Stories of Neighbours and Navigators: Perceptions and Implications of Climate

Mobility from Tuvalu and Kiribati to Aotearoa New Zealand

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Abstract

Climate change poses an unprecedented challenge to the Pacific region, disrupting Pacific livelihoods, ways-of-being and histories of agentic mobility. While most people want to remain rooted on their ancestral lands, some residents of low-lying islands, such as Kiribati and Tuvalu, are considering cross-border migration. Aotearoa New Zealand (NZ) is likely to host such climate migrants because of its long-standing – albeit fraught – relationships with the Pacific. Yet, no immigration pathways formally facilitate migration for climate-related reasons (climate mobility). Moreover, historical, environmental, political, and societal contexts may intersect to shape Pacific peoples' well-being in Aotearoa NZ. Therefore, this thesis explores perceptions about and the well-being implications of climate mobility from the Pacific to Aotearoa NZ, with a focus on the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland.

The thesis uses a mixed-methods and collaborative approach that combines the talanoa methodology and critical community psychology across four different studies, or 'stories', about climate mobility. A review of the literature suggests that internal and cross-border climate mobilities have similar disruptive impacts on people's identities, cultures, languages, social cohesion, and ties to land. However, the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities tell different stories of mobility according to the metaphor of te vaka or te wa (oceangoing canoe) journeys. In this, wayfinders navigate immigration obstacles to regrow roots in Aotearoa NZ and chart a course forward for future generations. A quantitative survey of Aotearoa NZers' perspectives contextualises these journeys, demonstrating that people's attitudes towards climate migrants relate to their beliefs about climate change, climate justice and immigration. Accounts of solidarity from youth climate activists then extend climate justice to notions of neighbourliness, which entails accepting accountability, rethinking hospitality and negotiating relational connection.

Together, these studies weave a complex story of climate mobility as an environmental and neighbourly crisis. That is, facilitating climate mobility within Aotearoa NZ's dehumanising immigration, economic and social systems is likely to heighten the precarity of climate change in the host nation. However, centring relationality in Aotearoa NZ's neighbourly partnerships creates an opportunity to restore(y) climate mobility and support the flourishing of the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in Aotearoa NZ.

This thesis is dedicated to Sinaï Lapersonne,

the fierce adventurer whose journey has come to an end.

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Glossary

Abbreviations

ACC	Anthropogenic climate change
AKSI	Auckland Kiribati Society Incorporated
CASP	Critical Appraisal Skills Programme
CO$_2$	Carbon dioxide
EEZ	Exclusive economic zone
GDP	Gross domestic product
HRC	Health Research Council of New Zealand
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MBIE	Ministry of Business, Immigration and Employment
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MFE	Ministry for the Environment
MPP	Ministry for Pacific Peoples
NZ	New Zealand
NZKNC	New Zealand Kiribati National Council
PAC	Pacific Access Category
PCW	Pacific Climate Warriors
RSE	Recognised Seasonal Employer
SLR	Sea level rise
SS4C	School Strike for Climate
TACTrust	Tuvalu Auckland Community Trust
TTF	Tuvalu Trust Fund
UN	United Nations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNHRC	United Nations Human Rights Committee
US	United States
WAKA	West Auckland Kiribati Association

Te Gagana Tuvalu	**The Tuvaluan Language**
Faka Tuvalu	In the style of Tuvalu
Fanua	Placenta
Fatele	Tuvaluan dance performance that involves the whole community.
Fenua	Land, island
Fiafia	Happiness from ways of life
Kaaiga	Family, including extended family and close friends
Malosi	Physical, mental and spiritual strength
Moana	Ocean and sky
Muna o te fale	Wisdom shared in the house
Ola filemuu	Living peacefully in family and community
Ola lei	Good life; well-being

Ola leva	Longevity, including respect and authority
Olaga lei	Good, meaningful living; living well
Olaga tokagamalie	A sense of security and preparedness embedded in family, land, ancestral knowledge, and cultural and spiritual practices
Palagi	People of European descent, in New Zealand or elsewhere.
Sautalaga	Open, fluid exchange of conversation and ideas
Tafatolu	Pillars
Uaniu	Preservation of fruits
Te Uluniu Tuvalu Taumatua	The Tuvaluan Elders' Group
Umaga	Cultivation of land
Vaka	Oceangoing canoe
Va fakaaloalo	Respectful relationships between extended family

Te Taetae ni Kiribati	**The Kiribati Language**
Te aba	Land, people
Te aba	The environment and people
I-Kiribati	Person/people of Kiribati, Kiribati people
I-Matang	Person/people of European descent
Te kainga	Extended family hamlet
Kaiin Kiribati	Kiribati people
Te karinerine	Respect within family, community and land
Te katei ni Kiribati	The Kiribati philosophical worldview, including core values, beliefs and customary practices
Ko rabwa	Thank you
Te maiu raoi	The good life/ well-being
Te mama	Shyness
Te maneaba/ te mwaneaba	Customary hall of community governance
Te marin aba	A healthy environment and ecology
Te maroro	An open exchange of stories or ideas
Mauri	Hello (informal)
Te mauri	To be in good health, sound life
Te Mauri, te Raoi ao te Tabomoa	Health, peace and prosperity (Kiribati saying for good wishes, toasts).
Te raoi	Peace, tranquillity, goodness, decency
Te tabomoa	Place of honour
Te tekatoka bau	Garland presentation dance
Te toronibwai	Skill of self-reliance related to subsistence and spiritual communion with nature
Te utu	Family unit
Te wa	Oceangoing canoe

Te Reo Māori	**The Māori Language**
Iwi	Tribe, people, nation
Manaakitanga	Mutual care, respect, power sharing
Pākehā	New Zealanders with European ancestry
Pūrākau	Story, myth, legend
Tauiwi	Non-Māori, typically non-Indigenous Aotearoa NZers
Te Tiriti o Waitangi	The Treaty of Waitangi
Tuakana-teina	Older sibling-younger sibling relationship
Whakapapa	Complex genealogical layering

Sāmoan, Tongan	
Talanoa	Open, free-flowing talk, to talk about nothing in particular
Vā	The sacred, social and spiritual space of relationships

Note. Translations of non-English words are approximate and vary according to local dialects.

Statement of Contribution

This thesis is based on four manuscript publications listed below. Three manuscripts have been published in peer-reviewed journals; one is set for publication as a book chapter. The publications are re-printed here with minor edits and changes in formatting to comply with the thesis guidelines. Consequently, "I" and "my" refer to the PhD candidate and author of this thesis, Olivia Yates, while "we" and "our" refer to my co-authors and PhD supervisors, Sam Manuela, Shiloh Groot, and Andreas Neef, and at times, our community partners. These publications will be referred to as Chapter Two, Chapter Three, Chapter Four, and Chapter Five, respectively. These chapters form the following publications:

Yates, O. E. T., Manuela, S., Neef, A., & Groot, S. (2022a). Reshaping ties to land: A systematic review of the psychosocial and cultural impacts of Pacific climate-related mobility. *Climate and Development, 14*(3), 250-267. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2021.1911775

Yates, O. E. T., Manuela, S., Neef, A, & Groot, S. (2022b). Attitudes towards climate migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand: The roles of climate change beliefs and immigration attitudes. *Regional Environmental Change, 22*(88). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-022-01942-y.

Yates, O. E. T., Groot, S., Manuela, S., & Neef, A. (2022c). "There's so much more to that sinking island!": Restorying migration from Tuvalu and Kiribati to Aotearoa New Zealand. *Journal of Community Psychology*. https://doi.org/10.1002/jcop.22928.

Yates, O. E. T., Groot, S., Manuela, S., & Neef, A. (In press). "Owning the reality of renting the skies": Youth climate activism and neighbourliness in the context of Pacific climate mobility. In B. Salami & N. Pauli. (Eds.), *Handbook of climate migration and mobility justice*. De Gruyter.

Chapter One. Stories from the Frontlines: Introduction

"On the behalf of our Prime Minister… My colleagues and I will defend the right for small nations like Kiribati to live on their ancestral lands. We will defend their right to self-determination." (Minister 'Aupito William Sio, New Zealand Kiribati Language Week, 12 July 2020).

"New Zealand salutes you, Tuvalu, and your courageous voice. We will stand with you and support your fight for the right to life and the right to live on your ancestral lands." (Minister 'Aupito William Sio, New Zealand Tuvaluan Language Week, 27 September 2020).

In 2020, Aotearoa New Zealand's (NZ) Minister for Pacific Peoples, Hon 'Aupito William Sio declared that Aotearoa NZ would support people from Kiribati and Tuvalu to remain on their ancestral lands in the face of climate-related threats. These pronouncements were directed to the Tuvaluan and Kiribati diasporas in Aotearoa NZ during their annual Pacific language weeks, dedicated to the thriving of their ancestral languages and cultures in Aotearoa NZ (Ministry for Pacific Peoples [MPP], 2020). By referencing climate change during Kiribati and Tuvaluan Language Weeks, Sio recognises that life and land have always been interwoven (Falefou; 2017; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020) for Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati. Their sense of well-being is bound up in their ties to their ancestral lands, languages, cultures, and identities (Panapa, 2012; The Kiribati Working Group, 2015). Aotearoa NZ's climate adaptation efforts on these low-lying islands would therefore support the well-being of the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in Aotearoa NZ.

However, implicit in Minister Sio's pronouncements is the lack of support for people who are migrating in the context of climate change (hereafter, climate mobility). In prioritising

people's rights to remain on their ancestral lands, Aotearoa NZ transfers responsibility onto those on the frontlines of climate change to negotiate their own, often precarious, migration pathways (Neef & Benge, 2022). This was evidenced in Aotearoa NZ's response to Mr. Ioane Teitiota from Kiribati, who sought asylum in Aotearoa in 2015 NZ as a 'climate refugee'. The courts denied his claim, asserting that he could return to Kiribati to live a life with dignity, despite personal testimonies to the contrary. Mr. Teitiota then brought a case against the New Zealand Government at the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) (*Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand*, 2020), who supported New Zealand's position in ruling that Teitiota's life was not in immediate danger (McAdam, 2020). Although this case opened the door to future climate change-related asylum claims (Hatano, 2021), there remains no legal protections for Pacific peoples considering migrating because of climate change (Asafo, 2022). Consequently, I-Kiribati, Tuvaluans, and other Pacific peoples who wish to migrate for climate-related reasons must navigate existing immigration avenues such as the Pacific Access Category (PAC) or else fashion their own mobility solutions to traverse international borders – and risk deportation, as was the case for Mr. Teitiota.

Placing Sio's speeches alongside Mr. Teitota's experiences highlights the challenges of supporting Pacific communities in Aotearoa NZ whose ancestral lands are on the frontlines of climate change (frontline Pacific communities). Aotearoa NZ's response to climate mobility echoes the Tuvaluan and Kiribati state positions, which tell stories of climate change that prioritise the rights of Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati to live on their homelands in the face of climate threats (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Kupferberg, 2021; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], 2018; Neef & Benge, 2022; Oakes, 2019). At the same time, there is an alternative story, that of the state's response to Mr. Teitiota, which actively undermines the abilities of Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati to choose instead to live in Aotearoa NZ (Asafo, 2022; Neef & Benge, 2022). Although no others are actively pursuing legal climate refugee

recognition, the current gaps in climate mobility policy is likely to have a significant impact on the well-being of frontline Pacific communities as they navigate existing immigration channels in Aotearoa NZ (Asafo, 2022; Gonzalez, 2020; Stanley, 2021). Moreover, as immigration does not occur in a vacuum, the societies into which frontline Pacific communities move (by whichever means) are likely to have an ongoing impact on their settlement and well-being (Echterhoff et al., 2020; Esses et al., 2017).

Climate mobility researchers have identified a need to understand the well-being implications of climate mobility in the Pacific in order to develop culturally responsive policies and well-being services (e.g., Ghosh & Orchiston, 2022; Pearson et al., 2021a; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020). There has been substantial research about the complexities of internal climate-related movements, reflecting Pacific peoples' preferences to remain on their homelands (e.g., Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Noy, 2017; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2021; Zickgraf, 2019, see below and Chapter Two). However, documented cases of cross-border climate mobility are rare, such that the well-being impacts of international migration are not well understood. Moreover, there has been little research about how climate mobility affects host societies (Ghosh & Orchiston, 2022) and less that is specific to Aotearoa NZ. Given Aotearoa NZ's position as a likely host of future climate migrants (Cass, 2018), it is important to understand the ways in which climate change, cross-border migration and host society come together to shape the lifeworlds of Pacific climate migrants in Aotearoa NZ. Moreover, there is a need for research that places the stories and priorities of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans at the centre.

This thesis explores the perceptions and implications of climate mobility to Aotearoa NZ, with a focus on the well-being of the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Aotearoa NZ. First, I review the literature on the psychosocial and cultural impacts of climate mobility in the Pacific. Then, I contextualise this for Aotearoa NZ by considering the perspectives of four

groups or communities: the I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland, Aotearoa New Zealand society in general and Pākehā/European NZer youth climate activists. With each group or community, I explore a particular story of climate mobility, which together build a picture about the societal setting of Aotearoa NZ. Specifically, the thesis asks:

1) What are the impacts of climate mobility across the Pacific, according to existing research? (Chapter Two)

2) How do I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland experience climate change and mobility to Aotearoa NZ? (Chapter Three)

3) What are the relationships between Aotearoa NZers' climate change beliefs and immigration attitudes? (Chapter Four)

4) What are Pākehā/European NZer climate activists' perceptions of solidarity in the context of climate mobility? (Chapter Five)

My exploration of these topics begins in the present chapter, which introduces the thesis. In this, I describe the diverse, sometimes contradictory descriptions and accounts of climate mobility as different 'stories'. Storying is a common tool deployed by Pacific and non-Pacific activists, scholars and journalists to reframe disempowering narratives of climate change, reclaim space for Pacific relational worldviews, and open pathways to radical, transformative change (Archibald et al., 2019; Chao & Enari, 2021; Harris, 2023; Riedy, 2020). In this thesis, storying serves as a narrative device, through which I weave together past and present encounters with climate change and mobility to identify key research areas and potential solutions.

The first section of this chapter reviews stories from the communities and people that are the focus of this thesis. It begins with the historic and contemporary circumstances of Kiribati and Tuvalu, describes the setting of Aotearoa NZ, and, thereafter, details the background to contemporary climate activism. The chapter turns to provide an overview of

contrasting stories of Pacific migration, including those that pre-date climate mobility research and those emerging from recent research and policy discussions about climate mobility. Thereafter, I outline the approaches taken to summarise the well-being impacts of climate mobility. In the last two sections, I introduce the research methodology and my relationship to it and finally map out the subsequent chapters in this thesis. Across all sections, I employ the language of activists (e.g., Kaho, 2021; 350 Pacific, n.d.) and, increasingly, scholars (e.g., Enari & Jameson, 2021; Pearson et al., 2022; Sanders, 2021), by using 'frontline communities' to refer to peoples who are the first and most impacted by the climate crisis, and 'frontline Pacific communities' to localise these experiences in the Pacific.

Introducing the Communities

Stories of climate mobility from the Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati communities in Aotearoa NZ reflect an interplay between the settings of their homelands and Aotearoa NZ. Kiribati and Tuvalu were previously combined under British colonial rule as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands (1892 -1976) (Tabe, 2019) and remain interconnected today through migration, intermarriage, employment, education, and climate change discourse. Yet, it is important to highlight that I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans have distinct histories, cultures, languages, spiritualties, and governance systems, even within islands, and which persist in Aotearoa NZ. Equally, they have unique relationships to climate change, mobility and Aotearoa NZ. I begin by describing the circumstances in Kiribati below, although neither Kiribati nor Tuvalu takes precedence in this thesis.

Stories from Kiribati

Kiribati is an island group in the Pacific Ocean consisting of 32 coral atolls and one raised limestone island (Banaba/Ocean Island) divided into three groups: Gilbert Islands,

Phoenix Islands and Line Islands (see Figure 1). The name Kiribati is a transliteration of the state's former colonial name, "the Gilbert Islands", in use since independence in 1979 (Republic of Kiribati, n.d.a). The maximum elevation of Kiribati's coral atolls is three to four metres (m) above sea level (The World Bank Group, 2021a). Despite having a landmass of only 811 kilometres squared (km^2), Kiribati has one of the largest exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the world with 3.5 million km^2 (Republic of Kiribati, n.d.a), making Kiribati "the small fish" who "owns the biggest ocean" (Men's maroro; see Chapter 3).

Figure 1

Map of the Southwest Pacific

Note. Copyright CartoGIS Services, Colleges of Asia and the Pacific, the Australian National University (2022).

Colonial rule (1892-1976) and the introduction of Christianity left a lasting influence in Kiribati. According to I-Kiribati in Aotearoa NZ, benefits of colonial rule and Christianisation included establishing schools, recognising women's rights and developing Kiribati industries. However, there were enduring negative consequences, including reorganising family and governance structures, introducing new diseases, establishing foreign legal systems, restricting inter-island travel, diminishing Kiribati knowledge and customs, fracturing inter-island harmony, and cultivating dependence upon capitalist systems (The Kiribati Working Group, 2015). Notably, the British colonial administration relocated several

I-Kiribati to other British colonies, including Banabans to Rabi in Fiji in the 1940s (Teaiwa, 2014) and others to the Solomon Islands in the 1950s and 1960s (Tabe, 2019).

The people of the contemporary Republic of Kiribati (kaiin Kiribati or I-Kiribati) speak te taetae ni Kiribati (the Kiribati language), although they learn English at school. In 2020, Kiribati had an estimated population of 119,446 (The World Bank Group, 2021a), of which over 50% lived on the island of South Tarawa, the site of the capital, Tarawa. The state has experienced steady growth in population and urbanisation since the 1940s (Kiribati National Statistics Office, 2020), creating a high population density of up to 15,000 people per km^2 and high unemployment rates, especially on Tarawa (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Republic of Kiribati, n.d.b). Fertile land and potable water are scarce, with water restrictions running most days.

Kiribati has a narrow export and production base. The bulk of Kiribati's gross domestic product (GDP) came from royalties from phosphate mining by the British Phosphate Commission until deposits on Banaba were depleted in 1979 (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Teaiwa, 2014). Since independence, Kiribati's primary sources of production have shifted to copra and tuna fishing, leaving the nation reliant upon imported foodstuffs and fuel (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Webb, 2020). Today, most of its GDP comes from tourism, selling fishing licenses to foreign-owned vessels and from overseas donors' grants. Nevertheless, I-Kiribati are independently minded, and Kiribati's economy has remained largely stable due to fiscal austerity and investing in Kiribati's sovereign wealth fund (Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2022; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020).

However, there are high unemployment rates; in 2020, 11% of the total population were unemployed, increasing to 15% in urban areas; a large portion of these young people of working age (Kiribati National Statistics Office, 2020). There are insufficient economic activities to meet the demand for employment, most of which is in the public sector (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). To supplement income, families and communities work together to ensure

people's material needs are met. Many young I-Kiribati men work overseas as seafarers, returning remittances to support their families and the nation's economy. Remittances also come from Aotearoa NZ's Pacific Access Category (PAC) scheme and seasonal worker schemes in Aotearoa NZ and Australia (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). More than 200 Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) scheme workers visit Aotearoa NZ each year, returning approximately $2 million to Kiribati through remittances (MFAT, n.d.).

Climate Change.

Kiribati has been on the forefront of climate advocacy due to its disproportionate exposure to climate change. Kiribati's per capita carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions (metric tons) are 18.3 times lower than those of the United States (US) and 8.5 times lower than those of Aotearoa NZ (Climate Watch, 2020). Yet, the state has been identified as "amongst the most vulnerable nations to climate change on Earth" (The World Bank Group, 2021a, p. 2). The future habitability of Kiribati is threatened by increased heat waves, drought, saline intrusion, storm surges and potential inundation from sea-level rise (SLR). Although Kiribati has a dynamic ecosystem to which people have adapted, SLR is likely to interact with changed wave patterns to increase the frequency of extreme sea level events such as king tides. Indeed, studies show that Kiribati has warmed 0.1-0.2 $^{\circ}$C per decade since 1950 and may experience up to 0.74m of SLR by 2100 (NASA, n.d.), although modelling future trends is hindered by Kiribati's dispersed land mass. This geographical exposure is exacerbated by anthropogenic pressures such as overcrowded urban areas, creating concerns about the future sustainability of Kiribati's ecological and societal systems (Thompson, 2015). Nonetheless, complete inundation is unlikely (The World Bank Group, 2021a).

Regardless of future predictions, Kiribati is already experiencing the impacts of climate change. Many residents report having observed changes in their environments, such as receding

shorelines and reduced fish stocks, and attribute these to climate change (Corcoran, 2016). People's beliefs about climate change vary and are often tied to their spiritualities: some believe that Nareau, a Kiribati ancestral God, will enable I-Kiribati to survive on their ancestral lands; others believe that climate change is God's punishment for Kiribati's sin (Corcoran, 2016; Roman, 2013). Most I-Kiribati perceive climate change as an existential threat but are hesitant to adopt mobility as a solution (Corcoran, 2016; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Oakes, 2019).

The preference to remain is the approach endorsed by the Kiribati government. Whereas the former presidency under Anote Tong (2014) advocated for preparing for 'migration with dignity' (detailed in Chapter 3; see also, O'Brien, 2013), the current government has a predominant focus on economic prosperity, strengthening governance, mitigation and in situ adaptation (Government of Kiribati, 2018; Kupferberg, 2021). Central to this approach are joint adaptation projects funded and/or administered by Kiribati's bilateral partners (including Aotearoa NZ) and donor organisations, despite critique that such projects undermine Kiribati ways of knowing and adaptive solutions in exchange for technocratic innovation (Klepp & Fünfgeld, 2022).

Kiribati Diaspora.

Aotearoa NZ is "a key development partner" with Kiribati (MFAT, 2021b, p. 6), owing to its shared Pacific identity, geographical proximity, economic partnership, and existing Kiribati communities (MFAT, n.d.). I-Kiribati arrived in Aotearoa NZ several decades after other Pacific ethnicities, following the introduction of 1986 work schemes with Kiribati and Tuvalu (Bedford & Hugo, 2008; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). Many translated their visas into permanent residency and settled in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). The I-Kiribati population has since increased rapidly to 3225 people as of 2018 (Stats NZ, n.d.b), nearly tripling in the last 10 years, owing to a high fertility rate and visa approvals under the

PAC as well as the Dependent Child, Partnership and Skilled migrant visa categories (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020).

Most I-Kiribati live in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland, followed by Kirikiriroa Hamilton and Te Whanganui-a-Tara Wellington (Stats NZ, n.d.b). There are tight-knit Kiribati communities across Aotearoa NZ, who gather annually on the 12th of July to celebrate Kiribati Independence Day. The different communities are represented by the New Zealand National Kiribati Council (NZKNC), who advocate for the communities' cohesion and social and economic advancement (NZKNC, n.d.). Most I-Kiribati are under the age of 40 and are Christian (86.5%, mostly Catholic), and many work as labourers (33.1%) (Stats NZ, n.d.b. Although most speak two or more languages (53.4%), te taetae ni Kiribati has been identified one of the most at-risk Pacific languages in Aotearoa NZ and in need of urgent revitalisation (MPP, 2021a). Te katei ni Kiribati (the Kiribati philosophical worldview, including customs and values) is also shifting in Aotearoa NZ, although te katei is fluid and able to be adapted to the Aotearoa NZ environment while remaining rooted to Kiribati (The Kiribati Working Group, 2015).

The importance of te katei ni Kiribati is heightened in view of Kiribati's position on the frontlines of climate change. In the likelihood of a climate-related increase in I-Kiribati migration to Aotearoa NZ, culturally informed and climate-sensitive well-being services will become necessary (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020). Several researchers have documented I-Kiribati experiences of migration and resettlement, describing the ways in which Kiribati social support networks can facilitate resettlement and buffer resettlement stressors, such as visa shortcomings, insecure employment, language barriers, and a high cost of living (Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Roman, 2013; Teariki, 2017; Thompson, 2015). However, there remains a need to understand how I-Kiribati conceptualise the

intersections between these buffers, stressors and climate change, and how this shapes their well-being.

Stories from Tuvalu

Tuvalu, formerly known as the Ellice Islands, is an island group in the Southwest Pacific north of Fiji that consists of nine islands (see Figure 1), eight of which have been continuously inhabited (Shen & Binns, 2012). The name "Tuvalu", chosen after independence in 1978, literally means "8 standing together" in te gagana Tuvalu (the Tuvaluan language). The maximum elevation of Tuvalu is 5 m and averages 1.8 m (The World Bank Group, 2021b; MFAT, 2019a). With a land mass of 26 km^2, Tuvalu has the fourth smallest landmass in the world, although it has a much larger EEZ of 750,000 km^2 (Shen & Binns, 2012; United Nations, 2022).

Tuvaluan societal structure and culture has always been adaptive and dynamic (Falefou, 2017). However, it was extensively modified following colonisation (1864-1978) and Christianisation in the 1800s. Many of Tuvalu's customs and traditions, including deities and lifestyle, were extinguished or reformulated into British customs and governance structures. The colonial administration also enforced or facilitated relocation to elsewhere in the Pacific. Tuvaluans of the island of Niutao were relocated in the 1950s to the island of Niulakita, the southernmost and smallest island of Tuvalu, in response to overpopulation on Niutao. British management of borders also permitted the people of Vaitupu (in present-day Tuvalu) to buy and immigrate to the island of Kioa in Fiji as insurance against overpopulation (McAdam, 2014; 2015). Tuvalu remains a constitutional monarchy with the British Sovereign as Head of State and a legal system that is the confluence of Christian principles, colonial laws, and Indigenous Tuvaluan governance systems (The Tuvalu Working Group, 2012; Aselu, 2015).

Family, community and the church are the main institutions that shape people's lives. Tuvaluans value their fenua (land, island) highly, most of which is held in customary tenure, as it gives a sense of security, belonging, and identity and provides for their material needs (Aselu, 2015). Tuvalu had a population of 11,600 in 2019 (The World Bank Group, 2021b), majority of whom live on the densely populated island of Funafuti, the nation's capital (Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Industries, 2017). Around three quarters of Tuvalu's labour force work in the informal economy, mostly in subsistence farming and fishing, especially on the outer islands (United Nations, 2022), as most land is not suitable for mass crop production.

Since independence, Tuvalu has become highly dependent upon overseas development assistance. Tuvalu's economic growth is limited by its few land-based natural resources and distance from major economies (Falefou, 2017). Despite this, Tuvalu's economy is relatively stable due to revenue from three main sources: its overseas investment fund (the Tuvalu Trust Fund [TTF]), into which the governments of Aotearoa NZ, Australia and the United Kingdom make significant payments (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, n.d.); followed by marketing Tuvalu's internet country code, '.tv' and fisheries license fees (Falefou, 2017). However, these funds are vulnerable to market fluctuations and shifting fish stocks. Tuvalu's fiscal situation is buffered by development partners including Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Aotearoa NZ, and others. It is also supplemented by remittances from the seafaring industry, seasonal work schemes in Australia and Aotearoa NZ, and from PAC migrants.

The capital, Funafuti, has one of densest populations in the world (Malua, 2014). Overcrowding in Funafuti began following the end of phosphate mining in Nauru and Kiribati, after which many Tuvaluan migrant workers returned to Funafuti (Shen & Binns, 2012). Today, high un(der)employment rates, especially for young people, are leading to further urbanisation of Funafuti (UN, 2022). A large proportion of those in formal employment work

for the government of Tuvalu, but there are insufficient jobs to meet demand (Falefou, 2017). Land, water and fresh food are scarce. Many people from the outer islands do not have customary land on Funafuti so live with extended family or build homes on the edges of the island (Malua, 2014). Thus, many residents recognise external migration as an important avenue to reducing the population pressures on Funafuti.

Climate Change.

Climate change exacerbates the pressures on Tuvalu's infrastructure. Like Kiribati, Tuvaluans have been vocal advocates for climate action out of love for their country and frustration at is disproportionate exposure to climate impacts (Malua, 2014). The state's per-capita CO_2 emissions are 16.3 times less than those of the US, and 7.5 times less than those of Aotearoa NZ. Yet, Tuvalu has been positioned as the world's poster child for climate change (Farbotko, 2010) and "one of the most climate-vulnerable states on earth" (The World Bank Group, 2021b). Tuvaluans have a long history of adapting to their changing ecosystems, but interactions between climate-driven extreme weather events and SLR may increase the ecosystem's variability and pose unprecedented challenges. Tuvalu has experienced 0.8 °C of warming since 1980, expected to rise to 2.8 °C in the future, although reliable prediction models are lacking. Nonetheless, Tuvalu is likely to experience more frequent heatwaves, intensified cyclones, saline intrusion, storm surges, and permanent inundation, leading to the loss of species and increased rates of disease. Global mean SLR is modelled to rise 0.44m-0.74m by 2100 (Church et al., 2013), but local predictions vary based upon wind and ocean currents, land uplift or subsidence, and anthropogenic hydrological modifications (The World Bank Group, 2021b).

Climate change is omnipresent in Tuvalu. Not only have many locals observed changes in wave patterns, shorelines and weather events (e.g., Allgood & McNamara, 2017; Emont et

al., 2021; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021; Siose, 2017); there are many climate adaptation projects and researchers and journalists frequent the islands (e.g., Farbotko, 2010; Gemenne, 2010). Despite this, not all Tuvaluans believe in climate change. Tuvaluans' (un)beliefs about climate change and mobility are heavily informed by conservative Christian beliefs that God will never flood the Earth again (Falefou, 2017). However, church leaders are shifting religious narratives towards the need to "construct an ark – solution – to save the islands" (Falefou, 2017, p. iii, see also Talia, 2021). Tuvaluans are resourceful people, and many are convinced that they will be able to overcome climate-related challenges in the short-term, leaving migration as a last resort (Milan et al., 2016; Siose, 2017). Research suggests that most migration is internal and economically- or education-driven, rarely for environmental reasons. Nevertheless, many people would consider external migration if climate change sufficiently worsened their living conditions and/or if they could cover the cost of flights and visa applications (Emont et al., 2021; Milan et al., 2016).

The Government of Tuvalu does not encourage large-scale migration, preferring temporary labour migration and local resilience building (Falefou, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour, 2011; 2014). These responses strive to build economic independence, maintain Tuvalu's self-determination as a sovereign nation and protect people's rights to land and culture (McMichael et al., 2021). For instance, Tuvalu's development policies see mitigation, climate adaptation and temporary migration as tools to advance Tuvalu's development and bolster environmental resilience (Te Kakeega III, Tuvalu's National Strategy for Sustainable Development [Government of Tuvalu, 2016]). Migration is seen as a worst-case scenario; one for which the nation must be ready (McMichael et al., 2021).

Tuvaluan Diaspora.

Aotearoa NZ sits on the board of the TTF and has a formal Statement of Partnership with Tuvalu, which identifies climate change as a key focus area for investment. This partnership is founded upon their shared geographical proximity, colonial history and the growing Tuvaluan diaspora in Aotearoa (MFAT, 2019b; Shen & Binns, 2012). Moreover, Tuvaluans and other Polynesian Pacific peoples have a kinship connection to Māori as tuakana-teina, older sibling to the younger, through the arrival of Māori from the South Pacific (Naepi, 2015).

Tuvaluans began to migrate to Aotearoa NZ in the 1980s for education and temporary work (Malua, 2014). Most settled in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland, particularly in West Auckland, who then welcomed kaainga (extended family and close friends) to live with them while searching for housing and employment, a practice which continues today. Consequently, 69% of Tuvaluans live in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland (Stats NZ, n.d.c), with the majority located in West Auckland, and they are supported by the advocacy work of the Tuvalu Auckland Community Trust (TACTrust, Malua, 2014). Others are spread out across Aotearoa NZ, especially in Wellington and Dunedin (Stats NZ, n.d.c). There were 4653 Tuvaluans living in Aotearoa NZ in 2018 and an unknown number of irregular migrants without valid visas (Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). Most Tuvaluans are Christian (84%) and many work as labourers (31%). Fluent speakers of te gagana Tuvalu are in decline such that the language is a priority target for revitalisation (MPP, 2022).

As in Tuvalu proper, the Tuvaluan community in Aotearoa NZ has been the focus of many research and government initiatives. Over the last decade, a number of researchers have documented similar resettlement experiences to those for I-Kiribati described above. People report encountering obstacles related to housing, visas, employment, language barriers, discrimination, social isolation, among others, which can lead to increased disease burdens,

mental distress, and for some, deportation (see Emont et al., 2021; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Gemenne, 2010; Malua, 2014; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021; Shen & Binns, 2012). These are heightened for irregular migrants (Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). In this context, the advocacy of the TACTrust is particularly important for supporting the well-being of the West Auckland Tuvaluan community and new arrivals, in addition to the social support provided by island-specific organisations and Tuvaluan churches. Nonetheless, there remains a need for more holistic health services that are sensitive to Tuvaluan understandings of well-being (Malua, 2014). For this, it is necessary to understand how Tuvaluan communities conceptualise and experience migration in the era of climate change and into Aotearoa NZ society.

Stories from Aotearoa New Zealand Society

I-Kiribati, Tuvaluans and other Tauiwi (non-Māori, including Pacific peoples, Pākehā [NZers with European ancestry] and other ethnic groups) are given a place in Aotearoa NZ through Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Te Tiriti, The Treaty of Waitangi, 1840), Aotearoa NZ's founding document. Māori, the Indigenous peoples of Aotearoa NZ, arrived in Aotearoa NZ from Polynesia many centuries ago, bringing with them ways of understanding and being in relation to the environment grounded in interdependence, one-ness, respect, and equality (Hikuroa, 2017; Winter, 2019). The arrival of European settlers in the 1800s disrupted this balance, as Māori land, culture, values, and worldviews were violently displaced by British settlers and sociolegal systems (Mercier, 2020). The signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (1840) set out the principles for a balanced relationship between the British Crown (and residents) and Māori. However, Te Tiriti was mistranslated and appropriated as tool to further the imperial project in Aotearoa NZ such that the state remains a constitutional monarchy.

Today, Aotearoa NZ is known internationally for its supposedly progressive stances on inter-ethnic diversity and environmental issues. The population of Aotearoa NZ is estimated at

5,124,100 (Stats NZ, 2022) with a median age of 37.9 years. The nation is becoming increasingly multicultural; in 2018 the population was 70.2% European (incl. Pākehā), 16.5% Māori, 15.1% Asian, 8.1% Pacific peoples, and 1.5% Middle Eastern, Latin American and African. 27.4% of the population was born overseas. Most Aotearoa NZers embrace this cultural diversity and believe that immigrants positively impact society (Ipsos, 2018). Yet, appeals to Aotearoa NZ as multicultural overlook the need for priority redress in Crown-Māori relationships to immigration (Kukutai & Rata, 2017). Multicultural ideals gloss over the persistent health and economic inequities between ethnic groups, particularly between Māori and Pacific peoples compared to Pākehā (Ministry of Health, 2020; Ryan et al., 2019). Further, they "equate to a particular capital-based version of diversity fixed on food and festivals, but short on the forum to discuss and critique the host nations' treatment of its minority [residents]" (Reid, 2019, p. 139). That is, Aotearoa NZ tends to commodify cultural practices while resisting associated shifts in the neoliberal and capitalist ideologies of the Pākehā majority (Reid, 2019; Simon-Kumar, 2015; Spoonley & Butcher, 2009).

Aotearoa NZ is also marketed internationally through it's 'clean green' and '100% Pure' global brand (Kaefer, 2014, Ministry for the Environment, 2001). This image paints Aotearoa NZ as the environmentally minded tourist's paradise, leading on sustainability, conservation and climate change issues (Coyle & Fairweather, 2005; Kaefer, 2014). The 'clean green' descriptor originated in the 1980s during a surge in environmental activism in Aotearoa NZ (Sanderson et al., 2003). While this image remains embedded within the Aotearoa NZ psyche – indeed, it was recently invoked when Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern declared a climate emergency in Aotearoa NZ (Corlett, 2022) – it is now widely regarded as a myth; as a "temporally distant Utopia" (Coyle & Fairweather, 2005, para. 1). There is growing scepticism about the legitimacy of the clean, green, 100% Pure brand (Coyle & Fairweather, 2005; Kaefer, 2014). The nation's environmental credentials and policies do not stand up to scrutiny, owing

to Aotearoa NZ's intensive, waterway-polluting dairying practices (Blackett & Le Heron, 2008) and poor climate change record.

Aotearoa NZ's gross greenhouse gas emissions are relatively low and accounted for only 0.17% of global emissions in 2019 (Ministry for the Environment [MFE], 2021). However, the nation's emissions per capita are high, reflecting the elevated contribution of the agricultural sector to its emissions profile. The country is one of the world's worst performers on emissions increases with the second greatest increase in emissions from 1990 to 2018 for all industrialised countries (McClure, 2021). Indeed, the nation's emissions reductions and policies have been labelled as "highly insufficient" and "critically insufficient" in relation to its fair share on the grounds of equity (Climate Action Tracker, 2021). Despite being one of few countries to enshrine a net zero emissions target by 2050 in law, the state's climate policies and their Paris Climate Agreement target do not currently sustain that ambition. Pacific leaders and Aotearoa NZ youth are aware of this inadequacy and have called on the state to take urgent climate action (Panapasa, 2022; Ritchie, 2021).

Stories from an Activist Tradition

The climate movement in Aotearoa NZ is an extension of the nation's grassroots activist tradition. Historic advocacy campaigns have united people from all corners of civil society around a shared (typically non-violent) vision of a more equitable Aotearoa NZ. Māori rights activists have a history of sustained activism focussed upon resisting settler colonialism and colonial exploitation (Nairn et al., 2021). Notable examples include the occupation of Parihaka in the late 1800s, the 1975 land marches in opposition to Te Tiriti breaches and land confiscations and the 1978 occupation of Takaparawhau Bastion Point (Walker, 2004). Similarly, Pacific peoples in Aotearoa NZ have a long history of activism, often centred around anti-racism, immigration and Aotearoa NZ's colonial influence in the Pacific, with the efforts

of revolutionary social justice group the Polynesian Panther Party establishing a foundation of Pacific peoples' activism (Anae, 2020; Gibson et al, 2019). Alongside these have been Tauiwi-led protests, some of which gained international recognition. These include the 1893 women's suffrage movement, earning many women the right to vote for the first time worldwide (Else, 1993), the nuclear disarmament campaigns of the 1960s-1980s (Temocin, 2021), and the 1981 Springbok Tour protests in opposition to rugby tours with apartheid-era South Africa (Pollock, 2004).

Whereas Māori have advocated for restoring connections with the environment since Aotearoa was colonised (Simons, 2021), environmental activism has only entered the mainstream in the last sixty years. In the 1960s and 1970s, alongside the nuclear-free movement, conservation-focussed environmental organisations began to emerge, including the arrival of international organisations such as Greenpeace (Downes, 2000). Environmentalists first united in the 1960s around the proposal to dam Lake Manapouri without public consultation (Downes, 2000; O'Brien, 2012) and gathered sufficient public attention to see the proposal dropped (Downes, 2000; Simons, 2021). In the 1970s, the movement shifted to focus on native deforestation through disruptive protest, petition and policy (Downes, 2000; O'Brien, 2012).

However, in the 1990s, environmental movements struggled to gain momentum, as environmental issues were resolved by top-down government policies (Downes, 2000). Around this time, there was a breakdown in relationships between Māori and Tauiwi environmentalists due to differences in environmental philosophies and approaches to environmental management (Mills, 2009). Following this era, environmental movements became more community-focussed and small-scale, largely due to a weakened support base, institutionalisation and relational breakdown (O'Brien, 2012; Simons, 2021).

Climate activism in Aotearoa NZ can be considered as an extension of this activist heritage (Simons, 2021). In the mid-2000s, as conservation-specific campaigns were losing momentum in Aotearoa NZ, climate change surfaced as a protest issue due to the lack of progress on emissions reductions (O'Brien, 2012; Simons, 2021). Catalysed by the failure of the 2009 UNFCCC Copenhagen meeting and growing scientific evidence, climate change became the focus of activist energies worldwide (de Moor et al., 2021). In Aotearoa NZ, the movement focussed on oil exploration, Indigenous land reclamation and lobbying political parties (Simons, 2021). However, the movement struggled to gain momentum until 2019, sparked by the efforts of climate organisations such as Fridays for Future, School Strike for Climate (SS4C) and Pacific Climate Warriors (PCW) (James & Mack, 2020; Ritchie, 2021). This "new wave" of activism saw increasing buy-in from media, businesses and politicians, bringing climate change into the mainstream (Fisher & Nazrin, 2021). Aotearoa NZ's 2019 Zero Carbon Act (ZCA), Aotearoa NZ's first climate law, can be partly attributed to this renewed energy (Ritchie, 2021).

In the last few years, environmental activism in Aotearoa NZ has widened the earlier focus on mitigating greenhouse gas emissions to incorporate broader notions of climate justice. Climate justice broadly seeks to redress the oppressive structures that contribute to climate change and associated inequities in its impacts and decision-making (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). In activism praxis, climate justice involves centring the voices and priorities of frontline communities in climate change analysis and solutions (Simons, 2021). Aotearoa NZ's climate organisations are shifting towards campaigns which pair climate mitigation with intersecting justice issues, such as Indigenous, LGBTQIA+, disability, gender, and racial justices. There is a strong emphasis on decolonisation, a process of personal and collective action to "root out the weeds of colonisation and provide space for Indigenous ways of knowing and being"

(Mercier, 2020, p. 45). Nevertheless, many Tauiwi-led organisations struggle to translate climate justice into their everyday activism (Simons, 2021).

Pacific climate activists espouse similar approaches to climate justice. Since being identified as a region of heightened climate risk, Pacific scholars, activists and organisations such as 350 Pacific and their subsidiary, Pacific Climate Warriors (PCW), have been advocating for Pacific climate justice on local and international stages (e.g., Enari & Jameson, 2021; Fair, 2020; Suliman et al., 2019; Tong, 2014). Using culture, art and philosophies from Pacific cultures, they call for increased Pacific leadership and demand that major-emitting states reduce their emissions to protect Pacific peoples' livelihoods and cultural heritage. In Aotearoa NZ, Pacific activists have gained visibility and influence within the climate space, particularly in recent years (de Moor et al., 2021; Fagaiava-Muller, 2021). However, the largely affluent, Pākehā movement has nonetheless excluded Pacific voices and has been critiqued for silencing or misrepresenting the stories and climate realities of those on the frontlines (de Moor et al., 2021; Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; Simons, 2021).

Centring Pacific peoples' stories is essential for a just response to climate mobility, especially given prejudicial responses to Pacific mobilities. The next section discusses accounts of mobility in the Pacific and the more recent developments in Pacific migration to Aotearoa NZ. Then, it outlines how Pacific mobilities have been transformed by the threat of climate change in the region. I review the turning points in climate mobility definitions, media frames and legal responses, and introduce approaches to mobility from a climate justice standpoint.

Narratives of Pacific Climate Mobilities

Pacific Mobilities

Pacific peoples have a proud history of traversing a sacred and interconnected "sea of Islands" (Hau'ofa, 1994) to explore, exchange, marry, and adapt to shifting environments

(Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Howe, 2007; Suliman et al., 2019). Oceanic lifestyles are the interplay between venturing on routes (mobility) whilst staying bound to roots (land, culture and identity) (Clifford, 2001; Farbotko et al., 2018; Finney, 2003; Hau'ofa, 2008; Jolly, 2001). Conceptions of land – whenua, enua, fonua, fenua, hanua, vanua, aba and others – vary across Pacific cultures, but they cohere around the recognition that land and people are interwoven across the cycles of life (Māhina, 2008; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020). In this, the vaka (oceangoing canoe in Tuvaluan and other Pacific languages) and te wa (oceangoing canoe in Kiribati) embody the physical and symbolic connections between sea, land, and people across a fluid continent (Haili'ōpua Baker et al., 2016; Teaiwa & Launiuvao, 2015).

These shifting mobilities were interrupted by colonial borders (Howe, 2007). While early encounters between Pacific communities and colonial settlers were marked by direct violence, the violence of colonial administration was less overt but more pervasive (Weatherill, 2022). Under British rule during the mid-19th and early 20th centuries, borders were imposed, and communities separated for economic and political gain (Connell, 2012; Tabe, 2019). Many Pacific communities were forced into indentured labour ("blackbirding") and spread around the globe (Fröhlich & Klepp, 2019). Others were resettled elsewhere to expedite the exploitation of their resources, as seen in phosphate mining of the 19th-20th centuries and the nuclear testing of the 20th century (McAdam, 2015; Tabe, 2011; Tabe, 2019; Weatherill, 2022;). Among the legacies of colonial rule are enduring borders, which continue to confine and regulate mobility (Hau'ofa, 1994), and belittling depictions of Pacific peoples, fomented to justify European interventions in the region (Morris, 2022; Teaiwa, 2014; Weatherill, 2022).

These exploitative accounts are tied to Aotearoa NZ through the story of Banaba. Phosphate mined from the island of Banaba (Ocean Island, in present-day Kiribati) was used to convert confiscated Māori land into lush farmland, assuring Aotearoa NZ's position as a powerful agrarian state (Teaiwa, 2014). To expedite phosphate extraction and the imperial

project, Banabans were forcibly relocated to Fiji, where many live to this day. Aotearoa NZ's economic dependence upon phosphate and perceived superiority over Pacific peoples led successive governments to turn a blind eye to the impact of phosphate mining on Banaba (Teaiwa, 2014). Yet, the (mis)treatment of Banaba led to the dislocation of both Banaban land and bodies to Aotearoa NZ. According to Teaiwa (2014), today, "the New Zealand landscape is a 'second home' to Banaban land, and, by association, Banaban bodies" (p. 109).

Migration to Aotearoa New Zealand

The story of Banaba exemplifies the ways in which Aotearoa NZ has and continues to exploit the lives of "brown labourers" (Teaiwa, 2014). Crown-driven immigration changes in the 1960s and 1970s were designed to coerce Pacific peoples to migrate to Aotearoa NZ and fill labour shortages in the post-war boom (Asafo, 2020; Simon-Kumar, 2015). However, following the 1973 oil crisis and subsequent recession, Pacific peoples became the scapegoats for the struggling economy and mass unemployment (Asafo, 2020). This resulted in the racist and inhumane treatment and deportations of Pacific migrants in what is known as the 'dawn raids' era (Anae, 2020; Asafo, 2020).

This mistreatment of Pacific peoples was exacerbated by increasingly neoliberal economic, social and immigration policies. The 1980s and 1990s saw Aotearoa NZ's major political parties adopt neoliberal economics, privatise state entities and roll back welfare provisions (Kelsey, 1997). Simultaneously, amendments to the racialised, pro-European Immigration Act set the stage for Aotearoa NZ as an increasingly diverse society (Simon-Kumar, 2015; Spoonley, 2015). However, many of these changes were influenced by a neoliberal agenda to fill labour shortages and support economic growth (Bedford, 2005; Simon-Kumar, 2015). This reframed the desirable migrant as one who conform to neoliberal ideals of economic competence, autonomy and self-responsibility (Simon-Kumar, 2015).

Given the domineering relationship between Aotearoa NZ and its Pacific neighbours, the media attributed health inequities between Pacific communities and Pākehā to inherent laziness and incompetence, rather than the impact of centuries of structural racism, institutional barriers and colonisation in the Pacific (Loto et al., 2006).

The current neoliberal immigration system remains covertly racialised. High-income skilled migrants are given preferential entry, while low-wage, 'unskilled' or 'low-skilled' migrants face substantial immigration barriers. Simon-Kumar (2015) explains that "[t]here are winners and losers in this emerging scenario. Clearly, low-skilled migrants from the Pacific Islands or even Asia are less desirable than the highly skilled workers and investors from emerging economies like China and India" (p. 1185-1186). Simon-Kumar alludes to the ways in which these neoliberal immigration policies exacerbate income and education inequalities stemming from unequal experiences of colonisation. Moreover, they create a hierarchy of skills in relation to their contribution to economic productivity. For example, many aspiring Pacific migrants possess qualifications that are non-transferrable (e.g., Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Malua, 2014) or skills that are devalued in relation to those of capitalist states and thus are ineligible for the skilled migrant visa category (New Zealand Immigration, n.d.b).

The shortcomings of the neoliberal immigration system are evidenced in the Pacific Access Category (PAC) and the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) visas. The 2001 PAC is a quota and ballot-based residency visa. At the time of the research, it was open to 250 people from Tonga, 250 people from Fiji, 75 people from Kiribati and 75 people from Tuvalu each year (Dalziel, 2001; Immigration NZ, n.d.a). This has since increased to 500 people for both Tonga and Fiji and 150 people for both Kiribati and Tuvalu. Registrants must obtain a qualifying job offer within eight months of selection and pass a medical examination, without which their applications are voided. During this eight-month period, Immigration New Zealand travels to each country to explain the PAC process to registrants (F. Laumalili, personal

communication, 16 November 2022). However, the quotas are rarely filled due to the strict visa requirements and limited government-funded resettlement support once in Aotearoa NZ (Emont et al., 2021). Consequently, existing migrant communities feel that they must fill the gaps in resettlement support, assisting with employment, housing and visa applications (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020).

The equally challenging 2007 RSE scheme was designed to address labour shortages in the viticulture and horticulture industries (Bedford et al., 2017). The RSE category is an employer-assisted scheme wherein employers support temporary workers to come to Aotearoa NZ, work for up to nine months in any eleven-month period and send remittances back to their families (Immigration NZ, n.d.d). Like the PAC visa, the RSE scheme has been heavily criticised. Not only does it frame Pacific peoples as cheap labour, commodifying Pacific bodies for economic gain; it also has a record of exposing workers to exploitation and human rights abuse (Asafo, 2020; Enoka, 2019).

These combined stories of colonisation and neoliberalism impact the well-being of Pacific communities in Aotearoa NZ. Pacific peoples' cultures, identities, religions, families, and communities can help with navigating the challenges of immigration and resettlement (e.g., Manuela, 2021; Manuela & Anae, 2017; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). Nevertheless, Pacific peoples are disproportionately impacted by the societal determinants of health, being more likely than Pākehā to face financial or housing challenges, encounter racism, live in neighbourhoods of high deprivation and experience periods of unemployment (Harris et al., 2018; Ryan et al., 2019). These have downstream consequences on mental and physical health, wherein Pacific peoples experience higher rates of mental distress than Pākehā (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020), alongside having a shorter life expectancy and a greater disease burden (Ryan et al., 2019). In this context, there is a clear need for more culture-specific mental health and well-being services for Pacific communities (Ataera-Minster & Trowland, 2018).

However, there is a lack of data about mental health across the region (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020), and even less that accounts for the impacts of climate change and displacement risks.

Pacific Climate Mobilities

The challenges of climate change further complexify Pacific mobilities. Climate change refers to alterations in the climate deriving from natural climate variability in addition to human activities that change Earth's atmospheric composition (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). These changes shift global temperatures, precipitation patterns and the intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, with downstream impacts on natural systems and people's social worlds. Such impacts will be and already are more severe for communities without a wide range of adaptation and recovery options (e.g., insurance, mobility options; social support: Moore & Wesselbaum, 2020). In the Pacific, climate change has been described as a "threat multiplier", in which it interacts with existing social, political and demographic pressures to construct uneven vulnerability to climate-related impacts (e.g., Gemenne et al., 2021; Jones, 2019; Moore & Wesselbaum, 2020; Schwerdtle et al., 2018). In this sense, climate change is an extension of colonialism (Jones, 2019), in which the individualised, capitalist and exploitative worldviews that buttress colonialism also underpin fossil-fuel dependent systems and the inequitable distribution of climate impacts across the Pacific (Whyte, 2017).

Climate change poses the single greatest threat to Pacific peoples' livelihoods and well-being across the Pacific region (Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, n.d.). Pacific states are increasingly impacted by slow-onset stressors, such as rising air temperatures, changing ocean temperatures and sea level rise (SLR), coupled with rapid-onset stressors, like stronger and more frequent storm surges, tropical cyclones, rainfall, and heatwaves (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). Empirical evidence and modelling of SLR tends to show that low-lying islands will primarily grow or change shape (Kench et al., 2015; Mann et al., 2016; Masselink et al., 2020;

McLean & Kench, 2015; Tuck et al., 2019) although differences may be coming as SLR accelerates (e.g., Bamber et al., 2019; Hauer et al., 2020; Storlazzi et al., 2018). Nonetheless, combined climate change risks are already impacting biodiversity, infrastructure, food and water security, livelihoods, and well-being (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Kelman et al., 2021; Masson-Delmotte et al., 2021). Local adaptation measures can protect Pacific communities, such as planting mangroves, building sea walls, strengthening governance structures and valuing local knowledges (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). However, geographical exposure coupled with lowered socio-ecological resilience from colonial exploitation limits Pacific peoples' abilities to adapt in situ (Kelman et al., 2021; Sealey-Huggins, 2017; Weatherill, 2022). Hence, migration and relocation have been proposed as alternative solutions.

