http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz

ResearchSpace@Auckland

Copyright Statement

The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand).

This thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act and the following conditions of use:

- Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.
- Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author's right to be identified as the author of this thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to the author where appropriate.
- You will obtain the author's permission before publishing any material from their thesis.

To request permissions please use the Feedback form on our webpage. http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/feedback

General copyright and disclaimer

In addition to the above conditions, authors give their consent for the digital copy of their work to be used subject to the conditions specified on the Library Thesis Consent Form and Deposit Licence.

Note : Masters Theses

The digital copy of a masters thesis is as submitted for examination and contains no corrections. The print copy, usually available in the University Library, may contain corrections made by hand, which have been requested by the supervisor.
A Commentary on Cicero’s *Philippics* 10 and 11

by

Tia Dawes

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Ancient History,
The University of Auckland, 2010
Abstract

The *Philippic* speeches, save *Philippic* 2, have received relatively little attention from scholars, despite providing an almost continuous narrative of the tumultuous year following Caesar’s assassination. *Philippics* 10 and 11 are amongst the least studied of the *Philippic* orations and no commentary deals specifically with the two speeches, either together or individually. I have aimed to fill that gap. In *Philippics* 10 and 11 the focus turns away from Marcus Antonius, the principal target of Cicero’s ire, to Brutus and Cassius, the assassins of Caesar and Cicero’s champions of the republican cause who were seeking to gain control of the eastern provinces in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of Antonius’ supporters. Cicero presents their actions as an *ad hoc* response to the manoeuvrings of Antonius’ agents, and attempts to show their actions as being conducted in the best traditions of the republic.

The thesis has three introductory chapters. The first of these covers, in brief detail, the historical circumstances immediately after the assassination and the events leading to the conflicts in the east. The second relates to the delivery and dissemination of *Philippics* 10 and 11, and the questions of form and purpose that arise from this enquiry. The third introductory chapter looks at praise and blame and the way Cicero manipulates these rhetorical *loci* in the presentation of Brutus and Cassius. The two following chapters form the commentaries on *Philippics* 10 and 11 respectively, in which the focus is firstly upon Cicero’s method of persuasion, and then in placing the orations in a broader context of the failing Roman republic.
For my parents
Preface

The *Philippics*, the last of Cicero’s published speeches, are an urgent and compelling depiction of the Late Republic once more bracing itself for civil war. Such a description of events makes it somewhat surprising that the *Philippics* have been slow to receive much critical attention (with the almost sole exception of *Philippic* 2). Indeed, during the twentieth century, the *Philippics* were disparaged as an unreliable and cantankerous record of events following the assassination of Caesar, and consequently dismissed as such. The *Philippics* have, however, received a renewed surge of interest following this long period of comparative neglect. This interest was perhaps sparked when Shackleton Bailey produced a newly edited text and translation in 1986, which he had hoped would provide the basis for future commentators.¹ This challenge has since been taken up by a number of scholars who have produced a series of commentaries to answer this call.²

Cicero’s often repeated aim within the *Philippics* was to defend the *res publica* against the tyrannical aspirations of M. Antonius and any with him who were prepared to take up arms against the *patria*. *Philippics* 10 and 11 are expressions of this aim, but the subject matter now takes on broader consequences as Cicero shifts the focus from Antonius in Italy to the provinces where Antonius’ satellites were laying claims. A new impetus was given to Cicero’s fight against Antonius in February 43, when M. Iunius Brutus, the co-leader with C. Cassius Longinus in the conspiracy against Caesar, informed the senate that he had taken possession of Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum, and that he was placing himself at the disposal of the senate. Cicero was delighted at the news; he delivered *Philippic* 10 proposing that Brutus be granted official command. On this occasion, Cicero’s proposal was duly passed, and Brutus’ appointment a political victory for the aged consular. Brutus’ legal title however was dubious; Cicero argued that Brutus had taken control of the Greek provinces in the interests of the *res publica*, and that he had done so in order to

---

deny Macedonia to Antonius. At the heart of Cicero’s argument was that all law could be laid aside if public interest was served; similarly, Antonius forfeited all legal right when he turned his army against the *res publica*.

News soon followed that P. Cornelius Dolabella, Antonius’ consular colleague, had put to death C. Trebonius, the governor of Asia and one of Caesar’s assassins, while en route to his province of Syria. The senate was outraged and immediately declared Dolabella a public enemy. This forms the occasion of *Philippic* 11. To meet this new menace, Cicero proposed an extended command for Cassius, who had secretly departed for the east after leaving Italy in the wake of Caesar’s assassination. Cicero believed he was in the region and in the process of raising arms and supplies in anticipation of a likely conflict (although Cicero avoids broaching the question of why Cassius was there). On this latter occasion Cicero’s proposal was opposed and the consuls instead were commissioned to go east against Dolabella once their campaign in Italy was brought to a conclusion.

