‘A retired Taoiseach working for a “comeback”’: Eamon de Valera and the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland

BY

EMILY WILKINSON

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN HISTORY

The University of Auckland
2022

Abstract

Throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Ireland boasted a tradition of seeking international support for domestic issues. Irish dignitaries like the Redmond brothers, John Dillon, and Michael Davitt toured the United States and Australasia to promote Irish Home Rule. Calling for monetary and moral support, these Irish politicians successfully engaged the Irish diaspora. Yet, with the violence of the prolonged Irish fight for independence (1916–1923), international Irish populations progressively cut ties with the homeland. Eamon de Valera, the surviving commandant of the 1916 Easter Rising and leading politician, attempted to continue the tradition of engaging overseas audiences in Irish affairs. However, de Valera's actions as Taoiseach during World War II, paired with Ireland's policy of neutrality, severely impacted his success. Travelling to the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in 1948 to promote his renewed obsession with the reunification of Ireland, de Valera attempted to mobilise Irish populations for his cause. He also laid the foundations for the Australian and New Zealand Leagues for an Undivided Ireland. My thesis utilises letters to the editors to identify many contemporary voices who expressed opinions about de Valera's anti-partition tour. Most of them alluded to a hostile Australasian environment towards most things Irish, a stark contrast to the Home Rule era. De Valera left Dr Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea to establish the Australian and New Zealand Leagues. However, he failed to account for the impossible environment the pair faced in Australasia. I find that a combination of internal disputes and external factors, like the changing face of the Australian Catholic Church and international developments, were directly responsible for the collapse of both Leagues by 1957.

Acknowledgements

A wise person once told me that completing a Masters thesis is not a measure of intelligence, but of determination. I have found this to be true. What was an already challenging year was further complicated by the conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, and as such, I am indebted to a number of people for their unwavering support throughout this process. I would like to thank my brother, Tom Wilkinson, and his partner, Ella McNeill, for their endless support and words of encouragement. I must also thank my parents for teaching me to follow my passions and providing unwavering love and support while I do so. I am especially grateful to my friend, Maya Hay, who has dedicated hours of time and energy into supporting and assisting me throughout the writing process. Last, but certainly not least, I wish to acknowledge my supervisor, Professor Malcolm Campbell, who has been a steady pillar of guidance throughout the year, redirecting me when I strayed too far off-track and helping me develop this thesis into something I am happy to submit.

Table of Contents

Introduction

'Ireland is a small nation, but it has a very long arm. Evidently, it reaches to New York, and I can assure you it reaches to Melbourne also; and though you have given so warm a welcome to the President of the Irish Republic, I can assure him from my own knowledge that your welcome is not more enthusiastic or warm than the welcome he will get in Melbourne if he ever reaches there.'

– Archbishop Daniel Mannix, 18 July 1920[1]

Amidst the Irish War of Independence (1919–1921), and a vigorous renewal of Irish American enthusiasm for the Irish fight for autonomy, Melbourne's Archbishop Dr Daniel Mannix championed Eamon de Valera's international influence to a crowd of 15,000 people at a rally at Madison Square Garden in New York on 18 July 1920. The only surviving commandant of the 1916 Easter Rising and President of Sinn Féin, de Valera continued the Irish tradition of seeking international support for domestic issues, travelling to the United States in 1919 to 'obtain a loan of about $5,000,000' for, and secure the American government's recognition of, the provisional Irish Republic.[2] Mannix had recently arrived in the United States to undertake a lecture tour, supported by a network of Irish republican supporters, before travelling to Rome for his compulsory *ad limina* visit. As an outspoken and devoted Irish nationalist, it was little surprise that Mannix was quick to become co-opted to de Valera's cause.[3] The two men had met for the first time just a few weeks prior, yet here Mannix was, claiming overwhelming support on behalf of Melbourne's Irish population.[4]

---

[1] Quoted in Malcolm Campbell, 'Mannix in America: Archbishop Daniel Mannix's Address at Madison Square Garden, New York, 18 July 1920', *The Australian Journal of Irish Studies*, 5, 2005, p.98.
[2] Francis M. Carroll, *American Opinion and the Irish Question 1910–1923: A Study in Opinion and Policy*, Gill and Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, Dublin; New York, 1978, p.150.
[3] Michael Gilchrist, *Daniel Mannix: Wit and Wisdom*, Freedom Publishing, Melbourne, 2004, p.89; Campbell, 'Mannix', p.97.
[4] Campbell, 'Mannix', p.99.

What was it about Eamon de Valera that captured the idealistic imagination of Mannix and many others in the United States at this point in time? Carroll describes de Valera as such: '[his] travels throughout America, more than any event since the 1916 Rising, dramatized for the American people the dimensions of the Irish struggle.'[5] In fact, de Valera was 'such an effective publicist and agitator' that it was against the British government's interests that he returned to Ireland.[6]

Twenty-eight years later, as Mannix had hoped, Eamon de Valera reached Melbourne. In 1948, de Valera, having led neutral Ireland during World War II, found himself as Leader of the Opposition; his constitutional republican party, Fianna Fáil, was defeated for the first time since 1932. De Valera and Frank Aiken, former Minister of Finance, took this opportunity to travel to the United States, New Zealand, and Australia to attempt to mobilise their Irish populations for specific objectives in Irish politics. De Valera's particular focus was the division of Ireland. One of his efforts for the anti-partition cause was the creation of the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland.

Interestingly, Dev's reception was not as warm or enthusiastic as Mannix had predicted. In the tradition of previous nationalist visits, de Valera was feted in the United States, Australia, and New Zealand by leading figures. As he had in the United States 28 years ago, de Valera 'addressed large public audiences, describing the iniquities of British rule in Ireland [and] the inherent right of Ireland to be free'.[7] However, the key audience, the Irish Catholic diaspora, failed to celebrate de Valera as they had previous visiting Irish dignitaries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Some people brushed de Valera off, a *West Australian* journalist did, who described de Valera as, 'a retired Taoiseach

[5] Carroll, p.150.
[6] Carroll, p.150.
[7] Carroll, p.150.

working for a comeback"'.[8] Others were infuriated by his presence.[9] Both Irish Americans and the Australasian Irish struggled with the violent history of the Irish Question and Ireland's recent neutrality during World War II.[10] In stark contrast to his 1919–1920 tour, the British Foreign Office in 1948 believed that 'Irish Americans were 'slightly less frenzied' than they had been in the past'; in Australia and New Zealand, diplomats reported little interest from antipodean audiences.[11] The lukewarm reception de Valera received set him up with a challenging landscape to establish the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland, something that the Leagues would not recover from.

The Irish in Australia and New Zealand have attracted extensive interest from historians, in which they explored different facets of the Irish immigrant experience. Broad sweeping histories like that of Patrick O'Farrell's *Irish in Australia* have explored the Irish immigrants' lasting legacy in their chosen societies.[12] The substantial Irish presence among the convict population of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries has been one area of focus. Another has been the period following the Great Famine to the early twentieth century (1850–1918).[13] Large numbers of Irish immigrated to Australasia during this time,

[8] *West Australian* (WA), 13 May 1948, p.2. Accessed via Trove: www.trove.nla.gov.au. All Australian newspapers accessed through Trove.
[9] *Otago Daily Times* (ODT), 20 May 1948, p.6. Accessed via Papers Past: www.paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers. All New Zealand newspapers (except *New Zealand Tablet*) accessed through Papers Past; *Courier-Mail* (CM), 4 June 1948, p.3.
[10] David Brundage, *Irish Nationalists in America: The Politics of Exile, 1798–1998*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, pp.178–86; Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's New Worlds: Immigrants, Politics, and Society in the United States and Australia, 1815–1922*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2007, pp.181–2; Rory Sweetman, ''How to behave among Protestants': Varieties of Irish Catholic Irish Catholic Leadership in Colonial New Zealand', in Brad Patterson, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts & Perspectives*, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Wellington, 2002, pp.152–153.
[11] Troy Davis, 'Anti-partitionism, Irish America and Anglo American Relations, 1945–51', in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: From Independence to Internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, p.195; Stephen Kelly, 'A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera's Anti-Partition Campaign, 1949–1951', *Études Irlandaises*, 36, 2 (2011), p.4.
[12] Patrick O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1987; Diane Hall and Elizabeth Malcolm, *A New History of the Irish in Australia*, Cork University Press; NewSouth Publishing, Cork; Sydney, 2019; Jock Phillips and Terry Hearn, *Settlers: New Zealand Immigrants from England, Ireland and Scotland 1800–1945*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2008.
[13] Donald Harman Akenson, *Half the World from Home: Perspectives on the Irish in New Zealand 1860–1950*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1990; Richard Davis, *Irish Issues in New Zealand Politics, 1868–1922*, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 1974; Angela McCarthy, *Scottishness and Irishness in New Zealand since 1840*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011.

tempted by government-assisted immigration schemes and promises of a better life; between 1861 and 1880, over ten per cent of Irish emigrants were Australasia-bound.[14] As the Canadian historian of Irish emigration, Donald Harman Akenson notes, 'the years 1870–90, and particularly the years 1871–85, were critically important in determining New Zealand's social mix'.[15] In Australia, the Irish exerted significant influence as a large minority population; in 1891, they made up 6.1 per cent of the total non-indigenous population.[16] But leading up to and following World War I, Irish immigrant numbers dropped significantly, which explains the trend of historians' interest in these diaspora populations following suit in a delayed fashion.[17]

The period after the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921) sees a gap in historiography, particularly in the Australasian space. Immigration historian Malcolm Campbell demonstrates this tendency with his book *Ireland's New Worlds*.[18] While it is a comprehensive transnational analysis of the Irish in the United States and Australia from 1815, Campbell stops short of exploring the Australian scene beyond the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty and the beginning of the Irish Civil War in 1922. In his words, 'the Irish and their descendants in the United States and Australia faced new struggles for their own and their children's advancement. These, rather than matters Irish, became the principal concern and predominant focus of attention for the future.'[19] However, historians' decision to end the story of the Australasian Irish diaspora's engagement with the Irish Question in the 1920s leaves a substantial gap, until others resume the story with the renewal of domestic Irish

[14] The numbers were large by Australian and New Zealand standards but not by the overall scale of Irish emigration. Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's Farthest Shores: Mobility, Migration, and Settlement in the Pacific World*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2022, pp.90–91.
[15] Akenson, p.24.
[16] Hall and Malcolm, pp.94–95.
[17] McCarthy, pp.212–13.
[18] Campbell, *New Worlds*, pp.159–82.
[19] Campbell, *New Worlds*, p.182.

militant republicanism from the early 1950s.[20] Part of the reason for this omission in the scholarship rests in the wider historiography of the period.

Understandably, the Great Depression of the 1930s and World War II tends to dominate the national historiographies of Australia, New Zealand, and, indeed, Ireland. O'Farrell illustrates elements of this in his personal reflection on the Irish in New Zealand and Australia, *Vanished Kingdoms*. O'Farrell briefly explores his aunt's experience of New Zealand during the Great Depression, using it as an entry point into exploring Irish emigrants' attitudes towards Ireland. He finds that feelings of betrayal, rejection and anger were common, with many Irish emigrants asking, "What has Ireland done for me?".[21] His work remains one of the rare instances of historians seeking out links to Ireland in the interwar period. This gap in historiography also highlights the loss of enthusiasm for Ireland, shared by the Irish-born and their historians. Both the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, signifying to many some sense of resolving the Irish Question, and the negative attitudes towards the Irish Civil War will have played a part in this lessening engagement.[22] Although there was lessening international engagement, it does not mean there are not stories to be explored – the absence of engagement with the Irish Question is as telling as its presence.

A rich vein in scholarship on the Irish diaspora over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been the impact of Irish nationalist politics, especially the travels of Irish politicians.[23] F.S.L. Lyons' biography of John Dillon remains a key work in the field.

---

[20] Ruán O'Donnell, 'The Australian Press and the IRA Border Campaign, 1956–62', in Laurence M. Geary and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, pp.224–39.
[21] Patrick O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms: Irish in Australia and New Zealand: A Personal Excursion*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1990, pp.160–3.
[22] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, pp.287–288; Seán Brosnahan, 'Parties or Politics: Wellington's IRA 1922-1928', in Brad Patterson, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts & Perspectives*, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Wellington, 2002, pp.67–68.
[23] F.S.L. Lyons, *John Dillon: A Biography*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968; Carla King, *Michael Davitt*, University College Dublin Press, Dublin, 2009; Malcolm Campbell, 'John Redmond and the Irish National League in Australia and New Zealand, 1883', *History: The Journal of the Historical Association* (HJHA), 86, 283 (2001), pp.348–362; Malcolm Campbell, 'Michael Davitt's Pacific World', *Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies* (JISS), 4, 1 (2010), pp.131–143.

Lyons was permitted access to Dillon's personal papers, aiding him in constructing the Irish politician's life story.[24] Carla King remains the expert on Michael Davitt, with several publications exploring different facets of the Irish politician's career. The aptly titled book, *Michael Davitt*, particularly highlights the amount of travelling Davitt did in his lifetime, both as a politician and an individual. However, the travels of Irish nationalists following the 1916 Rising struggled to gain the same attention from historians. Thus, while historians have interrogated the lives of some Irish politicians, there is a significant hole in which other Irish dignitaries were not as considered.

Mirroring the wider historiographical neglect of the post-World War I era, academic attention to political missions also declined. Barring exceptions such as Dianne Hall's examination of activists Kathleen Barry and Linda Kearns's Australasian tour in 1924, the nationalist story of international engagement received relatively little attention after 1918.[25] This can be partially attributed to the growing disillusionment of overseas audiences with Irish politics specifically, but it remains a crucial part of the story nonetheless. As republican activists, the women followed the lead of previous Irish dignitaries; they organised speaking engagements and fundraised for their cause, the Irish Republican Prisoners' Dependants' Fund.[26] Hall argues that the Irish women's tour was successful, not only in their fundraising but also in 'bridging the divisions that had formed within Irish-Australian communities over the Civil War'.[27] Hall's article on Barry and Kearns attempts to remedy this gap in the literature examining post-Rising Irish nationalists and their attempts at international engagement.

[24] Lyons, p.ix.
[25] Diane Hall, 'Irish republican women in Australia: Kathleen Barry and Linda Kearns's tour in 1924–5', *Irish Historical Studies* (IHS), 43, 163, 2019, pp.73–93.
[26] Hall, p.73.
[27] Hall, p.93.

Eamon de Valera was among the ranks of the travelling Irish politicians, and historians have dedicated ample attention to his American tour.[28] Born in New York in 1882 to Vivion de Valera, a Spanish musician, and Catharine, nee Coll, of Bruree in County Limerick, de Valera was sent to Ireland at age two with his maternal uncle, Edmund Coll.[29] De Valera joined the Gaelic League, the Irish Volunteers and then the IRB, eventually charged with leading the Third Battalion in the 1916 Easter Rising.[30] As the only surviving commandant of the Rising, de Valera was elected President of Sinn Féin following his release from prison in 1917. After the party captured 73 out of 105 Irish seats in British parliament in the 1918 general election and subsequently established a new Irish Parliament (Dáil Éireann) in Dublin in January 1919, de Valera was elected as President of the proclaimed Irish Republic.[31] He then travelled to the United States, in pursuit of American funding and support for the proclaimed Republic.[32] While de Valera was drawn back home amidst the violence of the Irish War of Independence, his American tour established him as an internationally aware politician, and simultaneously laid the foundational connections for his future travels.

After World War II and ousted from his role as Taoiseach, 'Dev', as he was popularly known, was on the road again. Once more he was travelling to garner support for his cause, his renewed obsession focused on securing a reunited Ireland. His post-World War II tour was important for three reasons: its point within his career, Ireland's post-World War II international standing, and reconnecting with Irish diaspora. Two historians in particular have used de Valera's 1948 anti-partition tour as an avenue to focus on developments in post-war

[28] Carroll, pp.149–76; Alan Ward, *Ireland and Anglo-American Relations, 1899–1921*, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1969; Brundage, pp.156–62.
[29] Tim Pat Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, pp.73–74.
[30] Fearghal McGarry, *The Rising: Ireland: Easter 1916*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp.129–130, 133.
[31] Brundage, pp.147–8.
[32] Campbell, *New Worlds*, p.178.

Irish politics.[33] In an article that focuses on de Valera as a politician, Rory O'Dwyer claims that through his anti-partition propagandising efforts Dev confirmed his status as both an international statesman and 'a custodian of republican virtue'; without the 1948 tour, de Valera may not have survived in the political arena.[34] Stephen Kelly's article follows de Valera's global anti-partition propaganda efforts throughout 1948 and 1949. Kelly argues that even accounts written by influential historians like John Bowman only briefly touch on de Valera's anti-partition tour.[35] Kelly claims that his article is the first to provide a 'comprehensive analysis of de Valera's world-wide anti-partition campaign'.[36] By using more recently available sources like de Valera's personal papers, Kelly is able to bring more depth to the story of Dev's post-war international travels. However, the article's focus is strictly on de Valera's tour and does not investigate its lasting effects on the diaspora communities following his departure.

So, what happened in Australia and New Zealand after de Valera left? Broader histories about Irish nationalism and diaspora have afforded passages to De Valera's legacy, the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland.[37] Until now, O'Farrell provides the only in-depth story of the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland (ALUI), and it proves a persuasive one. In his article, 'Irish Australia at an end: the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland, 1948–54', O'Farrell uses myriad correspondence to and from Dr Albert Dryer, founder and secretary of the New South Wales branch, to construct the story of the

[33] Rory O'Dwyer, ''A roof-raising affair'? Éamon de Valera's Tour of Australia and New Zealand', in Laurence M. Geary and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, pp.211–23; Kelly, pp.1–13.
[34] O'Dwyer, pp.221–2.
[35] Kelly, p.1; John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973*, Clarendon Press, Oxford; New York, 1982, p.274.
[36] Kelly, p.1.
[37] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, pp.210–12; O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, pp.304–5; Stephanie James, 'Varieties of Irish nationalism in South Australia, 1839–1950: Changing terms of engagement', in Susan Arthure, Fidelma Breen, Stephanie James and Dymphna Lonergan, eds., *Irish South Australia: New histories and insights*, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 2019, p.208; Patrick O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand, 1870–1990' in W.E. Vaughan, and UPSO, eds., *A New History of Ireland. Volume VI, Ireland under the Union, II, 1870–1921*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.722.

ALUI.[38] O'Farrell analyses reasons for the ALUI's failure, including Irish-Australian apathy and the broader failure of the international anti-partition movement.[39] However, his assertions are not without blind spots. O'Farrell, a Sydney-based historian, does not consider the trans-Tasman link between the Australian and New Zealand Leagues for an Undivided Ireland (NZLUI). In his one mention of the NZLUI, O'Farrell fails to address Kathleen O'Shea by name when describing her hesitancy to contact Dryer about the organisation's failure.[40] As the secretary of the NZLUI, O'Shea played a crucial role in attempting to sustain the League in New Zealand, and certainly deserved more than O'Farrell's superficial consideration. Malcolm Campbell, in his recently published book, *Ireland's Farthest Shores*, improves on O'Farrell's attempt by exploring Dryer and O'Shea's correspondence, providing a fuller picture of the trans-Tasman link.[41] Yet Campbell does not provide further analysis as to why the NZLUI, like the ALUI, failed – a forgivable choice, given the book's broad scope.

This thesis investigates de Valera's 1948 tour, focusing on the Australian and New Zealand legs, and his attempt to imprint his influence through the creation of the ALUI and NZLUI. In light of the Irish and international contexts to Dev's visit, my thesis aims to answer two questions: What were the limits to Irish political mobilisation in Australia and New Zealand in the immediate years after World War II? Why did it prove difficult or impossible for de Valera to emulate the success of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Irish delegations?

My thesis draws upon a range of secondary literature on twentieth century Irish and Australasian history, with a focus on political and diplomatic developments over the period.[42]

---

[38] Patrick O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end: the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland, 1948–54', *Tasmanian Historical Research Association: Papers and proceedings*, 21, 4 (1974), p.158.
[39] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', pp.149–55.
[40] O'Farrell, 'Irish-Australia at an end', p.149.
[41] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, pp.210-12.
[42] Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, 'The Study of Irish Foreign Policy', in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: From Independence to Internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, pp.13–24; James Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders From the 1880s to the Year 2000*, Allen Lane, Auckland, 2001; Dermot Keogh, 'Eamon de Valera and Hitler: An

Principal primary sources are correspondence on the ALUI and NZLUI between Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea, and a range of digitised newspapers from Australia and New Zealand covering the period between 1948 to 1954.[43] The incorporation of the Dryer O'Shea correspondence shines more of a light on the New Zealand context, often looked over in favour of Australia's experience, by allowing an insight into the difficulties faced by O'Shea in starting the New Zealand League. The broader time period paired with the case study of the ALUI and NLZUI failures is used to explore a range of significant themes in terms of the history of the Irish and of Irish in other places, outlined in the overview of Chapter Three.[44]

In the thesis that follows, I first address the background and diplomatic dimensions leading up to de Valera's anti-partition tour in 1948. I explore the broader role of political tours in Irish nationalist campaigns, stretching back to the Redmonds' tour of New Zealand and Australia in 1883. Ireland boasted a tradition of seeking international support for internal issues, with Irish dignitaries like the Redmond brothers, John Dillon, and Michael Davitt touring the United States and Australasia over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to promote Irish Home Rule. De Valera continued this trend following the 1916 Easter Rising, recognising the importance of seeking international recognition of the Irish Free State, particularly from the United States. However, following the outbreak of World War II in 1939, de Valera turned his focus inwards to Irish affairs when he implemented a policy of neutrality. It is here that Ireland's international support suffered – going from increasingly engaged from the 1880s to isolated and ostracized by 1945.

Analysis of International Reaction to the Visit to the German Minister, May 1945', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* (ISIA), 3, 1 (1989), pp.69–92.

[43] I was limited in access to some primary sources, namely the Frank Aiken and Eamon de Valera papers, and prolonged lockdowns limited the ability for me to freely access the Albert Dryer papers. Letters between Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea, Papers of Albert Dryer, National Library of Australia, MS 6610, Series 4, Box 4, Folder 8.

[44] This thesis covers a significant period of time, particularly concerning Irish developments over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, this is not my thesis's focus. I reference key historical events in order to tell the story of de Valera's tour, particularly in Chapter One, but I do not seek to engage with a history that has been covered extensively, and far more effectively, by myriad other historians.

In Chapter Two, I examine de Valera's international tour, focusing on his travels to the United States, Australia and New Zealand, and his ambition to develop the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland. Losing the 1948 Irish general election allowed him the time and opportunity to re-engage with international audiences. However, Dev underestimated the challenge that lay ahead of him. He had failed to recognise just how negatively the international community reacted to Irish actions during World War II – even amongst sympathetic Irish audiences.

Finally, in Chapter Three, I work to develop the story of the Australian and New Zealand Leagues in de Valera's absence. Despite the drive of Dr Albert Dryer, a devout follower of de Valera and Irish republicanism, and Kathleen O'Shea, the ambition for a trans-Tasman anti-partition movement struggled to get off the ground in Australia and New Zealand. Ultimately, a combination of internal disputes amongst organisers, and external issues like Irish disengagement with the partition cause and other world affairs taking precedent in the minds of most of the population led to the failure of the ALUI and NZLUI within years of its formation.

Chapter One – Following Tradition: Irish International Engagement, 1883–1948

Eamon de Valera's tour to reignite international engagement with critical questions of Irish identity and affairs made a lot of sense, given the long and colourful history of Irish dignitaries travelling globally to garner support for their cause. To foreground his tour, this chapter addresses the trajectory of Irish international relations from Home Rule until post-World War II, focused primarily on nationalist connections with Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The function of this layout is to help explain some of the difficulties de Valera faced when he attempted to reignite international support for the anti-partition movement in 1948. Within the chapter, critical issues are highlighted that contributed to the eventual failure of the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland in the 1950s.

Home Rule

The tradition of Irish politicians seeking international support for their causes was not a novel one. In the late nineteenth century, Charles Stewart Parnell, leader of the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), saw an opportunity in using global Irish networks to bolster support for Irish Home Rule.[1] Following British suppression of the Irish Land League and the subsequent establishment of the Irish National League in October 1882, Parnell's focus narrowed to the attainment of Irish Home Rule; agrarian reform was demoted to a secondary aim.[2] Parnell's redirection required a corresponding adjustment from Irish populations overseas in order to remain supportive of the cause "back home". Drawing inspiration from his own successful mission to the United States two years earlier, Parnell sent John and

[1] David Brundage, *Irish Nationalists in America: The Politics of Exile, 1798–1998*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, p.112.
[2] Brundage, p.124.

William Redmond – IPP members and Home Rule enthusiasts – on a tour of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in 1883–4.[3] They aimed to educate overseas audiences about the new Home Rule program and generate funds for the cause.[4] The Redmond brothers toured Australia for ten months, with a three-week interlude in New Zealand in October 1883.

Despite facing hostility from some factions, the Redmond brothers succeeded in generating interest and support for the Home Rule cause from Australian and New Zealand audiences. Middle- and upper-class Irish Australians, the clergy, and the metropolitan press were all cold towards John and William Redmond. The hostility was especially acute following the assassination of Lord Frederick Cavendish, Chief Secretary of Ireland, and Thomas Bourke, Cavendish's Under-Secretary in Phoenix Park, Dublin in May 1882. The murders resurrected fears of physical force nationalism and incited outrage across Britain and its empire.[5] In February 1883, a week after the Redmond brothers arrived in Australia, the Australian press began reporting on the court proceedings of the Phoenix Park murders. Evidence emerged that linked the Irish National League to the murders.[6] Despite repeatedly denying both personal and the League's involvement, these allegations followed the Redmond brothers throughout the tour and cast suspicion over the Irish National League and its Home Rule campaign.[7] Similar concerns reigned in New Zealand, with Roman Catholic bishops and Liberal and Irish politicians initially avoiding the Redmond meetings.[8] But throughout their ten-month stint in the Pacific, the Irish pair talked at over 200 meetings

[3] Brundage, pp.112-13.
[4] Malcolm Campbell, 'John Redmond and the Irish National League in Australia and New Zealand, 1883', *History: The Journal of the Historical Association* (HJHA) 86, 283 (2001), pp.351.
[5] Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's Farthest Shores: Mobility, Migration, and Settlement in the Pacific World*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2022, p.150.
[6] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.150.
[7] Campbell, 'Redmond', pp.356–57, 360.
[8] Richard Davis, *Irish Issues in New Zealand Politics, 1868–1922*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1974, p.102; Campbell, 'Redmond', p.355.

attended by thousands of people in towns and cities across the colonies.[9] The working-class Irish were the most prominent supporters for the new cause, turning out en masse to the Redmonds' public lectures.[10] More than £15,000 was raised for the Home Rule cause; the West Coast of New Zealand was particularly enthusiastic, with William Redmond raising £1400 from his procession through the area.[11] According to historian Malcolm Campbell, 'the cause of moderate Irish nationalism had been given a substantial fillip' by the Redmonds' visit.[12] While enthusiasm for Home Rule lessened when the Irish brothers left, colonial engagement with Irish nationalism lasted. To follow the trajectory of the politics in the homeland, the Australian Irish Land League branches were disbanded and replaced by Irish National League branches. The established link to the IPP 'dominated' the next three or so decades in Australia and New Zealand 'through variously titled local organisations, Irish parliamentary delegations and strong financial commitment.'[13]

Similar developments occurred in the United States following the Redmonds' tour. Both the West and East coasts of the United States received the Redmond brothers with enthusiasm. However, Malcolm Campbell notes that the further eastward the brothers travelled, the less their message resonated with Irish American audiences; instead, they pushed for physical force, believing that 'the brothers' fine words needed reinforcement with bombs and armed force'.[14] Despite the militant attitude of some supporters, engagement with the Home Rule cause and Irish nationalism more broadly remained high after the Redmond brothers left in 1884. Much like in New Zealand and Australia, the Irish National League of America replaced the American Land League. According to David Brundage, it was

[9] Davis, *New Zealand*, pp.102–4.
[10] Campbell, 'Redmond', pp.350, 357.
[11] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.103; Campbell, 'Redmond', pp.358, 360.
[12] Campbell, 'Redmond', p.360.
[13] Stephanie James, 'Varieties of Irish nationalism in South Australia, 1839-1950: Changing terms of engagement', in Susan Arthure, Fidelma Breen, Stephanie James and Dymphna Lonergan, eds., *Irish South Australia: New histories and insights*, Mile End, South Australia, 2019, p.200.
[14] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.153.

