singapore Launches Tech@SG Program*. https://www.aseanbriefing.com/news/singapore-launches-techsg-program/

ASEAN New Zealand Business Council (n.d.). Untitled. https://anzbc.glueup.com/event/meet-ryan-freer-trade-commissioner-to-thailand-myanmar-cambodia-laos-19174/

Auckland University of Technology (2018). *Alumni events in Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh City*. https://alumni.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/143704/alumni-mag2-080318-v29-web-spread.pdf

Auckland Unlimited (2018, May). *Zeffer Cider brews up rapid export growth*. https://www.aucklandnz.com/business/start-and-grow/success-stories/zeffer-cider

AvoScene (2015, July). Issuu. https://issuu.com/nzavocado/docs/avoscene_july_2015

Baharudin, H. (2020a, February). *Singapore Budget 2020: New multi-platform package to help firms grow and go global*. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-budget-2020-new-multi-platform-package-to-help-firms-grow-and-go-global

Baharudin, H. (2020b, February). *Singapore Budget 2020: Firms to get more help to innovate and go global*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/firms-to-get-more-help-to-innovate-and-go-global

Bangkok Post (2020, August). *AIS 5G service reaches every province*. https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/1972579/ais-5g-service-reaches-every-province
Barr, M. D. (2014). *The Ruling Elite of Singapore: Networks of Power and Influence*. London, UK: IB Taurus.
Barr, M. D. (2018). *Singapore: A Modern History*. London, UK: IB Taurus.
Barr, M. D., & Skirbiš, Z. (2008). *Constructing Singapore: Elitism, Ethnicity and the Nation-Building Project*. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies.
Beach, D., & Pedersen, R. B. (2013). *Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
Beehive.govt.nz (2003, March). *New Zealand Trade and Enterprise unveiled*. https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-trade-and-enterprise-unveiled
Beng, Y. S. (1994). The state of public relations in Singapore. *Public Relations Review, 20(4)*, 373-394.
Bhunia, P. (2018, April). *Singapore's Global Innovation Alliance network expands to Bangkok*. OpenGov Asia. https://opengovasia.com/singapores-global-innovation-alliance-network-expands-to-bangkok/
Blank, S. (1977). Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy, and the Problem of Pluralistic Stagnation. *International Organization, 31(4)*, 673-721.
Block, F. (2008). Swimming Against the Current: The Rise of a Hidden Developmental State in the United States. *Politics & Society, 36(2)*, 169-206.
Blyth, M. (2003). Structures Do Not Come With an Instruction Sheet: Interests, Ideas, and Progress in Political Science. *Perspectives on Politics, 1(4)*, 695-706.
Borroz, N. (2020). Comparing Space Sectors Down Under. *Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 3(2)*, 35-54.
Bunnell, T., Muzaini, H., & Sidaway, J. D. (2006). Global city frontiers: Singapore's hinterland and the contested socio-political geographies of Bintan, Indonesia. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(1)*, 3-22.
Busser, R. (2008). 'Detroit of the East'? industrial upgrading, Japanese car producers and the development of the automotive industry in Thailand. *Asia Pacific Business Review, 14(1)*, 29-45.
Callaghan Innovation (n.d.-a). *About Us*. https://www.callaghaninnovation.govt.nz/about-us
Callaghan Innovation (n.d.-b). *Growth Grants*. https://www.callaghaninnovation.govt.nz/grants/growth-grants
Campbell, K. (2017, September). *Thailand is open for business*. New Zealand Trade and Enterprise. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/about/news/blogs/thailand-is-open-for-business
Carney, M. (2005). Globalization and the renewal of Asian business networks. *Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 22(4)*, 337-354.
Carney, R. W. (2018). *Authoritarian Capitalism: Sovereign Wealth Funds and State-Owned Enterprises in East Asian and Beyond*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Cato Institute (n.d.). *About*. https://www.cato.org/about
Challies, E., & Murray, W. E. (2008). Towards a post-neoliberalism? The comparative politico-economic transition of New Zealand and Chile. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 49(2)*, 228-243.

Chan, S. (2017, March). *$200m to help fund local start-ups*. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/200m-to-help-fund-local-start-ups
Chan, S. J. (2019, November). *Enterprise Singapore links up with Synagie to spur SMEs' cross-border e-commerce growth*. The Edge Communications. https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/enterprise-singapore-links-synagie-spur-smes-crossborder-ecommerce-growth
Chang, H.-J. (1994). *The Political Economy of Industrial Policy*. New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.
Chen, T.-J., & T. F. Aquino (1998). *Taiwanese firms in Southeast Asia: networking across borders*. Cheltenham UK: Edward Elgar.
Chetty, S., & Patterson, A. (2002). Developing internationalization capability through industry groups: the experience of a telecommunications joint action group. *Journal of Strategic Marketing, 10(1)*, 68-89.
Chetty, S., & Blankenburg Holm, D. (2000). "The Role of Business Networks in the Internationalization of Manufacturing Firms: A Longitudinal Case Study." In McNaughton, R. B. (Ed.), *Developments in Australasian Marketing* (205-222). Stamford, CT: JAI Press.
Cho, M., & Chong, K. H. (2018). "Introduction." In Chong, K. H., & Cho, M. (Eds.), *Creative Ageing Cities: Place Design with Older People in Asian Cities* (205-211). New York, NY: Routledge.
Chong, C. (2019a, April). *Enterprise Singapore, MAS to match start-ups with global investors*. The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/garage/news/enterprise-singapore-mas-to-match-start-ups-with-global-investors
Chong, C. (2019b, April). *Enterprise Singapore, MAS to match start-ups with global investors*. The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/garage/news/enterprise-singapore-mas-to-match-start-ups-with-global-investors
Chong, K. H., & Cho, M. (Eds.) (2018). *Creative Ageing Cities: Place Design with Older People in Asian Cities*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Chu, Y.-W. (2019). Democratization, globalization, and institutional adaptation: the developmental states of South Korea and Taiwan. *Review of International Political Economy*, 1-22.
Chua, B. H. (2017) *Liberalism Disavowed: Communitarianism and State Capitalism in Singapore*. Singapore: NUS Press.
Clydesdale, G. (2015). Capabilities and Industrial Policy: Lessons from the New Zealand Movie Industry. *Industrial and Corporate Change, 24(5)*, 1149-1177.
Collier, D. (2011) Understanding Process Tracing. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 44(4)*, 823-830.
Commerce Commission (2016, August). Untitled. https://comcom.govt.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0019/61084/Contact-Energy-IM-review-draft-decisions-cross-submission-18-August-2016.pdf
Commerce Commission (n.d.). *Our Role*. https://comcom.govt.nz/about-us/our-role
Cordon, M. (2020, February). *Singapore sets aside additional $215m for deep-tech startups*. Tech In Asia. https://www.techinasia.com/singapore-allots-additional-215m-investments-deeptech

Court, M., & O'Neill, J. (2011). 'Tomorrow's schools' in New Zealand: From social democracy to market managerialism. *Journal of Educational Administration and History, 43(2)*, 119-140.

