

The Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship Program:
Understanding Private Resettlement in New Zealand and Drawing
Lessons from the Canadian System.

By:

Ashton Mismash

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Abstract

This thesis examines the newly introduced private resettlement program in New Zealand. The Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program started in 2017 and offers an additional method for refugee resettlement for quota refugees in New Zealand. The thesis uses the most similar case study comparative methodology to identify several countries with a similar private program structure as New Zealand. The cases examined were Australia, Argentina, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The thesis conducted a lesson drawing exercise comparing New Zealand against Canada and their private resettlement programs. Canada is an exemplar case in private resettlement and offers a good comparison to glean lessons. The thesis used normative principles to examine both programs and identifies how New Zealand can develop its private program to protect the government's international commitments from privatization. The thesis explores how the private sponsorship community, those who engage in private refugee resettlement, use these principles as standards for engagement in Canada and how this might apply to New Zealand.

Using lessons in Canada, the thesis comes to several conclusions and program recommendations for the second pilot of the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship programme. The thesis urges the New Zealand government to fully embody the principle of Additionality into their program design and use nodal policy instruments to publicize the information. The thesis draws on lessons from the Blended Visa Office Referred program and the Private Sponsorship Refugee program as to why full incorporation of this principle is needed. The thesis urges New Zealand to expand the Naming principle and allow family reunification within the private resettlement structure. Lastly, the thesis makes recommendations for resettlement plans to increase sponsorship success.

Dedication

Thank you, Tim, my supervisor, for guiding me through this process even when I was resistant to the council. Your persistence made a difference.

Thank you to my family, who have shown me endless love and support, even halfway across the world. Nancy, Helen, and Bruce, thank you for supporting me when I needed it the most.

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Glossary

Additionality Principle: Additionality refers to the refugee quotas developed by governments regarding private resettlement programs. This normative, ethical framework that prescribes all refugee placements provided to a private resettlement program is supplementary to government-led programs. This normative proposition places restrictions on governments regarding program changes to both government-led and private resettlement programs.

Blended Visa Office Referred program: This is a mixed private-public resettlement program where the government and private sponsors work together to resettle refugees in Canada. Unique to this program is the model is the matchmaking refugee nomination process. This program was introduced in 2013 and is an alternative resettlement program for Canada.

Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program: This is the private refugee resettlement program for New Zealand. This program started in 2017 through a small-scale pilot program, an alternative resettlement program for New Zealand.

Echo Effect: This is the phenomenon where private resettlements are heavily concentrated in areas populated by government-led refugees. This phenomenon focuses on increases in family reunification resettlement involved in the private resettlement programs.

Government-Assisted Refugee program: This is the government-led refugee resettlement program for Canada. This was established in 1976, and this is the main program Canada uses to fulfill its international commitments.

Naming Principle: Naming refers to the ability of private sponsors to nominate or select refugees for resettlement. This normative principle prescribes that sponsors should have as few restrictions on their capability to choose the refugee. This principle restricts government action regarding changes to private programs, government procedures in refugee processing, and family reunification.

Private Sponsorship Refugee program: This is the private refugee resettlement program for Canada. This program uses the public to relocate refugees into Canada through the approval of sponsors. This program was established in 1976, and this is an alternative resettlement program.

Refugee: A refugee within the context of this thesis will refer to refugees designated by the United Nations Quota Refugee Program. These are referred to as convention or quota refugees, although this is not a comprehensive list of all those who need care in the world. There are a few different references to refugees in the thesis, and in any reference to refugees, this will most likely mean a quota or convention refugee. Furthermore, the reference of refugee can mean a singular refugee, one individual, or this can also mean the principal refugee: the primary application responsible for the whole relocation of their family. Rather than referring to the refugee family or other designation, this thesis will primarily focus on the primary application as the point of interest. This designation for refugees is typical with government documentation and academic literature worldwide.

Refugee Quota Program: This is the government-led refugee resettlement program for New Zealand. This was established in 1987, and this is the main program New Zealand uses to fulfill its international commitments.

Resettlement State: This is a classification by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding countries participating in the United Nations Quota Refugee Program. Resettlement States are third-country hosting nations that accept refugees in a permanent manner, and this qualification does not apply to countries of first asylum.

Source Country: This is a classification by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding refugees who are located in their country of origin. Some countries might not allow private sponsorship of refugees who are located in their country of origin or Source Country.

Sponsor: This is a member of the public, a group of citizens, or an organization that decides to resettle a refugee through a private resettlement program. Sponsors make legal contracts with governments to provide resettlement services to refugees while in their care, creating a sponsorship duration. This description can apply to these people or organizations while the refugee is awaiting entry into the host nation, while the refugee is receiving pastoral care, and after the sponsorship duration.

In some programs, like the Refugee Family Support Category for New Zealand, the government uses the language ‘sponsor’ to indicate the nomination of the refugee for government resettlement. This reference of sponsor usually indicates just the nomination process and not the pastoral care present in the private resettlement system.

Temporary Stay and Stay Arrangements: This is a classification by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees regarding third country resettling countries that offer refugees temporary protection. This is differentiated from resettlement because refugees are susceptible to refoulement.

United Nations Quota Refugee Program: This is the official third-country resettlement program operated by the United Nations. The United Nations identifies and nominates refugees for relocation. This creates convention or otherwise known as quota refugees, those selected by the Quota Refugee Program. This is the primary supra-state program used by countries for the identification of refugees. If this program does not identify refugees for resettlement, most countries will not consider them for their government-led resettlement program. This program works with national programs to select and process refugees.

Chapter 1: Introduction

The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016 was a recommitment to refugees. The need for countries to recommit in helping 65 million forcibly displaced peoples has never been greater (SHARE Network, 2018). The Syrian refugee crisis in 2015 and Afghanistan refugee crisis in 2021 has shown the need for willing countries to help those most in need. The New York Declaration sought to improve how nations do resettlement. This United Nations declaration created the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework. This framework called on private and public entities to reengage in refugee support to spread the obligations needed to tackle this issue (SHARE Network, 2018; Hirsch et al., 2019). With less than 1% of refugees resettling in host nations, there was a need to create or explore alternative methods for resettlement (Hyndman et al., 2021). This is underscored by the shrinking government commitments to refugee resettlements, with countries like the United States contemporarily reducing their committed resettlements by 90% (Hyndman et al., 2021). Many states claim the inability to afford the cost of supporting refugees when considering all the costs associated with resettlement while proclaiming they need to focus on their domestic population and their needs. This stands in contrast to public outcry imploring their governments to engage with the refugee crisis across the world (Lenard, 2016). Alternative methods for resettlement are needed to support refugees and acknowledge citizens of host nations who want to help them.

This declaration inspired several countries to create a private or community refugee resettlement program, a framework by which citizens can directly support refugees by paying for their migration and integration to the host country. These countries include the United Kingdom, Ireland, Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand, who all started a version of private resettlement within their country (Hirsch et al., 2019; Urban Justice Center, 2018; Lehr & Dyck, 2020). This newfound engagement in private resettlement has created a wave of academic exploration of the subject and policy examination from intergovernmental organizations. This naturally creates some curiosity about what these private programs entail and how governments integrate these private programs with the traditional, government-led resettlement services established in their country. This paper will primarily examine the New Zealand private refugee resettlement program, the Community Organization Sponsorship Refugee pilot program. This program was

introduced shortly after the New York Declaration and commenced in 2017 with sponsored refugees arriving in the country in 2018 (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019).

Canada is an exemplar in the private resettlement field (Labman & Pearlman, 2018). When New Zealand created its program, they borrowed from the Canadian private refugee program through organizations like the Global Refugee Sponsor Initiative. However, the thesis still establishes a methodology for selecting a program for comparison. Using a most similar model for the methodology, the thesis establishes the key players in the private refugee ecosystem while defining private resettlement. The thesis eliminates programs like France, Switzerland, Poland, and more through a careful criterion to uncover a program for an accurate comparison. A normative lens was applied for the final case selection using standards established by the academic community and the United Nations. Finally, the thesis examines Australia, Argentina, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Canada in close detail to determine the final case for comparison. Ireland and Canada had the most similarities compared to New Zealand while maintaining normative aspects essential for an ethical private program. Canada was selected due to its exemplary status.

The thesis closely outlines Canada's government-led and private refugee programs through a background chapter detailing each resettlement method. It establishes key components of the private program, including financial estimations for sponsors, sponsor responsibilities, sponsor organizational structures, and more. Once the Canadian program has been explored thoroughly, the thesis examines the New Zealand government-led and private refugee programs. In this chapter, the thesis establishes differentiating factors New Zealand's program has compared to the Canadian program. These program differences are noteworthy because New Zealand borrowed from the Canadian program to establish its pilot program (New Zealand & The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019). This thesis can scrutinize what New Zealand borrowed and how effective these policy inclusions were. Using evaluation documentation provided by the Ministry of Business, Innovation & Employment, and Amnesty National regarding the pilot program, the thesis can explore the effectiveness of these policies in depth.

This paper will examine how the Community Organization Sponsorship Refugee pilot was structured, including examining the weaknesses and strengths of the program. This thesis

identified the Canadian Private Sponsorship Refugee Program to compare. The Canadian private resettlement program is the longest and most successful private refugee program globally, with over 325,000 private resettlements (Hyndman et al., 2021).

Drawing on principles from the academic community, such as the principle of Additionality and Naming along with suggestions from the United Nations, this thesis will examine elements of the program and make policy suggestions for the newly created second pilot program commencing in 2021 (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.e). This thesis will examine how applying these principles creates an ethical private resettlement structure. This thesis will explore definitions established by scholars regarding the Naming and Additionality principles, explaining their ability to influence the direction of private resettlement programs. The thesis will outline how sponsorship engagement with private systems is intrinsically linked to private resettlement programs adhering to these principles. The thesis will explore how the Additionally and Naming principles were created and utilized with the Canadian private refugee system. These principles can have program defining success, and the thesis will explore this in detail in the discussion chapter. This chapter will explore how the expansion of these principles can maintain sponsor engagement with private systems and create long-term program success.

The thesis will outline how government-led programs and private resettlement pathways are intrinsically linked through Naming and Additionality. The thesis will draw connections on how the Canadian government's Government Assisted Refugee and Blended Visa Office Referred program influences sponsorship engagement for the Private Sponsorship Resettlement program. Furthermore, the thesis will broaden this connection to New Zealand to examine how the Refugee Quota Program regional allocations could potentially affect private sponsors in future initiatives. The inspection of the interaction will continue into the Refugee Family Support Category and how the family reunification in the government-led system affects the Naming principle for private sponsors. The thesis will draw lessons from the Blended Visa Office Referred program to explore how the New Zealand system can avoid sponsor enthusiasm and engagement pitfalls.

What elements New Zealand chooses during the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship pilot program will most likely roll into the permanent program if determined successful by the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment. This gives an opportunity to examine the

New Zealand pilot program elements and make policy recommendations for the secondary pilot program. The COVID-19 pandemic has created another opportunity to examine the private resettlement program.

The COVID-19 lockdown enforced by the Labour government stopped the flow of refugees into New Zealand when the government enacted a border closure on March 19th, 2020 (RNZ, 2020). During the border closure time, the National Refugee Quota increased from 1000 to 1500 refugees per year. The Refugee Quota Programme operates under a three-year cycle, with a new cycle starting in 2020 with the refugee quota increase. Unfortunately, the border closure and the three-year cycle for the Refugee Quota Programme collided with each other, and the increase of refugees was canceled for the current cycle. For the remainder of 2020, New Zealand stopped receiving refugees. With the strategy to eliminate COVID from New Zealand, for the majority of the year, there has been a renewed focus in 2021 to keep the border closed until enough New Zealand citizens are vaccinated to stop the spread of the virus. The Labour government predicts the elimination strategy will stay in place, to some extent, with the border closed until early 2022 (Malpass & Cooke, 2021). The number of refugees scheduled to enter the country is a fraction of the proposed intake, with 750-1000 refugees planned to resettle in 2021 (Ministry of Business, Innovation, & Employment, 2021).

With all the restrictions to the border and subsequent refugee intake, policymakers can examine previous policy positions and adjust while refugee intake is low. The COVID-19 pandemic paired with the design window of the new pilot program allows policymakers a rare opportunity, an extended deliberation period where transformative policy change can occur. With this opportunity and the window it creates, policymakers can consider radical policy options to change program direction. This gives scholars in the private resettlement field an opportunity to offer policy recommendations for the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program. Drawing lessons from the exemplar program located in Canada, the thesis will provide policy recommendations for this program.

Drawing lessons from the Canadian system, the thesis can explore best practices from the most successful private refugee program. Using these lessons, the thesis can make recommendations, including expanding offshore refugee communication, providing clear details for what is financial required for sponsorship, the explicit inclusion of Additionality, and increasing

nomination capacity for sponsors. The thesis goes into depth regarding each recommendation and suggestion for implementation into the second pilot.

The private system in Canada has a robust academic community that can guide how a private resettlement program can operate to its fullest; using the knowledge from that community, academics can learn what constitutes an ethical program and how domestic actors can emulate that in New Zealand. The private system in New Zealand is infantile, and subsequently, there is very little academic research on this program. There is a crucial gap in the academic literature, and this thesis will outline how the private system will and should influence the government-led system, potentially impacting how the program operates. The public good provided by this thesis is an attempt to provide a foundation of knowledge on the private system and to guide New Zealand policymakers towards long-term program success.

Chapter 2: Methodology

Introduction

The chapter will detail the methodology for selecting Canada as the country for comparison. This thesis used a most similar methodology method to identify a program for lesson drawing. The goal—to generalize learnings from one comparative private program for New Zealand's Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program.

The overall population for comparison is the number of countries that have signed United Nations agreements concerning the recognition of refugees. The number of cases is relatively small, resulting in our methodology operating as a small-N study. To find a good case for comparison, the selection process used in this thesis was the most similar method. Scholars use the most similar method in instances when they are looking for generalizations. To correctly identify a most similar program, each program should have similar background conditions with a variation in the independent variable. For most similar methods utilizing the matching technique, there is a two-step process for case selection. The first is the identification of the independent variables treated as the matching variables, creating a broad selection of cases. The second step is the selection of the fitted values to create a list of cases to compare using conditions chosen by the researcher (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).

This thesis used a matching technique, which requires background, identifiable variables to identify a case similar to New Zealand. The dependent variables in question for this research are the implementation of private refugee resettlement programs and their policy impacts. The background variables in question are the international partners used in conjunction with host governments, qualifications of a Resettlement State, the presence of an operational private resettlement program, and the adoption of ethical resettlement program norms. This thesis used several criteria to find an exact match.

The thesis will start with all countries participating in the United Nations Quota Refugee Program for our representative population. This chapter will delineate the difference in programs operating as countries of first asylum and third country resettlers. The chapter will then highlight

all the countries operating as Resettlement States with recurring programs. The chapter will reduce the case list to a shortlist of countries with a private refugee program. This study created a list of normative qualifications to create the selection criteria for the case. The thesis analyzes the cases, identifying cases that do not meet the criteria. Lastly, the thesis identify why Canada is the best program to compare against the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship pilot program.

Resettlement is a complicated process often involving actors from the intergovernmental or supra-state level down to the local level. By having a robust number of criteria as part of the methodology, the thesis can eliminate programs with continuous variables. These variables take the form of substantive policy inclusions or exclusions that would impact the comparison. One example of a continuous variable explored is the participation in the European Union Relocation Program. New Zealand does not participate in this supra-state scheme, and a case utilizing this resettlement system will have drastically different policies and procedures for processing refugees.

Broad Selection

To identify a program to compare against the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program, the thesis can first narrow down the applicable programs by countries who have recognized the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. These documents lay the foundation for rights for refugees, along with who qualifies as a refugee, and create responsibilities for states regarding refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1966). One hundred forty-nine countries have acknowledged one or both documents and creating the baseline for our comparison (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1967; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951). These international treaties create the baseline of comparison countries to start our analysis, as these countries will recognize asylum seekers and refugees.

The thesis can narrow our country selection by identifying the countries that participate in United Nations Quota Refugees Program. These countries are directly working with refugees or asylum seekers by operating as a country of first asylum or a third country sponsor.

Countries operating as third country sponsors, countries the thesis are principally targeting, are different from countries participating in this program as countries of first asylum or where asylum seekers are first given their designation as refugees. These countries of first asylum are usually in areas of upheaval where there is intercountry or intercountry conflict. One good example is the public attention is the war in Syria. Countries surrounding Syria, such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Turkey, have received immense asylum seekers due to the conflict. Countries of first asylum usually receive the most refugees globally, with Lebanon receiving 19.5% and Jordan receiving 10.5% of the world's refugees (Christophersen, 2021). Without context, it would seem natural to analyze these countries with our comparison because they most likely have some policy complexity with resettling refugees due to their high number of asylum seeker cases. However, some critical aspects of these countries' involvement in the Refugee Quota Program disqualify them for the analysis.

Most of the countries that primarily operate as countries of first asylum interact and administer to asylum seekers. These countries spend considerable time managing their asylum-seeker population compared to their registered refugees. In Lebanon, with its 1.7 million asylum-seeker population, the government, alongside intergovernmental actors, have put a focus on civil documentation through a massive push to register asylum seekers to reduce statelessness and provide state benefits (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.c.; Anera, n.d.).

