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# **Representations of Hannibal: A comparison of iconic themes and events from the life and times of Hannibal.**

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy,  
The University of Auckland, 2009.

## **Abstract**

There are many stories about Hannibal found across a variety of texts and genres. No other external enemy of Rome had the same impact on Roman literature over time as the Carthaginians and their extraordinary general, Hannibal. This thesis compares the presentations of some iconic themes and events associated with Hannibal, as well as some less well known features about him in order to examine how his significance changed over time in Roman culture.

The comparisons made in this thesis focus primarily, but not exclusively, on literary features utilised by authors to promote (or downplay) particular events or people, such as the location of an event within the structure of a given text, the utilisation of omens or divine intervention, the patterning and content of speeches, the inclusion or exclusion of certain figures. The thesis aims to trace and compare ancient attitudes and responses to Hannibal, not to reinterpret the history of the Second Punic War or Hannibal's career. Roman attitudes toward Hannibal changed over time and ultimately became remarkably positive. Hannibal was, undoubtedly, a terrifying figure to Romans in the third century BC and a serious threat to Rome's suzerainty over Italy. Consequently, for many Romans, from at least the first century BC and possibly earlier, Hannibal embodied the archetype for a worthy enemy. His metamorphosis into the epitome of an eternal enemy is a representation which may, as this thesis suggests, have been in part self-promulgated. By the time of the late republic, it suited Roman writers such as Cornelius Nepos to write an astonishingly positive biography of Hannibal, acknowledging his skills as a commander and attributing to him a number of Roman virtues (Nepos, *Hannibal*, 1-13).

Comparing the treatments of a historical subject between genres and over time is of historiographic interest for examining how ancient Roman and Greek authors adapted tradition to suit their particular reading of events. This thesis also argues for some interesting correspondences between what might be considered two quite different modes of presentation of the Second Punic War: Polybius' narrative history and the Flavian epic of Silius Italicus. Comparison of these texts with Livy, Cornelius Nepos and other works highlights both the dramatised nature of certain sections of Polybius' *Histories*, and the frequency with the *Punica* conveys in its narrative some well-informed interpretation and comment.

## **Dedication**

To Angela, for encouraging me to embark on tertiary study.

## Table of Abbreviations

Latin and Greek quotations are taken from the Loeb editions unless indicated otherwise. All translations are taken, or adapted, from the Loeb translations, unless indicated otherwise. Frequently used texts and journals are abbreviated according to the conventions below.

<i>Aen.</i>	Virgil, <i>Aeneid</i>
<i>Appian, Hann.</i>	Appian, Roman History, Book 7, <i>The Hannibal War</i> .
<i>Appian, Pun.</i>	Appian, Roman History, Book 8, <i>The Punic Wars</i> .
<i>Lucan, bel. civ.</i>	Lucan, <i>De Bello Civilis</i>
<i>Cat.</i>	Sallust, <i>Bellum Catilinae</i>
<i>Jug.</i>	Sallust, <i>Bellum Iugurthinum</i> .
<i>Cornelius Nepos, Hann.</i>	Cornelius Nepos' biography, <i>Hannibal</i> .
<i>Hist.</i>	Polybius, <i>Histories</i>
<i>Livy</i>	Livy, <i>Ab Urbe Condita</i>
<i>NH</i>	Pliny, <i>Natural History</i>
<i>NQ</i>	Seneca, <i>Natural Questions</i>
<i>Pun.</i>	Silius Italicus, <i>Punica</i>
<i>Ad. Att.</i>	Cicero, <i>Epistulae ad Atticum</i>
<i>Tusc. Disp.</i>	Cicero, <i>Tusculan Disputations</i>
<i>Phil.</i>	Cicero, <i>Philippics</i>
<i>De Div.</i>	Cicero, <i>De Divinatione</i>
<i>De Leg. Agr.</i>	Cicero, <i>De Lege Agraria contra P. Servilium Rullum</i>
<i>Sat.</i>	Macrobius, <i>Saturnalia</i>
<i>Silv.</i>	Statius, <i>Silvae</i>
<i>Strat.</i>	Frontinus, <i>Stratagems</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt</i>
<i>ASCS</i>	Australasian Society for Classical Studies
<i>BMCR</i>	<i>Bryn Mawr Classical Review</i>
<i>BSR</i>	British School at Rome
<i>PBSR</i>	<i>Publication of the British School at Rome</i>
<i>CAH</i>	<i>Cambridge Ancient History</i>
<i>CIL</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</i>
<i>CIS</i>	<i>Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum</i>
<i>CJ</i>	<i>Classical Journal</i>
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>CR</i>	<i>Classical Review</i>
<i>G&amp;R</i>	<i>Greece &amp; Rome</i>
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>JRS</i>	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>
<i>PQ</i>	<i>Philological Quarterly</i>
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>

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# Introduction

This thesis sets out to explore the view of Hannibal in later Roman culture through a comparative study of the literary and historiographic treatment of certain episodes that became emblematic of his career and of the Second Punic War: his childhood oath and enmity to Rome; his crossing of the Alps; his march on Rome; his greatest victory at Cannae; the emasculation of his army in Campania; his defeat at Zama; his encouragement of foreign powers to make war on Rome; and his suicide.

In parte operis mei licet mihi praefari quod in principio summae totius professi plerique sunt rerum scriptores, bellum maxime omnium memorabile quae unquam gesta sint me scripturum, quod Hannibale duce Carthaginenses cum populo Romano gessere.

Livy, 21.1.1

In this preface to a part of my history I may properly assert what many an historian has declared at the outset of his entire work, to wit, that the war which I am going to describe was the most memorable of all wars ever waged, the war, that is, which, under the leadership of Hannibal, the Carthaginians waged with the Roman People.

Foster, 1949, 3.

Livy's opening sentence to the third decad glorifies the Second Punic War as the most memorable war that Rome ever fought and elevates Hannibal by naming him before anyone else (Livy also prioritises *populo Romano*, i.e., Rome as a community, over any individual Roman).<sup>1</sup> The story of Hannibal<sup>2</sup> and the Second Punic War (218-202)<sup>3</sup> between Rome and Carthage was one of enduring interest to the Romans and, as shown by Livy's opening remarks, the effects of Hannibal's impression can be traced in their texts for centuries after his lifetime.

In that this thesis compares the presentations and representations of Hannibal through events and themes associated with him in Roman cultural imagination, it is not aiming

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<sup>1</sup> Appendix 2 gives a brief overview of the use and importance of named figures in the major texts relevant to this study.

<sup>2</sup> Some recent works with a focus on Hannibal: Seibert, 1993; Hoyos, 1998, 2003, 2008; Goldsworthy, 2000, 2001; Lancel, 1995, 1998. See Hoyos, 2003, 212-222 for a comprehensive summary of ancient sources on Hannibal; also Hoyos, 1998, 280-296; 2003, 215-7; Hoyos, 2006, xxiv, echoes Livy, 21.1.1: 'Hannibal's war was the zenith of Roman heroism, virtue and toughness.' Also Caven, 1980; Bagnall, 2005; Cornell, Rankov and Sabin, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> All dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

to produce a historical study of the Second Punic War, nor is it a biographical study of Hannibal.

The chapters are generally, but not exclusively, arranged in a chronological sequence of Hannibal's life. It is argued, among other things, that one of the most iconic representations of Hannibal, his being the sworn enemy of Rome, is presented as derived from Hannibal himself. It is adapted and retained in the Roman tradition for its value in presenting Hannibal as an eternal enemy and a foil to Rome's imperial status. It is also argued that the association of Hannibal with Hercules is presented as originating from Hannibal, and then used against him. Thus the intention in this thesis is to show that the depiction of Hannibal in the ancient sources is more multifaceted and frequently far more positive than some recent estimations claim, for instance, Betlyon's assertion that the classical sources paint a picture of Hannibal as 'the consummate barbarian – ruthless, murderous, tyrannical, and without a shred of morality that was so important to Romans.'<sup>4</sup> Overall, it will be shown that, in fact, responses to Hannibal were far from uniformly negative. Of course he was feared, vilified and satirised but he was also upheld as an ideal, respected and even admired by the descendants of his former enemies. Due to the comparative nature of this study, a number of additional arguments are put forward, some specific to the topic covered in each chapter while others are more general to an author's response to tradition.

While this thesis is not intended to be primarily a comparison of historical events, the actual history of the Second Punic War and other events from Hannibal's later life are, nevertheless, of considerable relevance because this thesis seeks to illuminate the degree of displacement in the historical record caused by ideologically loaded distortions as authors negotiated with, or responded to, existing tradition as well as their contemporary power structure.<sup>5</sup> Consequently some chapters explore the implications where an author's engagement with a particular theme arguably accounts for significant differences between that author's presentation of a historical event and those of others. In chapter three, for example, which compares treatments of Hannibal marching on Rome, Livy's development of the theme is argued to account for a number of

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<sup>4</sup> Betlyon, 1999, 183.

<sup>5</sup> For recent work on political discourse in imperial Roman literature, see Dominik, Garthwaite and Roche (eds), 2009. For similar on Polybius, see Eckstein, 1997; Champion, 2004, with review by Burton, 2004.11.27. On Livy, see Jaeger, 1997, 2000, 232; Rossi, 2004; Miles, 1997; Feldherr, 1998; Roller, 2009, 153-172. On Silius Italicus: McGuire, 1989, 21-45; 1997; Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986, 2492-561; Dominik, 2003, 469-497.

differences between his depiction of Hannibal and those of other authors for a number of events prior to 211.

For another example, in the fourth chapter, which compares presentations of Cannae, it is argued that Silius Italicus and Livy include certain omens and portents in order to make connections to other events. The difference between them is that where Livy's connections are internal to his text, linking Cannae to a naval defeat of Rome by the Carthaginians in 249, Livy, *Per. 19.2*, Silius Italicus creates external links to other texts in order to connect Cannae to the civil war battle of Pharsalus (to the historical event, not only to the poem by Lucan).

Once Hannibal was dead, his exploits provided comfortable entertainment for reading or recitation and for representation on stage in historical plays. In Roman times, the figure of Hannibal featured in plays,<sup>6</sup> narrative and annalistic histories, biography, poetry, epic poetry, satire, speeches and private letters. Hannibal's successes and failures were topics for study in military manuals, such as Frontinus' text, and, according to Juvenal, they were enduringly popular subjects in schools of rhetoric, still wearing down both teachers and students in his own day (*Sat. 7.150-64; 10.165*). Thus Hannibal is one of a small handful of figures from the Roman Republican period for whom ancient representations can be traced in extant texts from within a generation of his lifetime through the third century AD and beyond. People were fascinated by this extraordinary man with his remarkable feats and victories in battle against the Romans, his ability to care for both his own safety and that of his men, as well as by his shortcomings and ill-luck in planning, logistics and strategic decision-making which led, eventually, to the inability to achieve overall victory either in the Second Punic War or later in his life in support of eastern kings against Rome.

Of the surviving accounts some of the most detailed treatments of Hannibal over the course of his life are found within four texts which are prioritised for this study. Conveniently they span a timeline of about three hundred years and cover a range of genres and socio-political backgrounds: Polybius' *Histories* is the earliest, written within a generation of the war during the period of Roman expansion in the early second century. Next is Cornelius Nepos' biography of Hannibal written in the tumultuous days of the Late Republic; then comes Livy's annalistic history, *ab urbe condita*, written during the Augustan period; and fourthly an epic poem, Silius Italicus' *Punica*

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<sup>6</sup> See discussions on Roman historical plays in Wiseman, 1979, esp. 1998, 2004; Braund and Gill (eds), 2003 and Fantham, 2000, 212 (review of Wiseman, 1998). For a later period, see Thomas Nabbes, 1635.

published in the Flavian period. There are, of course, many other texts and sources that contain representations of Hannibal, including works by Cicero, Valerius Maximus, Horace, Frontinus, Appian, Cassius Dio (whose history for this period survives in an abridged version by the Byzantine writer John Zonaras), Diodorus Siculus, Lucian, Juvenal, Plutarch, Florus, and the (probable) third century AD author, Marcus Junianus Justinus, who wrote an Epitome of the Augustan-age author Pompeius Trogus' *Philippic History*. These other texts are drawn upon where they help illustrate a point but are not prioritised for this study. In addition, there are non-literary sources, including numismatics and the Peutinger Map, (see Figures), which are drawn on where they have possible representations of or associations with Hannibal that are relevant to the events and themes discussed in this thesis.

Although Polybius was not a Roman writer he is included in this study for a number of reasons. He was a hostage at Rome, living with the Scipios, the family descended from Scipio Africanus, but, more importantly for this study, was known to be a source text for a number of Roman writers, and he knew that Romans would read his work. He was infused with both Greek and Roman culture and provides an earlier basis against which it is possible to measure later divergencies. On the other hand, as discussed below, the comparisons made in this thesis highlight certain features in Polybius' text that suggest aspects of his presentation should be treated with a measure of caution.

The range of texts in which Hannibal appears creates an opportunity to compare representations of the same event between different styles and genres over an extended timeline. Comparison between genres is possible because, apart from the subject, there are many structural features in common which are summarised and discussed in more detail below. Focussing on these features and themes in reference to the same event or anecdote can give insights into its adaptations for a given genre as well as the response to the subject.

A combination of literary and historical analyses is applied in the thesis because the texts are read as literary works on a related historical subject.<sup>7</sup> The idea of reconciliation between the historical and literary approaches to ancient texts is a continuing process in which the texts are read as narratives in their own right, each being the product of an author who is aware of his earlier traditions but has his own contemporary socio-

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<sup>7</sup> For discussion and bibliography on Roman historiography see Kraus and Woodman, 1997, esp. 51-81 for Livy; Wiseman, 1979, especially part 1, with reviews by Cornell, 1982, 204 and Briscoe, 1981, 49. Also Mellor, 1999, 11-24; Wiseman and Gill, 1993, 88-121.

political message. This message may distort the presentation of an event or underlying structure of a text irrespective of genre. The approach to the comparisons of structural features in this thesis is informed by Burck's studies on Livy and Silius Italicus, Luce on the structure of Livy's text,<sup>8</sup> as well as Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy on the structure of the *Punica*.<sup>9</sup>

Although Polybius' *Histories* are generally utilised by scholars as a historical source, more recently some have argued for greater recognition of literary structure in the text, an area not much discussed by the pre-eminent historian on the *Histories*, Walbank.<sup>10</sup> Champion, for example, argued that Polybius' representations of Romans are ingeniously manipulated by his politico-cultural language of Hellenism.<sup>11</sup> It is arguable that Polybius' Hannibal is cleverly glorified because it directly impacts on the presentation of Scipio Africanus, for example, the implicit comparison of Hannibal to Agamemnon in the battle at Zama raises both generals to the mythical realm (*Hist.* 15.16.3). Although the greater glorification of Scipio is the obvious level of reading the passage, on another level it must be remembered that Polybius was a political hostage at Rome, and, no matter how friendly he became with Scipio Aemilianus, this circumstance allows for a certain ambiguity in reading the representation of Hannibal. Furthermore, Polybius' implicit comparison of Hannibal to a mythical figure supports Wiseman's view that the interconnection of myth and history is especially relevant for this period of Roman history. Wiseman believes that it was during the period in which Ennius and Polybius were writing that the first historical Romans became mythic figures in their own right, 'some even descended from gods.'<sup>12</sup>

This thesis aims to show that the combined literary/historical approach to texts in the historiographical tradition may also be applied to poetry based on history, in that the Flavian poet, Silius Italicus, inherits both historiographical and poetic sources. He is, as noted by Augoustakis, located at the crossroads of these two inter-related traditions.<sup>13</sup> It will be argued that Silius Italicus creatively combines a number of apparently divergent traditions found in the historiographical texts and a variety of other allusions to present his uniquely Flavian version of events. Furthermore, and with a surprising frequency, he

<sup>8</sup> Luce, 1977, 31; Burck, 1971 (on Livy); 1984 (on the *Punica*).

<sup>9</sup> Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986.

<sup>10</sup> Marincola, 2001, esp 113-149; Eckstein, 1995; Champion, 2001; 2004. Cf. Walbank, 1957-79, 1972, 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Champion, 2004, 235, with review by Cazemier, 2006, 14.

<sup>12</sup> Scipio Africanus and Fabius Maximus are two examples. Wiseman 2004, 193. Also Griffith, 2006, 7.

offers a more plausible historical analysis for certain events and motivations than is to be found in the extant historiographical sources.

## Lost texts

Most of what was written about Hannibal in antiquity is lost. There are no first hand accounts of his activities or any surviving Carthaginian texts. Of the extant texts, the later books of Polybius' *Histories* become increasingly fragmentary. Thus the apparent responses from a later text to an earlier extant tradition may simply be coincidental.

The eventual Roman victory in the Second Punic War has always been justifiably viewed as one of the turning points in Rome's history and considered to mark the time when the city entered the 'world stage' in the ancient Mediterranean world as a major political and military player (Cf. Livy, 21.1.1; *Hist.* 3.1-4). This military and political watershed is reflected culturally in the flowering of Roman literature and Roman historiography from the end of the Second Punic War; so that by the time Polybius was writing there was already a range of well-established diverse traditions covering many events, and this range seems to have increased over time.<sup>14</sup>

Among the works known to be lost are those written by Hannibal himself, and those written by two of his companions, Sosylus and Silenus (Nepos, *Hann.* 13.3). Sosylus, reputedly Hannibal's tutor in Greek, wrote a seven-book history about Hannibal which was referred to by Diodorus and criticised by Polybius (*Hist.* 3.20.5; Diodorus, 26 fr. 6). It is possible that both Sosylus' and Silenus' texts were extant in the days of the late republic. Silenus, for example, is cited by both Cicero and Livy: *hoc item in Sileni, quem Coelius sequitur, Graeca historia est* (Cicero, *de Div.* 1.24.49; cf. Livy, 26.49.3).<sup>15</sup> Coelius' use of Silenus is testimony that its content appealed to both parties after the war.

Roman texts that referred to Hannibal and known to be lost include a seven book history of the Second Punic War by L. Coelius Antipater which is cited by Livy<sup>16</sup> a number of times, as well as texts by C. Claudius Quadrigarius and L. Valerius Antias.

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<sup>13</sup> Augoustakis, 2006, 145. However, the 'separation' of these traditions is more likely a modern concept reflecting the division between those who study history and those who study literature.

<sup>14</sup> Among others, Polybius refers to Chaereas, Sosylus, Silenus, Eumachus and a Xenophon.

<sup>15</sup> Günther, 2008, believes that both Silenus and Sosylus were sources not only for Polybius, but also for Nepos and Livy. Also Hoyos, 2008, 3. A surviving fragment of Sosylus describes a sea battle between Punic and Roman forces, *FGrH* 176 F1; Walbank, 1, 332-33; Hoyos, 1998, 281.

<sup>16</sup> Eg. Livy cites Coelius Antipater: 21.38.7; 21.46.10; 21.47.4; 22.31.8; 23.6.8; 26.11.10; 27.27.13. Valerius Antias: 25.39.14; 26.48.3; 38.53.8; 38.56.3; 44.13.12

Livy's remark on the number of alternative traditions over the death of Marcellus is illustrative of the considerable number of 'Hannibal stories' that were still in circulation at the time of Augustus:

ut omittam alios, Coelius triplicem gestae rei commemorationem ordine edit: unam traditam fama, alteram scriptam in laudatione fili, qui rei gestae interfuerit, tertiam quam ipse pro inquisita ac sibi conperta adfert.

Livy, 27.27.13

Not to mention others, Coelius gives three successive versions of events, one the traditional account, a second from the eulogy given by the son, who was present when it happened, and a third which he himself contributes as investigated and established by him.

Adapted from Moore, 1970, 323.

In sum, it is considered that only the tiniest fraction of the works that were available to Livy, who cites a number of his sources, is extant today.<sup>17</sup>

Two Roman authors who lived contemporaneously with Hannibal and the Second Punic War were L. Cincius Alimentus (said to have conversed with Hannibal when he was a prisoner, Livy, 21.38.3) and Fabius Pictor, both of whom wrote histories of Rome in Greek.<sup>18</sup> Doubtless there were a number of reasons behind their decisions to write in Greek but one consideration must have been the necessity to counter the publications by Hannibal and his companions in order to present the Roman point of view of the conflict with Carthage. Their texts would be read by Romans as well as others in the Greek-reading Mediterranean elite, possibly even Hellenistic kings like Antiochus or Prusias in whose courts Hannibal later appeared.<sup>19</sup> There is a different motivation at work for Cato the Elder because he wrote a history of Rome in Latin for the benefit of Romans.<sup>20</sup>

Fragments and titles of works by the poet and playwright Gnaeus Naevius, 270-201, and his popular successor, Ennius,<sup>21</sup> indicate that Romans of the late third and early

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<sup>17</sup> Mellor, 1999, 11-24, for general discussion.

<sup>18</sup> Fabius Pictor said to be the first Roman to write history in prose. He was sent to consult the oracle at Delphi during the Second Punic war. Polybius critiques his text in a discussion of the causes of the Second Punic War (*Hist.* 3.8.1-3.9.5). E.g. Fabius Pictor's account of Trasimene is preferred by Livy, 22.7.4. See also Mellor, 1999, 16-17; Forsythe, 1999, 18.

<sup>19</sup> Wiseman, 2004, 169 believes Fabius Pictor wrote in Greek for 'an international audience.'

<sup>20</sup> Gellius includes quotes from Cato's *Origines*. Pliny, *NH* notes that Cato refers to people other than himself by title (eg consul), relying on the context to indicate the person. Mellor, 1999, 19 'his [Cato's] purpose was to write history to instruct Rome's future leaders in pragmatic politics.'

<sup>21</sup> For recent scholarship on Ennius, see Goldberg, 1989, 247-261; 1995, 30; Rossi and Breed, 2006, 401; Fitzgerald and Gowers, 2007. Ennius was a prolific author with works in a variety of genres, and thought to have arrived in Rome c204. Silius Italicus poetically acknowledges Ennius by writing him into the *Punica* (*Pun.* 12.387-414).

second century were entertained with plays on a variety of historical events concerning Rome and her armies, delivered via the *fabula praetexta*.<sup>22</sup> Ennius' *Annales* also contained an account of the Second Punic War, and the title *Scipio*<sup>23</sup> for one of his texts suggests that it was culturally possible to glorify a living (or recently dead) person who gained significant achievements (Ennius, fr. 30, 32, 33).<sup>24</sup> Similarly, the earliest known Latin epic,<sup>25</sup> Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*, possibly about the First Punic War,<sup>26</sup> indicates that it was culturally acceptable to give relatively recent historical events epic treatment.

As an illustration of the importance of the Carthaginians to Roman culture, of all the enemy peoples fought by Rome, only the Carthaginians are known to feature in a series of epic texts that happen to mark cultural turning points in Roman history: Naevius' *Bellum Punicum*, Ennius' *Annales*, Virgil's *Aeneid* and Silius Italicus' *Punica*. Naevius possibly marks the start of cultural flowering, while Ennius marks the arrival of Rome as a significant Mediterranean power; Virgil is located at the start of the Augustan period and Silius Italicus lived through the change from the fall of Nero to the era of imperial Rome. Thus comparing the various treatments of their great Carthaginian enemy goes to the heart of Rome's construction of a national identity.

## Extant texts

The extant texts present Hannibal in a variety of ways to suit each author's genre, response to tradition, purpose in writing and contemporary circumstances. They are filtered again through later copyists whose work may affect the book lengths and divisions into chapters but the comparisons made in this study are based on the premise that the main themes of the original text are largely unchanged.

Cornelius Nepos' biography of Hannibal outlines salient features from Hannibal's life and is presented primarily, but positively, in terms of Hannibal's enmity with the

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<sup>22</sup> Wiseman, 1979, 1993, 1998. Contra, Flower, 1996.

<sup>23</sup> Rossi and Breed, 2006, 402 note that the genre is uncertain from the title *Scipio*.

<sup>24</sup> It is uncertain when Ennius wrote *Scipio*. Hardie, 2007, 129 notes that Petrarch, writing 1374, places Ennius on Scipio's righthandside as a laurelled poet during Scipio's triumph at Rome (Petrarch, *Africa*, 9.398-402).

<sup>25</sup> See Goldberg, 1995, for epic in the Republican period; Boyle, 1991, and 1993, for Roman epic generally; Sciarrino, 2006, 449-469 for the arrival of epic genre at Rome. Also Spencer, 2002, 12 for the genesis of Roman epic.

<sup>26</sup> Gellius, 17.21.45, refers to Naevius taking part in, and writing about, the First Punic War.

Romans.<sup>27</sup> Nepos' placement of the *Hannibal* biography under a heading of 'kings' is in accord with Polybius' presentation of Hannibal's epitaph.

Polybius presents an epitaph for each of Philopoemen, Hannibal and Scipio as an example to illustrate appropriate conduct for leaders in what Polybius believes are the three main types of constitution: Philopoemen sought glory in the democratic or mixed constitution, Scipio in an aristocratic constitution and Hannibal as a virtual monarch in the sense of his life in Spain and Italy (*Hist.* 23.12; 23.13; 23.14).<sup>28</sup>

Marincola<sup>29</sup> argues that Polybius' didactic purpose, to advise Greek-reading aspiring statesmen, was neither relevant nor of interest to the Romans of Livy's audience. This may be so, but comments by Cicero and Livy indicate that later Romans had great respect for the Greek historian while acknowledging that he had shortcomings, especially a bias in favour of Scipio Africanus.<sup>30</sup> Livy's praise of Polybius at the end of the Hannibalic decad (Livy, 30.45) is noted as a unique accolade<sup>31</sup> but it does not mean that Livy prioritises the Polybian tradition over others in the Hannibalic decad. Indeed Livy more frequently acknowledges a preference for the Polybian tradition in the fourth decad,<sup>32</sup> yet also places his strongest criticism of Polybius in that decad over Polybius' preferred date for the death of Hannibal (Livy, 39.52.1). The particular comparisons made in this thesis show that Livy frequently prioritises an alternative tradition, or applies a nuanced difference to the one preferred by Polybius.<sup>33</sup>

The stated respect for Polybius by ancient authors, coupled with, among other things, Polybius' deceptively credible style of presentation, has resulted in a tendency among twentieth century historical scholarship<sup>34</sup> to prefer the tradition espoused in the *Histories* over other texts, including Livy, while glossing over the underlying presentational style of the *Histories*.

<sup>27</sup> See Sage, 1978, 217-241 for general discussion of structure and chronology in Cornelius Nepos' text. Also McGushin, 1985 for transmission of the *Punica*; Dionisotti, 1988, 35-49. Mellor, 1999, 137-143 for a summary of Nepos and biographical writing. Geiger, 1985, argues (from silence on earlier sources) that Nepos invented biography as a genre; also review of Geiger by Wiseman, 1987, 250.

<sup>28</sup> Pomeroy, 1991, 96, n40.

<sup>29</sup> Marincola, 1997, 29.

<sup>30</sup> Cicero, *De Off.* 3.113.7; *ad Fam.* 5.12.2.8; *ad Att.* 13.30.2.2; Livy, 30.45.7; 33.10.10.

<sup>31</sup> Mellor, 1999, 67.

<sup>32</sup> Livy on Polybius: 33.10.10 an authority worthy of credence; 34.50.6 Polybius writes that; 36.19.11 on authority of Polybius; 39.52.1 as both Polybius and Rutilius write; 45.44.20 Polybius reports that... For discussions on Livy's sources: Walsh, 1963, Ch. 5; Mellor, 1999, 67-8.

<sup>33</sup> See Marincola, 1997, esp. appendices for discussion on how historians chose between variant versions.

<sup>34</sup> CAH 8, both editions prioritize Polybius over Livy as a source. For comparisons between the two texts, generally discussed in terms of Livy's use of sources: see Walbank, *Comm.*; Tränkle, 1977; Moore, 1989; Hoyos, 2001, 68-92; 2006; 2008, 5: (Livy's) 'historical and analytical skills were limited.' Briscoe, 1980, 190; Bosworth, 2003, 168. Cf. Luce, 1977, 139-229.

There is, of course, deep appreciation for Livy's literary composition but the statement that 'Livy would want to be judged on his literary style'<sup>35</sup> is only partially valid and now outdated. Livy wrote an annalistic history of Rome with a specific moralistic approach and would expect judgement on content too (Livy, 1.1). As Tacitus noted, style and honesty were both required in a historian (*Ann.* 4.34). Livy wrote in part 'to admire and to enshrine the deeds of the men who made Rome'<sup>36</sup> but also in admiration of the city of Rome itself as indicated by his title *ab urbe condita* and his first Preface (Livy, 1.1). This fundamental basis to Livy's text explains many of the differences between his presentation and those of other authors, including Polybius and Silius Italicus, as time and again Livy's presentation of events in the third decad returns the reader's focus to the physical city of Rome.

Luce's work on the architectural and symmetrical nature of Livy's text highlights the importance of structure as a 'dedication and a reflection of the architectural and decorative symmetry of the city that had become monumental in Livy's own time.'<sup>37</sup> Luce argued that Livy's narrative is a product of the choices he made from his available sources which are worked into the symmetry of his structure and these choices are made not only in terms of which historical record to follow.<sup>38</sup> This broad assessment of Livy's technique also appears in Moore's comparison of Livy and Polybius for the characterisations of certain (Roman) figures through specific Roman virtues.<sup>39</sup> The comparisons made in the fifth chapter of this thesis indicate that Livy expands considerably on the various forms and meanings of *fides* as presented by Polybius in reference to the story of Capua and other towns in Italy responding to Hannibal after Cannae. Although not directly related to Hannibal, and hence not discussed in depth in this thesis, it is a topic that could be explored in future research.

More recently, Livian scholarship has taken other factors into account, such as the importance of the physical city to the monumental and political nature of the text, and

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<sup>35</sup> Usher, 1969, 180. Briscoe, 1973, 17 describes Livy 33.45.7 as highly poetical; Livy, 33.48 as written in a free-flowing almost Herodotean style. 'Had he had time to revise the passage, one feels, the inelegancies would have been removed.'

<sup>36</sup> Marincola, 1997, 29.

<sup>37</sup> Luce, 1977, 139. For other discussions on the structure in Livy's text, see Mellor 1999, 75; Feldherr, 1998; Miles, 1995; Jaeger, 2000; Kraus and Woodman, 1997, 51-81. In historical terms see Hoyos, 2006, xxii-xxvi.

<sup>38</sup> Luce, 1977, 139; also Wiseman, 1979, 50.

<sup>39</sup> Moore, 1989, 149-151 argues that, in some cases, Livy translates Polybius directly but, in other cases, Livy changes the virtue to a different one, showing that Livy felt no obligation to praise his characters in the same terms used by his sources.

the importance to Livy of enabling his reader to visualise a scene.<sup>40</sup> There is increasing recognition that Livy constructed his work consciously and intentionally to promulgate a vision of the past that addresses his and his readers' contemporary needs and interests. While Jaeger's *Livy's Written Rome* is not specifically focussed on Hannibal and the third decad, her discussion on the importance of the physical city to Livy is developed in chapter three of this thesis in respect of Livy's development of a theme of Hannibal marching on Rome.<sup>41</sup> This theme, according to the argument of this thesis, pervades the first pentad and has the effect of repeatedly returning the reader's attention to the physical city.

If Livy has suffered in comparison to Polybius in terms of historical analysis, it is nothing compared to the scathingly dismissive treatment meted out on Silius Italicus, particularly in early to mid-twentieth century British scholarship on the quality of the *Punica*.<sup>42</sup> Indeed, the *Punica* is not listed in the *CAH* Introduction<sup>43</sup> on sources for the Punic Wars, nor is it included in the subsection of non-historical literature! Silius Italicus is often ignored by modern historians studying Hannibal or the Second Punic War because the *Punica* is considered an 'unreliable' source: 'scarcely usable as history.'<sup>44</sup> While this might be true for the actual events of the Second Punic War and, to some extent, their chronological sequence, the poem is a valuable source of evidence for first century AD attitudes to Hannibal and the Romans he faced. The same may be said of the works of other non-historiographical authors and poets who refer to Hannibal, such as Horace, Seneca, Statius, Juvenal and Martial.<sup>45</sup>

Martial's positive opinion of Silius Italicus has traditionally been given less credence than a negative interpretation of a comment by Pliny about the great care Silius took to write poetry: *scribebat carmina maiore cura quam ingenio* (Pliny, *Ep.* 3.7; Martial, *Ep.* 8.66.2).<sup>46</sup> Attitudes toward Silius began to change during the latter half of the twentieth century, and, as noted by Pomeroy and Wilson, Pliny may have been applying his own

<sup>40</sup> Miles, 1995; Jaeger, 1997; Feldherr, 1998; Moore, 2000, 487; Jaeger, 2000, 232; Rossi, 2004, 359-81.

<sup>41</sup> Jaeger, 1997; also review by Keaveney, 1999, 92.

<sup>42</sup> E.g. Moore, 1921, 105 'honest dullness,' Nicol, 1936; 1999, 293; Campbell, 1936, 57; Butler, 1909, 236: 'the longest and worst of the surviving Roman epics,' and 244: 'Silius rolls on lumbering and unperturbed.... he has all the faults of Ovid... none of the merits of Vergil.'

<sup>43</sup> Astin, 1951, 10; 1989, 11.

<sup>44</sup> Hoyos, 2008, 7.

<sup>45</sup> For a few references to Hannibal among these texts: Horace, *Odes*, 2.12.1; 3.6.34; 4.4.49; 4.8.15; *Epoche*, 16.8; Statius, *Silvae*, 4.6.78, 107; 4.3.4; 4.6.75, 85; Martial, 4.14; 9.43; 9.44; 13.73. See also Nisbet and Rudd, 2004.

<sup>46</sup> NB. Although not the focus of this thesis, Silius' text must have been valued more highly in the past to ensure its transmission. See McGushin, 1985; Reeve, 1983 for history of the transmission of the *Punica*.

apt witticism by echoing Ovid on Callimachus (*Am.* 1.15.14: *quamvis ingenio non valet, arte valet*). Given the frequency of Ovidian allusions in the *Punica*, modern scholars might, Wilson suggests, have misinterpreted Pliny's meaning.<sup>47</sup> These interpretations by Wilson and Pomeroy are representative of increasing scholarly recognition of the complexities within the *Punica*, as Silius Italicus, writing nearly three hundred years after the Second Punic War, takes the well-known and well-documented story into the mythical realm. As Goldberg wrote, 'when stories are well-known and literature abundant, the poet can put greater emphasis on the telling than on the tale.'<sup>48</sup> Scholars such as Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, Dominik, von Albrecht, McGuire, Hardie, Wilson and Augoustakis have, in various ways, contributed to countering the claim that Silius Italicus 'lacks originality'.<sup>49</sup> It is well established that Silius Italicus responds to a variety of earlier texts<sup>50</sup> including his epic predecessors.<sup>51</sup> Of these epic predecessors, Virgil's *Aeneid* and Lucan's *de Bello Civilis* have attracted most attention,<sup>52</sup> with Von Albrecht describing Silius Italicus as applying 'integral components of former epic, especially from the *Aeneid*, to illuminate crucial passages of his work, skilfully inserting them as gems, as it were, into his historical mosaic'.<sup>53</sup>

What has not been revisited in terms of recent scholarship on Silius Italicus is a possible relationship between his text and the tradition in Polybius' *Histories*. As far as the historical information is concerned, Campbell, Nicol, Von Albrecht, and McGuire conclude that Silius Italicus primarily, but not exclusively, used Livy.<sup>54</sup> Burck<sup>55</sup> too,

<sup>47</sup> Wilson, 2004, 227 n7. Pomeroy, 1989, 139 n78; 119 'Pliny is no admirer of Silius;' 2000, 151.

<sup>48</sup> Goldberg, 1995, 50.

<sup>49</sup> Nicol, 1936, 3 'Silius lacks originality;' 1999, 293. Campbell, 1936, 57 '[Silius is] little more than versification of Livy;' also Santini, 1991, 1. Contra: Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2493; Pomeroy, 2000; Matier, 1990, 7 'Silius shows great ingenuity in his adaptations of the historical material.' Wilson, 1993, 2004; Hardie, 1989, 3; Feeney, 1991, 302. Commentary: Spaltenstein, 1986. Other (positive) works on the *Punica*: Von Albrecht, 1997, 959-971; Pomeroy, 1989a; McGuire, 1997; Wilson, 2004; Dominik, 2003, 2006; Augoustakis, 2003, 2006; Marks, 2005, 110-213 argues that Silius moves from 'many' to 'one' (Scipio) to contend with Hannibal; Klaasen, 2006, 1-4 review of Marks.

<sup>50</sup> Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy, 1986; Pomeroy, 1989a, notes tributes by Silius Italicus to other authors such as Statius, Cicero and Q. Asconius Pedianus. For inter-textuality with other texts: McGuire, 1997 for Flavian epic generally; Von Albrecht, 1997, 301-309 and Wilson, 2004 for Ovid; Barnes, 1995, 287-291; Hardie, 1989, 1993 and Pomeroy, 2000 for Virgil. Also Boyle & Sullivan, 1991, 297-304; Wilson, 1993.

<sup>51</sup> Boyle, 1993, *Preface*, xi; Goldberg, 1995, esp. chapters 1, 2; Barnes, 1995; Hinds, 1998; McGuire, 1997; Wilson, 2004.

<sup>52</sup> See Ahl, Davis, and Pomeroy, 1986; Pomeroy, 1989a. Also Hardie, 1993, 64 for connections between the *Punica* with the *Aeneid* and Lucan; Von Albrecht, 1997, 963 summarises scholarship on the influences of the *Aeneid* on the structure of the *Punica*; 964 summarises scholarship on the influence of the *bellum civile* on the *Punica*.

<sup>53</sup> Von Albrecht, 1997, 963.

<sup>54</sup> Campbell, 1936, 57; Von Albrecht, 1997, 293 'Livy takes pride of place,' McGuire, 1997, 53. Nicol, 1936, concludes that Livy was the main source for the history in the poem.

<sup>55</sup> Burck, 1984; reviewed by Feeney, 1985, 390-1.

concentrates on comparing the *Punica* to Livy. Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, and Wilson express doubt over whether Silius Italicus was directly influenced by Polybius while Spaltenstein<sup>56</sup> writes that it would be a waste of time for those studying the *Punica* to consult the *Histories*.

In cumulative terms, based on the number of common elements between the *Punica* and the *Histories*, this thesis will posit a high probability that Silius Italicus not only had a copy of Polybius' *Histories* in his extensive library<sup>57</sup> but also consulted and responded to it from time to time, but not necessarily in narrowly historical terms. Given Silius Italicus' 'atypical methods of allusion'<sup>58</sup> and 'poetic invention'<sup>59</sup> as well as the availability of other Latin texts, such as Valerius Maximus and Sallust, which present similar traditions and/or express similar sentiments as Polybius, it is not possible to state unequivocally that Silius Italicus used Polybius directly. Sallust, however, dated Rome's corruption from the fall of Carthage in 146: *Carthago aemula imperi Romani ab stirpe interiit, cuncta maria terraeque patebant, saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit* (*Cat.* 10.1).<sup>60</sup> Thus, although the sentiment is shared between Sallust and Silius Italicus, their starting points are different as Silius, like Polybius, takes the Second Punic War as the point from which change could be traced (*Pun.* 10.657-8; 17.651-4).

Another example of Silius Italicus' poetic response to history is discussed in the fourth chapter of this thesis which offers a new argument for the theory of the 17-book structure of the *Punica*. It was a reflection of the 17 years of warfare and thus a poetic acknowledgement of the annalistic tradition, even though the content is not arranged annalistically. Furthermore, as will be argued, the 17-book structure may also acknowledge the original structure of the *Histories* up to the point of Scipio's triumph.

## Comparing features across texts and genres

There are a number of features in common across different genres which may govern the presentation of an event, person or theme. Such features may be thematic, structural (in literary terms), or relate to an aspect of characterisation, or the prioritising of moral issues over practical military reasoning. Comparing how authors manipulate these

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<sup>56</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2506; Wilson, 2004, 236; Spaltenstein, 1986, 10.

<sup>57</sup> Pliny, *Ep.* 3.7.8 remarks on Silius' library.

<sup>58</sup> Wilson, 2004, 227.

<sup>59</sup> Wilson, 1993, 218. Also Wiseman, 1979 more generally for 'creating' history.

features in their texts to prioritise, minimise or combine the various traditions from which they choose their material not only indicates the prevailing contemporary perceptions of Hannibal at a given point in time but also helps clarify how ancient authors dealt with the constraints and freedoms of their chosen genre. For each text and each topic there is a range of scholarly interpretation which will be discussed as it arises through the thesis, but some general points will be made here.

It will be shown that, for a number of the comparisons made in this thesis, there is room to extend and expand on McGuire's conclusion that Silius Italicus' Hannibal embodies all the characteristics of Livy's Hannibal combined with those of the other epic figures identified by Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy.<sup>61</sup> For a number of themes and events Silius Italicus successfully combines several distinct traditions found across a variety of earlier texts, not only from Livy and Polybius but also Valerius Maximus, Cornelius Nepos and others. This eclectic combining of traditions modifies to some extent Pomeroy's opinion that deviations from Livy by Silius Italicus are signs of poetic independence.<sup>62</sup>

In terms of structure, given the symmetrical arrangement<sup>63</sup> of many ancient texts, the identification of the structural centrepiece in a text is important to understanding its overall theme. The city of Rome's collective response to Hannibal's departure from the environs of the city in 211 is the centrepiece of Livy's third decad whereas the Roman defeat at Cannae forms the centrepiece of the *Punica*. This critical difference in emphasis should warn against reading the *Punica* as an 'epicised' version of Livy.<sup>64</sup>

The fragmentary state of the *Histories* makes identification of its centrepiece less certain, not only for the entire text but also for the section focussed on the Second Punic War. Nonetheless the battle at Cannae is notably treated by Polybius as a pivotal event because it is immediately followed by substantial break of three books in the Second Punic War narrative (as Polybius sought to explain how the Romans' socio-political system not only coped with the defeat but enabled them to continue fighting and eventually win the war).

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<sup>60</sup> See Kraus and Woodman, 1997, 24-50 for discussion on structure and themes in Sallust. Also Sallust, *Fr.* 1.9: 'the period between the Punic Wars was of internal concord and perfect morality.' Transl. McGushin, 1992, 77.

<sup>61</sup> McGuire, 1997; Ahl, 1986, 2511-19.

<sup>62</sup> Pomeroy, 1989a, 125; 40 n39. Cf. Nicol, 1936, and Nesselrath, 1986, 203-230 for Silius' use of Livy.

<sup>63</sup> Ellis, 1991, 345, for structure in Thucydides, n6 for summary of scholarship on ring structure and parallelism in the historiographical tradition; 346-7 for discussion of ring structure in Greek epic poetry (Homer, Hesiod).

<sup>64</sup> Campbell, 1936, 57; Santini, 1991, 1.

Speeches are important signifiers in a text for many reasons quite apart from their content. They are an integral part of Greek and Roman historiographical and epic traditions and serve a variety of purposes. The location of a speech within its physical and literary context, whether it is in direct or reported format, and in what sequence it is placed against speeches by other characters, all reflect the author's priorities. The earliest known discussion on the subject of speeches is in Thucydides' first Book where Thucydides announced his decision to include speeches in his text insofar as he could recall them, or failing that, to provide a speech that best fitted the occasion (*Thucydides*, 1.22).

In terms of structural detail there are interesting similarities and differences between the use of speeches by Polybius, Livy, and Silius Italicus. All three texts present Hannibal giving a speech at, or near, the top of an Alpine pass, for example, but they differ from one another in content and in details of context, the reasons for which are discussed in the second chapter. Similarly, there are nuanced differences between their respective presentations of speeches shortly before the battle at Cannae, discussed in the fourth chapter, and prior to Zama, discussed in the sixth chapter. Some of these differences may be considered minor, such as a reversal of ordering, but, in the context of the hierarchical nature of ancient Roman society and ancient rhetorical theory, these sequences are important and revealing about the author's priorities, the contemporary reception of the text, and the representation of Hannibal.

Whilst the extant speeches under discussion might just conceivably be faithful transcriptions<sup>65</sup> of an original oration, it is more likely that they are either the product of an author editing a predecessor's version, or entirely composed by the author to suit a given occasion and fulfil a particular characterisation. The frequency of speeches being 'paired' either by content, or position, or a combination of both, in the texts argues against the content being a faithful transcription of an original speech. This interpretation is further supported by the fact that many of the speeches contain readily identifiable inter- and intra- textual connections; these connections are particularly noticeable for speeches within and between Livy and Silius Italicus' *Punica*, but it will be shown that they also apply to certain speeches in Polybius. As Walbank comments 'the two harangues by Hannibal and Scipio prior to the Ticinus River (*Hist.* 3.63-4) are

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<sup>65</sup> Luce, 1997, 129 notes Polybius' 'concern with the truth' and that speeches should reflect what was said at the time (*Hist.* 2.56 cf. 29.12; 36.1).

among the greatest stumbling blocks to the theory that Polybius was an honest man.<sup>66</sup> The historicity of the content in the speeches presented by Polybius is a controversial, but unresolvable, topic.<sup>67</sup>

Authors may express their own views directly in the body of their text, or they may be more obliquely expressed, by such means as critiquing a predecessor, or conveyed through a character's speech, especially if the point might be considered controversial.<sup>68</sup> Wiseman argues that Sallust was pointedly neutral as a historian, but the reader can hear the *popularis* case through the speeches of his characters.<sup>69</sup> In another example closer to the theme of this thesis, Davidson noted that Polybius frequently presents the sense of danger through the perceptions of his figures, even if the validity is subsequently denied later in the narrative.<sup>70</sup> This technique impacts on Polybius' presentation of Hannibal's appearance outside the city of Rome in 211 because he presents people in Rome believing that Hannibal could not have reached their city in 211 unless he had destroyed the Roman army at Capua; they conclude that they will have to defend the city for themselves (*Hist.* 9.6.2). Livy, on the other hand, presents those in Rome as fully aware of the situation at Capua, and responding accordingly. Although the eventual outcome of Hannibal's departure is ultimately the same for both texts, the effect of the opposite beliefs at Rome makes the two presentations quite different.

Throughout the thesis it will be shown that Livy's representations of Hannibal's speeches and harangues contain more subtleties than would justify Mellor's judgement that they are 'wholly invented as a formulaic diatribe against the enemy.'<sup>71</sup> Speeches assigned to an enemy figure may be used to present what might be considered a controversial point to the contemporary audience, such as Livy's representation of Mago's report on Hannibal's successes to the Carthaginian senate, discussed in the

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<sup>66</sup> Walbank, 1965, 12 believes Polybius 'developed' earlier written versions of the speeches (which does not, of course, preclude the earlier author taking a Thucydidean approach to *his* text).

<sup>67</sup> Walbank, 1965, 11-13; Wooten, 1974, 235-251 discusses speeches in Polybius; also Sacks, 1981, 79-95 for review and discussion of scholarship on speeches in Polybius. Sacks, 1981, 88: Polybius exercised his right as a historian to collect as many arguments as possible that were used on a given occasion and then chose what to include in each one. Finley, 1972, 27: Polybius criticises his predecessors who invented speeches yet could not have had accurate reports for most, if any, of the 37 extant speeches in the *Histories*. Marincola, 2000, 131: Scipio's words are appropriate for someone over-confident and argues there is no reason to think that Polybius did not believe them to be historical.

<sup>68</sup> See Miller, 1975, 46 and 51-53 for a useful structural comparison between Polybius and Livy on their treatments of speeches by both Scipio and Hannibal, although Miller's tendency is toward 'how Livy used Polybius.'

<sup>69</sup> Wiseman, 2004, 196.

<sup>70</sup> Davidson, 1991, 12.

<sup>71</sup> Mellor, 1999, 189.

fourth chapter. Mago describes Hannibal's takeover of Capua in terms of Capuan surrender, not a change of allegiance.<sup>72</sup>

A number of Hannibal's reputed achievements are disputed, and for a given tradition in one text, another will present an alternative tradition. This is particularly evident between Livy and Polybius for some of the features discussed in this thesis. In respect of the tradition of Hannibal's record of victories in Italy it will be shown that a surprising choice has been made by the 'rational' historian, Polybius. As will be discussed further in chapter six, Polybius describes Hannibal as undefeated throughout the time he was in Italy; it is a 'fact' which Polybius<sup>73</sup> sustains through elision of claimed defeats of Hannibal in Italy and criticism of accounts that present Hannibal being defeated before Zama. Polybius' elision is criticised by Plutarch, particularly in respect of Marcellus, and implicitly opposed by Livy whose text includes two carefully presented defeats of Hannibal in Italy by Marcellus, as well as references to claims by others for defeating Hannibal. It is possible, from Livy's detailed descriptions of Marcellus' battles, that some of his readers might decide that Marcellus' victories do not 'count' in comparison to Cannae or Zama. Interestingly, Silius Italicus includes the first defeat of Hannibal by Marcellus given in Livy's text, but not the second, and furthermore, his description of first battle follows a different tradition to Livy. Consequently Silius Italicus offers different reasons to his audience as to why Marcellus' 'win' may not 'count' as a defeat in Italy for Hannibal. Indeed, it seems that Silius Italicus himself did not 'count' it in the poetic reckoning because the reason that Venus rescues Hannibal from drowning in the Sicilian Sea in *Punica* 17 is to prevent the Carthaginians glorifying Hannibal as an undefeated hero (*Pun.* 17.286).<sup>74</sup> Although Silius Italicus' allusion to the Polybian tradition seems unequivocal it may, of course, have come from a Scipio or Hannibal biography or similar text, now lost.

Divine or supernatural influence on the affairs of humans takes various forms, in large part depending on the genre of the text. It tends to be excluded in the

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<sup>72</sup> Cf. Will, 1983, 173-5 that it is exaggeration by Mago.

<sup>73</sup> Polybius' decision to subscribe to the 'myth' of Hannibal being undefeated in Italy brings to mind three options that Marincola referred to in respect of myths from the earliest times. 'For non-contemporary history there was myth, and that post-Thucydides historiography had three options, to avoid myths completely, to rationalise or de-mythologise them, or to include them and leave the credibility to the reader (which may require some justification).' Marincola, 1997, 189.

<sup>74</sup> There has been much discussion over whether or not Hannibal is the 'hero' or 'anti-hero' of the *Punica*. Duff, 1996, xi: 'Hannibal is the true hero;' Bassett, 1966, 265 argues for Scipio. Cf. Campbell, 1970, 989: 'Scipio fails... Hannibal is nearer the part;' Ahl, Davis & Pomeroy, 1986, 2519 'everyone Rome could muster against one enemy general,' also n29; Pomeroy, 2000, 160 argues for Aeneas; Dominik, 2003, 472 Hannibal. See Feeney, 1986, 140 and Marks, 2005, 61-65 for 'polyheroic' reading of 'Romans' generally.

historiographical tradition but may appear through references to gods in dreams or visions, or through references to local folklore, religious customs, lists of omens or references to oracles and prophecies. An author may also be read as implying divine intervention through descriptions of abnormal or extraordinary natural events which thwart or assist human affairs. There are several important events related to Hannibal which are preceded by treatments of this type. In particular it will be argued in the fourth chapter that the records of omens and portents in certain texts around Cannae are demonstrably ahistorical because they function mainly to create inter-textual and/or other literary connections (see Appendix 1). In addition, the involvement of the divine, either through omens or natural elements, in presentations of both Cannae and the defence of Rome against Hannibal in 211, will be shown to increase over time, even within the historiographic tradition.

The surviving record indicates traces of a tradition that associated Hannibal with the heroic figure of Hercules. It is a tradition for which, as argued in the second chapter, there appears to be corresponding numismatic evidence indicating that the association may be derived from Hannibal himself, and has been retained and adapted by Roman authors to jeer at Hannibal or to present him as deluded. That chapter explores the potential, as well as the risks, that the Hercules figure had to offer Hannibal, particularly in the early stages of the war. The presentations in the texts are, of course, affected by who won, and today only the *Punica* carries a trace of the reaction at Carthage on news of Hannibal's victory at Cannae: *aequatur rector divis* (*Pun.* 12.494).

On a number of occasions Hannibal's decision-making, such as whether or not he should march on Rome, discussed in the third chapter, is attributed to a dream or to his emotional state rather than to practical or military factors, and this, too, becomes a feature of representation that may be compared across different genres as authors attribute different emotions to their Hannibal figure for the same situation. Most explanations for how Rome is 'saved' in 211 are vague, and comparison suggests that authors imply varying degrees of divine intervention which increases over time. No-one offers a wholly coherent picture for Hannibal's march on Rome in 211, and comparing such features as whether or not it is a well-kept 'secret' will be shown to directly relate to an author's depiction of the Hannibal figure.

The fifth chapter of this thesis covers two invasions of Campania.<sup>75</sup> There are significant differences in detail between the presentations of Hannibal's spectacular night-time escape past Fabius' sentries using cattle with flaming firebrands tied to their horns as a diversionary tactic. Given its likely ahistorical location in Nepos' *Hannibal* biography after the fall of Capua, it is arguably a good example of a highly dramatic 'Hannibal story' that became separated from its original historical context, possibly early in its life. The episode is shown to be demonstrably adaptable for various depictions of both Hannibal and Fabius.

Following Hannibal's victory at Cannae, he returned to Campania. This time he succeeded in taking control of Capua without a fight or having to besiege the town. The texts give very little military information about the situation at Capua but focus instead on Capuan immorality due to their great wealth.<sup>76</sup> The depiction of the Capuans as morally degraded is based on a widely held concept in the ancient world that a luxurious and extravagant lifestyle caused moral and physical weakness in men.<sup>77</sup> There is an opportunity to present Hannibal and his army succumbing to the luxurious lifestyle with

<sup>75</sup> Polybius and Pliny describe Campania as encompassing both the *ager Campanus* to the south and the *ager Falernus* to the north of Capua (*Hist.* 3.91; *NH*, 3.60). For a discussion of the geography and history of the region: Frederiksen, 1984, esp. Ch.8; also Walbank, I, 1957, 424-9. In historical terms, it was important to Hannibal to gain control of Campania: the area was not too far from Rome to establish a base for possible attack; control of Campania would physically separate Rome from her allies further south; the land was fertile for feeding men and animals, and there were some good harbours for receiving additional supplies (*Hist.* 3.70; Pliny, *NH*, 17.25, 18.111, 191; Cicero, *de leg. agr.* 2.76; Virgil, *Georg.* 2.217-25). The traditions vary over Hannibal's success or otherwise in establishing a supply line through the Campanian coast. Silius Italicus depicts Hannibal meeting Carthaginian ships at Caieta (*Pun.* 7.410) whereas Plutarch explicitly favours the opposite tradition claiming that the Romans, led by Fabius, prevented Hannibal reaching the Campanian coast and making contact with the Carthaginians (*Fabius Maximus*, 6). Plutarch's emphatic denial suggests that the alternative tradition, less favourable to Fabius, was in circulation in ancient times, and, although no longer extant outside the *Punica* today, it may not be a poetic invention. Cf. Casali, 2006, 3: 'Silius makes "Ovidian moves" with scarcely known "facts" ... he invents them.' Also Wilson, 2004, 225-249.

<sup>76</sup> Capuan wealth: Plutarch, *Fab. Max.*, 17.3; Cicero, *de leg. Agr.* 2.86-7; Florus, 1.34; Polybius, *Hist.* 3.91.2; 7.1.2; Livy, 23.2.1. Lancel, 1998, 113 argues that the archaeological find of the *seplasia*, the perfume market, in ancient Capua supports the literary tradition for their wealth and luxury. For another indicator of wealth, there was a well-established mint at Capua. Crawford, 2001, 30 and Mattingly, 1960, 5 argue that the numismatic change in Capuan coinage in the form of an overstrike of an Oscan legend on Roman coins represents their change of allegiance from Rome to Hannibal on the basis that examples have been found in hoards that held mixes of coins from Carthage, Capua, Calatia and Atella; the Capuan coins have been dated to the period of Hannibal's occupation, 216-211. Also Grueber, 1970, 117-139 for a study of Romano-Campanian coins for the period 335-211; he dates electrum coins from the Capuan mint to 216-211 arguing that electrum is associated with Carthage but not Roman mints. Also Lancel, 1998, 122-3 believes that changes in Roman coinage, dated 215-211, reflects the pressure on Rome exerted by Hannibal.

<sup>77</sup> See Cato the Elder, Sallust, Cicero (*Leg. Agr.* 2.95); Val. Max., 2.4.6; Strabo (5.4.3); Seneca (*Ep.* 51.5; 86.6); Florus (1.22.19-22). Reflected in satire: Lucian's *Timon the Misanthrope*. The association of money and pleasure with moral ruin were not as Edwards, 1993, 176, n5 wrote: 'a preoccupation especially but not exclusively of the literature of Augustan Rome' but rather a matter of enduring debate at Rome from at least the end of the Second Punic War until well into the second century AD.

accompanying scenes of titillation, and, indeed, it will be shown that the differences between the texts tend to lie in which moral(s) or aspects of a moral an author chose to emphasise as missing or perverted among the Capuans, as well as Hannibal.

A famously emblematic representation of Hannibal is as an ‘eternal enemy’ of Rome (Appian, *Hann.* 1). Both Appian and Polybius introduce Hannibal to their texts in this guise, whereas it becomes a role that Hannibal gradually grows into across two decades in Livy, or assigned to him at Zama in Silius Italicus and Cornelius Nepos. The theme of Hannibal as a sworn enemy of Rome is discussed in the final chapter of this thesis. Following Zama, Hannibal is presented in a variety of guises, including, for some, that of a saviour of Carthage. Livy’s depiction of Hannibal as a saviour of Carthage is adapted to present his audience with another example of Punic trickery. Cornelius Nepos and Silius Italicus opt for an alternative tradition, one in which Hannibal does not accept the defeat as final but swears to continue warfare, an ‘eternal enemy’ openly keeping to his oath. An eternal enemy may be considered as a representative of dark forces, for every positive there must be a negative in order to achieve balance. The glory of Rome requires a powerful dark force, and this becomes Hannibal.

Over time Hannibal becomes the example by which other enemies are measured; his name is used far more frequently than Antiochus, or Pyrrhus. For Cicero and Cornelius Nepos, surrounded by the civil wars of the late republic, Hannibal represented an ‘ideal’ or archetypal foreign enemy that Romans of old used to fight, fear and hold in respect. Cicero has no respect for Antonius, and, as always, applies his analogies with great care to make pointed judgements about his opponent. In the *Philippics* he upholds Hannibal as a paradigm for a worthy enemy against whom Antonius cannot measure.<sup>78</sup>

Cicero seems to have steered clear of publicly comparing Caesar and Hannibal but in the later imperial period others were less circumspect. Liebeschuetz argued for similarities between Lucan’s Caesar and Hannibal.<sup>79</sup> McGuire identifies passages in the *Punica* that seem to characterise Hannibal and allude to Caesar.<sup>80</sup> As noted above, Silius Italicus used omens to connect Cannae with the historical battle at Pharsalus, and in particular to connect the Roman army at Cannae with the Pompeians at Pharsalus. By

<sup>78</sup> Billot, 2005a: Cicero compares Antonius poorly against Hannibal on 9 occasions in *Philippics* I, V, VI, XIII and XIV, but he does not see Antonius as ‘another’ Hannibal as in Lancel, 1998, 219.

<sup>79</sup> Liebeschuetz, 1989, 168.

<sup>80</sup> McGuire, 1997, 84, esp. n47. Cf. Von Albrecht, 1966; Vessey, 1973; Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2511 who note that the differences between Silius’ Hannibal and Caesar are almost as compelling as the similarities.

implication, therefore, Silius Italicus parallels Hannibal and Caesar, but it is not a direct analogy.

*Metus Punicus* was, no doubt, real enough at the time when Rome was facing an enemy whose victories came at the price of so many of her men. Once Carthage was defeated of course, *metus Punicus* diminished, but its use as a political weapon remained invaluable. Its expression through Cato's oft-repeated phrase *delenda est Carthago* eventually led to the destruction of Carthage itself in 146. Fear and hatred of Hannibal reappears in the Augustan period, in the poetry of Horace: *parentibusque abominatus Hannibal* (Horace, *Epoche*, 16.8). Readers are reminded that Hannibal was the most feared of all Rome's enemies.<sup>81</sup> Perhaps Horace felt it necessary to remind contemporary readers that at one time Rome had external enemies very close to home.

Hannibal's reputation remained secure as Plutarch, too, describes him as one of Rome's most formidable enemies, and until Marcellus defeated Hannibal, the Romans did not dare face Hannibal in the field (Plutarch, *Comparison of Marcellus and Pelopidas*, 1.4; 2.2). The image of Hannibal as 'worthy enemy' also appears in satire when Juvenal bewails the disappearance of enemies like Hannibal who kept the republican Romans honest in comparison to the Romans of his own day (Juvenal, *Sat.*, 6.290). There are other representations of Hannibal which indicate that various light-hearted traditions were in circulation. The ghost of Hannibal (almost) loses an argument over status firstly with the ghost of Alexander and then against the ghost of Scipio Africanus in Lucian's representation of a 'Judgement of Hannibal' scene in *Dialogues of the Dead* (71.14).<sup>82</sup> Silius Italicus includes amusing representations of Hannibal not found elsewhere: Hannibal leaves or is removed from every field of battle at critical moments on one pretext or another in the *Punica*, such as tending his sick brother at Trasimene or being lured from the field by Juno at both Cannae and Zama.

On another topic which is relevant to this thesis, the sequence in which named figures first appear in a text seems to signal the priorities of the author; Hannibal, for example, and the Roman people are the first named figures in Livy's third decad, quoted

<sup>81</sup> Mankin, 1995, 248 and Watson, 2003, 494 comment on the various interpretations of this phrase, whether *parentibus* refers to the parents of the soldiers killed by Hannibal (as in Gow, 1896, 387), or whether it carries a more general sense of the ancestors of Horace's Roman audience (preferred by Watson). The overall sense of Hannibal as Rome's greatest enemy remains the same, hence Watson's preference for the second interpretation.

<sup>82</sup> Levy, 1976, 227 notes similar comparisons made elsewhere: Appian, *Syr.* 10; Plutarch, *Flamin.*, 21; Livy, 35.14.

at the opening of this Introduction. Diana Spencer noted that ‘names matter’<sup>83</sup> and names mattered very much indeed in the upper echelons of the ancient Roman world. Appendix 2 briefly discusses the use of names in each of Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus as an important general feature which impacts on Hannibal and Romans alike.

Last, but not least, the texts are given titles. Polybius comments on the titles used by other authors claiming that ‘most historians’ describe the Second Punic War as the ‘Hannibalic War’ thereby locating the conflict in the personality of Hannibal (*Hist.* 1.3). On the face of it, Polybius tries to distance himself from these predecessors with his own, more neutral, title, but Hannibal is the dominant figure in his text and is said to be the cause of everything that happened between the two sides (*Hist.* 9.22.1).<sup>84</sup> Both forms are used for the subtitles in Appian’s *Roman History*, which is divided geographically in the sense that book 7, titled the *Hannibalic War*, covers Hannibal’s campaign in Italy and book 8, *The Punic Wars*, covers the actions in Africa from the earliest period. Titles along the lines of ‘Punic Wars’ or *Punica* may have conveyed more negative connotations to a Roman audience than works with more generalised titles if Franko,<sup>85</sup> who argues for the use of *poenus* as a derogatory name for the Carthaginians in early Latin literature, is right. If this is the case, then the word *punica* may be taken as a pointed archaism when employed by Silius Italicus for the title of his epic.

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<sup>83</sup> Spencer, 2002, 4.

<sup>84</sup> Walbank, 1957, 3.2, 42 suggests a qualification to Polybius’ opening statement as ‘most except Roman historians, who generally refer to the war as the Second Punic War.’ Also Scott-Kilvert, 1979, 43, n3.

<sup>85</sup> Franko, 1994, 154.

# Chapter 1: Hannibal's Heritage

Introductions of Hannibal usually include recollections of the past through references to his father, Hamilcar Barca. While it is not uncommon in ancient texts to introduce a figure through reference to the father, Hamilcar Barca's name carried certain connotations for the Roman audience: He held the Carthaginian stronghold at Mt Eryx but was required to surrender and negotiate terms to end the First Punic War with the Roman consul, Lutatius. Hamilcar was further humiliated when the terms he negotiated were rejected and made harsher by the Roman Senate. Not surprisingly perhaps, there are related traditions that Hamilcar Barca perceived himself to be personally undefeated in the First Punic War (*Hist.* 1.66.1); he believed that the Carthaginians surrendered Sicily too easily and that the Roman acquisition of Sardinia was dishonest (Cornelius Nepos, *Hamilcar*, 2; Livy, 21.1.5). Therefore introducing Hannibal as the son of Hamilcar Barca carries implications that Hannibal probably inherits his father's resentments and intends to restore family and Carthaginian honour.

The implication is made explicit through an anecdote that Hannibal swore an oath of enmity against Rome in his childhood, discussed in the first section of this chapter. The accounts all say that the oath was sworn under the guidance of Hamilcar Barca, thus emphasising his role as a father (not as a priest). It is argued here that the most significant variation between the texts is the context in which the anecdote is placed; the context is a good example of the ambiguity in Polybius' representation of Hannibal and whether or not Polybius intended to present Hannibal as a positive example for the Roman concept of *fides*.

References to perceived wrongs from the past may be interpreted as providing background information and motivating factors for Hannibal. On the other hand, avenging an insult is also the basis of the Trojan War epic cycle, and authors risk presenting Hannibal in a heroic mould if they over-emphasise his intention to avenge Hamilcar's humiliation and the outcome of the First Punic War. Yet, as discussed in the second section of this chapter, there is a distinct patterning of references to the First Punic War and its outcome in texts which otherwise focus on Hannibal. These

references are found within speeches from the historiographical tradition where they outnumber references to contemporary events such as the siege of Saguntum.<sup>86</sup>

Genre allows Silius Italicus to take a very different approach and the motivating factor for Juno to select Hannibal as her tool to block Rome's progress to world domination<sup>87</sup> in *Punica 1* is taken back into the mythical past. Recollections of the First Punic War are placed in certain speeches in the *Punica* and these are shown to allude in various ways to the different tradition in each of Polybius and Livy. In addition there are two recollections of the First Punic War in *Punica 6* which take a substantially different form to those elsewhere, and the second of these serves a specific motivational purpose for Hannibal.

## ***Fides and Hannibal's childhood oath***

One of the great virtues in Roman culture was *fides* (trust, faith, credence, belief); it was assessed in both personal and public terms from an early date, and a temple to *fides publica* was founded on the Capitol in 257.<sup>88</sup> The summary that prefaces Aulus Gellius' *Attic Nights*, 6.18.1-9 stresses the sanctity of an oath in Roman culture, a creed which is repeated in the opening sentence for the first chapter: *iustiurandum apud Romanos inviolate sancteque habitum servatum est* - an oath was regarded and kept by the Romans as something inviolable and sacred (Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights*, 6.18.1). The concept of personal *fides* presents a problem for portrayals of Hannibal in relation to the well-known anecdote about the 9-year old Hannibal swearing an oath of enmity to the Romans at an altar in Carthage under the guidance of his father, Hamilcar Barca, before accompanying Hamilcar to Spain. Hannibal was true to his oath throughout his life and therefore in danger of being portrayed as living up to a Roman ideal; Silius Italicus alludes to this point when Hannibal's personal *fides* and *pietas* are acknowledged by Hamilcar's shade to Scipio (*Pun.* 13.749).

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<sup>86</sup> The siege of Saguntum appears, of course, as a subject within the narratives and Polybius concludes his discussion of causes of the war with the remark that if the siege of Saguntum was the cause, then Carthage was to blame (*Hist.* 3.30). Silius Italicus places great emphasis on the siege of Saguntum precipitating the war by devoting much of *Punica 1* and *Punica 2* to its coverage, a high proportion of text relative to the overall length of the *Punica*. See Dominik, 2003 for an interpretation of the *Punica* comparing Saguntum with Rome and to read *Punica 1* and *2* as introductory, represented as an epic within an epic.

<sup>87</sup> Dominik, 2003, 473.

<sup>88</sup> Cicero, *De natura deorum*, 2.61. Wiseman, 2004, 153. Fears, 1981, 863 and n152; also 827-948 for cults to virtues generally; 843, n 67 for summary of scholarship on *fides* as a concept. Pomeroy, 1989a, 123, n28 cites numismatic evidence for importance of *fides* in Flavian Rome.

In contrast to *fides*, apart from *perfidia* which is also used in relation to Hannibal,<sup>89</sup> the Romans had a saying, *Punica fides*, which roughly relates to someone being untrustworthy, a liar.<sup>90</sup> Livy famously concludes his otherwise positive introductory portrait of Hannibal with the modification that Hannibal was someone whose untrustworthiness went beyond even that of Carthaginians generally:

Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant: inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam Punica, nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus, nullum ius iurandum, nulla religio.

Livy, 21.4.9.<sup>91</sup>

These admirable qualities of the man were equalled by his monstrous vices: his cruelty was inhuman, his perfidy worse than Punic; he had no regard for truth, and none for sanctity, no fear of the gods, no reverence for an oath, no religious scruple.