These two orations outline the changing situation in the east, and trace the emergence of Brutus and Cassius from a period of self-imposed exile, to a position in which they were now potent obstacles to Antonius. Irrespective of senatorial instruction, Brutus and Cassius colluded in securing the eastern provinces. The impetus towards civil war was now almost immutable. To what degree their actions were preconceived is not clear; but what is clear is that when the liberators acted, they did so with ambitious purpose, quickly securing a sizeable military force which they would continue to augment until the battles of Philippi. The emergence of Brutus and Cassius in the eastern provinces marks a decisive point in Cicero’s promotion of war against Antonius. The two orations trace the shift in senatorial debate from Antonius in Italy to the rejuvenation of what Cicero could present as a spontaneous response to the illegal activities of Antonius’ colleagues. My aim has been to trace this development throughout *Philippics* 10 and 11, to relate the two speeches to the *Philippic* corpus and to the wider historical context. Either of the two speeches can be read on its own; but only when read together are the anxieties regarding the liberators made clear. This has much to do with the respective characterisations of the leading figures within Cicero’s narrative. Cicero left an indelibly negative portrait of Antonius that has influenced both ancient and modern perceptions. Less noticeably, though no less influential, was Cicero’s portrayal of Brutus, whose enlightened and philosophically motivated characterisation within *Philippic* 10 has coloured
subsequent depictions of him. Less appealing was the character of Cassius, who provoked fear and hostility among his contemporaries and indeed to succeeding generations. He emerges as a far more ambiguous figure, lurking in the shadows of his more illustrious counterpart. This compels Cicero to approach the two speeches in dissimilar ways. This difference in approach allows us to compare Cicero’s strikingly different arguments aimed at legitimizing the conduct of Brutus and Cassius, the way Cicero moulds his arguments to the respective characterisation of his protagonists, and to the changed circumstances between the two speeches’ delivery. In Philippic 10, Cicero was speaking to the senate with the knowledge that he had the support of the presiding consul, Pansa, and therefore he could tailor his speech to an already receptive audience. However, in Philippic 11, Cicero faced a more hostile audience, anxious about the growing strength of the liberators and their intentions; Cicero shifts the focus of his argument accordingly, fashioning his argument to suit the newly developed situation in such a way as to placate anxieties among his senatorial peers.

Cicero’s immediate audience might well appreciate the vigour, humour and performative aspects of the oration, but Cicero also had to communicate his intentions, or even satisfy the expectations of a distanced audience who would read the speeches long after their delivery. In this way the dissemination of Philippiics 10 and 11, as written texts, allowed Cicero to operate beyond the immediate senatorial context. To those who were to receive copies, Cicero was able to outline the political situation, as he perceived it, and to articulate a policy that might encourage a particular response that supported his own position.

The commentary is prefaced by an introductory section which serves to orient the reader to the commentary, covering material related to an understanding of Cicero’s rhetorical aims and methods. Themes and relationships, established in the introductory sections, are addressed in more detail within the commentary proper when they relate to specific lemmata. Within the commentaries themselves I have focused primarily upon providing historical comment and rhetorical structure in relation to Cicero’s persuasive aims. Only occasional attention has been given to linguistic questions.

I do not provide a critical text, but rely primarily upon Shackleton Bailey’s text of 1986. Where necessary I refer to other editions; notably Clarke’s 1918 OCT edition; Fedeli’s 1982 Teubner edition; and the recently published Loeb edition of Manuwald and Ramsey 2009. Fedeli, in particular, provides an extensive apparatus
criticus, which complements Shackleton Bailey’s text and provides a less judgmental assessment of the various MSS. There is little textual comment, save where I have altered the text; and where I have altered the text, I have drawn attention to this within the corresponding lemma.
Acknowledgements

Finally, it is a pleasure to acknowledge those who have supported this work during its various stages. I owe a debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Marcus Wilson, whose turn of phrase revealed an astute understanding of Cicero’s method and whose many observations proved a stimulus to a greater appreciation of Cicero’s work. Tom Stevenson provided the initial encouragement and enthusiasm for this thesis, for which I will always be thankful. Mark Davies and Julian Larsen have read sections of my work and provided a welcome source of discussion and helpful advice. I would like to thank Hugo Messer, who has proven in many ways to be the inspiration for this project, despite never knowing it. And finally, I offer my deepest thanks to Penelope Lindsay for her continual support throughout this seemingly never-ending process.
# Table of contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................ i
Dedication ..................................................................................................................................... ii
Preface .......................................................................................................................................... iii
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... vii
Table of contents ........................................................................................................................ viii
References and abbreviations ....................................................................................................... ix
A note on the manuscript tradition ............................................................................................ xii
Textual variants .......................................................................................................................... xiii

## Introduction

1. The historical background to *Philippics* 10 and 11 ......................................................... 1
2. The inclusion of *Philippics* 10 and 11 within the *Philippic* corpus ............................. 15
3. Praise and blame .................................................................................................................... 28

## Commentaries

Introduction to *Philippic* 10 ..................................................................................................... 41
  Commentary ................................................................................................................................. 44
Introduction to *Philippic* 11 ..................................................................................................... 173
  Commentary ................................................................................................................................. 176

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 302
## References and Abbreviations

### Cited editions of the *Philippics*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Edition Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>King</td>
<td>1878</td>
<td><em>The Philippic Orations of M. Tullius Cicero</em> (Oxford)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td><em>Cicero, Orationes Philippicae I-XIV</em>, OCT. (Oxford)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ker</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td><em>Cicero, Philippi</em>, Loeb (Cambridge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shackleton Bailey</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td><em>Cicero, Philippics</em> (Chapel Hill and London)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Standard works

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIL</td>
<td><em>Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum</em> (1863- ).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIRA</td>
<td><em>Fontes Iuris Romani Ante Justiniani</em>. S. Riccobono ed. (Florence, 1941-3).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All dates are BC unless otherwise stated. Ancient authors and their works are abbreviated as in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary (OCD)*. The works of Cicero, however, are given by title only, followed by book and section number. For clarity, all references to the *Philippics* are given in full, including the orations under discussion, and for ease of reference I have included line numbers within the commentary; these
correspond to the line numbers within Shackleton Bailey’s edition and do not refer to a standardized numbering. Additionally, Cicero’s letters are referred to by traditional Book and letter number, not Shackleton Bailey’s renumbering. References to Appian without title are to the Civil Wars unless otherwise stated. Similarly, references to Quintilian are to the Institutio Oratoria. References to secondary scholarship are referred to in abbreviated form (name and year of publication); full publication details are supplied within the bibliography.