New Zealand has a low asylum-seeker population and subsequently does not have the same refugee focus as countries of first asylum. Approximately 300 asylum seekers arrive in New Zealand each year, with one-third of those cases translating into convention refugees or approved asylum cases (Bloom & Udaheureka, 2014; Bloom et al., 2013). The thesis can compare the asylum seeker cases with the quota refugees cases where New Zealand generally accepts 1500 refugees per year. Most refugees processed or handled by New Zealand are through the Refugee Quota program, creating a schism on the policy focus for New Zealand and Lebanon.

In simplified terms, countries of first asylum usually operate as the supply for third country sponsors, with their recognized refugees traveling to sponsoring countries. Most of the refugees

involved in the New Zealand Pilot program came from Jordan and Lebanon (Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). The duration of stay, and subsequently the policies determining how to navigate refugee settlement, is different from New Zealand. Most refugees settled in New Zealand or the other Resettlement States are usually guaranteed permanent status and protection from refoulement in some way. Convention refugees in these countries usually do not relocate to other countries for resettlement.

Most of the refugees in countries of first asylum are usually under temporary status, generally through a visa program, where they reapply for residency. The New Zealand program, and other third-country sponsors, offer permanent residency or citizenship for their refugees. For this reason, although countries of first asylum do participate in the United Nations Quota Refugee Program, this would immediately disqualify countries like Lebanon from the comparison.

Resettlement States and Private Programs

Once the thesis eliminates countries and programs operating primarily as countries of first asylum, the thesis can now focus on third-country resettlement programs. These host countries usually have a declared, renewing annual resettlement program; in a minority of countries, these programs are on an ad-hoc basis, where they accept refugees flagged by the United Nations (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). Thirty-six countries are operating in this supra-state program hosting refugees designated by the United Nations (Office of the Minister of Immigration, n.d.). Countries participating as Resettlement States and the number of refugees they help range from the United States who processed 29,026 Convention Refugees, to Latvia, which processed 4 in 2018 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2021).

For our purposes, the thesis is primarily interested in recurring programs, as this will be similar to the New Zealand program. This criterion would disqualify programs like France who have private programs but operate them on an informal case-by-case basis (SHARE Network, 2018). Additionally, this thesis is interested in ongoing programs where the government is actively working on improving its programs, and this should produce the best programs for comparison as these governments are actively working on them. This criterion would eliminate programs like

Portugal, Poland, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, and Switzerland as they are no longer supported or ongoing (Bertram et al., 2020).

There are still some delineations the thesis need to make to identify a correct private resettlement program. Most of these countries operate their programs through public bureaus or designated services providers, with the government providing all or most of the services for refugees (Lenard, 2016). In the United States, the State Department; Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; Office of Refugee Resettlement; Refugee Affairs Division of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service; and other bureaus handle refugee resettlement (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020). These bureaus and partners work to integrate the refugee into the country, usually through a process that can take a year or more to finish. During integration, countries offer vast arrays of programs to provide services to refugees to help them adjust (Lenard, 2016). These services include financial aid through unemployment benefits, monthly income support, medical assistance, mental health assistance, and more (Government of Canada, 2012; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014; British Red Cross, n.d.). Providing these services through public bureaus is the standard delivery method in most countries for resettlement services for refugees. In some countries, governments partner with non-governmental organizations to provide these services like the Red Cross. When governments rely on third-party providers, they divvy services between the government and the third party; for example, the government might pay for all associated costs for housing while the third party arranges the specific housing accommodation (British Red Cross, n.d.; New Zealand Red Cross, n.d.; Department of Justice and Equity, n.d.). Private resettlement operates differently compared to this model.

The first major distinctive factor of private refugee resettlement is the allocation of sponsorship slots for resettlement. Governments set aside a certain amount of additional refugee slots for these programs (Hyndman et al., 2021). Allowing sponsorship selection of the refugee is different from the government allowing citizens to participate in refugee services within the country. There are a few different organizational structures governments allow using the private sponsor method. In some countries, governments only allow pre-vetted organizations or non-governmental organizations to sponsor refugees. Otherwise, governments will allow a mixture of private citizens and organizations to engage in the private sponsorship system (Bertram et al.,

2020). If the government selects the refugee and allows private citizens to support them, this is usually not considered private resettlement (Hirsch et al., 2019). Private citizens are allowed to select refugees in the model principally because they pay for the majority of the resettlement costs.

Sponsors, depending on the program and country, pay roughly NZD 20,000 to resettle one refugee. This cost escalates when sponsors include more refugees, most programs have cost estimates for seven individuals (Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021; Hirsch et al., 2019; Department of Justice and Equity, n.d.; Home Office, 2016). With some programs, the sponsorship cost escalates very quickly, where the total amount required funds roughly total NZD 100,000 for a large family (Hirsch et al., 2019). With most private programs, the government provides cost estimates for sponsors, so they have upfront knowledge of financial requirements for the program. These financial declarations are another unique element of the private system, the financial requirement to engage in the program. Most private programs require sponsors to have the funds upfront or proof of funds in a pay-to-play style system. These cost requirements can include costs for applications. Application costs are present in the Australian program, but most programs only require enough funds for the duration of the refugee sponsorship (Hirsch et al., 2019). This financial requirement is significantly different from government programs, notably because government-run resettlement programs will cover all associated costs of integrating refugees into society.

In this model, private citizens have control of some aspects of the migration process from start to finish, including some control over the refugee selection. Once the refugee is within the country, after the sponsors have selected them, sponsors have considerable control over the services provided to the refugee. These services will range from temporary and permanent housing allocation for the refugee to emotional support for the duration of their sponsorship. Sponsors in most programs will be the primary provider of support for the refugees (Lenard, 2016). Sponsors in most programs connect refugees to most services in the country; this would include registering refugees with medical care and coordinating doctor visits (Lenard, 2019). Sponsors will work with refugees to improve their English, allocating housing and employment (Lenard, 2016; New Zealand and Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019; Department of Justice and Equity, n.d.). Often sponsors locate services within their local community. Sponsors, in this way,

create a network of services for refugees, usually planned and guaranteed with the government, where they perform all the needed resettlement needs. In some countries like Canada, some organizations have a constant, renewing, and yearly number of refugees they resettle. These organizations create a level of administrative sophistication where they operate on the same level as a governmental public partner, where they become de-facto resettlement partners at times resettling hundreds of refugees each year (CBC, 2012; Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019b).

Case Study Qualifications

To select the final country for our comparison, the thesis can create a series of criteria for the private refugee programs. The thesis can base these criteria on a few different metrics. First, the thesis can identify United Nations qualifiers for appropriate refugee resettlement, and if a country does not meet those parameters, the thesis can disqualify them. Second, the thesis can identify program properties flagged by the academic community as necessary to an ethical program. These are parameters seen as fundamental elements for a program to uphold their obligations to the international treaties they have signed.

One of the core aspects of the program is how it considers resettlement, its duration, or permanence. The United Nations considers resettlement as a permanent residency solution. Permanent resettlement protects refugees from refoulement, the forcible return of refugees to an area of persecution (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). The United Nations classifies programs offering temporary protection for refugees as Temporary Protection and Stay Arrangements (TPSAs) and not resettlement. These programs offer immediate protection on entry from refoulement but risk refoulement long-term. Furthermore, the United Nations has stated these should not supersede pre-existing programs or obligations by 1951 Refugee Convention partners (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014). Any program that does not guarantee refugees protection from refoulement will disqualify the program from comparison.

Another core aspect of refugee resettlement is the ability for refugees to naturalize. Refugee naturalization does not necessarily mean refugees are immediately granted citizenship on entry;

although, if governments do not naturalize refugees immediately, they should receive the rights of regular citizens persecution (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). The process for naturalization should be clear and accessible for refugees. If refugees are not guaranteed the same rights as citizens or are not provided a path for naturalization, the thesis can disqualify the program for comparison.

Programs can heavily limit the type of refugees eligible for their resettlement programs, and this is generally considered criteria discrimination. These criteria limiters include age, ethnicity, religion, nationality, health status, family size, and employability (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011; Hirsch et al., 2019). These discriminatory criteria can often exclude those who need resettlement the most or those vulnerable to harm. Criteria discrimination does not affect all groups equally and can disproportionately affect women or LGBTQ peoples, as an example (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2011). Some limitations on refugees are appropriate such as failing to pass a security evaluation. Countries using overly harsh selection criteria, falling into the discriminatory category, will result in disqualification.

Within the academic community studying private resettlement, one of the core principles is the idea of Additionality. Additionality focuses on how private refugee slots originate. All private refugee slots should be in addition to the national, government-led program and should not replace slots agreed to by the government (Hirsch et al., 2019; Hyndman et al., 2016; Martani, 2021; Kumin, 2015; Lenard, 2016; Lehr & Dyck, 2020; Labman, 2016). Private programs are ethical principally because, under these arrangements, more resettlements of refugees are possible, which without these programs, these resettlements would not occur (Labman, 2016). These principles guarantee that governments will uphold the commitments they have agreed to with their supra-state partners regarding their quotas. Private refugee programs do not guarantee a steady stream of refugees and can fluctuate depending on the engagement of citizens with the program.

Furthermore, this principle removes the option for governments to slowly transition their program from a public program to a fully private program. Governments, without this principle, could fully privatize their program to save on their budget or bureaucratic overhead. If a program is found not to adhere to the principle of Additionality, the thesis can disqualify the country.

Furthermore, exploring how private resettlement programs utilize and are constrained by the Additionality principle will be one of the primary investigative elements of the thesis. New Zealand's private resettlement program uses the Additionality principle in its program. If a country does not adhere to the Additionality principle, this will not allow us to examine both private programs equally, creating an imbalanced comparison.

Private citizens of the host country are at the heart of a private refugee program. The sponsors are using sizeable investments to assist with hosting. These private sponsors should be seen as critical stakeholders in the program, as without ample private engagement, these programs would not function.

Citizens are vital to program success (Hyndman et al., 2016). As a principle, these citizens should have as much engagement or control in the program as possible. One area of the resettlement process this should highlight the most is the nomination of the refugee. The ability for sponsors to choose a refugee is the 'Naming' principle, where private sponsors can indicate, through official United Nations systems, which refugee they would like to sponsor (Martani, 2021; Kumin, 2016; Lenard, 2016; Hyndman et al., 2016; Urban Justice Center, 2018; Lehr & Dyck, 2020). These individuals would still have to go through the traditional screening or evaluative processes so that the government can reject these refugees. The Naming principle is another major evaluative element of the thesis, as the thesis will explore both programs and how they incorporate this principle into their program design. The New Zealand government allowed its private sponsors to nominate their selected refugees. The Naming principle is built around the agency of sponsor choice. If the government egregiously interferes or reduces the ability of sponsors to select refugees, the thesis could view this program as not allowing Naming. If a government does not allow the selection of a refugee or drastically restricts selection, this can create an uneven comparison. For those reasons, any program that structurally or systematically restricts refugee choice will be disqualified

Another acceptable model for sponsorship nomination is a matchmaking model, where sponsors select a refugee already flagged by the host government for resettlement. This matchmaking process is similar to the direct selection of refugees flagged by the United Nations in the sponsor nomination model; the differentiating factor is that the host nation has already accepted these refugees. Instead of naming a refugee to begin the process, the sponsor selects a refugee already

approved by the government and chooses to support them (Urban Justice Center, 2018; SHARE Network, 2018). The matchmaking process is an adequate model, as private citizens still have a sizeable control over whom they support. More importantly, governments can violate this principle if the government supersedes the ability of sponsors to identify refugees in a meaningful way. This violation can occur if the government assigns a refugee to a private sponsoring group or drastically reduces sponsors' ability to select refugees. If this takes place, the thesis can rule out the program from our comparison.

The thesis can locate the last significant ethical or moral aspect within the program's overall strategy. Is the program principally arranged to expand resettlements or to generate revenue for the state? Programs do not want to be seen as a bad faith arrangement, abusing the public's trust. The program is centered around civic engagement and could run into transparency concerns if perceived as a revenue-generating scheme (Lenard, 2016). If the government establishes the program to relieve pressure on the budget, the thesis could interpret this as a revenue-generating scheme. A Significant shift of program cost and execution reduces the committed responsibility of the state and transfers it to private citizens. Second, the thesis can identify this if the program has recorded revenue. If a program is not designed or executed on the idea of expanding refugee resettlement, the thesis can disqualify it from our comparison.

The thesis can narrow our examination to ethical programs, as they uphold normative principles and comparable programs for the New Zealand private resettlement program. There are very few active, private resettlement programs in the world that fit the criteria outlined above. The following cases represent the population of cases that all fit within a decent fit of our criteria.

Cases

The thesis will examine the following cases: Argentina, Australia, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and Canada. These countries have a private resettlement program, and they are currently operating or maintaining these programs. The global pandemic has created some complexity regarding what qualifies as an operating program due to border closures and the reduction of refugee resettlement worldwide. All cases below have maintained their program in the last two years to some extent and are still pursuing private refugee resettlement. In each case, the thesis

outlines a brief history of the program and will note any breaches of the criteria listed above. Finally, the thesis will select a case for comparison and cover why it was chosen.

Australia

The first program in Australia surrounding private involvement in the refugee resettlement process was the Community Refugee Settlement Scheme. This program was created in 1979 and ran until 1997, integrating over 30,000 refugees during that time. Notably, this program was not a sponsorship program; instead, it allowed the Australian people to get involved in the process after the government relocated them to Australia (Hirsch et al., 2019). This is why the most recent program, the Community Support Program created in 2017 and its pilot, and the Community Proposal Pilot created in 2013, are seen as the country's entry into the private refugee program (Hirsch et al., 2019; Kumin, 2015). The thesis will use the Community Support Program, the current private refugee program operating in Australia, for our comparison.

The Community Support Program allows 1,000 refugees per year to resettle in Australia through private means, expanded from the pilot of 500 (Hirsch et al., 2019). Australia, however, did not expand its total amount of refugee slots when they added the private program. In 2013, roughly around the same time as Community Proposal Pilot, Australia increased the refugee slots for its Refugee and Humanitarian Program. This government-led resettlement program increased its slots from 13,750 to 18,750 for the 2018-2019 cycle, roughly the same time the Community Support Program was established (Hirsch et al., 2019). The Australian government did not distinguish separate slots for the private refugee program, and the program currently operates within the boundaries of the committed Australian refugee slots (Hirsch et al., 2019; Kumin, 2015). Not providing these private slots in addition to the government program violates the principle of Additionality, removing Australia from our comparison.

Although Australia will not qualify for our analysis, it is meaningful to note that violating the idea of Additionality is not the only reason this thesis did not consider its program. Another contributing factor is the presence of discriminatory criteria, where 'job or work ready' candidates are required (Hirsch et al., 2019). Furthermore, the Australian government created the Community Support Program to reduce the overall budgetary expenditure, and the program will raise a sizeable amount of funds for the government (Hirsch et al., 2019; Kumin, 2015). With this in consideration, it is apparent that Australia violates several elements of the criteria outlined, and the thesis should not include them in the comparison.

Argentina

In 2014 the Argentinian government committed to helping with the Syrian and Palestinian refugee crisis. Through the National Directorate for Migration, inter-bureau coordination established the Syrian Resettlement Program. Under this program, the Special Humanitarian Visa Program for Foreigners Affected by the Syrian Conflict, or Programa Siria, was established (Bond & Kwadrans, 2019). In 2015 the country allowed 100 refugees to resettle in the country, and the program set out a goal of relocating 3,000 refugees (Kumin, 2015; Bernas, 2017). Initially, this program required a familial connection to the refugee, although the rule was relaxed to allow refugees from Syria or Palestine. The familial requirement was removed in the Second Syria Program Provision. This provision allowed sponsors to partner with an organization to guarantee refugee services, allowing the Naming principle to expand (Bond & Kwadrans, 2019). Sponsors and refugees work with a local non-governmental organization to establish settlement services (Bernas, 2017).

This program operates like a traditional private resettlement service where the sponsor nominates a Syrian Refugee and supports the refugee once they are in the country. Argentina does not have a government-assisted or government-operated refugee resettlement program; Programa Siria is the primary avenue for convention refugee resettlement (Urban Justice Center, 2018). This is a major organizational difference compared to New Zealand, which has a government-led and private resettlement program. When considering the program in New Zealand, the thesis will measure the private program against the government-led program. Without a government program in Argentina, this will create an uneven comparison, potentially affecting the viability of the comparison. Although this is not part of the explicit criteria, excluding a government-led program does interfere with our most similar method. The lack of a government-led program is not the only reason for not including Argentina in the comparison.

One key element of Programa Siria is the type of visa it offers refugees. The program provides refugees with a temporary two-year visa upon entry (Urban Justice Center, 2018; Kumin, 2015; Bond & Kwadrans, 2019). Refugees can apply for a one-year extension and potentially permanent status after this initial two-year temporary visa (Kumin, 2015). Refugees within Argentina are susceptible to refoulement due to the temporary status of their visa and not initially

given permanent status. The temporary status of refugees violates our criteria for the comparison, as the thesis want to compare the New Zealand pilot program against a resettlement program, not a Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangement.