Foster, 1949, 11.

Hannibal's *Punica fides* or duplicity is later illustrated with what might be considered as necessary 'underhand' tactics for warfare: he is a master of pretended surrenders and ambush; he is depicted making treaties and promises to townspeople in Italy that he does not intend to keep; he is said to wear disguises. Roman distaste for such deceits may be read into the parody of these characteristics for slave figures in Plautine comedy whose roles require them to behave as generals.<sup>92</sup>

Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus all place the anecdote about Hannibal's childhood oath early in their texts as part of their introductory material but they differ on context which impacts on their overall representation of Hannibal. The earliest extant reference to the anecdote is in Polybius' *Histories*, 3.11.1-9 and Polybius attributes it to what, at first sight, is an impeccable source: Hannibal himself. This stated source is, like much of Polybius' text, deceptively plausible, in part because the anecdote belongs to Hannibal's childhood and is therefore unlikely to have been documented or noted as a special event by the other participants.

<sup>89</sup> E.g. Ennius, *fr.*, 272/3; Horace, *Odes* 4.4.49; 3.5.33-4; Martial, *Ep.*, 4.14.3-4 (dedicated to Silius); Statius, *Sil.*, 4.6.77-8 refers to Hannibal's oath-breaking sword.

<sup>90</sup> Sallust, *Jug.*, 108.3; Livy, 21.4.9; 22.6.12; 42.47.7; Cicero *off.*, 1.38; *leg. agr.*, 2.95; Virgil, *Aen.*, 1.661. Strabo, *Geog.*, 5.3.26. Franko, 1994, 154 observes that the proverb was not *fides Carthaginiensis* and argues that *poenus* and/or *punic* carried negative connotations whereas *Carthaginiensis* was more neutral. '*Punica*' has more punch, but that may be the modern ear.

<sup>91</sup> Starkes, 1999, 258 argues Livy invented the description because *Punica fides* was a common phrase.

<sup>92</sup> Plautus, *Poenulus*, Prologue, 114-5, alludes to this Carthaginian trait as the main character dissimulates his knowledge of languages. Leigh, 2004a, 52-6 notes the fragility of constructing Plautus' comic characters against Hannibal. Almost any 'generic' Roman, Greek or Carthaginian aristocratic general can be read into Plautus' character parodies which are pointedly non-specific.

Polybius states that Hamilcar Barca asked those around to stand back a little (*Hist.* 3.11.6), while he led his son to the altar, thus a mention of witnesses adds to the credibility of the story, but they are nameless and ultimately can only be described as a detail that adds to the scene but not the veracity of the narrative. Nevertheless Walbank believes there was no particular reason to doubt the authenticity of the story ‘as it goes back to Hannibal’s own information to Antiochus.’ An unknown factor, as Walbank observes, is how Polybius learned of the story; Walbank summarises the scholarship that speculated on Polybius’ sources, adding a suggestion that Polybius may have learned of the story from Aetolian exiles in Italy, concluding that the story had ‘widespread circulation since it is well established in the annalistic tradition’ for which, unfortunately, he gives the two references in Livy (Livy, 21.1.4; 33.19.2).<sup>93</sup>

The scholarly focus on Polybian source material does not take into account how Polybius adapts the story to his text and the consequent effect on his representation of Hannibal. The story is placed much later in the text than Hamilcar Barca’s departure for Spain in 221 where Polybius notes only that Hamilcar Barca was accompanied by his 9-year old son, Hannibal (*Hist.* 2.1.5). At this point Polybius maintains the audience focus on Hamilcar and the anecdote about the youthful Hannibal swearing enmity to Rome is delayed until *Histories* 3 where it follows Hannibal’s rise to power in Spain, forming part of the introduction of Hannibal to the narrative (*Hist.* 3.11.3-8).

The context in which Polybius places the story is relevant to the Roman concept of *fides*. It is in the form of an anachronistic illustration given by the ‘older man’ Hannibal to King Antiochus in an effort to convince the king of Hannibal’s continuing loyalty and long-standing hatred of Rome. Therefore Polybius introduces Hannibal as a man who lived by the oath he swore as a child and this underlying theme is supported by the notion of a veteran general like Hannibal referring to such a childhood memory when he had the examples of Cannae, Trasimene, and 17-years of continuous warfare to illustrate his antipathy to Rome. Polybius glosses over these and any detail of Hannibal’s other successes against the Romans with the comment that Hannibal had tried to defend himself to no avail with the king (*Hist.* 3.11.4-5). If Polybius’ elision of these events was because he had not yet related the stories of Cannae, Trasimene etc., and did not wish to pre-empt his own narrative, he need not have used the context of the ‘older man’

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<sup>93</sup> Walbank, 1957, I, 314: cites Meltzer, 1879-96: ‘oral tradition within the Scipio family.’ Cf. De Sanctis, 1907, 23; Leuze, 1923, 247-68: Polybius learned of it through Silenus or Sosylus.

Hannibal pleading a case to King Antiochus. The audience is forced to conclude that Polybius introduces Hannibal as someone who kept *fides* to his oath.

Moore<sup>94</sup> argues that, apart from *virtus*, no Roman virtue plays as important a role as *fides* in Livy's text; primarily Moore's focus is on *fides publica* as an aspect of an alliance between Rome and other townships or city-states, such as Saguntum suffering for her *fides* to Rome (Livy, 28.39.1). However, Livy also presents *fides* as a very important personal quality and his annalistic format justifies him using the anecdote about Hannibal's oath twice in his text but with important differences in context that may be interpreted as bearing on its relation to *fides*.

At the start of the third decad Livy relates a rumour (*fama*) that the 9-year old Hannibal swore an oath at an altar under the guidance of his father to be an enemy of Rome (Livy, 21.1.4-5). The word *fama* allows for a measure of doubt as to its veracity, and, because it is not placed in the context of an older Hannibal justifying himself to an eastern King it carries no underlying representation of Hannibal maintaining *fides* to his oath. Instead, there is more emphasis on continuing a family tradition, and in addition, Livy's representation of the child Hannibal has a nuanced difference to the child in Polybius:

Fama est etiam Hannibalem annorum ferme novem pueriliter blandientem patri Hamilcari ut duceretur in Hispaniam cum perfecto Africo bello exercitum eo traiecturus sacrificaret, altaribus admotum tactis sacris iure iurando adactum se cum primum posset hostem fore populo Romano.

Livy, 21.1.4

It is said moreover that when Hannibal, then about 9 years old, was childishly teasing his father Hamilcar to take him with him into Spain, his father, who had finished the African war and was sacrificing, before crossing with his army, led the boy up to the altar and made him touch the offerings and bind himself with an oath that so soon as he should be able he would be the declared enemy of the Roman people.

Foster, 1949, 5.

The child actively urges his father to take him to Spain whereas Polybius presents the child responding to an invitation, albeit with enthusiasm.<sup>95</sup>

At Hannibal's next appearance in the third decad, he is at war and the declared enemy of Rome. Livy avoids the problem of illustrating Hannibal's *fides* to his oath

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<sup>94</sup> Moore, 1989, 35-7.

<sup>95</sup> Hoyos, 2008, 25 also notes this subtle difference.

within the third decad by concluding with Hannibal's defeat at Zama. The division between decads which separates the Second Punic War from Hannibal's later life fighting Romans from within the courts of eastern kings also separates the realisation that Hannibal maintains *fides* to his oath from the initial introduction.

Livy's second insertion of the anecdote, in the fourth decad, is in a similar context to the one used by Polybius, as part of a conversation between Hannibal and Antiochus (Livy, 35.19.2). Livy's adaptation is different; it is not to hint at *fides*, but to emphasise Hannibal's role as a warmonger as he successfully incites Antiochus to warfare against the Romans. The depiction is strengthened by Hannibal's closing statement that if Antiochus failed to meet expectations, Hannibal would seek arms elsewhere. Once Antiochus was defeated, Hannibal evaded capture and later reappeared fighting for King Prusias of Bithynia against Rome.

There is another version of the oath story related by the Tiberian writer, Valerius Maximus, which explicitly upholds Hannibal as an external example to illustrate the Roman virtue of *fides* in its personal sense. Thus Hannibal is explicitly linked to the internal Roman examples who show *fiducia sui*, including Cato and Scipio (Val. Max., 3.7. ext. 6). The anecdote is placed in the familiar context of Hannibal in conversation with a king (Prusias of Bithynia) but the difference from the historiographical texts, and possibly due to genre, is that the arguments are fuller, making the overall sense of the conversation more plausible. Hannibal argues that when it came to the stratagems of warfare and military leadership against the Romans, Prusias needed a man with Hannibal's experience. Hannibal supports his claim with references to his successful Alpine crossing, his victories at Lake Trasimene and Cannae, as well as taking Capua. This mode of presentation highlights Hannibal's successes as unlikely and strange omissions from those representations that purport to be historical, particularly in Polybius' text.

Cornelius Nepos, living through the turmoil of the late republic, also openly respects Hannibal for his *fides* to his oath and never renouncing his hatred of the Romans (*Hann.* 1.1-3). The oath-swearing anecdote is located near the beginning of the *Hannibal* biography and in a similar context to Polybius' presentation of Hannibal justifying his loyalty to Antiochus (*Hann.* 3.2-6). By using the anecdote in the same introductory context as Polybius, Nepos highlights the subtext that Polybius, the Greek hostage at

Rome, perhaps cautiously leaves to the wit of his audience. Indeed, Cornelius Nepos<sup>96</sup> explicitly connects the story to Hannibal maintaining *fides* to his oath and emphasises the point by giving Hannibal direct speech:

Id ego iusiurandum patri datum usque ad hanc aetatem ita conservavi,  
ut nemini dubium esse debeat quin reliquo tempore eadem mente sim  
futurus.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 3.2.5

For my part, up to my present time of life I have kept the oath which I  
swore to my father so faithfully, that no-one ought to doubt that in the  
future I shall be of the same mind.

Rolf, 1984, 261.

Where Polybius' presentation of the anecdote may be read as ambivalent in respect of its treatment of Hannibal's *fides*, the oath scene in the *Punica* is also ambivalent in respect of personal *fides*, but not Hannibal's. As with Livy's text, *fides*, and other Roman virtues such as *pietas*, are recognised as major moral themes in the *Punica*.<sup>97</sup> In the oath scene that Silius Italicus creates, his audience is reminded of Aeneas' treatment of Dido, and superficially the scene seems sympathetic to the Carthaginians. The subtext that Aeneas' *fides* to the future Rome took precedence over his personal *fides* to Dido is left to the reader to understand.

Silius Italicus places the anecdote early in the *Punica* and creates a dramatic scene centred on the child Hannibal<sup>98</sup> (*Pun.* 1.70-121). Hannibal is not an experienced general justifying himself to an Eastern king nor is the story the subject of a colourful rumour, but cast in a scene of poetic surrealism as a 9-year-old child stands in the shrine at Carthage dedicated to Dido/Elissa on the spot where she threw herself onto her husband Sychaeus' funeral pyre. Aeneas' sword lies at the foot of her statue, a poignant reminder that his lack of *personal fides* and breach of *foedus* led to the current situation. For added emphasis Dido and Aeneas were more than lovers in the *Punica*, they were married (*Pun.* 8.53; 8.109-11). Thus the child Hannibal is being explicitly prepared to avenge Dido and there are close correspondences to Dido's death scene in *Aeneid* 4 with

<sup>96</sup> Dionisotti, 1988, 35-49 briefly discusses moral aspects in Nepos' biographies of Greek generals.

<sup>97</sup> Pomeroy, 1989a, 123 argues that their importance in the *Punica* may correlate with a Flavian revival of old values – but such revivals were regular parts of the Roman political landscape. See Marks, 2005, for Silius' treatment of Roman virtues in respect of Scipio; 245-252 summarises scholarship on contemporary Flavian socio-political allusions in the *Punica*. Klaassen, 2006, 3 for a correlation with similar scholarship on the ambivalence in the *Aeneid* towards Augustus' regime.

<sup>98</sup> Wilson, 1993, 218; Spaltenstein, 1986, 14. Cf. Vergil *Aeneid* 1.569.

her final imprecation that Carthage and Rome will be forever enemies (*Aeneid* 4.622-629; *Pun.* 1.114-119).<sup>99</sup>

The task is made easier because Hannibal already hates the Romans. Hamilcar Barca imbued in his son with hatred for Rome from the moment Hannibal began to speak (*Pun.* 1.78). Silius Italicus has no qualms about pre-empting his own text as the vow dictated to Hannibal by his father is intentionally ahistorical<sup>100</sup> and outlines the salient features of the first part of the Second Punic War: breaking the Ebro treaty, crossing the Alps and marching on Rome (*Pun.* 1.114-119). Later, Hannibal continues the family tradition in *Punica* 3 when he echoes Hamilcar's words to instruct his wife, Imilce,<sup>101</sup> to ensure that their infant son swears the same oath at the same altar as Hannibal when he reaches 9-years of age, should Hannibal be unsuccessful (*Pun.* 1.61-157; *Pun.* 3.81-3).

Silius Italicus was free to choose his epic location as Dido's shrine.<sup>102</sup> It is unnecessary and impossible to match the story to local topography, irrespective of the destruction of Punic Carthage by Scipio Aemilianus in 146. Most traditions are vague not only about 'where' but also 'to which god' Hannibal reputedly swore his oath; although Hannibal's theophoric name is a derivative of Baal this does not necessarily mean that his oath was sworn at an altar to Baal. Livy does not locate the anecdote in relation to any particular god, altar or temple in Carthage; Polybius uses the word Διú which is usually translated in reference to the Greek god, Zeus, although in this case it may represent a Greek translation of the Carthaginian god, Baal.<sup>103</sup> Cornelius Nepos places the scene at an altar to *karthagine Iovi optimo maximo* which may represent a

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<sup>99</sup> See Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986, 2495-7 also n6 speculates that a lacuna in *Aeneid* 2.567-588 may have cast Aeneas in a bad light; 2499 for comparison of the relationship between Aeneas and Dido in the *Aeneid* 4.338-9 and in the *Punica*. Feeney, 1982 argues that Dido's curse commits the two nations to war. Also Keith, 2000, 92.

<sup>100</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 24.

<sup>101</sup> Only Silius Italicus gives Hannibal's wife a name, divine origins and an infant son (*Pun.* 1.97; 3.97). She is sent to Carthage for her own safety; more pragmatically it ensures the loyalty of her father's tribe. Spaltenstein, 1986, 185, and Hoyos, 2008, 31 speculate that both her name and the infant are Silius' inventions. Spaltenstein compares the farewell scene between Imilce and Hannibal to that between Hector and Andromache with their son (Homer, *Il.* 6.392). Also Bruère, 1952, 219, n1 that Imilce is a created name (but does not prove that Silius created it); Bruère argues that Silius Italicus models the separation scene on Curtius' account of the siege of Tyre while acknowledging the influence of Lucan's scene of Cornelia's departure which, in turn, is derived from Ovid's presentation of Ceyx' departure from Alcyone (*Met.* 11.483). Cf. Fears, 1976, 216.

<sup>102</sup> Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986, 2496 note the parallels between *Pun.* 1.81-122 and *Aen.* 1.441-493 which locates Aeneas in Juno's Temple in the centre of Carthage.

<sup>103</sup> Liddell & Scott, 1994, 185; also Hoyos, 2008, 26. Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986, 2495 read Polybius 3.12 and Livy 2.1 locating the scene in a Temple of Jupiter.

Roman translation of the Carthaginian Baal (*Hann.* 1.2).<sup>104</sup> One of Martial's epigrams locates the oath scene at an altar of Hercules (Martial, *Ep.* 9.43.9) which is also plausible as Hannibal was linked to Hercules (Melqart in the Carthaginian pantheon), discussed in more detail in the following chapter. By a chance of survival Melqart is one of the few gods with surviving inscriptional evidence for a temple in Carthage but such evidence does not, of course, signify a connection to Hannibal's oath (*CIS* 1 4894, 5575).

## Motivation from perceived wrongs of history

Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus all depict Hannibal being motivated to some extent by the outcome of the First Punic War but each author takes a different approach to illustrate the point.

Polybius' *Histories* 1 and 2 are introductory, or preliminary,<sup>105</sup> to *Histories* 3, thus the defeat of Carthage in the First Punic War and its aftermath are presented as major motivating factors for Hannibal. Polybius reminds his audience of this view by referring back to the Carthaginian defeat at certain important moments in *Histories* 3, for example in the paired speeches by Hannibal and Scipio prior to battle at the Ticinus River.

Livy's annalistic format precludes the inclusion of much discussion on the First Punic War in the third decad, nevertheless he presents a series of references to the First Punic War at specific moments in the narrative and creates a pattern of references to it in speeches. Furthermore, he prioritises the effects of the distant past over contemporary events in the opening lines to the third decad by reference to the First Punic War *primo Punico bello* before covering any events in Spain (Livy, 21.1.2) and by introducing Hannibal as the son of Hamilcar Barca *patri Hamilcari* (Livy, 21.1.4). Mutual hatreds and especially Carthaginian resentment at Roman arrogance and greed in the aftermath of the First Punic War are given by way of an explanation for the ferocity of the warfare to follow.

Silius Italicus briefly refers to the First Punic War in two lines in *Punica* 1, as Carthaginian aspirations drown in the Sicilian Sea with Lutatius' victory (*Pun.* 1.33-5), primarily because he takes Carthaginian and Barca family resentments against Rome

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<sup>104</sup> Mellor, 1991, 142 reads the identification of the altar to the *Carthaginian Jupiter optimus maximus* as an example of Nepos simplifying his text for those readers only acquainted with Latin. Cf. Nepos, *De Duc. Illus.*, Pref. 1-3.

<sup>105</sup> *Hist.* 1.3.10; cf. Walbank, I, 44; Henderson, 2001, 232-5.

back into mythical time. The Barca family heritage is woven into the foundation stories of Carthage and Rome with their ancestry traced back to Belus, said to be a companion of Queen Dido, thus Hannibal's family ties justify Juno's selection of him as a tool for her ambitions (*Pun.* 1.72-80; 1.38-9). There are a number of recognised allusions to Virgil's *Aeneid* in this opening section of the *Punica*<sup>106</sup> but the relationship between Belus and Dido is different between the two texts because in the *Aeneid*, Belus is her father (*Aen.* 1.621; 1.729-30). It is possible that the ‘fantastical’<sup>107</sup> nature of the Barca family lineage and its connection to the story of Aeneas and Dido has links to an earlier epic, Naevius’ *Bellum Poenicum* (fr. 5-7; 21-23).<sup>108</sup>

Silius Italicus reserves his treatment of the First Punic War until *Punica* 6 which is framed by two forms of memory of that war, one verbal and one visual (*Pun.* 6.118-551; 6.653-697). The two memories are paralleled in the sense that they each focus on a son (Serranus; Hannibal) being reminded of his father (Regulus; Hamilcar) being taken prisoner in the First Punic War; they are contrasted in the sense that the Roman son, Serranus, is reminded of Regulus’ reputation for glory whereas the Carthaginian son, Hannibal, is reminded of his father’s shame. Paradoxically, where Hannibal is fired by the sight of his father’s shame to continue warfare, Serranus is begged by his mother Marcia not to be inspired by his father’s glory (*Pun.* 6.584-7).

The first of the two is the Roman recollection, related through Marus, a retired servant of Regulus, as he tends the badly wounded Serranus who miraculously managed to reach Marus’ home from the battlefield at Lake Trasimene. Marus attempts to restore Serranus’ spirits by recounting a fantastic tale of how Serranus’ father, Regulus, held his army together and threw the first spear to kill a man-eating snake in Africa (*Pun.* 6.118-551). Marus assures Serranus that his father’s glory derived, not from killing the serpent, or from the battlefield (because he was defeated by Xanthippus) but from how, after being captured, Regulus foiled Carthaginian intentions to use him for prisoner exchange (*Pun.* 6.299-333; 346). Regulus’ celebrated refusal to take part in the exchange (*Pun.* 6.466-489) resulted in his death by torture<sup>109</sup> at Carthage (*Pun.* 6.539-544).

<sup>106</sup> Especially *Aen.* 1.441-493, see discussion in Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986, 2496; Spaltenstein, 1986, 15; and Wilson, 1993, 219: ‘Juno’s legendary favouritism toward Carthage is drawn from Virgil (*Aen.* 4.625).’

<sup>107</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 14. Wilson, 1993, 219: ‘Silius personal literary universe has its own rules.’

<sup>108</sup> Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986, 2494; Gian Biagio Conte, 1994, 45; Goldberg, 1995, 43, 54.

<sup>109</sup> Augoustakis, 2006, 157 reads Regulus’ death by the iron maiden as retribution for transgressing nature by killing the serpent.

On the face of it, Silius Italicus appears to give Regulus more sympathetic treatment than the tradition in Polybius' text in which there is no honourable role for Regulus in a Carthaginian embassy (*Hist.* 1.26).<sup>110</sup> Hardie interprets Silius Italicus' depiction of Regulus not as a 'little king' but as the greatest Roman hero of his day, one who presented least risk of aiming at sole rule, a 'paradigm of republicanism'.<sup>111</sup> This interpretation suggests an implicit comparison of Regulus to Scipio Africanus that is less favourable to Scipio.

Scipio had a reputation for pushing the boundaries within the republican system; he was reputedly offered, but declined, a royal crown in Spain, and after Zama, according to Livy, he became the first Roman to have a nation's name as an honorific title added to his own name (Livy, 30.45.7; cf. Cornelius Nepos, *Cato*, 2.2). On the other hand, the representation of Regulus in *Punica* 6 may be read differently. Augoustakis, while noting that Silius Italicus combines the varied traditions about Regulus, points out that Silius Italicus voices strong criticism of Regulus through Marcia and by this means depicts Regulus as a man of flawed character.<sup>112</sup>

The context of the second father-son recollection of the First Punic War that closes *Punica* 6 is more plausible than the first. When Hannibal is in Campania he encounters a series of frescoes depicting episodes from the First Punic War decorating the walls of an unidentified temple<sup>113</sup> in Liternum (*Pun.* 6.653-697). The images summarise the main features of the war from the Roman point of view beginning with a portrait of Regulus arguing for war in the Senate. There is an image of Appius Claudius in a triumphal procession; another of Duilius' column in the *forum Romanum*; an unidentified 'Scipio' depicted burying 'a Carthaginian general' in Sardinia (perhaps an allusion to the earlier 'Hannibal'<sup>114</sup> in Polybius *Hist.* 1.22-5), and a second portrait of Regulus, this time fighting the serpent in Africa. The series draws to a close with an image of the Roman naval victory off the Aegates Islands and the final one, which deeply affects Hannibal, is of his father, Hamilcar Barca,<sup>115</sup> in chains, one among many prisoners:

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<sup>110</sup> Walbank, I. 93, 102 rejects the historicity of the embassy. Morgan, 1972, 122 notes the chronological problem of the embassy. Walbank, 1945, 5 'Regulus had not yet become paradigm of Roman *fides*'.

<sup>111</sup> Hardie, 1993, 8.

<sup>112</sup> Augoustakis, 2006, 160.

<sup>113</sup> There was a famous temple of Juno in Liternum; Livy, 42.3.1-3, implies that Hannibal, out of piety, left it intact which is quite different treatment to the unnamed temple in the *Punica*.

<sup>114</sup> There are various traditions. Polybius says Hannibal was blockaded in a harbour by the Romans and crucified by the surviving Carthaginians; Zonaras 8.12 says he was defeated by C. Sulpicius Paterculus, c. 258BC; Livy, *Ep.* 17 says he was stoned to death not crucified. See discussion in Walbank, I, 1957, 81. Cf. Fowler, 2000, 100 reads the 'Carthaginian general' as Hanno.

<sup>115</sup> Cf. Dio Zon 8.17. Spaltenstein, 1986, 439 notes the dramatic image is not found in a historical text.

haec inter iuncto religatus in ordine Hamilcar,  
ductoris genitor, cunctarum ab imagine rerum  
totius in sese vulgi converterat ora.

*Pun.* 6.689-91

And there too was Hamilcar, the father of Hannibal; fettered in a long row of prisoners, he turned the eyes of the whole throng away from all the painted scenes upon himself alone.

Duff, 1996, 333.

Hannibal's anger is refuelled at the sight of the provocative image of his father (*Pun.* 6.698-9). His emotional reaction to the paintings has a counterpart in the *Aeneid* where Aeneas views frescoes commemorating the Trojan War on temple walls in Carthage (*Aen.* 1.453-65). Their emotions, though, are quite different because Aeneas responds with tears, not anger, causing the audience to consider the fragility of fame.<sup>116</sup> Whereas Hannibal's reaction has been described as initially creative when he vows pictures to commemorate his own victories, but then destructive as he displays his fear of the power of art as well as his impiety<sup>117</sup> with an order to destroy and burn the images: *in cineres monumenta date atque involvite flammis* (*Pun.* 6.716). The audience is reminded of the impiety and inversion of the natural order by the hysteron proteron<sup>118</sup> of line *Pun.* 6.716. Hannibal's spirit is reinvigorated by his anger; he is motivated to restore his family honour and to continue the war at a time when he was becoming depressed and frustrated by Fabius' refusal to fight.

### **Recollections of the First Punic War in speeches**

It is slightly surprising that the first speeches recalling the outcome of the First Punic War in both Livy's and Polybius' Second Punic War narratives are not from a Roman memory of their victory, but from a Carthaginian memory of defeat and cited as the reason to maintain peace. Both texts present the speeches within similar contexts of a debate in the Carthaginian senate in the presence of Roman envoys during the siege of Saguntum and, in both cases, a Carthaginian argues for peace but for different reasons in each text.

In the *Histories* an unidentified Carthaginian argues for the predominance of the Lutatius treaty of 241 over the Ebro treaty - because the latter had not been ratified at

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<sup>116</sup> Boyle, 1993, 100.

<sup>117</sup> Wilson, 1993, 232.

<sup>118</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 441.

Carthage - as the reason that the two parties should not now declare war (*Hist.* 3.21-33). Livy's version names the Carthaginian spokesman as Hanno, who emphatically reminds his fellow Carthaginians that their earlier defeat meant they should not rise in arms against Rome because they had lost support from the gods (Livy, 21.10.2-13). Hanno has a second speech in Livy's text, but it is much later in the narrative, responding to Mago's report on Hannibal's victory at Cannae; it is included here because Silius Italicus seems to respond to a couple of points in it through his presentation of the first debate.

Livy's Hanno warns everyone that the Romans had not sued for peace despite their defeat at Cannae, citing the First Punic War as an example of Rome's uncompromising attitude which led them to ultimate victory despite suffering significant defeats: *Lutatio et Postumio consulibus devicti ad Aegatis insulas sumus* (Livy, 23.13.4). An angry Carthaginian reply draws attention, among other things, to Hanno's use of the Roman consular dating system in his speech: *audiamus Romanum senatorem in Carthaginiensium curia* (Livy 23.12.7). The response may suggest Hanno is pro-Roman but it may also be an indicator to the reader of the ahistorical nature of Hanno's speech.

Silius Italicus represents the first debate at Carthage with direct speeches by two opposing figures, Hanno and Gestar (*Pun.* 2.279-326; 2.330-374). In a summation of the debate before the speeches Silius Italicus refers to knowledge of the ratified treaty from the First Punic War causing disquiet among some senators (*Pun.* 2.273-6). Hanno is introduced as a hereditary foe of Hannibal with familial opposition stretching back to mythical times (*Pun.* 2.277). Hanno reminds everyone of their previous defeat off the Aegean islands (*Pun.* 2.310) and argues that it would be folly to embark on war because the Roman soldier has a spirit that never dies (*Pun.* 2.315-326). In Gestar's angry reply he asks if there was a Roman soldier sitting in their Senate: *Ausonius miles sedet* (*Pun.* 2.331) which echoes the anonymous Carthaginian reply in Livy querying the use of the Roman dating system. Silius Italicus presents Hanno arguing that they should surrender Hannibal for breaking the treaty by attacking Saguntum (*Pun.* 2.376-7). Thus Silius Italicus combines the arguments given in each of the historiographical texts for not going to war and emphatically presents Hannibal as a treaty-breaker. In addition, it is only in the *Punica* where the Carthaginians are depicted discussing the 'contemporary issue' of Hannibal.

Furthermore, in the *Punica*, it is Mago, not Hanno, who alludes to the outcome of the First Punic War in the report on Cannae to the Carthaginian Senate. Mago justifiably

claims that Hannibal had avenged their defeat off the Aegates Islands: *Aegates ille et servilia foedera larga ultus caede dies* (*Pun.* 11.527-8). Hanno still argues for peace but for a different reason to the one given in Livy's text, it is because Hanno fears the Roman determination after losing at Cannae: *vos ego, vos metuo, Cannae* (*Pun.* 11.574).

Livy includes two pairs of speeches that include recollections of the First Punic War which he arranges in an AB-BA pattern spanning the third decad. Two are by Hannibal [B] and the other two are each by a Scipio [A]. The first pair are by Hannibal and Scipio (the father of Africanus) to their respective armies prior to battle at the Ticinus River and the second pair are recorded as a conversation between Hannibal and Scipio Africanus shortly before battle at Zama.

Livy also places a pair of speeches in the Roman Senate that include references to the First Punic War. The first is by Fabius Maximus and the second, given in response, by Scipio (Africanus). Fabius Maximus opposes the assignment of Africa to the newly elected consul, Scipio, in a forceful direct speech that uses a series of *si* clauses to draw comparisons between Scipio and Lutatius, the First and the Second Punic Wars, as well as between Hamilcar and Hannibal (Livy, 28.41.3-42). Fabius Maximus upholds Regulus as an example of someone who had mixed fortunes on African soil (Livy, 28.42.1). Livy summarises what he describes as Scipio's response: *Scipio ita locutus fertur* (Livy, 28.43.2-44). Scipio ignores the comparison with Lutatius but argues for the right not to be influenced by Regulus' fate any more than that of his uncle and father who died in Spain (Livy, 28.43.17-19). Thus both speakers refer to the earlier examples from the First Punic War although Scipio also alludes to the more recent events around his father and uncle.

By contrast, the representation of this debate in the *Punica* is, in one respect, more plausible because both speakers, Fabius and Scipio, focus on the contemporary circumstances of the Second Punic War. The epic Fabius poses a series of perfectly legitimate militarily-focussed questions to Scipio about how Hannibal might react to Scipio's invasion of Africa (*Pun.* 16.604-643). In structural terms Scipio's reply might be said to allude to Livy's version of Fabius' speech because the epic Scipio draws a series of comparisons between himself as the man-of-action and Fabius the Delayer, each prefaced by *si* (*Pun.* 16.676-680).

Shortly before battle at Zama, Polybius and Livy present a meeting taking place between Hannibal and Scipio which is discussed more fully in Chapter 6, but relevant here in terms of the references the speakers make to the First Punic War (there is no

equivalent meeting depicted in the *Punica*). At the meeting, Polybius presents Hannibal offering his own experience of changing fortune after Cannae as more relevant than ‘giving an example drawn from an earlier generation’ for reasons to negotiate peace (*Hist.* 15.7.2-3). The phrasing suggests that Polybius acknowledges that there was an alternative tradition that presented Hannibal citing such an example. Livy may draw on that tradition, or respond to Polybius’ comment, because he represents Hannibal citing the example of Regulus as a reason why Scipio should not reject his offer of peace (Livy, 30.30.23). As the main point in the speech it seems to argue against the theory that Livy’s version of Hannibal’s speech is ‘based on Polybius.’<sup>119</sup>

### **Ticinus River harangues by Scipio and Hannibal**

The battle at the Ticinus River is presented as the first major conflict on the Italian side of the Alps between Hannibal and the Romans. To mark the occasion, Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus all precede the battle itself with a pair of exhortatory speeches by Hannibal and Scipio in which both speakers refer to the First Punic War as if the two sides are about to enter war again for the first time since Lutatius’ victory.

Polybius and Silius Italicus prioritise the forthcoming victor, Hannibal, by placing his speech first (*Hist.* 3.63.2-13; *Pun.* 4.59-66).<sup>120</sup> As noted above, Livy’s reverse ordering of this pair of speeches balances them against the paired speeches that close the decad by Hannibal and Scipio (Africanus) respectively. In both cases, Livy displays Hannibal’s ultimate inferiority by placing his speeches in the ‘B’ position. Livy’s paired harangues at the Ticinus River are almost exactly balanced in terms of length;<sup>121</sup> in the Loeb, Scipio has 27 lines (Livy, 21.40.1-41.17) and Hannibal has 25 lines (Livy, 21.43.2-44.9). The difference is minor and may depend on which text is consulted.

There are possible correlations in terms of content in the speeches between the texts because Polybius says that he omits most of what Scipio said about the exalted position of Rome and the achievements of his ancestors, which implies that the speech is based on what Polybius considered an original (*Hist.* 3.64.1). What remains, given in direct speech, presents Scipio arrogantly reminding his men that they were dealing with a

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<sup>119</sup> Miller, 1975, 52.

<sup>120</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 268 notes the changed order in the *Punica* from Livy but did not compare it to Polybius.

<sup>121</sup> Miller, 1975, 52.

previously beaten enemy, and that they should regard it as outrageous to have to fight people who paid tribute and who should be considered almost as slaves (*Hist.* 3.64.2-9).

Livy indicates that he wrote his own version of Scipio's speech (*talem*, 21.39.10), and, in contrast to Polybius' harsh editing, the speech is substantial. The content responds to and elaborates on the same points and in the same sequence as those given in the earlier speech by Hanno to the Carthaginian senate (Livy, 21.10.2-13; Livy, 21.40-41). Scipio reminds his men about the earlier Roman victory off the Aegates Islands, about Roman clemency for ransoming the Carthaginians under Hamilcar at Eryx at 18 denarii each instead of killing them, that Sicily and Sardinia were both prizes of war and even claims that they spared the city of Carthage (Livy, 21.40.6-13).<sup>122</sup> The conclusion of the speech, like the concluding remarks in Polybius, reiterate Roman anger at the ingratitude of those who had been defeated and paid tribute for the last twenty years; Hannibal was nothing but a tribute payer and slave (Livy, 21.41.6-13).

There are much closer correspondences between the two 'Hannibal' speeches in each of Polybius' and Livy's texts, especially in terms of context. In both cases Hannibal's speech is preceded by a demonstration of gladiatorial combat between a pair of Hannibal's Gallic prisoners with the winner gaining a horse, armoury and, above all, freedom (*Hist.* 3.62.1-11; Livy 21.23). Hannibal explains to his men that the purpose of the contest was to demonstrate how they, like the prisoners, were imprisoned in a foreign land, and they, too, must conquer or die: *vincendum aut moriendum* (Livy, 21.43.5; *Hist.* 3.63.9). Livy extends the speech to present Hannibal appealing to the different interests of the groups within his army: the Carthaginians are reminded of the losses of Sicily and Sardinia whereas the Gauls are reminded of the rewards of conquest, wealth, lands and booty (Livy, 21.43.6-9).

Silius Italicus' representation of Hannibal's speech prior to the battle at the Ticinus River is quite different from Livy and Polybius, in both context and in content (*Pun.* 4.59-66; *Pun.* 4.67-100). There is no gladiatorial show<sup>123</sup> and the content of Hannibal's speech has a much closer focus on contemporary events than historic victories or defeats. Hannibal applauds his men for their success at Saguntum, the subjection of Spain and their significant achievement of crossing the Alps (*Pun.* 4.59-66). His final assurance to his men is that his father, Hamilcar, would not scorn any Carthaginians

<sup>122</sup> Cf. Cornelius Nepos, *Hamilcar*, 1.5, Hamilcar negotiated terms so that his men in Eryx would leave with their weapons and therefore their pride intact; also Diodorus 24.13; Dio-Zonaras 8.17.

<sup>123</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 268 also notes this difference.

who died honourably at Trasimene when they arrive in Hades (*Pun.* 5.597-8). This sentiment echoes Hannibal's declaration in the other two texts (following the gladiatorial exhibition) that death on the battlefield is more honourable than being conquered or running away and suggests that Silius consciously chose not to include the fight scene. The quip about conquering or dying, attributed to Hannibal in all three texts, has, as shown by Silius, carried across time long after separation from the context of the gladiatorial fight and has become a popular motto in more recent times.<sup>124</sup>

Silius Italicus reinterprets the feat of crossing the Alps. Scipio underestimates his enemy as he declares that Hannibal's men are tired after their crossing, and tempts fate<sup>125</sup> with a wish to discover if they are fighting the same Carthaginians whose power sank off the Aegates islands (*Pun.* 4.68-80). The response to these closing words come from a Carthaginian soldier, Syrticus, who complains during the battle that the Romans at Trasimene do not match up to those of the past (*Pun.* 5.246-250).

## Hannibal's succession in Spain

The tradition that the nine years Hamilcar spent in Spain were in preparation for invading Italy locates Hannibal in a role of continuing his father's work (Livy, 21.2.2). Another famous son who continued his father's plans and whose success arose, in part, from his father's foundation work was Alexander of Macedon. In the ancient world Alexander became the paradigm<sup>126</sup> against which a successful general might measure his career, and Hannibal was no exception (Livy, 35.14.6-11).

The consistent father-son presentation by Livy elides that fact that Hannibal was not the immediate successor to Hamilcar Barca in Spain, and, although Livy does not compare Hannibal with Alexander at this point, but it may not have been far from his mind; his Hannibal and Alexander comparison appears in the following decad when Hannibal has moved to the east (Livy, 35.14.6-11). There is another, stronger intersection between Hannibal and Alexander than 'continuing his father's plans' through an analogy with Hercules (discussed in chapter two).

Hamilcar Barca was succeeded by his son-in-law, Hasdrubal, and Hannibal did not take command until after the death of Hasdrubal. When three men in succession from

<sup>124</sup> E.g. it is the motto for Scotland's Clan McDougal; the Texas 8<sup>th</sup> Cavalry in the American Civil War; the First Fighter Wing of USAF, 1918 etc.

<sup>125</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 269 notes that Scipio is depicted presupposing the victory. This is also the case in the historiographical traditions.

the same family have held such a command various other possibilities for authors arise, such as, whether to represent one, two, or all three men, as autonomous tyrant-figures or as ‘good kings.’ Of course, no-one directly states that the family held autonomous rule in Spain, particularly in the narrative sequences around the siege and fall of Saguntum (because it undermines the justification for Rome’s war with Carthage). Quotations of the Ebro treaty only refer to the ‘Carthaginians’ and presentations of disagreements over the validity or otherwise of the treaty refer to it exclusively in terms of the relations between Rome and Carthage (*Hist.* 3.20.6; 21.1-3; 33.1-4; *Livy*, 21.18.4-12; *Pun.* 1.693-4).<sup>127</sup> Yet, Cornelius Nepos’ biographies of Hamilcar and Hannibal are placed under a heading of kings; the poet Statius refers to Hannibal as a king (*Silv.* 4.6.75).<sup>128</sup> Similarly Hannibal’s rise to power in Nepos’ biography is reported to Carthage as *fait accompli*: *hoc quoque interfecto, exercitus summam imperii ad eum detulit. Id Karthaginem delatum publice comprobatum est* (Nepos, *Hann.* 3.1). One of Polybius’ literary portraits also suggests that Hannibal held some level of autonomy similar to kingship following his rise to power in Spain (*Hist.* 23.13). The establishment of dominions and founding cities<sup>129</sup> in Spain may or may not be under sanction from Carthage. In addition, Hannibal’s marriage to an elite woman from a Spanish tribe may represent active participation in royal status whilst ensuring the loyalty of her tribe; Silius Italicus gives her a long and sacred lineage (*Pun.* 3.62-65; 3.97-100).

Hannibal’s predecessor, Hasdrubal, is a shadowy intermediate figure and representations of him differ markedly, but all are negative. Polybius’ quotation of Fabius Pictor indicates an early tradition presenting Hasdrubal as no less aggressive than Hamilcar and Hannibal. Furthermore, after gaining power in Spain, Hasdrubal apparently attempted to establish a monarchy at Carthage but was blocked by rivals and returned to Spain which he ruled independently. In this tradition, Hasdrubal’s ambition and love of power was considered one of the causes of the Second Punic War as his successor, Hannibal, admired his principles and adopted the same policies (*Hist.* 3.8.1-5). While Polybius criticises many of Fabius Pictor’s interpretations, on this occasion he agrees that Hamilcar Barca inspired both Hasdrubal and Hannibal with hatred for Rome,

<sup>126</sup> See discussion in Green, 1989, 202 and Spencer, 2002, 157-9..

<sup>127</sup> Scholars differ over the level of autonomy for the Barcids in Spain; see Hoyos, 1998, 150 n1. The concern in this thesis is the literary presentation of these figures.

<sup>128</sup> Gruen, 1984, 354 n197; Seibert, 1993, 5, 13 cite a letter purporting to be from Hannibal that styles him as ‘king of the Carthaginians;’ it offers a prize for the best poem about Hannibals’ victories but is considered to be a first century BC parody.

<sup>129</sup> See discussion in Hoyos, 2006, Introduction, xiv-xv.

believing that only Hasdrubal's untimely death prevented him from taking action against Rome (*Hist.* 3.12.3-4).

Livy's portrayal of Hasdrubal is quite different, although, in Roman terms, it is still negative. Hasdrubal prefers diplomacy or bribery, not force of arms, in order to gain influence over the Spanish tribes, and, in keeping with a diplomatic persona, instead of preparing for war, he renews a treaty with Rome *foedus renovaverat* (Livy, 21.2.7). Simultaneously, this representation of Hasdrubal fulfils a literary role as a contrast figure sandwiched between the more aggressive Hamilcar and Hannibal figures. Cornelius Nepos similarly draws a negative portrait of Hasdrubal that is not aggressive, describing him as the first person to undermine the *mores* of the Carthaginians through the use of bribery (Nepos, *Hamilcar*, 3.3).

Cornelius Nepos includes a colourful rumour about Hasdrubal as Hamilcar Barca's toyboy and when other Carthaginians attempt to break the liaison, Hamilcar makes Hasdrubal his son-in-law (Cornelius Nepos, *Hamilcar*, 3.2). Cornelius Nepos' treatment of Hasdrubal contrasts with his surprisingly respectful introduction to the *Hamilcar* and *Hannibal* biographies:

De quibus quoniam satis dictum putamus, non incommodum videtur non praeterire Hamilcarem et Hannibalem, quos et animi magnitudine et calliditate omnes in Africa natos praestitisse constat.

Cornelius Nepos, *De regibus*, 3.5

Since I think that I have said enough about these kings, it seems fitting not to pass over Hamilcar and Hannibal, who are generally admitted to have surpassed all men of African birth in greatness of soul and sagacity.

Rolle, 1984, 253.

This assessment may be drawn from an earlier tradition because Plutarch quotes Cato the Elder as writing that kings, even those with great reputations, could not be compared to Epaminondas, Pericles, Thermistocles or Hamilcar Barca (Plutarch, *Cato the Elder*, 8).

Silius Italicus creates a dramatic vignette as the backdrop to Hannibal's rise to power in Spain that draws on certain aspects of the different traditions found in each of

Polybius and Livy.<sup>130</sup> Initially, Silius Italicus draws on the same tradition as Polybius and Fabius Pictor to present an aggressive Hasdrubal:

interea rerum Hasdrubali traduntur habenae  
occidui qui solis opes et vulgus Hiberum  
Baeticolasque viros furios agitabat iniquis.  
tristia corda ducis simul immedicabilis ira  
et fructus regni feritas erat; asper amore  
sanguinis et metui demens credebat honorem  
nec nota docilis poena satiare furores.

*Pun.* 1.144-150

Meanwhile the direction of affairs was handed over to Hasdrubal; and he harried with savage cruelty the wealth of the western world, the people of Spain and the dwellers beside the Baetis. Hard was the general's heart and nothing could mitigate his ferocious temper; power he valued because it gave him the opportunity to be cruel. Thirst for blood hardened his heart and he had the folly to believe that to be feared is glory.

Duff, 1996, 15.

McGuire<sup>131</sup> interprets this presentation of an aggressive persona for Hasdrubal as fulfilling the epic requirement for a tyrannical figure. By this reasoning, perhaps Polybius, through Fabius Pictor, also follows an 'epicising' tradition to present Hasdrubal as a tyrannical figure. Indeed, Walbank<sup>132</sup> rejects the Polybian tradition in favour of the 'diplomatic' Hasdrubal in Livy's text as closer to the 'historical' figure.

Unfortunately Livy's unsoldierly portrayal of Hasdrubal is not necessarily any closer to the 'historical' figure because, apart from its contrast function to the other two Barca men, it sets Hasdrubal up for an appropriately ignominious unsoldierly death. Hasdrubal is assassinated by a servant avenging the death of his unnamed Spanish master who was killed on Hasdrubal's order (Livy, 21.2.6).

Where Silius Italicus seems closer to Polybius for his characterisation of Hasdrubal, he incorporates a tradition very similar to the one in Livy for the death of Hasdrubal and rise of Hannibal scene. The epic Hasdrubal crucifies a Spanish king, Tagus,<sup>133</sup> and is

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<sup>130</sup> Cf. Spaltenstein, 1986, 29: Silius Italicus 'ignores the historical information to create a dramatic moment as background for the rise of Hannibal.' Cf. Hoyos, 2003, 86: 'the poet, Silius, may not just be inventing that he [Hasdrubal] wished to be feared, even if Silius overdoes it into caricature.'

<sup>131</sup> McGuire, 1997, 27.

<sup>132</sup> Walbank, I, 311.

<sup>133</sup> The *Histories* are the only other extant text with the name Tagus; it is the site of Hannibal's first defeat of the Spaniards when he took command after Hasdrubal's death (*Hist.* 3.13). The name in the *Punica* may allude to either the tradition or the text.

assassinated in his turn by a servant avenging the death of Tagus.<sup>134</sup> The story in the *Punica* diverges from Livy as the servant is subsequently tortured to death by the angry Carthaginians. The servant's body may be broken but not his spirit, and the scene descends into farce as he criticises his torturers for slacking at their task because he was not yet dead despite the variety of extreme acts carried out on his person. He demands to be crucified like his master (*Pun.* 1.176-80).<sup>135</sup> Crucifixion, the most demeaning way to kill someone, is represented here as the more 'honourable' way to die as far as the servant is concerned. It is against this sordid background of Carthaginian cruelty and monstrosity that Hannibal enters the *Punica* as the new commander of the Carthaginians in Spain (*Pun.* 1.182-4). It is quite a contrast to Livy who inserts a sober note about the Ebro treaty between his death-of-Hasdrubal and arrival-of-Hannibal scenes.

Appian has a slight variation on the same story given in the *Punica*, writing that a slave killed Hasdrubal while on a hunting expedition. Again the assassination was in revenge for Hasdrubal killing the slave's master; Hannibal convicted the slave and, by way of punishment, ordered that the slave be tortured to death (Appian, *The Wars in Spain*, 6.8). These variations on the character of Hasdrubal and the circumstances of his death suggest that illustrating Hannibal's rise to power through an exhibition of his cruelty was more important in many texts than the historical detail of Hannibal's accession.

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<sup>134</sup> Wilson, 1993, 222 notes that this is the first in a series of revenge killings that feature in the *Punica*.

<sup>135</sup> There are precedents for the exaggerated literary depiction of horrors in Senecan Tagedy and Lucan. Feeney, 1982, the servant is punished for despising punishment. For Silius Italicus' representation of the Carthaginians, see McGuire, 1997, 24; Hardie, 1993, 60-67.

## Chapter 2: Hannibal appropriates Hercules for psychological warfare

et utrum Hannibal hic sit aemulus itinerum Herculis, ut ipse fert, an vectigalis stipendiariusque et servus populi Romani a patre relictus.

Livy, 21.41.7

And whether our friend Hannibal is a rival, as he himself would have it, of the wandering Hercules, or has been left to the Roman people by his father to be their tributary, tax-payer, and slave.

Foster, 1949, 121.

The sarcastic allusion to Hannibal's self-representation as the embodiment of a 'second' or reincarnated Hercules<sup>136</sup> is embedded in Livy's construct of the Roman consul Scipio's address to his men prior to battle at the Ticinus River. This quote is one of a number of indicators suggesting that Hannibal may have wished to be considered as protected by Hercules, or as a reincarnated Hercules. Not only does Hannibal's extraordinary journey over the Alps emulate one of Hercules' mythical journeys but his series of victories on arrival in Italy meant that, at first, he must have appeared to be divinely favoured. From Hannibal's perspective, and this seems to be implied in Livy's quote, if he can inspire fear in his enemy by infusing ideas of divine support beforehand a battle can be won almost before it's started. Although the historical Scipio may have reacted skeptically to Hannibal's self-representation as a reincarnated Hercules, the quote carries a sense of Livy depicting over-confidence and under-estimation of the enemy as Scipio anticipated an easy victory over a tired army that had just completed an arduous journey.

It is argued here that representations of Hannibal attempting to emulate Hercules in the texts may be drawn from self-aggrandisement by Hannibal himself, for which he had good military and psychological reasons. Both Rawlings and I have argued from similar interpretations of the texts and numismatic evidence that the association of Hannibal and

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<sup>136</sup> For the sake of simplicity, I will keep to the Latinised spelling of Hercules/Herakles and refer to Hercules in preference to Melqart. These figures were assimilated from a very early date. For the Hercules theme generally, see Galinsky, 1972; Rawlings and Bowden, 2005; Hannibal and Hercules: Billot, 2005b, 111-118, and Rawlings, 2005, 153-181.

Hercules possibly goes back to Hannibal himself, the difference between us is that Rawlings does not discuss why Hannibal might promote a connection with Hercules.<sup>137</sup>

There were risks to appearing Herculean or being favoured by Hercules, and ultimately, of course, Hannibal's failure to achieve overall victory against Rome meant that any adoption of divine support or appearance would be turned against him by later authors. The first section of this chapter begins with a brief overview of the Hercules figure as a potentially useful tool for Hannibal in a psychological war against Rome. The overview will show that, although there were risks for Hannibal using the analogy in the long term, these were outweighed by the short-term benefits. The first subsection examines the possible representations of Hannibal as analogous with Hercules found in coinage and in certain texts. Hercules was a very popular cult figure at Rome and for Hannibal to proclaim support would signal a suggestion that Hercules may have deserted the Romans. The second subsection examines what might be the contemporary Roman reaction in numismatic changes, the vows to establish temples to other cults, such as to *Mens* and *Venus Erycina*, as well as increased veneration of Hercules.

Of the later Roman responses, it will be argued that Livy adapts Hannibal's appropriation to present a negative moral example, while Statius and Silius Italicus present Hannibal as ultimately deluded in his belief of Herculean support. The *Punica* shows how Hannibal could never become a 'new' or 'reincarnated' Hercules, an interpretation which is similar to Hardie's view that Silius Italicus represents Hannibal attempting to be another Hercules but only succeeding in playing the role of a Titan or Giant.<sup>138</sup> It is also compatible with Augoustakis' reading of the *Punica* that Hannibal embodies the negative characteristics of Hercules while Scipio embodies the positive.<sup>139</sup>

Hannibal was neither the first nor the last general from the ancient world said to claim descent or special favour through a particular god or hero.<sup>140</sup> His father, Hamilcar Barca was said to have been compared to Mars:<sup>141</sup> *sed pater ipse Hamilcar Mars alter,*

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<sup>137</sup> Billot, 2005b, 111-118 and Rawlings, 2005, 153-181.

<sup>138</sup> Hardie, 1993, 80. For the Hercules theme in the *Punica* (esp. *Punica* 3, 4) see Augoustakis, 1994, 35-76; 2003, 235; Spaltenstein, 1986, 231; Ripoll, 1998, 112-132; von Albrecht, 1964; Marks, 1999, 147-193; Wilson, 1993, 221-9.

<sup>139</sup> Augoustakis, 2003 argues that the mythical hero becomes the model for two opposing figures, Hannibal and Scipio. Cf. Bassett, 1966, 263-5 who argues that Silius represents Scipio as a successor of Hercules and that Silius follows Virgilian precedent by sometimes associating another Roman with Hercules.

<sup>140</sup> E.g Plutarch records the myth that Hercules was an ancestor to the Fabii, although Plutarch prefers the alternative 'local' folklore tradition of Fabian ancestry (*Fabius Maximus*, 1.2). Plutarch also notes a tradition that Theseus was descended from Hercules (Plutarch, *Thes.*, 6).

<sup>141</sup> Mars was Venus' lover. There may be a connection with the shrine of *Venus Erycina* on Mt Eryx, where Hamilcar was based.

*ut iste volunt* (Livy, 21.10.8). More well-known, perhaps, was Alexander's claim of descent from Zeus, confirmed at the shrine of Zeus-Ammon in Egypt, and the analogy with Hercules celebrated in a coin series (see Figure 4). For Hannibal, a link to Alexander through Hercules would be another useful addition to his psychological armoury. Silius Italicus shows how tenuous the link was, as well as highlighting the unreliability of oracles from the shrine of Zeus-Ammon.<sup>142</sup> Juvenal, too, compares Hannibal, Alexander, and indirectly, Caesar, in *Satire X*; Hannibal's life is summarised and dismissed in twenty lines, 147-167, before the poet moves onto cutting Alexander down to size.<sup>143</sup>

In general terms, any analogy with Hercules or another divinity might be taken seriously when it is accompanied by success but once the general is defeated or killed, a problem arises. Comic representations of generals and other figures claiming divine support in Plautus' plays and elsewhere illustrate the long-term risks to such claims and suggest that, at least in the aftermath of the Second Punic War, they were not taken too seriously.

Claims to divine favour may be turned to a different kind of military advantage and in the second half of this chapter it is argued that even in ancient times the route that Hannibal took through the Alps could not be ascertained with certainty because Hannibal intended it to be kept secret for both military reasons and promulgation of the myth that he was divinely favoured.<sup>144</sup>

Taking an army through the Alps is an action in common between Hannibal and Hercules but the various literary presentations of this connection have some unexpected similarities and differences: Polybius criticizes authors who suggest that Hannibal had a divine guide and compares their work with productions of Tragedy; Livy, perhaps drawing from Coelius or Silenus,<sup>145</sup> incorporates a story of Hannibal dreaming that a divine guide shows him the route while Silius Italicus includes both the dream tradition and creates a dramatic connection, except that the representation in the *Punica* is much closer to Comedy than Tragedy (*Hist.* 3.47.6-48.8; Livy, 21.22.6-9; *Pun.* 3.168, 503-4, 512-5). Thus both texts in the historiographic tradition incorporate the notion of divine intervention although by different methods: criticism of others or the report of a dream.

<sup>142</sup> Hannibal's seer to interpret the oracle is the aptly named Bogus (*Pun.* 4.131; 5.402).

<sup>143</sup> Green, 1998, n19 notes Juvenal's borrowing *non sufficit orbis* from Lucan 5.356, 10.455 creates the sting in the tail of his poem. Lucan uses the phrase in reference to Caesar.

<sup>144</sup> Billot, 2005b.

<sup>145</sup> Cicero wrote that Coelius found the dream version of the story in Silenus (*de Div.* 1.24.49).

## Hercules

Hercules was a semi-divine figure of great antiquity with equivalent gods or heroic figures throughout the ancient Mediterranean cultures; there were many stories about Hercules in multiple versions associated with his mythical life. In Greek mythology, he was the son of Zeus and Alcmene and soon demonstrated his superhuman strength when, as a baby, he strangled two snakes sent by Hera to kill him. There are a number of travel stories about Hercules, including ‘crossing the Alps,’ his twelve labours, as well as ‘death and resurrection’ stories which usually involve a visit to the underworld and returning unharmed. Other stories include the ‘Choice of Hercules’ by which he was required to choose between two paths in life, one of Pleasure or one of Virtue; he chose the path of Virtue and consequently represents the strength, courage and ingenuity of man overcoming seemingly impossible circumstances for the betterment of everyone.<sup>146</sup> In this guise, Hercules had much to offer powerful individuals who wanted a more complex form of aggrandizement than purely military success.<sup>147</sup>

Alongside Hercules’ superhuman feats and cares for mankind were his many human frailties; he frequently succumbed to the effects of alcohol and his libido. These diverse attributes have endeared him to artists and to stage performers for generations. There are representations of Hercules<sup>148</sup> in paintings, reliefs, sculptures and bronzes, usually with attributes alluding to one or more of his labours for ease of identification.

Texts, fragments and titles of dramatic productions from the ancient world featuring Hercules span a period of at least 700 years. There are stories of him in the underworld in Aristophanes’ *Frogs*; he has a major role in Euripides’ *Alcestis*, c 438, where his characterization is described as a disconcerting mix of comic and superhuman.<sup>149</sup> In the extant Roman tradition, Hercules appears in Plautus’ *Amphitruo*; he features in Senecan and pseudo-Senecan plays, and, in the second century AD in North Africa, Tertullian implies that ‘death and resurrection’ plays about Hercules were performed on-stage in their gruesome entirety (Tertullian, *Apologeticum*, 10.5; *Ad Nationes*, 1.10.47).<sup>150</sup>

<sup>146</sup> *Choice of Hercules* by Prodicus, preserved in Xenophon’s *Memorabilia*, 2.1.21-34. Cicero, *de Officiis*, 1.32. See Anderson, 1928, 7-58.

<sup>147</sup> See Rawlings and Bowden, 2005, 185-239 for discussions about the appeal of Hercules to later Roman emperors from Nero to Constantine.

<sup>148</sup> Two well-known examples: Relief sculpture, Hercules’ labours: Temple of Zeus, Olympia. Bronze sculpture of drunk Hercules: Villa dei Papyri, Herculaneum

<sup>149</sup> Grant, 1960, 266.

<sup>150</sup> Bonnet, 1988, 172-9 argues that Tertullian confirms the Hellenisation of Melqart to Hercules which neglects the point that North Africa had been under Roman rule for centuries.

In the Phoenician or Carthaginian pantheon the parallel figure to Hercules was Melqart, for whom there was a cult centre at Tyre dating back to the eighth century. At Carthage, inscriptions survive that refer to Melqart's cremation rites and resurrection ceremonies; the prestigious nature of the cult is indicated by some officiants being titled as Sufetes, the senior magistracy at Carthage (*CIS I* 227, 260-2, 377).<sup>151</sup> In addition, significant numbers of razors decorated with images of a figure wearing a lion-skin and/or leaning on a club found in a pre-Roman cemetery at Carthage attest to the popularity of Hercules/Melqart in the wider community.<sup>152</sup>

Hercules was a popular figure at Rome. Roman coins featuring Hercules, assigned by Mattingly<sup>153</sup> to the period 269-218, indicate that Hercules was a well-established cult figure at Rome long before the Second Punic War. The *ara maxima* was an altar to Hercules in the *forum boarium*, and a number of texts contain related versions of an aetiological tale for the foundation of the cult that predates the time of Romulus.<sup>154</sup> Livy, for example, related that a shepherd stole Hercules' beautiful cattle from the pasture near the Tiber where they were grazing, and attempted to hide them in a cave. Eventually Hercules found them and, during in the ensuing argument with the shepherd, the local ruler, Evander, arrived and recognised Hercules in accordance with a prophecy given by his mother. It was agreed to establish the cult and to dedicate an altar to Hercules (Livy, 1.7.4-12). Subsequently one of Romulus' first acts after defeating Remus was to sacrifice to Hercules:

sacra diis aliis Albano ritu, Graeco Herculi, ut ab Evandro instituta erant, facit.

Livy, 1.7.3

To other gods he sacrificed after the Alban custom, but employed the Greek for Hercules, according to the institution of Evander.

Foster, 1925, 27.

Cicero also claims that the cult to Hercules pre-dated the foundation of Rome, and that Romulus was the first Roman successor of Hercules. Furthermore Cicero believed that

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<sup>151</sup> Lancel, 1995, 205.

<sup>152</sup> Bonnet, 1986, 220-2 Figs. 1, 3 and 4; Lancel, 1995, 207; Rawlings, 2005, 159.

<sup>153</sup> Mattingly, 1960, 12.

<sup>154</sup> Livy, 1.7.4-12; 9.29.9; Propertius, *Elegies*, 4.9; Virgil, *Aen.*, 8.185; Macrobius, *Sat.* 1.12.27; Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.*, 1.12.28. Tacitus, *Annals*, 15.41: the altar burned during the great fire.

the story was relatively old because he was arguing that Ennius did not create the myth, he was simply the first person to write it into Roman literature (*Tusc. Disp.*, 1.12.28).<sup>155</sup>

## Hannibal and Hercules

A number of texts link Hannibal to Hercules, thus Silius Italicus was working within a well-established tradition in his adaptation of the analogy.<sup>156</sup> Martial, a contemporary of Silius, locates Hannibal swearing his childhood oath of enmity at an altar of Hercules in Carthage (Martial, *Ep.* 9.43.9). The connection is strengthened with the following epigram which has Hannibal as the one-time owner of a statuette of Hercules now in the possession of Martial's friend, Vindex. Ownership of the statuette connects Hannibal to Alexander, said to be the original owner, given that the inscription on the base names its creator as Alexander's famed sculptor, Lysippus (Martial, *Ep.* 9.44.6).

Statius, a contemporary of Martial and Silius Italicus, points up the paradox of the Hercules and Hannibal connection in a poem. The poem seems to refer to the same bronze statuette of Hercules observed by Martial, but suggests that ownership of a statuette and swearing vows does not necessarily mean that Hercules responded by supporting Hannibal.

S says that Hercules hated Hannibal for attacking the Romans, and Saguntum, a town said to be founded by Hercules, as well as for dragging the statuette around Italy.<sup>157</sup>

Mox Nasamoniaco decus admirabile regi  
possessum, fortique deo libavit honores  
semper atrox dextra periuroque ense superbus  
Hannibal. Italicae perfusum sanguine gentis  
diraque Romuleis portantem incendia tectis  
oderat et cum epulas, et cum Lenaea dicaret  
dona deus castris maerens comes ire nefandis,  
praecipue cum sacrilega face miscuit arces  
ipsius <im>meritaeque domos ac templa Sagunti  
polluit et populis furias immisit honestas.

Statius, *Silvae* 4.6.75-84<sup>158</sup>

<sup>155</sup> Cf. Anderson, 1928, 29: ‘Ennius was profoundly influential for bringing Greek mythology and the Trojan cycle to the fore in Roman consciousness.’ See Zetzel, 2007, 1-16; Feeney, 1991.

<sup>156</sup> Cf. Rawlings, 2005, 154 who reads Silius Italicus presenting Hannibal as a ‘rival’ to Hercules who easily defeats Hercules through defeating the Herculean ‘proxy’ of *Theron*, *Pun.* 2.233-63. Cf. Augoustakis, 2003, 235: ‘in *Punica* 3, the poet manipulates the complexities of traditional representations of Hercules to illustrate how Hannibal imitates the demigod’s conduct as it is portrayed in the aetiological tale of Pyrene’s rape and death.’

<sup>157</sup> Silius Italicus also depicts Hercules hating Hannibal. Hercules was forbidden to oppose Juno, and was unable to intervene on behalf of Saguntum (*Pun.* 1.29; 2.475).

Presently the wondrous treasure became the property of the Nasamonian king. Hannibal, ever savage of hand and proud in treacherous sword, gave libation to the valiant god, who hated him, steeped as he was in the blood of the Italian race, carrying dire conflagration to Romulean dwellings, even as he offered him viands and Lenaean bounty, grieving he accompanied that wicked army, above all when Hannibal with sacrilegious torch mangled the god's own towers, defiling the houses and temples of innocent Saguntum and filling her people with a noble frenzy.

Shackleton Bailey, 2003, 287.

Like Martial, Statius recounts a list of prestigious previous owners for the statuette. The list not only includes Alexander and Hannibal but also Sulla which makes the *Silvae* one of the few texts to connect Hannibal and Sulla (Statius, *Silv.* 4.6.85-6; Martial, *Ep.* 9.43.9).<sup>159</sup>

McNelis<sup>160</sup> argues that the current owner, Vindex, must be a personage of authority given this poetic alignment with Alexander, Hannibal and Sulla through ownership of a statue, yet Statius is explicit about the contrast between the statue's previous owners and the present one, Vindex. The statue no longer lives in a world of royal pomp, ceremony or warfare but resides instead with an owner who believes in old-fashioned values of *fides* and prefers singing to warfare (*Silv.* 4.6.92-109). Statius believes that Lysippus would approve of Vindex as the owner of his artwork (*Silv.* 4.6.108-9) and expresses admiration for Vindex's skill as a connoisseur of fine art and identifying the *uninscribed* bronze as the work of Lysippus:

quis namque oculis certaverit usquam  
Vindicis artificum veteres agnoscere ductus  
et non inscriptis auctorem reddere signis?

Statius, *Silv.* 4.6.23-4

For who would ever rival Vindex' eyes in recognising the hands of old masters and restoring its maker to an untitled statue?

Shackleton Bailey, 2003, 283.

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<sup>158</sup> Newlands, 2002, 73 reads Statius, *Silv.* 4.6 on the statuette as complementing *Silv.* 1.1 on the equestrian statue of Domitian in the *forum*; she notes that *Silv.* 4.6 is the longest poem in *Silv.* 4 as Statius cultivates the paradox of the length of poem against the diminutive size of the statuette and Hercules' reputation for super-human size and strength. Bassett, 1966, 268 compares the poetic treatments of the statue between Martial and Statius.

<sup>159</sup> Spencer, 2002, 242, n.9 argues that Sulla is an appropriate addition because Alexander was a model for Roman generals who absorbed too much power for themselves. McNelis, 2008, 258 notes that the rhetoric is more important than the 'truth,' arguing that the transmission of the statuette from Alexander to Hannibal to Sulla mirrors Roman cultural absorption of Greek art by conquest (the conquests of Syracuse and Tarentum in the Second Punic War brought the first inheritances of Greek Art to Rome).

<sup>160</sup> McNelis, 2008, 255. Cf. Rawlings, 2005, 155 notes that these 'Domitianic poets evidently enjoyed exploring the interplay between Hannibal's aspirations and Hercules' supposed contempt for them.'

Perhaps Statius was genuinely impressed or perhaps he did not look as closely at base of the statuette as Martial. It is, of course, possible that there were two statuettes, or the name of Lysippus was inscribed on the base between visits by the two poets.

There was a famous cult centre to Hercules at Gades in southern Spain with a temple that was noted for its antiquity that, at one time, was said to have contained a statue of Alexander (Suetonius, *Julius Caesar*, 7).<sup>161</sup> Polybius refers to the Heracleum at Gades and the Pillars of Hercules a number of times in a geographic sense but there is nothing in his extant text which locates Hannibal at the shrine (*Hist.* 2.1; 3.37-9; 3.57; 10.7; 16.29; 34.9). Livy, on the other hand, presents Hannibal travelling to the shrine after the fall of Saguntum to discharge his vows to Hercules and make new ones: *Hannibal, cum recensuisset omnium gentium auxilia, Gades profectus Herculi vota exsolvit novisque se obligat votis, si cetera prospera evenissent* (Livy, 21.21.9).

If Hannibal had another, more pragmatic, reason for his journey, it is not mentioned by Livy, but there was an important Carthaginian mint at Gades.<sup>162</sup> There is a series of Carthaginian coins with iconography relating to Hercules on the obverse faces which have been dated to the period of Barcid rule in Spain; it is not known if they have a connection with either the mint or the shrine (Figures 1-4). Two of the coin types have a club etched in outline behind a profile head on the obverse and an elephant on the reverse. There is a significant difference between the profile heads on two coin types because one is bearded while the other appears to be clean-shaven.<sup>163</sup> The obverse of a third coin type (Figure 3A) may depict a profile head wearing a lionskin headdress but it is much weathered and difficult to distinguish from some other form of headgear such as a helmet.<sup>164</sup>

Given that the profile heads of the two Carthaginian coin types have the distinctive difference of facial hair, and that the Alexander coins are generally accepted as representations of Alexander in the guise of Hercules, the Punic coins are similarly argued to represent historical figures in the guise of Hercules. There are no identifying legends, consequently the identities are uncertain and disputed but it seems reasonable to accept that they represent two different people. Robinson attributes the bearded figure

<sup>161</sup> Appian, 6.2, wrote that the rites carried out in the temple at gades were of the Phoenician type and that the temple was dedicated to Tyrian Hercules not the Theban Hercules.

<sup>162</sup> Robinson, 1956, 37.

<sup>163</sup> Hoyos, 2008, 75 agrees that the Punic coin with a clean-shaven male profile head with club (Fig. 2) behind date to Hannibal's time.

