

The Religious Paradox: Examining the countervailing impacts of religious and spiritual beliefs on socio-political outcomes

Christopher Lockhart

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology, the University of Auckland, 2021.

Abstract

Religious beliefs have often been argued to be universally held across cultures and history, yet their socio-political impacts are often ambiguous and poorly understood. This thesis examines forms of religious identification to address two fundamental gaps in the literature on religion's impact on political attitudes. The first oversight addressed by this thesis is to identify the temporal ordering of the oft-noted close relationship between religion and authoritarianism. The second gap addressed by this thesis is the countervailing association between religion and socio-political views, thereby demonstrating the plurality of religious identification and how different dimensions of religious belief affect political identification, environmental concern, and attitudes towards gender equality. Through four studies using data drawn from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS), I demonstrate that whilst religiosity appears to foster authoritarian attitudes, spirituality correlates with egalitarianism and thus increased liberal political identification and pro-environmental attitudes. Finally, drawing on past work, I suggest that religious collective narcissism—a threat-motivated defensiveness of the positive self-image of one's religious group—might suppress some of the positive impacts of religious identification on intergroup relations. Collectively, this work provides insight into the multidimensional nature of religion and its countervailing impacts on socio-political attitudes.

Acknowledgements

“Why should I let the toad work
Squat on my life?
Can’t I use my wit as a pitchfork
And drive the brute off?”

- *Toads*, by Phillip Larkin

With this thesis done I just want to express my thanks and gratitude to all the people who helped me “drive the brute off”. Firstly, to my primary supervisor Danny Osborne for his incredible patience, guidance, and generosity over the years. I genuinely don’t think this thesis would ever have been completed without his help and encouragement. Thank you also to Chris Sibley for all your support and wisdom, as well as the advice you’ve given over the course of my studies.

Secondly to all members of the NZAVS, past and present, including Anastasia, Carol, Chloe, Correna, Elena, Joaquin, Kieran, Lana, Nicole, Sam, Yanshu. Your friendship and support have made this a much lighter and enjoyable experience than Larkin’s poem might indicate. I admire each of you for your passion, and for making the office feel much brighter. I also want to thank my co-authors and the NZAVS research assistants, without whom this research would not be possible.

Finally, to my parents and family, for all their help and motivation. Thank you for listening to me babble on about my thesis, even when it made no sense, but allowing me to organise my thoughts. Thank you for every bit of support (big or small) over the years; it really has made all the difference.

Table of Contents

Abstract.....	i
Acknowledgements.....	ii
Table of Contents.....	vii
Introduction.....	1
The Religious Identity.....	2
Religion and political ideology.....	6
Religion and authoritarianism.....	9
The multidimensional nature of religion.....	13
The role of spirituality.....	20
Beyond RWA and SDO: The role of Collective Narcissism.....	22
Thesis Overview.....	27
Comment on publications.....	30
Chapter II: The Authoritarian Incubator: Examining the effect of conversion to Christianity on Right-Wing Authoritarianism.....	31
Bridging Statement.....	32
Introduction.....	35
Does religion socialize RWA?.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Religion and SDO.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Current Study.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Method.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Measures.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Results.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Discussion.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Conclusion.....	Error! Bookmark not defined.
Chapter III: Religion makes—and unmakes—the status quo: Religiosity and Spirituality have opposing effects on conservatism via RWA and SDO.....	64
Bridging Statement.....	65
Introduction.....	67
Religion and Conservatism.....	67

Current Study	71
Method	72
Participants	72
Measures	73
Results	75
Discussion	78
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions.....	81
Conclusion.....	83
Chapter IV: To be at one with the land: Māori spirituality predicts greater environmental regard	90
Bridging Statement.....	91
Introduction	95
Māori Identity and Environmental Regard.....	96
Method	102
Measures	102
Results	104
Discussion	106
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions.....	109
Conclusion.....	110
Chapter V: Religiosity and ambivalent sexism: The role of religious group narcissism.....	116
Bridging Statement.....	117
Introduction	120
Religion and Ambivalent Sexism.....	120
Collective Narcissism.....	123
Religious Group Narcissism and Ambivalent Sexism	124
Current Study	124
Method	125
Measures	128
Results	129
Discussion	135
Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions.....	138

Conclusion.....	138
Chapter VI: General Discussion	141
Main Findings	144
Contributions and Implications	150
Conclusion	161
References.....	164

Introduction

"The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice"

- Allport (1954)

Religious beliefs have often been argued to be universally held across cultures and histories around the world, yet the societal impacts of religion are complex and often misunderstood. Religiosity can foster social inequality as well as outgroup derogation and hostility, the most apparent example might be illustrated by the burning crosses left on the lawns of Black Americans during the Civil Rights era (Newton, 2014). Yet perhaps the most prominent of Civil Rights leaders during that time, Martin Luther King, Jr., was a devout Baptist minister. Under his leadership, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference played a powerful role in the fight for desegregation and racial equality. Even today, churches are argued to provide the Black community with an important resource for political activity (Harris-Lacewell, 2004; Kelly & Morgan, 2008), including mobilization efforts termed “souls to the polls” which have come under political pressure through changes to voting laws by Republican state governments (Herron & Smith, 2012). Thus, a fundamental question must be asked: what drives such diametric outcomes, despite each side seemingly motivated by religious beliefs? This thesis aims to resolve this paradox by examining how religion motivates political attitudes.

The Religious Identity

“Anyone who has truly practiced a religion knows very well that it is [the set of regularly repeated actions that make up the cult] that stimulates the feelings of joy, inner peace, serenity, and enthusiasm that, for the faithful, stand as experimental proof of their beliefs. The cult is not merely a system of signs by which the faith is outwardly expressed; it is the sum total of means by which that faith is created and recreated periodically. Whether the cult consists of physical operations or mental ones, it is always the cult that is efficacious.”

- Emile Durkheim (1912), *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*

Religion is a nebulous topic, particularly as the meaning and definition of religion has often been debated throughout the literature (see Hill et al., 2000; Tracy, 1981; Zinnbauer et al., 1999). Drawing on the work of Geertz (1966), Bellah (2011) posits that believers experience religion as a transcendental, experiential dimension; a religious ‘reality’ that sits separate and distinct from the “world” of everyday life. Meanwhile, Geertz (1966; 1975) argues that the everyday experiences of the layperson are essentially an ordered form of thought drawn from cultural underpinnings and organised into a framework that could be termed “common sense”. Thus, Bellah (2011) and Geertz (1966) address a fundamental aspect of contention when examining religion – i.e., that the implicit assumptions of religion appear to run counter to the grounded beliefs about the world upon which we rely when utilising “common sense” to navigate everyday life. In exploring this transcendental dimension, tacit acceptance of the mundane rules of the world are cast away to embrace a communal experience within which believers share, for a moment, a reality beyond the temporal.

Prior to this, Durkheim (1912) argued that religion is a “system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things”. By “things”, Durkheim addresses not simply the traditional concepts

of a deity (an anthropomorphised yet superhuman entity), but what could be termed animistic beliefs including the sacred and divine aspects of rocks, trees, springs, or even language. Indeed, perhaps one of the most powerful characterisations of the biblical Christian God is not as a superhuman entity, but rather, that of “the Word” (or perhaps *Logos*) – a term still debated but which may encapsulate the creative and also immutable laws and intent through which the divine realm is transformed into the mundane world (Edwards, 1995). Bound together by these ancient laws, adherents experience religion as a communal exercise of ritual and practice (Emmons, 1999).

Whilst distinct on the surface, the overlap between these two approaches becomes apparent. The first approach engages with religion as an experienced phenomenon drawn from cultural underpinnings, whilst the latter view encompasses communal beliefs and religious practices by which this phenomenon is defined, accessed, and participated in. What begins to emerge is a form of religion that encompasses a communal focus on the sacred (whatever that might be) which shapes the thoughts and experiences of believers, thereby creating a transcendental worldview that is shared with like-minded others, and ultimately forming a group with shared beliefs and practices (Hogg et al., 2010; King, 2003). Thus, drawing on the work of Tajfel and Turner (1979), religiosity is not simply a convergent set of individual beliefs, but a lived, communal experience – a social identity rooted in an ordered system of shared norms and laws centred on this concept of sacredness (Paloutzian & Park, 2005).

The social identity approach to religion suggests that individuals are driven to self-identify with groups that offer status and support, particularly when exposed to threats to self-esteem or well-being (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Social groups also provide a network of mutual support for the pursuit of shared goals and aims. Beyond such concerns, group identification is

also argued to be integral to one's sense of self (Tajfel, 1981). Through self-categorisation, an intrinsic distinction is created between those who share one's social category (the *in-group*) and those who do not (the *out-group*), and through this distinction a group member's self-concept is defined.

Consistent with this perspective, religious group affiliates typically view their religious membership as fundamental to their self-identity, with corresponding positive impacts on self-esteem (Thompson et al., 2012). Notably, this effect was particularly pronounced when affiliates were low in socio-economic status. However, religion is unique in its breadth by not only providing shared norms to ameliorate uncertainty concerns regarding daily life, but by also offering a comprehensive mythology and ideology that addresses fundamental existential issues regarding meaning, purpose and certainty (Hogg et al., 2010). Indeed, Krumrei-Mancuso (2018) noted that religious participation was negatively associated with intellectual humility, suggesting a powerful sense of certainty amongst affiliates. Furthermore, Ysseldyk and colleagues (2010) posit that religious groups foster a sense of eternal group membership, as well as the possibility of eternal spiritual rewards, creating a powerful sense of stability and future certainty amongst adherents.

Given this enhanced sense of certainty, religious identification tends to be linked to high perceptions of life satisfaction (Ozmen et al., 2018), greater subjective psychological well-being (Greenfield & Marks, 2007), and lower death anxiety (Jackson et al., 2018). On the darker side, religious affiliation also appears to protect against the negative impacts of deprivation on subjective wellbeing (Hoverd & Sibley, 2013; Thompson et al., 2012). Thus, whilst religion may address fundamental epistemic needs for meaning and security, Jost and colleagues (2014) argue that religion is also palliative and justifies the existing social order by enculturating and supporting

legitimising myths and ideologies. Indeed, religion has been associated with a range of outcomes that foster greater social inequality, such as endorsement of conservatism (Guth et al., 2006), authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), and sexual, racial, and gendered forms of prejudice (Hall et al., 2010; Bosetti et al., 2011; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014).

Yet religious rhetoric is often framed as arguing for equitable outcomes across social groups; indeed, many religious figures featured prominently amongst the American civil rights leaders during the mid-twentieth century (Houck & Dixon, 2006). This is somewhat antithetical to the notion that religious affiliation fosters social inequality, as well as raising the question of why religious identification has countervailing effects on socio-political issues. This thesis aims to address this paradox by examining the possibility that religious affiliation can elicit both traditionally hierarchical and egalitarian roles, and by illustrating nuances in religious affiliation and belief that help explain these contradictory effects. We then extend past work in this area by incorporating the dual process model of ideology (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009) to explain these effects. Furthermore, we contextualise these countervailing effects beyond simple ideology by examining specific socio-political issues.

Thus, this thesis begins by examining the connection between religious affiliation and political ideology, assessing the role of religious identity in fostering attitudes commonly linked to greater social inequality and outgroup hostility – specifically, authoritarianism. I then assess the multidimensional nature of religious affiliation by examining the theoretical underpinnings of identification before turning to spirituality, a form of religiosity that may foster more equitable socio-political outcomes. Finally, I look to how other forms of religious identification, specifically collective narcissism, may also explain differences in the ways religious beliefs impact socio-political outcomes. With this context in mind, this thesis presents four studies that

address fundamental questions raised by the literature, as well how they contribute to the field.

Religion and political ideology

“Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in popular form, its spiritual point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and justification.”

- Karl Marx (1843)

Religion has long been argued to foster satisfaction with the current status quo, providing a palliative effect that bolsters perceived wellbeing, but at the cost of concealing the true damage inflicted by inequality. Consistent with this perspective, Gaskins and colleagues (2013) found that religious participation is associated with lower societal development and higher levels of inequality. Similarly, past work has noted that religious beliefs flourish during times of social unrest (Kay et al., 2008; Kay et al., 2010), providing comfort and reducing anxiety. For example, Shepherd and colleagues (2017) found that governmental institutions often adopt the symbolic attributes of religious affiliation in times of crisis to compensate and help bolster public confidence in the system.

Collectively, this literature demonstrates that religious beliefs fulfil epistemic needs when secular institutions cannot, providing a sense of order and stability (Kay et al., 2010) in times of societal upheaval. The role of religion in addressing this need for predictability may be a product of evolutionary history, with religious affiliation argued to have evolved to bind groups into moral communities (Graham & Haidt, 2010). As such, religion fosters close-knit groups which provide not only structure and predictability, but a social network where such reliability can allow for mutual interdependence and support (Sosis & Bressler, 2003). Most importantly, religious group identification promises a stability and continuity beyond the limitations of

secular or temporal authority, providing the notion of an “eternal” united community that extends past mortality (Ysseldyk et al., 2010), and (nominally) beyond the boundaries of class, race or other forms of division.

Religion fundamentally addresses epistemic needs for security, stability, and continuity. Indeed, personality research reveals that religion is related to traits which underly these needs, including a positive relationship with conscientiousness (a preference for order), but a negative correlation with openness to values (see Saroglou, 2010). This appears to reflect a trend towards an ordered worldview that seeks to constrain ambiguity and instability with simple and intuitive answers. Indeed, belief in God is associated with uncertainty avoidance (Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015) and religious belief is correlated with a greater need for closure, intolerance of ambiguity, and a corresponding increase in dogmatic thought and judgement certainty (Sagioglou & Forstmann, 2013; Saroglou, 2002). In essence, religious believers appear to have strong epistemic needs for certainty and stability, with their religious social identity helping to ameliorate concerns over ambiguity and order.

Research has also indicated that these epistemic motivations are shared with conservatism. Jost and colleagues (2003) argue that political ideologies are born out of a desire to fulfil epistemic needs, with conservatism motivated by a need for certainty and stability provided by simple answers. In service of these motives, the two core components of conservatism are argued to be a resistance to change and an acceptance of inequality, thus creating a political ideology that produces stability by legitimising existing (and often unequal) systems. As such, religion and conservatism have consistently been shown to be strongly

correlated¹, with strong convergence on a number of moral and political issues, such as attitudes towards abortion (Petersen & Mauss, 1976), same-sex marriage (van der Toorn et al., 2017), and environmental conservation (Peifer et al., 2016), as well as forms of racial and gender-based prejudice (see Hall et al., 2010; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014). Importantly, they also appear to share multiple predictors and outcomes related to the management of uncertainty and anxiety, as well as fostering a sense of structure and continuity, including an intolerance of ambiguity, a need for closure and an endorsement of dogmatism (see Duriez, 2003; Jost et al., 2003; Jost et al., 2014).

Consistent with this reasoning, religion is associated with numerous values that prioritise preservation of the social order including traditionalism, conformity, and security (Saroglou et al., 2004) – all values that overlap with a conservative ideology. Religion is also associated with the moral foundations of in-group loyalty, purity, and respect for authority – the “binding” foundations of morality which foster tight-knit ingroups (Graham & Haidt, 2010) and predict conservatism (Graham et al., 2009). Thus, both religious and conservative group identities can address the issues of uncertainty by creating stable and loyal ingroups, bound together by group norms and values that members are expected to (publicly) support and conform to. Importantly, this mutual focus on loyalty suggests religion may be strongly related to conservatism as a product of a convergence of the two in fostering ingroup favouritism.

Whilst religiosity has often positioned itself as strongly prosocial – notably, characterised as the “Golden Rule” of religion (see Vilaythong et al., 2010), past work has indicated that such

¹ Exceptions are inevitable; for example, Catholic voters in the United States have contributed to the elections of both Republican and Democratic political officials (Prendergast & Prendergast, 1999) – likely a product of the historical antipathy of the American national identity towards Catholic immigrants (Casanova, 2012). Even then, however, Catholics have demonstrated a solid trend towards Republican affiliation in recent years (McDermott, 2007), though research indicates this conservative affiliation is restricted to majority-white traditions (O’Brien & Abdelhadi, 2020).

prosociality may be conditional, with religiosity predicting a preference towards other religious ingroup members (Dunkel & Dutton, 2016). Johnson and colleagues (2012) found that religiosity predicted outgroup prejudice, and religious priming increased negative attitudes towards norm-violators (also see Preston & Ritter, 2013). Furthermore, Kossowksa and Sekerdej (2015) argued that discomfort with ambiguity was associated with a greater belief in God and a derogation of outgroups that threatened the values of religion (but not outgroups irrelevant to religious norms). Interestingly, work on religious racism argued that racial discrimination is motivated by a form of ingroup favouritism, predicated on a religious ethnocentrism which positions same-race individuals as ingroup members and other races as norm-violating outsiders (Hall et al., 2010).

In a similar vein, conservatism has been consistently associated with greater ingroup identification and favouritism (see Parker & Janoff-Bulman, 2013; Sparkman et al., 2019). For example, Iacoviello and Spears (2018) found that conservatism was associated with increased ingroup favouritism and that this was perceived as consistent with their ingroup norms. Furthermore, they also noted that conservatism was negatively associated with perceived external norms which proscribed ingroup favouritism, perhaps because such norms threatened their fundamental motives towards ingroup loyalty. Indeed, moral foundations theory posits that ingroup loyalty is a fundamental motive of conservative ideology in contrast to the universalist values that underlie left-wing political attitudes (Weber & Federico, 2013).

Religion and authoritarianism

Given that both religious and conservative social identities predict ingroup favouritism, one possible mediator of this relationship between religion and conservatism is right-wing authoritarianism (RWA). This reflects an ideology motivated by ingroup favouritism (Stangor & Leary, 2006) and serves as a powerful predictor of conservative ideology (see Wilson & Sibley,

2013). This attitude is composed of three subdomains, including (a) obedience toward authority figures (authoritarian submission), (b) conformity to group norms (conventionalism), and (c) punishment of value-violators (authoritarian aggression; see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Notably, these share close conceptual overlap with the binding moral foundations argued to underlie religious belief. As such, given these domains, RWA could be argued to reflect the resistance to change aspect of conservative ideology (Jost et al., 2003).

Most importantly, RWA is a core component of the dual process motivational model of (conservative) ideology (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). This proposes a dual pathway towards conservative affiliation, driven by personality, social environment, and worldview beliefs, which motivate the ideological attitudes of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO; discussed further below). In turn, RWA (and SDO) appear to drive conservative political attitudes. Notably, RWA is argued to be motivated by a desire for social conformity (operationalised by the personality traits of low openness and high conscientiousness) and a corresponding perception of the world as a dangerous place (as opposed to safe and secure). Accordingly, RWA is strongly threat-motivated; authoritarians display a preference for security and are thus more likely to endorse social conformity. As a result, authoritarians display a heightened sensitivity to threats to the social order, motivating hostility towards perceived value-violators and endorsement of right-wing political attitudes.

This aligns with previous literature positioning the religion-conservatism relationship as rooted in epistemic needs for security and conformity (see Jost et al., 2003). As noted previously, religion is positively associated with conscientiousness and negatively with openness to experience (Saroglou, 2010), as well as values which endorse conformity to the existing social order (Saroglou et al., 2004). Furthermore, past work has demonstrated that religion is associated

with a dangerous worldview (Robertson, 2006) and mortality salience and death anxiety are noted predictors and outcomes of religious belief (see Arrowood et al., 2017; Jong et al., 2012). As such, it is unsurprising that religion is closely associated with authoritarianism.

Indeed, past work has often demonstrated this relationship, with Osborne and Sibley (2014) showing a strong relationship between church attendance and RWA, particularly when adherents endorsed existing system hierarchies and inequalities (i.e., system-justifying beliefs). Similarly, Shaffer and Hastings (2007) demonstrated that authoritarians were more religious than those low on RWA, and this divergence was accentuated when participants were exposed to religious threat. Importantly, they also noted that authoritarians exposed to threat were more likely to endorse religiously coded authoritarian ideals, suggesting some intrinsic connection between the concepts.

Yet, despite evidence of the strong correlations between religion and authoritarianism, the causal direction of such relationships remains an open question. Altemeyer (1988) argued that authoritarianism fosters religious identification due to the former's focus on dogma and tradition. Indeed, authoritarians typically carry their childhood religions into adulthood (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). As such, authoritarians are more likely to be invested in a religious social identity, as well as dismiss any doubts which may threaten that identity (Shaffer & Hastings, 2007). Hawkins and Nosek (2012) also showed that belief similarity moderated the association between political variation and religious ingroup favouritism, with Christian liberals showing lower religious group favouritism than Christian conservatives. They suggest that Christian liberals may perceive intragroup dissonance when confronted with religious groups which endorse conservative values, leading to their disidentification with the religion. In this way, the relationship between religious affiliation and political ideology may be a product of

selection, with political considerations taking precedence over religious beliefs.

On the other hand, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) note that religion may drive authoritarianism, with religious teachings enculturing respect for authority and conformity to (religious) traditions. Notably, priming research found that exposure to Christian religious concepts decreased tolerance for ambiguity (Sagioglou & Feldman, 2013) and increased the endorsement of concepts related to conformity and submission to authority (Saroglou, et al., 2009; Van Cappellen, et al., 2011) – key components of right-wing authoritarianism (see Altemeyer, 1988; Duckitt, 2006). As such, religious concepts appear to be closely associated with traditionalist doctrines that motivate conformity and submission to structured group norms.

Indeed, religiosity has often been defined as an approach to faith that formalises religious teachings and narratives into a communal understanding of the sacred shared by like-minded others (Emmons, 1999). Past work has argued that religiosity's communal focus emphasises religious group affiliation and the values of tradition, orthodoxy, and a respect for authority (Pargament, 1999; Saucier & Skrzypinska, 2006). Indeed, this may even assist religion in maintaining a congregation by punishing apostates and others who threaten the integrity of the religious group. Thus, as religion is governed by strict dogma and doctrine, it may motivate adherents to adopt religiously-coded authoritarian beliefs – most notably, religious fundamentalism (see Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) – as well as similar conservative beliefs within the temporal domain.

Thus, religious affiliation may enculture the values of conservation that underpin authoritarianism, encouraging believers to adopt such ideals in the political domain.

Alternatively, religion may have doctrines that appeal to authoritarians and, thus, are drawn to identify as religious, with religious membership serving as a marker by which authoritarians can

recognise and connect with each other. Whilst the latter suggests religion is a merely rallying point for authoritarians, the former suggests that religion fosters authoritarianism and, thus, contributes to both a religious resistance to societal change, and an acceptance of inequality. Hence, the importance of this temporal relationship is perhaps one of the most notable gaps in the literature.

The multidimensional nature of religion

That religiosity correlates positively with conservative and prejudicial attitudes may appear paradoxical, as various religions often admonish their adherents to ‘love thy neighbour’ (Shen et al., 2013). Indeed, Malka and colleagues (2011) noted this paradox in the context of social welfare, with religiosity promoting both opposition and support for welfare provision. Notably several religious movements contradict the assumption that religion universally promotes intergroup inequality and hostility. For example, Quakers express a decidedly anti-hierarchical view by professing that all of God’s creations share a fundamental sameness (Kesselring, 2011). Likewise, liberation theology, a religious movement prominent in South America that focuses on rectifying inequality, oppression and ultimately transforming social structures towards a society without injustice, is couched in religious and spiritual discourse (Evans, 1992). This focus on liberation, not simply spiritual, but social, political, and economic, is rooted in the experience of dispossessed people around the world (Evans, 1992), strongly refuting the simplistic view that religion primarily motivates intergroup hostility.

Personality research seems to support this assumption, as religiosity fosters honesty-humility (Stronge et al., 2020). Similarly, an examination of religious values showed that, alongside conservation values, religion was associated with benevolence (Saroglou et al., 2004), a value encompassing a concern for the welfare of others. Indeed, Łowicki and Zajenkowski

(2017) noted that general religiosity was negatively associated with psychopathy and Machiavellianism, whilst being positively associated with empathy (which in turn may facilitate positive intergroup attitudes; see Finlay & Stephan, 2000). Importantly, benevolence, empathy and honesty-humility, as well as low psychopathy, suggest that religion appears to be associated with endorsement of egalitarian ideals (Cohrs et al., 2005; Duckitt, 2001; Leone et al., 2012; Livi et al, 2014).

Work by Shen et al. (2013) further supports the notion that religiosity is sometimes associated with positive attitudes towards out-groups. Whilst religiosity was associated with lower positive attitudes towards outgroups, the authors noted that this association was mediated by aspects of RWA (namely, aggression, submission and conventionalism). Furthermore, after adjusting for the aggression subcomponent of RWA, religiosity was associated with greater positive attitudes toward ethnic/racial out-groups. Importantly, racial out-groups are arguably not typically perceived as normative threats to religion (except in cases of religiously motivated ethnocentrism; see Hall et al., 2010), thus suggesting that aspects of religion may be positively associated with intergroup tolerance and acceptance, provided such groups do not threaten the normative values of the faith.

Collectively, this work suggests that, far from a monolith construct, religion demonstrates a breadth and diversity in both forms of religious identification as well as their corresponding outcomes. Thus, examination of the multidimensionality of religious identification may provide insight into the countervailing associations of faith on society. Perhaps one of the first approaches used to examine this diversity of belief examined *why* individuals might identify with a religious group – with Allport and Ross' (1967) work attempting to describe the motivational bases of religious affiliation, conceptualising religious believers as situated along a dimension of

extrinsic or intrinsic belief.

Extrinsic religious belief is an overtly social, but externally incentivised, form of religious identification. Extrinsic believers are motivated not by a belief in the value of the faith itself, but rather, by the benefits to be gained from practicing such faith. Adherents may “perform” religion, but without internalisation of their religion’s beliefs and doctrines – in essence, such affiliates are not truly committed to the faith (Pargament, 1999). Importantly, this “performance” may incentivise the signalling of one’s affiliation, perhaps to assuage external concerns over an extrinsic affiliate’s commitment or motivations, and such signalling might result in overt displays of one’s intent to uphold religious norms and punish outgroups. Indeed, extrinsic religiosity is associated with authoritarianism (Kahoe, 1974; Ji & Suh, 2008), as well as relevant (unequal) outcomes (Siegman, 1962) such as racial (Herek, 1987) and sexual prejudice (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Bosetti et al., 2011), and a lower tolerance for atheists and non-believers (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999).

Conversely, *intrinsic* religious belief encompasses those whose affiliation is a product of a desire to authentically “live out” their religion, embracing the creed and doctrines of the faith and internalising them (Allport & Ross, 1967). This orientation seems to encompass the “true believer”, one who has overcome doubt (Hood, 1985) and is strongly committed to the religion (Donahue, 1985) due to the meaning it gives to one’s life (Allport, 1966). This more mature form of religion was suggested to foster more tolerant attitudes (Allport & Ross, 1967), and recent work seems to suggest intrinsic belief is related to a higher endorsement of fairness (Silvia et al, 2014). Yet such assurance in one’s beliefs may lead to hostility towards outgroups that violate the sacred norms held by intrinsic believers. Indeed, intrinsic religiosity has been positively associated with authoritarianism (Watson et al., 2003; Ji & Suh, 2008), as well as relevant

outcomes such as ambivalent sexism (particularly benevolent sexism; see Burn & Busso, 2005; Ozdemir, 2016) and prejudice primarily targeted towards outgroups that violate religious norms (such as homosexuality; see Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Van Camp et al., 2016). By contrast, intrinsic belief is either unrelated or negatively associated with prejudice towards outgroups of little relevance to religious norms, such as ethnic outgroups (Allport & Ross, 1967; Herek, 1987). Thus, intrinsic belief still encompasses a selective form of prosociality.

Whilst religious orientations were originally conceptualised by Allport and Ross (1967) within a the extrinsic-intrinsic framework, Batson and Ventis (1982) proposed a third religious orientation termed religious *quest*. In contrast to the ambivalence of extrinsic religiosity and the certainty of intrinsic belief, quest is characterised by doubt, complexity, and ambiguity. Quest embraces the open-ended nature of existential questions (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 1983) and the struggle for truth, with adherents encouraged to be self-critical and flexible. Indeed, quest orientation is associated with greater cognitive complexity when dealing with existential issues (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 1983), as well as endorsement of a more self-directed and personal approach to religious identification (Burns et al., 1996).

It is noteworthy that quest orientation reflects not a motivational approach to religiosity (as opposed to the extrinsic-intrinsic dimension; see Neyrinck et al., 2010), but instead focuses on the cognitive style of religion – namely, a comfort with ambiguity and complexity as opposed to a more rigid endorsement of security and cohesion. As such, it is here that we see a possible explanation for the countervailing socio-political impacts of religion, with quest negatively associated a range of prejudicial attitudes (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Burns et al., 1996; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005), as well as negatively predicting authoritarianism and conservative affiliation (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Quest is also associated with universalism and

benevolence (see Gennerich & Huber, 2006), values which conceptually capture a desire for communion with humanity and the world. Indeed, universalism is associated with facilitating outgroup contact (Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995), positive attitudes towards a range of minority and low status groups (see Beierlein et al., 2016), and even a general concern for environmental problems (Schultz et al., 2005).

The distinction between the extrinsic-intrinsic religious orientations and quest demonstrates two distinct religious themes of interest when considering their impacts on socio-political outcomes. Whilst extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity are concerned with goals and motivations, quest appears concerned with the nature of faith and the divine itself (Neyrinck et al., 2010). The first theme thus addresses concerns over psychological and epistemic needs, rooted in a certainty about one's religious beliefs. The second encompasses a kind of existential seeking – a journey undertaken for the nature of “divine truth”. This distinction in religious orientation has been noted elsewhere under various terms; defensive vs. existential (in the context of Terror Management Theory; see Beck, 2006), security vs. growth (Van Tongeren & Davis, 2015), literal vs. symbolic (see Wulff, 1997), and most pertinent to the current thesis, religiosity vs. spirituality (see Mahoney & Shafranske, 2013).

It is this distinction, herein termed religiosity vs. spirituality, that appears most relevant when discussing the multidimensional nature of religious group identity. Whilst nebulous, Pargament (1999) posits that religion, perhaps sharing conceptual overlap with intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations, is defined by a personal or group search for meaning through sacred means. In essence, the meaning of the sacred is either irrelevant or believed to be known – it is how the sacred applies to one's goals, needs and values that define religiosity. By contrast, spirituality is posited to be a search for the sacred itself. Here, meaning is sought in the sacred,

capturing the intellectual, seeking and aspects of quest through an acknowledgement of the unknown nature of the divine. Whilst religiosity appears to be motivated by epistemic concerns and goals, perhaps for security and continuity, spirituality expresses a greater focus on truth-seeking (though perhaps not necessarily a comfort with uncertainty – hence the need to seek out truth). Thus, as Pargament (1999) notes, spirituality is defined as a narrow construct, with religiosity having broader scope in its relationship with the adherent's needs and goals both transcendent and mundane.

By contrast, Zinnbauer and colleagues (1999) propose that religiosity and spirituality display a shared interest in their search for the sacred, but it is the contextual setting that creates the distinction. They propose that, whilst spirituality encompasses an individual or group search for the sacred in general terms, religiousness encompasses the more specific search for the sacred within a traditional sacred context. Whilst both are focused on truth seeking and a comfort with uncertainty, religiosity's focus on traditionalist contexts acts to constrain and reinforce orthodox religious precepts. Akin to the work of Emmons (1999), connection with the divine is accomplished through formalised teachings and traditions shared with a like-minded community. By contrast, spirituality seems to acknowledge the unknown (and perhaps unknowable) nature of the divine and recognising that divine connection can (and must) occur outside traditional, communal faith settings. Correspondingly, spirituality embraces unorthodox religious ideas in its search for divine truth. Here, spirituality displays a broader scope in its relationship with the world whilst religiosity is narrowly confined to traditional religious contexts. Most notably, spirituality is indeed associated with lower affiliation with traditional religious groups (Burns et al., 1996).

Essentially, these conceptualisations argue that the focus of religiosity may be functional

or traditional, whilst spirituality is either existential or individual/unorthodox. Importantly, they appear to align with the work of Tiliopoulos and colleagues (2007), who posited that religious orientations can be delineated into two orthogonal dimensions; a social-personal dimension assessing the focus and form of religion (that of a social or individual connection with the divine), and a means-ends dimension assessing religion to what degree religion is seen as functional (either to address epistemic needs or as a form of existential seeking). Thus, spirituality and religiosity appear to occupy polar ends of one of these dimensions, but key to their conceptualisations by Pargament (1999) and Zinnbauer and colleagues (1999) is which dimensions they occupy.

Perhaps, a more compelling conceptualisation might be a mixture of the two, for they do not seem wholly contradictory. As noted previously, religion is argued to be closely tied to tradition as a way of fulfilling and addressing adherents' epistemic needs for security and order – expressing the means motivations described by Pargament (1999) as well as the traditionalist argument of Zinnbauer and colleagues (1999). Similarly, as traditionalist religious contexts might largely encompass faith as a means to assuage security concerns, spirituality might be forced to utilise non-traditional forms of religion as a means of existential seeking. Although this thesis does not resolve the distinction between these conceptualisations, it presents work which can speak to this contention in the literature. Accordingly, it is important to acknowledge the commonalities underlying the definitions of spirituality and religion, particularly how spirituality has related to various outcomes throughout the literature, before exploring how they might influence socio-political outcomes.

The role of spirituality

Given the prosocial outcomes of religious quest (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and other forms of spiritual seeking (see Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Koca-Atabey & Öner-Özkan, 2011; Van Tongeren & Davis, 2015), spirituality may motivate prosocial and egalitarian values. Indeed, Hirsh and colleagues (2013) argued that spirituality might foster universalism – a value encompassing an acceptance of equals and a connection with the environment. Accordingly, Saroglou and colleagues (2008) found that priming individuals with emotions implying self-transcendence fostered spirituality. Other work similarly reveals that spirituality correlates positively with agreeableness, benevolence (Saroglou & Muñoz-García, 2008), universalism (Hirsh et al., 2013) and openness to experience (Li & Chow, 2015), as well as negatively related to self-enhancement values (those connected to inequitable intergroup dynamics such as power and achievement; see Piotrowski & Zemojtel-Piotrowska, 2020).

Importantly, such values suggest spirituality might motivate more universal forms of prosociality, as opposed to the selective and in-group specific forms of prosociality fostered by religiosity. Notably, Malka and colleagues (2011) found that religious identification motivated countervailing effects on opposition to social welfare through two distinct mediators. The first demonstrated religiosity's opposition to social welfare as mediated by increased conservative identity. The second showed increased support for social welfare through endorsement of prosociality, thus demonstrating that faith can motivate both selective and universalist prosocial attitudes. Similarly, work on the cognition of religious concepts suggests a delineation along these lines. Notably, priming *religion* concepts promotes prosociality towards ingroup members (Preston & Ritter, 2013). By contrast, priming *God* concepts increased prosociality towards outgroup members. Such work suggests that it is the concept of a divine entity, associated with

the core spiritual component of faith (i.e., seeking out the divine), that motivates universalist prosocial behaviour amongst the religious – not the concept of the religion (and its associated traditions) itself.

Endorsement of spirituality might even be the primary motivator of most (if not all) prosocial attitudes amongst the religiously identified. Li and Chow (2015) examined adolescent religiosity and spirituality as predictors of helping both strangers and peers. They found that spirituality was associated with helping peers, and partially with helping strangers, whilst religiosity was unassociated with either form of helping behaviour. Importantly, they also noted that when spirituality was partialled out, religiosity became negatively associated with helping peers.

Such work suggests that spirituality sits at the core of prosocial and egalitarian behavior, demonstrating a preference for more equitable intergroup relationships among those who identify as spiritual. In terms of political affiliation, such work suggests that spirituality, when distinct from religiosity, should negatively predict conservative affiliation given that opposition to equality is a core component of conservative ideology (Jost et al., 2003). Indeed, Hirsh and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that spirituality correlated positively with universalist values and that priming participants with spiritual content increased endorsement of liberal attitudes. Thus, spirituality may discourage conservative affiliation through promoting egalitarianism.