Nomenclature of the Late Republic poses some problem in terms of clarity, given the duplication of many of the nomina, particularly in relation to the Bruti and Antonii. For precision I refer to both Marcus Brutus and Marcus Antonius by their cognomen and nomen respectively, since they form the principal characters within Philippics 10 and 11; but I include praenomina when referring to any of the other Bruti or Antonii (for example, when referring to Decimus Brutus I refer to D. Brutus throughout). At times, I include praenomina when referring to M. Antonius and M. Brutus, but this is generally to clarify a particular context.

All Latin translations are my own unless otherwise stated. However, I have left some terms untranslated (such as res publica), since they depend very much on context to supply the particular meaning of the term.
A note on the manuscript tradition

The text of the Philippics is based on the following manuscripts (the sigla are taken from Fedeli 1982):

\[ V = \text{cod. tabularii Basilicae Vaticanae H 25, saec. IX} \]
\[ b = \text{cod. Bernensis 104, saec. XIII-XIV} \]
\[ c = \text{familia Colotiana, i.e. codicum Paris. Lat. 5802 (saec. XIII), Paris. Lat. 6602 (saec. XIII), Berolin. Philipp. 1794 (olim 201, saec. XII) consensus} \]
\[ n = \text{cod. Vossianus Lat. O 2, saec. X-XI} \]
\[ s = \text{cod. Vaticanus Lat. 3228, saec. X} \]
\[ t = \text{cod. Monacensis 18787 (olim Tegernseensis 787), saec. XI} \]
\[ v = \text{cod. Vaticanus Lat. 3227, saec. XII} \]
\[ D = \text{codicum benstv consensus} \]

The textual tradition of the Philippics has been shown to belong to two independent branches (\( V \) and \( D \)), which descend from a single archetype (no longer extant). For a detailed discussion of the textual tradition see the preface to Fedeli’s 1982 edition; but see also the introductory comments by M-R 2009: xxxvii-xxxix; Shackleton Bailey 1986: xiii-xv; and Clark 1900: 39-48. Of particular note, however, is the lacunae in \( V \) where no text is preserved for \textit{Phil.} 11.22-40. Conversely, a gap in \( D \) exists at \textit{Phil.} 10.8-10 for which we are reliant on \( V \).
## Textual variants

The text used for this commentary is based on Shackleton Bailey’s 1986 edition of the *Philippics*. Departures from Shackleton Bailey’s text are minimal and, where I have diverged from his text, I have made note both below and within the commentary. Shackleton Bailey’s textual emendations are justified by him in either the *apparatus criticus*, the appendix of his edition, or in his articles from 1979 and 1982 respectively (see bibliography).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shackleton Bailey</th>
<th>Dawes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 10.9.1 <em>po&lt;s&gt;t</em></td>
<td><em>post</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 10.9.5 <em>ut potuisset</em></td>
<td><em>potuisset autem</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 10.11.6 <em>elusi sumus</em></td>
<td><em>extrusimus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 10.22.6 <em>Saxa et Cafo</em></td>
<td><em>Saxae et Cafoes</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 10.25.3 <em>auxilia</em></td>
<td><em>exercitus</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 11.15.12 <em>[res] acta</em>[s]*</td>
<td><em>acta</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 11.23.3 <em>ulla</em>[m]</td>
<td><em>ulla</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Phil.</em> 11.27.3 <em>iudicabit</em></td>
<td><em>iudicavit</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

1. The historical background to Philippics 10 and 11

On the Ides of March 44 Caesar lay dead before his senatorial peers, murdered by a group discontented at the autocratic nature of his power. The conspiracy was led by the urban and peregrine praetors for the year, Marcus Iunius Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, both ex-Pompeians, but pardoned by Caesar in the wake of the civil war and subsequently employed in his new regime. Brutus and Cassius were to play leading roles over the following months, indeed years, leading, at first, the conspiracy against Caesar, and then leading the movement against Marcus Antonius, and against the eventual formation of the Second Triumvirate, until they fell on the battlefields of Philippi.

We are fortunate to possess a rich supply of evidence for the events following Caesar's assassination, in large measure owing to the Philippic corpus and to Cicero’s extensive correspondence throughout this period. We know that chaos immediately followed the assassination. Those senators not involved in the conspiracy fled in confusion and terror, Antonius among them. Brutus took the initiative, attempting to placate the senate by insisting that the conspiracy aimed at removing the tyrant only; and as proof, Antonius and Marcus Aemilius Lepidus were spared. The liberators turned to the people at Rome to reassure them of their peaceful and patriotic intent. They were quick to guarantee the veterans’ land allotments as a gesture of their goodwill. Nonetheless, their repeated attempts to placate the populace were in vain and they withdrew to the Capitol where their co-conspirator, Decimus Iunius Brutus Albinus, ensured their safety by posting a guard of gladiators.