<sup>164</sup> Robinson, 1956, 39, Pl. II. 5c, 6a, b, c, d; Kraay, 1966, Nos. 332 *obv.* Heracles, *rev.* Elephant and rider (Punic); 333 *obv.* Heracles, *rev.* Elephant (Punic); 569 Alexander *obv.* Heracles, *rev.* Zeus.

to Hamilcar; his preference is unexplained but may lie in the theophoric name and a belief that Hamilcar founded the mint at Gades. Seibert opts for the clean-shaven figure as a representation of Hannibal and uses the image as the cover-piece to his *Hannibal*. Lancel leaves the whole question open, and Hoyos, too, is rightly cautious as he dates the coin to the time of Hannibal but leaves the identification undecided.<sup>165</sup>

A supposed bust of Hannibal (Figure 5) from the Museo Archeologico, Naples, presents a bearded figure, but there is uncertainty, not only over the identity of the figure, but also over the antiquity of the bust.<sup>166</sup> Although the extant texts make a strong case for Hannibal as the Carthaginian figure most closely aligned with Hercules, this does not preclude either or both of his predecessors, or another unknown Carthaginian figure making the same analogy and celebrating it in coinage.<sup>167</sup>

In the historiographical tradition, the extant text of the *Histories* draws two possible connections between Hannibal and Hercules. Polybius embeds the first in a critique of authors who describe such extreme conditions in the Alps that the only way they can extricate Hannibal is by postulating ‘gods and heroes’ who show him the route. Hercules<sup>168</sup> is a possible contender but clearly not the only option given Polybius’ use of the plural (Silius opts for Mercury, discussed below). Polybius’ objection to these representations indicates that it was a well-established theme to present Hannibal having a divine guide, albeit of differing identities (and under the order of Zeus/Jupiter/Baal Hammon) (*Hist.* 3.47.6).

Polybius’ second connection is in the form of a legal document and his presentation implies that it derives from Hannibal himself, although the point remains questionable. Polybius quotes the opening preamble of a treaty said to have been under negotiation between Hannibal and Philip of Macedon until the envoys carrying it were captured by the Romans. The quotation includes three groups of three divinities by whom the treaty was to be sworn and the groupings of the gods are notable because Hercules and his companion, Iolaus, are included but immediately follow the Carthaginian *daimon* which separates them from the Greek triad (*Hist.* 7.9.1).<sup>169</sup> The list of divinities opens with the Greek triad of Zeus, Hera and Apollo, followed by the *daimon* of Carthage, Hercules

<sup>165</sup> Robinson, 1956, 37; Lancel, 1995, 379; Seibert, 1993; Hoyos, 2008, 75: the coin illustrated in his text is holed at the top.

<sup>166</sup> Hoyos, 2008, 36.

<sup>167</sup> It is possible that although the coins were found in Spain, they are not Barcid.

<sup>168</sup> De Witt, 1941, 60-1 speculates that Hercules appeared in reproduced versions of the march.

<sup>169</sup> For discussion on the treaty, see Bickerman, 1944; 1952, 1-23; Walbank, 1940, 68-71; 1967, 42-47; Barré, 1983, 64-73.

and his companion, Iolaus while the third group comprises Aries, Triton and Poseidon, after which follows a more general listing of divinities. Bickerman argues that Polybius gives a literal Greek translation of a Carthaginian original document,<sup>170</sup> but given that the treaty was under negotiation between a Greek and a Carthaginian, it may have been drafted in both languages. Even if Zeus, Hera and Apollo group are Greek translations for a Carthaginian triad of Baal Hammon (or Baal Shamin), Tanit and Reshef (or Resep), Hercules (or Melqart) is nonetheless presented as a figure of relative importance for its inclusion in the second group in the treaty.

## Roman reactions

It is possible that a contemporary Roman reaction to Hannibal's appropriation of Hercules may be read in numismatic changes with the disappearance of Hercules-style iconography from Roman coinage around 218. Another Roman response to the potential loss of support from Hercules may be read into their decisions to vow or construct temples in order to seek out and proclaim support from other divinities, as well as continuing to honour Hercules (Livy, 21.62).<sup>171</sup> Two cults are particularly relevant in an advertisement for divine support at this time, one for the goddess *Mens* and the other for *Venus Erycina*. Wiseman<sup>172</sup> reads this pair of temples as representing a combination of rational direction with human libido resulting from the need to replace the men lost in the three battles at Ticinus, Trebia and Trasimene. These factors were, of course, necessary for Roman recovery although there were other goddesses with stronger reputations than Venus for the promotion of childbirth.

Fabius Maximus' establishment of cult to *Mens*<sup>173</sup> helped spread his reputation as the Roman general *par excellence* for containing and practising deception against Hannibal; both he and Hannibal were considered shrewd, adept at concealing plans, covering up

<sup>170</sup> Bickerman, 1952, 2-5: for similarities between this treaty with Phoenician and Hebrew treaties. Livy fleshes out the spy-story to explain how the treaty fell into Roman hands but does not quote the opening preamble (Livy, 23.33-4-9) Also Appian, *Maced.* 1; Zonaras, 9.4.2-3.

<sup>171</sup> Rawlings, 2005, 161; Palmer, 1997, 61 read an inscription *ILLRP* 118 that Minucius dedicated an altar to Hercules after a minor victory against Hannibal in 217/216; Palmer goes further and connects it to the ceremony at Livy, 21.62. Cf. Livy, 23.63.1 names Flamininus as the consul and Atilius Serranus as the praetor.

<sup>172</sup> Wiseman, 2004, 164. Contra Henderson, 1999, 16-17 who speculates that the *Poenulus* was first performed at the dedication of the Temple to *Venus Erycina* by L Porcius Licinius in 181BC. See Leigh, 2004a, 30, n29 for further discussion.

<sup>173</sup> Also Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 4.3 for vows to gods generally; Fears, 1981, 856-7 for discussion on *Mens* as a Romanization of the Greek political idea of Wisdom as an essential attribute of good government and as a Fabian propaganda tool. Dumézil, 1970, 474 that *Mens* invoked a desire to match Hannibal's strategic and tactical powers.

tracks, disguising movements, laying stratagems and generally forestalling their opponent's designs (Polybius, *Hist.*, 3.87.6; 3.89.3; Cicero, *De Div.* 1.30).

Wiseman's interpretation that homage to *Mens* yielded quicker results through Fabius Maximus' policy of delay rather than waiting for a new generation of wiser fighters to grow up reads the establishment of cult to *Venus Erycina* as responding to a need for Roman procreation.<sup>174</sup> It may also be read as a response to the Hannibal-Hercules psychological threat because it reminds everyone at Rome that, since the end of the First Punic War and the transfer of Sicily to a Roman province, this powerful goddess supported Roman interests; a message that may well have filtered back to Carthage.

The *Punica* offers a different interpretation to Wiseman for measuring the success of investment in this cult because Hannibal and his men are represented as irretrievably weakened by Venus and her army of cupids during their sojourn in Capua. The goddess will wreak revenge on Hannibal for his impious assumption that he is divinely protected.

Silius Italicus illustrates the wide gulf of difference between Hannibal and Hercules in a number of ways, one of the first being Hannibal's destruction of Saguntum, a town founded by Hercules in *Punica* 2. Hence, where Hercules is constructive, Hannibal is destructive, and to add to insult to injury, Hannibal cheekily offers booty taken from Saguntum to Hercules' shrine at Gades (*Pun.* 3.14-44). Another illustration of the superficiality of the connection between Hannibal and Hercules (and Alexander) is through the oracle of Ammon in Egypt. Bostar's journey to consult the oracle at the start of the *Punica* 3 is mirrored by his return with its prophecy toward the close of the book (*Pun.* 3.1-5; 3.647-714). The oracle's prophecy is misinterpreted by Hannibal's appropriately named seer, Bogus, and Hannibal's subsequent actions are predicated on this misguided belief. Silius reassures his audience because the 'real' prophecy for the outcome of the war, voiced by Jupiter to Venus, is juxtaposed against Bogus' misinterpretation (*Pun.* 3.557-630).<sup>175</sup> Spencer<sup>176</sup> argues that Juvenal's representation of Hannibal as Alexander's equally doomed alter ego (*Sat.* 10.133-73) is derived from Livy's treatment of Hannibal but it may equally respond to the representations such as this one of Hannibal in the *Punica*.

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<sup>174</sup> Wiseman, 2004, 164.

<sup>175</sup> Feeney, 1991, 304 notes this scene of Jupiter comforting Venus echoes Jupiter's first appearance in Vergil's *Aeneid* (*Aen.* 1.223-96).

<sup>176</sup> Spencer, 2002, 157.

More positively, Silius Italicus also demonstrates the various ways in which Hercules has not abandoned the Romans. The first half of the *Punica* draws connections between Fabius Maximus and Hercules, including giving Fabius an impressive Herculean lineage (*Pun.* 2.3; 6.627; 7.35, 43-4, 592).<sup>177</sup> After Fabius' death, the latter part of the *Punica* follows a tradition that presents Scipio as a successor to Hercules (Cicero, *de re publica*, fr. 3; Lanctantius, *Div. Inst.* 1.18).<sup>178</sup> Silius Italicus adapts the ‘Visit to the Underworld’ and the ‘Choice of Hercules’ stories as well as the divine conception story for Scipio (*Pun.* 13.634-47; 13.385-95; 17.653).<sup>179</sup> The story of Scipio being conceived by a snake impregnating his mother parallels similar stories for Dionysus and Alexander (Gellius, 6.1.1; Livy, 26.19.5-7). Although Scipio Africanus is singled out for special treatment particularly in the latter part of the poem, overall the *Punica* reflects the complexities of republican Rome in a communal sense to show that it took the combined efforts of everyone, with leaders like Fabius Maximus, Marcellus and Scipio as well as many individuals performing heroic acts in battle, to win the war.

## Hannibal’s Herculean feat: Crossing the Alps

According to Cornelius Nepos and Pliny, Hercules crossed the Alps via the Graian (Greek) pass, which was subsequently named after him (*Hannibal* 3.4; *NH* 3.17.123). The location of the aetiological story about Hercules traversing the Graian pass in Cornelius Nepos’ *Hannibal* biography suggests that the late republican audience would recognise the connection between Hannibal and Hercules, although Nepos does not actually say that the historical Hannibal’s route traversed the Graian Alps.<sup>180</sup>

Crossing the Alps certainly emulates Hercules’ mythical journey in principle. For Hannibal to present himself as favoured by Hercules, or aligned with Hercules in some way, the actual route he took across the Alps ought not, perhaps, be too sharply defined especially if he did not traverse the Graian pass (which is too far north for someone

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<sup>177</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 1.1 gives two ‘heritage’ lineage options for the Fabii, one based on Hercules, and the other more ‘local’ which establishes the longevity of the family at Rome. Wiseman, 1974, 154 suggests that the one based on Hercules was a later ‘improvement.’

<sup>178</sup> See Walbank, 1985, 123; Scullard, 1930, 70.

<sup>179</sup> Bassett, 1966, 265 reads Silius Italicus presenting Scipio Africanus as the true successor to Hercules (*Pun.* 13.632-3; 4.475-6; 7.487). Also Scullard, 1930, 70ff; Walbank, 1985, 120-137; Rawlings, 2005, 155. Scipio’s mother resides in the Elysian fields with the other brides of Jupiter, Alcmene and Leda (*Pun.* 13.631).

<sup>180</sup> As read by De Beer, 1955, 115. Earlier in his book De Beer qualifies his reading of Nepos: ‘even assuming a precise meaning is to be attached to this statement,’ 52. Cf. Rawlings, 2005, 155 reads Hannibal crossing the Alps as a Herculean feat over the Graian Alps. See also Hoys, 2003, 227-8.

travelling from Spain to Italy). In addition Hannibal had a pragmatic necessity for secrecy and keeping the Alpine route open, preferably without the risk of ambush, to ensure the safe arrival of further supplies or reinforcements from Spain. A measure of Hannibal's success at maintaining the necessary security is that some eleven years after he crossed the Alps, Hasdrubal brought an army into Italy 'following Hannibal's route' apparently without difficulty (Livy, 27.39.7; Appian, *Hann.* 7.52.1).

In Livy's version, Hannibal's aim for secrecy is made easier by the reaction of P. Cornelius Scipio who arrived at the Carthaginian camp on the Rhône three days after Hannibal's departure. Scipio decides against pursuing Hannibal into the Alps (Livy, 21.32.1-3). While this might be prudent in terms of avoiding being ambushed in a valley or similar, there is no indication that Scipio sent scouts to follow Hannibal. Once Hannibal knew he was not being followed he was at liberty to disseminate whatever information he chose about the route and the conditions. It reflects well on Hannibal's leadership skills and control of his publicity that neither Polybius nor Livy finds a coherent answer to the actual route used to cross the Alps, and it should be no surprise that modern scholars cannot agree on the route either.<sup>181</sup> Polybius indirectly acknowledges his lack of information about the actual route through a digression that argues including place-names of unknown countries would be meaningless to his readers (*Hist.* 3.36.1-5).

There were potential advantages for Hannibal to have his crossing described as steep and treacherous because the higher and steeper the pass, the more ice, 'snow all year' on difficult pathways combined with appalling weather conditions conveys the idea of superior power and be a testimony to his strength.

On the other hand, his enemies might hope that his army was severely weakened by the experience (long, arduous journeys may be either toughening or weakening, depending on an author's viewpoint). Rumours of a divine guide add to the sense of mystery and help create a more spectacular event, and his feat becomes all the more impressive when followed by military success in Italy.

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<sup>181</sup> A few examples for the pass used by Hannibal: De Beer, 1955, and Brown, 1965, 41: Traversette; Hoyte, 1960; Proctor, 1971: Clapier; Walbank, I, 382-7: Cenis or Clapier, but notes Meltzer and Kahrstedt, 1913, 181: 'Das Problem ist literarhistorisch, nicht topographisch.' Lancel, 1998, 80: Savine-Coche, cf. Lancel, 1995, 385 reads the *Punica* describing a geographical route up the Durance river valley and a possible crossing at the Mont Genèvre pass (*Pun.* 3.503-4; 3.512-5). Others do not discuss the route: Hoyos, 2003, 98-113; Walbank, 1985, 117-119, acknowledges the route cannot be known. Prevas, 1998, 65: 'there are only literary representations for Hannibal actually crossing the Alps.'

Thus it might be thought that descriptions of the Alpine passage would be entirely open to an author's imagination, and in fact, certain elements, such as the extremity of the weather conditions, do vary. Indeed the winter conditions become progressively worse across time, but overall the presentations by Polybius, Livy and Silius are surprisingly consistent in a number of features. Livy and Polybius describe an arduous nine-day climb to the summit of an unidentified pass, at which Hannibal camped for two nights, waiting for his slower baggage train (and elephants) to catch up, before descending to the Po valley (*Hist.* 3.53.9, Livy, 21.34.8-35.5). The variation in the *Punica* is that it took twelve days to reach the summit because the whole army stays together; Hannibal does not camp at the top of a pass for a couple of days waiting for the rest to catch up (*Pun.* 3.554-6). Thus the total time length to reach the pass is much the same across the different representations, and indeed, the tradition in the *Punica* by which the army stays together and does not camp overnight at the pass should not be lightly dismissed. There is safety in keeping together and furthermore, no-one would camp at the top of an Alpine pass in autumn unless absolutely necessary.

As the scenic backdrop to the crossing is the Alps in late autumn, the texts include snowfalls, landslides and avalanches. The variation between them lying only in the increasing severity of the conditions and whether, for example, the snowfall preceded or followed Hannibal's speech (and hence whether or not it was one of the reasons that his men needed further encouragement).

Polybius indicates a recent snowfall when describing the accumulation of snow around the summits, and particularly the treacherous effect of new snow on top of old during the descent as well as the additional problem that the new snow hid the track (*Hist.* 3.54.8). Livy describes the snowfall as heavy, creating a new and difficult experience (for men from Spain and Africa); his description is closer to alpine conditions normally encountered later in the season than November (Livy, 21.35). Silius Italicus transforms the snowfall into raging blizzards shrouding the Alpine peaks, as if in the depths of winter: *iam cuncti fatus ventique furentia regna Alpina posuere domo* (*Pun.* 3.491-2).<sup>182</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> Scholars have used the snowfall and the morning-setting of the Pleiades to argue dates that vary from late-September to mid-November for Hannibal's crossing. The astronomical information appears to offer a solid basis regarding Hannibal's month of travel, but morning-setting of the Pleiades can be anything from, say, 4.00-7.30 a.m. and the three month difference is well within the margin of error. See also Walbank, I, 390. De Sanctis, 3.2.79; Dunbabin, 1931, 122; De Beer, 1955, 100.

Progress is slow in the *Punica* because steps have to be cut into the ice on steep slopes; the landslides referred to by Polybius and Livy become avalanches that sweep men and beasts away; high winds rip away shields and one endless height after another faces the weary soldiers (*Pun.* 3.516-535). The ‘bitter cold’ described by Livy is transformed into freezing conditions to the extent that frostbite puts men in danger of losing not just fingers or toes, but arms or legs (*Pun.* 3.552-3). Spaltenstein reads the extreme conditions encountered in the *Punica* as a hint that it should not be taken too seriously: ‘the level of exaggeration suggests that he [Silius Italicus] makes fun of the journey.’<sup>183</sup> The conditions in the *Punica* are so different from the other texts that Walbank considered that Silius Italicus used different sources from Polybius or Livy for his ‘geographic embroideries’.<sup>184</sup> It is, of course, impossible to know in what style many of the lost texts presented the story or whether the increasingly poor weather conditions observed here reflect first Livy’s and then Silius’ imaginative recreation of the crossing.

The story of Hannibal having a divine guide appears in different forms across the texts, which may, in part, be due to genre. Polybius’ technique of criticism enables him to acknowledge the existence of the story and to disagree with it (*Hist.* 3.47.6-48.8). Polybius’ criticism of authors who create such difficulties for Hannibal in the Alps that they are required to include a divine guide in their story to extricate Hannibal includes an analogy to the staged *finale* of a Tragedy (in which a god is required to intervene for the play to reach a satisfactory conclusion). Polybius’ discussion is helpful because it indicates that the story of Hannibal’s Alpine crossing became so misrepresented that, within a generation, the actual route and circumstances of the traverse through the Alps could not be ascertained with certainty. It also assists in reading the *Punica* as Silius Italicus may be drawing on one of the Tragic-style traditions that Polybius complains about or Silius Italicus may even be responding to Polybius’ criticism with his own illustration of such a representation.

Livy presents the divine guide story in the form of Hannibal having a dream: *ibi fama est in quiete visum ab eo iuvenem divina specie, qui se ab Iove diceret ducem in Italiam Hannibali missum: proinde sequeretur neque usquam a se deflecteret oculos* (Livy, 21.22.6-9; also Val. Max. 1.7 ext. 1). In a sense, this presentation has a certain validity because the notion that Hannibal had divine support might realistically derive from a

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<sup>183</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 242.

<sup>184</sup> Walbank, I, 387.

dream. The dream version of the story is an old tradition and may even derive from Hannibal himself given that it was found in Silenus (*de Div.* 1.24.49).

Silius Italicus' representation of Hannibal attempting to portray himself as a successor to Hercules includes two possible allusions to the Plautine play, *Amphitruo*. Such allusions would be very apt if this play is, as has been argued, one of the first presentations of a mythological comedy on a Roman stage.<sup>185</sup> The blizzards and gales which surround Hannibal as he reaches the summit of the pass in *Punica* 3 recollect the thundering climactic imagery around the birth of Hercules in *Amphitruo* (scene 15, line 1062).<sup>186</sup> Secondly, the ‘god-like being’ in the *Punica* directing Hannibal to Italy in the dream is not Hercules, but Mercury, whose role in the *Amphitruo* is to carry out Jupiter’s orders (*Pun.* 3.168; 184-214; *Amphitruo*, 9.984). Mercury (Hermes or, in the Carthaginian pantheon, Skn) is a more appropriate choice than Hercules if Hannibal is read as attempting a reincarnation of Hercules.

Poetic licence allows for Hercules’ route to be ‘known’ in the *Punica* as Hannibal orders his men to abandon the track made by Hercules, in favour of making their own way (*Pun.* 3.503-4; 3.512-5). Silius Italicus’ representation of Hannibal avoiding the Herculean track indicates that there is both a physical and an ideological distance between the two figures; Hannibal could not be a reincarnation of Hercules. This interpretation concurs with Augoustakis’ reading that Silius Italicus presents certain character traits in Hannibal to further separate the two figures, such as Hannibal’s boastfulness (*Pun.* 3.75, 80, 89, 90).<sup>187</sup> The immediate penalty for Hannibal’s impiety was the hardship his men faced, first against the natural elements, and then against the local inhabitants; the storms are nature’s protest as Hannibal breaches both the moral and physical boundaries when he trespasses into the sacred domains (*Pun.* 3.494-504).<sup>188</sup>

Hannibal’s defiance is the immediate implication of the text but it also aligns the *Punica* with the Polybian tradition of representing Hannibal as intelligent and smart enough to find his own way across the Alps. Polybius, claiming personal experience, explicitly states that Alpine crossings were not especially difficult, even in late season

<sup>185</sup> Christenson, 2000, 24. Another Plautine play, *Poenulus*, with its more direct Carthaginian connection, is discussed by Leigh, 2004a, esp. chapter 2, for possible connections to Hannibal (inconclusive) and the role of the ‘slave as a general.’

<sup>186</sup> Christenson (ed), *Plautus Amphitruo*, Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, 2000.

<sup>187</sup> Augoustakis, 2001, 2003 reads the rape of Pyrene as a story about Hannibal’s attack on Rome and Hannibal’s attempt to imitate Hercules through ‘penetration’ of the Alps.

<sup>188</sup> Wilson, 1993, 227.

(*Hist.* 3.48.12). He debunks any pretence that Hannibal's feat was heroic by pointing out that the Gauls who lived near the Rhône regularly crossed the Alps with large armies to fight alongside the Gauls of the Po Valley against the Romans. Polybius acknowledges Hannibal's intelligence and common sense, claiming that Hannibal researched both the route and temperament of the local populations even before leaving Spain (*Hist.* 3.34.2-6; 48.9-10). Livy, too, alludes to this view when he states that traversing the Alps was rumoured (*fama*) to be worse than it really was: *sed magis iter immensum Alpesque rem fama utique inexpertis horrendam metuebat* (Livy, 21.29.7). The routes through the Alps were well established and much safer in the Flavian period and these make good reasons for Silius Italicus to make fun of the journey.

The summit of the pass is an irresistible backdrop for Polybius and Livy to present Hannibal poised on the brink addressing his men before their descent into the Po Valley and invasion of Italy. There are slight, but important, variations in content and context between their presentations. Significantly, Silius Italicus does not employ that 'critical moment' for a speech by Hannibal, reserving it instead for Jupiter's reassurance to Venus. Instead, the epic Hannibal addresses his men shortly before reaching the pass and this representation, as well as the tone and content of the speech, arguably applies a more plausible sense of 'reality' than historiographical representations of Hannibal giving a speech at the summit.

Polybius uses indirect speech to represent Hannibal encouraging his despondent men. Hannibal indicates the view of the Po Valley, and reminds everyone of their friendship with the Gauls who lived there. He compares the Alps to a citadel overlooking the plain and even points out Rome itself, which is a rare fanciful moment on the part of Polybius (*Hist.* 3.54.2-8). Livy, having a particular focus on Rome, reworks the same analogy so that the Alps represent the walls of Rome itself; Hannibal cheers his men with the thought that they had scaled the walls not just of Italy, but of Rome, and that after a couple of battles the city would be theirs (Livy, 21.35.9). Silius Italicus also reworks the analogy to bring them within the city itself: shortly before reaching the pass Hannibal directs his men to believe not only that they are scaling the walls of Rome but that they are about to enter the Capitol (*Pun.* 3.509-10). In this way the summit of the pass is equated with the Temple of Jupiter on the Capitol and the moment that Hannibal enters the pass is the cue for Jupiter's speech to Venus over the outcome of the war (*Pun.* 3.557-629).

Livy places the heavy snowfall shortly before Hannibal's speech and this, coupled with the bitter cold, is the prompt for him to encourage his men (Livy, 21.35.6). The despondency of the soldiers in Livy's text is transformed to sheer terror in the *Punica*, with the soldiers more afraid of the natural environment than their human enemies (*Pun.* 3.503). The epic Hannibal was not afraid but instead of encouraging words or pointing out scenic views of the Po Valley (they were in a blizzard and they had not yet reached the summit) his concern is to drive his men through the appalling weather. He shames them in direct speech, for allowing themselves to be beaten by forces of nature, before they have met their true enemy in battle (*Pun.* 3.506-511). And these words worked. His men *were* encouraged (*Pun.* 3.504-5).

Hannibal's troubles are by no means over once the summit of the pass is reached; the three authors maintain tension with descriptions of the descent into Italy as particularly steep and even more perilous than the ascent; the men have to rebuild or widen sections of the pathway made impassable by landslides and avalanches (*Hist.* 3.54.5-8; Livy, 21.35-6; *Pun.* 3.515-39; 630-46). Polybius noted that some people recorded the poor condition of the elephants on arrival in Italy and that Hannibal sustained substantial losses of both men and horses (*Hist.* 3.56.1-5). The 'surprise' ending of this arduous journey is that, despite considerable hardship and losses, Hannibal's army defeats the Romans in battle, and not just once. Hence the journey is initially presented in each text as potentially 'weakening and debilitating' whereas in fact it was 'toughening,' awe-inspiring and a remarkable show of strength.

There is a popular<sup>189</sup> belief that the Romans were taken by surprise when Hannibal and his army appeared in the Po Valley. Walbank is sceptical about Polybius' presentation of mutual amazement between Hannibal and Scipio as they learned of each others' arrival in the Po valley: Hannibal's arrival may have surprised Scipio but Hannibal would have had more cause for amazement if he had *not* encountered Romans on arrival in Italy.<sup>190</sup>

When Hannibal set off into the Alps, Polybius says that Scipio was surprised at the *route* Hannibal had taken (*Hist.* 3.49.1), but Scipio's response to Hannibal's departure shows that he expected Hannibal to arrive on the Italian side of the Alps. After leaving the Carthaginian camp near the Rhône, Scipio returns to the coast and divides his

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<sup>189</sup> Prevas, 1998, 5; Proctor, 1971, 63; Lancel, 1998, 82; De Beer, 1955, 77; Spencer, 2002, 158; Goldsworthy, 2004, 166.

<sup>190</sup> Walbank, III, 395-6.

forces,<sup>191</sup> sending some to Spain (his allocated province) with his brother while he travelled to northern Italy. Scipio is represented anticipating an easy victory over an exhausted, depleted army, a crucial miscalculation of the effects of the journey (*Hist.* 3.61-64).

Seneca is witness to the tradition that the Romans were ‘taken by surprise’ at Hannibal’s arrival in Italy. Seneca’s explanation for ‘taken by surprise’ is in the degree to which Scipio and successive Roman consuls underestimated the strength of Hannibal’s army (*NQ* 3 Pref 6). Silius Italicus modifies the reaction to a sense of mutual amazement with a Roman reaction of alarm, but not shock, at reports of Hannibal’s arrival in the Po valley. There is, naturally enough, disappointment that Hannibal did not perish in the Alps (*Pun.* 4.33-6).<sup>192</sup>

Crossing the Alps with his army and elephants earns Hannibal a special place in history; Hannibal himself is represented by Silius as proud of this achievement (*Pun.* 4.3-5). It is a feat which, even today, tends to be admired rather than criticised, although there are some voices of dissent. Among the ancient texts, Juvenal cites Hannibal for bringing ruin to his country in his quest for glory; the crossing of the Alps served no purpose except to provide a topic for schoolboys’ recitations (*Sat.* 10.140-167). One modern critic is Dexter Hoyos, who argues that the overland journey from Spain to Italy was a serious miscalculation on the part of Hannibal, causing irrecoverable manpower losses: ‘crossing the Alps remains the most famous and mistakenly emblematic of his feats.’<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Polybius is non-specific about how Scipio divided his forces (*Hist.*, 3.49.2); Livy (21.32.1-2), wrote that he sent most to Spain, which excuses Scipio’s subsequent loss on the grounds of using mostly raw recruits. See Grant, 1979, 102-3 for a discussion of Scipio’s decision.

<sup>192</sup> See Wilson, 2007, 429-30 for a discussion of Seneca’s passage. Seneca disparages not only marauding generals, such as Hannibal, but also the historiographic tradition, including the Roman tradition, in comparison to his own genre.

<sup>193</sup> See Hoyos, 2003, 111-3; Goldsworthy, 2004, 167-8 for discussions of Hannibal’s manpower losses and long term implications for the war.

## Chapter 3: Marching to Rome in 211 and threats after early victories

‘acti’ inquit ‘nihil est, nisi Poeno milite portas  
frangimus et media uexillum pono Subura.’

Juvenal, *Sat.* 10.155-6

‘Nothing has been achieved,’ [Hannibal] cries, ‘until our Punic soldiers have smashed the gates of Rome and our standard is set in the Subura.’

Author’s translation.

Hannibal’s crossing of the Alps was an impressive feat, but it was his appearance outside the city of Rome in 211 that became emblematic for the notion of an ‘enemy at the gates.’ He was the last famous enemy general to invade Italy in the republican period<sup>194</sup> and the event of 211 is the only recorded occasion during the entire war when he came within sight of Rome. It offers, therefore, the only opportunity for an ancient author to showcase Rome successfully repelling an attack by her great enemy, Hannibal.

The geography of peninsular Italy and Rome’s location within it enables an author to loosely describe an enemy marching towards Rome whether the army enters the peninsula from the north<sup>195</sup> or south. Thus, to present Hannibal intending to march on Rome from the time he left Spain, and especially after one of his major victories, whatever his actual intentions, is not difficult.

The various presentations of Hannibal’s march on Rome in 211 are discussed in the first section of this chapter and the depictions of Hannibal *intending* to march on Rome prior to 211, together with the explanations for why he did not appear outside the city until 211, are discussed in the second section. The comparisons in the first section will show that, apart from a general agreement on context in 211 and a general vagueness over why Hannibal withdrew from his position outside the city, there are substantial differences between the representations of both his march on Rome and the defence of Rome in the face of his attack.

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<sup>194</sup> Boiorix, king of the Cimbri, may have been the last in 101BC (Plutarch, *Marius*, 25).

<sup>195</sup> The topography favours armies invading from the north; hence Napoleon’s quip about invading Italy as if putting on a boot – entering from the top.

These differences arise in part from an author's intended depiction of Hannibal. There is also an interesting tendency over time for authors to be increasingly direct in attributing the defence of Rome to divine intervention and in addition, to bring the Hannibal figure closer and closer to physical contact with the city. Admittedly these gradual exaggerations may very well be the result of survival in the record but that is by no means certain. In addition, Silius Italicus paradoxically provides one of the more pragmatic answers for the 'defence of Rome' while aligning Rome with ancient Troy.

The texts commonly explain Hannibal's non-appearance outside Rome before 211 as due either to his state of mind or to the intervention of natural forces in preference to other, more pragmatic, explanations. It will also be shown that where Polybius and Silius Italicus present Hannibal contemplating or discussing marching on Rome prior to 211 from time to time, it is Livy who develops the notion into a major theme in books 21-5 as part of a build-up toward his centrepiece of Rome resisting Hannibal's attack in 211. Livy's treatment of this theme is summarised in the first subsection before the more general comparisons because it offers an explanation for certain differences between his representation and those of others.

Given the Gauls' invasion of Rome in 390, some authors connect Hannibal's interactions with the Gauls after leaving Spain to the notion of marching on Rome. It is arguably a connection that depends to a large extent on an author's overall representation of Hannibal, for example, whether or not Hannibal acts alone.

The final section of this chapter explores representations of post-Sullan Roman generals as Hannibalic. It would appear that for over a century following the Second Punic War, Roman armies returned to Italy from Spain and elsewhere without any suggestion that the generals heading these armies were considered a possible threat to the city or compared to Hannibal. Everything changed in 88 when the disaffected Sulla showed what could be achieved by marching an army against Rome. Connections between Sulla and Hannibal are extremely limited<sup>196</sup> but comparison to Hannibal is shown to be a problem for Sulla's protégé, Pompey, and for others thereafter, including Antonius and Julius Caesar.

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<sup>196</sup> As noted in Chapter 2, Statius, *Silv.* 4.6.86 connects them through a statuette of Hercules.

## The enemy at the gates in 211

Hoyos argues that, if Hannibal had been serious about taking the city, he was ‘...five if not six years too late.’<sup>197</sup> This point is less important to authors than taking the only opportunity in the Second Punic War to present the city of Rome itself under attack.

Any comparison between Hannibal’s attack on Rome and the most famous event from ancient epic, the siege of Troy, seems, on the face of it, to be limited, but Silius Italicus draws a comparison in *Punica 1*. The brief description of the Palatine as surrounded and besieged by Hannibal goes somewhat beyond what other texts record of Hannibal’s attack:

sed medio finem bello excidiumque vicissim  
molitae gentes, propiusque fuere periclo  
quis superare datum: reseravit Dardanus arces  
ductor Agenoreas obsessa Palatia vallo  
Poenorum ac muris defendit Roma salutem.

*Pun.* 1.12-16

But in the second war each nation strove to destroy and exterminate her rival and those to whom victory was granted came nearer to destruction: in it a Roman general stormed the citadel of Carthage, the Palatine was surrounded and besieged by Hannibal and Rome made good her safety by her walls alone.

Duff, 1996, 5.

*Dardanus* is an archaism that alludes to the Trojan myth cycle, and in Homeric poetry, Troy was famed for the strength of her walls. Hence the description of Rome being saved by the strength of her walls alone (line 16) indicates that Rome is the stronger of the two cities.

Whether or not the historical Hannibal’s overall strategy included taking the city of Rome remains an open, and probably unresolvable, question but historical issues are not main point of this discussion.<sup>198</sup> There are fundamental structural differences between Livy, Polybius and Silius Italicus arising, in part, from the relative importance each author places on Hannibal’s march on Rome in 211.

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<sup>197</sup> Hoyos, 2003, 136.

<sup>198</sup> Hannibal had neither the resources in manpower or equipment to attack a well-defended city such as Rome without additional support from Carthage or other allies. Walbank, 1.421, Lazenby, 1996, 41, and Shean, 1996, 180-1 argue that he did not intend to attack Rome. Lancel, 1998, 96 agrees, noting that Hannibal was equipped for a war of mobility, not a static war against a well-fortified city. Hoyos, 2003, 116 argues that the Carthaginian fleet off Pisa, *Hist.* 3.96.8-10, intended to link with Hannibal for a combined attack on Rome.

Livy presents Rome's resistance to Hannibal as a climactic moment of triumph for Rome and the scene forms the centrepiece of the third decad (Livy, 26). The fragments of Polybius' text suggest from his focus of attention that he prioritised the intriguing military situation at Capua in 211 over Hannibal's march on Rome (*Hist.* 9.3-11) and neither is treated as a pivotal event. Silius Italicus admittedly devotes a substantial part of *Punica* 12 to Hannibal's march on Rome and treats it as a turning point for Rome's fortunes, but it is not the central event in the *Punica* (*Pun.* 12.479-752).

Nonetheless, even historiographical texts hint at factors beyond human control assisting in forcing Hannibal's departure from outside the city in 211. Polybius says that 'luck' played a part in turning Hannibal away while Livy brings Jupiter into his narrative through a prophetic speech by Fabius Maximus:

Romam cum eo exercitu qui ad urbem esset Iovem foederum ruptorum  
ab Hannibale testem deosque alias defensuros esse.

Livy, 26.8.5

As for Rome, Jupiter, witness of the treaties broken by Hannibal, and the other gods would defend her with the aid of the army stationed at the city.

Moore, 1970, 31

When, according to Livy, Hannibal appears outside the walls and the Romans prepare for battle, natural forces (hailstorms) intervene, preventing any action. This phenomenon occurs for two days running and eventually Hannibal leaves the area but it is left for Livy's audience to draw any connection between Fabius' prophecy and interpreting the subsequent natural phenomena of hailstorms as acts of defence by Jupiter (Livy, 26.11.12).

Among the late republican poets, Propertius presents a belief that it was due to Roman piety that the gods and *Lares* responded to their prayers and drove Hannibal away from Rome (Propertius, 3.3.10-11). An emphatic remark by the Hadrianic writer, Florus, suggests that the involvement of gods in historiographical texts for the defence of Rome in 211 was the subject of some discussion:

Quid ergo miramur moventi castra a tertio lapide Annibali iterum  
ipsos deos, deos inquam nec fateri pudebit restitisse? Tanta enim ad  
singulos illius motus vis imbrium effusa est, tanta ventorum violentia  
coorta est, ut divinitus hostem summoveri non a caelo sed ab urbis  
ipsius moenibus et Capitolio videretur.

Florus, 1.22.44-5

Why then are we surprised that when Hannibal was moving his camp forward from the third milestone, the gods, the gods, I say (and we shall feel no shame in admitting their aid) again resisted his progress? For at each advance of his, such a flood of rain fell and such violent gales arose that he seemed to be repelled by the gods, not from heaven but from the walls of the city itself and from the Capitol.

Edward Seymour Foster, 1995, 109.

Genre is not an issue for Silius Italicus who brings in the gods to the defence of Rome, but firstly, while comparing Rome more favourably to Troy, Silius offers the most pragmatic reason for what saved Rome: the strength of her walls (*Pun.* 1.16). Later, in *Punica* 12 when Hannibal is outside the city, Silius presents a gradual increase in Jupiter's intervention for the defence of Rome over the course of the three days of Hannibal's attacks.

On the first day, while surveying the city from various vantage points, Hannibal retreats at the sight of Flaccus approaching with his army (*Pun.* 12.559-574). Hannibal cheers his men's spirits by reminding them of the Gauls' invasion of Rome in 390 and urging them not to be put off by Roman claims of descent from Mars because the Romans were accustomed to their city being taken! He hopes that the senators are sitting on their curule chairs waiting for death, just as their ancestors once sat (*Pun.* 12.582-4). On the second day, Hannibal and the Carthaginians are arrayed outside the walls, Fulvius leads his army out to face the enemy, but Jupiter intervenes with a thunderstorm and orders all the gods to help defend Rome (*Pun.* 12.600-626). Even Jupiter struggles against Hannibal's determination despite using all the storms (wind, hail, rain etc) in his armoury and, of course, his weapon of choice, thunderbolts. The epic Hannibal continues to rally his men to fight despite his spear-tip melting and his sword fusing in the heat (*Pun.* 12.622-629). It is only when the rainstorm became so thick and dark that they could not see their enemies' swords that Hannibal retreated.

Mere hailstorms may have turned away Livy's Hannibal, but the epic Hannibal returns again on the next day, ready to attack. The Romans, too, prepare to fight but Jupiter intervenes once more. A black cloud and gale force winds force Hannibal's retreat but it is still not enough. On the fourth day, when Hannibal reappears ready to challenge again, Jupiter turns to Juno and instructs her to turn Hannibal away. Only by revealing herself to Hannibal, and showing him the gods in the heavens preparing themselves for battle, is Juno able to persuade Hannibal that he cannot win against Jupiter and the other gods; it is time for him to leave Rome (*Pun.* 12.703-30).

Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus favour different traditions over a number of other aspects around Hannibal's march on Rome. One such difference is whether or not to present it as a well-kept secret which leads to differences between them over when they present scenes of panic at Rome. One of the points in common between them is that Hannibal's departure from Capua was *intended* to be a secret; all three describe Hannibal slipping away with his army under cover of darkness while leaving campfires burning as a ruse to deceive the Roman besiegers (*Hist.* 9.5.7; *Pun.* 12.508; Livy 26.7.10).

Polybius arranges his narrative to show how, by keeping the plan a well-kept secret, it backfires on Hannibal (*Hist.* 9.4.6-8). Hannibal hopes that by leaving at night and suddenly appearing outside Rome, the mere sight of him would cause such panic that the Romans would either recall Appius Claudius, or require Appius to split his forces and thus give Hannibal a better chance of victory by fighting two smaller forces (*Hist.* 9.4.8). Polybius adds a further point which becomes relevant in later representations, that Hannibal was increasingly concerned that his own army might, in its turn, be attacked or besieged by Roman legions sent to Capua under the new consuls. Thus Hannibal hopes to prevent or disrupt the enlistment process as well as defeat the Roman recruits before they are properly trained (*Hist.* 9.4.5).

Hannibal sends a messenger to advise the besieged Capuans of his plan, and successfully maintains the element of surprise (*Hist.* 9.5.1). His sudden arrival outside Rome comes as a complete shock to those in the city, causing scenes of panic and consternation to a degree never seen before, even after Cannae. Women even sweep temple pavements with their hair, a custom that Polybius says only occurs at moments of extreme danger:

Οὗ γενομένου καὶ προσπεσόντος εἰς τὴν Ρώμην, εἰς ὀλοσχερῆ συνέβη ταραχὴν καὶ φόβον ἐμπεσεῖν τοὺς κατὰ τὴν πόλιν, ἄτε τοῦ πράγματος αἰφνιδίου μὲν ὄντος καὶ τελέως ἀνελπίστου διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε τὸν Ἀννίβαν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπηρκέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὑποτρεχούσης δέ τινος ἄμα καὶ τοιαύτης ἐννοίας ώς οὐχ οἷόν τε τοὺς ἐναντίους ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἐγγίσαι καὶ καταθαρρῆσαι μὴ οὐ τῶν περὶ Καπύην στρατοπέδων ἀπολωλότων. διόπερ οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες τὰ τείχη προκατελάμβανον καὶ τοὺς πρὸ τῆς πόλεως εὐκαίρους τόπους, αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες περιπορευόμεναι τοὺς ναοὺς ἱκέτευον τοὺς θεούς, πλύνουσαι ταῖς κόμαις τὰ τῶν ἱερῶν ἔδάφη. τοῦτο γὰρ αὐταῖς ἔθος ἐστὶ ποιεῖν, ὅταν τις ὀλοσχερής τὴν πατρίδα καταλαμβάνῃ κίνδυνος.

*Hist.* 9.6.1-4

When the news reached Rome it caused universal panic and consternation among the inhabitants, the thing being so sudden and so entirely unexpected, as Hannibal had never before been so close to the city. Besides this, a suspicion prevailed that the enemy would never have approached so near and displayed such audacity if the legions before Capua had not been destroyed. The men, therefore, occupied the walls and the most advantageous positions outside the town, while the women made the round of the temples and implored the help of the gods, sweeping the pavements of the holy places with their hair - for such is their custom when their country is in extreme peril.

Adapted from Paton, 2000, 13-15.

The ‘problem’ for Hannibal is the Roman assumption that his arrival was a sign that their army at Capua had been destroyed (i.e. another Cannae), leading people to believe that they will have to defend their city for themselves. Furthermore, in this version, Hannibal mistimed his arrival for preventing or disrupting the enlistment process. The incoming consuls, Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius,<sup>199</sup> had completed the enrolment of one legion and were in the process of recruiting another when Hannibal appeared outside the city. Consequently Rome was full of men (*Hist.* 9.6.5-6).<sup>200</sup> Polybius implies that this is the ‘stroke of luck’ that saves Rome, causing Hannibal to abandon his plan to attack (*Hist.* 9.6.8-9). Hannibal withdraws completely after a few days, ostensibly because one of the consuls sets up camp within 10 *stades* of Hannibal’s camp, although Polybius modifies the level of that threat by adding that Hannibal decided to leave because he thought enough time had elapsed since he left Capua to allow Appius Claudius to come to Rome (*Hist.* 9.7.2).

Livy comments that there were many different versions of events for the action at Capua in 211. He opts for an exciting account in which Hannibal’s cavalry and elephants almost break into the Roman camp with much fierce fighting during which Appius Claudius is wounded (Livy 26.5.3-6.13 cf. *Hist.* 9.3.2). Despite Hannibal’s fierce attack, he fails to dislodge the Romans from their siege and decides *on impulse* to march on Rome:

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<sup>199</sup> Polybius only uses ‘Publius’ for Sulpicius i.e. the same name that as he uses for Scipio Africanus; leaving a lingering suspicion that the potential confusion for who ‘defends’ Rome is a deliberate obfuscation.

<sup>200</sup> Walbank, 1957, v2, 126 suggests that Polybius meant two *legiones urbanae*. Contra Brunt, 1971, 628; see also Rich, 1983, 287-331 and Rosenstein, 2004, 38-9.

Multa secum quonam inde ire pergeret volventi subiit animum impetus  
caput ipsum belli Romam petendi, cuius rei semper cupitae  
praetermissam occasionem post Cannensem pugnam et alii volgo  
fremebant et ipse non dissimulabat: necopinato pavore ac tumultu non  
esse desperandum aliquam partem urbis occupari posse;

Livy, 26.7.3-5

While carefully considering whether he should remove, the impulse came to him to proceed to Rome, the very centre of the war. It was something which he had always desired to do, but after the battle of Cannae he had let the opportunity pass, as others commonly complained, and as he himself frequently admitted. In unexpected alarm and confusion it need not be beyond his hopes that some part of the city could be seized.

Moore, 1970, 27.

In this creation of Hannibal's decision-making to march on Rome, it is not a considered plan reached in consultation with advisors but an emotional reaction which is reinforced by his expression of regret that he had not marched on Rome after Cannae.

Although the march on Rome is intended to be kept secret and a messenger sent to inform the Capuans of Hannibal's plan (Livy, 26.7.1-10; cf. *Hist.* 9.5.6). The 'secret' soon becomes known to the Romans because deserters from Hannibal's army inform Fulvius Flaccus, the other pro-consul stationed at Capua with Appius Claudius.<sup>201</sup> Thus Livy presents Hannibal losing a measure of control over his military secrets and perhaps something of his charisma as some of his men desert. It is relevant to note here that Polybius' extant text makes no mention of Fulvius Flaccus<sup>202</sup> whereas Livy assigns Fulvius Flaccus a critical role bringing reinforcements from Capua to Rome. Fulvius Flaccus learns of Hannibal's plan in sufficient time to send a message to the Senate:

Id priusquam fieret, ita futurum conpertum ex transfugis Fulvius Flaccus senatu Romam cum scripsisset, varie animi hominum pro cuiusque ingenio adfecti sunt.

Livy, 26.8.1

Before this happened Fulvius Flaccus had learned from deserters that it was to be done, and had so written to the senate at Rome; whereupon men's feelings were differently stirred according to their several natures.

Moore, 1970, 29.

<sup>201</sup> Wiseman, 2004, 170 reads Polybius as 'what really happened' and Livy as 'what the Romans believed happened' in the defence of Rome.

<sup>202</sup> Walbank, 1967, 119 'this does not mean that his source was necessarily unaware that Claudius' colleague was Q. Fulvius Flaccus.'

There is even sufficient time for the Senate to discuss the matter and send a messenger back to the proconsuls at Capua instructing them to decide which of them would return to Rome to prevent a siege of the city and who would remain to continue the siege (Livy, 26.8.2-10). Livy imparts a sense of Roman pique in the Senate at the timing of Hannibal's march on Rome when Fabius Maximus argues that the siege against Capua should continue because it should be considered an insult that Hannibal would march on Rome in an attempt to relieve Capua when he had not marched against Rome after Cannae (Livy, 26.8.3-5).

The 'open secret' in Livy's version enables defence measures to be put in place. The loyal people of Fregellae destroy their bridge to delay Hannibal, and send a messenger to Rome to confirm Hannibal's approach. Tension mounts with an announcement that Fulvius Flaccus was delayed in pursuing Hannibal because the Carthaginians had burned the boats at the Volturnus River (Livy, 26.9.2-3). Consequently there is fear and panic at Rome, but the critical difference from Polybius' version is that Livy presents it developing in *anticipation* of Hannibal's arrival, not because he has suddenly appeared. The description of the scene within the city is reminiscent of Polybius:

Ploratus mulierum non ex privatis solum domibus exaudiebatur, sed undique matronae in publicum effusae circa deum delubra discurrunt, crinibus passis aras verrentes, nixae genibus, supinas manus ad caelum ac deos tendentes orantesque ut urbem Romanam e manibus hostium eriperent matresque Romanas et liberos parvos inviolatos servarent.

Livy, 26.9.7-8

The wailings of women were heard not only from private houses but from every direction matrons pouring into the streets ran about among the shrines of the gods sweeping the altars with their dishevelled hair, kneeling, holding up their palms to heaven and the gods and imploring them to rescue the city of Rome from the hands of the enemy and keep Roman mothers and little children unharmed.

Adapted from Moore, 1970, 33-5

This is the only occasion in the third decad when Livy describes women sweeping altars (not temple pavements) with their hair and it is tempting to read it as a response, with minor correction, to Polybius. In addition, Fabius Maximus plays a major role in Livy's narrative as an elder statesman dealing with the panicking populace; he advises the city praetors on how to organise the city defences with garrisons stationed on the walls, at the Capitol, the Alban Mount and at Aefula (Livy, 26.9.9). The sense of danger is increased and the panic justified with stories filtering back to Rome of the cruelties

inflicted on those captured by Hannibal's advance guard and by emphasising how close Hannibal came to Rome itself. Livy writes that Hannibal reached the Temple of Hercules near the Colline Gate which seems a little poetic, given the connection between Hannibal and Hercules (Livy, 26.10.3). As noted above, Polybius prefers a tradition that Hannibal crossed the Anio without being observed and set up camp not more than 40 *stades* from Rome (*Hist.* 9.5.9).<sup>203</sup>

Livy imparts a sense of the chaos that would result if Hannibal actually entered the city. The consuls required some Numidian deserters to be transferred from the Aventine and the appearance of these African men riding through the city streets somehow confused some people into believing that Hannibal had entered the city and captured the Aventine. The result is a breakdown of order within the city and confusion reminiscent of civil war or a real siege as people mistakenly attack those on their own side, while others panic believing they are unable to escape because of the Carthaginian camp outside (Livy, 26.10.7). Eventually calm is restored. Fulvius Flaccus arrives with his reinforcements from Capua to join the consuls with their armies, but despite the readiness of the two sides for battle, the hailstorms dictate otherwise, for two days running (Livy, 26.11.12). Frontinus, perhaps closer to the Polybian version, wrote that the Romans decreed not to recall their army from Capua until the town was captured and cites the Roman army at Capua as an example of steadfastness while besieging an enemy (Frontinus, *Strat.* 3.18.3).

The *Punica* contains a number of elements for these events that are nowadays exclusive to the epic poem. Only Silius Italicus presents Hannibal returning to his camp on the summit of Mt Tifata overlooking Capua when he learns of the Roman siege of the town (*Pun.* 12.486-7). From this height Hannibal studies the situation but does *not* attack the Roman camp although he considers the possibility in a soliloquy (*Pun.* 12.492-506). Hannibal expresses the same concern as noted in the Polybian tradition, that there was a risk his own army would, in its turn, become besieged, but in this case it is by a multiplicity of Roman legions<sup>204</sup> that he observes approaching from all directions (*Pun.* 12.480-6). In this imaginative recreation of his thinking, Hannibal decides that if he cannot defend Capua he will besiege Rome:

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<sup>203</sup> About 5 Roman miles (Strabo, 7.7.4). For discussion on measuring distances, see Engels, 1985, 300.

<sup>204</sup> Silius Italicus names two of the generals heading these legions as Nero and Silanus. The juxtaposition of those two names for figures leading Roman legions from opposing directions to converge at the same point is reminiscent of the Silanii in opposition to Agrippina and the future emperor Nero (cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* 12.2.-8). Livy 26.5.8 only names Nero.

‘defendere nobis  
si Capuam eruptum est dabitur circumdare Romam.’

*Pun.* 12.505-6

‘If the defence of Capua is denied me, I shall find it possible to besiege Rome.’

Duff, 1989, 185.

Hannibal reminds his men that Rome was their original target and declares that if gaining Rome meant losing Capua, it was a price worth paying (*Pun.* 12.511-18). The underlying ‘reality’ in his declaration suggests that while Hannibal perceived Capua as useful, the town was not critical for the Hannibal’s overall strategy for war against Rome. He was prepared to abandon Capua and not waste resources trying to defend the town.

Hannibal’s march on Rome in the *Punica* is intended to be a secret, and, in this respect Silius Italicus is much closer to the Polybian tradition than to Livy over Hannibal’s success at maintaining secrecy. Hannibal reaches the Anio undetected and remains undiscovered until he sets up a camp near where the Anio meets the Tiber<sup>205</sup> (*Pun.* 12.541-2; cf. *Hist.* 9.5.8). Therefore, as with Polybius, it is Hannibal’s sudden appearance outside Rome in the *Punica* which causes shock and panic within the city.

On the other hand, Silius Italicus, like Livy, depicts a Roman figure comprehending that Hannibal’s appearance outside Rome did not necessarily mean that he had destroyed the army at Capua. The difference from Livy is that Silius Italicus more plausibly voices it through Fulvius Flaccus than Fabius Maximus. Fulvius Flaccus was, after all, pursuing Hannibal from Capua:

Fulvius antevolans agmen ‘quis nesciat’ inquit  
‘non sponte ad nostros Poenum venisse penates?  
a portis fugit Capuae.’

*Pun.* 12.600-2

At the head of the army rode Fulvius. ‘It is an open secret,’ he said, ‘that Hannibal was no free agent when he came to attack our homes: he was driven in flight from the gates of Capua.’

Duff, 1989, 191.<sup>206</sup>

Most notably, given Silius Italicus’ predilection to name even the most minor characters in the *Punica*, he makes no mention of two Roman figures who play particularly

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<sup>205</sup> About 3 miles from Rome, Duff, 1989, 186 n.b.

<sup>206</sup> ‘open secret’ is a loose translation. Flaccus as the spokesman is more relevant for this point.

significant roles in each of the other two texts: Appius Claudius (from Polybius) and Fabius Maximus (from Livy). It is, of course, hard to argue from a negative, but perhaps Silius Italicus intended to counter Polybius' glaring omission of Fulvius Flaccus when writing that the siege of Capua was not abandoned without mentioning Appius Claudius (*Pun.* 12.571).

When Hannibal appears outside Rome, Silius Italicus describes the senators collectively bringing the panic and turmoil in the city under control, and unlike Livy, Silius Italicus does not single out Fabius Maximus for special treatment:

stat celsus et asper ab ira  
ingentemque metum torvo domat ore senatus.

*Pun.* 12.551-2

But the senators stood erect and formidable in wrath, and their grim aspect quelled the mighty panic.

Duff, 1989, 187.

In the *Punica* no individual takes a leading role and people took their cue from the collective appearance of the senators.

Hannibal is placed noticeably closer and closer to the physical city in each of Polybius, Livy and Silius' texts. Polybius places Hannibal's camp at 40 *stades* but the reader is not informed how much closer Hannibal came to the city (*Hist.* 9.5.9); Livy locates Hannibal at the Temple of Hercules near the Colline Gate (Livy, 26.10.3); in *Punica*, Hannibal makes physical contact. He rides around the walls banging on the city gates with his spear, enjoying the panic he created (*Pun.* 12.558-566). Of course, this sense of Hannibal's increasing proximity to the city from Polybius through Livy to Silius Italicus is probably a matter of survival in the record combined with the surrealist nature of epic poetry.

Despite the sense of fear and panic at Rome, whether it was at the sight of Hannibal outside the walls, or in the knowledge that he was approaching the city, people were resilient. Hannibal does not take the city, and each author reveals a different flaw in Hannibal's character or in his planning by way of explanation. For Polybius, Hannibal mistimed his arrival at Rome and the need for secrecy is flawed because the Romans believe that they have to defend the city for themselves. Livy depicts Hannibal unable to wield sufficient control to keep his plans secret; the Romans are forewarned and know that the army at Capua was intact. Silius Italicus combines the element of Hannibal's

sudden appearance outside Rome causing panic with Fulvius Flaccus' timely arrival to save the city.

The other substantial difference between these texts arises from their respective treatments of individual Romans, in particular Fulvius Flaccus, Appius Claudius and Fabius Maximus. These treatments may reflect the variety of available traditions between different Roman families in ancient times, but there is a distinct impression that Silius Italicus responds to each of Polybius and Livy in respect of these figures.

The defence of Rome in 211, irrespective of genre, is explained in supernatural terms. These, like Hannibal's ever-closer approach to the city, become noticeably more explicit over time if considered as progressing from Polybian 'luck' through Livy's two days of hailstorms to direct intervention by Jupiter and Juno in the *Punica* and Florus' reference to authors (and audience) accepting the roles of the gods defending the city in historiographical texts.

## **Representations of Hannibal marching on Rome before 211**

Hannibal is sometimes represented as marching to Rome or considering marching to Rome prior to 211 especially after certain victories, but for various reasons it does not happen. The explanations, however, for Hannibal not marching on Rome, are not concerned with his lack of resources to attack a walled city, his distance from the city or other pragmatic reasons, but instead they relate to his state of mind, natural forces or divine intervention. The emphasis on such reasons as Hannibal's state of mind or natural phenomena allows for these representations to be read as literary motifs and compared as foreshadowing features in relation to his actual appearance in 211. This interpretation is supported by the frequency with which these representations are located in the texts prior 211; the patterning of Hannibal's threats to the city in Livy's text is particularly striking, and discussed first before the more general comparisons.

### **Livy's theme of Hannibal marching on Rome**

Hiberum traieceris ad delendum nomen Romanorum liberandumque  
orbem terrarum.

Livy, 21.30.3

They had crossed the Ebro, in order to wipe out the name of the Romans and liberate the world.

Adapted from Foster, 1949, 87.

In this quote Livy echoes Cato's famously proverbial *delenda est Carthago* through Hannibal's announcement to his men shortly before crossing the Alps that their goal is to wipe out the name of the Romans. It marks the start of a theme that 'Hannibal is marching to Rome' which pervades Livy's first pentad and culminates in Hannibal's appearance outside the city in 211.

Livy's methods of presentation of the theme that Hannibal is marching to Rome are sufficiently frequent, varied, and carefully situated in his text to be described as forms of a foreshadowing<sup>207</sup> technique which build up tension and the sense of fear at Rome prior to Hannibal's appearance outside the city in 211. There are threats, discussions, an aborted attempt and feints. 'Rome resisting Hannibal's attack' in 211 marks both the literary midpoint of the third decad and the temporal midpoint of the war (if it is measured between Hannibal's siege of Saguntum in 219 and his defeat at Zama in 202).<sup>208</sup>

The central importance of book 26 is indicated through its opening scene: the first sentence begins ordinarily enough in typical annalistic format with the names of the consuls, but, atypically, they are convening their inaugural Senate meeting during the Ides of March to discuss the *res publica* (Livy, 26.1.1). It is one of the most important senate meetings of the year and lies at the heart of Roman culture; the only other book in the third decad with a comparable opening scene is the final one, book 30, although the meeting in that scene is not specifically identified as taking place during the Ides of March (Livy, 30.1.1).

One effect of the theme 'Hannibal marching on Rome' is to regularly return the audience attention to Rome even though the focus of the narrative may be on events far removed from the city. Given that Livy's overall focus is Rome, it is not Hannibal's appearance *per se* which is the centrepiece to the third decad but 'Rome' in a communal sense of the physical city with her inhabitants and her army resisting his attack. The centrality of the city of Rome to Livy's third decad concurs with his title, *ab urbe condita*, and with the role of the city in the other extant sections of the text. At the halfway point in the first decad, for example, Camillus has a substantial oration in which he summarises the preceding events of the pentad in terms that stress the importance of

<sup>207</sup> See use of this term in Kraus & Woodman, 1997, 61; and Luce, 1977: on the architectural structure in Livy. Mellor, 1999, 59-60: on architectonic patterns in the Hannibalic books.

<sup>208</sup>  $219 - 202 = 17$  years. Divide 17 by 2.  $219 - 8 = 211$ . Livy does not, by this reckoning, 'stretch the bounds of history,' as suggested by Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2505.

the physical city of Rome (and the need for piety toward the gods who protect the city, Livy, 5.51.1-5.55).<sup>209</sup>

The role of the physical city in Livy's text is in accord with Cicero's views on the importance of architecture (*aedificatio*) in a work of history and Livy's adaptation of Cicero's metaphor to both subject and structure has been recognised in terms of his overall literary organisation and focus on monuments to recall famous deeds.<sup>210</sup>

Rome as heroine in the third decad is a role that fits surprisingly well with the extant numismatic evidence for this period. Coins bearing the features of ROMA, a female personification of the city, are believed to have first appeared from about 211.<sup>211</sup> This external evidence supports Livy's presentation in the sense that contemporary Romans' perceptions of themselves and their city may have changed after Hannibal's brief appearance and departure from outside Rome followed shortly afterwards by the fall of Capua.

Some of the structure and themes in Livy's text were studied by Burck<sup>212</sup> who argues that Livy structured his decades around certain key events. Luce<sup>213</sup> is more specific to the themes in the third decad and notes that at the start of each pentad Hannibal is marching on Rome, a situation which is reversed at the end of the decad when the Romans march on Carthage. In terms of the centrality of Hannibal's appearance outside the city walls, Kraus & Woodman<sup>214</sup> describe it as 'the low point and geographical centre' of the decad; Mellor<sup>215</sup> agrees that Hannibal's march on the city marks the lowest ebb in Roman fortunes after which Roman victories followed. While agreeing with the centrality of the scene, the reading of the scene in this thesis interprets it as a celebration of Rome's success, not a low point, which is a closer correlation with those who read Hannibal's *withdrawal* from Rome as the centrepiece of the decad,<sup>216</sup> and with Jaeger's point that Livy pays much attention to the physical city of Rome at the midpoint of the third decad.<sup>217</sup>

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<sup>209</sup> Camillus claims that the Gauls sacked Rome in 390 because the Romans had neglected the gods, particularly Jupiter, and their ambassadors at Clusium behaved impiously (Livy, 5.51.5-10). See Ogilvie, 1965, 626; Luce, 1977, 268-; Levene, 1993, 199-200.

<sup>210</sup> Mellor, 1999, 59; Luce, 1977; 1997; Kraus and Woodman, 1997, 57-9.

<sup>211</sup> The legends ROMA, ROMANO appear on earlier issues but not with a female figure, Crawford, 1974, vol I, 41; vol. II esp. Tables V, VI; also Thomsen, 1957, 61; Mattingly, 1960, 11 argues for ROMANO as an old genitive plural – coinage of the Romans; ROMA lays more stress on the supremacy of Rome.

<sup>212</sup> Burck, 1971.

<sup>213</sup> Luce, 1977, 27.

<sup>214</sup> Kraus, & Woodman, 1997, 59.

<sup>215</sup> Mellor, 1999, 59.

<sup>216</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2505; Dominik, 2006, 116.

<sup>217</sup> Jaeger, 2000.

## Representations of Hannibal threatening Rome

When Hannibal sets out from Spain, the Gauls are generally represented giving him a mixed reception. Some tribes oppose him while others support him and he has to fight and/or negotiate or bribe his way across their territories into Italy from Spain. Polybius presents Hannibal fighting or negotiating with different tribes, but particularly illustrates Hannibal's forward-planning and negotiating skills by locating Hannibal in a meeting with Gallic chiefs from the Po Valley. It takes place before Hannibal crosses the Alps and indicates that Hannibal's envoys must have travelled well ahead of the army in order to meet and convince these men to meet the Carthaginian. Polybius presents Hannibal arranging for these chiefs to personally address his army in order to reassure his men of their support (*Hist.* 3.44.1-12).

Livy's representation of Hannibal's interactions with the Gauls is more negative; they prepare an army to face Hannibal but he persuades them that his quarrel is not with them and pays for passage through their lands (Livy, 21.24.3-5). Those tribes who support Hannibal are said to do so either out of fear or by accepting bribes. The contrary view that Hannibal crossed their territories by conquest is placed in a direct speech by Hannibal himself; its credibility is left to the reader. Hannibal reminds his men that as they had repeatedly conquered the Gauls who had themselves once captured Rome, they should find the courage to face their final goal, Rome:

Cepisse quondam Gallos ea quae adiri posse Poenus desperet? Proinde aut cederent animo atque virtute genti per eos dies totiens ab se victae, aut itineris finem sperent campum interiacentem Tiberi ac moenibus Romanis.

Livy, 21.30.11

Had the Gauls once captured that which the Phoenicians despaired of approaching? Then let them yield in spirit and manhood to a race which they had so often defeated over the last few days or look to end their march in the field between the Tiber and the walls of Rome.

Adapted from Foster, 1949, 89.

In the same speech, Rome is described as the capital of the world *Romam caput orbis terrarum* (Livy, 21.30.10). It might be considered a 'strange anachronism in the mouth of Hannibal'<sup>218</sup> but it reminds the audience of the fictional nature of the speech as well

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<sup>218</sup> Foster, 1949, 88, n2.

as the importance of the city not just to Hannibal, but to the decad and to Livy's whole work, *ab urbe condita*.

Silius Italicus, on the other hand, reminds *his* audience that the events of 390 are long since avenged; Roman honour was restored by conquest and memorialised by Gallic helmets and the sword of Brennus hanging in the entrance to the Senate House (*Pun.* 1.609-29). The *Punica* does not locate Hannibal meeting with Gallic chiefs prior to crossing the Alps. On the other hand, it is more apparent in the *Punica* than in Livy that many Gauls support Hannibal because they feature in the catalogue of peoples that comprise Hannibal's army shortly before leaving Spain (*Pun.* 3.340; 345). Silius Italicus also more plausibly indicates that there are mixed reactions to Hannibal and his army from different tribes as Hannibal crosses their lands from the Pyrenees to the Alps:

iamque per et colles et densos abiete lucos  
Bebryciae Poenus fines transcederat aulae.  
inde ferox quaesitum armis per inhospita rura  
Volcarum populatur iter tumidique minaces  
accedit Rhodani festino milite ripas.

*Pun.* 3.442-446

And now, marching through hills and dense pinewoods, Hannibal crossed the territory of the Berbrycian king. Thence he boldly forced his way through the land of the inhospitable Volcae, and ravaged it, till he came with rapid march to the formidable banks of the swollen Rhône.

Duff, 1996, 147.

iamque Tricastinis incedit finibus agmen  
iam faciles campos iam rura Vocontia carpit.

*Pun.* 3.466-7

Now Hannibal moved on through the territory of the Tricastini and made an easy march through the land of the Vocontii.

Duff, 1996, 149.

An easy march may refer to local topography but may equally imply conquest or negotiating safe passage, and the only tribe shown to be explicitly hostile (and conquered) are the Volcae.<sup>219</sup> Nonetheless, Hannibal later claims, as he does in Livy, that he forced or conquered his way across southern Gaul from Spain to Italy:

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<sup>219</sup> Contra Spaltenstein, 1986, 235 ‘Sil. néglige le combat contre les Volcae...’

‘debellata procul, quaecumque vocantur Hiberis,’  
ingenti Tyrius numerosa per agmina ductor  
voce sonat; non Pyrenen Rhodanumve ferocem  
iuissa aspernatos Rutulam fumasse Saguntum,  
raptum per Celtas iter,

*Pun.* 4.59-63

Then Hannibal’s voice rose in a great shout over his mighty host: ‘We have subdued all that distant land that bears the name of Spain; the Pyrenees and the proud Rhône have obeyed our bidding; Rutulian Saguntum has gone up in smoke; we forced a passage through Gaul,’

Duff, 1996, 173.

On arrival in the Po Valley, Hannibal cheered his men with the disingenuous remark that the rest of the route was over level ground and Rome was at their mercy (*Pun.* 4.40-4).

Polybius’ presentation shows that many Romans, including Scipio, who expected Hannibal’s journey over the Alps to have been exhausting, not toughening, were caught by surprise; Scipio was defeated and wounded in battle at the Ticinus River. Polybius condenses time, which has the effect of increasing the sense of shock and surprise at Rome when he says that news of Hannibal’s arrival in Italy seemed to come almost as soon as the rumours over the crisis at Saguntum had quietened down. He adds that the sense of shock at Rome was made worse by stories that (unspecified) Italian towns in the Po Valley were already under siege. These rumours, when coupled with Hannibal’s victory at the river Ticinus, present Hannibal defying all expectations, in a strong contrast to Polybius’ earlier description of Hannibal’s significant losses of men and animals in the Alps as well as the poor condition of the survivors. The Roman Senate responds by recalling the other consul, Tiberius<sup>220</sup> Sempronius, from Lilybaeum and requesting him to travel north at all speed to assist his colleague, Scipio (*Hist.* 3.61.5-8).

There is an interesting correlation between the recording of rumours about besieged Italian towns on Hannibal’s arrival in the Polybian tradition and rumours in the *Punica*. Silius Italicus personifies Rumour at the start of *Punica* 4 advancing through Italy with news of Hannibal’s arrival, adding stories and exaggerating Hannibal’s achievements, spreading panic among the populace (*Pun.* 4.1-38; cf. *Hist.* 3.61.6). Livy, perhaps unexpectedly, given the frequency with which he usually turns his narrative to Rome, makes no mention of the reaction at Rome either to news of Hannibal’s arrival in Italy

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<sup>220</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 307 notes the consul was Tiberius Sempronius Longus; Silius Italicus calls him ‘Gracchus,’ a branch of the family with a more illustrious name; Polybius names him ‘Tiberius’ and Livy as ‘Sempronius.’ When referring to this figure in the *Punica*, I will use the name Gracchus.

or to news of his victory over Scipio. Livy turns directly from the action in north Italy to the other consul, Tiberius Sempronius, and his successes in the Mediterranean. The reaction at Rome is merely implicit in the urgent message that Tiberius Sempronius receives from the Senate requiring him to travel at all speed from Sicily to assist his colleague in the north (Livy, 21.49-51).

