Representations of terrorism in U.S., U.K., and Indian news coverage

Raghuvir Dass

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Abstract

'Political-elite' research takes news media to be serving government agendas on security and conflict issues, with news content largely shaped by official sources. There is reason to ask whether an emphasis on top-down influence fails to reflect the degree of critical news coverage of governments and their agencies, potential contextual complexity, and a range of alternative voices. Studying the news coverage of terrorism provides a way to address these issues given the potential for state support but also scope for criticism of security failures and police or military responses. This thesis is based on a large-scale content analysis of news articles on terrorism in a single tumultuous year, 2016, in six of the world's most widely-read newspapers based in three countries – *The New York Times*, *USA Today*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Hindu*, and *The Times of India*. Almost 9,000 articles were coded for a range of variables in this comparative study. Coverage patterns indicate that deference towards government actions and policies is influenced by the newspapers ideological or political stance, and the region of coverage. There are increased levels of criticism for state responses occurring in left-aligned newspapers, and for foreign governments. High levels of support for a newspaper's home government were evident but, equally, overall levels of criticism were higher than suggested by existing 'political-elite' theories and research. This thesis seeks to make a significant contribution to the study of news content with its use of a highly-detailed coding sheet, a dataset that includes every terrorism-related news article published in 2016 from six newspapers, and a conclusion that the way the news is reported, and the features of its coverage, is more nuanced and complex than shown by existing research.

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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1 Background

Of the many different news topics that compete for space in the news media and our minds, terrorism can be seen as a linchpin topic. The coverage of terrorist attacks is important in itself and provides the connective narrative tissue between diverse areas such as civilian casualties in war, government surveillance and privacy rights, and geopolitics. The Global Terrorism Database, a resource provided by the University of Maryland, shows an unprecedented increase in terrorist attacks over the past decade compared to earlier periods, with over 55,000 deaths attributed to the actions of the world's most dangerous terrorist groups, the Islamic State or ISIS, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and Al-Shabaab (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). Even though the Islamic State's "strategic supremacy" over territory (Burke, 2014) has declined in recent years, it, along with al-Qaida, remains resilient and continues to pose a threat in sponsoring terrorist attacks internationally with an estimated 24,000-30,000 of its foreign terrorist fighters still active (United Nations, 2019; United Nations, 2020). In addition, recent events in Washington and El Paso in the U.S. and Christchurch in New Zealand, among others across the world, indicate a growing right-wing terrorist threat motivated by white supremacism (The New York Times, 2019), with far-right terrorist attacks quadrupling between 2016 and 2017 in the U.S., and increasing 43% in Europe (Jones, 2018).

There are two broad perspectives in this area. 'Political-elite' or 'official-dominance' research describes terrorism and conflict news as heavily influenced by a symbiotic relationship between journalists and government officials, resulting in news content which rarely contradicts elite-defined perspectives and reflects frames that originate with political elites (Bennett et al., 2007; Entman, 2003; Gans, 2004; Hallin, 1986; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Wolfsfeld, 2011). Criticism of government policy and action is found to occur primarily when government officials publicly disagree with each other (Bennett, 1990; Zaller & Chiu, 2000), implying that journalists lack the initiative to engage in independent and spontaneous criticism with official sources given primacy.

In contrast, 'event-driven' research highlights how, in spite of a media and economic structure that prioritises the legitimacy of official sources, unplanned, accidental, and dramatic events can disrupt institutional control over the political and media environment, and provide journalists with evocative imagery and ideological cues, leading to news content that is potentially politically volatile, critical of governments, and driven by a variety of sources (Bennett & Lawrence, 1995;

Lawrence, 2000; Wolfsfeld, 1997). So far, this strand of research has not directly addressed the impact of terrorist attacks as dramatic events on news output.

Terrorism news coverage has characteristics that in principle could invite explanation from within either paradigm: the official-dominance or the event-driven perspective. Terrorism news is about the kind of visually driven, dramatic, tragic incidents that 'event-driven' theorists argue lead to politicians' losing control over the political environment (Wolfsfeld, 1997, 2011), and provide opportunities or "legitimising pegs" for journalists to form detailed criticism of official responses (Lawrence, 2000). Alternatively, proponents of a thesis of top-down influence would describe journalists as "teammates of officialdom" during times of crisis (Graber & Dunaway, 2014) for their attempts to restore a sense of order and safety. They could cite a great deal of prior research to argue that terrorist attacks would encourage journalists to turn to official sources to fill an information vacuum and provide support to a government agenda (Bennett et al., 2007; Wolfsfeld, 1997). This ambiguity is explored further in the literature review, exemplified by the contradictory results of empirical research in terrorism and conflict news coverage.

This thesis conducts an in-depth study of the news coverage of terrorism in a single year to explore whether persisting 'political-elite' research which describes news content as influenced by official sources and serving government agendas accurately describes the news framing of terrorism; or if such research overstates the top-down determination of content and in doing so, fails to recognise contextual complexity, a range of alternative voices, and the impact of diverse events. As mentioned above, terrorism is a linchpin topic, the news coverage about terrorism not only features terrorist attacks but also coverage of new laws, government programmes, civilian casualties, and legal battles, all related to terrorism and the struggle of governments against it. This range allows the thesis to add a further perspective to this field of research.

The New York Times, *USA Today*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Hindu,* and *The Times of India* were the selected newspapers. The year chosen is 2016. The reasons behind these choices are discussed below.

1.2 Overview of Research Aims and Design

The precursor of the primary research question lies in questions including: What does the media talk about when it talks about terrorism? What tone does it take towards official responses to terrorism? How are terrorist goals and motives represented in news coverage? And who exactly is doing the talking? As the literature was further explored and the original research proposal refined, these questions became the operational sub-questions in service to a larger question. Does terrorism news content support existing research that describes the news media as heav-

ily influenced by government officials and sources and deferential to official agendas; or is the research that supports this point of view overstated and are news articles more critical than previously thought?

To answer these questions news articles were selected as the unit of analysis. Two newspapers from each of the three countries, the U.S., U.K., and India were selected with the aim of achieving a balance between newspapers with a large circulation and newspapers of record. The six newspapers are *The New York Times*, the *USA Today*, *The Guardian*, *The Daily Telegraph*, *The Hindu*, and *The Times of India*. There are strong advantages in studying news content published by traditional news groups such as those represented here. One is that prior research going back decades focuses on newspapers, including *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*. A continuing narrative can be formed by using past research results. Additionally, newspapers such as *The New York Times* influence the news agendas of other newspapers (McCombs, 2014 loc: 3894). There is also evidence that newspaper content has a strong influence on social media content. Vargo's analysis of Twitter posts suggests that traditional newscasts and newspaper articles can forecast, or shape, the total amount of Twitter chatter an issue receives (Vargo, 2011; Vargo et al., 2014), indicating that mainstream print news media still have a powerful hold over the public agenda, even in digital space. It also helped that there was an available archive of news stories to study on ProQuest, which I had access to through the University.

2016 was chosen as the time period. As Carolyn McCall, CEO of British airline company easy-Jet put it in *The Daily Telegraph*, "You've got more terrorist events this year (2016) than in any year that anyone can remember" (Martin, 2016). 2016 saw several highly covered attacks in the U.S. Europe, and India, ranging from the Brussels Airport and Metro bombings, the Nice truck attack, the Orlando Pulse nightclub shooting, and the Pathankot airbase attack among many others. Every article that was published in the above newspapers in 2016 with a focus on any topic related to terrorism was included in a database and studied using content analysis. The database contains 8,742 news articles.

Using the methodologies and coding sheets of previous studies as a starting point, I created a coding sheet that examined three key variables. The first is 'issue/themes' (akin to Entman's (1993) problem definition variable) which was used to identify the thematic content, issues, and subjects that comprise news articles. Examples could be 'police response to terrorism', describing a variety of different types of police actions, 'victim memorial', describing statements from friends and family that praise and mourn victims in terrorist attacks, or 'motives' and 'origins' describing the direct individual motives of terrorists or wider economic or political influences on terrorism. The second key variable is sources, the government, police, military, academic,

civilian and other voices that were cited throughout entire news articles along with any principal sources relied on more than other sources. The third is stances, or the overall supportive, critical, neutral or descriptive tone used in news articles towards issue/themes and government policies among numerous other points of data. This allowed for the research question to be examined from multiple perspectives. The methodology is described in detail in chapter 3.

Sources, stances, and theme selections have been captured in a wide array of countries, during a large number of different events, yielding an image of news construction that is more nuanced and complex than shown by existing theories. Higher levels of support for a newspaper's home government were evident but, equally, overall levels of criticism were higher than suggested by existing "political-elite" research, seemingly determined by newspaper ideology as well as the region of reporting. The left-leaning papers tend to offer higher levels of critical news coverage than their right-leaning counterparts in general, but both newspaper types, at least the Indian and U.S. papers, are less critical of their own officials' responses than those of foreign nations.

These findings are fairly consistent in different ways throughout the thesis, police actions see greater responsibility framing in left-leaning papers as well as in countries not their own, the coverage of terrorist's motives and origins, critical news coverage of police actions, the coverage of civilian casualties suffered in the course of military actions against terrorist groups, and critical coverage of government policies all see greater coverage in left-leaning papers with the proviso that the newspaper's home government isn't involved. There are certain exceptions and patterns that are discussed in greater detail in the chapters to come as well as in the conclusion.

1.3 Thesis outline

This thesis has 12 chapters including this one and the conclusion. The next chapter is the literature review, which covers a definition of terrorism for this thesis, the research results of existing studies of the news coverage of terrorism, the different theories that relate to news content, and other relevant topics. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used and the coding sheet and its development.

Chapter 4 marks the start of the findings and discussion chapters, beginning with an analysis of the extent of praise and criticism of government responses and policies following 6 terrorist attacks with some of the highest volumes of coverage in 2016. Chapter 5 is a direct extension of chapter 4, highlighting the representation of terrorist goals and motives in the same 6 attacks and showing how the framing of these motives favours governments under certain conditions.

The findings laid out in chapters 4 and 5 are further reinforced in the other chapters, which focus on some of the most highly reported news topics in 2016. Chapter 6 is an analysis of civilian

casualties caused by U.S. military action against terrorist groups, mainly the Taliban in Afghanistan, and ISIS in the Middle East, and describes how these casualties are under-reported with coverage often favouring the U.S. government and armed forces. Chapter 7 is a study of the news coverage of Apple's conflict with the U.S. State Department regarding Apple's refusal to aid in unlocking the San Bernardino terrorist's encrypted iPhone and provides an analysis of the struggle between economic and political-elite agendas in the news. Chapter 8 examines the debate over U.S. citizens having the right to sue foreign states for sponsoring terrorism, essentially giving them the right to sue the Saudi Arabian government for its alleged role in the 9/11 attacks. Chapter 9 looks at the coverage given to the U.K. PREVENT strategy in *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* to counter radicalisation among the British public

Chapter 10 is an analysis of the newspaper coverage of Naxal or Maoist terrorism in India, providing a different perspective to the overall findings from the previous, more West-centric chapters.

Chapter 11 provides context to the prior chapters. It looks at the different terms used to identify different terrorist groups, how those terms vary by region with the word 'terrorist' favoured by news groups for North American and West European regions and a profusion of terms for the others. It also examines the newspaper reporting trends by region with each newspaper showing a preference for its own region.

Chapter 12 concludes the thesis.

1.4 Thesis contributions

This thesis uses almost 9,000 news articles; the intention was to acquire the complete news coverage of terrorism published in 2016, across six of the world's most widely read newspapers in three different countries. Each article was analysed using a coding sheet that captured far more detail than the coding sheets used in previous studies. A distinction was made between sources that were simply cited in an article, and principal sources, or sources that were relied on for facts and opinions over others. Source stances: supportive, neutral, critical, and descriptive were used to provide further context to a large variety of issue/themes identified in the coverage. Mentions of government policies and stances towards them and a host of other variables were categorised and used in the analysis as well.

The aim was to make a comprehensive contribution to the research surrounding the nature of news content, and clarify the different ways and extent to which news articles are supportive or critical of governments in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.

The key question this thesis tries to answer is, does the news framing of terrorism fit with an image

of the news media as heavily influenced by government officials and deferential to official agendas, or do terrorist attacks cause criticism of governments to emerge from non-official sources? To answer this question terrorism news articles were used to explore the theories that explain how news content is dominated and influenced by official sources. Many of the existing studies mentioned in the next chapter have a narrower focus than this thesis, they tackle these issues using shorter time spans, or focusing on single events, or with coding sheets that capture less detail. This thesis records sources, and themes, government policies, and source stances, and meta-data such as perpetrator groups, regions, countries, as well as the terms used to identify perpetrators, and then presents data on the total volume of all terrorist news over the course of a year heavy with terrorist attacks from 6 different newspapers across three countries, the U.S., the U.K., and India. It is hoped that in both breadth, and depth, this thesis presents a comprehensive research image.

The results contribute to the existing literature by showing that official sources, though used with high frequency, were not as widely used as "political-elite" research indicated they would be, either as cited or principal sources. The findings chapters will show two conditions that seem to influence the nature of news content, whether a newspaper leans to the left or right of the political spectrum, and the region or country of coverage. Left-leaning newspapers appear more critical than right-leaning newspapers in a variety of ways, and the U.S. and Indian newspapers are far less critical and more openly supportive of their home country's government actions, responses, and policies than they were of foreign nations.

Chapter 2
News coverage of terrorism:
surveying the field

2.1 Introduction

Terrorism and its coverage by news media understandably have been a focus for considerable previous research. This chapter surveys key areas of that research, placing the present study in the context of the academic literature.

Defining terrorism in section 2.2 is an important first step in this literature review, necessary to explain how terrorism is understood in this thesis. This understanding of terrorism was used to create the list of rules that determined which news articles were studied. These rules are explained in the methodology chapter. Section 2.3 will examine existing studies of the news coverage of terrorism and conflict and their tendency to find a heavy use of government sources and a favouring of government agendas in the news coverage, as well as a lack of context, both present and historical. These studies support the broad conclusion of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model, Hallin's Sphere of Consensus, and elements of Bennett's Indexing model, which are explained in section 2.4 along with the potential causes for the use of government sources including news routines and System Justification Theory.

Section 2.5 focuses on the news coverage of terrorist motives and objectives, and how research so far finds that this coverage is supportive of government agendas. Section 2.6 considers the research that contradicts the 'political-elite' work explored in prior sections. It outlines the criticism levelled at the methodology used by 'political-elite' researchers, as well as credible results and arguments that perhaps the official dominance conclusions might be overstated. Event-driven and CNN effect research further strengthen the idea that the news is more independent of government officials and critical of government actions than previously thought. Section 2.7 is an overview of the research on the regional distortions present in terrorism news, newspapers generally focus on events in their home country's regions. This is explored further in chapter 11, the last findings chapter.

2.2 Defining Terrorism

Terrorism is an act of public violence, or a publicity driven threat of violence, to create fear with the intent to achieve a political or social change or advantage. This much is widely agreed; however this definition, describing terrorism's mechanism of action, is nearly always applied by observers only after considering the identity of the perpetrator and victim. The terms terrorism,

and terrorist, are highly pejorative labels, describing an irrational and fanatical 'other', typically opposed to an established, morally upstanding way of life. One's own social or political system is rarely thought of as perpetrating terrorism (Crenshaw, 1995; Goodin, 2006; Jenkins, 1980; Nacos, 1994; Schmid et al., 1988; Whittaker, 2007). This allows for some flexibility in framing terrorist events, different social constructions of the identities of the attackers and victims, and legitimate social and political responses. Yasser Arafat alluded to this when this when he said that those who fight for just causes are not terrorists, but revolutionaries (Laquer, 1976 cited in Hoffman, 2006). Everyone's cause is just in their own eyes which makes the successful labelling of a group as "terrorist" the winning of a moral and political battle. This flexibility in presenting information means that studying the use made of governments and other influences as news sources and the process in which citizens receive news is vitally important, especially when governments claim to act with their people's consent, and on their behalf (Altheide, 1987).

This thesis does not determine what counts as terrorism by all that its author might view as terrorism, including some forms of state terrorism. It studies coverage of what certain mainstream newspapers and governments consider to be terrorism; if the newspaper under study uses and accepts the label "terrorism" or "terrorist" in an article, it was included. Additionally, if the U.S. U.K. or Indian government label a group as "terrorist", the coverage given to that group was included regardless of the label the media give them. About a quarter of the articles coded did not have the words "terror", "terrorist", or "terrorism" in the article, relying only on the name of the group, or another term such as "militant", "fighter", or "insurgent", sometimes used in reference to the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Maoists in India. These alternative identifying terms have been coded as well, and are revealing of biases per region. The methodology chapter lists the full criteria used for the selection of news articles.

For the purposes of this study, the U.S. the U.K. and India are not considered to engage, as states, in terroristic behaviour. Governments can be criticised and held accountable for a variety of failings, but the tag of terrorism is rarely attached, at least by news media particularly when referring to their own country's government. At least one researcher finds that social science literature and the mass media have largely ignored the conclusion that terrorism may also be committed by "pillars of the international community" (Selden & So, 2004). As Taylor (1991) put it, "Acts of terrorism are routinely seen to be the opposite of the forces of law and order, embodied in the police and paratroopers who offer comfort to the wounded." Some academics also define terrorism as an action perpetrated by sub-national groups or non-state entities (Whittaker, 2007, p. 8). The U.S. State Department defines terrorism as "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine

agents, usually intended to influence an audience" (U.S State Department, 2016).

The Global Terrorism Database (referenced in this thesis as GTD), an important resource based at The University of Maryland that attempts to document every attack that has taken place, has several criteria for the inclusion of an incident, one is it must be an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor. Another states that "The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities. That is, the act must be outside the parameters permitted by international humanitarian law" (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2019). Legitimate warfare activities rule out virtually any military action by the United States and its allies.

Apart from practical considerations or semantic rules, a case can be made, at least with regard to democratic states, in support of the tendency of media and others to limit terrorism to non-state actors. The first point of difference is the method of acquiring targets: Terrorists select random targets based on national, religious or class characteristics. These targets, either people or symbolic objects, are seen as responsible for, or a symbol of, a societal or political problem and are thus valid targets for violence (Schmid et al., 1988). Most democratic states regardless of military action and political motives, do not believe in mass guilt and therefore random death to achieve their objectives. A second differentiator is foreknowledge, when governments practice, or sponsor groups to practice repression, the affected populace is generally aware of the rules of the system and can actively avoid violence and sanction (Lutz & Lutz, 2005). Terrorists however operate outside established laws and rules of warfare (Hoffman, 2006). Nacos (2002, pp. 17-18) found an ingenious way of separating states and terrorists. If terrorism is a method of attaining political change through the publicising of violence, the mass media is therefore key to acquiring publicity among target groups. Governments, she says, are not at all interested in publicising, via the mass media, domestic or international acts of violence that harm non-combatants. Governments therefore cannot be terrorists: rather than seeking publicity for civilian casualties, they would want to limit media exposure.

Nacos's argument has a flaw. While seeking publicity is a key element of a terrorist action, the mass media is not always key to the spreading of fear which can always be spread by rumour or word of mouth. State terrorism in the Soviet Union for example existed on a massive scale without using the media, relying instead on rumours and individual tales of terror to discipline dissidents (Schmid et al., 1988, p. 21). The Shia Assassins used terror as a political weapon, the news of murders were designed to spread via word of mouth to frighten and weaken the Sunni establishment (B. Lewis, 2008).

An example of the reduction of media attention not affecting terroristic activity can be seen in the British government's ban on the broadcasting of direct statements by representatives or supporters of the IRA and Sinn Fein in 1988. There was a sharp reduction in Sinn Fein interviews, potentially limiting statements that might justify or legitimise the IRA's terrorism (Lago, 1998) but this did not result in an overall drop in attacks, while there was a decline in the two years following the ban in 1988, by 1990 there is a clear increase as can be seen in an analysis of GTD in figure 2.1 below. A separate analysis finds little evidence that the ban hampered the military activities of the IRA (Miller, 1995, p. 68).

2.3 'Political-elite' research in terrorism and conflict

A strong strand of research central to the concerns of this thesis finds that news content is influenced by official sources and fulfils an agenda that favours political elites.

A recent study by Courty et al. (2019) examined the dissemination of ISIS propaganda in four newspapers, *The New York Times*, the *Times*, *The Daily Mail*, and *Le Figaro*. They studied 371 articles over a one-week period, 14-20 November 2015, with the focus on the news coverage of the 2015 ISIS attacks in Paris. They found that the coverage had a narrow focus on the responses of state actors and represented official views on aggressive counter-terrorism responses and policies without additional perspectives. They describe the political rhetoric as alarmist, inflammatory, and divisive, and that this supported ISIS's goal of being seen as an Islamic threat to the Western world.

Similar results are found in studies of earlier time periods as well. Steuter (1990), examined *Time Magazine's* coverage of terrorist events in 1986 and coded 130 articles to conclude that

> Authority sources predominated, headlines focused on violence, and negative labels were attached to those groups whom Time defined as terrorists. Coverage typically featured violence or governmental response to violence, while the underlying objectives were rarely explained and almost never justified. As a result, the terrorists were identified with criminal violence and seen as senseless, irrational, and inhuman.

She states that her results refute "the most hallowed tenet of the ideology of professional jour-

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nalism—that the news is an unbiased reflection of reality." This lack of explanation of a terrorist's goals and identification of terrorists as irrational and inhuman is arguably in favour of government foreign or domestic policy, which otherwise could come under closer scrutiny as contributing factors to the underlying causes of terrorism. This is explored further in section 2.4.

Clear support for government action was found by Yarchi et al. (2015), who studied the media coverage given to four sporting events between 1996 and 2008 that either suffered a terrorist attack, or the threat of one. 239 articles from *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post*, *The Guardian*, and Australian newspapers *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Herald Sun* were studied. The study found 43.9 percent of articles across newspapers and attacks were supportive of authority actions, mostly in the way the attack or threat was handled by security forces, with criticism in only 13 percent. Yarchi and colleagues do not however look at the differences between the coverage of different attacks, and hence there are no comparisons possible, between attacks or newspapers. These differences are a concern of this thesis and are addressed in the findings chapters.

Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008) studied the framing of terrorist attacks in U.S. and U.K. newspapers, in *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, the *London Financial Times*, and *The Guardian* over an entire year, using 107 articles in their analysis. Papacharissi and Oliveira's analysis was done using a technique called centering resonance analysis, determining frames from clusters of words extracted using computers. The perspective provided by this is arguably far too general without clear numbers illustrating which narratives are used and in which proportions, which is why Papacharissi and Oliveira supplement it with a discourse analysis. They conclude that the news content in both nations is aligned with government policy. The U.S. papers used episodic frames, depicting issues as a series of specific events with little context and the coverage focused on the military. The U.K. papers used thematic frames, placing issues inside a bigger picture or wider context, the coverage focused on diplomatic evaluations of terrorist events.

At least initially, in the aftermath of a terrorist attack, the news media are said to become 'teammates of officialdom in attempts to restore public order, safety, and tranquillity' (Graber & Dunaway, 2014). Entman finds that journalists (in the U.S.) are far too dependent on the government executive's interpretation, whether it's regarding Vietnam as a limited war, Watergate as "a third-rate burglary" or the Iran hostage taking a "world-historical crisis" (Entman, 1989, p. 5). He highlights how the press despite energetic and critical reporting during these events, failed to provide the in-depth inquiry needed to "make government decisions visible and their leaders accountable" and failed to "prevent rulers from damaging the nation and destroying themselves".

While the above studies focus exclusively on terrorism, other research that focuses on war and conflict finds very similar results. Welch (1972) examined four U.S. newspapers' coverage of the U.S.'s military, economic, diplomatic, and other involvement in Indochina from 1950 to 1956 and found that "the press relied almost completely on Administration sources for information" and it "did a play a crucial role in developing and sustaining mass and elite public acceptance of the Administration's view". Another analysis of the sources cited in seven U.S. newspapers for national security issues in 1988 found the majority were government officials with executive sources favoured (Hallin et al., 1993). This focus on executive sources was identified in yet another early study of newspaper source use. Sigal (1973, pp. 123-124) examined a sample of page one stories from *The New York Times* and *Washington Post* between 1949 and 1969 and found that US government officials accounted for nearly one half, 46.5 percent, of all sources cited, and within that category, which included all three branches of government, the executive made up 92 percent with 2 percent from the judiciary and 6 percent from Congress.

The use of official sources, especially for national security issues has a possible connection to a lack of context and historical background in the news. Iyengar and Simon (1994) for instance, found that more than half of the 79 broadcast news reports covering the first Gulf War between August 2nd 1990 and May 4th 1991 had official spokespersons as their primary source, with stories about successful military action and Iraqi malevolence as 'news staples', while civilian casualties were ignored. The American public was

> Rarely provided background in the form of analyses of the antecedents of the conflict, historical precedents of similar territorial disputes, information about the socioeconomic and cultural makeup of Iraqi and Kuwaiti society, or other such contextual presentations

This is supported by Bennett and Manheim (1993) who fault the news media for not highlighting key facts, such as George Bush's business ties to Kuwait's oil fields. They find a low level of official disagreement and strong support for the government in the news. Mermin (1996) found that the coverage of the first Gulf War reported in *The New York Times* and *ABC World News Tonight* was almost "uniquely uncritical" of American policy. Of 49 *ABC* stories over three days, only one contained criticism of the decision to attack on the ground, not a single story suggested that Bush might fail to achieve his objectives. In *The New York Times* not one of the thirteen front page and news analysis stories studied contained a critical viewpoint on the decision to fight in Iraq, or even a suggestion that Bush might not achieve his goals. Wolfsfeld (1997) found evidence that showed that the authorities "were able completely to dominate the press" by controlling the supply of information, resulting in highly favourable coverage of the U.S. military. These results are mirrored in a study of the television news coverage of the Wars on Terror in Iraq (the second

Gulf War) and Afghanistan. The coverage favoured the executive branch, with negative events receiving less coverage (Aday, 2010).

Reese (2010, pg. 37) finds that the Administration's War on Terror frame was accepted uncritically by the news media in the days following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, with journalists "obliged to transmit and amplify the framing they already implicitly accepted as way of viewing the world." Editors and journalists come under direct criticism. J. Lewis et al. (2006) interviewed 23 key actors in British broadcast journalism involved in reporting on the second Iraq War, with seven embedded in U.S. and British military units, and 5 editors and journalists from al-Jazeera in Qatar and found they had "deep professional concerns" about partisanship, balance, and censorship. Despite these feelings, their reports were dominated by government and military sources from the U.S. and U.K. and were uncritical of government framing. They further found that the broadcast coverage concerning the Iraqi response was primarily about how the Iraqi people supported the invasion, and this was accepted unquestioningly.

Dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) described *The New York Times*'s coverage of the second Iraq war as episodic, focused on battle coverage and military issues, with only a fraction of its articles addressing the broader issues of responsibility for the war, or the connection between Iraq and WMDs. They compare this to a Swedish newspaper, which they say addressed responsibility and carried an anti-war frame with greater frequency. They coded 408 articles, tying each article to a single frame.

Support for official agendas can also be seen in Griffin and Lees's (1995) study of all Gulf War related images published during the first Iraq War from the three news magazines with the largest circulation: Time, Newsweek, and U.S. News and World Report. 49 percent of all 1,104 images published consisted of military hardware, U.S. troops, and Western political leaders, George Bush appearing in 50 percent of that last category. Only 3 percent of imagery showed depictions of war time destruction in Iraq: "bombed out buildings…scud missile debris, burning oil wells etc". Only 6 images out of the 1,104 depicted Iraqi civilian casualties, rendering the large number of actual dead civilians invisible. The high proportion of photos of soldiers in training exercises and imagery of U.S. war planes tanks, and ships, often used directly from industry promotional materials, is said to have glorified U.S. military power while sidelining the impact of that power. Griffin (2004) states that the same categories that made up half of all imagery in the 1991 conflict, U.S. military hardware, troops, and political leaders, also comprised about half of all the imagery in the 2003 conflict. Imagery of casualties, both soldiers and civilians, the damage to Iraqi homes and infrastructure, and pictures from the Iraqi point of view were similarly relatively absent (Griffin, 2004).

The author's master's thesis research studied 9 months of all ISIS related stories in *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mail* in 2014 and found a similar result. Across 2,247 online news articles 30 percent of imagery consisted of Western government leaders, Western military hardware and Western soldiers. 10 percent consisted of refugees and locals suffering and 3.2 percent were of scenes of destruction and death. The content analysis ended just prior to the start of the air war against ISIS (Dass, 2015).

Deference to government sources and agendas can be clearly observed in the above studies. What is more subtle, and less easy to spot is deference to government agendas through the marginalised representation of a terrorist's motives and objectives, an important part of this thesis. This is explained further in section 2.5 of this literature review and studied in findings chapter 5. But first, it is important to explore how these empirical studies that focus on the use of government sources, the support of government agendas, and selection of themes favourable to governments, interact with the theoretical research that explains such findings.

2.4 'Political-elite' theories, and causes for the use of government sources.

The research in the previous section describes the news media as heavily influenced by government sources, with news content that favours government agendas. These findings can be explained with a theoretical understanding of how governments and the media interact with each other, as well as observations regarding news routines and journalist behaviour. Further context to this research is provided by the event-driven work in the coming sections.

An important theory is Bennett's Indexing model. Bennett (1990), supported by Zaller and Chiu (2000), found clear evidence that American news content that supported or opposed government policy was tied to or "indexed" to the range of debate within government entities such as Congress, with criticism only emerging during periods of elite disagreement. Indexing theory posits that the diversity of opinions in news and editorials pertaining to everyday crises and policies matches the range and dynamics of government debate. If officials present a unified front, critical counter frames diminish. If official debate increases, with policy-making implications, counter frames expand (Bennett, 1990; Bennett et al., 2006). Bennett (1990) successfully tested this in finding that the news coverage of U.S. policy towards Nicaragua in the mid-1980s matched the views in elite debates. While the research on terrorism and conflict described so far doesn't test Bennett's condition for criticism to arise, it does intersect with the Indexing model in one key way, studying the use of sources. Bennett's (1990) study predicted and found a heavy use of government and other political sources, with only 15 percent of non-government sources used over almost 4 years of coverage on the US's Nicaragua policy. Essentially, regardless of levels of agreement in Congress, sources from government institutions (executive and others)

were relied on almost exclusively. Existing research (which tends to focus more on Administration sources) broadly confirms this.

Further important work in this area was done by Herman and Chomsky (2002), who find that the news media generally fail to provide information to aid the public to understand government actions and policies, with editors and journalists having internalised a deference to the views and agendas of political elites. Their analysis of the news coverage given to the wars in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as elections in third world countries among other case studies support the five filters of their "Propaganda model", which explains how the news media defends the "economic, social, and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the domestic society and the state." The first filter is the corporate ownership of large media groups; ownership by single parent companies alongside other large multinational companies and business interests results in an incentive to focus on profit, and in sustaining an environment favourable to increased profits. The second is a dependence on advertising revenue which discourages criticism of corporate activities. Content which might threaten the public's "buying mood" is discouraged as this could harm advertising revenue and profits. The third is the presumption of accuracy and credibility of information from official sources, giving government officials a default advantage as sources in news content. The fourth is public and elite (both corporate and political) backlash, or negative feedback for critical news coverage, and the fifth is fear, of communism, terrorism, or something else. Fear is used to discourage dissenting views.

The research on terrorism and conflict discussed in the previous section of this literature review focuses on the use of government sources, or the Propaganda Models' third factor, and supports its claim, that the news media relies on government sources. It also supports the Model's overall conclusion, that the news media and news content favours government agendas. Concerning the use of sources, Herman and Chomsky's (2002) own study found that 54 percent of experts on terrorism and defence issues who appeared on a broadcast channel news hour were government officials, dovetailing with Bennett's work.

Further research highlights why the news media relies on government sources and gives them a high degree of credibility. Paletz et al. (1982, pp. 167-168) and Gans (2004, pp 82-83) find that journalists lack time to investigate sources and select news stories, resulting in pressure to provide platforms to people and institutions who as leaders, are automatically presumed credible. This is exacerbated by an excess of possible news stories; as a media channel cannot possibly report every event and phenomenon, journalists grant legitimacy to the government as an "exclusionary consideration", or a means of automatically limiting the number of stories available (Gans, 1979, p. 147; Gans, 2004, p. 82-83). Paletz et al. (1982) studies the evening

news programs of three television networks to show that the news relies heavily on authority sources (and also that the news does not cover a terrorist's goals and motives, a similar finding to the research done by Kelly and Mitchell, and Steuter discussed in the next section). Gans's (2004) content analysis of two leading evening news shows and two news magazines in 1967, 1971, and 1975 found that the US President and other Federal officials made up 33 percent of sources used; with House and Senate members and state and local officials this increases to 67 percent. Almost half of all news is about conflicts between different branches of government, government announcements of new policies, congressional approvals and supreme court decisions, and government personnel changes. As Gans (2004, p. 62) puts it "the news deals mostly with those who hold the power within various national or societal strata", and on page 81, "The economically and politically powerful can obtain easy access to and are sought out by journalists, those who lack power are harder to reach by journalists and are generally not sought out until their activities produce social or moral disorder news." Though Gans (1979, 2004) studies news content from the 1960's and 70's, he is supported by more recent research, such as that done by Wolfsfeld (1997, 2011). Wolfslfeld's study of different events leads him to conclude that "political power can usually be translated into power over the news media". He says that those who have information tend to get covered more by journalists, and also tend to get covered more positively because of who they are. Tuchman (1978 p. 92) makes a relevant observation concerning this positive treatment. She finds that news editors equate numerical strength to legitimacy. The more the members of a particular group, the stronger the legitimacy of that group's representatives. She states that

> in all the time I've spent observing reporters and editors, I've never heard them challenge the right of an elected or appointed official to make news. Rather, the assumption is that the holder of a legitimated status speaks for the government. All others must demonstrate their relationship to a more amorphous entity – the public.

In addition to presumed legitimacy, officials with political power have the resources to prepare information to suit the news medium in which they wish the story to appear. Taking care of technical details, such as ensuring professional handling of lighting and camera angles for pre-recorded footage, designing press releases to need as little editing as possible before being used as news articles, and providing easy access to information and events, all make the reporter's job of publishing news easier, and encourage reliance on officials (Wolfsfeld, 2011). Herman and Chomsky (2002) explain similar practices as a part of the third filter of their Propaganda Model. Using official sources saves both time and money as large bureaucracies specialise in meeting journalist's needs with facilities in which to gather, advance copies of speeches and reports, press conferences at suitable times and press releases in usable language.

Graber and Dunaway's strong phrasing "teammates of officialdom" mentioned above, is interesting in the context of system justification theory, which adds an additional facet to the above work (Jost & Banaji, 1994). Though a part of psychology and outside the ambit of media and politics research, it provides an interesting and alternative explanation for this dependence on elites, and apparent alignment of interests.

System justification (SJT) is a socio-psychological theory that explains why individuals and members of groups tend to provide cognitive and ideological support to defend and rationalise existing social, economic, and political orders. Jost states that "many, or perhaps most" members of a society, in seeing aspects of their political and social system as good, fair, and legitimate, consequently condemn or ignore alternatives to the status quo for ideologically defensive reasons (Jost & Andrews, 2011; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Jost et al., 2004). Individuals do this because engaging in system justification results in greater subjective well-being, increased life satisfaction, and a sense of self-esteem. This results in a strong inclination to support governments and the social system, and to be wary of protests and change (Jost & Andrews, 2011). Jost and Andrews (2011) see both pros and cons for this. A stable and legitimised social system reduces social disorder, at the same time, risking "excessive ideological enthusiasm; the deleterious consequences of reactionary conservatism, extreme nationalism, and militarism."

It's possible to apply SJT to the behaviour of institutions such as media groups. Institutional behaviour can be seen as driven by individual behaviour, it is individuals who make up the groups and some journalists and editors could well engage in system justifying behaviour in the workplace. Bennett et al. (2007) echo system justification when they write that

> the dependent relationships between the press, public officials, and government…
> may rest on an idealised belief in the open flow of public information and a shared
> commitment by elected officials to democratic values. Indeed, most journalists, like
> most Americans, probably want to believe that these articles of democratic faith
> underlie their government

SJT could explain not only Indexing, but also Hallin's Sphere of Legitimate Controversy (Hallin, 1986). Hallin (1986) recognised that leading politicians define three spheres of media behaviour. The first sphere consists of issues recognised as legitimate by the ruling elite, within this region, objectivity and balance is a virtue. The second is the sphere of consensus, encompassing issues not seen as controversial, opposing views are not required and journalists are seen to celebrate consensus values. The third is the sphere of deviance, the realm of views that are unworthy of being heard or debated. Neutrality is not considered a virtue. The third sphere would include Jost's 'condemned alternatives to the status quo', ideologically out of sync with, or inapplicable to the established political and social system, inviting exclusion from media channels, to condemna-

tion if raised. Hallin's model is a precursor to Indexing, in that it describes how journalists include the opinions of political elites but shun those that are not legitimatised by established actors.

A possible complement to SJT, Wolfsfeld et al. (2008) theorised that the news media is motivated by cultural ethnocentrism, its behaviour defined by the narrow perspective of ethnic groups. This tribalistic motivation is said to explain why journalists give legitimacy to official (and local) sources, and defend the status quo. They use the Israeli and Palestinian news coverage of a suicide bombing on a Jerusalem Bus to demonstrate how each nation uses Jewish and Palestinian sources almost entirely, how the Palestinians downplayed the attack, giving it 5 minutes in a 30 minute program while the Israelis had an extended broadcast of 45 minutes with the bombing as the main story, and a high degree of victim memorialisation, with no memorialisation taking place in the Palestinian coverage. Gans (2004, pp. 42-43) also highlights ethnocentrism, especially in the war reporting of US newspapers. He found that the weekly casualty stories in the Vietnam War reported on the number of Americans and South Vietnamese killed, wounded, or missing, but the casualties in North Vietnam were impersonally described as the "Communist death toll" or "body count". American atrocities went ignored in the news media until the end of war, when the evidence was incontrovertible and couldn't be ignored. These findings provide important context to a part of this thesis's central argument, that the news media provides favourable coverage to domestic authorities, and critical coverage to foreign governments, though whether this is conclusively due to ethnocentrism cannot be said for certain.

2.5 The coverage of terrorist motives and objectives

An alternative method to outline potential deference to political elites in news coverage is the representation of the motives and origins of terrorists. If the news media presents a terrorist's motives as political, with actions motivated by the death of civilians in wars abroad, or the desire for independent statehood, then potential blame can be assigned to the target government's foreign and domestic policy, and possible calls for changes to those policies in ways that may not align with a state's larger geo-political goals. However, if a terrorist's origins or motives are reported as religious in nature, motivated by a poisonous Islamic ideology, or if psychosocial or sociological causes are emphasized such as social exclusion, an unstable childhood, or anger issues or the abuse of alcohol or drugs, then the focus shifts from the state to the individual. The state gets a pass as it cannot be held responsible for an individual's poor personal character or decisions which could include the choice to follow a religious ideology that promotes isolation or hate.

This focus on the news media's representation of goals, motives, and causes of terrorism and its connection to criticism of government action and policy is a contribution to a larger academic

debate regarding terrorist motives. A brief exploration of this debate below though not directly part of media research, provides important context nonetheless.

Kundnani (2014, 2015) argues that Islamist extremism is largely attributable to wars in the Middle East and South Asia waged by Western powers. He finds evidence that many terrorists, though Muslim, are not inspired by religious ideology or any characteristic of Islam, but by foreign wars that have resulted in hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians dying. He recognises a distinction between violent radicalism, or terrorism, and non-violent radicalism among Muslims. In contrast, Laqueur (2004) sees Muslim communities in Europe as a singular monolithic group, unwilling to integrate with the rest of society, and whose Islamic attributes and traits have resulted in radicalisation and terrorism. This is echoed by Sageman (2004) who focused on social bonds among Muslims as a precursor to Salafi ideology and terrorism, with jihadi (religious) ideology as an important constituent of political violence, and Silber and Bhatt (2007) who led the NYPD to see radicalism as an exclusively Muslim phenomenon.

Kundnani is indirectly supported by Horgan (Holbrook & Horgan, 2019; Knefel, 2013; Schuurman & Horgan, 2016) who focuses on a combination of factors, not just religion, but social, religious, psychological, and political causes as a combination of factors that lead to terrorism. Horgan doesn't use the word ideology as a substitute for religion, but as a term that encompasses both politics and religion. Likewise Bartlett and Miller (2012) find that religious ideology is far from the only cause of radicalisation, that outrage with Western foreign policy, peer pressure, a desire for status, and the emotional pull of the concept of Muslims under attack around the world are the main factors.

There is evidence that shows the political reasons for terrorism as voiced directly by terrorists themselves being overlooked by world leaders and the news media. After the 9/11 attacks in the U.S. the second President Bush in an address to Congress after 9/11 asked, "why do they hate us?", then answered himself, claiming that the terrorists hate America's freedoms such as the freedom to vote, assemble, and practice religion. Though he mentioned their political goals of overthrowing a number of Middle Eastern governments, greater attention was paid to explaining how "terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but to disrupt and end a way of life" (Bush, 2001). Bush chose not to focus on the motives publicly stated by Bin Laden which range from the oppression of people in Palestine by the U.S/Israeli coalition, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 (Bin Laden, 2004), U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia and used in Middle Eastern conflicts and wars (Bin Laden, 1998), and poor economic management by the Saudi government causing inflation (Bin Laden, 1996a). There is no denying that religious ideology features heavily in all of Bin Laden's writings, the objection to U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia is primarily due to the religious

significance of Saudi Arabia to Islam. But there is also no denying the strong political motives overtly explained in his publications, even extending to a criticism of the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Bin Laden, 1996b).

Another example is the Boston Marathon bombings. On April 15, 2013, two bombs made out of pressure cookers and shrapnel were set off at the Boston Marathon resulting in three deaths and two hundred and sixty injuries (Ray, 2020). Obama, paraphrasing Bush's response to 9/11 when Bush asked, "why do they hate us?" (Bush, 2001) said "Why did young men who grew up and studied here, as part of our communities and our country, resort to such violence?" (Obama, 2013). Four days later, while the terrorist Dzhokhar Tsarnaev hid inside a drydocked boat in a residential backyard, he wrote a message on the walls of the boat that said (U.S District Court: District of Massachusetts, 2013)

> The U.S. Government is killing our innocent civilians…I can't stand to see such evil go unpunished…We Muslims are one body, you hurt one you hurt us all…Now I don't like killing innocent people it is forbidden in Islam but due to said [unintelligible] it is allowed…Stop killing our innocent people and we will stop

According to Kundnani, "media reflections on the causes of the bombings gave little attention" to this message, choosing to focus instead on the brothers psychological deterioration (Kundnani, 2014). He also raises the example of the murder of Lee Rigby, a British soldier on the streets of Woolwich in South London. Two terrorists attacked and stabbed him to death, immediately after the attack the terrorists stated (Bari, 2013)

> The only reason we have killed this man today is because Muslims are dying daily by British soldiers. And this British soldier is one. It is an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. By Allah, we swear by the almighty Allah we will never stop fighting you until you leave us alone … So leave our lands and we can all live in peace. That's all I have to say

Kundnani finds that the media portrayal of motives again differed from the attackers given statement, focusing on the official narrative of radicalisation by a dangerous ideology. Kundnani makes sweeping statements about the media coverage but offers insufficient data to confirm his larger claim, this thesis attempts to fill this gap. The question of whether the news media actually devalues or distorts terrorists' own stated political motives, and in doing so perhaps privileges government action will be examined in chapter 5. This thesis does not argue that the media support terrorism, or agree with the methods used by terrorists. The news media can condemn the violence or a terrorist's methods, but explore the motives, and where necessary, criticise a target government's actions or policies that could have potentially been a contributory factor to a terrorist's actions.

After 9/11, the news media found itself part of a shift in perspective on terrorism. Islamist terror-

ism was seen as different from 20th century nationalist or political terrorism as it was said to be motivated by Islamic theology. The term radicalisation itself was rarely used in the news media before 9/11 and was used as a general term to describe a shift to more radical politics. It saw a massive upswing in use as the 21st century progressed and by 2004 it had come to mean the theological and/or psychological process by which Muslims became terrorists. Diverse groups were combined together and seen as driven by a single violent Islamic religion, "implacably opposed to anything alien to Islam and irrationally murderous in attitude. (Herbert, 2009, p. 392; Kundnani, 2014; Sedgwick, 2010, pp. 480-481).

The neo-radicalisation view tends to subordinate all other factors to religious zeal. Walter Laqueur, one proponent, finds that "al Qaeda was founded and September 11 occurred not because of a territorial dispute or the feeling of national oppression but because of a religious commandment—jihad and the establishment of shari'ah…terrorist groups with global ambitions cannot be appeased by territorial concessions" (Laqueur, 2004). His larger argument is that terrorists are neither poor nor do they come from poor backgrounds as well as arguing that many communities throughout history have suffered grievances, such as the gypsies or Dalits of India, and none have participated in terrorism. If not socio-economic reasons, then a "cultural-psychological predisposition" must be the root cause, or rather, the cause is something peculiar to Islam rather than external (Laqueur, 2004). This ignores the fact that the members of indigenous Adivasi tribes in India form between 80 to 90 percent of the of Maoist insurgency against the Indian state (Ghose, 2018; Sundar, 2016), in response to decades of brutalisation and eviction from upper caste settlers, Indian paramilitaries and state supported militias (Shah, 2019; Thomas, 2014).

If Islam provided the "Why" of terrorism, group psychology provided the "How", that is, a type of psychological process was regarded as key for an radicalised individual to transform into a violent terrorist. A key proponent of this is Marc Sageman, an author, psychiatrist, and former CIA officer. For Sageman, ideology alone is not enough, social bonds are the key to people becoming terrorists. It's an individual's friends and relatives that initiate the transformation to a "dedicated global Salafi mujahed." He called this the "bunch of guys theory". It begins with moral outrage about a perceived injustice, progresses with an interpretation that then places that outrage in a narrative involving a larger moral conflict, intensifies with negative personal experiences such as discrimination, and finally ends with joining an extremist network through friends and family (Sageman, 2004 ,loc: 368; 2011, pp. 72-88).

While religious ideology and its accompanying psychological component could well play a role in radicalisation, it seems likely, often by the terrorists' own manifestos, that political motives play

an equal or even greater role. One study of 117 homegrown jihadi terrorists identified six indicators of jihadi radicalisation, or six markers that indicate type of motive. While 5 of those markers were linked to religion and only one was "the expression of radical political views", the political drive to radicalisation was the factor found most frequently, occurring in 73.5% of the terrorists studied (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, pp. 53-54). This suggests that, as Brian Jenkins put it in the study's foreword "religious faith alone does not propel one into terrorism—radical political views are prerequisite (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 8).

Existing research indicates that the news coverage of terrorism does not pay attention to terrorist motives. Kelly and Mitchell (1981) examine 655 articles in total, including editorials, that reported on 158 incidents of transnational terrorism, that is terrorism that is carried out by groups outside their home nations, involving the citizenry and leaders of different countries. They found a focus on a terrorist's violent actions as opposed to causes and motivations, with little to no context, discussion of the issues involved, or background coverage that could help readers understand what was taking place and why. "For the most part, the news coverage focused on the sensational aspects of the incident – the blood and gore, the horror of the victims etc" (Kelly & Mitchell, 1981, p. 288). Paletz (1982) studied 192 New York Times articles from 1977 to 1979 that discussed 3 terrorist groups. Only 7 percent of articles mentioned the social, economic and political conditions in the country from which the groups originated, often briefly. Over 70 percent of articles had no discussion of the group's goals or objectives, and in only 5.5 percent did the groups' goals and objectives receive more than a single sentence. Steuter's work discussed above reveals a similar result with terrorist's objectives, "rarely explained and almost never justified" (Steuter, 1990).

The researcher's own content analysis regarding ISIS in 2014 found that out of 2,247 online news articles from *The Guardian* and *The Daily Mail*, only 32 had a primary purpose of examining the origins or reasons for ISIS's rise or expansion. 9% dealt with any form of analysis as opposed to almost a third that focused on describing the threat posed by the recruitment of foreign jihadists and the details of military action (Dass, 2015).

This appears to be replicated for the coverage given to the Maoists. Sundar (2016, loc: 492.1) found that the Indian press fails to provide context or background to explain the support given to the Maoists, that the print media was "more interested in reporting on the Maoists' marital and sex life than on the conditions that drove them to fight, or the sufferings of ordinary villagers." This is mirrored in television coverage, which focuses largely on terrorist attack details and police counter terrorist actions. Thomas (2014) concurs with this assessment, finding that the news coverage of the Maoists focuses primarily on the deaths caused by both sides, providing a "one-dimensional" understanding to audiences with coverage that fails to provide data about

the harm to communities and environment caused by economic growth. Mishra (2011) has very similar findings, with an analysis of newspaper coverage of the Maoists from 2009 that concludes that there was an "excessive salience to violence, Naxal-military confrontation and government's anti-Naxal policy measures while leaving out the historical context and controversial issues…"

If the four goals of terrorism can be summarised as public attention, recognition of demands, respect, and legitimacy (Nacos, 2016) it seems that only public attention might be fulfilled. This could be why there is a sense that there is a trivialisation of news, a shaping of stories to ensure emotional connections with people as opposed to analysis or contextualisation to gain an understanding of the background to a particular issue (Hoffman, 2006, p. 181), the accuracy of this is studied in this thesis.

2.6 Research to contradict dependence on elites

Despite the preponderance of evidence in support of 'political-elite' research and theories, there is considerable research to contradict it. It begins with a criticism of methodology. For example, Iyengar and Simon (1994) who studied broadcast news reports of the first Gulf War and were highly critical of the dependence on official sources and the news agenda that supported them, did not read the full transcripts of the television broadcasts, only the abstracts to determine whether the content was episodic or thematic. They don't specify whether or not their central or primary source classification was also from the abstracts. Methodologies that capture fewer data-points or do not consider the material in their entirety could potentially overlook the "semantic richness" of news frames, that can go beyond single words, or limited abstracts (Porpora et al., 2010).

This is the main criticism Porpora et al. (2010) levy against Bennett et al. (2006). Both teams study *The Washington Post's* news coverage of the Abu Ghraib scandal, with Bennett et al. (2006) searching for which label, abuse, mistreatment, scandal, or torture, was used to describe prisoner mistreatment. The use of these labels is seen to cue audiences to the meaning of events, with torture being seen as "strongly intentional" (Bennett et al., 2006, p. 473), and the others as not. The label used was identified as the frame. Bennett et al. (2006) are critical of the news coverage, they find the torture frame was only used at the beginning of the scandal, before it was framed as "regrettable abuse on the part of a few troops". The reason for this, in line with Bennett's indexing theory, is that there was the lack of any criticism by high level officials, as there was no counter framing, there was no challenge to the administration.

Porpora et al. (2010) in their study of the Abu Ghraib scandal, argue that frames should not be identified by looking at single words, that they are formed by the content as a whole. The use of

the word "abuse" instead of "torture" therefore does not have to mean giving the administration a pass, higher level responsibility is designated in diverse ways. They code for "slants" (frames), looking at the material in the headline and first three paragraphs. Their two frames are "Bad Apples" - prisoner mistreatment was caused by a few rogue soldiers, and was not systematic, and "higher level responsibility". They directly contradict Bennett's research results, finding that *The Washington Post* consistently criticised the Bush administration in both news and opinion articles. Administration framing was rejected, the 'higher responsibility frame was more frequent, and most articles did not downplay responsibility as mere laxity or neglect.

Speer (2017) goes a step further, assigning a frame to every paragraph that met his framing criteria in entire articles. He too finds evidence to support the 'event-driven' model in his study of how the Samarra Shrine bombing (as an event) led to a shift in the framing of the second Iraq war. Prior to the bombing the U.S. Military's framing of the Iraq war as a fight against insurgency was prevalent in the news, not The White House's War on Terror frame. Speer says that the disagreement between the military and government "provided an opening for journalists to actively promote non-White House frames". The insurgency frame was found in statements attributed to third party sources as well as journalists. The White House's War on Terror frame was rare, and rarely used by journalists without attribution, signalling a lack of adoption.

Immediately after the bombing, journalists took the initiative to present the conflict as a possible civil war. The Danger of Civil War frame was frequently used by journalists themselves, without attribution to any other source, despite it having less elite support. Speer does note that the Civil War frame did exist before, promoted by a small number of Democrats and military officials. However, journalists did take the framing lead so to speak, with the frame being used in coverage before the increase in statements of this frame from official sources. He doesn't outrightly contradict political elite models, noting that the frame was used by some political elites prior to the bombing, journalists did not come with it, they chose it, staying within the bounds of elite debate, however they did choose to champion it, when it saw little elite support, and used it without attribution.

This lack of use of The White House's War on Terror frame in 2006 could possibly be explained by Glazier and Boydstun (2012) who theorise that the news media support political elites in the immediate aftermath of a crisis, but as new events occur over time, and divided opinions appear among officials, the ruling government's frames are given less primacy. They use 500 statements and speeches made by President Bush, and 901 article abstracts from the Wall Street Journal between the 11th of September 2001 and December 31st 2006 , as a means of demonstrating "the press aligning with the president's frames during periods of national unity following a crisis

but then diverging as that solidarity fades."

Largely though, Speer's research supports Entman's (2004) Cascading Activation model, where the ability to promote frames by political elites is stratified across the political and military hierarchy with counterframes created by journalists and lower level politicians able to gain ground in the media and in government. Cultural ambiguity increases successful counter framing (Bennett et al., 2006). Entman's (2004) model uses the concept of applicability, terming it "congruence", to describe the ease of frame movement from political elites, to journalists and publics.

> Cultural congruence measures the ease with which…a news frame can cascade through the different levels of the framing process and stimulate similar reactions at each step. The more congruent the frame is with schemas that dominate the political culture, the more success it will enjoy

Althaus (2003) studies the news coverage of the first Gulf War to also find that political elite research under-represents the extent of critical news. This is possibly due to studies using abstracts as proxies for full text news content. Althaus finds that proxies "overstate the amount of support for administration policies contained in news discourse". He uses 3,854 full text transcripts of the nightly news broadcasts of three U.S. television networks between February and August 1991 and codes for three broad themes and stances, like Speer (2017), in each paragraph of text. He finds evidence to suggest that indexing was limited. His findings are similar to Speer's results, that journalists "frequently presented competing perspectives and were often the instigators rather than merely gatekeepers of critical view-points" though having said this, there was still a fair amount of support, anywhere from 49 to 87 percent of articles were supportive depending on the category.

What is clear from the above studies is that a more detailed methodology can lead to more detailed, and possibly more accurate research results. This thesis's methodology takes this into account.

It is entirely possible that journalists and third-party sources are not just present but given primacy in the news coverage of terrorism. Dramatic events, whether a type of political violence, or reactions to them (like Abu Ghraib), possess what journalists value, they are unexpected, unambiguous, and contain negative references to elites (Galtung & Ruge, 1965, p. 70). They contain potential for critical counter frames, either sponsored by journalists themselves, or social and political challengers, to break through into the public discourse.

One example of this in a different news category is provided by Bennett and Lawrence (1995) who analysed news about the environment and waste recycling from 1980-1990 to find that the rejection of a garbage barge for 3 months from various ports dramatically shifted coverage

patterns and generated enough public pressure to force a change in landfill policy. They add that certain events can challenge dominant ideologies when journalists and their sources use them to focus attention on political and social problems. CNN Effect research provides further evidence to demonstrate this. The CNN Effect is an umbrella term for a series of sub effects that are derived from the impact of the rapid transmission of images and text on diplomacy, foreign policy, and public opinion; named after the Cable News Network (CNN), the first 24 hour television news channel, and its impact on U.S. government policy during the first Gulf War. These sub effects include the shortened time available for governments to establish a position or formulate a policy, or the doubts raised in the news about the legitimacy of military engagements and government policies (Bahador, 2007). Bahador's (2007) research shows that the negatively framed emotive news coverage and imagery surrounding three incidents involving the massacres of Kosovo Albanians contributed to a policy shift in favour of a military intervention. By demonstrating the ability of the media to influence the government, rather than the other way around, Bahador (2007) effectively criticizes the work done by Bennett (1990) and Herman and Chomsky (2002). CNN Effect research however does not appear to study the extent to which critical information or imagery appears in the news, only that when it does occur, it has a clear impact on government policy. This thesis does not focus on the impact of news coverage on government policy, but rather the nature of terrorism news coverage and how often criticism and praise occurs, the forms it takes, and the context it occurs in. In doing so, it shares a similar goal with CNN Effect research in evaluating the validity of political elite research, whether theoretical or empirical, but from a different perspective, one which is focused on the news coverage, the sources used in that coverage, and the variables that might impact that news coverage, rather than how the news might influence external/dependent variables.

That unpredictable events can lead to a loss of government control over political environments, leading to criticism or policy changes is clear. Wolfsfeld (1997, pp. 167-168) describes the Israeli government's loss of control over the news narrative during the intifada, where the imagery resonated with journalistic and political values, resulting in a focus on a Palestinian victim frame over an Israeli law and order frame in foreign news outlets, Israeli media however did have a greater focus on a law and order frame, beneficial to the Israeli government. Foreign news outlets had the organisation and resources to cover events without depending on Israeli government sources, with easy access to protest locations and protesters. Israeli journalists however were more dependent on Israeli government sources, as there was a larger demand in Israel for official information. Wolfsfeld (1997) does not examine this foreign/local divide in a larger context, comparing the news media of different nations and how they might cover events differently depending on the region in which the event takes place. This is a key issue examined by this

thesis. He argues that when governments lose control over the political environment, perhaps when unpredictable events occur or when government policies fail, when news organisations possess knowledge about the conflict, with the resources and organization to cover it, and when journalists don't need to depend on officials for information, then the news media breaks away from government influence and can turn critical.

Despite this however, he argues that incidents such as terrorism are not likely to lead to the fulfillment of the above conditions, that the news media are likely to play the role of "faithful servants" in times of national crises and war. But he does not distinguish (at least not explicitly) between domestic and international events, and how news media behaviour might change depending on the location of the news story.

Lawrence (2000) finds that while the news does "present officially sanctioned realities" this is not inevitable. She highlights (among other events) the videotaped beating of African-American Rodney King by white police officers as an example of a defining event, shifting views with new voices

> Accidental events happen, and they produce news dynamics less firmly pegged to official sources, news that allows journalists thematic licence, news that offers opportunities to reshape the public definitions of problems we face in society

She identifies key elements that make up a "defining" or "newsworthy" event that encourages criticism to emerge. There should be witness or family member statements that publicly contradict official versions, official documents such as coroner reports, or whistle-blower statements that accuse officials of malfeasance, strong public reactions from NGOs or other public or even official figures, and colourful or emotional soundbites from victims. Groeling and Baum (2008) study 42 U.S. foreign policy crises, particularly military mobilisations and conflicts to demonstrate that journalists play an active role in choosing which political elites to give primacy, with a preference for criticism. They study the television broadcasts involving every appearance by a Senator or Congressman 30 days before and 30 days after the announcement or start of the U.S. force deployment associated with each event, and code source stance towards the President. They find that the majority of evaluations given coverage are critical, so much so that they describe it as "waves of negativity in media coverage of elite discussion concerning the president and his policies."

2.7 Regional distortions in terrorism news

The existing literature is highly critical of the news coverage of terrorism in terms of the quality of information provided and the nature of sources used. It is also critical in terms of biases by region, a criticism that supports this thesis's findings of different styles of coverage for different

regions. Kelly and Mitchell (1981) find clear regional biases, for example, *The New York Times* focused on North America, the Middle East, and Central Asia and under-reported the other regions, while the Times of London focused most of its coverage on Europe and the Middle East, also under-reporting the other regions. Carpini and Williams (1987) studied NBC's television news coverage of terrorism and found a similar result. Schaefer (2003) finds broad structural reasons for the higher volume of coverage given to attacks in a newspaper's own country. He studies two events, the 1998 U.S. embassy truck bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and 9/11 in four newspapers, *The New York Times*, and the *Washington Post*, and a newspaper from Kenya and Tanzania. All papers gave coverage to stories based on geographical proximity, including more coverage given to attacks in their home cities. He cites the ease of reporting in terms of journalist access to sources and information as a factor, and an ethnocentric and nationalis- tic bias in covering foreign affairs. Jetter (2014) also finds that geographical distance plays an important role. He studies terrorist attacks from 1998 to 2012 in *The New York Times*. He finds that the number of casualties does not determine media attention. Geographical distance is the prime determinant of coverage with countries located further away from the U.S. receiving less coverage. Countries received more coverage if they had stronger trade relations with the U.S. or possessed important natural resources or foreign direct investment.

Hawkins (2008) adds an important perspective to the above research in his study of conflicts across the world. He finds that conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo, southern Sudan, and the Angolan Civil War, which claimed over 8 million casualties, received little to no attention in the global media, or by policy makers, NGOs, and the public. This, in comparison to conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel and Palestine, and Serbia which receive a great deal of attention and coverage. He questions why the most severe conflicts in terms of loss of life go ignored to find several key factors that influence the amount and direction of media (and other entities) attention. The most important factor is if a conflict affects a country's economic, military, or other national or strategic interests. Another is geographic proximity or access. Similarly to Jetter (2014), Hawkins (2008) finds that conflicts with a close physical proximity would likely mean an impact on trade and the economy as well as the possibility of incoming refugees from that conflict, this is apart from the sense of closeness to local disturbances resulting in increased attention. Locations further away from a reporter's home base can also mean dangers for reporters, difficulty in accessing locations and legal restrictions on entering areas, all of which discourage attention. The ability to identify with the participants or victims of a conflict through shared racial, national, ethnic, reli- gious, cultural, linguistic, historic, or socioeconomic ties influences the ability to sympathise with one side of the conflict as the victims, and to cast the other as evil perpetrators. This sympathy is key to positioning a conflict as simple, which media corporations require for saleability. According

to Hawkins, media corporations need to fit news stories into short easily understandable formats to sell to consumers. Complex conflicts involving warlords or blurred lines between victims and perpetrators tend to receive less attention. The last factor is sensationalism. The more dramatic and sensational the conflict, the more difficult it is to ignore.

Thus, the research indicates that newspapers cover foreign events that are linked with their own country's state interests, political debates, or cultural issues, and quite possibly require, as one New York Time's columnist put it, 'an emotionally engaging frame of clearly identifiable good guys and bad guys' (Taub, 2016b). She supports the academic research by comparing the conflicts in Yemen and Syria, to find Yemen relatively ignored as compared to Syria due to the involvement of Saudi Arabia, a U.S. ally, and the lack of an easily defined villain to blame. Graber and Dunaway (2014) don't compare individual countries but find the television coverage in March and April 2009 heavily skewed towards the Middle East, with the Caribbean and Australia receiving no coverage at all.

Nickerson (2019) studied *The Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *The Boston Globe* and the *LA Times's* coverage of terrorist attacks in France and Turkey over a two-year period. He studied 475 articles, 143 from Turkey, and 332 from France. After making a list from the GTD of all terrorist attacks in France and Turkey during the time period, he searched for articles in the attack location and date from the news websites. The articles were further winnowed using the keywords: 'terrorist attack', 'France attacks', 'Turkey attacks'. He assigned single themes to the article headlines and content. Both headlines and content in the coverage of attacks in France were found to have used the words terrorist and terror attack more frequently than the coverage of attacks in Turkey, 19 vs 8 and 74 vs 21 percent respectively, a possible indication of a difference in perception for attacks in Turkey. Chapter 11 in this thesis reveals similar findings and provides further detail.

This thesis looks at regional data along with key words used by both country and region to identify trends in terrorism news coverage, a potential factor in identifying regional importance to different newspapers.

2.8 A brief note on framing and agenda-setting

Frames are ways of defining and explaining events and phenomena (Speer, 2017). There are two ways to understand framing, the sociological perspective known as emphasis framing, and the psychological perspective, known as equivalence framing (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Druckman, 2001; McLeod & Shah, 2014; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012). In emphasis framing, frame builders promote or emphasise a particular definition of a problem, cause, solution, and moral judgment

(Entman, 1993). Different emphasis frames therefore consist of different sets of facts, facts cannot be held constant across different frames (McLeod & Shah, 2014). Equivalence framing is the opposite. Equivalence frames are found in pieces of content that consist of different, but logically equivalent words and phrases. The differences in the frames consist of variations in the mode of presentation, how it is presented to the audience, rather than the substantive factual differences that make up emphasis frames. Equivalence frames cannot exist independently, they are defined by their opposite frames (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Druckman, 2001; Scheufele & Iyengar, 2012; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Were this a study of audience opinions, equivalence framing might be a viable candidate for adoption. But this is a study of terrorism news content, it's sources, and the possible influences that shape it. Therefore emphasis framing is better suited for it.

Agenda-Setting is the transfer of salience of the news topics on the media agenda to the audience agenda (McCombs, 2014). A basic agenda-setting study will typically comprise of a content analysis of news coverage for an issue or set of issues over a period of time followed by a survey to determine the issues that receive the most mentions by participants. Agenda setting research focuses on the impact of the media agenda on an audience agenda, that is, media content is considered an independent variable, and the audience agenda is the dependent variable, with correlation between issues on the media agenda and issues on the public agenda the primary research image (Dearing & Rogers, 1996; McCombs, 2014). In this thesis media content is the dependent variable, influenced by semi-independent factors. The tradition of agenda-setting is not the right fit in this case

2.9 Conclusion

Though the news coverage of terrorism (and other conflict news) has been studied from numerous perspectives in the past, there is scope for further study and a wider perspective. This thesis considers criticism and praise of government action in news coverage, the representation of terrorist goals and motives in multiple terrorist attacks, and the use of sources, stances, themes, and frames in terrorism related events and policy areas and hopefully provides that perspective.

Prior studies have shown a heavy use of official sources and content that favours official agendas in print and television news following a terrorist attack, as well as in the coverage of foreign wars. There appears to be an overall lack of coverage given to terrorists' motives and origins, and when such coverage occurs, religious and psychosocial causes are given primacy over political motives. Though there is a great deal of evidence to support 'political-elite' research, there is also sufficient evidence to indicate that dramatic events provide openings for news that is critical of officials to break through. In addition, there are potential methodological flaws with

some studies that support the principle that there is a general lack of criticism directed at high level officials. The thesis methodology outlined in the next chapter explains how these flaws are avoided.

Chapter 3
Methodology

3.1 Introduction

What the literature review shows us is that a detailed methodology that studies the entirety of the news text is critical to obtaining valid results. Apart from reading the full news article, several steps were taken to ensure the capture of multiple points of data from news articles to help understand the key issue of the extent of official source use and agenda representation in terrorism news.

Section 3.2 of the methodology will first explain how news articles were selected, using the definition of terrorism from the previous chapter to outline six rules to determine whether or not an article would be included in the database and used for analysis, it will also elaborate on the choice of newspapers and countries selected for study. Section 3.3 will be a detailed explanation of the type of content analysis used, and why Krippendorff's definition of content analysis is the most suitable. Section 3.4 outlines the coding sheet used to study the selected news articles, the process by which it was developed, and the key variables. Section 3.5 explains how those key variables were used in the findings chapters. The final section outlines the intercoder reliability test conducted on a sample of news stories.

3.2 How news articles were selected

The unit of data collection, defined by Neuendorf (2017, p. 43) as "the element on which each variable is measured", is the news article whose predominant subject is terrorism. The previous chapter's exploration of terrorism definitions was used to create six rules or criteria to determine whether or not an article would be included in the database and undergo the full content analysis. These rules are as follows:

i.   The event is described/accepted/undisputed as terrorism by the media group.

ii. The event is described/accepted/undisputed as terrorism by a leading Western democracy

iii. The event involves the actions of a group/individuals that are a part of a proscribed terrorist group as listed by a leading Western democracy (U.S./U.K. etc.). This Includes Hamas, the Taliban and others. Some stories do not actually use the words terrorism, or militancy, but simply make a reference to a group.

iv. The event is described/accepted/undisputed as terrorism by allies of leading Western democracies.

v.   The event has no clear terror label, is conducted by an individual/undefined group, but has the three elements that make it terrorism, violence, social/political motive, publicity.

vi.   State violence is generally not included, unless factions within the state are accused, or the state is accused of terrorism by a leading Western democracy. For example stories about Saudi Arabian officials accused of funding 9/11 hijackers are included. State violence against civilian population stories are not included (for example, the Myanmar government's violence against the Rohingya, which escalated towards the end of the year), unless that violence is directed at a Western government proscribed terrorist group and that counter terrorist action is causing civilian casualties. So if Russia is causing civilian casualties in Syria in the course of attacking ISIS, it is included. General stories about civilian deaths in the course of the Syrian War are not. Any government counter terror action against a proscribed terrorist group is included.

News articles were acquired from the ProQuest database. Each newspaper's archive within the database was selected, and the key words below were used to search that newspaper archive month by month for the year of 2016.

> Terrorist, Terrorism, Terror, Counter-Terror, ISIS, ISIL, Islamic, State, Neo-Nazi, Neo-Fascist, Militant, Al-Qaida, Indian Mujahideen, PKK, Kurdistan Workers Party, Boko Haram, Naxal, Militant, Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Maoist, al-Shabaab

The key words were deliberately left as broad as possible to include a listing of all stories that might potentially be related to terrorism. The initial list of news articles was predictably large (any article that featured the word 'terror' was present), each article was then read, the above rules were applied, and the article was either included, discarded, or placed in a "not sure list". The stories on this list are not included in the analysis but still retained in the list because I did not feel comfortable ignoring them, despite them not fulfilling the conditions above.

The 'not sure' list has stories where authority figures such as police department spokespeople and leaders in local or national governments cast doubt over whether an act of violence is terrorism. In such instances, and others where it is unclear if the actions or events taking place are terrorism or not, news articles are kept, but kept aside. Some stories on the list are 'mixed' stories, perhaps terrorism is given a few paragraphs, but the article then pivots to other subjects, only stories that are entirely, or almost entirely about terrorism are included in the analysis. A very rough approximation would be at least two thirds of the article's content.

The ProQuest database appeared to be incomplete for *The Guardian* starting in July 2016, so the search terms were used directly on *The Guardian's* website for the second half of the year to acquire news stories.