Accordingly, Pacific peoples have adopted a diverse array of movements to mitigate climate risk. These vary by voluntariness, distance travelled, migration drivers, and the extent of pre-planning (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Laczko & Piguet, 2014, McMichael et al., 2019; also refer to Chapter Two). Movements range from forced (e.g., by immediate environmental hazards or political institutions) to voluntary (e.g., to minimise future climate risk) and in response to sudden or slow-onset environmental changes. The majority of climate mobility occurs *within* national borders, including movements within or in proximity to one's ancestral lands or to a different island (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Clement et al., 2021; Kelman, 2015). In many cases, people choose to remain on their homelands ('voluntary immobility') in order to sustain their ties to place and their cultural heritage (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; McMichael et al., 2021; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2021). There is also significant emphasis on planned relocation, the long-term resettlement of people in a new location, for which Fiji and Vanuatu have developed specific relocation strategies (Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2016; Office of the Prime Minister, 2019; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014; Vanuatu National Disaster Management Office, 2018).

In exceptional cases where options for internal movement are limited, Pacific people may decide to traverse international borders (e.g., Dixon, 2017; Fedor, 2012; McClain et al., 2019; Roman, 2013; refer also to Chapter Two). However, it is difficult to attribute cross-border mobility solely to climate change due to combined influences across environmental, social, political, cultural and economic dimensions (Bakaki, 2021; Moore & Wesselbaum, 2020; Piguet, 2021). The multidimensional influences pose challenges when seeking to estimate the scale and timing of Pacific cross-border climate mobility (Hoffmann et al., 2021; McMichael et al., 2021; Tschakert & Neef, 2022). Nevertheless, cross-border climate mobility has remained the (controversial) focus of much social and political discourse, as outlined below.

Framing Climate Mobility.

Contemporary approaches to climate mobility look significantly different to its first entry into public and political discourse. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a consortium of United Nations (UN)-commissioned scientists who synthesise climate change research (McTegart et al., 1990), first linked human mobility to global climate change. At that point, the term, "environmental refugees" had already been mentioned for the first time in an UN report (El-Hinnawi, 1985) and became widely associated with the phenomenon, despite not formally existing in international refugee law (Gemenne et al., 2021). Researchers, activists and policymakers adopted the phrase, and regarded the migration and displacement of 'climate refugees' as one of the most severe climate impacts. However, this language positioned Pacific peoples from low-lying islands as the 'canaries in the mine', the first unfortunate but necessary witnesses of climate change needed to fuel global action (Gemenne, 2010). This rendered Pacific peoples "expendable to the onward sweep of both climate activism and its opponent, capitalist modernity" (Farbotko, 2010, p. 58). Consequently,

the term, 'climate refugee' was rejected by Pacific leaders, with global and regional partners following suit (Felli, 2013; Gemenne et al., 2021).

Notions of victimhood remain associated with the Pacific, despite being dismissed by frontline Pacific peoples. Pacific media and activists assert the region's autonomy, self-determination, global leadership, and climate justice advocacy (e.g., Enari & Jameson, 2021; Holmes & Burgess, 2020; McNamara & Farbotko, 2017; Suliman et al., 2019). In contrast, non-Pacific media and policy continue to paint a picture of the Pacific as a fragile, helpless and vulnerable region in crisis (Belfer et al., 2017; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Fröhlich & Klepp, 2019; Haalboom & Natcher, 2012; Mayrhofer, 2021; Shea et al., 2020). Although victim and vulnerability framing may intend to encourage compassion and care for frontline Pacific communities (Sakellari, 2021), these one-sided stories tend to perpetuate a paternalistic relationship between Pacific nations and their political partners, which becomes the reference point for political action (Mayrhofer, 2021). This "colonial logic of disposability" (Weatherill, 2022, p. 1) naturalises climate-related loss, disregards Pacific peoples' inherent strengths, silences frontline Pacific communities' resistance, and reduces their access to decision-making (Asafo, 2020; Sakellari, 2021). Moreover, it obscures extractivist pasts and presents which not only contribute to vulnerability rhetoric but underpin the inequities leading to mobility (Morris, 2022). In other words, such language actively makes vulnerable - or 'vulnerabilises' – Pacific frontline peoples.

Attempts to avoid 'climate refugee' and 'vulnerability' framing saw policymakers adopt the strategy of migration-as-adaptation. Introduced in a Foresight report (Black et al., 2011), migration as adaptation has had an enduring impact on climate change research and policy (Felli, 2013; Gemenne et al., 2021). In this strategy, labour migrants are seen as adaptive agents who gain new skills, qualifications and capital to then re-invest in their homelands and bolster in situ climate adaptation (Barnett & O'Neil, 2012; Dun et al., 2020; Farbotko et al.,

2022a). Yet, not only can mass out-migration destabilise island economies (Barnett, 2012), the processes of labour migration can also have a detrimental impact on migrants' mental health as well as the well-being of their families and communities back home (Farbotko et al., 2022a; Voyatzis-Bouillard & Kelman, 2021). Furthermore, migration-as-adaptation demands that labour migrants conform to the values of neoliberal capitalism (Felli, 2013). Labour migrants are expected to benefit the host economy and "integrate within capitalist social relations, albeit in a mostly informal and degraded form of waged labour" (p. 357). Meanwhile, responsibility for climate adaptation and mitigation is shifted away from major emitters, who do need to acknowledge the rights and responsibilities otherwise demanded by 'climate refugee' discourse (Felli, 2013; Neef & Benge, 2022; Offner & Marlowe, 2021).

Recent research on climate mobility recognises that the topic cannot be simplified into a single story or frame. Empirical and modelling studies consistently associate climatic changes with increased emigration, but also an array of other responses (Bakaki, 2021; Moore & Wesselbaum, 2020; Piguet, 2021) as social, political, economic, and environmental variables interact to trigger and constrain migration (e.g., Hauer et al., 2020; Kelman, 2015; Piguet, 2022). For instance, environmental degradation will lead to increased internal migration in the Pacific, but only under certain settings and depending upon global mitigation efforts (Clement et al., 2021; Kelman, 2015; Piguet, 2022). Meanwhile, resource constraints and intense climatic shocks can reduce migration, creating immobile or trapped populations (Oakes, 2019; Wiegel et al., 2019). In some cases, people return to sites of climate risk to maintain their ties to their homelands (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; McMichael et al., 2021; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2021). Hence, many of the aforementioned categories of mobility overlap, and indeed can be oversimplifying (as discussed in Bridging Statement Two). Therefore, this thesis adopts the language of 'climate mobility', which acknowledges the complexities within the topic and the spectrum of movements people make in response to climate change (Boas et al.,

2022; Tschakert & Neef, 2022). On occasion, I also use 'migration' and 'migrants' to denote movements that are perceived as voluntary, and 'displacement' and 'the displaced' for those that are regarded as involuntary or forced (cf. Gemenne et al., 2021).

Climate Mobility in Policy.

Legal responses to climate mobility reflect the phenomenon's complexity. Aside from the aforementioned 'climate refugee' strategy, climate migration first entered international frameworks within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) 2010 Cancún Adaptation Framework (Blake et al., 2021; Narusova et al., 2010). Responsibilities to address displacement-related losses were later included within the UNFCCC's 2013 Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage (Decision 2/CP.19, 2013), subsequently mandated in the 2015 Paris Agreement in COP21 (Blake et al., 2021; Gemenne et al., 2021). These and other climate mobility policies – a term which refers to "official government laws, regulations and directives designed to shape the mobility actions and outcomes of people affected by climate change" (Blake et al., 2021, p. 9) – have employed a range of justifications to regulate climate migrants. Blake et al. (2021) label these as security and rule of law (reducing threats of climate change on the of life of host residents and hosts), rights (minimising impacts that undermine climate migrants and hosts' rights, including the right to a life with dignity – see Chapter 3), development (promoting social, political and economic growth), preservation of cultures and customs and resilience (strengthening governance systems). Of these, security discourse has been especially criticised for enabling reactionary policies and militarised solutions, which encourage fear and distract from climate justice (Cusato, 2022; Mayrhofer, 2021).

However, notions of climate justice remain largely excluded from global climate mobility policies. Climate justice acknowledges that responsibility for climate change is

unequally distributed, despite structurally or historically disadvantaged groups, who have contributed the least to the climate crisis, experiencing the most severe impacts (e.g., Indigenous peoples, low-income communities, women and other oppressed genders, people with disabilities) (Kanbur, 2018; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Accordingly, climate justice has the aim of ensuring that the burdens and benefits of climate change are shared equally, with emphasis on addressing the unjust structures at the root of the issue (Kanbur, 2018, see also Chapters 3 and 5). Concepts of climate justice in relation to mobility policy cohere around justice, human rights and local agency over movement or staying in place (Farbotko et al., 2022b). For cross-border climate mobility, these conversations concentrate upon the policy settings that guide movement and the narratives that determine what is right or just for mobile communities. Many scholars focus on the function of borders, suggesting that the responsibility to support climate migrants falls more on the shoulders of states with larger historical and contemporary contributions to the climate crisis (e.g., Matias, 2020; Nawrotzki, 2014; Neef & Benge, 2022; Vaha, 2018). Others underline that borders themselves are the site of climate injustice. In this, restrictions on immigration and the gaps in climate mobility policy are understood to create "legal violence" (Skillington, 2015) that limits frontline Pacific communities' options to adapt to climate risks (Bates-Eamer, 2019; Chavers et al., 2021; Gonzalez, 2020; Rice et al., 2021; Sakellari, 2021). Accordingly, some scholars assert that climate justice demands that borders be extensively reconfigured or even abandoned entirely (Chavers et al., 2021; Gonzalez, 2020; Marshall, 2016; Skillington, 2015).

Aotearoa NZ's climate mobility policies focus on the Pacific. This position reflects the nation's political allegiances, sizeable Pacific diaspora, geographical proximity, and whakapapa (complex genealogical layering) ties to frontline Pacific communities (Crossen, 2020; Neef & Benge, 2022; Te Punga Somerville, 2012). The New Zealand Government has been discussing climate mobility with its Pacific partners since 2008 (Neef & Benge, 2022)

but has no plans to enact climate mobility legislation until at least 2024 (MFAT, 2021a). The interim period has been marked by two denied claims for asylum on climate change grounds, that of a Kiribati man, Mr. Ioane Teitiota in 2013 (McAdam, 2020), and a Tuvaluan family of four in 2014 (Neef & Benge, 2022). Although there was talk of enacting a climate humanitarian visa after these cases, this was dropped when Pacific leaders conveyed their preferences for in situ adaptation (Neef & Benge, 2022).

Little progress has been made in Aotearoa NZ since. The New Zealand Government's 2018 Pacific Climate Displacement Action Plan stressed the need to avert or delay migration through mitigation and adaptation, while preparing for future mobility through a regional response (MFAT, 2018; Neef & Benge, 2022). Climate mobility has also received subsequent mention in climate adaptation and mitigation reports, which emphasise the need for further research (see Auckland Council, 2020; MFE, 2022; MFAT, 2021a). However, it is generally portrayed as distant threat requiring future action (Zaman & Das, 2020), for which expanding the RSE and PAC visas provide a possible solution (Bedford et al., 2017; MFAT, 2021a). To date, Aotearoa NZ has no policies that facilitate climate mobility or acknowledge climate justice (Neef & Benge, 2022). Moreover, none acknowledge obligations to Māori under Te Tiriti o Waitangi (1840; Crossen, 2020; Neef & Benge, 2022). Nevertheless, there is growing impetus for a coordinated, regional and evidence-based response to support Pacific climate migrants in Aotearoa NZ (Asafo, 2022; Neef & Benge, 2022; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020).

Most recently, Aotearoa NZ was party to the draft Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility, facilitated through the Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security programme (International Labour Organisation; 2022; Pacific Climate Change Migration and Human Security, 2022). This non-binding Framework is not yet finalised nor publicly available. However, it is likely to be a flexible tool kit for states and partner agencies to address legal, policy and logistical issues related to climate mobilities. The Framework has

particular emphasis on supporting the dignity, human rights and self-determination of frontline communities. Importantly, it acknowledges the diversity of climate mobilities, classified as either displacement, migration, evacuation or planned relocation, and may go further to give intentional voice to immobility issues and solutions (Thornton et al., 2023).

Pacific Climate Mobility and Well-Being

These multifaceted responses to climate mobility reflect the diverse and sometimes conflicting descriptions of its well-being impacts. Most mobility scholars view migration not as a one-off movement but as a constant journey of resettlement with ongoing well-being impacts (Ghezal, 2022; Schultz et al., 2021), the perspective used in this thesis. Beyond this, researchers differ widely in how they delineate the impacts of climate mobility. For instance, many scholars draw from the UNFCCC's legal categorisations of loss and damage as stated in the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Loss and damage denotes the economic and non-economic impacts of climate change and mobility which are not necessarily avoidable through mitigation or adaptation efforts. Using this framework, climate mobility can be related to loss of cultural heritage, language, identities, and Indigenous knowledges, with cascading effects on communities' well-being (e.g., McNamara et al., 2021; Pearson et al., 2021a; Westoby et al., 2022).

Other research is biased towards the biopsychosocial model of mental and physical health, which dominates contemporary Eurocentric medicine (Engel, 1997). This model understands mental disorders and disease in terms of their biological, societal and psychological determinants (Bolton & Gillett, 2019; Deacon, 2013). Climate mobility research using this paradigm stresses the probability of adverse mental health impacts arising from the mobility journey, such as an increased frequency of infectious diseases and/or anxiety disorders and highlights the lack of research exploring the climate change-mobility-mental health nexus

(e.g., Gibson et al., 2020; Kelman et al., 2021; Schwerdtle et al., 2018; Watts et al., 2021). References to mental health and well-being explicitly (e.g., Kelman et al., 2021) or implicitly (e.g., Gibson et al., 2020) conceptualise wellbeing as a subjective but universally experienced sense of health that contributes to a person's life satisfaction and ability to participate in community and society (e.g., Ayeb-Karlsson, 2021; Galderisi et al., 2015).

These legalistic or medicalised understandings of climate mobility have several notable limitations. First, they collectively convey a deficit-based view of the Pacific (cf. Fogarty et al., 2018). There tends to be an overarching emphasis on negative well-being impacts, such as losses of identity or mental health deficits, without acknowledging Pacific communities' adaptive capacities, the potential for positive mental health outcomes (Voyatzis-Bouillard & Kelman 2021), nor the historic and contemporary injustices which situate Pacific communities on the forefront of the climate crisis (Suliman et al., 2019; Whyte et al., 2019). Furthermore, these models adopt universalised definitions of mental health and well-being which do not reflect all Pacific peoples' ontological realities (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020). There is an evolving body of literature which asserts that Pacific peoples' mental health depends upon culturally specific understandings of well-being (e.g., Kapeli et al., 2020; Manuela & Anae, 2017; Tamasese et al., 2005; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020). While these differ across different Pacific cultures, they tend to convey mental health and well-being as embedded within the relational, spiritual, cultural, familial, environmental, and physical domains of existence. Accordingly, Tiatia-Seath and colleagues (2020) emphasise that the climate change-mobility-mental health-nexus is not homogenous but rather varies according to Pacific peoples' specific ontological and cosmological worlds.

For example, despite the expansion of research about the Tuvaluan community, there remains limited understanding about the ways in which migration intersects with well-being from a Tuvaluan worldview. Notable exceptions include the works of Sagaa Malua (2014),

which describes the subjective health experiences of the Tuvaluan community in Auckland, and the Tuvalu Working Group's (2012) model developed to address family violence in Aotearoa NZ. This model, the Tuvaluan Toku Fou Tiale framework ("my garland of gardenia flowers" [p. 5]) conceptualises the means for Tuvaluans to optimise well-being, peace and harmony through the setting of a fatele, a Tuvaluan dance performance. This model reflects the Tuvalu-based writings of Aselu (2015), Panapa (2012) and Talia (2021). Aselu (2015) asserts that Tuvaluans have unique concepts of well-being that differ from universalised conceptualisations of health as described above. These are embodied in their language as olaga lei, or living well, and olaga tokagamalie, a sense of security and preparedness embedded in family, land, traditional knowledge, spiritualties, and cultural practices. Panapa (2012) explains that health - ola lei (literally, good life) – is reliant upon ola filemuu (living peacefully in family and community), fiafia (happiness from ways of life), malosi (physical, mental and spiritual strength), and ola leva (longevity, including respect and authority). Talia (2021) grounds these discussions in te muna o te fale (wisdom shared in the house), which describes ways of managing the three tafatolu (pillars) of Tuvaluan environment that anchor Tuvaluan identity: te moana (ocean and sky), te umaga (cultivation of land), te uaniu (preservation of fruits).

Likewise, I-Kiribati have notions of well-being that exist within their own worldview. The Kiribati Working Group's (2015) framework, entitled Boutokaan Te Mweeraoi ("the supporting beams or structures for uplifting or enhancing wellbeing in the home", p. 8) represents the process for achieving te maiu raoi (the good life/well-being) for I-Kiribati communities. Cultivating te maiu raoi involves having marin aba (a healthy environment and ecology), te toronibwai (self-reliance), te katei (the Kiribati philosophical worldview, including core values, beliefs and customs), and te karinerine (respect within family, community, and land) (The Kiribati Working Group, 2015). These are supported through right relationships with te utuu (the family), te kainga (the extended family group) and te mwaneaba (customary

hall of community governance), who support I-Kiribati to maintain cultural values and be in harmony with te aba (the environment and people). However, climate mobility research is yet to link notions of te maiu raoi to I-Kiribati experiences of mobility.

Regardless of their ontological underpinnings, climate mobility studies align in acknowledging the role of context in people's experiences of climate mobility. Throughout this chapter, I have described the ways in which migration, climate change and climate mobility present differently across diverse temporal, spatial and cultural contexts. Indeed, Voyatzis-Bouillard and Kelman (2021) emphasise the health impacts of climate change in the Pacific are not separate from the societal and institutional determinants of health. For example, migration studies explain that pre-migration processes weave together with people's resettlement experiences, including of discrimination, immigration systems, and institutional support in the destination (the host nation) to inform migrants' well-being (e.g., Echterthoff et al., 2020; Esses et al., 2017; Sangaramoorthy & Carney, 2021). This is evident in the experiences of Pacific peoples in Aotearoa NZ, whose lifeworlds are textured by the intermingling of colonial histories, migration policies, societal ideologies, and more recently, of climate change.

Yet, for all the research on climate mobility, there is a lacuna in research on the implications of climate mobility within host societies (Ghosh & Orchiston, 2022). Peace and conflict scholars explain that host residents' responses to climate migrants will depend upon their regional identities, the availability of resources, histories of migration, the perceived causes of migration and the political setting (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Koubi, 2019; Pearson & Schuldt, 2018). Other researchers suggest that people's openness towards climate migrants is related to the extent to which climate migrants are perceived as threatening and their movement as involuntary (e.g., Allwood, 2013; Gonzalez, 2020; Hedegaard, 2021; Helbling, 2020; Lujala et al., 2020; Spilker et al., 2020; Stanley & Williamson, 2021; Uji et al., 2021). However, research has not investigated a core element of context: that of the host nation's

complicity in migration and displacement. Climate justice scholars have theorised such relations (e.g., Marshall, 2016; Nawrotzki, 2014; Stanley, 2021) but they are yet to be examined empirically.

Studies of settler and climate change activism may offer some insight. Across history, non-Indigenous activists have stood in support of Indigenous efforts towards decolonisation (e.g., Huygens, 2011; Kluttz et al., 2020; Land, 2011; Margaret, 2010; Simons, 2021). Those with settler colonial heritage have had to navigate the complex space of having directly and indirectly contributed to colonial and climate-related injustices committed against Indigenous peoples. Here in Aotearoa NZ, Tauiwi scholars have documented the tensions and paralyses that can arise as people confront their own complicities in settler colonialism (Huygens, 2011; Jones & Jenkins, 2008; Margaret, 2010; Simons, 2021). Yet, scholars and activists alike recognise that turning to face one's complicity is a key step in moving with Indigenous peoples towards justice. Indeed, Pacific activists in Aotearoa NZ call on non-Pacific peoples to join in the fight for climate justice, so long as they are sensitive to the tensions within their (settler-colonial) identities and the attendant need for climate justice to be Pacific-led (Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; Pacific Climate Warriors, 2021). However, research is yet to investigate how non-Pacific Aotearoa NZers understand their responsibilities to the Pacific in relation to climate mobility, and whether this guides them towards accommodating climate migrants.

In considering Aotearoa NZ's conflicting positions – as a host of climate migrants (Cass, 2018; MFAT, 2018) with a large per-capita carbon footprint (Climate Watch, 2020) and a settler-colonial history, it is important to understand how environmental, historical, cultural, political, and societal contexts fuse to shape frontline Pacific communities' well-being. For this, there is a need to understand how host residents perceive Pacific climate migrants. Furthermore, there is a need for work that clarifies the nature of climate mobility and the settings under which it occurs (MFAT, 2018; Neef & Benge, 2022). Such knowledge is

necessary to better support the flourishing of frontline Pacific communities in Aotearoa NZ, particularly those from low-lying islands like Tuvalu and Kiribati, now and into the future.

This Story: Overview of the Thesis

Untangling this complicated web of contexts in relation to Pacific climate migrants' well-being is the focus of this thesis. However, climate mobility from the Pacific to Aotearoa NZ is too broad a topic to be discussed comprehensively in a single doctoral thesis. Working alongside diasporic communities from Tuvalu and Kiribati provides a smaller scale in which climate mobility can be examined and an opportunity to further climate justice with those on the frontlines. Thus, this thesis uses a multi-study, collaborative design to explore perceptions about and the implications of climate mobility to Aotearoa NZ for the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in Tāmaki Makaurau. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the four key areas described earlier: 1) a review of the well-being impacts of climate mobility across the Pacific, 2) the climate change and mobility experiences of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland, 3) the relationships between Aotearoa NZers' climate change beliefs and immigration attitudes, and 4) youth climate activists' perceptions of climate mobility.

Below, I outline the methodologies that I/we used in this research project. 'I' and 'me' relate to the doctoral candidate, Olivia Yates. 'We' and 'us' refer to me and my research supervisors (and also co-authors) and/or the project's community partners, depending upon the context. I begin by locating myself within this research and topic, before outlining the combination of the talanoa methodology and critical community psychology that underpin my methodology. Chapter One concludes by providing an overview of the thesis.

My Story

My father is a natural storyteller. I grew up being regaled by his bedtime stories of imaginary adventures, talking animals and secret locations where relationships could exist beyond the bounds of contemporary society. In this research, I embrace the idea that human beings are storytellers, and that the content of these stories illustrate processes of both personal and collective meaning-making across our lifetimes. A focus on storying brings our attention to how stories are produced, who produces them, how they work, how they are received, and whether they are accepted, contested or even silenced (Squire, Andrews, & Tamboukou, 2013). Like my father's adventures, stories are not neutral; they depend upon the position of the storyteller.

As such, stories are political tools, which can convey complex ideas and spark imagination that another world is possible (Chao & Enari, 2021; Riedy, 2020). Similarly, stories can be corrupted to justify the status quo, maintain hierarchy and entrench long-held inequities (Chao & Enari, 2021; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012; Riedy, 2020). Decolonial scholar, Linda Tuhiwai Smith (2019), writes that the "dominant perspective [-] has assumed the right to tell the stories of the colonised and the oppressed, which they have re-interpreted, re-presented and re-told through their own lens" (p. xi). This is evident in many settler-Indigenous research partnerships, whereby Indigenous stories are extracted by and solely for non-Indigenous researchers, to the detriment of the original storyteller (Enari & Jameson, 2021; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). Accordingly, McIntosh (2011) encourages researchers to ask, "There is a story to tell… Who is served by telling the story? Do/we have the right to tell this story?" Many of the stories in this thesis could not be told except through trusting relationships with Kiribati and Tuvaluan community partners (cf. Chan, 2021; Archibald, 2019). Nonetheless, these shared stories cannot be decontextualised from my non-Indigenous,

non-Pacific background (cf. Chan, 2021). Below, I detail these subjectivities to convey how I perceive of my role within the stories of Pacific climate mobilities.

My commitment to climate and mobility justice is the confluence of my education, identities and life experiences. I am an Aotearoa NZ-born citizen with English, Irish and Scottish ancestry. I primarily refer to myself as Pākehā out of recognition of my responsibilities to the whenua (land, ground, country, placenta) that has nourished me under Te Tiriti o Waitangi and the relationship this prescribes with Māori, although I also describe myself as Palagi when considering my location within the Pacific. My first ancestors to arrive in Aotearoa NZ, John and Mary Parsons, came in 1842 on the Timandra passenger ship. They were both from low-income families in Cornwall, England. Faced on one hand with potential unemployment and limited social mobility in England, and the prospects of independent land ownership in Aotearoa NZ on the other, emigration was likely an enticing option (Arnold, 1981). In late 1841, a year after the signing of Te Tiriti, they travelled to Aotearoa NZ to work in the new settlement of New Plymouth (Ngāmotu) in Taranaki. Their ocean passage was likely sullied by classist discrimination, cramped living quarters (Dalziel, 1991) and the death of their young daughter. However, life in New Plymouth would not have been much easier, with poor housing, infrastructure, and low wages from working the land – which, though 'purchased', was exacted from Taranaki iwi (tribe) through deceit and invalid legal procedures (Waitangi Tribunal, 1996).

I open with the stories of my ancestors to stress the interconnectedness of colonisation, migration and my Pākehā identity. Like many colonial settlers, my ancestors encountered unexpected difficulties in their migration journeys, not too dissimilar to the experiences of the communities described in this thesis (see Chapter Three). They lost community and became disconnected from their Cornish lands, language and identity (Payton, 2005). Yet, the Parsons' status as British colonial settlers set them and their descendants (me included) apart from

migrants today. Not only were their/our ancestral values and worldviews reflected within the British socio-legal systems used to govern Aotearoa NZ; they/we also received automatic citizenship. Under Te Tiriti, Māori and British settlers were automatic British citizens (then Aotearoa NZ citizens from 1949); all others were 'aliens' (Archives New Zealand, 2022). Nearly two centuries later, I have inherited this 'citizenship privilege' (Skillington, 2015) which finds its source in stolen land. Unlike many immigrants, I have never had to question my right to live, work and belong in Aotearoa NZ. This research project has highlighted to me that my citizenised, dominant ethnic group-position must never be taken for granted.

It was my own experience of migration which ultimately led me to this topic. My family and I lived in France when I was a teenager and I returned in my twenties to perfect my French. During this second trip, I was frustrated that, despite my best efforts to fit in, my mannerisms, non-fluency in French, strange accent and "quirky" dress sense marked me as 'Other'. My otherness led me into several precarious situations, notably (briefly) losing my job and home. I became critically aware of the entrenched racism within French society: had I not looked like a member of the white French majority, my encounters with resettlement barriers and precarity could have been much worse. Upon my return to Aotearoa NZ, I pursued postgraduate studies in psychology with an interest in immigration, language and the creation of (un)belonging.

This same year, I became involved in Aotearoa NZ's climate movement (the climate space). Until this date, the environmental disconnect stemming from my Pākehā identity and middle-class upbringing had blinded me to the seriousness of climate change for structurally disadvantaged communities (Sealy-Huggins, 2017; Williams, 2020; see also Chapter 5). After reading Naomi Klein's (2015) *This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs the Climate,* I was propelled into the climate space. As a Christian and proponent of liberation theology (Gutiérrez, 1973), I saw climate-related inequities as a call to partner with the oppressed in seeking justice (c.f. Isaiah 1:17, the New Revised Standard Version Bible). Out of fear of a

warming world and a newfound passion for climate justice, I joined a lobby-focussed organisation called Generation Zero and became deeply invested in the climate space. Meanwhile, my postgraduate studies, especially community psychology (see below), provided a platform upon which I could weave together my emerging interests in climate justice, collective action and immigration. I saw that neither community psychology nor the climate movement were speaking about climate mobility and believed – and still believe – that I should use my activist and scholarly energies to support frontline Pacific communities' efforts towards climate (mobility) justice.

There is growing recognition that Pacific research is most effective when conducted 'by Pacific, for Pacific' (e.g., Tiatia-Seath, 2020; Tualaulelei & McFall, 2019; Vaioleti, 2006). This position disrupts research's colonising past (Tuhiwai Smith, 2012) by placing control over the narrative and terms of engagement into Pacific hands (cf. Land, 2015; Tuck & Yang, 2014). Moreover, it can lead to culturally specific framings of climate change and well-being, which, in turn, can lead to improved mental health services (Tiatia-Seath, 2020). While I affirm this position, relationships from my activist background guide my conviction that Palagi have a responsibility to work alongside frontline groups and their Pacific neighbours for a decolonised, climate-just future (see Chapters 3 and 5). In the words of Brianna Fruean, a friend and activist from 350 Pacific (quoted in Fagaiava-Muller, 2021, para. 24), "The weight of this crisis is heavy. It will take everyone's hands and help to carry it." Whether in research or activism, carrying the burden equitably requires a commitment to relationality, reflexivity and humility (Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; Fletcher et al., 2006; Kluttz et al., 2020; Pacific Climate Warriors, 2021; Vaioleti, 2006). Moreover, I believe that it requires Palagi to do the work of engaging other Palagi on climate justice and our relationships to (de)colonisation with respect to the Pacific.

Nonetheless, this position is not fixed. Like other Pākehā activists, I must constantly negotiate my solidarity based upon my multiple identities and within wider social relationships (Bowman & Germaine, 2021). As a non-Tuvaluan and non-Kiribati woman, I am often seen as an outsider to these communities. At the same time, our identities overlap through our mutual commitments to immigration reform and the Christian faith that many of us share. As Narayan (1993) reminds us, it is not the insider/outsider labels that we carry but rather the quality of the research relationships with those that we work that should define our research. Throughout this thesis, I therefore adopt the stance of a co-learner and co-producer of knowledge (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014), learning and researching in relationships with the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities for a climate-just future (cf. Jones & Jenkins, 2008). In this, I draw from the scholar-activist tradition, which is committed to "exposing, subverting and challenging social injustices through a combination of various forms of scholarly work and activism" (Murray, 2012, p. 1) in collaboration with community partners (Hodgetts et al., 2014).

Methodologies

The approach to collaborative research in this thesis combines the talanoa methodology and critical community psychology (CCP) in a multi-study, mixed-methods design. Each empirical research question engages different communities: Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland (Chapter Three), Aotearoa NZers generally (Chapter Four) and Pākehā/European NZer youth climate activists (Chapter Five). Across these studies, I employ an array of qualitative and quantitative, Eurocentric and Pacific methods in dialectical pluralism (Johnson, 2016) and through the lens of relational ethics to most effectively answer the multi-scalar research questions (Patton, 2002; Anae, 2019). I describe the methodological underpinnings of the project below, although the specific methods used in each study are detailed in their respective chapters.

The overall thesis is informed by talanoa and CCP. Talanoa (Vaioleti, 2006) is a Pacific methodology with embedded methods that centres Pacific worldviews from project inception to completion. As a method, talanoa (literally, 'just talk' or 'to talk about nothing in particular' e.g., in Tongan, Sāmoan; Fijian) is more than an interview; it is an open, intersubjective and empathetic exchange between people in relationship with one another (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014; Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014; Vaioleti, 2006). In this, the interlocutors' emotions, behaviours, cultures, and empathy are central (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014; Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014). As a methodology, it is a platform for ongoing, reciprocal and meaningful dialogue between researchers and community collaborators in order to produce culturally appropriate knowledge that supports Pacific peoples' interests (Seumanutafa, 2017; Vaioleti, 2006). Talanoa resonates with I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities, who have similar concepts of te maroro and sautalaga, respectively. The values of talanoa therefore guide my engagement with the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in way that benefits them and centres their customs, worldviews and priorities for climate mobility.

Critical community psychology (CCP) adds an ecological analysis of climate mobility to the foundation of talanoa. CCP has its origins in the liberation struggles in Latin America (e.g., Gutiérrez, 1973; Freire, 1970; Martin-Baro, 1994) and critiques of individualised approaches to health in North America (e.g., Albee, 1969; Jahoda, 1958; Ryan, 1971) in the latter half of the 20th Century (Murray, 2012). CCP is focussed on structural change, wherein researchers partner with structurally disadvantaged groups to promote their flourishing (Hodgetts et al., 2016; Murray, 2012). The discipline also retains its critiques of individualised psychology and instead views people's health and well-being as situated within their political, social and environmental contexts (Chapman et al., 2018; Hodgetts et al., 2016; Murray, 2012). Moreover, CCP focuses on critical analyses of power, resistance and liberation (Adams, 2021; Arcidiacono & Di Martino, 2016; Evans et al., 2017).

Despite the increasing severity of the climate crisis, CCP has been largely inattentive to climate change (Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Riemer & Reich, 2011), with notable exceptions (e.g., Chapman et al., 2018; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Pavel, 2015; Riemer & Harré, 2017). Consequently, a growing body of community psychologists are calling on the discipline to confront the climate crisis, an individualised and depoliticised problem, which requires collective and politicised solutions (Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Riemer & Reich, 2011). Whereas hegemonic psychology tends to approach climate change with the goal of individual behaviour change, CCP asserts that researchers must join with frontline communities to confront climate-related inequalities (Adams, 2021; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020). CCP's critical, contextual and praxis-oriented analysis of climate injustices is used in this thesis.

CCP and talanoa are united in their inherent opposition to hegemonic psychology's tradition of exploitative research (e.g., Tuck & Yang, 2012; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). Since the emergence and spread of European Psychology following the Industrial Revolution, hegemonic psychology has been reductionistic and individualised (Pita et al., 2017). This produces a psychology which views people's thoughts, feelings and behaviours as separate from their social, cultural and spiritual worlds (Liu & King, 2021; King et al., 2017). This psychology became a tool for enacting epistemic and colonial violence on Pacific and Indigenous communities (Rua et al., 2021; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012), the impact of which persists in misinformed policy formation (Anae, 2019). In resistance to this, a growing movement of Pacific scholars are engaging with their histories, strengths, ways of being and psychologies to create methodologies which advance Pacific interests (Fletcher et al., 2006; Kapeli et al., 2020; Manuela & Anae, 2017; Ponton, 2018; Seumanutafa, 2017; Tualaulelei & McFall, 2019).

Many of these methodologies emphasise research which attends to the vā, a heterogenous concept present in many Pacific cultures that cannot be honoured in a few words,

as well as between research methods (Anae, 2010; Cammock et al., 2021). It has primarily been described in terms of its role in Sāmoan and Tongan cultures, wherein it refers to the spaces between (Anae, 2019; Wendt, 1999), social space (Ka'ili, 2005), relationality (Poltorak, 2007), or the sacred space of spiritual and social relationships (Anae, 2010). The vā also contains relational obligations to care for and attend to the state of the va, in Sāmoan, to teu le va (Anae, 2010). This is similar to the Tongan concept of tauhi vā, which Ka'ili (2005, p. 89) translates as "nurturing sociospatial ties", or va fakaaloalo in Tuvaluan, respectful relationships between extended family (the Tuvalu Working Group, 2012).

As a non-Pacific person, vā is not a concept with which I am familiar, nor do I make claims to fully comprehend it. However, relationality, or respecting and privileging our relatedness to each other and to our environments (Reynolds, 2019), resonates within my worldview. Applied to research, relational ethics focuses on the procedures, purpose and praxis of research (Hodgetts et al., 2021). Like talanoa's emphasis on reciprocity and intersubjective empathy (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014), relational ethics "requires researchers to act from our hearts and minds, acknowledge our interpersonal bonds to others, and take responsibility for actions and their consequences" (Ellis, 2007, p. 3). In other words, it is an ethical orientation which values the interconnectedness of self and other throughout the research process. Moreover, relational ethics contains an expectation that scholarly activities benefit the communities with whom we are in relationship (Hodgetts et al., 2021; Anae, 2019).

Relational ethics serves as the binding agent between the Eurocentric and Pacific methodologies in this thesis. These methodologies have traditionally had conflicting metaphysical orientations. For instance, whereas Eurocentric psychologies tend to discount the spiritual realm (King et al., 2017), faith, spirituality and religion are central to many Pacific conceptualisations of the self and well-being (e.g., Anae, 2021; Manuela & Anae, 2017). This thesis circumvents this impasse by accepting that the communities in this thesis have diverse

ontological and epistemological claims in relation to climate mobility. Instead of adopting overarching ontological and epistemological frameworks (thereby inadvertently undermining another group's worldview and experiences), I see reality as multiple and knowledge as relational and culturally patterned. From this perspective, knowledge is not universal but culturally specific and "socially constructed by embedded, embodied people who are in relation with each other" (Bishop, 2011, p. 245). The purpose of this approach is to avoid "endlessly pontificating about" (Rua et al. 2021, p. 2) the nature of epistemology and ontology and instead focus on upholding reciprocal and committed relationships with our community partners. In this, I draw upon pragmatism (Bishop, 2014) to choose methodologies (however dialectically opposed) that have the most valuable impacts for the communities with whom we work (cf. Bishop, 2014; Cammock et al., 2021; Rua et al., 2021), i.e., the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities.

In this sense, this research is not objective but has a particular political stance and ethical obligations. This position draws upon talanoa and community psychology in recognising that we, as researchers, have access to decision-makers and, hence, opportunities to influence the policies that shape people's well-being (Hodgetts et al., 2016; Ponton, 2018). Moreover, it acknowledges that we are bound through reciprocity to use our knowledge for the benefit of community members (Seumanutafa, 2017). In this research project, we (the research team and our community partners) strive to provide empirical suggestions to redress Aotearoa NZ's immigration and climate mobility policies. This broad goal was decided collaboratively at the onset of our project by our research advisory board (including I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan elders, experts in Pacific research and policy and Pacific youth climate activists), the West Auckland Kiribati Association (WAKA), Auckland Kiribati Society Incorporated (AKSI), the TACTrust, and with input from the NZKNC. The specific targets of our project are subject to ongoing conversations, although they currently prioritise naturalising irregular migrants,

improving resettlement support services, amending the PAC and RSE, and creating a new climate-related visa category. Thus, this project does not seek to generate universally generalisable truths; instead, it aspires to create robust, locally relevant and co-produced knowledge that can be mobilised for climate and mobility justice (cf. Hunsburger et al., 2017).

To this aim, this thesis invokes storying as a narrative tool for moving towards climate justice for and with the Pacific (Chao & Enari, 2021). Storying is commonly used by climate activists to increase public engagement, counter misinformation and mobilise communities around climate action (Burch, 2019; Chao & Enari, 2021; Kurz & Prosser, 2021; Riedy, 2020). Indigenous experiences and knowledges are often passed on through story, which can spark curiosity, join past, present and future, bind storyteller and listener, and engage the collective imagination to overcome oppression (Archibald et al., 2019; Enari & Jameson, 2021). Indigenous storywork as methodology has seen a recent insurgence (Archibald, 2008; Archibald et al., 2019), including across Oceania, with Pacific methodologies that embody storytelling, such as talanoa (Fa'avae et al., 2022; Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014), and the growth of the pūrākau (storytelling) method in Aotearoa NZ (Archibald et al., 2019; Lee, 2009). I use storying as a conceptual device to relate the multiple, shifting accounts of climate change and mobility across each study. Storying brings together these different, sometimes contradictory layers of meaning, which are integrated through bricolage (Brinkmann & Kvale, 2019) to make sense of the social processes shaping climate mobility to Aotearoa NZ. In so doing, radical solutions for transformative change may be found (cf. Chao & Enari, 2021; Riedy, 2020).

Each chapter in this thesis contributes one part to this picture, which together build a multi-layered, contextual analysis of people's perceptions about the well-being implications of climate mobility from the Pacific to Aotearoa NZ. In the next section, I map out the specific objectives and methods used in each study. These include a systematic literature review of the

psychosocial and cultural impacts of climate mobility (Chapter Two), I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan stories of climate mobility (Chapter Three), Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate migrants (Chapter Four), and Pākehā/European NZers' understandings of neighbourliness (Chapter 5).

Thesis Structure

This thesis 'maps' the implications of climate mobility for well-being from four different angles. Drawing from the Pacific mobility narratives (e.g., Falefou, 2017; Suliman et al., 2019) that ground this thesis, the chapters might be considered as different 'islands', which have separate settings, foci, methods, and communities of interest (Figure 2). Each island represents a published or soon-to-be published piece, which can be read as standalone articles. These are situated in an interconnected 'ocean' of overlapping macro-level histories, policies, environmental settings, and political and institutional structures. Accordingly, the order of the chapters within the thesis is not chronological, as a PhD, like mobility, is not a linear journey. Rather, the peoples and communities on each island and in each chapter concurrently affect the other. Therefore, the chapters are laid out in a manner that most effectively demonstrates their connections. I expand upon these links in the 'bridging' statements between chapters and discuss them further in Chapter Six.

Figure 2

Map of the Thesis

Note. Dotted lines represent the interconnections between chapters, which although enumerated, are not listed chronologically.

Given that each chapter is its own publication, there may be some recurring material and inconsistencies across the thesis. For instance, there is some repetition within the introduction sections as they deal with similar subject matter. There is also variation in the pronoun conventions according to the journal or book within which each publication is (set to be) published. The introduction, bridging statements, discussion and most chapters employ first-person pronouns to denote the unfolding story of the thesis and our roles in it, although I

shift to using third-person pronouns in Chapter Five. Furthermore, there are subtle differences in the language and labels used to discuss climate mobility. These have changed since the inception of this thesis and are reflected within the publications: Chapter Two refers to 'climate-related mobility' (Chapter Two); all others use simply 'climate mobility'. Finally, I shift between describing Aotearoa NZers with European ancestry as Palagi (Chapter Three), Pākehā (Chapter Four), Pākehā/European NZers (Chapter Five), depending upon the context and core relationships within each chapter.

Chapter Two (Figure 2) extends the literature review in this introductory chapter. Chapter Two focuses on the psychosocial and cultural impacts of climate mobility in the Pacific and the methods employed in the field. Using a systematic review of qualitative research, we (the authorship team) identify cases of mobility related to climate change and assess these studies against the Pacific Health Research Guidelines (Health Research Council of New Zealand [HRC], 2014) and Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP, 2018). Thereafter, the chapter compares and contrasts the implications of climate mobility for internal and cross-border migrants, observing similarities in the social factors influencing acculturation and relationships to land. These impacts are discussed in relation to the place of cultural practices, values, knowledge, and community cohesion in resisting climate- and mobility-related disruptions.

These concepts and findings are then made concrete in Chapter Three (Figure 2). In this chapter, we focus on the diverse experiences of climate mobility for the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland based upon maroro (Kiribati) and sautalaga (Tuvalu) (open discussions) with community members. The chapter offers a retelling of climate mobility grounded in a range of stories of purposeful, agentic Pacific migrations (Haili'ōpua Baker et al., 2016; Suliman et al., 2019) and the concept of 'migration with dignity' (Tong, 2014). Specifically, the chapter draws upon the journeys of te wa or te vaka (Kiribati or

Tuvaluan oceangoing canoes; Figure 6) to analyse the ways in which community participation, societal barriers and political loopholes shape the communities' well-being and efforts to (re)claim their dignity. Particularly, we consider how Aotearoa NZ's neoliberal climate and immigration policies inform the community members' lived realities. In our analysis, the importance of being anchored in community, culture, language, and identity becomes evident, as does the need for policy reform to address the gap between migration *in*dignities and migration *with* dignity.

Implicit within many of the community members' journeys is the social rhetoric surrounding climate mobility. To better understand this, Chapters Four and Five (Figure 2) consider Aotearoa NZers' perceptions of climate mobility and immigration more generally, with a focus on climate justice. Chapter Four provides a bird's eye view of the topic using findings from a quantitative survey of Aotearoa NZers' beliefs about climate change and immigration. We first compare people's overall attitudes towards climate migrants compared to immigrants in general and then examine the relationships between people's immigration attitudes, climate change beliefs, climate justice awareness, and their attitudes towards climate migrants. These links are depicted in an empirical model (Figure 9) through moderated mediation analysis, which suggests that being complicit in climate injustices may shape people's attitudes towards climate migrants. The chapter concludes by contextualising these findings and their implications for Aotearoa NZ's regional setting.

In the last empirical chapter of this thesis, we tease out how youth climate activists approach their/our activism in the context of climate mobility (Figure 2). Youth climate activists claim to be championing climate justice and may have a deeper sense of Aotearoa NZ's interconnectedness to frontline Pacific communities than the public. Based upon interviews with eleven youth climate activists and my experiences within the movement, the chapter invokes Aotearoa NZ's position as a so-called 'neighbour' to Pacific states (Ardern,

2019) and the form that this takes within Aotearoa NZ's climate movement. In this, we expand upon how the activists approach solidarity with Pacific communities and outline their neighbourly obligations related to accountability, hospitality and relationality. The significance of this framework is highlighted with regards to foregrounding climate justice and equitable partnership in climate mobility strategies.

In the final chapter (Chapter Six), I expand upon the linkages between each of these chapters as they relate to the objectives of this thesis. The overall discussion in this chapter brings together recurrent themes from across the thesis pertaining to discussions of roots and roots (Clifford, 2001; Farbotko et al., 2018; Finney, 2003; Hau'ofa, 2008; Jolly, 2001) and an (un)neighbourly response to climate mobility. The chapter then outlines opportunities for new stories of climate mobility that better support the well-being of Pacific climate migrants. In doing this, Chapter Six strives to provide an answer to the research question: what are people's perceptions about and the implications of climate mobility from the Pacific to Aotearoa NZ?

Summary

Climate mobility is a complex phenomenon that has been storied in multiple, often divergent, ways. Each of the communities represented in this chapter – I-Kiribati, Tuvaluans, Aotearoa NZers, and climate activists – has their own narrative of climate mobility. While there are some overlaps, their stories are patterned by their different histories, worldviews, policy settings and responses to the threat of climate change. In the Pacific region, narratives of mobility as navigation across a vast ocean have been disrupted by colonisation, neoliberalism and more recently, climate injustices. In research and policy, climate mobility has been inscribed with shifting names, frames and legislative responses, and yet climate migrants remain outside of legal protections. As a neighbour to the Pacific, Aotearoa NZ is

likely to become a main character in this unfolding story, although it remains to be seen whether it will be known for its hostility or hospitality towards climate migrants.

These overlapping accounts of injustice and inaction have placed Tuvalu, Kiribati, and other low-lying Pacific states on the frontlines of the climate crisis. Those who leave their ancestral lands are likely to encounter inadequate climate mobility policies and unexpected resettlement challenges which may impact their well-being. However, the roles of several key players – Aotearoa NZ society, youth activists and the Tuvaluan and Kiribati diasporas – in migrants' settlement are poorly understood, yet necessary to support future climate migrants at the community- and state-level. Against this background, it is important to understand people's perceptions about and the well-being implications of climate mobility from the Pacific to Aotearoa NZ, which is the focus of this thesis. It is especially critical to do so in a way in which I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans can influence the narrative, collaborate on the research and determine its outcomes.

Bridging Statement One

The chapters that follow present the four studies outlined in Chapter One, each separated by a Bridging Statement. Chapter Two details the first of these studies. While diverse literature reviews have outlined the intersections of climate change and well-being in the Pacific region (e.g. Handmer & Nalau, 2019; Kelman et al., 2021; Schwerdtle et al., 2018), none to date have provided an in-depth review of the well-being impacts of climate mobility specifically. Moreover, none have analysed the methodologies employed within climate mobility research. Therefore, Chapter Two provides a snapshot of the well-being impacts of climate mobility in the Pacific based upon a systematic literature review of qualitative research. This includes the spectrum of climate-related movements from internal relocation to cross-border migration. I note that primary research published post-2019 is excluded due to the timing of the study and of the publication, which had gone to print prior to this thesis being prepared. Some pertinent, recently published works are discussed in Bridging Statement Two.

The literature review that follows is the author's version of a manuscript published in *Climate and Development*. Please refer to:

Yates, O. E., Manuela, S., Neef, A., & Groot, S. (2022b). Reshaping ties to land: A systematic review of the psychosocial and cultural impacts of Pacific climate-related mobility. *Climate and Development*, *14*(3), 250-267. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2021.1911775

Chapter Two. Reshaping Ties to Land: A Systematic Review of the Psychosocial and Cultural Impacts of Pacific Climate-Related Mobility

Introduction

Many Pacific Island communities are at serious and immediate risk of climate-related loss and damage. Despite uncertainty about the precise timing and magnitude of sea-level rise, other changes – unpredictable weather patterns, receding coastlines, king tides and soil salinisation – are already affecting Pacific island livelihoods (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; International Organisation for Migration [IOM], 2019b). Without broad-reaching reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions, such climate change impacts will alter existing mobility drivers, potentially displacing an increasing number of people from Pacific islands (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). Yet, there remains little legal protection for people who migrate for climate-related reasons for lack of conclusive evidence that climate change is life-threatening (Cohen & Bradley, 2010; *Ioane Teitiota vs New Zealand*, 2020; McAdam, 2020). Difficulties prescribing the role of climate change in displacement reflect the complexity of population movements in the context of climate change, or 'climate-related mobility' (Jolly & Ahmad, 2019; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951).

Climate-related mobility is a complex and multi-faceted phenomenon. Migration, the movement of people from their usual homes (IOM, 2019d), ranges from short-distance, internal relocation, to extended cross-border migration, which can vary in permanence, 'voluntariness', and the extent of pre-planning (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Laczko & Piguet, 2014). Patterns of migration are highly context-dependent, driven by interactions between environmental changes and economic, social, cultural, historical, and political dimensions (Bettini, 2017; Laczko & Piguet, 2014). In the Pacific, heightened vulnerability to climate change impacts can reflect living in exposed low-lying or coastal locations alongside lowered socio-ecological resistance, the outcome of decades of oppressive colonial policies and forced displacements (Green &

Raygorodetsky, 2010; Klepp & Herbeck, 2016). Accordingly, mobility is rarely purely 'voluntary.' People may choose if, when and how to move in response to sudden- (e.g., inundation, cyclones) or slow-onset (e.g., coastal erosion, sea-level rise) environmental change. However, historical and contemporary geopolitics largely determine the reality of climate change and communities' resilience to its impacts (Ferris, 2011; Methmann & Oels, 2015; Noy, 2017).

Regardless of its definition, climate-related mobility has important implications for human well-being, including a host of mental health challenges (Schwerdtle et al., 2018). From a psychological standpoint, mobility is not a discrete event with a definitive endpoint but a continual adjustment process with evolving impacts (Shultz et al., 2019). Analyses of climate-related mobility suggest that trauma from pre-mobility weather events could combine with anguish from the 'intolerable loss' (Handmer & Nalau, 2019) of intergenerational practices, livelihoods and connections to place (Shultz et al., 2019). Migrants' experiences of loss can depend upon the scale and degree of voluntariness of migration as well as the ability to continue socio-cultural practices in the new location (Handmer & Nalau, 2019; Torres & Casey, 2017). However, more disruptive movements may give rise to chronic stress, anxiety and depressive disorders, especially if returning home is unfeasible (Britton & Howden-Chapman, 2011; Manning & Clayton, 2018; McIver et al., 2016; Shultz et al., 2019; Torres & Casey, 2017). Empirical studies on the nexus of well-being, migration and climate change are rare. Yet, reviews of the migration and displacement literature anticipate that acculturative stress, the psychological impact of adapting to a new cultural context (Berry, 1997), could compound climate change-related trauma (Manning & Clayton, 2018; Torres & Casey, 2017). Migrants' well-being could be challenged by cultural and linguistic barriers (Barnett & O'Neill, 2012; Merone & Tait, 2018), discrimination, ethnic tension (Torres & Casey, 2017), distress about

socio-cultural change (Schwerdtle et al., 2018), social isolation, and reduced social and material resources (Adger et al., 2012; Torres & Casey, 2017).

However, researchers rarely employ Pacific perspectives of well-being to explain climate-related mobility impacts (Lala, 2015). Indigenous peoples, many from the Pacific, are likely to be the most impacted by climate change due to their connectedness to the environment and their experiences of structural inequities, often consequences of social and political marginalisation (Green & Raygorodetsky, 2010; Jones, 2019). Yet, Indigenous knowledges, narratives and values have traditionally been excluded in climate change scholarship, which is often biased towards Eurocentric research paradigms (Jones, 2019). These paradigms tend to give preference to precisely defined and empirically measured research. Such rigour is not always essential to Indigenous knowledges (Alexander et al., 2011), which are "gained through trans-generational experiences, observations, and transmission" (United Nations Environment Programme, 2021, para. 1). Further, Eurocentric research tends to construct reality from a predominantly (settler-)European worldview, and assumes associated values, such as anthropocentrism and individualism – the same values largely driving the climate crisis – to be the normative standard (Jones, 2019; Lala, 2015; Naidoo, 1996). Consequently, Eurocentrism has minimised the role of Indigenous values in climate research, reducing space for Indigenous voices in decision-making (Jones, 2019).