One way of operationalising such egalitarian values is through examination of social dominance orientation (SDO). SDO reflects the second pathway of the dual process model of conservative ideology (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). As noted previously, this model reflects two pathways towards conservative affiliation motivated by personality, social environment and worldview beliefs. However, whilst RWA is argued to be motivated by a threat-driven desire for

social conformity, SDO describes a political attitude characterised by a preference for inequality driven by a competitive worldview and low levels of both agreeableness and empathy (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Sidanius et al., 2013) – the very values that religion appears to endorse. As such social dominance orientation seems to reflect a motivated disinterest in connection or cooperation with other groups that runs counter to the universalist and collaborative ideals argued to underpin growth-oriented/spiritual beliefs (Piotrowski & Zemojtel-Piotrowska, 2020; Van Tongeren & Davis, 2016).

Indeed, spirituality has been argued to motivate lower endorsement of SDO (Hirsh et al., 2013) with past work showing a negative correlation between the two variables (Saucier & Skrzypinksa, 2006). Notably, and consistent with the dual process model, SDO is a strong predictor of conservative attitudes (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), thus potentially acting as a mediator for the negative relationship between spirituality and conservative affiliation. As such, spiritual identification may explain the countervailing impacts of religion on conservatism through two distinct processes, with religiosity motivating authoritarianism (and thus conservatism), whilst spirituality discourages SDO (with corresponding negative impacts on conservative affiliation). Hence, work should further examine the impact of religiosity and spirituality on both RWA and SDO, as well as their respective impacts on conservative affiliation.

Beyond RWA and SDO: The role of Collective Narcissism

Previous work has largely examined religion under the paradigm of the religious and spiritual forms of group identification. Examination of the values underlying these religious dimensions provides some explanation for their distinct impacts on socio-political outcomes. Specifically, we see that religion (broadly) appears to be positively related to authoritarian attitudes by sharing a focus on order and security as fostered by group cohesion and

homogeneity (Saroglou et al., 2004; Hirsh et al., 2013). By contrast, spiritual identification (broadly) appears to connect to the values of benevolence and universalism, fostering a form of group identification focused on connection with humanity and the environment as an expression of a desire for a closer connection with the divine (Saroglou & Muñoz-García, 2008). As such, spirituality appears to foster more positive attitudes towards egalitarianism, lower endorsement of SDO, and thus lower levels of conservatism (Hirsh et al., 2013). Thus, the spirituality/religiosity dichotomy, when contextualised through the values of egalitarianism vs. authoritarianism, begins to elucidate the countervailing effects of religion on political attitudes.

Yet, recent work has also posited a form of group identification termed collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). This form of group affiliation is characterised by a deep investment in the positive self-image of one's ingroup, a heightened perception of threat to that positive self-image, and a reactionary aggression when confronted by perceived threats (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala, 2011). Importantly, whilst collective narcissism is related to both RWA and SDO, it is argued to predict political attitudes beyond authoritarian and anti-egalitarian attitudes (Golec de Zavala, 2011). As such, religious collective narcissism reflects the direct impacts of the motivational underpinnings of religious identification on socio-political attitudes. Thus, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that the motivational underpinnings of religious belief, reflected by examining collective narcissism, appear to both indirectly (through religious considerations of threat-motivated social conformity vs. egalitarianism) and directly motivate socio-political beliefs in a countervailing fashion.

Indeed, examining the conceptual roots of collective narcissism gives some indication of how it delineates from both RWA and SDO. Whilst still rooted in the epistemic motives of self-esteem and security proposed by social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), collective

narcissism emerges when individuals perceive a lack of personal control over their lives. Such individuals endorse collective narcissism in an attempt to regain a sense of personal power, by rooting their self-identity in the (perceived) positive self-image of their social group (Cichocka, 2016; Cichocka et al., 2017). Hence, collective narcissism is fundamentally rooted in insecurity over the perceived importance of one's group. Whilst group members hold an inflated sense of their ingroup's worth, they also expect (or demand) external validation of that perception from outgroups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Hence, collective narcissism encompasses a form of group identification which projects the perceived (positive) attributes of the group onto the self – as Cichocka (2016) argues, “the in-group is in service of the self” (also see van Veelen et al., 2011).

In this way, collective narcissism encompasses the ingroup favouritism of RWA and the competitive outgroup derogation of SDO (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Yet despite these conceptual overlaps, the motivational underpinnings of the concepts appear quite different. Whilst RWA is argued to be motivated by the epistemic needs for security and order (Duckitt, 2006), collective narcissism is thought to originate from the need to maintain a positive self-image of the group (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Similarly, whilst collective narcissism shows overlap with the group-based dominance and outgroup derogation focus of SDO, these attitudes are not motivated by a general support for hierarchies and an opposition to equality, but rather, a response to perceived threats to one's group image. As such, collective narcissism uniquely encompasses both in-group favoritism and out-group hate (Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020).

Consistent with this theorising, collective narcissism correlates positively with sensitivity to threats, even perceiving inconvenient yet innocuous situations as deliberately insulting (see Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). This heightened sensitivity is associated with greater hostility

towards the perceived opposition, as well as endorsement of retaliatory/revenge motivations (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016; Dyduch-Hazar & Mrozinski, 2021; Guerra et al., 2020). For example, collective narcissism correlates with increased nationalism (Cichocka & Cislak, 2020) and a corresponding hostility and willingness to engage in violence towards outgroups (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). It is also associated with the endorsement of conspiracy theories which portray outgroups as hostile agents, including anti-Semitic Jewish conspiracies (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012; also see Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2019).

Whilst collective narcissism encompasses a form of *insecure* identification, this form of group identification stands in contrast to more secure group identities. Cichocka (2016) notes that, whilst insecure narcissism is a product of frustrated needs for control, secure group identities emerge when such needs are satisfied. As opposed to the external validation required by collective narcissism, those secure in their group identities hold positive views of the self and the group which are not contingent on external validation. Indeed, parallels have been drawn between blind patriotism and constructive patriotism (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). Thus, similar to intrinsic motivations for group identity, non-narcissistic forms of group identification are not driven by external needs for security or self-esteem, but rather, by personal motivations for goal pursuit and self-efficacy (Gagné & Deci, 2005; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1997). Hence, secure group identification seems to encompass a desire to project one's own attributes onto the in-group – as Cichocka (2016) argues, “the self is in the service of the group”.

Consistent with this point, secure forms of group identification are associated with lower endorsement of hostile outgroup conspiracy beliefs and positive impacts on outgroup relations across a range of variables (Cichocka et al., 2016; also see Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). Importantly, such work has also revealed that secure group identification and collective

narcissism appear to function as mutual suppressors, concealing the countervailing effects of secure vs. insecure group identities on outgroup attitudes (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013; Golec de Zavala et al., 2019). As such, collective narcissism (vs. secure group identification) may explain some of the countervailing effects of religious affiliation on outgroup attitudes, with resultant socio-political outcomes.

Indeed, past work examining collective narcissism in the context of religion has noted that insecure religiosity can have negative impacts on intergroup relations. Marchlewska and colleagues (2019) noted that Catholic collective narcissism was associated with gender conspiracy beliefs. Consistent with this, Golec de Zavala and Bierwiazzonek (2020) noted that Catholic collective narcissism was associated with greater endorsement of hostile sexism independently of religious fundamentalism (which reflects religiously coded authoritarian ideals), suggesting that religious group narcissism may indeed function directly (and independently of RWA) on outgroup attitudes. It should also be noted that intrinsic religiosity, was estimated simultaneously in this model, demonstrating a negative association with hostile sexism. Notably, intrinsic religiosity reflects a secure form of religious identification (once the variance of religious group narcissism is accounted for). This provides an indication that secure vs. insecure forms of religious group identification may play an important role in explaining the countervailing effects of religion on outgroup attitudes and socio-political outcomes.

Importantly, the concept of insecure vs. secure forms of religious group identification proposed by collective narcissism appears to align with past conceptualisations of the religiosity vs. spirituality (or security vs. growth, extrinsic vs. intrinsic etc.) dimensions of religious belief. As such, religious group narcissism appears to address the fundamental dichotomy of religious beliefs (and associated political outcomes) found within the literature. Whilst insecure forms of

religious group identification reflect the use of religion to satisfy epistemic needs for self-esteem, secure forms of religion appear to reflect a more intrinsic and sincere form of religious affiliation rooted in faith. Thus, religious narcissism may reflect a more performative form of religious belief, predicated on using religion to conceal vulnerabilities or for grandiose goals (Łowicki & Zajenkowski, 2017). As such, where religiosity and spirituality may align with intrinsic religiosity and quest, respectively, religious narcissism may better encapsulate extrinsic concerns for status and superiority. Hence, research on religious group narcissism thus promises to more directly tap into the motivational processes which drive religion, whether as a means or an end, and the resultant direct impacts of such motivations on socio-political outcomes. Collective narcissism might suggest that it is not simply religious concerns over egalitarianism and authoritarianism that motivate the religion's countervailing impacts on political attitudes, but also the prior motivations for religious group identification that have direct impacts on conservative ideology (and outgroup attitudes more generally).

Thesis Overview

This thesis presents four studies which utilize both cross-sectional and longitudinal data to address two broad gaps in the literature. The first gap addresses the fundamental question of the temporal ordering of religion on authoritarianism, providing evidence for the impact of conversion (and deconversion) on authoritarian attitudes. Although past work has highlighted the strong association between religious affiliation and authoritarianism, it remains unclear whether this association reflects selection or enculturation effects. To this end, the first study in this thesis examines longitudinal data to examine the effects of religious conversion on authoritarianism in order to resolve this contention.

The second gap broadly examines the countervailing impacts of religious affiliation on

socio-political beliefs. Specifically, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that religious affiliation and spirituality show distinct impacts on political affiliation (and related socio-political attitudes) through separate processes. The second study presented contextualises this relationship within the dual process model framework (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), examining the impact of religious and spiritual identification on conservative ideology through both authoritarian (RWA) and anti-egalitarian attitudes (SDO).

Extending this work, the third study examines the impact of spirituality on a topical socio-political attitude in a uniquely New Zealand population – that of indigenous New Zealand Māori. Conceptualisations of religiosity and spirituality tend to be defined from Western cultural roots with questionable applicability to non-Western contexts. To investigate this, the third study presented here employs an *etic-emic* approach to the subject of how Māori spirituality affects attitudes towards environmental conservation. The *etic* approach treats culture as a factor that influences cognition, behaviour and learning (Helfrich, 1999) and denotes the use of general, cross-cultural measures, specifically examining Māori endorsement of conservation values. By contrast, the *emic* approach focuses on culture specifically, aiming to tease out an individual's experiential world through their own explanations in local cultural terms (Berry, 1999).

Specifically, we looked at Māori spirituality as a facet of a cultural identity that is uniquely Māori (see Houkamau & Sibley, 2015).

This work demonstrates that Māori identities which uphold the importance of spiritual beliefs and cosmologies appeared to be strongly rooted in universalist approaches to nature and the environment. Importantly, such beliefs don't merely emphasise the value of protecting the environment but also the kinship, unity, and spiritual ancestry Māori share with the land, as well as its importance to the role of Māori as *tangata whenua*. This work reveals that the impacts of

spirituality on socio-political outcomes are more nuanced than they first appear, particularly when considering environmental concern, as well as demonstrating that spiritual associations with universalist ideals appear to bear relevance to New Zealand's indigenous population.

Finally, I conclude by examining religious group narcissism and its impacts on socio-political attitudes. Specifically, we seek to demonstrate that forms of religious identification appear to play a role in predicting political attitudes alongside religiously motivated authoritarian vs. egalitarian considerations. As such, the motivational underpinnings that underlie religious identification itself (reflected by the secure vs. insecure forms of religious identification) may independently predict socio-political attitudes from RWA and SDO. Notably, past work has demonstrated that collective narcissism and secure group identification have countervailing effects on socio-political issues (see Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala et al., 2020; Guerra et al., 2020), whilst Catholic collective narcissism plays an important role in predicting hostile sexism (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiazzonek, 2020). The fourth chapter of this thesis conceptually replicates and extends this work by examining the role of religious group narcissism in predicting ambivalent sexism (both hostile and benevolent), and its role as a mutual suppressor of the positive impacts of religious identification on said outcomes. Importantly, this study demonstrates that these effects are independent of both right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) suggesting religious narcissism may have direct impacts on outgroup attitudes worth considering.

Comment on publications

This thesis presents four manuscripts, two of which are published, one which (at the time of writing) is currently in-press, and one which is in preparation for journal submission.

Published manuscripts are presented here with minor formatting adjustments to maintain consistency with the thesis. Manuscripts under review may differ in final published form. These manuscripts are referred to as Studies 1 to 4 throughout this thesis, presented in Chapters Two – Five, respectively.

Lockhart, C., Sibley, C., and Osborne, D. (under review). The Authoritarian Incubator:

Examining the effect of religious conversion on Right-Wing Authoritarianism.

Manuscript submitted for publication.

Lockhart, C., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2020). Religion makes—and unmakes—the status

quo: religiosity and spirituality have opposing effects on conservatism via RWA and SDO. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, 10(4), 379-392.

Lockhart, C., Houkamau, C. A., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2019). To be at one with the land:

Māori spirituality predicts greater environmental regard. *Religions*, 10(7), 427.

Lockhart, C., Sibley, C., Osborne, D. Religiosity and Ambivalent Sexism: Religious Group

Narcissism as a Suppressor. Manuscript in preparation for journal submission.

Chapter II

Bridging Statement

As previously noted, religion has often been associated with conservative ideology (Malka et al., 2012), specifically due to religion's endorsement of traditionalist ideals closely associated with authoritarian attitudes (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Saroglou et al., 2004). Yet the temporal ordering of this relationship has yet to be determined within the literature. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) hypothesised that religious doctrine might enculture authoritarian norms. However, they also suggested that authoritarians might be more likely to select into religious groups, due to the normative nature of religious belief across most cultures, as well as providing rhetoric and dogma that appeals to authoritarian sensibilities.

Study 1 seeks to provide evidence towards a better understanding of the nature of this relationship. Past research has utilised longitudinal research to demonstrate that religious behaviour and affiliation, such as church attendance and religious identification, appeared to be associated with authoritarianism over time (see Wink et al., 2007; Osborne & Sibley, 2014). Yet the act of religious conversion provides the opportunity to assess the temporal ordering of this relationship in a more definitive fashion. Indeed, to our knowledge, the impact of religious conversion has yet to be examined in this context. Moreover, whilst past work on religious conversion has predominantly utilised cross-sectional data, the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS) is uniquely positioned to answer the question of selection vs. enculturation by examining the impact of conversion longitudinally.

Whilst conversion may be a somewhat nebulous term, we took a specific approach to examining religious conversion in this study. Conversion was examined via participants who self-affiliated with a non-religious/secular identity at some point during the study, before then transitioning to identifying as a member of a Christian group at a later time point. Religious

identification was assessed using a self-report measure, specifically “What religious or spiritual group?” participants identified with. Christian identification in particular was assessed due to model constraints, with subsequent analyses of different religious groups resulting in too small a sample size for useful results.

To these ends, my colleagues and I present an event-centred piecewise latent growth model of religious (Christian) converts across a period of 9 years. Centred on religious conversion, specifically secular individuals coming to identify with a Christian religious group, we demonstrate that the event of conversion appears to precede increases in authoritarianism, but not anti-egalitarian attitudes. Furthermore, we also examined the impact of religious deconversion, with Christian individuals coming to identify as secular, both to provide comparison with our conversion results and to examine the unique effect of deconversion on authoritarian attitudes.

Overall, Study 1 provides the most comprehensive examination of religious conversion’s impact on socio-political attitudes (specifically, authoritarianism and anti-egalitarianism) to date. It demonstrates the powerful impact of religion in motivating authoritarian attitudes as well as indicating that such beliefs do not motivate anti-egalitarianism – thus aligning with past work demonstrating the fundamental role of traditionalism (but not hierarchical intergroup dynamics) in the relationship between religiosity and conservative affiliation. Our results also suggest that the impact of deconversion on authoritarianism appears to be a product of selection, with political attitudes taking precedence over religious considerations amongst some segments of our religious affiliates. The implications of these findings are further discussed in the manuscript below as well as in the general discussion section of this thesis.

This manuscript is currently in-press with the reference as follows:

Lockhart, C., Sibley, C., and Osborne, D. (in-press). The Authoritarian Incubator: Examining the effect of religious conversion on Right-Wing Authoritarianism.

The Authoritarian Incubator: Examining the effect of conversion to Christianity on Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation

“I appeal to you, brothers and sisters, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, that all of you agree with one another in what you say and that there be no divisions among you, but that you be perfectly united in mind and thought.”

– 1 Corinthians 1:10 (NIV)

As implied by the epigraph above, religion can foster a sense of community amongst its followers (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Ysseldyk et al., 2010), thereby creating a uniquely powerful social identity. By providing both a structured belief system and a community of fellow believers, religion promises a sense of stability and communal support that supersedes most other social identities (Ysseldyk, et al., 2010). Yet, this focus on shared faith may also be linked to the endorsement of conformity and traditionalism (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Indeed, explicit in the opening epigraph is a mandate to conform to the group’s conventions by uniting “in mind and thought”. As such, religion is often associated with a tendency to uphold traditions and conform to group norms (Saroglou et al., 2004), as well as to pay respect to, and comply with, ingroup authorities (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992).

Research has extensively explored the positive correlation between religious affiliation and traditionalism, particularly right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; see Altemeyer, 1988). RWA encompasses a tendency towards group convention, conformity, and aggression towards perceived deviants, and is rooted in a perception of the world as a dangerous and threatening place (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Notably, studies examining the origins of certain religious beliefs such as fundamentalism (i.e., the belief that the teachings of one’s religion are inerrant

and unquestionable) find that such attitudes are also rooted in threat-based and security concerns that are motivated by an epistemic need to ameliorate uncertainty and outgroup threat (Robertson, 2006). Accordingly, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) theorised that authoritarians are often introduced to religion in childhood and carry their faith into adulthood. The tenacity of religious belief is unsurprising, as tradition and conformity—two values closely linked to religion (see Saroglou et al., 2004)—are integral to RWA (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Thus, once introduced, authoritarians hold onto their religious beliefs. However, religion may also prescribe traditional values, which may lead adherents to adopt authoritarian attitudes (Altemeyer 1981). As such, the temporal order of the positive association between religious affiliation and RWA remains an open question. Do authoritarians gravitate toward religion? Or does religious conversion precede the endorsement of authoritarianism?

The current study helps to answer this question by using data from a nationwide longitudinal panel study to investigate the relationship between conversion to Christianity and RWA. Specifically, we focus on a unique subsample of participants who initially reported no religious affiliation but then identified—and continued to identify—as Christian at some point during a 9-year period. Accordingly, we examine participants' levels of RWA in the years prior to, and after, their conversion to Christianity. Because religion may also promote humility and egalitarian attitudes, we also assessed participants' levels of social dominance orientation (SDO; a measure of support for group-based hierarchy) using the same method. To complement these analyses, we also examined the possibility that declines in RWA *precede* de-converting from Christian to no religious affiliation. In doing so, we aim to identify the temporal ordering of the relationship between religious conversion and RWA, while also examining the processes that precede religious deconversions.

We begin by reviewing the literature on the association between religious affiliation and RWA. Next, we explain how the values of tradition, conformity and conventionalism taught in religion may foster RWA. We also examine how religion may impact SDO, noting that religion also preaches universalism and benevolence—values that are antithetical to the hierarchical attitudes that comprise SDO. We conclude this section by summarizing the aims and hypotheses of the current study. In short, we provide the most comprehensive assessment of the relationship between religious conversion and RWA to date and help contribute to the debate over whether religious affiliation fosters RWA, or if those who endorse RWA are simply attracted to religion.

Religion and RWA: A (un)holy union?

Although some research indicates that spiritual forms of faith correlate positively with liberal and egalitarian attitudes (see Hirsh et al., 2013; Lockhart et al., 2020; Malka et al., 2011), both research and conventional wisdom has often (broadly) positioned religious affiliation as a strong correlate of traditional values (e.g., conformity and submission; see Saroglou et al., 2004). One attitude that may express such traditionalism is right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), an ideological attitude composed of three distinct subdimensions: conventionalism (a tendency to conform to group norms), authoritarian submission (a tendency to obey authority figures), and authoritarian aggression (a tendency towards coercive social control of nonconformists; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Accordingly, RWA is associated with values encompassing tradition and security (e.g., conformity and convention; see Livi et al., 2014), as well as personality traits such as (high) conscientiousness, (low) openness (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), and (high) agreeableness (Osborne et al., 2013)—values and traits that often correlate positively with religion (see Saroglou, 2015; Saroglou et al., 2004).

Other research also links religious affiliation with authoritarianism. For example, RWA

fosters a communal sense of identity, motivated by an ingroup-focused prosociality that trends towards in-group favouritism (Stangor & Leary, 2006). Similarly, religiosity (i.e., identification with a religious or spiritual group; see Ysseldyk et al., 2010) fosters a communal understanding of the sacred, emphasising religious group affiliation, as well as tradition, orthodoxy, and respect for authority (see also Pargament, 1999; Saucier & Skrzypinska, 2006). Although this form of selective religious-based prosociality may seem counterintuitive given the positive correlation between religiosity and universal prosociality (Bulbulia, 2004; Sibley & Bulbulia, 2015), religiously motivated prosocial behaviour, like that of the prosociality fostered by RWA, is conditional (Vilaythong et al., 2010). For example, Preston and Ritter (2013) presented religiously identified participants with a forced-choice scenario where they could assist either an ingroup or an outgroup member and were asked who a hypothetical moral audience would want them to help. Those informed that a religious leader was their moral audience were more likely to help the ingroup than the outgroup member. When asked to explain their decision, participants noted a sense of similarity and community with the ingroup member.

Religiosity may also elicit RWA by fostering respect for authorities. Indeed, many traditional religions encourage adherents to respect authority figures (Graham & Haidt, 2010). To these ends, Wisneski and colleagues (2009) revealed that religious identification correlated positively with trusting the decisions made by authorities. Napier and Jost (2008) also identified a positive relationship between the perceived importance of religion and respect for authority across 19 countries. Accordingly, Osborne and Sibley (2014) found that church attendance (i.e., one's exposure to formal religious doctrine) correlated positively with RWA.

In line with the thesis that religion fosters conformity and tradition, religiosity correlates positively with both dogmatism (Jost et al., 2014) and Need for Closure (Saroglou, 2002).

Notably, dogmatism is a powerful predictor of RWA (Altemeyer, 1996; but see Duckitt, 2009). Both religious belief and RWA are also associated with information-processing heuristics that prioritise quick, efficient, and simple responses to problems (Altemeyer, 1988; Chirumbolo, 2002; Kruglanski et al., 2006; Pennycook et al., 2012). Thus, religion may foster RWA by decreasing tolerance for ambiguity (Kilpatrick et al., 1970).

Does religion socialize RWA?

Whilst religious affiliation is closely associated with values and beliefs that predict authoritarianism (Napier & Jost, 2008; Osborne & Sibley, 2014; Saroglou et al., 2004), the direction of this relationship is an open question. Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) noted that authoritarians (i.e., those who are more likely to adhere to group norms and traditions) typically carry their childhood religions into adulthood—a pathway suggesting that RWA elicits religious affiliation. Consistent with this perspective, authoritarianism correlates positively with church attendance, frequency of prayer, and time spent reading scripture (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Likewise, individuals high on RWA are more religious and express fewer doubts than do those who are low on RWA (Shaffer & Hastings, 2007). Authoritarians exposed to a religious threat also display fewer doubts and stronger religious identification than do authoritarians who are not threatened, indicating that religious affiliation may be a product of ingroup identification which, when threatened, leads adherents to ‘double-down’ in their loyalty to the ingroup (see Shaffer & Hastings, 2007). Thus, authoritarianism may foster religious identification by instilling ingroup identification/loyalty and adherence to group norms, increasing the salience of ingroup welfare, and promoting an adverse reaction to those who threaten the group (Altemeyer, 1988).

Although RWA might plant the seeds of religiosity, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) also note that religion may breed authoritarian attitudes, as many religious teachings valorise

respect for authority and the censuring of non-conformists. Building on the relationship between religion and dogmatism, Sagioglou and Forstmann (2013) found that priming Christian religious concepts increased intolerance of ambiguity—a critical predictor of RWA (Altemeyer, 1988; Feldman, 2003). Accordingly, authoritarians readily accept traditional religious messages—messages that are often clear and unambiguous (Altemeyer, 1996). Exposure to religious primes (e.g., religious words) also increases the salience of submission-related concepts which, in turn, encourages submission to authority and conformity to ingroup norms (Saroglou et al., 2009; Van Cappellen et al., 2011). Hence, religion appears to foster core components of authoritarianism (namely, conformity and respect for authority; Altemeyer, 1988). Indeed, a 40-year longitudinal study conducted by Wink and colleagues (2007) found that religiosity predicted increases in authoritarianism over time. That said, research has yet to identify the effects of religious conversion on authoritarianism.

Religion and SDO

Despite the close relationship between religion and RWA, past research has noted that religion can have countervailing effects on political attitudes and intergroup relations (Hirsh et al., 2013; Lockhart et al., 2020; Shen et al., 2013). These countervailing associations emerge partly because religiosity correlates positively with conscientiousness (a preference for order; Hirsh et al., 2013), as well as agreeableness (a preference for group cooperation and tolerance; see Saroglou, 2010) and honesty-humility (a preference for reciprocal altruism and fairness; Stronge et al., 2020). Alongside these traits, Saroglou and colleagues (2004) noted that religion is associated with the values of conservation (a preference for social order) but also benevolence (expressing a concern for others welfare). Thus, religion appears to foster authoritarian ideals, as well as an empathetic, prosocial concern for others.

Consistent with the idea that religion can also foster prosocial outcomes, research reveals that spirituality correlates negatively with social dominance orientation—a preference for group-based hierarchy (SDO; Hirsh et al., 2013; Lockhart et al., 2019). Notably, SDO is rooted in competitive beliefs about the world with a strong focus on power and superiority, as well as an endorsement of unequal and hierarchical relationships between social groups (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Accordingly, SDO correlates negatively with traits and values that give rise to egalitarian ideals including empathy (Sidanius et al., 2013), agreeableness (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), benevolence and universalism (Livi et al., 2014) – ideals notably supported by religion. Indeed, religiosity correlates positively with agreeableness (see Saroglou, 2015; Silvia et al., 2014) and benevolence (Saroglou et al., 2004). Similarly, religious beliefs related to questioning and reflexivity (i.e., religious quest), as well as spirituality, correlate positively with universalism (Gennerich & Huber, 2006; Saroglou & Muñoz-García, 2008). Despite these noted relationships, research has yet to examine the temporal ordering of religion on SDO with regards to conversion (and deconversion).

Current Study

The current study contributes to the debate on the temporal order of religion and authoritarian views by examining the relationship religious conversion (and deconversion) has with both RWA and SDO. Past research reveals that religious conversion is a powerful process that coincides with dramatic changes across multiple domains including goals, feelings, attitudes, and behaviours (Paloutzian, et al., 1999). Religious conversion can even change personality traits (Stronge et al., 2020). Thus, religious conversion could predict increases in authoritarianism by encouraging submission to traditional religious authorities (a key component of RWA; see Duckitt et al., 2010). Indeed, religion teaches adherents to follow convention and respect

authority figures (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), while also imbuing such values with religious meaning. As such, traditional religions may position authoritarian values as sacred, thereby encouraging adherents to endorse authoritarianism (Mahoney & Pargament, 2004).

On the other hand, the relationship between RWA and religion may simply be the product of a selection effect whereby authoritarians are attracted to religious beliefs that validate their views (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). Indeed, Hawkins and Nosek (2012) argued that Christian liberals were more likely to perceive a dissonance between their religious and political beliefs and posit that political ideology may take precedence over religious considerations. Thus, liberal Christians may opt out of religious groups they perceive as dissonant with their political beliefs. Our work helps to resolve these contrasting positions of selection vs. enculturation by assessing the trajectory of participants' levels of RWA and SDO pre- and post-conversion to Christianity.

To these ends, we followed an analytic approach developed by Stronge and colleagues (2020) to examine linear growth models of RWA in the years leading up to, and following, religious conversion over 9 years in an ongoing longitudinal panel study. Given the lack of socialization pressures, we expected that RWA would be stable among participants prior to their conversion to Christianity. After conversion, however, these same individuals should experience increases in RWA, as their exposure to religious teachings—teachings that should foster conformity and tradition—increase. Such results would help resolve the debate over the temporal ordering of religious conversion and authoritarianism.

Although religiosity correlates positively with the idealisation of authority, it also correlates positively with modesty and greed-avoidance (Stronge et al., 2020), as well as benevolence (Saroglou et al., 2004)—attitudes and values that are antithetical to group-based

hierarchy (Leon et al., 2012). As such, we also investigated the impact of religious conversion on SDO (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Because participants wouldn't experience the socialisation of these prosocial values until after exposure to religious teachings, we expected that SDO would be stable prior to participants' conversion to Christianity but decline post-conversion as they are socialised into values that contrast with hierarchy and dominance. By showing that religious conversion precedes both increases in RWA and decreases in SDO, we aim to increase understanding of the countervailing associations religiosity has with authoritarianism and the preference for group-based hierarchy.

To complement and extend these analyses, we also examined the effect of religious *deconversion* over the same period. Religious deconversion is thought to be distinct from religious conversion and encompasses a period of intellectual reflection and doubt before departing the religion (Perez & Vallières, 2019). Indeed, Stronge and colleagues (2020) found that declines in agreeableness *preceded* religious deconversion. Moreover, past work has argued that Christian liberals prioritise their political beliefs over their religious affiliation, ultimately leading them to disidentify with their Christian identity (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). These studies suggest that religious deconversion may begin well-before people distance themselves from their (former) religion.

To examine this possibility, we assessed linear growth models of RWA and SDO in the years leading up to, and following, religious deconversion over 9 years. These participants provided at least one data point where they identified as Christian before indicating they had deconverted and became non-religious—and continued to identify as non-religious—for the rest of their involvement in the study. We anticipated that Christian affiliated individuals would show a significant decrease in RWA prior to deconversion, and that this effect would persist following

deconversion. By contrast, we anticipated that religious individuals would show a significant increase in SDO both pre- and post-deconversion. This is consistent with past research showing that the perceived dissonance between one's personal beliefs and the demands of their religious affiliation may motivate deconversion (see Hoskins & Nosek, 2012; Stronge et al., 2020). As such, we predict that Christian deconversion will show a distinct pattern from conversion in its relationship with both RWA and SDO such that political considerations will temporally precede a decline in religious beliefs.

Method

Sampling Procedure

Data for the current study came from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS)—a nationwide longitudinal panel study that began in 2009². Responses for Time 1 (2009) of the NZAVS came from 6,518 participants who were randomly sampled from the 2009 electoral roll. The sample for Time 2 (2010) contained responses from 4,441 participants (with 4,425 retained from the previous wave; a retention rate of 67.9% over 1 year) and Time 3 (2011) contained responses from 6,884 participants (3,918 retained, 2,966 additional participants from a booster sample). Time 4 (2012) utilised responses from 12,179 participants (6,805 retained from at least one previous wave; 5,374 added through booster sampling), whilst Time 5 (2012) used data from 18,261 participants (10,502 retained from at least one previous wave; 7,759 new participants from additional sampling). Time 6 contained data from 15,820 participants (with 15,740 retained from at least one previous wave; 82 new participants from booster sampling), and Time 7 contained responses from 13,942 participants (with 13,941 retained from at least one

² A de-identified dataset containing the variables analysed in this manuscript is available upon request from the corresponding author, or any member of the NZAVS advisory board, for the purpose of replication or checking of any published study using NZAVS data.

previous wave and 1 new unsolicited opt-in). Times 8 and 9 contained 21,936 participants (13,781 retained from at least one previous wave; 8,157 new from additional sampling) and 17,072 participants (16,931 retained; 141 new), respectively. Finally, Time 10 contained 47,951 participants (18,010 retained from at least one previous wave; 29,941 new). In terms of retention across separate waves, the Time 10 sample contained 2,964 participants retained from Time 1 (a retention rate of 45.5% over 9 years), and 14,049 participants from the previous wave (a retention rate of 82.3% from the previous year). See Satherley et al. (2015) for predictors of attrition.

Due to the requirements associated with our modelling approach, the religious conversion model was estimated using different sample sizes for each time point. For example, participants who converted from non-religious to religious between Times 1 and 2 (and who remained in the study for the remaining waves) contributed one pre-conversion and nine post-conversion data points. Conversely, those who converted between Times 9 and 10 contributed nine pre-conversion and one post-conversion data points. Accordingly, we utilised data from all 536 participants who provided at least one pre-conversion data point and one post-conversion data point, and who remained religious for the remainder of their involvement in the study (see the leftmost columns of Table 1). Of these participants, 65.5% (351) were female and 34.5% (185) were male. The mean age of the sample was 52.3 ($SD = 12.6$) and participants identified with the following ethnic groups: New Zealand European (82.1%), Māori (11.2%), Pacifica (3.9%), and Asian (1.7%), with 6 participants who did not report their ethnicity (the ethnicity of participants was priority-coded, with 'Māori' taking priority over all other ethnicities, followed by 'Pacific' and 'Asian' peoples, then 'European', respectively).

Like our religious conversion models, our models examining the effects of deconversion on RWA and SDO relied on different sample sizes for each time point. Specifically, we utilised data from 696 participants who provided at least one data point where they affiliated as Christian and at least one point where they had deconverted from Christianity and remained non-religious for the remainder of their involvement in the study (see the rightmost columns of Table 1). Of these participants, 62.45% (435) were female and 37.55% (261) were male. The mean age of the sample was 49.3 ($SD = 14.4$) and participants identified with the following ethnic groups: New Zealand European (80.2%), Maori (13.4%), Pacifica (3.2%), and Asian (2.3%), with 7 participants who did not report their ethnicity (participants' ethnicity was priority-coded).

Table 1.

Sample Size, as well as Mean and Standard Deviation of RWA and SDO, for Each Year Pre- vs. Post-(De)Conversion to Christianity

Year	<i>Religious Conversion</i>					<i>Religious Deconversion</i>				
	N	<i>RWA</i>		<i>SDO</i>		N	<i>RWA</i>		<i>SDO</i>	
		Mean	SD	Mean	SD		Mean	SD	Mean	SD
<i>Pre-(de)conversion</i>										
-6	41	3.331	0.935	2.659	0.934	37	3.452	0.863	2.304	0.866
-5	74	3.220	0.990	2.592	1.021	68	3.568	0.823	2.288	0.809
-4	100	3.396	1.032	2.603	1.000	104	3.532	0.910	2.315	0.846
-3	128	3.206	1.033	2.541	1.032	147	3.415	0.886	2.350	0.871
-2	248	3.249	0.964	2.502	1.060	281	3.424	0.894	2.416	0.901
-1	536	3.388	1.003	2.557	1.021	696	3.348	0.922	2.438	0.903
<i>Post-(de)conversion</i>										
1	536	3.505	0.954	2.498	0.958	696	3.254	0.957	2.419	0.941
2	271	3.513	1.034	2.503	0.981	364	3.164	0.987	2.345	0.934
3	183	3.537	0.994	2.517	0.970	198	2.982	0.935	2.363	0.969
4	148	3.593	0.956	2.567	0.981	154	2.975	0.997	2.366	0.888
5	126	3.526	0.919	2.412	0.913	129	2.919	0.984	2.271	0.915
6	62	3.501	1.044	2.484	1.069	60	3.028	0.936	2.236	0.873

Measures

The current study focused on measures of religious affiliation, RWA, and SDO. Gender, age, and the first time point at which the participant identified as religious (non-religious) were included as covariates. Items were interspersed within a large omnibus survey containing other measures outside of the scope of the current study.