The search terms above mean that what I'm studying is what the media label as terrorism, which means that my work is revealing of biases in the media. As Powell (2011) and Kearns et al. (2019) explain, terrorism in the Western media is indelibly linked to Muslims. Including India, 69.5 percent of the database has stories about terrorism motivated by religion, and of those stories, 98 percent are about Islamist terrorism. To put it another way, 68 percent of the entire

volume of terrorism coverage in 2016 focuses on Islamist motivated terorrism As Daniel Benja-min, a professor at Dartmouth and former State Department coordinator for counterterrorism put it, "If there is a mass killing and there is a Muslim involved, all of a sudden it is by definition terrorism," (Mazzetti & Schmitt, 2016).

Perhaps this is why there is a paucity of articles that link white nationalism/supremacy to terror-ism. Only 0.9 percent of news articles in the database are about right-wing perpetrators. There were stories about neo-Nazi's, but almost all of them have been placed in the 'not sure' list because they aren't labelled as terrorists and because there is no actual violence described in the news articles. They're either protesting (without overt violence) or marching or doing some-thing just within the democratic boundary.

There is evidence to show that right-wing terror is not labelled as such, for example, when Dylann Roof killed nine people at a predominantly black Church in South Carolina, not a single charge against him mentioned terrorism. As one *New York Times* editorial put it, "When mass killers show even minor hints of affinity for jihadist groups, as they did in recent attacks in Orlando, Fla., and Nice, France, their actions are swiftly judged to be terrorism. But when their source of inspiration appears to be right-wing extremism…they are often treated as disturbed loners" (Fisher, 2016b).

If I had used 'disturbed' and 'loner' as search terms to try to find stories about right-wing terror-ism, the number of stories I would have to sift through would have ballooned. With the search terms used I estimate I read about 28,000 to 30,000 stories in total to find the 8,742 stories in the database and the almost 900 stories on the 'not sure list'. For practical reasons, this had to be a study of what the media label as terrorism, and unfortunately, right-wing individuals, groups, and their violence were not labelled as such. A recent page 1 article in *The New York Times* about the 2021 storming of the U.S. Capitol, arguably a spectacular act of violence for publicity to achieve a political goal, that is to say, an act of terrorism, refers to the perpetrators as insurrectionists, extremists, neo-Nazis, and white nationalists. Never terrorists. Two paragraphs are dedicated to the terrorists Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people in Norway, Dylann Roof, who attacked a Church in the U.S. and killed 9 black parishioners, Brenton Tarrant, who killed 50 Muslims in New Zealand, and Patrick Crusius, the El Paso Walmart shooter who killed 22 people. Not one of them are described as terrorists in the article (Bennhold & Schwirtz, 2021).

Some events simply lack any clear identification or agreement about what has happened and have been disregarded entirely. These could include stories such as the Gulenists in the U.S. and Turkey coup, or the protesters at the Dakota pipeline in the U.S.

The Syrian Civil War is not included at all, unless the news article focuses on the actions of a

Western democracy proscribed terrorist group. Russia and Syria are not a part of the countries being studied, and when they proscribe a terrorist group, I do not study that group's coverage. I have been led by the three countries whose newspapers are under study. For example, if Turkey calls the PKK terrorists and the U.S. concurs, the PKK is included in the database. But when Turkey calls Gulen a terrorist, there is no agreement among any of the three countries and no evidence to back it up, I don't include Gulenists.

6 print newspapers have been selected from 3 countries, for their high circulations within their country of publication, often global readership either online or print, and their ability to set the news agenda of other media groups (*The New York Times* has this effect in particular). The time span under analysis is 1 year, 2016.

The United States: *The New York Times* and *USA Today* have been selected. Both publications are ranked one and two respectively in terms of circulation in the U.S. (Cison, 2016), with *The New York Times's* agenda of stories paid close attention to by the *Associated Press* (McCombs, 2014) and with "significant correlations between the international news agenda of the morning *New York Times* and the international news agendas of three evening television news programs" (Golan, 2006). Reese and Lewis (2009) also focus on the Washington-based *USA Today* for its "largest daily newspaper national circulation and a publication that seeks to speak with a national voice."

The United Kingdom: Newspapers in the U.K. fall into two categories, the quality press which includes "more serious newspapers which give detailed accounts of world events" (Collins English Dictionary, 2017a) and the tabloids, newspapers with small pages, short articles, and lots of photographs, "often considered to be less serious than other newspapers" (Collins English Dictionary, 2017b). The source used for this classification is specific to the U.K. *The Sun* and T*he Daily Mail* have the highest circulations and therefore should be natural candidates for analysis (Ponsford, 2016). However, they are both tabloids, from my personal experience analysing tabloids such as *The Daily Mail* is time consuming and hard with little return given that articles are mostly comprised of images. Looking at the quality press, *The Guardian* has a very low circulation, one of the lowest in print, though evidence suggests it is doing much better online, behind only *The Daily Mail* in daily average unique browsers (Ponsford, 2016). The only seven day a week newspaper within the UK ABC termed 'qualities' category, is *The Telegraph* (ibid). *The Telegraph* is widely considered to be a conservative paper, with *The Guardian* considered left-leaning, making it a natural counterpoint (BBC, 2009a). These are the two newspapers that are analysed from the U.K.

India: Indian newspapers provide an alternative perspective to the U.S. and U.K. English language newspapers were selected to provide common ground with the other papers. According to the India Audit Bureau of Circulations, *The Times of India* and *The Hindu* are the two largest English newspapers by circulation. From my own personal experience, *The Times of India* is right of centre, *The Hindu* is a left-leaning publication. They have the highest circulations in the English language category (Audit Bureau of Circulations India, 2016).

3.3 Content analysis

The thesis focuses on newspaper articles, as opposed to interviewing journalists directly. As Bennett (1990) justified it, journalists reside within the media system and produce news "with little self-conscious articulation of underlying assumptions." Their responses to questions about the use of sources and theme selection would possibly be more defensive rather than revealing of the nuances of different variables in news articles. Journalistic norms are thought to be constituted in journalistic output, and a study of the news articles themselves was thought to be better suited to answering the research question.

Content analysis was chosen as the primary research method. The essential action of content analysis is the counting of repetitions of pre-defined instances through a large body of work (such as newspaper articles published in a certain period) and tracing patterns where they may be found. Themes, sources, stances, and frames are examples of a pre-defined instance. A more formal and wider ranging definition for content analysis is "A research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the contexts of their use" (Krippendorff, 2004). Neuendorf (2017, p.19) clearly defined it as "the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message characteristics."

This project will accept Krippendorff's (2004) definition of content analysis that argues that the researcher's understanding of a subject is inseparable from its study, that meaning is not manifest in content but is created in the process of consuming it. This allows for the use of the researcher's own ability to detect latent meaning in content, essential for identifying themes and stances in content, as well as frames. These variables are explored further in the next section. Despite the subjective nature of such empirical observation, there are sufficient commonly agreed upon interpretations to allow for observable patterns to exist (Reese, 2007).

Krippendorff replaces objectivity and systematicity, the motivations of Berelson's (1952) understanding of meaning, with replicability (reliability) and validity. A process can acknowledge its own fallibility, excusable only when it is governed by clear rules, explicitly stated and applied equally to all units of analysis; essentially, be subjective, but be exceedingly clear and consist-

ent about what you are being subjective about. Validity goes a step further, demanding that the researcher's subjective processes of sampling and reading satisfy external criteria.

It should be noted that subjectivity does not automatically equate to bias. Allowing for the existence of different patterns of observable interpretations allows a researcher to bring his or her own conceptual contributions to the study, but this does not mean a lack of rigour in identifying what is being observed and not taking steps to minimise external factors or internal biases to reduce the risk that the frames found were consciously or unconsciously looked for. To answer Reese's (2010) question, "How does one convincingly establish that a frame exists?" Through careful description (Downs, 2002), and displaying a kind of meta-cognition, or awareness of one's own potential biases. As Tankard (2001) noted, coming up with the names of frames itself involves a kind of framing, a process one should be aware of while doing it. The issue/themes variable takes this into account and is explained below.

Efforts have been made to increase the transparency of frame identification, and potentially other ways to identify media variables. Matthes and Kohring (2008), in an effort to increase replicability and validity, suggested splitting up a frame into the separate elements identified by Entman (1993) and letting a cluster analysis reveal the frame, limiting the researcher's role to identifying the discrete elements. Those elements are: problem definition or the central issue under investigation, causal attribution or the cause of the problem (Matthes and Kohring define this slightly differently due to the difference in topic), treatment recommendations or proposed solutions, and moral evaluations. They admit that the problem reliability in frame analysis is not completely resolved but is shifted to the content analytical assessment of single frame elements. The more manifest a certain variable, the higher its reliability. Because coders don't know which frame they are coding, the impact of coder schemata or coding expectations is weaker.

Their method, tested in an analysis of the coverage of biotechnology, while an interesting evolution from past studies, could be problematic. The removal of the analyst from frame identification might comprise on validity. Understanding and identifying media frames involves the use of latent content, the reading between the lines written about earlier, which a cluster analysis would not reveal. It would not reveal the connections that a human audience might make, connections which a human analyst would be better suited at identifying (B. T. Scheufele & Scheufele, 2010). The problem with Matthes and Kohring's method found by Scheufele and Scheufele was also found by the researcher while identifying media frames for this content analysis. There are occasions when the frame does not clearly match its building blocks. An academic might clearly identify a problem or issue, a cause, a solution, and moral evaluation, but the final frame identification is based on something more than just the sum of an article's parts, requiring a human to identify

and then quantify, rather than a computerised process. The content analysis used in this thesis has the researcher read an article text, identify the key variables in it, then code those variables directly into SPSS, an IBM software designed for quantitative research.

This potential ambiguity in frame identification was recognised early. Goffman (1974) himself said that frameworks vary in degrees of organisation, some are neatly presentable as a system of entities, postulates and rules; others appear to have no apparent articulated shape, providing only a lore of understanding, an approach, a perspective. The frames used in this thesis are listed in the appendix and are discussed in the next section.

3.4 The coding sheet

The coding sheet went through several iterations. The first version used the four variables described by Entman (1993), the problem definition, the causal attribution, treatment recommendation, and moral evaluation. The moral evaluation variable had multiple 'objects', understood in the social psychology definition of the term as the thing that a person holds an opinion about (Guo et al., 2012). I soon realised that this method was unsuitable for achieving the goals I had in mind.

As stated earlier, I wanted to take into account the criticisms others had made, such as Porpora of Bennett, to capture the total semantic richness of the news article. Entman's four variables, while useful in understanding framing, are not suitable for this purpose. They are also unsuitable for understanding how sources are represented in news articles, and the stances they hold on a diverse range of issues. The problem definition according to Matthes and Kohring (2008) "includes both the central issue under investigation and the most important actor". The trouble is that many articles lack a single problem definition. They don't have a single central issue under investigation, and if a coding sheet, as so many do, has only one variable to list a single problem definition, important nuances get lost. When there's only one listing for the problem, in order to encompass multiple meanings, problem definitions must be vague, easily generalisable to mean multiple actions by multiple actors. While this would aid the ease of the content analysis making it easier to categorise articles, as well as ensure a high intercoder score, it defeats the purpose of understanding the finer nuances of news articles that contain multiple issues.

In addition, I found most articles did not have a clearly defined causal attribution, or a treatment recommendation, or a moral evaluation. A significant number were just a series of different problem definitions. In the first iteration of the coding sheet, there was simply no data other than problem definitions.

Which is why, rather than having a single problem definition, I increased the number to four and

called them 'issue/themes'. The term 'issue/theme' is awkward but is necessary because of the diverse range of subjects it encompasses. When the word 'coverage' is used in the findings chapters it refers to the body of issue/themes. Examples of issue/themes include: Description of terrorist attack, which labels news content which is about the details of the attack itself and how it was carried out. Or exploration of terrorist motives or origins, which covers any material referencing why a terrorist carried out an attack, or the underlying conditions that contributed to the attack. Another might be military counter terrorist actions, for article content about military actions against terrorist groups. A full listing is provided in the appendix.

To focus on government policies and criticism I took inspiration from Bennett and Manheim (1993) who studied the news coverage of the first Gulf War. Their coding sheet recorded "the presence or absence of an explicit mention of a policy issue or question". I added a policy/question variable to each issue theme.

Policy/questions began as recording only the mention of a government policy. They quickly evolved into recording the news topics in coverage, and became a method of clarifying the less specific, more general issue/theme. For example, if the issue/theme was 'government counter terrorist actions, US, legal', then the policy/question could be 'Should Apple unlock the San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone?' This variable specifies precise news topics and adds further weight to the next key variables: sources and stances.

Each of the four issue/theme and policy/question pairs had up to 10 cited sources attached to them. That is any sources that were used to provide information or opinions on the issue/theme, policy/question pair. The cited sources are 'source categories', so for example, if a 'U.S. Congressman, Democrat' appears as a source, and then a different 'U.S. Congressman, Democrat' is used as another cited source, they both are counted under the single 'U.S. Congressman, Democrat' source listing.

Out of all the cited sources, one was potentially the principal or primary. This was determined in two ways, volume, and context. Some articles are descriptions of events without any moral judgements; fact-based themes or articles that have information provided by one source over all others, or a single source, are listed as having a principal source. But context was taken into account as well. An article about a statement by Donald Trump would have Donald Trump as the most cited source by volume, all the content would essentially be his speech, but the journalist might use certain words at the start or end of paragraphs, words like hysterical or controversial, or might juxtapose the speech with facts that contradict them. In such cases, despite one source occupying greater volume, it cannot be listed as the principal source as the entire

content is being criticised or invalidated. In this example described above, the journalist would be the principal source.

All sources were listed in granular categories. For example, rather than 'U.S. politician', or 'U.S. politician', 'Democrat' or 'Republican', There are 'U.S. Congressman' and 'U.S. Senator', divided by party. Instead of 'U.S. Federal Government Official' as a single umbrella term, there were coding categories for 'U.S. President', 'U.S. Administration' and 'U.S. Prosecutor'. This was done to capture more detail about the sources, but led to a loss of detail in the principal source variable in instances when multiple government officials were used and there was no umbrella term to list them under.

The next key variable is stances. Each issue/theme and policy/question pairing, substantiated by up to 10 cited sources, and potentially 1 principal source, was given a supportive, neutral, critical, or descriptive stance, for both, the issue/theme, and the policy/question. So if the issue/theme was 'government counter terrorist actions, US, legal', and the policy/question was 'Should Apple unlock the San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone?' An article in outright support of the government's position, and opposed to Apple would have a 'Supportive' stance for the issue/theme variable, and a 'Supportive' stance for the policy/question variable. If the sources used and news article content was more or less evenly divided, representing both the government and Apple's position without either entity favoured, then both stances would be 'Neutral'. The 'Descriptive' stance is when there is no explicit or implicit stance, that there isn't any clear praise or criticism and no identifiable 'sotto voice' speaking loudly enough to warrant a stance listing. The 'supportive' and 'critical' stances correspond to their assumed values.

All stances were assigned based on either clear word use related to praise or criticism, or based on Gans's (2004, p.40) "sotto voice". Gans recognised that news stories can implicitly express positive and negative values, with the assumption that the audience also shares these values. For example, if a news article reports that a police dog was awarded a medal for bravery for its actions in a battle against the Maoists, outright words of praise are not necessary for the description of police action issue/ theme to be marked as supportive. The story itself suggests "sotto voice" that the police action was positive, resulting in a medal for bravery. Or In Gan's own words,

> When a story reports that a politician has been charged with corruption, it suggests, sotto voce, that corruption is bad and that politicians should be honest. Much news is about the violation of values; crime and disasters are not reported because these phenomena are desirable

To sum up so far, each article was viewed as consisting of up to 4 'sets', with each set containing an issue/theme, a policy/question, 10 cited source categories, a potential principal source, a

source stance (moral evaluation) towards the issue/theme and a separate stance for the policy/question.

A single article frame was chosen based on the coding of all variables. Of the multiple definitions of framing some highlight how they differ in degrees of organisation and have no concrete indicator (Goffman, 1974), others how they encompass different positions and allow for supporters on opposite sides of an issue to share a common frame (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, 1989). Some definitions are more specific in nature, creating three or more parts to each frame: the diagnosis of a problem, a solution, and a call to action (Snow & Benford, 1988, 2000; Entman, 1993). Reese defines frames as "organizing principles that are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the social world" (Reese, 2001). With this definition, he communicates two key points. The first is that by defining frames as principals, he avoids rooting frames as a static feature of either media texts or individual psychological elements. In doing so he shares the position taken by Snow and Benford (2000) who see frames as only partly cognitive entities, manifest in the individual, but their essence, sociologically, residing in situated social interaction, in the interpretive discussions and debates that social movement actors engage in amongst each other and in the framing contests that occur between diverse entities. The practical meaning of this is that rather than describe narratives alone, frames describe a deeper level of thinking in society, which is broadly applied to multiple narratives (Reese, 2001, 2007).

Past research often uses one of two categories of emphasis frames to study content, context specific and transcendent frames. Context specific frames consist of variables that are highly specific to a particular issue, they cannot be generalised to multiple topics, transcendent frames describe the more abstract qualities of content and can be generalised across issues (McLeod & Shah, 2014). A strain of thought says that frames should be generalisable to diverse issues and is critical of studies that offer "new operationalisations of media frames…without addressing the conceptual foundations of their work or clarifying the inconsistencies between their measures and frames used in previous studies" (McCombs & Ghanem, 2001; D. A. Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).

Transcendent frames however, while useful for a wider perspective, can run the risk of lacking sufficient description of the content associated with the frame. For example Schaefer (2003) who uses a "disaster" frame among others in a study on framing differences of terror attacks in U.S. and African newspapers, uses it to encompass rescue efforts, victim stories, and attacks. The frames used in this thesis are a mix of context specific and transcendent. A flowchart of the coding sheet is illustrated on the next page.

Flowchart of Coding Sheet

3.5 The structure of the findings chapters

The methodology has so far explained how articles have been selected, content analysis as a research method, and the key variables of the coding sheet. This section will explain the methodology's application to the findings chapters. All of the 8,742 articles analysed in the database are about terrorism in all its diverse possible manifestations. They include stories about police responses to terrorism, military actions against terrorist groups, whether civilians should have the right to sue states for sponsoring terrorism, terrorist motives and origins, specific attack descriptions, civilian casualties in the fight against terrorism, anti-radicalisation programmes to prevent extremist thinking that leads to terrorism, and more. The coded content was not only coverage of terrorist attacks, but the broader sweep of coverage related to terrorism, meaning the methodology described applies to all chapters of the thesis.

The content analysis, conducted through a detailed coding sheet, permits the measurement of a variety of different thematic elements, sources, and stances. After determining the news

topics that received the most coverage, as well as those that were relevant to the thesis, each topic was made the focus of a findings chapter, and the sources and stances for each topic was investigated in order to answer the larger research question: Is the news coverage of terrorism favourable for governments as predicted by political-elite research and theory, or is the news media more critical than previously thought? Each chapter focuses on a single highly reported aspect of the wider 2016 terrorism coverage as identified in the comprehensive database of news stories that have undergone content analysis, and makes a vital contribution to the core argument made by the thesis and discussed in the conclusion.

Chapters 4 and 5 focus on the most covered terrorist attacks of 2016, highlighting six of them. Two attacks took place in Europe: The attack on the Brussels airport and metro, and the truck massacre in Nice, France. Two in the U.S.: The shooting attack in the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, and the pressure cooker bombings in New York and New Jersey. And two in India: The Pathankot airbase attack, and the Uri military base attack. Chapter 4 examines the most used issue/themes and sources, as well as the stances towards official responses in these six attacks. Chapter 5 focuses on the representation of terrorist motives and origins in each of the attacks.

The database revealed that the civilian casualties caused by military actions against terrorist groups was a highly covered news topic, and one of particular relevance to this thesis as a potential area for criticism of governments to arise. Chapter six focuses on the coverage given to the U.S. military actions against terrorist groups, and the civilian casualties that occur in the process, again, investigating the sources used, the stances adopted in the news, and focusing on the specific incidents in the news text and how different newspapers use sources to either justify or condemn military actions.

Chapter 7 considers the source and stance use in another key news topic of 2016, the question of whether Apple should acquiesce to the F.B.I.'s demand that it should provide assistance in unlocking the San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone. Chapter 8 examines the coverage of the legal struggles of the 9/11 victims' families to sue Saudi Arabia for its possible involvement in 9/11. Chapter 9 considers the source and stance use of the PREVENT anti-radicalisation programme in the UK, and chapter 10 the coverage given the Maoists in India. All the chapters barring chapter 11, focus on the central argument made by the thesis, that the news coverage of terrorism is more supportive of a newspaper's local or domestic authorities, and critical for foreign government, and that criticism is concentrated in left-leaning, not right-leaning papers. Chapter 11, the final findings chapter focuses on one half of this argument, providing further context to the regional disparities highlighted in the previous chapters. It considers the distortions in coverage by region, as well as the labels used to describe attacks.

3.6 The intercoder reliability test

Intercoder reliability is defined as the level of agreement on a measured variable among two or more coders, and is required to ensure that the coded data is not the result of a single analyst's subjective judgement and that the code sheet can be used repeatedly and achieve similar results (Neuendorf, 2017, p. 235).

The intercoder process for this thesis was a difficult one, testers with knowledge of SPSS, the statistical software used for the coding, needed to be found, and needed to have the time to learn the admittedly complex coding sheet with its multiple variables and over a hundred different sources, themes and frames, and time to code 10 percent, or almost 1000 articles (this was later revised to 409 articles or roughly 5 percent of the database due to the intercoder's time constraints). The only choices available were fellow PhD students.

The first intercoder left the project citing its lengthy learning curve and busy schedule. To make it easier for the second intercoder, the coding sheet was simplified, reduced to a single issue/theme instead of four, along with a single primary source, source stance, and frame. The ten most used issue/themes, sixteen sources, and all seventeen frames were provided as choices along with the four stances. It was felt this was a similar enough approximation of the choices I had to make and the kind of work I had to do, while still being approachable for an intercoder.

Krippendorf's alpha, Cohen's kappa, and Cronbach's alpha tests were used to determine the intercoder scores which are shown in table 3.1 below. While the percentage agreements are all above 80 percent, Krippendorf and Cohen's tests show slightly lower scores for principal source and source stance though it's acknowledged that for Cohen's kappa a score of 0.60 and above is considered acceptable with 0.75 and above indicating "excellent agreement beyond chance" (Neuendorf, 2017, p. 236). Hayes and Krippendorf's SPSS macro was used to generate the Krippendorf alpha score (Hayes & Krippendorf, 2007) and Recal2, an online calculator for Cohen's kappa. Cohen's kappa, cronbah's alpha, and the percentage agreements were generated by the intercoder separately as well.

Table 3.1 - Intercoder Reliability Scores				
Variable	Krippendorff's α	Cohen's k	Cronbach's α	% agreement
Issue/Theme	0.9306	0.931	.977	385/409=94.1%
Principal Source	0.7559	0.756	.882	342/409=83.6%
Source Stance	0.7004	0.700	.735	370/409=90.5%
Frame	0.8918	0.892	.948	371/409=90.7%
n	409	409		89.73% average

Chapter 4
Praise and criticism of government actions following six terrorist attacks

This chapter explores the dominant issue/themes in six of the most highly reported terrorist attacks of 2016 to identify those that see the most use, and those which closely describe government actions. It uses the 'stances' variable linked to these issue/themes to assess praise and criticism of governments, and it uses an analysis of the news article text to explore how deference to governments, as well as opposition, emerges following a terrorist attack. The use of the 'Responsibility' frame in news articles in relation to police, intelligence, and political responses along with the 'motives' and 'origins' issue/themes provides further context. Apart from stances, frames, and motives, this chapter also includes a listing of the cited and principal sources used by different newspapers. Six high profile terrorist attacks from 2016 were selected for this chapter's analysis out of close to two hundred attacks recorded in the content analysis database. There are two each from India, Europe, and the U.S. They were chosen based on the total volume (number of articles) of news coverage received and are listed in table 4.1 on the next page. Each attack resulted in varying levels of coverage among the six newspapers leading to certain papers' coverage of the attacks being excluded from the analysis.

This chapter's findings indicate that newspapers tend to offer higher levels of critical news content regarding police actions and political responses, with police and intelligence actions (or inactions) framed as negligence, and greater coverage of a terrorist's motives and origins for attacks that occur outside their home regions. Further, left-leaning papers provide more responsibility framing of police actions, more critical coverage overall, and as the next chapter will explore, more articles exploring motives and origins than their right leaning counterparts.

Official sources are the most cited across all newspapers and attacks, and journalists tend to use their own opinions and unattributed facts more often than other sources. This does not always translate into principal source use however, with a large percentage of issue/themes featuring no principal source at all, and criticism when made, coming from diverse primary sources.

Although not the first attack by date (see table 4.1), the first terrorist attack to be studied to be studied is the Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings. The Indian terrorists attacks see coverage almost entirely from the Indian newspapers only, and as such will be analysed towards the end of this chapter. This chapter, and others, use the term 'GCTA', an abbreviation for government counter terrorist action. For example, GCTA police describes police responses to terrorism, military, social, and legal are also used as well.

Table 4.1 - Top six terrorist attacks of 2016 by number of news articles

Date	Country	Attack	Perpetrator	NYT	USAToday	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI	Total
Jan-16	India	Pathankot Airforce Base	Jaish-e-Muhammad	8	0	0	0	225	252	485
Sep-16	India	Uri Military Base	Jaish-e-Muhammad	3	0	7	2	211	216	439
Mar-16	Belgium	Brussels Airport and Metro	ISIS	37	20	34	55	26	28	200
Jul-16	France	Nice Truck Massacre	ISIS claimed/ inspired	21	2	27	31	6	5	92
Jun-16	U.S.A	Orlando Nightclub Shooting	ISIS claimed/ inspired	73	38	17	18	9	9	164
Sep-16	U.S.A	N.Y.C Pressure Cooker Bombings	Individual motivation	27	10	9	11	0	3	60

4.1 Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings

4.1.1 Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings: Attack details

The Brussels Airport and Metro bombings occurred on March 22, 2016. The attack consisted of two ISIS organised suicide bombings. The first took place at approximately eight a.m. by two men who wheeled luggage trolleys containing nail bombs to the check in desks at the Brussels-Zaventem airport. The second took place at 9.11 a.m. when a third suicide bomber detonated a nail bomb inside a subway train at the Maelbeek metro station in central Brussels. Thirty-one people died in the immediate attacks and a further four died in hospitals. There were over 300 injuries. The three bombers were aided by two more terrorists who were arrested on April 8, 2016. Police raids turned up more nail bombs as well as Islamic State flags with twelve more individuals arrested across Belgium, France, and Germany (BBC, 2016c; Mirbabaie & Zapatka, 2017; Rankin & Henley, 2016). The attack resulted in 200 news articles published across the six newspapers, shown in table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2 - Brussels Airport and Metro bombings article distribution		
	Frequency	Percent
The New York Times	37	18.5
USA Today	20	10
The Guardian	34	17
The Daily Telegraph	55	27.5
The Hindu	26	13
The Times of India	28	14
Total	200	100

4.1.2 Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings: Most used issue/themes

The most used issue/themes across all the newspapers are illustrated in figure 4.1 below and are descriptions of police actions, victim memorials, motives and origins discussions, and descriptions of the terrorist attack itself. Roughly 25 percent of the coverage focuses on police actions, and 10 percent each on memorials, motives and origins, and attack descriptions. As we will see this list and its ranking of issue/themes are almost identical for the truck attack in Nice, are similar to the two attacks in the U.S., but are very different from the coverage of the Indian attacks.

Figure 4.1 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Top issue/themes

- Terrorist background and profile — 3.70%
- Warnings of Terror Attacks (General) — 4.00%
- Origins — 4.80%
- Motives — 4.80%
- Societal reaction to terrorism — 5.60%
- Danger of foreign recruits — 5.90%
- Descriptivve of terrorist event — 9.00%
- Memorial for victim — 11.30%
- GCTA, E.U/Western Country, Mili/Pol — 24.90%

Coverage that focuses on politician responses is absent. To clarify, the 'politician responses' issue/theme describes political actions, behaviour and statements that couldn't be categorised under the other issue/themes. It includes condemnations of the attack, thoughts and prayers for the victims (without the details of those victims that would make it a victim memorial issue/theme) and political mudslinging, and assignations of blame that lack the detail needed for categorisation under exploration of motives or origins. For example, after the Pathankot attack Tathagatha Roy, a BJP governor of Tripura, an Indian State tweeted "I seriously suggest Russian treatment to terrorists' carcasses. Wrap them in***skin, bury them face down in *** excreta" and later commented "Yes, I am the governor of Tripura, but I am also a nationalist. I am not an Islamophobe. Jihadis or suicidal maniacs don't have a religion. They are enemies of the state... What I have said is backed by anecdotal data" (The Times of India, 2016d). Statements of this sort are coded as political responses. For the Brussels and Nice attacks, criticism of the state is predominantly represented through the criticism of the police, often held responsible for intelligence failures among other kinds of failure, as an analysis of the text will show in section 4.1.5.

When the most used issue/themes are viewed by newspaper in table 4.3 below, the left-leaning papers overall have higher levels of coverage of motives and origins, about 20 percent more combined compared to the right-leaning papers. *The Guardian* stands out as having the lowest coverage of police actions, and the highest proportion of the descriptive of terrorist event theme. *The Telegraph* stands out for having almost eight percent of its coverage devoted to the negative economic impact of the attack, and a surprisingly low two and a half percent of its themes dedicated to describing what actually happened in the bombings. Like *The New York Times*, it has about a third of its articles focused on police counter terrorist actions. *The Times of India* has about forty two percent of its coverage dedicated to victim memorials, almost half of its 36 articles

Table 4.3 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings: Top Issue/Themes by Newspaper						
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
GCTA, E.U/West, Mili/Police	32.20%	24.30%	20.00%	29.10%	28.90%	2.80%
Memorial for victim	4.60%	2.70%	12.90%	7.60%	11.10%	41.70%
Descriptive of terrorist event	11.50%	10.80%	17.10%	2.50%	4.40%	5.60%
Danger of foreign recruits	5.70%	2.70%	8.60%	5.10%	4.40%	8.30%
Societal reaction to terrorism	4.60%	8.10%	7.10%	1.30%	13.30%	2.80%
Motives	**5.70%**	**0.00%**	**10.00%**	**1.30%**	**6.70%**	**2.80%**
Origins	**5.70%**	**8.10%**	**0.00%**	**6.30%**	**4.40%**	**5.60%**
Warnings of Terror Attacks	6.90%	5.40%	1.40%	3.80%	2.20%	2.80%
Terrorist background	2.30%	2.70%	2.90%	7.60%	2.20%	2.80%
Strategies to prevent attack	4.60%	0.00%	0.00%	7.60%	0.00%	5.60%
Alienation of muslims	2.30%	8.10%	4.30%	2.50%	0.00%	0.00%
Negative economic Impact	1.10%	5.40%	0.00%	7.60%	0.00%	2.80%
Total	**87.20%**	**78.30%**	**84.30%**	**82.30%**	**77.60%**	**83.60%**

Figure 4.2 on the next page shows that police action was viewed overwhelmingly from a respon-

sibility frame as opposed to a retribution frame. That is to say, how police failures could have contributed to the attack taking place as opposed to how the police responded to the attack. There are overall, more issue/themes focusing on police actions from a responsibility perspective than there are issue/themes focusing on an examination of terrorist motives and origins.

Figure 4.2 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: GCTA Police E.U Country by Frame

Frame	Percentage
Economy Frame	1.10%
Terrorist Attack Frame	3.40%
Activity Frame	4.50%
State of Fear Frame	4.50%
Enemy Within Frame	4.50%
Retribution Frame	9.10%
Resistance Frame	10.20%
Other	11.40%
Responsibility Frame	51.10%

Responsibility framing for police action was common across all newspapers barring *The Times of India*, which had only one article for police counter terrorist action and was categorised under the resistance frame. Figure 4.3 below shows that all three left-leaning papers have higher rates of responsibility framing for police action compared to their right-leaning counterparts.

Figure 4.3 - Brussels Bombings: GCTA Police E.U Country, Newspaper and Frame

Newspaper	Retribution Frame	Resistance Frame	Other	Responsibility Frame
The Times of India	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
The Hindu	0.00%	0.00%	7.70%	69.20%
The Daily Telegraph	13.00%	21.70%	17.40%	39.10%
The Guardian	0.00%	7.10%	21.40%	42.90%
USA Today	11.10%	0.00%	11.10%	33.30%
The New York Times	14.30%	7.10%	3.60%	64.30%

49

4.1.3 Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings: Stances and Sources

As illustrated in figure 4.4 below all the newspapers were intensely critical of the Belgian police response. *The Guardian* and *USA Today* stand out for lower levels of outright criticism and *The Guardian* also has a far higher neutral position, that is, news representing multiple points of view with no clear stance favoured. The left-leaning papers though not consistently more critical in terms of volume of police action specifically, exhibit more comprehensive criticism of government policy. This is explored in the next section.

Figure 4.4 - Brussels Bombing: GCTA Police E.U Country, Newspaper Stances

An examination of the source data illustrates the principal and cited sources used throughout the coverage, as well as the specific sources used to provide this criticism. Table 4.4 below shows that 33 percent of sources cited were government, police, and other officials, and 18 percent were civilians, NGOs, academics, and other non-official sources. 23 percent were journalists.

Table 4.4 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Total Cited Sources	N	Percent
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	210	23.10%
E.U/E.U Country/Other West Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	110	12.10%
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/victim	67	7.40%
Other news agencies	52	5.70%
E.U Country/Other West judiciary/officer of the court	44	4.80%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	39	4.30%
French government/Military/Police/Intelligence	34	3.70%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	32	3.50%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	29	3.20%
U.S Republican	25	2.70%
Indian civilian/local/victim	24	2.60%
E.U Country/Other West NGO/Independent Monitor/Academic/Think Tank	20	2.20%
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	18	2.00%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	14	1.50%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	14	1.50%
E.U Country Politician	14	1.50%
U.S Democrat	13	1.40%
U.K Civilian/Local/Victim	13	1.40%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	12	1.30%
German government/miltary/police/intelligence	12	1.30%
Turkish government/military/police/intelligence	11	1.20%
Total	**807**	**88.40%**

Table 4.5 and 4.6 show the breakup of cited sources by newspaper, and interestingly, the left-leaning papers cite government and other official sources far more than their right-leaning counterparts, with the right-leaning papers citing non-government sources at roughly the same or a slightly higher rate. The left leaning papers use journalists as self-cited sources to a lower degree than the, right leaning newspapers. Similar results are seen in the principal sources.

Table 4.5 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Cited Sources by Newspaper Crosstab						
	NYT	USAToday	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI
Journalist	17.10%	23.00%	18.40%	26.90%	30.90%	33.80%
E.U Country Gov/Mili/Police	16.60%	9.20%	14.50%	7.70%	9.30%	10.80%
E.U Country civilian/local/victim	8.30%	8.00%	7.50%	7.70%	6.20%	4.10%
Other news agencies	4.10%	6.90%	7.90%	4.30%	7.20%	4.10%
E.U Country judiciary/court official	6.90%	4.60%	5.30%	5.30%	2.10%	0.00%
U.S Gov/Mili/Police	6.00%	11.50%	3.90%	2.90%	1.00%	0.00%
French Gov/Mili/Police	2.30%	1.10%	8.80%	3.40%	1.00%	0.00%
U.K Gov/Mili/Police	1.40%	0.00%	4.40%	8.20%	2.10%	0.00%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	4.10%	2.30%	3.90%	3.40%	1.00%	1.40%
U.S Republican	3.20%	5.70%	2.60%	1.40%	2.10%	2.70%
Indian civilian/local/victim	0.90%	0.00%	1.80%	0.50%	6.20%	14.90%
E.U Country NGO/Acad/Think Tank	2.80%	3.40%	1.30%	1.90%	3.10%	1.40%
Indian Gov/Mili/Police	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	6.20%	16.20%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2.80%	5.70%	0.90%	0.50%	0.00%	0.00%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0.90%	0.00%	2.20%	1.90%	3.10%	0.00%
E.U Country Politician	1.80%	1.10%	3.50%	0.50%	0.00%	0.00%
U.S Democrat	0.90%	5.70%	0.40%	1.00%	2.10%	1.40%
U.K Civilian/Local/Victim	0.90%	1.10%	0.90%	3.80%	0.00%	0.00%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	3.20%	1.10%	0.40%	1.40%	0.00%	0.00%
German Gov/Mili/Police	3.20%	0.00%	1.30%	1.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Turkish Gov/Mili/Police	0.90%	1.10%	2.20%	1.00%	1.00%	0.00%
Total	**88.30%**	**91.50%**	**92.10%**	**84.70%**	**84.60%**	**90.80%**

Table 4.6 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings: Cited Source Category by Newspaper						
	NYT	USAToday	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
Official sources	37.3%	27.5%	40.4%	29.5%	22.7%	27%
Non-official sources	19.8%	19.3%	15%	17.7%	18.6%	19%
Journalists	17.1%	23%	18.4%	26.9%	30.9%	33.8%
Total	**74.2%**	**69.8%**	**73.8%**	**74.1%**	**72.2%**	**79.8%**

Figure 4.5 on the next page shows that the majority of the coverage did not have a principal source, almost forty percent. That is almost 40 percent of the coverage did not rely on a single source, using two or more sources to substantiate the issue/themes that made up the articles. Government and other officials are used as principal sources at 9 percent, non-officials at 8 percent and journalists use themselves as principals at a relatively high proportion of twenty five percent.

Looking at the principal sources by newspaper, tables 4.7 and 4.8 on the next page shows that the Indian newspapers relied on multi-sourced articles (i.e. more "no principal sources") far more than the U.S. and British papers (barring *The Guardian*). What will be visible in the later part of

Figure 4.5 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Principal Sources

this chapter is that the use of 'no principal sources' by Indian publications was far lower in their coverage of the Indian military base attacks. That is, the two Indian newspapers both used single principal sources, usually officials and journalists far more in the coverage of the Pathankot and Uri attacks than in their coverage of the Brussels bombing. All the left leaning papers, *The New York Times*, *Guardian*, and *Hindu* all feature higher numbers of no principal sources than their right leaning counterparts (they all used two or more sources to substantiate news coverage) and all barring *The Hindu* have lower proportions of journalists as sources. *The New York Times* can be seen as the greatest user of official principal sources if one includes judiciary and other court officials such as prosecutors, a category in the Times that, at 11 and a half percent, sees more use than government, military, and police officials. It also uses non-official sources the least. Other than *The New York Times*, the other newspapers use official sources at a far lower rate, roughly 5 percent of the time, far lower than their use as cited sources.

Table 4.7 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Principal Source and Newspaper Crosstab

	NYT	USAToday	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI
No principal source	28.70%	24.30%	54.30%	39.20%	48.90%	44.40%
Journalist	26.40%	37.80%	20.00%	30.40%	20.00%	13.90%
E.U Country civilian/local/victim	3.40%	13.50%	4.30%	2.50%	2.20%	2.80%
E.U Country judiciary/court official	11.50%	2.70%	2.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
E.U Country Gov/Mili	6.90%	2.70%	0.00%	1.30%	4.40%	0.00%
Indian civilian/local/victim	0.00%	0.00%	2.90%	0.00%	2.20%	13.90%
Other news agencies	2.30%	0.00%	0.00%	1.30%	6.70%	0.00%
U.K Gov/Mili	1.10%	0.00%	1.40%	3.80%	0.00%	0.00%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0.00%	0.00%	2.90%	2.50%	2.20%	0.00%
Total	80.30%	81.00%	88.70%	81.00%	86.60%	75.00%

Table 4.8 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombings: Principal Source Category by Newspaper

	NYT	USAToday	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
Official sources	19.5%	5.4%	4.3%	5.1%	4.4%	0%
Non-official sources	3.4%	13.5%	10.1%	5%	6.6%	16.7%
Journalists	26.4%	37.8%	20%	30.4%	20%	13.9%
No principal source	28.7%	24.3%	54.3%	39.2%	48.9%	44.4%
Total	78%	81%	88.7%	79.7%	79.9%	75%

Table 4.9 below highlights those principal sources that were used to criticise the Belgian police and intelligence agencies, and is concentrated among journalists, a category well represented in *The New York Times* as well as the other newspapers. There are no official or non-official sources that stand out, barring the Turkish government, the rest of the criticism of the Belgian police is diffused across multiple primary sources.

Table 4.9 - Brussels Bombing: GCTA E.U Country, Critical Stance, Principal Source and Newspaper							
	NYT	USAToday	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI	Total
Journalist	5	2	1	6	3	0	17
No principal source	3	2	2	5	2	1	15
Turkish Gov/Mili/Police	0	0	2	2	1	0	5
French retired intell/police	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
E.U Country gov/mili/police	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
E.U Country Politician	2	0	0	0	0	0	2
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
U.K Retired Mili	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
German gov/mili/police	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
E.U Country civ/local/victim	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
Indian gov retired	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Other news agencies	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
Total	17	4	5	14	8	1	49

4.1.4 Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Critical news text content

Two broad groups are held responsible for the Brussels bombings, the terrorists with their individual motives who are influenced by larger social and political forces, and the State, represented by the Belgian police and Belgian and E.U. intelligence agencies who failed to prevent the attack from occurring.

There are 34 instances of the issue/theme that explores the direct motives and potential origins of the terrorists behind the Brussels bombings and 45 that focus on Belgian or E.U police action with a responsibility frame out of a total of 88. Of the 88 instances of the issue/theme focusing on Belgian and E.U police action, almost none are supportive, a clear majority are critical, with limited descriptive stances. This is the case across almost all the newspapers as shown in the data tables and charts in the previous sections.

There are three broad strands of criticism, open borders, flawed intelligence and police agencies, and inefficient and naïve E.U. law enforcement structures. These three causes are sometimes described together simultaneously, occasionally in *The New York Times*, but most often in *The Telegraph*.

The New York Times has the highest proportion of coverage of police and intelligence action from all six newspapers, and a high rate of criticism. It's articles state that the Islamic State has been aided by "porous borders and a calcified security apparatus in Europe" (Mazzetti, 2016a).

Mazzetti (2016a) cites a former state department official turned academic who criticises the intelligence agencies of Europe, saying they refuse to share information with each other, creating "blind spots" for terrorist groups to operate. The Belgian government is described as "fractured" and its security services as "dysfunctional", akin to the breakdown between the F.B.I. and C.I.A. in the months leading up to the 9/11 attacks. In other articles terrorists are described as operating across open borders, "ignoring national boundaries" as they slip in and out of Europe, and within European countries, and that cross border cooperation between intelligence agencies simply isn't keeping up. A variety of officials are cited as calling for a restoration of frontiers, and a strong single European intelligence agency (Nossiter, 2016a)

Inefficiencies in security and intelligence agencies and the alleged fatal flaw of open E.U borders are not always combined, with many articles focusing on either one or the other. Further *New York Times* articles highlight how Erdogan, the Turkish President had detained one of the bombers, Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, and "alerted the Belgian government that he 'was a foreign terrorist fighter,' and then deported him to the Netherlands" and how this was ignored by Belgium, whose justice and interior ministers acknowledged the failing (Rubin et al., 2016; Rubin & Gladstone, 2016). The Belgian police were reported to have had suspicions about the terrorists, but failed to act on them, actions described as "repeated dysfunctions" caused by "deep structural problems" by Marco Van Hees, a Belgian MP (Higgins & Freytas-Tamura, 2016). These problems include Belgian police and intelligence agencies fragmented by language differences, as well as ethnic profiling by police alienating Muslim communities who see the police as a threat and decline cooperation (The New York Times, 2016f). Foreign tourists in Belgium, whose credentials were nothing more than they "followed news coverage" are cited as saying that "All of us have doubts that the Belgian government can manage this situation. There are so many competing language groups. The police don't cooperate well together" (Bilefsky et al., 2016).

These multiple criticisms are essentially mirrored in the other newspapers with varying degrees of emphasis. The *USA Today* focuses on the police failure to heed Turkey's warning that one of the bombers was a terrorist, as well as the systemic issues leading to insular Muslim communities, and poor police-community relations leading to a lack of progress in investigations (Andelman, 2016; Bacon, 2016). *The Guardian* too, focuses on missed warnings, both Turkey's (Henley, 2016; Henley & Shaheen, 2016), as well as an F.B.I warning to Dutch investigators that the bombers were sought after by Belgian police during the bombers stay in the Netherlands. This later warning is used as an example to argue the communication failures of Europe's intelligence services as a cause for the attacks (Rankin, 2016).

The Telegraph with 14 critical issue/themes, the highest after the NYT's 17, introduces no new

point of criticism that hasn't been already covered by the previous newspapers. However, it emphasises almost all the intelligence, police, and border failings as the fault of the E.U., as an irredeemable aspect of an inherently flawed E.U. structure and a key reason why the U.K. would be a more secure nation if it left the Union. The narrative is fairly consistent across its news articles. Belgium's border force are bunglers who missed a number leads (Mulholland, 2016b), and whose security lapses led to a failure to "check suspect passengers from high-risk countries against the counter-terrorism database" underlining "fears that one weak link in the Schengen system of borderless travel puts the security of the entire bloc at risk" (Holehouse, 2016; Holehouse & Foster, 2016). Typically only a single, critical perspective of the E.U is offered, such as Penny Mordaunt, the U.K defence minister who says that Britain's membership of the E.U. stops it from being able to form alliances and to share the intelligence needed to ensure security (Whitehead, Dominiczak, et al., 2016).

An Israeli minister is given space to explain his understanding for why the attack took place. It's because (in his words), hapless chocolate eating Belgian officials are powerless to stop Islamist terrorists, those officials "enjoy life and to appear to be big liberals and democrats", lacking the ability to undertake hard measures (Holehouse & Foster, 2016). The E.U.'s focus on multiculturalism is described as a weakness, preventing the integration of migrant Muslims whose "cultures have violent criminal elements" and whose young people become ISIS soldiers. This combined with the E.U.'s lack of a unified intelligence agency and outdated intelligence practices is described as a failure that led to the attack (Collins, 2016).

The Turkish warning and its lack of acknowledgement by the Belgians is of course cited as well, numerous times (Henry & Mendick, 2016; The Daily Telegraph, 2016a; Whitehead, Dominiczak, et al., 2016). Given these failures, "leaving the EU would improve Britain's security", the cost of Brexit is described as low, and the security gains high. Obstacles to greater security such as European Convention on Human Rights would be removed, and immigration from the E.U would be controlled (Swinford, 2016a). As Michael Hayden, a former CIA chief is cited as saying, "EU membership sometimes 'gets in the way' of states providing security" (Henry, 2016b), and "the EU 'is not a natural contributor to national security'. Since it seeks to dilute the concept of nationhood, why would it want to be?" (Moore, 2016).

This almost total focus on the E.U. as the primary contributing factor of the Brussels bombings and a key problem for Britain's security is what differentiates *The Telegraph* from the other papers. *The Hindu* (like the other papers) while also critiquing the E.U.'s lack of an intelligence agency and the fragmented nature of its law enforcement agencies (Narayana, 2016) for example, attributes police failures to simple incompetence and the complexity of Belgium's social and political

structures, rather than E.U. membership (Menon, 2016a; The Hindu, 2016b, 2016f). Turkey's unheeded warning is of course, also mentioned (Hindu, 2016).

4.2 The Nice Truck Attack

4.2.1 The Nice Truck Attack: Attack details

On the 14th of July, 2016, a Tunisian born Frenchman drove a 19-ton rental truck through a crowd celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice. People were leaving the annual fireworks. He drove two kilometres before he stopped and fired a pistol into the crowd. The attack ended with the terrorist being shot by French police. 86 people died and over 300 were injured. ISIS released a statement claiming responsibility, stating that the "executor of the operation" was their "soldier" who responded to their call for attacks on "crusader states" warring against it in Iraq and Syria. The terrorist himself did not publicly state his allegiance to ISIS. This thesis assumes that the terrorist was inspired by ISIS given his statements to his friends in support of ISIS, his sharing of beheading videos, photos of dead bodies and an Islamic State flag found on his computer among other images linked to radical Islam, and internet searches for jihadist propaganda chants (BBC, 2016a; Carroll & Collingburn, 2016; Lewis et al., 2016; Rubin & Breeden, 2016a)

Given the low number of articles in the *USA Today*, *The Hindu*, and *The Times of India*, the newspapers that shall be analysed will be *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Telegraph*.

Table 4.10 - Nice Truck Attack article distribution		
Newspaper	Frequency	Percent
The New York Times	21	22.8
USA Today	2	2.2
The Guardian	27	29.3
The Daily Telegraph	31	33.7
The Hindu	6	6.5
The Times of India	5	5.4
Total	**92**	100

4.2.2 The Nice Truck Attack: Most used issue/themes

The most used issue/themes in the coverage of the Nice attack are illustrated in figure 4.6 on the next page. The top four for Nice are identical to the Brussels attack: police counter terrorist action, terrorist attack descriptions, terrorist motives and origins, and victim memorial. One significant change is the addition of the political response issue/theme, focusing on statements made by French Socialist party members. There are two issue/themes that showcase official responses and reactions, the GCTA military and police action issue/theme, and the Socialist party politician reaction issue/theme. These will receive further attention in the stances and frames data.

The differences per newspaper can be seen in table 4.11 on the next page *The Guardian* focuses

Figure 4.6 - Nice Truck Attack: Top Issue/Themes

Theme	Percentage
Alienation of muslims/defence of Islam	2.30%
Politician reaction, U.S, Republican	2.80%
Origins	3.40%
Danger of foreign recruits	4.50%
Terrorist background and profile	5.10%
Warnings of Terror Attacks (General)	5.60%
Politician reaction, France, Socialist Party	6.80%
Societal reaction to terrorism	7.30%
Motives	8.50%
Memorial	9.00%
Descriptive of terrorist event	15.30%
GCTA France, Mili/Pol	16.90%

the most on police action, almost twice that of *The New York Times*, and though half of this coverage is critical (as show in the stance tables) this is not unique, all three papers have largely critical coverage of the French police. *The Guardian*'s coverage of victim memorials is also close to double that of *The New York Times*. *The Daily Telegraph* has the least coverage of terrorist attack details, and the greatest focus on terrorist motives, a lead that is maintained when origins is included. In this case the only right-leaning paper listed has more coverage devoted to motives, mainly reported as "psychological disorder, criminality and Islamist radicalism" (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2016). This is explored further in the next chapter. The newspapers contain largely the same volume of coverage of the ruling party/government's political statements and reactions.

Table 4.11 - Nice Truck Attack: Top Issue/Themes by Newspaper Crosstab			
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph
GCTA France, Military, Police, Intelligence	13.50%	24.50%	17.20%
Descriptive of terrorist event	17.30%	16.30%	10.30%
Memorial for victim	5.80%	10.20%	6.90%
Motives	**7.70%**	**6.10%**	**13.80%**
Origins	**3.80%**	**2.00%**	**3.40%**
Societal reaction to terrorism	5.80%	0.00%	8.60%
Politician response/reaction (Socialist Party, France)	7.70%	8.20%	6.90%
Warnings of Terror Attacks (General)	5.80%	4.10%	8.60%
Terrorist background and profile	7.70%	2.00%	6.90%
Danger of foreign recruits	0.00%	10.20%	1.70%
Alienation of muslims/defence of Islam	3.80%	2.00%	1.70%
Total	**78.9%**	**85.6%**	**86%**

Figure 4.7 and table 4.12 one the next page show how the two issue/themes relevant to official response, police/intelligence actions and political statements, were framed. Across the three newspapers analysed almost half of police action coverage and a third of the ruling party's political statements and reactions came under the responsibility frame.

Figure 4.7 - Nice Truck Attack: GCTA France Mili/Police and Politician Response Socialists by frame

Table 4.12 - Nice Truck Attack: GCTA France Mili/Pol/Intel and Poli respo Socialists by frame crosstab			
	GCTA France, Mili/Pol/Intel	Poli respo (Socialist Party, Fra.)	Total
Responsibility Frame	13	4	17
Other	9	2	11
Political Factions Frame	1	4	5
Terrorist Attack Frame	3	0	3
Retribution Frame	2	0	2
Total	28	10	38

Figures 4.8 and 4.9 on the next page show the framing of these two issue/themes by newspaper, The York Times has the highest proportion of "responsibility" framed articles for the two issue/ themes. *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* have a far lower proportion. When it comes to the ruling party's political statements, *The New York Times* links them almost entirely with a 'responsibility' frame, *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* do not. Linking an issue/theme to responsibility does not necessarily mean a critical stance, however, as will be explained in the Pathankot attacks where *The Times of India* considered holding the army's failures as contributing to the attack but choose to blame civilian leaders and Pakistani involvement.

4.2.3 The Nice Truck Attack: Stances and sources

The levels of critical news coverage are similar to the Brussels attacks in that they seem relatively high. The overall stance data for the Nice attack is illustrated in tables 4.13 and 4.14 on the next page and shows that roughly half of the coverage of police and intelligence actions across all newspapers and 50 to 75 percent of the coverage of political statements from the governing party were critical. *The New York Times* and *The Telegraph*'s coverage of the official response to the Belgian attacks was more critical than the French response to Nice, about 17 and 11 percent more respectively.

Figure 4.8 - Nice Attack: GCTA France, Military/Police Frame differences by Newspaper

Figure 4.9 - Nice Attack: Politician response, Socialists France, Frame differences by Newspaper

Table 4.13 - Nice Truck Attack: Stances by newspaper, combined GCTA Fr Police/Mili and Poli Respo			
	The New York Times	The Guardian	The Daily Telegraph
Supportive	27.30%	6.30%	0.00%
Neutral	9.10%	0.00%	7.10%
Oppositional	45.50%	56.30%	57.10%
Descriptive	18.20%	37.50%	35.70%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Table 4.14 - Nice Truck Attack: Stances by newspaper and theme						
	The New York Times		The Guardian		The Daily Telegraph	
	GCTA France, Mili/Pol	Poli Respo Socialists, France	GCTA France, Mili/Pol	Poli Respo Socialists, France	GCTA France, Mili/Pol	Poli Respo Socialists, France
Supportive	28.60%	25.00%	8.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Neutral	14.30%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	25.00%
Oppositional	42.90%	50.00%	50.00%	75.00%	50.00%	75.00%
Descriptive	14.30%	25.00%	41.70%	25.00%	50.00%	0.00%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

59

The cited sources listed in table 4.15 below show that about 31 percent of all sources used were government, police, and judiciary officials such as prosecutors. About 16 percent were non-officials: civilians, victims, academics, think tanks, and NGOs. 22.5 percent were journalists. This is almost the same as the Brussels bombings.

Table 4.15 - Nice Truck Attack: Top Cited Sources, All newspapers	N	Percent
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	107	22.50%
French government/Military/Police/Intelligence	94	19.80%
French civilian/victim	49	10.30%
French judiciary/officer of the court	31	6.50%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	31	6.50%
Other news agencies	25	5.30%
French politician	21	4.40%
U.S Republican	12	2.50%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	10	2.10%
French NGO/Independent Monitor/Academic/Think Tank	9	1.90%
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/victim	9	1.90%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	8	1.70%
E.U/E.U Country/Other West Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	8	1.70%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	7	1.50%
Total	**421**	**88.60%**

The cited sources can be seen by newspaper in tables 4.16 and 4.17 below. There is no clear difference between the different newspapers. The representations of officials, non-officials and journalists is largely the same.

Table 4.16 - Nice Truck Attack: Cited Sources by newspaper crosstab			
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph
Journalist	24.60%	23.10%	17.50%
French government/Military/Police/Intelligence	20.30%	21.70%	19.50%
French civilian/victim	12.30%	9.80%	10.40%
French judiciary/officer of the court	6.50%	6.30%	7.10%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	6.50%	5.60%	7.80%
Other news agencies	4.30%	5.60%	6.50%
French politician	4.30%	5.60%	6.50%
U.S Republican	3.60%	1.40%	2.60%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	0.00%	2.80%	3.90%
French NGO/Independent Monitor/Academic/Think Tank	2.20%	1.40%	1.30%
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/vic m	1.40%	3.50%	0.60%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2.20%	2.10%	1.30%
Total	**88.20%**	**88.90%**	**85.00%**

Table 4.17 – Nice Truck Attack: Cited Source Category by Newspaper			
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph
Official sources	26.8%	30.8%	30.5%
Non-official sources	18.1%	16.8%	13.6%
Journalists	24.6%	23.1%	17.5%
Total	**69.5%**	**70.7%**	**61.6%**

Figure 4.10 one the next page shows the principal sources used in the Nice attack, and like the cited sources, they are very similar to the Brussels bombings. Both attacks had about 40 percent

of coverage lacking any principal source, journalists use themselves as principal sources about 22 percent in Nice, and about 25 percent in Brussels, and the civilians and victims impacted by the attacks are used about 5 percent of the time in both cases. Official sources are used in about the same proportions in both attacks as well.

Figure 4.10 - Nice Truck Attack: Top Principal Sources, All newspapers

Source	Percentage
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2.30%
U.S Retired Intel/Police	2.30%
Other news agencies	2.80%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	2.80%
French judiciary/officer of the court	4.00%
French civilian/victim	5.60%
French gov/mili/police	7.90%
Journalist	22.00%
No primary source	41.20%

Examined by newspaper in tables 4.18 and 4.19 below, *The New York Times* has about 15 to 17 percent fewer 'no principal sources' compared to *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph*. That is to say, its coverage had more single principal sources than either of the British papers. Journalists, government and other state officials including police and military are the two most used principal source types and they see similar use across the newspapers. Government officials are used a greater amount compared to the Brussels bombings and in roughly the same proportions by all newspapers.

Table 4.18 - Nice Truck Attack: Top Principal Sources by Newspaper crosstab			
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph
No principal source	30.80%	44.90%	48.30%
Journalist	23.10%	22.40%	17.20%
French government/Military/Police/Intelligence	7.70%	8.20%	8.60%
French civilian/victim	7.70%	6.10%	3.40%
French judiciary/officer of the court	3.80%	4.10%	5.20%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	5.80%	0.00%	3.40%
Other news agencies	3.80%	0.00%	5.20%
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police Official	7.70%	0.00%	0.00%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1.90%	2.00%	3.40%
Total	**92.30%**	**87.70%**	**94.70%**

Table 4.19 – Nice Truck Attack: Principal Source Category by Newspaper			
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph
Official sources	11.5%	14.3%	13.8%
Non-official sources	9.6%	8.1%	6.8%
Journalists	23.1%	22.4%	17.2%
No principal source	30.8%	44.9%	48.3%
Total	**75%**	**89.7%**	**86.1%**

Figure 4.11 below shows that only a few principal sources engaged in criticism, the majority of the critical coverage has no principal source. Almost 40 percent of *The Telegraph*'s critical coverage comes from Telegraph journalists and opinion writers compared to about 20 percent from the other papers. *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* make up this difference by using French politicians (not from the ruling party) to criticise the government, police, and military.

Figure 4.11 - Nice Truck Attack: Critical Stance, Principal Sources, French official related themes

4.2.4 The Nice Truck Attack: Critical news text content

Across all newspapers, about 37 percent of coverage focuses on terrorist aims, counter-terrorism action and political responses, the vast majority of this coverage is critical in *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph*, and a slight majority is critical in *The New York Times*, where the proportion of positive and descriptive stances roughly matches the critical/negative stance. Unlike the Brussels bombings however, with the Nice attack, intelligence and police failure is more closely and explicitly linked to the President and political failure.

The New York Times stands out from the other two newspapers with a higher proportion of neutral stance content which typically features sources both critical and supportive of the government, with the journalist often taking both sides simultaneously in the same article. For example, a politician from the Republican party is cited in an article to accuse the government of forgetting the lessons of attacks such on Charlie Hebdo, the Bataclan, and Brussels, to which the journalist responds (Nossiter, 2016b)

> the government's effort has been considerable… there have been thousands of arrests in France's Muslim communities, dozens of judicial procedures, heavy surveillance, and repeated bombing of Islamic State strongholds. France was under a state of emergency before Nice, and continues under one

But in the same article what was described as a "considerable effort"is then described using a parliamentary report as frenetic police work and "window dressing", actions with minimal impact.

This back and forth continues in numerous different ways with different sources cited. Other neutral articles draw focus to specific police action during the attack itself, debating what the police could have done to stop the truck, with defenders of police action arguing that the truck was moving at 60 kilometers an hour in response to criticisms that the police took too long to shoot the driver (A. Higgins, 2016b).

Supportive articles cite fewer, or only supportive sources, such as only Hollande for instance who praises his government and the security services as having "taken all necessary measures so that this fireworks show might be as protected as possible" (Higgins, 2016c). The editorial board takes a supportive stance by not highlighting any prior criticisms of the police, intelligence agencies, or government, and by stating that (The New York Times, 2016d)

> President François Hollande cannot be faulted for assuming in the immediate aftermath of so vicious an attack on so exalted a day that it had been an act of terrorism, nor for extending the state of emergency -- a measure giving the police extraordinary powers to search and detain suspected terrorists -- for three more months.

The Guardian and *The Telegraph* are more critical. *The Guardian*'s criticisms are two-fold, a lack of security at the event, and a flawed intelligence system. The French President, Hollande, is held responsible for both these failures, his state of emergency following the ISIS attacks on Paris in November 2015, "condemned as a cosmetic measure designed to reassure the French public" (Wintour & Chrisafis, 2016). Centre-right and far right figures are cited in a news article without any countering views, claiming that "if the right measures had been taken the attack would have been preventable" and "nothing has been done…no reintroduction of double punish-ment, nor depriving people of nationality, nor the closure of salafist mosques...nor the banning of certain organisations." Civilians back them up, expressing disgust at Hollande, he is labelled a "killer" (Marlière, 2016; Wintour & Chrisafis, 2016). Hollande's response to extend the state of emergency, deploy 10,000 army reservists and increase military action in Iraq and Syria is said to be irrelevant or damaging (S. Jenkins, 2016b).

Concerning police action, criticism centred around the lack of a police presence and the claims made by the interior minister that police cars were present and blocking access to the pedestri-anised walkway. When asked how the truck had managed to bypass the cars, the minister said it had forced its way through by mounting the pavement. *The Guardian* cites a report that this claim was false (S. Jones & Chrisafis, 2016; Willsher, 2016). Intelligence failures are attributed to "fragmented, bureaucratic and still under-resourced security services", and calls for a single U.S. style national counterterrorism agency (Burke, 2016c; Nougayrede, 2016). Similar criticism and calls were made after the Brussels bombings.

The Telegraph, in contrast with the Brussels bombings, has only one article that focuses on lax border security as a primary contributor to the Nice terrorist attack. Though this one article is quite comprehensive. It echoes Laqueur (2004) and his conception of an unbridgeable gap between Islam and the West, describing the social divide between Muslim communities and the mainstream as "wider than elsewhere in Europe" before turning to the border. The reason that terrorists are able to enter France at all is because of the E.U and its open borders, this is "unlike Britain - which has always retained its frontier controls and has the natural advantage of being an island." The article concludes with a criticism of France's intelligence agencies who are said to be unable to cope with the "scale of the threat", the thousands of suspects who must be monitored due to the free movement between cities in Europe (Blair, 2016).

The majority of the *The Telegraph*'s police and politics coverage is very similar to *The Guardian*. Right wing politicians are cited as highly critical of Hollande and his government (Chazan, Morgan, et al., 2016; Rothwell & Sabur, 2016) and the police are criticised for failing to stop the truck, for failing to spot it even though it was a type of truck banned from Nice on public holidays (Chazan, 2016; Chazan, Jalil, et al., 2016). French intelligence is described as a failure and French soldiers present in public due to the emergency as ineffectual (Farmer, 2016a).

4.3 The Orlando Nightclub Shooting

4.3.1 The Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Attack details

On the 12th of June, 2016, at about 2 a.m., a 29 year old U.S. citizen born to Afghan parents entered the Pulse dance club in Orlando, Florida and used an assault rifle and pistol to kill 49, and wound 50 people. At 2.35 a.m. the terrorist called 911 and declared his allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State. The attack ended at around 5 a.m. when Orlando police used an armoured vehicle to destroy one of the club's walls and killed the terrorist after a gun battle. The nightclub is one of the biggest gay nightclubs in Orlando, and the attack was described by President Obama as "both an act of terrorism and a hate crime". Claims that the terrorist was gay and the attack was motivated by hatred of homosexuals was not substantiated by an F.B.I. investigation of the terrorist's phone, computer, or online account records (BBC, 2016e; Ray, 2016; Shapiro, 2016)

At 164 articles across all newspapers, the Orlando nightclub shooting is the fourth most covered terrorist attack of 2016. Excluding the coverage devoted by the Indian newspapers to the Indian terrorist attacks, the Orlando attack ranks second, just behind the Brussels bombings. Table 4.20 on the next page shows that *The New York Times* accounts for almost 45 percent of the total volume, followed by the *USA Today*, *The Telegraph*, and *The Guardian*. *The Hindu* and *The Times of India* will be excluded from the following analysis given the low article numbers.

Table 4.20 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting article distribution		
	Frequency	Percent
The New York Times	73	44.5
USA Today	38	23.2
The Guardian	17	10.4
The Daily Telegraph	18	11
The Hindu	9	5.5
The Times of India	9	5.5
Total	**164**	**100**

4.3.2 The Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Most used issue/themes

Figure 4.12 below illustrates the most used issue/themes in the coverage of the Orlando Night-club shooting across all newspapers. Political statements and responses from Republican politicians is perhaps surprisingly the most used issue/theme, displacing the coverage given to police action in the attacks previously analysed. This focus on Republican reactions and actions is largely critical. Unlike the coverage given to the European terrorist attacks, the U.S. and Indian attacks both feature high levels of coverage given to political statements. As mentioned above, the political response issue/theme comprises politician statements and commentary that lack the detail and content needed to form a clear categorisation under another issue/theme. Exploration of motives, victim memorials, and descriptions of the terrorist attack are in the top four and this at least is similar to previous terrorist attacks.

Figure 4.12 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Top Issue/Themes

The breakdown by newspaper listed in table 4.21 on the next page shows that the coverage of Republican political statements is largely driven by *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, not *USA Today* or *The Telegraph* which have a far lower volume of coverage given to Republican political responses. The U.S. newspapers have a far lower proportion of their coverage given to the terrorist's motives in comparison to the U.K. papers, and not a single article in either U.S.

paper contains any 'origin' issue/themes either. As table 4.59 (page 95) in this chapter's conclusion will show, the Indian and U.S. newspapers have a higher volume of coverage of motives and origins of terrorists abroad (in Europe), and lower coverage for attacks in their own countries. As the rest of this chapter shows, this differential treatment by region also occurs in lower rates of criticism by newspapers of police action and government in a newspaper's own country.

Focusing on the Orlando shooting, another difference is the coverage given to U.S. police action. The most used issue/theme across all 5 of the other attacks, it is relegated to the seventh most used theme in Orlando with about 7 percent of the coverage across all newspapers. The breakup by newspapers shows almost the same proportions of coverage of police action by all newspapers, barring *The Guardian* which surprisingly does not have a single article which uses the police counter terrorist action issue/theme.

Table 4.21 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Top Themes by Newspaper Crosstab				
	NYT	USA Today	The Guardian	The Telegraph
Poli Respo Repub	22.00%	4.30%	18.40%	9.40%
Motives	**8.50%**	**7.20%**	**31.60%**	**18.80%**
Origins	**0.00%**	**0.00%**	**5.30%**	**3.10%**
Descriptive of terrorist event	6.80%	10.10%	7.90%	21.90%
Memorial for victim	7.60%	10.10%	15.80%	6.30%
Poli Respo Demo	5.90%	17.40%	5.30%	9.40%
Strategies to stop terror	12.70%	4.30%	5.30%	6.30%
GCTA U.S Mili/Pol	8.50%	8.70%	0.00%	9.40%
Terrorist background	7.60%	5.80%	5.30%	9.40%
Alienation of Muslims	4.20%	4.30%	2.60%	3.10%
Societal reaction to terrorism	4.20%	7.20%	0.00%	0.00%
Total	**88.00%**	**79.40%**	**97.50%**	**97.10%**

4.3.3 The Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Stances and sources

Table 4.22 on the next page shows is that out of the 92 issue/themes that represent coverage related to officials and government, almost half, 42 out of 92 relate to political statements made by Republicans. Out of 42 Republican response issue/themes, the majority, 32 of them, are criticised. Republican statements are primarily regarding a ban on Muslim refugees, how President Obama doesn't use the term "Islamic Terror", and gun control as a means of reducing terrorist attacks. The Republican positions on all three areas are heavily criticised with only 3 instances of outright praise.

Regarding U.S. police action, table 4.22 shows that overall criticism is fairly muted. It is present, but 9 out of 17 descriptions of police action are positive and descriptive (53%), and only 4 are critical (23%). This is yet another departure from the European terrorist attacks where police and intelligence failures are strongly highlighted in the U.S. papers. There was significant scope for criticism of police actions as will be explored in the last subsection.

		GCTA U.S Mili/Pol	GCTA U.S Legal	Response Repub	Response Demo	Total
Support	Gun control to reduce terrorism	0	4	3	1	8
	Refuse refugees/ "Muslim Ban"	0	0	0	1	1
	Obama not using term "Islamic Terror"	0	0	0	2	2
	None	2	0	0	3	5
	Total	**2**	**4**	**3**	**7**	**16**
Neutral	Gun control to reduce terrorism	1	2	0	0	3
	None	2	0	0	2	4
	Total	**3**	**2**	**0**	**2**	**7**
Critical	Gun control to reduce terrorism	1	3	8	1	13
	Refuse refugees/ "Muslim Ban"	0	0	13	1	14
	Obama not using term "Islamic Terror"	0	0	5	4	9
	None	4	0	6	0	10
	Total	**5**	**3**	**32**	**6**	**46**
Descrip	Gun control to reduce terrorism	0	0	1	5	6
	Refuse refugees/ "Muslim Ban"	0	0	2	0	2
	Obama not using term "Islamic Terror"	0	0	3	0	3
	None	7	0	1	4	12
	Total	**7**	**0**	**7**	**9**	**23**
Total	Gun control to reduce terrorism	2	9	12	7	30
	Refuse refugees/ "Muslim Ban"	0	0	15	2	17
	Obama not using term "Islamic Terror"	0	0	8	6	14
	None	15	0	7	9	31
	Total	**17**	**9**	**42**	**24**	**92**

Table 4.22 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Issue/Theme, Policy, and Stance Crosstab

Table 4.23 below shows a breakdown of the stances used by newspaper for the relevant issue/ themes. There is intense criticism of Republican politicians in *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *USA Today*, but not *The Telegraph*. All of *The Guardian*'s critical coverage was of the Republican party. Criticism of police is muted in the U.S. papers with only 20 and 33 percent critical coverage in *The New York Times* and *USA Today* respectively, compared with 60 and 44 percent in both papers for the Brussels attack, and 43 percent in *The New York Times* for Nice.