By the time Tiberius Sempronius arrives to join Scipio, the two opposing armies are camped not far from each other near the river Trebia; Scipio is alive but wounded from battle at the river Ticinus. Some sources, including Polybius and Livy, use Tiberius Sempronius' arrival to foreshadow Cannae in the sense of showing that defeat is the result for consuls who argue and cannot work together in order to defeat a common foe. Tiberius Sempronius is eager to attack Hannibal whereas the wounded Scipio urges caution.<sup>221</sup> The two authors offer different reasons for Tiberius' enthusiasm and Silius Italicus offers yet another. According to Polybius, it is elation caused by a recent success against the Carthaginians in a cavalry skirmish; Tiberius believes he can defeat Hannibal (*Hist.* 3.70.1). Livy relates it to Hannibal's threat to Rome and Tiberius Sempronius is eager to attack because the Carthaginians were camped 'almost within sight of Rome':

Castra Carthaginiensium in Italia ac prope in conspectu urbis esse.

Livy, 21.53.4

The Carthaginians were encamped in Italy and almost within sight of Rome.

Foster, 1949, 157.

In the *Punica*, there is no disagreement between the consuls and Gracchus is eager to fight simply because such spirit was a family trait (*Pun.* 4.495-6).<sup>222</sup> All three representations of Gracchus' enthusiasm probably have a measure of validity.

Polybius does not directly present Hannibal intending to march on Rome following the victory at the Trebia, and it might be stretching the point to read it in the description of Hannibal's men chasing the retreating Romans and only to be stopped in their pursuit by natural forces, in the form of a storm (*Hist.* 3.74.9-11). Except that the passage

<sup>221</sup> Scipio argues for delay over winter because Hannibal is under pressure to impress the Gauls in the Po Valley, he wants to fight the Romans while Scipio is sick and the Roman recruits raw (*Hist.* 3.70.1-12).

<sup>222</sup> Silius Italicus' version of the battle also differs from others for the effects of the cold river. It is a more plausible but more shameful explanation that, during the course of battle, Hannibal's army gradually pushes the Romans into the cold water (*Pun.* 4.570-666). Cf. Polybius, *Hist.* 3.61.6-11, Livy, 21.54.5, the Romans are lured through the cold water to fight on the other side. Appian, 7.2.6 has yet another version: the Romans ford the cold river in order to provoke battle.

immediately following has turned to Rome. Polybius describes the reaction, as at first, people believe the report that a storm deprived Tiberius of victory followed by their disbelief, shock and surprise when they learn that Hannibal and his army were not only safe in their camp but that it was the Romans who retreated (*Hist.* 3.75.1).<sup>223</sup> The information that Hannibal was in a camp indicates that he was not, in fact, marching on Rome and the new consuls, Servilius and Flaminius, have time to organise their preparations (*Hist.* 3.72.5-7).

Livy presents a deeper emotional reaction of terror and consternation<sup>224</sup> at Rome to the news of the defeat at the Trebia and connects it to the theme of Hannibal marching on Rome through people's imagination, not through any action by Hannibal. Nobody expects Hannibal to remain in his camp, but to appear outside the city at any moment: *ut iam ad urbem Romanam crederent infestis signis hostem venturum* (Livy, 21.57.1).

Silius Italicus moves directly from the defeat at the Trebia to the rise of Flaminius, nor do the Carthaginians remain in their winter camp for very long. Juno, disguised as the goddess of Trasimene, appears in a dream to Hannibal, convincing him to drive his men in a forced march across the wintry Apennines and through the marshes toward the lake. As the men had recently crossed the Alps, they were considered quite capable of crossing the Appenines in winter (*Pun.* 4.739-762). In his epic reinterpretation Silius Italicus maintains a consistent portrayal of Hannibal either working alone or as a tool of Juno, whereas both Livy and Polybius set aside Hannibal's record for making pre-emptive strikes and credit the Gauls<sup>225</sup> with pressuring him to leave his winter camp to invade Roman territory at the earliest opportunity (*Hist.* 3.78.5-6; Livy 22.1.2).

Polybius attests to a Roman assumption that Hannibal would march on Rome and which route he would take by locating the consul Flaminius near Ariminum preparing to confront Hannibal and block his progress (*Hist.* 3.75.1-4). Polybius' narrative shows how these assumptions and plans are confounded by Hannibal's decision to take the more treacherous west coast route through marshland toward Etruria.

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<sup>223</sup> Polybius shows that by sending out these legions the Romans were protecting their interests, and attempting to deflect Carthaginian resources away from Italy possibly aiming to draw Hannibal out of the peninsular (*Hist.* 3.75.4). Cf. McCall, 2002, 35 who argues that the Roman losses at the Ticinus and Trebia rivers were minor given they sent legions to Sardinia and Sicily and garrisons to other towns.

<sup>224</sup> Foster, 1949, 168, n1: the description of terror and consternation in Rome at news of the defeat 'are not in Polybius and very likely drawn from Coelius Antipater.'

<sup>225</sup> Livy says that Gauls within Hannibal's army wanted booty and those outside pressure him because they did not want war on their lands (Livy, 22.1-4).

By taking this route through the marshes, Hannibal is generally accepted as marching on Rome, exemplified by Silius Italicus who describes him as unconcerned about his loss of sight<sup>226</sup> in one eye if his other eye allowed him to see his goal, the Capitol:

si victoria poscat  
satque putat lucis Capitolia cernere victor  
qua petat atque Italum feriat qua comminus hostem.

*Pun.* 4.757-9

If victory demanded it, he was willing to sacrifice every limb for the sake of war; it seemed to him that he had sight enough if he could see his victorious path to the Capitol, and a way to strike home at his foe.

Duff, 1996, 225.

As Hannibal moved south, Flaminius moved from Ariminum toward Trasimene in order to confront him. It may seem a reasonable course of action and the accounts of Flaminius ignoring advice to wait for his colleague have an overwhelming sense of hindsight. Polybius is highly critical of Flaminius, describing him as rash and irresponsible, claiming that it was inappropriate for a consul to ignore advice from his officers. He does, however, include Flaminius' counter-argument that the Roman army should not remain idle while observing the enemy destroying the country almost up to Rome itself (*Hist.* 3.82.3-4; also Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 3.1). Livy similarly presents Flaminius angrily refusing to wait for the Senate to summon him while Hannibal marches to the walls of Rome: *ad Romana moenia perveniat* (Livy, 22.3.10).

The ignoring of sage advice emphasised in the historiographical traditions is poetically transformed by Silius Italicus to forewarnings through a series of omens and divine inspiration that serve to warn Flaminius, except, as everyone knows, omens and portents warn, but do not prevent destiny (*Pun.* 5.59-74; 5.78-100). Flaminius' reasoning to reject the advice echoes the phrasing in Livy that the Roman army cannot wait while Hannibal marches to the walls of Rome (*Pun.* 5.124-5).

Polybius perhaps intends his audience to compare Flaminius' refusal to listen to advice against Hannibal because he depicts Hannibal following up his victory by meeting with his brother and other advisors to discuss where and how to deliver the final attack. Rome is the implicit target and Hannibal is confident:

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<sup>226</sup> Cf. Manilius, *Astronomica*, 4.564-7, that Hannibal's blindness was a mark of Fortune's envy.

ταῦτα δὲ πράξας διενοεῖτο μετὰ τάδελφοῦ καὶ τῶν φίλων ποῦ καὶ πῶς δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ὄρμήν, εὐθαρσῆς ὥν ηδη περὶ τῶν ὄλων.

*Hist. 3.85.6*

After this he consulted with his brother and friends as to where and how it was best to deliver his attack, being now quite confident of final success.

Paton, 2001, 209.

Hannibal's confidence is understandable and Rome might be the implicit target for the final attack, but Polybius leaves his audience hanging on the outcome of the meeting by turning first to the consternation at Rome at news of yet another defeat and the missing body of Flaminius.<sup>227</sup> When his narrative returns to Hannibal it becomes apparent that marching on Rome was discussed at the meeting but rejected. Paradoxically perhaps, Hannibal's confidence in achieving ultimate success causes him to decide against approaching Rome in favour of going to the Adriatic coast (*Hist. 3.86.8*). The only explanation offered is Hannibal's caution. Similarly, Polybius leaves his audience to decide if it is caution or cruelty that underlies Hannibal's order that all adults encountered be killed as his army makes its way to the Adriatic coast (*Hist. 3.86.9*).

Livy turns immediately to the reaction at Rome after the disaster at Trasimene, and does not, therefore, present Hannibal meeting with advisors. When his narrative returns to Hannibal it is implied that Hannibal considered marching on Rome. The crucial difference from Polybius' portrait of Hannibal is that, instead of being confident of success, Livy's Hannibal turns away because he calculated Rome's power to be too strong after he tried but failed to take Spoletum, a Roman colony:

Hannibal recto itinere per Umbriam usque ad Spoletium venit. Inde cum perpopulato agro urbem oppugnare adortus esset, cum magna caede suorum repulsus, coniectans ex unius coloniae haud prospere temptatae viribus quanta moles Romanae urbis esset, in agrum Picenum avertit iter non copia solum omnis generis frugum abundantem, sed refertum praeda, quam effuse avidi atque egentes rapiebant.

Livy, 22.9.1-3.

Hannibal marched straight on through Umbria as far as Spoletum. But when after systematically ravaging the country, he attempted to storm the town, he was repulsed with heavy losses; and conjecturing from

<sup>227</sup> Brizzi, 1984, 35-43 argues that the Gauls' tradition of decapitating the enemy and stripping their armour would have rendered Flaminius' body unrecognisable. Livy 22.6.3-4 says the body was protected by the veterans. Polybius, *Hist. 3.84* is non-specific. Silius Italicus, *Pun. 5.665*: the body became buried under corpses. Plutarch, *Fab. Max. 3.3*: Flaminius died heroically; his body never found.

the strength of a single colony which he had unsuccessfully attacked how vast an undertaking the city of Rome would be, he turned aside into the Picentine territory.

Foster, 1949, 229.

In Livy's eyes the strength of a Roman colony is measured by its social tie (and the implicit military experience of its veteran citizens), not physical size or defences, to be less than that of Rome. Therefore, the message from this test of strength is that if Hannibal cannot take a single loyal colony, he will not succeed against Rome. Woodman identifies this 'intended but aborted' march on Rome after Trasimene as a literary foreshadowing for the real march.<sup>228</sup> If this is the case, it could also be postulated that Polybius' presentation of Hannibal considering but deciding against marching on Rome is a foreshadowing of the actual march on Rome.

Silius Italicus does not turn immediately to Rome. The opening scene of *Punica* 6 is a moment of pathos in the battlefield on the morning after the battle at Trasimene as Bruttius, the standard bearer, though mortally wounded, manages to bury the eagle in his dying moments. Eventually those at Rome learn of the crisis, personifications of Fear and Rumour exacerbate the fear, causing people to recall the sack of Rome in 390:

Interea rapidas perfusa cruentibus alas  
sicut sanguinea Thrasymenni tinixerat unda  
vera ac ficta simul spargebat Fama per urbem.  
Allia et infandi Senones captaeque recursat  
attonitis acris facies: excussit habenas  
luctificus Pavor, et tempestas aucta timendo.

*Pun.* 6.552-8

Meanwhile, Rumour, her swift wings dyed with blood – she had dipped them in the blood-stained waters of Lake Trasimene – spread tidings true and false throughout Rome. In their terror men recalled the battle of the Allia, the accursed Senones and the sight of the captured citadel. Woeful Fear shook off all restraint and the calamity was made worse by apprehension.

Duff, 1996, 323.

The sight of women with hair turned grey from the dust in the temples indicates the extreme level of tension. As noted previously, Polybius and Livy only present this evocative detail in relation to Hannibal's actual appearance outside Rome in 211 (*Pun.* 6.560-2; Livy, 26.9.8; *Hist.* 9.6).

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<sup>228</sup> Woodman, in Kraus and Woodman, 1997, 61: 'the aborted march is a foreshadowing function with the real march to tie the text together.'

Where Livy's Hannibal gains a new respect for Roman power after his attempt against Spoletium, the epic Hannibal develops a fear of the basis of Roman power, the individual Roman soldier. Hannibal surveys the dead Romans at Trasimene, their anger still showing on their faces:

‘et vereor, ne, quae tanta creat indole tellus  
magnanimum fecunda viros, huic fata dicarint  
imperium, atque ipsis devincat cladibus orbem.’

*Pun.* 5.674-6

‘It misgives me that this land, the fertile mother of such noble heroes, may be destined to hold empire, and may, even by its lost battles, conquer the world.’

Duff, 1996, 281.

*Punica* 6 resumes with the survey of the battlefield; in one case the dead Roman's anger is converted to epic fury<sup>229</sup> as the soldier, for want of a weapon, has used his teeth and bitten the nose off his opponent, also dead (*Pun.* 6.47-53).

Hannibal's fear does not prevent him continuing with a plan to march on Rome. He does not turn toward the Adriatic because he is confident of ultimate success as suggested by Polybius, or because he has gained new respect for Roman power after failing to take a Roman colony, as in Livy. The only thing that eventually stops the epic Hannibal's determination to march on Rome is direct intervention by Jupiter:

‘haud umquam tibi Iupiter,’ inquit,  
‘o iuvenis dederit portas transcendere Romae  
atque inferre pedem.’

*Pun.* 6.600-602

‘Never shall Jupiter permit you, young man,’ he said, ‘to pass the gates of Rome and walk her streets.’

Duff, 1996, 325.

Jupiter then hurls four<sup>230</sup> thunderbolts to make his point (*Pun.* 6.605-8). The tradition of divine intervention and Jupiter preventing Hannibal marching on Rome after Trasimene is not exclusive to the *Punica*. Appian wrote that ‘divine Providence’<sup>231</sup> turned Hannibal away toward the Adriatic (Appian, *Hann.* 3.12.1).

<sup>229</sup> Braund and Gilbert, 2003, 275-6 argue for cannibalism as symbolic epic anger that goes beyond the moral bounds. However the focus of the text is on anger, not cannibalism; there is no suggestion of hunger on the part of the Roman soldier. See also Livy's scene at Cannae, Livy 22.51.

<sup>230</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 433 notes that ‘four’ is a less prestigious number than ‘three.’

<sup>231</sup> White, 2002, 323.

News of the disaster at Trasimene resulted in rapid political change at Rome. With one consul dead and the other, Servilius, on his way back to the city but too far away to preside over the Senate, Fabius Maximus was elected Dictator (Livy, 22.9.6-7; *Hist.* 3.87; Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 4.1). Later in his narrative Livy elaborates on the unusual circumstances of the election, explaining that, in the absence of Servilius, Fabius could only be a pro-Dictator (Livy, 22.31.8-11). The extraordinary nature of Fabius' appointment noted by Livy is transformed in the *Punica* to intervention by Jupiter (*Pun.* 6.609-12).

Fabius Maximus is credited as the person most responsible for changing Roman tactics in response to Hannibal. He implemented an ultimately successful policy for a longer drawn-out war of attrition governed by tracking Hannibal, blocking him from the coast or marching on Rome and engaging in small-scale skirmishes, but avoiding battlefield confrontation (Livy, 22.8.7; 22.9.7-8; Plutarch, *Fab. Max.*, 5.1-5). The policy of defeating Hannibal by not fighting earned Fabius a new cognomen, Cunctator, and people paid him the tribute of calling him the Shield of Rome: *Hinc illi cognomen novum et rei publicae salutare Cunctator; hinc illud ex populo, ut imperii scutum vocaretur* (Florus, 1.22.27). The analogy of Fabius as the Shield of Rome is itself based on the assumption that Hannibal was marching to Rome; the title dates to the period very soon after the war, given the references to it by Ennius.<sup>232</sup>

In book 22, Livy presents Hannibal apparently deceiving Fabius by making a feigned march on Rome. After Hannibal extricates himself from the Falernian plain by tricking his way past Fabius (Livy, 22.16.4) he seems to march toward Rome through Samnite territory:

Tum per Samnum Romam se petere simulans Hannibal usque in  
Paelignos populabundus rediit.

Livy, 22.18.6

Hannibal now feigned a movement upon Rome by way of Samnium, and marched back right to the land of the Paeligni, pillaging as he went.

Foster, 1949, 261.

It is, by definition, impossible to judge how serious a feint might be and Livy implies that it worked because in the next sentence Fabius is recalled to Rome, ostensibly on religious matters (Livy, 22.18.8).

Livy's presentation allows for an initial perception that Fabius was deceived by Hannibal's move and became concerned for the defence of the city but when Fabius appears with reinforcements just in the nick of time to rescue Minucius, the more lasting impression is one of Fabius being just as capable at playing games of deception as Hannibal (Livy, 22.24.12)! In comparison, Polybius and Silius Italicus also present Fabius recalled to Rome for religious matters, but neither of them situates the recall adjacent to a feigned march on Rome by Hannibal (*Hist.* 3.94.8-9; *Pun.* 7.377).

### A vulnerable moment after Cannae

Polybius closes *Histories* 3 with a summary of the immediate effects of Cannae including the Roman expectation that Hannibal would appear at the gates of Rome (*Hist.* 3.118.5-8). Appian, too, wrote that the Romans expected Hannibal to march on Rome and capture their city (Appian, *Hann.* 5.27.1). Yet, unlike the aftermath of Hannibal's previous victories, Polybius does not depict him in a meeting to discuss his options. Instead there is a substantial break of three books and when the narrative returns to the Second Punic War story, it resumes with the Roman Senate declining Hannibal's offer to ransom Roman prisoners. It is apparent that Hannibal did not march to the city (*Hist.* 6.75). No explanation is offered.

Livy compares the sense of despair at Rome to the time when the city had been captured by the Gauls because the initial reports suggest that the entire army had been wiped out and both consuls killed (Livy, 22.54.7). Livy found it too difficult to describe the state of mind of the populace:

Nunquam salva urbe tantum pavoris tumultusque intra moenia Romana fuit. Itaque succumbam oneri neque adgrediar narrare quae edissertando minora vero faciam.

Livy, 22.54.8

Never except when the city had been captured, was there such terror and confusion within the walls of Rome. I shall therefore admit myself unequal to the task, nor attempt a narrative where the fullest description would fall short of the truth.

Adapted from Foster, 1949, 377.

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<sup>232</sup> Cicero, *Ad Att.*, 2.19.2; *De officiis*, 1.84 (quoting Ennius); Plutarch, *Fab Max* 19.3; *Marcellus* 9.4. See Wiseman, 2004, 166.

Livy continues the passage with a description of the *city walls* protecting the panicking citizens in the face of their crisis. The terror and confusion are confined to the space within the protective walls, *intra moenia*, which inspire a sense of safety among senior-ranking citizens. This enables them to find the courage to continue the *res publica* and allows the Praetors call a Senate meeting (Livy, 22.55.1-4).

Hannibal lacked the immediate resources for a siege but one of the most successful methods of taking a well-defended, well-resourced ancient city during a siege or even without a siege was by treachery. Livy presents certain actions at Rome that suggest this was taken into account following Cannae; these actions are acted out as religious rituals in response to the crisis which imparts a sense of validation. Two Vestal Virgins were punished for breaking their vows, and a pair of Greeks and a pair of Gauls are buried alive in the Forum Boarium (Livy, 22.57).<sup>233</sup> The declared intention was to appease the gods but where the punishment of the Vestals served as a warning to the citizens who transgress ancient custom, the other was a savage warning to any non-citizen residents of Rome, particularly among the two groups of people most likely to consider supporting Hannibal.

Where Polybius places Hannibal in meetings after his earlier victories, but not after Cannae, Livy does the opposite.<sup>234</sup> Livy presents one of Hannibal's cavalry commanders, Maharbal,<sup>235</sup> urging Hannibal not to waste any time but to set out for Rome immediately following his victory. Florus, likewise, repeats Maharbal's criticism of Hannibal but, as an author, cannot decide between Hannibal's mistaken judgement (lack of *Virtus*) or the future destiny of Rome, *Fortuna*, as ordained the gods (Florus, 1.22.18-22).<sup>236</sup>

Livy's scene is noted by Hoyos<sup>237</sup> for its parallels with the meeting that Polybius presents after Trasimene (Livy, 22.51.1-4; *Hist.* 3.85.1-6). Hoyos argues that Maharbal's urging Hannibal is more likely, especially in terms of distance, after

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<sup>233</sup> Human sacrifice was rare but not unknown. Pliny, *NH*, 30.1.12 notes that in 97BC a decree forbidding human sacrifice was passed by the Senate which indicates that it happened from time to time.

<sup>234</sup> Livy states that he used Fabius Pictor, 'a contemporary witness,' for his account of Trasimene; Livy does not name his sources for Cannae: 'some' writers, 22.52. For comments on differences between Polybius and Livy: Scott-Kilvert, 1979, 391, n1; Lancel, 1998, 131.

<sup>235</sup> It is uncertain whether or not this figure is Hannibal's brother. Florus describes Maharbal at Cannae as son of Bomilcar; Livy does not identify him beyond his name; Polybius refers to Maharbal in the mopping-up operations after Trasimene but does not identify Maharbal as the 'brother' in the meeting with Hannibal.

<sup>236</sup> For discussion on Florus' historiography and reinterpretation of Sallust to show *Virtus* and *Fortuna* working to the same end, see Quinn, 1994.

<sup>237</sup> Hoyos, 2000, 610-614.

Trasimene than after Cannae. One unforeseen result of Hannibal *not* marching on Rome after Cannae has been the extraordinary amount of discussion it has generated.<sup>238</sup>

Livy presents Hannibal later regretting his decision not to march on Rome (Livy, 26.7.2). The reason that Livy offers for Hannibal not marching on Rome after Cannae is due to Hannibal's state of mind in that the idea is too vast and too joyous for him to grasp:

Hannibali nimis laeta res est visa maiorque quam ut eam statim capere animo posset.

Livy, 22.51.3

To Hannibal the idea was too joyous and too vast for his mind at once to grasp it.

Foster, 1949, 369.

Where Livy represents Hannibal as overwhelmed with joy by his achievement, in the *Punica* Hannibal has a quite different, almost surprising emotion. Hannibal is not happy after his victory at Cannae, but angry. Angry and frustrated because he had not attained his object of marching on Rome:

stimulat dona inter tanta deorum  
optatas nondum portas intrasse Quirini.

*Pun.* 10.331-2

When the gods had given him so much, it stung him to think that he had not yet gained his object - to enter the gates of Quirinus.

Duff, 1989, 75.

This epic Hannibal intends to march on Rome the following day but Juno, aware of Jupiter's plans for Rome's destiny, prevents him pursuing his objective by summoning Sleep (*Pun.* 10.337-345). The only thing that Hannibal can do is dream about marching on Rome and even then, when he arrives outside the city, Jupiter orders him not to enter the city (*Pun.* 10.358-369). Thus, in this version, Hannibal cannot take the city even in his dreams!

When Hannibal wakes, it is his brother, Mago (not Maharbal), who urges him to march on Rome (*Pun.* 10.375-9; '*fratri*' *Pun.* 10.387). In some ways, Silius Italicus' use of Mago concurs with both Livy and Polybius to the extent that they both place Mago with Hannibal on the battlefield at Cannae, whereas only Livy places a Maharbal at

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<sup>238</sup> A few examples: Montgomery, 1968, 98 argues Maharbal was right in principle. Warmington, 1969, 208: 'Hannibal's force was too small, and he had no siege engines.' Lancel, 1998, 109 and Hoyos, 2003, 136 argue that conditions were unchanged since Hannibal arrived in Italy; he did not have the resources to besiege Rome. Lancel 1998, 96: 'Hannibal was best suited to a war of mobility rather than a static war against the well-fortified city of Rome.' Shean, 1996, 180-1 defends the decision not to march on Rome.

Cannae (Livy, 22.46; 51.3; cf. *Hist.* 3.114.7 where Polybius names Hanno). The epic Hannibal says nothing of his dream to Mago but claims weakness from wounds and tired soldiers. In what seems to be an echo of the meeting presented by Polybius after Trasimene when Hannibal chose not to march on Rome because he was confident of success, this Hannibal warns Mago in direct speech against the dangers of over-confidence:

celatis superum monitis clausoque pavore  
vulnera et exhaustas saevo certamine vires  
ac nimium laetis excusat fidere rebus.

*Pun.* 10.377-9

Concealing the divine warning and suppressing his fears, Hannibal pleaded in excuse the wounds and weariness of the soldiers after their fierce conflict, and spoke of over-confidence due to success.

Duff, 1989, 79

Mago's angry reply echoes the critique given by Livy that, by not following up on his victory, Hannibal had not defeated Rome, only Varro:

‘tanta mole,’ inquit, ‘non Roma ut creditit ipsa  
sed Varro est victus...’

*Pun.* 10.382-3

‘Then our mighty effort has not defeated Rome, as Rome herself believed; it has only defeated Varro...’

Duff, 1989, 79

Hannibal is slowing down. Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy note that representations of Hannibal in the *Punica* after Cannae indicate a steady decline and loss of vigour; there are no further outstanding battle successes.<sup>239</sup> The poetic reinterpretation reflects what might be viewed as a change of policy by the historic Hannibal. It was to his advantage to wait and assess how many towns in Italy either defect or surrender to him after Cannae. Silius Italicus, in acknowledging the physical and logistical difficulties for Hannibal to march on Rome after Cannae, gives both the concerns voiced by Hannibal to his brother as well as the opinion of Hannibal's men. They believe that the march to Rome in 211 was better timed than after Cannae:

creduntque ducis sollertibus actis  
aptius id coeptum, quam si duxisset ab ipso  
fatali Aeneadis campo.

*Pun.* 12.519-21

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<sup>239</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2509-2510; also Marks, 2005, 26.

They believed that, thanks to their general's adroitness, this enterprise was better timed than if he had led them there straight from the field so fatal to the Aeneadae.

Duff, 1989, 185.

The structure of Cornelius Nepos' *Hannibal* biography suggests, but does not directly state, that Hannibal did march on Rome after Cannae. Where Chapter 4 of the biography closes with Hannibal's victory at Cannae, in an interesting juxtaposition the next sentence opens Chapter 5 with Hannibal's march on Rome:

Hac pugna pugnata Romam profectus nullo resistente in propinquis urbi montibus moratus est. Cum aliquot ibi dies castra habuisset et Capuam reverteretur Q Fabius Maximus dictator Romanus in agro Falerno ei se obiecit.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 5.1

After having fought that battle, Hannibal advanced on Rome without resistance. He halted in the hills near the city. After he had remained in camp there for several days and was returning to Capua, the Roman dictator Quintus Fabius Maximus opposed himself to him in the Falernian region.

Rolfe, 1984, 265.

On the other hand, Cornelius Nepos is explicit that Hannibal was returning to Capua. It might be that Nepos condenses time which concurs with the overall summarising style of the biography or there might be missing text which would also explain *hac pugna pugnata*. Nepos' placement of Fabius opposing Hannibal *after* Hannibal's march on Rome is another variation on the historiographical tradition and not necessarily an error, especially as Nepos' text is incomplete. It may be indicative of the number of extant traditions about of these events and demonstrate how some features of Hannibal's exploits may have become dislocated from their historical chronology.

## Risks for later Roman generals

Spencer's assessment<sup>240</sup> that there are no extant comparisons of Sulla to Hannibal for marching an army on Rome seems true enough, although that is a common feature between the two men. There is one extant text, Statius' *Silvae*, that draws a connection between Sulla and Hannibal, but it is not drawn through their common actions but through their supposed consecutive ownership of a statuette of Hercules:

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<sup>240</sup> Spencer, 2002, 157.

Nec post Sidonii letum ducis aere potita  
egregio plebeia domus. convivia Sullae  
ornabat semper claros intrare penates  
assuetum et felix dominorum stemmata signum

Statius, *Silvae*, 4.6.86-88

After the death of the Sidonian captain [Hannibal] ‘twas no common house that gained possession of the peerless bronze. Ever accustomed to enter the famous homes and fortunate in the line of his owners, the statue adorned the banquets of Sulla.

Shackleton Bailey, 2003, 287

The poet condenses time, giving the impression that the statuette passed directly from Hannibal to Sulla.<sup>241</sup> While this connection between Sulla and Hannibal is tenuous at best, there are indications that potential comparison to Hannibal was a problem for Sulla’s protégé, Pompeius Magnus, and for one of Sulla’s opponents and rivals, Sertorius.

Pompey’s affectation to be considered as another ‘Alexander’ as well as favoured by Hercules<sup>242</sup> makes him susceptible to comparison with Hannibal given the links between these figures, and the problem is compounded by some of Pompey’s actions. Maneuvering politically for the opportunity to match Alexander’s achievement of conquests on three continents was well nigh impossible for a Roman consul operating under the traditional rules and charged politics of republican Rome. It was not until Pompey’s highly irregular career that such an achievement became a reality for a Roman general (Plutarch, *Pomp.*, 45).

Pompey brought an army over the Alps into Italy on his way back to Rome from Spain. Sallust paraphrases a letter, said to be from Pompey, to the Senate dated 70 in which it is apparent that Pompey is aware of the possible comparison to Hannibal and takes care to distance himself from Hannibal in physical terms as well as to present himself as a more prudent commander by stating that he opened a ‘route that was different from that which Hannibal had taken and more convenient:’ *per eas iter aliud atque Hannibal, nobis opportunius, patefeci* (Sallust, fr. 2.82.4).<sup>243</sup> The sting in the tail at the end of the letter threatening war is more suggestive of Sallust’s authorship than of

<sup>241</sup> Cf. Plutarch, *Sulla*, 35.1 links Sulla to Hercules: Sulla consecrates a tenth of all his substance to Hercules prior to a feast for the people at Rome at which there was more food than could be consumed over the course of a number of days.

<sup>242</sup> Plutarch, *Pomp.* 2.1; 46.1-2: comparisons with Alexander. Appian, *BC*, 2.76: the Pompeian watchword at Pharsalus was *Hercules invictus*.

<sup>243</sup> Sallust, Fr. 2.82.4; transl. McGushin, 1992, 59. Incidentally the letter shows a Roman mindset that Hannibal crossed the Alps by a treacherous route.

Pompey: ‘you are our last resort: unless you come to our aid, my armies, against my wish but as I have already warned you, will cross to Italy and bring with it the whole Spanish War.’ ‘*reliqui vos estis: qui nisi subvenitis, invito et praedicente me exercitus hinc et cum eo omne bellum Hispaniae in Italiam transgredientur*’ (Sallust, *fr. 2.82.10*).<sup>244</sup>

It seems inconceivable that the historical Pompey, if he was as concerned with appearances as the opening of the letter suggests, would threaten to alienate the Senate and march an army to Rome at a time when he hoped for a triumph as the reward for his Spanish victory.<sup>245</sup> As it is very likely that Sallust’s *Histories* post-date<sup>246</sup> the death of Pompey, the letter may have been edited by Sallust and must be treated with caution. Nevertheless, the main point for this thesis is that the phrasing indicates an awareness of the risk to appear Hannibalic.

A more sympathetic tradition appears in Appian’s text about Pompey, and possibly alludes to the letter in Sallust. Appian describes Pompey ‘courageously crossing the Alps, but not with the expenditure of labour of Hannibal, but by opening another passage around the sources of the Rhône and the Eridanus (Po),’ (Appian, *BC*, 1.109).<sup>247</sup> The underlying politics in these representations to distance Pompey from Hannibal requires Hannibal’s route across the Alps to be ‘known’ and presented as crossing through a high and difficult pass.

The comparison between Hannibal and others were not necessarily related to common actions; his comparison to Sertorius<sup>248</sup> (defeated in Spain by Pompey) is related to a shared physical characteristic. Plutarch observed that some of history’s most able generals had been one-eyed men: Sertorius, Hannibal, Philip and Antigonus. All four were notable for their achievements and cunning in warfare, although Sertorius was reputed to have been more merciful towards his enemies than Hannibal (Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 4). Plutarch’s biography is, of course, written much later than Sallust’s letter (c. 75 AD) but Plutarch believed that the comparison was old, derived from a Greek tradition related to courtiers’ flattery of Mithridates. The flatterers compared Sertorius to

<sup>244</sup> Sallust, *Fr. 2.82.10*; translation adapted from McGushin, 1992, 59.

<sup>245</sup> McGushin, 1992, 14: ‘Sallust often allows a figure to present their own point of view to justify conduct or policy and then creates an ironical contrast to the situation as Sallust sees it. What little is known of Sallust suggests that he began his political life as a Pompeian but transferred his allegiance to Caesar, perhaps after being expelled from the Senate in 50 (Dio, 40.63.4).’

<sup>246</sup> McGushin, 1992, 4 uses internal evidence to date Sallust’s works between 44-35, noting that Jerome is unreliable for 35 as the date for Sallust’s death.

<sup>247</sup> Transl. McGushin, 1992, 245.

<sup>248</sup> See Plutarch, *Sertorius*.

Hannibal and Mithridates to Pyrrhus, telling Mithridates that the Romans could not hold out when the ablest of generals was in alliance with the greatest of kings (Plutarch, *Sertorius*, 23.3). Despite Plutarch's belief, the tradition also has a Roman thread because it appears in Tacitus' *Histories*. Tacitus wrote that Claudius Civilis compared himself to Sertorius and Hannibal on the basis of being one-eyed. Unlike Sertorius, Civilis managed to avoid being declared a public enemy by affecting friendship with Vespasian; an incisive Tacitean *sententia* that also hints at another reputed Hannibalic trait: Civilis' lack of *fides* (Tacitus, *Hist.* 4.13).

Julius Caesar 'marched on Rome' but the few extant contemporary comparisons between Julius Caesar and Hannibal are circumspect. Cicero, for example, restricts his comparison to a private letter to his friend Atticus, dated to 21 January 49:

Quaeso, quid est hoc? Aut quid agitur? Mihi enim tenebrae sunt. 'Cingulum' inquit 'nos tenemus, Anconam amisimus; Labienus discessit a Caesare.' Utrum de imperatore populi Romani an de Hannibale loquimur?

Cicero, *Ad. Att.* 7.11.1

What in the name of wonder is this? What is going on? I am in the dark. People say, 'Cingulum is ours, Ancona is lost, Labienus has deserted Caesar.' Are we talking of a general of the Roman people or of Hannibal?

Adapted from Winstedt, 1958, 53.

Cicero dramatizes the rumours as he summarises Caesar's progress through Italy toward Rome. It is a rare opportunity for Cicero to present Caesar acting incongruously in an apparently anti-Roman cause, but notable that he kept his criticism to a private letter.

Cicero's later comparisons of Antonius to Hannibal are embedded within his series of very public criticisms known collectively as the *Philippics*,<sup>249</sup> but are not directly related to marching on Rome. Cicero argues that Antonius measures poorly against Hannibal as a general, and upholds Hannibal as an 'ideal' enemy of past times.

In sum, Sallust's text, Cicero's letter to Atticus, and Appian are all important for their treatments of Hannibal as the archetype for an enemy marching on Rome. As Sallust and Cicero predate Livy, their comparisons suggest that Livy developed his theme from a Roman belief that Hannibal intended marching on Rome.

Tacitus and Plutarch show that Hannibal was compared for his leadership and qualities as a general (as well as his physical appearance). In addition, Plutarch's

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<sup>249</sup> Billot, 2005b, 15.

reference to Mithridates' courtiers indicates that Hannibal left an equally lasting impression in the Greek East as he did in Italy despite the eventual Roman victories over Antiochus and Prusias.

## Chapter 4: Cannae, the most celebrated memorial of Punic victory

*Cannas Punicae victoriae clarissimum monumentum*

Hannibal to Prusias, Val Max., 3.7. ext. 6

One man's victory is another man's defeat and elsewhere Valerius Maximus describes Hannibal's victory at Cannae in August 216 as an unmitigated disaster for Rome: *Cannensem cladem* (Val. Max. 1.1.15). Cannae is accepted by many historians<sup>250</sup> as the biggest military defeat for Rome in the mid-Republican period. Hannibal's victory becomes yet more stunning and the Roman defeat more ignominious given Roman numerical superiority and the fact that both consuls were sent to Cannae to force the issue against Hannibal (*Hist.* 3.107-8.1).

Apart from the general agreement that Cannae was Hannibal's high-point and a disastrous defeat for Rome, there is considerable variation between the presentations of the event and the figures involved. In part these differences result from assessments that are made in moral terms. The most negative form follows a tradition that traces Roman moral decline back to Cannae, a view which underlies the *Punica* and, as will be shown, to a lesser extent underlies the *Histories*. The first section of this chapter compares the treatments of Cannae and the generals involved in terms of various features including the location of the event within the text; divine intervention; and exhortations.

The second section of this chapter compares the types of omens and portents associated with Cannae (even Polybius includes a rare reference to omens prior to Cannae) to argue for their use by Livy and Silius Italicus to connect Cannae and/or the generals at Cannae with other events or people. Livy will be shown to create connections within the third decad and to a First Punic War defeat in book 19, whereas Silius Italicus, using the same method, draws connections to other texts, particularly those concerned with the civil war battle of Pharsalus. The effect of the connections in the *Punica* is to align the Romans at Cannae with the Pompeians at Pharsalus, and this carries consequent implications for reading Hannibal as Caesar, though the

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<sup>250</sup> E.g. Lazenby, 2004, 225, describes the outcome as 'perhaps the worst losses ever suffered by a Western army in a single day.' See also Goldsworthy, 2001, 197-221; Daly, 2002.

representation is very indirect. It should, however, be noted that these connections between the *Punica* and Pharsalus are in addition to those connections already noted by others<sup>251</sup> between the *Punica* and Lucan's *de bello civili* which is centred on Pharsalus.

## Relative importance of Hannibal's victory

As quoted at the start of this chapter, Livy summarises Cannae as a disaster in terms of the human cost for the army and the ignominy of defeat for Rome (Livy, 22.50.1). His long-term assessment, however, is that the defeat was not of great significance because Hannibal, unlike the Gauls, did not follow up on his victory by taking the city of Rome.<sup>252</sup> Livy seems to support this view by not locating the battle in a prominent position within his text; it is in the latter part of Book 22 and the book closes with the reception given to Varro on his return to Rome in the wake of defeat.<sup>253</sup>

This location within Livy's text may also be justified on temporal grounds if the battle took place in August because it is mid- to late-year in relation to the annalistic historiographic tradition and therefore neither at the beginning nor at the end of a book. In architectural terms across Livy's third decad, the Roman defeat at Cannae corresponds to, and is balanced against, the Roman victory over Hasdrubal at the Metaurus River in 207. This event is located in the latter half of Book 27, thus a major defeat and the low point for Rome at Cannae are balanced structurally against a high point and a substantial victory. The two battles are connected by a number of features including parallels in the records of omens associated with them, discussed more fully in the following section (see also Appendix 1).

A further link is the reappearance of Gaius Terentius Varro in the narrative for the first time since his return to Rome after Cannae (Livy, 22.61; 27.36). Varro's name reappearing in the text assists the reader to recall Cannae and compare the outcome of defeat when consuls disagree, as at Cannae, to the reward of victory when they cooperate and work together, as at the Metaurus River, *ea omnia cum summa concordia consulum acta* (Livy, 27.38.10).

<sup>251</sup> See Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2501-4; Boyle and Sullivan, 1991, 297-9: 'Silius met Lucan halfway.' Also Mills, 2007, 1 who argued that the introduction of Hannibal in the *Punica* has discernible echoes of Julius Caesar's introduction in Lucan's *de bello civili* (*Pun.* 1.56-60; *BC* 1.144-50).

<sup>252</sup> Livy elides the fact that the Allia is much closer to Rome than Cannae.

<sup>253</sup> Jaeger, 2000, 97 notes how the Roman nobility and plebeians all turn out to meet Varro, on his return from Cannae (Livy, 22.61.13-15). See Rosenstein, 1990, for discussion on how Roman society coped with defeats and rarely, in fact, blamed defeated generals for losses. See also Rich, 1991, 401.

Polybius treats Hannibal's victory at Cannae as a pivotal event of enormous significance. It is located at the close of *Histories* 3 and followed by a substantial break of three books in the Second Punic War narrative in which Polybius sought to explain how the qualities of the Roman socio-political structures enabled them firstly to recover their supremacy in Italy, then to conquer Carthage and eventually become masters of the (Mediterranean) world (*Hist.* 3.118).

Where Livy may have had a chronological justification to locate the battle in the latter part of book 22, Polybius may justify locating Cannae at the conclusion of *Histories* 3 because it took place near the end of the 140<sup>th</sup> Olympiad (*Hist.* 3.118.11).<sup>254</sup> On the other hand, it is also demonstrable that Polybius arranged his narrative material in order to conclude *Histories* 3 with Cannae because his summary of contemporaneous events in Spain, including the Scipios' successes, are placed before, not after, the events in Italy (*Hist.* 3.95.1-6).<sup>255</sup>

Champion<sup>256</sup> argues that Polybius presents Cannae as the fiercest battle of the war in order to reveal the highest qualities of both sides. This study agrees that the battle is given special treatment in Polybius' text, though not eulogised to the extent of Zama. Polybius' treatment of Cannae serves as a warning to his audience that the Romans refuse to accept even the most severe defeat as the final outcome, and that they have a remarkable determination to achieve ultimate victory in warfare.

A number of texts present Roman moral decline as a consequence of Cannae; it is based on the notion that once Rome recovered from such a heavy defeat and eventually went on to overall victory at Zama, the subsequent Roman conquests across the wider Mediterranean were driven by an ever increasing greed for wealth and power (Sallust, *Cat.* 10; Velleius Paterculus, 2.1-2; Silius Italicus, *Pun.* 10.657-8). Silius Italicus' focus on the battle coupled with his emphasis on the role of the gods are interpreted by McGuire<sup>257</sup> as indicative of the poetic construct and artificiality of the poem in order to direct the Flavian audience to a message that moral decline at Rome could be measured from, and was a consequence of, Cannae. The paradoxical message that defeat would

<sup>254</sup> The Olympics were generally held between late July and early September; Polybius does not specify in which month they took place that year.

<sup>255</sup> Livy also briefly covers events in Spain for 216 before turning to Cannae (Livy, 22.19-22) but, unlike Polybius, does not mention the Scipios' successes in Spain until the following book (Livy, 23.26.1-29).

<sup>256</sup> Champion, 2004, 117.

<sup>257</sup> McGuire, 1997, 56-7; 126-9.

have been better for Rome than victory is similar to the paradox underlying Lucan's *de bello civili*, that victory is no proof of righteousness.<sup>258</sup>

Silius Italicus directly relates Cannae to a theme of moral decline through his concluding remarks in *Punica* 10:

haec tum Roma fuit; post te cui vertere mores  
si stabat fatis, potuis, Carthago, maneres.

*Pun.* 10.657-658

Such was Rome in those days; and, if it was fated that the Roman character should change when Carthage fell, would that Carthage were still standing!

Duff, 1989, 99.

The battle at Cannae is the centrepiece of the *Punica* with the three central books (*Punica* 8, 9 and 10) devoted to Hannibal's victory and balanced with seven books on either side.<sup>259</sup> The structure of the *Punica* has been a subject of some discussion. Some suggest that its structure is not based on any prior tradition on the Second Punic War,<sup>260</sup> while others have argued for the influence of either Ennius or Virgil on Silius Italicus for the length of the *Punica* and criticise Silius Italicus because there is a problem in terms of 'fitting' the seventeen books of the *Punica* to the length of either of these two predecessors.<sup>261</sup> Wallace suggests that the seventeen book structure of *Punica* was poorly modelled on the 12-Book *Aeneid*, while von Albrecht hypothesises that the *Punica* is based on a series of three pentads (1-5; 7-11 and 13-17) which are 'interspersed by two Books' to account for the two 'extras,' *Punica* 6 and *Punica* 12.<sup>262</sup> Undoubtedly the *Punica* responds in a variety of ways to the *Aeneid*<sup>263</sup> and undoubtedly

<sup>258</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2503-4; Boyle and Sullivan, 1991, 299.

<sup>259</sup> Boyle and Sullivan, 1991, 299: Two heptads separated by a triad; Dominik, 2006, 116. Cf. Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2505 who identify Silius Italicus' invocation of the Muses just prior to battle at Cannae (*Pun.* 9.340-353) as the centrepiece of *Punica* 9 and the centre of the whole poem. Contra, Moore, 1921, 151: 'no well developed climax...nor are such great events as...Cannae... adequately used.' Note also Pomeroy, 1989a, 127 'the 17 books are carefully planned and not the mark of an ailing poet.'

<sup>260</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2493, 2507; McGuire, 1977.

<sup>261</sup> Mendell, 1924, 92-106; Martin, 1946, 163-5 and Conte, 1994, 491 argue for Ennius as a model which requires an 18 book structure. Leigh, 2000b, 478 argues that Silius Italicus aspired (but failed) to produce something comparable to the eighteen Books of Ennius' *Annales*.

<sup>262</sup> von Albrecht, 1999, 294; Wallace, 1958, 100.

<sup>263</sup> There is much scholarship on the relationship between the *Aeneid* and the *Punica*. Ahl, Davis & Pomeroy, 1986, 2493-2501; Hardie, 1989, 3-20; and Spaltenstein, F, 1986 note many of the relevant passages. Also references in Wilson, 1993 and 2004; Boyle and Sullivan, 1991, 301. Boyle, 1993, 91, Rome's future assured in *Aeneid* 12, makes a similar point.

contains allusions to Ennius' *Annales*,<sup>264</sup> but quantity of Books is not one of them. Thematically *Punica* 12 and *Aeneid* 12 have similarities in terms of impact<sup>265</sup> but the *Punica* is not, as noted by Wilson, in any danger of coming to a sudden end with *Punica* 12.<sup>266</sup>

If, however, the seventeen-book composition of the *Punica* reflects the seventeen year length of fighting referred to by Hannibal in his harangue to his men before Zama as given by Polybius, (*Hist.* 15.11.6), its structure may be considered as a poetic acknowledgement of an annalistic tradition without being written in annalistic form (but not Livy's text because his Hannibal refers to sixteen years of fighting Livy, 30.32.6). It is also open to conjecture that there is a poetic allusion to the structure of the *Histories* because a fragment describing Scipio's triumph after Zama is only placed by editors in *Histories* 16 through comparison with Livy.<sup>267</sup> If the fragment was originally from *Histories* 17 the result would be a very interesting correlation of seventeen Books between the *Histories* and the *Punica* for the story of the Second Punic War.

The centrality of Cannae to the *Punica* distorts time if the *Punica* is read as a poetic narration of the Second Punic War and Silius Italicus' application of time<sup>268</sup> generally has been much discussed: Feeney, for example, reads the historical events as radically dislocated to make the 'nadir of Roman fortunes the high point of the poem,' and Dominik notes that the 'narrative strategy... includes the elastic use of time.'<sup>269</sup> In a related vein, Wilson<sup>270</sup> says that Silius Italicus 'goes much further than Livy in allowing thematic relevance rather than temporal duration determine the amount of narrative allocated to particular incidents.' He calculates that events ending with Cannae occupy about one-fifth of Livy's narrative, whereas the same time period occupies over half of the *Punica*, and the remaining 15 years of the Second Punic War are compressed into the second half of the epic.

<sup>264</sup> Beard, 2007, 43 suggests that the triumph of Scipio as the culmination of the *Punica* is modelled on Ennius' *Annales* of which she believes the final book featured the triumph of Ennius' patron, Marcus Fulvius Nobilior, 187BCE.

<sup>265</sup> von Albrecht, 1999, 294.

<sup>266</sup> Hardie, 1993, 60. Cf Wilson, 2004, n22 'Hardie's attempt to see the end of the *Punica* as related primarily to the end of the *Aeneid*... is a particularly Virgiliocentric reading...'

<sup>267</sup> Walbank, 1967, 25.

<sup>268</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics* 1449b13f. For modern summary of timing of historical events in Livy compared to the *Punica* see table in Wallace, 1968, 84.

<sup>269</sup> Feeney, 1986, 141; Dominik, 2006, 115.

<sup>270</sup> Wilson, 1993, 230.

## Representing Hannibal's leadership skills and selecting the battle-site

In their accounts of the period shortly before Cannae, Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus increase the sense of tension with an illustration of Hannibal's leadership being put to the test when certain groups within his army threaten to leave.

In each case, Hannibal successfully persuades them to remain; the variation between the representations is over which group threatens to leave and for what reason. Polybius particularly lauds Hannibal for his leadership skills and compares him to a good sea-captain<sup>271</sup> for holding together an army of diverse groups from different nationalities without disbanding it for the entire time he was fighting the Romans (*Hist.* 11.19.3).<sup>272</sup> He presents Hannibal persuading the Gauls to remain with him, despite their knowledge that the *praetor* Lucius Postumius was in Cisalpine Gaul with his legion (*Hist.* 3.106.6). It is not stated if Hannibal had a similar cause for concern over his Spanish allies whose home territory was also under pressure from Roman invasion (*Hist.* 3.96.1). Polybius also suggests that Hannibal faced problems feeding his army because Hannibal is said to have seized Cannae both for its grain store and its commanding position (*Hist.* 3.107.2).

Livy opts for Hannibal's skills being tested in retaining his Spanish fighters but not by the invasion of Spain; they threaten to leave because there is a lack of food and they have not received any payment (Livy, 22.43.3-5). Hannibal persuades them to remain and is in a cheerful, positive mood because the arrival of the two consuls meant that the Romans were preparing for a battle (Livy, 22.41.1-4).

Silius Italicus, like Polybius, represents the Gauls threatening to leave but the reason for their possible desertion is different: this time it is over the lack of action (*Pun.* 8.16-20). In addition, Hannibal is not happy but depressed and frustrated at the inaction resulting from Fabius' refusal to fight which is compounded by a lack of support and political difficulties in Carthage led by his enemy, Hanno, who blockades Hannibal's food supply from Carthage (*Pun.* 8.21-24). The poetic interpretation elides the Roman naval blockade as a factor that prevents supplies reaching Hannibal paradoxically presenting a Carthaginian blockade!

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<sup>271</sup> As will be shown in the relevant sections, this analogy is reworked by Silius Italicus for each of Paulus and Varro.

<sup>272</sup> Polybius' placement of this analogy in the *Histories* encourages his audience to compare Hannibal against Scipio's leadership and handling of sedition in the Roman army in Spain a few chapters later (*Hist.* 11.25.1-9).

Although Polybius refers to Hannibal taking the township of Cannae for its location and grain store, he also makes a rare reference to divine intervention over the choice of battle-site.

Polybius protects himself against his own criticism of authors who include the actions of deities in a historiographical text by voicing it through Hannibal's exhortation to his men. Hannibal announces that thanks were due firstly to the gods for selecting the battleground and secondly to himself for compelling the enemy to fight (*Hist.* 3.111.3).

Silius Italicus also attributes the selection of the battle-site to divine intervention. In this case, Juno sends the nymph, Anna, to offer Hannibal encouragement and lift his depression at his lack of progress against Rome. Among other things, Anna tells Hannibal the outcome of the forthcoming battle (*Pun.* 8.11.1-231).<sup>273</sup> Suitably encouraged, Hannibal orders his men to follow her to the battle-site:

‘vellantur signa, ac diva ducente petamus  
infaustum Phrygibus Diomedis nomine campum.’

*Pun.* 8.240-1

‘Pull up the standards, and let us follow the goddess to the field where  
the name of Diomede is of ill omen to Trojans.’

Duff, 1996, 409.

Livy is one of a number of other authors who prefer the tradition that Hannibal himself chose the location (Livy, 22.44.1; Valerius Maximus, 2.7 ext 2; Plutarch, *Fab. Max.*, 16; Frontinus, *Strat.*, 2.2.7). The reason given by Livy echoes a point of contention between the Roman consuls in Polybius: that the natural topography suited Hannibal's cavalry. Furthermore, once Hannibal understood the local conditions he relocated his camp to a situation with its back toward the Volturnus wind (Livy, 22.43.10-11; 22.44.4 cf. *Hist.* 3.110). Perhaps the one point in common between these different traditions is a general agreement that the site was not selected by the Roman consuls, and Livy is explicit that they followed the Carthaginians to Cannae: *consules satis exploratis itineraryibus sequentes Poenum, ut ventum ad Cannas* (Livy, 22.44.1).

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<sup>273</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2496 note that Anna reveals the mythical causes of the war which is important background information, but her role is ambiguous. Contra: Santini, 1991, 7 for whom the speech is a ‘pause in the poem’s narrative rhythm.’

Descriptive lists summarising the opposing forces prior to significant battles are common features of ancient texts that may be traced back to Homeric poetry. Livy and Polybius both supply brief summaries of the composition of Hannibal's forces but there is a nuanced difference between them. Indeed, Polybius may be closer in style to the epic tradition by describing the panoply for each of the Carthaginians, Spanish and Gauls fighting with Hannibal in terms of their traditional armoury (*Hist.* 3.114.2-4).<sup>274</sup> Livy explains the differences between the shields and swords of the Gauls and Spaniards due to their different fighting styles. He particularly notes, however, that the Africans might be mistaken as Romans, *Afros Romanam crederes aciem*, because they were using equipment retrieved from dead Romans at Trasimene and the Trebia (Livy, 22.46.4-5).

The Carthaginian retrieval of Roman equipment is noted by Polybius but not in relation to Cannae (*Hist.* 3.87.3). The possibility of mistaking the Carthaginian soldiers for Romans obviously has potential for confusion in the field and allows an implicit comparison with a civil war battle, a point not missed by Silius Italicus, as will be discussed below.

In the *Punica* there is no 'epic list' for the Carthaginian side at Cannae and furthermore, given the availability of source material from both Polybius and Livy, it must be a deliberate omission. Silius Italicus focuses on the Romans and aligns the *Punica* with ancient epic tradition by including a substantial catalogue of (anachronistically) named Romans and their allies preparing for the battle (*Pun.* 8.356-616).<sup>275</sup>

## Speeches prior to Cannae

Accounts of important battles in ancient texts are often preceded by paired exhortations given by each of the opposing generals to their armies, but there is potentially a symmetry problem for Cannae because three generals were involved.

Polybius reveals his bias and deals with the problem by not assigning a speech to Varro.<sup>276</sup> Furthermore, the paired exhortation speeches by Paulus and Hannibal are

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<sup>274</sup> Lazenby, 2004, 228 notes that it is the only description relating to Hannibal's army and that very little is known about the Carthaginian equipment or weaponry.

<sup>275</sup> See McGuire, 1985; 1997, esp 30-32, 136-8 for Silius' repeated allusions to civil war through this list and elsewhere in *Punica* 8-10.

<sup>276</sup> Polybius' prioritisation of Paulus over Varro is foreshadowed earlier in his claim that Paulus was given a 'lead role' by the Senate because he was considered 'senior' to Varro in experience (*Hist.* 3.107)

described by Walbank as ‘full of commonplaces and it is unlikely they go back to a genuine record.’<sup>277</sup> Paulus’ exhortation conveys an appropriate sense of foreboding as he attempts to justify the earlier defeats at the Trebia River and Lake Trasimene and proclaims that there were no more excuses for losing (*Hist.* 3.108-109). Thus although Polybius may have followed Thucydidean principles of producing what was likely to have been said, there is a certain irony to Paulus voicing the advantage of having both consuls and their armies together when the next passage presents him arguing with Varro and reluctant to fight due to the unsuitability of the terrain (*Hist.* 3.110).

Hannibal’s exhortation is slightly briefer than Paulus’ speech and correspondingly encouraging and positive, as befitting an imminent victor. Hannibal reminds his men of their three earlier victories and highlights the advantages of the terrain for their style of fighting. As this point becomes the subject of the argument between the two consuls it indicates that the speech is either closely edited or scripted for the text. The closing remark that victory will win Hannibal’s men the city of Rome and everything they wished for (*Hist.* 3.111.3-11) proves an empty promise and a similar account of Hannibal speaking of these goals as expectations for his men, rather than his own intention, reappears in the *Punica*.

Livy does not include any formal exhortations prior to Cannae. This decision, coupled with the less prominent location of the battle within his text, mentioned above, reduces the significance of the battle in relation to the overall structure of his text. It also recognises the equality of power between the two consuls by not prioritising one over the other with a speech. The consuls are given voices, but in the form of an argument which illustrates how their rivalry contributes to the defeat. The disagreement between them stems, not from opposing views about the suitability of the terrain as in the Polybian tradition, but over whether they should fight Hannibal at all. Paulus reminds Varro of Sempronius and Flamininus<sup>278</sup> while Varro claims that Fabius Maximus’ refusal to fight was a poor example to follow:

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<sup>277</sup> Walbank, I. 442; Walbank, 1965, 12: ‘speeches by Romans are not only in the minority in the *Histories* but most of those are by men related either to the original family of Scipio Aemilianus or his adopted family.’

<sup>278</sup> Paulus does not directly profess adherence to Fabius’ tactics; his claim is that he intends to proceed cautiously (Livy, 22.38.9-11). i.e. he does not say that he would avoid battle. Contra Goldsworthy 2004, 199 who writes ‘there is no good reason to accept Livy’s depiction of Aemilius Paulus as an adherent of Fabius’ strategy of avoiding battle.’

Inde rursus sollicitari seditione militari ac discordia consulum Romana castra, cum Paulus Sempronique et Flamini temeritatem Varroni, Varro Paulo speciosum timidis ac segnibus ducibus exemplum Fabium obiceret, testareturque deos hominesque hic, nullam penes se culpam esse, quod Hannibal iam velut usu cepisset Italiam;

Livy, 22.44.5-6

This caused the Roman camp to be once more the scene of strife amongst the soldiers and dissension between the consuls. Paulus cast in Varro's teeth the recklessness of Sempronius and Flaminius; Varro retorted that Fabius was a specious example for timid and slothful generals, and called on gods and men to witness that it was through no fault of his that Hannibal had by now acquired as it were a prescriptive right to Italy.

Adapted from Foster, 1949, 347.

Silius Italicus takes a different approach and gives Hannibal an exhortation (*Pun.* 9.184-216) but not to either of the Roman consuls; they argue because Varro resents the delay after winning a skirmish against Hannibal (*Pun.* 9.25-36). Hannibal's exhortation echoes and extends a number of points in the Polybian version as Hannibal assures the men that both Italy and the city of Rome would fall to them after their victory.

'neu vos Garganus Daunique fefellerit ora;  
ad muros statis Romae; licet avia longe  
urbs agat et nostro procul a certamine distet,  
hic hodie ruet, atque ultra te ad proelia, miles,  
nulla voco; ex acie tende in Capitolia cursum.'

*Pun.* 9.212-216

'And do not be misled by the sight of Mount Garganus and the land of Daunus: you are standing now before the walls of Rome. Although the city lies at a distance and is far removed from this battlefield, she shall fall here and now, and never again shall I summon you to arms; when the fight is over, march straight against the Capitol.'

Duff, 1989, 19.

Furthermore, Hannibal explicitly limits his own expectations announcing that he will be content with the fame and glory alone:

'mihi magna satis, sat vero superque  
bellandi merces sit gloria; cetera vobis  
vicantur.'

*Pun.* 9.193-5

'For me fame is enough, and more than enough, to repay me for the toils of war; let the other gains of victory be yours.'

Duff, 1989, 17.

‘nil ductor honoris  
ex opibus posco.’

*Pun.* 9.199-200

‘I your general, seek no fame from riches.’

Duff, 1989, 17.

Perhaps these claims to contentment with fame and glory alone are ironic allusions to Hannibal’s reputation for greed (*Hist.* 9.26.11).

Livy, too, alludes to the notion that Hannibal would become master of Italy if he won at Cannae, but Livy places it in Varro’s retort to Paulus that it would be no fault of Varro’s if Hannibal, by his victory, had almost gained the right to Italy (Livy, 22.44.6).

### **Hannibal almost duels with Aemilius Paulus**

Presentations of Aemilius Paulus in battle at Cannae tend to vary only in measures of his degree of heroism. Polybius brings his battle narrative as close as possible to presenting a one-against-one duel between Paulus and Hannibal despite the reality that they never meet. The fighting on the wing under Paulus’ command is described as particularly fierce and, once they engaged with the enemy, the cavalry dismount and fight man-to-man (*Hist.* 3.115.1-3). After the cavalry wing was defeated, Paulus, who survived, moves to the centre and became personally involved in the combat, urging his men to stand firm (*Hist.* 3.116.1). Polybius describes Hannibal, who had been in the centre from the beginning, as doing the same (*Hist.* 3.116.3-4). Thus Polybius places the two men against each other on the same part of the battlefield at the same time; they ‘duel’ with their armies.

Livy initially presents Paulus as an even more heroic figure than Polybius because Livy’s Paulus continues to command and fight despite being wounded at the start of battle:

Parte altera<sup>279</sup> pugnae Paulus, quamquam primo statim proelio funda graviter ictus fuerat, tamen et occurrit saepe cum confertis Hannibali et aliquot locis proelium restituit, protegentibus eum equitibus Romanis, omissis postremo equis, quia consulem vel ad regendum equum vires deficiebant.

Livy, 22.49.1

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<sup>279</sup> Foster, 1949, n2, 359 reads this phrase as placing Paulus in the centre.

In the other part of the field Paulus, although he had received a severe wound from a sling at the very outset of the battle, nevertheless repeatedly opposed himself to Hannibal, with his men in close formation, and at several points restored the fight. He was guarded by Roman cavalry, who finally let their horses go, as the consul was growing too weak even to control his horse.

Foster, 1949, 359.

The picture changes when the reader is told that the *equites* dismount because Paulus became too weakened from his wound to control his horse; it is a rather less heroic reason than wishing to engage more closely with the enemy. Livy alludes to the Polybian tradition when he writes that someone told Hannibal that Paulus ordered the *equites* to dismount and fight on foot; Hannibal's response suggests that he did not fully understand his enemy when he questions why Paulus didn't simply hand them over and surrender: '*quam mallem vinctos, mihi traderet!*' (Livy, 22.49.4).<sup>280</sup> In another, more mundane, version, it is Paulus' horse that was wounded, and threw Paulus who tried to escape but was caught up and killed in the rout (Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 16.4).

In Silius Italicus' account, Paulus in *Punica* 9 and 10 is far removed from being ignominiously thrown from a wounded horse. Indeed, it is Hannibal's horse which is wounded and throws its rider (*Pun.* 10.250-5). The epic Paulus carries out many heroic deeds on the battlefield but, in contrast to Livy's version, he is not wounded early in the action by a sling-stone. Furthermore, he perhaps refers to his Polybian self when he questions Varro over why they are not fighting hand to hand: '*quin imus comminus*' *inquit* (*Pun.* 9.633).<sup>281</sup> The depiction of Paulus moving (to the centre) to seek out Hannibal also adapts more closely the tradition in Polybius (*Hist* 3.116.1) than Livy:

per medios agitur, proiecto lucis amore  
Hannibalem lustrans, Paulus: sors una videtur  
aspera, si occumbat ductore superstite Poeno.

*Pun.* 10.42-44

Despising life, Paulus pressed through the centre of the fray, seeking Hannibal; there was but one fate he dreaded - to die and leave the Carthaginian general alive.

Duff, 1989, 55.

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<sup>280</sup> Foster, 1949, 359 n4 an ironical allusion to the consul's order which prevented any means of escape.

<sup>281</sup> Roller, 2009, 169 argues that fighting hand-to-hand in pitched battles was thought to secure the good of the *res publica* and rewarded with *gloria* and *virtus*. If so, it is possible that this concept underlies the presentations of Cannae.

Juno intervenes to protect Hannibal. Firstly she tries to dissuade Paulus from his intentions, but when that effort fails she changes her disguise and lures Hannibal away to another part of the battlefield (*Pun.* 10.90-1).

The death scenes for Paulus vary. Polybius simply describes Paulus dying heroically in the thick of the fight from many dreadful wounds (*Hist.* 3.116.9). In the *Punica* he kills many men until he is fatally wounded, not by a small stone from a slingshot, but by a huge rock from an unknown hand hitting him in the face (*Pun.* 10.235-7). Livy and Silius Italicus also include a scene in which Lentulus finds the dying Paulus sitting alone on a rock covered in blood. The ensuing conversation differs slightly since Livy depicts Lentulus imploring Paulus to take his horse and escape, not to blight the battle with a consul's death (Livy, 22.49.7-8). In the *Punica* Lentulus reflects a harsher tradition when he says that unless Paulus lives on and takes command, Paulus will be considered guiltier than Varro for allowing himself to die and deserting Rome. In support of his point, Silius Italicus reworks the 'good sea-captain' analogy used by Polybius about Hannibal (ἀγαθὸς κυβερνήτης *Hist.* 11.19.3) as Lentulus urges the dying Paulus not to abandon the army (ship):

‘Quid deinde relictum,  
crastina cur Tyrios lux non dederat ad urbem,  
deseris in tantis puppim si, Paule, procellis?  
testor caelicolas,’ inquit, ‘ni damna gubernas  
cruelis belli vivisque in turbine tanto  
invitus, plus, Paule (dolor verba aspera dictat)  
plus Varrone noces.’

*Pun.* 10.267-273

'What still remains,' he cried, 'to prevent the enemy from marching on Rome tomorrow, if you, Paulus, abandon the ship in such a storm? By heaven I swear – if my words are harsh, grief prompts them – that unless you take command in this terrible war and live on against your will amid the tempest, you are guiltier even than Varro.'

Duff, 1989, 71.

Polybius and Silius Italicus each give Paulus brief epitaphs shortly after his death. Polybius<sup>282</sup> lauds Paulus for doing his duty to his country throughout his life and especially at Cannae (*Hist.* 3.116.9). In a similar vein, Silius Italicus writes that his

<sup>282</sup> Walbank, I, 447, notes Polybius' formulaic phrase is found on many Hellenistic inscriptions. For fuller discussion on Polybius' death notices, see Pomeroy, 1986, 407-423; 1991, 85-109. Livy's death notices, Pomeroy, 1991, 146-168 and Appendix 2.

death in battle added glory to the city and raised Paulus' fame to the sky (*Pun.* 10.308-9). Livy includes an epitaph of sorts, but it is delayed and voiced through a tribune, Tuditanus, who reminds his fellow prisoners that their consul, Paulus, preferred an honourable death to life with ignominy (Livy, 22.50.4-7).

There is a tradition that Hannibal found and honoured Paulus' body with burial. The story that Hannibal sent quantities of Roman gold rings to Carthage as proof of his great victory indicates that his men scoured the battlefield searching for the wealthy and elite, undoubtedly also searching for Paulus. Silius Italicus and Valerius Maximus depict Hannibal finding Paulus' body and honouring it with lavish funerary rites (*Pun.* 10.515-523; *Val. Max.* 5.1. ext. 6).

Facta mentione acerrimi hostis mansuetudinis eius operibus quam  
Romano nomini praestit locum qui inter manus est finiam: Hannibal  
enim Aemilii Paulli apud Cannas trucidati quaesitum corpus quantum  
in ipso fuit inhumatum iacere passus non est.

*Val. Max.* 5.1 ext. 6

Now that I have mentioned our bitterest enemy I shall end the topic I have in hand with acts of mercy that he rendered to the Roman name. For Hannibal made search for the body of Aemilius Paulus, slain at Cannae, and so far as lay with himself did not let it lie unburied.

Shackleton Bailey, 2000.

Paulus' funeral makes a public display of Hannibal's piety and his respect for a worthy opponent; it is noted by Ash as a familiar literary motif for an act of graciousness on the part of a victorious general.<sup>283</sup> The body is wrapped in purple and gold and the Carthaginians raise a turf altar for Paulus' shield and sword; the *fasces* are symbolically broken (which seems to imply that Paulus' lictors either dropped them in their flight or died heroically protecting their consul thus enabling his body to be identified: *Pun.* 10.560-575).

Others, such as Plutarch and Livy prefer the tradition that Paulus' body remained unidentified among his soldiers (Livy, 22.49.10-12; 22.52.6). Livy's inclusion of a conversation between Paulus and Lentulus allows for the possibility that Lentulus also removed the consular regalia and seal ring, making identification of Paulus' body more difficult.

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<sup>283</sup> Ash, 1999, 65. The motif only partially fits the *Punica*. Silius depicts Hannibal treating Marcellus with a lavish funeral, *Pun.* 15.385-396, but not Ti. Gracchus.

Plutarch has a slightly different version and implies that the insignia had already been removed which meant that Lentulus had trouble recognising Paulus (Plutarch, *Fab. Max.*, 16.6).

### Varro has no contact with Hannibal

On the day that Varro has command at Cannae, he exercised his right to lead out the Roman army for battle (*Hist.* 3.113.1; *Livy*, 22.45.5).<sup>284</sup> In the *Punica* he continues onto the battlefield in defiance of the bloodied message on a shield left by Solimus: *fuge proelia Varro* (*Pun.* 9.175). Varro, having command for the day, was also responsible for signalling the Roman withdrawal (*Appian, Hann.* 4.23).