There is increasing recognition of the value of Indigenous knowledges in environmental protection (Alexander et al., 2011; Etchart, 2017; Green & Raygorodetsky, 2010), but Eurocentrism persists within research (Lala, 2015). In the field of psychology, Eurocentric perspectives tend to reduce psychological well-being to individual behaviour, while cultural, societal and political contexts are often excluded (Lala, 2015; Naidoo, 1996). Though unique to each culture, Pacific understandings of psychological well-being are generally more holistic (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014). Psychological well-being extends from beyond the

individual to the integrated relationship between personal, familial, community, spiritual and environmental well-being (HRC, 2014; Le Va & Te Pou, 2009). Quantitative and conceptual models of Pacific well-being (e.g., Crawley et al., 1995; Manuela & Sibley, 2013, 2015) demonstrate the interconnections between mental well-being and family, social systems, cultural values, Pacific identity, language, spirituality, and the environment.

Conversely, studies of climate change and well-being in the Pacific tend to separate the person from their community. Individualised, 'adverse' mental health is often emphasised (Gibson et al., 2020; Shultz et al., 2019; Torres & Casey, 2017) without incorporating Pacific cultural values or contexts (Lala, 2015). Further, migration is frequently regarded as an 'adaptive response' to climate change for its capacity to reduce physical exposure (Black et al., 2011; Warner et al., 2013), downplaying the socio-cultural risks of displacement (Neef et al., 2018). While environmental migration is not a new phenomenon in the Pacific, separation from one's ancestral lands can disrupt "personal and intergenerational histories of attachment to place" (McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020, p. 289) with potential impacts on psychological, cultural and social well-being, for the individual and their extended family (Campbell, 2014b). Further, defaulting to migration as a climate solution can depoliticise the climate discussion, emphasise island vulnerabilities over strengths, and absolve industrialised powers of their emissions reduction responsibilities (McMichael et al., 2019; Perkiss & Moerman, 2018; Smith, 2013). Accordingly, many Pacific peoples are now resisting climate-related migration, prioritising in situ adaptations to protect their cultures, languages and identities (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Perkiss & Moerman, 2018).

Projected environmental risks nonetheless steer many Pacific leaders towards exploring 'optimal' mobility responses (Hermann & Kempf, 2017). The impact of mobility can depend upon the distance moved, the extent of pre-planning, the availability of customary land, and the community's role, each underpinned by the social and historical context (Barnett &

McMichael, 2018; Campbell, 2014a; International Organisation for Migration (IOM) & Ocean Climate Platform (OCP), 2016). The majority of future climate-related mobility is likely to be internal as it involves fewer financial, legal, and socio-cultural costs than cross-border migration (Campbell, 2014a). For example, planned relocation, the long-term movement and resettlement of most or all village members to a new location (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014), has been touted as a 'successful' form of internal mobility for its capacity to reduce climate change risk while safeguarding community cohesion (Gharbaoui & Blocher, 2016; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2014). Relocation is already underway in three Fijian villages, with at least 45 more planned for the future (Office of the Prime Minister, 2019). Yet, even the most carefully planned relocation can carry such significant psychosocial and cultural costs that many people only consider it a last resort (The NANSEN Initiative, 2015).

Accordingly, Lala (2015) has called for the insertion of Pacific perspectives on well-being into climate change research. Lala echoes the broader call for methodologies which centre Indigenous values, practices and ways of being (Naidoo, 1996; Ponton, 2018; Seumanutafa, 2017; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012). Pacific methodologies, collaborative research frameworks designed for and by Pacific peoples, provide such an approach. They include embedded Pacific values and norms (Anae, 2010; Ponton, 2018; Seumanutafa, 2017), favour storying, and focus on building culturally-appropriate and respectful relationships (Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014). A myriad of frameworks exists, including talanoa (Vaioleti, 2006), Teu le Va (Anae, 2010) and faafaletui (Tamasese et al., 2005) approaches. Talanoa can mean "talking about nothing in particular and interacting without a rigid framework" (Vaioleti, 2006, p. 23). More than just a conversation, talanoa is a method and a methodology grounded in mutual respect, empathy, reciprocity, and relationality (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014; Vaioleti, 2006). The researcher participates deeply in the research process in an empathetic

exchange (Boon-nanai et al., 2017; Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014; Vaioleti, 2006). Unlike talanoa, faafaletui (Tamasese et al., 2005) tends to involve group discussion of a more serious nature and the skilful weaving together (tui) of 'houses' (fale) of culturally-contextual knowledge (Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014). Researchers can use these methodologies alone or in conjunction with other Pacific methodologies (HRC, 2014) like teu le va (Anae, 2005), a Samoan concept broadly meaning "to value, cherish, nurture, and take care of the va, the relationship" (p. 2). Teu le va prioritises attending to and respecting the relationships between all stakeholders for research that supports Pacific communities (Anae, 2010; Ponton, 2018). By relying on metaphor and Pacific worldviews, these and other Pacific methodologies (summarised by Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019) use Pacific knowledges to guide respectful research with positive outcomes for Pacific communities (Ponton, 2018; Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014).

Alongside the appeal for Pacific-centred approaches, there is a push for more evidence-informed climate-related migration policies (IOM, 2019c; McMichael et al., 2019; Wiegel et al., 2019). Researchers can derive methodological and practical insight for climate policy from systematic reviews of qualitative data (Snilstveit et al., 2012). Some authors critique systematic qualitative reviews for being poorly designed and inconsistent with qualitative data's rich and variable nature (Barbour & Barbour, 2003; Sandelowski & Barroso, 2007; Snilstveit et al., 2012). Others argue that they are necessary for progressing climate change policy – but only if conducted transparently and rigorously, with a critical assessment of included information (Berrang-Ford et al., 2015; Ford et al., 2011). The Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP, 2018) provides such a means of appraising qualitative studies for inclusion in systematic reviews. However, the structured CASP approach can privilege Eurocentric conceptions of academic rigour (Dixon-Woods et al., 2007) over Pacific-centred frameworks. Nonetheless, Pacific-centred frameworks can produce authentic research with social impact (Boon-nanai et

al., 2017; Ponton, 2018). In contrast, Pacific knowledges are incorporated into the Pacific Health Research Guidelines (HRC, 2014). These guidelines outline aspects of ethical, effective and appropriate research with Pacific communities, with key considerations for each step of the research process. While not intended as a comparative tool, the guidelines were designed to address contemporary issues in Pacific research, thus may also be used to review climate change research.

Therefore, this systematic qualitative review seeks to respond to simultaneous calls for Pacific-centred and climate-related mobility research. The aims of this review are twofold. First, this review aims to synthesise the literature to understand the psychosocial and cultural impacts of Pacific climate-related mobility for the individual and their community. Second, the review aims to summarise the predominant methods and methodologies employed in this field. 'Climate-related mobility' will be used to refer to migration, relocation, and displacement, acknowledging that the climate change-migration nexus generates multiple, multidimensional 'mobilities' (Bettini, 2017).

Method

Our emphasis on Pacific research led us to seek qualitative rather than quantitative studies. Qualitative data are more sensitive to storied expressions of holistic well-being and can access the culturally-situated language and meanings people attach to their experiences, fundamental in Pacific research (Camfield et al., 2009; Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014). Recognised methods for thematic synthesis (Thomas & Harden, 2008) were employed, incorporating aspects of qualitative meta-synthesis (Thorne et al., 2004), including using a predefined research question to guide the search and analysis (Saini & Shlonsky, 2012). Though drawn from Eurocentric paradigms, these methods are flexible and can be sensitive to contemporary Pacific settings, ontological pluralities (Hodge & Lester, 2006) and cultural

complexities (Anae, 2010). We considered studies following Eurocentric approaches alongside those employing Pacific methodologies (for examples, see Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019). Knowledges from these different frameworks were woven into the present findings by the interdisciplinary (psychology and development studies) and multi-ethnic (Palagi [Aotearoa NZer of European descent], Cook Is. Māori, Māori/Te Arawa; German) research team.

We describe many impacts and experiences at the 'community' level. The term 'community' is not without its pitfalls, notably, its assumed homogeneity, fixed boundaries and insensitivity to socio-political contexts (Buggy & McNamara, 2016; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2020; Titz et al., 2018). However, we adopt it in places due to its wide use within the Pacific literature (e.g., Malua, 2014; Ponton, 2018; Tualauelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019). Our reference to 'community' is loosely defined, not taking a "smallness view" (Hau'ofa, 1994, p. 159) of Pacific communities, but recognising that Pacific peoples can participate in multiple linguistic, cultural, geographic and religious communities which transcend physical borders.

Study Selection

The lead author conducted a comprehensive search of EBSCO, Google Scholar, JSTOR, Ovid, Proquest, Science Direct, SCOPUS, and Web of Science, and thesis databases (Research New Zealand and the University of the South Pacific) for studies containing the key terms, 'climate change,' and 'climate migration,' 'climate-related displacement,' 'environmental migration,' and 'Pacific,' and 'mental health,' 'well-being,' 'identity,' 'place attachment,' or 'culture,' alongside a manual search of grey literature for studies and reports in any language published from 1979 (year of the first World Climate Conference, Zilman, 2009) to 1 December 2019. Ovid and EBSCO databases permitted longer search strings, so searches also included 'mobility,' 'resettlement,' or 'climate refugee.' Database searches identified 43,950 articles, with eleven additional studies from thesis repositories.

The lead author screened titles and abstracts of search results for relevance to the research topic, excluding 43,860 articles with no mention of recent (since 1979) mobility. Scanning the remaining studies' reference lists produced 16 additional studies. Next, the lead and second author assessed the full texts of the 116 residual studies. We only included empirical qualitative studies with mentions of Pacific peoples with Polynesian or Melanesian heritage, internal or cross-border mobility, climate change as the direct or indirect cause of mobility (or a reason not to return), and a description of post-mobility psychosocial impacts. For example, studies outlining climate-related mobility drivers but not associated impacts were excluded (e.g., Noy, 2017). We included mixed-methods studies if qualitative findings could be separated. Thirty-four studies met the requirements and are included in the thematic synthesis (see Figure 3).

Figure 3

Stages of Study Selection

Data Extraction and Synthesis

The lead author extracted qualitative findings pertaining to the research question, including original excerpts (quotes, stories, etc.) and associated interpretations (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2007). Findings were inductively coded 'line by line' into groups of initial codes within the a priori categories of cross-border and internal mobility, as per the research question (Robertshaw et al., 2017). The lead and second authors regrouped codes into descriptive themes to reflect the meaning of the subgroupings (Thomas & Harden, 2008) , constantly comparing these to concepts within the included studies (Sandelowski & Barroso, 2007) and peer-debriefed with the second author. We then generated superordinate analytical themes from these subgroupings to address the research question.

Study Characteristics

The 34 studies compromised 31 separate studies published from 1990-2019, 23 of which are qualitative, with the remaining eight being mixed methods. Across these, there are 26 separate instances of climate change-related mobility, including sixteen internal mobilities from seven countries (Edwards, 2013; Lazrus, 2009; Locke, 2009; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015; Neef et al., 2018; O'Collins, 1990; Smith, 2013; Warrick, 2011) (Figures 4 & 5, Tables 1 & 2) and ten cross-border migrations from five countries (Dixon, 2017; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Fedor, 2012; Lazrus, 2009; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020; O'Brien, 2013; Roman, 2013; Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015) (Figures 4 & 5, Table 3). Studies of internal mobility include eight planned village relocations (Albert et al., 2018; Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Bertana, 2018; Campbell et al., 2005; Charan et al., 2018; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Edwards, 2013; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Neef et al., 2018; O'Collins, 1990; Warrick, 2011) (Table 1) and eight

cases of ad-hoc (where needed, as individuals or small groups) (Albert et al., 2018; Dixon, 2017; Lazrus, 2009; Locke, 2009; Smith, 2013) (Tables 1 & 2; Figure 5).

Figure 4

Map of the Pacific Region

Note. From "*Map of Oceania, with ISO 3166-1, country and territory code,*" (adapted) by Reis, Julio, 2006, (https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=823837). CC BY-NC

Figure 5

Cases of Climate-Related Mobility by Country

Note. Each number represents migration or relocation with a different origin or destination.

Table 1

Characteristics of Internal Relocations

Country of Origin	Village/island of origin	Destination	Main causes of mobility	Mobility Type		Data collection methods
				Planned[a]	Customary lands	
Fiji	Narikoso (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020)	200m upstream	Coastal erosion, failed sea walls, inundation, saltwater intrusion, sea-level rise	✓	✓	Field notes (Bertana, 2018), interviews (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020),participant observation (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020), talanoa (McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020)

Country of Origin	Village/island of origin	Destination	Main causes of mobility	Mobility Type		Data collection methods
				Planned[a]	Customary lands	
	Vunidogoloa (Bertana, 2018; Charan et al., 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015)	2 km inland ('Kenani')	Coastal erosion, failed sea walls, inundation, saltwater intrusion, sea-level rise,	✓	✓	Field notes (Bertana, 2018), interviews (Bertana, 2018; Charan et al., 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015), participant observation (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020), questionnaire (Charan et al., 2018), talanoa (McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020)
	Vunisavisavi (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020)	Set back from inundation zone	Coastal erosion, inundation, saltwater intrusion, sea-level rise,	✓	✓	Field notes (Bertana, 2018), interviews (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020), talanoa (McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020), participant observation (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020),

Country of Origin	Village/island of origin	Destination	Main causes of mobility	Mobility Type		Data collection methods
				Planned[a]	Customary lands	
	Busadule, Biasevu River (Campbell et al., 2005)	Koroinalagi	Cyclone-induced inundation	✓	✓	Literature search, participatory community-based fieldwork, transect walks, workshops, (Campbell et al., 2005)
	Wavuwavu (Neef et al., 2018)	Etatoko	Inundation, riverbank erosion	✓	✓	Interviews, participatory mapping (Neef et al., 2018)
Solomon Islands	Nuatambu (Albert et al., 2018)	12 locations across Choiseul Island	Coastal erosion, sea-level rise	✓	✗	Field notes, focus groups, grey literature, participant observation (Albert et al., 2018)
	Nusahope (Albert et al., 2018)	15 locations on surrounding islands and mainland	King tides, overcrowding, sea-level rise	✗	✓	
	Taro (Albert et al., 2018)	Choiseul Island	Threats of sea-level rise	✗	✗	
Papua New Guinea (PNG)	Carteret Islands	Bougainville (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Edwards, 2013); Kuveria (O'Collins, 1990)	Food insecurity, flooded taro pits, land subsidence, overcrowding, storm exposure, wave overtopping,	✓	✗	Participant observation (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Edwards, 2013; O'Collins, 1990), interviews (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Edwards, 2013; O'Collins, 1990),

Country of Origin	Village/island of origin	Destination	Main causes of mobility	Mobility Type		Data collection methods
				Planned[a]	Customary lands	
Vanuatu	Lateu Village, Tegua Island (Warrick, 2011)	Lirak Village, Tegua Island	Coastal erosion, cyclones, river inundation, sea-level rise	✓	✓	Interviews, questionnaire

Note. [a]Where an X is indicated, relocation was *ad-hoc:* as families or individuals

Table 2

Characteristics of Internal Inter-island Migrations (ad-hoc)

Country of origin	Village/island of origin	Destination	Main causes of mobility	Mobility type		Data collection methods
				Planned[a]	Customary lands	
Kiribati	Abaiang (Smith, 2013)	Tarawa	Education, employment, re-join the family	✗	✗	Key informant interviews
	Nikunau (Dixon, 2017)	Tarawa	Education, employment	✗	✗	Key-informant interviews, participant observation
	'Outer islands' (Locke, 2009)	Tarawa	Environmental pressures, king tides, salt intrusion, storm surges,	✗	✗	Interviews
Tuvalu	Nanumea (Lazrus, 2009)	Funafuti	Education, healthcare	✗	✗	Focus groups, interview, questionnaire, observation, transect walks, workshop,
	Vaitupu (Smith, 2013)	Funafuti	Education, employment, lack of potable water, re-join family, saltwater intrusion	✗	✗	Key informant interviews
	'Outer islands' (Locke, 2009)	Funafuti	Employment, overcrowding, volatile environment	✗	✗	Interviews

Note. [a]Where an X is indicated, relocation was *ad-hoc:* as families or individuals

Table 3

Characteristics of Cross-border Migrations (ad-hoc)

Country of origin	Village/ island of origin*	Destination	Mobility Type		Primary causes of mobility	Data collection method(s)
			Planned	Customary lands		
Federated States of Micronesia	NA	US: Oregon (Drinkall et al., 2019)	✕	✕	Education, employment, family, healthcare	Questionnaire, interviews
Kiribati	Tarawa; outer islands	Australia: Brisbane (O'Brien, 2013)	✕	✕	Education: Kiribati-Australia Nursing Initiative, employment	Interviews
	NA	Fiji (Hermann & Kempf, 2017; Maekawa et al., 2019)	✕	✕	Education, employment, family, sea-level rise	Ethnographic interviews (Hermann & Kempf, 2017), questionnaire (Hermann & Kempf, 2017; Maekawa et al., 2019),
	Nikunau (Dixon, 2017), others not described	Aotearoa NZ (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013): Wellington (Thompson, 2015), South Island (Fedor, 2012);	✕	✕	Better prospects for children education, employment, environmental change, food insecurity, healthcare, overcrowding, re-join family,	Focus groups (Gillard & Dyson, 2012), interviews (Dixon, 2017; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013) participant observation (Dixon, 2017; Fedor, 2012; Roman, 2013), questionnaire (Roman, 2013)
	NA	The United States (US) (Roman, 2013)	✕	✕	Education, employment, family	Interviews, participant observation, questionnaire,

Country of origin	Village/ island of origin*	Destination	Mobility Type		Primary causes of mobility	Data collection method(s)
			Planned	Customary lands		
Palau	NA	US: Oregon (Drinkall et al., 2019)	✗	✗	Education, employment, family, healthcare	Questionnaire, interviews
Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI)	NA	US: Oregon (Drinkall et al., 2019); Springdale, Arkansas (McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020)	✗	✗	Education, employment, healthcare, family, sea-level rise	Questionnaire, interviews (Drinkall et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020)

Country of origin	Village/ island of origin*	Destination	Mobility Type		Primary causes of mobility	Data collection method(s)
			Planned	Customary lands		
Tuvalu	Nanumea (Gemenne, 2010; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Siose, 2017), Nukulaelae (Siose, 2017), Nui (Siose, 2017), others not described	Aotearoa NZ (Gemenne, 2010; Lazrus, 2009; Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011) Auckland (Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Malua, 2014; Siose, 2017) Wellington (Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Siose, 2017)	✗	✗	Children's prospects, climate change, education, employment, environmental security, flooding, overcrowding, re-join family, remittances, sea-level rise, water insecurity	Focus group (Lazrus, 2009; Shen & Binns, 2012; Siose, 2017), photo elicitation (Siose, 2017), archival research (Marino & Lazrus, 2015), field notes (Shen & Binns, 2012), interviews (Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Lazrus, 2009; Malua, 2014; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011), participant observation (Lazrus, 2009; Malua, 2014; Marino & Lazrus, 2015), questionnaire (Lazrus, 2009; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Siose, 2017), sautalaga (Siose, 2017), transect walk (76), workshop (76),

Note. [a]Where an X is indicated, relocation was *ad-hoc:* as families or individuals *NA= Not applicable; the study did not specify the island/village

of origin.

The primary push and pull factors for cross-border migration were education, employment, healthcare, and family. Not all participants believed in climate change or that it would lead to their displacement (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; O'Brien, 2013; Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017). Nonetheless, participants frequently cited climate change-related pressures as reasons not to return permanently (Drinkall et al., 2019; Malua, 2014; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020; O'Brien, 2013; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). Key factors contributing to internal migration were erosion, inundation, saltwater intrusion, and food insecurities. For more details of studies' locations, mobilities and methods, see Tables 1, 2 and 3.

Critical Appraisal

To understand the methodological approaches of the field, we compared included articles against the Pacific Health Research Guidelines (HRC, 2014) as well as elements of the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) Qualitative Checklist (CASP, 2018). However, our approach did not omit any studies, given the variable standards of methodological reporting within climate change research (Berrang-Ford et al., 2015) and the bias within systematic appraisals favouring academic rigour over insight (Barbour & Barbour, 2003; Dixon-Woods et al., 2007).

Pacific Research Guidelines.

Only three studies explicitly considered Pacific methodologies. One study employed Pacific research methodologies throughout research design, analysis and interpretation (Siose, 2017). Two studies briefly mentioned using the Pacific method of talanoa but did not further explain their use of Pacific methodologies throughout the research practice (McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020). Interviews were conducted in participants'

Indigenous languages for sixteen studies (Bertana, 2018; Charan et al., 2018; Drinkall et al., 2019; Lazrus, 2009; Malua, 2014; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020; Neef et al., 2018; Siose, 2017; Smith, 2013; Thompson, 2015; Warrick, 2011). Others used English (Fedor, 2012; Gemenne, 2010; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015; O'Brien, 2013; Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011) or did not mention the language of communication (Albert et al., 2018; Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Campbell et al., 2005; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Dixon, 2017; Edwards, 2013; O'Collins, 1990). Most studies did not describe giving people an active role in the research process. Island or village leaders and organisations facilitated recruitment, data collection, or gave approval for nine studies (Bertana, 2018; Drinkall et al., 2019; Edwards, 2013; Malua, 2014; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Neef et al., 2018; O'Brien, 2013; Shen & Binns, 2012). Five studies used explicit participatory research methods (Campbell et al., 2005; Charan et al., 2018; Lazrus, 2009; Neef et al., 2018; Smith, 2013). A small number discussed their insider statuses and community involvement. Two first-authors were self-identified insiders from Tuvalu (Malua, 2014, Siose, 2017), and three first-authors were connected to the communities through marriage (Dixon, 2017; Thompson, 2015) or work (Roman, 2013).

Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) Assessment.

There was much variation in methodological reporting. All studies provided clear statements of the aims of the research. Few detailed their chosen methods and analytic approaches. Researchers reflexively discussed their positionalities and influences on data collection in a small number of studies (Bertana, 2018; Dixon, 2017; Lazrus, 2009; Malua, 2014; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015; Warrick, 2011) and data interpretation (Bertana, 2018; Dixon, 2017; Malua, 2014; Neef et al., 2018; Thompson, 2015). Three explored the role of their worldviews and subjective experiences in shaping their interpretations of the data (Bertana,

2018; Malua, 2014; Thompson, 2015). Nine studies discussed respecting cultural norms and protocols (Bertana, 2018; Dixon, 2017; Edwards, 2013; Malua, 2014; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Neef et al., 2018; Thompson, 2015; Warrick, 2011). More details of the CASP and Pacific Health Research Guidelines assessments are available in Appendices A and B.

Thematic Synthesis Findings

We derived two overarching themes across cross-border and internal mobility: Social factors influencing acculturation and relationship to land. Although separated into discrete components below, all themes interacted to shape well-being (Table 4).

Table 4

Outcomes of Climate-Related Mobility from Thematic Synthesis

Theme	Subtheme	Description	Example
		Cross-border mobility	
Social factors influencing acculturation	Resettlement experiences	The challenges of unfamiliar political and bureaucratic systems, discrimination, and barriers to adequate housing, employment and education can be unexpected and contribute to health issues.	Pressure on I-Kiribati workers in Aotearoa NZ to find a job under the PAC[a] requirements, unrecognised by some employers creating stress for migrants and their families (Dixon, 2017).
	Cultural adjustments	Adapting to unfamiliar cultural values and practices can be difficult, shifting cultural identity and community cohesion.	Less-frequent Tuvaluan community gatherings than on their home islands, so elders have fewer opportunities to pass on culture and traditions (Malua, 2014).
	Community support	Robust social support systems and community activities ease resettlement challenges and facilitate ongoing connections to culture, identity, and language.	The I-Kiribati community in Brisbane, Australia gathering for Kiribati Independence Day, an occasion for I-Kiribati nurses to retain their local dances like the tekatoka bau (garland presentation) (O'Brien, 2013).
Relationship to land	Ties to land	Land and identity are intertwined; climate change-related migration might disrupt physical ties to land but does not always alter identity and affective ties to land.	Many Tuvaluans in Aotearoa NZ do not wish to return to Tuvalu due to environmental concerns and overcrowding, but "Tuvalu would always be dear to their hearts" (Malua, 2014 p. 47)
	Land and loss	The loss of land and the anticipated consequences for cultures, identities, and loved ones create fear, sadness, distress, and resentment.	Personal and second-hand observations of "islands shrinking" (Drinkall et al., 2019, p. 1271) in Micronesia lead to concerns about the safety of elders who do not want to relocate.

Theme	Subtheme	Description	Example
		Internal mobility	
Social factors influencing acculturation	Community structure	The suitability of the location, layout, and timing of relocation influence whether community socio-cultural structure and livelihoods are maintained or disrupted post-relocation.	To avoid king tides, villagers of Nusa Hope, the Solomon Islands, relocated ad-hoc to dispersed hamlets and no longer felt part of the Nusa Hope community (Albert et al., 2018).
	Governance of relocation	Involving community members in relocation planning and decision-making minimises community disruption	The relocation of Vunidogoloa, Fiji began once community members had reached consensus through ongoing discussion and debate (Bertana et al., 2018).
	Intergroup conflict	Uncertainty over land and fishing rights and more interactions with non-community members after relocation can spark conflict between ethnic groups or interfere with livelihoods.	Carteret Islanders relocated to mainland PNG had frequent land conflicts with nearby villages, leading some families to return to their atoll homes (Edwards, 2013; O'Collins, 1990)
	Affective response to relocation	Relocation can bring new hope and relief from fears of climate-related hazards, although new sights, sounds and challenges at the relocation site can create fear, stress or anxiety.	Relocatees from Vunidogoloa in Fiji, now able to sleep without the fear of sudden inundation, saw relocation as a means of recreating a viable future (McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; McNamara & des Combes, 2015)
Relationship to land	Ties to place/ land	Migrating or relocating can shift people's relationship with their lands, so it is considered in light of the ties between land, identity, culture, and historical or spiritual sites.	Villagers of Vunisavisavi relocated a short distance to be able to continue in their role as caretakers of the remnants of the former home of the Tui Cakau, Paramount chief of Cakaudrove (Bertana, 2018; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020)
	Ancestral and spiritual connection	Maintaining ancestral and spiritual ties to former lands through short-distance movements and prayer can ease mobility's emotional toll.	Relocating Vunidogoloa created 'spiritual heartbreak' for some villagers as they moved away from their ancestral lands and burial grounds (Charan et al., 2018)

Note. [a] Pacific Access Category Resident Visa: Allows a limited number of people and their families from Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tonga and Fiji to work in Aotearoa NZ indefinitely, provided they have a job offer in advance of arrival. (Ministry of Immigration, Business and Employment, 2019).

Cross-Border Mobility

Social Factors Influencing Acculturation.

The outcomes of acculturation processes involved the interplay of resettlement experiences, cultural adjustments, socio-political contexts, and community support (see Table 4). People migrated from their island homes to Aotearoa NZ, Australia, the United States, or Fiji, expecting better education and employment opportunities, improved health, and quality housing (Dixon, 2017; Maekawa et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020; Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Thompson, 2015). However, many were shocked by the realities of life abroad (O'Brien, 2013; Thompson, 2015). Resettlement challenges were especially surprising for many I-Kiribati women, who tended to have less experience travelling overseas than men (Thompson, 2015). In Aotearoa NZ, the US and Fiji, I-Kiribati, Marshallese and Tuvaluans encountered barriers to resettlement, leaving them underemployed (Shen & Binns, 2012) or unemployed (Malua, 2014; McClain et al., 2019), in inadequate housing (Malua, 2014; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2015), or unable to access education and healthcare services (Dixon, 2017; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017). Resettlement was often hindered by strict visa requirements (as for the Pacific Access Category Visa [PAC] in Aotearoa NZ) (Gemenne, 2010; Malua, 2014; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015), non-transferral of education credits (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Maekawa et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020), racism (Dixon, 2017; Drinkall et al., 2019; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2015), workplace exploitation (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Malua, 2014), costly housing (Dixon, 2017; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Malua, 2014; Roman, 2013), unfamiliar foods (Dixon, 2017; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Malua, 2014; Thompson, 2015); cultural misunderstandings (Dixon, 2017; Drinkall et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020), or discomfort speaking English (Dixon, 2017; Drinkall et al., 2019; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Thompson, 2015). The weight of these cumulative stressors can lead to physical health issues (Dixon, 2017;

Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Malua, 2014; Thompson, 2015) and distress, anxiety or depression from feeling unable to support one's family and community (Dixon, 2017; Thompson, 2015).

Adapting to unfamiliar cultures can unsettle Pacific migrants. Emphasis on rigid time schedules, monetisation and individualism experienced in Pacific Rim countries can be foreign and disruptive for those accustomed to the values of collectivism, respect and self-sufficiency common in Tuvalu, Kiribati and the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) (Dixon, 2017; Drinkall et al., 2019; Locke, 2009; McClain et al., 2020; Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). Some parents and elders expressed concern for the cultural and spiritual well-being of their children, who were internalising Palagi (Aotearoa NZer of European descent) values (Dixon, 2017; Roman, 2013; Thompson, 2015). Others mourned the loss of their island cultural distinctiveness (Dixon, 2017; Fedor, 2012; Lazrus, 2009; Locke, 2009; McClain et al., 2020; Roman, 2013) as national identity subsumed island-specific identity (Dixon, 2017; Lazrus, 2009; Roman, 2013) and hybrid host-home (e.g., 'I-Kiwibas,' i.e. Kiwi New Zealander/I-Kiribati) or pan-ethnic ('PI,' i.e. Pacific Islander) identities emerged (McClain et al., 2020; Roman, 2013).

Migration can disrupt the cohesion of island communities. Family separation is common; some family members choose to remain in their homelands (Albert et al., 2018; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Hermann & Kempf, 2017; O'Brien, 2013) while others cannot afford to migrate or are not given visas (Gemenne, 2010; Malua, 2014; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). In Aotearoa NZ, some migrants are saddened that their lifestyles are less communal than in their homelands, with less-frequent gatherings (Siose, 2017), weaker community-based culture (Gemenne, 2010; Gillard & Dyson, 2012) and closed-off housing, more separated from their neighbours (Gemenne, 2010; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). In Fiji, I-Kiribati lived in smaller, dispersed communities wherever jobs were available (Maekawa et al., 2019). However,

historical and present-day connections between Pacific and Indigenous peoples in the host nation can give migrants a greater sense of belonging, cultural acceptance (Fedor, 2012; Hermann & Kempf, 2017) and solidarity concerning experiences of social marginalisation (Dixon, 2017; Fedor, 2012; O'Brien, 2013; Shen & Gemenne, 2011).

Community support systems often built upon interdependence and reciprocity can nonetheless remain strong. Marshallese, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Fiji, Aotearoa NZ and the US often share their homes, knowledges and experiences of migration to assist extended family members with resettlement (Dixon, 2017; Maekawa et al., 2019; Malua, 2014; McClain et al., 2020; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). For some I-Kiribati, developing social support networks is regarded as invaluable for supporting future climate-displaced community members. However, concerns about the severity of climate change are not shared by all. Some I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans believe that God will protect their homelands and that displacement is unlikely (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; O'Brien, 2013; Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017).

Vibrant community life ties people to one another, to their island identities and their homelands. In Aotearoa NZ, song, storying, feasting, dance, sporting events, religious gatherings, and island celebration create spaces for Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati cultures, languages, and identities to thrive (Dixon, 2017; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Gemenne, 2010; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Lazrus, 2009; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; O'Brien, 2013; Siose, 2017). Elders can pass on island languages, identities, practices, and knowledge at island or religious gatherings (Dixon, 2017; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Lazrus, 2009; Malua, 2014). Church and community organisations facilitate transnational "participation in home" (Marino & Lazrus, 2015, p. 347) by hosting celebrations, sending remittances, and assisting with return migration (Dixon, 2017; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Malua, 2014; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017;

Smith, 2013), especially important to some elders to maintain their island identities (Malua, 2014).

Relationship to Land.

People's ties to their homelands shaped their experiences of migration and climate change (Table 4). For many Pacific cultures, land – aba (Kiribati), fenua (Tuvaluan) and āne (Marshallese) – cannot be separated from culture and identity. Land connects past, present and future peoples; it is a marker of social standing which cannot be sold and is passed down through generations (Fedor, 2012; Hermann & Kempf, 2017; McClain et al., 2020; Shen & Binns, 2012; Thompson, 2015). In Tuvalu and Kiribati, one's island of origin defines identity and ancestors can be buried on family plots (Fedor, 2012; Lazrus, 2009; Smith, 2013). Landless migrants can experience a downward shift in agency and socioeconomic status (Dixon, 2017; McClain et al., 2020; Shen & Binns, 2012; Thompson, 2015). Further, some I-Kiribati perceive homeownership as the key to self-sufficiency and belonging in the host nation (Thompson, 2015).

Many migrants sense that they will always retain their island ties and identities, even if climate change forces them to leave their homelands (Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Fedor, 2012; Malua, 2014; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). Tears and nostalgia were evoked when talking of their homelands, indicating affective connections to land (Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015). However, climate change-related fears and uncertainties can disrupt physical ties to land by dissuading many migrants from returning home permanently (Drinkall et al., 2019; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Malua, 2014; McClain et al., 2019; McClain et al., 2020; O'Brien, 2013; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Thompson, 2015). Conversely, a minority of I-Kiribati migrants feel such strong ties to their homelands that they wish to live out their final years on their islands,

despite reports of climate change risks, which they may see as exaggerated or unreliable (O'Brien, 2013; Thompson, 2015).

Present-day and future land-loss incite strong affective responses. Migrants can perceive threats of land loss as threats to the safety of the families and communities that remain, leading to profound concern (Drinkall et al., 2019; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Siose, 2017), sadness (Fedor, 2012; Siose, 2017), fear (Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Siose, 2017), despair (Gemenne, 2010), trauma (Locke, 2009), or anxiety (Gillard & Dyson, 2012) for loved ones. Some migrants deny climate change because of God's promise to Noah (Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017), and others are uncertain about its origins (Drinkall et al., 2019; O'Brien, 2013). Despite faith in God's protection, many still acknowledge the threat posed to their homelands, as understood through church-based discussions (Shen & Gemenne, 2011) as well as personal experiences, word-of-mouth (Drinkall et al., 2019; Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; O'Brien, 2013; Roman, 2013), gatherings (Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011), social media, and news broadcasts (Siose, 2017). Visits home can highlight the pace of environmental degradation and heighten concerns (Drinkall et al., 2019; Fedor, 2012; O'Brien, 2013; Roman, 2013). Tuvaluans in Aotearoa NZ tend to sense greater urgency about securing safety for their loved ones than in Tuvalu (Gemenne, 2010; Siose, 2017), many fearing complete submersion of their atolls (Gemenne, 2010; Shen & Binns, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011; Siose, 2017).

Threats of climate-related land loss also conjure concerns about cultural loss. Many migrants feel deep sadness (Siose, 2017) that being displaced by climate change will reshape their unique cultures and identities (Hermann & Kempf, 2017; Roman, 2013). Fears that climate change will forever disconnect their children from their cultural practices, identities and languages (Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017; Thompson, 2015) compound concerns over adopting Palagi culture. Others lament the probable loss of Indigenous

knowledges and practices (Fedor, 2012; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Siose, 2017). In one paper, the author describes participants' responses as "anticipated cultural bereavement" (Fedor, 2012, p. 78), the present-day expression of imagined responses to future loss. Coming to terms with land and cultural loss can produce distress (Roman, 2013), hopelessness (Gemenne, 2010; Maekawa et al., 2019; Shen & Gemenne, 2011) and resentment towards industrialised nations for their ongoing inaction (Gemenne, 2010; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Shen & Gemenne, 2011).

Internal Mobility

Climate-related mobility similarly challenges livelihoods and connections to land for internal migrants (who move ad-hoc, alone or in small groups) and relocatees (who move with their community).

Social Factors Influencing Acculturation.

The outcomes of internal mobility were related to community structures, relocation governance, intergroup conflict, and affective responses to relocation (see Table 4). The influence of relocation on community livelihoods can depend upon the relocation site. Short-distance relocations within customary lands tend to be less disruptive to subsistence-based livelihoods, such as fishing and crop production (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Warrick, 2011). However, relocated communities can become separated from their fishing grounds (Bertana, 2018) or fertile soils (Neef et al., 2018), needing to either introduce new crops (Neef et al., 2018) or travel long distances to their former grounds (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Neef et al., 2018) to secure their food supply. Outside of customary lands, inter-island migrants and relocatees can have reduced fishing rights (Albert et al., 2018; Edwards, 2013; O'Brien, 2013; Shen & Binns, 2012). They may need to learn to cultivate new crops, as occurred for Carteret Islanders in Papua New Guinea (PNG) (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; O'Brien, 2013).

The layout of relocated villages can influence community cohesion. When customary land is unavailable, partial or ad-hoc relocation can fragment close-knit communities and alter their sense of identity (Albert et al., 2018; Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Charan et al., 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; Warrick, 2011). For example, ad-hoc relocation from Nusa Hope and Nuatambu to sites across the Solomon Islands limited villagers' attendance at community and church events, where culture, genealogies and stories were passed on (Albert et al., 2018). Relocatees often prefer whole-village relocation to maintain the village's socio-cultural integrity and unified identity (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Charan et al., 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; Warrick, 2011). Yet, whole-village relocations can nonetheless impact community cohesion. Village layouts typically reflect the importance of interdependence (Bertana, 2018; Charan et al., 2018; Edwards, 2013); poorly designed relocated villages can disrupt village culture (Bertana, 2018; Edwards, 2013). Relocations can disproportionately impact women, as village custom may restrict their roles in planning (Bertana, 2018; O'Brien, 2013), or they may be responsible for adjusting their families to the new, sometimes incomplete sites (Bertana, 2018; Campbell et al., 2005). In Vanuatu, the Tegua Island villagers chose the layout of their relocated village, built with the same skills and materials as their former homes, and were satisfied with their relocation (Warrick, 2011). Conversely, the village of Vunidogoloa in Fiji was rebuilt on a hillside without footpaths and with homes no longer organised around the central church. The steep site had an adverse psychological impact on less-mobile elders, hindering them from fully participating in social and religious activities (Bertana, 2018).

Following established decision-making structures can minimise community disruption. Relocated villages were better suited to communities' needs when villagers were involved in the design and execution, with time to reach consensus (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Bertana, 2018; Campbell et al., 2005; McMichael et al., 2019; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015; O'Brien, 2013; Warrick, 2011). However, the involvement of external agents can shift

ownership of relocation out of the communities' hands. Governmental, legal and monetary restrictions prevented some villagers' wishes from being enacted (Bertana, 2018; Edwards, 2013; McMichael et al., 2019; Neef et al., 2018). Further, relocatees can become dependent upon 'outsiders'' assistance to maintain and upkeep new technologies without adequate succession planning and upskilling (Bertana, 2018; O'Brien, 2013; Warrick, 2011).

Post-relocation, encountering non-community members can lead to intergroup conflict. Relocating outside customary lands can trigger disputes with other villages over rights to customary land, farming and fishing (Albert et al., 2018; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Edwards, 2013; O'Brien, 2013). In PNG, Carteret Islanders encountered such tension and cultural misunderstandings with neighbouring villages that some relocatees returned to their islands (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Edwards, 2013; O'Brien, 2013). Greater exposure to 'outsiders' from being relocated to peri-urban areas or visited by researchers can also unsettle relocated communities, exhausting their hospitality or interfering with their customs (Bertana, 2018).

Present or projected concerns about climate change accompany the stress from relocation. Many relocatees live with the immediate fear of environmental hazards, such as storms or inundation, with most anticipating that such risks will intensify due to climate change (McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020). A few villagers attribute such changes to other causes, like natural cyclical patterns, deforestation, or punishment for personal sin over human activity (Bertana, 2018; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Neef et al., 2018). However, many relocatees continue to trust in God's protection and provision (Bertana, 2018; Charan et al., 2018). According to Neef and colleagues (2018), reconciling spiritual causes of environmental changes (e.g., God's hand) with physical causes (e.g., deforestation causing erosion) can help villagers to cope with the change from relocation. Eventually, relocation can bring relief to the community, a sense of safety from background fears of sudden or slow-onset environmental changes (Albert et al., 2018; Bertana, 2018; Warrick, 2011). Relocatees also

express shared apprehension and anxiety from living in unfamiliar environments away from the ocean (O'Collins, 1990) or frustration that the community's suffering is tied to "big countries" climate inaction (McMichael et al., p. 331). Despite adversity, many relocatees convey hope and determination to recreate viable futures elsewhere (Charan et al., 2018; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; O'Brien, 2013).

Relationship to Land.

Villagers' ties to land influenced the outcomes of internal mobility (Table 4). Relocatees and inter-island migrants can have unique relationships to their lands (Charan et al., 2018). People's identities, cultures, genealogies and languages tend to be interwoven with customary lands (Albert et al., 2018; Bertana, 2018; Campbell et al., 2005; Charan et al., 2018; Edwards, 2013; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Warrick, 2011), which typically cannot be sold but inherited (Charan et al., 2018; Edwards, 2013; Smith, 2013). Many people are concerned that leaving their lands will lead to losses of identity, culture, language (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Dixon, 2017), and traditional ecological knowledges (Dixon, 2017; Edwards, 2013). They balance the need to relocate with their responsibilities as caretakers of the spirits of their ancestors (Albert et al., 2018; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Smith, 2013), stewards of sites of historical or spiritual significance (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020), and caretakers of their cultures for future generations (Albert et al., 2018; Charan et al., 2018).

Internal mobility can be traumatic as people's relationship with the land shifts. Some authors describe villagers' concerns that their ties to their land will be "disrupted" (Charan et al., 2018; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020) or "challenged" (Edwards, 2013) by relocating. Others depict relocation as breaking these ties, creating a "fissure" (Campbell et al., 2005) or "rupture" (McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020). Shifts in the land-person relationship are

associated with collective experiences of stress, anxiety, nostalgia, loss, sadness, heartbreak, or a sense of being "robbed" of their identity. Relocatees can feel such emotions for relocations both within (Charan et al., 2018; Neef et al., 2018) and outside of (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; O'Brien, 2013) customary lands. However, people who relocate within proximity of their former village or island can retain physical, cultural, familial and spiritual and connectivities with their lands (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Smith, 2013) by visiting burial grounds, gardens and fishing sites (Neef et al., 2018; Smith, 2013).

Ancestral connectedness guides the process and outcome of relocation. Some communities draw strength from their ancestors' historical movements in response to environmental change or colonial administration. Remembering that their ancestors have undergone similar experiences can reduce trepidation about relocation (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019). Yet relocating away from ancestral lands can still be "harrowing", creating "a profound spiritual predicament" for entire communities (Charan et al., 2018, p. 351). Communities may be reluctant to relocate without being able to retain spiritual connections to their lands and ancestors. Collective prayer and fasting, visiting burial grounds or shifting ancestors' graves away from the encroaching coastline can protect villagers' bonds with the land, their ancestors and God(s) (Bertana, 2018; Charan et al., 2018).

Discussion

This thematic synthesis demonstrates that internal and cross-border climate-related mobility can have similar impacts on psychosocial and cultural well-being, despite the different challenges involved. Mobility tended to shift the relationships between Pacific communities and their lands, disrupting the continuity of livelihoods, cultures, languages, identities, governance, social structures, and spiritualties. Disruptions were often suffered as collective

losses, contingent on acculturation experiences and perceptions of climate change impacts. Resisting loss involved ensuring land-community continuity by engaging with community life, former homes, and cultural governance structures.

In many communities, disrupted community cohesion had cascading effects for social support networks, cultural connectedness, spirituality, and ethnic identity. Elsewhere, the contribution of social ties to mental health post-migration has been isolated (Torres & Casey, 2017) or related to psychopathology (Manning & Clayton, 2018; McIver et al., 2016), but not to holistic well-being. The interconnectedness of community and social disruption to other aspects of well-being better reflects Pacific well-being frameworks (e.g., Manuela & Sibley, 2013, 2015) and Lala's (2015) description of holistic, community-level climate change impacts in Tuvalu. This affirms the need for climate change research sensitive to Pacific knowledges.

Depictions of people's relationship with their land as 'broken' or 'challenged' suggest that climate-related mobility may irreversibly reshape communities' bonds with their lands. Communities migrating beyond customary land could no longer actively steward the land, and the land could no longer provide for their material needs. However, the land remained the immaterial anchor of identities and ancestral connections (Campbell, 2014b). Yet, even where mobility was within customary lands, some communities were 'heartbroken' by relocating (Charan et al., 2018). This sentiment may be because internal relocations were often linked to a more immediate, permanent risk of land loss than ad-hoc migrations, wherein return migration was theoretically possible. Thus, relocated communities may have anticipated a long-term de-anchoring of their relationship to land, leading to other socio-cultural losses. Marino and Lazrus (2015) describe how ex-outer-islander Tuvaluans wanted some community members to remain on their islands to anchor them to home. Retaining a physical presence on land may be necessary to anchor deeper spiritual, cultural, identity or ancestral connections and to tie people together (Smith, 2013). This link may explain why there is resistance to contemporary environmental

migration (e.g., Farbotko & McMichael, 2019, 2019), although more research is needed. As such, having a physical connection to land may outweigh the internal/cross-border distinction in determining mobility's socio-cultural consequences (Campbell, 2014a).

The emotional toll of mobility demands a reassessment of 'successful' migration-as-adaptation. Optimal movements reduced physical risk, allayed climate-related fears and were minimally disruptive to livelihoods by being within customary lands, well-planned, pre-emptive, participatory, reinforced by rights to residency and employment, and buttressed by a 'social safety net' (Maekawa et al., 2019; O'Brien, 2013). Yet, such 'gold standard' movements would "rarely be considered successful by those who move" (McAdam, 2015, p. 79). Mobility could not offset the psychosocial impacts of choosing between the 'intolerable loss' (Handmer & Nalau, 2019) of lives or lands and shifting to a destination unavoidably unfamiliar and uncomfortable (Edwards, 2013). Many people experienced acculturative stress or hostility after moving. Others often exhibited strong affective responses to climate-related land loss, observed and anticipated, and to its consequences for individual and collective well-being. As Gibson et al., (2020) report, both witnessing and contemplating climate change impacts for Pacific island homes are related to similar levels of psychological distress. It is unsurprising then that many community members desired to hold on to home (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017) or were angered by the injustice of climate-related mobility. Migration may be the preferred adaptation option for many communities (Neef et al., 2018), but being 'minimally disruptive' does not make it a success.

Climate-related loss must not be underemphasised, but nor should collective strengths. Many studies underlined the disruptive impacts of mobility, including "anticipated cultural bereavement" (Fedor, 2012, p. 78), "catastrophic psycho-social consequences" (Barnett & McMichael, 2018, p. 340), or "fragmented" (Emont & Anandarajah, 2017, p. 1214) communities. On the surface, this language demonstrates the wide-reaching impacts of land

loss on other interconnected aspects of well-being (Pulotu-Endemann, 2009). However, the authors' use of strong negative framing might imply that Pacific communities are constantly mourning. Instead, this review demonstrates that many villages, communities and island groups remain united and determined to thrive in the present. Many cross-border migrants re-established a sense of rootedness and cultural connection through participating in vibrant island life and developing new livelihoods – connections that may become increasingly important for future climate migrants. Similarly, relocated communities' governance structures, ancestral connections, strong social ties, and customary land titles facilitated adjustment post-relocation. Such strengths can foster adaptive capacity (Albert et al., 2018) to resist socio-cultural loss. This raises the question: how can research highlight the gravity of climate-related losses without undercutting community strengths? Indeed, many Pacific peoples resist being victimised by mainstream climate change narratives, which stress their suffering over their hope and agency (Dreher & Voyer, 2015). Designing research that amplifies Pacific voices (e.g., Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014; Ponton, 2018) may be one such solution, giving Pacific peoples more control over the climate-related loss narrative (Dreher & Voyer, 2015).

Further, Pacific communities are not powerless but can have their autonomy compromised by climate-related mobility. Some studies concluded that depicting migrants as 'powerless' should be avoided (Gemenne, 2010) and countered by increasing choice about where and when to move (Barnett & McMichael, 2018). Yet even community-driven movements were disempowering. The most satisfied relocatees were invited to design and participate in migration/relocation (Bertana, 2018; McMichael et al., 2019; Warrick, 2011). Still, they lacked genuine agency due to government regulations, insufficient funding and restricted rights to land. Ferris (2011) notes that, in relocating, communities often shift the 'locus of control' towards others, typically the government. Hence, consenting to relocation does not guarantee the community's full participation in the process nor its decision-making

powers (McAdam, 2015). On the other hand, ad-hoc migrants, who generally retain the 'locus of control' (Ferris, 2011), nonetheless lost social status, experienced downwards social mobility or were marginalised at the destination. Warner et al., (2013) argue that it is the existence of realistic options from which to choose, despite constraints, that defines a 'voluntary' movement. Yet, in most cases reviewed, the "element of choice" (Warner et al., 2013, p. 40) diminished from the onset of and during mobility. Indeed, Pacific communities did not volunteer to bear the costs of climate change (McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020) or have their choices constrained as they moved out of harm's way. Such autonomy restrictions affirm that the 'voluntariness' of climate-related mobility should not be over-emphasised (Methmann & Oels, 2015; Wiegel et al., 2019).

While many studies concluded that future climate policy must be participatory and culturally-appropriate (Barnett & McMichael., 2018; Fedor, 2012; McNamara & Des Combes, 2015; Smith, 2013), only three considered Pacific methodologies in their research design (McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Siose, 2017). For example, Siose (2017) used sautalaga, a Tuvaluan form of talanoa, to respect Tuvaluan elders' sacred knowledge. Though most studies did not detail their methodologies in-depth, the minimal references to Pacific methodologies may reflect climate research's tendency to silence Indigenous perspectives (Alexander et al., 2011). Pacific ways of understanding their realities have always existed but have struggled to gain recognition in higher education (Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019) and contemporary climate change research (Jones, 2019). In the last few decades, there has been a shift towards collaborative methodologies that centre Pacific cultural norms and protocols (Fia'ali'i et al., 2017; Ponton, 2018; Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019). Tualaulelei and McFall-McCaffery (2019) encourage Pacific and non-Pacific researchers to embrace this trend, inviting them to engage deeply and respectfully with Pacific research paradigms (for examples, see Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019, p. 192)

for the advancement of Pacific issues. Climate-related mobility researchers could be guided by such methodologies (Hermann & Kempf, 2017), alone or alongside other interdisciplinary methodologies (HRC, 2014). Reviews of the climate change literature would equally benefit from a Pacific framework, although such a review method is yet to be created. Overall, researchers could then develop designs that follow mobility researchers' suggestions for 'good practice': that are participatory, culturally appropriate, responsive to Pacific contexts, and support Pacific communities to advocate for their own climate change solutions (Anae, 2010; Vaioleti, 2006).

Similarly, we observed an absence of reflexivity across most studies, omitting mention of how the researcher(s) may have had a bearing on the questions asked, data collected and findings presented. Reflexivity involves recognising one's influence in the research process, disclosing biases, interests and positions within cultural and political structures without framing these as the sole reality (Simpson & Ake, 2010). Such considerations can be vital for qualitative researchers (Nicholls, 2009) and may be indispensable for those engaged in Pacific climate change research, whether Pacific or non-Pacific researchers; whether community 'insiders' or 'outsiders'. Attending to one's socio-cultural realities and assumptions about climate change, Pacific peoples and what counts as knowledge may help centre Pacific perspectives when interpreting findings (Baldacchino, 2008; Tuhiwai Smith, 2012; Vaioleti, 2006). Further, the potential for Pacific climate change research to shape climate policy (McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020) suggests an ongoing role for reflexivity in future explorations of climate-related mobility (Biermann, 2011; McIntosh, 2011; Nicholls, 2009).