Predictors

Religious (de)conversion was derived via self-report. Each wave, participants were asked the following question: “Do you identify with a religion and/or spiritual group?”. Those who answered “yes” were then asked to indicate with which religion they identified (“What religion or spiritual group?”). Only those who indicated that they had converted from “No religion” to “Christian” at some point during the study (and remained religious for the rest of their involvement in the study) were included in our analysis of religious conversion. Similarly, those who indicated they had converted from “Christian” to “No religion” at some point during the study (and remained secular for the rest of their involvement in the study) were included in our analysis of religious deconversion.

Right-wing authoritarianism was assessed using six items from Altemeyer (1996)³. Example items include: “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds” and “Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done” (reverse-coded). Items were averaged together with higher scores

³ At Time 2, only 5 items were used to assess RWA. The item, “some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the "normal way" things are supposed to be done”, was not measured at this wave and could not be included in our analysis.

reflecting higher levels of authoritarianism (α ranged from .66 to .75; see Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials).

Social dominance orientation was assessed using six items from Sidanius and Pratto (1999). Example items include: “It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others” and “We should have increased social equality” (reverse-coded). Items were averaged together with higher scores reflecting higher levels of SDO (α ranged from .69 to .79; see Table S1 in the Supplementary Materials).

Covariates

Our covariates included gender (0 = Woman; 1 = Man), ethnicity (0 = New Zealand Pākehā/European; 1 = minority), age and the first time point at which the participant identified as religious (non-religious)⁴.

Results

To examine the temporal ordering of the relationship between religious conversion and RWA, we conducted an event-aligned piecewise growth model using Bayesian estimates (see Stronge et al., 2020). This modelling approach estimates separate growth curves for the periods before and after an event of theoretical importance (i.e., the point of religious conversion), thus allowing researchers to see if rates of change differ as a function of the said event. Ideally, the posterior predictive p value (PPP) of these models should be close to .5 and the 95% Confidence Interval (CI) should cross 0 for good model fit (Muthén & Asparouhov, 2012). Models with PPP values as low as .05 do, however, provide an acceptable fit to the corresponding data (see Asparouhov & Muthén, 2010). Based on this criterion, our model examining the relationship

To adjust for any differences that might emerge due to when religious (de)conversion took place, we included the year in which participants first reported being Christian (or non-religious) as a covariate.

between religious conversion and RWA provided a good fit to these data, $PPP = .175$, 95% CI [-27.89, 74.72]. Most importantly, Figure 1 demonstrates that there were no significant changes to RWA in the years leading up to participants' conversion to Christianity ($b = .011$, 95% CI [-.037, .063], $p = .322$). However, in the years immediately following their religious conversion, participants exhibited a significant increase in RWA over time ($b = .030$, 95% CI [.001, .062], $p = .022$).

A separate event-aligned piecewise growth model examining the relationship between religious conversion and SDO also provided a good fit to these data, $PPP = .375$, 95% CI [-43.22, 57.18]. Consistent with the results for RWA, Figure 2 reveals that SDO was stable in the years leading up to participants' conversion to Christianity ($b = -.014$, 95% CI = [-.063, .038], $p = .303$). But in contrast to the significant post-conversion increase in RWA, results revealed no significant decline in SDO in the years following participants' religious conversion ($b = -.018$, 95% CI = [-.047, .012], $p = .116$).

As an important point of comparison, we also examined the relationship between religious deconversion and both RWA and SDO. Our first model investigating the relationship between religious deconversion and RWA provided a good fit to these data, $PPP = .208$, 95% CI [-15.27, 74.49]. In line with our predictions, Figure 3 reveals that there was a significant decline in RWA prior to religious deconversion ($b = -.091$, 95% CI = [-.139, -.045], $p < .001$). Also as hypothesized, RWA continued to decline after religious deconversion ($b = -.024$, 95% CI = [-.054, -.004], $p = .047$). Further analyses of the change in slope before and after deconversion indicated that the decline in RWA was significantly steeper prior to deconversion than it was post-deconversion ($b = -.066$, 95% CI = [-.129, -.008], $p = .014$).

A final event-aligned piecewise growth model examining the relationship between

religious deconversion and SDO also fit these data well, PPP = .336, 95% CI [-39.87, 61.01].

Contrary to our hypotheses, Figure 4 reveals that SDO was stable prior to deconversion ($b = -.002$, 95% CI = [-.051, .044], $p = .464$). Nevertheless, there was evidence of a small, but reliable, decline in SDO post-deconversion ($b = -.039$, 95% CI = [-.068, -.011], $p = .003$).




Figure 1. Piecewise latent growth models estimating change in RWA for participants pre- (left panel) and post- (right panel) conversion to Christianity ($N = 536$). Time on x-axis is measured in years. $*p < .05$




Figure 1.2. Piecewise latent growth models estimating change in SDO for participants pre- (left panel) and post- (right panel) conversion to Christianity ($N = 536$). Time on x-axis is measured in years. * $p < .05$




Figure 1.3. Piecewise latent growth models estimating change in RWA for participants pre- (left panel) and post- (right panel) deconversion from Christianity ($N = 696$). Time on x-axis is measured in years. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$




Figure 1.4. Piecewise latent growth models estimating change in SDO for participants pre- (left panel) and post- (right panel) deconversion from Christianity ($N = 696$). Time on x-axis is measured in years. ** $p < .01$

Discussion

The current study investigated the relationship religious conversion (and deconversion) had with both RWA and SDO. Although religious affiliation correlates positively with authoritarianism (Weller, Levinbok, Maimon & Shaham, 1975; Wink et al., 2007), most studies are cross-sectional and, as such, rely on retrospective accounts or contemporaneous comparisons of religious versus non-religious participants. By using a longitudinal dataset containing a nationwide random sample of adults, we were in the unique position of having access to a large subsample of non-religious participants who became—and remained—Christian at some point during a 9-year period. Because religiosity correlates positively with values that resonate with authoritarianism (i.e., tradition, conformity, and submission to authority; see Saroglou et al., 2004), we expected that RWA would be stable before becoming Christian but increase in the years following religious conversion.

As hypothesized, our results demonstrate that conversion to Christianity temporally precedes increases in authoritarianism (rather than vice versa). Specifically, participants' levels of RWA were stable in the years prior to conversion but increased after identifying as Christian. These results suggest that, rather than motivating people to adopt a religious affiliation, the conversion process itself may motivate authoritarian attitudes. In other words, differences in RWA between those who identify as Christian and the non-religious appear to be (partly) due to socialization (rather than self-selection). Notably, these processes were specific to RWA—analyses focusing on SDO found that religious conversion did not precede changes to converts' preference for group-based hierarchy. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate that religious conversion precedes increases in RWA, but is unassociated with changes in SDO, over time.

We also examined the relationship between deconversion and authoritarian attitudes. As hypothesised, religious participants showed a marked decrease in RWA both before and

after becoming secular. But notably, the decline in RWA was significantly higher before (vs. after) deconversion (i.e., while participants identified as religious). These results suggest that, at least in the case of deconverting from Christianity, religious participants may have been motivated to disidentify from their religious affiliation given their resistance to authoritarian beliefs. Indeed, past work has posited that liberal Christians may be driven to disidentify from their religious identity due to the perceived dissonance between their religious and political beliefs (Hawkins & Nosek, 2012). That the decline in RWA was significantly steeper pre-deconversion suggests that eventual apostates may begin to display reactance to the authoritarian content to which they are exposed before distancing themselves from religion. Consistent with this interpretation, Rosenberg and Siegel (2020) argued that restrictive religious proscriptions for behaviour are more likely to provoke reactance amongst adherents, leading to the endorsement of unorthodox religious beliefs or even disaffiliation. In other words, the pressure to conform to authoritarian religious narratives may provoke reactance and foster lower levels of RWA amongst those who eventually leave their religious identity behind. Our results corroborate this narrative and show that declines in RWA temporally precede religious deconversion.

Although our results demonstrate that RWA declines both pre- and post-deconversion, other research suggests that some types of religious belief may be associated with a decrease in authoritarianism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Leak & Randall, 1995). For example, Leak and Randall (1995) found that religious maturity correlates negatively with RWA. Likewise, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) reveal that religious quest (i.e., a set of religious beliefs that embrace ambiguity and doubt, as well as encourage adherents to view religion as a journey of self-discovery; see Batson & Ventis, 1982) correlates negatively with authoritarianism. Indeed, whilst some religious proscriptions foster a dangerous worldview and, consequently, RWA, other religious teachings promote inclusive values that open one's

worldview to non-believers (Djupe & Calfano, 2013). Accordingly, future research will need to examine the generalisability of our results across distinct forms of religious belief.

Finally, we showed that, unlike religious conversion, religious deconversion decreased SDO. That is, SDO remained stable in the years leading up to deconversion but then experienced a weak, albeit significant, decrease in SDO after participants disidentified with Christianity. Although these results conflicted with our expectations, they are useful comparisons to our conversion work. To these ends, researchers have noted that disaffiliation with a religion can occur for numerous reasons and that only a minority of deconverts become atheists (see Sherkat & Wilson, 1995; Streib et al., 2009). Indeed, unlike those who became consistently secular, some participants may switch religions and retain their religious belief. Given that our deconversion sample only included religious individuals who became secular, we cannot speak to whether these effects generalise to all participants who simply disaffiliated with Christianity.

On a related note, we only assessed self-identified religious affiliation. As such, we cannot speak to the specific faith or belief of those who converted to Christianity, nor whether belief or affiliation impacts the increase in authoritarianism post-conversion, or the decrease in authoritarianism prior- and post-deconversion. Indeed, religious or spiritual beliefs may still be upheld among those who do not identify with a religious label or institution (see Hood & Chen 2013; Van Tongeren et al., 2021). Work on religious orientations—studies that examine why and how religious adherents approach their faith (see Allport & Ross, 1987; Batson & Ventis, 1982)—reveals that people affiliate with religions for several reasons. For example, extrinsic believers affiliate with religion for external reasons and often fail to internalise religious belief/behaviour (Neyrinck et al., 2010). Although it is critical to keep in mind these important nuances in religious belief, our results demonstrate that self-affiliation as a Christian appears to precede increases in RWA.

Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions

The current study expands the literature on religious conversion in a methodologically novel manner by identifying the temporal ordering of the oft-researched connection between religious affiliation and authoritarianism. Notably, we utilise a subsample of self-selected Christian converts from a unique nationwide random sample of New Zealanders. As such, our results should generalize to the wider population of converts in New Zealand across Christian denominations. Despite these strengths, our work has a few limitations. Firstly, our results showed only a small (though statistically significant) increase in authoritarianism following conversion to Christianity. While this may seem counterintuitive given that conversion is often viewed as a sudden, transformative, and disruptive experience (e.g., see Glock & Stark, 1965), Granqvist (2003) argued that conversion is a slow, gradual shift that unfolds over time. Accordingly, Paloutzian and colleagues (1999) found that personality traits were largely unchanged following conversion (see also Stronge et al., 2020). Our results corroborate this perspective by showing that religious conversion produces a subtle (rather than dramatic) increase in authoritarianism.

We should also note that our analyses only focus on those who converted to Christianity and remained religious for the rest of the study. Though necessary for our analyses, this approach limits the generalisability of our results to only certain types of religious conversion (i.e., for those who [at least temporarily] remained religious). But as Loveland (2003) notes, religious preferences are fluid and religious “switching” is common amongst the religious (see Sherkat, 2001; Sherkat & Wilson, 1995). As such, those in our sample frame who converted and remained religious may differ in important ways from those who switch between being believers and non-believers (and back again). Similarly, our findings for those who deconverted and remained (nominally) unaffiliated with a religion must be considered in the context of the complexity of religious conversion (and

deconversion)—our results only speak to one segment of the shifting nature of faith.

Our use of a simple measure of Christian affiliation (namely, Christian vs non-religious) also limits the generalizability of our results, as we are unable to investigate denominational or faith-based differences in the effects of conversion on RWA. Yet denominational switching may also influence RWA following conversion. Indeed, Sherkat and Wilson (1995) argued that Catholics are strongly encouraged to participate in their religion. Given that church attendance correlates positively with authoritarianism (Osborne & Sibley, 2014), switching to-or-from Catholicism (or between other denominations with strict social norms surrounding attendance at religious services) may also shape authoritarianism in ways that differ from less participatory denominations. Research does, however, find comparable levels of RWA between Protestants and Catholics (Wink et al., 2007). Moreover, beliefs and practices are often better predictors than denominational affiliation of RWA (Wink et al., 2007). Although these findings increase confidence in the generalisability of our results, future research should nevertheless explore denominational differences in the relationship between religious conversion and RWA.

On a related note, we only examined Christian and nonreligious identification. As such, we are unable to assess the effects of faith switching, particularly in contexts where Christianity is not the majority religion (though New Zealand as a whole is largely secular; see Hoverd & Sibley, 2010). Indeed, the status of a religion in a particular cultural context may influence our findings, as majority religions are likely to have a breadth of beliefs and religious motivations that encompass both true believers and those whose affiliation is a product of cultural or social norms. Notably, religious beliefs, and the reasons why adherents endorse them, are often multi-faceted, reflected by a variety of religious orientations (Neyrinck et al., 2010). As such, our study may overlook the nuances of religious diversity by simply assessing Christian affiliation.

Whilst our novel method provides unique insights into the temporal ordering of the relationship between religious conversion (and deconversion) and changes in political attitudes, it is not without its limitations. Firstly, we were unable to include SDO as a covariate in our examination of conversion's impact on RWA, as it is difficult to incorporate time-varying covariates into our modelling approach. Unlike ethnicity and age at the start of the study, RWA and SDO vary across time. Because participants converted (or deconverted) at different time points throughout the study, there was no simple way to adjust for SDO. Whilst this may seem problematic given the strong correlation between RWA and SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009), past work has indicated that the consistency of this relationship is weakened by religious belief (see Dallago et al., 2008).

Secondly, we are unable to provide a comparison between the levels of RWA for both Christian converts and those who remained non-religious. Specifically, converts from secular to Christian identification comprise a small subsample of our overall participant pool (i.e., around 5% of the total sample). As such, the sample size of those who did not convert would be grossly imbalanced relative to those who did, thereby violating assumptions of homogeneity of variance (i.e., the variance in RWA and SDO would be notably smaller among those who did not convert given their larger sample size). Furthermore, because participants converted at different time points throughout the study, the comparable "non-conversion" point for the rest of the sample is impossible to identify (i.e., there is no "event" upon which to centre our analyses for those who did not convert). As such, our analysis would be limited to a growth curve beginning in 2009, with the assumption that RWA is stable across the population over time (e.g., see Osborne et al., 2020). Nevertheless, past work has shown increasingly egalitarian sentiment in New Zealand (Hammond et al., 2018; Sibley et al., 2020). As such, in contrast to the increase observed among converts here, those who did not convert to Christianity should demonstrate a gentle decrease in RWA over time.

Although we show that affiliation as a Christian precedes increases in authoritarianism, the mechanism(s) underlying this relationship remain an open question. One possibility is that repeated exposure to the values emphasised in traditional Christian doctrines (e.g., obedience to authority, respect for tradition, etc.) facilitates the development of RWA. Another possibility is that religious conversion induces a change in one's worldviews, driving a perception of the world as a dangerous place which, in turn, gives rise to RWA (see Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). On the other hand, self-affiliation as Christian may increase religious engagement and the traditions it encompasses, including practices that give rise to authoritarianism (e.g., see Osborne & Sibley, 2014). Future research should examine the religious content to which newly affiliated Christians are exposed in order to unveil the mechanism(s) responsible for transmitting religious conversion to increases in RWA.

Conclusion

The current study investigated the temporal ordering of the relationship between religious conversion and authoritarianism by examining the growth of RWA pre- and post-conversion to Christianity. Our results revealed that authoritarianism was highly stable in the years leading up to religious conversion. However, in the years immediately following the conversion process, participants displayed a significant increase in RWA. Notably, these processes were distinct to RWA, as we found evidence of a slight *decrease* in SDO post-conversion. Although research shows that both religious involvement and affiliation correlate positively with authoritarianism (Graham & Haidt, 2010; Osborne & Sibley, 2014), we are the first to extend this literature by directly assessing the relationship religious conversion has with both RWA and SDO. In doing so, we corroborate the view that, rather than producing a dramatic shift in people, religious conversion is a slow and gradual process (Granqvist, 2003; Paloutzian et al. 1999). We also demonstrate, consistent with past research, that religiosity

can have countervailing associations with political attitudes (i.e., increased in RWA but decreases in SDO)—relationships that are best explained by the multi-faceted nature of religious belief (see Gennerich & Huber, 2006). Finally, and perhaps most notably, our research demonstrates that authoritarian attitudes increase after religious conversion.

Although our research cannot definitively rule out selection effects on religious conversion, the temporal ordering of the relationship is clear: converting to Christianity precedes a gradual increase in RWA over time.

Chapter III

Bridging Statement

In Study 1 my colleagues and I demonstrated that conversion to a religious (specifically Christian) affiliation appeared to temporally precede increases in authoritarian attitudes, suggesting that religious affiliation (partially) motivates traditionalist ideals. Yet, religious conversion did not appear to precede anti-egalitarian attitudes. Indeed, past work has often noted that religion is sometimes associated with pro-egalitarian values such as universalism and benevolence (Livi et al., 2014). Notably, Evans (1992) argued that liberation theology, a doctrine of religious belief, is grounded in a desire to rectify inequality and uplift the poor and the dispossessed. As such, past work suggests that some forms of religious belief may motivate pro-egalitarian attitudes which stand at odds with conservative affiliation (Jost et al., 2003; Hirsh et al., 2013).

Past work has posited spirituality, as distinct from traditional religiosity, as a possible explanation for the apparent countervailing impacts of religion on socio-political attitudes (Piotrowski & Zemojtel-Piotrowska, 2020). Whilst religiosity motivates authoritarian attitudes, spirituality appears to reflect a more questioning and cognitively flexible form of faith (Browne et al., 2014), resulting in more universalist ideals. As such, Study 2 sought to extend on previous work by examining the downstream impacts of religiosity on conservatism as well as addressing the multidimensionality of religion oft noted in the literature (see Hill et al., 2000; Pargament, 1999). Specifically, my colleagues and I examined whether social dominance orientation (SDO), an attitude examining a preference for hierarchical and unequal intergroup relations, might reflect the anti-egalitarian preferences expressed by spirituality.

To this end we conducted a cross-sectional pathway model estimating religiosity and spirituality as simultaneous predictors of conservatism, through both RWA and SDO. This allowed us to demonstrate the distinct and countervailing impacts of religiosity and

spirituality on conservatism, displaying two separate processes by which religion motivates political attitudes. This model also allowed us to compare the strength of these two pathways to further investigate the overall impact of religiosity on political ideologies. Accordingly, we found that the positive association between religiosity and conservatism appear to suppress and conceal the more subtle countervailing effects of faith on political attitudes.

Finally, we sought to examine the impact of political engagement as a possible moderator in our model. Past work has argued that the close relationship between religiosity and conservatism might be a product of political discourse (Malka et al., 2012). This might be due to religious individuals conforming to societal expectations, or higher political engagement allows religious individuals to better identify political identities that suit their beliefs. This raises the possibility that religious individuals may be drawn to authoritarianism (and spiritual individuals to egalitarianism), largely as a product of their political engagement. Religion may thus only enculture authoritarian values when such ideals become politically salient. To investigate this, we included political identity centrality (a proxy of political engagement) as a moderator on our variables of interest for both pathways.

The reference for the manuscript is as follows:

Lockhart, C., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2020). Religion makes—and unmakes—the status quo: religiosity and spirituality have opposing effects on conservatism via RWA and SDO. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *10*(4), 379-392.

Religion makes—and unmakes—the status quo: Religiosity and Spirituality have opposing effects on conservatism via RWA and SDO

Let everyone be subject to the governing authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God.

—Romans 13:1 (NIV)

Perhaps unsurprising to those familiar with Romans 13:1, religiosity often correlates positively with deference to authority and, in turn, conservatism (Guth, et al., 2006; Malka, et al., 2012; Olson & Green, 2006). Yet the association between religion and conservatism is more nuanced than it may first appear. Religion is typically unassociated with economic conservatism (Duriez, 2003), and can help unite disadvantaged groups against a common oppressor (see Harris-Lacewell, 2010)—outcomes that are notably discordant with two core features of conservatism (namely, resistance to change and acceptance of inequality; see Jost, 2006). Thus, religious orientations have complicated relationships with socio-political views.

The current study investigates these complexities and argues that, rather than being universally associated with conservatism, religiosity and spirituality—two distinct religious orientations characterised by traditionalism and egalitarianism, respectively—have opposing relationships with conservatism through their countervailing associations with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO). We begin by reviewing the relationship between religion and conservatism, followed by a discussion on the potential for RWA to mediate this association. We then note a key distinction between religiosity and spirituality and argue that spirituality may (indirectly) oppose conservatism by fostering anti-hierarchical beliefs (i.e., low levels of SDO). We conclude with a summary of our study.

Religion and Conservatism

Despite proclamations of a separation between church and state in many Western

democracies, religion and politics often intertwine. For example, Kelly and Morgan (2008) revealed that religious traditionalism correlated positively with conservatism among Latino voters. Olson and Green (2006) similarly demonstrated that church attendance exacerbated the polarization between Democrats and Republicans in the 2004 Presidential election. Thus, religion seems to be a key driver of the political polarization sweeping through contemporary politics (see Abramowitz & Saunders, 2008; Putnam & Campbell, 2010).

Although religiosity correlates positively with conservatism, the processes through which this association emerge are largely unknown. One potential mechanism is Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA); an attitude characterised by obedience to authority (authoritarian submission), conformity to norms (conventionalism), and coercive social control of perceived deviants (authoritarian aggression; Altemeyer, 1996). Indeed, the subcomponents of RWA correspond closely with values enculturated by religion (namely, conformity and security; see Cohrs, et al., 2005; Schwartz, 1992; also see Saroglou, et al., 2004). Accordingly, Altemeyer (1988) theorised that authoritarians tend to uphold the religious beliefs they developed in childhood. Consistent with this perspective, religious fundamentalism correlates positively with RWA (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Shaffer & Hastings, 2007). Moreover, longitudinal research demonstrates that church attendance—a behavioural expression of religiosity—predicts relative increases in RWA over time (Osborne & Sibley, 2014). In turn, RWA is a well-known predictor of conservative socio-political beliefs (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Duckitt, et al., 2010).

Although religiosity tends to correlate positively with RWA (and conservatism), some features of this association are paradoxical. Many religions encourage adherents to ‘love thy neighbour’ (Shen, et al., 2013), a universalistic proscription that conflicts with RWA’s prioritisation of the ingroup. Likewise, Quakers express a decidedly anti-hierarchical view by professing that all of God’s creations share a fundamental sameness (Kesselring, 2011).

Moreover, social movements influenced by religion including the Civil Rights Movement (led by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference) refute the notion that religion *solely* elicits support for the status quo. Indeed, churches provide the Black community with an important resource that fosters a sense of shared fate, solidifies racial identity and provides the impetus for political mobilization *against* racial oppression (Kelly & Morgan, 2008; also see Harris-Lacewell, 2010). These diverse religious-based movements stand in stark contrast to the idea that religion *only* fosters conservative views.

Hirsh and colleagues (2013) aimed to resolve these contradictions by distinguishing between religiosity and spirituality. Whereas fundamental religious beliefs foster tradition and conventionalism, spirituality involves a search for meaning and connection with nature and humanity (Emmons, 1999)—a universalistic sentiment that is notably anti-hierarchical (see Milfont, et al., 2013). Indeed, Laird, Curtis, and Morgan's (2017) thematic analysis revealed that spirituality encompasses, among other beliefs, an awareness of relationships between the self and others. As such, spirituality may *undermine* (rather than reinforce) conservatism by decreasing support for the social hierarchy.

Consistent with this reasoning, Hirsh and colleagues (2013) revealed that spirituality correlated positively with universalism—an ideology of inclusivity and egalitarianism (see Saroglou et al., 2004). The authors also noted that universalism correlated negatively with SDO. That both spirituality and egalitarianism correlate negatively with SDO is perhaps unsurprising, as SDO reflects a preference for group-based hierarchy, and is motivated by competition and dominance over subordinate groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001)—motives that are antithetical to connecting harmoniously with others. In turn, SDO correlates positively with social and economic conservatism, as well as right-wing political party preferences (Cornelis & Van Hiel, 2006; Pratto, et al., 1994). Thus, spirituality appears to correlate negatively with conservatism by discouraging SDO.

Notably, the association religiosity has with conservatism via RWA may be discrete from the association spirituality has with conservatism through SDO. Consistent with this hypothesis, belief in God correlates positively with intolerance toward value-violating groups (e.g., homosexuals or followers of other religions; Kossowska & Sekerdej, 2015), but is unassociated with intolerance toward other low-status groups who do not threaten religious values (e.g., the poor; Shen et al., 2013). Hence, religiosity should correlate positively with RWA, but should be unrelated to SDO. Conversely, spirituality is unrelated to the conservation values (e.g., tradition) underlying RWA, but rather, emphasises universalism (see Hirsh et al., 2013). Indeed, universalism is unrelated to RWA when controlling for SDO (Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002; Duriez, et al., 2005). Thus, whilst religiosity may increase conservatism through RWA, spirituality appears to decrease conservatism by countering SDO. Collectively, this process reflects two independent pathways through which religious beliefs influence socio-political outcomes.

Whilst religiosity and spirituality may have independent, countervailing associations with conservatism via discrete mediators (see Hirsh et al., 2013), the strength of these relationships likely depend on people's political awareness. Indeed, political knowledge helps one to identify the policies (and parties) that best resonate with their personality and values (Osborne & Sibley, 2012, 2015). Consistent with this hypothesis, Malka et al. (2012) revealed that the positive correlation between religiosity and conservatism was stronger for the politically engaged vis-à-vis the unengaged. Federico, Hunt, and Ergun (2009) also found that political expertise strengthened the respective effects of competitive-jungle and dangerous-world beliefs on SDO and RWA. Finally, Osborne and Sibley (2012) revealed that the negative associations the Big Five's Openness to Experience had with conservative socio-political beliefs and behaviors was stronger for those high (vs. low) on political sophistication (see also Osborne et al., 2017). Yet no study to date has examined the possibility that political

sophistication also moderates the countervailing associations that religiosity and spirituality have with conservatism.

Current Study

The current study addresses this oversight by replicating and extending Hirsh et al.'s (2013) study. Given the emphasis on tradition and conventionalism in some approaches to religion (i.e., values that coincide with RWA), we hypothesized that religious identification would have a positive indirect effect on conservatism through RWA. Conversely, spirituality, a religious orientation that fosters universalism (i.e., an ideology of inclusivity and egalitarianism), should have a negative indirect effect on conservatism via SDO. Although these predictions replicate Hirsh and colleagues' results in a distinct national context, we extend their model by arguing that political sophistication should help people connect their religious approach with their ideological worldviews (c.f. Osborne & Sibley, 2012, 2015). Specifically, political identity centrality—the extent to which politics are important to one's identity—should moderate the relationships that religiosity and spirituality have with RWA and SDO (respectively) by enabling people to identify which ideological attitudes resonate with their approach toward religion. Likewise, political identity centrality should strengthen the independent associations RWA and SDO have with conservatism.

To investigate these hypotheses, we controlled for covariates associated with political beliefs. Given that women are often more liberal than men (Feldman & Johnston, 2014), we controlled for gender. Also, Openness to Experience correlates negatively with conservatism (Sibley, et al., 2012). As such, we controlled for the Big-Six, a framework that adds Honesty-Humility (i.e., a trait encompassing fairness and greed-avoidance) to the five-factor model of personality (Ashton & Lee, 2007). Because Hirsh and colleagues (2013) also show that different values underlie religious and spiritual beliefs, we controlled for Openness to Change, Conservation, Altruism and Self-enhancement values (Schwartz, 1992). Our study

thus provides the most complete examination of the associations that religiosity and spirituality have with conservatism to date, whilst ruling out the most plausible alternative explanations for our hypothesized results.

Method

Sampling Procedure

Data for this study came from Time 8 of the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS)—a national longitudinal panel study that began in 2009.⁵ Sampling for Time 8 occurred five times. The first sample occasion sent invitations to 40,500 people listed on the 2009 electoral roll (a registry of all New Zealand citizens eligible to vote), yielding 6,518 participants (response rate = 16.6%). By 2011, 3,918 participants remained in the study. As such, a non-random booster sample of 2,966 was recruited from the website of a nation-wide newspaper, bringing the Time 3 sample size to 6,884 participants.

Three more sets of booster sampling were conducted in 2012 (Time 4), 2013 (Time 5), and 2016 (Time 8). Recruitment at Time 4 yielded 5,374 new participants and sampling at Time 5 provided 7,759 new participants. Finally, sampling at Time 8 resulted in 8,158 new participants, bringing the total sample size to 21,937 participants, 8,275 of whom identified as religious. Of these participants, 7,417 (89.6% of the sample who identified as religious) provided partial or complete responses to our variables of interest and were included in the current study.

Participants

Of our 7,417 participants, 65.4% (4850) were female and 34.5% (2,557) were male (0.1% [10 people] of the sample did not report their gender). The age range was 18-97, with a mean age of 51.80 ($SD = 13.67$). As for ethnicity, 76.1% (5,646) identified as New Zealand

⁵ We used Time 8 because it was the first time we assessed spiritual identification.

European or Pākehā, 12.4% (923) identified as Māori, 5.9% (441) identified as Asian and 3.9% (288) identified as Pacific (1.6% [119] of the sample did not report their ethnicity).

Thus, the demographic composition of the NZAVS corresponds closely to the New Zealand census, but over-represents New Zealand European women and under-represents Pacific and Asian men and women (see Sibley, 2014).

Measures

The current study focused on measures of religiosity, spirituality, RWA, SDO, conservatism, political identity centrality, and covariates. Items were interspersed within an omnibus survey containing other measures outside the current study's scope. Unless noted, items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale.

Predictors

Religious identification was assessed using one item: “How important is your religion to how you see yourself?”. This was drawn from Hoverd and Sibley's (2010) work on religion in New Zealand and was rated on a 1 (not important) to 7 (very important) scale.

Spiritual identification was assessed using one item: “I identify as a spiritual person”. As noted by Postmes, Haslam, and Jans (2013), a single-item social identification measure is both reliable and valid across a range of social groups.

Right-wing authoritarianism was assessed using six items from Altemeyer (1996). Example items include: “It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds” and “Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the ‘normal way’ things are supposed to be done” (reverse-coded). Items were averaged together with higher scores reflecting higher levels of authoritarianism ($\alpha = .70$).

Social dominance orientation was assessed using six items from Sidanius and Pratto (2001). Example items include: “It is OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others” and “We should have increased social equality” (reverse-coded). Items were averaged together with higher scores reflecting higher levels of SDO ($\alpha = .74$).

Conservatism was assessed by asking participants to “Please rate how politically liberal versus conservative you see yourself” on a 1 (Extremely Liberal) to 7 (Extremely Conservative) scale.

Political identity centrality was assessed using one item developed for the NZAVS: “How important are your political beliefs to how you see yourself?” on a 1 (Not at all) to 7 (Extremely) scale.

Covariates

Covariates included ethnicity, age and gender, all of which were assessed using open-ended items. Dummy-codes were created for ethnicity (0 = New Zealand European/Pākehā; 1 = minority) and gender (0 = Woman; 1 = Man).

We also measured personality using the 24-item Mini-IPIP6 (Sibley et al., 2011). Example Extraversion items include: “Am the life of the party” and “Don’t talk a lot” (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .74$). Example Agreeableness items include: “Sympathise with others’ feelings” and “Am not really interested in others” (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .68$). Example Conscientiousness items include: “Like order” and “Often forget to put things back in their proper place” (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .66$). Example Neuroticism items include: “Get upset easily” and “Seldom feel blue” (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .71$). Example Openness to Experience items include: “Have a vivid imagination” and “Am not interested in abstract ideas” (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .69$). Example Honesty-Humility items include: “Would like to be seen driving around in a very expensive car” (reverse-coded) and “Would get a lot of pleasure from

owning expensive luxury goods” (reverse-coded; $\alpha = .77$).

Finally, Schwartz's (1992) scale was used to assess participants' values. An example Openness to Change value was, “A varied life (filled with curiosity, novelty and change)” ($\alpha = .77$). An example Conservation value was, “Family security (safety for loved ones)” ($\alpha = .60$). An example Altruistic value was, “Equality (equal opportunity for all)” ($\alpha = .73$). Finally, an example Self-enhancement value was, “Authority (the right to lead or command)” ($\alpha = .61$).

Results

Because religious and spiritual identification have different implications for deference to authority and group-based hierarchies (see Hirsh et al., 2013), we predicted that religiosity would correlate positively with RWA (but not SDO), whereas spirituality would correlate negatively with SDO (but not RWA). In turn, both RWA and SDO should correlate positively with conservatism (Duckitt, 2001). The relationships between socio-political attitudes and their psychological antecedents should, however, partly depend on political expertise (see Federico et al., 2009; Malka et al., 2012; Osborne et al., 2017; Osborne & Sibley, 2012, 2015). Thus, we further hypothesised that political identity centrality—a proxy for political expertise (see Luskin, 1990)—would moderate the associations between our variables of interest.

To investigate our hypotheses, we estimated a moderated mediation model in *Mplus* version 8.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 2018). Accordingly, we regressed conservatism onto RWA (mean-centred), SDO (mean-centred), political identity centrality (mean-centred), religious identification (mean-centred), and spiritual identification (mean-centred), as well as our mean-centred and dummy-coded covariates. We also included the RWA \times Political Identity Centrality and SDO \times Political Identity Centrality interaction terms to predict conservatism.

We then regressed RWA and SDO onto religious identification (mean-centred), spiritual identification (mean-centred), and political identity centrality (mean-centred), as well as our mean-centred and dummy-coded covariates. Finally, we included the Religious Identification \times Political Identity Centrality and Spiritual Identification \times Political Identity Centrality interaction terms to predict RWA and SDO. The entire model was then estimated using full information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation and 95% Bias Corrected (BC) confidence intervals (CIs), utilising 5000 bootstrapped resamples (with replacement) to correct for potentially non-normal data.

Table 2.1 displays the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations of our measures. Results from our focal analyses revealed that our model provided an excellent fit to these data, $\chi^2_{(7)} = 288.177, p < .001$; CFI = .971; RMSEA = .074 [.066, .081; $p < .001$]; SRMR = .010. Inspection of the individual pathways to RWA indicated that Extraversion ($B = -0.023$, 95% BC [-0.042, -0.002], $p = .028$), Openness to Experience ($B = -0.141$, 95% BC [-0.161, -0.118], $p < .001$), Openness to Change values ($B = -0.184$, 95% BC [-0.206, -0.164], $p < .001$), and Altruistic values ($B = -0.194$, 95% BC [-0.220, -0.168], $p < .001$) correlated negatively with RWA. Conversely, Conscientiousness ($B = 0.057$, 95% BC [0.035, 0.080], $p < .001$), Conservation values ($B = 0.374$, 95% BC [0.344, 0.402], $p < .001$), and Self-enhancement values ($B = 0.159$, 95% BC [0.138, 0.180], $p < .001$) correlated positively with RWA. After accounting for these covariates, Figure 2.1 reveals that political identity centrality correlated negatively ($B = -0.037$, 95% BC [-0.050, -0.023], $p < .001$), whereas religious identification correlated positively ($B = 0.217$, 95% BC [0.205, 0.230], $p < .001$), with RWA. Unexpectedly, political identity centrality did not moderate the relationship between religious identification and RWA ($B = 0.003$, 95% BC [-0.004, 0.011], $p = .368$).