'dominated completely by members of the Clan na Gael' – the successor of the Fenian Brotherhood.[15] Displeased with the revolutionary and militant attitude of those in control, a group of more moderate (and more affluent) Irish Americans led by Irish-born banker Eugene Kelly established the Irish Parliamentary Fund Association.[16] Despite their differences, funds sent from both groups helped finance 'the parliamentary fight for Home Rule'.[17] Brundage argues convincingly that, '…the Home Rule leaders John and William Redmond did much to make their party the apparent voice of a tightly linked Irish diaspora.'[18] The Redmonds' success demonstrated the progress of Irish issues, like Home Rule, significantly benefitted from international tours.

Despite the failure of the first Home Rule Bill on 8 June 1886 – 341 votes against the bill, 311 votes for – Parnell and the IPP remained internationally oriented and aware.[19] Due, in large part, to the work of the Redmond brothers, the IPP had come away with a strengthened 'international network of financial and moral support' for the Irish Home Rule cause – something Parnell continued to engage with.[20] He sent a second delegation, led by John Dillon, to tour Australasia in 1889. Dillon and his delegation spent 13 months overseas, attempting to explain and generate funds for the Plan of Campaign back in Ireland, but also to re-engage international audiences with Irish Home Rule.[21] In Australia and New Zealand, they were met with great enthusiasm – more than the Redmond brothers had been six years earlier. Dillon's public speaking drew large crowds.[22] Irish New Zealanders in particular were 'greatly stimulated' by Dillon, demonstrated by the £6000 raised after 37 meetings in the colony.[23] New Zealand historian Richard Davis argues that the New Zealand public were

[15] Brundage, p.124.
[16] Brundage, p.125.
[17] Brundage, p.125.
[18] Brundage, p.125.
[19] Alvin Jackson, *Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2003, p.63.
[20] Brundage, p.125.
[21] F.S.L. Lyons, *John Dillon: A Biography*, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, London, 1968, pp.102–105.
[22] James, p.201; Davis, *New Zealand*, pp.106–7.
[23] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.111.

'well prepared' for Dillon's message as Home Rule was no longer a novel concept, in part due to the Redmond tour of 1883.[24] Dillon was blown away by the support demonstrated by New Zealand with its 'relatively sparse Irish population', as well as those in Queensland who had 'surpassed all other Australians in co-operativeness'.[25] In his biography of Dillon, F.S.L. Lyons notes that the Irish delegation raised £33,000, 'an achievement without which the Plan of Campaign could not have been carried on'.[26]

The international tours of Irish nationalists and politicians engaged directly with leading figures in Australia and New Zealand.[27] Nineteen Members of the House of Representatives attended Dillon's meetings in New Zealand; notable supporters included both Harry Atkinson, New Zealand's Premier, and John Ballance, the Irish-born leader of the opposition. Dillon also met the majority of Australia's leading political figures – his Melbourne platform was 'thronged with members of the Victorian legislature' – suggesting a friendliness expressed to the Irish dignitary that was not so present for John and William Redmond.[28] This increased political presence at events suggests bi-partisan support for the Home Rule cause on both sides of the Tasman.[29] When the renowned nationalist and land reformer Michael Davitt visited Australia and New Zealand in 1895, he also met the big names of local politics, including Richard Seddon, the Premier of New Zealand, and Edmund Barton, who would later become the Australian Commonwealth's first prime minister in 1901.[30] While locals' enthusiasm was beneficial to the Irish Home Rule cause, the greater value came from leading politicians' support in Australasia.[31] With the support of the leading

[24] Davis, *New Zealand*, pp.106–7.
[25] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.111; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.154.
[26] Lyons, p.106.
[27] Davis, *New Zealand*, pp.107–8.
[28] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.154; Lyons, p.103; James, p.201; Davis, *New Zealand*, pp.106–7, 111-12.
[29] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.111–12.
[30] Malcolm Campbell, 'Michael Davitt's Pacific World', *Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies* (JISS)*,* 4, 1 (2010), p.139; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.158.
[31] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.112.

politicians, Home Rule was a more acceptable point of consideration for Australasian audiences.

Parnell's leadership and the future of the Home Rule suffered a blow as a result of an unpredicted personal grievance made public. In the divorce proceedings between Captain W.H. O'Shea and Katharine O'Shea, Capt. O'Shea accused Katharine of having a decade-long affair with Parnell. The divorce scandal and the subsequent split of the IPP in December 1890 damaged international support for the Home Rule cause. Following five days of debate over Parnell's suitability as leader of the IPP, Parnell's deputy Justin McCarthy 'led forty-four of his colleagues away … and into schism', marking 'the beginning of a nine-year civil war within the Home Rule movement'.[32] The Home Rule movement split into two: John Redmond was voted leader of the IPP after Parnell's death in October 1891, and John Dillon was the leader of the newly formed group, the Irish National Federation (INF). As Australian historian Stephanie James describes the situation, 'overseas communities were confronted in terms of personal allegiance to Parnell, a major challenge to the previously accepted terms of engagement.'[33] In New Zealand, there lacked popular enthusiasm for the introduction of the second Home Rule Bill in 1893, even amongst the West Coast community, which had been such fervent supporters of the cause since the Redmond tour.[34] In the United States, financial support 'dried up almost overnight', with funds dropping from $1000 a week to $10 within a few days of the IPP split.[35] Australian fundraising mirrored that of the United States.[36] Historian Patrick O'Farrell argues that the divorce scandal and the subsequent factional split created a feeling of 'intense bitterness and sense of betrayal' in Australia and New Zealand alike; Parnell's actions humiliated those who had openly supported him and were now faced

[32] Jackson, p.76.
[33] James, p.202.
[34] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.114.
[35] Brundage, p.129.
[36] Brundage, pp.128–9.

with judgment 'from a critical colonial society'.[37] Overseas interest remained low for the rest of the 1890s until the reunification of the Irish Parliamentary Party under John Redmond's leadership in 1900.[38]

Despite the failure of two Home Rule Bills, the end of the Home Rule movement "civil war" reignited a sense of optimism for legislated Irish self-governance, both domestically and internationally. In Australia and New Zealand, Home Rule again became 'an increasingly acceptable cause' to support despite retaining 'controversial overtones'.[39] New Zealand received two delegations in the decade leading up to the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill, the first being John Devlin and John Donovan who visited in 1906. Davis suggests that while there was less financial support demonstrated than during Dillon's visit in 1889, in part due to the lack of fervour from the West Coast, 'enthusiasm for the Irish cause had by no means evaporated'.[40] Dillon was also a bigger name to overseas audiences than Devlin and Donovan. Regardless, the Irish dignitaries still left New Zealand happy, stating the colony had made 'a relatively larger contribution than any of the Australian states.'[41] Donovan returned in 1911 with another delegation, accompanied by Home Rule supporters Richard Hazleton and W.A. Redmond; they were again met with enthusiasm by New Zealand supporters. From 72 meetings, the trio raised approximately £10,000 for the Home Rule cause in Ireland.[42] Across the Tasman, Irish Australians were equally supportive.[43] Further afield, the newly founded United Irish League of America raised over

[37] Patrick O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand, 1870–1990' in W.E. Vaughan, and UPSO, eds., *A New History of Ireland. Volume VI, Ireland under the Union, II, 1870–1921*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.713.
[38] Jackson, pp.83–84.
[39] Seán Brosnahan, ''Shaming the Shoneens': The Green Ray and the Maoriland Irish Society in Dunedin, 1916–22', in Lyndon Fraser, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, p.118.
[40] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.124.
[41] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.126.
[42] Anna Rogers, *A Lucky Landing: The Story of the Irish in New Zealand*, Random House, Auckland, 1996, p.189.
[43] James, p.204.

£50,000 for the reunited IPP over the course of a decade. While his fundraising success led Redmond's British opponents to mock him as the "Dollar Dictator", international audiences in effect funded Redmond's Home Rule campaign.[44]

By the time the IPP had reunited in 1900 and was sending international delegations to inspire support yet again for the Home Rule cause, they faced a new issue: the United States, Australia, and New Zealand were all experiencing a drop in Irish migration numbers. For New Zealand, numbers had been consistently dropping since 1890 – a potential consequence of the government abandoning assisted migration schemes.[45] As a result, the total Irish population in New Zealand became smaller – from 10.6 per cent of the total population in 1878 to 4.1 per cent by 1911.[46] Australia experienced the same trend: the Irish-born totalled 212,633, or 9.4 per cent, of the total Australian population in 1881, and by 1911, this had dropped to 3 per cent.[47] Even the United States, the more popular destination for Irish immigrants, faced a significant drop in numbers; by 1910, they made up less than 1.5 per cent of the total population.[48] A decline in the Irish-born population, however, did not necessarily mean estrangement from Irish affairs – at least in the early twentieth century.

While there were fewer Irish immigrants, the Irish descendant population grew, and engagement continued. It becomes more difficult to examine if descendant populations remained as engaged with the Irish call for political and financial assistance as their predecessors. O'Farrell challenges the idea that children or grandchildren of Irish immigrants were more inclined to be engaged with their history, speaking both from personal experience

---

[44] Brundage, p.132.
[45] Donald Harmon Akenson, *Half the World from Home: Perspectives on the Irish in New Zealand 1860–1950*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1990, p.24.
[46] Statistics New Zealand, 'Results of a Census of the Dominion of New Zealand', 2 April 1911; www3.stats.govt.nz/historic_publications/1911-census/1911-results-census.html.; Angela McCarthy, *Scottishness and Irishness in New Zealand since 1840*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011, p.212; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.341.
[47] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.341; Malcolm Campbell, 'Emigrant Responses to War and Revolution, 1914–1921: Irish Opinion in the United States and Australia', *Irish Historical Studies* (IHS), 32, 125 (2000), p.75.
[48] Census data quoted in Campbell, 'Emigrant Responses', p.75.

and from his own research.[49] Other historians maintain that a sense of romanticism clouded Irish engagement, but it was there nonetheless. Malcolm Campbell argues that the Roman Catholic Church played a critical role here, promoting a strong sentimental attachment to Ireland through education and parish life.[50] While sentimental attachment alone would not be enough to sustain engagement with Irish issues, travelling Irish dignitaries' calls for financial aid signalled to audiences a straightforward way to help. Davis notes that while the first-generation Irish population had dropped 'sharply' by the 1906 Irish delegates' tour, there remained excitement for Home Rule from a solid proportion of the New Zealand population.[51]

After a long, carefully cultivated campaign to win and maintain the support of the overseas Irish, Irish Home Rulers were rewarded by the introduction of the third Irish Home Rule Bill in April 1912.[52] This momentous occasion was the culmination of all that the touring Irish dignitaries had done to build connections with overseas Irish, and the resultant diasporic support – those funds donated being key in sustaining the Home Rule campaign. Progress of the Home Rule Bill was slow, courtesy of stiff protest from Ulster Unionists and members of the House of Lords alike.[53] However, recent reforms under the leadership of Prime Minister Herbert Asquith in August 1911 meant that Asquith could push the Home Rule Bill through despite the Lords defeating three revisions of the bill over two years.[54] By September 1914, a month after the outbreak of World War I, Asquith had 'enacted and simultaneously postponed' Home Rule, opting to keep it so until the war ended.[55] Both

[49] Patrick O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms: Irish in Australia and New Zealand: A Personal Excursion*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1990, pp.189–97.
[50] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, pp.195..
[51] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.124.
[52] David George Boyce, *The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868–1996*, Macmillan Press; St Martin's Press, Basingstoke; New York, 1996, p.55.
[53] Boyce, p.55.
[54] Jackson, p.108.
[55] Jackson, p.141.

Australia and New Zealand welcomed the news of Home Rule passing and turned their focus to their own war efforts.[56]

From the 1880s, there was a willingness, especially from Parnell and his followers, to seek out sympathetic international audiences to Irish issues. Travelling delegations placed overseas Irish men and women directly in the conversation of Home Rule, disrupting and recentring the diaspora narrative so that it was coming directly from the source rather than through the lens of British press reports. American and Australasian audiences benefitted from these tours – they helped establish links between the Ireland and diaspora, allowing to help the Irish cause despite being physically distant from Ireland. However, the 1916 Rising changed the course of overseas Irish engagement.

1916 Rising

On Easter Monday 1916, a small number of armed revolutionaries took to the streets of Dublin in an attempt to establish an independent Irish Republic. Clashes between Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB)-led insurgents and the smaller Citizen's Army, and British government forces lasted for little over a week until the insurgents surrendered; fighting had ceased by 30 April.[57] The Irish Volunteer's Third Battalion, which Eamon de Valera led, occupied positions around Boland's Mill and Westland Row train station until overrun by British forces in the final hours of the Rising.[58] De Valera was the last Rising commandant to surrender and the only senior leader to escape execution. A key factor in his evasion of the death penalty was his American birth; the American consulate in Ireland intervened on de

[56] Campbell 'Emigrant', p.75; Rory Sweetman, ''The Importance of Being Irish': Hibernianism in New Zealand, 1869–1969', in Lyndon Fraser, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration and New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, p.146.
[57] Fearghal McGarry, *The Rising: Ireland: Easter 1916*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp.139, 142–8.; Boyce, p.59.
[58] McGarry, p.133.

Valera's behalf, raising questions about his citizenship and the legal implications of executing a foreign national.[59]

Initial Irish reaction was generally hostile towards the impulsive and violent actions of the insurgents.[60] Overseas audiences mirrored this reaction – a mixture of embarrassment, confusion, and anger.[61] In the words of Davis, the New Zealand Irish response was 'immediate and forthright' with protest meetings held in several cities and towns.[62] The *New Zealand Tablet* was 'particularly vehement in its condemnations [of the insurgents]', deeming the Rising the 'Made-in-Germany Rebellion'.[63] The rebels were viewed as ''nobodies' who were unrepresentative of Irish opinion', and were denounced by laity and clergy alike.[64] For the most part, the Irish in Australia echoed much the same opinion.[65] Australasian familiarity with those advocating for Home Rule, along with established colonial engagement with the IPP, further influenced local opinion of the Rising.[66] However, a minority approved of the Rising from the outset and seized on events in Dublin to promote a more radical agenda.

The events of 1916 saw the rise to prominence of those with whom de Valera would later seek to engineer the Australian and New Zealand Leagues for an Undivided Ireland. Albert Dryer, a Sydney-born public servant who later graduated in Medicine and Surgery from Sydney University, founded the Irish National Association in 1915. In Dryer's words, the INA's purpose was 'to propagate the principle of independence of Ireland'.[67] According

[59]Tim Pat Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p.74.
[60] There is more nuance to this claim, explored briefly by Alvin Jackson, but the majority of the Irish public were not supportive of the Rising insurgents at the outset. Jackson, p.153.
[61] Brosnahan, 'Shoneens', p.119.
[62] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.132; Sweetman, 'Hibernianism', p.148.; Jim McAloon, 'Harry Holland, *The Maoriland Worker*, and the Easter Rising', in Peter Kuchs and Lisa Marr, eds., *New Zealand's Responses to the 1916 Rising*, Cork University Press, Cork, 2020, pp.43–51.
[63] Davis, *New Zealand*, p.132; Brosnahan, 'Shoneens', p.120.
[64] Brosnahan, 'Shoneens', p.120.
[65] Patrick O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1987, pp.259–60; Malcolm Campbell, ''Too great to be unconnected with us': Reactions to the 1916 Easter Rising in the British Empire and the United States', in Peter Kuchs and Lisa Marr, eds, *New Zealand's Responses to the 1916 Rising*, pp.89–90.
[66] Campbell, '1916 Easter Rising', p.89.
[67] 'Curricula Vitarum: Albert Thomas Dryer', Albert Thomas Dryer, 'Statement Regarding Certain Events in Australia Related to the Movement for the Independence of Ireland and Based Upon First Hand Experiences of

to Patrick O'Farrell, the INA 'broke radically with Irish-Australian tradition' in its desire for an independent Irish republic instead of Home Rule.[68] Dryer was also recruited into the Australian Division of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB(A)).[69] When news of the Rising reached Australian shores, Dryer was swimming against the tide of local opinion in openly declaring his support for the Irish insurgents.[70] In the eyes of many Home Rule supporters in Australia, the Rising made 'loyalty to Ireland and loyalty to the empire mutually exclusive'.[71] In light of this, it should come as little surprise that the Australian government arrested Dryer and six other INA members in June 1918.[72] Dryer was eventually released in February 1919, facing limited employment opportunities due to of his arrest.[73] He stepped back from the INA for nearly 27 years to rebuild his life, managing to get a medical degree and not re-emerging in the society's records until 1946.[74]

However, the tide of opinion shifted as news of the heavy-handed British response spread amongst the Irish and international communities. Executions of 16 of the leading insurgents, 15 of whom were shot by firing squad, and the arrests of about 3500 others suspected of complicity came as a shock to both Home Rule leaders and the general public. Irish historian Alvin Jackson states that the public expected a few executions but the 'number and manner of the killings was not foreseen', especially given the 'mild response of the British to the risings of 1848 and 1867'.[75]

---

the Writer', WS 957, Irish Bureau of Military History: Bureau Staire Mileata 1913–1921: www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/reels/bmh/BMH.WS0957.pdf

[68] O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand', pp.715–16.

[69] Garrath O'Keeffe, 'Australia's Irish Republican Brotherhood', *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society* (JRAHS), 83, 2, (1997), p.137.

[70] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, p.259.

[71] O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand', pp.715–16.

[72] The Internments, Dryer's memoirs, p.1.

[73] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, p.276.

[74] Richard Reid, Jeff Kildea, and Perry McIntyre, ''To Foster an Irish Spirit: Writing the Centenary History of the Irish National Association', Melbourne Irish Studies Seminar, 29 June 2021: www.isaanz.org/events/miss-seminars/

[75] Jackson, p.153.

The Easter Rising unquestionably impacted Ireland's international relations. Following the signing of the armistice in November 1918, the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF), an American political group founded by Clan na Gael leaders John Devoy, Joseph McGarrity, and Daniel Cohalan in 1916, resumed its activism; FOIF held several large meetings around the United States. Notably, they sponsored a second Irish Race Convention in Philadelphia in February 1919, where a delegation was appointed to meet with the President Woodrow Wilson the following month. The aim of the meeting was to 'encourage him to raise the Irish question at the upcoming Paris peace conference'.[76] Unfortunately, the meeting did not go as planned – Wilson allegedly said to his legal advisor that he was tempted to tell the Irish Americans to 'go to hell' – but three members from the meeting were selected to 'present the case directly' at the Paris peace conference.[77] While first appearing as though progress was being made, the group's visit to Ireland hurt their chances of success at the conference. Hosted by Sinn Féin and leaders of the Dáil Éireann, the three Irish representatives delivered speeches expressing their desire for an independent republic, giving their visit 'a partisan flavor'.[78] Wilson was mortified by the Irish delegations' actions, telling his secretary, 'I have tried to help in the Irish matter but the extraordinary indiscretion of the American delegation over here has almost completely blocked everything.'[79] Wilson never mentioned Irish self-determination to British Prime Minister David Lloyd George, nor was Lloyd George interested in bringing up what he viewed as a British domestic issue to the international community.[80] Brundage argues that by failing to mention Ireland in the Treaty of Versailles, the Irish American community – particularly the FOIF – rallied against it and the proposal for a League of Nations. As a consequence, the FOIF helped shape the

[76] Brundage, pp.154–5.
[77] Brundage, pp.154–5; Carroll, pp.158–60.
[78] Brundage, p.155.
[79] Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's New Worlds: Immigrants, Politics, and Society in the United States and Australia, 1815–1922*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2007, p.178.
[80] Brundage, p.155.

'isolationism that would characterize aspects of American foreign policy in the 1920s and 1930s'.[81]

The publicity from the Rising and the sympathy extended by international audiences started to fade by 1921. The shift from the IPP to Sinn Féin in Irish governance, paired with the violence now associated with the Irish Question, generated a lapse of interest in, or for some a purposeful distancing from, Irish causes. O'Farrell argues that from as early as 1919, the Irish Republican Army's (IRA) violent campaign for Irish independence repelled most of Irish Australia: 'Very few Irish Australians wanted any association whatever with that aspect of the struggle for Irish independence which involved killing, maiming and destruction'.[82] In his article analysing the public response to the arrests of IRB(A) members (including Albert Dryer), Garrath O'Keeffe agrees with O'Farrell's assessment. O'Keeffe suggests that the majority of Irish Australians were supportive of the Irish republican ideal, but they 'could not support violence to achieve an independent Ireland'.[83] Elizabeth Malcolm and Diane Hall nuanced O'Farrell and O'Keeffe's stances. They argued that 'Catholic Irish Australians were appalled by British violence in Ireland'.[84] Supported by the Australian Labor Party, large groups of Catholic Irish Australians held protest meetings in response, demanding British withdrawal from Ireland.[85] It was Protestant Anglo-Australians politicians and newspapers that were outraged by the 'Sinn Féiners', believing that they were 'intent upon destroying the UK, if not the empire'.[86] The New Zealand Irish appeared to be more supportive of the Irish fight for independence. According to Seán Brosnahan, in New Zealand, the Catholic Irish 'had been won to the Sinn Féin cause' between 1918 and 1921.[87] The *New Zealand Tablet*

[81] Brundage, p.156.
[82] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, p.287.
[83] O'Keeffe, p.149.
[84] Elizabeth Malcolm and Diane Hall, *A New History of the Irish in Australia*, Cork University Press; NewSouth Publishing, Cork; Sydney, 2019, p.243.
[85] Malcolm and Hall, p.243.
[86] Malcolm and Hall, p.243.
[87] Brosnahan, 'Shoneens', p.130; Campbell, *New Worlds*, pp.181–2.

editor, Bishop James Kelly, played a key role in this shift.[88] But once the Treaty was signed in 1921 and ratified by the Dáil Éireann, producing a 'satisfactory outcome' for most New Zealand Irish, the Irish issue 'rapidly disappeared from New Zealand political consciousness'.[89] The same happened in Australia and the United States.[90]

The subsequent violence of the Irish Civil War (1922–1923) was the final straw for most Irish overseas. In both Australia and New Zealand, aside from small pockets of dedicated republicans, the Irish in-fighting was off-putting and humiliating.[91] Eamon de Valera, heading the anti-Treaty republicans and nominal leader of the IRA, found himself and his cause increasingly on the outskirts of popular opinion. Archbishop Daniel Mannix remained steadfast in supporting de Valera and opposing the treaty, however, Mannix was an outlier of the church as the majority of bishops backed the Irish Free State.[92] De Valera still capitalised on his friendship with Mannix, using the Australian connection to send two Sinn Féin representatives to promote and fundraise for the anti-Treaty side. Father Michael O'Flanagan and J.J. O'Kelly arrived in early 1923. After the St Patrick's Day procession in 1923, Mannix introduced O'Flanagan and O'Kelly as 'two distinguished delegates … on a mission of peace and enlightenment' for the anti-Treaty side.[93] Four months later, Australian officials arrested and deported the Irish envoys under the Immigration Act of 1920 for advocating and fundraising for the overthrowing of the established Irish Free State

[88] Sweetman, 'Hibernianism', pp.150–1.
[89] Seán Brosnahan, 'Parties or Politics: Wellington's IRA 1922–1928', in Brad Patterson, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts & Perspectives*, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Wellington, 2002, pp.67–68.
[90] Campbell, 'Emigrant Responses', p.91.
[91] Campbell, *New Worlds*, pp.181–2; O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, pp.287–8; Diane Hall, 'Irish republican women in Australia: Kathleen Barry and Linda Kearn's tour in 1924–5', *Irish Historical Studies* (IHS), 43, 163 (2019), p.75.
[92] Malcolm and Hall, p.247.
[93] Michael Gilchrist, *Daniel Mannix: Wit and Wisdom*, Freedom Publishing, Melbourne, 2004, p.113.

government.[94] The two men had also managed to alienate most of the Australian Catholic hierarchy, excepting Archbishop Mannix.[95]

In August 1923, the Anglo-Pacific diaspora met the news of the assassination of Michael Collins, leader of the provisional Irish Free State government, with horror. New Zealand Catholic newspaper, the *Month*, 'denounced [Eamon de Valera] as the leader of a gang of 'robbers and assassins'.[96] Following a similar line, Sydney's *Freeman Journal* remarked: 'The sane and decent friends of Ireland stand behind true Irish aspirations, and Ireland has expressed what her aspirations are. Those who would murder those aspirations … can expect neither sympathy nor assistance from the Irish overseas.'[97] As Malcolm Campbell observes, those who 'remained loyal to de Valera and an undivided republic … faced a lonely road ahead.'[98] The violence that came with the Irish Civil War solidified the distancing of the Australasian Irish diaspora's from their homeland; it remained this way for a few decades to come. The prevailing sentiment was best summarised by Bishop Michael O'Farrell of Bathurst in 1923, 'No one wants to speak of the Irish question out here.'[99]

Inter-War Period (1923–1939)

The general attitude after the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and particularly after the Irish Civil War, from overseas communities was largely that Ireland's issues were now their own to deal with. This impacted their international relations going forward, making it more difficult to mobilise mass engagement with the Irish Question. Some marginal groups participated in a variety of Irish events and continued to support Ireland. One such group was the New Zealand Irish Republican Association (NZIRA). Established by Gerald Griffin in

[94] Malcolm and Hall, p.247.
[95] Hall, p.76.
[96] Sweetman, 'Hibernianism', p.152.
[97] Quoted in Campbell, *New Worlds*, p.182.
[98] Campbell, *New Worlds*, p.182.
[99] Quoted in O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand', p.721.

May 1924, the NZIRA failed to generate interest in Irish republican affairs: branches struggled to open and fundraising attempts were hopeless.[100] At barely 21 years of age, Griffin was the leading force in promoting the Irish Republican cause; this alone gives a sense of how uninterested the New Zealand population was in Ireland's affairs.

Travelling Irish republican envoys from this point onwards faced a more hostile environment to achieve the same levels of success as the IPP's Home Rule tours pre-1916 Rising. De Valera reconnected with Mannix once more in 1924 when he sent another delegation to Australia after the Irish Civil War: republican activists Kathleen Barry and Linda Kearns in October 1924.[101] Barry was an active member of Cumann na mBan, the Irish republican women's paramilitary organisation affiliated with the IRA, and Kearns was a trained nurse who had participated in the 1916 Rising, Irish War of Independence, and the Irish Civil War.[102] Despite their anti-Treaty associations, both women were exceptionally well-received by their Australian audience, as they were perceived as 'less politically dangerous' than Dev's previous delegation.[103] Fundraising for a charity, the Irish Republican Prisoners' Dependants' Fund, the women manipulated contemporary gender expectations and used their political skills to be 'able to pitch successfully their appeals to audiences who held differing views on Irish politics and Irish-Australian contribution to them.'[104] At de Valera's request, Gerald Griffin of the NZIRA tried to raise money for Kearns and Barry. Unfortunately, Griffin was only able to generate £157 – a miniscule sum compared to the £8000 the women raised themselves on their four-month tour of Australia.[105] It appears that despite the illusion of hostility, Australasian Irish communities were still receptive to some Irish issues – dignitaries just had to find an effective way to access the audience's affinities.

[100] Brosnahan, 'Parties or Politics', pp.71–72.
[101] Hall and Malcolm, p.247.
[102] Hall, pp.77–78.
[103] Hall, p.93.
[104] Hall, pp.74, 93.
[105] Brosnahan, 'Parties or Politics', pp.71–72; Hall, p.74.