Conclusion

For Pacific communities, climate-related mobility can have significant consequences for well-being which extend beyond individual psychopathology. Whether moving short

distances or across national borders, being de-anchored from ancestral lands by climate change can disrupt communities' cohesion, livelihoods and people-land relationships. While moving can bring relief from immediate climate change concerns, anticipated long-term loss of cultures, languages and ancestral connections can evoke individual and collective distress. Accordingly, the psychosocial impacts of mobility for villages and island groups may be inseparable from climate change's environmental consequences. However, mobilities that enable socio-cultural continuity may mitigate these impacts, facilitating access to ancestral lands, promoting community participation, and affording people choice over when, where and how to move.

As reasons to migrate become more pressing, planning for migration that mobilises such strategies may be critical. Yet, essential questions remain: How do Pacific island communities situate their governance systems within external governance structures? To what extent are diasporic communities already supporting climate migrants? Importantly, how might a physical link to land inform resistance to contemporary environmental migration? Ongoing effort to understand climate-related mobility provides mobility researchers with an opportunity to engage more deeply with Pacific methodologies. In embedding Pacific knowledges in future research, mobility researchers can allow culturally situated perspectives on loss, agency and well-being to shape future migration research.

Bridging Statement Two

Chapter Two provided a summary of the psychosocial and cultural impacts of climate mobility in the Pacific and reviewed the methods common to the field. From a systematic review of the literature up until December 2019, we concluded that internal and cross-border mobilities have related and wide-reaching well-being impacts. Mobility can be highly disruptive, shifting communities' connections with each other, their ancestral lands, and associated identities, cultures and spiritualities. Yet, these same connections provide sources of strength during the adversity of mobility, especially movements which are top-down, mismanaged, non-consensual, or outside of customary tenure. Our review also critiqued the dominance of Eurocentric means of knowledge-making in Pacific research, noting the paucity of research grounded in Pacific methodologies and conducted in partnership with Pacific communities (cf. Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020).

The above outcomes reflect a snapshot of the climate mobility conversation in 2019 and early 2020. The literature has continued to evolve past this point, such that several new studies offer additional insights. Two seminal review papers have been published from Pacific (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020) and Eurocentric (Pearson et al., 2021b) perspectives, wherein Tiatia-Seath et al.'s (2020) review embodies Pacific perspectives on well-being, whereas Pearson et al.'s (2021b) contribution observes and comments on Pacific experiences. Meanwhile, new empirical works have emerged which critique reductive approaches to mobility (McMichael et al., 2021; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2021), incorporate labour mobility within notions of climate mobility (Dun et al., 2020; Farbotko et al., 2022a) and spotlight the experiences of the Tuvaluan diaspora in Aotearoa NZ (Ghezal, 2022; Emont et al., 2021; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). This bridging statement provides additional reflections in light of these recent contributions.

Firstly, these more recent articles employ a greater diversity of Pacific and collaborative methodologies than reflected in our original review. Farbotko et al. (2021) and Nguyen and Kenkel (2021) describe methodologies which connect Tuvaluan customary knowledges and participatory practices to action for climate and mobility justice. Such methodologies are similar to our own (see Chapter One). Ghezal (2022) and Emont et al.'s (2021) research was less collaborative, although they lived among the participating communities short-term and sought the approval of community leaders. They used the Pacific method of talanoa (Vaioleti, 2006). McMichael et al. (2021) and Piggott-McKellar and McMichael (2021) also used talanoa-like semi-structured interviews in combination with other methods but did not detail their long-term objectives nor partnerships with participating communities. Based upon this glimpse into recent literature, Pacific methods, especially talanoa (Vaioleti, 2006) are becoming increasingly common in climate mobility research. However, participatory methods that foreground long-term relationships with community partners continue to remain on the periphery (see Chapter One). Nonetheless, Farbotko et al.'s (2022) and Nguyen and Kenkel's (2021) work reinforces that participatory research that centres Pacific ontological claims is feasible and effective.

The value of locally relevant knowledges in research is evident when comparing Pearson and colleagues' (2021b) and Tiatia-Seath and colleagues' (2020) literature reviews. Pearson et al. (2021b) reviewed studies related to the loss and damage of Indigenous knowledges and cultural heritage. For people who move from sites of climate risk, they contest that relocation will "sever[s] ties to a place which sustains culture, traditions, identity and belonging" (p. 12; cf. Westoby et al., 2021). While some loss is possible (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020; Westoby et al., 2022), Chapter Two counters that ties to land, identity and culture are generally renegotiated and maintained post-mobility (see also Yates et al., 2022b). For those who remain in-situ, Pearson et al. (2021b) maintain that they will experience

'solastalgia' (Albrecht et al., 2007), the sense of losing security and solace in significant places. Tiatia-Seath and colleagues' (2020) review of climate change and well-being in the Pacific concedes that some people may have solastalgia-like feelings. However, they underscore that solastalgia is an unfamiliar concept, deployed in spaces where expressions of sacred bonds with land already exist. They apply this same critique to climate change research generally, noting that researchers predominantly import conceptual frameworks from European/North American traditions into Indigenous and Pacific spaces, as Chapter Two (Yates et al., 2022b) also observed. Tiatia-Seath and colleagues therefore stress that research should be grounded in culturally situated ontologies and cosmologies in relation to climate change and well-being.

Two empirical studies extend Tiatia-Seath et al.'s (2020) critique by challenging the categorisation of climate mobility. In Chapter One, we depicted internal relocation as either 'ad-hoc' or 'planned' and excluded immobility based upon the literature at the time of writing. Scholars were discussing immobility but often framed it as (semi-)permanent state, separate from mobility (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2021; Zickgraf, 2019). However, McMichael et al. (2021) and Piggott-McKellar and McMichael (2021) emphasise that many climate-related movements fall outside of binary mobility/immobility and planned/ad-hoc classifications. Drawing upon the aspirations of residents from seven villages in Fiji (McMichael et al., 2021; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael 2021) and one in Tuvalu (McMichael et al., 2021), the authors underscore that climate mobility occurs on a continuum that flows from voluntary immobility to full community relocation. Moreover, some people are moving towards sites of climate risk to (re)connect to their land and local livelihoods (McMichael et al., 2021). These new studies (McMichael et al., 2021; Piggott-Mckellar and McMichael, 2021) alongside Tiatia-Seath et al.'s (2020) suggest that climate mobility scholars need to move away from dividing human mobilities

into reductive categories. While categories provide a convenient heuristic when planning for mobility, it is important to attend to culturally situated understandings of mobility and the borderless nature of pre-colonial Pacific migrations (Marshall, 2016; Suliman et al., 2019; Tabe, 2019).

Broadening our definition of climate mobility brings the well-being impacts of labour mobility into consideration. As mentioned in Chapter One, research and policy commonly regard labour mobility as a form of climate adaptation (Barnett & Chamberlain et al., 2010; Bettini et al., 2017; Farbotko et al., 2021; Ober & Sakdapolrak, 2017). Although Chapter Two's literature review did not include labour mobility, Dun et al. (2020) and Farbotko et al. (2022) report that some labour mobility is partly climate driven. Researchers spoke with guest workers in Australia from the Solomon Islands (Dun et al., 2020) and Tuvalu (Farbotko et al., 2022a) who had migrated for a combination of economic and environmental reasons. They observed that labour migration supports the financial stability of the workers' home communities. However, this is to the detriment of guest workers' well-being, who experienced high levels of social and emotional distress from factors including family separation, social isolation, communication barriers, and workplace exploitation. These downstream consequences underline that economic opportunities (Dun et al., 2020; Farbotko et al., 2022a) and safety from climate hazards (Yates et al., 2022c) do not offset the psychosocial and cultural risks of mobility (see Chapter Two). Increasing the inclusion of migrants in programme planning and providing comprehensive institutional support may minimise these impacts, as Chapter Two and Farbotko et al. (2022a) suggest.

Finally, I turn to examine recent research with the Tuvaluan community in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland related to cross-border mobility (Emont et al., 2021; Ghezal, 2022; Nguyen and Kenkel, 2021). Emont et al.'s (2021) and Ghezal's (2022) findings about the drivers of migration, barriers to resettlement, worries about shifting cultures and identities,

and strong community support networks largely reflect those summarised in Chapter Two. Nguyen and Kenkel (2021) add to this by describing the experiences of 'Tuvaluan hope seekers', those who migrate on valid visas in search of new opportunities but are unable to obtain further visas. Their research was not explicitly about climate change although some hope seekers had migrated to Aotearoa for climate-related reasons. Without a visa, hope seekers were unable to work legally and access government services, so their communities and churches provided additional support. Many hope seekers were under constant stress from high living costs; low wages, unpredictable work, and risk of deportation (as we also discuss in Chapter Three). Taken together, Emont et al. (2021), Ghezal (2022) and Nguyen and Kenkel (2021) highlight the countless social, economic, and institutional obstacles that the Tuvaluan community must navigate, on top of climate threats. These factors combined are likely to pose unique well-being challenges for the Tuvaluan community (Emont et al., 2021; Ghezal, 2022).

Overall, this bridging statement points towards the need to understand frontline Pacific communities' perceptions and experiences of climate mobility on their terms (Emont et al., 2021; Ghezal, 2022; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2020). In particular, there is a need for research about how Pacific communities in Aotearoa NZ navigate the combined challenges of environmental deterioration and post-migration society (Ghezal, 2022; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020; Farbotko et al., 2021). Many Pacific climate migrants are likely to come to Aotearoa NZ (Cass, 2018), where Pacific peoples are generally socially and culturally well connected (Ataera-Minster & Trowland, 2018). However, there are persistent health inequities between Pacific peoples and non-Pacific peoples due to ongoing structural inequality (Ataera-Minster & Trowland, 2018; Ryan et al., 2019). In this context, it is important to develop more culturally nuanced and climate-aware support for climate migrants from the Pacific (cf. Pearson et al., 2021b; Tiatia-Seath et

al., 2020). Research that takes direction from frontline Pacific communities (including irregular migrants) and foregrounds their conceptions of climate change and well-being can contribute to this (see Chapter Two; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Kumasaka et al., 2021; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020).

The following chapter contributes to this discussion through collaborative research with Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland. The chapter brings the concept of migration with dignity (Tong, 2014) into conversation with climate mobility through the metaphor of Pacific navigation. Drawing upon the journeys of te wa or vaka (ocean-going canoes, Kiribati and Tuvaluan, respectfully), we investigate the impact of societal and political barriers on mobility and well-being (cf. Emont et al., 2021; Ghezal, 20221; Farbotko et al., 2022a; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2022). Further, we discuss how the communities are reclaiming their dignity in the face of climate change and immigration challenges. Mobility is depicted as an ongoing, recursive process, in which the communities navigate immigration obstacles to (re)grow their roots in Aotearoa NZ before charting a course for future generations to thrive.

These findings are oriented towards supporting the communities' aspirations for living with dignity in Aotearoa NZ. Kiribati and Tuvaluan community leaders requested that our research be used to support their efforts to "ease the burden" (Tito*, elders' sautalaga; Table 5) of resettling in Aotearoa NZ. Specifically, they wanted the research to support their efforts to establish a climate-related visa, provide amnesty to irregular migrants, resource the communities to "stay in our own… individuality, our own identity, our language and culture" (Vaeluaga, elders' sautalaga; Table 5), make "the Government policies [specifically, the PAC] to be more flexible" (Lilipeti; women's sautalaga; Table 5). Community members' mobility journeys of mobility provide the rationale for these changes, as explained in the next chapter.

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Chapter Three. "There's So Much More to that Sinking Island!"– Restorying Migration

from Kiribati and Tuvalu to Aotearoa New Zealand

Introduction

Background

Climate mobility can be retold through Pacific metaphors of purposeful, agentic movement. Pacific peoples across history hold the ocean as sacred; a vast highway joining interconnected islands, where no movement is ever accidental (T. Bishop, personal communication, July 13, 2021). The voyaging canoe, including te vaka (Tuvalu) or te wa (Kiribati) is central to this navigation, a medium for exploring a boundless ocean which colonial borders have artificially separated (Hau'ofa, 1994; Howe, 2007; The Kiribati Working Group, 2015). Seeing Oceanic navigation through te wa or te vaka gives us language to position climate migrants as rooted, self-determined navigators without the indignity of victim-based narratives. Te wa or vaka journeys tell stories of fluid identity and connectivity; of people paddling together through the liminal spaces between vulnerability and agency "to stand together against the riptides of colonisation and globalisation" (Haili'ōpua Baker et al., 2016, p. 46).

Te vaka or te wa exemplify the interconnectedness of land, ocean and people. Although Pacific conceptions of land are diverse, most Pacific peoples express relational, reciprocal ties to land – te aba (Kiribati), fenua (Tuvalu) (and variations, e.g., fanua, fonua, whenua, vanua, 'enua). Land is the essence of belonging, the source of livelihood and the sustainer of life (Havea, 2007). From the fenua or aba emerge Pacific identities, languages, spiritualities, and ancestral connections (Hau'ofa, 1994; Jolly, 2001; Yates et al., 2022b); to refer to one's fenua or aba is to simultaneously claim physical place on land and a sense of belonging to land (Dei, 2022). However, attachment to land is not static, but a way of being and a point of reference in a shifting Oceanic environment (Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Māhina, 2008). Te wa or te vaka are emblematic of these fluid relationships between society and nature. Crafted from trees and traversing oceans, te wa or te vaka link roots (heritage; place attachment) to routes (mobility) (Clifford, 2001; Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; Haili'ōpua Baker et al., 2016;

Hau'ofa, 1994, 2008; Jolly, 2001; Teaiwa & Launiuvao, 2015). They have come to symbolise post-colonial resistance and cultural revitalisation as groups such as the Polynesian Voyaging Society revive early canoe-building techniques, and the Pacific Climate Warriors paddle canoes to resist fossil fuel powers (McNamara & Farbotko, 2017; Finney, 2003; Suliman, 2019).

Yet, environmental deterioration complicates realities of rootedness and fluidity for people from Kiribati and Tuvalu (Falefou, 2017; Haili'ōpua Baker et al., 2016). Residents of these neighbouring states on the frontlines of climate change are already observing changing weather patterns, diminishing landscapes and reduced food security, raising concerns about the continued ability of their aba or fenua to support them (Corcoran, 2016; Lala, 2015). Some residents are considering settling elsewhere to safeguard their lives and livelihoods (Falefou, 2017; Kupferberg, 2021; Tabe, 2019), although most desire to remain rooted to their aba or fenua to preserve the legacies of place, identity and nation (Corcoran, 2016; Falefou, 2017). However, adaptation options are constrained by lowered socio-ecological resistance, the product of 19th and 20th century colonisation and extractivism in the Pacific. Colonial administrations imposed borders and forcefully exploited and resettled Pacific communities for political and economic benefit, leaving lasting impacts on community structure and connections to land, identity, culture, and language (e.g., Connell, 2012; Tabe, 2019; Teaiwa, 2014). Eager to avoid colonial harms, many Pacific governments are considering alternative mobility solutions (Thornton et al., 2020).

Accordingly, the former President of Kiribati developed the novel 'Migration with Dignity' approach (Tong, 2014). Currently, no legally binding frameworks exist to protect those who migrate for climate-related reasons (hereafter, climate migrants) (McAdam, 2020). Thus, Kiribati's strategy encapsulated the provision of transferable skills for I-Kiribati, facilitating migration to neighbouring states within existing frameworks to ensure the continuation of cultural practices abroad (Kupferberg, 2021; McMichael et al., 2021). However, the focus has now shifted towards economic prosperity, mitigation and in-situ adaptation (Kupferberg, 2021). This echoes Tuvalu's preference for temporary labour migration "with dignity" and local

resilience-building (Falefou, 2017; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour 2011; 2014).

Nonetheless, the notion of dignity continues to hold weight within climate mobility discussions (e.g., Farbotko et al., 2018; Kupferberg, 2021; McAdam, 2020). Dignity is an elusive construct with multiple definitions, broadly comprising the notion that human beings possess intrinsic worth which demands respect and recognition (McCrudden, 2008). Although conceptually vague, dignity is operationalised within human rights charters and constitutions around the world (Daly & May, 2019), most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). Leaning upon dignity as a human right can highlight the impacts of climate change on people's lives and ways-of-being (Daly & May, 2019). For example, climate change worsens I-Kiribati's and Tuvaluans' access to material resources, such as food, housing or education, and their abilities to practice their cultural rights (Human Rights Measurement Initiative, 2021a, 2021b). In 2015, Ioane Teitiota from Kiribati used such arguments to seek asylum in Aotearoa NZ although his claim was denied and he and his family were deported. However, a subsequent ruling by the United Nations' Human Rights Committee found future migrants may be afforded asylum when climate change unequivocally threatens their right to a life with dignity (see McAdam, 2020).

To secure the rights of future climate migrants, Kupferberg (2021) proposes a dignity framework for mobility. The framework outlines 'the minimally good life' (p. 6) in which all basic needs (e.g., autonomy, food, water, healthcare; social support) are met. However, Kupferberg's (2021) 'minimally good life' primarily centres on material needs. The definitional haziness of dignity allows for it to be reinterpreted to sit within Pacific peoples' ontologies of worth (Barlo, 2016; Winter, 2019). I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan conceptualisations of dignity give priority to land, cultural and spiritual practices. For instance, Uriam (1983) links dignity to faithfulness to te katei ni Kiribati (the Kiribati way) as a pathway to Te Mauri, Te Raoi ao Te Tabomoa (health, peace and prosperity). From a Tuvaluan perspective, te ola lei (the good life) is not just physical (Panapa, 2012) but sits alongside te olaga lei (good, meaningful living), and

olaga tokagamalie, a sense of security and preparedness embedded in family, land, ancestral knowledge, and cultural and spiritual practices (Aselu, 2015).

Aotearoa New Zealand Context

Rather than offering dignified avenues to migration, Aotearoa NZ maintains a dominant focus on controlling its borders. The New Zealand Government sought to implement a targeted climate change visa in 2017, but this was dropped after dialogue with its Pacific neighbours about their preference to remain (Neef & Benge, 2022). The Government's updated approach supports in-situ adaptation alongside options for expanding migration pathways from the Pacific (e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], 2021a). However, with these yet to be implemented, migrants from communities on the frontlines of climate change must navigate Aotearoa NZ's neoliberal, securitised immigration system. Visas are offered to the self-sufficient, self-protecting migrant – who provides exploitable low-wage labour – while hostility is extended to the 'non-ideal' climate migrant, who makes claims to welfare or citizenship (Stanley, 2021). Such non-recognition of climate migrants might be considered a form of legal violence (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012) where the legal harm inflicted on migrants' bodies manifest through the denial of haven from climate breakdown. Mobility restrictions primarily impact frontline nations, forcing residents to remain in exposed locations or traverse state borders on temporary visas and 'overstay'. And as a penalty for seeking refuge, these irregular migrants risk being criminalised or deported, and are otherwise pressed to live precarious lives excluded from Government services (Skillington, 2015; Stanley, 2021; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021).

Nonetheless, many I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans continue to migrate to Aotearoa NZ in pursuit of employment, education, family reunification, or to send remittances home (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Malua, 2014). Most people migrate through the Recognised Seasonal Employer (RSE) category, a temporary labour mobility visa, or the Pacific Access Category (PAC), a ballot-based scheme giving permanent residence to 75 I-Kiribati and 75 Tuvaluans

per year at the time of writing (this has since increased to 150 people each from Kiribati and from Tuvalu). However, low wages, unstable employment, workplace exploitation, and strict visa requirements can hinder resettlement (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Malua, 2014; New Zealand Immigration, n.d.c), forcing some into illegality and constant fear of deportation (Malua, 2014).

The vestiges of Pacific labour exploitation structure such punitive processes. Since the forced indentured labour ('Blackbirding') of Pacific peoples in the 19th and early 20th centuries, Pacific bodies have been commodified as solutions to economic problems (Enoka, 2019; Stanley, 2021). Aotearoa NZ's place as a wealthy agrarian settler colony was built upon the import of Banaban phosphate fertiliser – and by extension, of Banaban bodies – to Aotearoa NZ (Stanley, 2021; Teaiwa, 2014). The country's economy has continued to be reliant upon the Pacific region, with the introduction of visas in the 1950s for Pacific peoples to fill labour shortages, and the establishment of the RSE scheme to buttress the horticulture and viticulture industries (Malua, 2014). Despite this dependence, social discourse perpetuates anti-Pacific rhetoric, historically framing Pacific peoples as criminals and economic threats – resulting in the inhumane treatment and deportation of Pacific migrants in the Dawn Raids era (Anae, 2020) – and more recently, as cheap, dehumanised labour (Enoka, 2019).

However, such narratives do not align with the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities' experiences of migration. Despite a shared past as the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, joined by the British Empire until 1976, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans are far from homogenous, distinct in history, culture and language, with multi-layered collective identities and vibrant communities. According to the most recent census, among the roughly 380,000 Pacific people in Aotearoa NZ, there were 3225 I-Kiribati, 44% living in Auckland, and 4653 Tuvaluans, 69% living in Auckland, populations which are rapidly growing (Stats NZ, 2018a). Community and church groups create a sense of transnational island belonging as well as provide social support and assist with resettlement (Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Malua, 2014). The uniqueness of these communities is honoured nationwide during the annual Kiribati and Tuvaluan Language

Weeks, Independence Days and at events throughout the year, affirming their right to belong in Aotearoa NZ.

Research focus

This article documents Kiribati and Tuvaluan migration journeys to Aotearoa NZ in the context of climate change. We bring migration with dignity into conversation with tales of Oceanic voyaging, echoing the move to place Pacific knowledge systems at the centre of psychological research (e.g., Lala, 2015; Manuela & Anae, 2017; Panapa, 2012; Yates et al., 2022b). While dominant modes of psychology tend to prioritise Eurocentric understandings of well-being, which emphasise an individualised, reductionist separation of oneself from the environment, Pacific psychologies generally view well-being as interconnected to all aspects of life (Johnson et al., 2021; Ponton, 2018). Yet, Pacific psychologies rarely feature within climate change research (Yates et al., 2022b) resulting in little understanding of climate mobility from Pacific, relational perspectives (Johnson et al. 2021; Lala, 2015; Yates et al., 2022b). Combining Pacific psychologies with the critical community psychology framework (Evans et al., 2017) outlined below, we offer a retelling of migration with(out) dignity which conceptualises climate mobility as an ongoing process structured by personal, local and national-level forces. Specifically, we draw upon the journeys of vaka and wa to a) highlight the impact of societal barriers and political loopholes (including the denial of climate migration pathways) on diasporic communities' dignity and well-being, and b) discuss the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities' efforts to (re)claim their dignity in the face of climate change and neoliberal immigration systems.

The next three sections of this article story Kiribati and Tuvaluan experiences of climate mobility with(out) dignity. First, we outline our research strategy, detailing our multi-layered methodology which grounds community-level analysis (Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020) in the talanoa methodology (Vaioleti, 2006). Next, we introduce the vaka or wa model of mobility, based on a series of open group discussions (sautalaga, Tuvalu; maroro, Kiribati) with members

of the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland. We recount climate mobility as a three-stage, recursive journey wherein voyagers navigate immigration obstacles to arrive on new shores, regrow roots from the seeds of connection they carry and chart a course forward for future generations. Each stage of the model teases out the interrelatedness of host society dynamics, environmental degradation and migrant well-being. Finally, the third section weaves together some concluding remarks and outlines implications for the governance of climate mobility across Oceania.

Research Strategy

This article draws upon the accounts of mobility in the context of the climate crisis for 38 people from the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland. The city has been nicknamed the 'Polynesian Capital of the World' (Anae, 2004 p. 3), being home to diverse Pacific communities who together comprise 15% of Aucklanders (Auckland Council, n.d.). Although the term 'community' is critiqued for assuming homogeneity and fixed boundaries (Titz et al., 2018), we refer to the Kiribati and Tuvaluan groups as 'communities' to reflect how they label themselves. Our multi-ethnic (Palagi [Aotearoa NZer of European descent], Māori [Uenukukōpako, Ngāti Pikiao], Cook Island Māori [Rarotonga, Manihiki, Atiu]; German) research team (all also authors) pair the talanoa methodology (Vaioleti, 2006) with critical community psychology (CCP, Evans et al., 2017) for a contextualised, culturally relevant and justice-oriented view of mobility. Talanoa, meaning a flexible, empathetic conversation, is a deeply emotional and intersubjective methodology with embedded Pacific values (Vaioleti, 2006; Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014).

Talanoa co-constructs knowledge that legitimates Pacific metaphysical realities as socially, spiritually, politically and historically situated and seeks transformative change for Pacific peoples (Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019; Anae, 2010; Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014). CCP then affords an ecological and justice-oriented analysis of climate mobility. It is a framework that directs researchers to attend to how community affiliation structures

people's lives, and how power, inequality and liberation can shape climate mobility practices (Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Arcidiacono & Di Martino, 2016).

Our approach centres reciprocity, the honouring of that given to the research through relationships and the advancement of the collective (Arcidiacono & Di Martino, 2016; Vaioleti, 2006). In both talanoa and CCP, relationality and justice as inseparable. Researchers build committed, reciprocal relationships with community partners to enable collaborative research which centres the communities' priorities for change (Chung-do et al., 2016; Evans et al., 2017; Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014). Open dialogue with community members throughout the research optimises opportunities for co-constructing knowledge. This knowledge can then supplement community-led initiatives to enact institutional change (Rua et al., 2021). Dialogue and relationship shift researcher power to the sidelines, blur the lines between the personal and the professional, and afford participants more agency over outcomes, disrupting the coloniality of Eurocentric psychologies that seek to maintain researcher objectivity (Fletcher et al., 2006; Rua et al., 2021). For O. Yates (the Palagi first author), fostering relationships required participating in the shared consciousness of all community members (Bishop, 2011). At the inception of the project, she sought to build relationships with Kiribati and Tuvaluan community partners, engaging community elders in talanoa about how to design the research to support their interests. She 'resided alongside' the communities (Rua et al., 2021), investing in their concerns and aspirations (Bishop, 2011) for mobility justice. Opportunities for the research to support community efforts towards immigration reform were collectively determined.

Community engagement and an advisory board then informed the research design. The advisory board (composed of community partners, Pacific youth climate activists and Pacific academics) helped to align the study design, topics and outcomes with the communities' priorities (Chung-do et al., 2016). Data were collected through face-to-face group sautalaga, te maroro and field notes (participants' names with an * are pseudonyms). Te maroro and sautalaga are Kiribati and Tuvaluan concepts, respectively, of freely and casually exchanging

ideas, similar to talanoa (Lala, 2015; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). More than open interviews, they are respectful, reciprocal, and culturally appropriate exchanges between researchers and community members (Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014; Vaioleti, 2006). Community partners led recruitment for four maroro with I-Kiribati and four sautalaga with Tuvaluans, held in familiar settings. These were segmented by age, sometimes gender and community affiliations (Table 5) to respect eldership and to allow a diversity of voices. Community partners assisted as co-moderators and interpreters. Maroro or sautalaga opened in prayer followed by information about the study, giving oral consent and dialogue on topics related to climate change, mobility and cultural identity. After closing in prayer, participants were offered a voucher, invited to collaborate on the research analysis and outcomes then shared a meal in acknowledgement of the knowledge and time gifted (as informed by Anae, 2010). We returned after transcription to discuss evolving findings and applications.

Table 5

Maroro and Sautalaga Demographics

Group	Maroro with I-Kiribati				Sautalaga with Tuvaluans			
	N	Age	Gender	Years in Aotearoa NZ	N	Age	Gender	Years in Aotearoa NZ
Men	4	48-59	M	9-27	2	61-78	M	7-24
Women	6	NA	F	14-25	6	45-77	F	6-34
Youth[a]	8	18-29	M & F	14-born here	3	23-29	F	22-born here
West[b]/elders[c]	3	41-64	M & F	9-16	3	60-65	M	>1-35

Note. NZ = New Zealand

[a]For the communities, this roughly includes people aged 15 to 30 years.

[b]With I-Kiribati in West Auckland

[c]With Tuvaluans

The challenges of outsider research require negotiation through a commitment to relationship, reflexivity and collaboration between Pacific and Palagi researchers (Fletcher et al., 2006; Vaioleti, 2006). In this, our multiple identities, ideologies and intersubjectivities

(Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014) become tools for connection. O. Yates is Palagi, a researcher and an activist. She calls herself Palagi as this is how community partners refer to her. Relationships from her background in climate activism ground her conviction that Palagi carry a responsibility to work alongside frontline Pacific groups towards a climate-just future. This shapes her epistemological commitments to research as an activist-scholar (Hodgetts et al., 2014), and relationality (Reynolds, 2019). O. Yates leans upon her activist voice and research tools to accompany community partners in asserting their dignity and calling for climate justice (Evans et al., 2017) while moving carefully across intercultural and positional edges in the space created by collaborating communities (Reynolds, 2019). S. Groot is a Māori community psychologist with extensive experience documenting and addressing precarity in partnership with Indigenous peoples and community services. S. Manuela is Cook Islands Māori social psychologist with a focus on Pacific peoples' ethnic identities and wellbeing within the Aotearoa NZ context. A. Neef is Palagi of German descent with an interest in climate change adaptation and climate mobility justice in the Pacific and globally. He has worked extensively on these topics with iTaukei (Indigenous) communities in Fiji as well as with Fijians of Indian descent.

The research adopted a relational epistemology, wherein knowledge was co-constructed through ongoing, inclusive relationships between researchers and community members. Community members entrusted us with their accounts of mobility, which we then re-interpreted vicariously while remaining in conversation with one another (cf. Hodgetts et al., 2021). Following Braun and Clarke's (2019) reflexive thematic analysis, O. Yates inductively transcribed and coded transcripts using Nvivo12. O. Yates and S. Groot organised, revised and reconceptualised these codes into interrelated latent themes, attending to the unexpected or "stumble data" (Brinkmann, 2014) which challenged dominant theories of climate mobility. We mapped connections between candidate themes, noting that they followed the three stages of migration expressed within Solofa's (Tuvalu, elders' sautalaga; Table 5) story: immigration/resettlement, recreating belonging, and preparing for the future. We then revisited

the transcripts to test these developing themes. Themes were checked with S. Manuela who provided guidance and cultural accountability throughout the project. Finally, we returned to participants and community partners to discuss resonances between our interpretation and their experiences (Colucci et al., 2008). Tying together community and advisory board suggestions (such as to use the canoe metaphor), we reconceptualised the themes through the journey of te wa and te vaka, as in the analysis below.

Analysis

Te wa and te vaka model of climate mobility (see Figure 6) reflects the strengths, challenges and aspirations shaping the mobility journeys of the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Aotearoa NZ. 'Te wa' and 'te vaka' each refers to an ocean-going outrigger canoe in the Kiribati and Tuvaluan languages. However, just as the names and significance of te wa and te vaka differ by form, function and dialect (Teaiwa & Launiuvao, 2015; Zann, 1980), so too do the Kiribati and Tuvaluan diasporas have diverse tales of climate mobility. The model does not assume uniform experiences across communities nor within but notes the shared threads which unite the lives of Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members.

The three phases through the centre of the model (Fig. 6) tell stories of climate mobility as a recursive, ever-evolving journey, anchored in migrants' homelands while moving towards a more secure future in Aotearoa NZ. I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans are expert navigators faced with 'navigating immigration obstacles' and socio-political barriers to well-being (phase 1), 'regrowing roots' to negotiate a transnational sense of belonging (phase 2), and 'charting a course for future generations' to thrive in the face of uncertainty (phase 3). Although presented as a one-way journey, the phase boundaries are fluid, as histories and genealogies, present challenges and the realisation of future hopes converge to guide people's daily lives.

Dignity and climate change shape each phase of the journey (Fig. 6). The placement of dignity above the model illustrates how community members' beliefs in their rights to safety and the inherent value of their ways-of-being guide them through the murky waters of

migration. Similarly, the location of climate change below the model depicts how rising tides, shrinking shores and other environmental changes are inextricably linked to community members' journeys of migration and resistance – regardless of the motivation to move. Whereas most overseas-born community members migrated in search of better opportunities in education, employment or healthcare (cf. Roman, 2013; Siose, 2017; Smith, 2013), more recent arrivals migrated for climate-related reasons (cf. Roman 2013; Siose, 2017). Nonetheless, climate change rhetoric, policies and uncertainties touch all community members' lives.

The following sections story the community members' experiences of mobility in the context of climate change, following the metaphor of te wa and te vaka journeys (Figure 6). We examine the interconnections between dignity, climate change, and mobility while retaining a dominant focus on how Kiribati and Tuvaluan wayfinders navigate immigration obstacles, regrow their roots, and chart courses forward for future generations.

Figure 6

Te Wa and Te Vaka Model of Climate Mobility

Navigating Immigration Obstacles

Upon arriving on the shores of Aotearoa NZ, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members were quickly confronted with new, unforeseen obstacles in their journeys (Fig. 6, phase 1). The first barrier encountered was a paradox of immobility, of having no visa and nowhere to go but moving regardless (see Fig. 6, phase 1A). Given Aotearoa NZ's neoliberal immigration system (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020), community members who desire safety from environmental or socio-cultural challenges have limited options to safeguard their livelihoods. Some sought protection through recognised immigration schemes, like Kalapu* (Tuvalu, women's sautalaga; see Table 5) below:

> *So dangerous to stay there, so scary… because the island is so small, no mountains to go, no high buildings to go. So we make a plan to get a better life, and lucky we have a chance to come under this Tuvalu PAC.*

Kalapu* recognised that extreme weather events were threatening Tuvaluan lives and livelihoods so tried her luck within the Pacific Access Category (PAC) ballot. Like Kalapu*, most community members had arrived through the PAC or the Skilled Worker visa. These highly bureaucratic, employment-dependent and ballot-based immigration avenues exclude climate risk when determining eligibility (see Immigration NZ, n.d.c). Hurdles within these schemes tend to prioritise host 'citizenship privileges' (Skillington, 2015) over the safety of those on the frontlines, leaving many I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans to rely upon good fortune rather than merit to enter Aotearoa NZ.

Faced with convoluted immigration systems and non-existent climate mobility policies, ineligible but determined migrants carved out their own pathways around the mandate for visa recognition. Some aspiring migrants arrived on short-term visas and stayed on as irregular migrants; others fought for permanent residency (PR) while living undocumented. Solofa (Tuvalu, elders' sautalaga; Table 5) continues to seek PR on climate grounds, saying, *"It's over three years now that we've been here. And we're vying for some recognition of being here, based on climate change…but the mind would be more settled if indeed we are given PR status."*

Although migrating provides Solofa with *"some relief"* from his climate fears, his unrecognised status and the risk of deportation leaves him in limbo (cf. Malua, 2014; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). His story highlights how the absence of protection for climate migrants creates legal violence (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012) by recreating precarity in the host nation (Bates-Eamer, 2019). Irregular migrants like Solofa come to inhabit a space of invisibility while waiting for PR, vulnerable to exploitation, stress and anxiety, and trapped in a purgatorial state of 'deportability' (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012).

In the excerpt above, Solofa alludes to climate change being one among many interrelated obstacles (Fig. 6, phase 1B). Negotiating resettlement barriers (cf. Yates et al., 2022b), extractive immigration policies and unfamiliar systems often takes precedence over future-oriented climate change concerns. Kalapu* (Tuvalu, women's sautalaga; Table 5) regretted having been absent from her growing family but justified that:

> *Kalapu*: I can go from home like seven in the morning and get back to home eleven at night, like 11:30, because I can pick up two shifts aye. ...*
>
> *Lilipeti*: Because you need that, aye.*
>
> *Kalapu*: But yeah, at the time I really need some money for you know, the family in Tuvalu, and we are here renting a place as well, of our own. It's really expensive as well, the rent as well, I think that's why.*

In their exchange, Lilipeti* and Kalapu* understand that no matter how tirelessly they worked, low wages, high living costs and tenuous housing arrangements can disrupt their dreams for their families, compounding the stress of migration. This is heightened by the rules of the workplace, as Emeri* (Kiribati, women's maroro; Table 5) points out:

> *Back home, it's our own time... But here, fifteen-minute break is fifteen minutes. Not fifteen minutes and one second. Yeah. And we call it the Palagi time aye?* [laughter] *But we don't have a choice. We have to obey and abide by those because we don't want to lose our jobs or get in trouble... and we can't really explain why we are a bit slack, maybe we are sick or unwell, but ... we have to, you know, work hard. No matter what.*

Here, Emeri* compares the balanced work lifestyles on her home islands with the neoliberal expectations of working within Aotearoa NZ, where employers can have little grace for sickness, language barriers or te mama (shyness). The restructuring of work lives in Aotearoa NZ towards a neoliberal, market-oriented economy has placed profitability before people and the environment, increasing insecure employment (Ongley, 2013). Precarity in the workplace combined with the regional labour market further commodifies and dehumanises Pacific bodies (Enoka, 2019). Many migrants are trapped in low-wage, insecure labour because their right to remain in Aotearoa NZ can rely upon keeping their jobs, *"no matter what"*.

Alongside systemic economic insecurity, Kiribati and Tuvaluan navigators were confronted with cultural precarity, the creation of cultural unbelonging through institutional non-recognition and identity loss (Bertram, 2012; Nowicka, 2018). This is evidenced in Rui's* story (Kiribati, youth maroro; Table 5):

> *Yeah, I remember this one time, this guy from the island, back in Ōtāhuhu, they um, went fishing, um out in the creek... They thought it was just like an ocean...And the police, they had to like, chase them out of the creek because you're not allowed to fish in the creek. ... They were caught though but didn't catch anything!* [laughter].

Rui* portrays how Kiribati fishing customs can be criminalised in Aotearoa NZ. Such cultural practices, grounded in balanced relationships with sacred, abundant oceans and one another, compete with the extractive and hierarchical view of the environment within Aotearoa NZ (Winter, 2019). To pursue their aspirations for *"better lives",* many community members are pressed to 'float with the current' (see Fig. 6, phase 1C) and adapt their lived cultures to their new environments, or else *"they just deport you back"* (Solofa, elders' sautalaga; Table 5). Toma* (Tuvalu, men's sautalaga; Table 5) explained that the Tuvaluan community must adapt because *"[i]f you are 101% Tuvaluan, good, but you can't find a job here in New Zealand, can't survive."* In this, Toma* identifies how 'successful' resettlement is predicated upon assimilating to the neoliberal and individualised lifestyles of Aotearoa NZ (cf. Bertram, 2012).

These conflict with the social values of reciprocity and togetherness which guide economic and social relationships in Kiribati and Tuvalu (Dixon, 2017; Malua 2014).

In the face of adversity, communities become the 'strong winds' (Fig. 6, phase 1D) that guide Kiribati and Tuvaluan wayfinders through cultural and institutional non-recognition. Family, church and community groups fill gaps in resettlement support (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020) by offering assistance with immigration, housing or employment. Support extends to spiritual well-being, wherein churches and gatherings create spaces for spiritual encouragement and the transmission of religious values. Communities also act as social support, providing childcare, food parcels, financial assistance, and emotional support (see also Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Siose, 2017), as Emeri* (Kiribati, women's maroro; Table 5) describes:

> *... living in a community way really helps us to, you know, to be I-Kiribati...We have our own programmes, like we dance, we host, just sitting together, we don't talk, we feel, you know like, relief and healed. But mainly the language and the practices like dancing and proper etiquette.*

Coming together in community, speaking the language and engaging in cultural practices gives Kiribati women strength, healing and respite from the pressures of resettlement. Strong social ties can be invaluable during climate crises, as migrants can lean on their communities to alleviate the mental health and material burdens of resettlement (Torres & Casey, 2016).

In this regard, all community members are more than just passive recipients of care (Fig. 6, phase 1E; cf. Groot et al., 2011). Contrary to the rhetoric which devalues Pacific peoples and climate migrants as vulnerable "welfare burdens" (Allwood, 2013, p. 55), community members work hard to elevate collective well-being and prosperity. Nui (Tuvalu, youth sautalaga; Table 5) conceptualises the community's role through the fatele, a Tuvaluan group dance:

> *And like, even the fatele, like our cultural dance, you can't do that alone. Like, it's a collective. Like that's our traditional dance. And that just speaks to me volumes of who we are as community, like you can't do a fatele by yourself like you can't do a solo. That doesn't exist* [laughter].

Similar to the fatele, everybody in the Tuvaluan community works together to uplift the peace, harmony and well-being of the collective. On top of countless hours of unpaid work and volunteering to care for their families, communities and islands, Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members work doggedly in paid labour to pave the way for future generations to prosper. However, many feel that their hard work and determination goes unacknowledged. Not only is the economic value of Pacific peoples' unpaid work underestimated (Ministry for Pacific Peoples, 2021b), but the roles of irregular migrants ('overstayers') are erased, as Uelese and Toma* (Tuvalu, men's sautalaga; Table 5) explain below.

> Uelese: It's their second home, no matter if they're overstayers.
>
> Toma*: … But the sad thing, too, they've been contributing to the economy of New Zealand since way, way back, they were here like 30 years back. They've been the backbone of the economy… And now we just ignore them.

These men point out how irregular migrants' informal status often overshadows their social and economic contributions to their communities, echoing the Dawn Raids era (Anae, 2020). Capitalistic and populist rhetoric makes social acceptance conditional upon legality and economic productivity (Nowicka, 2018; Stanley, 2021), translating the lives of irregular migrants into social and economic threats. Toma* and Uelese counter that irregular migrants merit the same dignity and humanity as community members who carry formal visas.

Regrowing Roots

In the same way that early Pacific navigators transported root crops on their canoes for cultivation at their new landfall (Pollock, 2009), Kiribati and Tuvaluan wayfinders carry their roots – identities, cultures, languages and livelihoods and ties to place– on their wa or vaka to cultivate and (re)build a sense of belonging in Aotearoa NZ (Fig. 6, phase 2; cf. Falefou, 2017). Elders are core knowledge holders who 'sow the seeds' (Fig. 6, phase 2A; Agee & Culbertson, 2012) of their faiths, languages and cultural heritages for their children, grandchildren and

great-grandchildren. Toma* and Uelese (Tuvalu, men's sautalaga; Table 5) depict grandparents as puka trees who shelter roosting sea birds, the family, in their branches (Fig. 6, phase 2A).

> *Toma*: In our culture we call it like a big tree, like a puka, a puka is like a big tree in Tuvalu. And all the birds, they come and they live there in the different branches. Once the puka tree fell* (sic) *down, then they start flying away. So, in our words, if the old grandparent is not anymore in the house, then there's no more coming back because they're flying away. … We call it, Uelese?*

> *Uelese: Ka siga te puka.*

> *Toma*: Yes, ka siga te puka.*

In this Tuvaluan saying, Toma* and Uelese depict that having elders re-join their families in Aotearoa NZ can bring a sense of wholeness as families can stay connected and grandchildren can be taught to live harmonious lives. However, Aotearoa NZ's residency pathways devalue eldership by preferencing age and productive capacity (cf. Immigration NZ, 2021). Some elders were highly respected on their home islands but were unable to get PR because of their age. Nonetheless, they remain valuable members of their communities *"even though we know they're overstayers"* (Lilipeti*, Tuvalu, women's sautalaga; Table 5) because of their roles in uplifting family and community well-being.

Other community relationships provide 'fertile soil' for connecting people to their roots and regrowing a sense of belonging in Aotearoa NZ (Fig. 6, phase 2B). Although most community members long to return to their fenua or te aba (either to visit or long-term), for first-generation migrants, community acts as a transnational *"home-away-from-home"*, like Naomi, Charles and Dr Janet (Kiribati, West Auckland maroro; Table 5) outline:

> *Naomi: We leave all our families in the islands. And so, when we come to the community, I feel that, I belong, you know?*

> *Charles: Sense of belonging.*

> *Naomi: Yeah, it is very nice that I have friends. Well, friends become families, in the community….It's just not that, I come from a different island…*

Dr Janet: We become one family…. So it's like a home.

For Dr Janet, Charles and Naomi, their community is a home built upon shared bonds to Kiribati and the reordering of their identities into te kainga (extended family). In community, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans can live out te katei ni Kiribati (the Kiribati way) or faka Tuvalu (in the style of Tuvalu, Yoshida, 2015) and (re)build ties to their lands and identities.

In community, community members can also speak Kiribati or Tuvaluan languages and strengthen ties to their roots (Fig. 6, phase 2C). Below, Emeri* (Kiribati, women's maroro; Table 5) explains the power of hearing te taetae ni Kiribati (the Kiribati language):

> *Straight away,* [the women] *appreciate you, because you, you talk to them in our … language. You use the, the most powerful word. Mauri, ko rabwa, thank you. So mauri is like knowing and accepting that this is a Kiribati person.*

In this excerpt, the women relate how speaking their language affirms and respects their dignity as I-Kiribati. The Kiribati and Tuvaluan languages embody the interconnectedness of identity, people, culture, and land. For instance, in Tuvalu, the fanua (placenta) is planted in the fenua (land) (Falefou, 2017); in Kiribati, te aba (Kiribati) signifies both people and land (Teaiwa, 2014). When community members speak in the Kiribati or Tuvaluan languages, they uphold their ways-of-being, knowledges, genealogical ties, and connections to land. However, climate change complicates ties between language and identity, as Nui (Tuvalu, youth sautalaga; Table 5) identifies

> *If we don't continue to speak about our culture and how things are or continue to teach the younger generation the language, then, what is going to happen to Tuvalu and the culture itself? Like, yes I'm Tuvaluan, and me not being able to speak Tuvaluan fluently doesn't make me any less Tuvaluan. But, if we don't have a home to go back to, if we don't have our elders to teach us the ways…then where does Tuvalu sit in like 50 years?*

Although Nui and the other Tuvaluan youth did not see fluency as contingent to their authenticity as Tuvaluan, they understood the importance of language investment in light of the existential threat of climate change (Suliman et al., 2019). Many Pacific youth are apprehensive

about the loss of their Pacific languages, which battle for their existence within monolingual structures (Samu et al., 2019, p. 131). For many I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans, the climate crisis heightens this struggle, as speaking their language is understood as a critical component of their resistance against the degradation of their lands and identities. Moreover, being a *"minority in a minority"* (Fig 6., phase 2D) can hinder the growth of language, culture and identity. Nui went on to explain:

> *You're Tuvaluan... but you're also part of the Westernised culture. Like, you have to fit into that. And then, you, you're not the default… And within, we're a minority, within the minority, like within the Pacific, like, Pacific group, Tuvalu, like cause we're also Tokelauan. So it's like a little dot trying to find your way through. There's a lot of noise.*

She references how Eurocentric social systems in Aotearoa NZ can limit NZ-born or -raised Tuvaluans from growing in their identities and cultures. Not only excluded from Palagi spaces, which were *"not built for you"*, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans can feel crowded out by larger Pacific communities. Matika (Kiribati, youth maroro) felt she needed to shift her identity to facilitate acceptance: *"*[My friends] *always say, 'Where you from?' I always say, 'I'm from Sāmoa.' Cause I always want to be cool with them. But now I'm proud to say I'm Kiribati."* Matika expressed having felt invisible as I-Kiribati but eventually coming to resist perspectives of smallness (Hau'ofa, 1994) of Kiribati and embrace her roots.

Navigating belonging is not straightforward for many Pacific youth. Like Matika above, many contend with complex socio-cultural environments and political structures which can marginalise smaller Pacific communities (Mila, 2012; Samu et al., 2019). Yet through relationships with the migrant generation, they can *"reconnect with their stories"* (Lilipeti*, women's sautalaga; Table 5) and develop pride in their unique identities.

Charting a Course for Future Generations

Once Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members have established roots in Aotearoa NZ, they begin to chart courses forward for future I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans to flourish (see Fig.

6, phase 3). Their aspirations for the next phase of their mobility journeys are interlaced with a plurality of climate change beliefs (Fig. 6, phase 1A), as they held diverse frameworks for responding to observed environmental degradation. The Kiribati women below (women's maroro; Table 5) combined Western and Indigenous ontologies.

> *Teima*:* [Kiribati] *won't sink.*
>
> *Emeri*: It won't. It won't. It's not like the Titanic.* [Laughter]. *Yeah. Because – and maybe because it's a superstitious thing, you know, compared to the knowledge of science and the study, but we strongly believe that…it will always be there. And our culture won't disappear.*

They attribute sea-level rise to greenhouse gases and hydrological modifications, alongside believing accounts of Kiribati's permanence inherited from their ancestors. But, *"no matter how much it is destroyed,"* they remain optimistic about Kiribati's adaptive capacity and hopeful about future return (cf. Roman, 2013).

For others, first- or second-hand observations of extreme weather events corroborated *"what the science says"* (Vaeluaga, Tuvalu, elders' sautalaga; Table 5). The majority of community members regard climate change as a severe and irreversible threat, leading some to believe that climate migration was inevitable, although they expect many people, especially elders, to choose to remain (cf. Farbotko & McMichael, 2019). Tito migrated after witnessing his ancestors' *"bones [be] literally tossed about by the typhoon"* which *"was the last straw that broke the camel's back"*. Vaeluaga stressed that "[Tito's] *still crying out for amnesty. Such an issue, this is the main obstacle in terms of settling down here in New Zealand."* Tito's experiences of climate change and living undocumented in Aotearoa NZ guide his conviction that climate mobility is a present reality, believing that Aotearoa NZ must open avenues to climate-related residency.

Nonetheless, most community members feel that they lack sufficient knowledge to determine whether their islands would remain habitable, producing uncertain boundaries of the future (Fig. 6, phase 3B). Different imagined futures weigh heavily upon their hearts as they

worry about their loved ones' safety, question the possibility of return, are unsure about the future of their place-based identities and cultural heritages, and doubt the political will to protect their continued existence. Nui (Tuvalu, youth sautalaga; Table 5) reflected upon the future of Tuvalu, saying:

> *I am like preparing myself to, like, be ready to know that it's not going to be the way that it was, different areas are going to be beautiful, because they're going to be developed, but also the areas that I loved as a child playing, that's non-existent.*

Nui was deeply saddened by the prospects for beloved places, people and land, but was encouraged by Tuvalu's potential to evolve, adapt and rise. Although fear, anger and despair are common responses to anticipated loss (Yates et al., 2022b), many Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members did not feel helpless. Nia* (Tuvalu, youth sautalaga; Table 5) maintained that *"[w]e can do all we can do in preparation, so that on our end, so that if they do decide to come, if our people do decide to come, that they can do it and not have that baggage."* Like Nia*, the communities see these uncertainties as windows to prepare their hearts, homes and national policies so that people can migrate without shame and with dignity.

Looking ahead, most community members are certain that they will carry their islands with them (Fig 6., phase 3C). Amid the dual threats of assimilation and climate change, some I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan elders are concerned that their place-based knowledges, languages and cultures would fade into dominant (Palagi) lifeways (cf. Orafa, 2019). Some researchers speculate that climate mobility will sever ties to Pacific peoples' homelands and eventually their intangible cultural heritage (e.g., McNamara et al., 2021; Pearson et al., 2021b). But as Emeri* explained on behalf of the Kiribati women (women's maroro; Table 5):

> *Some people feared that if they are relocated to another country, maybe our ways as I-Kiribati will be ... no, overturned, overcomed* [sic] *by the country we, we transferred to, or relocated to aye. But, it is important for our language and culture to remain. And it's us to do that.*

Emeri* asserted that cultural loss is not a given, as long the Kiribati communities remain collectively committed to keeping their language and culture afloat. Young and old alike share a sense of responsibility to carry on their legacies. As if speaking to her elders in Tuvalu, Nui (Tuvalu, youth sautalaga; Table 5) insisted that:

> *If you leave, you take Tuvalu with you. Like, you take that in your blood, you take that through next generations that are going to come. … Like, yes, our homeland is going to be gone. But, we as Tuvaluans will carry our culture with us.*

Drawing upon their experiences of acculturation, many youth like Nui believe that successive generations – rather than land itself – will become the vessels that carry ties to their lands and cultures, wherever the winds blow them. Often, imagined futures of climate catastrophe and loss can obscure communities' capacities for resilience and adaptation (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). However, as Campbell (2010) reminds us, "venturing on routes does not suggest the loss of roots" (p. 63), despite being separated from fenua or te aba. The Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities are currently using a range of adaptive strategies to reinforce their cultural identities while in Aotearoa NZ (cf. Yoshida, 2015). Alongside a commitment to participating in community, they are developing resources such as bilingual children's books and online communities to promote and cultivate pride in their diverse languages and cultures.

Furthermore, the communities are (re)asserting their dignity (Fig. 6, phase 3D). For the Tuvaluan community, this entails extending their reach: unlocking spaces for young Tuvaluans to succeed in education and employment, showcasing their strength, humility, and resilience, and calling for (climate) mobility justice grounded in dignity rather than pity. Meli* and Nia* (Tuvalu, youth sautalaga; Table 5) express this below in their visions for migration.