Crick, D., & Lindsay, V. (2015). Service and service-intensive New Zealand internationalising SMEs: Managers' perceptions of government assistance. *Market Intelligence & Planning, 33(3)*, 366-393.

Davis, K. (n.d.). *Kiwi manufacturing influx into Thailand*. NZ Manufacturer. https://nzmanufacturer.co.nz/2010/11/kiwi-manufacturing-influx-into-thailand/

Dent, C. (2007) 'The State and Transnational Capital in Adaptive Partnership: Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan', in Yeung, H. W.-C. (ed.) *Handbook of Research on Asian Businesses* (223-249). Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.

Department of Statistics Singapore. (n.d.). *SingStat Table Builder*. https://www.tablebuilder.singstat.gov.sg/publicfacing/mainMenu.action

Deyo, F. C. (1991). "Singapore: Developmental paternalism." In Goldstein, S. M. (Ed.), *Minidragons: Fragile Economic Miracles in the Pacific* (64-103). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Diez, J. R., Breul, M., & Moneke, J. (2019). The SIJORI Growth Triangle: Territorial complementarities or competition for FDI in the oil and gas industry? *Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, 36(1)*, 71-90.

Doing Business (n.d.) *Reports*. https://www.doingbusiness.org/en/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2020

Dollars and Sense (2015, July). *6 Things That We Know About Temasek Holdings From Their Latest Results*. https://dollarsandsense.sg/6-things-that-we-know-about-temasek-holdings-from-their-latest-results/

Doner, R. F. (1991). *Driving a bargain: automobile industrialization and Japanese firms in Southeast Asia*.

Doner, R. F., B. Ritchie, & Slater, D. (2005). Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective. *International Organization, 59(2)*, 327-361.

Easton, B. H. (1997). *The Commercialization of New Zealand*. Auckland, NZ: Auckland University Press.

Economic Development Board (2017, July). *Singapore's advanced manufacturing avatar "Industry 4.0"*. https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/business-insights/insights/singapores-advanced-manufacturing-avatar--industry-4-0.html

Economic Development Board (n.d.). *Business-friendly environment*. https://www.edb.gov.sg/en/why-singapore/business-friendly-environment.html

Enterprise Singapore (2019, March). *Speech by Mr Peter Ong, Chairman of Enterprise Singapore, at Enterprise Singapore's Year-in-Review Media Briefing*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/media-centre/speeches/2019/march/speech-by-peter-ong-at-the-enteprise-singapore-year-in-review-media-briefing

Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-a). *Grants*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/grants

Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-b). *Enterprise Financing Scheme: Overview*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/loans-and-insurance/loans-and-insurance/enterprise-financing-scheme/venture-debt/overview
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-c). *Investments*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/investments
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-d). *Key Strategies – 2019 and Beyond*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/about-us/strategic-plan
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-e). *Global Innovation Alliance*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/industries/hub/startup/global-innovation-alliance
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-f). *Profiled Industries*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/overseas-markets/asia-pacific/thailand/profiled-industries
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-g). *About Enterprise Singapore*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/about-us/overview
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-h). *Loans & Insurance*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/loans-and-insurance
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-i). *Tax Incentives*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/tax-incentives#tax-incentives
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-j). *Market Readiness Assistance (MRA) Grant*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/grants/for-local-companies/market-readiness-assistance-grant
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-k). *Overview: SME Working Capital*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/loans-and-insurance/loans-and-insurance/enterprise-financing-scheme/sme-working-capital/overview
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-l). *Overview: Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A)*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/loans-and-insurance/loans-and-insurance/enterprise-financing-scheme/merger-and-acquisitions/overview
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-m). *Overview: Project Loan*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/financial-assistance/loans-and-insurance/loans-and-insurance/enterprise-financing-scheme/project-loan/overview
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-n). *For Singapore Companies*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-singapore-companies
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-o). *Overview: Global Ready Talent Programme (For Companies)*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-singapore-companies/talent-attraction-and-development/internships/global-ready-talent-programme-for-companies/overview
Enterprise Singapore (n.d.-q). *Enterprise Leadership for Transformation*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-singapore-companies/growth-partnership-programme/enterprise-leadership-for-transformation
Enterprise Singapore, (n.d.-p). *Scale-Up SG*. https://www.enterprisesg.gov.sg/non-financial-assistance/for-singapore-companies/growth-partnership-programme/scale-up-sg
Eskow, S. (2013, February). *Callaghan Innovation touted as business enabler*. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/unlimited/8252187/Callaghan-Innovation-touted-as-business-enabler

Evans, L., Grimes, A., Wilkinson, B., & Teece, D. (1996). Economic Reform in New Zealand 1984-95: The Pursuit of Efficiency. *Journal of Economic Literature*. 1856-1902.

Evans, P. (1995). *Embedded Autonomy: States & Industrial Transformation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Everiss, L., D. Hill, & Meade, A. (2017). A Story of Changing State Priorities: Early Childhood Care and Education Policies in Aotearoa New Zealand. *Education in the Asia-Pacific Region, 35*, 163-186.

Export Essentials (n.d.). *Export Essentials*. https://www.exportessentials.nz/

Facebook (2018, July). Untitled. https://www.facebook.com/nzembassybangkok/posts/1288644581269944/

Felzensztein, C, Stringer, C., Benson-Rea, M., & Freeman, S. (2014). International marketing strategies in industrial clusters: Insights from the Southern Hemisphere. *Journal of Business Research, 67(5)*, 837-846.

Fernquest, J. (2014, March). *What's new in business news: March 31, 2014*. Bangkok Post. https://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/advanced/402719/what-new-in-business-news-march-31-2014

Finegold, D., Wong, P.-K., & Cheah, T.-C. (2004). Adapting a foreign direct investment strategy to the knowledge economy: The case of Singapore's emerging biotechnology cluster. *European Planning Studies, 12(7)*, 921-941.

Flickr (n.d.) Untitled. https://www.flickr.com/photos/nztradeandenterprise/10951926295/in/photostream/

Fuquay, J. W., Fox, P. F., & McSweeny, P. L. H. (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Dairy Sciences: Second Edition*. San Diego, CA: Elsevier.

Geddes, B. (1990). How the Cases You Choose Affect the Answers You Get: Selection Bias in Comparative Politics. *Political Analysis, 2*, 131-150.

Geddes, B. (1994). *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Geddes, B. (2003). *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: MI: University of Michigan Press.

