Political marketing and nation branding by New Zealand and Australian advocacy groups to support Israeli and Palestinian governmental public diplomacy

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Abstract

This thesis explores how advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia have used a range of communications, relational and recruitment/internal cohesion activities and strategies to advance Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy. This research uses an analytical framework developed through a synthesis of several advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing theories and concepts. Taking a qualitative approach, this research examines four case studies: the Palestine Solidarity Network of Aotearoa (PSNA), the Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ), the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), and the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN). This research draws upon a range of sources including webpages, social media posts, pamphlets, press releases, media articles, and interviews with representatives from the organisations studied.

This research draws attention to the role that non-state actors' public diplomacy can play in influencing government policy, media coverage, and public opinion of international issues such as the Israel-Palestine conflict. It also sheds light on how pro-Palestinian advocacy groups engage in public diplomacy and nation branding through their advocacy work. This research also expands the limited New Zealand literature on advocacy groups that take an interest in Israel-Palestine issues. It also explores how pro-Palestinian advocacy groups support Palestinian public diplomacy through their advocacy work. Finally, this research explores how advocacy groups can incorporate political marketing strategies and techniques into their advocacy work. In short, this thesis not only contributes a New Zealand and Australian dimension to the literature on Israeli and Palestinian advocacy but also seeks to expand the frontiers of public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing.

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Abbreviations

ABC: Australian Broadcasting Corporation

AFOPA: Australian Friends of Palestine Association

AFP: Australians for Palestine

AIIA: Australian Institute of International Affairs

AIJAC: Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council

AIR: Australia/Israel Review

AJC: American Jewish Committee

AJDS: Australian Jewish Democratic Society

AJN: *Australian Jewish News*

ALP: Australian Labor Party

ANU: Australian National University

APAN: Australia Palestine Advocacy Network

ASPIRE: Australian Society for Palestinian-Iraqi Refugees

AUJS: Australasian Union of Jewish Students

BDS: Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions movement

BESA: Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies

C4 Israel: Christians for Israel New Zealand

CPACS: Centre of Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Sydney

ECAJ: Executive Council of Australian Jewry

GP&J: Global Peace and Justice

IAJV: Independent Australian Jewish Voices

IDF: Israel Defense Forces

IHRA: International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance

IINZ: Israel Institute of New Zealand

ISO: International Socialist Organisation

ITUC: International Trade Union Congress

J-AIR: Jewish-Australian Internet Radio

JNS: Jewish News Syndicate

MCW: Military Court Watch

MEF: Middle East Forum

MFAT: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (New Zealand)

NZCTU: New Zealand Council of Trade Unions

NZFOI: New Zealand Friends of Israel Association, Inc

NZJC: New Zealand Jewish Council

NZPSN: New Zealand Palestine Solidarity Network (predecessor to the PSNA)

PA: Palestinian National Authority (also known as Palestinian Authority)

PHRC: Palestine Human Rights Campaign

PIEN: Palestine-Israel Ecumenical Network

PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organisation

PMW: Palestine Media Watch

PSNA: Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa

SBS: Special Broadcasting Service

SJP: Students for Justice in Palestine

TVNZ: Television New Zealand

UIA: United Israel Appeal

UN: United Nations

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

UNRWA: United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near
East

WCC: Wellington City Council

WPG: Wellington Palestine Group

ZFNZ: Zionist Federation of New Zealand

Chapter 1: Introduction

On 28 September 2015, two Israeli soldiers visited Victoria University of Wellington to deliver a lecture on the 2014 Operation Protective Edge sponsored by the Australasian Union of Jewish Students (AUJS). Their visit attracted a vigorous protest by members of the local Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), a Palestinian solidarity group that has adopted the global Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, which seeks to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination by applying economic and social pressure on Israel. In addition, eleven academics criticized the university for sponsoring an event which they regarded as "part of a nationwide campaign to justify Israel's latest war crimes in Gaza." The visit and resulting protest also attracted notable media coverage (Hunt, 2015; Faitaua, 2015). Besides reflecting the significant international controversy around Israel-Palestine issues, the incident demonstrated the competing efforts by various governments and non-state actors including advocacy groups to shape public opinion towards Israel and the Palestinians through public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing. While the Israeli government and international pro-Israel advocacy groups have sought to promote a favourable image of Israeli resilience and self-defence, the Palestinian National Authority (PA) and Palestinian solidarity groups have sought to mobilize international support for the Palestinian cause and hold Israel accountable for alleged human rights abuses and aggression against the Palestinians.

This research seeks to address the question of how advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia have used nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of Israel and the Palestinians through a range of communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. In addition, this research seeks to address the hypothesis of whether advocacy groups function as proxies of foreign governments. The null hypothesis is that they are spontaneous, independent entities who pursue their own goals and interests but work with governments when their interests overlap.

Advocacy groups (also known as non-interest groups) are interest groups devoted to certain causes or representing sectional interests like workers, employers, ethnic, and faith communities. Public diplomacy refers to the outward communicational and relational activities by states and allied non-state actors such as advocacy groups, businesses and public

relations firms to win over foreign audiences. Nation branding describes efforts by states and allied non-state actors to promote a favourable image of a destination (such as a country, city region) usually for tourism purposes and to counter negative imagery and publicity. Finally, political marketing refers to the use of marketing techniques by various actors including governments, political parties and candidates in order to enhance their messaging and achieve their desired goals and objectives.

This research will synthesise understanding from these four fields to create a framework to use in analysing the communications, relational and recruitment/internal cohesion activities of both pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia. First, this framework looks at how groups use a range of communications mediums and platforms to communicate their messages and arguments. Second, this framework looks at how groups use a range of relational activities to promote their causes and network with like-minded allies. Third, this framework looks at how groups used a range of recruitment/internal cohesion strategies and techniques to promote their causes, identify supporters and allies, mobilize their support base, and raise funds for their advocacy work. In short, this framework will analyse how groups use these activities to promote their causes while supporting the messages and interests of state actors and factions (namely Israel and the Palestinians).

This research seeks to expand on the limited research on both pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups in New Zealand. The New Zealand literature on Israel-Palestine has mainly focused on the political and economic dimensions including foreign policy. While there is a significant body of literature on pro-Israel groups in Australia, research on Palestinian advocacy groups there has been neglected. New Zealand and Australia were selected due to their cultural, political and demographic similarities. Both are former British settler colonies which have developed into wealthy liberal democracies with free market economies. Due to their history of colonisation, both countries have significant indigenous populations (namely the Māori in NZ, and the Australian Aborigines, and Torres Straits Islanders). As immigrant-receiving countries, both are home to significant Jewish and Arab diaspora populations. While New Zealand and Australian foreign policies have traditionally focused on the Asia-Pacific region, both states have followed developments in Israel-Palestine through the United Nations and other international bodies. While both countries have supported a two-state solution, there have been some differences in their foreign policies and diplomatic engagement with Israel and the Palestinians. Whereas Australia has been a vocal supporter of Israel on the international stage, New Zealand has taken a more "even

handed" position towards Israel and the Palestinians, criticising Israeli settlement expansion and violence on both sides (MacIntyre, 1986; Van Voorthuysen, 2011; Badder, 2014; Reich, 2005; Rubenstein and Fleischer, 2007; Han and Rane, 2013). For example, New Zealand's co-sponsorship of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2334 in December 2016 strained bilateral relations with Israel. By contrast, Canberra criticised Resolution 2334 and subsequently hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2017 (Stuff, 2016; Radio New Zealand, 2017; Greene, 2016). While both Wellington and Canberra maintain diplomatic relations with Israel and unofficial relations with the Palestinian Authority, only Australia maintains an embassy (https://israel.embassy.gov.au/) in Tel Aviv and a representative office (https://ramallah.mission.gov.au/) in Ramallah. By contrast, New Zealand has no diplomatic presence in Israel-Palestine; instead accrediting its embassies in Turkey and Egypt to managing relations with Israel and the Palestinian Authority respectively (MFAT, n.d.). This is the cultural, political and diplomatic environment in which Zionist and Palestinian solidarity groups in Australia operate in this thesis seeks to investigate whether advocacy groups play a role in influencing government, media and public opinion and policies towards Israel-Palestine.

Empirically, uses a qualitative and comparative case studies approach, exploring four case studies: the Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA; formerly known as the New Zealand Palestine Solidarity Network or NZPSN), the national umbrella organisation for Palestinian solidarity groups in NZ; the Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ), a pro-Israel think tank based in Auckland; the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), a Jewish community organisation and lobby group; and the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN); the peak organisation for Palestinian solidarity groups and activists in Australia. It will undertake a content analysis of a range of primary sources produced by the groups including websites, social media posts, videos, pamphlets, and posters. These primary sources will be analysed against the analytical framework via NVivo software. The primary sources will be supplemented by interviews with available practitioners from the four case studies: the PSNA's National Chair John Minto, the Israel Institute's Director David Cumin, and APAN's Executive Officer Jessica Morrison.

In doing so, the research will contribute to the academic literature on both pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups by addressing gaps in existing academic literature which have hitherto failed to address how non-state actors such as advocacy groups use

public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing, particularly in New Zealand and Australia related to Israel-Palestine issues. It will therefore explore how advocacy groups can conduct public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing; activities which had traditionally been conducted by states, political parties, and politicians.

Thesis overview and structure

This thesis will be divided into three main sections. Within Section One, Chapter Two will consist of the literature review, which will outline and discuss the theoretical and empirical literature relevant to this research within the sub-fields of advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing. Besides providing an overview of the prior research within these sub-fields, this chapter also discusses the gaps in research around the topic of this thesis, especially relating to pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia. Finally, this chapter will outline this research's analytical framework, which was developed through a synthesis of the above academic subfields. Chapter Three will outline the methodology utilised in this research as well as introducing the four case studies and the criteria for selecting them.

Section Two of the thesis applies the synthesised analytical framework to analyse the communications, relational and recruitment/internal cohesion activities of the four case studies. Chapter Four will look at the Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa while Chapter Five will look at the Israel Institute of New Zealand. Chapter Six will look at the Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council while Chapter Seven will look at the Australia Palestine Advocacy network. These empirical chapters will analyse how the advocacy groups followed the criteria of the analytical framework, while highlighting the strengths and limitations of the framework. These chapters will also discuss how the advocacy groups carried out public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing through their communications and advocacy work.

Section Three of the thesis will consist of the discussion chapter and the conclusion, which are designated Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine respectively. Chapter Eight, will discuss the overall findings of the empirical chapters against the analytical framework, identifying the commonalities and variations within the communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion criteria. Finally, Chapter Nine will summarise the key findings

of this research against the analytical framework and discusses how they addressed the main research question, sub-questions, and hypotheses. Most importantly, the conclusion will explain how this thesis addressed the research gaps identified by the literature review and contributed to the academic literature on advocacy groups, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This chapter presents the results of reviewing the existing academic literature which is relevant to how advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia use nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments. Whilst there is no work that focuses on the specific topic of this research, the review identifies what concepts are relevant from existing literature in multiple fields - advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing. It then synthesises this work to create a new analytical framework.

Advocacy

Advocacy is about how organisations including governments and interest groups promote support for their policies, ideas and interest among foreign publics through a range of communications, press relations, and lobbying activities (Cull 2009, Pamment 2013). Interest groups target a wide range of actors including political parties, the media, civil society groups, and the general public. ("Interest Groups," 2010; Cawson, 1991a; Cawson, 1991b; "Lobbyists," 2009; World Bank, n.d.). There is, of course, a substantial field of research in this area, but this chapter focuses on discussing that which was found to be more relevant to the research question in terms of how advocacy groups work internationally, and use diplomacy, branding and marketing tools, in New Zealand and Australia specifically.

One of the most valuables pieces of work is Keck and Sikkink's (1998) "transnational advocacy network", four types of "political action," and "Boomerang pattern" models, which explored how activists and groups work on internationally on a cause issue; lobby governments, the media, international organisations and other influential actors; and share information. When a state violates human rights, individuals and groups lacking recourse for redress within their domestic political and judicial environments use their international connections with like-minded groups and individuals to advance their concerns and interests. This creates a boomerang "pattern of influence" where domestic actors bypass state institutions and appeal to foreign allies, who lobby their governments and international institutions like the United Nations into exerting pressure on the offending state into rectifying their behaviour. Keck and Sikkink argue that this triangular boomerang patterns facilitates interaction and connections between globally disparate groups working on a range

of human rights, indigenous rights and environmental issues. They pursue four types of political action: information politics, symbolic politics, linkage politics, and accountability politics, which encompass elements of political communication, narratives, agenda setting and lobbying.

Empirically, Keck and Sikkink's research focused on other groups however such as the transatlantic anti-slavery movement, the suffragette movement, the anti-female circumcision campaign in Kenya, the anti-foot binding movement, and global non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Greenpeace. These models have also been applied by scholars to other interest groups, such as Winston (2001), Brown (2001), Welch (2001), Steinber (2011), and Louvet (2016). Steinberg applied the concept of a transnational advocacy network to explain how various international, Palestinian, and left-wing Israeli NGOs formed what he regarded as a global "anti-Israel" Palestinian solidarity network at the 2001 Durban Forum, which he argues laid the foundation for the global Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement. Louvet has applied Keck and Sikkink's transnational advocacy framework for exploring the linkages between Irish-based advocacy groups and transnational Israeli and Palestinian advocacy networks, focusing on three case studies: Irish Palestinian solidarity groups, Irish Republican groups, and pro-Israel Unionist groups. None of this work explored groups in New Zealand and Australia, but the concepts of international activity and potential forms of political action are valuable to this research and will be integrated into the theoretical model.

Besides Keck and Sikkink, this thesis drew upon Lang and Lang (1983) and Cobb and Elder's (1972) research into agenda building. Lang and Lang describe agenda building as a process where the media exploit newsworthy events and activities to influence public opinion and changes in government leadership and policy. While the authors primarily focused on the media's role in influencing US politics during the Watergate scandal, certain activities such as political framing and symbolic languages are also applicable to other actors including advocacy groups. Cobb and Elder have focused on how the agenda building process is used to bring certain issues to the attention of governmental decision-makers. The authors define an issue as a conflict between two or more identifiable groups relating to the distribution of positions or resources. They also explore the framing and expansion of the conflict, symbolic politics, the setting and characteristics of the uses as key factors within agenda building. Cobb and Elder also conceptualize the groups' target audience as consisting of a spectrum

ranging from identification groups (who are most receptive to their cause) and the general public (who are the least receptive to their cause and are only motivated if the issue/s become highly generalised and symbolic). Cobb and Elder's research helped to shape this research's understanding about how advocacy groups can manipulate issues for the purposes of reaching the public, media, and political elites.

There is a small group of work on pro-Israel and Palestinian solidarity advocacy groups in New Zealand by Ritchie (1986), MacIntyre (1986; 1987), Rainbow (1997), Van Voorthuysen (2011) but it focuses on bilateral relations with Israel with advocacy groups being relegated to the margins, with little or no exploration of advocacy group's motivations, ideology, and activities, let alone their use of political marketing and nation branding. While Badder (2014) and Trotter (2019) have explored organised Jewish and historical Zionist groups in New Zealand, they did not explore their public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing activities to influence opinion in New Zealand about international (Israel and Palestine) issues.

On the Australian side, although a substantial body of literature had been published on Australian foreign policy and bilateral relations with Israel (Reich, 2002; Rubenstein and Fleischer, 2007; Han and Rane, 2013) and Australian Jewish diaspora politics and advocacy groups (Ben-Moshe, 2004; Levey, 2004; Rutland, 2004; Markus, 2004; Reich, 2004; Levey and Mendes, 2004; Lowenstein, 2006; Mendes, 2016). The foreign policy and Australian-Israel relations literature mainly focused on government-level relations but did briefly touch upon the role of non-state actors including advocacy groups. The Australian Jewish diaspora and advocacy literature identified several of the major Jewish community institutions and Israel advocacy groups, which helped inform the case-study selection process that will be discussed in the methodology chapter. There is also some work about Australian Palestinian advocacy groups such as Mendes (2006, 2016) and Mendes and Dyrenfurth (2015), have touched upon Palestinian advocacy groups, although this was done within the context of the BDS movement and Australian Jewish diaspora politics. However this literature does not explore their public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing activities to influence opinion in New Zealand about international (Israel and Palestine) issues.

There are also studies of advocacy groups in other countries using communication for overseas causes such as Mearsheimer and Walt (2007), Bard (2010), Hafsa (2014), and Paul

and Paul's (2009) work on Zionist and Arab lobby groups in the United States. Given the significant role that Zionist lobby groups have played in influencing US foreign policy and public discourses towards Israel, it was necessary to review the American literature for comparative purposes. While these authors do not explore the use of public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing activities to influence domestic opinion about international issues, they add further evidence of the potential of groups to work within one country to influence issues in another. Similarly, there is literature on pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups in Europe. For example Miller (2004) and Louvet (2016) explores pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel groups in Ireland; Voltolini (2016) has examined efforts by both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel groups to influence the European Union's policies towards Israel-Palestine; and King (2016) has looked at the Christian Zionist advocacy group European Coalition for Israel's efforts to promote support for Israel within the European Union. Both the US and European literature did not explore how they use public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing to influence domestic opinion about international issues. Additionally, Toledano (2016)'s research on a peace advocacy group called Palestinian-Israel Bereaved Families for Peace further supports the idea that groups use a range of communications, relational, and recruitment activities and strategies to advance their cause, but Israel and the Palestinian Territories are not the focus. None of this work answered the specific question for this research, but it reinforced the potential for research in this area if other scholars have found groups in other countries.

There is also literature on the BDS Movement, which is a loosely organised global civil society network seeking to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination by targeting Israel's economy and international engagement. While the BDS National Committee in Ramallah serves as a Palestinian "reference point" for coordinating the BDS network, it does not direct the movement with international affiliates wielding considerable autonomy (Hallward, 2013; Barnes, 2014). Some useful studies were Hallward's comparative case studies of four civil society-led BDS boycott and divestment campaigns in the United States; Hitchcock's (2016) study of how two pro-BDS groups - the local Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapter at the University of Houston and Jewish Voice for Peace – DC Metro Chapter - used social media to promote messages and arguments and coordinate their activities; and Mendes and Dyrenfurth's (2015) discussion of pro-BDS advocates and groups in Australia. Though this body of literature yielded useful information about the structure, communications and activities of BDS affiliates internationally including Australia, there

remains a lack of research on contemporary BDS activism among Palestinian solidarity groups in New Zealand; which provides an opportunity for this research to help address.

Public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is about how governments seek to influence foreign publics through a range of informational and relational activities. During the Cold War, the term public diplomacy gained popular currency among the US and allied states; with numerous government departments and academic institutions adopting it including the former Israeli Ministry of Public Diplomacy and Diaspora Affairs (since revamped as the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs) (Cull, 2009; Gur-Arieh, 2013). Besides promoting a favourable image of a nation's policies, actions, political and economic systems, public diplomacy has been used to advance national interests and objectives including getting foreign states to alter their behaviour and even regime change. It involves cultural and educational exchanges, festivals, exhibitions, cultural centres, language training, and local friendship and business associations and communications technologies such as radio and television broadcasting, the Internet, and social media. There is of course a wealth of literature on public diplomacy theories and concepts, but this review will only discuss those which are most relevant to the research topic: the question of how the nation branding and political marketing activities of various advocacy groups fit into the frameworks of both Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy.

The most valuable work identified within public diplomacy included Cull (2009), Gilboa (2001; 2008), and Zaharna (2009)'s public diplomacy models and frameworks. Cull and Gilboa argue that non-state actors including advocacy groups can still contribute significantly to states' public diplomacy efforts and Zaharna that public diplomacy can be understood through both informational and relational frameworks which informed the theoretical framework developed for this research.

Cull's (2009) "New Public Diplomacy" (NPD) model is an updated approach to public diplomacy which recognises the role of "new actors" (such as NGOs, advocacy groups, international organisations and corporations) in public diplomacy, the use of digital communications technologies, the blurring of domestic and international news, nation branding, and the use of horizontal communication and relationship-building. This model argues that non-traditional actors (NGOs and corporations) can also engage in public

diplomacy using digital media (websites, real-time news, cellular phones), relationship building, which blurs domestic and international boundaries. Theoretically this draws on corporate branding and network communications theory and soft power and nation branding. Similarly Gilboa's (2001; 2008) public diplomacy work, particularly his "non-state transnational model," argued that advocacy groups and other NGOs can exploit global news networks and media events to cultivate global support for their causes. He argued that in the non-state transnational model, advocacy groups practise public diplomacy across national boundaries to highlight human rights and other issues to raise international awareness and bring change. Gilboa's argues there has been an evolution of public diplomacy over time to fit different challenges and issues. These two pieces of research therefore provided useful conceptualisation of how non-state actors including advocacy groups can support the public diplomacy activities of states.

Zaharna (2009) added to the understanding of how advocacy groups might use public diplomacy both by disseminating information to the public and building relationships between political entities and the public through first tier cultural and educational exchanges and bilateral trips at the first tier, and second tier cultural and language institutes, developmental aid projects, twinning arrangements between towns, cities or provinces, relationship-building campaigns such as public concerts, exhibitions, and competitions, non-political networking schemes to build institutional communication channels between different countries. These concepts were integrated in the final synthesised theoretical framework created at the end of this chapter.

In addition to this comparative work on public diplomacy, literature specifically on Israeli public diplomacy and Palestinian public diplomacy was reviewed. Existing research has noted that the Zionist movement and Israeli Government have practised a variation of public diplomacy called *hasbara* (Hebrew for explanation) but there is debate on whether this would be considered to be public diplomacy (see Cummings, 2016; Schleifer, 2003; Gilboa, 2006; Greenfield and Rothman, 2012; Shai, 2018; and Toledano and McKie, 2013). This research will treat hasbara and public diplomacy as analogous terms since the Israeli government appear to treat the two terms as synonymous and that growing international criticism of Israeli policies and actions towards the Palestinians have sparked a renewed

interest in public diplomacy among Israeli academic and government circles, generating a substantial body of academic literature on Israeli public diplomacy.

Much of this literature has focused on harnessing Hasbara to fix Israel's negative international image and counter Palestinian "propaganda" Toledano (2005) has analysed the informational output of the Zionist leadership and movement between 1871 and 1917 through the framework of public relations. Toledano and McKie (2009, 2013) subsequently explored the public diplomacy output of the Israeli Government and several non-state actors including the World Zionist Organization (WZO), the Jewish Agency, the Hadassah (the Women's Zionist Organization of America), the Histadrut (the Federation of Trade Unions), political parties, youth movements, non-profit organisations, and advocacy groups which provides further evidence of the value of studying the behaviour of advocacy groups (see also Greenfield and Rothman, 2012; Hadari and Turgeman, 2016). Shai (2018) also examines the public diplomacy activities of several Israeli government departments and intelligence services but includes discussion of NGOs and advocacy groups in both Israel and the American Jewish diaspora but did not look at pro-Israel advocacy within Australia and New Zealand. There is also literature critiquing specific organisations and hasbara campaigns such as (e.g. Toledano, 2010; Hershkovitz, 2012; Magen and Lapid, 2016; Dart, 2016) but this is not the focus of this thesis.

There is also limited literature on Palestinian public diplomacy, focusing on the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). For example, Zaharna (2003) used communications theory to analyse Palestinian messaging and image management diplomacy during the First Intifada (1987-1989) and the Second Intifada (2000-2002) which reinforced the importance of image management and narrative building in the public diplomacy war. A recurrent theme was that the asymmetry in power and resources between Israel and the Palestinians inhibited the public diplomacy capabilities of the latter. Awad (2015) and Zaharna, Hammad, and Masri (2009) show that the PA views public diplomacy as one among several tools including traditional diplomacy, legal proceedings, and outright resistance used to advance Palestinian aspirations and interests. However this literature mostly focused on the Palestinian government and whilst there was some discussion of the role of Palestinian NGOs and diaspora communities in public diplomacy, there was little exploration of how these groups operated or contributed to advancing the Palestinian cause on a global level.

Nation branding

Nation branding is about how governments and other actors including companies and advocacy groups use marketing and branding concepts and techniques to promote favourable imagery of a country and to combat negative perceptions and publicity (van Ham, 2001; Giboa, 2008; Szondi, 2008; Copeland, 2009; Pamment, 2013; Dinnie, 2016). While nation branding shares public diplomacy's goal of country promotion and image management, nation branding focuses on short-term marketing goals while public diplomacy takes a strategic long-term approach (Gilboa, 2008). Historical and contemporary examples of nation branding have including nation building efforts during the 19th and 20th centuries, flags, public expos and fairs, the branding of currency, transportation, soccer matches, and cuisines to reinforce national political identities (Ollins, 2002; van Ham, 2001, Nimijean, 2005, 2006; Gilboa, 2008; Smits and Jensen 2012, Rockower 2012; Pamment, 2013; Dinnie 2016). While there is a wealth of literature on nation branding theories and concepts, this review will focus on those which are most relevant to the research topic: the question of how the nation branding and political marketing activities of various advocacy groups fit into the frameworks of both Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy.

One of the most valuable pieces of work on nation branding was Szondi (2008), who developed five conceptual models discussing the possible relationships between nation branding and public diplomacy ranging from the being separate fields, being subsets of each other, being distinct but overlapping fields, and finally being the same concept. While Szondi is unsure which of these models will be dominant in the future since the boundaries of these two areas are still formulating, he recognises that nation branding and public diplomacy have a shared interest in culture, identity, image, and values. Though Szondi does not look at Israel and Palestine, his ideas about the overlapping between nation branding and public diplomacy are valuable to this research and along with Brin (2006) and Smits and Jensen (2012) helped to inform the development of the communications and relational image management criteria of the framework.

In addition to the generic literature on nation branding, the specialist literature relating to Israeli nation branding was also reviewed. For example, Beirman (2000; 2002) explored how the Australian-based Israeli Tourism Office collaborated with the Israeli-government to encourage sympathetic Australian, New Zealand, and Pacific Islands demographics such as

Jews and Christians to visit Israel for tourism and religious pilgrimages which provides support to the argument that it is worth researching the nation branding aspect of pro-Israel advocacy in Australia. Similarly Brin (2006) researched the competing politically-oriented tourism trips in Jerusalem promoted by the Israeli government and informal Jewish, Christian Zionist, and Palestinian solidarity groups, providing evidence of how non-state actors can engage in nation branding through solidarity tourism activities. Avraham (2009), Schulman (2012), and Shai (2018) looked at the Israeli Government's Brand Israel campaign between 2003 and 2013 which sought to combat Israel's negative international imagery through tourism promotion, marketing Israeli technology and innovation, and by appealing to certain segments including the LGBT community. Finally, Campo and Alvarez's (2014) research into Israeli tourism marketing in Spain and Turkey demonstrate that effective communications can be neutralised by other variables such as competition and negative imagery arising from cultural and religious affinity. There was however no academic literature about Palestinian nation branding. Nevertheless the research that does exist backed up the suggestion that advocacy groups can use nation branding to promote awareness and support for their causes.

Political marketing

Political marketing is about how various actors including political parties, governments, and advocacy groups use marketing strategies and techniques to enhance their messaging and recruitment strategies, and to help them achieve their goals including winning elections or passing legislation (Lock and Harris, 1996; Henneberg, 2002; Lees-Marshment, 2001, 2014). Political marketing also covers various activities including political advertising, political communication, campaigning, media management, market intelligence, product design, product promotion, and the behaviour of politicians and political organisations. While there is a wealth of literature on political marketing theories and concepts, this review will focus on those which are most relevant to the research topic: the question of how the nation branding and political marketing activities of various advocacy groups fit into the frameworks of both Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy.

The most relevant work is Lees-Marshment's (2001; 2003; 2004; 2014) "product/sales/market-oriented framework" and communications and relational activities, Bannon (2004) and Ahuvia's (2004) conceptualisation about segmentation, Lees

Marshment's (2014; 2018) ideas about targeting and Bartle and Griffith's (2002) ideas about positioning and Pettitt's (2015) internal marketing framework. Lees-Marshment's (2003, 2004) "product/sales/market-oriented charities framework" will provide a useful framework for analysing the strategies and behaviour that underpin advocacy groups' communications, relational, and recruitment activities. Lees-Marshment's charity framework has been utilised by Foster, Hudon, and Yates (2015) and helped informed the development of the marketing orientation criterion in the new analytical framework presented at the end of this chapter. Lees-Marshment (2014) has also categorised political actors' communications into "static communications" (eg. posters, paraphernalia, websites, emails, op-ed letters and columns) and "relational/interactive communications" (eg. demonstrations, strikes, speaking tours public meetings, workshops, media interviews, and social media platforms), which helped inform the structure of the analytical framework.

In terms of segmenting, the framework drew upon Bannon's (2004) geographical, behavioural, demographic and psychographic segmentation categories, and Ahuvia's (2012) segmentation of American Jewish public opinion towards Israel-Palestine. This framework drew upon Lees-Marshment's (2014, p.20) definition of targeting as "strategically allocating marketing resources and products where there is a market for them and it will win them necessary support to achieving their goals. While usually applied to political parties and elections (Lees-Marshment, 2018), targeting can also be applied to other actors including advocacy groups. For positioning, the framework drew upon Bartle and Griffith's (2004) idea that actors can either modify their products to cater for the market ("real positioning") or change their audience's perceptions of their product ("psychological positioning"). Together, these theories and concepts shaped the development of the analytical framework's "segmentation, targeting and positioning" criterion, providing a framework for analysing how advocacy groups positioned themselves in the market place through their communications and advocacy work.

Finally, this review consulted Pettitt's (2015) "five internal stakeholder marketing approaches" framework which deals with how groups can motivate their members and supporters into joining and remain remaining effective activists within their organisation. Pettitt's framework (particularly his base strategy category) influenced the development of the framework's "internal marketing" criterion. Together, the above political marketing models and frameworks were useful to suggest how the recruitment strategies of advocacy

groups might be analysed, including how they market their cause to the public, how they identify and recruit supporters and allies, and how they maintain internal morale and cohesiveness.

In addition to the generic literature on political marketing, this review also consulted the political marketing literature on the Arab-Israeli conflict, Israel, the Palestinians, and advocacy groups. Not surprisingly, there is very little work in this area. That which does exist is not directly relevant to this specific research. Astorino-Courtois (1996; 2000) has explored the use of political marketing to promote support for the peace process in Jordan, Israel, and the Palestinian methods through public opinion surveys of university students. While helpful, public opinion of the Israel-Palestine peace process lies outside the scope of this research. Within the Israeli political marketing literature, this review found that Schonker-Schreck (2004), Auerbach and Yehuda (2010), Balmas and Sheafer (2010), and Orkibi (2015) have conducted research on Israeli candidate branding, political communications, and electoral campaigning. This review also identified a lack of extensive prior research into Palestinian political marketing apart from the Israeli scholars Mozes and Weizmann (2010) and Schleifer's (2014) research into Hamas' online political communications output. Unlike Israel, there has been no political marketing research conducted on Palestinian parties, politicians, and political institutions. There is also a lack of literature dealing with the political marketing of pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups, providing an opportunity for this research to break new ground within the political marketing literature.

Research question and hypothesis

This thesis seeks to address to the research question: how do advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia use nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments?

This thesis also seeks to address the null hypothesis that these advocacy groups are spontaneous affiliates or independent entities which share the ideology, goals, and aspirations of one of the two governments and conduct nation branding and political marketing to promote their messages and recruit members to their cause. Within this framework, this thesis intends to address three sub-hypotheses:

1. The first hypothesis is that advocacy groups play a significant part in public diplomacy by using nation branding and political marketing to increase support for, and positive attitudes towards, the Israeli and Palestinian countries. The first null hypothesis is that advocacy groups do not play a significant part in Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy and that they do not use nation branding and political marketing.

2. The second hypothesis is that all identifiable advocacy groups are linked to, and subordinate to the interests of, one of the other governments. The second null hypothesis is that there exist advocacy groups that have no discernible link to either government but arise spontaneously, motivated by local ethnic, ideological, religious, humanitarian or other convictions.

3. The third hypothesis is that the two governments deliberately support sympathetic advocacy groups in various ways, and sometimes create them as a central element of their public diplomacy policies. The third null hypothesis is that the governments' attention to advocacy groups is sporadic and inconsequential.

In short, this thesis intends to address the place of advocacy groups in public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing.

Conclusion and new analytical framework

This literature review identified a wide range of academic literature in the fields of advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing. This section summarises the key findings, gaps and opportunities of the literature review while the next section presents the analytical framework developed through a synthesis of the key relevant concepts identified from the four fields discussed above.

In terms of advocacy, Keck and Sikkink's (1998) "transnational advocacy network," "political actions" and "boomerang pattern" models were the most useful and widely applicable advocacy models and concepts. For New Zealand, the review found that some limited research had been conducted on pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups but was mainly historical-oriented or superseded by contemporary events. For Australia, the review identified a substantial body of literature on Australian Jewish groups as well as a limited body of research on Australian Palestinian groups. For comparative purposes, the

review also consulted the literature on groups in Israel-Palestine, the United States, Europe, and the BDS movement.

In terms of public diplomacy, the most useful models and concepts were Cull's (2009) "New Public Diplomacy" model, Gilboa's (2001; 2008) "non-state transnational model," and Zaharna's (2009) information and relational frameworks. However, one unresolved issue that Cull identified was the relationship between the output of these new actors and state interests. This raises the question of whether advocacy groups are unpaid auxiliaries of official public diplomacy efforts or whether they are independent actors with their own interests and agenda? While the review identified a substantial body of literature on Israeli public diplomacy by official and informal actors, limited research has been conducted on Palestinian public diplomacy; presenting opportunities for further academic research in this area.

In terms of nation branding, the most useful works were Szondi's (2008) discussion of the overlapping relationship between nation branding and public diplomacy, Brin's (2006) research into Israeli and Palestinian solidarity tourism, Smits and Jensen's (2012) discussion of public expos, and Beirman's (2000, 2002) research into private-public nation branding partnerships in Australia. While the review identified a significant body of literature on Israeli official and informal Jewish nation branding activities, there was a lack of literature on Palestinian nation branding apart from Brin's (2006) research into informal Palestinian advocacy groups' solidarity tourism activities.

In terms of political marketing, the most useful theories and concepts were included Lees-Marshment's (2001; 2003; 2004; 2014) "product/sales/market-oriented framework" and communications and relational activities, Bannon (2004) and Ahuvia's (2004) ideas and concepts about segmentation, Lees Marshment's (2014; 2018) ideas about targeting, Bartle and Griffith's (2002) ideas about positioning and Pettitt's (2015) internal marketing framework. This review also found a significant body of political marketing literature relating to the Arab-Israeli peace process, Israeli politics, and Hamas. Much of this literature was written from a Western and Israeli perspective and there was an absence of the Palestinian perspective. While there has been some research on the political marketing of advocacy groups by Lees-Marshment (2004) and Foster et al, the political marketing activities of pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups has remained unexplored.

Based on this literature search, this review identified a gap in existing research. No existing literature explores how advocacy groups can use public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing activities to influence opinion in New Zealand about Israel and Palestine issues. Given this, this review created an original framework by synthesising key elements from the advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing theories, concepts, and principles. To do this, it placed the key relevant concepts into the taxonomy below, which served as a basis for creating the new framework. Concepts from the different fields intersect and overlap in three ways: communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. These three characteristics were used to construct a taxonomy of the activities of cause-oriented advocacy groups that take an interest in Israeli-Palestinian affairs:

Figure 1: Taxonomy of advocacy groups' activities	
Activities	**Influences**
Communications activities	Zaharna's public diplomacy informational framework, Lees-Marshment's "static political marketing communications"
a. Information politics	Keck and Sikkink's informational politics
b. Strategic political communication	Keck and Sikkink's symbolic politics, Cobb and Elder's framing and symbolic politics, Lang and Lang's political framing and symbolic languages, media management
c. Communications adaptation	Keck and Sikkink's informational politics, Cull's New Public Diplomacy
d. Communicational image management	Cull's New Public Diplomacy, Gilboa's non-state transnational public diplomacy, cultural promotion, brand/image management, Szondi's nation branding and public diplomacy models
Relational activities	Zaharna's relational public diplomacy framework, Lees-Marshment's "relational/interactive political marketing communications"
a. Cause promotion	Zaharna's relational public diplomacy framework, Less-Marshment's "product, sales and market-oriented framework"
b. Exerting leverage	Keck and Sikkink's symbolic, accountability and leverage politics, Cobb and Elder's "issue creation" and four types of public audiences
c. Coalition building	Keck and Sikkink's boomerang effect and transnational advocacy network theory and Cobb and Elder's identification and attention groups
d. Transnational collaboration	Keck and Sikkink's boomerang effect and transnational advocacy network theory, Cull's New Public Diplomacy, Gilboa's non-state transnational public diplomacy
e. Relational image management	Interactive nation branding activities such as politically-oriented tourism and cultural expos, tours, and trips, Brin's research into Israeli and Palestinian solidarity tourism, Beirman's research into private-public tourism promotion
Recruitment and internal cohesion activities	
a. Marketing orientation	Lees-Marshment's "product/sales/market-oriented framework"
b. Segmentation and targeting	Bannon and Ahuvia's ideas and concepts about segmentation, Lees-Marshmen's ideas about targeting, Bartle and Griffith's ideas about positioning
c. Internal marketing	Pettitt's internal marketing model
d. Fundraising	Standalone criterion

The proposed analytical model is outlined below:

Figure 2: A model of how advocacy groups use public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments

Communications activities	
Give out information about their cause	a. Generating politically usable information through one-way communication mediums such as literature, paraphernalia, posters, advertisements, opinion columns, letters and websites.
Engage in strategic political communication	a. Engaging in symbolic politics (such as symbols, actions or stories) to communicate messages, raise awareness, and bolster recruitment. b. Managing media coverage of a state or sub-national actor through op-ed columns and letters, advertisements, audio-visual media, and exploiting news coverage to promote positive aspects of a destination and raise domestic support for their causes. c. Engaging in specific short-term campaigns.
Respond to changes in communications technology	a. Using a wide range of communications mediums and platforms to reach a wide range of audiences. b. Using formal channels e.g. websites, electronic documents, newsletters, bulletins, posters, pamphlets, and other paraphernalia. c. Using informal channels e.g. emails, text messages, social media, and telephones.
Promote a favourable image of a government, sub-national entity, or people through nation branding communications activities	a. Promoting the country or ethnic group's culture, heritage, and identity by producing, sponsoring or distributing a range of literature and media that promotes those attributes including territorial claims. b. Undertaking image management of a country or ethnic group in response to crises and conflicts.

Relational activities	
Promote their cause through activities and two-way communication	a. Using relational activities (such as public booths, meetings, rallies, concerts, speaking engagements, cultural and education exchanges, and fundraising events) b. Using two-way communication mediums (such as text messages, emails, and social media)
Influence powerful actors through lobbying, leveraging and	a. Influencing the public policy process by lobbying and building relationships with influential political, media, and civil society leaders and actors. b. Holding these actors to account by ensuring that they abide by their stated policies and principles.

holding them to account	
Build effective relationships by working with a range of other activists and organisations	a. Forging coalitions, relationships and linkages with other like-minded political, media and civil society actors including oNGOs and activists. b. Working with these like-minded groups and actors to bring about change in foreign countries – the boomerang effect.
Work internationally on a cause issue	a. Participating in "transnational advocacy networks" by working internationally on a cause issue with other like-minded political, media and civils society actors to change the behaviour of states and international organisations. b. This cooperation can take the form of information sharing, co-hosting events and functions, webinars, and lobbying campaigns.
Promote a favourable image of a government, sub-national entity, or people through relational nation branding activities	a. Sponsoring speaking engagements, cultural and education fairs and expos. b. Promoting a county or ethnic group's culture, heritage, and identity c. Managing public perceptions of a country or ethnic group in response to crises and conflicts. d. Sponsoring politically-oriented tourism to promote political sympathy, potentially segmented to target certain demographics.

Recruitment and internal cohesion activities	
Attract new members by adopting product, sales or market-orientations which guide their behaviour and use of political marketing	• Adopting a product-orientation, motivated by their cause, allowing their political values and beliefs to dictate their actions and policies. Reluctant to change their communications and relational activities to suit membership subscription, public or govt. opinion. OR • Adopting a sales-orientation, sticking to the message and cause regardless of their political market's demands, and using communications and relational activities to recruit supporters to their cause. OR • Adopting a market-orientation, using market intelligence to identify supporters' demands and needs, and designing their cause and product including the campaigning and membership package to recruit supporters. They also communicate campaign progress to retain the support of their members.
Engage in targeting key segments	a. Segmenting the market into smaller sections which can be targeted in terms of product, message and medium. Tailoring

	their product and message to meet the needs and expectations of different markets. b. Targeting segments that are sympathetic towards their stated goals and interests by strategically allocating resources and products to reaching them.
Use internal marketing to respond to their activists/supporters	Using a range of ideological, material or democratic incentives to encourage activists and members to carry out external communications and relational activities: • **Material incentives** involve paying senior-ranking members including directors, researchers, and consultants. OR • A **base strategy** involves giving internal stakeholders what they want and designing the advocacy group's product to fit their needs and expectations. OR • An **empty vessel** strategy involves creating a vague product that allows people to project their own ideas, wants, and demands onto it. OR • **Dignified democracy** involves using solidarity incentives (which is the satisfaction derived from feeling part of an organization through activism) to motivate members and supporters. OR • **Effective democracy** involves real democratic consultation and joint creation and ownership of the product by all internal stakeholders.
Raise funds to support their cause and activities	Raising money to support their advocacy activities such as printing magazines, posters and other paraphernalia, guest speaking engagements, overseas trips, and campaigns via: a. Fundraising activities b. Donations c. Subscriptions

This provides a comprehensive framework to use when analysing advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia. The next chapter will outline the methodology for this empirical research.

Chapter 3: Methodology

To answer the research question, this research adopted a qualitative research design and collected and analysed in-depth empirical data for four case-studies: key pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups based in New Zealand and Australia. Extensive primary data was collected consisting of multiple and diverse online and print material from the case studies, as well as in-depth elite interviews. This data was analysed using content analysis, coding the data in NVIVO 11 against the theoretical framework created from a synthesis of existing literature. This chapter will explain and justify the different methods that will be adopted.

Research design

This research used a qualitative methodological research design that was informed by a constructivist worldview and deductive approach, pursued a strategy of inquiry based on comparative case studies, and utilised two qualitative research methods: namely the content analysis of sources and elite interviews with representatives from the advocacy groups being studied.

First, this study was underpinned by a constructivist philosophical worldview where individuals make sense of the world around them as a result of their social interactions and the influence of historical and cultural norms and forces that operate in their lives. The goal of constructivist research is to draw upon the participants' views of the situation being studied (Creswell, 2007, 2009; Sarantakos, 2005; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). A constructivist worldview addresses how both pro-Israel and Palestinian solidarity groups construct meaning by promoting messages and arguments that support their cause and political narratives about Israel-Palestine. While pro-Israel advocates see themselves as defending the legitimacy and historical claims of Israel and the Jewish people against anti-Semitism, Palestinian advocates view themselves as standing for Palestinian rights and self-determination against Zionist "settler colonialism." While constructivism works well with grounded theory, this research is instead guided by the synthesized analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter.

Second, this research was informed by a deductive approach where theories guided the analysis of the research findings. Taking a "top-down" approach, deductive research uses the synthesised analytical framework outlined in the previous chapter to generate the research question and hypotheses that can be tested. This research then analysed a range of print, online, and audio-visual sources against the criteria of the analytical framework, research question and hypotheses. This deductive approach informed this research's comparative cases studies methodology that utilised content analysis and elite interviews.

Third, in terms of strategies of inquiry, this research took a comparative (also known as collective) case study approach. Case study research explores various topics including individuals, groups, processes, events, and activities over a time period using a range sources including interviews, observations, audio-visual material, documents and reports. A comparative case studies consist of several single studies investigated jointly for the purpose of inquiring into an issue, phenomenon, group, or condition. Case studies research can either be used inquire into a social issue or to refine theory, and their results have wider application beyond the study itself. (Creswell, 2007, 2009; Sarantakos, 2005; Pierce, 2008). This research adopted a comparative case study approach since it allows this research's analytical framework to be tested against several different groups.

To ensure balance, this research looked at four groups: two-pro-Israel groups and two Palestinian solidarity groups in New Zealand and Australia. The New Zealand case studies consisted of the Palestinian Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA; formerly the New Zealand Palestine Solidarity Network) and the Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ) while the Australian case studies consisted of the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN). Criteria for selection included their broad scope of activity, approachability/accessibility, and linkages to state actors through advocacy and public diplomacy. The PSNA and APAN are national umbrella organisations, making them the leading organisations for Palestinian activism in NZ and Australia. The IINZ was selected due to its broad scope of activity and easily accessibility to the researcher since it is based in Auckland. Finally, AIJAC was selected since the literature review identified it as the most active pro-Israel advocacy organisation due to its broad scope of communications and relational activities particularly its interest in lobbying political, media, and civil society elites. While there were various other groups advocating on Israel-Palestine issues including dissident Jewish groups such as Shma Kolenu and Australian Jews Against

Fascism and Christian Zionist groups such as New Zealand Friends of Israel (NZFOI) Association and the International Christian Embassy Jerusalem (ICEJ), time constraints and the in-depth nature of the research design made it hard to study a wider range of groups. Studying four groups representing opposites of the debate ensures a balance between time management and the quality of the depth of research.

Fourth, the research utilised two qualitative research methods: content analysis and elite interviews. Due to the nature of this research, qualitative research was the most suitable since it deals with themes, ideologies, patterns, and interpretations. For data collection, this research undertook a content analysis of a range of print, audio-visual, and online literature and media produced by the groups, supplemented by semi-structured interviews. Sources derived from the content analysis and interviews were analysed against this research's analytical framework using NVivo software. The following sections discuss both the data collection and analysis process for the print, audio-visual, and online sources as well the interviews.

Data collection and sampling processes

In terms of data collection, this research collected a total of 1,898 primary sources from the four case studies' websites, social media accounts, paraphernalia (including leaflets and posters), and op-ed media articles published during the time period between 2010 and 2018. This eight-year timeframe covers a range of key events and developments relating to Israel-Palestine during the 2010s, the most recent past decade. The table below provides a brief tally of the types of sources that the content analysis used for writing each of the four case studies. The individual case studies' sub-sections will provide a more detailed description of the collection process and final tally for these sources.

Figure 3 Tally of primary sources

Groups	Webpages	Facebook	Twitter	Videos and podcasts	Paraphernalia and media articles	Total (Groups)
PSNA	14	153	Nil	111	32	310
IINZ	167	135	135	Nil	Nil	437
AIJAC	223	162	172	11	105	673
APAN	248	Nil	138	31	61	478

Total (Sources)	652	450	445	153	198	1,898

In line with its constructivist epistemology, this research studied 1,898 primary sources by the groups to ensure triangulation between numerous sources and generate "thick descriptions" with plentiful samples of raw data. In terms of triangulation, this research investigated whether there were differences in the content and messaging on different platforms and mediums. While there was some variation in the way the messages and content were delivered depending on the type of medium, their messages and arguments remained consistent. Though Facebook and Twitter posts tended to be shorter than columns and audio-visual interviews, this did not compromise the group's messages and arguments. Palestinian solidarity groups consistently advanced Palestinian rights and criticised Israel while pro-Israel groups consistently defended Israel's image and actions. The synthesised analytical framework discussed earlier was used to generate "thick descriptions" in the empirical chapters. "Thick descriptions" provide "details of recall and imagery, interpretative comment, contextual knowledge, emotions and the web of social relationships" (Creswell, 2007; O'Connor and Joffe, 2020). This research generated "thick description" by analysing the groups' messages, activities, and other associated information through the criteria of the analytical framework, which drew upon the sub-fields of advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing.

During the data collection process, content was copied from the groups' websites and stored on Word documents and PDF files. This research also transcribed audio-visual recordings from podcasts, YouTube, and Vimeo videos. Occasionally, the researcher used Internet Wayback Machine to retrieve lost Internet webpages. For Facebook posts and Twitter tweets, screenshots of the posts were copied onto Paint and Paint3D files where they were cropped and saved. Since Internet sources such as webpages, social media posts, and audio-visual files can be lost when websites and accounts are updated or deleted, it was necessary to persevere copies of these sources for referencing and analysis purpose. For each case study, an NVivo project file, source checklist sheet, and list of references was created to facilitate the collection and cataloguing of sources. Word and Paint files of the various pamphlets, webpages, and social media posts were also copied onto case study sub-folders stored within the researcher's laptop, university desktop, and an external hard drive.

Seidel (1991) has also raised concerns about an over-emphasis on the volume of data prioritising scope over resolution; a problem which surfaced during the content analysis stage of both Australian case studies. To maintain control over the research process, critical case sampling was used to generate samples from AIJAC's website, Twitter and Facebook posts as well as APAN's Twitter account. Further details about data collection and sampling are outlined below.

Palestine Solidarity Network

Data was collected from the PSNA's website (https://www.psna.nz/), Facebook site (https://www.facebook.com/NZPalestine/), email mailing list, leaflets, posters, and the affiliated Palestine Human Rights Campaign's (PHRC) YouTube channel (www.youtube.com/user/palestinehumanrights/video). While the PSNA was founded in 2013, several of the organization's core members particularly the PHRC Auckland and Kia Ora Gaza were already operating well before then. Thus, the researcher included the PHRC's YouTube channel, which dates to 2010.

During data collection, this research collected and analysed a total of 310 sources, which are outlined below:

Figure 4 Total number of PSNA sources	
Typology	**Collected**
Webpage	**14**
• PSNA webpages	5
• PSNA affiliates' webpages (eg. Boycott the Film Agreement, Kia Ora Gaza, PHRC, Wellington Palestine)	Nil
• External sources (including op-ed material)	9
Facebook posts	**153**
• Posts	149
• Facebook videos	4
YouTube videos	**111**
• Shahar Peer 2010 Tour	17
• 2010 Gaza flotilla incident	8
• 2011 campaign and events	4
• 2012 campaigns, events, and protests	7
• Kia Ora Gaza Convoy 2012	6
• 2013 campaigns, events, and protests	3
• 2014 campaigns, events and protests	3

• 2014 Gaza War protest campaign	40
• 2014-15 SuperFund protest campaign	6
• Dr. Musa Mohd Nordin Viva Palestina Malaysia,"	1
• 2016 campaigns and events	5
• 2016 Women's Boat to Gaza	4
• Gideon Levy talk, Mt Eden War Memorial Hall, Auckland, 3 Dec 2017	2
• Free Ahed Tamimi rally, 3 Feb 2018	5
Paraphernalia	**32**
• Newsletters	3
• Talks and functions (2016-2018)	7
• Pamphlets, posters, and other paraphernalia	22
Total	**310**

Israel Institute of New Zealand

This chapter's content analysis consulted the Israel Institute's website (https://israelinstitute.nz/), Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/Israel.Institute.NZ/), and Twitter channel (https://twitter.com/IsraelInstNZ). This research collected and analysed a total of 437 sources, which are outlined below:

Figure 5 Total number of IINZ sources	
Typology	**Collected**
Webpages	**167**
• Navigational articles	4
• Website articles	126
• Sideroom	35
• External sources	2
Facebook posts	**135**
Twitter posts	**135**
Total	**437**

To generate older Twitter posts that have been archived, the researcher used the website Tweet Tunnels to find these posts. The researcher also manually selected Facebook posts from the Israel Institute's Facebook account. The IINZ is a recent organisation dating back to 2016, hence the lack of material prior to that year. While the IINZ also had LinkedIn (https://www.linkedin.com/company/israel-institute-of-new-zealand/) and YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCunLRO6b9Z3JAlECtptLbQ) accounts, the

researcher did not use them because they mainly replicated content that had already been published on the group's website and other social media channels.

Australia/Israel and Jewish Affairs Council

This chapter's content analysis consulted AIJAC's website (https://aijac.org.au), *Australia/Israel Review* magazine (using selected articles published on their website), Twitter account (https://twitter.com/AIJAC_Update), and Facebook page (https://www.facebook.com/aijac.au). While AIJAC had a YouTube channel (https://www.youtube.com/user/AIJACvideo), this research did not use it since the same videos were published on their website. This research analysed AIJAC's web, Twitter and Facebook output produced between August 2010 and August 2018, which amounted to thousands of articles, posts and videos. Due to the vast quantity of material, this research used critical case sampling to filter the material to a more manageable size, utilising the methodological scholarship of Henry (1990), Altheide and Schneider (2013), Etikan et al (2016), and Slakoff and Brennan (2017). To aid with filtering process, the researcher developed a filtering framework for the AIJAC case study, which is outlined and discussed below:

Figure 6 AIJAC critical case sampling categories	
Coding categories	**Subcategories (Topics, themes and issues)**
New Zealand	**Focuses on New Zealand politics and current affairs (4):** • Relations with Israel • NZ's voting record on the UN • Hostility to Israel • Elections: 2011, 2014, 2017
Australia	**Focuses on Australian politics and current affairs (6):** • Elections: 2010, 2013, 2016 • 18C • ALP/Labor • Bob Carr • Australia at the UN • **Australia-Israel relations:** Covers state visits, economic relations, and defence ties.
Israel	**Themes (22):** 1. **Crisis management:** • Gaza flotilla • Gaza blockade

	2012 Gaza War 2014 Gaza War - Israel wanting peace - Israeli settlements - Jerusalem as Israel's capital - Nation-State Law - Price tag attacks - Israeli defence **2. Nation branding:** - Start-up - Technology - Green energy - Innovation - Economy - Israeli democracy and human rights - Israeli elections: 2013, 2015 - Culture - Health - Animal rights
Palestinians	**Topics (12):** - Palestinian violence - Palestinian terrorism - Palestinian incitement - March of Return - Palestinian intransigence - Palestinian corruption - Misuse of foreign aid money (including Australian aid) - Pay to Slay campaign - Opposition to Palestinian statehood - Dissident Palestinians: Palestinians for normalisation - Israeli-Palestinian cooperation - Mistreatment of Palestinians by Arab states: "Palestinians killed in Syria"
Media	Focusing on monitoring media coverage of Israel-Palestine by selected individuals, media organisations, and media products (6) **Individuals (two "pro-Palestinian" journalists):** - John Lyons, former *The Australian* and ABC - Sophie McNeill, ABC Middle East correspondent **Media organizations:** - ABC - Fairfax **Films and TV shows:**

	• Bethlehem film • The Other Son • The Promise television series
Academia	Monitoring of academics who take an interest in Israeli, Palestinian, and Middle Eastern affairs (7): **Pro-Palestinian academics:** • Han and Rane • Jake Lynch • Amin Saikal • Sydney University **Pro-Israel academics:** • Barry Rubin • Daniel Pipes • Bernard Lewis
Anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism	Focusing on various strands of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism, both real and alleged (8): • In general • BDS • Left-wing • Right-wing • Muslim • Arab • Palestinian • Christian

As shown above, this framework is divided into seven thematic coding categories: New Zealand, Australia, Israel, Palestinians, Media, Academia, and Anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism. Within these seven categories, the researcher also identified 65 sub-categories based on certain themes, issues, and topics. The categories and sub-categories met the parameters of this PhD research design and surfaced frequently in AIJAC's media output, advocacy work and outreach activities. As an Australian-based group, AIJAC took an avid interest in both Jewish and Israeli-related events and issues in Australia and to a lesser extent New Zealand. The Israeli and Palestinian sub-categories also covered various newsworthy events and developments related to the Israel-Palestine conflict such as the Gaza conflicts and the 2010 Gaza Flotilla as well as settlement expansion, Palestinians in Israeli custody, and home demolitions. Other sub-categories included messages, themes and issues that AIJAC highlighted. For example, AIJAC's coverage of Israel focused on defending Israel's actions

and promoting the country as a functioning democracy and nation-state. By contrast, AIJAC's coverage of the Palestinians was negative, focusing on both alleged and real Palestinian intransigence, hostility, and aggression towards Israel. In terms of the media and academia, AIJAC highlighted instances of alleged media and academic bias against Israel in line with its mission as a pro-Israel watchdog. Reflecting Jewish concerns about anti-Semitism, AIJAC also devoted extensive coverage to both alleged and real incidents of anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism across the political spectrum. Due to the Israel-Palestine conflict, the BDS movement and Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism featured prominently as sub-categories. Focusing on these categories, sub-categories, and issues reflected this research's comparative case study methodological approach. In addition, the researcher developed a typological system for ranking sources:

1. Media statements
2. Essays, focus articles, videos on topics
3. Op-ed columns, letters to the media, and news interviews (including videos)
4. Current affairs reports from their Fresh Air and Update sections
5. External media content including guest articles.