> *Meli*: And I would hope that if the time comes my, like, our people are welcomed … And they treat it like they have their dignity, and yeah, not being pitied, and being like, "Oh, yeah, we're helping you."*

> *Nia*: …'Cause really, like, our people are more than capable of helping themselves.*

The Kiribati communities are embracing their growing visibility in Aotearoa NZ (see Stats NZ, 2018a), rejecting climate-related precarity, and stressing their tenacity, independence and the richness of their language and culture. As Kiata* and Mateata portray:

> *Kiata*: 'Cause when we go to other places and they say, "Where are you from?" And we say, "Kiribati," and they don't know where that places is. And now they're slowly knowing, like, "Oh so you're the sinking island!" And we go, "No, not the sinking island!"*

> *Mateata: There's so much more to that sinking island* [laughter]. *Get your facts right*!

For these Kiribati youth (youth maroro; Table 5), migrating with dignity involves being seen – but on their terms. More than symbolic recognition of their right to belong, the Kiribati communities want tangible pathways to residency coupled with financial support for language and cultural maintenance. Moreover, the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities would like to see Palagi engage with their communities to learn about their inherent strengths (see Appendix C for suggestions of ways to engage). As such, reasserting dignity disrupts vulnerabilising tropes of pity (Head, 2020), smallness (Hau'ofa, 1994) and sinking islands (Farbotko, 2010) which tend to render Pacific lands, peoples – and histories of structural injustice – invisible.

Conclusion

The gap between present migration *in*dignities and migration *with* dignity provides an opportunity to restory climate mobility. When climate mobility is seen as a dynamic wa or vaka journey, migration with dignity (Tong, 2014) is understood as a circular movement between wayfinders' ancestral lands and their physical homes which affirms and sustains their ways-of-being. Kiribati and Tuvaluan migrants uproot their lives to test the waters in another country, wondering if they will be able to regrow their roots abroad and hoping that they will be able to return. Immigration, assimilation and climate-related obstacles can move community members into economic and cultural precarity, undermining their well-being, future hopes, identities, cultures and languages. However, the communities collectively provided shelter from waves of

adversity. Anchored in community, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans could carry their identities with them to cultivate a transnational sense of rootedness and resist the 'absolute loss' of dignity-sustaining relationships to land (cf. Johnson et al., 2021; Pearson et al., 2021b; Suliman et al., 2019)

Nonetheless, the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities' journeys exemplify how borders can amplify climate-related precarity (Bates-Eamer, 2019). By dichotomising the deserving, legal migrant and the undeserving, illegal 'overstayer', wayfinders pursuing climate protection can *"fall through the cracks"* (C. Enoka, personal communication, March 29, 2021) of neoliberal economic and immigration systems. Their rights to residency, social support and cultural continuity become defined not by their climate exposure but by their productive capacity. This narcissistic humanitarianism devolves the state of responsibility for supporting the climate-displaced while perpetuating the colonial exploitation and commodification of Pacific bodies (cf. Enoka, 2019; Tabe, 2019). Without visas or compassion to support their resettlement burdens, wayfinders can land in precarious employment, illegality or social marginalisation and be denied full community participation (cf. Bates-Eamer, 2019; Offner & Marlowe, 2021; Stanley, 2021). Considering how visa issues and minoritisation compound the indignities of resettlement, it is unsurprising that many I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans want to remain in their homelands (e.g., Corcoran, 2016; Falefou, 2017).

However, centring I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan views of mobility reveals that indignity is not a given. Linkages between land and people, te aba and te aba, fenua and fanua, persist even when separated from land (cf. Haili'ōpua Baker et al., 2016; Suliman et al., 2019). Consequently, the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities can respond to affronts to their dignity by drawing strength from their roots and reclaiming and embracing the fullness of their cultural values and practices (cf. Barlo, 2016; Daly & May, 2019). The communities are already acting to dismantle immigration obstacles and secure the material, cultural and spiritual well-being of current and future generations that climate breakdown, migration and precarity threaten to erode (cf. Johnson et al., 2021). They are also challenging shame and victimhood to determine for

themselves who deserves dignity and what it means to live with well-being, te maiu raoi (The Kiribati Working Group, 2015) or te ola lei (Panapa, 2012) as communities of worth (cf. Daly & May, 2019). Affirming their dignity within policy could further support their efforts to uplift collective harmony and well-being. Migration with dignity would equip communities to steer their own wa or vaka through future climate uncertainties. It would value all lives – including those of elders and irregular migrants – and the preservation of ancestral knowledges and languages over employability. And more than symbolic recognition of their worth, it would include amnesty for irregular migrants, wraparound resettlement support (cf. Farbotko et al., 2022a; McClain et al., 2022), funding for community initiatives, and legal options for accessing permanent residency (e.g., Farbotko et al., 2022a; Heyward & Ödalen, 2016; Matias, 2020; McCarney & Kent, 2020),

Acknowledging the inherent worth of Pacific wayfinders invites states to reimagine their plans for climate mobility. Through listening to its multilateral partners, the New Zealand Government has redirected its focus from forced migration towards supporting in-situ climate adaptation, resilience and disaster preparedness in the Pacific (e.g., MFAT, 2021a; ; IOM, 2019a; Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, 2020; UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, 2021). Nonetheless, it recognises climate mobility as a "potential, future phenomenon" (MFAT, 2021a, p. 5) and considers existing schemes, like the permanent PAC and temporary RSE, as "sufficiently flexible" (p. 6) to respond to the issue. However, top-down approaches which disregard existing climate mobility, overlook prevailing social and immigration issues and exclude Pacific voices risk being maladaptive (cf. Johnson et al., 2021). As we have identified, some Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati are already migrating in part because of current or future climate risks. Situating climate mobility in the future (see also *Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand*, 2020) denies protection to such migrants who are pre-emptively moving in anticipation of intensifying ecological and economic challenges (cf. Barnett & McMichael, 2018). Moreover, expanding defective immigration frameworks could repeat the mistakes of exploitative colonial relocations (see Tabe, 2019), magnifying the power imbalances which

marginalise frontline Pacific communities while compounding climate-related precarity. Alternatively, states, regional actors and Pacific communities can circumvent obstacles to well-being by co-planning for mobility. In this, Pacific knowledge systems can guide the development of culturally specific, whole-of-community protection for climate migrants.

Critically, when climate mobility is viewed through the lenses of those on the frontlines of the climate crisis, the value and urgency of emissions reductions becomes self-evident. Inherent in te wa or te vaka-centred response to mobility is the recognition that the journey is circular, that the communities will always be oriented towards home. A focus on resettling climate migrants without climate action deems migration as inevitable and ties to land as inconsequential. Yet, the continued existence of te aba and te fenua reminds the Kiribati and Tuvaluan diasporas of the power in their identities and the inviolability of their dignity. It remains to be seen how climate migrants will relate to their motherland as climate change intensifies, but as long as she is still there, the land will always call them home.

Bridging Statement Three

Chapter Three (Yates et al., 2022c) offered a framework for restorying climate mobility that is rooted in Pacific histories of oceanic voyaging. It introduced Te Wa and Te Vaka Model of Climate Mobility (Fig. 6), which depicts climate mobility as an interconnected journey shaped by the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities' claims to dignity and resistance against climate-related losses. The community members navigated diverse socio-economic, immigration and environmental pressures, which can amplify climate-related precarity, particularly for irregular migrants. Despite this, the communities remained firmly rooted in their cultures and identities for the well-being of current and future generations. The chapter concluded by identifying the need to create new, climate-just immigration pathways.

From Chapter Three, it is evident that Aotearoa NZ's society and institutions impact the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities' well-being (cf. Manning & Clayton, 2018; Palinkas & Wong, 2020; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020). However, the focus of the article was on people's mobility journeys overall, leaving little room to examine specific events that took place around the time of data collection. Thus, I use the present bridging statement to provide evidence that external context not only informs the study's outcomes but also the communities' well-being in Aotearoa NZ. The section concludes by introducing the study of Aotearoa NZers' understandings of climate mobility, the focus of the next two chapters (Chapters Four and Five).

Contextualising the Findings

Given our commitments to contextual methodologies, it is important to consider the events surrounding the production of Chapter Three. The talanoa methodology recognises that researchers must be flexible to move with the shifts in people's social and cultural worlds (Cammock et al., 2021; Vaioleti, 2006). Relatedly, critical community psychology is committed to knowing and situating people's experiences within their socio-political environments

(Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Nelson & Prilleltensky, 2010). While Chapter Three explored Aotearoa NZ's socio-political context, we did not discuss the particular moment in time in which sautalaga and maroro occurred – marked by the Covid-19 pandemic, national elections and the Pacific Language Weeks – and thus I do so here.

Firstly, the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic were deeply interwoven throughout the research. As depicted in Figure 7 (below), sautalaga and te maroro with the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities, respectively, took place after several periods of enforced household isolation ('lockdown') following an outbreak of COVID-19. This had a significant impact on my engagement with the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities. As I wrote in my research diary on the 26th of March 2021,

> *On Tuesday I went to the Te Uluniu Tuvalu Taumatua gathering* [the Tuvaluan Elders' group] *to talk about our research. Only three people showed up. This made me realise that the threat of COVID is so much more present for this community. As Vaeluaga* [elders' sautalaga; Table 5] *said, "COVID-19 is still very real for our people".*

This diary excerpt points towards the disparities experienced in the Covid-19 response by Pacific communities. Pacific peoples were overrepresented in COVID-19 cases and hospitalisations (RNZ, 2022) due to failures in communication and decades of systemic health inequalities (Colmar Brunton, 2022; Su'a-Tavila et al., 2020; Pickering-Martin, 2021). Furthermore, a disproportionate number of Pacific households experienced reduced income and precarity in employment (Colmar Brunton, 2022). At the same time, many community members were essential workers, who were required to work during COVID lockdowns, typically in high-pressure, low-waged jobs, and facing greater exposure to the virus (Ministry of Health, 2021). To protect the vulnerabilised within their communities from COVID-19, the communities were gathering less often and sometimes shifting online. To respect their preferences, we decided to move the in-person sautalaga and maroro to the end of the year,

when the restrictions were lowered. Meanwhile, talanoa between our research team, advisors and community partners often took place online in response to the pandemic's restrictions. Despite the shift away from face-to-face knowledge sharing within a physical space, online talanoa nonetheless allows researchers to hold space for shared, empathetic dialogue that attends to the vā (relational space) between researchers and community members (Faleolo, 2021).

Figure 7

Timeline of Data Collection and Analysis Alongside External Events

External Events		Research Activities
	●	JUL 2019 - Research begins
Tuvaluan Language Week - SEP	●	
	●	DEC-MAR - Survey data collection
	◻	**2020**
Covid-19 Lockdown - MAR-MAY	●	MAR - JUL - Survey analysis
Inaugural Kiribati Language Week - JUL	●	
Covid-19 Lockdown- AUG	●	
Tuvaluan Language Week - SEP	●	SEP- Interviews w/ climate activists
NZ General Election - OCT	●	*OCT - Sautalaga with Tuvaluans*
	●	*NOV - Maroro with i-Kiribati*
	◻	**2021**
Covid-19 Lockdown - FEB-MAR	●	*FEB-APR – Sautalaga & maroro analysis*
	●	*MAY-AUG - Confirming model with communities*
Kiribati Language Week - JUL	●	
Covid-19 Lockdown AUG-OCT	●	
Tuvaluan Language Week - SEP	●	
Change in Covid-19 system - DEC	●	DEC-FEB - Interview analysis
	◻	**2022**
	●	DEC-FEB - Interview analysis
Kiribati Language Week - JUL	●	
Tuvaluan Language Week - SEP	●	
	◻	**2023**

Note. Dates are approximate.

Sources: Ministry of Pacific Peoples (2022); New Zealand Doctor (2022)

Informal conversations with community members relayed the intersections between pandemic-related challenges and their wa or vaka journeys of mobility. I was often told of the ways in which the families, community organisations and churches served as 'strong winds' (Chapter Three, Figure 6) in their communities, working tirelessly to provide financial, social, spiritual and physical well-being support to those most affected by Covid-19. Their responses are reflected in the efforts of Pacific peoples across Aotearoa NZ, who (despite discriminatory press coverage suggesting otherwise [Pickering-Martin, 2021]) led a coordinated and rapid response to ensure that Pacific peoples had access to sufficient Covid-related information, support services and Covid-19 vaccines (Fa'alii-Fidow, 2020). Other conversations evoked the issues of having 'no visa; nowhere to go' (Figure 6). Some community members lost their jobs during the pandemic and became trapped in Aotearoa NZ on seasonal or expired visas; others were already undocumented and unable to work to supplement their families' reduced income (cf. Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). As I noted in my research diary after speaking with the TACTrust (5 Dec 2020),

> *New Zealand citizens who've come back to NZ because of Covid and can't find a job or don't want to work still get visas. Yet, the community members who work and have been doing so for years but are undocumented don't get visas.*

These sentences exemplify the ways in which Covid-19 exacerbates immigration-related inequalities. Returning Aotearoa NZ citizens retain their citizenship privileges to have immediate access to state-sanctioned support – regardless of their willingness to support Aotearoa NZ's stalling economy (cf. Ratuva et al., 2021). Meanwhile, many irregular migrants – who have/had jobs, pay/paid taxes, contribute(d) to Aotearoa NZ's economy and participate in their local communities – are denied formal belonging to society (see Chapter Three, also Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021; Simon-Kumar, 2015). This "institutionalised exclusionary power of citizenship" (Ramsari, 2020, p. 1) intensifies social inequality. It reduces non-permanent

residents' access to public services while shifting responsibility for their care onto their communities. In response to these injustices, community members were actively 'reasserting their dignity' (Chapter Three, Figure 6) by advocating for amnesty for irregular migrants in order to fill labour shortages (Kitchen, 2021). The Pacific Leadership Forum, which included Kiribati and Tuvaluan elders, went as far as to present these ideas to Parliament in a petition (Bonnett, 2021).

The communities' migration journeys were marked by other milestone events alongside COVID-19. Data collection occurred after the first ever Kiribati Language Week (12-18 July), the Tuvaluan Language Week (27 September-3 October) (Sio, 2020) and surrounding the Aotearoa NZ general election (17 October 2020) (The Guardian, 2020) (Figure 7). The intersections of these events were evident during talanoa with community partners. For instance, the Kiribati Language Week was particularly poignant for the Kiribati communities, for whom this was the first time that the New Zealand Government had formally endorsed the Language Week. Dr Janet, Charles and Naomi (Kiribati, West Auckland maroro; Table 5) explained their experiences of this:

> *Dr. Janet:* [The Language Week] *brought tears to the eyes.*
>
> *Charles: Because there's been a lot of, a lot of-*
>
> *Naomi: Emotional.*
>
> *Charles: So that's been a long journey… When we first migrated to New Zealand, you know, we were hardly, uh, seen. I mean, we felt that we were not given, we were never recognized. …. So yeah, this year, it's a, it's a milestone for us…. Because as people, migrating from Kiribati to New Zealand, we, we make a huge contribution. You know, we are part of this society. And we need that ongoing support.*

For the West Auckland Kiribati community, the official Kiribati Language Week was formal recognition of their collective efforts to establish themselves here in Aotearoa NZ (see Chapter Three for more details). Yet, Charles notes that the Language Week is not the end point to the journey: the Kiribati community have *"more that we need to employ, and to resource, and to build on"* to further uplift the communities' wellbeing. Several Tuvaluan and Kiribati community leaders hoped that the re-elected Labour government would deliver some of this support. With its largest ever Pacific caucus (Hopgood, 2020) and several local MPs expressing concern for the well-being of irregular migrants (Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021), community leaders were hopeful that the shift in Government values would translate into provisions for amnesty for irregular migrants and continued support of their communities' well-being. In turn, they anticipated that this would lead to additional funding for community events, which could strengthen their efforts to regrow their roots in Aotearoa NZ (Chapter Three, Figure 6). Thus, it is apparent frontline Pacific communities' mobility journeys are not purely influenced by climate change but also the ever-evolving societal context in the host nation.

Introduction to Chapters Four and Five

In particular, societal perceptions of climate mobility are likely to have a significant impact on migrants' resettlement experiences (Echterhoff et al., 2020; Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2015; Stanley, 2021; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020; Voyatzis-Bouillard & Kelman, 2021). Narratives of climate mobility are moving away from vulnerability rhetoric (Shea et al., 2020), although the last two decades have nonetheless been replete with deficit-based views of Oceania (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Gemenne, 2010; Farbotko, 2010; Mayrhofer, 2021; Shea et al., 2020; Sakellari, 2021). This has had an enduring impact on policy, media and, conceivably, on public opinion. Yet, relative to all research on climate mobility, there are few studies that attend to host residents' conceptualisations of climate mobility (Ghosh & Orchiston, 2022).

Accordingly, there is a burgeoning field of research that seeks to understand societal attitudes towards climate migrants (Hedegaard, 2021; Helbling, 2020; Lujala et al., 2020; Gonzalez, 2020; Spilker et al., 2020; Stanley & Williamson, 2021; Uji et al., 2021). This research is highly context-specific; local discourse around climate migration tends to underpin the outcomes of each study. Yet, little attention has been paid to the Aotearoa NZ setting, despite the nation being a likely host of future climate migrants (Cass, 2018; Neef & Benge, 2022). Local research has been limited to a masters' thesis (Allwood, 2013) and a survey exploring perceptions of economic threat (Stanley & Williamson, 2021). Meanwhile, grassroots and political discussions have continued to evolve (Barbara et al., 2021; Enari & Jameson, 2021; McAdam, 2020; Ritchie, 2021; Zaman & Das, 2020), bringing climate justice in the Pacific into the public eye.

Therefore, the next two chapters pivot away from the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities' perspectives to consider Aotearoa NZers' conceptualisations of climate mobility. Chapter Four takes a bird's eye view of the factors likely to inform Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate migrants. Then, Chapter Five takes a deep dive into youth climate activists' understandings of solidarity with their Pacific neighbours. Across both chapters, we use the many layers of climate justice theory (e.g., Enari & Jameson, 2021; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014) to query the places of knowledge, responsibility and accountability in climate mobility research and governance.

Our discussion of public opinion begins in Chapter Four with a quantitative analysis of an online survey. In this, we explore how notions of complicity in climate injustices interact with people's broader attitudes towards immigration. Specifically, the chapter asks how Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate migrants compare to those towards immigrants in general and investigates how climate change beliefs might contribute to any observed differences. Findings suggest that people's perceptions of climate migrants relate to their

awareness of the complex causes of climate mobility. The chapter concludes by outlining anticipated challenges to and potential opportunities for welcoming climate migrants into Aotearoa NZ.

The research article that follows is the author's copy of a manuscript published in *Regional Environmental Change*. Please refer to:

Yates, O. E. T., Manuela, S., Neef, A., & Groot, S. (2022b). Attitudes towards climate migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand: The roles of climate change beliefs and immigration attitudes. *Regional Environmental Change, 22*, 88. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113-022-01942-y

Chapter 4. Attitudes Towards Climate Migrants in Aotearoa New Zealand: The Roles of Climate Change Beliefs and Immigration Attitudes

Introduction

The contribution of climate change to population movements is contested, despite consensus that climate change will alter mobility patterns overall (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Rigaud et al., 2018). Research suggests that most movement will be transient and internal, but some communities are considering long-term migration across national borders (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Kelman, 2015). The well-being impacts of such climate mobilities depend upon the societal context at the destination (Schwerdtle et al., 2020). Host residents' responses to migrants can influence migrants' transnational connections to their homelands. Further, discriminatory attitudes and behaviours towards immigrants can adversely impact their mental health (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Esses et al., 2017; Priebe & Giacco, 2016; Schwerdtle et al., 2020). As many nations prepare for climate mobility (Remling, 2020), understanding prospective hosts' views of climate migrants may be critical.

Climate migrants are themselves immigrants, for whom environmental change often co-exists alongside multiple, interconnected migration drivers (Burrows & Kinney, 2016). Nevertheless, mainstream media coverage tends to ignore these complexities. Climate migrants are frequently framed as 'victims,' 'refugees', or as 'vulnerable' to climate change, rather than as migrants deserving of justice (Belfer et al., 2017; Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Shea et al., 2020). Many Pacific communities are resisting these narratives, preferring to tell their own stories as agents of change who choose when, where and how to migrate (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Herrmann, 2017). Yet, victimisation predominates, ultimately dehumanising, disempowering and 'othering' Pacific communities in the reader's mind (Herrmann, 2017).

Using an online survey in Aotearoa NZ, we first investigate how attitudes towards climate migrants compare to those towards immigrants in general (hereafter: just

'immigrants'). We ask whether there are differences between host perceptions of climate migrants compared to immigrants (Hypothesis 1, [H1]). We then explore patterns that may underlie potential differences, asking if attitudes towards climate migrants are mediated by climate change beliefs and perspectives on climate change (Hypotheses 2-5 [H2-H5]).

Figure 8 conceptualises our hypotheses. As per Path C, people's belief in climate change may be related to their attitudes towards climate migrants. However, this relationship might be explained by their support for distributive justice, the belief that wealthy states should support others more affected by climate change (Pottier et al., 2017) (Paths A-B). Yet, to endorse distributive justice, one must first understand both anthropogenic climate change (ACC) and its uneven distribution (climate justice awareness). Hence, people's belief in ACC may combine with their climate justice awareness to predict their stance on distributive justice (Path A), and in turn, their attitudes towards climate migrants (Path B). The following sections explain these concepts further.

Figure 8

Conceptual Model of the Direct (Path C) and Indirect (Paths A-B) Relationships Between Climate Change Beliefs and Attitudes Towards Climate Migrants

Note. ACC= anthropogenic climate change. Distributive justice= support for distributive-justice based initiatives to accommodate climate migrants.

Attitudes Towards Climate Migrants

Attitudes towards migrants often reflect perceptions of the cause of migration. In the case of climate mobility, the causes are multifaceted and complex. In addition, climate mobility is rarely purely voluntary, being enmeshed in destabilised economic and political systems (Kelman, 2015). Public understanding of these interconnections can derive from their relationships with immigrants, histories of environmental change and the dominant climate change narratives (Echterhoff et al., 2020; Lujala et al., 2020). In Germany (Arias & Blair, 2022; Helbling, 2020) and the United States (Arias & Blair, 2022), residents regarded cross-border climate migrants as being forced to migrate, similar to political migrants or refugees, and more deserving of asylum than economic migrants, those who seek a better quality of life. Yet, in Kenya and Vietnam, internal climate migrants and economic migrants are seen to have equally valid reasons to migrate (Spilker et al., 2020). The authors suggest that residents in lower-income countries may see economic migration as a consequence of untenable living conditions created by climatic instabilities. Given that perceptions of cause can influence perceptions of climate migrants, we anticipate that Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate migrants will differ from their attitudes towards immigrants in general.

H1: There are differences in attitudes towards climate migrants compared to immigrants in general.

Such differences may also relate to whether people believe that climate change is a valid reason to migrate. Psychological research consistently relates beliefs about climate change to greater pro-environmental intentions, behaviours and climate policy support (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2016; Milfont et al., 2017). Knowledge of climate change can also inform peoples' perceptions of threat (Van der Linden, 2015). Similarly, understandings of migration drivers and consequences can influence host resident attitudes. People tend to be more positive towards involuntary migrants than voluntary migrants (Verkuyten et al., 2018), especially

those migrating due to persecution, war or after experiencing extreme suffering (Bansak et al., 2016; Echterhoff et al., 2020; Kotzur et al., 2019). Hence, hosts who believe in ACC may see climate change as a more serious risk to people's livelihoods, and therefore they could hold more positive attitudes towards climate migrants (Fig. 8, Path C).

H2: Belief in ACC is related to more positive attitudes towards climate migrants.

Climate Justice

Attempts to understand attitudes towards climate migrants are complicated when considering responsibility for climate mobility. Whereas political and economic migrants often move to regions that are disconnected from the cause of their misfortune (e.g., persecution or economic instability, Burrows & Kinney, 2016; Koubi, 2019), climate migrants tend to move towards the perpetrator – although host communities may not see themselves as such. Adopting a climate justice lens can highlight the links between displacement and host greenhouse gas emissions. Climate justice recognises that climate change impacts differ across locations and generations, and that they are more acute for groups experiencing other historically or socially constructed vulnerabilities. These impacts are often disproportionate to national greenhouse gas emissions, with many low-emitting nations bearing the burden of climate impacts (Gach, 2019; Kanbur, 2018).

Proponents of climate justice generally call for the fair distribution of climate burdens and benefits. They emphasise distributive justice, the allocation of material and social resources to those with less income and political influence (Kanbur, 2018; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). Many climate justice advocates call for the insertion of distributive justice into migration governance. They argue that migration policies must reflect the association between industrialised nations' fossil fuel emissions and livelihood disruption in low-polluting nations. Acknowledging their complicity could then enhance their sense of responsibility to support

at-risk communities (Marshall, 2016; Nawrotzki 2014). Governing bodies are encouraged to provide financial support, compensation for land loss, prioritise community-led solutions, and ease immigration restrictions for the environmentally threatened (Skillington 2015).

Taking together the importance of attribution (e.g., Esses et al., 2017) and distributive justice (Marshall, 2016; Nawrotzki, 2014), acknowledging responsibility for migration may inform people's responses to climate migrants. That is, the more host residents believe that climate change has human origins (belief in ACC), the greater their sense of responsibility for supporting climate migrants (distributive justice), and the warmer their attitudes towards climate migrants (Fig. 8, Paths A and B). Hence, we hypothesise that:

H3: Greater belief in ACC is related to warmer attitudes towards climate migrants through greater support for distributive justice.

However, seeing oneself as complicit in migration may depend upon understanding that climate impacts are unevenly distributed. We refer to this knowledge as 'climate justice awareness'. According to Swim and Bloodhart (2018), knowledge of climate (in)justices may create a sense of responsibility for and a desire to minimise climate impacts. Indeed, Stanley and Williamson (2021) recently observed that supporting equality was associated with willingness to accept 'climate refugees.' Therefore, the link between believing in ACC and endorsing distributive justice may rely upon people's understandings of climate justice (Figure 8, Path A).

H4: The relationships between belief in ACC and distributive justice depend upon awareness of climate justice.

Acculturation Expectations

Finally, worries about socio-cultural shifts can also influence attitudes towards migrants. Concerns about the erosion of host identities, customs or institutions – often to

safeguard perceived social cohesion and societal privilege (Esses et al., 2017) – can engender hostility towards climate migrants (Brzoska & Fröhlich, 2016; Burrows & Kinney, 2016; Lujala et al., 2020). Host residents tend to prefer that culturally similar migrants integrate (maintain both their home and host cultures) while culturally distinct migrants are expected to assimilate (completely adopt the host culture and values) (Berry, 1997; Esses et al., 2017; Florack et al., 2013). Support for integration or assimilation can relate to openness to cultural diversity (Florack et al., 2013). Hence, acculturation expectations may also be related to attitudes towards climate migrants.

H5: Assimilation and integration expectations are related to attitudes towards climate migrants.

Migration to Aotearoa New Zealand

Aotearoa NZ is likely to host future climate migrants (Cass, 2018) and thus is the focus of this article. The nation's public and political discussion of climate mobility focuses almost exclusively on Pacific peoples (Cass, 2018; Fuatai, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], 2018). Aotearoa NZ is relationally and politically connected with the Pacific through its location, political priorities, shared colonial histories, and ancestral connections between Pacific peoples and Māori (MFAT 2018; Te Punga Somerville, 2012). Distinct Pacific communities live in Aotearoa NZ, collectively constituting 8.1% of the population (Stats NZ, 2018a). However, Pacific peoples have been 'othered' by the media, historically depicted as unmotivated and dependent upon Pākehā support (Loto et al., 2006; 'Ofa Kolo, 1990), and more recently, as dehumanised commodities during low wage labour shortages (Enoka, 2019).

Pacific climate mobility sits within broader immigration discourse. Aotearoa NZ is ethnically diverse, with 27.4% of the population being born overseas, many from the United

Kingdom, China, India, and Australia (Stats NZ, 2019a). Most Aotearoa NZers embrace this cultural diversity, endorsing a multicultural ideology, supporting integration, and appreciating immigrants' contribution to society (Spoonley 2015; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Yet, multicultural ideals tend to gloss over engrained racism, persistent inequalities between ethnic groups and resistance to shifts in the 'pre-existing' neoliberal and capitalist values of the Pākehā settler majority (Harris et al., 2018; Lyons et al., 2011).

Aotearoa NZers' attitudes to climate migrants emerge from this context. Nearly a decade ago, Allwood (2013) reported that some Aotearoa NZers support climate mobility because of Aotearoa NZ's Pacific connections, despite concerns that Pacific climate migrants would be a "welfare burden (p. 61) or "change the New Zealand [*sic*] social structure" (p. 79). Since then, climate justice has been increasingly centred in climate policy (Gach, 2019), Pacific peoples' calls for climate justice have become more vociferous (Tahana, 2019), and many Aotearoa NZers have reported supporting 'climate refugee' policy (Stanley & Williamson, 2021). It is uncertain whether these trends translate into greater climate justice awareness, responsibility to accept climate migrants, and positive attitudes towards climate migrants overall. Moreover, it is uncertain how these factors intersect with existing perspectives on immigration.

Therefore, we seek to understand whether Aotearoa NZers' complicity in climate mobility contributes to their attitudes towards climate migrants. Through a cross-sectional survey using an online convenience sample, we first test whether there are underlying differences in attitudes towards climate migrants, compared to other immigrants (H1). Then, summarising our hypotheses through the conceptual model (Fig. 8), we assess whether perceptions of climate migrants are mediated by climate change beliefs. In Figure 8, Path C tests the direct effect: that belief in ACC is related to attitudes towards climate migrants (H2). Paths A and B test the indirect effect: that support for distributive justice mediates the

association between belief in ACC and attitudes towards climate migrants (H3). Finally, Path A tests the conditional indirect effect: that awareness of climate justice moderates the relationship between belief in ACC and distributive justice (H4).

Method

Data

Data were generated through a cross-sectional online questionnaire on Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate change and migration, administered from December 2019 to March 2020. People self-selected through volunteer and snowball sampling in response to a Facebook advertisement. The advertisement was "seeking participants for a survey on migration and climate change" and was incentivised by a prize draw to win one of four vouchers. The present analyses employ a subset of questions within a larger battery of measures on climate change and migration. A total of 238 people aged 18-86 years completed the questionnaire. This is considered a medium-sized sample in psychological research (Feng et al., 2020). More women (55.6%), Pākehā (87.0%) and tertiary-educated people (58.5%) were represented in this convenience sample than in the Aotearoa NZ population (see Table 6 for population-wide comparisons). Although not completely representative, a range of different participants completed the survey.

Table 6

Descriptive Statistics for the Sample and the Aotearoa NZ Population Across Survey

Variables

Variable	n (=236)					α
Attitudes towards migrants (1= more negative, 7= more positive)						
Attitudes towards immigrants				5.10	1.48	0.83
Attitudes towards climate migrants				4.39	1.73	0.92
Assimilation expectations (1=low, 7= high):						
For immigrants				4.62	1.75	
For climate migrants				4.40	1.85	
Integration expectations (1=low, 7= high)						
For immigrants				5.35	1.37	
For climate migrants				5.07	1.46	
Climate change beliefs (1=strong disbelief, 7= strong belief)						
Reality				5.84	1.92	
Anthropogenic climate change (ACC)				5.11	2.34	
Climate justice awareness				4.94	1.94	0.86
Distributive justice				4.61	1.73	0.74
Demographic characteristics						
Age (median)				41	37[b]	
Household income ($NZ)				98700	105700[c]	
Political orientation (1=liberal, 7= conservative)				3.32	1.85	
Ethnicity[a] (yes = 1; no = Pākehā)						
Māori	15	6.5	16.5			
Pākehā	202	87.0	64.1			
Pacific	5	1.7	8.1			
Asian	11	4.8	15.1			
European	23	9.5	6.0			
Not elsewhere classified	3	1.3	2.7			
Gender[d,e] (yes = 1; no = male)						
Male	102	42.7	46.9			
Female	131	55.6	48.2			
Non-binary or gender diverse	3	1.7	0.8			
Education[f]						
High school	46	19.1	39.3			
Associate/technical degree/ diploma	51	21.2	18.7			
Bachelor's degree	83	35.7	14.6			
Postgraduate qualification	9	3.7	5.7			

Master's degree	40	17.0	3.7
Doctor's degree	5	2.10	0.8
Other	2	1.20	NA

Note. Immigration and climate change measures recorded on a Likert scale from 1 to 7.

[a] Defined as per Stats NZ (2018a, 2019a). Frequencies do not sum to 100% as respondents could identify with more than one ethnic group.

[b] Stats NZ (2019b).

[c] Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) (n.d.)

[d] Stats NZ (n.d.a)

[e] Stats NZ (2021)

[f] Stats NZ (2018b)

Climate Change Measures

The questionnaire included four climate change measures, assessed on a Likert scale ranging from 1-7 (1: strongly disagree; 7: strongly agree). Questions on climate change reality and belief in anthropogenic climate change, previously demonstrated to predict environmental behaviours (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2016; Milfont et al., 2017; Van der Linden et al., 2019), were derived from the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Study (NZAVS, Sibley, 2018). To gauge climate justice awareness, participants responded to three questions (Cronbach's alpha, $\alpha =$ .86) about the unequal distribution of climate impacts across generations, locations and household income, e.g., "My or my friends' children will experience more extreme weather events in their lifetimes than I will." Distributive justice, i.e. the belief that countries should support others more affected by climate change (Pottier et al., 2017) was measured from the average of three items ($\alpha = .74$) adapted from Allwood (2013). See Appendix D for details.

Immigration Measures

We adapted perspectives on immigration from Ward and Masgoret (2008). Before answering, respondents were provided with a definition for 'climate migrants' but not for 'immigrants,' as climate migrants do not frequently feature in mainstream discourse in Aotearoa NZ, unlike immigrants (Spoonley & Butcher, 2009; Zaman & Das, 2020). The term 'climate migrants' was chosen to reflect current policy discussion and avoid the more divisive term 'climate refugees' (Kelly, 2020; Zaman & Das, 2020).

We first asked all respondents about their attitudes towards immigrants ($\alpha = 0.83$) then climate migrants ($\alpha = 0.92$) for a within-person comparison of attitudes towards (im)migrants. The variables were assessed from three items measured on a Likert scale from 1-7 (1: strongly disagree; 7: strongly agree), e.g., "The unity of New Zealand is enhanced by immigrants"/"The unity of New Zealand will be enhanced if we accommodate climate migrants." We employed tense differences to match the framing of climate mobility in public discourse as a distant phenomenon rather than a present reality (Zaman & Das, 2020).

Acculturation expectations, including for assimilation and integration, were measured from single items adapted from Allwood (2013). Both expectations were separately measured for climate migrants and immigrants, e.g., "Immigrants should fully adopt New Zealand culture and values," or "Climate migrants should maintain their cultures while also adopting New Zealand culture."

Demographic and Political Characteristics

Socio-political and demographic characteristics demonstrated elsewhere to be associated with climate change (e.g., McCright et al., 2014; Milfont et al., 2015) and migration attitudes (e.g., Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; O'Rourke & Sinnott, 2006) were controlled for in the analyses. Covariates included age, education, household income, gender, ethnicity, and

political orientation. Using these covariates accounted for the variation in our measures of interest that was solely related to the demographics of the self-selected sample. To retain responses from underrepresented gender and ethnic groups, gender was assessed as male/other genders (female, non-binary, transgender, and intersex) and ethnicity as Pākehā/non-Pākehā (Māori, Pacific, Asian, Middle Eastern, African, and Latin American). Despite oversimplifying experiences of structural inequality, these variables broadly reflect benefitting from the male or Pākehā hegemony compared to facing historical disadvantage (e.g., Spoonley, 2015; Tan et al., 2019). Political orientation was measured using one item, "Please rate how politically liberal versus conservative you see yourself as being," measured from 1 (liberal) to 7 (conservative) (Sibley, 2018).

Empirical Methods

Within-subjects MANCOVA was used to test for differences in attitudes towards (im)migrants and acculturation expectations. The within-subjects MANCOVA assessed two different measurements from the same participants, rather than the same measurement at separate time points. Within-participants designs are not without their pitfalls, notably carry-over and researcher demand effects (Charness et al., 2012). However, we selected this design because people's attitudes towards immigrants are likely to inform rather than be independent of their perceptions of future climate migrants.

To test the conceptual model (Fig. 8), we employed moderated mediation analyses through Hayes (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS (model 7). Moderated mediation analysis combines the effects of mediation and moderation to test the conditional indirect effect. This tests whether the indirect effect – the effect of the predictor (belief in ACC) on the outcome (attitudes towards climate migrants) through the mediator (distributive justice) – depends upon the level of the moderator (climate justice awareness) (Hayes, 2015; Preacher et al.,

2007). Statistical significance of the overall model was assessed from the index of moderated mediation, which computes the relationship between the indirect effect and the moderator. This employed 95% bootstrap confidence intervals of 5,000 bootstrap samples with homoscedasticity-consistent standard errors (Hayes, 2013; 2015).

Results

Table 6 provides descriptive statistics of demographic, climate change and immigration variables used in the analyses. First, a within-subjects MANCOVA was performed to test for baseline differences in migration attitudes, accounting only for climate change reality. These included significant differences in attitudes towards (im)migrants and acculturation expectations ($F_{within effects}(2.20,511.42)=47.96$, $p < .001$, Greenhouse Geisser correction, see Appendix E). To investigate these differences further, we re-ran the analyses with all covariates to control for demographic characteristics as well as climate change reality. Most people agreed that climate migrants and immigrants in general made positive contributions to Aotearoa NZ, even when accounting for demographic differences (Fig. 9). However, attitudes towards migrants and acculturation expectations differed, supporting H1, as shown from the MANCOVA ($F_{within effects}(2.55,512.09)=3.70$, $p < .05$, Greenhouse Geisser correction, see Appendix E). People felt more negatively towards climate migrants than they did towards immigrants (Figure 9, $p < .01$). They expected both migrant groups to integrate more than assimilate into society ($ps < .01$, posthoc tests with Bonferroni correction, Fig. 9 and Appendix E). However, climate migrants were expected to both assimilate and integrate less than were immigrants ($ps > .05$). Migration attitudes also varied by climate change, gender and political orientation, as Appendix E details.

Figure 9

Attitudes Towards Migrants and Acculturation Expectations for Immigrants Compared to Climate Migrants

Note. Higher score indicates more positive attitudes or stronger expectations, adjusted for covariates. Covariates included age, education, income, political orientation, gender, ethnicity, and climate change reality. Error bars = 95% confidence intervals.

Attitudes Towards Climate Migrants

To better understand people's responses to climate migrants, we analysed the links between their climate change beliefs and their attitudes towards climate migrants. Using moderated mediation analyses (Hayes [2013] PROCESS model 7), we first tested the conceptual model (Fig. 8) without covariates, then later included covariates for the final analysis. Excluding covariates, each path of the model was significant (*ps* < .001, Appendix

E) and the index of moderated mediation was greater than zero (index = 0.03 [0.01, 0.06]), suggesting that our overall model was significant.

We then re-ran the model with covariates to account for sample bias, differences in demographic characteristics and acculturation expectations (Fig 8; Table 7). For Path C (Fig 9.), belief in ACC was related to attitudes towards climate migrants ($p < .01$). On average, the more that people believed in ACC, the more positively they perceived climate migrants, as per H2.

Next, we tested the indirect effect (Paths A-B). For Path A, belief in ACC and awareness of climate justice were positively related to support for distributive justice ($p < .001$). Awareness of climate justice moderated the relationship between belief in ACC and support for distributive justice, in line with H4 (interaction effect: $ps < 0.05$, Table 7 and Appendix E). That is, the more that people believed that climate change was human caused and were aware of climate justice, the more they believed that states had differentiated responsibilities towards climate migrants. However, these relationships depended upon people's awareness of the unequal spread of climate impacts. Specifically, as people's belief in ACC increased, they were more likely to feel responsible for supporting climate migrants, especially if they were also knowledgeable about climate justice.

Table 7

Coefficients for Moderated Mediation of Attitudes to Climate Migrants on Climate Change Beliefs

Predictor	Path C: Direct effect on attitudes towards climate migrants		Path A: Conditional indirect effect on distributive justice		Paths B & C': Direct and indirect effect on attitudes towards climate migrants	
	Coefficient[a]	95% CI[b]	Coefficient[a]	95% CI[b]	Coefficient	95% CI[b]
Belief in ACC	0.13**	[0.03, 0.23]	0.23***	[0.10, 0.37]	0.06	[-0.04, 0.17]
Climate justice awareness	-	-	0.33***	[0.18, 0.48]	-	-
Belief in ACC*Climate Justice Awareness	-	-	0.06*	[0.01, 0.10]	-	-
Distributive justice	-	-	-	-	0.21**	[0.07, 0.03]
Integration expectation	0.37***	[0.25, 0.49]	0.23***	[0.12, 0.34]	0.32**	[0.20, 0.44]
Assimilation expectation	-0.22***	[-0.32, -0.12]	-0.08	[-0.18, 0.01]	-0.19***	[-0.29, -0.10]
Age	0.01	[-0.01, 0.02]	0.01	[0.00, 0.02]	0.004	[-0.01, 0.01]
Pākehā[c]	-0.30	[-0.672, 0.23]	0.16	[-0.24, 0.55]	-0.28	[-0.69, 0.13]
Other genders[d]	0.53**	[0.21, 0.86]	0.43**	[0.12, 0.74]	0.45**	[0.12, 0.78]
Education	0.12*	[0.01, 0.23]	-0.03	[-0.13, 0.07]	0.12*	[-0.26, -0.02]
Income	0.00	[0.00, 0.00]	0.01	[-0.09, 0.07]	-0.04	[-0.12, 0.04]
Political orientation[e]	-0.18**	[-0.30, -0.06]	-0.14*	[-0.25, -0.24]	-0.14*	[-0.26, -0.02]
Constant	2.67**	[0.34, 3.46]	3.54***	[2.41, 4.67]	2.52***	[1.24, 3.79]
R^2	0.63		0.69		0.64	
F-statistic	$F(9, 211) = 38.35***$		$F(11, 201) = 41.50***$		$F(10, 202) = 36.64***$	
Test of unconditional interaction	-		R^2 change= 0.01		-	
	-		$F\text{-statistic}_{interaction}(1,201)=6.41*$		-	
Paths A→B: Index of moderated mediation					0.0118	[0.0002, 0.0267]

Note. The following values were mean-centred: belief in ACC; climate justice awareness

[a]Unstandardised coefficients

[b]CI=Confidence interval.

[c]0= non-Pākehā, 1= Pākehā.

[d]0= male, 1= female, non-binary or gender diverse.

[e]1= very politically liberal, 7= very politically conservative.

*$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test)

** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed test)

*** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed test)

For Path B, being more supportive of distributive justice was significantly related to having more positive attitudes towards climate migrants ($p < .01$, Table 7). Finally, we tested Path C, accounting for the moderated mediation through Paths A and B and covariates. The relationship between believing in ACC and being positive towards climate migrants was no longer significant, confirming H3 ($p > .05$). This signifies complete mediation, i.e., that the relationship in Path C between people's belief in ACC and their attitudes towards climate migrants was explained by whether they were a) aware of climate justice and b) supported distributive justice-based initiatives (Table 7).

On top of this, these climate change beliefs were also related to people's political orientation, gender and acculturation expectations (as per H5). Consistently, political orientation was negatively correlated, gender was positively correlated, and integration expectations were positively correlated to all outcome measures (Fig 9. Paths A to C, $ps < .05$; Table 7). Conversely, support for assimilation was negatively related to attitudes towards climate migrants but was unrelated to support for distributive justice (Fig 9. Paths B and C, $ps < .01$). To summarise, respondents who were politically liberal, supported integration, and did not identify as male generally held more positive views of climate migrants. By contrast, respondents who wanted climate migrants to assimilate generally viewed them more negatively (c.f. Florack et al., 2013; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007).

Lastly, we tested all paths of the model together. The index of moderated-moderated mediation remained (marginally) significant (index = 0.0118, [0.0002, 0.0267][1], Table 7), accounting for covariates. In other words, people's beliefs about climate change and about justice interacted to predict how they perceived climate migrants. Moreover, host residents' openness towards climate migrants depended upon their awareness of climate injustices, as

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[1] The effect size is significant, though small. The Bootstrap confidence interval is positive, albeit small. Four decimal places are used here to show this effect.

per the conditional indirect effect (Appendix E). For people with average-to-high awareness of climate justice, the more they believed in anthropogenic climate change, the more likely they would view climate migrants positively. By contrast, for people with little knowledge of climate justice, believing in ACC had no connection to their attitudes towards climate migrants.

These patterns are depicted in the final model (Figure 10). Overall, people's attitudes towards climate migrants were related to their beliefs in anthropogenic climate change and their opinions about the distribution of its impacts, even when accounting for differences in sample demographics. Consistently, people who were the most positive towards climate migrants believed that climate change was human-caused and were also aware that its impacts are unjustly distributed. This pattern was observed on top of the relationships between climate change beliefs, acculturation expectations and demographic characteristics (Table 7).

Attitudes Towards Immigrants

For comparison, we assessed whether climate change beliefs were also related to attitudes towards immigrants. We re-ran the moderated mediation analysis for attitudes towards immigrants (Appendix E). Climate change beliefs were not tied to attitudes towards immigrants in general (the direct effect [Fig. 8, Path C], $p > .05$), so we did not test the model further. However, acculturation attitudes and political orientation were linked to attitudes towards immigrants ($ps < .01$). People who were more politically liberal, had higher integration expectations and had lower assimilation expectations viewed immigrants more positively.

Figure 10

Final Empirical Model of the Direct and Indirect Relationships Between Belief in Anthropogenic Climate Change (ACC) and Attitudes Towards Climate Migrants, Including Covariates.

Note. Numeric values indicate the strength of the associations between variables. Solid lines indicate significant relationships; dotted lines indicate the non-significant relationship when accounting for the mediation through distributive justice.

Discussion and Conclusion

Overall, respondents from this cross-sectional, opt-in study were positive towards immigrants in general and climate migrants specifically, including when accounting for differences in sample demographics. This positivity reflects previous findings about Aotearoa NZers' openness to cultural diversity (Perry et al., 2018; Sibley & Ward 2013). However, people believed that immigrants more than climate migrants made positive contributions to society, even accounting for sample characteristics and different levels of belief in climate change (cf. Ipsos, 2016; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). We propose that these differences in immigration attitudes are related to climate change beliefs and the effect of being complicit in climate migration.

Firstly, the difference in attitudes between immigrants and future climate migrants may reflect the uncertainties surrounding climate mobility. There were no official climate migrants in Aotearoa at the time of data collection, reflected in the survey questions which compare attitudes towards 'future' climate migrants with attitudes towards contemporary immigrants. Despite creating additional uncertainty, these different temporal framings assessed the abstract (Dreher & Voyer, 2015) and imprecise (Hoffmann et al., 2021) status of climate mobility discourse in Aotearoa NZ. In the absence of concrete information about the nature of climate mobility (Zaman & Das, 2020), respondents may have substituted the uncertainties surrounding the future of climate mobility with negative stereotypes evoked by mainstream media (Echterhoff et al., 2020; Swim & Bloodhart, 2018), such as Pacific peoples being financially 'dependent' (Allwood, 2013; Loto et al., 2006). While we accounted for climate change scepticism in our analysis, we did not directly test for such economic concerns (c.f. Stanley & Williamson, 2021).

Our model suggests that climate change beliefs contribute to these attitudinal differences. Individual variation in belief in ACC was related to warmth towards climate migrants through support for distributive justice. Being a cross-sectional study, our findings do not support causality nor the direction of the association. Namely, believing in ACC could be driving attitudes towards climate migrants, or attitudes towards climate migrants could be influencing belief in ACC. Nonetheless, our model does support claims that how one perceives the cause of mobility is tied to how one regards climate migrants (Echterhoff et al., 2020; Hornsey et al., 2016). That is, acknowledging climate change as real may encourage hosts to see climate change as a form of involuntary displacement, thus, to view climate migrants as deserving of assistance (cf. Verkuyten et al., 2018). Further, the mediation through distributive justice (Fig. 8, paths A and B) supports Nawrotzki (2014) in that responsibility for climate migrants may emerge when one observes the interconnectedness of human activities and

climate-related livelihood destruction. Combining Nawrotzki's and others' work (e.g., Helbling, 2020; Stanley & Williamson 2021) with our observations, we propose that acknowledging one's complicity in climate mobility fosters positivity towards climate migrants. Conversely, refuting human contributions to climate change may lead to denying Aotearoa NZ's duty of care (cf. Esses et al., 2017; Swim & Bloodhart 2018; Verkuyten et al., 2018). However, further research with an experimental design is needed to confirm this effect of complicity.

Awareness of climate justice was also conditionally related to support for distributive justice. This suggests that understanding the diverse impacts of climate change on people's lives may foster a sense of responsibility towards climate migrants (cf. Lujala et al., 2020). For example, people who connect climate change in the Pacific to livelihood disruption may be more likely to regard economic migration as a form of climate migration (cf. Spilker et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2018). Consequently, they might believe that major-emitting states have a responsibility to welcome *all* migrants from nations with an elevated risk of environmental degradation. However, there is much ambiguity surrounding migration drivers, given the routine omission of the historical and structural causes of climate 'vulnerability' in the Pacific (Dreher & Voyer 2015; Shea et al., 2020). Hosts may be unaware of justice-based arguments for accepting climate migrants (c.f. Swim & Bloodhart, 2018). Indeed, the observed differences in attitudes towards other immigrants compared to climate migrants (c.f. Arias & Blair, 2022; Helbling, 2020; Spilker et al., 2020) may reflect this lack of understanding. Going forward, it is important to understand whether host residents in different regions associate economic migration with climate change, and how personal immigration experiences, access to resources and climate justice beliefs inform their opinions.

Acculturation expectations were related to attitudes towards climate migrants, independent of climate change beliefs. Most respondents were open to climate migrants and

supported their integration (cf. Ward & Masgoret, 2008), although many people also endorsed assimilation. As assimilation implies a cultural loss, pressure to conform to hosts' expectations may disrupt migrants' cultural, linguistic, identity and spiritual ties to their homes (Allwood, 2013; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). Conversely, migrants' efforts to maintain their cultures and languages (i.e., integrate) may be met with hostility in regions where the hosts prefer assimilation – especially those where the residents are unfamiliar with climate migrants' (Pacific) cultures (c.f. Esses et al., 2017; Lujala et al., 2020). Nonetheless, our model suggests that educating the public about climate justice has the potential to counter hostility and socio-cultural concerns. Without having tested this experimentally, it is plausible that encouraging residents to connect local fossil fuel use with offshore environmental and economic insecurity could increase positivity towards climate migrants overall.

However, it is important to note that participants were first asked about immigrants and then about climate migrants, who are also immigrants. Complete independence of paired samples is not necessary for repeated-measures analysis (Nimon, 2012) but this pairing may have created a degree of overlap in responses. Furthermore, question order can bias outcomes in within-participants survey designs. Attitudes towards climate migrants may have differed had the question order been reversed or excluded prior reference to immigrants (Charness et al., 2012). Although within-person comparison was our intention, such biases may have reduced the strength of our overall model, which was statistically significant, despite the small effect size (Table 7). Furthermore, our findings rely upon a convenience sample, notably including proportionally more women, Pākehā and tertiary-educated people than in the general Aotearoa NZ population. Extending our study to a larger, more representative sample that controls for established relationships between economic concerns and immigration attitudes (e.g., Stanley & Williamson, 2021) may strengthen the observed effect of complicity.

Overall, we have demonstrated a persistent link between climate change beliefs and attitudes towards migrants which is not attributable to sample demographics and is unique to our regional context. In Aotearoa NZ, recognising that host nations are complicit in climate mobility may foster responsibility to accept future climate migrants and increase the chances that host communities will welcome them warmly. Nonetheless, complex interactions between residents' climate change beliefs emphasise that no singular response to mobility can be assumed across and within receiving countries.

Bridging Statement Four

The previous chapter gave an overview of the relationships between Aotearoa NZers' climate change beliefs, immigration attitudes and attitudes towards climate migrants (Yates et al., 2022a). This study contributes to a growing body of work exploring the factors that shape public discussions surrounding climate mobility (e.g., Arias & Blair, 2022; Blake et al., 2021; Hedegaard, 2021; Lujala et al., 2020; Mayrhofer, 2021; Spilker et al., 2020; Uji et al., 2021), but with a specific lens on Aotearoa NZ (cf. Stanley, 2021; Stanley & Williamson, 2021). Through a quantitative survey, we observed that people are more positive towards immigrants in general than climate migrants specifically. This difference was related to the constellation of people's beliefs about climate change, and in particular, climate justice. Chapter Four's findings demonstrate that Aotearoa NZers have diverse understandings of climate mobility, especially pertaining to its causes and associated responsibilities. How people respond to climate migrants appears connected to how they perceive climate change impacts, including whether individuals and, more broadly, Aotearoa NZ, are complicit in climate mobility in the Pacific.