Lepidus, Caesar’s Master of Horse, acted quickly, bringing a legion into the city to impose calm on the night of 15 March. Antonius too reasserted his position,

---

3 Full accounts of the conspiracy and assassination are widely available: Syme 1939 remains a compelling and moody account of the period; Frisch 1946 covers the historical and political material extensively, paying particular attention to the developments in relation to the Philippic speeches; but see also Lintott 2008: 339-421; Ramsey 2003: 1-10; Rawson 1992: 468-90; Horsfall 1974.
4 Perhaps against the wishes of Cassius who may well have advocated a purge of Caesar’s leading supporters (so Vell. Pat. 2.58.2; App. 2.114; Plut. Brut. 18.2; 20.1).
5 Nic. Dam. 101; Att. 14.10.1; 15.11; Rawson 1992: 469.
6 Dio 44.22.2; Nic. Dam. 27.103; Vell. Pat. 2.58.2; App. 2.122; Phil. 2.89-90; Pelling 1988: 155.
despite his initial flight, involving himself authoritatively in the negotiations that followed. Hostages were exchanged while tentative discussions were conducted, and only two days later, on 17 March, the senate agreed upon a fragile and uneasy compromise: Caesar’s *acta*, both those published and those yet to be verified were bound in law, while the liberators were granted an amnesty for their role in the assassination of the Dictator.\(^7\)

On 20 March riots broke out in response to the assassination. In the midst of the unrest that followed mobs attempted to raze the liberators’ houses and were only repulsed with difficulty; and, in a case of mistaken identity, the tribune Helvius Cinna was killed by a mob as a result of being mistaken for the conspirator L. Cornelius Cinna.\(^8\) Antonius promoted the unrest, gathering around him a bodyguard of Caesar’s veterans. Such was his growing assertiveness over the following months that he effectively intimidated a number of senators (including Hirtius, the consul-designate for 43, and the consular Cicero), into staying away from the senate until further measures had secured his dominance.\(^9\) The possession of Caesar’s *acta*, entrusted to Antonius by Caesar’s widow, were to provide Antonius with the political leverage he sought, but his manipulation of the *acta* for his own gain drew open criticism.\(^10\) As early as April, Cicero expressed his distrust of Antonius’ control of Caesar’s memoranda, accusing him of having passed various counterfeit measures and thereby subverting the details contained within the memoranda.\(^11\) Antonius was not to be hindered; he soon took control of the treasury placed in the temple of Ops, monies marked out for Caesar's Parthian campaign, an amount totalling some 700 million sesterces.\(^12\)

\(^7\) Cassius dined with Antonius, Brutus with Lepidus as part of tentative discussions (Dio 44.34-5; App. 2.134; 2.136; 2.142; 3.15; Plat. *Brut.* 19-20; Vell. Pat. 2.58). For the compromise see *Phil.* 1.4; 1.16-25; 1.31; 2.89; 3.30; *Att.* 14.11.1; 14.14.2; App. 2.128; Dio 44.22; Cicero, although involved in the negotiations, was later to regret the outcome; the tyrant was dead but the tyranny remained, a repeated protest within his extant correspondence (*Att.* 14.4.1; 14.9.2).

\(^8\) *Phil.* 2.91; Suet. *Iul.* 85; on the death of Cinna: *Plut.* *Brut.* 20; Wiseman 1974: 44.

\(^9\) *Att.* 15.5.2.

\(^10\) Matijević (2006) has sought to rehabilitate the actions of Antonius by arguing that Antonius pursued a policy of moderation, particularly in the early stages after Caesar’s death. He argues that Antonius was politically isolated, not by the violation of Caesar’s *acta*, but by the emergence of Octavian and by Caesar’s *clientela* clamouring for revenge against the tyrannicides (Matijević 2006: 378-380). Matijević provides a useful counterpoint to Cicero’s forceful rhetoric, but perhaps goes too far in absolving Antonius from culpability since he denies that Antonius did anything particularly unusual in the use of intimidation and violence in the context of the Late Republic.

\(^11\) Measures included tax exemptions, the enfranchisement of Sicily, and territorial allowances to the Galatian king Deiotarus, but such measures came at the cost of support from his political peers (*Phil.* 2.92-8). For a collation of Antonius’ forged decrees see Fezzi 2003: 86-93; Manuwald 2007: 430-2.

\(^12\) *Phil.* 2.93; 8.26.
The hostile atmosphere at Rome and the lack of security for the assassins was telling; it forced Brutus and Cassius to suspend their praetorial duties and they withdrew to the south of Rome while tensions were high.\(^{13}\) Antonius was complicit, aiding their departure by passing legislation that exempted Brutus and Cassius from their praetorial duties, and permitting the allocation to them of minor \textit{provinciae} which would take Brutus and Cassius from Italy altogether.\(^{14}\)

During the liberators’ absence from Rome, Antonius was becoming increasingly hostile, claiming they were parricides and murderers.\(^{15}\) D. Brutus communicated the unease with which he assessed the situation. He believed Antonius had provoked the animosity towards the liberators, and that he intended declaring the liberators ‘\textit{hostes}’, warning they were not safe as long as Antonius was inflaming the populace and soldiery into civil unrest. He predicted war in the long run and suggested the liberators make plans for that eventuality: \textit{si melior casus fuerit, revertemur Romam; si mediocris, in exsilio vivemus; si pessimus, ad novissima auxilia descendemus. succurret fortasse hoc loco alicui vestrum cur novissimum tempus exspectemus potius quam nunc aliquid moliamur.}\(^{16}\)

This is our first indication of opposition to Antonius from within the liberators’ camp. We have little contemporary discussion within our extant correspondence, in the weeks after the assassination, to indicate that the liberators were making any particular effort at challenging the position of the consul. Indeed, the position of the liberators seemed near powerless to Cicero.\(^{17}\) Whatever their intentions, the liberators were not yet prepared, nor resourced, to oppose Antonius’ position of predominance. They sought to remedy this imbalance by striking out for their provincial appointments. Among the conspirators who had prospered from Caesar’s regime were Gaius Trebonius and Lucius Tillius Cimber, appointed