However, political developments in Ireland in the 1930s did not lend themselves to Commonwealth sympathies. Fianna Fáil's replacement of Cumann na nGaedheal in 1932 and Eamon de Valera's election as Taoiseach signalled a shift in Ireland's political climate. After nearly a decade of a somewhat cooperative Irish government, Britain now had to confront an administration led by de Valera, a known agitator against the British government.[106] De Valera's new government engaged in protectionist policies for the Irish Free State. One of their first actions taken was refusing to pay land annuities to Britain, a carry-over policy from the land purchase acts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[107] The Fianna Fáil government also implemented several legislative acts in an attempt to loosen ties with Britain, the most notable being the elimination of the oath of allegiance to the Crown in 1933, and the External Relations Act of 1936, which allowed external association with the Commonwealth. These were stepping stones to de Valera's *pièce de résistance*, the Constitution of Ireland, which he introduced in 1937.[108] The Constitution made Ireland an independent republic 'in all but name'.[109]

Other dominions were initially sympathetic to Britain when de Valera's onslaught on the 1921 treaty settlement began in 1933. However, by January 1937, the dominions favoured an Irish settlement. They recognised that the land annuities dispute between the Irish Free State and Britain was 'obviously political', so the sooner it was resolved, the better for the Commonwealth's image.[110] At a meeting of the Imperial Conference in London in May 1937, Stanley Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, expressed that the

[106] Boyce, pp.86–87.
[107] Boyce, pp.86–87.
[108] Boyce, p.87.
[109] Ronan Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review', *Irish Studies in International Affairs* (ISIA), 1, 3 (1982), p.29.
[110] Boyce, p.88.

new Irish constitution should be accepted with minimal fuss to ensure 'marvellous cooperation in the commonwealth'.[111]

After a period of bitter dispute between Britain and Ireland, particularly over trade issues, a final settlement between the two countries was reached in early 1938. Unimpressed but wanting a resolution, Neville Chamberlain's British government agreed to the following: the return of Irish naval bases that had been under British control since the 1921 Treaty; the end of the economic war; and a comprehensive trade agreement that allowed most Irish goods free entry into the British market, with a 'less favourable reciprocal arrangement for British goods'.[112] By returning complete control of the treaty ports to the Irish Free State, de Valera claimed that it 'finally establishes Irish sovereignty over the twenty-six counties and the territorial seas'.[113] It also laid down the foundation for Irish neutrality in the coming war.[114]

World War II and Beyond

At the outbreak of World War II (colloquially known in Ireland as the Emergency) in 1939, Eamon de Valera's Ireland declared its neutrality. On paper, Irish foreign policy operated as "true" neutrality but in practice it favoured the Allied Forces. When the United States entered the war after the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbour in late 1941, de Valera restated Ireland's policy: 'The policy of the state remains unchanged. We can only be a friendly neutral. From the moment this war began, there was for this state only one policy possible – neutrality.'[115] Historian Dermot Keogh describes the British and American attitude as a reluctant acceptance of Ireland as a friendly neutral; the British and American press displayed some antagonism towards Ireland, but this was the case for any neutral power

[111] Boyce, p.88.
[112] Boyce, p.90.
[113] Quoted in Fanning, p.30.
[114] Fanning, p.30.
[115] Quoted in Dermot Keogh, 'Eamon de Valera and Hitler: An Analysis of International Reaction to the Visit to the German Minister, May 1945', ISIA, 3, 1 (1989), p.70.

during the war. In Australia and New Zealand, there were stronger feelings of disillusionment towards the Irish declaration of neutrality.[116] But by early 1945, there had been no catastrophic misstep from Ireland that deemed international relations unsalvageable post-World War II – Keogh notes that the Irish government simply had to 'keep a low profile and work towards the establishment of harmonious relations with the allied powers in the immediate aftermath of the war.'[117] Notwithstanding de Valera's claim to have maintained 'friendly neutrality' favouring the Allies, his decision to visit Eduard Hempel contravened the expectations of a neutral state.

Upon hearing the news of Adolf Hitler's death in May 1945, de Valera visited the private residence of Hempel, head of the German legation in Dublin, to express his condolences. De Valera feared that by not treating Hitler's death as he would any other death of head of state, he would open Ireland to international criticism of its neutrality.[118] De Valera also held Hempel in high regard and felt that it would be disrespectful if he did not offer the diplomat his condolences. However, other neutral democracies, like Switzerland, correctly adhered to cultural expectations of neutrality by doing nothing. Coming just months after the discovery of Nazi concentration camps in Europe by Allied troops, there appeared a general understanding amongst the Allied forces and other neutral powers that Hitler was not 'an average head of state'.[119] Understandably, de Valera's gesture set off a wave of angry criticism around the world.

Word of de Valera's visit travelled quickly. The *Irish Press* first reported de Valera's visit on 3 May 1945. Only a few hours later Iveagh House, the headquarters of the Irish Department of External Affairs in Ireland, received a telegram regarding the reaction in the

[116] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.211; O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.224; *Press* (PR), 25 September 1939, p.8; *Evening Post* (Wellington) (EPW), 7 May 1941, p.8; *New Zealand Herald* (NZH), 9 July 1941, p.6.
[117] Keogh, 'Hitler', p.71.
[118] Keogh, 'Hitler' p.73.
[119] Keogh, 'Hitler', p.75.

United States: 'Radio Commentator announced item in bitter and caustic tone. Although similar action by Portugal is reported Chief gets headlines in all papers seen. Particularly because of horror atrocity stories of German prison camps during past months. Anti-German feeling was never so bitter here as now.'[120] It is important to note that at this time, Portugal was operating as part of what Keogh calls the 'rightist 'Catholic bloc'' (during the war), something that Ireland did not want to be perceived as part of.[121] Negative reaction towards de Valera's visit reverberated internationally.[122] In his Victory in Europe (VE) Day speech on 8 May 1945, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill stated that they had 'left the Dublin government to frolic with the Germans and later with the Japanese representatives to their hearts' content.'[123] Regardless of de Valera's justifications, serious damage had been done to international relationships by his visit to Hempel. It strengthened what Keogh calls the 'image of a narrow-minded nationalist clinging to his Celtic ideology' as the rest of the democratic world engaged in the fight against fascism.[124]

De Valera's actions, prompted by his understanding of neutrality, had rankled the emerging power players in the post-war international community. The United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) vetoed Ireland's application to the United Nations (UN) in 1946 and continued to do so until 1955. Australian historian Kevin Molloy argues the USSR vetoed Ireland's application because of its neutrality during World War II.[125] Alternatively, both Dermot Keogh and Irish historian Tim Pat Coogan suggest the USSR was concerned with the power balance between the Eastern and Western blocs in the UN; Ireland's rejection was collateral damage in the USSR's attempt to 'bargain' for the admission of a handful of

[120] Quoted in Keogh, p.75.
[121] Keogh, p.80.
[122] Keogh, pp.80–86.
[123] Quoted in Fanning, p.32.
[124] Keogh, 'Hitler' p.89.
[125] Kevin Molloy, 'Tradition, Memory and The Culture of Irish-Australian Identity, 1900–1960', *Australasian Journal of Irish Studies*, 16 (2016), p.57.

Eastern bloc countries.[126] Either way, Ireland's failure to win membership of the UN dealt a serious blow to their aspirations for international reconnection.

But de Valera recognised, to some degree, that action was needed to reconnect with the rest of the world post-World War II. He took steps towards cultivating this international connection. One such effort was establishing new diplomatic posts overseas such as the appointment of T.J. Kiernan as minister plenipotentiary to Australia in 1946.[127] Additionally, de Valera's poor choice of actions as Taoiseach and Minister for External Affairs during the war forced the Department of External Affairs to evolve into an effective branch of government that could rectify the fallout.[128] De Valera also supported Ireland's joining of the Marshall Plan in 1947. The United States and Britain had not forgotten de Valera's actions but having Ireland as an ally against the encroaching threat of the USSR and its satellite states outweighed their desire for punishment.[129] The Marshall Plan, officially named the European Recovery Programme (ERP), was that olive branch to start mending the Allies' relationship with Ireland. For de Valera's Ireland, the ERP offered a solution to its ailing post-war economy and an opportunity to broaden diplomatic horizons in lieu of UN membership.[130]

However, de Valera's renewed focus on the anti-partition cause clouded his awareness of the reality of his international influence and the potential successes of his forthcoming campaign. At the post-war Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis (conference), de Valera announced that 'a world-wide anti-partition propaganda campaign would form the basis of

[126] Coogan, p.122; Dermot Keogh, 'Epilogue: Ireland and the Diplomacy of Normalcy in Europe, 1945–48', in *Ireland & Europe 1919–1948*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1988, p.202.
[127] Rory O'Dwyer, ''A roof-raising affair'? Éamon de Valera's Tour of Australia and New Zealand', in Geary, Laurence M. and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, p.214.
[128] Keogh, 'Epilogue', p.201.
[129] Bernadette Whelan, 'Integration or Isolation? Ireland and the Invitation to Join the Marshall Plan' in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: from independence to internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, pp.204–5.
[130] Whelan, pp.209–14.

Fianna Fáil's partition policy' going forward.[131] It took three years for this tour to come to fruition, triggered by de Valera's loss at the 1948 Irish general election. But the world in which de Valera set out on his tour was different from that of pre-World War II – less engaged with all Irish matters and certainly more focused on other world affairs.

[131] Stephen Kelly, 'A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera's Anti-Partition Campaign, 1948–1951', *Études Irlandaises*, 36, 2 (2011), p.2.

Chapter Two – Eamon De Valera's Anti-Partition Tour: Mixed Reactions and Lacklustre Results

Eamon de Valera lost the 1948 Irish general election, yielding the position of Taoiseach he had occupied for the previous 16 years. Fianna Fáil lost its outright majority and could not retain control of government without a coalition agreement. The other parties, Fine Gael, Labour, National Labour, Clann na Poblachta, Clann na Talmhan and Independents, formed a coalition instead, with enough seats between them to oust Fianna Fáil from power.[1] Deputy of Fine Gael John Costello replaced De Valera as Taoiseach, and Clann na Poblachta's Seán MacBride filled the position of Minister for External Affairs.[2] Rather than staying in Ireland as Leader of the Opposition, de Valera set off on a tour of the United States, Australia, and New Zealand for three months to reignite the anti-partition movement amongst international audiences.

Emerging to face personal criticism for his choices during the war, de Valera had much work to do to rebuild affected international links. This international anti-partition tour was part of de Valera's effort. Personally, de Valera had become separated from the international community during the Emergency, when he focused on Ireland and its affairs. Ireland, too, became separated from the world. Tony Gray, a young journalist in Ireland during the Emergency, summarised the experience: 'It was a curiously claustrophobic period in which we were cut off, not merely physically but even more so mentally, from the main stream of world experience.'[3] Whether Dev's tour was a success remains a point of contention amongst historians.[4] However, it would be naïve not to acknowledge that there

[1] Tim Pat Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p.93; John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973*, Clarendon Press, Oxford; New York, 1982, pp.265–66.
[2] Bowman, pp.265–66.
[3] Tony Gray, *The Lost Years: The Emergency in Ireland 1939–45*, Little, Brown and Company, London, 1997, pp.5–6.
[4] Rory O'Dwyer, ''A roof-raising affair'? Éamon de Valera's Tour of Australia and New Zealand', in Geary, Laurence M. and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*,

were no doubt personal motivations, namely his own political ambitions, that sent de Valera overseas.[5] Nevertheless, de Valera's reasons, personal and political, were not mutually exclusive.

In this chapter, I lay out de Valera's movements during his anti-partition tour in 1948. I then examine the Australasian public's responses to the tour, using local newspapers to explore the principal perspectives that arose. The majority of local submissions cited Irish neutrality as a key issue. This was followed closely by the perception that de Valera was acting as a disruptive force on settled Irish communities. These two perspectives illustrate the lasting impact that de Valera's choices during the Emergency had on international opinion. It also helps construct a clearer picture of the difficult environment that Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea faced when tasked with establishing the Australian and New Zealand Leagues for an Undivided Ireland, respectively, after de Valera's departure.

United States

De Valera set off on the first leg of his anti-partition tour to the United States, accompanied by Frank Aiken, former Irish Minister of Finance, in early March 1948.[6] The outgoing Taoiseach's departure garnered international attention. A London-based correspondent for the Melbourne *Age* relayed the excitement at Shannon Airport, stating that 'three thousand onlookers burst the barriers … to farewell ex-Premier de Valera on his departure for the United States'.[7] The article also recognised de Valera's intention for his overseas visit – to generate international support for the end of Irish partition.[8] Wellington's *Evening Post* echoed this sentiment, as did the *New Zealand Tablet* when it eventually

Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, pp.211–23; Stephen Kelly, 'A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera's Anti-Partition Campaign, 1948–1951', *Études Irlandaises*, 36, 2 (2011), pp.1–13; Bowman, pp.275–82.
[5] Bowman, p.274.
[6] O'Dwyer, p.212.
[7] *Age* (Melbourne) (AGM), 9 Mar 1948, p.1.
[8] AGM, 9 Mar 1948, p.1.

reported on the event.[9] The world was not only aware of but engaged with de Valera's movements.

The Irish dignitaries landed in New York in the early hours of the morning on 8 March 1948.[10] Greeted at the airport by Grover Whalen, chairman of the Mayor's Reception Committee, Garth Healy, the Irish Consul General in New York, and several Irish-American society representatives, de Valera and Aiken wasted little time in getting down to business.[11] Their first day consisted of a private lunch at Gracie Mansion with the city's Irish-American mayor, William O'Dwyer, a press conference, and meetings with local Irish leaders. When asked by journalists about whether his trip was to generate sympathy for the anti-partition cause, de Valera stated that, 'he came out here at the invitation of Irish-American societies in San Francisco, to renew old acquaintances and to see old friends'.[12] However, if the issue of partition came up during his talks, he would be pleased. When pressed further, it was reported that he sharply remarked, '"I have explained that. My purpose in coming here was to accept an invitation."'[13] His reaction begs the question why he was so resistant to questions about Irish partition given the 'actual' purpose of his trip.

De Valera's official welcome to New York took place the following day. Starting from Bowling Green in the Financial District, de Valera's open car procession up Broadway to City Hall attracted a large and enthusiastic crowd.[14] According to Frank Gallagher, director of the Government Information Bureau from 1939 to 1948, the parade was 'the biggest seen

[9] Quoted in Peter Burke, *True to Ireland: Éire's 'conscientious objectors' in New Zealand in World War II*, The Cuba Press, Wellington, 2019, p.191; *New Zealand Tablet* (NZT), 26 May 1948, p.11, accessed through Holy Cross Seminary, Auckland.
[10] Note: minor discrepancies between primary and secondary sources about de Valera's arrival in New York: *New Zealand Tablet, Age,* and *New York Times* all stated de Valera's arrival as 8 March 1948, whereas Stephen Kelly's article, 'Policy of Futility', states de Valera arrived on 4 March 1948. I will be relying on newspaper reports for most dates going forward.
[11] NYT, 9 March 1948, p.1.
[12] NYT, 9 March 1948, p.1.
[13] NYT, 9 March 1948, p.1.
[14] NYT, 9 March 1948, p.1; O'Dwyer, p.212.

since the end of World War II.'[15] After being presented with honorary New York citizenship, de Valera was invited to an official luncheon at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel. In the evening, he was a guest at a private dinner hosted by Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York.[16] On 11 March 1948, before travelling to the West Coast, the Irish delegation stopped by the White House in Washington to meet with President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State, George Marshall, architect of the Marshall Plan.[17] It appears that de Valera did not mention partition in his meeting with Truman.[18] Historian Stephen Kelly suggests de Valera recognised both the limits of his influence and the residual negative attitude towards Irish actions during World War II. Ultimately, the Truman administration had 'no interest' in de Valera's anti-partition propaganda campaign.[19]

De Valera retraced his footsteps from nearly 30 years prior, travelling to California before returning to the East Coast via key Irish centres.[20] De Valera and Aiken split their time between San Francisco and Los Angeles. The West Coast Irish responded positively to the visit, turning out in large numbers to see the Irish pair. De Valera was appointed Grand Marshal of the St Patrick's Day parade in San Francisco, and was accompanied by California's governor, Earl Warren, and San Francisco's mayor Elmer Robinson; over 60,000 people joined the procession.[21] The East Coast Irish also showed up in droves for the Irish statesmen. De Valera and Aiken travelled eastwards to Chicago, an Irish stronghold, where they attended a meeting sponsored by the recently founded American League for an Undivided Ireland.[22] The meeting drew an audience of 2000 people, where they were treated

[15] Quoted in Kelly, p.2.
[16] NYT, 9 March 1948, p.1.
[17] NYT, 9 March 1948, p.1.; O'Dwyer, p.212.
[18] Kelly, p.3.
[19] Kelly, p.3.
[20] Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's Farthest Shores: Mobility, Migration, and Settlement in the Pacific World*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2022, p.202; Carroll, pp.150–60.
[21] *Advocate* (Melbourne) (ADM), 8 April 1948, p.22.
[22] *Chicago Daily Tribune* (CDT), 22 March 1948, p.22; Noel David Doyle, 'The Irish in Chicago', *Irish Historical Studies*, 26, 103 (1989), pp.293, 296; Michael F. Funchion, 'Political and Nationalist Dimensions', in

to de Valera claiming that the Irish would 'withhold any support of Britain as long as a partitioned nation existed'.[23] Other stops included Detroit, Oklahoma, Philadelphia, Boston, and Washington.[24] De Valera's arrival in Philadelphia reportedly numbered over 15,000 people.[25] In Boston, Dev was presented with the symbolic key to the city by Mayor James McCurley, who stated that de Valera had America's support in reuniting Ireland.[26] De Valera and Aiken wrapped up the American leg of the tour where they started, leaving New York for Ireland on 5 April 1948.[27]

While perhaps appearing a successful leg of the tour and a promising sign for what was to come, historians recognise that the United States, once a very strong proponent for a united Ireland, lacked the same passion for the subject in 1948.[28] The majority of Irish American nationalists had accepted the outcome of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921. While still deeply distrusting of the British, many either accepted Irish Free State leader Michael Collins's argument that 'the Free State was but a way station on the road to a republic' or recognised it was no longer their place to express an opinion – the centre of action was now firmly located in London and Dublin.[29] The big achievement was independence from Britain; being united became a 'nice-to-have'. The embarrassment and disgust felt by Irish Americans towards the infighting of the Irish Civil War confirmed their decision to distance themselves from the issue.[30] It was only truly dedicated republicans who committed themselves to the anti-partition cause from the 1920s onwards. These supporters, and Irish American

---

Lawrence J. McCaffrey, Ellen Skerrett, Michael F. Funchion and Charles Fanning, eds., *The Irish in Chicago*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1987, pp.73-78.
[23] CDT, 22 March 1948, p.22.
[24] *Washington Post* (WP), 28 March 1948, p.S11; WP, 29 March 1948, p.B2; NYT, 3 April 1948, p.30; O'Dwyer, p.212; Kelly, p.2.
[25] NYT, 28 March 1948, p.17.
[26] O'Dwyer, p.212.
[27] NYT, 4 April 1948, p.14; NYT, 6 April 1948, p.19; CDT, 6 April 1948, p.1.
[28] David Brundage, *Irish Nationalists in America: The Politics of Exile, 1798–1998*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016, pp.184–8.
[29] Brundage, pp.168–9.
[30] Brundage, p.169.

nationalism more generally, were hurt badly by rumours of IRA-Nazi dealings, and Ireland's policy of neutrality during World War II.[31] David Brundage expands on three demographic trends that also influenced Irish American nationalism in the post-war years: a decrease in Irish migration to the United States post-Great Depression, the improvement in material conditions for Irish Americans, and the process of suburbanization, where Irish Americans left concentrated Irish neighbourhoods and towns.[32] In spite of this, Rory O'Dwyer states that de Valera and Aiken were 'warmly received and entertained by ecclesiastical, state and city authorities' when they visited in 1948; they were given 'at least one opportunity of making an addresses' in each city they travelled to and were 'treated with extreme courtesy'.[33] O'Dwyer argues that de Valera's 'previous experience touring the US' benefitted the Irish dignitaries.[34] However, this warm reception did not translate to meaningful support for de Valera's anti-partition cause. Stephen Kelly argues that politically, 'de Valera's American speeches were a failure'.[35] De Valera's calls for a united Ireland seemed to fall on deaf ears; the only support he received was from the aforementioned committed republicans, from the same generation of nationalists as de Valera. Brundage also calls de Valera's anti-partition campaign a failure.[36]

Contemporaries recognised, too, that the Truman administration was no longer interested in calls for Irish unity. Britain, a close observer of developments in post-war Ireland, kept an eye on de Valera's trip to the United States. The Dominions Office in London feared that de Valera would rouse anti-British sentiment by spreading anti-partition rhetoric to an American audience, thereby adversely impacting the "special relationship" between Britain and the United States following the end of World War II. However, after

[31] Brundage, p.184.
[32] Brundage, pp.186–7.
[33] O'Dwyer, p.212.
[34] O'Dwyer, p.221.
[35] Kelly, p.3.
[36] Brundage, p.187.

monitoring de Valera's movements, the Dominions Office reported that this leg of the tour 'had little effect in influencing general United States opinion on the Irish partition issue'.[37] The Commonwealth Office reported similarly: 'Irish politics seemed to have ceased to be an issue of the moment to the mass of Americans'.[38] The American State Department echoed their British counterparts' findings, recognising de Valera's rhetoric was 'mainly for home consumption in Ireland' and therefore failed to generate anything more than sympathy amongst Irish-American audiences, with minimal motivation towards action.[39]

Australia and New Zealand

After a brief return to Ireland, de Valera and Aiken travelled to the Southern Hemisphere where they would remain for six and a half weeks. The two politicians spent the majority of their time in Australia, with a brief visit to New Zealand in late May. De Valera's announcement of his visit to Australia generated a lot of attention, reported in numerous newspapers including the *West Australian* and the Melbourne *Argus*.[40] Initial Australian reaction seemed hesitant. A writer for the Brisbane *Courier-Mail* questioned whether de Valera's Australian tour was a good idea. While recognising that it was a great opportunity for Australians to get a chance to witness the 'personality' of de Valera, the writer also recognised that his anti-partition rhetoric may stir up unnecessary animosity amongst Irish Australian audiences: 'if Mr. De Valera is still a man of peace he will not use his visit to Australia to start a quarrel here among Australians who regard some part of Ireland, be it in Eire or the Northern Counties, as their Motherland.'[41] The Newcastle District Council of Ex-servicemen's organisations also expressed concern towards de Valera's imminent tour. T.W.

[37] Quoted in Kelly, p.3.
[38] Quoted in Kelly, p.3.
[39] Bowman, p.274.
[40] *West Australian* (WA), 19 April 1948, p12; *Argus* (AR), 19 April 1948, p.3.
[41] *Courier-Mail* (CM), 20 April 1948, p.2.

Bartley, a member of the Legion of Ex-Servicemen and Women, moved a motion to send a letter of complaint to Prime Minister Ben Chifley, claiming that de Valera was 'an enemy of the Empire in sentiment and conduct' and if he were permitted to speak about partition, it might cause dissent amongst Australian audiences.[42] The motion passed unanimously.

Feelings of excitement replaced hesitancy in the newspapers upon the Irish dignitaries' arrival. De Valera and Aiken arrived in Sydney on 27 April 1948 to what several newspapers described as a 'wild welcome by Irish supporters' and an official welcoming party that included members of the Federal and State governments and representatives of the Catholic Church.[43] When the press asked de Valera about the tour's purpose, he responded that it was 'to attend the Roman Catholic centenary celebrations in Melbourne' and while he was 'willing to discuss the partition of Ireland … it was not the primary purpose of his visit'.[44] According to the Melbourne *Herald*, de Valera noted that support from the Australian public for ending partition 'would be "very helpful"'.[45] He also emphasised that he was 'anxious to see the country which he said the Irish people had played a prominent part in building'.[46] When pressed about his political future, he commented that 'he was now "fully engaged as leader of the Opposition"'.[47] Interestingly, when reporting Archbishop Mannix's invitation to Australia for the Melbourne centenary celebrations and de Valera's acceptance of it, many of the reports noted that de Valera would seek Australian support for the ending of partition in Ireland.[48] De Valera's response upon his arrival in Australia suggests he tried to downplay that aspect of the tour.

[42] *Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate* (NMH), 21 April 1948, p.3.
[43] *Cairns Post* (CP), 28 April 1948, p.1; *Sydney Morning Herald* (SMH), 28 April 1948, p.1; AGM, 28 April 1948, p.1.
[44] SMH, 28 April 1948, p.1.
[45] *Herald* (Melbourne) (HM), 28 April 1945, p.5.
[46] AGM, 28 April 1948, p.1.
[47] HM, 28 April 1945, p.5.
[48] CP, 19 April 1948, p.1; AR, 19 April 1948, p.3; WA, 19 April 1948, p.12; *Warwick Daily News* (WDN), 19 April 1948, p.3; NMH, 19 April 1948, p.2.

De Valera's cautious engagement with the Australian press highlights his varied approach to propagandising during his travels. Irish partition was a politically sensitive subject, and de Valera had been inimical towards journalists when questioned while in the United States. This attitude persisted in Australia. His demeanour can be explained by two factors. Firstly, de Valera was invited to Australia for the Melbourne diocesan centenary celebrations and may not have wanted to distract from the events. Secondly, de Valera was sensitive to Australia's relationship with Britain. The tour's Australian leg was politically riskier, mainly because of the country's continuing alignment with Britain.[49] Instead of risking the disruption of diplomatic ties between Ireland, Britain and Australia, de Valera could rely on Archbishop Daniel Mannix to be an outspoken ally. A longstanding Irish nationalist and an influential local public figure, Mannix could act as an additional spokesperson for ending partition while de Valera was in Australia. This would, in turn, reduce both de Valera's workload and risk of diplomatic embarrassment.

In spite of aligning with the British Empire, the Australian federal government was generous in welcoming de Valera and Aiken. De Valera was invited to an official luncheon at Parliament House in Canberra as a 'guest of the Commonwealth government'.[50] De Valera was granted a seat on the floor of the New South Wales Legislative Assembly besides the Speaker, William Lamb, which the *Sydney Morning Herald* article noted was 'a rare privilege granted only to distinguished visitors'.[51] The Minister for Housing, Clive Evatt, hosted de Valera and Aiken at Parliament House afterwards, where both the Premier and the Speaker were present.[52] De Valera and Aiken then flew to Melbourne that same evening.[53]

[49] O'Dwyer, p.221.
[50] AR, 29 April 1948, p.3.
[51] SMH, 29 April 1948, p.5.
[52] SMH, 29 April 1948, p.5.
[53] AR, 29 April 1948, p.3.

Dev's arrival in Melbourne was met with great enthusiasm. The Melbourne *Age* reported that approximately 500 people were at the aerodrome to welcome de Valera and Aiken, with a sizeable police presence for crowd control; one section of the crowd smashed the glass of the airport lounge door when trying to follow the official welcoming party.[54] The article also noted that de Valera was staying as a guest of Mannix during his time in Melbourne, suggesting the closeness of the two men – understandably so, given their friendship was a longstanding one of almost 30 years.[55] Speaking to journalists at the Melbourne aerodrome, de Valera again reiterated the purpose for the tour: '…to represent Irish laity at the Catholic centenary celebrations and to show, in coming here, his regard for Mannix, whom he had not seen for 25 years.'[56]

A significant challenge that de Valera confronted from the outset the Australasian leg of the tour was bitterness towards Ireland's wartime policy of neutrality. As in other Allied countries, resentment simmered in Australia and New Zealand over Ireland's decision to not enter the alliance against Hitler's regime during World War II.[57] However, de Valera underestimated this anger, expressing confusion at Australian incomprehension of Irish neutrality.[58] Both the *Mail* (Adelaide) and the *Advocate* (Tasmania) published articles that highlighted this.[59] The *Mail* quoted de Valera when challenged on Irish wartime neutrality: 'Don't interpret this as an apology. There is no call for apology.'[60] De Valera had genuinely believed that neutrality was Ireland's best option during World War II. Meanwhile, halfway across the world, both Australian and New Zealand populations failed to see the nuance in de Valera's wartime decisions; this attitude was also present in sympathetic Irish audiences.[61]

---

[54] AGM, 30 April 1948, p.1.
[55] AGM, 30 April 1948, p.1; O'Dwyer, pp.214–15.
[56] AR, 30 April 1948, p.3.
[57] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.211; Kelly, p.4; O'Dwyer, p.214.
[58] *Advocate* (Tasmania) (ADT), 1 May 1948, p.2.
[59] *Mail* (Adelaide) (MA), 1 May 1948, p.2; ADT, 1 May 1948, p.2.
[60] MA, 1 May 1948, p.2.
[61] Patrick O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms: Irish in Australia and New Zealand: A Personal Excursion*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1990, p.224; Rory Sweetman, ''The Importance of Being Irish':

Thus, his refusal to apologise for Irish neutrality will have hurt his promotion of the anti-partition cause on the tour's Australasian leg.