Gilpin, R. (1975). *US Power and the Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Global Ready Talent Programme (n.d.). *Management Associate*. https://www.joinsme.sg/ManagementAssociate

Goertz, G., & Mahoney, J. (2012). *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Goldfinch, S. (2000). *Remaking New Zealand and Australian Economic Policy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.

Goldfinch, S., & Malpass, D. (2007). The Polish Shipyard: Myth, Economic History and Economic Policy Reform in New Zealand. *Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53(1)*, 118-137.

Goldstein, A., & Pananond, P. (2008). Singapore Inc. Goes Shopping Abroad: Profits and Pitfalls. *Journey of Contemporary Asia, 38(3)*, 417-438.

Goldstein, S. M. (Ed.) (1991). *Minidragons: Fragile Economic Miracles in the Pacific*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Gopinathana, S., & Lee, M. H. (2011). Challenging and co-opting globalisation: Singapore's strategies in higher education. *Journal of Higher Education Policy and Management, 33(3)*, 287-299.

gov.sg (n.d.). *Singapore Government Directory*. https://www.sgdi.gov.sg/ministries

Grundy-Warr, C., Peachey, K., & Perry, M. (1999). Fragmented integration in the Singapore-Indonesian border zone: Southeast Asia's 'Growth Triangle' against the global economy. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(2)*, 304-328.

Haggard, S. (2004). Institutions and growth in East Asia. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 38(4)*, 53-81.

Haggard, S. (2015). The developmental state is dead: long live the developmental state! In Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. (Eds.), *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis* (39-66). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, P. A. (2006). Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it. *European Management Review, 3(1)*, 24-31.

Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.). (2001). *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (2001). An introduction to varieties of capitalism. In Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D. (Eds.), *Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage* (1-68). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Hamilton-Hart, N. (2005). "The Regionalization of Southeast Asian Business: Transnational Networks in National Contexts." In Pempel, T. J. (Ed.), *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region* (170-192). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Harris, C. (2009, July). *Flying the Kiwi flag in Thailand*. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/industries/2564545/Flying-the-Kiwi-flag-in-Thailand

Hauge, K. H., & Wilson, D. C. (Eds.) (2009). *Comparative evaluations of innovative fisheries management global experiences and European prospects*. London, UK: Springer.

Heng, M. (2019, August). *Enterprise Singapore sees scope for unmanned stores*. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/enterprise-spore-sees-scope-for-unmanned-stores

Higgott, R. A., Leaver, R., & Ravenhill, J. (Eds.) (1993). *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?* St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Hill, M., & Lian, K. F. (1995). *The Politics of Nation Building and Citizenship in Singapore*. London, UK: Routledge.

Ho, K. C. (1994). Industrial restructuring, the Singapore city-state, and the regional division of labour. *Environment & Planning A, 26(1)*, 33-5.

Holden, K., & Demeritt, D. (2008). Democratising Science? The politics of promoting biomedicine in Singapore's developmental state. *Environment and Planning, 26(1)*, 68-86.

Homewood, D. (2009). "Tools of the trade: engaging with markets." In *Agents abroad: the story of the New Zealand Trade Commissioner Service*. North Shore, NZ: Penguin.

Hooks, J., & Tooley, S. (2015). Electricity pricing in New Zealand and the Australian State of Queensland: Accounting for the impact of sector restructuring. *Financial Accountability & Management, 31(4)*, 439-462.

Hsieh, C., & Löfgren, H. (2009). Biopharmaceutical innovation and industrial developments in South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. *Australian Health Review, 33(2),* 245-257.
Huang, J.-A. (2020, March). *New tech keeps Lingjack on track*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/new-tech-keeps-lingjack-on-track
Human Resources Online (2018, April). *Enterprise Singapore to boost HR operations with three new initiatives*. https://www.humanresourcesonline.net/enterprise-singapore-to-boost-hr-operations-with-three-new-initiatives
Industrial Automation Asia (2020, October). *Singapore Embarks On Next Phase Of Industry 4.0 Transformation For Manufacturers*. https://www.iaasiaonline.com/singapore-embarks-on-next-phase-of-industry-4-0-transformation-for-manufacturers/
Infocomm Media Development Authority (2020, February). *Services 4.0: The Future of Services in a Digital Economy.* https://www.imda.gov.sg/infocomm-media-landscape/services-40
Infocomm Media Development Authority (n.d.). *Helping SMEs Go Digital*. https://www.imda.gov.sg/-/media/Imda/Files/About/Media-Releases/2020/COS2020/Annex-C-COS-2020---Factsheet---SME-Go-Digital_Grow-Digital.pdf
Infrastructure Asia (2019, March). *Memorandum of Understanding between Singapore and the United States to Deepen Cooperation on Infrastructure Development*. https://www.infrastructureasia.org/en/media-centre/mou-between-singapore-and-the-united-states-to-deepen-cooperation-on-infrastructure--development
Infrastructure Asia (n.d.). *About Us*. https://www.infrastructureasia.org/en/About-Us
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (2015, June). *Singapore and Thailand Revise Their Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation*. https://www.iras.gov.sg/irashome/News-and-Events/Newsroom/Media-Releases-and-Speeches/Media-Releases/2015/Singapore-and-Thailand-Revise-Their-Agreement-for-the-Avoidance-of-Double-Taxation/
Jain, P. (2016). Japan's foreign aid: old and new contests. *Pacific Review, 29(1)*, 93-113.
Jalal, T. S., & Bodger, P. (2011). Evaluating the impacts of generation capacity cycles in New Zealand. *2011 IEEE/PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition*.
Jenner, J. (2009). "Expansion through to 1986: New posts, new exporters, new services." In *Agents abroad: the story of the New Zealand Trade Commissioner Service*. North Shore, NZ: Penguin.
Johnson, C. (1982). *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Joshi, D. K. (2012). Varieties of Developmental States: Three Non-Western Pathways to the Millennium Development Goals. *Journal of Developing Societies, 28(3)*, 355-378.
Kang, D. C. (2002). *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Katō, H. (2016). Japan's ODA 1954-2014: Changes and Continuities in a Central Instrument in Japan's Foreign Policy. In Katō, H., Page, J., & Shimomura, Y. (Eds.), *Japan's Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda* (1-18). Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
Katō, H., Page, J. & Shimomura, Y. (Eds.) (2016). *Japan's Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda*. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Katzenstein, P. J. (1985). *Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Katzenstein, P. J., & Shiraishi, T. (Eds.). (1997). *Network Power: Japan and Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Kelsey, J. (2015). *The FIRE Economy: New Zealand's reckoning*. Wellington, NZ: Bridget Williams Books with the New Zealand Law Foundation.
Kienzle, R., & Shadur, M. (1997). Developments in business networks in East Asia. *Management Decision, 35(1)*, 23-32.
Kit, T. S. (2019, February). *Budget 2019: Measures worth S$1 billion to help businesses build 'deep' capabilities*. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/budget-2019-measures-1-billion-help-businesses-capabilities-11252898
Klingler-Vidra, R. (2018). *The venture capital state: the Silicon Valley model in East Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Knook, J., Dynes, R., Pinxterhuis, I., de Klein, C. A. M., Eory, V., Brander, M., & Moran, D. (2020). Policy and Practice Certainty for Effective Uptake of Diffuse Pollution Practices in A Light-Touch Regulated Country. *Environmental Management, 65(2)*, 243-256.
Koh, G. (1997). Bureaucratic Rationality in an Evolving Developmental State: Challenges to Governance in Singapore. *Asian Journal of Political Science, 5*(2), 114-141.
Koh, W. T. H., & Wong, P. K. (2005). "The Venture Capital Industry in Singapore: A Comparative Study with Taiwan and Israel on the Government's Role. *SMU Edge Conference: Bridging The Gap - Entrepreneurship in Theory and Practice.*
Kompass (n.d.). SPRING Singapore. https://sg.kompass.com/c/spring-singapore/sg014449/
Konzelmann, S. J., & Fovargue-Davies, M. (Eds.), *Banking Systems in the Crisis: The Faces of Liberal Capitalism*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Krause, N. (2012, April). *Building a business in the sand*. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/6702064/Building-a-business-in-the-sand
Kyung-sup, C, Fine, B., & Wise, L. (Eds.) (2012). *Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Lai, L. (2019, December). *Enterprise Singapore launches second run of Scale-up SG*. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/sme/enterprise-singapore-launches-second-run-of-scale-up-sg
Lam, F. (2020, February). *Budget 2020: Training, mentorship for 900 SME leaders over next 3 years*. The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-budget-2020/budget-2020-training-mentorship-for-900-sme-leaders-over
Lambie, T. (2005, February). *Miracle Down Under: How New Zealand Farmers Prosper without Subsidies or Protection*. The Cato Institute. https://www.cato.org/free-trade-bulletin/miracle-down-under-how-new-zealand-farmers-prosper-without-subsidies-or
Lecler, Y. (2002). The cluster role in the development of the Thai car industry. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 26(4)*, 799-814.
Leonidou, L. C., Katsikeas, C. S., Samiee, S., & Aykol, B. (Eds.) (2018). *Advances in Global Marketing: A Research Anthology*. Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Leow, A (2019, October). *SMEs must press on with global plans: ESG*. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/smes-must-press-on-with-global-plans-esg