Table 4.23 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Official related issue/themes newspaper and stances crosstab

Stance	The New York Times			USA Today			The Guardian			The Daily Telegraph		
	GCTA Police	Dem respo	Rep respo	GCTA Police	Dem respo	Rep respo	GCTA Police	Dem respo	Rep respo	GCTA Police	Dem respo	Rep respo
Supportive	20.0%	28.6%	7.7%	16.7%	33.3%	0.0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
Neutral	40.0%	14.3%	0.0%	16.7%	8.3%	0.0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Critical	20.0%	42.9%	92.3%	33.3%	33.3%	66.7%	0%	0%	71.4%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%
Descriptive	20.0%	14.3%	0.0%	33.3%	25.0%	33.3%	0%	100%	28.6%	66.7%	66.7%	66.7%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	0%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Table 4.24 on the next page shows that along with less criticism in the U.S. papers of U.S. police action compared to its coverage of European police action, police framing under responsibility is far lower in *The New York Times* and *USA Today* too. *The New York Times* framed 40 percent

of its police action coverage under a responsibility frame, and the *USA Today* was 16.7 percent. This compared to 64 and 33 percent responsibility framing for Brussels in the two papers respectively, and 71 percent responsibility for police action for the Nice attack in *The New York Times*.

Table 4.24 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Official related issue/themes newspaper and frames crosstab												
	The New York Times			USA Today			The Guardian			The Daily Telegraph		
Frame	GCTA Police	Dem Respo	Rep respo	GCTA Police	Dem Respo	Rep respo	GCTA Police	Dem Respo	Rep respo	GCTA Police	Dem Respo	Rep respo
Political Factions	0%	42.9%	34.6%	16.7%	25.0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
Responsibility	40%	28.6%	19.2%	16.7%	16.7%	0%	0%	50%	42.9%	33.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Memorial	20%	14.3%	3.8%	16.7%	8.3%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%
Resistance	0%	0.0%	15.4%	16.7%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	66.7%
Retribution	20%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0%	0%	0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total	80%	85.8%	73.0%	100%	50.0%	0%	0%	50%	42.9%	33.0%	100%	100%

The cited source list in table 4.25 below shows a similar order of cited sources as compared to the other attacks. Government and other officials, journalists, and civilians and victims appear as the most used cited sources. Republican and Democrat politicians are a new addition.

Table 4.25 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Top Cited Sources	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	162	21.30%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	141	18.50%
U.S Republican	100	13.10%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	85	11.20%
U.S Democrat	76	10.00%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	65	8.50%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	43	5.70%
Other news agencies	22	2.90%
U.S Court Official	11	1.40%
Total	705	92.60%

Table 4.26, below shows the breakdown of these sources by newspaper. While the use of official sources looks lower than the European terrorist attacks, this is due to the European attacks containing comments and statements from multiple governments.

Table 4.26 - Orlando Nightclub: Cited Sources and Newspaper Crosstab				
	NYT	USA Today	The Guardian	Telegraph
U.S Government/Military/Police	21.10%	34.10%	21.40%	23.10%
Journalist	16.30%	13.40%	15.30%	24.60%
U.S Republican	17.40%	13.40%	12.20%	9.20%
U.S Democrat	12.60%	11.00%	10.20%	9.20%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	7.80%	12.20%	15.30%	9.20%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	6.30%	6.10%	12.20%	10.80%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	7.80%	2.40%	2.00%	1.50%
Total	89.30%	92.60%	88.60%	87.60%

Table 4.27 on the next page shows the breakdown of official to non-official sources.

Table 4.27 – Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Cited Source Category by Newspaper				
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph
Official sources (non-politician)	21.1%	34.1%	21.4%	23.1%
Non-official sources	15.6%	14.6%	17.3%	10.7%
Journalists	16.3%	13.4%	15.3%	24.6%
Total	53%	62.1%	54%	58.4%

Figure 4.13 below shows that the majority of the coverage relied on a single principal source for facts, opinion, and stances. About 15 percent of issue/themes featured a government, police, or military official, this is similar to Brussels and Nice.

Figure 4.13 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Top Principal Sources

Tables 4.28 and 4.29 below shows that *USA Today* has the highest proportion of principal sources compared to the other newspapers as well as the highest proportion of official sources. *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* use far fewer principal sources than *The New York Times* and *USA Today*.

Table 4.28 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Top Principal Sources by Newspaper				
	NYT	USA Today	The Guardian	The Daily Telegraph
No principal source	29.70%	18.80%	50.00%	50.00%
Journalist	31.40%	29.00%	18.40%	18.80%
U.S Gov/Mili/Police	13.60%	23.20%	7.90%	6.30%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	12.70%	8.70%	7.90%	3.10%
U.S Republican	2.50%	7.20%	5.30%	3.10%
U.S Democrat	3.40%	4.30%	10.50%	3.10%
Total	93.30%	91.20%	100.00%	84.40%

Table 4.29 – Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Principal Source Category by Newspaper				
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph
Official sources (non-politician)	13.6%	23.2%	7.9%	6.3%
Non-official sources	12.7%	8.7%	7.9%	3.1%
Journalists	31.4%	29%	18.4%	18.8%
No principal source	29.7%	18.8%	50%	50%
Total	87.4%	79.7%	84.2%	78.2%

Table 4.30 one the next page shows that criticism of both parties is lead by journalists, with

Republican sources used to criticise Democrats an exception. For what criticism exists of the police, that too is predominantly made by journalists.

Table 4.30 - Orlando Nightclub Attack: Critical Principal Sources and Officials Issue/Theme Crosstab				
	GCTA U.S Mili/Pol	GCTA U.S Legal	Poli Respo Repub	Poli Respo Demo
Journalist	40.00%	0.00%	54.30%	37.50%
U.S Gov/Mili/Police	20.00%	0.00%	22.90%	0.00%
U.S Republican	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%
No principal source	20.00%	33.30%	5.70%	0.00%
U.S Democrat	0.00%	0.00%	8.60%	0.00%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	20.00%	0.00%	5.70%	0.00%
U.S Think Tank/Acad/NGO	0.00%	33.30%	2.90%	0.00%
Total	100.00%	66.60%	100.00%	87.50%

4.3.4 The Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Critical news text content

The Orlando Nightclub shooting is riven with conflict between the Republicans and Democrats on the points of gun control, immigration (specifically on banning Muslim immigrants), and whether or not President Obama should use the term "Islamic terrorism". These points of discussion are fuelled by Donald Trump, who is the main constituent element of the "U.S. Republican" principal and cited source count. *The New York Times* gives the most space to Trump's agenda, almost always critical, but the sheer volume devoted to Trump and his talking points of a Muslim ban and Obama being unable to recognise Islam as a source of terrorism crowds out almost everything else. Referring to table 4.21 on page 66: top themes by newspaper crosstab, *The New York Times* devotes a full 22 percent of its coverage to political statements and responses by Republican party members (mostly Trump), and only about 7 percent to actually describing what happened in the terrorist attack. The Democrats get only about 6 percent of coverage, and police counter terrorist action 8 and a half percent. *USA Today*, in contrast, is far more balanced in its prioritisation of issue/themes, but also far less critical of the Republicans.

Regardless, this section will not explore the intricacies of the political factionalism between Republicans and Democrats (which includes not analysing the gun control debate) but will focus on the degree of responsibility to which police actions and failures are held. The representation of motives and origins surrounding the terrorist perpetrator will be explored in the next chapter.

The first point to note is the strangely limited coverage given to the police response which involved a Police S.W.A.T team stationed outside the nightclub for three hours before breaking down a wall and engaging in a gun battle with the terrorist. Roughly 9 percent of the coverage across all newspapers was devoted to police action. *The Guardian* didn't have a single article that talked about it. Of 118 issue/themes in *The New York Times*, only 10 explored police action (8.5%) with 6 out of 69 (8.7%) in *USA Today*, and 3 out of 32 (9.3%) in *The Telegraph*.

The coverage of the police action in the Orlando Shooting takes place on two levels, the state police response, and the F.B.I. response and the coverage from *The New York Times*, as explored above, is fairly deferential. In the past the terrorist made "incendiary remarks" to an undercover informant and his name was connected to an American Muslim who travelled to Syria and carried out a suicide bombing. Because of this the F.B.I. investigated him for 10 months using wiretaps and analysed his financial records. The investigation was closed after an interview (Apuzzo & Lichtblau, 2016; Fandos, 2016; Mazzetti et al., 2016). What is relevant in the neutral, positive, and descriptive news articles that explore this F.B.I. investigation is not just the lack of criticism, but the strong effort to justify why there shouldn't be any criticism, as though the journalists are worried the F.B.I will be misunderstood and thought of unfairly. The F.B.I is said to have to manage thousands of investigations and handle a "flood of leads" and that intelligence agencies in Europe face similar challenges (but *The New York Times* does not defend them in the same way at all, quite the opposite as illustrated in the European attacks coverage). "Sorting out angry Americans talking tough from would-be terrorists" is said to be just very difficult in the U.S. (Apuzzo & Lichtblau, 2016). Comey, the then head of the F.B.I. defended the agency's work believing that "they draw criticism for any choices they make -- either for leaving cases open too long, or for closing cases that don't seem to have enough evidence" (Mazzetti et al., 2016). The U.S. attorney general also added that though the terrorist had raised suspicions, there was insufficient evidence to suggest Mr. Mateen would actually carry out any attacks. (Fandos, 2016).

When it comes to *The New York Time's* coverage of the local police action in Orlando, police sources are given preference to engage in self-praise, and defend their actions from limited criticism. One entire 1500 word article is dedicated to the emotional trauma suffered by the police officers who responded to the scene of the attack, and the difficulties they experienced in accessing therapy. Police officers are said to suffer night terrors among other problems and having to face an uncaring bureaucracy to get help (Robles, 2016). The police are described as heroic by a district attorney and "They should not be second-guessed", potential criticism of a long time gap of three hours between the police arriving on scene and engaging the terrorist is defended by a police chief who argues that "police had used the time to rescue patrons, get the lay of the building, put resources into place, determine where people were hiding and talk to the gunman" (Perez-Pena et al., 2016). Though the bulk of the sources and volume in these articles favour the police, there are critical voices, victims of the attack accused the police of shooting at them, causing casualties and of unnecessary delays in finding a solution to the terrorist (Perez-Pena et al., 2016). This is briefly mentioned and not explored further in *The New York Times*.

It is however explored further in The *USA Today*, one article headline reads "Officers may have

shot club patrons" (Sarkissian, 2016), though even in the *USA Today*, which has a more even distribution of critiques, the criticism is rather weak. The possibility of civilian casualties is justified with a police officer stating that the crowd was large, and the layout of the club was complex. The same article has strong elements of praise, focusing on the "dozens and dozens" of people who were rescued, and the gun battle with the terrorist in which he was killed (Sarkissian, 2016). Most of the *USA Today* and much of *The New York Times* feature straightforward descriptions of police action, details of the steps the F.B.I are taking to investigate, or the explosives used by police to breach a wall before using an armoured vehicle to enter the club, the number of times the terrorist was shot, or the autopsy details of the victims (Blinder, 2016; Hampson, 2016; USA Today, 2016a).

The Guardian surprisingly has no coverage of the police action, while *The Telegraph* has only three articles, one of which raises concerns over the dismissed F.B.I. investigation (Sherlock, 2016), and the other two are merely descriptive (Rayner, 2016; Rayner & Alexander, 2016).

4.4 The New York City Pressure Cooker Bombs

4.4.1 The New York City Pressure Cooker Bombs: Attack details

On the 17th of September 2016, a thirty year old Afghan born immigrant living in New Jersey in the U.S. placed multiple improvised explosive devices across New Jersey and Manhattan, New York City. Three of them exploded: a pipe bomb at a Marine Corps Charity 5K race in new Jersey, a pressure cooker style bomb filled with a high explosive main charge and thousands of ball bearings at the Chelsea neighbourhood at Manhattan, and a third bomb at a New Jersey transit station which detonated as the police used a robot to attempt to defuse it. A fourth bomb in Manhattan was identified and detonated safely, and multiple other bombs were safely recovered. The Chelsea pressure cooker bomb (known as the 23rd street bomb) injured thirty people with an explosion so powerful it sent a 45 kilogram dumpster more than 120 feet into the air, and shattered windows as far as 400 feet from the blast site. The Marine Corp race had a delayed start, the bomb went off too early and there were no victims. The terrorist was arrested on the 19th of September after a gun battle with police during multiple police officers and himself were shot and injured (Associated Press, 2017; U.S. Department of Justice, 2018; Wilson, 2016).

Perhaps given the lack of fatalities, the number of articles is fairly low. Table 4.31 on the next page shows that there were only 60 articles across five newspapers and not a single article in *The Hindu*. Given that *The Times of India* has only 3 articles, only the American and British coverage will be analysed.

Table 4.31 - The New York City Pressure Cooker Bombings article distribution		
	Frequency	Percent
The New York Times	27	45.00%
USA Today	10	16.67%
The Guardian	9	15.00%
The Daily Telegraph	11	18.33%
The Times of India	3	5.00%
Total	**60**	**100.00%**

4.4.2 The New York Pressure Cooker Bombs: Most used issue/themes

Figure 4.14 below shows that almost thirty percent of issue/themes used across newspapers were descriptions of U.S. police action. This is similar to the Indian terrorist attacks (roughly 32 and 25 percent) and far higher than the Orlando shooting which was only 6.9 percent of the total coverage. This is possibly due to a successful police outcome with no fatalities, as compared with Orlando where the scope for criticism of the police was far higher, with civilian reports of police firing on hostages and the long delay between the police arrival and final confrontation with the terrorist. There is almost no use of the victim memorial theme, it doesn't appear in the top theme list. This is probably due to the fact that there were no fatalities, only injuries. Just like Orlando, political responses from Republican politicians is in the top 4 most used themes at 10 percent of the coverage.

The newspapers provide a platform largely to Donald Trump, though it should be noted in this attack, *The New York Times* provides almost no coverage to Republican/Trump's statements at all: only 2.4 percent as compared to 22 percent in Orlando.

Figure 4.14 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Top Issue/Themes

Table 4.32 on the next page shows that the 10 percent overall coverage of Republican state-ments in the New York bombings is driven by the *USA Today*, *The Guardian*, and *The Telegraph*. Police action received about twice the coverage in the *USA Today* and *The Telegraph* than it does in *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, and the two left leaning papers cover the terrorist's

background and life growing up about twice the amount found in their right leaning counterparts. The four newspapers cover the terrorist's motives in roughly the same proportions.

Table 4.32 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Top Themes and Newspaper crosstab				
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph
GCTA U.S Mili/Pol	24.40%	42.10%	22.70%	35.30%
Attack Description	14.60%	10.50%	13.60%	23.50%
Terrorist background	14.60%	5.30%	18.20%	11.80%
Poli Respo Repub	2.40%	10.50%	22.70%	11.80%
Societal reaction	12.20%	5.30%	0.00%	5.90%
Poli Respo Demo	4.90%	5.30%	18.20%	0.00%
Motives	7.30%	5.30%	4.50%	5.90%
GCTA U.S Legal	9.80%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Total	90.20%	84.30%	99.90%	94.20%

Table 4.33 below shows that police actions, the most used issue/theme, received lower levels of responsibility framing compared to the European attacks, 24 percent across all newspapers. *The New York Times* had 64 and 72 percent responsibility frame for police and intelligence agency actions for Brussels and Nice respectively, and only 40 and 20 percent for Orlando and the NYC bombings. The *USA Today* is similar, with 33 percent responsibility frame use in the Brussels bombings, and 12 percent responsibility in the New York attacks.

Table 4.33 – New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Frames by newspaper for US GCTA Police				
	NYT	USA Today	The Guardian	The Telegraph
Responsibility Frame	20%	13%	20%	50%
Terrorist Attack Frame	20%	13%	20%	17%
Resistance Frame	20%	38%	0%	0%
Retribution Frame	10%	25%	0%	17%
Total	70%	88%	40%	83%

4.4.3 The New York City Pressure Bombings: Stances and sources

As figure 4.15 on the next page shows, across all newspapers there is almost no critical news coverage of U.S. police or intelligence agencies in the NYC attack, only 10 percent averaged for all the newspapers. In contrast, almost half (47 percent) of the total coverage of police and intelligence agency actions in the lead up to and after the attacks in Nice was critical, and more than half (57 percent) in the Brussels bombings. The only critical news coverage of the NYC bombings was carried in *The Telegraph*.

The New York Times had 60 and 71 percent of its coverage with a critical stance towards police action in the Brussels and Nice attacks, and only 20 percent in the Orlando shooting, and no outright critical coverage at all in the New York attack. *USA Today* is similar with 44 percent criticism for police action in the Brussels bombings and 0 percent criticism for police action in the New York attacks. The *USA Today* however was more critical towards U.S. police action in the Orlando shootings, with 33 percent of its coverage of the police using a critical stance, though 50

percent of its coverage was either supportive or descriptive, and almost 17 percent was neutral.

Figure 4.15 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: GCTA U.S Police, Stances by Newspaper

The cited source list in table 4.34 below is very similar to the Orlando attack, with government and other officials, civilians, terrorist and associated sources such as family members, and academics in the top cited sources. Table 4.35 also below shows a higher level of use of government and police sources in the U.S. papers compared to the European papers, this too is similar to the Orlando shooting.

Table 4.34 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Top Cited Sources	N	Percent
U.S Gov/Mili/Police	66	23.30%
Journalist	52	18.40%
U.S Democrat	45	15.90%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	32	11.30%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	23	8.10%
U.S Republican	21	7.40%
U.S Court Official	21	7.40%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	5	1.80%
Other news agencies	5	1.80%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	4	1.40%
Total	**274**	**96.80%**

Table 4.35 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Cited Sources by Newspaper Crosstab				
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph
U.S Gov/Mili/Police	31.20%	32.40%	21.90%	10.90%
Journalist	15.10%	14.70%	20.50%	23.90%
U.S Democrat	14.00%	17.60%	16.40%	21.70%
Terrorist and associated	11.80%	2.90%	12.30%	17.40%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	10.80%	5.90%	6.80%	8.70%
U.S Republican	3.20%	11.80%	13.70%	6.50%
U.S Court Official	5.40%	11.80%	0.00%	2.20%
Total	**91.50%**	**97.10%**	**91.60%**	**91.30%**

Coming to principal sources, figure 4.16 on the next page shows that across all newspapers the majority of the coverage had no principal source, 51.5 percent of the coverage used two or more different sources to provide facts and opinions. State and police officials only appeared as principal sources about 9 percent of the time. Though terrorist and associated sources appear

as principal sources just below officials at about 8 percent, its not the terrorist himself, but his family members and close friends that comprise most of that 8 percent, and are used, among other sources, to substantiate one of the most used issue/themes for this attack, terrorist background and profile.

Figure 4.16 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Top Principal Sources

Table 4.36 below shows the break down of principal source use by newspaper. *USA Today* stands out, compared to the other newspapers, it has a far higher use of official and Republican politician primary sources, and uses far more primary sources in its articles than the other newspapers, i.e. its no primary source use is about 40 percent lower than the other newspapers. The breakup of principal sources by newspaper can also be seen in table 4.36 below.

The vast majority of U.S. police action issue/themes have no principal source. Though not shown in a graph here, out of 29 police action issue/themes, 20 of them have no principal source. No principal sources feature in 9 out of 10 *New York Times* issue/themes, 3 out of 8 in the *USA Today*, 4 out of 5 in *The Guardian*, and 4 out of 6 in *The Daily Telegraph*. The only critical stances appear in *The Daily Telegraph*, and they come from the terrorist's family members. *The Daily Telegraph* has a total of 6 issue/themes dedicated to police coverage, three of these are critical, and of these three, 2 are linked to terrorist and terrorist associated sources.

Table 4.36 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Top Principal Sources by Newspaper Crosstab				
	NYT	USA Today	The Guardian	The Telegraph
No principal source	58.50%	21.10%	59.10%	58.80%
Journalist	4.90%	15.80%	18.20%	17.60%
U.S Gov/Mili/Police	9.80%	21.10%	4.50%	0.00%
Terrorist and associated	9.80%	0.00%	0.00%	23.50%
U.S Republican	2.40%	21.10%	4.50%	0.00%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	9.80%	0.00%	9.10%	0.00%
Total	95.20%	79.10%	95.40%	99.90%

4.4.4 The New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Critical news text content

The coverage of police action is simply descriptive across all newspapers barring *The Telegraph*, which has fewer articles overall, but a higher proportion of critical articles. Articles across *The*

New York Times, The *USA Today*, and *The Guardian* describe and praise how the police tracked down and disarmed the bombs, used New York's emergency notification system to warn people to look out for the terrorist, tracked him down and engaged in a firefight which led to his arrest (Roberts & Lartey, 2016; Santora, Rashbaum, et al., 2016a, 2016b; *USA Today*, 2016b; Wyrich et al., 2016). Unlike the critical coverage given to European security agencies, there is no similar debate over U.S. failures to detect and prevent the attack, despite a clear opportunity to do so over the terrorist's father warning the F.B.I. about his son's potential for violence.

The extent of *The New York Time's* criticism is it asking, "Did the government miss something?" after reporting the terrorist's travel history, 4 trips to Pakistan between 2005 and 2014, with his last visit lasting over a year. The article concludes that there were no obvious lapses by law enforcement given the terrorist's excuse, he was visiting family (Shane et al., 2016). The terrorist's father spoke out and said he warned the F.B.I. about his son's interest in Al Qaida and jihadist music and videos, stating that he told the F.B.I. everything he knew about his son. The F.B.I disputed this, saying the father told them he was referring to his son's link with "gangsters and criminals, not terrorists" (Santora, Shah, et al., 2016). The father claims the F.B.I is lying. Even if the F.B.I. is to be believed, if the father was reporting that his son was becoming involved with "gangsters and criminals", why did the F.B.I. close the case? This is not highlighted. *The New York Times* does not make any explicit criticism beyond simply reporting on the discrepancy.

USA Today is far more dismissive of this point, giving primacy to the official account and accepting that the father called his son a terrorist in anger and didn't really mean it (K. Johnson et al., 2016). Law enforcement are praised for their "impressive skills collecting video images" of the terrorist moving his bombs. Their vigilance led to the shoot-out and subsequent arrest (USA Today, 2016b). *The Guardian*, though not so open with praise, is fairly anodyne in its reporting, like *The New York Times*, mentioning the discrepancy between the father and the F.B.I, but not pursuing the point further. Law enforcement is quoted as saying that the father retracted his terrorist comment and meant that his son was hanging out with gangs, the F.B.I. reviewed its database and found no credible threat of terrorism (Ackerman, Owen, & Jamieson, 2016). Only *The Telegraph* gives primacy to the father's claims, highlighting the F.B.I. failure to notify local authorities, it's potential failure to interview the terrorist himself, and the terrorist's travel history (Alexander, 2016; Lawler & Alexander, 2016).

4.5 The Pathankot Air Force Base Attack

4.5.1 Pathankot Air Force Base Attack: Attack details

During the 1st and 5th of January, six Jaish-e-Muhammad terrorists killed between seven and ten Indian soldiers and wounded twenty two after infiltrating an Indian military airbase in Pathankot,

Punjab with the intention of destroying military aircraft on the base. Before the attackers could reach their targets they were confronted by Indian soldiers and after an initial shoot-out, a later ambush, and rigged explosives set off over a period of time, Indian authorities finally declared that the base was safe and that all the terrorists were dead (Jaffrelot, 2017, p. 29; SADF, 2016; U.S Army TRADOC, 2016).

The newspaper coverage was intense with almost 500 articles published between *The Times of India* and *The Hindu* over the course of a year, with about 70 percent of the articles from *The Hindu* and *The Times of India* published within January and February. A small number of articles appeared in *The New York Times*. Due to their limited number they will not be analysed. The focus will be on the Indian newspapers.

Table 4.37 - Pathankot Airforce Base Attack article distribution		
	Frequency	Percent
The Hindu	225	47.2
The Times of India	252	52.8
Total	477	100

4.5.2 Pathankot Air Force base Attack: Most used issue/themes

Figure 4.17 below shows that only 6.7 percent of issue/themes had any descriptions of the terrorist attack itself. Almost a third of issue/themes contained descriptions of Indian counter terrorist actions involving both the military and police, this was the most used issue/theme in the coverage. Another 12.5 percent contained political statements and responses from the ruling party, the BJP, and this formed the second most used issue/theme.

Figure 4.17 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Top Themes

Only 2 percent of *The Hindu*'s coverage focused on motives and origins, and 3 percent of *The Times of India*, which only focused on motives, not origins. The low overall number of motive and origin themes doesn't mean that the motive for the attack was entirely unexplored. In this case, the 7.9 percent of articles containing accusations of Pakistani complicity could be seen as a possible, if inadequate substitute. Such articles explain how the attack happened, that Paki-

stan, or factions within the Pakistani government and military were behind it, but not why. Almost all terrorist motive articles explored political motives.

Figure 4.18 below shows that the two newspapers are largely similar in their use of issue/ themes, barring two key areas: The number of articles regarding the BJP's political statements and responses, and the articles accusing the Pakistani government with being complicit in the attack. *The Hindu* devotes more than double the coverage to the BJP's statements and reactions compared to *The Times of India*, which in turn devotes more than double *The Hindu*'s coverage to accusation's of Pakistani complicity. *The Hindu*'s greater coverage is linked to a higher rate of criticism and responsibility framing of the BJP

As noted above and visible in figure 4.17, the dominant issue/themes are military and police counter terrorist actions, BJP politician/government leader responses, and accusations of Pakistani complicity in the attack. These three themes comprise 52 percent of the total coverage across both newspapers.

Figure 4.18 - Pathankot AIrbase Attack: Newspaper differences between top themes

4.5.3 Pathankot Air Force Base Attack: Stances and sources

Though *The Hindu* focuses almost three times more on BJP political leader's statements and responses, and its coverage praises the BJP in the same proportion as *The Times of India*, it is more critical of the BJP than *The Times of India*.

This can be seen in table 4.38 on the next page. It also shows a 20 percent difference between *The Hindu* and *The Times of India* in the descriptive stance towards the BJP. *The Hindu*'s coverage is 10 percent more critical and 10 percent more neutral towards the BJP than *The Times of India*. *The Hindu* is also more critical and less supportive of police and military counter terrorist actions than *The Times of India*.

Table 4.38 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Official related issue/themes newspaper and stances crosstab

Stance	The Hindu			The Times of India		
	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement
Supportive	16.2%	27.6%	92.9%	23.9%	26.9%	76.9%
Neutral	6.1%	13.8%	0%	5.3%	3.8%	15.4%
Oppositional	19.2%	48.3%	7.1%	8.0%	38.5%	2.6%
Descriptive	58.6%	10.3%	0%	62.8%	30.8%	5.1%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

These differences are further outlined when looking at the framing of the top issue/themes in table 4.39 below. *The Hindu* has military action and political statements and responses linked to a responsibility frame at a far higher rate than *The Times of India*.

Table 4.39 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Official related issue/themes newspaper and frame crosstab

Frame	The Hindu			The Times of India		
	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement
Responsibility	32.3%	34.5%	35.7%	18.6%	23.1%	48.7%
Political factions	0%	37.9%	35.7%	2.7%	61.5%	17.9%
Retribution	9.1%	0%	7.1%	21.2%	7.7%	12.8%
Resistance	51.5%	3.4%	0%	39.8%	0%	5.1%
Total	92.9%	75.8%	78.5%	82.3%	92.3%	84.5%

These results indicate that *The Hindu* is more critical of the Indian government and holds government and military failures as contributing to the attack. The news text shows that *The Hindu*, while engaging in some criticism of the Indian military, is more critical of the BJP government for the instructions it gave the military, placing the responsibility for military organisational failure in the hands of civilian decision makers as opposed to military commanders, as well as highlighting how the attack could have been prevented with the government having access to prior intelligence of the attack (Hebbar, 2016; Jeelani, 2016; Josy, 2016; V. Singh, 2016c; The Hindu, 2016i). This is not to say that *The Hindu* doesn't explore Pakistan's role in the attack, it does, but it also considers failures in decision making at the military and civilian level, more so than *The Times of India*. At the start of its coverage, *The Times of India* does critique the Indian military for a number of failures ranging from the old age of base security guards (Sura, 2016b), faulty infrastructure such as thermal imagers (Chauhan, 2016), and organisational confusion (Sura, 2016a). However it soon pivots to praise of the military (Pandit, 2016; The Times of India, 2016c), and focuses on Pakistani involvement in planning and supporting the attack.

Coming to the cited sources, table 4.40 below shows that almost two thirds of all sources cited across all news articles and newspapers were either from the Indian government, military or police, or were the journalists themselves, largely mirroring the principal source list which has the two categories at 40 percent.

Table 4.40 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Top cited Sources	N	Percent
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	473	33.80%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	405	28.90%
Anonymous source	119	8.50%
Pakistani government/military/police/intelligence	75	5.40%
Indian politician, Congress	38	2.70%
Indian civilian/local/victim	36	2.60%
Other news agencies	31	2.20%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	30	2.10%
Indian politician, BJP/VHP/Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena	29	2.10%
Indian state government official, Other	21	1.50%
Indian government retired	17	1.20%
Indian politician, Other	17	1.20%
Other Country government	15	1.10%
Total	**1306**	**93.30%**

Similarly to the principal sources, the overall use of all sources cited shows no significant difference between the two newspapers. This can be seen in table 4.41 also below.

Table 4.41 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Total Cited Sources by Newspaper		
	The Hindu	The Times of India
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	32.60%	34.80%
Journalist	30.80%	27.20%
Anonymous source	1.60%	6.50%
GCTA Pakistan, Mili/Pol	6.30%	10.60%
Indian politician, Congress	3.40%	2.10%
Indian civilian/local/victim	1.80%	3.30%
Other news agencies	1.90%	2.50%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	1.80%	2.50%
Indian politician, BJP/VHP/Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena	1.50%	2.60%
Indian state government official, Other	2.40%	0.70%
Total	**84.10%**	**92.80%**

Figure 4.19 on the next page shows that the coverage of the Pathankot attack had one of the lowest uses of 'no principal sources' of all the six attacks. That is to say, the vast majority of both *The Hindu* and *The Times of India*'s coverage relied on a single source or source category to provide facts and opinions.

This is in direct contrast to both newspapers' coverage of the Brussels bombings, where almost half of their coverage was substantiated by 2 or more sources. Indian state and military officials were the most used principal sources, almost 25 percent of all themes in articles across both newspapers relied on official sources to the exclusion of all others.

Figure 4.19 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Top Principal Source Use

Category	Value
Pakistani Gov/Mili/Police	1.80%
Indian civilian/local/victim	2.10%
Indian politician, BJP	2.80%
Indian politician, Congress	3.00%
Anonymous source	4.20%
Journalist	15.10%
Indian Gov/Mili/Police/Intel	24.90%
No primary source	35.20%

This doesn't change when we look at official principal sources by newspaper. Figure 4.20 below shows that both *The Times of India* and *The Hindu* largely use official principal sources in equal proportion, which is interesting given the difference in themes and tone. Given this, where is the criticism of the government coming from? Table 4.42 on the next page shows us more.

Figure 4.20 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Top Principal Sources by Newspaper

Category	The Times of India	The Hindu
Indian state government official, Other	0.60%	2.50%
Indian government retired	0.00%	3.20%
Pakistani government/military/police/intelligence	2.00%	1.60%
Indian civilian/local/victim	2.80%	1.30%
Indian politician, BJP/VHP/Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena	3.70%	1.90%
Indian politician, Congress	2.00%	4.10%
Anonymous source	6.50%	1.60%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	15.50%	14.50%
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	25.70%	24.00%
No principal source	33.60%	36.90%

The Times of India ■ The Hindu

Table 4.42 on the next page illustrates that in *The Hindu*, the primary sources of criticism are from journalists and the Congress opposition party, the difference in the use of Congress sources between the two newspapers plays a role here. Official sources do appear as critical principal sources, though are mainly from the military engaging in self-reflection and criticism of issues such as lax base security. There is one article with criticism from the Prime Minister.

Of the most used principal sources, 37 sources (typically but not always 1 principal source per

Table 4.42 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Official related issue/themes newspaper, principal sources and stances crosstab percentage

Principal Source	GCTA India Military/Police				BJP political responses				Accusation of Pakistan's involvement			
	The Hindu											
	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip
Indian gov/military	62.5%	0%	21.1%	27.6%	37.5%	0%	7.1%	50.0%	23.1%	NA	0%	NA
Indian politician Cong	18.8%	0%	0%	0%	6.3%	0%	25.0%	0%	0%	NA	0%	NA
Indian politician other	0%	0%	10.5%	0%	6.3%	0%	7.1%	0%	7.7%	NA	0%	NA
Indian politician BJP	NA	NA	NA	NA	12.5%	0%	7.1%	0%	7.7%	NA	0%	NA
Journalist	12.5%	0%	21.1%	15.5%	12.5%	0%	25.0%	16.7%	0%	NA	0%	NA
No principal source	6.3%	100%	21.1%	53.4%	12.5%	87.5%	10.7%	33.3%	30.8%	NA	0%	NA
Total	100%	100%	73.8%	96.5%	87.6%	88.0%	82.0%	100%	69.3%	NA	0%	NA

Principal Source	GCTA India Military/Police				BJP political responses				Acc. of Pak involvement			
	The Times of India											
	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip
Indian gov/military	70.4%	16.7%	33.3%	29.6%	42.9%	0%	0%	37.5%	30%	33.3%	0%	0%
Indian politician Cong	0%	0%	11.1%	0%	0%	0%	40.0%	0%	6.7%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician other	NA	NA	NA	NA	0%	0%	20.0%	0%	0%	NA	NA	NA
Indian politician BJP	7.4%	0%	0%	0%	42.9%	0%	10%	0%	6.7%	0%	0%	0%
Journalist	0%	0%	33.3%	12.7%	0%	0%	0%	25%	13.3%	33.3%	0%	50.0%
No principal source	14.8%	66.7%	0%	40.8%	0%	100%	0%	37.5%	23.3%	33.3%	0%	50.0%
Total	92.6%	83.4%	77.7%	83.1%	85.8%	100%	70%	100%	80%	100%	0%	100%

article) are used to criticise government action in *The Hindu*. *The Times of India* on the other hand has only 14, with limited criticism from official sources, the Congress opposition party, and journalists.

In summary, Both *The Hindu* and *The Times of India* considered failures in the military and civilian government, though *The Hindu* tended to focus more on the responsibility within India, and *The Times of India* focused more on Pakistan with far less criticism devoted to Indian entities. The two dominant sources for both papers were government and military officials, and journalists. *The Hindu* however used Congress and other political sources in its critical news stories, along with journalists.

4.6 The Uri Military Base Attack

4.6.1 The Uri Military Base Attack: Attack details

On the 18th of September 2016, four (most likely) Jaish-e-Muhammad terrorists attacked an Indian army base near Uri in Kashmir. Nineteen soldiers died in the attack making it the deadliest in Kashmir in over 26 years. Unlike the Pathankot attack which lasted days due to the uncertainty of terrorists still at large, all terrorists were killed in a relatively short time. The terrorists set fire to two wooden buildings as well as soldiers' tents while they were sleeping, shooting any who attempted to escape. Disoriented by the smoke, the attackers moved in an unintended direction before encountering Indian soldiers who killed them all. Ten days later the Indian Army crossed the border into Pakistan occupied Kashmir and attacked terrorist camps, potentially causing up to 200 casualties. Pakistan denies this happened (BBC, 2016d; Pendleton, 2017). The newspaper coverage was similar in volume to the Pathankot Airbase attack in January, with both newspapers providing almost the same number of news articles.

Table 4.43 - Uri Military Base Attack: Article distribution		
	Frequency	Percent
The Hindu	211	49.4
The Times of India	216	50.6
Total	427	100

4.6.2 The Uri Military Base Attack: Most used issue/themes

Figure 4.21 on the next page shows a near total absence of coverage regarding motives and origins, this too is similar to the Pathankot attack. There were five motive issue/themes, all focusing on political motives and two origin themes out of 702, about one percent of the total. Like the Pathankot attack coverage, the top two themes are Indian military and police action stories and politician responses by the BJP. Accusations of Pakistani complicity appear as the third most used theme. Though the issue/theme 'GCTA India Military Police and Intelligence' is all inclusive, in this attack it almost entirely signifies the Indian army's actions.

Figure 4.21 - Uri Army Base Attack: Top themes

Figure 4.22 below clearly illustrates the difference between the two newspapers' use of themes. *The Times of India* and *The Hindu* both cover the Indian government's military and police action more than any other theme with *The Times of India* providing about four percent extra coverage. When it comes to political statements and responses from the BJP government, *The Hindu*, again like Pathankot, provides a greater focus than *The Times of India*. With Uri however, the difference is far less, only three percent extra. Both newspapers provide almost the same amount of focus on accusations of Pakistani complicity in the attack. The next two issue/themes see stark differences. *The Times of India* and *The Hindu* both focus on societal reactions to terrorism, that is civilian opinions and responses, but *The Times of India* dedicates eleven percent of its coverage to it, whereas *The Hindu* has only three and a half percent. Societal reactions were almost completely absent from the Pathankot attack. The memorial for victim issue/theme sees a similar difference, though low in overall percentage points, *The Hindu* has almost double the memorial themes versus *The Times of India*.

Figure 4.22 - Uri Army Base Attack: Newspaper differences between top themes

Actual descriptions of the terrorist attack itself are, like Pathankot, rather low compared to the other themes, however with Uri it's even lower. Pathankot had both newspapers devote about

85

six and half percent of their thematic coverage to descriptions of the attack, with Uri both news-papers reduce this number to about three and a half percent.

4.6.3 The Uri Military Base Attack: Stances and sources

Table 4.44 below shows that the combined critical stances towards political responses from the BJP and military action in the Uri and Pathankot attacks are very similar. *The Hindu* presents roughly double the amount of critical news coverage compared to *The Times of India*. Though *The Times of India* has only 25 percent outright support for the government and military in the Pathankot attack, and close to 50 percent in Uri, when the supportive and descriptive stances are combined both attacks even out to about 70 percent supportive/descriptive in *The Times of India*.

Table 4.44 - Uri and Pathankot GCTA India Military/Police and BJP Political Response Stances				
	Uri		Pathankot	
	The Hindu	The Times of India	The Hindu	The Times of India
Supportive	26.70%	48.20%	20.40%	24.50%
Neutral	2.30%	3.60%	8.90%	5.00%
Oppositional	27.50%	15.30%	29.90%	13.70%
Descriptive	43.50%	32.80%	40.80%	56.80%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

The overall stances table is shown in greater detail in table 4.45 below which breaks down the stance use in the Uri attack by issue/theme. *The Times of India* is more out-rightly supportive of the Indian military than *The Hindu* which contains less praise and is more descriptive, but both papers look largely the same when both supportive and descriptive stances are combined. *The Hindu* is far more critical of the BJP than *The Times of India*, which has more than double the coverage in support of the BJP and less than half the critical coverage offered by *The Hindu*.

Table 4.45 - Uri Army Base Attack: Official related issue/themes newspaper and stances crosstab						
	The Hindu			The Times of India		
Stance	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement
Supportive	28.2%	24.5%	93.3%	42.6%	60.5%	95.5%
Neutral	2.6%	1.9%	0%	1.1%	9.3%	2.3%
Oppositional	7.7%	56.6%	6.7%	10.6%	25.6%	2.3%
Descriptive	61.5%	17.0%	0%	45.7%	4.7%	0%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

This stance disparity is mirrored in the use of frames too, as outlined in table 4.46 on the next page. The left-leaning *Hindu* links military action and the BJP's responses to the responsibility frame about twice as much as the centre right-leaning *Times of India*, though admittedly, *The Hindu* too doesn't seem too high at about 17 and 19 percent respectively. Both newspapers use the 'responsibility frame' far lower than the attacks in Europe.

Table 4.46 - Uri Army Base Attack: Official related issue/themes newspaper and frames crosstab						
	The Hindu			The Times of India		
Frame	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement	GCTA India Mili/Pol	BJP respo	Acc. of Pak involvement
Responsibility	16.7%	18.9%	60.0%	9.6%	9.3%	40.9%
Political factions	12.8%	54.7%	6.7%	10.6%	67.4%	6.8%
Retribution	34.6%	9.4%	13.3%	50.0%	11.6%	38.6%
Resistance	20.5%	0%	6.7%	18.1%	0%	2.3%
Total	84.6%	83.0%	86.7%	88.3%	88.3%	88.6%

The news text shows that *The Hindu*'s criticism of the BJP is, apart from the military strikes not taking place sooner (Rashid, 2016), primarily rooted in its contradictory policies and actions. For example, it describes how the post Uri strike on terror camps in Pakistan occupied Kashmir was supposed to send a message that future attacks would result in retaliation. However organising attacks on India through proxies is reportedly a low cost strategy for Pakistan, easier for them to do than it is for India to launch punitive attacks for each one using its armed forces resulting in the terrorist attacks that occurred after Uri going unpunished. The Indian government, it is argued, cannot live up-to its commitment (Happymon, 2016). Other contradictions highlighted include the Indian Prime Minister speaking about Pakistan linked violence at every international forum but praising Ban Ki Moon's omission of any reference to Kashmir arguing that this reaffirms India's position that it is a bilateral and not an international issue (Haidar, 2016). *The Times of India*'s critical coverage is far less substantial, with news articles consisting of terse statements from Congress leaders and representatives accusing the government of weakness, communalism, and the politicisation of the armed forces. None of these claims are examined in detail, and are typically made in single sentences.

The cited sources are listed in table 4.47 below and show that similarly to Pathankot, government, military, and journalists make up the majority of all sources cited.

Table 4.47 - Uri Army Base Attack: Total Cited Sources	N	Percent
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	385	26.50%
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	371	25.50%
Indian civilian/local/victim	96	6.60%
Pakistani government/military/police/intelligence	76	5.20%
Indian politician, Congress	69	4.70%
Indian politician, BJP/VHP/Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena	68	4.70%
Anonymous source	62	4.30%
Indian politician, Other	55	3.80%
Indian NGO/independent monitor/academic/think tank	41	2.80%
Other Country government	32	2.20%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	27	1.90%
Total	1282	88.20%

Table 4.48 below shows minimal difference in cited source use between the two newspapers. Given the difference in stances and frames, this indicates that journalists can use the same sources in news articles in different ways.

Table 4.48 - Uri Army Base Attack: Cited Sources by Newspaper		
	The Hindu	TOI
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	26.60%	26.40%
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	26.60%	24.70%
Indian civilian/local/victim	5.20%	7.70%
Pakistani government/military/police/intelligence	4.90%	5.50%
Indian politician, Congress	6.00%	3.80%
Indian politician, BJP/VHP/Bajrang Dal/Shiv Sena	4.10%	5.20%
Anonymous source	3.90%	4.50%
Indian politician, Other	3.30%	4.20%
Indian NGO/independent monitor/academic/think tank	2.70%	2.90%
Other Country government	1.90%	2.50%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1.40%	2.20%
Total	86.60%	89.60%

Concerning the use of principal sources, figure 4.23 below shows that the use of Indian government, military officials and journalists as principal sources is at about twenty one and eleven percent. This is almost the same as the attack at Pathankot in which they were used at about twenty five and fifteen percent.

Figure 4.23 - Uri Army Base Attack: Top Principal Source Use

Figure 4.24 on the next page shows that *The Hindu* relies on single principal sources far more than *The Times of India*, and interestingly, also uses official sources far more than *The Times of India*, about eight percent more. It's use of the opposition Congress party is also far higher, more than double that of *The Times of India* which uses more than double the civilian sources than *The Hindu*.

The use of these sources can be seen in the criticism and praise of the government in table 4.49 on page 84.

What is clearly visible in table 4.49 is *The Hindu*'s use of official sources as principles in articles

Figure 4.24 - Uri Army Base Attack: Top Principal Sources by Newspaper

that either blandly describe or out-rightly praise government military and police actions and the BJP's responses. There are eighty nine occurrences of Indian central government and military sources as principles in all *The Hindu*'s Uri articles, and 56 of them are used in these three top themes, to describe and praise military and political actions and responses as well as outline Pakistan's involvement.

Congress politicians are given primacy in *The Times of India* and *The Hindu*'s criticism of the BJP ruling party, but are simply used less in *The Times of India*. There are 53 instances of official praise predominantly using official sources compared to 15 instances of criticism via the Congress and other sources.

The Times of India's use of government and military sources to praise government and military action is equally visible. BJP politicians are used to praise the BJP. *The Times of India* has 43 listed issue/themes focusing on the BJP's political statements and reactions of which only 4 are categorised under the responsibility frame and of those only two are critical, with retired military officials and a non BJP/Congress politician making the criticisms.

Table 4.49 - Uri Army Base Attack: Official related issue/themes newspaper, principal sources and stances crosstab percentage												
	The Hindu											
Principal Source	GCTA India Military/Police				BJP political responses				Accusation of Pakistan's involvement			
	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip
Indian gov/military	31.8%	0%	16.7%	47.9%	38.5%	0%	0%	44.4%	38.1%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician Cong	9.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	100%	53.3%	0%	11.9%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician other	9.1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	13.3%	0%	2.4%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician BJP	4.5%	0%	0%	0%	38.5%	0%	3.3%	0%	4.8%	0%	0%	0%
Journalist	0%	0%	16.7%	10.4%	7.7%	0%	6.7%	11.1%	4.8%	0%	0%	0%
No principal source	4.5%	100.%	16.7%	27.1%	7.7%	0%	0%	22.2%	7.1%	0%	33%	0%
Total	59%	100%	50.1%	85.4%	92.4%	100%	77%	77.7%	69.1%	0%	33%	0%
	The Times of India											
Principal Source	GCTA India Military/Police				BJP political responses				Acc. of Pak involvement			
	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Descrip
Indian gov/military	37.5%	0%	10.0%	0%	19.2%	0%	0%	50%	21.4%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician Cong	10.0%	0%	0%	0%	3.8%	0%	54.5%	0%	2.4%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician other	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	27.3%	0%	2.4%	0%	0%	0%
Indian politician BJP	5.0%	0%	0%	0%	42.3%	0%	0%	50%	7.1%	0%	0%	0%
Journalist	0%	0%	0%	36%	7.7%	0%	0%	0%	14.3%	0%	0%	0%
No principal source	22.5%	100%	40%	55.8%	15.4%	100%	9.1%	0%	28.6%	100%	0%	0%
Total	75%	100%	50%	92%	88.4%	100%	91%	100%	76.2%	100%	0%	0%

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore the extent to which official actions were criticised following a terrorist attack, and the accuracy of past research results which describe news coverage as favouring government agendas and influenced by official sources. The steps taken to do this using a combination of content analysis and news article text data are as follows.

First, the most used issue/themes used in each of the six most widely covered terrorist attacks in 2016 were examined and found (in varying proportions) to be descriptions of police or military action against the terrorist perpetrators, memorials for the victims of the attacks, descriptions of the attack itself, the motives and origins of the terrorists, and for certain attacks, political statements and responses from different politicians. A summary of these issue/themes across the six attacks can be found in table 4.50 below.

Table 4.50 – Most used issue/themes across all attacks						
	Brussels	Nice	Orlando	NYC	Pathankot	Uri
GCTA Police/Military	24.9%	16.9%	6.9%	29.3%	31.6%	24.5%
Victim Memorial	11.3%	9.0%	9.7%	1.0%	3.9%	4.13%
Attack description	9.0%	15.3%	10.0%	15.2%	6.7%	3.42%
Motives/Origins	9.6%	11.9%	12.8%	6.1%	2.5%	1.0%
Politician respo Rep.	0.0%	0.0%	15.9%	10.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Politician respo BJP	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	13.68%
Acc. of Pak invlmnt	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	7.9%	12.68%
Total	54.8%	53.1%	55.3%	61.7%	65.1%	59.41%

The coverage of federal and local police and military responses and actions before and after a terrorist attack is common to all six attacks, and from 17 to 30 percent of the coverage (barring Orlando), is the most used issue/theme. Given this volume, broad occurrence, and the close connections between the police, military, and government, security responses and actions was considered representative of officialdom and government action in the analysis and used alongside the stances and frame variables.

The coverage of politician statements and responses primarily occurs in the Indian and U.S. terrorist attacks, not the European ones. Interestingly, only the political responses from right-wing parties were found in the top four issue/themes. While responses from the Democrat party in the U.S. and Congress party in India were present, they were never as widely covered as their right-wing counterparts. Hence the 'politician response' issue/theme was only used occasionally in this chapter.

Having identified the issue/themes that represent official actions, the stances used to describe those issue/themes can be examined. The stance data in table 4.51 on the next page can be examined in at least two ways: By newspaper ideology, left or right-leaning, and by the region

of reporting. Viewed by newspaper slant, the results appear mixed, the left-leaning papers are not consistently more critical of police, intelligence, and military action than the right-leaning papers. Viewed by region however, the U.S. and Indian newspapers are more critical of police/ military responses for attacks outside their home region, this is potentially supporting evidence for Wolfsfeld et al. (2008), (summarised in the literature review on page 18) who found an ethno-centric motivation for news production, as well as Wolfsfeld (1997). Where both the U.S. and Indian papers were highly critical of the responses to the Brussels bombings, and *The New York Times* of the response to the Nice attack, levels of criticism are far lower among the U.S. news-papers for the U.S. attacks, and the Indian papers for the Indian attacks.

Table 4.51 - Percentage of critical Police/Intelligence/Military action coverage						
	Brussels	Nice	Orlando	NYC	Pathankot	Uri
NYT	60.7	42.9	20	0	NA	NA
USA Today	44.4	NA	33.3	0	NA	NA
The Guardian	35.7	50	0	0	NA	NA
The Telegraph	60.9	50	33.3	50	NA	NA
The Hindu	61.5	NA	NA	NA	19.2	7.7
The Times of India	100	NA	NA	NA	8	10.6

This further reinforced by the data in table 4.52 below which highlights how the U.S. newspa-pers were more critical of the police and military responses in the E.U. and other Western coun-tries than they were of U.S. police and military action. *The New York Times* and the *USA Today* combined have far higher levels of support for U.S. police and military responses compared to the responses of E.U and other Western agencies, 35 versus 11 percent. Criticism for official responses is also far lower for the U.S. compared to other Western nations, almost 18 percent for the U.S. versus 34 percent abroad.

Table 4.52 - U.S. Newspapers stances coverage of U.S./U.K./E.U, and other West Police/Military action				
	U.S Police/Intelligence/Military		E.U/Other West Police/Intel/Military	
Stance	frequency	percent	frequency	percent
Supportive	132	34.82%	16	10.81%
Neutral	53	13.98%	12	8.11%
Oppositional	67	17.67%	51	34.46%
Descriptive	127	33.50%	69	46.62%
Total	379	100.00%	148	100.00%

Though there is no clear pattern to criticism and praise among left and right-leaning newspapers for the six terrorist attacks, there is a clear "left-right divide" when the data in table 4.52 above is broken down by newspaper. Table 4.53 on the next page clearly shows that *The New York Times* is more critical than *USA Today* for U.S. and E.U/other West police and military action, albeit by only 10 and 7 percent. Table 4.53 also shows that *USA Today* has a far higher proportion of its coverage in clear support and praise for U.S. police and military action than *The New York Times*. This pattern can also be seen in the Indian newspapers, *The Times of India* and *The Hindu*.

Table 4.53 - U.S. Newspapers stances coverage of U.S./U.K./E.U, and other West Police/Military action								
	U.S Police/Intelligence/Military				E.U/Other West Police/Intel/Military			
	New York Times		USA Today		New York Times		USA Today	
Stance	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Supportive	82	29.60%	50	49.02%	14	10.77%	2	11.11%
Neutral	43	15.52%	10	9.80%	11	8.46%	1	5.56%
Oppositional	56	20.22%	11	10.78%	46	35.38%	5	27.78%
Descriptive	96	34.66%	31	30.39%	59	45.38%	10	55.56%
Total	277	100.00%	102	100.00%	130	100.00%	18	100.00%

Table 4.54 below highlights how the Indian newspapers, like the U.S. papers, were more critical of the security responses in the U.S., E.U. and other Western countries than they were of Indian police and military action. Both Indian and U.S. papers also have greater coverage in terms of sheer volume given to their own domestic security forces, though this is more apparent in the Indian newspapers.

Table 4.54 - Indian Newspapers stances coverage of Indian, U.S./U.K./E.U./West Police/Military actions				
	Indian Police/Intelligence/Military		U.S./E.U/Other West Police/Intel/Military	
Stance	frequency	percent	frequency	percent
Supportive	256	13.51%	10	8.47%
Neutral	49	2.59%	9	7.63%
Oppositional	432	22.85%	42	35.59%
Descriptive	1157	61.06%	57	48.31%
Total	1895	100.00%	118	100.00%

Table 4.55 below shows that the left-leaning *Hindu* provided more criticism and less praise to Indian state security responses than its right-leaning counterpart, *The Times of India*. Within the Western security response category *The Hindu* has far less supportive news content than *The Times of India*, though both newspapers have roughly the same proportion of critical news content. Both newspapers, as also shown above, are more supportive, and less critical of the Indian security responses than the Western responses.

Table 4.55 - Indian newspapers stances coverage of Indian, U.S., E.U, and West Police/Military action								
	Indian Police/Intelligence/Military				U.S./E.U/Other West Police/Intel/Military			
	The Hindu		The Times of India		The Hindu		The Times of India	
Stance	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
Supportive	124	9.44%	132	22.72	4	5.00%	6	15.79%
Neutral	33	2.51%	16	2.75	7	8.75%	2	5.26%
Oppositional	332	25.27%	101	17.38	28	35.00%	14	36.84%
Descriptive	825	62.79%	332	57.14	41	51.25%	16	42.11%
Total	1314	100.00%	581	100.00%	80	100.00%	38	100.00%

The U.K. newspapers do not present a similar result as illustrated in tables 4.56 and 4.57 on the next page. While there are higher levels of praise for U.K. security responses in both U.K. papers as compared to foreign responses, the U.K. papers show slightly higher levels of criticism for its security agencies' actions, with the right-leaning Telegraph more critical than the left-leaning Guardian.

This result is very different from the U.S. papers, both of whom have far higher levels of praise for U.S. actions than criticism. In India, while overall levels of criticism of police and military actions are higher, this is driven by the left-leaning Hindu which has more criticism and less praise of Indian security actions, as opposed to the right-leaning Times of India which is more supportive.

Table 4.56 - U.K. newpapers stances coverage of U.K./U.S./E.U./Other West police/military action

	U.K. Police/Intelligence/Military		U.S./E.U/Other West Police/Intel/Military	
Stance	frequency	percent	frequency	percent
Supportive	50	20.66%	39	8.44%
Neutral	17	7.02%	19	4.11%
Oppositional	87	35.95%	153	33.12%
Descriptive	88	36.36%	251	54.33%
Total	242	100.00%	462	100.00%

Table 4.57 - U.K. newspapers stances coverage of U.K./U.S./E.U./Other West police/military action

	U.K. Police/Intelligence/Military				U.S./E.U/Other West Police/Intel/Military			
	The Guardian		The Telegraph		The Guardian		The Telegraph	
Stance	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%	freq	%
Supportive	9	16.07%	41	22.04%	17	8.46%	22	8.43%
Neutral	7	12.50%	10	5.38%	16	7.96%	3	1.15%
Oppositional	16	28.57%	71	38.17%	67	33.33%	86	32.95%
Descriptive	24	42.86%	64	34.41%	101	50.25%	150	57.47%
Total	56	100.00%	186	100.00%	201	100.00%	261	100.00%

A similar pattern can be seen in the frame data, specifically the "responsibility " frame. Table 4.58 below illustrates the use of the "responsibility" frame for police and military responses across all six attacks. To reiterate, this frame was applied to news articles whose issue/themes contained content that described actions, behaviour, and forces that led to, or were responsible for, a terrorist attack taking place. If a police/military/intelligence counter terrorist action issue/theme was linked to a "responsibility" frame, it means that the security action was viewed in the context of its failure to prevent an attack, that the security action failure contributed to the attack taking place.

Table 4.58 - Percentage of Police/Intelligence/Military action under responsibility frame

	Brussels	Nice	Orlando	NYC	Pathankot	Uri
NYT	64.3	71.4	40	20	NA	NA
USA Today	33.3	NA	16.7	12.5	NA	NA
The Guardian	42.9	33.3	0	20	NA	NA
The Telegraph	39.1	40	33.3	50	NA	NA
The Hindu	69.2	NA	NA	NA	32.3	16.7
The Times of India	0	NA	NA	NA	18.6	9.6

With *The Guardian* as an exception, table 4.58 above shows that *The New York Times* and *The Hindu* consistently link police, military, and intelligence agency actions and responses to a 'responsibility' frame at a much higher rate compared to their right leaning counterparts. The Brussels attack sees *The New York Times* frame police actions under 'responsibility twice as much as *USA Today*, at about 64 versus 33 percent. *The Hindu* sees 69 percent of its Brussels police coverage under a 'responsibility' frame versus no 'responsibility' framing at all in *The Times*

of India. Similar results can be seen In Orlando and NYC, Pathankot, and Uri. *The Guardian* is an anomaly, It not only scores lower in 'responsibility' framing compared to *The Telegraph* in every attack bar Brussels, not a single police action story was had a 'responsibility' frame in the Orlando attack. A closer look shows it focuses its blame on the Republican party obstructing gun control laws as opposed to police failures.

Considering the use of this frame by region, once again the U.S. and Indian newspapers have far higher levels of 'responsibility' framing for police actions outside their home countries. *The New York Times* use of the frame in Brussels and Nice is 64.3 and 71.4 percent, and in Orlando and NYC its 40 and 20 percent. *USA Today* has 33.3 percent 'responsibility' framing for police responses in Brussels, and 17 and 12.5 percent in Orlando and NYC. Though the data is sparse for the Indian newspapers given their overall lack of coverage of events abroad, there is data for the Brussels attack, *The Hindu* has a large 70 percent of police action under "responsibility", and only 32 and 17 for the police and military in the Indian attacks. *The Times of India* is similarly low at 19 and 10 percent.

The coverage of terrorism's motives and origins further reinforces these findings. The coverage of the motives and origins issue/themes also falls under the lines of newspaper ideology and region. Table 4.59 below shows that the left-leaning papers generally provide more coverage to exploring the terrorist's motives, and larger contributing factors to the attack than their right leaning counterparts, and that the U.S. and Indian papers spend more time exploring these motives and origins for attacks outside the U.S. and India respectively.

Table 4.59 - Motives and Origins (percentage of issue/themes)						
	Brussels	Nice	Orlando	NYC	Pathankot	Uri
NYT	11.4	11.5	8.5	7.3	NA	NA
USA Today	8.1	0	7.2	10.6	NA	NA
The Guardian	10	8.1	36.9	4.5	NA	NA
The Telegraph	7.6	17.2	21.9	5.9	NA	NA
The Hindu	11.1	10	16.7	NA	1.80	0.90
The Times of India	8.4	0	20	NA	3.10	1.20

Another interesting expression of the difference between left and right-leaning papers is the extent of source variability. The left-leaning papers feature multiple different sources in news articles to a far higher degree than the right-leaning papers. The following two tables were originally made to measure whether the number of sources used in news articles was higher or lower in the days or weeks after the peak coverage of a terrorist attack. A time chart was made for each attack, and the number of articles from the day of the attack itself to the day when the coverage reached its zenith was designated 'attack coverage'. Coverage in the days and weeks following the peak was labelled 'post coverage'. While the original purpose for these graphs didn't pan

out, a pattern was observed among newspaper ideology groupings. Table 4.60 below shows the attacks studied, and the dates used for their attack and post attack coverage.

Table 4.60 – Attacks and time periods used in table 4.59						
Attack	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI
Pathankot Air base	NA				3-10 Jan	2-10 Jan
					11 Ja-15 Feb	11 Ja-18 Feb
Uri Army base					19 Sep-3 Oct	19 Sep-9 Oct
					4 Oct-1 Nov	10 Oct-9 Nov
Brussels Bombings	23-25 Mar	23-25 Mar	22-25 Mar	23-25 Mar	23-25 Mar	23-25 Mar
	26 M-20 Apr	28 M-11 Apr	26 M-17 Apr	26 M-30 Apr	27 Mr-26 Apr	27 Mr-8 May
Nice truck attack	15-17 Jul	NA	14-17 Jul	15-18 Jul	NA	
	18-25 Jul		22 Jul-15 Oct	19 Jul-19 Sep		
Berlin, Christmas Market truck	20-23 Dec		20-22 Dec	20-22 Dec		
	24-31 Dec		23-24 Dec	23-31 Dec		
Orlando nightclub shooting	13-16 Jun	13-15 June	12-14 Jun	13-14 Jun	14-15 Jun	13-15 Jun
	17 Jun-7 July	16-13 July	15-25 Jun	16 Ju-24 Jun	16-19 Jun	16-23 Jun
NYC pressure cooker bombing	18-21 Sep	19-20 Sep	NA			
	22 Se-14 Oct	21-29 Sep				
Dhaka, Holey Artisan Bakery	2-7 Jul	NA			3-6 Jul	3-8 Jul
	8 Jul-31 Aug				7 Jul-11 Sept	9 Jul-11 Sept

Table 4.61 on the next page compares the percentage of all articles that used only one or two source categories in the attack coverage, to the percentage of all one or two sourced articles in the post attack coverage. Essentially, a higher percentage score indicates lower source variability, it means that more articles used only one or two source types. A lower percentage indicates higher source variability, that is fewer articles used one or two source types, a greater number used three or more source categories

What table 4.61 shows is that the left-leaning newspapers consistently have lower percentage scores for two or fewer sourced articles than the right-leaning newspapers. That is, they have higher numbers of articles with three or more sources throughout the coverage of multiple terrorist attacks.

The source data summarised in tables 4.62 and 4.63 on page 98 unfortunately reveal few patterns if any. Official sources consisting of federal or central government officials, prosecutors, police and military officials (represented in the tables as 'G') generally comprise 1 in 4 to 1 in 3 cited sources, far more than the non-official sources (NG) which consist of civilians, victims, academics, NGOs, authors, and think tanks. This fairly high use of officials as cited sources does not always translate into the principal source list. That is to say, that while officials may be widely used as sources in news coverage, their views and opinions are not always given primacy, or relied on more than or to the exclusion of the other cited sources. Consider *The Guardian*'s coverage

Table 4.61 – Source use variation in newspapers in two time periods following the attack																								
	NYT				**USA Today**				**Guardian**				**Telegraph**				**Hindu**				**TOI**			
	Attack coverage		Post attack coverage		Attack coverage		Post attack coverage		Attack coverage		Post attack coverage		Attack coverage		Post attack coverage		Attack coverage		Post attack coverage		Attack coverage		Post attack coverage	
Attack	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles	<2 sources	All articles
Brssls	7	20	6	17	7	16	0	5	3	25	1	8	12	23	14	30	9	16	6	10	10	18	7	10
	35%		35.29%		43.75%		0%		12%		12.50%		52.17%		46.66%		56.25%		60%		55.55		70%	
Nice	3	15	0	6	NA				5	20	2	6	5	18	5	13	NA							
	20%		0%						25%		33.33%		27.77%		38.46%									
Berlin	1	12	1	7					0	9	0	3	6	18	3	12								
	8.33%		14.20%						0%		0%		33.33%		25%									
Orlnd	9	33	10	35	15	26	5	12	2	11	2	5	2	10	2	7	1	5	3	4	2	5	3	4
	27.27%		28.57%		57.69%		41.66%		18.18%		40%		20%		28.57%		20%		75%		40%		75%	
NYC	5	16	3	11	2	5	2	5	NA															
	31.25%		27.27%		40%		40%																	
Pkot	NA																62	92	33	53	69	108	43	59
																	67.39%		62.26%		63.88%		72.88%	
Uri																	104	148	49	59	94	161	25	48
																	70.27%		83.05%		58.38%		52.08%	
Dhaka	0	5	1	8	NA												7	22	16	31	17	26	11	24
	0%		12.50%														31.81%		51.61%		65.38%		45.83%	

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of the Brussels attacks which has officials at 40 percent and non-officials at 15 percent of cited sources. In the principal source table *The Guardian* has only 4 percent of officials used as principal sources as compared to 10 percent of non-officials. A similar result in the Brussels bombings can be seen in *USA Today*. There is no consistent pattern of this however, the results are uneven.

Concerning sources of criticism of police actions, journalists themselves were the dominant critical principal sources across newspapers and attacks, barring the Indian newspapers' coverage of the Indian terrorist attacks. In the Indian attacks, journalists and military officials were critical of military responses in equal proportion, and opposition politicians were largely used to critique the ruling party response. As shown above, overall levels of criticism were fairly low.

Table 4.62 - Percentage of cited sources (rounded figures)

	Brussels			Nice			Orlando			NYC			Pathankot			Uri		
	G	NG	Jo	G	NG	Jo	G	NG	Jo	G	NG	Jo	G	NG	Jo	G	NG	Jo
NYT	37	20	17	27	18	25	21	16	16	31	11	15						
USATdy	27	19	23		NA		34	15	13	32	6	15			NA			
Guardian	40	15	18	31	17	23	21	17	15	22	7	20						
Telegraph	29	18	27	30	14	17	23	11	25	11	9	24						
Hindu	23	19	31				NA						33	2	31	27	8	27
TOI	27	19	34										35	3	27	25	11	26

Table 4.63 - Percentage of principal sources (rounded figures)

	Brussels				Nice				Orlando				NYC				Pathankot				Uri			
	G	Ng	Jo	NP	G	Ng	Jo	NP	G	Ng	Jo	NP	G	Ng	Jo	NP	G	Ng	Jo	NP	G	Ng	Jo	NP
NYT	19	3	26	29	11	10	23	31	14	13	31	30	10	10	5	58								
USA	5	13	39	24		NA			23	9	29	19	21	0	16	21			NA				NA	
Gu	4	10	20	54	14	8	22	45	8	8	18	50	4	9	18	59								
TLG	5	5	30	39	14	7	17	48	6	3	19	50	0	0	18	59								
Hindu	4	7	20	49					NA								26	1	14	37	25	8	11	16
TOI	0	17	14	44													24	3	15	34	17	14	12	33

To conclude, there is evidence to suggest that newspaper coverage is influenced by the region in which a terrorist attack takes place, with a newspaper's home country receiving preferential treatment across multiple coverage attributes. A newspaper's right-left ideology has an impact as well, with left-leaning newspapers providing higher levels of criticism in certain attacks, as well as linking official reactions to a "responsibility frame", and providing higher levels of coverage to a terrorist's motives and origins.

There is evidence to support an understanding of deference to government actions, but local government actions, not foreign ones. Both U.S. and Indian newspapers appear to provide preferential coverage towards their own police, intelligence and military institutions as compared to their critical coverage of European agencies.

Where there is relatively in-depth (in *The New York Times* at least) fact finding in order to provide comprehensive examinations of European failings, there is deference in the U.S. and Indian

papers towards the equivalent official groups. The New York attack coverage in the U.S. papers concludes that failed police investigations into the terrorist's movements really weren't the police's fault. The terrorist's family tipping off the F.B.I. about their son saw the U.S. papers dismiss the family's claims and support the F.B.I.'s claim that the evidence submitted to them was irrelevant. Only *The Telegraph* took a more critical stance towards the U.S. police in this case.

A similarly positive tone was also used for the Orlando attacks. Police sources were used to justify their actions and engage in self-praise with minimal newspaper criticism of delayed police action and reports of possible civilian deaths during the course of the counter terrorist raid. The high scope for potential criticism of the police response is a possible reason for a graphic and prolonged police encounter and gun battle receiving the lowest rates of coverage of all the terrorist attacks.

The Indian newspapers focus their attentions on Pakistan as the source of terrorism, and the prime cause of the attacks on the Pathankot Airbase and the Uri Military base. The Indian army and police forces are given minimal criticism, and while *The Hindu*, a left leaning paper, does critique the policies and actions of the ruling BJP party, *The Times of India*, a centre-right paper, does so far less, and engages in outright praise of the BJP to a large extent.

Though criticism is present in all newspapers across most terrorist attacks, it is only predominant for the Indian and U.S. papers for attacks outside their home countries. The U.K. papers unfortunately lack any clear and consistent pattern. Other than the murder of Jo Cox, which didn't attract as much coverage as the 6 attacks studied, there were few attacks in the U.K. that might warrant further attention.

Though the stance data is mixed, left-leaning papers consistently use the "responsibility" frame at a higher rate for police action compared to their right-leaning counterparts, as well as have more coverage of the motives and origins of terrorists. A closer look at the representation of these motives and origins of terrorism in the six newspapers is the subject of the next chapter, and is further revealing of the left-right divide.

The key question is whether or not the news coverage of terrorism is influenced by government sources and supportive of government agendas. Bennett (1990, 2007), Herman and Chomsky (2002), and the authors of a range of studies of terrorism and conflict would argue that it is; whereas a body of contradictory research finds the news more critical than otherwise thought by political-elite proponents. This chapter has contributed to answering this question by outlining the key issue/themes that comprise the most covered terrorist attacks of 2016, the sources used in the coverage, and the stances adopted to criticise and praise government responses.

It found that criticism, in the various forms described in the previous pages, generally occurred more often in left-leaning, not right-leaning papers, and for governments outside the newspaper's home country. This adds a dimension little explored in prior research for this area which tends towards more static findings of either support or criticism for governments. The wide scope of this thesis that studies multiple attacks across 3 different continents might account for this nuanced perspective. This could be a contribution to Wolfsfeld's (1997) Political Contest Model, which argued that critical news is more likely to occur when governments lose control over the political environment. Wolfsfeld (1997) however considers national crises such as terrorist attacks and wars to lead to a rally effect, in which the news media relies on official sources for information to become "faithful servants" of governments. Terrorists are considered as obvious examples of enemies that would lead to this outcome. The "regional-rule" discussed in this chapter finds this rally effect limited to a newspaper's own government, foreign governments are exempted, Wolfsfeld's (1997) study of the intifada coverage explored in the literature review supports this regional rule by finding news more critical of the Israeli government in the foreign media, and news supportive of the Israeli government in the Israeli media. This is explored in chapter 2.