When we designed this study, I believed that our quantitative survey would be able to provide sufficient detail to contextualise the collaborator communities' experiences of migration. Instead, the survey has uncovered a need to understand Aotearoa NZers' conceptualisations of climate mobility more deeply, and in particular, causality, complicity and hospitality. Firstly, Chapter Four contends that attributions for the cause of mobility may inform people's perceptions of climate migrants. Seeing climate change as inextricable from other causes of mobility such as economic challenges (Cattaneo et al., 2019; Piguet, 2022; see also Chapter Three) is likely to foster openness towards climate migrants. Yet, we note that most Aotearoa NZers are unlikely to understand the multi-causal nature of climate mobility nor the socio-economic and historical causes of vulnerability (Barnett & Waters, 2016; Gemenne et al., 2021; Piguet, 2022; Suliman et al., 2019). Anecdotally, this has been my experience. Friends

and family tend to repeat the ideas expressed within the scant media coverage of the topic, which tends to invisibilise the economic, political and colonial dynamics that structure Indigenous climate (im)mobilities (Sakellari, 2021; Whyte et al., 2019; Zaman & Das, 2020). Theoretical work has begun to disentangle the ties between societal rhetoric and residents' attributions for climate mobility (e.g., Baldwin, 2016; Stanley, 2021). Nevertheless, there remains a need for more regionally specific, empirical research about host residents' perceptions of causality (Ghosh & Orchiston, 2022; Yates et al., 2022a).

Our survey has also opened conversation surrounding Aotearoa NZers' senses of complicity in climate mobility. Chapter Four theorised that feeling complicit in climate change in the Pacific is important for accepting climate migrants. Yet, responsibility for climate injustice is morally ambiguous (Pottier et al., 2017). It is simultaneously idiosyncratic and nationally determined, depending upon the person and their connections to oppressive and fossil-fuel dependent structures (Methmann & Oels, 2015; Pottier et al., 2017; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014; Skillington, 2015). Further investigation is necessary to unravel this complex web of causes and consequences as they pertain to perceptions of climate migrants. Moreover, as noted in Chapter Four, acknowledging one's complicity does not automatically create openness towards climate migrants (cf. Helbling, 2020; Yates et al., 2022a). A complicit person, institution, or state may also need to accept their concomitant responsibilities towards frontline communities in order to act (Nawrotzki, 2014; Skillington, 2015; Yates et al., 2022a). Spaces that accept a responsibility for climate justice, like Aotearoa NZ's climate movement, may therefore provide useful insight into the functioning of complicity in the context of climate change.

The notion of 'welcoming climate migrants' raised in Chapter Four is equally vague. In Chapter Four, we gave a broad outline of "attitudes towards climate migrants", remarking that people's "warmth", "positivity" or "openness" towards climate migrants is related to their

climate change beliefs and immigration attitudes. While these findings provide a useful overview of the topic, quantitatively measuring "attitudes" has limited capacity to express the relational core of showing hospitality (Aparna & Schapendonk, 2020; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). Hospitality can be both a high-level policy discussion (e.g., MFAT, 2018; Pacific Islands Association of Non-Governmental Organisations, 2018) and an intimate, interpersonal act (Aparna & Schapendonk, 2020). I have observed diverse gestures of hospitality from host residents during my time in the climate space and working with the collaborator communities. Most climate organisations prioritise placing "friendship first" (Generation Zero, 2020) in any campaign, including when partnering with frontline groups. Likewise, many Māori and Tauiwi open up their homes and walk alongside I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans in their communities (see also Ghezal, 2022; Gillard & Dyson, 2012). These acts of hospitality embody diverse forms of connection that go beyond the migrant/host label. Indeed, there is growing impetus in the realms of research (e.g., Hodgetts et al., 2021) and activism (Helferty, 2020; Showden et al., 2022; Simons, 2021) to prioritise relationships with those that we support. Considering our survey in light of these relational perspectives demands a deeper analysis of residents' "attitudes" towards climate migrants.

However, emphasising relationality alone ignores the realities of power and privilege in many host-migrant exchanges. Internationally, sociological and psychological studies have theorised how national identity and populist attitudes drive notions of desirability and deservingness in accepting (climate) migrants (e.g., Khosravi, 2010; Sangaramoorthy & Carney, 2021; Stanley, 2021; Spilker et al., 2020; Verkuyten et al., 2018). Chapter Four connects these discussions to Aotearoa NZ, suggesting that climate migrants who conform to societal norms will be received more positively (cf. Allwood, 2013; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Stanley (2021, p. 10) goes further, articulating the conditions for a universally positive welcome:

'Success' for responsibilized migrants – they will be vulnerable (but without making demands on welfare services), culturally strong (yet conforming to white controls), and compliant, docile labourers (yet economically productive, innovative and able to pay their way) – is impossible to attain.

Stanley's analysis underscores the need to make visible the intersections of neoliberalism, capitalism and colonialism in Aotearoa NZers' responses to immigration. These contradictory demands scaffold the immigration obstacles described in Chapter Three. Moreover, we observed that they play a significant role in the mental health and well-being of the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities (cf. Sangaramoorthy & Carney, 2021). A review of attitudes towards climate migrants that side-steps these tensions would be thus incomplete.

Immigration research suggests that attitudes towards (climate) migrants cannot be explained by a singular theory; multi-level analyses are necessary (Ceoban & Escandell, 2010). Sociological and psychological studies have demonstrated that people's personal values, beliefs, identities, and experiences are related to their perceptions of (climate) migrants (e.g., Berg, 2015; Lujala et al., 2020; Helbling, 2020; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Yet, the majority of these studies employ quantitative methods to investigate a particular theoretical model (Berg, 2015; Ceoban & Escandell, 2010) – as we have also done in Chapter Four. These chosen methods atomise people's social worlds, preventing researchers' from capturing the multi-layered nature of attitudes towards immigrants. That is, perceptions of immigrants vary at the personal-level while also being influenced by intersecting meso-level and macro-level factors (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010). These can include public opinion, diasporic communities' visibility, legal immigration regimes, constructions of citizenship, and the manner in which these converge in each regional setting. Ceobanu and Escandell therefore assert that immigration researchers need to take a step back to consider broader socio-political contexts and institutions in their analyses. In the context of climate mobility, this points towards

connecting host residents' understandings of causality, complicity and hospitality to Aotearoa NZ's socio-political climate.

Speaking with Tauiwi who participate in Aotearoa NZ's climate movement provides an opportunity to contextualise host attitudes towards climate migrants. Climate activists are embedded in their/our communities as well as the climate space, making the climate movement a microcosm of the social forces structuring Aotearoa NZ society (Simons, 2021). Moreover, they/we contribute to contemporary public and political discussions about climate justice. However, the movement is largely affluent and Pākehā-dominated (Nairn et al., 2021; Simons, 2021) such that its priorities can be removed from those of Indigenous and Pacific communities on the frontlines of climate change (James & Mack, 2020; Nairn et al., 2021; Simons, 2021). Accordingly, Tauiwi climate activists are encouraged to reflect upon their/our identities, social positions and rationales for their/our climate justice advocacy (McLaren, 2022). In this sense, speaking with climate activists can offer a window into Aotearoa NZers' posture in relation to climate justice. In particular, climate activists may reveal the motivations undergirding Aotearoa NZers' perspectives on climate mobility, including how they understand causality, complicity, and hospitality.

Chapter Five therefore discusses youth climate activists' orientations to climate mobility in the Pacific. Using findings from interviews with young, mostly Pākehā climate activists and drawing upon my own phronetic knowledge from participating in the climate space, we explore how youth climate activists understand solidarity with Pacific activists and their communities when considering climate change in the Pacific. Specifically, we outline how the activists rely upon ethical principles inherent to neighbourliness to navigate their inexperience within the climate mobility. Our discussion leans upon a tripartite framework for approaching neighbourliness, which includes accepting accountability, rethinking hospitality and negotiating relational connectedness.

The research article that follows is the author's copy of a manuscript to be published in the De Gruyter *Handbook of Climate Migration and Mobility Justice.* Please refer to:

Yates, O. E. T., Groot, S., Manuela, S., & Neef, A. (In press). "Owning the reality of renting the skies": Youth climate activism and neighbourliness in the context of Pacific climate mobility. In B. Salami & N. Pauli. (Eds.), *Handbook of Climate Migration and Mobility Justice.* De Gruyter.

Chapter 5. "Owning the Reality of Renting the Skies" – Youth Climate Activism and

Neighbourliness in the Context of Pacific Climate Mobility

Introduction

Understanding and responding to climate mobility in the Pacific has long been a complex issue. Early policy approaches to climate mobility misrepresented Pacific peoples' migration priorities. These approaches emphasised notions of 'vulnerability' and presented Pacific peoples as 'climate refugees' who must relocate or else adapt to their degraded island home (Barnett & Waters, 2016; Black, 2011; Farbotko & Lazrus, 2012). Pacific activists and leaders rejected such terms, recognising that they patronise Pacific peoples (Fair, 2020), ignore their wishes to remain on their ancestral homes (e.g., McNamara & Farbotko, 2017) and conceal state powers' duties to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions (Enari & Jameson, 2021). Consequently, more recent scholarship has highlighted the agency of Pacific peoples to shape responses to climate change, ranging from immobility and resistance to cross-border migration (e.g., Farbotko & McMichael, 2019; McNamara et al., 2021; Piggott-McKellar & McMichael, 2021).

High school student Aigagalefili 'Fili' Fepulea'i Tapua'i evoked the issues above in a powerful speech, which declared that "[t]hey ignore that climate change is Pacific genocide" (Storytellers NZ, 2019). In this phrase, Fili Fepulea'i Tapua'i not only evoked the existential threats facing many Pacific islands (Suliman et al., 2019), but how "they" – non-Pacific, non-Indigenous people driving climate activism and policy – systematically exclude Pacific voices from the climate movement (Fagaiava-Muller, 2021). Her pronouncement came after the March 2019 School Strike for Climate (SS4C) in Aotearoa NZ, a global protest founded by international youth climate movement, Fridays for Future (de Moor et al., 2021). The strike was planned locally for the same day as Polyfest, a long-established festival of profound importance for cultural connection and pride for Pacific youth (Kaho, 2021). Fili Fepulea'i Tapua'i later

highlighted this clash on national television (Latif, 2021). This reignited calls for decolonisation of the largely affluent, Pākehā-dominated climate movement. Groups collaborated to mobilise 180,000 people for a second strike in September 2019 (de Moor et al., 2021). Nevertheless, one group, SS4C Auckland, chose to disband. They acknowledged having been a "racist, white-dominated space" (SS4C Auckland, 2021, para. 3) which "avoided, ignored and tokenised" (para. 3) Pacific and Māori climate activists.

Using the climate movement as symbolic of societal dynamics, this chapter explores the youth climate movement in Aotearoa NZ and their responses to Pacific climate mobility. In the next section, we begin by establishing the ties between coloniality, climate mobility and the climate movement. Following this, based upon interviews with youth climate activists in Aotearoa NZ with European ancestry, we explore how activists articulate their neighbourly solidarity with Pacific communities in light of climate change in the Pacific region. Their learnings and encounters provide lessons for host societies aspiring to be good neighbours through accommodating climate migrants.

Colonialism and Climate Mobility

Although low-lying Pacific islands like Tuvalu and Kiribati have limited options for internal movement away from climate hazards, many people prefer to stay on their ancestral lands (e.g., McNamara & Farbotko, 2017; Suliman et al., 2019). Yet, for some, geographical exposure coupled with historically constructed vulnerabilities drives considerations of international migration (e.g., Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Yates et al., 2022c). The New Zealand Government is preparing for climate mobility (MFAT, 2018) due to the nation's size, location, and socio-political ties to the Pacific (MFAT, 2018; Te Punga Somerville, 2012). This plan investigates options for regional immigration frameworks, expanding existing (labour) visa schemes, and creating a climate-specific migration pathway (MFAT, 2018).

Much of this response is predicated upon Aotearoa NZ's self-identification as a neighbour to the Pacific. On a regional level, Aotearoa NZ, Australia and Pacific Island nations inhabit the neighbourhood of Oceania, an interconnected network of relationships sharing a common border of ocean (Fox, 2016). Australia and Aotearoa NZ often justify their Pacific-oriented aid, actions, and policies through a commitment to support their 'Pacific neighbours' (e.g., Ardern, 2019; Lewis, 2015). Though implying goodwill and solidarity, this language evades any moral obligations towards emigrants from climate-affected states (Lewis, 2015). Lewis argues that moral duties are inherent to neighbourliness. Indeed, the "Good Neighbourliness" concept in international law imposes duties on states to cooperate harmoniously and avoid activities which create harm or tension (Sub-Committee on Good Neighbourliness, 1988). Consequently, Lewis (2015) proposes that Pacific 'neighbourliness' be leveraged to create stronger regional climate mobility strategies.

However, existing neighbourly relations in the Pacific neighbourhood are underpinned by colonial exploitation (Fox, 2016). Pacific peoples have a long history of relocation across an interconnected ocean as an adaptive response to their changing environments (Hau'ofa, 1994; Suliman et al., 2019). Indeed, Polynesian wayfarers traversed the Pacific Ocean to arrive in Aotearoa NZ, connecting the Pacific to Māori through whakapapa (complex genealogical layering) (Te Punga Somerville, 2012). Yet, forced relocation during the colonial era unsettled and disrupted Pacific mobilities. 'Blackbirding', the forced indentured labour of Pacific peoples, and its successor, colonial resource extraction, saw Pacific bodies dehumanised, exploited and relocated for economic gain (Stanley, 2021; Tabe, 2019). This degrading treatment continued, seen in the deportations of Aotearoa NZ-based Pacific migrants in the 'Dawn Raids' era of the 20th century (Anae, 2020). Today, many Pacific migrants face systemic racism, neoliberal immigration policies and labour exploitation while residing in Aotearoa – their so-called 'neighbour' (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Yates et al., 2022c).

The welcoming neighbour dynamic also conceals the ties between the climate crisis and colonialism (Gonzalez, 2020; Sealey-Huggins, 2017). The legacy of colonial imperialism is an economic system of excessive consumption beyond planetary limits (Chavers et al., 2021). This system was founded upon the assumed superiority of European society and industrial capitalism (Kluttz et al., 2020) which permitted the expansion of the imperial project across Oceania. In Aotearoa NZ, British and successive governments adopted mistranslations of *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* ('Te Tiriti', *The Treaty of Waitangi*, 1840), Aotearoa NZ's founding document, to assume sovereignty and the right to exploit Māori, their lands and resources (Huygens, 2011). Across the Pacific neighbourhood, imposing false borders enabled resource extraction while disrupting Pacific peoples' mutualistic relationships with the land (Chavers et al., 2021; Suliman et al., 2019). Today, lingering colonial mindsets threaten Pacific peoples' lands and cultures through continued fossil fuel extraction (Rice et al., 2021; Suliman et al., 2019). Yet, lowered socio-ecological resistance – the product of centuries of colonisation – constrains their abilities to adapt to these challenges (Bordner et al., 2020; Suliman et al., 2019).

Climate Activism

The climate movement is increasingly sensitive to this colonial influence. Climate action has proven effective in pressuring economic and political actors to reduce their emissions through technocratic, market-based approaches (Fisher & Nasrin, 2021). However, this approach conceals the systems of exploitation and oppression at the heart of the climate crisis (Ritchie, 2021). Subsequently, climate activists are advocating for societal restructuring, which includes dismantling the capitalist and colonialist systems that contribute to climate injustices (James & Mack, 2020; Ritchie, 2021; Whyte, 2018). As such, there is growing awareness that climate action alone is insufficient; the movement must reorient towards climate justice (e.g., Generation Zero, 2021; McLaren, 2022; Te Ara Whatu, 2021). Climate justice has the broader

aim of redressing the societal injustices preceding the climate crisis which contribute to inequities in vulnerabilities and decision-making (Schlosberg & Collins, 2014).

In Aotearoa NZ, youth climate activists have brought climate justice issues into the national and global consciousness. Māori and Pacific activists have been at the forefront of international climate activism, representing Indigenous issues at government and United Nations proceedings (Enari & Jameson, 2021; Ritchie, 2021). Locally, youth climate activists have progressed Aotearoa NZ's climate policy, spearheading Aotearoa NZ's legislation for a just and inclusive pathway towards net zero emissions (Ritchie, 2021). Nevertheless, persistent harm is incurred as the colonial legacies of Aotearoa NZ society manifest in the climate space (Simons, 2021). This has been evidenced in SS4C's aforementioned internal issues (Te Ara Whatu, 2021), which demonstrated that "Pacific Islanders are not on people's … radar, at all" (Helena Fuluifaga Chan Foung, as cited in Kaho, 2021, para. 8).

The politics of solidarity offer useful insight when considering non-Indigenous, non-Pacific efforts towards climate justice. Notions of solidarity explore how people – especially those whose social positions confer them disproportional advantages – navigate working across difference towards a shared goal (Land, 2011). Researchers have discussed the nature of settler support of decolonisation (e.g., Huygens, 2011; Land, 2011; Margaret, 2010), including furthering climate justice with Indigenous peoples (e.g., Helferty, 2020; James & Mack, 2020; Kluttz et al., 2020). Scholars argue that activists must move beyond 'allyship', which allows a passive and guilt-absolving identification with the struggle (e.g., James & Mack, 2020; Kluttz et al., 2020; Land, 2011; Margaret, 2010). Instead, they are encouraged to embrace the values of 'decolonised allyship' (James & Mack, 2020), grounded in reciprocity, relational accountability and collective learning (Huygens, 2011; James & Mack, 2020; Kluttz et al., 2020; Land 2015). Such critical discussions are also occurring in Aotearoa NZ's climate space.

The Present Study

Aotearoa NZ's climate movement reproduces the forces that shape wider society (Simons, 2021). Youth climate activists' experiences in their local communities spill over into their work in policy spaces. Therefore, understanding their perceptions of climate change in the Pacific may provide insight into dynamics underpinning the nation's climate mobility responses. Drawing upon interviews with climate activists conducted in 2020 and the phronetic knowledge that the first author has accumulated through her doctoral research and four years as a Pākehā member of the climate movement, we (the research team) investigate European-descendent youth climate activists' accounts of settler activism in the context of Pacific climate mobility. This discussion coheres around how youth climate activists perceive their place as Pacific neighbours. We explore how these activists approach solidarity with Pacific communities, discussing the place of an ethic of neighbourly solidarity, which is attuned to notions of accountability, hospitality and relationality. This tripartite framework for neighbourliness is designed to shape where and with whom we cultivate shared spaces for trust, dialogue and cooperative action (*cf.* Hodgetts et al., 2021).

Research Strategy

The research forms part of a collaborative mixed-methods study on the implications of climate mobility to Aotearoa NZ, conducted alongside Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland. It involved three stages: a survey of Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate migrants (Yates et al., 2022a), talanoa (free flowing, empathetic talk) sessions with members of the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities (Yates et al., 2022c) and interviews with European-descendant youth climate activists. The present study relates our findings from this third stage. An advisory board including Pacific community leaders, youth climate activists and Pacific research experts supported the project. The overall project leans upon the talanoa

methodology (Vaioleti, 2006) and community-oriented research (Cornish et al., 2018; Fernandes-Jesus, 2020) for a contextual, relational and transformative approach to climate mobility in the Pacific. Talanoa is a Pacific methodology that highlights the importance of reciprocity, cultural context and intersubjectivity in research (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014; Vaioleti, 2006). It is an effective community-focussed approach for climate-related research when exploring how grassroots groups contest unequal power relations (Cornish et al., 2018; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020).

As researchers of climate and mobility justice, our multiple identities and social positions shape our complicities in the climate crisis and our connections to one another. The first author is a Pākehā New Zealander with colonial settler ancestry. Her activist and settler background inform her beliefs that climate justice is the work of all of people and that non-Indigenous peoples have a specific role in supporting Indigenous leadership (cf. Land, 2011). This conviction recognises that our pasts, presents and futures are bound together; restoring our disordered relationships to the environment and each other would benefit all people. These positions guide the first author's commitments to activist-scholarship (Hodgetts et al., 2014) and relationality (Cornish et al., 2018; Hodgetts et al., 2021) within climate change research. The second author is a Māori community psychologist with extensive experience documenting and addressing precarity in partnership with Indigenous peoples and community services. The third author is a Cook Islands Māori social psychologist with a focus on Pacific peoples' ethnic identities and wellbeing within the Aotearoa NZ context. The fourth author is a development studies scholar of German descent with interest in climate change adaptation and climate mobility justice in the Pacific and globally. He has worked extensively in these areas with iTaukei (Indigenous) communities in Fiji as well as with Fijians of Indian descent.

The first author spoke with eleven youth climate activists in one-on-one online or in-person semi-structured interviews. All participants had European ancestry: eight identified as

Pākehā, one identified as Māori and Pākehā and three (who were first-generation immigrants) identified with other European nationalities. Hence, we refer to them collectively as 'Pākehā/ European NZers'. They were aged from 18 to 26 and had been involved in the movement for one to six years. Names with an asterisk are pseudonyms; others agreed to the use of their real name. Activists were recruited via snowball sampling through climate change networks. We did not intentionally only include people with European ancestry, although they were the only people who responded. Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Auckland Human Participants Ethics Committee Ref. 024001.

The enquiry followed Braun and Clarke's (2019) reflexive thematic analysis. This analytic approach works with rather than minimises our researcher subjectivities, allowing us to draw on our own experiences with activism and solidarity to guide our interpretations. The first author transcribed the interviews, checked them with the activists then inductively coded the transcripts using NVivo12. The first and second authors constructed, revised and defined these codes into latent themes, also noting surprising phenomena which were not explained by existing theory (Kennedy, 2018). We then mapped the ties between candidate themes, from which we derived the overarching concept of neighbourliness. Themes were checked with the third author before being finalised within a tripartite framework as 'accepting accountability', 'rethinking hospitality' and 'negotiating relationality'. The following section explains our findings.

Neighbourliness

Neighbourliness privileges Aotearoa NZ's relationship with the Pacific in host-migrant exchanges (Zaman, 2020). It transcends colonial-imposed borders to create modes of hospitality and connection that acknowledge climate injustices (Gonzalez, 2020). Moreover, it opens people up to accepting accountability for their failed neighbourly duties (cf. Enari & Jameson,

2021, 2019; Fair, 2020). The participating youth activists expressed their ties to climate mobility through the language of neighbourliness. One youth activist, Rilke (European, 18), stated, *"We have like, strong ties with Pacific nations because of that, like geographic closeness, that we have to be very open on a practical level to helping them."* Inherent in Rilke's understanding of neighbourliness are notions of accountability, hospitality, and relational connection.

We therefore divide our analysis into three sections: accepting accountability, rethinking hospitality and negotiating relational connection. These pillars of neighbourliness are expressed within the climate movement and reflected within Aotearoa NZ's multilateral partnerships. First, we discuss the youth activists' understandings of accountability, including identifying responsibility for and taking steps to rectify climate injustices. Then, we consider notions of hospitality as projected by the activists across the host-climate migrant hyphen. In the final section, we explore how the youth activists navigate the relational barriers that emerge from climate injustices to find common ground with their Pacific neighbours.

Accepting Accountability

The youth activists see the principle of accountability as the essential foundation to developing their neighbourly relationships. While accountability is differently construed across disciplines, at its core is a moral obligation to take responsibility for and provide an account of one's decisions, actions and subsequent outcomes (e.g., Brunelli et al., 2020; MacLean, 2019). Accountability is leveraged in the climate space to ensure that the states and corporations most responsible for climate change take concrete steps towards climate justice (e.g., Brunelli et al., 2021; Enari & Jameson, 2021; MacLean, 2019; Williams, 2020). In particular, the youth activists saw it as a tool to express Aotearoa NZ's responsibilities towards their Pacific

neighbours (cf. Enari & Jameson, 2021; Lewis, 2015), which emerge from their complicity in climate injustices.

Neighbourly accountability requires recognising one's multi-scalar contributions to the intersecting ecological and economic crises. This form of accountability can occur at the personal level, as Clara* (Polish, Scottish, 26), explained:

> *I really strongly think that everyone contributes to the world, so everyone has to be part of the solution* [to climate injustices]. *For me… that feels really clear. That even in small little ways, we're all emitting carbon … we have to like, own the reality of kind of renting the skies.*

In the excerpt above, Clara* notes that all people who participate in fossil-fuel dependent systems are complicit in climate-related inequities – regardless of the size of their personal carbon footprints. MacLean (2019) contests this perspective, arguing that unintentionally contributing to a harmful process does not inherently entail moral duties. However, the youth activists believe that their neighbourly position intensifies their personal and collective responsibility to minimise their emissions (see Land, 2015; Yates et al., 2022a). For them, neighbourliness is an ethical position with implicit responsibilities to support the well-being of those to whom we are relationally bound (cf. Lewis, 2015; Turhan & Armiero, 2019).

An element of accountability is derived from uneven systems of privilege and oppression. Clara* later said, *"I feel like a responsibility I guess, because of the privilege that I've been born into, and also like this historic responsibility of my, I guess, country and like, family."* Like Clara*, the youth activists understand that they have personal obligations to welcome their Pacific neighbours because they benefit from the systems at the heart of climate injustices: industrialisation, white supremacy and colonialism (Helferty, 2020; Sealy-Huggins, 2017). They extend this principle to the state-level, wherein they see Aotearoa (and other high-emitting states) as obliged to welcome climate migrants as reparations for their *"neighbourly*

debt" (Rilke, European, 18). This form of debt accounts for their current climate inaction, historic contributions to the climate crisis and benefits obtained from industrialisation processes at the expense of their Pacific neighbours (e.g., Gonzalez, 2020; Sealy-Huggins, 2017).

However, Aotearoa NZ disguises its neighbourly debt as an opportunity for generosity towards its Pacific neighbours. Generosity assumes that host nations stand in morally neutral positions; gestures of openness towards climate migrants are thus virtuous acts, surplus to national responsibilities. Adam (Pākehā, 21) identified the flaws in this reasoning:

> *Is it really enough, us being generous to them in the broad scheme of things? It's not. Yeah. I think, we've probably, in some ways, in terms of people in Tuvalu, I think we've probably done so much that I think that whatever we do, I don't think it's ever gonna be at the generous point.*

Adam highlights that seeing the acceptance of climate migrants as benevolent borders on the absurd; accepting climate migrants is not generous but a necessary expression of accountability to our Pacific neighbours. This language of charity and generosity serves to maintain a sense of comfort and moral righteousness while ignoring justice-based obligations towards Pacific peoples (cf. Land, 2015; Stanley, 2021). In Harry*'s (Pākehā, 24) words, it is akin to *"giving ourselves a pat on the back"* in place of seeing it as *"part of our own complicity"*. This posture towards climate mobility is underpinned by historical and contemporary power imbalances, as Rilke (European, 18) explains

> *We think we can handle environmental degradation better because we're richer or stuff like that… New Zealand doesn't really treat our Pacific partners as like equals because they have, you know, different ways of life that we see is like, you know, just 'less developed'…*

Rilke refers to how Aotearoa NZ's assumed superiority over Pacific nations (Lakanen, 2019; Loto et al., 2006) enables a patronising approach to neighbourliness. What she terms an

"underlying racist superiority complex" can lead Aotearoa NZ to position itself as the rescuer of those believed to be inherently weaker and more vulnerable. This inadvertently situates frontline Pacific communities as agents of their own misfortune, rather than identifying climate exposure as historically and economically constructed. Pacific leaders, scholars and activists reject this 'smallness' (Hau'ofa, 1994), deficit-based and depoliticised view of the Pacific (e.g., Enari & Jameson, 2021; Loto et al., 2006; Stanley, 2021). Nonetheless, it is re-embedded when wealthier states enact climate solutions without the input of their Pacific partners, such as Aotearoa NZ's proposed – and quickly withdrawn – 2017 humanitarian climate visa (see Anderson, 2017).

Thus, the activists believe that host nations must account for harms incurred through their pursuit of climate and mobility justice (cf. Simons, 2021). Clara* (Polish, Scottish, 26) said that middle-higher income nations *"need to take a step to the back…because the* [solutions] *that we've brought forward haven't worked, and they've like, you know, created a lot of the problems."* She makes reference to the exclusion of Indigenous and Pacific peoples from decision-making spaces. This can perpetuate colonial violence when Indigenous rights are obscured and chosen approaches prop up capitalist and neoliberal institutions (cf. James & Mack, 2020; Simons, 2021; Whyte, 2017). For instance, the youth activists identified that welcoming climate migrants under existing social and political settings risks re-entrenching precarity, as Harry* (Pākehā, 24) explains:

> *Climate-related migration is a thing. And we can't pretend that it's not. And, so, we have to have the policy settings to grapple with that. But we, our current immigration system is, is racist and it's, it is a system that is built on economic exploitation. So, to pretend that our current immigration system is going to do that well is, yeah, we'd be, we'd be kidding ourselves.*

In this, Harry* points towards the institutional barriers that climate migrants encounter in Aotearoa NZ. In lieu of designated residency pathways for climate migrants, they must navigate existing neoliberal and capitalist immigration schemes (Yates et al., 2022c), which treat Pacific migrants like *"second-rate citizens"* (Clara*, Polish, Scottish, 26). The emphasis on employment within some seasonal and permanent visa categories exposes Pacific migrants to low wages, workplace exploitation and sometimes deportation (Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Yates et al., 2022c). Several activists assert that being accountable for this system involves creating immigration pathways that prioritise migrants' well-being over their employability and ensuring that they can access meaningful work and livelihood security.

However, the youth activists recognised that they could not solely address climate mobility without striving to undo the works of colonialism (cf. Land, 2015; Turhan & Armiero, 2019). Welcoming climate migrants creates *"an opportunity to like, fuck up less than we've already done"* (Clara*, Polish, Scottish, 26). Instead of an orthodox response to mobility that upholds the status quo, they believed that Aotearoa could use this moment to transform society so that all people – climate migrants or otherwise – are valued equally (cf. Land, 2015; Turhan & Armiero, 2019). They advocated for a transformational neighbourliness, one that dismantles the "capitalist-colonialist matrix of oppression" (Whyte, 2018, para. 10) of which climate mobility is but a symptom. Some of their suggestions included supporting Indigenous governance (e.g., Kumasaka et al., 2021; Woods, 2020), reordering Aotearoa NZ's economic system, and redefining citizenship away from economic value (cf. Gonzalez, 2020; Simon-Kumar, 2015; Turhan & Armiero, 2019).

Rethinking Hospitality

Where accountability is the justice-related component of neighbourliness, hospitality is its relational twin. Neighbourly hospitality is enacted when the scale of the neighbourhood

shrinks to within the bounds of a nation. The activists spoken with frame hospitality as commitments to mutual care, respect and reciprocity towards those invited into one's space. This has not been the reality for Aotearoa NZ, whose Pacific relationships are patterned by centuries of exploitative exchange and displacement across Oceania (Tabe, 2019). Although the activists acknowledged these tensions, they saw climate mobility as an opportunity to restore balance to their neighbourly partnerships.

Hospitality begins with re-evaluating the role of the host. Typically, host governments have the power to deny migrants' claims to residency while host residents control the terms of belonging and inclusion in society (Antonsich, 2012). Many activists felt that this pattern negates the place of Māori and *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* (1840) in neighbourly relations. Harry* (Pākehā, 24) asserts,

> *I don't know if it's my place* [to say how Aotearoa NZ should respond to climate migrants]. *I think that's a place for Māori to be leading that conversation. And for everyone else to be recognizing our own place as migrants to this land first before we can even pretend that we have a right to judge, or just you know, have an opinion on how other people are coming to this land.*

Harry* suggests that the role of Tauiwi (non-indigenous Aotearoa NZers) in climate mobility pivots around understanding their/our responsibilities to Māori through *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* (1840), Aotearoa NZ's founding constitutional document. Although *Te Tiriti* upholds Māori sovereignty and affirms a relationship of mutual benefit between Māori and the British Crown (Mercier, 2020), Māori social and political systems were replaced by British neoliberal and capitalist institutions. Consequently, contemporary immigrants must integrate into the Eurocentric mainstream according to the demands of but one Treaty partner (Kukutai & Rata, 2017, p. 31). Kukutai and Rata advocate for an alternative immigration approach wherein Māori and Tauiwi have equal authority over decision-making. This gives space to Māori conceptions

of hosting that centre the value of manaakitanga, entailing mutual care, respect and power sharing. A response to climate mobility grounded in manaakitanga would reduce pressure on climate migrants to conform to assimilationist demands (Kukutai & Rata, 2017), allowing them to maintain the fullness of their cultural practices.

Yet, based upon populist rhetoric, many youth activists anticipate that people will only show manaakitanga when hosting is perceived as economically beneficial. Lucy* (Pākehā, 25) clarified:

> If I was to open a newspaper in like 2040… it would read something along the lines of like, "We can barely deal with climate change ourselves, [Pacific climate migrants] are taking up all our resources and we have to make bigger sacrifices if they come. They should have figured this out sooner, it's their fault."

Lucy*'s figurative newspaper column alludes to the impact of neoliberal and capitalist values on public opinion. Aotearoa NZ's immigration policy is structured such that migrants with greater financial capital are prioritised for citizenship (Simon-Kumar, 2015). Downstream, residents' willingness to host climate migrants becomes contingent upon whether they are perceived as economic threats or self-responsible, productive labourers (Stanley, 2021; Stanley & Williamson, 2021). As Lucy* contends, this conditional neighbourliness shifts responsibility for resettlement onto climate migrants to protect state financial interests (Stanley, 2021; Yates et al., 2022a). Potentially, climate migrants become the scapegoats for the economic and environmental consequences of capitalism and colonialism (Gonzalez, 2020), denying polluting nations' complicity in the climate crisis (cf. Sakellari, 2021; Sealy-Huggins, 2017).

The youth activists see reciprocity as critical for countering hostile and exploitative host-neighbour relations. Rosie* (Pākehā, 25) explains the role of the host in this:

> It's more than just being like, yeah, you can come stay here. It's like connecting them into the community … that can support them in getting used to New Zealand, or, you

> *know, just keeping connected to Pasifika culture, which is really important as well…and just yeah, planning for actually conducting them rather than putting them in somewhere, some social housing, and being like, 'Sweet, have fun!'*

According to Rosie*, hosting climate migrants is an active process with embedded responsibilities to prioritise the other group's well-being (cf. Allwood, 2013). From their knowledge of Pacific perspectives on well-being (e.g., Manuela & Anae, 2017; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020), they believed that host nations should provide holistic resettlement support, which includes facilitating the maintenance of their cultural and spiritual ties to their homelands (cf. Tiatia-Seath, 2020; Yates et al., 2022c). Such an approach privileges sociocultural connections ahead of the expendability of Pacific lives and livelihoods (Rice et al., 2021; Zaman, 2020).

Within this reciprocal hospitality is the recognition that the neighbours, in turn, would benefit the host community. Marcail (Pākehā, 18) believes that welcoming climate migrants would be an opportunity to learn *"values to do with community and the way that family works, and look at the way we treat the environment"*. Adam (Pākehā, 21) said that he *"would feel incredibly honoured that they chose New Zealand",* believing that,

> *We can have a different type of economic system, you know, that values the different types of work and that a community bring, that values the work of the elders, that values the work of the mothers, of the fathers, of all the different types of you know, of responsibilities that people have.*

According to Marcail and Adam, common Pacific values such as communality, reciprocity, holism and respect (Health Research Council of New Zealand, 2014) might balance out the capitalistic and individualistic ideals that dominate Aotearoa NZ society. Whereas perceiving shifts in social systems tends to provoke hostility towards immigrants (e.g., Allwood, 2013; Stanley & Williamson, 2021), the youth activists welcome climate migrants precisely for their contributions to societal shifts. This reflects the conversation in the climate space more broadly

about the "universal indispensability" (Rice et al., 2021, p. 12) of Indigenous knowledges and value systems. These are seen to foreground dignity and connectedness between people and their environments, a necessary pre-condition to a climate-just society (cf. James & Mack, 2020; Ritchie, 2021; Talia, 2021; Whyte, 2018, 2019).

Negotiating Relational Connection

Although neighbourliness is an inherently relational concept, premised upon one's position in relation to another (Zaman, 2020), the relational qualities necessary for neighbourly partnership can be missing (cf. Whyte, 2020). As the SS4C-Polyfest clash exemplifies (Kaho, 2021), different histories, social positionings and inequitable societal structures can fragment relationships between Pākehā/ European NZers and their Pacific neighbours (cf. Gatlin, 2020; Whyte, 2020). Nevertheless, the youth activists recognise the importance of togetherness to enable a just response to climate mobility.

This relational disconnect is visible in the language used to describe the climate crisis, which reflects the historical realities of Pākehā/ European NZers and their Pacific neighbours (cf. James & Mack, 2020). Alva (European, German, 21) says,

> *The loss I think that we're talking about is different to the loss that Pacific or Māori would identify... Pākehā wouldn't talk about a loss of culture, or a loss of belonging, or... that if we talk about climate justice, but we talk about, "Ooh, sixth mass extinction and plastic bottles."*

In this, Alva hints at the impacts of colonisation on Pākehā/ European NZers' experiences of climate-related loss. Through European industrialisation and urbanisation, ways of life centred on communal bonds between people and land were replaced by systems of monetary exchange (King, 2017). Associated values of capitalism and individualism were then exported by colonial settlers into Aotearoa NZ, concreting Pākehā/ European NZers' separation from a relational

understanding of the world (King, 2017). Many Pacific activists continue to draw upon relational ties, relating how loss of land, species and ecosystems can have profound impacts on social cohesion, collective identity, and cultural heritage (Enari & Jamieson, 2021; McNamara & Farbotko, 2017). In contrast, many Pākehā/ European NZer climate activists have yet to come to terms with the impacts of environmental deterioration on identity and well-being. Climate change instead is seen as an abstract environmental issue, disconnected from human and more-than-human relationships (Gonzalez, 2020; Whyte, 2017).

Consequently, the largely Pākehā/ European NZer climate movement regards climate mobility as a distant scenario. While speaking about climate mobility, Ben (Pākehā, 22) says, "*If climate refugees become more prevalent in the Pacific…*" He later corrects his use of *"if",* realising that:

> *I still have this idea that climate change is something in the future… and that what we're experiencing right now is … just a precursor to it, and it's not directly cause for action. But that's probably far from the truth.*

Like the wider climate movement, Ben's* engagement with activism was largely future-oriented, urgently pushing to prevent some dystopian catastrophe (cf. James & Mack, 2020; Nairn, 2021). However, Ben alludes to the growing recognition within the Pākehā/ European NZer climate movement that this approach misrepresents Pacific and Indigenous climate realities. Emphasis on urgency regards relationship building, which relies upon gradually building trust, as inferior to mitigating climate change (Whyte, 2020). Furthermore, positioning climate change as a distant crisis obscures the immediate threats for Indigenous and Pacific communities and negates their experiences of the ongoing crises of colonialism (Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; Gonzalez, 2020; Nairn, 2021; Whyte, 2017).

Income inequality can deepen misunderstandings of Indigenous and Pacific climate realities. Several activists identified that socio-economic status insulates people from engaging with climate mobility. Harry* (Pākehā, 24) says,

> *You know, I could go to work in Wellington or Auckland and there might be a, you know, extreme weather event every so often that meant that causes slight disruption, but you know, it would be very possible to live in a quite sheltered understanding of what's going on in the world right now.*

Harry* points towards the impact of wealth inequality on climate change apathy (cf. Sakellari, 2021; Sealey-Huggins, 2017). Communities with higher levels of wealth tend to be shielded from climate change, having greater capital to prepare for, adapt to or move away from environmental hazards (Williams, 2020). Inequitable wealth distribution intensifies other structural drivers of unequal climate impacts along the lines of race, gender, disability, and other identifiers (Sealey-Huggins, 2017; Williams, 2020). Possessing the wealth and subject positions to avoid or ignore climate change's greatest threats, or 'climate privilege' (Rice et al., 2021), is removed from the lived realities of many people. For Pacific and Indigenous peoples, engaging with climate change is not often a choice but a way-of-being, an outworking of the relationship with the lands that raised them (Enari & Jameson, 2021; Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; Helferty, 2020).

Whereas climate privilege creates barriers, storying builds bridges of connection. First, engaging with Pacific peoples' personal stories through direct relationships or activist networks fosters empathy. Despite his climate privilege, Harry* (Pākehā, 24) stresses that "*the stories and the ability to understand what's going on for people and their communities kind of makes all the difference.*" The power of storying is reflected in Katherine*'s (British, 22) time spent working alongside refugees.

It made [climate change] *more real for me, because before, you know, I thought about the polar bears … every time I think about a starving polar bear it makes me cry … But, but the people is quite easy to make a connection with. So, that sort of opened my eyes to actually there's gonna be a whole lot of people like this…*

Katherine* and Harry* demonstrate that listening to frontline people's stories can foster empathy, which breaks through apathy and disconnection. Empathy is about taking another's perspective, understanding their needs and feeling an emotional connection to them (Woods, 2020). This empathetic connection transcends the inequities that divide people, building a sense of solidarity with those facing climate change's greatest threats (Gatlin 2020; Woods, 2020). Yet, empathy alone is insufficient for solidarity. It can serve to atone for one's own guilt about climate change and universalise differentiated climate impacts into a general sense of victimisation (cf. Gatlin, 2020). Moreover, it masks the underlying legal and colonial violence that create climate injustices and separate communities to begin with (cf. Gatlin, 2020; Woods, 2020).

Beyond empathy, storying can spark a reflexive analysis of hierarchical systems of climate injustices (Gatlin, 2020). Joy* (Pākehā, Māori [Ngā Puhi], 20) recounts an exchange between a conservative politician and two Pacific youth, in which they confronted him about his technocratic climate solutions.

How on earth can you come up with an argument against someone who is saying that, "Look, I'm gonna be separated from my family, it's already happening that we're seeing all these storms…" Like that's the sort of power I mean…We all need to be challenged in that way, especially politicians like Michael Woodhouse[2] who fall into the 'not affected, will be fine' category of the climate crisis.

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[2] Member of Parliament (2008-2022) from the National Party, a centre-right political party.

According to Joy*, frontline Pacific communities' stories carry the power to unsettle complacency and raise awareness of inequitable experiences of climate change. Kluttz and others (2020) describe this as transformative learning, the lessons from participating in social movements that profoundly change people to become more inclusive. Frontline climate stories, heard through mediums like social media, protests, climate justice trainings, and personal relationships, reveal how intersecting systems of oppression – colonialism and capitalism – create uneven climate impacts and divide Oceanic neighbours (James & Mack, 2020; Kluttz et al., 2020; Whyte, 2017).

Lastly, combining different stories consolidates relationships between neighbours. Joy* continues her anecdote from above, saying:

> As someone with a science background, I was able to chime in with a couple of things, and like how Michael Woodhouse was so bullshit, whilst he was trying to steamroll them. And, they came up to me afterwards and said, like, "Thank you so much for being there." And I felt like that was the most useful thing that I will ever be able to do with my entire degree.

In this moment, Joy* recognises the power of solidarity for overcoming relational breakdown. Stories gained through her tertiary education could complement the Pacific youths' lived experiences to build an irrefutable case for climate action. Pacific and Indigenous climate groups assert that all people have skills to contribute to the fight for climate justice, whatever their backgrounds (e.g., Pacific Climate Warriors, 2021; Te Ara Whatu, 2021). These neighbourly relationships, which divest themselves of self-interest to prioritise collective gain, create what Sanga (2016) refers to as a "new neighbourliness". This partnership redefines the Pacific/ non-Pacific relationship to centre our shared humanity and mutual pursuit of an equitable future (cf. Land, 2011).

Conclusion

Local activist solidarities provide insight into host nation - climate migrant dynamics across the neighbourhood of Oceania. The intersecting forces of colonialism, capitalism and individualism, present in the climate movement (Simons, 2021), are likely to be reflected in Aotearoa NZ's climate mobility responses. However, the principle of neighbourliness provides an opportunity to transform hierarchical relationships between receiving communities and their regional neighbours. Neighbourliness exists where climate justice meets proximity. At its core lie interconnected notions of accepting accountability, rethinking hospitality and negotiating relationality, which cannot exist without each other. Accountability accepts major-emitting states' neighbourly debt to frontline Pacific communities (Lewis, 2015; Sealy-Huggins, 2017); hospitality then ensures equitable care for their holistic well-being, and relationality overcomes artificial divisions to foreground their humanity (cf. Stanley, 2021; Stanley & Williamson, 2021).

That is, neighbourliness places neighbourhood above nationhood (Turhan & Armiero, 2019). Nationhood emphasises the boundaries between host residents and migrants along the lines of nationality and citizenship. Given the exploitative relations between Aotearoa NZ and its Pacific partners, nationhood positions Pacific climate migrants as threats to the state's socio-economic institutions (cf. Stanley, 2021), outside of the nation-state's duty of care, and separate from obligations to Māori under *Te Tiriti o Waitangi* (1840). On the other hand, neighbourliness, as depicted by the climate activists, reimagines citizenship through reciprocity and connection. It begins in the home, first encouraging reflection upon the role of the host as reflected in *Te Tiriti* (Kukutai & Rata, 2017). Then, as an ethical code of behaviour (Lewis, 2015) and concomitant feeling of kinship (Zaman, 2020), neighbourliness guides host residents to reciprocally and respectfully coexist with climate migrants. While neighbourliness does not negate Aotearoa NZ's colonial history, it directs the state to reimagine its social and political

structures to avoid further harm and to promote the well-being of all who come to reside here on our shores.

Enacting neighbourliness can involve shifting the focus away from 'rescuing' climate migrants, towards strengthening awareness of climate change's causes and implications. Conversations about climate mobility are uncommon in Aotearoa NZ's climate groups, although the activists interviewed have baseline knowledge of the issue. Dialogue with Pacific people can effectively fill gaps in this knowledge, provided that states and individuals also reckon with their subjective ties to climate change and migration (cf. Lakanen, 2019; Land, 2015). Reflexive analysis of personal and national value systems, social positions, colonial histories, and collusion in unjust climate systems enables deeper understanding of the uneven outworking of climate change on Pacific and Indigenous groups (cf. James & Mack, 2020; Lakanen, 2019; Land, 2015). This awareness can facilitate empathetic understanding of the impacts of climate mobility for Pacific communities. Moreover, it can build a sense of collective accountability among non-Pacific, non-Indigenous peoples for the impacts of climate change and colonialism in the Pacific.

Accepting accountability does not beget an equal partnership with Pacific peoples. Power dynamics persist even in situations of solidarity as "the workings of power and contrasting relationships to colonialism eventually reveal themselves" (Land, 2015, p. 132). When Pacific and non-Pacific entities come together to further climate mobility preparations, contrasting connections to colonialism and climate change can structure the collaboration and its objectives (cf. Kluttz et al., 2020). Nonetheless, working through these tensions is crucial for furthering climate justice (Pacific Climate Warriors, 2021). Centring accountability in solidarity prioritises Pacific leadership and climate migrants' rights over assumptions of equality and takes responsibility for the outcomes of the partnership. This, coupled with neighbourly hospitality and relationality, can create a working relationship ordered around

reciprocity and commitment to a climate-just future which is divested of self-interest (cf. Kluttz et al., 2020; Sanga, 2016).

Yet, who decides if one is a neighbour? Assuming that neighbourliness is an automatic product of proximity has the same perils of allyship: it can become performative, self-serving and removed from discussions of rights and obligations (Kluttz et al., 2020; Lewis, 2015). Neighbourliness is not only created by geographical location; it is also wrought by proximity within social and economic systems (cf. Gatlin, 2020). Uneven relations within hierarchical systems of climate injustice can distance host residents from Pacific peoples on the frontlines of climate change. Host solidarity efforts which do not link to broader justice issues like migrant rights and Indigenous justice can further widen this gap. Instead, genuine neighbourliness connotes an "unsettled commitment" (Kluttz et al., 2020) to bringing close those made distant by industrial capitalism and colonial exploitation. Engagement in solidarity that works to restructure socio-economic systems would not only promote the well-being of climate migrants but also benefit all people as host societies become more equitable and connected (cf. Kluttz et al., 2020; Land, 2015).

Chapter Six. Bridging our Islands: Discussion and Conclusion

The preceding chapters of this thesis tell an unfolding story about the perceptions and implications of climate mobility to Aotearoa NZ with a focus on the Kiribati and Tuvaluan communities in Aotearoa NZ. We have examined the literature on the psychosocial and cultural implications of climate mobility in the Pacific (Chapter Two), 'restoried' climate mobility from Tuvalu and Kiribati to Aotearoa NZ (Chapter Three), analysed Aotearoa NZers' attitudes towards climate migrants (Chapter Four), and investigated youth climate activists' perspectives on climate mobility and neighbourliness (Chapter Five). In the introductory chapter, I referred to these chapters as different 'islands', situated in an interconnected 'ocean' of historical, social, economic, and political settings (Figure 2). Returning to this imagery, this discussion chapter bridges the connections between islands to convey their theoretical and practical implications in relation to well-being for Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in Aotearoa NZ.

I explore these well-being implications through recounting three different but connected stories of climate mobility. First, this chapter reconsiders Tuvaluan and Kiribati stories of routes (mobility) and roots (heritage, place attachment) in light of our other findings and the broader literature. I then examine the ways in which these journeys are enabled or constrained by narratives of hospitality in the host nation. Specifically, I argue that framing and borders construct climate mobility as a crisis of neighbourliness as much as a crisis of environmental change. Thereafter, I outline an opportunity for a new story of climate mobility with relationality at its centre. This final section argues for using a relational, climate-just approach in policy and research to better support the well-being of current and future climate migrants.

Stories of Roots and Routes

In the introduction of this thesis, I opened with a quote from Hon. 'Aupito William Sio invoking the ties between climate change and well-being for I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans in

Aotearoa NZ. Sio's words alluded to the ties between land and life (Falefou, 2017; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020) for Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in Aotearoa NZ. This is supported by this thesis (Chapter Three), in which community members remain transnationally connected to their roots, despite travelling on routes (cf. Clifford, 2001; Farbotko et al., 2018; Finney, 2003; Hau'ofa, 2008; Jolly, 2001). However, most community members expressed concerns about climate-related losses, regardless of the reasons for which they migrated. This suggests that existing understandings of the ties between routes and roots need to be re-examined to be responsive to the realities of Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in Aotearoa NZ.

Firstly, our research confirms that researchers and policymakers ought to be wary of mapping out routes (Pacific mobilities) – that have historically been fluid and circular (Suliman et al., 2019) – according to fixed and inflexible categories (Bridging Statement Two; Chapter Three). Each chapter in this thesis considers climate mobility as movement that is related to the impacts of climate change with a focus on movements that traverse state borders. Bridging Statement Two further clarifies that climate mobility occurs on a spectrum from immobility to cross-border migration (and back again) across a range of temporalities (e.g., McMichael et al., 2021; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2021; Tschakert & Neef, 2022). In this sense, climate mobility does not fit binary voluntary/forced and short term/long term labels (Kelman et al., 2021). The Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities' movements equally sit outside of rigid definitions of climate mobility, as explained in Chapter Three. Most people moved primarily for familial and economic reasons, although climate change is inextricable from their migration experiences and aspirations for the future. This reinforces the 'persistent fuzziness' surrounding climate mobility (Tschakert & Neef, 2022) that hinders estimates of the extent to which climate mobility is already influencing rates of Pacific migration (Campbell, 2022; Cattaneo et al., 2019; Neef & Benge, 2022).

Others experienced a new form of immobility within the host nation. That is, climate change appears to combine with societal barriers to prevent circular migration back to one's roots. In Chapter Three, we explained that Kiribati and Tuvaluan journeys of mobility are always oriented towards home; most community members longed to return to their fenua or te aba at some stage in their lives to strengthen their ties to their lands, cultures and identities (cf. Malua, 2014; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Siose, 2017). Yet, many people were unable to return due to expensive airfares, COVID-19 border closures (see Bridging Statement Three) and uncertainties surrounding their visas. Moreover, they felt that Aotearoa NZ provided a more reliable refuge from the economic and environmental challenges in their home islands (cf. Ghezal, 2022; Gillard & Dyson, 2012; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). Although they chose to remain in Aotearoa NZ, the choices available to them were constrained by interactions between climate change and societal factors (see also Chapter Two). This quasi-voluntary immobility appears to be a strategy that asserts the value of family well-being and their continued rights to health, education, employment, and self-determination (cf. McMichael et al., 2021). However, it may also create tension between belonging to their physical home and their symbolic home, the territories in which their livelihoods, cultural identities and values are rooted (Nakhid et al., 2007). Nonetheless, while return remained possible, most participants planned to visit their home islands – although only short-term – to *"refresh themselves"* (Lilipeti*, women's sautalaga; Table 5).