Turning to SDO, Agreeableness ($B = -0.163$, 95% BC [-0.186, -0.140], $p < .001$), Openness to Experience ($B = -0.058$, 95% BC [-0.076, -0.041], $p < .001$), Honesty-Humility

($B = -0.068$, 95% BC $[-0.086, -0.050]$, $p < .001$), Openness to Change values ($B = -0.042$, 95% BC $[-0.060, -0.025]$, $p < .001$), and Altruistic values ($B = -0.433$, 95% BC $[-0.456, -0.411]$, $p < .001$) correlated negatively with SDO. Conversely, Conservation ($B = 0.142$, 95% BC $[0.117, 0.167]$, $p < .001$) and Self-enhancement ($B = 0.161$, 95% BC $[0.143, 0.178]$, $p < .001$) values correlated positively with SDO. After adjusting for these covariates, Figure 2.1 reveals that spiritual identification correlated negatively ($B = -0.039$, 95% BC $[-0.052, -0.026]$, $p < .001$), whereas political identity centrality correlated positively ($B = 0.026$, 95% BC $[0.014, 0.037]$, $p < .001$), with SDO. Nevertheless, political identity centrality moderated the hypothesized relationship between spiritual identification and SDO ($B = -0.010$, 95% BC $[-0.018, -0.003]$, $p = .006$). Figure 2.2 reveals that the relationship between spiritual identification and SDO was stronger for those who were high (i.e., $+1 SD$) on political identity centrality ($B = -0.056$, 95% BC $[-0.077, -0.038]$, $p < .001$) relative to those who were low (i.e., $-SD$) on political identity centrality ($B = -0.022$, 95% BC $[-0.039, -0.005]$, $p = .008$).

We now turn to an examination of the direct effects of our predictors on conservatism. As hypothesized, both RWA ($B = 0.373$, 95% BC $[0.342, 0.404]$, $p < .001$) and SDO ($B = 0.185$, 95% BC $[0.150, 0.222]$, $p < .001$) correlated positively with conservatism. Moreover, political identity centrality moderated these associations ($B = 0.016$, 95% BC $[0.001, 0.032]$, $p = .038$, and $B = 0.085$, 95% BC $[0.067, 0.105]$, $p < .001$, respectively), although the RWA \times Political Identity Centrality interaction was only marginally associated with conservatism and should be treated with caution (especially given our sample size). Specifically, Figure 2.3 shows that the positive relationship between RWA and conservatism was marginally stronger for those who were high ($B = 0.400$, 95% BC $[0.357, 0.441]$, $p < .001$), relative to those who were low ($B = 0.346$, 95% BC $[0.309, 0.385]$, $p < .001$), on political identity centrality. Nevertheless, Figure 2.4 shows that the positive relationship between SDO and conservatism

was notably stronger for those who were high (vs. low) on political identity centrality ($B = 0.325$, 95% BC [0.274, 0.375], $p < .001$ vs. $B = 0.045$, 95% BC [-0.001, 0.094], $p = .059$, respectively). However, neither the direct relationship between religious identification and conservatism ($B = 0.012$, 95% BC [-0.007, 0.029], $p = .201$), nor the direct association between spiritual identification and conservatism ($B = -0.015$, 95% BC [-0.036, 0.006], $p = .171$), were significant.

Although the direct associations both forms of religiosity had with conservatism were not significant, religious and spiritual identification may nevertheless be indirectly associated with conservatism through RWA and SDO, respectively (see MacKinnon, 2008). Indeed, Hayes, Preacher, and Myers (2011) note that indirect effects can occur in the absence of direct effects, particularly when there are multiple mediators in a model (as is the case here). To these ends, examination of the specific indirect effects showed that RWA fully mediated the relationship between religious identification and conservatism ($B_{\text{Indirect}} = 0.081$, 95% BC [0.073, 0.089], $p < .001$), whereas the specific indirect effect of religious identification on conservatism through SDO was not significant ($B_{\text{Indirect}} = 0.000$, 95% BC [-0.003, 0.002], $p = .705$). Conversely, spiritual identification had a negative specific indirect effect on conservatism through SDO ($B_{\text{Indirect}} = -0.007$, 95% BC [-0.011, -0.005], $p < .001$), whereas the corresponding specific indirect effect via RWA was non-significant ($B_{\text{Indirect}} = 0.003$, 95% BC [-0.002, 0.009], $p = .279$).

Discussion

Although religiosity often correlates positively with conservative beliefs including RWA (Shen et al., 2013), not all approaches toward religion predict conservative outcomes. Indeed, Hirsh and colleagues (2013) found that, while religiosity correlated positively with RWA, spirituality correlated *negatively* with SDO. In turn, both RWA and SDO correlated positively with conservatism. Thus, religious orientations can both make and unmake support

for the status quo.

Based on this insight, we sought to replicate and extend Hirsh and colleagues' (2013) findings in a distinct national context. Because political expertise should help people identify issues that resonate with their dispositions (see Malka et al., 2012; Osborne & Sibley, 2012, 2015), we hypothesized that political identity centrality would moderate the hypothesised associations that religiosity and spirituality had with RWA and SDO, respectively. Political identity centrality should also help people connect their deference to authority and preference for group-based hierarchy with their socio-political views (Federico, et al., 2011). Thus, we also expected that political identity centrality would strengthen the positive associations RWA and SDO had with conservatism.

As hypothesized, religiosity correlated positively with RWA (but not SDO), whereas spirituality correlated negatively with SDO (but not RWA). We also expected that political centrality would help participants to identify the ideologies that best supported their values (c.f., Osborne & Sibley, 2012, 2015). Consistent with this thesis, political identity centrality strengthened the negative association between spirituality and SDO. Unexpectedly, political identity centrality did not moderate the relationship between religiosity and RWA. Thus, an identification with politics helps people to connect their spiritual identity with their political attitudes (Federico et al., 2011), but does not help connect their religious identity with RWA. This implies that there is an intuitive association between religious identification and RWA, as even those disinterested in politics can connect their religious identity with a deference to authority.

We also found that both RWA and SDO correlated positively with conservatism (as hypothesized). But somewhat surprisingly, political identity centrality only seemed to notably strengthen the positive relationship between SDO and conservatism. Indeed, political identity centrality just marginally affected the strength of the positive association between RWA and

conservatism. Given the size of our sample and the small magnitude of the interaction effect, these results suggest that RWA closely aligns with conservatism (at least in our sample) and that an interest in politics is largely unnecessary to make this connection. Thus, deference to authority and conservatism appears intuitively associated, whereas the connection between preference for group-based hierarchy and conservatism may (partially) depend on political awareness.

That the association between religiosity and RWA was only marginally affected by political identity centrality seems consistent with moral foundations theory and the claim that “binding” moral foundations underlie both religiosity and conservatism (Graham & Haidt, 2010). Indeed, the emphasis on group loyalty, respect for authority and purity (i.e., binding foundations) found in religion seems to parallel the authoritarian aggression, submission, and conventionalism subcomponents of RWA, respectively. Whilst some question whether these moral foundations reflect unique constructs as opposed to certain aspects of authoritarianism (Kugler, et al., 2014), religiosity seems closely intertwined with authoritarian tendencies.

The relatively intuitive connection between religiosity and authoritarianism may also reflect cognitive styles common to both conservative and religious orientations. Baumard and Boyer (2013) posited a dual-process model of religiosity consisting of an intuitive pathway comprised of easily accessible—and cognitively simple—beliefs, and a reflective pathway characterised by analytical processes that are deliberate and cognitively complex. Notably, intuitive thinking styles are linked to traditional religious beliefs (Shenhav, et al., 2012), whereas analytical thinking corresponds with unorthodox spiritual/supernatural beliefs (e.g., Pantheism; Pennycook, et al., 2012). Consistent with this framework, analytic thinking correlates negatively with intrinsic/extrinsic religious orientations and general religious belief, but positively with quest (a religious orientation characterised by doubt and non-conformity; Bahçekapili & Yilmaz, 2017). Intuitive cognitive styles also correlate with

conservatism, whereas reflective thinking correlates with liberalism (Saribay & Yilmaz, 2017). These findings help to explain why political identity centrality only moderated some of the paths between religious orientations, authoritarianism, and conservatism.

Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions

Our research replicates and extends Hirsh and colleagues' (2013) work, showing that political identity centrality moderates the relationship between spirituality and SDO. We also demonstrate the generalizability of their findings by using nationally representative data from a distinct national context. Moreover, we reveal that religiosity is more intuitively connected to RWA than spirituality is to SDO. Indeed, political identity centrality strengthened the negative relationship between spirituality and SDO but did not moderate the corresponding association between religiosity and RWA. These results suggest that religiosity aligns with authoritarianism *irrespective* of political sophistication, whereas an interest in, and identification with, politics helps to connect spirituality with a preference for group-based hierarchy.

Despite the strengths of our study, we note a few limitations. Most notably, New Zealand is becoming increasingly secular (Hoeverd & Sibley, 2010), potentially limiting the generalisability of our findings to other highly religious Western nations. Nevertheless, our results corresponded closely with Hirsh et al.'s (2013) U.S.-based study. That we replicated Hirsh and colleagues' findings in a context where religiosity is less normative demonstrates the generalisability of these associations.

Furthermore, our single-item measure of conservatism prevents us from exploring differences in the antecedents to social and economic conservatism. Indeed, research reveals that cultural conservatism correlates positively with religious belief, whereas economic conservatism tends to be unassociated with either religiosity or spirituality (Duriez, 2003a). Echoing these findings in the context of cognitive styles, scores on the cognitive reflection

test (a correlate of religiosity) correlate negatively with general and social conservatism but are not associated with economic conservatism (Deppe et al., 2015). Our work on general conservatism is consistent with these findings. Moreover, the single-item ideological self-placement measure used in the current study is one of the most effective predictors of voting behaviour in the literature on political psychology (see Jost, 2006).

There are also limitations to our measures of RWA and SDO. Some (correctly) note that measures of RWA overlap with focal outcomes, potentially over-inflating the size of the correlation between variables (Mavor, et al., 2011). Indeed, the RWA scale contains items specifically referencing religion, raising the possibility that the correlation between RWA and religiosity is tautological. However, work that excludes these religiously toned items still reveal a consistent relationship between religiosity and RWA (see Osborne & Sibley, 2014). Relatedly, given the conceptual overlap between the preference for group-based hierarchy and one of the key pillars of conservative ideology (namely, acceptance of inequality; see Jost, 2006), the correlation between SDO and conservatism may be (partly) tautological. Future research would do well to help further differentiate these important constructs.

Finally, we note the use of short form measures in our study. Although necessary due to the omnibus nature of our survey, it may have attenuated the reliability for some of our covariates (namely, Self-enhancement and Conservation values, as well as Openness, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness). Accordingly, the magnitude of the associations identified in our study may be stronger than we reported. Similarly, we used single-item measures of religious and spiritual identification. As a result, cannot speak to the diverse religious orientations that are distinct from religiosity and spirituality (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson & Ventis, 1982). Although spirituality seems closely aligned with a quest religious orientation (Batson & Ventis, 1982; Bulbulia et al., 2013), nuances exist in how different measures of religious and spiritual beliefs correlate

with conservatism. The current study provides the necessary foundations to examine these complexities in the future.

Conclusion

The current study investigated religion's ability to both preserve and challenge the status quo. Whereas religiosity appears to foster authoritarianism and, in turn, conservatism, spirituality tends to undermine support for the status quo by reducing preference for group-based hierarchy (particularly for those who identify strongly with politics). Accordingly, the political implications of religion depend on whether one's religious orientation emphasises tradition or universalism, respectively. Thus, contrary to popular thought, religious beliefs do not narrowly foster conservatism, but rather, have the capacity to both make—and unmake—support for the status quo.

Table 2.1. *Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for variables of interest.*

	<i>M</i>	<i>S</i>								8	
	<i>ea</i>	<i>D</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		9
	<i>n</i>										
1. Gender ¹	0. 35	0. 48	---								
2. Age	51 .8 0	13 .6 7	.106 ***	---							
3. Minority ²	1. 39	0. 82	-.00 6	-.18 0***	---						
4. Conservatism	4. 04	1. 34	.053 ***	.100 ***	-.05 3***	---					
5. SDO	2. 45	0. 94	.185 ***	.131 ***	.054 ***	.297 ***	---				
6. RWA	3. 83	1. 13	.022	.068 ***	.102 ***	.462 ***	.227 ***	---			
7. Spirituality	5. 13	1. 73	-.15 5***	-.07 9***	.067 ***	.025 *	-.17 8***	.207 ***	---		
8. Religiousness	4. 78	2. 00	-.06 8***	-.04 4***	.130 ***	.153 ***	-.07 0***	.427 ***	.565 ***	---	
9. Political Centrality	4. 23	1. 64	.086 ***	.151 ***	.091 ***	-.04 2**	.017	-.00 4	.065 ***	.143 ***	---
10. Extraversion	3. 94	1. 16	-.04 1***	-.02 0	-.00 4	-.07 2***	-.02 3	-.07 7***	.027 *	-.02 1	.095 ***
11. Agreeableness	5. 44	0. 93	-.24 5***	.009	-.08 4***	-.06 4***	-.31 5***	-.02 7*	.194 ***	.100 ***	.006
12. Conscientiousness	5. 14	1. 01	-.08 9***	.067 ***	.010	.118 ***	-.00 5	.123 ***	.029 *	.016	.002
13. Neuroticism	3. 42	1. 12	-.12 5***	-.18 1***	.020	-.04 7***	-.00 1	-.05 0***	-.01 1	-.03 2**	-.00 6
14. Openness	4. 86	1. 11	.054 ***	-.12 5***	.007	-.21 4**	-.19 1***	-.22 0***	.145 ***	.030 **	.060 ***
15. Honesty	5. 38	1. 20	-.12 7***	.149 ***	-.14 7***	-.01 1	-.24 3***	-.01 3	.099 ***	.092 ***	-.08 5***
16. Openness Value	5. 01	1. 25	.026 *	.005	.049 ***	-.11 2***	-.08 3***	-.13 2***	.032 **	-.03 2**	.166 ***
17. Conservation Value	5. 86	0. 90	-.04 7***	.149 ***	.132 ***	.212 ***	-.02 3	.301 ***	.129 ***	.161 ***	.096 ***
18. Altruism Value	5. 94	1. 02	-.15 3***	.099 ***	.088 ***	-.16 9***	-.44 3***	-.06 4***	.157 ***	.088 ***	.152 ***
19. Enhancement Value	3. 97	1. 33	.050 ***	.072 ***	.151 ***	.161 ***	.207 ***	.210 ***	.000	.053 ***	.189 ***

¹Gender was dummy-coded (0 = Female, 1 = Male)

²Minority was dummy-coded (0 = New Zealand European/Pākehā, 1 = ethnic minority)

⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 2.1 (continued).

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
10. Extraversion	---							
11. Agreeableness	.186 ^{***}	---						
12. Conscientiousness	.052 ^{***}	.134 ^{***}	---					
13. Neuroticism	-.133 ^{***}	-.064 ^{***}	-.199 ^{***}	---				
14. Openness	.203 ^{***}	.223 ^{***}	.003	-.030 ^{**}	---			
15. Honesty	-.102 ^{***}	.216 ^{***}	.091 ^{***}	-.166 ^{***}	.047 ^{***}	---		
16. Openness Value	.210 ^{***}	.093 ^{***}	.035 ^{**}	-.048 ^{***}	.218 ^{***}	-.119 ^{***}	---	
17. Conservation Value	.044 ^{***}	.148 ^{***}	.223 ^{***}	-.102 ^{***}	-.045 ^{***}	.033 ^{**}	.351 ^{***}	---
18. Altruism Value	.082 ^{***}	.259 ^{***}	.081 ^{***}	-.017	.105 ^{***}	.091 ^{***}	.356 ^{***}	.450 ^{***}
19. Enhancement Value	.155 ^{***}	-.015	.117 ^{***}	-.036 ^{**}	-.047 ^{***}	-.329 ^{***}	.449 ^{***}	.430 ^{***}

⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$




Figure 1.1. Path model showing two opposing paths to conservatism (paths reflect unstandardized regression coefficients). One pathway illustrates the hypothesized positive indirect effect of religiousness on conservatism through RWA, and the other pathway reflects the hypothesized negative indirect effect of spirituality on conservatism via decreases in SDO. Political identity centrality was included as a moderator for our variables of interest along both sets of pathways.




Figure 2.2. Relationship between spiritual identification and social dominance orientation at low (-1 *SD*) and high ($+1$ *SD*) levels of political identity centrality. Results control for our covariates.




Figure 2.3. Relationship between right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and conservatism at low ($-1 SD$) and high ($+1 SD$) levels of political identity centrality. Results control for our covariates.




Figure 2.4. Relationship between social dominance orientation (SDO) and conservatism at low ($-1 SD$) and high ($+1 SD$) levels of political identity centrality. Results control for our covariates.

Chapter IV

Bridging Statement

Study 2 thus demonstrated the downstream effect of religiosity enculturing authoritarian attitudes whilst also accounting for the multidimensional nature of religious affiliation. Importantly, it demonstrated that religiosity and spirituality appear to show distinct, countervailing pathways to conservatism. Accordingly, religiosity motivated higher authoritarianism (but not social dominance orientation) whilst spirituality was correlated with lower SDO (but not RWA). Most notably, our model showed full mediation, indicating that the impact of religious and spiritual identification on conservative affiliation seemed to be wholly explained by authoritarian and anti-egalitarian beliefs. Such work demonstrates that fundamental to the impact of religiosity and spirituality on socio-political outcomes, is their endorsement of traditionalist and universalist values, respectively.

Spirituality's role in enculturing universalism, a strongly egalitarian value encompassing connection with mankind and the environment (Schwartz, 1992), suggests outcomes beyond mere political affiliation. Indeed, they suggest that spirituality is also associated with other universalist outcomes such as environmental concern. Notably, Spilka (1993, ref. Hill et al., 2000) contended that spirituality is multidimensional, divided by its orientation towards God (rooted in less-traditionalist theologies), the world (stressing man's relationship with nature), and other people (focusing on human empowerment and connection). Consistent with this, past work has demonstrated that certain spiritual beliefs, particularly those that view nature as sacred, are (perhaps unsurprisingly) associated with environmental concern (Bloch, 1998; Kearns, 1996).

It is noteworthy however, that these conceptualisations of religiosity and spirituality has largely arisen from majority Christian samples, as well as those rooted in a broad-tent (monotheistic) religious and (Western) cultural heritage (with some exceptions; see Li & Chow, 2015). As such, the applicability of these conceptualisations comes into question when

assessing non-Western samples (Sheridan, 1986). Indeed, majority religions are argued to encompass large numbers of adherents with vastly different religious beliefs, identities, and definitions of religion. Bulbulia and colleagues (2020) noted that Christian denominations showed somewhat even distribution across five distinct religious typologies in New Zealand, speaking to the variety of religious beliefs and concepts held even by those purportedly of the same religion. Thus, given that spirituality appears to situate a search for the sacred through unorthodox means (Zinnbauer et al., 1999), spirituality and its values may be distinct across cultures. What is traditional or unorthodox in one society or religion, may not be in another.

As such, Study 3 examined spiritual beliefs and the value of universalism in a culturally unique population, namely that of New Zealand Māori. Importantly, Māori are the indigenous population of New Zealand with a rich cultural and spiritual heritage, and particularly a strong connection to the land. Fundamental to Māori spirituality is that all things, including Māori themselves, originate from *Rangi* (the sky father) and *Papatūānuku* (the sky mother; see Roberts et al., 1995). As such, Māori share kinship with the *atua* (gods), personifications of all natural phenomena who held authority over all aspects of existence (Mead 2003), creating a network of relationships which can be traced back through *whakapapa* (genealogy). As such, Māori spirituality appears strongly pro-environmental rooted through a strong relationship with nature and reminiscent of Spilka's (1993) world-oriented conception of spirituality.

Yet, Māori spiritual identity is unique – one not easily reconciled with considerations of spirituality as existential (not functionally) motivated, nor with Spilka's (1993) clean distinctions. As a product of this common *whakapapa*, Māori spiritual traditions position Māori as members of the environment (Durie, 2012), acknowledged in their status as *tangata whenua* (people of the land). Importantly, integral to Māori spirituality is the vitalist concept of *mauri* (life energy). This reflects the interplay between man and the forces of Mother Earth

(i.e., the source of life; see Henare, 2001), with disruptions to these vital connections resulting in corresponding impacts on the entire *mauri* system (Dell, 2017). Hence, for Māori there is a clear connection between healthy ecosystems and the people's cultural and spiritual welfare (Harmsworth & Awatere, 2013).

Correspondingly, fundamental to the role of Māori as *tangata whenua* is that Māori are protected and sustained by the land but are expected to reciprocate in turn—an obligation best exemplified by *kaitiakitanga* (guardianship/resource management; Kawharu, 2000). Hence, a theme of responsibility and reciprocity pervades Māori perspectives on the environment. Yet, *kaitiakitanga* is both philosophical and political. Land provides access to resources and assets to secure a sustainable livelihood and economic security, all of which enable Māori to control the course of their own lives (Dell, 2017). Thus, *kaitiakitanga* and the role of Māori as *tangata whenua* not only expresses spiritual concerns but also enables Māori to re-establish a sense of control and self-autonomy so fundamental to regaining *tino rangatiratanga* (self-determination/authority).

As such, Māori spirituality seems to uniquely reflect a communal spiritual tradition rooted in functional considerations towards responsibility and reciprocity (specifically with the land). Māori spirituality suggests that considerations of spirituality as individualist and concerned only with existential seeking might be too limited a view. Yet Māori spirituality also appears to strongly endorse the universalist values, reflected by the sense of universal kinship expressed by *whakapapa*, that sits at the heart of spirituality. Importantly, Māori spirituality seems to overlap both a world-oriented and person-oriented view of spirituality (Spilka, 1993). Study 3 thus sought to examine the role of Māori spirituality in motivating environmental concern, specifically assessing Schwartz's (1992) universalism values in the context of the environment. This study demonstrates the unique nature of Māori spirituality

whilst also giving some indication of the cross-cultural validity of spirituality's association with universalist ideals.

The reference for the manuscript is as follows:

Lockhart, C., Houkamau, C. A., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2019). To be at one with the land: Māori spirituality predicts greater environmental regard. *Religions, 10*(7), 427.

To be at one with the land: Māori spirituality predicts greater environmental regard

Te toto o te tangata he kai; te oranga o te tangata, he whenua

The blood of man is food, (hence) the life of man is the land

(Māori Proverb, as cited in Firth 1926)

As the indigenous population of New Zealand, Māori have a deep connection with the environment (Bergin & Smith, 2004; Harris & Tipene, 2006). Indeed, past research reveals that Māori express the highest levels of environmental regard across ethnic groups (Cowie et al., 2016). Furthermore, Cowie and colleagues (2016) found that socio-political consciousness, an aspect of Māori identity encompassing an awareness of, and support for, Māori rights, correlated positively with environmental regard. This may be unsurprising, as features of the natural environment were thought to represent the centre and source of the sustenance upon which Māori relied (Keenan, 2012), naturally facilitating a desire to protect the land.

Yet, the significance of the land goes beyond survival concerns, extending into cultural, social and spiritual domains which are rooted in, and centred around, the land (Keenan, 2012) and natural resources, including the marine environment (Jackson et al., 2017). Indeed, as Durie (2012) notes, a substantial religious philosophy underlies Māori land customs, predicated on the belief that Māori have a shared ancestry with all aspects of the environment. As such, Māori see themselves as *part of* the environment, not masters of it (Durie 2012). Replicating and extending Cowie et al.'s (2016) work, the current study hypothesises that both Māori spirituality and socio-political consciousness should predict higher environmental regard. We further aim to show spirituality's connection with environmental attitudes by highlighting its relationship with Schwartz's (1992) value of environmental unity. To these ends, we begin with a review of Māori identity, focusing on

how Māori spirituality facilitates environmental values. Then, we examine how socio-political consciousness, grounded in spiritual beliefs and Māori cosmology, correlates with valuing environmental protection. We conclude by summarising the aims and hypotheses of the current study.

Māori Identity and Environmental Regard

Research examining environmental regard reveals that Māori value the environment more than other ethnic groups in New Zealand (Cowie et al., 2016), perhaps due to the intrinsic link between Māori identity and the land. Yet assessing something as diverse as Māori identity can be challenging for quantitative researchers. Indeed, Hokowitu (2012) aptly noted that colonisation has fragmented Māori identity, resulting in diverse ways of self-representation that range from iwi to Māori nationalism (and even to global indigenous movements). Accordingly, researchers have identified distinct typologies of Māori identity, distinguishing between those who are deemed traditionally/culturally Māori (i.e., those most familiar with their Māori heritage and culture), those who are ‘bicultural’, and those who are ‘marginalised’ and ‘disconnected’ from their heritage (Durie, 1994; Williams, 2000). In short, there is considerable diversity in what it means to ‘be’ Māori.

To capture these various components of Māori identity, Houkamau and Sibley (2010) developed the Multidimensional Model of Māori Identity (MMM-ICE)—an *emic* measure of Māori identity that assesses attitudes and feelings of what it means to ‘be’ Māori. Houkamau and Sibley initially uncovered six dimensions of Māori identity, with subsequent revisions to the MMM-ICE revealing additional dimensions (see Houkamau & Sibley, 2015).

Accordingly, the latest model consists of the following eight dimensions: (a) group membership evaluation (e.g., the value placed on being Māori), (b) interdependent self-concept (e.g., the importance of relationships with other Māori), (c) spirituality (e.g., engagement with Māori spiritual beliefs), (d) cultural efficacy (e.g., the belief that one has the

resources to engage with Māori), (e) socio-political consciousness (e.g., the importance of Māori historical rights), (f) authenticity beliefs (e.g., the perception of being an ‘authentic’ Māori), (g) perceived appearance (e.g., “looking” Māori), and (h) whānau efficacy (e.g., the belief that one’s whānau can solve challenges).

Of the eight dimensions of Maori identity recognised by the MMM-ICE, socio-political consciousness and spirituality appear to be the most central to attitudes toward the environment. Indeed, Māori spirituality is arguably the root of Māori environmental regard, as this aspect of identity provides a cosmological order to the universe that underlies Māori ancestral customs, describes how Māori perceive their place in the environment, and explicates their relationship with the land (Harmsworth & Awatere, 2013). Māori beliefs regarding the origin of the universe are integral to this framework, as they recognise the union of *Rangi* (i.e., the sky father) and *Papatūānuku* (i.e., the earth mother) as the moment of creation – a moment that gave birth to the *atua* (gods), personifications of all natural phenomena who held authority over all aspects of existence (Mead, 2003).

It is important to note that this is not purely an animistic framework, as Māori spirituality holds that all things, including Māori themselves, originate from *Rangi* and *Papatūānuku* (Roberts et al., 1995). Thus, the *atua* are kin to Māori, creating a network of relationships that connects all things in existence and which can be traced back through *whakapapa* (genealogy). This holistic framework served as the organising principle of the universe and is a central worldview for Māori; to ‘know’ something is to know its *whakapapa*, and to make sense of the world is to understand its origins and history (Kawharu, 2000; Roberts, 2012; Whitt et al., 2001). Accordingly, knowledge must be considered holistically and acknowledge one’s relationships with the subject matter, one’s obligations to it and what one could expect in return, as well as its relationship with all other phenomena. In this sense, Māori are members (rather than masters) of the environment (Durie, 2012), as

acknowledged in their status as *tangata whenua* (people of the land). *Whakapapa* thus describes an unbroken lineage between all things and the primordial progenitors whereby the natural and the supernatural are indistinguishable (Roberts et al., 1995), nor is the world and the self.

Another example of this holistic framework is the concept of vitalism, which is integral to Māori spirituality. Emerging from the union of *Rangi* and *Papatūānuku*, *mauri* (life energy) is said to infuse everything from living organisms to inanimate objects/structures (Dell, 2017). As an expression of the power of the *atua* (gods), *mauri* straddles the spiritual and physical, binding the *wairua* (spirit) with the physical body until death (Kawharu, 2000). Indeed, Henare (2001) writes that *mauri*, as an interactive force, is vital to the subtle interplay between man and the forces of Mother Earth (i.e., the source of life). Paralleling this binding role between man and spirit, Māori have a reciprocal relationship with the land (Mother Earth). As such, *whenua* (land) also means ‘placenta’, signifying a vital relationship. Disruptions to these vital connections, or manipulations of any part of the environment, would have corresponding impacts on the *mauri* and the entire *mauri* system (Dell, 2017; Harmsworth, & Awatere, 2013). Hence, a theme of responsibility and reciprocity pervades Māori perspectives on the environment.

As noted by Magallanes (2015), *mauri* and *whakapapa* are the building blocks of the worldview of Māori and of Māori identity. This holistic worldview includes interconnections between all things, both animate and inanimate, and emphasises the kinship that Māori share with all facets of nature due to the shared ancestry that stretches back to creation itself. Thus, Māori spirituality is inextricably linked to the environment. Accordingly, we predicted that Māori spirituality should be the strongest predictor of Schwartz’s (1992) value of uniting with nature.

Although Māori spiritual beliefs are intimately connected with the environment, socio-political beliefs also appear to be closely aligned with environmental regard. Indeed, researchers (Mills, 2009; Keenan, 2012) suggest that Māori situate environmental concerns within a wider political framework, and that attitudes toward the environment intertwine with socio-political goals for Māori rights and sovereignty. Consistent with this perspective, Cowie et al. (2016) found that Māori socio-political consciousness correlated positively with environmental regard. Thus, we turn to a discussion on Māori socio-political consciousness in order to examine how it relates to Māori environmental attitudes.

As another core component of Māori identity, socio-political consciousness focuses on Māori rights, as well as historical factors that influence contemporary intergroup relations between Māori and other ethnicities, most notably Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Houkamau & Sibley, 2015). Te Tiriti o Waitangi forms the foundation for contemporary Māori rights (Magallanes, 2015), particularly with regard to land. As noted by Challenger (1985) the land is a vital source of life and Māori spiritual beliefs place Mother Earth as a nurturing source of human existence. Indeed, Walker (2004) notes that the erosion of an economic land base for Māori led to cultural, spiritual and economic decrements. Hence, as Harvey (2003) notes, land rights (and other aspects of indigenous sovereignty) do not separate subsistence from spirituality. For Māori, there is a clear connection between healthy ecosystems and the people's cultural, as well as spiritual, welfare (Harmsworth & Awatere, 2013). Thus, land provides access to resources and assets to secure a sustainable livelihood and economic security, all of which enable Māori to control the course of their own lives (Dell, 2017).

As noted above, land enables Māori to re-establish a sense of control and self-autonomy. Notably, *tinō rangatiratanga* (self-determination/authority) is guaranteed under the second article of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Dell, 2017). Whilst interpretation of this term has changed, it has become a focal point of movements to empower Māori to reclaim land rights

(Dell, 2017). Thus, through the pursuit of *tinu rangatiratanga*, Māori express a desire to see Te Tiriti upheld in order to gain the influence and chart their own future.

Given the importance of land, a vital aspect of *tinu rangatiratanga* is the responsibility of Māori for the environment. As noted by Cowie et al. (2016), Māori, connected by *whakapapa* to *Papatūānuku*, identify as *tangata whenua* (people of the land), a role recognised in New Zealand legislature. In this role, Māori are protected and sustained by the land, but are expected to reciprocate in turn—an obligation best exemplified by *kaitiakitanga* (guardianship/resource management; Kawharu, 2000). Expressing both environmental guardianship and resource management, *kaitiakitanga* is both philosophical and political. As a philosophy, it is strongly rooted in Māori cosmology, with the mortality of *mauri* sitting at the crux of environmental regard. Indeed, without proper care, *mauri* can be depleted and leave behind desolation (Head, 2006).

Kaitiakitanga also encompasses relationships that transcend time and space, managing the relationships between the land and the people for both the past, present and future (Kawharu, 2000). In this sense, *kaitiakitanga* taps into the historical aspects of Māori socio-political consciousness, with reference to the inter-generational obligations of Māori. Indeed, as noted by Durie (2012), the land does not simply belong to Māori who are living, but also to the dead (and to those who have yet to be born). On the marae, the living and the dead are addressed together, with the land imbued with the ancestors themselves, holding knowledge and the history of the group's relationship with their land (Durie, 2012). Because they are related to the land through *whakapapa*, Māori become part of the land in death. By invoking the ancestral names of places, Māori reaffirm their authority and their identity as caretakers of the land, protecting the land, and, by extension, the ancestral knowledge of the ground and the source of life for Māori (Durie, 2012). The land thus provides the stability of an unbroken connection between ancestors and future generations (Dell, 2017).

As noted by Kawharu (2000), *kaitiakitanga* helps to promote the unique status of Māori as *tangata whenua*. As such, *kaitiakitanga* is not simply a responsibility of *tangata whenua*, but an affirmation of this identity, denoting the reciprocal relationship between land and people, as well as the inseparability of the two (Dell, 2017). It is through *kaitiakitanga* that *tinu rangatiratanga* is expressed. Indeed, it is telling that the Waitangi Tribunal considered *kaitiakitanga* as an inherent part of the exercise of *rangatiratanga* (Mutu, 1994). Thus, *kaitiakitanga* affirms Māori identity and assures its spiritual, economic, and political survival. As Magallanes (2015) eloquently notes, the protection of the environment, the exercise of *kaitiakitanga*, and the preservation of *mātauranga* regarding the environment are inseparable from the protection of Māori culture itself. Thus, we predicted that Māori socio-political consciousness—a facet of identity that emphasises the importance of Māori rights and *tinu rangatiratanga*—would be the strongest predictor of protecting the environment.

To summarise, the current study examines the role of Māori spirituality and socio-political consciousness in the unique relationship between Māori and the environment. Whilst past research found that socio-political consciousness correlated positively with environmental concern, spirituality did not (Cowie et al., 2016). However, this may be due to the intertwined nature of the two concepts, as Māori cultural practices and rights over the land are argued to be rooted in spiritual beliefs (Durie, 2012). Thus, we sought to differentiate between environmental outcomes using Schwartz's (1992) value model. Accordingly, we hypothesised that Māori spirituality—a core component of Māori identity that positions Māori as kin to the environment—would be the strongest predictor of placing value on uniting with nature (see Schwartz, 1992). Conversely, we expected that Māori socio-political consciousness (i.e., the drive for recognition of Māori rights) would be the strongest correlate of placing value on protecting the environment. In short, we predicted that the unique

connection between Māori and the land would be simultaneously rooted in spirituality and socio-political concerns.

Method

Sampling Procedure

Data for the current study came from the Māori Identity and Financial Attitudes Study (MIFAS)—a nationwide postal survey study conducted in 2017 (Houkamau, Sibley, & Henare, 2019). Invitations to complete the survey were sent to a random sample of 100,000 people who identified as Māori on the 2017 Electoral roll (a registry of all New Zealand citizens who are eligible to vote), yielding 7,019 participants (response rate = 7.02%).

Participants

Of the 7,019 participants who responded to the MIFAS, 6,812 provided either partial or complete responses to our variables of interest and were included in the current study. In terms of gender, 61.97% ($n = 4,221$) of the sample were female and 38.03% ($n = 2,590$) were male. The age range was 18-83, with a mean age of 48.68 ($SD = 14.78$).

Measures

The current study employed an *emic-etic* approach. The *etic* approach denotes the use of general, cross-cultural measures that can be applied across a variety of contexts (Helfrich, 1999). Hence, *etic* measures do not seek to explain culture as a phenomenon, but rather, treats culture as a factor that influences cognition, behaviour and learning (Helfrich, 1999). In contrast, an *emic* approach focuses on culture specifically, aiming to tease out and explore psychological phenomena in local cultural terms (Berry, 1999). Thus, an *emic* approach allows for the construction of an individual's experiential world through his/her own reports and explanations, providing the participant self-determination and autonomy in the research process (Helfrich, 1999).

To achieve the aims of our *emic-etic* approach, we used Schwartz's (1992) value model as an *etic* measure of environmental values endorsed by Māori, and a culturally specific model of Māori Identity (Houkamau & Sibley, 2015) as an *emic* measure of Māori identity that predicted environmental regard. Specifically, we focused on the identity dimensions of Māori spirituality and socio-political consciousness derived from the MMM-ICE3, as well as relevant covariates. Unless noted, all items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale and were interspersed within a larger omnibus survey containing other measures outside the scope of the current study.