This typological system helped to eliminate duplicates and outdated sources. While the researcher prioritised original content produced by AIJAC staff members over recirculated external media content, useful guest articles that met the sampling framework's criteria were also sampled. This sampling and filtering process allowed the researcher to reduce the number of AIJAC articles and videos produced between 6 August 2010 and 6 August 2018 from 3,443 to 335; roughly a tenth of the original source. While the videos were available on the website at the time of content analysis, they have since been moved to AIJAC's YouTube channel as of 2020.

After testing the sampling framework on AIJAC's website, the researcher also used critical case sampling to select posts from AIJAC's Twitter and Facebook accounts. For APAN's Twitter account, the researcher used the retrieval website Tweet Tunnels to retrieve posts from AIJAC's Twitter account. Since AIJAC's Twitter account dated back to 29 July 2011, the researcher only sampled Tweets published between that date and 6 August 2018. Since there were 85 months in the period between July 2011 and August 2018, the researcher sampled two Tweets per month, generating a total of 170 Tweets (roughly 5% of the 3,239 AIJAC tweets published during that period). Like the website, AIJAC's Tweets were selected based on the sampling framework's categories and sub-categories. Reflecting the parameters

of this research, the researcher prioritised Tweets relating to both AIJAC's advocacy work and coverage of newsworthy contemporary events in Israel-Palestine and Australia.

For AIJAC's Facebook account, the researcher used the data extraction software Netvizz to extract data from AIJAC's Facebook page. Since AIJAC's Facebook page dated back to 4 November 2011, the researcher only sampled posts published between that date and 6 August 2018. As there were 82 months in the period between July 2011 and August 2018, the researcher only sampled two posts per month; generating a sample of 164 (roughly 7.2% of the 2,290 AIJAC Facebook posts published during that period). While the researcher initially considered sampling 5% of Facebook posts, the figure (of 115 posts) generated was considerably smaller than the Twitter population. Thus, to ensure that a proportional population of Facebook posts was generated, the researcher settled on the 7.2% sample. As with AIJAC's website and Twitter account, Facebook posts were selected based on the sampling framework's categories and sub-categories. Reflecting the parameters of this research, the researcher prioritised Facebook posts. relating to both AIJAC's advocacy work and coverage of newsworthy contemporary events in Israel-Palestine and Australia.

Using critical case sampling, this research generated a sample of 673 sources, which are outlined below:

Figure 7 Total number of AIJAC sources	
Typology	**Sampled**
Webpages	**223**
• Informational pages	2
• Fresh AIR	44
• In the Media	33
• Media releases	40
• Resources	6
• Updates	98
AIR Magazine	**105**
Facebook	**162**
Twitter	**172**
Videos	**11**
Total	**673**

Australia Palestine Advocacy Network

This chapter's content analysis consulted APAN's website (https://apan.org.au/), Twitter channel (https://twitter.com/apan4palestine/) and Vimeo account (https://vimeo.com/user42457739). While APAN also has Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/AustraliaPalestineAdvocacyNetwork/) and Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/apan4palestine/) accounts, these were not analysed since changes to Facebook's privacy policies in late 2019 following the Cambridge Analytica affair have made it impossible to retrieve Facebook data using extraction software like Netvizz, Facepager, and Scrapestorm. Since the three earlier case studies looked at two social media platforms each, the researcher selected Vimeo, a video streaming platform similar to YouTube, as a substitute for Facebook. As the PSNA case study had looked at the PHRC's YouTube channel, it made sense to look at second video streaming platform for this thesis. The researcher did not analyse APAN's Instagram account since it mainly consisted of photographs and visual graphics, which were not the main focus of this study. To maintain consistency with the other case studies, this research only analysed content between APAN's launch in May 2011 and August 2018.

While surveying the APAN website, the researcher used critical case sampling to categorise their web content into several topics and themes: Australia, Palestine, Israel, Media, and Global. These categories and their sub-categories are outlined and discussed below:

Coding categories	Subcategories (Topics, themes and issues)
Figure 8 APAN critical cases sampling categories	
Australia	• Australia-Palestine relations: 18 • Australia-Israel relations: 27 • Australian foreign policy: 35 • Australian aid to the Palestinians: 2 • Australian Jewish community: 3 • 2013 Australian federal election: 46 • 2016 Australian federal election: 63 • Australian solidarity activities (*eg. meetings, lobbying, rallies, speaking engagements, public activities, coalition building, and fundraising*): 11 **Total: 205**
Palestine	• 2018 Gaza March of Return: 4 • Palestinian children and youth: 12

	- Palestinian dispossession and Nakba: 4 - Palestinian human rights: 12 - Palestinian refugees: 4 - Palestinian resistance and struggle: 8 - Palestinian self-determination and statehood: 21 - Palestinian terrorism and violence: 2 **Total: 67**
Israel	- Gaza Blockade: 19 - 2012 Gaza War: 3 - 2014 Gaza War: 13 - 2013 Israeli legislative election: 1 - 2015 Israeli legislative election: 1 - Israeli human rights abuses and discrimination: 5 - Israeli intransigence: 5 - Israeli occupation and oppression: 11 - Israeli settlements: 15 - Jerusalem: 7 **Total: 80**
Media engagement	- In general: 1 - 3CR Community Radio: 1 - ABC: 3 - John Lyons: 1 - SBS/SBS Arabic Radio: 4 - Sophie McNeill: 1 - *The Promise*: 1 **Total: 12**
Global	- Anti-Semitism: 4 - BDS: 39 - Transnational collaboration and solidarity activities (includes solidarity tourism, hosting foreign guest speakers and delegates, and taking part in global solidarity actions like boycotting Paypal): 10 **Total: 53**
Grand Total	**417 (*Some articles may belong to several different codes*)**

These sampling categories and sub-categories were modelled after the previous AIJAC case study. They also met the parameters of this PhD research design and surface in APAN's communications output and advocacy work including lobbying, protest activities, speaking engagements, and informational trips to Israel-Palestine. As an Australian-based group, APAN unsurprisingly covered in events and developments in Australia relating to Israel and the Palestinians. As a Palestinian solidarity group, APAN's Palestinian sub-

categories focused on the Palestinian human right, resistance, and self-determination. While APAN also covered newsworthy events and developments in Israel, these subcategories reinforced the image of Israel as a human rights violator and "settler-colonial" state. The media engagement category mainly focused on APAN's engagement with media organisations and coverage of journalists (eg. Lyons and McNeill) and media products (*The Promise*) covering Israel-Palestine issues. The global sub-categories focused on highlighting Palestinian solidarity activism and the BDS movement, including combating opponents' assertions that these movements promoted anti-Semitism. While the researcher used the critical case sampling codes to categorize sources, they were not used to filter APAN's website since it had substantially less content that the AIJAC study. Still, the researcher did exclude duplicate content, links to expired or irretrievable articles and audio-visual material, and non-English language content; which reduced the website sample from 462 to 326 units. For accessing some content on the APAN website's "In the news" section, the researcher used Internet Wayback Machine and the University of Auckland Library's EBSCOhost and ProQuest databases to retrieve expired articles or articles that were locked behind paywalls.

The APAN critical sampling framework proved useful for sampling APAN's Twitter account. As APAN's Twitter account dated back to November 2012, the researcher only sampled Tweets published between that date and August 2018. Since the period between November 2012 and August 2018 covered 70 months, the research analysed two Tweets per month, generating a total of 138 Tweets (roughly 5.5% of the roughly 2,320 Tweets produced during that time period). While the researcher initially considered sampling 5% of their Tweets, the figure of 127 would have fallen short of the two-posts-per-month formula applied to the previous AIJAC case study. While the sample would have been 140 Tweets, the total figure was two units short since APAN produced no Tweets in January 2013. Like the website, APAN's Tweets were selected based on the sampling framework's categories and sub-categories. Reflecting the parameters of this research, the researcher prioritised Tweets relating to both APAN's advocacy work and coverage of newsworthy contemporary events in Israel-Palestine and Australia.

For APAN's Vimeo account, this research analysed 13 videos published between July 2015 and August 2018 These were mainly videos of APAN's guest speaker events and advocacy campaigns. Due to the small size of the sample, the researcher did not need to filter the videos. While the cut-off date is 6 August 2018, the researcher included three videos in

August that were published after that date since they contained information that was crucial to understanding APAN's advocacy and cause promotion activities.

Using a combination of data collection and sampling, this research generated a sample of 478 sources, which are outlined below:

Figure 9 Total number of APAN sources	
Typology	**Sampled**
Webpages	**248**
• Directory	8
• Homepage list	44
• About	4
• APAN Highlights	40
• APAN media releases	36
• Palestine in Australian politics	12
• 2013 candidate responses	46
• 2016 candidate responses	56
• Category Archives: General APAN news	2
• External webpages	Nil
Twitter	**138**
Videos and podcasts	**31**
Newspapers and magazines	**61**
Total	**478**

Content analysis process

Content analysis (also known as textual analysis or text mining), is a technique and documentary method used to analyse a wide range of print, audio-visual and digital literature and media. Its origins can be traced back to theological studies during the 17th century when the Catholic Church was concerned about the spread of non-religious matters through newspapers. Content analysis as an academic field emerged during the late 19th century through the analysis of newspaper content in New York. During the 20th century, sociologists, linguists, propagandists, psychologists and computer programmers made extensive use of content analysis. Content analysis has been used in both quantitative and qualitative research (Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 1980; Sarantakos, 2005; Burnham et al, 2008; Pierce, 2008;). While the methodology's content analysis process drew upon Hsieh and Shannon (2005) and Wesley's (2014; 2015) three-stage "qualitative textual" coding (which consists of open, axial and selective coding) and Seidel's (1991) coding process, it did not

use open coding to generate broad themes since this research had already developed a synthesised analytical framework through the literature review process. This research used the communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion categories and activities of the analytical framework as initial coding categories, which were organised into the following categories and codes:

Figure 10 Analytical framework categories and codes		
Communications activities	**Relational activities**	**Recruitment and internal cohesion activities**
Information politics	Cause promotion	Marketing orientation
Political communication	Exerting leverage	Segmentation
Communications adaptation	Coalition building	Targeting
Image management	Transnational collaboration	Internal marketing
	Image management	

Using the analytical framework, the content analysis was able to proceed directly to the axial coding stage in which all sources were consulted, patterns were identifies, and certain passages were "tagged" as belonging to one or more codes or categories in the analytical framework. The researcher used the "Nodes" function in the NVivo file to generate an outline of the categories and codes of the analytical framework. Passages and other content were then highlighted and arranged under the various analytical codes. For example, something relating to fundraising would go into the fundraising criterion. As part of the "tagging" process, a Word document was used as a source checklist to show how the various sources met the criteria of the analytical framework. The source checklist document was also used to provide a summary of sources that could not be analysed via NVivo such as Facebook posts and Twitter feed. All four case studies had their own NVivo files, source checklists and reference lists for the purposes of record keeping, referencing, and selective coding.

Finally, this research conducted selective coding to check and recheck these "tags" in order to ensure that labels were properly applied and to identify discrepancies. For example, the groups' websites, social-media, pamphlets, posters, and media output was generally categorised as communications activities since they involved the transmission of information while the groups' lobbying activities, guest speaking events, public functions, informational trips, and fundraisers were categorised as relational activities since they involved

interpersonal contact. During the content analysis there were some cases of overlapping or misplaced tagging. For example, several of the PSNA's protests and picketing activities (Palestinehumanrights, 2010b, 2011a, 2013c) were categorised as "political communications" within the "Communications activities" category since they were interpreted as short term campaigns used to communicate messages and arguments about Palestinian rights and resistance to the wider public. In another example, APAN's (2014l; 2016aa). Twitter exchanges with Alex Ryvchin of the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) were categorised as "cause promotion" since social media platforms can be used for the purposes of both transmitting information and interpersonal communications. While consistency should be applied across the case studies, nuance is needed since certain activities may overlap with different categories.

This research did not use intercoder reliability since this approach clashes with the interpretative nature of constructivism, which rejects the idea of a single, objective external reality but posits that there are multiple perspectival realities created through an individual's social context and personal history. The role of qualitative research is not to reveal universal objective facts but to apply theoretical knowledge and expertise to interpreting and communicating the diversity of perspectives on any given topic. Constructivist epistemology views research reflexivity and active personal engagement with the data as resources rather than "noise" to be minimised. To ensure the trustworthiness of results, qualitative content analysis uses several criteria including a transparent reporting of analytical procedures, producing "thick descriptions" with plentiful samples of raw data, triangulation between numerous studies, paying attention to deviant cases and asking research participants to validate the legitimacy of the researcher's analytical interpretations (O'Connor and Joffe, 2020; Elo et al, 2014). To ensure the trustworthiness of the content analysis, this research:

- Kept detailed records of the analytical process via NVivo and Word files.
- Triangulated various sources including webpages, social media posts, media articles, pamphlets, and audio-visual material.
- Conducted elite interviews to cover gaps in the content analysis as well as corroborating their research.

In short, a constructivist research design was suitable for addressing the diametrically opposed narratives and worldviews constructed by the pro-Israel and Palestinian solidarity groups studied.

Elite interviews

This research also conducted a smaller number of semi-structured elite interviews to fill gaps within the content analysis findings and provide clarity on the groups' communications, advocacy work, and strategies. For interviews, the methodology was informed by the scholarship of Richards (1996), Lilleker (2003), Rogers (1987), and Seidel (1991). While most of these scholars apart from Rogers and Seidel largely focused on interviews with politicians and government officials, their advice and methods were relevant for interviewing representatives from advocacy groups. Semi-structured interviewing provides a framework for keeping the meeting on track while creating a comfortable atmosphere for both the researcher and the participant. While allowing the participant to express themselves and engage in dialogue with the researcher, the semi-structured questions format allows the researcher to control the direction of the meeting. While Seidel recognised that advances in audio-recording technology have helped revolutionise the research interview process, he raised concerns that the research and data analysis would be driven by technology. The semi-structure interview approach addressed this problem by ensuring that the interview process met the research parameters.

This research sought to recruit interviewees who were leaders or senior office holders within the four case studies. These prospective interviewees were identified through the advocacy group's literature and media output as well as external media and literature. Original semi-structured interviews were conducted either in person or through the video conferencing platform Zoom. Ethical clearance for these interviews was approved by the University of Auckland's Human Participants Ethics Committee (UAHPEC), with participants being given the necessary informational documents and consent forms.

Following the content analysis, the researcher interviewed the PSNA's National Chair John Minto (personal communication, February 28, 2020), the Israel Institute's Director David Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020), and APAN's Executive Officer Jessica Morrison (personal communication, April 7, 2020). Due to AIJAC's policy of not granting interviews, the researcher was unable to interview any current or former AIJAC staff members. To fill several gaps identified during the initial content analysis of AIJAC sources, this research consulted 19 external sources including the works of Reich (2004),

Rutland (2004), Markus (2004), Levey and Mendes (2004), Loewenstein (2006), Han and Rane (2013), Lyons (2017) and Gawenda (2020). As with the web, print and audio-visual sources, the interviews were analysed against the codes and categories of the analytical framework via NVivo software.

Conclusion

Overall, the methodological design enabled in-depth empirical research including collection and analysis of 1,898 primary sources (652 webpages, 450 Facebook posts, 445 Tweets, 153 videos and podcasts, and 198 paraphernalia items and media articles) from four case studies. This content analysis provided a rich insight into the advocacy groups' use of nation branding, public diplomacy and political marketing. The content analysis of the groups' print, audio-visual and online content, supplemented by research interviews, produced a systematic analysis against the new analytical framework's criteria. The next four empirical chapters will present the results of this research.

Chapter 4: Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa

This chapter explores the communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities of the Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA), the premier Palestinian solidarity network in New Zealand. The PSNA was formerly known as the New Zealand Palestine Solidarity Network (NZPSN) until an organisational restructuring that occurred in June 2019. Due to the timeframe of this thesis, this research covers the period between 2010 and 2018, when the Network was still known as the NZPSN. It presents the results of the content analysis of 138 primary sources: 31 webpages, 17 paraphernalia (including press releases, newsletters, pamphlets, posters, and field notes), 34 Facebook posts, and 56 videos. This content analysis has been supplemented by an interview with the PSNA's national chair John Minto. This chapter will give a brief description of the PSNA before discussing the group's communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities.

Overview

The Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA) is a network of Palestinian solidarity organisations in New Zealand. It was founded as the New Zealand Palestine Solidarity Network (NZPSN) following the Conference on Palestine in 2013 to facilitate cooperation among local Palestinian solidarity groups and promote support for a free Palestine in New Zealand. In June 2019, the Network formalised its national structure and revamped itself as the PSNA. The PSNA advocates recognising the Palestinian Right of Return, ending the Israeli military occupation, alleged discrimination, and human rights abuses against the Palestinians, and proposes a one-state solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict (NZPSN, n.d.a; PSNA, 2019, June 27). The PSNA has consisted of several groups including Kia Ora Gaza, the Auckland-based Palestine Human Rights Campaign (PHRC), Palestine Human Rights Campaign Waikato, the Palestine Solidarity Network Christchurch, Wellington Palestine, Te Tau Ihu (Nelson) Palestine Solidarity, Palestine Solidarity Whangarei, Tauranga Moana 4 Palestine, Dunedin for Justice in Palestine, Global Peace & Justice (GP&J) Auckland, University of Auckland Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP), and

Victoria University Students for Justice in Palestine (Wellington Palestine, n.d.a; NZPSN, 2018, March; Ahed Tamimi Dunedin rally, personal communication, February 3, 2018). According to Minto (personal communication, 2020, February 28), the PSNA's member organisations are autonomous with each group making their own decisions and running themselves. They are bound together by a common cause: solidarity with the Palestinians and working to improve public support in New Zealand for the Palestinians. In addition, the PSNA works with several other Palestinian solidarity groups, civil society groups, and political parties in New Zealand and around the world including the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement.

Communicational activities

1. Information politics

Firstly, propagation or giving out information appears to be a major component of the PSNA's communicational activities. According to Minto (personal communications, February 28, 2020), the Network (2018, April) operates a website (https://www.psna.nz/), Facebook site (https://www.facebook.com/NZPalestine/), and email mailing list. In addition, the PSNA disseminates leaflets and posters; and encourages its members and supporters to write letters to newspapers and call talkback radio on issues relating to Israel-Palestine. Since the Auckland-based PHRC is a member organisation, this research also drew upon their YouTube channel "Palestinehumanrights" (https://www.youtube.com/user/palestinehumanrights/videos) during the content analysis. The PSNA website contains information about the Network's aims (including endorsement of the BDS movement), public activities, member groups, pamphlets, posters, and audio-visual material (NZPSN, n.d.a.; n.d.b; n.d.e). The Network's website appears to be the main online space for the organization to promote its cause and agenda to a wider audience in New Zealand and beyond.

Analysis

The PSNA met the informational politics code of the analytical framework by using a range of print and online media to give out information about their cause Due to the descriptive nature of "giving out information", it accurately captured the PSNA's communicational activities.

2. Strategic political communication

Second, the PSNA has also engaged in "strategic political communication" by framing information in a way that supported their cause with the goal of building sympathy for Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Symbolic politics and short-term campaigns

Second, the PSNA has used "symbolic politics" such as symbols, actions, or stories to amplify their messages, raise awareness of the Palestinian cause, and bolster recruitment. This has surfaced in the PSNA's communications output and literature. Political symbols used by the Network have included the Palestinian flag, keffiyehs, the BDS logo, and Palestinian themed T-shirts; the latter of which have been sold on their website (Palestinehumanrights, 2014u; NZPSN, 2018g; NZPSN, n.d.d).

In terms of symbolic actions, the PSNA has organised short-term campaigns such as "Salt Water Challenges" to express solidarity with Palestinian prisoners on hunger strikes in Israeli prisons (NZPSN, 2017d; 2017e; 2017f). These political symbols and short-term campaigns are used public awareness of the Palestinian cause, express solidarity with Palestinians, and advance the BDS cause on a local level.

Several PSNA activists including Joe Carolan, John Minto, Janfrie Wakim, Billy Hania, and Roger Fowler have also espoused binary messages and narratives likening Israel to brutal regimes such as Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa; identifying the Palestinian solidarity movement with earlier popular causes such as the American civil rights, Irish civil rights, anti-Apartheid, nuclear free, and the Māori rights movements; Zionism being a racist ideology built on ethnocentrism and genocide; and the "indigenous" Palestinians being oppressed by Israeli "settler colonialism" (Palestinehumanrights, 2012d; 2014n; 2010d; 2014g; 2014l). These messages and narratives help to reinforce the PSNA's message that the Palestinians are locked in a "David versus Goliath" struggle for their rights and self-determination against Israel.

First, the PSNA has sought to manage media coverage of the Palestinians as well as the Network's advocacy work by getting the media to publish articles sympathetically covering the Network's activities and the Palestinian cause and using Facebook to share public favourable media coverage. Some of these are outlined below:

- Daphna Whitmore's (2017) article on the online Marxist publication *Redline* publicizing the PSNA's guest speaking event in Auckland featuring dissident Israeli journalist Gideon Levy, who shares the Network's view that Israel is a racist "ethno-state" and advocates a bi-national solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict. Her article is linked to a sympathetic Radio New Zealand interview of Gideon Levy.

- Stuff journalist Chris Harrowell's coverage of Kia Ora Gaza coordinator Roger Fowler's involvement in organizing the 2018 International Freedom Flotilla to Gaza. Harowell also highlights Fowler's record as an anti-war activist and community leader in Auckland suburb of Mangare East (NZPSN, 2018h).

- Student journalist Caitlan Johnston's (2018) coverage of the PSNA hosting Palestinian-American journalist and activist Ramzy Baroud during his five-day tour of New Zealand to promote his book *The Last Earth: A Palestinian Story*; an anthology featuring Palestinian refugees.

- The Christchurch-based PSNA activists Lois and Martin Griffith hosted the Gaza-based New Zealand journalist Julie Webb-Pullman on their talk-back radio show *Earthwise Plains FM 96.9* on 21 May 2018. Webb-Pullman talked about her efforts to pursue prosecution against senior Israeli officials for alleged war crimes during the 2014 Gaza War. (NZPSN 2018o; Griffith and Griffith, 2018).

These four articles and interviews show that the PSNA sought to promote the Palestinian case and their advocacy activities through the media. Members such as the Griffiths, who work in the media, also seek to raise awareness of the Palestinian plight as well as Palestinian solidarity activism. Raising awareness is the first step within the process of influencing public opinion and attitudes towards Israel-Palestine.

Analysis

The PSNA met the symbolic politics and short-term campaigns criteria of the analytical framework while addressing most aspects of the "media coverage management"

criterion. First, in terms of symbolic politics, the PSNA used symbols (flags, t-shirts, and Keffiyehs), short-term campaigns (the 2017 "salt water challenge"), and narratives (eg. Zionism is racism, the David versus Goliath narrative) to communicate their messages and arguments about the Palestinian cause. The PSNA's references to popular causes such as the American Civil Rights movement, the anti-Apartheid movement, and Māori rights are meant to appeal to supporters of these causes by linking their struggles to the Palestinian cause. In fact, the BDS movement (which the PSNA endorses) has sought to present its campaign as the heir of the anti-Apartheid movement by casting Israel as an "Apartheid state."

Second, in terms of media management, the PSNA sought to publicise their advocacy activities through the media. However, the Network did not produce content highlighting the positive aspects of Palestine as a destination. To avoid duplication with "communicational image management," this section focused on crisis management rather than cultural heritage promotion. While this research found that PSNA exploited media coverage of international events in Israel-Palestine with the goal of raising domestic support for their causes, it did not measure their impact on influencing public opinion.

3. Communications adaptation

As discussed above, the PSNA has effectively responded to changes in communications technology by using a wide range of literature and media including pamphlets, posters, a website, and social media platforms to disseminate its message to a wider audience. The Network's website, monthly newsletters, posters, and pamphlets would be considered formal channels while their email subscription list, Facebook account, and the PHRC's YouTube channel would be considered informal channels. The PSNA uses these informal channels to publicize their advocacy activities and to share news and other materials related to Palestinian rights and self-determination. As with other cause-oriented advocacy groups, facilitating communications and information sharing among activists and supporters are key components of the Network's activities.

Facebook

Based on the frequency of updates and voluminous amount of content, the PSNA Facebook page appears to be their main public channel for publicising their activities and sharing resources such as media articles. The Network used their Facebook page to advertise

upcoming protests, speaking tours, and other local events such as their monthly Palestine solidarity rallies in Aotea Square, Rafeeh Ziadah's April 2017 tour, Ramzy Baroad's speaking tour of New Zealand in May 2018, and a joint PSNA-Auckland Peace Action "die-in" protest against the screening of the Israeli film *Ben Gurion – An Epilogue* at Q Theatre (NZPSN, 2017a; 2017b; 2018m; 2018m). These activities seem to be used to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause within the New Zealand public space while also maintaining a sense of cohesion and purpose among local Palestinian solidarity activists.

A content analysis of 147 selected posts, videos, and shared links from the PSNA's Facebook page between December 2016 and May 2018 has shown that there was a substantial sharing of information and services between the Network and other sympathetic activists, organizations, and media. In addition, the Network sought to exploit media coverage of Israel-Palestine and the global Palestine solidarity movement to raise awareness and support for their cause. Approximately 82 of these selected Facebook content (55.8%) had been shared from other Facebook pages, news media, and websites including posts advertising events and links to articles and videos. Besides affiliated Palestinian solidarity groups such as Kia Ora Gaza and PHRC Waikato's Facebook page, the shared content also came from external groups such as Auckland Peace Action, BDS Movement, and Mondoweiss and media sources such as Al Jazeera, Electronic Intifada, Māori Television, Middle East Monitor, the *Northern Advocate,* and Television New Zealand (TVNZ). The sharing of posts, articles, and videos from other activists, groups, and media (both domestic and local) shows that the PSNA actively uses their Facebook page as a platform for keeping their members and supporters informed about developments concerning Israel-Palestine. The large amount of overseas pro-Palestinian media content not only helps to raise awareness of international developments but also reinforces the notion that local Palestinian solidarity activists are part of a wider, global solidarity movement working to advance Palestinian rights and freedom; something addressed further below. Due to the global and interconnected nature of Facebook, the PSNA is not only sharing the content on their public profile with their members and supporters but also members of the public.

YouTube

Since the PHRC was a constituent member of the PSNA, this research utilised its YouTube channel "Palestinehumanrights" (n.d.b; n.d.a), which was founded on 6 January

2010. The PHRC has used its YouTube channel to publicise its protest and picket campaigns in support of the Palestinian cause:

- Three-day picket against the participation of Israeli tennis player Shahar Pe'er at the 2010 ASB Tennis Tournament (Palestinehumanrights, 2010a; 2010b; 2010c).

- Protest campaign in response to the 2010 Mavi Marmara incident (Palestinehumanrights, 2010e; 2010f; 2010g; 2010h).

- 2011 picketing campaign targeting the Israeli company Premier's stalls selling "Dead Sea products" at the St Luke's Westfield and Sylvia Park Malls in Auckland (Palestinehumanrights, 2011a; 2011b).

- Publicising Kia Ora Gaza's "aid convoy" to Gaza (Palestinehumanrights, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c).

- Protest campaign against the 2012 Gaza War (Palestinehumanrights, 2012d; 2012e).

- Protest campaign against Veolia's investment in the Palestinian "Occupied Territories" (Palestinehumanrights, 2013a)

- Protested against the Israeli Ambassador Shalom Cohen's visit to the University of Auckland on 27 May 2013 (Palestinehumanrights, 2013b).

- Picketing the Batsheva Dance Troupe's tour of Wellington in February 2014 (Palestinehumanrights, 2014a).
- Protest campaign against the 2014 Gaza War (Palestinehumanrights, 2014b; 2014m; 2014n).

- Protest campaign against the SuperFund's investments in Israel (Palestinehumanrights, 2015a; 2015b)

- Protest campaign calling for the release of Palestinian teenage activist Ahed Tamimi (Palestinehumanrights, 2018b; 2018e).

Publicising their campaigns on YouTube would help the PHRC and PSNA to circumvent the mainstream media and communicate their cause and messages to a wider audience. While the mainstream news media may occasionally cover PSNA events, having their own YouTube channel would allow them to control the message. In addition, these YouTube video clips serves as an informal historical record of the PSNA's protests activities. Though the PHRC predates the formation of the Network, several of its members including their spokesperson Janfrie Wakim later became involved in the PSNA. Several PSNA leaders including Wakim, Kia Ora Gaza leader Roger Fowler, and National Chair John Minto also appeared in these videos (Palestinehumanrights, 2014m; 2014g; 2014d). While their video list mainly consists of Palestinian-related protest campaigns, there was also content from other left-wing

campaigns such as the 2011 Occupy movement, the Tamaki Housing Group, labour strikes, and the 2015 campaign to get the New Zealand Government to admit more refugees. This suggests that PSNA members support a broad range of left-wing causes and partner with other like-minded activists and groups in New Zealand.

Analysis

The PSNA met all three criteria of communications adaptation by adapting to the evolving nature of online communications technology. First, the Network used a wide range of communications mediums and platforms, both informal and formal, to disseminate their message and arguments to a wide audience. Second, the Network used several informal channels consisting of their email newsletters, Facebook account, and the PHRC's YouTube channel. Third, their formal channels consisted of their websites, newsletters, press releases, posters, pamphlets and paraphernalia. The PSNA's website and social media accounts serve as important platforms for propagating the Palestinian cause as well as advertising their events and activities. Information is used to motivate activism, linkages with like-minded domestic and overseas group, and reinforces the globalised nature of Palestinian solidarity activism.

4. Communicational image management

Communicational image management is also a key subset of the PSNA's communications activities. Besides fundraising, the PSNA website's "Shop page" (http://www.palestinesolidaritynz.net/shop.html) also helped to promote a favourable view of the Palestinian cause. As of June 2018, their page has been used to sell Palestinian literature such Ali Abunimah's *The Battle for Justice in Palestine* (2014), Iyad Burnat's *Bil'in and the Nonviolent Resistance* (2016), and DVDs of Emad Burnat's film *5 Broken Cameras* (2011). Proceeds from the books and DVDs go back to the authors and can be deposited into the PSNA's bank account. This shows that the PSNA financially supports Palestinian authors and film-makers, which can be considered fundraising and coalition building as well. Previously, the "Shop page" had also sold copies of "Resistance"-themed Palestinian calendars on behalf of the Ramallah-based "Young Artists Forum", which runs evening art classes for Palestinian children. These calendars depicted pictures of Palestinian people including Mahmoud Darwish, buildings including the iconic Dome of Rock mosque, fields, and tapestries (NZPSN, n.d.d). In addition, these "Resistance" calendars are also advertised on their

Facebook page at the end of the year when people are searching for calendars (NZPSN, 2017m). Besides revenue generation, Palestinian books, media, and calendars help to promote a favourable image of the Palestinians as an "indigenous" people resisting Israeli "oppression" and fighting for self-determination; a message that would resonate with Palestinian solidarity advocates.

As part of their image management, the PSNA has also shared articles, posts, and audio-visual media promoting Palestinian rights and self-determination on their Facebook page including the following:

- Peter de Graaf's coverage of Māori carver, weaver and artist Paitangi Ostick's documentary web-series *Pai in Palestine* exploring the art and lives of Palestinians living in the West Bank against the backdrop of the Israeli military occupation and settler expansion (NZPSN, 2017l; Paitangi, n.d.).
- PSNA activists Lois and Martin Griffith's radio interview with journalist and activist Julie Webb-Pullman, focusing on her efforts to pursue Israeli officials for alleged war crimes during the 2014 Gaza War. (NZPSN, 2018o; Griffith and Griffith, 2018).
- Encouraging supporters to buy copies of the Palestinian activist Ramzy Baroud's book *The Last Earth* (NZPSN, 2018p).

These shared content shows that the PSNA's communicational image management focuses on humanising Palestinians as human beings, combating the dual media image of Palestinians as terrorists and "perpetual victims", and promoting the narrative of Palestinian resistance against Zionism. In addition, they also help promote Palestinian culture, heritage, and their claim to the land. While Ostick, Web-Pullman, and the Griffiths provide examples of New Zealanders speaking up for the Palestinians, Baroud can be regarded as an example of a Palestinian voice to whom the PSNA helps provide a platform for. Thus, image management can also help reinforce the idea that New Zealanders and Palestinians are working together as allies in the global struggle for Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Analysis

In terms of communicational image management, the PSNA met that code's two main criteria of promoting a cultural group's culture, heritage and identity; and undertaking image management in response to crises and conflicts. First, by selling Palestinian literature, media, and paraphernalia on their website, the Network not only engages in cultural and heritage

promotion but also helps to promote the Palestinian claim to the "Holy Land." Second, the PSNA's image management took the form of sharing and producing media and literature that "humanises" the Palestinians as a creative, resilient people resisting Israeli "Apartheid."

Relational activities

5. Cause promotion

In terms of cause promotion, the PSNA has used both relational activities (such as public demonstrations, speaking engagements, and film screenings) and interactive social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube. The PSNA stages monthly rallies on the first Saturday of each month in Auckland's Aotea Square (NZPSN, 2018b). In addition, the PSNA and its allies have also organized other protest campaigns in response to Shahah Peer's participation in the 2010 ASB Tennis Tournament (NZPSN, n.d.f), the sale of Israeli "Dead Sea products" and SodaStream soft drinks in NZ (Palestinehumanrights, 2011a; 2011b; NZPSN,n.d.j.), the Batsheva Dance Tour's 2014 Wellington tour (Palestinehumanrights, 2014a), and protests in response international developments such as the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid, Israel's "Operation Pillar of Defense" in Gaza in November 2012, the 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict, the 2017 Temple Mount crisis, and the 2018 imprisonment of Palestinian teenager Ahed Tamimi (Palestinehumanrights, 2010g; 2012e; 2014q; 2014u; 2018e; Al Aqsa Solidarity Rally, personal communication, July 29, 2017; NZPSN, 2018b).

Cause promotional activities are designed to raise public awareness of the Palestinian cause by occupying public spaces (such as Auckland's Aotea Square, St Luke's and Sylvia Park shopping malls, and the University of Auckland). As discussed earlier, the PSNA used its Facebook page and the PHRC's YouTube channel to publicise their protest campaigns. Some of the PSNA's campaigns such as those picketing Dead Sea products and Sodastream were done in support of the BDS Movement, a topic discussed in the transnational collaboration section below. Often, the PSNA's events involved the participation of representatives from other organisations such as the Unite Union, First Union, Dayenu, and the Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand (Palestinehumanrights, 2014h; 2014t; 2018d; 2014f). In addition, these protest activities are often timed to coincide with widely-publicized international events such the 2014 Gaza conflict and the 2015 BDS worldwide campaign against the French multinational transport company Veolia International's bus operations in

the Occupied Territories (NZPSN, n.d.f; Palestinehumanrights, 2013a). In short, cause promotional activities serve as a means of advancing Palestinian rights and statehood.

Analysis

The PSNA met both criteria of cause promotion through their use of public gatherings and two-way communications technology. Since the Network is interested in building public support for the Palestinians, public gatherings such as meetings, rallies, concerts, speaking tours, cultural and educational exchanges, and fundraising events help generate awareness of their cause. To maximize awareness, several of these events have been promoted or recorded through social media platforms such as Facebook and YouTube, which also facilitate communications among members and supporters.

6. Exerting leverage

The PSNA has also sought to influence powerful actors through lobbying, leveraging and hold them to account. This has included seeking to influence institutional and business policies and practices by building relations with and lobbying powerful "target actors" and "decision-makers" such as public institutions, banks, corporations, and political parties.

NZ Super Fund campaign, 2012-2015

One notable PSNA campaign has been to lobby the New Zealand Super Fund into divesting from companies investing in Israel and the Palestinian Territories. In 2012, Palestinian solidarity advocates succeeded in convincing the NZ Super Fund to divest from three companies involved in the construction of settlements and the Israeli "West Bank security barrier" (or "Apartheid Wall"): Africa Israel Investments (and its subsidiary Danya Ce bus), El bit Systems Ltd, and Shikun & Binui (NZPSN, n.d.l). Seeking total divestment from Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the PSNA and the allied Wellington Palestine Group focused on several Israeli and Western banks and companies (NZPSN, n.d.m; WPG, 2016), which are outlined below:

Figure 11 The PSNA's NZ SuperFund divestment targets		
1. **Israeli banks financing "illegal settlements"**	2. **Weapons manufacturers**	3. **"Infrastructure supporting the occupation and incarceration"**

Bank Leumi: has branches in the settlements and stakes in several companies involved in the "Occupation" including Paz Oil, Super Pharm, Hot Communication Systems, and Israel Chemicals.	**United Technologies:** supplies Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters to the Israeli Air Force.	**Hewlett Packard:** supplies technology, equipment, and IT services to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), and for the checkpoints and ID card system used in the Occupied Territories.
Mizrahi Bank: has branches in the settlements.	**Boeing**: supplies F-15A fighter jets and Apache AH-64 helicopters used by the Israel Air Force.	**Caterpillar Inc.:** supplies bulldozers used to demolish Palestinian homes, orchards, and olive groves in the Occupied Territories, to clear land for "illegal settlements", the West Bank security barrier, and segregated roads.
Bank Hapolim: provides mortgages for houses in the settlements and financed the construction of at least two settlements.	**General Dynamics**: supplies bombs and engines for the Israeli Army's Merkava tanks.	**G4S**: a British multinational security services company supplying security equipment, services, and maintenance to Israeli prisons, checkpoints, and settlements in the West Bank.
	Raytheon: produces bombs and missiles used during military operations in Gaza	
	Israeli Chemicals: supplies the white phosphorus used during the 2014 Gaza War.	

Besides Israeli banks and companies, the targeted companies have included several American and European multinational companies investing in Israel and the Palestinian Territories including Boeing, General Dynamics, Hewlett-Packard, and Caterpillar Inc. These companies' provision of products and services to Israeli military and Government operations in the Occupied Territories have made them designated boycott targets for the BDS movement and its international affiliates (BDS National Committee, 2011; Nieuwhof, 2014; BDS Movement, n.d.b; n.d.c). The PSNA's efforts to lobby the NZ Super Fund into divesting from those multinational companies shows that often abides by the BDS National Committee's policies and campaigns.

To publicize their Super Fund divestment campaign, PSNA activists also picketed the NZ Super Fund headquarters in Auckland's Elizabeth Square on 23 August 2014. During the

picket, GP&J Auckland organizer Mike Treen alleged that the Super Fund was violating its guiding principles by investing in companies "supporting" the Israeli Occupation. Exploiting media coverage of the 2014 Gaza War, Treen also drew attention to the Super Fund's investment in Israeli Chemicals which manufactured white phosphorus, a dangerous chemical substance used in munitions capable of causing severe burns (Palestinehumanrights, 2014v). Similarly, PHRC Auckland member and Palestinian-New Zealander Billy Hania denounced the Super Fund for investing New Zealand taxpayers' money in Israel's "war machine." Identifying himself as the son of a Palestinian refugee, Hania denounced Israel as a state built on terrorism and ethnic cleansing against the indigenous Palestinians (Palestinehumanrights, 2014y). This picket was followed by several New Zealand superannuants including Roger Fowler meeting with the NZ Super Fund management on 27 January 2015 to lobby them into divesting from companies investing in Israel and the Occupied Territories. As a form of symbolic leverage, the Palestine solidarity supporters also handed out a box of about 500 signed cards from the general population stating that they did not want their superannuation funds invested in companies that supported the "illegal settlements" (Palestinehumanrights, 2014a). When the NZ Super Fund ignored the PSNA's appeals, their activists staged a second protest outside the Super Fund's headquarters on 3 August 2015. As part of their symbolic leverage, they attempted to enter the building but were blocked by a line of police (Palestinehumanrights, 2015b). In all three divestment activities, the PSNA actively linked the superannuation investments in the targeted companies to settlement expansion and alleged Israel "war crimes" and human rights abuses against the Palestinians. Despite the PSNA's efforts, the Network failed to convince the Super Fund to divest from those Israeli and Western companies. This may suggest an unwillingness of the NZ Super Fund's management to let "politics and business mix" especially when it involves powerful, global multinationals such as HP, Caterpillar, Boeing, and General Dynamics. Perhaps, advocacy groups such as the PSNA do face limits to their campaigns.

Israeli-NZ film co-production agreement

Besides the NZ Super Fund campaign, the PSNA has also opposed the "Agreement on Film Co-Production Between the Government of New Zealand and the Government of the State of Israel" that was signed in March 2016. Instead of directly lobbying the New Zealand Government (which was then dominated by the centre-right National Party), the PSNA urged members of the NZ public and film industry to boycott the film agreement by:

- Refusing to participate in films or other projects receiving funding because of the agreement including funding for travel, production, and promotion.
- Calling on film industry professionals to boycott the Agreement;
- Calling on the New Zealand Government to cancel and/or refuse to adhere to the Agreement (NZPSN, 2016d; n.d.h; n.d.i).

In addition to circulating a press release and leaflets, a website called "Boycott the Film Agreement" (n.d.a) was also started. While the website avoided using logos belonging to the PSNA and other Palestinian solidarity groups, it shares the same heading and logo seen on the Network's leaflets. In addition, the Boycott the Film Agreement website (n.d.b) contains links to the PSNA and other Palestinian solidarity groups in New Zealand and abroad including Kia Ora Gaza. Appealing directly to the public and film industry professionals suggests that the PSNA seems to be following the BDS strategy of building grassroots civil society support for their campaigns. Governments tend to be less receptive to the BDS Campaign since it would complicate bilateral relations with Israel and the United States, which is the former's strongest international supporter. Promoting the campaign both online and offline would allow them to reach a wider audience.

Israeli innovation mission

A third campaign was the PSNA's opposition to the so-called "Innovation mission to Israel", a delegation of 50 New Zealand businessmen led by Spark NZ chief executive Simon Moutter, in June 2016. In response, the PSNA's organiser Sian Robertson wrote an open letter to the delegation members urging them not to travel to Israel since their presence would legitimize the Jewish State's alleged "racist" policies and human rights abuses against Palestinians. Robertson also linked her group's opposition to the global BDS campaign against Israel, reflecting the transnational nature of Palestinian advocacy. Besides the letter, the PSNA spokesperson John Minto also issued a press release denouncing the "Innovation mission" as a public relations campaign by Israel to combat the BDS campaign, which he claimed was hurting Israel economically (NZPSN, 2016c; 2016e). Following the example of the BDS Movement, the Network sought to link Israel to Apartheid South Africa, calling on the businessmen to choose the right side of history by shunning Israel. For many Palestinian solidarity activists, Israel serves as the next "rogue regime" needing to be toppled. Despite the PSNA's leveraging efforts, the Innovation mission to Israel proceeded and almost led to a bilateral research and development agreement. Before this agreement could be signed, NZ-

Israel relations were adversely affected by Foreign Minister Murray McCully's sponsorship of the contentious UN Security Council Resolution 2334 in December 2016 condemning Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank; a development that was welcomed by the PSNA (BusinessDesk, 2016; McBeth, 2017; Cumin, 2018a; NZPSN, 2016f). While the Innovation mission is another example of the PSNA's limits, it also shows that the group can claim victories from events beyond its control.

Other campaigns

While the content analysis suggested that the PSNA does not lobby policy makers, John Minto (personal communications, February 28, 2020) confirmed that the Network has lobbied both central and local government policy-makers. In December 2016, the PSNA lobbied the New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully into co-sponsoring UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which condemned Israeli settlement expansion. In February 2020, the PSNA also lobbied the Wellington City Council (WCC) against passing a resolution adopting the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's (IHRA) "Working Definition of anti-Semitism", which in Minto's view would have delegitimised Palestinian solidarity activism, particularly the BDS movement. Under Minto's leadership, the PSNA wrote a letter explaining their issues with the IHRA resolution to the WCC, prompting the Council to withdraw the resolution. Minto also stated that he was intending to meet with Wellington Mayor Andrew Foster to discuss the Network's perspective on the IHRA issue, suggested that the organisation has taken an interest in building relations with policy makers.[1] This shows that the PSNA has sought to influence the public policy process at both national and local levels as part of its goal of advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Analysis

This research shows that the PSNA has fulfilled the two main criteria of "exerting leverage" by influencing the public policy process and accountability politics. First, the Network sought to influence the policies of a range of civil society and political actors including the NZ Super Fund, New Zealand film industry professionals, the NZ business community, the New Zealand Government, and Wellington City Council. The Network's mixed record of success with these campaigns reflects the unwillingness of business and civil

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[1] For more on the IHRA Working Definition of Anti-Semitism, see IHRA (n.d.); George, D. (2020, February 25).

society actors to jeopardise lucrative economic and institutional international investments and relationships as well as having to navigate accusations of anti-Semitism levelled by their opponents.

Second, these lobbying campaigns show that the PSNA is seeking to hold these political and civil society actors to account against their stated policies and principles. Besides appealing to ethical arguments about human rights and war crimes, the PSNA was guided by the BDS Movement's policies of boycotting Israeli and international companies alleged to be involved in human rights violations and encouraging civil society institutions to divest from such companies. In addition, the Network has sought to convince national and local policy makers to adopt policies favouring the Palestinians and solidarity activists. The use of lobbying and accountability politics reflect the PSNA's efforts support for the BDS campaign.

7. Coalition building

The PSNA has also sought to forge relations, coalitions and institutional linkages with other sympathetic activists, organizations, decision-makers, and other relevant actors bring about change in foreign countries (in the Network's case advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination). While the PSNA has worked with a range of international groups and activists to promote the Palestinian cause, this section will focus on its coalition building efforts in New Zealand. The following section will look at the Network's transnational collaboration with international groups and activists. Reflecting the PSNA's identity as a national umbrella of Palestinian solidarity groups, coalition building was an integral component of the Network's identity, structure, and activities. This research found that the PSNA has worked with a range of domestic actors in New Zealand including like-minded Palestinian solidarity activists and groups, civil society, and political actors, which are outlined below.

Firstly, the Network has worked with several other Palestinian solidarity groups in New Zealand including: "Dayenu – NZ Jews Against the Occupation," "Palestine Community NZ," and the Wellington Palestine Group (WPG). Some examples of cooperation have included:

- The PSNA and WPG collaborating during their 2016 NZ Super Fund divestment campaign (NZPSN, n.d.l; n.d.m; WPG, 2016).

- PSNA leaders Janfrie Wakim and Roger Fowler attending a candlelight vigil organized by Dayenu to mark the 60th anniversary of the Six Day War in June 2017(NZPSN, 2017g).

- Dayenu leader Justine Sachs speaking at the PSNA's Free Ahed Tamimi rally in February 2018 and the "Lorde Help Us" public meeting at the University of Auckland on 21 March 2018 (Palestinehumanrights, 2018d; Lorde Help Us talk, personal communication, March 21, 2018).

Working together enables Palestinian solidarity groups to share resources and personnel while reinforcing the notion that they are working together to advance a greater cause: Palestinian rights and self-determination. The Network's use of dissident Jews such as Sachs and Gideon Levy to combat criticism that the Palestine solidarity movement is anti-Semitic.

Second, the PSNA has sought to build relations with a range of civil society organisations to promote Palestinian rights and self-determination among New Zealand civil society. This reflects the BDS Movement's (n.d.a) strategy of encouraging civil society institutions and companies such as local councils, churches, pension funds, banks, and universities to divest from all Israeli companies and international companies alleged to be involved in violating Palestinian rights. While these organizations do not focus on Palestinian issues, they may adopt the Palestinian cause as one among many contemporary issues such as climate change, poverty, war, and workers' rights. Some notable groups have included the New Zealand Confederation of Trade Unions (NZCTU), Unite Union, First Union, Quaker Peace & Service, Pax Christi, Wellington Peace Action, Auckland Peace Action, WILPF, Working Together, International Socialist Organisation (ISO), and Black Star Books Dunedin (Palestinehumanrights, 2014x; NZPSN, 2018d; 2018e, Ahed Tamimi Dunedin rally, personal communication, February 3, 2018). There were also some individuals who had overlapping membership in different organizations. For example, National Chair John Minto was also a member of the GP&J Auckland, Unite Union, and Deputy Leader of the Mana Movement (Palestinehumanrights, 2010h; 2014n). Similarly, Joe Carolan was a member of both the Unite Union and Socialist Aotearoa (Palestinehumanrights, 2010e; 2012d). Some examples of collaboration with non-Palestine oriented civil society organizations have included:

- The prominent trade union presence at PHRC and PSNA-sponsored protest campaigns during the 2010 Mavi Marmara Incident, the 2013 Veolia divestment protest, the 2014 Gaza War, and the 2018 Free Ahed Tamimi Auckland protest (Palestinehumanrights, 2010e; 2013a; 2014d; 2014e; 2018c).
- The First Union and NZCTU's support for the BDS campaign including the NZPSN's NZ Super Fund divestment efforts (Palestinehumanrights, 2014x).
- The PSNA and Auckland Peace Action picketing the screening of the Israeli Embassy-sponsored film *Ben-Gurion, An Epilogue* (2016) at the Doc Edge film festival at Q Theatre on 27 May 2018 (NZPSN, 2018m).

These activities show that the PSNA has been seeking to promote the Palestinian cause among sympathetic civil society actors. This fits the coalition building criterion of facilitating cooperation with other like-minded NGOs and interacting with other groups to bring about change in foreign countries.

Third, these sources indicate that the PSNA has been forging relations with several left-wing political parties including the New Zealand Labour Party, Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand, Mana Movement and Socialist Aotearoa. Representatives from these parties including several current and former Members of Parliament (MPs) have spoken at various PSNA rallies and public meetings; as outlined in the table below:

Figure 12 PSNA political outreach efforts

Parties	Representatives and MPs	Events
Labour Party	Priyanca Radhakrishnan, then a Labour list candidate	Spoke at the Free Palestine Rally on 9 August 2014 (Palestinehumanrights, 2014o).
	David Shearer, current MP	Spoke at the Free Palestine rally on 16 August 2015 in favour of divesting NZ Super Fund's investments in Israeli Chemicals (Palestinehumanrights, 2014s).
	Su'a William Sui, current MP	Guest speaker (Justice for Palestine talk, personal communication, April 3, 2016)
Green Party	Keith Locke, former MP	Spoke at the Gaza Flotilla protest on 5 June 2010 and an Auckland Peace Action's Rally for Peace on 7 June 2017 (Palestinehumanrights, 2010f; 2017h).

	Kennedy Graham, former MP	Spoke at the Gaza/Palestine rally on 19 July 2014 and reiterated the Greens' support for Palestine. Later criticized Foreign Minister Gerry Brown's U-turn on NZ's sponsorship of UN Security Council Resolution 2334 (Palestinehumanrights, 2014f; NZPSN, 2017i).
	Catherine Delahunty, former MP	Spoke at two Palestinian rallies during the 2014 Gaza War and reiterated Green Party's support for sanctions against Israel and expelling the Israeli Ambassador (Palestinehumanrights, 2014j; 2014r).
	Marama Davidson, current MP and Co-leader	Has spoken at several PSNA rallies and meetings including the 2016 Justice for Palestine Conference. She was sponsored by Kia Ora Gaza to take part in the Women's Flotilla to Gaza in October 2016. Also hosted visiting Palestinian speaker Ramzy Baroud in May 2018 (Palestinehumanrights 2014c; 2016a.2016e; NZPSN, 2018n).
Mana Movement	John Minto, former Mana Movement candidate	Prior to becoming National Chair, Minto once served as the Mana Movement's deputy leader. Has spoken at several PSNA rallies in Auckland (Palestinehumanrights, 2014n).
	Syd Keepa, former Mana spokesperson and current NZCTU Vice-President	Spoke on behalf of Mana and the CTU during the "Gaza/Palestine rally" held on 26 July 2014 (Palestinehumanrights, 2014i).
Socialist Aotearoa	Joe Carolan, Socialist Aotearoa and Unite Union member	Has attended and spoken at several PHRC Auckland and PSNA-sponsored rallies on Palestine (Palestinehumanrights, 2010e; 2012d; Kaloti, 2018).

Reflecting the Network's approval, several of their speeches were uploaded on the PHRC's YouTube channel. The presence of Labour and Green Party politicians at Network rallies and meetings shows that the network has been cultivating relations with these two parliamentary parties. Labour is the major centre-left party in New Zealand politics while the Greens are a left-wing environmentalist party with a strong focus on social justice and human rights issues. In addition, the PSNA appears to have forged friendly relations with minor left-wing parties such as the Mana Movement and Socialist Aotearoa. As shown in the cases of Syd Keepa and Joe Carolan above, there appears to be an overlapping membership between trade unions and

radical left parties. The presence of both centre-left and radical left politicians at Network events and rallies suggests that Palestinian solidarity is becoming a left-wing phenomenon.

Analysis

The PSNA met the two major criteria of coalition building: forging relations with like-minded NGOs and other actors; and interacting with other groups to bring about change in foreign countries. First, the Network's coalition building efforts have occurred on three fronts: with other Palestinian solidarity groups, civil society actors, and political parties; reflecting the efforts of Palestinian solidarity groups to build support for the Palestinian cause across a wide cross-section of society.

Second, the PSNA's efforts to build a moment for change in Israel-Palestine reflects the "boomerang effect" of advocacy groups working on a cause issue in another country. While this research found evidence of extensive networking and relationship building with various civil society actors, governments, and sub-national actors, there was little evidence of networking with international organisations like the United Nations; reflecting the limits of its resources and energy. The PSNA's efforts to cultivate relations with several left-wing parliamentary politicians may indicate a growing affinity for Palestine among the left.

8. Transnational collaboration

The PSNA has also worked internationally on the Palestinian cause by working on a global level within international Palestinian solidarity activists and groups to promote Palestinian rights and self-determination and apply pressure in Israel through the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) Movement, a global Palestinian-led civil society seeking to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination. The BDS Movement was formally launched in July 2005 when 170 Palestinian civil society groups endorsed the "Palestinian Call for Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions against Israel." Modelled after the South African anti-Apartheid movement, it advocates boycotts and divestment against Israel. The BDS Movement's stated goals are to end the Israeli military occupation, advance Palestinian rights, and to facilitate the Palestinian Right of Return. The BDS Movement is headed by the BDS National Committee. The PSNA looks to the BDS National Committee for guidance and seeks to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination in New Zealand (NZPSN, n.d.g; BDS Movement, n.d.a; 2005). This cooperation has included information sharing, co-

hosting events, and lobbying campaigns. The BDS Movement is a textbook example of Keck and Sikkink's (1998, pp. 1-4) "transnational advocacy work," a network of activists and groups "whose formation is motivated by the centrality of principled ideas and values." Operating beyond national boundaries, these networks connect activists, civil society groups, and institutions in different countries, thus improving their access to information, resources, and access to key stakeholders such as governments, international institutions, and corporations.