Polybius' overall treatment of Varro is minimalist. There is a brief acknowledgement of Varro's election to the consulship (*Hist.* 3.106.1) but the emphasis in the text is on Paulus' 'seniority' in experience and Varro's cowardice (*Hist.* 3.108.1).<sup>285</sup> Furthermore, Polybius' battle narrative concerning Varro at Cannae requires the audience to assume that Varro is the commander concerned because Polybius does not name him after his initial description of disposition of forces. Varro commands the allied cavalry opposite Hanno and is kept occupied by the Numidians (*Hist.* 3.114.6). After Hasdrubal defeats the Roman cavalry (led by Paulus), he moves across the battlefield to face Varro's wing and prepares to charge. At the *sight* of Hasdrubal's preparation (even before the actual charge!), Varro runs away, leaving Hasdrubal free to attack the Roman rear (*Hist.* 3.116.5-8). Polybius elides the threat of encirclement that would result and make the call for retreat a reasonable decision, not despicable, as his text implies. His final disparaging comment on Varro is that the decision to flee was as much a disgrace to himself as his consulship had been a disgrace to Rome (*Hist.* 3.116.13).

Livy's treatment of Varro is negative, but through its similarity to Flamininus,<sup>286</sup> not through contrast to Paulus. Hence Varro is no coward, but rash, because he leads the charge to begin fighting (*Livy*, 22.47.1) although, perversely, the fighting on his wing is

<sup>284</sup> Potter, 2004, 76: 'Varro is hardly to be criticised for seeking decisive battle...the Roman people did not vote the consuls an especially large army to hide in the hills: they expected them to fight Hannibal and end the war.'

<sup>285</sup> Walbank, I, 448: suggests Polybius' portrayal of Varro is derived from Fabius (Pictor) to equate with the later portrait of Fabius Maximus reputedly leading the spirit of magnanimity toward Varro.

<sup>286</sup> Varro's similarity to Flamininus is indicated through parallel omens at their respective elections, and if this connection is missed by some in Livy's audience, there is a reminder in Fabius' address to Paulus about Varro *omnis etiam tibi causa absit C Flamini memoria* (*Livy*, 22.39.6).

initially slow: *segne primo* (Livy, 22.48.1). In a possible allusion to Varro's lack of experience, he is deceived by a ruse when a large group of Numidians feign desertion and dismount, throwing down their javelins but keeping swords concealed beneath their clothing; they are sent to the rear without being searched or placed under sufficient guard. Hence they were in position to attack the Romans from behind to devastating effect once the action turned into a rout (Livy, 22.48.2-5).<sup>287</sup>

Silius Italicus combines the negative features about Varro from both the earlier traditions to introduce him as militarily inexperienced, as rash as Flaminius and a coward (*Pun.* 8.258-262; 8.310-16). This must modify somewhat the view that Silius Italicus follows Livy in terms of the ‘blistering treatment’ he gives Varro, portraying him as ‘unscrupulous and cowardly to create his two paradigms of Roman conduct for each consul, one glorious, one shameful.’<sup>288</sup> It is rightly pointed out that Varro never appears heroically fighting in the *Punica* and when he finds himself unable to fight or die, he flees (*Pun.* 9.656-657).<sup>289</sup> The nymph, Anna, directly compares Varro to Flaminius in her description to Hannibal: *cumque alio tibi Flaminio sunt bella gerenda* (*Pun.* 8.218) but Silius Italicus has a slight variant on Livy’s presentation of a Punic deception to illustrate Varro’s inexperience. In the *Punica*, Varro is not so naive and the (unidentified) soldiers who feign surrender *are* searched and disarmed because when they decide to re-enter the fray they do not have weapons and take them from corpses lying around (*Pun.* 10.185-92).<sup>290</sup>

When Varro calls for withdrawal, authors have the option of presenting an ordered departure or a disordered flight and chaos. Initially Livy allows for the possibility of Varro making an ordered withdrawal:

Consul alter, seu forte seu consilio nulli fugientium insertus agmini,  
cum quinquaginta fere equitibus Venusiam perfugit.

Livy, 22.49.14

The other consul, whether by accident or by design, had not joined any  
throng of fugitives, but fled to Venusia with some fifty horsemen.

Foster, 1949, 363.

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<sup>287</sup> Appian, *Hann.* 7.22, says Servilius, not Varro, was tricked by the feigned desertion. Servilius removed the weapons and thought that leaving them in tunics would be sufficient.

<sup>288</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2531.

<sup>289</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2535-6.

<sup>290</sup> In Livy’s text they picked up spare shields not weapons. Appian, 7.4.22, includes the same ruse but presents the soldiers as Celtiberians from the Carthaginian centre.

But the next chapter leaves a more lasting, and possibly realistic, impression that Varro and the survivors fled the battlefield in a disorganised mêlée:

ad Cannas fugientem consulem vix quinquaginta secuti sunt, alterius morientis prope totus exercitus fuit.

Livy, 22.50.3

At Cannae the consul who fled was accompanied by a scant fifty men; the other, dying, had well-nigh the entire army with him.

Foster, 1949, 365

In the *Punica*, Varro is passive in his flight. It is his horse which carries him away:

plura indignantem telis propioribus hostes  
egere, et sonipes rapuit laxatus habenas.

*Pun.* 9.656-7

Further protest was cut short by the approach of the enemy: their attack drove him back, and his warhorse with loosened rein carried him swiftly away.

Duff, 1989, 49.

Polybius ignores Varro after Cannae; there is no mention of him in the immediate aftermath of battle. The resumption of the narrative at the end of *Histories* 6 focusses on Hannibal attempting to ransom the prisoners back to the Senate. It is possible that Varro reappeared later in the narrative, in a section that is no longer extant, but given his treatment at Cannae, it seems unlikely.

Livy is more sympathetic in his treatment of Varro.<sup>291</sup> After the initial shock at news of the defeat and the death of a consul, Varro regains respect because he did not surrender and one defeat is not considered the final outcome of a war. Livy adapts the analogy of the sea-captain in a positive sense because he describes Varro sending the formal announcement of the defeat to Rome and describes Varro remaining at Canusium gathering the remnants of the army as if after a storm at sea (Livy, 22.61.2).

Silius Italicus conveys a sense of the mixed emotions that probably prevailed at the time, and the sea-captain analogy is reworked in a more negative sense than Livy:

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<sup>291</sup> When Varro reappears he is a proconsul based in Picenum, 215-213. He is re-elected to the praetorship and given command of two legions in Etruria, 208-7, considered to be an area at risk (Livy, 27.38.6). i.e. not only was Varro re-elected to high office, he received commands critical for the defence of Rome. His subsequent career was by no means ignominious and nor is he depicted as a demagogue or again compared to Flaminus. Picenum: Livy, 23.25.11, 32.19; 24.10.3, 11.3, 44.5. Etruria: Livy, 27.24.1-9, 35.2, 36.13; 28.10.11, contra Goldsworthy, 2004, 199 who claims that 'Livy presents Varro as a demagogue.' This only holds true for Livy's picture of Varro prior to Cannae.

haud secus ac, fractae rector si forte carinae  
litoribus solus vacuis ex aequore sospes  
adnatet, incerti trepidant, tendantne negentne  
iactato dextras, ipsamque odere salutem  
unius amissa superantis puppe magistri.

*Pun.* 10.608-12

So, when the captain of a wrecked ship is saved from the sea and swims ashore alone, men are at a loss and uncertain whether to welcome the sea-tossed man or to disown him; they cannot bear that the captain only should be saved when his ship is lost.

Duff, 1989, 95.

Despite the shocking news, some took a more positive view. Fabius Maximus urged the Senate and people to go out and welcome Varro, to pity his misfortune, to blame themselves (for electing him to office), and to rejoice that Hannibal did not have the satisfaction of killing both consuls (*Pun.* 10.615-625).<sup>292</sup> Varro himself weeps, ashamed to look at anyone, his *lictors* are silent, not making their customary shouts to clear the way for the consul. Varro found it hard to believe that the people and Senate were there to thank him, not to demand the return of their lost brothers and sons (*Pun.* 10.630-39). Silius Italicus comments that surrender was held worse than any crime (*Pun.* 10.653-6).

Livy illustrates the mixed emotions but does not assign a conciliatory role to Fabius Maximus. At first both consuls were criticised for not doing enough to save the army and for putting themselves first, one for his flight and the other for choosing to die (Livy, 22.50.3). Nonetheless, by the time Varro returns to Rome, he is welcomed and formally thanked in the Senate for not despairing of the state: *et gratiae actae quod de re publica non desperasset* (Livy, 22.61.14). Livy closes the book with an interesting comparison between the welcome given to Varro at Rome against the likelihood of punishment for Hannibal if he had returned to Carthage in the wake of such a defeat:<sup>293</sup> *qui si Carthaginiensium ductor fuisset, nihil recusandum supplicii foret* (Livy, 22.61.15). This comparison is one of the closest connections drawn between Varro and Hannibal, although even here Hannibal is not directly named.

The mellower attitude toward the two consuls endures as evidenced by Florus who wrote that both deserved praise: Paulus, who was ashamed to survive, and Varro, who refused to despair (1.22.17). Of the extant texts, only the *Punica* turns to the rapturous reception at Carthage to the news of Hannibal's victory. Hannibal is ranked with the

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<sup>292</sup> Also Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 18.

<sup>293</sup> The Carthaginians had a reputation for crucifying generals who lose, e.g. Hanno, the loser at the Aegates in 241. Also Val. Max. 2.7. ext. 1. Foster, 1949, 408, n2.

gods, *aequatur rector divis* (*Pun.* 11.494). Whether or not there was a prior tradition for this treatment of Hannibal will remain unanswered but it is quite possible.

## Making connections: Omens and portents

Omens and portents impart a sense of divine sanction or warning around certain individuals or events, and in this sense the omens in the texts prior to Cannae may be compared as literary features. It will be argued here that Livy applies omens in book 22 prior to Cannae to create links to other events and figures *within* his text whereas Silius Italicus applies omens prior to Cannae to create external links. Silius Italicus includes some links to Livy, but more particularly he also links the Pompeians at Pharsalus to the Romans at Cannae. It is, however, left to the wit of his reader to make any connection between Hannibal and Caesar.

Appendix 1 presents a table summarising the omens associated with Cannae found across a number of texts (Appian is not included as there are none in his text). The omens are grouped into types, and, in order to illustrate the connections Livy makes within his text, it includes omens associated with the 207 Roman victory at the Metaurus River from Livy, 27.37.1-8. In addition, for the purposes of illustrating the connections made in the *Punica* it includes omens associated with Pharsalus given in Valerius Maximus and in Lucan's *de bello civili*. It can be seen that Livy creates intra-textual links within third decad and across his wider text by recording parallel or duplicate omens. Silius Italicus, on the other hand, applies parallel or duplicate omens to link his Cannae with Pharsalus through inter-textual parallels with Valerius Maximus and Lucan's *de bello civili*. It is important to note that the extensive list of omens and portents in *Punica* 8 specifically excludes the omens that Livy places in relation to Cannae (indicated by the greyed out spaces on Table 1). This result suggests that Silius Italicus specifically distances his representation of Cannae from Livy.

Not only does Polybius make a rare suggestion of divine intervention over the choice of battle-site at Cannae, voiced through Hannibal (*Hist.* 3.111.3), but in addition, one of his few references to omens is also related to Cannae. His description of the reaction at Rome to news that two consular armies were camped opposite Hannibal at Cannae and preparing for battle includes a remark that all the omens and prodigies ever recorded were being reported:

πάντα δ' ἦν τὰ παρ' αὐτοῖς λόγια πᾶσι τότε διὰ στόματος, σημείων δὲ καὶ τεράτων πᾶν μὲν ιερόν, πᾶσα δ' ἦν οἰκία πλήρης, ἐξ ὧν εὐχαὶ καὶ θυσίαι καὶ θεῶν ἱκετηρίαι καὶ δεήσεις ἐπεῖχον τὴν πόλιν.

*Hist.* 3.112.8

All the oracles that had ever been delivered to them were in men's mouths, and every temple and every house was full of signs and prodigies, so that vows, sacrifices, supplicatory processions and litanies pervaded the town.

Paton, 2001, 279

Polybius adds a contemporary observation that the Romans were much given to propitiating both gods and men in times of danger and there was nothing in such rites considered unbecoming or beneath their dignity. Although the tone of Polybius' observation is somewhat cynical and dismissive, eliciting a modern view that he simply repeats a conventional motif of panic,<sup>294</sup> his relative silence on omens generally and outright rejection of divine support for Hannibal crossing the Alps mean that this inclusion gives his representation of Cannae more impact.

Livy often records omens and prodigies as 'notices' at the end of a consular year; he also records omens around elections of particular individuals, as well as citing omens taking place in Roman camps, especially prior to defeat, such as a wolf getting into Scipio's camp and the swarm of bees appearing in a tree above his tent prior to battle at the Ticinus River (Livy, 21.46.1-2).<sup>295</sup> Somewhat surprisingly, therefore, given the remark by Polybius about all the omens ever recorded being reported at Rome prior to Cannae, Livy's account seems relatively restrained immediately prior to Cannae with the mention of only one omen in the Roman camp (Livy, 22.42.8). Levene thinks it most odd that Livy makes so little of the omens, given Polybius' extraordinary treatment of the theme<sup>296</sup> but the wider arrangement of the omens in Livy's third decad may be read differently. At first glance the single omen in the camp may reflect Livy's stated view on Cannae not being a critical defeat, but this apparently low-key approach to omens before Cannae when compared to Polybius' *Histories* or the *Punica* depends on how Livy's text is approached.

<sup>294</sup> Levene, 1993, 48; Walbank, I, 443. Cf. *Hist.* 6.56.6-12 where Polybius supports the exploitation of superstition and religion for reasons of state.

<sup>295</sup> A swarm of bees is a 'negative' omen for a general about to be defeated. Honey and beeswax were very valuable commodities in the ancient world and allowing bees to swarm means loss of stock and poor management on the part of the apiarist, hence the analogy with a general who has a duty of care for his men.

<sup>296</sup> Levene, 1993, 48; and Levene, 1993, chapter two for a general discussion of omens in the third decad.

Book 22 opens with the longest list (21) of negative omens in the third decad (Livy, 22.1.8-13). Levene<sup>297</sup> interprets them as presaging Flaminius' fate at Trasimene rather than any association with Cannae. Admittedly the list immediately follows expressions of anger about Flaminius in the Senate but, for a number of reasons apart from the length of the list and its location at the opening of Livy 22, it can be argued that the list is intended to presage Cannae as well as Flaminius' fate at Trasimene. Flaminius himself has already been surrounded by bad omens at the end of the previous Book (Livy, 21.62.2) and, for the moment, has left the narrative.<sup>298</sup> More striking is the fact that three of the omens in this first list are repeated in a second, shorter list of five omens placed in the text shortly after the election of Paulus and Varro (Livy, 22.36.6-9).

The repeated or paralleled omens link the two lists; in the second list, two of the three repeated omens have a changed location and are situated in Rome. The rain of stones took place on the Aventine instead of at Paestum; the group of soldiers struck by lightning were somehow in the arched way (!) to the Campus Martius instead of at an unspecified location, and the third is an exact repeat: the hot springs at Caere ran red with blood, which Livy acknowledges as a repeat by commenting on the 'frequency' with which it was reported (Livy, 22.1.9-10; 22.36.7-9).

Following this shorter list of omens is a positive 'long-range forecast' for the city of Rome significantly located in the centre of Livy 22; it is Livy's final view of the city before Cannae. The Senate formally accepts a gold statue of Victory sent by Hiero of Syracuse; it is placed in the most prestigious temple in the city, the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus (Livy, 22.37.1). Livy indicates that acceptance of the statue was an exception rather than the rule because previously the Senate had declined all but the smallest of a number of gold bowls sent from Neapolis (Livy, 22.32.9), and returned gold bowls sent from Paestum (Livy, 22.36.9). Levene<sup>299</sup> interprets the gold statue as negating the two lists of negative omens that precede it in the text, arguing that Livy plays down the omens in order to reduce the role of the gods and magnify Hannibal's genius as a man at Cannae. In fact, Livy does not describe the placement of the gold Victory statue in terms of expunging omens and, indeed, both lists of omens are

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<sup>297</sup> Levene, 1993, 40.

<sup>298</sup> Levene, 1993, 42: the expiations carried out by Fabius at Livy, 22.9.7-10, brings to a close the progression of impiety that reaches its climax in the defeat at Trasimene. See Hoffman, 1942, 30-38 for Fabius and the revival of religion.

<sup>299</sup> Levene, 1993, 49.

followed by expiation rites as prescribed by the priests after consulting the Sacred Books (Livy, 22.1.14.20; 22.36.9).<sup>300</sup>

As Varro prepares to lead out the army from the camp at Cannae for an attack he is recalled by Paulus because the sacred chickens refuse to eat their corn (Livy, 22.42.7-10). The omen of the chickens is identical to one that Livy used to forecast an earlier defeat of Romans at the hands of Carthaginians. In the *Periocha* of the previous decad which covered the First Punic War it is recorded that the consul, Claudio Pulcher, ignored the sign of the sacred chickens refusing to eat and was defeated (Livy, *Per.* 19.2).<sup>301</sup>

Livy's decision to link these two defeats of the Punic Wars with the omen of the chickens is strengthened by his decision *not* to use this omen in association with Flaminius prior to Trasimene even though there was a tradition for it (Cicero, *de Div.* 1.3.35.77). Levene<sup>302</sup> suggests that Livy doesn't include this omen in association with Flaminius in order to avoid too much repetition, which may be so, but the effect of the repetition is to link two major Roman defeats between the First and Second Punic Wars.

Furthermore, Livy makes the connection explicit when he presents Varro recollecting the outcome of Claudio Pulcher ignoring omens. Varro countermands his earlier order and returns to the camp (Livy, 22.42.9). Unfortunately Varro's deference to the gods only serves to delay the inevitable result because, as Cicero advises, the will of the Fates cannot be overridden by obeying or ignoring omens (Cicero, *de Div.*, 2.8.21). Interestingly Cicero illustrates this remark with the example of the omens at Cannae but gives it in terms of Paulus, not Varro. Cicero says that Paulus obeyed the signs but still lost his life and his army (*de Div.* 2.33.71).

In addition to the omens prior to Cannae and the link to defeat in the First Punic War, Livy links Cannae to the victory at the Metaurus River through portents involving the Vestals. He remarks that *after* Cannae people retrospectively sought prodigies to recognise and expunge in their efforts to appease the gods. These, Livy explains, had to be extreme in nature to match the extent of the disaster; hence two vestal virgins were found guilty of breaking their vows.

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<sup>300</sup> The first omen list is followed by a long list of appeasements with sacrificial victims, a three-day supplication at all the couches of the gods, a gold thunderbolt gifted to Jupiter, offerings of silver to Juno and Minerva, and a *lectisternium* by the matrons, all culminating in the foundation of the Saturnalia as a public holiday (Livy, 22.1.14.20). Presenting a list of omens followed by an expiation involving women is paralleled at Livy, 27.37 where the omens are expiated in part by the chorus of young women processing from the Carmental gate.

<sup>301</sup> Cf. Val. Max. 1.4.3: Claudio ordered the chickens thrown in the sea to let them drink.

Such behaviour was normally interpreted as pollution but given its discovery after Cannae, it was converted into a portent. One Vestal committed suicide while the other was buried alive under the wall at the Colline gate according to ancient custom (Livy, 22.57.2-4). This reference to an incident involving the Vestals being reconsidered as a portent is paralleled in a dramatic reference to them located in the text shortly before the Roman victory at the Metaurus River. The fire of Vesta goes out during the night,<sup>303</sup> a terrifying experience resulting in a consideration of whether it was a portent or human carelessness. The response embraced both, with the sacrifice of full-grown victims and supplication in the temple of Vesta for the portent, and the Vestal concerned was whipped for being careless (Livy, 28.11).

## Hannibal and Caesar

Silius Italicus follows the spirit of the Polybian tradition with an avalanche<sup>304</sup> of omens in *Punica* 8 just before Cannae and, depending on the reader's approach to Livy's text, the total number of omens in *Punica* 8 (21) is the same as the total in Livy's first list which opens book 22. There are, however, significant differences between the lists in each text; those in *Punica* 8 become increasingly violent to culminate with the most terrifying omen of all time: the eruption of Vesuvius (*Pun.* 8.622-655).

Like Livy, Silius Italicus applies certain omens to connect people or events, but, because Silius has different socio-political<sup>305</sup> and literary objectives, a number of the omens in Livy's lists and the omen of the chickens refusing to eat in the camp at Cannae are not included in the *Punica*. Indeed, Silius Italicus specifically distances the *Punica* from Livy's text over the chickens not eating by clearly identifying the omen in the camp that causes Paulus to recall Varro as an animal sacrifice because the gods' disfavour lay in the entrails of the victims (*Pun.* 9.16). Therefore, although Silius Italicus includes the tradition of Paulus recalling Varro due to a bad omen, the omen itself is different.

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<sup>302</sup> Levene, 1993, 42.

<sup>303</sup> Livy 28.11.6. The significance of the event is recorded in the late antique manuscript (Paris, BNF, lat. 5730) as it is punctuated with a large capital at *ignis*, which occurs in the middle of a sentence in the modern editions. For a reproduction of this page see E. Chatelain, *Paleographie des classiques latins* 2 vols. (Paris, 1884-92). My thanks to Dr Andrew Turner of the University of Melbourne for bringing this item to my attention.

<sup>304</sup> Rothschild, 1995, 110.

<sup>305</sup> Ahl, 1993, 125, wrote that Roman poetry from Virgil onward has a political soul.

Silius Italicus uses omens to connect the poetic Cannae to the civil war battle at Pharsalus, not to Livy's Cannae. Pharsalus may seem an odd choice but there are details from the historical texts about Cannae that Silius Italicus seems to have adapted for this purpose. Firstly, the conflict between the two Roman consuls may be represented in terms that intimate civil war; and secondly, the references to Hannibal's soldiers using Roman equipment<sup>306</sup> makes them similar in appearance to the Romans:

Afros Romanam crederes aciem: ita armati erant armis et ad Trebiam,  
ceterum magna ex parte ad Trasumenum captis.

Livy, 22.46.4; cf. *Hist.* 3.87.3

The Africans might have passed for an array of Romans, equipped as they were with arms captured partly at the Trebia but mostly at Lake Trasimene.

Foster, 1949, 351.

The table in Appendix 1 shows that there are six 'Cannae' omens in common between Livy and Valerius Maximus but only three (at most four) between Livy and Silius Italicus. There are *nine* omens in common between the *Punica* and the two lists of omens in Lucan's *de bello civili* (*bel. civ.*, 1.525-583; 7.152-213). Furthermore, although there are four omens in common between the *Punica* and Valerius Maximus, they are specifically the ones that Valerius Maximus uses in relation to the Pompeians at Pharsalus and *not* the omens that he associates with Cannae (Val. Max. 1.6.12). This connection with Valerius Maximus shows that Silius Italicus links the Roman army at Cannae with the Pompeians at the historical battle of Pharsalus, as well as more generally to linking them to Lucan's epic. Whether Silius' contemporary audience was alert to this subtlety is unknowable but those who knew their Lucan and Valerius Maximus might have been tempted to cross-check against Livy and confirm the connection.

A number of scholars have studied the links between the *Punica* and Lucan's text and the links between the omens support their work.<sup>307</sup> Ariemma<sup>308</sup> notes that Silius Italicus places omens involving earthquakes, collapsing or shaking mountains, and flooding

<sup>306</sup> Lazenby, 2004, 228 notes the problem of understanding what exactly Polybius meant by Roman equipment - armour, weapons or both?

<sup>307</sup> Hardie, 2005, 96, 64: 'Hannibal is a hero in the mould of Lucan's Caesar but... turns out to be a vehicle for other beings.' Hardie follows others who have compared Silius Italicus' Hannibal and Lucan's Caesar including McGuire, 1997, 84; von Albrecht, 1997, 963; Hardie, 193, 64; Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy, 1986; Pomeroy, 1986a; Vessey, 1973. Also Mills, 2007, 1.

<sup>308</sup> Ariemma, 2000, 140, cf. Lucan, *bel. civ.* 7.173.

rivers<sup>309</sup> into pairs which add to the sense of double identity and civil war confusions in the *Punica* as discussed by McGuire.<sup>310</sup> And it is the more ‘extreme’ omens that link the two texts; for example, both have the Alps moving (*bel. civ.* 1.610; *Pun.* 8.648–9) which Silius Italicus pairs with the Appenines moving. Silius Italicus’ description of Vesuvius erupting on a ‘scale worthy of Etna’ (*Pun.* 8.654) may also link to the volcano (Etna) omen in Lucan (*bel. civ.* 1.545–6). In addition, Silius Italicus’ description of the swarms of bees around the Roman standards at Cannae as ‘thick’ *densae* (*Pun.* 8.635) has a closer parallel to the description in Lucan than in Valerius Maximus (1.6.12). Lucan describes the swarms as so thick that the standards are hidden (Lucan, *bel. civ.* 7.187). In addition, both Lucan and Silius Italicus personify the standards with feelings of terror, *trepidis... aquilis*, metaphors, perhaps, for the soldiers who will march to them on behalf of Pompey and Varro.

Furthermore Varro and Pompey share a reputation for ignoring omens. Valerius Maximus claims that Pompey was dismissive of thunderbolts fired against his men (Val. Max. 1.6.12). Silius Italicus directly links Varro to the tragedy of civil war through his rejection of an omen. The story of sorry coincidences, noted by Wilson as derived from Silius Italicus’ reading of Ovid,<sup>311</sup> centres on a mistaken identity leading to parricide. The dying father forgives his son and the suicidal son leaves a message in blood on his shield to warn Varro: *fuge proelia Varro* (*Pun.* 9.175). Varro is angry (at yet another attempt to stop him), decides to ignore the impiety,<sup>312</sup> and continues preparations for battle, with disastrous consequences.

The connection between Hannibal and Caesar is implied in that Varro and the Roman army at Cannae are equated with Pompey and his army at Pharsalus. The closest that Silius Italicus comes to comparing Hannibal and Caesar directly is through the omen of thunderbolts.<sup>313</sup> In the *Punica* and the *de bello civili* thunderbolts shoot from the lands from which the threats emanate (Libya and the north, respectively) upon the same destination, Latium (*bel. civ.* 1.534; *Pun.* 8.650). While these comparisons add weight to those who read Caesar in Silius’ Hannibal, as Ahl, Davis and Pomeroy

<sup>309</sup> The Aufidus and the Allia, *Pun.* 8.629; 8.647.

<sup>310</sup> McGuire, 1997, 127.

<sup>311</sup> Wilson, 2004, 244.

<sup>312</sup> According to Cicero, *Leg.* 2.22, parricide was an offence against the divine; though Varro could not have ‘known’ it was parricide.

<sup>313</sup> Florus, 1.22.9–15 also compares Hannibal to one of Jupiter’s thunderbolts, shooting through the Alps and descending on Italy where he releases thunderbolts of his own at the Ticinus and Trebia rivers, Lake Trasimene and finally at Cannae. Hannibal’s putative surname ‘Barca’ aptly translates as ‘thunderbolt.’

observe: ‘the differences between Caesar and Hannibal are almost as compelling as the resemblances.’<sup>314</sup>

Silius Italicus’ list of omens is prefaced with a bleak sense of foreboding, focussed on the Roman camp where the soldiers set up their unlucky standards on the ill-omened ramparts: *defigunt diro signa infelicia vallo* (*Pun.* 8.623). Shortly afterwards, they collapse along their length (*Pun.* 8.627-9). Spaltenstein<sup>315</sup> compares this omen to the gods demolishing the walls of Troy in *Aeneid* 2.608, supported by Silius Italicus’ initial comparison to the Trojan War a mere two lines earlier (*Pun.* 8.617-621). It also recalls the walls of Saguntum crashing down (*Pun.* 1.368) through repetition of *aggere* and the parallel simile for the thunderous noise of both sets of collapsing walls being compared to crashing mountains. If one reads the siege of Saguntum in *Punica* 1-2 as a metaphor for Rome, as argued by Dominik,<sup>316</sup> the inter-textual link between the walls of the camp at Cannae and the walls of Saguntum is as strong as the allusion to the *Aeneid*.

Astronomical phenomena such as comets and eclipses were widely accepted as powerful omens. Eclipses, whether solar or lunar, are problematic for texts relating to historical topics, because ancient astronomers could forecast them and many people would observe them; thus authors had to exercise a certain amount of care if there was no eclipse over the area concerned at the time of the events they describe. For this reason Livy, Valerius Maximus, Lucan and Silius Italicus all hint at eclipses at Cannae and Pharsalus but say nothing explicit. Livy notes claims that the sun seemed to fight the moon (Livy, 22.1.10) but on this score Silius Italicus aligns himself closer to Lucan, using the same word, *tenebris*, to describe atmospheric gloom as light suddenly became withdrawn (*Pun.* 8.633; *bel.civ.*, 1.542).

Both of Livy’s lists include a number of omens involving blood, either flowing from springs or in sweat from statues or other images, and one of bloodied ears of corn harvested at Antium (Livy, 22.36.7-9; 22.1.10-8). Only one similar type of omen is used in the *Punica* and it is located in the centre of Rome: blood flows from the Temple of Jupiter (*Pun.* 8.644-5).<sup>317</sup>

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<sup>314</sup> Von Albrecht, 1966; Vessey, 1973; Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2511: ‘Silius’ Hannibal owes much to Lucan’s Caesar.’

<sup>315</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 555.

<sup>316</sup> Dominik, 2003.

<sup>317</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 557 notes the wording *atro sanguine* as traditional, citing Ennius (*trag.* 310), and Virgil (*Aen.* 4.687) where the wording is similar but not identical (*atros cruores*).

Night is the time for ghostly apparitions and they feature in numerous Roman texts,<sup>318</sup> but only Silius Italicus has one of a Republican Roman soldier's worst nightmares: dead Gauls rising up out of their graves (*Pun.* 8.642)!

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<sup>318</sup> Cf. Virgil, *Aen.* 7.64; Lucan, *bel. civ.* 7.208-9; Seneca, *Ag.* 1-55; *Thy.* 1-120; *Tro.* 1.1.-65; *Apocolocyntosis Divi Claudi;* *Octavia,* 593-645; Statius, *Thebaid.*

## Chapter 5: Invading Campania, 217 and 216

The first section of this chapter compares the treatments of one of the most famous and more bizarre of the ‘Hannibal’ stories: Hannibal’s incursion into the *ager Falernus* which ended with his legendary night-time escape past Roman sentries when he distracted their attention with oxen that had burning faggots tied to their horns. While the basic core of the story remains the same across the texts, the variations in the circumstances suggest that many details, such as exactly ‘when’ and ‘where’ it took place quickly became uncertain, perhaps the effect of retelling a popular, highly dramatic tale.

The representations of Hannibal vary from Polybius depicting him deliberately staging a dramatic exit to Livy representing him making a mistake over Latin pronunciation and tricking his way out of a trap. Silius Italicus will be shown to weave elements from both of these traditions into the *Punica* as well as presenting a more pragmatic ‘truth,’ also hinted at by Livy, which may underlie the story of the oxen.

The second section compares the treatments of Hannibal’s takeover and occupation of Capua in 216, and the reputedly detrimental effects of Capuan wealth and luxury on Hannibal and his men. Primarily the texts present the ease with which Hannibal took control of Capua in moral terms which leads to some interesting disconnections as authors have to balance the claim and its implications against later representations of Hannibal. Indeed, the focus on Capuan moral degradation is so strong in the historiographic texts that the ‘historic’ details of how, exactly, Hannibal took control of the town are a confused mix of the Capuans inviting Hannibal to their town (for different reasons); negotiating a treaty, and/or surrendering (too easily) with further differences over whether or not there was consensus amongst them to admit Hannibal. The comparisons indicate that the material is adapted to illustrate whichever canonical Roman moral an author considers to be most perverted, or missing at Capua or, conversely, which canonical sins the author wishes to promote in either, or both, of Hannibal and the Capuans. Once Hannibal enters the town, authors take the opportunity to display aspects of Hannibal’s character through a selection of scenes that illustrate Hannibal’s *Punica fides*: his greed, gluttony and tyranny.

Where it might be expected that an author would represent Hannibal and his army becoming seduced and weakened by the effects of Capuan luxury, the texts are more

mixed. Presenting Hannibal as weakened by Capuan luxury has to be equated with his five year occupation of Capua and the fact that he remained in Italy for another seven years after the fall of Capua back to Rome in 211. Furthermore the notion of defeating a ‘weakened’ Hannibal does not reflect well on subsequent Roman victories in the field or the eventual Roman victory at Zama. For one final point, presenting Hannibal as weakened by the Capuan lifestyle also has to be equated with another tradition about Hannibal: that he remained undefeated during the time he was in Italy (to be discussed in the final chapter of this thesis).

## Hannibal's dramatic escape

Polybius presents Hannibal intending to persuade towns in Campania to change allegiance by impressing them with a show of his strength against Rome; the plan being to defeat the Romans in battle somewhere on the Falernian plain (*Hist.* 3.70). The representation is supported with a strong sense of staging a spectacle:<sup>319</sup>

διόπερ ἔμελλον εἰς ταῦτα καταστρατοπεδεύσαντες ώσπερ εἰς θέατρον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι καταπλήξεσθαι μὲν τῷ παραλόγῳ πάντας, ἐκθεατριεῖν δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους φυγομαχοῦντας, αὐτοὶ δ' ἐξ ὄμολόγου φανήσεσθαι τῶν ὑπαίθρων κρατοῦντες.

Polybius, *Hist.* 3.91.10

The Carthaginians, then by quartering themselves in these plains, made of it a kind of theatre, in which they were sure to create a deep impression on all by their unexpected appearance, giving a spectacular exhibition of the timidity of their enemy and themselves demonstrating indisputably that they were in command of the country.

Paton, 2001, 225.

Polybius made an explicit theatrical analogy by comparing the approaches into the *ager Falernus* to the three doors of a stage:

ἄμα δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ὀχυρὰ δοκεῖ καὶ δυσέμβολα τελέως εἶναι τὰ πεδία: τὰ μὲν γὰρ θαλάττῃ τὸ δὲ πλεῖον ὅρεσι μεγάλοις πάντῃ καὶ συνεχέσι περιέχεται, δι' ὧν εἰσβολαὶ τρεῖς ὑπάρχουσι μόνον ἐκ τῆς μεσογαίου στεναὶ καὶ δύσβατοι, μία μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς Σαυνίτιδος, δευτέρα δ' ἀπὸ τῆς Λατίνης, ἡ δὲ κατάλοιπος ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ τοὺς Ἰρπίνους τόπων.

*Hist.* 3.91.8-9

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<sup>319</sup> Davidson, 1991, 16 also notes a general sense of a theatrical ‘spectacle’ to this passage.

Besides the above advantages the whole plain of Capua is strongly protected by nature and difficult of approach, being completely surrounded on one side by the sea, and for the greater part by lofty mountain-ranges, through which there are only three passes from the interior, all of them narrow and difficult, one from Samnium, the second from Latium, and the third from the country of the Hirpini.

Paton, 2001, 225.

In this theatrical reconstruction, the important ‘centre’ stage-door is the entrance from Latium and the direction of Rome. Polybius precedes the analogy with a list of the Campanian towns that Hannibal intended to impress, including Capua, said to be the wealthiest, Neapolis, Sinuessa, Cyme, Dicaearchea (Puteoli), Nola, and Nuceria further south (*Hist.* 3.91.2-4).

Having created an audience, set the scene and built up expectations, Polybius then shows how Hannibal copes when his plans are thwarted. Instead of the Campanian towns watching a spectacular battle, Fabius Maximus refuses to fight, and the Roman army becomes the implicit audience as they shun battle, and shadow the Carthaginians from the heights around the plain:

Φάβιος δὲ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ συνάψαι τοῖς τόποις ἔσπευδε καὶ συνυπεκρίνετο τοῖς προθύμως καὶ φιλοκινδύνως διακειμένοις, ἐγγίσας δὲ τῷ Φαλέρνῳ ταῖς μὲν παρωρείαις ἐπιφαινόμενος ἀντιπαρῆγε τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν τοῖς αὐτῶν συμμάχοις ἐκχωρεῖν τῶν ὑπαίθρων, εἰς δὲ τὸ πεδίον οὐ καθίει τὴν δύναμιν, εὐλαβούμενος τοὺς ὄλοσχερεῖς κινδύνους διὰ τε τὰς προειρημένας αἰτίας καὶ διὰ τὸ προφανῶς ἵπποκρατεῖν παρὰ πολὺ τοὺς ὑπεναντίους.

*Hist.* 3.92.5-7

Fabius did bestir himself to reach the district, sharing in so far the view of the more eager and venturesome spirits, but when he came in view of the enemy on approaching Falernum, while moving along the hills parallel to them so as not to appear to the allies to be abandoning the open country, he did not bring his army down into the plain, avoiding a general action both for the above-mentioned reasons and because the Carthaginians were obviously much his superiors in cavalry.

Paton, 2001, 227.

Walbank describes the stage analogy as an ‘exaggeration’ by Polybius because it does not fit with the geography of the region and identifies at least eight approaches to the area from the surrounding hills.<sup>320</sup> Whether there are eight approaches or only three,

<sup>320</sup> Walbank, I, 426: ‘The actual site is uncertain.’ Frederiksen, 1984, 238: ‘it is generally agreed to be from a valley below modern Pietravairano.’ Walbank also notes that Livy’s description is no easier to match to local topography than Polybius.

Polybius' stage analogy carries a subtext for Hannibal's next move: that Hannibal deliberately stages a dramatic exit through the pass guarded by Fabius' men instead of leaving by any one of the other possible exits. The representation of Fabius correctly guessing that Hannibal would leave by the same pass that he arrived and posting soldiers to guard the pass is unexplained (*Hist.* 3.92.10). Polybius' lack of information about other factors, such as deserters or spies informing Fabius or the encumbrances of booty restricting Hannibal's choice of exit, leave a more lasting impression that Hannibal's spectacular diversion of oxen running berserk with burning faggots tied to their horns becomes a calculated demonstration to show that one way or another Hannibal could outwit and upstage Fabius Maximus.

Livy pays less credit to Hannibal's intelligence and the abilities of his scouts than does Polybius. Hannibal enters the *ager Falernus* in error when a guide mistakes his Latin pronunciation of Casinum for Casilinum (Livy, 22.13.6, also Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 6.1). The misunderstanding, considered by Frederiksen as 'too picturesque to be true,'<sup>321</sup> leads to a portrayal of Hannibal exhibiting barbaric cruelty through scourging and crucifying the unfortunate guide (Livy, 22.13.9).

Livy alludes to the tradition for presenting Hannibal's intentions through a theatrical analogy but gives it less force than Polybius because it is voiced through the soon-to-be-discredited Minucius. As a frustrated member of Hannibal's audience, Minucius angrily complains about idly watching Hannibal's army devastate the countryside<sup>322</sup> as if watching a spectacle: '*spectatum huc...ut ad rem fruendam oculis, sociorum caedes et incendia, venimus*' (Livy, 22.14.4).

As Livy does not compare the area to a stage with three exits, there is no subtext that Hannibal deliberately upstaged Fabius when he could have exited by another route. Livy's Fabius, like his Polybian counterpart, is, nonetheless, certain about which route Hannibal would take to leave the area and installs guards to block the way:

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<sup>321</sup> Frederiksen, 1984, 238. von Ungern-Sternberg, 1975, ch 1, argues that Livy relocated the anecdote. Cf. Luce, 1976, 391 notes that von Ungern-Sternberg takes a 'very dim view' of the Roman annalistic tradition.

<sup>322</sup> Hannibal is said to devastate all the farmlands except those which his informants told him belonged to the Fabii. Consequently Fabius has to convince everyone, especially his army, of his loyalty to Rome, while continuing to resist the urge to fight Hannibal (Livy, 22.23.4; Val. Max. 7.3 ext. 8; Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 7.2; Dio Cassius, 14, 15, Zonaras 8, 26; Frontinus, *Strat.* 1.8.2; *Pun.* 7.260-267). This anecdote, while not directly related to the thesis topic, is further evidence for literary adaptation within historiographical texts as Walbank, I, 430 and Frederiksen, 1984, 238 read it as comparison between Fabius and Pericles. I would argue that in the Roman tradition it compares Fabius to Coriolanus (cf. Livy, 2.39.6). The 'historical' context of this story also differs between texts as Plutarch, *Fabius*, 6, associates it with Hannibal's departure from the Falernian plain whereas Livy places it later in his narrative.

Cum satis sciret per easdem angustias quibus intraverat Falernum agrum redditum, Calliculam montem et Casilinum occupat modicis praesidiis,

Livy, 22.15.4

Feeling certain that Hannibal would leave the Falernian district, by the same passes through which he had entered it, he posted a fair-sized garrison on Mount Callicula and another in Casilinum,

Foster, 1949, 251.

Hannibal seems hemmed in. As Livy's narrative unfolds, it becomes apparent that the incident is adapted to depict Hannibal's Punic adroitness at extricating himself from a seemingly impossible situation:

Itaque cum per Casilinum evadere non posset petendique montes et iugum Calliculae superandum esset, necubi Romanus inclusum vallibus agmen adgrederetur, ludibrium oculorum specie terribile ad frustrandum hostem commentus, principio noctis furtim succedere ad montes statuit.

Livy, 22.16.5-6

Accordingly, since he could not get out by way of Casilinum, but must take to the mountains and cross the ridge of Callicula, fearing lest the Romans should assail his troops as they were marching through the gorges, he resolved to approach the mountains under cover of darkness in the forepart of the night, after first contriving a terrifying exhibition, to cheat the enemy's eyes.

Foster, 1949, 255.

Silius Italicus provides a reasonably accurate description of the Falernian plain as a space bounded by inhospitable marshes, mountains, and the Volturnus River, albeit with poetic embellishment about the strength of these natural barriers (*Pun.* 7.276-8, cf. *Hist.* 3.91.8). As in Polybius' *Histories*, the epic Hannibal enters the area intending to provoke the Romans to battle, and there is no mistake over Latin pronunciation for the names of towns in the *Punica*. On the other hand, Silius' allusion to Hannibal's intention to stage a spectacle more closely echoes the angry remark by Livy's Minucius than Polybius' text because Silius describes Fabius (and his army) sitting like spectators watching Hannibal devastate the territory in a fruitless attempt to provoke battle:

Cassarum sedet irarum spectator et alti  
celsus colle iugi domat exultantia corda  
infractasque minas dilato Marte fatigat  
sollers cunctandi Fabius.

*Pun.* 7.123-6

Fabius sat and watched this fruitless rage from a lofty mountain-top; by refusing battle he tamed their proud hearts, and wore out their baffled boasting by masterly delay.

Duff, 1996, 345.

In this representation it is not Minucius who expresses frustration at Roman inactivity, but *Hannibal* who becomes angry and frustrated because he cannot induce the Romans to fight (*Pun.* 7.116-126; 146-156; 212-4).

Silius Italicus, like Livy, also favours representing Fabius and Hannibal understanding each other's tactics and each doing his best to outwit the other (*Pun.* 7.131-53; 260; 268; Livy, 22.16.5. Cf. Plutarch, *Fab. Max.* 5-6). As argued by Marks, part of the focus of *Punica* 7 is to demonstrate the superiority of Fabian caution and delay over daring and impetuous action as well as the superiority of age over youth.<sup>323</sup>

Fabius' patience pays off in the *Punica*, as it does in Appian's version (Appian, *Hann.* 7.14). Hannibal makes a mistake, not because of confused Latin but because he did not know the area, consequently he took a wrong turn and is 'almost trapped' by Fabius:

donec reptanten, neququam saepe trahendo  
huc illuc castra ac scrutantem proelia Poenum,  
qua nemorosa iuga et scopulosi vertice colles  
exsurgunt, clausit sparsa ad divortia turma.

*Pun.* 7.272-5

At last, as Hannibal crept about, shifting his camp without result and spying out any chance of battle, Fabius posted cavalry where cross-roads met and shut him in, where there were wooded heights and steep rising cliffs.

Duff, 1996.357

The texts differ in some of the details about how Hannibal organised the escape for himself and his army, and these are related to the intended depiction of Hannibal. According to Polybius, Hannibal plans and organises the escape during the previous day, discussing his idea with Hasdrubal, ordering the servants to gather and prepare the dry wood. Under cover of darkness, the faggots are tied to the horns of two thousand oxen. The servants are ordered to set the faggots alight and drive the cattle up the hillside toward the pass; they are accompanied by a contingent of soldiers whose orders are to take control of the ridge (*Hist.* 3.92.4-10). Appian adds that the soldiers were the bravest of Hannibal's young men (Appian, *Hann.* 14). The lasting sense from Polybius'

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<sup>323</sup> Marks, 2005, 23-27. Cf. Roller, 2009, 169 that Hannibal created a military and ethical crisis at Rome, forcing Q. Fabius Maximus Cunctator to innovate.

text is that everything is well organised and well orchestrated. The potential for disaster is not recorded because Polybius' narrative does not remain with the Carthaginians but turns to the Roman reaction.

Livy's description of the preparations is largely similar to Polybius, including the unbelievably huge number of oxen and the involvement of Hasdrubal (Livy, 22.16.4-8). An important difference is that Livy remains with the Carthaginians a little longer than Polybius and shows how the plan quickly came close to chaos. Once the faggots were lit the oxen, not surprisingly, went crazy with terror and quickly became unmanageable. As they shook their heads in distress they fanned the flames and spread the fire further.

It is this point that Livy switches focus to the Roman guards at the pass. They think that the woods and mountainside had been set on fire and fear that they might be surrounded. Consequently they leave their posts to move toward the area with least flames in order to find an escape route. In so doing, they come across some of the oxen and Carthaginians, and, suspecting a trick to ambush them, they scatter (Livy, 22.17.1-6). In the meantime, Fabius, aware of the noise, but also suspecting an ambush, keeps his men within the camp (Livy, 22.18.1).

Polybius, on the other hand, describes how the Roman guards at the pass leave their posts and bravely move *toward* the lights that they see moving up the slope. The guards believe that Hannibal was preparing a night attack from that direction and they move to intercept the Carthaginians. Unlike Livy, there is no reference to the oxen becoming unmanageable or any indication that the fire spread to the hillside. Fabius remains in his camp, and the Loeb translator, Paton, reads an analogy in Polybius' text comparing Fabius to one of Odysseus' companions, Eurylochus:<sup>324</sup>

Φάβιος δὲ τὰ μὲν ἀπορούμενος ἐπὶ τῷ συμβαίνοντι καὶ κατὰ τὸν ποιητὴν όισσάμενος δόλον εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπόθεσιν οὐδαμῶς κρίνων ἐκκυβεύειν οὐδὲ παραβάλλεσθαι τοῖς ὅλοις, ἥγε τὴν ἡσυχίαν ἐπὶ τῷ χάρακι καὶ προσεδέχετο τὴν ἡμέραν.

*Hist. 3.94.4*

Fabius, partly because he was at a loss to know what was occurring, and as Homer<sup>325</sup> says, deeming it to be a trick, and partly because he adhered to his former resolve not to risk or hazard a general engagement, remained quiet in his camp waiting for daylight.

Paton, 2001, 231

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<sup>324</sup> Paton, 2001, 231.

<sup>325</sup> Homer is understood.

Εὐρύλοχος δ' ύπέμεινεν, ὁισάμενος δόλον εἶναι.

Homer, *Odyssey*, 10.232

Only Eurylochus remaining behind, because he suspected a trick.

Murray, 1919.

Perhaps Silius Italicus, like Paton, read Polybius making an analogy to Homeric epic, because there is distinct heroic imagery in the Flavian poet's recreation of Hannibal's escape preparations, except that it surrounds *Hannibal* and *his* companions, not Fabius.

Silius Italicus condenses the time-scale. It is already night when Hannibal conceives his idea about how to escape through the pass. Hannibal puts on his lion-skin that he usually sleeps on and goes to wake his brother:

Nam membra cubili  
erigit et fulvi circumdat pelle leonis,  
qua super instratos proiectus gramine campi  
presserat ante toros. Tunc ad tentoria fratribus  
fert gressus vicina citos; nec degener ille  
belligeri ritus, taurino membra iacebat  
effultus tergo et mulcebat tristia somno.

*Pun.* 7.287-293

Rising from his bed, he put on the tawny lion-skin which had served him as bedding when he lay stretched on the grassy sward. Then he went in haste to his brother's tent which was pitched near his own. Mago,<sup>326</sup> too, was no effeminate soldier: his limbs rested on an ox-hide, as he lay there soothing trouble with sleep.

Duff, 1996, 359.

The lion-skin connects Hannibal with Hercules and Silius continues the heroic theme through his description of the scene. Hannibal's brother, Mago, sleeps with his spear planted in the ground next to him with helmet hanging from the spear-point; shield and other weapons lie close by, his war-horse kept saddled, even at night. Another soldier, Maraxes, uses his shield as a pillow and is surrounded by blood-dripping spoils while he sleeps (*Pun.* 7.200-327). Others do not sleep but work on honing their weapons, while yet another, Acherras, attends to one of the horses (*Pun.* 7.337-40).

Hannibal's orders are carried out in the dark and in silence. Once the dry brushwood and faggots are tied to the oxen, it burns easily:

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<sup>326</sup> Duff, 1996, 357 translates *fratribus* to Mago. Cf. Polybius and Livy who both name Hasdrubal in this incident, not Mago (*Hist.* 3.92.4; Livy, 22.16.9).

rapida iam subdita peste  
virgulta atque altis surgunt e cornibus ignes.  
hic vero ut, glacente malo et quassantibus aegra  
armentis capita, adiutae pinguescere flammae  
coepere, et vincens fumos erumpere vertex.

*Pun.* 7.351-5

The brushwood was quickly kindled, and the fire rose high from the horns of the cattle. But when the mischief spread and the beasts tossed their tortured heads, the flames, so helped, grew thicker, and their crest burst upwards through the smoke and conquered it.

Duff, 1996, 361

Like Livy, Silius describes the oxen panicking and shaking their heads. Livy uses an ablative absolute to suggest that the hillside then caught fire:

Quo repente discursu haud secus quam silvis montibusque accensis  
omnia circa virgulta ardere visa; capitumque irrita quassatio excitans  
flamمام hominum passim discurrentium speciem praebebat.

Livy, 22.17.3

As they suddenly rushed this way and that, all the bushes far and near seemed to be burning, as if the woods and mountains had been set on fire; and when they shook their heads they only fanned the blaze and made it look as men were running about in all directions.

Foster, 1949, 257.

Silius is explicit. In the *Punica*, the sparks from the faggots actually do start wildfires. Soon the whole hillside is ablaze and nothing can stop it:

per iuga, per valles errat Vulcania pestis,  
nusquam stante malo; vicinaque litora fungent.

*Pun.* 7.360-1

Nothing can check the destroying fire, it runs from place to place over hill and valley; and the sea not far away reflects it.

Duff, 1996, 361.

Depending on the weather conditions, it is a plausible scenario, and Frontinus, who may have known Silius Italicus, relates a similar version of events. He wrote that Hannibal released the oxen with the intention that they would run amok and send sparks flying to set the hillside alight. Frontinus relates that the Romans guarding the pass at first suspect a prodigy until scouts return with the facts. They inform Fabius who suspects a trick and remains within his camp while the Carthaginians escape through the unguarded pass (Frontinus, *Strat.* 1.5.28).

According to Polybius, Fabius was criticised for allowing the enemy to escape (*Hist.* 3.94.8). Livy, giving Fabius an indirect speech to Minucius, seems to respond to that criticism with the claim that, although it might seem nothing was achieved, they had not been defeated (Livy, 22.28.10). Silius Italicus similarly reinterprets the outcome in a ‘positive’ sense, when his Fabius tells Minucius that, by refusing to fight, he had kept the army intact (*Pun.* 7.399-400).

While Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus favour placing this spectacular escape in 217 and follow it with the story of Fabius travelling to Rome for religious reasons and returning in the nick of time to rescue Minucius, Appian and Cornelius Nepos follow traditions which have different historical chronologies. Appian places the escape story *after* Fabius has rescued Minucius and his army (Appian, *Hann.* 13-14) and Cornelius Nepos places the event some years later, on Hannibal’s retreat following his march on Rome in 211 (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 5.2). These alternative time-frames, plus the other differences outlined above, seem to indicate that, over time, the story took on a life of its own so that, at some point, it became detached from the historical chronology to become part of the popular mythology about Hannibal.

### ***Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse (Livy, 23.45.4)***

Polybius’ text is fragmentary for much of Hannibal’s interactions with the Capuans, but there is a surviving fragment in which Polybius is explicit that the Capuans invited Hannibal to their city: ἐκάλοντο τὸν Αὐγίσταν (*Hist.* 7.1.2). Polybius implies that there was consensus among the Capuans by referring to them collectively, but the reason for their defection is paradoxical: it is claimed that they could not endure the burden of their prosperity.

For the benefit of his readers, Polybius describes the Capuan wealth as so extensive that they enjoyed ‘habits of luxury and extravagance surpassing even the rumours concerning the wealth of Croton and Sybaris’ (*Hist.* 7.1.1).<sup>327</sup> The opinion that Polybius did ‘no more than follow standard literary perceptions’,<sup>328</sup> about Capuan wealth may be so, but his comparison assists his Greek-reading audience understand the extent of Capuan riches, and their corresponding level of moral degradation. Furthermore, the focus on wealth suggests that Hannibal responds out of greed for their riches; a

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<sup>327</sup> Croton and Sybaris were not far from Tarentum; their legendary wealth grew from Etruscan trade, but their rivalry ended in the total destruction of Sybaris in 510 BC.

<sup>328</sup> Frederiksen, 1984, 244; Hoffman, 1942, 54.

characteristic that Polybius notes in two literary portraits of Hannibal, albeit qualified with the remark that the accusations of greed for personal wealth largely derive from Hannibal's enemies (*Hist.* 9.22; 9.25.1-4).

In Livy's versions of events, Capuan wealth is not an over-riding factor, nor do the Capuans invite Hannibal to their town. Livy emphatically describes the Capuans as surrendering when Mago announces to the Carthaginian senate, in direct speech, that the Capuans surrendered, *se tradidisse*, and Mago clearly distinguishes Capua from the communities which defect to Hannibal after Cannae:

Bruttios Apulosque partem Samnitium ac Lucanorum defecisse ad Poenos. Capua quod caput Campaniae modo sed post afflictam rem Romanam Cannensi pugna Italiae sit, Hannibali se tradidisse.

Livy, 23.11.10-11.

That the Bruttians and Apulians and some of the Samnites and Lucanians had revolted to the Carthaginians, that Capua, which was the capital not only of Campania, but, since the Roman defeat by the battle of Cannae, of Italy also, had surrendered to Hannibal.

Moore, 1951, 37.

Surrender, from the Roman point of view, is considered worse than defeat. Thus Livy presents to his audience a different example to Polybius of Capuan moral degradation. On the other hand, Livy's use of Mago to announce the surrender in a speech to the Carthaginian senate allows his Roman audience to read the statement as a lie. Many modern scholars read *se tradidisse* (Livy, 23.11.11) and *se traditurum* (Livy, 23.1.1) as 'handing over' or 'delivering' rather than the possible 'surrendering' in order to fit Livy's text more closely to Polybius' presentation and promulgate the notion that the Capuans defected.<sup>329</sup> Any historical circumstances of *force majeure* are rarely, if ever, considered.

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<sup>329</sup> Rossi, 2004, 368; Heurgon, 1942, 115: 'pour châtier sa défection;' 144; De Sanctis, iii, 2,214; Warmington, 1969, 205; Sherwin-White, 1973, 41; Salmon, 1957, 153; Mankin, 1995, 247; Crawford, 2001, 1974, 30; Watson, 2003, 491. Frederiksen, 1977, 183 notes Hannibal's camp above Capua but Frederiksen, 1984, 227, 238, 241, consistently refers to defection, only once conceding the Capuans may have been unable to resist; von Ungern-Sternberg, 1975, argues that Capua's revolt was the act of a united state seeking independence. This means that the Capuans were prepared to risk the lives of all those Capuans serving in the Roman army including 300 *equites* based in Sicily (Livy, 23.5.1). Lancel, 1998, 114 argues that these men effectively became hostages once the siege of Capua began. Yet it seems that they remained loyal to Rome after Hannibal took control of Capua. Sicily was strategically critical to prevent supplies from Carthage reaching Hannibal and not a location for soldiers of doubtful loyalty to Rome, as acknowledged when these men were later granted Roman citizenship and had their residency transferred from Capua to Cumae, backdated to the day before Capua came under Hannibal (Livy, 23.31.10).

The notion of Capuan surrender is compatible with the other sections of Livy's narrative. At the opening of book 23, Livy describes Hannibal turning toward Capua after investigating but deciding against attempting to take Neapolis. The phrase does not imply one way or the other that Hannibal responded to an invitation: *inde Capuam flectit iter* (Livy, 23.2.1).<sup>330</sup> It is not until later in the narrative that Livy incorporates the Capuans negotiating a treaty with Hannibal, discussed below. Its location in the text gives it less impact than the announcement of surrender, and, as will be shown, certain features suggest that its inclusion is more relevant to supporting Livy's subsequent depiction of Hannibal as a treaty-breaker (Livy, 23.7.1-3).

Silius Italicus more closely follows Polybius, not Livy, because his Capuans invite Hannibal to their city: *et Poenos in tecta vocant* (*Pun.* 11.134) but the reason for the Capuan defection in the *Punica* is different. It is not their 'unbearable prosperity' but because the Romans had rejected a Capuan request to share the Roman consulship in return for continued allegiance against Hannibal (*Pun.* 11.55-121; also Cicero, *De Leg. Agr.*, 2.95). Livy acknowledges but rejects this tradition on the basis that it echoed too closely a similar demand by the Latins from earlier times (Livy, 23.6.5). (It would be so helpful to know more about Livy's personal rules were governing the inclusion or otherwise of 'echoes' or 'parallels' in his text!)

Livy depicts Hannibal applying an iron-fist-in-a-velvet-glove approach to the Italian communities after Cannae. Hannibal orders Mago to take over the cities that were deserting from Rome or compel them to desert if they refused: *exercitu partito Magonem regionis eius urbes aut deficientis ab Romanis accipere aut detractantis cogere ad defectionem iubet* (Livy, 23.1.4). Livy indirectly acknowledges that *force majeure* may have been a factor historically for the Capuans through two items. The first is a literary vignette about Compsa which precedes the story of Capua and the second is the location of Hannibal's camp in relation to Capua.

Livy's literary vignette about Compsa parallels Polybius' insertion of a literary vignette about Petelia immediately preceding the story of Capua. In each text the vignette serves a different purpose as Polybius contrasts the Petelians against the Capuans, as a good example of *fides* to Rome. The Petelians hold out in a siege against the Carthaginians for so long that they were reduced to chewing leather and eating tree

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<sup>330</sup> Lancel, 1998, 113 argues that Hannibal taking Capua was not a random choice which may be so but Livy clearly indicates that it was second choice after Neapolis.

bark, not surrendering until they received permission from the Senate (*Hist.* 7.1.2).<sup>331</sup> Livy's vignette about the Compsans, however, is noted for its *parallels* to the Capuans. The Compsans are divided and argue about how they should respond to Hannibal. Eventually, the pro-Roman contingent, the Mopsii, is out-voted and leave town before Hannibal arrives (Livy, 23.1.2). The pro-Hannibal contingent, led by a Statius Trebius, invited Hannibal to enter and surrender the town to him:

Hannibal post Cannensem pugnam castraque capta ac direpta  
confestim ex Apulia in Samnum moverat, accitus in Hirpinos a Statio  
Trebio pollicente se Compsam traditurum.

Livy, 23.1.1

After the battle at Cannae and the capture and plunder of the camps, Hannibal moved out of Apulia into Samnum, having been invited to the land of the Hirpini by Statius Trebius, who promised that he would surrender Compsa to him.

Adapted from Moore, 1951, 3.

Livy assumes his audience is aware of the physical location of Compsa in the Aufidus valley to the west of Cannae, and that Hannibal, heading up the valley from Cannae, would reach Compsa whether or not he was invited. Under these circumstances the Compsan surrender to Hannibal is arguably more prudent than attempting to hold out against him, but, as with the Capuans, that is not the point: surrender should not be an option for an ally of Rome.<sup>332</sup>

It is moral comparison by contrast to Rome and individual Romans that underlies much of Livy's depiction of Capua and individual Capuans for this episode. The story of Capua generally and the details about certain individuals are adapted to illustrate how Roman moral values, such as the various forms of *fides*, are missing or distorted amongst Capuans.<sup>333</sup> Like the Compsans, Livy's Capuans argue over how they should respond to Hannibal. This is quite the opposite of what will be the Roman reaction when Rome faces the same crisis in 211 when the Romans are depicted working together as a

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<sup>331</sup> Livy's annalistic format places the story of the Petelians after the winter in Capua, 23.19.1-2.

<sup>332</sup> Varro's list of requirements to the Capuan delegation commissioned to visit him not only illustrated just how severely the Roman resources were depleted but also clearly indicated that Varro had not surrendered (Livy, 23.5.2; Val. Max. 7.6.1a). This message was not taken seriously enough by the Capuans, described by Livy as proud and faithless: *superbis atque infidelibus* Livy, 23.5.1.

<sup>333</sup> Moore, 1989; Edwards, 1993 and Chaplin, 2000 (esp. Introduction) discuss various moral values upheld in parts of Livy's text but not in terms of comparing Capua against Rome. Moore focuses primarily on Livy's portrayal of Roman virtues but does not compare them against Capuan vices; Edwards and Chaplin focus their studies on Livy's depiction of individual Roman generals as moral examples.

community to resist Hannibal who eventually withdraws from outside their city. In reality of course the two situations were quite different.

Livy's placement of the item about the Capuans voting to contact Hannibal *after* Hannibal has already turned toward Capua from Neapolis allows for the possibility that they surrendered out of fear.<sup>334</sup> Livy also separates further information that would otherwise add to the sense of the physical and psychological threat facing the Capuans. The reference to Hannibal's camp<sup>335</sup> on Mt Tifata which overlooks the town is not mentioned until 36 chapters after the story of the Capuan surrender (Livy, 23.36.1; see Figure 6). This separation also removes a distinct parallel between the Capuan surrender to Hannibal and their original surrender to Rome, recorded in Livy's first decad which took place when the Samnites were threatening and attacking the city from their camp on Mt Tifata (Livy, 7.29).<sup>336</sup> Similarly the intention to separate the two events may also explain Livy's decision to use *se tradidisse* in relation to Hannibal, not *se dedere* as in the earlier Capuan *deditio* to Rome (7.30.1).

The pro-Roman voices of dissent at Capua are represented by Magius Decius, a senator, and the young son of the leading senator, Pacuvius Calavius (Livy, 23.6.1-6; 23.7.1-2).<sup>337</sup> Livy develops a sense of pathos around these two figures, discussed below, as the son reluctantly obeys his father and Magius Decius will be punished by Hannibal. The moral degeneracy of the Capuans is illustrated by their method of showing support for Hannibal as he approaches the town. The Roman prefect<sup>338</sup> and other Roman citizens are seized and murdered through suffocation in the baths:

nam praefectos socium civisque Romanos alios partim aliquo militiae munere occupatos partim privatis negotiis implicitos plebs repente omnis comprehenos velut custodiae causa balneis includi iussit ubi fervore atque aestu anima interclusa foedum in modum exspirarent.

Livy, 23.7.3

<sup>334</sup> Zonaras writes that the people wanted to defect from Rome but not the nobility; the two groups became reconciled with one another and made peace with Hannibal (Zonaras, 9, 2). Diodorus writes that the Capuans reached a unanimous decision out of fear of Hannibal (Diodorus, 36.10.1).

<sup>335</sup> There is an interesting correlation between Livy and an area labelled on the medieval Peutinger map as Hannibal's camp, *Aniba castra*, on Mt Tifata. Zonaras 9.2 describes Hannibal seizing a Samnite fortress on entering Campania after Cannae; its location is unspecified. Cf. Livy, 7.29.

<sup>336</sup> The Capuans sought *amicitiam in perpetuum* with Rome because their army, weakened by excessive luxury and effeminacy, could not defend the town against the Samnites (Livy, 7.30.1). Capua's reputation as an unhealthy place for military discipline is reinforced soon after when a Roman garrison installed there turned to luxury and becomes mutinous (Livy, 7.32-7).

<sup>337</sup> Lancel, 1998, 114 describes Pacuvius as a 'political genius.' In my view, Livy presents Pacuvius as a man of dubious, manipulative characteristics (Livy, 23.3).

<sup>338</sup> Whether there was a Roman military presence at Capua or whether this person was there to levy troops is not known.

The people suddenly seized the Prefects of the Allies and other Roman citizens, some of them employed in a military duty, some engaged in private business, and with the pretence of guarding them ordered them all to be confined in the baths, that there they might die a terrible death being suffocated by the extreme heat.

Moore, 1951, 21.

Baths have strong associations with immorality and pleasure as hot water was thought, among other things, to undermine a man's strength and weaken the body.<sup>339</sup> Hence both the imagery of the location as well as the unmanly and unsoldierly method of killing them represents moral degeneracy on the part of the Capuans.

Murdering people through suffocation in baths is used by Dio and Appian to illustrate unmanliness in Hannibal and the Carthaginians. When Hannibal obtains the surrender of the Nucerians after besieging their town, he allows the common people to leave with one garment each, but has the senators suffocated in the baths (Dio, fr. 57.30; Zonaras, 9.2; cf. Appian who adds that as the common people were leaving the town, the Carthaginians shot them with arrows, *Pun.* 8.63). As Pomeroy points out, the Carthaginians are depicted not only attacking Romans and Italians but attacking *fides* itself.<sup>340</sup> Another similarly far-fetched story depicting Hannibal's immorality in Appian's text is his method of repairing a bridge with the bodies of slaughtered prisoners (Appian, *Lib.* 63.281); though this not to say that atrocities were not carried out by either side during the war.

### Hannibal's *Punica fides* and Hannibal the tyrant

There is a tradition that a treaty was agreed between the Capuans and Hannibal prior to Hannibal entering the town. Considering that the treaty follows Hannibal's stunning victory at Cannae, Livy's summary of the terms agreed is extraordinarily favourable to the Capuans, and indicate to Livy's audience the extent of Capuan ambition and delusion:

Legati ad Hannibalem venerunt pacemque cum eo his condicionibus fecerunt, ne quis imperator magistratusve Poenorum ius ullum in civem Campanum haberet, neve civis Campanus invitus militaret munusve faceret; ut suae leges, sui magistratus Capuae essent; ut

<sup>339</sup> Toner, 1995, 55. Heurgon, 1942, 126 notes that the baths at Capua date to early second century and may have been in existence at the time of the Second Punic War. Cf. Nielsen, 1985, 81: 'the earliest hypocaust system known is dated to 90-80.' Others said to be suffocated in a hot bath include: Marius' enemy, Catalus, in 87; Nero's wife, Octavia, in AD 64 and Constantine's wife, Fausta, in AD 326.

<sup>340</sup> Pomeroy, 1989b, 163.

trecentos ex Romanis captivis Poenus daret Campanis, quos ipsi elegissent, cum quibus equitum Campanorum, qui in Sicilia stipendia facerent, permutatio fieret.

Livy, 23.7.1-2

The legates came to Hannibal and made an alliance with him on these terms: that no general or magistrate of the Carthaginians should have any authority over a Campanian citizen, and that no Campanian citizen should be a soldier or perform any service against his will; that Capua should have its own laws, its own magistrates, that the Carthaginian should give the Campanians three hundred of the Roman captives of their own choosing with whom there should be an exchange of the Campanian horsemen who were serving in Sicily.

Moore, 1951, 19.

The suspension of belief that Hannibal agreed<sup>341</sup> to these terms is necessary while Livy's narrative unfolds to reveal the extent of Capuan self-delusion and Hannibal's *Punica fides* as a treaty-breaker. On Hannibal's first day, with the (unwitting) support of the Capuans, he dissimulates his intentions:

Hannibal ingressus urbem senatum extemplo postulat, precantibusque inde primoribus Campanorum ne quid eo die seriae rei gereret diemque ut ipse adventu suo festum laetus ac libens celebraret, quamquam praeceps ingenio in iram erat, tamen, ne quid in principio negaret, visenda urbe magnam partem diei consumpsit.

Livy, 23.7.11-12

Hannibal entered the city and at once demanded a senate meeting. Then the leading Campanians begged him not to do any serious business that day and that he should cheerfully and willingly honour the day gladdened by his coming, though he was naturally short-tempered, still in order not to deny them anything at the start, he spent a large part of the day in sightseeing around the city.

Adapted from Moore, 1951, 23.

It is on Hannibal's second day that everything changes. Hannibal presides over a Senate meeting. Livy gives Hannibal direct speech in which Hannibal expresses thanks to the Capuans for their support and promises that they would soon be the premier city of Italy. Hannibal then reveals his *Punica fides* through a change of tone and demands the surrender of Magius Decius for trial in direct contravention of the first treaty item (Livy, 23.10.1-2). Magius Decius had been brought to Hannibal's attention by publicly displaying his *fides* to Rome when he walked around the forum with clients instead of

<sup>341</sup> Von Ungern-Sternberg, 1975, 76 reads them as Hannibal's terms... conventional promises that were repeated to Tarentum, Locri and Lucania. Erskine; 1993, 60 reads the treaty as consistent with Hannibal's liberation propaganda and reflecting traditional Greek aspirations.

joining other senators with their families to welcome Hannibal (Livy, 23.7.4). If there was a treaty between Hannibal and the Capuans along the lines of the one quoted by Livy, then it is possible that one aspect of the treaty was observed by Hannibal: there is no extant record of Capuans serving in Hannibal's army, unlike the Lucanians and Bruttians.