Ireland

The Irish government established the Community Sponsorship Ireland program in 2018 under the Irish Refugee Protection Programme. The private resettlement program initially started as a pilot where private citizens relocated 17 refugees in 2018, with the pilot program concluding in the same year (Pollack, 2019). After the pilot program, when the government created the official program, 30 individuals have resettled in the country (Irish Refugee Protection Programme, 2020). The Irish government designed the program to give an alternative approach to resettlement and allow Irish citizens to get involved in the resettlement process (Department of Justice and Equality, n.d.) The Community Sponsorship Ireland program has been allocated refugee slots in addition to its government-led resettlement program. Sponsors can nominate refugees in the United Nations refugee systems or through the European Union Relocation Programme, where sponsors choose refugees from Greece through intercountry cooperation. The Irish government allocated approximately 255 refugees slots to the European Union Relocation Programme from the total 1,200 Irish commitment (Department of Justice and Equality, n.d.).

Furthermore, the Irish program has several special allocations or missions. These projects include the Mediterranean Search & Rescue Mission, Calais Special Project, and Unaccompanied minors Greece. These special programs fit into the greater 4,000 resettlement goal for the Irish Refugee Protection Programme (Irish Refugee Protection Programme, 2020).

Ireland's private refugee program is an excellent comparative program when measured against the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program. Both programs were created around the same time and had roughly the same amount of refugees slots. Both countries were modeled after the Canadian private refugee program and had similarities in founding principles. Studies comparing the two countries and their respective pilot programs could show how effective new, alternative resettlement paths develop within immigration bureaus. However, the European Union's involvement will result in greater program complexity than New Zealand's program.

Irish officials will have to coordinate and manage commitments with both Suprastate entities when dealing with offshore refugee processing. This complexity is not present in the New Zealand process, where the only referring agency is the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. When considering what program to compare and identifying the best fit, this extra program complexity removed Ireland from consideration.

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom's private refugee resettlement program started in 2016 with a pilot program with nine sponsoring organizations (Home Office, 2016a). The Community Sponsorship Scheme program has resettled roughly 500 refugees into the United Kingdom since its permanent installment as part of the overall refugee resettlement strategy, the United Kingdom Resettlement Scheme, operated by the Home Office (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.d). Both programs operate under an umbrella mission of resettling 20,000 Syrian refugees by 2020. The Syrian Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme with its sister program, The Vulnerable Children's Resettlement Scheme, is the overall private refugee resettlement program operated by the Home Office and the United Nations in the United Kingdom (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.d; Home Office, 2016). COVID-19 disrupted this program, but it still attained its goal of 20,000 resettlements by 2020. The Vulnerable Persons Resettlement Scheme was finalized in 2021, with the remaining 1,838 refugees processing through the programs, with the Vulnerable Children's Resettlement Scheme still operating (UK Visas and Immigration, 2021). In 2019 the United Kingdom Government announced support for the Community Sponsorship Scheme with a new five-year commitment. Due to the pressure on immigration from COVID-19, private sponsorship was suspended and has not resumed. There is no clear indication from the British government when private resettlement will resume (Nicholls, 2021).

The United Kingdom did not allocate separate refugee slots for the private pilot program, instead of having private resettlement count towards resettling 20,000 Syrian refugees (Urban Justice Center, 2018). This violates the Additionality principle and removes the United Kingdom from our comparison. However, this is not the only eliminating factor for the United Kingdom.

One key area of concern for the community sponsorship program and the United Kingdom resettlement program is the temporary status of refugees on entry. The British government provides Refugees with a five-year visa when they enter the country; after these five years, refugees can apply for a permanent visa (Home Office, 2016; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.d). The temporary nature of resettlement and threat of refoulement would remove the United Kingdom from our comparison as this would be considered a Temporary Protection or Stay Arrangement. Along with the ambiguity on their permanent status, the visa system has a complicated, multi-tiered approach, creating a problematic scenario for refugees to navigate. The United Nations have flagged this as an area of improvement, and they have recommended permanent status for refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, n.d.d).

Canada

The Canadian private refugee program started in 1979 in response to the refugee crisis started in Vietnam. The private resettlement programs in Canada have resettled over 325,000 refugees since the program's inception (Hyndman et al., 2021). The 1976 Immigration Act formalized the provisions for Canada to start the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Program, creating the private resettlement program (Labman, 2016; Lenard, 2016). This act is pivotal to the private resettlement movement, as it created the framework for what academics now understand as the Additionality principle. When the Canadian government created the private refugee system, it allocated slots in addition to the government-led resettlement program, the Government Assisted Refugee program. The Additionally principle has persisted through the program's history, with any private resettlement allocations are added to the Canadian government-led resettlement program (Lenard, 2016). This is not without difficulty, as aberrations on this principle have occurred (Labman, 2016;).

The public zeitgeist was focused on the worsening 'boat people' crisis, where the government used the private resettlement program to focus public attention on the issue. In 1979 alone, the Canadian people privately resettled 34,000 refugees (Labman, 2016). Notably, before this crisis, the program had less than 100 refugees resettled through this program, and the presence of the crisis catapulted the program to its success. This crisis created the precedent for the Naming

principle; normal Canadians sponsored thousands of people who had no real connection or attachment (Labman, 2016). This Naming principle persisted throughout the program's history, all nationalities are eligible for resettlement within Canada, and no familial connection is required (Lenard, 2016). All resettlement in Canada is permanent; no program within Canada allocates temporary protection for convention refugees. Furthermore, any citizen in Canada is eligible to participate in the private resettlement program. (Lenard, 2016). For most of our criteria, the Canadian program has created the standard by which other programs measure themselves.

For these reasons, the thesis will select the Canadian case for comparison. The Canadian case qualifies for all the selection criteria, and in many instances, created the precedent for these criteria. Within the private resettlement space, Canada is considered an exemplar program (Lenard, 2016). In addition to being an exemplar program, the New Zealand private resettlement program was modeled after the Canadian system. Working with the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, a program designed to export Canada's model, New Zealand policymakers structured their program to have aspects of the Canadian system (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019; Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.). Using the Canadian case, the thesis can explore what New Zealand borrowed from the Canadian system and analyze Canada to determine where lessons can be learned.

Conclusion

There were several cases examined as part of this methodology. Several of the cases did not adhere to the principle of Additionality. This creates an ethical conflict. Are these states privatizing their resettlement contributions? This was seriously questioned regarding Australia's private resettlement system (Hirsch et al., 2019). The United Kingdom did not adhere to the Additionality principle as well. The second reason, as described, New Zealand adheres to this principle, which would create an uneven comparison. Holding New Zealand to a higher standard than the compared case and examining program outcomes would be difficult to execute. Some programs did not offer quota or convention refugees a permanent status, allowing the possibility of refoulement for the refugee. The presence of temporary protection for convention refugees in

a country's private program does not allow us to compare them against New Zealand adequately. New Zealand provides permanent status to all quota refugees, so comparing temporary resettlement programs in detail regarding resettlement services would not have been appropriate. Temporary protection was present in Argentina, and the United Kingdom, allowing us to disqualify them from the selection. Argentina does not have a government-led resettlement program with the United Nations, so there was an element of this program the thesis would not have compared with New Zealand. Also, the absence of a government-led resettlement system will naturally lead to different policy outcomes, as the government-led and private resettlement programs have noticeable interactions in countries where both are present.

Ireland provided a good fit, considering all the criteria the thesis outlined. However, when trying to narrow the selection down to one case, the best fit, they were removed due to participation in European Union resettlement programs. New Zealand does not participate in these programs, so the thesis would not be able to compare some elements of the Irish case. The final country examined, Canada, was the best fit. Canada met all the requirements, and in many cases, set the precedent for the criteria used. There is the added benefit that New Zealand borrowed from the Canadian system; the thesis can examine an element of policy transfer.

Chapter 3: Canadian and New Zealand Refugee Resettlement Programs

Introduction

This chapter will outline New Zealand and Canadian resettlement programs. This chapter will go into detail regarding how government-led and private resettlement programs are structured in each country. The government-led systems explored in this chapter are Canada's Government Assisted Refugee program and the Refugee Quota Program for New Zealand. The private resettlement programs explored in this chapter are the Private Sponsorship Refugee program in Canada and the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program for New Zealand. This chapter will explore Canada's Blended Visa Office Referred program, the private-public matchmaking model used in Canada. New Zealand does not have a hybrid, blended resettlement system but uses some elements from this program that will be insightful. This chapter will use Additionality and Naming principles to outline how these normative principles interact with all resettlement models. The thesis will explore how the inclusion of these principles creates an ethical private system and increases sponsorship engagement with private resettlement systems.

The Canadian quota refugee system has four main, distinct paths for United Nations identified quota refugees. These programs are Government-Assisted Refugees, Visa Office-Referred, Blended Visa Office-Referred, or Private Sponsored Refugee programs. These four distinct paths for immigration significantly shape the integration path for refugees and the type of services offered to them in the country.

Canada

Canada has several programs facilitating refugee resettlement within the country. The government-led program, the Government-Assisted Refugee program, is a recurring, annual program where the Canadian federal government directly assists with refugee integration. This

chapter will cover a brief history of the program, how Canada conducts refugee allocation, and the implementation of services for these refugees.

The thesis will then explore the Private Sponsorship Refugee Program, the private resettlement program present in Canada. The chapter will cover a brief history of the program before exploring the organizational structures of private resettlement. As part of the structural exploration, the thesis will detail the different sponsorship methods available for Canadians, such as the Sponsorship Agreement Holder, the Group of Five, and the Community Sponsor. Each of these subprograms offers a different way for the private community to resettle refugees. The chapter will cover the cost of private resettlement and potential risks to program success.

Following the private resettlement chapter, the thesis will cover the hybrid sponsorship model: the Blended Visa Office Referred program. The thesis will cover how the Blended Visa Office Referred program differs from the purely private methods, and the responsibilities sponsors have in this program. Following this chapter, the thesis will briefly discuss the Visa Office Referred program.

Lastly, the thesis will cover the various initiatives present in Canada regarding refugee resettlement. These programs include the Joint Assistance Sponsorship Program and the Rainbow Refugee Assistance Partnership. These unique programs provide an insight into how Canada helps to support vulnerable communities.

Government Assisted Refugee Program

The Government-led refugee program in Canada started in the late 1940s through the International Refugee Organization program. This program resettled over 100,000 refugees from the aftermath of World War Two. This program continued to migrate people, with 37,000 refugees relocating in 1956 and 1957. Resettlement continued through admissions of 11,000 Czechoslovakian refugees in 1968 and 7,000 refugees in 1972 (Labman, 2016). The engagement of the Canadian government with asylum seekers, before such official title for these vulnerable people, was created, was on an ad hoc basis. Before the 1976 legislation, there was no program for a recurring, annual resettlement program in Canada. Canada was a key partner for drafting the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees serving on its Executive

Committee. Canada ratified these commitments in 1969. The 1976 Immigration Act created the Government Assisted Refugee Program, the same legislation that created the provision for the private program (Labman, 2016). From 1980 to 2015, the Canadian government has resettled 333,303 refugees through the Government Assisted Refugee Program (Canada et al., 2016). The Government Assisted Refugee program is still the recurring, annual government-led resettlement program for Canada. For this chapter, the thesis will detail some of the core aspects of the Government Assisted Refugee Program and how the government-led system can impact private resettlement programs.

Government Assisted Refugee Quotas

As part of the overall Canadian strategy for refugees, the Canadian government participates in the United Nations Refugee Quota program. This Canadian program, the Government-Assisted Refugee program, is the traditional state and supra-state cooperation where Canada takes primary responsibility for refugee care (Lenard, 2016). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees nominates individuals and families worldwide, distributing them to countries based on their declared quota number. Once refugees are nominated, Canada filters refugees based on their country-specific specifications for entry, and if the refugee's case is accepted, they migrate to Canada. In 2019 14,651 quota refugees immigrated through the Government-Assisted Refugee Program (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2020). From 2015 to 2020, Canada resettled 61,335 through the Government Assisted Refugee Program (Martani, 2021). These numbers represent the official, committed refugees Canada agreed to relocate as part of their United Nations commitments.

Government-led resettlement numbers and quotas are significant; the private resettlement community will measure these commitments relative to private resettlement slots. If private resettlement numbers increase while government-led numbers decrease, the private resettlement community can view this as a violation of the Additionality principle. The thesis can see this occurring in Canada, where scholars have monitored the allocations of both the government-led and private programs (Hyndman et al., 2016; Labman & Pearlman, 2018).

In 2018 the Canadian government allocated or allowed an additional 20,000 refugees to the Private Sponsorship Refugee program for the following three-year cycle. The refugee allocation for the private system increased by 15,500 slots from 2010 when it was 4,500. Simultaneously, the government increased the government-led resettlement to 10,000 spaces for the same three-year cycle. The increase of the refugee commitment to the Government Assisted Refugee program is was an increase of 2,500 refugee slots, up from 7,500 in 2010 (Hyndman et al., 2021). There are two intriguing occurrences with this data.

First, in 2010 the government-led resettlement allocation was larger than the private system. This is the most desirable scenario when the government hosts more refugees; it is hard to cite an infraction to Additionality if this occurs. However, if this relationship inverts, programs are susceptible to criticism regarding Additionality. If the government allocates more migration numbers for the private community, sponsors can generate the negative perception that the government is privatizing their responsibilities, risking low engagement from sponsors (Labman, 2016). Second, the government increased the government-led refugee allocation by 25% over eight years, while the private system allocation increased by 340%. Private sponsorship has risen by 400% in the last decade (Hyndman et al., 2021). This heavy refugee allocation transition to a private system with this short duration is considered a direct violation of the Additionality principle, where governments quickly transition refugee resettlement to private communities to fulfill commitments (Labman, 2016; Hyndman et al., 2016). Although the thesis is analyzing the program from 2010-2018, equivalent scholarly examinations of the Additionality principle have occurred in the past, like refugee allocation from 2001-2014 (Labman, 2016).

In both metrics, the Additionality principle used the Government Assisted Refugee program and its committed level of refugees. The private sponsorship community examined the government-led quota as a benchmark when deciding commitment for the private system. Any implementation of private resettlement that uses the Additionality principle, which New Zealand adheres to, will have to balance the refugee allocation for both programs. The Canadian government (2016) acknowledged this occurrence with the following quote:

"Although the principle of additionality is not part of the PSR [Private Sponsorship Refugee] program theory, private sponsors felt that the PSR program was contradicting

the principle of additionality, as in 2013, as the number of admitted PSRs was higher than the number of GARs [Government Assisted Refugees]" (p. 28).

The government can risk privatizing their international commitments without close monitoring of refugee allocation or how fast they increase refugee numbers for private programs.

Participation from sponsors in the private resettlement programs is discretionary, and if sponsors feel the government is not meeting their commitments, it could reduce overall resettlements. The thesis explores this topic in the discussion chapter, but it is important to note that the overall government-led refugee quota directly impacts private sponsor engagement.

Government Assisted Refugee Selection and Services

The Canadian government works with the United Nations to identify those in need of resettlement. Canada has several missions of importance, with special focuses at times, including supporting refugees caught in the Syrian Civil War (Hyndman et al., 2016). The government process for selecting refugees is called Visa Office Referred method. The opposing alternative nomination model is the Named Sponsorship model, utilizing the Naming principle (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). The Visa Office Referral nomination is a process by which the Canadian government, through their bureaus, select and approve refugees migrating to Canada. The Canadian government has complete control of whom they accept under this program. The Canadian matchmaking model uses this nomination process in the Government Assisted Refugee program and Blended Visa Office Referred Program (Lehr & Dyck, 2020).

The private community has influenced the Visa Office Referred method. Large engagements from the public in the late 1970s granted the public the ability to shift and make government classifications malleable. From the program's inception in 1976, the Canadian government struggled to meet its commitment of 50,000 resettlements from the Vietnam conflict, heavily relying on the private community to reach total fulfillment of Canadian international obligations (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). The control private actors gained during this time allowed the public to alter classifications of refugees to include Self-Exiled Persons, Indochinese, and Political Prisoners and Oppressed Persons. More recently, in 2002, the Canadian government broadened these classifications to welcome refugees from Source Countries and countries of first asylum,

allowing more selection of refugees globally. The Source Country selection category was discontinued by the government later discontinued in 2011 (Lehr & Dyck, 2020).

The Government Assisted Refugee program takes on all responsibilities for the refugees as part of their resettlement process. These activities include integration services upon entry into the country through the Refugee Assistance Program. These services start at the initial settlement of the refugee, like providing welcoming services at the airport, providing refugees language assistance through translators, and providing refugees with appropriate cold-weather clothing. The resettlement assistance continues through the length of the government commitment through services like finding temporary or permanent housing, integrating refugees into the national health system, guiding refugees through the financial system, and working with children to place them into appropriate schooling (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, 2019a; Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, 2019b; Lenard, 2016).

These resettlement services are a small part of the services provided by the Canadian government for Government-Assisted Refugees, but these services shed some light on some of the responsibilities the government undertakes when accepting quota refugees. The Canadian government agrees to support these refugees for 12 months or until the refugees are deemed independent by the government. Under this program, the government works with their municipal and local partners to provide services throughout all pre-designated resettlement locations. This resettlement strategy primarily functions through a collaboration power-sharing scheme where the federal government works with provincial and municipal partners. This collaboration operates through a Local Implementation Partnership program, where municipal organizations provide services for refugees (Walton-Roberts et al., 2019). The purpose of the Local Implementation Partnerships and their position within the strategy was defined well here:

Local Immigration Partnerships are steered by broad-based coordinating councils comprised of key community members, often representing important local organizations. The partnership councils are tasked with overall stewardship and management control over initiatives such as needs assessments and asset mapping of their community. The partnership council's main goal is to oversee the development of a local settlement strategy and targeted action plan to produce a more welcoming and inclusive community (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, n.d.).