\(^{13}\) An exodus of senators from Rome followed in the days after the assassination (\textit{Att. 15.3.1}; \textit{Plut. Brut. 21}). Brutus and Cassius were initially inclined to remain in Rome, in order to fulfil their duties as praetors (App. 3.6), but by 15 April Brutus had left; his whereabouts were only rumoured in an attempt to ensure the secrecy of his location (\textit{Att. 14.7.1}; \textit{Plut. Brut. 21}). Nic. Dam. (31) and Dio (47.20.3) wrongly attribute the departure of Brutus and Cassius to fear of the military preparations of Octavian (Rice Holmes 1928: 45-46). There was a further exodus of senators in late May, coinciding with Antonius’ return to Rome with his six thousand veterans (\textit{Att. 15.3}; App. 3.5).


\(^{15}\) \textit{Att. 14.4.1}; the feelings of animosity towards the liberators were giving Cicero cause for concern (cf. \textit{Att. 14.15.1}; \textit{Fam. 12.3.1-2}).

\(^{16}\) \textit{Fam. 11.1.1-4}.

\(^{17}\) \textit{Att. 14.4.1: equidem doleo numquam in ulla civitate accidit, non una cum libertate rem publicam recuperatam ... reliquae res opes et copias desiderant, quas nullas habemus}; Lintott 2008: 341.
governors of Asia and Bithynia respectively. Within a month of Caesar’s death both set out for their respective provinces, prompted by the hostile attitude of the urban populace. Both were quick to begin fortifying towns and procuring resources for any potential conflict. Nor were they alone in seeking succour in the provinces. Lepidus too, made for Gallia Narbonensis; Lucius Munatius Plancus for Gallia Comata; and by the year’s end Gaius Cornelius Dolabella was making for Syria.

During May and June, Antonius consolidated his own position further, through a series of legislative measures. His brother L. Antonius was tribune this year, and charged with chairing the new commission empowered with the distribution of land among the veterans, while C. Antonius, the eldest of the Antonii brothers, was a praetor and allotted Macedonia as his promagisterial province (see Phil. 10.4.5 n.). Antonius himself was intent on securing Gallia Cisalpina and Comata, in exchange for the province of Macedonia, and did so with the collusion of his colleague Dolabella, who was to receive the province of Syria in return for his support. Antonius was to have the legions of Gaul at his disposal, in addition to those of Macedonia, marked out for Caesar’s Parthian campaign; and worse, the provincial allocations for both Antonius and Dolabella were to be for a period of five years, a contravention of Caesar’s acta that had placed a two year limit on provincial magistracies. Hirtius and Pansa, the consuls-designate for 43, were troubled by Antonius’ impetuous behaviour, and shunned the meeting summoned by Antonius for the beginning of June, at which Antonius intended securing his desired provincial allocation. Brutus and Cassius too, had written to Antonius to express their concern over Antonius’ legislative intentions, but to no avail. Undeterred, Antonius passed his legislative measures through the assembly, circumventing the senate which was proving increasingly hostile to his intentions. Shortly after, on 5 June, as part of Antonius’ political programme Brutus and Cassius were assigned the commission to organise the grain supply from Asia and Sicily respectively, a degrading and insignificant

18 App. 3.2; Plut. Brut. 19.2.
19 Trebonius had set out for Asia, allotted by Caesar, D. Brutus for Cisalpine Gaul and Tillius Cimber for Bithynia (Att. 14.10.1; Fam. 12.13.3; App. 3.2.4-5; 3.6.18; Dio 47.21.3; 47.26.1; Drum 2008: 91 n. 33).
20 Nic. Dam. 28.
21 Att. 14.9.3; 14.14.4; Phil. 1.19; Dio 43.25.3.
22 Fam. 11.2.1.
23 There had been rumours that Antonius had been intent on this transfer of provinces as early as April and under the provisions of the law Antonius was free to go to his newly allotted province (Att. 14.14).
The commission was an onerous task and one that they were reluctant to accept, as Cicero reveals to Atticus in a letter that paints a striking image of their response when discussed at a family meeting at Antium (Att. 15.11). Cicero’s details of the meeting provide an informative episode in which the future of the liberators was discussed, and which provide tantalising hints of future plans. Upon receipt of news of the commission, Servilia, the influential mother of Brutus, made known her contempt for the post and promised to exert her influence and have its terms amended. Brutus expressed his reluctance, but was undecided about accepting the commission; Cassius, however, was outraged at the suggestion (Att. 15.11.1: egone ut beneficium accepissem contumeliam?), and was adamant that he would not undertake the appointment. He was eager to leave for Greece, but his intentions for doing so are left unsaid. Despite their refusal to undertake the commission, the appointment nonetheless allowed Brutus and Cassius to obtain a fleet for a safe withdrawal from Italy, an eventuality that Cicero was to endorse since it provided the liberators with the opportunity to stay out of Rome at a time when their safety could not be assured. Brutus, however, continued to hope for reinvolvement in political affairs through the production of the ludi Apollinares, public games, over which the urban praetor presided in the second week of July. He was keen to conduct the games, at which he hoped to agitate popular support that might prompt a return to Rome; his hopes never materialised and he was forced to manage the games in absentia. Cicero and Brutus were together at Nesis, between Puteoli and Neapolis in the bay of Naples, when Atticus informed them of the outcome of the games; there was agitation in Brutus’ favour at a production of Accius’ Tereus, but despite signs of favour, practical benefits were not realised. And worse, the games were celebrated by Brutus’