Silius Italicus, in contrast to Livy, depicts Hannibal as a tyrant from the moment Hannibal enters Capua. The reference to a treaty between Capua and Hannibal is a brief one-line: *ast delecta manus iungebat foedera Poeno* (*Pun.* 11.190) and there is no summary of the treaty conditions, hence Hannibal is not directly represented as a treaty-breaker. Hannibal exerts his authority immediately on entering the city; his first action is not sightseeing but presiding over the trial and banishment of Decius Magius<sup>342</sup> (*Pun.* 11.228-30). Hannibal explodes with tyrannical anger at Decius and the spirited reply seems to allude to the sightseeing tour described by Livy with the claim that Hannibal had neither attended the Senate House nor visited the Temples (*Pun.* 11.252-3).

Hannibal-the-tyrant has no interest in the Capuan Senate and there is no pretence that it has any function as a governing body. He goes on his sightseeing tour *after* the trial, but his questions to the guides have nothing to do with sightseeing. They are, however, entirely appropriate for a general at war because Hannibal wants to know numbers of men under arms, the quality of the cavalry, how much money the Capuans possess and how much food is available (*Pun.* 11.252-3).

### **Gluttony and a threat of assassination**

Hannibal surgere de nocte solitus ante noctem non requiescebat;  
crepusculo demum ad cenam vocabat neque amplius quam duobus  
lectis discumbebatur apud eum.

Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.3.7

Hannibal was accustomed to rise while it was still dark, but never took any rest before night. At dusk and not before, he called his friends to dinner; and not more than two couches were ever filled with dinner guests at his headquarters.

Bennet, 2003, 291.

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<sup>342</sup> Decius in the *Punica* is stronger than his Livian counterpart. He actively attempts to rally support to attack Hannibal, urging his fellow Capuans to block the way with corpses if Hannibal tries to enter the gate (*Pun.* 11.197-9). His appeal is in vain; Hannibal is met and escorted into town by the senators and a 'rabble' (not wives and children as in Livy) *senatu et vulgo* (*Pun.* 11.222-3).

Frontinus' description of Hannibal's modest eating habits are in keeping with Livy's introductory portrait of Hannibal at the opening of the third decad. Livy wrote that Hannibal ate meat and drank only according to his bodily needs: *cibi potionisque desiderio naturali non voluptate modus finitus* (Livy, 21.4.6).

In the ancient world, plentiful food is an indicator of wealth and may, depending on the context, imply gluttony. Celebratory feasts, for example, customarily provide more food than is normally consumed and are therefore adaptable as symbols of gluttony, wastefulness and extravagance. It is in this guise that both Livy and Silius Italicus depict Hannibal attending a celebratory feast in his honour on his first day in Capua, but, as will be shown below, there is little in common between the feast described in the *Punica* and the one described by Livy.

On Hannibal's first day, after sightseeing, Livy locates him as guest of honour at a feast in the opulent house of two brothers, the Ninnii Celeres. It is also, on Hannibal's order, an exclusive affair. The Capuan side of the party comprising only the brother hosts, Pacuvius Calavius with his son, and a 'distinguished soldier,' Vibellius Taurea (Livy, 23.8.1-5).<sup>343</sup>

Livy notes that the feasting began during the day and that, as such, the meal was not in accord with either Carthaginian custom or with military discipline:

epulari coeperunt de die et convivium non ex more Punico aut militari disciplina esse sed ut in civitate atque etiam domo diti ac luxuriosa omnibus voluptatium inlecebris instructum.

Livy, 23.8.6

They began feasting by daylight and the banquet was not according to Carthaginian custom or military discipline, but provided with all that tempts indulgence, as was to be expected in a city, and a house, of wealth and luxury.

Adapted from Moore, 1951, 25.

Thus the guests rise at sunset.

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<sup>343</sup> Pacuvius Calavius had sought Hannibal's pardon for his son (who supported the anti-Hannibal party) which led to both being invited to the feast; the son's presence has to be explained given his wish to attempt to assassinate Hannibal. In addition, Taurea might be distinguished by Capuan standards for his *virtus* but Livy shows later that he is no match in single combat against the Roman, Claudius Asellus. Livy compares inferior Capuan *virtus* against Roman *virtus* through two displays of single combat between Campanians and Romans: Vibellius Taurea versus Claudius Asellus (Livy, 23.46.12-47.8; 24.8.3) and Badius versus Crispinus (Livy, 25.18.5-15). Each time the Romans win. Moore, 1989, 13: 'Although Livy generally portrays the Romans as superior in *virtus* to other peoples, he uses *virtus* of Hannibal nine times, yet of Scipio, eight times.'

Silius Italicus, however, has the feast *commencing* in the evening *as was customary for the Capuans*, and, in further contrast to the select few participants in Livy, celebrations take place throughout the city:

iamque diem ad metas defessis Phoebus Olympo  
impellebat equis fuscabat et Hesperos umbra  
paulatim infusa properantem ad litora currum.  
instituunt de more epulas festamque per urbem  
regifice extractis celebrant convivia mensis.

*Pun.* 11.267-71

By now Phoebus was driving his weary steeds down the sky to their goal, and Evening spread her gradual shade and darkened his car in its course to the sea. The citizens made feast as was their custom; the city kept holiday and banquets were held at tables piled high with regal splendour.

Adapted from Duff, 1989, 121.

Furthermore Silius Italicus poetically reinterprets Livy's remark that the meal was not in accord with military discipline. Those serving the feast in the *Punica* were organised in terms of a military operation by being divided into companies and each assigned an allotted task (*Pun.* 11.274-277).

Pacuvius Calavius' son shows some Roman spirit (given Pacuvius' marriage to Claudia he would be the grandson of Appius Claudius) because he intends to assassinate Hannibal and tells his father of the plan (Livy, 23.2.1-7; *Pun.* 11.332). In both texts, the father dissuades his son but the scenes differ because Livy's intention is to illustrate the son's misguided priorities for the Roman virtue of *pietas*.<sup>344</sup> The tension between *pietas* due to a parent with that due to the state is acknowledged in the son's speech that closes the episode in Livy's text.<sup>345</sup>

Silius Italicus first applauds the bravery of the son's idea (*Pun.* 11.304-9) but the father, Pacuvius, is even more terrified and weak than his Livian counterpart. He begs, not orders, his son not to attack Hannibal (*Pun.* 11.329-331). His reasoning, however, is not, as given by Livy, related to the son being an invited guest but based on a belief that

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<sup>344</sup> The son erroneously places his *pietas* to his father over his *pietas* to Rome when he obeys his father's order not to attack Hannibal. Pacuvius Calavius points out the strength of Hannibal's bodyguard, but insists that because Hannibal invited the son to the feast it was inappropriate for a guest to murder a host (Livy 23.9.10-11).

<sup>345</sup> *ego quidem... quam patriae debo pietatem exsolvam patri* (Livy 23.9.11). See Moore, 1989, 60. Later Livy gives two examples for the correct priorities for *pietas*, firstly, the boy's grandfather, Appius Claudius, maintains the siege of Capua despite his family ties. Secondly, Fabius Maximus dismounts on the orders of his son's lictor when his son, Quintus Fabius, is consul (Livy, 24.44.10).

Hannibal was divinely protected (by his victories), as well as physically protected by a powerful bodyguard:

fallit te, mensas inter quod credis inermem.  
tot bellis quaesita viro, tot caedibus armat  
maiestas aeterna ducem. si admoveris ora,  
Cannas et Trebiam ante oculos Thrasymennaque busta  
et Pauli stare ingentem miraberis umbram.  
Quid? tanto in casu comitam iuxtaque iacentum  
torpebunt dextrae?

*Pun.* 11.342-348

If you think that he sits unarmed at table, you are wrong. His armour is the immortal glory he has gained by constant warfare and tombs of victims slain. If you come close to him you will marvel to see before you Cannae and the Trebia, the dead of Lake Trasimene and the mighty shade of Paulus. Again, will his officers and those who sit at meat beside him lift no finger while such a scene is acting?

Duff, 1989, 127

Hannibal could only be defeated by a more powerful Roman (Scipio), not a mere boy from Capua (*Pun.* 11.332-350).

The deification of Hannibal at Carthage following news of Cannae (*Pun.* 12.494) is prefigured at the Capuan feast where Hannibal is afforded divine honours *ipse deum cultu et sacro dignatus honore* (*Pun.* 11.272). Initially Hannibal disapproves of the lavish feast (but not the divine honours), eating in silence until he relaxes under the effects of alcohol and settles to enjoy the male singers and lyre-players (*Pun.* 11.283-5; 428-431).

Disapproval of performers was a distinguishing Roman characteristic<sup>346</sup> and in the *Punica*, Hannibal is presented as rapidly succumbing to Capuan degradation. Furthermore, in a portrait nowadays unique to the *Punica*, Hannibal shows an effeminate preference for the male singer, Teuthras, to sexual debauchery with women:<sup>347</sup>

in primis dulcem, Peno laetante, per aures  
nunc voce infundit Teuthras, nunc pectine, cantum.

*Pun.* 11.432-3

Teuthras above all charmed Hannibal, filling his ears with sweet music both of the voice and of the instrument.

Duff, 1989, 133.

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<sup>346</sup> Edwards, 1993, 98.

<sup>347</sup> Wilson, 1993, 232.

## Effects of Capuan luxury

Hannibal doesn't get a hangover and the immediate effects of the feast were minimal because the following morning he is hard at work. In Livy, Hannibal reveals his *Punica fides* by demanding that Magius Decius be put on trial in direct contravention of the first treaty item (Livy, 23.10.1). The epic Hannibal is also up and working before sunrise, sending Mago to Carthage<sup>348</sup> with captives and booty, including Decius, who had already been condemned to exile at his trial the previous day (*Pun.* 11.369-376). Despite this hard work the following day, there is a strong tradition that Hannibal and the Carthaginians are weakened by the Capuan lifestyle; for example, shortly after taking control Hannibal leaves Capua to attack Casilinum, but the attempt fails (Livy, 23.20.5 cf. Zonaras 9.2). The focus on Hannibal weakening masks to some extent the change in the style of warfare as Hannibal concentrates on gaining control of Italian townships (indicated by his order to Mago).

Diodorus describes the luxurious Capuan lifestyle as significantly weakening Hannibal and his army, claiming that they succumbed to the temptations of soft couches, perfumes and plentiful food; they lost strength and their ability to endure danger as their bodies and spirits became reduced to a womanish condition (Diodorus Siculus 26.9.11). Florus cites the hot springs of Baiae and the balmy Campanian climate as the primary causes of weakness in Hannibal's army:

Cum Victoria posset uti, frui maluit, relictaque Roma Campaniam Tarentumque perrexit; ubi mox et ipsius et exercitus ardor elanguit, adeo ut vere dictum sit Capuam Annibali Cannas fuisse. Si quidem invictum Alpibus indomitumque armis Campani – quis crederet? – soles et tepentes fontibus Baiae subegerunt.

Florus, 1.22.21-2

When he might have exploited his victory, he preferred the enjoyments which it offered and, neglecting Rome, marched to Campania and Tarentum, where the vigour of both himself and of his army soon languished to such an extent that it has been remarked with truth that 'Capua was Hannibal's Cannae.' For, though it is scarcely credible, the sunshine of Campania and the hot springs of Baiae overcame him who had been undefeated by the Alps and unconquered on the battlefield.

Seymour Forster, 1995, 101.

<sup>348</sup> In structural terms, Silius Italicus echoes Livy by placing a reference to Mago in the morning after the feast at Capua. The difference is that Livy locates Mago at Carthage, as he had been sent directly from Cannae to report on the victory (Livy, 23.11.7).

It is, as Florus wrote, scarcely credible. In reality, Baiae was too close to Roman held territory, such as Naples, for Hannibal to have spent much time relaxing in the hot pools.

Livy makes no reference to the spa resort in his summary of the invidious effects of Capuan luxury on Hannibal and his army; the focus of his text is on activities within Capua:

Somnus enim et vinum et epulae et scorta balinaeque et otium consuetudine in dies blandius ita enervaverunt corpora animosque ut magis deinde praeteritae victoriae eos quam praesentes tutarentur vires maiusque id peccatum ducis apud peritos artium militarium haberetur quam quod non ex Cannensi acie protinus ad urbem Romanam duxisset; illa enim cunctatio distulisse modo victoriam videri potuit hic error vires ademisse ad vincendum.

Livy, 23.18.12-13

For sleep and wine, and feasts and harlots, and baths and idleness, which habit made daily more seductive, so weakened their bodies and spirits that it was their past victories rather than their present strength which thereafter protected them, and this was regarded among the military experts as a more serious failure in their commander than that he had not led his men from the field of Cannae forthwith to the city of Rome.

Moore, 1951, 63.

In sum, Hannibal's men enjoy the women,<sup>349</sup> and the baths, both of which were considered to weaken a man's moral and physical strength, leaving him unable to take part in public or military life.<sup>350</sup> Brothels were an integral part of Roman society but Cicero implies that they were considered *infamia* (Cicero, *Cael.* 48). *scorta*, Livy's word for the Capuan women is a derogatory term.

Silius Italicus acknowledges the effects of the baths causing irreversible weakness in Hannibal's men (*Pun.* 11.417-8) but there is no direct reference to the Capuan women in the *Punica*. It is Venus who despatches an army of Cupids to weaken Hannibal's soldiers (*Pun.* 11.385-423).<sup>351</sup> The allegorical use of the goddess shows a careful distinction that she, not the Capuan women, deserved thanks for her role in weakening Hannibal's army:

<sup>349</sup> See Edwards, 1993, 92 for Roman views of sex. There is no evidence to support her comment that 'real Romans only had sex with their wives and even then not too often.'

<sup>350</sup> E.g. Martial, 7.82. Cf. Sallust, *Cat.* 11.5: the pleasures of the East and art appreciation weakened Sulla's army.

<sup>351</sup> Wilson, 1993, 222.

Nec Venerem interea fugit exoptabile tempus  
Poenorum mentes caeco per laeta premendi  
exitio et luxu corda importuna domandi

*Pun.* 11.385-7

Meantime Venus did not miss the welcome opportunity to destroy the discipline of the Carthaginians by the insidious weapon of pleasure, and to tame their fierce hearts by luxury.

Duff, 1989, 129.

Silius Italicus emphasises the detrimental effects of Capuan luxury through the structure of the *Punica* in which the depiction of Hannibal's first Capuan winter is the subject of the whole of *Punica* 11. The weakening of Hannibal's army is demonstrable because Hannibal's first attempt to take Neapolis is located *after*, not before, spending winter in Capua (*Pun.* 12.1-103). The attempt fails, not, as suggested by Livy, because of the strength of Neapolitan walls but because the Carthaginian army was infected and weakened by Capuan wealth and luxury (*Pun.* 12.286-7).

This point illustrates a significant difference between Silius Italicus and Livy over their depictions of Hannibal and his army which will become more apparent in the next chapter. Livy's narrative modifies the tradition about the effects of the Capuan lifestyle on Hannibal in a number of ways. Hannibal's first attempt against Neapolis precedes his taking control of Capua, and he was put off by the sight of the Neapolitan walls, despite defeating the defenders when they attacked (Livy, 23.1.3-7).<sup>352</sup> In addition, throughout the period of the first winter in Capua, Hannibal sustained sieges against both Petelia<sup>353</sup> and Casilinum, both of which indicate that he was not totally distracted by Capuan hospitality (Livy, 23.18.1-9; 23.19.1-17). The siege of Casilinum was sufficiently well maintained for a desperate story about how the Romans, under Gracchus, tried to offer relief to their faithful allies by floating pots of food and nuts down the river to the town. Eventually the inhabitants of Casilinum were reduced, like the Petelians, to chewing leather before capitulating (Livy, 23.19; Val. Max., 7.6.1c; Coelius, frg. 27; Strabo, 5.4.10). Hannibal eventually succeeds in taking Nuceria and, later, one of his officers

<sup>352</sup> Frederiksen, 1984, 90; 242 for discussion of Hannibal's repeated attempts to take over Neapolis, Nola and Nuceria; Hannibal tried both persuasion and force (Livy, 23.1; Zonaras 9.2; Livy, 23.14.5-6; 23.14.10-13; 23.15.6).

<sup>353</sup> The Petelians were besieged for eleven months according to Frontinus, Strat. 4.18. Valerius Maximus praised the Petelians as 'second to Saguntum' as an example of *de fide publica*. When the Petelians approached Rome for help, the Romans, unable to assist, authorised the Petelians to do whatever they thought most expedient for their own safety. The Petelians evacuated their women and children, and fought Hannibal to the last man. Silius Italicus alludes to this tradition through his comparison of Petelia to Saguntum for the way Petelia burned *Pun.* 12.431-2.

takes Petelia (Livy, 23.15.3; 23.30.1). Despite repeated attempts, Hannibal cannot capture either Nola or Neapolis, both strategically critical towns.<sup>354</sup>

Livy depicts Hannibal losing something of his leadership qualities through his inability to prevent his men leaving to visit their Capuan girlfriends (Livy, 23.18.16) whereas Silius Italicus illustrates the same problem differently to Livy. It is not Hannibal's men taking unauthorised leave but *Hannibal* who leaves his men to continue the siege of Puteoli while he went sight-seeing around the hot springs of Baiae with the Capuan nobility (*Pun.* 12.104-115). Not surprisingly the siege ends in failure (as it did in Livy, 24.13.6). The *Punica* is the earliest extant text that locates Hannibal at the spa resort of Baiae, but, as with the surprising number of items in common between the *Punica* and later texts such as Florus and Appian that are not found elsewhere, it is impossible to know whether it reflects a common tradition used by Silius, Appian and/or Florus, or whether it reflects the influence of the *Punica* on these later texts.

Marcellus successfully held Nola against Hannibal (Livy 23.15.7), and later gains the first significant victory against Hannibal (Livy 23.44-45.4). It is the first major morale boosting battlefield victory for Rome after Cannae that gave rise to the quip *Capuam Hannibali Cannas fuisse* (Livy, 23.45.4). The victory signals a change in Roman fortunes and Marcellus was subsequently rewarded with full military authority as proconsul as only he had recorded success against Hannibal in Italy (Livy, 23.30.19). Silius Italicus epicised Marcellus' win by having him challenge Hannibal to single combat (*Pun.* 12.198) except that Juno intervened to ensure Hannibal did not fight (*Pun.* 12.201). This point becomes significant for the tradition of Hannibal's record of victories in Italy, discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Appian gives another reason that concurs with the depiction of Hannibal weakening, and relates it to the Roman successes in Spain. Hannibal's fortunes are said to decline from 215 (coinciding with taking control of Capua) because Spanish fighters coming to Italy to fight on behalf of Rome conversed with their compatriots in Hannibal's army, persuading many of them to join the Romans (Appian, *Hann.* 7.30). Livy and Plutarch also refer to Spanish fighters deserting Hannibal after 215, but not by persuasion from

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<sup>354</sup> Contra Frederiksen, 1984, 242 who argues that Livy confused his sources: 'the first two are Coelian and sound, the third is clearly a doublet of the first. The motive is repeated *eisdem verbis*; the capture of Nuceria must precede the revolt of Capua, since Roman supporters from Nuceria cannot get into Capua 'quod portas Hannibali clausissent,' 23.15.6. Livy has muddled the praetor's arrival at Casilinum with his later move to Nola (23.14.10-13). The source is thus non-Coelian, otherwise unknown.'

compatriots from Spain, these desertions follow Marcellus' victory outside Nola (Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 11.4; Livy 27.26.1).

## Loss of Capua

Hannibal is said to have become so settled in Capua that he considers the town a second home; the quip is in both the *Punica* and Florus: *altera iam patria atque aequo sub honore vocatur altera Carthago Capua* (*Pun.* 11.424-5); *domus et patria altera Annibalis* (Florus 1.22.42).

Although the town was under Carthaginian control, Hannibal is not located in Capua with any frequency across the texts.<sup>355</sup> Nonetheless, its control was accepted as strategically critical and Hannibal's loss of Capua in 211 is presented by Livy as being as much a turning point for Hannibal's fortunes as it is for Rome. When Hannibal eventually decides to cut his losses, leave Capua to its fate, and head south for Rhegium he loses much more than Capua (Livy 26.12.1-2). In particular, according to Livy, he lost prestige and trust among other towns in Italy (Livy, 26.38.1).

Livy surmises that Capua fell because Roman persistence in pressing the siege was not matched by Hannibal's persistence in defending the town. The comparison, albeit unfair to Hannibal, is voiced paradoxically through his officers, Hanno and Bostar, who, feeling abandoned in Capua, complain that the Roman as an enemy is so much more steadfast than the Carthaginian as a friend: *tanto constantiorem inimicum Romanum quam amicum Poenum esse* (Livy, 26.12.13). When the Romans regained control, the Capuans were severely punished by Fulvius Flaccus and Livy's scenes compare them unfavourably to Roman virtues; their cowardice had made them unworthy of Roman citizenship.<sup>356</sup>

Over time, the Roman attitude toward the Capuans gradually softened. The poet, Horace, for example, presents a more conciliatory approach to the Capuans in *Epoche* 16 where they feature as valiant rivals: *aemula nec virtus Capua* (Horace, *Epoche* 16.5). As

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<sup>355</sup> For example, Capua is not presented as his regular winter quarters. Crawford, 2001, c1974: Carthaginian contact is indicated through numismatics and finds of North African style pottery at Capua.

<sup>356</sup> Capuan *virtus* is not as manly as Roman *virtus*. The Capuan Vibius Virrius calls on his countrymen to commit suicide (Livy, 26.13.19) but the Capuan methods do not match his rhetoric; they choose poison rather than death by the sword (Livy, 26.14.3). Cf. Livy, 22.60.14 and the Senate's refusal to ransom Roman prisoners.

Watson writes, Horace dignifies the threat they offered to Rome.<sup>357</sup> The change in attitude toward the Capuans is also apparent in Silius:

Sed fas id Celtis, fas impia bella referre  
Boiorum fuerit populis: Capuaene furorem,  
quem Senonum genti, placuisse, et Dardana ab ortu  
moenia barbarico Nomadum sociata tyranno  
quisnam, mutato tantum nunc tempore, credat?

*Pun.* 11.28-32

It might be lawful for Celts, lawful for the tribes of the Boii, to renew impious warfare; but who could believe that Capua would take the same mad decision as the tribe of Senones, and that a city of Trojan origin would ally herself with the barbarous ruler of the Numidians – who could believe this now, when times have changed so greatly?

Duff, 1989, 103.

The Capuans had been allied to Rome for so long and had such close ties, that Silius challenges anyone to believe that Capua would consider deserting Rome.

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<sup>357</sup> Watson, 2003, 491. Also Mankin, 1995, 247.

## Chapter 6: *Hannibalis sat nomen erat*

*Punica*, 16.19

Hannibal's name was enough

The fall of Capua back into Roman hands cost Hannibal a measure of prestige among Italian towns, but it was by no means the end of his war. His determination to continue is reflected in two further invasions of Italy in 207 and 205 led by Hasdrubal and Mago respectively, and if either had been successful in linking with Hannibal, the outcome of the war may have been different. Even so, Hannibal remained in Italy at least until autumn 203.

The representations of Hannibal in relation to these events and Zama are explored in this chapter. The chapter is divided into four sections which examine, firstly, the tradition that Hannibal remained undefeated throughout the time he was in Italy; secondly the treatments of the two Carthaginian invasions of Italy in 207 and 205; thirdly the presentations of Hannibal's departure from Italy, and fourthly, the treatments of Zama<sup>358</sup> as an iconic event. This last has subsections focussed on the presentations of a meeting between Scipio and Hannibal prior to battle, the patterning of their speeches and harangues, and the features that glorify the battle itself, particularly in terms of what the protagonists thought they were fighting for.

The depictions of Hannibal in all of these circumstances are shown to be strongly influenced by an author's portrayal of Scipio Africanus. Wiseman<sup>359</sup> argues that the Scipio myth is derived from the presentations in the *Histories* and the *Punica* which recognises the correlation between these two texts, but accepting his view dates the development of the Scipio myth to the post-Flavian period whereas it is argued here that the Scipio myth was pervasive from an earlier period and underlies even those authors, such as Livy, who attempt to limit the significance of Scipio.

Hannibal's persistence against Rome meant that for generations after his death, he remained the most feared of all Rome's enemies: *parentibusque abominatus Hannibal*

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<sup>358</sup> For discussions on the historic event of Zama, see Scullard, 1970, 140-160; Goldsworthy, 2001, 286-309.

<sup>359</sup> Wiseman, 2004, 177 argues that Scipio Africanus was the first historic Roman figure to be assigned divine parentage.

(Horace, *Epoche*, 16.8). The quotation from the *Punica* for the title of this chapter poetically reinterprets a remark by Polybius that the Romans lived in dread of Hannibal until they defeated Hasdrubal at the Metaurus River in 207. The sentiment is similarly located in both texts, shortly after Hasdrubal's defeat at the Metaurus River (*Hist.* 11.3; *Pun.* 16.19). Livy does not directly admit to Roman fear of Hannibal at this stage of the war, but that fear underlies his statement that, despite their victory over Hasdrubal, the Romans did not provoke Hannibal as long as he remained inactive, such was the power that they believed he held: *tantam inesse vim, etsi omnia alia circa eum ruerunt in uno illo duce censebant* (Livy, 28.12.1).

## Hannibal undefeated in Italy

Associated with the Roman fear of Hannibal is a tradition that Hannibal remained undefeated in battle throughout the time that he was in Italy; it glorifies Scipio as the first Roman to defeat Hannibal and, of course, enhances Hannibal's own reputation. The claim was disputed in ancient times, especially in relation to Marcellus (Livy, 23.15; Plutarch, *Marcellus*).

Polybius supports the tradition by placing a claim in Hannibal's harangue to his men before Zama, that, in the previous seventeen years of fighting together, they had been invincible:

Ἄννίβας δὲ τοὺς μεθ' αὐτοῦ παραγεγονότας ἐπιπορευόμενος ἡξίου καὶ παρεκάλει διὰ πλειόνων μνησθῆναι μὲν τῆς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐπτακαιδεκαέτους συνηθείας, μνησθῆναι δὲ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν προγεγονότων αὐτοῖς πρὸς Ρωμαίους ἀγώνων. ἐν οἷς ἀλτήτους γεγονότας οὐδ' ἐλπίδα τοῦ νικᾶν οὐδέποτ' ἔφη Ρωμαίοις αὐτοὺς ἀπολελοιπέναι.

*Hist.* 15.11.6-7

They did as they were ordered, and Hannibal himself went the round of his own troops, begging and imploring them to remember their comradeship of seventeen years and the number of the battles they had previously against the Romans. ‘In all these battles, you proved so invincible that you have not left the Romans the smallest hope of ever being able to defeat you...’

Paton, 2000, 489.

Its location in a speech by Hannibal immediately prior to battle at Zama imparts a sense of credibility, and serves to remind the audience that, according to this presentation, Scipio will become the first Roman to defeat Hannibal in a formal battle.

The claim was disputed in ancient times. In particular, Plutarch, while comparing Marcellus and Pelopidas at the conclusion of their paired biographies, expresses the opinion that Polybius specifically rejected representing Hannibal being defeated in Italy in favour of its effect on Scipio (Plutarch, *Comparison of Pelopidas and Marcellus*, 1.4-7). Plutarch cites a range of other authors who counter the claim that Hannibal was not defeated in Italy including Livy, Caesar, Cornelius Nepos and King Juba (described as a Greek writer). He particularly notes their claim that sundry defeats and routs were inflicted by Marcellus upon Hannibal's army, and as some of these texts are extant they may be cross-checked.

Any direct refutation of Marcellus' success or otherwise against Hannibal in Polybius' *Histories* is no longer extant. However, Plutarch may have a valid point because in the extant sections of the *Histories*, Polybius' acknowledgement of Hannibal's record in Italy is couched in very carefully phrased remarks. When, for instance, Polybius admires Hannibal's ability to retain men of diverse nationalities and languages within his army for a sustained period of time in Italy, he adds that this is even though the *winds of fortune were not always in Hannibal's favour*:

ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἡ τοῦ προεστῶτος ἀγγίνοια τὰς τηλικαύτας καὶ τοιαύτας διαφορὰς ἐνὸς ἐποίει προστάγματος ἀκούειν καὶ μιᾶς πείθεσθαι γνώμῃ, καίπερ οὐχ ἀπλῆς οὖσης τῆς περιστάσεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποικίλης, καὶ πολλάκις μὲν αὐτοῖς λαμπρᾶς ἐπιπνεούσης τῆς τύχης, ποτὲ δὲ τούναντίον.

*Hist. 11.19.5*

The metaphor is ambiguous and may refer to any type of ill-luck or hardship quite apart from battlefield defeats.

If Cornelius Nepos published a biography of Marcellus, it is no longer extant, but comparing Plutarch's remarks against Nepos' biography of Hannibal makes interesting reading. Cornelius Nepos twice refers to Hannibal's track record in Italy:

quamdiu in Italia fuit, nemo ei in acie restitit, nemo adversus eum post Cannensem pugnam in campo castra posuit.

Hinc invictus patriam defensum revocatus, bellum gessit adversus P. Scipionem, filium eius quem ipse primo apud Rhodanum, apud Padum, tertio apud Trebiam fugarat.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hannibal*, 5.4 - 6.1

So long as he was in Italy no one was a match for him in the field, and after the battle of Cannae no one encamped face to face with him on open ground.

Then undefeated he was recalled to defend his native land; there he carried on war against Publius Scipio, the son of that Scipio whom he had put to flight first at the Rhone, then at the Po, and a third time at the Trebia.

Rolfe, 1984, 267.

On the face of it, these two sentences, and particularly the second one, seem to contradict Plutarch's remark about Nepos allowing for sundry defeats of Hannibal, but the picture changes if the first sentence is interpreted to allow for certain *types* of victory against Hannibal (such a quibble may seem trivial today, but for ancient Roman society in which family honour and social ranking were so important, every detail counts). Such victories may include the successful defence of townships attacked by Hannibal (e.g. Nola or Neapolis); retaking townships that had previously defected or surrendered to Hannibal; skirmishes, or other forms of action that did not compare to Cannae or Zama in terms of being a formal battle on open ground. It is unfortunate that the editor's chapter division separates sentence 5.4 from sentence 6.1 because this removes an important context for understanding the second sentence in relation to Plutarch's comment. The sensational claim in 6.1 that Hannibal was undefeated in Italy should, I believe, be qualified by the preceding sentence that no-one faced him in an open-field style battle. Evaluating these two sentences together correlates more closely with Plutarch's assessment of Nepos' text (assuming, I think reasonably, that Plutarch's remarks encompassed the *Hannibal* biography).

Plutarch's comments may also be compared to the relevant sections of Livy's text, and Livy is much less ambiguous than Cornelius Nepos' *Hannibal*. Livy records a number of Roman claims for successes over Hannibal in Italy which contradict the idea that Hannibal was undefeated in Italy, and not only by Marcellus. P. Licinius and P. Sempronius reported that they defeated Hannibal with their combined armies in Bruttium; Gnaeus Servilius claimed that he drove Hannibal out of Italy (Livy, 29.36; 30.6; 30.24.1). Unfortunately, there are no further details in support of these reports, and it is Livy's portrayal of Marcellus that offers the strongest counter to the claim.

Livy includes three victories over Hannibal by Marcellus, of which the first was particularly important for lifting Roman morale and demonstrating that Hannibal was neither invincible nor divinely protected (Livy, 23.45; 24.17; 27.13). In literary terms,

Livy stresses the importance of this first and the third victory by patterning them against each other, on either side of the centrepiece of the third decad, while the second victory is treated as a relatively minor event (Livy, 23.45; 27.13). Furthermore the first victory outside Nola is described as taking place on an open area of the plain between Nola and Hannibal's camp: *mille fere passuum inter urbem erant castraque; eo spatio – et sunt omnia campi circa Nolam – concurrerent* (Livy, 23.44.7). Livy depicts Marcellus cheering his men with thoughts that they were fighting men who are weakened by the wine and women of Capua while he depicts Hannibal correspondingly reproaching his men for their weakness against a mere legate (Livy, 23.45.2-10).

Marcellus' first victory, as described by Livy, correlates with Plutarch's assessment of Livy's text, but, in terms of literary presentation, Livy shows that the battle is not comparable to either Cannae or Zama: Apart from the mention of the death of two elephants, there is no detailed description of the battle, no formal speeches, no discussion of cavalry action (Livy, 23.44.3). Marcellus' second victory, also outside Nola, may not 'count' either in the contemporary reader's reckoning of defeating Hannibal in the field because Livy explicitly excludes any cavalry action. Readers are given a convoluted story about how the cavalry 'got lost' (Livy, 24.17.5-8). A similar logic may be applied to the opening of Livy 27 which lists the townships (Salapia, Marmoreae and Meles) that Hannibal lost to Marcellus (Livy, 27.1.1). It is left to the reader to decide whether regaining control of townships 'count' as victories against Hannibal. It should be added, of course, that historically Marcellus must have gained some significant achievements against Hannibal to become known as the 'Sword of Rome.'

Silius Italicus similarly presents Hannibal attacking Nola after his winter in Capua, where it is said that the first sign of weakness appears in Hannibal. Hannibal's response is inadequate when challenged to single combat by Marcellus: '*dimitto e caede cohorts, spectemur soli. Marcellus proelia posco*' (*Pun.* 12.198). Once again Juno intervenes to preserve Hannibal and divert him; thus Hannibal does not actually fight Marcellus (*Pun.* 12.201-2). Instead, Hannibal rages at his men and, like his counterpart in Livy, he blames Capuan hospitality for causing the loss of vigour in his men: '*talesne e gremio Capuae tectisque sinistris egredimur*' (*Pun.* 12.204-5)? Again, the reason why this battle may not 'count' in comparison to Cannae or Zama is because it is in defence of Nola, otherwise it includes the 'ingredients' of cavalry and elephants both of which appear at Cannae and Zama in the *Punica* (*Pun.* 12.177-8; 12.276).

Silius concludes, like Livy, that the main point of this victory was its demonstration that Hannibal was not invincible:

ille dies primus docuit, quod credere nemo  
auderet superis, Martis certamine sisti  
posse ducem Libyae.

*Pun.* 12.273-5

That day first proved, what none would have dared to believe, though the gods had promised it – that the Libyan leader could be withheld in battle.

Duff, 1989, 167.

More pragmatically, it should be added that the other point of the victory was retaining control of Nola!

Livy's presentation of Marcellus' third victory in 209 near Canusium is a much more serious contender to debunk the myth of Hannibal's invincible record in Italy. It is notably missing from the *Punica*, although its omission from the *Histories* is less certain given the fragmentary state of the text, however, given Plutarch's statements, it seems likely that it was excluded or at best, greatly minimised. Polybius' criticism of Marcellus for allowing himself to be caught in an ambush is extant but there is no sense in the narrative that he included a description of an earlier battle (*Hist.* 10.32).

Livy depicts Marcellus first suffering a defeat against Hannibal, returning and harrying Hannibal to fight again (Livy, 27.11.11-17). On this second attempt Marcellus achieves a victory in a battle that includes both cavalry and elephants (Livy, 27.13.11-14.15). Even so, Plutarch claims that Livy, although acknowledging the renown that the victory brought to Marcellus, understates its importance particularly in terms of the number of Hannibal's men killed and the number of Numidians and Spaniards who desert to the Roman side (Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 11.4; cf. Livy 27.26.1).

Given that Livy places Marcellus' death in an ambush very shortly after this victory and that both the *Punica* and the *Histories* include very similar death scenes for Marcellus, it must be concluded that Silius Italicus (and possibly Polybius) chose not to include this second victory by Marcellus (Livy, 27.28.2; *Hist.* 10.32-33; *Pun.* 15.334-380). Polybius, while praising Hannibal in comparison to Marcellus, expresses a belief that, as long as a commander takes care to keep safe, even in the event of a total defeat,

Fortune<sup>360</sup> will provide a means for him to retrieve his loss (*Hist.* 10.32.7; 10.33.1-4). Polybius could be referring to either man.

Livy presents Hannibal turning the death of Marcellus to a political advantage by honouring Marcellus' body with funerary rites (Livy, 27.28.1-2).<sup>361</sup> It is quite possible that such representations upholding Hannibal as a man of honour derive from his own historians and the imagery is adopted in Roman texts. Valerius Maximus places Hannibal under the heading *de humanitate et clementia* for his treatments of Paulus and Gracchus, and for honouring Marcellus with a Punic cloak, golden crown and funeral ceremony (Val. Max. 5.1. ext. 6). The *Punica* similarly represents Hannibal honouring Marcellus' body with elaborate rites, said to be worthy of his martial spirit (*Pun.* 15.387-396). In contrast, the only time the Romans are depicted honouring the body of an enemy during this period is the public funeral provided for Syphax at about the time of Scipio's triumph (Livy, 30.45.4; Val. Max. 6.2.3).

## Invasions of Italy in 207 and 205

There is a strong tradition emphasising the importance of Hasdrubal's defeat in 207, linking it to a belief that the Romans might have lost the war if the outcome had been different (Horace, *Ode*, 4.4; Diodorus Siculus, 26.24.2; Appian, *Hann.* 8.52).

The Augustan poet, Horace, lauds the Claudians through emphasising the significance of the victory by their ancestor, Cladius Nero, over Hasdrubal at the Metaurus River:

quid debeas, o Roma, Neronibus,  
testis Metaurum flumen et Hasdrubal  
devictas et pulcher fugatis  
ille dies Latio tenebris.

Horace, *Ode*, 4.4.37-40

O Rome, how much you owe the Neronians  
Metaurus stream bears witness and Hasdrubal's  
defeat and that most glorious day which  
scattering the darkness that covered Latium.

Lee, 1998, 167.

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<sup>360</sup> Walbank, 1967, 244 considers the use of τύχη in these passages as little more than a figure of speech.

<sup>361</sup> Livy, 27.27.12, comments that there were many versions for Marcellus' death; Coelius alone had three different versions: one from tradition, one from the funeral oration and one from his own research.

Polybius links Hasdrubal's invasion of Italy in 207 to glorifying Scipio and implies that Scipio forced Hasdrubal out of Spain. The invasion is presented as a 'last minute' decision by Hasdrubal whilst he was under pressure from Scipio's successes in Spain (*Hist.* 10.37).<sup>362</sup> Polybius explains that Scipio chose not to follow-up his attack on Hasdrubal because he was afraid of being attacked from behind by Mago and another Hasdrubal (the son of Gesco, *Hist.* 10.38.10-39.10). An explanation for Scipio not pursuing Hasdrubal after defeating him was certainly required given that Hasdrubal's 'retreat' was at elephant pace and that he went on to invade Italy with a significant force (*Hist.* 10.39; 11.1). Silius Italicus also favours depicting Scipio driving Hasdrubal out of Spain, and recording his glorious victory on a shield set up among the peaks of the Pyrenees: *Hasdrubalis spolium gradivo Scipio vitor* (*Pun.* 15.492).

Any plans Hannibal had for linking with Hasdrubal in a pincer movement through the Italian peninsula came to an abrupt end when Hasdrubal was defeated and killed by the combined armies of M. Livius Salinator and C. Claudius Nero at the Metaurus River. Polybius treats the victory over Hasdrubal as important, locating it to open *Histories* 11, and, although some details may no longer be extant, Hasdrubal's death is marked with a very respectful literary portrait. Polybius then turns to the great joy at Rome, once people were convinced that the victory was genuine (*Hist.* 11.1-3.6).

While treating the victory over Hasdrubal as important, Livy's presentation differs from Polybius in a number of respects (Livy, 27.40-49). In particular, Hasdrubal's invasion was a planned event and this, in turn, modifies the significance of Scipio's victory because it was not against a full strength Carthaginian army, as elephants, men and money had already been sent on ahead before Scipio attacked (Livy, 27.19.1). Scipio's decision not to pursue Hasdrubal for fear of being attacked from behind by Mago and the other Hasdrubal (Livy, 27.20.1) is criticised by Fabius Maximus, because Scipio allowed Hasdrubal to slip past and invade Italy (Livy, 28.42).<sup>363</sup> Placing such criticism in the mouth of Fabius Maximus is a touch ironic given that Hannibal and his entire army 'slipped past' Fabius Maximus in the Falernian plain!

In this version, the Romans initially learned about the planned invasion from captives (Livy, 27.5.12). The details were confirmed when the Romans captured Hasdrubal's messengers to Hannibal (Livy, 27.43). Livy's presentation may, like Horace, reflect the

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<sup>362</sup> Walbank, 1967, 247 Walbank considers Polybius' representation to be plausible.

political climate of Augustan Rome and ascendancy of the Julio-Claudians over the Scipios (lauding a ‘Claudian’ victory over Hannibal). There is no Roman interception of spies in the *Punica* but the personification of Italy who urges Nero to travel north to his colleague (*Pun.* 15.546-557).

Hannibal exhibits a rare touch of human frailty because he is deceived by the same tactics that he had used at Capua against the Romans. When the bulk of the Roman army slipped away under cover of darkness, Hannibal remained unaware that he was facing a reduced force (Livy, 27.47; Frontinus, *Strat.* 1.1.9). Hannibal only learned of the Hasdrubal’s defeat through a highly dramatic gesture when Hasdrubal’s head was thrown into his camp (Livy, 27.51). This gruesome signal is also preferred by Silius Italicus despite the fact that it does not reflect well on the Romans in comparison to Hannibal for honouring the bodies of dead enemy generals (*Pun.* 15.813-4).

Horace depicts Hannibal lamenting the loss of his brother and voicing a prescience of overall defeat:

‘Carthagini iam non ego nuntios  
mittam superbos: occidit, occidit  
spes omnis et fortuna nostri  
nominis Hasdrubale interempto.’

Horace, *Ode*, 4.4.69-72

‘No more shall I be sending to Carthage town  
proud messages now. Overthrown, overthrown  
is every hope and all our famous  
Fortune with Hasdrubal’s fatal ending.’

Lee, 1998, 169.

Hannibal is described as retreating into Bruttium in response to the news, taking as many supporters as possible, including those who had to be relocated: *Bruttia maerentem casus patriaeque suosque Hannibalem accepit tellus* (*Pun.* 16.1; cf. Livy, 27.51).

Depicting Hannibal with a prescience of defeat in 207 (*agnosco infelicitatem Carthaginis* Florus, 1.22.53) supports the presentation of this victory over Hasdrubal as a critical event, but it is premature to present Hannibal considering defeat. He exhibits a strong, almost Roman, spirit of doggedly continuing with war. Silius Italicus poetically

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<sup>363</sup> Walbank, 1967, 251-2 thinks Hasdrubal may have *anticipated defeat* and sent some elephants and cash on ahead, which evades the point about the size of army faced by Scipio. Walbank notes that Fabius’ criticism shows it was a debated issue in ancient times.

acknowledges Hannibal's continuing belligerence as the epic Hannibal vows to sacrifice appropriate (Roman) victims to his brother's shade (*Pun.* 15.819-20).

Hannibal waits patiently and keeps his men occupied by employing them to erect an altar to Juno (a display of piety which arguably conflicts with Livy's claims of his lack of respect for the gods Livy, 21.4.9). The altar is inscribed with a record of his exploits in Greek and Phoenician which might be the bronze tablet seen by Polybius (Livy, 28.46; *Hist.* 3.33.18).

Hannibal bides his time because, a two years later in 205, there is another Carthaginian invasion into the northern Italy. This time it comes from the sea, not far from modern Genoa, and led by Mago, who intends to raise further recruits from among the Gauls before heading south to link with Hannibal (Livy, 29.5; 30.18). Livy indicates Hannibal's involvement with this invasion voiced through a criticism over the amount of time being taken for its preparation and Mago's slow progress:

Nec Magonem ex Gallia movere tumultus quicquam nec coniungere  
sese Hannibali, et Hannibalem ipsum iam et fama senescere et viribus  
Livy, 29.3.15

Mago was neither setting in motion any uprising on the part of Gaul, nor uniting with Hannibal; and Hannibal himself by this time was on the decline in both repute and strength.

Moore, 1949, 221.

Presenting Mago's invasion as a carefully planned event further indicates that, in historical terms, Hasdrubal's invasion, too, was unlikely to be a last minute decision precipitated by Scipio driving him out of Spain. Mago established a bridgehead which he held onto for three years but it is uncertain how much progress he made; Livy notes that Genoa had been destroyed by Mago (Livy, 30.1.10).

In 203 Livy describes a final battle against Mago as closely fought, including elephants and cavalry, attributing the Roman victory to a severe wound inflicted on Mago (Livy, 30.18.1-15). The wounded Mago may have been defeated but he was not, in Livy's version, immediately driven out of Italy because he was entrenching his position when envoys from Carthage arrived to recall him at the same time that other envoys were sent to recall Hannibal (Livy, 30.19-20.1). He dies of his wound en route back to Carthage (Livy, 30.19.5). Thus by a remarkable coincidence, not only do Hannibal and Mago receive simultaneous orders to return to Africa, but the news of the Carthaginian armies departing from both the north and south of Italy arrived at Rome at

about the same time: *Romam per eosdem dies et Magonem et Hannibalem profectos adlatum est* (Livy, 30.21.1).

Silius Italicus elides Mago's invasion, the details of the battle and his wound. Mago's defeat is implied in *Punica* 16 with the reference that he was deprived of his camp and sailed back to Africa, driven by fear: *iam Mago, exutus castris, agitante pavore in Libyam proper tramisit caerula velo* (*Pun.* 16.26-7).

## Hannibal leaves Italy

The capture of Syracuse by Marcellus was a hugely significant contribution to the Roman war effort which cast a long shadow over Hannibal's chances of overall victory in Italy (Livy, 25.23-41; *Pun.* 14; Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 18.3). It would have impacted to some extent on Hannibal's supply routes because control of Syracuse enabled the Romans to maintain at least some form of naval blockade of the shortest, safest sea-route between southern Italy and Carthage. Livy devotes much of book 25 to Marcellus' successes in Sicily, and Silius Italicus, too, acknowledges the importance of Marcellus' contribution by devoting an entire Book, *Punica* 14, to the capture of Syracuse. Its possibly ahistorical location in the *Punica* after the fall of Capua (Livy places it prior to the fall of Capua) might be a poetic response to Polybius' discussion about the Roman plundering of Syracuse which is located in the *Histories* 9 after the fall of Capua (Polybius' narrative about the events prior to the capture of Syracuse is no longer extant).<sup>364</sup>

Polybius is initially highly critical of the Roman plundering of Syracuse, arguing that things that have nothing to do with material wealth should be left in their place. He points out that by removing not just the gold and silver, but every possible item from the defeated Syracusans the victors engender rage, jealousy and hatred; his criticism of the Roman abuse of power is very thinly veiled (*Hist.* 9.10).

Silius Italicus seems to respond to this sentiment in Polybius' text. The epic Marcellus recognises that he has the power to decide what will remain standing and what will be removed; he restrains his men's greed. This portrait differs from the one in Livy who says that the city was given over to the soldiers as soon as guards had been posted at the houses of those who had supported the Romans (Livy, 25.31.8-11). The epic Syracusans were so grateful to Marcellus for his restraint that he was compared to

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<sup>364</sup> See also Plutarch, *Marcellus*, 19.3; Val. Max. 8.7. Ext. 7.

the gods and hailed as a second founder of the city (*Pun.* 14.680-1). Pomeroy observes that Silius' closing remarks in *Punica* 14 allude to Cicero's comparison of Marcellus' restraint to Verres' greed and rapaciousness. Cicero upheld Marcellus as the measure against Verres to illustrate the moral decline in Roman character (Cicero, *Verrines*, 2.4.115-123, 131).<sup>365</sup>

Control of Syracuse by the Romans may have made communication with Carthage more difficult for Hannibal but it was insufficient to dislodge him from Italy. The primary factor, as presented by Polybius, was Scipio's invasion of Africa and, in particular, his subsequent victories against the Carthaginians. If Polybius indicated other contributing factors to dislodge Hannibal, they are no longer extant; his focus is almost entirely on Scipio masterminding the idea to invade Africa once the Carthaginians had been forced out of Spain and is the reason why Scipio was anxious to return to Rome in time for the consular elections (*Hist.* 11.24-33).

The claim is voiced by Scipio in a speech to Hannibal prior to Zama (*Hist.* 15.8.4-14). At the equivalent meeting in Livy's text it is voiced by Hannibal, who acknowledges Scipio's success in Africa as the reason for his departure from Italy (Livy, 30.30.14). In the context of this meeting, it is quite possibly what Hannibal would say in order to flatter his opponent as part of an attempt at negotiation; on the other hand, Polybius placing the claim in Scipio's voice is equally valid.

Others agree. Frontinus places Scipio's successes in Africa as a stratagem under the chapter heading on determining the course of the war (*De constituendo statu belli*):

Scipio, manente in Italia Hannibale, transmisso in Africam exercitu necessitatem Carthaginiensibus imposuit revocandi Hannibalem. Sic a domesticis finibus in hostiles transtulit bellum.

Frontinus, *Strat.*, 1.3.8

While Hannibal was lingering in Italy, Scipio sent an army into Africa, and so forced the Carthaginians to recall Hannibal. In this way he transferred the war from his own country to that of the enemy.

Bennett, 2003, 25.

Livy modifies Scipio's claim to have forced Hannibal's departure from Italy by noting the discovery of a prophecy in the Sibylline books. The prophecy read that in order to remove a foreign foe from Italian soil, the Romans must first welcome the Idaean

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<sup>365</sup> Pomeroy, 1989a, 134. Silius Italicus praises Domitian (or possibly Nerva) (*Pun.* 14.684-8), but I do not see a connection to Silius Italicus' own governorship as argued by Leigh, 2000b, 480.

Mother (Livy, 29.10.4-5). After consultation, the Delphic oracle instructed that the best men at Rome should greet the goddess (Livy, 29.11.6). In the event, Livy says that all the matrons were required to take part in the welcome ceremony, with Quinta Claudia as conspicuous among them although she is not depicted hauling the boat as in Ovid.<sup>366</sup>

The importance of gaining divine sanction to ensure the success of Scipio's invasion of Africa is acknowledged in the *Punica*. Silius Italicus opens *Punica* 17 with the Sibyl's oracle, and the welcome at Rome includes the full story of Claudia (*Pun.*17.1-4; 17.33-47). Once the ceremony was over, Scipio departed for Sicily with authorisation to invade Africa, if it seemed advisable. Augury indicates Jupiter's divine sanction as eagles lead the way for Scipio's fleet; their cries are interpreted as an omen of success: *augurium clangor laetum dabat* (*Pun.* 17.55).

Livy draws attention to other causal factors that contribute to Hannibal's difficulties prior to his eventual departure from Italy. These include the capture of Syracuse and the Roman naval blockade; Hasdrubal's defeat and then Mago's defeat, as well as Carthaginian politics. Livy also records the claims of other Romans, such as Gnaeus Servilius, for attacking Hannibal and forcing him out of Italy (Livy, 30.6; 30.24.1).

The later books of Polybius text are too fragmentary for conclusive comparison but there is one reference to the possible roles of other people in forcing Hannibal's departure from Italy. It is embedded in a speech by Roman envoys at Carthage protesting about a Carthaginian attack on Roman shipping. The envoys claim that Hannibal had been driven out of the rest of Italy into the Lacinian promontory from which he barely escaped (*Hist.* 15.1.11).

Silius Italicus summarises the logistical and political problems that faced Hannibal in 22 lines (*Pun.* 16.1-22). In this brief acknowledgement of other factors causing difficulties for Hannibal, Carthaginian politics is considered his biggest problem:

sed vigor, hausurus Latium, si cetera Marti  
adiumenta forent, prava obtrectante suorum  
invidia, revocare animos ac stare negata  
cogebatur ope et senio torpescere rerum.

*Pun.* 16.11-14

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<sup>366</sup> Cf. Ovid, *Fasti* 4.293-328; and an altar relief, German Archaeological Institute, Rome, DAI 38.1602. Wiseman, 2004, 177 argues for dramatic origins of the Claudia story.

Hannibal's fiery spirit might have destroyed Rome, if the other requirements of war had been forthcoming; but he was thwarted by the perverse jealousy of his countrymen. Supplies were refused to him and he was forced to tame his proud spirit and let it rust in idleness.

Duff, 1989, 387.

Primarily Silius Italicus, like Polybius, places most emphasis on Scipio's successes in Africa as the reason for Hannibal to be recalled. The remainder of *Punica* 16 is devoted to Scipio's rise to power, culminating in his speech to the Senate as consul arguing for permission to go to Africa (*Pun.* 16.645-697).

The extant sections of the *Histories* covering Scipio's attacks on the enemy camps in Africa have been described as 'sensationalist'.<sup>367</sup> Polybius presents the Carthaginian response to Scipio through a recreation of a Carthaginian senate meeting discussing its options after their army has been defeated and their camps near Utica destroyed. The senate divided into three groups, each arguing for a different response to the crisis. The group wanting to recall Hannibal from Italy is prioritised by having its argument placed first (*Hist.* 14.6.10). The second group argues for negotiating a peace settlement with Scipio while the third group argues for contacting Syphax (a Numidian king married to Hasdrubal's daughter) and continuing the war (*Hist.* 14.6.12). This third group prevails until Scipio defeats the combined forces of Hasdrubal and Syphax (*Hist.* 14.7-8). The Carthaginian senate reconvenes and, still belligerent, decides to attack the Roman fleet at Utica at the same time as sending envoys with instructions to recall Hannibal, who is described as their last hope (*Hist.* 14.10.1; cf. Livy, 30.8-9).<sup>368</sup>

Livy's presentation of this meeting has close parallels to the one in Polybius, and despite Livy's earlier mention of envoys being sent to recall Mago at the same time as Hannibal, there are no references to Mago in either Livy's or Polybius' depictions of the Carthaginian senate discussions. The main difference between them is in Livy's prioritising of the three political groups at Carthage. The suggestion to recall Hannibal is put back to the second position; the call for peace negotiations placed first and the call for strengthening the army and contacting Syphax remaining third. This last is described by Livy as a reaction worthy of the Romans in adversity (Livy, 30.7.1). As in the Polybian tradition this third group initially prevails until Syphax and Hasdrubal are defeated. The Carthaginians decide to attack the Roman fleet off Utica and send envoys

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<sup>367</sup> Walbank, 1967, 429.

<sup>368</sup> Dodge, 1891, 640 argues that the recall was too late. 'Carthage was lost long before Zama.' Even if Hannibal had won, there would have been another battle.

to recall Hannibal. The description of Hannibal is slightly re-phrased as he is considered the only general that could defend Carthage: *Carthaginem ipsam qui tueatur neque imperatorem alium quam Hannibalem neque exercitum alium quam Hannibalis superesse* (Livy, 30.9.3).

As noted above, Livy undermines the glory of Scipio's eventual victory by implying that Hannibal's army had become weakened both physically and numerically especially following Mago's defeat in 205. In addition, Livy voices through Hannibal the perception of another factor. In a direct speech, Hannibal blames Carthaginian politics, claiming that Hanno, not Scipio, was his more invidious enemy (Livy, 30.20.1-2; also Diodorus Siculus, 25.19.1). Hannibal expresses his frustration through a dramatic final moment when the Carthaginian envoys arrive; he knows why they have come and gnashes his teeth, groans, and almost cries: *frendens gemensque ac vix lacrimis temperans dicitur legatorum verba audisse* (Livy, 30.20.1). Leaving without a final victory is considered particularly shameful and inglorious:

neque hac deformitate reditus mei tam P Scipio exsultabit atque efferet  
sese quam Hanno qui domum nostram quando alia re non potuit ruina  
Carthaginis oppressit.

Livy, 30.20.4

And over this inglorious return of mine it will not be Publius Scipio  
who wildly exults, so much as Hanno who, unable to do so by any  
other means, has ruined our family by the downfall of Carthage.

Moore, 1955, 441.

Livy compares Hannibal's gloomy departure to someone going into exile except that, paradoxically, Hannibal was leaving enemy territory and going to his home country. He stares back to Italy as his vessel sails to Africa, accusing gods, men and cursing himself for not having marched on Rome after Cannae (Livy, 30.20.7-9).

Despite the last minute anger and tears, Hannibal's departure from Italy is a well-organised, well-planned event with ships prepared well in advance: *iam hoc ipsum praesagiens animo praeparaverat ante naves* (Livy, 30.20.5). There is time to dispose of everything surplus to requirements, to exchange the strong men in the garrisons of Italian towns for weaker men; the strongest will be required for the army in Africa.

In a final representation of alleged brutality and gross impiety while in Italy, Hannibal is said to have killed all the Italians who could not be persuaded to travel to Africa. The slaughter was said to be carried out in the precincts of a temple to Juno

(Livy, 30.20.5-7; Diodorus Siculus 27.8-9; Appian, *Hann.* 9.59).<sup>369</sup> Yet, Livy closes with a remark that Hannibal arrived in Africa with no loss to his military strength (Livy, 30.28.1-2). Indeed, in historical terms, any of Hannibal's soldiers left behind would fear for their lives if they were captured by the Romans, thus refusing to travel to Africa with Hannibal seems an unlikely choice.

The debate within the Carthaginian senate related by Polybius and Livy, discussed above, is not depicted in the *Punica* but implied when Syphax is summoned to the Carthaginian senate to be reminded that his marriage to Hasdrubal's daughter binds him to Carthage and overrides any agreement he made with the Romans. Consequently Syphax breaks his recent treaty with Rome (*Pun.* 17.59-75) but retribution for such impiety is swift because he and Hasdrubal are defeated in battle. The Roman victory is already assumed because Syphax is taken prisoner and kept alive for Scipio's triumph (*Pun.* 17.127-149; 17.629).

The second senate debate is implied when envoys are sent to recall Hannibal, described as their last resort (cf. *Hist.* 14.10.1; Livy 30.9.8):

Stabat Carthago, truncatis undique membris,  
uni nixa viro; tantoque fragore ruentem  
Hannibal absenti retinebat nomine molem.

*Pun* 17.149-51

Now that all her limbs were severed; Carthage depended entirely on one man for support; and the great name of Hannibal, even in his absence, kept the edifice of her greatness from falling in utter ruin.

Duff, 1989, 451.

Hannibal is reluctant to leave Italy, but the envoys point out that if he delayed, Carthage itself may no longer exist (*Pun.* 17.156-7). There is short delay until Hannibal dreams that he was forced out of Italy, not by Scipio, but by the ghosts of all those he had killed:

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<sup>369</sup> Appian also says that some were given as slaves to other soldiers in the army (Appian, *Hann.* 9.59). Moore, 1955, 441 n3: the story is a fiction; the temple would hold few people. (This is a very literal reading as a temple precinct could cover a considerable area.) Appian does not mention a temple; Diodorus Siculus puts a number of 20,000 killed! The reality of Hannibal's military situation means he would not leave behind anything potentially useful for his enemies, whether equipment, pack animals, or well-trained soldiers.

namque gravis curis carpit dum nocte quietem,  
cernere Flaminium Gracchumque et cernere Paulum  
visus erat simul adversos mucronibus in se  
destrictis ruere atque Itala depellere terra;  
omnisque a Cannis Thrasymennique omnis ab undia  
in pontum impellens umbrarum exercitas ibat.

*Pun.* 17.160-5

For while resting at night from his burden of anxiety, he dreamed that Flaminius and Gracchus and Paulus were all attacking him at once with drawn swords and driving him off the soil of Italy; and the whole army of ghosts from Cannae and Lake Trasimene were marching against him and forcing him to the sea.

Duff, 1989, 451.

The envoys treat Hannibal as if he were a god:

haec postquam dicta, et casus patuere metusque,  
effundunt lacrimas dextramque ut numen adorant.

*Pun.* 17.182-3

When they had spoken thus and revealed their disasters and fears, they wept and kissed his hand as if it were a god's.

Duff, 1989, 453.

His response to them is not angry and frustrated as in Livy, but pensive as he ponders briefly if Carthage is worth the sacrifice (*Pun.* 17.184-6). Silius Italicus then depicts Hannibal, in a direct speech which echoes the Hannibal speech in Livy's text, summarising the difficulties that have beset him in terms of Carthaginian politics:

'o dirum exitium mortalibus! O nihil umquam  
crescere nec magnas patiens exsurgere laudes,  
invidia! eversam iam pridem exscindere Romam  
atque aequasse solo potui, traducere captam  
servitum gentem Latioque imponere leges.  
dum sumptus dumque arma duci fessosque secundis  
summisso tirone negant recreare maniplos,  
dumque etiam Cerere et victu fraudasse cohortes  
Hannoni placet, induitur tota Africa flammis,  
pulsat Agenoreas Rhoeteia lancea portas.  
nunc patriae decus et patriae nunc Hannibal unus  
subsidiū; nunc in nostra spes ultima dextra.  
vertentur signa, ut patres statuere; simulque  
et patriae muros et te servabimus, Hannon.'

*Pun.* 17.187-200

'How dreadful the doom that waits on mortal men! How envy ever stunts the growth of great deeds and nips them in the bud! Long ago I might have overthrown Rome and sacked the city and levelled her with the ground; I might have carried her people into slavery and dictated the conditions of peace. But I was refused money and

weapons and fresh recruits for my army which victories had worn out; and Hanno thought fit to cheat my soldiers even of bread to eat; and now all Africa is wreathed with fire, and the Roman lance beats on the gates of Carthage. Hannibal is now the glory of his country and her only rock of refuge; their one remaining hope is in my right arm. I shall march away, as the senate has decreed; I shall save the walls of Carthage and at the same time save Hanno.'

Duff, 1989, 453.

Hannibal makes a pointed acceptance of the order to return and save both Carthage and his political enemy, Hanno. Perhaps some in his audience would read Silius aligning Hannibal with Caesar as the Loeb translator, Duff, notes: 'This rhetorical point, that he will save his bitterest enemy, is more in the manner of Lucan than of Silius.'<sup>370</sup>

Silius Italicus distances his text from the claims in Livy that Hannibal was driven out of Italy. Hannibal's departure in the *Punica* is depicted as unmolested due to Roman fear; the Romans were still so afraid of him that non-one dared even to attack Hannibal's rear as he left Italy. They thought it a gift from the gods that he left of his own accord:

non terga est ausus cedentum invadere quisquam,  
non revocare virum; cunctis praestare videntur,  
quod sponte abscedat, superi, tandemque resolvat  
Ausoniam.

*Pun.* 17.203-6

No-one dared to attack his rear as they departed, none dared to recall him. All thought it a gift from the gods that he should go of his own accord and at last set Italy free.

Adapted from Duff, 1989, 455.

Hannibal's sea-crossing to Africa in the *Punica* is, unlike Livy's smooth crossing, action-packed. While the soldiers watch the sea, Hannibal watches the receding Italian coastline; his silent tears reminiscent of an exile leaving the land he loves (*Pun.* 17.213-7; cf. Livy, 30.20.7-9). Once the coast of Italy disappears from view Hannibal's mood changes to anger and frustration at himself and he changes his mind!

'flectite in Italiam proras, avertite classem.  
faxo, ut vallata revocatur Scipio Roma.'

*Pun.* 17.234-5

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<sup>370</sup> Duff, 1989, 452, note b.

‘Turn the ships’ prows back towards Italy and alter our course! I warrant that beleaguered Rome will summon Scipio ere long to return.’

Duff, 1989, 457.

It is not too late to reverse the situation, to invade Italy, march on Rome and force Scipio’s recall! Neptune observes Hannibal’s attempt to return to Italy and intervenes with a storm. In the chaos Hannibal’s plunder is scattered and sinks. Hannibal too, almost drowns, regretting that he, unlike Hasdrubal would not be dying in battle (*Pun.* 17.260-7). Venus (not Juno) intervenes and pleads with Neptune to calm his waters to save Hannibal, but Venus is not acting out of compassion for Hannibal. She foresees that if Hannibal dies at sea he will remain forever a hero to the Carthaginians, and she wants Scipio to have his victory (*Pun.* 17.278-284; cf. Livy, 30.28.1-2).

## Zama

Cornelius Nepos presented Hannibal continuing warfare in Africa for some years after Zama which suggests that not everyone agreed with Polybius that the battle at Zama was decisive and final.<sup>371</sup> Polybius, Livy and Silius Italicus contribute significantly to the creation of Zama into an iconic event and a finale by preceding it with speeches, harangues, and descriptions of the dispositions of forces. In addition, Polybius includes a number of allusions to Homeric poetry, thus further elevating the status of the battle. Livy writes:

Has formidines agitando animis ipsi curas et metus augebant, etiam quod, cum adsuissent per aliquot annos bellum ante oculos aliis atque aliis in Italiae partibus lenta spe in nullum propinquum debellandi finem gerere, erexerant omnium animos Scipio et Hannibal, velut ad supremum certamen comparati duces.

Livy, 30.28.8

By brooding over such terrifying thoughts men were adding to their own anxieties and fears, for another reason too: whereas year after year it had been their habit to carry on a war before their eyes in one part and then in another of Italy, with hope deferred and looking to no immediate end of the conflict, all men’s interest was now intensified by Scipio and Hannibal, as it were, pitted against each other for the final combat.

Moore, 1955, 467.

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<sup>371</sup> Nepos (*Hann.* 6) gave the battle its familiar title, Zama; Silius uses the same name, *Pun.* 3.261. The historical location is uncertain.

Although there is much in common between Livy's and Polybius' presentations of Zama,<sup>372</sup> there are subtle differences between them, and a number of alternative traditions may be identified in other texts. Silius Italicus has what is today a unique focus on Hannibal with a series of soliloquies, including the last spoken word in the *Punica*. The focus of this section compares the representations of Hannibal and to a lesser extent, Scipio, over what the protagonists thought they were fighting for at Zama, as well as the content and patterning of the two pairs of speeches by Hannibal and Scipio.

Polybius opens the episode with an anachronistic exaggeration in his introductory overview of what he thought Carthage and Rome were fighting for at Zama:

εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπούριον ἄμα τῷ φωτὶ τὰς δυνάμεις ἔξηγον ἀμφότεροι καὶ συνίσταντο τὸν ἀγῶνα, Καρχηδόνιοι μὲν ὑπὲρ τῆς σφετέρας σωτηρίας καὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πραγμάτων, Ρωμαῖοι δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων ἀρχῆς καὶ δυναστείας.

*Hist.* 15.9.2.

On the following morning at daybreak they led out their armies and opened the battle, the Carthaginians fighting for their own safety and the dominion of Africa, and the Romans for the empire of the world.

Paton, 2000, 485.

Polybius emphasises his perception of the Roman purpose through its repetition in Scipio's harangue to his men (*Hist.* 15.10.2). It also echoes his sentiments in his earlier discussion about the Roman plundering of Syracuse in which he considers the impossibility of them aiming for world domination without removing the wealth of others (*Hist.* 9.10.11-13).

Livy represents *both* parties fighting for world domination; it is written into his text as a report that both Hannibal and Scipio announce to their men:

Roma an Carthago iura gentibus daret ante crastinam noctem scituros; neque enim Africam aut Italiam, sed orbem terrarum victoriae praemium fore; par periculum praemio quibus adversa pugnae fortuna fuisset.

Livy, 30.32.2

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<sup>372</sup> Until the late twentieth century most studies comparing this episode between these two texts focus on Livy's use or otherwise of the *Histories* as a historical source e.g. Miller, 1975, 52 believes it 'probably right' that Livy worked directly from Polybius. Cf. Tränkle, 1977, 241, who suggests the similarity between the two versions reflects close adherence to a mutual source rather than Livy's direct use of Polybius. Chaplin, 2000, 25, and Burck, 1967, 440-52: that the 'Hannibal speech' before Zama is the closest that Livy comes to simply reproducing Polybius. Walbank, 1967, 446, notes that there are more problems - sources, chronology, site, numbers and tactics - over Zama than for any other battle in the war. For discussions of the battle, see Goldsworthy, 2001, 298-309; 193-203; Bradford, 1981, 193-203.

Whether Rome or Carthage should give laws to the nations they would know the next day before nightfall. For not Africa, they said, or Italy, but the whole world would be the reward of victory. A reward matched by the danger for those whom the fortune of battle should not favour.

Moore, 1955, 485

Where Polybius represents Scipio claiming that the Romans were fighting for world domination, Livy places it in *Hannibal's* harangue to the Carthaginian component in his army, telling them that they faced either servitude or ruling the world (Livy, 30.33.8-12). Silius Italicus follows Livy's preference for Hannibal to voice the opinion that the battle was for world domination, and similarly places it toward close of Hannibal's harangue:

Non altera restat  
iam Libyaec nec Dardaniis pugna altera restat.  
certatus nobis hodie dominum accipit orbis.