Leow, A. (2020a, February). *Companies to add S$17.3b in value, 21,700 in jobs from Enterprise Singapore help in 2019*. The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/companies-to-add-s173b-in-value-21700-in-jobs-from-enterprise-singapore-help-in

Leow, A. (2020b, March). *Don't skimp on rent relief, Chan Chun Sing tells landlords*. The Business Times. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/government-economy/singapore-budget-2020/dont-skimp-on-rent-relief-chan-chun-sing-tells-landlords

Levi-Faur, D. (1998). The competition state as a neomercantilist state: Understanding the restructuring of national and global telecommunications. *Journal of Socio-Economics, 27(6)*, 665-685.

Lin, K.-H., & Chaney, I. (2007). The influence of domestic interfirm networks on the internationalization process of Taiwanese SMEs. *Asia Pacific Business Review, 13(4*), 565-583.

Lindlof, T. R., & Taylor, B. C. (2017). *Qualitative Communication Research Methods, Fourth Edition*. Los Angeles, CA: SAGE.

Lindsay, V., Rod, M., & Ashill, N. (2018). "Home Country Institutional Agents (HCIAs) as Boundary Spanners Supporting SME Internationalization." In Leonidou, L. C., Katsikeas, C. S., Samiee, S., & Aykol, B. (Eds.), *Advances in Global Marketing: A Research Anthology* (99-124). Cham, Switzerland: Springer.

Lockhart, J. (2013). "New Zealand: Staying in the black." In Konzelmann, S. J., & Fovargue-Davies, M. (Eds.), *Banking Systems in the Crisis: The Faces of Liberal Capitalism* (134-154). New York, NY: Routledge.

Loh, D. (2017, June). *17 start-up mentors accredited to guide entrepreneurs under Startup SG Founder scheme*. CNA. https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/17-start-up-mentors-accredited-to-guide-entrepreneurs-under-8836922

Low, L. (2001). The Singapore developmental state in the new economy and polity. *The Pacific Review, 14(3)*, 411-441.

Luxury Society Asia (n.d.). *The Taste Of New Zealand 2019*. https://www.luxurysocietyasia.com/the-taste-of-new-zealand-2019/

MacGregor, R. C., & Hodgkinson, A. T. (Eds.) (2006). *Small Business Clustering Technologies: Application in Marketing, Management, IT and Economics*. Hershey, PA: Idea Group Inc.

MacManus, R. (2018, November). *MacManus: Mind the tech sector's funding gap*. Newsroom. https://www.newsroom.co.nz/2018/11/06/303453/the-funding-gap-in-our-tech-sector

MacNeil, R. (2013). Seeding an Energy Technology Revolution in the United States: Re-conceptualising the Nature of Innovation in 'Liberal-Market Economies'. *New Political Economy, 18(1)*, 64-88.

Maher, S. (2012). Leading from behind: An ethnographic study of business diplomacy in the making of free trade agreements in New Zealand. PhD dissertation. University of Auckland.

Mahoney, J. (2007). Qualitative Methodology and Comparative Politics. *Comparative Political Studies*, *40(2)*, 122-144.