Predictors

Māori spirituality was assessed using five items from Houkamau and Sibley (2015). Example items include: "I believe that Tupuna (ancient ancestors) can communicate with you if they want to", "I believe that my Taha Wairua (my spiritual side) is an important part of my Māori identity", and "I can sometimes feel my Māori ancestors watching over me". Items were averaged together with higher scores reflecting greater engagement in concepts of Māori spirituality ($\alpha = .86$).

Māori socio-political consciousness was assessed using five items from Houkamau and Sibley (2015). Example items include: "All of us, both Māori and Pākehā, did bad things in the past – we should all just forget about it" (reverse-coded), "I think that Māori have been wronged in the past, and that we should stand up for what is ours" and "I stand up for Māori rights". Items were averaged together with higher scores reflecting greater endorsement of the relevance of historical factors to contemporary Māori ($\alpha = .82$).

Values of uniting with nature and protecting the environment were each assessed using a single item alongside the other values of Schwartz's (1992) model. Specifically,

participants were asked to rate the extent to which they valued (a) “unity with nature” and (b) “protecting the environment”.

Covariates included a number of demographics that could influence our results. These were: age, socio-economic status, deprivation, gender, education, religiousness, urban/rural residence, parent status, partner status, employment status, and political orientation. Gender was assessed using open-ended questions and subsequently dummy-coded (0 = Female; 1 = Male). Religiousness was assessed asking participants if they identified “with a religion and/or spiritual group (0 = No, 1 = Yes). Urban/rural residence status was assessed using open-ended questions and subsequently dummy-coded (0 = Urban, 1 = Rural). Political orientation was assessed using a single item: “Please rate how politically liberal versus conservative you see yourself as being”, with a higher score indicating a more conservative ideology.

Results

Given that socio-political consciousness fosters a protective attitude toward the environment amongst Māori (Cowie et al., 2016), we predicted that Māori socio-political consciousness would correlate positively with valuing environmental protection. Conversely, we expected that Māori spirituality, an aspect of identity that emphasises humanity as descendants of *Papatūānuku* (the Earth mother; Dell, 2017), would correlate positively with valuing unity with nature.

To investigate our hypotheses, we estimated a multiple regression model in *Mplus* version 8.2 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2017). Specifically, we used the eight dimensions of Māori identity to predict valuing environmental protection and unity with nature. In estimating our model, we also controlled for the following variables: gender, age, deprivation, socio-economic status, religiousness, parental status, partner status, employment

status, urban or rural location and political orientation. Table 3.1 displays the correlations among these measures, as well as the corresponding descriptive statistics.

Results displayed in Table 3.2 reveal that those who identified as religious were less likely than their non-religious counterparts to value protecting the environment ($B = -0.112$, $SE = 0.030$, $\beta = -.048$, $p < .001$). Also, political orientation ($B = -0.039$, $SE = 0.011$, $\beta = -.046$, $p < .001$), living in a rural setting ($B = -0.084$, $SE = 0.028$, $\beta = -.036$, $p < .01$), socio-economic status ($B = -0.002$, $SE = 0.001$, $\beta = -.034$, $p < .05$), and partner status ($B = -0.075$, $SE = 0.031$, $\beta = -.031$, $p < .05$) correlated negatively with valuing environmental protection. Conversely, age correlated positively with protecting the environment ($B = 0.010$, $SE = 0.001$, $\beta = .125$, $p < .001$). No other covariates reliably correlated with valuing environmental protection.

After accounting for these covariates, our results revealed (consistent our hypothesis) that socio-political consciousness correlated positively with valuing environmental protection ($B = 0.151$, $SE = 0.014$, $\beta = .187$, $p < .001$). Indeed, inspection of the corresponding standardized regression coefficient shows that socio-political consciousness was by far the strongest predictor of environmental regard. Of the other dimensions of Māori identity, spirituality ($B = 0.085$, $SE = 0.119$, $\beta = .119$, $p < .001$), whānau efficacy ($B = 0.069$, $SE = 0.012$, $\beta = .069$, $p < .001$), cultural efficacy ($B = 0.041$, $SE = 0.014$, $\beta = .049$, $p = .005$), and authenticity beliefs ($B = 0.050$, $SE = 0.012$, $\beta = .059$, $p < .001$) all correlated positively with protecting the environment. Conversely, interdependent self-concept correlated negatively with protecting the environment ($B = -0.040$, $SE = 0.013$, $\beta = -.048$, $p < .01$).

In terms of our predictors of valuing unity with nature, the rightmost columns of Table 3.2 show that living in a rural environment correlated negatively with this value ($B = -0.164$, $SE = 0.036$, $\beta = -.052$, $p < .001$). Similarly, religiousness ($B = -0.132$, $SE = 0.039$, $\beta = -.042$, $p = .001$), socio-economic status ($B = -0.006$, $SE = 0.001$, $\beta = -.065$, $p < .001$), and

political orientation ($B = -0.031$, $SE = 0.015$, $\beta = -.026$, $p < .05$) correlated negatively with valuing unity with nature. Finally, age correlated positively with valuing unity with nature ($B = 0.014$, $SE = 0.002$, $\beta = .128$, $p < .001$). No other covariates were reliably associated with valuing unity with nature.

After controlling for these covariates, Māori spirituality correlated positively with valuing unity with nature ($B = 0.237$, $SE = 0.016$, $\beta = .245$, $p < .001$). Consistent with our hypotheses, spirituality was by far the strongest identity-based predictor of valuing unity with nature. As for the other Māori identity variables, socio-political consciousness ($B = 0.102$, $SE = 0.018$, $\beta = .093$, $p < .001$), authenticity beliefs ($B = 0.090$, $SE = 0.016$, $\beta = .079$, $p < .001$), and whānau efficacy ($B = 0.090$, $SE = 0.017$, $\beta = .066$, $p < .001$) correlated positively with valuing unity with nature. No other Māori identity variables were reliably associated with valuing unity with nature.

Discussion

Past research suggests that Māori express greater environmental regard than other ethnic groups in New Zealand, as land and the environment are located at the centre of a broader Māori socio-political struggle for self-determination (see Cowie et al., 2016; Grimes, MacCulloch, & McKay, 2015). Tellingly, Klein (2000) argues that Pakeha hold a more anthropocentric and utilitarian view of nature, whereas Māori perceive a greater responsibility for the environment than Pakeha, holding a view that by claiming *mana* over the environment one must accept unconditional responsibilities for care and protection (Patterson, 1994). As such, we expected that socio-political consciousness would correlate positively with valuing environmental protection. Yet spirituality is also integral to the worldview of many Māori, as Māori laws, customs, and socio-political attitudes towards the environment are based upon an underlying spiritual philosophy (Durie, 2012). Indeed, Māori spirituality encompasses a holistic view of the world that positions Māori as members—but

not masters—of the environment (Dell, 2017). Accordingly, we also expected that Māori spirituality would correlate positively with valuing unity with nature.

As hypothesised, our results showed that socio-political consciousness was by far the strongest predictor of protecting the environment. Indeed, Māori rights are firmly rooted in the land because, as Dell (2017) notes, land allows for self-determination and the charting of one's future. Additionally, as *tangata whenua*, Māori are legally recognised as custodians of the land. As such, New Zealand has a responsibility to protect this important source of wellbeing for Māori (Kawharu, 2000). Accordingly, our results imply that socio-political consciousness underlies environmental concern among Māori.

Also consistent with our hypotheses, Māori spirituality was the best predictor of valuing unity with the environment. Māori spirituality emphasises the interconnectedness of all natural phenomena, including Māori, through *whakapapa* (Dell, 2017). Furthermore, all things are said to be infused with *mauri*, the disruption of which could cause catastrophic outcomes (Henare, 2001). As such, it is critical to not only protect the environment, but to ensure that Māori are able to freely unite with nature in order to preserve these vital forces. Collectively, our results reveal that socio-political consciousness and Māori spirituality foster the unique connection between Māori identity and the land.

Although results were consistent with our hypotheses, a number of other sub-dimensions of Māori identity predicted attitudes toward the environment. Both cultural and whānau efficacy, as well as authenticity beliefs, correlated positively with protecting the environment. Likewise, authenticity beliefs and whānau efficacy correlated positively with valuing unity with nature. Indeed, this is to be expected, as higher scores on these scales would suggest a stronger commitment to traditional Māori values, which in turn coalesce around resource protection. Furthermore, that spirituality would predict protecting the

environment above and beyond these other important facets of identity is perhaps unsurprising. Māori spirituality incorporates *mauri* and *utu*—beliefs that underlie *kaitiaki* and foster guardianship of the land (both in terms of physical and spiritual management; see Kawharu, 2000). Similarly, Māori culture is deeply interwoven with the land. Consistent with this perspective, Roberts and colleagues (1995) note that tribal histories, ancestry and whakapapa play key roles in land narratives that help to define Māori identity. Indeed, land narratives help to build resilience and strengthen bonds to facilitate positive transformation (see Dell, 2017). Hence, the defence of ancestral land is vital in the pursuit of *tino rangatiratanga*.

Although many aspects of Māori identity correlated with our outcome measures in an intuitive manner, we surprisingly found that interdependent self-concept correlated *negatively* with protecting the environment. This seems to indicate that Māori who feel embedded within a collectivist identity network, as opposed to ascribing to individualistic (traditionally Western) notions of the self (Houkamau, & Sibley, 2010), are less likely to value protecting the environment—at least after accounting for the other predictors in our model. This finding is counterintuitive, as protecting the environment is arguably an expression of Māori rights and a validation of the environmental responsibilities of Māori (Gillespie, 1998). Yet, as Gillespie (1998) notes, environmental concern may not be an end goal, but rather, must be considered with regard to the land in question and the attitudes of the *kaitiaki*. Indeed, Māori have a responsibility not just to the land, but also to each other. Thus, circumstances may arise where Māori find it necessary to utilise land to provide for the group (Gillespie, 1998). In other words, because Māori have been (and continue to be) disenfranchised by colonization, the fight for *tino rangatiratanga* and empowerment (Dell, 2017) may require the use of land and its resources to improve the well-being of people.

Importantly, the above discussion need not imply that spiritual concerns conflict with the socio-political concerns of *tino rangatiratanga*. Rather, our results reveal that, whilst spirituality was the strongest correlate of valuing unity with nature, socio-political consciousness also predicted this aspect of environmental regard. Thus, the socio-political identity of Māori is intrinsically tied to a sense of unity with the environment. In this sense, *tino rangatiratanga* is not only expressed by reclaiming land, but also by reuniting with it. Accordingly, socio-political consciousness, particularly the concept of *kaitiakitanga* (i.e., an expression of Māori rights, guardianship and identity as *tangata whenua*), is deeply rooted in spirituality through *whakapapa* and *mātauranga* (Kawharu, 2000). Indeed, *mātauranga* emphasises the importance of the environment in transmitting knowledge vital to self-determination and is seen as an extension of nature (J. T. Johnson, & Murton, 2007). In short, our results reveal that Māori have a unique connection with the land, as multiple aspects of Māori identity correlate with a desire to be close to, or facilitate a bond with, nature.

Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions

The current study demonstrates that both socio-political concerns and spirituality foster environmental regard among Māori. Specifically, we used nationally representative data to examine the unique relationship between Māori identity and the environment. To these ends, our results corroborate the literature on indigenous relations with the environment to show that spirituality is a vital aspect of the connection between Māori and the land, as well as socio-political consciousness.

It is important to note, however, that awareness of Te Tiriti rests largely at the forefront of our conceptualisation of socio-political consciousness. Some, however, have levelled criticism of such a focus, arguing that it ties Māori identity to colonial history, that is defines Maori in relation to colonisation (see Hokowitu, 2012). As noted by Memmi (1965), colonisation warps perceptions of both the colonizer and the colonized, transforming the

former into a powerful oppressor whilst the latter is left defeated and oppressed. In the acceptance of such a role, the colonized risk legitimising the colonizer and the power dynamic itself (Memmi, 1965), a perspective that is relevant to the New Zealand context (see Hokowitu, 2012). Nevertheless, Māori history is a history of contact (Keenan, 2012), and the implications of Te Tiriti on modern Māori cannot be overlooked. It is important to consider the extent to which the desire to be connected or united with the land is actually a result of colonisation itself, i.e., having the land removed has created a strong desire to reconnect with it, particularly for those who are politically conscientious.

Future research may wish to examine important boundary conditions of the relationships identified in the current study. To these ends, one possible moderator of the noted relationships is the salience of climate change and environmental degradation. As Milfont and colleagues (2014) note, physical proximity to the coastline predicted greater climate change concern. Similarly, occupation type may affect the relationship between Māori identity, as farmers and other households dependent upon agriculture are under increasing threat due to climate change (Hertel, 2015). Moreover, whilst the impacts of environmental degradation may not directly affect participants, family ties to small island countries (i.e., those most vulnerable to climate change; see Mimura 1999) may increase the salience and urgency of the need for environmental protection. Thus, future research might extend upon this work to examine possible moderators of the relationships Māori spirituality and socio-political consciousness have with attitudes toward the environment.

Conclusion

The current study investigated the unique relationship that Māori, as *tangata whenua*, have with the land. Accordingly, socio-political consciousness acknowledges the rights of Māori over the land. Because land provides socio-political influence (see Dell, 2017), reclaiming the land by Māori serves not only to return that which was stolen though

colonization, but also to restore self-determination, efficacy and pride to Māori. These beliefs are rooted in a spiritual tradition that place Māori as members (but not masters) of their environment and emphasise the importance of adapting to the land as part of *kaitiakitanga*. Without careful resource management, the land may lose its *mauri* and its ability to sustain the people. Indeed, land is the life of Māori; it tells the story of Māori (Firth, 1926). Through the relationship between the land and people, Māori are able to establish their sense of spiritual connection, self-determination and identity.

MĀORI SPIRITUALITY PREDICTS GREATER ENVIRONMENTAL REGARD

Table 3.1. *Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for variables of interest.*

	<i>Me</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
	<i>an</i>										
1. Gender ¹	0.38	0.49	---								
2. Age	48.68	14.77	.114*	---							
3. Education ²	4.06	2.77	-.102	-.148***	---						
4. Deprivation	6.47	2.87	-.028	.046**	-.174***	---					
5. Socio-economic status	48.09	17.07	-.145***	-.003***	.597**	-.178***	---				
6. Religiosity	0.45	0.50	-.014	.236**	-.009***	.122**	.012**	---			
7. Parent status	0.79	0.41	-.004***	.402**	-.092***	.059*	.013**	.101**	---		
8. Partner status	0.66	0.48	.092**	.043**	.084**	-.186***	.110**	-.028***	.232**	---	
9. Employment status	0.71	0.45	.025**	-.250***	.214**	-.180***	.130	-.096	-.067***	.180**	---
10. Urban/rural ²	0.51	0.50	.006**	-.119	.109	-.197***	.104	-.046***	-.091*	-.034	.076**
11. Political orientation	3.78	1.34	.055**	.144	-.186***	.078**	-.110***	.174*	.126**	.047**	-.064
12. Group membership evaluation	5.29	1.36	-.111***	-.098***	.139	.166**	.085	.123**	-.002*	-.058	.024
13. Cultural efficacy	4.84	1.40	-.110***	-.004***	.099	.254**	.065	.191**	.075	-.062**	-.025
14. Interdependent Self-concept	4.00	1.38	-.035***	.138**	-.002	.245**	-.017***	.191**	.079**	-.106**	-.093***
15. Spirituality	5.01	1.62	-.197***	.065**	.005**	.243	.002**	.178	.098**	-.102***	-.050***
16. Socio-Political Consciousness	5.21	1.43	-.098*	.016	.171**	.151**	.122**	.116**	.027*	-.064**	-.019***
17. Perceived Appearance	4.11	1.98	.009**	.125**	-.114***	.262**	-.095	.156**	.129**	-.049***	-.059***
18. Authent	4.0	1.3	.032*	.212*	-.16	.166*	-.15	.167*	.090*	-.11	-.18

MĀORI SPIRITUALITY PREDICTS GREATER ENVIRONMENTAL REGARD

					113						
icity	1	7	**	**	6***	**	3***	**	**	4***	7***
Beliefs											
19. Whāna	4.7	1.1									
u	2	5	-.06	-.04	.002*	.081*	-.00	.053*	.005	-.00	.009*
Efficac			8***	8***	**	**	9***	**		9***	**
y											

¹Gender was dummy-coded (0 = Female, 1 = Male)

²Urban/rural was dummy-coded (0 = Urban, 1 = Rural)

⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

Table 3.1 (continued).

	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
10. Urban/rural ²	---							
11. Political orientation	-.082***	---						
12. Group membership evaluation	-.020***	-.130***	---					
13. Cultural efficacy	-.069***	-.038***	.567***	---				
14. Interdependent Self-concept	-.084***	.004***	.562	.496**	---			
15. Spirituality	-.062***	-.035***	.564***	.562***	.497***	---		
16. Socio-Political Consciousness	.005***	-.190***	.656**	.485***	.440***	.510***	---	
17. Perceived Appearance	-.125***	.083***	.326***	.397***	.349***	.364**	.288***	
18. Authenticity Beliefs	-.106***	.115***	.140***	.143	.430***	.220***	.085***	
19. Whānau Efficacy	-.045***	.003	.264***	.279**	.205***	.210***	.177***	

⁺ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 3.2. Summary of Simple Regression Analyses for Variables Predicting Value of Protecting the Environment and Unity with Nature (N = 6812)

	Protecting the Environment				Unity	
	B	SE	β	p	B	SE
Demographic Covariates						
Gender (0 = Female, 1 = Male)	0.045	0.029	.019	.118	0.038	0.038
Age	0.010	0.001	.125	<.001***	0.014	0.002
Education	-0.001	0.007	-.001	.932	0.009	0.009
Deprivation	-0.005	0.005	-.012	.383	-0.009	0.007
Socio-economic status	-0.002	0.001	-.034	.033*	-0.006	0.001
Religiousness (0 = No, 1 = Yes)	-0.112	0.030	-.048	<.001***	-0.132	0.039
Parent status	-0.046	0.040	-.016	.246	-0.020	0.053
Partner status	-0.075	0.031	-.031	.015*	-0.075	0.041
Employment status	-0.012	0.033	-.005	.708	-0.002	0.044
Urban/Rural (0 = Urban, 1 = Rural)	-0.084	0.028	-.036	.003**	-0.164	0.036
Political orientation	-0.039	0.011	-.046	<.001***	-0.031	0.015
Identity Dimensions						
Group Membership Evaluation	-0.004	0.016	-.005	.793	-0.005	0.022
Cultural Efficacy	0.041	0.014	.049	.005**	0.018	0.019
Interdependent Self-concept	-0.040	0.013	-.048	.003**	-0.007	0.018
Spirituality	0.085	0.012	.119	<.001***	0.237	0.016
Socio-Political Consciousness	0.151	0.014	.187	<.001***	0.102	0.018
Perceived Appearance	0.002	0.008	.003	.845	0.005	0.011
Authenticity Beliefs	0.050	0.012	.059	<.001***	0.090	0.016
Whānau Efficacy	0.069	0.012	.069	<.001***	0.090	0.017
Model Summary						
	R^2			.116		

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Chapter V

Bridging Statement

Study 3 demonstrated that Māori spirituality, despite divergences from conceptualisations of religiosity born from Western religions, show endorsement of universalist values (at least within the environmental domain). This aligns with past work regarding spirituality, which is often associated with universalist and egalitarian values (Saroglou & Muñoz-García, 2008). Importantly, Māori spirituality provides some indication of how spirituality might motivate socio-political outcomes elsewhere. Māori spirituality serves as the foundation for kinship relationships Māori share with the land, as well as the land's importance in their cultural and spiritual welfare. Most notably, Māori spirituality roots land and the environment as fundamental to Māori reclaiming *tino rangatiratanga* (self-determination/authority), deeply entwining environmental concerns with concerns for indigenous sovereignty. As such, Māori spirituality motivates universalist concerns regarding kinship, and by extension Māori political aspirations for self-determination.

The above work has demonstrated the importance of religiosity and spirituality in motivating the values of tradition and universalism. Importantly, they demonstrate that such values motivate countervailing political effects, mediated by high authoritarianism (for religiosity) and low social dominance orientation (for spirituality). Fundamental is the role of religiosity in enculturing these values (as demonstrated in Study 1), with traditionalist doctrines and rhetoric seemingly vital to the enculturing of religious authoritarianism. Yet, Duriez and colleagues (2002) suggest that value orientations (despite the results of Study 2) may not wholly explain the impact of religiosity on political attitudes. Rather, they suggest that distinctions in religious typologies (such as religiosity and spirituality) might predict political outcomes independently of values, likely as a product of differing motivations for, and approaches to, religious group identification. Importantly, only Study 3 of this thesis has

attempted to directly examine the meaning and motivations behind spiritual (or religious) identification when considering their socio-political impacts.

One pertinent field that has examined the motivations for group identification has been collective narcissism – a threat-indexed construct motivated by low levels of personal control and a resultant need for positive self-image (Cichocka, 2016). Importantly, collective narcissism literature has distinguished between insecure and secure group identification. Whilst such work has yet to be fully applied to the realm of religious affiliation, parallels can be drawn between previous examinations of religion as motivated by extrinsic vs. intrinsic (or security vs. growth, defensive vs. existential, etc.; see Beck, 2006; Van Tongeren & Davis, 2015). Notably, collective narcissism has also been argued to motivate countervailing effects on socio-political outcomes, such as outgroup attitudes, even when accounting for authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (which seem to tap into the very values underlying religion's impacts on political attitudes).

Accordingly, Study 4 seeks to examine the role of religion beyond the domain of political affiliation, assessing how religion influences intergroup relations more directly. More specifically, we sought to examine the impacts of religion on intergroup outcomes with specific reference to the motivational bases of religious group identification. Given that past work has characterised religion's impact on gender relations as somewhat mixed (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014), my colleagues and I inspected the relationship between religion and ambivalent sexism before including measures of religious group narcissism. We also included right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and social dominance orientation (SDO) as covariates to demonstrate that religious group narcissism (and secure religious identification) appears to independently predict ambivalent sexism. Thus, this work more directly assesses the motivations for religious identification through collective narcissism, as well as their impacts on outgroup attitudes.

This manuscript is currently under preparation for publication, with the reference as follows:

Lockhart, C., Sibley, C., Osborne, D. Religiosity and Ambivalent Sexism: Religious Group Narcissism as a Suppressor. Manuscript in preparation for journal submission.

Religiosity and ambivalent sexism: The role of religious group narcissism

“I do not permit a woman to teach or to exercise authority over a man; rather, she is to remain quiet.”

– 1 Timothy 2:12 (ESV)

“There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is no male and female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus.”

– Galatians 3:28 (ESV)

As illustrated by the opening epigraph, religious scripture often frames gender relations in a hierarchical and unequal fashion by enculturating values that promote and justify rigid gender roles to which women must conform (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014; Van Assche et al., 2019). Consistent with this assumption, hierarchical biblical beliefs correlate positively with adherence to traditional gender roles, as well as the endorsement of both hostile and benevolent sexism (Eliason et al., 2017). Religious identification also correlates positively with paternalistic attitudes towards women (Burn & Busso, 2005), thereby legitimising gender inequality by characterising women as weak and in need of men’s protection (Glick et al., 2002).

Although religion may foster unequal gender relations, the relationship between religious identification and sexism may be more nuanced than it appears at first glance. Faith can instil a fundamental sense of fairness and tolerance (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiazzonek, 2020), as religious identification can promote universalism, benevolence, and social justice (Saroglou et al., 2004). As such, Mikołajczak and Pietrzak (2014) suggest that, whilst the traditional values of religion motivate sexism, the pro-social aspects of faith may weaken sexist attitudes. Consistent with this perspective, religious belief has countervailing impacts on some socio-political attitudes (Hirsh et al., 2013; Lockhart et al., 2019).

Given these nuances, the nature of the relationship between religious identification and sexism remains unclear. The current study aims to clarify this association by using data from a nationwide random sample of the New Zealand population to investigate the relationship between two forms of religious identification and ambivalent sexism. Accordingly, we argue that, whilst a secure form of religious identification may foster egalitarian views on gender relations, people's insecure attachment to their religious identity (namely, religious group narcissism) may instead foster the endorsement of sexist attitudes. We begin by reviewing the literature on the association between religion and ambivalent sexism. We then explore the literature on group narcissism before discussing how religious group narcissism may drive sexist attitudes. We conclude this section by summarizing the aims and hypotheses of the current study. In doing so, we contribute to the literature on the impacts of collective narcissism on intergroup relations, while also increasing understanding of the complexities of religious identification.

Religion and Ambivalent Sexism

Ambivalent sexism theory argues that sexist attitudes are comprised of two, separate, albeit correlated (Glick & Fiske, 1996), dimensions. Whereas hostile sexism (HS) captures traditional forms of gender-based prejudice characterised by hostility, benevolent sexism (BS) encompasses the subjectively positive attitudes towards women that subversively promote traditional gender roles (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Despite their seemingly antithetical nature, HS and BS correlate positively with each other across cultures (Glick et al., 2000), and work in concert to propagate gender inequality. Key to these attitudes is the importance of gender roles, with women traditionally characterised by BS as warm, pure, and unskilled, whilst those who defy such roles are cast by HS as cold and hostile (Dardenne et al., 2007).

Notably, certain religious beliefs and identities have been argued to be strongly associated with these gender roles. Eliason and colleagues (2017) found more hierarchical

biblical beliefs correlated positively with the endorsement of traditional gender roles. Religious identification (i.e., how important a role religion plays in one's life) has also been associated with the subdomains of benevolent sexism (namely, paternalism and complementary gender differentiation) which reduce women's agency by confining them to specific roles within society (Burn & Busso, 2005).

Given this focus on traditional gender roles, it is perhaps unsurprising that religion has often been linked to both hostile and benevolent sexism. A study examining religious conformity showed that ambivalent sexism in both Christian and Muslim adolescent females was driven by pressure to adhere to religious norms governing the status and behavior of women (Mastari et al., 2021). Even mere exposure to religious content can foster sexist attitudes (Haggard et al., 2019). Similarly, Taşdemir and Sakallı-Uğurlu (2010) found that religious identification amongst Muslim men correlated positively with both hostile and benevolent sexism. This suggests that religious belief may foster the endorsement of hostile sexism, although perhaps only implicitly for some religious believers. Indeed, Taşdemir and Sakallı-Uğurlu suggest that Muslim men in Turkey are more comfortable with open expressions of hostile sexism than men in Christian countries.

Although a number of studies reveal a positive correlation between religious belief and ambivalent sexism, relationship is more complex than it first appears. Notably, the relationship between religiosity and benevolent sexism appears predicated on fostering the purity of women, leaving the reasons for why religiosity might correlate with hostile sexism more muddled. Past work has indicated that religiosity may only directly motivate benevolent sexism, showing no association with hostile sexism (Burn & Busso, 2005; Hellmer et al., 2018). Indeed, Gaunt (2012) noted that Jewish religiosity was actually negatively associated with hostile sexism. Similarly, other forms of religiosity such as religious quest, characterised by an acceptance of doubt and an open-minded approach to faith, showed a negative

association with both hostile and benevolent sexism (Ozdemir, 2016). Thus, religion's impacts on sexism appear almost paradoxical, both motivating and demotivating ambivalent sexism.

What is driving these paradoxical effects? Past work suggests that explanations for sexist attitudes lie not in differences in religious affiliation itself (see Hannover et al., 2018; Mastari et al., 2021) but rather, how, and to what extent, affiliates identify with their religion. In essence, religious sexism seems to be a product of individual differences in religious identification rather than group-level differences in affiliation. Religion's complex relationship with ambivalent sexism may thus be partially explained by differences in religious identification.

Collective Narcissism

According to social identity theory, identification with a social group satisfies various psychological needs (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Although identification with an ingroup can elicit positive feelings towards those who share the same social category (Abrams & Hogg, 1990), Cichocka and colleagues (2016) note that in-group identification may take forms that are not always constructive or beneficial. One such form of ingroup identification is collective narcissism, a type of in-group positivity that arises when fundamental needs for personal control are frustrated. Notably, collective narcissism reflects an inflated sense of the group's worth, combined with a need for external validation and an increased defensiveness that manifests as a sensitivity and aggression toward perceived threats to the group's image.

Past research demonstrates that collective narcissism is intrinsically linked with a belief that others are threatening the in-group (Cichocka, 2016). For example, Cichocka et al. (2018) found that national collective narcissism correlated positively with belief in conspiracies related to threats from foreign governments. Similarly, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2016) found that collective narcissism, but not private collective self-esteem,

heightened sensitivity to in-group insults or humiliations which, in turn, increased direct and indirect hostility towards the perpetrating outgroup. Notably, collective narcissism does not seem to ameliorate frustrations regarding fundamental needs. Rather, these inflated feelings of group-worth appear to decrease self-esteem and refuel one's sense of entitlement, further increasing threat sensitivity (Golec de Zavala, et al., 2019; Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020). As such, the perception of power and control through a greater collective self is only unstably maintained through exaggerated threat perception, with the sense of threat constantly reinforced, rather than ameliorated, by collective narcissism (Golec de Zavala & Lantos, 2020).

Religious Group Narcissism and Ambivalent Sexism

Religion may thus offer an attractive group identity to ameliorate such frustrations, providing a culturally respected normative ingroup which promises to recapture a sense of control over one's life by shifting agency to a divine God. Given the importance of gender roles to one's religious identity, those who (insecurely) identify as religious may perceive those who deviate from the traditional gender roles as threatening to one's group image. Indeed, Golec de Zavala and Bierwiazzonek (2020) argued that Catholic collective narcissism might motivate sexism by perceiving gender equality as a threat to the Catholic faith. Consistent with this argument, Catholic collective narcissism correlated positively with tolerance of violence against women.

Similarly, Marchlewska and colleagues (2019) showed that Catholic collective narcissism was associated with gender conspiracy beliefs, argued to represent a perception of gender equality as a threat to traditional values. Importantly, these conspiracy beliefs mediated a positive relationship between Catholic collective narcissism and outgroup hostility towards those perceived as threatening Catholic values. As such, this work shows that religious group narcissism has negative impacts on gender relations by motivating a

threat-based perception of equality – at least amongst Catholics. More broadly, collective narcissism has been shown to have a negative impact on intergroup relationships across a range of variables (Cichocka, 2016). Thus, religious group narcissism should show a positive relationship with ambivalent sexism through endorsement of gender roles and a strong hostility towards those who defy them.

Religious group narcissism may also suppress the countervailing (positive) relationship between secure religious belief and support for gender equality. Non-narcissistic forms of group identification express an ingroup positivity that is not contingent on external validation, thus resulting in a lower sensitivity to threat (Cichocka, 2016) and more secure dealings with outgroups. Indeed, Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2013) demonstrate that secure ingroup positivity is associated with more positive outgroup attitudes, and that this effect statistically suppresses the negative impact of collective narcissism on attitudes towards outgroups.

Consistent with this perspective, religious identification is associated with kindness, equality and universalism values alongside conservation values (Gennerich & Huber, 2006). As such, hostile sexism, as an antagonistic attitude towards women, may not resonate with the benevolent and self-transcendence values associated with religion (Saroglou et al., 2004). Conversely, the seemingly positive nature of benevolent sexism may be promoted by the traditional values also associated with religion (Glick et al., 2002). Thus, religious values may work to both motivate and weaken sexist attitudes (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014). As such, religious group narcissism may explain the inconsistent association between religiosity and ambivalent sexism, with secure and insecure religious identification working against one another.

Current Study

The current study examines the relationships secure and insecure forms of religious

identification have with both hostile and benevolent sexism. Past work suggests that religious identification displays a complex and paradoxical relationship with ambivalent sexism (Burn & Busso, 2005; Gaunt, 2012; Taşdemir & Sakallı-Uğurlu, 2010). However, consistent with previous research (Maltby et al., 2010), we hypothesised that, on its own, religious identification would correlate positively with benevolent sexism but would not correlate with hostile sexism. Given the importance of both traditional gender roles and conservation values to one's religious identity (Burn & Busso, 2005; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014), those who identify more with their religion should show greater endorsement of benevolent sexism.

Past research also reveals that group narcissism is a powerful motivator of in-group defensiveness and correlates with increased threat perception and negative outgroup attitudes (Cichocka, 2016). However, research also suggests that this in-group defensiveness may target ingroup members who threaten the group's self-image (perhaps by violating group norms), particularly in the realm of gender relations (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014; Marchlewska et al., 2019). As conservation values often lie at the heart of religious beliefs (Gennerich & Huber, 2006), those high on religious group narcissism might perceive non-conformist women as a threat to their religious values (Golec de Zavala & Bierwiazzonek, 2021). We thus expect religious group narcissism to correlate positively with both hostile and benevolent sexism.

Finally, we expected that both religious identification and religious group narcissism would act as mutual suppressors once estimated simultaneously. Once religious group narcissism was partialled out, we expected the remaining variance of religious identification to reflect a secure form of (religious) ingroup positivity (Cichocka et al., 2016). In line with past work on secure ingroup positivity (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013), as well as the egalitarian values often espoused by religious rhetoric (Gennerich & Huber, 2006), we expected religious identification, once religious narcissism is accounted for, would correlate

negatively with both hostile and benevolent sexism.

Past work also indicates that secure group identification can suppress the negative impact of collective narcissism on outgroup attitudes (Cichocka et al., 2016). Specifically, given that secure group identification and collective narcissism are often strongly correlated, religious narcissism, when estimated alone, should capture some of the variance of secure ingroup positivity. As such, we expected that the positive relationship between religious group narcissism and both hostile and benevolent sexism would strengthen after adjusting for religious identification.

To demonstrate the robustness of these hypotheses, we controlled for covariates associated with the endorsement of both benevolent and hostile sexism. Given that both right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), an attitude reflecting conformity to group norms, and social dominance orientation (SDO), an attitude reflecting a preference for group hierarchy, are positively associated with benevolent and hostile sexism (Sibley et al., 2007), we controlled for both. Furthermore, as men tend to endorse both forms of sexism to a higher degree than women (Akrami et al., 2011), we controlled for gender. We also controlled for age, as endorsement of both hostile and benevolent sexism change across the lifespan (Hammond et al., 2018). Additionally, we controlled for majority/minority ethnic group membership because ethnic status may impact stereotypes of women and attitudes towards more equitable gender relations (Robnett et al., 2012). Finally, we controlled for personal locus of control as a perceived lack of control is argued to be a powerful antecedent of collective narcissism (Cichocka et al., 2016). We thus aim to contribute to the extant literature on group narcissism by demonstrating the noted suppression effect(s) of this form of group identification within the domain of gender relations, as well as show that the relationship between religious beliefs and sexist attitudes may be more complicated than it first appears.

Method

Sampling Procedure

Data for the current study came from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS)—a nationwide longitudinal panel study that began in 2009. Participants were sampled from the New Zealand electoral roll, which represents all citizens over 18 years of age who were eligible to vote regardless of whether they chose to. Here, we focus on participants who completed our variables of interest, which were only included at Time 3.5 and Time 4. Time 3.5 (2012, mid-year) of the NZAVS was a supplementary, online-only, questionnaire that contained responses from 4,514 participants, 1,690 of whom identified as religious at Time 3.5. Of these 1,690 participants, 1,307 identified as religious at both Times 3.5 and 4 with 1,116 of these participants completing our variables of interest.

Participants

Of our 1,116 participants, 66.1% (738) were female and 33.9% (378) were male. The age range was 18-87, with a mean age of 53.45 ($SD = 15.2$). In terms of ethnicity, 81.8% (913) of participants identified as part of a majority group (such as NZ European or Pakeha), whilst 18.2% (203) identified as part of a minority group (i.e., Māori, Pacifica, or Asian).

Measures

The current study focused on religious identification, religious group narcissism, and endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism (see Glick & Fiske, 1996), as well as relevant covariates. Unless noted, all items were rated on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale. Items were interspersed within the larger omnibus NZAVS survey containing other measures outside of the scope of the current study.