*Pun.* 17.335-7

'Neither Carthage nor Rome can fight another battle. Today must decide the struggle between us for mastery of the world.'

Duff, 1989, 463.

In the *Punica* the ascendancy<sup>373</sup> of Scipio has been read as the first step toward the principate and the one-man rule of imperial Rome. Of all the various representations in the ancient texts over what Rome and Carthage were fighting for at Zama, it is perhaps the Hadrianic author, Florus, who summarises the outcome in terms that most closely reflect the historical reality: Africa was the prize of victory, the rest of the world soon followed: *praemiumque victoriae Africa fuit et secutus Africam statim terrarium orbis* (Florus, 1.22.61).

Polybius lauds Hannibal and Zama with proverbs and quotes from Homeric poetry, closing the episode with the highest praise of Scipio. Zama is the only event given such treatment in the extant sections of the *Histories* which reflects Polybius' belief in the pivotal role its outcome played for changing the balance of power across the ancient Mediterranean world. Polybius' first quotation, described by Walbank<sup>374</sup> as a contaminated mixture of Homer's *Iliad* 2.804; 4.437 and *Odyssey* 19.175, compares the

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<sup>373</sup> Fears, 1981, 779: the literary image of Scipio assumes various attributes of Hellenistic kingship. Ennius celebrated Scipio as *invictus* and thus associated the victory with the person not Rome as a society. Marks, 2005, argues for Silius Italicus presenting Scipio as a 'good king' and virtuous *princeps* ideal for Domitian but is not entirely convincing.

<sup>374</sup> Walbank, 1967, 459.

plethora of voices in the Carthaginian army<sup>375</sup> to the Trojans whose allies came from many areas:

οὐδ' ἴα γῆρυς,  
ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα, πολύκλητοι δ' ἔσαν ἄνδρες,  
καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἐξηριθμησάμην.

*Hist.* 15.12.9

Mixed was the murmur, and confused the sound,  
Their names all various.

Paton, 2000, 493.

πολλοὶ γὰρ κατὰ ἄστυ μέγα Πριάμου ἐπίκουροι,  
ἄλλη δ' ἄλλων γλῶσσα πολυσπερέων ἀνθρώπων.

*Iliad*, 2.803-4

It is an interesting choice of analogy on the part of Polybius, and perhaps indicates that Roman claims of descent from the Trojans were not yet entrenched. In historical terms it is a disingenuous comparison in the context of Zama not only because Hannibal had a particularly good record of managing an army of mixed ethnicities but also because the Roman side also comprised a multiplicity of peoples not least of which were their new Numidian allies. Nonetheless, Polybius supports his analogy by representing Hannibal ordering his officers to address their own contingents in the army while he addressed his own men (*Hist.* 15.11.4-6).

Polybius then compares Hannibal to Agamemnon through a quotation from the *Iliad* for the manner in which Hannibal forced the reluctant Carthaginians<sup>376</sup> to keep fighting by placing them in the middle of his forces:<sup>377</sup>

ὅφρα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων τις ἀναγκαῖῃ πολεμίζοι.

*Hist.* 15.16.3

That e'en the unwilling might be forced to fight.

Paton, 2000, 501.

<sup>375</sup> Goldsworthy, 2000, 305 notes the theme was as old as the *Iliad* and often repeated in narratives of Greek victories over the Persians.

<sup>376</sup> Walbank, 1967, 464, notes that the sense is changed by Livy, 30.35.7, who describes the mercenaries as the unstable element and placed in the centre.

<sup>377</sup> Frontinus says Hannibal placed his Italians in the rear because he distrusted their loyalty for dragging them from Italy against their will (*Strat.* 2.3.16). The logic seems odd, those least to be trusted are unlikely to be at the rear of the battleline where they can attack from behind (cf. Cannae).

ὅφρα καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλων τις ἀναγκαῖη πολεμίζοι.

*Iliad* 4.300

Even those reluctant to fight should be forced to take part in the battle  
Scott-Kilvert, 1979, 478.

The comparison of Hannibal to Agamemnon not only connects Hannibal to the mythical king of the *Iliad* but also links him to the heroic figure of Greek Tragedy; arguably a fitting representation of Hannibal. The Loeb and Teubner editions bracket a phrase at *Hist.* 15.13.1, that the whole battle was hand to hand [the men using neither spears nor swords.]<sup>378</sup>

The provenance of Polybius' final proverb comparing Hannibal and Scipio is not known, but may be from a Hellenistic poem: *a brave man meets another braver yet:*<sup>379</sup> ἐσθλὸς ἐὼν ἄλλου κρείττονος ἀντέτυχεν (*Hist.* 15.16.6).<sup>380</sup> Polybius attributes Hannibal's defeat to a mix of bad luck and being up against a better man; the corollary for Scipio being a combination of personal merit and good fortune.<sup>381</sup>

Livy applies a different technique of exaggeration for Zama as he focuses on the personal qualities of Scipio and Hannibal, the bravery of their respective armies, as well as describing Rome and Carthage as the two wealthiest powers of the day:

ad hoc discrimen procedunt postero die duorum opulentissimorum populorum duo longe clarissimi duces, duo fortissimi exercitus, multa ante parta decora aut cumulaturi eo die aut eversuri

Livy, 30.32.4

For this decision on the following day two most distinguished generals by a long way, and two of the bravest armies of the two wealthiest nations went out, either to crown the many distinctions previously won or to bring them to nothing.

Adapted from Moore, 1955, 487

Zama is the grand finale for the *Punica*. Silius indicates the significance of Zama when Jupiter and Juno converse and Jupiter decides on the fates of Hannibal and of Carthage (*Pun.* 17.371-85). Yet Zama also marks the 'beginning of the end' for Silius with the rise of Scipio and, in due course, Caesar claiming divine heritage (*Pun.* 17.653-4).<sup>382</sup> The link was created in *Punica* 3 between Zama and Thapsus as common sites of

<sup>378</sup> Paton, 2000, 498. Note b.

<sup>379</sup> Paton, 2000, 501.

<sup>380</sup> Walbank, 1967, 464, summarises the arguments for Hellenistic epigram; the killing of Eurypylus by Neoptolemus; or a quote from Theognis.

<sup>381</sup> See Fears, 1981, 760-1 for discussion on Polybius' use of luck and personal merit.

<sup>382</sup> Also Boyle, 1991, 303.

spilt Roman blood (*Pun.* 3.261-264).<sup>383</sup> The context of the spilt blood was, of course, quite different and the two Scipios involved were at opposite ends of the scale for *virtus* (cf. Suetonius, *D. Iul.* 59).

Florus locates Zama as one of the greatest battles in Roman history due to the personal qualities of Scipio and Hannibal. They are considered the two greatest generals of all time. Hannibal is even represented as the conqueror of Italy:

non fuit maior sub imperio Romano dies quam ille, cum duo omnium et antea et postea ducum maximi duces, ille Italiae, hic Hispaniae victor, conlatis comminus signis direxere aciem.

Florus, 1.22.58

In the whole history of the Roman empire there was no more notable occasion than when the two generals, greater than any before or since, the one the conqueror of Italy, the other of Spain, drew up their armies for a pitched battle.

Forster, 1995, 113.

### **Hannibal and Scipio meet before battle: An irresistible concept**

Most authors present a ‘moment in history’ depicting Scipio and Hannibal meeting<sup>384</sup> shortly before Zama to discuss the possibility of agreeing to peace terms (*Hist.* 15.6.3-14; Livy 30.30-31; Appian *Pun.* 39; Zon. 9.14, Florus 1.22.58). Rossi reads Livy’s episode as indebted to Polybius’ account but notes that Livy’s Hannibal has quite distinct non-Polybian characteristics.<sup>385</sup> Livy acknowledges that there were other traditions, such as Valerius Antias’ claim that Hannibal was simply one of a group of ten delegates meeting Scipio to discuss terms after Hannibal had been defeated by Scipio in a battle prior to Zama (Livy, 30.29.7). Furthermore Livy allows for doubt over the credibility of the speeches at the meeting, by reminding his audience that it was held in private, and, when Scipio addressed his men afterwards, he was free to report on the meeting as he wished: *ad hoc conloquium Hannibalis in secreto habitum ac liberum*

<sup>383</sup> Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2518 note the comparison: ‘another Scipio confronts Caesar and the republican forces at Thapsus: the battle that Lucan says the ghosts of Carthage will have their fill of Roman blood (Lucan 6.309-311).’

<sup>384</sup> Walbank, 1967, 451 believes it possible and even probable but acknowledges that it might be derived from Ennius. Goldsworthy, 2000, 301 accepts the meeting but doubts the speeches preserve anything of the actual conversation. Contra Seibert, 1993, 465; also Mellor, 1999, 61, describes the meeting in Livy’s text as ‘fictitious; it encapsulates the confrontation better than any description of battle tactics.’

<sup>385</sup> Rossi, 2004, 359.

*fingenti qua volt flectit* (Livy, 30.32.8-9). Whatever version of the meeting Hannibal may have given to his men, it has not survived.

There might be a lacuna in *Punica* 17 following line 290.<sup>386</sup> The text seems to break just after Venus persuades Neptune to calm his storm against Hannibal sailing to Africa.<sup>387</sup> The next line opens with Hannibal's harangue to his men prior to Zama. Therefore, if Silius Italicus had included a meeting between Scipio and Hannibal, it is lost. The Loeb translator, Duff,<sup>388</sup> believes it inconceivable that Silius Italicus would omit such a dramatic moment, yet it is possible that Silius Italicus did not include the meeting because the more general depiction of Hannibal in the *Punica* does not present him as the negotiating type.

Polybius has Hannibal requesting the meeting because he is so impressed with Scipio's courage and his unusual treatment of captured Carthaginian spies (the spies were caught but returned unharmed after being taken on a conducted tour of Scipio's camp, *Hist.* 15.5.9-10; 15.6.1).<sup>389</sup> The remark about Hannibal being impressed with Scipio seems to underlie the depictions by Livy and Florus that purport to record Hannibal and Scipio gazing at each other in mutual admiration at the start of their meeting: *et steterunt diu mutual admiratione defixi* (Florus 1.22.58). Livy's scene is so over-dramatised that it creates an impression of a degree of irony:

Summotis pari spatio armatis, cum singulis interpretibus congressi sunt, non suae modo aetatis maximi duces, sed omnis ante se memoriae, omnium gentium cuilibet regum imperatorumve pares. Paulisper alter alterius conspectus, admiratione mutua prope attoniti, conticuere.

Livy, 30.30.1-2

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<sup>386</sup> See McGushin, 1985 for general discussion of transmission of the *Punica*.

<sup>387</sup> Duff, 1989, 460 note a: 'That some verses, perhaps a great many verses, have been lost here seems to me certain. For the present episode is incomplete; and the following episode requires introductory matter which is lacking. There is no other instance in the poem of narrative so faulty. Further it is known that Scipio and Hannibal met in conference before the battle: and it is inconceivable that Silius should pass over an incident so dramatic.'

<sup>388</sup> Duff, 1989, 460, note a.

<sup>389</sup> Valerius Maximus, 3.7.1d, cites the event as an example of Scipio's self-confidence and intention to break the enemy psychologically. Cf. Goldsworthy, 2000, 301: Scipio's treatment of the spies was a stratagem either to convince Hannibal that Masinissa had not yet arrived (*Hist.* 15.3) or to demoralise Hannibal because Masinissa had arrived (Livy, 30.29.1-10). Walbank 1967, 450 notes the close resemblance to Xerxes' treatment of three Greek spies in Herodotus 7.146.7, and parallels Laevinus' treatment of Pyrrhus' spies in Dion. Hal. 19.11; Zon. 8.3.6. Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.7.7.

Keeping their armed men at the same distance the generals, each attended by one interpreter, met, being not only the greatest of their own age, but equal to any in history before their time. For a moment they remained silent, looking at each other and almost dumbfounded by mutual admiration.

Moore, 473, 1955.

Cornelius Nepos prefers a different tradition, writing that Hannibal requested the meeting, not out of admiration for Scipio, but because Carthaginian resources were depleted and Hannibal wanted to negotiate a truce to buy more time; the two men could not agree on terms and a few days later they fought at Zama (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 6.3). Similarly, Livy wonders whether Hannibal requested the meeting or if it was the result of an order from Carthage: *id utrum sua sponte fecerit an publico consilio neutrum cur adfirmem habeo* (Livy, 30.29.6). Livy's seed of doubt that Hannibal sought to negotiate peace enables those among his readers who believe in Hannibal as an eternal enemy to continue in that belief.

Hannibal, as supposed initiator of the meeting, speaks first and Scipio responds. Hannibal's speech is relatively long and sues for peace whereas Scipio's speech is brief to the point of being curt, and unrelenting. Kraus and Woodman, in their study of Livy's passage, note that the content of Scipio's speech is in sharp contrast to the mutual respect implied at the start of the meeting.<sup>390</sup>

Polybius presents Hannibal disingenuously offering a peace treaty on the basis that Spain and all the islands between Africa and Italy will belong to Rome and promises not to wage war against Rome. Hannibal's opening preamble summarises his own command and reflects a touch of pessimism on the vicissitudes of Fortune.<sup>391</sup> A sense of hindsight<sup>392</sup> underlies his closing expectation that Scipio will not take the opportunity to be magnanimous (*Hist.* 15.6.4-7.9; 15.7.8-9). Livy's version of the meeting is somewhat different and Hannibal has a much longer speech in which he reviews not just his own glorious career but also Scipio's meteoric rise. Hannibal summarises the main features of the war from fighting Scipio's father at Trasimene to facing Scipio in Africa; in this way the speech creates internal links from the first to final books of the decad. Hannibal even accepts responsibility for starting the war and declares that he incurred the envy of

<sup>390</sup> Kraus & Woodman, 1997, 60.

<sup>391</sup> Walbank, 1967, 452 notes a suggestion that *Hist* 15.6.8 of Hannibal's speech is derived from Ennius *Ann.* 312-13 and therefore the whole meeting is taken from Ennius but agrees with de Sanctis (3.2.594-5) that the Hellenistic sentiments are common, the parallelism slight and the Ennian context uncertain.

<sup>392</sup> Walbank, 1967, 452.

the gods by conducting it so well.<sup>393</sup> Hannibal's concluding 'offer' of lands already possessed by Rome through conquest and his expression of pessimism that Scipio would not negotiate for peace are the closest points of resemblance to the Polybian version of the speech (Livy 30.30.3-30).<sup>394</sup>

Scipio's brief response also differs slightly as presented by the two historians (*Hist.* 15.8.2; Livy 30.31.2-9). In the Polybian version of his speech, he rejects all Roman responsibility for the war, claims that Carthage had broken a recently negotiated truce, and does not believe that Hannibal is seeking genuine peace. He closes with a challenge to surrender unconditionally or fight (*Hist.* 15.8.2-14). Livy acknowledges that his version of Scipio's speech was not historically exact: *hanc fere sententiam respondit* (Livy, 30.31.1). Scipio claims that the Carthaginians were the aggressors in both the First and Second Punic Wars, and that Hannibal only left Italy because Scipio invaded Africa. Scipio further claims that if Hannibal had returned to Africa and sued for peace before Scipio invaded, the Romans might have negotiated but now Hannibal either agrees to an additional indemnity on the previous terms or he fights (Livy, 30.31.2-9).

### Patterning of harangues and dispositions of forces

Polybius and Livy both preface their battle narratives with paired harangues to the respective armies by Scipio and Hannibal, and paired summaries of the dispositions of the respective Roman and Carthaginian forces. Polybius creates an ArBrBcAc<sup>395</sup> pattern across his text as he describes the dispositions for the Roman forces before summarising Scipio's harangue. Hannibal's harangue is next, followed by the disposition of the Carthaginian forces. The sense of symmetry is further enhanced by roughly the same amount of space being devoted to each of the descriptions of Scipio's and Hannibal's dispositions. The paired harangues, however, are reversed in terms of length against the paired speeches given in their earlier 'private' meeting. This time Scipio has the longer, direct, speech and Hannibal's harangue is considerably shorter, partly reported and partly direct.

<sup>393</sup> Moore, 1989, 60 says that Scipio is given the highest praise when Livy couples *pietas* and *virtus* in Hannibal's speech (Livy, 30.30.13). It depends how much value is placed on praise that Livy says came from Hannibal in a private conversation which was made public by Scipio (Livy, 30.32).

<sup>394</sup> Rossi, 2004, 1 notes the 'unPolybian' characteristics of Hannibal's speech in his argument that Livy presents Hannibal and Scipio as a pair of parallel lives.

<sup>395</sup> A: dispositions; B: speech; r: Roman; c: Carthaginian.

In terms of content, Scipio's harangue<sup>396</sup> looks to the future and echoes Polybius' introductory remark that the Romans were fighting for world domination.<sup>397</sup> It closes by echoing an admonition made by Hannibal at the start of the war: that the men must conquer or die; for the Romans, this meant no more running away as happened at Cannae (*Hist.* 15.10.1-7). As noted at the start of this chapter, Hannibal's harangue, by contrast, looks back to the past as he reminds his men of their prior victories, seventeen years of comradeship in Italy, and urging them to maintain their record of invincibility (*Hist.* 15.11.6-12). Described by Walbank<sup>398</sup> as 'full of commonplaces,' which may be so, but the harangue seems, at least in part, adapted to suit the figure who is about to be defeated.

The sequence of the two exhortations in Livy's text is a reversal of that in the Polybian account and they are patterned differently against the army dispositions. Luce<sup>399</sup> notes, for example, that the exhortations by Scipio (father, son) and Hannibal to their respective armies before Zama and before the Ticinus battles are the only such chiastically arranged pairs in Livy's surviving work. The exhortations are directly adjacent to each other, with Hannibal's first, and they precede the paired dispositions of the forces (Roman dispositions placed first) to create a BcBrArAc pattern (Livy, 30.33). Hannibal's speech looks back to the past but, in keeping with Livy's depiction of Hannibal losing to Marcellus, Hannibal does not refer to an invincible record of victories in Italy. As Hannibal moves down the ranks it is apparent that he knows many men personally as he recalls the deeds of certain individuals; language was no barrier (Livy, 30.32.4).<sup>400</sup>

Scipio's harangue opens by recalling the conquest in Spain; he reiterates that the Carthaginians were treaty breakers and suffered an innate lack of *fides*. He closes by looking forward, not to world domination but to something far more tangible for his men, the spoils of Carthage:

<sup>396</sup> Walbank, 1967, 456 comments that the speech contains 'little but commonplaces; and there may be some anachronism.'

<sup>397</sup> Walbank 1967, 444 describes Polybius' comment as an 'interesting anachronism' and that it shows the issue of the war was not yet of interest to areas beyond the western Mediterranean, despite Agelaus' warning *Hist.* 5.104. Lancel, 1998, 187 argues that the unprovoked declaration of war against Philip of Macedon in 200BC marks the birth of Roman imperialism (as punishment for his dead letter alliance with Hannibal in 215BC).

<sup>398</sup> Walbank, 1967, 459 describes the content as 'mainly commonplaces.'

<sup>399</sup> Luce, 1977, 27, n58 Book 21: Scipio – Hannibal; Book 30: Hannibal – Scipio.

<sup>400</sup> Serrati, 2005, 250 reminds readers that Hannibal spent many years in Spain and was possibly as fluent in Spanish dialects as well as his own language. Cf. Kaplan, 2003, 34: 'Hannibal could only communicate through interpreters.'

Adesse finem belli ac laboris, in manibus esse praedam Carthaginis,  
reditum domum in patriam ad parentes, liberos, coniuges penatesque  
deos. Celsus haec corpore voltuque ita laeto ut viciisse iam crederes  
dicebat.

Livy, 30.32.10-11

The end of the war and hardship was at hand, the spoils of Carthage within reach, and the return home to their native city, to parents, children, wives and household gods. So erect did he stand as he spoke these words and with so happy a look on his face that one would have believed him already the victor.

Moore, 1955, 489

Silius Italicus treats the material differently. If dispositions of the two armies were included in the *Punica* then they must have been placed before the harangues, in an AABC(Br) pattern. Scipio's harangue is bracketed because he is cut short before saying anything; his men are so eager to fight they don't require further encouragement (*Pun.* 17.340). Thus only Hannibal actually addresses his troops and his harangue is longer than the one in Livy's text. The emphasised *tu* or *te* throughout the speech shows that Hannibal recognises individual soldiers more quickly by their feats in battle than by their names. He recognises the arms that attacked and killed, or attacked and wounded many famous Romans (Flaminius, Paulus, Marcellus, Gracchus, Appius, Fulvius, Crispinus and the elder Scipio are all mentioned, *Pun.* 17.295-337). Hannibal concludes with an acknowledgment that this battle is 'final' and echoes the ahistorical claim that it is for world domination:

'certatus nobis hodie dominum accipit orbis.'

*Pun.* 17.337

'Today must decide the struggle between us for mastery of the world.'

Duff, 1989, 463.

## Battle at Zama

In Polybius' description of the battle at Zama, everything that could go wrong for Hannibal did go wrong. The elephants began their charge but panicked. Some ran back toward Hannibal's ranks, others ran down the spaces created as Scipio's men stepped aside. The Roman infantry marched forward and charged, gradually gaining ground. As the Carthaginian mercenaries began to give way, some turned and began to attack the Carthaginians behind them, who fought back. Hannibal would not allow those who turned back into the ranks; his men kept their spears lowered. The Roman cavalry defeated and chased off the Carthaginian cavalry. The battle hung in the balance until

the Roman cavalry returned and began to attack the Carthaginians from behind (*Hist.* 15.14).

Livy has some slight, but significant, differences. Hannibal had eighty war elephants, more than ever before: *octoginta autem erant, quot nulla unquam in acie ante habuerat* (Livy, 30.33.3). Of these elephants, it was those stationed on the left-wing that panicked at the sound of the Roman war trumpets, and turned against their own side. Masinissa defeated and chased off the Numidian cavalry on the left wing while the other elephants continued their charge. This elephant charge was largely ineffective because Scipio had trained the Roman *velites* to step aside from each other and create passages for the elephants to run through without harming anyone. The Romans attacked the remaining elephants and (somehow) succeeded in driving them toward the Carthaginian cavalry. Laelius, like Masinissa, took advantage of the moment and drove off the Carthaginian cavalry leaving Hannibal's wings exposed (Livy, 30.34).

Appian follows a more dramatic version of events that brought Hannibal and Scipio together in single combat. On the other hand, Appian's description of the battle scene better explains how the Numidian cavalry (on the Roman side) succeeded in causing the elephants on both wings to panic and be taken out of the battle by their drivers; Appian also gives more information about Hannibal's tactics. In this version the elephants in the centre continued their charge and trampled the heavy armoured Roman infantry, until Scipio ordered the Roman cavalry to dismount and attack these elephants. In this version, there is no mention of the Roman infantry smartly stepping aside to allow the elephants to pass. Once the elephants had gone, the battle continued, fought by men and horses (Appian, *Pun.* 8.7.43). Scipio shadows Hannibal's moves in terms of reinforcing the battle-lines, but more dramatically, Hannibal and Scipio are in the same part of the battlefield at the same time. Tension mounts as each throws a spear at the other; Hannibal's shield is pierced but he is not injured whereas Scipio's horse is hit, as it took Scipio to the rear, Scipio hurls a second spear at Hannibal but missed. Appian then brings Masinissa and Hannibal together in an encounter that echoes the one between Hannibal and Scipio. A spear pierces Hannibal's shield and he, in turn, wounds his opponent's horse; Masinissa also throws a second spear at Hannibal, but misses (Appian, *Pun.* 8.7.44-6). When Hannibal leaves the field to bring in another body of Spaniards and Gauls some of his men misinterpret the move and believe he is retreating and start to do the same; nonetheless Hannibal prepares another battle line and so, too,

does Scipio. Appian closes the scene when Hannibal's men are defeated and Hannibal decides to escape (Appian, *Pun.* 8.7.47).

Silius Italicus' representation of Zama is different again. If there was an elephant charge, it is not in the *Punica*, but there may be a poetic allusion to the pathways created by the Romans stepping aside to allow the elephants to pass when Silius says that wide passages appeared as men fell which others rush to fill (*Pun.* 17.420-5). Silius Italicus placed Macedonian horsemen fighting for Hannibal as well as Greek infantry in their traditional phalanx whereas Livy only mentions Macedonian infantry in the second line behind the Carthaginians: *in secunda acie Carthaginienses Afrosque et Macedonum legionem* (Livy, 30.33.4; cf. *Pun.* 17.413-9). The epic Scipio searches out Hannibal for single combat: *illum igitur lustrans circumfert lumina campo rimaturque ducem* (*Pun.* 17.517-8). For the last time, Juno intervened and removed Hannibal from the field of battle in order to protect him. She is invisible to the Carthaginians who believe that Hannibal has deserted them, consequently they lose heart: *ingruit Ausonius versosque agit aequore toto rector* (*Pun.* 17.585).

Florus summarised Zama as an evenhanded battle at which the two sides fought long and hard. He says that everyone agreed that both armies made the best of the occasion, Scipio said as much about Hannibal and Hannibal about Scipio: *hoc Scipio de Annibalis, Annibal de Scipionis exercitu praedicaverunt* (Florus, 1.22.60).

At Scipio's triumph<sup>401</sup> the greatest attraction for the crowds, and the final image of Hannibal in the *Punica*, is a painting that depicts Hannibal running away: *sed non ulla magis mentesque oculosque tenebat quam visa Hannibalis campis fugientis imago* (*Pun.* 17.643-4). Of course, a painting<sup>402</sup> is no substitute for parading Hannibal in person and the dying Syphax made a poor second choice.<sup>403</sup>

<sup>401</sup> Livy 38, 52-3 casts a retrospective cloud over Scipio Africanus' triumph in Scipio's trial some years later. See Beard, 2007, 253. Some suggest that Scipio 'allowed' Hannibal his freedom, De Beer, 1969, 290; Lancel 1998, 180, and that Scipio had the foresight to recognise that Hannibal as the most capable person to aid Carthaginian recovery.

<sup>402</sup> Appian, 8.66, lists categories of items in Scipio's triumph, including paintings depicting events from the war; he does not name any of the prisoners.

<sup>403</sup> Silius Italicus favours the tradition that is today extant in Polybius but not in Livy when describing the dying Syphax being carried through Scipio's triumphal procession on a litter (*Pun.* 17.629-30). Livy says that Syphax died in prison beforehand thus denying Scipio the satisfaction of displaying either Hannibal or Syphax (Livy, 30.45.4-5). Polybius said that Syphax died soon after the triumph (*Hist.* 16.23). See Beard, 2007, 129-132 for an argument that the supposed ancestral custom to kill kings or foreign leaders paraded in triumphal processions is a myth based on very little evidence. Beard notes that most captives executed in one text are found to have remained alive in another text. Syphax is another example with opposing traditions but no-one claims that he was killed as part of the triumphal celebration.

## Chapter 7: The Legacy ‘War’

This chapter is divided into four parts as it examines the treatments of Hannibal following his defeat at Zama and his metamorphosis to an eternal enemy of Rome. The first section covers the immediate aftermath of the battle at Zama when authors faced the choice of depicting Hannibal accepting the defeat as final or choosing to continue warfare, and both representations are extant.

For those texts that depict Hannibal as a sworn enemy of Rome, presenting him not accepting the defeat as final is easily compatible with the author’s overall presentation (e.g. Cornelius Nepos, *Hannibal*, 7.3; Seneca, *NQ* 3, *praef.* 5-7; Silius Italicus, *Pun.* 17.611-2). The portrait becomes more complex in those texts that depict Hannibal as a sworn enemy *and* accepting the defeat as final, especially if he is also presented actively persuading the Carthaginians either to sue for peace or to accept Scipio’s terms (e.g. Polybius, *Hist.* 15.19.2-9; Livy, 30.35.11). On the face of it, a ‘sworn enemy’ of Rome seems an unlikely figure to sue for peace. If, on the other hand, Hannibal dissembled his attitude toward Rome in order to save both citizens and the physical city of Carthage from the consequences of slavery, plundering and burning at the hands of Scipio’s army, the representation may be interpreted as displaying Punic trickery.

From the Carthaginian point of view, Hannibal might even be considered a saviour of their city. The first section explores this slightly incongruous (for Roman texts) portrait of Hannibal because such a depiction adds to the aura of his reputation as an extraordinary figure, and, although it may not be considered a particularly strong or ‘iconic’ representation of Hannibal today, it has an intrinsic value as an alternative, positive portrait of Hannibal that probably has non-Roman origins. It is also important because it reappears in a slightly different guise in Livy’s fourth decad a few years after Zama when Hannibal again saves Carthage from Roman punishment. He solved an economic crisis that enabled the Carthaginians to continue paying the indemnity due to Rome, although the traditions differ on Hannibal’s methodology.

In the second section of this chapter it will be argued that Livy’s depiction of Hannibal as a controversial politician develops into the next portrait of Hannibal: The scapegoat and warmonger. Hannibal became the focus for Roman anger and had to escape from Carthage. The devolution of blame onto one man has advantages for the

other protagonists involved in a conflict, and there are indications that there was some connivance among certain Carthaginians. In the long term, Roman acceptance of Hannibal as the instigator of a war or as their ‘real’ enemy allows them to be more merciful toward their erstwhile opponents. When Hannibal appears in the court of Antiochus, he is depicted arguing for war, but Livy indicates that Hannibal was not solely responsible for inciting the king to war against Rome. It will be argued that the picture becomes more complicated in Livy’s narrative because the depiction of Hannibal through the fourth decad is affected by the presentation of a gradual increase in moral degradation appearing among Roman leaders, including Scipio Africanus and Flamininus.

The third section of this chapter compares the records of Hannibal’s death of which there are various stories about when, where and how Hannibal died. There are two features in common between all the traditions: As befitting an eternal enemy he is never represented as captured or killed by a Roman, nor does he die of peaceful old age. Suicide becomes his final act of independent defiance of Rome.

The epitaphs and literary portraits of Hannibal are compared in the final section of this chapter. The comparisons show that most are overwhelmingly positive, in addition, the negative characteristics are surprisingly limited to a few specific points that are frequently negated within the narrative by the same author.

## Eternal Enemy and Saviour of Carthage

Livy indicated through Scipio’s exhortation to his men before the battle at Zama that Carthage itself is under threat because Scipio tempted his men with the wealth of the city (Livy, 30.32.10). Despite this threat and the destruction of the Carthaginian fleet, Carthage itself was not sacked or plundered, although the matter was considered (Livy, 30.36.10). The corollary to depicting Scipio’s magnanimity and clemency toward the Carthaginians in response to their pleas and supplications for peace is the presentation of Hannibal, in effect, saving the city, when he either persuaded the Carthaginians to initially seek peace, or persuaded them to accept the offered terms.<sup>404</sup> Although both Polybius and Livy depict Hannibal arguing in favour of accepting Scipio’s terms there is

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<sup>404</sup> De Beer, 1969, 290, credits Scipio not only with granting Hannibal’s freedom but also with the foresight to recognise Hannibal as the most capable person to ensure the indemnities are paid.

a nuanced difference between them over whether or not Hannibal took an active role in initially urging the Carthaginians to seek peace.

Livy acknowledges the existence of a variety of traditions about Hannibal's reaction to his defeat at Zama. He prioritises the one in which Hannibal not only accepted the defeat as the final issue for the war, but depicts Hannibal insisting that the Carthaginians sue for peace as their best hope for their own safety:<sup>405</sup>

Hannibal cum Hadrumentum refugisset accitusque inde Carthaginem sexto ac tricesimo post anno quam puer inde profectus erat redisset fassus in curia est non proelio modo se sed bello victum, nec spem salutis alibi quam in pace impetranda esse.

Livy, 30.35.11

Hannibal, after his flight to Hadrumetum, was summoned to Carthage, returning in the thirty-sixth year after he had left it as a boy. Thereupon in the Senate House he admitted that he had been defeated not only in a battle but also in the war and that there was no hope of safety except in successfully suing for peace.

Adapted from Moore, 1955, 501.

If Livy's readership was in any doubt about what would happen if the Carthaginians did not follow Hannibal's advice, his following passage indicates Scipio's probable intentions. Scipio travels to his camp at Utica but the legions are ordered to march to Carthage. The city is in imminent danger: *Cn. Octavium terrestri itinere ducere legiones Carthaginem iubet* (Livy, 30.36.3). At Hannibal's instigation, ten Carthaginian envoys sail out to meet Scipio who was sailing toward Carthage from Utica: *decem legati erant principes civitatis, auctore Hannibale missi ad petendam pacem* (Livy, 30.36.4).<sup>406</sup> The Carthaginian ship is decked out in fillets and olive branches as signs of suppliants seeking peace, but Scipio did not immediately respond to their pleas and they are redirected to his new camp closer to Carthage (Livy, 30.36.5). The Carthaginians comply with the instructions and send an even larger group of thirty envoys to the camp where Scipio sets out his peace conditions (Livy, 30.37.2-6).

The *Histories* have become increasingly fragmentary and are largely a compilation of excerpts for these events, but it appears that Polybius differs from Livy on a number of points, including over the timing of Hannibal's arrival at Carthage. Under the current

<sup>405</sup> Lancel, 1998, 177 hypothesises that Hannibal retreated to Hadrumetum in order to negotiate his own safety and avoid being crucified before travelling to Carthage. The texts are mute on this point. There are no crucifixions of Carthaginian generals in the *Histories* that post-date the First Punic War.

<sup>406</sup> Goldsworthy, 2000, 307: Hannibal's defeat left Carthage with no choice but to surrender. Scipio sails toward Carthage as a show of force to pressure Carthage to seek peace.

arrangement of the text, Hannibal escapes from the battlefield at Zama and rides to Hadrumetum but it seems that Polybius does not locate him in Carthage until after the envoys return from seeking peace with Scipio (*Hist.* 15.15.3). Therefore Polybius does not grant Hannibal any initiative for seeking peace. The Romans are deeply suspicious of the Carthaginian envoys' sincerity and Polybius himself gives a scathing assessment of their extravagant display of sorrow as disingenuous charlatanry<sup>407</sup> or over-acting of the worst type (*Hist.* 15.17.1). Nevertheless the envoys are given Scipio's surrender terms and return to Carthage (*Hist.* 15.18). It is at this point that Polybius places Hannibal in the Carthaginian senate, giving Hannibal a speech in which he acknowledges his defeat and urges the Carthaginians to accept the offered terms and hope that the Roman people would ratify them (*Hist.* 15.19.2-9).

The scene in the senate degenerates into farce with a display of Hannibal's violence and ignorance of protocol when he pulls down an opposing speaker. It is an irony that the great military general cannot tolerate someone questioning his opinion. Livy similarly illustrates Hannibal's inability to cope with verbal opposition and physically dragging down an opposing speaker (Livy, 30.37.7-8). Nonetheless the outcome is the same in both texts as Hannibal wins the point and Carthage is saved from a fate comparable to that of New Carthage.

Livy's depiction of Hannibal urging the Carthaginians to seek peace coupled with the suggestion that Scipio wanted to settle peace terms before his period of office expired undermines the tradition of Scipio's generosity in sparing the city and lives of his enemies. According to Livy, Scipio realised that attempting to besiege a walled city with coastal access meant that the glory of ending the war would probably accrue to his successor. Hence Livy's remark that everyone inclined toward peace: *ad pacem omnium animi versi sunt* (Livy, 30.36.11).

It would appear that Hannibal took no chances with his personal safety and although he may have urged the Carthaginians to seek or accept peace, he cautiously played no part as an envoy during the negotiations. The extant summaries of Scipio's peace terms do not specify a requirement to surrender Hannibal, although Livy acknowledges that there was a tradition for it (Livy, 30.37.13). In this tradition, Scipio's demand for the surrender of Hannibal is tied quite closely to the concept of Hannibal as an eternal

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<sup>407</sup> Walbank, 1967, 465.

enemy and warmonger because Hannibal was said to have left Africa immediately after the battle at Zama, sailing east to join King Antiochus:

Sunt qui Hannibalem ex acie ad mare pervenisse inde praeparata nave ad regem Antiochum extemplo profectum tradant, postulantique ante omnia Scipioni ut Hannibal sibi traderetur responsum esse Hannibalem in Africa non esse.

Livy, 30.37.13

There are some who relate that Hannibal, on leaving the battle made his way to the sea and sailed at once on a ship prepared for him to King Antiochus, so when Scipio demanded above all things that Hannibal be surrendered to him, the reply was that Hannibal was not in Africa.

Adapted from Moore, 1955, 509.

It may almost be regarded as a passing remark but it foreshadows Hannibal's future in Livy's next decad. Livy leaves the development of the Roman desire to capture Hannibal until the following decad.

Appian and Cornelius Nepos paint somewhat different pictures of Hannibal in the aftermath of Zama to the portraits found in Polybius and Livy. They agree insofar as Hannibal escaped from the battlefield and reached Hadrumetum (Appian says that Hannibal stopped at Thon (an unidentified location), but left under cover of darkness because he was afraid that the Bruttians he encountered there would surrender him to Scipio: Appian, *Pun.* 8.47). In these texts Hannibal does not consider his defeat as final and takes no part in the immediate peace negotiations; it is others who negotiate peace with Scipio. Instead Hannibal rallies the survivors, recruits additional men and makes preparations to continue the war (Appian, *Pun.* 8.47; Cornelius Nepos, *Hannibal*, 6.4). Appian, *Pun.* 8.55, puts the number mustered at 6,000 whereas Nepos writes only that Hannibal rallied as a large number within a few days.

Appian returns his readers to the unrest at Carthage; some people were angry at those who sent provisions to the Romans in a time of great food shortage and threaten to burn their houses in retaliation. Hannibal was summoned and, apparently surprised them by urging them to accept the peace terms (Appian, *Pun.* 8.55). As Appian presents it, not everyone at Carthage looked forward to the prospect of Roman domination with enthusiasm.

The mixed feelings at Carthage may underlie Nepos' representation of Hannibal continuing to rally men while others negotiate the peace terms. In Nepos' biography, the Carthaginians, despite making peace, neither stop Hannibal's activities nor recall him:

Cum in apparando acerrime esset occupatus, Karthaginienses bellum cum Romanis composuerunt. Ille nihil setius exercitui postea praefuit resque in Africa gessit usque ad P. Sulpicium C. Aurelium consules.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 7.1

While he was busily engaged in these preparations the Carthaginians made peace with the Romans. Hannibal, however, continued after that to command the army and carried on war in Africa until the consulship of Publius Sulpicius and Gaius Aurelius.

Rolfe, 1984, 269

Hannibal retains command of the army and continues warfare for at least another couple of years although his enemy is not specified (possibly the Numidian allies of Rome, or Romans left in Africa). Nepos supports the portrait with a description of the reaction at Rome when Carthaginian envoys arrive to present a gold crown in thanks for making peace. The envoys requested the release of Carthaginian prisoners and the relocation of Carthaginian hostages to Fregellae. The Senate accepted the crown, agreed to the relocation of the hostages but refused to return any prisoners<sup>408</sup> because Hannibal and his brother, Mago,<sup>409</sup> still commanded the Carthaginian army:

His ex senates consulto responsum est: munus eorum gratum acceptumque esse; obsides quo loco rogarent futures; captivos non remissuros, quod Hannibalem, cuius opera susceptum bellum foret inimicissimum nomini Romano, etiam nunc cum imperio apud exercitum haberent itemque fratrem eius Magonem.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hannibal*, 7. 3

To them, in accordance with a decree of the senate, the following answer was made: that their gift was received with thanks; that the hostages should live where they had requested; that they would not return the prisoners, because Hannibal, who had caused the war and was bitterly hostile to the Roman nation, still held command in their army, as well as his brother, Mago.

Rolfe, 1984, 269

The Carthaginians adroitly comply with the Roman conditions, yet show their continuing support for Hannibal because they recall him from his army command and make him king (*sufete*): *rex factus est* (Nepos, *Hann.* 7.4).

<sup>408</sup> Cf. Livy who writes that some Carthaginian prisoners were returned with the Carthaginian envoys who had been sent to Rome to plead for acceptance of the peace terms, Livy, 30.43.5-6.

<sup>409</sup> Lancel, 1998, 180 prefers the tradition that Mago had died of his wounds after invading Italy and consequently discounts the entire passage in Cornelius Nepos. Hoyos, 2003, 189 suggests Cornelius Nepos confused Mago ‘the brother’ for one of two other ‘Mago’ figures known in the texts.

A passage from Seneca indicates that, in his time, a popular portrait of Hannibal was as someone who continually sought warfare against Rome:

quemadmodum Hannibal Alpes superiecerit scribunt quemadmodum confirmatum Hispaniae cladibus bellum Italiae inopinatus intulerit fractisque rebus, etiam post Carthaginem pertinax reges pererraverit contra Romanos ducem promittens exercitum petens; quemadmodum non desierit omnibus angulis bellum senex quaerere adeo sine patria pati poterat sine hoste non poterat.

Seneca, *NQ*, 3, Pref. 6.1

They write how Hannibal crossed the Alps, how he unexpectedly carried to Italy a war supported by disasters in Spain; and how even when his fortunes were dashed to pieces after Carthage he was still obstinate and wandered among kings begging for an army and promising to be a general against the Romans, and how as an old man he did not stop searching for war in every corner of the world; he could endure being without a country but he could not stand being without an enemy.

Corcoran, 1971, 203-5

Seneca's use of the plural, *scribunt*, implies general agreement among the texts. Seneca presents Hannibal as someone obsessed with war against Rome, continually seeking support to underwrite his intentions. The passage closes with a memorable *sententia* that neatly summarises an eternal enemy.<sup>410</sup>

Silius Italicus' depiction of Hannibal in the aftermath of Zama is someone who refuses to accept defeat. The epic Hannibal neither accepts Zama as 'final' nor does he seek peace. Instead he escaped from the battlefield and found a hiding place in mountainous country while the Carthaginians capitulated of their own accord (*Pun.* 17.616-24). It is Juno, not Hannibal, who saves Carthage from destruction in the *Punica* pleading for her city to be preserved when Jupiter tells her that the war must end at Zama. She begs for Hannibal to be spared the indignity of exhibition in a Roman triumph (*Pun.* 17.344-369). Jupiter grants her requests but warns her that one day Carthage would be destroyed by another Scipio (Aemilianus) but if she took care of Hannibal he would live to continue warfare, although never in Italy:

Sic Iuno, et contra breviter sic Iupiter orsus:  
'do spatium muris, ut vis, Carthaginis altae:  
stent lacrimis precibusque tuis. sed percipe, coniux,  
quatenus indulsisse vacet. non longa supersunt  
fata urbi, venietque pari sub nomine ductor,

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<sup>410</sup> Wilson, 2007, 429.

qui nunc servatas evertat funditas arces.  
aetherias quoque, uti poscis, trahat Hannibal auras,  
ereptus pugnae. miscere hic sidera ponto  
et terras implore volet redeuntibus armis.  
novi feta viri bello praecordia. sed lex  
muneris haec esto nostri: Saturnia regna  
ne post haec videat, repeatat neve amplius umquam  
Ausoniam. nunc instanti raptum avehe leto,  
ne, latis si miscebit fera proelia campis,  
Romulei nequeas iuvenis subducere dextrae.'

*Pun.* 17.370-84

Thus Juno spoke, and Jupiter answered her briefly thus: 'I grant to the walls of lofty Carthage the reprieve you seek. Let them stand, in answer to your prayers and entreaties. But hear how far your husband is able to grant your requests. The days of Carthage are numbered, and another Scipio shall come, to raze to the ground the towers which for present are safe. Further, let your prayer for Hannibal be granted: let him be rescued from the fray and continue to breathe the air of heaven. He will seek to throw the world into confusion and to fill the earth with renewed warfare. I know his heart, which can bring forth nothing but war. But I grant him life on one condition: he must never hereafter see the land of Saturn and never again return to Italy. Snatch him away at once from imminent death; or else, if he joins in fierce battle on the broad plains, you may be unable to rescue him from the right hand of the young Roman general.'

Duff, 1989, 467.

Hannibal's anger and frustration is reflected in his final speech in the *Punica*. He is given a soliloquy in which he refuses to accept the defeat at Zama as the final decision for the war; he swears to remain an enemy of Rome, and that the memories of his deeds and of Cannae will never be forgotten. Indeed, they will outlive Jupiter:

'caelum licet omne soluta  
in caput hoc compage ruat, terraeque dehiscant,  
non ullo Cannas abolebis, Jupiter, aevo,  
decedesque prius regnis quam nomina gentes  
aut facta Hannibalis sileant. nec deinde relinquo  
securam te, Roma, mei: patriaeque superstes  
ad spes armorum vivam tibi. nam modo pugna  
praecellis, resident hostes: mihi satque superque,  
ut me Dardaniae matres atque Itala tellus,  
dum vivam, expectent nec pacem pectore norint.'

*Pun.* 17.606-615

Though the earth yawn asunder, though all the framework of heaven break up and fall upon my head, never shalt thou, Jupiter, wipe out the name of Cannae, but thou shalt step down from thy throne ere the

world forgets the name or achievements of Hannibal. Nor do I leave you, Rome, without dread of me: I shall survive my country and live on in the hope of warring against Rome. She wins this battle but that is all: her foes are lying low. Enough and more than enough for me, if Roman mothers and the people of Italy dread my coming while I live and never know peace of mind.

Duff, 1989, 483.

This passage encapsulates the image of Hannibal as an eternal enemy and imparts the sense of fear generated by such an implacable foe. No-one would be able to relax while there was any possibility that Hannibal might return to Italy; the reference to the Roman mothers in line 614 recalls *Punica* 1.112, his childhood oath and a line in Horace: *parentibusque abominatus Hannibal* (Horace, *Epoche*, 16.8). This speech supports the notion that, unlike Polybius and Livy, Silius Italicus did not place Hannibal in a meeting with Scipio suing for peace before the battle. Africa might be won by Rome but Hannibal will continue warfare and rouse other foes against Rome; his name was synonymous with fear and his reputation long outlived the reign of Jupiter.<sup>411</sup>

### Saving Carthage again

Among the texts that depict Hannibal remaining in Africa after Zama there are conflicting traditions over the level of his participation in Carthaginian economic recovery during the years after Zama. The author of *de Caesaribus*, 37.3, wrote that Hannibal ordered his soldiers to plant olive trees which began the long-term recovery process.<sup>412</sup> Livy indicates that the agricultural recovery was relatively quick because, within two years, the Carthaginians ship substantial quantities of grain both to Rome and to Macedonia (for the Roman army Livy, 31.19.2). Although neither Livy nor Cornelius Nepos mention the planting of olive trees both authors present Hannibal solving the problem of maintaining the indemnity payments due to Rome and consequently saving Carthage from Roman punishment a second time. It is notable that they follow different traditions over how exactly Hannibal solves the crisis because these have consequences for Hannibal's continuing popularity or otherwise at Carthage.

<sup>411</sup> Vespasian restored the Roman republican forum; his joint triumph with Titus over the Jews concluded in the Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus (Josephus, *de bello Judaico*, 7.153.1). This restoration of Jupiter's role was shortlived in the era of imperial cult. During Domitian's time, the forum became dominated by at least three substantial Flavian features: a temple to the Flavian imperial cult adjacent to the Temple of Saturn; an equestrian statue of Domitian, and the arch of Titus.

<sup>412</sup> Sextus Aurelius Victor, *Liber de Caesaribus*, ed., Pichlmayr, Teubner, 1993. See also Lancel, 1998, 182: 'peace aided Carthaginian recovery while the Romans burdened themselves with further warfare.'

Livy's presentation of Hannibal in relation to the Carthaginian recovery is complex. Hannibal has the final direct speech in the third decad, but its context and content are quite different from his soliloquy in the *Punica*. Hannibal's final speech is addressed to the Carthaginian senate, responding to accusations that he was laughing at their economic distress over the payments due to Rome (Livy, 30.44.4-5). Hannibal expresses dismay at their economic condition but insists that there is no time for grief and, furthermore, he has a solution to offer. His controversial proposal is that because the public treasury was depleted, the Carthaginian senators should pay the indemnity from their private fortunes. He assured them of the one certainty, that if the required payments were not made, the Romans would return and give them a great deal more to shed tears over (Livy, 30.44.6-11).

The speech foreshadows Livy's depiction of a rift developing between Hannibal and certain Carthaginian senators that will deepen in the fourth decad. The theme is picked up again in Hannibal's first speech in that decad and serves as a literary link between the two decades.

Hannibal's speech follows an audit of the public treasury; Hannibal contentiously declared that if the treasury was repaid what was lost through mismanagement and corruption, then no further taxation of Carthaginian citizens would be necessary (Livy, 33.46-47.1). To deal with the corruption problem, Hannibal proposes (and carries) a law changing the rules around the term of office for judges intending to make them more accountable. The proposal naturally endears Hannibal to some but creates dangerous enemies amongst others. Lancel interprets the divisive nature of Hannibal's proposal as Livy presenting Hannibal aiming to be a demagogue along similar lines to the Gracchi.<sup>413</sup> In 1995 Lancel had argued that Livy had adapted this section on Carthaginian politics in response to Polybius' comparison of Roman and Carthaginian constitutions in *Histories* 6 where Polybius believed that the prevailing influence of the Carthaginian people over their Senate was symptomatic of political decline. It could also be said that by presenting Hannibal as a controversial political figure Livy created the basis and prepared his readers for the betrayal of Hannibal by his political enemies.

Cornelius Nepos' Hannibal was not, apparently, a controversial political figure at Carthage. According to the biographer, Hannibal set new taxes that proved sufficient not

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<sup>413</sup> Lancel, 1998, 181 says that Hannibal did not first consult the Council of Elders and suggests that the power exercised by the assembly could lead to senior magistrates taking on demagogic attitudes. For the constitution of Carthage, see also Picard, 1968, 210-5; Warmington, 1969, 119; Lancel, 1995a, 118-9.

only to meet the indemnity payments but even created a surplus for the treasury, with no suggestion of dissent:

Namque efficit ex novis vectigalibus non solum ut esset pecunia quae Romanis ex foedere penderetur, sed etiam superesset quae in aerario reponeretur.

Nepos, *Hann.* 7.5

For by means of new taxes he provided, not only that there should be money to pay the Romans according to the treaty, but also that there should be a surplus to be deposited in the treasury.

Rolfe, 1984, 271

Despite their differences over exactly how Hannibal solved the economic problem, both presentations by Cornelius Nepos and Livy depict Hannibal as the person responsible for solving the economic woes of Carthage and saving them from retributive punishment.<sup>414</sup> Indeed, Hoyos believes that Hannibal's services to Carthage during his time as *sufete* outweighed his achievements as a general and that it was Hannibal's political success that made him more enemies within Carthage.<sup>415</sup>

These representations of Hannibal saving Carthage economically bear a striking parallel to accounts of Hamilcar Barca saving Carthage from a similar situation after the Mercenaries war of 241-237 (Polybius, *Hist.* 2; Diodorus Siculus, 25.8). Indeed, Polybius' depiction of Hamilcar Barca led to an analysis by Hoyos which resembles that of Lancel on Livy's representation of Hannibal noted above, that Hamilcar Barca aimed to 'to make himself and his family virtual rulers of the city and its growing empire.'<sup>416</sup> The different solutions that Hannibal and Hamilcar applied (taxation vs. invading Spain) reflect the different circumstances of their times, but the outcome for Carthage was the same in each case, that reparations due to Rome were paid and the city was not destroyed. Nevertheless, the repetition in the portraits between father and son 'saving Carthage' economically is striking.

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<sup>414</sup> Hoyos, 2003, 194 suggests that Nepos either misunderstood Hannibal's anti-corruption measures or that the taxes were imposed on allies and subjects, not Carthaginians. He notes that the financial recovery continued beyond Hannibal's rule because, during Rome's war against Antiochus, the Carthaginians offered to help by paying the entire remaining 40 years' indemnity in one lump sum: Livy, 36.4.7-9.

<sup>415</sup> Hoyos, 2003, 200.

<sup>416</sup> Hoyos, 1999, 1 'The saviour of Carthage from its domestic foes, Hamilcar Barca...'; Hoyos, 1998, 142 notes the similar accusations made against the Gracchi.

## Hannibal the Scapegoat and Warmonger

The focus of Roman anger onto one man saves the rest from retributive punishment. There are varying traditions for the level of Carthaginian complaisance in the deflection of Roman anger away from themselves onto Hannibal; a similar theme reappears among the presentations of Rome's war against Antiochus. In some texts, the king is depicted being persuaded into war against Rome by warmongering advisors such as Hannibal, thus the king himself is not held solely responsible for embarking on war.

Hannibal is generally presented as perceiving that sooner or later the Romans would demand his person. This comprehension underpins the drama and secrecy around his escape stories, firstly from Carthage and later from the court of Antiochus.

Hannibal's economic and judicial reforms may have created a political rift between himself and others at Carthage, but it was an internal matter and not a reason for Roman anger toward Hannibal. External relations between Carthage and elsewhere, however, are a different issue. Consequently, when his Carthaginian political enemies are said to have informed their friends at Rome that Hannibal was in discussion with King Antiochus and planning an attack on Rome, it is Hannibal as an individual, not the Carthaginian senate, who stands accused of violating the peace conditions (Val. Max. 4.1.6b; Livy, 33.45.3).

Livy presents the accusations being dismissed initially as scurrilous gossip by the Roman Senate and gives Hannibal a somewhat surprising supporter in the figure of Scipio Africanus arguing that it was beneath the dignity of Rome to treat Hannibal as a criminal (Livy, 33.47.2). Valerius Maximus records a similar reaction by Scipio, but for the less plausible reason that it was inappropriate for Rome to interfere in the internal affairs of Carthage (Val. Max. 4.1.6b). Of course, any discussion with Antiochus would have constituted external, not internal, affairs. Scipio eventually agreed that envoys should be sent to Carthage.<sup>417</sup>

Livy marks a perceptible level of Roman moral decline in the fourth decad through his depiction of the Roman envoys as duplicitous and in connivance with Hannibal's enemies at Carthage. The envoys comply with advice to cover their true purpose with an announcement that they had come to settle a dispute between Carthage and Masinissa.

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<sup>417</sup> Hoyos, 2003, 201 suggests that it reflects Scipio's waning influence when the envoys are sent to Carthage.

Apparently Hannibal was the only person who did not believe the story (Livy, 33.47.2; also Justinus 31.1; 31.2).

Cornelius Nepos, who relates a similar story, offers no reason for the Roman envoys' visit to Carthage. Thus in his version, there is no suggestion that the envoys had a secret agenda; it is simply an assumption on the part of Hannibal that they would demand his surrender:

Deinde M. Claudio L. Furio consulibus, Roma legati Karthaginem  
venerunt. Hos Hannibal ratus sui exposcendi gratia missos, priusquam  
iis senatus daretur, navem ascendit clam atque in Syriam ad  
Antiochum perfugit.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 7.6

Then in the following year,<sup>418</sup> when Marcus Claudius and Lucius Furius were consuls, envoys came to Carthage from Rome. Hannibal thought that they had been sent to demand his surrender; therefore, before they were given audience by the senate, he secretly embarked on a ship and took refuge with King Antiochus on Syria.

Rolfe, 1984, 271

Hannibal's legendary ability to take care of himself and the necessary secrecy around an escape leads to another exciting episode in his life-story. Livy and Justinus describe how Hannibal managed to slip out of Carthage in disguise and, under cover of darkness, rode out to a coastal property he owned where a ship was waiting for him (Livy, 33.48.1; Justinus 31.2).

Hannibal receives celebrity treatment at Cercina and Tyre which show that his achievements had earned him great fame across the Mediterranean. The welcomes also imply that he did not travel incognito and that he was widely known. Furthermore, they may have been official welcomes as it was said that he was on a mission to Tyre (Livy, 33.48.2-49; Diodorus, 17.40; Diodorus Siculus, 28.10). Such a mission is plausible as traditionally Carthage was once a colony of Tyre and there are records elsewhere of Carthage sending embassies to Tyre.<sup>419</sup>

At Cercina, Hannibal cleverly prevented any vessels (Carthaginian or otherwise) departing before himself by organising a sacrifice and feast that required the loan of the sails and ropes from all the other ships in the harbour, except his own, to create a

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<sup>418</sup> 196.

<sup>419</sup> Carthaginian missions to Tyre: Quintus Curtius, 4.2.10; Diodorus 17.40, and Strabo 17.3.15 all refer to annual sacrifices made by Carthage at Tyre to Melqart (Hercules). Carthage was originally a colony of Tyre: Diodorus 17.40, Strabo 17.3.15, and Livy 33.49. Dido took sacred utensils of Hercules from Tyre

shelter. Hannibal sailed out in the pre-dawn light the next morning while everyone else slept (Livy, 33.48.6-8).

From Tyre, Hannibal travelled to Antioch where he was welcomed by Antiochus' son before travelling to Ephesus to join Antiochus:

Ephesi regem est consecutus, fluctuantem adhuc animo incertumque de Romano bello; sed haud parvum momentum ad animum eius moliendum adventus Hannibalis fecit.

Livy, 33.49.7

At Ephesus [Hannibal] overtook the king, still wavering in mind and undecided about the war with Rome; but the arrival of Hannibal was no small factor in making up his mind.

Adapted from Sage, 1961, 407.

Not all the stories are so positive about Hannibal's departure from Africa. A fragment from Sallust relates that the Pelorus promontory in Sicily was named after Hannibal's helmsman, who was buried there when Hannibal had him killed in the belief that Pelorus was betraying him (Sallust, *Hist.* 4.24; cf. Valerius Maximus, 9.8 ext. 1, who places the anecdote at the time of Hannibal's departure from Italy to Africa).<sup>420</sup>

Back at Carthage, according to Livy, the Roman envoys revealed their true purpose in demanding the surrender of Hannibal. They claimed to have proof that Hannibal was a warmonger and treaty-breaker since he had previously tried to incite Philip of Macedon into war against Rome<sup>421</sup> and intended to do the same with Antiochus (Livy, 33.49.6). The envoys required the Carthaginians to prove that they did not support Hannibal; the Carthaginians responded by agreeing to do whatever the Romans considered appropriate (Livy, 33.49.3-4). Livy does not detail what actions were taken, but Cornelius Nepos writes that the Carthaginians confiscated Hannibal's property, demolished his house and declared him an exile. They also sent two ships to arrest him (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 7.7).

Livy's representation of Hannibal's escape from Carthage has been noted for certain parallels with Thucydides' account of the flight and exile of the great Athenian general,

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(Justinus 4.15). Ships took offerings to the gods of Tyre from Carthage shortly before the fall of Carthage (Polybius, *Hist.* 31.12).

<sup>420</sup> McGushin, 1994, 43; 149 notes an emendation in Sallust's text by Mela.

<sup>421</sup> The Romans resumed their 'suspended' war against Philip because Philip had sent money and military aid to Hannibal in Africa (Livy, 31.1.8-10). For discussions on the wars with Philip and Antiochus, see Warrior, 1996; Briscoe, 1973; Gruen, 1984, and Walbank, 1940, 2002.

Themistocles (Thuc. 1.135-8).<sup>422</sup> However, the parallels between the two figures are very slight. Themistocles became politically alienated at Athens after the victory at Salamis; he left Athens and he was declared an exile with a price on his head; he escaped by ship to Asia, perhaps via Aegea where none but his host knew his identity; and, at the end of his life, he may have committed suicide by poison (Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 26-7, 31.5; Thucydides, 1.135-6). Briscoe's remark that Themistocles was greeted, not by the king but the king's son might be a misreading of Thucydides, 1.137.3, as Artaxerxes was the new king (discussed by Plutarch, *Themistocles*, 27.1).

On the other hand, as Briscoe points out, Themistocles' flight to Persia did not prove the charge of Medism made before he left.<sup>423</sup> For the same reason, the Roman case against Hannibal was fragile and the fact that he joined Antiochus later does not mean that Hannibal had been in negotiation with him beforehand. Briscoe's further observation that the parallels to Themistocles' story create a 'difficulty' in Livy's account stemming from Polybius (no longer extant) is left unexplained but reflects the concern of much early to mid-twentieth century scholarship with identifying Livy's sources where none are extant (and dismissing anything considered 'non-Polybian' as unreliable). It is, as Warrior says, an approach that distorts the interpretation of Livy,<sup>424</sup> and furthermore, in this instance, the attempt to create similarities between these two figures later years seems to depend on an assumption that Polybius would allude to his Greek predecessor.

Justinus writes that the charges against Hannibal were false but accepted by those Carthaginians who were afraid of Rome. Once Hannibal joined Antiochus, the king became a more dangerous enemy (Justinus, 31.1-2). Cornelius Nepos depicts Hannibal inspiring Antiochus for warfare against Rome (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 2.1). The Romans counter by sending envoys to Antiochus from time to time with instructions to request an audience with Hannibal in order to arouse Antiochus' suspicions against Hannibal (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 2; also Frontinus, *Strat.* 1.8.7; Livy, 35.14).

Perhaps these duplicitous embassies and courtly intrigues lie behind a remark by Diodorus that Antiochus became suspicious when Hannibal urged caution in fighting the Romans (Diodorus Siculus, 29.3). It is in reference to Antiochus' suspicion of Hannibal's motives when Livy inserts the anecdote of Hannibal's childhood oath into a

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<sup>422</sup> Briscoe, 1973, 335.

<sup>423</sup> Briscoe, 1973, 336-7.

<sup>424</sup> Warrior, 1996, 10.

direct speech by Hannibal to Antiochus. Hannibal successfully convinces Antiochus of his loyalty to the king and hatred of Rome, and the king decides on war (Livy, 35.19.1-7). Hannibal's speech reaffirms Livy's depiction of him as a warmonger against Rome and as a sworn enemy to Rome, and the role of Hannibal as an eternal enemy of Rome is presented as coming from Hannibal himself.

Justinus describes a scene which puts a different perspective on Hannibal's relationship with Antiochus; Hannibal's loyalty is unquestionable. He was brought to the king's council, not to reassure Antiochus of continuing loyalty or hatred of Rome, but to discuss the conduct of the war and to defend his earlier advice to invade Italy. Consequently there is no quaint story of a childhood oath but Hannibal gives his justifications for invading Italy. Hannibal concludes with the observation he had never been defeated in Italy, but it was his return to Africa that changed both the seat of war and his luck (Justinus, 31.5).

Livy later expresses doubt that Hannibal was solely responsible for inspiring Antiochus to war with Rome because Antiochus has other military advisors, in particular two Greek generals (Alexander and Thoas) pressuring the king into war against Rome. They each propose different strategies from Hannibal and both try in different ways to undermine his relationship with Antiochus. Perhaps Antiochus himself was wary of allowing Hannibal too much control.<sup>425</sup> The patterning of the expressions of their views conveys a sense of argument and courtly intrigue as conflicting influences on Antiochus. Hannibal's arguments in favour of invading Italy (Livy 34.60-1; 36.7-8) are wrapped either side of the arguments by the two Greek generals who favour fighting the war in Greece. The Acarnanian general, Alexander, advises that Hannibal be sent to Africa to create a diversion and split the Roman forces (Livy, 35.18). The Aetolian general, Thoas, tries to persuade the king not to give Hannibal a command but is not totally successful on this point as Antiochus retains Hannibal as an advisor (Livy, 35.42). Perhaps everyone, including Antiochus, had a right to be afraid of Hannibal.

The Aetolians succeeded in persuading Antiochus to invade Greece (Livy, 45.22.7). Whereas Florus puts some responsibility onto Hannibal, asserting that two people, the Greek general, Thoas, and Hannibal were responsible for inciting Antiochus to war (Florus, 24.8.5). Hannibal, according to Livy, understood something of the Roman system of recruitment and hence believes that the only way to victory over Rome is to

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<sup>425</sup> Lancel, 1998, 195.

prevent the Romans from recruiting men within Italy. His advice continued to be that Antiochus should invade Italy and plan on using Italian supplies and recruits (Livy, 34.60.2). Cornelius Nepos remarks that if Antiochus had followed Hannibal's advice the battle for power in the Mediterranean may well have been fought nearer the Tiber than Thermopylae (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 8.3).

Livy's unfolding narrative shows how Hannibal's advice was not followed. By the time that Hannibal convinced Antiochus to adopt his strategy it was too late, the necessary support from Carthage has dissipated (if it had even existed). Three years is a long time in politics, ancient and modern. When Hannibal's agent, Aristo, contacts the Carthaginians on his behalf, they report the matter to Rome; Aristo himself manages to escape (Livy, 34.61.1; cf. Justinian, 31.4.1; Appian, *Syriaca*, 7.29). Whether or not the convoluted story has any historical foundation,<sup>426</sup> it specifically associates Hannibal with the suggestion of an invasion of Italy, with all the memories that invokes for Livy's readership. It is an association that Livy repeats again, two books later.

Livy gives Hannibal a substantial speech in which he supports the Acarnanian general, Alexander, urging Antiochus to make a treaty with Philip of Macedon, and not to rely on the Boeotians and Thessalians for support. Hannibal's view of the overall strategy is unchanged, repeating his earlier argument that Antiochus should invade Italy, with the added note that nothing would frighten the Romans more than the thought that Hannibal was in Italy: *et, qui maximus iis terror est, Hannibalem in Italia esse audirent* (Livy, 36.7). Hannibal's point about the psychological effect on Rome of invading Italy is good but, once again, his advice is not taken (Livy, 36.8.1).<sup>427</sup>

The next time Livy depicts Hannibal advising Antiochus the circumstances have changed. Antiochus had been defeated by the Romans<sup>428</sup> and was back in Ephesus. Hannibal is presented as the only one of the king's advisors warning him to prepare for a Roman invasion of Asia. Indeed, Hannibal declares that he was more surprised that the Roman legions had not landed yet:

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<sup>426</sup> It is questionable whether Greek generals would seriously urge warfare in their own lands in preference to drawing the Roman legions out to fight elsewhere.

<sup>427</sup> Philip had been defeated; his son, Demetrius, was held hostage at Rome. Eventually Philip is rewarded for his loyalty with his son's release and a promised refund on the indemnity (*Hist.* 21.1). The political divisions in Greece, as predicted by Hannibal, divert Antiochus' attention from the main goal, Rome. There is another distraction that signals defeat for Antiochus: his new marriage (*Hist.* 20.8; Livy, 36.15).

<sup>428</sup> Antiochus had two significant defeats, at Thermopylae, 191, and Magnesia, 190. For discussion of the history, see Errington, 1989, *CAH* 8, 272-82.

Hannibal unus, cuius eo tempore vel maxima apud regem auctoritas erat, magis mirari se aiebat, quod non iam in Asia essent Romani, quam venturos dubitare; propius esse ex Graecia in Asiam quam ex Italia in Graeciam traicere, et multo maiorem causam Antiochum quam Aetolos esse; neque enim mari minus quam terra pollere Romana arma.

Livy, 36.41.2

Hannibal alone, whose influence with the king was at the time perhaps at its greatest, said that he was more surprised that the Romans were not already in Asia than doubtful that they would come; it was a shorter crossing from Greece to Asia than from Italy to Greece, and Antiochus was a far more powerful motive than the Aetolians; nor were Roman arms less powerful on sea than land.

Sage, 1958, 273.

Livy then echoes Polybius' comments about the outcome of Zama through Hannibal insisting to Antiochus that the Romans were aiming for world domination. Hannibal predicts to the king that the Romans would invade Asia and Antiochus would have to fight for survival, not simply victory or defeat (cf. Livy 30.32.2; Polybius *Hist.* 15.9.2; 15.15.1). It is a good example of Livy using a speech to announce an unpalatable truism, and allow his audience to reject it, given that the voice is that of an enemy. The content echoes a similar assessment of Roman behaviour and intentions in a letter said to be from Mithridates to Arsaces given in Sallust (Sallust, *Hist.* 4.67.5-23).<sup>429</sup> Sallust therefore uses a slightly different literary technique to impart a similar message. In this case, it is Mithridates warning Arsaces that the Romans have an inveterate desire for riches and dominions, and that they will, undoubtedly, invade and overthrow the king.

Livy returns his focus to Rome. The consul Lucius Scipio was assigned Greece as his province; his brother, Scipio Africanus, would accompany him:

Haec vox magno adsensu audita sustulit certamen; experiri libebat, utrum plus regi Antiocho in Hannibale victo an in victore Africano consuli legionibusque Romanis auxilii foret; ac prope omnes Scipioni Graeciam, Laelio Italiam decreverunt.

Livy, 37.1.10

These words, listened to with full approbation, ended the contest; they wanted to ascertain whether King Antiochus would find more powerful assistance in the defeated Hannibal or the Roman consul and legions in his conqueror Africanus; and almost unanimously they decreed Greece to Scipio, Italy to Laelius.

Sage, 1958, 293.

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<sup>429</sup> See McGushin, 1994, 180 for discussion on Sallust.