Mahoney, J. (2012). The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social Sciences. *Sociological Methods & Research, 41(4)*, 570-597.
Mahoney, J., & Thelen, K. (Eds.) (2015). *Advances in Comparative-Historical Analysis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Majone, G. (Ed.) (1996). *Regulating Europe*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Mako Networks (2013, December). *Mako Networks Joins NZ Trade Mission to Thailand*. https://makonetworks.com/about/news/2013/12/mako-networks-joins-nz-trade-mission-to-thailand/
Martin, J. (2014, February). *Turners & Growers fancies Apollo Apples*. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/farming/agribusiness/9696825/Turners-Growers-fancies-Apollo-Apples
Mayes, D. G. (2015). Regulation and governance in the non-bank financial sector: Lessons from New Zealand. *Journal of Banking Regulation, 16(4)*, 289-305.
Mazzucato, M. (2013). *The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Myths in Risk and Innovation*. Anthem Press.
McArthur, J. (2017). Auckland: Rescaled governance and post-suburban politics. *Cities, 64*, 79-87.
McLean, F. (2009). "In the beginning: In search of fresh markets 1894-1950." In *Agents abroad: the story of the New Zealand Trade Commissioner Service*. North Shore, NZ: Penguin.
McNaughton, R. B. (Ed.) (2000). *Developments in Australasian Marketing*. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.
McNaughton, R. B., & Bell, J. (2001). Corporate social capital: A framework for understanding network-based export development programs. *Research in the Sociology of Organizations, 18*, 209-230.
Menon, J., & Melendez, A. C. (2017). Realizing an ASEAN Economic Community: Progress and Remaining Challenge. *Singapore Economic Review, 62(3)*, 681-702.
Milhaupt, C. J., & Pargendler, M. (2017). Governance Challenges of Listed State- Owned Enterprises Around the World: National Experiences and a Framework for Reform. *Cornell International Law Journal, 50(3)*, 473-542.
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2006, August). *Evaluation of the Sector Projects Programme*. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/2405-evaluation-sector-projects-programme-pdf
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (2007, April). *Fisher & Paykel Factory Relocation to Thailand*. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0704/S00396/fisher-paykel-factory-relocation-to-thailand.htm
Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment (n.d.). *Endeavour Fund*. https://www.mbie.govt.nz/science-and-technology/science-and-innovation/funding-information-and-opportunities/investment-funds/endeavour-fund/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.-a). *Thailand*. https://www.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/Countries-and-Regions/Southeast-Asia/Thailand
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (n.d.-b). *ASEAN*. https://www.mfa.gov.sg/SINGAPORES-FOREIGN-POLICY/International-Organisations/ASEAN
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.-a). *Thailand*. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/countries-and-regions/south-east-asia/thailand/

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.-b). *ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand free trade agreement (AANZFTA)*. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-agreement-aanzfta

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (n.d.-c). *AANZFTA overview*. https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-in-force/asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-agreement-aanzfta/aanzfta-overview/

Ministry of Trade and Enterprise Singapore (n.d.). *Contact Us*. https://www.mti.gov.sg/Contact-Us

Ministry of Trade and Industry Singapore (2006, February). *Science and Technology Plan 2010*. https://www.cepal.org/iyd/noticias/pais/9/31519/Singapur_doc_1.pdf

Morrison, P. S. (2004). Deregulation of the New Zealand labour market. *GeoJournal, 59(2)*, 127-136.

My Careers Future (n.d.). *Wholesale Trade: PCP for International Trading Executives*. https://conversion.mycareersfuture.gov.sg/Portal/ProgramDetails.aspx?ProgID=P00000107

National Archives of Singapore (2016). Untitled. http://www.nas.gov.sg/1stcab/PanelPDF/Section%203%20-%20Economy%20Miracle%2016.pdf

National Research Foundation (2019). *RIE2020 Plan*. https://www.nrf.gov.sg/rie2020

National University of Singapore (n.d.). *Startup SG Equity*. https://enterprise.nus.edu.sg/funding/startup-sg-equity/

Nel, E. (2015). Evolving regional and local economic development in New Zealand. *Local Economy, 30(1)*, 67-77.

Nel, E., & Stevenson, T. (2014). The catalysts of small town economic development in a free market economy: A case study of New Zealand. *Local Economy, 29(4-5)*, 486-502.

Neo, H. (2010). The Potential of Large-Scale Urban Waste Recycling: A Case Study of the National Recycling Programme in Singapore. *Society & Natural Resources, 23(9)*, 872-887.

New Zealand ASEAN Business Alliance (n.d.). *NZ ASEAN Business Alliance Bangkok Conference*. https://nzaba.asia/nz-asean-business-alliance-business-conference-2019-2/

New Zealand India Trade Alliance (2018, September). *Tech India a Huge Opportunity For New Zealand Companies*. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1809/S00716/tech-india-a-huge-opportunity-for-new-zealand-companies.htm

New Zealand Thai Chamber of Commerce (n.d.). Untitled. https://www.nztcc.org

New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (2004, April). *New Trade Commissioner To Thailand*. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0404/S00099/new-trade-commissioner-to-thailand.htm

New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (2019, November). *NZ ranks first for ease of doing business for fourth year*. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU1911/S00390/nz-ranks-first-for-ease-of-doing-business-for-fourth-year.htm

New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (2020, June). *The digital future for exporters is here, at NZTE*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/blog/the-digital-future-for-exporters-is-here-at-nzte

New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-a). *About NZTE*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/page/about-nzte
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-b). *Our Beachhead Advisors*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/page/our-beachhead-advisors
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-c). *Focus and evolve*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/export-assistance/our-customers/focus-and-evolve
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-c). *Ryan Freer*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/about/our-people/trade-commissioners/east-asia/ryan-freer
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-d). *Our services*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-e). *Essential Selling*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services/essential-selling
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-f). *Sarakit Chutikul*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/about/our-people/beachheads/southeast-asia-beachhead-advisors/sarakit-chutikul
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-g). *Market Finder*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services/market-finder
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-h). *Prioritise digital to transform your business*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services/prioritising-digital
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-i). *Strengthen your business through governance*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services/governance
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-j). *Increase your sales performance*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services/sales-performance
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-k). *Co-investment to help you accelerate your international growth*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/our-services/international-growth-fund
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-l). *Getting Started with NZNTE*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/page/getting-started-with-nzte
New Zealand Trade and Enterprise (n.d.-m). *Natural Beauty in East Asia: Research Report*. https://www.nzte.govt.nz/about/news/resources/natural-beauty-in-east-asia-research-report
Nicholls, K. (2017). Economic outcomes in New Zealand: a varieties of capitalism lens. *Australian Journal of Political Science, 53(2)*, 160-175.
Nischalke, T., & Schöllmann, A. (2005). Regional development and regional innovation policy in New Zealand: Issues and tensions in a small remote country. *European Planning Studies, 13(4)*, 559-579.
Nolan, J., Rowley, C., & Warner, M. (2016). “Key Debates in Business Networks in East Asian Capitalisms: An Introduction.” In Nolan, J., Rowley, C., & Warner, M. (Eds.), *Business Networks in East Asian Capitalisms: Enduring Trends, Emerging Patterns* (1-14). New York, NY: Chandos Publishing.
Nolan, J., Rowley, C., & Warner, M. (Eds.) (2016). *Business Networks in East Asian Capitalisms: Enduring Trends, Emerging Patterns*. New York, NY: Chandos Publishing.
Norman, R., & Gregory, R. (2003). Paradoxes and Pendulum Swings: Performance Management in New Zealand’s Public Sector. *Australian Journal of Public Administration, 62(4)*, 35-49.