Predictors

Religious identification was assessed at Times 3.5 and 4 using a single item: “How important is your religion to how you see yourself?”. This item was drawn from Hoverd and Sibley’s (2010) work on religiosity in New Zealand.

Religious group narcissism was examined at Time 3.5 using these three items adapted from Golec de Zavala and colleagues (2009): “I insist upon my religious group/denomination getting the respect that is due to it”, “If my religious group/denomination had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place”, and “The true worth of my religious group/denomination is often misunderstood”.

Hostile Sexism was examined at Time 4 using five items from Glick and Fiske (1996). Example items include: “Women seek to gain power by getting control over men” and “Once a woman gets a man to commit to her she usually tries to put him on a tight leash”.

Benevolent Sexism was examined at Time 4 using five items Glick and Fiske (1996). Examples items include: “Every man ought to have a woman whom he adores” and “Women should be cherished and protected by men”.

Covariates

Our covariates included age, ethnic majority/minority status, gender, personal locus of control, RWA, and SDO. Age, ethnic majority/minority status, and gender were assessed using open-ended questions. Dummy codes were created for ethnicity (0 = NZ European/Pakeha; 1 = minority) and gender (0 = Woman; 1 = Man). Personal control was assessed at Time 3.5 using these three items from Paulhus and Van Selst (1990): “I can learn almost anything if I set my mind to it”, “Almost anything is possible for me if I really want it,” and “I can usually achieve what I want if I work hard for it”. RWA was assessed using six items from Altemeyer (1996). Example items include: “Our country will be destroyed

someday if we do not smash the perversions eating away our moral fibre and traditional beliefs” and “Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the ‘normal way’ things are supposed to be done” (reverse-coded). Finally, SDO was assessed using six items from Sidanius and Pratto (1999). Example items include: “To get ahead in life, it is sometimes okay to step on other groups” and “We should do what we can to equalise conditions for different groups” (reverse-coded).

Results

Although religious identification is often associated with endorsement of traditional gender roles, the evidence for this relationship is decidedly mixed. We aimed to examine this relationship in the context of differing forms of religious affiliation, specifically by examining secure vs. insecure forms of group identification. Consistent with past literature, we hypothesised that religious identification alone would show no significant relationship with ambivalent sexism. However, because group narcissism captures the extent to which group members hold an inflated view of their in-group that is contingent upon external validation (Cichoka, 2016), we expected that religious group narcissism would be associated with greater sensitivity towards perceived threats to their group’s image. Specifically, we expected some insecure religious affiliates, holding traditional beliefs about gender roles as fundamental to one’s religious identity (see Golec de Zavala & Bierwiazzonek, 2020), may perceive attempts to stray outside the boundaries of such roles as threats to their group’s image and their inflated sense of self-esteem. As such, we hypothesised that, when included, religious narcissism would have a direct positive effect on hostile and benevolent sexism, with female non-conformist behaviour seen as increasingly egregious by religious group narcissists.

Additionally, past research has indicated that collective narcissism, once accounted for, will parcel out more secure forms of group identification (Cichocka, Marchlewska, Golec de Zavala, et al., 2016). Importantly, such research has also found that collective narcissism can act as a suppressor on the effects of secure group identification, with collective narcissism concealing the positive effects of secure identification on outgroup positivity (Cichocka, 2016). Thus, as insecure group identification is argued to be related to both decreased sensitivity to group threats as well as a greater endorsement of equality (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala et al., 2013), we hypothesised that religious group identification would be negatively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism. As such, insecure and secure religious narcissism should function as mutual suppressors when predicting sexist attitudes.

To investigate our hypotheses, we estimated two regression models in *Mplus* version 8.4 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2020). Specifically, we first regressed hostile and benevolent sexism onto religious identification, as well as our control variables. In turn, we then estimated our model by including religious group narcissism as a simultaneous predictor. Both models were estimated simultaneously using FIML and 95% Bias Corrected (BC) confidence intervals (CIs).

Table 1. *Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for variables of interest.*

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Gender ¹	0.34	0.47	---									
2. Age	53.65	15.18	.223***	---								
3. Ethnicity ²	0.18	0.39	-.033	-.281***	---							
4. Religious Identification	4.85	1.87	-.037	-.061*	.051	---						
5. Religious Group Narcissism	3.60	1.40	.043	-.084**	.112***	.485***	---					
6. Hostile Sexism	2.96	1.19	-.308***	.062*	.067*	-.008	.155***	---				
7. Benevolent Sexism	3.86	1.16	.160***	.145***	.103***	.097***	.209***	.358***	---			
8. RWA	3.75	1.10	.060*	.101***	.016	.353***	.343***	.244***	.384***	---		
9. SDO	2.38	0.90	.216***	.149***	-.012	-.099***	.016	.362***	.175***	.233***	---	
10. Personal Locus of Control	5.44	1.04	-.071*	-.187***	.164***	-.019	-.026	-.039	.065*	-.073**	-.058*	---

¹Gender was dummy-coded (0 = Female, 1 = Male)

²Ethnicity was dummy-coded (0 = NZ Euro/Pakeha, 1 = ethnic minority)

+ $p < .10$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 2. Regression analysis results predicting hostile and benevolent sexism.

Models	Variables	R ²	B	S.E	HS		R ²	B	S.E	BS	
					Confidence Interval	p-value				Confidence Interval	p-value
1	Religious Identification	.225	-.038	.020	-.077-.001	.054	.213	-.011	.020	-.050-.027	.561
Covariates	Age		-.002	.002	-.007-.003	.393		.011	.002	.007-.016	<.001***
	Gender		.604	.072	.464-.745	<.001***		.285	.068	.152-.418	<.001***
	Minority/Majority		.239	.087	.069-.409	.006**		.375	.088	.203-.547	<.001***
	RWA		.214	.033	.149-.279	<.001***		.386	.032	.323-.449	<.001***
	SDO		.349	.040	.272-.427	<.001***		.053	.038	-.021-.129	.162
	Personal Locus of Control		-.008	.036	-.079-.062	.818		.132	.034	.066-.197	<.001***
2	Religious Narcissism	.238	.081	.027	.028-.134	.003**	.223	.088	.025	.040-.137	<.001***
Covariates	Age		-.002	.002	-.006-.003	.507		.012	.002	.007-.017	<.001***
	Gender		.602	.071	.463-.740	<.001***		.268	.068	.135-.401	<.001***
	Minority/Majority		.211	.086	.042-.381	.014*		.353	.086	.184-.521	<.001***
	RWA		.155	.033	.091-.219	<.001***		.338	.032	.276-.400	<.001***
	SDO		.384	.039	.308-.460	<.001***		.073	.037	.001-.145	.048*
	Personal Locus of Control		-.015	.037	-.087-.057	.685		.127	.034	.061-.193	<.001***
3	Religious Identification	.238	-.072	.021	-.0113--.032	<.001***	.225	-.043	.020	-.083--.003	.033*
	Religious Group Narcissism		.117	.029	.061-.173	<.001***		.110	.026	.058-.161	<.001***
Covariates	Age		-.001	.002	-.006-.003	.587		.012	.002	.008-.017	<.001***
	Gender		.586	.070	.448-.724	<.001***		.268	.068	.135-.401	<.001***
	Minority/Majority		.209	.086	.041-.377	.015*		.347	.086	.178-.516	<.001***
	RWA		.183	.034	.116-.249	<.001***		.357	.033	.292-.421	<.001***
	SDO		.352	.039	.275-.429	<.001***		.056	.038	-.018-.129	.139
	Personal Locus of Control		-.007	.035	-.076-.063	.844		.133	.033	.068-.198	<.001***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 2 reveals the results of our three separate models. Contrary to past research, the results from Model 1 show that the direct relationship between religious identification and both hostile sexism ($B = -0.038$, 95% BC [-0.077, 0.001], $p = .054$) and benevolent sexism ($B = -0.011$, 95% BC [-0.045, 0.024], $p = .543$) was non-significant when religious group narcissism was excluded from the model. In contrast, Model 2 shows that religious narcissism correlated positively with both hostile sexism ($B = 0.081$, 95% BC [0.028, 0.134], $p = .003$) and benevolent sexism ($B = 0.088$, 95% BC [0.040, 0.137], $p = <.001$). To examine the hypothesised suppression effect, we then included both religious identification and religious group narcissism in the model as simultaneous predictors of both hostile and benevolent sexism.

Most importantly are the results from Model 3. After accounting for both religious narcissism and religious identification, results revealed that gender ($B = 0.586$, 95% BC [0.448, 0.724], $p < .001$), minority/majority status ($B = 0.209$, 95% BC [0.041, 0.377], $p = .015$), RWA ($B = 0.183$, 95% BC [0.116, 0.249], $p < .001$), and SDO ($B = 0.352$, 95% BC [0.275, 0.429], $p < .001$) were positively associated with hostile sexism. Neither personal locus of control ($B = -0.007$, 95% BC [-0.076, 0.063], $p = .844$), nor age ($B = -0.001$, 95% BC [-0.006, 0.003], $p = .587$), were significantly associated with hostile sexism. After controlling for these variables, religious group narcissism correlated positively with hostile sexism ($B = 0.117$, 95% BC [0.061, 0.173], $p < .001$), whilst religious identification correlated negatively with hostile sexism ($B = -0.072$, 95% BC [-0.113, -0.032], $p = <.001$).

Table 2 also displays the correlates of benevolent sexism in Model 3. As shown here, age ($B = 0.012$, 95% BC [0.008, 0.017], $p < .001$), gender ($B = 0.268$, 95% BC [0.135, 0.401], $p < .001$), minority/majority status ($B = 0.347$, 95% BC [0.178, 0.516], $p = <.001$), RWA ($B = 0.357$, 95% BC [0.292, 0.421], $p < .001$), and personal locus of control ($B = 0.133$, 95% BC [0.068, 0.198], $p < .001$) correlated positively with benevolent sexism. SDO

($B = 0.056$, 95% BC [-.018, 0.129], $p = .139$) was not significantly correlated with benevolent sexism. After controlling for these variables, religious group narcissism correlated positively with benevolent sexism ($B = 0.110$, 95% BC [0.058, 0.161], $p < .001$), whereas religious identification correlated negatively with benevolent sexism ($B = -0.043$, 95% BC [-0.083, -0.003], $p = .033$).

Discussion

The current study investigated the role of religious group narcissism on the relationship between religious identification and both hostile and benevolent sexism. Religious affiliation has been argued to undermine equitable gender relationships (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014), particularly by enculturing a view of women as weak and in need of protection by men, thus driving higher endorsement of benevolent sexism (Burn & Busso, 2005). Yet, past research has shown mixed results, with some forms of religious identification leading to lower endorsement of ambivalent sexism (Ozdemir, 2016). We argued that this complexity is (at least partly) due to the differing impacts of secure v. insecure forms of religious identification. We further argued that those who fail to conform to traditional gender roles will violate the group norms of tradition and conservation that underlie religious identification (Gennerich & Huber, 2006), but that only those high on religious group narcissism (i.e., those most likely to perceive non-conformist women as a threat to their religious group image) will perceive such violations as threats to their group's self-image. By contrast, secure religious group identifiers are more likely to be confident in their group's status and, thus, less sensitive to perceived threats to their group's self-image (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009). Thus, whilst religious group narcissism would correlate negatively with support for equal gender relations, religious identification (after accounting for religious narcissism) should show decreased endorsement of sexist attitudes.

Contrary to our expectations, our results demonstrated that religious identification

was unassociated with ambivalent sexism when estimated alone. Whilst we hypothesised that religious identification would correlate positively with BS, this result is in-line with the complex association between religion and ambivalent sexism (Burn & Busso, 2005; Gaunt, 2012). Moreover, as hypothesised, religious group narcissism (as a single predictor) was positively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism. Furthermore, once accounting for religious group narcissism, religious identification was negatively associated with both forms of ambivalent sexism. Finally, the positive relationship between religious group narcissism and both hostile and benevolent sexism strengthened after adjusting for secure religious identification. Thus, both religious identification and religious group narcissism acted as mutual suppressors by strengthening the respective countervailing impacts of secure and insecure religious identification on both HS and BS.

These results suggest that religious group narcissism plays a role in the oft-mentioned positive relationship between religious identification and sexist attitudes. Conservation values have been argued to lie at the heart of the religious identity (Saroglou et al., 2004) and are positively associated with endorsement of gender roles and thus ambivalent sexism (Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014). Given that group narcissism is associated with increased threat perception and group defensiveness (Cichocka, 2016), any attempt to violate gender roles may be seen as a threat to one's faith (see Marchlewska et al., 2019). As such, religious group narcissism may drive greater endorsement of both benevolent and hostile sexism in an attempt to maintain the integrity of one's social identity.

By partialling out religious group narcissism, religious identification should encompass a secure form of in-group positivity (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013), characterised by a collective self-esteem without the need for external validation (Cichocka, 2016). Interestingly, religious identification showed a negative relationship with both forms of sexism, indicating that secure in-group positivity appears to *increase* positive attitudes

towards gender equality—at least after adjusting for an insecure form of religious identification. This is consistent with past work showing that religion may motivate more egalitarian attitudes (Lockhart et al., 2019). Conversely, the positive relationship between religious narcissism and ambivalent sexism strengthened after adjusting for religious identification. These results indicate that both secure and insecure forms of religious identification mutually suppress their respective associations with hostile and benevolent sexism.

Past literature examining collective narcissism has found similar results. Cichocka and colleagues (2016) noted that in-group positivity was negatively associated with belief in anti-Polish conspiracies, but this relationship was suppressed by the positive effect of collective narcissism on conspiracy belief. Other research on intergroup relations corroborates these findings, as collective narcissism and in-group positivity act as mutual suppressors, with the true effects only revealed after partialling out collective narcissism (see Golec de Zavala et al., 2013; Dyduch-Hazar & Mrozinski, 2021). Thus, our results suggest that religious identification has countervailing effects on both forms of sexism, once collective (religious) narcissism is accounted for.

Importantly, this work demonstrates that secure religious identification has positive impacts on attitudes towards gender equality. Secure in their religious identity, such adherents appear unlikely to perceive women who fail to conform to traditional gender roles as a threat to their faith. By contrast, narcissistic religious identification appears to be related to endorsement of gender roles and a threat-based view of gender equality (see Marchlewska et al., 2019), leading to greater endorsement of ambivalent sexism. Indeed, both hostile and benevolent sexism is argued to be motivated by collective threat hostility (see Lizzio-Wilson et al., 2020) which might closely align with the reactionary and threat-motivated nature of collective narcissism. These findings thus provide insight into the countervailing effects of

religious identification on socio-political outcomes previously noted in the literature (see Lockhart et al., 2019).

Strengths, Limitations and Future Directions

The current study expands the literature on the relationship between religious identification and sexism, demonstrating that these effects are more nuanced than they first appear. Religious identification does not always result in negative attitudes towards social equality, particularly in the domain of gender relations. Indeed, our results reveal that the nonsignificant relationship between religious identification and both hostile and benevolent sexism is a product of a suppressor effect from religious group narcissism. Once group narcissism was accounted for, we found that secure religious belief was negatively associated with sexism whilst group narcissism motivated higher endorsement of both HS and BS. As such secure and insecure religious group identification (partially) suppress their respective effects on socio-political issues.

Importantly, we also found that these effects were significant after controlling for both right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, suggesting that religious identification and religious narcissism explain variance in ambivalent sexism beyond the dual process model. This stands in contrast to past work which has suggested that the impact of religion on ambivalent sexism is likely a product of individual differences in political/ideological attitudes (specifically RWA and SDO; see Van Assche et al., 2019). Notably, the collective narcissism literature suggests that, whilst RWA and SDO share conceptual overlap with insecure group identification, they are distinct processes with differing underlying motivations (de Zavala et al., 2009). Consistent with this idea, the negative relationship between religious group narcissism and gender equality appears to be distinct from that of the dual process model of ideology (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009).

Interestingly, our results suggest that these effects also pertain to intra-group relations,

at least within the domain of religious belief and gender relations. Religious affiliates high on religious group narcissism, regardless of gender, showed higher endorsement of sexist attitudes towards women. One possibility is that religious group members no longer saw non-conformist women as in-group members, validating them as targets for hostility. It is thus possible that these results may be moderated by the target's (perceived) religious affiliation, or by the participant's gender. Whilst the former is outside the scope of this study, we did investigate participant gender as a possible moderator of this relationship but found no significant interaction with religious group narcissism on either hostile or benevolent sexism.

Finally, past work has shown group narcissism is strongly positively correlated with in-group identification (Golec de Zavala et al., 2013). To account for this, we attempted to partial out the shared variance of religious narcissism and religious identification by including both variables as simultaneous predictors in our model. We assumed, in line with past work, that once we had accounted for group narcissism, religious identification would only encompass those participants who identified who securely identified with their religion. Despite this reasoning, we note that we were unable to assess the actual religious beliefs of non-narcissistic religious individuals in our sample. Thus, the exact mechanism of the relationship between (secure) religious identification and ambivalent sexism is unclear. Possible explanatory factors underlying the distinctions between secure and insecure forms of religious identification on sexism should be explored in future research.

Conclusion

The current study investigated the relationships religious identification and religious group narcissism had with hostile and benevolent sexism. Our results revealed that religious group narcissism and religious identification mutually suppress their respective relationships with sexism. Specifically, secure group identification was revealed to be negatively correlated with benevolent and hostile sexism after adjusting for religious narcissism.

Conversely, the positive relationship between religious narcissism and both forms of sexism became stronger after adjusting for secure religious identification. These results corroborate past research showing that collective narcissism suppresses the relationship between various forms of secure group identification and a range of outcomes, including gender relations (Cichocka et al., 2016; Marchlewska et al., 2019). In doing so, we demonstrate that the positive relationship between religious identification and sexism appears to be specific to insecure forms of group identification. By contrast, a secure form of religious identification appears to drive more equitable attitudes. Thus, the core tenets of religion may be geared towards equality, but such aspects are only engaged with when one is secure in their faith.

Chapter VI

General Discussion

The impact of religion on socio-political outcomes has been somewhat complex throughout the literature, unassisted by the varying and nebulous conceptualisations of religion. Whilst religion has largely been associated with conservative attitudes, fundamental questions surround this relationship which remain unresolved. Firstly, the temporal relationship of religion on conservative attitudes, specifically authoritarianism, has remained a prominent gap in the literature since the latter's conceptualisation. Secondly, whilst religion has been characterised as a way of justifying inequality (Jost et al., 2014), past literature has also characterised religion as a source of empowerment for the dispossessed, prominent examples being that of liberation theology (Evans, 1992) and the Quaker movement (Kesselring, 2011). As such, religion appears to demonstrate countervailing effects on socio-political outcomes (Malka et al., 2011), and this paradox has been argued to be a product of two distinct conceptualisations of religion: that of religiosity and spirituality (Hirsh et al., 2013).

Whilst these terms are debated in the literature, past conceptualisations of religion (see Pargament, 1999; Zinnbaeur et al., 1999) have largely taken the view of religion as functionalist and traditionalist, whereas spirituality is conceptualised as substantive and unorthodox. Whilst some might disagree, and certainly this suggested polarization of these nebulous topics has been critiqued throughout the literature (see Pargament, 1999; Zinnbaeur & Pargament, 2005), such conceptions nonetheless provide useful points of reference for the results demonstrated by these studies. Fundamentally however, conceptualisations of religion and spirituality are set aside for the purpose of this thesis, instead characterising religiosity and spirituality by the values they endorse and enculture. Specifically, religiosity and spirituality appear to reflect distinct pathways underlined by values associated with each dimension. Namely, religiosity, rooted in epistemic needs for security and a resultant

traditionalist and functionalist approach to faith, appears to motivate authoritarian attitudes. By contrast, spirituality, driven by an open-minded approach to existential seeking and a resultant universalist (almost immanent) perspective of the divine, appears to motivate egalitarian values. Accordingly, these two distinct dimensions of religion are argued to motivate two separate pathways towards political affiliation reflected by said values.

This thesis thus sought to examine these two fundamental gaps in the literature, providing novel evidence towards addressing these open questions through four studies. Firstly, we examined the impact of religious identification on authoritarianism with the aim of assessing the temporal order of this oft-mentioned relationship. Specifically, by examining religious conversion we were able to demonstrate that religious conversion appeared to precede increases in authoritarianism over time. Secondly, we demonstrated that religiosity and spirituality show distinct and countervailing processes motivating conservative affiliation through their relevant values. Finally, two further studies addressed topics relevant to these processes. The former examined the role of spirituality in a unique sample of New Zealand Māori participants, demonstrating the cross-cultural importance of spiritual identification. The latter sought to demonstrate the importance of religious motivations on intergroup attitudes more directly, providing evidence that value orientations may not wholly predict religion's impact on socio-political outcomes (see Duriez et al., 2002). Thus, in this chapter I summarize the key findings of these works, their contributions to both this thesis and extant research, as well as discussing potential areas of future enquiry.

Main Findings

This thesis begins its contributions by examining the oft-mentioned relationship between religiosity and authoritarianism, aiming to assess the temporal ordering of this association. Indeed, whilst Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) demonstrated evidence of this relationship, they could only hypothesize as to its temporal ordering, arguing that whilst religiosity might enculture authoritarianism, authoritarians might also be drawn to religious beliefs. There has been a dearth of work assessing this notable gap since. Wink and colleagues (2007) conducted analyses on longitudinal data of Christians from close to a 40-year time period, finding that religiosity was positively associated with authoritarianism in late adulthood. Similarly, Osborne and Sibley (2014) showed that church attendance was positively associated with authoritarianism over time, particularly among those high on system justification (i.e., those motivated to legitimise the existing social system; see Jost & Banaji, 1994).

Such work has yet to definitively resolve the issue of temporal association, despite some indications towards the role of religion in enculturing authoritarian attitudes. Study 1 thus sought to better address this gap by assessing a unique and underexamined aspect of religious identification – that of religious conversion. Past work assessing the socio-political impacts of religious conversion have been cross-sectional, with methodological limitations regarding collecting relevant data both prior and post-conversion. However, Study 1 utilised a unique longitudinal sample of religious converts (and deconverts) to examine the impact of religious conversion on both authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Results were consistent with past work indicating the enculturation effect of religion on authoritarian ideals. Namely, religious conversion appeared to precede slight, but significant, increases in authoritarianism post-conversion. Whilst certain aspects of the sample may limit the generalisability of these results, namely that only those who converted to and remained

Christian were included in our analyses, they are nonetheless the first clear indicators of the temporal relationship between religion and authoritarianism

Given these results, we sought to demonstrate the downstream effects of religion on political affiliation through authoritarianism. Extending this further, we sought to resolve an essential paradox in religion's impacts on socio-political outcomes. For example, Malka and colleagues (2011) noted that religious affiliation appeared to have competing effects on social welfare (a decidedly prosocial behaviour). Whilst religiosity negatively predicted endorsement of welfare through endorsement of cultural conservatism, religiosity also seemed to demonstrate positive attitudes to welfare through prosocial values. Importantly, Malka and colleagues suggest that these reflect two distinct pathways, with prosociality independent of religious conservatism. Indeed, past work has shed some light on this paradox, delineating religion into religiosity (reflecting functionalist or traditionalist religious frameworks) and spirituality (reflecting existentialist or unorthodox faith). Importantly, these two concepts are functionally distinct, with religion motivating tradition and social conformity (reflecting a form of religious conservatism) whilst spirituality motivates universalism and self-direction (perhaps reflecting religious prosociality; Saroglou et al., 2008).

Thus, Study 2 examined the role of religious and spiritual identification in predicting conservatism through right-wing authoritarianism (a strongly traditionalist attitude) and social dominance orientation (reflecting an anti-egalitarian belief). With religious and spiritual identification included as simultaneous predictors, we were able to demonstrate two distinct and separate pathways with countervailing effects on conservative attitudes. We also showed that the impact of religious and spiritual identification on conservatism appeared to be fully mediated by RWA and SDO. As such, it appears that it is the values underlying religious beliefs that truly motivate their impacts on socio-political outcomes. Most

importantly, comparison of these pathways demonstrated that the strength of religion's relationship with conservatism seems a product of a strong association with authoritarian ideals – consequently, the egalitarian values of spiritual identification are largely suppressed.

Finally, our model included political awareness as a moderator of both pathways, yet notably only the spirituality on SDO pathway showed significant moderation. This suggests, consistent with religion's enculturation of authoritarian ideals reflected in Study 1, that religion is intrinsically connected with authoritarian values – the religious who do not engage with politics show similar levels of RWA as those regularly attentive of political news. By contrast, the spirituality on SDO pathway demonstrated that amongst those low on spiritual identification, those strongly politically engaged demonstrated higher anti-egalitarianism than those who were not politically engaged. Thus, those low on spirituality seem to identify with anti-egalitarian values partially because of political rhetoric.

Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 address the fundamental gaps presented within the literature, drawing a clear pathway from religious and spiritual beliefs to their subsequent conservative socio-political outcomes. The values of egalitarianism and authoritarianism appear to play instrumental roles, fitting with past work which has argued that value systems play an integral role in explaining religion's social impact (Hirsh et al., 2013; Saroglou et al., 2008). However, questions of interest remain regarding the role of values in underpinning religious beliefs. Most particularly, the universalist values of spirituality suggest that such beliefs should not only endorse intergroup egalitarianism, but also stewardship sentiments towards the environment. Indeed, Spilka (1993, ref. Hill et al., 2000) argued that spirituality might be divided along three lines of concern: that oriented towards God, beliefs oriented towards the world (encompassing stewardship of nature), and a people-oriented view of faith (stressing human empowerment and achievement).

Thus, in Study 3, I sought to examine the role of spirituality in predicting environmental attitudes. Importantly, this study also assessed such beliefs within a unique cultural context, specifically spiritual beliefs among New Zealand Māori. Māori, as the indigenous population of New Zealand, have a deep connection with the land rooted in spiritual beliefs regarding *whakapapa* (genealogy), shared ancestry with the *atua* (gods/natural forces) of the world reaching back to *Rangi* (the sky father) and *Papatūānuku* (the earth mother). Furthermore, this connection with the land is not simply spiritual but also fundamental to Māori efforts to reclaim *tinō rangatiratanga* (self-determination/authority). Consequently, in Study 3 we demonstrated that Māori spirituality is strongly associated with both protecting the environment and a desire for unity with nature, grounding the importance of the land both spiritually and politically.

These results demonstrate the importance of universalist ideals to Māori spirituality, particularly with regard to the environment. This is consistent with past work examining spirituality and environmental concern (Kearns, 1996). Furthermore, that these results are demonstrated amongst a unique cultural sample speaks to the cross-cultural validity of spirituality's close association with universalism. Specifically, spirituality's associations with self-transcendence values have been argued to reflect a fundamental association with spiritual transcendence that crosses cultures. Indeed, past work has suggested that spirituality might reflect a cross-cultural personality trait rooted in universalism, whereas religion has been argued to be grounded in cultural norms and traditions (Piedmont, 1999; Piotrowski & Žemojtel-Piotrowska, 2020). By assessing spirituality amongst Māori, an indigenous culture that has retained spiritual content and beliefs from prior to colonization (though often syncretised with Christian beliefs; Rangiwai, 2021), we provide evidence for this fundamental association by demonstrating the relevance of self-transcendence values to spirituality in a unique cultural and traditional context from most WEIRD samples.

Yet, arguably Māori spirituality not only serves to ground environment issues as one of spiritual kinship but also responsibility and reciprocity, as well as integral in the fight for self-determination. Indeed, our results demonstrated that environmental variables were also strongly associated with Māori socio-political consciousness, examining how actively engaged an individual is in promoting and defending Māori rights (Houkamau & Sibley, 2015). As such, the importance of the land appears to reflect a desire for unification, driven by Māori spiritual beliefs, but land is also important politically and culturally, expressed by the spiritual and political importance of *kaitiakitanga* (guardianship) and the role of Māori as *tangata whenua* (people of the land).

Māori spirituality thus demonstrates the broad nature of spiritual beliefs; most notably, spirituality is not merely concerned with existential seeking of the sacred (Pargament, 1999), or abstract conceptions of egalitarian intergroup outcomes. Furthermore, environmental spiritual concern does not preclude a desire for human empowerment and achievement. Instead, spirituality's conceptualisations and values are complex and nuanced, motivating a broad variety of outcomes. Most importantly, however, is that spirituality appears to foster feelings of a special connection (Hyland et al., 2010) – whether that be with the environment, God, or humanity, and that this connection seems to motivate positive subsequent impacts on intergroup relations and environmental regard.

Studies 1-3 collectively demonstrate the importance of religion in motivating socio-political outcomes, with the impact of religion and spirituality mediated by certain values. Specifically, they demonstrate that the religious dimensions of religiosity and spirituality, rooted in the motivational bases of security concerns and existential seeking, seem innately connected to the value contents of tradition and universalism. Yet, past work has posited that the value systems expressed by religion may not be the sole predictors of socio-political outcomes (Duriez, 2002). Notably, Duriez (2002) found that religious dimensions,

specifically examining a literal vs. symbolic understanding of transcendent religious content, predicted various socio-political attitudes independently of associated values.

One possibility is that religion and spirituality may miss a third motivational bases for religious identification. Whilst religiosity and spirituality appear to capture genuine interest and faith in one's religion, termed intrinsic/quest religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967; Batson & Ventis, 1982), Allport's extrinsic religiosity appears to sit outside such a framework. Notably, extrinsic religiosity is a form of religious identification motivated by social and personal needs for self-esteem and a self-enhancement. Most importantly, it is argued to be a "performative" approach to religion, one characterised by a lack of genuine commitment to the faith (Pargament, 1997). Indeed, Łowicki and Zajenkowski (2017) noted that narcissism, both grandiose and vulnerable, was positively correlated with an extrinsic religious orientation. They suggest that extrinsic beliefs may identify with religious beliefs as a way of gaining status or to protect their vulnerable egos.

Given these results, extrinsic religiosity may tap into a form of religious identification that perceives not merely value-violators as dangerous, but rather a range of outgroups as threatening to one's individual and group status. In essence, religious prejudice may be driven by narcissistic motivations for status or self-esteem, not the intrinsic motivations for security and tradition found in some forms of religious identification. Indeed, it must be noted that extrinsic religiosity is associated with more uniform prejudice towards outgroups, rather than simply those who threaten the values of the ingroup (Van Camp et al., 2016). As such, Study 4 sought to examine a form of religious identification characterised by this motivation for group status, namely religious group narcissism. Importantly, we assessed the impact of religious narcissism on ambivalent sexism with the aim of demonstrating the value of this form of religious identification in predicting outgroup attitudes beyond simple political affiliation. Sexism was chosen due to the complex relationship between religion and gender

relations demonstrated in past literature (Eliason et al., 2017; Mikołajczak & Pietrzak, 2014) with the aim of clarifying this relationship.

Our results demonstrated that religious group narcissism, encompassing a form of religious identification motivated by a desire for self-aggrandizement, seemed to be positively associated with both hostile and benevolent forms of sexism. Furthermore, we also noted that religious identification, after parcelling out religious group narcissism, was negatively associated with both forms of sexism. Importantly, these results were demonstrated even after controlling for both right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. Thus, it appears that religious identifications/motivations can directly impact intergroup attitudes outside political affiliation and beyond the values of (traditionalist) authoritarianism or (universalist) egalitarianism. As such, these results express that whilst religiosity and spirituality may be important factors in enculturing value systems and their subsequent political attitudes, future work must examine the motivational underpinnings of religious identification itself to better clarify these relationships.

Contributions and Implications

The studies provided here demonstrate multiple contributions to the literature on religious beliefs, their multidimensionality, and their socio-political attitudes. Particularly, Study 1 provided some of the first indicators of the temporal association between religion and authoritarianism. Religious conversion predicted increases in authoritarianism whilst deconversion appeared to follow decreases in authoritarian ideals. These findings speak more broadly to the literature regarding the nature of religion, conversion, and their impacts on socio-political attitudes. Notably, they demonstrate that the process of religious conversion truly seems to differ from that of deconversion with asymmetric processes and socio-political impacts. Whilst conversion appeared to display an enculturation effect, deconversion seemed to demonstrate a possible selection effect, with authoritarianism declining both prior and

post-deconversion, and with a stronger decline prior to disaffiliation. We suggested that these results reflect religious anti-authoritarians moving out of their Christian identification as a product of their political beliefs, as well as a strong reactance to religion's authoritarian values before deconversion. If the case, these effects reflect that religious identification does appear to proselytize authoritarian values, reinforcing the hypothesised enculturation effect of faith. Yet, the possible selection effect demonstrated by religious deconversion also suggest that the direction (as might be expected) is not solely unidirectional – certainly, whilst religion might endorse authoritarian values, those opposed to such views are unlikely to remain religiously identified.

This signifies a kind of religious mobility alluded to in the paradigm of “religious markets” (see Sherkat & Wilson, 1995). Originally conceptualised as a function of rational choice, with religious affiliation changing depending on needs, it has come to be seen as a matter of religious preferences, which both motivate and are motivated by religious affiliation (Sherkat & Wilson, 1995; Loveland, 2003). Indeed, whilst religious switching is not uncommon, past work suggests that social constraints⁶, particularly religious attendance, serves as a motivator of stabilising religious preferences (Loveland, 2003). Only when religious practice lapses, with the accompanying removal from religious social norms, does religious switching seem more likely. This suggests that it is the religious traditions that are the most doctrinal, cohesive, and socially oriented that are the most successful at retaining adherents (Sherkat, 2001) and past work seems to support this (see Loveland, 2003; Sherkat, 1991; Sherkat, 2001). As put by Loveland (2003), it is the religious traditions that are best

⁶ Another important social constraint is religious conversion for marriage reasons. Musick & Wilson (1995) note that Americans are often likely to switch to harmonize their marriage and are unlikely to switch to a secular marriage. This suggests that a religious marriage may be an important social constraint alongside religious communities which help to maintain religious affiliation.

able to cultivate specific religious preferences, and then cater to those preferences, that are best able to prevent religious switching.

Thus, Study 1 suggests that establishing the role of religion in enculturing authoritarian values is just the beginning. Religion may cultivate and maintain religious preferences, but Study 1 suggests that other socio-political considerations factor into the decision to keep or reject one's religious identity. Indeed, we suggest that the deconverts observed in our sample may have lapsed in religious attendance as a product of their dissatisfaction with the religious values on offer. Inevitably, without the social pressures to conform, such individuals are likely to disidentify with the faith. In essence, such work appears to point to a bidirectional effect of religion on authoritarianism, with religion enculturing authoritarian values whilst authoritarians are more likely to remain within the religious group.

This suggests that political attitudes may sometimes motivate beliefs consistent with their ideology. The question therein is under what circumstances, and to what degree, authoritarian or egalitarian values are encultured and maintained by religious/spiritual beliefs. It is possible that religious beliefs play a vital role in enculturing political attitudes, but once established, religious identification may change as dictated by instilled political values. Indeed, past work has argued that religion serves an important role in establishing ingroup norms, fostering moral intuitions that prove difficult to change (see Graham & Haidt, 2010). However, once religious values are encultured, it seems likely that religion merely serves to satisfy and reinforce these values.

As such, we might expect that traditionalist/authoritarian ideals are likely the stronger predictor of affiliation, rather than religious affiliation on authoritarian ideals, when considered longitudinally. This is particularly when accounting for authoritarianism's strong

focus on social relationships and cohesion. Thus, we might expect that those whose religious identities no longer matched their authoritarian attitudes would not depart the religion entirely, but rather find another religious group to identify with. By contrast, those who no longer endorsed authoritarianism might seek out a new religious group (one likely more spiritual) but might also be more willing to depart the religion entirely (due to religion's strong association with tradition). In essence, religious beliefs play a vital role in instilling certain values, but once accomplished, religious belief may function as motivated cognition; believed in only for its role in servicing the epistemic needs and values of its adherents.