The Refugee Assistance Program is responsible for coordinating national actors and the Local Implementation Partnerships. This infrastructure is specifically for the Government Assisted-Refugee program, and the Canadian government usually does not provide this infrastructure to the Private Sponsorship Refugee or the Blended Visa Office-Referred sponsors. Often those programs act autonomously from the traditional government-based services (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.). Those programs operate through a separate hierarchy through a series of private-public partnerships. For the private resettlement program, sponsors will create their refugee services, utilizing both government and private resources, creating a parallel set of services provided by the government. This chapter will outline how private structures are created and operated in Canada.

Private Sponsorship Refugee Program

Allocation of Private Resettlement Slots

The Private Sponsorship Refugee program allows the citizenry to select refugees to immigrate to Canada outside government-controlled pathways like the Government Assisted-Refugee and Blended Visa Office Referred program. Private refugee sponsorship operated in an ad-hoc manner in the 1960s in Canada before the government introduced the formal program in 1976. The Private Sponsorship for Refugees Program was initiated by the 1976 Immigration Act, providing access to local citizens to help refugees for permanent refugee placements (Lenard, 2016). The change in the law led to a mass wave of 60,000 refugee sponsorship of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Laotians in the next decade (Beiser, 2003). The massive influx of refugees includes 29,269 privately resettled in 1979 alone, visible in the figure below (Hyndman et al., 2017). Canada has estimated it has roughly resettled 325,000 refugees using private sponsorship programs (Hyndman et al., 2021). Although, this number seemingly might be misrepresented as several peer-reviewed material reference slightly varied total resettlement total statistics (Martani, 2021; Lenard, 2016). In the last decade, roughly 60% of the refugees resettled in Canada involved private sponsorship programs. From 2015 to 2020, private sponsors resettled 84,615 in Canada through various Private Sponsorship programs (Martani, 2021)

The Government Assisted Refugee program chapter noted that the Canadian government has recently allocated roughly 20,000 resettlement slots each year towards the Private Refugee Sponsorship program (Hyndman et al., 2021). This refugee cap has been a recent development change in 2011; previously, the program had no limit to the number of resettlements. In the previous year, the Canadian government set a target for the Private Sponsorship Refugee program, which the government perceived as a goal for program success. The private community could sponsor more refugees outside of this range if participation that year were exceptionally high. Sponsors rarely resettled more refugees than the target occurred but was present. From 2001-2014 only 2005 exceeded the private resettlement target (Labman, 2016).

The Canadian government introduced the private program refugee cap to respond to budgetary constraints on Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Furthermore, the government introduced these refugee sponsorship caps to improve program management (Labman, 2016). These fiscal constraints created slow processing time for refugee cases, a persistent complaint by sponsors and refugees (Lenard, 2016). The Canadian government introduced the private sponsorship cap to deal with an overload of refugee cases allowing Canada to catch up. The private sponsorship cap was a temporary measure in 2011, and this program limit was not meant to run 10 to 15 years (CBC, 2012). This cap limited private sponsorship enthusiasm and engagement during this period, with some religious organizations reducing their private sponsorship load per year from 225 to 25 persons (CBC, 2012). Including a limit on sponsorship results in stymieing sponsorship when they are most engaged or when the public feels most compelled to support refugees worldwide. This limitation on private sponsors limits the capacity for civil society to act without another ability to resolve what they perceive as a global issue. Nation-states have to grant the ability for private sponsors to engage in this system, and without that permission, private sponsors have little recourse (Hyndman et al., 2017).

The inability for the citizenry to directly engage in global refugee crises leaves a vacuum, the desire to participate in the refugee crisis without any ability to participate. These citizens often have a compulsion to act on the refugee crisis, to act on feelings and virtues like social justice (Hyndman et al., 2017). Academics saw this vacuum occurrence in 2016 in Winnipeg, when the Hospitality House Refugee Ministry opened its waiting list, and they received more than 7,000 applications. The city estimated the number of applications could have easily doubled, although

the thesis could not identify if the city did double its applications. The limit of private refugee slots stymied the desired participation of the public, without only 16,000 private spaces available for the whole nation (Hyndman et al., 2016).

The private sponsorship cap policy solution has seemingly not improved the situation with the refugee backlog in Canada. In March of 2021, Canada had 83,600 refugees waiting for their initial decision, down 6.5% earlier this year. Those waiting for over two years for their initial decision were 21,562, with those waiting over a year representing 38,239 (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2021). In some particularly egregious cases, refugees have had to wait up to 70 months (Hyndman et al., 2016). How governments handle and process refugees through their systems, with when refugees will arrive within the country, will influence private refugee resettlement. The possibility of negative perception in the private resettlement community in regards to refugee processing and its potential negative consequence is highlighted by Naomi Alboim (2016):

In the Syrian movement, average Canadians have come forward in droves to sponsor refugees. The Liberal platform during the election period committed to bringing in 25,000 government-assisted refugees, and it provided no ceiling for privately sponsored refugees above that figure. When the government met its target of 25,000 refugees in February, Canadians with sponsorship applications in the pipeline became concerned that the commitment to quick processing was waning and that the government had placed a cap on the number of refugees. Sponsor groups were outraged when they were told that they would have to wait until 2017 before the refugees they sponsored would come to Canada. In response to these concerns, the government announced that all private sponsorship applications submitted by March 31, 2016, would be processed no later than early 2017. The government will have to find ways to respond to civil society's increased willingness to engage in refugee resettlement, or it may lose all the benefits that come with it (para. 17).

Here, through this quote, the thesis can see how the government handles offshore processing will impact sponsorship engagement. If sponsors do not have adequate information on when the refugee will come to the country, through long processing time or a limit on the number of refugees entering the country, this can discourage sponsors from continuing with the program.

Financial Contributions from Private Sponsorship Community

The reduction to the private sponsorship program was alongside other broad immigration cuts introduced during the same period (Albiom & Cohl, 2012). Additions to the private sponsorship umbrella, with the creation of the Blended Visa Office Referred program, as occurred during this same period increasing the slots available for private citizens. This has contributed to the refugee cap and caseload problem, creating a seemingly contractionary stance within the Canadian government.

In addition to sponsorship caps, the Canadian government limited sponsorship categories. The government removed the Source Country class, which identified states where vulnerable citizens qualified for refugee status but were still in the country of origin (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). This restriction applied to Groups of Five and Community Sponsors (Labman, 2016). This limited sponsor selection does not ultimately restrict the sponsor's naming ability but shows the ability for governments to reduce and expand the Naming principle on a whim (Labman, 2016). In the Canadian government quote, the thesis identified the pliability of ethical principles, where the Additionality principle was not part of their evaluation metric. Without these standards directly codified into the program design, political administrations or bureau agendas can alter program aspects that significantly affect the ethical principles which uphold the program and keep sponsors engaged.

During 2014 and 2015, the government immigrated 7,513 refugees through the Government Assisted Refugee program. The initial cost for this program, used in the Refugee Assistance Program, was CAD 68,095,040, and these funds went to refugee services used in the first six months of refugee arrivals. The Refugee Assistance Program's total budget does cover costs associated with income support for the full extent of twelve months of their resettlement, and this does cover some of the costs associated with the Blended Visa Office Referred program and other mixed funding private sponsorship schemes. This roughly breaks down to CAD 9,063 for resettlement costs for each refugee (Immigration, Refugee and Citizenship Canada, 2015). The full Refugee Assistance Program's expenditures do not cover all associated government costs but provide an insight into the government's initial spending for each refugee.

The Refugee Assistance Program's cost per refugee stands in high contrast to the minimum financial requirement the government requires for private individuals to have for resettlement: CAD 16,500 (Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021). You can see the minimum financial requirement breakdown for the private sponsorship program in Figures one and two. The more family members included in the sponsor reduces the cost per refugee, with the second member of a family only costing the individual CAD 8,300. At the higher end of the table, the sixth member of the family only requires an additional CAD 3,200 (Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021). Beyond seven family members, these large families will qualify for mixed funding from Canada, described in the Joint Assistance Sponsorship program chapter. The financial requirement for the initial placement for one refugee for the entire private sponsorship duration is 73% higher for a sponsoring organization than the government.

For refugees in the Blended Visa Office Referred program, the initial startup fee for a family of one is CAD 9,900 for private sponsors. The second family member costs CAD 5,050 with a decreasing cost with more members (Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021). The reduced fee for private sponsors is principally due to the mixed funding nature of these refugees, with the government paying for some of the resettlement

It is important to note the financial cost of the program, as sponsors take on a large number of financial burdens to keep the programs running. Depending on the speed of government initiatives, sponsors can struggle to gather enough funds to fill the slots provided by the government (Labman, 2016). Furthermore, with their associated financial burden, the processing of providing services can be difficult for sponsors to provide (Hyndman et al., 2021). The financial cost sponsors agree to stands in contrast to government cost, which is substantially lower. Governments might switch to more private slots, as it is a more cost-effective and efficient model for refugee resettlement (Kumin, 2015). The resettlement cost and implementation of services are shifted to the private community, while the government provides oversight for the sponsors. Although this is more expensive for sponsors, this is more efficient for governments. Governments can find transforming their refugee allocations into private resettlements as enticing; governmental bureaus are incentivized to maximize their budgets. Private programs can take on more burdens than government programs without clear principles and adherence to those guidelines. As previously noted, significant shifts in refugee allocations

can have their issues with Additionality, but it is essential to remember the financial commitment from the private sponsors regarding these programs and how much cost is associated with resettlement.

This chapter displays the total financial funds required for the Private Refugee Sponsorship program through two tables, one showing the total amount of monies necessary for sponsorship and the other showing the in-kind donations deductible table. These tables represent the total costs private sponsors can expect as part of their resettlement process. The in-kind donation system appraises local sponsors' owned goods to reduce the overall money required for sponsorship. There are a few different categories sponsors can use to reduce the cost of resettlement, including clothing and furniture, which are indicated in the table below. Each category has a different percentage cap for the maximum deductible amount, like furniture allowing 70% of the financial contribution to be in-kind donations. The table leaves an open-ended amount of costs for families above seven or more. Large refugee families can qualify for the Joint Assistance Sponsorship program for further financial and resettlement assistance for exceptional cases (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019b).

Figure 1: Private Sponsorship Refugee Program Financial Requirements Table

Sponsorship cost table for Privately-Sponsored Refugees

You are responsible for providing 12 months of income support, plus start-up costs.

| Family Size | 12 Months of Income Support | Start-up Costs | Estimated Total Annual Settlement Cost (\$) |
|--|------------------------------------|-----------------------|--|
| 1 | 13,200 (12 x 1100) | 3,300 | 16,500 |
| 2 | 19,700 (12 x 1642) | 5,100 | 24,800 |
| 3 | 20,400 (12 x 1700) | 6,300 | 26,700 |
| 4 | 21,200 (12 x 1767) | 7,500 | 28,700 |
| 5 | 23,700 (12 x 1975) | 8,600 | 32,300 |
| 6 | 25,700 (12 x 2142) | 9,800 | 35,500 |
| 7 or more (for each additional member) | 1,600 (12 x 133) | 1,100 | 2,700 |

Source: Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021.

Figure 2: Private Sponsorship Refugee Program Financial In-Kind Deduction Table

In-Kind Deduction Table for Privately-sponsored Refugees

| Family Size | Start-up costs (annual amount) \$ | | | | | | Ongoing costs (annual amount) \$ |
|--|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------------|----------------------------------|
| | Clothing | Furniture | Household Needs | Linens | School supplies | Food Staples | Shelter |
| 1 | 385 | 1,085 | 300 | 80 | | 105 | 7,008 |
| 2 | 770 | 1,708 | 325 | 160 | | 150 | 9,984 |
| 3 | 1,033 | 2,016 | 350 | 240 | | 195 | 10,632 |
| 4 | 1,295 | 2,310 | 375 | 320 | | 240 | 11,328 |
| 5 | 1,558 | 2,604 | 400 | 400 | | 285 | 12,024 |
| 6 | 1,820 | 2,898 | 425 | 480 | | 330 | 12,372 |
| 7 or more (for each additional family member) | 263 | 294 | 25 | 80 | \$75 per child between ages 4-21 | 45 | 12,372 (for family of 7+) |

Source: Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021.

This financial requirement and upfront declaration are essential for a few reasons. First, this creates a barrier of entry for participants; only organizations or citizens with enough financial income can sponsor refugees. Noted in the application process, the government suggests that financial capacity exceeds the minimum requirement, hinting at some higher scrutiny regarding the participant's financial background (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019b). Sponsors present these financial declaration documents alongside the resettlement plan as part of the application process. Second, this upfront declaration gives participants clear expectations and requirements regarding their involvement in the resettlement process. Alongside the financial expectations, the Canadian government provides detailed documentation on the division of communal tasks and where the local sponsor fits into the greater network. There is little ambiguity for what qualifies as the minimum standard, providing clear expectations for private sponsors of their responsibilities and roles during the resettlement process. Third, these documents and processes, among others, are all part of the application process designed to make sure only qualified organizations or citizens sponsor refugees.

The Private Sponsorship program sets up several structural templates for private citizens to engage in the refugee process. Under the Private Sponsorship Refugee program, members agree

to cover the initial 'startup' or initial local placement costs. They agree to provide financial, social, and community support for one year (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019b). These costs cover a series of expenses the refugees will require through their resettlement period. Refugees are still eligible for all the welfare or government services within Canada. Sponsors act as the primary contact for the refugee during their initial migration to the country. The implementation for resettlement services in the country falls on the sponsoring group for delivery. The allocation of refugee services to private sponsors decentralizes responsibility for refugees to the private community as sponsors work in their local area to facilitate the refugee family's medical, housing, and schooling needs (Immigration Refugees and Citizenship Canada, 2019b). The thesis can view the implementation of services through a bottom-up implementation lens, where the sponsors significantly impact the delivery of services.

The thesis can understand Bottom-up implementation as the divide between policy formation's outputs and implementation's policy outcomes with how much control local actors have over the process. In this model, local actors, or those who directly carry out the policy, have the greatest ability to steer the program's direction due to their ability to interface with the target population directly. With this model, local actors interpret macro, central actors (Knill & Tosun, 2012). Another element of the Bottom-up implementation theory is the ability for local actors to modify the information provided by central actors and their ability to develop their program (Knill & Tosun, 2012).

Applying this framework to private refugee sponsorship, sponsors receive stipulations and limitations from the Canadian Federal government on what they must do with refugees once they are in the country. Sponsors interpret that information and modify it to accomplish their own goals. One of the main goals established by the Canadian government for sponsors during their sponsorship period is getting refugees financially sufficient. The government requires sponsors to work with their refugees on a series of tasks, including English language classes, integration with Work and Income, and more (Kyriakides et al., 2019; Lenard, 2019). How sponsors accomplish this goal is up to their purview, and the Canadian government's central actors have little control over how sponsors accomplish their settlement duties. Depending on their resettlement program, private refugees in Canada can access unemployment benefits to give them more time to get acclimated to the Canadian market. Depending on their values, sponsors

actively persuade refugees not to participate in this government program (Lenard, 2019). Sponsors take the resources provided by the government and apply a lens of their success as sponsors when guiding refugees. Sponsors viewed the integration of the refugee into the workforce as a sponsorship milestone they needed to accomplish, so some actively pushed refugees away from resources that might delay refugees from securing part-time or full-time work (Lenard, 2019). The effect of the sponsor as a local implementor with their ability to influence policy outcomes is evident. The substantial difference in accessing the standard government benefits between Government Assisted Refugees and privately resettled refugees is the introduction to welfare services, with the primary point of contact being the sponsoring group with their goals and desires (Lenard, 2016).

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees or the Canadian Government does not usually nominate refugees to Canada through this system. Instead, private Canadian citizens find the specific refugee in their country of asylum, usually through some personal connection, to nominate for resettlement. The ability for Canadian citizens to select their desired refugee is the origin of the Naming principle, where sponsors actively participate in the refugee nomination process. This resettlement is a permanent process by which these refugees become permanent residents and then are eligible for citizenship. Policymakers refer to this nomination process as the refugee referred model (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.). This private refugee sponsorship scheme is unique primarily because Canada allows refugees to nominate quota refugees regardless of nationality, and Canada does not require a personal connection to the refugees from the sponsors. The lack of a personal connection is another aspect of the Naming principle, the low connection requirement for nomination. Sponsors have a wide array of refugees they can sponsor under this framework, with the ability to nominate any refugee in the United Nations system. As noted in the methodology chapter, some countries require a familial connection or various direct connections with the refugee. This framework allows any Canadian to join these initiatives without creating significant barriers (Lenard, 2016).