Though sceptical of Ireland's neutrality, Melbourne's Catholic population responded well to the visit. De Valera was warmly welcomed by over 1000 people at the South Melbourne Town Hall on 30 April.[62] The Melbourne diocesan centenary celebrations began on Sunday 2 May, which took up most of de Valera and Aiken's time in Melbourne. While the celebrations were meant to be centred on the Catholic Church, de Valera unintentionally stole the limelight. At the opening reception in the afternoon following the Pontifical High Mass, an audience totalling 40,000 lay Catholics called for an impromptu address from de Valera. Cries of 'we want Dev' spurred the Irish guest into saying a few words, expressing his congratulations unofficially on behalf of the Irish people.[63]

De Valera benefitted greatly from Mannix's invitation to attend the Melbourne centenary celebrations, and Mannix from de Valera's presence. Although Mannix was a controversial figure who was followed closely by the press, it was more important that he had a sizeable platform during the centenary celebrations that de Valera could co-opt for his own political messaging. He was wary about doing so, not wanting to distract from the centenary celebrations, but even being visible alongside Mannix was beneficial.[64] A series of public events enabled de Valera and Mannix to attract extensive press attention. On Monday 3 May, de Valera and Aiken were guests at a civic reception at Melbourne Town Hall with an audience of about 3000 people. The pair received 'a special cheer from the crowd as they mounted the stage' to sit with the other guests.[65] On Wednesday 5 May, Dev was Mannix's

Hibernianism in New Zealand, 1869–1969', in Lyndon Fraser, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, p.153.
[62] AR, 1 May 1948, p.3.
[63] AR, 3 May 1948, p.5.
[64] O'Dwyer, pp.214–15.
[65] ADT, 4 May 1948, p.5.

guest at a contemporary religious art exhibition.[66] On Friday 8 May, de Valera and Aiken were guests at the official Centenary Dinner, and on Tuesday 11 May, a public reception was held by Mannix for de Valera in the Exhibition Buildings, with a crowd of reportedly 15,000 people.[67] Mannix took this opportunity to discuss partition, stating that the 'hatchet could never be buried' between Ireland and England as long as partition remained.[68] Newspapers published extensively on this event. In a letter to his wife, Aiken said that it was 'a roof-roaring affair'.[69] Having both Mannix and de Valera speak on partition at such an important event would have effectively drawn the audience's attention to the Irish Question, which played directly into de Valera's hopes of reaching and educating an Australian audience about the issue, despite his initial caginess in expressing this wish.

Yet not all of de Valera's speaking engagements were positively received in Melbourne. De Valera had received a not-so-pleasant reception when he addressed Melbourne University students earlier on 11 May. Invited as a guest of the Newman Society, de Valera delivered a short speech on the history of Ireland, emphasising that 'it was impossible to have world peace when nations are dissatisfied with their lot', alluding to the partition of Ireland.[70] Some of his statements irritated the audience – they hissed at him – but de Valera found a way to twist their reaction in a positive light, stating that it was simply demonstrating that 'Australians did not know the history of Ireland' and hoped that the hissing 'indicated an interest which could lead to a search for the truth'.[71] This was not the only occasion where de Valera expressed a sense of frustration at what he perceived as Australian ignorance of Irish issues. De Valera later said that in his (then) three-and-a-half weeks in Australia, he had had '"great difficulty" in explaining matters concerning Ireland to

[66] ADM, 13 May 1948, p.21.
[67] AR, 8 May 1948, p.6; SMH, 12 May 1948, p.1.
[68] Quoted in Michael Gilchrist, *Daniel Mannix: Wit and Wisdom*, Freedom Publishing, Melbourne, 2004, p.199.
[69] Quoted in O'Dwyer, p.215.
[70] AGM, 11 May 1948, p.3.
[71] AGM, 11 May 1948, p.3.

Australian audiences' because they were uninformed.[72] He blamed Australian newspapers for their ignorance, claiming that in his time in Australia, he had not read a single article about Ireland that was not sensationalist or left the reader with 'a wrong impression'.[73] While he may have been correct about the inexpert reporting of the Australian newspapers on Irish affairs, overall, this shows the limitations of de Valera's understanding of his target audience. He struggled to recognise that he was the one who was out of step with what mattered to Australian Catholics. Instead, he placed the blame anywhere else other than himself. The only group safe from de Valera's scapegoating was those who positively responded to his anti-partition propaganda.

As historians have highlighted, many of those who were actively engaged with de Valera's rhetoric were of his generation, trapped in an older style of Irish nationalism – one that tended towards a nostalgic understanding of Ireland.[74] De Valera failed to adapt his nationalist content to account for both a growing generational gap as well as an audience that was noticeably less Irish than during the Home Rule campaigns of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[75] Dev was a powerful influence, but after World War II the world saw him as living in the past, unable to connect effectively with younger audiences. Mannix was much the same: an exceptionally compelling orator and Irish Catholic leader, but he engaged with an audience who were mostly Catholics of Irish descent, many of whom had never visited Ireland and only had sentimental understandings of the "homeland" through their religion and education.[76] Attempts had been made to establish a more forward-focused link between Ireland and Australia. De Valera's appointment of Dr. T.J. Kiernan as minister

[72] *Mercury* (Tasmania) (MT), 22 May 1948, p.4.
[73] MT, 22 May 1948, p.4.
[74] O'Dwyer, p.222; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.211.
[75] Troy Davis, 'Anti-partitionism, Irish America and Anglo American Relations, 1945–51', in Michael Kennedy and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: From Independence to Internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000 p.195; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, pp.90-91; Donald Harman Akenson, *Half the World from Home: Perspectives on the Irish in New Zealand 1860–1950*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, pp.56–63.
[76] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.211.

plenipotentiary to Australia in 1946 was one such attempt. Over the first two years of his posting, Kiernan had travelled around Australia, delivering lectures on Ireland's history and culture. In the words of Rory O'Dwyer, Kiernan had made a 'favourable impression' in the Australian environment.[77] Australians might have been uneducated on the Irish Question, but it was not only the concept of partition that prevented widespread engagement with the cause: Dev and Mannix were old men who themselves struggled to understand the changing nature of Australia's Irish Catholics.

The long-time links between Irish Catholics and the Australian Labor Party (ALP) underpinned some public events during the tour. Arthur Calwell, Australia's controversial post-war Minister for Immigration and Information, and future leader of the ALP, hosted a reception for de Valera and Aiken on 12 May. Over 150 guests attended, including Dr T. J. Kiernan, Ireland's minister plenipotentiary, diplomats, bishops, and the Vice-Chancellor of Melbourne University.[78] A second-generation Irish-Australian, Calwell considered himself a friend of Ireland, and for good reason. Kevin Molloy points out that Calwell and his wife, Elizabeth Marren, were tireless supporters of Fianna Fáil, de Valera and Mannix over the years.[79] Historian Michael Gilchrist describes Calwell as having 'worshipped the ground Dr Mannix trod upon' since the archbishop arrived in Australia in 1913.[80] Calwell and Marren launched the *Irish Review* in 1933; the newspaper operated as the official organ for the Irish in Australia, reporting on 'all Australian and New Zealand Irish Societies and Irish-Australasian sporting events'.[81] During the Melbourne leg of the tour, Calwell hosted this reception and also personally drove de Valera and Aiken to the town of Ballarat to show them

[77] O'Dwyer, p.214.
[78] AR, 13 May 1948, p.7.
[79] Kevin Molloy, 'Tradition, Memory and The Culture of Irish-Australian Identity, 1900–1960', *Australasian Journal of Irish Studies*, 16 (2016), p.57.
[80] Gilchrist, p.188.
[81] Molloy, 'Tradition', p.58.

the 1854 Eureka stockade monument, highlighting the Irish who died for the cause.[82] On one topic, however, Calwell and de Valera disagreed. As Minister for Immigration, Calwell was charged with increasing immigration by the government after World War II, and his attitude towards Ireland influenced his construction of renewed immigration schemes – extending the post-war assisted migrant schemes to Ireland.[83] In contrast, while touring Australia, de Valera had declared, that 'the best place for an Irishman was Ireland' – his desire to retain the Irish population and even to attract them back "home" was in direct opposition to Australia's immigration policy.[84] The disjunct between Calwell and Dev shows just another way in which Dev idealised his nationalism and, as such, was increasingly out of touch with reality.

In stark contrast to the enthusiastic welcome received in Melbourne, de Valera and Aiken's experience in Perth was more subdued. Stopping over at Parafield, South Australia, on their way to Perth, de Valera and Aiken were met by 'only a handful' of people, with one Adelaide newspaper reporting that, 'Barricades and posting of a large police squad at strategic points on the tarmac proved superfluous'.[85] There was no official welcome from the Western Australian administration upon arrival at Guildford airport in Perth; instead, de Valera was met by representatives of Irish organisations.[86] According to the *West Australian*, there were cries of "Good old Dev" and applause, with members of the Hibernian Society forming a guard of honour for de Valera to pass through. It was 'one of the biggest crowds seen at the airport for some time' – about 250 people in total.[87] While the *West Australian* reported on de Valera's arrival positively, official recognition of and interest in the visit was limited.

---

[82] O'Dwyer, p.215.
[83] Patrick O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end: the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland, 1948–54', *Tasmanian Historical Research Association: Papers and proceedings*, 21, 4 (1974), p.146.
[84] De Valera's attitude tapped into a long nationalist tradition of restricting emigration for the benefit of the homeland. AGM, 30 April 1948, p.2.
[85] *News* (Adelaide) (NA), 14 May 1948, p.1.
[86] WA, 14 May 1948, p.2; *Daily News* (Perth) (DNP), 14 May 1948, p.7; O'Dwyer, p.215
[87] WA, 15 May 1948, p.2.

Despite the aloof attitude in Perth, de Valera's supporters tried to get him out and about to show him as a man of the people. The events organised for de Valera in Perth included some Australian rules football games as a guest of the Western Australian Football League on Saturday 15 May, a reception at the Celtic Club that evening, and an open invitation 'garden party' organised for Sunday 16 May.[88] Approximately 5000 people showed up to this event, where de Valera gave an anti-partition address. The Archbishop of Perth, Dr Redmond Prendiville, another Irish member of the Catholic Hierarchy, attended this event to demonstrate his support. De Valera acknowledged his unpopularity in the press in Western Australia but emphasised that he did not know 'what there was to fear from him'.[89]

In the tradition of previous Irish political visits to Australia, long-distance travel between the major cities took up a significant amount of the visitors' time. De Valera and Aiken arrived in Adelaide on the morning of 18 May. Over the couple of days spent in Adelaide, de Valera was the guest of the Archbishop of Adelaide, Australian-born Dr Matthew Beovich. Attending a lunch held in his honour by the Catholic Club that day, de Valera 'became less restrained in his condemnation of partition'.[90] He reminded the audience that, 'the real enemies of the British people are those who want the partition to continue, thus preventing full good relations between the two countries'.[91] He also exclaimed that 'only a bandit would cut one part of Ireland from another'.[92] Later that evening, de Valera was given a public welcome at Centennial Hall, headed by Dr Beovich.[93]

The reaction in Tasmania encapsulated a much more moderate attitude to de Valera's visit. De Valera and Aiken received a slightly warmer reaction when they arrived in Tasmania on Thursday 20 May. According to O'Dwyer, the pair were met in Hobart by

[88] DNP, 14 May 1948, p.7; WA, 14 May 1948, p.2.
[89] WA, 17 May 1948, p.8.
[90] O'Dwyer, pp.216–17.
[91] *Canberra Times* (CT), 19 May 1948, p.1.
[92] Quoted in O'Dwyer, pp.216-217.
[93] *Southern Cross* (SC), 14 May 1948, p.15.

Tasmanian government representatives and a large Irish Australian crowd.[94] After being entertained to supper at Hotel Fairfield, de Valera and Aiken attended the public welcome headed by the Premier, Robert Cosgrove. Advertisements of the event highlighted that it was to be de Valera's only public appearance in Hobart.[95] The event was not without its hiccups. A 'small but defiant' group of protestors sang the British national anthem and "Rule Britannia" as de Valera entered the Town Hall.[96] But once inside, de Valera received huge applause from a fully packed hall. This perfectly reflected the mixed opinion towards de Valera in Tasmania – sitting in the middle of the spectrum, with Melbourne at one end and Perth at the other.

De Valera and Aiken spent the remainder of their time in Tasmania visiting key areas of Irish history. The Tasmanian leg of the trip fell on the centenary of the 1848 Rebellion in Ireland, an event which had strong ties to Tasmania given the high-profile of the insurgents who were sentenced to transportation there. Dev stated to local newspapers that a primary reason for his visit to Tasmania was to immerse himself in the early history of the state in which 'many of Ireland's great reformers' were transported to.[97] The following day the pair visited Derwent Valley, where Young Irelander John Mitchel lived during his exile.[98] Dev also visited Young Irelander leader William Smith O'Brien's cottage in the old Port Arthur penal colony.[99] Premier Cosgrove had presented de Valera with a sketch of Smith O'Brien's cottage the day before, along with a collection of letters written by various Young Irelanders while held in Tasmania, after the Irish statesman had been 'treated to a special lecture on the 1848 exiles in Tasmania given by Monsignor John Cullen, vicar-general of the archdiocese of

[94] O'Dwyer, p.217.
[95] MT, 19 May 1948, p.10.
[96] ADT, 21 May 1948, p.5.
[97] ADT, 24 May 1948, p.2.
[98] O'Dwyer, p.217.
[99] O'Dwyer, pp.217–18.

Hobart'.[100] While in Launceston the following day, de Valera visited Daniel Bourke's daughter; Bourke had helped John Mitchel escape to the mainland in 1853.[101] It was little wonder that de Valera, as a 'custodian of Irish nationalist heritage' and with his passion for Irish nationalist history, later declared the Tasmanian visit as his favourite part of the anti-partition tour.[102] The pair flew back to Sydney before embarking on the next, albeit short, leg of the tour.

Ever since the 1880s, Irish leaders visiting Australia had crossed the Tasman and de Valera was no exception. New Zealand newspapers reported early on that de Valera may cross the Tasman for a few days as part of his tour. Wellington's *Evening Post*, the *Gisborne Herald*, and the *Northern Advocate* all published articles on 19 April announcing de Valera's visit to Australia for the Melbourne diocesan centenary celebrations, noting that he may come to New Zealand for a week.[103] According to New Zealand writer Peter Burke, 'the de Valera roadshow was already on the radar of the New Zealand Government in early May 1948, with reports of the Irish opposition leader's speeches in the United States being channelled back to them'.[104] A telegram from Rev. Dean William Murphy from the Auckland Parish of Balmoral on 5 May spurred the New Zealand Government into action. Rev. Murphy enquired whether the government had any official plans for de Valera and Aiken or if the Irish National Society should make arrangements.[105] The Prime Minister's Department contacted the New Zealand High Commissioner in Australia, James Barclay, to extend an invitation to de Valera and Aiken as official guests of government; on 13 May, de Valera graciously accepted.[106]

[100] ADT, 22 May 1948, p.2; O'Dwyer, pp.217–18.
[101] ADT, 24 May 1948, p.2.
[102] O'Dwyer, p.217
[103] *Gisborne Herald* (GH), 19 April 1948, p.5; *Northern Advocate* (NA), 19 April 1948, p.2; Burke, p.191.
[104] Burke, p.192.
[105] Burke, p.192.
[106] Burke, p.193; *Ashburton Guardian* (AG), 13 May 1948, p.6; GH, 13 May 1948, p.4; *Otago Daily Times* (ODT), 13 May 1948, p.6; NA, 13 May 1948, p.3.

However, it did not take long for rumbles of discontent to emerge. Within a few days of newspapers confirming the official government invitation extended to de Valera and Aiken, the Legislation Committee of the Grand Orange Lodge of New Zealand sent Prime Minister Peter Fraser a letter of protest. The Committee's primary concern was de Valera's attitude during World War II, and that they hoped the government would 'withdraw from what we believe is an indefensible position and one which much create the strongest resentment'.[107] From the outset, subsets of New Zealand Irish were highly unimpressed with Dev's presence in their country, spreading a message with which they did not agree.

In spite of these rumblings, the Irish dignitaries received a very warm welcome to New Zealand. De Valera and Aiken arrived in Auckland from Sydney on Tuesday 25 May to a positive reception from members of the Auckland branch of the Irish National Society (INS) and J. Clarke, manager of the Government Tourist Department as the government's representative.[108] Speaking to reporters briefly, de Valera praised New Zealand as 'an example to the world as a modern country with modern government'; when asked who held New Zealand up as such an example, he replied amusedly, 'The Opposition, of course.'[109] The Irish pair then flew to the Paraparaumu aerodrome, arriving to meet the Wellington Irish flying flags and banners. The official welcoming party consisted of INS Patron Fr. Brennan, President David O'Connell, and Secretary Kathleen O'Shea – a key influence in the later establishment of the New Zealand League for an Undivided Ireland.[110] After speaking to another set of reporters and posing for photographs, de Valera and his entourage drove to Wellington.

The New Zealand government officially acknowledged the Irish party's arrival in the capital. Prime Minister Peter Fraser hosted a parliamentary lunch for de Valera at the

[107] ODT, 19 May 1948, p.6; *Bay of Plenty Times* (BOPT), 20 May 1948, p.3; NA, 20 May 1948, p.6.
[108] AG, 25 May 1948, p.4; NA, 25 May 1948, p.6; GH, 26 May 1948, p.6; NZT, 2 June 1948, p.42.
[109] NA, 25 May 1948, p.6; GH, 26 May 1948, p.6.
[110] Burke, p.195.

Waterloo Hotel before the two men held a formal two-hour meeting. This was followed by a press conference. When asked about the reason of the tour, apart from attending the Melbourne centenary celebrations, de Valera openly admitted that he sought moral support from 'their friends'– the United States, Australia, and New Zealand – to end partition.[111] This answer contrasted to how he had responded to the same question in Australia and the United States, where he was more defensive.[112] Also noteworthy was his emphasis on the fact that he was not asking for financial support. De Valera stressed that while his visit to the United States years ago was for fundraising purposes, that was not the case this time around. Rather than being a campaign for funds such as the Redmonds', Dillon's, and Davitt's de Valera's visit came from a different angle – Ireland was no longer a state reliant on overseas donations for political success. He also emphasised that, 'no government had given any assistance in his aims', implying that it was grassroot organisations expressing support instead.[113] It is difficult to tell whether this was the outcome de Valera was hoping for.

Later that evening, de Valera and Aiken were publicly welcomed at the Wellington Town Hall.[114] Open to all interested in attending, the public welcome boasted large numbers – the hall could seat up to 1600 people and newspapers reported that 'hundreds were unable to obtain admission'.[115] Speeches were given by those who represented key facets of New Zealand society: Peter Fraser for the New Zealand government, Archbishop O'Shea for the Catholic Church, and Wellington City Councillor, Brian O'Brien, for the New Zealand Irish community.[116] De Valera used his speech to engage in his classic anti-partition rhetoric,

[111] AG, 26 May 1948, p.2.
[112] SMH, 28 April 1948, p.1.
[113] ODT, 26 May 1948, p.4; AG, 26 May 1948, p.2.
[114] NZT, 26 May 1948, p.42; Burke, p.196.
[115] Quoted in Burke, p.197.
[116] Burke, pp.197–8.

describing it as 'a grievous wound that was deeply resented by the people of Ireland'.[117] His first public meeting in New Zealand appeared to be a resounding success.

The following day was dedicated to official government business. Meetings with the Minister of Housing, Bob Semple, and the Minister of Justice, Rex Mason, filled de Valera's morning, before he gave an interview to *Salient*, the Victoria University College Students' Association magazine. It appears that de Valera, as the chancellor of the University of Ireland, was invited to address students at Victoria University College in the evening of 26 May.[118] This speech never eventuated. Instead, three members of Victoria's Political Science Society interviewed de Valera for *Salient*. According to Peter Burke's reporting on the article, de Valera was interested in the university's affairs, supportive of student organisations, and as a trained mathematician kept up with mathematical developments in New Zealand, praising the work of the late Professor Somerville.[119] This was again another contrast in de Valera's experience with students in New Zealand compared to Australia – his meeting proved much more civil than being hissed at by Melbourne University students.[120]

Later that day, de Valera and Aiken attended a state afternoon tea held in their honour. There was a wide range of people in attendance: parliamentary officials, members of the diplomatic corps, clergy, businesspeople, members of the Irish community, and Māori representatives, including Lady Mīria Pōmare, a prominent community leader, and Te Puea Hērangi, a leader of the Kīngitanga movement.[121] In his speech, Fraser praised de Valera's 'great democratic outlook' – a comment that may have raised some eyebrows and some hackles.[122] He also said that, 'We all feel that we would like Ireland – the whole of Ireland –

[117] Quoted in Burke, p.198.
[118] BOPT, 24 May 1948, p.3; NA, 24 May 1948, p.2.
[119] Burke, pp.198–9.
[120] AGM, 11 May 1948, p.3.
[121] ODT, 27 May 1948, p.6; BOPT, 27 May 1948, p.2; GH, 27 May 1948, p.6; Burke, p.200.
[122] ODT, 27 May 1948, p.6; BOPT, 27 May 1948, p.2; GH, 27 May 1948, p.6.

to be close to us in political and economic bonds for all time.'[123] A comment like this would not have been made lightly; it demonstrated Fraser's friendliness towards de Valera and a degree of sympathy towards the cause of partition – not very surprising given Fraser's involvement in the Irish Self-Determination League 30 years prior.[124] In his reply, de Valera commended New Zealand's development as a modern country, and insisted that both New Zealand and Ireland shared the same political and social ideas.[125]

The Irish pair's final commitment in Wellington was the official welcome by the Wellington branch of the Irish National Society. Hosted in St Francis Hall, it was a more relaxed and jovial occasion. According to a report in the *New Zealand Tablet*, when de Valera took to the stage, the crowd cheered for seven minutes before settling down enough for de Valera to be heard.[126] De Valera reportedly spoke for an hour and a half, mainly about the partition issue, claiming it was the main reason for his visit to New Zealand.[127] The author of the *New Zealand Tablet* article from 16 June 1948 was at pains to point out the hard work of Kathleen O'Shea as the new secretary of the INS, who also presented de Valera and Aiken with 'suitable gifts' for their wives on behalf of the women of the club.[128] The efforts of the INS to welcome Dev warmly may have given him the impetus to speak not only for an hour and a half, but also focus explicitly on partition – this was well and truly an different attitude compared to his abrasive interviews in the United States and Australia.

The Irish pair did not escape controversy in the New Zealand leg of the tour. In between their Wellington and Auckland fixtures, de Valera and Aiken were confronted with provocative comments from the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom in New Zealand, Sir Patrick Duff, which were published in newspapers across the country.

[123] ODT, 27 May 1948, p.6; BOPT, 27 May 1948, p.2; GH, 27 May 1948, p.6.
[124] Burke, p.198.
[125] NZT, 2 June 1948, p.6.
[126] NZT, 16 June 1948, p.5.
[127] NZT, 9 June 1948, p.9; NZT, 16 June, p.5.
[128] NZT, 16 June 1948, p.5.

Acknowledging that while 'everyone could speak his mind on any political subject anywhere within the Commonwealth', Duff argued that 'it would be unfair to the people of Britain if New Zealanders were left with the impression that there was no opposite side to the [anti-partition] case as stated by Mr De Valera'.[129] He went on to state that 'there was no argument in favour of Éire's own independence, which was not also an argument in favour of partition'.[130] Duff cited differences in living conditions and religious beliefs between Northern Ireland and Ireland as possible reasons for resentment in both countries if either were pressured into reuniting. He posited this resentment would exist whether it be as a united independent Ireland or if it was incorporated into the United Kingdom.[131] What Duff may not have considered, according to Rory O'Dwyer, was that his comments 'served to fuel media interest in de Valera's next address in Auckland, and helped ensure that the local Irish community would be in mass attendance.'[132]

Sure enough, the Auckland Town Hall was 'filled almost to capacity' on Friday 28 May, when the Auckland INS hosted a reception for de Valera and Aiken.[133] The main party included Bishop James Liston, Deputy Prime Minister Walter Nash, and President of the Auckland branch of the INS, J.C. Robinson.[134] In his address, de Valera alluded to the uncertainty of international politics at this point in time (in the Cold War context), stating that he felt he was 'doing good work not only for Ireland and Britain, but for world peace'.[135] He also directly responded to Sir Patrick Duff's comments, stating that he was simply not correct – Ireland was an 'ancient nation', the partitioned Six Counties were not, and 'the people of Ireland as a whole should decide what was going to be the government of the land and its

[129] AG, 26 May 1948, p.2; NA, 26 May 1948, p.6; GH, 27 May 1948, p.6.
[130] AG, 26 May 1948, p.2; NA, 26 May 1948, p.6; GH, 27 May 1948, p.6.
[131] AG, 26 May 1948, p.2; NA, 26 May 1948, p.6; GH, 27 May 1948, p.6.
[132] O'Dwyer, p.219.
[133] NA, 29 May 1948, p.5; NZT, 9 June 1948, p.47.
[134] NZT, 9 June 1948, p.47.
[135] NA, 29 May 1948, p.5.

relation to other lands'.[136] Important to this thesis is not whether this was an effective rebuttal, rather it is the audience's response. According to a letter written by Aiken to his wife, the speech was the best one of the entire tour and exceptionally well-received by the audience.[137]

Before leaving for Sydney on 30 May, de Valera was invited to deliver a speech for radio broadcast. It followed many of the same themes de Valera had talked on throughout his New Zealand leg: praise for New Zealand's modernity, desire for closer relations between New Zealand and Ireland, explaining the issues of partition, and the call for the moral support of New Zealanders.[138] While a short visit, de Valera made the most of his official engagements in New Zealand, using every opportunity to espouse his nationalist rhetoric. Whether that was enough to motivate New Zealanders to engage with the anti-partition movement remained to be seen.

De Valera's return to Sydney, while brief, was an effective and busy end to the Australasian leg of his tour. Shortly after arriving, de Valera visited the University of Sydney as the guest of the acting Vice-Chancellor, before attending a reception held in his honour that evening, hosted by the executive of the Irish National Association.[139] The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported that, when answering questions about partition, de Valera stated it was 'ridiculous to suggest a Roman Catholic majority intimidated a Protestant minority' as it was Irish tradition that there was no religious intolerance, highlighting that 'many Irish patriots had been Protestants'.[140] There was no mention of the response his answers evoked. However, looking at de Valera's prior outbursts of frustration towards an inexpert Australian

[136] Quoted in O'Dwyer, p.219.
[137] O'Dwyer, p.219.
[138] NA, 31 May 1948, p.5; NZT 23 June 1948, p.8.
[139] *Catholic Weekly* (CW), 3 June 1948, p.1.
[140] SMH, 1 June 1948, p.2.

audience, it is not a stretch to assume that most Australians would not know – or care – enough about Irish history to try fight his claim of Irish religious tolerance.