Such work adds context and caveats which must be addressed when considering such results, some of which have been addressed in Study 1. Notably, the effect of religious conversion was demonstrated on a sample of those who identified as Christian and then stayed religious throughout the period assessed. If only those religious identities that motivate (and cater to) traditionalist ideals are likely to consistently retain members, it seems inevitable that our assessment of religious converts over a lengthy period would demonstrate an enculturation effect. Those religious groups that apply social pressures and norms to enforce attendance seem more likely to hold on to adherents, who would then take on the traditionalist values espoused. Thus, we cannot discount the possibility that the effect of religious conversion was simply due to the failure of less orthodox forms of religiosity to retain a consistent base of believers.

And what of these religious groups or identities that did not enforce such stringent traditionalist norms? They might be reflected in those who deconverted during that time. Notably, our pre-deconversion results in Study 1 showed sharper declines in authoritarianism than post-deconversion. We previously proposed this might be due to a reactance effect, whereby religious individuals prioritise their political leanings over their religious beliefs. A plausible alternate, though perhaps less likely, possibility is that it was not traditionalist

religious rhetoric that fostered deconversion but rather a lack of religious social pressures (i.e., a distinct *lack* of authoritarianism). Thus, whilst declines in authoritarianism certainly preceded deconversion, such a hypothesis suggests that less traditionalist beliefs motivated decreasing endorsement of authoritarianism prior to deconversion. Furthermore, this decline may have indirectly led to deconversion, raising the troubling prospect that authoritarianism (or at least traditionalism) is a vital predictor of remaining (consistently) religiously identified. In essence, religion and authoritarianism may be intrinsically wed; religion must foster tradition to survive, and authoritarian ideals inevitably arise from religious rhetoric.

Such work would be consistent with the innate relationship between religion and authoritarianism demonstrated by Study 2. Other work in the field of morality has indicated similar themes, most notably the emerging field of work on Moral Foundations Theory (see Haidt et al., 2009). This framework suggests that morality is a multidimensional, almost subjective, experience driven by evolutionary pressures towards intuitive thinking and social cohesion. Importantly, morals are argued to be intuitive, having evolved culturally and instilled through social institutions such as religion (Graham & Haidt, 2010), thus working to ensure cooperation and community survival. As such, religious beliefs may have evolved to instil morals that bind together ingroups, creating traditional norms and values to maintain group cohesion.

Indeed, past work has demonstrated that religion seems strongly connected with morals that foster ingroup cohesion and loyalty (K. A. Johnson et al., 2016; Van Tongeren et al., 2021). Importantly, these values appear to have consequent positive impacts on authoritarianism and conservatism (Milojev et al., 2014; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). Thus, Moral Foundations Theory seems to provide important context for the enculturation effect of religion on authoritarianism demonstrated in Study 1, rooting it in evolutionary history and selection pressures. Furthermore, this strong relationship also suggests that religious morals

for ingroup bias play a fundamental role in religious commitment (K. A. Johnson et al., 2016). Indeed, these moral intuitions are argued to be intrinsic and intuitive, with endorsement difficult to shift (Graham et al., 2009). Consequently, where religion fails to enculture such norms, religious affiliation may fade into irrelevance.

Of course, Study 1 can only speak to the temporal relationships of our variables, specifically that conversion preceded increases in authoritarianism whilst decreases in authoritarianism preceded deconversion. As such, these results cannot distinguish which religious groups affiliates identified with, nor whether their doctrines may have been traditionalist or permissive. However, these hypothesised permissive religious groups may align with spiritual identification, prioritising universal brotherhood over cohesive, traditionalist doctrine. Indeed, whilst spirituality does appear significantly associated with church attendance, it is to a lesser degree than religiosity (Zinnbauer et al., 1997). Similarly, spiritual beliefs are arguably characterised by a focus on seeking the sacred, particularly through unorthodox means, rather than traditional religious groups. As such, it is possible that spiritual identifiers do not remain as such over time, slowly coming to lose their religious identities as they disaffiliate with traditionalist groups.

Indeed, Pennycook and colleagues (2012) notably suggest that non-traditional religious beliefs, such as pantheism or deism, may serve as transitional beliefs towards secular ideas. Certainly, upon rejecting traditionalist doctrine, it seems unlikely that religious affiliates would reject faith altogether (the impact of religious experiences are not quickly forgotten; see Pauha et al., 2020; Stronge et al., 2020; Van Tongeren et al., 2021). Rather, religious defection appears to be a lengthy process of deliberation, intellectual reflection, and doubt (Perez & Vallières, 2019). Thus, some may embrace spirituality as a way of seeking the sacred before ultimately choosing to reject supernatural beliefs altogether.

The work of Studies 1 and 2 thus demonstrate the importance of examining the temporal ordering of religion and its associated political attitudes. Particularly, Study 1 shows the value of an underutilised method of examining such relationships, namely religious conversion. This process is argued to be a unique and transformative experience with long-term impacts (Stronge et al., 2020). Religion is not (often) ephemeral or changeable to a person's needs; rather it seems to dictate and enculture certain values within adherents. Future work may thus wish to examine the temporal associations demonstrated here more closely, particularly by examining which specific religious beliefs precede increases (or decreases) in authoritarianism and egalitarianism. Most notably, whilst our work demonstrates that spirituality may be negatively associated with SDO (and thus conservatism), the causal nature of this relationship remains an open question.

Similarly, longitudinal work on the stability of spiritual identification may be of interest when considering its socio-political impacts. If spirituality is a transitional form of religiosity towards more secular belief, we might expect decreasing endorsement of religious content over time amongst the more spiritually affiliated (perhaps leading towards more secular belief). Notably, past work examining religion has argued that it would be a mistake to characterise the universalism of spirituality in purely religious/divine terms (Wulff, 1997). Indeed, Wulff (1997) proposed two dimensions of religiosity grounded in the idea that religious contents are processed distinctly from their acceptance. The first dimension, Exclusion vs. Inclusion of Transcendence, encompasses a willingness to embrace or reject transcendental, religious ideas. Importantly, this dimension is motivated by Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction on one end, and Tradition and Conformity on the other (Fontaine, 2005). The second dimension, Literal vs. Symbolic, assesses to what degree religious affiliates endorse religious ideas as literal truths or abstract myths with symbolic

meaning. This is characterised by a conflict between Security and Power values, and Universalism and Benevolence (Fontaine, 2005).

Thus, fundamental to this model is the acknowledgement that religious non-believers can also express literal or symbolic understandings of religious content (with resultant consequences for endorsement of universalist values). Notably, Duriez (2004) found that a symbolic approach to religion, but not acceptance of religion itself, was positively associated with empathy. Hence, spirituality may thus be an expression of religious struggle, a movement towards a symbolic (universalist) understanding of the world whilst still nominally accepting religious content as important⁷, and only encompassing a small segment of the religious population. Indeed, that acceptance of religious content was associated with traditionalist values (Fontaine, 2005) might suggest that spirituality is less focused on transcendent content than religiosity. Thus, these results indicate that the distinction between religiosity and spirituality in Study 2 may be a result of these differences in religious approach. Religiosity may capture acceptance of religious content only, with its focus on traditionalist norms, whilst spirituality captures those who embrace a symbolic cognitive approach to their faith. The distinct processes through which religiosity and spirituality function are perhaps better clarified when they are situated on distinct dimensions.

Notably, Study 2 also demonstrated that religiosity was the stronger determinant of conservative affiliation when compared to spirituality. This indicates that religiosity itself is associated with conservatism, fitting with past work arguing that acceptance of religious/transcendent material is correlated with conservation values. By contrast, the acceptance of universalist values is determined by one's *cognitive approach* to religion

⁷ Intriguingly, this model suggests that spiritual affiliates have less in common with those who reject religion due to literal interpretations of its content (associated with higher levels of social dominance orientation; see Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002) than with religious fundamentalists (literalist believers) or relativists (those who understand the symbolic value of religious content but reject religion itself).

(Duriez & Van Hiel, 2002); whilst simply accepting religious content as valuable is enough to drive traditionalist values, only religious affiliates who also approach such content in a symbolic fashion are likely to endorse spirituality. Thus, whilst religion seems invariably and innately connected to traditionalist beliefs, its impact on universalist ideals is divided by literalist and symbolic believers.

As demonstrated here, conceptualisations of religiosity and spirituality remain difficult to pin down, complicated by the fact they are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, Pargament (1999) argued that the polarization of the two concepts might serve as a detriment to the field in general by obscuring the complexity of the concepts and limiting them to caricatures. Similarly, whilst past work has found some affiliates view themselves as spiritual not religious (Streib & Hood, 2011), many religious individuals would (and do) describe themselves as spiritual (and vice-versa; see Hill et al., 2000; Zinnbauer et al., 1997). Notably, neither Studies 1 and 2 directly assessed what participants believed religion or spirituality to mean. Yet, it appears the significance underlying these concepts is at least implicitly understood by most. Specifically, Study 2 assessed participants' religious and spiritual identification through a single item of self-report. That the results demonstrated the hypothesised values of religion and spirituality seems to indicate a fundamental understanding of the meaning of the terms by participants, irrespective of how they are officially characterised. Furthermore, Study 2 demonstrates that the impact of spirituality and religiosity is not only fully mediated by authoritarianism and social dominance orientation, but these pathways represent two distinct processes by which these two forms of faith impact political attitudes (when estimated simultaneously). Hence, religiosity and spirituality may be correlated, but they appear innately distinct in process and outcome.

Overall, two themes emerge that seem central to our understanding of religion and

spirituality. The first examines cognitive style and approach, examining how religious content is processed. As described by Wulff (1997) and aligned with the work of religious quest (Batson & Ventis, 1982), religious seeking seems to be a matter of cognitive style, with considerations of abstract and symbolic views of religious matters playing a fundamental role in determining religious views on matters of egalitarianism. Thus, spirituality may be a religious facet of symbolic cognitive approaches to content. If so, spirituality would appear to encompass a narrower aspect of human faith (as described by Pargament, 1999), focused on a religious form of a specific cognitive style.

The second theme reinforces the importance of religious motivations (or orientations; see Allport & Ross, 1967) as vital to our conceptualisation of religion and its socio-political outcomes. Utilising Wulff's (1997) framework, acceptance of religion appears to be strongly associated with traditionalist values. Indeed, Studies 1 and 2 show that this relationship is intrinsic; religion seems to enculture and motivate traditionalist ideals. Yet this effect is not a simple product of traditional dogma, but rather an evolved mechanism (Graham & Haidt, 2010) by which religion addresses epistemic needs for closure, continuity, and predictability (Jost et al., 2003). Indeed, Jackson and colleagues (2018) demonstrated that religious beliefs appeared to alleviate implicit death anxiety, even among non-believers. Authoritarianism is thus an expression of religiosity's defensive role in providing security in an unpredictable world, regardless of how such content is cognitively processed.

Critical to this conception of religiosity is an innate belief in religious content. Indeed, if religion has evolved to alleviate concerns regarding security, one might expect genuine engagement and affiliation, thus instilling the religious ideals that provide palliative effects on anxiety. As such, religiosity would seem to be aligned with intrinsic belief (Allport & Ross, 1967), encompassing a sincere attachment to one's faith. Yet, this would suggest that extrinsic religious affiliates, whose affiliation is a matter of convenience, might not be

encompassed by either religiosity or spirituality. Thus, Study 4 examined religion using collective narcissism theory, positing an alignment between collective narcissism and extrinsic motivations for religiosity. Importantly, this demonstrated that whilst religiosity and spirituality may encapsulate concerns over tradition and connection, a segment of religious affiliates seem to be motivated by extrinsic concerns over status and self-enhancement. Resultantly, these narcissistic approaches to religion are associated with negative impacts on intergroup attitudes.

Collective narcissism is an emergent field of study and its importance in the domain of religion remains an intriguing area for future research. However, that religious group narcissism seemed to distinguish itself from authoritarianism and social dominance orientation seems to suggest it is a vital one. As opposed to religious motivations for security and cognitive styles towards existential seeking, which motivate authoritarian and anti-egalitarian attitudes respectively, religious narcissism appears to directly motivate intergroup attitudes. Furthermore, collective narcissism has been associated with conspiracy beliefs across a range of domains (Cichocka, 2016; Golec de Zavala & Federico, 2018; Marchlewska et al., 2019). Notably, religious and conspiracy beliefs are argued to be associated with lower institutional trust (Jasinskaja-Lahti & Jetten, 2019; Kay, Shepard, et al., 2010), and conspiracy theories are argued to have quasi-religious qualities (Franks et al., 2013). Thus, given the increasing relevance of conspiracy theories, religious narcissism may play an important role in understanding the appeals of such beliefs and the motivations of their believers⁸.

Collectively, this work provides a reminder of the importance of emergent and

⁸ Indeed, if religious and conspiracy beliefs have similar underlying motivations, research in this field may give a better idea of how to discourage conspiracy theories. Of course, given that religious beliefs are largely predicated on unprovable hypotheses, conspiracy beliefs with religious content may prove extremely difficult to dislodge.

existing fields, particularly religious motivations and cognitions, in extending our understanding of how religion functions. Furthermore, it hints at the incredibly complexity and diversity of religious conceptualisations, providing indications of the difficulty of conducting research in this area. Arguably, streamlining the field's approaches to religion may be one way to extend our understanding of how religious identification functions; the field is rife with differing approaches to religious content and attempts to create meaningful delineations of religious dimensions. As of yet, no consensus exists on what religion is, nor how the numerous dimensions within the literature differ or relate to one another. Of course, this may simply reflect the incredibly complex nature of religion and attempts to unify conceptualisations of the field must not fall into the trap of being overly reductionist. Nonetheless, I argue such an attempt would prove a valuable direction for the field, helping to better understand the impact of religion on socio-political attitudes, as well as assisting future researchers in navigating the incredibly complexity that is religious affiliation.

Conclusion

It was Allport (1954) who noted that religious affiliation had paradoxical socio-political outcomes, both affiliated with unequal social dynamics and with more egalitarian attitudes. In the time since then the field has continued to develop, yet the multidimensional nature of religion, and its resultant impact on socio-political outcomes, remains a largely unresolved mystery. Religion has been persistently associated with conservative and authoritarian attitudes (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; M. K. Johnson et al., 2011; Jost et al., 2014; Osborne et al., 2014), with literature positioning it as a system-justifying belief system (Jost et al., 2014), providing a palliative effect by satisfying fundamental needs for simplicity, continuity, and predictability. However, religion has also been associated with altruism and prosocial outcomes (Preston et al., 2010; Schroeder et al., 2015; Shariff &

Norenzayan, 2007; Sibley & Bulbulia, 2015), and argued to foster interpersonal harmony and cohesion through increased empathy and agreeableness (Saroglou, 2010; Schieman et al., 2019; Silvia et al., 2014).

Key to understanding these countervailing effects is the multidimensional nature of religion which has been theorized within the literature. This thesis draws on this past work, utilising the framework of religion and spirituality to delineate religious outcomes as a product of affiliation with different values. Four studies are presented here with the aim of contributing to existent literature on religion's complex nature, taking a value systems approach as a possible explanation for religion's paradoxical socio-political outcomes, and providing intriguing evidence towards resolving the question of the temporal association between religion and authoritarianism (a long-standing issue within the field).

These studies suggest that religious affiliation does appear to enculture traditionalist and authoritarian values (Study 1), and correspondingly conservative ideals. However, religious affiliation seems fundamentally distinct from that of spirituality, which is associated with universalist and egalitarian values, and correspondingly lower endorsement of conservatism (Study 2). Indeed, spirituality's expression of universalism is not simply reflected in political affiliation but also in environmental regard, reinforcing past work which has emphasised the world/nature-oriented aspects of spirituality (Study 3). Importantly, such work demonstrates the importance of spirituality's egalitarian values cross-culturally whilst also suggesting that spirituality may include traditionalist and functionalist aspects.

Finally, dimensions of religion are demonstrated to have direct countervailing socio-political impacts beyond differential endorsement of distinct values. Focusing on collective narcissism literature, potentially expressing a form of extrinsic motivation for affiliation, religious group narcissism is demonstrated to have powerful negative impacts on both hostile

and benevolent sexism, whilst secure religiosity displays the opposite (Study 4). As such, collectively this thesis indicates that religion's negative socio-political outcomes appear to be motivated by inequality and insecurity, founded on epistemic needs for control and self-esteem. Given this, it is perhaps unsurprising that religion seems to flourish in the most unequal of societies (Gaskins et al., 2013)

Broadly, this thesis provides evidence towards value systems as important, but perhaps not integral, to our understanding of religion's countervailing socio-political impacts. Whilst religion and spirituality may remain conceptually "fuzzy" (Pargament, 1999), its underlying values show distinct pathways towards political attitudes. The mechanics of these effects remain a vital question, but one in which religious motivations and cognitive approaches seem a promising direction of research. Overall, this thesis provides a picture of religious affiliates (at present) as innately motivated towards traditionalist and authoritarian ideals, likely to alleviate epistemic needs for security perhaps only achievable in the transcendental world of the supernatural. Thus, if religious belief is to foster egalitarian outcomes, it is not simply a matter of religious groups emphasising spiritual ideals – broader society itself must provide the sense of control and certainty which religious affiliates are seeking.

References

- Abramowitz, A. I., & Saunders, K. L. (2008). Is Polarization a Myth? *The Journal of Politics*, 70(2), 542–555. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381608080493>
- Abrams, D. E., & Hogg, M. A. (1990). *Social identity theory: Constructive and critical advances*. Springer-Verlag Publishing.
- Akrami, N., Ekehammar, B., & Yang-Wallentin, F. (2011). Personality and Social Psychology Factors Explaining Sexism. *Journal of Individual Differences*, 32(3), 153–160. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001/a000043>
- Allport, G. W. (1966). The religious context of prejudice. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 5(3), 447–457.
- Allport, G. W., & Ross, J. M. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5(4), 432–443. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021212>
- Altemeyer, B. (1988). *Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism*. Jossey-Bass.
- Altemeyer, B. (1996). *The authoritarian specter*. Harvard University Press.
- Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 2(2), 113–133. https://doi.org/DOI: 10.1207/s15327582ijpr0202_5
- Altemeyer, B., & Hunsberger, B. (2004). RESEARCH: A Revised Religious Fundamentalism Scale: The Short and Sweet of It. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 14(1), 47–54. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1401_4

- Arrowood, R. B., Coleman, T. J., Swanson, S. B., Hood, R. W., & Cox, C. R. (2018). Death, quest, and self-esteem: Re-examining the role of self-esteem and religion following mortality salience. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *8*(1), 69–76.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2016.1238843>
- Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2007). Empirical, theoretical, and practical advantages of the HEXACO Model of personality structure. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *11*(2), 150–166.
- Asparouhov, T., & Muthén, B. (2010). *Bayesian analysis of latent variable models using Mplus* (Technical report). Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén.
- Bahçekapili, H. G., & Yilmaz, O. (2017). The relation between different types of religiosity and analytic cognitive style. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *117*, 267–272.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.06.013>
- Batson, C. D., & Raynor-Prince, L. (1983). Religious Orientation and Complexity of Thought about Existential Concerns. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, *22*(1), 38–50.
JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1385590>
- Batson, C. D., & Ventis, W. L. (1982). *The religious experience: A social-psychological perspective*. Oxford University Press.
- Baumard, N., & Boyer, P. (2013). Religious beliefs as reflective elaborations on intuitions: A modified dual-process model. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *22*(4), 295–300.
- Beck, R. (2006). Defensive versus Existential Religion: Is Religious Defensiveness Predictive of Worldview Defense? *Journal of Psychology and Theology*, *34*(2), 142–152. <https://doi.org/10.1177/009164710603400204>

- Beierlein, C., Kuntz, A., & Davidov, E. (2016). Universalism, conservation and attitudes toward minority groups. *Social Science Research, 58*, 68–79.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2016.02.002>
- Bellah, R. N. (2011). *Religion in human evolution*. Harvard University Press.
- Bergin, H., & Smith, S. E. (2004). *Land and place: He whenua, he wāhi: Spiritualities from Aotearoa New Zealand*. Accent Publications.
- Berry, J. W. (1999). Emics and Etics: A Symbiotic Conception. *Culture & Psychology, 5*(2), 165–171. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9952004>
- Bloch, J. P. (1998). Alternative Spirituality and Environmentalism. *Review of Religious Research, 40*(1), 55–73. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3512459>
- Bollen, K. A., & Curran, P. J. (2006). *Latent curve models: A structural equation perspective*. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Bosetti, G. L., Voci, A., & Pagotto, L. (2011). *Religiosity, the sinner, and the sin: Different patterns of prejudice towards homosexuals and homosexuality. 18*(3), 15.
- Browne, M., Pennycook, G., Goodwin, B., & McHenry, M. (2014). Reflective minds and open hearts: Cognitive style and personality predict religiosity and spiritual thinking in a community sample. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 44*(7), 736–742.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2059>
- Bulbulia, J. (2004). Religious costs as adaptations that signal altruistic intention. *Evolution and Cognition, 10*(1), 19–38.

- Bulbulia, J., Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2013). Moral Foundations Predict Religious Orientations in New Zealand. *PLOS ONE*, *8*(12), e80224.
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0080224>
- Bulbulia, J., Troughton, G., Highland, B. R., & Sibley, C. G. (2020). A national-scale typology of orientations to religion poses new challenges for the cultural evolutionary study of religious groups. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, *10*(3), 239–251.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2019.1678516>
- Burn, S. M., & Busso, J. (2005). Ambivalent Sexism, Scriptural Literalism, and Religiosity. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, *29*(4), 412–418. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2005.00241.x>
- Burns, C. T., Jackson, L. M., Tarpley, W. R., & Smith, G. J. (1996). Religion as Quest: The Self-Directed Pursuit of Meaning. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *22*(10), 1068–1076. <https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672962210010>
- Casanova, J. (2012). The politics of nativism: Islam in Europe, Catholicism in the United States. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, *38*(4-5), 485-495.
- Challenger, N. (1985). *A comparison of Māori and Pakeha attitudes to land* (Doctoral dissertation, Lincoln College, University of Canterbury). Retrieved from <http://researcharchive.lincoln.ac.nz/handle/10182/1272>
- Chirumbolo, A. (2002). The relationship between need for cognitive closure and political orientation: The mediating role of authoritarianism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *32*(4), 603–610. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869\(01\)00062-9](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00062-9)

- Cichocka, A. (2016). Understanding defensive and secure in-group positivity: The role of collective narcissism. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 27(1), 283–317.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2016.1252530>
- Cichocka, A., & Cislak, A. (2020). Nationalism as collective narcissism. *Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences*, 34, 69–74. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cobeha.2019.12.013>
- Cichocka, A., Dhont, K., Makwana, A. P., & Back, M. (2017). On Self-Love and Outgroup Hate: Opposite Effects of Narcissism on Prejudice via Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. *European Journal of Personality*, 31(4), 366–384.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2114>
- Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., & de Zavala, A. G. (2016). Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Predict Conspiracy Beliefs? Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 7(2), 157–166.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550615616170>
- Cichocka, A., Zavala, A. G. de, Marchlewska, M., Bilewicz, M., Jaworska, M., & Olechowski, M. (2018). Personal control decreases narcissistic but increases non-narcissistic in-group positivity. *Journal of Personality*, 86(3), 465–480.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12328>
- Cichocka, A., Marchlewska, M., Golec de Zavala, A., & Olechowski, M. (2016). ‘They will not control us’: Ingroup positivity and belief in intergroup conspiracies. *British Journal of Psychology*, 107(3), 556–576. <https://doi.org/10.1111/bjop.12158>
- Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes, J., & Kielmann, S. (2005). The motivational bases of right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: Relations to values and

attitudes in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(10), 1425–1434.

Connelly, K., & Heesacker, M. (2012). Why Is Benevolent Sexism Appealing?: Associations With System Justification and Life Satisfaction. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 36(4), 432–443. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0361684312456369>

Cornelis, I., & Van Hiel, A. (2006). The impact of cognitive styles on authoritarianism based conservatism and racism. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 28(1), 37–50. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15324834basp2801_4

Cowie, L. J., Greaves, L. M., Milfont, T. L., Houkamau, C. A., & Sibley, C. G. (2016). Indigenous identity and environmental values: Do spirituality and political consciousness predict environmental regard among Māori? *International Perspectives in Psychology: Research, Practice, Consultation*, 5 (4), 228–244. <https://doi.org/10.1037/ipp0000059>.

Dardenne, B., Dumont, M., & Bollier, T. (2007). Insidious dangers of benevolent sexism: Consequences for women's performance. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 93(5), 764–779. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.764>

Dell, K. M. (2017). *Te Hokinga Ki Te Ūkaipō: Disrupted Māori Management Theory; Harmonising Whānau Conflict in the Māori Land Trust*. University of Auckland.

Djupe, P. A., & Calfano, B. R. (2013). Religious Value Priming, Threat, and Political Tolerance. *Political Research Quarterly*, 66(4), 768–780. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912912471203>

Donahue, M. J. (1985). Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiousness: The Empirical Research. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 24(4), 418. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1385995>

Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 33, pp. 41–113). Elsevier.

Duckitt, J. (2006). Differential effects of right wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on outgroup attitudes and their mediation by threat from and competitiveness to outgroups. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 32(5), 684–696.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167205284282>

Duckitt, J., Bizumic, B., Krauss, S. W., & Heled, E. (2010). A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model: Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism. *Political Psychology*, 31(5), 685–715.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00781.x>

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A Dual-Process Motivational Model of Ideology, Politics, and Prejudice. *Psychological Inquiry*, 20(2–3), 98–109.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028540>

Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Personality, Ideology, Prejudice, and Politics: A Dual-Process Motivational Model Duckitt & Sibley Dual-Process Motivational Model. *Journal of Personality*, 78(6), 1861–1894. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2010.00672.x>

Duncan, T. E., & Duncan, S. C. (2009). The ABC's of LGM: An Introductory Guide to Latent Variable Growth Curve Modeling. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 3(6), 979–991. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00224.x>

Dunkel, C. S., & Dutton, E. (2016). Religiosity as a predictor of in-group favoritism within and between religious groups. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 98, 311–314.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.04.063>

- Durie, M. (1994). *Whaiora: Māori health development*. Oxford University Press.
- Durie, E. (2012). Ancestral laws of Māori: Continuities of land, people and history. In D. Keenan (Ed.), *Huia histories of Māori: Ngā Tāhuhu Kōrero*. Huia Publishers.
- Duriez, B. (2003a). Religiosity and conservatism revisited: Relating a new religiosity measure to the two main conservative political ideologies. *Psychological Reports*, 92(2), 533–539.
- Duriez, B. (2003b). Vivisecting the religious mind: Religiosity and motivated social cognition. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, 6(1), 79–86.
- Duriez, B. (2004). Are religious people nicer people? Taking a closer look at the religion–empathy relationship. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, 7(3), 249–254.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13674670310001606450>
- Duriez, B., Luyten, P., Snauwaert, B., & Hutsebaut, D. (2002). The importance of religiosity and values in predicting political attitudes: Evidence for the continuing importance of religiosity in Flanders (Belgium). *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, 5(1), 35–54.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13674670110066831>
- Duriez, B., & Van Hiel, A. (2002). The march of modern fascism. A comparison of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 32(7), 1199–1213. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869\(01\)00086-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(01)00086-1)
- Duriez, B., Van Hiel, A., & Kossowska, M. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance in Western and Eastern Europe: The importance of the sociopolitical context and of political interest and involvement. *Political Psychology*, 26(2), 299–320.
- Durkheim, É. (1912). *The elementary forms of the religious life, a study in religious sociology*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, New York: Macmillan.

- Dyduch-Hazar, K., & Mrozinski, B. (2021). Opposite associations of collective narcissism and in-group satisfaction with intergroup aggression via belief in the hedonistic function of revenge. *PLOS ONE*, *16*(3), e0247814. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0247814>
- Edwards, M. J. (1995). Justin's Logos and the Word of God. *Journal of Early Christian Studies*, *3*(3), 261–280.
- Eliason, K. D., Hall, M. E. L., Anderson, T., & Willingham, M. (2017). Where gender and religion meet: Differentiating gender role ideology and religious beliefs about gender. *Journal of Psychology and Christianity*, *36*(1), 3–15.
- Emmons, R. A. (1999). Religion in the Psychology of Personality: An Introduction. *Journal of Personality*, *67*(6), 874–888. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00076>
- Evans, E. N. (1992). Liberation theology, empowerment theory and social work practice with the oppressed. *International Social Work*, *35*(2), 135–147.
- Federico, C. M., Fisher, E. L., & Deason, G. (2011). Expertise and the Ideological Consequences of the Authoritarian Predisposition. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *75*(4), 686–708. <https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfr026>
- Federico, C. M., Weber, C. R., Ergun, D., & Hunt, C. (2013). Mapping the connections between politics and morality: The multiple sociopolitical orientations involved in moral intuition. *Political Psychology*, *34*(4), 589–610.
- Feldman, S., & Johnston, C. (2014). Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideology: Implications of Structural Complexity: Understanding Political Ideology. *Political Psychology*, *35*(3), 337–358. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12055>

- Finlay, K. A., & Stephan, W. G. (2000). Improving Intergroup Relations: The Effects of Empathy on Racial Attitudes. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30*(8), 1720–1737. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2000.tb02464.x>
- Fontaine, J. R. J., Duriez, B., Luyten, P., Corveleyn, J., & Hutsebaut, D. (2005). Consequences of a Multidimensional Approach to Religion for the Relationship Between Religiosity and Value Priorities. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 15*(2), 123–143. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr1502_2
- Gagné, M., & Deci, E. L. (2005). Self-determination theory and work motivation. *Journal of Organizational Behavior, 26*(4), 331–362. <https://doi.org/10.1002/job.322>
- Gaskins, B., Golder, M., & Siegel, D. A. (2013). Religious Participation and Economic Conservatism. *American Journal of Political Science, 57*(4), 823–840. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12024>
- Geertz, C. (1966). Religion as a cultural system. In M. Banton (Ed.), *Anthropological approaches to the study of religion* (pp. 1–46). Lavistock.
- Geertz, C. (1975). Common Sense as a Cultural System. *The Antioch Review, 33*(1), 5–26. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4637616>
- Gennerich, C., & Huber, S. (2006). Value Priorities and Content of Religiosity—New Research Perspectives. *Archive for the Psychology of Religion / Archiv Für Religionspsychologie, 28*(1), 253–267. <https://doi.org/10.1163/008467206777832508>
- Gillespie, A. (1998). Environmental politics in New Zealand/Aotearoa: Clashes and commonality between Māoridom and environmentalists. *New Zealand Geographer, 54* (1), 19–26.

Glick, P., & Fiske, S. (1996). The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory: Differentiating Hostile and Benevolent Sexism. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(3), 491–512.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.3.491>

Glick, P., & Fiske, S. (2001). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender inequality. *American Psychologist*, 56(2), 109–

118. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.2.109>

Glick, P., Fiske, S. T., Mladinic, A., Saiz, J. L., Abrams, D., Masser, B., Adetoun, B., Osagie, J. E., Akande, A., Alao, A., Annetje, B., Willemsen, T. M., Chipeta, K., Dardenne, B., Dijksterhuis, A., Wigboldus, D., Eckes, T., Six-Materna, I., Expósito, F., ... López, W. L. (2000). Beyond prejudice as simple antipathy: Hostile and benevolent sexism across cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(5), 763–775.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.5.763>

Glick, P., Lameiras, M., & Castro, Y. R. (2002). Education and Catholic Religiosity as Predictors of Hostile and Benevolent Sexism Toward Women and Men. *Sex Roles*, 47(9), 433–441. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021696209949>

Glock, C. Y., & Stark, R. (1965). *Religion and society in tension*. Rand McNally & Company.

Grimes, A., Macculloch, R., & McKay, F. (2015). Indigenous Belief in a Just World: New Zealand Māori and other Ethnicities Compared. *Motu Working Paper No. 15-14*.

<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2668388>

Golec de Zavala, A. (2011). Collective Narcissism and Intergroup Hostility: The Dark Side of ‘In-Group Love.’ *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 5(6), 309–320.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2011.00351.x>

- Golec de Zavala, A., & Bierwiazzonek, K. (2020). Male, National, and Religious Collective Narcissism Predict Sexism. *Sex Roles, 84*(11), 680–700. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-020-01193-3>
- Golec de Zavala, A., & Cichocka, A. (2012). Collective narcissism and anti-Semitism in Poland. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 15*(2), 213–229. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430211420891>
- Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., & Bilewicz, M. (2013). The Paradox of In-Group Love: Differentiating Collective Narcissism Advances Understanding of the Relationship Between In-Group and Out-Group Attitudes. *Journal of Personality, 81*(1), 16–28. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2012.00779.x>
- Golec de Zavala, A., Cichocka, A., Eidelson, R., & Jayawickreme, N. (2009). Collective narcissism and its social consequences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 97*(6), 1074–1096. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016904>
- Golec de Zavala, A., & Federico, C. M. (2018). Collective narcissism and the growth of conspiracy thinking over the course of the 2016 United States presidential election: A longitudinal analysis. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 48*(7), 1011–1018. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2496>
- Golec de Zavala, A., Federico, C. M., Sedikides, C., Guerra, R., Lantos, D., Mroziński, B., Cypryańska, M., & Baran, T. (2019). Low self-esteem predicts out-group derogation via collective narcissism, but this relationship is obscured by in-group satisfaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 119*(3), 741. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000260>

- Golec de Zavala, A., & Lantos, D. (2020). Collective Narcissism and Its Social Consequences: The Bad and the Ugly. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 29(3), 273–278. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721420917703>
- Golec de Zavala, A., Peker, M., Guerra, R., & Baran, T. (2016). Collective Narcissism Predicts Hypersensitivity to In-group Insult and Direct and Indirect Retaliatory Intergroup Hostility. *European Journal of Personality*, 30(6), 532–551. <https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2067>
- Graham, J., & Haidt, J. (2010). Beyond Beliefs: Religions Bind Individuals Into Moral Communities. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 140–150. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309353415>
- Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of moral foundations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 96(5), 1029.
- Granqvist, P. (2003). Attachment Theory and Religious Conversions: A Review and a Resolution of the Classic and Contemporary Paradigm Chasm. *Review of Religious Research*, 45(2), 172–187. JSTOR. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3512581>
- Greenfield, E. A., & Marks, N. F. (2007). Religious Social Identity as an Explanatory Factor for Associations Between More Frequent Formal Religious Participation and Psychological Well-Being. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 17(3), 245–259. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10508610701402309>
- Guerra, R., Bierwiazzonek, K., Ferreira, M., Golec de Zavala, A., Abakoumkin, G., Wildschut, T., & Sedikides, C. (2020). An intergroup approach to collective narcissism: Intergroup threats and hostility in four European Union countries. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 1368430220972178. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220972178>

- Guth, J. L., Kellstedt, L. A., Smidt, C. E., & Green, J. C. (2006). Religious influences in the 2004 presidential election. *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, *36*(2), 223–242.
- Haidt, J., Graham, J., & Joseph, C. (2009). Above and Below Left–Right: Ideological Narratives and Moral Foundations. *Psychological Inquiry*, *20*(2–3), 110–119.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028573>
- Haggard, M. C., Kaelen, R., Saroglou, V., Klein, O., & Rowatt, W. C. (2019). Religion’s role in the illusion of gender equality: Supraliminal and subliminal religious priming increases benevolent sexism. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, *11*(4), 392–398.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000196>
- Hall, D. L., Matz, D. C., & Wood, W. (2010). Why don’t we practice what we preach? A meta-analytic review of religious racism. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *14*(1), 126–139.
- Hammond, M. D., Milojev, P., Huang, Y., & Sibley, C. G. (2018). Benevolent Sexism and Hostile Sexism Across the Ages. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, *9*(7), 863–874. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617727588>
- Harmsworth, G. R., & Awatere, S. (2013). Indigenous Māori Knowledge and Perspectives of Ecosystems. *Ecosystem Services in New Zealand—Conditions and Trends*, 274–86.
- Harris, & Tipene. (2006). Māori Land Development. In *State of the Māori Nation: Twenty-First Century Issues in Aotearoa*. Reed.
- Harris-Lacewell, M. V. (2010). *Barbershops, bibles, and BET: Everyday talk and black political thought*. Princeton University Press.
- Harvey, G. (2003). Environmentalism in the Construction of Indigeneity. *Ecotheology: Journal of Religion, Nature & the Environment*, *8* (2), 206–23.