Chapter 5
Representations of terrorist motives and origins in news coverage

As noted in the literature review in chapter 2, the representation of a terrorist's motives and origins in news coverage can be used to gauge levels of deference towards governments. If the origins of terrorism are emphasised in the news media as rooted in political causes or poor domestic policies, it falls within the ambit of the target state and could start a public discussion regarding that government's possible failures as contributing to the attack and calls for changes in policies that may not align with a state's local or larger geopolitical goals. In contrast, an emphasis on a terrorist's unhappy childhood, or other environmental or psychological factors turns the causes of the attack inward to the terrorist as an individual, leaving the target government unblamed, not responsible for an individual's poor choices or circumstances.

The 'motives' and 'origins' issue/themes were briefly referenced in the previous chapter as a way of illustrating the overall thematic content of the news coverage of each terrorist attack. To clarify, 'motives' refers to an individual's personal reasons for carrying out an attack, or psychological or environmental causes specific to that individual. 'Origins' refers to larger societal level causes described as creating an environment for violent radicalisation or terrorism to grow, these could range from historical factors, inequality in housing or employment, or alienation caused by narrow national identities. This chapter explains in detail how the motives and origins behind each terrorist attack was represented in the news coverage. Similarly to the previous chapter the findings show a difference in the volume and content of news coverage between left and right-leaning papers, as well as a difference in the coverage between different countries in the U.S. and Indian papers.

The U.S. newspapers emphasise psychosocial motives in the U.S., side-lining political causes and any discussion of potential state fault, while freely focusing on the failures of foreign government policy abroad. Another similar finding to the previous chapter is the clear difference in news coverage between left and right-leaning newspapers, with the left-leaning papers showing higher levels of coverage of motives and origins as compared to their right-leaning counterparts. There is also, for attacks in countries not a newspaper's own, increased criticism of government policy as a contributing factor of terrorist activity in the left-leaning papers, while the right-leaning papers almost always focus on individual failings and religious motives. This regional rule takes precedence over newspaper ideology in the U.S. papers, whereas in the Indian papers, *The Hindu* is clearly more critical of official actions in the Indian attacks than *The Times of India*, albeit far

more critical of government action abroad.

This chapter can be seen as a contribution towards the existing literature that finds little to no focus on a terrorist's express motives, and findings that the news media chooses not to pay attention to terrorist messages. Four high profile terrorist attacks are analysed in depth, the same attacks in the U.S. and Europe that were studied in the previous chapter, with a focus on the representation of terrorist motives and potential deeper origins. The two Indian attacks are given a shorter explanation as there is almost no discussion of motives and origins in the Indian newspapers, a focus on Pakistani support for terrorism lacked sufficient detail to be classed under origins, and there is little to no coverage of those attacks in the Western papers.

5.1 Motives and Origins: Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 below show that there were a total of 34 issue/themes that focused on explanations of the terrorist's motives and contributing factors under origins, almost ten percent of the coverage across all newspapers. There is a fairly strong representation of the motives and origins themes across *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Telegraph* and though the numbers in comparison are lower for the *USA Today*, *The Hindu*, and *The Times of India*, considering the number of themes used across all articles, the motive and origin themes as a percentage of total themes is not insignificant across all newspapers.

Table 5.1 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Motives and Origins by Newspaper							
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI	Total
Motives	5	0	7	1	3	1	17
Origins	5	3	0	5	2	2	17
Total	10	3	7	6	5	3	34

Table 5.2 - Brussels Airport and Metro Bombing: Motives and Origins by Newspaper							
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI	Total
Motives and Origins	10	3	7	6	5	3	34
Total Themes used	87	37	70	79	45	36	354
M/O as % of themes	**11.4%**	**8.1%**	**10%**	**7.5%**	**11.1%**	**8.3%**	**9.6%**

There are three key elements that can be identified in the motives and origins coverage of the Brussels bombings. One, a lack of detail in the coverage of the terrorists' motives. Two, a lack of attention to the terrorist stated reasons for the attack. And three, the difference in emphasis on origins, or larger root causes for the attack in the left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers.

On the first point, the coverage of the bombers' motives is lacking in detail and stated in brief generalities that just about merit a listing under motives in the content analysis, but usually without the content needed for further classification under the political, religious, or psychosocial emphases.

In *The New York Times* the terrorist's motives are said to be to "weaken Western society by spreading fear and panic, turning citizen against citizen, feeding xenophobic sentiments and further alienating and radicalizing Muslim youths" (The New York Times, 2016b). Their brand is "brutality", William McCants of the Brookings Institute is cited as saying, to "kill wherever they find the opportunity" (Mazzetti, 2016). Similar terse motive statements are found in *The Guardian*. A Guardian editorial states that ISIS's "twisted ambition is to trigger a form of civil war among Europe's different communities. Integration and open societies are what it hates the most, and what it wants to destroy" (The Guardian, 2016c). Its goal is said to be to "sow division and make us afraid of one another" (Henin, 2016), and to "spread fear and hatred around the globe (O. Jones, 2016), the attack is a means to an end, and "the end is power" (S. Jenkins, 2016a). *The Hindu* is slightly more explanatory, stating that ISIS's motive is to gain more recruits and maintain its relevance. To do so its "fighting a war against the civilisational values of the modern world…, it wants to create panic in free and open societies, break their social cohesion and then reap the dividends (The Hindu, 2016f).

The New York Times considers the process by which one of the bombers was radicalised, providing intimate details about his life, his schooling, and his family's positive values, but ultimately doesn't provide an explanation for why he carried out the attack, simply citing "personal and psychological" causes (Rubin, 2016b). The article focuses on the terrorist's search for Islam leading him to a purist Islamist interpretation of conflict between Islam and the West, and this is what drove him to become a suicide bomber.

Regarding the second point, the lack of attention to the terrorist stated motives, only one article in *The New York Times* examined the Islamic State's given reason for the attack, that Belgium is, "a country participating in the coalition against the Islamic State" (Shannon, 2016). This brief line sees no further analysis or explanation in *The New York Times*. Neither *The New York Times* nor the other newspapers discuss the antecedents of the conflict with ISIS, its founding, the second Iraq war and other factors that led to its growth (Stern & Berger, 2015), the evolution of its goals, or the beheading of James Foley and other Western hostages by ISIS that accelerated the coalition military response against it. On the same day as *The New York Time's* publication of the ISIS bulletin stating that Belgium was attacked for its role in the coalition against the Islamic State, Jason Burke in *The Guardian* questions why the attack took place, musing, "Revenge strike?...incompetent security services?...none of the above?.... For the terrorists, the aim is to show they can still terrorise…" (Burke, 2016a). A closer examination of the events that led to the attack, and ISIS stating that it was retaliation for the war against it is missing.

Point three, the difference between the left and right-leaning newspapers is clearly visible in the

'origin' issue/theme, assigned to coverage with a focus on exploring the larger social, political, and economic forces that could have contributed to the attack. There are seventeen 'origin' issue themes in the news coverage, and these do engage in a more substantial discussion. *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Hindu* consistently focus on factors related to communities, cultures, and identities in their discussion of origins, whereas *The Telegraph* highlights Britain's membership of the E.U as a cause of susceptibility to terrorism.

In the left-leaning papers, *The New York Times* faults government negligence of immigrant majority communities resulting in the growth of isolated ethnic ghettos, an environment that caused anger, crime, and resentment to take hold among the young people who live there. These grievances were said to be ripe for exploitation by terrorist recruiters (Erlanger, 2016). These cut off neighbourhoods are analysed further in another article and found to consist of Moroccan and Turkish Muslim immigrants. A Belgian mayor explains that this geographic difference is found to be more important than religion. The Moroccan Muslims are said to be far angrier and more alienated due to their origins from a part of Morocco in conflict with the ruling monarchy there. In addition, Moroccan Muslims have a strong desire to integrate and speak fluent French, making them more sensitive to discrimination, and viewing "minor slights as proof that the entire system is against them". In contrast, the Turks are "proud to be Turks and are much less tempted by extremism" In addition, the Turkish government controls the mosques attended by Turkish Muslims, and uses a network of Turkish trained imams to keep extremism at bay (Higgins, 2016a). Other analysts cite the lack of a "European Dream" a narrative or national spirit to believe in like the U.S, along with the lack of strong singular national identities to adopt, encouraging Muslims to turn to ISIS (Bittner, 2016). An editorial finds that strong communities are therefore central in preventing terrorism with isolated communities said to be uncooperative with law enforcement, with ethnic profiling by police leading to further alienation (The New York Times, 2016f). This emphasis on community is somewhat echoed by *USA Today*, which cited a retired French intelligence officer as saying, "an entire nation living within our country whose language we do not speak, whose customs and religion, whose hopes and fears we do not understand" is the greatest threat to security. Though he was speaking in a narrower sense of explaining why members of such communities don't cooperate with the police (Andelman, 2016).

The Guardian focuses on communities as well, but more in the way suggested by Sageman's perspective of social networks as a catalyst for radicalisation (discussed in the literature review). The lead bomber was sheltered by "dozens" or "scores" of contacts that either shared his views, or supported them out of friendship or family obligations, making terrorism not so much about the lone wolf, but the "significant number of people who are deeply embedded in broader commu-

nities or neighbourhoods (Burke, 2016a). The suburb where he lived is described as a place known for "criminal networks as well as for radical Islamisim" (The Guardian, 2016c). Terrorism is described as a "social activity" that resembles other social activities, foreign fighter networks are held akin to street gangs in methods of recruitment and demographics (Burke, 2016a). *The Hindu* cites the same academic as *The Guardian*, arguing that religion is not the sole driver for radicalisation, that the radicalised become terrorists because they feel alienated, or for praise and attention that is lacking in their families and schools and that they find in terrorist networks (Menon, 2016b). *The Hindu* in an article analysing the European migrant influx from a terrorism perspective blames anti-migrant sentiment and conflicting migrant policies as making life harder by placing suspicion on entire communities. A British political journalist is cited to blame the foreign policy of Western governments as "ultimately responsible for the appalling attacks in Brussels and Paris" (Menon, 2016c).

The Telegraph, in contrast to the other newspapers, uses Belgium's experience to highlight Britain's membership of the E.U as a cause of susceptibility to terrorism. Europe's open borders are described by former Conservative leaders, and think tanks, as a "welcome sign" to terrorists, the passport-free Schengen zone "makes Europe less safe" and therefore to prevent the free movement of terrorists from Europe to Britain, the U.K must leave the E.U (Hope, 2016). Douglas Murray, a conservative commentator writes in *The Telegraph* that "whenever any act of Islamist terror is carried out on Western society we…ask all the wrong questions….And then we blame ourselves. "What did we do to make this happen?" we ask, time after time. He disagrees with the critical news coverage of failed policing and urban policies that have failed to integrate Muslim neighbourhoods. According to Murray it is not deprivation or alienation that leads to terrorism, he finds that the Muslim ghettos of Belgium are nicer than the housing estates of Britain (how they might compare with the rest of the housing in Belgium goes unremarked). He feels that introspection and self-criticism that draws focus to foreign policy and inequality is a form of self-loathing that must stop.

He argues a simple cause of radicalisation : Islam is a flawed religion. What Muslims really want is parallel societies because, in Murray's words, Muslims are racist. There is no such distinction between Turkish or Berber speaking Moroccan Muslims ala *The New York Times*. Muslims are a monolithic community that are allowed to propagate violent views by Liberal politicians. An example is provided of Nicola Sturgeon visiting a mosque following the ISIS attack on Paris in 2015, where the imam made a statement in support of Mumtaz Qadri, the man who assassinated a secular governor in Pakistan (Murray, 2016). *The Telegraph* doesn't explore the direct motives of the terrorists for the bombing, but rather why they might have chosen suicide bombing as a

tactic. One of the suicide bombers left an audio recording stating he preferred to carry out the bombing rather than go to jail (Henry & Mendick, 2016).

The Times of India provides a similarly simple critique, Molenbeek, a Muslim majority suburb in Brussels where the bombers lived is described as a jihadi ghetto that the authorities investigate after any terrorist attack in Europe. The ghetto is said to comprise of Moroccan and Turkish middle class Muslims, and like *The Telegraph*, there is no further explanation or nuance of the kind found in *The New York Times* (The Times of India, 2016a).

To summarise, the exploration of motives and origins in the Brussels bombings as a whole averages out to about 10 percent of each newspaper's total coverage. The left-leaning newspapers provide more coverage of motives and origins than the right-leaning newspapers. Across all newspapers attempts at detailed explanations of the terrorists' individual motives are lacking, when motives are brought up, they are simple, short statements relating to terrorist evil and brutality. There is no attempt at further analysis or explanation of a clearly political motive statement issued by ISIS. In contrast there are detailed explanations of terrorism's origins. The origins variable which focuses on the macro causes, is present in almost all the six newspapers. These explanations vary from alienation caused by poor government social policy and law enforcement failings in the left-leaning papers to inherent flaws in Islam and open borders resulting in uncontrolled immigration in the right-leaning papers.

This focus on origins, or larger societal or government policy based causes continues in the next attack analysed, the Nice Truck attack.

5.2 Motives and Origins: The Nice Truck Attack

In the coverage of the Nice Truck attack the volume of coverage dedicated to motives and origins as outlined in tables 5.3 and 5.4 below is roughly the same as the Brussels bombings with each newspaper at about 10 percent. *The Telegraph* stands out here at about 17 percent, the largest proportion of coverage devoted to motives and origins among the papers. Though not shown in these tables, *USA Today* had no coverage of motives and origins compared to about 11 percent

Table 5.3 - Nice Truck Attack: Total Motives and Origins				
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph	Total
Motives	4	3	8	15
Origins	2	1	2	5
Total	6	4	10	20

Table 5.4 - Nice Truck Attack: Motives and Origins as percentage of total issue/themes				
	NYT	Guardian	Telegraph	Total
Motives and Origins	6	4	10	20
Total Themes used	52	49	58	159
M/O as % of themes	**11.50%**	**8.16%**	**17.20%**	**12.57%**

for *The New York Times*. A significant difference between the two attacks is the coverage of origins. It was equal in number (if more detailed) to motives in the Brussels bombings, but sees far less coverage in the Nice attack.

The New York Times and *The Guardian* emphasise religious and political motives along with alienation caused by gentrification and in doing so they are critical of the French government, while *The Telegraph* focuses on psychosocial content and exclusively considers individual motives, it is unconcerned with state responsibility.

The New York Times has a fairly consistent narrative, one in which it's difficult to tease out precise differences between motives and origins. The Nice terrorist attack is described as stemming from a "social and political problem", not ideology or religion. The widening gap between Muslim and non-Muslim communities referenced in *The Telegraph* is a central problem for *The New York Times*, but unlike *The Telegraph*, the cause is not left unexplained with an inference of irreconcilable differences between religions and communities.

Across different articles, *The New York Times* identifies as key factors contributing to Islamist attacks, a narrowly-defined national identity based on secularism (Fisher, 2016a), with divisive right wing politics and gentrification (Rubin, 2016a), and government indifference leading to unequal opportunities in employment and education (Soufan, 2016). *The New York Times* reports that Muslims and Non-Muslims lived together in harmony for generations in Nice, but this changed with the rise of the Far Right in France represented by the National Front Party whose leaders have engaged in divisive politics. Increasing feelings of alienation are exacerbated by gentrification which has pushed immigrants to the periphery of urban areas. Local governments are accused by civilian sources of facilitating this by purchasing buildings and refusing to rent to Muslim shopkeepers. A Nice resident said that there were no mosques in Nice itself "because the mayor's office is against them" (Rubin, 2016a). This lack of political and economic support is said to coexist alongside repression and corruption, and a flawed education system that fails to instil the critical thinking needed to reject the "false promises of extremism" (Soufan, 2016). Muslims therefore struggle to integrate and feel further rejected by national identities that stress secularism and are rooted in European heritage. Thus they turn to terrorism to "bring meaning to their lives or to explain their own sense of helplessness or isolation" (Fisher, 2016a; Rubin, 2016a; Soufan, 2016).

Where *The New York Times* focuses on the failings of government resulting in political, economic, and social pressures, *The Guardian* is less certain in its placement of responsibility. France is said to be a target for two reasons, its secularism, which is seen by jihadis as a means of under-

mining their Islamic world, and its participation in the U.S.-led coalition's air strikes on the Islamic State (Burke, 2016c). Other articles are more exploratory. Terrorism could be inspired by a "nihilist generational revolt" where young people are already in turmoil and are simply using Islam as a frame for their anger and alienation. It could be Islam itself is prone to violent interpretation. *The Guardian* suggests it could be the "historical impact of western colonialism as well as that of more recent western policies in the Middle East." The terrorist could also simply have been "a genuine loner and suffering serious mental illness" without an ideological element (Burke, 2016b; Nougayrede, 2016). Though Burke does say this is unlikely, the focus on psychology over politics or religion is the thrust of one of *The Guardian*'s articles which focuses on the terrorist's past psychiatric treatment, mental instability, violent altercations and history of minor disturbances. His sister stated that "My brother had psychological problems, and we have given the police documents showing that he had been seeing psychologists for several years" (S. Jones et al., 2016).

The Telegraph's primary focus, unlike the other newspapers, is on the terrorist's psychological problems and Islamic State propaganda. There is almost no discussion of political motives or government failings. The main causes are "psychological disorder, criminality and Islamist radicalism. Many killers exhibit all three at once." The terrorist is said to be "another sad loner… unhappy about a broken marriage and occasionally in trouble with the police." (The Daily Telegraph, 2016g). A wife-beater, he is described as "mentally unstable and prone to violent fits of rage" having shredded his daughter's teddy bear with a knife after she left him (Chazan et al., 2016). He is however, described as having become radicalised very quickly, in a matter of days or weeks (Henry, 2016a), and not at all a fervent Muslim. Lurid details of his being a "sex maniac" and "ultra-violent sadist", in love with a seventy three year old man who was his "main lover" (Henry & Chazan, 2016) is presented alongside neighbours testimony for his love of "women, drink, and salsa" (Henry & Morgan, 2016). *The Telegraph* reports his phone as "full of messages, videos and photographs, including ones of men and women he had recently slept with". His psychiatrist confirmed his "violent behaviour towards his family" (Morgan et al., 2016).

The Telegraph's coverage of motives is an example of Kundnani's accusation of a lack of acknowledgement of political motivations in the news. The near exclusive focus on the terrorist's individual psychology assigns the State minimal responsibility. *The Telegraph* however does also report in one article that secularism, and the French ban on the veil and headscarves in public and schools was cited by the Islamic State as a key reason for singling out France (Mulholland, 2016a). *The Telegraph* hints at criticism when it says that authorities "must struggle to establish a close relationship between their police and intelligence services and the communities from which terrorists typically emerge" (Barrett, 2016).

5.3 Motives and Origins: The Orlando Nightclub Shooting

The volume of coverage dedicated to motives and origins in the Orlando shooting is outlined below in tables 5.5 and 5.6. The U.S. papers have a lower proportion of coverage dedicated to the two issue/themes compared to the Nice and Brussels attacks, and the British papers have a far higher proportion than the U.S. papers in their Orlando shooting coverage.

Table 5.5 - Orlando Nightclub Shooting: Motives and Origins by Newspaper					
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Total
Motives	10	5	12	6	33
Origins	0	0	2	1	3
Total	10	5	14	7	36

Table 5.6 - Orlando Shooting: Motives and Origins by Newspaper as percentage of total issue/themes					
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Total
Motives and Origins	10	5	14	7	36
Total Themes used	118	69	38	32	257
M/O as % of themes	**8.47%**	**7.20%**	**36.80%**	**21.80%**	**14%**

In a near complete reversal from its coverage in the European attacks, *The New York Times* has no 'origin' issue/themes for the Orlando shootings, no analysis of any wider social or political influences that could have contributed to the attack. Instead it (as well as the other newspapers) join *The Telegraph* in side-lining the terrorist's stated motives regarding civilian deaths caused by U.S. air strikes in Iraq in favour of a psychosocial explanation. This ranges from a delinquent childhood, to an unstable adulthood, to being a repressed homosexual and the attack motivated by a hateful obsession with gay people.

Concerning the terrorist's stated motives, one article in *The New York Times* mentions that the terrorist demanded via Facebook that the U.S. and Russia stop the air strikes against the Islamic State writing, "You kill innocent women and children by doing us airstrikes… Now taste the Islamic state vengeance." In a final post he wrote "In the next few days you will see attacks from the Islamic state in the usa" (Blinder et al., 2016). That the terrorist's motive was politically oriented was further reinforced during the attack itself, when the terrorist called the police during the attack to pledge allegiance to the Islamic State (Robles & Perez-Pena, 2016), and told hostage negotiators to stop bombing Syria and Iraq (Lawler, 2016). The two articles that mention this have no discussion of U.S. foreign policy or war. There is no segue into the civilian causalities caused by the U.S. in the Middle East and Afghanistan during the War on Terror. This particular subject is analysed further in the next chapter.

Rather than discussing the terrorist's politics, *The New York Times* chooses to focus on his state of mind, the psychosocial aspect of this motives. This focus is expressed in three ways, the terrorist's childhood delinquency, his misogyny and physical abuse of his wife, and his repressed

homosexuality. The same article which carries the terrorist's online statement regarding civilian casualties shifts its focus to his childhood. A school report says he engaged in "much talk about violence and sex" and was "constantly moving, verbally abusive, rude, and aggressive". He was repeatedly suspended for fighting and celebrated and mocked the 9/11 attack, he was disciplined 31 times. Later in life as a security guard he talked of killing people, and claimed his support of Islamist extremist groups (Barry et al., 2016; Blinder et al., 2016). In his work as a guard, those who met him dreaded the interactions stating he "acted like a straight-up predator", a civilian who once confronted him said "It was like I was staring into the eyes of Ted Bundy" (Barry et al., 2016).

The second aspect of the psychosocial discussion in *The New York Times* is domestic violence. The terrorist was a wife beater. His wife says that she was forbidden from leaving their house except to go to work, couldn't contact her parents, and was beaten for reasons including the laundry not being finished by the time he got home. One instance of violence involving strangulation almost killed her. *The New York Times* says that violence against women is a key aspect of Islamic State culture as well as a recruiting tool it uses for young men, it makes a promise to allow them male dominance over women and this is said to have been a source of appeal to the terrorist given his misogyny. The terrorist attack is said to be a way for the terrorist to provoke fear and assert control similarly to how he dealt with women, his domestic violence "a psychological training ground…to commit a mass attack" (Mazzetti et al., 2016; Taub, 2016a).

One account from the terrorist's alleged ex-gay lover states that the terrorist felt rejected by gay people and was angry after a liaison with a man who confessed to being H.I.V positive. Choosing a gay nightclub as a target was therefore an act of revenge. After an investigation, this account was dismissed by law enforcement as lacking credibility, though several men came forward to state that the terrorist was a regular at the club. A Navy veteran said he had communicated with the terrorist for a year on a gay chat and dating app called Jackd. An investigation of a different site purportedly used by the terrorist turned up no leads, and the site's spokesperson was cited as saying that he believed the terrorist's alleged use of such apps to be a hoax (Robles & Turkewitz, 2016). Rumours of the terrorist's homosexuality and its possible role as a motive persist in other newspapers discussed below. A *New York Times* columnist summarises this discussion, the terrorist is "lashing out" against America with his "darker, smaller, more oppressive" mindset (Bruni, 2016). The "crucial context for what happened in Orlando" is said to have nothing to do with the war on terror, or the civilian casualties caused in those wars, but rather "to be gay is to be in mortal danger. To embrace love is to court death" (Bruni, 2016).

Though there are terrorist attacks where the terrorists do not openly state their motive, such as

the Nice attack, or the Berlin Christmas Market attack, or the Brussels attack, it is interesting that even when there is a clear and stated motive, it is resolutely rather than just passively ignored. One article in *The New York Times* states that "Offering an explanation -- whether it is radical Islam or mental illness or homophobia or gun access -- is also a way of trying to comfort ourselves by asserting false clarity over something that is ultimately unknowable". The same article has Will McCants of the Brookings Institution is quoted as saying "terrorist attacks have a confluence of causes, and because we're dealing with the human mind and the interplay of complex social and political factors, it's difficult to separate the crucial from the incidental" (Fisher, 2016c). Another article states that "Efforts to parse Mr. Mateen's motivation have revealed strands of Islamist radicalism, bigotry, mental illness and even self-hatred (Robles & Perez-Pena, 2016). All of this may well be true, but to focus on all the alternative or additional possible reasons for why the attack took place and to mostly ignore the concrete reasons plainly stated not just once but multiple times over by the terrorist himself is to avoid a discussion that could well turn critical of government policy.

The homosexual motive is strongly reported by *USA Today*. It reports that, according to his father, the terrorist was "repulsed when he saw two men kissing" (Solis, 2016) and even though the paper covers his childhood behaviour and reputation in a very similar fashion to *The New York Times* (Elliot & Atterbury, 2016), the attack is framed as a hate crime, an attack on homosexuals (Hampson, 2016; Solis, 2016). There is no reporting of his Facebook posts, or the content of his phone call to police during attack other than he made the call and he pledged his allegiance to the Islamic State (K. Johnson, 2016).

The Guardian also emphasises the attack as a hate crime, an attack on gay people and the latest in a "line with a long dark history of such outrages in America" (Pilkington, 2016). It emphasises the father's account of his son's repulsion at two men kissing, and an editorial criticises any hesitancy to recognise it as such (*The Guardian*, 2016b). The use of the gay dating app and his visit to the gay club on apparently at least 12 occasions according to the club regulars is used by *The Guardian* to support the theory that the terrorist was a repressed homosexual who took out his frustrations on the community he felt he couldn't be a part of. According to a Guardian opinion editor, "What of the powerful forces of sexuality? Of shame, of belonging, of the desire to ruin what you feel you cannot have -- some of the most powerful forces a psyche can contain?" (Shariatmadari, 2016).

Like *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* has one report of his political motives, the Facebook posts where he pledges allegiance to ISIS and the quote, "You kill innocent women and children by doing us airstrikes...now taste the Islamic state vengeance" (Smith & Ackerman, 2016). Also

like *The New York Times*, this is mentioned once and never again, the focus stays on his possible homosexuality, and also his violent nature. His wife is repeatedly quoted as saying he was bipolar, co-workers say he was bigoted, that he hated "blacks, lesbians, women, and Jews" and that he was always "angry, sweating, just angry at the world." He is said to be mentally unstable and ill (Ackerman et al., 2016; Teague et al., 2016). *The Guardian* also reports that the terrorist physically abused his wife (Ackerman et al., 2016), though it does not (unlike *The New York Times*) link this abuse and hatred of women to his support of ISIS, choosing instead to focus on his homosexuality, and how that trait served as an unconscious motivator. Both papers focus on psychosocial causes but choose different emphases.

The Telegraph, like *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* carries one article that mentions a political motive, which is then ignored, and then reports the terrorist's homosexuality as an undisputed fact and the primary motive for the attack taking place.

The only article in *The Telegraph* that carries the political motive doesn't discuss the Facebook posts, but does mention the phone call to police during the attack, that the terrorist "identified himself as an Islamic soldier during the calls, and told hostage negotiators to tell the US to stop bombing Syria and Iraq" (Lawler, 2016). The rest of the articles state that the attack was an act of revenge after the terrorist found out that one of his male lovers was HIV positive (Allen, 2016), an account that was dismissed by *The New York Times* (Robles & Turkewitz, 2016). *The Telegraph* article continues, quoting from a television interview with the terrorist's alleged friend, whose voice was altered and was wearing a disguise (Allen, 2016)

> He hated gay Puerto Ricans for all the stuff they did to him. I believe this crazy horrible thing he did was for revenge. When I asked him what he was going to do now, his answer was, 'I'm going to make them pay for what they did to me'

Other articles cite the same information from the previous papers, that the terrorist's father said his son was enraged after seeing two gay men kissing (Whitehead et al., 2016).

To summarise, all the newspapers' coverage of the terrorist's stated motive is minimal, no more than a single line in a few articles mention his Facebook statements related to civilian deaths in airstrikes against ISIS. Unlike the exploration of the deeper social or political issues behind the terrorist attacks in Europe, the U.S. papers, in particular *The New York Times*, focus almost all their attention on the terrorist's personality problems and possible repressed homosexuality. Because of this the attack is framed as fuelled by an internal individual conflict, rather than by an external, political cause. This can be argued is a form of deference to the U.S. and other government's foreign policy agendas which is spared the debate and potential criticism that might arise from an examination of its military actions abroad and domestic policies at home.

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 in the previous pages show the left-leaning papers continue to provide more coverage to the terrorist's motives than the right-leaning papers, though unlike in the European attacks, greater levels of motive and origin stories in this case does not mean greater levels of examination of government responsibility. This is possibly due to the fact that the U.S. papers are now reporting on the U.S. government, though it doesn't explain the deferential, psychosocial coverage in the U.K. papers which according to the argument advanced in this thesis, should be more critical in this case.

5.4 Motives and Origins: The New York City Pressure Cooker Bombings

Tables 5.7 and 5.8 below show that the New York Pressure Cooker Bombings have a lower proportion of motive and origin themes compared to the other terrorist attacks, and this section is correspondingly shorter.

Only two attacks have lower motive and origin numbers: Uri at 1 percent and Pathankot at 2.5.

Table 5.7 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: Motives and Origins by Newspaper					
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Total
Motives	3	1	0	2	6
Origins	0	1	0	0	1
Total	3	2	0	2	7

Table 5.8 - New York Pressure Cooker Bombings: M/O by Newspaper as % of total issue/themes					
	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Total
Motives and Origins	3	1	0	2	7
Total Themes used	41	19	22	17	99
M/O as % of themes	7.3%	5.2%	0%	11.7%	7.07%

The coverage of the NYC bombings is similar to the Orlando shootings in that the newspapers focus predominantly on the terrorist's psychology and religion. The terrorist's childhood is once again a focus with *The New York Times* describing his anger issues and poor behaviour. The similarities with the Orlando terrorist are striking. His fifth grade teacher complained that Ahmad "acted like a king in class", and in junior high he broke his friend's nose. He dated a local girl of his own choice and got her pregnant rather than accept the family arranged match from Afghanistan. "He tried different jobs and failed… years of small indignities piled up" (Barker et al., 2016). His writings are said to praise jihad, and terrorist figures including Anwar-Al-Awalaki (Santora & Goldman, 2016) and his YouTube account listed jihadi videos, some with battle hymns that "glorify the violent struggle in religious terms and are meant to instill piety and inspire jihadis" (Mele, 2016). His journal is reported as full of jihadi references, with direct quotations praying for Allah not to take jihad away and how he has received guidance to attack "the Kuffar in their backyard". (Santora et al., 2016). His radicalisation is said to have begun when his father sent

him to Pakistan and Afghanistan, said to be a way to discipline him for his American manner-isms, his baggy jeans and hoodies, slangy text messages, girlfriends, and other misbehaviours. Instead, he is said to have fallen under the influence of a radical cleric and came home "angry and violent", stabbing his mother, brother, and sister a few months later (Barker et al., 2016).

The only potential reference to political motives in *The New York Times* is in a single line: "Pierced by a bullet and splattered with blood, the journal contains screeds against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan" but this is not explored further. What is explored is further is the religious motive: "My heart I pray to the beautiful wise ALLAH," he wrote. "To not take JIHAD away from. I beg." "Mr. Rahami writes of "killing the kuffar," or unbelievers, and praises terrorists figures, including Anwar al-Awlaki, once Al Qaeda's leading propagandist, who died in a drone strike in Yemen" (Santora & Goldman, 2016).

The trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan are cited in *The Guardian* too. A childhood friend of the terrorist is used to explain how the terrorist's personality changed after these trips, how he was more religious, quiet and mature (Roberts & Lartey, 2016). Beyond this, there is little to no inves-tigation or explanation for why the terrorist carried out the attacks.

The Telegraph focuses on the terrorist's sister, citing her sharing anti-American rhetoric online. She shared a quote from an al-Qaida co-founder stating, "If defending ourselves is terrorism, then let history be witness that we are terrorists!" There is no explicit link between this possi-bly political quote and the terrorist's actions, there is an implicit assumption that the family as a whole supports terrorism.(Alexander, 2016). *The Telegraph* also focuses on the trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the link to the terrorist's radicalisation (Harriet & Lawler, 2016).

5.5 Motives and Origins: Pathankot and Uri attacks

Tables 5.9 and 5.10 on the next page show that a low 2.1 percent of articles, only 14, had any explorations of individual terrorist motivations and an additional 3 articles explored historical origins. *The Hindu* had fewer overall articles focusing on motives compared to *The Times of India*, though it did have the only articles with the origins issue/theme. The low overall number of articles doesn't mean that the motive for the attack was entirely unexplored. 7.9 percent of arti-cles contained accusations of Pakistani complicity. Pakistan's involvement in the terrorist attack is the primary explanation for why the attack took place, even though the historical reasons for the India-Pakistan conflict is unexplained.

The articles exploring terrorist motives in *The Times of India* seem to have a generally political overtone, but are inconsistent in content. The terrorist attack is said to have taken place due to the terrorist's motive to degrade the "good atmosphere…created by Prime Minister Narendra

Table 5.9 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Total Motives and Origins			
	The Hindu	**The Times of India**	**Total**
Motives	3	11	14
Origins	3	0	3
Total	6	11	17

Table 5.10 - Pathankot Airbase Attack: Total Motives and Origins as a percentage of issue/themes			
	The Hindu	**The Times of India**	**Total**
Motives and Origins	6	11	17
Total Themes used	317	354	671
M/O as % of themes	1.89%	3.10%	2.53%

Table 5.11 - Uri Military Base Attack: Total Motives and Origins			
	The Hindu	The Times of India	Total
Motives	3	2	5
Origins	0	2	2
Total	3	4	7

Table 5.12 - Uri Military Base Attack: Total Motives and Origins as a percentage of issue/themes			
	The Hindu	The Times of India	Total
Motives and Origins	3	4	7
Total Themes used	349	353	702
M/O as % of themes	0.85%	1.13%	0.99%

Modi's visits across the globe" according to a Union Minister (Mayilvaganan, 2016); there are accusations of genocide by the Indian army in Kashmir by terrorist leader Hafiz Saeed (The Times of India, 2016b), and a note found on the terrorists killed in the attack stated it was for revenging the death of Afzal Guru a terrorist convicted and executed for his role in an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001 (Chauhan & Dua, 2016). *The Hindu* focuses on this note, and the political motive of revenge for the execution of Afzal Guru (V. Singh, 2016a, 2016b). Despite the emphasis on political motives it does not lead to further debate or criticism of the government's actions. Criticism is generated by the government's response to the terrorist attack and is covered in the previous chapter.

The Uri Attack is similar to Pathankot, seen in proportion to the large number of issue/themes, there is very low number of issue/themes focusing on individual terrorist or terrorist group motives. This can be seen in tables 5.11 and 5.12 above. There were seven motive and origin issue/themes out of a total of 702, about one percent of the total. Five of these were motive issue/themes, all focusing on political motives. Shown in charts in the previous chapter, accusations of Pakistani complicity appear as the third most used theme as compared to the fourth most used theme in Pathankot. Holding Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies responsible for organising the attack is used as the primary explanation for how the attack took place, with minimal accompanying context or history. The origin articles in *The Times of India* focus on

political errors made by successive Congress government in decades past, in underfunding the military and being insufficiently aggressive in its military strategy, resulting in tactical errors that led to compromised security in border regions (Sahni, 2016). One article cites Kashmir, briefly mentioning the historical dispute as a cause of tension between India and Pakistan (Khan, 2016).

The coverage of motives and origins are far lower in the Indian papers for the Indian attacks as compared to their coverage of the European attacks. *The Hindu*'s coverage of Brussels and Nice had about 10 percent of its coverage devoted to motives and origins, and *The Times of India* has about 8 percent for Brussels. This falls to 2 and 1 percent in *The Hindu* for Pathankot and Uri, and 3 and 1 percent for *The Times of India*.

5.6 Conclusion

There is a clear difference in the volume and nature of coverage given to motives and origins based on newspaper ideology and region. The left-leaning papers tend to provide more coverage than their right-leaning counterparts. A regional difference appears to impact volume of coverage as well. The U.S. and Indian newspapers provide far lower levels of coverage to attacks in their own countries.

These two conditions, newspaper ideology and the regional rule, also impact the nature of coverage. Outside of their home countries, in the European attacks studied, the left-leaning papers focus on political and social causes behind the origins of terrorism, while the right-leaning papers focus on individual failings, poor choices, and psychological flaws. The study of specific terrorist motives, political or religious is largely ignored, (though it is paid attention to in the NYC bombing).

In the Brussels bombings *The New York Times* blames government policy for causing isolated communities that are uncooperative with law enforcement, *The Guardian* talks about alienation from families and schools, and *The Hindu* about anti-migrant policies. In the Nice truck attack, *The New York Times* frames it as a social and political problem, blaming right-wing politics, gentrification, government indifference in employment and education, and a flawed education system that fails to instil critical thinking. *The Guardian* brings up French secularism as a jihadi target and France's participation in the U.S.-led coalition air strikes.

In both of the above attacks the right-leaning papers either fault the E.U'.s open borders, racist Muslims, or mentally unstable, sadistic terrorists. While the right-leaning papers maintain a consistent focus on the individual terrorist's psychology regardless of location, the left-leaning papers switch to a psychosocial emphasis for the U.S. attacks.

The terrorist who attacked the nightclub in Orlando made a clear statement about civilian casu-altiies in war. While it's possible this statement was misleading, it receives almost no attention at all from the 4 newspapers analysed. *The New York Times*'s coverage of the Orlando motives and origins is suddenly very similar to *The Telegraph*'s coverage of not only Orlando, but Nice too. There is a common focus among all the newspapers on the terrorist's state of mind and possible homosexuality. There is a similar focus on mental instability and religious radicalisa-tion as motivating factors in the NYC bombing among all the newspapers, ignoring a potentially political motive written in the terrorist's journal.

Another way of approaching the same subject is by considering the prominence of political versus other motives in terms of the position of relevant reports in the (physical) newspaper. Looking at the allocation of political, religious, and psychosocial motive explorations to different page numbers in *The New York Times* and *The Telegraph* (the two papers with page numbers in the ProQuest database) is further revealing of the overall focus on religious and psychosocial motives. Table 5.13 and 5.14 below show that political motives have a far lower share of the first four pages than religious and psychosocial motives. Table 5.15 on the next page shows that *The New York Times* has the majority of its coverage of motives and origins on the first twelve pages, far more than *The Telegraph*, and though its coverage of religious and psychosocial motives is substantial, it does contain a higher proportion of political motive coverage than *The Telegraph*.

Table 5.13 – Motive type by page numbers, The New York Times and The Telegraph combined								
	GVM, Political		GVM, Religious		GVM, Psychosocial		GVM, Combined	
Page No.	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
1	6	13.6%	11	22.0%	9	24.3%	0	0.0%
2	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
3	0	0.0%	1	2.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
4	2	4.5%	2	4.0%	2	5.4%	0	0.0%
5	2	4.5%	0	0.0%	1	2.7%	0	0.0%
6	3	6.8%	1	2.0%	1	2.7%	1	11.1%
7	2	4.5%	0	0.0%	1	2.7%	0	0.0%
8	2	4.5%	3	6.0%	1	2.7%	1	11.1%
9	1	2.3%	3	6.0%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
10	3	6.8%	3	6.0%	3	8.1%	2	22.2%
11	3	6.8%	1	2.0%	3	8.1%	0	0.0%
12	4	9.1%	2	4.0%	2	5.4%	0	0.0%
12 pg total	28	63.4%	27	54.0%	23	62.1%	4	44.4%
29 pg total	44	100%	50	100%	37	100%	9	100%

Table 5.14 – Motive type by page numbers, The New York Times and The Telegraph combined								
	GVM, Political		GVM, Religious		GVM, Psychosocial		GVM, Combined	
Page No.	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%	Freq	%
1-4	8	18.1%	13	28.0%	11	29.7%	0	0%
5-8	9	20.3%	4	8.0%	4	10.8%	2	22.2%
9-12	11	25.0%	9	18.0%	8	21.6%	2	22.2%
12 pg total	28	63.4	27	54.0%	23	62.1%	4	44.4%
29 pg total	44	100%	50	100%	37	100%	9	100

Table 5.15 – Motive type by page numbers, The New York Times and The Telegraph								
	GVM, Political		GVM, Religious		GVM, Psychosocial		GVM, Combined	
Pg No.	NYT	Telegraph	NYT	Telegraph	NYT	Telegraph	NYT	Telegraph
1-4	25.90%	5.90%	41.70%	15.30%	55%	0%	0%	0%
5-8	29.60%	5.90%	8.30%	7.60%	0%	23.60%	25%	0%
9-12	22.20%	29.40%	20.80%	15.30%	20%	23.60%	25%	0%
Total	77.7%	41.2%	70.8%	38.2%	75.0%	47.0%	50.0%	0%

The U.S. newspapers while ready to explore the failings of European governments, seem more reluctant to do so for their own governments, focusing almost entirely on the individual psycho-social motives of American terrorists. Domestic and foreign policy is given minimal coverage, though there was a strong debate regarding lax U.S gun laws that resulted in significant criticism of Republicans.

The Indian newspapers, while ready to join in with the critique of Belgian policies as seen in the previous chapter, exhibit greater reluctance to do so for their own government.

Deference to government can be clearly observed in the U.S. and Indian newspapers for their own governments. In the Indian papers this is more observable in *The Times of India*.

This chapter has answered the third sub-question of the thesis which asks how terrorist motives and origins are represented in the news coverage. Kelly and Mitchell (1981), Paletz (1982), Steuter, (1990), and Sundar (2016), all find that the news media tends to avoid discussions of terrorists' motives and origins almost entirely. Kundnani (2014) provides examples to highlight how when the causes of terrorism are discussed, a terrorist's stated political motives are ignored in favour of reporting psychological causes. The left-right divide and regional rule highlighted in the past two chapters add a further perspective to these findings. Coverage of motives and origins was generally low, confirming prior research findings. However it was lower in newspapers reporting on attacks in their own nations and found at a higher frequency in left-leaning papers. This regional divide goes beyond volume of coverage, the left-leaning newspapers focus on political failings outside their home nations, but join their right-leaning counterparts in a style of coverage that arguably absolves governments of responsibility at home. Thus Kundnani's (2014) findings are found to be accurate, but only under certain conditions.

The difference in the nature of news coverage between the left and right-leaning papers as well as the increased level of deference to a newspaper's own government is explored further in the next chapter, which focuses on the civilian casualties incurred in the military actions against terrorism.

Chapter 6
Coverage of civilian casualties caused by U.S. military action against terrorist groups

6.1 Introduction

The wars waged against Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIS and the Taliban have resulted in the deaths of approximately 250,000 civilians (Crawford, 2018), and the coverage given (or denied) these deaths and the military actions that caused them provides an invaluable perspective from which to explore newspapers' support and criticism of government sponsored military action against terrorism.

Proponents of a thesis of top-down influence would highlight strong government influence on the news media during wars and crises and control over journalist movement in war zones which could be thought to predict low levels of coverage of civilian casualties caused by U.S. and U.S. led Coalition military action, and when coverage is given, defence of the belligerents rather than sympathy with the victims. Proponents of event-driven theories might argue that specific incidents involving civilian casualties could prompt journalists to take the initiative to form detailed criticism of military action driven by the evocative imagery of the dead, the narrative power of victims' stories, the willingness of international organisations to champion those stories, as well as efforts of local activists and victims' families to highlight their suffering (Lawrence, 2000).

The research in this chapter shows a combination of these two perspectives, with newspapers' coverage influenced by newspaper ideology and the region of reporting. While the left-leaning papers have a higher volume of coverage of civilian casualties as compared to their right-leaning counterparts, a lack of civilian casualties coverage is clearly visible across all newspapers, and this absence could be seen to serve a larger government interest. It would be nearly impossible to positively frame an incident where innocent civilians have died, though as we shall see, a strong attempt has been made in *USA Today*. Even in *The New York Times*, there is a visible effort to defend military actions though it does include civilian and other accounts that are more critical. *The Guardian* is the only newspaper that rarely uses government sources to justify military actions and strongly represents the trauma of dead civilians over military accounts. It's possible this is due to it being both, a left-leaning paper, as well as non-American.

The rest of this introductory section will show the proportion of U.S. military action stories that contain descriptions of civilian casualties. It will outline the amount of coverage given to civilian casualties compared to the number of incidents that took place in 2016. Section 6.2 explains

the content analysis data via tables and crosstabs, illustrating source use and stances across the four Western newspapers. Section 6.3 analyses the article text in the four newspapers, and a special focus is given to *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* because about 75 percent of all civilian casualty coverage takes place in those two papers. A number of events in 2016 were given coverage in *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, chief among them was the accidental attack by U.S. forces on the Doctors Without Borders (M.S.F.) Hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan. A detailed examination of the event and the differences in the framing that followed in the two newspapers takes place in section 6.3.3.1.

Table 6.1 below shows that the coverage of civilian casualties caused by U.S. and Coalition military action against terrorist groups in the Middle East and North Africa and Afghanistan is far less than the coverage of military action as a stand alone topic. Across all newspapers, there were about 524 news articles that described U.S. led coalition military actions against terrorist groups. Of these stories, 58 of them, or 11 percent described how military actions caused civilian casualties.

Table 6.1 – Coverage of U.S-led Coalition civilian casualty stories			
	U.S military issue/themes	U.S mili with civ casualties	% of civ casualty coverage
NYT	208	28	13.46%
USA Today	74	7	9.45%
Guardian	81	15	18.51%
Telegraph	96	7	7.29%
Hindu	43	1	2.32%
TOI	22	1	4.54%
Total	524	59	11.25%

The Hindu and *The Times of India* each have only one article describing the civilian casualties caused by U.S. military action. However this is not representative of their overall levels of coverage of civilian casualties. The Indian newspapers tend to focus more on the civilian loss of life caused by Indian military and paramilitary action against the Maoists in Central and East India, and various terrorist groups in Kashmir. Table 6.2 below illustrates the extent of this focus. There is a rough correspondence to the left-right newspapers above with *The Hindu* covering civilian casualties far more than *The Times of India*.

Table 6.2 - Indian Military action causing civilian casualties, article coverage in Indian newspapers			
	Indian military issue/themes	Indian mili with civ casualties	% of mili with civi casualties
Hindu	1314	130	9.89%
TOI	581	34	5.85%
Total	1895	164	8.65%

All the left leaning papers listed above have a higher proportion of articles that discuss civilian casualties. However when the Indian papers are limited only to news articles focused on the Maoists, there is almost no difference in the percentage between the left-leaning Hindu and the

right-leaning *Times of India*, though *The Hindu* does have a far higher number of stories overall. This can be seen in table 6.3 below. The Maoists are rarely covered by the non-Indian papers.

Table 6.3 - Indian Military action against Maoists w/civilian casualties, Indian newspapers

	Indian mili themes, Maoists	Indn mili, Maoists w/ civ cas	% of mili themes w/ civ cas
Hindu	456	70	15.35%
TOI	35	5	14.28%
Total	491	75	15.27%

Focusing on the Western newspapers, what is immediately striking is the low number of stories about civilian casualties, despite the high number of incidents and immense loss of civilian life in 2016, not to mention the War on Terror as a whole. According to AirWars, a U.K. based NGO that tracks civilian casualties in Iraq, Syria, and Libya (not Afghanistan) there were 62 U.S. led Coalition air strikes in 2016 that were conceded by the U.S. as having caused civilian casualties (as opposed to 429 alleged incidents). Of the 62 confirmed attacks, 30 attacks causing 51 casualties were not publicly reported at the time by the military and were confirmed only at a later date. (Airwars, 2016a; Airwars, 2016c). Assuming that the only events to receive coverage would be those where the U.S. led Coalition were clearly at fault, and had publicly accepted responsibility within the 2016 time period there were 32 clear incidents in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. Again this incident number doesn't include Afghanistan where international forces caused 145 deaths and 117 injuries in 2016, and 1,243 civilians deaths in airstrikes between 2009 and 2015 (Rosenberg, 2016b; United Nations, 2017).

Between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*, the two newspapers with the most coverage, only 10 distinct incidents of civilian casualties were reported, these are listed in table 6.4 on the next page.

Therefore, of the 429 alleged incidents in Iraq and Syria, and 32 confirmed beyond doubt and publicly reported by the U.S. military at the time of the incident, and the large death toll in Afghanistan caused by even further attacks, only 10 were reported. Interestingly, four of the ten covered incidents were disputed by the accused (usually U.S.) military who denied a U.S. role. Given the sizable number of undisputed, U.S. acknowledged attacks to report on, choosing attacks in which civilian accounts fight against official denials appears to be the news championing the victims perspective. But as the analysis below will show, in almost all these disputed accounts the official sources and point of view are favoured.

This fairly muted coverage of civilian casualties as compared to the number of reports of military action is itself potentially indicative of deference to a government agenda. The lack of coverage implies that the public received a partial, or incomplete, representation of the U.S.-led Coalition's wars in the Middle East and South Asia. A representation that focuses on battle details and enemy

Table 6.4 – 10 incidents of civilian casualties reported in The New York Times and The Guardian				
No.	Event Date	Event Description	Event Location	Disputed?
1.	Wed 17 Feb, 2016	Afghan forces with suspected U.S Special Forces assaulted doctors and patients in a hospital, executed two patients and an 11-year-old caregiver accused of being terrorists.	Day Mirdad district, Wardak Province, 100 miles from Kabul, Afghanistan	Unknown
Citations: (Human Rights Watch, 2016a), (Mashal, 2016a)				
2.	Sat 3 Oct, 2015	U.S AC-130 Gunship accidentally attacked MSF hospital, 42 dead, 30 injured.	Kunduz City, Kunduz Province, Afghanistan	No
Citations: (MSF, 2016), (Graham-Harrison & Thomas, 2016)				
3.	Tue 19 July 2016	The U.S Airforce attacked an ISIS held town and killed anywhere between 56 to 203 civilians.	Tokhar village, near Manbij, Northern Syria	No
Citations: (Reuters, 2016), (Airwars, 2016b)				
4.	Wed 6 April 2016	Locals claim American airstrikes killed 17 civilians, Afghan and U.S officials claim only Taliban members were killed.	Nematabad, Paktika Province, Afghanistan	Yes
Citations: (Farooq & Mashal, 2016), (Qazi, 2016)				
5.	Sat 25 June 2016	Local sources, victims and officials, claim U.S airstrikes killed at least seven Taliban held hostages, denied by senior Afghan officials	Kunduz Province, Afghanistan	Yes
Citation: (Rahim & Nordland, 2016b)				
6.	Wed 28 Sep 2016	A U.S drone strike aimed at ISIS killed at least 13, maybe 15 civilians and injured 13 more.	Achin district, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan	Yes
Citations: (Alokozay & Nordland, 2016), (Rasmussen, 2016)				
7.	Sat 17 Sep 2016	A U.S airstrike accidentally killed 62 and injured 100 Syrian government troops.	Deir al-Zour Province, Syria	No
Citation: (Barnard & Mazzetti, 2016)				
8.	Fri 21 Oct 2016	An alleged U.S or Iraqi airstrike attacked a mosque killing at least 13 women and children at a funeral	Daquq, 30 km South of Kirkuk, Iraq	Yes
Citations: (Human Rights Watch, 2016c), (Arango, 2016)				
9.	Sun 18 Sep 2016	A U.S airstrike accidentally killed seven Afghan police officers.	Oruzgan Province, Afghanistan	No
Citations: (Abed & Shah, 2016)				
10.	Thu 3 Nov 2016	A battle took place between the Taliban and Afghan and U.S soldiers. Airstrikes were requested as the battle turned against the Coalition. 32 civilians died and 19 were injured.	Boz Qandahari village, Kunduz Province, Afghanistan	No
Citations: (UNAMA, 2016), (Rahim & Nordland, 2016a)				

losses and gains rather than the human cost. This would appear to match the research done on the news coverage of the two Iraq wars outlined in the literature review. However, when the articles that do exist are analysed, a more nuanced picture is revealed. Section 6.2 consists of the overall sources and stances, as well as the data by newspaper. Section 6.3 will analyse the news text and take a closer look at the coverage given to some of these incidents.

6.2 Sources and stances

6.2.1 Total coverage

The following tables focus on the data of the news reports of civilian casualties caused by all military actions, not just the U.S. A supportive stance means clear recognition of civilian casualties having taken place, usually, but not always with evidence and criticism of the belligerents responsible, and minimal to no opposition, defence of the military action, or justification. The neutral stance is used when multiple viewpoints are represented: though casualties may be admitted by one or more sources (or denied), there is usually some defence or justification of the military action involved. The opposition stance indicates denial that civilians died. It could also mean admitting casualties but defending the action that caused it and justifying the deaths. The descriptive stance is a passive version of the supportive stance, casualties are briefly mentioned, sometimes as just a number, but always with minimal details and context and usually single sources. The cited sources in table 6.5 below lists the total sources cited across all newspapers. It shows officials representing 29% percent of all sources used, with NGOs, academics, civilians, and the United Nations representing 26%.

Table 6.5 – Cited Sources, all newspapers for all military actions causing civilian casualties		
	N	Percentage
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	182	20.50%
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	93	10.50%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	68	7.70%
Indian civilian/local/victim	51	5.80%
Indian NGO/independent monitor/academic/think tank	40	4.50%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	39	4.40%
United Nations	28	3.20%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	25	2.80%
Other Country government	25	2.80%
Pakistani government/military/police/intelligence	24	2.70%
Other MENA civilian/victim/victim family	20	2.30%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	20	2.30%
Indian politician, Other	19	2.10%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	19	2.10%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	18	2.00%
Indian politician, Congress	18	2.00%
Indian Court Officer	15	1.70%
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	15	1.70%
E.U Country/Other West NGO/Independent Monitor/Academic/Think Tank	14	1.60%
Other country intelligence/military/police	13	1.50%
Total	746	84.20%

This 3 percent difference in the total sources cited is reversed when the principal source list is considered in table 6.6 below. That is to say, across all newspapers, government sources tend to be cited more often than non-government sources, but when a source is given primacy, relied on more than any other to provide opinions and facts, non-government sources such as NGOs, academics, and civilians are used about 7 percent more than government and military sources, 21 percent versus 14 percent. Most articles had no principal source, using an even mix of the total sources cited.

Journalists provide their own opinions and facts at a far higher rate than any other source.

Table 6.6 - Principal Sources, all newspapers for military action causing civilian casualties		
	N	Percentage
No principal source	123	37.73%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	28	8.59%
Indian NGO/independent monitor/academic/think tank	24	7.36%
Indian civilian/local/victim	18	5.52%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	14	4.29%
Indian Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	14	4.29%
Pakistani government/military/police/intelligence	14	4.29%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	12	3.68%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	11	3.37%
United Nations	10	3.07%
Indian politician, Other	8	2.45%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	6	1.84%
Indian politician, Congress	5	1.53%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	4	1.23%
Total	291	89.26%

Table 6.7 below shows that 74 percent of civilian casualty coverage, the vast majority, didn't deny the deaths of civilians and was often critical of the belligerents (though many articles in *The New York Times* upon acknowledgement have military sources attempting a defence of the action). Of this coverage, 35.3 percent had no principal source, a number of sources were used.

Table 6.7 - Principal Source and Stances crosstab, all newspapers, military action causing civilian casualties					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	76	26	11	10	123
Journalist	21	2	3	2	28
Indian NGO/academic/think tank	24	0	0	0	24
Indian civilian/ /victim	18	0	0	0	18
U.S Gov/Mili/Pol	5	2	6	1	14
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	7	0	5	2	14
Pakistani Gov/Mili/Pol	14	0	0	0	14
Terrorist and associated	12	0	0	0	12
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	10	1	0	0	11
United Nations	10	0	0	0	10
Indian politician, Other	8	0	0	0	8
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	5	1	0	0	6
Indian politician, Congress	5	0	0	0	5
U.K Gov/Mili/Pol	0	0	4	0	4
Total	**215**	**32**	**29**	**15**	**291**

6.2.2 The New York Times - Sources and stances

The previous tables provide an overview across all newspapers, when each paper is analysed separately, the image changes. This section examines the data by newspaper starting with *The New York Times*.

Table 6.8 below shows that though U.S. government sources were cited the most, at almost 30 percent, there are strong representations of NGOs, academics, civilians, and the United Nations. Of all sources cited 51.71 percent were government, military, or other officials. 31 percent were third parties such as NGO's, academics, and authors.

Table 6.8 - Cited sources, NYT, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	N	Percentage
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	34	29.31%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	11	9.48%
Other Country government	10	8.62%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	7	6.03%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	7	6.03%
Other country intelligence/military/police	7	6.03%
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	7	6.03%
United Nations	7	6.03%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	6	5.17%
E.U Country/Other West NGO/Independent Monitor/Academic/Think Tank	5	4.31%
Other MENA civilian/victim/victim family	3	2.59%
Other news agencies	3	2.59%
Iraqi politician	2	1.72%
Other country politician	2	1.72%
U.S Retired Military Official	1	0.86%
E.U/E.U Country/Other West Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	0.86%
Unnamed civilian	1	0.86%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	1	0.86%
Unnamed analysts	1	0.86%
Total	**116**	**100.00%**

This difference between official and non-official sources cited is removed in the principal sources, listed in table 6.9 below. Officials and non-official sources are equally relied on as principal sources at about 21 percent of the time.

Table 6.9 - Principal sources, NYT, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	Frequency	Percentage
No principal source	13	46.43%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	5	17.86%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	3	10.71%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	7.14%
United Nations	2	7.14%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	3.57%
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	1	3.57%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	1	3.57%
Total	**28**	**100.00%**

The cross tab below in table 6.10 illustrates how not a single article published in *The New York Times* was entirely dedicated to denying or defending the occurrence of civilian casualties. Having said this, eight articles fell under the neutral category. What this essentially means is that eight articles clearly represented the views of multiple sources, including sources that denied or justified civilian casualties.

As will be seen in the article discussion in the next section, these articles (and even at times the articles that admitted civilian casualties had taken place without justification) engaged in some level of defending the belligerents responsible for the casualties.

When the U.S. government and military appeared as a principal source however, they were used to admit and condemn the occurrence of civilian casualties in 3 out of 5 occurrences. So, despite perhaps an uneven representation of agendas and a lack of strong criticism of the U.S. Military in roughly a third of *The New York Times*'s articles (8 neutral and 2 descriptive), the picture is still hardly one of total official dominance.

Table 6.10 - Principal Source and Stances, NYT,U.S led Coalition stories w/ civilian casualties				
	Supportive	Neutral	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	7	5	1	13
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	3	1	1	5
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	2	1	0	3
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	1	0	2
United Nations	2	0	0	2
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	0	0	1
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	1	0	0	1
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	1	0	0	1
Total	**18**	**8**	**2**	**28**

The Guardian, the other left-leaning newspaper in contrast, does not have any neutral or descriptive stances, as will be shown in the coming subsection. This difference between the two newspapers is highlighted in the later discussion.

It was then thought that perhaps *The New York Times* treats the U.S. Military differently from the military forces of other countries. Do the source or stance numbers change significantly when military casualties are caused by non U.S./Coalition troops?

The tables on the next page show that they do not. While there is a slight change in the source lists, the stance numbers are almost identical. The difference in regional reporting doesn't appear to apply here.

6.2.3 USA Today - Sources and Stances

There is a significant difference in the use of government and official sources between the four

Table 6.11 - Cited sources, NYT, Non-US military stories with civilian casualties	N	Percentage
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	8	10.13%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	7	8.86%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	7	8.86%
United Nations	7	8.86%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	7	8.86%
Other MENA civilian/victim/victim family	6	7.59%
Other country intelligence/military/police	5	6.33%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	4	5.06%
Other Country government	4	5.06%
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	4	5.06%
Israeli Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	3	3.80%
Other country NGO/independent monitor	3	3.80%
Iraqi civilian/victim	3	3.80%
Terrorist and terrorist associated	2	2.53%
Total	70	88.61%

Table 6.12 - Principal sources, NYT, Non-US military stories with civilian casualties	Frequency	Percentage
No principal source	12	46.15%
United Nations	4	15.38%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	2	7.69%
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	2	7.69%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	7.69%
Egyptian government/military/police/intelligence	1	3.85%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	3.85%
French government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	3.85%
Other country NGO/independent monitor	1	3.85%
Total	26	100.00%

Table 6.13 - Principal Source and Stance Crosstab, NYT, Non-U.S military stories w/ civilian casualties	Supportive	Neutral	Descriptive	Oppose	Total
No principal source	5	6	1	0	12
United Nations	3	0	0	0	3
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	0	0	1	2
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	2	0	0	0	2
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	1	0	0	2
Egyptian government/military/police/intelligence	0	1	0	0	1
United Nations	1	0	0	0	1
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	0	0	0	1
French government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	0	0	0	1
Other country NGO/independent monitor	1	0	0	0	1
Total	16	8	1	1	26

newspapers. This is potentially an outcome of each newspaper's ideological or political stance. *USA Today*'s cited source table listed on the next page shows that U.S. government and retired military officials comprise almost 65 percent of all cited sources, 9 out of 14 cited sources used. The low number of stories itself is indicative of *USA Today* attaching a lack of importance to the subject of civilian casualties. This is only further reinforced in its article text discussed in the next

Table 6.14 - Cited sources, USA Today, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	N	Percentage
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	7	50.00%
U.S Retired Military Official	2	14.29%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	14.29%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	2	14.29%
U.S Republican	1	7.14%
Total	14	100.00%

section. The principal sources outlined in tables 6.15 and 6.16 below show that when principal sources are used in *USA Today*, 6 out of 7 are U.S. government/military sources, and 5 out of 7 articles out-rightly justify and defend the occurrence of civilian casualties. Not a single article out of the 7 showed any criticism of the U.S.-led Coalition, the polar opposite of *The Guardian* described in the next sub section, and vastly different from *The New York Times* described above.

Table 6.15 - Principal Sources, USA Today, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties	
	Frequency
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	6
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	1
Total	7

Table 6.16 - Principal Source and Stances USA Today, Non-U.S military stories w/ civilian casualties			
	Neutral	Oppositional	Total
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	5	6
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	0	1	1
Total	1	6	7

6.2.4 The Guardian - Sources and Stances

The Guardian, as mentioned above, is the inverse of the *USA Today*, and the most strident critic of military action in the context of civilian casualties. Though its cited source listed in table 6.17 below is about 30 percent government, the balance 70 percent is almost entirely comprised of alternative voices, think tanks, NGO's, academics, and civilians/victims.

Table 6.17 - Cited Sources, The Guardian, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	N	Percentage
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	11	24.44%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	11	24.44%
E.U Country/Other West NGO/Independent Monitor/Academic/Think Tank	5	11.11%
United Nations	4	8.89%
Other Country government	3	6.67%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	4.44%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	4.44%
Other MENA civilian/victim/victim family	2	4.44%
Other social media/internet source	2	4.44%
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/victim	1	2.22%
Other country politician	1	2.22%
Other country civilian/victim/victim family	1	2.22%
Total	45	100.00%

The Guardian has no government sources in its principal source list in table 6.18 below, and the principal source stances in table 6.19 are almost always explicitly critical of military action.

Table 6.18 - Principal Sources, The Guardian, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	Frequency	Percentage
No principal source	10	66.67%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	13.33%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	2	13.33%
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/victim	1	6.67%
Total	**15**	**100.00%**

Table 6.19 - Principal Source and Stances, The Guardian, U.S military stories with civilian casualties				
	Supportive	Neutral	Descriptive	Total
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	0	0	2
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/victim	1	0	0	1
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	2	0	0	2
No principal source	8	1	1	10
Total	**13**	**1**	**1**	**15**

6.2.5 The Telegraph - Sources and Stances

The Telegraph has one similarity with *The Guardian*, its cited sources consist of almost 32 percent of government and other officials. Its "alternative voice" source list however is about 27 percent, and almost 32 percent of cited sources consists of journalist opinions and uncited facts. This is illustrated in table 6.20 below.

Table 6.20 - Cited Sources, The Telegraph, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	N	Percent
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	7	31.80%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	5	22.70%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	3	13.60%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	4.50%
E.U Country/Other West civilian/local/victim	1	4.50%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	1	4.50%
Other MENA civilian/victim/victim family	1	4.50%
Other Country government	1	4.50%
Other news agencies	1	4.50%
United Nations	1	4.50%
Total	**22**	**100.00%**

The principal source list in table 6.21 below shows that the bulk of its coverage has no principal sources.

Table 6.21 - Principal Sources, The Telegraph, U.S led Coalition stories with civilian casualties		
	Frequency	Percent
No principal source	5	71.4
Other Country government	1	14.3
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	1	14.3
Total	**7**	**100**

The cross tab on the next page in table 6.22 shows an interesting result, *The Telegraph* is the

only newspaper without any neutral or opposition stances towards civilian casualties. It has no articles that deny, or defend civilian casualties in any way, even in a limited way. However, a large number of its articles are descriptive, that is to say lacking in any context, details, or condemnation of the belligerents. This is further outlined in the textual analysis in the next section.

Table 6.22 - Principal Source and Stance, The Telegraph, U.S military stories with civilian casualties

	Supportive	Descriptive	Total
Other Country government	1	0	1
Journalist	0	1	1
No principal source	2	3	5
Total	3	4	7

Table 6.23 below is a comparison of the different stances taken by each newspaper using percentages.

Table 6.23 – % comparison of stances, all newspapers, U.S military stories w/ civilian casualties

	Supportive	Neutral	Opposition	Descriptive	Total
New York Times	64.28%	28.57%	0.00%	7.14%	100.00%
USA Today	0.00%	14.28%	85.71%	0.00%	100.00%
The Guardian	86.66%	6.66%	0.00%	6.66%	100.00%
The Telegraph	42.85%	0.00%	0.00%	57.14%	100.00%

6.3 Analysis of the news articles

The above data creates an interesting picture. On the one hand, civilian casualties receive relatively low levels of coverage given their frequent occurrence. But when they are reported, barring the *USA Today*, there is a profusion of non-official voices cited and used as defining voices in news articles, and when government or military sources are used, they do at times engage in self-criticism, taking responsibility for the loss of innocent life. A closer look at the text adds greater depth to the numbers and reveals the extent to which official sources either justify or take responsibility for military actions.

6.3.1 USA Today

USA Today's coverage constructs a narrative of the U.S. Army as a heroic fighting force that battles a fierce enemy while taking the utmost care to avoid hurting the local populace. Military representatives are prominently cited with a focus on the good intentions of the U.S. military and the efforts made to track and avoid civilian casualties. Third party sources are not cited at all. This is clearly reflected in the tables above, which are almost entirely comprised of military and government sources.

In a news article *USA Today* journalist Tom Vanden Brook describes the U.S. Military as responsible and precise, committed to protecting the innocent, with deaths and injuries among civilians discounted as a "nearly inevitable result of wars" (Vanden Brook, 2016b). The government is

described as taking steps to fulfil the American public's aversion to killing innocents, White House spokesman Josh Earnest said President Obama is "justifiably proud of the great lengths we've gone to avoid civilian casualties -- certainly greater lengths than our adversaries in this conflict." (Vanden Brook, 2016b). This is accompanied by the U.S. Department of Defense describing how video from attacking aircraft is used to assess whether the strike was compliant with the rules of war, and in step with the respect for life. Essentially, that even though casualties take place, the government tries very hard to track them.

> Central Command, which oversees the war, investigates reports of civilian casualties. Claims, even tweets, are matched against missions flown to determine whether coalition aircraft conducted bombing runs nearby. Video from drones and other aircraft track every bomb dropped, a Defense official said. If the report is deemed credible, investigators assess whether the strike complied with the laws of war and proper precautions were taken

These articles are disingenuous, the concern for civilian casualties is only shown via descriptions of thorough tracking systems, this is used as a form of moral capital, which is then spent on arguing for increased aggression against terrorist groups, the civilian casualties that take place are seemingly justified by tracking measures and good intentions. For example, when a new government policy to risk increased civilian deaths to destroy ISIS targets was created in April 2016, it received approval from *USA Today* journalists. No criticism at all was offered of the increased risk. *USA Today* went further in arguing that the processes that were in place to protect civilians were unnecessary bureaucracy, causing "targets of fleeting opportunity" to be missed. The only criticism of this new policy came from retired Air Force General David Deptula, that the easing of restrictions "was a necessary but insufficient step toward defeating the Islamic State" (Vanden Brook, 2016a), essentially that this easing was not enough, it needed to go further.

This focus, on tracking and intention to avoid casualties rather than the casualties themselves, is a key component in *USA Today*'s support of the government's wars on terror. It is exemplified in articles that pair descriptions of successful military action with tracking and intent to avoid casualty descriptions. The language is straightforward, for example, (Al Shamary, 2016)

> Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles Brown said the coalition takes great care to minimize civilian casualties. Over the past 24 hours, coalition aircraft launched four strikes around Fallujah, targeting three Islamic State units, two tunnels, four vehicles, an artillery piece, a weapons cache and three fighting positions, U.S. Central Command announced Thursday

And, " (Michaels, 2016b)

> Last month, hundreds of fighters escaped Manbij in northern Syria by placing civilians in a convoy of 500 vehicles. Hundreds of militants were killed but several hundred escaped with weapons. The Pentagon said it didn't fire on the convoy for fear of hitting civilians. Military planners said they will design surveillance and other

intelligence to determine when militants will quit fighting and try to escape. That might allow U.S. aircraft to strike militants before they can grab civilians. For example, they are watching for militant commanders to order their fighters to flee, which might allow for pre-emptive strikes.