First, the PSNA has endorsed the BDS movement's goals of ending the Israeli military occupation, advancing Palestinian rights, and facilitating the "Right of Return." The PSNA looks up to the BDS National Committee for guidance and leadership, as shown by a webpage explaining the history and goals of the BDS campaign (NZPSN, n.d.a). In 2016, Minto described the BDS movement as the last resort against Israeli human rights abuses against Palestinians, settlement expansion, and the military occupation of Palestinian lands in an undated BDS leaflet circa 2016. (NZPSN, n.d.f). The PSNA has supported the BDS campaign by:

- Staging protests in Auckland calling upon the French multinational transport company Veolia International to divest from bus operations in the Occupied Territories in 2015 (NZPSN, n.d.f; Palestinehumanrights, 2013a).
- Supporting international BDS efforts to convince the Danish-British security company G4S, Irish company CRH, and the French telecommunications company Orange to divest from Israel (NZPSN, n.d.f).
- Opposing the proposed Film Cooperation agreement between New Zealand and Israel in solidarity with the BDS Call (NZPSN, n.d.h; n.d.i; n.d.k).
- Calling on Wellington stores to remove SodaStream products (NZPSN, n.d.j).
- Opposing the planned "Innovation expedition" to Israel (NZPSN, 2016b; 2016c).
- Promoting the "BDS – Driving Global Justice for Palestine" held at the University of Sydney in late July 2017. The BDS Sydney conference was sponsored by the University of Sydney's Department of Peace and Conflict Studies, Sydney University Staff for BDS, and the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN). One PSNA leader Wakim gave a talk at the conference (NZPSN, 2017h; BDS Sydney, n.d.a; n.d.b).

This content analysis shows that the PSNA as an organization is wholly committed to promoting the BDS Movement as a means of advancing Palestinian rights and aspirations. The Network also regards the BDS National Committee as the voice of Palestinian civil society and by extension, ordinary Palestinians.

Analysis

The PSNA has fulfilled both criteria of the transnational collaboration code by networking with other international activists and groups and cooperating in various ways including information sharing and hosting guest speakers. First, the PSNA has participated in a transnational network (the BDS movement) to apply pressure on states and international institutions to advance Palestinian rights and aspirations. Second, this cooperation has taken the form of information sharing, co-hosting guest-speaking events and functions, and organising protests in support of the BDS movement. While the PSNA sought to influence New Zealand foreign policy towards Israel, it has not lobbied international organisations like the United Nations; reflecting its domestic priorities.

9. Relational image management

Relational image management is also a key subset of the PSNA's communicational activities. The Network has sponsored numerous speaking engagements, cultural, and public functions to promote awareness of the Palestinian cause and forge relations with overseas-based activists and groups including the following:

- Sponsoring guest speaking tours by Palestinian diaspora activists and civil society leaders including Ali Abunimah, Rafeef Zidah, Huwaida Arraf, and Ramzy Baroud (NZPSN, 2016a; 2017c; 2018f; 2018i)
- Hosting Israeli dissident journalist and author Gideon Levy's public lecture at the Mount Eden War Memorial Hall on 3 December 2017 in conjunction with Quaker Peace and Action Service (NZPSN, 2017n; Palestinehumanrights, 2018a).
- Promoting Palestinian culture and media by publicising film-screening events like Waiheke's "Palestine Film Festival at Tivoli Theatre" in Oneroa in July 2017 and the screening of Paitangi Ostick's web documentary series *Pai in Palestine* in Whangarei in August 2017 (NZPSN, 2017j; 2017k).

- Sharing a post by Students for Justice Victoria University of Wellington (SJPVUW, 2017) advertising a family-friendly Palestinian-themed picnic on 16 December 2017 promoting Palestinian cuisine.

Besides fostering friendly relations with other Palestinian solidarity activists and groups, these talks and functions promote Palestinian cultural heritage and identity and combat negative imagery of the Palestinians resulting from media coverage and alleged Zionist "disinformation." These talks and functions also seek to promote the image of Palestinians as a resilient, cultured people resisting Israeli "settler-colonialism." The presence of Palestinian speakers and activists at these events helps give an authentic Palestinian voice. In addition, these events promote the PSNA's advocacy work in a positive light.

Finally, one of the Network's member organizations, Kia Ora Gaza, has organized several "politically-oriented" trips and expeditions to the Palestinian Territories:

- Kia Ora Gaza (2018b; Palestinehumanrights, 2012a; 2012b; 2012c) participated in the 2010 Viva Palestina aid convoy to Gaza and organized a fact-finding mission to Gaza in November 2012.
- Sponsoring Green MP Marama Davidson as the New Zealand representative on the "Women's Boat to Gaza" in October 2016 as part of a transnational campaign to oppose the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza (Palestinehumanrights, 2016b; 2016c; 2016d).
- Facilitating New Zealand participation in the "2018 Freedom Flotilla to Gaza" to challenge the Israeli blockade (NZPSN, 2018j; 2018k).

While elements of these activities overlapped with coalition building and transnational collaboration, these were fundamentally politically-oriented trips to Palestinian Territory. Kia Ora Gaza and the PSNA's participation in these trips and expeditions constitute New Zealand's contribution to advancing the Palestinian cause globally. Besides building relationships with Palestinians and other solidarity advocates, these trips sought to "educate" New Zealand participants about the "facts on the ground."

Analysis

The PSNA actively pursued the first (sponsoring speaking engagements, cultural and educational fairs, and expos) and fourth criteria (sponsoring "political-oriented tourism") of relational image management to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause and struggle. These

activities also fulfilled the second and third criteria of relational image management: promoting an ethnic group's culture, heritage and identity and managing the public perceptions of the ethnic group in response to crises and conflicts.

While the PSNA conducted politically-oriented tourism via fact-finding missions and solidarity trips to the Palestinian Territories, these were not intended to be traditional tourism activities but were rather solidarity trips meant to strengthen ties between solidarity activists and the Palestinians themselves. While the research found no evidence that the PSNA's politically-oriented tourism was segmented to target certain ethnic and religious communities, participants tended to be Palestinian solidarity activists and other sympathetic individuals.

Recruitment/internal cohesion activities

10.Marketing orientation

While the content analysis findings suggested that the PSNA pursued a sales-orientation, John Minto (personal communications, February 28, 2020) indicated that the Network pursued a product-orientation. A product-oriented organisation focuses on advancing its cause with little interest in changing their behaviour to suit membership subscriptions, public or government opinion (Lees-Marshment, 2004; Lees-Marshment, 2014). During the interview, Minto clarified that the Network did not target a specific audience or demographic, stating that *"the people that we target are people who have already shown an interest. That is people who have turned up to a public meeting or who approach us at a protest and put their names down. So people who sort of identify as supporters and they choose to join our mailing list. So we don't go door to door and we don't go out to talk. We work with people who have already shown an interest."* Minto also explained that the Network was a voluntary organisation with the only paid employee being the Network's Secretary Neil Scott. The Network regarded door-to-door recruiting and cold calls as an ineffective way of doing things, with Minto describing their support base as "self-identified" Palestinian solidarity supporter. Though the PSNA uses its website, social media, and newsletters to disseminate its messages and promote its public gatherings, the focus is on communicating the Network's product of advancing Palestinians rights and self-determination through the BDS campaign.

The interview and content analysis showed that the PSNA followed the four-stage process associated with product-oriented charities, which is outlined below:

Stages	Definitions	Examples
	Figure 13 The PSNA analysed using Lees-Marshment's product-oriented framework	
Product design	Design a wide range of behaviour in accordance to what they think is right, works best, helps it to achieve its goals, as well as receive enough money to do it.	Advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination through the BDS campaign as part of a global Palestinian solidarity movement (NZPSN, n.d.a).
Communication	Information is there if people want to get it.	Using its website, social media, email newsletters, media releases, paraphernalia and public gatherings to communicate its message (Minto, personal communication, February 28, 2020).
Campaign	Inform and lobby individuals, groups, governments, and other actors about what they want. This may also include short-term campaigns.	Organising various public activities including public meetings, protests, speaking events, and tours to promote their cause and attract supporters (NZPSN, 2017l; Palestinehumanrights, 2010c; 2011a; NZPSN, n.d.j). Lobbying various political and civil society actors on Palestinian issues including UN Resolution 2334 and IHRA's definition of anti-Semitism (Minto, personal communication, February 28, 2020).
Delivery	Deliver what it thinks is best	Using its website, social media, and email newsletters to inform supporters and the public of their activities and successes.

Analysis

In terms of marketing orientation, the PSNA fulfilled the hallmarks of a "product-oriented advocacy group" in the Lees-Marshment "product, sales and market orientation" model. As a product-oriented organisation, the Network does not seek to change its product (advancing the Palestinian cause through BDS) but rather uses a range of communications and relational activities to convince civil society, the general public, opinion-makers, and companies to support its cause.

The PSNA's advocacy work also reflects the four stages of product-oriented political marketing. Firstly, it has a product in the form of advancing Palestinian rights and statehood

through BDS. Second, it has used a wide range of communication and relational activities to raise awareness of its product to the public. Third, the Network has staged highly visible public events and lobbied civil society and governmental actors to advance its cause and goals. Finally, the PSNA engages in delivery by using its own communications to extol the successes of their campaigns. Lees-Marshment's product-oriented model is useful for classifying the PSNA as group.

11. Segmentation and targeting

The initial content analysis suggested that the PSNA attracted those who were sympathetic to Palestinian rights and self-determination. This research used field notes from seven public meetings and speaking engagements between 2016 and 2018 that were sponsored by the Network (Justice for Palestine talk, personal communication, April 3, 2016; Kia Ora Gaza fundraiser dinner, personal communication, August 28, 2016; Rafeef Ziadah concert, personal communication, April 9, 2017; Al Aqsa Solidarity Rally, personal communication, July 29, 2017; Ahed Tamimi Dunedin rally, personal communication, February 3, 2018; Lorde Help Us talk, personal communication, March 21, 2018; The Last Earth: A Palestinian Story talk, personal communication, May 24, 2018). These field notes generated several observations:

- They attracted several left-wing political and civil society figures including Labour MP Su'a William Sui, First Union secretary general Robin Reed, Greens Co-Leader Marama Davidson, anti-TPPA (Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement) campaigner Jane Kelsey, Save Our Unique Landscapes spokesperson Brendan Corbin, and organisations such as the Green Party, the ISO, and Black Star Books.
- They attracted several members of the Palestinian diaspora in New Zealand and abroad including trade unionist Nadia Abu-Shanab, Canadian activist Rafeef Ziadah, American lawyer Huwaida Arraf, and former PSNA national coordinator Debbie Abbas. Also present were members of the Arab and Muslim communities in NZ.
- They also attracted some dissident members of the New Zealand Jewish community including Dayenu members Justine Sachs and Avigail Allen.
- Some events such as the Al Aqsa rally and the "Lorde help us" talk attracted pro-Israeli figures such as Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ) director David Cumin, New Zealand Jewish Council (NZJC) member Juliet Moses, and Zionist Federation of

New Zealand (ZFNZ) leader Rob Berg, who came to challenge the PSNA's message and arguments.

These content analysis findings suggested that the PSNA attracted a predominantly left-wing Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim support base, reflecting the contemporary left-wing sympathy for the Palestinians. The presence of left-wing political parties and civil society figures suggests that the PSNA is networking with left-wing political and civil society groups and figures in New Zealand. While the PSNA's activities attracted opposition from Zionist groups and figures, they also managed to attract dissident Jewish New Zealanders such as Sachs and Allen.

In addition to these public gatherings, National Chair John Minto (personal communication, February 28, 2020) clarified that the Network did not target specific demographics. Instead, it used its public meetings, Facebook account, and mailing list to attract both individuals and groups who were sympathetic to Palestinian human rights and self-determination. For individuals, the Network targeted sympathetic individuals who expressed their support for the Palestinian cause and the PSNA's work by attending public meetings, protests, and joining their mailing list. Minto added that the Network also avoided door-to-door canvassing and cold calls, regarding them as ineffective and costly in terms of resources and manpower. For groups, the Network welcomed other pro-Palestinian groups into its network. Minto described the PSNA as a network of autonomous groups that made their own organisational decisions but shared a common cause of promoting Palestinian rights and self-determination. In short, the PSNA targeted self-described Palestinian solidarity supporters and groups as members and supporters.

Analysis

The PSNA met the targeting criterion of "segmentation and targeting." While the PSNA did not practise segmentation, both the content analysis and interview with Minto showed that the group targeted individuals and groups who were sympathetic to the Palestinians by allocating resources and products such as its email newsletters, Facebook posts, and public gatherings. These segments happened to come from left-wing, Arab, and Muslim circles.

12.Internal marketing

In terms of internal marketing, the PSNA pursues a base strategy, which involves the leadership using a product that resonates with their core supporters to incentivise them. As with most political parties, participation in advocacy groups is motivated by solidarity and commitment towards the group's aims and goals (Pettitt (2015, pp. 143-144). A base strategy also aligns with the Network's product-orientation which involves attracting members and supporters who support their goal of promoting Palestinian rights and self-determination through BDS.

Evidence for a base strategy is supported by a content analysis of the PSNA's "What is BDS?" page (NZPSN, n.d.a) and three newsletters (NZPSN, 2018a; 2018b; 2018c). These showed that membership of the Network is based on members and supporters participating in a range of advocacy activities to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination including:

- Joining in pickets, demonstrations, meetings and other actions when called.
- Supporting the BDS Movement's boycott and divestment campaigns against Israel
- Telling local MPs their opinions on divestment and sanctions against Israel
- Setting up SJP chapters on campuses.
- Writing letters to newspapers and calling talkback radio
- Keeping updated on their Facebook pages and websites
- Offering to help with leafletting and posters
- Donating towards their campaigns

Besides enabling activists and supporters to contribute to advancing the Network's cause and advocacy work on a local level, these activities also help to build a sense of community through solidarity and commitment to a shared cause. People and groups are drawn to the PSNA by its stated commitment to advancing the Palestinian cause and BDS Call at a local level.

The content analysis findings were corroborated by Minto (personal communication, February 28, 2020), who stated that "people are motivated by information" about the plight of the Palestinians. Besides educating the public about the situation in Palestine, the Network also sought to convince them that their advocacy work could help make a difference. Besides their Facebook page and email newsletter, Minto regarded the Network's guest speaking engagements as an important aspect of the organisation's work. He claimed that the PSNA

promoted loyalty and purpose among its members and supporters by "being clear and focused in their communications with members and the general public." He also regarded maintaining a high public profile as essential to maintaining a sense of purpose and morale among their members. Minto's remarks confirm that the Network pursues a base strategy since it appeals to internal stakeholders' sympathy for Palestinian rights and self-determination. The PSNA has designed the group's product (producing communications and organising public events to promote the Palestinian cause through BDS) to appeal to their support for the Palestinian cause.

Analysis

This research found that the PSNA used ideological incentives to encourage activists and members to carry out external communications and relational activities. Pettitt's "base strategy" category of his internal marketing model proved useful for explaining the internal marketing activities of the PSNA. As a cause-oriented advocacy group, the Network's members and supporters were bound together by a shared adherence to the product of advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination via the BDS movement.

13.Fundraising

Finally, the PSNA uses fundraising to generate funds for its campaigns and activities. According to the Network's fundraising webpage and monthly newsletters, has three main types of donations (NZPSN, n.d.c; 2018a; 2018b; 2018c):

- One-off donations: Cover the cost of printing, travel expenses for international speakers, and the hiring of venues and equipment for events. Usually collected at guest speaking engagements and other public events such as the 2016 Justice for Palestine talk, the April 2017 Rafeef Ziadah concert, and the May 2018 Ramzy Baroud tour.
- Specific campaigns: Roger Fowler and Niuean activist Tigilau Ness' fundraising gigs (Palestinehumanrights, 2011c; 2011d), Kia Ora Gaza raising funds to buy medical aid and two ambulances during the 2014 Gaza War (Palestinehumanrights, 2014k; 2014p), and promoting Ramzy Baroud's book *The Last Earth* (NZPSN, 2018l; 2018p). Besides raising funds for the Network and its member organizations' activities, these public events also help to raise public awareness of the Palestinian cause and the network's activities.

- Regular donations: These sustain the PSNA's ongoing campaigns and help to raise $200 a week for wages and associated expenses. Regular donors receive regular updates from the Network about progress in their various campaigns, which serve as a form of campaign delivery to ensure supporters that their money is being put to good use (NZPSN, n.d.c; 2018a; 2018b; 2018c).
- Selling t-shirts on its websites to cover the costs of organizing events such as hosting international speakers. Funds are deposited into the Network's online account. Buyers are also instructed to email the PSNA with details of their order and delivery address (NZPSN, n.d.d).

Analysis

The PSNA met two of the three criteria of fundraising. First, the PSNA organised fundraising activities to supports its advocacy work. Second, the group encouraged supporters and sympathizers to donate money to support a wide range of activities such as printing paraphernalia, covering travel expenses, and speaking engagements, and overseas trips. However, the PSNA did not use membership subscriptions.

Conclusion

The conclusion discusses the combined findings of the content analysis and the interview with PSNA's National Chair John Minto. This research yielded valuable information on the Network's communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. These combined findings are discussed in the following sub-sections below:

Strengths

The PSNA's activities fitted most of the criteria of the analytical model's communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities.

Communications

The communications activities category largely covered most of the PSNA's communicational activities apart from elements of "strategic political communication." First, the Network gave out information effectively by using a range of different literature and media to disseminate its cause and "politically usable information." Due to the descriptive

nature of that analytical code, it effectively covered the PSNA's communicational activities. Second, the Network fulfilled all three criteria of "strategic political communications" by engaging in media management, symbolic politics, and short-term campaigns. The PSNA sought to solicit favourable media coverage of their advocacy work and the Palestinians. In terms of symbolic politics, the PSNA made extensive use of political symbols (flags and Keffiyehs) associated with the Palestinians, symbolic actions and narratives (such as the Palestinian David versus Israeli Goliath narrative and "Israeli Apartheid") to enhance their messaging. The Network sought to link the Palestinian struggle to other popular causes such as the American civil rights, anti-Apartheid, and Māori rights movements to boost its legitimacy. The PSNA also used at least one short-term campaign (the "Salt Water Challenges") to raise awareness of the plight of Palestinian prisoners. As an analytical code, strategic political communication was useful in explaining how the PSNA marketed their messages and arguments to the public and media.

Third, the PSNA met all the criteria of "communications adaption" by using a wide range of communications mediums and platforms to propagate the Palestinian cause and advertise their events and activities. While the Network has adapted well to the Internet, social media, and emails, it has not abandoned more traditional forms of communications such as posters, newsletters and other paraphernalia. As an analytical code, the descriptive nature of communications adaptation allows it to capture a wide range of activities. Fourth, the PSNA met the two main criteria of communicational image management by promoting a cultural group's culture, heritage and identity, and actively engaging in image management to improve public perceptions of a cultural group in in response to crises and conflicts. These two sets of activities took the form of selling and distributing literature and media that promoted Palestinian claims to the Holy Land and depicted as both victims and resisters against Israeli "Apartheid."

Relational

The relational activities category largely covered most of the PSNA's relational activities. First, the Network met all the criteria of cause promotion by actively engaging in relational activities (such as public meetings, speaking engagements, concerts, demonstrations, and protests) and utilizing interactive communications technologies such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Some of their activities fitted under both criteria. For

example, several of their protests and speeches would tick both the relational activities and interactive communications technologies criteria since many of these events were filmed and uploaded onto YouTube. Second, the PSNA has fulfilled the two main criteria of "exerting leverage" by seeking to influence the public policy process and hold powerful actors to account by ensuring that they abide with their stated policies and principles. While the content analysis suggested the Network has not targeted governments but focuses on public institutions such as the NZ Super Fund and civil society (film professionals and businesspeople), an interview with John Minto showed that the network has lobbied both central and local governments during the 2016 UN Security Council Resolution 2334 vote and a 2020 Wellington City Council vote on adopting the IHRA's definition of anti-Semitism, and taken an interest in building relations with influential actors. This suggests that the PSNA under Minto's leadership may have taken a greater interest in lobbying and cultivating relations with political actors.

Third, the PSNA fulfilled the two main criteria of coalition building by forging relations with other like-minded groups and actors and interacting with these groups and actors to bring about change in Israel-Palestine. While the Network did sometimes cooperate with some governments and subnational actors, it mainly focused on forging coalitions with sympathetic civil society actors. Fourth, the Network engaged in transnational collaboration by working as part of a transnational Palestinian advocacy network called the BDS movement to promote a cause issue (Palestinian rights and self-determination). This collaboration took the form of information sharing, co-hosting events and functions, and coordinating their advocacy work.

Though the Network carried out all four criteria of relational image management, this was dominated by the first and fourth criteria: sponsoring speaking engagements, cultural and educational fairs and expos; and sponsoring "politically-oriented tourism." The second and third criteria – promoting a country's culture, heritage, and identity; and managing public perceptions of a country in response to crises and conflicts – largely fitted under the first criteria of sponsoring speaking engagements and other cultural and educational functions. These three categories would be domestic oriented and aimed at members and supporters in New Zealand. The PSNA member group Kia Ora Gaza has used "political-oriented tourism" such as organizing aid convoys and flotillas to Gaza to foster political sympathy for the Palestinians.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

The recruitment and internal cohesion category largely covered the PSNA's recruitment and internal cohesion activities. First, the Network met the characteristics of a product-oriented advocacy group. An in-depth analysis of the PSNA's communications and relational activities showed that the group carried out all four stages of product-oriented political marketing by using their communications and relational activities to attract those who supported advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination through the BDS campaign. Second, in terms of "segmentation and marketing", this research found that the Network did not conduct segmentation but instead used its events and activities to target people who were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. This target audience tended to come from left-wing circles, the Arab and Muslim communities, and includes some dissident Jews.

Third, the PSNA met the criteria of internal marketing by using ideological incentives to encourage activists and members to carry out external communications and relational activities. Of Pettitt's five internal marketing models, the content analysis and Minto's interview found that the Network pursued a base strategy which involved giving internal stakeholders what they wanted and designing the group's product to fit their needs and expectations. A base strategy worked best for the PSNA since participation in the group's communicational and relational activities is based on a shared ideological affinity for the Palestinian rights and self-determination. As a theory, a base strategy is useful for explaining how a cause-oriented group uses ideological commitment as the glue that binds together its support base.

Finally, the PSNA met two of the criteria for fundraising by organising fundraisers and soliciting donations to cover the costs of its communications output and relational activities. In short, the content analysis and interview findings confirmed Network followed the communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion criteria of the synthesised analytical model.

Limitations

Although the PSNA followed significant criteria of the model, there were some criteria that it did not adhere to. While the Network met all the criteria of "strategic political

communication," their exploitation of media coverage of newsworthy events related to Israel-Palestine was carried out at a domestic level rather than a global one. Thus, the Network was revised to reflect this observation. While the content analysis found that the PSNA did not promote Palestine as a tourism destination, the Network sought to promote sympathetic media coverage of their advocacy work and the Palestinians. Due to the overlap between strategic political communication's media management work and the crisis and conflict criterion of "relational image management", the former focused on crisis management and the PSNA's activities while the latter focused on cultural heritage promotion.

Research gaps

There were also some limitations to this content analysis of the PSNA's communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. While there were no problems with the "communications adaptation" criteria, this chapter's content analysis was limited to the Network website, public Facebook page, the PHRC Auckland's YouTube channel and excluded other "informal channels" such as their email newsletters, Facebook group page, and PHRC member Leslie Bravery's *In Occupied Palestine* newsletters. Due to issues regarding privacy and consent, these were not utilised as part of my content analysis. In addition, this research had access to enough of the Network's literature and media, which were supplemented by an interview with National Chair John Minto.

Despite the limited quantity of sources used for writing the "segmentation and targeting" and "internal marketing" sections, these were compensated by an interview with Minto. First, he confirmed that the Network did not target any specific demographics but used their Facebook page, newsletters, and public meetings to attract individuals and groups who were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Second, Minto confirmed that the Network pursued a base strategy by using its goals and activities to appeal to its members' and supporters' commitment to advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Overall findings

The PSNA largely followed the various communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion categories of the analytical framework. Within the communications category, the Network met all the criteria of the various communicational activities apart from the "media coverage management" criterion of "strategic political

communication." While the group engaged in exploiting newsworthy events in Israel-Palestine and soliciting favourable media coverage of the group's activities, the content analysis found little evidence of destination branding.

In terms of relational activities, the PSNA met all the criteria of the various relational activities. While the content analysis suggested the Network did not focus on lobbying governments and preferred to build up support for its cause within civil society, Minto confirmed that the Network has since extended its lobbying to both the central and local government levels.

The PSNA also fulfilled all the criteria of the various recruitment/internal cohesion activities. Minto helped to fill gaps regarding their marketing orientation, segmentation and targeting, and internal marketing strategies. As a product-oriented group, the PSNA placed the Palestinian cause at the centre of its communications and advocacy work and showed little interest in moderating its product to win over the elites and public. In terms of segmentation and targeting, the Network used its public gatherings and communications to attract people who were sympathetic to the Palestinians but did not conduct segmentation. In terms of internal marketing, the Network pursued a base strategy; using its pro-Palestinian communications and advocacy work to appeal to their supporters' commitment to the Palestinian cause.

Chapter 5: Israel Institute of New Zealand

This chapter explores the communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities of the Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ), a pro-Israel think tank dedicated to promoting a favourable image of Israel among New Zealanders through analysis, commentary, and advocacy. This chapter will give a brief description of the Israel Institute before discussing the group's communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. This chapter's content analysis drew upon total of 147 sources: 94 webpages, 19 Facebook posts, 13 Twitter posts, 18 videos, and three journal articles. These were supplemented by an interview with David Cumin, one of the three directors of the Israel Institute.

Overview

The Israel Institute is an Auckland-based think tank whose stated mission is to promote "a better understanding of the State of Israel through accurate analysis, insightful commentary, and effective advocacy." The IINZ (n.d.a) is led by three directors – Dr David Cumin, a University of Auckland anaesthesiology lecturer and member of Auckland's Jewish community; Ashley Church, CEO of the Property Institute of New Zealand; and Perry Trotter, an Auckland-based photographer, Christian Zionist, and creator of the Shadows of Shoah Holocaust exhibition. According to Cumin, the Israel Institute's formation was prompted by New Zealand's co-sponsorship of UN Security Council Resolution 2334 in December 2016, which condemned Israeli settlement expansion in the West Bank. Besides these three part-time directors, the Institute is also supported by several supporters and donors (IINZ, 2018b; 2018q). In addition to their online output, the IINZ has also organised some public functions, an opinion poll, and undertake advocacy work.

Communicational activities

1. Information politics

The Israel Institute's website (https://israelinstitute.nz) serves as the central hub for their articles and videos. Their website publishes a range of audio-visual content, reportage and commentary on newsworthy developments in Israel-Palestine and New Zealand, the

organisation's history, mission, and key figures including Cumin, Church, and Trotter. Besides their website, the IINZ also operates social media accounts on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/Israel.Institute.NZ/), LinkedIn (https://www.linkedin.com/company/israel-institute-of-new-zealand), Twitter (https://twitter.com/IsraelInstNZ), and YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCunLRO6b9Z3JAlECtptLbQ). The IINZ's online content is marketed at a New Zealand audience with a substantial proportion of their articles and videos dealing with local developments concerning Israel.

Besides their online output, the IINZ has also written letters to the editor to the media. Cumin (2018b; 2018j) has published letters in *The Dominion Post,* a major Stuff-owned Wellington newspaper, highlighting Iranian aggression and human rights violations and defending the Trump Administration's abrogation of the previous Obama Administration's Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. These letters advanced the pro-Israel narrative that the Iranian regime was a threat to Israeli and US interests in the Middle East. Cumin's letters reflect the IINZ's efforts to build a media profile, a topic discussed in farther detail below.

Analysis

The Israel Institute met the informational politics code of the analytical framework by using its online media output and editorial letters to articulate their pro-Israel messages and arguments.

2. Strategic political communication

Second, the Israel Institute has engaged in "strategic political communication" through symbolic politics, managing media coverage of Israel, and short-term campaigns, which are discussed below:

Symbolic politics

First, the IINZ has used "symbolic politics" to advance pro-Israel narratives and arguments in their communications output. Several recurrent pro-Israel narratives and arguments produced by the Israel Institute have included:

- Israel being a vibrant, pluralistic democracy and advanced society (Bing 2018a).
- Zionism being an indigenous rights movement seeking to restore the Jews to their historical homeland (Trotter, 2017a).
- Israel wanting peace while the Palestinians seeking Israel's destruction (P. Trotter, 2017c).
- Attributing the Palestinian refugee problem, restrictions on Palestinians, and the Gaza Blockade to Palestinian anti-Semitism and rejectionism (P. Trotter, 2016a; 2016b).
- The international mainstream media and United Nations are biased against Israel (IINZ, 2018c; Bayefsky, 2017).
- Palestinian advocates such as the BDS Movement and Kia Ora Gaza are anti-Semitic movements seeking to delegitimise and destroy Israel (Cumin, 2018c; S. Trotter, 2017a).
- Zionism and the State of Israel are integral elements of Jewish identity, culture, and history. While the IINZ does accept that the Israel does make mistakes, they oppose efforts by Palestinian solidarity advocates and groups to distinguish between anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism; regarding anti-Zionism as the latest manifestation of anti-Semitism (Shalom.Kiwi, 2017h; P. Trotter, 2018b).

These messages and arguments underpin the IINZ's view of events and developments in Israel-Palestine and are shared by other pro-Israel groups in New Zealand and abroad.

Media management

Second, the Israel Institute has tried to manage media coverage of Israel with a focus on "explaining" Israeli policies and actions and countering negative perceptions of Israel. As part of this media management work, the IINZ has produced pro-Israel articles, videos and media interviews on their website and several New Zealand newspapers and broadcast media. Key contributors have included Israel Institute members Cumin, Perry Trotter, his wife Sherry Trotter. In addition, the IINZ has also used several guest writers including Juliet Moses of the pro-Israel media watchdog Shalom.Kiwi and the NZ Jewish Council, Josh Brown of the Zionist Federation of New Zealand (ZNFNZ), conservative journalist Karl du Fresne, and the former Israeli peace negotiator Moty Cristal.
- Cumin (2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2018c) has covered several topics including the medical journal *Lancet* repudiating "anti-Israel" articles, the US-Israeli withdrawal

from the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), UN Resolution 2334, and the BDS Movement.

- Perry Trotter (2017d; 2018g) has criticised UN Resolution 2334 and the New Zealand Government's "one-sided" condemnation of violence in the 2018 Land March. He also interviewed Cristal, who defended Israel's role in the Oslo peace process and blamed alleged Palestinian "intransigence" for their failure (P. Trotter, 2016b).

- Sheree Trotter (2017b) discussed the centenary of the Balfour Declaration, focusing on how it facilitated the re-establishment of the Jewish homeland.

- Moses (2017a) defended New Zealand's participation in the Middle East theatre of World War I on the grounds it ended Ottoman rule and facilitated the restoration of Israel.

- Brown (2017) defended the Trump Administration's decision to relocate the US Embassy to Jerusalem by framing it as a recognition of the Jewish connection to Jerusalem, which occupies a central place in Jewish culture, history, and religion.

- Du Fresne (2018) promoted the Zionist narrative of Israel being an "oasis of democracy" and contrasted Israel's willingness to make peace with alleged Palestinian hatred and rejectionism.

Besides disseminating a pro-Israel perspective, the Israel Institute's informational output seeks to provide context to media coverage and commentary on Israel-Palestine issues. They can also highlight issues and stories that the IINZ feels has been neglected or misrepresented by the mainstream media. In addition, the Israel Institute seeks to counteract the pro-Palestinian "David versus Goliath" narrative within the media and public. The IINZ's informational output also reinforces the pro-Israel narrative that Israel is under siege from an international smear campaign seeking to delegitimize it. Since the modern State of Israel is regarded as the fulfilment of the Zionist desire to re-establish the Jewish homeland, anti-Zionism is equated with anti-Semitism.

In addition, the IINZ has sought to solicit favourable media coverage of its advocacy work through interviews, editorial letters, press releases, and being quoted in news reports:

- Cumin has participated in interviews with several domestic and foreign media outlets including Radio 531 PI, the radio station Newstalk ZB, Television New Zealand's (TVNZ) 1 News and Te Karere programs, Radio New Zealand, the TV channel

Newshub, Radio Live, and J-AIR (Jewish-Australian Internet Radio) (Cumin, 2017h; IINZ 2017i; 2017j; 2017m; 2017l; 2017n; 2018k; 2018f) .

- The IINZ's engagement with pro-Israel groups and media such as the Algemeiner, Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), JNS, Radio Shalom and J-AIR (IINZ, 2017e; 2018g; 2018q; Radio Shalom, 2018).

Besides building a media profile, the IINZ's interviews with mainstream media provide a valuable opportunity for the IINZ to present pro-Israel "facts" and arguments and forge links with members of the media. Meanwhile, the IINZ's engagement with other pro-Israel groups and Jewish media help the IINZ to forge relations with other pro-Israel groups in New Zealand and abroad. Building relations with the news media and pro-Israel groups not only helps the IINZ to disseminate its arguments and agenda but also to burnish the think tank's credentials as a pro-Israel advocacy group.

Short term campaigns

The IINZ has also engaged in two specific short-term campaigns as part of their informational and advocacy work: a 2017 public opinion poll and a 2017 election voting guide.

The IINZ published a survey focusing on New Zealand public opinion towards Israel on 9 August 2017. The survey was conducted by Curia Market Research in July 2017 and surveyed around 1,000 New Zealanders. Based on the survey's findings:

- 55% of respondents supported Israel while only 13% opposed Israel.
- Regarding New Zealand's co-sponsorship of UN Security Council Resolution 2334, only 27% believed the New Zealand government was right to co-sponsor the resolution, 30% believed that the Government should have abstained, and 43% were unsure.
- The IINZ survey also found that 60% of male and 51% of female respondents believed that Israel should exist as a "majority" Jewish state. By contrast, only 13% of male and 12% of female respondents disagreed with the idea that Israel should not exist as a majority Jewish state.
- Majority support for Israel existed across party lines: National (58%: 10%), New Zealand First (51%: 20%), and the Greens (56%: 21%).

Based on the survey, Dr Cumin claimed "that support for Israel cuts across ages, genders, location and party lines" and that the New Zealand public had little understanding of UN Resolution 2334. Cumin also reiterated the IINZ's opposition to UN Resolution 2334, claiming that it ignored Palestinian aggression and denied the Jewish historical connection to the Holy Land (IINZ 2017a; 2017b). While this research does not examine New Zealand public opinion towards Israel-Palestine, it is important to consider how variable factors such as the survey selection methods, data collection and sample size can influence its results. Curia Market Research (n.d.) is managed by David Farrar, a prominent blogger, pollster, and activist who owns the Kiwiblog website and has ties to the centre-right National Party. While Farrar (2012) does not identify as a Jew, his family has Jewish ancestry through the father's side. Farrar (2009; 2016) has also expressed pro-Israel sentiments on Kiwiblog. The partnership between Farrar and the Israel Institute suggests an alignment of their pro-Israel views and sympathies. In short, this survey may be part of the IINZ's campaign to promote a favourable image of Israel in New Zealand by demonstrating that a wide segment of the public is sympathetic towards Israel. The public opinion poll may also constitute a form of market intelligence since it involves using segmentation to map out and identify the key bases of pro-Israel support in New Zealand.

Second, the IINZ (2017c) also produced an online election guide during the 2017 New Zealand general election listing the various political parties' positions on Israel, party leaders' and other Members of Parliament's positions, and statements made by members of the New Zealand-Israel Parliamentary Friendship Group. Parties were included in the election guide if they polled above 1% in most public opinion surveys. Pro-Israel positions and MPs were given a golden thumbs up while anti-Israel positions and MPs were given a black thumbs-down. The election guide did not explicitly sponsor certain candidates and parties but encouraged readers to make up their mind base on the following criteria. First, in terms of political parties' positions, the IINZ categorised parties based on their stance on several criteria including UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2334, Palestinian terrorism, support for negotiated solution, ties with Israel, and "understanding" of Israel-Palestine issues. Based on these criteria:

- The incumbent National Party was praised for supporting relations with Israel but was criticized for its unwillingness to condemn UN Resolution 2334 and Palestinian terrorism.

- The centre-left Labour Party was praised for condemning Palestinian terrorism but criticized for its stance on UN Resolution 2334, peace negotiations, and lacking an "understanding" of Israel-Palestine issues.
- The populist New Zealand First was praised for its condemnation of UN Resolution 2334.
- The Greens and Māori parties were criticized for their support for UN Resolution 2334, opposition to a negotiated solution and closer ties with Israel and lacking an "understanding" of Israel-Palestine issues.
- Finally, the libertarian ACT Party was praised for condemning UN Resolution 2334 and supporting ties with Israel.

These criteria served as a litmus test for helping pro-Israel voters to vote for parties based on their stance for Israel. While none of the parties surveyed met all five of the IINZ's criteria, the only party to meet two criteria was the ACT Party.

The Israel Institute also assessed party leaders based on their level of support or opposition for Israel:
- The IINZ praised NZ First leader Winston Peters and ACT leader David Seymour for publicly condemning New Zealand's co-sponsorship of UN Resolution 2334 in December 2016 and expressing support for Israel as a democracy in the latter's case.
- National Party leader Bill English was chastised for standing by UN Resolution 2334.
- Greens Co-Leader James Shaw was also criticised for opposing Foreign Minister Gerry Brownlee's efforts to repair relations with Israel over UN Resolution 2334.
- Greens politician and future Co-Leader Marama Davidson was downgraded for her outspoken criticism of Israel and participating in the 2016 Women's Freedom Flotilla to Gaza.
- The Opportunities Party (TOP) leader Gareth Morgan was criticised for denouncing Israel as "Apartheid state."
- Labour MP David Parker was also listed for criticizing Israel and Brownlee's efforts to repair relations with Israel.
- National MP Simon O'Connor was praised for being one of the few National MPs to speak out against UN Resolution 2334.
- Finally, the IINZ scrutinized the NZ-Israel Parliamentary Friends of Israel. While most of its members had not issued public statements about Israel, the IINZ praised

Peters and Seymour for condemning UN Resolution 2334 and supporting relations with Israel. Another pro-Israel member of the Parliamentary Friends group was National MP Paul Foster-Bell, who defended Israel's right to security and supported greater trade and investment relations with Israel.

The prominence of UN Resolution 2334 as a litmus test for a politicians and political parties' stance on Israel reflects the Israel Institute's avowed opposition to New Zealand's sponsorship of the UNSC resolution, which in their view unfairly blamed Israel for fuelling the conflict and denied the Jewish historical connection to Jerusalem and the Holy Land (IINZ, 2017c; 2017d). For the Israel Institute and other local pro-Israel groups, New Zealand's sponsorship of UN Resolution 2334 was a mark of shame in the country's foreign relations with Israel. The support for Israel among members of the National, ACT, and New Zealand First parties suggests that affinity for Israel is increasingly becoming associated with right-leaning and conservative parties while left-leaning parties are more sympathetic to the Palestinians.

Analysis

The IINZ fulfilled all three criteria of strategic political communication by engaging in symbolic political narratives, media management, and running a few short-term campaigns. As a think tank, the Israel Institute focuses on producing pro-Israel analysis and commentary rather than protest activities. First, in terms of symbolic politics, the IINZ focused on promoting pro-Israel arguments and narratives such as promoting Israel as a functioning democracy and defending Israeli military actions as self-defence against Palestinian hostility. The Palestinians are framed as the aggressor while Israel is presented as the peace-seeking party. Zionism and the State of Israel were presented as legitimate expressions of Jewish identity. While these arguments and narratives were used to communicate messages and raise awareness, there was little evidence they were used to bolster recruitment since the IINZ is not a membership organisation.

Second, the IINZ has engaged in media management by producing pro-Israel content on its website and external media including op-ed columns, letters, and media interviews. Key issues have included highlighting perceived media bias against Israel, promoting Israel-NZ bilateral relations and trade, and defending Israeli actions and policies. Besides engaging with the media, the Israel Institute also seeks to burnish credentials as a pro-Israel watchdog. While this research found that IINZ exploited media coverage of international events in

Israel-Palestine with the goal of raising domestic support for their causes, it did not measure their impact on influencing public opinion

Third, the Israel Institute also engaged in at least two short-term campaigns including a public opinion poll in August 2017 and a voting guide during the 2017 general elections. Besides gauging New Zealand attitudes towards Israel, the public opinion poll's results were used to support the IINZ's message that the New Zealand public is largely sympathetic to Israel. Meanwhile, the voting guide was used to identify political segments who were sympathetic or towards Israel. In short, the Israel Institute carried out the symbolic political, media management, and short term criteria of strategic political communications but often avoided engaging in protests or bolster recruitment since it was not a membership organisation.

3. Communications adaptation

Third, the Israel Institute has used a range of Internet and social media platforms to reach a web-based audience in New Zealand. As discussed above the Israel Institute has used both informal and formal channels to disseminate its informational output. The IINZ's website served as its formal channel while informal channels included its email newsletter and its Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube social media accounts. The Israel Institute produces a fortnightly email newsletter to highlight contemporary affairs articles featured on their website (Cumin, personal communication, March 3, 2020). The content analysis found that the IINZ's Facebook and Twitter accounts were used to both disseminate original content from their website and to share content from a range of media, groups, and blogs. The IINZ's LinkedIn account was used to reproduce content from their website while their YouTube channel was used to circulate videos that have been published on their website. Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) confirmed that the Israel Institute had developed a social media presence in order to reach out to the 16-30 age demographic, who were less likely to support Israel and more likely to be influenced by Palestinian solidarity groups, which the IINZ regarded as hostile to their cause and work. The IINZ's use of email and social media platforms to supplement their website shows that the think tank seeks to reach a wider audience including younger people.

This research also analysed the IINZ's Facebook and Twitter accounts. For comparative purposes, this research surveyed 135 Facebook posts published between 3 May and 6 August 2018 and 135 tweets between 27 July and 6 August 2018. While the IINZ did use their Facebook and Twitter accounts to disseminate their own articles, most content came from other pro-Israel groups, media, and advocates such as *The Algemeiner Journal,* ISRAEL21c, *The Jerusalem Post,* Palestine Media Watch (PMW), *The Times of Israel*, and Ynetnews (*Yedioth Ahronot*). Other publishers included state actors such as the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the Prime Minister's Office, and the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories. While the IINZ primarily targets a New Zealand audience, the interconnected nature of the Internet makes it accessible to a global audience. These social media posts were organised into four major categories: New Zealand events and developments, Israel-Palestine conflict related news, Israeli image management, and other international events and developments.

The IINZ's social media coverage of New Zealand-related events and developments have included the Celebrate Israel at 70 rally, the screening of the Israeli biographical film *Ben Gurion: Epilogue,* the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (MFAT) sponsorship of local Palestinian advocate Rowe's public lecture in August 2018, the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri, and New Zealand's voting record on Israel-Palestine issues at the United Nations, and Newshub's coverage of the 2018 Gaza Land March (IINZ, 2018r; 2018t; 2018gg; 2018tt; 2018uu; 2018rr). Second, reflecting its interest in Israel, the IINZ has shared media stories covering the 2018 Gaza War focusing on Palestinian arson and rocket attacks, and Israeli military and security responses to Palestinian terror attacks (IINZ, 2018w; 2018x; 2018jj; 2018nn). Due to the asymmetry in power between Israel and the Palestinians, the IINZ's coverage seeks to frame Israel as defending itself against Palestinian terror attacks.

Third, the IINZ has also sought to manage Israel's international image by circulating posts and tweets highlighting Israel's respect for human rights, Israeli scientific and technological research and innovation, and Israeli humanitarian and disaster relief activities. In terms of human rights, the IINZ (2018u; 2018vv) has sought to highlight positive stories such as Israel allowing 120,000 Palestinians to visit the Temple Mount for Ramadan religious observations and a team of Palestinian girls participating in a Silicon Valley app competition. Such stories are intended to help counter reports of Palestinians facing discrimination, travel restrictions, and other human rights abuses. In line with Israeli public diplomacy efforts to

promote their country as a "start-up nation", the IINZ (2018y; 2018ff; 2018kk; 2018ll) has circulated numerous Facebook and Twitter posts highlighting Israeli start-up firms, and scientific and technological research and innovation. Highlighting Israeli innovation is intended to combat both the negative imagery associated with the Israel-Palestine conflict and BDS efforts to isolate Israel internationally. Finally, highlighting Israeli humanitarian and disaster relief activities such as the evacuation of Syrian White Caps, the 2018 Guatemala volcano relief efforts, and the Tham Luang cave rescue would help promote the narrative that Israel is a responsible international citizen willing to fulfil its humanitarian obligations to the international community (IINZ, 2018cc; 2018hh; 2018ii).

Finally, the IINZ has shared posts relating to international media coverage of contemporary issues, particularly those relating to the Middle East, United Nations, and US-Israel bilateral relations. Due to Israel's proximity to Syria, there have been several posts relating to the Syrian Civil War. In addition, the IINZ (2018z; 2018bb; 2018ee; 2018mm; 2018oo; 2018pp) has also circulated several Facebook and Twitter posts presenting the Iranian regime as a rogue state, focusing on Iran's nuclear program, aggressive anti-Israel and anti-US rhetoric, and Iranian intervention in Syria and Yemen. A Facebook post on a pro-Hezbollah rally in Auckland highlighted its designation as a terror organisation by several Western governments (IINZ, 2018aa). The IINZ's Iranian social media output reflects contemporary Israeli and US threat perceptions towards Tehran, which date back to the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nuclear program. Reflecting its pro-Israel perspective, IINZ social media posts have reinforced the message that the United Nations is biased against Israel." Related to that, the IINZ (2018s; 2018v; 2018qq; 2018dd; 2018ss) also circulated several posts highlighting Australian and US statements and actions supporting Israel including chastising the UN for its anti-Israel bias" and cutting funding to United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine (UNRWA). These posts reflect Israel's warm relationship with the United States and Australia, two of its major international allies. The IINZ's international social media coverage shows that it accepts the Israeli view of Iran being a major security threat, the UN being institutionally biased against Israel, and the importance of the US-Israeli "special relationship."

Analysis

The IINZ has fulfilled all three criteria of communications adaptation. First, it has used a wide range of communications mediums and platforms including a website and

several social media channels to keep up with contemporary communications technology and reach a wide audience. Second, their website would be their primary formal communications channel. Third, key informal channels include their email newsletter, and Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube accounts. In short, the IINZ has adapted well to advances in communications technology by utilizing a wide range of web and social media platforms.

This research showed that their Facebook and Twitter accounts were used to circulate pro-Israel content and messages related to current affairs issues. The use of social media was also driven by a need to reach younger New Zealanders, who were more critical of Israeli policies and actions, and more sympathetic to the Palestinians. Through the Internet, the IINZ can work on a transnational level with like-minded groups and activists to defend Israel's international image and combat anti-Semitism.

4. Communicational image management

In line with the Israel Institute's primary mission to "provide New Zealanders with a better understanding of Israel through analysis, insightful commentary, and effective advocacy", the Israel Institute has engaged extensively in communicational image management. This has taken the form of producing, distributing, and sharing web media content that promotes Jewish-Israeli culture, heritage and identity, the Jewish connection to the land, and undertaking image management to correct Israel's fraught international image in New Zealand. As of 6 August 2018, the IINZ has produced or shared links to 58 articles, videos, and podcasts relating to communicational image management work. Of these content, 30 items were originally sourced from various domestic and international media, groups, and websites such as the conservative YouTube channel PragerU, the pro-Israel media commentary website Shalom.Kiwi, the Jewish community website *One Community Chronicle*, the *Dominion Post, Hawkes Bay Today,* UN Watch, Fox News, AIJAC, the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA), the *New York Times,* and *The Times of Israel.* This content has included IINZ press releases published on the news website Newsie and Fuseworks Media, and media interviews with Radio Shalom, Radio Live, and J-AIR (IINZ, 2018o; 2017k; 2018b; Cumin, 2018k; IINZ, 2018q). Reproducing external content not only improves the Israel Institute's informational production output but also reinforces the ideological camaraderie with other regional pro-Israel groups.

The IINZ's "communicational image management" content can be categorised into two categories: combating negative publicity and perceptions of Israel (particularly in the news media); and promoting a favourable image of Israel (particularly tourism and scientific research and development). Reflecting the think tank's efforts to reach their audience through different mediums, they have produced several articles and videos dealing with Israel-related issues:

- The *Lancet* medical journal editor Richard Horton's efforts to make amends for the journal's previous anti-Israel content by publishing a special issue focusing on Israel's health achievements (Cumin, 2017a). This morale-boosting article would highlight a victory in the global struggle against the BDS campaign, which Israel advocates regard as the latest manifestation of anti-Semitism.

- Criticising political figures including Green co-leader Marama Davidson, TOP leader Gareth Morgan and former Foreign Minister Murray McCully for pursuing policies and actions deemed to be hostile towards Israel (S. Trottter, 2017a; Shalom.Kiwi, 2017a; Bell, 2017).

- Criticising the deletion of references to Israel in Artsplash's *Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat* musical (Shalom.Kiwi, 2017d).

- Covering a bilateral innovation agreement with Israel, publicizing Israeli digital technology and joint Israeli-New Zealand agritech cooperation (IINZ, 2018a; 2018d; Cumin 2018h).

Besides challenging perceived anti-Israel sentiment and actions within academia, politics, and civil society, the IINZ also seeks to highlight positive stories presenting Israel as a modern, technologically advanced country that can benefit the New Zealand economy and society. The IINZ also highlights what it regards as victories for Israel such as *The Lancet's* efforts to make amends for anti-Israel content and efforts to deepen New Zealand's economic and technological engagement with Israel.

Secondly, the IINZ has also produced videos to counter negative imagery and perceptions of Israeli policies and actions:

- Hosting video interviews with several guests including the dissident Palestinian journalist Bassam Eid, former Israeli peace negotiator Moty Cristal, former Israeli Labor politician and Member of Knesset (MK) Einat Wilf, and former US foreign policy adviser Elliot Abrams (P. Trotter, 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; 2017b). Besides

communicating pro-Israel arguments and messages to a New Zealand audience, hosting these foreign guests helps to build linkages with other pro-Israel allies abroad. Hosting a Palestinian guest provides a pro-Israel Palestinian voice who is critical of the Palestinian political leadership.

- Reaching out to the Māori and Pasifika communities by producing a video featuring a Samoan Māori man criticising the BDS Movement (P. Trotter, 2018a). This seeks to combat Palestinian solidarity advocates' efforts to reach those communities.

- Sharing external pro-Israel video content including a UN Watch video criticising the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) for inciting hatred against Israel, a White House video announcing the Trump Administration's decision to relocate the US Embassy to Israel, and an IDF video about the 2018 Gaza Land March (UN Watch, 2017; IINZ, 2017g; Cumin 2018f). Sharing these videos helps to bring pro-Israel arguments and messages to a New Zealand audience. The UN Watch video uses Palestinian dissident Mosab Hassan Yousef as a pro-Israel Palestinian voice who strengthens Israeli criticism of the PLO and Palestinian Authority. Meanwhile, the presence of British-born Major Keren Hajioff in the IDF video articulates the interlocking messages that Israeli society empowers women and that the bond between the Jewish Diaspora and State of Israel is strong and unbreakable ("British-born IDF major honoured with award for contribution to Israel", 2018f).

The Israel Institute's video output shows that the think tank is interested in producing content in a range of different mediums that promotes Israel in a positive light and counters negative imagery. The presence of foreign guests and external video content shows that the IINZ sees itself as working with like-minded allies on a global level to defend Israel; a topic discussed further in "transnational collaboration."

Analysis

The Israel Institute met both criteria of communicational image management by disseminating various articles and audio-visual material promoting a favourable image of Israel and combating negative imagery of Israel in response to crises and conflicts.

Besides producing their own content, the IINZ has also shared content from other pro-Israel groups and media in New Zealand and abroad, which shows that it sees itself as

working alongside other pro-Israel groups and the Israeli Government to defend Israel's international image and combat anti-Semitism including the BDS movement.

Relational activities

5. Cause promotion

In terms of cause promotion, the Israel Institute has published video interviews and speeches, and participated in public meetings and gatherings. As a think tank, the IINZ prefers to engage in knowledge production and lobbying rather than organising pickets and protest rallies, activities which tend to be associated with Palestinian solidarity groups such as the Palestine Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA).

As a primarily web-based organisation, the IINZ has published numerous videos to disseminate its message to a wide audience including social media platforms, widening the think tank's Internet reach. Social media allows people to comment and share on videos and articles, reaching a wider audience. The IINZ (2017d) has published a video discussion between Auckland University of Technology (AUT) historian and former IINZ Director Dr Paul Moon and Dr Cumin's on UN Resolution 2334. P. Trotter (2018b) has produced a video by an unidentified Indian Jewish feminist criticizing Women's March leaders Tamika Mallo, Carmen Perez, and Linda Sarsour for their alleged anti-Semitism. She argues that their presence in the Women's March damages the integrity of the movement by excluding Jewish and Zionist feminists from a female "safe space." Trotter's video reinforces the pro-Israel narrative that anti-Semitism has infiltrated various aspects of civil society including the feminist and progressive movements. These videos facilitate dialogue and are designed to be shared on social media platforms.

Besides its online activities, the Israel Institute has promoted several public gatherings:
- The IINZ participated in at least two pro-Israel rallies including the "New Zealand Bless Israel Celebration" in April 2018 and the "Celebrate Israel at 70" rally in May 2017. While the former was aimed primarily at Christian Zionists, the latter attracted a wider spectrum of pro-Israel supporters from the Jewish, Christian, Māori, Pasifika, Indian, and Hindu communities including Ngati Whatua representative and Pastor Tawhiri Littlejohn, National MP Ngaro, Indian Association spokesperson Roy

Kaunds, Habonim Dror representatives Neveh Shimi and Alana Jacobson-Pepere, Christians for Israel New Zealand (C4 Israel) National Director Bryce Turner, and Zionist Federation leader Rob Berg. (Shalom.Kiwi, 2018b; IINZ, 2018i). The "Celebrate Israel at 70" event was picketed by 30 Auckland Peace Action counterdemonstrators, who staged a "Wall of Noise" (Bhattari, 2018).

- Covering the screening of Israeli film director Yariv Mozer's film *Ben Gurion, Epilogue* at the 13th Doc Edge Film Festival in Wellington and Auckland in May 2018, which was sponsored by the Israeli Embassy (IINZ, 2018k).

- Covering the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri in July 2018, a special welcoming ceremony organised for Israeli Ambassador Itzhak Gerberg and Honorary Consul David Robinson by Ngaphui kaumatua (elder) Pat Ruka and other pro-Israel elements within the Māori community as a symbolic apology for New Zealand's co-sponsorship of UN Resolution 2334. The Powhiri showcased several Māori cultural elements including the Wero (a challenge to determine whether visitors come in peace or hostility), the Karanga (call onto the Marae), Mihi (speeches), Waiata (song) and performances by Hoani Waititi Kura Kapa Haka group and Pacific Pearls. In addition, members of the Auckland Jewish community sang Hebrew songs in honour of the guests (S. Trotter, 2018).

These public gatherings serve as opportunities for pro-Israel New Zealanders including Jews and Christians to express solidarity with Israel and the Jewish community in New Zealand. In addition, they cooperation between pro-Israel individuals and groups in New Zealand; something discussed in the coalition building sub-section. The presence of pro-Israel Māori individuals such as Pastor Littlejohn and Māori cultural elements at the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri show that the Israel Institute is seeking to promote support for Israel among the Māori and counter inroads made by Palestinian solidarity activists. The presence of the Israeli Ambassador Gerberg may signal a tacit official endorsement of the work carried out by pro-Israel advocacy groups in New Zealand.

Analysis

The Israel Institute fulfilled both criteria of cause promotion by participating in relational activities and using two-way communications technologies such as the Internet and social media to promote them. Though the Israel Institute is primarily a think tank that engages in informational and advocacy work, it has participated in public gatherings such as meetings,

rallies, and cultural functions to advance its goals of promoting Israel and networking with other pro-Israel groups and actors.