The event that received most fanfare was the "Monster Rally" at Rushcutters Bay Stadium on 1 June. Over 7000 people filled the stadium to hear de Valera speak on the partition issue. There had been threats made by 'Orangemen and Ulstermen' that they would be in attendance to cause disruption.[141] However, this threat rang empty – the protestors never showed up at the event. Instead, as Dr Albert Dryer welcomed de Valera and Aiken, they were 'greeted with a fanfare of trumpets and the cheers of the crowd'.[142] De Valera spoke for over an hour about the partition of Ireland.[143] Sydney's *Catholic Weekly* printed the majority of his address. It was classic de Valera rhetoric, with the same themes he had been championing for the previous five weeks.[144] The Melbourne *Advocate* recognised the pattern, instead opting to summarise his talk, as it was 'along the lines of his previous address' that had been published previously.[145]

Brisbane was one of the final stops on the tour. Here, too, de Valera and Aiken received a warm welcome upon touchdown, with Irish pipers playing "Garry Owen" while the Irish tricolour was flown. The Acting Premier of Queensland, Vince Gair, was represented by C.B. Byrne, Monsignor English on behalf of Archbishop Duhig, and members of the Queensland Irish Association were also present, namely the president, J. Keogh and the secretary, W. Collins.[146] De Valera shared that Queensland held 'a particularly warm spot in his heart' because it was the first Australian state that he had officially been in contact with, back in 1919.[147] Newspapers did not elaborate on what this meant.

---

[141] SMH, 2 June 1948, p.3.
[142] SMH, 2 June 1948, p.3; CW, 10 June 1948, p.3.
[143] SMH, 2 June 1948, p.3.
[144] CW, 10 June 1948, p.4.
[145] ADM, 17 June 1948, p.4.
[146] *Brisbane Telegraph* (BT), 3 June 1948, p.2.
[147] CP, 4 June 1948, p.5.

De Valera kept a busy schedule during his short stint in Brisbane. His activities included being the guest of honour at a small private luncheon hosted by Acting Premier Gair, a visit to the Lourdes Hill Convent and School, a public garden party and reception organised by the Augustinian Fathers, and the laying of the foundation stone of the Sacred Heart Memorial College.[148] The key event from this leg of the tour was the dinner given by the Queensland Irish Association and a subsequent talk at the City Hall on Saturday 5 June. The advertisement for the City Hall event labelled de Valera as 'World Leader of the Irish Race' – a term similar to what Mannix used to describe the Irish statesman nearly 30 years prior.[149] O'Dwyer reported that de Valera's address was 'powerfully worded' – perhaps Dev was finally committing fully to spreading his anti-partition message.[150]

The last few visits on de Valera and Aiken's way up to Darwin included areas of strong Irish association, like Cairns and Innisfail. Although only stopping in each area for less than 24 hours, de Valera was given dinners and public welcomes in both towns. The *Cairns Post* published a detailed play-by-play of de Valera's time in Cairns. According to the article, the Vicar-General of the Roman Catholic Diocese of Cairns, Father Thomas Hunt, responded to those who had been asking why de Valera would tour Australia: 'If the wrongs of Poland were sufficient to call the nations to war in 1939, surely Mr. de Valera has the right to come here to tell us the wrongs of Ireland.'[151] The Vicar-General's comparison of Poland to Ireland was an interesting choice, but it may reflect the Vicar-General's passion for Ireland issues. Once again, de Valera emphasised the call for moral support to right the wrongs of partition. In Innisfail, there was a similar speech evoking the same ideas and a similarly warm response by the audience. Finally, de Valera and Aiken reached Darwin – their final stop in

[148] BT, 4 June 1948, p.5.
[149] BT, 4 June 1948, p.13; Malcolm Campbell, 'Mannix in America: Archbishop Daniel Mannix's Address at Madison Square Garden, New York, 18 July 1920', *Australian Journal of Irish Studies*, 5 (2005), p.98.
[150] O'Dwyer, p.220.
[151] CP, 8 June 1948, p.3.

Australasia. Bidding farewell to an enjoyable but hectic part of their international anti-partition tour, de Valera and Aiken spent the final weeks tour visiting Singapore, Burma, India, and Rome, before returning to Ireland in July 1948.

Australian and New Zealand Responses

At first glance, the Australasian leg of the tour reads like a success. Both Australian and New Zealand newspapers portrayed de Valera's tour mostly in a positive light, reporting seemingly impressive numbers and supportive reactions at his speaking engagements throughout the Tasman. In Sydney and Melbourne, in particular, he drew relatively large crowds.[152] Rory O'Dwyer endorses this perception of success. During the tour, de Valera assisted in establishing the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland, his public addresses were 'extremely well attended', and the tour helped 'confirm de Valera's status as a world figure and internationally recognised statesman'.[153]

However, the leading historian of the Irish in Australia took a different view. In Patrick O'Farrell's eyes, the tour was counterproductive. Much like in the United States, many Irish and descendants of Irish immigrants in Australasia regarded de Valera with either indifference or embarrassment.[154] For older Irish Australians and New Zealanders, the memory of the Irish Civil War had left a lingering sour taste.[155] Additionally, the crowd numbers were not representative of de Valera's actual appeal to Australian audiences. In Melbourne, considerable sections of the audiences were there for Mannix; de Valera was 'an additional attraction'.[156] The Sydney "mammoth rally" was a predominantly Catholic

[152] AR, 1 May 1948, p.3; AR, 3 May 1948, p.3; ADT, 4 May 1948, p.5; AR, 8 May 1948, p.6; SMH 12 May 1948, p.1; SMH, 2 June 1948, p.3.
[153] O'Dwyer, pp.221–22.
[154] Kelly, p.3; Patrick O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1987, p.304.
[155] Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's New Worlds: Immigrants, Politics, and Society in the United States and Australia, 1815–1922*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2007, pp.181–2; O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, pp.287–8; Sweetman, 'Hibernianism', p.152.
[156] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, p.304.

occasion, 'crammed with bishops and priests'.[157] Considerable sections of the audiences were also bolstered by organised attendees, like school children and choirs; the remainder were primarily made up of those who felt a sense of duty or were simply curious.[158] For those who did attend out of genuine interest, de Valera's political style was not what many Australian and New Zealanders were used to, nor did his anti-partition rhetoric inspire much sympathy or further action.[159] Stephen Kelly's argument echoes much of O'Farrell's, judging de Valera's Southern Hemisphere tour a 'flop'.[160]

Immigrant letters give us an insight into contemporaries' responses to de Valera's visit. Looking at various letters to the editor and opinion pieces from Australian and New Zealand newspapers helps to build a clearer picture of the environment de Valera faced during his tour. Across a range of Australasian newspapers, multiple perspectives emerge: mixed opinions on Irish neutrality and de Valera's actions during World War II, the view that he was a disruptive force in the Irish diaspora community, and a collection of more random responses that encompassed a variety of reasons for disliking de Valera. My examination of this correspondence shows that most of those who submitted letters to the editor were defenders of Northern Ireland's membership in the Union and were opposed to de Valera on both individual and symbolically representative levels. Those few who expressed support for de Valera and the anti-partition movement faced a general climate of opinion in Australia and New Zealand that was largely hostile.

The most notable issue cited in correspondence was Irish neutrality during World War II. There are a couple of variations on why it was an issue. The first, and most frequently mentioned, was that neutrality equalled anti-British sentiment. Lloyd Jones' letter to the *Mercury* asked, 'whether the honour [of public welcomes] is to be reserved for those who

[157] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, p.304.
[158] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.144.
[159] O'Farrell, *Irish in Australia*, pp.304–5; Kelly, pp.3–4.
[160] Kelly, p.3.

hampered Britain and helped our enemies during the most critical days of our history'.[161] R.J. Wells followed a similar line of thinking: 'This man hates the British Empire, and would do all he could for its downfall.'[162] W.L. Nichols's letter also fits the concept of neutrality equalling anti-Britain. They wrote, 'Every Australian knows only too well that he [de Valera] was against the Allied forces in the darkest days of Britain's plight.'[163] J.A. Carbine, from the Loyal Orange Institution of Queensland, called de Valera 'an avowed rebel to the Empire' and considered his visit to Australia 'a stab in the back of the British Empire'.[164] The Tasmanian Protestant Federation submitted two separate letters to the *Mercury* and the Tasmanian *Advocate*, protesting de Valera's tour and the state and federal governments welcoming of him.[165] Again, the common thread was that Irish neutrality and de Valera's actions in accordance with that were, in fact, beneficial to 'the enemies of the British Empire, and therefore our enemies' during World War II.[166] An author in New Zealand voiced an almost identical opinion that, 'Mr De Valera is still trying to split up Britain and is no friend of the Empire'.[167] "Digger" and "Lest We Forget", also to the *Mercury*, were slightly more specific in their blame. In their eyes, de Valera's refusal to engage in blackout conditions guided German bomber planes to Britain during the war.[168]

The second variation of negativity towards Irish neutrality evoked the memory of those who perished fighting for the Allied Forces in World War II. V. Wilson, in a letter to the *Sydney Morning Herald*, wrote that the anti-partition tour '…would be an opportune moment for all those people who propose to cheer Mr. De Valera … to offer a moment's grateful silence to those hundreds of British seamen who perished in the North Atlantic … to

[161] MT, 20 May 1948, p.3.
[162] MT, 21 May 1948, p.3.
[163] MT, 22 May 1948, p.3.
[164] CM, 4 June 1948, p.3.
[165] MT, 22 May 1948, p.3; ADT, 27 May 1948, p.7.
[166] ADT, 27 May 1948, p.7.
[167] ODT, 15 May 1948, p.9.
[168] MT, 20 May 1948, p.3.

whom Mr. De Valera refused every form of co-operation.'[169] Mrs A. Lilian Collins, to the Melbourne *Herald*, cited Winston Churchill's speech in the House of Commons: 'the lives of thousands of sailors might have been saved had Eire granted us the use of her bases'.[170] Both of these responses harked back to the return of the Irish treaty ports in 1938 as part of the resolution for the Anglo-Irish trade war.[171] "Irish Descent" suggested that de Valera's welcome to Tasmania should have 'every fallen soldier's wife, child, mother or sister wear mourning and file past this enemy of true Australians'.[172] Some even went as far as placing the blame squarely on de Valera and his policy of neutrality specifically for deaths in World War II. A.B.N., to the Tasmanian *Advocate*, claimed that 'Thousands of soldiers, airmen and seamen lost their lives because of Eire's policy of neutrality.'[173] E. Smith, to the *Mercury*, made the same claim, as did R.J. Shield. [174] John Goodman, to the *Mercury*, personally blamed de Valera for the death of his son during World War II.[175] "Loyal Ulsterwoman" – their name self-explanatory – submitted her steadfast opinion that, 'a widow of the last war … [w]e should send him [de Valera] back to where he belongs in Sinn Fein Ireland.'[176] She blamed de Valera's policy of neutrality for both her husband's death and her son losing six years of his life to war.[177]

While following slightly different threads, all of these letters pull together to form a broader understanding that Irish neutrality and de Valera's role in it made him anti-British, which was unacceptable in the eyes of these writers. These perspectives were hardly surprising, as Irish neutrality was a contentious issue for many Australians and New Zealanders. Historian Stephen Kelly, when referring to reports from British officials in

[169] SMH, 23 April 1948, p.2.
[170] HM, 4 May 1948, p.8.
[171] Ronan Fanning, 'Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review', p.30.
[172] MT, 22 May 1948, p.3.
[173] ADT, 10 May 1948, p.2.
[174] MT, 20 May 1948, p.3; MT, 21 May 1948, p.3.
[175] MT, 20 May 1948, p.3.
[176] ODT, 20 May 1948, p.6.
[177] ODT, 20 May 1948, p.6.

Australia, notes that de Valera's trip 'provided evidence of little sympathy' for Irish neutrality during World War II.[178] This suggests that these letters to the editor may be representative of the broader population's view towards de Valera and his anti-partition tour.

Along a similar vein was correspondence to the editors expressing the view that de Valera was disrupting the lives of Irish immigrants and their commitments to their new countries. The primary concern of these letter writers was to keep the peace in Australia, particularly after Irish Catholic immigrants had learned to live harmoniously alongside their Protestant compatriots. Of note is a letter written by G.S. Mann, a self-proclaimed Australian, who appeared to have submitted to both the *Sydney Morning Herald* and the Adelaide *Advertiser* – both papers published Mann's original letter.[179] It suggests that perhaps Mann felt so strongly about de Valera's tour that they felt their letter must be seen by more than one region's readership. Nevertheless, Mann expressed the view that while Australia had its own domestic issues, they would be solved over time. However, if de Valera reintroduced the call for ending partition, it would reignite controversy unnecessarily. In their words, '…if Mr. de Valera is permitted to air his one-sided, distorted views while in a British country, to ill-informed people, then I fear a controversy which, if handled by unscrupulous men, might grow into a canker.'[180] A letter written by F. Wilson followed the same line of thinking. Claiming part Southern Irish descent, Wilson wrote that they 'resent[ed] Mr. de Valera's attempt to re-kindle animosities which have almost ceased to exist' in Australia.[181] They expressed concern that the recent Melbourne centenary celebrations had riled up the Irish population, encouraging them to 'cheer anything suggested by a leader of their race'.[182]

[178] Quoted in Kelly, p.4.
[179] SMH, 4 May 1948, p.2; *Advertiser* (Adelaide) (AA), 26 May 1948, p.2.
[180] SMH, 4 May 1948, p.2; AA, 26 May 1948, p.2.
[181] SMH, 13 May 1948, p.2.
[182] SMH, 13 May 1948, p.2.

Not only was de Valera a disruptive force, but he apparently demanded too much from antipodean audiences. Two articles argued that partition was specifically an Irish domestic issue; journalists wrote these rather than members of the public. The first, published in the *Courier-Mail*, argued that de Valera was visiting a very different Australia from 15 years ago, namely that the excitement and passion for the partition issue had 'been spent'.[183] The author acknowledged that de Valera's visit should be 'made as enjoyable and informative as possible', but asking for Australian support went a step too far. According to the author, it was up to Northern Ireland and Ireland to resolve partition amongst themselves, rather than 'us[ing] his [de Valera's] visit to Australia to start a quarrel here among Australians who regard some part of Ireland, be it in Eire or the Northern Counties, as their Motherland.'[184] The other journalist's article followed a similar line. Published in the *West Australian*, the author stated that de Valera was welcome to 'use the old and bitter quarrel between north and south … as a refuge for a retired Taoiseach working for a "comeback"' but attempting to bring Australia into the fold was 'an abuse of hospitality'.[185] In the author's eyes, it would unnecessarily rekindle political controversy and sectarianism amongst Australians.[186]

In addition to these principal areas of comment, a collection of more random responses encompassed a variety of reasons for disliking Dev. A handful of letters disagreed specifically with de Valera's anti-partition messaging. Signed "Be Fair", this author wrote that de Valera failed to mention to the audience that the North was 'determined to remain under the Union Jack and would not link up with the south along Republican lines'.[187] K.G., to the *Courier-Mail*, was a little more impassioned, describing de Valera's rhetoric of

[183] CM, 20 April 1948, p.2.
[184] CM, 20 April 1948, p.2.
[185] WA, 13 May 1948, p.2.
[186] WA, 13 May 1948, p.2.
[187] *Examiner* (Launceston) (EL), 26 May 1948, p.2.

injustice as 'poppy-cock', but followed the same argument as "Be Fair": the six counties of Northern Ireland would never leave the United Kingdom to unite with the republican South.[188] With a convincing and thoughtful letter to the editor, "Irish-Australian" poked holes in de Valera's defence of Ireland's neutrality in World War II early in the tour. De Valera described partition as an 'injustice', and as long as it remained, Ireland would not fight for other lands.[189] "Irish-Australian" noted that this was 'surely a narrow isolationist doctrine which would obliterate the larger hopes of mankind in a petty sense of local grievance'.[190] They continued, arguing that forcing Northern Ireland into a united republican Ireland would go directly against the self-determination that de Valera championed.[191]

A few letters to the editors simply expressed a general dislike for de Valera without necessarily citing a reason. "Union Jack" wrote to the *Examiner* about de Valera, 'Three cheers for all who have expressed resentment, whether they be Protestants or other.'[192] M. Miller wrote to the Tasmanian *Mercury* that de Valera's statement about Ireland not fighting for the freedom of other nations while Ireland remained ununited was 'the meanest-spirited [statement] ever made by a public man'.[193] De Valera's visit even provoked a small number of Australian correspondents to demand his deportation. Two individuals who wrote to the *Daily News* called for de Valera to be treated as an 'alien', referencing the recently passed *Aliens Deportation Act*, introduced by immigration minister Arthur Calwell.[194] B.R. also wrote to the *Daily News* with a similar opinion: 'Better national "friends" have been deported.'[195] However, the most explicit call for de Valera's deportation came from an individual who wrote to the *Brisbane Telegraph*. That writer cited the recent deportation

[188] CM, 9 June 1948, p.2.
[189] HM, 12 May 1948, p.4.
[190] HM, 12 May 1948, p.4.
[191] HM, 12 May 1948, p.4.
[192] EL, 7 June 1948, p.2.
[193] MT, 26 May 1948, p.3.
[194] DNP, 30 April 1948, p.2.
[195] DNP, 10 May 1948, p.2.

under the White Australia Policy of a man named Jim Foo and his pregnant wife to Singapore.[196] They claimed that it was ridiculous that a man like Foo, who served for five years in the Australian armed forces, should be deported yet de Valera, 'noted for his hatred of Britain, and [who] therefore must hate Australia, is allowed to enter Australia and is honoured and feted by our Government.'[197] These responses do not quite fit into any of the aforementioned themes, but they still illustrate a general feeling of dislike towards de Valera, despite failing to narrow in on a specific "why?".

Much as earlier Irish political visits had a trans-Tasman dimension, so too, were there connections in opinion regarding de Valera's tour. "Very Much Down Dev", who agreed with "Loyal Ulsterwoman", quoted some "facts" from an Australian newspaper in their submission to the *Otago Daily Times*. "Very Much Down Dev" also noted the "monster meeting" advertised in Sydney to protest de Valera's visit and asked, 'Is it too late for similar meetings to be held in this country to have this man expelled from our shores?'.[198]

While the majority of letters to the editor surveyed expressed a negative opinion towards de Valera and his tour, there were some who came to his defence, particularly for the policy of neutrality. X.W. reminded *Daily News* readers that de Valera's Ireland 'provided a proportion of volunteers for the Allied forces'.[199] "Irish-Australian" for the *West Australian* and "True Patriot" for the *Mercury* highlighted the same thing in their letters.[200] Others expressed that Ireland, like other nations, had the right to exercise neutrality during World War II and that de Valera should not face such denigration for choosing that option. Some argued that it was actually better for Ireland to have remained neutral; Ireland's defences were not strong enough to protect themselves against a German invasion, risking opening

[196] BT, 7 May 1948, p.4.
[197] BT, 11 May 1948, p.4.
[198] ODT, 26 May 1948, p.6.
[199] DNP, 10 May 1948, p.2.
[200] WA, 15 May 1948, p.2; MT, 21 May 1948, p.3.

Britain up to a war on two fronts if the Germans situated themselves in Irish ports and airfields.[201] N.J Holland, who submitted a letter to the editor of the *Mercury*, went so far as to defend de Valera's visit to Hempel. They argued that de Valera acted in a 'perfectly moral' manner; it was 'official custom' under wartime neutrality to 'sympathise with the German Government on the death of its leader'.[202]

However, positive depictions of de Valera proved rare. There were only two instances where I found overt praise for de Valera in my selection of newspapers. The first was a submission to the *Sydney Morning Herald* by K. Carpenter. This writer praised de Valera's 'scholarly background, his intellectual honesty, his physical and moral courage … [and] his political wisdom and integrity' and stated that Sydney citizens should 'hail this great man as one who has never betrayed the trust of his country or of humanity at large'.[203] This was the only letter where Dev was praised for his character rather than his message. In New Zealand, "Up Dev" wrote to the *Otago Daily Times*, arguing that despite Irish neutrality, de Valera still helped the Allied Forces by sending food and volunteer soldiers. He ended his letter, 'I may say, "God bless De Valera. May his stay in New Zealand be happy and glorious."'[204] It appeared that "Up Dev" and Carpenter were in the minority of antipodean voices. Australasians and their press, as illustrated by the overwhelmingly negative letters published, did not hold him in high regard.

The issues that were repeated time and again in letters to the editors in New Zealand predominantly harked back to Irish neutrality during World War II and de Valera's extended condolences after Hitler's death. It was clear that those who were passionate on either side incorporated personal experiences into their arguments. However, it is important to remember that those submitting correspondence to their local papers were impassioned – this is not

[201] AA, 18 May 1948, p.11; MT, 21 May 1948, p.3; MT, 26 May 1948, p.3; AA, 31 May 1948, p.2.
[202] MT, 27 May 1948, p.3.
[203] SMH, 26 April 1948, p.2.
[204] ODT, 22 May 1948, p.6.

necessarily representative of the entire population, which is thought to have been largely apathetic towards Irish issues in general.

The other element to the response to de Valera's tour is that while Dev drew large crowds, almost all attendees were not actually interested in helping with the partition issue. Looking at reports of de Valera's events in the Australian and New Zealand newspapers, it may read that it was a success. However, it is more likely that his visit fed the nostalgia that older Irish or Irish descendants felt to their homeland – cultural reminiscing and nothing more. As Rory O'Dwyer summarises, 'de Valera provided a focus for nostalgic yearnings' for the Irish diaspora in Australia and New Zealand.[205] Additionally, de Valera was a controversial and well-known politician, so there was an element of curiosity in some of the tour attendees.

Australian and New Zealand populations were largely unimpressed with de Valera by the time he visited their shores in 1948. The inconsistent receptions throughout his tour and the varying perspectives in letters published in local newspapers demonstrated the lacklustre attitude. These letters, however, nuance how historians have recorded Australasians' understanding of Dev's presence in the Pacific. Informed by recent events such as the World Wars and the associated events in Ireland, the misgivings of Australian and New Zealand Irish communities are understandable. For the few who shared positive viewpoints regarding Dev, the anti-partition cause did not dominate their thoughts. Although the newspaper reports on his tour reflected on good turnouts to de Valera's speeches and mostly warm welcomes, what Dev failed to realise was that the Australasian Irish were not supportive of his wartime choices in the least. This simmering resentment simmering in Australia and New Zealand towards Irish neutrality and de Valera's actions were incomprehensible to him. The fact that

[205] O'Dwyer, p.222.

de Valera was ignorant of the reality in Australia and New Zealand was an eery signpost to the impending failure of the ALUI and NZLUI.

Chapter Three – 'The Irish people here do not want the League': The Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland, 1948–1957

While on tour in 1948, Eamon de Valera spoke privately with several organisers of his Australian meetings to propose the idea of a new organisation: the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland (ALUI). De Valera wanted the ALUI to generate Australian support for the anti-partition movement, hoping that international pressure would compel the British government to pursue the end of Irish partition.[1] The League may have remained a suggestion and nothing more, except for two forces on the Australian scene: in Melbourne, Archbishop Daniel Mannix, a devoted supporter of de Valera and in Sydney, Dr Albert Dryer, a loyal advocate of Irish independence. Despite a longstanding relationship with Mannix, de Valera charged Dryer with establishing a Sydney branch and coordinate a national network of the ALUI. Dryer was honoured by this request and dedicated what little spare time he had to fulfil it.[2]

To de Valera, the surviving commandant of the 1916 Easter Rising and opponent of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, Ireland's partition was an issue that transcended geographical boundaries and impacted the international community. Therefore, the ALUI's public image needed to identify for a global audience the injustice of partition and cast the dispute in broader terms than Irishness or Catholicism. In an attempt to achieve this distinction, de Valera wanted the ALUI to exist as a stand-alone organisation rather than as an extension of an existing one, with nondenominational membership open to anyone interested in the anti-partition cause.[3] Additionally, de Valera envisaged that an independent organisation would

[1] Patrick O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end: the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland, 1948–54', *Tasmanian Historical Research Association: Papers and proceedings*, 21, 4 (1974), p.145.
[2] Albert Dryer to Kathleen O'Shea, 6 November 1948, Letters between Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea, Papers of Albert Dryer, National Library of Australia, MS 6610, Series 4, Box 4, Folder 8; O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', pp.145-7.
[3] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.145.

not leave him beholden to the wishes of the Catholic Church or the Irish government. Affording less space for their respective agendas allowed de Valera greater opportunity to play up his own nationalist credentials, enabling a resurrection of his political career.[4] Regardless of de Valera's political reckoning, Albert Dryer embraced the opportunity to lead a new campaign calling for the end of Irish partition.

Dryer had big dreams for the future of the ALUI. He visualised his ALUI as not only an Australian group but a trans-Tasman phenomenon with international connections too.[5] Dryer's ambition was bold, considering that it would be difficult enough to start and sustain a national organisation in the Australian context. According to historian Patrick O'Farrell, at this time 'the Australian Irish were incapable of working together' – the previous failed attempts of Australian Irish organisations was proof enough.[6] From his experience with the Irish National Association (INA), Dryer was also keenly aware of the external friction he faced in starting a new Irish organisation in Australia. The fact the INA survived through the early twentieth century in an environment of pro-British sympathies, anti-Irish attitudes, and general ignorance of Irish affairs demonstrated its resilience.[7] While boasting a substantial and stable membership in the 1940s, the INA's function had shifted from cultural to social, much to Dryer's disapproval.[8] The ALUI provided an opportunity for Dryer to redirect the Australian Irish towards engaging with current Irish affairs. Armed with determination and a vision, Dryer committed the next several years of his life to achieve it.

---

[4] John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973*, Clarendon Press, Oxford; New York, 1982, p.274.
[5] Malcolm Campbell, *Ireland's Farthest Shores: Mobility, Migration, and Settlement in the Pacific World*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2022, p.211.
[6] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[7] 'The Independence of Ireland: The Movement in Australia', p.1, Albert Thomas Dryer, 'Statement Regarding Certain Events in Australia Related to the Movement for the Independence of Ireland and Based Upon First Hand Experiences of the Writer', WS 957, Irish Bureau of Military History: Bureau Staire Mileata 1913–1921: www.bureauofmilitaryhistory.ie/reels/bmh/BMH.WS0957.pdf; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, pp.181–5.
[8] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', pp.146-7.

In one of his first steps towards coordinating a national network of the ALUI, Dryer wrote to other state leaders that had organised receptions for de Valera. Dryer hoped that each state would endorse a national constitution that ensured consistency and clarity about ALUI's purpose and how best to achieve its goals. However, Dryer's overtures were met with very low levels of enthusiasm. Some of those he approached were irked by Dryer's proposal for an anti-partition organisation, and nearly all had existing commitments to longstanding Irish or Catholic organisations. Dryer himself was exceptionally busy – involved in the Sydney INA and running his medical practice – but his devotion to the ALUI cause meant that he was 'up to 1 or 2 a.m. every morning, seven days a week, with League correspondence'.[9] Unfortunately for Dryer, those he wrote to either did not have the time or the energy to match his regimen.

Repeated correspondence from Dryer attempted to elicit agreement from all states, with some taking longer than others. Queensland, Western Australia, Tasmania, and Dryer's own New South Wales had formally affiliated under the proposed national constitution by early December 1948.[10] Conversations between Dryer and the Victorian ALUI secretary were also underway by this point.[11] After months of back-and-forth, the Victorian branch eventually signed the national constitution. South Australia was the slowest to engage with Dryer and sign on – it took seven months and nine letters before Dryer received a reply and another three months before South Australia signed the constitution – but by June 1949, all six Australian states were formally affiliated under the same constitution.[12]

Dryer also looked across the Tasman to New Zealand, hoping that a unified trans-Tasman campaign could build pressure through the Pacific. The New Zealand League for an Undivided Ireland (NZLUI) was founded in Wellington in August 1948, and Dryer was quick

[9] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.147.
[10] Dryer to O'Shea, 3 December 1948.
[11] Dryer to O'Shea, 3 December 1948.
[12] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.147.

to initiate conversation, sending his first letter on 9 September 1948. At the outset, Dryer recognised that the NZLUI should act as its own entity, but he believed lines of communication should remain open so there could be 'unity in action'.[13] The NZLUI secretary Kathleen O'Shea responded quickly and positively. She asked for a copy of Sydney's ALUI constitution so the NZLUI could stay closely aligned with the Australian organisation, a 'desirable' outcome in O'Shea's eyes.[14] Her response suggests a keenness for the NZLUI to succeed and that the organisation was willing to work with Dryer to form a united Pacific front.