From these stories, it is unequivocal that climate change is already influencing migration to Aotearoa NZ. Chapter Three outlined that climate change played a role, albeit small, in most community members' decisions to travel to Aotearoa NZ and/or to return. In the words of Harry (Pākehā, 24, Chapter Five), "*Climate-related migration is a thing. And we can't pretend that it's not."* Combining the need for flexible frameworks (Tschakert & Neef, 2022) and the present reality of climate change for Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati, this thesis concludes that climate

mobility refers to movements, past, present and future, that are at least partially driven or constrained by climate change (similar to the search criteria applied in Chapter Two). I use 'climate migrants' to denote people who undertake such movements. Inherent in this definition is that climate mobility is not unidirectional but rather a circular, ongoing process of adjustment; the community members invest in maintaining ties to their lands while settling and putting down roots in their new homes (cf. Enari & Jameson, 2021). Linking migration to climate change in Aotearoa NZ is not without caveats – this risks minimising community members' agency over migration and drawing attention away from socially-constructed vulnerabilities to "stressors from the sky" (Lahsen & Ribot, 2022, p. 7). On the other hand, this definition also asserts the definitional fluidity of climate mobility, which may incentivise research on a wider scope of climate mobilities and their well-being impacts.

Indeed, this thesis demonstrates that climate change impacts the well-being of the Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati diasporas in Aotearoa NZ, regardless of whether they have explicitly migrated for climate-related reasons. Given the intimate interconnections between land and identity for Tuvaluans, I-Kiribati and other Pacific peoples, researchers have suggested that long-term separation from ancestral lands without possibility of return is likely to have enduring well-being impacts (cf. Falefou, 2017; Kelman et al., 2021; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020; The Kiribati Working Group, 2015). This is supported by Chapter Two, which establishes that communities' relationships to their ancestral lands are paramount in determining the psychosocial and cultural consequences of mobility. Similarly, in Chapter Three, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members expressed deep sadness and worry about losing their lands, and consequently, their languages, identities and cultural heritages. Such concerns and impacts are embodied within Tuvaluan and Kiribati conceptualisations of good health (te ola lei [Panapa, 2012] or te maiu raoi [The Kiribati Working Group, 2015], respectively). In these, that which affects land also affects identity, language, cultural and spiritual values, family and community

structures, and physical well-being. These interconnections reinforce the need for mental health and well-being support for I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans in Aotearoa that attend to local conceptualisations of health and well-being and that take climate-related impacts into account. However, more in-depth research is needed about the mental health impacts of climate change for other Pacific communities in Aotearoa NZ, especially as climate change worsens.

Nevertheless, not only are frontline Pacific communities intimately aware of the implications of land loss; they are already acting to protect their ties to their roots and secure the well-being of future generations (cf. Johnson et al., 2021). Across the Pacific, internal and cross-border migrants maintain a sense of rootedness through connecting with their ancestors, maintaining their governance structures, creating strong ties to family and community, and continuing their cultural practices (Chapter Two). In Aotearoa NZ, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans host frequent gatherings and celebrations which support living in te katei ni Kiribati (the Kiribati way) or faka Tuvalu (in the style of Tuvalu) and resisting threats to their lands, languages, identities, and social cohesion (Chapter Three). In line with extant mobility and Pacific literature (Ataera-Minster et al., 2018; Kapeli et al., 2020; Manuela, 2021), this indicates that Pacific languages, cultural practices and ethnic identities serve as protective factors against the potentially severe psychological consequences of climate mobility (cf. Barnett & McMichael, 2018). However, it is important to note that not all community members can participate equally in community, particularly irregular migrants. Moreover, not all community members can speak their Indigenous languages fluently, with fluency less common among youth (cf. MPP, 2022). This points towards the need for mental health and well-being services that are sensitive to climate-related challenges and cognisant of Pacific peoples' diverse experiences in Aotearoa NZ (cf. Manuela & Anae, 2017).

This thesis also lends weight to the buffering power of community networks against the adverse impacts of travelling on routes (cf. Manning & Clayton, 2018; McIver et al., 2016;

Torres & Casey, 2017). Although migration separates families, social cohesion is reparable (Westoby et al., 2022) and indeed can become a pillar post-migration (Chapter Three). As per Chapters Two and Three, community networks provide spaces to foster languages and cultural practices alongside offering material support and guidance with resettlement processes. However, simplistic discussions about the importance of social ties obscure the underlying reasons for which community networks can be so critical (Schwerdtle et al., 2018; Torres & Casey, 2017). In Aotearoa NZ, community members often have little choice due to the shortfalls of the neoliberal PAC and RSE visas (see also Malua, 2014; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021) and absence of climate-related pathways to residency. Individuals who do not have social connections are less likely to find a job, and therefore they must either return, having spent their life savings on visa applications, or remain undocumented and risk deportation. If migrants were sufficiently supported in their mobility aspirations, perhaps social networks need not bear the costs of resettlement.

Regardless, the power of community networks indicates that Pacific peoples' social connectedness and strengths counter the well-being implications of separation from one's roots. There is growing interest in the long-term implications of extensive land loss, despite varied predictions about the futures of low-lying Pacific island atolls (e.g., Kench et al., 2015; Mann et al., 2016; McLean & Kench, 2015; The World Bank Group, 2021a, 2021b), particularly in relation to statehood and identity in the absence of a physical state (e.g., Costi & Ross, 2017; Farbotko et al., 2016; Gianni, 2022; Kelman et al., 2021; Kupferberg, 2021; Pearson et al., 2021b; Suliman et al., 2019; Westoby et al., 2021). In Chapter Two, we make the case that retaining a physical presence on ancestral lands may be important for anchoring relocatees and migrants to their cultural, spiritual, ancestral and identity connections (see also Marino & Lazrus, 2015; Smith, 2013). However, Chapter Three provides evidence that people's ties to their ancestral lands will be carried in the hearts and minds of their people, regardless of the

future habitability of Kiribati or Tuvalu. This is not to say that losing land will have no consequences – bonds between lands and people mean that "any radical transformation of the land or separation from it… is likely to be a catalyst for profound identity loss" (Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020, p. 402). Instead, it indicates that there are alternative possible futures beyond a "large scale alteration" (Kelman et al., 2021, p. 5) or "absolute loss" (Pearson et al., 2021b, p. 7) of cultural heritage, identities and language, in which frontline Pacific communities continue to thrive away from their homelands.

Indeed, in our research, many Aotearoa NZ-born Kiribati and Tuvaluan children continue to participate in community activities and dances, can speak the language to some degree and have a strong sense of ethnic identity. This is largely due to the continued efforts of their families, elders and churches, who invest in passing on their knowledge and practices, and through support from government-funded events, such as the Pacific Language Weeks (Chapter Three). Other externally relocated communities have similarly worked together to maintain their island identities, cultures and languages across generations, such as the Gilbertese on Wagina, Banabans on Rabi and Vaitupuans on Kioa (Falefou, 2017; McAdam, 2014; 2015; Tabe, 2019). Yet, these historical movements were into unpopulated environments, arguably enabling a greater degree of communality, self-determination and self-governance than is currently experienced by Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in Tāmaki Makaurau Auckland (Chapters Two and Three; cf. McAdam, 2016; Tabe, 2019). This difference highlights that government support of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan-led initiatives is vital, especially as subsequent generations of I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans are born in Aotearoa NZ. By combining ongoing, intergenerational efforts and strengthened government support, it is possible that Tuvaluan and Kiribati roots, identities and ways of being may never be completely lost – despite travelling on routes (see also Enari & Jameson, 2021; Campbell, 2010; Malua, 2014; Suliman et al., 2019).

Any efforts to support the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in Aotearoa NZ must be responsive to Aotearoa NZ's urban, individualised, neoliberal and settler-colonial context. Our research demonstrates that Aotearoa NZ's policies and societal dynamics influence people's connections to their roots (cf. Bhatia & Ram, 2009). For instance, pressures to conform to individualised social norms and the *"minority-in-a-minority"* statuses of Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati in Aotearoa NZ disrupt the generational continuity of cultural knowledge and language. This indirectly shifts people's connection to their homelands. For those who wish to return to Tuvalu or Kiribati to refresh their ties to their roots, costly flights coupled with low wages and visa insecurity can hinder many people from visiting or returning home. More than this, Aotearoa NZ's systemic reliance upon fossil fuels (Climate Action Tracker, 2021) heightens the probability of widespread land loss in the Pacific. Furthermore, many of these societal issues are an extension of colonialism, wherein rigid immigration systems, hegemonic individualism and carbon capitalism indirectly contribute separation from ancestral lands (Gonzalez, 2020; Rice et al., 2021). From this, it is apparent that the themes from Chapter Two, 'social factors influencing acculturation' and 'relationships to land', are inseparable.

Consequently, the well-being impacts of travelling on routes are heightened for people who experience other structural disadvantages (see Campbell, 2022; Gemenne et al., 2021; Gonzalez, 2020; Tschakert & Neef, 2022). Our research provides preliminary evidence that women, young people, elders, and people with disabilities face additional challenges when journeying to and resettling in Aotearoa NZ, although more research is needed. Tuvaluan and Kiribati elders are pillars in family homes, yet many are ineligible for the PAC and RSE and must find other, often more precarious or irregular solutions to migration (Chapter Three). Young people also face unique challenges, such as developing a sense of ethnic identity against the ongoing threat of identity loss (Chapter Three). Further, women are disproportionately affected by internal and cross-border mobilities due to exclusion from decision-making and

their additional domestic responsibilities (Chapters Two and Three; see also: Gemenne et al., 2021; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). I note that we and others have only reported gendered impacts in relation to binarised genders; there is little knowledge about LGBTQIA+ people's experiences of climate mobility (Campbell, 2022). Finally, according to Chapters Two and Three, people with disabilities seem to encounter greater barriers to resettlement related to additional healthcare costs, inaccessible homes (cf. Campbell, 2022; Schwerdtle et al., 2020) and Aotearoa NZ's ableist immigration policies (Ayoubi & Orakani, 2022). These diverse experiences indicate the need to pay greater attention to the ways in which pre-existing vulnerabilities shape people's experiences of routes and roots.

Therefore, this thesis implies that the well-being consequences of climate mobility – like climate vulnerability itself – are as much a function of host society as they are of climate change (cf. Voyatzis-Bouillard & Kelman, 2021). Many Tuvaluan and Kiribati community members indicated that 'climate change is not the only issue' (Chapter Three, Figure 6); they faced other, more immediate challenges as they navigated social and economic systems of non-belonging. These societal factors can explain many of the links between routes, roots and well-being. For example, constructions of migrants as undesirable are often used to justify punitive policies and institutional mandates that exclude migrants from full societal participation (Sangaramoorthy & Carney, 2021; Stanley, 2021). Similarly, societal discrimination, xenophobia and marginalisation can have direct, adverse impacts on Pacific peoples' sense of value, cultural identity, participation in community activities, and overall mental health and well-being (Ataera-Minster & Trowland, 2018; Kapeli et al., 2020; Sangaramoorthy & Carney, 2021). Thus, host residents' perceptions of their Pacific neighbours shape, to a degree, frontline Pacific people's abilities to remain connected to their roots, to participate in community life and ultimately, to live well (see also Echterhoff et al., 2020; Kelman et al., 2021; Voyatzis-

Bouillard & Kelman, 2021). I explain this below by returning to the concept of neighbourliness (Chapter Five).

Stories of a Neighbourly Crisis

In Chapter Five, we explained that Aotearoa NZ has not upheld its neighbourly obligations to accept accountability for climate injustices, offer hospitality so all can benefit and foreground relationality to overcome relational breakdown. According to Whyte (2020), similar qualities are often missing in partnerships with Indigenous communities, such that the impacts of climate change on Indigenous communities cross a 'relational tipping point' (p. 7). Extending Whyte's argument, our research suggests that climate mobility is a crisis of neighbourliness as much as of environmental change. Continuing to avoid the responsibilities of neighbourliness is already having significant well-being impacts for Pacific communities. That is, Aotearoa NZ currently offers migrants conditional hospitality (Khosravi, 2010) according to their perceived deservingness of residency in Aotearoa NZ. These perceptions of deservingness are then enacted at the border, creating new forms of climate-related precarity. Leaving these issues unaddressed pushes Aotearoa NZ towards a relational tipping point (Whyte, 2020), which suggests a need to re-evaluate the migration-as-adaptation discourse.

Conditional Hospitality

According to Asafo (2022), the UNHRC denied residency to Mr. Teitiota because of racist and arbitrary assumptions about what constitutes a life with dignity in Kiribati (cf. *Ioane Teitiota v New Zealand,* 2020). This thesis indicates that the Aotearoa NZ public and government use similar arbitrary heuristics to determine whether their Pacific neighbours on the frontlines of climate change are deserving of hospitality, residency and belonging in Aotearoa NZ (cf. Hedegaard, 2021). Much of this relates to the framing of climate mobility in

the public imagination, which carries implicit assumptions about the forcedness of mobility, its temporal and geographic proximity and climate migrants' perceived alignment with societal values (cf. Esses et al., 2017; Gemenne et al., 2021; Stanley, 2021).

Firstly, this thesis confirms the problems of vulnerability-oriented framing of the Pacific. Chapter Three suggests that public attitudes towards climate migrants relate to the perceived causes of migration, supporting others' research (e.g., Arias & Blair, 2022; Hedegaard, 2021; Helbling, 2020; Lujala et al., 2020; Spilker et al., 2020). These perceptions are underpinned by the extent to which migration is regarded as forced, typically determined by local understandings of migration. Central to this are notions of 'vulnerability', which can lend weight to claims of forcedness (Hodge, 2019; Offner & Marlowe, 2021; Sakellari, 2021), while simultaneously engendering patronising, ill-suited responses to mobility (Mayrhofer, 2021; Sakellari, 2021; Weatherill, 2022).

This thesis further indicates that repeating notions of forcedness and vulnerability in Aotearoa NZ may entrench stereotypes of Pacific peoples as welfare-dependent and 'unskilled' (see Chapter Four; Enoka, 2019; Loto et al., 2006). These stereotypes reduce Pacific peoples to their productive capacity while ignoring their non-economic contributions to society, such as their Indigenous environmental knowledges and roles in uplifting community well-being (Chapter Three). Moreover, such outcomes imply that migrants' right to belong is subject to host residents' biases and preconceptions about the Pacific (cf. Asafo, 2022). According to this thesis, many Aotearoa NZers do not understand the underlying reasons for which Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati journey to Aotearoa NZ (Chapters Four and Five). This lack of knowledge is likely heightened by the ambiguities surrounding the futures of Tuvalu and Kiribati (The World Bank Group, 2021a, 2021b). This creates a double bind: Aotearoa NZers may deny hospitality to those who migrate as economic migrants, who may be perceived as voluntary migrants, despite the links between climate change and economic migration (Hauer et al., 2020; Kelman,

2015; Piguet, 2022). At the same time, they may deny hospitality to people who make claims of forced climate mobility, regardless of their lived experiences of climate change, because their lives are not yet perceived to be sufficiently at risk.

Constructions of conditional hospitality may also relate to the temporal and spatial framing of the climate crisis. In Chapter Five, I explained that framing climate mobility as a distant threat can undermine Indigenous and Pacific peoples' present-day experiences of climate change (Gonzalez, 2020; Nairn et al., 2021; Whyte, 2020). I have observed the same mindset within political spaces. Policymakers are preparing for future impacts (cf. MFAT, 2021a; MFE, 2022; Zaman & Das, 2020) while climate change is already impacting the lives of Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati. This reflects the 'slow violence' of climate change, which Nixon (2011) describes as "a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not viewed as violence at all" (p. 2). I use slow violence to relate the ways in which the gradual worsening of climate change in the Pacific invisibilises the experiences of those who are migrating in the present. Consequently, people who are making claims to residency on climate-related grounds, such as Mr. Ioane Teitiota (Asafo, 2022) and several community members, are denied hospitality. The slow violence of climate change in the Pacific then heightens the legal violence (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012) of climate mobility by diminishing pressure to legislate on climate mobility and shifting responsibility for action onto future peoples (see Chapter Three).

Based upon psychological distance research (Singh & Swanson, 2017; Spence et al., 2012; Pearson et al., 2021a), it is possible that describing climate mobility as current and ongoing may build momentum to develop climate mobility policy and support the well-being of climate migrants. Yet, there are several warnings within this. Firstly, emphasising the immediacy of climate mobility when Aotearoa NZers appear to know little about climate

mobility (Chapters Four and Five) risks sparking fear of climate migrants. That is, urgency framing may invoke notions of "climate barbarians at the gate" (Bettini, 2013, p. 63; see also, Dreher & Voyer, 2015), increasing hostility and discrimination towards climate migrants. Such hostility is likely to have detrimental impacts on Pacific people's mental health and well-being (cf. Kapeli et al., 2020; Manuela, 2021). Secondly, urgency framing may create pressure to act quickly on climate mobility such that the relational qualities of neighbourly partnerships are bypassed (as outlined in Chapter Five; cf. Whyte, 2020). Respecting relationships in the context of climate mobility is important as healthy relationships are vital elements of Kiribati, Tuvaluan and other Pacific peoples' well-being and sense of belonging (Ataera-Minster & Trowland, 2018; Panapa, 2012; The Kiribati Working Group, 2015). However, hastily developing climate mobility policies does not allow time to invest in relationship building. As a result, hurried climate mobility policies may not reflect the needs of climate migrants, and relationships between host governments, host residents and frontline groups may be strained. (This occurred surrounding Aotearoa NZ's withdrawn climate humanitarian visa [Neef & Benge, 2022].) Therefore, it is important that climate mobility be approached in a nuanced manner that balances urgency with slowly building reciprocal relationships.

Our research further implies that perceptions of deservingness connect to whether climate migrants are believed to conform with the norms of individualism and neoliberalism. In 2013, Allwood reported that Aotearoa NZers are concerned about climate migrants disrupting host society cohesion and culture. Our survey research in Chapter Four suggests that some Aotearoa NZers continue to hold such sociocultural concerns. However, it appears that most Aotearoa NZers predominantly fear the disruption of Aotearoa NZ's economy (as supported by other research, e.g., Hedegaard, 2021; Stanley & Williamson, 2021; Uji et al., 2021). As surmised from our survey (Chapter Four), the climate activists' insights (Chapter Five) and the community members' migration journeys, climate migrants are offered

conditional hospitality (Khosravi, 2010) that depends upon their conformity to neoliberal capitalism. Therefore, while emphasising climate migrants' economic value may foster a sense of openness towards climate mobility, it may also fuel hostility towards people perceived to be burdensome to the economy, such as elders and irregular migrants – despite evidence to the contrary (Chapter Three; also, MPP, 2021b; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021).

In this section, I have argued that the framing of climate mobility can influence host residents' hospitality towards frontline Pacific communities, and therefore, Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati well-being. These arguments might be condensed and mapped onto the discussion of 'climate refugees' versus 'climate migrants'. For instance, 'climate refugees' has connotations of vulnerability, forcedness and urgency (Felli, 2013; Gemenne et al., 2021; Offner & Marlowe, 2021). Meanwhile, 'climate migrants' implies voluntariness, autonomy and economic independence. Evidently, these two labels have strengths and pitfalls, such that Stanley (2021) concludes that 'success' for responsibilized migrants….is impossible to attain" (p. 144, see Bridging Statement 4). Arguments appealing to 'climate refugees'' vulnerability and immediate needs may increase perceptions that they are deserving of hospitality and invoke responses appealing to benevolence and compassion (also see Sakellari, 2021). At the same time, such arguments have the potential to increase hostility towards frontline Pacific communities and engender patronising or misrepresentative policy responses (see Chapter Five). On the other hand, foregrounding 'climate migrants' autonomy, self-reliance and productive capacity may increase their perceived desirability as future citizens. However, this approach risks undermining climate migrants' perceived deservingness of compassion, and it may also exclude so-called 'non-productive' residents from societal belonging.

Bordered Hospitality

These heuristics for providing hospitality are not abstract but have very real impacts on frontline Pacific communities' lives. Conditional hospitality is enacted at the border and then used to determine climate migrants' rights to access the 'citizenship privileges' (Skillington, 2015) of other Aotearoa NZers. As a result, borders engender precarity by restricting Pacific mobilities, legitimating neoliberal value judgements and limiting service access. Suliman et al. (2019, p. 312) explains the role of borders in relation to Pacific climate mobilities:

> The confines of the nation-state, with its rigid border controls, sedentarism and ultimately poor support of mobility people who do not fit the criteria of the wealthy, industrialised-world passport holder, work strongly against Pacific Island people finding their own mobile destinies in a changing climate.

As Suliman alludes to, state borders constrain and disrupt fluid, circular mobility journeys, which could otherwise be agentic responses to the climate crisis. Climate mobility labels then work to uphold coloniality within immigration policies by affirming false dichotomies between the deserving/undeserving, forced/voluntary migrants (Chapter Two, see also, Bates-Eamer, 2019) and affirming state sovereignty to stratify and exclude migrants (Collins, 2022). According to Chapter Three, many Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati who wish to migrate for climate-related reasons cannot do so because of the climate mobility policy gap. This limits frontline Pacific communities' options for moving away from sites of climate risk (should they wish to do so) and makes it likely that they will be exposed to heighted risk of adverse climate-related impacts.

Borders then enact precarity through neoliberal judgements of migrants' worth. Due to the climate mobility policy gap, wayfinders must find their own migration solutions, often using existing migration pathways or temporary visas to traverse state borders. At the border, they are subject to immigration controls, which determine their suitability for residency according to the aforementioned neoliberal ideals of belonging (Simon-Kumar, 2015; Stanley, 2021). This

is upheld by neoliberal immigration policies (Simon-Kumar, 2015), with a preference for so-called skilled applicants and migrants with investment-ready capital. Successful applicants are then expected to be productive, independent, self-reliant individuals (Stanley, 2021) who can navigate complex immigration systems without government immigration support. Many Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati have little options but to accept this 'invisible bargain' (Pugh, 2020) due to having few other pathways to safety from climate change and the precarious nature of their residency and work lives (Chapter Three). If applicants are denied, they can either be deported, return 'voluntarily' to their homelands (after having sold their belongings and spent their life savings on visa applications) or remain in Aotearoa NZ as irregular migrants, in a constant state of deportability (Rosenberg, 2022).

Finally, precarity is maintained post-border crossing by controlling access to services. According to Chapter Two's review, the boundaries of customary tenure heavily influence the outcomes of mobility by shaping resource access and the availability of land. In the context of cross-border mobility specifically, borders serve as the defining line around eligibility for permanent residency and the citizenship privileges (Skillington, 2015) it affords (as per Chapter Three). As Nguyen and Kenkel (2021) explain, people on temporary or invalid visas are ineligible for subsidised healthcare, tertiary education, state welfare, and most forms of employment and housing. Our research demonstrates that these support shortfalls are exacerbated by the lack of resettlement support provided within existing resettlement schemes, especially the PAC, and the lack of pathways to residency for irregular. Consequently, many community members are left in limbo, under constant pressure from their unrecognised or temporary status and mounting debts, creating additional stress, anxiety and depression (Chapter Three; Thompson, 2015).

Following these arguments, it is evident that precarity is not a natural outcome of climate mobility but rather the product of a crisis of neighbourliness. Frontline Pacific

communities' experiences of precarity reflect active political processes and responses to climate-related threats on behalf of their neighbours that make frontline Pacific communities' lives precarious (see Chapter Three; Bates-Eamer, 2019; Hodge, 2019). Hodge (2019) describes this as "the process of making precarious" (p. 88), which is prescribed by the state through discriminatory immigration policies and non-recognition of migrants' values, identities and cultural practices. Accordingly, Castañeda et al. (2015) assert that immigration is a societal determinant of health because it influences all relationships and engagements with structural and political forces. However, I contend that immigration is not a societal determinant of health as much as are the colonial borders that separate neighbours and enable arbitrary assumptions of desirability and deservingness. These assumptions are ascribed to mobile peoples and then disconnect them from dignity- and well-being-affirming spaces. One could hardly consider this a neighbourly welcome.

A Relational Tipping Point?

Without addressing the impacts of conditional hospitality and neoliberal borders, Aotearoa NZ may cross a relational tipping point (Whyte, 2020). According to Whyte, a relational tipping point is passed when extractive partnerships between non-Indigenous and Indigenous peoples produce irreversible impacts on Indigenous peoples' well-being. Aotearoa NZ's relational tipping point appears to involve sustained inaction on climate mobility, such that we rely upon existing immigration, economic and social systems to facilitate climate mobility. This approach may have long-lasting impacts on I-Kiribati, Tuvaluans and other frontline Pacific peoples.

In lieu of climate mobility-specific policies, I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans who wish to secure their safety from climate change must follow existing labour-reliant migration pathways like the PAC and RSE visas. These focus on economic productivity over supporting migrants'

dignity (Enoka, 2019; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020; Simon-Kumar, 2015). Many PAC migrants and RSE workers are constrained to low-wage and insecure employment, which create additional barriers to financial security and sending remittances back to Tuvalu or Kiribati. Meanwhile, the New Zealand government and industries profit from using Pacific bodies as cheap labour (Enoka, 2019) as migrant workers (including those without visas) continue to fill low-wage labour gaps and pay tax. Moreover, Aotearoa NZ's neoliberal immigration policies shift responsibility for facilitating migration and resettlement onto frontline Pacific communities, who cover flights, application fees and other costs out of their personal and collective pockets. This brings into question the value of migration as an adaptive solution. Migration-as-adaptation discourse typically assumes that mobility will confer reciprocal benefits to migrants (and their home countries) and host societies (Dun et al., 2020). However, this example demonstrates that the benefits of labour mobility skew towards one neighbour, while the other faces unexpected social and economic challenges (cf. Felli, 2013).

This imbalance is further noticeable considering the well-being trade-offs that frontline Pacific communities must negotiate. As per Chapter Two, moving away from sites of climate risk alleviates climate-related anxieties but also disrupts livelihoods, threaten identity loss, and re-embed power imbalances between mobile community and development partners. In the context of Aotearoa NZ, many Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati felt physically safe from climate hazards, although social exclusion, economic insecurity, unfamiliar societal systems, and risks of deportation created new threats to their psychological safety (Chapter Three, also Bates-Eamer, 2019). Consequently, mobility may secure the well-being of future generations, while simultaneously creating unexpected, immediate resettlement obstacles, which compromise migrants' health and well-being. These trade-offs create "untenable choices" (Kelman et al., 2021, p. 10) between immobility and migration. Cultural heritage and community networks can

buffer these impacts to some extent, but the mental health and well-being challenges of migration bring a simplistic view of migration-as-adaptation into question (see Chapter Three).

Moreover, climate mobility within existing immigration pathways risks repeating historical trauma. Chapters Three and Five explain that Aotearoa NZ's history is stained by the exploitation of Pacific people's lands and bodies for economic gain, such as through Banaban phosphate extraction and the unjust deportations of the 'dawn raids' era (Anae, 2020; Asafo, 2022; Tabe, 2019). This thesis suggests that these mistreatments are not solely something from the past. Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati continue to face legal violence (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012) through the denial of sanctuary from climate breakdown and the persistent fear of deportation for those without valid visas. Like colonial displacements and the dawn raids, the resulting psychological trauma, social isolation and barriers to public services from temporary or invalid visas may have long-term, intergenerational consequences, although more research is needed in this area (cf. Asafo, 2021; McAdam, 2016; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021; Teaiwa, 2014).

Furthermore, this thesis suggests that the trauma of deportability (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012) is symptomatic of a system in which Pacific peoples' lifeways continue to be devalued and commodified. In his critique of Aotearoa NZ's apology for the dawn raids, Asafo (2021) explains that the raids were about "Pacific peoples being treated like disposable tools of labour for white profit, worthy of police violence and unworthy of citizenship and permanent residency" (para. 12). The same might be said in the context of climate mobility. Our research explains that I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan community members must navigate individualised and neoliberal systems, which situate their communities as 'minorities within minorities' (Chapter Three), criminalise their cultural practices and equate their right to residency with their productive capacity. According to Chapter Five, these systems are underpinned by colonial rhetoric that treats Pacific peoples as inferior, *"second rate citizens"* (Chapter Five). Migration-as-adaptation discourse is likely to further this *"racist superiority complex"* (Chapter Five) by

avoiding conversations of rights and responsibilities and instead expecting climate migrants to become labourers within Aotearoa NZ's capitalist and neoliberal system (cf. Bettini, 2017; Felli, 2013).

Defining climate migrants' right to residency by their perceived economic contributions becomes an increasingly perilous position in light of future climate change predictions. Aotearoa NZ is likely to welcome more climate migrants as climate change intensifies in the Pacific (Cass, 2018; Neef & Benge, 2022). At the same time, climate change is likely to destabilise Aotearoa NZ's economy (MFE, 2022). In line with rising populism worldwide, there is a real risk that Pacific migrants will again become the scapegoats for the failures of neoliberal capitalism (see Chapter Three; Faber & Schlegel, 2017), as occurred during the dawn raids (Anae, 2020). The lack of knowledge surrounding climate mobility (Chapters Four and Five) may exacerbate this hostility. Indeed, Aotearoa NZ is already undergoing an immigration reset that is set to tighten its borders to 'unskilled' workers to ease perceived pressure on infrastructure (Donovan, 2022). This change is likely to disadvantage aspiring migrants from Pacific countries due to the subtle racism within Aotearoa NZ's immigration system (cf. Simon-Kumar, 2015), moving Aotearoa NZ closer to its relational tipping point.

In view of these potential outcomes, I return to a question posed by a reviewer of our literature review (Chapter Two): if Pacific peoples have a long history of using migration as means of adaptation to environmental change (e.g., Suliman et al., 2019), why is there such resistance to moving now? I believe that this neighbourly crisis hints towards the reasons for people's preferences to hold onto home (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017). Firstly, the community members' stories of migration obstacles (Chapter Three) and the youth climate activists' insights into Aotearoa NZ (Chapter Five) dispel the myth that Aotearoa NZ is a 'clean, green,' (Kaefer, 2014) multicultural utopia (Reid, 2019). While migration had positive outcomes for many (cf. Ghezal, 2022), others experienced significant resettlement challenges to the point of

wanting to return to their homelands. Choosing to remain may therefore reflect collective wisdom that the benefits of migration could not outweigh the importance of staying close to the lands upon which their ancestors lived, which sustain their well-being identities, cultural and ancestral continuities, and placed-based livelihoods (e.g., McMichael et al., 2021; Oakes, 2019; Piggott-McKellar et al., 2021).

Furthermore, perhaps resistance to migrating as a form of adaptation is ultimately that: resistance. Although ties to place are unlikely to be lost (Chapter Three, see also, Suliman et al., 2019), the combination of climate change and border controls present a unique context in which the possibilities of returning to ancestral lands are not assured (Chapters Two and Three). Pacific mobilities are constrained by false borders, which are costly to cross (limiting chances of return migration) and impose punitive measures on those unable to get permanent residency. Voluntary immobility may be symbolic resistance to a colonial system, marked by sedentarism (Fröhlich & Klepp, 2019; Suliman et al., 2019), which recognises neither the circularity of migration nor the significance of ties to place. Moreover, it may be a choice to 'stay and voice' (Noy, 2017) dissent about the mistreatment of Pacific climate migrants as expendable, cheap labour (Enoka, 2019; Rice et al., 2021) while major-emitting neighbours continue to benefit from fossil-fuel dependent systems (e.g., Lewis, 2015; Enari & Jameson, 2021). Taken together, remaining on ancestral lands may be a move to refuse migration-as-adaptation discourse and demand climate-just, dignity-sustaining solutions to climate change.

A New Story of Climate Mobility

In this chapter, I have considered the well-being impacts of climate mobility, as they relate to relationships to land and conditional hospitality. In particular, I have argued that the adverse consequences of climate mobility reflect a crisis of neighbourliness – that edges towards a relational tipping point (Whyte, 2020) – as much as of environmental change.

Whereas Whyte (2020) reasons that it may be too late to avoid injustices against Indigenous peoples, the ideas across this thesis suggest that there are still opportunities to restore(y) relationships between neighbours and navigators across Oceania. I propose that relationality, and related notions of the vā, climate justice and neighbourliness, might open new pathways to further the good life, te maiu raoi or te ola lei, with and for climate migrants.

In the introduction of this thesis, I explained that vā was not a concept with which I was familiar, and I opted instead to draw upon relational ethics. However, after having completed this research, I am convinced that the wisdom of vā is useful grounding for the relationships between Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities and Aotearoa NZers. As explained in the introduction, the vā is a heterogenous Pacific concept that refers to the sacred social and spiritual space within relationships between people (e.g., Anae, 2005, 2010, 2019; Cammock et al., 2021; Faleolo, 2021). Anae (2010) explains that researchers should teu le vā between other researchers, participants, funders, and policymakers to ensure positive outcomes for all parties. Reynolds (2019) further emphasises the need to teu le vā in relation to edge-walking and "working across intercultural and positional edges" of non-Pacific and Pacific spaces (p. 33). Similarly, our research points towards the importance of building positive, reciprocal relationships between climate migrants and host societies, or more precisely, between Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati, their non-Pacific neighbours, and policymakers (see Chapter Three and also Appendix C). Extending upon Anae (2010) and Reynolds (2019), it is likely that mutually engaging with and configuring the vā in host-climate migrant spaces will promote harmony and balance between climate migrants and host societies. Specifically, a relational edge-walking approach to intercultural dialogue, which foregrounds the quality of relationships over what might be extracted from them, is likely to foster inclusion, a sense of belonging and positive health and well-being among frontline Pacific communities (cf. Ataera-Minster & Trowland, 2018).

How, then, might Aotearoa NZ work towards building respectful, reciprocal relationships with climate migrants? According to Reynolds (2019), to teu le vā requires resolving relational conflict and attitudes of superiority that connote the inferiority of others. From the studies in this thesis, much of the relational conflict between Aotearoa NZ and frontline Pacific communities (Chapter Three) appears to result from Aotearoa NZ's exploitative treatment of the Pacific, which contributes to its historical and contemporary complicity in climate and mobility injustices. Therefore, returning balance to the neighbourly partnership would be the opposite of this: a relational, neighbourly approach (Chapter Three), which works towards climate justice (Chapters Three, Four and Five) across the entire mobility journey. This relational approach entails inserting climate justice into every engagement between host societies and frontline Pacific communities, pre-migration, within Aotearoa NZ, in societal attitudes, and in further research.

Pre-migration

When I presented my research at a conference, a fellow speaker in a climate change panel asked me whether discussing possible climate mobility avenues meant that we had "given up". Her question was implying whether international emissions reductions had failed and whether climate change would inevitably displace people en masse from their ancestral lands. My response was a firm, "No." Although climate-related impacts such as temperature and sea-level rise in the Pacific are already locked-in to some extent, there remains a narrow window of opportunity to keep temperature rises to within 1.5 degrees and sea-level rise to a minimum (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018; Masson-Delmotte et al., 2021). This requires global, concerted efforts to radically reduce greenhouse gas emissions in all sectors. Therefore, prioritising emissions reductions reduces the likelihood of forcibly separating Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati

from their ancestral lands (Masson-Delmotte et al., 2021; The World Bank Group, 2021a, 2021b).

More than this, my response to the speaker's question echoed the broader resistance from many Pacific leaders to the "colonial logic of disposability" (Weatherill, 2022, p. 1). As explained in Chapter Three, to accept migration as an inevitability is to naturalise climate-related loss, devalue Pacific lifeways and undermine the significance of place, at the same time as permitting a business-as-usual response to the climate crisis. The Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati communities profoundly reject this mentality (see Chapter Three), as do the youth climate activists (chapter Five), according to the "universal indispensability" (Rice et al., 2021, p. 12) of Indigenous and Pacific ways of being. For Aotearoa NZ, providing adaptation support while continuing to reduce emissions would be a gesture of solidarity and respect towards its Pacific neighbours; a recognition of the inviolability of their dignity and an affirmation of the value of their identities and culture (Chapter Three).

Nevertheless, there is a fine line between accepting (giving up) and accepting (preparing for) climate mobility. As I have argued in this thesis, people are already migrating for climate-related reasons, and to ignore this fact can heighten the precarity of climate mobility in the host nation. If we acknowledge this movement, then there is an emergent need to address the climate mobility policy gap – but without depoliticising the issue, shifting responsibility onto frontline Pacific communities or retrenching power imbalances (cf. Crossen, 2020; Neef & Benge, 2022). The concepts of accepting accountability and complicity from Chapters Four and Five may be useful here. These would see Aotearoa NZ welcome numbers of climate migrants in proportion to the country's available resources and its neighbourly debt towards the Pacific (cf. Marshall, 2016; Nawrotzki, 2014; Skillington, 2015). This would require visa pathways that accommodate larger numbers than those already in place.

Increasing the flexibility of the PAC and RSE and other labour mobility schemes has been suggested as a solution to climate change in the Pacific (e.g., Emont et al., 2021; MFAT, 2021a; Neef & Benge, 2022; Ney, 2017). Yet, this option is far from delivering climate justice (cf. Farbotko et al., 2022a). As I have argued, labour mobility within existing socioeconomic systems does not uphold climate migrants' dignity and poses unexpected risks to migrants' health and well-being. Moreover, it does not enable tino rangatiratanga Māori (Māori sovereignty, self-determination, autonomy) as enshrined in Te Tiriti o Waitangi (1840), who would otherwise be co-hosts in migration (see Chapter Five, also, Kukutai & Rata, 2017).

One possible avenue to climate and mobility justice is to create a collaborative climate migration pathway that is co-designed between Māori, frontline Pacific peoples and the New Zealand Government. As argued in Chapter Five, a climate-just response to mobility would first recognise Māori as co-hosts of climate migrants, unsettling the conditional hospitality of Pākehā hosts (Bell, 2010; Chapter Five). In so doing, this could create an understanding of mobility that upholds Māori notions of manaakitanga in place of hierarchical notions of worth (Kukutai & Rata, 2017; Chapter Five). Further, many participants felt comfortable in Māori spaces due to their shared whakapapa ties and cultural resonance (see Bridging Statement Three; Appendix C; also, Ghezal, 2022; Thompson, 2015). This suggests that a joint approach may help incoming migrants to remain rooted in their cultures and identities rather than feel pressured to assimilate into the neoliberal capitalist systems of the Pākehā hegemony. Moreover, centring manaakitanga could create an approach that moves away from extractive, neoliberal and exclusive requirements of citizenship (Chapter Five, also Fox, 2016; Turhan & Armiero, 2019) to reimagine citizenship through reciprocity and connection. Working collaboratively with frontline Pacific communities could then ensure that mobility policies reflect Pacific priorities and views of mobility as an agentic, circular and ongoing process that is oriented towards home (Chapter Three; see also Kitara et al., 2021). This partnership model

might take a similar approach to Namoori-Sinclair's (2020) combined neoliberal-maneaba (cultural meeting hall) PAC model, which combines Kiribati and neoliberal understandings of migration to better support Kiribati women on the PAC. More research is needed to determine the value and feasibility of this type of joint approach.

However, there are difficult lines to walk when considering a climate-related visa to Aotearoa NZ. As outlined earlier, there is an urgent need to support those who are migrating already without the legal space to do so. Yet, caution is vital to maintain the qualities of a mutual and committed relationship (cf. Whyte, 2020). Many leaders of neighbouring Pacific states have clear preferences for in-situ adaptation (e.g., Government of Kiribati, 2018; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade, Tourism, Environment and Labour, 2011; 2014). If a new solution were to be created, it is critical that this does not undermine Pacific leaders' authority, trust, consent, and self-determination (cf. Whyte, 2020), hence furthering climate injustices against Pacific peoples. This places Aotearoa NZ in a difficult position. To teu le vā (Anae, 2005, 2010), Aotearoa NZ must look after its long-standing relationships with its Pacific neighbours, who prefer "averting/delaying migration" before facilitating migration (MFAT, 2018). Yet, Pacific peoples are a heterogenous group with diverse hopes for (im)mobility solutions, which change over time (Asafo, 2022; Farbotko et al., 2016). Some community members have expressed to me their aspirations for a 'climate refugee' visa and their frustrations about their governments' opposition to climate mobility. Others endorse their governments' approaches and affirm that most Tuvaluans or I-Kiribati do not want to migrate. Which relationships should the New Zealand Government attend to most: its residents or its political partners?

Far from providing an answer, I return to the ideas of neighbourliness and dignity. Neighbourliness highlights the importance of relationality, accountability, hospitality, and ultimately a self-aware partnership (Chapter Five; Lewis, 2015). Dignity support migrants' rights to migrate on their terms and live the good life (Chapter Three). Whichever response

Aotearoa NZ takes therefore could involve a regional approach (such as the Pacific Regional Framework on Climate Mobility [Pacific Climate change Migration and Human Security, 2022], working with its Pacific neighbours to develop a mutually beneficial mobility solution that foregrounds migrants' dignity and knowledge systems across the mobility journey (cf. Asafo, 2022; Crossen, 2020; Kitara et al., 2021). Following the principle of accountability (Chapter Five), this would directly acknowledge Aotearoa NZ's responsibilities to Māori through Te Tiriti o Waitangi (1840) as well as the nation's historic and contemporary contributions to climate mobility in the Pacific (cf. Marshall, 2016; Nawrotzki, 2014; Neef & Benge, 2022). An accountability-centric approach also entails fulfilling Aotearoa NZ's neighbourly obligations to provide adaptation support and reduce its emissions (Asafo, 2022) in order to support people's efforts to hold onto home (Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017) for as long as possible.

Finally, there remains the option for a more transformative neighbourly response. Aotearoa NZ is part of the neighbourhood of Oceania (Fox, 2016), which Pacific peoples have historically understood as being interconnected by a vast, borderless ocean (Hau'ofa, 1994). Extending Pacific, pre-colonial understandings of borders suggests that state borders ought to be recognised as arbitrary and made permeable to climate migrants. From this perspective, climate migrants would have free movement around the Pacific and more control over their futures, regardless of the perceived forcedness of their movement and/or their assumed economic value (Marshall, 2016; Stanley, 2021; Skillington, 2015; Turhan & Armiero, 2019). This is a similar approach to Heyward and Ödalen (2016)'s 'Passport for the Territorially Dispossessed', which claims that climate migrants ought to be able to choose their new nationality and retain control over their destiny. Whether this approach is feasible is yet to be seen.

Within Aotearoa New Zealand

While awaiting a climate mobility-specific pathway, there is a clear need for redress in existing migration pathways. Drawing upon the principles of 'rethinking hospitality' (Chapter Five) and 'charting a course for future generations' (Chapter Three), this involves providing ongoing resettlement support. The New Zealand Government could reset the PAC to ensure that migrants receive wraparound, state-funded resettlement support before, during and after moving. According to community members, their priority needs are visa assistance, transitional housing, employment advice and language support, which could be centralised into a cohesive system, accessible from Kiribati, Tuvalu and Aotearoa NZ (cf. Emont et al., 2021; Malua, 2014; Namoori-Sinclair, 2020). Aotearoa NZ might also expand its criteria for PAC eligibility to include elders and people with disabilities who face more barriers to citizenship-based belonging. There is also a need to provide more comprehensive pastoral care (cf. Farbotko et al., 2022a) and pathways to residency for RSE seasonal workers. This could be accompanied by providing amnesty to irregular migrants so that they might participate fully in society, receive state well-being support and continue to pursue their migration aspirations (Malua, 2014; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021). Alongside these changes, it would be essential to provide increased funding for activities which support the intergenerational continuity of frontline Pacific communities' languages, cultures and identities. Finally, there is a need for mental health and well-being services attuned to the impacts of climate change and its different impacts across and within Pacific communities (cf. Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020).

These initiatives are likely to be costly. Yet, Draper (2021) emphasises that migration policies that reflect climate justice must be different to other migration policies. By their logic, high-income states owe adaptation solutions to low-income states, and, therefore, do not have the right to benefit from the process nor to offer restrictive visa terms to aspiring migrants. I concur, and I further argue that comprehensive resettlement support is a necessary pathway to

restoring damaged relationships and 'accepting accountability' (Chapter Five) for potential loss and damage to migrants' cultural heritage (cf. Pearson et al., 2021b). If dignity violations and human rights breaches (see Asafo, 2022; Nguyen & Kenkel, 2021) are not sufficient motivation to repair the cracks in Aotearoa NZ's immigration policies, the need to accept responsibility (Chapter Five) for intergenerational climate injustices may be leveraged as further incentive.

Furthermore, this thesis points towards the need to decolonise all institutions if climate migrants are to flourish in Aotearoa NZ. In his critique of Aotearoa NZ's apology for the dawn raids, Asafo (2022) explains that Pacific communities will never see equity so long as the British Crown controls migrant-state relations and Māori are denied tino rangatiratanga. Asafo's diagnosis reinforces the conclusions throughout this thesis that migrating within Aotearoa NZ's colonial immigration and socioeconomic settings is likely to create adverse, maladaptive and unanticipated well-being impacts. These consequences are likely to be heightened for groups who experience other structural and historical disadvantages. This suggests that the well-being impacts of climate mobility cannot be addressed without engaging in decolonisation (cf. Jones, 2019). That is, the 'minimally disruptive' pathway to climate mobility (Chapter Two) would be produced by undoing the "capitalist-colonialist matrix of oppression" (Whyte, 2018, para. 10) for which climate mobility is but a symptom. This also requires radical politics of resettlement to reduce barriers to education, healthcare, employment, and housing. This would require addressing intersecting issues for which climate change is a 'threat multiplier': xenophobia, racism, sexism, ableism, homophobia and other 'isms' (e.g., Campbell, 2022; Gemenne et al., 2021). Moreover, this affirms the need to restore te tino rangatiratanga to Māori by upholding te Tiriti o Waitangi (1840) and pushing for constitutional transformation, such as outlined in Matike Mai (Matike Mai Aotearoa, 2016).

Transformative approaches to climate mobility provide opportunities for collective liberation. In activism, collective liberation refers to the ways through which diverse struggles

are bound up together; both the oppressor and the oppressed suffer under dehumanising systems and benefit under equitable systems (People and Planet, n.d.). For example, where urbanisation and industrialisation have separated many non-Pacific Tauiwi from their environments and each other (King et al., 2017), accommodating climate migrants provides an opportunity to restore balanced relationships for all human and more-than-human beings. I have come to recognise Tuvaluans, I-Kiribati and Palagi are bound together across temporal scales through stories of intergenerational separation from our ancestral lands and cultures and the dehumanising demands of neoliberal capitalism on our work and social lives (Logan-Riley, 2021). Working together for climate (mobility) justice and decolonisation therefore combines our diverse identities and strengths, growing our collective power to build a more interconnected, dignity-affirming world that restores our separation from the environment (cf. People and Planet, n.d.). Therefore, investing in the well-being of Tuvaluans, I-Kiribati and other frontline Pacific communities is an investment in the well-being of all Aotearoa NZers.

Shifting Societal Attitudes

Pro-climate change, pro-immigration laws in democratic societies tend to only endure so long as they receive ongoing support from the public (Kanbur, 2018; Rosenberg, 2022). Therefore, while changes at the political level are important, shifts in societal attitudes are equally necessary for effective, enduring support of climate migrants. Our research has revealed a gap in public knowledge about climate mobility, which is an opportunity to design public communications to ensure that climate mobility initiatives receive widespread public support. This would require careful attention to framing in communication and education campaigns in order to be maximally effective and minimally harmful.

In this chapter, I have explained the pitfalls of framing climate mobility in terms of vulnerability, urgency and conformity to capitalism. The findings in this thesis suggest that an

alternative approach involves emphasising host nations' complicity in climate injustice. Based upon Chapters Four and Five, Aotearoa NZers appear to draw from their knowledge of climate change, climate justice and Pacific mobilities to determine climate migrants' rights to hospitality. This may be because they understand that Aotearoa NZ is complicit in climate change in the Pacific, and therefore that they have justice-based duties to welcome their Pacific neighbours (cf. Lewis, 2015; Nawrotzki, 2014; Turhan & Armiero, 2019). The need to emphasise climate justice is supported by the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities, who assert that responses to climate mobility be grounded in justice, rights, and responsibilities (Chapter Three).

There are several caveats to note, however. Framing climate change in terms of justice and fairness tends to resonate more strongly for liberals than conservatives (Swim & Bloodhart, 2018; Tam et al., 2021; Wolsko, 2017), who are already more likely to support climate migrants (Appendix E [Table 16]; see also, Hedegaard, 2021; Helbling, 2020). Further research is needed to determine whether complicity framing fosters openness to climate migrants across the political spectrum. Secondly, if complicity derives from contemporary climate responses alone, then future emissions reductions and adaptation policies would lead to a withdrawal in hospitality. That is, host residents might believe that Aotearoa NZ is 'doing its part' for the Pacific and therefore devolve themselves of any further hosting responsibilities (see Chapter Three). Therefore, it is likely to be more effective to portray complicity in terms of Aotearoa NZ's contemporary *and* historic contributions to the climate crisis to engender a more enduring form of hospitality.

Complicity framing suggests that support for climate mobility is fostered through reflexive education for climate justice. Chapter Four concludes that education about climate (in)justices as they relate to Aotearoa NZ may counter hostility towards climate migrants. This is further supported in Chapter Five, wherein youth activists' knowledge of climate justice and

of Aotearoa NZ's neighbourly position engendered solidarity with climate migrants. Other research similarly emphasises that education about climate change, climate justice and wealthy states' obligations can build support for climate justice policies and solidarity with those impacted (Kanbur, 2018; McGregor & Christie, 2021; Pearson et al., 2021a; Stapleton, 2019; Svarstad, 2021). However, I have noted that justice-oriented media framing may not (yet) resonate within all host residents' ideological frameworks (Swim & Bloodhart, 2018; Wolsko, 2017; Tam et al., 2021). Further, emphasising the urgency or forcedness of climate change in the Pacific alone is unlikely to foster pro-climate migrant attitudes due to the spatial and conceptual distance of climate mobility from many Aotearoa NZers' lives (Chapter Four and Five; Swim & Bloodhart, 2018; Pearson et al., 2021a). Indeed, it may create unintended consequences by invoking harmful stereotypes of Pacific peoples as threats to Aotearoa NZ's socioeconomic stability.

Instead, there is space for dignity and justice-centric education that connects the consequences of climate change to Aotearoa NZers' individual and collective neighbourly responsibilities. This is likely to build what Rosenberg (2022) refers to as "a sense of cosmopolitan empathy" (p. 1) towards non-residents. That is, education that emphasises our connectedness – through relationships, the Pacific Ocean, whakapapa, and within capitalist-consumerist systems (Whyte, 2018) – is likely to expand Aotearoa NZers' notions of deservingness from nationhood to neighbourhood (see Chapter Five) in order that all climate migrants may be seen as worthy of belonging (cf. Fox, 2016; Rosenberg, 2022; Turhan & Armiero, 2019). Such education could encourage individuals to attend to the social injustices and power disparities within climate mobility, so that they may be able to situate their own complicities in the problem (Land, 2015; Stapleton, 2019). Moreover, it could employ strengths-based language of climate migrants' dignity, resourcefulness, resistance, and self-determination (see Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Holmes & Burgess, 2019). Host nations might

consider this carefully crafted education for use within schools, social media and news media as well as within climate advocacy spaces.

In addition to education, there is also an opportunity to restore relationships through 'encounter opportunities' (Hodgetts et al., 2021) between host residents and climate migrants. For Tuvaluans and I-Kiribati, relationships with non-community members can support their aspirations to become established in Aotearoa NZ and build a sense of belonging and connectedness in their *"home away from home"* (see Chapter Three; Appendix C; cf. Ghezal, 2022). For host residents, such relationships create opportunities to learn about the climate crisis and reckon with one's own collusion within it, which can build solidarity and invoke empathy (Chapter Five, also: James & Mack, 2020; Lakanen, 2019; Land, 2015; Woods, 2020).

Moreover, these relationships are opportunities to learn about and create space for alternative ways of doing and being in the world. Youth climate activists' (Chapter Five) experiences with Pacific communities led them to recognise the 'universal indispensability' (Rice et al., 2021) of Pacific peoples' cultures and worldviews. This is not solely because of the capital-based form of multiculturalism of food and festivals (Reid, 2019) but due to the importance of common Pacific values such as interdependence and environmental connectedness (HRC, 2014) for confronting the climate crisis (Whyte, 2017). Consequently, they understood the need to upend traditional models of hospitality and instead adapt themselves and their institutions to create space for migrants' cultures and values (cf. Verkuyten et al., 2018). However, these relationships would have to develop over time (cf. Whyte, 2020) to gradually build a sense of trust, consent and accountability between frontline Pacific communities and host residents. Although this slower pace may clash with the immediacy of climate-related migration to Aotearoa NZ and the sense of hurry within Aotearoa NZ's climate movement, it may prove indispensable to building local spaces of solidarity and dignity within Aotearoa NZ.