24 For the grain commission see Att. 15.5.2; 15.9.1 15.11.1; and for the provincial commands see App. 3.8; Dio 47.1; Frisch 1946: 102-3; Rawson 1992: 475.
25 Att. 15.11.2. Servilia’s insistence on having the commission amended came to nothing. See Bauman (1992: 7) on Servilia’s powerful behind-the-scenes influence.
26 Cf. Cicero’s similarly resentful response to the commission at Att. 15.10.1: quid foedius? frumentum imponere (cf. Att. 15.9.1; 15.12.1).
27 Att. 15.10; App. 3.5. Brutus’ decision to accept the grain commission fortuitously justified the raising of a fleet, since it involved counter-measures against pirates on the Tyrhenian coast. Piracy was noted in contemporary letters, which may indicate that the removal of the pirates was included within the commission of Brutus and Cassius as part of the curatio frumenti (Att. 16.1.3; 16.2).
28 Att. 16.2.3; 16.4.1; Cicero advised Brutus against being present and was deterred from attending himself by the threat of danger, although Brutus had asked for his attendance (cf. Phil. 10.7.2 n.).
29 Att. 16.2.3; Phil. 1.36; App. 3.23-4.; see below Phil. 10.7.12. Cicero was of the opinion that any support for Brutus, derived from the games, might force Antonius into some hostile action.
praetorial colleague and M. Antonius’ brother, Gaius, on the renamed Nones of ‘Julius’, and not the conventional ‘Quinctilis’, much to Brutus’ anguish.\(^{30}\)

On 8 July Cicero wrote of his arrival at Puteoli from where he set out to meet Brutus at Nesis (Att. 16.1). Brutus spoke of leaving when he met Cicero. Cicero intimated they might leave together, but Brutus dithered (Att. 16.5.3). His hesitancy was no doubt for the reasons Luceceius suggested to Cicero: it was not from irresolution of purpose, but in case a new opportunity should arise for a return to duties as praetor.\(^{31}\)

Brutus and Cassius continued to hope for a return as late as July when they issued a joint edict summoning the senate for August 1 at which there was some hope for compromise.\(^{32}\) The agenda for the meeting is unclear, but the fact that a *frequens senatus* was requested indicates that either a *privilegium* was being sought or that provincial allocations were to be determined.\(^{33}\) We know there was a demand of Antonius (*aliquid edicto postulassemus a consule*: Fam. 11.3.1), probably the termination of the grain commission and so the requirement of a *privilegium* excusing them from their duty and the hope of a return to Rome (*nostri Romam redirent*: Att. 16.7.1).\(^{34}\)

The liberators repeatedly indicated willingness to compromise their political position if they were allowed a return to Rome. They declared that they had aimed for concord from the beginning and their actions had proven it: *nos ab initio spectasse otium nec quidquam aliud libertate communi quaesisse, exitus declarat* (Fam. 11.2.2). As a further indicator of their willingness towards compromise, Brutus and Cassius informed Antonius, through public edict, that they had dismissed a band of supporters which they had collected from the *municipia*: *sed certe, cum ipsi in tua potestate fuerimus tuoque adducti consilio dimiserimus ex municipiis nostros necessarios, neque solum edicto, sed etiam litteris id fecerimus* (Fam. 11.2.1). Antonius replied to the edict in hostile manner, to which Brutus and Cassius produced a counter-reply warning Antonius to bear in mind not only the length of Caesar’s life but the brevity

\(^{30}\) *Att*. 16.1.1; 16.4.1; 16.5.1; App. 3.23.

\(^{31}\) *illum valde morari non tergiversantem sed expectantem si qui forte casus* (Att. 16.5.3); cf. Cicero’s similar explanation for his delay in Puteoli at *Att*. 16.2.4.

\(^{32}\) The edict, although no longer extant is referred to at *Phil*. 1.8; *Att*. 16.7.1; *Fam*. 11.3.1 and approved by Cicero at *Att*. 14.20; *RE* 10.998.17.


\(^{34}\) So Denniston 1928: 76; Shackleton Bailey 1977: 476; Ramsey 2001: 259-60.
of his reign. They stated that they were precluded from fulfilling the duties of their offices and that on account of this they were willing to enter into voluntary exile. The liberators reiterated their desire to participate in a free res publica (te cupiamus in libera re publica magnum atque honestum esse), and denied any intention of pursuing civil war, and insisted that their actions had been undertaken for the sake of peace and concord: non licere praetoribus concordiae ac libertatis causa per edictum de suo iure decadere (Fam. 11.3). The letter failed to achieve any tangible results giving cause for Cicero to criticize: sed quid ista edicta valeant aut quo spectent plane non video (Att. 16.7.7). It now appears that alternative plans were in place and that the liberators were resigned to departing.

In late August both Brutus and Cassius left Italy, ostensibly for their allotted provinces of Crete and Cyrenaica. Their departure appeared to Cicero like exile, and the liberators perhaps made it appear deliberately so. Antonius had accused them of tampering with the soldiers and of sending agents beyond Italy as early as August 44 with the purpose of fomenting support for their cause. Brutus and Cassius denied the accusations, but Antonius appears to have been well informed. What had been evident was the lack of preparatory measures for the immediate future and the loss of opportunities through which the liberators might impose themselves. Whatever the initial lack of direction, their sense of purpose thereafter becomes more focused, precisely at the time when our correspondence ends, through to the point where

35 Fam. 11.3; cf. Att. 16.7.7. Antonius had responded with hostility to Brutus and Cassius’ public responses with threats which appeared to the liberators as contumeliosus and minacis (Fam. 11.3.1; Att. 16.7.7). Brutus’ deference to the senate, after taking possession of the Balkans, also indicates a measure of compromise. He would allow C. Antonius to retain his insignia of office once captured, a concession that appears out of place within Cicero’s presentation of the Antonii. For Brutus things were not yet irreconcilable, and despite Brutus being open to the possibility of compromise, Cicero seems to have used the opportunity to further promote war by exaggerating an escalation in hostilities. Ramsey (2001) has argued that Antonius, on the other hand, showed no inclination towards compromise given the strength of his position.