While de Valera's proposal of the Leagues and Dryer's drive were strong enough to set up the framework for both the ALUI and NZLUI, there was nowhere near enough fuel to sustain the challenging journey ahead. At a glance, it appeared that Dryer made progress with inter-state cooperation despite the frustrating delays, and O'Shea's enthusiastic response showed promise for the broader anti-partition campaign. In actuality, most branches of the ALUI were largely disengaged and, according to O'Farrell, 'tiny, apathetic and ineffective'.[15] I extend this description to encompass the NZLUI as well despite O'Shea's eagerness. Dryer's ambition of a transnational movement was in danger from the beginning.

There is little evidence outside of private letters for the foundation and existence of ALUI branches in three of six Australian states: Western Australia, Queensland, and Tasmania. That these three states signed the national constitution organised by Dryer by the end of 1948 suggests that all had established central branches by then. However, there was no mention of these states' respective branches in Australian newspapers from mid-1948 to the end of 1950. In contrast, South Australia, Victoria, and New South Wales each had at least

[13] Dryer to O'Shea, 9 September 1948.
[14] O'Shea to Dryer, 26 October 1948.
[15] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.148.

one publication in local newspapers announcing or advertising their branches of the ALUI.[16] The dearth of public evidence of the existence of the South Australian, Queensland, and Tasmanian branches suggests that there may have been little care for the anti-partition cause in these states; these same states demonstrated the least enthusiasm for de Valera's anti-partition tour earlier in 1948. Whether this was the result of hostility expressed by newspaper editors towards the movement or a lack of effort from the League's officers in their branches, or a combination of the two, is unclear. Regardless, the branches in Queensland and Western Australia seem like ghosts; they indeed existed, but there is no evidence of their life or even their failure. The implications of such an absence of evidence speaks loudly for de Valera's ambitions.

While lacking newspaper publicity, Dryer's correspondence confirmed that the Tasmanian branch existed for nearly two years. By early October 1948, an ALUI branch had been established in Hobart, with members elected for the executive. But at a meeting on 4 October, the Hobart ALUI committee decided that its campaign should be 'discreet'.[17] This approach was endorsed by the secretary in Hobart, who requested that Dryer should 'address all mail to him personally, without reference to his League office, again for "discreet purposes"'.[18] There had been mixed responses to de Valera's visit earlier in 1948, which may help explain the cautious approach from Hobart's executive.[19] Yet requesting discretion concerning a campaign that hinged on garnering public support appears self-sabotaging. In hindsight, it seems unlikely that this secretive campaign could be an effective means of garnering public support for the anti-partition movement in Australia.

---

[16] *Catholic Weekly* (CW), 2 September 1948, p.9; *Southern Cross* (SC), 3 September 1948, p.5; *Advocate* (Melbourne) (ADM), 21 April 1949, p.3.
[17] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[18] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[19] *Mercury* (Tasmania) (MT), 19 May 1948, p.10; MT, 21 May 1948, p.3; MT, 27 May 1948, p.3; Rory O'Dwyer, ''A roof-raising affair'? Éamon de Valera's Tour of Australia and New Zealand', in Geary, Laurence M. and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, pp.217–18.

The Tasmanian ALUI's situation did not improve throughout its lifetime. In correspondence dated 27 February 1950, Dryer noted that Hobart Premier Robert Cosgrove had written to him, promising 'full support' for the ALUI.[20] Dryer failed to acknowledge in this correspondence that the Hobart ALUI branch secretary, Joe Morgan, had written to him in January 1950 alerting him of 'apathy and inactivity in Tasmania'.[21] Regardless of how much support Premier Cosgrove would or could give, it was not enough. By September 1950, Morgan reiterated that the Tasmanian ALUI faced 'gross apathy and indifference' and expressed disappointment at those who had abandoned the League: 'Perhaps I am naive; I really believed them when they swore undying allegiance to the cause.'[22] The executive had wasted away to three members, 'the Catholic clergy were hostile', and the Australian-born Archbishop of Hobart, Ernest Tweedy, had requested the ALUI dissolve in Tasmania.[23] Despite the dedication of a small number of individuals, like Morgan – who O'Farrell notes was 'the most active and dedicated of all the state secretaries' – it was not enough to sustain the movement in Tasmania.[24]

South Australia's ALUI faced a similar fate. While there is public evidence of its existence, there is confusion in the sources symptomatic of the League's foundation. The *Southern Cross* published an announcement of the South Australian ALUI's formation on 3 September 1948.[25] The article also reported that the branch had sent cables to English Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Opposition Leader Winston Churchill, urging the abolition of the partition of Ireland.[26] However, Dryer was under the impression that the South Australian ALUI had not inaugurated their branch until mid-1949. In correspondence to O'Shea dated

[20] Dryer to O'Shea, 27 February 1950.
[21] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[22] Quoted by O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[23] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[24] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[25] SC, 3 September 1948, p.5.
[26] SC, 3 September 1948, p.5.

18 June 1949, Dryer stated that the South Australian executive had 'at last been able to take the initiative in inaugurating the League in that State'.[27] Additionally, in a previous letter, Dryer highlighted one state that was 'scarcely showing any sign of life at all'.[28] Given that the Victorian branch had been actively discussing its arrangements to sign the national constitution with Dryer for a couple of months, and all remaining states had signed on already, it leaves South Australia as the state that matches this description. These two conflicting pieces of evidence suggests chaotic local organisation of the South Australian branch, perhaps symptomatic of a weak organisation with similarly weak leadership. At the very least, it demonstrates how difficult Dryer found it to correspond and coordinate with other state branches, and not for want of trying on his end.

The experience of the South Australian League was symptomatic of the wider scene in that state. The South Australian INA struggled to survive in the late 1940s. Historian Stephanie James looked at correspondence between Dryer and P.E. O'Leary, head of the South Australian INA and the state's ALUI. She found that Dryer was far more engaged, sending 23 letters from 1949 to 1954, with only ten replies from O'Leary. This is typical of correspondence between Dryer and others involved in the ALUI.[29] However, early in his correspondence, intimated to Dryer the challenges the state branch faced.[30] While she fails to expand on O'Leary's reasons, James argues that ageing second-generation members and a disengaged third generation 'resulted in a weakened INA facing the postwar world'.[31] If O'Leary struggled to keep the INA alive by 1949, a longstanding organisation since the

[27] Dryer to O'Shea, 18 June 1949.
[28] Dryer to O'Shea, 11 January 1949.
[29] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.147.
[30] Stephanie James, 'Varieties of Irish nationalism in South Australia, 1839-1950: Changing terms of engagement', in Susan Arthure, Fidelma Breen, Stephanie James and Dymphna Lonergan, eds., *Irish South Australia: New histories and insights*, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 2019, pp.208.
[31] James, pp.208.

1910s, it left little hope for a brand-new, specialised organisation like the ALUI to break through in South Australia.

While Dryer succeeded in convincing all six Australian states to affiliate under a national constitution by mid-1949, four out of six states' organisations had failed by the beginning of 1951. Unmotivated communication from ALUI secretaries meant Dryer was unaware of the inertia of other states' organisations.[32] The only states where there appeared to be any level of interest were Victoria and New South Wales. Given that the two largest established Irish populations were in Melbourne and Sydney – making up about 22 per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, of the total Irish-born population in Australia - it makes sense that these two branches of the ALUI were the most successful, comparatively.[33] The states' size and their historical experience and networks also lent themselves to connecting with New Zealand to pursue Dryer's dream of a more transnational movement. As Lyndon Fraser comments, the historical links between the West Coast of New Zealand and Victoria made the New Zealand region into 'a trans-Tasman suburb of Melbourne'.[34]

The Sydney branch of the ALUI emerged soon after de Valera's departure, with the inaugural meeting held on 9 August 1948.[35] An executive was elected, with Dryer as honorary secretary. The branch's first official action appeared to be issuing cables to British Prime Minister Attlee and Opposition Leader Winston Churchill, calling for an end to partition to strengthen democratic relationships between England, Ireland, and Australia.[36]

The Victorian branch of the ALUI was delayed in its official beginnings, not holding its augural meeting until April 1949. The reasons for this slow beginning were numerous, but

[32] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[33] These numbers are calculated from the 1947 census data included in the 1954 Australian census. Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1954': www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/2108.01954?OpenDocument.
[34] Lyndon Fraser, *Castles of Gold: A History of New Zealand's West Coast Irish*, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2007, p.27.
[35] CW, 2 September 1948, p.9.
[36] CW, 2 September 1948, p.9.

according to Melbourne's *Advocate* newspaper it mostly seemed due to 'doing the necessary preliminary ground work in Melbourne' so that they could 'keep up an exchange with other States to achieve uniformity in essentials so that the league could be built upon an Australia-wide basis.'[37] Victoria's Irish launched the League at an event celebrating both the men of the 1916 Rising and also the so-called tenth anniversary of the Irish Republic.[38] Mannix spoke at the event, which ended up widely publicised, much more than the New South Wales inaugural meeting had been.[39] Having Mannix as a figurehead for the League ensured high levels of publicity and public rallying. However, with only two Australian states demonstrating any sign of life and a fragile NZLUI, Dryer's dream of a transnational movement was unlikely to be realised.

Minor branches aside, the story of the Australasian Leagues for an Undivided Ireland even in the most populous states is still one of decline. Despite garnering some interest in the early stages, the ALUI and NZLUI never achieved the traction Dryer and O'Shea desired. The NZLUI failed in the traditional sense by the end of 1950 – no members, no money, and no interest.[40] The Melbourne ALUI was near dead by 1952 but was saved by a group of recent Irish arrivals.[41] The branch failed because its intended function was redirected, becoming more of a social society than a political one. The Sydney ALUI outlived the other branches – it was still operational by 1957 – but faced constant challenges from local Sinn Féin supporters from 1954 onwards. Dryer eventually shut down the Sydney branch due to increasing local tensions, spurred by a shift towards militant action rather than ending partition through peaceful means.[42]

[37] ADM, 21 April 1949, p.3; ADM, 9 June 1949, p.17.
[38] ADM, 21 April 1949, p.3.
[39] ADM, 21 April 1949, p.3; SMH, 20 April 1949, p.5; ADM, 9 June 1949, p.17.
[40] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.
[41] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.156.
[42] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.157.

While the experience across Australia and New Zealand was broadly one of failure, different local and international factors affected the Leagues' ability to win support beneath the surface. External circumstances exacerbated the internal difficulties experienced by the different branches. Even if the branch leaders had managed to cooperate, the increasingly diverse Irish diaspora and the wider Australasian population did not care for Irish issues. The changing face of the Australian Catholic Church, industrial troubles in New Zealand, and an enduring fear of Communism that developed in World War II and endured in the post-war era further contributed to an already indifferent Australasian audience.

Internal Disputes

Inter-state tension between the Victorian and New South Wales ALUI branches over League matters complicated what was already a massive undertaking for Dryer. Dryer's plan for the ALUI relied on all six Australian states' Leagues signing the national constitution before starting 'meaningful work' in order to work in unity.[43] The Victorian ALUI sought various amendments to the constitution, morphing into a months-long back-and-forth between its leaders and Dryer. Increasingly frustrated, Dryer complained in a letter to O'Shea that, 'our work has been retarded to a degree by the recalcitrant and unco-operative attitude' of Victoria.[44] In Dryer's eyes, the Victorian ALUI's refusal to accept his constitution without critique came from a place of state and personal rivalry. Dryer hypothesised that being picked as the coordinator for the ALUI movement over Archbishop Mannix left those in the Victorian ALUI unhappy.[45] However, Dryer's feelings do not accurately represent the whole situation.

[43] Dryer to O'Shea, 11 January 1949.
[44] New South Wales's only action prior to Victoria's affiliation was sending cables to British Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Opposition Leader Winston Churchill at the League's inaugural meeting in August 1948. Dryer to O'Shea, 11 January 1949.
[45] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.

The more significant issue was that the Victorian ALUI was determined to manipulate the branch in its own way. Like other state branches, the Victorian ALUI was plagued by apathetic officers and executive members. Still, the Victorians were the only state other than New South Wales that showed any meaningful engagement with League matters.[46] However, Victoria used this engagement to challenge Dryer's every suggestion. Their demands included 'a new form of petition, a different constitution, [and] a national conference to formulate policy'.[47] The Victorian ALUI also very publicly launched its branch 'with a public meeting addressed by Archbishop Mannix', in a direct challenge to de Valera's, and therefore Dryer's, wish to keep ALUI's image nondenominational.[48]

Differences in members' backgrounds and attitudes further exacerbated tensions. The Victorian ALUI drew a substantial proportion of its membership from the professional classes, with members in careers like politics or law. In contrast, Sydney's membership leaned more towards a working-class background. Where this became an issue was in their approach to action. The Sydney ALUI drummed up support for a petition calling on the British government to 'withdraw support of the puppet Belfast Government'.[49] Melbourne 'regarded the petitions as unduly provocative manifestoes' and believed that 'diplomatic language was more likely to obtain the desired result', whereas Sydney (i.e., Dryer) felt that 'Direct language is the only speech these people comprehend'.[50] Dryer had to appeal to Dr Kiernan, the Irish government representative in Australia, 'to act as arbitrator' between New South Wales and Victoria, as they had been so challenging to work with.[51]

Despite Dryer's frustration with the Victorian ALUI's methods, they worked, at least initially. Having the Melbourne *Advocate* as the unofficial mouthpiece of the Victorian ALUI

[46] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', pp.148–9.
[47] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', pp.148–9.
[48] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', pp.148–9.
[49] ADM, 10 Nov 1949, p.17.
[50] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.148.
[51] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.148.

benefitted the organisation, allowing it to advertise meetings, plans, and events. Within months of its inauguration, the Victorian ALUI expanded its operations, planning to open branches in country centres.[52] By March 1950, the Victorian secretary, T.W. Martin, had procured anti-partition literature from Ireland and other ALUI branches to distribute to new members.[53] The Melbourne branch met monthly and advertised two general meetings in 1950 and one in 1951.[54] They also organised two concerts: one at Roma House in November 1950 and another at Cathedral Hall in June 1951. Both evenings consisted of music and dancing and were headed by anti-partition lectures.[55] The 1951 concert attracted more attention than the 1950 concert, and ALUI activities more generally, with articles published in the Melbourne *Advocate*, Sydney's *Catholic Weekly*, the *Argus*, and *Warwick Daily News*.[56] This popularity was largely thanks to Mannix's attendance and his impassioned anti-partition speech. In stark contrast, Dryer and the NSW ALUI did not feature in any newspapers following the announcement of their first meeting in 1948.[57]

Even though Dryer reportedly quashed the proposal that Mannix should be the patron of the ALUI, the Archbishop was tied to the Melbourne movement, at least initially. This is understandable given Mannix's position as an influential member of the Catholic Hierarchy, an outspoken supporter of republicanism, and his ability to generate widespread media engagement – especially important for the success of the Victorian branch of the ALUI.[58] It also helped that he owned the Melbourne *Advocate*, which published the most articles that mentioned the ALUI from 1949 to 1955. The newspaper had been under diocesan control

[52] ADM, 10 November 1949, p.17.
[53] ADM, 2 March 1950, p.22.
[54] ADM, 16 March 1950, p.18; ADM, 30 November 1950, p.15; ADM, 5 April 1951, p.23.
[55] ADM, 9 November 1950, p.18; ADM, 23 May 1951, p.23.
[56] *Argus* (AR), 4 June 1951, p.1; *Warwick Daily News* (WDN), 4 June 1951, p.5; ADM, 7 June 1951, p.7; CW, 14 June 1951, pp.1, 4.
[57] CW, 2 September 1948, p.9.
[58] Patrick O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms: Irish in Australia and New Zealand: A Personal Excursion*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1990, pp.235–6; Michael Gilchrist, *Daniel Mannix: Wit and Wisdom*, Freedom Publishing, Melbourne, 2004, p.74.

since Mannix purchased it in 1919. Mannix was not a distant proprietor and was involved in the editing process, so it was likely that most articles required his approval before publication. The Victorian ALUI's public image may not be representative of its actual nature, but it remains helpful to historians in demonstrating the trajectory of the League over its existence.

Across the Tasman, the NZLUI faced its own domestic difficulties. The organisation had been operating under the auspices of the Irish National Club (INC) despite O'Shea's belief that an independent NZLUI would be 'in a better position to do something towards dispelling the apathy of our people'.[59] Several members of the INC thought otherwise. At its biannual general meeting on 28 November 1948, the INC defeated the motion for the NZLUI to operate as a separate entity. Instead, members decided that the NZLUI 'should continue as '"one of the Club's activities"'.[60] O'Shea was committed to the cause, however, telling Dryer that 'all the work which has hitherto been done will be futile' if the NZLUI could not operate independently.[61] Her goal was to 'call a special General Meeting early this year and have the whole position clarified'.[62] O'Shea felt that until that meeting went ahead, all the NZLUI could meaningfully contribute was completing their educational pamphlet distribution.[63] In correspondence dated 2 May 1949, O'Shea seemed hopeful for outcome of the general meeting in the next fortnight, as the committee had formed a united front in favour of separation.[64] However, O'Shea never confirmed the split of the NZLUI from the INC.

The delays in starting what Dryer and O'Shea determined as meaningful progress, in turn, hindered both Sydney and Wellington's ability to aggressively pursue activities to engage those who were interested. By the time that both the ALUI and NZLUI deemed

[59] O'Shea to Dryer, 3 January 1949.
[60] O'Shea to Dryer, 3 January 1949.
[61] O'Shea to Dryer, 3 January 1949.
[62] O'Shea to Dryer, 3 January 1949.
[63] O'Shea to Dryer, 28 October 1948.
[64] O'Shea to Dryer, 2 May 1949.

themselves on a secure enough foundation in mid-1949, the opportunity to use the publicity of de Valera's tour and any enthusiasm generated by it to their advantage had well and truly passed.

External Issues: International Developments and Local Affairs

By the time the ALUI and NZLUI had resolved their internal issues, Anglo-Irish developments relating to the Irish Question had made it increasingly difficult for international anti-partition groups to achieve anything meaningful. In September 1948, Taoiseach John Costello announced his intention to repeal de Valera's 1936 External Relations Act and introduce the Republic of Ireland Act. In doing so, Ireland would sever the last of its ties with the Crown and leave the British Commonwealth to operate as an independent republic.[65] De Valera and his political party, Fianna Fáil, opposed the measure. De Valera's ideal Irish republic was united – all 32 counties under one government – but as it stood in 1948, Costello's announcement confirmed it as a partitioned one. Breaking the link with the Commonwealth, de Valera argued, would make it significantly more difficult to end partition; it would signal acceptance of the boundary between Northern Ireland and what would become the new Republic of Ireland.[66] England's Ireland Act of 1949 confirmed de Valera's fears. According to the Ireland Act, 'the part of Ireland heretofore known as Ireland ceased as from the eighteenth day of April 1949 to be part of His Majesty's Dominions', and that 'in no event will Northern Ireland or any part thereof cease to be part of His Majesty's dominions and of the United Kingdom without the consent of the parliament of Northern Ireland'.[67] By

[65] John B. O'Brien and Anne E. O'Brien, eds., *Studies in Irish, British and Australian Relations 1916-1963: Trade, Diplomacy and Politics*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2005, pp.83–84; Tim Pat Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, p.96.
[66] Coogan, p.96; O'Brien and O'Brien, pp.97–98.
[67] David George Boyce, *The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868–1996*, Macmillan Press; St Martin's Press, Basingstoke; New York, 1996, pp.101–102; Coogan, p.96.

implementing this latter condition, the partition of Ireland was all but confirmed.[68] As historian Alvin Jackson summarised, ‘‘any part’ of Northern Ireland (including Nationalist areas) could not have its legitimacy called into question’.[69]

From this point onwards, the international anti-partition movement started to lose steam. The first and principal reason was the mixed international reactions to Ireland’s departure from the Commonwealth. While primarily diplomatic in tone, Australian Prime Minister Ben Chifley expressed glimpses of disappointment with Costello’s decision. In a *New Zealand Tablet* article relaying Chifley’s official statement about Ireland’s departure from the Commonwealth, he was quoted as stating that, ‘Australia must reluctantly accept the factual position, which we hope will only be temporary, that Éire, because of its own free choice, cannot now be regarded as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations.’[70] In another instance, when pressed about the issue in the House of Representatives, he repeated Australia’s commitment to the Commonwealth, based on ‘our relations with the King not merely as a symbol of association but as our monarch and enjoying the same loyalty and affection in Australia as in Britain itself’.[71] Chifley’s understanding of the Australian-Commonwealth link was founded on a pro-British attitude, still prominent following World War II amongst most Australians; they saw themselves as, in some sense, ‘British’ people.[72]

Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr H.V. Evatt, was somewhat of an Australian outlier. While initially indignant upon hearing Costello’s announcement in September 1948, he worked towards confirming legislation that would treat Ireland as a non-alien country in the eyes of the Commonwealth. Costello’s repeal of the External Relations Act left Irish citizens overseas at risk of losing privileges afforded to them through

[68] Kelly, p.7; O’Farrell, ‘Irish Australia at an end’, p.149.
[69] Boyce, pp.101–102.
[70] NZT, 8 December 1948, p.44.
[71] Quoted in O’Brien and O’Brien, p.89.
[72] O’Brien and O’Brien, p.89; James Belich, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders: From the 1880s to the Year 2000*, Allen Lane, London; Auckland, 2001, p.118.

Commonwealth membership.[73] Evatt's proposed legislation would enable Irish citizens to continue being treated as they had been, rather than as "foreigners". Historian John O'Brien argues that Evatt succeeded in this move because he was based overseas at this point in time. It allowed him both elements of freedom from the opinions of his Prime Minister and Cabinet colleagues back home and to generate support from other dominion's representatives, notably from New Zealand's Prime Minister, Peter Fraser.[74] Evatt managed to swing the opinion of the dominions so that only Britain stood by the desire to treat Ireland like a foreign country; the British eventually yielded. With the passing of Evatt's bill, Ireland was 'now in the Commonwealth without being in it'.[75]

New Zealand's official response mirrored Australia's, so Peter Fraser's individual engagement with the Irish issue was again somewhat of an outlier in the scheme of broader opinion. In his book, *Paradise Reforged*, James Belich highlights that post-World War II, a close relationship remained between New Zealand and Britain, the head of the empire.[76] Understandably, the New Zealand Cabinet was 'tepid' in response to Ireland's departure from the Commonwealth.[77] Even Fraser was initially mixed in his commitment to helping Ireland smooth over Anglo-Irish relations. However, with some convincing, Fraser became a steadfast supporter of Evatt's cause and fully backed him in the Paris meeting in November 1948.[78] Fraser was able to do so for the same reasons Evatt could – being abroad allowed greater leeway in decisions, not necessarily having to 'obtain prior approval for [his] actions'.[79] Despite his support for Evatt's policy, Fraser also expressed similar misgivings as his Australian counterpart, Chifley, when pressed by the media. Fraser 'declined to comment

[73] O'Brien and O'Brien, p.85.
[74] O'Brien and O'Brien, pp.87, 89.
[75] O'Brien and O'Brien, p.97.
[76] Belich, *Paradise*, pp.318–19.
[77] O'Brien and O'Brien, pp.89–90.
[78] O'Brien and O'Brien, p.89.
[79] O'Brien and O'Brien, pp.89–90.

on the repeal of the External Relations Act' when visiting Ireland in December 1948.[80] When visiting Northern Ireland early the following year, Fraser stated that while '[w]e of the Dominions are anxious that there should be no rupture with the Irish Republic, and that we should remain on terms of the greatest friendship', he also noted that 'as the Prime Minister of a British Dominion', he was not pleased 'to see any country leaving the Commonwealth', and that he was sorry to see that the Dublin government 'considered it essential' to do so.[81] Still, it also suggests that Fraser, historically a staunch Irish supporter, recognised the limits of New Zealand's involvement in what was now considered Irish internal politics.

The ALUI branches initially took it upon themselves to respond directly to the passing of the *Ireland Act*. According to O'Farrell, the ALUI sent 'a flurry of indignant protest' cables, 'in which it claimed to act on behalf of two million Australians', telling the British Prime Minister that the Act 'absolutely denied' the right to Irish self-determination.[82] However, Dryer recognised very quickly that it was not sensible to be pushing the partition issue in the current Australian environment. An intensely hostile public reaction to the Irish decision was never going to be conducive in generating support for the League, nor was trying to motivate a low-morale Irish-Australian population, confused and discouraged by Costello's decision and Britain's continuing support of partition.[83]

Despite a similar environment in New Zealand to Australia, O'Shea pursued a new project in her attempt to generate greater engagement following these international developments. She had been receiving a variety of newspaper clippings and articles from Frank Aiken's office in Dublin and weekly press releases from Dr Kiernan in Melbourne. O'Shea wanted to publish this material to make it publicly available, so the Wellington

[80] Peter Burke, *True to Ireland: Éire's 'conscientious objectors' in New Zealand in World War II*, The Cuba Press, Wellington, 2019, p.203.
[81] NZT, 2 February 1949, p.33.
[82] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.149.
[83] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.150.

branch of the NZLUI planned to produce its own newspaper, named the *Irish Opinion*. Its founders envisaged that the *Irish Opinion* would contain a selection of the material mentioned above, locally obtained articles about partition, and notices and reports of the NZLUI's activities.[84] O'Shea also asked Dryer to send 'any information on the successes and achievements of your organization', as she believed that the New Zealand population, 'though apathetic towards our own organization are often impressed when they hear of the activities of similar organizations operating in other countries.'[85]

O'Shea's secondary aim of starting the NZLUI's newspaper was to combat local press hostility. New Zealand's media was primarily unsympathetic to the anti-partition cause and Irish issues more broadly. This attitude was the continuation of a trend that had ebbed and flowed since the first calls for Home Rule in the nineteenth century; by 1948, recent Irish actions, like neutrality during World War II, lent itself to a more unsympathetic press.[86] Although employed at one of Wellington's daily newspapers, O'Shea's attempts to publish anti-partition articles were consistently refused by her superiors.[87] In line with O'Shea's personal experience, local New Zealand newspapers never advertised NZLUI meetings, events, or calls to action. They only seemed to report on Irish partition when addressed on the international stage – items like the passing of the *Ireland Act* in May 1949, Britain vetoing discussion of partition at the first meeting of the Council of Europe in August 1949, and the United States House of Representatives voting to refuse Marshall Plan aid to Britain until partition was ended in March 1950 (quickly repealed by the Senate).[88] O'Shea's hope for the *Irish Opinion* was that it would help resolve the pro-Irish gap in New Zealand newspapers.

[84] O'Shea to Dryer, 2 May 1949.
[85] O'Shea to Dryer, 2 May 1949.
[86] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.
[87] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.
[88] *Ashburton Guardian* (AG), 4 May 1949, p.5; *Northern Advocate* (NA), 4 May 1949, p.5; *Otago Daily Times* (ODT), 5 May 1949, p.7; NA, 9 August 1949, p.5; *Press* (PR), 10 August 1949, p.7; *Gisborne Herald* (GH), 31 March 1950, p.5, AG, 31 March 1950, p.3; PR, 31 March 1950, p.7; PR, 3 April 1950, p.7.