Together, relationships between host residents and frontline Pacific communities create opportunities for new 'shared stories' (Chapter Five): opportunities for neighbours to work together towards climate justice with and for the Pacific. These opportunities could come from supporting Tuvaluan or Kiribati-led community initiatives, joining in the language weeks, attending community events (see Appendix C) and more broadly, accepting Pacific activists' invitations to fight together towards climate justice (Pacific Climate Warriors, 2021; Suliman et al., 2019; Te Ara Whatu, 2021). These can create physical and symbolic spaces of belonging, which disrupt unequal colonial relations of us/other, saviour/victim, citizen/threat, host/migrant (cf. Bhatia & Ram, 2009) – as long as the partnership works "in a way that upholds everyone's dignity and right to their voice to be heard" (Brianna Fruean, PCW, quoted in Fagaiava-Muller, 2021, para. 30). I myself have experienced the power of connection through this research, wherein some community members have joked that I am becoming Tuvaluan or I-Kiribati; on one instance, an I-Kiribati partner described me as both a *"community member and a guest"* (research diary, 16 Oct 2022). Such interpersonal spaces of belonging may then extend influence into political spaces, wherein host residents are able to act as informed, empathetic beings who support policy changes that benefit their Pacific neighbours (cf. Hodgetts et al., 2021).

Climate-Just Research: Methodological Reflections

In this chapter, I have noted that there are many areas of Pacific climate mobility that remain under-researched. These include but are not limited to the mental health impacts of climate mobility for other diasporic Pacific communities in Aotearoa NZ, the ways in which climate mobility differentially impacts people with intersecting structurally disadvantaged identities, the intergenerational consequences of climate mobility, the potential of education for climate mobility justice, and the place of partnerships between Māori and frontline Pacific

communities. Herein lies an opening to restory climate mobility through research that is responsive to Pacific climate justice. Insights from conversations with community members, youth activists and from our research methodologies point towards a research framework that prioritises Pacific ontologies, relationality, reciprocity, Pacific leadership, ecological-level analyses, reflexivity, and methodological pragmatism in climate mobility research. I explain these principles using reflections and experiences from my research journey.

Firstly, research for climate mobility justice would place Pacific ontologies at the heart of its research design. Pacific worldviews have historically been marginalised within research and governance, which can produce research and policy outcomes that misrepresent Pacific notions of land, place, community, and mobility (Chapter Two, see also, Kumasaka et al., 2022; Suliman et al., 2019; Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020; Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019). Adjusting this bias requires moving away from the Eurocentric biopsychosocial understanding of well-being (Engel, 1977) and attending to the well-being impacts of mobility that emerge from Indigenous and Pacific worldviews. I have sought to do this in this research, wherein we related the well-being impacts of climate mobility to Tuvaluan and I-Kiribati notions of dignity, well-being and perspectives of navigation. While it was an honour to work across two communities, we have had to weave together a single story from distinct ontological realities. Consequently, we were unable to explore in-depth the multifaceted nature of climate mobility from a uniquely Tuvaluan or I-Kiribati perspective. From this experience, research for Pacific climate and mobility justice appears to be most beneficial when anchored in a specific community's conceptualisations of well-being, climate change and migration (or when researching what these may be where research is lacking [cf. Tiatia-Seath et al., 2020]).

Pacific relational methods and community-oriented approaches also value reciprocity, or honouring participants' contributions by ensuring that they benefit from the research process (e.g., Anae, 2010, 2019; Cammock et al., 2021; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020; Hodgetts et al.,

2016; Vaioleti, 2013). In this research, our exchange of time and stories sits within a mutual understanding that the research will advance the communities' interests while also contributing to my own doctoral qualification (cf. Anae, 2019; Hodgetts et al., 2021; Seumanutafa, 2017). Accordingly, I have sought to share our findings and advocate for change in the areas identified by the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities (cf. Ponton, 2018). For instance, I have run workshops about our findings with community members and youth climate activists. I have also made submissions on immigration and climate change policies, lobbied government officials to see climate mobility represented within their policies (e.g., in Auckland Council, MBIE, MFAT and Immigration New Zealand) and encouraged community members to engage in public consultation processes (cf. Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020). Nevertheless, I have often felt overwhelmed by the enormity of the change required to better support climate migrants in Aotearoa NZ. Our research has uncovered a messy heap of intersecting issues, the remedies of which will require collective efforts and substantial time that extends beyond one person's PhD timeframe (cf. Chung-do et al., 2016). However, this research is one more piece of the advocacy puzzle, an evidence base that we can use where and when the right doors open. From these experiences, I advocate for building partnerships between researchers, communities and grassroots organisations that continue beyond research deadlines in order to effectively use collaborative research for transformative change.

Relationality is another central component to a climate-just response to climate mobility. Within the communities, my self-prescribed scholar-cum-activist position was often contested. I was challenged to go beyond my advocate role to *"deeply embed myself in the community"* (research diary, 28 Nov 2020). The NZKNC invited me to *"be a familiar face"* and attend community events (research diary, 1 Jun 2020). Vaeluaga (Tuvalu) asked me to participate in events as a means to *"see, feel, smell and taste what life is like for Tuvaluans"* (personal communication, 29 Nov 2020). While not all community members shared these

sentiments, these requests affirm the centrality of relationality in research for climate justice (Chapter Five; also, James & Mack, 2020; Kluttz et al., 2020; Lakanen, 2019) and with Indigenous and Pacific peoples (e.g., Anae, 2019; Kumasaka et al., 2021; Reynolds, 2019; Whyte, 2020). Investing in relationships foregrounds our shared humanity as collaborators (Anae, 2019) and deepens researchers' knowledge of communities' lived realities (cf. Kagan et al., 2011; Suaalii-Sauni & Fulu-Aiolupotea, 2014). Moreover, relationality builds trust in our ability to produce effective research and reduces relational barriers between ourselves and those with whom we collaborate (cf. Anae, 2019; Vaioleti, 2006).

Drawing upon the work of Pacific scholars and activists, a climate-just research framework would also be Pacific-led and participatory at every stage (see Chapter Two, also Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; Tiatia-Seath, 2020; Tualaulelei & McFall, 2019; Vaioleti, 2006). This recognises the importance of Pacific leadership to showcase that Pacific peoples have always been skilful navigators. The research in this thesis was more collaborative than fully participatory and Pacific-led, as I largely initiated the topic and directed the process, although I sought community leaders' input whenever possible. It is possible that working with community leaders according to participatory research methods (e.g., Baum, 2006; Cammock et al., 2021) would have had outcomes that are more beneficial for the communities. Indeed, the occasions where I have worked the most closely with community leaders have resulted in greater community engagement and more expressions of support for the findings. This affirms the importance of Pacific leadership in climate mobility research (cf. HRC, 2014). It also speaks to the transformative potential of collaborative leadership between Pacific and non-Pacific peoples for climate mobility justice. Building upon Chapter Five's 'negotiating relational connection' and Vaioleti's (2013) talanoa, combining our stories and strengths in a way that maximises Pacific participation, works with appropriate leaders and respects cultural values may therefore have catalytic power for addressing climate mobility injustices through research.

A multilevel, social-ecological perspective is also fundamental to a climate-just approach to climate mobility. The concept of recognition in climate justice asserts the need to acknowledge that which is often obscured in climate action and policy, such as the value of Indigenous knowledges and the socio-historical causes of climate vulnerability (e.g., Klepp & Fünfgeld, 2022; Schlosberg & Collins, 2014). This is supported by CCP's emphasis on ecological-level analysis, which intentionally guides researchers to attend to the multi-level structures and power imbalances that contribute to climate change (Adams, 2021; Arcidiacono & Di Martino, 2016; Chapman et al., 2018; Fernandes-Jesus et al., 2020). This is essential in the context of Pacific climate mobility, wherein the well-being impacts of mobility for individuals are heightened by climate inaction and exclusionary immigration and societal systems (Chapters Three, Four and Five). Through the logics of recognition justice, exploring climate mobility without acknowledging such layered dynamics would further the violence of climate mobility. In contrast, investigating these intersecting structures can identify the pathways with the greatest potential to support community flourishing and liberation (cf. Hodgetts et al., 2021).

Reflexivity also appears central to climate-just research on climate mobility. According to Chapter Two, few climate mobility researchers overtly engage in reflexivity. Yet, reflexivity is an essential component of neighbourly solidarity because it guides people to identify the ways in which their identities and positions shape their responsibilities towards the Pacific and assumptions about legitimate knowledge (Chapters Two and Three, see also, Helferty, 2020; James & Mack, 2020; Simons, 2021). Personally, reflexivity has enabled me to understand my obligations as a non-Pacific person towards the community members that I stand alongside. It has also helped to visualise and contest the assumptions that I carry about their experiences, so that I may be a better neighbour. At times, this has been an uncomfortable – albeit necessary – process, as I have had to grapple with my own colonial history and carbon footprint, which

shape my personal complicity within climate mobility. Ultimately, I have realised that when we can identify our personal biases and privilege in climate justice work, then we are more able to stand with frontline Pacific communities with humility and a willingness to make space for Pacific-led solutions (cf. Fagaiava-Muller, 2021; McLaren, 2022).

Many of these principles and protocols are central to Pacific methodologies (Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019), although researchers rarely acknowledge Pacific methods in climate mobility research (see Chapter Two). Consequently, we conclude that climate mobility researchers might consider Pacific collaborative methodologies in future work to ensure optimal outcomes for frontline Pacific communities (Chapter Two, see Tualaulelei & McFall-McCaffery, 2019 for examples of Pacific methodologies). This applies to Pacific and non-Pacific climate researchers alike. In our research, the talanoa methodology (Vaioleti, 2006, 2013) has served as a useful framework for attending to I-Kiribati and Tuvaluan cultural contexts, practices and conceptualizations of climate mobility. For example, it was a reminder to notice the ways in which knowledge was embodied within culture, spirituality, spoken language and body language during te maroro and sautalaga (Falefou, 2017; Teaiwa, 2014). Moreover, its emphasis on fluid dialogue (Vaioleti, 2006) and intersubjective empathy (Farrelly & Nabobo-Baba, 2014) created a sense of conviviality and connection through which we could share our stories of migration, our frustrations and our aspirations for the future. These experiences identify the humanising potential of talanoa and other Pacific methodologies in Pacific climate justice work.

Finally, researchers might adopt a pragmatist approach (Bishop, 2014) and combine Pacific with Eurocentric methodologies. Psychology tends to silo Pacific methods from Eurocentric methods due to the dominance of Eurocentric approaches in the discipline (Liu & King, 2021). Yet, Pacific and Eurocentric collaborative approaches have many similarities. In our approach, talanoa and CCP share a focus on reciprocity, relationality, reflexivity, and social

change aspirations (cf. Cammock et al., 2021; Ponton, 2018). At the same time, they also have different strengths. Talanoa departs from CCP through its emphasis on cultural context and furthering Pacific interests (Ponton, 2018; Vaioleti, 2006; 2013), while CCP differs from talanoa in its socio-ecological-level analysis (Arcidiacono & Di Martino, 2016; Evans et al., 2017). Weaving together these two methodologies creates a unique action-focussed Pacific methodology that may be useful for advancing climate justice through climate mobility research. This follows the work of Cammock et al. (2021), who adapted participatory action research to the talanoa methodology according to Fijian ideologies. Pacific and non-Pacific researchers could use such combinations to attend to local conceptualisations of climate mobility, consider the colonial and host society context and identify a relational and Pacific-led response to climate mobility.

From a pragmatist perspective, researchers might adopt whichever combination of quantitative and qualitative methods supports the study's objectives (cf. Anae, 2010; HRC, 2014). Whereas quantitative researchers are interested in results that are generalizable, reliable and valid (Hunsberger et al., 2017), Indigenous qualitative researchers argue that these do not apply to discursive social phenomena and time-proven Indigenous knowledges (Alexander et al., 2011; Bishop, 2011; Vaioleti, 2006). Our mixed-methods approach suggests that researchers can circumnavigate these differences by again drawing upon pragmatism (Bishop, 2014) and dialectical pluralism (Johnson, 2016). In this, the focus is upon creating locally relevant, justice-oriented knowledge for social change (cf. Hunsberger et al., 2017). Nevertheless, Vaioleti (2006) highlights that Pacific-oriented research ought to nonetheless produce 'trustworthy' research encounters and analytic outcomes. In our research, the trustworthiness of our quantitative survey (Chapter Four) will be seen in the extent to which it is used to inform responses to climate mobility in Aotearoa NZ. Chapter Three's trustworthiness was enhanced by co-creating knowledge research objectives with community members (cf.

Vaioleti, 2006). Trustworthiness was affirmed through community members' subsequent support for our findings (cf. Tamasese et al., 2005). Chapter Five's trustworthiness was supported by my prior understanding of the climate space, member checking and fellow activists' agreement with the outcomes (cf. Kornbluh, 2015). The trustworthiness of our findings suggests that mixed-methods research can be an effective tool for pursuing climate and mobility justice.

Final Reflections

McIntosh (2011) writes that researchers ought to pose themselves a series of questions when embarking on Indigenous research. These include, "There is a story to tell…Do I/we have the right to tell this story? Do I/we need to earn it?" (p. 71). I have returned to these questions at numerous points throughout this project, interrogating my right to share the communities' stories of mobility and the possibility of producing a narrative that embeds victimising tropes of climate migrants. However, I now believe that we develop the right to tell a story through committed partnerships with the storytellers. PCW activist, Cherelle Fruean, said that supporting Pacific peoples requires *"asking how we would like you to show up"* (field notes, 26 July 2022). Cherelle implies that the right to tell a story is grounded in recognising Pacific leadership on climate issues and sharing the story according to their directives. Charles (Kiribati, West Auckland maroro; Table 5) communicated a similar sentiment, saying, *"We are part of the story that you are going to tell the world. And we own it. So that's us."* Here, Charles shares his excitement about seeing his community finally represented on the international stage, while they also maintain control of the narrative. This contrasts with the depictions of Tuvalu a decade ago, in which Tuvaluans' stories were extracted to drive political action while they themselves saw no benefit (Farbotko, 2010). Thus, Charles alludes to the ongoing challenge for

climate mobility practitioners: to recognise the transformative potential of ongoing collaboration for climate and mobility justice, as long as frontline Pacific communities' stories and the narratives that underpin them remain in the hands of the storytellers.

Concluding Remarks

This thesis tells interwoven stories of Pacific peoples on the move, internally and across borders, because of climate change and because of their aspirations for better lives. Many of these movements play out within historical narratives of routes and routes, of agentic migration with dignity across an interconnected ocean. Following in the paths of their ancestors, the Tuvaluan and Kiribati communities in Tāmaki Makaurau are adaptive and resourceful peoples who are already acting to secure their roots and well-being in Aotearoa NZ. While most community members did not migrate because of climate change (and could not officially have done so due to the climate mobility policy gap), climate change is inextricable from their lived experiences and aspirations for the future. However, they draw upon their collective strengths to navigate immigration obstacles and ensure the longevity of their cultural heritages and ties to lands for future generations.

Yet, there is an emerging counternarrative, that of the realities of migration within existing systems, which pose unforeseen challenges to mobile Pacific communities. Stemming from a crisis of neighbourliness, perceptions of migrants as deserving of either hospitality or hostility recreate climate-related precarity in Aotearoa NZ. These perceptions derive from how climate mobility is storied in the public imagination and are then enacted at the border and inscribed on migrants' lives. Aspiring migrants must therefore balance the competing stories of staying rooted on their ancestral lands and exposed to climate change or moving away from climate threats and into new, potentially hostile spaces. Such experiences question whether

migration is truly a form of climate adaptation and shed light upon the power of immobility as resistance.

Nonetheless, this is not the end of the story. Aotearoa NZ sits upon a precipice, a turning point in the plot. Without addressing the socioeconomic and political issues in this chapter, that which began as a story of migration as navigation may end as a tale of exploitation, deportation and responsibilisation that crosses a 'relational tipping point' (Whyte, 2020). However, just as these issues are a feature of society, so too can they be avoided by amending society. At the heart of these issues is a crisis of neighbourliness between frontline Pacific communities and Aotearoa NZ, who are bound by a vast ocean, yet separated by colonial exploitation, power imbalances and societal inequities. Working to repair these disconnects requires centring relationality and the wisdom of vā – and by extension, climate justice – in all responses to climate mobility across the journey, whether in policy, research or our interpersonal relationships. This is a careful line to walk, given that Pacific leaders prefer in-situ adaptation while some of their citizens are already migrating to Aotearoa NZ. Yet, when the focus is on the neighbourly relationship rather than that which may be extracted from it, a new story that respects Pacific leaders' priorities while strengthening our connectedness and supporting communities' well-being and is able to be written.

Appendices

Appendix A. CASP Assessment

All studies provided clear statements of the aims of the research but there was little methodological and analytical information given for most studies. Data collection methods were provided for all studies, but 16 studies did not detail how participants were contacted (Albert et al., 2018; Barnett & McMichael, 2018, Campbell et al., 2005; Charan et al., 2018; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Dixon, 2019; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Gemenne, 2010; Hermann & Kempf, 2017; Lazrus, 2009, Locke, 2009; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; McClain et al., 2020; O'Collins, 1990; Smith, 2013; Warrick, 2011). Twelve studies justified their chosen methodologies (Barnett & McMichael, 2018; Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017; Drinkall et al., 2019; Edwards, 2013; Emont & Anandarajah, 2017; Gemenne, 2010; Malua, 2014; Marino & Lazrus, 2015; McClain et al., 2019; O'Collins, 1990; Shen & Gemenne, 2011) (Table 1).

The method of qualitative analysis was mentioned for ten studies (Bertana, 2018; Edwards, 2013; Fedor, 2012; McMichael et al., 2019; McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020; Neef et al., 2018; O'Brien, 2013, Smith 2013, Thompson, 2015), five of which describe data analysis in some detail (Edwards, 2013; Neef et al., 2018; O'Brien, 2013; Smith, 2013; Thompson, 2015). Findings were synthesised from multimodal data and/or discussed in reference to the wider literature for all studies except one (O'Brien, 2013) (Table 1).

Table 8

CASP Protocol Assessment.

			Aims and methods			
Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
Albert et al., 2018	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification of epistemologies and ontologies	A) N B) Each island was chosen for their differences in causes and outcomes of relocation	A) Y - focus groups, field observations, grey literature, personal involvement in govt. and community meetings B) Y	N
Barnett & McMichael, 2018	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) N B) N	N
Bertana, 2018	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y	A) Y - details how they contacted villages, B) Y - details why villages are chosen	A) Y - interviews, with villagers and key informants and participant observation B) Y	Y - explains how and why she went to each location, e.g., external circumstances which dictated an impromptu visit to Vunisavisavi
Campbell et al., 2005	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y	A) N B) N	A) Y - literature search, participatory community-based fieldwork, a regional workshop, transect walk B) Y	N
Charan et al., 2018	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) Y - interviews, questionnaire (open-ended) , semi-structured key-informant interviews B) Y	N

Aims and methods

Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017	Y	Y - qualitative, ethnography	A) Y B) Y	A) N B) N	A) Y - participant observation, key informant interviews B) N	N
Dixon, 2017	Y.	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y	A) N B) N	A) Y- participant observation + secondary source analysis B) Y	Partial - considers role as insider (affinal ties to community) but does not consider influence on approach chosen
Drinkall et al., 2019	Y	Y - mixed methods	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - members of Micronesian community in Oregon B) N	A) Y - semi-structured interviews + survey, interviews provided greatest insight B) N	N
Edwards, 2013	Y	Y - qualitative, ethnography	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - non-random selection for key informants B) Y - detailed about their background	A) Y- interviews (type not mentioned) B) N - No justification	N
Emont & Anandarajah, 2018	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) N B) N	N
Fedor, 2012	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - snowballing B) Y - participation at community event.	A) Y - semi-structured interviews, participant observation B) Y C) Should be open interviews	N
Gemenne, 2010	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) N B) N	N

Aims and methods

Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
Gillard & Dyson, 2012	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y	A) Y - snowballing, B) N	A) Y - Semi-structured interviews B) Y	N
Hermann & Kempf, 2017	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y	A) N B) N	A) Y - interviews + open-ended questionnaires B) N	N
Lazrus, 2009	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y, to capture various ways in which knowledge is held and expressed	A) N B) N	A) Y - survey + interviews B) Y - thoroughly justified	Y - explains why Tuvalu was chosen, N - No discussion of why that research question was chosen N - No discussion of influence on interview process and questions.
Locke, 2009	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y - but description minimal B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) Y - interviews + observations B) Y - useful for exploring beliefs C) Doesn't mention how interviews were conducted, where from, and whose beliefs are included	N
Maekawa et al., 2019	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - snowballing, B) Y - easiest to interview/ access C) Most participants were students	A) Y - survey + semi-structured interviews B) Y	N

			Aims and methods			
Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
Malua, 2014	Y	Y - qualitative, no explicit methodology	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y B) Role at community centre, 9 families	A) Y - interviews B) N	Y - role as insider, consideration of why and how participants were contacted N - no discussion of influence on question formulation
Marino & Lazrus, 2015	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) Y - archival research, participant observation, semi-structured interviews, household surveys B) N	N
McClain et al., 2019	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - snowballing, B) Y - RMI students in US	A) Surveys + structured interviews B) N	N
McClain et al., 2020	Y	Y - mixed methods	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) Interviews B) N - not discussed any further	N
McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - Turaga ni Koro called villagers to talanoa, 18-73 B) Y	A) Y – semi-structured interviews, group talanoa, participant observation B) N	N
McMichael et al., 2019	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y - allows for personalised accounts	A) Y - Turaga ni Koro called villagers to talanoa, 18-73 B) Y	A) Y- semi-structured interviews, group talanoa, participant observation B) N	N

Aims and methods

Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
McNamara & Des Combes, 2015	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y - key informants B) - government, ministers, officials NGO, intergovernmental organisations	A) Y - interviews with key informants B) N	N
Neef et al., 2018	Y.	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y - avoids science-based knowledge over local adaptation strategies and stories	A, B) Y - via appropriate governance structures and leaders - two different villages	A) Y- open-ended temporal interviews, participant observation, participatory mapping B) Y	N
O'Brien, 2013	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) No justification	A, B) Y - through the Brisbane University - KANI students, aged 22- 25	A) Y- in-depth interviews B) Y C) Open interviews would be more culturally appropriate	None - mentions that face-to-face is important for reading body language, doesn't acknowledge different body language cues from culture (c.f. Thompson)
O'Collins, 1990	Y	Y - qualitative	A) No description B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) Y - interviews, key informant interviews, government reports, participant observation B) N	N

Aims and methods						
Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
Roman, 2013	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y - multi-site ethnography	A) Snowballing B) N	A) Y- semi-structured interviews + closed-ended survey questions + participant observation	N
Shen & Binns, 2010	Y	Y - qualitative epistemology: intentionality	A) Y B) No justification	A) Y- purposive sampling, B) Y - with members of communities facilitated by church and community leaders	A) Y - focus groups, key informant interviews, field notes (semi-structured interviews) B) Y	N
Shen & Gemenne, 2011	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y/N - no time to conduct face-to-fact interviews B) No justification	A) Y - random B) Y - random	A) Y - survey, semi-structured interviews B) N C) No time to interview NZers, just completed qualitative survey	N
Siose, 2017	Y	Y - qualitative and Indigenous methodologies	A) Y B) Y - use of Pacific methods	A) Y - snowballing B) Y - through insider connections, elders as knowledge holders	A, B) Y - sautalaga important for elderly groups, oral focus, rich with information, have traditional rights to Indigenous knowledge, questionnaire for 18 - 60 year olds, photo elicitation to access emotions, focus group, questionnaire	Y - discusses insider role in how people were contacted, her role in the interview, N - no discussion of her role in the formulation of questions

				Aims and methods		
Author(s)	1. Aims*	2. Methodology: *	3. Research design: *	4. Recruitment *	5. Methods: *	6. Reflexivity *
Smith, 2013	Y	Y - qualitative	Discourse analysis - yes, to analyse media discourse + allow villagers to provide own perspective.	A) N B) Y - participants reflect range of views of government, civil servants and islanders themselves. C) Possible over-emphasis on government perspectives	A) Y - interviews B) N	N
Thompson, 2015	Y	Y - qualitative	A) Y B) Y - constructivist grounded theory	A) Y- self-selection + cold calling, B) Y - as an insider, has knowledge about who to talk to	A) Y - unstructured interviews B) Y	Y - Considers how her role as insider and outsider led her to view data collection as ongoing process of engagement with community, language of interviews, interpretations of questions
Warrick, 2011	Y	Y - mixed methods	A) Y B) No justification	A) N B) N	A) Y - household questionnaire qualitative survey, interviews, participant observation, key informant interviews B) Y, thorough	Y - discusses use of bislama language, role of Likert scales (and subjectivity of these)

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Albert et al., 2018	N	A) Partial - deductive coding into inhibitors and facilitators B) N	N	Y - triangulation via site visits	Y	Y - suggestions for relocation to guide relocation of indigenous communities
Barnett & McMichael, 2018	N	N	Partial - alludes to difference of Pacific perspectives, not explored in depth	N	Y	Some - theoretical article, but suggests importance of choice in leveraging mobility and adaptation practices
Bertana, 2018	Y - aware of burden on hospitality, of implications of her gender on divulging of information, of being included in certain spaces	A) Partial - descriptive and interpretive analyses, little detail B) N	Y - acknowledges outsider status, interpreting people's narratives through her perspective, acknowledges privileges given to her as a white woman,	Y - triangulation via participant observation, interviews with officials, and villagers	Y	Y - challenges and important factors for relocating villages
Campbell et al., 2005	N	N	N	Y - triangulation	Y	Y - suggestions for how to carry out successful relocation to reduce challenges, important considerations for future policy

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Charan et al., 2018	N	N	N	Y - triangulation - various interviews + questionnaire backed up by interviews	Y	Y - suggestions for successful relocation
Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017	N	N	N	N	Y, although emphasises migration as adaptation without critique of concept	Y - application of findings suggesting importance of traditional governance and land rights
Dixon, 2017	Y	N	Partial - mentions role as insider and outsider, how this allows him to gather empirical material himself, how he can understand, analyse and interpret materials - but doesn't mention how this is articulated through specific worldview	Partial - validates through comparison with personal experiences, observations, stories retold	Y	Little
Drinkall et al., 2019	N	N	N	Y - triangulation via interview + surveys	N	Y - includes a list of actions for capacity building

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Edwards, 2013	Y - Sought permissions via Tulele Peisa	A, B) Partial - use of IRR conceptual framework for analysing interviews and organising into themes (deductive) No mention of how themes were derived.	N	N	Y	Y - suggestions and guidance for future resettlements based upon lessons from the Carteret's
Emont & Anandarajah, 2018	N	N	N	N	Y – albeit catastrophising: "when that fateful day arrives"	Little, although highlights importance of cultural competence when working with Tuvaluans
Fedor, 2012	N	A) Y - open coding - needs to be more thorough explanation of coding B) N	N	Y - triangulation via participation observation	Y	Y - useful for addressing resettlement challenges
Gemenne, 2010	N	N	N	N	Y	Little - critique of "canaries in the mine" discourse
Gillard & Dyson, 2012	Y - explains data storage, anonymity etc. N - no community approval	N	N	Y - triangulation, multiple methods	N	Y - describes main challenges and makes significant suggestions for future changes that community needs

		Results and outcome				
Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Hermann & Kempf, 2017	N	N	N	Y - triangulation via open-ended interview and survey	Y	Y - discussion of how land in Fiji might be perceived in law
Lazrus, 2009	N	N	N	Y - triangulation using various interviews, survey to ensure all households' participate	Y	Little
Locke, 2009	N	N	N	N	Y	N - just highlights importance of proactive policy, but more theoretical/ review in nature
Maekawa et al., 2019	N	N	N	Y - triangulation- compared with interviews with key informants	N	Y - describes resettlement experiences, important for knowing how to develop policy
Malua, 2014	Y - acknowledges difficulty of role as insider, but importance for policy / political implications	N	Y - acknowledges insider status, acknowledges subjective experiences as a Tuvaluan.	N	N	Y - very useful for discussions of health among Tuvaluan community in West Auckland

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Marino & Lazrus, 2015	N	N	N	Y - triangulation - multi-methods	Y	N - theoretical
McClain et al., 2019	N	N	N	Y - triangulation - Interview and surveys	N	Y - for understanding the needs and requirements of RMI community in Arkansas and to improve resettlement experiences
McClain et al., 2020	N	N	N	Y - triangulation - background interviews with community providers contextualised responses	Y	Y - challenges the Marshallese face when migrating, calls for improving capacity for migration with dignity
McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020	Y - Sought participants via appropriate governance structures, with approval of village heads	A) Y - Thematic analysis, little detail B) Y	N	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	Y	N - theoretical, reframing understanding of relocation as one-off to ongoing interweaving of past, present and future
McMichael et al., 2019	Y - Sought participants via appropriate governance structures	A) Y - Thematic analysis, little detail B) Y	N	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	Y	N - theoretical, reframing understanding of agency of villagers

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
McNamara & Des Combes, 2015	N	N	N	Partial - unimodal, although grounded in literature/theory	Y	Y
Neef et al., 2018	Y - sought participants via appropriate governance structures, interviews observed cultural protocols	A) Y - deductive coding, then broken into sub codes. B) No clear method.	Partial - acknowledges understanding of what consists of adaptations is constructed by themselves, no reflexivity / exploration of self in the presentation of findings (NB: codes were based upon a former article)	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	Y	Y - useful to highlight imperative of allowing locally-situated understandings of climate adaptation
O'Brien, 2013	Y - description of permission granted, processes taken, approval from university	A) Partial - inductive, detailed description B) No specific method,	N	N	N	Y - analysis of KANI initiative and barriers t resettlement
O'Collins, 1990	N	N	N	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	N	Y - useful to understand resettlement challenges + mitigate risks
Roman, 2013	Y - approval by ethics board, mentions of anonymity etc.	N	N - although mentioned how came to be in Kiribati, own connection to the islands	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	Y	Little = good to provide context of Kiribati perspectives

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Shen & Binns, 2010	N	N	N	Y - triangulation with field notes + key informant interviews	Y	Some: helps to understand Tuvaluan migration to new Zealand, calls for re-thinking of migration policy
Shen & Gemenne, 2011	N	N	N	Y - triangulation using surveys + interviews with families on both Tuvalu and NZ	Y	Some: can dispel myths about why Tuvaluans migrate, if disseminated
Siose, 2017	Y - culturally-appropriate interview design to show respect + consideration of anonymity	N - little explicit method for analysis	N	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	Y	Y – very: reasons for Tuvaluan migrants to come to NZ
Smith, 2013	No - especially concerning given outer islanders' voiced resistance to assertions of the all-encompassing effects of climate change	A) Y - discourse analysis, evidenced variation of insights of both Tuvalu and Kiribati (i.e. Islands not homogenised) B) Y	N	N	Y	Y – very: calls for island-centred policymaking. Also, included a workshop 'by the people for the people' on outer islands

Results and outcome

Author(s)	7. Ethics:*	8a. Data analysis: *	8b. Reflexive interpretations:*	9a. Credibility of findings *	9b. Situated in wider literature?	10. Usefulness: *
Thompson, 2015	Y - consideration of insider role + cultural expectations e.g., Wanted translations as a sign of respect to the community	A) Y - inductive and deductive iterative analysis B) Y - narrative analysis	Y - acknowledges that meaning is co-constructed, influenced by her refugee-background family, spouse's resettlement experiences, and her work as a public servant	Y - triangulation using multiple data sources - interviews, memos, questionnaires, participant observation	Y	Some - explores resettlement challenges, helpful if disseminated
Warrick, 2011	Y - tried to reduce impact on community	N	N	Y - triangulation using multimodal data sets	N	Some - lessons for improving relocation, helpful if disseminated

Note. Y= Yes, N= No information given. *Questions for each CASP research component were: 1. Aims: is there a clear statement of the aims of the research? 2. Methodology: is qualitative research the right tool? 3. Research design: A) is the design appropriate for the aim? B) is research design or epistemology justified? 4. Recruitment strategy: A) was recruitment stated? B) Was choice of participants justified? C) Limitations. 5. Methods: A) was it stated how data was collected? B) Was choice of methods justified? C) Limitations. 6. Reflexivity in methods (formulation of questions, data collection, location, researcher role). 7. Ethical considerations: explicitly considers ethical issues and/or impacts on participants before/after. 8a. Data analysis: A) clear analysis method? B) Followed established analysis method? 8b. Reflexive interpretations: researcher examines own role, potential bias, influence during analysis, and data selection 9a. Credibility of findings e.g. triangulation or respondent validation? 9b. Situated in wider literature? 10. Usefulness: contributes to knowledge, policy, practice, and new research areas.

Appendix B. Pacific Research Assessment

Table 9

Assessment of Studies per Pacific Health Research Guidelines

Author(s)	1. Beneficial outcome*	2. Pacific methodology:	3. Research design:	4: Insider research:	5. Interview language:
Albert et al., 2018	N	N	N	N	No info
Barnett & McMichael, 2018	N	N	N	N	No info
Bertana, 2018	N	N	N	N	Conducted in English, iTaukei, Fiji Indian, local dialects. Interpreters were used for interviews with villagers). Aware of social implications of English & Fijian
Campbell et al., 2005	N	N	Y - participatory workshops	N	No info, although assumed iTaukei with research assistants
Charan et al., 2018	N	N	Y - participatory community-based fieldwork	N	iTaukei, English.
Connell & Lutkehaus, 2017	N	None	N	N	No info

Author(s)	1. Beneficial outcome*	2. Pacific methodology:	3. Research design:	4: Insider research:	5. Interview language:
Dixon, 2017	N	None	N	Affinal community member	No info
Drinkall et al., 2019	Y	N	N	Y, although not explicit	English, with Palauan or Chuuk where needed, interviews conducted by Micronesian community
Edwards, 2013	N	None	N	N	No info
Emont & Anandarajah, 2018	No - but gives steps for physician's response to working with Tuvaluans	N	N	N	No info
Fedor, 2012	N	None	N	N	English
Gemenne, 2010	N	N	N	N	English
Gillard & Dyson, 2012	N	N	N	N	English
Hermann & Kempf, 2017	N	N	N	N	No info

Author(s)	1. Beneficial outcome*	2. Pacific methodology:	3. Research design:	4: Insider research:	5. Interview language:
Lazrus, 2009	N	N	Y - participatory resource mapping + workshop	N	Tuvaluan & English
Locke, 2009	N	None	N	N	No info
Maekawa et al., 2019	N	N	N	N	No info
Malua, 2014	Y - targets improvement in TB treatment for Tuvaluans	No explicit methodology, but in Tuvaluan,	N	Y - Tuvaluan	English, Tuvaluan
Marino & Lazrus, 2015	N	None	N	N	English and Tuvaluan
McClain et al., 2020	N	N	N	N	Marshallese, with interpretation
McClain et al., 2019	N	None, but interviews conducted in Marshallese where needed	N	N	English, with Marshallese translation available

Author(s)	1. Beneficial outcome*	2. Pacific methodology:	3. Research design:	4: Insider research:	5. Interview language:
McMichael & Katonivualiku, 2020	N	Y - group talanoa, use of local dialects, working within indigenous structures for access to villages - but no acknowledgement of Pacific methodologies throughout practice	N	N	English, Fijian and local dialects
McMichael et al., 2019	N	Y - group talanoa, use of local dialects, working within indigenous structures for access to villages - but no acknowledgement of Pacific methodologies throughout practice	N	N	English, Fijian, local dialects, translated by 2nd and 3rd authors
McNamara & Des Combes, 2015	N	N	N	N	English
Neef et al., 2018	N	N - although used pillars, such as being response-appropriate following governance structures, cultural practices, cultural sensitive and respect	Y - participatory mapping	N	English, Fijian, local dialects
O'Brien, 2013	N	None - doesn't acknowledge the need to know cultural behaviours during interviews; no discussion of worldviews	N	N	English

Author(s)	1. Beneficial outcome*	2. Pacific methodology:	3. Research design:	4: Insider research:	5. Interview language:
O'Collins, 1990	N	N	N	N	No info
Roman, 2013	N	None	N	Partial - travels frequently to Kiribati, has friend-family connections there	Te taetae ni Kiribati, translated
Shen & Binns, 2010	N	None , uses semi-structured but open interviews	N	N	English
Shen & Gemenne, 2011	N	N	N	N	English
Siose, 2017	N	Y - discusses importance of Indigenous methodologies, also uses photo elicitation; emphasis on oral discussion	N	Y - Tuvaluan	Tuvaluan "to reassure the participants"
Smith, 2013	Partial - outer island workshops led by participants, but focus was gathering information;	N	Y - community workshop run on outer islands, "by the people, for the people"	N	Workshops in Tuvaluan, no information for interviews

Author(s)	1. Beneficial outcome*	2. Pacific methodology:	3. Research design:	4: Insider research:	5. Interview language:
	makes policy suggestions.				
Thompson, 2015	Y	N - Western methodologies, but adoption of important Kiribati concepts in interviewing, changed interview method to better suit style of communication (conversational interview)	N	Affinal community member	English, Kiribati , mixture, translation available where necessary
Warrick, 2011	N	N - but in bislama, and followed appropriate cultural structures)	N	N	Bislama

Note: Y= Yes, N= No information given. *Pacific Research criteria were: 1. Outcome: research benefits participating communities. 2. Methodology: uses Pacific methodology or methods. 3. Research design: participatory, Pacific-led or guided. 4: Insider research: first author states engagement with community. 5. Interview languages: interview language was stated, was in an Indigenous languages; a translator was used.

Appendix C: Supporting the Kiribati and Tuvaluan Communities

During all maroro and sautalaga, community members mentioned specific examples of the ways by which host residents could support their dignity in Aotearoa NZ (cf. Chapter Three, Figure 6). Many I-Kiribati and Tuvaluans already feel supported by Māori and other Pacific communities, given their shared whakapapa and similar cultural values around hospitality, family and respect (Fedor, 2012; Ghezal, 2022). However, the community members believe that Tauiwi, especially Palagi, should do more to engage with their communities. Specifically, they want people to attend their events, listen to their stories and learn about their cultures, languages, values and identities. Through this, they hope that Tauiwi will gain a more complete understanding of their realities in Aotearoa NZ as peoples whose collective strengths are greater than their vulnerabilities to climate change.

Table 10 summarises these suggestions (next page). Collectively, these are invitations to see frontline Pacific communities on their terms, not as drowning peoples but as resourceful and self-determined change agents who are capable of directing their own futures (Dreher & Voyer, 2015; Gonzalez, 2020).

Table 10

Suggestions for Tauiwi to Support the Kiribati and Tuvaluan Communities in Tāmaki

Makaurau Auckland

Suggestion	Kiribati		Tuvalu	
	Suggestion	Example	Suggestion	Example
Community involvement	Embrace the culture and language	Promote or host Kiribati Language Week events	Embrace the culture and language	Participate in Tuvaluan Language Week events
	Participate in community activities	Attend Kiribati Independence Day	Support Tuvaluan-led initiatives	Celebrate Tuvaluan Language Week in the workplace
	Support the communities to showcase their strengths	Invite Kiribati dance groups to perform at events		
Personal learning	Learn and use the language	Greet I-Kiribati in te taetae ni Kiribati	Show curiosity and a desire to learn about Tuvaluan culture	Ask Tuvaluans about their culture and language; undertake independent learning
	Learn about the culture	Seek to understand Kiribati cultural practices	Recognise the community's contributions to society	Speak out against narratives of irregular migrants as burdens on society
	Understand the values which contribute to identity	Humility, resilience, strength, compassion, love, hardworking, respect	Learn about community strengths	Hospitality, resilience, hardworking, big hearts, collective pride, humility, resourcefulness, love, family, community

Appendix D. Survey Items for Study 2

Immigration Attitudes

Attitudes towards immigrants

- The unity of New Zealand is enhanced by immigrants (adapted from Sibley, 2014).

- Immigrants make a valuable contribution to New Zealand (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008).

- Immigrants have many qualities that I admire (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008).

Integration expectations (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008)

- Immigrants should maintain their culture while also adopting New Zealand culture

Assimilation expectations (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008)

- Immigrants should give up their original culture for the sake of adopting New Zealand culture.

Climate Migration Attitudes

Attitudes towards climate migrants

- The unity of New Zealand will be enhanced if we accommodate climate migrants (adapted from Sibley, 2014).

- Climate migrants will make a valuable contribution to New Zealand (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008)

- Climate migrants will have many qualities that I admire (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008)

Integration expectations (adapted from Ward & Masgoret, 2008)

- Climate migrants should maintain their cultures while also adopting New Zealand culture

Assimilation expectations (adapted from Ward and Masgoret, 2008)

- Climate migrants should give up their original culture for the sake of adopting New Zealand culture.

Climate Change Beliefs (Sibley, 2014)

Belief in climate change

- Climate change is real.

Belief in anthropogenic climate change

- Climate change is caused by humans.

Distributive justice (adapted from Allwood, 2013)

- Affected nations' neighbouring countries should be responsible for accommodating displaced climate migrants.

- New Zealand does not have a responsibility to support neighbouring Pacific countries impacted by climate change.

- Each country should only be responsible for the effects of climate change experienced by their own people.

- Countries which emit the most fossil fuels per person should accommodate the most climate migrants.

Climate justice awareness

- Everyone will be impacted by climate change in the same way, regardless of their background or living situation.

- People from low-income households will be more impacted by climate change than weather households.

- My or my friends' children will experience more extreme weather events in their lifetimes than I will.

Appendix E. Supplementary Tables for Chapter Four

Comparison of Migrant Attitudes (Without Demographic Covariates)

Table 11

Repeated Measures MANCOVA of Immigration Attitudes, Excluding Demographic Covariates

Within-effects	*F*-value	Between-effects	*F*-value
Migration	3.40**	Intercept	790.60***
Attitudes*climate change reality	4.98**	Climate change reality	5.00*

Note. With Greenhouse-Geisser correction. There are significant differences in immigration

attitudes. Immigration attitudes significantly vary by belief in climate change reality.

*$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test)

** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed test)

*** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed test)

Table 12

Raw and Covariate-Adjusted Means of Migration Attitudes, Excluding Demographic

Covariates

Measure	Immigrants		Climate migrants	
	M (SE)	Covariate-adjusted M (SE)	M (SE)	Covariate-adjusted M (SE)
Attitudes to migrants	5.10 (.0.10)	5.13[a] (.09)	4.39 (.11)	4.41[a] (.09)
Assimilation expectations	4.62 (0.11)	4.61[b,c] (.10)	4.40 (.12)	4.42[d,e] (.11)
Integration expectations	5.35 (0.09)	5.34[b,e,f] (.09)	5.07 (.09)	5.09[c,d,f] (.09)

Note. [a,b,c,d,e,f] indicate significant differences between means. SE = Standard error. Covariates

included climate change reality only.

Comparison of Migrant Attitudes (Including Covariates)

Table 13

Repeated Measures MANCOVA of Immigration Attitudes with Covariates

Within-effects	F-value	Between-effects	F-value
Migration	3.70**	Intercept	130.13***
Attitudes*climate change reality	4.98**	Climate change reality	1.50
Attitudes*age	1.19	Age	6.4*
Attitudes*Pākehā	1.50	Pākehā	0.48
Attitudes*other genders	5.67**	Other genders	1.05
Attitudes*education	1.67	Education	3.35
Attitudes*income	0.23	Income	0.73
Attitudes*political orientation	35.01***	Political orientation	3.76

Note. With Greenhouse-Geisser correction. Immigration attitudes differed within-subjects, and also by belief in climate change, gender and political orientation.

*$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test)

** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed test)

*** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed test)

Table 14

Raw and Covariate-adjusted Means of Migration Attitudes

Measure	Immigrants		Climate migrants	
	M (SE)	Covariate-adjusted M (SE)	M (SE)	Covariate-adjusted M (SE)
Attitudes to migrants	5.10 (.0.10)	5.23[a] (.08)	4.39 (.11)	4.49[a] (.08)
Assimilation expectations	4.62 (0.11)	4.60[b,c] (.10)	4.40 (.12)	4.39[d,e] (.11)
Integration expectations	5.35 (0.09)	5.37[b,e] (.09)	5.07 (.09)	5.14[c,d] (.09)

Note. [a,b,c,d,e] indicate significant differences between means. SE = Standard error. Covariates included age, education, income, political orientation, gender, ethnicity, and climate change reality.

Table 15

Covariate-Adjusted Means for Immigration Attitudes by Gender

Measure	Men Covariate-adjusted M (SE)	Other genders Covariate-adjusted M (SE)
Attitudes to climate migrants	4.01[abd] (.14)	4.82[ac] (.11)
Attitudes to immigrants	5.10[b] (.14)	5.32[cd] (.11)
Integration expectations		
Climate migrants	4.89[i] (.14)	5.32[deh](.12)
Immigrants	5.47[j] (.15)	5.32[fg] (.13)
Assimilation expectations		
Climate migrants	4.58 (.18)	4.25[dfg] (.15)
Immigrants	4.78[ij] (.17)	4.46[fh] (.14)

Note. With Bonferonni correction. Other covariates include age, income, climate change reality, ethnicity, education, and political orientation. Standard error is in parentheses. [a-j] indicate significant differences between means. People with non-male genders thought more positively of climate migrants than did men. Men and people with other genders all regarded immigrants more positively than they did climate migrants. Men thought immigrants should integrate more than assimilate, but there were no differences for climate migrants. People with other genders thought both immigrants and climate migrants should integrate more than assimilate.

Table 16

Covariate-Adjusted Means for Immigration Attitudes by Political Orientation

	Very liberal	Very conservative
Immigration attitudes	Covariate-adjusted M	Covariate-adjusted M
Attitudes to climate migrants	5.31 [a] (.24)	2.40 [a,f] (.34)
Attitudes to immigrants	5.92 [b] (.24)	3.78 [b,f] (.34)
Integration expectations		
Climate migrants	5.39 [c,g] (.25)	5.32 [c,i] (.34)
Immigrants	5.33 [d,h] (.28)	5.16 [d,j] (.43)
Assimilation expectations		
Climate migrants	3.52 [e,g] (.32)	6.08 [e,i] (.46)
Immigrants	3.79 [h] (.30)	6.16 [j] (.43)

Note. With Bonferonni correction. Standard error is in parentheses. Very liberal and very conservative are 1 and 7 on the political orientation scale, respectively. [a-j] indicate significant differences between means. Other covariates include age, gender, income, climate change reality, ethnicity, and education. People who were very politically liberal held more positive beliefs towards both immigrants and climate migrants than did people who were very politically conservative. People who were very conservative also viewed immigrants more positively than climate migrants. People who were very liberal thought that immigrants and climate migrants should integrate more than assimilate into society. People who were very conservative preferred that climate migrants and immigrants assimilate more than integrate.

Simplified Model, No Covariates

Table 17

Model Excluding Covariates: Moderated Mediation of Climate Migrant Attitudes on Climate

Change Beliefs Moderated by Climate Justice Awareness

Predictor	Attitudes to climate migrants		Attitudes to immigrants	
	Coefficient	95% CI	Coefficient	95% CI
Path C: Direct effect on attitudes towards climate migrants				
Belief in ACC	0.48***	[0.40, 0.54]	0.30***	[0.23, 0.37]
Constant	2.00***	[1.58, 2.40]]	3.57***	[3.17, 3.98]
Summary	R^2=0.40		R^2=0.22	
	F-statistic(1,233)= 158.02***		F-statistic(1,233)= 66.27***	
Path A: Conditional direct effect on distributive justice				
Belief in ACC	-0.04	[-0.25, 0.18]		
Climate justice	0.06	[-0.20, 0.32]		
Belief in ACC x climate justice	0.07**	[0.03, 0.12]		
Summary	R^2=0.59			
	F-statistic(3,231)= 109.92***			
Test of unconditional interaction	R^2 change=0.02			
	F-statistic(1,231)= 9.90**			
Paths B & C': Direct and indirect effect on attitudes to climate migrants				
Belief in ACC	0.21***	[0.12, 0.31]		
Distributive justice	0.47***	[0.34, 0.60]		
Constant	1.11***	[0.66, 1.55]		
Summary	R^2 = 0.51	R^2 = 0.63		
	F-statistic(2,232)= 122.02***			
Paths A & B: Conditional indirect effect of belief in ACC on attitudes to climate migrants				
Index of moderated-moderated mediation	0.0339	[0.0102, 0.0602]		

Note. CI= Confidence interval. The following values were mean-centred: Belief in ACC,

climate justice awareness, distributive justice, integration expectations. The index of

moderated mediation shows that the overall model is significant.

*$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test)

** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed test)

*** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed test

Table 18

Path A: Conditional Effects of Belief in ACC at Values of the Moderator, Excluding Covariates

Interaction	Moderator value	Effect	SE	95% CI
Belief in ACC*climate justice awareness-> distributive justice	-1 SD=2.98	0.18**	0.07	[0.04, 0.31]
	Mean=4.94	0.32***	0.07	[0.18, 0.45]
	+1 SD=6.90	0.46***	0.09	[0.27, 0.64]

Note. ACC= anthropogenic climate change, SD= standard deviation, SE= standard error, CI=confidence interval. As belief in climate justice increases, so does the strength of the association between belief in ACC and distributive justice.

*p < 0.05 (two-tailed test)

** p < 0.01 (two-tailed test)

*** p < 0.001 (two-tailed test)

Table 19

Path A→B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Belief in ACC at Values of the Moderator, Excluding Covariates

Moderator value		Effect	SE	95% CI
-1 SD	2.96	0.08	0.04	[-0.01, 0.16]
Mean	4.91	0.15*	0.04	[0.07, 0.23]
+1 SD	6.86	0.22*	0.06	[0.11, 0.33]

Note. ACC= anthropogenic climate change, SD= standard deviation, SE= standard error; CI=confidence interval. * indicates significant effects. As awareness of climate justice increases, so does the mediation of attitudes towards climate migrants through climate change beliefs.

Full Model: Climate Migrants

Table 20

Path A: Conditional Direct Effects of Belief in ACC at Values of the Moderator, Including

Covariates

Interaction	Moderator value	Effect	SE	95% CI
Belief in ACC*climate justice awareness-> distributive justice	-1 SD=2.98	0.12	0.07	[-0.01, 0.25]
	Mean=4.94	0.23***	0.07	[0.10, 0.37]
	+1 SD=6.90	0.34***	0.09	[0.16, 0.53]

Note. ACC= anthropogenic climate change, SD= standard deviation, SE= standard error, CI=confidence interval.

*** *p* < 0.001 (two-tailed test)

Table 21

Path A➔B: Conditional Indirect Effects of Belief in ACC at Values of Climate Justice,

Including Covariates

Moderator value		Effect	SE	95% CI
-1 SD	2.98	0.03	0.02	[-0.01, 0.7]
Mean	4.94	0.05*	0.02	[0.01, 0.08]
+1 SD	6.90	0.07*	0.04	[0.01, 0.14]

Note. ACC= anthropogenic climate change, SD= standard deviation, SE= standard error, CI= confidence interval.

Full Model: Immigrants

Table 22

Path C: Direct Effect on Attitudes Towards Immigrants, Including Covariates

Predictor	Attitudes towards immigrants	
	Coefficient	95% CI
Belief in ACC	0.05	[-0.03, 0.16]
Integration expectation	0.36***	[0.25, 0.47]
Assimilation expectation	-0.19**	[-0.39, -0.09]
Age	0.00	[-0.01, 0.01]
Pākehā[c]	-0.025	[-0.45, 0.40]
Other genders[e]	0.21	[-0.11, 0.54]
Education	0.01	[-0.09, 0.13]
Income	0.00	[0.00, 0.00]
Political orientation	-0.174**	[-0.29, -0.06]
Constant	4.03***	[2.63, 5.42]
R^2	0.44	
F-statistic	$F(9,209)=17.23$***	

Note. The following values were mean-centred: belief in ACC; climate justice awareness

[a]Unstandardised coefficients.

[b]CI= Confidence interval.

[c]0= non-Pākehā, 1= Pākehā.

[d]0= male, 1= female, non-binary or gender diverse.

[e]1= very liberal, 7= very conservative.

*$p < 0.05$ (two-tailed test)

** $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed test)

*** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed test)

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