The praise given to the U.S. military's methods of assessment are in contrast to the severe criticism of those methods by Human Rights Watch as resulting in a dramatic undercount of casualties, videos taken from the air being inconsistent with the death and destruction suffered on the ground. Accounts from NGOs, and interviews with survivors and victims on the ground were ignored (Human Rights Watch, 2016b) which is possibly why President Obama in an Executive Order published in July 2016 stated that the U.S. Government shall also consider, "relevant and credible information from all available sources, such as other agencies, partner governments, and non-governmental organizations, and take measures to mitigate the likelihood of future incidents of civilian casualties" (Obama, 2016a). This is not reported by *USA Today* which describes the military's estimates of 55 deaths in nearly 15,000 coalition strikes as "confirmed through a rigorous process" while admitting that other allegations are under investigation and the actual casualties are likely to be much higher. The military is given space to state, "Most times we're trying to drive it to zero civilian casualties" (Michaels, 2016a).

Michaels (2016a) further describes how an air strike must first be approved by a one star general or higher, and involves complex formulas for "estimating the potential for civilian casualties on any given target and what type of bomb to use to achieve a specific goal". The rigour of the process and the intense effort to prevent casualties is further highlighted by criticism that the rigorousness goes too far. *USA Today* cites retired Air Force General, Chuck Horner, who complains that the system is too convoluted and the relentless focus on avoiding casualties is akin to "fighting with one arm tied behind our back." The steps taken to prevent civilian deaths is described as "layers of bureaucracy", so thick that it's hindering the military campaign. Republican Senator John McCain is cited as complaining that "three-quarters of the coalition's aircraft came back to base without having dropped their weapons". Essentially, the system is designed to avoid civilian casualties at the cost of winning battles, with the above complaints serving as further proof as to how careful the U.S. Army is around civilians in war zones.

USA Today has a low rate of coverage of civilian casualties, 7 issue/themes describing U.S. military action with civilian casualties (even if it's only in the context of how they are avoided) to 74 issue/themes describing military action in total. This limited coverage can best be summed up as dominated by government and military officials and strongly represents an official agenda without any representation whatsoever of third party sources such as victims, bystanders, NGOs academics, authors, or think tanks. Clearly the strong representations of these sources depicted

in the total source lists above are to be found elsewhere.

6.3.2 The Telegraph

The Telegraph, like *USA Today*, provides limited coverage of civilian casualties caused by US-led coalition actions as compared to its coverage of those actions as a whole, only 7.29% of its coverage of U.S.-led military actions focused on civilian casualties caused by those actions. Unlike *USA Today* however, there was no justification of those casualties or defence of the U.S. Military's methods. However quite uniquely among all the newspapers, civilian casualties though acknowledged, often appear almost as an afterthought, mentioned in the context of successful military actions, resulting in the large number of descriptive stances used. Articles tend to use official sources to focus on the success of military action against terrorist groups such as ISIS, and then perhaps use a single line to reference civilian casualties in their closing paragraphs or sentences. The following examples illustrate this practice.

In one article about the invasion of ISIS held territory in Iraq multiple references are made to the ground lost by ISIS, up-to 40 and 20 percent in Iraq and Syria according to the U.S. Defense Secretary who provides details regarding the fight against "the metastasis of the ISIL tumour". A single paragraph at the end includes a quote from the Pentagon admitting "tragic" civilian casualties, but highlighting how more civilians have been killed by Russian bombing in Syria (Spencer, 2016). Another focuses on the success U.S. air strikes have had in Yemen against al-Qaida, providing vivid battle details such as how "Explosives rained down as the al-Qaeda recruits were gathering for dinner…the planes struck as al-Qaeda people stood in line to receive their meal." A Pentagon spokesman is cited to explain how al-Qaida's ability to use Yemen as a base has been degraded. At the end of the article a single line mentions that 136 air strikes have been carried out in Yemen, killing 700 al-Qaida fighters and more than 100 civilians (Sanchez, 2016). Yet another article describes how ISIL leaders fled the city of Mosul as the U.S. and Iraqi/Kurdish forces closed in, towards the end of the article Iraq's defence minister is cited as saying "the biggest challenge would be to protect civilians. In previous offensives, Isil has used them as human shields" (Ensor, 2016a). Similarly, another article about British jihadists being sentenced to death in Iraqi courts mentions civilians dying seemingly as background information regarding the invasion, stating that "The US-led coalition bombing Isil said that 54 civilians had been "inadvertently killed" in seven air strikes between March and October (Ensor, 2016b).

There are some articles that devote greater attention to civilian deaths and provide similar levels of detail to the battle coverage. One for example describes incident number 3 in table 6.4 on page 122, the attack on the village of Tokhar, an ISIS held town in Syria, accurately as "one of the deadliest strikes on civilians by the alliance since the start of its operations in the country"

(Ensor, 2016c). The article describes images of the bodies of children as young as 3 under piles of rubble, and families killed as they tried to flee the fighting in their area. Articles with a singular focus on civilian casualties are uncommon, civilian casualties are usually mentioned in the context of military action.

6.3.3 The New York Times and The Guardian, a comparison

This subsection is an analysis and particular understanding of *The New York Time's* style of neutrality, one which edges on favouring the U.S. military and defending the occurrence of civilian casualties. *The New York Times* across multiple articles and events strongly features government and military sources and despite its liberal reputation, tended to represent an official point of view in covering incidents with civilian casualties. This is in sharp contrast to *The Guardian* which almost exclusively champions victims, NGOs, and civilians as principal sources, and explores, often the same events, from a very different perspective, one which is highly critical of military actions.

The New York Times has no article that outrightly favours an official agenda, or provides exclusive space to the military or government, there is always just enough critical content to push the coded stance in the content analysis database to 'neutral'. However articles often have strong representations from official figures which create a sense of doubt over whether casualties have actually taken place, and whether the accounts of civilians, local officials, and victims are truthful. In other cases journalists appear to omit context that would present U.S. military actions in a more critical tone, a critical context that *The Guardian* provides. An example of this is the U.S. Airforce's airstrike on an M.S.F. Trauma Centre in Kunduz, Afghanistan which received a great deal of coverage from both *The New York Times* and *The Guardian*.

6.3.3.1 The M.S.F. Hospital Attack in Kunduz

A description of the incident will be useful. Kunduz, an Afghan city, was attacked and held by the Taliban on the 28th of September 2015. Afghan troops with the aid of the U.S. led Coalition fought to take back control. In the course of the battle which took place over multiple days, U.S. Special forces led by Major Michael Hutchinson believed that Afghan troops were under attack from the Taliban and called for an air strike on a Taliban controlled building believed to be the source of the attack. A U.S. AC130 Gunship, a fixed wing aircraft with a mounted cannon, was already in the air on an emergency call regarding a different incident. It had launched 69 minutes prior to its originally scheduled take off for that emergency call and because of this early launch there was a lack of preparedness, there were no printed graphics showing the planned operating area, no charts that showed "no-strike targets", or the location of the hospital. The "no-strike" information was not loaded into the plane's guidance systems which the aircrew relied on to alert

them to the places they should avoid attacking. This "no-strike" information which included the M.S.F. Trauma Centre's location was emailed to the Gunship along with other mission information, but a mechanical failure prevented the aircraft from sending or receiving email. As a result, the crew did not have the coordinates for the M.S.F. centre.

The AC130's original emergency call was cancelled, and when Major Hutchinson called for support, it was redirected to him while airborne. En-route the AC130 was fired on by a missile and in avoiding it, its ability to locate ground targets was "degraded". When the AC130 arrived at the correct coordinates provided by Hutchinson and obtained from the Afghan soldiers, it was an empty field. They then requested a physical description of the target. Hutchinson, relying on an interpreter, spoke to Afghan forces and transmitted their description of the Taliban held building to the aircrew. The aircrew subsequently targeted the wrong building. Unsure of what they were targeting, the aircrew described the building and the behaviour of the people in and around it to Hutchinson who concluded from their description that the M.S.F. Trauma Centre was the Taliban occupied target. He could not see the building from his location. The aircraft's video camera which might have transmitted images wasn't working due to a battery shortage. Hutchinson authorised the attack and the AC130 Gunship proceeded to kill 42 patients, doctors, and other medical staff while injuring possibly 229 more people. According to M.S.F, the attack went on for 30 minutes after M.S.F informed NATO and U.S. officials that the hospital was under attack, for a total period of approximately one hour. The U.S. Central Command report has the attack ending just after officials were informed about the attack. This point is unresolved.

The Department of Defense Investigative Report released in April 2016 concluded that Hutchinson and the aircrew failed to comply with the law of armed conflict, there were no legitimate circumstances requiring the crew members to make decisions to engage without clarifying or requesting more information. The aircrew failed to take the necessary precautions to reduce the risk of harm to individuals they could not positively identify as civilians. It wasn't punished as a war crime however because there was no intent (Daugirdas & Mortenson, 2016; Mashal & Rahim, 2016; Rosenberg, 2016a; Rosenberg & Goldstein, 2016; Sifton, 2016; U.S. Central Command, 2016).

In the five articles that focus on this attack published in *The New York Times* and the three in *The Guardian*, there is a clear image that emerges in the two papers based on the sources represented and the opinions they voice. *The New York Times* will be examined first.

The first article of 2016 is a short report of 265 words, that simply mentions that the military personnel involved in the airstrikes have been disciplined but will not face criminal charges

(Schmidt & Schmidt, 2016). A prominent aspect of the attack's coverage in *The New York Times* was whether it was an act of negligence which would result in administrative punishments for those involved or a war crime which carries criminal prosecution. An editorial in *The New York Times* (no. 2) strongly represents the views of M.S.F. The M.S.F President's statement that good intentions alone cannot excuse responsibility for the loss of life due to negligence is endorsed with the editorial board criticising the Pentagon's failure to prosecute in a court of law as "deeply troubling" (MSF, 2016; The New York Times, 2016c). The Government's position (simply that the troops involved didn't mean to attack the hospital) is briefly explained, then condemned entirely. As Sifton (2016) of Human Rights Watch explains further, intent to kill is not a key factor in deeming an action a war crime. Reckless behaviour resulting the deaths of two civilians in Afghanistan resulted in the court-martialling of an officer in 2013. Further criticism is made of the compensation offered to the victims and their families, the amount of six thousand U.S. dollars for each death and three for injury is deemed "utterly inadequate".

This clearly critical tone is reflected in just one news article. This article (no. 3) reported a public apology made by the military commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General John W. Nicholson Jr., who visited Kunduz to meet with local officials and families of the victims. The focus of the article however was not on the apology, but on the victims finding it entirely insufficient, as simply a speech given by the general in an auditorium where they were denied a chance to speak. There is a strong journalist endorsement of the victims sentiments through contextual explanation and source use, the experience of one victim is confirmed and reinforced by other victims, including a nurse disfigured in the attack and victim's family members. The apology is framed as inadequate to address the loss of life, coming six months too late (Mashal & Rahim, 2016). The only official sources used in this article admit responsibility for the attack. This article accepts the M.S.F timeline, describing the attack as continuing for more than an hour.

Article number 4 and 5 take a very different approach, covering the attack from the perspective of the soldiers behind it, describing the chaos of the battlefield and the fatigure of the soldiers, and the equipment failures that took place. In doing so, they implicitly endorse the Pentagon's denial of the war crime charge and support its claim of straightforward negligence.

A key aspect of both articles is their use of the U.S. Central Command Investigation Report as a source. This is an official, 700 plus page government report detailing the investigation into the incident. It was released on the 29th of April 2016.

The investigatory report in question finds that "fatigue and high operational tempo" were contributory factors to the incident, along with human error and equipment failure. But it also states (as

mentioned above) that there was no pressing need to engage without clarifying or requesting more information (U.S. Central Command, 2016, p. 91). Apart from this, the 700 page plus report makes several, very clear, critiques of the actions of the U.S. troops. According to the report:

> Nothing observed by *(censored)* indicated a hostile act or demonstrated hostile intent. ....The aircraft commander failed to positively identify a threat to USSF or ASSF, consistent with the defense of others...(U.S. Central Command, 2016, p.75).

> There were no exigent circumstances that caused the aircrew to clarify the target. This was not a time-sensitive target…the aircrew had time to execute the deliberate targeting process prior to engagement. The aircraft was not low on fuel (U.S. Central Command, 2016, p. 93)

> Commands did not take adequate steps to halt the engagement when they had information to believe that the MSF trauma center was being engaged… The OPSCENTER called the aircraft and inquired about the target but did not direct a cease fire (U.S. Central Command, 2016, p. 80)

Despite these criticisms, the articles that cover this report mirror only the "fatigue and high operational tempo" frame". One article explores the equipment failures and human errors, and the other places the reader firmly in the boots of the soldiers on the ground and neither report on the criticisms made by the U.S. military's own investigators. It should be noted that these critiques appear a bit later in the report, the initial pages are a closer match to the tone of The New York Time's fourth and fifth articles.

These articles jointly outline the chaos of the battlefield and the exhaustion of the soldiers, senior military officials are said to refer to the incident as a "tragic accident". The articles describe how the soldiers hadn't slept for days, and were running low on ammunition, food, and batteries for equipment. The battle raged in the context of a "clearly desperate situation" (Rosenberg, 2016a; Rosenberg & Goldstein, 2016). In the 'soldiers on the ground' article journalists Rosenberg and Goldstein, rather than finding fault with the soldiers, blame the "ill-defined parameters of the United States' mission in Afghanistan". In one sentence the exact mission is said to be unknown, in the very next, the goal is stated to be the recovery of the city from the Taliban, with the problem being no soldier on the ground being aware of "how far the group was supposed to go to ensure success." The article clearly favours the experiences of the soldiers on the ground (Rosenberg & Goldstein, 2016).

> When soldiers sought guidance from commanders in Kabul, 'the only sounds audible were the sounds of crickets,' a Green Beret officer said, adding, 'Though those were hard to hear over the gunfire.'

What is not explained, is how this is relevant to the negligence that led up to the attack. What guidance withheld by senior commanders was required to avoid the mistakes that were made that led to the attack? The Afghans are described in the coverage as lacking urgency, unable to

provide answers to the questions of senior American officers. These articles appear to defend the mistakes that led to the attack with a thorough description of the battle field chaos, the bombs and traps, the rocket-propelled grenades and suicide car bombers, the aggression of a relentless enemy, the Taliban, and the exhaustion incurred on days of continuous fighting on the battle-field with little to no rest. *The New York Times* reports that at the time Major Michael Hutchinson ordered the attack, he is said to have been awake and had experienced significant fighting for 51 hours (Rosenberg & Goldstein, 2016; U.S Central Command, 2016).

> After a confusing back-and-forth with Afghan officers, he came to believe that the Afghan commandos were under fire from the N.D.S. building. (They were in fact nowhere near it.) The major called in air support from an AC-130 gunship. He then climbed to a balcony in one of the police compound's buildings, seeking a better vantage. He could hear intermittent gunfire. But he could not see much. The gunship was also struggling to find the building. It had the right coordinates, but its targeting system malfunctioned.

The 'equipment failure' article also describes a similar image of the battle with American troops fighting off the Taliban for two days with little sleep. It focuses more on the various hardware problems, the failures of the gunship's targeting system and satellite radio, preventing the upload of the map that would show the hospital to the aircrew. (Rosenberg, 2016a).

What is strongly implied by the vivid descriptions of the battle, the aggression of the enemy, the chaos, and the fatigue, and equipment failures is how, in a situation where the Afghans have vacated responsibility, where American soldiers have risked their lives against a deadly foe, have been under immense trauma and strain, been placed on a battlefield by a bureaucracy that has left them with insufficient instructions, how can they possibly be prosecuted as criminals for a mistake that left civilians dead? Rosenberg and Goldstein make no mention of the Central Command's finding that there was a lack of urgency for the airstrike. And there is no mention of the various other criticisms in the investigative report they use for the information in their articles.

It should be noted that at the time of coding, the equipment failure/human error article was marked as critical of the military, there was sufficient self-criticism provided by members of the U.S. Military. The battle article was marked as descriptive. At no point in either article is there any explicit defence of the U.S. Military's actions in the manner of the *USA Today*. Though perhaps if I had coded these articles at a later date with greater knowledge of the information in the investigative report I might have thought the implicit meanings so strong that it warranted a change in coding.

The Guardian is far more critical than *The New York Times*. Though *The New York Times* does represent the views of the victims and finds room for their voices to criticise the military in a few articles, the space given to the victims and the detailed descriptions of their accounts is far

greater in *The Guardian*. Where *The New York Times* described the battle from the point of view of the military, *The Guardian* does so from the point of view of the victims in the M.S.F. Hospital (Graham-Harrison & Thomas, 2016).

From this perspective, exhausted surgeons were working "late into the night to tackle a backlog of major surgeries", in a place where anyone, including the Taliban, "caught by bullets, rockets or grenades" could seek aid and shelter. Dr. Kathleen Thomas who was working at the hospital reports a blast ripping through the intensive care unit killing all but one patient, amid a strafing attack that caused patients to burn beyond recognition while dozens more were grievously injured. She describes her colleagues who died, and how they died, slowly and screaming. She describes in detail the gruesome injuries suffered by patients. The lived experience of the attack places the reader directly in her shoes, similar to *The New York Times* article that did the same thing for the soldiers on the ground.

Another article describes the events that led up to the attack and caused it. The victims are given space in a 1500 word article to express their anger and grief (Ackerman & Rasmussen, 2016). It recognises how the Central Command Report stated that "the strike…was disproportional to the observed threat….There were no legitimate circumstances requiring the crew members to make decisions to engage without clarifying or requesting more information….They had observed no hostile act or intent" It also recognises that Major Hutchinson relied on an unknown party (the report is censored) assumed to be the Afghan military when he knew that he was not authorised to do so (U.S Central Command, 2016, pp. 091-092). *The Guardian* highlights this, that there was no pressing need for an airstrike (Ackerman & Rasmussen, 2016),

> Yet the inquiry found no combatants were firing on US or Afghan forces from the hospital, raising questions about how the gunship crew could have considered it a hostile staging area….the report found that US and Afghan forces had fought relentlessly in Kunduz "throughout the evening of 30 Sep until early evening 2 Oct," suggesting that the pre-dawn morning of 3 October, when the strike was called in and took place, was relatively calm, a point MSF has made for seven months.

As stated above, *The New York Times* omits this important context, choosing to focus instead on the "high operational tempo" of the previous days as an unstated justification or an explanation for the attack in its battle article. The closest it comes to acknowledging the lack of threat was a single line in its almost 2000 word equipment failure/human error article, "The hospital was a protected facility that was at no time being used by active Taliban fighters…contradicted the claim by many senior Afghan officials that Taliban fighters were in the hospital and therefore a legitimate target" (Rosenberg, 2016a).

Even though *The New York Times* may not have been as graphic as *The Guardian* in describing

the trauma of the victims in this event, it does cover more attacks with civilian casualties than either *The Guardian* or *USA Today*, and there are cases where it doesn't give primacy to government sources. For example, the very first article of 2016 in *The New York Times* reports on the first incident in the incident list. A Swedish charity and Afghan doctor are used to describe the inaction of coalition troops while Afghan troops they were working with entered and assaulted doctors inside a hospital and killed three patients that the military alleged were Taliban members. The descriptions of events are almost entirely provided by the NGO, the doctor in charge of the hospital, and the United Nations. The military is only given space to make a statement admitting their awareness of the incident and its intent to conduct an investigation (Jolly, 2016).

6.3.3.2 New York Times neutrality, context, civilian scepticism, and a lack of criticism

The New York Times's high proportion of neutral stances is perhaps the result of a desire to achieve a balance between sources, a practice identified by Gans (2004, p. 175) as "identifying the dominant, most widespread, or most vocal positions, then presenting 'both sides.'" This is done to avoid bias and boost credibility and a sense of objectivity. This practice in the reporting of civilian casualties however is usually accompanied with a particular context or source scepticism that appears to side with the U.S. military's version of events and a defence of military actions. Multiple events illustrate this, all of them air strikes in Afghanistan.

In the first event of this subsection, a local Afghan senator and a district governor reported that multiple U.S. air strikes were carried out in Paktika. The first hit a truck carrying civilians, the second killed two people who went to retrieve the bodies of the civilians, and a third killed three more people who went to find out why the first two people hadn't returned. This accusation is contradicted by the Paktika Chief of Police who claimed that only Taliban members were killed. A U.S. Military source supported this claim, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Cleveland was cited as saying, "There was no evidence to indicate that there were any civilian casualties at all" (Farooq & Mashal, 2016).

After the journalist presents the two opposing source groups with no attempt to resolve their contradictory claims, he proceeds to describe the rarity of airstrikes in Paktika and how U.S forces have trained and assisted Afghan troops in fighting the Taliban, the focus of the military is "on conducting counterterrorism operations". The article concludes with describing the fight against the Islamic State (Farooq & Mashal, 2016). This added context arguably boosts the legitimacy of the U.S. military and tacitly endorses the U.S. claim of no civilian casualties. This article was coded as neutral given the presence of local sources claiming that casualties did take place and the lack of a clear resolution.

In a further example, 13 people were killed by an air strike in the eastern Afghan province of Nangarhar. Local Afghan news organisations quoted residents as saying the victims were civilians. The provincial police said the dead were members of the Islamic State. The first article to report these deaths cites a U.S. military source who states that though investigations are ongoing, ISIS, "continue to put innocent lives at risk by deliberately surrounding themselves with civilians and dressing in female attire" and are "systematically killing the population in Nangarhar". With this statement the U.S. military casts doubt on the local residents claim and sides with the provincial police (Alokozay & Nordland, 2016).

A second article the next day, a rare follow up for an event that involves civilian casualties, uses the United Nations as a source to find that though Islamic State fighters were among the victims, most of those killed were civilians. There is strong representation of both the U.S. Military and Afghan government in the article, the journalist enters the article as well (Mashal, 2016d) stating that:

> Information about the strike, which occurred early on Wednesday morning in the Islamic State stronghold of Achin district, in Nangarhar Province, has been contradictory, with the remoteness of the area making reports hard to verify.

A delegation sent by the governor of Nangarhar Province returned with its findings late on Wednesday, saying 18 of those killed were Islamic State fighters, including a major commander and judge, there were five civilian casualties. The U.S Military spokesperson made a statement devoid of acceptance or sympathy (Mashal, 2016d)

> Brig. Gen. Charles Cleveland, a spokesman for the United States military in Afghanistan, said American officials were aware of the United Nations statement but stood by the insistence that the military had been targeting Islamic State militants

In another article, senior Afghan officials clash with the families of victims and local officials over precisely what happened in a U.S. drone strike. According the families, at least seven Taliban held hostages, possibly 16, died in a U.S. drone strike. This is supported the local police commander. But the senior police commander and the governor of Kunduz claim the Taliban responded to U.S. drone strikes that did take place, by beheading their captives and then killing them in an explosion to make it seem as though they died in the air strike. A hospital chief is cited as saying that the damage to the bodies appeared to have been caused by an aircraft rocket. The Taliban are cited as denying having staged the deaths. No further clarification is offered by the journalist (Rahim & Nordland, 2016b).

Similarly bland language can be found in an article covering an American airstrike that killed at least seven Afghan police officers in the southern province of Oruzgan. A police post was under attack from the Taliban and an airstrike hit the post instead of the attackers. The deputy police

chief for the province confirmed the strike was a mistake due to incorrect coordinates provided, but rather than confirm the claim or correct the cause, let alone apologise, the spokesman for the American-led coalition, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Cleveland simply stated that an airstrike was conducted on individuals firing on, and posing a threat to the Afghan police. And that, "U.S., coalition and Afghan forces have the right to self-defense, and in this case were responding to an immediate threat." A spokesperson for the governor of Oruzgan "credited air support from the coalition with stopping the Taliban advance". The rest of the article is devoted to battle details such as Taliban and police movements" (Abed & Shah, 2016). This explanation for why the attack took place, that incorrect coordinates were provided, is possibly incorrect.

The potential reasons for why these casualties occur was explained in an in depth *New York Times* article that followed a mistaken U.S. air strike on Syrian soldiers. In this significant incident, American planes attacked a vehicle convoy thought to belong to the Islamic State. After about 20 minutes a military command centre received a call from a Russian official who told them they were actually attacking Syrian troops and needed to stop. Russia's defence ministry said 62 Syrian troops were killed, and 100 more wounded (Barnard & Mazzetti, 2016; Rosenberg, 2016b).

Just a few days later, Matthew Rosenberg wrote an article that explained why these accidents took place, not just for the Syrian soldiers strike, but seemingly for all of them. The reasons he outlines draw striking parallels with the Kunduz M.S.F. Hospital attack and others described above. Essentially, the U.S. Airforce overestimates its abilities to gather and analyse information on the battlefield. Inevitably sensors fail, analysts make errors in interpreting data and images, the data gathered contains inaccuracies, targets are misidentified for a myriad of reasons, perhaps they weren't wearing the right uniforms, buildings don't have marks, such as a red cross on them. These are the causes behind the "fog of war" or confusion on the battlefield which when combined with faulty intelligence leads to most accidents (Rosenberg, 2016b). These causes are used to explain the deaths of the seven Afghan police officers in Oruzgan, Afghanistan described above. The airstrike apparently didn't take place due to incorrect coordinates provided to the crew, the aircraft did indeed strike the men attacking the police post, it just so happened that the assailants were possibly police themselves or from a village militia, and were attacking the post "as part of some kind of turf war with another faction within the police" (Rosenberg, 2016b). The third article reporting on the Syrian soldiers attack cites a U.S investigation that finds that the victims (Schmidt, 2016a)

> were not wearing recognizable military uniforms or identification flags, and there were no other signs of their ties to the government…. Human factors like 'confirmation bias,' 'improper labeling' and 'invalid assumptions' resulted in labeling of individuals as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant forces early in the process, which colored later analysis and resulted in continuing misidentification of the forces on the ground

Jeffrey L. Harrigian, a U.S. Air Force Commander took full responsibility for the attack, stating that "In this instance, we did not rise to the high standard we hold ourselves to, and we must do better than this each and every time." The officer who led the investigation, Brig. Gen. Richard A. Coe, however struck a defensive tone similar to the incidents described above, stating, "In my opinion, these were a number of people all doing their best to do a good job" (Schmidt, 2016a).

While *The Guardian* gives credence to local sources, in some cases relying on them almost entirely, *The New York Times* is far more sceptical. This is illustrated in an article that describes a battle between the Taliban and American and Afghan forces in an Afghan village called Boz Qandahari in which "many civilians died". The article fails to provide exact numbers for the dead civilians, focusing on the dead relations of a single victim, but does mention that two American Special Forces soldiers and three Afghan Special Forces soldiers were killed, and seven other soldiers of both nationalities were wounded. The journalists first lay out their template article for civilian casualties (Rahim & Nordland, 2016a):

> American ground forces get into trouble, and they respond by calling for airstrikes, which often kill civilians…the Taliban quickly issue a social media bulletin blaming the Americans and their Afghan allies for any civilian deaths, survivors and relatives of the victims denounce the episode as an atrocity, the American military promises an investigation, and human rights groups deplore the senseless loss of civilian life.

They then proceed to heavily criticise the "survivors and relatives of the victims" of this incident, describing two falsehoods made by locals and then linking them to the Taliban. The first is the locals claim that there were no members of the Taliban when the Government and Coalition forces attacked, that the attack was therefore unwarranted. The journalists visit the village to find a heavy Taliban presence, catching the local account out in an apparent lie. The second contradiction was a local claim that he had nothing to do with the Taliban, but the local "warned the reporter exactly where to walk to avoid hidden explosive devices on the street leading to where the Americans had been killed."

The article lacks sympathy for the dead or the survivors. Residents are described as "less forthcoming about whether there had been any Taliban in their neighbourhood when the Americans were killed on Thursday" and as contradicting themselves about the number of men in the village, "Residents said their young men had all emigrated to Iran for work, but there were plenty of young men in the village on Friday, many of them heavily armed….at least 40 young men, apparently members of the Taliban, were visible". While the journalists admit that there is no doubt that many civilians died, "it was clear that many in the neighbourhood already did stand with the insurgents" and there was a heavy Taliban presence in the area. The U.S. Military spokesperson, Brig. Gen. Charles H. Cleveland is given space at the end to say, "Every

aspect of this is clear that this was an effort to defend these troops who were down there trying to protect the people of Kunduz." (Rahim & Nordland, 2016a).

What is clear is that the dead are barely mentioned, and the only locals cited are ones that have a potential link to the Taliban. What is left to the assumption of the reader is there were no civilians on the ground without a Taliban link, that there were no legitimate local accounts. The journalists, by finding some local support for the insurgency, essentially create a monolithic civilian/Taliban identity nexus and find fault with the civilians for the civilian casualties, not the military. If after all, the locals did not stand with the insurgents, then perhaps the battle would not have taken place in the village.

What was unexpected was the lack of coverage for what is the worst incident in terms of loss of life in 2016. Tokhar, a town in northern Syria north of Manbij suffered at least 56 civilians dead as reported by Reuters in *The New York Times* and between 78 and 203 by Airwars (Airwars, 2016a; Reuters, 2016). The U.S.-led Coalition admitted responsibility on the 1st of December 2016. There was one article in *The New York Times* and two in *The Guardian*. *The New York Times* presents a straightforward statement of facts, simply that there were airstrikes that killed at least 56 people with a short context of the number of people who had died in airstrikes since late May, 104. Concern is shown for the impact of war on civilians, the lack of critical infrastructure like electricity and water, and the numbers of people trapped between warring parties. Apart from stating the number of people who have died in airstrikes, there is no overt criticism of the U.S. military. A military spokesperson is given space to say that the military was looking into reports of civilian deaths, and that the military was being "extraordinarily careful to make sure" the right targets were selected (Reuters, 2016).

The lack of third party sources in *The New York Times* as compared to government/military sources is telling here. As noted on page 125 only 31 percent of sources cited came from NGO's, academics, authors, and the United Nations. 52 percent were government and military. It's rare to find a source like Amnesty pointing out just how bad U.S. air strikes have been for civilians in the pages of *The New York Times*

The Guardian's more vivid style of reporting as described in its coverage of the M.S.F. incident, is more personal, intense, and captures the pain of the locals on the ground, serves as a strong contrast to *The New York Times* and is used in the coverage of the deaths of Syrian civilians in Tokhar and Manbij.

In *The Guardian* the deaths are described as a "brutal reminder of the intensity of the war currently being waged and the horror experienced by victims caught in its crossfire" (German, 2016). The

bombing of Tokhar village (*The New York Times* never mentions its name whereas *The Guardian* does) is correctly described as "one of the deadliest single air assaults on civilians of the entire war" (Graham-Harrison, 2016a). The reader "living in the relative peace of Western society" is asked to (German, 2016)

> imagine what it must be like even to witness airstrikes on a daily basis: the noise, the fear, the constant quandary about where to move to in order to be safe. How many more are in fear of their lives?

Responsibility is clearly apportioned without interjections from Military spokespersons as to good intentions or denials. Russia and Syrian air attacks are recognised as having killed "many more civilians than the coalition" as well as targeting homes and hospitals while "not admitting a single civilian death caused by its actions in Syria". The U.S. led Coalition is criticised by Amnesty as "having launched at least three of the deadliest single air attacks of the war on civilians " (Graham-Harrison, 2016a). Neil Sammonds, the Amnesty source is cited further regarding the U.S. led Coalition methods of determining civilian casualties (Graham-Harrison, 2016a)

> Their investigations are not transparent and the 'reasons' for dismissing evidence seem weak," he said. "They dismiss evidence pointing to civilian casualties if it hasn't been captured from the sky by their own operatives, so even if there are photographs of scores and scores of dead bodies, with names, it's still discounted.

The difference in reporting styles between *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* is further highlighted in the two newspapers' coverage of trend stories.

The New York Times and *The Guardian* both include stories that report general trends rather than any specific incident, though references to previous attacks may be included. These stories tend to use sources such as the United Nations, or well-known NGOs, but in *The New York Times*, stop short of assigning blame to the U.S. military.

The New York Times's coverage had at least three clear trend articles in April, July and November 2016, two of which were exclusively sourced from the U.N. to not only describe general casualties, but the overall impact of the war on people's lives. A relevant portion of article 1 reads (Mashal, 2016c)

> 'In the first quarter of 2016, almost one-third of civilian casualties were children,' said Danielle Bell, the United Nations human rights director in Afghanistan. 'If the fighting persists near schools, playgrounds, homes and clinics, and parties continue to use explosive weapons in those areas -- particularly mortars and I.E.D. tactics -- these appalling numbers of children killed and maimed will continue.' The agency recorded internal displacement caused by violence across 23 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces in the first quarter of 2016. The northeastern province of Baghlan, where Taliban attacks have increased, was at the top of the chart, with 25,000 people displaced. A combined total of more than 20,000 people were displaced in the southern provinces of Oruzgan and Helmand.

The loss of life in both articles is blamed on the Taliban as well as government forces including the Coalition, but the focus is on the Taliban. Only one article mentions the Coalition in a single sentence (Mashal, 2016c), the rest of the article simply refers to "government" and "pro-government forces". The second article uses the term "pro government forces" without mentioning the coalition at all, and uses the blander "all parties in the Afghan conflict" as having "failed in their commitment to reduce violence to civilians" (Mashal, 2016b).

The third article is almost exclusively sourced from the U.S. Military and the content is strongly defensive of military action. After military officials state the loss of life, they blame ISIS's use of human shields and commit to minimising suffering at the cost of missing targets (Schmidt, 2016b). Rather than show any support of empathy towards the victims, the focus is entirely on statistics and defensibility of the action. The article is worth quoting at some length

> The United States has killed 119 civilians in Iraq and Syria since it began military operations against the Islamic State there in 2014, military officials said Wednesday. In each case, the American military followed the proper procedures and it did not violate laws of armed conflict, officials said. 'Significant precautions were taken, despite the unfortunate outcome,' said Col. John J. Thomas, a spokesman for United States Central Command

> American military commanders have said that as forces move closer to the most populated areas in Iraq and Syria controlled by the Islamic State, there are likely to be more civilian casualties. The commanders also said that Islamic State fighters had increased their use of so-called human shields to avoid being struck as they fled. 'It's a key tenant of the counter-ISIL air campaign that we do not want to add to the tragedy of the situation by inflicting addition suffering,' Colonel Thomas said. 'Sometimes, civilians bear the brunt of military action, but we do all we can to minimize those occurrences even at the cost of sometimes missing the chance to strike valid targets in real time'

The Guardian's articles used NGOs like Amnesty International, The Syrian Network for Human Rights, the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights and the Violations Documentation Centre and are far more critical of the U.S.-led Coalition (Graham-Harrison, 2016a, 2016b). Rather than *The New York Times* which focuses on a U.N. report that describes the majority of casualties caused by the Taliban, *The Guardian* focuses on Coalition airstrikes relying on eyewitness accounts, video and photographic evidence, and reports from local activists. An article cites a researcher from Airwars who states that ""They take enormous pride in getting it right. It is actually very difficult to pretend people have been killed because they get found out" (Graham-Harrison, 2016a).

The Guardian uses these sources to provide coverage that is more critical than *The New York Times*. For example, on the day *The Guardian* wrote about Amnesty International's report on how the U.S led Coalition has killed 300 civilians in Syria (Graham-Harrison, 2016b), *The New York Times* was writing about civilian casualties caused by ISIS in Iraq through the use of

human shields (Arango, 2016). *The Guardian* carries Amnesty as a single source in an article that accuses the U.S-led Coalition of "significantly underestimating the harm caused to civilians in its operations in Syria" in "disproportionate or otherwise indiscriminate attacks". Meanwhile in *The New York Time's* 1100-word article about ISIS brutality, two short paragraphs mention a possible air strike on a civilian target, a mosque at Daquq, a town in Iraq, where 13 women and children were killed attending a funeral. While local officials and Human Rights Watch are cited as blaming the Coalition with HRW stating that the evidence was consistent with an air strike, U.S. military officials are cited as denying it was their fault, suggesting it was the result of an artillery shell (Arango, 2016).

6.4 Conclusion

This chapter set out to explore the volume and nature of support and criticism in four newspapers' coverage of U.S. led military action against terrorist groups in 2016. Overall there is a relative absence of civilian casualty coverage, and this absence would serve a larger government interest in avoiding criticism of its actions. However of the limited coverage that exists across all newspapers, the vast majority doesn't deny that civilian casualties took place when incidents occur, nor do they justify or defend them. This overall finding however doesn't explain the finer details of the coverage which is revealed with a closer examination of the article text.

USA Today is exactly what the top-down model describes. It is entirely dominated by government sources and strongly defends the U.S. military, creating a narrative of strength, discipline, and great effort to avoid casualties at the cost of failing military objectives. *The Guardian* is the opposite of the top-down model. It never uses government or military sources as principal sources and strongly relies on local civilian and NGO accounts to graphically communicate the horrors faced by affected civilians while criticising and holding Western forces as responsible *The Telegraph* treats civilian casualties as an afterthought, briefly mentioned as bare statistics, devoid of detail, usually in the final sentence of the last paragraph in articles about military actions against terrorist groups.

The New York Times, which has the largest volume of coverage of all the newspapers studied, is a mixed bag. While it never outrightly favours a government agenda in the style of *USA Today* and does contain criticism of military actions, it also includes a strong representation of government sources that defend those actions. Its neutral articles involve a subtle defence of the establishment. 7 of its 18 articles that are clearly accepting of casualties having taken place and are critical of the U.S. Military are from the M.S.F. Kunduz Strike and the Syrian Soldiers Strike, both of which were too high profile to ignore. It's use of civilian sources is rarely without extra context or the inclusion of military spokespersons that throws doubt on the veracity of their

claims. Lawrence's study of source use in the coverage of police brutality in the U.S. is useful here. She found that (Lawrence, 2000, p.31)

> critical citizen voices are not completely absent from the news about policing, but they are generally not granted the same place in the news as those of police and other officials, and often are subtly undermined by the ways that reporters frame news stories.

Across all newspapers the British papers have a higher overall rate of acknowledgement of civilian casualties than the U.S. papers, in keeping with the overall conclusion that the U.S. papers are less critical of U.S. actions, within each newspaper pair, the left leaning papers are more critical of military actions than their right leaning counterparts.

This chapter closely examined a highly covered news topic of 2016, the study of which leads to a useful perspective in answering the thesis questions. Chapter 4 examined the stances taken towards official responses to terrorist attacks and in doing so directly examined whether the news media was deferential to those responses. Chapter 5 argued that the lack of coverage on one hand, and the focus on psychological causes instead of political motives was beneficial for governments. This chapter considered how the coverage of civilian casualties often takes place in ways that work in favour of the militaries and governments whose actions lead to those casualties taking place. The findings continue to demonstrate a significant difference in coverage between left and right-leaning papers, as well as differences in coverage based on the region of reporting, with the US papers both appearing to favour the US military.

The next chapter, the coverage given to the San Bernardino terrorist's encrypted iPhone, focuses exclusively on the U.S. papers given their high volume of coverage, and finds a greater level of criticism of the U.S. government, though this criticism is backed by Apple, an influential and wealthy corporation, highlighting how the regional rule could be moderated when a powerful economic entity opposes the US government.

Chapter 7
Should Apple unlock the San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone?

7.1 Introduction

The incident of the encrypted San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone was one of the most intensely reported of 2016 with almost a hundred articles written over the course of approximately a month and a half, between the 17th of February and the 28th of March 2016. 69 of those articles were published in *The New York Times* and *USA Today* and those two newspapers will be studied in this chapter. The San Bernardino iPhone case is illustrative of how terrorism can be linked to other political and societal issues, in this case, issues of security versus privacy, and the extent to which a private company is morally obligated to assist the government in the event of a crisis (Sorkin, 2016). In addition, the news coverage of this case potentially serves as an example of indexing, how levels of disagreement in government could have impacted the representation of powerful civil society and business voices and contributes to an understanding of how different frames and agendas are represented.

On the 2nd of December 2015 Syed Rizwan Farook and his wife Tashfeen Malik pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the now deceased leader of ISIS, then used assault rifles to attack the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health, where Farook was employed as a health inspector. They murdered 14 people and injured 22 more (Aisch et al., 2016; Decker, Donahue, et al., 2016a). While the immediate coverage of the attack itself is not studied here, the repercussions following Apple's refusal to assist the F.B.I. in unlocking the terrorist's iPhone is.

During the F.B.I.'s investigation, they recovered Farook's employer issued iPhone 5C. It was believed to contain the terrorist's communications with each other and with the victims before the shootings and their location between the attack and subsequent shoot-out with the police. To recover this data, F.B.I. personnel reset the iPhone's iCloud password, the password to Apple's cloud-based storage system, mistakenly believing that this would allow them to access the phone. However, doing this locked them out of the phone in question. The F.B.I. was then unable to determine the password through repeated guesswork because of the possibility of an auto-erase function being enabled, if 10 wrong guesses were made, it was possible that the phone would permanently lock itself, becoming forever inaccessible (Decker, Donahue, et al., 2016a, 2016b; Kang, 2016; Kerrigan, 2017).

On the 16th of February, the F.B.I. filed an application in a U.S. District Court in California, asking

a judge to compel Apple to create software that would disable this auto erase function, allowing the F.B.I. to enter as many passwords it would need to unlock the phone, without the fear of the phone erasing itself. Magistrate Judge Sheri Pym granted this application, ordering Apple to do whatever was necessary to enable the search of the iPhone (Decker, Donahue, et al., 2016a; Kang, 2016; Kerrigan, 2017).

Apple appealed the decision, and on the same day Apple CEO Tim Cook released an open letter, explaining why Apple believed that refusing cooperation was the right thing to do.

This letter, and the subsequent F.B.I. legal filing in response, form the basis for the struggle between the privacy and security centric world views represented in the news coverage in *The New York Times*, and *USA Today*. The language from the letter and F.B.I. filing is echoed in the news and opinion articles, and the tables in the next section show the stances each newspaper took.

In Tim Cook's letter (Cook, 2016; Kerrigan, 2017), he cites three key problems.

i.   The precedent. If Apple were to acquiesce to the F.B.I.'s demand, it would set a dangerous precedent. In the future, the government could "demand that Apple build surveillance software to intercept your messages, access your health records or financial data, track your location, or even access your phone's microphone or camera without your knowledge".

ii. The data security threat. The software, contrary to the government's claim, could be used any number of times on any iPhone: "it would be the equivalent of a master key, capable of opening hundreds of millions of locks". If it ever was released, it would form a backdoor into iPhones around the world, exposing individuals to unacceptable risk from hackers, criminals, and rogue states.

iii. Government overreach. Linked to the 'dangerous precedent' argument, Cook feels that the government is "proposing an unprecedented use" of a law called the All Writs Act to force their cooperation, and the law was never meant for this purpose.

Three days later the F.B.I. responded with another legal filing, a motion to compel Apple to comply with the court order of February 16th (Decker, Donahue, et al., 2016a, 2016b).

i.   It denies the data security threat, stating that Apple is allowed to retain custody of its software at all times (a questionable claim given that even the most heavily guarded software can be stolen from their owners as the NSA's own hacking tools stolen by Chinese intelligence in 2016 has shown (Perlroth et al., 2019).

ii. It denies that government could have the ability to hack into phones without the user's knowledge and says that a warrant would be required.

iii. It denies overreach, stating that Apple has complied with previous orders based on the All Writs Act to search Apple devices running earlier version of iOS. It counters that given Apple's past compliance, and current technical capability to render assistance, Apple's refusal is "based on its concern for its business model and public brand marketing strategy" (Decker, Donahue, et al., 2016b).

These points were highlighted in different ways by the *USA Today* and *The New York Times*, the two newspapers with the most number of articles. While how these points were championed and by whom are discussed in section three, the content analysis data presents us with an overview of the sources used, and the stances taken by *USA Today* and *The New York Times*.

7.2 Content Analysis Data

7.2.1 All newspaper sources and stances

Table 7.1 below lists the number of articles each newspaper published that discussed the San Bernardino iPhone incident. *The New York Times* and *USA Today* comprise almost 70 percent of the coverage and will be analysed below and in the next section.

Table 7.1 - News articles, San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone		
	Frequency	Percent
The New York Times	39	38.6
USA Today	30	29.7
The Guardian	8	7.9
The Daily Telegraph	16	15.8
The Hindu	5	5
The Times of India	3	3
Total	**101**	**100**

Table 7.2 below illustrates each newspaper's stances. It's clear that *The New York Times* and *The Telegraph* have the highest neutral stances, almost half of their coverage represented the views of Apple and the F.B.I. almost equally. Articles in clear support for Apple was roughly the same in both U.S. newspapers at about 30 percent, though *USA Today* had about 16 percent fewer neutral articles. That missing neutrality was substituted by articles supporting the government, about 16 percent more than *The New York Times*. Not a single article was found in clear support of the government's position in *The Guardian*.

Table 7.2 - Newspaper stances percentage crosstab, "Should the San Bernardino iPhone be unlocked?"					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
The New York Times	10.30%	46.20%	30.80%	12.80%	100.00%
USA Today	26.70%	30.00%	30.00%	13.30%	100.00%
The Guardian	0.00%	12.50%	50.00%	37.50%	100.00%
The Daily Telegraph	12.50%	43.80%	25.00%	18.80%	100.00%
The Hindu	40.00%	20.00%	40.00%	0.00%	100.00%
The Times of India	0.00%	0.00%	66.70%	33.30%	100.00%

Table 7.3 on the next page lists the cited sources used across all newspapers. Official sources from the Administration and F.B.I. are the most used at 22 percent, with technology sector sources, that is Apple and other Silicon Valley technology companies, coming second at 18.1%. Journalist's provide their own uncited facts and opinions at 16.4%. Academics, think tanks, and NGOs appear slightly more than judges, prosecutors and lawyers with 14.2 and 12.5 percent

of sources cited respectively.

Table 7.3 - Cited sources, all newspapers, San Bernardino iPhone	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	79	22.00%
Industry Leaders, Technology	65	18.10%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	59	16.40%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	51	14.20%
U.S Court Official	45	12.50%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	14	3.90%
U.S Republican	13	3.60%
Other news agencies	8	2.20%
U.S Democrat	4	1.10%
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police Official	4	1.10%
Total	**342**	**95.10%**

Table 7.4 below shows that close to half of the coverage across all newspapers lacked a principal source with journalists serving as their own primaries in 1 in 5 articles. While U.S. government officials were cited at a slightly higher rate than industry leaders, they were used twice as frequently when it came to principal source use. This favouring of industry leaders as primary or principal sources is clearly reflected in the stances table.

Table 7.4 - Principal sources, all newspapers, San Bernardino iPhone	Frequency	Percent
No Principal source	44	43.6
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	21	20.8
Industry Leaders, Technology	17	16.8
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	8	7.9
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	4	4
U.S Republican	1	1
U.S Court Official	1	1
U.S Retired Government Official (All branches)	1	1
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police Official	1	1
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	1	1
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	1
Other news agencies	1	1
Total	**101**	**100**

Table 7.5 on the next page shows that across all newspapers about 30 percent of the coverage was in clear support of Apple, with almost half this support provided by technology industry leaders serving as principal sources, followed closely by journalists themselves, and 12 percent coming from academics and think tanks. A slightly higher proportion of articles were neutral, with government and Apple agendas equally represented and argued. 15.8 percent was clearly opposed to Apple and in support of the government. This image sees some changes when broken down by newspaper.

7.2.2 The New York Times sources and stances

Table 7.6 on the next page shows that *The New York Times* cited official sources slightly less than non-official sources. Combining federal government, police, and prosecutors *The New York*

Table 7.5 - Principal source stance crosstab, All Newspapers, "Should the iPhone be unlocked?"					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	1	28	5	10	44
Journalist	4	6	8	3	21
Industry Leaders, Technology	2	1	14	0	17
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intel	6	0	0	2	8
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	4	0	4
U.S Republican	1	0	0	0	1
U.S Court Official	1	0	0	0	1
U.S Retired Government Official	0	0	1	0	1
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police	0	0	1	0	1
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	1	0	0	0	1
U.K gov/mili/pol	0	1	0	0	1
Other news agencies	0	0	0	1	1
Total	**16**	**36**	**33**	**16**	**101**

Times cited officials at 37.2 percent, non-official sources combining industry leaders, academics and NGO's, and civilians were cited 39.8 percent.

Table 7.6 - Cited sources, NYT, San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone		
	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	38	24.80%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	30	19.60%
Industry Leaders, Technology	23	15.00%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	21	13.70%
U.S Court Official	19	12.40%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	8	5.20%
U.S Republican	4	2.60%
U.S Retired Government Official (All branches)	3	2.00%
U.S Democrat	2	1.30%
Total	**148**	**96.60%**

Table 7.7 below shows that over half of *The New York Times*'s coverage had no principal source and 20.5 percent of all coverage had the journalists using themselves as primary sources. Government officials and tech industry leaders appear as principal sources in the same proportion, almost 8 percent each. The vast majority of journalists supported Apple, not the government.

Table 7.7 - Principal sources, NYT, San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone	Frequency	Percent
No principal source	21	53.8
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	8	20.5
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	3	7.7
Industry Leaders, Technology	3	7.7
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	5.1
U.S Retired Government Official (All branches)	1	2.6
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	1	2.6
Total	**39**	**100**

Table 7.8 on the next page shows that of the principals in favour of Apple, journalists comprised almost half, with tech company leaders, academics, and a retired government official making up the rest. The same table shows that almost half (46%) of the New York Time's coverage is

neutral, and unlike its coverage of military actions, there is no slanting towards the government agenda, quite the opposite, most articles with neutral stances ended with Apple having the last word. Literally, after presenting all the arguments, with no clear resolution at all throughout the article, the final sentences of 9 the 18 articles ended with support for Apple. 3 of the final sentences supported the government and 6 were supportive of neither. 30 percent of The New York Time's coverage was in clear support of Apple, and 10 percent in support of the government.

Table 7.8 - Principal source stance crosstab, NYT, "Should the iPhone be unlocked?"					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	0	16	1	4	21
Journalist	0	2	5	1	8
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intel	3	0	0	0	3
Industry Leaders, Technology	0	0	3	0	3
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	2	0	2
U.S Retired Government Official	0	0	1	0	1
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	1	0	0	0	1
Total	**4**	**18**	**12**	**5**	**39**

7.2.3 USA Today sources and stances

USA Today, like *The New York Times* cited non-official sources more than official sources. This can be seen in table 7.9 below. Non-official sources, that is technology leaders, think tanks and academics, civilians, and victims see use 39.5 percent of the time, as opposed to official sources, government, police, and court officials such as prosecutors at 34%.

Table 7.9 - Cited sources, USA Today, San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone		
	N	Percent
Industry Leaders, Technology	20	21.30%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	16	17.00%
U.S Court Official	16	17.00%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	11	11.70%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	11	11.70%
U.S Republican	6	6.40%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	4	4.30%
Other news agencies	4	4.30%
U.S Democrat	2	2.10%
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police Official	1	1.10%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	1.10%
Israeli civilian/victim	1	1.10%
United Nations	1	1.10%
Total	**94**	**100.00%**

Table 7.10 on the next page shows that this difference is mirrored in *USA Today*'s use of principal sources. While almost 37 percent of articles lacked a principal source, technology industry leaders were relied on as primary sources in almost 1 out of every 4 articles at 23.3 percent use, while government and police sources were used only 6.7 percent of the time, going up to 10 percent when combined with prosecutors.

Table 7.10 - Principal sources, USA Today, San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone		
	Frequency	Percent
No principal source	11	36.7
Industry Leaders, Technology	7	23.3
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	5	16.7
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	2	6.7
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	6.7
U.S Republican	1	3.3
U.S Court Official	1	3.3
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police Official	1	3.3
Total	**30**	**100**

Despite this use of technology industry leaders as principal sources, the stance use is almost evenly divided between supporting the government position that Apple should aid the F.B.I. in unlocking the iPhone, Apple's position that Apple should not be forced to render such aid, and articles that represented both sides more or less the same.

Table 7.11 below shows that this support for the government came from a number of primary sources, *USA Today* journalists in op-ed articles support the government position, almost half of the supportive stances in *USA Today* are provided by journalists. Government officials and Republican senators are present as supportive voices too. Technology company representatives and leaders see far higher rates of use as principal sources than in *The New York Times*.

Table 7.11 - Principal source stance crosstab, USA Today, "Should the iPhone be unlocked?"					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	1	6	1	3	11
Industry Leaders, Technology	1	1	5	0	7
Journalist	3	2	0	0	5
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intel	1	0	0	1	2
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	2	0	2
U.S Republican	1	0	0	0	1
U.S Court Official	1	0	0	0	1
U.S Retired Intelligence/Police Official	0	0	1	0	1
Total	**8**	**9**	**9**	**4**	**30**

7.3 Newspaper text analysis

7.3.1 USA Today

The opinion articles of *USA Today* support the government's position as illustrated by three defining articles written by Michael Wolff, a columnist and contributor of *USA Today*, Richard Burr, the Republican Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, and Jim Michaels, a correspondent with *USA Today*.

All three articles are characterised by a lack of engagement with Apple's claims. There is an echoing of the language used in the F.B.I.'s legal filings, signalling an adoption of its framing. Michael Wolff opens the coverage by labelling Cook's letter as melodramatic, chest beating,

and preposterous, his arguments as "agitprop", and his fear of special security disabling software being used as a master key for any iPhone dismissed as merely "theoretical" (Wolff, 2016). Apple's motivations are lifted almost directly from the F.B.I.'s "privacy as marketing gimmick" frame, outlined in its February 19th legal filing (Decker, Donahue, et al., 2016b, pp. 2-3), in the words of Wolff, "it is not clear whether the company truly sees itself as an ultimate protector and enforcer of a new tech order…or if it is, in the Snowden age, just doing some proactive PR and marketing." Wolff never states why Cook's fears of a universal key is simply theoretical, or why he simply believes the F.B.I. when they say it will only be used on a single phone. Fear of government abuse is used to paint Apple as unreasonable. Apple is said to view the government as "the enemy, even the operative villain in modern life, perfidiously or mindlessly intent on taking away the privacy of its citizens."

Richard Burr, the Republican chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, continues the *USA Today*'s criticism, writing that Apple's technology was being used by murderers, paedophiles and drug dealers, he says that Apple is in no way required to provide a back door (Burr, 2016). How access is obtained without Apple creating special software to weaken its security, i.e. the back door, is not explained. He also mirrors the F.B.I. framing of Apple's motives, that Apple was prioritising its business model above compliance with the law, tracing it back to Apple's response to an earlier F.B.I. demand, where among the reasons given for an inability to assist, Apple added that public sensitivity to issues of privacy was high, and that forcing Apple to extract data absent of clear legal authority could threaten the trust between Apple and its customers and substantially tarnish the Apple brand (Apple, 2015; Burr, 2016).

USA Today's coverage begins to shift with Michael Hayden, a former CIA and NSA chief declaring his support of Apple's position. *USA Today* doesn't provide his background, corporate consulting with technology companies like Apple, and its potential impact , *The New York Times* does (Lichtblau, 2016b). Hayden echoes Cook's letter, saying that "we are a safer, more secure nation without back doors. With them, a lot of other people would take advantage of it." (Page, 2016).

The coverage changes further as technology companies formed coalitions in support of Apple. These powerful third party voices joined prominent NGOs such as the ACLU and the Electronic Frontier Foundation to make strong statements of support, Microsoft's chief legal officer went so far as to say that, "The path to hell starts at the backdoor, and we need to make sure that encryption technology remains strong" (E. Kelly, 2016; Weise, 2016). Mozilla chief legal officer Denelle Dixon-Thayer said, "(The government request) is an overreach; it is asking a tech company to undermine years of security," (Swartz et al., 2016). Twitter, Airbnb, LinkedIn, ebay, AT&T, Intel, Google, Amazon, Facebook, Cisco, Microsoft, Mozilla, Snapchat, Box, Slack, and Yahoo formed

coalitions that filed amicus briefs in court in support of Apple, urging the court to rethink a legal decision based on a law made in an era when cell phones and the Internet didn't exist (Swartz, 2016; Swartz et al., 2016).

The stance of *USA Today*'s journalists however is firmly in favour of the government. Two days after the tech industry publicly backed Apple, Jim Michaels, a correspondent with *USA Today* criticised Silicon Valley as a whole in an opinion piece (Michaels, 2016c).

> Silicon Valley is its own culture, peopled by highly educated workers with a deep mistrust of government. Its leaders have succeeded in global economy, attended elite schools and grown up in sheltered communities. Silicon Valley sees the war against the Islamic State as the government's fight, not the nation's. Patriotism makes them uncomfortable

This issue of patriotism and security can be seen in government filings as well, where it is embodied in the urgency created by terrorism (Decker, Donahue, & Wilkison, 2016; Johnson & Swartz, 2016).

> Apple and its amici try to alarm this Court with issues of network security, encryption, back doors, and privacy, invoking larger debates before Congress and in the news media. That is a diversion. Apple desperately wants—desperately needs—this case not to be "about one isolated iPhone." But there is probable cause to believe there is evidence of a terrorist attack on that phone, and our legal system gives this Court the authority to see that it can be searched pursuant to a lawful warrant. And under the compelling circumstances here, the Court should exercise that authority, even if Apple would rather its products be warrant-proof

Note the jump. The F.B.I. first brings up how Apple needs this case to be about all iPhones, but then fail to substantiate why Apple is incorrect, why isn't it about all iPhones, instead jumping to the terrorist attack, and the lawful warrant to search the phone. Apple in its responses acknowledges the terrorist attack, acknowledges its past cooperation, but its key point of how weakened security systems could jeopardise the safety of personal information is not contested or engaged with, either by the government, or the articles in support of the government in the *USA Today*. There appears to be an implicit assumption in the arguments supporting the government that the trade off of jeopardising the security of millions of phones is acceptable for the benefit of acquiring evidence relevant to a single terrorist attack. This is not clearly stated anywhere.

USA Today has articles that carry one point of view, then another. They accept the Justice Department claim that "Apple has sought to advance "false" arguments that threaten privacy breaches on a massive scale in the tech giant's opposition to a court order requiring it to help the FBI gain access to the iPhone used by San Bernardino terrorist Syed Rizwan Farook" (K. Johnson & Swartz, 2016). Then another article, published a few days later champions Apple's point of view rejecting the government's insistence that the case relates to a single iPhone. Apple's

lawyers are quoted as saying that "The Founders would be appalled…. this case hinges on a contentious policy issue about how society should weigh what law enforcement officials want against the widespread repercussions and serious risk their demands would create" (K. Johnson & Weise, 2016).

The data regarding *USA Today* shows an equal division of article stances in, support, neutral, and opposition, with four articles in the descriptive/no stance category. The majority of the articles in support of the F.B.I.'s position in the *USA Today* read as though the journalists and their sources are speaking to themselves, there is a lack of discussion of deeper historical antecedents and causes and a lack of engagement with Apple's arguments. While Apple, the technology industry, NGOs and some academics talk about the dangers of compromised privacy rights, and the negative impacts of a society shaped by government and corporate surveillance, the F.B.I. and Administration, and its supporters talk about patriotism, relying on the immediacy of terrorism to justify immediate and full cooperation. But pushing the point of immediate danger is only a partial engagement with Apple's arguments. In this *USA Today*'s coverage is somewhat in sync with the F.B.I.'s claims. The government highlights its legally issued search warrant but fail to engage with the idea that the law, and its subsequent application are contested. The government highlights how Apple can remain in possession of its software but fail to engage with the potential dangers of it being created at all. Apple's motives are supposed to be driven by its business model, but why this model acts against the larger benefits brought by a strong privacy stance is not explained. The government failure to engage with Apple's arguments are reflected in the news coverage.

7.3.2 The New York Times
The New York Times's coverage carries only 4 articles in support of the government, 18 articles are listed as neutral, and 13 in opposition. *The New York Time's* journalists take the lead in opposing the government, appearing as the most frequent principal source in opposition. However in the supportive and neutral stance articles they too identify a business motive right from the start of *The New York Time's* coverage. Apple's business is found to rely on data, and "depend on the global public's collective belief that they will do everything they can to protect that data" (Manjoo, 2016a). Another reason put forward was that Apple has a business model of selling physical devices, unlike other tech companies they don't compete for the cloud computing businesses of the government and so have less to lose in a legal conflict with the government (Lichtblau & Apuzzo, 2016; Wingfield & Isaac, 2016).

The New York Times never goes as far as *USA Today* to identify Apple's fight for user privacy as a gimmick. Far from it, a front-page article on the 19th of February, just as the F.B.I. filed its

second brief to compel Apple's cooperation, idolises Cook's values. The article links his present defiance of the government to his childhood defiance of the Ku Klux Klan, despite there being no clear connection between his protests against cross burning and the privacy issues facing his wealthy corporation. Mr Cook is said to be proud that Apple did not traffic in the intimate, digital details of its customers lives, and is responsive to the needs of his customers, who after revelations of mass government surveillance wrote to Cook to let him know just how important data security was to them (Benner & Perlroth, 2016). This is said to be what prompted Cook to write in his open letter, "Compromising the security of our personal information can ultimately put our personal safety at risk, that is why encryption has become so important to all of us." (Benner & Perlroth, 2016; Cook, 2016).

A point of difference between The New York Time's coverage and *USA Today* is that *The New York Times* focuses far more on the legal arguments, criticising the government's use of the All Writs Act as applicable to old technology, and unsuitable for newer technologies. Articles explain how courts in the 1960s and 1970s created rules for the wiretapping of analog phone calls and that those rulings were later applied as the basis for mass surveillance of the Internet. Neil Richards, a professor at the Washington University School of Law is cited and highlights what the government refuses to acknowledge, that this case sets a precedent, "This case can't be a one-time deal, this is about the future" (Manjoo, 2016b).

The neutral articles have a fairly straightforward representation of the views of both parties without seeming to tilt into either camp, unlike the *New York Time's* neutral stance articles in the civilian casualty chapter. As mentioned above, it might be useful to note that 9 out of the 18 neutral stance iPhone articles give Apple the last word, literally. The last sentence of these neutral articles, after discussing both sides more or less equally without giving one side primacy, ends with an Apple quote or defence of Apple's arguments. For example, (Lichtblau, 2016a)

> Law enforcement today has access to more data -- data which they can use to prevent terrorist attacks, solve crimes and help bring perpetrators to justice -- than ever before in the history of our world

Or (Benner & Appuzo, 2016)

> At a product event on Monday at the company's Cupertino, Calif., headquarters, Timothy D. Cook, Apple's chief executive, emphasized a philosophy of helping to protect users' data. "This is an issue that impacts all of us and we will not shrink from this responsibility," Mr. Cook said

An op-ed neutral article ends with (Levine, 2016)

> But the current choice is between a government that doesn't seem to recognize limits to its own power to access personal information and a technology company

that does. It's a bad choice, but an obvious one. While nobody elected Mr. Cook to
protect our privacy, we should be glad someone is.

The neutral articles primarily echo the 3 point claims made by Apple and the F.B.I. without addi-
tions or deviations. These articles feature the government's arguments that there is no data
security threat, it's a "one time demand" without further ramifications (Benner & Apuzzo, 2016),
that the government will not have the power to freely hack anyone's phone, not without a warrant
(McPhate, 2016), that there is a legal precedent established through the All Writs Act to compel
Apple's cooperation (Benner et al., 2016; Lichtblau & Goldstein, 2016), and that Apple's refusal
to cooperate is a marketing strategy to bolster its privacy branding (Apuzzo et al., 2016; Licht-
blau & Benner, 2016). Articles also feature Apple's arguments, that fulfilling the F.B.I's request
sets a dangerous precedent for repeat requests (Benner & Apuzzo, 2016; Perlroth, 2016), that
having a master key to open any iPhone is a data security threat (Shear, 2016; Sorkin, 2016),
and that the government is overreaching, the law in question, the All Writs Act is outdated and
not meant for this purpose (Apuzzo et al., 2016; Lichtblau & Benner, 2016).

7.4 Potential reasons for a lack of government support in the coverage

The majority of articles is most definitely not in favour of the government in either paper, though
the *USA Today* may favour the government's stance more than *The New York Times*. Indexing
theory provides us with potential reasons why this might be the case. Not only were there signif-
icant divisions between powerful government and ex government officials, but wealthy and influ-
ential technology companies formed a third-party voice that the media paid significant attention
to. A list of the individuals and companies involved, and their stances is provided below in table
7.12, to illustrate the extent of the divisions.

Table 7.12 – List of Individuals and their stances for "Should Apple unlock the San Bernardino iPhone?"	
Support	**Oppose**
Barack Obama, President (D)	Tim Cook, CEO of Apple
James Comey, FBI	Gen. Michael Hayden, Ex NSA and CIA Director
Sheri Pym, Magistrate Judge, California	Zeid Raad al-Hussein, UN HC for HR
Michael Ramos, San Bernadino DA	Mike Honda, Congressman (D)
Dianne Feinstein, Senator (D)	Ron Wyden, Senator (D)
Trey Gowdy, Congressman (R)	Google, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft etc
Richard Burr, Senator (R)	Michael Chertoff, Ex Director Homeland Security
Bill Nelson, Senator (D)	Edward Snowden, Whistleblower
Stephen G. Larson, lawyer victims' families	Salihin Kondoker, family of victim
Loretta Lynch, Attorney General	Ted Poe, Congressman (R)
Eileen M. Decker, US Attorney	J. Michael McConnell, Ex NSA Director in the 1990s
William Bratton, NY Police Commissioner	Jason Chaffetz, Congressman (R)
James A. Lewis, Center for Strategic and International Studies	Nuala O'Connor, President, Center for Democracy and Technology
Bill Gates (Neutral)	

Concerning the extent of divisions among Federal and other government bodies, no less then Obama himself was reported to be conflicted, despite his support for the F.B.I. The NYT reports President Obama's divided opinion over the iPhone case (Lichtblau & Apuzzo, 2016).

> In a meeting with technology company executives in the Situation Room last spring, Mr. Obama pleaded with them to allow national security and law enforcement officials some access to private data, according to one participant in the room. In an interview last year with Re/Code, a technology website, Mr. Obama lamented being stuck, 'smack-dab in the middle of these tensions'

A White House Statement (that appears only in *The New York Times*, the text cannot be found in Obama's White House Archives) exemplifies the conflict and uncertainty surrounding the government's approach to encryption. On the one hand, "The United States government firmly supports the development and robust adoption of strong encryption, which is a key tool to secure commerce and trade, safeguard private information, promote free expression and association" it also says that "At the same time, encryption poses a grave challenge for our national security and law enforcement professionals" (Shear & Sanger, 2016).

This language is echoed in a letter to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at the United Nations. Jason R. Mack of the U.S. Mission writes, "The U.S. Government recognizes the importance of strong encryption. Encryption and anonymity tools facilitate digital safety for at risk internet users, including journalists, members of civil society, and citizens from malevolent state and non-state actors, and are a key tool to secure commerce and trade. It is also critical for strong cybersecurity."

He then goes on to say that "At the same time, encryption poses a grave challenge for our national security and law enforcement professionals, who work to ensure that malicious actors are held to account and cannot exploit technology as a means to evade the law. We recognize that there is always a risk that encryption may be used for terrorist or other malevolent pur-poses, and we must do our utmost to combat this" (Mack, 2018).

The high level of disagreement within the Obama administration and the conflicting interests between law enforcement and national security concerning terrorism, and national security concerning data privacy, could well explain the relatively low levels of support for the government in *The New York Times*, and the more or less equal levels of support for and against the government in *USA Today* in terms of number of articles, if not editorial stance.

In addition Michael Hayden, the former NSA and CIA Director, Michael Chertoff, the former director of Homeland Security, J. Michael McConnell, an ex NSA Director from the 1990's, all publicly announced their support for Apple. *The New York Times* reported that while the F.B.I.

wanted the ability to break into smartphones and computers for investigations, the Pentagon and intelligence officials feared the abuse of weakened encryption by rogue states, criminals, and hackers and that China would use the same pressure tactics to acquire data (Shear & Sanger, 2016). These fears were the same ones expressed in Cook's letter. The conflicting positions between the F.B.I. and Pentagon and the American intelligence community could be seen in the conflicting statements made by James Comey, the then director of the F.B.I., and Defence Secretary Ashton B. Carter. Comey testified in Congress about the need for encrypted devices to have built in guaranteed methods of law enforcement access, Carter, speaking at an annual computer security conference in San Francisco said that "Data security, including encryption, is absolutely essential" (Shear & Sanger, 2016).

This chapter has explored a key news topic, one that received more coverage than some terrorist attacks, to show that support for the US government's responses to terrorism is far from guaranteed, however it could take a range of powerful industry figures to publicly oppose the government for opposition in the news to appear.

The next chapter highlights an exchange of positions between *The New York Times* and *USA Today*, with *USA Today* opposed to the government position, and *The New York Times* in support.

Chapter 8
Coverage of the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act

8.1 Introduction

The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) is a U.S. law designed to permit the 9/11 victim's families (9/11 families) to sue the Saudi Arabian government for its alleged role in the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001. It was passed by the U.S. Congress on September 28th, 2016 with massive bipartisan support. The Senate and House of Representatives didn't have a single vote against it, and after President Obama vetoed it, Congress overrode the veto with a vote of 97 to 1 in the Senate and 348 to 77 in the House of Representatives. The law has several theoretical repercussions, of which only one saw coverage in the newspaper with the most articles, *The New York Times*, the possibility of other states using similar laws to bring cases against the United States. (Johnson, 2018; Watkins, 2017; Williams, 2016; Zengerle, 2016). The issue of whether the citizens of the United States should be allowed to sue Saudi Arabia for allegedly sponsoring terrorism has several key stakeholders. The families of the 9/11 victims, politicians from both the Republican and Democratic parties, the U.S. President and adminis-tration, as well as foreign, usually Saudi officials. Examining the representations of the different sides in the news provides another facet in this study. Unlike in the previous case involving the San Bernardino terrorist's iPhone, there was no division in opinion within the government itself, and there is far greater support for the government's position in the news.

The 9/11 families supported JASTA because they believed that the royal family of Saudi Arabia provided money and other support to the 19 terrorists who carried out the 9/11 attacks (Bolton & Mukasey, 2016). A lawsuit jointly filed by the families in the months after the attack stated that (Rosen, 2017)

> 'Upon information and belief, there were and are a large number of Saudi citizens and members of the Saudi royal family who support bin Laden', the suit charged. 'High-ranking officials in the Saudi government and Saudi businessmen have provided money to support bin Laden and al Qaeda'

The suit specifically accused the Saudi defence minister and minister of the interior of providing hundreds of millions of dollars to bin Laden and al-Qaida. Fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 attackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia and this was interpreted as particularly meaningful, along with the censorship of the final section of a U.S. Senate Report on 9/11 titled the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (Bolton & Mukasey, 2016). This withheld final section was colloquially called "the 28 pages" and

was a summary of the investigative leads of U.S. Federal agencies into possible Saudi support for the 9/11 terrorists ("Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before And After The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001", 2002; U.S. Senate Select Committee On Intelligence & U.S. House Permanent Select Committee On Intelligence, 2002).