The existing publication that came closest to filling this gap was the Dunedin-based *New Zealand Tablet*. In her analysis of the *Tablet* from 1898 to 1923, New Zealand historian Heather McNamara describes the publication as both 'a narrator of Irish-Catholic life in New Zealand' and holding 'a significant role within a different (but overlapping) diaspora' of the New Zealand Roman Catholic Church.[89] The balance between these two roles had shifted by 1948, with greater weight placed on the publication's Catholic element. From January 1948 to December 1950, the *Tablet* had a page dedicated to "Irish News" in nearly every issue, as well as advertisements for the Hibernian Australasian Catholic Benefit Society (HACBS), an Irish-Catholic organisation. However, the *Tablet* never issued any call-to-action for Irish issues nor advertised the NZLUI.[90] This kind of engagement was not foreign to the *Tablet*; under Bishop James Kelly's editorship from 1917 to 1932, the *Tablet* was incredibly outspoken on Irish issues. Kelly was unapologetic in his attempts to swing New Zealand Irish Catholics' opinion towards supporting Sinn Féin following the 1916 Rising.[91] But with Kelly's removal, the *Tablet* morphed into a softer, less controversial publication. When Irish issues were discussed outside of the "Irish News" section, the articles generally fit into the media mould described by historian Kevin Molloy: '…within an Irish and especially Catholic-Irish context, tradition was used explicitly to link current Irish-Catholic cultural practice with its roots in a circumscribed Irish past'.[92] In other words, the *Tablet* aimed to elicit nostalgia with its Irish content, rather than trying to motivate their audience into political or nationalist action. Understanding this, then, it would not be a stretch to argue that while sympathetic to Irish issues, the *Tablet* proved hesitant to issue any calls-to-action

[89] Heather McNamara, 'The *New Zealand Tablet* and the Irish Catholic Press Worldwide, 1898-1923', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 37, 2 (2003), p.156.
[90] The NZLUI was mentioned once, in passing, over January 1948 – December 1950 (152 issues). NZT, 1 June 1949, p.17.
[91] McNamara, pp.158–60; Rory Sweetman, ''The Importance of Being Irish': Hibernianism in New Zealand, 1869–1969', in Fraser, Lyndon, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, pp.149–51.
[92] Kevin Molloy, 'Tradition, Memory and the Culture of Irish-Australian Identity, 1900–1960', *Australasian Journal of Irish Studies*, 16, 2016, p.50.

around something contentious like partition. The risk of alienating their audience was too high. Although the NZLUI was committed to ending partition through peaceful means, like petitions and public education, the *Tablet*'s audience may not have perceived it as such; the group was likely seen as actively Irish. The *Tablet*'s editors may have feared that advertising like the NZLUI would read as endorsing the side of the partition issue that had been associated with violence in the past.[93]

Dryer's initial response to O'Shea's project was mostly positive. He congratulated O'Shea on her ambition but noted that newspapers, while effective, should be supplemented by pamphlets and handbills.[94] In his following letter at the end of the year, given there had been no update from O'Shea, Dryer suggested some more ideas to incorporate or replace the concept of the NZLUI's newspaper. Using the *Irish Weekly*, a 'powerfully Nationalist journal published in Belfast', the *Irish Review* (or the *Irish Opinion*, if being published), and the collection of Kiernan's weekly press releases and other propaganda, Dryer anticipated the NZLUI could set up that study groups. The purpose would be to inspire members to become 'active missionar[ies]' for the anti-partition cause.[95] Unfortunately for Dryer, O'Shea's silence continued for nearly two years.[96]

New developments in Ireland continued to impact upon the international dimension of the anti-partition movement, contributing to de Valera's dwindling levels of engagement with Dryer and O'Shea. Although the anti-partition campaign sparked up again, driven by southern Irish political parties following the passing of the Ireland Act, it was futile.[97] Within

[93] De Valera was not only a survivor of the 1916 Rising and a driving force on the anti-Treaty side during the Irish War of Independence, but he was also the spokesperson for Irish neutrality during World War II. Seemingly shrouded in controversy, de Valera's association with the NZLUI may not have served the organisation well when trying to advertise in more conservative publications like the *Tablet*.
[94] Dryer to O'Shea, 18 June 1949.
[95] Dryer to O'Shea, 13 December 1949.
[96] O'Shea sent a cable to Dryer on 2 May 1949 and did not send another until 9 April 1951. In this timeframe, Dryer sent seven cables to O'Shea, with his seventh one on 21 March 1951 finally eliciting a response from O'Shea.
[97] Boyce, pp.102–103; Kelly, p.7.

Ireland and the United Kingdom, little was achieved. According to historian David George Boyce, the political propaganda had 'no impact on the north, except to raise further the political temperature there by its rancour'.[98] When Seán MacBride, Irish Minister of External Affairs, argued the case against partition at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, an organisation in London committed to analysing international affairs, he was met with a lukewarm response. His audience was not unsympathetic but felt that it was better to 'take up his case with Belfast rather than London'.[99] Other attempts to air the partition grievance in international organisations did not fare much better. Tim Pat Coogan best summarised Ireland's first year in the Council of Europe: 'The vibrant speeches of her representatives exacerbated the Northern Unionists, bored other delegates into weary unconcern, and diverted Ireland's energies from more fruitful courses in international affairs.'[100] Additionally, Ireland's refusal to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in January 1949 left it on the outskirts of British and western European politics.[101] If Ireland's British and European neighbours were growing less interested, how could awareness be sustained further afield? The answer is simple: it could not.

De Valera, so determined in his efforts to generate international support for ending partition over 1948 and 1949, finally recognised the limits of his influence after the introduction of the Ireland Act.[102] Despite his broadcasting of political propaganda to audiences across the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, international pressure on Britain to alter their policy never developed. De Valera's tour had also irritated the Northern Irish government.[103] This did not bode well for his hope of Irish reunification, given Stormont

[98] Boyce, pp.102–103.
[99] Boyce, pp.102–103.
[100] Coogan, p.121.
[101] Boyce, pp.103; Kelly, pp.11–12; Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War: A World History*, Penguin Books, London, 2018, p.118.
[102] Kelly, p.7.
[103] Kelly, p.6.

(the Northern Irish government) was responsible for the decision now, more than the British government. De Valera had always believed that ending partition was achievable within his lifetime, but these developments shifted his mindset.[104] De Valera ended his international anti-partition campaign in early 1950. According to historian Stephen Kelly, de Valera privately admitted that 'a more realistic attitude' to ending partition was required.[105] When re-elected as Taoiseach in 1951, de Valera 'dismantle[d] the anti-partition apparatus abroad and in Ireland' and ceased funding the Irish Anti-Partition League in Northern Ireland, and the Anti-Partition of Ireland League of Great Britain; he turned his focus inwards, believing it was not the responsibility of external lobby groups but of the Irish government to resolve partition.[106]

De Valera's withdrawal of support to international lobby groups affected the ALUI and NZLUI. De Valera had been somewhat engaged with Dryer and O'Shea initially. Before leaving New Zealand in May 1948, de Valera suggested to O'Shea that the NZLUI publish anti-partition pamphlets to distribute amongst members. O'Shea took this onboard and had 10,000 copies of David O'Neill's booklet, 'The Partition of Ireland', published and distributed throughout the country by October 1948.[107] Dryer kept de Valera updated on the ALUI's progress throughout 1948 and 1949, receiving occasional responses of encouragement.[108] However, that was all that de Valera was willing to extend. According to O'Farrell, Dryer's requests for 'advice and information and contacts in Ireland went unanswered'.[109] In a letter on 18 June 1949, Dryer asked O'Shea if she was writing to de Valera or Aiken, to be sure to push for the "World League for an Undivided Ireland", stating that while the Irish politicians will have likely considered this already, it would be useful to

[104] Bowman, p.160.
[105] Quoted in Kelly, p.9.
[106] Kelly, p.9.
[107] O'Shea to Dryer, 26 October 1948.
[108] Dryer to O'Shea, 26 March 1949; O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.150.
[109] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.150.

show more comprehensive support for the idea.[110] However, de Valera may have already rejected Dryer's idea; it was around this time that de Valera was starting to turn his attention to within Ireland for resolving partition.[111] As de Valera increasingly pulled away from international engagement, the star power associated with the ALUI and NZLUI fell away. The responsibility of sustaining their respective organisations rested solely on Dryer and O'Shea, but neither individual had the same *je ne sais quoi* as de Valera did.

A common complaint that emerged in the early months of both the ALUI and NZLUI's operation was Irish and Irish descendants' resistance towards engaging with the anti-partition cause. O'Shea recognised that support from the New Zealand Irish population was crucial to the NZLUI's success. Without it, there was little chance of interest from the rest of New Zealand – a majority Protestant population that, as Jenny Carlyon and Diana Morrow say, remained sentimentally tied to 'the Mother Country'.[112] The issue, however, was engaging with said Irish population. In her second letter to Dryer in January 1949, O'Shea noted that 'the League's work has been regarded with comparative indifference by the Irish people in Wellington'.[113] While there were promising developments in other areas that demonstrated small pockets of interest throughout the country – a 'vigorous' Auckland branch, another in Christchurch, and some small-town North Island branches – O'Shea reminded Dryer of the reality in New Zealand: 'I think the reluctance of the majority of the Irish people to take a tangible interest in the League's work … is present in varying degrees throughout the Dominion'.[114]

---

[110] Dryer to O'Shea, 18 June 1949.
[111] O'Farrell notes that de Valera 'poured cold water' on the idea but fails to reference when this happened. O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.150.
[112] Jenny Carlyon and Diana Morrow, *Changing Times: New Zealand since 1945*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2013, pp.47, 52; James Belich, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders: From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, Allen Lane, London; Auckland, 1996, p.438.
[113] O'Shea to Dryer, 3 January 1949.
[114] O'Shea to Dryer, 3 January 1949.

O'Shea tried her best but unfortunately never managed to grab their interest, and by early 1951, the NZLUI had failed. The surviving members of the Wellington branch were O'Shea and the President, Daniel O'Connell. No new members had signed up, and existing members failed to renew their membership. Echoing the same issue from her earlier correspondence, O'Shea noted that 'the Irish people here are not interested in, and do not want, the League.'[115] Branches in Auckland and Christchurch had also disbanded. Presumably, this also extended to all small-town branches previously mentioned. The Wellington Irish did not take O'Shea's ideas seriously due to her "New Zealander" status. If the Irish did not want the League, there was little hope that New Zealanders could justify their support: 'As far as the New Zealand members are concerned, they cannot very well be expected to be interested when the Irish-born members repudiate the League so vigorously.'[116]

Dryer faced a similar issue with the New South Wales Irish. He stated that the ALUI had been met with 'the same inertia, apathy and even hostility from members of our Race' as the NZLUI; other executive members agreed with his assessment.[117] However, Dryer remained optimistic. While the apathy was 'pandemic', he believed that staying the course, motivated by the pride that they could be considered 'the few' who pursued difficult paths as they had chosen with the Leagues, would sustain them and help break through the wall of Irish indifference.[118]

O'Shea and Dryer were dealing with a substantially smaller Irish-born population, compared to the era of Home Rule. By 1948, Irish populations had shrunk in Australia and New Zealand, both in number and proportion of the total population. As mentioned in Chapter One, key centres of Irish settlers faced diminishing immigration numbers from the

[115] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.
[116] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.
[117] Dryer to O'Shea, 11 January 1949.
[118] Dryer to O'Shea, 11 January 1949.

1900s. In New Zealand in 1911, the Irish population numbered 4.1 per cent of the country's total population, a drop from 10.6 per cent in 1878; in Australia, they numbered only 3 per cent, down from 9.4 per cent in 1881.[119] Following World War II, these numbers were even smaller: in 1945, Irish-born in New Zealand comprised 1.1 per cent of the total population, and Irish-born in Australia was 0.59 per cent of the total population, according to the 1947 census.[120] Admittedly, one cannot assume that a shrinking Irish population inevitably equalled a less engaged population. However, by pairing these smaller population sizes with physical and personal considerations of the Irish immigrant experience, a slightly clearer picture emerges of why Dryer and O'Shea struggled to connect with the Irish-born and Irish-descendants of Australasia.

Physical aspects, encompassing both spatial and temporal dimensions of the Irish experience in New Zealand and Australia, are one side of the story of lessening engagement. Where an Irishman or woman moved from and to, and when, influenced their engagement with Irish issues. In his book, *Vanished Kingdoms*, Patrick O'Farrell suggests the particular 'phase and variety of Irish culture which existed and prevailed at the time and place in Ireland' when an individual emigrated played a part in their attitude towards Ireland.[121] This difference can be seen in O'Farrell's comparison of his parents, Paddy and Mai, with the parents of Michael Joseph Savage, New Zealand's first Labour Prime Minister (1935-1940). Savage's father immigrated to Victoria for the gold rush after the Great Famine. He came from a 'pre-modern Ireland' wherein his education and religiosity were underdeveloped.[122] In stark contrast, O'Farrell's parents, Paddy and Mai, left Ireland in 1914. The pair were

[119] Statistics New Zealand, 'Results of a Census of the Dominion of New Zealand'; McCarthy, *Scottishness and Irishness*, p.212; Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.341; Malcolm Campbell, 'Emigrant Responses to War and Revolution, 1914–1921: Irish Opinion in the United States and Australia', *Irish Historical Studies*, 32, 125 (2000), p.75.
[120] Angela McCarthy, *Scottishness and Irishness in New Zealand since 1840*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011, p.212; Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Census of the Commonwealth'.
[121] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.135.
[122] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.84.

products of a still rural Ireland, 'but with a growing middle-class with skills, education, aspirations to refinement, and a culture increasingly anglicised, and Catholicised'.[123]

Where an Irish migrant settled also mattered. Unlike in the United States, Irish emigrants tended to disperse relatively evenly throughout Australia and New Zealand, bar a few pockets of concentrated Irish clusters.[124] This factor, in turn, influenced the pressure to assimilate (or not) within the local community. For example, an Irish migrant's experience settling in Chicago, with a strongly nationalist and Irish Catholic population, would be radically different to living in Greymouth on New Zealand's West Coast, which historically had a Fenian streak but ultimately relied on assimilation for the benefit of community harmony.[125] The location of where an Irish person settled as well as the length of time they lived outside of Ireland impacted upon their level of engagement with Irish issues, unless actively communicating with family or friends in Ireland.[126]

It would be remiss to ignore personal circumstances when considering immigrants' engagement with Irish issues. Every Irish emigrant had their own motivations for beginning a life overseas. In no way was there a 'common standard "Irish" culture', especially when analysing migration patterns after the Famine.[127] It is generally accepted that people leave a city or country when their needs are no longer met; the same broad statement applies to antipodean Irish, too. Moving to Australia or New Zealand offered lives filled with 'freedom, security, confidence [and], independence' – attributes which Irish migrants saw Ireland as no

[123] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.84.
[124] David Fitzpatrick, *Oceans of Consolation: Personal Accounts of Irish Migration to Australia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London, 1994, p.14.
[125] Ellen Skerrett, 'The Catholic Dimension', in Lawrence J. McCaffrey, Ellen Skerrett, Michael F. Funchion and Charles Fanning, eds., *The Irish in Chicago*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1987, p.22; O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.157.
[126] Fitzpatrick, pp.535, 560.
[127] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, pp.135–6.

longer possessing.[128] It was a commonly voiced sentiment among Irish Catholic migrants in particular of 'what has Ireland done for me?'[129]

All of the above factors would, in turn, influence children and grandchildren's relationship with Ireland. Studies are still being conducted on the fluctuating engagement with the "homeland" between Irish-born and Irish-descendant, but current interpretations suggest descendants were less interested in the Irish matters. Patrick O'Farrell's considerations of his younger brother's experience of Ireland, in comparison to his Irish-born parents give a sense of the complexity of this issue. According to O'Farrell, his brother Tim, 'found little vestige of the antiquated dreamworld Mai [their mother] had led him to expect'.[130] Mai's sentimental remembering of Ireland did not match up to the realities that Tim experienced during his visit in 1951. O'Farrell goes on to say that Tim could not conceive of his parents as being part of Ireland: 'He knew them in New Zealand and of New Zealand'.[131] He also did not care much about his Irish ancestry until 'compelled to do so'.[132] O'Farrell's exploration of Tim's experience as a second-generation Irishman gives one example of how a descendant may have envisioned their Irish identity – one that was not interested in Ireland much at all.

The multifaceted construction of "being" Irish in diaspora communities meant it was nearly impossible for Dryer and O'Shea to capture the attention of all Irish immigrants. Older generations or descendants from late nineteenth-century Irish migrants were perhaps more likely to be involved in Irish societies if they cared for them. If one remembered Ireland, it was often with nostalgia.[133] Younger descendants, however, were less inclined to care given

[128] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, pp.123–4.
[129] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, pp.161–3.
[130] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.186.
[131] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.195.
[132] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.195.
[133] *Age* (Melbourne) (AGM), 19 March 1951, p.8; ADM, 22 March 1951, p.3.

their physical and generational distance from Ireland.[134] The lack of interest in partition and Irish issues more broadly continues the trend since the Irish War of Independence. Antipodean willingness to celebrate cultural heritage was not mutually inclusive of their interest in their "homeland's" ongoing state of affairs.[135] Successful and meaningful engagement with the anti-partition cause hinged upon two factors. One, Dryer and O'Shea needed to emulate the way Barry and Kearns campaigned between 1924 and 1925 – harnessing the local discourses to their advantage. Second, Australian and New Zealand Irish needed to be open to learning. Securing both components to the equation proved difficult.

Finding vocal supporters was a much harder task than Dryer anticipated. The ALUI's biggest supporters were generally the small yet dedicated older generation of diehard Irish republicans. The issue was not simply that this group was an aging and dying population, but that their descendants were not replacing them in Irish societies. The pickings were slim and getting slimmer.[136] The other factor that came into play was the hostile Australian environment towards Irish issues. In particular, fear of retribution stopped influential people of note from engaging meaningfully in the cause.[137] O'Farrell argues that Dryer encountered only one 'real enthusiast' for the anti-partition cause: Father Dermot Mahon of Temora. Mahon 'believed that the only way to gain attention for the anti-partition movement in Australia was to make enemies'.[138] Dryer agreed with this tactic, but neither men were able to generate discussion. Instead, in O'Farrell's words, they were 'simply ignored, by foes as well as friends'.[139] The Melbourne *Advocate* noted that some higher-up lawyers, his Honour Mr.

---

[134] Patrick O'Farrell, *The Irish in Australia*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1987, p.301.
[135] Simon O'Reilly, 'St Patrick's Day in South Australia, 1836–1945' in Susan Arthure, Fidelma Breen, Stephanie James and Dymphna Lonergan, eds., *Irish South Australia: New histories and insights*, Mile End, South Australia, 2019, p.188.
[136] Patrick O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand, 1870–1990' in W.E. Vaughan and UPSO, eds., *A New History of Ireland. Volume VI, Ireland under the Union, II, 1870–1921*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p.710.
[137] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.152.
[138] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.153.
[139] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.153.

Justice F. Dwyer, his Honour Mr. Justice A.J. de Baun, and his Honour Judge J. Lamaro, 'had accorded their patronage and support to the movement for an undivided Ireland.'[140] But again, these votes of support were not enough to sustain the anti-partition movement.

Mahon's and Dryer's considerations of partition illustrate the diversity of thought within the anti-partition movement. Despite supporting the end of partition, Mahon had concerns about the potential outcome. As a Northern Irishman, Mahon recognised the practical difficulties of resolving partition. He wrote to Dryer in December 1949, relaying the intensity of sectarian divisions that had been brewing in Northern Ireland since partition was introduced.[141] Blaming both Unionist politicians and Orange Lodges, and the Nationalist party in the North for promoting this division, Mahon told Dryer that Protestants in the North were scared for their lives at the idea of partition dissolving: 'it's a foolish fear, but they *are* afraid, because they genuinely think that the moment partition goes, their goose will be cooked with a vengeance. And they will fight and die sooner than give in.'[142] Mahon continued, 'the immediate abolition of Partition, to my mind would be a tragedy for Ireland … it would mean bloodshed & civil war in the North', and that 'Young men are thinking deeply & hard in the North & they are beginning to believe that another rising in arms is needed.'[143] O'Farrell notes that Mahon's insights were rare in both Australia and Ireland. But his considerations were noticeably more in touch with Ireland's pulse than Dryer's, or even de Valera's. De Valera faced critique from most Australasians during his anti-partition tour because of the vagueness of his solutions for partition. Dryer had the same ambiguity about his ideas paired with a sense of ideological superiority – if everyone knew what partition was, of course they would agree with him. Naturally, this approach effectively alienated much of his audience to the cause. Dev and Dryer's arrogance precluded an effective method for

[140] ADM, 2 March 1950, p.22.
[141] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.153.
[142] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.153.
[143] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.153.

garnering support in Australasia, which was supposed to be the basis for pressuring the British government into accepting an undivided and independent Ireland. The disjunct in approaches between Mahon, and Dev and Dryer exemplified even more explicitly how out of touch Dryer and Dev were to the reality of solving partition.

Not only was Dryer out of touch with the needs of his audience, but he inadvertently neglected a newer group of Irish patriots. As Mahon had hinted to Dryer in 1949, for those in Ireland engaged with the partition issue, violence was increasingly favoured as a means to an end. Following changes to the government-assisted passage scheme in 1948, there was an influx of Irish immigrants to Australia, reaching a peak of 47,673 by 1954.[144] The group was composed mostly of males, with a third of them involved in building and transport.[145] The younger men were relatively mobile due to the nature of their employment, but they posed serious challenges to Irish societies when staying in established communities.[146] Geographer Seamus Grimes found that the more recent Irish immigrants were inclined to treat Irish societies as a chance to mingle, suggesting that it 'perhaps reflect[ed] a desire for opportunities of a more intimate style of social occasion, rather than an interest in building up organisation to promote Irish identity in a public manner'.[147] If the Irish immigrants were politically inclined, their attitude was more militant, reflecting the political situation developing in Ireland at the same time. By 1951, the Irish Republican Army had 'again attained a position of some strength' and by the end of 1953, 'the political and constitutional arm of the IRA', Sinn Féin, was gaining popularity throughout the Republic of Ireland.[148] In 1954, the IRA, along with other militant Republican groups, launched a campaign of violence

[144] O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand', pp.722–3.
[145] Seamus Grimes, 'Irish Immigrants in Sydney in the Twentieth Century: Adaptation to a New Environment', in Colm Kiernan, ed., *Australia and Ireland 1788–1988: Bicentenary Essays*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1986, p.217.
[146] O'Farrell, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand', pp.723–4.
[147] Grimes, p.217.
[148] Coogan, p.276.

along the Border. As the violence reached its height in 1957 so, too, did the support for Sinn Féin.[149] It made 'its first electoral appearance since 1927, winning 65,640 votes and four seats', reflecting the desperation some Irish people felt to achieve a better standard of living through reunification – and they would be accepting of violence to attain it.[150] With an eye to the events in Ireland, the simmering militant attitudes in Sydney and Melbourne were perfect for branches of Sinn Féin to grow from.[151] This "new Irish" group was an exemplary demonstration of the differences within Pacific Irish diaspora attitudes toward Irish issues.

The "new Irish" of the younger generations directly challenged the 'established stereotype' set out by Irish Australians, which made it even more difficult for Dryer to access local discourses and attitudes.[152] As described by Dryer and perpetuated by O'Farrell, the "new Irish" were brash, mobile, interested in sports, with a fondness for drinking and socialising.[153] This was in stark contrast to what the Irish of the nineteenth and early twentieth century had been viewed as – individuals who had 'forged their place in Australian society with determination … and with high seriousness'.[154] Molloy argues that what O'Farrell does not account for is 'the sense of exclusion that was on occasion felt by the incoming Irish when faced with the established Australian-Irish and their networks', as they were coming from a very different Ireland than earlier Irish immigrants had.[155] O'Farrell fails to explain 'the mid-century economic realities of the Ireland of John Costello [and] de Valera', and how this would influence the "new" Irish's outlook.[156] Dryer embodied the attitudes of the 1916 generation, much like de Valera and Mannix, and he was unwilling to admit or accept that by the middle of the century the new attitudes were vastly different to

[149] Coogan, p.281.
[150] Coogan, p.104.
[151] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.157.
[152] Molloy, 'Tradition', pp.58–59.
[153] Molloy, 'Tradition', p.58.
[154] Molloy, 'Tradition', p.58.
[155] Molloy, 'Tradition', pp.58–59.
[156] Molloy, 'Tradition', p.59.

his. Most Irish descendants had lost interest in Irish issues, or their interest had become almost exclusively nostalgic or religiously grounded, and those who recently migrated had a very different outlook on how to best achieve change. In 1957 Dryer wrote to de Valera that the Sydney ALUI needed to shut down, '"because our efforts would at once be associated in the minds of the community, with those of the physical force party"'.[157] Dryer would rather his League be disbanded than be associated with acts and mentalities of violence – his refusal to adapt to the actual political and cultural climate of Irish Australia left him no other option.

The Australianisation of the Catholic Church was yet another factor that worked against Dryer's efforts. The replacement of Irish members in the Hierarchy weakened ties to Ireland. By the turn of the twentieth century, only 5 per cent of the Catholic priests in Australia were colonial born; in Sydney, 87 per cent of the clergy were Irishmen.[158] But this Irish dominance was increasingly coming under fire from Australian-born and educated priests. Cardinal Patrick Moran had established St Patrick's College in Manly in 1889 to cultivate the development of an Australian clergy.[159] By 1914, the growing population of Manly Union graduates were arguing that 'a predominantly Australian laity needed an Australian priesthood'.[160] Additionally, the Manly Union priests viewed Irish priests' involvement in Ireland's politics as problematic. Not only was it a distraction from their religious duties, but it also tied Australian Catholicism directly to Irish nationalism. This went directly against the Manly priests' vision of Catholicism in Australia: it 'ought not to have any national identification, and certainly not one alien to the land it existed'.[161] By 1930, the Vatican had listened to the cries of the Australian-born clergy. The arrival of Archbishop John Giovanni Panico as Apostolic Delegate, sent on behalf of the Holy See, saw an

[157] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.157.
[158] Patrick O'Farrell, *The Catholic Church and Community: An Australian History*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1985, p.357.
[159] O'Farrell, *Catholic*, p.357.
[160] O'Farrell, *Catholic*, p.359.
[161] O'Farrell, *Catholic*, p.360.

acceleration in the 'hasten[ing] the elimination of the Irish-born leadership of the Church in Australia'.[162] Soon after Panico's arrival, Dr Michael Sheehan, Sydney's Irish Coadjutor Archbishop, announced his resignation. Michael Gilchirst argues that Panico had pressured Sheehan into this decision, for Sheehan would have soon replaced 90-year-old Archbishop Kelly, joining the ranks of Archbishop Mannix and leaving 'Irish prelates at the helm of Australia's two major Sees'.[163] Instead, Bishop Norman Thomas Gilroy, Sydney-born and Manly-educated, was awarded the role and later succeeded Archbishop Kelly in 1940.[164] Gilroy's succession to Sydney signified the formal arrival of 'Australianism' in the Church, and the crippling of the Irish hold over Australia's Catholic Hierarchy.

The changing composition of the Catholic Church affected all strata within. The 'Britishism' that came with its Australianisation meant that the Church increasingly treated Irish affairs as irrelevant to its organisation.[165] De Valera's anti-partition tour only proved this shift; O'Farrell concluded that, 'To those attempting to organise support for de Valera's campaign against the partition of Ireland, it soon became obvious that Australian Catholics, both clerical and lay, were at best indifferent, at worst hostile to Irish causes'.[166] Given the Catholic clergy influenced and educated its community on issues it considered important, the disintegrating ties to Ireland meant the laity were not exposed to and learning about Irish issues.[167] So, 'When laymen, or obscure individual brothers, preached Ireland, nobody listened.'[168] Irish movements in Australia were inherently Catholic, so for anything to be successful it hinged on the 'support and involvement' of the Catholic clergy.[169] Dryer and de Valera's decision to make the ALUI both nondenominational and secular meant they

[162] Gilchrist, pp.153–4.
[163] Gilchrist, pp.157–8.
[164] Gilchrist, pp.157–8; O'Farrell, *Catholic*, p.366.
[165] O'Farrell, *Catholic*, p.404.
[166] O'Farrell, *Catholic*, p.404.
[167] Campbell, *Farthest Shores*, p.211; O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, pp.78–80.
[168] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, p.235.
[169] O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms*, pp.233–4.

effectively rejected any crumbs of the Catholic clergy that could have supported and aided their cause – most notably Archbishop Mannix.