The IINZ and its allies' use of Māori culture and pro-Israel Māori individuals may suggest efforts by both pro-Israel and Palestinian solidarity groups to win over Māori support for their respective causes.

6. Exerting leverage

Both the content analysis and a follow-up interview with David Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) have shown that the Israel Institute has sought to lobby the New Zealand Government, politicians, parties, media, businesses and other civil society actors through its website, social media platforms, email newsletters, and traditional methods such as face to face meetings and phone conversations. Through lobbying, the IINZ seeks to cultivate relations with influential political, media, and civil society actors to influence their policies, attitudes, and relations with Israel, and combat the perceived anti-Israel bias and lack of support for Israel within New Zealand politics and society.

Government and political actors

First, the Israel Institute has lobbied the New Zealand Government, politicians, and political parties on Israel-related issues through press releases, articles, and face-to face meetings. The IINZ has raised various issues including:

- Calling on the New Zealand Government to recognise Jerusalem as the capital of Israel (IINZ, 2017h).
- Opposing the United Nations Human Rights Council's proposed blacklist of companies operating in Israeli settlements (Cumin, 2018).
- Calling on the New Zealand Government to join international efforts led by the US to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and condemning an Iranian drone attack on Israeli soil (Cumin, 2018h).
- Calling on the New Zealand Government to designate the political wing of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation (IINZ, 2018n).
- Urging the New Zealand Government to condemn Hamas' rocket attacks on Israel during the 2018 Gaza March of Return and to review its aid policies to the Palestinians (IINZ, 2018n).

- Criticising MFAT's sponsorship of Palestinian solidarity advocate and University of Auckland Dance Studies Associate Professor Nick Rowe's public talk on the one-state solution and the BDS in August 2018 (IINZ, 2018p).

The IINZ's advocacy on these issues shows that it supports the Israeli Government's stance on various issues including Jerusalem, Iranian aggression, Hezbollah, Hamas, and opposition to the BDS Movement and a bi-national state solution. They also regard the New Zealand Government as unsympathetic to Israeli interests and national security.

In addition to these press releases, Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) confirmed that the Israel Institute has corresponded with politicians through more direct methods including a fortnightly newsletter, face-to-face meetings, and phone calls. Cumin said that the IINZ's outreaches to government ministers was intended to counter what he regarded as MFAT's "misrepresentation" of the situation and issues in Israel-Palestine, which he blamed for the lack of support for Israel in government circles and public hostility towards Israel. While the IINZ had successfully engaged with members of the National and New Conservative parties, Cumin said that it had managed to engage with several sympathetic Labour MPs. However, he expressed concern that support for Jewish "indigenous rights" was becoming a more partisan issue in New Zealand with left-wing parties adopting positions which the Israel Institute and other Zionist groups deemed "anti-Israel", following a similar trend in the United Kingdom and United States. Cumin regarded the Green Party as hostile Israel due to Co-Leader Marama Davidson's participation in the Women's Freedom Flotilla and Golriz Ghahraman's remarks alleging Israeli genocide against the Palestinians and claiming that Jesus' mother was a Palestinian. Cumin also expressed disappointment with New Zealand First Leader Winston Peters for neglecting to promote pro-Israel policies as Foreign Minister in the Sixth Labour Government. Cumin's interview confirms this research's observation that Israel-Palestine has become a left-right issue with conservative parties favouring Israel and left-wing parties favouring the Palestinians. It also shows that the Israel Institute has identified the segments in New Zealand politics who would be most sympathetic to their cause.

Media

Second, the Israel Institute has sought to influence the New Zealand media's coverage of Israel-Palestine by challenging media reports that it regards as "inaccurate and biased" and

cultivating relations with sympathetic journalists. The Israel Institute has monitored the media's coverage of events in Israel-Palestine including the following:

- Criticising Radio New Zealand, the *New Zealand Herald*, the *Otago Daily Times*, Newshub, and Stuff for what it regarded as their inaccurate coverage of Israeli cross-border operations into Syria after an Iranian drone penetrated Israeli airspace (IINZ, 2018c).

- Welcoming TVNZ acknowledgement that its coverage of the Gaza March of Return in June 2018 had exaggerated the death toll (IINZ, 2018m).

- Challenging broadcaster Annabelle Lee, the executive producer of TV3's "The Hui" current affairs show, for retweeting a Twitter post claiming that Israel had exploited the trauma of the Holocaust to justify its oppression of millions of Palestinians (IINZ, 2018q; Benson, 2018).

The IINZ's media engagements show that it regards the news media as a major front in their struggle to defend Israel's public image in New Zealand. Key issues have included dispelling the perceptions of Israeli aggression, war crimes, Palestinian oppression, and anti-Semitism. By publicising these cases, the Israel Institute intends to send the message to media outlets and journalists that it is monitoring their coverage and commentary on Israel-Palestine issues.

In addition to their online output, David Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) confirmed that the IINZ also used more traditional methods such as phone calls and face-to-face meetings to reach journalists. Cumin added that the Israel Institute had more success in cultivating contacts and relationships with individual journalists than media outlets and publishers. Without naming names, Cumin mentioned that the Israel Institute had established at least two good media contacts, whom it regularly briefed about "various issues in the background." Cumin was critical of the Stuff-owned Christchurch daily newspaper *The Press* for publishing numerous "anti-Israel" letters, which he attributed to the presence of "anti-Israel" individuals in Christchurch and the editor's friendship with John Minto, the national chair of the PSNA. Cumin also criticised the public broadcaster Radio New Zealand for publishing what he regarded as its "imbalanced" coverage of Israel and unwillingness to engage with the Israel Institute's concerns. Besides shedding light on the IINZ's efforts to build a rapport with journalists, Cumin also identified media outlets that were less sympathetic to the think tank's work. Due to its recent establishment, the Israel Institute has a

long way to go in building up its media profile and shaping media coverage and commentary around Israel-Palestine.

Civil society actors

Besides political actors and the media, the Israel Institute has also engaged with civil society actors including businesses and trade unions. On the business front, the Israel Institute has published a couple of articles about possible trade relations with Israel and a business deal between the Livestock Investment Council (LIC) and Afimilk. Without naming names, Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) mentioned that the Israel Institute had several contacts with the business community. Cumin also indicated that the Israel Institute had encountered difficulty in cultivating relations with New Zealand trade unions, whom he regarded as unsympathetic to Jewish "indigenous rights." Cumin viewed the New Zealand trade union movement's support for the BDS campaign as counterproductive to Palestinian rights, claiming that the Israel trade union movement promoted the rights of Palestinian workers in Israel. Besides confirming that the Israel Institute had sought to promote business contacts and economic relations between NZ and Israel, Cumin's interview confirmed the research findings that the PSNA and other Palestinian solidarity advocates had successfully cultivated relations with several trade unions including the Unite Union, First Union, and NZ Council of Trade Unions (Palestinehumanrights, 2014n; NZPSN, 2018j). This reflects the global left-right political polarisation on Israel-Palestine.

Analysis

The Israel Institute has met both criteria of exerting leverage by seeking to influence the public policy process by cultivating relations with influential stakeholders; and seeking to hold influential actors to account by their stated policies and principles. First, the Israel Institute has used a range of methods including its website, social media, email newsletters, phone calls and face-to-face interviews to lobby and co-opt political, media and civil society actors including. Reflecting the left-right divide on Israel-Palestine, right-wing politicians and parties tended to be more sympathetic to Israel than left-wing politicians and parties.

Second, the Israel Institute has practised "accountability politics" in order to address what it regards as New Zealand's "biased and imbalanced" foreign policies and media coverage towards Israel-Palestine. For the NZ Government, this has taken the form of seeking to

address New Zealand's lack of support for Israel in the international stage, which in the Israel Institute's view goes against New Zealand's claim to be a "fair and balanced" international actor. For the media, the Israel Institute has sought to address a perceived anti-Israel bias in coverage and commentary on developments in Israel-Palestine. While the Israel Institute has made some inroads into the business sector, it has made little headway with influencing trade unions due to the latter's pro-Palestinian sympathies.

7. Coalition building

This research found that the Israel Institute has actively engaged in coalition building with other pro-Israel groups and individuals in New Zealand. Besides co-hosting public events, this coalition building has included meetings, discussions, and sharing content produced by other groups and activists. Dr Cumin also outlined the Israel Institute's policy of coalition building during an interview with Radio Shalom (2018):

"We [Cumin, Church, and Perry Trotter] *did a lot of engagement as well with various community groups in the Christian and Jewish communities to make sure that we would not be stepping on anyone's toes or stealing anyone's thunder. To make sure that we did things right. I think that it served us well. We have got a lot of support around the country and a lot of good people doing some good things that we can support and mutually help each other…"*

Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) stated that one of the Israel Institute's major accomplishments was improving coordination among other pro-Israel groups in New Zealand including the New Zealand Friends of Israel Association (NZFOI) and C4 Israel. He claimed that other pro-Israel groups viewed them as a leader for improving public understanding of Israel and engaging with the NZ Government and media. These show that the Israel Institute has pursued a collaborative approach by cooperating with like-minded pro-Israel groups in the New Zealand Jewish and Christian communities. This section explores the IINZ's engagement with pro-Israel individuals, groups, media, political elites, and state actors in New Zealand:

Individuals

The Israel Institute has sought to work with several pro-Israel individuals in New Zealand. It has published guest articles by University of Waikato political scientist Dr Dov Bing, Emmaus Road Ministries leader Graeme Carlé, and the journalist Karl du Fresne:

- Dr Bing (2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2018d) wrote a four-part series exploring the historical connections of Jews and Arabs to Israel and the establishment of modern

Israel. Bing (2018a; 2018b) expounded the Zionist narrative that Jews are indigenous to Israel and claimed that Palestinians were the descendants of Arabs who migrated there during the 7th century CE.

- Carlé (2017) has defended the Balfour Declaration by articulating the Zionist narrative that modern Jordan is the Palestinian state. Carlé also blames the persistence of the Palestinian refugee problem on the unwillingness of the Arab states to recognise Israel and to resettle Palestinian refugees.

- Karl du Fresne (2018) has argued that Israel is a success story. While acknowledging that transgressions have occurred on the Israeli side such the Sabra and Shatila massacres and Baruch Goldstein's massacre of 29 Palestinian worshippers in 1995, du Fresne argued that Arab extremism is a greater threat, citing the terror attacks of Hezbollah and Hamas. He defended the Trump Administration's relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem as a recognition of the importance of Jerusalem to Jewish history culture, and religion.

- Similarly, the Zionist Federation member Josh Brown (2017) has criticised the mainstream New Zealand media for allegedly perpetuating Palestinian victimhood and defending the Trump Administration's decision to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem.

Besides demonstrating the Israel Institute's willingness to work with other like-minded pro-Israel advocates, publishing their content helps circulate pro-Israel arguments and messages and to reinforce the ideological camaraderie with other Zionists in New Zealand

Besides publishing content by Israel advocates, the Israeli Institute has also worked with pro-Israel community figures such as Māori pastor and musician Tawhiri Littlejohn, the Māori agritech venture capitalist Arama Kukutai. Littlejohn served as the opening speaker at the Celebrate Israel at 70 rally in May 2018 while Kukutai has sought to foster cooperation between the New Zealand and Israeli agricultural sectors (P. Trotter, 2018f; Cumin, 2018i). Highlighting these pro-Israel Māori figures would help attract Māori into the pro-Israel movement. In Kukutai's case, this would also highlight institutional links between the agricultural sectors of the two countries. Since agriculture is a mainstay of the New Zealand economy, it would be expedient to highlight how interconnected the NZ and Israeli economies are. Finally, the Israel Institute has also worked with Ylia Trotter, a film-maker and photographer who filmed the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri (Y. Trotter, 2018). Given the

IINZ's interest in producing audio-visual content, filmmakers such as Trotter would be useful allies due to their technical skills and expertise. In short, the Israel Institute has cultivated relations with pro-Israel individuals in New Zealand due to their skills and traits in various areas including communication skills, personal connections with Israeli institutions and society, and technical expertise.

Groups

The Israel Institute has worked with several pro-Israel civil society groups in New Zealand and abroad. As discussed earlier, the IINZ joined forces with several other local pro-Israel groups including the ZFNZ, Jewish Federation of New Zealand, NZJC, International Christian Embassy Jerusalem, C4 Israel, Operation Ebenezer, Flaxmere Christian Fellowship, Habonim Dror, the Indian Association, and NZFOI to organise a public rally marking the 70th anniversary of Israel's independence at Auckland's Silo Park in May 2018 (Celebrate Israel at 70 event, personal communication, May 13, 2018). While most of these groups are Jewish and Christian, they also included the Indian Association's President Roy Kaund, who voiced support for Israel on behalf of the New Zealand Hindu community (P. Trotter, 2018d). Kaunds' presence reflects a sympathy for Israel within the Hindu community in India and global diaspora in response to Hindu-Muslim communal tensions and the antagonistic nature of Indo-Pakistani relations. In addition, Indo-Israel relations have also blossomed under the tenure of Indian Prime Minister Narenda Modi, leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (Kumaraswamy, 2017; Sharma and Bing, 2015; Therwath, 2007). Celebrate Israel at 70 was an effort by local pro-Israel groups to occupy a public space in New Zealand, a tactic commonly pursued by Palestinian solidarity groups in NZ and abroad. Public rallies and marches would serve as a show of force by various cause groups and advocates while generating public and media attention.

The IINZ also enjoys a close relationship with the pro-Israel media watchdog Shalom.Kiwi, which focuses on combating perceived anti-Israel bias in the New Zealand media and public sphere. The IINZ has republished several Shalom.Kiwi articles covering a range of issues including Gareth Morgan's views on Israel-Palestine, Bill English's stance on UN Resolution 2334, Marama Davidson's participation in the Women's Peace Boat, Artsplash's 2017 *Joseph and the Amazing Technicolor Dreamcoat* play, UNESCO downplaying the Judeo-Christian connection to Hebron, the 2017 Temple Mount Crisis,

British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn, the Greens and New Zealand media's response to the 2018 Gaza March of Return, and the "NZ Bless Israel" event in April 2018 (Shalom.Kiwi, 2017a; 2017b; 2017c; 2017d; 2017e; 2017f; 2017g; 2017h; 2018a; 2018c; 2018b). Reproducing these articles indicates an alignment of views between the Israel Institute and Shalom.Kiwi. Both groups see themselves as combating anti-Israel bias in New Zealand society and promoting a positive image of Israel. The IINZ has also reproduced content by Shalom.Kiwi spokesperson Juliet Moses including a video promoting Zionism as an indigenous rights movement and articles defending New Zealand's role in the Palestine campaign during World War I and criticising Palestinian victimhood for obstructing peace with Israel (P. Trotter, 2017c; Moses, 2017a; 2017b). The reproduction of Moses' articles suggests not only an ideological affinity but also a friendly camaraderie between the IINZ leadership and Moses.

Media

The Israel Institute has sought to build a rapport with some New Zealand media outlets to promote sympathy for Israel and raise the IINZ's media profile including the Auckland-based Pasifika radio station Radio 531 and the Jewish community radio station Radio Shalom. In December 2017, Cumin used an interview with Radio 531 PI host Brian Sagala to address the political intrigue behind New Zealand's sponsorship of UN Resolution 2334 (IINZ, 2017f). Through this outreach, Cumin gave Pasifika listeners a pro-Israel perspective on that issue. In February 2018, Cumin used an interview with Radio Shalom to raise awareness of the Israel Institute's goals and advocacy work within New Zealand. He talked about combating negative perceptions of Israel arising from the Israel-Palestine conflict and engagement with Jewish and Christian community groups in NZ (IINZ, 2018b). These friendly interviews helped the group forge contacts with opinion makers and community leaders in both the Pasifika and Jewish communities in New Zealand. In short, the IINZ's media contacts are designed to advance its mission to promote a favourable image of Israel "through analysis, commentary, and advocacy" while simultaneously building its media profile.

Political elites and state actors

The IINZ has cultivated relations with sympathetic political elites and government officials including National Member of Parliament (MP) Alfred Ngaro and Israeli

Ambassador Itzhak Gerberg. In May 2018, National Party MP Alfred Ngaro served as one of the keynote speakers at the Celebrate Israel at 70 rally in Auckland, which was jointly organised by several pro-Israel groups including the IINZ. He spoke about how the Battle of Beersheba cemented the bonds between New Zealand, Australia, and Israel (P. Trotter, 2018c). Forging ties with Ngaro may give the Israel Institute and other pro-Israel groups access to the centre-right National Party, one of New Zealand's two major parties. The challenge for the IINZ and other pro-Israel groups would be to build bipartisan support for Israel in the New Zealand Parliament, particularly within the centre-left Labour Party and left-wing Green Party.

In addition, the IINZ has also forged relations with Itzhak Gerberg, Israel's Ambassador to New Zealand. In August 2018, the Israel Institute published a video featuring Ambassador Gerberg's participation in the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri (Y. Trotter, 2018). The Powhiri was designed to show that many New Zealanders including several Māori leaders and groups were sympathetic to Israel and disagreed with the New Zealand Government's policies towards Israel at the United Nations. Cultivating a relationship with Gerberg would give the Israel Institute access to the Israeli government through its diplomatic corps, strengthening the IINZ's networking. In short, cultivating relations with political elites helps the IINZ to gain access to politicians and policy-makers within both the NZ and Israeli governments.

Analysis

The IINZ fulfilled the first criterion of coalition building by forging coalitions, relationships, and linkages with other pro-Israel political, media and civil society actors including activists and other pro-Israel groups. Since its formation, the IINZ has partnered with sympathetic individuals, NGOs, media, and political elites who share its goals of promoting a favourable image of Israel in New Zealand. Due to the IINZ's nature as a think tank, this coalition building has taken the form of hosting video interviews, republishing their articles, and building friendly relations with sympathetic political, media and civil society leaders in a position to encourage greater political and economic engagement with Israel.

However, the IINZ did not meet the second criteria of coalition building. While the Israel Institute took a strong interest in international developments in Israel-Palestine and

networked with liked-minded international groups and actors (which is discussed below), it has not focused on bringing change to that region due to its primary focus on "correcting" Israel's public image in New Zealand.

8. Transnational collaboration

The Israel Institute engaged in transnational collaboration by working with other groups and actors to promote support for Israel and combat anti-Semitism on a global level by exchanging information, hosting foreign guests, and participating in pro-Israel conferences and events. Since the previous section looked at the IINZ's coalition building on a domestic level in New Zealand, this section will focus on the group's collaboration with overseas-based individuals, groups, media, political elites, and state actors:

Individuals

The Israel Institute has hosted several pro-Israel individuals from abroad including Palestinian journalist Bassam Eid and British-Israel journalist and Middle East expert Dr Jonathan Spyer:

- In a video interview, Eid challenged the Palestinian narrative that Israel is an "Apartheid state" and repeated pro-Israel narratives about the BDS Movement being anti-Semitic and the UN and Palestinian leadership letting Palestinians down (P. Trotter, 2016a).
- Dr Spyer talked about the Syrian Civil War and the Turkish-Kurdish conflict (P. Trotter, 2018h).

Hosting these foreign experts would not only educate their viewers about events in Israel-Palestine and the wider Middle East but would also help to strengthen contacts and relationships with other pro-Israel advocates overseas. Having a pro-Israel Palestinian ally like Eid would help dispel the notion that being pro-Israel means being anti-Palestinian.

Groups

The IINZ has also forged relations and worked with several foreign pro-Israel groups including the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), the American Jewish Committee (AJC), and the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ):

- Reproducing AIJAC policy analyst Ahron Shapiro's (2017e) article criticizing Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas's alleged anti-Semitic and anti-Israel remarks during the Organization of Islamic Cooperation's (OIC) 6th "Extraordinary Islamic Summit Conference on Al-Quds Ash-Sharif" held at Istanbul on 13 December 2017. Shapiro disputed Abbas' claim that Palestinians are the descendants of the Canaanites and claimed that the Palestinian leadership was not genuinely interested in peace with Israel. This information sharing highlights the ideological affinity between the two groups.

- Highlighting AIJAC's coverage of the IINZ's advocacy work including Dr Moon's commentary on the 2017 New Zealand general election, Dr Cumin's call for NZ to recognise Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and Ashley Church's comments on the Lorde's cancellation of her 2018 Tel Aviv concert (IINZ, 2017e; 2018a; 2018e).

- Reproducing an article by AJC Executive Director David Harris (2017) advancing the Israel narrative that the PLO has obstructed Israeli efforts to seek a long-lasting peace with the Palestinians.

- Helping the ECAJ's Director of Public Affairs Alex Ryvchin to promote two of his works including his 2018 book *The Anti-Israeli Agenda*, which looked at anti-Semitism and the BDS movement, and his 2018 article on contemporary attempts to politicize the Holocaust in Poland and Saudi Arabia (Cumin, 2018e; Ryvchin, 2018).

- Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) was also open to the idea of hosting AIJAC's international guest speakers in New Zealand but conceded that the IINZ lacked the budget to bring them over from Australia. As the IINZ's resources and profile grows, it may reconsider expanding collaboration with AIJAC and other foreign advocacy groups.

These interactions show that the Israel Institute is willing to work with like-minded pro-Israel advocacy groups in Australia and the United States on a transnational level. This transnational collaboration has included sharing information about their communications output and advocacy work and co-hosting at least one foreign guest in New Zealand. In short, this cooperation helps reinforce global connections and promote a shared, cohesive pro-Israel narrative globally.

Media

The IINZ has cultivated relations and worked with several pro-Israel foreign media outlets and organisations including the Jewish News Syndicate (JNS), Australian radio station J-Air, the US-based JNS, and the US-based YouTube channel PragerU:

- Republishing Sean Savage's (2017) JNS article covering the centennial commemoration of the Battle of Beersheba. The story mentioned Cumin praising a recent bilateral aviation agreement between Israel and New Zealand as a sign that the two countries were prepared to repair relations following the UN Resolution 2334 "debacle."

- Cumin participating in an interview with J-AIR's host David Schulberg in order to raise awareness of the Israel Institute's advocacy work particularly media management and to raise funds (IINZ, 2018f; 2018q).

- Republishing content from the conservative American YouTube channel PragerU on with various Israel-Palestine topics including the BDS Movement, United Nations "double standards" towards Israel, the Middle East's political situation, and the legitimacy of Israel (Dershowitz, 2016; 2017; Bayefsky, 2017, Prager, 2017).

This transnational collaboration has consisted of taking part in media interviews and exchanging information via sharing their content on its website and social media platform. For the JNS and J-AIR, sharing content and participating in interviews helps raise the Israel Institute's international profile within the Jewish diaspora in the US and Australia. In the case of PragerU, publishing its videos helps to promote the conservative YouTube channel's credentials as a reliable pro-Israel source among New Zealand viewers.

Political elites and state actors

The IINZ has forged relations with several Israeli and US politicians and government officials including the former Israeli negotiator Moty Cristal, former Israeli Labor Party politician Einat Wilf, and US foreign policy advisor Elliot Abrams. As discussed earlier, the Israel Institute has hosted video interviews with Cristal and Wilf, seeking their expertise and perspectives on the Oslo peace process and the legitimacy of Zionism. Besides giving their audience access to Israeli perspectives, hosting these Israeli figures helped the IINZ to build allies in Israel (P. Trotter, 2016b; 2017a; 2017b). In the case of Abrams, hosting a former US foreign policy advisor and Council on Foreign Relations researcher would provide a pro-Israel American perspective on Israeli settlements and Israel-Palestine relations. While these

are retired individuals, they still have connections to the Israeli and US governments and foreign policy establishments. Having political elite allies, even if they are retired, aids the Israel Institute's political network.

In addition to individual contacts, the Israel Institute also has contacts with the Israeli Government. In mid-March 2018, the IIINZ participated in the 6th Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism in Jerusalem, which was hosted by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs. Dr Cumin and Perry Trotter represented the Israel Institute. The conference was attended by a thousand delegates from Israel and 83 countries including AIJAC's Director of International and Community Affairs Jeremy Jones, ECAJ Research Officer Julie Nathan, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Tzipi Hotovely, the British Chief Rabbi Ephraim Mirvis, Executive Vice Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations Malcolm Hoenlein, former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls, Jewish Agency chairman Nathan Sharansky, and senior clergy from the Jewish, Catholic, and Muslim communities. The conference addressed various topics including anti-Semitism in several arenas including cyberspace, far right and far left politics, sports, Protestant churches, Arabic mass media, campuses, and the "rainbow coalition"; efforts by governments and faith communities to combat anti-Semitism; and Holocaust remembrance and revisionism. During the Global Forum, the Israeli, Greek, Maltese and Italian justice ministers also signed a "Joint Statement on Countering Online Hate Speech and Incitement to Violence and Terrorism" focusing on hate speech, violence and terror incitement on social media. Reflecting Facebook's cooperation with the Israeli government in deleting terrorism-related content, Delphine Reyer, the company's Policy Director for the Southern Africa, Middle East and Africa Region, attended the signing ceremony. The Joint Statement would signal a willingness of governments and non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs) to collaborate on issues of shared interests such as hate speech and counter-terrorism. As a state-sponsored event, the Global Forum seeks to coordinate efforts by the Israeli government, civil society groups, and business actors to combat anti-Semitism on an international level (Kutner, 2018; Cumin, 2018g). The IINZ's participation in the Global Forum shows that it is part of an informal pro-Israel transnational advocacy network working to combat anti-Semitism and advance Israel's interests and security.

The research findings that the Israel Instituteis part of a transnational advocacy network was corroborated by Cumin, who mentioned that the Israel Institute was part of a social media network of pro-Israel activists called #DigiTell. Cumin described it as a "very good network of online pro-Israel advocacy groups and organizations of different stripes" that shared resources, information, and ideas. (Cumin, personal communication, March 3, 2020; Jaffe-Hoffman, 2019). In short, the Israel Institute's engagement with like-minded individuals, groups, media, political elites, and state actors shows that it recognizes the importance of networking and collaboration.

Analysis

The Israel Institute met both criteria of transnational collaboration. First, it has networked with a range of like-minded overseas-based individuals, groups, media, political elites and state actors. Second, it has hosted guest speakers, sharing content, participated in media interviews, reports, international gatherings such as the 6th Global Forum on Combating Anti-Semitism, and online networks such as the #DigiTell social media network. These activities show that the group seeks itself as part of an informal transnational pro-Israel advocacy network that works to promote a favourable image of Israel and combat anti-Semitism on a global level.

9. Relational image management

The Israel Institute has also engaged in relational image management by sponsoring or publicising several pro-Israel public functions to promote solidarity with Israel and participating in politically-oriented tourism to promote Israel as a tourist destination and the Jewish homeland. These activities promote Israeli and Jewish culture, heritage, and identity while combating negative perceptions of Israel in response to the Israel-Palestine conflict.

First, the content analysis found several instances of the IINZ engaging in pro-Israel image management at public events it had sponsored or publicised:

- During the Celebrate Israel at 70 event held in 2018, several speakers advanced pro-Israel narratives about Israel being a democracy and productive member of the international community. Pastor Tawhiri Littlejohn talked about attending an indigenous peoples' conference and praised the hospitality of local Arabs in East Jerusalem (P. Trotter, 2018f). National MP Alfred Ngaro described Israel as a

democracy that deserved the right to self-determination (P. Trotter, 2018c). Alana
Jacobson-Pepere of the Jewish socialist group Habonim Dror reiterated Israel's right
to self-defence and asserted that Israel "connected the Jewish people and youth with
each other and history." Zionist Federation leader Rob Berg highlighted Israel's
achievements in science, agriculture, medicine, and winning the hosting rights for the
2019 Eurovision song contest. Finally, IINZ contributor Sheree Trotter described
Israel as a "beacon of light, liberalism, humanity and democratic values" in the
Middle East (Celebrate Israel at 70 event, personal communication, May 13, 2018).

Supporting Israeli public diplomacy and nation branding outreaches in New Zealand by
promoting the Israeli film *Ben Gurion, Epilogue* in late May 2018 and the Aotearoa-Israel
Powhiri welcoming ceremony, which both involved the Israeli Embassy. As discussed earlier,
the *Ben Gurion* film sought to educate the New Zealand public about Prime Minister Ben
Gurion's nation-building and political legacy while the Powhiri helped to build relationships
between the Israeli Ambassador Gerberg, the Israeli Honorary Consul Robinson, the
Auckland Jewish community, and pro-Israel Māori elements of the Māori community (IINZ,
2018k; S. Trotter, 2018). This research found that the Israel Institute has used public
gatherings and events to promote Israel in favourable light. The "Celebrate Israel at 70" rally
helped reinforce pro-Israel narratives and messages about Israel being an "oasis of
democracy," scientific and technological hub, and protecting the rights of Israeli Arabs. In
addition, the IINZ has assisted Israeli public diplomacy by supporting the screening of Israeli
films and forging ties with New Zealand civil society. Since the mainstream media may not
always cover Israel-related events favourably, the IINZ and other groups like Shalom.Kiwi
provide an alternative media platform for pro-Israel readers.

Second, the IINZ has also promoted tourism to Israel as a means of improving public
perceptions of Israel and fostering interpersonal relations between New Zealanders and
Israelis. In mid-March 2018, the group published a Vimeo video of Dr Cumin's (2018l) tour
of four popular tourist destinations in Jerusalem: the Mahane Yehuda Market, the Knesset,
Mamilla Mall, and Jaffa Gate. Besides educating viewers about the historical significance of
these sites and Israeli heritage preservation efforts, Cumin supported the Israeli
Government's claim to Jerusalem as its "indivisible" capital. Finally, Cumin compared the
Israeli presence favourably to the brief Jordanian occupation of Jerusalem between 1948 and
1967. While the Jordanians excluded Jews from East Jerusalem, the Israelis opened it to
everyone again including adherents of all three Abrahamic faiths. Besides encouraging

tourism to Israel, Cumin's video promoted several Israeli arguments and messages about the importance of Jerusalem to Israel and Jews.

Analysis

The Israel Institute engaged in all four criteria of relational image management, particularly sponsoring public events and encouraging politically-oriented tourism. These two activities were used to promote Israeli culture, heritage, and identity, and combat negative perceptions of Israel. Sponsoring public rallies, film screenings, and cultural functions also helps to advance Israeli public diplomacy and nation branding efforts in New Zealand. To combat the negative stigma associated with the military occupation and human rights violations, the IINZ seeks to promote Israel as a successful democracy and hub for scientific and technological innovation. While the Israel Institute lacked the resources to sponsor its own informational trips to Israel, Cumin's Vimeo video promoting tourism in Jerusalem helped promote Israel's territorial claim.

Recruitment/internal cohesion activities

10.   Marketing orientation

This research confirmed that the IINZ pursues a sales-orientation, which involves using marketing intelligence to identify supporters and designing effective communications and activities to reach them (Lees-Marshment, 2004; 2014). Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) confirmed that the Israel Institute conducted market intelligence in the form of public opinion polling and segmentation. The IINZ segmented its audience into two main segments: "the naïve and undecided" and "pro-Israel supporters" Since people in the 16-30 age demographic are less likely to support Israel and more sympathetic to the so-called "anti-Israel" groups, Cumin said that the IINZ had focused on creating a social media presence. Besides the Israel Institute's Facebook and Twitter channels, Cumin indicated that the Israel Institute was interested in expanding to other social media platforms such as Tik Tok, Snap Chat and Instagram if they had more resources. Taken together, the content analysis and interview suggest that the Israel Institute conducted rudimentary segmentation and targeted a broad, pro-Israel audience but has also adapted its communications and relational methods such as social media and Māori culture to reach out

to younger people and the Māori community. This shows that the Israel Institute has been able to adapt to meet the needs of certain segments.

This research found that the IINZ followed the five-stage process associated with sales-oriented charities, which is outlined below:

Figure 14 The IINZ analysed using Lees-Marshment's sales-oriented framework		
Stages	**Definitions**	**Examples**
Product design	Design a wide range of behaviour in accordance to what they think is right or works best.	Defending Israel, Zionism, and the New Zealand Jewish diaspora. Combating anti-Semitism and the BDS Movement.
Market intelligence	Identify the groups and segments of the public most likely to support it, using market segmentation to target them, and discuss how best to influence and persuade them.	Using public opinion surveys and segmenting its audience into the "undecided" and pro-Israel supporters. Using social media to reach out to younger people and cultural outreaches to Māori (IINZ, 2017a; S. Trotter, 2018; Cumin, personal communication, March 3, 2020).
Communication	Proactive, entertaining communication designed to attract attention, influence the public and civil society, raise income from potential supporters; using a wide range of marketing techniques such as pamphlets, posters, websites, Facebook, and Twitter.	Using its website, social media accounts, and a monthly newsletter called *The Advocate* to disseminate information (Cumin, personal communication, March 3, 2020).
Campaign	Short-term, one-off appeals	Meeting journalists and politicians, organising public events like the "Celebrate Israel at 70" rally, public opinion polls, producing voting guides, and soliciting donations (Cumin, personal communication, March 3, 2020; IINZ, 2017a; 2017c).
Delivery	Deliver what it thinks is best, promoting it in the most positive way possible.	Reporting its progress and achievements on its website, social media, and email newsletter including its substantial social media following and engagement with political elites.

Analysis

In terms of marketing orientation, the IINZ followed the five-stage process associated with sales-oriented advocacy groups. First, it has a product in the form of promoting Israel and Zionism and combating anti-Semitism and the BDS movement. Second, the IINZ has engaged in market intelligence by using a public opinion survey and targeted two major segments: the "naïve and undecided" and "pro-Israel supporters." Besides seek to cultivate Māori support for Israel, the organisation has also used the Internet and social media to reach younger audiences. Third, the IINZ has disseminated its message on accessible, modern communications technologies such as the Internet, social media platforms, and email newsletters to maximise its outreach. Fourth, the IINZ has engaged in some short-term campaigns including a public opinion survey, voting guide, and fundraising. Finally, the Israel Institute has used its communications output and public opinion polls to inform its supporters about its achievements. The group's large social media following and engagement with political elites were regarded as successes in its advocacy work.

11.Segmentation and targeting

This research found that the Israel Institute targeted two demographics: "the naïve and undecided" and pro-Israel segments within the Jewish, Christian, Hindu, and Bahai communities in New Zealand. As discussed above, the Israel Institute also reached out to certain demographics, particularly young people and the Māori community. For segmentation and targeting, this research drew upon a content analysis of the Celebrate Israel at 70 event in Auckland, Dr Cumin's interview with Radio Shalom in 2018, content from the IINZ's website and social media platforms, and a personal interview with Dr Cumin, which are discussed below.

First, the Celebrate Israel at 70 event attracted members of the Jewish, Christian, Hindu and Bahai communities. Europeans, Māori, Pacific Islanders, and Asians (particularly Indians) were also represented in the 80-strong crowd, reflecting Auckland's ethnically diverse population. Notable attendees included Pacific Pearls leader Stephanie Harawira, National MP Alfred Ngaro, and Indian Association leader Roy Kaunds. This public gathering is a microcosm of the pro-Israel support base in New Zealand and supports the interview findings that the Israel Institute seeks to work with sympathetic allies. For Christians, it may reflect a desire to atone for centuries of Christian anti-Semitism and Christian Zionist beliefs

about the restoration of Israel and Jews being God's "Chosen people." For Hindus like Kaunds, this reflects the warm, contemporary Indo-Israel bilateral relationship. Similarly, the pro-Israel sympathy of Baha'is reflects Israel's policy of religious tolerance. Haifa also hosts the Baha'i World Centre, which serves as the faith's headquarters (Heern, 2017; Lynfield, 2017).

Second, Dr Cumin identified the local Jewish and Christian communities as the strongest pillars of pro-Israel support in New Zealand during an interview with Radio Shalom (IINZ, 2018b). He also stated that the IINZ (2018b) was interested in reaching out to New Zealand youth, commenting "that the youth growing up have not had the more balanced perspective that there was in the past. Correcting that should be what we are mindful of." The intergenerational gap in public perceptions of Israel between reflects the growing international scrutiny of Israeli policies and actions towards the Palestinians. While many in the older generations regarded Israel as a plucky young nation fighting for its survival, many in the younger generations view Israel as a "Goliath" that is oppressing the Palestinians. The content analysis findings were corroborated by Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020), who confirmed that the Israel Institute was interested in using social media platforms to reach out to the 16-30 age demographic, who were less likely to support Israel and more receptive to the messaging and arguments of Palestinian solidarity groups. The combined findings confirm that younger audiences are a key priority of the Israel Institute's communications and advocacy work.

Third, a content analysis of the IINZ's web and social media output indicated that the group sought to promote support for Israel among the Māori community to combat recent efforts by Palestinian supporters to win over Māori support. While Palestinian advocates sought to draw a parallel between Māori and Palestinian experiences with colonisation and land loss, the IINZ and other pro-Israel advocates have emphasized the commonality between Māori and Jewish indigeneity. Segmentation and targeting activities aimed at Māori have included:

- Promoting pro-Israel Māori figures such as IINZ contributor Sheree Trotter, Pastor Tawhiri Littlejohn, Cook Islander National MP Alfred Ngaro, and businessman Arama Kukutai. Trotter and, Littlejohn sough to link Māori indigeneity to Jewish indigeneity to Israel by asserting argued that Māori and Jews were able to trace their historical connection to their homelands through their *whakapapa* (or genealogies).

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Reflecting his Christian Zionist worldview, Ngaro also likened the Treaty of Waitangi to the Biblical Abrahamic Covenant, which in the Judeo-Christian view established Jews as God's "Chosen People" (P. Trotter, 2018c; 2018f)

- Highlighting Kukutai's efforts to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information and technology between the New Zealand and Israeli agricultural sectors (Cumin, 2018i).

- Organizing Māori-themed pro-Israel events such as the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri. Besides serving as a show of strength by pro-Israel New Zealanders but would also showcase Māori culture and arts (S. Trotter, 2018).

By promoting pro-Israel Māori individuals, events and incorporating Māori culture and terminology into its messaging, the IINZ hopes to counter the inroads made into that community by Palestinian advocates and allied Māori figures such as Marama Davidson and Hone Harawira. Cumin (personal communication, 2020, July 28) later clarified that the Israel Institute had established contacts with several communities including Māori and took a particular interest in connecting with Māori Christians, a pro-Israel demographic Taken together, these findings show that the Israel Institute uses culturally specific methods to reach out to certain demographics.

Finally, Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020) clarified that the Israel Institute targeted two demographics: "the naïve and undecided" and pro-Israel supporters. Based on the group's public opinion polling, Cumin claimed that public support for Israel cut across all ages, locations, and even political lines in New Zealand. However, the IINZ's polling found that the younger age demographic between 16 and 30 years were less likely to support Israel and more sympathetic to arguments and messaging of Palestinian solidarity groups. In response, the Israel Institute invested substantial time and resources into developing a social media presence via Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. The interview helped to clarify the Israel Institute's segmentation and targeting policies while corroborating the case study findings.

Analysis

The IINZ fulfilled both criteria of segmentation and targeting. First, the content analysis and follow-up interview with Dr Cumin confirmed that the IINZ practised some degree of segmentation towards two demographics: young people and Māori Christians.

While key pro-Israel segments have included the Jewish and Christian communities, the presence of Māori, Pacific Islanders, Asians, Hindus, and Baha'is at the Celebrate Israel at 70 event reflects the ethnically and religiously diverse nature of this pro-Israel support base. Second, the IINZ also used its communications output to target two key segments: those supportive of Israel and the "uniformed and undecided." It has allocated resources to reaching them by using social media platforms to connect with younger people and promoting pro-Israel Māori figures, culture and arts to appeal to Māori Christians. In short, The IINZ's strategy of targeting supporters and the undecided is simple but effective, with specific communications and relational activities being used to appeal to certain segments.

12. Internal marketing

While the content analysis yielded no information about the Israel Institute's internal marketing, Dr Cumin (personal communication, 2020, March 3) confirmed that the group sought to promote a sense of belonging among its subscribers by reaching out to thank them for their support. In addition, the IINZ pursued a broader strategy of publicising their advocacy work and achievements on their website, social media, and email newsletters including their efforts to hold New Zealand officials and media to account for policies and coverage deemed unfriendly to Israel. Cumin also mentioned that the IINZ had plans to establish a network of "friends of the Institute" groups across New Zealand to facilitate a sense of belonging and provide educational material. The interview findings suggest that the Israel Institute pursues a base strategy which involves giving stakeholders what they want. Due to its Zionist orientation, the group would naturally attract people who are sympathetic to defending Israel and Zionism's image in New Zealand.

A base strategy also works well with a sales-oriented advocacy group which focuses on selling its product to the wider public instead of designing a product that would fit with what the public wants or needs. While supporters of Israel remain a key audience, the Israel Institute has adapted its communications and relational activities to reaching certain segments like youth and Māori, as discussed above.

Analysis

The IINZ has met the criteria of internal marketing by pursuing a base strategy. As a Zionist cause group, the Israel Institute has pursued a base strategy by keeping its supporters

informed of its efforts to promote a favourable image of Israel in New Zealand, thus appealing to their affinity and support for Israel.

13.Fundraising

Finally, the Israel Institute has solicited donations to generate funds for both its communicational and advocacy activities. The IINZ's website (n.d.b) allows visitors to its website to make one-time or monthly donations. In addition, Dr Cumin has sought to solicit funds from pro-Israel supporters overseas including Australia. During an interview with J-AIR host Schulberg, Dr Cumin took the opportunity to encourage Australian listeners to support the IINZ's activities. These funds are used to support the IINZ's content production (IINZ, 2018q). The IINZ uses both communicational and relational methods in the form of its website and soliciting donations from other pro-Israel advocates to finance its informational output and advocacy work.

Analysis

The IINZ met two of the three criteria of the fundraising code. First, they solicited fundraising to support their online content production. Second, they solicited donations through their website. Unlike the NZPSN, the IINZ doesn't print posters and other paraphernalia. There is little information on whether it uses funds to organise public events, host international guests, or support charitable activities.

Conclusion

The conclusion discusses the combined findings of the content analysis and the interview with the Israel Institute's Director David Cumin. This research yielded useful information about the group's communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesions activities. These combined findings are discussed in the following sub-sections below:

Strengths

Communications

The Israel Institute covered all four communications criteria. Firstly, the think tank generated politically-useful pro-Israel information through its website and social media accounts. The website serves as their main information production hub while their Facebook, LinkedIn, Twitter, and YouTube accounts are used to disseminate their web articles and videos to a wider audience. Second, in terms of "strategic political communication", the Israel Institute has articulated pro-Israel political and historical narratives arguments, managed media coverage of Israel and its advocacy work, and organised at least two short-term campaigns. Several prevalent pro-Israel narratives articulated by the IINZ included Israel being a democracy; Israel being the historical homeland of the Jewish people; Israel wanting peace but the Arabs seeking its destruction; and Israel acting in self-defence against terrorism and anti-Semitism. These narratives reflect the IINZ's focus on rationalising Israeli actions and policies. Media management has taken the form of presenting Israeli actions and society in a favourable light and challenging perceived anti-Israel media bias in the mainstream media. Since the IINZ views itself as a think tank focusing on education, it refrains from organising protests, strikes, and pickets; traits associated with the PSNA.

Third, the IINZ has adapted well to changes in communications technology as shown by using their website and social media platforms to reach an Internet-savvy audience. Finally, the IINZ has fulfilled both characteristics of communication image management by combating negative publicity and perceptions of Israel particularly in the news media and promoting a favourable image of Israeli culture, society, tourism, and scientific research and development. To advance these objectives, the IINZ has produced and shared articles, videos, and even hosted several Israeli and pro-Israel experts.

Relational

The Israel Institute carried out most of the criteria of relational activities apart from lobbying policy makers and civil society actors. First, the IINZ has fulfilled both characteristics of cause promotion by utilizing two-way communications technologies such as social media platforms and participating in pro-Israel public gatherings such as the Celebrate Israel at 70 rally and the Aotearoa-Israel Powhiri. Reflecting the online nature of the IINZ's work, webpages and videos were often used to publicise pro-Israel gatherings. Second, the

IINZ has fulfilled both criteria of exerting leverage by lobbying and cultivating relationships with political elites, media, and civil society leaders with the goal of influencing New Zealand foreign policy, media coverage, and civil society links with Israel. The IINZ has also sought to hold political elites and the media to account for New Zealand's "imbalanced" foreign policy and media coverage regarding Israel. While the Israel Institute mainly used indirect methods such as websites, social media, and email newsletters, it also used direct methods such as phone calls and face-to-face meetings.

Third, the IINZ has engaged in coalition building by forging relationships, partnerships, and linkages with other pro-Israel civil society, media and political actors in New Zealand and abroad; the latter being discussed under transnational collaboration. As a web-oriented think tank, the IINZ's coalition building has focused on sharing and reproducing pro-Israel content produced by other groups. According to Cumin, the Israel Institute's coalition building activities has included encouraging close coordination with other like-mind pro-Israel groups. While the IINZ does work collaboratively to improve New Zealand public perceptions of Israel, it has not focused on bringing change to Israel-Palestine since that lies outside its stated mission to improve Israel's public image in New Zealand. Fourth, the IINZ has engaged in transnational collaboration by working with like-minded civil society, media and political actors on a global level to promote support for Israel and combat anti-Semitism. This transnational collaboration has taken the form of hosting guest speakers, attending conferences such as the 6th Global Forum for Combating Anti-Semitism, and sharing information. The content analysis and interview findings showed that the IINZ is part of an informal pro-Israel transnational advocacy network. Finally, the IINZ engaged in all four criteria of relational image management by sponsoring pro-Israel public events and gatherings; promoting Israeli and Jewish culture, heritage, and identity; and managing public perceptions of Israel in response to negative imagery associated with the Israel-Palestine conflict. While the Israel Institute lacked the resources to organise its own informational trips to Israel, Cumin encouraged tourism to Jerusalem to support Israel's claims to that historical city.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

First, the content analysis and interview with David Cumin showed that the Israel Institute has pursued the five-stages of a sales-oriented charity. First, the IINZ has sought to

promote Israel and Zionism and combat anti-Semitism and the BDS movement. Second, the IINZ has conducted public opinion polls and used segmentation to target young people and Māori via social media and the utilisation of Māori culture and pro-Israel personalities. Third, the IINZ has used the Internet, social media, and relational activities to reach a New Zealand audience. Fourth, the IINZ has engaged in some short-term campaigns with the goals of gauging NZ public sentiment towards Israel, influencing voting behaviour, and soliciting funds from sympathetic listeners. Finally, the Israel Institute has used its website, social media platforms and email newsletters to informs its supporters about its achievements and progress.

Second, in terms of segmentation and targeting, this research showed that the Israel Institute targeted two main segments: the "naïve and undecided" and pro-Israel supporters. Key pro-Israel supporters in NZ have been the Jewish and evangelical Christian communities, a pattern reflected in previous studies of pro-Israel interests groups. The presence of Māori, Pacific Islanders, Asians, Hindus, and Baha'is at the Celebrate Israel at 70 event reflects the ethnically and religiously diverse nature of this pro-Israel support base. The IINZ has also allocated resources including its social media presence, Māori culture and pro-Israel Māori individuals to influence two segments: the 16-30 age demographic and Māori.

Third, the interview found that the IINZ pursued a base strategy by keeping supporters informed about its efforts to promote a favourable image of Israel in New Zealand, thus appealing to their affinity and support for Israel. Fourth, the content analysis found that the IINZ has actively solicited donations through its website and conducted fundraising to support its informational output and advocacy work.

Limitations

The Israel Institute fulfilled most of the communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities and criteria. While there were several gaps in the content analysis around exerting leverage, marketing orientation, segmentation and targeting, and internal marketing, the interview with Dr Cumin helped fill these gaps. The interview showed that the:

- IINZ targeted a range of different actors through different communications and relational activities;

- Used its website, social media platform, and email newsletters to inform supporters about its achievements;

- Segmented its audience into pro-Israel supporters and the "naïve and uninformed", taking a particular interest in young people and social media;

- Pursued a base strategy based on pro-Israel advocacy.

There was one area where the Israel Institute did not fully follow the framework. In coalition building, the IINZ did not focus on bringing about change in Israel-Palestine. While the IINZ is certainly interested in events and developments in Israel-Palestine, it was more interested managing Israel's public image in New Zealand.

Research gaps

Due to spatial and time limitations, the content analysis only consulted content produced between late 2016 (around the time of the Israel Institute's emergence) and 6 August 2018. While the content analysis drew upon their website, Facebook, and Twitter accounts, it did not look at their LinkedIn and YouTube content since these accounts replicated content that had already been published on their website.

However, one issue that surfaced when integrating the interview findings into the chapter was Cumin's clarification that the IINZ targeted two major segments: the "naïve and undecided" and pro-Israel supporters. The content analysis suggested that the IINZ made specific outreaches to Māori by promoting Māori culture, arts, and pro-Israel individuals within that community. A follow-up email from Cumin clarified that the Israel Institute had established connections with a range of communities including Māori Christians. Based on this, the researcher concluded that the IINZ used culturally specific methods to reach out to certain demographics.

Overall findings

The IINZ largely followed most of the communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion categories of the analytical framework apart from coalition building's "seeking to bringing about change abroad." As a think tank, the Israel Institute produced pro-Israel content in various formats, took part in pro-Israel public events, and

lobbied politicians and journalists. The interview with Cumin clarified gaps in leveraging, marketing orientation, segmentation and targeting, and internal marketing.

The research has shown that Israel Institute has fulfilled most of the criteria of the four communications activities. First, the IINZ has produced pro-Israel information and research on its website, social media platforms, and several New Zealand media outlets. Second, IINZ has promoted pro-Israel arguments and messages through its own online output and various New Zealand media. Third, IINZ has used a range of communications technologies including its website and social media platforms. Fourth, the IINZ sought to promote a favourable image of Israel by counter negative imagery and promoting tourism and the Jewish connection to Israel.

The research has shown that IINZ has fulfilled most of the criteria of the five communications activities. First, IINZ has used public activities and social media to promote its cause. Second, IINZ has also engaged extensively in lobbying and accountability politics. Third, IINZ has built coalitions with a range of sympathetic individuals, groups, governments, media, and institutions in New Zealand. Fourth, APAN has participated in a transnational pro-Israel advocacy network by partnering with overseas groups and activists to defend Israel and combat anti-Semitism. Finally, IINZ has used public events and film screenings to assist Israeli public diplomacy efforts and work with like-minded allies including the Israeli Ambassador and other pro-Israel groups. However, IINZ did not fully follow the model. In terms of coalition building, the Israel Institute did not seek to bring change abroad due to its emphasis on defending Israel's image in New Zealand.

The research has shown that IINZ has fulfilled all four recruitment and internal cohesion activities: namely marketing orientation, "segmentation and targeting," internal marketing and fundraising. First, IINZ pursued a sale-orientation that involved using marketing intelligence and public opinion polling to identify supporters and designing effective communications and activities to reach them. Second, Cumin confirmed that the IINZ targeted two major segments – the "naïve and undecided" and pro-Israel supporters. In addition, it used social media platforms and relational activities to reach young people and Christian Māori. Third, IINZ has pursued a base strategy that involves appealing to its supporters' support for Israel and Zionism. Fourth, IINZ also engaged in fundraising through online donations and fundraisers.

Chapter 6: Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council

This chapter explores the communicational, relational, and recruitment activities of the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC), a pro-Israel Australian Jewish think tank and advocacy group. It will give a brief description of AIJAC before discussing the group's communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. This chapter presents the results of the content analysis of 292 primary sources: 138 webpages, 52 articles from AIJAC's *Australia/Israel Review* magazine, 11 videos, 49 Twitter posts, and 42 Facebook posts. These primary sources were supplemented by 16 secondary sources particularly the works of Reich (2004), Han and Rane (2013), and Gawenda (2020), which filled several gaps encountered during the content analysis.

Overview

AIJAC is a think tank and advocacy group dedicated to representing the Australian Jewish community to the government, media and other civil society actors. It was formed in 1997 through the merger of two earlier Jewish organisations: Australia-Israel Publications and the think tank Australian Institute of Jewish Affairs. While it devotes much of its informational output and advocacy work to Israel and the Middle East, AIJAC also deals with other issues of concern to the Australian Jewish community such as Islamism, terrorism, racism (including anti-Semitism), religious intolerance, war crimes justice, Holocaust denial, multiculturalism, and democracy. Its activities have included sponsoring guest speaking engagements, educational missions to Israel and the West Bank, publishing a monthly magazine called *Australia/Israel Review* (*AIR*), and networking with other liked-minded civil society groups and activists in Australia and the Jewish diaspora (Reich, 2004; Gawenda, 2020).

Communicational activities

1. Information politics

First, information dissemination appears to be a major characteristic of AIJAC's communication activities. AIJAC has used its website (https://aijac.org.au), its monthly *AIR*

magazine (which is available both in print and online), and Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/aijac.au), Twitter (https://twitter.com/AIJAC_Update), and YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/user/AIJACvideo) social media accounts to generate pro-Israel commentary and analysis on current affairs issues. As a think tank and advocacy group, AIJAC has focused on influencing public, media, and elite opinions on various issues of concern to the Australian Jewish community including Israel-Palestine, anti-Semitism, racism, multiculturalism, and security. Besides its informational activities, AIJAC analysts and staff members have also engaged with the media through op-ed columns, letters, and interviews. AIJAC's website consists of a current affairs blog called "Fresh Air," selected *AIR* magazine articles, externally-published op-ed columns and letters, press releases, email newsletters, and various audio-visual content (AIJAC, n.d.a). At the time of the content analysis, AIJAC published its video interviews on its website but these have since been relocated to its YouTube channel.

Analysis

AIJAC met the information politics code of the analytical framework by producing politically-usable information relating to Israel and Australian Jewish interests through its website, op-ed columns and letters, and by participating in media interviews and programs.

2. Strategic political communication

Second, AIJAC has engaged in strategic political communication by framing information in a way that advanced their cause and agenda with the goal of building sympathy for the two. This has taken the form of advancing pro-Israel arguments and messages; soliciting favourable media coverage of Israel and engaging in short-term campaigns on issues of interest to Australian Jewry. In addition to their informational and media output, AIJAC has also shared content on their Facebook and Twitter platforms.

Themes and narratives

AIJAC has engaged in symbolic politics to promote pro-Israel narratives, themes, arguments, and stories in their communications output. These were organised into three major categories: "pro-Israel", "counter-Palestinian", and "combating Anti-Semitism" themes and messages.

PRO-ISRAEL THEMES AND MESSAGES

First, AIJAC's pro-Israel themes and messages has sought to counter negative reports and perceptions about Israel while promoting Israel as modern, democratic, prosperous, and technological advanced success story. Key issues have defending Israeli policies and actions, Israel wanting peace, Israeli democracy, and Israeli prosperity and innovation.

AIJAC has defended several contentious Israeli policies and actions that have generated international attention:

- Defending Israeli military actions including the 2010 *Mavi Marmara* raid, the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars, and the 2018 Gaza March of Return as legitimate and proportionate responses to hostile threats against Israel's national security (AIJAC, 2010; 2014l; Fleischer, 2012b; Rubenstein, 2018d).
- Defending the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children as a response to violent crimes fuelled by anti-Semitic incitement (Rubenstein, 2014a).
- Defending Israel's decision to install metal detectors at Al Aqsa Mosque during the 2017 Temple Mount Crisis by drawing attention to similar security measures at Mecca and the Vatican (Frantzman, 2017).
- Defending Israeli settlements in the West Bank, contending that settlement expansion has been exaggerated and that they do not pose a threat to a two-state solution (A. Shapiro, 2018a).

These reports and stories reflect AIJAC's efforts to manage Israel's public image by countering critical media coverage and rationalising Israeli policies and actions.

In addition, AIJAC has also advanced the narrative that Israel wants peace with its Arab neighbours by highlighting:

- Israel's willingness to trade 1,000 Palestinian prisoners to secure the release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit (Rubenstein, 2011).
- Israeli efforts to facilitate humanitarian assistance and basic supplies into the blockaded Gaza Strip (Mittelman, 2014b)
- Israeli medical assistance to Syrians (A. Shapiro, 2013c).
- Israeli diplomatic outreaches to several Sunni Arab states and Indonesia (Nadel, 2012b).