36 See Phil. 10.8.5 n.; cf. Fam. 11.3.2, dated 4 August. Antonius is unlikely to have been overly concerned by the threats issuing from the praetors (contained within Fam. 11.3) as the liberators were voicing their concerns from a position of political isolation. Antonius was in a dominant position while Brutus and Cassius were rumoured to be lingering south of Rome, their actions conducted in secret for fear of reprisal, and the grain commission limiting their authority. Moreover, Antonius was preoccupied with the success of Octavian’s games in honour of Caesar, a more immediate threat to his political dominance (c. 20-28 July; Ramsey and Licht 1997: 54-55).

37 Att. 14.19.1; 14.18.4; Fam. 11.3.3. Rice Holmes (1928: 45-46) argues that Brutus remained in Italy until October, inferred from Fam. 12.2 and 3. But this is too late according to Rawson 1992: 476 n. 50.

38 Fam. 11.3.4.
Brutus was able to communicate his successes in Greece and Macedonia in early February.  

Our evidence regarding the liberators’ movements and intentions thereafter is fragmentary at best; a condition imposed by the winter months (*Fam.* 12.5.1: *hiemem credo adhuc prohibuisse quo minus de te certum haberemus quid ageres maximeque ubi esses*), and by what must have been some reluctance to publicise the details of their movements. Asinius Pollio noted that despatches were being intercepted (*Fam.* 10.31.1: *scrutantur tabellarios et retinent*), making it unsafe to confide plans via written communication. Antonius’ control of the Adriatic and its landing points left the most direct routes impracticable. Thus the liberators’ intentions can only be gleaned from their subsequent actions, given the level of secrecy and the impracticality of open communication. Cicero himself, despite his active and extensive correspondence, was without any information regarding their activities, since the liberators were reluctant to communicate their thoughts to him.  

Brutus was soon heard to be in Athens where he was received with enthusiasm; his statue was placed alongside those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the tyrant slayers, and thus he was celebrated as a liberator. Brutus’ presence in Athens was notable; he was seen to be devoted to the study of philosophy, an impression that Brutus no doubt fostered, given his well-known philosophic leanings. Plutarch, however, noted the dissimulation, claiming Brutus was secretly preparing for war. In any case, his preparations were made clear by subsequent events. A number of Rome’s younger political generation were quick to join Brutus; among them were the offspring of Rome’s staunchest republicans, an Ahenobarbus, Bibulus, and Cicero’s

---

39 Drum (2008) has recently argued that their unexpected control of the eastern provinces was long preconceived and that the conspiracy was intended to target the recent beneficiaries of Caesar’s allocations in the east. The level of coordination led Drum (2008: 89) to the ‘unavoidable conclusion that the conspirators recognised the importance of the eastern provincial commands and took steps to shore them up in the closing months prior to the assassination.’ An indication of the coordination may be evinced by the criticism which D. Brutus receives from his co-conspirators for some kind of inaction (*Att.* 15.11.2; *Fam.* 11.13a.1-2; Rice Holmes 1928: 202). It is possible the liberators themselves expected D. Brutus to pursue a certain line of action in coordination with their own intentions, and that D. Brutus was failing to fulfil his obligations.  

40 They had not communicated their intentions of the assassination plan to Cicero, although, when Caesar lay dead, they called upon Cicero by name (*Phil.* 2.12.1-3; Dio 44.20.4).  

41 *Phil.* 10.7.5 n.; Dio 47.20.4.  

son. Leves were raised from among the Roman citizens in Greece, and remnants of Pompey’s defeated forces after Pharsalus swelled his ranks.\textsuperscript{43}

Some time towards early January, Brutus entered Macedonia, prompted by news of the imminent arrival of C. Antonius, the dating of which can be inferred by the actions of Brutus himself.\textsuperscript{44} C. Antonius had made a hasty departure from Rome, after Macedonia had been allocated to him at a meeting of the senate on 28 November.\textsuperscript{45} Having taken command of some troops on his immediate arrival, he withdrew to Dyrrachium, and then fell back to Apollonia on the approach of Brutus, where he was being barricaded at the time of Brutus’ despatch to the senate.\textsuperscript{46} Brutus was greeted with a more advantageous reception. He was received by the outgoing governor of Macedonia, Quintus Hortensius Hortalus, the son of the orator and an ex-Caesarian, but also a close relation to Brutus.\textsuperscript{47} Publius Vatinius, the governor of Illyricum, was complicit, giving a semblance of republican unity which Cicero was eager to parade in \textit{Philippic} 10 as proof of a consensus against Antonius.\textsuperscript{48} The quaestors, Marcus Apuleius of Asia, and Gaius Antistius Vetus of Syria, rallied to Brutus handing over funds which they had brought from their provinces.\textsuperscript{49}