Sponsorship Offshore Communication

Another critical element of sponsorship control with policy outcomes is the ability for sponsors to contact refugees while they are offshore directly. Sponsors can directly reach out to refugees through various social media platforms to relay information about their specific resettlement accommodations in Canada (Kyriakides et al., 2019). Sponsors can relay information about the refugee family's temporary or permanent living arrangement or gather information from refugees about their needs (Kyriakides et al., 2019). Sponsors are not the only source of information for refugees; refugees still participate in boilerplate refugee resettlement orientation sessions provided by the Canadian government. In some circumstances, sponsors do not reach out to refugees while they are offshore instead of relying on interactions with them once they are in Canada. However, this information provided by the central government is not specific to the refugee or the local area in which they will immigrate. Sponsors can give detailed, applicable information to refugees about their resettlement journey and what they should expect (Kyriakides et al., 2019).

Sponsors can talk with refugees regularly to start building the relationship between the two entities. Offshore contact and the early building steps are critical to the relationship and can have ramifications for resettlement in the long run (Kyriakides et al., 2019). If sponsors do not adequately estimate when the refugee will finish the immigration and visa process, this can discourage sponsors from engaging in contact. It is an unreasonable expectation for sponsor groups, which might process hundreds of refugees, to keep in touch with refugees for 70 months before they enter the country. Furthermore, if sponsors expect refugees to process into the country, which gets delayed due to refugee limits, this can dismay sponsors from continuing with contact in the future.

Sponsorship Arrangements in the Private Sponsorship Refugee program

Under the Private Refugee Sponsorship umbrella, there are a few different managerial configurations on sponsoring refugees. These can include Sponsorship Agreement Holders, Groups of Five, and Community Sponsors. Unpacking these structural arrangements will be

relevant to our discussion for a few reasons. First, these structures highlight the responsibilities for sponsors and what is required during the sponsorship duration. Each model has a different way these sponsors coordinate with the government, so briefly covering each provides insight into other ways sponsors can engage in the private system. Second, this can illuminate how New Zealand adapted to the Canadian system. The thesis can understand what New Zealand borrowed from the Canadian system by exploring these systems when creating their private resettlement system.

Sponsorship Agreement Holder

The first of the private sponsorship structures is a Sponsorship Agreement Holder. This sponsorship method uses an incorporated organization, vetted by the government, to create an agreement with Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (Lenard, 2016). Each year, the government provides a recurring amount of sponsorship or nomination slots to these organizations through a signed legal agreement between the two entities. Sponsorship Agreement Holders are the most widely used system in Canada and represent a significant amount of resettlements. From 2015 to 2019, Canada resettled over 73,000 Syrian refugees, with 65% of the resettlements conducted through Sponsorship Agreement Holders (Martani, 2021).

Examples of Sponsorship Agreement Holders can be religious organizations, ethnocultural groups, or Humanitarian Groups (Immigration, Refugees, Citizenship Canada, 2020a). Under the same four-year period of Syrian resettlements, religious communities sponsored 75% of all private sponsorships through this program (Martani, 2021). Under this arrangement, the Sponsorship Agreement Holder is directly responsible for the refugees and their resettlement outcomes, like access to healthcare facilities and permanent housing (Lenard, 2016). These sponsors are removed, or not integrated, into the traditional Government Assisted Refugee programs. These sponsors can still access services within their local and regional areas; however, those are not the primary source for resettlement resources. Large Sponsorship Agreement Holders could have some contingent paid staff and volunteer staff dedicated to resettlement, while small Sponsorship Agreement Holders will usually operate with only volunteer staff (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.). As mentioned above, any organization can become

a Sponsorship Agreement Holder, with proof of organizational and financial capacity to resettle the refugees.

Under the Sponsorship Agreement Holder structure, these corporations can create Constituent Groups, essentially the operational arm responsible for the refugees. These are the sub-groups acting on behalf and operating under the license of the Sponsorship Agreement Holder. These groups can incorporate or operate as a simple arrangement and duty structure for the Sponsorship Agreement Holder (Immigration, Refugees, Citizenship Canada, 2020a). Smaller Sponsorship Agreement Holders do not form Constituent Groups; instead, they work directly with the refugees. Additionally, Sponsorship Agreement Holder can have many Constituent Groups operating under them, with some having hundreds of Constituent Groups (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.).

Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative provides a good, broad example of Constituent Groups and Sponsorship Agreement Holders through a faith-based organization. The church as an aggregate will operate as the Sponsorship Agreement Holder, while their parish or congregation will operate under the license as a Constituent Group (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, n.d.). In Canada, 75% of all Sponsorship Agreement Holders are faith-based organizations (Hyndman et al., 2017). One of the Sponsorship Agreement Holders operating in Canada is AURA, an Anglican religious organization. AURA operates with a volunteer staff of 500 and sponsors events like Ride for Refuge to encourage private sponsorship within Canada (AURA, 2021).

Groups of Five

The second pathway of Private Refugee Sponsorship is the Group of Five. Instead of working with a corporation, Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada will work with a group of at least five Canadians to sponsor a refugee. In this arrangement, Canadians will pool together the listed resources to support the refugee for 12 months. Once the refugees resettle within Canada, the roles and responsibilities are the same as a Sponsorship Agreement Holders. Three out of the five signing members must meet the financial requirements for sponsorship, and all members are required to assist the refugees once they are in the country. The relationship between the Group

of Five and the government is simple; the government works directly with the group of five without any intermediary between them (Global Refugee Sponsor Initiative, 2020b). To gather funds, these groups use online fundraising techniques like GoFundMes, or fundraising through social networks like Facebook to gather the required funds necessary for resettlement.

A prime example is Jennifer Nagel. In 2015 she and her 15 friends raised CAD 33,000 for a Syrian Widow and her five children (Rojas & Ross, 2015). Usually, a Group of Five will specifically nominate a United Nations Human Rights Commission-recognized refugee for resettlement. In this regard, the sponsorship is not recurring and generally specific to the needs or desires of the community. If the group sponsors a refugee from an existing community member, they can add them as co-sponsors.

Community Sponsor

The third pathway of Private Refugee Sponsorship is the Community Sponsor. These are organizations, like Sponsorship Agreement Holders, directly work with the government to resettle refugees. These entities usually exist within the local community of resettlement (Martani, 2021). There are a few distinctions, the first being that a Community Sponsor does not need to be a corporation. Instead, these groups need to be a legal entity of some kind. These entities do not sign a formal agreement with the government regarding recurring private resettlements. Due to this arrangement, the Canadian government does not assign a recurring, yearly resettlement slot for Community Sponsors; instead, they have an open-ended agreement with the government to apply for a sponsorship slot every time they request a private refugee (Martani, 2021). They can resettle as many refugees as they can financially and logistically support through these repeat applications.

Like other private sponsorships, Community Sponsors take on all resettlement duties and are primarily responsible for the refugees during the one-year commitment. The Canadian government notes that Community Sponsors cannot also function as Sponsorship Agreement Holders, although it is unknown why from an outside perspective.

Blended Visa Office Referred Program

The Blended Visa Office-Referred program is a mix of the Private Refugee Sponsorship and Government Assisted Refugee program. This new program introduced in 2013 allows a split contribution model for private-public cooperation in refugee resettlement (Martani, 2021; Labman & Pearlman, 2018). From 2015 to 2020, The private sector and government resettled 8,670 refugees through this program (Martani, 2021). The private sponsorship community had an initially negative view of the new blended matchmaking process. Opponents argued that the Blended Visa Office Referred Program was only a cost-saving measure and would replace slots designated for the Government Assisted Refugee Program (Lenard, 2016; Labman & Pearlman, 2018). As previously noted in 2011, the Canadian government underwent a budgetary overhaul concerning their immigration programs when they introduced caps to the private program. The Blended Visa Office-Referred program was introduced during this time, replacing 1,000 slots allocated for the Government Assisted Refugee Program. The reallocation of government-led placements was a challenge to the Additionality principle, and the sponsorship community had some for several years (Labman & Pearlman, 2018).

In this program, sponsors work in tandem with the government to resettle refugees within Canada. Sponsors can nominate refugees already designated as Government Assisted Refugees. Groups cannot independently nominate refugees for resettlement using the blended program, forcing them to rely on the government for nomination. The Canadian government creates a refugee profile with basic information about the refugee on an online database. The government allows this profile to exist for three months before processing the refugee through the Government Assisted Refugee program (Labman & Pearlman, 2018). These groups use an online government database, the Blended Visa Office Referred Matching Database of Refugee Profiles, to select refugees within the Canadian system to best work for their situation (Lenard, 2016). In some instances, the Canadian government quickly assembled these profiles. Labman & Pearlman (2018) give some insight here "Syrian refugee profiles were 'fast tracked' and online for only 2 weeks. Interested sponsors submit a request and a case is reserved for 3 days. Over this period, more details are provided and sponsors must decide whether or not to proceed" (p.443). The matchmaking system emphasizes how the government controls this program, requiring sponsors to engage with the system rather than the government awaiting refugee referrals.

Sponsorship groups can operate as a Group of Five, Community Sponsor, or as Sponsorship Agreement Holder. One sponsorship organization can have fully private or blended sponsorship refugees. The blended program sponsors agree to pay for the initial resettlement costs and the first month of financial support. Canada agrees to sponsor the refugee from month two to seven; the sponsors pay for the remainder of the year (Lenard, 2016). The table below shows the financial cost required for sponsors under the Blended Visa Office-Referred program. The private sponsorship program sponsor can reduce the financial contribution needed through in-kind donations with a percentage cap; this is displayed in a table below showing the maximum deductions possible.

Figure 3: Blended Visa Office Referred Program Financial Requirement Table

Sponsorship Cost Table for Blended Visa Office-Referred (BVOR) Refugees

When you sponsor a BVOR, you are responsible for providing 6 months of income support, plus start-up costs. IRCC provides the remaining 6 months of income support through the [RAP](#).

| Family Size | 6 Months of Income Support | Start-up Costs | Estimated Total Annual Settlement Cost (\$) |
|--|----------------------------|----------------|---|
| 1 | 6,600 (6 x 1100) | 3,300 | 9,900 |
| 2 | 9,850 (6 x 1642) | 5,100 | 14,950 |
| 3 | 10,200 (6 x 1700) | 6,300 | 16,500 |
| 4 | 10,600 (6 x 1767) | 7,500 | 18,100 |
| 5 | 11,850 (6 x 1975) | 8,600 | 20,450 |
| 6 | 12,850 (6 x 2142) | 9,800 | 22,650 |
| 7 or more (for each additional member) | 800 (6 x 133) | 1,100 | 1,900 |

Source: Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021.

Figure 4: Blended Visa Office Referred Program Financial In-Kind Donation Table

In-Kind Deduction Table for Blended Visa Office-referred Refugees

| Family Size | Start-up costs (annual amount for sponsor) | | | | | | Ongoing costs (annual amount for sponsor) |
|--|--|-----------|-----------------|--------|----------------------------------|--------------|---|
| | Clothing | Furniture | Household Needs | Linens | School supplies | Food Staples | Shelter |
| 1 | 385 | 1,085 | 300 | 80 | | 105 | 3,504 |
| 2 | 770 | 1,708 | 325 | 160 | | 150 | 4,992 |
| 3 | 1,033 | 2,016 | 350 | 240 | | 195 | 5,316 |
| 4 | 1,295 | 2,310 | 375 | 320 | | 240 | 5,664 |
| 5 | 1,558 | 2,604 | 400 | 400 | | 285 | 6,012 |
| 6 | 1,820 | 2,898 | 425 | 480 | | 330 | 6,186 |
| 7 or more (for each additional family member) | 263 | 294 | 25 | 80 | \$75 per child between ages 4-21 | 45 | 6,186 (for family of 7+) |

Source: Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Canada, 2021.

During the one-year resettlement period, sponsors under the blended program are responsible for all the resettlement tasks; however, they have more access to the Resettlement Assistance Program for financial and social funding. The government does not provide resettlement services through the Resettlement Assistance Program; fulfilling these services is the sponsor's responsibility (Martani, 2021). Overall, the duties are the same for Blended Visa Office-Referred and Private Refugee Sponsorship sponsors. Sponsors take on the full emotional support for the refugees. The blended visa sponsors get more financial assistance with incidental costs. These incidental costs fluctuate depending on the resettlement region, and Canada provides a rate sheet for each region.

Other Private Sponsor Programs

The Joint Assistance Sponsorship Program is similar to the Blended Visa Office-Referred Program. Once the refugee is in Canada and within the care of the private citizen Sponsor Agreement Holder the responsibilities for the citizen sponsors are identical (Immigration, Refugee, Citizenship Canada, 2019c).

This system does have distinct elements from the Blended Visa Office-Referred program. Instead of sponsoring citizens nominating an individual or family from the approved United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, refugees choose from the pre-selected Government-Assisted Refugee list. A Canadian migration officer will classify a person needing additional services due to a series of personal circumstances requiring higher care, within Canada adding them to the Joint Assistance Sponsorship system. Notably, some of the reasons a refugee might qualify for this program include a significant number of family members in Canada, trauma from violence, medical disabilities, or discrimination. Another change from the Blended Visa program is the financial commitment required from sponsors. There are fewer upfront costs required from sponsors, and these costs are paid for by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada; however, there are higher communal service standards to meet the needs of these refugees (Immigration, Refugee, Citizenship Canada, 2019c).

Once Canada nominates a refugee for the Joint Assistance Sponsorship Program, citizens can search sponsorship databases to find a refugee profile best fit for their situation. For a Sponsor Agreement Holder to qualify for sponsorship, there is a higher standard for services they must meet to satisfy the increased need from the refugee. This need and subsequent qualifications create a filtering process where only experienced and capable sponsors are part of the program. Unlike the Blended Visa or Private Sponsorship methods, the caretaking period is long for the Joint Assistance Sponsorship system, with a minimum sponsorship duration of 24 months. In some cases, the caretaking period can extend to 36 months.

These programs offer an attractive alternative option for the sponsorship of refugees who are the most vulnerable. With the Joint Assistance Sponsorship program those families, that might not be selected principally from the effort required for care are offered an alternative path. This chapter will discuss vulnerability regarding family reunification, but the Joint Assistance

Sponsorship program is a bulwark against private resettlement programs turning into solely family reunification systems. Furthermore, the mechanic by which the Canadian achieved care for vulnerable refugees is through the duration of the sponsor's responsibility of care. The standard sponsorship period is 12 months for the Private Sponsorship Refugee program; this program's sponsorship duration is doubled or tripled. Variable sponsorship duration offers an enticing model or approach to sponsorship for policymakers. The government can allow sponsorship of any refugee regardless of sponsorship load with careful attention and flexibility to the duration of the sponsorship. The more vulnerable the refugee can directly correlate with the sponsorship duration, and if these terms are acceptable to sponsors, governments can allow this resettlement to occur.

The Rainbow Refugee Assistance Partnership expands the Blended Visa Office-Referred pathway designed explicitly for LGBTQ2 refugees. The Canadian government started this program in 2020 with a proposal of fifteen to fifty refugees resettling each year through this scheme. The Rainbow Refugee Assistance Partnership was in addition to other private resettlement programs and adhered to the Additionality principle by adding more refugee placements (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, 2019). This program is a 12-month blended sponsorship program. The government covers initial placement costs along, traditional Refugee Assistance Program services, with three months of essential financial assistance (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program, 2021). The private sponsor covers the remaining nine months of care and resettlement services akin to the blended visa program.

Besides its refugee and asylum seeker targeting, it behaves similarly to the blended visa program. In its original state, the Rainbow Refugee Society started as a non-profit venture before being officially sponsored by the Canadian government in 2011. Through pilot programs, Canada expanded the scheme to its current state in June of 2019. Its Sponsorship Agreement Holders, rebranded to Circles of Hope, operate as a network of providers for the LGBTQ2 refugee community (Rainbow Refugee, n.d.).

New Zealand

Introduction

The primary method of refugee resettlement within New Zealand is through the government-run Refugee Quota Program. This program allows a set number of refugees to enter the country each year, relying on government support and services for resettlement for refugees from pre-designated first asylum countries. In 2017 the government started a new initiative to have privately sponsored refugees enter the country. The new private resettlement system started as a pilot program called the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program. This pilot program allowed 25 United Nations designated refugees to immigrate to New Zealand in 2018 independently from the Refugee Quota Program (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, 2019). Like the Canadian programs, these refugees are privately sponsored refugees with community members providing the primary services needed to resettle, with some differences between the programs. The pilot program ran for one year, finalizing mid-2019 (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, 2019).

Refugee Quota Program

Historically New Zealand has used government programs to resettle refugees. New Zealand started regularly resettling refugees in 1979. The government-led refugee scheme, the Quota Refugee Program, was created in 1987, becoming the designated scheme for resettlement. This program allows United Nations designated refugees to attain permanent residency on admission, with eligibility for citizenship after five years (Office of the Minister of Immigration, n.d.). In the inaugural year, the New Zealand government designed the program to allow 800 refugees per year, although there is some flexibility with the quota cap with some years exceeding the yearly caps. The Government amended the Refugee Quota Program and reduced the quota to 750 refugees in 1997 (Office of the Minister of Immigration, n.d.). The 750 person cap persisted to 2015 when the government increased the quota to 1000 placements (Human Rights Commission,

2016). In June 2020, government officials expanded the Quota Refugee Program again to 1500 persons (Office of the Minister of Immigration, n.d.).

Regional Allocations

During all these reductions and increases to the refugee quota, the unitary government was responsible for the welfare of refugees. The New Zealand government has shown a commitment to continue engagement in the United Nations refugee program and works closely with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on selecting the refugees.