NZ Herald (2015, March). *Your Business: Wearable tech - Mark Finch, I Measure U*. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/your-business-wearable-tech-mark-finch-i-measure-u/HTDTGOWCPFGA7XCF53JREBWJTQ/
NZ Herald (2018, October). *Avocado market grows for Thailand*. https://www.nzherald.co.nz/the-country/news/avocado-market-grows-for-thailand/RGBD5OVXNTBYVRWNWN2UAEYORM/
Ohno, I., & Kitaw, D. (n.d.). *Chapter 3: Productivity Movement in Singapore*. https://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/pdf_e12/JICA&GDFReport_Ethiopia_phase1/Kaizen_National_Movement/Kaizen_ch3.pdf
Ooi, C.-S. (2010). Political pragmatism and the creative economy: Singapore as a City for the Arts. *International Journal of Cultural Policy, 16(4)*, 403-417.
Ooi, G.-L. (1995). The Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle: Sub-Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration. *GeoJournal, 36(4)*, 337-344.
Orrú, M., Hamilton, G. G., & Suzuki, M. (1989). Patterns of Inter-Firm Control in Japanese Business. *Organization Studies, 10(4)*, 549-574.
Packer, S. (1998, August). *Export quality*. Financial Review. https://www.afr.com/politics/export-quality-19980828-jl9dc
Peerenboom, R., & Ginsburg, T. (Eds.) (2014). *Law and Development of Middle-Income Countries: Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Pellerin, C. L. (2020). The aspiring developmental state and business associations in Ethiopia-(dis-)embedded autonomy? *Journal of Modern African Studies, 57(4)*, 589-612.
Pempel, T. J. (Ed.) (2005). *Remapping East Asia: The Construction of a Region*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Peng, D. (2002). Invisible linkages: A regional perspective of East Asian political economy. *International Studies Quarterly, 46(3)*, 423-447.
Pereira, A. A., & Tong, C. K. (2005). Power and Developmental Regimes in Singapore, China and Malaysia. *Global Economic Review, 34(1)*, 129-144.
Perry, M. (2005). Clustering Small Enterprise: Lessons from Policy Experience in New Zealand. *Environment and Planning C: Government & Policy, 23(6)*, 833-850.
Perry, M. (2006). "From Networks to Clusters and Back Again: A Decade of Unsatisfied Policy Aspiration in New Zealand." In MacGregor, R. C., & Hodgkinson, A. T. (Eds.), *Small Business Clustering Technologies: Application in Marketing, Management, IT and Economics* (160-183). Hershey, PA: Idea Group Inc.
Perry, M., & Yeoh, C. (2000). Singapore's overseas industrial parks. *Regional Studies, 34(2)*, 199-206.
Pharmaceutical Society (2009, September). *UK acquisition for New Zealand Pharmaceuticals*. Scoop. https://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/BU0909/S00085/uk-acquisition-for-new-zealand-pharmaceuticals.htm
Prime Minister's Office (2009, July). *Prime Minister's Interview with Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 14 Jul 2009*. https://www.pmo.gov.sg/Newsroom/prime-ministers-interview-frankfurter-allgemeine-zeitung-14-jul-2009

Public Service Division (2015). *Making a Living, Ensuring Growth*. https://www.psd.gov.sg/heartofpublicservice/our-institutions/making-a-living-ensuring-growth/

Quek, C. (2020, February). *Govt's S$300 million injection into deep-tech scheme will benefit Singapore. But some concerns remain*. TODAY. https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/govts-s300-million-injection-deep-tech-scheme-will-benefit-singapore-some-concerns-remain

Ramírez, C. D., & L. H. Tan (2004). Singapore Inc. versus the Private Sector: Are Government-Linked Companies Different? *IMF Staff Papers, 51(3)*, 510-528.

Regional Business Partner Network (2017, November). *Management Capability Development Voucher Fund Handbook for Service Providers*. https://assets.ctfassets.net/puga2cn07wue/gji8Ng37urDASSm8R9bLl/cec13fee2b869e0537a78ad356c8bdba/RBP_Programme_Handbook_for_Service_Providers.pdf

Regional Business Partner Network (n.d.). *Regional Business Partner Network – Registration Terms & Conditions*. https://app.regionalbusinesspartners.co.nz/Business/TermsAndConditions

Reiffenstein, T., & Nguyen, H. T. (2011). The international developmental state: The Japanese intellectual property system in Vietnam. *Geoforum, 42(4)*, 462-472.

Reuters Plus (2020, March). *Thailand's Eastern Economic Corridor: Southeast Asia's New Engine of Growth*. https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/thailand-advancing-into-the-future/southeast-asia-new-engine-of-growth

Ricks, J. I., & Liu, A. H. (2018). Process-Tracing Research Designs: A Practical Guide. *PS: Political Science & Politics, 51(4)*, 842-846.

Rodan, G. (1989). *The Political Economy of Singapore's Industrialization*. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.

Rodan, G. (1993). "Reconstructing Divisions of Labor: Singapore's New Regional Emphasis." In Higgott, R. A., Leaver, R., & Ravenhill, J. (Eds.), *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s: Cooperation or Conflict?* St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin.

Rotherham, F. (2014, May). *The character of Kiwi innovation*. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/10002091/The-character-of-Kiwi-innovation

Sandrey, R., & Vink, N. (2007). The deregulation of agricultural markets in South Africa and New Zealand: A comparison. *Agrekon, 46(3)*, 323-350.

Santander (n.d.). *Thailand: Foreign Investment*. https://santandertrade.com/en/portal/establish-overseas/thailand/foreign-investment

Schein, E. H. (1996). *Strategic Pragmatism: The Culture of Singapore's Economic Development Board*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Sen, N. J. (2019, February). *Singapore Budget 2019: $4.6 billion over next 3 years committed to building business capabilities and helping workers*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/singapore-budget-46-billion-over-next-3-years-committed-to-building-business-capabilities

SGInnovate (2020, February). *Industry 4.0: Singapore's Strategy*. https://www.sginnovate.com/blog/industry-40-singapore's-strategy