Statements made by the 9/11 families suggest that they believe the U.S. government has overlooked the role played by the Saudis for abstract geopolitical reasons, and opaque foreign lobbying has allowed them to evade the laws that would bring them to justice in U.S. Courts (Paliewicz & Hasian, 2018). As Mindy Kleinberg, whose husband died in the World Trade Center said, "It's stunning to think that our government would back the Saudis over its own citizens" (Mazzetti, 2016b). Or as Sean Passananti, whose father died in the attacks said, "Obama is showing he's on the side of the Saudis instead of the 9/11 families and the American people" (Bergengruen, 2016). An open letter penned to President Obama in support of legislation designed to permit litigation against Saudi Arabia stated that, (New York Daily News, 2016)

> We and so many other families have fought for years to know all of the truth about 9/11….It will help uncover truth — such as the mysteries surrounding the ability of 19 hijackers — barely educated, not speaking much English and without visible resources — to come to America, learn to fly, set up camps in several cities and hijack four commercial airliners, crashing them into....the heart of our economy.

Lee Ielpi, a New York City firefighter who spent nine months digging out bodies from the rubble of the towers, including his own son, summed up the 9/11 family's goal (Rosen, 2017).

> People need to be brought to justice, There were people in Saudi Arabia, whatever positions they were in, who knew the people that committed this crime — who were involved with the people who committed this crime, who met them in California. If in fact it can be proved that the country or higher-ups within the country were involved, we should sue them for everything we can get.

These sentiments found a voice in the bipartisan unity that pushed JASTA into law. Representative Jerrold Nadler, Democrat of New York, who was a lead Democratic sponsor of the bill in the House stated that "Anyone who facilitates a terrorist attack on our people should be brought to justice" (Steinhauer, 2016) while Senator John Cornyn, Republican of Texas stated that "Unanimous passage of this bill, I believe, sends an unmistakable message that we will combat terrorism with every tool we have and just as importantly, we will make sure that simple justice is available to the victims of terrorist attacks on our soil by not erecting any unnecessary roadblocks to their pursuit of justice in the courts of law." (Steinhauer, 2016). Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-N.Y.), who co-authored the bill with Senator John Cornyn (R-Tex.), stated that, "Overriding a presidential veto is something we don't take lightly, but it was important in this case that the families of the victims of 9/11 be allowed to pursue justice, even if that pursuit causes some diplomatic discomforts" (Demirjian & Eilperin, 2016).

Among the "diplomatic discomforts" mentioned by Schumer is the creation of an exception to diplomatic immunity that no matter how well-crafted or limited, is said to be regarded by Saudi Arabia and other countries as the ending of a legal precedent, which creates an opening for retaliation against the United States and its officials for its foreign enterprises and activities (Johnson, 2018; Paliewicz & Hasian, 2018; Watkins, 2017). Though JASTA has numerous flaws resulting in President Obama opposing the bill (discussed in the next section), this one aspect of it, the possibility of retaliatory lawsuits received the most attention in *The New York Times*, possibly due to it being highlighted by President Obama. Interestingly, this was recognised by the then Senate majority leader, Mitch McConnell who when after the law was passed, said that "nobody had really focused on the potential downside in terms of our international relationships, and I think it was just a ball dropped." Other Republicans too had second thoughts, recognising that service members could face legal problems overseas (The New York Times, 2016a). These are just some of the themes among others that will explored in the sections to come.

8.2 The coverage: sources and stances

8.2.1 All newspapers

This issue received sparse coverage in *USA Today* and *The Guardian* with 6.8 and 9.1 percent of the total number of news articles as shown in table 5.2 below. *The Telegraph* had a larger number of articles than *The Guardian* and about one fourth of the coverage. *The New York Times* provided the bulk of the coverage and will be the focus of the textual discussion in the coming pages.

Table 8.1 - News article distribution, JASTA	Frequency	Percent
The New York Times	21	56.8
USA Today	3	8.1
The Guardian	4	10.8
The Daily Telegraph	9	24.3
Total	**37**	**100**

Looking at the sources cited across all newspapers shown in table 8.2 on the next page, we can see that while the U.S. government and other officials are the most used single source category at 19 percent, politicians: Democrat and Republican senators, congressional representatives and presidential candidates jointly make up 23.7 percent of the sources. Non U.S. government sources are significant however as government officials from the Middle East consist of 10.82 percent of the sources. The total use of government sources, from the U.S., the U.K., the E.U, and the Middle East and North Africa far outnumber any other source combination at 34 percent. If U.S. court officials such as judges and prosecutors (7.73 percent) is added to this it becomes 41.75 percent, almost half of all the sources used across all newspapers. This compared to

U.S. civilians, victims, think tanks and academics which jointly make up only 10.31 percent of all sources cited.

Table 8.2 - Cited sources, all newspapers, JASTA	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	36	21.20%
U.S Democrat	25	14.70%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	22	12.90%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	20	11.80%
U.S Republican	19	11.20%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	11	6.50%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	7	4.10%
U.K Politician, Conservative	6	3.50%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	5	2.90%
U.S Court Official	3	1.80%
E.U/E.U Country/Other West gov/mili/police	3	1.80%
U.K Politician, Labour	2	1.20%
U.K Retired Military Official	2	1.20%
Total	**161**	**94.80%**

The use of government and politician sources in general citations does not translate into equivalent use in the principal source list in table 8.3 below, though it does seem to be reflected in the article and source stance table below. In table 8.4 "no principal sources" occur the most indicating no single source being favoured, but they tend to occur as opposing JASTA or as neutral towards it (multiple points of view being represented equally).

Table 8.3 - Principal sources, all newspapers, JASTA	N	Percent
No principal source	19	48.7
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	7	17.9
U.K Politician, Conservative	4	10.3
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	3	7.7
U.S Democrat	3	7.7
U.S Republican	1	2.6
U.S Court Official	1	2.6
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	2.6
Total	**39**	**100**

Table 8.4 - Principal source and stance crosstab, all newspapers, JASTA					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	2	8	6	3	19
Journalist	0	2	4	1	7
U.K Politician, Conservative	0	0	4	0	4
U.S Democrat	3	0	0	0	3
U.S gov/mili/police	0	0	3	0	3
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	1	0	1
U.S Court Official	0	0	0	1	1
U.S Republican	1	0	0	0	1
Total	**6**	**10**	**18**	**5**	**39**

8.2.2 USA Today

Though there are only three articles in the analysis, two of them support JASTA's passage, and one simply describes events with no stance taken. Government sources are cited slightly less

than the politicians, academics/think tanks, and civilians at a straight 40 versus 60 percent. There are no principal sources. All but one are U.S. sources. This can be seen in tables 8.5 and 8.6 below.

Table 8.5 - Cited Sources, USA Today, JASTA		
	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	3	30.00%
U.S Republican	2	20.00%
U.S Democrat	2	20.00%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	10.00%
U.S Civilian	1	10.00%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	1	10.00%
Total	10	100.00%

Table 8.6 - Principal Sources and stances, USA Today, JASTA			
	Supportive	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	2	1	3

8.2.3 The Guardian

Table 8.7 below shows that *The Guardian* doesn't include any civilians or victims in its cited source use, with only 7.14 percent of its total given to think tanks, academics, and NGOs. Government sources: The U.S. and Middle Eastern governments, combined total 42.86 percent with Republican and Democrat political sources totalling 35.72%. Four out of the six source categories are U.S. sources.

Table 8.7 - Cited Sources, The Guardian, JASTA		
	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	8	28.57%
U.S Republican	4	14.29%
U.S Democrat	6	21.43%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	7.14%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	4	14.29%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	4	14.29%
Total	**28**	**100.00%**

Table 8.8 below shows that *The Guardian* too has no principal sources, but unlike The New York Time or *USA Today*, all four of its articles fall under the neutral stance category, not a single article was clearly for or against JASTA.

Table 8.8 - Principal Source and stance crosstab, The Guardian, JASTA		
	Neutral	Total
No principal source	4	4

8.2.4 The Telegraph

Coming to *The Telegraph*, table 8.9 on the next page shows that five out of its ten source cate-

gories are from the U.K. 39.4 percent are government and official sources from the U.K., the U.S., and the Middle East. U.S. civilians and victims are not represented at all. 32.1 percent of all sources are U.K. politicians, led by members of the Conservative party who, apart from journalists, are the single most used source category at 21.4 percent. This is in direct contrast to *The Guardian*, which relied almost entirely on U.S. based sources.

Table 8.9 - Cited sources, The Telegraph, JASTA

	N	Percent
U.K Politician, Conservative	6	21.40%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	6	21.40%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	5	17.90%
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	4	14.30%
U.K Politician, Labour	2	7.10%
U.K Retired Military Official	2	7.10%
U.K Politician, Liberal Democrat	1	3.60%
E.U/E.U Country/Other West Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	1	3.60%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	1	3.60%
Total	**28**	**100.00%**

Table 8.10 and 8.11 below show that Conservative party politicians also appear as primary sources in a good one third of *The Telegraph*'s articles, always in opposition to JASTA. Similar to *The Guardian* in its stances, it doesn't have a single article in support of JASTA, all articles have a clear opposition stance.

Table 8.10 - Principal sources, The Telegraph, JASTA

	Frequency	Percent
U.K Politician, Conservative	4	36.4
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	2	18.2
No principal source	5	45.5
Total	**11**	**100**

Table 8.11 - Principal sources and stances crosstab, The Telegraph, JASTA

	Neutral	Oppositional	Total
U.K Politician, Conservative	0	4	4
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	0	2	2
No principal source	1	4	5
Total	**1**	**10**	**11**

8.2.5 The New York Times

Table 8.12 on the next page shows that *The New York Times* has the most diverse sources out of all the newspapers in this section with 17 different source categories. All sources above one percent were included in the cited source list on the next page.

There are nine of them. The U.S. Government and associated official sources were the most used at 20.20 percent. Combined with different Middle Eastern and E.U. government sources, the total government and other officials source share is 35.6 percent. Democrat and Republican politician sources occupy over a fourth, 28.8 percent of all sources cited with think tanks and

academics, and civilians and victims making up 13.5 percent of the total.

Table 8.12 - Cited sources, The New York Times, JASTA	N	Percent
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	21	20.20%
U.S Democrat	17	16.30%
Other MENA government/police/military/intelligence	14	13.50%
U.S Republican	13	12.50%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	12	11.50%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	8	7.70%
U.S Civilian/Local/Victim	6	5.80%
U.S Court Official	3	2.90%
E.U/E.U Country/Other West Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	2	1.90%
Total	**96**	**92.30%**

Table 8.13 below shows only a few instances of principal sources, 37 percent of articles had no principal source with journalists appearing as the principal in another 22 percent. Democrats, senators and congressional representatives are used as principal sources more often than the U.S. Administration and associated sources, almost five percent more

Table 8.13 - Principal sources, The New York Times, JASTA	Frequency	Percent
No principal source	7	33.3
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	5	23.8
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	3	14.3
U.S Democrat	3	14.3
U.S Republican	1	4.8
U.S Court Official	1	4.8
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	1	4.8
Total	**21**	**100**

The principal source stances outlined in table 8.14 below show that 8 out of 21 articles, 38 percent of the total, exhibited clear opposition to JASTA. The supportive, neutral and descriptive stances are roughly the same, at about 20 percent each. This is hardly an overwhelming endorsement of the executive's point of view, despite public statements by the President in opposition to JASTA.

Table 8.14 - Principal sources and stances, The New York Times, JASTA	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	0	3	2	2	7
Journalist	0	2	2	1	5
U.S Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	0	0	3	0	3
U.S Democrat	3	0	0	0	3
U.S Republican	1	0	0	0	1
U.S Court Official	0	0	0	1	1
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	1	0	1
Total	**4**	**5**	**8**	**4**	**21**

Civilians and victims receive almost no space in the cited sources list, and no representation at all in the principal sources list. The civilian support of JASTA was expressed by politicians, more from the Democrats than the Republicans. Civilians and victims didn't receive as much

representation as other sources, with only 5.3 percent in *The New York Times*, nothing at all in *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* and 10 percent in *USA Today*.

Table 8.15 below outlines the stances used by each newspaper. The only articles supporting JASTA appear in the U.S. newspapers and not a single supportive article appears in the U.K. papers. This supports the findings of the textual analysis below, briefly stated in the introduction, that the civilian/victim agenda was carried forward by the U.S. politicians.

Table 8.15 - Newspaper stances crosstab, all newspapers, JASTA					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
The New York Times	19.05%	23.81%	38.10%	19.05%	100%
USA Today	66.67%	0%	0%	33.33%	100%
The Guardian	0%	100%	0%	0%	100%
The Telegraph	0%	9.09%	90.91%	0%	100%
All newspapers	14.63%	29.27%	43.90%	12.20%	100%

8.3 *The New York Times* news article analysis

There are four key themes that can be identified across *The New York Time's* coverage. The first is bipartisan support for JASTA, where the content describes how Democrats and Republicans are united in their efforts to secure justice for the victims of 9/11. The second theme is about the underlying motive for that bipartisan support, the evidence of Saudi government connections to the 9/11 terrorists. A part of the second theme is how the Saudis support extremism around the world. The third theme is linked to the second, its about the 28 pages, a censored section of a government report on 9/11 that dealt with possible Saudi involvement. The fourth theme is one of JASTA's flaws, the only flaw that is really given serious attention, that is that is how JASTA could be setting up the U.S. government to be sued in other countries.

8.3.1 Bipartisan support

The articles in support of JASTA contain statements of support for it across the political spectrum, either generic, or referencing Saudi connections to terrorists and the 28 pages. The first 2016 article about JASTA appeared in April and featured Hillary Clinton declaring her support for the bill. Of the 28 pages she said, "I think the administration should take a hard look at them". Democratic Senator Schumer added that, "if Saudi Arabia were complicit in terrorism and people were killed because of it, there should be a right of the families of the victims to go to court." Bernie Sanders released a statement on the same day saying he supported the bill (Chozick, 2016). There is no inclusion of any source that criticises JASTA and the journalist doesn't comment on any of the politician's statements either.

The next article in support of JASTA has an even mix of the four themes described above. Politicians from both parties, Senators Schumer and Cornyn are depicted as unified in their support

of the 9/11 families and the victim's right to justice. Senator Schumer framed the legislation as a means of being extra thorough, "For the sake of the families, I want to make clear beyond the shadow of a doubt that every entity, including foreign states, will be held accountable if they are found to be sponsors of the heinous act of 9/11." Senator Cornyn defended the legislation, arguing that it wouldn't result in reciprocal treatment from other countries (the U.S. government won't be counter sued) because of the bill's fine print towards its end that allows for an infinite number of 180 day hold periods if the administration can demonstrate "good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant" ("Justice Against Sponsors Of Terrorism Act", 2016; Mazzetti, 2016c).

As briefly explored in the introduction, it is likely that very few politicians wanted to be on the wrong side of the 9/11 family drawn line of justice and individual suffering, virtually none wanted risk an unpatriotic image by telling their constituents that they thought the 9/11 families' efforts for justice through JASTA was a bad idea (Paliewicz & Hasian, 2018).

8.3.2 Allegations of Saudi support for terrorism and the missing 28 pages.
Possibly the most significant point of contestation between the 9/11 families and the Administration that underpinned the civilian and bipartisan push for JASTA was "the 28 pages", the censored section of a government report on 9/11 that dealt with possible Saudi involvement. The consistent denials of both the U.S. and Saudi government were dismissed in the favour of preliminary investigative reports that JASTA supporters saw as evidence supporting Saudi involvement. JASTA would allow this evidence to be presented in a U.S. court.

In 2002 a joint congressional investigation was conducted into the intelligence failures that led to 9/11, but President Bush Jr. ordered a section of the report, consisting of 28 pages (it turned out to be 29) to be kept secret, with speculation rife that this section contained evidence of Saudi involvement (Phippen & Vasilogambros, 2016; The New York Times, 2016g). This speculation was bolstered by former U.S. Senator Bob Graham, a co chairman of the committee that wrote the report. He claimed there was evidence of foreign governments involved in facilitating 9/11 as early as 2002 (Graham & Shelby, 2002) and publicised the belief that the F.B.I. failed to fully investigate 9/11 with the suspicion that the Bush administration had knowledge of Saudi support for the hijackers (Isikoff, 2002). This continued up to 2016 with Graham claiming that there was evidence of complicity by institutions and people beyond the 19 terrorists (The New York Times, 2016c).

Articles in support of JASTA frequently mention the then still unreleased 28 pages, described as "evidence that Saudi government officials and other Saudi citizens living in the United States had a hand in the terrorist plot" and as "compiling numerous possible connections between the

hijackers and Saudis in the United States." It is only after mentioning this that the article does clarify that the the 9/11 commission found "no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded" Al Qaeda or the 9/11 terrorists. As well as adding that (Mazzetti, 2016c)

> The commission's co-chairmen, Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton, issued a statement saying that the 28 pages 'were based almost entirely on raw, unvetted material that came to the F.B.I.' -- much of it ultimately deemed inconclusive by the Sept. 11 panel. 'Accusations of complicity in that mass murder from responsible authorities are a grave matter,' they wrote. 'Such charges should be levied with care.'

It is left to the reader to make the connection that if this is in fact the case, then why is there a need for JASTA? In the content analysis stance marking the article was marked as supportive of JASTA given that the vast majority of it is in near total support.

Another article supportive of JASTA focuses on the 28 pages, accepting the proponents description of them as "findings that are said to show high-level Saudi Arabian support for the hijackers". In a 932 word article, a single line mentions that "Some in the intelligence community have raised concerns that some of the original findings proved unsubstantiated and that a release now might do more harm than good." Senator Graham responded with "I think the person looking at this without preconception is going to find it very disconcerting what the Saudis did." (Hulse, 2016a). Senator Graham is given an entire opinion piece in September after the 28 pages were released. Barely acknowledging the lack of evidence in them, he states that (Graham, 2016)

> Questions about whether the Saudi government assisted the terrorists remain unanswered…. Some of those questions might be answered if the government released more of the findings of the Sept. 11 commission, the citizens inquiry that followed our congressional inquest. The commission said that it found no Saudi links to the hijackers. But the government could satisfy lingering doubts by releasing more of the commission's records. Parallel investigations were also conducted by the F.B.I. and C.I.A. How much did they look into whether Prince Bandar or other Saudis aided the hijackers?

The 28 pages themselves state that ("Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before And After The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001", 2002, p. 421)

> this Joint Inquiry has made no final determinations as to the reliability or sufficiency of the information regarding these issues that we found contained in FBI and CIA documents. It was not the task of this Joint Inquiry to conduct the kind of extensive investigation that would be required to determine the true significance of any such alleged connections to the Saudi Government. On the one hand, it is possible that these kinds of connections could suggest, as indicated in a (redacted) dated July 2, 2002, incontrovertible evidence that there is support for these terrorists within the Saudi Government." On the other hand, it is also possible that further investigation of these allegations could reveal legitimate, and innocent, explanations for these associations

In 2014 President Obama ordered the 28 pages prepared for release, which took place in 2016 (The New York Times, 2016g). They focus on low level Saudi employees, and as the full report indicates, there is no conclusive evidence of Saudi government support. On reading the 28 pages, Senator Graham doesn't acknowledge that they are full of "maybes", individuals who "may have provided assistance or support", "may have been in contact with", there are many qualifying remarks and uncertainties, which is to be expected of a preliminary staff report which is what the 28 pages are, they were included in the formal 9/11 report but were not written by the committee. CIA Director John Brennan called them uncorroborated, unvetted, and inaccurate. A separate F.B.I. report has a summary of the new information from investigations of the 9/11 attacks, no member of the Saudi royal family or senior Saudi official is named. When the pages were released, it was acknowledged that they failed to provide any credible evidence of Saudi government involvement in the attacks by several government officials and offices including the President, the director of the CIA, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the 9/11 Commission chairs. Further, the 9/11 Commission, created by Congressional legislation to investigate the attacks stated in its report that, "Saudi Arabia has long been considered the primary source of al Qaeda funding, but we have found no evidence that the Saudi government as an institution or senior Saudi officials individually funded the organization." Though they do note a likelihood that "charities with significant Saudi government sponsorship diverted funds to al Qaeda." The 28 pages mention this, that the F.B.I. noted that the al-Haramain Islamic Foundation "has clear ties to the Saudi government and intelligence reporting suggests it is providing financial and logistical support to al-Qa'ida." What it doesn't note is that the Saudi government froze some of al-Haramain's assets in 2002 and had it closed in 2004, after a joint investigation with U.S. intelligence services. The 28 pages further alleged that Saudi intelligence officers in the U.S. were in contact with the hijackers, but the 9/11 commission and the intelligence community found a lack of evidence to substantiate this. The pages also allege that financial support was provided to the hijackers by the family of the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., but the 9/11 Commission concluded that there was no evidence for this either. The evidence is limited to potential financing of terrorism by some Saudis, but there is no evidence for official Saudi government involvement in the Al-Qaida terrorist attacks that took place on September the 11th. (Bowen, 2016; Cordesman, 2016; Hoffman et al., 2015; "Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before And After The Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001", 2002; Roth et al., 2004, pp. 138-139; The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 2004, p. 171).

Though these might be the facts, they were not well represented in the news coverage. Neither were all the flaws present in the JASTA bill.

At this point it should be restated (as noted above) that *The New York Times* though always entertaining doubt over Saudi Arabia's role, and including sources that raise the 28 pages among other reasons, do qualify them with sources that speak to the lack of evidence connecting Saudi Arabia to the hijackers. There were nine clear mentions of Saudi Arabia and the 9/11 hijackers, or Saudi Arabia's general support for terrorism in The New York Time's JASTA coverage. Only two were unqualified statements blaming Saudi Arabia. Only one directly contradicted Saudi Arabian support for the hijackers. Seven were neutral and entertained the possibility of Saudi support, contrasting sources both for and against it.

Concerning Saudi Arabia, JASTA is linked to more than just the 28 pages. For example, Senator Richard Blumenthal, Democrat of Connecticut spoke about its "historical funding of extremist groups and that "Americans are also increasingly concerned about Saudi Arabia's human rights record."(Mazzetti & Steinhauer, 2016). This is mirrored by Senator Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee who understands that "the whole Wahhabi effort emanated from there and that alone is an issue," (Mazzetti & Steinhauer, 2016).

Three out of the five neutral articles bring up Saudi Arabia and extremism is general, editorials do it too, "Saudi-American relations have been badly shaken by disputes over Iran, Syria and other issues, as well as by American frustration with the Saudis' longstanding embrace of Wahhabism, an extremist form of Islam that inspires Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. (The New York Times, 2016g)". Saudi Arabia is described as a difficult ally, "at odds with the United States over the Iran nuclear deal, a Saudi-led war in Yemen and the war in Syria" and "home of the fundamentalist strand of Islam known as Wahhabism, which has inspired many of the extremists the United States is trying to defeat" (The New York Times, 2016e). Saudi Arabia's political and religious ideology may have inspired Al Qaeda and it may be a difficult ally, but suing it for causing 9/11 does not cure any underlying problems, and in fact could well exacerbate an already difficult relationship that undermines the fight against Islamist terrorist groups in which Saudi Arabia is an ally (The New York Times, 2016e). This is recognised by opposition articles.

8.3.3 Coverage of JASTA's flaws in The NYT critical and neutral stance articles.
This brings us to *The New York Time's* neutral and opposition articles. As mentioned, the only flaw in JASTA discussed is the danger of retaliatory lawsuits. This is discussed in every single neutral and opposition article, with numerous quotes all retreading the same ground, that Americans will be at risk of lawsuits abroad (J.H.D Davis, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c; Hulse, 2016b; Mazzetti, 2016b; Mazzetti & Steinhauer, 2016; Steinhauer, 2016; Steinhauer, Davis, et al., 2016; Steinhauer, Mazzetti, et al., 2016; The New York Times, 2016a, 2016e, 2016g).

Only one article briefly mentions sovereign immunity as "a fundamental tenet of international law" and that JASTA would "jeopardize the effectiveness of American foreign aid and the legitimacy of the United States' actions in the war on terrorism" but then goes right back to "reciprocal self-interest" and retaliatory lawsuits (Curtis & Goldsmith, 2016). A single *New York Times* editorial cryptically states that "legal experts…doubt that the legislation would actually achieve its goal." The article is correct, it cannot achieve its goal because successful plaintiffs cannot collect foreign state entity owned assets on the judgement, but rather than explain why it can't achieve its goal, the article lets the sentence dangle and is drawn right back to "retaliatory actions by other nations" (The New York Times, 2016e).

This makes for a very limited debate and subsequent analysis of the opposition articles, there is very simply only one point about JASTA that is given coverage. There are rare articles that mention economic fallout, but only briefly (Mazzetti, 2016a; Mazzetti & Steinhauer, 2016).

The coverage doesn't explore the many well established flaws of JASTA. One of the biggest flaws is that, as mentioned in the above paragraph, JASTA doesn't allow a successful plaintiff to draw on foreign state owned entity assets to satisfy a judgement.

As Watkins (2017), Johnson (2018) and Daniels (1995, cited in Watkins 2017) explain, sovereign immunity is a legal means of protecting a foreign government from being sued. Interstate diplomacy, communication, and cooperation being more likely if governments don't have to worry about their diplomatic officers being involved in court cases. Sovereign immunity in the U.S. was codified in a 1976 law called the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which in 1996 was amended with section 1605A, a terrorism exception to allow for lawsuits against countries that perpetrated terrorist attacks and that were designated by the State department as "State sponsors of terrorism". In order to minimise any loss of U.S. immunity in foreign countries, it was written to only apply to countries deemed to have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism" ("National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008", 2008b, p. 341). There are strong arguments to suggest that regardless of how well designed the exception, retaliation will inevitably follow with American government workers following their orders not receiving diplomatic protection (Watkins, 2017). John B. Bellinger III, a legal advisor for the State Department during the second Bush administration stated in a Senate hearing that even this limited amendment went against international laws pertaining to sovereign immunity which have no similar exception, and that a U.S. government verdict of other governments as sponsors of terror had resulted in a reciprocal labelling of the U.S. as a "terrorist government" with U.S. government employees "potential targets for litigation in foreign courts". This is clearly not a theoretical concern as Iran and Cuba lifted sovereign immunity for the U.S. in its courts in retalia-

tion, resulting in lawsuits in those countries courts with judgements against the U.S. amounting to billions of dollars. Additionally, lawsuits have been filed against U.S. government employees in Europe for U.S. government sanctioned actions against terrorism (Evaluating The Justice Against Sponsors Of Terrorism Act, 2010, pp. 38-39). An example of this was the conviction of a CIA base chief and 22 other CIA officers for the kidnapping of a Muslim cleric, the leader of a militant mosque in Milan (Donadio, 2009).

Upto 2008, section 1605A was limited by a Supreme Court rule called the Bancec rule that prevented judgements against foreign governments from using state owned entity property to satisfy verdicts. So, if Iran owned an oil company in the U.S. and that oil company owned a fleet of trucks and a judgement was found against Iran for terrorism, the Iranian oil company's trucks could not be seized to fulfil the monetary damages. This was changed in 2008, an amendment was created for section 1605A called 1610G which relaxed the Bancec rule, making foreign nation owned property available to enforce judgements ("National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008", 2008a, p. 340; United States Code 2006 Edition Supplement 5 Title 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE, 2011, p. 402; Watkins, 2017).

Now, enter the 9/11 families and JASTA, a terrorism exception to sovereign immunity that technically provides civil litigants a direct path to sue foreign states that support terrorism, bypassing the executive, as any country can be sued, not just countries designated by the State Department as state sponsors of terror (Johnson, 2018). It's stated purpose is ("Justice Against Sponsors Of Terrorism Act", 2016)

> to provide civil litigants with the broadest possible basis, consistent with the Constitution of the United States, to seek relief against persons, entities, and foreign countries, wherever acting and wherever they may be found, that have provided material support, directly or indirectly, to foreign organizations or persons that engage in terrorist activities against the United States.

It targets:

> Persons, entities, or countries that knowingly or recklessly contribute material support or resources, directly or indirectly, to persons or organizations that pose a significant risk of committing acts of terrorism that threaten the security of nationals of the United States or the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States

It's broad basis though literally written as "the broadest possible basis" and which appears to transfer power from the executive to the Judiciary in that lawsuits can now be brought against countries that haven't been labelled as state sponsors of terror, is actually limited in the fine print that appears later in the Act. If the Secretary of State certifies to the court that the U.S. is "engaged in good faith discussions with the foreign state defendant" then the court will (it's written as "may" though just two paragraphs down it says "shall" pertaining to extensions) stay the proceeding

against the foreign state for 180 days. This can be extended for 180 day periods indefinitely.

While the indefinite extensions is one part of the problem, the other is that the relaxation of the Bancec rule via 1610G (the amendment for 1605A) does not apply to JASTA. JASTA was originally conceived as a modification of the existing Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1605A exception, which would have given it the benefit of the Bancec rule exemption. But in its final form, it became a separate FSIA exception with the Bancec rule very much in place and therefore no attachment immunity exception. What this means is, that it doesn't actually matter if the 9/11 plaintiffs win their case against Saudi Arabia, they can't actually collect any financial compensation. A foreign sovereign thus loses immunity from judgement, i.e. a public moral battle is now permitted to take place, but not immunity from actually having to pay anything to the victims (Johnson, 2018; Watkins, 2017). The litigation process is seen as a waste of judicial and State resources as lengthy and complex cases could potentially create congestion in the judicial system with definitely no payout, litigants as a part of the discovery process would demand access to classified government documents and data as well as question public officials. The U.S. government could be forced to have to choose between protecting sensitive information from disclosure in court, or suffering an adverse ruling from a refusal to cooperate (Bolton & Mukasey, 2016; Carter, 2016; Watkins, 2017).

None of this is explained in the news coverage. There were other flaws *The New York Times* could have explored and did not. As Obama (2016b) argued in his veto message to Congress, the responsibility to respond to foreign terrorism belongs to the national security and foreign policy professionals of the Federal Government, not private litigants and courts. There are at present two lists of individuals and organisations designated as terrorists, the State Department's Foreign Terrorist Organisation list and the Treasury Department's Specially Designated Global Terrorist List. Given that managing these lists and making the decisions needed to respond to often quickly evolving local and global situations require foreign policy considerations, they fall under the control of the executive, with Congressional advice (Watkins, 2017). What JASTA essentially does is transfer the power to designate states as supporting or involved in terrorism from the executive to the judiciary, or more precisely, to a single district court judge (Bolton & Mukasey, 2016; L.A. Johnson, 2018; Obama, 2016b). Obama (2016b) writes that given the serious consequences,

> state sponsor of terrorism designations are made only after national security, foreign policy, and intelligence professionals carefully review all available information to determine whether a country meets the criteria that the Congress established

JASTA transfers the authority to label foreign states as terrorists and remove its sovereign immunity from the executive to the Judiciary and in doing so, potentially sets up conflicting positions

between the two branches of government, when one deems a foreign state an ally, and the other labels it as a terrorist (Johnson, 2018).

There is also the risk of compromised counter terrorism strategies. As President Obama's Defence Secretary, Ash Carter put it (Carter, 2016),

> allowing our partners and allies – not just designated state sponsors of terrorism – to be subject to lawsuits inside the United State will inevitably undermine the trust and cooperation our forces need to accomplish their important missions. By damaging our close and effective cooperation with other countries, this could ultimately have a chilling effect on our own counterterrorism efforts

According to Obama, he was contacted by "a number of allies and partners" who had serious concerns about being exposed to litigation in U.S. courts, with the consequence of having to limit cooperation on joint security issues and counter-terrorism initiatives (Obama, 2016b). The U.A.E's ambassador to Washington DC wrote a letter to a U.S. Senator stating that JASTA would undermine the unity required to sustain the global fight against terrorism, that if a sovereign nation was at risk of being sued in a U.S. court, that nation would think twice before participating in joint intelligence missions and sharing information. "Why risk alienating key allies at a time when their cooperation is absolutely necessary?" (Malnick & Heighton, 2017).

What *The New York Times* does focus on is the legal retaliation by foreign states. The U.S. conducts a variety of intelligence, military, counter-terrorist, and diplomatic initiatives and operations all over the world, and consequently has large numbers of government employees of every kind working in diverse places. Its international presence is greater than any other country in the world. U.S. officials are protected by the sovereign immunity laws in other countries, without which they would be open to the jurisdiction of foreign courts. With JASTA in place, there is the strong possibility that a government being sued in a U.S. court (or its allies) would engage in reciprocal behaviour, and remove the sovereign immunity extended to the U.S. Without mutual sovereign immunity, states in the Middle East could well view U.S. aid to Israel as a form of terrorism for causing deaths in the West Bank and seek to pursue lawsuits. This would allow U.S. diplomatic officials to be sued for incidents and alleged crimes arising from going about their regular business, to military officials being sought by foreign courts for causing civilian casualties or being held responsible for the deaths and injuries caused by third party militaries that receive U.S. aid, such as the alleged attacks on civilians by U.S. supported Syrian rebels. U.S. assets abroad would be used to satisfy judgements and even if cases were filed under false pretences the intrusive discovery process would put the U.S. Government in the difficult position of having to choose between sensitive information and public disclosure to win a foreign lawsuit. The Italian case against the CIA mentioned above is one example, lawsuits have been threatened in

Belgium and Spain for U.S. actions in Iraq and other countries (Bolton & Mukasey, 2016; Carter, 2016; Obama, 2016b; Watkins, 2017). Pierre Lellouche, the French equivalent of the chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee stated that he would support legislation to permit French citizens to sue the U.S, that JASTA would "cause a legal revolution in international law with major political consequences." (Steinhauer, 2016).

8.4 Conclusion

To conclude, the source use across all newspapers is largely divided between Administration sources, and non-Administration political sources i.e. politicians, and even though this isn't reflected in the principal source lists it is in the overall stances. Supporting coverage for JASTA is based on a lack of understanding of its flaws and a non-existent link between Saudi Arabia and the 9/11 hijackers that has persisted for decades with minimal evidence. The opposition coverage to JASTA, despite having four broad points to draw on, focuses exclusively on the risk of the U.S. being sued in foreign courts, limiting the debate and failing to adequately critique the legislation. Considering all the newspapers, the opposition to JASTA was strong. Even in *The New York Times*, four articles supported JASTA to eight articles that opposed it (considering articles that only focused on JASTA and nothing else). However, there were a significant number of neutral articles in both categories which raised numerous concerns about Saudi Arabia. Even in the opposition articles, there was almost always some negative coverage about Saudi Arabia, which though might be well deserved in other contexts, should not be present for an article debating the merits of JASTA. The media image is mixed, and Administration sources are far from dominant.

This chapter has demonstrated an interesting reversal The *USA Today* reflects the bipartisan support and the popular appeal of the 9/11 families to attack the government's opposition to JASTA, whereas *The New York Times* supports the government, strongly reflecting a key point of President Obama's that JASTA could result in lawsuits against the US. This shows that right-leaning newspapers can adopt a more critical stance towards government responses to terrorism, perhaps this is when the government adopts a stance that appears to undermine the interests of the victims. This chapter, as the chapters before it, considered the source and stance use of an important topic in the news coverage, another facet in the news coverage of terrorism that deepens our understanding of how the coverage of government responses might change depending on the context.

Chapter 9
An analysis of the news coverage of the U.K. PREVENT strategy

9.1 Introduction

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks the U.K. Government labelled radicalised Muslims as Islamist terrorists and stated that they posed a "serious and sustained" threat that was current, global, indiscriminate, potentially increasing and unlikely to diminish (U.K. Home Office, 2006, p. 1). The London bombings of 2005 no doubt further cemented the connection between Islam and terrorism, and added the spectre of the "enemy within", the four suicide bombers were not directed or organised by al-Qaida, but acted spontaneously and independently, with three of them radicalised by the fourth and oldest member of the group (Bennetto & Herbert, 2005). In 2009 a government document stated "the greatest threat at present is from terrorists who claim to act in the name of Islam" (U.K Home Office, 2009, p. 81). This Islamist threat identification remained virtually unchanged with a focus on al-Qaida and its affiliates till 2011, when right wing terrorism was recognised though played down as less widespread, systematic, or organised than al-Qaida associated terrorism. In a Parliamentary Debate in 2016, Gavin Robinson, an MP from the Unionist Party in Northern Ireland said that he had asked the Government "why Northern Ireland, which has a fair number of extremists, was not included in the *(counter terrorism)* strategy?" He was told, "Don't push the issue too far. It is really a counter-Islamic strategy." Sir Gerald Howarth of the Conservative Party in the same debate went further to say that "The Government…are pretending that there are extremists in other quarters in this country, such as in far-right groups. Yes, there are undesirable, revolting groups in this country, but they do not threaten our national security as it is being threatened by one group" (United Kingdom, 2016, p. Column 579WH). The relevant policy areas for Northern Ireland related terrorism were stated to be the responsibility of the devolved administration in Northern Ireland (U.K Home Office, 2009, 2011).

With this almost singular focus on Islamist terrorism, the U.K. Government launched a counter terrorism strategy called CONTEST in 2006, with new versions released in 2009 and 2011 and further official guidance, policy documents and laws published in 2015 (BBC, 2009c; U.K Home Office, 2009, 2011, 2015). CONTEST was divided into four sub programmes called PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT, and PREPARE. This chapter focuses on the nature of the 2011 and 2015 PREVENT module and the coverage it received from *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph*. The incidents that resulted from PREVENT's application have often attracted intense criticism in the news media, particularly *The Guardian*. The nature of this criticism, its highlights and failings, will

be discussed. But in order to better understand this coverage, an understanding of the different iterations of PREVENT and their differences is required.

The first version of PREVENT in 2006 saw radicalisation as a problem with a political cause such as anti-Westernism generated by Western troops in Muslim countries along with the perceived failure to protect Muslim victims in conflicts such as Bosnia and Chechnya. Specific events were recognised to contribute to this anti-Westernism such as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the, "Media coverage of isolated and unacceptable incidents…where individuals fail to live up to the standards we have set ourselves in the treatment of prisoners and civilians" (U.K Home Office, 2006, p. 10). The Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal could be a possible example. Even though the first PREVENT document notes how the many positive interventions and support for Muslims across the world are ignored by the terrorists' versions of history and that military forces are often present at the request and with the permission of a country's government, it recognised Western military action abroad, or at the very least, the negative perception of Western military action caused by bad PR, as a significant contributing cause to terrorism. Only brief mentions are given to socio-psychological and theological/ideological factors, such as personal alienation and an exposure to radical Islamic ideas and even within these non-political factors, socio-economic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and a lack of opportunity are cited as the more relevant causes (U.K Home Office, 2006, p. 10).

This focus on the socio-economic and political causes brought corresponding solutions, a focus on Muslim inequality in employment, education, housing, and a number of community cohesion programs (U.K Home Office, 2006, pp. 11-16). Funding was provided for projects such as community plays about tolerance, DVD's about Islamophobia, sports programs for Muslim boys, leadership training for Muslim women, English lessons and British Museum trips for imams, and refurbishments for mosques (Kundnani, 2014 ,loc: 306.7). 520,000 pounds, or half of PREVENT's budget was spent on communications campaigns in Pakistan and Middle Eastern countries with the message that Britain is not anti-Islamic and that British Muslims are well integrated (BBC, 2009b; Kundnani, 2014). The cost of these programmes including the recruiting of 300 new police officers to work in national and regional counter-terrorism teams in 2008-9 alone was 140 million pounds (U.K. Home Office, 2009, pp. 14-15).

PREVENT 2006 targeted violent extremism, there are 23 mentions of extremism in the 2006 document and all are linked to terrorism and violence (U.K Home Office, 2006). The second version of PREVENT was launched in 2009, and though its definition of radicalisation was similar to 2006, focusing on the process by which people turn to violence to resolve grievances (U.K Home Office, 2006, p. 9; 2009, p. 14), there were significant differences.

The first key difference was that PREVENT 2009 shifted its focus to non-violent extremism. The term itself was never explicitly mentioned, though it was always referred to by its definition, "views which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values" (Elshimi, 2017; U.K Home Office, 2009, p. 81 and 15). PREVENT 2009 described "shared values" as what defines Britain is as a country, and what PREVENT supports: human rights, parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, and freedom from discrimination on the basis of race, faith, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality (U.K Home Office, 2009, p. 87). The term "shared values" became "British values" in 2011 with the release of PREVENT version 3 (U.K Home Office, 2011, p. 34).

This focus on objectionable views undermining shared, or British values, highlights the second change, an emphasis on ideologies and ideologues as a cause of radicalisation over foreign policy and globalisation, and ideologues ability to exploit vulnerable individuals through violent extremist messaging (U.K Home Office, 2009, p. 83). It still spoke of empowering communities and equality, but a new focus was given to challenging religious ideology as a cause of not just violent, but non-violent extremism. The 2009 document gave credence to ideology and psychology as causes of radicalisation rather than foreign policy or wars, now limited to a single bullet point as "real or perceived grievances" (U.K Home Office, 2009, p. 83).

This change in understanding of the causes of radicalisation to be Islamist ideology and objectionable views that undermine shared values was critical because it widened PREVENT's ambit to target people who displayed no inclination towards violence, but who communicated or demonstrated values that the British government deemed problematic. PREVENT 2011 stopped using the term "violent extremism" altogether, stating that the term "is ambiguous and has caused some confusion in the past, most notably by giving the impression that the scope of Prevent is very wide indeed and includes a range of activity far beyond counter-terrorism" (U.K Home Office, 2011, p. 25). This is ironic given that the document uses the single term "extremism" to mean "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs" (U.K Home Office, 2011, p. 107), which only seems to widen PREVENT's scope, not narrow it down. As an analyst at the U.K think tank DEMOS stated in an interview (Elshimi, 2017):

> There's difficulty in defining who non-violent extremist groups are. Because it is a relative term everyone has their own definitions … Hypothetically, let's imagine we had a good definition: it's a belief in this or that view makes you extremist. How do you then determine whether a group is an extremist group or not? Will it have to be written in their governing articles? Will it be based on the fact they once invited a speaker who once shared that view? What if you have a chairman, who used to be an extremist, but is now renounced, but used to sit on another board? And this is

the problem; it's not just about how you define but what is your criterion for making that decision?

The shift to religious ideology and psychological/sociological factors as the cause of radicalisation reached its apotheosis with PREVENT 2011, funding for integration and community cohesion social programs was cut back (Kundnani, 2014; U.K Home Office, 2011, p. 30) and PREVENT began working with schools, outlining how "Staff can help to identify, and to refer to the relevant agencies, children whose behaviour suggests that they are being drawn into terrorism, violent extremism and non-violent extremism." This became a legal requirement in 2015, with all specified authorities required (U.K Government, 2015b; U.K Home Office, 2015)

> to participate fully in work to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism…. Being drawn into terrorism includes not just violent extremism but also non-violent extremism, which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit… Schools should, however, be mindful of their existing duties to forbid political indoctrination and secure a balanced presentation of political issues.

In addition schools were explicitly required to promote "fundamental British values", now explicitly defined as "democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance for those of different faiths and beliefs". Enforcement of this policy is carried out by Ofsted inspections (U.K Government, 2015a, p. 26; U.K Home Office, 2015). Teachers were tasked with spotting signs of violent or nonviolent extremism and making referrals to the deradicalisation subprogramme within PREVENT called Channel, "a police coordinated, multi-agency partnership" that seeks "cognitive or behavioural change" (U.K Home Office, 2011, p. 58). As we shall see, this led to the accusation in the news coverage of the government being accused of thought policing, especially given the difficulty in identifying just what non-violent extremism is and what falls under "British values".

A result of widening the ambit of extremism was that some of the NGOs the government worked with, such as STREET and MCB were excluded from the PREVENT programme and denied funding, despite having a proven track record in preventing vulnerable individuals from becoming terrorist recruits (Casciani, 2011; Elshimi, 2017; U.K Home Office, 2011, pp. 34-35). The trouble is that STREET's founder is a conservative Salafist who though has credibility with vulnerable Muslims and is in agreement with government goals of preventing terrorist recruitment, has been criticised by government advisors over his stance on progressive positions such as women's rights and gay rights (Casciani, 2011). As the PREVENT 2011 document put it, "Intervention providers are in a position of great influence over vulnerable people. They must be credible and able to reach and relate to people who will very often be alienated and separated from mainstream society and Government. Some of these people may have been in prison…We will signif-

icantly enhance the monitoring of the intervention process. Prevent will not fund interventions providers who promote extremist ideas or beliefs." (U.K Home Office, 2011, p. 61).

9.2 The coverage of PREVENT in The Guardian and The Telegraph

The Indian newspapers didn't have a single article on PREVENT, and *The New York Times* only had one. The two newspapers that will be analysed in this section are *The Guardian* with 32 articles, and *The Telegraph* with 11. Table 9.1 below shows the overall difference between *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* stances towards PREVENT. *The Guardian*, a left-leaning newspaper (in keeping with the general pattern identified in this thesis) has almost twice the critical news content compared to the right-leaning Telegraph and is far less supportive and descriptive of the government's PREVENT programme.

Table 9.1 - Newspaper stance percentage table, PREVENT					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
The Guardian	9.38%	3.13%	84.38%	3.13%	100.00%
The Daily Telegraph	36.36%	0.00%	45.45%	18.18%	100.00%

9.2.1 The Guardian - Sources and stances

Looking at the cited source use within *The Guardian* in Table 9.2 below, the top three consist of 65.17 percent of all sources, with academics and NGOs from the U.K. the most cited, followed by government and other official sources, and then journalists. Looked at another way, government and other officials are only cited as a source category 22.47 percent of the time, far from a majority, which is very similar to how *The Guardian* covered articles about military action causing civilian casualties, but not at all similar to articles about JASTA, which might be explained given the strong political nature of the topic.

Table 9.2 - Cited Sources, The Guardian, PREVENT		
	Frequency	Percent
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	24	26.97%
U.K Government/Military/Police	20	22.47%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	14	15.73%
U.K Civilian/Local/Victim	8	8.99%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	7	7.87%
U.K Politician, Labour	5	5.62%
U.K Politician, Other/Joint Committees	4	4.49%
United Nations	2	2.25%
U.K Retired Intelligence/Police Official	2	2.25%
Total	**86**	**96.63%**

The principal sources listed in table 9.3 on the next page reveals that though government and official sources were among the most cited individual source categories, they were almost never used as principal sources, only twice out of thirty two articles. Academics think tanks and NGOs appeared the most after no principal sources.

Table 9.3 - Principal Sources, The Guardian, PREVENT		
	Frequency	Percent
No principal source	10	31.25%
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	8	25.00%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	4	12.50%
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	2	6.25%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	2	6.25%
U.K Politician, Labour	2	6.25%
U.K Politician, Other/Joint Committees	2	6.25%
U.K Civilian/Local/Victim	2	6.25%
Total	32	100.00%

These non-official sources were relied on the most as primaries to criticise PREVENT, this can be seen in table 9.4 below. Almost thirty percent of opposition articles had NGOs and academics as primary sources, the rest are almost equally divided between U.S. NGOs and academics, Labour politicians, U.K. civilians, and journalists. Only five articles were not explicitly critical towards PREVENT, of them only three were supportive, and of those three, two were sourced from the U.K. government and related officials.

Table 9.4 - Principal Sources and stances crosstab, The Guardian, PREVENT					
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
No principal source	1	1	7	1	10
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	8	0	8
Journalist's unsourced facts	0	0	4	0	4
U.S Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	0	2	0	2
U.K Gov/Military/Police	2	0	0	0	2
U.K Politician, Labour	0	0	2	0	2
U.K Politician, Other/Joint Committees	0	0	2	0	2
U.K Civilian/Local/Victim	0	0	2	0	2
Total	3	1	27	1	32

The broad point of *The Guardian*'s opposition is that PREVENT is a source of mistrust and fear in the Muslim community. It alienated an entire class of people as it was perceived to assume that Islam was intrinsic to terrorism. This was recognised in the 2011 PREVENT document, that PREVENT "implied terrorism was a problem specific to Muslim communities" (U.K. Home Office, 2011, p. 40), the paper solution on the same page was that "the Home Secretary directed that Prevent should be proportionate and focused" and that "the new strategy will apply to all terrorist threats we face". *The Guardian*'s coverage describes how this was not the case.

9.2.2 The Guardian - news article analysis

A significant type of media critique of PREVENT took place by illustrating the many examples of its misinterpretation and overreach. Some of these examples are listed below and include the "cuker-bum" incident, where staff at a nursery school threatened to remove a four year old child from his Muslim family and refer him to Channel. The child had drawn a picture of his father cutting a cucumber, but he mispronounced cucumber as "cuker-bum", staff thought the four year old

was referring to a cooker bomb, an explosive device and contacted the authorities. The mother was told by staff that if she could prove herself innocent her children "might not be taken off you". After investigations and consulting with the local council no referral was ultimately made (Quinn, 2016). In another incident a Muslim student mentioned in a class discussion that participants in environmental protests were referred to as eco-warriors or eco-terrorists, and sometimes spiked trees with nails to stop them from being cut down by chainsaws. He was pulled out of class and taken to an "inclusion centre" with a child protection officer and a staff member who questioned him about his possible ISIS affiliations and whether or not the chainsaws explode. (Dodd, 2015). And again, a 16 year old Muslim student was referred to PREVENT staff after borrowing a book about terrorism from his school library, his special needs teacher removed the book from his bag without his knowledge leading to his mother being asked by anti-terror officers if he was being radicalised (Datoo, 2016). A Guardian article described a report prepared by a U.S. NGO called the Open Society Justice Initiative which further described how PREVENT was used (Cobain, 2016)

> information was apparently gathered from Muslim primary school children without their parents' consent; PREVENT being used to bypass disciplinary processes during the attempted dismissal of a school dinner lady; a 17-year-old referred to the police by his college authorities because he had become more religious; and the cancellation of university conferences on Islamophobia.

Police figures indicate that only 20% of those referred to PREVENT were assessed as at risk of being drawn into violent extremism (Cobain, 2016).

There are at least two underlying causes for almost all of the above and other similar incidents. One, the unsuitability of co-opting professors and teachers into what the evidence indicates is a form of surveillance of Muslims. The fear of being typecast and watched can only make it harder to build cooperation and trust. And two, a focus on ideology as the primary cause of radicalisation, above other causes.

The 2015 U.K. Counter Terrorism and Security Act makes it mandatory for universities, schools and other specified authorities like hospitals to passively surveil and report any signs of extremism (U.K Government, 2015b). This is problematic both in intent and execution. An opinion piece carried by *The Guardian* written by Amrit Singh of the Open Society Justice Initiative mentioned above described how Prevent is leading to the cancellation of conferences and debates about Islamophobia and students being targeted for reading course materials on terrorism and expressing political views. Discussions and debates about terrorism reportedly no longer take place openly in classrooms where they could be challenged by teachers. A report prepared by Singh in which she interviewed 87 people covering a wide range of backgrounds from students and

teachers to health professionals, journalists, government officials and religious leaders mentions a psychologist saying, "we are being encouraged to police thought crimes and political opinions". Another psychologist was reportedly given questions by PREVENT officers to ask her patient (A. Singh, 2016a, 2016b).

The U.K. Government's guideline on suspicious behaviour that was sent to professors identifies twenty two types of behaviour that could indicate that a student is being drawn into terrorism. Lecturers are supposed to spot (Home Office, 2012, p2; Spiller et al., 2018)

Feelings of grievance and injustice • Feeling under threat • A need for identity, meaning and belonging • A desire for status • A desire for excitement and adventure • A need to dominate and control others • Susceptibility to indoctrination • A desire for political or moral change • Opportunistic involvement • Family or friends involvement in extremism • Being at a transitional time of life • Being influenced or controlled by a group • Relevant mental health issues • Over-identification with a group or ideology• 'Them and Us' thinking• Dehumanisation of the enemy • Attitudes that justify offending • Harmful means to an end • Harmful objectives • Individual knowledge, skills and competencies • Access to networks, funding or equipment • Criminal Capability

The guidance is notably vague and entirely open to individual interpretation. Arguably a great many students are "at a transitional time of life" (line 5), and display "a desire for excitement and adventure" (line 2), "a desire for political and moral change" (line 3), and a "desire for status" (line 2). This ambiguity is further reflected in government designed training modules for public sector workers. A study found that an e-learning package given to professors provides a series of questions and answers that serve as a guide to specific types of behaviour that indicate possible susceptibleness to terrorism, they include: crying, signs of stress, asking inappropriate questions, isolation from friends/family, change in appearance, and unhealthy use of internet, among other equally ambiguous actions (Spiller et al., 2018).

The Guardian doesn't just indirectly reference this through its coverage of arguably overzealous referral incidents, it tackles this issue head on with articles that describe the massive increase in people referred to PREVENT, the figures of 2016 reported to be nearly triple the figure of 2015 with an average of nearly 11 people a day (Halliday, 2016). Another article describes how anti-fracking protestors were placed on a list alongside Islamic terrorists and far-right extremists, with a school including anti-fracking campaigners in its counter-terrorism advice for parents. It references Amrit Singh again as explaining how "Prevent's sweeping definition of extremism threatens the very British values it seeks to uphold, by penalising free expression on issues vitally important to the public" (Townsend & Cobain, 2016). Dr Erin Saltman, a senior counter-extremism researcher at the Institute for Strategic Dialogue who runs a programme to help young

people counter violent extremism is quoted in *The Guardian*, restating the findings listed above, that the provided advice for teachers on how to spot signs of students being drawn into terrorism was open to diverse interpretations leading to inconsistent implementation (Halliday, 2016).

> The real problem is that a lot of signifiers are things that would be considered normal teenage behaviour, like changes in dress, changes in ability to want to talk to teachers or parents," she said. "Teachers are fearful and want to safeguard students but they're not being given very clear guidelines or training. What this will now do is shut down dialogue, rather than open up discourse and transparency within a classroom

Furthermore the training provided is inconsistent, at least up to 2017. In a Freedom of Information request made to the Home Office Spiller et al. (2018) in the same study referenced above learnt that only 29,238 higher education and further education staff received training in contrast to the 201,380 academic staff and 208,750 non-academic staff working in U.K. universities (HESA, 2020).

At least one group of twenty university professors that were interviewed is in agreement with Amrit Singh's report about the lack of open debate caused by these rules and add that it throws up barriers to research sensitive topics. As one professor put it (Spiller et al., 2018)

> …Its [University's] primary function is about debate, conduct of research, producing and disseminating knowledge and also dissent I think is really important. Universities should be a space for speaking truth to power…this kind of responsibility makes that far more difficult

Another professor summed up a key problem with PREVENT, the difficulty of building the trust needed to relate to and communicate with students while being deputised as an agent of the state (Spiller et al., 2018)

> How can we build trust with our students when the very thing we are doing will create suspicion and mistrust? I am genuinely not sure now whether someone wearing a head scarf or if someone has a beard should warrant me contacting the relevant services. I mean that's worrying because it's not just me who thinks like this. I have had colleagues contact me and say to me is she someone who needs reporting because she wears a face veil and has said she had travelled to Turkey for a holiday

But the use of public facing workers as a sort of auxiliary government surveillance network isn't the only reported phenomenon. *The Guardian* also had in-depth news and analysis coverage on the activities of the Home Office's Research, Information and Communications Unit, referred to as Ricu (Cobain et al., 2016). Ricu documents seen by *The Guardian* stated that Ricu's purpose is to create strategic communications to effect behavioural and attitudinal change. Ricu achieves this by giving "moderate Muslim" civil society groups (with which the government has no public connection) counter-radicalisation messages to distribute on YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook. Content is prepared by a team of linguists, psychologists, anthropologists, film

makers, and marketing consultants working in three teams, a monitoring team to study digital media, an analysis team to research audience reactions, and a campaigns team to deliver the content. This content is often made and then distributed to the moderate organisations by third party contractors. One of those contractors stated that Ricu's purpose is to create a "reconciled British Muslim identity" while keeping its involvement hidden. Documents apparently frequently talk about "measurable attitudinal change outcomes". One person involved reportedly acknowledged Ricu's efforts as propaganda. In defence of Ricu, this person added that, "All we're trying to do is stop people becoming suicide bombers" (Cobain et al., 2016).

The Guardian's alternative to PREVENT is that the government should encourage Muslim led interventions and education programmes that inculcate a combination of Islamic pride and critical thinking in a kind of Islamic renaissance. Rather than emphasise a clash between British values and Islamic values, where the latter is ablated in favour of a uniform national identity, *The Guardian* suggests that a long term educational policy to support a vibrant Islamic identity would be a better option (Dodd, 2016; Neustatter, 2016; Ramadan, 2016; Sahin, 2016).

The overall point made in a series of news and opinion articles is that rather than work with the Muslim community in open and transparent initiatives towards a gradual and permanent social change that takes place with the informed consent of those involved in the change, the U.K. government would rather engage in subterfuge to achieve limited aims. Rendering non-violent extremism a crime fails to build trust, without it, the government can "only project power and, in turn, spark protest" (Kazmi, 2015). As an opinion piece in *The Guardian* puts it, "the Prevent strategy is seen as a top-down government-led effort to create a more palatable version of Islam, targeting so-called non-violent extremists without a robust definition. Instead, Muslim communities support a greater focus on violent terrorism specifically, while community cohesion efforts unrelated to terrorism are dealt with separately (Versi, 2016).

For example, the writers of these articles state that the problem of extremism could be dealt with by working through schools to improve critical thinking and inter cultural understanding. This could allow for young Muslims to challenge conservative or extremist interpretations of Islam without feeling alienated from society or feeling culturally lost. A critical and reflective Islamic education programme is said to have been trialled and shown to address radicalisation among British Muslim youth (Sahin, 2016). The proposed solution is not to foster suspicion of an entire religious group, and promote fundamental British values as though the goal was assimilation, but to strengthen an existing Islamic heritage of critical education and self-examination to balance out religious observance, and join in a larger national effort of countering extremism through religious pride and internal Islamic intervention (Sahin, 2016). Sahin says that "Young Muslims

care deeply about their faith and are very keen to keep Islam as their identity, but this means they are vulnerable to being hijacked." According to him the traditional way of teaching Islam is producing closed minds which can be solved by teaching Islam "intelligently". He set up an MA for Muslim educators (Neustatter, 2016). The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) which represents 500 charities, schools, and mosques, plans on running its own counter-radicalisation programme with mosques as a key point of contact. Its goal is only to turn people away from violence, with no intention of liberalising British Islam (Dodd, 2016). This is partly at cross purposes with Sahin's proposition of critical Islamic education, which views "an indoctrinatory approach to learning and teaching about Islam" as the cause for rigid interpretations and exploitation (Sahin, 2016). Yet another Muslim organised programme is described where young Muslims are told about the realities of war and fear is used to keep them from joining ISIS. They are shown deactivated tank shells, inert aerial shells, sniper bullets, and a landmine, and an amputation saw with pictures of a fighter with a leg, arm, and a chunk of stomach missing. The general message is "If you don't trust people in your own neighbourhood, why would you want to go and trust people you don't know, fight with people thousands of miles away?" (Shabi, 2016).

Essentially, rather than having multiculturalism where minorities define themselves by their differences from the host society, or promoting a single national identity with a single set of values, I believe *The Guardian* (though it doesn't use this term) wants multivocalism, where rather than explain national identity as a set of values such as freedom or equality, or see it as a group of diverse but disconnected and separate foreign identities; different ethnic, religious, and political groups are encouraged to identify with the nation and its symbols but to do so in their own way using local, creolised versions of their religions or ethnic identities which are projected onto a national one. The nation and its symbols are allowed to mean different things to different people, without a single centralised national identity (Kaufmann, 2018).

A common link between these alternative approaches is that they are Muslim led, by local Muslim organisations who work on educating other Muslims at the grassroots level (Ramadan, 2016). There is an underlying assumption that Muslims must be intermediaries for the government to reach out to Muslim communities, that the U.K. Government has lost all trust through a variety of domestic and foreign policy measures and that communication and government objectives must filter through the "good" or "moderate" Muslim organisations and individuals.

The Guardian's coverage is not without flaws. Some articles exhibit criticism without sufficient substantiation. While articles do provide coverage of the real life fall out of PREVENT in terms of discriminatory episodes, there is a lack of explanation of proposed solutions, or how PREVENT works. For example (Grierson, 2016)

> Rushanara Ali, the MP for Bethnal Green and Bow, told BBC Radio 4's Today programme on Friday that she had deep concerns about Prevent, which funds local authority schemes aimed at preventing people from becoming involved in extremism.
>
> 'Many have concerns about how Prevent is being implemented, concerns about young Muslims being stigmatised. There needs to be a balance struck to protect young people, to prevent them from being radicalised, but also making sure teachers and other agencies have the proper advice training and support,' she said
>
> 'I have huge concerns about some of the ways in which it's implemented; some of it can be quite misguided. The government needs to do a proper assessment of what's working and what's not and listen to the Muslim community and the dangers the Muslim community face.'

Ali, as well as the journalist fail to explain just how that balance between anti-radicalisation and support should be struck, about how teachers should be trained and which signs of extremism they should look out for to ensure that discrimination and stigmatisation don't take place. There is a lack of detailed evidence to support their alternatives to PREVENT, or explanations of just how a multivocalist (or even multiculturalist) society is expected to support the increased acceptance and uniform application of gender equality or individual freedom.

Apart from this, every single article that quotes David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism laws, misrepresents him, making him sound like a far more severe critic of PREVENT than he actually is. One article labels him a "critic" of PREVENT and another a "high profile critic" (Townsend & Cobain, 2016; Travis, 2016). *The Guardian* only presents partial sections of his written submissions to the government or limited quotes that alter his point of view. There are seven articles out of a total of thirty-two that cite him. Every one of them quotes him as unequivocally condemning PREVENT (alongside sources that mostly also condemn PREVENT), whereas the truth is quite the opposite. This can be illustrated with a comparison between *The Guardian*'s main source: David Anderson's four page, 18 point written statement submitted to the Home Affairs Committee in January 2016 (Anderson, 2016b), his public statements made in a radio interview to the BBC in November 2016 (D. Anderson, 2016a), and *The Guardian*'s news articles.

The Guardian's first article with Anderson as a source cites him as having said that PREVENT has (Batty, 2016)

> become a 'significant source of grievance' among British Muslims, encouraging 'mistrust to spread and to fester'…In his written submission to the home affairs select committee inquiry into the government's counter-terrorism strategy, he also raised concern that elements of Prevent were "ineffective or being applied in an insensitive or discriminatory manner". "It seems to me that Prevent could benefit from independent review," wrote Anderson…The watchdog's concerns were echoed by expert witnesses…Raheel Mohammed…called for a review of Prevent in schools… The programme was stifling schools from openly discussing and safely addressing issues around extremism, creating an atmosphere of fear

The Guardian acknowledges that they cited Anderson from his 18 point written submission to the Committee. The above quote is a combination of points 11 and 3f (D. Anderson, 2016b). Anderson's point 11 is one of the only two critical points in his submission and the only one highlighted by *The Guardian*. It states that (D. Anderson, 2016b):

> It is perverse that Prevent has become a more significant source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial powers…the lack of transparency in the operation of Prevent encourages rumour and mistrust to spread and to fester

Point 3f states that (D. Anderson, 2016b):

> 3f. Stories alleging the insensitive and discriminatory application of the Prevent duty in schools have since last summer become a media staple (including in mainstream outlets such as *The Guardian*, Independent and BBC)

The second article also uses his words from point 11, that "David Anderson QC, reported that Prevent has become a "significant source of grievance" among British Muslims and called for a review into it (The Guardian, 2016a).

What *The Guardian* leaves out are Anderson's opening remarks, "I was asked to comment on allegations that it (Prevent) was 'controversial to British Muslims', 'broken', 'the biggest spying programme in Britain in modern times', and 'an affront to civil liberties'. I agreed only with the first of those suggestions… but the lack of confidence…among Muslims is undeniable" (D. Anderson, 2016b, pp. 1, point 2 and 3). Hardly the remarks of a staunch critic, he only agrees that Prevent is controversial, not broken, or a spying programme, or an affront to civil liberties. *The Guardian* makes the first article worse by linking him to another witness, Raheel Mohammad who does seem to agree with those allegations.

The Guardian also ignores points 5 and 6, which endorse the use of the use of professors and teachers in schools to identify extremism (D. Anderson, 2016b, p. 2)

> In addition, those who propose the abolition of Prevent must surely acknowledge the need for at least some of what it attempts to do. When a father can photograph his young sons holding a sword in front of an ISIS flag, as the Old Bailey heard in this month's trial of Ibrahim Anderson, it would be perverse to deny that schools have a potentially useful safeguarding role…I asked to see the guidance on radicalisation that was issued in 2015 to new teachers in the school where my daughter works: it struck me as helpful and non-discriminatory.

If he is referring to the June 2015 Prevent duty guidance document referenced earlier in this chapter, that is the document that "makes clear that schools and childcare providers are expected to assess the risk of children being drawn into terrorism, including support for extremist ideas" and "build pupils' resilience to radicalisation by promoting fundamental British values" (U.K Home Office, 2015, pp. 5-6).

The third article (an editorial) quotes him as saying said that "mistrust of Muslims is often linked to reports of terrorism and whipped up by mainstream media whose coverage can be grossly irresponsible" (*The Guardian*, 2016d). This quote exists only in *The Guardian*, an online search using two different search engines reveals a single search result which is *The Guardian* article. I can't trace the source of this quote. *The Guardian* is essentially saying that Anderson is criticising the mainstream media for exaggerating reports of Muslims as terrorists which increases the mistrust of Muslims. Perhaps he did say this and nothing further, I have no way of disproving it, however in his submitted writing to the Home Affairs Committee and his Radio interview to the BBC, he takes a subtly different point of view. Point 3f provided above appears critical on its own, but takes on a very different stance when read in the context of points 3g and 4. In points 3f, g, and 4 (which *The Guardian* ignores) Anderson says that (D. Anderson, 2016b, p. 2)

> 3f. Stories alleging the insensitive and discriminatory application of the Prevent duty in schools have since last summer become a media staple (including in mainstream outlets such as *The Guardian*, Independent and BBC)

> 3g. Some such cases (e.g. the recent "terrorist house" story from Lancashire, subsequently said by the police to have been inaccurately reported by the BBC) have been the subject of publicity and criticism around the world. Below-the-line comments often contain further (usually unverifiable) claims of similar incidents, which in turn achieve wide circulation.

> 4. It is important not to accept all these claims uncritically…I am well aware of the potential for mismatch between concerns voiced by "community leaders" and the views of ordinary people. It is quite possible that some of those attacking Prevent (not of course all) are motivated by a wish not to promote harmony but to sow grievance and division.

What Anderson is doing in the above paragraphs is also criticising the media, like *The Guardian*, but unlike *The Guardian*, he appears to be criticising the media for a different reason, not for the irresponsible reporting of Muslims as terrorists, but for irresponsible reporting on PREVENT. The media is making PREVENT look bad, Anderson implies, and it's important not to "accept all these claims uncritically". These negative claims could be motivated by a desire to "sow grievance and division."

Anderson says that the lack of confidence in PREVENT among Muslims is understandable, but nowhere in his document does he seem sympathetic to any of the incidents of genuine discrimination that were reported in the media, rather choosing to focus on an incident which was misreported. That first paragraph, point 3f, used in conjunction with point 11 in article 1 doesn't actually acknowledge that PREVENT is insensitive and discriminatory, he says, "stories alleging the insensitive and discriminatory application of PREVENT… have… become a media staple" and then in 3g. he chooses to highlight an incident where the media made a mistake as a way of saying we must not accept the media's claims uncritically in point 4.

This is not the phrasing or tone of a PREVENT critic the way *The Guardian* makes it out to seem in article one (see above) where they simply quote him as saying, "he also raised concern that elements of Prevent were "ineffective or being applied in an insensitive or discriminatory manner" (Batty, 2016).

The fourth article quote is, "David Anderson, the official reviewer of terrorism legislation, said earlier this month: "There is a strong feeling in Muslim communities that I visit that Prevent is, if not a spying programme, then at least a programme that is targeted on them" (Dodd, 2016). Article six requotes article 4 and adds the "critic" label (Travis, 2016), "high profile critic" appears in article seven (Townsend & Cobain, 2016). The fourth and sixth article quote is from a BBC Radio 4 Today programme broadcast on the 6th of October 2016 at 0830 hours (BBC, 2016b; Gani, 2016). The episode unfortunately is not available to hear online and I wasn't able to locate a transcript. However I was able to locate a BBC Radio 4 episode titled "Terrorism, Extremism and the Law" where David Anderson is interviewed by Joshua Rozenberg, a BBC journalist and lawyer. This episode was aired on the 3rd of November 2016 at 2000 hours (D. Anderson, 2016a) and there is unlikely to be any meaningful change in Anderson's opinions in such a short amount of time. In any case, Anderson has been consistent in his opinions in the evidence I was able to uncover from January to November.

Just like article three, look at Anderson's language in article four, "There is a strong feeling in Muslim communities that I visit that Prevent is, if not a spying programme, then at least a programme that is targeted on them" (Dodd, 2016). He doesn't actually condemn PREVENT, he simply recognises that Muslim communities see it in a particular way. In the radio interview with the BBC that I was able to find, which took place not one month after *The Guardian* reported the above comment, he was asked about how successful he thought Prevent has been over the years and he said (D. Anderson, 2016a ,20:32 min)

> I think it's absolutely right that we should have some policy based on inoculating the young, intervening when it's necessary to do so and, if things really have gone wrong, attempting what is much more difficult, which is deradicalisation. But for whatever reason, perceptions particularly in Muslim communities and particularly among people who are politically aware, seem to me at least to be strongly negative. So, I welcome the fact that the Prevent strategy is currently being reviewed, and I hope we're going to see some changes.

And though he does say he hopes to see changes, he highlights the weakness of his criticism with his phrasing. In the same interview he goes on to say it is "unpalatable" that the public discourse is dominated by people who oppose the strategy (D. Anderson, 2016a ,21:33 min)

> the unpalatable fact is that the public discourse on the subject of Prevent among Muslim communities is, I would say, currently dominated by people who oppose the strategy

When his interviewer, Joshua Rozenberg said, "And of course, Prevent is designed to help the Muslim community as well as monitor it, because Muslims are the victims of terrorism, just as many terrorists happen to be Muslims themselves." Anderson voiced no disagreement. There are plenty of genuine examples of discrimination faced by Muslim students. But rather than focus on any of them, Rozenberg and Anderson discuss a case where the media got it wrong, the same "terrorist house" incident he highlighted in point 3f of his written submission to the Home Affairs Committee (Anderson, 2016a ,min: 21:58; defendfreespeech.org, 2016).