Through the Refugee Quota Branch of the Ministry of Immigration, New Zealand works with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Organization of Migration to establish regional numbers for eligible refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2018). The Ministry works with United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to establish these regional allocations in concordance with New Zealand's immigration missions and the needs of refugees around the globe. Historically New Zealand has placed some specific regional requirements for refugees, with the most recent being the familial connection requirement for Middle Eastern and African Refugees introduced in 2009 (Small, 2019; Radio New Zealand, 2019). In 2019 the government removed the familial connection requirement and updated their regional allocations for the next three-year strategy cycle. In this announcement, the government allocated 50% for Asia/Pacific, 15% for the Middle East, 20% for the Americas, and 15% for African countries (Office of the Minister of Immigration, 2019).

The Refugee Quota Program allocation is significant because the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program uses these mission allocations to base their selection criteria. The private program used these allocations for budgetary reasons, quick placement of refugees, and logistic feasibility (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment. 2019; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.e). If the private program is limited to these regional allocations, this will naturally reduce the ability for sponsors to name the refugee of their choice if refugees are from countries no longer supported within those criteria. Furthermore, if a program heavily leans towards one region, like the Middle East, with its

Afghanistan refugee crisis, this raises questions. Will the government cap this region if the Refugee Quota Program hits the 15% threshold? The Middle East's refugee allocation is roughly 225 refugees under the 1,500 limits, so it is a sensible worry, given that the new private pilot launches in 2021 and will resettle 50 refugees per year (Lees-Galloway, 2020).

If the government limits private sponsorship with regional allocations, how does this affect sponsors' ability to nominate individuals from these countries? If sponsor applications receive rejections due to regional caps, drastically limiting the ability for sponsors to name refugees, the thesis can interpret this as an infringement on the Naming principle. These allocations would naturally favor some sponsorship communities over others as they can sponsor refugees through more slots. These regional allocations could discourage sponsors interested in supporting refugees from the Middle East or Africa, as the government is more likely to reject their case. Regional allocations were not present in the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship, as they limited the refugees specifically to Jordan and Lebanon (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment. 2019).

Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa and New Zealand Red Cross

On entry, quota refugees go through the Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa (Māngere Refugee Resettlement Centre), where they undergo a six-week orientation program from government staff. During this initial program, refugees go through an acclimation curriculum where government staff assists them with learning English, with children undergoing an education orientation program for the New Zealand schooling system. The Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa facility has room for 300 refugees, where they socialize with other refugees during their stay, often participating in group classes. With their permanent residency status, refugees enroll into the national health system with full benefits of the fully public system receiving mental and health support while in Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa. Concurrently staff selects a location for their residence after they graduate from the six-week curriculum at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa. Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa is important mainly due to its centralized nature. Staff and facilities at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa support communities worldwide, including translation services for those with low English-speaking ability. Furthermore, capacity at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa

dictates the flow of quota refugees within the country. If Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa is full, the processing of refugees into the country is limited, creating a bottleneck.

After the refugees leave Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa, they work with the Red Cross in their Pathways to Resettlement Program. The New Zealand Red Cross is the preferred localization group the Ministry of Immigration uses to place refugees within communities. The Ministry of Immigration places refugees selectively within thirteen communities within New Zealand, and the Red Cross operates in all resettlement locations (New Zealand Red Cross, n.d.). This group conducts resettlement services, including family planning, daily task assistance, orientation classes, and connecting refugees to the broader community. Additionally, the Red Cross operates as an employment matchmaker connecting refugees and employers through their Pathways to Employment program. Red Cross resettlement services take the form of holding employment workshops, providing language support, and working with employers to create a hospitable work culture eligible for refugees. Beyond the public health services offered to refugees, the Red Cross provides a broad, refugee-specific trauma recovery (New Zealand Red Cross, n.d.).

In this model, the Red Cross operates similar to the Canadian Local Implementation Partner, where they take on responsibility for refugee welfare once they have left their initial in processing. In the same regard, these organizations work with other broad organizations and bureaus to accomplish the general welfare need for refugees during their resettlement. Like the Local Implementation Partner, the Pathways to Resettlement program is specifically for refugees processing through the Quota Refugee Program and was not utilized by the private sponsorship pilot program. This follows the schism of separation for private and public programs, where they operate on parallel paths without extensive program interaction.

Refugee Family Support Category

There are programs outside of the Quota Refugee Program New Zealand operates when dealing with quota refugees. The most notable is the Refugee Family Support Category, the main category for family reunifications in New Zealand. The government provides 300 slots for family members categorized as refugees by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. This program allows New Zealand citizens or permanent residents to nominate their family members

for one of these places (Community Law, n.d.). The Ministry of Immigration makes some distinctions based on how many refugee family members reside within New Zealand. Tier One Sponsors are designated by having no immediate family within New Zealand excluding dependents and prioritizing resettlement. (Community Law, n.d.; Immigration New Zealand, n.d.). Tier Two Sponsors have some immediate family members residing within New Zealand, and they do not have family members eligible for any other visa program. Tier One Sponsors have priority over Tier Two Sponsors, and the government processes all Tier One requests before Tier Two sponsors. Once a sponsor has used this visa pathway, they are not allowed to use it again. Once the government has accepted the refugee, they go through the default New Zealand screening process. If refugees pass the screening, they immigrate (Community Law, n.d.; Immigration New Zealand, n.d.).

The family reunification program is influential for private sponsors. Refugees eligible for the Refugee Family Support Category do not qualify for private resettlement (The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.c). The government requires eligible refugees to use the government-led process and disqualifies them from the private route. Not allowing family reunification in the private system is a strange inclusion, but there is some rationale for this requirement for refugees. Refugee resettlements are highly scarce resources, so these normative decisions on who can apply are appropriate for government officials to consider (Lenard, 2020). If a private program drifts too much into the category of family reunification, it could be deemed not to uphold the international commitments set by the United Nations (Kumin, 2015). This criticism is rooted in the phenomenon where refugees use the private resettlement method as the default option for family reunification, not allowing vulnerable or the most in need to resettle in Canada (Lehr & Dyck, 2020).

However, there is some contention on how refugees qualify for a vulnerable status. Refugee vulnerability is conceptualized as the inability for the refugee to have significant control over their life, with a sliding scale on the lack of agency. The thesis can understand this in two different metrics, how vulnerable the refugee is within their place of refuge and how much persecution they are expected to face if they return to their country of origin (Lenard, 2020). The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has its metric for tracking refugees' vulnerability status, but this has come under "considerable controversy" (Lenard, 2020, p. 68).

So, it is fair to assume that private resettlement of pure family reunification can still reach people with high vulnerability under our definition of vulnerability. These refugees, with their status, can operate outside of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees classification, depending on the metrics policymakers uses to assess vulnerability (Lenard, 2020).

Furthermore, there are incentives from refugees resettled through the government-led program to relocate their family members through a private program. Often when refugees migrate to the host nation, they leave behind several members of their family or community by which they have a deep attachment. These attachments do not disappear while they are in Canada or any host nation. This phenomenon where refugee families are both located in the country of asylum and host nation, with the subsequent desire to rectify the situation by resettled refugees understood as the echo effect. After refugees fully integrate into the host society, they feel the compulsion to relocate the rest of their family, and the private resettlement system offers them a remedy. This results in communities with a heavy concentration of government-led refugees will subsequently lead to more private resettlements within that community, creating an echo of resettlement for the community (Hyndman et al., 2021; Lehr & Dyck, 2020). So, it is sensible that the New Zealand government would take some action or provide regulation to curtail this behavior in the program.

However, this decision not to include sponsors seeking family reunification shows a lack of clarity regarding the make-up and desires of the sponsorship community. Most sponsors connect to refugees through direct family members or a link to an ethnonational identity (Hyndman et al., 2021). During the inception of the Canadian program in 1976, most of the refugees who relocated to Canada did not have a family connection, as the private sponsorship community was reacting to the refugee crisis from Vietnam (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). In 1995 90% of all private resettlements had an element of family reunification, which prompted an investigation by Canadian officials into the program. Officials were worried the program was firmly within the realm of being solely a family reunification system, which threatened to undermine the program. However, an evaluation by the government during the same period recommended that the program continue allowing family reunifications (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). Lehr and Dyck (2020) provided some rationale behind the decision by the Canadian government:

EIC [Employment and Immigration Canada] questioned the appropriateness of this practice but concluded that a varied approach to refugee selection was worthwhile and recommended that sponsorship groups continue to have the right to name refugees. EIC [Employment and Immigration Canada] included a soft ask that sponsorship groups remain open to receiving names from the Government, UNHCR, Amnesty International, International NGOs and other international agencies, etc., and passing them back to private sponsorship groups for sponsorship.

The study identified that the 'principal reason for the current heavy emphasis on named refugees appears to be the pressure on sponsors by previously sponsored refugees to help bring other family members to Canada.' The study also concluded that a significant promotional effort, involving multiple stakeholders, would be required to increase the sponsorship of unnamed refugees (p. 51-52).

These quotes highlight two crucial insights. First, although private sponsorships were high in the 1990s, the government felt they could directionally correct the private program to allow sponsors to retain the naming capacity they had fought for in the 1970s. Fixing the refugee selection process could be accomplished by asking sponsors to consider refugee profiles submitted by the government. First, this shows that the Canadian government had some capacity to communicate with the private sponsorship community. Second, this quote shows that the government and the private sponsorship community were aligned, and there was trust between the two communities.

Moreover, the government attempted to solve this problem by creating blended sponsorship models through the matchmaking process in the following decade (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). The second takeaway from the quote is that the effort required to remove the Naming principle was arduous. Converting the program into a pure Office Referred Visa program would require substantial work. The attempt to get the sponsorship to sign onto this program alteration would be difficult, meaning the sponsorship community had come to accept and expect the ability for them to name refugees. The Canadian government noted this, as taking away this naming ability would negatively impact trust with non-governmental sponsors affecting resettlements (Lehr & Dyck, 2020). Not removing the Naming principle or reducing its scope shows that the Naming principle was part of the foundation of the private program; the echo effect resulted from previous refugees using this system effectively and efficiently to help reunify their families.

Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship Program

The Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program was initially started by communities lobbying the government for a private solution. They petitioned the government to adopt the Canadian model for private sponsorship. In mid-2016, the New Zealand parliament passed budget allocation and created the pilot program. Cabinet designed the program over the following year, and they implemented the pilot in late 2017. Refugees entered the country in 2018, with twelve adults and twelve children constituting the whole program (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019).

The New Zealand government selected sponsors through a merit-based system where organizations who wanted to sponsor refugees from Lebanon or Jordan petitioned the government for a slot. As part of the application process, all organizations need to demonstrate that they are legal entities. Each of these organizations had to show a history of working with refugees. These organizations created a resettlement plan and entered into an agreement with the government on fulfilling their agreed-to plan (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). This resettlement plan included how the organization would support the refugee financially.

Organizations provided proof of funds for estimated sponsorship costs for two years, including housing costs. These budgets ranged from NZD 15,000 to NZD 44,000, with sponsors having various sponsored individuals they were assisting. Three months into the pilot program, when the Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment evaluated the pilot (2019), these organizations had spent between NZD 5,000 and NZD 18,000. An important note here is that the pilot program did not require or state a specific amount these organizations needed to have; instead, the Ministry of Immigration approved fiscal plans submitted by sponsors. The vague financial requirement is a deviation from the Canadian system. As previously noted, Canada had a specific amount required from sponsors to engage with the system. This requirement indicated the costs associated with sponsorship and a financial barrier to entry. Sponsors in the program noted ambiguity as to what sponsors needed to pay for during their sponsorship duration. Some sponsors were under the impression they were required to pay for all the accommodation costs

for the entire two years (New Zealand & The Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment).

Other elements of the resettlement plan were how the sponsors would integrate the refugees into the community through their key relationships, the ability for sponsors to offer employment support for the refugees, and what the sponsor could provide through non-financial contributions. It was noted in the evaluation document from the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2019) that some of the requirements in the resettlement plan appeared redundant and could use more clarity. Furthermore, it is not clear what non-financial contributions entailed. The sponsorship application form was ambiguous. Did the New Zealand government Immigration New Zealand consider social and emotional support as the non-financial contributions? Or did the government interpret this as physical assets sponsors could provide to refugees? Exploring the application form for sponsors, INZ 1238 chapter D, there was no inclusion or chapter for in-kind donations for financial contributions.

Furthermore, this application allowed sponsors to declare financial capacity for sponsorship using a variety of evidence, not requiring a discreet list of financial documents or explicit financial minimums for resettlement (Immigration New Zealand, 2021). The Canadian program provided sponsors with an in-kind contribution table and guide outlining the financial cost needed for the resettlement of the refugees. This in-kind contribution was capped at a percentage amount not to exceed or meet the total monetary amount required. The in-kind deduction table and the sponsorship cost table clarified what was eligible for financial contributions and what was outside of those financial requirements.

Four organizations were selected for the pilot programs from diverse communities within New Zealand through forms and interviews. Once the organizations were selected, the Ministry provided two different working models—the Partnership model and the Sole Provider model. The Sole Provider model required a legal entity with a history of working with refugees to apply successfully. This organization had to have the total financial amount to sponsor refugees and needed to provide all refugees services required by the government (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). Both sponsors involved in the Sole Provider model were theological organizations. One of these organizations sponsored and integrated three refugee families into their community. The Partnership model was the alternative to the Sole

Provider model for those who could not individually support refugees or could not qualify for the program due to its requirements. These individuals could partner with an organization that could meet all the requirements. One of the sponsors using the system was part of the ethnic community of the refugee but could not sponsor alone. (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). The Amnesty International (2018) evaluation supported this, where Zuheir Al Qattan, a pseudonym used by Amnesty International, noted he had family within the sponsorship group.

All of these sponsors were religious organizations, with the make-up of the sponsoring groups mostly being volunteers. Each of these organizations had six members who could fully support the refugees once they entered the country. These sponsors spanned both islands, with two on the North Island and two on the South Island. The pilot program did not consider Organizations from Auckland predominantly because of the pressures on the housing market. The inclusion of North and South Island sponsors created some complexity with the program implementation; South Island sponsors had difficulty accessing facilities from the Ministry of Immigration like Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa. The difficulty in accessing Government services made uneven communication and resources for South Island Sponsors (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019).

Five of the six families participated in a two-week orientation session at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa for this pilot program, similar to quota refugees participating in the Refugee Quota Program. A significant difference is the duration of stay with refugees participating in the Refugee Quota Program staying in the facility for six weeks instead of two (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). The five families participated in a curriculum focused on employment, law, Taha Māori, and English during their stay. One of the families did not participate in this curriculum and instead went directly into the sponsor's community. Regardless of participation in the Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa curriculum, sponsors were provided with broad demographic information about the refugee family to guide integration in their community. The Government expected sponsors to have enough information to successfully take on the full responsibility of the refugees once they had this information.

The inclusion of Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa into the resettlement process is a deviation from the Canadian private resettlement process, where sponsors directly integrate refugees into the local

community upon arrival. The information provided by sponsors and the Canadian Government has more impact, as there is no orientation program where in-person communication can align refugee expectations and correct misinformation. However, there was some confusion by Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa staff as to what information was needed for refugees in the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program as they had a curtailed stay at the facility. Another specific note on the curriculum at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa was generic information regarding integration into New Zealand. Topics included material on financial independence with a focus on Curriculum Vitae creation and recognition of technical qualifications (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). The material was not specific to their local community or how the refugees would interface with the sponsoring group.

Once the Ministry of Immigration selected sponsors and refugees, the government exchanged contact details for both parties, allowing sponsors to contact refugees through social media platforms. Refugees had received information from the Ministry of Immigration regarding resettlement in a CD and booklet. Furthermore, refugees participate in an interview by the Ministry of Immigration staff to ask questions about the migration process (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). The outreach by sponsors was an additional information outreach step that was unique for the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program. A few of the sponsors contacted their matched quota refugees relaying information about their living accommodations and providing details about themselves to begin the relationship between the two parties. Some sponsors maintained contact while the refugees were at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa for their two-week orientation session. (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019).

Having the government and sponsors both provide resettlement services creates a unique model compared to the Canadian system. The Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program has modeled its sponsor structures after the Sponsorship Agreement Holder and the Community Sponsor models from Canada. The Sole Provider model is closely aligned with the Sponsorship Agreement Holder model, where theological organizations provide sponsorship services. The organizations in the Sole Provider model works directly with the government without working through an intermediary. The unique inclusion here is the prevalence of coordination with the government on the initial integration. With initial integration, the government takes some direct

control, placing the refugee into Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa or directly into the sponsor community. The Partnership model is more aligned with the Canadian Community Sponsor model, where individuals create a one-off sponsor relationship with an organization to resettle a refugee. In the Community Sponsor model, these resettlement placements were non-recurring. This was hard to discern the recurring element of sponsorship with the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program, with the limited duration and refugees in the pilot program. These organizations partner with the government through a contract to guarantee refugee services.

There were some deviations from the Canadian models with the New Zealand program. The government provides initial support to the refugees through government-led services at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa, and the private sponsors account for the remaining sponsorship duration. Although the government involvement is low, this is still a blended-services model with both the government and private sponsors are responsible for some portion of the sponsorship. As noted before, the private system in Canada was wholly separated from the government system creating a parallel track for integration. The New Zealand government is leaning more towards the Blended Visa Office Referred track, with a mixture of government and private services. This creates some interesting complexity with the program: what will the governmental services include at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa and how would that affect the handoff to sponsors?