Shin, J.-S. (2007). "Globalization and challenges to the developmental state: A comparison between South Korea and Singapore." In Shin, J.-S. (Ed.). *Global Challenges and Local Responses: The East Asian experience* (31-49). London, UK: Routledge.
Shin, J.-S. (Ed.) (2007). *Global Challenges and Local Responses: The East Asian experience*. London, UK: Routledge.
Sidhu, R. (2009). The 'brand name' research university goes global. *Higher Education, 57(2)*, 125-140.
Sidhu, R., Ho, K.-C., & Yeoh, B. (2011). Emerging education hubs: the case of Singapore. *Higher Education, 61(1)*, 23-40.
Singapore Accreditation Council (2018, April). *Launch of Enterprise Singapore*. https://www.sac-accreditation.gov.sg/newsroom/news-releases/launch-of-enterprise-singapore
Singapore Business Federation (n.d.). *Market Study Trip to Thailand (19 – 24 August 2018)*. https://login.sbf.org.sg/SBFPortal/Events/Event_Display.aspx?EventKey=AS180223
Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (n.d.-a). *About Us*. http://www.sce.org.sg/about-us.aspx
Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (n.d.-b). *Our Services*. http://www.sce.org.sg/our-services.aspx
Singapore Cooperation Enterprise (n.d.-c). *Public-Private Partnerships Project*. http://www.sce.org.sg/public-private-partnerships.aspx
Singleton, J., & Verhoef, G. (2010). Regulation, deregulation, and internationalisation in South African and New Zealand banking. *Business History, 52(4)*, 536-563.
Slater, D., & Ziblatt, D. (2013). The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison. *Comparative Political Studies, 46(10)*, 1301-1327.
Smellie, P. (2011, March). *Investment group has NZ firms in its sights*. Stuff. http://www.stuff.co.nz/business/4802634/Investment-group-has-NZ-firms-in-its-sights
Smylie, C. (2014, December). *Serial tech entrepreneur Claudia Batten named NZTE's director for North America*. NBR. https://www.nbr.co.nz/article/serial-tech-entrepreneur-claudia-batten-named-nztes-director-north-america-cs-166877
Söderberg, M. (1996). *The business of Japanese foreign aid: five case studies in Asia*. London, UK: Routledge.
Startup SG (n.d.-a). *Startup SG Founder*. https://www.startupsg.gov.sg/programmes/4894/startup-sg-founder
Startup SG (n.d.-b). *Frequently Asked Questions*. https://www.startupsg.gov.sg/programmes/4897/startup-sg-tech/frequently-asked-questions
Startup SG (n.d.-c). *Singapore's Startup Ecosystem*. https://www.startupsg.gov.sg/directory/
Stats NZ (2020 March). G*oods and services trade by country: Year ended December 2019*. https://www.stats.govt.nz/information-releases/goods-and-services-trade-by-country-year-ended-december-2019
Stephenson, J., Spector, S., Hopkins, D., & McCarthy, A. (2018). Deep interventions for a sustainable transport future. *Transportation Research Part D: Transport and Environment, 61*, 356-372.
Stevenson, R. (2018, February). *The rise and fall of CricHQ, the star-backed 'Facebook for cricket'*. The Spinoff. https://thespinoff.co.nz/business/13-02-2018/the-rise-and-fall-of-crichq-the-star-backed-facebook-for-cricket/

Strategy Group (2018). *Population in Brief 2018*. https://www.strategygroup.gov.sg/images/PublicationImages/population-in-brief-2018.pdf

Stubbs, R. (2005). *Rethinking Asia's Economic Miracle: The Political Economy of War, Prosperity, and Crisis*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Stuff (2016, March). *Chicken chunks made from peas bring in investors*. https://www.stuff.co.nz/business/farming/agribusiness/78019484/chicken-chunks-made-from-peas-bring-in-investors

Subramaniam, S. (2014). "When Does 'Politics' Get in the Way of Development? The Developmental State, Good Governance, and Liberal Democratic Change in Malaysia and Singapore." In Peerenboom, R., & Ginsburg, T. (Eds.), *Law and Development of Middle-Income Countries: Avoiding the Middle-Income Trap* (36-55). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

T&G (n.d.). *Meet BayWa*. https://tandg.global/about/baywa/

Tan, C. (2020a, March). *Local start-up brews alcohol from unwanted soya whey*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/local-start-up-brews-alcohol-from-unwanted-soya-whey

Tan, S.-A. (2020b, March). *Plan to upgrade enterprises in the heartland*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/plan-to-upgrade-enterprises-in-the-heartland

Tan, S.-A. (2020c, March). *Parliament: Customised help for SMEs take the next leap in their transformation*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-customised-help-for-smes-take-the-next-leap-in-their-transformation

Tan, S.-A. (2020d, March). *More support for SMEs to transform themselves*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/more-support-for-smes-to-transform-themselves

Tay, S., & Wau, J. (2020, August). *Singapore as a hub: Renewing Asean's relevance*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/singapore-as-a-hub-renewing-aseans-relevance

Tay, T. F. (2020, March). *Parliament: Short-sighted not to pass on property tax rebates to tenants, says Chan Chun Sing*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/parliament-short-sighted-not-to-pass-on-property-tax-rebates-to-tenants-says-chan-chun-sing

Temasek Holdings (2003, October). *Temasek Holdings' Response to Financial Times Article of 29 Oct 03*. https://www.temasek.com.sg/en/news-and-views/news-room/statements/2003/temasek-holdings-response-to-financial-times-article-of-29-oct-0

Temasek Holdings (2006, January). *Istithmar and Temasek Invest in Bumrungrad*. https://www.temasek.com.sg/en/news-and-views/news-room/news/2006/istithmar-and-temasek-invest-in-bumrungrad

Temasek Holdings (2014, March). *Temasek acquires stake in A.S. Watson*. https://www.temasek.com.sg/en/news-and-views/news-room/news/2014/temasek-acquires-stake-in-a-s-watson

Temasek Holdings (2019, July). Untitled. https://www.temasek.com.sg/content/dam/temasek-corporate/our-financials/temasek-bonds/MTN/2019-

oc/Temasek_Financial_(I)_Limited_US$20billion_GMTN_Programme_OC_dated_15July2019.pdf
Temasek Holdings (2020a). *Our Major Investments*. https://www.temasekreview.com.sg/our-major-investments/
Temasek Holdings (2020b). *Our Major Investments: Telecommunications, Media & Technology*. https://www.temasekreview.com.sg/our-major-investments/telecommunications-media-and-technology.html
Terry, E. (1996). An East Asian Paradigm? *Atlantic Economic Journal, 24(3)*, 183-198.
The Baxter Brenton (2017, February). R*eceived an invitation from New Zealand Embassy's*. https://www.thebaxterbrenton.com/event/received-an-invitation-from-new-zealand-embassys/
The Business Times (2019, June). *Many non-tariff barriers remain in Asean: report*. https://www.businesstimes.com.sg/asean-business/many-non-tariff-barriers-remain-in-asean-report
The Government Public Relations Department (2019, May). *Members of the Diplomatic Corps Granted an Audience with King Rama X*. https://thailand.prd.go.th/ewt_news.php?nid=7926&filename=index
The Online Citizen (2020, March). *Enterprise Financing Scheme for SMEs in Singapore*. https://www.theonlinecitizen.com/2020/03/04/enterprise-financing-scheme-efs-smes/
The Straits Times (2019a, August). *Temasek sells stake in Thai telco Intouch for $702m*. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/economy/temasek-sells-stake-in-thai-telco-intouch-for-702m
The Straits Times (2019b, July). *South-east Asia's Rise to run AI accelerator programme from Singapore*. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/south-east-asias-rise-to-run-ai-accelerator-programme-from-singapore
The Straits Times (2020a, February). *Singapore Budget 2020: Strengthening partnerships, deepening capabilities and developing people*. https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/strengthening-partnerships-deepening-capabilities-and-developing-people
The Straits Times (2020b, February). *Forum: Different forms of assistance to help SMEs go global*. https://www.straitstimes.com/forum/different-forms-of-assistance-to-help-smes-go-global
Thompson, M. R. (1996). Late Industrialisers, Late Democratisers: Developmental States in the Asia-Pacific. *Third World Quarterly, 17(4)*, 625-648.
Thompson, P. (2014). Wired-up or Wind-up? The Political Economy of Broadband Policy in New Zealand/Aotearoa. *Media International Australia incorporating Culture & Policy, 151*, 146-156.
Thurbon, E. (2016). *Developmental Mindset: The Revival of Financial Activism in South Korea*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Thurbon, E., & Weiss, L. (2019). Economic statecraft at the frontier: Korea's drive for intelligent robots. *Review of International Political Economy,* 1-25.
Tonami, A. (2018). Exporting the developmental state: Japan's economic diplomacy in the Arctic. *Third World Quarterly, 39(6)*, 1211-1225.