- Hawkins, C. B., & Nosek, B. A. (2012). When Ingroups Aren't "In": Perceived Political Belief Similarity Moderates Religious Ingroup Favoritism. *PLOS ONE*, 7(12), e50945. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0050945>
- Helfrich, H. (1999). Beyond the Dilemma of Cross-Cultural Psychology: Resolving the Tension between Etic and Emic Approaches. *Culture & Psychology*, 5(2), 131–153. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354067X9952002>
- Hellmer, K., Stenson, J. T., & Jylhä, K. M. (2018). What's (not) underpinning ambivalent sexism?: Revisiting the roles of ideology, religiosity, personality, demographics, and men's facial hair in explaining hostile and benevolent sexism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 122, 29–37. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.001>
- Henare, M. (2001). Tapu, Mana, Mauri, Hau, Wairua: A Māori Philosophy of Vitalism and Cosmos. *Indigenous Traditions and Ecology: The Interbeing of Cosmology and Community*, 197–221.
- Herek, G. M. (1987). Religious Orientation and Prejudice: A Comparison of Racial and Sexual Attitudes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 13(1), 34–44. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167287131003>
- Herron, M. C., & Smith, D. A. (2012). Souls to the polls: Early voting in Florida in the shadow of House Bill 1355. *Election Law Journal*, 11(3), 331–347.
- Hertel, T. W. (2015). Food security under climate change. *Nature Climate Change*, 6 (1), 10–13.
- Hill, P. C., Pargament, K. II., Hood, R. W., McCullough, Jr., Michael E., Swyers, J. P., Larson, D. B., & Zinnbauer, B. J. (2000). Conceptualizing Religion and Spirituality:

Points of Commonality, Points of Departure. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, 30(1), 51–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5914.00119>

Hirsh, J. B., Walberg, M. D., & Peterson, J. B. (2013). Spiritual Liberals and Religious Conservatives. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 4(1), 14–20. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550612444138>

Hogg, M. A., Adelman, J. R., & Blagg, R. D. (2010). Religion in the face of uncertainty: An uncertainty-identity theory account of religiousness. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 72–83.

Hokowhitu, B. 2012. "As For These Blankets, Burn Them." In D. Keenan (Ed.), *Huia histories of Māori: Ngā Tāhuhu Kōrero*. Huia Publishers.

Hood, R. W. (1985). The Conceptualization of Religious Purity in Allport's Typology. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 24(4), 413. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1385994>

Hood, R. W., & Chen, Z. (2013). Conversion and deconversion. In S. Bullivant & M. Ruse (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Atheism*. Oxford University Press.

Houck, D. W., & Dixon, D. E. (2006). *Rhetoric, religion and the civil rights movement, 1954-1965* (Vol. 1). Baylor University Press.

Houkamau, C. A., and Sibley, C. G. (2010). The Multi-Dimensional Model of Māori Identity and Cultural Engagement. *New Zealand Journal of Psychology*, 39 (1): 8-28.

Houkamau, C. A., & Sibley, C. G. (2015). The Revised Multidimensional Model of Māori Identity and Cultural Engagement (MMM-ICE2). *Social Indicators Research*, 122(1), 279–296. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0686-7>

- Houkamau, C. A., Sibley, C. G., Henare, M. (in press). Te Rangahau O Te Tuakiri Māori Me Ngā Waiaro Ā-Pūtea | The Māori Identity and Financial Attitudes Study (MIFAS): background, theoretical orientation and first wave response rates. *MAI Journal of Indigenous Scholarship*
- Hoverd, W. J., & Sibley, C. G. (2010). Religious and denominational diversity in New Zealand 2009. *New Zealand Sociology*, 25(2), 59.
- Hoverd, W. J., & Sibley, C. G. (2013). Religion, deprivation and subjective wellbeing: Testing a religious buffering hypothesis. *International Journal of Wellbeing*, 3(2).
- Hunsberger, B., & Jackson, L. M. (2005). Religion, meaning, and prejudice. *Journal of Social Issues*, 61(4), 807–826.
- Hyland, M. E., Masters, K. S., Wheeler, P., & Kamble, S. (2010). A Sense of ‘Special Connection’, Self-transcendent Values and a Common Factor for Religious and Non-religious Spirituality. *Archive for the Psychology of Religion*, 32(3), 293–326.
<https://doi.org/10.1163/157361210X533265>
- Iacoviello, V., & Spears, R. (2018). “I know you expect me to favor my ingroup”: Reviving Tajfel’s original hypothesis on the generic norm explanation of ingroup favoritism. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 76, 88–99.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018.01.002>
- Jackson, A. M., Mita, N., & Hakopa, H. (2017). *Hui-te-ana-nui: Understanding kaitiakitanga in our marine environment* (Ngā Moana Whakauka – Sustainable Seas National Science Challenge). University of Otago, New Zealand.

Jackson, J. C., Jong, J., Bluemke, M., Poulter, P., Morgenroth, L., & Halberstadt, J. (2018).

Testing the causal relationship between religious belief and death anxiety. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, 8(1), 57–68. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2016.1238842>

Jackson, L. M., & Hunsberger, B. (1999). An Intergroup Perspective on Religion and Prejudice. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 38(4), 509–523. JSTOR.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/1387609>

Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., & Jetten, J. (2019). Unpacking the relationship between religiosity and conspiracy beliefs in Australia. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 58(4), 938–954.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12314>

Ji, C.-H. C., & Suh, K. H. (2008). Doctrinal Faith and Religious Orientations in Right-Wing Authoritarianism: A Pilot Study of American and Korean Protestant College Students.

Journal of Psychology and Christianity, 27(3), 253–265. Health Research Premium Collection; ProQuest Central.

Johnson, J. T., and Murton. (2007). Re/Placing Native Science: Indigenous Voices in Contemporary Constructions of Nature. *Geographical Research*, 45 (2): 121–129.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-5871.2007.00442.x>.

Johnson, K. A., Hook, J. N., Davis, D. E., Van Tongeren, D. R., Sandage, S. J., & Crabtree, S. A. (2016). Moral foundation priorities reflect U.S. Christians' individual differences in religiosity. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 100, 56–61.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.12.037>

Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., Barnard-Brak, L. M., Patock-Peckham, J. A., LaBouff, J. P., & Carlisle, R. D. (2011). A mediational analysis of the role of right-wing

authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism in the religiosity–prejudice link.

Personality and Individual Differences, 50(6), 851–856.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.01.010>

Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. P. (2012). Religiosity and prejudice revisited:

In-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both? *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 4(2), 154–168. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025107>

Jong, J., & Halberstadt, J. (2017). What is the causal relationship between death anxiety and religious belief? *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, 7(4), 296–298.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2016.1249916>

Jost, J. T. (2006). The End of the End of Ideology. *American Psychologist*, 61(7), 651–670.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651>

Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin*, 129(3), 339.

Jost, J. T., Hawkins, C. B., Nosek, B. A., Hennes, E. P., Stern, C., Gosling, S. D., & Graham, J. (2014). Belief in a just God (and a just society): A system justification perspective on religious ideology. *Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology*, 34(1), 56.

Kahoe, R. D. (1974). Personality and achievement correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 29(6).

Kawharu, M. (2000). Kaitiakitanga: A Māori anthropological perspective of the Māori socio-environmental ethic of resource management. *The Journal of the Polynesian Society* 109 (4): 349–70.

Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., McGregor, I., & Nash, K. (2010). Religious Belief as Compensatory Control. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 37–48.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309353750>

- Kay, A. C., Gaucher, D., Napier, J. L., Callan, M. J., & Laurin, K. (2008). God and the government: Testing a compensatory control mechanism for the support of external systems. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 95*(1), 18–35.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.95.1.18>
- Kay, A. C., Shepherd, S., Blatz, C. W., Chua, S. N., & Galinsky, A. D. (2010). For God (or) country: The hydraulic relation between government instability and belief in religious sources of control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 99*(5), 725–739.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0021140>
- Kearns, L. (1996). Saving the Creation: Christian Environmentalism in the United States*. *Sociology of Religion, 57*(1), 55–70. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3712004>
- Keenan, Danny. 2012. "Land, Culture and History Interwoven." In D. Keenan (Ed.), *Huia histories of Māori: Ngā Tāhuhu Kōrero*. Huia Publishers.
- Kelly, N. J., & Morgan, J. (2008). Religious Traditionalism and Latino Politics in the United States. *American Politics Research, 36*(2), 236–263.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X07309738>
- Kerr, N. L., & Kaufman-Gilliland, C. M. (1997). “.. And besides, I probably couldn’t have made a difference anyway”: Justification of Social Dilemma Defection via Perceived Self-Inefficacy. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 33*(3), 211–230.
<https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1996.1319>
- Kesselring, K. J. (2011). Gender, the Hat, and Quaker Universalism in the Wake of the English Revolution. *The Seventeenth Century, 26*(2), 299–322.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0268117X.2011.10555672>

- Kilpatrick, D. G., Sutker, L. W., & Sutker, P. B. (1970). Dogmatism, Religion, and Religiosity, a Review and Re-Evaluation. *Psychological Reports*, 26(1), 15–22.
<https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1970.26.1.15>
- King, P. E. (2003). Religion and Identity: The Role of Ideological, Social, and Spiritual Contexts. *Applied Developmental Science*, 7(3), 197–204.
https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532480XADS0703_11
- Klein, U. (2000). Belief - Views on nature - Western environmental ethics and Māori world views. *New Zealand Journal of Environmental Law*, 4, 81-119.
- Koca-Atabey, M., & Öner-Özkan, B. (2011). Defensive or Existential Religious Orientations and Mortality Salience Hypothesis: Using Conservatism as a Dependent Measure. *Death Studies*, 35(9), 852–865. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07481187.2011.553319>
- Kossowska, M., & Sekerdej, M. (2015). Searching for certainty: Religious beliefs and intolerance toward value-violating groups. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 83, 72–76.
- Kruglanski, A. W., Pierro, A., Mannetti, L., & De Grada, E. (2006). Groups as epistemic providers: Need for closure and the unfolding of group-centrism. *Psychological Review*, 113(1), 84–100. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.113.1.84>
- Krumrei-Mancuso, E. J. (2018). Intellectual humility's links to religion and spirituality and the role of authoritarianism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 130, 65–75.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.03.037>
- Kugler, M., Jost, J. T., & Noorbaloochi, S. (2014). Another look at moral foundations theory: Do authoritarianism and social dominance orientation explain liberal-conservative

differences in “moral” intuitions? *Social Justice Research*, 27(4), 413–431.

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-014-0223-5>

Laird, L. D., Curtis, C. E., & Morgan, J. R. (2017). Finding Spirits in Spirituality: What are We Measuring in Spirituality and Health Research? *Journal of Religion and Health*, 56(1), 1–20. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-016-0316-6>

Leak, G. K., & Randall, B. A. (1995). Clarification of the link between right-wing authoritarianism and religiousness: The role of religious maturity. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 245–252. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1386769>

Leone, L., Chirumbolo, A., & Desimoni, M. (2012). The impact of the HEXACO personality model in predicting socio-political attitudes: The moderating role of interest in politics. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 52(3), 416–421.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.10.049>

Li, K.-K., & Chow, W.-Y. (2015). Religiosity/spirituality and prosocial behaviors among Chinese Christian adolescents. *The Mediating Role of Values and Gratitude*, 7(2), 150–161. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0038294>

Livi, S., Leone, L., Falgares, G., & Lombardo, F. (2014). Values, ideological attitudes and patriotism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 64, 141–146.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.02.040>

Lizzio-Wilson, M., Masser, B. M., Hornsey, M. J., & Iyer, A. (2020). You’re making us all look bad: Sexism moderates women’s experience of collective threat and intra-gender hostility toward traditional and non-traditional female subtypes. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 1–29. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430220913610>

- Lockhart, C., Houkamau, C. A., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2019). To Be at One with the Land: Māori Spirituality Predicts Greater Environmental Regard. *Religions, 10*(7).
<https://doi.org/10.3390/rel10070427>
- Lockhart, C., Sibley, C. G., & Osborne, D. (2020). Religion makes—And unmakes—The status quo: Religiosity and spirituality have opposing effects on conservatism via RWA and SDO. *Religion, Brain & Behavior, 10*(4), 379–392.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2019.1607540>
- Loveland, M. T. (2003). Religious Switching: Preference Development, Maintenance, and Change. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42*(1), 147–157.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5906.00168>
- Łowicki, P., & Zajenkowski, M. (2017). No empathy for people nor for God: The relationship between the Dark Triad, religiosity and empathy. *Personality and Individual Differences, 115*, 169–173. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.02.012>
- Luskin, R. C. (1990). Explaining political sophistication. *Political Behavior, 12*(4), 331–361.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00992793>
- Magallanes, C. (2015). Maori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: Protecting the Cosmology That Protects the Environment Symposium: Global Environmental Constitutionalism. *Widener Law Review, 21*, 273–328.
- Mahoney, A., & Pargament, K. I. (2004). Sacred changes: Spiritual conversion and transformation. *Journal of Clinical Psychology, 60*(5), 481–492.
<https://doi.org/10.1002/jclp.20007>
- Mahoney, A., & Shafranske, E. P. (2013). Envisioning an integrative paradigm for the psychology of religion and spirituality. In K. I. Pargament, J. J. Exline, & J. W. Jones

(Eds.), *APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality (Vol 1): Context, theory, and research*. (pp. 3–19). American Psychological Association.

<https://doi.org/10.1037/14045-001>

Malka, A., Lelkes, Y., Srivastava, S., Cohen, A. B., & Miller, D. T. (2012). The association of religiosity and political conservatism: The role of political engagement. *Political Psychology, 33*(2), 275–299.

Malka, A., Soto, C. J., Cohen, A. B., & Miller, D. T. (2011). Religiosity and Social Welfare: Competing Influences of Cultural Conservatism and Prosocial Value Orientation. *Journal of Personality, 79*(4), 763–792. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2011.00705.x>

Marchlewska, M., Cichocka, A., Łozowski, F., Górska, P., & Winiewski, M. (2019). In search of an imaginary enemy: Catholic collective narcissism and the endorsement of gender conspiracy beliefs. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 159*(6), 766–779. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2019.1586637>

Mastari, L., Droogenbroeck, F. V., Spruyt, B., & Keppens, G. (2021). Ambivalent sexism among Christian and Muslim youth. The gendered pathway of perceived pressure for religious conformity. *European Societies, 1*–24. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2021.2012219>

Mavor, K. I., Louis, W. R., & Laythe, B. (2011). Religion, Prejudice, and Authoritarianism: Is RWA a Boon or Bane to the Psychology of Religion? *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50*(1), 22–43. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2010.01550.x>

McDermott, M. L. (2007). Voting for Catholic candidates: The evolution of a stereotype. *Social Science Quarterly, 88*(4), 953-969.

- Mead, S. M. (2003). *Tikanga Māori: Living by Māori values*. Huia.
- Mikołajczak, M., & Pietrzak, J. (2014). Ambivalent sexism and religion: Connected through values. *Sex Roles*, 70(9–10), 387–399. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-014-0379-3>
- Milfont, T. L., Richter, I., Sibley, C. G., Wilson, M. S., & Fischer, R. (2013). Environmental Consequences of the Desire to Dominate and Be Superior. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(9), 1127–1138. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213490805>
- Milfont, T. L., Evans, L., Sibley, C. G., Ries, J., & Cunningham, A. (2014). Proximity to Coast Is Linked to Climate Change Belief. *PLoS ONE*, 9 (7).
- Mills, K. (2009). The Changing Relationship between Māori and Environmentalists in 1970s and 1980s New Zealand. *History Compass*, 7 (3): 678–700.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1478-0542.2009.00598.x>.
- Milojev, P., Osborne, D., Greaves, L. M., Bulbulia, J., Wilson, M. S., Davies, C. L., Liu, J. H., & Sibley, C. G. (2014). Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation Predict Different Moral Signatures. *Social Justice Research*, 27(2), 149–174.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-014-0213-7>
- Musick, M., & Wilson, J. (1995). Religious Switching for Marriage Reasons†. *Sociology of Religion*, 56(3), 257–270. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3711822>
- Muthén, B., & Asparouhov, T. (2012). Bayesian structural equation modeling: A more flexible representation of substantive theory. *Psychological Methods*, 17(3), 313–335.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026802>
- Muthén, L., & Muthén, B. (1998). *Mplus User's Guide (Eight ed.)*. Los Angeles, CA: Muthén & Muthén.

- Mutu, M. (1994). The use and meaning of Maori words borrowed into English for discussing resource management and conservation. Unpublished discussion paper for Conservation Board Chairpersons. Conference, 10 February, 1994.
- Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). The “Antidemocratic Personality” Revisited: A Cross-National Investigation of Working-Class Authoritarianism. *Journal of Social Issues*, 64(3), 595–617. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.2008.00579.x>
- Newton, M. (2014). *White Robes and Burning Crosses: A History of the Ku Klux Klan from 1866*. McFarland & Co.
- Neyrinck, B., Lens, W., Vansteenkiste, M., & Soenens, B. (2010). Updating Allport’s and Batson’s Framework of Religious Orientations: A Reevaluation from the Perspective of Self-Determination Theory and Wulff’s Social Cognitive Model. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 49(3), 425–438.
- O’Brien, J., & Abdelhadi, E. (2020). Re-examining Restructuring: Racialization, Religious Conservatism, and Political Leanings in Contemporary American Life. *Social Forces*, 99(2), 474-503.
- Olson, L. R., & Green, J. C. (2006). The religion gap. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 39(3), 455–459.
- Osborne, D., Dufresne, Y., Eady, G., Lees-Marshment, J., & van der Linden, C. (2017). Is the Personal Always Political? *Journal of Individual Differences*.
- Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2012). Does personality matter? Openness correlates with vote choice, but particularly for politically sophisticated voters. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 46(6), 743–751. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.09.001>

- Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2014). Endorsement of system-justifying beliefs strengthens the relationship between church attendance and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 17(4), 542–551.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430213507322>
- Osborne, D., & Sibley, C. G. (2015). Within the limits of civic training: Education moderates the relationship between openness and political attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 36(3), 295–313.
- Ozdemir, F. (2016). The Predictive Power of Religious Orientation Types on Ambivalent Sexism. *Nesne Psikoloji Dergisi*, 4(7), 89–107. <https://doi.org/10.7816/nesne-04-07-05>
- Ozmen, C. B., Brelsford, G. M., & Danieau, C. R. (2018). Political Affiliation, Spirituality, and Religiosity: Links to Emerging Adults' Life Satisfaction and Optimism. *Journal of Religion and Health*, 57(2), 622–635. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10943-017-0477-y>
- Paloutzian, R. F., & Park, C. L. (Eds.). (2005). *Handbook of the psychology of religion and spirituality*. Guilford Press.
- Paloutzian, R. F., Richardson, J. T., & Rambo, L. R. (1999). Religious Conversion and Personality Change. *Journal of Personality*, 67(6), 1047–1079.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00082>
- Patterson, J. (1994). Maori Environmental Virtues. *Environmental Ethics*, 16 (4), 397-409.
- Pargament, K. I. (1999). The Psychology of Religion and Spirituality? Yes and No. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 9(1), 3–16.
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327582ijpr0901_2

Parker, M. T., & Janoff-Bulman, R. (2013). Lessons from Morality-Based Social Identity:

The Power of Outgroup “Hate,” Not Just Ingroup “Love.” *Social Justice Research*, 26(1), 81–96. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-012-0175-6>

Pauha, T., Renvik, T. A., Eskelinen, V., Jetten, J., van der Noll, J., Kunst, J. R., Rohmann, A.,

& Jasinskaja-Lahti, I. (2020). The Attitudes of Deconverted and Lifelong Atheists

Towards Religious Groups: The Role of Religious and Spiritual Identity. *The*

International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 30(4), 246–264.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2020.1774206>

Paulhus, D. L., & Van Selst, M. (1990). The spheres of control scale: 10 yr of research.

Personality and Individual Differences, 11(10), 1029–1036.

[https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869\(90\)90130-J](https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(90)90130-J)

Peifer, J. L., Khalsa, S., & Howard Ecklund, E. (2016). Political conservatism, religion, and

environmental consumption in the United States. *Environmental Politics*, 25(4), 661–

689. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2016.1159604>

Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Seli, P., Koehler, D. J., & Fugelsang, J. A. (2012). Analytic

cognitive style predicts religious and paranormal belief. *Cognition*, 123(3), 335–346.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2012.03.003>

Perez, S., & Vallières, F. (2019). How do religious people become atheists? Applying a

Grounded Theory approach to propose a model of deconversion. *Secularism and*

Nonreligion, 8. <https://doi.org/10.5334/snr.108>

Petersen, L. R., & Mauss, A. L. (1976). Religion and the “Right to Life”: Correlates of

Opposition to Abortion. *Sociological Analysis*, 37(3), 243.

<https://doi.org/10.2307/3710566>

Piedmont, R. L. (1999). Does Spirituality Represent the Sixth Factor of Personality? Spiritual Transcendence and the Five-Factor Model. *Journal of Personality*, 67(6), 985–1013.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00080>

Piotrowski, J. P., & Żemojtel-Piotrowska, M. (2020). Relationship between numinous constructs and values. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, No Pagination Specified-No Pagination Specified. <https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000306>

Postmes, T., Haslam, S. A., & Jans, L. (2013). A single-item measure of social identification: Reliability, validity, and utility. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 52(4), 597–617.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12006>

Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance orientation: A personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 67(4), 741–763. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741>

Prendergast, W. B., & Prendergast, M. E. (1999). *The Catholic voter in American politics: The passing of the Democratic monolith*. Georgetown University Press.

Preston, J. L., & Ritter, R. S. (2013). Different effects of religion and God on prosociality with the ingroup and outgroup. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 39(11), 1471–1483.

Preston, J. L., Ritter, R. S., & Hernandez, J. I. (2010). Principles of Religious Prosociality: A Review and Reformulation. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 4(8), 574–590. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00286.x>

Putnam, R. D., & Campbell, D. E. (2010). *American grace: How religion divides and unites us*. Simon & Schuster.

- Rangiwai, B. W. (2021). Māori theology and syncretism. *AlterNative: An International Journal of Indigenous Peoples*, 17(3), 425–432.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/117718012111038247>
- Roberts, M. 2012. "Revisiting 'The Natural World of the Māori'." In D. Keenan (Ed.), *Huia histories of Māori: Ngā Tāhuhu Kōrero*. Huia Publishers.
- Roberts, M., Norman, W., Minhinnick, N., Wihongi, D., & Kirkwood, C. (1995). Kaitiakitanga: Maori perspectives on conservation. *Pacific Conservation Biology*, 2 (1), 7. <https://doi.org/10.1071/PC950007>
- Robertson, A. (2006). *In Search of a Theoretical Explanation for the Relationship between Religiosity and Prejudice among Self-identified Christians*. Victoria University of Wellington.
- Robnett, R. D., Anderson, K. J., & Hunter, L. E. (2012). Predicting Feminist Identity: Associations Between Gender-Traditional Attitudes, Feminist Stereotyping, and Ethnicity. *Sex Roles*, 67(3–4), 143–157. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-012-0170-2>
- Sagioglou, C., & Forstmann, M. (2013). Activating Christian religious concepts increases intolerance of ambiguity and judgment certainty. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 49(5), 933–939. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2013.05.003>
- Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (1995). Value priorities and readiness for out-group social contact. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69(3), 437–448.
<https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.69.3.437>
- Saribay, S. A., & Yilmaz, O. (2017). Analytic cognitive style and cognitive ability differentially predict religiosity and social conservatism. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 114, 24–29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.03.056>

- Saroglou, V. (2002). Beyond dogmatism: The need for closure as related to religion. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, 5(2), 183–194. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13674670210144130>
- Saroglou, V. (2010). Religiousness as a Cultural Adaptation of Basic Traits: A Five-Factor Model Perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14(1), 108–125. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309352322>
- Saroglou, V. (2015). Personality and Religion. In *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (pp. 801–808). Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.25080-0>
- Saroglou, V., Corneille, O., & Van Cappellen, P. (2009). “Speak, Lord, Your Servant Is Listening”: Religious Priming Activates Submissive Thoughts and Behaviors. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 19(3), 143–154. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10508610902880063>
- Saroglou, V., Delpierre, V., & Dernelle, R. (2004). Values and religiosity: A meta-analysis of studies using Schwartz’s model. *Personality and Individual Differences*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.10.005>
- Saroglou, V., & Muñoz-García, A. (2008). Individual Differences in Religion and Spirituality: An Issue of Personality Traits and/or Values. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 47(1), 83–101. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2008.00393.x>
- Saucier, G., & Skrzypińska, K. (2006). Spiritual but not religious? Evidence for two independent dispositions. *Journal of Personality*, 74(5), 1257–1292. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2006.00409.x>
- Schieman, S., Bierman, A., & Upenieks, L. (2019). Beyond “Heartless Conservative” and “Bleeding Heart Liberal” Caricatures: How Religiosity Shapes the Relationship Between

Political Orientation and Empathy. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 58(2), 360–377. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jssr.12595>

Schroeder, D. A., Graziano, W. G., Tsang, J.-A., Rowatt, W. C., & Shariff, A. (2015).

Religion and Prosociality. In D. A. Schroeder & W. G. Graziano (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Prosocial Behavior*. Oxford University Press.

<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195399813.013.013>

Schultz, P. W., Gouveia, V. V., Cameron, L. D., Tankha, G., Schmuck, P., & Franěk, M.

(2005). Values and their Relationship to Environmental Concern and Conservation Behavior. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 36(4), 457–475.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022105275962>

Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical

Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries. In *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). Elsevier. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601\(08\)60281-](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6)

6

Seguino, S. (2011). Help or Hindrance? Religion's Impact on Gender Inequality in Attitudes and Outcomes. *World Development*, 39(8), 1308–1321.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2010.12.004>

Shaffer, B. A., & Hastings, B. M. (2007). Authoritarianism and religious identification:

Response to threats on religious beliefs. *Mental Health, Religion & Culture*, 10(2), 151–158. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13694670500469949>

Shen, M. J., Haggard, M. C., Strassburger, D. C., & Rowatt, W. C. (2013). Testing the love thy neighbor hypothesis: Religiosity's association with positive attitudes toward

ethnic/racial and value-violating out-groups. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 5(4), 294.

Shenhav, A., Rand, D. G., & Greene, J. D. (2012). Divine intuition: Cognitive style influences belief in God. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, 141(3), 423.

Shepherd, S., Eibach, R. P., & Kay, A. C. (2017). “One Nation Under God”: The System-Justifying Function of Symbolically Aligning God and Government: One Nation Under God. *Political Psychology*, 38(5), 703–720. <https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12353>

Sheridan, D. P. (1986). Discerning Difference: A Taxonomy of Culture, Spirituality, and Religion. *The Journal of Religion*, 66(1), 37–45. JSTOR.

Sherkat, D. E. (1991). Leaving the faith: Testing theories of religious switching using survival models. *Social Science Research*, 20(2), 171–187. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0049-089X\(91\)90015-U](https://doi.org/10.1016/0049-089X(91)90015-U)

Sherkat, D. E. (2001). Tracking the Restructuring of American Religion: Religious Affiliation and Patterns of Religious Mobility, 1973-1998. *Social Forces*, 79(4), 1459–1493. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2001.0052>

Sherkat, D. E., & Wilson, J. (1995). Preferences, constraints, and choices in religious markets: An examination of religious switching and apostasy. *Social Forces*, 73(3), 993–1026.

Sibley, C. G., & Bulbulia, J. (2015). Charity explains differences in life satisfaction between religious and secular New Zealanders. *Religion, Brain & Behavior*, 5(2), 91–100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2014.899509>

Sibley, C. G., Luyten, N., Purnomo, M., Mobberley, A., Wootton, L. W., Hammond, M. D., Sengupta, N., Perry, R., West-Newman, T., & Wilson, M. S. (2011). The Mini-IPIP6:

Validation and extension of a short measure of the Big-Six factors of personality in New Zealand. *New Zealand Journal of Psychology (Online)*, 40(3), 142.

Sibley, C. G., Osborne, D., & Duckitt, J. (2012). Personality and political orientation: Meta-analysis and test of a Threat-Constraint Model. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 46(6), 664–677. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.08.002>

Sibley, C. G., Wilson, M. S., & Duckitt, J. (2007). Antecedents of Men's Hostile and Benevolent Sexism: The Dual Roles of Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33(2), 160–172. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206294745>

Sidanius, J., Kteily, N., Sheehy-Skeffington, J., Ho, A. K., Sibley, C., & Duriez, B. (2013). You're Inferior and Not Worth Our Concern: The Interface Between Empathy and Social Dominance Orientation. *Journal of Personality*, 81(3), 313–323. <https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12008>

Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (2001). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. Cambridge University Press.

Siegmán, A. W. (1962). A Cross-Cultural Investigation of the Relationship between Religiosity, Ethnic Prejudice and Authoritarianism. *Psychological Reports*, 11(2), 419–424. <https://doi.org/10.2466/pr0.1962.11.2.419>

Silvia, P. J., Nusbaum, E. C., & Beaty, R. E. (2014). Blessed are the meek? Honesty–humility, agreeableness, and the HEXACO structure of religious beliefs, motives, and values. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 66, 19–23. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.02.043>

- Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003). Cooperation and Commune Longevity: A Test of the Costly Signaling Theory of Religion. *Cross-Cultural Research*, 37(2), 211–239.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397103037002003>
- Sparkman, D. J., Eidelman, S., & Till, D. F. (2019). Ingroup and outgroup interconnectedness predict and promote political ideology through empathy. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 22(8), 1161–1180. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430218819794>
- Stangor, C., & Leary, S. P. (2006). Intergroup beliefs: Investigations from the social side. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 38, 243–281.
- Streib, H., & Hood, R. (2011). “Spirituality” as Privatized Experience-Oriented Religion: Empirical and Conceptual Perspectives. *Implicit Religion*, 14(4), 433–453.
<https://doi.org/10.1558/imre.v14i4.433>
- Streib, H., Hood, R. W., Keller, B., Csöff, R.-M., & Silver, C. F. (2009). *Deconversion: Qualitative and quantitative results from cross-cultural research in Germany and the United States of America* (Vol. 5). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Stronge, S., Bulbulia, J., Davis, D. E., & Sibley, C. G. (2020). Religion and the Development of Character: Personality Changes Before and After Religious Conversion and Deconversion. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550620942381>
- Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology*. Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations* (pp. 33–47). Brooks/Cole.

- Taşdemir, N., & Sakallı-Uğurlu, N. (2010). The Relationships between Ambivalent Sexism and Religiosity among Turkish University Students. *Sex Roles, 62*(7), 420–426.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-009-9693-6>
- Thompson, M. S., Thomas, M. E., & Head, R. N. (2012). Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Self-Esteem: The Impact of Religiosity. *Sociological Spectrum, 32*(5), 385–405.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2012.694792>
- Tiliopoulos, N., Bikker, A. P., Coxon, A. P. M., & Hawkin, P. K. (2007). The means and ends of religiosity: A fresh look at Gordon Allport's religious orientation dimensions. *Personality and Individual Differences, 42*(8), 1609–1620.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2006.10.034>
- Tracy, D. (1981). The Analogical Imagination. *Religious Studies, 19*(4), 552–553.
- Van Assche, J., Koç, Y., & Roets, A. (2019). Religiosity or ideology? On the individual differences predictors of sexism. *Personality and Individual Differences, 139*, 191–197.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.11.016>
- Van Camp, D., Barden, J., & Sloan, L. (2016). Social and Individual Religious Orientations Exist within *Both* Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religiosity. *Archive for the Psychology of Religion, 38*(1), 22–46. <https://doi.org/10.1163/15736121-12341316>
- Van Cappellen, P., Corneille, O., Cols, S., & Saroglou, V. (2011). Beyond Mere Compliance to Authoritative Figures: Religious Priming Increases Conformity to Informational Influence Among Submissive People. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 21*(2), 97–105. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10508619.2011.556995>
- van der Toorn, J., Jost, J. T., Packer, D. J., Noorbaloochi, S., & Van Bavel, J. J. (2017). In Defense of Tradition: Religiosity, Conservatism, and Opposition to Same-Sex Marriage

in North America. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 43(10), 1455–1468.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217718523>

van Leeuwen, F., & Park, J. H. (2009). Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations, and political orientation. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 47(3), 169–173.

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.02.017>

Van Tongeren, D. R., Davis, D. E., Hook, J. N., & Johnson, K. A. (2016). Security versus growth: Existential tradeoffs of various religious perspectives. *Psychology of Religion and Spirituality*, 8(1), 77–88. <https://doi.org/10.1037/rel0000050>

Van Tongeren, D. R., DeWall, C. N., Chen, Z., Sibley, C. G., & Bulbulia, J. (2021).

Religious residue: Cross-cultural evidence that religious psychology and behavior persist following deidentification. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 120(2), 484–503. <https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000288>

van Veelen, R., Otten, S., & Hansen, N. (2011). Linking self and ingroup: Self-anchoring as distinctive cognitive route to social identification. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 41(5), 628–637. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.792>

<https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.792>

Vilaythong T., Oth., Lindner, N. M., & Nosek, B. A. (2010). “Do Unto Others”: Effects of Priming the Golden Rule on Buddhists’ and Christians’ Attitudes Toward Gay People. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 49(3), 494–506.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2010.01524.x>

Walker, R. (2004). *Ka whawhai tonu matou: Struggle without end*. Penguin.

Watson, P. J., Sawyers, P., Morris, R. J., Carpenter, M. L., Jimenez, R. S., Jonas, K. A., &

Robinson, D. L. (2003). Reanalysis within a Christian Ideological Surround:

Relationships of Intrinsic Religious Orientation with Fundamentalism and Right-Wing

Authoritarianism. *Journal of Psychology and Theology*, 31(4), 315–328.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/009164710303100402>

Weber, C. R., & Federico, C. M. (2013). Moral Foundations and Heterogeneity in Ideological Preferences. *Political Psychology*, 34(1), 107–126. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00922.x>

Weller, L., Levinbok, S., Maimon, R., & Shaham, A. (1975). Religiosity and authoritarianism. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 95(1), 11–18.

Whitt, L.A., Roberts, M., Norman, W., & Grieves, V. (2001). Belonging to Land: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and the Natural World. *Oklahoma City University Law Review*, 26, 701-743.

Williams, J. (2000). *The nature of the Māori community*. Paper Presented to PSSM Conference, New Zealand Stage Services Commission. October, 2000. Wellington.

Wilson, M. S., & Sibley, C. G. (2013). Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing Authoritarianism: Additive and Interactive Effects on Political Conservatism. *Political Psychology*, 34(2), 277–284. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00929.x>

Wink, P., Dillon, M., & Prettyman, A. (2007). Religiousness, Spiritual Seeking, and Authoritarianism: Findings from a Longitudinal Study. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 46(3), 321–335. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5906.2007.00361.x>

Wisneski, D. C., Lytle, B. L., & Skitka, L. J. (2009). Gut Reactions: Moral Conviction, Religiosity, and Trust in Authority. *Psychological Science*, 20(9), 1059–1063. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02406.x>

Wulff, D. M. (1997). *Psychology of religion: Classic and contemporary* (2nd ed.). Hamilton Printing.

- Ysseldyk, R., Matheson, K., & Anisman, H. (2010). Religiosity as Identity: Toward an Understanding of Religion From a Social Identity Perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review, 14*(1), 60–71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309349693>
- Zinnbauer, B. J., & Pargament, K. I. (2005). Religiousness and spirituality. *Handbook of the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality, 21–42.*
- Zinnbauer, B. J., Pargament, K. I., & Scott, A. B. (1999). The Emerging Meanings of Religiousness and Spirituality: Problems and Prospects. *Journal of Personality, 67*(6), 889–919. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.00077>