These articles seek to combat the anti-Israel narrative of Israel as a racist, Zionist entity occupying Palestinian land and to highlight Israel's humanitarian side.

In terms of Israeli democracy and human rights, AIJAC has published content highlighting religious freedom and Israeli-Arab success stories to combat the narrative that Israel is a racist, "ethno-state" where non-Jews are second-class citizens including:

- Highlighting Israeli government programmes and initiatives to aid Israeli Arab integration and help Palestinian children (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012d; AIJAC, 2017f)
- Highlighting Israel's achievements in women's rights, seeking to emphasize Israel's modernity and advances by minorities (N. Levin, 2018).
- Condemning "price tag attacks" against Palestinians such as the 2014 murder of Mohamed Abu Khdeir and the 2015 Duma village arson attack as the actions of extremist Jewish elements (Rubenstein and Leibler, 2014; 2015).

This allows AIJAC to draw a moral equivalence between Israeli condemnation of extremist violence and Fatah and Hamas' incitement of violence against Israel. Most importantly, it allows AIJAC to position itself as a pro-Israel group that is committed to human rights, peaceful coexistence, and anti-racism.

Finally, AIJAC has also produced content highlighting Israeli economic prosperity and technological innovation:

- Promoting Israel as a successful market economy and gas exporter, combating the conflict imagery associated with the Middle East region (Asa-El, 2018; S. Levin, 2017c).
- Publicising Israeli water and agricultural expertise and management systems, disaster management policies, the information technology industry, and solar energy (A. Shapiro, 2012a; Rubenstein, 2016a; "Yosef Abramowitz on Israel's green energy outreach, human rights and environmental activism," 2018).

These articles seek to brand Israel as a business-friendly place with the goal of encouraging Australian investment and trade with Israel.

COUNTER-PALESTINIAN THEMES AND MESSAGES

Second, AIJAC's "counter-Palestinian" themes and messages have sought to blame the plight of the Palestinians on Palestinian hostility and rejection of Israel. Key issues have

included Palestinian intransigence, incitement, violence, and terrorism, the Hamas threat, "good Palestinians," and highlighting Palestinian stories ignored by the mainstream media.

AIJAC has advanced the theme of Palestinian intransigence in its communications output:

- Asserting that the Palestinian Authority has rejected Israel's peace offers and sought to circumvent bilateral peace negotiations by using the United Nations (UN) to exert pressure on Israel. This is connected to the pro-Israel narrative that the UN is institutionally biased against Israel (Rubenstein, 2017a; Fleischer, 2013).

- Producing numerous reports of alleged Palestinian incitement, violence, and terrorism against Israel, focusing on Israeli victims of terror attacks, the promotion of violence by the Palestinian leadership and society, and the misuse of foreign aid for terrorism purposes including the Palestinian Authority's "Pay to Slay" programme which Israel alleges incentivises Palestinian terrorists by rewarding their families with financial support (Rubenstein, 2016b; Burack, 2018).

These support the Israeli narrative that the Palestinians are not genuinely interested in peace and that Palestinians society is infected with anti-Semitic hatred.

AIJAC has also produced content attacking Hamas as an anti-Semitic, Islamic extremist terror organisation hell-bent on Israel's destruction:

- Publishing content highlighting Hamas in a negative light including the indoctrination of Palestinian youths into "terrorist fighters," the alleged usage of human shields, the diversion of foreign aid money for terrorism purposes, Hamas terror attacks on Israel, and the harassment of journalists in Gaza (Avi-Guy, 2013d; AIJAC, 2012b; Hyams, 2016; Shapiro, A. & AIJAC Staff, 2018c; AIJAC, 2014e).

- Disputing media reports of Hamas' reconciliatory tone towards Israel in 2017. While recognising that Hamas' 2017 policy manifesto eliminated anti-Semitic language, Shapiro countered that Hamas was still committed to its goal of establishing a Palestinian state from "the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea," effectively Israel. He also emphasised that the Hamas policy manifesto did not replace the Hamas Charter, which still calls for Israel's destruction and contains anti-Semitic language (A. Shapiro, 2017d).

- Blaming Hamas for instigating the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars and the 2018 March of Return. (Asa-El, 2012; 2014; Rubenstein, 2018e).

For AIJAC, Hamas is devoid of any redeeming qualities since it embodies two forces antagonistic towards Israel: Islamic extremism and radical Palestinian nationalism. In addition, Hamas' uncompromising commitment to a Palestinian state from the "river to the sea" and anti-Semitic ideology only justifies its pariah status.

While AIJAC's coverage of the Palestinians has been overwhelmingly negative, the think tank has also promoted "good Palestinians" who support normalisation with Israel such as former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, Palestinian-American businessman Bashar Masri, and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) Executive Committee secretary-general Yasser Abed Rabbo.

- Sympathetic coverage of Masri's ambitious project to build a planned Palestinian city called Rawabi. (AIJAC, 2015b).
- Promoting Al Quds University Professor Mohammed Dajani Daoudi for defending normalisation and academic ties with Israel and criticising the BDS campaign (Kahana, 2018).

In AIJAC's view, these "good Palestinians" are friends of Israel because they support normalisation of relations with Israel and reject both the BDS movement's campaign to isolate Israel and Hamas' policy of destroying Israel.

To draw away attention from the Israel-Palestine conflict and military occupation, AIJAC has also highlighted Palestinian-related stories ignored by the media such as the Syrian Army's 2012 bombardment of the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp, which killed 400 residents. AIJAC analyst Sharyn Mittelman (2012d) criticised Palestinian advocates for failing to condemn the Assad regime's actions, suggesting that they employed a double standard against Israel. In AIJAC's view, the international community only cares for Palestinians when they are killed by Israelis; reinforcing the pro-Israel narrative that the United Nations practises "double standards" against Israel.

COMBATING ANTI-SEMITISM

Third, AIJAC has devoted considerable content to raising awareness of anti-Semitism, focusing particularly on anti-Zionism, the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS)

movement, Arab-Muslim and left-wing anti-Semitism. In addition, AIJAC has also monitored right-wing and Christian anti-Semitism. While AIJAC does acknowledge that Israeli society has problems with racism towards Arabs such as the "price tag attacks", it claims that criticism of Israel has been hijacked by those seeking to delegitimize Israel and to promote anti-Jewish hatred (Falkenstein, 2014c).

AIJAC opposes anti-Zionism since it regards Zionism as a Jewish self-determination movement seeking to restore Jews to their ancestral homeland:

- Mittelman (2013a) has condemned the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for his remarks equating Zionism with fascism and racism.
- *AIR Magazine* editor Tzvi Fleischer has condemned former British Labour Mayor Ken Livingstone for claiming that the Zionists collaborated with the Nazis prior to World War II (AIJAC, 2017p).

For AIJAC, Zionism emerged as a response to centuries of anti-Semitic persecution and pogroms in Europe, climaxing in the Holocaust. Rather than a colonialist movement, Zionism merely seeks to restore the Jews to their historical homeland; a position shared by Israel and numerous Jewish and pro-Israel groups. Critics argue that this narrative ignores the centuries-long Palestinian Arab presence in the Holy Land and justifies the dispossession and victimisation of Arabs.

Reflecting their diametrically opposed aims and goals, AIJAC regards the BDS Movement as an anti-Semitic hate movement seeking to destroy Israel. As discussed earlier, the BDS Movement (n.d.a) is a Palestinian-led global network of civil society groups seeking to advance Palestinian rights and statehood by exerting international economic and social pressure on Israel. AIJAC has monitored several BDS campaigns in Australia and abroad including:

- the Max Brenner boycott campaign and the 2011 Marrickville Council's divestment policy targeting Israel (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2011b)
- a 2012 Nakba Day march in Sydney (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012c)[2]
- the University of Sydney Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (CPACS)' boycott of Israeli academics (A. Shapiro, 2012b)

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[2] The Nakba (literally "Disaster) is a term used by Palestinians to the Palestinian refugee crisis that occurred during the creation of Israel during the 1948 War (Ibish, 2018; BBC, 2018).

- Australians for Palestine's (AFP) 2013 boycott campaign against Israeli Jaffa oranges (Rose, 2013).

- The Soda Stream boycott campaign (AIJAC, 2014c)

- The disruption of British Colonel Richard Kemp's 2015 talk at the University of Sydney (Falkenstein, 2015a)

- The boycott of the superhero film *Wonder Woman* which featured Israeli actress Gal Gadot as the eponymous character (Beroff, 2017).

In addition, AIJAC has criticised dissident Jewish and Israeli advocates and groups such as the Australian Jewish Democratic Society (AJDS), B'Tselem, and Justine Sach's "Dayenu: New Zealand Jews Against the Occupation" as fringe elements that do not represent the Jewish diaspora and Israel (Reich, 2004; Mittelman, 2015a; Bell, 2018a). AIJAC regards the BDS Movement and affiliated Palestinian solidarity activists' calls for Palestinian justice, rights and ending the Israeli military occupation is a smokescreen for an anti-Israel agenda. Since Israel is the expression of Jewish identity and aspirations, BDS activism is seen as a gateway to anti-Semitism from a pro-Israel perspective. Due to its Zionist orientation, AIJAC views Palestinian advocates and groups including dissident Jewish elements as opponents whose arguments and actions need to be refuted and challenged.

AIJAC has focused on monitoring Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism, reflecting the strong anti-Jewish and anti-Israel feelings emanating from this segment.

- Producing reports and articles challenging the Pact of Umar's vaunted tolerance towards Jews and non-Muslims, highlighting the expulsion of Jews from Arab countries following the 1948 War; and drawing attention to anti-Semitic and anti-Israel sentiment within the Australian Muslim community, media, and religious material (Fleischer, 2014; Mittelman, 2012c; Ahmed, 2016; Porat, 2018a).

- Producing articles on the Hypercacher kosher supermarket siege and the Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris in early 2015 drawing a link between Islamic extremism and anti-Semitism (AIJAC, 2015n; 2015o).

These AIJAC articles and posts advance the narrative that anti-Semitism and its anti-Israel variation is embedded in Muslim society and predates the establishment of Israel. This narrative seeks to counter the pro-Palestinian narrative that Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism and hostility towards Israel is the result of the Israeli dispossession, occupation, and marginalization of Palestinians. Meanwhile, the association of Islamic extremism with anti-

Semitism reflects AIJACs' efforts to link support for Israel to Western counter-terrorism efforts in the War on Terror. To counter suggestions that AIJAC promotes Islamophobia, AIJAC has enlisted sympathetic Australian Muslim guest columnists like Dr Tanveer Ahmed, defended Australian Labor Member of Parliament Ed Husic's decision to take his oath of office on the Quran, and condemned the Christchurch mosque shootings as an act of "right wing racist terrorism." (Ahmed, 2016; AIJAC, 2013a, 2019).

AIJAC content on left-wing anti-Zionism has focused on defending Zionism and Israel from charges of racism and aggression, countering the "Palestinian David versus Israeli Goliath" trope, and highlighting the overlap between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism (Fleischer, 2012a; A. Shapiro, 2016d).

- Opposed the election of the "hard-left" pro-Palestinian Jeremy Corbyn as leader of the British Labour Party for causing an upsurge of anti-Semitism within the centre-left party (David, 2016).
- Criticising the double standards of Australian Greens Senator Lee Rhiannon for publicizing the mistreatment of cattle at the Israeli Bakar Tnuva abbatoir while ignoring similar animal rights abuses in Gaza (A. Shapiro, 2013d).

AIJAC's criticisms of Corbyn and Rhiannon reflect the Israeli and Jewish diaspora narrative that anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism are intertwined and inseparable. Pro-Israel assertions of left-wing anti-Semitism have proven controversial since the political left generally characterizes itself as anti-racist and pro-human rights in orientation. Within many left-wing quarters worldwide, Israel is increasingly seen as a "racist, Apartheid state" and lackey of American imperialism. Zionism has also been criticised as an ethnocentric ideology due to its perceived incongruence with socialism, which focuses on class differences and internationalism. While pro-Palestinian left-wing elements have sought to distinguish anti-Semitism from anti-Zionism, AIJAC argues they are indistinguishable.

In addition, AIJAC has also devoted some coverage to right-wing and Christian anti-Semitism:

- AIJAC's Director of International and Community Affairs Jones (2011; 2017) drew attention to the anti-Semitic views of Norwegian mass shooter Anders Breivik and criticised controversial Australian writer Helen Demidenko for promoting anti-Semitic tropes in her novel.

- Meanwhile, fellow analysts Falkenstein and Narunsky (2016) produced a scathing factfinder on the policies of several minor far right Australian political parties during the 2016 Australian federal election; drawing attention to their racist and exclusionary rhetoric.

- AIJAC has criticised pro-Palestinian Christian advocates including the US-based Israel Palestine Mission Network (IPMN) for promoting a supersessionist theology and "misunderstanding" the Israel-Palestine conflict (Jones, 2014).

Reflecting its broader commitment to anti-racism and multiculturalism, AIJAC has condemned neo-Nazism, White supremacy, Holocaust denial, anti-immigrant sentiment, and Islamophobia. AIJAC's opposition to far right extremism shows that it has positioned itself as a liberal, mainstream community organisation that supports a multicultural Australia. AIJAC and other Jewish groups have also sought to combat what it regards as Christian manifestations of anti-Semitism including supersessionism (also known as "Replacement theology" and "Fulfilment theology") which claims that Christians have replaced Jews as God's "Chosen people". Historically, supersessionism has been associated with anti-Semitism within the Catholic and Protestant denominations (McDowell, Church, Tollestrup, Chapman, and Yule, 2009; F. Shapiro, 2015). Thus, Jewish groups like AIJAC are naturally suspicious of Christian ideologies and teachings that downplay the Jewish connection to Israel, especially one that has been adopted by some pro-Palestinian Christian advocates.

Reflecting AIJAC's focus, its themes and messages can be categorized into three broad categories: managing Israel's image, "counter-Palestinian" themes and messages, and combating anti-Semitism. They show that AIJAC positions itself as a pro-Israel and Zionist organisation that is also committed to multiculturalism, anti-racism, and promoting harmonious relations between different faiths and ethnic communities.

Media management

Besides its own informational output, AIJAC staffers have also submitted op-ed columns and letters, and participated in interviews with Australian broadcast media outlets in order to manage Israel's media and image. AIJAC seeks to combat negative media coverage and perceptions of Israel and to highlight positive stories about Israel. The table below outlines the media outlets that AIJAC has published op-ed columns, letters, and solicited interviews between 6 August 2010 and 6 August 2018:

Figure 15 AIJAC's media engagement (6 August 2010 - 6 August 2018)	
Media outlet	**Topics**
The Advertiser	Praised the South Australian Legislative Council for voting against a motion calling for the unilateral recognition of Palestine (Lerman, 2017).
The Age	Defended Israeli home demolitions (Hyams, 2014b) and the relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem (Rubenstein, 2017c).
The Australian	Discussed Australian aid money to the Palestinians, the BDS-inspired 2011 Max Bremner chocolate boycott campaign, the controversial *Promise* mini-series, Professor Johan Galtung's anti-Israel remarks, defending Israeli settlements, the ABC's controversial *Stone Cold Justice* documentary, and former Foreign Minister Bob Carr's controversial memoir (Ostrovsky, 2011; Meyerowitz-Katz, 2011b; Hyams and Fleischer, 2012; Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012a; Rubenstein, 2012b; 2014a; 2014b). Also penned a letter challenging Palestinian solidarity activist Sonja Karkar's claim that Israel massacred civilians during the 2014 Gaza War (AIJAC, 2014g).
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)	Published columns on Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons, Sydney University's CPACS Director Jake Lynch's boycott of Israeli academics, Shurat HaDin's lawsuit against Lynch, blaming Hamas for civilian casualties during the 2014 Gaza War, criticising the BDS Movement as anti-Semitic, the 2015 "Knife Intifada," and defending American historian and Middle East Forum (MEF) President Daniel Pipes' 2018 visit to Australia (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012b; 2012f; 2013b; Falkenstein, 2014a; 2014d; 2015b; Rubenstein, 2018a).

AIJAC staff members have also appeared as guests on ABC News reports, providing commentary on the 2013 Israeli elections, Israeli settlements, Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull's 2017 visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories, the relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and Israel's Nation State Law (ABC News24, 2013; 2017a; 2017b; 2018a; 2018b). |
Australian Financial Review	Op-ed columns criticising Australia's abstention during the 2012 UN General Assembly vote to upgrade Palestine's membership status, defending the Coalition Government's revision of East Jerusalem's status, and defending Israel's conduct during the 2014 Gaza War (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012e; Rubenstein, 2014c; 2014d).
Australian Jewish News	Published AIJAC analyst Sharyn Mittelman's (2013b) article comparing the Australian Labor Party and Coalition's policies towards Israel and the Jewish community and Rubenstein's article criticising the Australian Jewish Association for hosting alt-right nationalist Lauren Southern (AIJAC, 2018k).
Brisbane Times	Published AIJAC analyst A. Shapiro's (2014) article about his fact-finding trip to Sderot shortly after the 2014 Gaza War, which emphasised the threat posed by Hamas and Israel's efforts to make peace with the Palestinians.
Canberra Times	Published op-ed columns and letters praising Foreign Minister Bob Carr for urging Palestinians to pursue negotiations with Israel, praising Foreign Minister Julie Bishop as a friend of Israel, and

	criticising UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2334 (Rubenstein, 2012a; Mittelman, 2013c; Rubenstein, 2017a; 2017c).
Daily Telegraph (Australia)	Published op-ed columns criticising ABC and SBS for using Al Jazeera stories as part of their foreign media coverage and criticising the Palestinians for misusing Australian aid money to reward Palestinian terrorists. (Rubenstein, 2017b; Mittelman, 2018).
Dominion Post	Published a joint op-ed column by New Zealand political scientist Dov Bing and Executive Director Rubenstein (2017c) criticising New Zealand's sponsorship of UNSC Resolution 2334.
Herald Sun	Published columns responding to Palestinian activist Joseph Wakim's criticisms of Israel and presenting Israel as a success story (Hyams, 2014a; Rubenstein, 2018b).
Jakarta Post	Published Rubenstein's (2018d) letter defending Israel's Nation-State law.
The New Zealand Herald	Published Nadel and Fleischer's (2012) op-ed column discussing how Israeli musicians and singers build bridges with other Middle Eastern countries, facilitating cultural diplomacy.
Online Opinion	Published Falkenstein's (2014b) op-ed column highlighting Israel's efforts to expose Hamas "terror tunnels."
Special Broadcasting Service (SBS)	SBS World News (2018) hosting Rubenstein as a guest on a news report about Druze protests against Israel's Nation State Law.
Sky News Australia	Sky News AM Agenda has hosted AIJAC analysts Or Avi- Guy and Jamie Hyams, who defended Israeli actions including airstrikes into Syria and Israel's handling of the 2018 Gaza Land March (AIJAC, 2013b; Sky News AM Agenda, 2018). The news channel has hosted several AIJAC-sponsored guest speakers including Jonathan Spyer, Bassem Eid and Colonel Richard Kemp (AIJAC, 2015j; 2015r; 2018h).
Sydney Morning Herald	Published op-ed columns defending Israel's ground offensive during the 2014 Gaza War, praising the Trump Administration's decision to relocate the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and marking the 70th anniversary of Israel's independence (Mittelman, 2014c; Rubenstein, 2017c; 2018c). Also published letters defending Israel's policy of demolishing Palestinian homes as a terror deterrent (Hyams, 2014b;
The Strategist	Published Fleischer's (2018) article presenting the Israeli perspective on the Gaza March of Return in response to US academic Mohammed Ayoob's article defending the Gaza March and criticising Israel.

This sample of 52 op-ed columns, letters, video interviews, and social media posts shows that AIJAC has targeted several prominent media outlets such as ABC, SBS, Sky News Australia, *The Australian*, *Sydney Morning Herald*, and *The Age*, which reach substantial national audiences. In addition, AIJAC also published in specialist publications such as the *Australian Jewish News*, On-Line Opinion, and *The Strategist.* By engaging with the media, AIJAC not only provides a pro-Israel perspective but also reinforces its public profile as a pro-Israel media watchdog. While AIJAC mainly focused on Australian media and publications, it also

occasionally published in some neighbouring foreign media outlets like *The New Zealand Herald* and Indonesia's *Jakarta Post.* Reflecting its priorities, most of its solicited content deal with events and developments of concern to the Jewish community in Australia, Israel-Palestine and the wider world. Many of these articles and videos were subsequently republished on AIJAC's website and social media platforms to highlight the advocacy group's media outreach.

Short-term campaigns

AIJAC has engaged in short-term campaigns by publishing content on their website, *AIR* magazine, social media platforms, and external media in response to newsworthy developments in Israel-Palestine, Australia, and the world of interest to the Australian Jewish community and pro-Israel supporters. A sampling of their website and social media posts showed that AIJAC devoted extensive coverage to certain current affairs events and developments including elections in Israel, Australia, and New Zealand, the 2012 Gaza War, the 2014 Gaza War, Prime Minister Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia, the 2018 March of Return, and the 2018 Nation State Law. These are listed in the table below:

Figure 16 AIJAC's short-term campaigns (2010-2018)					
Topics	**Articles**	**Videos**	**Facebook**	**Twitter**	**Total**
Israeli elections (2013, 2015)	4	1	2		7
Australian elections (2010, 2013, 2016)	5		1	2	8
New Zealand elections (2011, 2014, 2017)	4				4
2012 Gaza War	3	1	1	2	7
2014 Gaza War	13		4	4	21
Netanyahu's 2017 state visit	3		2	2	7
2018 March of Return	7	1	2	1	11
2018 Nation State Law	3		1	1	5

During data collection, the researcher used critical case sampling to filter the number of AIJAC webpages, videos, Facebook, and Twitter posts based on certain themes and issues, which became critical case sampling categories. Using these methods, the researcher was able to reduce the number of AIJAC webpages and videos from 3,443 to 335 sources (roughly

10%). For AIJAC's Twitter and Facebook posts, Tweet Tunnel and Netvizz respectively were used to retrieve historical posts between August 2010 and August 2018. Critical case sampling was also used to generate samples of 174 Tweets and 174 Facebook posts; roughly 5% and 7.5% of the total number of roughly 3,000 Twitter and 2,290 Facebook posts respectively. To ensure consistency, two posts were selected a month. The researcher was able to identify a spike in the publication of topics related to certain current affairs issues like the 2014 Gaza War and the 2018 March of Return, which shows that AIJAC takes a keen interest in current affairs developments relating to both Israel-Palestinian and Australian Jewish interests. As discussed earlier, AIJAC seeks to promote Israel in a positive light and combat negative imagery and media coverage.

Analysis

AIJAC engaged in all three criteria of strategic political communication by advancing pro-Israel themes and messages, managing media coverage of Israel by soliciting pro-Israel op-ed columns and taking part in media interviews, and engaging in short-term campaigns relating to current affairs relating to Israel-Palestine and other issues of interest to Australian Jewry.

First, AIJAC has produced content promoting Israel in a favourable light, criticising the Palestinians, and exposing anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. In general, AIJAC defended controversial Israeli policies and military actions against the Palestinians while promoting Israel as a thriving democracy with a prosperous economy and technological innovation. "Price tag" attacks against Palestinians were condemned as the actions of Israeli extremists who did not represent Israeli and Jewish norms and values. AIJAC's Palestinian political communications has presented the Palestinians particularly the Palestinian Authority and Hamas as intransigent and untrustworthy. There is also a focus on Palestinian terrorism, violence, incitement, and indoctrination. Despite its largely negative coverage of the Palestinians, AIJAC has also highlighted stories of "good Palestinians" who support normalisation with Israel. As a Jewish organisation, AIJAC has devoted extensive coverage to anti-Semitism. While AIJAC currently focuses on anti-Zionism and Arab-Muslim anti-Semitism in relation to its pro-Israel advocacy work, AIJAC has also covered far right and Christian anti-Semitism. These three major themes reflect the Zionist ideological worldview that underpins much of AIJAC's communications output. While AIJAC has used political

and ideological themes and stories to communicate their messages and increase awareness, it has not undertaken protest activities since it prefers to promote change through persuasion and lobbying. It is also unclear whether AIJAC uses its communication output to recruit new staff members.

Second, AIJAC has sought to manage media coverage and commentary on issues of interest to the Australian-Jewish community by producing op-ed columns, letters, and taking part in current affairs interviews with broadcast media. These not only articulate a pro-Israel perspective but also enable AIJAC staff members to build a rapport with the media and raise the organisation's public profile. While this research found that AIJAC exploited media coverage of international events in Israel-Palestine with the goal of raising domestic support for their causes, it did not measure their impact on influencing public opinion. While most of its media solicitation content focused on Israel-related conflicts and crises, AIJAC also engaged in "destination promotion" by promoting Israel as a functioning democracy and innovation hub.

Third, AIJAC engaged in short-term campaigns by covering issues of interest to Australian-Jewish community including Israel-Palestine, Australian-Israel bilateral relations, and election cycles. In short, AIJAC's political communication activities are heavily influenced by current affairs developments and media cycles, with a focus on managing Israel's public image in Australia. AIJAC also eschews protest activities in favour of promoting its goals through persuasion and lobbying.

3. Communications adaptation

As discussed earlier, AIJAC has used a range of communications media and platform including its website, *AIR* magazine, its Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube social media platforms, and its email newsletters to reach a wide pro-Israel audience. AIJAC's website and *AIR* magazine serve as its formal channels while its email newsletters and social media platforms serve as its informal channels. AIJAC produces email newsletters for its Fresh Air and Update blogs while its Facebook and Twitter channels are used to share information about its advocacy activities and sympathetic news and stories. Finally, AIJAC used its YouTube account to publish videos and media interviews. Since AIJAC's YouTube video content was previously published on their website during the content analysis phase, these

were not analysed. Since AIJAC's website has been discussed earlier this section focuses on their Facebook and Twitter accounts. This research undertook a content analysis of AIJAC's Facebook and Twitter social media output between August 2010 and August 2018, which were organised under the following categories: Australian-Israel relations, Israel, Palestine, and the BDS Movement.

In terms of Australia-Israel relations, AIJAC has shared several stories and reports relating to:

- Praising Treasurer Joe Hockey for pursuing a Double Taxation Agreement between Australia and Israel (AIJAC, 2015d).
- Australia voting against a resolution at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calling upon Israel to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty in September 2015 (AIJAC, 2015k).
- Israeli President Reuben Rivlin's state visit to Australia in March 2016 (AIJAC, 2016e)
- shared Australian and Israeli interests in combating radical Islam and rogue nuclear states (AIJAC, 2016m).
- Israeli military guest speakers speaking at an AIJAC-sponsored function in Sydney (AIJAC, 2016v)
- the centenary of the Battle of Beersheba in November 2017 (AIJAC, 2017u).
- coverage of their Ramban information missions to Israel (AIJAC, 2016u; 2018s)

These social media posts spread awareness of the friendly Australian-Israel bilateral relationship while also highlighting some of AIJAC's Ramban missions.

AIJAC's Israel-related social media posts have covered a range of issues including the democracy, human rights, healthcare, technological innovation, disaster relief, and foreign relations:

- In terms of human rights and democracy, sharing positive stories about Israeli Arabs studying at Israeli universities, Arab medical graduates entering the work force, Israel's first female sharia court judge Hana Khatib, Arab and Jewish medical professionals working together, and a settler leader helping a Palestinian man who

lost his job for helping Israeli terror victims (AIJAC, 2014j; 2016o; 2017h; 2015l; 2016i).

- In terms of healthcare, sharing favourable media coverage of Israeli's military emergency response teams and the ReWalk exoskeleton for spinal cord injury victims (AIJAC, 2016l; 2018o).

- In terms of technological innovation, sharing favourable media coverage of agricultural water conservation and the use of Israeli company Maxtech's communications technology during the 2018 Tham Luang cave rescue (AIJAC, 2011c; 2018j).

- Raising awareness of Israeli disaster relief activities including IsraAid's efforts to help Syrian, Iraqi and Pakistani refugees in Europe, disaster relief following a 2016 earthquake in Ecuador (AIJAC, 2015s; 2016t).

- Israel's establishment of a diplomatic mission in the United Arab Emirates (AIJAC, 2015u).

Like its online and media output, AIJAC's social media output seeks to promote a positive image of Israel in the areas of human rights, healthcare, technological innovation, and participation in international affairs. Positive stories about Israeli Arabs help counter the Palestinian narrative that Israel is a racist, Apartheid state while stories about Israeli health and technological innovation reinforce the discourse of Israel being a success story. Finally, highlighting Israel's disaster relief efforts and Israel's rapprochement with Gulf States like the UAE helps advance the narrative that Israel is a good international citizen that wants peace with its neighbours.

AIJAC's Palestinian-related social media output have sought to advance pro-Israel themes and messages about Palestinian aggression, incitement, intransigence, and terrorism:

- In terms of Palestinian aggression, AIJAC's social media output during the 2018 Gaza War focused on Hamas' aggressive actions such as sending incendiary kites and rockets into Israel (AIJAC, 2018p; 2018r). AIJAC (2018q) also shared a media story about the presence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants among Palestinian casualties.

- Exploiting media coverage about anti-Israel incitement in Palestinian textbooks and a Palestinian diplomat defending stone-throwing as acts of resistance against Israeli troops (AIJAC, 2016g; 2018g).

- Sharing media stories promoting the theme of Palestinian intransigence including President Mahmoud Abbas rejecting Israel's historical claims to the Holy Land and an UN-brokered deal to resettle Palestinian refugees from Syria in the West Bank and Gaza (AIJAC, 2017u; 2015q).

- Exploiting media coverage of Palestinian terrorism including the killing of Israeli Sergeant Tuvia Yanai Weissman and the Palestinian Authority "rewarding" the families of two Palestinian killers named Omar al-Abed and Nimer Mahmoud Ahmed Jamal through their Martyr Fund program, which Israel and its allies have described as a "pay to slay" program that encourages the murder of Israelis (AIJAC, 2016p; 2017i; 2017s).

As with their other content, these social media posts advance pro-Israel narratives about Palestinian duplicity, violence, incitement, and aggression against Israel. Stories about incitement and violence advance the narratives that Palestinian society is saturated with anti-Semitism. Stories about Palestinian rejections of peace offers advance the Israeli narrative that the Palestinians "never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity." Terrorism-related stories seek to convince readers that the Palestinian Fatah and Hamas leadership condone the killing of Israeli Jews as acts of resistance, making them an untrustworthy peace partner.

Reflecting AIJAC's interest in monitoring anti-Semitism, their social media posts have shared content casting the BDS Movement in a negative light including:

- Highlighting the damage to the Palestinian economy caused by BDS activism (AIJAC, 2015f).

- Palestinian solidarity activists' alleged promotion of anti-Semitic and anti-Israel hatred and intimidation at American universities (AIJAC, 2016q).

- British punk band The Stranglers defying a BDS call to boycott Israel (AIJAC, 2016m).

- Disputing the BDS Movement's victories and achievements (AIJAC, 2017e).

These posts promote the narrative that the BDS Movement promotes hatred, racism, and violence against Jews and Israelis. Rather than a legitimate human rights movement and international civil society actor, the BDS Movement is regarded as the latest manifestation of anti-Semitism that threatens the legitimacy of Israel.

Thus, AIJAC uses its Facebook and Twitter posts to promote Australian-Israel bilateral relations and disseminate pro-Israel messages about events and issues concerning Israel, the Palestinians and BDS movement. Besides promoting the idea that Israel and Australia are natural allies, AIJAC seeks to combat perceptions of Israel being a racist, Apartheid state and highlight Israel's achievements and contributions to the international community. Reflecting its pro-Israel agenda, AIJAC attributes the Palestinians' predicament to the rejectionism, incitement, and violence promoted by the Palestinian leadership and society. Similarly, the BDS Movement is presented as a hate movement motivated by anti-Semitism rather than a legitimate civil society actor working to advance Palestinian rights. While AIJAC's social media output is aimed at an Australian audience, it reinforces the messages and narratives of the Israeli Government and sympathetic civil society groups and media. In short, AIJAC has skilfully harnessed the Internet and social media as "force multipliers" to advance its informational output and advocacy work.

Analysis

AIJAC has met all three criteria of communications adaptation. First, it has used a wide range of communications mediums and platforms to disseminate their message to a wide audience. Second, AIJAC maintains formal channels like its website and *AIR* magazine. Third, AIJAC's Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube accounts function as informal channels that help advance its communications output and advocacy work. While AIJAC still publishes print editions of *AIR* magazine and actively engages in traditional lobbying, AIJAC has recognized the importance of the Internet to keeping up with their supporters and audience. In short, the AIJAC has adapted well to advances in communications technology by utilizing a wide range of print and online media platforms.

4. Communicational image management

In line with its stated mission to "highlight and counteract instances of anti-Israel bias and misinformation in the Australian media and wider public debate", AIJAC has sought to manage Israel's public image. This has taken the form of promoting a favourable image of Israel (particularly bilateral relations, democracy, human rights, economic development, trade, and innovation) and combating negative imagery and perceptions of Israel (particularly in the news media) through its website, *AIR* magazine, media engagement, and social media platforms. Through nation branding, AIJAC (2013c) has sought to promote Israel as a

successful, prosperous democracy that has triumphed against adversity and belongs to the international community of nations. Most importantly, AIJAC regards Israel as the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people. As a subset of public diplomacy, nation branding has traditionally been used to promote a country's tourism, economic investment, trade, art, culture, music, and heritage but can also be used to counter negative international images of a country or destination (Van Ham, 2001; Gilboa, 2008).

Positive image management

AIJAC's "positive image management" have focused on promoting favourable coverage of Australian-Israeli bilateral relations, Israeli socio-economic development, and international engagement.

AIJAC has sought to raise awareness about the benefits of bilateral relations between Australia and Israel:

- In terms of bilateral relations, AIJAC has highlighted Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia and both federal and state governments' expressions of support for Israel (S. Levin, 2017b; AIJAC, 2018e; Lerman, 2017).
- In terms of historical ties, A. Shapiro (2017e) highlighted the centenary of the Battle of Beersheba in October 2017, emphasising the Australia and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) Mounted Division's contributions to the British victory in the Palestine campaign of the First World War, which Shapiro argued paved the way for the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent establishment of Israel.
- In terms of economic trade and cooperation, AIJAC has highlighted Woodside Petroleum's 2012 investment in Israel's Leviathan natural gas field and cooperation between local governments, start-up companies and the agricultural sector in Australia and Israel (AIJAC, 2016s; 2012e; Rubenstein, 2016a; AIJAC, 2017j).

Reflecting its pro-Israel advocacy mission, AIJAC has promoted a favourable image of Israel by highlighting positive developments in Australian-Israel bilateral relations. Besides exploring the historical, political, economic, and technology dimensions of that relationship, these articles seek to emphasize that Australia and Israel are friendly allies with shared interests.

Second, AIJAC has sought to promote favourable coverage of Israeli socio-economic development in various areas:

- In terms of animal welfare and climate change, AIJAC has highlighted Israeli animal welfare laws banning animal testing and foie grass, and Israeli efforts to combat climate change through water conservation and solar energy (Mittelman, 2014a; AIJAC, 2016f).

- In terms of arts and culture, this has included publicising Israeli music artists such as singer Rita Jahanfarouz and Israeli hard-rock band Orphaned Land and Israel winning the rights to host the 2019 Eurovision contest (Nadel and Fleischer, 2012; A. Shapiro and AIJAC Staff, 2018a). AIJAC has also promoted Israeli films such as Dror Moreh's *The Gatekeepers*, Emad Burnat and Guy Davidi's *5 Broken Cameras*, and Lorraine Lévy's *The Other Son* as examples of Israel society's encouragement of creativity and freedom of expression (Avi-Guy, 2013a; Mittelman, 2013d).

- AIJAC has also sought to promote the image of Israel as an inclusive democracy by highlighting Israeli social investment in the Israeli-Arab community, the protection of LGBT rights, and a favourable 2017 Freedom House report praising Israel's media freedom, civil liberties, electoral processes political pluralism, and anti-corruption measures (Mittelman, 2016a; ABC News24, 2017b; S. Levin, 2017a).

- In terms of economic development, AIJAC has promoted the image of Israel as a thriving free market economy by highlighting business stories such as Berkshire Hathaway and Intel Corporation's acquisitions of Israeli metal-cutting tools company Iscar and vehicle technology company Mobileye (Asa-El, 2018; Avi-Guy, 2013c; AIJAC, 2017o).

- In terms of healthcare, AIJAC has highlighted Israel's high happiness ranking in 2012 and human interest stories such as a Palestinian boy named Yakoub Ibhisad receiving a kidney transplant and the presence of Israeli-Arab doctors in Israeli hospitals and clinics, (Nadel, 2012a; Avi-Guy, 2013e).

- In terms of religious freedom, AIJAC has highlighted positive stories about Israel protecting the rights of its Christian minority community, issuing permits allowing Palestinian Christians to celebrate Easter in Jerusalem, and Indonesian Muslim leaders attending an interfaith dialogue meeting in Israel (AIJAC, 2012c; 2014i; 2015e).

- In terms of technological innovation, AIJAC has highlighted positive stories about Israeli efforts to develop alternative energy sources, medical technologies, water management policies, transportation, and satellites (G. Levin, 2011; Mittelman, 2012a; Avi-Guy, 2013b; Asa-El, 2016; Kaye, 2016).

AIJAC's coverage of Israeli socio-economic development seeks to promote the image of Israel a legitimate democracy that protects the human rights of both its Jewish and non-Jewish citizens and as a technologically, advanced society that encourages the arts, creativity, and innovation. This coverage is also intended to combat the negative international perception of Israel as a human rights violator and so-called "Apartheid state."

Third, AIJAC has sought to promote the image of Israel being a good international citizen by highlighting positive stories about Israeli humanitarian assistance and cooperation with foreign governments and sub-national bodies.

- In terms of counter-terrorism, AIJAC has publicised media coverage of European leaders including London Lord Mayor Sadiq Khan soliciting Israeli counter-terrorism expertise including social media algorithms (S. Levin, 2017d).

- AIJAC has also highlighted Israeli efforts to provide humanitarian assistance during the Syrian Civil War and the 2014 Gaza War as well as Israeli medical relief efforts during the 2018 Volcán de Fuego eruption in Guatemala (A. Shapiro, 2013c; Mittelman, 2014b; AIJAC, 2018i).

- In terms of economic and technical cooperation, AIJAC has covered Israel's economic engagement with China and India, and Asian countries seeking Israeli expertise on water and agricultural technology (A. Shapiro, 2012a; Rubenstein, 2013).

- In terms of international diplomacy, AIJAC has highlighted Netanyahu's efforts to establish a regional peace plan with Arab neighbours (A. Shapiro, 2017a). Ultimately, Israeli diplomatic efforts, with the help of the Trump Administration, led to the Abraham Accords, which facilitated the normalization of Israel's relations with the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan in 2020 (Singer, 2021; Jeong, 2021).

AIJAC has used these stories to promote the image of Israel being a good international citizen that is willing to work on with the international community in numerous areas including counter-terrorism, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, trade and technological cooperation. AIJAC's coverage of Israeli counter-terrorism efforts supports Reich's (2007) observation that AIJAC has promoted Israel as a reliable ally of the West in the War on

Terror. The coverage of Israeli humanitarian assistance in Syria and Gaza seeks to show that Israel wants peace with its neighbours and seeks to minimise the harm to civilians during warfare. The emphasis on trade and technical cooperation is linked to the image of Israel being a technologically advanced country that contributes to humanity. These positive stories seek to address the media focus on conflict and controversies by emphasizing Israel's democratic credentials, prosperity, technological innovation, and contributions to the international community.

Defensive image management

AIJAC has also published content countering negative media coverage of Israel on various controversial issues including Israeli military actions, the military occupation, settlements, law enforcement measures, human rights, and national identity. These are discussed under the categories of Israeli-Palestinian relations and Israeli social cohesion.

AIJAC has devoted extensive coverage to Israeli-Palestinian relations, which has been fraught by conflict, military rule, and settlement expansion. Reflecting its mission as a pro-Israel watchdog, AIJAC has sought to defend Israeli policies and actions towards the Palestinians.

- AIJAC has defended the legality of the Gaza Blockade, citing the United Nations' Palmer Report and Hamas' hostility towards Israel (Mittelman, 2011). AIJAC has rebuffed media and activist claims that Israel has produced a crippling blockade on Gaza by asserting that Israel allows the movement of basic goods and construction materials but only restricts the entry of material that can be used as weapons (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2011a; Fleischer, 2016b).
- In terms of law enforcement in the West Bank, AIJAC has defended Israel's detention of Palestinians as a legitimate response to terrorism and security threats. AIJAC has also rejected Palestinian allegations of human rights abuses by claiming that Israeli prisons comply with international standards (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012b). In addition, AIJAC has defended the detention of Palestinian children and youth on the grounds that they have allegedly committed violent crimes including stone-throwing against Israelis (AIJAC, 2011). AIJAC has also defended the demolition of Palestinian homes on both legal and anti-terrorism grounds (Lee, 2015).

- AIJAC has defended the actions of the Israel Defense Forces during the boarding of the *Mavi Marmara* in 2010, 2012 Gaza War, 2014 Gaza War, and the 2018 March of Return by asserting that Israel was responding defensively to Hamas aggression (AIJAC, 2010; Rubenstein, 2012c; Avi-Guy, 2015; Lee, 2015b; A. Shapiro, 2018b).

- AIJAC has combated negative media coverage and commentary of the Israeli military occupation of the West Bank by presenting checkpoints, barriers, and movement restrictions as a defensive reaction to Palestinian violence and terrorism during the Second Intifada (Fleischer, 2016a). Rubenstein (2014c) has also argued that the disputed status of the Palestinian Territories can be resolved as part of final status bilateral peace negotiations (Rubenstein 2014c). In addition, AIJAC (2014d) has promoted a positive spin on the Israeli military presence by highlighting peaceful coexistence between Israeli soldiers and Palestinian residents in Hebron.

- In terms of Israeli-Palestinian diplomacy, AIJAC has emphasised Israel's commitment to a two-state solution while asserting that the question of Palestinian statehood should be decided during final status bilateral peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians (AIJAC, 2015c). AIJAC has sought to highlight Israeli peace initiatives such as the Gilad Shalit prisoner exchange and the return of deceased Palestinian prisoners (Rubenstein, 2011; Mittelman, 2012b).

- In terms of resource allocation, AIJAC has disputed allegations that Israel discriminates against Palestinians in terms of the provision of power and water utilities (Thurin, 2014; Bigman, 2014).

- In terms of territorial disputes, AIJAC (2018c) has defended Jerusalem's status as the indivisible capital of Israel, citing the city's historical and cultural importance to Jews. In addition, AIJAC has rebuffed allegations that Israel is trying to deny Palestinians access to the Temple Mount, a significant religious site for the three Abrahamic faiths (Mittelman, 2015d). AIJAC has also defended Israeli settlements, which remain a a major point of contention between Israel and the international community due to the "occupied" status of the West Bank. AIJAC has claimed that they make up two percent of West Bank land and accusing critics of "double standards" by highlighting that other states including Russia, Indonesia, China, and Armenia have settled their citizens on "occupied territories." (AIJAC, 2015a; Fleischer, 2016c)

In short, AIJAC has focused on managing Israel's public image in response to media coverage of controversial issues in Israeli-Palestinian relations such as the Gaza Blockade,

law enforcement actions, the military occupation of the West Bank, military operations, resource allocation, and territorial disputes. AIJAC has advanced the narratives of Israel wanting peace and only acting in self-defence against what it considers Palestinian aggression.

In terms of Israeli social cohesion, AIJAC has also covered controversial issues relating to national identity and racism and discrimination against ethnic and religious minorities.

- In terms of Israeli national identity, AIJAC has defending Israel's right to identify as a Jewish state including the controversial Nation State Law, citing Zionist arguments about ethnic groups being entitled to national homelands (Rubenstein, 2018d; ABC News24, 2018b). In response to critical media commentary describing the Nation State Law as racist, Hyams (2018h) countered that the rights of Israel's non-Jewish minorities are protected by law.
- AIJAC has also responded to media coverage of racism and discrimination in Israel by condemning racism and "price tag attacks" against Arabs and African minorities as the work of fringe, far-right Jewish extremists (Friedman, 2016).

AIJAC's coverage of these stories and issues shows that it supports the Zionist view that Israel is the national homeland of the Jewish people. In line with its efforts to promote Israel as an authentic democracy, AIJAC has sought to reassure the Australian public that racism and discrimination are at odds with Jewish and Israeli values and identity.

Analysis

AIJAC has fulfilled the two main criteria of communicational image management: positive and defensive image management. AIJAC has disseminated a range of print, online and audio-visual media through various platforms and mediums to reach a wide audience. In terms of positive image management, AIJAC has sought to market Israel as a functioning democracy, market economy, innovative country, and good international citizen that is willing to share its knowledge and expertise. While AIJAC did highlight the Jewish historical claim and connection to Israel, this was covered under strategic political communication under themes and narratives.

In terms of defensive image management, AIJAC has sought to manage Israel's international image in response to a range of contentious issues including Israeli military actions and security measures, the occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Blockade, the detention of Palestinian prisoners, Israel's Jewish national identity, allegations of Israeli racism and discrimination, and criticism of the pro-Israel lobby. In response to the pro-Palestinian David versus Goliath narrative, AIJAC has sought to emphasize Israel as the peace-seeking party acting in self-defence.

Relational activities

5. Cause promotion

AIJAC (n.d.a; 2017d) has used relational activities including its guest speaker "Visitor program," "Ramban Israel Fellowship" informational trips, and several public functions to promote closer relations and cooperation between pro-Israel advocates and groups in Australia and abroad. These include its:

- Visitor program: Hosting international guest speakers in Australia. Notable participants have included Israeli Labor Member of Knesset (MK) Yehiel "Hilik" Bar, Israeli writer, journalist and analyst Jonathan Spyer, former Israeli Labor MK Einat Wilf, Palestinian human rights activist Bassem Eid, former Israeli national security adviser Eran Lerman, Middle East Forum President Daniel Pipes, former IDF spokesperson Col. (ret.) Peter Lerner, and Israeli solar energy entrepreneur Yosef Abramowitz (AIJAC, 2014h; 2014l; 2015j; 2015r; 2018m; Mittelman, 2015d; A. Shapiro, 2017c; "Yosef Abramowitz on Israel's green energy outreach, human rights and environmental activism, 2018").

- Ramban Israel Fellowships: which involve sending journalists, politicians, policy-makers, student leaders and trade unionists to Israel to promote sympathy and understanding for Israel. This will be discussed in the "relational image management" sub-section below.

- Besides having *AIR* magazine correspondents Amotz Asa-El and Andrew Friedman in Israel, AIJAC has also dispatched staff writers including Ahron Shapiro on fact-finding trips to Israel. Shapiro visited the Israeli border town of Sderot to cover Israel's military response during the 2014 Gaza (AIJAC, n.d.b; A. Shapiro, 2014).

- In addition, AIJAC has worked with the Australian Strategic Policy Institute and the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University to host the Beersheba Dialogue, an annual meeting of Israeli and Australian strategic analysts and defence experts to facilitate bilateral defence cooperation. During the third Beersheba Dialogue in November 2017, Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull signed a Memorandum of Understanding on defence industry cooperation, reflecting AIJAC's access to senior ministers and officials within the Australian Federal Government (AIJAC, 2017c).

Besides promoting a favourable view of Israel, these guest speaking engagements, information trips, and overseas functions help foster ties and collaboration with sympathetic political, business, media, and other influential civil society actors in Australia, Israel and abroad. While the guest speaking functions provide Israeli and pro-Israel international figures with a platform to communication with the Australian public and civil society, its informational trips and policy networks like Beersheba Dialogue help to promote Australian-Israeli bilateral cooperation.

Analysis

AIJAC has fulfilled one of the two criteria of cause promotion. First, it has carried out a range of relational activities including organizing speaking engagements, public meetings, and informational trips. Second, while AIJAC has made active use of communicational technologies such as emails, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to promote their cause and messages, these were more for communicational than relational purposes. Hence, they were covered in the Communicational activities section.

6. Exerting leverage

Leveraging activities particularly lobbying, accountability politics, press releases, and its communications output have been major aspects of AIJAC's advocacy work. Reflecting its mission to convey Australian Jewish interests to influential Australian political, media and civil society actors, AIJAC (n.d.a) has sought to lobby and build relations with them, and to also hold them accountable for their perceived bias or hostility against Israel. AIJAC's leveraging activities targeting political, media and civil society actors are discussed below:

First, AIJAC has lobbied and cultivated relations with several Australian political actors and institutions to influence public policy on Israel and other issues of interest to Australian Jewry:

- Australian Government: AIJAC's (2016r) national board of directors regularly meets with senior policy-makers and leaders including the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Opposition Leader, and Shadow Foreign Leader to maintain bipartisan support for Israel within the Australian Parliament. AIJAC (2017b; 2018e; 2016k) has lobbied the Australian Government and Parliament on the issues of preserving Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act (RDA), regulating Australian aid policies to the Palestinians, and opposing a United Nations Educational, Science, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) resolution which allegedly denied Jewish ties to the Temple Mount and Kotel. In addition, AIJAC has praised the Australian Government for facilitating an Australian-Israel double taxation agreement, condemning the BDS Movement, and supporting a US amendment to an "unbalanced" UN resolution on Israel (AIJAC, 2015d; 2017n; Mittelman, 2018).

- Coalition: AIJAC has taken Coalition Members of Parliament (MPs) on Ramban informational tours and met with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop (Narunsky, 2012; AIJAC, 2016r). AIJAC has also submitted questions to the Coalition on Israel, Iran, and the BDS movement during the 2013 Australian federal election (Mittelman, 2013b).

- Australian Labor Party: Regularly meeting with key Labor leaders including Opposition Leader Bill Shorten, MPs Mark Dreyfus and Michael Danby, and shadow foreign leader Tania Plibersek to discuss the Australian Labor Party's (ALP) approach to Israel and other issues of concern to the Australian Jewish community (AIJAC, 2015t). AIJAC has also submitted questions to Labor on Israel, Iran, and the BDS movement, during the 2013 Australian federal election ("The Face-Off," 2013).

- Bob Carr: AIJAC has sparred with the retired Australian Foreign Minister, New South Wales Premier, and Labor politician on numerous occasions dating back to PLO official Dr Hanan Ashrawi's 2003 Sydney Peace Prize (Levey and Mendes, 2004; Loewenstein, 2006). AIJAC has responded to Carr's criticisms of Israeli settlements (AIJAC, 2012a; Narunsky, 2017), "Israel lobby" allegations (Mittelman, 2015c), and Israel's rightward political shift (Debinski and Shapiro, 2014). They have also

criticised his association with pro-Palestinian advocates including the Australian Friends of Palestine Association and the Al Quds Community Centre (Jones, 2018). AIJAC has sought to influence the Australian Government, Parliament, Coalition, and Labor parties on issues of interest to the Australian Jewish community and Israel. AIJAC seeks to build bipartisan support for Israel and Australian-Jewish interests among the ALP and Coalition. In addition, AIJAC has sparred with former Labor cabinet minister Carr due to his criticism of Israeli politics, settlement policies and AIJAC's lobbying activities. These interactions show that AIJAC has an insider relationship with the Australian Government and major political parties. According to Grant (1995), insider groups are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which are considered legitimate by governments and regularly consulted by the relevant policy-makers and institutions.

Second, AIJAC has lobbied and criticised several media actors including radio and television broadcasters, newspapers, and journalists for reportage that it regards as anti-Semitic and biased against Israel.

- 3ZZZ: AIJAC criticised the radio station's Syrian program for broadcasting anti-Semitic content from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) including the Protocols of the Elders of Zion. AIJAC reminded 3ZZZ that such content violates its own constitution and the Community Radio Broadcasting Codes of Practice (Porat, 2018a).
- ABC: While AIJAC has used the ABC as a platform to disseminate pro-Israel perspectives, it has also clashed with the national broadcaster's coverage of Israel-Palestine. Key complaints have included the public broadcaster's coverage of breast cancer in Gaza, the detention of Palestinian children, alleged restrictions at Gaza's Rafah crossing (which the ABC subsequently apologized for inaccuracies), lack of coverage of Gazan rocket attacks in 2018, an August 2018 report describing Hamas and Islamic Jihad as resistance organisations, and sourcing of foreign stories from Al Jazeera, (A. Shapiro, 2013b; Hyams and Shapiro, 2014; AIJAC, 2016j; 2018d; 2018f; Rubenstein, 2017b). Still, AIJAC has praised the ABC for hosting Israeli analyst Ehud Yaari during a news report covering an Israeli airstrike on a Syrian military convoy (A. Shapiro, 2013a).
- Fairfax Media: AIJAC has criticised the Fairfax-owned newspapers *The Age, Sydney Morning Herald,* and the *Canberra Times* for running a feature article on Jewish

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American dissident and scholar Noam Chomsky (which downplayed Chomsky's alleged Holocaust denial during the Faurisson affair) and a travel article featuring Irish "travel writer" and pro-Palestinian activist Dervla Murphy (Fleischer, 2011; A. Shapiro, 2015b). AIJAC has also criticised Fairfax journalist Ruth Pollard for her "biased" coverage of the 2012 and 2014 Gaza conflicts (Lee, 2012b; 2014).

- John Lyons: *The Australian's* former Middle East correspondent who was based in Jerusalem. AIJAC has criticised his coverage on the eviction of Palestinian families, settlement expansion, the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian minors, and his controversial "Stone Cold Justice" documentary on ABC's Four Corners (Fleischer, 2017). In response, Lyons (2017) has criticised AIJAC in his memoir *Balcony over Jerusalem,* alleging that AIJAC harassed journalists who were deemed critical of Israel, prompting AIJAC to defend their media management activities (A. Shapiro, 2017d).

- Sophie McNeill: The ABC's former Middle East correspondent. AIJAC criticised McNeill as an "advocacy journalist" due to her pro-Palestinian sympathies and ties with Palestinian solidarity groups, which in their view violated the ABC's Code of Practice (A. Shapiro, 2015). AIJAC has criticised McNeill's coverage of Israel's border control policies in Gaza, the Gaza blockade, demolition of Palestinian homes, alleged rationalisation of Palestinian violence, and blaming Israeli policies for Palestinian suffering in Gaza (A. Shapiro, 2016a; 2016b; Lee, 2015a; 2015c; 2016a).

- SBS: AIJAC calling upon the public broadcaster to stop sourcing its foreign news content from Al Jazeera (Rubenstein, 2017b). The SBS also upheld an AIJAC complaint about an SBS Arabic 24 report on the 2018 Gaza March of Return that cast Israel in a negative light (AIJAC, 2018f).

Reflecting its interest in current affairs, AIJAC has lobbied and criticised several media organisations and journalists for media coverage and commentary deemed to be biased against Israel. While AIJAC has directly contacted the ABC, SBS, and *The West Australian* to raise it concerns and urge them to abide by their stated charters, AIJAC also uses its communications and media output to challenge these organisations and journalists' reportage. AIJAC has particularly focused on the ABC and SBS since the two public broadcasters reach sizeable television and radio audiences and receive taxpayer funds. AIJAC has targeted the journalists Lyons and McNeill due to their pro-Palestinian slant and critical coverage of the Israeli military occupation and society. Besides questioning the accuracy of their reports,

AIJAC has also challenged their employers for tolerating what it regards as their biased reportage.

Third, AIJAC has lobbied and criticised several civil society actors including activists, universities, and academics for promoting views and arguments that it regards as anti-Semitic or anti-Israel.