As it happened, Hannibal did not face Scipio in another land battle but was defeated at sea by the Rhodians (Livy, 37.24; Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 8.4). In the aftermath of Antiochus' defeat both Livy and Polybius depict Scipio Africanus (not the consul, his brother, Lucius Scipio) as the spokesman for the Romans. Whether or not it is historical, Scipio Africanus demands the surrender of Hannibal, as well as Antiochus' other commanders (*Hist.* 21.17). Polybius repeats the demand for Hannibal's person in a final summary of the peace conditions, although it is modified with the proviso 'if it is within Antiochus' power to do so' (*Hist.* 21.45). Livy, on the other hand, writes that the requirement to surrender Hannibal and the other generals was appended as an additional clause to the treaty (Livy, 38.38.18). If Livy's text suggests a perception that it was unworthy of Roman honour to place such a demand into a peace agreement; there are no such qualms in Scipio's speech. Scipio particularly demands the surrender of Hannibal more than everything else because 'wherever Hannibal is there can never be peace with Rome': *sed numquam satis liquebit nobis ibi pacem esse populo Romano, ubi Hannibal erit; eum ante omnia deposcimus* (Livy 37.45.16).

True to form, Hannibal escaped from Antiochus' court to Crete before he could be surrendered to the Romans (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 9.1). Cornelius Nepos and Justinus say that Hannibal stayed in Crete before travelling to Prusias of Bithynia and both texts relate a similar story of Hannibal deceiving the Cretans into believing they were guarding his wealth while he smuggled it out of the island hidden in hollow statues (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 9.2-3; Justinus, 32.4). Strabo and, later, Plutarch relate that Hannibal travelled to Artaxias of Armenia (previously one of Antiochus' generals) and spent enough time there to found a city, Artaxata, on the king's behalf (Strabo, *Geography*, 11.14; Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 31.3).

Where Livy's narrative implies that Hannibal went directly to Prusias, it is more likely that Livy chose not to follow Hannibal's fortunes further until his next contact with Rome, which is when Rome sends ambassadors to Prusias (Livy, 39.51). Cornelius Nepos presents Hannibal persuading Prusias to embark on war, in particular against Eumenes of Pergamum, an ally of Rome (Prusias did not have the resources for any larger scale operations against Rome, Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 10.1). Whether Hannibal incited Prusias to war or not, he shows himself to be as devious and as imaginative as ever in battle tactics. On behalf of Prusias, Hannibal is about to commence a sea battle against Eumenes and needs to identify Eumenes' ship in order to focus his attack. He sends a herald with a letter and waits to see which ship received the emissary.

Somewhat less credible is the detail that the herald was allowed to leave before the letter, which contained nothing but insults, was opened. Naturally Eumenes did not understand the purpose of the herald's visit; his soldiers laugh at Hannibal's new weapon when earthenware pots were catapulted into their ships. They stop laughing when the pots smashed open on the decks, releasing snakes. Eumenes managed to escape and Prusias gained a memorable, if short-lived, victory (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 10.3-11.7; cf. Justinus, 32.4; Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.7.11). According to Frontinus, Hannibal first devised this idea while he was with Antiochus and it follows a passage about Scipio catapulting pots of pitch and resin to set fire among the enemy ships (Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.7.9-10).

These representations of Hannibal supporting Eastern kings depict him keeping to his oath of enmity insofar as he continues to fight on the side in opposition to Rome, and is generally presented actively fomenting war. Perhaps the most unexpected representation of Hannibal is through his reported speech to Antiochus in Livy's text. It is prophetic as Hannibal warns Antiochus not only to prepare for a Roman invasion of Asia but to expect defeat. Furthermore, Livy's paraphrase of a letter Antiochus purportedly sent to Prusias forewarning Prusias of Roman aggression is in a similar vein. The growing perception of Roman belligerence coupled with Scipio's demands for Hannibal to be handed over as a prisoner are points in a theme by which Livy indicates a gradual degradation in Roman morality. It reappears in the presentations of circumstances around Hannibal's death.

## Final act of independent defiance

The documented events from Hannibal's life suggest that he lived a remarkably long time for an individual in antiquity, although the suggestion that he reached 70 years of age may be an exaggeration (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 13.1).<sup>430</sup> There are a number of extant traditions over how and when he died and the publication of his death notice is a good example for the manipulation of the traditions, in that 'death notices' in ancient

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<sup>430</sup> Rolfe, 1984, 280, n2 calculates that in 183BC Hannibal was 63 years old. Hannibal's long life shows that it is not length of life that gains a person mythic status but his achievements within that life. Thus Alexander's short life was not the reason for his immortality. Cf. Spencer, 2002, 162: 'Alexander died young, sealing his mythic status... guaranteeing his immortality.'

texts serve a variety of purposes.<sup>431</sup> Suicide by taking poison in the face of imminent capture is generally presented in texts that promote him as an eternal enemy.

The section of the *Histories* covering the death of Hannibal is no longer extant, but Cornelius Nepos and Livy both refer to the death notice given by Polybius (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 13.1; Livy, 39.50.10). Livy rarely criticises his sources, thus his criticism of ‘Greek and Latin historians’ for locating Hannibal’s death in the same year as Scipio Africanus and Philopoemen is notable and an illustration of the need to treat Polybius’ text generally with some caution. Livy implies that Polybius manipulated the date with the express purpose of glorifying Hannibal by placing his death in the same year as the two other ‘great’ men.<sup>432</sup> Livy rejects the Polybian date on the basis that Polybius is in error over the death of Africanus which Livy places at the time when Africanus’ name disappears from the *lustrum*.

Livy notes that there were certain similarities between them as none of the three died in glorious circumstances in comparison to their lives. All three were exiles as Scipio was in disgrace for not appearing in court when summoned; Hannibal and Philopoemen died by poison (Livy, 39.52.9). On the other hand, when it comes to manipulation, Livy not only closes the year 183 but also the fourth decad with a final report on Hannibal’s death:

Hannibalem hoc anno Antias Valerius decessisse est auctor legatis ad eam rem ad Prusiam missis praeter T. Quinctium Flamininum, cuius in ea re celebre est nomen, L. Scipione Asiatico et P. Scipione Nasica.

Livy, 39.56.7

Valerias Antias says that Hannibal died this year, ambassadors having been sent to Prusias for this purpose, namely Lucius Scipio Asiaticus and Publius Scipio Nasica, in addition to Titus Quinctius Flamininus, whose name is best known in this connection.

Sage, 1936, 399.

Livy’s death notice serves an important literary function as the ‘Hannibal’ and ‘Scipio’ names appear at the opening and closing points across two decades.

Cornelius Nepos conveniently summarises the various dates that he discovers for Hannibal’s death and names the three authors he consulted, including Polybius:

<sup>431</sup> See Pomeroy, 1986, 1988, 1989b and c.

<sup>432</sup> Editors of the *Histories* place character portraits of Philopoemen, Hannibal and Scipio adjacent to each other (*Hist.* 23.12; 13; 14). Pomeroy, A, 1989 and 1986, 415 accepts Polybius’ version of all three ‘good’ men passing in the same year.

Sic vir fortissimus, multis variisque perfunctus laboribus, anno adquievit septuagesimo. Quibus consulibus interierit non convenit. Namque Atticus M. Claudio Marcello Q. Fabio Labeone consulibus mortuum in Annali suo scriptum reliquit, at Polybius L. Aemilio Paulo Cn. Baebio Tamphilo, Sulpicius autem Blitho P. Cornelio Cethego M. Baebio Tamphilo.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 13.1.

Thus that bravest of men, after having performed many and varied labours, entered into rest in his seventieth year. Under what consuls he died is disputed. For Atticus has recorded in his *Annals* that he died in the consulate of Marcus Claudius Marcellus and Quintus Fabius Labeo (183); Polybius under Lucius Aemilius Paulus and Gnaeus Baebius Tamphilus (182); and Sulpicius Blitho, in the time of Publius Cornelius Cethegus and Marcus Baebius Tamphilus (181).

Rolfe, 1984, 281

Although Cornelius Nepos leaves the final decision to his reader, his summary indicates another influence on Polybius' decision-making that is not apparent from Livy's remarks. Polybius not only has Scipio Africanus, Hannibal and Philopoemen die in the same year, but, according to Nepos, places them in the consulship of Lucius Aemilius Paulus, the natural father of Scipio Aemilianus.<sup>433</sup> If Polybius manipulated the material to record these deaths not only within the same Olympiad (four years) but also within a particular consulship, the same question arises over the tradition preferred by Atticus, also cited by Nepos, who placed Hannibal's death in the consulship of Marcus Claudius Marcellus. Marcus Claudius Marcellus was a common consular name, of course, but also happens to be the namesake of the first Roman general to inflict a significant defeat on Hannibal.

A number of texts say that Flamininus travelled to Bithynia in order to collect Hannibal from Prusias (Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 12.1-2; Livy, 39.51.1; Justinus, 32.4). Livy modifies it slightly by referring to Flamininus having other business with Prusias, but the only business mentioned is the surrender of Hannibal arising from the suspicion that Prusias was harbouring an enemy of Rome.

Plutarch, on the other hand, writes that Flamininus happened to see Hannibal at Prusias' court while there on other business and decided to capture him (Plutarch, *Flamininus*, 20.3). The representations of Flamininus' determination to capture Hannibal are not to his glorification but make him the subject of criticism. Livy

describes Flamininus language as menacing and presents Hannibal describing himself as a guest of Prusias (Livy, 39.51.12). Plutarch, too, describes Prusias attempting to intercede on behalf of Hannibal as a friend (Plutarch, *Flamininus*, 20.3).

Livy's description of Hannibal living in a house under guard suggests that he was a prisoner or that Prusias may have planned on killing him in order to show support for Rome. Hannibal is given some 'last words' in direct speech before taking poison:

'Liberemus,' inquit 'diurna cura populum Romanum, quando mortem senis exspectare longum censem. Nec magnam nec memorabilem ex inermi prodiisque Flamininus victoram feret. Mores quidem populi Romani quantum mutaverint, vel hic dies argumento erit. Horum patres Pyrrho regi, hosti armato, exercitum in Italia habenti, ut a veneno caveret praedixerunt: hi legatum consularem, qui auctor esset Prusiae per scelus occidendi hospitis, miserunt.' Exsecratus deinde in caput regnumque Prusiae et hospitales deos violatae ab eo fidei testes invocans, poculum exhaustus. Hic vitae exitus fuit Hannibalis.

Livy, 39.51.11-12

'Let us,' he said, 'relieve the Roman people of their long anxiety, since they find it tedious to wait for the death of an old man. Neither magnificent nor memorable will be the victory which Flamininus will win over a man unarmed and betrayed. How much the manners of the Roman people have changed, this day in truth will prove. Their fathers sent word to King Pyrrhus, an enemy in arms, commanding an army in Italy, warning him to beware of poison: these Romans have sent an ambassador of consular rank to urge upon Prusias the crime of murdering his guest.' Then, cursing the person and kingdom of Prusias and calling upon the gods of hospitality to bear witness to his breach of faith, he drained the cup. This was the end of the life of Hannibal.

Sage, 1983, 379-383.

Given that the speech is unlikely to be historical, Livy uses Hannibal's voice to express some harsh judgements on the Romans, especially Flamininus, as well as Prusias. It is an observation by Livy on the degradation of Roman morals over the space of Hannibal's lifetime. In his view, Flamininus has gained nothing more than an inglorious win over an ageing, unarmed and betrayed man; it is no great victory.

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<sup>433</sup> Polybius, not only as noted by Nepos but is also apparent from reading the *Histories*, frequently names the consuls for a given year as he traces their activities. The Olympiads generally ran from July, and the Roman consular year from March.

Cornelius Nepos similarly depicts Flamininus and Prusias as dishonourable in their behaviour. The king asks that the custom of hospitality be respected but does nothing to prevent the Romans searching for Hannibal (Nepos, *Hann.* 12.4).<sup>434</sup>

There are various methods of committing suicide. Hannibal's decision to use poison was considered discreditable for a soldier:

quid referam Cannas admotaque moenibus arma  
Varronemque fuga magnum Fabiumque morando  
postque tuos, Trasimenne, lacus, cum vincere posset,  
accepisse iugum victae Carthaginis arces,  
seque ratum Hannibalem nostris cecidisse catenis  
exitium generis furtiva morte luisse?

M. Manilius, *Astronomica*, 4.37-42

What need have I to tell of Cannae and enemy arms brought to the city walls, of the heroism of Varro's flight and Fabius' delays? What need to tell how after the battle at your lake, Trasimene, when victory lay in her grasp, the towers of humbled Carthage bowed to the yoke and Hannibal, judging he had fallen into our clutches, expiated in an inglorious death the destruction of his race?

Goold, 1977, 225.

On the other hand, whatever method is used, from Hannibal's point of view, suicide is better than being captured and paraded at Rome. This interpretation underlies the reference in Cornelius Nepos' biography, that it was time for Hannibal to stop thinking about preserving his life:

Puer cum celeriter quid esset renuntiasset omnisque exitus occupatos  
ostendisset, sensit id non fortuito factum, sed se peti neque sibi diutius  
vitam esse retinendam. Quam ne alieno arbitrio dimitteret, memor  
pristinarum virtutum venenum quod semper secum habere consuerat  
sumpsit.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 12.5

The slave having quickly reported the facts and told him that all the exits were guarded, Hannibal knew that it was no accident; that it was he whom they were after and he must no longer think of preserving his life. But not wishing to lose it at another's will, and remembering his past deeds of valour, he took the poison which he always carried about his person.

Rolfe, 1984, 281.

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<sup>434</sup> Briscoe, 1973, 23; 236 considers the episode highly discreditable to Flamininus for forcing Prusias to surrender Hannibal.

Hannibal's suicide becomes an independent act of defiance, chosen by him in preference to death at the hands of some other person. Hannibal is thus depicted taking the most honourable option available to him under the circumstances.

Silius Italicus takes a different approach. He summarises Hannibal's later life in the form of a prediction by the Sibyl to Scipio at the conclusion of Scipio's visit to the underworld. It is a shameful and ignominious end:

‘ne metue,’ exclamat vates, ‘non vita sequetur  
invoilata virum: patria non ossa quiescent.  
namque ubi fractus opum magnae certamine pugnae  
pertulerit vinci turpemque orare salutem,  
rursus bella volet Macetum instaurare sub armis.  
damnatusque doli, desertis coniuge fida  
et dulci nato, linquet Carthaginis arces  
atque una profugus lustrabit caerula puppe,  
hinc Cilicis Tauri saxosa cacumina viset.  
pro! quanto levius mortalibus aegra subire  
servitia atque hiemes aestusque fugamque fretumque  
atque famem, quam posse mori! post Itala bella  
Assyrio famulus regi falsusque cupiti  
Ausoniae motus, dubio petet aequora velo,  
donec, Prusiacas delatus segniter oras,  
altera servitia imbelli patietur in aevo  
et latebram munus regni. perstantibus inde  
Aeneadis reddique sibi poscentibus hostem,  
pocula furtivo rapiet properata veneno  
ac tandem terras longa formidine solvet.’

*Pun.* 13.874-893

‘Fear not,’ cried the priestess: ‘no life of untroubled prosperity shall be his; his bones shall not rest in his native land. For all his strength will be broken in a great battle; he will suffer defeat and stoop to beg for his life; and then he will try to wage a fresh war with the armies of Macedon. Condemned as a traitor, he will leave his faithful wife and darling son behind him, abandon Carthage, and flee across the sea with a single ship. Next he will visit the rocky heights of Mount Taurus in Cilicia. Ah, how much easier men find it to bear cold and heat and hunger, bitter slavery and exile, and the perils of the sea, rather than face death! After the war in Italy he will serve a Syrian king, and, cheated of his hope to make war against Rome, he will put to sea with no certain destination, and at last drift idly to the land of Prusias, where, too old to fight any more, he will suffer a second slavery and find a hiding-place by the king’s favour. At last, when Rome persists in demanding the surrender of her foe, in hasty stealth he will swallow a draught of poison, and free the world at last from a long enduring dread.’

Duff, 1989, 269; 271.

The Sibyl predicts that Hannibal will be condemned before leaving Carthage; he will die in exile, away from his homeland and his family. There will be no state funeral or any rites in accord with Carthaginian custom for Hannibal. Within the *Punica*, the imagery contrasts with Scipio's glorious triumph at the close of the poem which culminates with confirmation of Scipio's divine origins and title of *pater patriae* (*Pun.* 17.625-54). The Sibyl is quiet on the parallel to Scipio's own death in voluntary exile (Livy, 39.52.6; cf. *Hist.* 23.14).

Silius' reinterpretation of Hannibal's role with Prusias as nothing more than a slave is also found in Juvenal *Satire* 10.161-2. Silius and Juvenal reflect what might be the contemporary attitude to Hannibal, that despite his glorious victories and the serious threat he had once posed to Rome, he had come to nothing. The end of Hannibal's life is, as presented by Juvenal, an anti-climax.

Representations of Hannibal committing suicide by poison are appropriate. Suicide is, after all, the only independent option for an eternal enemy, and poison is a suitably ignominious method. But they are probably literary constructs. Pausanias related a different, rather more mundane, version of events. The geographer wrote that Hannibal was being pursued by Flamininus and was turned away by Prusias when he approached the king as a suppliant. As Hannibal left the king, he cut a finger on his sword and died of a fever a few days later at a place called Libyssa (Pausanias, 8.11.11). The item was of interest to Pausanias because an apocryphal story of an oracle from Ammon said that when Hannibal died he would be buried in Libyan earth. Hannibal, like so many recipients of oracles, misunderstood the prophecy, erroneously believing that it meant he would destroy the Roman empire and return to his home in Libya to die of old age.

The location of Libyssa as the site where Hannibal died, whether or not by suicide, was accepted by others. Cassius Dio wrote that a tumulus by the river Libyssa was decorated with white marble by Septimius Severus<sup>435</sup> in the belief that it belonged to Hannibal, a fellow North African (Cassius Dio, 64; Zonaras 9, 21).

In today's world, there is a memorial 'Hannibal garden' at Gebze (Libyssa in modern Turkey) containing a white rock inscribed with Hannibal's features and the words 'by the order of Ataturk, in honour of Hannibal.'<sup>436</sup>

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<sup>435</sup> Birley, 1999, 142 for discussion of Cassius Dio as a possible witness to the dedication by Septimius.

<sup>436</sup> Chaabane, 2004, 20.

## Epitaphs and literary portraits

There are four negative aspects to Hannibal's character which feature in a series of four literary portraits by Polybius: Greed, cruelty, lack of *fides* and impiety (*Hist.* 9.22.1-10; 9.24.1-26.11; 10.33.1-8; 11.19.1-7). Polybius acknowledges that these traits are often standard accusations, and, in respect of Hannibal, Polybius offers explanations and extenuating circumstances to counter each one, except for the charge of impiety (*Hist.* 9.24.1; 9.25-26.11). These explanations include the influence of Hannibal's diverse friends, his lack of reliable manpower resources forcing him to break treaties with Italian towns that he cannot garrison, and one of his officers by the same name (Hannibal Monomachus) was said to have been largely responsible for the acts of cruelty in Italy. The summary of this particular characterisation closes with the remark that the accusations of monetary greed came primarily from Hannibal's Carthaginian enemies, while the accusations of cruelty came primarily from the Romans (*Hist.* 9.26.11).

There are no such accusations about Hannibal in Cornelius Nepos' biography. Nepos introduces and presents Hannibal as an eternal enemy of Rome, living by his childhood oath; in this guise Hannibal continues to command the Carthaginian army even after the Carthaginians have made peace with Rome (Nepos, *Hann.* 1.1; 7.1). When the Romans objected to his activities, Hannibal was recalled from the army and made a political leader at Carthage (a 'king,' *rex factus est*).<sup>437</sup> Hannibal is depicted as a 'good king' as he ensured, through taxation, that the indemnity was paid to Rome and the Carthaginian treasury left with a surplus (Nepos, *Hann.* 7.5). When Hannibal's term of office ended, he suspected that certain envoys coming from Rome intended to demand his person, and made his escape. Hannibal is proved correct, because in his absence, he is declared an exile (Nepos, *Hann.* 7.7). Nepos leaves condemnation of the consul Flamininus to his reader but the depiction of a consul, the highest possible office at Rome, hastening after an old man, coupled with the imagery of a frightened Prusias is unmistakeably negative for the Roman (Nepos, *Hann.* 12.1-5).

Livy's opening literary portrait of Hannibal, too, is overwhelmingly positive. The negative characteristics are given in a few lines at the close; they are strongly worded but somewhat different from ones given by Polybius:

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<sup>437</sup> McGushin, 1985, 42, reads 'rex' as Nepos simplifying the term for his audience.

Missus Hannibal in Hispaniam primo statim adventu omnem exercitum in se convertit; Hamilcarem iuvenem redditum sibi veteres milites credere; eundem vigorem in voltu vimque in oculis, habitum oris lineamentaque intueri. Dein brevi effecit ut pater in se minimum momentum ad favorem conciliandum esset; nunquam ingenium idem ad res diversissimas, parendum atque imperandum, habilius fuit. Itaque haud facile discerneres utrum imperatori an exercitui carior esset; neque Hasdrubal alium quemquam praeficere malle, ubi quid fortiter ac strenue agendum esset, neque milites alio duce plus confidere aut audere. Plurimum audaciae ad pericula capessenda, plurimum consilii inter ipsa pericula erat; nullo labore aut corpus fatigari aut animus vinci poterat; caloris ac frigoris patientia par; cibi potionisque desiderio naturali, non voluptate modus finitus; vigiliarum somnique nec die nec nocte discriminata tempora; id quod gerendis rebus superesset quieti datum; ea neque molli strato neque silentio accersita; multi saepe militari sagulo opertum humi iacentem inter custodias stationesque militum conspicerunt. Vestitus nihil inter aequales excellens; arma atque equi conspiciebantur. Equitum peditumque idem longe primus erat; princeps in proelium ibat, ultimus conserto proelio excedebat. Has tantas viri virtutes ingentia vitia aequabant, inhumana crudelitas, perfidia plus quam Punica, nihil veri, nihil sancti, nullus deum metus nullum ius iurandum, nulla religio. Cum hac indole virtutum atque vitiorum triennio sub Hasdrubale imperatore meruit nulla re quae agenda videndaque magno futuro duci esset praetermissa.

Livy, 21.4.2-10

Hannibal was sent to Spain, where he was no sooner come that he won the favour of the entire army. The old soldiers thought that Hamilcar was restored to them as he had been in his youth; they beheld the same lively expression and piercing eye, the same cast of countenance and features. But he soon brought it to pass that his likeness to his father was the least consideration in gaining him support. Never was the same nature more adaptable to things the most diverse – obedience and command. And so one could not readily have told whether he was dearer to the general or the army. When any bold or difficult deed was to be done, there was no-one whom Hasdrubal liked better to entrust with it, nor did any other leader inspire his men with greater confidence or daring. To reckless courage in incurring dangers he united the greatest judgement when in the midst of them. No toil could exhaust his body or overcome his spirit. Of heat and cold he was equally tolerant. His consumption of meat and drink was determined by natural desire, not by pleasure. His times of waking and sleeping were not marked off by day or night: what time remained when his work was done he gave to sleep, which he did not court with a soft bed or stillness, but was seen repeatedly by many lying on the ground wrapped in a common soldier's cloak amongst the sentinels and outguards. His dress was in no way superior to that of his fellows, but his arms and horses were conspicuous. Both of horsemen and foot soldiers he was undoubtedly the first – foremost to enter battle, and

last to leave it when the fighting had begun. These admirable qualities of the man were equalled by his monstrous vices: his cruelty was inhuman, his perfidy worse than Punic; he had no regard for truth, and none for sanctity, no fear of the gods, no reverence for an oath, no religious scruple. With this endowment of good and evil traits he served for the space of three years under Hasdrubal, omitting nothing that should be done or seen by one who was to become a great commander.

Foster, 1949, 9-13.

Livy says nothing of greed, the claim against Hannibal which Polybius attributed to the Carthaginians, although the charge of cruelty remains. The main focus, however, is on Hannibal's lack of religion and moral scruple which concurs with the overall moral theme to Livy's text.<sup>438</sup> Yet, as has been shown in this thesis, Hannibal's lack of religion is not entirely sustained either within Livy's narrative<sup>439</sup> or by other texts. In support of Hannibal's respect for Juno, Livy notes that neither Pyrrhus nor Hannibal desecrated the temple of Juno Lacinia when, in 173, there was an outcry over Fulvius Flaccus having the roof tiles removed in order to use them for a new temple to *Fortuna Equestris* that he was constructing (Livy, 42.3.1-3). Pliny, when discussing the age of certain famous temples, dated the Temple of Diana at Saguntum to the town's foundation and claimed that the original beams of juniper were still in existence in his day because Hannibal, from motives of religion, spared the temple when he took the town: *pepercit religion inductus Hannibal* (Pliny, 16.79.216).

Silius Italicus' introductory portraits of Hannibal in *Punica* 1 illustrate the complex relationship between his text and the earlier traditions noted throughout this thesis. Silius Italicus echoes the structure of Livy in the sense of inserting his literary portraits into the start of his text, but also tends toward the Polybian structure by giving multiple portraits. The content of the first portrait echoes both Polybius and Livy in terms of Hannibal's lack of *fides* and lack of respect for the gods:

Ingenio motus avidus fideique sinister  
is fuit, expsuperans astu, sed devius aequi.  
armato nullus divum pudor; improba virtus  
et pacis despectus honos; penitusque medullis  
sanguinis humani flagrat sitis.

*Pun.* 1.56-60

<sup>438</sup> Note that Livy's narrative depicts Hannibal performing sacrifices and dedicating monuments, e.g. Livy, 28.46.15-16. See Jaeger, 2006, 389.

<sup>439</sup> e.g. Hannibal's oath, Livy, 21.1.4; Hannibal erects the altar to Juno, Livy, 28.46; cf. Livy, 26.11.8; 30.20.6-7 where Hannibal desecrates temples following his failure to take Rome and his recall from Italy.

By nature he was eager for action and faithless to his plighted word, a past master in cunning but a strayer from justice. Once armed, he had no respect for Heaven; he was brave for evil and despised the glory of peace; and a thirst for human blood burned in his inmost heart.

Adapted from Duff, 1996, 7-9.

The allusion to Hannibal's thirst for human blood may well refer to the battlefield, but, in one portrait, Polybius records that Hannibal Monomachus suggested to Hannibal that the men may have learned to eat human flesh in order to sustain themselves in enemy territory. Polybius does not believe Hannibal resorted to such action, and suggests that the violence attributed to the Carthaginians in Italy was at the hands of this other Hannibal (*Hist. 9.24.6*).

Silius Italicus presents a second character portrait of Hannibal on his accession to power in Spain. It echoes Livy in terms of Hannibal's physical similarities to his father, Hasdrubal:

hinc studia accendit patriae virtutis imago,  
hinc fama in populous iurati didita belli,  
hinc virides ausis anni fervorque decorus  
atque armata dolis mens et vis insita fandi.

*Pun. 1.185-8*

The reflection in him of his father's valour; the report, broadcast among nations, that he was the sworn enemy of Rome; his youth eager for action and the fiery spirit that well became him; his heart equipped with guile, and his native eloquence.

Duff, 1996, 18-9.

This image is not as strongly negative as Livy's portrait because Hannibal's guile is not directly linked to the breach of *fides*. It is, perhaps, closer to the images given by Cornelius Nepos and Polybius; the reference in line 186 to Hannibal being well known abroad as a sworn enemy of Rome seems comparable to Polybius' anecdotal introduction of Hannibal's conversation with Antiochus.<sup>440</sup> Silius follows this passage with a geographic digression on Africa, before inserting another short portrait of Hannibal:

primus sumpsisse labore,  
primus iter carpsisse pedes partemque subire,  
si valli festinet opus. nec cetera signis,  
quaecumque ad laudem stimulant; somnumque  
negabat  
naturae noctemque vigil ducebat in armis,

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<sup>440</sup> Polybius introduces Hannibal as an eternal enemy by means of reporting the conversation with Antiochus (*Hist. 3.12.1*).

interdum projectus humi turbaeque Libyssae  
insignis sagulo duris certare maniplis;  
celsus et in magno praecedens agmine ductor  
imperium präferre suum; tum vertice nudo  
excipere insanos imbres caelique ruinam.

*Pun.* 1.242-251.

He was ever the first to undertake hardship, first to march on foot, and first to bear a hand when the rampart was reared in haste. In all other things that spur a man onto glory he was untiring: denying sleep to nature, he would pass the whole night armed, and awake, lying sometimes upon the ground; distinguished by the general's cloak, he vied with the hardy soldiers of the Libyan army; or mounted high he rode as leader of the long line; again he endured bare-headed fury of the rains and the crashing of the sky.

Duff, 1996, 23.

Here Silius Italicus depicts Hannibal as a commander continuing his soldier's habit of sleeping on the ground from time to time wrapped in a cloak. The difference being that Hannibal now wraps himself in a general's cloak, not the soldier's cloak he used to wear under Hasdrubal's command (Livy, 21.4.8; also Frontinus, *Strat.* 4.3.7-8). The nuanced differences, such as this one, between Silius Italicus and Livy, have been interpreted both negatively, as a poor versification of Livy and positively, 'Silius shows great ingenuity in his adaptations of the historical material.'<sup>441</sup>

Virgil's Jupiter tells Venus that Rome will be granted eternal power (Virgil, *Aeneid*, 1.79) and this can be related to the requirement for an eternal enemy. Plutarch describes a philosophical thought in which there is a need for balance between dark and light, positive and negative forces. His example is the Egyptian god Osiris who embodied the nature of light, while Typhon, eternal enemy of Osiris, embodied the nature of darkness. The analogy may be applied to Rome and Hannibal, thus where Rome was granted eternal power, an eternal enemy was required to provide balance. Plutarch explains the concept in terms that one cannot have friends without enemies (Plutarch, *Moralia*, 2.1).

Carthage in the collective sense could not be an eternal enmity because the city surrendered and paid tribute. Hamilcar may have been a strong candidate but, irrespective of his involvement in the surrender negotiations in the First Punic War, he died before being able to embark on further warfare. Of all Rome's enemies, only Hannibal continually escaped capture and continued to fight against Rome even though it meant exile from his homeland.

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<sup>441</sup> Campbell, 1936, 57 poor versification; Matier, 1990, 7 great ingenuity in his adaptations.

## Conclusions

There are a number of conclusions to this thesis; given the focus in each chapter on a different aspect of the tradition about Hannibal, there are conclusions that are specific to each chapter which will be summarised below, as well as some overall summations about the texts and representations of Hannibal which will be covered first. Most of the conclusions are necessarily tentative due to the necessity of comparing and interpreting incomplete texts and other sources that have survived from the ancient world through the hands of copyists or sheer chance.

Hannibal's epitaphs and literary portraits as well as Cornelius Nepos' biography generally present him as an exemplary general despite the fact that he did not win either the Second Punic War or any subsequent wars against Rome. Authors such as Diodorus Siculus admire Hannibal's military genius, highly imaginative strategic skills, his charisma, his ability to retain and command men from a variety of cultures, as well as to maintain and provision a large army in Italy for a sustained period of time (Diodorus Siculus, 29.19). Justinus' epitome included the information that Hannibal was respected by some for his sober habits, not reclining at meals, not drinking too much wine or over-indulging with female captives, despite the best efforts of his enemies to suggest otherwise (Justinus, 32.4).

Appian and Juvenal have been shown to present Hannibal and the events around him in ways that have certain similarities with the depiction of Hannibal in the *Punica*. Appian has been shown in a number of chapters to follow a similar tradition to Silius, for example, divine Providence turning Hannibal away from Rome after his victory at Trasimene, while Juvenal and Silius describes Hannibal in similar terms as a client of Prusias. It is not possible to conclude with certainty whether the differences in the later presentations reflect changing attitudes to Hannibal, or reflect the influence of a text like the *Punica* (if it predates Juvenal's *Satire X*) or if Appian and Silius are influenced by other traditions that are no longer extant; there is scope for further research between these texts.

Polybius frequently presents Hannibal embodying the virtues of a good general, planning his operations carefully, creating alliances to distract his enemies (such as that with Philip), being bold when necessary and exercising caution over his personal safety

(*Hist.* 3.69.12-14; 9.9.1-3; 9.22.1-10; 9.24.1-26.11; 10.33.1-8; 11.19.1-7; 15.15.3-16.3; 23.13.1-2). Polybius' glorification of Hannibal was ostensibly aimed at the greater glorification of Scipio, as indicated at the close of the battle at Zama. Yet, if the portrait of Hannibal is extracted and separated from the Scipio tradition, Polybius supplies a very positive depiction of Hannibal.

Hannibal features regularly in Frontinus' work on military stratagems, and the 45 entries under his name in the index<sup>442</sup> is the highest number for any individual. His text reflects an enduring Roman interest in Hannibal and the change in attitude as, over time, a willingness to learn from Hannibal's techniques replaced the fear that he generated whilst in Italy.

These generally positive assessments of Hannibal far outweigh the negative characteristics of greed, cruelty and impiety attributed to him, discussed in the final chapter. Hannibal undoubtedly had personal ambitions about his legacy; the records of his exploits by Sosylus and Silenus were sufficiently well written and widely distributed to be acknowledged by Greeks and Romans, not only during Hannibal's lifetime but up to two hundred years later (Polybius, *Hist.* 3.20.5; Nepos, *Hann.* 13.3; Cicero, *de Div.* 1.24.49; Livy, 26.4.3). If the historical Hannibal wished to be remembered as an exemplary general, then it is probable that he was careful to live appropriately and controlled as far as possible whatever information was made public. Thus the portrait of him becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy sustained by a handful of notable victories and some memorably clever manoeuvres to ensure the safety of himself and his men.

The picture is more complicated, of course, if only because Hannibal's enemies and opponents were entirely free to publish whatever negative information they wished about him. Yet if Hannibal was abstemious and his habits were widely known, there would be limitations upon what anyone could write that would be credible to readers. Perhaps this is why, for example, there are so few representations of Hannibal under the influence of alcohol or with women, apart from his wife which is, of course, a positive portrait and is indebted to epic poetic antecedents like Homer's Hector and Andromache and Lucan's Pompey and Cornelia (*Pun.* 3.61-157). Only Appian makes a passing reference to Hannibal giving himself up to love in Lucania, after which, little by little, his fortune changed (Appian, 7.43.1).

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<sup>442</sup> Bennet, 2003, 474.

It is interesting to note that episodes of drunken debauchery did not become interpolated into later extant portraits of Hannibal, unlike treatments of Alexander, for example.<sup>443</sup> On the other hand, these two figures are not very comparable because, as discussed in the first chapter, if the historical Hannibal had sole power in Spain it is necessarily played down, and consequently he is less susceptible than Alexander to negative treatments of kingship.

There was an opportunity to depict Hannibal as a tyrant during the five year period in which he controlled Capua, but, as discussed in chapter five, the extant treatments are relatively muted and the overwhelming focus on morality for Hannibal's takeover of Capua masks historical considerations of power, possible commercial advantage for those involved and so on. While not directly related to the topic of this thesis, the moralising treatments of the Capuans, particularly in Livy, whose presentation is arguably aimed at comparing Capua against Rome and Capuan against Roman to illustrate Capuan moral inferiority, is another area worthy of further research.

Polybius expressed a view that if Hannibal had begun his career elsewhere and not fought the Romans until he had acquired more experience, he would have been more successful. There were other similar opinions, such as that of Cornelius Nepos, who, in an extraordinary re-interpretation of Roman success at preventing Hannibal maintaining contact with Carthage for supplies, wrote that Hannibal would have been victorious if he had received more support from Carthage. Nepos adds an interesting remark in terms of Roman power:

Si verum est, quod nemo dubitat, ut populus Romanus omnes gentes virtute superarit, non est infitiandum Hannibalem tanto praestitisse ceteros imperatores prudentia, quanto populus Romanus antecedat fortitudine cunctas nationes.

Cornelius Nepos, *Hann.* 1.1

If it be true, as no one doubts, that the Roman people have surpassed all other nations in valour, it must be admitted that Hannibal excelled all other commanders in skill as much as the Roman people are superior to all nations in bravery.

Rolfe, 1984, 259.

This acknowledgement of Rome's status across the wider Mediterranean area predates the passage in Virgil, *Aeneid*, 1.79, where Jupiter assures Venus of Rome's imperial

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<sup>443</sup> For Alexander see: Diodorus Siculus, 17.1.-118; Plutarch, *Alexander*, Arrian, *Anabasis*, Quintius Curtius Rufus. The negative depictions of Alexander include such items as burning the palace at Persepolis; the murder of Cleitus in a drunken rage; his marriages. For other sources see Hammond, 1993.

destiny. Thus Nepos' biography of Hannibal, like Cicero's use of Hannibal as the example of a worthy enemy, is compatible with the view that Hannibal was viewed as Rome's eternal enemy in the late republic.

Livy adapts his portrait of Hannibal across the third and fourth decads to present Hannibal as a foil to Roman moral standards. Hannibal's introductory portrait closes with the slights about his impiety and cruelty, perhaps to meet the expectations of Livy's audience, but by the close of the fourth decad these remarks have been largely negated through the narrative and Hannibal is portrayed positively in respect of *fides* to his childhood oath and *pietas* to his father. While not discussed in great detail in this thesis, it becomes apparent that the morality of Roman figures across the two decads correspondingly exhibit a gradual degradation in standard. The balance between these corresponding portraits in Livy is in accord with Plutarch's interpretation of the balance required between positive and negative or light and dark forces, referred to at the close of chapter seven.

In many sections of this thesis Silius Italicus has been shown to combine the sometimes disparate traditions and structural variations found across a range of historiographical and other texts. This thesis has identified more allusions in the *Punica* to the tradition derived from Polybius than is generally acknowledged by previous scholars.<sup>444</sup> Although, as noted in the introduction to this thesis, it is not possible to state unequivocally that Silius Italicus used Polybius directly given Silius Italicus' methods of allusion as well as the availability of Latin texts which present similar traditions and/or express similar sentiments as Polybius. On the other hand, I hope that this thesis has countered Spaltenstein's opinion that it would be a waste of time for those studying the *Punica* to consult the *Histories*.<sup>445</sup> In my view, it would be more shocking if Silius Italicus had not kept a set of *Histories* scrolls in his extensive library and consulted it from time to time.

To briefly summarise the conclusions for each chapter of this thesis: The first chapter argued that the anecdote of Hannibal's childhood oath was adapted according to how positively an author wished to present Hannibal in relation to the Roman virtues of *fides*

<sup>444</sup> Campbell, 1936, 57; Von Albrecht, 1997, 293 'Livy takes pride of place [in the *Punica*],' McGuire, 1997, 53. Nicol, 1936, concludes that Livy was the main source for the history in the poem. Burck, 1984; reviewed by Feeney, 1985, 390-1. Ahl, Davis, Pomeroy, 1986, 2506; Wilson, 2004, 236. For another feature of structure in common between Polybius and Silius Italicus, Henderson, 2001, 232, reads *Histories* 1 and 2 as 'introductory' to the rest of the text, while Dominik, 2003, 469, reads *Punica* 1.271-2.707 as an introductory programmatic episode to the rest of the *Punica*.

<sup>445</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 10.

and *pietas*, with Polybius and Cornelius Nepos offering the most explicit versions (*Hann.* 1.3; *Hist.* 3.12.1). Where Polybius makes direct comparisons of events that in effect align Hannibal with heroic figures from Greek epic,<sup>446</sup> Silius Italicus uses the epic genre to rework the story into a heroic guise by taking Carthaginian resentments back to mythical time (*Pun.* 1.70-121). Authors such as Livy and Polybius present recollections of the First Punic War and of Hamilcar as motivating factors for Hannibal through their introductions and through speeches, whilst Silius Italicus represents the theme ‘pictorially’ when Hannibal’s anger is re-ignited at the sight of the frescoes in the temple at Liternum (*Pun.* 6.653-697). The final section of this chapter argued for the presentations of Hasdrubal fulfilling literary purposes, either to set up and contrast with Hamilcar and Hannibal (Livy, 21.2.7), or to stress the similarities, as in Polybius, Silius Italicus, and Cornelius Nepos (*Hist.* 3.8.1-5; *Pun.* 1.144-150; Nepos, *Hamilcar*, 3.3). In addition, if an aggressive Hasdrubal is considered to fulfill an epic requirement for a tyrannical figure in the *Punica*, as argued by McGuire, then the aggressive Hasdrubal in Polybius (drawn from Fabius Pictor) may also have tyrannical origins; perhaps this underlies Walbank’s unexplained rejection of the portrait in Polybius.<sup>447</sup>

The second chapter argued that Hannibal appropriated Hercules as part of a psychological war against Rome, a view supported by some possible numismatic evidence (see Figures 1-4). Part of the reason may have been to divert attention from the actual route he took through the Alps. Given the popularity of Hercules at Rome, Hannibal’s early victories and the feat of crossing the Alps, this appropriation appears to have been the cause of great concern at the time, but in the aftermath of defeat, Hannibal’s divine pretensions are turned against him with wit, humour and sarcasm, most notably by Livy, Juvenal, and by Silius Italicus.

The third chapter compared treatments of Hannibal as the iconic figure for the ‘enemy at the gates.’ Hannibal’s intentions against Rome and his capabilities have been much discussed.<sup>448</sup> It was argued here that the differing depictions of Hannibal’s ability to maintain secrecy or otherwise for his march on Rome led to different reasons for the scenes of panic in the city. Despite these differences, the outcome of failure for Hannibal was the same because his plans were flawed irrespective of whether or not they were kept secret.

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<sup>446</sup> The alignment of Fabius with Eurylochus, *Hist.* 3.94.4, cf. *Od.* 10.232; the comparison of Hannibal to Agamemnon at Zama, *Hist.* 15.16.3, cf. *Iliad* 4.300.

<sup>447</sup> McGuire, 1997, 27; Walbank, I, 311.

In addition, it was shown that the use of divine intervention to defend the city becomes gradually more explicit over time. Similarly, but also possibly due to the accident of survival in the records, it was noted that in each text and therefore over time, Hannibal's appearance outside Rome is brought progressively closer and closer to the city, until, in the *Punica*, he makes physical contact with the city walls. It was also argued that Livy's particular treatment of the 'enemy at the gates' theme fundamentally differentiates his text from others on the Second Punic War. This thesis differs from other readings of Livy's text because it interprets the centrepiece of the decad as a celebration of Rome resisting her great enemy, Hannibal, and consequently his departure is not a 'low-point' in Roman fortunes.<sup>449</sup>

In the fourth chapter it is argued that Polybius creates the sense of a duel through his treatment of Paulus and Hannibal during the battle at Cannae by emphasising how the two men opposed each other, without mentioning Varro. In addition, it argues for greater recognition of the correlation between the *Punica* and Polybius, as Silius Italicus' depiction of Varro, for example, is much closer to the cowardly unnamed figure in Polybius than the one in Livy. The chapter also posits a new argument for the 17-book structure of the *Punica* as a poetic acknowledgment of the annalistic tradition and the 17-years of the Second Punic War, although the content of the poem is not arranged annalistically. The final section of this chapter argued that Silius Italicus adapts Livy's technique of 'repeating' omens to draw connections between figures or events in order to link Cannae with the civil war battle of Pharsalus (not the literary Pharsalus in Lucan's text, although there are many allusions to Lucan's work). Silius is shown to link the Roman army at Cannae with the Pompeians at Pharsalus; thus the link between Hannibal and Caesar is unstated but is the unavoidable conclusion. The omission or emphasis of names for Roman figures in key events, such as Cannae, or the defence of Rome, is shown to be a revealing point of comparison between the texts, and in a cumulative sense adds weight to the argument that Silius Italicus poetically alludes to these omissions and inclusions of Polybius and Livy as well as to traditions from other texts.

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<sup>448</sup> By historians such as Hoyos, 2003, 136; Lazenby, 1996, 41, Goldsworthy, 2004, 184-196.

<sup>449</sup> Luce, 1977, 27; Kraus and Woodman, 1997, 59: Hannibal's *appearance* outside Rome is the geographic centre and 'lowpoint,' Mellor, 1999, 50: [Hannibal's march on Rome] is the lowest ebb; Ahl, Davis & Pomeroy, 1986, 2505; Dominik, 2006, 116: Hannibal's withdrawal from Rome is the centrepiece [of the decad].

The fifth chapter compared treatments of two of Hannibal's incursions into Campania. The first part examined the presentations of the story of Hannibal escaping past Roman guards by means of a ruse with oxen with burning firebrands tied to the horns. It built on Davidson's interpretation of a 'general sense of spectacle'<sup>450</sup> in Polybius' passages to argue that Polybius applied a specific theatrical analogy in order to depict Hannibal deliberately staging a dramatic exit and demonstrating that he could upstage and outwit Fabius Maximus who Polybius compares with Eurylochus (*Hist.* 3.94.4). Livy represents the story, depicting Hannibal tricking his way out of a trap with only one exit, while Silius Italicus was shown to weave elements from both these traditions into the *Punica*, and offer a more 'pragmatic' truth to the story behind the oxen. Cornelius Nepos' placement of the 'oxen and firebrands' story at a later point in time than in the other texts (211) suggests that the story may have become separated from its original historical context. It may have been related, or staged, as a popular 'Hannibal story' in its own right.

The second part of this chapter argues that the focus on Capuan morality and the supposed effects of that morality have caused the historical details of Hannibal's takeover of the town to become uncertain and distorted. Most scholars prefer Polybius' and Silius' description of the Capuans inviting Hannibal to their town.<sup>451</sup> The interpretation in this thesis argues that Polybius was more concerned to present the Capuans as morally depraved and hence preferred the tradition of 'defection.' Hannibal's initial stay in Capua is brief but it is shown that authors take the opportunity to present Hannibal succumbing to Capuan luxury in the form of a feast and other scenes, but with significant differences in the details. Furthermore the ambiguity in the depictions of the long term effects of Capuan luxury on Hannibal and his men are argued to be influenced by another tradition about Hannibal: He was undefeated throughout the time that he was in Italy, discussed in the next chapter.

Presenting Hannibal as undefeated in Italy not only suited the glorification of Scipio but suited Hannibal's rhetoric that he left Italy as an undefeated hero (*Pun.* 17.286). The claim was, of course, disputed, and an extant discussion by Plutarch in relation to Marcellus is compared in the sixth chapter against some of the authors to whom

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<sup>450</sup> Davidson, 1991, 16.

<sup>451</sup> Most scholars prefer the tradition that the Capuans defect: Rossi, 2004, 368; Heurgon, 1942, 115: 'pour châtier sa défection;' 144; De Sanctis, iii, 2,214; Warmington, 1969, 205; Sherwin-White, 1973, 41; Salmon, 1957, 153; Mankin, 1995, 247; Crawford, 2001, 1974, 30; Watson, 2003, 491. Frederiksen, 1977,

Plutarch refers. The comparison indicates that Nepos' biography of Hannibal, as it is currently published, does not match up with Plutarch's assessment of placing Nepos among authors who say that Marcellus and others inflicted sundry defeats on Hannibal in Italy. A modification to the editing of Nepos' *Hannibal* was proposed, as, although it is possible that Plutarch was referring to a different biography one should expect it to correspond to the *Hannibal*.

The following section compared presentations of Hannibal's determination to continue the war and the extent of his involvement with planning the invasions of Italy in 207 and 205. These are arguably linked to each author's depiction of Scipio in terms of whether or not Scipio drove Hasdrubal out of Spain and forced Hannibal's departure from Italy. As much as anything, it is argued that Hannibal's dogged persistence led to his reputation as Rome's most feared enemy, exemplified in Horace *Epode*, 16.8.

Most texts present Zama as the climactic event to the war, particularly in terms of what the two protagonists thought they were fighting for; Polybius is anachronistic with the claim that the Romans were fighting for world domination (*Hist.* 15.9.2). His view is important, however, for presentations of Hannibal in the role of an eternal enemy, since, as far as Polybius was concerned, the Romans were the dominant power by the time that the *Histories* were published some forty years later.

Whereas Polybius draws connections between Zama and Homeric epic, Silius Italicus links Zama with to the historic civil war battle in Africa, Thapsus (*Pun.* 3.261-264; 17.371-85). In this respect, Zama marks the 'beginning of the end' for Silius with the rise of Scipio and, in due course, Caesar claiming divine heritage (*Pun.* 17.653-4).<sup>452</sup> It is argued in this thesis that Silius Italicus' consistent depiction of Hannibal as a sworn enemy meant that the epic Hannibal did not seek peace through a meeting with Scipio beforehand. The notion of being an eternal enemy of Rome is placed in Hannibal's voice, and perhaps, as depicted, the idea originated from him, and that his enemies accepted him in that role.

Silius Italicus' Hannibal in the aftermath of Zama is quite different from the figure in both Livy and Polybius. The final chapter argues that authors had a number of options for their depictions of Hannibal's reaction to Zama, and how those depictions relate to an overall presentation of Hannibal as a sworn enemy of Rome. For authors such as

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<sup>183</sup> notes Hannibal's camp above Capua but Frederiksen, 1984, 227, 238, 241, consistently refers to defection; only once concedes the Capuans may have been unable to resist.

<sup>452</sup> Also Boyle, 1991, 303.

Livy and Polybius who depict Hannibal accepting the defeat as final, there are differences over whether or not he had any involvement in suing for peace. Arguably, a presentation of Hannibal urging the Carthaginians to sue for peace locates him in the role of a saviour of Carthage, and a foil to Scipio's magnaminity. In the *Punica*, however, it is Juno who saves Carthage from destruction, not Hannibal.

It is argued that Livy's presentation of Hannibal's involvement in suing for peace at the close of the third decad is, in part, governed by the use of the Hannibal figure to link the two decades and the changing portrait of Hannibal across the two decades. Livy's presentation of Hannibal saving Carthage from destruction after Zama at the close of the third decad is shown to foreshadow a similar role in the fourth decad when Hannibal again saves the city from Roman destruction by ensuring the indemnity is paid. It is argued here that this portrait has distinct echoes of Hamilcar who similarly ensured that due payments were made to Rome.<sup>453</sup>

Traditions differ over Hannibal's continuing popularity at Carthage in the years after Zama. It is shown that Livy adapts his presentation to prepare his audience for Hannibal's next role in the narrative, that of scapegoat and a warmonger.<sup>454</sup> The devolution of blame onto one man is convenient for both Romans and Carthaginians, and Hannibal's rapid departure from Carthage has all the necessary elements for an exciting story with elements of secrecy, duplicity and showmanship.

Livy offers one explanation why, in retrospect, Hannibal came to be viewed more positively by some Romans. The context of the quotation below follows the collapse of negotiations with Perseus of Macedonia:

Postremo ita de bello et pace quaeri ut inter omnes conveniat, nec turpius quicquam esse quam sine certamine cessisse regno nec praeclarius quam pro dignitate ac maiestate omnem fortunam expertum esse.

Livy, 42.1.11

Finally this discussion about peace and war was based on the universally accepted view that nothing is more disgraceful than to have yielded a kingdom without a struggle, nor anything more glorious than to have made a trial of fortune to the utmost in defence of rank and crown.

Sage, 1938, 445.

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<sup>453</sup> Hoyos, 1991, 1 describes Hamilcar as the saviour of Carthage from its domestic problems.

<sup>454</sup> Contra Lancel, 1998, 181 who reads the passages as foreshadowing the Gracchi.

The point is that Hannibal did not give up. His death marked the end of an era for Rome, and suicide by poison is arguably a literary invention given its ‘appropriateness’ for an eternal enemy not to die at the hands of his enemy, for an exemplary old soldier not to die of natural causes but not quite so exemplary that kills himself by sword.

The conclusions reached in this thesis are the result of comparing the presentations of Hannibal in the extant texts. In sum, this thesis shows that ancient authors were flexible in their approach to tradition as the story of Hannibal was presented and represented over the generations, yet essential elements and, of course, the outcome of certain events remain unchanged. There will always be room for further study on the texts and on Hannibal, but it is hoped that the points raised here will be of historiographic interest as well as of interest to those involved in the study of Hannibal’s reputation, and that others might be encouraged to reconsider the *Punica* in terms of allusions to the traditions espoused in Polybius’ *Histories*.


## Illustrations



**Figure 1: Kraay, Pl.112 No 332**



**Figure 2: Kraay, Pl.112 No 333**



**Figure 3: Robinson, *Fig. 3*; Sear, 1979, No. 6829**



**Figure 4: Kraay, Pl. 172 No. 569 (Alexander of Macedon/Head of Hercules)**

The coin type is popular: Carradice, Ian, 1995, 36 a. (Alexander, silver tetradrachm). Sear, 1979, No. 6829 (Seleucid) – almost, but not quite, identical; the style was closely adopted. Reverse: Zeus enthroned with eagle and sceptre.



**Figure 5: 'Hannibal,' Museo Archeologico, Naples**

**Figure 6: Excerpt from Peutinger Map showing Hannibal's Camp above Capua**



# Appendix 1: Omen lists for Cannae, Metaurus and Pharsalus

Author:	Various authors	Livy	Silius Italicus	Valerius Maximus	Lucan
References to lists of omens. Total number of omens in a list is given in brackets.	Polybius, <i>Hist.</i> 3.112.6-9 All omens ever ...	Lists in Bk 22: 22.1.8-13 (21) 22.36.7-8 (5) 22.42.8 (1) Metaurus River: 27.37.1-7 (8)	<i>Punica</i> 8.625-655 (20) 8.659-673 (1) 9.66-177 (1)	1.6.5: Cannae 1.6.12: Pompey's camp at Pharsalus	<i>de bello civili</i> 1.557-66 1.161-5 7.151-
Deformed infants born		<b>27.37.5</b> baby size of 4yr old		1.6.5 baby with head of elephant	1.562-3 monsters
Wolf taking sentry's sword. Wolf in a camp Wolf mauls sentry		21.62.6 Gaul - Flaminius 21.46.2 Scipio, Ticinus <b>27.37.4</b> mauls sentry, Capua	8.638-9 wild beasts eat sentry	1.6.5	
Sacrifice animal escapes		21.63.14 calf Flaminius			1.165 Bull
Rain stones		<b>22.1.9</b> Praeneste 21.62.6 Picenum <b>22.36.7</b> Rome, Aricia <b>27.37.4</b> Armilustrum		1.6.5 Picenum	
Blood in water		<b>22.1.10</b> Caere <b>22.36.7</b> Caere <b>27.37.1</b> Veii <b>27.37.4</b> Minturnae			7.176 Lake Boebeis
Standards stuck in ground		<b>22.3.12</b> Flaminius		1.6.6 Flaminius	1.161
Gods warning			8.625 <i>superi</i>	1.6.12 (Pompey)	7.151-2 <i>Fortuna</i>
Javelins on fire (St Elmo's?)	Caesar, <i>De bel. Afr.</i> 47	<b>22.1.8-9</b> Sicily	8.626		7.185 melt in heat
Watchman's staff catch fire		<b>22.1.8</b> Sardinia			
Sudden fires		<b>22.1.8</b>	8.631		7.179
Shields sweat blood		<b>22.1.8</b> Sardinia		1.6.5 Sicily	
Shrinking sun		<b>22.1.9</b>			
Solar Eclipse?		<b>22.1.10</b> Arpi sun fighting moon	8.633 <i>tenebris</i>		1.542-3 <i>tenebris</i> 7.177-8
Two moons		<b>22.1.10</b>			
Cavalry shields in sky		<b>22.1.9</b> Arpi			
Bleeding corn		<b>22.1.10</b> Antium		1.6.5	

				Antium	
Sky torn		22.1.11 bright light revealed	8.652 Jupiter's face revealed		
Lots shrunk		21.62.5 Caere 22.1.11			
Statues sweat		22.1.12 Mars 22.1.12 Wolf			1.557 (Lares)
Sky on fire		22.1.12 Capua			1.527 sky 1.531 sky
Images bleed		22.36.7 Sabine			
Soldiers struck by lightning		22.1.9 22.36.9			7.155
Cold water from hot springs		22.36.7			
Sacred chickens not eat	Cicero, <i>De Div.</i> 1.35.77 Trasimene	Per. 19.2 22.42.8			
Vestals have affairs		22.57			
Vesta's fire out		28.11			1.549-50
Mountains collapse/move			8.629 Garganus 8.644 Tarpeian		7.173-4 Pindus into Olympus
Floods			8.630 Aufidus 8.647 Allia		
Screech owls			8.634 camp gates		
Bees swarm		21.46.1-2 Scipio at Ticinus	8.635 <i>Densae</i> (thick swarms)	1.6.12 on Pompey's standards	7.187 so thick that Pompey's standards are hidden
Comets			8.636 multiple		1.529 one
Ghosts			8.641-2 dead Gauls rise	'Nocturnal terrors' Pompey's camp	1.569-71 groans from urns 1.572 a Fury 1.581 Sulla 1.583 Marius
Earthquakes	Cicero, <i>de Div.</i> 3.35.78 Gaul, Italy (Trasimene)		8.648 Alps 8.648 Apennines		1.553 Alps 1.610 Alps
Meteors and/or Lightning Thunderbolts		27.11 statue of Jupiter on Alban Mount; tree; grove at Ostia; Temple of Fortune at Capua; wall and gates at Sinuessa 29.14.3 East to West, Setia	8.650-1 Meteors Libya to Latium. Thunderbolts Africa to Italy	1.6.12 against Pompey's men	1.527 Meteors 1.530 lightning 1.534 thunderbolts from North to Latium 7.155 meteors, columns of fire and lightning at soldiers
Volcano erupt			8.654 Vesuvius – on scale worthy of Etna (!)		1.545 Etna – toward Italy
Father-son parricide - portent of civil war			9.66ff		

## Appendix 2: The importance of names

Polybius' first named Roman in the *Histories* is Appius Claudius (Consul 264) and the first named Carthaginian is Hannibal's father, Hamilcar Barca (*Hist.* 1.11; 1.13). Polybius demonstrably manipulated his text in order to name Hamilcar first because prior to this passage, Polybius referred to the Carthaginians only in general terms and therefore avoided naming Hanno whom he knew to be the 'Carthaginian commander' in *Histories* 1.11 because he referred back to Hanno in that role at *Histories* 1.16. By the same token, the choice of Appius Claudius is deliberate, (if nothing else, he had a colleague, Fulvius), and, in this instance, it might be connected to contemporary second century politics. In 184, an Appius Claudius headed a commission to investigate and report on the Achaean League, and Polybius may have intended to flatter him through prioritising his ancestor and family name (cf. Livy, 34.33).

As quoted in the Introduction to this thesis, the first named figure in Livy's third decad is Hannibal followed by the Roman people as a community: *quod Hannibale duce Carthaginienses cum populo Romano gessere* (Livy, 21.1.1). The first and the last Roman names in the third decad are both Scipio (Livy, 21.6, the father, Publius Cornelius Scipio; Livy, 30.45, his more famous son, Scipio Africanus). The literary decision to make 'Scipio' the first Roman name in the decad required Livy to prioritise a tradition which he believed to be anachronistic over when, exactly, the Saguntines sent envoys to Rome to request assistance: *Consules tunc Romae erant P. Cornelius Scipio et Ti. Sempronius Longus* (Livy, 21.6.3).

Livy delayed discussion of the chronological problem until nearly ten chapters later well after the initial impact of the Scipio name has passed. Livy noted that these two men were consuls in 218, whereas other sources (including Polybius) stated that the siege of Saguntum began in 219, in which case, these they could not have been the consuls (Livy, 21.15.2-6). Therefore Livy was aware of the chronological problem and its convenient implication that the siege of Saguntum did not last as long as suggested by others; he also indicates his dissatisfaction and criticism of the historicity of the source text through the phrase: *quae si ita sunt – if this is so* (Livy, 21.15.4). Livy's decision to discuss the chronology at all indicates to his audience that his text is carefully arranged to suit his particular presentation.

Names have a special importance for Silius Italicus. Like Livy's third decad, Hannibal is the first named figure in the *Punica*, but it is Silius Italicus' choices of ahistorical names for many minor characters which are recognisably resonant with meaning and connotation for his contemporary audience. Since the historical names of all but the most famous combatants were very unlikely to be known to him, he became free to apply his own choices for his own purposes. These choices have been noticed and some have been discussed by scholars. In the Loeb translation, Duff noted against two individuals, Micipsa and Jugurtha, who appear on the Carthaginian side during the siege of Saguntum, that 'Silius appears to be giving to fictitious persons names that were famous later in Roman history' (*Pun.* 2.160; 2.165).<sup>455</sup> McGuire discussed Silius Italicus' selection of certain Roman names given in the Catalogue<sup>456</sup> of Roman troops for their relevance to Roman history generally and especially with their resonances in the context of civil war (*Pun.* 8.356-616).<sup>457</sup>

Silius Italicus' application of ahistorical names was not a new phenomenon in literature. Braund<sup>458</sup> observed that, in Roman satire, names are deliberately chosen because they are significant and suitable for the context by evoking particular characteristics. While not suggesting that the *Punica* is satire, Silius Italicus was writing to entertain an educated audience and a light touch of wit with literary allusion does not necessarily detract from the narrative credibility of his epic. It would remind readers that certain topics are selected for expansion because they offer intellectual entertainment.

Silius Italicus' use of names and descriptions of heroic feats by named individuals points up a possible omission in Polybius and Livy over the role played by the young Scipio Africanus at Cannae. In the *Punica* Scipio is under orders from Varro and undertakes various heroic deeds (*Pun.* 9.412ff). Polybius' silence may be read to imply that Scipio was not at Cannae. On the other hand, Livy indirectly indicated Scipio took part in the battle by bringing him into a meeting with other survivors in the aftermath of defeat when Scipio required them to swear allegiance to Rome (Livy, 22.53.1-2). There are a couple of explanations why Polybius and Livy did not discuss Scipio's role in the battle. Firstly, Scipio was too young to be in a position of command and, in the historiographical tradition, authors generally only name the commanders for a given

<sup>455</sup> Duff, 1996, 70, b.

<sup>456</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 521 describes it as a catalogue along a traditional theme, inspired by Virgil, *Aen.* 7.647.

<sup>457</sup> McGuire, 1985, 27, 77-147.

<sup>458</sup> Braund, 1989, 29 draws examples from Horace, Juvenal and Petronius.

battle; occasionally naming the commanders of the infantry and cavalry wings for particularly important battle scenes. Secondly, to name Scipio at Cannae might cast a shadow on his later reputation. Silius Italicus forces his readers to accept that, like many other Romans at Cannae that day, Scipio probably ran away.

Silius Italicus also presents a number of figures whose names are replete with gentle irony when considered in the context of that person's activity or the manner in which he died. They are figures whose actions are closely connected with Hannibal, and consequently denigrate Hannibal by association. For some, there is a difference of one letter between their name and the association with their fate or role. Hence word-play in the *Punica*, either written or spoken, deserves consideration, although modern readers, with a preference for precision in meaning and spellings, may be inclined to suggest that there is a problem with textual transmission.

Four examples, Murrus/Murus, Caicus/Caecus, Harpe/Harpie, Allius/Alius, are discussed here. In the case of Murus/Murrus, the double 'r' began to appear in documents about 200 as evidenced by a bronze decree of L Aemilius Paullus, praetor in Spain 192-190, which contains *turri* (ILS 15). Varro, *Ling. Lat.* 521, discussed the etymology of 'terra' from 'teritur' and says that in an earlier period of the ancient augural books, 'terra' was spelt with one 'r'.<sup>459</sup> Murrus<sup>460</sup> leads the defence of his city and is particularly associated with the walls of Saguntum, a connection which Silius makes explicit with Murrus' entrance into the text:

terribilem in sonitum procumbens aggere victo  
Herculeus labor atque immania saxa resolvens  
mugitum ingentem caeli dedit. Alpibus altis  
aeriae rupes scopulorum mole revulsa  
haud aliter scindunt resonanti fragmine montem.  
surgebat cumulo certantum prorutus agger  
obstabatque iacens vallum ni protinus instant  
hinc atque hinc acies media pugnare ruina.

*Pun.* 1.368-75

The rampart gave way, the walls built by Hercules sank down with a fearful crash, and the huge stones fell apart and a mighty rumbling of the sky followed their fall. So the towering peaks of the high Alps, when a mass of rock is torn away from them furrow the mountainside

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<sup>459</sup> Lockwood, 1969, 14.

<sup>460</sup> Dominik, 2003: 478-9 draws strong connections between Murrus and Daunus' ancestries and Rome; Murrus represents Roman values of loyalty, obedience to law and respect for the gods. Daunus is noted for his oratory and protection of laws. Rawlings, 2005, 153, suggests Murrus is a mortal embodiment of the Herculean wall.

with the roar of an avalanche. With haste the ruined rampart was raised again; and nothing but the prostrate wall prevented both armies from fighting on in the wreckage that divided them.

Adapted from Duff, 1996, 33.

The name Murrus is attested as a Spanish name (*CIL* 2.3650) and another Spanish soldier named Murrus appears later in the *Punica* (*Pun.* 15.467). Thus, while it cannot be stated with certainty whether or not Silius took the name of a historical figure or used a popular Spanish name for these passages, but given the association of the figure with the walls of Saguntum, it might well be, as Spaltenstein suggests, a pun (*un calembour*).<sup>461</sup>

After a section of the walls had been sapped and collapsed, Murrus leapt into action to defend his city, killing ten opponents (*Pun.* 1.376-417). The ten bodies accumulated by Murrus effectively create another wall: *et iam corporibus cumulatus creverat agger* (*Pun.* 1.418). Murrus challenged Hannibal: *tum ductorem avido clamore in proelia poscit* (*Pun.* 1.420). Hannibal was not physically close enough to respond to the challenge so a messenger was sent (*Pun.* 1.426).

Meantime the audience learns that Hannibal too, had been active in the battle as Silius Italicus parallels Murrus' list of ten defeated opponents with a slightly less impressive list of those who had succumbed to Hannibal: Eight men dead, and one, Daunus, ignominiously tied up (*Pun.* 1.436-51). When Hannibal is told that Murrus was performing better because he had a higher body tally, Hannibal is eager to fight (*Pun.* 1.456-461). They taunt at each other (*Pun.* 1.478-487) but Hannibal was in the better position, higher up, on part of the damaged wall. He threw a boulder from the wall at Murrus, scoring a hit:

Haec inter cernens subeuntem comminus hostem  
praeruptumque loci fidum sibi corripit ingens  
aggere convulso saxum et nitentis in ora  
devolvit pronoque silex ruit incitus ictu.  
Subsedit duro concessus fragmine **muri**.

*Pun.* 1.488-92

Meanwhile seeing his foe come close and that he could trust the overhanging ground where he stood, [Hannibal] rent the rampart and seized a huge rock and hurled it down upon the head of the climber and the stone fell swiftly with downward force. Smitten by the tough fragment of the wall, [Murrus] crouched down.

Duff, 1996, 41.

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<sup>461</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 62.

It is with the final word at the close of the passage that Silius Italicus draws the strongest connection between Murrus' name and the wall, 'mur.' Murrus, mortally wounded by the wall of his city, struggles up the broken wall, but, like that section of wall, he too is broken and destroyed (*Pun.* 1.494-520).

Caicus is the name of the first man in both the *Aeneid* and the *Punica* to make contact with the enemy.<sup>462</sup> In the *Aeneid*, 9.35-61, the Trojan Caicus was on the wall watching for the enemy, and, being 'sharp-eyed,' he was the first to see the enemy approach. Virgil does not follow up on the fate of his Caicus, but the Trojan had sharper eyes than his literary successor in the *Punica*. The first man *killed* by Hannibal is Caicus, pierced by Hannibal's javelin as he stood on the walls. He fell down the exterior side of the wall (physically difficult to achieve, given the momentum of the javelin), and in so doing returned the spear to its owner, a moment of irony in itself (*Pun.* 1.304-309). Therefore, although Caicus was watching, he did not see the javelin coming, hence the play on the word Caecus, 'blind.'

When one of Hannibal's female warriors, Asbyte, hurled her weapons, an archer, Mopsus, responded. He aimed for Asbyte but killed her bodyguard, Harpe, with an arrow through the mouth (*Pun.* 2.114-120). Harpies were birds with women's faces who stole food; their bodies were protected from attack by feathers, leaving the face as their weak spot (*Aen.* 3.220-1). Therefore it is appropriate that Harpe, whose name recalls that of the mythical creature, is killed by an arrow through her mouth.

For the last example, taken from *Punica* 4, a Roman, Allius, is killed by two javelins, one thrown by Mago the other by Maharbal. The points of the two javelins meet at the centre of his heart:

haud secus acer  
hinc atque hinc iaculo devolvitur Allius acto.  
it stridens per utrumque latus Maurusia taxus;  
obvia tum medio sonuerunt spicula corde,  
incertumque fuit, letum cui cederet hastae.

*Pun.* 4.565-9

Even so brave Allius was overthrown by the javelins that came from both his foes. The Moorish yew-wood passed hissing through both his sides, the points met and clashed in the centre of his heart, and it was doubtful which of the two spears could claim his death.

Duff, 1996, 211.

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<sup>462</sup> Spaltenstein, 1986, 52 argues that certain episodes in the *Punica* can be read in terms of continuations of episodes from the *Aeneid*. Also Barnes, 1995, 287.

Here Silius Italicus seems to be using word-play on the Latin word *alius* for the man's name because afterwards it could not be decided which javelin killed him. It could have been either one or the other.

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