> **Joshua Rozenberg:** And let's take some examples given by people within the Muslim community: the case of the schoolboy who was allegedly reported to the authorities by his school, because he wrote that he lived in a 'terrorist' house and what he meant to say was a terraced house, a house that was joined on to its neighbours. Is that a story that rings true, or was there perhaps rather more to it than was reported?

> **David Anderson:** I think that story rather demonstrates that credulous media does not assist. That particular story was run without mentioning the fact that as well as indeed saying in his homework that he lived in a 'terrorist' house, which was an obvious spelling error, the boy had also said that his uncle beat him. And when the police went round to the house to see what was going on, it was really a straightforward safeguarding intervention. Unfortunately by that time the story had gone round the world, it had been retweeted hundreds of thousands of times and the myth remains well ingrained in Muslim communities that I go to visit.

The only clearly critical remarks Anderson makes about PREVENT in this interview concern its focus on "fundamental British values

> applying it *(PREVENT)* to ideas that are, for example, un-British or opposed to democracy, seems to me very dangerous and quite wrong. We got through the Cold War after all without making it illegal to be a Communist or to express Communist opinions. I'm very much with Justice Brandeis, the power of reason as applied through public discussion was preferable to silence coerced by law.

The fifth article goes back to point 11's a "significant source of grievance". Point 11 of Anderson's written submission is what *The Guardian* seems to rely on the most, appearing in articles 1, 2 and 5. Article 5 states (A. Singh, 2016b):

> Unsurprisingly, Prevent is alienating many law-abiding Muslims wrongly targeted and causing them to question their place in British society. David Anderson QC, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, observed in his testimony before parliament's home affairs select committee that "Prevent has become a more significant source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial powers … that are exercised under the Pursue strand of the Contest strategy". Prevent's alienating effect in turn undermines the ability of law enforcement officials to elicit the cooperation of Muslim communities for countering future terrorist attacks

Only two of Anderson's 18 points exhibit criticism. Point 7 when he says, "the Prevent programme is clearly suffering from a widespread problem of perception…It is also possible – though I am not in a position to judge – that aspects of the programme are ineffective or being applied in an

insensitive or discriminatory manner." And point 11 stated above and restated here, which is the only point *The Guardian* focuses on: "It is perverse that Prevent has become a more significant source of grievance in affected communities than the police and ministerial powers…the lack of transparency in the operation of Prevent encourages rumour and mistrust to spread and to fester" (D. Anderson, 2016b).

Based on his written submissions and available radio interviews, David Anderson suggests that PREVENT is a necessary programme, and if it has any flaws, its only in its perception and lack of transparency in execution. The only time he says that aspects of it might be ineffective, or insensitive, or discriminatory, he removes himself from this comments by saying he is not in a position to judge. *The Guardian* however represents none of Anderson's nuances, and some-times support for PREVENT, branding him an outright "high-profile" critic in article seven, lumping him in with other (perhaps more genuine critics) like the directors of Muslim NGOs and the U.N. special rapporteur on the right to freedom of assembly (Batty, 2016; Townsend & Cobain, 2016).

It might have been the case that the journalists who wrote those articles quoting him never actu-ally read what Anderson wrote, choosing instead to rely on the Home Affairs Committee report to which Anderson submitted his commentary (Home Affairs Committee, 2016 ,Chapter 3). This report summarises Anderson's 4 page submission, omitting his positive emphasis.

> He suggested to us that the Muslim community felt "under siege" and, though he did not agree there was any reason to believe Prevent was not well-motivated, there was a risk that some parts of the Muslim community saw Prevent as "a sort of spying programme" when it was already feeling pressurised. He has therefore called for an independent review of the Prevent strategy

But this is highly unlikely as Guardian articles quote him directly from his written submission. Or rather quote only the limited negative bits from his written submission, leaving out his other remarks more positive of PREVENT, or remarks critical of the media. To get to the critical remarks of point 11, the journalists would have had to read all the other positive remarks as well.

Apart from the coverage given to Anderson, What *The Guardian* could have focused on to a greater extent is the underlying definitions of radicalisation and conceptions of terrorist motives that give PREVENT its purpose and authority. Some articles do write about this, but not in detail. There is a general recognition in *The Guardian*'s coverage that the government's focus on reli-gious ideology, and solutions for countering it through counter messaging, deradicalisation programs and passive surveillance through public institutions is incorrect.

Cobain (2016) for instance cites a Justice Initiative report that says that religious ideology as a precursor to terrorism has been "widely discredited by the British government itself, as well

as numerous reputable scholars" but the rest of the article doesn't explore the other causes of radicalisation, instead highlighting the individual cases of discrimination.

Cobain doesn't seem to delve too deeply into his source's citations. The Justice Initiative report called 'Eroding Trust' from which he pulls his quote (A. Singh, 2016a, p. 16) cites only one reputable scholar, Sageman, who talks more about how, i.e. the mechanism by which radicalisation takes place rather than why (Sageman, 2014). Sageman's steps to terrorism start with a perception of war being waged against one's in-group, moral outrage at a salient major injustice, resonance with personal experience, and mobilisation by a politically active social network. He does criticise existing deradicalisation programs (without mentioning PREVENT) by saying that they are based on a flawed understanding of radicalisation that is based on individuals receiving a misinterpreted version of Islam, this is not the same as ideology having no influence (Sageman, 2014, pp. 568-569). He also says that, "There is no doubt that ideology, including global neo-jihadi ideology, is an important part of any explanation in the turn to political violence, but we still don't understand how" (Sageman, 2014, p. 567), directly contradicting the Justice Initiative's quote used by Cobain.

The Guardian had limited coverage in support of PREVENT. The views of Sara Khan, the founder of an NGO called Inspire which works with the government are represented in one article. "Prevent is about safeguarding, not scapegoating," Khan said. "You would report any other form of grooming or abuse -- why would you not report this?" The fear of Islamophobia causes politically correct behaviour that ultimately ruins lives. According to Khan, "Young people are being fed illiterate religious views by people with only a very superficial understanding of Islam. It's up to us to stop these children making the worst mistake of their lives" (Preston, 2016).

A second article is an opinion piece written by Simon Cole, the National Police Chiefs' Council lead for Prevent and chief constable of Leicestershire. He describes how the positive accounts of PREVENT "rarely make the cut in the reports, analysis and interviews" and furnishes examples of successful interventions. PREVENT teams are described as humane, taking the trouble to visit and console the parents of children who were not referred to PREVENT and hence denied the opportunity of a positive intervention, and who had died violent deaths (presumably outside the U.K as terrorists). Referring to the discriminatory incidents raised in the news media and *The Guardian* he says that (Cole, 2016)

> no child has ever been visited by a Prevent team because he drew a picture of his dad cutting up a cucumber…no child has been visited by a Prevent team because he wore a badge supporting a Palestinian cause. The kind of children who have been visited by a Prevent team have aspired to travel to Syria to join friends who were later killed in the fighting, or were on their way to becoming a young bride of an Islamic State fighter

While no actual PREVENT team might have been involved, he doesn't acknowledge the fear that comes from the authorities being contacted in the first place, from the threat of a PREVENT team's involvement, or how PREVENT focuses suspicion on an entire religion.

The underlying theories, motives, language and terms, and finally objectives and proposed solutions of PREVENT along with the implications of on ground practice are not easy to grasp. There are three different PREVENT documents that at times don't just outrightly state what they're trying to say, and multiple guidance sheets along with a counter terrorism bill. Perhaps this is the reason *The Guardian* tends to focus more on the incidents of discrimination caused by PREVENT, they make it easy to underscore PREVENT's flaws. Deeper questions as to why a government shouldn't involve itself in preventing violent or non-violent extremism are given far less attention. Content in *The Guardian* takes inconsistent stands concerning terrorist motives with one opinion piece stating that "the research on terrorism, radicalisation and extremism suggests that, though beliefs matter to people and organisations who adopt violence, a more complex mix of social, psychological, political and strategic factors plays a part" (Kinninmont, 2016), and a news article that says, "the claim that…religious ideology -- is the precursor to terrorism has been widely discredited by the British government itself, as well as numerous reputable scholars" (Cobain, 2016). As referenced above, "the numerous scholars" are just one scholar who acknowledges the role played by religious ideology" (Sageman, 2014, p. 567). The arguments against PREVENT laid out in an editorial were confusing at best, and the misrepresentation of David Anderson's views on PREVENT detract from the valid criticisms *The Guardian* does make of it. At least *The Guardian* had coverage about PREVENT, as we shall see below, *The Telegraph* had far fewer articles dedicated to it.

9.2.3 The Telegraph - sources and stances

There were only 11 articles in *The Telegraph* compared to *The Guardian*'s 32, and *The Telegraph*'s content analysis data is sparse. Table 9.5 on the next page shows that official sources were used far more than *The Guardian*, though still less than non-official sources. Looking at the other sources, the coverage was even less informed by government sources than its 32 percent suggests, Academics, NGOs, journalists, and Labour politicians make up 68.42 percent of the total source use. This lack of government and other official sources in the cited source list is mirrored in the principal source list in table 9.6 on the next page. Official sources are only used in 18 percent of articles, that is, only two of them. Despite this there is still a large proportion of supportive articles for PREVENT in *The Telegraph*. Table 9.7 on the next page shows that 4 out of 11 articles were positive and this praise was driven by government sources, as well as a journalist and a mixed source article.

Table 9.5 - Cited Sources, The Telegraph, PREVENT

	N	Percent
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	7	36.84%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	6	31.58%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	5	26.32%
U.K Politician Labour	1	5.26%
Total	**19**	**100.00%**

Table 9.6 - Principal Sources, The Telegraph, PREVENT

	Frequency	Percent
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	3	27.27%
Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions	3	27.27%
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	2	18.18%
No principal source	2	18.18%
U.K Politician Labour	1	9.09%
Total	**11**	**100.00%**

Table 9.7 - Principal Sources and stances crosstab, The Telegraph, PREVENT

	Supportive	Oppositional	Descriptive	Total
U.K Think Tank/Academic/NGO	0	3	0	3
Journalist	1	1	1	3
U.K Government/Military/Police/Intelligence	2	0	0	2
No principal source	1	0	1	2
U.K Politician Labour	0	1	0	1
Total	**4**	**5**	**2**	**11**

9.2.4 The Telegraph - News article analysis

There are four broad, easily identifiable themes in *The Telegraph*'s coverage.

i.   The flaws in PREVENT and other government policies (Johnston, 2016; Swinford, 2016b; Whitehead, 2016)

ii.   Political correctness blocking the honest assessment of Muslims as at risk of radicalisation (Bingham & Whitehead, 2016; McCann, 2016),

iii. The rise in the numbers of children referred to deradicalisation programmes, not to criticise PREVENT, but rather to highlight the danger posed by radicalisation (Farmer, 2016b; *The Daily Telegraph*, 2016d)

iv.   The rise of far right extremism (The Daily Telegraph, 2016c, 2016e)

The first PREVENT article in *The Telegraph* appears in early January and is critical of PREVENT, stating that it stigmatises all Muslims. It combines this criticism with the dangers of the E.U.'s open borders, stating that "it is not clear how successful it (PREVENT) is at intercepting returning jihadis." The article then turns to the dangers posed by British terrorist recruits abroad coming home, facilitated by the E.U.'s lax border controls (Johnston, 2016).

> Thousands of foreign nationals have gone to fight with Isil in Syria and Iraq and many
> have returned to their home countries. The perpetrators of the Paris massacre were

> Belgian and French jihadis who had travelled in and out of Europe with ease, not least because there are (or were) no internal borders

David Anderson is cited in one article, not as a "high profile critic" as labelled by *The Guardian* but as simply stating that PREVENT lacked transparency and had attracted dissatisfaction (Whitehead, 2016). Other sources more clearly critical of PREVENT are used. Rights Watch UK highlights the use of teachers in schools and colleges to report on their students as counterproductive as it "is stifling the freedoms of children in classrooms" (McCann, 2016). Rushanara Ali, the MP for Bethnal Green and Bow raised concerns about young Muslims being stigmatized, this was in the context of Kadiza Sultan, a young British schoolgirl who joined ISIS being killed in an airstrike after cancelling an escape attempt following the death of another foreign girl (Swinford, 2016).

Following the death of Kadiza Sultan, a researcher at the Royal United Services Institute, a defence and security think tank wrote an op-ed where he advocated a very similar set of measures as what was listed in PREVENT 2006. There were five broad suggestions. One, the Government should focus on structural problems in education, housing, employment and health to improve social mobility and increase the participation of Muslim women in the labour market. Two, encourage a progressive political Islam that is pro-human rights and pro-gender equality alongside "the essential creeds and codes of the faith". This is similar to *The Guardian*'s position. Essentially rather than treat signs of being openly Muslim as suspicious, this is evidenced in the guidance to teachers that changes in clothing and appearance are markers of extremism, the government should participate in a positive social change that celebrates Islamic identity while encouraging the openness, critical thinking and progressive values that might tackle non-violent and violent extremism. Three, support youth initiatives. Four, review and improve PREVENT to make less of a heavy handed imposition. And five, direct interventions with radicalised returnees (Abbas, 2016).

The Telegraph doesn't explore the causes of extremism or terrorism in relation to PREVENT but does blame political correctness for avoiding the recognition of extremism in Muslim communities. Nick Boles, the skills minister is quoted in a news article as saying "We do have a problem with extremism in parts of our country in certain communities, we have a problem and we will not solve that problem by tiptoeing around it and somehow failing to recognise it" (Bingham & Whitehead, 2016). He said this in a meeting with MPs who questioned him about unemployment in the Muslim community. The meeting transcript shows that he adds, in response to further questioning about the increased tension caused by PREVENT among Muslims (Boles, 2016):

> It is nevertheless the case that we have a very small but potentially very dangerous number of people who fall into those dangerous ideas and practices and who mostly

come from some particular religious and ethnic groups. We do have to tackle that as a Government.

While Boles doesn't furnish any examples of his theory, political correctness is brought out in another article, which opens with the statement that, "Warders are too afraid of being accused of racism to tackle extremists in jails." The statement comes from Ian Acheson, a former prison governor who adds that there was a "'significant fear among staff' about confronting Islamist ideology". It's uncertain though whether he's blaming the fear of being labelled racist, i.e. political correctness, or the government for a lack of funding. He adds that it was a "bit nuts" that funding was not guaranteed after April, but then goes back to racism with "Even with the most dangerous prisoners, there is a responsibility ... to be able to confront that narrative on the landing where it exists" The article ends with a paragraph sourced from Rights Watch UK about a nine year old wearing a t-shirt with the name of a (presumably Islamic) saint being reported as a suspected terrorist (McCann, 2016).

The third major theme is the focus on young children being referred to PREVENT. The articles are not critical or worried about this in terms of PREVENT overstepping its bounds, but accept the referrals as valid and are worried about the rise in radicalisation among young children. These articles contain lots of statistics. For example (The Daily Telegraph, 2016d),

> More than 400 children aged 10 and under have been referred to the Government's deradicalisation scheme in the last four years….Figures obtained by the National Police Chief 's Council (NPCC) showed 415 children aged 10 or younger had been referred to the programme in England and Wales, while 1,424 secondary school aged children, between 11 and 15, had also been referred. The NPCC freedom of information request found 1,839 children aged 15 and under were referred between 2012 and 2015. Last summer eight people a day were reported to the scheme, a third of whom were under the age of 18.

The article with the above statistics describes Channel simply as (The Daily Telegraph, 2016d),

> a voluntary early intervention scheme designed to identify people vulnerable to extremism. It then engages appropriate agencies to address their behaviour and keep them away from the danger of exploitation and exposure to terrorist ideas. It can include work with schools, social services, police and local councils.

without any criticism or descriptions of overreach at all. And valid criticisms do exist. U.K. Government statistics on PREVENT referrals show that the vast majority of people referred to PREVENT, i.e. people who fell under the suspicion of public facing workers like teachers, were never brought into the Channel deradicalisation programme, the government assessed them as never actually being at risk of extremism at all. In the 2016/17 period, 6,093 individuals were "subject to a referral due to concerns that they were vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism", of this number, 2,199 or 36 percent were outrightly dismissed as requiring no further action. 2,748

or 45 percent were referred to other services, such as the education or health sectors. 1,146, or 19 percent merited further discussion, and of that number, 814 or 71 percent were sent back to other services, and only 332, or 29 percent of 1,146 went on to receive Channel support (Home Office, 2018). To put this in perspective. Out of the 6,093 people who went through referral, only 5.4 percent (332) were deemed to be at sufficient risk to warrant the counselling and other measures associated with Channel.

It's possible that this data came out much later which is why *The Telegraph* didn't access it, the statistics document on the U.K. Government website only went up in 2018. But *The Guardian* made the same point (Cobain, 2016) through the Justice Initiative's Eroding Trust report (A. Singh, 2016a, pp. 107-108) which highlighted 3,934 referrals between April 2007 and March 2014, of which only 20 percent were assessed as needing Channel support which is about 787 people over a seven year period. The Justice Initiative got this data from the National Police Chiefs' Council website, the page is unfortunately no longer live. *The Telegraph* mentions none of this, accepting the rise of referrals among children to PREVENT as valid, and a natural response to the accepted assumption that large numbers of children are vulnerable to extremism.

This receives further elaboration in another article, which restates the message of a dangerous wave of radicalisation taking over Britain's youth (Farmer, 2016b).

> A total of 4,611 people, half of them children and teens, have been flagged up for possible intervention to stop them falling under the spell of extremist ideas. The figures have leapt 75 per cent in the past 12 months since authorities including schools and councils were given a statutory duty to stop people being drawn into terrorism.

> Figures released under the Freedom of Information Act show that in the year to June there were 2,311 referrals to the Channel scheme relating to under-18s, up 83 per cent, including 352 cases of children aged nine or under, an average of one a day…. Terrorism experts said online propaganda meant police were finding young people exposed to extremist ideas at younger and younger ages. The legal obligation to flag up potential cases, known as the Prevent duty, has also led to a huge increase in young people being referred. One social worker from east London said she was regularly notifying the police of rebellious and often troubled teens parroting Islamist ideas they had encountered on the internet.

No doubt the social worker from East London is encountering "troubled teens parroting Islamist ideas", but devoid of the larger context supplied by statistics on how many referrals actually warrant deradicalisation, *The Telegraph* successfully communicates its message of fear.

> Jonathan Russell, of counter-extremism think tank Quilliam, said factors behind the rise could include the "increased visibility" of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant leading to more radicalisation, and the Prevent duty resulting in more referrals because frontline workers can now "spot the signs"

Jonathan Russell doesn't elaborate as to what those signs are, described in previous pages, they are so vague as to include crying and unhealthy use of the internet (Spiller et al., 2018).

> Mr Russell added: 'The important thing to note is that the stats show that trained professionals think an increasing number of young people are vulnerable to radicalisation.'

Russell's interpretation, accepted without comment by *The Telegraph* in support of its claim of "a huge increase in young people being referred" may be correct. The trouble is the implication of increasing radicalisation made in this article as well as the previous article referenced above.

Newspaper, journalist, and source assume that referrals are an accurate metric for determining radicalisation in society. But as we have seen, the vast majority of referrals in the 2016/17 period were rejected as not requiring Channel support. Examining the numbers for the 2015-16 period shows not only a similar trend, but a declining one.

In the 2015/16 period there were 7,631 referrals (Home Office, 2017). In the 2016/17 period there were 6,093 referrals (Home Office, 2018). A decline across all age groups.

In the 2015/16 period, 381 were marked as needing Channel support. In the 2016/17 period 332 were assigned to Channel. Another decline across all age groups.

Breaking the numbers down by age (as *The Telegraph* is focused on the danger posed to children), in the 2015/16 period, 273 individuals under the age of 20 received Channel support, this figure included 108 children under 15 who received support. In the 2016/17 period 226 individuals under the age of 20 received Channel support, of which there were 90 children under the age of 15. Another set of declines.

Even considering the change in numbers of total referrals from 15/16 to 16/17, there was a decline of 1,538 referrals. I don't know how *The Telegraph* has achieved its statistics of a 75 percent increase in the referral rate. The article specifically states (Farmer, 2016b),

> A total of 4,611 people…have been flagged for possible intervention…The figures have leapt 75 per cent in the past 12 months since authorities including schools and councils were given a statutory duty to stop people being drawn into terrorism… Figures released under the Freedom of Information Act show that in the year to June there were 2,311 referrals to the Channel scheme relating to under-18s, up 83 per cent, including 352 cases of children aged nine or under, an average of one a day.

The article was published on the 12th of September 2016. I confirmed this on *The Telegraph*'s website. So *The Telegraph* is comparing two periods, period one which is the year to June i.e. Jan 2016 to June 2016, and period two which is 12 months prior to this, perhaps Jan to June 2015? I can't figure it out, I looked at the numbers by financial quarter, thinking that *The Telegraph*

could be using intra year combinations but that doesn't work either, comparing the numbers by financial quarters 2015/16 to 2016-17 show declines, massive declines for quarters 3 and 4. It's possible they're using stats from period 14/15 to 15/16. The British government which has made all its other data accessible, for some reason does not have data on the 14/15 period. Perhaps there was a rise in referrals from 14/15 to 15/16.

What can be conclusively stated, is that based on the Justice Initiative's data which covers 2007 to 2014, and the U.K. Government's data, which covers 2015-17, that the danger of spreading radicalisation, among children and others, seems to be exaggerated by *The Telegraph*, it is at least, not a problem that is growing larger.

The last theme of *The Telegraph* is far right extremism. The articles are brief and very simply recognise the growing threat posed by far right extremists in the wake of the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox by Thomas Mair, a neo-Nazi (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2016c, 2016e). They recognise that "There have been a number of terrorist-related incidents involving far-Right extremists" and that "The number of far-Right extremists referred to the government's counter-terrorism programme has risen significantly in the past year with cases accounting for 20 per cent of the workload in some areas" (*The Daily Telegraph*, 2016e).

On the whole *The Telegraph*'s coverage of PREVENT is notable for its lack of it. There are only 11 articles. Those articles are divided between a vision of the U.K. as being threatened by a sharp rise in radicalised individuals brought about by weak borders and protected by government deradicalisation programmes. And PREVENT as stigmatising all Muslims and stifling the freedoms of students. Neither grouping tends to explore the finer details of PREVENT.

9.3 Conclusion

The left-right divide is a part of the central argument made by this thesis and is further developed in this chapter's investigation of the news coverage of PREVENT, the U.K's anti-radicalisation programme. The right-leaning *Telegraph's* coverage of PREVENT was far lower than *The Guardian's*, and attracted a more supportive position. 36 percent of *The Telegraph's* coverage was in support of PREVENT, and 45 opposed, compared to *The Guardian's* 9 percent in support and 84 percent against. A key sub question asked in the introduction concerns the use of sources and each chapter contributes towards understanding this use. A summary of the source use across the thesis as a whole and its interaction with prior research is provided in the conclusion. Concerning this chapter however, it's interesting to note that both papers engage in source distortion. *The Guardian* uses David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation as a critical source, ignoring his comments in support of PREVENT. *The Telegraph* ignores the

broader context in government statistics to make it appear as though radicalisation in the UK were a far bigger problem. Going back to chapter 6 concerning civilian casualties, this distortion is similar to *The New York Time's* use of the U.S. military's report on the M.S.F. Kunduz strike, where a U.S. aircraft accidentally attacked a Doctors Without Borders hospital in Afghanistan. *The New York Times* avoided the report's many criticisms of the U.S. military, and focused only on those details that defended the mistakes made by U.S. soldiers.

It is possible that the regional rule is moderated in some way by the ideology of the party in power, with right-leaning papers less critical of right-leaning governments and similarly for left-leaning papers with left-leaning governments, further research into how these two factors intersect with each other and interact with other factors could prove useful.

This thesis shows that the right-leaning newspapers provide a lower volume of coverage to topics that might lead to government criticism, There are lower rates of coverage for civilian casualties, terrorism's motives and origins, and in certain cases even police actions following terrorist attacks. PREVENT isn't an exception to this. This finding continues to be the case in the next chapter, a study of the coverage given to the civilian casualties suffered in India's war against the Maoist insurgency. The left-leaning *Hindu* provides a far greater spotlight on this issue than the right-leaning *Times of India*, and this additional coverage leads to greater detail of the conflict and higher levels of critical coverage.

Chapter 10
Indian news coverage of the Maoist insurgency

10.1 Introduction

10.1.1 The Maoists, Adivasis, and background to conflict with the Indian state

Though Indian newspapers may not cover the deaths of civilians caused by the U.S.-led Coalition in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, as referenced in Chapter 6, they do, to an extent, report on the civilian deaths caused by Indian paramilitary action against the Maoists. This chapter focuses on the nature of the news coverage of the Indian Maoists, and the civilian casualties caused in the war against them.

The Communist Party of India (Maoist), referred to more simply as the Maoists or the Naxals (Shah, 2019, p. 35; Thomas, 2014), are an armed force of roughly 10,000 dedicated armed insurgents and an additional militia of 100,000 (Bahree, 2010). They are drawn mostly from the Indian tribal communities called Adivasis and are active in the forests and hills of central and eastern India (Shah, 2019). Originating in a single district of West Bengal in the late 1960's, the Maoists are now present in 223 districts across 20 states, accompanied by a thousand fold increase in the police budgets of Union and State governments from 1967 to 2007 (Subramanian, 2010), and as of 2010, over 100,000 Indian paramlitary troops to combat the perceived threat (Thomas, 2014). Its stated goal, listed in article 4 of its party constitution is to overthrow the Indian government, described as imperialistic and feudalistic, and establish a "people's democratic dictatorship under the leadership of the proletariat… The ultimate aim of the party is to bring about communism… thus abolishing the system of exploitation of man by man from the face of earth (CPI-Maoist), 2004). Essentially, the Maoists believe that the "innate, structural inequality of Indian society can only be redressed by the violent overthrow of the Indian State" (A. Roy, 2009). In this effort, the Maoists target and murder people they suspect of being police informers and state collaborators and periodically carry out attacks on government targets such as jails where they free prisoners, police camps where they kill policemen and steal weapons, and arson attacks on railway stations and transmission towers (Guha, 2007).

Since the 1980's the Maoists also filled a law and order void in places where the state lacked both interest and infrastructure, holding 'people's courts' to adjudicate on cases of upper caste exploitation of tribals and lower castes, and attacking police and forest departments they accuse of exploitation. They also involve themselves in education, irrigation, medical units, community kitchens, and the enforcement of minimum wages for labourers (Ahuja & Ganguly, 2007, Das,

2004b cited in Ahuja and Ganguly, 2007; Shah, 2019, pp. 35-36; Sundar, 2011; Verma, 2011).

The Maoists are mostly comprised of Adivasis, a collective term for the multiple tribal groups indigenous to India. Comprising almost 10 percent of India's population, they reside in every state though are predominantly found in the forested areas of central and east India (Guruswamy, 2019; Rycroft, 2014; Shah, 2019). In contrast to the caste hierarchy regulated agrarian societies of the Indian plains who label them ' junglis' (barbarians), Adivasis are mostly egalitarian hunter-gather groups who discourage the accumulation and use of wealth and status symbols. Labour, whether it is hunting, gathering, construction, childcare, or cleaning is by and large not gendered, shared equally among men and women and is done communally (Majumdar, 1935 Chapter 8; Shah, 2019, pp. 32-34). Adivasis have a present centric sense of time, their present existence is their only reality, they have no concept of heaven, hell, or rebirth. There is no sense of lost time, no anxiety over delays, hurrying, or waiting which leads to a pleasure-seeking and easy-going way of life (Sen, 2014).

Various studies on different Adivasi groups have remarked on their carefree and easy going temperament (S. C. Roy, 1984 page 246 cited in Sen, 2014) with one scholar writing that "The daily routine of a Ho (an Adivasi tribe) young man from morning to late night may be summed up in the following sentence, eat, play, eat, play, eat and dance till the stars change their places and the darkness of the night fades into the twilight of morning" (Majumdar, 1935, p. 83). Enjoyment of food and drink is considered a primary motive with consumption a means of promoting community spirit rather than individual superiority. This way of life is defined by access to the forest and its resources, and the autonomy the forest provides from other Indian communities.

Politically, leaders are chosen by lottery and are more facilitators than chiefs, resolving disputes by consensus and taking on the responsibility for cultivating communal fields, used to feed the entire community three times a year as well as a means of social security for anyone facing hardship. If anyone felt they couldn't or didn't want the role of leader, they could pass it on to someone else (Shah, 2019). Majumdar (1935, pp. 82-83) felt a summation of Adivasi values and goals could be conveyed in an Adivasi tribe's popular song:

> Let us be merry my dear,
> Be merry as long as this life lasts
> We shall not find
> We shall not find such joy,
> We shall not live forever my dear.
> Like the earth we shall not be lasting,
> Like leaves we do not shoot into new leaves.

These are the people who comprise between 80 to 90 percent of the Maoists (Ghose, 2018;

Sundar, 2016). A significant motivator is tribal autonomy, not communism. The Adivasis have suffered decades of brutalisation and eviction from upper caste settlers, Indian paramilitaries and state supported militias (Shah, 2019; Thomas, 2014). A report prepared by a member of the Indian Planning Commission shows that 40 million people have been displaced due to development projects between 1951 and 1990, of which 40 percent were tribal people, and only 25 percent have been rehomed. The victims of this development form the core of the Maoists (Subramanian, 2010), though according to at least one former Maoist, there are no Adivasis in the Maoist's senior leadership, who only use them to achieve their own political goals (Ghose, 2018).

The hills and forests of central and east India that sustain the Adivasi way of life contain rich deposits of bauxite, iron, coal, platinum, corundum, limestone, uranium, tin, copper, gold, and other minerals. Bastar, a Maoist stronghold and a single district in the Indian state of Chhattisgarh has 10 percent of India's iron ore reserves (A. Roy, 2009; Sundar, 2016). A Mckinsey report for the Confederation of Indian Industry stated, "India is endowed with great mineral wealth. Properly tapped, it can help propel India's GDP growth, generate additional employment and mitigate fiscal and forex challenges" (Mckinsey, 2014). In 2009 there was an estimated 4 trillion USD worth of Bauxite deposits in Orissa, a single mineral, in a single state, (A. Roy, 2009). The Maoists parallel state structure in these resource rich regions where the Adivasis live put both Maoists and Adivasis in direct opposition to the interests of some of the world's wealthiest and most powerful corporations (Sundar, 2016).

The Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce & Industry (FICCI) is a 250,000 company strong, government policy influencing, business building and promotion group that describes itself as the "voice of India's business and industry" (FICCI, 2020). As they put it, "…India needs to ramp up its industrial machine to lock in growth… Naxalites are clashing with mining and steel companies essential to India's long-term success" (FICCI, 2009). Or as Manmohan Singh, India's Prime Minister said in a Parliament speech, "if Left Wing extremism continues to flourish in important parts of our country which have tremendous natural resources of minerals and other precious things, that will certainly affect the climate for investment" (Singh, 2009).

Most of the land acquisition that takes place for mining, industrial townships, power stations, and other industrial developments, is carried out by the government for private companies: mega-corporations like the Tata Group, Vedanta, and Jindal Power among others (Bahree, 2010). These companies sign agreements with mineral rich states with large Adivasi populations to start industrial development projects, without sharing any amount of wealth that might make the destruction of the local environment worthwhile to the locals. A central government draft scheme to provide 26 percent equity in development projects to the affected local Adivasis was rejected

by FICCI as there would be fewer investments in a sector where 26 percent of the shareholders "do not make any contribution to the company" (PTI, 2010; Sundar, 2011). The Congress led UPA government gave in to opposition from businesses and replaced the draft amendment, making a new proposal with a diluted version acceptable to the mining companies (Karat, 2015).

The difficulty state governments face in land acquisition is that by law, only an Adivasi can buy the land of another Adivasi, or there has to be at least 80 percent agreement of the people living in an area for that land to be bought. (Shah, 2019, p. 153). The Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act or PESA of 1996 and the Forest Rights Act of 2006 requires that Adivasi land owners be consulted over land acquisition, and that Adivasis have rights over the land they occupy and the right to use and manage the forests they live in and use the resources they contain (Kumar, 2016; Sundar, 2016). When Adivasis refuse to sell, violence is used against them to attain that consent. Villagers relate stories of being forced to sign documents with guns pressed to their heads (Sundar, 2016), arrested on charges of disturbing the peace when they gather for meetings or to protest, arrested on false charges and held until family members sign deeds of sale, false deeds of sale drawn up and evictions carried out, and corporations conducting illegal construction on farmland with police complaints met with harassment, and judicial orders to cease construction ignored (Bahree, 2010).The Adivasi protests against land acquisition are used by the Maoists to gain further support for the communist cause, while the government's war against the Maoists provides cover to arrest, harass, and kill Adivasis who stand in the way of mining and industrial development (Sundar, 2011).

To understand the news coverage, it's important to establish details of conflicts in recent years. The first wave of government reprisals against the Maoists began in 2005, just after agreements for steel plants were signed with the Tatas and Essar, two of India's largest corporations (Guha et al., 2006; Sundar, 2016). Villagers were arrested under the charge of sympathising with Maoists and jailed, villages that refused to join the anti-naxal movement were burned, grain stores and livestock were destroyed, women were gangraped in front of their families and murdered. More than 350,000 people were forced to leave their homes according to human rights activists (Sundar, 2011, p. 7). Strong evidence, from government documents, police video recordings, local journalist testimony, and the use of special police officers shows that the movement was promoted and funded by the state government (Bahree, 2010; Guha et al., 2006; A. Roy, 2009; Shah, 2019; Sundar, 2016).

The second wave began in 2009, with a transition from local militias to central government paramilitaries. The new offensive was called 'Operation Green Hunt'. Journalists could only travel into Naxal areas with a security force escort and human rights activists and journalists sympathetic

to Adivasi rights were jailed and harassed. (Shah, 2019, p. 46). Human rights activists claimed that the real reason behind Operation Green Hunt was to occupy the mining zones with military barracks, to harass the locals and to accuse them of being Maoists so that they would be forced to leave, or be arrested and killed (Shah, 2019, pp. 153-154). Police often claim false encounter killings, a focus of *The Hindu*'s coverage in 2016, where civilians or suspected Maoists, or Maoist sympathisers, are captured, tortured, and killed, before being presented to the world as Maoists who attacked the police, who in turn had no choice but to kill them. The National Human Rights commission reported more than 200 cases of fake encounters in the country, most in Naxal areas (Sundar, 2011, p. 7).

10.1.2 Existing media coverage of the Maoists

Sundar (2016) a prominent researcher on the Maoist insurgency is highly critical of the existing media coverage. She finds that the media tends to follow the state's narrative when coverage is given with sources selected to champion the administration's views over the views given to dissenters. The national media is said to be "sanguine" about the civilian casualties caused by military action against the Maoists, the bulk of news coverage downplaying any killings carried out by the state and focused more on sensationalist details such as the marital and sex lives of Maoists as opposed to their motives, or the suffering of Adivasis.

She is supported by Thomas (2014) whose research indicates that journalists provide uncritical coverage to the state's version of events and produce narratives in support of corporate interests. He studied 200 news articles with a Maoist focus, a sample of English print news in India over a three-month period. *The Times of India* and *The Hindu* are among his newspapers. He finds the majority of the articles focus on military counter terrorist actions in a variety of forms ranging from arrests to encounter killings to military battles, along with Maoist terrorist attacks. He also finds that the majority of the news articles in his study "relied on official sources" (Thomas, 2014, p. 498). His analysis doesn't distinguish between different newspapers, treating all 200 stories as a single block, and no statistics on source use. Mishra (2011) also finds that the "media overwhelmingly relied on government officials in defining the Naxal conflict" and a "serious dearth of investigative and critical reporting on the conflict"

Sharma (2012) performs an analysis of the coverage in 2011 that somewhat contradicts the above findings. The Hindi newspapers were less likely to cover subjects that might embarrass the local government, such as the deaths and destruction that resulted from Salwa Judum as compared with the English newspapers, especially *The Hindu*. She identifies single primary sources in Indian Hindi and English newspaper coverage of Maoists in 2011 to find that *The Hindu* exhibited greater primary source variation than the other Hindi and English language

newspapers as well as being the only newspaper to use the Maoists as sources.

The above research results make sense when viewed in the context of the recommendations made by FICCI to the Indian government. In a report on terrorism written by former Indian intelligence, military, and government officials, FICCI (2009) has a section for the Indian news media. It states that the government wants media groups to create news coverage to advance the government rather than the terrorist's agenda by avoiding "weeping mother" emotional stories on relatives of victims…to prevent public pressure on governments to make concessions", and they want the media "to boost the image of government agencies" (FICCI, 2009, pp. 104-105). It goes on to make a long list of recommendations for how the media should behave during a terrorist attack, all of them favour the state's interests. The closest positive recommendation it makes is "Media should contribute to educating the public and if the need be, put pressure on the government of the day to pursue measures that are credible." What this means precisely is unexplained (FICCI, 2009, p. 110).

What FICCI does clearly recommend is that the media "co-operate with the government…in order to bring a peaceful end to the terrorist episode". The result of non-cooperation is not stated, but the report suggests that it would be useful "for the Hon'ble Prime minister to convene a meeting of the media barons, both print and electronic, seek their cooperation and give them a veiled hint of possible implications of non-cooperation on National Security issues" (FICCI, 2009, p. 111). Cooperation is repeatedly stated in the report, which at least states that security forces shouldn't have a "veto power" over reporting, but there should be "co-operation and mutual respect and understanding between Government agencies and the media" (FICCI, 2009, p. 111).

10.2 News coverage of Maoists - Themes, sources, and stances

Table 10.1 on the next page shows that *The Hindu* publishes stories about Maoists far more than *The Times of India* as well as a slightly higher proportion of Maoist stories that describe civilian casualties. *The Times of India* surprisingly has a higher proportion of stories that describe Maoist goals, motives, and origins than *The Hindu*. It should be noted that in the ProQuest database, some of the articles listed as published by *The Times of India* were marked with city names. I looked these up online and they appeared to be local city edition stories. The 1,645 articles included in my database were the ProQuest *Times of India* articles marked with a "India" tag, I assumed these to be national stories published regardless of city edition. Checking a small number of these articles with their online counterparts showed this to be correct. *The Hindu* articles on ProQuest had no such tags which is why I did all of them, resulting in a large disparity between *The Times of India* and *The Hindu*. It is possible that there is some distortion here.

Table 10.1 - The Hindu and The Times of India Maoist stories coverage overview			
	The Hindu	TOI	Total
Total news coverage			
Total stories	2897	1645	4542
Total stories %	63.78%	36.21%	100%
Total Maoist news coverage			
Total stories about Maoists	703	58	761
Total Stories about Maoists % (subset within newspaper)	24.26%	3.52%	N.A
Maoist stories with civilian casualties			
Maoist stories w/ civ casualties	71	5	76
Maoist stories w/ civ casualties % (subset within newspaper)	10.09%	8.62%	N.A
Motives and Origins			
Maoist stories with motives and origins	54	7	61
Maoist stories with motives and origins % (subset within newspaper)	7.68%	12.06%	N.A

Figure 10.1 below shows that almost half of all coverage of the Maoists describes some form of military action against them. The rest of the coverage is given over to descriptions of Maoist terrorist attacks, the dangers of Maoist recruitment, the decline of Maoist influence, and government social programmes to counter Maoist influence.

Figure 10.1 - Most used Issue/Themes, All Maoist Stories, TOI and The Hindu

Figure 10.2 on the next page shows that *The Hindu* focuses less on Maoist terrorist attacks and more on their recruitment efforts and decline of influence than *The Times of India*. Despite this the two newspapers do not differ significantly, especially on the issue/theme covered the most, military action against the Maoists.

The dominance of the military action theme can be clarified with the context given by the policy/ question variable in table 10.2 on the next page. Fifteen percent of all stories describing military or police action do so in order to highlight how that action is causing civilian casualties. Almost all those stories are critical of the police and security forces.

Figure 10.3, on the next page shows that overall levels of criticism though not insignificant,

Figure 10.2 - Most used issue/themes, All Maoist Stories, TOI and Hindu differences

Theme	The Times of India	The Hindu
Memorial	0.00%	1.60%
Terrorist profile	0.00%	2.70%
Societal reaction	5.10%	2.60%
GCTA India, Legal	1.30%	3.90%
Motives	5.10%	4.80%
GCTA India, Social	6.40%	5.90%
Decline of terror power	1.30%	6.30%
Danger of recruits	2.60%	6.40%
Descriptive of Terrorist Attack	14.10%	9.30%
GCTA India, Mili/Pol	44.90%	49.00%

Table 10.2 - GCTA India Themes and Policy/Question Crosstab			
	GCTA India, Mili/Pol	GCTA India Legal	GCTA India Social
Waterboarding/Torture/Enhanced interrogation	0.60%	0.00%	0.00%
Restriction on art/censorship, Arrest of protestors	1.20%	10.80%	0.00%
Military action causing civilian casualties	15.30%	0.00%	0.00%
Positive community spirit/overcoming divisions	0.00%	0.00%	1.70%
Death of Indian soldier	3.30%	0.00%	0.00%
Arrest/Sentencing	13.80%	54.10%	0.00%
None	65.80%	35.10%	98.30%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Figure 10.3 - GCTA India Themes, Stances, All Newspapers

seems low given the presumed scale of violence against civilian populations. Shah (2019, p. xvi) uses a source called the South Asia Terrorist Portal which in turn draws on Indian Home

Ministry figures to show that in 2016 there were 1048 "incidents" in which 213 civilians were killed. Shah, the South Asia Terrorist Portal and the Home Ministry data table don't explain what "incidents" mean. Are they terrorist attacks or attacks on Maoists by Indian security forces? In the context of Shah's preface, they are the latter, and indicate deaths in the course of security force action against the Maoists.

Assuming this is accurate, more than a third of coverage, 36 percent, was critical of the police and military, the vast majority of coverage however, 62 percent, was either descriptive, or supportive. 2 percent was neutral. About 6 percent of the total coverage was focused on government social programs to counter the Maoists and was almost universally either praised or described.

Figures 10.4 and 10.5 below show that *The Times of India*, despite having roughly a third of the volume of articles published by *The Hindu* (again, which could be due to the article labelling system in the ProQuest database) has a higher proportion of criticism levelled at the Indian security forces, almost 43 percent of its coverage was critical compared to *The Hindu* at about 35 percent. *The Times of India*'s criticism, though not explored in-depth in this chapter given the lower volume of coverage, is mainly regarding the police harassment and arrests of human rights activists and journalists, and to a limited degree, the deaths of civilians.

Figure 10.4 - All GCTA India Themes, The Hindu, Stances

Figure 10.5 - All GCTA India Themes, The Times of India, Stances

Coming to sources, all stories about the Maoists mainly had two types of sources: Officials (central government, military and police), and the journalists themselves. This is similar to the sources used in the two Indian terrorist attacks covered in chapter 4. The cited sources can be seen in figure 10.6 below. About two in every three sources cited are either government, police, military officials, or journalists. The balance 1/3 is made up of a diverse make up of Maoists, civilians, victims, NGOs, academics, court officials and non non-ruling party politicians. As we shall see, most of these non-official sources occur in the stories with military actions causing civilian casualties.

Figure 10.6 - Top Cited Sources, All Maoist Stories

Source	Percentage
Indian politician, Congress	1.10%
Indian State gov, other	1.50%
Indian politician, other	2.50%
Anonymous source	3.30%
Indian Court Officer	3.70%
Indian NGO/Academic	5.30%
Indian civ/victim	6.50%
Terrorist and associated	8.50%
Indian Gov/Mili/Police	31.70%
Journalist	33.40%

Looking at the cited sources by newspaper in table 10.3 below shows certain significant differences. *The Hindu* has double the Maoist sources than *The Times of India*, whereas *The Times of India* has almost twice the court officials compared to *The Hindu*.

Table 10.3 - Top Cited Sources by newspaper, all Maoist stories		
	The Hindu	The Times of India
Journalist	34.00%	27.20%
Indian Gov/Mili/Police	31.30%	35.30%
Terrorist and associated	9.00%	4.30%
Indian civ/victim	6.40%	7.60%
Indian NGO/Academic	5.30%	5.40%
Indian Court Officer	3.40%	6.50%
Anonymous source	3.20%	3.80%
Indian politician, other	2.40%	3.30%
Indian State gov, other	1.60%	0.50%
Indian politician, Congress	1.20%	0.00%
Total	97.80%	93.90%

The dominance of official and journalist self-citing sources in the cited source list is carried over to the principal source list as shown in figure 10.7 on the next page. While a little over 1 in 4 articles have no principal sources, that is, only 27 percent of articles see mixed source use, they don't rely on a single source, almost 1 in 3 articles rely on an Indian official to provide a stance.

Figure 10.8 below shows that both newspapers use official sources as principals roughly the same amount. *The Hindu* uses principal sources far more than *The Times of India*, as well as journalists as principal sources. The Maoists appear as the third most cited source overall and the fourth most used principal source, and this is driven by *The Hindu*.

Figure 10.7 - Top Principal Sources, All Maoist stories, All newspapers

Source	Percentage
Indian state gov other	1.50%
Indian Court Officer	1.50%
Indian poli other	3.20%
Indian civ/victim	4.10%
Indian NGO/Academic	6.40%
Terrorist and associated	7.40%
Journalist	17.70%
No principal source	26.80%
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	27.90%

Figure 10.8 - Top Primary Sources, All Maoist stories, by newspaper

Source	The Times of India	The Hindu
Indian state gov other	1.30%	1.50%
Indian Court Officer	5.10%	1.20%
Indian poli other	5.10%	3.00%
Indian civ/victim	0.00%	4.40%
Indian NGO/Academic	9.00%	6.20%
Terrorist and associated	2.60%	7.80%
Journalist	5.10%	18.80%
No principal source	37.20%	25.90%
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	26.90%	28.00%

When we look at the sources of criticism in *The Hindu* in table 10.4 on the next page, criticism does not come from journalists, for as much as journalists use their own opinions and facts, they are not criticising the government, they are engaging in praise. The main sources of criticism of

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government action in *The Hindu* are NGOs and academics, the Maoists themselves, civilians and victims, and non Congress/BJP politicians. This use of terrorist sources is particularly interesting and is explored further in the coming pages.

Table 10.4 - Principal Source Stance, GCTA India Maoist Stories, The Hindu				
	Supportive	Neutral	Oppositional	Descriptive
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	54.70%	0.00%	2.40%	41.80%
No principal source	14.10%	88.90%	20.00%	27.30%
Journalist	20.30%	0.00%	4.70%	26.30%
Terrorist and associated	0.00%	0.00%	14.10%	0.00%
Indian NGO/Academic	0.00%	0.00%	25.30%	0.70%
Indian civ/victim	3.10%	0.00%	10.60%	1.00%
Indian poli other	1.60%	0.00%	10.60%	0.00%
Indian Court Officer	0.00%	0.00%	4.70%	1.00%
Indian state gov other	3.10%	11.10%	1.20%	1.30%
Total	96.90%	100.00%	93.60%	99.40%

The Times of India surprisingly uses official sources to apparently engage in self-criticism, with no regional politicians, civilians and victims, and minimal NGO use. This can be seen in table 10.5 below.

Table 10.5 - Principal Source Stance, GCTA India Maoist Stories, The Times of India			
	Supportive	Oppositional	Descriptive
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	60.00%	18.80%	40.00%
No principal source	20.00%	37.50%	45.00%
Journalist	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Terrorist and associated	0.00%	6.30%	0.00%
Indian NGO/Academic	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%
Indian civ/victim	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Indian poli other	0.00%	0.00%	5.00%
Indian Court Officer	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%
Indian state gov other	20.00%	0.00%	0.00%
Total	100.00%	87.60%	90.00%

While the data tables so far consider all news articles with a focus on the Maoists, if Maoists stories with civilian casualties are isolated, the use of cited and principal sources changes. Given the limited number of stories in *The Times of India*, the next figures and tables will focus on *The Hindu*.

Figure 10.9 on the next page shows that government officials and journalists are still the most used sources, but the overall combined proportion drops from 66 percent to 42 percent. Figure 10.10 also on the next page shows that even though government sources are cited in 20 percent of the coverage, they are rarely used as principal sources, giving way to NGOs, academics, Maoists, civilians, and victims.

Table 10.6 on the next page shows that journalists don't criticise government actions directly, leaving it to the non-official sources they cite.

Figure 10.9- Military Action causing civilian casualties Maoist stories, Cited Sources, The Hindu

Source	Percentage
Indian poli, BJP	1.10%
Indian state gov, other	1.60%
Indian poli, Other	3.80%
Indian Court Officer	3.80%
Indian poli, AAP	4.90%
Terrorist and associated	6.00%
Indiain poli, Congress	7.60%
Indian NGO/Academic	13.00%
Indian civ/victim	14.10%
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	19.00%
Journalist	23.40%

Figure 10.10 - Military Action causing civilian casualties Maoist stories, Principal Sources, The Hindu

Source	Percentage
Indian poli, BJP	1.40%
Indian state gov, other	1.40%
Indian Court Officer	1.40%
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	2.80%
Journalist	4.20%
Indian poli, Other	4.20%
Indian poli, AAP	4.20%
Indiain poli, Congress	5.60%
Indian civ/victim	9.90%
Terrorist and associated	14.10%
Indian NGO/Academic	22.50%
No principal source	28.20%

Table 10.6 - Military Action causing civ casualties Maoist stories, Principal Source Stances, The Hindu			
	Neutral	Opposition	Descriptive
No principal source	100.00%	26.90%	33.30%
Indian NGO/Academic	0.00%	23.90%	0.00%
Terrorist and associated	0.00%	14.90%	0.00%
Indian civ/victim	0.00%	10.40%	0.00%
Indiain poli, Congress	0.00%	6.00%	0.00%
Indian poli, AAP	0.00%	4.50%	0.00%
Indian poli, Other	0.00%	4.50%	0.00%
Journalist	0.00%	3.00%	33.30%
Indian Gov/Mili/Pol	0.00%	1.50%	33.30%
Indian Court Officer	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
Indian state gov, other	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
Indian poli, BJP	0.00%	1.50%	0.00%
Total	100%	100%	100%

10.3 *The Hindu's* news coverage of Indian military and police action

The Hindu published 703 articles about the Maoists in 2016, and 71 of those, 10 percent, focused on civilian casualties. This subset of stories deserves a closer look because it highlights some of the strongest criticism of state action and civilian suffering to be found in the entire database of coded news articles, as well as the unique use of Maoists as principal sources. No other newspaper provides a similar level of legitimacy, and a platform to a state labelled terrorist group.

Within the 10 percent of Hindu articles that focus on police and paramilitary action causing civilian violence, there are four types of stories about the Maoists:

i.   The Maoist-sourced critique,

ii.   The harassment of journalists, activists, and aid workers due to their criticism of the state (a point often raised in Maoist press releases)

iii. The sporadic false encounter story

iv.   The sustained coverage of single events

The first type of story is the Maoist-sourced critique. Almost uniquely among all the newspapers in this thesis, *The Hindu* carries terrorist press releases and reports Maoist public statements in their entirety, without using any other sources to add context or a provide counter-opinions. There is often minimal wider context or journalist commentary. This is quite possibly due to the lack of credibility of the Indian security forces, who by numerous victim and activist accounts, explored further below, appear to be still inflicting brutal violence on the local Adivasis. The factual content of the Maoist criticisms, though it carries no citations, resembles the content of the literature in the introductory section above.

Consider the following press statement released by a Maoist leader, carried in a brief article dedicated to it and excerpted here (Dahat, 2016b)

> The atrocities on Bastar tribals are at their peak due to the BJP government's policy to loot minerals and land of Bastar tribals. It is all a part of a bigger conspiracy to render the indigenous tribals landless. Tribal women are being gang-raped…. Innocent civilians are being killed and branded as Maoists and propaganda is being carried out in the media. Villagers from interior areas are being threatened with arrests and being made to surrender as Maoists

As explored in the literature above, both the Congress and BJP governments, as well as their industry representatives, prize mining and industrialisation as a means of economic growth. Numerous academic, NGO, journalist, and civilian/victim accounts have covered the viciousness by which land is acquired from indigenous tribes. Further Maoist press releases carried in *The Hindu* continue to highlight alleged crimes against women caused by security forces and civilian deaths caused by troops. Terrorist claims are accepted as fact with the disclaimer "allegedly", for example, "The dreaded Maoist leader also named the 'innocent farmers and villagers' alleg-

edly killed in 'fake encounters'". Despite saying "allegedly" however, Maoist claims of encounter killings, molestations, and rapes are carried without any corroborating source, essentially leaving the Maoist claims uncontested (Dahat, 2016e, 2016f; The Hindu, 2016h). Even when police sources are cited the Maoists are used as principal sources. For example, an article carries a police statement reporting that 40 Maoists had been killed in the first two months of 2016, but then ignores the police account to focus on a Maoist counter statement that only eight Maoists had been killed, with the balance of thirty-two being innocent villagers. The Maoist statement reported in *The Hindu* is detailed, highlighting a list of the victims, and the villages they were from, as well as discussing the targeting of journalists and legal groups by the police (Dahat, 2016f).

Figure 10.11 below shows that motives and military actions are the two top issue/themes in which Maoists are used as principal sources.

Figure 10.11 - Issue/Themes in which Maoists are used as principal sources

However the scale of use of Maoists as principal sources is actually fairly low. Table 10.7 below shows that or all the intense criticism levelled by the Maoists against police action, Maoists rarely appear as principal sources for police action stories, only in 5 and half percent of police action issue/themes across *The Hindu*'s coverage. They appear as principal sources the most in Hindu articles exploring their motives.

Table 10.7 - Use of Maoists as principal sources in relation to other principal sources			
Issue/Themes	Maoists as principals	All principal sources	% of Maoists as principals
Motives	**30**	**45**	**66.66%**
GCTA India, Mili/Pol	**25**	**456**	**5.40%**
Danger of foreign recruits	8	60	13.33%
Descriptive of Terrorist Attack	3	87	3.40%
Warnings of Terror Attacks	3	11	27.27%
Poli Respo BJP	3	8	37.50%
Decline of terrorist power	2	59	3.38%
Societal reaction	1	24	4.16%
Total	**75**	**750**	**10.00%**

As table 10.4 and 10.6 on pages 217 and 218 show, Maoists are the principal sources in articles

critical of government action roughly 14 percent of the time. NGOs, academics, civilians, victims, and non Congress and BJP politicians make up the majority of the other critical primary sources.

The second type of article focuses on a point raised in Maoist press releases, the harassment of journalists and aid workers due to their criticism of the state. These stories carry statements from the NGO workers only, are endorsed by the journalists through repetition and acceptance of claims and are highly critical of the police (Dahat, 2016a, 2016g; *The Hindu*, 2016k). While some articles simply don't have a police source cited, (police, government, and military only account for 19 percent of all cited sources for the civilian casualties subset) in others the police are said to ignore *The Hindu*'s calls for comment, as they did when AAP politician and activist Soni Sori alleged that police in Chhattisgarh had detained and tortured seven activists who worked with her, among them a former BJP leader accused of being a Maoist by the police who had been acquitted of all charges (Dahat, 2016g).

This article type typically features reports of gratuitous violence by the police against civilians, witnessed by aid workers, and then carries reports of state backlash against the aid workers. For example, The Jagdalpur Legal Aid group alongside other activists documented "at least three cases of mass sexual violence in the past three months alone (Dec 2015-Feb 2016), in which security forces have run amok in villages, stripping women, playing with their naked bodies and indulging in gang rape, looting their precious food supplies and destroying their homes and granaries" (Dahat, 2016a). In response, the landlord of one of the Legal Aid's founding members was taken by police and kept in the station till two in the morning and his car was impounded. He said he had no choice but to evict the aid worker.

This targeting of activists' landlords is not a unique tactic. Bela Bhatia, a human rights activist and social researcher who helped tribal women file cases against security personnel for gang rapes and grievous assaults was reported to be have been evicted by her landlord after he was questioned by police and questioned again later by a mob of people who gathered outside her residence and called her a Naxal (*The Hindu*, 2016i).

Activists and aid workers like Soni Sori are also the principal sources used to provide a context for the violence covered in news reports, essentially repeating points found in the literature on the conflict and stated by the Maoists. Examples include: That the state's goal is to kill Adivasis and take their lands, that the state has a mining agenda to benefit the corporate sector and enrich the politicians involved, and that security forces use torture, rape, and destruction of property in the name of fighting terrorism to force tribals to flee their ancestral homes (Bhattacharjee, 2016; The Hindu, 2016a; Vadlamudi, 2016). One police officer, according to Soni Sori, told

her that the government can't take tribal land due to the PESA Act that grants that land to them, that's why non-Adivasis aren't being killed for their land, non-Adivasi land is far easier to access (Vadlamudi, 2016).

The third type of story is the false encounter i.e. the cold blooded killing by police, either of Maoists, or of alleged Maoists who are later found out through interviews and NGO fact-finding visits to be innocent tribals. In these events the police create an "encounter" scenario, they make it appear as though they were attacked and had no choice but to defend themselves, in the process the suspect was shot dead. Such stories are usually brief. An NGO, and there is diverse range of them, constitutes a team (usually termed a fact finding mission), visit an area affected by violence, conduct interviews, and gather evidence of their own, and then report their findings. Occasionally, but more often than not, news articles of this type don't provide detailed accounts of the fact finding missions, they neither question or defend their veracity and backgrounds but simply quote their allegations. There are many examples, a few of which are illustrated below:

i.   In January 2016 an article cited The Human Rights Forum which alleged that a Maoist called Nagesh was shot dead while unarmed, moved to a different location, and was claimed as an encounter killing by police who allegedly could have arrested him, but chose to shoot him down. No civilians, witnesses, family members etc are cited, the article simply carries the allegations of the Human Rights Forum (The Hindu, 2016d).

ii.   In April 2016 an article reported that four tribals were fired upon while hunting and two died. The Police claimed they were Maoists and a two-member fact finding team from Human Rights Forum determined that they were not, after visiting their villages. The Human Rights Forum is given primacy (The Hindu, 2016h).

iii. In another April article the Coordination of Democratic Rights Organization (CDRO) and Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, Tamil Nadu (CPDR) describe the "plain slaughter" of villagers in Chhattisgarh by security forces. The villagers told the joint team that six of them were on their way to a market when they were ambushed by security forces and four were shot dead. Two girls escaped. In a separate spate of alleged police violence in January 2016, it took the joint team 13 days to file a police report, when it finally was, they state that "five men and five women were illegally taken into custody, women were sexually assaulted and one man died." (The Hindu, 2016c)

iv.   One article lists multiple incidents together, describing the experiences of the All India People's Forum's fact-finding team: three village boys killed in a fake encounter on November 3, 2015, four women killed in another fake encounter on November 11, 2015, one of them was raped before being killed. Two young girls were killed by police on January 31st, 2016, the police declared them Maoists but their neighbours and family deny they had any connection to the Maoists. A married couple was killed by police on May 21st 2016 and declared as Maoists, but the couple had left the Maoists five years ago (Dahat, 2016d)

These are just a limited selection from a long list of incidents recorded. False encounter articles such as the ones described above tend not to situate each reported incident within a larger context, provide statistics, historical background, or past police policies and statements, or contain an explanation of source antecedents. NGOs with no introduction or background informa-

tion provided in news articles provide reports which are used as the dominant source. Villagers are cited directly only occasionally, possibly for fear of retaliation, but there are no aggregated or anonymous local victim voices, only the civilian activists.

Similar to the false encounter story type is the coverage of sustained events, story type number four. There were certain false encounters that received sustained coverage, there is no conclusive reason as to why these events receive greater coverage than others given that there isn't any clear difference between them, they largely possess the same characteristics. One possible reason, outlined by Lawrence (2000) that causes greater media attention is the public activities of NGOs, family members, or institutions that possess public standing. These activities ranging from protests to press conferences provide "legitimising pegs" to journalists, reasons for them to take a closer look at an event as more newsworthy than others. This championing of certain incidents by family members and NGOs is a common element to the two events below that received sustained coverage, and the coverage given to these events tend to share certain similar characteristics.

There were two "sustained coverage" events in 2016 in *The Hindu*:

i. The Madkam Hidme murder with four articles
ii. The Kandhamal District Shootings with seventeen articles

In the first case the police reported that a Maoist women was killed in an encounter with security forces in the forest of Sukma district. Soni Sori, an activist, drew attention to the case and cited Madkam's neighbours and family as saying she was forcibly taken from her village by police and raped before being killed (Dahat, 2016h). The family went to the Bilaspur High Court and accused the police of her rape and murder (Dahat, 2016c) and protests were held by activists (The Hindu, 2016e). A tribal collective called for a bandh (similar to a strike) to protest a series of similar incidents, but in the article describing this bandh, only Madkam Hidme is mentioned, possibly due to her family's legal case against the police (Dahat, 2016i).

In the second case the police reported that five civilians were killed in police crossfire in an operation against the Maoists. An NGO source said it was six who died, including three women and a child, and that they were all either Adivasis or Dalits (the lowest caste in India's caste hierarchy). The same source, quoting civilians who in turn had spoken to the villagers said there were no Maoists at all, the police simply fired on the civilians who were travelling in a rickshaw (Das, 2016). Further investigations by NGOs found that the bullet holes were only present on a single side of the rickshaw, indicating that there was no firefight, and no Maoists on the other side. These NGOs cite eyewitness accounts that the police fired indiscriminately, more than 100 rounds at the rickshaw, then removed the bullet cartridges to hide the evidence (The Hindu, 2016g).

In the Kandhamal case it is likely attention was generated by local politicians from the BJP and Congress who were not in power, they used the case to criticize the ruling state party. A significant number of the seventeen articles don't actually describe the event at all, but rather describe the political actions of these politicians, critical statements, visits to the family, announcements of their own investigative panels and other similar actions.

Both cases are similar to their single article incident counterparts, in that events are episodic, most of the coverage has no context or no historical background, there is no paragraph or even sentence connecting them to any trend of past violence. A reader unaware of the Maoists and the war against them could well see these as isolated incidents.

10.4 Conclusion

This chapter provided a further understanding of source, theme, and stance use from an Indian perspective. The different issue/themes, sources, and stances taken towards government responses in different contexts are key aspects of the research question and sub questions that have been central to each chapter of the thesis. Government and official sources are widely used across all Maoist coverage and Maoist coverage that focuses on the civilian casualties caused by military and police action. The overall proportion of stories that focus on civilian casualties appears to be fairly low, about 10 and 8 percent for *The Hindu* and *The Times of India*. This increases within the military/police action issue/theme, 15 percent of stories within this one theme focuses on civilian casualties across both newspapers. Both newspapers devote about half their coverage to military counter terrorist action.

Focusing on just the limited military action/civilian casualty subset however changes the source mix; while government and official sources are still among the most highly cited, they are rarely used as principal sources, the critical viewpoint of NGO's, activists, academics, civilian protestors, and victims are given primacy.

Essentially, criticism is limited in *The Hindu*, but when it does take place it is full throated. Criticisms made by prior research related to the lack of historical context in news, and alternative voices (Mishra, 2011; Sundar, 2016; Thomas, 2014) are largely correct, but lack the detail provided by the content analysis above. Those alternative voices are present, but only within the narrow context of civilian casualties.

Chapter 11
Terrorism news coverage patterns

11.1 Introduction

A recurring finding in previous chapters has been newspapers' providing different types and styles of terrorism related coverage outside their home country. The Indian newspapers tend to have minimal coverage of terrorism outside India, and the American and British newspapers tend to have minimal coverage of terrorism in India, as well as other non-Western countries.

Each newspaper seems to provide more attention to their own country. This regional centric pattern has expressed itself in different ways apart from simple article numbers. Criticism tends to be more intense for foreign governments instead of domestic ones, terrorists' goals, motives, and origins abroad are described in ways that seem more wide ranging and are used to criticize government policy as compared to terrorism at home. The coverage of civilian casualties caused by military actions provide further evidence that news content focuses more on battle coverage than civilian casualties.

This chapter provides further context to these findings by considering two ways in which newspapers report on terrorism by region. The first is direct coverage of domestic and non-domestic terrorist events by number of articles, the second is the use of word terrorism, whether an article mentioned it, and if it did, how its use compares with the other terms.

11.2 Volume of coverage by region

This section shows severe distortion in coverage by region. The following three tables were made using the Global Terrorism Database's (GTD) list of total terrorist attacks that took place in 2016. The GTD is one of the largest and most extensive open source terrorism databases and though not without criticisms, is the current best estimation of global terrorist activity (LaFree & Dugan, 2007). Carpini and Williams's (1987) method was used to create an image of over and under coverage by region.

The key variable is the number of news articles, with the understanding that a greater volume of articles focusing on a particular region signifies a greater level of attention, or possibly concern for the region.

By comparing the number of news articles to the number of events that took place, an initial picture emerges of severe under and over reporting by region. A picture that is confirmed by examining coverage by word use in the next tables.

Table 11.1 below is a simple listing of attacks by region and number of news article per region, per newspaper.

Table 11.1 - Amount of coverage in number of news article							
Region	Events	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	Hindu	TOI
1. North America	72	455	156	70	66	36	29
2. Western Europe	269	266	48	329	603	55	36
3. M. East & N. Africa	6089	404	120	232	341	106	14
4. South Asia	3629	227	23	56	62	2554	1436
5. Southeast Asia	1078	19	1	8	6	3	1
6. Sub-Saharan Africa	2051	88	3	37	43	9	2
7. South America	133	11	2	1	7	10	0
8. Australasia/Oceania	10	5	0	15	5	0	1
9. Eastern Europe	132	9	1	2	2	0	0
10. Central Asia	16	3	0	0	2	1	1
11. East Asia	8	3	0	1	5	0	1
12. Cent. America/Carib.	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	13490	1490	354	751	1142	2774	1521

This was used to compare the ratio of articles produced to the number of events that occurred in the different regions of the world in 2016 in table 11.2 below. The assumption is that a more constant ratio is reflective of consistent coverage, where the number of news articles is a closer match to the extent of terrorist activity.

Table 11.2 - Ratio of number of news articles/number of events						
Region	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
1. North America	**6.31**	**2.16**	0.97	0.91	0.5	0.4
2. Western Europe	0.98	0.17	**1.22**	**2.24**	0.2	0.13
3. M. East & N. Africa	0.06	0.01	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.002
4. South Asia	0.07	0.006	0.01	0.01	**0.7**	**0.39**
5. Southeast Asia	0.01	0	0.007	0.005	0.002	0
6. Sub-Saharan Africa	0.04	0.001	0.01	0.02	0.004	0
7. South America	0.08	0.01	0.007	0.05	0.07	0
8. Australasia/Oceania	0.5	0	1.5	0.5	0	0.1
9. Eastern Europe	0.06	0.007	0.01	0.01	0	0
10. Central Asia	0.18	0	0	0.12	0.06	0.06
11. East Asia	0.37	0	0.12	0.62	0	0.12
12. Cent. America/Carib.	0	0	0	0	0	0

In table 11.3 on the next page, the percentage of terrorism in the 'number of events' column was subtracted from the percentage of articles by region to illustrate the extent of bias by region in each newspaper.

For example, the percentage of terrorist events in North America in 2016 was 0.53% of the total, that is 72 out of 13,490. The percentage of *New York Times* articles with a focus on North America was 30.53%, or 455 articles out of a total of 1,490. 30.53% minus 0.53% equals to 30% over coverage. The closer to zero, the more balanced the coverage with a large positive number indicating over coverage and large negative number indicating under coverage. Figure 11.1 on page 228 illustrates table 11.3 in the form of a bar chart.

Table 11.3 - Percentage of Regional Over or Under Coverage by Newspapers						
Region	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
1. North America	**30**	**43.53**	8.79	5.24	0.76	1.37
2. Western Europe	15.86	10.21	**41.818**	**50.81**	-0.01	0.37
3. M. East & N. Africa	-18.01	-14.73	-14.238	-15.27	-41.3	-44.21
4. South Asia	-11.6	-21.1	-19.44	-21.48	**65.16**	**67.51**
5. Southeast Asia	-6.71	-7.96	-6.92	-7.07	-7.88	-7.93
6. Sub-Saharan Africa	-9.29	-14.4	-10.27	-11.44	-14.8	-15.07
7. South America	-0.24	-0.41	-0.85	-0.37	-0.62	-0.98
8. Australasia/Oceania	-0.26	-0.07	1.92	0.36	-0.07	-0.01
9. Eastern Europe	-0.36	0.68	-0.7	-0.8	-0.97	-0.97
10. Central Asia	0.1	-0.11	-0.11	0.06	-0.08	-0.05
11. East Asia	-0.04	-0.05	0.08	0.38	-0.05	-0.01
12. Cent. America/Carib.	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02

What table 11.3 above and figure 11.1 on the next page show is dramatic over coverage of terrorist events by each newspaper within its home region, and almost equally dramatic under coverage by each newspaper for terrorism outside its home region. 717 stories were listed as involving more than one region and were not included in this analysis.

The figures in the above tables need interpreting in awareness of the GTD's broad definition of terrorism, not always matched by newspapers. The GTD operates on an academic definition of terrorism that includes events in the database that newspapers would possibly consider non terrorist crimes.

For example, in the U.S. an assailant sent a GIF image of a strobe light to an epileptic Jewish journalist with the intent to cause a seizure. The assailant was anti-semetic and was arrested and charged with aggravated assault. This incident appears in the GTD with no mention of terror-ism in 2 out of the 3 news articles cited by the database. The third was behind a paywall. There similar examples in the GTD.

To ensure the validity of the findings, only the terrorist attacks perpetrated by ISIS, the Taliban, and Boko Haram were selected in the GTD and contrasted with the content analysis news arti-cles that focused on only these three terrorist groups.

The content analysis search terms used to find the articles had all three group names, as well as variations on ISIS. This ensures a match between the GTD events data, and the content analysis news article data.