- Australian National University (ANU): In September 2013, Chairman Leibler and Executive Director Rubenstein objected to the university's "Human Rights in Palestine Conference" as "one-sided." They also objected to the conference's guest speaker Dr Richard Falk, a controversial UN human rights rapporteur and alleged "anti-Israel" critic. (AIJAC, 2013d). AIJAC also criticised Professor Amin Saikal, the head of ANU's Centre for Arab and Islamic Studies, for his "imbalanced" article on Israel's occupation of the Palestinian territories and assertion that a pro-Israel lobby distorts US foreign policy towards the Middle East (Hyams, 2011; Lee, 2016b). Paralleling their US counterparts, AIJAC has also criticised academic Middle East Studies programmes for allegedly promoting anti-Israel bias (Rubin, 2015).

- Randa Abdel Fattah: An Australian Muslim writer of Palestinian-Egyptian descent and outspoken Palestinian advocate. AIJAC has disputed her views of Israel as a racist, Apartheid state and criticised her defence of BDS advocate and Sydney University academic Jake Lynch (Lee, 2011; Meyerowitz-Katz, 2013b).

- Eulalia Han and Halim Rane: Dr Han is a research fellow at the National University of Singapore while Dr Rane is a senior Islamic Studies scholar at Griffith University (Han and Rane, 2013, backcover). AIJAC criticised Han and Rane's 2013 book *Australian Foreign Policy on Israel-Palestine;* disputing their methodology and scholarly rigour, pro-Palestinian slant, and criticism of Israel, Zionism, and pro-Israel advocacy groups (Jones, 2013).

- University of Sydney: AIJAC has criticised the University's Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies for endorsing the BDS campaign by boycotting Israeli academics and institutions (Hyams, 2011). They objected particularly to its Chair Associate Professor Jake Lynch's pro-Palestinian activism including hosting Palestinian activist Sameh Habeeb and disrupting British pro-Israel advocate Colonel Richard Kemp's talk at Sydney University (Meyerowitz-Katz, 2012f; Falkenstein, 2015a). Meyerowitz-Katz

(2012a) also criticised the CPACS guest lecturer Johan Galtung, Norwegian sociologist and founder of the peace and conflict studies discipline, for allegedly promoting anti-Semitic tropes about Jewish media and political control and denouncing Israel as a racist endeavour. During the 2018 Gaza Land March, AIJAC (2018a) criticised pro-BDS academics at Sydney University for advocating a boycott of Israel.

Besides combating Palestinian activists and solidarity groups including Fattah, AIJAC has also sought to combat manifestations of anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism within Australian academia. Besides objecting to BDS and "anti-Israel" events at Australian universities such as ANU and Sydney University, AIJAC has monitored the research output, activism and public commentary of Australian intellectuals which it considers to be hostile to Israeli or Jewish interests and security. As academics, Galtung, Lynch, and Saikal were targeted for their outspoken anti-Israel and pro-Palestinian views and activism. Meanwhile, Han and Rane's research was criticised for advancing the Israel lobby narrative that pro-Israel advocacy groups distort Australian and US foreign policies towards Israel-Palestine. Since universities and intellectuals can wield significant influence on the public policy process and opinion-making, AIJAC fears that letting their views and assertions go unchallenged would undermine public support for Israel in Australia.

Analysis

AIJAC fulfilled both criteria of exerting leverage by seeking to influence the Australian public policy process and practising accountability politics. First, AIJAC has sought to influence the public policy process towards Israel and other domestic policies affecting Australian Jewry by lobbying and forging relations with key political actors including the Federal Government, the Federal Parliament, and the two major political parties. Second, AIJAC has sought to hold media organisations, journalists, politicians, and academics accountable for what it regards as factual inaccuracies and anti-Israel bias. While AIJAC has contacted some politicians, media outlets and universities directly, most of its accountability activities have taken the form of publishing articles, press releases and op-ed articles challenging their assertions and activities.

7. Coalition building

AIJAC has forged relationships, coalitions and linkages with other pro-Israel advocates, Jewish groups and institutions, and other allies to promote the interests and aspirations of Israel and the Australian Jewish community. According to its website, AIJAC (n.d.a) has worked with other ethnic community organisations to expose incidents of racism and anti-Semitism in Australia and online as well as advising governments on legislative and educational measures to combat racism. This section focuses on AIJAC's efforts to forge coalitions with sympathetic political, media and civil society actors at a domestic level while the next section will look at AIJAC's transnational collaboration with foreign-based actors.

In terms of political actors, AIJAC has forged relationships and worked with several sympathetic politicians including Labor MPs Bill Danby, Bill Leadbeater and Victorian Labor leader Daniel Lewis and South Australian Liberal MP Corey Wingard. AIJAC (2016; 2017t) has shared Danby's op-ed column criticising Carr's remarks about the Middle East and defended Danby's advertisements criticising the ABC's news coverage of Israel-Palestine. In addition, AIJAC (2017g; 2014f) has shared a column by Leadbeater criticising UK Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn's alleged anti-Semitism and a speech by Lewis defending Israel's conduct during the 2014 Gaza War at the Melbourne Rally for Peace. Finally, Wingard has praised his recent Ramban trip to Israel ("Corey Wingard MP (South Australia) – Impressions of Israel," 2017). Besides monitoring the media for pro-Israel advocacy work and statements, AIJAC has also recruited sympathetic politicians onto its Ramban missions with the goal of maintaining bipartisan support for Israel and cultivating political allies able to promote a pro-Israel agenda within their parties, the federal parliament, and state legislatures.

In terms of media actors, AIJAC forged relations from local Jewish media such as the *Australian Jewish News* (AJN) and J-Wire. In return for publicising AIJAC's advocacy work, AIJAC has shared their content. AJN has covered AIJAC's advocacy work including its discussions with senior Australian Government officials, a successful AIJAC complaint against the ABC, and AIJAC calling on the Australian Government to criticise a "biased" UNESCO resolution and ensure that Australian aid is not funnelled into terrorism (AIJAC, 2016r; 2016j; 2016u). Similar, J-Wire has covered AIJAC's activities including its engagement with senior Labour politicians, Ramban missions for Victorian MPs and

Indonesian Muslim civil society leaders and educators, AIJAC's opposition to the far right politician Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party, and an AIJAC-sponsored luncheon in Sydney for attendees of the 2016 Beersheba Dialogue (AIJAC, 2015t; 2016g; 2017m; 2016h; 2016v). In return, AIJAC (2017l; 2018l) has shared J-Wire stories including a 2017 motion by the National Council of Students condemning anti-Semitism and the murder of Israeli medic Razie Shevah. AIJAC has cultivated a relationship with both *Australian Jewish News* and J-Wire due to their sympathetic coverage of its advocacy work. In addition, they share a commitment to advancing Australian Jewish interests and defending Israel.

In terms of civil society actors, AIJAC has partnered with several groups and individuals that share its worldview about advancing Australia-Israel relations and Australian-Jewish communal interests.

- Co-hosting the Third Beersheba Dialogue in November 2017 with the Australian think tank Australian Strategic Policy Institute (AIJAC, 2017c).
- Working with Jewish civil society groups and institutions including Australian Voices for Israel, Sydney's Central Synagogue, the United Israel Appeal (UIA), and Zionist Council of New South Wales to host guest speaking functions featuring Israeli and international speakers (AIJAC, 2014b; 2016b; 2018b).
- Endorsing the Executive Council of Australian Jewry's (ECAJ) critical response to Bob Carr's July 2015 speech at the Australian National University criticising the Australian "Israel lobby" (AIJAC, 2015c).
- Despite its criticism of Australian academics that criticise Israel, AIJAC has also collaborated with pro-Israel academics such as Ran Porat (a researcher at Monash University's Australian Centre for Jewish Civilisation) and the late Barry Rubin. Dr Porat (2018a; 2018b) has written articles in *AIR* magazine, focusing on anti-Semitism within the Australian Arab-Muslim communities. The late Israeli academic Dr Rubin was also one of AIJAC's most prolific guest speakers and contributors to *AIR* magazine (AIJAC, 2014a).

These interactions allow AIJAC to share resources, knowledge and expertise with other Jewish and pro-Israel civil society groups and activists who share its goals and worldview. Besides co-hosting events and producing media output, they also help articulate pro-Israel arguments and messages to political elites and the wider public. Working with Australian Jewish bodies such as the ECAJ, Central Synagogue, the Zionist Council of NSW and Dr

Porat helps reinforce Jewish communal ties and unity. In short, AIJAC has worked with allies in various sections of Australian society to promote Israeli and Australian Jewish interests and aspirations.

Analysis

AIJAC has fulfilled one of the criterion of coalition building by forging coalitions, relationships and linkages with sympathetic political, media and civil society allies including fellow Australian Jews to advance Israeli and Australian Jewish interests and aspirations. . While AIJAC worked with a range of foreign groups and actors (a topic covered in transnational collaboration), its focus was not on bringing change to foreign counties but rather advocating on issues of concern to Australian Jews on a domestic level.

8. Transnational collaboration

Besides its domestic coalition building efforts, AIJAC has also collaborated with a range of foreign political, media, and civil society actors including the Israeli Government and other pro-Israel advocacy groups. This collaboration has taken the form of sharing media and op-ed content, hosting guest speakers, and official functions such as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's state visit in February 2017. In addition, AIJAC (n.d.a) has participated in international human rights activity, interfaith dialogue, and other activities aimed at improving understanding of Israel. AIJAC's interactions with foreign political, media, and civil society actors is explored below:

In terms political actors, AIJAC has cultivated relations and worked with the Israeli government:

- AIJAC National Chairman Mark Leibler met with Prime Minister Netanyahu in November 2016 (AIJAC, 2016a). Leibler later officiated over two major public events during Netanyahu's state visit to Australia in February 2017 (AIJAC, 2017a).
- In addition, AIJAC has hosted several retired Israeli policy-makers and politicians including and former Israeli Labor politician Einat Wilf and veteran IDF spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel (res.) Peter Lerner during their speaking tours in Australia (AIJAC; 2015p; 2018b).

AIJAC's access to Netanyahu and other senior Israeli policy-makers and politicians demonstrate that the think tank has gained high-level access to both the Israeli and Australian

governments. AIJAC's productive working relationship with the State of Israel reflects official Israeli sympathy for their efforts to strengthen links between Israel and the Australian Jewish diaspora.

In terms of media actors, AIJAC has shared content from international Jewish media including the Jewish American publications *Algemeiner Journal* and *Mosaic*. AIJAC (2015m) shared an *Algemeiner* article raising awareness about the history of Jewish refugees expelled from Arab countries during the 1948 War and the Six Day War. In addition, AIJAC reproduced a *Mosaic* obituary article commemorating the legacy and scholarship of American Middle East Studies scholar Bernard Lewis, who was known for his pro-Israel views (Kramer, 2018). These show that AIJAC has sourced content from other Jewish diaspora media that share its ideology and worldview about Jewish history and Israel's place in the world.

Finally, AIJAC has forged relations and shared content with various Jewish and pro-Israel civil society actors and individuals abroad including New Zealand, the United States and United Kingdom.

- AIJAC (n.d.a) has a formal partnership with the American Jewish Committee (AJC), a major Jewish American lobby group. The two collaborate to promote a greater understanding of the issues and challenges facing world Jewry in the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, AIJAC has published content by AJC staff member Miriam Smallman criticising New Zealand's voting record on Israel at the United Nations (Smallman, 2015).
- AIJAC's New Zealand correspondent Miriam Bell (2015; 2018b) has highlighted the work of local pro-Israel figures and groups including Gael Keren of the Astor Foundation, the Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ), New Zealand Jewish Council (NZJC), and the Zionist Federation of New Zealand (ZFNZ).
- AIJAC has also collaborated with several international think tanks and advocacy groups including the American Enterprise Institute, the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University, Britain Israel Communications and Research Centre, the Gatestone Institute, Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, Middle East Forum, Middle East Media Research Institute, NGO Watch, Palestine Media Watch (PMW), UN Watch, and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy by sharing their content

online, co-hosting guest speakers, and utilising their research and expertise for its advocacy work (AIJAC, 2017d; 2017c; 2017k; Toameh, 2015; Falkenstein, 2015c; AIJAC, 2018m; 2018n; 2015i; Mittelman, 2017; "Simon Henderson on Israel's warming ties with Saudi Arabia," 2016).

- Working with Bassem Eid, the founder of the Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group, who supports normalisation with Israel and opposes the BDS movement. AIJAC has hosted him as a guest speaker, endorsed his activism, and shared his content ("Bassem Eid on prospects for a Palestinian state," 2015; AIJAC, 2015r).

In addition to AIJAC's global partnership with the American Jewish Committee, AIJAC has also cooperated and shared information with various pro-Israel activists and groups abroad including New Zealand, the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom. AIJAC's transnational collaboration with various political, media and civil society actors constitutes an informal "transnational advocacy network" bound by solidarity with Israel, Zionism, Jewish Diaspora, and combating anti-Semitism, anti-Zionism, terrorism, and extremism.

Analysis

AIJAC has fulfilled most of the criteria of transnational collaboration. First, it has participated in an informal pro-Israel "transnational advocacy network" by working with the Israeli Government and various international media and civil society actors. This informal network (which also includes the Israel Institute of New Zealand) is based on supporting Israel, the Jewish diaspora, and combating anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism. However, AIJAC has shown little interest in influencing foreign states such as New Zealand or international institutions such as the United Nations. This shows that AIJAC has clearly set goals and parameters for its advocacy work. Second, this collaboration has taken the form of high-level access to Israeli political elites, hosting guest speakers and state functions, and sharing information and research expertise.

9. Relational image management

AIJAC (n.d.a) has sought to promote a favourable image of Israel through nation branding relational activities by assisting with official Israeli state visits, hosting international speakers through its "visitor program"; and sponsoring informational trips to Israel-Palestine through its "Ramban Israel Fellowship" program. These relational activities seek to promote

Israel's culture, heritage, and national identity, and manage Israel's international image in Australia.

First, AIJAC's National Chairman Leibler took part in two public events during Prime Minister Netanyahu's state visit to Australia in February 2017. At the request of Prime Minister Turnbull's office, Leibler served as MC at a luncheon for business leaders that Turnbull had organised for Netanyahu in Sydney on 22 February 2017. This event allowed Netanyahu to meet with key Australian business leaders to promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation. Later that evening, Leibler welcomed Netanyahu during a Jewish community function at Sydney's Central Synagogue, which was also attended by Turnbull. To generate favourable publicity, several senior AIJAC staff members produced newspaper op-eds and took part in interviews with several Australian, Israel, and New Zealand media outlets (AIJAC, 2017a). AIJAC's involvement in official functions reflects its "insider" relationships with both the Australian and Israeli governments, who recognise it a legitimate representative of the Australian Jewish community. Netanyahu's state visit marked the first visit by an Israeli head of government to Australia and reflected the warm nature of Australian-Israel bilateral relations. It also provided an opportunity for the Israeli Prime Minister to connect with the Australian business community and Jewish diaspora.

Second, AIJAC has brought international speakers including Israelis to speak at private and public functions across Australia and New Zealand in cooperation with Jewish community organisations and synagogues. AIJAC has sponsored several guest speakers including the following:

- Israeli political figures including former Israeli Labor parliamentarian and Dr Einat Wilf, Likud parliamentarian and government minister Tzachi Hanegbi, former Israeli National Security Council (NSC) member Dr Eran Lerman, and former IDF spokesperson Lt. Colonel Peter Lerner. These guest speakers covered a range of topics including the BDS movement, anti-Zionism, and Israeli settlements (Mitteman, 2015d; AIJAC, 2016b; A. Shapiro, 2017c; AIJAC, 2018b). In addition, AIJAC (2017r) hosted a luncheon and public talk for Israeli and Australian defence officials at Sydney's Central Synagogue.
- Israeli civil society and media representatives including Israeli-Arab Channel 2 broadcaster Lucy Aharish and green solar entrepreneur Yosef Abramowitz. Aharish

spoke about Israeli Arab lives and integration while Abramowitz talked about Israel's solar industry (Mittelman, 2016b; ("Yosef Abramowitz on Israel's green energy outreach, human rights and environmental activism," 2018).

- Dissident Palestinian activist Bassem Eid's talk in August 2015 about the two-state solution, Palestinian Authority, BDS movement, and peace through economic development ("Bassem Eid on prospects for a Palestinian state," 2015).
- MEF President Daniel Pipe's Melbourne 2018 public lecture on the Middle East (AIJAC, 2018m).

Despite their varied backgrounds and trades, these guest speakers share AIJAC's worldview about Israel's positive contributions to the humanity. Besides fostering Australian Jewish diaspora connections with Israel and abroad, these talks help to promote a positive image of Israeli society and counter negative imagery and perceptions. For example, the presence of Israeli-Arab broadcaster Aharish helps combat the narrative of Israel being a racist, Apartheid state while hosting dissident Palestinian voices like Eid helps to reinforce criticism of the BDS movement as an anti-Semitic hate movement. Hosting Abramowitz highlights Israel's green energy industry and efforts to combat climate change and pollution.

Third, AIJAC has used its Ramban Israel Fellowship program to bring political, media and civil society leaders including student leaders, trade unionists, and religious leaders on informational trips to Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The Ramban program was started by Sydney businessman Brian Sherman in late 2003 to "lift the veil" on Israel for opinion-makers whose views of Israel were negatively affected by the Second Intifada (AIJAC, n.d.a; Reich, 2004; Loewenstein, 2006). According to Jones (2016), the Ramban program exposes people in Australia and the Asia-Pacific to a wide range of viewpoints, educates them about Israeli geography, history, cultural diversity and society, and enables them to meet with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, experts and activists from across the spectrum. A survey of several Ramban missions between February 2012 and August 2018 found that notable guests have included:

- Politicians and officials from both the Liberal and the Labor parties have participated in these Ramban missions. Notable Liberal participants have included Bradfield MP Paul Fletcher, Tasmanian Senator David Bushby, Paterson MP Bob Baldwin, South Australian Senator David Fawcett, Brisbane MP Teresa Gambaro, Cowan MP Luke Simpkins, Liberal National MP Mal Brough, Senator Sean C. Edwards, and South

Australian MP Corey Wingard (Narunsky, 2012; AIJAC, 2015h; ("Corey Wingard MP (South Australia) – Impressions of Israel," 2017).

- Notable Labor participants have included the Victorian Parliamentary Secretary to the Premier Colin Brooks, Deputy Speaker Don Nardella, Government Whip Ros Spence, and Victorian State Parliament MPs Lizzie Blandthorn, Josh Bull, Paul Edbrooke, Nick Staikos, Vicki Ward, Gabrielle Williams, and veteran MP Marsha Thomson (AIJAC, 2016u). Other participants have included MP Julian Hill, Labor senior advisers Thomas Mooney and Sandy Kay-Oswald, Senators Kristina Keneally and Anthony Chisholm (AIJAC, 2017q; 2018t).

- Indonesian Muslim leaders and educators: In January 2017, AIJAC's Director of International & Community Affairs Jeremy Jones took these Muslim civil society leaders on a tour of Israel and the Palestinian Territories, focusing on Muslim-Jewish interfaith dialogue. Participants visited Bethlehem, Ramallah, the 'planned city' of Rawabi, Al Aqsa Mosque, Church of the Holy Sepulchre, Gaza's border and the Golan Heights (AIJAC, 2017m). Reflects AIJAC's efforts to promote understanding and reconciliation between Muslims and Jews.

- Trade unionists: Diana Asmar of Health Services Union Victoria and Glen Chatterton of the Plumbers Union Service Trade Queensland took part in a Ramban mission in 2017, which focused on fostering bilateral trade union ties, water technology transfer, and visiting Israeli Arab doctors at hospitals (AIJAC, 2017r).

This sample of Ramban missions shows that AIJAC has sponsored politically-oriented trips to Israel and the Palestinian Territories in order to promote support for Israel and cultivate relations with influential political, religious, and trade union leaders. The inclusion of Indonesian Muslim leaders and educators shows that AIJAC's operations are not limited to Australia but also encompass the broader Asia-Pacific region. By 2020, about 500 individuals including journalists, commentators, senior public servants and academics had participated in the Ramban programme (Gawenda, 2020). However, AIJAC to date has not included New Zealand political and civil society figures in its Ramban program; suggesting that it may not want to step on the toes of local Jewish and pro-Israel groups.

Analysis

AIJAC has fulfilled all four criteria of relational image management through its guest speaker program, Ramban Israel Fellowships, and involvement in official functions such as Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia. First AIJAC has sponsored a guest speaker program bringing Israeli and international guest speakers to Australia and New Zealand, which help to promote sympathy and understanding for Israel. While AIJAC did not organise cultural and educational fairs and expos, it still helped host Netanyahu's 2017 state visit, suggesting that it has an insider relationship with both the Australian and Israeli governments.

Second, this research found that AIJAC promoted Israeli-Jewish culture, heritage and identity by hosting Indonesian religious leaders and educators during a Ramban information trip. Reflecting its interest in current affairs, most of AIJAC's relational image management activities have focused on contemporary issues rather than heritage promotion.

Third, AIJAC has managed public perceptions of Israel in response to crises and conflicts by tackling a range of contemporary issues such as settlements, anti-Semitism, the BDS movement, Israeli-Australian bilateral relations, terrorism, humanitarian efforts, and ethnic and religious harmony in Israel. These reflect AIJAC's mission to counter negative imagery and perceptions around Israel and to strengthen relations between Israel and the Australian Jewish diaspora.

Fourth, AIJAC's Ramban missions can be categorized as a form of politically oriented tourism designed to promote sympathy and understanding for Israel. These missions have included educating participants about Israel's challenges and successes and exposing them to Israeli and Palestinian political and civil society leaders. AIJAC segmented their Ramban missions to target sympathetic political and civil society leaders rather than based on ethnic or religious criteria. Most of these participants came from non-Jewish backgrounds.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

10.Marketing orientation

AIJAC has pursued sales -based orientation by producing content that appeals to its Australian-Jewish and pro-Israel audience. Drawing upon Lees-Marshment's (2004) "Market/Sales/Product-Oriented" charity framework, AIJAC can be classified as a sales-oriented advocacy group that follows the five stages of a sales-oriented group:

Figure 17 AIJAC analysed using Lees-Marshment's sales-oriented framework

Stages	Definitions	Examples
Product design	Design a wide range of behaviour in accordance to what they think is right or works best.	Advocating on issues of interest to the Australian Jewish community including Israel, anti-Semitism, Islamism, terrorism, racism and religious intolerance, war crimes justice, and Holocaust denial. Commitment to democracy, human rights, free speech, and multiculturalism in Australia and combating forms of extremism and fundamentalism (ACNC, 2019; Reich, 2004).
Market intelligence	Identify the groups and segments of the public most likely to support it, using market segmentation to target them, and discuss how best to influence and persuade them.	Segmenting influential political, media, and civil society actors into sympathetic and hostile elements based on how they align with AIJAC's goals and agenda. It has targeted them through its communications media, guest speaker program, and its Ramban Israel Fellowship missions. For example, sympathetic segments can include Labor and Coalition politicians while hostile elements would include the Greens and One Nation (Reich, 2004; Han and Rane, 2013, Lowenstein, 2016; Gawenda, 2020).
Communication	Proactive, entertaining communication designed to attract attention, influence the public and civil society, raise income from potential supporters; using a wide range of marketing techniques such as pamphlets,	Using its monthly magazine, the *Australia/Israel Review* (*AIR*), website, an Updates email newsletter, and Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube social media accounts to disseminate information.

	posters, websites, Facebook, and Twitter.	
Campaign	Short-term, one-off appeals; for example media campaigns and influencing policy-makers and other actors	Engaging in advocacy activities such as lobbying, guest speaker program, and the Ramban information trips. Covering specific current affairs events and developments like Israeli, Australian, and New Zealand elections, the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars, Prime Minister Netanyahu's state visit to Australia in February 2017, and the 2018 Gaza March of Return in order to influence elite, media and public opinion and policies.
Delivery	Deliver what it thinks is best, promoting it in the most positive way possible.	Using its print and online output to publicise its advocacy activities and achievements including include hosting Netanyahu's state visit to Australia, winning a media complaint against the SBS's coverage of the 2018 Gaza March of Return, and challenging journalist Lyons' alleged anti-Israel bias (AIJAC, 2017a; 2018f; Fleischer, 2017).

Analysis

In terms of marketing orientation, AIJAC has followed the five-stage process associated with sales-oriented advocacy groups. First, AIJAC has advanced its product (defending Israel, Australian-Jewish interests, combating anti-Semitism and racism). Second, AIJAC conducted market intelligence by seeking to co-opt sympathetic political elites, media, and civil society actors through its communications output and advocacy work particularly its guest speaker program and Ramban information trips. Third, AIJAC has disseminated its messages and arguments on accessible, modern communications technologies such as its website, *AIR* magazine, social media platforms, and email newsletters to maximise its outreach. Fourth, AIJAC has used its advocacy activities including short-term campaigning to influence political, media and public opinion on Israel-Palestine. Finally, AIJAC has used its communications output to promote its work and achievements including its official role in facilitating Netanyahu's 2017 state visit and media management work.

11. Segmentation and targeting

AIJAC has engaged in "segmentation and targeting" by cultivating relationships with sympathetic Australian politicians, parties, civil servants, journalists, editors, academics, trade unionists, and religious leaders such as Indonesian Muslim leaders and scholars who are in a position to influence public policy and opinion on Israel-Palestine. AIJAC's outreach activities towards these elites have included sending submissions on the Middle East to government officials, organising meetings between Israeli academics and Australian bureaucrats, its Ramban informational trips, distributing its monthly *Australia/Israel Review* magazine to politicians, and publishing press releases for journalists (AIJAC, n.d.a; 2017m; Reich, 2004; Loewenstein, 2006; Han and Rane, 2013, Gawenda, 2020). Cultivating relations with sympathetic political, media and civil society elites enables AIJAC to persuade political, media and civil society leaders and institutions to adopt policies that benefit the interests of Israel and the Australian Jewish community including countering so-called anti-Israel "propaganda" and activism. The presence of Indonesian Muslim leaders and scholars also reflects AIJAC's efforts to promote Jewish-Muslim reconciliation.

In addition, this research found that AIJAC excluded certain political, media and civil society actors such as the Australian Greens, One Nation, the journalists John Lyons and Sophie McNeill, and dissident Jewish and Israeli groups. For various reasons, AIJAC regards these segments as hostile since their ideology and activities clash with its goals and values:

- AIJAC opposes the Australian Greens' pro-Palestinian policies which advance the narrative that Israel is a "racist, Apartheid state" (A. Shapiro, 2016d).

- AIJAC rejects One Nation's exclusivist White supremacist agenda as incongruent with its vision of a pluralistic, multicultural, and tolerant Australia (Falkenstein and Narunsky, 2016).

- AIJAC has clashed frequently with Lyons and McNeill over what they regard as their "biased" coverage of Israel-Palestine (Fleischer, 2017; A. Shapiro, 2015).

- AIJAC has also clashed with dissident Jewish and Israeli groups such as the AJDS and B'Tselem due to their avowed criticism of Israeli policies and actions. Besides viewing these groups as a threat to Israel's national security and interests, AIJAC regards them as fringe groups that are out of touch with both mainstream Jewish diasporic and Israeli public opinion (Reich, 2004; Mittelman, 2015a).

This research shows that AIJAC has segmented Australian society and its "near abroad" including Indonesia into both sympathetic and hostile elements based on ideological alignment. In short, AIJAC seeks to work with political, media and civil society elites that support its efforts to advance Israeli and Australian Jewish interests and aspirations while opposing those elements that do not share its goals and worldview.

Analysis

AIJAC has fulfilled both criteria of segmentation and targeting. First, it has segmented political, media and civil society elites in Australia and its "near abroad" into friendly and hostile segments. Second, AIJAC has targeted sympathetic elites who can influence policies and public opinion towards Israel and the Jewish Diaspora by allocating resources to reaching them via its communications and advocacy activities, particularly its *AIR* magazine and Ramban program. While this research has shed light on how AIJAC's goals and values guided its segmentation and targeting methods, this research generated little information about AIJAC's efforts to recruit young professionals into their organisation through their "AIJAC Forum" program (AIJAC, n.d.a). Due to AIJAC's policy of not granting interviews, the researcher was unable to speak with both current and former staff members who could shed light on the inner workings of AIJAC Forum.

12.Internal marketing

Drawing upon several primary and secondary sources, this research found that the organisation pursues a "base strategy." Pettitt (2015) defines a base strategy as one that involves mobilising activists by pushing a product that appeals to the group's most committed supporters. According to AIJAC (n.d.a) and ACNC (2019), the organisation is committed to the following goals and values:

- Conveying the interests of the Australian Jewish community to government, media and community organisations;
- Combating anti-Israel bias and "misinformation" in the media and wider public debate;
- Promoting tolerance and multiculturalism;
- Combating racism, anti-Semitism, extremism, and fundamentalism; and

- Educating the Australian public and elites about Israel and other issues of interest to Australian Jewry.

These primary documents show that AIJAC has a clearly defined set of goals and values which its members and supporters are expected to follow. As a think tank and lobbying outfit, its staff members are expected to engage in research and advocacy work that advances these goals.

These primary sources were corroborated by observations from the secondary literature:

- According to Reich (2013) and Gawenda (2020), AIJAC's Executive Director Colin Rubenstein envisioned AIJAC as a professional lobbying organisation and think tank along the lines of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee and the AJC that would produce information, research, and lobby on issues of importance to Australian Jewry.

- According to Han and Rane (2013), AIJAC has advocated on issues of concern to Australian Jewry including racism, anti-Semitism, terrorism, maintaining Jewish identity, autonomy and communal survival, anti-Zionism, Israeli sovereignty and security, and anti-Israel "bias" in the media and academia. They have also promoted the Australian Jewish community's solidarity and commitment to Israel through fundraising, Aliyah (emigration to Israel), and cultural and religious identification with Israel.

- According to Gawenda (2020), Rubenstein ran AIJAC as a private advocacy organisation that operated independently of the ECAJ, the major Jewish representative organisation in Australia). This research found that Rubenstein has largely succeeded in these goals due AIJAC's substantial communications output, research, and extensive advocacy works.

Based on these primary and secondary sources, AIJAC pursues a base strategy since its ideological commitment to advancing Israel, Zionism and Jewish communal interests drives its activities and attracts liked-minded personnel and supporters. As a professional lobbying body, AIJAC does not have mass membership but seeks to recruit skilled personnel with a background in media, research, and who are able to network with influential political, media, civil society and business elites.

Analysis

In terms of internal marketing, the research showed that AIJAC pursues a base strategy that appeals to issues of concern to Australian Jewry including Israel, racism, anti-Semitism, promoting democracy and multiculturalism, and combating extremism and fundamentalism. AIJAC also sees itself and operates as a lobbying organisation and think tank devoted to raising these issues to Australian society through its communications output and advocacy work. AIJAC seeks to recruit members who share its aims and goals, and who are thus motivated by a sense of loyalty and purpose towards advancing these goals.

13.Fundraising

Drawing upon several primary and secondary sources, this research found that AIJAC generated its funding through magazine subscriptions and donations from wealthy and connected members of the Australian Jewish community.

- According to AIJAC (n.d.c), *AIR* magazine is a subscription-based magazine available in both print and online editions, with different rates for adult, student, pensioner, and Australasian Union of Jewish Students (AUJS) subscribers.
- Reich (2004), Loewenstein (2006), and Han and Rane's (2013) research found that AIJAC's operations were financed through private donations from wealthy members of the Australian Jewish community that sympathise with its goals and advocacy work.
- According to Gawenda (2020), AIJAC's financial supporters have included several wealthy Jewish patrons in Melbourne and Sydney who have ties and dealings with both National Chairman Leibler's law firm Arnold Bloch Leibler and Executive Director Rubenstein. One notable patron is the billionaire businessman Solomon Lew, the head of the Melbourne-based Premier Investment company, who helped recruit Leibler and Rubenstein to head AIJAC.

While AIJAC is a registered charity (ACNC, n.d.), these subscriptions and magazine private funding sources enable it to operate independently of the federal Australian Jewish representative organisations: the ECAJ and Zionist Federation of Australia. According to Gawenda (2020), AIJAC has an annual operating budget of AU$4 million, an amount that exceeds the budgets of other Jewish civil society groups including the Jewish Community Council of Victoria (JCCV). This budget does not include AIJAC's Ramban Israel Fellowships, which are funded by several of Australia's wealthiest Jewish families. At the

time of writing, AIJAC's headquarters is based within an office suite in South Melbourne with a branch office in Sydney. AIJAC has 17 staff members including eight full-time policy analysists and journalists.

Analysis

AIJAC fulfilled two of the three criteria of fundraising. While AIJAC did not carry out fundraising activities, it solicited donations from sympathetic members of the Australian Jewish community and also relied subscriptions for its *AIR* magazine. AIJAC uses this generous financial support to carry out its communications output and advocacy work which seeks to advance Israel and other issues of interest to Australian Jewry. AIJAC's private funding also gives it more room to manoeuvre than publicly-funded bodies.

Conclusion

The conclusion discusses the combined findings of the content analysis and secondary sources. This research yielded useful information about the group's communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesions activities. These combined findings are discussed in the following sub-sections below:

Strengths

Communicational activities

AIJAC has met all four communications criteria. First, AIJAC has produced politically-usable information through its website, magazine, op-ed columns, editorial letters, and by participating in media interviews and programs. Second, AIJAC has carried out all three criteria of "strategic political communications" by advancing pro-Israel themes and messages through its communications output; managing media coverage of Israel through engagement with media companies and journalists; and engaging in short-term campaigns on current affairs issues of interest to the Australian Jewish community. In general, AIJAC's themes and messaging have sought to defend Israeli actions; shift the blame onto the Palestinian side; and highlighting the dangers posed by anti-Semitism including the BDS variation. These three major themes underpin much of AIJAC's commentary and analysis on current affairs issues. To promote a favourable image of Israel, AIJAC has also cultivated relations with the media by publishing content and taking part in interviews. Finally, AIJAC has engaged in short-

term campaigns by producing content of interest to its readers including the Israel-Palestine conflict, Australian-Israel relations, and elections. In short, AIJAC's political communication activities are heavily influenced by media cycles and its ideological orientation.

Third, AIJAC has skilfully adapted to changes in communications technologies by harnessing popular social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to reach a wider audience. AIJAC has also used its Facebook and Twitter accounts to exploit media coverage of newsworthy issues relating to Israel-Palestine and Australian-Israel affairs. Besides the Internet, AIJAC has also used traditional print media like its *AIR* magazine. Fourth, AIJAC has fulfilled the two criteria of communicational image management by engaging in both positive and defensive image management. Positive image management has focused on "branding" Israel as a democratic, tolerant, innovative country and good international citizen. Defensive image management has focused on combating negative perceptions of Israel and defending controversial Israeli policies and actions such as home demolitions and detention of children.

Relational activities

AIJAC has fulfilled most of the five relational criteria. First, AIJAC has engaged in cause promotion by organising speaking engagements, public meetings, and informational trips to Israel through its visitor program and Ramban Israel Fellowships. While AIJAC has used interactive communications technologies such as the Internet and emails, they were classified under communicational activities since AIJAC used them more for messaging than relationship building. Second, AIJAC has sought to lobby and cultivate relations with various political, media and civil society leaders in a position to influence policies and public opinion on issues of interest to Australian Jewry. In addition, AIJAC has sought to hold various media outlets, journalists, politicians, and academics to account for both perceived and real anti-Israel bias and anti-Semitism. While AIJAC has contacted some media outlets directly, most of its accountability activities have taken the form of producing media content articulating their issues.

Third, AIJAC has built coalitions with a range of Australian actors including Jewish civil society groups and media, politicians, and academics to advance its aims and goals. Fourth, AIJAC has engaged in transnational collaboration by networking and sharing

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information with various foreign political, media, and civil society groups and individual actors. Fifth, AIJAC has carried out relational image management by sponsoring speaking engagements and politically-oriented trips to Israel-Palestine through its guest speaking program and Ramban Israel Fellowships. These initiatives help to promote a favourable view of Israel and Israeli society, and to manage negative public perceptions of Israel.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

AIJAC has fulfilled all four criteria of recruitment and internal cohesion. First, AIJAC pursues a sales-orientation orientation by using persuasive communications, interactive advocacy activities, and market intelligence to promote its pro-Israel cause. AIJAC's market intelligence involved identifying influential Australian political, media and civil society elites who can influence official policies and public opinion towards Israel-Palestine.

Second, AIJAC has fulfilled both criteria of segmentation and targeting by segmenting the Australian political, media and civil society elites into friendly and hostile segments and targeting sympathetic segments who can influence policies and attitudes towards Israel and the Jewish Diaspora by allocating resources and products to reaching them such as its Ramban and AIJAC Forum programs.

Third, AIJAC has used a base strategy to encourage its members to carry out communications and relational activities by appealing to their commitment to Israel, Zionism, and a multicultural Australia.

Fourth, AIJAC receives generous funding from sympathetic wealthy members of the Australian Jewish community as well as magazine subscriptions. AIJAC has used this generous financial backing to support its communications output, advocacy work, Visitor and Ramban programs, and meet its operating expenses.

Limitations

Communicational activities

The content analysis found that AIJAC did not fit some characteristics of communication activities. First, this research categorised social media as a form of communications adaptation rather than relational cause promotion since AIJAC has tended to use social media

as a communicational "force multiplier" rather than as a means of engaging with readers. While several AIJAC social media posts did attract comments, these posts were primarily used to transmit messages and content.

In terms of communicational image management, this research found that AIJAC highlighted the Jewish historical claim and connection to Israel but categorized this under strategic political communication's "themes and narratives" sub-section since it fitted with the group's Zionist narrative. Placing the Jewish historical connection to Israel under strategic political communication would prevent overlapping.

Relational activities

To avoid duplication, the coalition building section focused on AIJAC's efforts to forge relations and cooperation with sympathetic groups, individuals, and media in Australia. Meanwhile, the transnational collaboration section focused on AIJAC's efforts to forge relations and cooperation with sympathetic overseas-based and international groups, individuals, and media. While AIJAC took a strong interest in influencing Australian government policy, media coverage and public opinion towards Israel, it was not interested in influencing foreign governments such as New Zealand or international institutions such as the United Nations. This shows that AIJAC has clearly set goals and parameters for its advocacy work.

This research also found that most of AIJAC's relational image management activities were focused on contemporary issues rather than heritage promotion, reflecting its interest in current affairs issues.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

While the content analysis was unable to yield satisfactory information about AIJAC's marketing orientation, segmentation and targeting, internal marketing and fundraising, most of these gaps except for recruitment were addressed by prior secondary research conducted by Reich (2004), Rutland (2004), Markus (2004), Levey and Mendes (2004), Loewenstein (2006), Han and Rane (2013), Lyons (2017) and Gawenda (2020).

Research gaps

While a combination of primary and secondary sources yielded sufficient information for the synthetised analytical framework, one gap that remains is the process for recruiting individuals into the AIJAC Forum programme, which seeks to recruit young Australian professionals into the organisation. The research was also unable to obtain input from both current and former AIJAC staff members due to the organisation's policy of not granting interviews.

Overall findings

The AIJAC followed all the communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion categories of the analytical framework apart from the classification of their social media platforms as communicational activities rather than relational ones. This research showed that AIJAC operated as both a think tank and advocacy organisation that produced pro-Israel commentary, analysis, and research on its official organ *AIR* magazine, website, social media platforms, and a range of external media outlets in Australia and abroad.

In addition to its media output, AIJAC also lobbied, cultivated relationships, and networked with a range of sympathetic individuals, groups, governments, media, and institutions in both Australia and abroad, particularly Israel-Palestine. AIJAC's other relational activities have included its international guest speaker programme, and bringing sympathetic political, media, and civil society leaders to Israel-Palestine under its Ramban Israel Fellowships. These helped to promote a positive image of Israel and combat negative imagery. AIJAC also enjoys an "insider relationship" with the Australian and Israeli Governments as shown by its involvement in Prime Minister Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia.

Third, this research shows that AIJAC has conducted several recruitment and internal cohesion activities. First, it pursued a sales-oriented approach that focused on promoting Israel and other issues of interest to Australian Jewry through a range of literature, media, and advocacy activities. Second, AIJAC has segmented and targeted political, media and civil society elites in a position to influence Australian government policy and public opinion towards Israel via its communicational output and relational activities. AIJAC also pursues a base strategy of recruiting employees based on their affinity for Israel and Zionism. Finally,

AIJAC has quietly solicited funds from sympathetic Australian Jewish leaders and magazine subscriptions to finance its communications output and advocacy work.

Chapter 7: Australia Palestine Advocacy Network

This chapter explores the communication, relational, and recruitment activities of the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN), a national coalition of pro-Palestinian groups and individuals seeking to influence Australian public policy towards Palestine and Israel. It presents the results of the content analysis of 277 primary sources: 129 webpages, 35 newspaper and magazine articles, 27 videos and audio podcasts, and 86 Tweets. This content analysis was supplemented with an interview with APAN's Executive Officer Jessica Morrison. This chapter will give a brief description of APAN before discussing the group's communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities.

Overview

The Australia Palestine Advocacy Network is a national coalition of pro-Palestinian advocacy organisations and individuals, formed in 2011. APAN's key aims and goals has included promoting Palestinian rights and self-determination; ending the Israeli military occupation, settlement expansion, and the blockade of the Palestinian Territories; promoting a "just and lasting" negotiated solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict in accordance with international law; and to build alliances with like-minded Palestinian solidarity groups and activists in Australia and abroad. APAN is led by an Executive board that consists of members drawn from various civil society groups including members of the three Abrahamic communities (APAN, n.d.a; n.d.b).

Communicational activities

1. Information politics

APAN's website (https://apan.org.au/) provides information about the organisation's mission, leadership, and activities. In addition, APAN operates social media accounts on Facebook (https://www.facebook.com/AustraliaPalestineAdvocacyNetwork/), Twitter (https://twitter.com/apan4palestine/), Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/apan4palestine/), and Vimeo (https://vimeo.com/user42457739).

Analysis

APAN fulfilled the information politics criterion by generating content through its website. In addition, the Network utilised several interactive social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Vimeo.

2. Strategic political communication

APAN has engaged in strategic political communication by framing information in a way that supported their pro-Palestinian cause and agenda with the goal of building sympathy and support for the Palestinians.

Themes and narratives

APAN has engaged in symbolic politics to promote pro-Palestinian narratives, themes, arguments, and stories in their communications output. These were organised into four main themes: Australian relations with Israel-Palestine, pro-Palestinian themes and messages, counter-Israeli themes and messages, and anti-Semitism/anti-Zionism.

AUSTRALIAN RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL AND PALESTINE

Reflecting its interest in influencing Australian government policy, media coverage, and public discourses around Israel-Palestine, APAN has taken an interest in Australian foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine, Australian-Palestinian relations, and Australian-Israel relations.

APAN has taken several positions on Australian foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine:

- Urged Australia to hold Israel accountable for what it regards as human rights violations against the Palestinians including the Gaza blockade, settlement expansion, and administration detention (APAN, 2012e).
- Advocated that Australia unilaterally recognise Palestinian statehood and support multilateral peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians since the asymmetry between the two sides makes a bilaterally-negotiated peace outcome untenable (APAN, 2012e).
- Appealing to the Australian notion of "fair go," APAN (2015j) claims that the Australian Government's unquestioned support for Israel despite its alleged regard for

international law and Palestinian human rights goes against the Australian values of fairness and justice.

- Advancing the idea that Australia can support a "win-win solution" to the Israel-Palestine conflict where a just and prosperous Palestine can live beside Israel (APAN, 2015j).

- Criticised the Australian Government for refusing to condemn Israeli settlements, recognise East Jerusalem as "occupied," and opposing UN Security Council Resolution 2334 (APAN, 2013s, 2014s; 2017o).

These statements show that APAN has sought to promote the narrative that Australian foreign policy is imbalanced in Israel's favour and that Australia can address this by advancing Palestinian rights and justice.

In terms of Australian-Palestinian relations, APAN has monitored politicians and political parties' positions and policies towards the Palestinians:

- Praised a 2015 Australian Labor Party (ALP) National Conference motion on the Israel-Palestine conflict calling for any resolution of the conflict to be based on the 1967 borders with agreed land swaps, ending the Israeli military occupation and settlement expansion, and resolving Palestinian refugee issues (Shaik, 2015a).

- Criticised the Turnbull Government for cutting aid to the Palestinian Authority, asserting that there was no evidence of misuse of funds and that this undermined the Australian Government's claim to support a two-state solution and Palestinian rights (APAN 2018i).

These statements show that APAN advances the narrative that the Palestinians are locked into an unequal "David and Goliath" relationship with Israel where Palestinian rights and interests are subordinated to those of Israel.

In terms of Australian-Israel relations, APAN has criticised politicians and civil society groups when they adopt policies that favour Israel at the expense of the Palestinians:

- Criticising Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia due to the Israeli occupation and alleged human rights abuses against the Palestinians (APAN, 2017p).

- Criticised the Australian Government for justifying Israeli military actions such as the shooting of protestors and air strikes during the 2018 Gaza March of Return (APAN, 2018g; 2018x).

- Criticised the Australian Government for opposing a UN Human Rights Council resolution condemning Israel's "wholly disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force" and calling for an investigation of all alleged violations and abuses of international law. In APAN's (2018g) view, Australia's refusal to condemn Israeli actions made it complicit in Israeli crimes against the Palestinians.

- Reflecting its antagonistic relationship with pro-Israel lobby groups such as AIJAC, APAN (2014d) has claimed that AIJAC has influenced Australian Middle Eastern foreign policy in a direction that is hostile towards peaceful coexistence and Palestinian rights.

Throughout their political communications, APAN has advanced the narrative that the Australian Government's pro-Israel foreign policy is at odds with the Australian ethos of "fair go." For APAN, this not only makes Australia a party to alleged Israeli human rights abuses and discrimination against the Palestinians but also places Australia at odds with much of the international community except the United States, Israel's strongest international ally. Rejecting the status quo, APAN has dedicated its existence to promoting what it regards as a more "fair and just" foreign policy that respects Palestinian rights and self-determination.

PRO-PALESTINIAN THEMES AND MESSAGES

APAN has sought to promote the "David and Goliath" narrative of the oppressed Palestinians resisting Israeli "settler colonialism" by highlighting the asymmetry of power between Israel and the Palestinians; the former in APAN's view a sovereign state with a strong military and powerful international allies, and the latter a people experiencing a military occupation, dispossession, inadequate access to land and resources, and lacking full international recognition. The "asymmetry of power" theme has also been utilised by Palestinian figures including Palestinian Executive Committee member Dr Hanan Ashrawi and former Palestinian Prime Minister Dr Salam Fayyad (APAN, 2015k; 2015l). By using the "David and Goliath" analogy, the Palestinians and their supporters including APAN can frame the Israel-Palestine conflict as a struggle for freedom and self-determination and counter the Zionist narrative that Israel is fighting for its survival against anti-Semitism and terrorism. Reflecting the David and Goliath narrative, APAN has sought to raise awareness and advocate on issues relating to Palestinian human rights including the plight of Palestinian prisoners, children and youth, and refugees, Palestinian resistance and struggle, and Palestinian self-determination, which are outlined below.

In line with its human rights interest, APAN has publicised the plight of Palestinian prisoners particularly children and youth in Israeli military custody by:

- Raising awareness of the plight of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli custody by networking with sympathetic politicians like Cathy O'Toole, organising symbolic solidarity activities such as the "Salt Water Challenge" to coincide with Palestinian hunger strikes, and issuing social media posts timed to promote these campaigns (APAN, 2016dd; 2017t; 2018u).

- Endorsing Australian journalist John Lyons' *Stone Cold Justice,* a jointly produced Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC)-*The Australian* documentary about the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children and youth (APAN, 2014a).

- Petitioning the Australian Government about the plight of Palestinian children in Israeli military custody (APAN 2014b). Working with sympathetic Members of Parliament (MPs) and senators to lobby Israel regarding the detention of Palestinian children (APAN 2016n; 2016o).

- Demanding the release of Palestinian teenage activist Ahed Tamimi, whose arrest and trial drew considerable international attention (APAN 2018d; 2018o).

Besides raising awareness of the plight of Palestinian prisoners, children, and youth, these reports and personal stories also draw to attention the asymmetry between the Palestinians and Israel and reinforce the narrative that Israel is oppressing the Palestinians.

In line with its interest in Palestinian human rights, APAN has also sought to raise awareness of the plight of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon and Syria (where they are denied many basic rights including access to work, healthcare, and social services) by:

- Organising visits to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon as part of its study tour program in order to educate Australians about the plight of Palestinian refugees (Bartlett, 2015).

- Raising awareness about the plight of Palestinian refugees living in Yamouk refugee camp in April 2015 and calling on the Australian Government to support international efforts to allow humanitarian aid to enter the refugee camp and for people to be allowed to leave it (APAN, 2015m).

- Joining forces with ASPIRE (the Australian Society for the Palestinian-Iraqi Refugees) to raise awareness about the plight of Palestinian refugees in Syria and call

on the United Nations and international aid organisations to include them in their humanitarian aid programs (APAN, 2015a; 2015i).

APAN's efforts to highlight the plight of Palestinian refugees is part of its broader goal of promoting Palestinian rights and self-determination.

In line with its "David and Goliath" narrative, APAN has sought to frame Palestinian resistance as a human rights issue and liberation struggle against Israeli "settler-colonialism":

- In October 2015, APAN issued a statement blaming the so-called "Knife Intifada" (or "Stabbing Intifada) which engulfed the West Bank and East Jerusalem on Israeli provocations including the "invasion" of the Temple Mount (Harem al-Sharif) by Jewish religious nationalists, restrictions on Palestinian access to the Temple Mount and Jerusalem's Old City, home demolitions, and extra-judicial killings. While APAN regretted the attacks and killings of Israelis, it framed the outbreak of violence as a result of the settlement expansion and dispossession associated with Israel's occupation of the Occupied Territories (Shaik and Morrison, 2015).

- Advancing the theme of Palestinian resistance through social media posts promoting Emud Burnat's film *5 Broken Cameras,* non-violence resistance, Ahed Tamimi, and linking Palestinian resistance to the Black Lives Matter movement (APAN, 2013n; 2015w; 2018r; 2018l).

APAN's promotion and justification of Palestinian acts of resistance against Israel reflects its view that Palestinian violence is a response to the human rights abuses, discrimination, and loss of land and homes associated with the Israeli occupation of Palestinian Territories. Thus, it also consciously avoids using the term "terrorists" to describe Palestinian belligerents since it plays into the Israeli narrative that Palestinian resistance and violence are illegitimate forms of terrorism.

APAN has also advanced arguments and positions to promote Palestinian self-determination and statehood to an Australian audience by:

- Publishing a media release (APAN, 2011c), sponsored a petition (APAN, 2011b), and submitted op-ed columns in *The Canberra Times* and *Sydney Morning Herald* urging the Gillard Government to support upgrading Palestine's UN membership status to "non-member observer state" in order to advance a two-state solution ("Australia's leaders must back Palestinian bid for Statehood," 2018; Henderson, 2012).

- Defending Palestinian efforts to seek international recognition and membership of international institutions on the grounds that Israel had undermined the peace process through its ongoing military occupation, settlement expansion, home demolitions, and land confiscations (Browning, 2014d).

- Welcoming the 2014 Hamas-Fatah peace accord as a means of alleviating the hardship faced by the people of Gaza and strengthening the Palestinian voice at the negotiating table while framing US and Israeli opposition to the accord as a rejection of the democratic electoral process and Palestinian national unity (Carisbrooke, 2014b; APAN, 2014p).

- Welcoming a 2017 Hamas-Fatah peace accord and attacking Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for opposing any moves towards Palestinian unity (APAN, 2017o).

In APAN's view, Israeli intransigence and aggression is to blame for the lack of progress in attaining Palestinian statehood through the peace process. Palestinian refusal to accept Israeli peace offers and violence is often framed as a response to so-called Israeli "bad faith" and repression; a theme discussed below.

COUNTER-ISRAELI THEMES AND MESSAGES

Third, APAN has produced content criticising Israel and Zionism, focusing on alleged Israeli aggression, human rights abuses, discrimination, intransigence, the military occupation, oppression, and settlement expansion; which are discussed below. Within APAN's communications output, Israel is portrayed as a human rights abuser and rogue state that is obstructing Palestinian self-determination and aspirations. Zionism is presented as a racist, exclusionary form of nationalism that has dispossessed, dehumanised, and delegitimised the Palestinians.

In line with these views, APAN has condemned Israeli military actions against the Palestinians:

- During the 2012 Gaza conflict, APAN (2012j; 2013j) condemned the Israeli air bombardment as the "extrajudicial killings" of civilians that breached international law. APAN also drew attention to the use of white phosphorus by the Israel military and the crippling effect of the Gaza Blockade.

- During the 2014 Gaza conflict, APAN (2014f; 2015q) condemned the high civilian casualties and widespread destruction of infrastructure as war crimes the violated the Geneva Conventions. In 2016, President Browning criticised the United Israel Appeal for hosting former Israeli Commander in Chief Lt. Colonel Benny Gantz, stating that his defence of Israeli's bombardment was inconsistent with the Australian values of respecting human life and supporting the oppressed (APAN, 2016e).
- During the 2018 Gaza March of Return, APAN (2018g; 2018x) condemned the Israeli military's use of lethal force against Palestinian protesters as a "flagrant violation of international law."

Besides highlighting the civilian casualties and devastation caused by Israel's military actions, APAN has claimed that Israel violated international law and Australian norms and values, thus reinforcing the Palestinian narrative of Israel being a rogue state in violation of international norms.

In line with its Palestinian human rights advocacy, APAN has sought to highlight incidents of Israeli human rights abuses and discrimination such as the 2015 Duma arson attack, a 2016 public opinion survey claiming that half of Israeli Jews object to Arabs teaching their children, and claiming that the 2018 Nation State Law for promoting "Apartheid" between Jews and Arabs (APAN 2015u; 2016y; 2018r). These posts advance the narrative that Israeli racism and human rights abuses against Palestinians are the result of the "structural oppression" caused by the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian Territories.

In line with the "David and Goliath" conflict theme, APAN (2011a) has also presented Israel as the "intransigent" party in the Israel-Palestine conflict, contending that its military occupation, settlement expansion, land confiscations, home demolitions and alleged human rights violations undermine the peace process and a two-state solution. This has surfaced in APAN's communications output and online campaigns including:
- APAN's (2014i) "good-do" campaign petitioning the Australian Government to support recognising Palestinian statehood on the grounds that Israel is not genuinely committed to a two-state solution due to its encouragement of settlement expansion in the West Bank. Browning's (2017) also challenged AIJAC's National Director Colin Rubenstein's assertion that the Palestinians had spurned Israeli peace offers by contending that Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's Palestinian statehood plan in

2008 was rejected by Deputy Prime Minister Tzipi Livni and his successor Netanyahu.

- APAN (2016w; 2017y; 2017ee) publishing tweets asserting that Israeli settlement expansion has obstructed peace and damaged US-Israeli relations under the Obama Administration; Israel prospering from the military occupation at the expense of Palestinians; and a Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) report documenting what it regarded as inflammatory and belligerent anti-Palestinian remarks by Israeli politicians.

APAN has sought to combat pro-Israel arguments and messages blaming Palestinian intransigence and rejectionism by highlighting what it regards as Israel's obstructive behaviour and actions, particularly "settlement colonialism" and human rights abuses.

APAN has also highlighted the Israeli military occupation of Palestinian Territories in its communications output, claiming that it facilitates the subjugation, oppression, and dispossession of the Palestinians:

- In response to the 2018 Gaza March of Return, APAN issued a statement asserting that even though Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2015, the Israeli air, land, and sea blockade of the territory constitutes a form of occupation due to travel and importation restrictions (APAN, 2018g).
- Browning's (2015b) *Labor Herald* op-ed column arguing that Israel's ongoing military occupation violates international law and Christian principles about justice through what he regards as the deliberate displacement of Palestinians.
- To mark the 50th anniversary of the Six Day War in June 2017, APAN (2017j) issued a statement condemning the Israeli military occupation and urging Israel to comply with UN General Assembly resolution 242, UN Security Council resolution 2334, and the Fourth Geneva Convention.