Furthermore, the first engagement most of these families had within New Zealand was with government staff; how did that impact the relationship with sponsors and services? The consideration of this impact was not explored within the evaluation document produced by the New Zealand government or the Amnesty International evaluation (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019; Amnesty International, 2018). How the government handles sponsorship responsibility and coordination of sponsorship responsibilities with their unique model is an area of research that could produce exciting insights into what private sponsorship looks like in New Zealand.

Conclusion

The thesis has explored how the government-led program and private programs affected sponsors' ability to work with refugees through their perception of government participation and systems by which Canada allows private citizens to get involved in the refugee process. Areas of note include how the private community will analyze the government-led refugee quotas as a barometer when gauging their participation, along with the system design of programs. The chapter explored how the government-led system provided services for refugees and compared this to the private system. Within the private system, the thesis explored refugee regional quota limits and how that might affect sponsor enthusiasm regarding future sponsorship. The thesis then explored Canada's different structural paradigms for sponsors, the Sponsorship Agreement Holder, Groups of Five, and Community Sponsorship. The thesis touched on the Blended Visa Office Referred program, its complexities, and its challenges. Noted here was how the private community viewed the Naming principle and the Additionality principle. This chapter provided a brief overview of the other special categories in the Canadian private system and highlighted how this helps fulfill Canadian commitments.

In the New Zealand chapter, the thesis covered the Refugee Quota program. The thesis covered the regional allocations for refugees and the potential to influence interest with private sponsors. The chapter drew attention to the Family Support Category and how that affects the ability of sponsors to name refugees by limiting family reunification. The thesis went into detail regarding the structural make-up of the Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program. The chapter provided insight into how New Zealand adapted the Canadian model and questions how this unique model might operate moving forward.

Chapter 4: Discussion

Introduction

The thesis can make recommendations for the New Zealand private refugee program and draw on insights from the Canadian program using the lesson drawing process. Lesson drawing is an exercise of providing specific and detailed information about a program to provide actionable knowledge for program implementation (Rose, 1991). A lesson is an actionable insight or experience about a program in operation somewhere else that is transferable to another program. One of the principal concerns of lesson drawing is the transferability of lessons and if the target government can successfully adapt the lesson. One requirement of lesson drawing is the ability for lessons to have implementable insights, with a reason for execution (Rose, 1991). With the development of the secondary pilot, with the potential of a permanent private resettlement program, lessons are valuable because policymakers can act upon them. In 2021 the Ministry of Immigration has developed the design of the second pilot with refugees arriving next year, with a dependency on the openness of the border. This pilot will run for three years, with another evaluation period following the pilot (Lees-Galloway, 2020; Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.e). Policymakers can use these lessons and their learnings for implementation in the new pilot program for its duration.

Through our most similar model, the thesis avoided some of the pitfalls of lesson drawing. This thesis avoided programs where transferability would be difficult or identifying a symbolic program where lessons lose value (Rose, 1991). Furthermore, this thesis developed a nuanced understanding of the Canadian and New Zealand programs beyond overall program strategies or ideals through our program background chapter. The Canadian program was the most similar to New Zealand's program with its structural organization and program norms.

The Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship program is unique, as it has already undergone a lesson process in the past. The Ministry of Immigration used the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative, an organization developed to spread the Canadian private refugee model, to develop its private program (New Zealand & The Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). As previously outlined, there was quite a bit borrowed from the Canadian

system, so it is not prudent for this discussion to outline all the program differences present. Instead, this discussion can explore areas where New Zealand's pilot program is deficient, what the pilot borrowed successfully, and identify learnings from the Canadian system. This discussion will analyze specific areas of the pilot program and the Canadian programs to find implementable improvements to the New Zealand program.

Sponsor Encouragement with Private Programs

At the heart of any private refugee resettlement plan are sponsors; no resettlements will occur without their engagement in the system. Several moving components are needed to orchestrate a private program successfully, and the thesis can understand this through the multiple stream agenda-setting theory. John Kingdon proposed this theory in his book *Agendas, alternatives and public policies* (2011) in the twentieth century as an alternative theory for agenda setting, policy change, and policy formation (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Capano, 2009; Knill & Tosun, 2012 p.257). This theory builds on the idea of organized chaos with ideas concerning chance in policy change, where many elements need to converge for change to occur with emphasis on the individual behavior (Capano, 2009). This work expounded on Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) work on organized anarchy to explain how policies are developed, stating that these policies are rational processes (Kingdon, 2011).

One of the strengths of this theory is its simplicity, where it can be easily applied to the policymaking process, which has led to major adoption in academic literature (Capano, 2009; Zohlnhöfer, 2015). The model's simplicity has also been a major criticism of the work, as the theory can be superficially applied without a deep understanding of the theory or the broader context (Beland & Howlett, 2016; Cairney et al., 2016). This can create academic works missing a meaningful theoretical contribution and only use isolated elements of the theory (Cairney et al., 2016; Zohlnhöfer, 2015). This has led to another criticism of the theory, the lack of development by academics. The theory is widely used without scholars adding to or examining the theory's core strengths, resulting in the theory being underdeveloped (Zohlnhöfer, 2015). Recently the multiple streams model has been expounded upon, traditionally used within one political system, to include comparative analysis (Beland & Howlett, 2016).

The multiple stream theory dictates three separate components in harmony for a policy to occur. The first component, the politics of the issue, must have the attention of policymakers to persuade them to change operational arrangements present. The second component is the availability of a solution; policymakers will move on to other issues without a proper solution to solve the issue. The third component is the political climate surrounding the issue, is there is enough momentum around the issue to compel action (Kingdon, 2003, as cited in Knill & Tosun, 2012, p.257). The thesis can simplify this down to the alignment of policy, polity, and politics surrounding an issue. Although this method is used for more traditional policy agenda-setting, the thesis can apply this to sponsorship engagement with private programs.

Private Resettlement System Design

The private resettlement environment within the host country will dictate how sponsors will engage with the system, and subsequently, the program's success. The solution needs to be perceived as adequate or acceptable by sponsors to engage in the system. The Blended Visa Office Referred program was not deemed acceptable by sponsors, and the program suffered. With its matchmaking refugee process and mixed payment structure, the initial program structure was perceived by sponsors as a violation of the Additionality and Naming principles (Labman & Pearlman, 2018). The Canadian Council for Refugees (2016), were a vocal opponent of the implementation of the Blended Visa Office Referred system stating:

“Canadians who stepped up to sponsor BVORs [Blended Visa Office Referred] were not adding to the number of refugees resettled: they were rather saving the government money... We are therefore very disappointed that the Government has decided to count BVORs towards the 25,000 refugees brought by the government. Our position is that they should count as no more than 50%, since private sponsors are assuming at least half the costs (and work)” (para. 3-6).

One element not explicitly stated in the quote is implied is the perceived value of Canada's international commitment by the Canadian Council for Refugees. When the program was deemed to interfere with these commitments, participation was low (Labman & Pearlman, 2018). This quote underscores the attitude of private interest views regarding the structural design of the

Blended Visa Office Referred system, and this negative perception ultimately affected the program's performance. In 2013, the program's founding year, had a refugee target of 200-300 refugees, and only 153 refugees were processed through the system. Subsequently, in 2014 the program expanded to allow 400-500 refugees to process through this program, and only 177 refugees were resettled (Labman & Pearlman, 2018; Labman, 2016; Canada et al., 2016). Studies examining the Blended Visa Office Referred program have noted that the program has feasibility concerns (McNalley, 2020, as cited in Hyndman et al., 2021, p. 3). The low private interest engagement stands out even more when compared with other private resettlement programs in Canada. As previously stated, Canada introduced a cap to private refugee slots due to the high demand when the Blended Visa Office Referred program was introduced.

Furthermore, in 2016, the Syrian refugee crisis inspired Canadian sponsors to engage with the private refugee system. Roughly 71,000 Syrian refugees were resettled from 2015-2019, with half of those refugees processed through the private system (Martani, 2021). However, this massive influx of private refugees was another point of conflict between the sponsorship community and the Canadian government.

In 2013 the Canadian government announced plans to resettle 1,300 Syrian refugees before the end of 2014 in response to the increasing Syrian refugee crisis. The government announced it would allocate 200 slots for the Government Assisted Refugee program, and sponsors through private resettlement would handle the rest (Labman, 2016). This took the sponsorship community by surprise, as they did not indicate to the government that they could resettle the desired number of refugees with that timetable due to the required financial burden. The allocation of a small number of government-led resettlements to the private resettlement along with tight deadlines was not well received by the Canadian sponsorship community. The community indicated that the desired amount of 1,300 might not be possible given the conditions presented (Labman, 2016). The Canadian government, through its messaging, indicated and pressured the private resettlement community to engage in the Syrian initiative. Government communication indicated it was the duty for sponsors to engage in this initiative, putting the onus of Syrian resettlement success on the private community (Labman, 2016).

The perception of the Syrian resettlement strategy was worsened when private sponsors did engage with the private resettlement system. Syrian refugees offshore processing time ranged

from twenty-four to forty-three months, with very few refugees arriving in Canada before the 2014 deadline. This led some sponsors to indicate it was impracticable to engage in the system (Labman, 2016). Another announcement by the Canadian government in 2015 increased the number of Syrian refugees Canada would resettle by 10,000 slots. Six thousand refugee slots were given to the private sector without consultations, exacerbating issues present with the Syrian initiative (Labman, 2016). The lack of community consultation occurred with the Blended Visa Office Referred program as well. The government acknowledged the low amount of consultation regarding program allocations and targeting affected program performance (Canada et al., 2016).

The thesis can see the importance of the solution or its perceived value regarding sponsorship engagement from these examples. The thesis can learn that if the solution is not deemed acceptable by the principal actor, the sponsor, the program's viability will decrease. With the private resettlement program being discretionary in design, perception of the program will have a large impact on its success. Here the thesis can see the impact of the polity element of the multiple streams theory—polity needs to align with politics, i.e., sponsorship expectations. The Blended Visa Office Referred program offers an example of this occurring, where sponsors had expectations on how the program should operate and then chose not to participate when the program did not align with their expectations. In the Syrian initiative example, the Canadian government did not communicate with the sponsorship community regarding their participation. This sensation is conceptualized best by Naomi Albiom (2016), a previous public servant and scholar in private resettlement:

Trust in and respect for the civil service matters: This allows civil servants to make decisions, use discretion, and be flexible and innovative, so they can get the job done effectively.

There was very little trust in the civil service under the previous administration. Processes had become extremely complicated and rule-bound, and risk aversion was ingrained at all levels of the organization. It was difficult for some public servants to make the cultural shift necessary to meet the objectives set by the new government for the Syrian movement.

This impacted the ability of sponsors to work in harmony with the government, affecting the program's success. A negative perception of the program's overall structure or how it is handled can impact the number of refugees resettled, and thus secure a positive perception will increase program success. Creating a private resettlement structure acceptable to sponsors is pivotal to program success.

Applying this lesson to New Zealand, the government should directly work with sponsors to implement the next pilot program or any future program. Direct sponsor input into the decision-making process for refugee slots, the division of resettlement tasks, refugee processing time, and financial requirements for sponsors will increase the likelihood of a successful pilot program. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, the implementation body for the private refugee program, has indicated through their “CORS (Community Organisation Refugee Sponsorship) Pilot timeline” that they would have a community engagement element in early 2021 as part of their program design (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.d). However, the ministry has not publicly communicated what this community engagement would entail or how much this would factor into the new pilot design.

The government has to give the sponsor the ability to nominate the refugee, the government holds power in this arrangement because they act as a broker for sponsors and refugees. The thesis saw private, non-governmental interests in New Zealand lobby the government to create the private resettlement program (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019). This is an example of the outside-initiative model where public pressure creates the need to expand the public domain (Knill & Tosun, 2012). Once the solution has been created, there is now an opportunity for these interests to engage with refugees. The refugee community within New Zealand reflects this, the Refugee Research Centre chair had this to say regarding the refugee strategy:

The resettlement strategy hasn't been reviewed for a long time,' she [Zhiyan Basharati, Refugee Research Centre] said. 'We need more than well-seasoned words on a document, we need solutions, and who better to be part of those solutions than people with lived experience, who are professionals, who have been through the workforce in New Zealand, who've been through the education system in New Zealand, and who understand

the settlement journey that we've been on, who have dedicated their entire careers to supporting our communities.

We really need to have a conversation, we need to be invited to be part of that conversation and we are hoping that the Refugee Alliance can be part of that voice. To push for that change that we need for the review (Bonnett, 2021, para. 3-6).

Although this quote talks about the private sector's involvement in the overall New Zealand Resettlement Strategy, we can extrapolate this to the pilot program. If the private refugee community is not involved in designing the overall refugee strategy, it is easy to assume that this exclusion is not the only place this occurs. Inclusion of key refugee community groups within the system design should be taking place. The Refugee Alliance is a conglomeration of several programs the government can work with for this endeavor. The Refugee Alliance was created to improve the New Zealand resettlement strategy and family reunification scheme (The Refugee Alliance, n.d.). Their members include organizations like Refugees as Survivors New Zealand, a non-governmental organization providing mental health and wellbeing services to refugees throughout New Zealand (Refugees as Survivors New Zealand, n.d.). Other members include The New Zealand National Refugee Youth Council, Authenticity Aotearoa, Amnesty International, Belong Aotearoa, Migrant Action Trust, and Refugee Research Center (The Refugee Alliance, n.d.). These members represent a robust list of refugee non-governmental organizations and could provide an excellent partner for the private resettlement design consultation. Amnesty International provided the evaluation document for the previous pilot program, so the Ministry of Immigration has a history working with these organizations (Amnesty International, 2018). The New Zealand government should incite participation from the previous four sponsorship groups, as they have hands-on knowledge of how sponsorship works in New Zealand. Feedback was already gathered from these groups as part of the Community Organization Refugee Sponsorship program evaluation, so the ability to work and communicate with these groups is present (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019).

The principal reason for consultation with these groups is to avoid included elements within the new pilot that discourages sponsor participation. The thesis can learn from the Canadian Blended Visa Office Referred program in this manner. If sponsors perceive the new pilot program as a

method for New Zealand to privatize its international commitments, this could jeopardize the program's success and the potential for a permanent community resettlement program. This could occur in a few ways.

The first lesson the thesis can glean from the Canadian programs is introducing private refugee slots without consultation. If the private community is not ready to resettle refugees through funds or means, this will impact refugee numbers. The COVID-19 pandemic has created huge uncertainty regarding how the country will protect its citizenry and how it manages its immigration processes. As previously noted, the border has been closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic, with refugee numbers impacted as a result. The Refugee Quota program was scheduled to resettle 1,500 refugees in 2021 but instead is estimated to resettle 750-1,000 refugees due to the requirement of managed isolation (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.a). The New Zealand government has not released information regarding the status of the previously released timeline of the pilot but noted this could change because of COVID-19 (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, n.d.a). The government should work with the private resettlement community to learn when they feel comfortable accepting refugees while the country is still experiencing lockdowns, vaccine mandates, virtual schooling, and more. It is hard to know if sponsors are ready for the pilot; no documentation or consultation has occurred to create such a record. At the moment, there is an air of speculation, which could lead to implementation failure.

The second direct learning the thesis could take away from the Blended Visa Office Referred program is the idea of Additionality. When the Canadian government did not equally add or replace government-led resettlement, this created a negative perception with sponsors, resulting in low refugee resettlements. Sponsors in New Zealand have the same expectations for Additionality as their Canadian counterparts. This was noted by Amnesty International (2018) in their report, stating:

It is clear from our interviews with participants that a driver for their commitment is that they feel they are playing a part in helping a global need, on top of what the Government offers. This motivation would be impacted if the community sponsorship programme lost the additionality component and instead asked citizens to carry out work that should be done by the government quota (p. 16).

It is clear with this quote that New Zealand sponsors expect that Additionality should be upheld regarding private resettlement. With the government not reaching its 1,500-refugee commitment in the same year as the private resettlement program, this could create the perception that these private slots are replacing or supplementing the Government-Assisted Refugee program. For the inaugural year of the second pilot, the next step in the private program for New Zealand policymakers should do what they can to avoid the negative perception from the private sponsorship community they are infringing on Additionality.

From a public view, the private resettlement program appeared to be accepting sponsorship applications for private resettlement. This would indicate that the second private pilot program is moving forward. If the government is not meeting its stated commitments to government-led quotas, how does this impact Additionality while proceeding with the private program? If the quota is not met next year, the government processes private sponsorship refugees for resettlement. Is the government replacing government-led placements for private placements? The New Zealand government seemingly takes a passive approach to adherence to this principle from an outside perspective. Without active measures to ensure this founding principle of the program persists in the long run, more active measures are required from the New Zealand government. Plainly put, the government is not doing enough to show commitment to Additionality, and that should change before the principle is lost.