The three tables on page 229 and figure 11.2 on page 230 show very similar results to the tables that focus on the total events data of the GTD. There is consistent over and under coverage by region by each newspaper based on the newspaper's home region even when the analysis is limited to terrorist attacks and news coverage of ISIS, Boko Haram, and the Taliban.

Figure 11.1 - PERCENTAGE OF OVER AND UNDER COVERAGE BY REGION

Table 11.4 - Amount of coverage in number of news articles, ISIS/Taliban/Boko Haram only

| Region	Events	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
1. North America	9	135	56	40	26	14	6
2. Western Europe	23	154	32	180	350	33	21
3. M. East & N. Africa	1432	257	93	183	266	79	8
4. South Asia	1085	148	17	33	38	350	173
5. Southeast Asia	12	5	1	6	3	2	1
6. Sub-Saharan Africa	238	41	0	25	22	3	1
7. South America	0	2	2	1	4	1	0
8. Australasia/Oceania	1	5	0	8	5	0	0
9. Eastern Europe	2	4	0	2	2	0	0
10. Central Asia	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. East Asia	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
12. Cent. America/Carib.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	2803	752	201	479	717	482	211

Table 11.5 - Ratio of number of news articles/number of events, ISIS/Taliban/Boko Haram only

Region	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
1. North America	**15**	**6.22**	4.4	2.8	1.5	0.66
2. Western Europe	6.69	1.3	**7.8**	**15.2**	1.43	0.91
3. M. East & N. Africa	0.17	0.06	0.12	0.18	0.05	0.005
4. South Asia	0.13	0.01	0.03	0.03	**0.32**	**0.15**
5. Southeast Asia	0.41	0.08	0.5	0.25	0.16	0.08
6. Sub-Saharan Africa	0.17	0	0.1	0.09	0.01	0.004
7. South America	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	0
8. Australasia/Oceania	5	0	8	5	0	0
9. Eastern Europe	2	0	1	1	0	0
10. Central Asia	0	0	0	0	0	0
11. East Asia	N/A	0	N/A	N/A	0	N/A
12. Cent. America/Carib.	0	0	0	0	0	0

Table 11.6 - Percentage of Regional Over/Under Coverage by Newspapers, ISIS/Taliban/Boko Haram only

Region	NYT	USA Today	Guardian	Telegraph	The Hindu	TOI
1. North America	**17.63**	**27.54**	8.03	3.31	2.58	2.52
2. Western Europe	19.66	15.1	**36.76**	**47.99**	6.03	9.13
3. M. East & N. Africa	-16.9	-4.81	-12.88	-13.98	-34.69	-47.29
4. South Asia	-19.02	-30.24	-31.81	-33.4	**33.91**	**43.29**
5. Southeast Asia	0.24	0.08	0.83	0	-0.01	-0.05
6. Sub-Saharan Africa	-3.04	-8.49	-3.27	-5.42	-7.87	-8.02
7. South America	0.27	1	0.21	0.56	0.21	0
8. Australasia/Oceania	0.63	-0.03	1.64	0.67	-0.03	-0.03
9. Eastern Europe	0.1	-0.07	0.35	0.15	-0.07	-0.07
10. Central Asia	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
11. East Asia	0	0	0	0.14	0	0.47
12. Cent. America/Carib.	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figure 11.2 - PERCENTAGE OF OVER AND UNDER COVERAGE BY REGION - ISIS/Taliban/Boko Haram only

11.3 Differing uses of terrorism as a label

Regions outside the newspapers home region are found to have dramatically reduced levels of coverage when it comes to terrorism and terrorist attacks. While these results can potentially be explained as media coverage serving as a proxy for the attention of audiences, that the reading public is simply more interested in their own regions and countries, it does not fully explain the results outlined in table 11.7 and 11.8 below. The U.S. and U.K. newspapers use the words "terror, terrorist, or terrorism", (at least once) in news articles at a far higher rate in covering Western regions, as opposed to non-Western regions. The word "terrorism", and its close variations, are used the least in the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South, Southeast, and Central Asia.

Table 11.7 - Does the article mention the words: terror/terrorist/terrorism? (U.S newspapers)					
Region of Focus	Yes	No	Yes	No	Total
1. Australasia and Oceania	100.00%	0.00%	5	0	5
2. Global (West)	100.00%	0.00%	17	0	17
3. North America	92.80%	7.20%	567	44	611
4. South America	92.30%	7.70%	12	1	13
5. Western Europe	91.40%	8.60%	287	27	314
6. Eastern Europe	90.00%	10.00%	9	1	10
7. Global (Multi-Region)	87.40%	12.60%	104	15	119
8. Global (Non-West)	68.80%	31.30%	11	5	16
9. Central Asia	66.70%	33.30%	2	1	3
10. East Asia	66.70%	33.30%	2	1	3
11. Southeast Asia	65.00%	35.00%	13	7	20
12. Middle East and North Africa	63.50%	36.50%	333	191	524
13. Sub-Saharan Africa	53.80%	46.20%	49	42	91
14. South Asia	46.00%	54.00%	115	135	250
Total	76.50%	23.50%	1526	470	1996

Table 11.8 - Does the article mention any of the words: terror/terrorist/terrorism? (U.K newspapers)					
Region of Focus	Yes	No	Yes	No	Total
1. Global (West)	100.00%	0.00%	27	0	27
2. Australasia and Oceania	95.00%	5.00%	19	1	20
3. Western Europe	90.30%	9.70%	842	90	932
4. South America	87.50%	12.50%	7	1	8
5. Southeast Asia	85.70%	14.30%	12	2	14
6. North America	85.30%	14.70%	116	20	136
7. East Asia	83.30%	16.70%	5	1	6
8. Global (Multi-Region)	78.10%	21.90%	218	61	279
9. Eastern Europe	75.00%	25.00%	3	1	4
10. Global (Non-West)	60.00%	40.00%	3	2	5
11. Middle East and North Africa	55.00%	45.00%	315	258	573
12. Central Asia	50.00%	50.00%	1	1	2
13. Sub-Saharan Africa	42.50%	57.50%	34	46	80
14. South Asia	41.50%	58.50%	49	69	118
Total	74.90%	25.10%	1651	553	2204

What this means is that a high proportion of articles focusing on particular regions i.e. the

non-Western regions, simply did not make any reference at all to terrorism, despite describing the actions of terrorist groups, counter-terrorism policy, the activities of terrorist recruits, or terrorist attacks. They simply mentioned the group name, or referred to them as militants, insurgents, fighters, or extremists.

There is a potential implication here to political deference when these findings are applied to specific countries. When examining the U.S. newspaper's mention of the word terrorism in the Middle-East and North Africa, in which only 63.5 percent of articles used the word and its variants, U.S. allied nations achieve the dubious privilege of suffering from terrorism far more than other nations. This is outlined in table 11.9 below.

Table 11.9 - Mention of terror/terrorist/terrorism in the Middle East? (U.S newspapers)					
Country of Focus	Yes	No	Yes	No	Total
Iran	100.00%	0.00%	2	0	2
Turkey	88.90%	11.10%	64	8	72
Israel	88.50%	11.50%	46	6	52
Jordan	81.80%	18.20%	9	2	11
Saudi Arabia	66.70%	33.30%	4	2	6
Tunisia	66.70%	33.30%	2	1	3
Libya	58.80%	41.20%	20	14	34
Syria	57.50%	42.50%	46	34	80
Iraq	50.70%	49.30%	74	72	146
Algeria	50.00%	50.00%	1	1	2
Yemen	44.40%	55.60%	4	5	9
Lebanon	40.00%	60.00%	2	3	5
Egypt	35.70%	64.30%	5	9	11
Total	64.00%	36.00%	279	157	436

Table 11.9 above shows that other than Iran, which only has two articles, the only countries at the higher end of the terrorism use list are Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and to a limited extent, Saudi Arabia. Turkey and Israel also have a relatively high number of articles published about them. Note, these tables show percentages by rows, not columns.

The exclusion of certain regions and nations from the "terrorism" designation confers a special status to the word. Countries with a closer relationship to the newspaper's home government could well be seen as suffering from a more pejorative and legitimate sounding "terrorism" problem. While others suffer from mere violence. A strong possibility is that these countries receive the more pejorative term of terrorism because they are U.S. allies in the region, with military and political ties. Jetter (2014) provides useful insights in this area, finding that *The New York Times* has increased coverage on terrorist attacks in countries that have strong trade relations with the U.S., as well as a higher importance of natural resources or foreign direct investment.

This is further exemplified by a breakdown of specific terms per country in table 11.10. This

table, rather than looking at a simple mention of terrorism or not, examines dominant terms, that is which of the terms listed is used the most. For example, if in an article, the word terror or terrorism is used 4 times, and militant or militancy twice, then terrorist is listed as the dominant term. Similarly, if there are a profusion of terms, and no one term has a clear majority over all the others, then the article is listed as a 'multiple term' article. As can be seen, Israel and Turkey also lead with terrorist/terrorism as the dominant term. Iran and Algeria may have high scores, but they only had an article count of 2.

Table 11.10 - Dominant Term of identification in the Middle East (U.S Newspapers)

Country	Terrorist+	Militant	Fighter	Group	Jihadist	Islamist	Multiple	None
1. Iran	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
2. Israel	65.4%	7.7%	0.0%	0.0%	1.9%	0.0%	17.3%	7.7%
3. Algeria	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
4. Turkey	40.3%	15.3%	1.4%	2.8%	0.0%	0.0%	36.1%	4.2%
5. Tunisia	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
6. Jordan	27.3%	9.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	54.5%	9.1%
7. Syria	12.5%	22.5%	12.5%	10.0%	2.5%	0.0%	36.3%	1.3%
8. Iraq	11.6%	25.3%	13.0%	7.5%	0.7%	0.0%	39.0%	2.7%
9. Egypt	7.1%	21.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	57.1%	0.0%
10. Libya	5.9%	17.6%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.9%	47.1%	2.9%
11. Yemen	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	88.9%	0.0%
12. Lebanon	0.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	60.0%	0.0%
13. S. Arabia	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Total	22.9%	19.3%	8.5%	5.3%	1.4%	0.9%	37.8%	3.2%

Tables 11.11 below and 11.12 on the next page show a similar result for the U.K. papers. Tunisia was a surprising result, nine articles, and all of them with mentions of terrorism. A closer look at those articles shows that all but one of them focus on tourism in Tunisia, and how the impact of a terrorist attack in 2015 on British tourists in Tunisia resulted in a decline in British tourists visiting the country.

Table 11.11 - Mention of terror/terrorist/terrorism in the Middle East? (U.K. newspapers)

Country of Focus	Yes	No	Yes	No
1. Saudi Arabia	100.00%	0.00%	7	0
2. Tunisia	100.00%	0.00%	9	0
3. Morocco	100.00%	0.00%	1	0
4. Israel	94.10%	5.90%	16	1
5. Turkey	80.60%	19.40%	58	14
6. Jordan	66.70%	33.30%	6	3
7. Egypt	62.50%	37.50%	5	3
8. Syria	53.70%	46.30%	65	56
9. Algeria	50.00%	50.00%	1	1
10. Yemen	42.90%	57.10%	3	4
11. Libya	42.90%	57.10%	15	20
12. Iraq	37.10%	62.90%	65	110
13. Somalia	0.00%	100.00%	0	1
14. Lebanon	0.00%	100.00%	0	2
15. U.A.E	0.00%	100.00%	0	1
Total	53.70%	46.30%	251	216

Table 11.12 - Dominant Term of identification in the Middle East (U.K. Newspapers)								
Country	Terrorist+	Militant	Fighter	Group	Jihadist	Islamist	Multiple	None
1. Morocco	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
2. Tunisia	88.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	11.10%	0.00%
3. Israel	58.80%	5.90%	5.90%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	17.60%	11.80%
4. S. Arabia	57.10%	0.00%	0.00%	14.30%	14.30%	0.00%	14.30%	0.00%
5. Turkey	44.40%	20.80%	0.00%	6.90%	1.40%	1.40%	20.80%	4.20%
6. Jordan	22.20%	11.10%	0.00%	11.10%	0.00%	0.00%	55.60%	0.00%
7. Syria	15.70%	8.30%	9.90%	19.80%	5.00%	0.80%	29.80%	9.90%
8. Yemen	14.30%	0.00%	14.30%	14.30%	14.30%	0.00%	28.60%	14.30%
9. Libya	8.60%	5.70%	14.30%	28.60%	0.00%	0.00%	34.30%	8.60%
10. Iraq	6.30%	12.60%	10.90%	17.10%	9.70%	0.00%	32.00%	10.30%
11. Somalia	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%
12. Egypt	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	12.50%	0.00%	37.50%	50.00%
13. Lebanon	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	0.00%
14. Algeria	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	50.00%	50.00%
15. U.A.E	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

This focus on tourism is emblematic of the difference in reporting styles for different regions, as well as potential influences other than deference to government policy. Terrorist attacks in Turkey or Tunisia are often viewed from the rather parochial frame of how they impact tourist plans in the West. Consider the contrast:

> Innocents. That's what we talk about every time there is a terrorist attack; every time a murderous maniac destroys others in the name of some god that they pretend to serve. We talk about the innocent people who have had their lives ravaged and ruined by evil

That's what *The Telegraph* published on page 5, a day after the ISIS-inspired terrorist attack in Nice, where a truck was used to massacre 86 people and injure 303 (Gordon, 2016). On the same day, an article published on page 7 of the "Cruise" section of the paper was titled, "a good time to sail the Mediterranean", about how cruise ship tickets are on sale due to terrorism. A reluctance to travel to Turkey due to recent terrorist attacks has resulted in perks like free drinks, internet access, and on-board credit (The Daily Telegraph, 2016b). There are further examples of the disparity between regions, consider that in 2016 the U.K., papers had seventeen articles discussing whether the U.K. cricket team would be safe from South Asian terrorism on a trip to Bangladesh but only one 2016 article contained a memorial for a victim of South Asian terrorism. *The Telegraph* wrote about the life and death of a Sufi singer in Pakistan, murdered by a Taliban faction in Karachi with the terrorist stated motive of the singer being a "blasphemer" (Sabri, 2016).

An argument could be made that analysing word use between regions as a measure of differential treatment for those regions is problematic. The Middle East and North Africa does after all suffer from ongoing militancy and insurgency rather than the distinct singular acts of terrorism that take place in politically stable democracies. To further explore this, table 11.13 on page 236

compares the dominant terms used in *The New York Times* and the *USA Today* in prominent terrorist attacks in Belgium, France, Germany, and the United States, as well as India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Though these South and East Asian countries have suffered repeated terrorist attacks, none can be said to be in the same politically precarious state of Afghanistan, Iraq, or other Middle Eastern and North African countries.

The results are clear. The dominant term used for the attacks in Western nations is "terrorism". The dominant term used for almost all the attacks in the selected Asian nations is often anything but "'terrorism". Other than the Holey Artisan Bakery massacre which had a number of Italian and Japanese victims, terrorist attacks in Bangladesh never result in a terrorism label. Out of the two Western terrorist attacks when terrorism was not the dominant term, one was when an Oregon Wildlife Reserve in the U.S. was occupied by a militia. This was a right-wing attack. Almost all the attacks regardless of country were organised or inspired by ISIS. Table 11.14 on page 237 applies the same criteria to the U.K. papers and finds a very similar result.

The Indian newspapers exhibit a similar pattern to the U.S. and U.K. papers, though perhaps not as extreme. Table 11.15 below shows South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, South America and Southeast Asia ranging from about 70 percent at the highest, to 50 percent at the lowest. Stories with a multi country non-western focus is ranked fairly high, alongside Western Europe and North America at about 90 percent. The same category in the U.S. and U.K. papers was about 70 and 60 percent. South Asia, which in the Indian papers is at about 70 percent, was at 45 and 40 percent respectively in the U.S. and U.K. papers.

Table 11.15 - Does the article mention any of the words: terror/terrorist/terrorism? (Indian newspapers)					
Region of Focus	Yes	No	Yes	No	Total
1. Central Asia	100.00%	0.00%	2	0	2
2. Australasia and Oceania	100.00%	0.00%	1	0	1
3. Global (Multi-Region)	93.30%	6.70%	139	10	149
4. North America	89.20%	10.80%	58	7	65
5. Western Europe	87.90%	12.10%	80	11	91
6. Global (Non-West)	87.80%	12.20%	86	12	98
7. South Asia	68.20%	31.80%	2720	1270	3990
8. Sub-Saharan Africa	63.60%	36.40%	7	4	11
9. Middle East and North Africa	59.20%	40.80%	71	49	120
10. South America	50.00%	50.00%	5	5	10
11. Southeast Asia	50.00%	50.00%	2	2	4
12. East Asia	0.00%	100.00%	0	1	1
Total	69.80%	30.20%	3171	1371	4542

A breakdown of South Asia by country in table 11.16 on page 238 is surprising, with India centric articles at the lower end of the scale at about 64 percent. A list of the top terrorist groups given coverage in India and whether terrorism and its related variants are used to label them is shown

Table 11.13 - Terrorist attacks with dominant term of identification (U.S Newspapers)

Specific terrorist attack list			Dominant terms used in terrorist attacks							
Country	Month/Year	Description/Attack name	Terrorist+	Militant	Group	Multiple	None	Extremist	Jihadist	Islamist
Germany, Berlin	Dec 2016	Christmas market truck attack	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium	Aug 2016	Machete attack on police	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Paris	Jan 2016	Meat cleaver attack on police	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Philadelphia	Jan 2016	Shooting of police officer	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium, Brussels	Oct 2016	Police officer Stabbing	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Paris	Nov 2015	Bataclan shootings	83.3%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	10.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A Minnesota	Sep 2016	Shopping mall stabbing	83.3%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Ohio	Nov 2016	Ohio State attack	83.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Nice	Jul 2016	Nice truck attack	81.0%	0.0%	0.0%	4.8%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium, Brussels	Mar 2016	Airport and metro bombing	76.0%	0.0%	0.0%	8.0%	14.0%	2.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, S. Bernardino	Dec 2015	San Bernardino Shootings	68.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.3%	30.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, N.Y.C	Sep 2016	NYC cooker bombings	64.9%	0.0%	0.0%	13.5%	18.9%	0.0%	2.7%	0.0%
U.S.A, Orlando	Jun 2016	Pulse Nightclub shootings	62.4%	0.0%	8.3%	9.2%	18.3%	1.8%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, N.Y.C	Sep 2001	9/11	57.8%	0.0%	0.0%	6.3%	35.9%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Paris	Jan 2015	Charlie Hebdo shootings	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Boston	Apr 2015	Boston Marathon Bombings	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Normandy	Jul 2016	Catholic Church Priest Stabbing	42.9%	0.0%	28.6%	14.3%	0.0%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%
India, Punjab	Jan 2016	Pathankot airbase attack	40.0%	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%	40.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Indonesia, Jakarta	Jan 2016	Starbucks/Police station bombing	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Magnanville	Jun 2016	Stabbing of French Police Captain	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Dhaka	Jul 2016	Holey Artisan Bakery massacre	23.1%	30.8%	0.0%	46.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Oregon	Jan 2016	Wildlife Reserve Militia	18.8%	31.3%	0.0%	25.0%	18.8%	6.3%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Dhaka	Apr 2016	Hacking death, editor of gay mgzn	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh	Mar 2016	Stabbing of Christian convert	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%
Indonesia	Mar 2016	Tugboat hijacking	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Dhaka	Apr 2016	Hacking death, atheist law student	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Bangladesh	Apr 2016	Hacking death, English professor	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Tangail	May 2016	Hacking death of Hindu Tailor	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh	Jun 2016	Hacking death of Hindu priest	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
India, Kashmir	Sep 2016	Uri Army Base Attack	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total			62.90%	2.90%	2.0%	11.4%	18.0%	1.9%	0.4%	0.4%

Table 11.14 - Terrorist attacks with dominant term of identification (U.K. Newspapers)

Specific terrorist attack list			Dominant terms used in terrorist attacks							
Country	Month/Year	Description/Attack name	Terrorist+	Militant	Group	Multiple	None	Extremists	Jihadist	Islamist
France, Paris	Jan 2016	Meat cleaver attack on police	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A Minnesota	Sep 2016	Shopping mall stabbing	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium, Charleroi	Aug 2016	Machete attack on policewomen	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, N.Y.C	Sep 2016	NYC cooker bombings	95.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, N.Y.C	Sep 2001	9/11	90.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	10.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Unknown Middle-East	Jan 2016	Murder, 5 alleged British spies by IS	66.7%	0.0%	22.2%	0.0%	11.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Paris	Jan 2015	Charlie Hebdo shootings	62.5%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%
Belgium, Brussels	Mar 2016	Airport and metro bombing	61.7%	0.0%	0.0%	13.3%	20.0%	1.7%	3.3%	0.0%
France, Nice	Jul 2016	Nice truck attack	60.7%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%	26.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Normandy	Jul 2016	Catholic Church Priest Stabbing	60.0%	0.0%	0.0%	20.0%	15.0%	0.0%	5.0%	0.0%
France, Paris	Nov 2015	Bataclan shootings	52.8%	0.0%	0.0%	11.1%	36.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Belgium, Brussels	Oct 2016	Police officer Stabbing	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Philadelphia	Jan 2016	Shooting of police officer	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Ohio	Nov 2016	Ohio State attack	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
France, Magnanville	Jun 2016	Stabbing of French Police Captain	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Germany, Berlin	Dec 2016	Christmas market truck attack	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, Orlando	Jun 2016	Pulse Nightclub shootings	42.9%	0.0%	2.9%	11.4%	40.0%	2.9%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Dhaka	Jul 2016	Holey Artisan Bakery massacre	37.5%	12.5%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.S.A, S. Bernardino	Dec 2015	San Bernardino Shootings	36.8%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	63.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.K., Birstall	Jun 2016	Shooting and stabbing of Jo Cox, MP	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%	9.5%	33.3%	23.8%	0.0%	0.0%
India, Kashmir	Sep 2016	Uri Army Base Attack	12.5%	37.5%	0.0%	25.0%	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
India, Kashmir	Oct 2016	Baramulla Army Base Attack	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
U.K., Manchester	Aug 2016	Former Imam killed by IS supporters	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
Indonesia, Sumatra,	Aug 2016	ISIS stabbing of Catholic priest	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif	Nov 2016	German Consulate Attack	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Dhaka	Apr 2016	Hacking death, atheist law student	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%
Bangladesh	Mar 2016	Stabbing of Christian convert	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Bangladesh, Dhaka	Apr 2016	Hacking death, editor of gay mgzn	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Indonesia, Jakarta	Jan 2016	Starbucks/Police station bombing	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Total			54.9%	2.2%	1.7%	12.5%	22.2%	4.3%	1.7%	0.1%

below in table 11.17. What this shows is that out of the 761 stories about Maoists, about 25 percent of the total, almost none mention the word terrorism or its variants . This is the cause of the lower South Asia score for the Indian newspapers. It's possible that terrorism in India is strongly associated with Muslim groups, allowing left wing and separatist groups such as the Maoists, ULFA, and NSCN to escape the more pejorative charge of terrorist group that is their legal designation by the Indian government, and accepted and used by the GTD.

Table 11.16 - Mention of the words: terror/terrorist/terrorism in South Asia? (Indian newspapers)					
Country of Focus	Yes	No	Yes	No	Total
1. Sri Lanka	100.00%	0.00%	7	0	7
2. Pakistan	85.70%	14.30%	84	14	98
3. Bangladesh	78.00%	22.00%	71	20	91
4. India	63.70%	36.30%	2055	1172	3227
5. Afghanistan	45.90%	54.10%	28	33	61
Total	64.40%	35.60%	2245	1239	3484

Table 11.17 - Is terrorism mentioned for the below perpetrator groups? (Indian Newspapers)					
Name of Perpetrator Group	Yes	No	Yes	No	Total
Jaish-e-Muhammad	97.1%	2.9%	533	16	549
State Actor	95.6%	4.4%	65	3	68
Khalistan Terror Force/Khalistani Militants	94.7%	5.30%	18	1	19
Hindutva fundamentalists	94.4%	5.6%	67	4	71
The Base Movement (India, al-Qaida)	88.9%	11.1%	16	2	18
Multiple groups	88.1%	11.9%	104	14	118
IM (Indian Mujahideen)	84.8%	15.2%	28	5	33
Lashkar-eTaiba	83.4%	16.6%	191	38	229
Al-Qaida	83.3%	16.7%	10	2	12
Individual/Undefined Group	80.7%	19.3%	509	122	631
ISIS/ISIS Inspired	73.7%	26.3%	274	98	372
Bodo Militants/NDFB	66.7%	33.3%	10	5	15
Hizbul Mujahedeen (Kashmir)	50.3%	49.7%	100	99	199
PLA/UNLA (Manipur militants)	45.5%	54.5%	5	6	11
National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN)	14.3%	85.7%	1	6	7
ULFA militants (Assam)	9.1%	90.9%	1	10	11
Maoists/Naxals	4.6%	95.4%	35	725	760
Total	62.9%	37.1%	1967	1157	3124

11.4 Conclusion

The U.S. and U.K. newspapers clearly label terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Europe as terrorist attacks in their news coverage, but use a number of alternative terms for terrorist attacks in non-Western regions ranging from militants to fighters, or just mentions of the name of the group.

If an article in the Western newspapers focuses on a country in North America and Western Europe the perpetrators are described as terrorists, societies suffer from terrorism and young men and women are recruited as terrorists. This indicates that for Western newspapers, terrorism is not just a localised term, shorn of any other value, it, along with the disproportionate news focus on regions that suffer from terrorism far less than others, is a way of recognising the legitimacy

of the lived experiences of the people who have suffered through terrorism. There is a recognised capacity for Western citizens to feel fear. Their experiences, reactions, and responses are given full expression. That the citizens of Paris suffer from terrorism, and those in Dhaka suffer from militancy is a sign of a perverse luxury, the capacity to be terrorised.

This chapter adds to the understanding of terrorism news coverage developed in the previous chapters, it presents a deeper context to the findings that a newspaper's home country attracts a very different style of coverage concerning a terrorist's motives and origins and coverage of police responses as compared to other countries. Trade, tourism, and geopolitical importance to the home country could well be additional factors that impact the nature of the news coverage of terrorism. There is scope for further research in this area.

Chapter 12
Conclusion

12.1 Introduction

Terrorism, and the fight against it, are key issues of our time. The news media coverage of terrorism reflects this importance, and this thesis has made an in-depth exploration of the coverage. The key research question asked about the extent to which terrorism news content serves government agendas and represents official sources and if it supports the findings of persisting "political-elite" research and theories. An influential view in existing research, both old and new, is that news output reflects government sources and stances and is deferential to government agendas. In contrast to this research, "event-driven" research shows how dramatic events can provide a platform, or inspiration, for journalists to challenge established authority figures and official narratives. Other research shows how flawed methodologies relying on abstracts of news reports are the cause of findings that the news is deferential to governments, and that the news is actually more critical than is shown in official-dominance research.

This criticism has been taken seriously in this thesis which used the total volume of terrorism news coverage in 2016 across six of the world's most widely read newspapers, almost 9,000 articles, to contribute to this debate. Full article texts have been analysed in greater detail than they have in the past. These articles were studied through content analysis, analysing issues, themes, policies, cited and principal sources, stances towards issues and policies, and frames, among other variables, to provide a comprehensive research picture of the news coverage. A closer look at the text that contained the above elements allowed for a deeper and more detailed explanation of the news content.

The findings showed that government and other official sources were not as widely used as prior political-elite research indicated they might be. There were also significant pockets of criticism of a variety of government policies and actions and this was driven by journalists themselves taking a critical approach, as well as a variety of third-party sources ranging from NGOs and academics to civilians. There were two conditions which seemed to impact levels of criticism and praise of government actions. The first condition was what I call the "left-right divide", or the ideological slant of the newspaper. Left-leaning papers were more critical of official responses in general compared to their right-leaning counterparts. The second condition was the "regional rule": both left and right-leaning papers were less critical and more supportive of their own country's government's actions than they were of the actions of governments in foreign nations. The influence of these two factors was manifested in a variety of ways, ranging from coverage of

police and intelligence agency action, coverage of government policy towards minority communities, the representation of terrorism's origins and terrorists' motives, "responsibility" framing of police response, coverage of civilian casualties caused in the War on Terror, and different government laws and policies.

In this concluding chapter, the following section will summarise the findings in a little more detail and contrast them with the existing literature. Section three will discuss limitations in the scope and implementation of the thesis research and areas for further research. A short final section recaps the contributions of the research.

12.2 Summary of thesis findings

A survey of the research literature (chapter 2) showed that a great deal of past research has found that news content privileges government responses to terrorism and conflict in a number of ways. A variety of studies that support a "political-elite" view of news highlighted how the news coverage of terrorism from around the world is aligned with government policy, focuses on the responses of state actors to terrorism, represents official views, and praises security responses with minimal criticism (Courty et al., 2019; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008; Sundar, 2016; Thomas, 2014; Yarchi et al., 2015). Studies of the first Gulf War found strong support for the U.S. government (Bennett & Manheim, 1993), almost no opposition to government decisions to go to war in popular newspaper and broadcast coverage (Mermin, 1996), and stories about successful military action regularly featured while civilian casualties were ignored (Iyengar & Simon, 1994). Studies of the second Gulf War found a lack of criticism and uncritical adoption of government framing (Lewis et al., 2006; Reese, 2010), a focus on battle coverage (Dimitrova & Strömbäck, 2005; Papacharissi & Oliveira, 2008), and a near total absence of imagery depicting Iraqi civilian casualties and destroyed homes (Griffin, 2004). This image category was similarly absent for the first Gulf War (Griffin & Lee, 1995). The theories put forward by Bennett (1990) and Herman and Chomsky (2002), as well as the research conducted by Gans (2004) and Wolfsfeld (1997), all highlight the strong influence government officials have over the news media. Bennett (1990), Herman and Chomsky (2002), and Gans (2004) have performed content analyses that show a high proportion, almost always a majority or overwhelming majority of sources used in the news media are government sources, usually from the executive, and that news content favours government agendas.

In contrast, Groeling and Baum (2008) studied 42 U.S. foreign policy crises with a focus on military mobilisations and conflicts and found "waves of negativity in media coverage of elite discussion concerning the President and his policies". Glazier and Boydstun (2012) found that news content and White House messaging was closely aligned during and after crises but diverged

as the solidarity following a crises fades. Althaus (2003) found that in news coverage of the first Gulf War, journalists frequently presented critical viewpoints and often presented critical views themselves. Speer (2017) analysed *The New York Times*'s coverage of the Iraq war in late 2005 and early 2006 to find that the White House's preferred War on Terror frame was uncommon in the coverage, and not favoured by journalists the way Reese (2010) said it was following 9/11, supporting evidence for Glazier and Boydston's findings of diverging alignment. Bahador's (2007) research on the CNN effect demonstrated the power of the news media to shift government policy on the Kosovo War, ultimately prompting Western military intervention. Wolfsfeld (1997) and Lawrence (2000) both examine the potential of unpredictable events that have the potential to cause a loss of government control over the news narrative and lowered dependency of journalists on official sources, leading to viewpoints that are often critical of government actions.

This thesis casts new light on aspects of prior research, its added level of detail pointing to two key rules or regularities that could be seen to add further nuance to Wolfsfeld's (1997) more dynamic model of media behaviour, which highlights how news coverage can shift depending on the context in which the reporting takes place. The first rule is the 'left-right divide', and the second is the 'regional rule'. For the first rule, left-leaning newspapers provided higher levels of criticism of official actions than their right-leaning counterparts. This criticism was manifested in different ways. As shown in chapter 4, the left-leaning U.S. and Indian newspapers had (across the entire coverage of 2016) higher rates of criticism of police and military responses, and lower praise, as compared to the right-leaning newspapers. This even though the analysis of the stance use in the six terrorist attacks saw mixed results in the 'left-right divide'. The left-leaning papers in all three countries did not consistently feature higher levels of critical news coverage in the six attacks specifically. They did however consistently show a higher use of the 'responsibility frame': that is, police and intelligence actions and failings were framed as potentially contributory to attacks occurring with a far greater frequency in the U.S. and Indian left-leaning papers. The tables that show this data are on pages 92, 93 and 94.

For the above findings, *The Telegraph* and *The Guardian* show mixed results with *The Telegraph* often appearing more critical than *The Guardian* or with higher levels of "responsibility" framing. The overall volume listed in percentages presents a partial picture; however, a closer look at the text showed that *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* were directly critical of security and intelligence agencies. These criticisms ranged from deep structural problems with the police and ethnic profiling alienating Muslim communities in the Brussels bombings, to fragmented and underfunded security services and flawed intelligence services in the Nice attack. In the Brussels bombings, *The Telegraph* also discusses police failures but unlike the other newspapers it

highlights these failings as the fault of the E.U., and it uses the Brussels attack to support Brexit, arguing that Britain would be a safer country if it left the European Union. *The Telegraph* repeats this argument, albeit to a lesser degree, for the Nice attack.

Chapter 5 illustrated how, for most of the attacks, the left-leaning newspapers had a higher proportion of coverage devoted to exploring the motives and origins of terrorists. This finding is slightly mixed, however, as the U.K. papers are again an exception with *The Telegraph* outscoring *The Guardian* in two out of four attacks, and *USA Today* about three percent more than *The New York Times* for one attack. Once again, the numbers showing volume of coverage were illuminated by the news text content where there were clear and consistent differences between all the left and right-leaning newspapers. These differences are most obvious in the "origins" coverage. *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Hindu* were vocal in their coverage of how government policy failures contributed to attacks. Highlighted reasons included a lack of community cohesion, alienation of minorities with narrowly defined secular national identities, unequal housing opportunities, secularism, right-wing identity politics, a failure to recognise ethnic fault lines in immigrant communities leading to anger and resentment, and many others. The right-wing newspapers are mostly represented by *The Telegraph*, which, as confirmed in chapter 5, highlighted Britain's membership of the EU as an invitation to terrorism. In this manner, Brexit is made a part of terrorism coverage, as a solution to safeguarding the U.K's security interests.

The left-right divide described so far in summarising chapters 4 and 5 is subject to the second broad finding, the 'regional rule'. The 'rule' is hypothesised in so far as the analysis did not feature terrorist events in the U.K., but certainly the U.S. and Indian newspapers have lower levels of criticism and higher levels of praise for official responses for attacks that take place in their own nations. The 'regional rule' also manifests in different ways. The U.S. newspaper coverage of four terrorist attacks showed consistently higher levels of criticism for police and intelligence actions for the European security forces as compared to the U.S. police and intelligence agencies which attract little to no criticism at all. This is also visible for the U.S. newspapers' total 2016 coverage of U.S. and Western non-U.S. police issue/themes. The Indian newspapers behaved in a very similar way, both for the terrorist attacks, as well as total coverage of Indian and Western non-Indian police/military issue/themes (the tables that show this result are on pages 92 and 93). While *The New York Times* and *USA Today* are fairly critical of European police responses, this criticism is muted for U.S. agencies where both papers are defensive of local police and the F.B.I. For example, *The New York Times* reports that an F.B.I. failure to identify a terrorist after investigating him is due to their having to manage thousands of investigations. Local police action was defended, and the emotional trauma faced by police officers was the entire focus

of a 1500-word article. *USA Today* is similarly protective of U.S. law enforcement. "Responsibility" framing of police actions is far higher in the U.S. newspapers for European attacks, and far lower in the U.S. newspapers for U.S. attacks. *The Hindu*, the only Indian newspaper with any significant coverage of terrorism in Europe, attributes some responsibility to the authorities in 70 percent of its police coverage, which falls to 32 and 17 percent for the two Indian attacks (see table 4.58 on page 94). Interestingly, the Orlando shooting had a high potential for police criticism with reports of civilians caught in police crossfire (among other points), and it attracted the lowest rates of police coverage from the U.S. papers among all four attacks. It's possible this was because the U.S. papers simply wanted to avoid the scope for potentially critical police coverage. Both *The New York Times* and *USA Today* had about 9 percent of Orlando coverage describing police action. Brussels was 32 and 24 and Nice was about 14 and 25 respectively. A successful U.S. police outcome in the New York bombings with no victims and the terrorist successfully captured alive resulted in 24 and 42 percent of *The New York Times* and *USA Today* focusing on police coverage.

The regional rule also applies to the coverage of motives and origins. While both origin and motive coverage were lower for an attack in a U.S. and Indian newspaper's own country, there were also significant differences in the thematic content in the left-leaning newspapers' domestic and foreign coverage. In the European attacks *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* focused on social, economic, and political causes for terrorism, considering government failings as contributory. The coverage of terrorists' motives is lacking, either stated in brief, simplistic statements about how terrorists seek to inspire fear, or briefly mentioned in single articles then ignored across the rest of the coverage in favour of explanations more critical of government action. *The Telegraph* focuses on psychosocial causes and is unconcerned with state responsibility. In covering the U.S. attacks, the left-leaning papers converge with those on the right, foregrounding psychosocial emphases and containing almost no coverage of police or government failings. From alienation and community failings, government ineptitude and unequal housing in Europe, *The New York Times* and *Guardian* become narrowly focused on individual terrorist psychology and immediate social environments in the U.S., ignoring very clear politically oriented statements from terrorists mentioning foreign wars and civilian casualties, briefly mentioned in single articles and never referred to again.

The existing research on motives and origins (see chapter 2) similarly found a lack of coverage and explanation given to a terrorist's motives (Kelly & Mitchell, 1981; Paletz et al., 1982; Steuter, 1990; Sundar, 2016), and coverage when present does not focus on potential or stated political motives but on psychological causes, avoiding critical implications for U.S. and British foreign

policy (Kundnani, 2014). The motive and origin findings in this thesis (explored in chapter 5) support these existing research findings: roughly 10 percent of each terrorist attack's coverage was devoted to motives and origins, and in these attacks, political motives were largely side-lined in favour of psychological and religious explanations. While origin coverage does exist and is critical of government policies, it is limited to left-leaning papers' coverage of foreign governments.

These two core findings: the 'left-right divide' and the 'regional rule', show two possible conditions under which news content aligns with government agendas and diverges from them depending on the position of the news provider, politically and geographically. These findings are reflected in the other chapters of the present thesis.

In chapter 6 it was shown that the left-leaning papers have a higher proportion of military action stories that focus on civilian casualties than the right-leaning papers. *The New York Times*'s proportion of coverage is four percent higher than *USA Today*, *The Guardian* is 11 percent more than *The Telegraph*, and *The Hindu*, in an Indian context is 4 percent more than *The Times of India*, almost twice the proportion of coverage given to civilian casualties. When focused on civilian casualties in a Maoist context, however, *The Hindu* has only a one percent lead on *The Times of India*, even though it has far more articles overall.

As chapter 6 also showed, *USA Today* has a full-throated defence of U.S. military actions and bemoans the casualty prevention regulations that hamstring the military, while for *The Telegraph* civilian casualties are an afterthought, briefly mentioned as statistics towards the end of its articles on military action. This strongly supportive coverage of the military and apathetic approach to civilian casualties is lacking in *The New York Times*, but its neutral and descriptive stories betray a slant towards the military and U.S. government. The Central Command investigation report into the M.S.F. hospital attack contained clearly critical conclusions of the soldiers involved, which *The New York Times* ignored in favour of an emphasis that defended military actions: Soldier fatigue, the chaos of battle, and equipment failures were highlighted over critiques that there was enough time for the correct target to be selected, there was no need for any fast decisions, and that the attack didn't stop quickly enough once the target was reported as an M.S.F. clinic. *The Guardian* in contrast, describes the attack from a victim's perspective, and highlights the critical comments in the Central Command Report. In other attacks *The New York Times* shows some scepticism of local sources, and privileges military spokespersons, with added context that appears to be supportive of the military, though articles rarely veer into outspoken praise or justification. In contrast *The Guardian* is more critical and uses a variety of local and international NGOs as sources for this criticism.

The coverage of the San Bernardino's terrorist's iPhone explored in chapter 7 shows the potential impact of Apple's messaging. Apple CEO Tim Cook saw the points in his open letter echoed and carried in news articles, and the overall level of support for the F.B.I.'s position was low. The "left-right divide" is present here as well: in the U.S. papers the right-leaning *USA Today* has a higher level of support for the F.B.I. with 27 percent of its coverage outrightly supportive, compared to only 10 percent of *The New York Times*'s coverage. Support for Apple was virtually identical, with only a one percent difference between the two papers. Almost half of *The New York Times*'s coverage was neutral. The coverage of JASTA explored in chapter 8 shows this divide in a different light: while *USA Today* has minimal coverage of the law, and supports the 9/11 families completely, *The New York Times* has about 38 percent of its coverage in support of the government, with about 20 percent to the other stances. Only a single point, one highlighted by Obama, received attention in *The New York Times*, that is the fear of retaliatory lawsuits from other nations.

The left-right divide is further exemplified in *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph*'s coverage of the U.K.'s PREVENT counter-radicalisation program in chapter 9. *The Telegraph*'s coverage of the controversial scheme was far lower than *The Guardian*'s and attracted a very different tone of coverage: 36 percent of *The Telegraph*'s coverage was in support of PREVENT, and 45 opposed, compared to *The Guardian*'s 9 percent in support and 84 percent in opposition. *The Guardian* and *The Telegraph* both seem to engage in highlighting particular sources to suit their own narratives. *The Guardian* seems to ignore the positive comments made by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, where he supports PREVENT, in favour of his fewer, more negative comments. Those negative comments, stripped of their more positive context, make him appear far more of a severe critic. *The Guardian* also cites NGO-prepared reports without checking their citations, leading to avoidable errors. *The Telegraph* on the other hand seems to ignore the broader context in government provided statistics to make it appear as though radicalisation in the U.K. were a far bigger problem. Those same government statistics when viewed in their entirety plainly show a difference between people referred to PREVENT and the referrals the programme deems valid. The vast majority of referrals are dismissed by PREVENT. As seen in the previous paragraphs, certain points of view in *The New York Times*, *The Guardian*, and *The Telegraph* are made via the omission of context, either in news topic selection, or emphasis on a particular aspect of a source. As Taylor (1991, p.123) put it: "although the press uses official sources, it translates them to accord with its own predetermined needs.

In chapter 10, it was shown that the Indian newspapers' coverage of the Maoists, the left-leaning Hindu, does what no other newspaper in this thesis was found to do: it provides a platform for

Maoist statements regarding police brutality and their own motives without any further context or contradictory source. This chapter also highlights one of the few occasions where a right-leaning paper has a higher proportion of criticism of police or military actions than a left-leaning paper. *The Times of India* has 43 percent critical coverage of military and police action against the Maoists, compared to 35 percent in *The Hindu*, even though *The Hindu* has a far higher overall number of critical stories.

The penultimate chapter, chapter 11, further elaborates the "regional rule" observed in previous chapters. It shows how each newspaper provided an arguably disproportionate amount of terrorism coverage to its own region, regardless of the number of attacks. Terrorism in the U.S. might not be the problem it is in the Middle East, and yet terrorist attacks in the Middle East are vastly under-covered, while terrorism news in the U.S. receives far more attention in the U.S. papers. Each set of newspapers engages in the same behaviour. This may seem unsurprising, yet the degree of disproportion is striking. Further, the chapter shows how terrorist attacks in the U.S. and Western Europe are more likely to receive the pejorative tag of terrorism, while terrorist attacks in South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa are identified with a variety of other terms such as militancy. Exceptions seem to be made for U.S. allies in the Middle-East, where Israel and Turkey suffer "terrorist" attacks, while articles covering terrorism in Yemen, Lebanon, Libya, and Egypt often do not use the word "terrorism" or its variants at all, relying on the terms militant, fighter, Islamist, group name references, or an even mix of terms (which might include terrorism) with no single word being used more than the others. This shows that terrorism is a value laden term in the U.S. and U.K. papers, used for the home country and nations with a cultural, economic, or political connection. Its far higher use for domestic attacks and those in allied or connected nations, and its far higher use in regions that also receive far higher volumes of terrorism news coverage creates two categories of victims, those who are terrorised and suffer from terrorism, and those who are not and don't. This unequal divide despite groups like ISIS inflicting similar acts of violence across the world.

The sources studied across the thesis as a whole contradicts existing research which highlights the dominant use of State and other official sources. As noted previously (chapter 2), Welch (1972) found an almost total reliance on U.S. administration sources in her six-year study of U.S. military, economic and diplomatic actions in Indochina. Sigal (1973) found almost half of sources from The New York Times and Washington Post page one stories were US government officials, almost all of them from the executive. Hallin et al. (1993) found a majority of sources across seven U.S. newspapers favoured the executive. Iyengar and Simon (1994) found that half the U.S. broadcast news reports of the first Iraq war featured official spokespersons as their

primary sources. Lawrence (2000) found that out of 2,600 articles across *The New York Times* and LA Times regarding the police use of force, close to 80 per cent of all articles relied on official sources. Bennett (1990), Herman and Chomsky (2002), and Gans's (2004) research on the dominance of government sources has been referenced above.

This thesis investigated the use of sources as a part of the research question and found the case for this 'elite' reading to be less than convincing, at least as a generalisable theory. Table 12.1 below shows that across all the chapters, across all newspapers, the use of central or federal government, police, military, and intelligence sources along with (depending on the context), prosecutors and certain court officials, rarely rose above 30 percent of the total cited source use. The average for government and official sources was 29 percent, far from the 80 percent found by Lawrence or the "total reliance on Administration sources" found by Welch. Of this 29 percent finding in the thesis, 15 percent of cited official sources were used as principals, just three percent higher than non-government/official sources. The non-government source category included civilians, victims and their family members, NGOs, academics, authors, and think tanks. It also included relevant U.N. agencies. This category made up 18 percent of cited sources. More so than officials and non-officials, journalists use themselves as principal sources, almost 40 percent of all principal sources used are journalists and they are well represented across all critical news coverage, indicating that when criticism is made, journalists are usually the ones making it themselves, not a non-journalist source.

Table 12.1 – Cited and principal source use across chapters							
	Cited Sources			Principal Sources			
Attack/Topic	Gov/Officls	Non-Gov/Cvln	Journalist	Gov/Officls	Non-Gov	Journalist	No Prnpl
Brussels	33%	18%	23%	9%	8%	25%	40%
Nice	31%	16%	22%	12%	8%	22%	41%
Orlando	23%	11%	18%	14%	12%	26%	30%
NYC	23%	11%	18%	9%	6%	12%	51%
Pathankot	34%	3%	29%	25%	2%	15%	35%
Uri	30%	9%	26%	23%	11%	11%	25%
Civi Cas Total	29%	26%	20%	14%	21%	9%	38%
iPhone	22%	36%	16%	8%	18%	21%	44%
JASTA	42%	10%	13%	10%	3%	18%	49%
PREVENT	24%	45%	18%	9%	30%	15%	35%
Maoists	32%	12%	34%	28%	10%	18%	27%
Total (Avg %)	29%	18%	21%	15%	12%	17%	38%

Summing up, the present research has shown that the picture is more complex than seen in previous models that highlight official dominance, or dramatic events. Location and newspaper ideology both play a role in not just source selection, but how those sources are used to create a point of view, as well as the extent of coverage provided to issue/themes potentially critical of authority. Criticism of authority is certainly present, but to a far greater extent of foreign authorities, and more so in left-leaning papers.

12.3 Limitations and areas for further research

All research has limitations and omissions and the present study, despite its scope, is no exception. The first limitation to acknowledge is that the research did not involve studying any U.K. attacks. There were only two terrorist attacks in the U.K. given coverage in 2016: the murder of Labour MP Jo Cox by a right-wing terrorist, and the murder of a former Imam in Rochdale by ISIS supporters. The Jo Cox murder had 28 articles devoted to it in the newspapers studied, and in the initial research design was one of twelve terrorist attacks to be studied for the purposes of chapters 4 and 5. Due to time and space constraints, this number was reduced to six, and given the low number of articles, the Jo Cox murder was left out. At the time the research was still exploratory and it was not appreciated that the omission would mean not being able to fully assess the U.K. papers in relation to the "regional rule", although Chapter 11 shows this rule at least partially applies to them.

A second element that could have been modified was the high number of coding options for principal sources. In an effort to capture as much nuance as possible, official sources were listed in granular categories. For example, instead of 'U.S. Federal Government Official' as a single umbrella term, there were coding categories for 'U.S. President', 'U.S. Administration', 'U.S. Prosecutor' and others. While it was useful to see just how many times President Obama was cited in news articles, a bird's eye view that analysed general trends of official or non-official source use was more useful. When multiple, different U.S. federal officials were cited for an issue/theme without any single one relied on more than the other, rather than listing the principal source as "U.S Federal Official", it was listed as "no principal source" because there was no umbrella term to list them under. Hence the large number of "no principal sources" throughout the thesis. The benefit of acquiring extra detail in this area ultimately did not justify the time involved.

On reflection, an omission in coding was not including the word 'extremist' in the search terms. In designing the research it was felt that terrorism and its variants would be sufficient, with a word like 'extremist' equally commonly applied to non-terrorist as terrorist stances and actions. However, it has become clearer that right-wing terrorism is often referred to as extremism, not terrorism. Leaving this word out possibly accounts for the near-absence of right-wing terrorism in the thesis. I did include the words 'neo-nazi' and 'neo-fascist' in the search terms, but these words were infrequently used in news articles.

The research aim of being as comprehensive as possible had a drawback in yielding what was perhaps at times an overly complex research design. The goal was to capture every source category cited in every article's complete text, not just abstracts or first three paragraphs, and as many issue/themes or problem definitions as were used in news articles. Each news arti-

cle was allowed four issue/themes, but this made the analysis complex and time-consuming, and the overall research a lengthy process. It could have been reduced to two issue/themes with an acceptable loss of detail. Simplifications across the coding sheet would have reduced the amount of time spent coding. Despite these flaws, however, the coding sheet delivered an immense amount of data that proved very fruitful to analyse.

Improving research in this area, rather than regretting omissions, points to future possibilities. There is scope for future research in how the 'left-right divide' and 'regional rule' might intersect with each other, when one might take precedence over the other, and the impact of other influences. For example, the ideological leaning of a government as an independent variable couldn't be studied in this thesis given that 2016 was the only year analysed. 2016 saw a centre-left government in the U.S. and a right-wing government in the U.K. It's likely, of course, that a left-leaning newspaper would be less critical of a left-leaning government, and vice versa. This was seen in the findings but could only be fully explored given changes of government within the time period of research. The content analysis provided a large amount of data for this thesis, some of which could serve as starting points for future research such as article headline analysis. The detailed coding sheet serves as a stepping stone for other researchers to use or develop further in other projects.

The present thesis was made possible by the ability to search online sources and it seems probable that future content analysis on this scale would turn further towards using machine analysis, an earlier example being Papacharissi and Oliveira's (2008) use of centring resonance analysis. It would be relatively straightforward to adopt or develop a computer program to scan for keywords that could indicate sources used or issue/themes or government policies present. Tone analysis of text could be used in conjunction with this automated scanning to determine stances used. Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC: pronounced "Luke") developed at the University of Texas, Austin, is a computer program that determines the emotional content of text by comparing each word and word stem used against a dictionary in which each word has been assigned an emotional category.

The clearest advantage to automated content analysis is time. A year of coding could be shortened to weeks. This was considered at the start of this thesis but was rejected because of the clear disadvantages, chief among them being the lack of nuance and potential inaccuracies of the software in being unable to identify subtle cues in language that often change between newspapers. A human coder can more accurately identify different issue/themes, the use of one source over others through the championing of that source's claims, different stances and when a purported neutral stance is leaning towards once side or the other, as well as which variables

and trends to analyse during the coding sheets design and execution.

To conclude, this thesis found that the newspaper coverage of terrorism was more complex and multi-faceted than predicted by either 'political-elite' or 'event-driven' research. It found that official sources were not used as often as prior 'political-elite' research suggested they might be, a variety of non-government sources ranging from academics to NGOs and other civilians were used too. Terrorist attacks did inspire criticism of official actions as 'event-driven' research indicated, but only under certain conditions outside of which there was considerable support for a newspaper's domestic police and military responses. To explore these findings a diverse range of sources were listed in the coding sheet to ensure accurate and detailed representation, and then identified in complete article texts in 8,742 articles across six of the world's most widely read newspapers. Articles were analysed by identifying up to four issue/themes present in the text, alongside the presence of government policies, sources, and stances used. Two conditions were identified that shaped levels of praise and criticism in news content, showing that political elites and dramatic events are not the only variables in play. Newspaper ideology and region of reporting, or the 'left-right divide' and the 'regional rule' both play a role. Left-leaning newspapers have less praise and more criticism for official responses and actions than their right-leaning counterparts in general, and the U.S. and Indian newspapers show higher levels of deference to official responses and actions provided those officials are from the newspaper's home country. Those of foreign nations receive higher levels of criticism.

Studying the different aspects of terrorism news coverage in 2016 provided a large amount of data that allowed for a detailed analysis of a variety of variables and perspectives, with the goal of making a useful contribution to the field of media research. A comprehensive coding sheet allowed for a nuanced and in-depth study of the topic, and findings that reveal a complex news media landscape. Terrorism sadly continues to be a prominent feature of that landscape, and continuing research into its many dimensions is imperative if we are to understand our world, and even change it.

Appendix 1: The Coding Sheet

The coding manual for the content analysis for the representations of terrorism in U.S., U.K., and Indian news coverage

1. Newspaper: The Newspaper from which the article has been selected: The New York Times, USA Today, The Guardian, The Telegraph, The Times of India, The Hindu
2. Date: The news article date of publication, entered as dd/mm/yyyy
3. Day of week: The day of publication
4. Article URL: The URL of the article from the ProQuest database, (where possible bibliography entries contain urls from the publication website for easier access)
5. Page section: The section in which the article is located, A,B etc. Found only in The New York Times and The Telegraph
6. Page number: The page number on which the article is located, all NYT, USA Today and Telegraph articles have page numbers, The Guardian has them for some articles, Hindu and TOI do not have them at all.
7. Article Type: Is the article an editorial? Or a news report? If not explicitly stated, observe the writing style and decide.
8. Article Headline: The article's headline
9. Mention of terrorism: A binary selection of "Yes" or "No". If the article uses the word terrorist, terror, terrorism, counter-terror/terrorist anywhere in the article then select "Yes". If not, then select "No".
10. Dominant term for perpetrator:
    - word search each article for: terrorist (plus associated words), jihadi/jihadist, extremist, islamist, militant, figher, rebel, insurgent, fidayeen. Three additional options are: multiple, group name or none.
    - Count the number of occurrences of each term. If one term is used more than all other terms combined, then it is the dominant term.
    - Example, terrorist used 2 times, islamist used 2 times and militant used 1 time. Terrorist is not the dominant term as there are three occurrences of alternative terms. In this example there is no dominant term so enter multiple.
    - Use group name as the listing only when there is no other term linked to it. If the article describes the group as a terrorist/militant etc group then proceeds to use the group name, use the associated term as dominant.
    - Some articles will mention "terror" or "terrorism" only once without a connection to a group name and as a vague reference to general violence, if only used once and never again in the article select "None" as dominant term. If used two times or more as disconnected term use "terrorist" as dominant term.
11. Region of Focus: Which world region does the article focus on? If the article describes events or actions etc in more than one region without a clear focus then select Global (multi-region). If more than one region in the West, e.g. North America and Western Europe select Global (West). If more than one region not containing Western nations select Global (Non West). The list of regions used has been taken from the Global Terrorism Database Codebook given that the GTD will be used in the analysis to calculate over and under coverage by region, the regions in my database need to match the GTD database:

1 = North America: Canada, Mexico, United States

2 = Central America & Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Martinique, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago

3 = South America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Falkland Islands, French Guiana, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

4 = East Asia: China, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, North Korea, South Korea, Taiwan

5 = Southeast Asia: Brunei, Cambodia, East Timor, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, South Vietnam, Thailand, Vietnam

6 = South Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Mauritius, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka

7 = Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan

8 = Western Europe: Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Gibraltar, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Vatican City, West Germany (FRG)

9 = Eastern Europe: Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Estonia, Hungary, Kosovo, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Serbia, Montenegro, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Soviet Union, Ukraine, Yugoslavia

10 = Middle East & North Africa: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, North Yemen, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Western Sahara, Yemen

11 = Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, People's Republic of the Congo, Republic of the Congo, Rhodesia, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

12 = Australasia & Oceania: Australia, Fiji, French Polynesia, New Caledonia, New Hebrides, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna

12. Country of Focus: Which country does the article focus on? Choose from the list given, if new country found, add it to the list.
13. Attack Focus: Does the article focus on a single attack? An article can either make a terrorist attack it's primary focus, and report on its details, political reactions and so forth. Or it makes a single, central reference to a terrorist attack, and then uses that reference to discuss associated topics, societal reactions, measures to mitigate terrorism etc. List the attack that is either the

primary focus or the central reference. Contact researcher for a full list of terrorist attacks covered in the 6 newspapers in 2016.

14. Perpetrator Ideology: The great majority of articles focus on terror attacks, terror groups, or counter terrorist actions against a group that are motivated by a single ideology. State the ideology of the terrorist group being given coverage. The categories used to analyse articles is also from the Global Terrorism Database.

   1. Religious extremism: Violence in support of a particular faith-based belief system and its corresponding cultural practices and views, sometimes in opposition to competing belief systems. Characterized by opposition to purported enemies of God, nonbelievers, or perceived evildoers; striving to forcibly insert religion into the political or social sphere through the imposition of strict religious tenets or laws; and/or bring about end times. Subcategories:
   2. Right-wing: Violence in support of the belief that personal and/or national way of life is under attack and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent. Characterized by anti-globalism, racial or ethnic supremacy or nationalism, suspicion centralized federal authority, reverence for individual liberty, and/or belief in conspiracy theories that involve grave threat to national sovereignty and/or personal liberty.
   3. Left-wing: Violence in support of a revolutionary socialist agenda and the view that one is a protector of the populace. Characterized by disdain for capitalism, imperialism, and colonialism, and by a Marxist political focus and procommunist/socialist beliefs, or support for a decentralized, non-hierarchical sociopolitical system (e.g., anarchism).
   4. Nationalist/Separatist: Violence in support of ethnic or geo-political self-determination. Characterized by regional concentration and a history of organized political autonomy, traditional rule, or regional government, and a commitment to gaining or regaining political independence.
   5. Single issue extremism

15. Religious Extremism subcategory:

   1. Christian
   2. Jewish
   3. Islamic
   4. Hindu
   5. Buddhist

16. Group name: State the name of the group.
17. Issue/theme: Each news article is being read as a series of issues and themes, similar to Entman's problem definition variable, it covers the different thematic focuses of news articles. Up to 4 issue/themes are recorded. State the issue or theme: (Evaluation of intelligence agencies onward is divided by a list of countries)
   1. Descriptive/details of terrorist event: Terrorist actions, events of the attack.
   2. Danger of foreign recruits: Activities of terrorist recruits, terrorist recruiters
   3. Terrorist background and profile: Background information on terrorist unconnected to motives and origins.

4. Potential strategies to erode terrorist power: Discussions of social, legal, policing and other strategies to counter terrorism.

5. Brutality of terrorist action: Gory descriptions of terrorist violence usually against large civilian populations. Stories of ISIS use of sex slaves, forcing civilians as human shields etc.

6. Warnings of Terror Attacks: When an article warns of an impending terrorist attack and discusses the danger.

7. Evaluation of risk of terrorism overall: Statistics based issue/theme where the article discusses the statistical risk of terrorism to a country, city, or population.

8. Increase in domestic/international surveillance: Articles describing specific counter-terrorist action related to government surveillance.

9. Exploration of terrorist group goals/motives – Explorations (or even mentions) of a group or individuals motives, or motivations.

10. Exploration of terrorist group origins/support base/conditions for growth – Exploration of terrorist group origins, historical, political, economic etc. or conditions for growth.

11. Accusation of terror group involvement in attack: If a terrorist group is accused of orchestrating an attack.

12. Accusation of state complicity in attack: If a state is accused of orchestrating an attack.

13. Details of foiled terrorist attack: Details about terrorist attacks that were prevented from taking place.

14. Decline of terrorist influence/power: Details about how a terrorist group's influence and/or power is waning.

15. Expansion of terrorist influence/power: Details about how a terrorist group's influence and/or power is expanding.

16. Multiculturalism: Some articles use terrorism as a springboard to discuss multiculturalism. Rare.

17. Societal reaction to terrorism: Describes individual civilian responses to terrorist attacks, demonstrations, protests etc.

18. Alienation of muslims/defence of Islam: Describes discrimination against Muslims as a result of terrorist attacks, sometimes involving a defence of Islam in some shape.

19. Definition of terrorism/labelling some ideologies terrorism: Discussions about how to define terrorism. Rare.

20. Memorial for victim: Describes praise for victims who have died in terrorist attacks, details of their lives, statements about them from family and friends.

21. Negative economic Impact: Describes the negative economic impact caused by terrorism.

22. Danger of Terrorist propaganda: Describes terrorist messaging, social media, radio, propaganda dissemination efforts. Distinct from "danger of foreign recruits" but can be used in conjunction, this focuses exclusively on messaging activities. Usually focuses on ISIS communication tactics in Iraq and Syria.

23. Government Counter Terror Actions, Military: Describes military actions against terrorists.

24. Government Counter Terror Actions, Police: Describes police actions against terrorists.

25. Government Counter Terror Actions, Legal: Describes legal efforts to undermine terrorism.

26. Government Counter Terror Actions, Social: This describes government social outreach programs, communications campaigns, anti-terror work that involves community outreach

and deradicalization, actions that are designed to have a softer counter terrorism response via societal mechanisms, they don't involve the framing of new laws.

27. Government Counter Terror Actions, Other – This involves the investment to safeguard critical infrastructure, and any other actions that don't fall into the above categories.

28. Politician/Political Response/Reaction/Philosophy: Politician statements and responses regarding terrorism that don't match the other issue/themes. For example, this is not used when a politician engages in memorialising the victims of an attack, the issue/theme would be victim memorial. It is used if the politician engages in an emotional condemnation of the terrorists as barbaric, brutal etc without any clear detail as to describing the attack, the motives, etc. or engages in blaming other political figures.

29. Country Subdivisions: U.S, U.K, France, Germany, Other E.U Country, E.U, Other West, Israel, Turkey, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Other

18. Issue Policy/Question: List any specific references to government policies, overarching questions that repeat across articles, laws being debated etc. The issue policy/question is linked to the issue/theme. For example, if the issue/theme is Government Counter Terrorist Action, Legal, and the subject being reported is the Real ID law, then the issue policy is the Real ID law and the sources/journalists/articles stance on it.

19. Source: Sources being used for the issue theme and policy question: Divided by country, U.S, U.K, France, Germany, Other E.U Country, E.U, Other West, Israel, Turkey, Iraq, India, Pakistan, Egypt, Other MENA, Other. Sources were combined into single categories in the final analysis.

U.S President, Democrat	U.S President, Republican
U.S Administration, Democrat	U.S Administration, Republican
U.S Senator, Republican	U.S Senator, Democrat
U.S Congressman, Republican	U.S Congressman, Democrat
U.S State Government official, Republican	U.S State Government official, Democrat
U.S Politician, Republican	U.S Politician, Democrat
U.S, Other government source	U.S Unnamed government sources
U.S Intelligence Official, N.S.A	U.S Intelligence Official, C.I.A
U.S Unnamed Intelligence Official	U.S Military Official, Pentagon/Armed Forces
U.S Law Enforcement, F.B.I	U.S Law Enforcement, state police
U.S unnamed law enforcement	U.S Judge
U.S Prosecutor	U.S Defence Attorney
U.S Retired Government Official (All branches)	U.S Retired Military Official
U.S Retired Intelligence Official	U.S Civilian/Local
U.S victim/victim family	U.S Think Tank
U.S NGO/Independent Monitor	U.S Academic/Authors
U.K Prime Minister	U.K Administration (Cabinet/Officials)
U.K House of Commons Member, Conservative	U.K House of Commons Member, Labour
U.K House of Commons Member, Liberal Democrat	U.K House of Commons Member, SNP
U.K House of Commons Member, Plaid Cymru	U.K House of Commons Member, UKIP
U.K House of Commons Member, Other	U.K House of Lords
U.K unnamed government source	U.K Intelligence Official, MI5
U.K Intelligence Official, MI6	U.K Unnamed Intelligence Official
U.K Military Official	U.K Law Enforcement Official
U.K Judge	U.K Court Official

U.K Retired Government Official (All branches)	U.K Retired Military Official
U.K Retired Intelligence Official	U.K Civilian/Local
U.K victim/U.K victim family	U.K Think Tank
U.K NGO/Independent Monitor	U.K Academic/Author
French government (Federal)	French government (State)
French politician	French unnamed government source
French intelligence	French military
French police	French unnamed intelligence/military/police
French judiciary/officer of the court	French civilian
French victim/victim family	French NGO/Independent Monitor
French Think Tank	French Academic/author
German government (federal)	German government (state)
German politician	German unnamed government source
German intelligence	German military
German police	German judiciary/officer of the court
German civilian	German victim/victim family
German NGO/Independent Monitor	German Think Tank
German Academic/Author	E.U Government
E.U intelligence/police	E.U Country Government
E.U Country Politician	E.U Country intelligence
E.U Country military	E.U Country police
E.U Country judiciary/officer of the court	E.U Country civilian/local
E.U Country victim/victim family	E.U Country NGO/Independent Monitor
E.U Country Think Tank	E.U Country Academic/Author
Other Western Nation government	Other Western Nation politician
Other Western Nation intelligence/military/police	Other Western nation Judiciary/Officer of the Court
Other Western nation civilian	Other Western Nation victim/victim family
Other Western nation NGO/Think Tank/Independent Monitor	Other Western Nation Academic/Author
Israeli Government	Israeli politician
Israeli intelligence	Israeli military
Israeli police	Israeli judiciary/officer of the court
Israeli civilian	Israeli victim/victim family
Israeli academic/author	Israeli NGO/independent monitor
Turkish government	Turkish politician
Turkish intelligence	Turkish military
Turkish police	Turkish judiciary/officer of the court
Turkish civilian	Turkish victim/victim family
Turkish academic/author	Turkish NGO/independent monitor
Iraqi government	Iraqi politician
Iraqi intelligence	Iraqi military
Iraqi police	Iraqi judiciary/officer of the court
Iraqi civilian	Iraqi victim/victim family
Iraqi academic/author	Iraqi NGO/independent monitor
Indian Prime Minister	Indian Administration
Indian Lok Sabha Member BJP	Indian Lok Sabha Member, Congress
Indian police, federal	Indian police, state
Indian unnamed government source	Indian army
Indian judge	Indian prosecutor
Indian lawyer	Indian intelligence agency

Indian civilian/local	Indian victim/victim family
Indian NGO/independent monitor	Indian academic/author
Pakistani government	Pakistani politician
Pakistani intelligence	Pakistani military
Pakistani police	Pakistani judiciary/officer of the court
Pakistani civilian	Pakistani victim/victim family
Pakistani NGO/Independent monitor	Pakistani academic/author
Egyptian government	Egyptian politician
Egyptian intelligence	Egyptian military
Egyptian police	Egyptian judiciary/officer of the court
Egyptian civilian	Egyptian victim/victim family
Egyptian NGO/Independent monitor	Egyptian academic/author
Other MENA government	Other MENA politician
Other MENA intelligence/military/police	Other MENA judiciary/officer of the court
Other MENA civilian/victim/victim family	Other MENA NGO/Independent monitor
Other MENA academic/author	Other Country government
Other country politician	Other country intelligence/military/police
Other country judiciary/officer of the court	Other country civilian/victim/victim family
Other country NGO/independent monitor	Other country academic/author
Anonymous source	Unnamed civilian
Unnamed security/police	Unnamed government
Terrorist spokesperson	Terrorist's family
Jihadi videos/website material	Corporations
Industry Leaders, Technology	Industry Leaders, Other
Other news agencies	Pope/Vatican
United Nations	Journalist's unsourced facts/unattributed opinions

20. Principal Source: Does the article rely on a single source over others to report on the issue or prove a point? Which source is used to provide either the most information in the article, or used to drive home the article's message? 'Proving points' and 'driving home messages' does not necessarily have to be based on the space given to a source, an article can consist of a Republican politician statements in the majority and then have a paragraph by the journalist that dilutes, contradicts, or shows in a negative light, the validity of the prior source information or viewpoint. The principal source in such a case would the journalist, despite the journalist only appearing in a single paragraph. This depends on the extent to which a source's points are engaged with and undermined.

21. Source Stance/Position: What is the stance of the article as a whole towards the issue/theme and policy/issue, or the stance of the principal source if a principal source is being used? This rating depends on context. If the issue is "negative economic impact" and the rating is 1. Then the source stance is not positive evaluation of or spin on the negative economic impact, but rather in agreement that there is in fact a negative economic impact. Similarly to the issue "expansion of terrorist influence" a 1 rating does not mean that the sources support the expansion of a terrorist group's influence, but rather support the evidence that an expansion is in fact taking place. The 1. rating includes the term "in agreement".
    1. Supportive/In agreement/Positive evaluation
    2. Neutral/Supports multiple positions
    3. Oppositional/Disagreement/Negative evaluation

      4.   Descriptive/undisputed/reports event without supporting stance

22. Frames:
    1.   Government Powers Frame: Focus on government surveillance or general stories about government overreach or limiting government powers.

    2.   Enemy Within Frame: Stories about foreign and local terrorist recruits and their activities

    3.   State of Fear Frame: Articles with a strong tone of fear, typically describing brutal terrorist activity (genocides/chemical weapons use etc) without any solution.

    4.   Terrorist Attack Frame: Stories that describe acts of terrorist violence.

    5.   Memorial of Victim Frame: This frame describes articles that are dedicated to the victims of terrorist attacks, typically tributes, content about the victim's behaviour, praise etc.

    6.   Responsibility Frame: The 'How did it happen' frame. Articles that assign blame on individuals or institutions for inadequacies that resulted in a terrorist attack, or explain the causes behind a terrorist attack

    7.   Retribution Frame: This frame is used to describe the arrests/sentencing of terrorists and counter offensive operations.

    8.   Resistance Frame: Investigations by police, legal proposals to inhibit terrorist recruitment, any action to prevent a terrorist attack, societal reactions to protest terrorism, all fall under resistance.

    9.   Political Factions Frame: An exploration of the political responses from different factions, usually criticising each other.

    10. Western/Local Muslim Frame: Articles about Muslim discrimination/xenophobia, or positive activity by Muslim religious groups.

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