These statements show that APAN views the Israeli occupation as part of a structural process of subjugating and making conditions unbearable for the Palestinians with the goal of forcing them out of their homeland, exposing the racist nature of the Zionist "settler-colonial enterprise."

Since its inception, APAN (2011a; 2017j) has consistently opposed Israeli settlements, as illegal under international law and described them as a threat to Palestinian

human rights, economic security, and self-determination. Its anti-settlement stance is reflected throughout its media statements, op-ed columns, Twitter feed, and speaking events:

- Calling upon the Australian Government to condemn Israeli settlement expansion in tandem with its support for Palestinian self-determination (APAN, 2012k).

- Op-ed column in *The Australian* describing settlements as a major barrier to world peace (APAN, 2012o).

- Tweeting former Australian Foreign Minister Bob Carr's article denouncing Israeli settlements as illegal and a threat to Israeli democracy (APAN, 2013m).

- Tweeting a *Haaretz* column asserting that the Netanyahu government is being intransigent by legalising Israeli settlements (APAN, 2015v).

- Tweeting a *New York Times* article reporting that the Israeli Government is violating their own High Court's order to demolish the illegal Amona outpost (APAN, 2016ee)

In APAN's view, settlement expansion not only violates international law and undermines the peace process but also deprives Palestinians of the land and resources needed to build a functioning economy and state. For APAN, settlement expansion is part of a colonisation process to alter the demographics of the West Bank in Israel's favour by driving Palestinians out of the region.

Together, APAN uses the themes of Israeli aggression, violence, human rights violations, intransigence, military occupation, and settlement expansion to promote the image of Israel as a rogue state at odds with international norms and morality.

ANTI-SEMITISM

APAN has also devoted some coverage to anti-Semitism, taking the view that it should be distinguished from legitimate criticism of Israeli policies and actions including human rights abuse:

- President Browning (2013a) criticising the London Declaration for equating criticism of Israel's occupation and settlement expansion with traditional anti-Semitism.

- Peter Slezak defending the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement against allegations of anti-Semitism. Slezak claimed that the movement was only interested in advancing Palestinian rights, self-determination, and holding Israel accountable for human rights violations (APAN, 2013r).

Rebutting Liberal MP Michael Sukkar's speech denouncing BDS as an anti-Semitic "hate movement." APAN countered that BDS was targeting companies profiting from Israeli settlement expansion and Palestinian home demolitions. To counter Sukkar's assertion that the Palestinians denied Israel's right to exist, APAN published remarks by several Israeli government ministers rejecting Palestinian statehood and advocating annexation of the Palestinian Territories. In APAN's view, Israeli politicians rather than the BDS movement were the ones stoking hatred and racism. (APAN, 2016f).

- Rejecting the Executive Council of Australian Jewry's (ECAJ) claim that the Network was "anti-Israel" as an attempt to smear the Palestinian advocacy movement in Australia (APAN, 2017a).

For APAN and other Palestinian solidarity groups, the smear of anti-Semitism has been a major obstacle to influencing public, government and media opinion towards Israel-Palestine. While APAN's leadership has supported Israel's right to exist, they believe that this should not come at the expense of trampling on Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Reflecting APAN's focus, its themes and messages can be categorized into four broad categories: Australian relations with Israel and Palestine, pro-Palestine themes and messages, counter-Israel themes and messages, and anti-Semitism. These show that APAN has positioned itself as an advocacy organisation dedicated to advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination in Australia and documenting alleged Israeli intransigence and human rights abuses. APAN has also sought to change Australian foreign policy in favour of the Palestinians and to distinguish criticism of Israeli policies and human rights abuses from anti-Semitism.

Media management

In addition to its own informational output, APAN members have also submitted op-ed columns and letters, participated in interviews and news broadcasts with Australian media outlets, and publicised media coverage of its activities and press releases. Reflecting its interest in building a media profile, APAN has devoted a page called "APAN in the news" (https://apan.org.au/apan-in-the-news/) to listing these contacts with the media. The table below outlines the media outlets that APAN has published op-ed articles, solicited interviews or that have covered APAN's activities in the period between 9 June 2011 and 1 June 2018:

Media outlet	Topics
3CR Community Radio	Covered APAN's study tours (Bartlett, 2015) and the 2018 Gaza March of Return (Bartlett, 2018)
The Age	Published Browning's (2014d) op-ed column on Israeli settlements. Covered APAN's November 2011 Roy Morgan public opinion poll, lobbying activities, and concerns about Palestinian perspectives being excluded from the Victorian public secondary education (Fitton, 2011; Willingham, 2011; Jacks and Education Reporter, 2016).
The Australian/Weekend Australian	Columns and letters about Israeli settlement expansion, the 2014 Gaza War, defending Bob Carr, Palestinian statehood, and the 2018 Gaza March of Return (Barr, 2011b; Burns, 2012; 2014; Shaik, 2014; Browning, 2014e; 2015d; Dally, 2018).
ABC	APAN members taking part in media interviews and reports about the Gaza Blockade, the Palestinian bid for UN statehood, the Abbot Government's decision to reclassify East Jerusalem as "not occupied", Bill Leak's offensive cartoon from the 2014 Gaza War, Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia, and Donald Trump's decision to move the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem (Flescher, 2012; AusJDS, 2012; Om, 2014; Kelly, 2014; Barry, 2014; Carabine, 2017; Oriti, 2017; Schwartz, 2017). Published Slezak's radio documentary about life in the Occupied Territories on ABC's Radio National (Melville, 2012). ABC coverage of APAN's 2014 Roy Morgan Poll which found that 57% of Australians supported a Palestinian state (West, 2014).
Australian Financial Review	Covered APAN's statements on the 2012 UN General Assembly vote to upgrade Palestinian membership status, the implications of Donald Trump's election for US-Palestinian relations, the Trump Administration's decision to move the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and APAN's boycott of Paypal (Clark, 2012; 2017; Tillett, 2017, 2018).
Australian Jewish News	Covered the Limmud Oz's decision to exclude APAN Vice President Bassam Dally from a session on Israeli-Palestinian coexistence due to his support for BDS (Kohn, 2016).
Canberra Times	Published letters and op-ed columns by APAN members on Australian foreign policy, Palestinian statehood, Israeli settlement expansion, Palestinian participation in the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and defending Labor MP Melissa Parke's support for BDS (Newton, 2011; "Australia's leaders must back Palestinian bid for Statehood," 2011; APAN, 2011d; "Mid East position will bite Gillard," 2011; Newton, 2012a; 2012b; Slezak and Browning, 2014).
Courier-Mail	Published two op-ed columns by Browning (2017c; 2017a) criticising the Turnbull Government's rejection of UN Resolution 2334 and commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Six Day War.
Crikey	Covered APAN's response to Bill Leak's offensive "anti-Palestinian" cartoon during the 2014 Gaza War, and APAN's first media study tour of the Palestinian Territories in late 2016 (Rubin, 2014; 2016).

Figure 18 APAN's media engagement (June 2011 - June 2018)

Electronic Intifada	Covered APAN's campaign petitioning 49 Australian politicians into signing a joint letter calling Israel to cease human rights abuses against Palestinians (Abunimah, 2016).
The Guardian	Covered President Browning's responses to Labor leader Bill Shorten's remarks about Israeli settlements, criticism of the Abbott Government's positions of East Jerusalem and Palestinian statehood (Chan, 2014; Taylor, 2014; Medhora, 2015). Published Browning's (2017d) op-ed column chastising the Turnbull Government for opposing UN Security Council Resolution 2334, which condemned Israeli settlement expansion.
J-Wire	Published Slezak's (2012) op-ed criticising the Limmud-Oz committee's decision to rescind their speaking invitation due to his disagreement with the mainstream Australian Jewish community's pro-Zionist leanings.
Labour Herald	Published an op-ed by Browning (2015c) blaming Israeli settlement expansion and the military occupation for fuelling the Israel-Palestine conflict.
Melbourne Anglican	Published a guest column by Browning (2015b) about the Israel-Palestine conflict.
New Matilda	Sympathetic coverage of APAN's adoption of the BDS campaign and efforts to lobby Australian parliamentarians on the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children (Chalmers, 2015; Brull, 2016).
Noise11	Covered APAN's guest talk in February 2018 featuring Roger Waters (Cashmere, 2018).
On Line Opinion	Published op-ed columns by APAN members on various topics including junket trips to Israel, Nakba commemorations, anti-Semitism, Israeli "Apartheid", the 2015 Israeli general election, the BDS movement, and the status of Jerusalem, and political parties' positions on Israel-Palestine (APAN, 2016c; Barr, 2012; Browning, 2013a; Dally, 2014; Browning, 2015a; Rees, 2015; Browning, 2016; Morrison, 2016).
Special Broadcasting Service (SBS)	APAN members have been interviewed or quoted in SBS media coverage of various topics including former Foreign Minister Bob Carr's memoir, the formation of a Palestinian unity government, the Abbott Government's position on East Jerusalem, the Balfour Declaration's centenary, and the Trump Administration's relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem (Carisbrooke, 2014a; 2014b; Cowie, 2014; O'Brien, 2017; Christian, 2013).
Sydney Criminal Lawyers (SCL)	Interviewed APAN members Jessica Morrison and Browning about the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children and the 2018 Gaza March of Return (Gregoire, 2016; Gregoire and Nedim, 2018).
Sydney Morning Herald	Published letters and op-ed content by APAN members about alleged Israeli intransigence, the Israel-Palestine peace process, and Palestinian resistance (Barr, 2011c; Henderson, 2012; Browning and Barak, 2018). Covered APAN's statements about Israeli settlements, the 2014 Gaza War, and Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia (Swan, 2014; Hasham, 2014; Gartrell, 2017).
The Wire	Slezak took part in a *Wire* podcast to discuss the implications of the 2015 Israeli election for the Israeli-Arab and Palestinian communities (Sferruzzi, 2015).

This sample of 88 articles shows that APAN has targeted several prominent media outlets such as ABC, SBS, *The Australian, Sydney Morning Herald,* and *The Age*, which reach substantial national audiences. Soliciting media coverage from these media via op-ed content, interviews, and media reports helps to get APAN's message out to a wider audience, build its public profile, and forge contacts with journalists. In addition, APAN solicited coverage from sympathetic left-wing media and organisations such as 3CR Community Radio, *Crikey, New Matilda,* and Sydney Criminal Lawyers. While APAN mainly focused on Australian media and organisations, it also attracted coverage from foreign media such as *The Guardian*, which publishes an Australian edition, and the Chicago-based Palestinian diaspora news website *Electronic Intifada.* APAN's contacts with the media shows that it views the "fourth estate" as a key theatre for influencing public opinion and government policy towards the Palestinians.

Short term campaigns

APAN has engaged in short-term campaigns by publishing content on their website, social media platform and external media covering newsworthy developments in Israel-Palestine, Australia, and the world that are of interest to Palestinian solidarity supporters. This research's website and social media data sampling found that APAN devoted extensive coverage to certain current affairs events and developments including elections in Australia and Israel, the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars, and Palestinian solidarity events and campaigns. These are listed in the table below:

Figure 19 APAN's short-term campaigns (2012-2018)					
Topics	**Website**	**Twitter**	**Vimeo**	**External media**	**Total**
2012 Gaza War	1	1	0	1	3
2013 Australian federal election	2	1	0	0	3
2013 International Day of Solidarity	2	0	0	0	2
2014 Gaza War	4	3	0	3	10
2015 International Day of Solidarity	1	0	0	0	1
2016 Australian federal election	5	3	2	1	11
2017 Roy Morgan Poll	1	0	0	0	1

2018 Gaza March of Return	2	2	0	2	6
Nakba Day commemorations (2013, 2016, 2017, 2018)	2	3	0	0	5
Palestine National Day (2017)	0	1	0	0	1
Palestinian Prisoners Day (2018)	0	1	0	0	1

The researcher collected articles, Vimeo videos, and links to external media content on APAN's website. Based on the content analysis, the researcher was able to organize them into certain themes and issues, which became critical case sampling categories for APAN's Twitter account, which had published 2,530 posts between November 2012 and August 2018. Based on the earlier AIJAC case study, the research used these sampling categories to generate a 5.5% sample (or roughly 138 posts). To ensure consistency, two posts were selected a month. As with the prior cases study, the researcher found a spike in APAN content in response to newsworthy events and developments like the 2012 and 2014 Gaza Wars, the 2013 and 2016 Australian federal elections, and the 2018 Gaza March of Return. APAN (2017g; 2013k; 2017i; 2016x; 2018f; 2017cc; 2018u) also used its website and Twitter to publicize certain activities and commemorative events like their 2017 Roy Morgan Poll, the Nakba Day commemorations, Palestinian National Day, and Palestinian Prisoners Day. APAN's short-term campaigns shows that it is interested in exploiting current affairs developments to raise awareness of the Palestinian struggle and cause.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled all three criteria of strategic political communications by advancing pro-Palestinian themes and messages, managing media coverage of the Palestinians, and engaging in short-term campaigns in response to media coverage of Israel-Palestine issues on both a global and domestic level.

First, APAN has sought to raise awareness of the Palestinian cause, focusing on Australian relations with Israel-Palestine, pro-Palestinian and counter-Israeli themes and messages, and anti-Semitism. Through these four issues, APAN has advanced the narrative

that Australia needs a balanced foreign policy that addresses Palestinian rights and aspirations and holds Israel to account for its alleged intransigent behaviour. APAN has also promoted the "David and Goliath" narrative that the Palestinians are fighting for their human rights and self-determination against the Israeli military occupation and settler colonialism. APAN has sought to portray Israel as a serial human rights violator using military force and discriminatory policies to subjugate the Palestinians. Finally, APAN has also sought to differentiate anti-Semitism from efforts by the BDS movement to hold Israel to account for its alleged human rights abuses and aggression towards the Palestinians. These four major themes reflect APAN's mission and underpin the content of its communications output and advocacy activities. While not explicitly stated, APAN used its messages and arguments to attract potential supporters; a topic addressed in the "recruitment and internal cohesion" sections below.

Second, APAN has sought to manage media coverage of the Palestinians by producing op-ed columns, letters, taking part in media interviews, and promoting media reports highlighting their activities. Besides articulating a pro-Palestinian perspective, these media engagements allow APAN members to cultivate relations with the media and build their public profile. While this research found that APAN exploited media coverage of international events in Israel-Palestine with the goal of raising domestic support for their causes, it did not measure their impact on influencing public opinion. Reflecting the situation in Israel-Palestine, APAN has avoided tourism promotion but emphasised Palestinian indigenous rights. .

Third, APAN has engaged in short-term campaigns by publishing content on current affairs issues relating to Israel-Palestine, Australian relations with Israel-Palestine, and elections in Australia and Israel. In short, APAN's political communication activities were heavily influenced by current affairs developments and media cycles. This content analysis showed that APAN's political communications activities have focused on promoting Palestinian human rights and self-determination and holding Israel accountable.

3. Communications adaptation

As discussed earlier, APAN has used a range of communications media and platforms including its website, its Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Vimeo social media accounts to

reach a wider pro-Palestinian audience. While APAN's website serves as its formal channel, its Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Vimeo social media accounts constitute its informal channels. Since APAN's website has been discussed earlier this section focuses on APAN's Twitter and Vimeo accounts.

Twitter

Based on the content analysis, APAN (2013p; 2016aa; 2016cc; 2012mm; 2012n; 2013k; 2013g; 2013q) used its Twitter account to promote its media statements, fundraising dinners and marathons, protests, lobbying activities, petitions, guest speaking engagements, and informational tours. In addition, APAN (2014x; 2013s; 2014m; 2014u; 2016v; 2017s; 2017ff; 2018t) shared and retweeted content by other groups, individuals and media on various issues relating to Israel-Palestine including Palestinian UN membership status, Israeli settlement expansion, military occupation, the detention of Palestinian children, the 2014 Gaza War, punitive demolitions, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia, the Trump Administration's relocation of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, and the 2018 Gaza March of Return.

APAN (2012n; 2013l; 2013t; 2018p; 2017x) has also retweeted several Avaaz and Change.org campaigns to highlight Palestinian human rights including Palestinian statehood, the plight of Negev Bedouins facing eviction, the Gaza Blockade, Palestinian children in Israeli military detention, and Paypal's discrimination against Palestinians. In addition, APAN (2018u; 2016t; 2013f; 2014n; 2013g) has shared content from sympathetic individuals and groups including Addameer Prisoner Support and Human Rights Association, Israeli human rights non-governmental organisation (NGO) B'Tselem, the Independent Australian Jewish Voices (IAJV), Australian Labor Party Member of Parliament (MP) Melissa Parke, and British musician and activist Roger Waters. Besides circulating their messages, retweeting their posts and articles helps APAN work with other activists and groups on both a domestic and transnational level. APAN's use of Twitter shows that it seeks to raise awareness of the Palestinian struggle while simultaneously pushing for change through petition campaigns and networking with like-minded activists and groups in Australia and abroad. For them, their Twitter space is not just an "echo chamber" but also helps to advance change and collaboration on a limited level.

A content analysis of nine of Vimeo videos published between July 2015 and August 2018 suggests that APAN uses Vimeo to promote its public events including forums and guest speaking engagements, advocacy campaigns, and interviews; which are outlined below:

1. APAN and the Australian Jewish Democratic Society (AJDS) hosting a video presentation by Palestinian Executive Committee member Dr Hanan Ashrawi at the 2015 ALP National Conference (APAN, 2015k).

2. APAN (2015l) republishing an ABC video broadcast of former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad's address to the Australian Press Club.

3. APAN's (2016q) "I VOTE PALESTINE!!" campaign to petition politicians into signing APAN's Pledge on Palestine during the 2016 Australian federal election.

4. APAN's (2016r) Melbourne Candidates Forum featuring Greens MP Adam Bandt and Labor candidate Sophia Lewis, who had signed APAN's Pledge on Palestine.

5. APAN's (2017n) mid-2017 campaign to get Paypal to stop discriminating against Palestinians living in the West Bank.

6. APAN (2018k) hosting a guest speaking event in Melbourne featuring Pink Floyds musician and Palestinian solidarity activist Roger Waters, Palestinian-Australian activist Randa Abdel-Fattah and Jewish-Australian journalist Antony Loewenstein.

7. APAN and Australians for Palestine hosting Palestinian-American scholar and activist Noura Erakat's Melbourne guest talk linking the Palestinian cause to the Black Lives Matter movement (APAN, 2018l).

8. APAN (2018n) hosting Military Court Watch (MCW) founders Gerard Horton and Salwa Duaibis's Australian speaking tour in August 2018, focusing on the Israeli detention of Palestinian children and military occupation.

9. APAN (2018m) promotional video talking about their recent advocacy work including lobbying stakeholders, highlighting the plight of Palestinian children, hosting Palestinians and allies like Salam Fattah and Roger Waters, information tours, and members, volunteers, and donors.

These videos show that APAN has produced videos to promote their speaking engagements, campaigns and advocacy work in order to promote the Palestinian cause and cement ties with other activists, groups, and the Palestinian Authority. As a video hosting platform, APAN's Vimeo account also serves as an informal film vault for their past advocacy activities and

campaigns. APAN's use of both Twitter and Vimeo shows how widespread and ubiquitous the Internet has become to modern life and communications including advocacy work.

Analysis

APAN met all three criteria of communications adaptation. First, the Network used a wide range of communications mediums and platforms to promote the Palestinian cause to a tech-savvy Australian audience, which tended to be progressive and pro-Palestinian. Second, APAN has used formal channels like its website and emails. Third, they used a range of informal channels including their Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Vimeo accounts. For this sub-section, the researcher focused on their Twitter and Vimeo accounts. Twitter was used mainly for messaging and sharing articles and tweets while Vimeo was used to promote their public activities including speaking engagements, forums, and advocacy campaigns through videos. In summary, APAN has responded well to changes in communications technology by harnessing the Internet and social media platforms, allowing it to reach a wide audience.

4. Communicational image management

APAN has promoted a favourable image of the Palestinian cause while seeking to combat negative imagery about the Palestinians. Due to the situation in the Palestinian Territories, APAN's communicational image management has not focused on tourism, destination branding, and cultural promotion but rather on presenting the Palestinians as waging a struggle for human rights and self-determination against Israeli military domination. In September 2012, Slezak participated in an ABC *Radio National* documentary called "Breaking the Silence" which featured dissident Israelis, Palestinians, and human rights activities. The documentary presented the Palestinians as a resilient, courteous, and hospitable people under siege from a "brutal" Israeli military occupation including the separation wall, settlement expansion, and home invasions. By contrast, Israel was presented as an aggressor that had committed war crimes in Gaza by bombing civilians. The Israeli military occupation was also characterized as a process of structural violence where Palestinians were dehumanized and robbed of their lands and homes through the separation wall, settlement expansion, evictions, and other legal subterfuges (Melville, 2012). Slezak's documentary advanced the narrative that the Palestinians were fighting a "David and Goliath" struggle against a racist Israeli occupation. A similar theme was expounded by Browning and

Barak (2018) in a *Sydney Morning Herald* op-ed column commemorating the 70th anniversary of Israel's independence in May 2018. They framed the Palestinians as an oppressed people fighting for their freedom despite the Israeli military occupation, exile, the failed Palestinian leadership, and the powers arrayed against them. For the authors, Israel's birth ushered in the displacement, oppression, and denial of Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Analysis

Due to the Palestinian's circumstances, APAN fulfilled one criterion of communicational image management by managing public perceptions of the Palestinians in response to the Israel-Palestine conflict. APAN framed the Palestinian cause and struggle in a positive light rather than promoting tourism and Palestinian culture and heritage, reflecting its focus on the Palestinian political struggle. APAN did not fulfil the second criterion: promoting Palestinian culture, heritage, and identity through knowledge production. However, it has strongly supported the Palestinians' identity as a people and connection to their land; a theme addressed in the other sections.

Relational activities

5. Cause promotion

APAN has used a range of relational activities including mass gatherings (rallies, guest speaking engagements, fundraising events, and other public events) and interactive communications technologies to promote Palestinian rights and self-determination to the Australian public and media; which are outlined below:

- Has organised protests rallies in response to the 2012 Gaza War, the 2014 Gaza War, and Prime Minister Netanyahu's 2017 state visit to Australia (APAN 2012m; 2014e; 2017c).
- Has organised guest speaking engagements featuring international allies including Israeli historian Ilan Pappe, Palestinian doctor Mona El Farra, Israeli peace activist Jeff Halper, UN Special Rapporteur Richard Falk, former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, Palestinian activists Rafeef Ziadah and Ali Abunimah, Israeli journalist Gideon Levy, British musician and activist Roger Waters, and Palestinian-

American activist Noura Erakat (APAN, 2012h; 2013o; 2015d; 2016u; 2017dd; 2018c; Morrison, 2013).

- Former APAN President Jim Barr also spoke at the Limmud Oz, an annual Australian Jewish educational festival. Though fellow APAN member Slezak' panel was cancelled, he gave his talk at a nearby venue (APAN, 2012d).

- APAN (2012b; 2014h; 2015f; 2015x) has organised fundraising dinners and "Run for Palestine" marathons to raise awareness and funds for the Palestinian cause.

- APAN (2012i) organised its first annual general meeting in Adelaide that was attended by 26 church, union, and community-based organisations to discuss strategies for advancing the Palestinian cause.

- APAN (2014c; 2017i; 2018f) has also organised public events such as a UN Year of Solidarity parliamentary event in March 2014 and Nakba Day commemorative events in 2017 and 2018.

- APAN (2014l; 2016s; 2016z) has used Twitter to engage with opponents such as the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ) spokesperson Alex Ryvchin and Israeli human rights lawyer and advocate Arsen Ostrovsky on issues such as the Israeli military occupation and alleged anti-Semitism.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled both criteria of cause promotion by using a wide range of relational activities including protests, guest speaking engagements, fundraisers, meetings, commemorative events, and social media to advance their pro-Palestine advocacy work. This also enables them to build ties and collaborate with local and international allies; a topic that will be discussed further below. Reflecting the widespread use of social media, the Twitter exchanges with Rvychin and Ostrovsky show that APAN has used social media for facilitating dialogue and debate.

6. Exerting leverage

Leveraging activities particularly lobbying and petitions have been major aspects of APAN's advocacy work. APAN (2013a; 2018m) has sought to influence government policies, media coverage and business policies towards the Palestinians by lobbying and cultivating relations with influential actors such as Australian political elites and actors; media; and civil society actors. APAN wants them to adopt policies and positions that would

support Palestinian rights and aspirations. APAN's lobbying targets and campaigns are discussed below:

In terms of Australian political elites and actors, APAN has lobbied the Australian Government, policymakers, and political parties. APAN (2014e; 2014f; Kelly, 2014) has called on the federal Government to recognise Palestinian statehood, designate Jerusalem as occupied territory and implored Israel to end the 2014 Gaza War and Gaza Blockade. As part of its advocacy work, APAN (2012e; 2012f) has met with politicians and policy-makers in Canberra to lobby them on Palestinian issues and recruit allies. Some specific targets and campaigns have included:

- Gillard Government: Lobbying them to oppose Israeli settlement expansion and to support upgrading Palestine's membership status at the United Nations (APAN, 2012c; 2012n).

- Abbott Government: Browning (2014a) criticised Foreign Minister Julie Bishop for attending the late Israel Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's funeral due to his "troubling" record on Palestinian rights. APAN has also lobbied Bishop on the issues of Palestinian children in Israel military custody, the planned demolition of the Palestinian village of Susiya, and the illegal status of Israeli settlements (Browning, 2014b; APAN, 2015b, 2014q).

- Turnbull Government: Petitioning Prime Minister Turnbull to avoid the centenary celebration for the Battle of Beersheba, claiming it omitted the Palestinian Arab contribution to the Allies' Palestine campaign in World War One (APAN, 2017m). APAN (2017e) also petitioned the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to adopt a "balanced" foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine.

- Australian politicians and candidates: Petitioning politicians and candidates to sign their pledges for Palestine during the 2013 and 2016 federal elections (2013c; 2016h). Working with sympathetic politicians to sign a joint letter deploring the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children (Gregoire, 2016). Urging politicians to boycott official functions related to Netanyahu's 2017 state visit (APAN, n.d.g).

- Australian Labor Party: Browning (2014c) petitioning Labor leader Bill Shorten to abide by his party's policy that Israeli settlements in the West Bank are illegal under international law. APAN (2015t) has also lobbied Labor to recognise Palestinian statehood. Due to APAN's efforts, the 2015 ALP National Conference adopted a

motion committing future Labor federal governments to recognising Palestinian statehood if there was no progress in the next round of peace negotiations (Lynch, 2015). The New South Wales, Queensland, and Western Australian Labor branches subsequently passed motions calling on the federal Labor party to recognise Palestine (APAN, 2017y; 2017aa).

- Israeli Government and politicians: APAN (2013l) has sponsored an Avaaz petition calling upon the Israeli Knesset members to vote against the Prawer-Begin Bill, which they claimed would displace thousands of Bedouins (APAN, 2013l). Browning also wrote a letter to the Israeli Ambassador criticising the alleged institutional racism and discrimination against Israeli-Arab citizens during the "Day of Solidarity for Palestinian Citizens of Israel" (APAN, 2016a).

In terms of the media, APAN has lobbied the national daily newspaper *The Australian* and public broadcaster SBS.

- During the 2014 Gaza War, Browning criticised *The Australian* for publishing Bill Leak's cartoon depicting a Hamas militant encouraging his son to become a human shield, claiming that it promoted racist stereotypes about Palestinians (Robin 2014).
- After the SBS aired the controversial British television series *The Promise* (which portrayed Palestinians in a positive light), the-then APAN President James Barr (2011a) praised the SBS's Managing Director Michael Ebeid for screening the series. In addition, APAN (2012a) issued a media statement defending the series from criticism.

These two case studies reflect APAN's interest in managing media coverage of the Palestinians by combating negative depictions of the Palestinians and encouraging content that depicts them in a positive light.

In addition to political elites and the media, APAN has also sought to lobby other civil society actors.

- APAN (2015p) supported an online campaign urging the University of Southampton in England not to cancel a conference on Israel and international law. While APAN did not initiate the campaign, it saw itself as participating in a global struggle to promote Palestinian rights and statehood.

- APAN (2017k; 2017x) also sponsored a Change.org and social media campaigns urging Paypal to extend services to Palestinians living in the West Bank. Ultimately, this lobbying campaign did not work and APAN (2018b) ended up advocating a boycott of Paypal in 2018.

APAN's outreach to civil society groups shows that it is willing to work on a global level with other groups and activists to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled both criteria of exerting leverage by seeking to influence the Australian public policy process through lobbying, relationship building, and accountability politics. First, APAN has sought to influence government policies, media coverage, and business practices towards the Palestinians by lobbying and cultivating relations with various political, media, and civil society actors. This outreach has taken the form of sending letters, complaints, submissions, and using the Internet and social to share petition campaigns.

Second, APAN practised accountability politics by seeking to ensure that influential political, media and civil society actors upheld international law, their own policies, and fairness. For the Australian Government and political parties, it has called on them to abide by international law, UN resolutions, and party policies regarding Israel-Palestine. For companies like Paypal, it has called for fairness in its business dealing with the Palestinians. For media outlets like *The Australian,* APAN has challenged what it regards as racist and defamatory depictions of the Palestinians. In short, APAN has taken pride in its lobbying and accountability activities, viewing them as a means of advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination.

7. Coalition building

APAN has worked and partnered with a range of political, media, and civil society actors including Palestinian solidarity advocates and groups to promote Palestinian rights and self-determination. As an umbrella organisation, APAN's (2011a; n.d.b) leadership and membership are drawn from a diverse range of civil society groups and individuals including the Palestinian diaspora, the Christian, Muslim, and Jewish communities, and various human rights NGOs, activist groups, and trade unions including Australians For Palestine, the Palestine Israel Ecumenical Network (PIEN), IAJV, and Christian Peacemaker Teams.

Reflecting APAN's identity as a cause-oriented organisation, these individuals and groups share the Network's objectives including advocating for an end to the Israel-Palestine conflict and promoting peace within the framework of UN resolutions and international law (APAN, 2016l). This section focuses on APAN's collaboration with a range of Australian-based political, media and civil society actors to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination. The next section will cover their collaboration with foreign groups and activists.

In terms of political actors, APAN has worked with several state actors, politicians, and political parties who are sympathetic to the Palestinians.

- Palestinian "General Delegation to Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific": Co-hosting visiting Palestinian doctor Mona El-Farra, working with Palestinian Ambassador Izzat Abdulhadi to encourage Australian politicians to visit the Palestinian Territories, and hosting Abdulhadi at their 2016 annual dinner (APAN 2013b; 2014v; 2016k).

- Working with the Parliamentary Friends of Palestine and Parliamentary UN Friendship group to host visiting speakers and the 2014 UN Year of Solidarity at the Australian Parliament (APAN, 2012e; 2014c).

- Australian Greens: APAN (2015q; 2015g; 2015y) has welcomed their recognition of Palestinian statehood and opposition to the Gaza Blockade and aid cuts to the Palestinians, reflecting the party's support for the Palestinians. Several Green politicians including MP Adam Bandt, and Senators Richard Di Natale, Lee Rhiannon, and Janet Rice have spoken APAN events including the 2016 Melbourne Candidates Forum and their annual dinners (APAN, 2016r; 2017z; 2014h). Both Bandt and Rhiannon have also advocated for Palestinian children in Israeli military custody (APAN, 2016p; 2018d).

- Australian Labor Party: Endorsing pro-Palestinian Labor politicians including MPs Jill Hall, Ross Hart, Chris Hayes, Cathy O'Toole, Melissa Parke, Graham Perett, Maria Vamvakinou, Tony Zappia, and Senators Lisa Singh and Anne Urquhart (APAN, 2014i; 2016p; 2016dd; 2017v; 2018d). In addition, Labor politicians Sophie Ismail, Tony Burke and Vamvakinou have spoken at APAN's 2016 Melbourne Candidates Forum and fundraising dinners (APAN, 2016r; 2014h; 2017z).

- Liberal Party: Former politicians John Down, Malcolm Fraser, and MP Craig Laundy have endorsed APAN's pro-Palestinian advocacy including promoting Palestinian

statehood and opposing the demolition of Susiya village (APAN, 2011c; 2015b; Laundy, 2014).

- National Party: APAN praised National MP Andrew Broad for speaking out for Palestinian Bedouins whose water had allegedly been stolen by an Israeli settlement and hosted fellow National MP Mark Coulton at their 2017 annual dinner (APAN, 2016p; 2017z).

- Nick Xenophon Team (Centre Alliance): APAN has praised NXT leader Nick Xenophon and MP Rebecca Sharkie for speaking out the plight of Palestinians in Hebron and Palestinian children in Israeli military custody (APAN, 2014q; 2016p).

Besides cultivating a warm relationship with the Palestinian Authority's local representatives in Australia, APAN has also worked with sympathetic Labor and Green politicians. The large presence of Labor politicians along with the Australian Greens' pro-Palestinian position reflects the growing left-wing sympathy for the Palestinians. While the right-wing Liberal and National parties have traditionally supported Israel, APAN has cultivate relations with several sympathetic Liberal and National politicians. Due to its efforts to change Australian foreign policy towards Palestine, identifying political allies is a major priority of APAN's coalition building activities.

In terms of media actors, APAN has cultivated relations with the left-wing Melbourne radio station 3CR and left-wing news website *New Matilda*, which have sympathetically covered APAN's activities and given APAN a platform to communicate with the public.

- 3CR host Jan Bartlett (2015; 2018) has hosted APAN study tour coordinator Lisa Arnold and Vice President Bassam. Returning the favour, APAN (2017w) has promoted 3CR on its Twitter feed. 3CR would count as one of APAN's media allies.

- Meanwhile, *New Matilda* has published an op-ed article by Slezak distinguishing criticism of Israel from anti-Semitism (APAN, 2013r). It has also publicised APAN's adoption of the BDS campaign and 2016 campaign to lobby Australian parliamentarians into signing a letter condemning the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children (Lynch, 2015; Brull, 2016). During the 2014 Gaza War, Brull along with Slezak and two Palestinian activists Randa Abdel-Fattah and Samah Sabawi penned a joint letter condemning Israeli actions on the website (Brull et al, 2014). In addition, APAN has shared several *New Matilda* articles on its website and

Twitter feed raising awareness of the Palestinian plight and struggle (New Matilda, 2014; APAN, 2016c; 2016x; 2017q).

These interactions show that APAN has cultivated a good relationship with both 3CR and *New Matilda* due to their shared support for Palestinian rights and self-determination.

In terms of civil society actors, APAN has worked with a range of groups and activists who have either worked on Palestine issues or taken pro-Palestinian positions.

- Working with local Palestinian Australian individuals and groups including author Randa Abdel-Fattah and musicians Phil Monsour and Mohamed Yousef (APAN, 2018k; 2014h).

- Partnering with other Australian Palestinian solidarity groups including Australian Friends of Palestine Association (AFOPA), Australians for Justice and Peace in Palestine, AFP, ASPIRE, Coalition for Justice and Peace in Palestine, Friends of Bethlehem, Olive Kids, and PIEN (APAN, 2011f; 2012b; 2015a; 2016cc; 2016bb; 2017f; 2017h; 2017dd).

- Working with other local Palestinian solidarity advocates including Stuart Rees and the late Patrick Wolfe (Rees, 2015; APAN, 2016d).

- Working with dissident Jewish individuals and groups including the journalist Antony Loewenstein, the AJDS, and the IAJV (APAN, 2018k; 2012f; 2013f; Browning and Barak, 2018).

- Working with various other civil society leaders actors including public speaker Tasneem Chopra, International Trade Union Congress (ITUC) Secretary-General Sharan Burrow, the aid NGOs "Action Aid" and "Union Aid Abroad-APHEDA," the Australian Arabic Council, the Islamic Council of Victoria, Liberty Australia, the Major Issues and Theology Foundation (MIAT), Muslim Legal Network, Sydney Criminal Lawyers, the University of Sydney Queer Collective and the Wallace Foundation (APAN, 2012b; 2014k; 2015b; 2017d; 2017z; 2018j; 2018v; Gregoire and Nedim, 2018).

APAN's cooperation with other civil society actors have taken the form of coordinating public opinion surveys, speaking events, dinner functions, fundraising marathons, informational trips, lobbying activities, press releases, and sharing information.

The content analysis's findings were corroborated by the follow-up interview with Morrison (personal communication, April 7, 2020), who stated that APAN engaged in community mobilisation including inviting people to their public events including protests, vigils, and "education events." These have include co-hosting a vigil for Palestinian human rights with a local Canberra-based Palestinian advocacy group during the Israeli President Reuven Rivlin's 2020 visit to Canberra. Morrison also stated that APAN supported efforts by local Palestinian solidarity supporters to hold local events, campaigns, establishing new Palestinian advocacy groups, and sharing skills, knowledge and other resources with other activists and groups. This reflects the importance that APAN attaches to forging coalitions and networking with other like-minded individuals and groups.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled coalition building by working with a range of other activists and groups and networking with them to bring change in foreign countries. First, it has forged coalitions, relationships, and links with other like-minded political, media, and civil society actors including the Palestinian General Delegation, the Palestinian Authority's official representative in Canberra. Second, while APAN has also collaborated with sympathetic civil society and political actors to bring about change in Israel-Palestine, the transnational aspects will be explored in the next section below.

Like the PSNA, APAN is fundamentally a coalition of individuals and groups bound together by an affinity for the Palestinians. As with AIJAC, APAN has also cultivated relations with sympathetic politicians but has much to work on in pushing Australian foreign policy towards a more pro-Palestinian direction. Besides the political theatre, APAN has also partnered with sympathetic civil society institutions and businesses in order to foster alliances between like-minded allies.

8. Transnational collaboration

APAN has worked with a range of foreign Palestinian solidarity advocates, groups, media, governments, and international organisations on a transnational level to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination. This cooperation has taken the form of hosting

foreign delegates and guest speakers, information sharing, co-hosting events and functions, webinars, and lobbying campaigns. Since October 2016, APAN has also endorsed the global Boycott, Divestments, and Sanctions (BDS) campaign, which seeks to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination by promoting boycotts, divestments, and sanctions against Israel (Shaik, 2015b). APAN's transnational collaboration with international political, media and civil society actors including the BDS campaign are outlined below.

First, APAN has worked with several international political actors to advance the Palestinian cause by exchanging information and hosting videos:

- APAN and the AJDS hosted a video interview with Palestinian Executive Committee member Hanan Ashrawi at the Labor Party's National Conference (APAN, 2015k).
- Sharing a report by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation's (PLO) Department of Public Diplomacy & Policy (PLO-DPDP) listing inflammatory racist remarks about Palestinians made by several senior Israeli government ministers including Prime Minister Netanyahu, Education Minister and Diaspora Minister Naftali Bennett, and Justice Minister Shaked (APAN, 2017ee).
- APAN member Slezak consulted UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East) official Chris Guinness as an expert guide for his ABC radio documentary *Breaking the Silence*, which looks at life in the Palestinian Territories under the Israeli occupation (Melville, 2012).

These interactions show that APAN has used modern communications technology to keep in touch with sympathetic international actors.

Second, APAN has also worked and shared information with foreign journalists and media organisations:

- John Lyons: As *The Australian*'s Middle East correspondent between 2009 and 2015, Lyons featured as an expert guide on the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children in Slezak's *Breaking the Silence* documentary (Melville, 2012; Meade, 2017).
- +972 Magazine: APAN (2014w) shared an article blaming Israel for Gaza's electrical shortages and the failure of the peace process.
- Mondoweiss: APAN (2018r) shared an article alleging that the Israeli Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked's Nation State Bill promoted "Apartheid."

These interactions show that APAN worked with journalists and organisations who shared its sympathy with the Palestinians by sharing content and utilising their knowledge and expertise.

Third, APAN has also cooperated with several foreign civil society activists and groups working on Palestine issues including the BDS campaign:

- APAN (2018b; 2013h; 2015s) has supported the BDS campaign by boycotting Paypal for denying services to the Palestinians and circulating favourable media stories about the BDS Movement on Twitter including a British judge's 2013 decision dismissing a complaint by an anti-BDS academic and the US denomination United Church of Christ endorsing the BDS campaign.

- APAN (2016u; 2018w; 2018l; 2013b; 2012h; 2017s; 2018k; Morrison, 2013) has cooperated with several Palestinian and international advocates including Ali Abunimah, Ramzy Baroud, Noura Erakat, Dr. Mona Farra, Bassem Tamimi, Rafeef Ziadah, Israeli activist Jeff Halper, British activist Roger Waters, and former UN human rights rapporteur Richard Falk.

- APAN has cooperated with several international groups including Al Haq, the American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the American Friends Services Committee, Breaking the Silence, Defence for Children International, ITUC, the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions, MCW, the Palestinian Women National Organisation, and Youths Against Settlements (Abunimah, 2016; APAN, 2017bb; 2012g; 2013i; 2014r; 2018s; 2013o; 2018n; 2017l; Bartlett, 2015; Melville, 2012; Newton, 2012b).

This cooperation has taken the form of hosting them on guest speaking engagements and trips to Australia, working with them on study tours into the Palestinian Territories, drawing upon their services as experts in Slezak's ABC radio documentary, hosting a Facebook Live with at least one activist, and sharing online content on their website and social media accounts. APAN's endorsement of the BDS campaign has led it to present the movement as a legitimate global civil society initiative promoting the Palestinian cause and highlight its victories.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled both criteria of transnational collaboration. First, the Network has participated in the BDS movement, a transnational advocacy network of Palestinian solidarity groups and activists seeking to change Israel's behaviour and advance Palestinian rights through a combination of activism, lobbying, and economic and social pressure. Second, APAN has collaborated with these international allies by hosting guest speakers, video conferences, sharing information with them via audio-visual and social media.

9. Relational image management

APAN's relational image management has taken the form of sponsoring study tours into Israel and the Palestinian Territories, guest speaking engagements, fundraising dinners, and helping the allied Australian Friends of Palestine Association (AFOPA) to promote a Palestinian cultural centre. These activities have focused on educating Australians about the plight of the Palestinians as well as promoting Palestinian aspirations and culture.

First, APAN's study tours are a key pillar of its relational image management activities. Their study tours are working tours, usually between 8-12 participants, which involve meeting Palestinian peoples in the Palestinian Territories, Israel, Lebanon, and Jordan, and visiting their homes and communities. The tour programme costs AU$7,000 and includes international economy-class airfare, in-country accommodation and transportation, meals, a pre-departure briefing, an information booklet and prescribed reading list, and access to experts on Palestine (APAN, n.d.f). These study tours usually involved meeting with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and visiting Jerusalem and West Bank cities including Ramallah and Bethlehem. Besides meeting with Palestinian and Israeli officials, sympathetic local Palestinian and Israeli civil society groups including the Palestinian Women's Humanitarian Organisation and the Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions, the study tours also include meeting with the Australian Representative Office in Ramallah to learn about Australian aid projects. APAN's study tour coordinator is Lisa Arnold, a humanitarian aid worker who had previously worked for APHEDA, the aid agency of the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)(Bartlett, 2015). The study tours are open to anyone interested in Palestine and the Palestinians with past participants having included politicians, journalists, and trade unionists (APAN, 2017r; 2018h; Robin, 2016). Besides educating

Australians about the lives and struggles of ordinary Palestinians, APAN's study tours also seek to build relations with sympathetic Palestinian and Israeli individuals and groups. APAN has particularly targeted influential policy-makers, media, and civil society leaders with the goal of shifting the political and public discourses on Israel-Palestine.

Second, APAN has hosted several guest speaking functions and fundraising dinners as well as an information centre.

- Sponsoring speaking tours by Palestinian guest speakers including Dr Mona El-Farra, former Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, and BDS activist Ramzy Baroud. These speakers covered a range of topics including the Palestinian Nakba, the Gaza Blockade, the Oslo peace process, settlement expansion, and the Palestinian refugee crisis (APAN, 2013l; 2015l; 2018w).
- Palestinian Ambassador Izzat Abdulhadi spoke at APAN's 2014 annual dinner, providing an official Palestinian perspective of the situation in Israel-Palestine (APAN, 2014t).
- Promoting AFOPA's new "Palestinian Centre" in Adelaide selling both informational resources and Palestinian fair-trade products (APAN, 2016b). Besides informing Adelaide residents about the Palestinian people, this shop helps Palestinian communities to sell their produce at a sustainable level.

In short, these speaking engagements and fair-trade shop not only help to get the message out but enable sympathetic Australians to build ties with Palestinians and aid Palestinian businesses and producers.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled three of the four criteria of relational image management by sponsoring speaking engagements, managing public perceptions of an ethnic group in response to crises and conflicts, and political- oriented tourism in the form in study tours. While APAN did not sponsor cultural and education fairs and expos, it did promote another Palestinian solidarity group's Palestinian informational and fair-trade centre in Adelaide. While APAN's study tours were intended to promote sympathy for the Palestinians among policy and opinion-makers, they were not segmented to target certain ethnic and religious groups. Due to the precarious situation facing the Palestinians, crisis management took precedence over cultural and heritage promotion.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

10. Marketing orientation

The content analysis generated little information about APAN's marketing orientation. A March 2014 Twitter post reporting on APAN's meetings with Australian politicians shows that the organisation engages in campaign delivery by informing supporters of their achievements (APAN, 2014o). A 2018 informational Vimeo video suggests that APAN is a product-oriented advocacy group since it was founded to advance Palestinian rights and self-determination. APAN has also made efforts to recruit like-minded members, volunteers, and financial donors (APAN, 2018m). Morrison (personal communication, April 7, 2020) stated that APAN used its media releases, website, and public gatherings to attract individuals and groups who were interested or involved in Palestinian human rights and justice as well as human rights in general. Taken together, the content analysis and Morrison's interview show that APAN pursues a product orientation. As a product-oriented charity/advocacy group, APAN would focus on "battling for their cause and not on changing their behaviour to suit membership subscriptions, public or government opinion. They may believe that as long as they all work towards a common goal, people will simply see how good they are and support them automatically, and they will be able to influence government" (Lees-Marshment, 2004, p. 97-98). As the table below shows, APAN followed the four stages of a product-oriented charity/advocacy group:

Figure 20 APAN analysed using Lees-Marshment's product-oriented framework		
Stages	**Definitions**	**Examples**
Product Design	Design a wide range of behaviour according to what it thinks is right, and assume it will succeed, "do good" and achieve its goals, as well as raise enough money to do this.	Advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination; seeks to end the Israeli military occupation, settlement expansion and the Gaza Blockade, and supports the BDS Movement a "just and lasting" solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict within the framework of international law the BDS Movement (APAN, n.d.; 2011a; 2016l; n.d.b; Shaik, 2015b).
Communication	Information is there if people want to get it.	Promoting its advocacy work through its website, media releases, public

		gatherings, social media, and op-ed columns and letters, and media interviews (Morrison, personal communication, April 7, 2020).
Campaign	Inform and lobby individuals, groups, governments, and other actors about what they want. This may also include short-term campaigns.	Working with individuals and organisations that share its commitment to Palestinian human rights and self-determination. Lobbying a range of political, media and civil society actors (Morrison, personal communication, April 7, 2020).
Delivery	Deliver what they think is best.	Using its website, social media, and email newsletters to inform people of their work and achievements (Morrison, personal communication, April 7, 2020; APAN, 2016b; 2014o).

Analysis

In terms of marketing orientation, APAN fulfilled the four criteria of a "product-oriented advocacy group" in the Lees-Marshment "product/sales/market orientation" model. As a product-oriented organisation, APAN does not seek to change its product (advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination through BDS) but rather uses a range of communications and relational techniques and methods to convince civil society, the general public, opinion-makers, and companies to support its cause.

11. Segmentation and targeting

Seeking to influence Australian government, public, and media perceptions and policies towards the Palestinians and Israel, APAN has sought to segment and target sympathetic Australian political parties and individual politicians. This section looks at three case studies: APAN's "Palestine in Australian politics" reports and the Network's advocacy campaigns during the 2013 and 2016 Australian federal elections.

Palestine in Australian politics, 2011-2018

Seeking to influence Australian foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine, APAN has collected statements by Australian parliamentarians on Palestine and lobbied Australian

politicians during the 2013 and 2016 federal elections. Between 2011 and 2018, APAN has monitored parliamentary debates and speeches for references to Palestine through its annual "Palestine in Australian Politics" reports (APAN, 2011g; 2012l; 2013e; 2014g; 2014j; 2015c; 2015i; 2016g; 2016m; 2018a; 2018h). These parliamentary reports generated several observations:

1. First, the Australian Greens were the staunchest pro-Palestinian supporters in the Australian Parliament with the most vocal voices including Senators Lee Rhiannon, Scott Ludlam, and party leader Di Natale.

2. Second, the Australian Labor Party contained both pro-Palestinian and pro-Israel supporters. Notable pro-Palestinian Labor parliamentarians have included Maria Vamvakinou, Melissa Parkes, Jill Hall, Ross Hart, Tony Zappia, and Anne Urquhart. Meanwhile pro-Israel Labor parliamentarians have included Michael Danby, Milton Dick, and Mike Kelly.

3. Third, while most Coalition parliamentarians particularly Liberal Senator Eric Abetz were pro-Israel and hostile to Palestinian interests, there were several exceptions including Liberal MPs Sussan Levy, Russell Broadbent and Craig Laundy, and National MP Mark Coulton.

4. Fourth, independent Senator Nick Xenophon and his former "Nick Xenophon Team" (now known as Centre Alliance) were also sympathetic to the Palestinians.

5. Finally, several minor parties like Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party and the libertarian Liberal Democratic Party made remarks attacking Muslims and Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas respectively.

Together, these observations show that APAN has sought to cultivate relations with sympathetic Australian politicians and parties in order to influence Australian foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine. While the left-wing Greens and Labor parties were the most sympathetic to the Palestinians, APAN is interested in building cross-party support as shown by of the presence of sympathetic Coalition MPs like Laundy and Coulton.

Australian federal election, 2013

The content analysis showed that APAN used segmentation and targeting when lobbying political candidates during the 2013 Australian federal election. During the 2013 federal election, APAN got their supporters to send postcards and emails to political candidates from

various parties asking them their position on several questions relating to Australian foreign towards the Palestinians' "struggle for freedom", which are outlined below:

- "Did your party support Palestine's bid for the United Nations membership in November 2012?
- Does your party support a peace settlement based upon the 1967 borders?
- What is your party's position on the Jewish settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories?
- What is your party's position on Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip?
- What is your party's position regarding aid to Palestine?
- If you are elected, will you advocate for an Australian Foreign Policy that supports the Palestinian's struggle for freedom and independence?" (Storey, 2013)

APAN received responses from 44 politicians. Based on these responses, APAN stated its positions on the Coalition (Liberal/National), Labor, and Green parties' policies towards Israel-Palestine:

- APAN criticised the Coalition's opposition to Palestinian admission into the UNGA and BDS campaign, and its promise to strengthen relations with Israel; which it viewed as at odds with international opinion in the light of alleged Israeli intransigence towards the Palestinians. While Liberal and National candidates reiterated their parties' support for a two-state solution, they tended to side with Israel, blaming the conflict on the Palestinians.

- While APAN welcomed Labor's support for a two-state solution based on the 1967 border (or Green Line) and opposition to illegal Jewish settlements in the West Bank, it disagreed with the party's abstention on the granting of non-member observer status to the Palestinians at the UNGA. While most Labor candidates tended to toe their party's policies, some Labor candidates like Michael Stove and Melissa Parke supported the removal of Jewish settlers from the West Bank and condemned the Gaza Blockade; issues not mentioned in Labour's platform (Stove, 2013; Parke, 2013).

- APAN (2013c; 2013d) also praised the Greens for supporting Palestinian rights and aspiration, upgrading Palestine's UN membership status, and opposing Israel's bombing and blockade of Gaza, and settlement expansion in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The researcher found that Green candidates were most sympathetic to the Palestinians.

The content analysis found that Green and Labor candidates had a higher response rate to APAN's survey than Coalition MPs, who comprise less than 20% of respondents. This suggests that left-wing politicians and parties are more sympathetic to Palestinian solidarity groups than right-wing ones.

Australian federal election, 2016

APAN also used segmentation and targeting when lobbying political candidates during the 2016 Australian federal election. APAN got its supporters to email political candidates, asking them to sign APAN's Pledge:

1. I unequivocally support the equal rights of Palestinians and Israelis to live in peace within internationally recognised and secure borders, in accordance with relevant United Nations resolutions and international and humanitarian laws.

2. Ensure if I travel to the region, I will spend equal time observing the facts on the ground and listening to Palestinian voices as to Israeli voices.

3. Publicly advocate for Australia to join 136 countries (70% of the world) to Recognise Palestine and to call for an end to the occupation.

4. Support nonviolent activities that help to achieve these goals and provide hope for a just and peaceful resolution (Morrison, personal communication, December 9, 2019).

APAN received 127 responses, which amounted to roughly ten percent of candidates contesting that election (APAN, 2017b). APAN (2016i; 2016j) also evaluated eleven political parties' policies and positions towards the Palestinians. Key findings are outlined below:

- 58 respondents signed APAN's pledge including all 51 Green candidates, eight Labor candidates, two Socialist Alliance candidates, and the candidates from the Nick Xenophon Team, the Australian Defence Veterans Party and the Animal Justice Party.

- Coalition: Despite the Coalition's claim to support a two-state solution, APAN disagreed with their aid policies and their support for a negotiated peaceful resolution without "any preconditions," which APAN felt favoured Israel. APAN was dissatisfied with the Coalition's lack of interest in Israel settlements in the West Bank, travel to Palestine, and human rights abuses but praised their belated recognition of Palestinian rights.

- Labor: APAN criticised their lack of engagement on spending equal time in Palestine, unclear position on Israeli settlements, and opposition to BDS. However, APAN praised the Labor Party for its openness to recognising Palestinian statehood.

- The Derryn Hinch Justice Party and the Online Direct Democracy candidates expressed ambivalence while the Sex Party was sympathetic to Palestinian rights but did not sign APAN's pledge.

- Candidates from the right-wing Liberty Alliance, Christian Democratic Party, and Family First opposed Palestinian rights and expressed support for Israel using Christian Zionist arguments.

These findings show that APAN has conducted research to identify candidates and political parties who were sympathetic to the Palestinians, ambivalent, or hostile. APAN would then target pro-Palestinian parties and candidates such as the Australian Greens, Socialist Alliance, and pro-Palestinian Labor MPs like Parke and Vamvakinou for leveraging and coalition building activities while avoiding hostile pro-Israel parties like the Liberty Alliance, CDP, and Family First.

Targeting and allocation

This research found that APAN targeted these sympathetic segments by allocating resources and products (such as fundraising dinners, public meetings, sympathetic press releases and social media posts) to reaching them:

1. APAN released a statement by Liberal MP Laundy praising APAN's advocacy work at their 2014 annual dinner (Laundy, 2014).

2. President Browning and Executive member Slezak have defended Labor MP Parke's endorsement of BDS movement against criticism by the ECAJ (Slezak and Browning, 2014).

3. APAN (2014i; 2016p) has praised Labor MPs Hall, Hart, and Zappia, and Senator Urquhart for advocating the recognition of Palestinian statehood and condemning the Israeli military's detention of Palestinian children.

4. APAN (2015g; 2015y) has praised the Australian Greens for adopting a policy recognising Palestinian statehood in November 2015.

5. Reflecting the warm relationship between APAN and the Greens, Senator Rhiannon and MP Bandt have participated at APAN events including its 2014 annual dinner and the 2016 Melbourne Candidates Forum (APAN, 2014h; 2016r).

6. APAN (2016p) has praised NXT leader Xenophon and MP Rebecca Sharkie for condemning Israeli settlements and calling for the Australian Government to pressure Israel to reform their juvenile military court system.