Tsui-Auch, L. S. (1999). Regional production relationships and developmental impacts: A comparative study of three production networks. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 23(2)*, 329-344.
Tsui-Auch, L. S. (2004). Bureaucratic Rationality and Nodal Agency in a Developmental State: The Case of State-Led Biotechnology Development in Singapore. *International Sociology, 19(4)*, 451-477.
Turner, J. A., Klerkx, L., Rijswijk, K., Williams, T., & Barnard, T. (2016). Systemic problems affecting co-innovation in the New Zealand Agricultural Innovation System: Identification of blocking mechanisms and underlying institutional logics. *NJAS – Wageningen Journal of Life Sciences, 76*, 99-112.
UOB (2019, October). *The FinLab in Thailand: Helping SMEs transform digitally*. https://www.uobgroup.com/techecosystem/news-insights-the-finlabs-thai-transformation-journey.html
Van de Velde, D., &. Wallis, I. (2013). 'Regulated deregulation' of local bus services – An appraisal of international developments. *Research in Transportation Economics, 39(1)*, 21-33.
Vavra, P. (2011). "Policy Schemes and Trade in Dairy Products: Agricultural Policy Schemes: Other Systems." In Fuquay, J. W., Fox, P. F., & McSweeny, P. L. H. (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Dairy Sciences: Second Edition* (306-311). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
Vogel, S. K. (2018). *Marketcraft: How governments make markets work*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Voxy (2019, April). *Premium NZ food brands in Alibaba e-commerce world first*. http://www.voxy.co.nz/business/5/336598
Wade, R. (1990). *Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wade, R. H. (2018). The Developmental State: Dead or Alive? *Development and Change, 49(2)*, 518-546.
Waldby, C. (2009). Biobanking in Singapore: Post-developmental state, experimental population. *New Genetics and Society, 28(3)*, 253-265.
Walker, A. (2012). *Thailand's political peasants: Power in the modern rural economy*. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
Wei, A. C. (2019, March). *Enterprise Singapore delivers first report card*. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/enterprise-singapore-delivers-first-report-card
Weiss, L. (1995). Governed interdependence: Rethinking the government-business relationship in East Asia. *The Pacific Review, 8(4)*, 589-616.
Weiss, L. (2000). Developmental states in transition: adapting, dismantling, innovating, not 'normalizing'. *The Pacific Review, 13(1)*, 21-55.
Weiss, L. (2012). "The Myth of the Neoliberal State." In Kyung-sup, C, Fine, B., & Wise, L. (Eds.), *Developmental Politics in Transition: The Neoliberal Era and Beyond* (27-42). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
Weiss, L. (2014). *America Inc.? Innovation and Enterprise in the National Security State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wetzstein, S. (2008). Relaunching Regional Economic-Development Policy and Planning for Auckland: Remaking the State and Contingent Governance under Neoliberalism. *Environment and Planning C: Government & Policy, 26(6)*, 1093-1112.
Wong, J. (2011). *Betting on Biotech: Innovation and the Limits of Asia's Developmental State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wong, L. (2019, December). *German trip opens doors for local logistics start-ups*. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/german-trip-opens-doors-for-local-logistics-start-ups
Woo-Cumings, M. (1999). "Introduction: Chalmers Johnson and the Politics of Nationalism and Development." In Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.), *The Developmental State* (1-31). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Woo-Cumings, M. (Ed.). (1999). *The Developmental State*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
World Integrated Trade Solution (n.d.-a). *Singapore trade balance, exports and imports by country 2018*. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SGP/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/by-country
World Integrated Trade Solution (n.d.-b). *Singapore trade balance, exports and imports*. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SGP/Year/2010/TradeFlow/EXPIMP
World Integrated Trade Solution (n.d.-c). Singapore Product Exports to Thailand 2016. https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/SGP/Year/2016/TradeFlow/Export/Partner/THA/Product/All-Groups
Yang, L.-F. (2005). Embedded autonomy and ecological modernisation in Taiwan. *International Journal of Environment and Sustainable Development, 4(3)*, 310-330.
Yeoh, C., Sim, V., & How, W. (2007). Transborder industrialization in the framework of Singapore's regionalization strategy: The case of Singapore's Gambit in Vietnam. *Journal of Asia-Pacific Business, 8(3)*, 63-90.
Yeung, H. W.-C. (2000a). Local Politics and Foreign Ventures in China's Transitional Economy: The Political Economy of Singaporean Investments in China. *Political Geography, 19(7)*, 809-840.
Yeung, H. W.-C. (2000b). State intervention and neoliberalism in the globalizing world economy: Lessons from Singapore's regionalization programme. *Pacific Review, 13(1)*, 133-162.
Yeung, H. W.-C. (2002). *Entrepreneurship and the internationalisation of Asian firms an institutional perspective*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Pub.
Yeung, H. W.-C. (2016). *Strategic Coupling: East Asian Industrial Transformation in the New Global Economy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Yeung, H. W.-C. (ed.) (2007) *Handbook of Research on Asian Businesses*. Cheltenham and Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Yeung, H.W.-C. (2017). Rethinking the East Asian developmental state in its historical context: finance, geopolitics and bureaucracy. *Area Development and Policy, 2(1)*, 1-23.
You, J.-S., & Park, Y. M. (2017). The Legacies of Corporatism in Korea: Regulatory Capture in the Sewol Ferry Tragedy. *Journal of East Asian Studies, 17(1)*, 95-118.
Zengkun, F. (2020, February). *Automate or stagnate*. The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/business/automate-or-stagnate