How can the government accomplish take a more active role in adhering to Additionality? First, no visible, explicit declaration of this principle exists in any New Zealand government documentation regarding the private program. This thesis could only find one explicit mention of this principle, or the program's commitment to Additionality, in a speech given by the Minister of Immigration, Iain Lees-Galloway, in 2018 (Lees-Galloway, 2018). The evaluation document provided by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (2019) only mentioned the program had a goal to “provide an alternative form of admission for refugees to complement New Zealand’s Refugee Quota Programme” (p. 5). New Zealand should actively promote the notion that they are creating an ethical private resettlement program, as very few countries do, which the thesis explored in the methodology chapter. The government should provide this declaration in the sponsorship application process, in their press releases about program success, and on the Ministry of Immigrations website when describing the program.

Besides the broad declaration from the New Zealand government abides by Additionality, when the government-led quota is increased, or decreased Additionality should be acknowledged on every occasion. The New Zealand government provides a three-year strategy for the Refugee Quota Program, outlining the next cycle's goals. When the government decided to expand this program, they stated the information within that strategy document (Lees-Galloway, 2019). With the knowledge that the government-led quota will affect the private system and sponsor engagement with resettlement, the private system should be included in these reports. When references are made to the quota of any government-led program, there should be some consideration from the government on Additionality and public perception.

If the government does not acknowledge this, it could emulate what happened in Canada regarding the Syrian refugee resettlement process, where sponsors were surprised by the lack of communication regarding the quota fluctuations. The Blended Visa Office Referred Program sponsors considered the shifting refugee allocation as infringing on Additionality, and the program suffered. As mentioned before, this is a discretionary program, and how the public perceives the program is one of the key metrics that should be measured when determining program success.

Naming Principle and Program Plasticity

The presence of a problem is be found at the core of private resettlement programs. In the presence of a refugee crisis, sponsors will use a private resettlement program as an avenue to impact the situation. Although Canada has shown a long history of private sponsorship with consistent resettlements without the Sponsors will assess the current refugee issue, choosing to engage further with creating a sponsoring organization. The refugee crisis is never in a position where it has been 'solved,' with a constant need for more participation from countries that can care for the world's most needy. However, the interest in private resettlement programs increases when a refugee crisis emerges like the Afghanistan refugee crisis.

The ebb and flow of refugee crises is how our politics component of our multiple streams model is identified. Sponsors will assess the refugee crisis, which is often heavily impacted by the current widely held public opinion on the situation. The thesis can understand how and when sponsors engage with refugee resettlement through Down's attention cycle (1972). There are five steps to the attention cycle: The pre-problem stage, the alarmed discovery & euphoric enthusiasm stage, the realising the cost of significant progress stage, the gradual decline of intense public interest stage, and the post-problem stage (Downs, 1972). This chapter will cover the pre-problem stage and the alarmed discovery phase and how that applies to sponsor engagement with private resettlement programs.

The pre-problem stage refers to the presence of a crisis or problem without the issue capturing the public's eye. Experts and other technocrats might be alarmed by the issue, but the public is complacent during this stage (Downs, 1972). The Syrian Civil War started in 2011 when the Syrian government conducted forceful crackdowns on peaceful protests. The New York Declaration did not occur until 2016, and for several years, the public's attention on this issue was lax (World Vision, 2021). This was the same occurrence with the Afghanistan refugee crisis, the 20-year-old American war created thousands of refugees, but the public's attention on the issue did not reach the alarmed discovery stage until 2021 (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2021). In this step, private sponsors are not presently aware of the issue or crisis, so sponsorships are not in high demand. The thesis saw this phenomenon regarding the Private Resettlement Refugee program in 1979, where engagement was low before the crisis hit the

alarmed discovery phase. Sponsorships will traditionally carry on with their normal resettlement processes. Some sponsorship groups knew of the Syrian refugee crisis, and they had conducted resettlement of refugees well before the Canadian government decided to do its massive influx of Syrian refugees later that decade, but these were nominal (Hyndman et al., 2016).

The alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm stage is created through noteworthy events that capture the public attention on the issue, where the public is suddenly aware of the crisis. A sharp increase follows this in conversation about solving or improving the issue. This puts pressure on policymakers to provide a solution to the high demand and interest by the public (Downs, 1972). With refugee crises, this is usually typified by a singular image that rallies the public attention, usually shocking in nature. With the ‘boat people crisis,’ the result of the Vietnam war, the image that rallied public attention was the image of Phan Thi Kim Phuc, the Napalm Girl. The child was forced from her village when the South Vietnamese Air Force attacked (Hyndman et al., 2016). The presence of this conflict and crisis created the private resettlement program in Canada. The Vietnam war and its subsequent refugee crisis was the catalytic factor for the creation of the program.

For the Syrian Civil War, the spark that exploded public interest was the lifeless body of Alan Kurdi as he lay dead, face down, on a Turkish beach. His family tried to cross the Mediterranean Sea. Alan’s Aunt had applied for refugee status in Canada for his family before his death. The Canadian public interest after the release of the photo and the worsening crisis drastically increased. When the Canadian government decided to open the country to 25,000 Syrian refugees, there was not a lack of desire but functionality from private sponsors (Hyndman et al., 2016). The alarmed discovery stage with refugee issues is centered on a flashpoint in time, with the need for refugees and public interest drastically shifting. The occurrence of this phenomenon was present with the fall of Kabul to the Taliban. The desire of the public to participate in this crisis transitioned in a week with images of refugees filling military planes fleeing the country (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2021).

If sponsors cannot engage with the refugee crisis during the alarmed discovery stage, when the issue enters the gradual decline phase, the thesis can view this as the political climate element of our multiple streams theory. The thesis has already explored the need for a positive sponsor perception of private programs. If sponsors cannot engage with the program on their terms when

they are engaged the most, the political climate will shift from a positive view to a negative view. The thesis saw this present in the Syrian conflict with refugee processing times. Long waiting periods when sponsors want to work with refugees impacts their willingness to continue with the program. If the government is applying pressure for the public to engage with the crisis while obstructing their ability to engage efficiently, this will affect the political climate of the program and perception from sponsors.

The ability for sponsors to quickly engage with refugees during this stage of the attention issue cycle is critical, as this is when they will want to participate the most. Sponsor enthusiasm is one of the key catalytic factors for resettlement; sponsors will resettle refugees when they want to engage with the refugee crisis. In this regard, the private resettlement programs need plasticity—the ability of resettlement programs to react to public demand quickly. A government can increase its plasticity in a few different regards. First, the government can structure their private resettlement programs with refugee crises in mind, knowing there might be instances where huge bursts of public engagement will emerge quickly. This is a preemptive approach to this problem. This can involve program elements like private refugee limits; if the government has a soft cap of refugee entries, the government can quickly remove this for crises allowing the government to adapt to public interest quickly. As part of their program design, the New Zealand government should consider how their private resettlement program will deal with emergent refugee crises and how program limits will be considered. Before the next refugee crisis, the New Zealand government should have a process to handle mass sponsor applications. The primary goal is to avoid sponsor frustration with application rejections. If the sponsor community is actively engaged with the crisis and cannot nominate because of a program quota limit, this could negatively affect future sponsorships.

Another preemptive element governments can incorporate a broad nomination process for private resettlement, with few restrictions. If sponsors can identify refugees through the United Nations system quickly and put them through host nation processing systems, this will allow the sponsor to engage with the crisis quickly. If sponsors cannot nominate a refugee in this crisis, this could decrease sponsorship in the future. Some sponsors are not recurring, annual participants; instead, they represent people who want to enact a sense of ‘social justice.’ New Zealand should remove as many restrictions on private resettlement refugees as possible,

enabling the Naming principle to its full extent. New Zealand should remove employment requirements and other refugee requirements for sponsorship. The thesis explored, to some extent, that including these requirements excludes women and those in the LGBTQ2 community. Canada has shown that changing the sponsorship duration for more vulnerable groups is a possible solution for private programs through some of its specialty programs. New Zealand should actively pursue an investigation regarding sponsorship duration and the expansion of sponsors' nomination capacity.

The expansion of the Naming principle should include removing the restrictions on family reunification through the Refugee Family Support Category. The Canadian experience has shown that family reunifications are a core part of the private resettlement process, and Canada has shown that corrections to an overabundance of family reunifications can occur with the effort from immigration policymakers. Furthermore, refugee sponsorships during refugee crises are not usually family reunifications, and resettlements can swing back to the 'vulnerable' category. The thesis has also briefly touched on how family reunification can still reach vulnerable refugees, depending on the criteria governments use to identify vulnerability.

Canada has created a structure where Canadians can nominate refugees with little restrictions, without regional restrictions or major limiting criteria. In this regard, Canada has shown full commitment to the Naming principle, allowing the sponsors to choose the refugee freely. New Zealand should emulate this program structure. New Zealand has indicated they want to expand this capacity to emulate Canada, but this requires infrastructural challenges with the United Nations (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019). This is a fair limitation, and the expansion of sponsorship nomination capacity is not expected to be instant. New Zealand should continue pursuing this to its full extent and diligently work with United Nations to gradually expand the nomination process to emulate the Canadian program fully. This partnership aims to quickly adapt to refugee crises, where New Zealand can be seen as a key partner with the United Nations in relocation refugees due to the capacity the two entities created through persistent effort.

Improving Resettlement Outcomes

The next discussion will cover how to improve resettlement outcomes for refugees and sponsors. This chapter will highlight specific actions New Zealand can take to improve the private resettlement program. This chapter will touch on the financial declarations for sponsorship and offshore contact from sponsors.

Financial Declarations

The Canadian model has provided a clear example of declaring what is financially needed for private resettlement correctly. The Private Sponsorship Refugee and Blended Visa Office Referred program provided specific minimum requirements for sponsors for what was needed as part of the process. This clearly indicates to those interested in the program the financial costs associated with the sponsorship process. Furthermore, through their in-kind deduction information, they elaborate on what is considered as non-financial contributions. Clear, specific financial requirements avoid ambiguity from sponsors on what they need to pay for during the sponsorship period. This gives the ability for sponsors to assemble applicable financial assets for sponsorship. The New Zealand government should emulate this.

The New Zealand government should provide a similar financial breakdown shown in Canada. A simple financial breakdown will allow the private resettlement community to see what is needed, with little guesswork or vague financial declarations. This would streamline the sponsorship application. Immigration caseworkers would not need to cipher estimates provided by sponsors; instead, they would evaluate if the sponsor meets the financial requirement with a simple pass or fail decision-making matrix.

Offshore Contact

One crucial element of the private resettlement process is the relationship between the sponsor and the refugee. How these two entities interact will determine the success of the resettlement, as this program heavily relies on the sponsor guiding the refugee during their initial arrival. The

development of this relationship then is pivotal to success, and the development of the relationship starts before the refugee interacts with the sponsor.

While the refugee is offshore or still within the country of asylum, they have a slew of sources on the resettlement process and what it entails. While the refugee is offshore, they actively seek out information regarding resettlement. While refugees wait for confirmation on their application, they are in an informational deficit, creating a large amount of uncertainty about their status. This uncertainty would continue past the interview process, where refugees are unsure about their status and are awaiting a final decision (Kyriakides et al., 2019). This information-gathering period can be exaggerated due to how long the waiting period is for selection. Refugees are often under much stress, creating a desire to seek out information (Simich et al., 2002). Refugees do several things to resolve this stress, like talking with other asylum seekers or refugees who spread false information about what life will be like in resettling countries (Simich et al., 2002; Kyriakides et al., 2019). Refugees would reach out to fellow refugees placed in host countries to relay information about their resettlement journey. Some of the information relayed by refugees was misleading, creating misaligned expectations of what refugees will experience once they immigrate. Misinformation on social media included false information, including examples of Western governments taking children away from families once they immigrated (Kyriakides et al., 2019).

Furthermore, traditional forms of communication by immigration staff might not have the desired impact policymakers desire. In both New Zealand and Canada, the government conducts a visa interview as part of the selection process for refugees. During this interview, refugees can ask questions, even be encouraged by immigration staff regarding the migration process and integration into the host country (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). Refugees can be reluctant to trust immigration staff, exhibiting a timidity due to past experiences or trauma. This makes the interview process less than ideal because open communication where the refugee gathers accurate information is inhibited through mistrust or stress.

Furthermore, refugees are more amenable during the interview, out of a desire to quickly immigrate and remove themselves from their current situation (Simich et al., 2002). This interview step is where misinformation about the host country or the migration process can get

resolved. However, considering the social climate of the refugee in the country of origin or country of asylum, past experiences, and a desire to migrate, the post visa interview can result in a sub-par result (Kyriakides et al., 2019).

Information regarding the host country and what refugees should expect is given to the refugee before their immigration. As noted in the program background chapter, New Zealand provides privately resettled with a CD and booklet about resettlement while they are offshore. This is general information regarding New Zealand designed to provide accurate information about the migration process (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). Refugees in Canada receive similar information, where refugees participate in orientation sessions, and it has had mixed success. Kyriakides et al. (2019) illuminates the refugee communication experience with the following:

Um Halil: The information we obtained was that we should not expect that we are going to paradise. That the air we breathe there costs money, and that life in Canada is not easy and we must work to be able to live.

Abu Halil: The course was not useful because they did not give us any information that would help us to survive. In my opinion, the course aimed to make the refugee understand that we should not be a burden on the Canadian government and we should work hard to be able to survive (p. 22).

This quote highlights the perceptions refugees can receive from generic information provided by the government. Some refugees also noted a lack of cultural nuance in the material resulting in insulting or disparaging communication that was deaf to their lived experience. Kyriakides (2019) summarized these emotions as “the impression that the information offered was patronizing paternalistic, and premised on a one-sided understanding of resettlement from the host perspective” (p. 22). This reaction subverts the desired goal from policymakers to provide accurate information and expectations regarding the host country instead of exacerbating perception issues. The undesired effect from visa interviews and generic resettlement information punctuates the need for either course correction or specific information from private sponsors in the offshore step of the migration journey.

Some commonalities are present in some of the information New Zealand provides for refugees and Canada's information. New Zealand has a thirty-minute orientation video for refugees, and information regarding costs is present through the video. The content covers housing, medical and schooling costs. The video also touched on trauma's impact on refugees and some of the symptoms they could experience from this trauma (Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014). There is no research on the impact of offshore communication on the New Zealand private refugee or government-assisted experience. Understanding the impact of offshore communication for New Zealand could illuminate the experience of refugees before they arrive at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa. Given the Canadian study, it is reasonable to assume some level of disillusion with generic immigration information. There is another level of nuance with the New Zealand immigration process with refugees participating in the orientation program at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa. The government has indicated that sponsor contact while the refugee was at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa was impactful (New Zealand & the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2019). Understanding the impact of the orientation program on refugee perceptions of resettlement and comparing refugees' perception of their resettlement with how they felt offshore would underscore the importance of Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa on the private refugee journey.

Sponsors can drastically affect the perception of refugees while they are offshore. Refugees highlighted how communication from their sponsor reduced the uncertainty of the process, noting they felt they had an advocate in the host country. In some circumstances, sponsors maintained sustained contact with the refugee amplifying the feeling of security they received from the communication. One of the key priorities of the sponsors during the resettlement process is to provide emotional support for the refugee. For the duration of the sponsorship, the sponsoring group agrees to provide emotional support for the refugee. During the pilot program, refugees noted that the emotional support sponsors provided was critical to their success and helped them the most during their initial migration (New Zealand & Ministry of Business, Innovation, and Employment, 2019). Refugees in the Canadian study noted offshore contact provided them with emotional relief, where they could speak to sponsors as they were their advocates in the system. Sponsors would engage with refugees to reassure them during the process and learn about their struggles (Kyriakides et al., 2019).

Some refugees noted this was the deciding factor to resettle in the host country (Kyriakides et al., 2019). Sponsor communication establishes the relationship with the refugee early on, where relevant information is relayed while resolving the uncertainty involved in the resettlement process. With repeat contact, sponsors could clear or adjust how they communicated to better communicate to the refugee, imparting tailored information. This process of transferring information would create trust between both parties

Transversely, refugees maintained their misaligned perceptions of resettlement without this communication, leading to a worse relationship with sponsors. In some cases, some refugees stated they would actively discourage others from immigrating to Canada due to their immigration experience with their sponsors (Kyriakides et al., 2019).

Knowing how sponsor and government communication impacts refugee resettlement, the New Zealand government should do the following. New Zealand should explicitly require sponsors to communicate with refugees while they are offshore as part of the resettlement plan they submit to the government. Connecting the sponsor to the refugee should be a priority for the New Zealand government, as they operate as advocates for refugees and can provide emotional support while the refugee is offshore. Sponsors should be required to provide tentative information they will relay to refugees as part of the application to show they are ready to begin the relationship with the refugee. If New Zealand continues with refugee resettlement services at Te huru Mōwai o Aotearoa, they should require communication with the refugee, as it has shown to have a positive impact on the relationship. Overall the expansion of the sponsor and refugee relationship should occur, and the New Zealand government should encourage this.

Conclusion

This thesis has examined the New Zealand private resettlement system, comparing it to Canada and has drawn several lessons. First, sponsors are the principal actor within private systems; these private citizens are the linchpin with private programs. Second, policymakers must consider ethical frameworks for program success—they have an impact on how the public views the program and resettlements. Third, government-led programs are intrinsically linked to private programs, and adjustments to government-led systems need to consider their private counterpart.

This thesis made some specific recommendations for New Zealand. It should broaden the Naming and Additionality principles through several policy actions. These were suggestions, and this can be accomplished in a myriad of ways. The New Zealand government should strengthen resettlement plans and streamline application processes to improve refugee resettlement outcomes.

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