7. Hosting sympathetic Australian parliamentarians including National MP Coulton, Greens leader Natale, Greens Senator Janet Rice, and Labor MP Vamvakinou as speakers and guests of honour at their 2017 annual dinner (APAN, 2017z).

These interactions show that APAN has sought to target sympathetic politicians by issuing public statements and social media posts praising their support for the Palestinians. In addition, APAN has allocated resources to co-opting them into their advocacy work by including them as guests at their fundraising meetings and public speaking functions. While the Green and Labor politicians were most receptive to APAN's outreaches and advocacy work, the presence of Coalition and NXT politicians reflects APAN's desire to build cross-party support for changing Australian foreign policy towards Israel-Palestine.

Though Morrison (personal communication, April 7, 2020) claimed that the Network did not focus on particular segments but "attracted people who were concerned with human rights as a general paradigm including Palestinian rights." However, APAN's "Palestine in Australia" reports and petition campaigns during the 2013 and 2016 federal elections clearly show that the Network has conducted research to identify political segments who are sympathetic to their cause and advocacy work. Despite these findings, this research generated no information about APAN's efforts to segment and target various civil society actors including activists, NGOs, ethnic and faith communities, businesses, and trade unions. This remains a gap that future studies can help address.

Analysis

This research showed that APAN has fulfilled both criteria segmentation and targeting, focusing specifically on Australian political parties and candidates. First, APAN has segmented the political market for the purpose of identifying sympathetic individuals and parties who can be targeted for coalition building and lobbying. Unlike other groups, APAN does not appear to have adapted its marketing to meet the needs and expectations of different markets since politicians appear to be the main target of its segmentation activities. Second,

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APAN has targeted these sympathetic elements by strategically allocated resources such as communications posts and fundraising events to reaching political allies. This fits in with APAN's long-term goal of changing Australian foreign policy and political discourse in favour of the Palestinians. Despite these useful findings, Morrison's interview did not shed more insight into APAN's segmentation and targeting activities towards civil society groups and activists.

12. Internal marketing

According to APAN's Constitution and its membership application form, membership is open to individuals and organisations that share its mission and objectives: namely to advocate for an end to the Israel-Palestine conflict; promoting peace within the framework of UN resolutions and international law; building the capacity of like-minded organisations in Australia; and fostering alliances between like-minded organisations in Australia and the international community. APAN (n.d.c; 2016l; n.d.e) also has separate membership packages for individuals and organisations that include membership fees. Larger organisations (groups with 5,000 members and above) have higher membership fees and voting rights than smaller groups and individuals; suggesting that organisations with a bigger clout have more influence in APAN's decision-making process. The content analysis suggests that APAN pursues a base strategy since it limits membership to individuals and groups that share its objectives of advancing Palestinians rights and self-determination. These preliminary observations were also supported by its Vimeo promotional video and a webpage promoting their 2015 annual dinner, which emphasised APAN's commitment to advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination by working with like-minded groups and influencing political, public, and media discourses on Palestine (APAN, 2015e; 2018m).

The content analysis was corroborated by Morrison (personal communication, April 7, 2020), who explained that APAN encouraged its members to help advance its aims and goals through petition campaigns, protests, vigils, and educational events. When asked about how APAN promoted a sense of loyalty and purpose among its members and supporters, Morrison said that people were attracted to APAN by their passion for Palestinian human rights and justice. She also clarified that APAN did not seek to promote a sense of loyalty to their group but wanted them to be able to advocate for a more "just world." Together, the content analysis and the interview confirmed that APAN has pursued a base strategy by

relying on purposive incentives to promote a product that resonates with its core supporters: advancing Palestinian rights and statehood. Quoting Pettitt (2014, p. 147), "activist commitment to this product remains strong as long as the product does not deviate from these goals and cause."

Analysis

The content analysis and interview with Morrison showed that APAN has pursued a base strategy by using its commitment to advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination to attract members and supporters who share these goals. APAN has advanced these goals and cause by using a range of relational activities to promote these goals.

13. Fundraising

APAN has raised funds for its cause through various sources including individual and group membership subscriptions, online donations, and fundraising events. Individual members pay an annual membership fee of AU$100 with a concession rate of AU$50. Meanwhile, APAN's organisational membership package charges AU$400 for large organisations (groups with 5,000 or more members) and AU$200 for small organisations (groups with less than 5,000 members) (APAN, n.d.c; n.d.e). In addition, APAN (n.d.d) has an online donation webpage for sympathetic visitors to donate to the group. In addition, APAN (2014t; 2015e; 2016k; 2015x) has organised fundraising events such as dinners and charity marathons to raise funds to cover its advocacy work and other expenses in Australia. According to its website, APAN (n.d.a) limits both its funding and membership to Australia; which shows that APAN wants to avoid being beholden to foreign interests and organisations.

Analysis

APAN has fulfilled the three criteria of fundraising by organising fundraising activities such as dinners and marathons, soliciting donations via its website, and collecting individual and group membership donations. While the content analysis and interview with Morrison showed that APAN accepts both individual and group memberships, it yielded little information about the Network's membership.

Conclusion

The conclusion discusses the combined findings of the content analysis and the interview with APAN's Executive Officer Rebecca Morrison. This research yielded useful information about the group's communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesions activities. These combined findings are discussed in the following sub-sections below:

Strengths

Communications activities

APAN has met all four communications criteria. First, APAN has produced politically-usable information through its website, op-ed columns, letters, and media interviews in order to influence public opinion and media commentary on Palestine and Israel in Australia.

Second, APAN has carried out all three criteria of "strategic political communication" by advancing pro-Palestinian themes and narratives, managing media coverage of the Palestinians, and engaging in short-term campaigns in response to current affairs issues related to the Palestinian cause. First, APAN has engaged in symbolic politics by producing content highlighting Palestinian resistance and suffering and Israeli intransigence and aggression. As an Australian organisation, APAN has focused on Australia's relations with the Palestinians and Israel. In response to the pro-Israel narrative that criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic, APAN has sought to distinguish anti-Semitism from criticism of Israeli policies and actions towards the Palestinians. Second, APAN has sought to manage media coverage of the Palestinians with the goal of promoting their cause and advocacy activities, which have included publishing op-ed articles and letters in Australian media, participating in media interviews, and sharing favourable media reports. APAN also exploited media coverage of international events in Israel-Palestine with the goal of raising domestic support for their causes. Finally, APAN has engaged in short-term campaigns by exploiting media coverage of contemporary issues including crises and conflicts in Israel-Palestine, Australian relations with Israel-Palestine, elections in Australia and Israel, and Palestinian commemorative activities in Australia. In short, APAN's media engagement is part of its efforts to educate the media and public about the Palestinian cause.

Third, APAN has met all three criteria of communications adaptation by using a wide range of communications mediums and platforms to reach a wide audience including its website, Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Vimeo social media accounts. Formal channels have included its website and email newsletters while informal channels have included its four social media platforms.

Fourth, APAN met one criterion of communicational image management by using image management to raise awareness of the Palestinian plight and struggle and to combat negative imagery and narratives about the Palestinians. While it did not promote Palestinian culture, heritage, and identity through knowledge production, it has strongly supported the Palestinians' claims and connection to their land; a theme addressed in the other sections below particularly relational image management.

Relational activities

First, APAN has promoted the Palestinian cause through both relational activities (such as public meetings, speaking engagements, protests, and fundraising events) and interactive communications technologies like social media. While most of APAN's online activities were categorized under the communications category, APAN's 2014 Twitter exchange with ECAJ spokesperson Alex Ryvchin was a good example of interactive cause promotion since it involved the exchange of arguments and narratives on a social media platform.

Second, APAN has sought to exert leverage over powerful actors to influence public policy and ensure accountability. First, APAN sought to influence Australian foreign policy, media coverage and business practices towards the Palestinians by cultivating relations with influential Australian political, media, and civil society actors and leaders. Second, APAN has used accountability politics to hold these actors and groups to account based on their stated policies and principles as well as international law and Australian concepts of fairness.

Third, APAN has forged coalitions, relationships, and linkages with several like-minded activists, civil society groups and institutions, politicians, media organisations and the Palestinian General Delegation, the Palestinian Authority's official representative in

Canberra. Coalition building was a key shared characteristic of all four case studies, with groups working with allies on both a domestic and global level. While APAN has interacted with other groups and individuals on an international level to promote the Palestinian cause, this was covered under transnational collaboration.

Fourth, APAN has fulfilled the transnational collaboration criterion by working on a global level with other political, media, and civil society actors to advance the Palestinian cause including promoting the BDS movement. Besides sponsoring guest speakers, APAN has used audio-visual media and the Internet to exchange information with other like-minded groups and individuals.

Fifth, APAN has fulfilled all four criteria of relational image management by sponsoring guest speaking engagements, promoting a Palestinian cultural and information centre in Adelaide, managing the Palestinian's public image by raising awareness of their plight and struggle, and sponsoring politically-oriented tourism through its flagship study tours program.

Recruitment and internal cohesion

APAN fulfilled all three criteria of segmentation and targeting, focusing on Australian politicians and political parties. First, APAN has pursued a product-orientation since it had a clear product (advancing Palestinian rights and self-determination) and did not seek to change its behaviour to suit membership subscriptions and public and government opinion.

The content analysis showed that APAN segmented politicians and parties who were sympathetic to Palestinian human rights and justice. Second, APAN targeted sympathetic politicians and parties by inviting them to its relational activities including fundraising dinners, leveraging campaigns, and Palestinian study tours. These activities show that APAN has allocated resources and products where there is a market for them and when it helps them achieve their goals. Besides monitoring parliamentary statements and speeches, APAN also launched lobbying campaigns during the 2013 and 2016 Australian federal elections.

In terms of internal marketing, the content analysis and Morrison's interview clarified that APAN has pursued a base strategy by appealing to its members and supporters' desire to

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advance Palestinian rights and self-determination through its relational activities including mass gatherings and advocacy work.

In terms of fundraising, APAN has utilised various sources including individual and group membership subscriptions, its donation webpage, and fundraising dinners and marathons.

Limitations

Communications

In terms of strategic political communication, tourism promotion and destination branding took second place to raising awareness of Palestinian human rights and self-determination due to the situation in Palestine. While APAN has sought to expand their networks through lobbying and coalition building, these activities were covered elsewhere within the relational section.

In terms of communications adaptation, the researcher sampled APAN's Twitter and Vimeo platforms due to difficulties with accessing their Facebook platform. In terms of communicational image management, tourism and cultural heritage promotion was secondary to promoting awareness of the Palestinian struggle.

In terms of communicational image management, APAN did not engage in cultural and heritage promotion activities such as producing material encouraging tourism due to the unstable situation in the Palestinian territories. APAN has also focused on the political situation there.

Relational

In terms of transnational collaboration, APAN exploited media coverage of human rights and other contemporary issues to raise awareness and support for the Palestinian cause but this was aimed at a domestic Australian audience rather than an international one.

In terms of relational image management, crisis management took precedence over Palestinian cultural and heritage promotion. While APAN organised study tours, these were more of educational trips rather tourism activities. Though APAN targeted opinion makers,

politicians, and civil society leaders who were sympathetic to the Palestinians for their study tours, recruitment was not segmented along ethnic and religious lines.

Research gaps

While the content analysis showed that APAN accepts both individual and group memberships, it yielded little information about the network's membership. The researcher asked Morrison about what groups were members of APAN, but she was unable to divulge this information due to privacy and safety reasons.

Overall findings

APAN followed most of the communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion categories of the analytical framework apart from prioritising image and crisis management over tourism and destination promotion. This research showed that APAN seeks to shift Australian public, media, governmental and civil society perspectives and policies in favour of the Palestinians through its informational output and advocacy work.

This research has shown that APAN has fulfilled most of the criteria of the four communications activities. First, APAN has produced pro-Palestinian information and research on its website, social media platforms, and several Australian media outlets. Second, APAN has sought to promote pro-Palestinian media commentary in various Australian media. Third, APAN has used a range of communications technologies including its website and social media platforms. Fourth, APAN has sought to promote a favourable image of the Palestinians including their claims to their homeland through its media output. However, it did not always follow the model. In terms of strategic political communication, APAN did not seek to raise international support for its cause since it was targeting a domestic Australian audience. In terms of communicational image management, APAN focused on promoting sympathy for the Palestinians rather than cultural, heritage, and tourism promotion due to the Palestinians' unique circumstances.

This research has shown that APAN has fulfilled most of the criteria of the five communications activities. First, APAN has used public activities and social media to promote its cause. Second, APAN has also engaged extensively in lobbying and accountability politics. Third, APAN has built coalitions with a range of sympathetic

individuals, groups, governments, media, and institutions in Australia and abroad. Fourth, APAN has participated in a transnational pro-Palestinian advocacy network by partnering with overseas groups and activists to work on Palestinian-related issues. Finally, APAN has used public meetings, functions, and study tours to raise awareness of the Palestinian struggle and co-opt influential leaders and opinion-makers. However, there were areas where APAN did not follow the model. In terms of relational image management, crisis management took precedence over heritage promotion and tourism since APAN's study tours were intended primarily as educational trips rather than tourist excursions.

This research has shown that APAN has fulfilled all four recruitment and internal cohesion activities: namely marketing orientation, "segmentation and targeting," internal marketing and fundraising. First, APAN pursued a product-orientation that involved attracting people who were sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. Second, this research shows that APAN uses segmentation to identify sympathetic politicians and parties. APAN targets them by allocating resources to reaching them including speaking engagements, fundraising dinners, and study tours. Though Morrison stated that APAN did not conduct segmentation, this research shows that the organisation segmented sympathetic politicians. Third, APAN has pursued a base strategy that involves appealing to its members and supporters' support for the Palestinian cause. Fourth, APAN also engaged in fundraising through group and individual membership dues, online donations, and fundraising events.

Chapter 8: Discussion

This discussion chapter looks at how the case studies met the various communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities and criteria of the framework. It then reflects on the overall findings.

Communicational activities

1. Information politics

All four groups met the information politics criterion by generating politically usable information through a range of online and print media including websites, social media, email newsletters, pamphlets, posters, and magazines. They also solicited op-ed articles and interviews in various news media to cultivate their public profile in New Zealand and Australia.

2. Strategic political communication

All four groups met the criteria of strategic political communication including symbolic politics, media management, and short-term campaigns. First, all cases also engaged in symbolic politics by using themes, messages, and narratives to raise awareness of Israel-Palestine issues and expand their networks. For example, PSNA made extensive use of political symbols such as flags and Keffiyehs associated with the Palestinians. Both PSNA and APAN promoted several pro-Palestinian messages and narratives including the "David and Goliath" struggle between the Palestinians and Israel, Israeli "Apartheid", Israeli aggression, Israeli intransigence, and defending Palestinian activism including the BDS movement from pro-Israel charges of anti-Semitism. The Israel Institute and AIJAC promoted several pro-Israel messages and narratives including Israel being the homeland of the Jewish people and acting in self-defence, Israel wanting peace, Palestinian intransigence, rejectionism, and terrorism, and highlighting the danger posed by variations of anti-Semitism including anti-Zionism.

Second, they sought to influence media coverage of Israel-Palestine by producing op-ed columns and letters and participating in media interviews in order promote positive

imagery of a destination and raise domestic support for their causes. , While this research found that the groups sought to raise public awareness of Israel-Palestine, it did not measure the impact of their advocacy activities on influencing public opinion.

All groups also engaged in short-term campaigning. While the PSNA staged symbolic actions such as the "salt water challenges" to promote the Palestinian cause, the other three groups mainly responded to newsworthy events and developments through their communications. The IINZ also engaged in short term campaigns by producing a public opinion survey and voting guide to coincide with the 2017 general election in New Zealand. The latter campaign helped reinforce the IINZ's narrative that a majority of New Zealand were sympathetic to Israel.

One divergence from the framework was that the Zionist groups conducted both crisis management and tourism promotion. By contrast, Palestinian groups like the PSNA and APAN focused on crisis management due to the asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians.

3. Communications adaptation

All four groups used a wide range of communications mediums and platforms particularly the Internet, social media, and email newsletters. All groups maintained an official website as well as at least one social media account. While the PSNA and AIJAC used print media such as posters, leaflets, newsletters, and magazines (eg. AIJAC's *Australia/Israel Review* magazine), other groups like the Israel Institute and APAN focused on online media and platforms. PSNA relied on their member groups operated their own social media accounts such as the Palestine Human Rights Campaign's (PHRC) YouTube channel, which was used to advertise their events and activities, whilst the other three groups used their own platforms. The IINZ made a cognizant effort to use social media platforms to reach younger people who were perceived as less likely to support Israel and more likely to be influenced by Palestinian solidarity groups. APAN used Vimeo, another video streaming platform.

4. Communicational image management

While all four groups engaged in both criteria of communicational image management and promoted their sides' claim to the land, there was variation in how they carried them out. While the PSNA engaged in both promoting Palestinian culture and heritage and improving the Palestinians' media image, APAN focused more on the latter. Meanwhile, the Israel Institute and AIJAC have focused on promoting positive characteristics of Israel as a tourist destination, culture, heritage, scientific and technological innovation, and safe and diverse place to live while simultaneously combating negative perceptions and coverage of Israel in the media such as home demolitions, the detention of Palestinian children, Israeli military operations, anti-Semitism, and anti-Zionism. The differences in approach and emphasis reflects the asymmetry in power and resources between Israel and the Palestinians. Pro-Israel groups focused on defending the status quo which favours Israel while Palestinian solidarity groups seek to challenge the status quo which they regard as unfavourable and oppressive towards the Palestinians.

Relational activities

5. Cause promotion

All four groups used relational activities such as public gatherings, speaking engagements, concerts, demonstrations, and fundraisers and interactive communications technologies like the Internet, emails, and social media to promote their causes, advocacy work and public events, although there was some variance between the groups in what they used.

6. Exerting leverage

All four groups met both criteria of exerting leverage by seeking to influence the public policy process and practising accountability politics. First, the groups lobbied and cultivated relations with various political, media and civil society actors and leaders in order to influence the public policy process. Second, the groups sought to hold these actors accountable to their stated policies and principles.

Despite these commonalities, there were variations in their accessibility to stakeholders and level of success in advancing their goals and objectives as of 2018. While

the PSNA made some modest gains in convincing the NZ Super Fund to divest from Israeli banks and the Wellington City Council not to adopt the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance's definition of antisemitism, it has met little success in convincing the New Zealand Government and companies to boycott and severe relations with Israel. While the IINZ managed to cultivate relations with some politicians, journalists and civil society leaders, it has had little impact on NZ foreign policy and media coverage towards Israel-Palestine as of 2018. Of the three groups, AIJAC has had the most success in cultivating relations with sympathetic Australian political and media actors, becoming an influential pro-Israel voice in the Australian public policy process and media coverage towards Israel. AIJAC's success reflects the sizeable Australian Jewish population, who constitute a significant electoral force in Australian politics (Rutland, 2004; Levey, 2004; Ben-Moshe, 2004). While APAN has made inroads in cultivating relations with sympathetic Australian political and media actors, it has yet to build up the same clout and influence as AIJAC.

7. Coalition building

All four groups met both criteria of coalition building by networking with sympathetic political, media and civil society actors and working to bring change in foreign countries via the "boomerang effect." However, there was some variation in how they conducted coalition building and the boomerang effect. PSNA focused on cultivating relations with several left-wing Labour and Green politicians, indicating an affinity for Palestine among the political left worldwide. Meanwhile, the Israel Institute successfully forged relations with the conservative National MP Alfred Ngaro and the Israeli Ambassador Itzhak Gerbeg. While the PSNA sought to effect change in Israel-Palestine via the BDS campaign, the IINZ was more interested in managing Israel's public image in New Zealand. Compared with their New Zealand counterparts, AIJAC and APAN were more successful in cultivating relations with government and sub-national actors as shown by the former's friendly relations with the Australian and Israeli Governments and the latter's friendly relations with the Palestinian Authority particularly Palestinian Ambassador Izzat Salah Abdulhadi. While APAN sought to effect change in Israel-Palestine via the BDS campaign, AIJAC was more interested in influencing the Australian public policy process and media coverage towards Israel-Palestine.

8. Transnational collaboration

All four groups met both criteria of transnational collaboration by networking on a global level with other like-minded activists and groups and cooperating via sharing information, co-hosting events and functions, webinars, and joint lobbying campaigns. Palestinian solidarity groups like the PSNA and APAN supported the BDS movement while the Israel Institute and AIJAC networked with various pro-Israel individuals, groups, and other actors on a global level. While all groups sought to influence national and local government policies, media coverage and public opinion towards Israel and the Palestinians, they avoided lobbying international actors such as the United Nations; showing that they mainly operate at the domestic level.

9. Relational image management

While all four groups engaged in relational image management, not all of them met all the four criteria. The PSNA fulfilled the first and fourth criteria by sponsoring educational public gatherings and politically-oriented tourism in the form of fact-finding missions to the Palestinian Territories. The second and third criteria – cultural heritage promotion and crisis management – were largely embedded into their public gatherings and fact-finding missions to the Palestinian Territories. While the Israel Institute did engage in all four criteria, this was dominated by public gatherings and some political oriented tourism with heritage promotion and crisis management being subsumed into their relational activities.

Both AIJAC and APAN fulfilled the first, third, and fourth criteria by sponsoring public gatherings, engaging in crisis management, and organising informational trips to Israel-Palestine. However, crisis management took precedence over cultural heritage promotion, reflecting their focus on current affairs. This may reflect the Australian organisations' interests in contemporary issues and combating perceived media bias and negative imagery towards Israel and the Palestinians respectively.

Recruitment and internal cohesion
10. Marketing orientation

The two Palestinian solidarity groups pursued product-orientations, using their communications and relational activities to attract people who were sympathetic to

Palestinian human rights, justice, and self-determination. They showed little interest in modifying their platform and activities (including support for the BDS campaign) to accommodate elite and public opinion. For these two networks, advancing their product of Palestinian rights and self-determination was the driving force behind their communications, advocacy work, and membership. While the PSNA advocated a one-state solution abolishing Israel, the more moderate APAN avoided taking a position on final status issues, preferring that they be resolved through "fair" peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

By contrast, the pro-Israel groups Israel Institute and AIJAC pursued a sales-orientation where groups are committed to a certain product (supporting Israel and combating anti-Semitism) but use proactive communications and relational techniques and activities to convince the public, media, and elites about the legitimacy of their cause (supporting Israel and combating anti-Semitism). The IINZ conducted market intelligence by segmenting its audience and targeting certain segments like young people and Māori via social media and cultural-specific targeting. This research also found that AIJAC pursues a sales-orientation by using market intelligence to identify influential political, media, and civil society elites who were sympathetic to its goals of promoting Israel and various issues of concern to Australian Jews including anti-Semitism, terrorism, extremism, and advancing multiculturalism and democracy. This research suggests that a market-orientation may not work with cause-based groups since the four groups studied had a clear pre-determined product in mind that they were unwilling to let market forces dictate or shape.

11. Segmentation and targeting

While all four groups engaged in segmentation and targeting, they varied in their methods and targets. While the PSNA did not practise segmentation, they conducted targeting by allocating resources and products such as their online output and guest speaking engagements to reaching sympathetic individuals and groups, who tended to come from left-wing, Arab, and Muslim backgrounds. The Israel Institute segmented their audience into the "naïve and undecided" and pro-Israel supporters, also taking an interest in reaching young people and the Māori community via social media and cultural-specific targeting.

Both AIJAC and APAN segmented the Australian public and political actors into friendly and hostile elements, targeted sympathetic political and media actors and allocated resources and products through their media output and relational activities to reaching them. AIJAC segmented and targeted Australian political, media, and civil society actors who were sympathetic to AIJAC's agenda and able to influence policies and public opinion.

12.Internal marketing

All four groups pursued a base strategy, which involves incentivising their potential and actual activists and supporters by pushing a product that appeals to their most committed supporters. While a base strategy has limited design flexibility and rules out a catch-all approach, activist commitment to the group's product will remain strong for as long as the product remains unchanged. The PSNA and APAN mobilised their supporters through their platform of Palestinian rights, justice and self-determination. Likewise, the Israel Institute and AIJAC mobilized their supporters through their platform of defending Israel, combating anti-Semitism, and advancing Jewish communal interests in the case of the latter. AIJAC's leadership viewed the organisation as a professional lobbying organisation dedicated to advancing these goals through its communications output and advocacy work.

13.Fundraising

All four groups engaged in fundraising but varied in how they met the criteria. While the PSNA and Israel Institute engaged in fundraising activities and solicited donations through their websites and events, they lacked membership subscriptions as of 2018. By contrast, AIJAC avoided fundraising and drew much of its funding from wealthy Australian Jewish donors and magazine subscriptions. APAN has relied upon individual and group membership subscriptions, online donations, and fundraising dinners and marathons. The groups also sought to encourage members and supporters to make a difference by contributing financially to the groups' work.

Overall reflection

Groups	PSNA	IINZ	AIJAC	APAN
Figure 21: Did the Advocacy Groups adhere to the Criteria?				
Communicational activities				
1. Information politics				
1a. Print media	√		√	
1b. Online media	√	√	√	√
2. Strategic political communication				
2a. Symbolic politics	√	√	√	√
2b. Managing media coverage to raise domestic support	√	√	√	√
2c. Short term campaigns	√	√	√	√
3. Communications adaptation	√	√	√	√
3a. Formal channels	√	√	√	√
3b. Informal channels	√	√	√	√
4. Communicational image management				
4a. Positive image management (eg. heritage/tourism promotion)	√	√	√	
4b. Crisis image management	√	√	√	√
Relational activities				
5. Cause promotion				
5a. Relational activities	√	√	√	√
5b. Two-way communication mediums	√	√		√
6. Exerting leverage				
6a. Lobbying and relationship building	√	√	√	√
6b. Accountability politics	√	√	√	√
7. Coalition building				
7a. Cooperating with sympathetic domestic actors	√	√	√	√
7b. Boomerang effect	√		√	√
8. Transnational collaboration				
8a. Transnational advocacy networks	√	√	√	√

8b. Seeking to change states and international organisations' behaviours	√		√	√
8c. Information sharing and guest speakers	√	√	√	√
9. Relational image management				
9a. Public gatherings	√	√	√	√
9b. Cultural and heritage promotion		√	√	
9c. Crisis management	√	√	√	√
9d. Politically-oriented tourism	√	√	√	√
Recruitment and internal cohesion activities				
10. Marketing orientation				
10a. Product-orientation	√			√
10b. Sales-orientation		√	√	
10c. Market-orientation				
11. Segmentation and targeting				
11a. Segmentation		√	√	√
11b. Targeting	√	√	√	√
12. Internal marketing				
12a. Material incentives				
12b. Base strategy	√	√	√	√
12c. Empty vessel				
12d. Dignified democracy				
12d. Effective democracy				
13. Fundraising				
13a. Fundraising activities	√	√		√
13b. Donors	√	√	√	√
13c. Subscriptions			√	√

As the table above shows, the advocacy groups met most of the communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion criteria of the analytical framework apart from some variations:

1. An earlier version of the "strategic political communications" criterion suggested that the groups exploited global media coverage to raise international support for their causes. This research demonstrated that while the groups were interested in international events relating to Israel-Palestine, they mainly targeted domestic audiences in New Zealand and Australia since this was their natural environment.

2. In terms of relational image management, the Palestinian solidarity groups tended to focus more on crisis image management while the pro-Israel groups conducted both positive image management (cultural heritage and tourism promotion) and crisis management. This reflects the asymmetry in power and resources between Israel and the Palestinians.

3. In terms of transnational collaboration, the Israel Institute has shown less interest than the other groups in bringing about change overseas due to its domestic focus on managing Israel's image in New Zealand.

4. In terms of marketing orientations, Palestinian solidarity groups favoured a product-orientation that placed their cause at the centre of their communications and advocacy work. By contrast, Zionist groups favoured a sales-orientation which involved using their communications output and advocacy work to sell their cause to the public and other influential actors.

5. In terms of segmentation and targeting, the Palestinian solidarity groups were less likely to carry out segmentation than the pro-Israel groups. However, all groups allocated resources to reaching sympathetic political, media and civil society elements.

6. In terms of internal marketing, all the groups pursued a base strategy where membership was motivated by ideological affinity for the Israeli or Palestinian causes.

7. In terms of fundraising, AIJAC was the only group that did not use fundraising campaigns since it had access to wealthy donors and magazine subscriptions.

Summary

This research found that whilst the groups operate independently of the Israeli government and Palestinian Authority, they engage in public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing which supports public diplomacy of overseas governments.

In terms of public diplomacy all the groups apart from the PSNA, supported the public diplomacy of state actors by maintaining communications with Israeli and Palestinian diplomats and senior officials and hosting them at public functions and events. The groups' involvement in public diplomacy ranged from having no contact to having a high level of contact and engagement with state actors. Whilst PSNA did not appear to participate in the Palestinian Authority's public diplomacy efforts, preferring to work with other activists and NGOs, AIJAC by contrast not only had access to Israeli diplomats and representatives but also had access to senior Israeli officials including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. These advocacy groups focused on influencing domestic audiences, policy-makers and institutions since they did not have the resources to conduct lobbying on a global level.

In terms of nation branding, the groups promoted either Jewish/Israel or Palestinian culture, heritage and history through their communications and relational activities. On a communications level, they produced or shared literature and media promoting favourable images of the Israeli or Palestinian side and combating negative imagery and messages about them. On a relational level, they sponsored guest speakers from Israel or the Palestinian Territories, and informational trips designed to educate participants about the "facts on the ground."

In terms of political marketing, Palestinian solidarity groups tended to pursue product-orientations which placed their cause (Palestinian rights, justice, and self-determination) at the forefront of their communications output and relational activities. Pro-Israel groups tended to pursue a sales-orientation which focused on using proactive communications and relational activities to advance their cause (Israel, Zionism, and Jewish communal interests and security). The Palestinian solidarity groups may be pursuing a product-orientation since public opinion and media coverage is increasingly favourable to the Palestinian cause in many segments. By contrast, pro-Israel groups have resorted to a sales-orientation due to the need to persuade the public about the legitimacy of Israeli policies and actions. While all four groups carried out some degree segmentation and targeting, pro-Israel groups appeared to more willing to use market intelligence (such as the Israel Institute segmenting their audience into pro-Israel supporters, the undecided, young people, and Māori). In terms of internal marketing, all four case studies pursued a base strategy with their cause being the primary factor for attracting people into their group and for motivating them to carry out their activism and advocacy work.

Overall, this shows that advocacy groups are utilising public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing to advance their international causes to a significant degree. This shines the light on the behaviour of Palestinian and Israel activists and lobby groups in New Zealand and Australian which had not been previously researched. The next chapter, the conclusion, will sum up the key findings and contents of this thesis.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

The topic and research question

This thesis has explored both pro-Israel and Palestinian solidarity advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia, focusing on how they have used nation branding and political marketing to support Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy efforts. Throughout the course of the Israeli-Palestine conflict, the Israeli and Palestinian governments along with sympathetic non-state actors including advocacy groups have used public diplomacy, nation branding and political marketing strategies and techniques to win over the sympathy and support of foreign publics. This struggle has reverberated through civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), local government bodies, public institutions, trade unions, businesses, the news media, the Internet, and social media. In the process, both sides have constructed diametrically opposing narratives positing themselves as the victims and their opponents as the aggressors. While the Israeli Government and pro-Israel advocacy groups have framed Israel's struggle as a defensive one against anti-Semitism and Islamism, the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian solidarity groups including the BDS movement have framed the Palestinian struggle as an anti-colonial struggle against settler-colonialism, Israeli military occupation, and "Apartheid." This research therefore sought to explore whether and how advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia use nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments, uncovering news spheres of influence for branding and political marketing.

The research

To begin addressing this issue, firstly, a multi-field literature review of advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing was completed, as well as drawing on literature relating to public diplomacy and Israeli and Palestinian advocacy groups worldwide. This process identified six major gaps in existing academic literature including the limited attention to advocacy groups within the public diplomacy literature and the limited research on Palestinian public diplomacy and nation branding. There has been the little research on New Zealand-based advocacy groups interested in Israel-Palestine issues as well as Australian-based Palestinian advocacy groups. Finally, there has been limited

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research on how international advocacy groups use political marketing, particularly Israeli and Palestinian advocacy groups worldwide apart from Ahuvia's (2012) research into the Brit Tzedek peace group.

However the review also identified key concepts in existing work that could be adapted to suit the research focus, including in advocacy: Keck and Sikkink's (1998) "transnational advocacy network", four types of "political action," and "Boomerang pattern" models; public diplomacy work by Cull (2009), Gilboa (2008), Zaharna (2009), Copeland (2009), Pigman (2010), Pamment (2013), Berridge (2015), and Seib (2012); nation branding work by van Ham (2001), Ollins (2002), Gilboa (2008), Szondi (2008), Copeland (2009), Smits & Jansen (2012), Dinnie (2016), Beirman (2000), Brin (2006), Avraham (2009), and Campo/Alvarez (2014); political marketing work by Lees-Marshment (2014; 2004), Foster et al (2012), and Ahuvia (2012)'s research into the messaging and recruitment strategies of advocacy groups.

Building on core concepts from these works, a new theoretical framework was created which combined advocacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing research: A model of how advocacy groups use public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments. This argued that advocacy groups could use nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments in three key areas: communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities.

- Communications: information politics, strategic political communication, communications adaptation, and communications image management.
- Relational: cause promotion, exerting leverage, coalition building, transnational collaboration, and relational image management.
- Recruitment and internal cohesion: marketing orientations, segmentation and targeting, internal marketing, and fundraising.

Methodology

Empirical research was conducted to explore the extent to which advocacy groups were following this framework using a qualitative and comparative case studies approach. It

analysed four groups; two-pro-Israel groups and two Palestinian solidarity groups. The New Zealand case studies consisted of the Palestinian Solidarity Network Aotearoa (PSNA; formerly the New Zealand Palestine Solidarity Network or NZPSN) and the Israel Institute of New Zealand (IINZ) while the Australian case studies consisted of the Australia/Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC) and the Australia Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN). The research used several qualitative research methods including a content analysis of a range of web, social media, and print sources and qualitative interviews. Sources derived from the content analysis and interviews were analysed against the researcher's analytical framework using NVivo software. The following paragraphs discuss both the data collection and analysis methods and processes.

A total of 1,898 sources were analysed for the four case studies. These sources were supplemented by interviews with available practitioners from the four case studies: the PSNA's National Chair John Minto, the Israel Institute's Director David Cumin, and APAN's Executive Officer Jessica Morrison. Unfortunately, despite multiple attempts it was not possible to interview any current or former AIJAC staff members due to AIJAC's policy of not granting interviews, thus secondary sources were used to fill this gap in data. The data was analysed against the analytical framework using NVivo software.

Research findings

Research question

In relation to the research question, this research found that advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia have used nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments through a range of communicational, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. To reiterate, they supported the public diplomacy of these state actors by advancing their messages and interests through various online and print literature and media; lobbying and cultivating relationships with a range of political, media, and civil society actors; and organising various activities such as public gatherings, fundraisers, and informational trips. The groups conducted nation branding by seeking to promote favourable images and counter negative imagery of the state actor they were supporting through a range of communications output and relational activities such as advocacy work, mass gatherings, fundraisers, and

informational trips. They also used a range of several political marketing approaches and techniques including marketing orientations, segmentation and targeting, and internal marketing for the purposes of publicising their causes and recruiting supporters in New Zealand and Australia. In short, public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing permeated their communications, relational and recruitment/internal cohesion activities.

Public diplomacy

While all four groups studied supported the public diplomacy goals and interests of state actors through their communications output and advocacy activities, this research also sought to address their interaction with state actors and level of autonomy. The findings of the research with respect to the question of interaction and autonomy are worth summarising prior to the next section, which shows how the four case studies addressed the main research question, centred on the groups' support for the public diplomacy of state actors.

First, this research found that several groups had cultivated relations with foreign governments and their local representatives in Australia and New Zealand. AIJAC and the IINZ succeeded in cultivating relations with senior Israeli policy-makers and officials including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Ambassador Itzhak Gerberg (AIJAC, 2016a; 2017a; Shalom.Kiwi, 2018b; Cumin 2018g). While APAN (2014v; 2015k) had cultivated relations with the Palestinian Ambassador Abdulhadi and senior Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) official Hanan Ashrawi, the PSNA appeared to have no direct contact and ties with the Palestinian Authority, which may reflect the Palestinian General Delegation's limited travel expenditure (Ambassador Abdulhadi, personal communications, March 20, 2017). The higher level of interaction between pro-Israel groups and the Israeli government in comparison to that between Palestinian solidarity groups and the Palestinian Authority reflects the asymmetry of power and resources between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Though advocacy groups clearly supported state actors' public diplomacy through their communications and advocacy work, no evidence was found of more than limited contact with state actors and their representatives. While these interactions with state actors show that foreign governments do endorse the groups advocacy work and activism, it should not be overlooked that advocacy groups remain one among many "channels of access" that

governments have for conduction public diplomacy including the media, businesses, trade unions, educational institutions, professional bodies, and government actors.

Second, this research showed that the advocacy groups can be considered autonomous allies who support the goals and interests of Israel and the Palestinian Authority rather than "foreign agents" that were controlled by foreign governments. Despite their friendly interactions with foreign governments and their representatives, all four groups studied drew their leadership and support (including financial and material) from domestic support within Australia and New Zealand. While this research found that pro-Israel groups draw their support from local Jewish communities, Christian Zionists and the political right, pro-Palestinian groups draw their support from the political left and the Arab and Muslim communities; suggesting that Israel-Palestine is becoming a polarising issue in left-right politics. The case for autonomy was also supported by the groups' varying levels of support for the states' public diplomacy efforts. While pro-Israel groups were more willing to follow the Israeli Government's official line, the pro-Palestinian groups were more willing to take an independent stance from the Palestinian Authority. For example, APAN (2017l) has spoken out against the Palestinian Authority's arbitrary detention of political opponents. In addition, this research found that the Palestinian solidarity groups looked up to the Palestinian-led BDS movement, a non-state civil society actor, for leadership and guidance in carrying out their advocacy work and activities. This research found that the groups largely emerged in response to local conditions in Australia and New Zealand rather than through foreign interference in domestic affairs. AIJAC and the Israel Institute emerged in order to combat perceived anti-Israel sentiment in their countries while APAN and the PSNA emerged to coordinate Palestinian solidarity activism nationally. Despite supporting states' public diplomacy efforts, these groups also sought to lobby and work with a range of domestic actors including political elites, the media and other faith and ethnic communities. In short, these observations suggest that the advocacy groups should be classified as autonomous allies who supported the states' public diplomacy activities rather than foreign agents that were directly controlled by them.

Case studies' findings

This section shows how the four case studies addressed the main research question. It also summarizes the commonalities and variations of the case study findings against the

communications, relational and recruitment/internal cohesion activities of the analytical framework.

Commonalities

This research showed that advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia use nation branding and political marketing to support the public diplomacy efforts of the Israeli and the Palestinian governments to a significant extent using communications, relational activities and recruitment and internal cohesion activities.

The groups engaged in communications including information politics, strategic political communication, communications adaptation, and communications image management. First, the groups produced a range of print and online media, literature, and paraphernalia to promote their cause. Second, the groups used symbolic politics to promote favourable arguments and messages and build a media profile by producing op-ed articles and letters and taking part in media interviews. Third, the groups have used a wide range of communications technologies and platforms including websites, emails, social media, pamphlets, posters, and other forms. Fourth all groups carried out communications image management by producing or sponsoring a range of online and print media and literature promoting their allied state/faction's culture, heritage, identity, territorial claims and combating negative information and perceptions.

The groups also carried out relational activities including cause promotion, lobbying, coalition building, transnational collaboration, and relational image management. First, they organised a range of public gatherings including protests, fundraisers, and guest speaking engagements and utilised interactive communications technologies such as emails and social media. Second, they lobbied a range of political, media, and civil society actors to influence their policies and practices, cultivate relations, and to exert accountability. Third, they forged coalitions and networks with a range of individuals, groups, and other actors on a domestic level. Fourth, all groups collaborated with a range of individuals, groups, and other actors on a transnational level via information sharing, co-hosting events and functions, webinars, and advocacy campaigns. Finally, all four groups carried out relational image management by organising range of public gatherings, meetings, speaking engagements and politically-oriented informational trips to promote support for their state/ethnic group, cultural heritage

promotion, and combating negative imagery of their allied country or ethnic group. The most common criteria fulfilled by the four groups tended to be the first and fourth: sponsoring public gatherings and politically oriented tourism.

The groups also engaged in recruitment and internal cohesion activities including adopting segmenting and targeting, internal marketing, and fundraising. First, all four groups carried out some form of segmenting and targeting but did not always fulfil the three criteria. Despite these differences, all four groups have allocated resources and products via their communications output and relational activities to reaching sympathetic elements. Second, all four groups pursued a base strategy where ideological affinity was a key factor in motivating members' and supporters' participation in the groups' activism, advocacy work, and recruitment efforts. Finally, all four groups used a range of fundraising methods to generate revenue including online donations and fundraising events.

Taken together, these commonalities suggest that political marketing and nation branding are shared tools used by advocacy groups to support public diplomacy of overseas governments. In terms of communications activities, the groups used a wide range of platforms including websites, social media, and print media to promote a favourable image and counter negative imagery of their cause and faction/state. In terms of relational activities, the groups used a wide range of advocacy activities including public gatherings, lobbying, meetings, fundraising and social media to win support for their cause and faction/state, and to forge alliances with like-minded individuals, groups, and other actors. Political marketing and nation branding theories and concepts also helped explain their recruitment and internal cohesion strategies and methods, particularly how they pitched their messages and recruited supporters and allies to their cause.

Variations

There were variations in the way the groups conducted their communications, relational, and recruitment and internal cohesion activities:

First, three of the groups used both print and online mediums while only the Israel Institute of NZ used only online media.

Second, while all groups conducted nation branding, they varied in their focus on tourism promotion and crisis management. Palestinian solidarity groups tended to focus more on crisis management while pro-Israel groups balanced their crisis management output with cultural and tourism promotion. This reflects the asymmetry of power and resources between Israel and the Palestinians where Israel controls land, air and maritime borders and entry into Israel and the Palestinian Territories including tourism and work movements. While the New Zealand groups tended to use nation branding for communication purposes, the Australian groups tended to focus on relational activities such as networking, lobbying, and study tours. This shows that Australian groups were more well-resourced and connected than their New Zealand counterparts.

Third, Australian groups tended to have more success than their New Zealand counterparts in lobbying and cultivating relations with a range of political, media, and civil society targets, reflecting Australia's larger Jewish and Arab diaspora communities and the corresponding greater interest in Israel-Palestine issues (Ben-Moshe, 2004; Han & Rane, 2013; Carr, 2014, Lyons, 2017).

Fourth, the groups differed in terms of how they carried out their marketing orientations. While Palestinian solidarity groups pursued a product-orientation that focused on promoting their cause, pro-Israel groups favoured a sales-orientation which focused on influential, sympathetic elements who could help advance their cause. Palestinian solidarity groups tended not to practise segmentation, preferring to produce communications and conduct relational activities with the goal of attracting sympathetic individuals and groups. They showed little interest in modifying their platform and activities since their cause was the primary driving force behind their communications, advocacy work, and membership. This research suggest that Palestinian solidarity groups can exploit growing public sympathy for the Palestinians due to the perceived asymmetry of power and resources between Israeli and the Palestinians. By contrast, pro-Israel groups tended to use segmentation to identify influential, sympathetic elements who could be targeted through a range of communications and advocacy activities. They sought to cultivate relationships with political, media and civil society actors who could influence policies and public opinion in Israel's favour. They were particularly concerned with combating the public image of Israel as the oppressor and highlighting Palestinian intransigence.

Fifth, pro-Israel groups were more likely than Palestinian solidarity groups to conduct segmentation while the latter focused more on targeting sympathetic audiences. While the PSNA targeted a broad pro-Palestinian audience, the Israel Institute used Māori culture and arts to reach out to a certain demographic. Meanwhile, AIJAC and APAN focused on winning over sympathetic political elites and opinion makers in order to influence the Australian government policies and public opinion.

Sixth, AIJAC was the only group not to solicit fundraising, instead relying on private donors and magazine subscriptions.

Contributions to original knowledge

This research helped to fill the six key gaps noted in the literature review and contribute to several fields of knowledge: namely the role of non-state actors in public diplomacy, the limited research on Palestinian public diplomacy, Palestinian nation branding, and New Zealand-based advocacy groups that take an interest in Israel-Palestine issues, Australian-based Palestinian solidarity groups, and how international advocacy groups including pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian groups use political marketing, which are discussed below.

The first gap that it addressed was drawing attention to the role and contributions of non-state actors such as advocacy groups in carrying out public diplomacy in order to influence Australia and New Zealand's foreign policy, media coverage, and public opinion towards Israel and the Palestinians. Advocacy groups have contributed to public diplomacy by advancing the messages, arguments, and interest of state actors through their communicational output and relational activities including lobbying, mass gatherings, and informational trips. While AIJAC had previously been studied by other scholars, the other three groups are recent organisations that emerged after 2011, making this research one of the first academic studies to explore the PSNA, IINZ, and APAN in substantial depth. This thesis contributed to the existing literature on AIJAC by including events and developments in the 2010s particularly their use of social media platforms. This research also addressed the relationship between governments and non-state actors in Cull's New Public Diplomacy model by showing that the advocacy groups largely functioned as independent actors with their own goals and interests rather than operating as foreign agents of state actors. While

advocacy groups and state actors did work together when their goals and interests aligned, the former answered primarily to their own domestic leaderships and support bases rather than state actors. Though not all the groups studied had relations with state actors, these interactions gave the groups a sense of legitimacy and purpose among their members and supporters.

Second, this research contributed to the limited literature on Palestinian public diplomacy by focusing on how the PSNA and APAN advanced Palestinian messages, goals, and interests through their communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. Despite the looser links and connections between the Palestinian Authority and these two groups, this research found that they both supported many of the formers' goals such as advancing Palestinian rights, justice, and statehood; ending the Israeli military occupation, settlement expansion, and Separation Barrier; and holding Israel accountable for alleged human rights abuses and injustices. These goals and themes surfaced throughout their communications output and advocacy work, suggesting ideological affinity and solidarity. While the PSNA had no direct links to the Palestinian Authority, its Australian counterpart APAN had cultivated relations with some Palestinian officials and diplomats including Ambassador Abdulhadi, who attended several of their public events and fundraisers. This research suggests that Palestinian advocacy groups act as "force multipliers" in supporting Palestinian public diplomacy by helping to compensate for the limited diplomatic resources and capabilities of the Palestinian Authority, a non-state actor locked in an asymmetrical relationship with its larger neighbour, Israel. The limited literature on Palestinian public diplomacy may reflect the asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians.

Third, this research contributed to the limited literature on Palestinian nation branding by focusing on how the PSNA and APAN used their communications output and relational activities including producing print and online media, and sponsoring speaking engagements, fundraisers, public gatherings, information trips, and politically-oriented tourism to promote the Palestinians in a positive light and counter negative imagery. Unlike the pro-Israel groups, Palestinian solidarity groups tended to focus more on crisis management rather than cultural and tourism promotion due to the asymmetry between Israel and the Palestinians. This research shows that non-state actors including advocacy groups can engage in nation branding through their communications output and advocacy work. In addition, this research also expanded upon Beirman (2000) and Avraham's (2009) research into NGOs'

involvement in facilitating politically-oriented tourism (a subset of nation branding) to Israel-Palestine by exploring how Australian and New Zealand-based groups on both sides of the debate promoted tourism and information trips groups as a means of promoting their narratives about Israel-Palestine. This research thus shows that non-state actors including advocacy groups can also conduct nation branding.

Fourth, this research expanded upon the research by Ritchie (1986), MacIntyre (1987) and Van Voorthuysen (2011) on New Zealand-based advocacy groups that take an interest in Israel-Palestine. Besides exploring their involvement in Palestinian and Israeli public diplomacy initiatives, this research focused on how two groups, the PSNA and Israel Institute, sought to influence government, public, media, and civil society attitudes and policies towards Israel-Palestine through their communications, relational activities, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. In addition, this research also analysed these two groups' efforts to network with like-minded individuals, groups, and other actors in New Zealand and abroad, linking them to transnational solidarity networks dedicated to advancing Palestine and Israel respectively. The research into the PSNA's incorporation of the BDS platform into their local campaigns and activities also expands the international literature on the BDS movement and activism. In short, this research not only enrichens the literature on advocacy groups and activism in New Zealand but also contributes to the international literature on advocacy groups and activists interested in Israel-Palestine including the BDS movement and activism.

Fifth, this research contributed to the limited literature on Australian-based Palestinian solidarity groups by exploring APAN's efforts to influence Australian government policy, media coverage, and public opinion and help advance Palestinian public diplomacy through its communications, relational activities, and recruitment/internal cohesion activities. In addition, this research also analysed APAN's efforts to network with like-minded individuals, groups, and other actors in Australia and abroad, linking them to transnational Palestinian solidarity networks including the incorporation of the BDS platform into their local campaigns and activities. In short, this thesis not only enriches the literature on advocacy groups and activist in Australia but also contributes to the international literature on advocacy groups and activists interested in Israel-Palestine including the BDS movement and activism.

Finally, this research explored how international advocacy groups, particularly Israeli and Palestinian advocacy groups, used political marketing strategies and techniques in their communications, relational and recruitment/internal cohesion activities, demonstrating that political marketing is used beyond parties not just domestically by advocacy groups or NGOs but in international affairs. This research found that several political marketing theories and concepts including marketing orientation, "segmenting and targeting" and internal marketing were useful frameworks for analysing how the groups pitched their campaigns and activities, identified their support bases, and mobilised their members and supporters through ideological incentives. While Palestinian solidarity groups preferred product-oriented marketing, pro-Israel groups favoured sales-oriented marketing which included using market intelligence to sell their product. While the Palestinians groups generally targeted pro-Palestinian individuals and groups, at least one pro-Israel group segmented their audience into different categories which were targeted through different means. All four groups subscribed to a base strategy which involved appealing to their members and supporters' ideological commitment to advancing a certain cause, whether it be defending Israel and combating anti-Semitism or advancing Palestinians rights and self-determination. In short, political marketing permeated their messaging, advocacy, and mobilisation strategies and activities, showing that marketing has a wider reach into political behaviour beyond its application to domestic candidates, parties, and elections.

In summary, this research has contributed to academic research by showing how:

1. Advocacy groups can support states' public diplomacy activities in a meaningful way;

2. Palestinian solidarity groups can assist Palestinian public diplomacy activities;

3. Advocacy groups particularly Palestinian advocacy groups can engage in nation branding activities;

4. That political marketing can be used outside of domestic party politics and elections by a range of actors including international advocacy groups.

Expanding the literature on:

5. Both pro-Israel and Palestinian advocacy groups in New Zealand;

6. Australian Palestinian advocacy groups by analysing the communications and activities of their national umbrella organisation APAN.

This research has shown that advocacy groups can conduct public diplomacy, nation branding, and political marketing; activities which had traditionally been conducted by states,

political parties, and politicians. This demonstrates that branding and marketing are being used in politics by advocacy groups and other non-traditional actors in new ways with international aspects to its application.

Value of the research

Analytical framework's value

This research found that the synthesized analytical framework proved useful for analysing advocacy groups' communications, relational, and recruitment/internal cohesion strategies and outputs, focusing on four pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups in New Zealand and Australia. Despite its focus on pro-Israel and pro-Palestinian advocacy groups, this framework's criteria can be used to analyse a range of different advocacy groups in various settings since it covers several key hallmarks of advocacy groups' work; namely their communications output, advocacy work and other public activities, recruitment/mobilisation, and funding activities and strategies. First, this framework addressed how groups used a range of communications mediums and platforms to advance messages and narratives that appealed to local audiences in New Zealand and Australia. Second, this framework addressed how groups used a range of relational activities to raise awareness and support for their cause and network with like-minded individuals and groups both domestically and globally. Third, this framework addressed how groups used a range of recruitment/internal cohesion strategies and techniques to promote their cause and message, identify supporters and allies, mobilize their support base, and raise funds for their communications and relational activities. Through these activities, groups sought to promote awareness and support for their causes while advancing the messages, goals, and interests of state actors and factions (namely Israel and the Palestinians).

Limitations

Though the content analysis and interviews addressed the research questions and analytical framework, there were still several limitations in terms of how the advocacy groups met the analytical framework's criteria, the scope and selection of sources, and discrepancies between the content analysis and interview findings.

First, there were limitations to the scope and selection of sources in some case studies. For the PSNA, this research excluded the Network's email subscription list and email newsletter "In Occupied Palestine" due to privacy issues and the sufficient amount of accessible sources like their website, Facebook page, and the PHRC Auckland's YouTube channel. Excluding private communications and focusing on outward public communications mediums may lead the research to focus on the public image of the group that they seek to cultivate rather than developments happening behind the scenes. This research was also unable to interview both current and former AIJAC staff members to verify the organisation's market intelligence, recruitment, internal marketing and funding methods due to their reluctance to participate in this research project for privacy reasons. To address these gaps, the researcher consulted the works of Reich (2004), Rutland (2004), Markus (2004), Levey and Mendes (2004a), Loewenstein (2006), Han and Rane (2013), Lyons (2017) and Gawenda (2020), which gave useful insight into AIJAC's agenda and activities. Engaging with the prior literature on AIJAC informs this research about what areas have been covered as well as gaps that can be covered by this research.

Second, there were some contradictions between the findings of the content analysis and interviews, which affirm the value of a multi-method approach since the researcher's observations may vary from those of practitioners from the case studies. For the PSNA, Minto (personal communication, February 28, 2020) clarified that the Network did not target specific demographics, as the content analysis had assumed, but instead used their communications and relational activities to attract sympathetic individuals and groups. For the Israel Institute, the content analysis suggested that the think tank made specific outreaches to Māori by promoting Māori culture, arts, and pro-Israel individuals within that community. Cumin (personal communication, March 3, 2020; personal communication, July 28, 2020) clarified that the Israel Institute segmented their target audience based on their knowledge and support for Israel and established connections with various communities including Māori Christians. This shows that the IINZ has pitched their messaging and outreach work to appeal to different segments. For APAN, the content analysis showed that the Network segmented politicians for targeting. Morrison (personal communication, April 7, 2020) claimed that APAN did not focus on certain segments but appealed to people and groups who were passionate about Palestinian human rights and justice without elaborating further. Overall, the evidence from this research demonstrated that APAN conducted segmentation but future research could focus on its segmentation efforts on civil society groups. Due to privacy

reasons, Morrison was unable to disclose the Network's marketing strategies and member groups. These variations between the content analysis and interview findings show that interviews can yield useful insights into the organisation's strategies and techniques. However, the accuracy of interviews may be affected by what information the groups want to put out into the public domain.

Despite these two limitations, they did not affect the empirical findings of this research, which showed that the groups used a range of communications, relational, and recruitment activities to advance both Israeli and Palestinian public diplomacy through nation branding and political marketing.

Future research

Areas and issues that could be explored include:

- How non-state actors including advocacy groups are incorporating both political marketing techniques and practices traditionally associated with political parties and candidates and marketing techniques and practices associated with businesses into their communications output and advocacy work. One possible project is a comparison of the case studies' marketing orientations using Lees-Marshment's "product/sales/market orientation" framework.
- Whether the alignment of Palestinian solidarity groups with left-wing elements and the alignment of pro-Israel groups with right-wing elements show that Israel-Palestine has become a left-right "flashpoint" issue?
- Efforts by the advocacy groups to win over certain ethnic and religious demographics via targeting and segmentation. Possible topics include the collaboration between pro-Israel advocates and Christian Zionists, and the collaboration between Palestinian solidarity groups and Muslim and Arab communities.

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