Across the Tasman, it was local affairs, rather than the changing face of Catholicism, that contributed to disengagement with Irish affairs. Throughout the late 1940s, tensions had been growing between unions, the New Zealand government, and the public. Unions were 'disgruntled with economic stabilisation and compulsory arbitration' and took strike actions like stoppages and go-slows. In turn, the public grew embittered with the industrial unrest and turned on the Labour government, accusing them of bowing to the unions' 'ceaseless demands'.[170] The National Party used this to their advantage in the 1949 election, running on a platform that claimed it would 'tame militant unions'.[171] National's platform struck a chord with voters, with the party winning a 12 seat majority. Peter Fraser was replaced by Sidney Holland, leader of the First National Government. Fraser had been a particularly important figure for the NZLUI. He had fronted issues of Irish self-determination in Parliament from 1919 to 1921, acted as an ally for Evatt's cause when Ireland left the Commonwealth in 1949, and had a longstanding friendship with Eamon de Valera since 1935, demonstrated in his support for de Valera's anti-partition tour in 1948.[172] In her final letter to Dryer, Kathleen O'Shea noted that while the Labour government had not been entirely sympathetic to the anti-partition cause, the new National government would be openly hostile if the issue was ever brought up.[173] For the NZLUI, Fraser's ousting and subsequent death in 1950 concreted the simple fact that there was diminishing opportunity for government sympathies, and

[170] Carlyon and Morrow, p.11.
[171] Carlyon and Morrow, p.11.
[172] O'Dwyer, p.218; Seán Brosnahan, 'Parties or Politics: Wellington's IRA 1922–1928', in Patterson, Brad, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts & Perspectives*, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Wellington, 2002, p.74; O'Brien and O'Brien, p.90; Peter Burke, p.6, 'Chemistry in Motion – the special relationship between Eamon de Valera Taoiseach/President of Ireland and Hon Peter Fraser Prime Minister of New Zealand', *A paper presented to the 23rd Australasian Conference of Irish Studies, Sydney University*, November 2018: www.true-to-ireland.com/files/ChemistryInMotion.pdf
[173] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.

therefore action, for ending Irish partition; the NZLUI had lost their most influential ally in New Zealand politics.

Add onto this the disruption of local union strikes that captured the attention of the New Zealand population, the NZLUI never had a chance. At the time of O'Shea's final letter to Dryer in April 1951, New Zealand was in the midst of one of its biggest industrial confrontations in history: the 1951 Waterfront Dispute.[174] Rising tensions between the newly formed Trade Union Congress, made up primarily of watersiders, coalminers and freezing workers, and what seemed like nearly everyone else in New Zealand came to a head in February 1951. The tipping point was disagreement over whether a general wage increase included or excluded a 6 per cent increase for watersiders from the previous year. James Belich suggests that the problem itself was solvable, but 'leaders on both sides [felt] that the time was ripe for confrontation'.[175] The watersiders found themselves up against the media, employers, farmers, the Federation of Labour, the National-led government, and the majority of the public; even the Labour Party failed to commit to either side of the dispute.[176] In O'Shea's words:

> As far as the New Zealand public are concerned, the present industrial trouble here and the state of world affairs completely overshadow what in their minds is a ridiculous triviality. Industrial strikes, and the threat of war as indicated by the trend of world affairs take pride of place in the minds of New Zealanders, and partition in Ireland is by comparison a very small and unrelated matter.[177]

After nearly six months of 'bitter and costly industrial struggle involving about 20,000 workers, the state and its many allies crushed the watersiders and their few allies'.[178] By this point, the NZLUI was well and truly extinguished.

[174] O'Shea to Dryer, 9 April 1951.
[175] Belich, *Paradise*, p.300.
[176] Belich, *Paradise*, p.300.
[177] O'Shea to Dryer, 19 April 1951.
[178] Belich, *Paradise*, p.300.

O'Shea's comment on 'world affairs' brings up the final, yet important, consideration for the failure of both the ALUI and NZLUI: the impact of the broader Cold War context on Australasian attention. Developments in Asia throughout the 1940s had reawakened fears of Asian expansionism in Australasia. During World War II, concerns revolved primarily around Japanese invasion, sparked by the British government's indication in 1940 that they could not defend Singapore if attacked by the Japanese.[179] Singapore fell into Japanese control two years later, confirming to New Zealand and Australia that there was no guaranteed protection in the Pacific, with war creeping closer to their shores.[180] Japan increasingly encroached into the Pacific, extending their reach as far as the north of Australia when Darwin and Broome were 'bombed into ruins' in 1942.[181] Fear of Asian expansionism remained after Japan's defeat in 1945, with Australasia's focus shifting instead to China, where renewed tensions between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese Nationalist Party had escalated into civil war. The rise of Communist insurgencies in Asia from 1945, the fall of the Chinese Nationalist government in 1949, and the signing of the Sino-Soviet pact in 1950 all gave justification to this fear.[182] Newspapers did little to help ease the Australasian public's fear, with some reporting that the developing conflict in Korea from 1950 was the precursor to World War III. The Cold War was well and truly underway, and for many in Australasia, the perceived threat of Communist domination was edging far too close to home.

The issue was that even though people in Australia and New Zealand were fearful of Communism, when Dryer manipulated popular anti-Communist rhetoric in relation to ending partition, his audience still did not care. He also genuinely shared the same fears as the Australasian population.[183] In fact, Dryer placed the partition issue directly in the

[179] Carlyon and Morrow, pp.45–46.
[180] Carlyon and Morrow, p.46.
[181] Belich, *Paradise*, p.531.
[182] Belich, *Paradise*, p.298; Carlyon and Morrow, p.54.
[183] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.154.

conversation of international democratic relationships. Not only did the Sydney ALUI cable issued to Attlee and Churchill in 1948 cite strengthening relationships, but the article published in the *Catholic Weekly* announcing the organisation's formation followed the same line of thinking:

> In the dangerously unstable condition of international relationships which exist to-day, it is manifestly inimical to the interests of the Western European democracies to permit any factor which promotes or maintains disunity to remain operant. Foremost amongst such factors insofar as an important section of the democratic bloc is concerned, namely, the Irish and the British nations, is the existence of the evil of the partition of Ireland.[184]

Dryer had made a concerted effort to appeal to the population through language they were very familiar with, however, by this point the question of Irish partition had been demoted as world events were more immediately concerning.

Despite their best efforts, Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea could not reframe the Irish partition issue in a way that captured Australian or New Zealand attention. It was still considered an Irish issue, in spite of efforts by Eamon de Valera and Dryer to disassociate from that identifier. More importantly, the cause was simply too small, too complicated, and too far away to care about for the majority of Australasia.

External factors compounded the internal complications that Dryer and O'Shea encountered. These external factors were the consequences of a changing post-war world and de Valera and others' inability to stay relevant to it. For Irish diaspora in the Pacific, their care for the Irish Question had been largely left in the 1920s, with the exception of a few pockets of dedicated republicans, the likes of Dryer and Mannix. More pressing concerns were afoot. The developing Cold War situation, local union protests, survival post-war, all captured attention more than partition did. Interest and concern were only truly reignited in the Anglo-Pacific when the violence of the Troubles in the 1960s broke out.

[184] CW, 2 September 1948, p.9.

As suggested by O'Shea in her final letter, if the Irish themselves were not interested, why would anyone else be? What could New Zealand and Australia realistically do to help their brethren overseas? As O'Farrell claims, 'The affairs of Ireland were of interest to her descendants in Australia, only if they called on their charity, or somehow appeared to symbolise or involve their own circumstances within Australian society. Partition evoked neither response.'[185] Ultimately, very few people in Australia and New Zealand cared for the partition issue as deeply as Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea did. Those who did care were mostly recent Irish arrivals, whose desired solutions did not line up with Dryer's vision of a peaceful end to partition. Dryer had been left behind without realising it – by de Valera, the Irish-born and Irish descendants of Australasia, and the international community – devoted to an issue that had morphed into something requiring greater action than the Australasian Leagues could ever offer.

[185] O'Farrell, 'Irish Australia at an end', p.143.

Conclusion

Speaking to 15,000 Irish Americans in New York in 1920, Eamon de Valera and Archbishop Daniel Mannix showed that they posed a serious challenge to the British government.[1] Both men's ability to rally sympathetic communities behind the causes they deemed worthy frightened their opponents. Twenty-eight years later, when de Valera landed in Melbourne in 1948, he was lauded as 'leader of the Irish Free World' and was warmly welcomed by Mannix.[2] With the two reunited, the future of promoting Irish issues in Australia looked promising: a strongminded politician, a passionate supporter with public gusto, and a large population to mobilise. But de Valera failed to engage his Australasian audience. Instead, he found himself defending Irish neutrality during World War II and expressing frustration at Australasian ignorance of Irish affairs. In attempting to start the ALUI and NZLUI in such difficult conditions and then ultimately abandoning Dr Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea to keep the organisations afloat, de Valera's attempts to reignite international interest in partition failed. The tour of Australia and New Zealand and its aftermath gives us reason to pause and ask just how influential de Valera was in the outer reaches of the diaspora. Despite how persuasive de Valera thought he could be in spreading a message important to him, the inertia in his strategy precluded him from navigating critical issues unfolding in both Australia and New Zealand. De Valera's work notwithstanding, Dryer and O'Shea – both less influential and headstrong people – encountered impossible local conditions, leaving them no choice but to disband their respective Leagues.

Despite his inability to get the international anti-partition movement up and going, it did not negatively impact on de Valera's political career in Ireland. Rory O'Dwyer argues

[1] Malcolm Campbell, 'Mannix in America: Archbishop Daniel Mannix's Address at Madison Square Garden, New York, 18 July 1920', *Australian Journal of Irish Studies*, 5 (2005), p.97
[2] *Brisbane Telegraph* (BT), 4 June 1948, p.13.

that de Valera's political appeal in Ireland actually benefitted from his overseas anti-partition efforts; Dev continued to operate as 'a custodian of republican virtue'.[3] He remained an important figure in Irish politics throughout the 1950s until his death in 1975. During his time as Leader of the Opposition from 1948 to 1951, de Valera's two key goals – to reunite Ireland and resurrect his own career – remained at the forefront of his mind. Re-elected to the office of Taoiseach in 1951 and then again in 1957 – with another stint as Opposition leader after the 1954 election – de Valera achieved the latter.[4] In June 1959, he became the third president of Ireland, holding this position for 14 years until finally retiring from politics in 1973 at age 90.[5] However, in his remaining years of active political service, de Valera failed to achieve the end of partition in Ireland. The lack of progress on unification was a surprise and a disappointment to him, yet his colleagues and the Irish public saw his goals as unrealistic.

De Valera's ambition for the Australian and New Zealand Leagues of an Undivided Ireland was unfulfilled. Whereas in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Irish often responded to the injunctions of the influential political leaders who visited, that proved not to be the case after World War II. On one side of de Valera's tour and his hope to establish an effective Australasian anti-partition movement, there was the dramatic era of the Irish fight for independence in the 1910s and 1920s. On the other side was a shift towards militancy from the mid-1950s onwards. This interval from 1920-1950s was, for the Leagues, a period of distance and separation – part of the ebb and flow of global Irish connection. Dev was the embodiment of a nostalgic Ireland for some Australasian Irish, but the sentimental connection to the homeland did not elicit meaningful engagement with Irish issues. Even religion, a

[3] Rory O'Dwyer, ''A roof-raising affair'? Éamon de Valera's Tour of Australia and New Zealand', in Geary, Laurence M. and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, p.222.
[4] Tim Pat Coogan, *Ireland Since the Rising*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966, pp.102–103.
[5] Peter Burke, *True to Ireland: Éire's 'conscientious objectors' in New Zealand in World War II*, The Cuba Press, Wellington, 2019, pp.215– 6; John Bowman, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973*, Clarendon Press, Oxford; New York, 1982, pp.288–94.

major influence in retaining emigrants' and their descendants' connection to Ireland, was facing serious challenges – both in the church and the school system.[6] Despite their best efforts, Dr Albert Dryer and Kathleen O'Shea failed to keep their respective organisations afloat.

While de Valera's tour gives us a look at international audiences' engagement with Irish issues, the impact of the tour on his work as Taoiseach is a topic worthy of significantly more research. Was Dev able to adapt his political strategies to strengthen the international connections between Ireland, Australasia, and the rest of the world? Did his tour broaden his perspective? Were his policies as Taoiseach cognisant of his experiences overseas? Or maybe de Valera simply continued as he had done in the past, following the same tracks he had traipsed for the previous few decades – the personification of a dying form of Irish nationalism.

[6] Patrick O'Farrell, *Vanished Kingdoms: Irish in Australia and New Zealand: A Personal Excursion*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1990, pp.78–80.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Irish Bureau of Military History: Bureau Staire Mileata 1913–1921

Albert Thomas Dryer, 'Irish National Association in Australia, 1915-1919', WS 957.

National Library of Australia

Papers of Albert Dryer, MS 6610, Series 4, Box 4, Folder 8.

Official publications

Statistics New Zealand, 'Results of a Census of the Dominion of New Zealand', 2 April 1911.

Australian Bureau of Statistics, 'Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1954'.

List of Australian newspapers accessed through Trove

Trove: www.trove.nla.gov.au

Age (Melbourne) (AGM).

Argus (AR).

Advertiser (Adelaide) (AA).

Advocate (Melbourne) (ADM).

Advocate (Tasmania) (ADT)

Brisbane Telegraph (BT).

Cairns Post (CP).

Canberra Times (CT).

Catholic Weekly (CW).

Courier-Mail (CM).

Daily News (Perth) (DNP)

Examiner (Launceston) (EL).

Herald (Melbourne) (HM).

Mail (Adelaide) (MA).

Mercury (Tasmania) (MT).

Newcastle Morning Herald and Miners' Advocate (NMH).

News (Adelaide) (NA)

Southern Cross (SC).

Sydney Morning Herald (SMH).

Warwick Daily News (WDN).

West Australian (WA).

List of New Zealand newspapers accessed through Papers Past

Papers Past: www.paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers

Ashburton Guardian (AG).

Bay of Plenty Times (BOPT).

Evening Post (Wellington) (EPW).

Gisborne Herald (GH).

New Zealand Herald (NZH).

New Zealand Tablet (NZT). Accessed through the Holy Cross Seminary, Auckland.

Northern Advocate (NA).

Otago Daily Times (ODT).

Press (PR).

List of United States newspapers accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers

Chicago Daily Tribune (CDT). Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers: Chicago Tribune.

New York Times (NYT). Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times.

Washington Post (WP). Accessed through ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Washington Post.

Secondary Sources

Books

Akenson, Donald Harman, *Half the World from Home: Perspectives on the Irish in New Zealand 1860–1950*, Victoria University Press, Wellington, 1990.

Bayor, Ronald H. and Timothy J. Meagher, eds., *The New York Irish*, John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore; London, 1996.

Belich, James, *Making Peoples: A History of the New Zealanders: From Polynesian Settlement to the End of the Nineteenth Century*, Allen Lane, London; Auckland, 1996.

Belich, James, *Paradise Reforged: A History of the New Zealanders: From the 1880s to the Year 2000*, Allen Lane, London; Auckland, 2001.

Blessing, Patrick J., *The Irish in America: A Guide to the Literature and the Manuscript Collections*, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, D.C., 1992.

Bowman, John, *De Valera and the Ulster Question 1917–1973*, Clarendon Press, Oxford; New York, 1982.

Boyce, David George, *The Irish Question and British Politics, 1868–1996*, Macmillan Press; St Martin's Press, Basingstoke; New York, 1996.

Brundage, David, *Irish Nationalists in America: The Politics of Exile, 1798–1998*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2016.

Burke, Peter, *True to Ireland: Éire's 'conscientious objectors' in New Zealand in World War II*, The Cuba Press, Wellington, 2019.

Campbell, Malcolm, *Ireland's New Worlds: Immigrants, Politics, and Society in the United States and Australia, 1815–1922*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2007.

Campbell, Malcolm, *Ireland's Farthest Shores: Mobility, Migration, and Settlement in the Pacific World*, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 2022.

Carlyon, Jenny and Diana Morrow, *Changing Times: New Zealand since 1945*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2013.

Carroll, Francis M., *American Opinion and the Irish Question 1910–1923: A Study in Opinion and Policy*, Gill and Macmillan; St. Martin's Press, Dublin; New York, 1978.

Coogan, Tim Pat, *Ireland Since the Rising*, Pall Mall Press, London, 1966.

Davis, Richard, *Irish Issues in New Zealand Politics, 1868–1922*, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 1974.

Fitzpatrick, David, *Oceans of Consolation: Personal Accounts of Irish Migration to Australia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca; London, 1994.

Fraser, Lyndon, *Castles of Gold: A History of New Zealand's West Coast Irish*, Otago University Press, Dunedin, 2007.

Gaddis, John Lewis, *The Cold War*, Allen Lane, London, 2005.

Gilchrist, Michael, *Daniel Mannix: Wit and Wisdom*, Freedom Publishing, Melbourne, 2004.

Gray, Tony, *The Lost Years: The Emergency in Ireland 1939–45*, Little, Brown and Company, London, 1997.

Jackson, Alvin, *Home Rule: An Irish History, 1800–2000*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2003.

Kershaw, Ian, *Roller-Coaster: Europe, 1950–2017*, Allen Lane, London, 2018.

King, Carla, *Michael Davitt*, University College Dublin Press, Dublin, 2009.

King, Michael, *God's Farthest Outpost: A History of Catholics in New Zealand*, Viking Press, Auckland, 1997.

Lyons, F.S.L., *John Dillon: A Biography*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1968.

Malcolm, Elizabeth, and Diane Hall, *A New History of the Irish in Australia*, Cork University Press; NewSouth Publishing, Cork; Sydney, 2019.

McCaffrey, Lawrence J., Ellen Skerrett, Michael F. Funchion and Charles Fanning, eds., *The Irish in Chicago*, University of Illinois Press, Chicago, 1987.

McCarthy, Angela, *Scottishness and Irishness in New Zealand since 1840*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011.

McGarry, Fearghal, *The Rising: Ireland: Easter 1916*, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016.

O'Brien, John B., and Anne E. O'Brien, eds., *Studies in Irish, British and Australian Relations 1916-1963: Trade, Diplomacy and Politics*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2005.

O'Farrell, Patrick, *The Catholic Church and Community: An Australian History*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1985.

O'Farrell, Patrick, *The Irish in Australia*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1987.

O'Farrell, Patrick, *Vanished Kingdoms: Irish in Australia and New Zealand: A Personal Excursion*, New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1990.

Phillips, Jock and Terry Hearn, *Settlers: New Zealand Immigrants from England, Ireland and Scotland 1800–1945*, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2008.

Rogers, Anna, *A Lucky Landing: The Story of the Irish in New Zealand*, Random House, Auckland, 1996.

Ward, Alan, *Ireland and Anglo-American Relations, 1899–1921*, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 1969.

Westad, Odd Arne, *The Cold War: A World History*, Penguin Books, London, 2018.

Articles and Chapters

Akenson, Donald Harman, 'No Petty People: Pakeha History and the Historiography of the Irish Diaspora', in Fraser, Lyndon, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, pp.13–24.

Alomes, Stephen, 'Culture, Ethnicity and Class in Australia's Dominion Period, 1900–39', in Kiernan, Colm, ed., *Australia and Ireland 1788–1988: Bicentenary Essays*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1986, pp.182–194.

Brosnahan, Seán, ''Shaming the Shoneens': The Green Ray and the Maoriland Irish Society in Dunedin, 1916–22', in Fraser, Lyndon, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, pp.117–134.

Brosnahan, Seán, 'Parties or Politics: Wellington's IRA 1922–1928', in Patterson, Brad, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts & Perspectives*, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Wellington, 2002, pp.67–88.

Campbell, Malcolm, ‘Emigrant Responses to War and Revolution, 1914–1921: Irish Opinion in the United States and Australia’, *Irish Historical Studies*, 32, 125 (2000), pp.75–92.

Campbell, Malcolm, ‘John Redmond and the Irish National League in Australia and New Zealand, 1883’, *History: The Journal of the Historical Association*, 86, 283 (2001), pp.348–362.

Campbell, Malcolm, ‘Mannix in America: Archbishop Daniel Mannix’s Address at Madison Square Garden, New York, 18 July 1920’, *Australian Journal of Irish Studies*, 5 (2005), pp.95–107.

Campbell, Malcolm, ‘Michael Davitt’s Pacific World’, *Journal of Irish and Scottish Studies,* 4, 1 (2010), pp.131–143.

Campbell, Malcolm, ‘‘Too great to be unconnected with us’: Reactions to the 1916 Easter Rising in the British Empire and the United States’, in Kuchs Peter and Lisa Marr, eds., *New Zealand’s Responses to the 1916 Rising*, Cork University Press, Cork, 2020, pp.88–94.

Daly, Mary, ‘Nationalism, Sentiment, and Economics: Relations Between Ireland and Irish America in the Postwar Years’, *Éire-Ireland*, 37 (2002), pp.74–91.

Davis, Troy, ‘Anti-partitionism, Irish America and Anglo American Relations, 1945–51’, in Kennedy, Michael and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: From Independence to Internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, pp.192–202.

Doyle, David Noel, ‘The Irish in Chicago’, *Irish Historical Studies*, 26, 103 (1989), pp.293–303.

Fanning, Ronan, ‘Irish Neutrality: An Historical Review’, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 1, 3 (1982), pp.27–38.

Fitzgerald, Garret, ‘Eamon de Valera: the price of his achievement’, in Doherty, Gabriel and Dermot Keogh, eds., *De Valera’s Irelands*, Mercier Press, Cork, 2003, pp.185–204.

Grimes, Seamus, ‘Irish Immigrants in Sydney in the Twentieth Century: Adaptation to a New Environment’, in Kiernan, Colm, ed., *Australia and Ireland 1788–1988: Bicentenary Essays*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1986, pp.215–226.

Hall, Diane, ‘Irish republican women in Australia: Kathleen Barry and Linda Kearn’s tour in 1924–5’, *Irish Historical Studies*, 43, 163 (2019), pp.73–93.

James, Stephanie, ‘Varieties of Irish nationalism in South Australia, 1839-1950: Changing terms of engagement’, in Arthure, Susan, Fidelma Breen, Stephanie James and Dymphna Lonergan, eds., *Irish South Australia: New histories and insights*, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 2019, pp.192–211.

Kelly, Stephen, ‘A Policy of Futility: Eamon de Valera's Anti-Partition Campaign, 1948–1951’, *Études Irlandaises*, 36, 2 (2011), pp.1–13.

Kennedy, Michael and Joseph Morrison Skelly, ‘The Study of Irish Foreign Policy’, in Kennedy, Michael and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: From Independence to Internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, pp.13–24.

Keogh, Dermot, ‘Epilogue: Ireland and the Diplomacy of Normalcy in Europe, 1945–48’, in *Ireland & Europe 1919–1948*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1988, pp.197–212.

Keogh, Dermot, ‘Eamon de Valera and Hitler: An Analysis of International Reaction to the Visit to the German Minister, May 1945’, *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, 3, 1 (1989), pp.69–92.

McAloon, Jim, ‘Harry Holland, *The Maoriland Worker*, and the Easter Rising’, in Kuchs, Peter and Lisa Marr, eds., *New Zealand’s Responses to the 1916 Rising*, Cork University Press, Cork, 2020, pp.43–51.

McNamara, Heather, ‘The *New Zealand Tablet* and the Irish Catholic Press Worldwide, 1898-1923’, *New Zealand Journal of History*, 37, 2 (2003), pp.153–170.

Molloy, Kevin, ‘Tradition, Memory and The Culture of Irish-Australian Identity, 1900–1960’, *Australasian Journal of Irish Studies*, 16 (2016), pp.47–64.

Molloy, Kevin, ‘Invisible Irish? *Ulster Link* and Northern Irish Post-War Migrant Networks in Australia’, *Australasian Journal of Irish Studies*, 20 (2020), pp.59–82.

Murphy, Gary, ‘‘A Wider Perspective’: Ireland’s View of Western Europe in the 1950s’ in Kennedy, Michael and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: from independence to internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, pp.247–264.

O’Donnell, Ruán, ‘The Australian Press and the IRA Border Campaign, 1956–62’, in Geary, Laurence M. and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, pp.224–239.

O’Dwyer, Rory, ‘‘A roof-raising affair’? Éamon de Valera’s Tour of Australia and New Zealand’, in Geary, Laurence M. and Andrew J. McCarthy, eds., *Ireland, Australia and New Zealand: History, Politics and Culture*, Irish Academic Press, Dublin; Oregon, 2008, pp.211–223.

O’Farrell, Patrick, ‘Irish Australia at an end: the Australian League for an Undivided Ireland, 1948–54’, *Tasmanian Historical Research Association: Papers and proceedings*, 21, 4 (1974), pp.142–160.

O'Farrell, Patrick, 'Varieties of New Zealand Irishness: A Meditation', in Fraser, Lyndon, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, pp.25–35.

O'Farrell, Patrick, 'The Irish in Australia and New Zealand, 1870–1990' in Vaughan, W. E. and UPSO, eds., *A New History of Ireland. Volume VI, Ireland under the Union, II, 1870–1921*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, pp.703–724.

O'Hearn, Denis, 'Freedom from Mother Church: The Stephen Hero Image in Australian Literature', Kiernan, Colm, ed., *Australia and Ireland 1788–1988: Bicentenary Essays*, Gill and Macmillan, Dublin, 1986, pp.24–33.

O'Keeffe, Garrath, 'Australia's Irish Republican Brotherhood', *Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society*, 83, 2 (1997), pp.136–152.

O'Reilly, Simon, 'St Patrick's Day in South Australia, 1836–1945' in Arthure, Susan, Fidelma Breen, Stephanie James and Dymphna Lonergan, eds., *Irish South Australia: New histories and insights*, Wakefield Press, Adelaide, 2019, pp.173–191.

Sweetman, Rory, ''The Importance of Being Irish': Hibernianism in New Zealand, 1869–1969', in Fraser, Lyndon, ed., *A Distant Shore: Irish Migration & New Zealand Settlement*, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2000, pp.135–154.

Sweetman, Rory, ''How to behave among Protestants': Varieties of Irish Catholic Irish Catholic Leadership in Colonial New Zealand', in Patterson, Brad, ed., *The Irish in New Zealand: Historical Contexts & Perspectives*, Stout Research Centre for New Zealand Studies, Wellington, 2002, pp.89–102.

Whelan, Bernadette, 'Integration or Isolation? Ireland and the Invitation to Join the Marshall Plan' in Kennedy, Michael and Joseph Morrison Skelly, eds., *Irish Foreign Policy, 1919–66: from independence to internationalism*, Four Courts Press, Dublin, 2000, pp.203–221.

Other

Burke, Peter, 'Chemistry in Motion – the special relationship between Eamon de Valera Taoiseach/President of Ireland and Hon Peter Fraser Prime Minister of New Zealand', *A paper presented to the 23rd Australasian Conference of Irish Studies, Sydney University*, November 2018: www.true-to-ireland.com/files/ChemistryInMotion.pdf

McGarry, Fearghal and Darragh Gannon, 'Ireland 1922: Independence, Partition, Civil War', Melbourne Irish Studies Seminar, 28 September 2021: www.isaanz.org/events/miss-seminars/

Reid, Richard, Jeff Kildea, and Perry McIntyre, 'To Foster an Irish Spirit: Writing the Centenary History of the Irish National Association', Melbourne Irish Studies Seminar, 29 June 2021: www.isaanz.org/events/miss-seminars/