C. Antonius was quickly suppressed. In early February 43, Brutus informed the senate that he had taken control of Macedonia, Greece and Illyricum, that he had shut C. Antonius in at Apollonia, thus depriving him of the province, and that he was placing himself at the disposal of the senate.\textsuperscript{50} When news reached Rome, Pansa, the presiding consul, summoned the senate in order to discuss this sudden and unexpected revelation. This forms the juncture at which Cicero delivered \textit{Philippic} 10. Pansa’s

\textsuperscript{43} Remnants of the Pompeian forces from Pharsalus came over to Brutus (\textit{Att.} 16.7.1; Plut. \textit{Brut.} 25; Dio 47.21; Raubitschek 1957: 6; see \textit{Phil.} 10.24.5 n.), and according to Appian, two further legions of new recruits were drilled to Italian standards (Dio 47.21; App. 3.79). The enthusiasm with which this was done was noted by Horace who was enlisted among them (\textit{Hor. Sat.} 1.6.47; \textit{Carm.} 2.7.9; 3.4.26).

\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Fam.} 12.4.2.

\textsuperscript{45} The senate subsequently stripped C. Antonius of his Macedonian command in December 44, insisting that current governors were to retain possession of their respective provinces until new successors were appointed (\textit{Phil.} 7.3).

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{Phil.} 10.10; Plut. \textit{Brut.} 25-6.

\textsuperscript{47} Plut. \textit{Brut.} 25-26; see \textit{Phil.} 10.11.9 below. Hortensius served on Caesar's staff in the civil war (Caes. \textit{B Civ.} 1.8.1); for his relation to Brutus see Münzer 1963: 309; \textit{MRR} 2: 321.

\textsuperscript{48} Hortensius commanded one legion; Vatinius, three (\textit{Att.} 16.5.3; 16.4.4; Frisch 1946: 100); two legions were raised by Brutus from among Macedonian levies, though it is unlikely that these were put to immediate use (App. 3.79). The levies raised were not enough to make full the complement of Republican legions (App. 4.88; 4.108; cf. Plut. \textit{Brut.} 38 where there is supportive, though not conclusive, agreement). Two legions were raised from volunteer levies from both the Balkan regions and from Italy swelled his ranks, much to Pansa’s dismay (\textit{Ad Brut.} 2.4.4).

\textsuperscript{49} See \textit{Phil.} 10.24.5 n.

\textsuperscript{50} \textit{Fam.} 12.5; Dio 47.22.1.
view of Brutus’ success in Greece was favourable and his opinion allowed Cicero to range freely over the reasons for Brutus’ command. There was, however, opposition within the senate to Brutus’ actions. Quintus Fufius Calenus, characterised by Cicero himself and other sources as Antonius’ leading supporter at Rome, was called upon to speak first, and proposed that Brutus be compelled to turn over his command, presumably arguing against the legality of Brutus’ actions.\textsuperscript{51} Cicero, rising in response, proposed that not only should Brutus be confirmed in his position as proconsul of Macedonia, but that he should have the right to raise the money and forces required to meet his needs in the immediate conflict with C. Antonius. Cicero’s proposal was carried. Scholarship is near unanimous on this point.\textsuperscript{52}

The date on which \textit{Philippic} 10 was delivered cannot be determined with precision, since we have no clear evidence when the dispatch from Brutus was received by Pansa. Various dates have been advocated for the delivery of the oration, although none have found general consensus given the paucity of evidence. We know that \textit{Philippic} 10 followed very soon after the delivery of \textit{Philippic} 8, at which terms were discussed after negotiations with Antonius. The embassy, of which Sulpicius was a member together with the consulars L. Calpurnius Piso and L. Marcius Philippus, was despatched to Antonius after the senate met on the first four days of January, 43.\textsuperscript{53} The embassy returned with a series of counter proposals by the beginning of February. Pansa convened the senate on 3 February in order to discuss the outcome of their negotiations. The debate continued into a second day, on which

\textsuperscript{51} Ad Brut. 2.3.4; see \textit{Phil}. 10.6.16 n. Calenus was usually the first senator called upon to speak in the senate. He appears to have led the opposition to Cicero’s more aggressive and belligerent policies (cf. \textit{Phil}. 8.11-19; 10.2-6; 12.3-4; 12.18). For the order of the speakers throughout the period of the \textit{Philippics} see Frisch 1946: 170; Lintott 2008: 406-7.

\textsuperscript{52} Woodman (1983: 132-4) raised an objection to the acceptance of any such decree, and argued against the appointment of Brutus by pointing to a lack of any corresponding evidence that confirmed the senate’s decree. Woodman argued that Brutus was granted the Macedonian command only \textit{after} Mutina, based upon Velleius’ repeated assertion: \textit{quam [sc. Sex. Pompeium] senatus paene totus adhuc e Pompeianis constans partibus post Antonii a Mutina fugam eodem illo tempore quo Bruto Cassioque transmarinas provincias decreverat} (Ve\textit{ell. Pat.} 2.73.2; cf. similar assertions at 2.62.2; 2.62.4). He dismissed Cicero’s \textit{decreta nostra} used of Brutus’ command at \textit{Phil}. 11.27, and argued that ‘It is significant that nowhere in the whole of \textit{Phil}. 11 does Cicero use the senate’s alleged ratification of Brutus’ Macedonian command as a precedent for Cassius’ in Syria. It would have been the most natural and most cogent argument of all, yet Cicero never mentions it; the clear inference, it seems to me, is that Brutus did not constitute a precedent precisely because his command had not been ratified’ (Woodman 1983: 133). The context had shifted markedly from an attitude of acceptance of Brutus’ position, to one of anxiety at the growing strength of the assassins of Caesar. Cicero consequently avoided the overt association of Cassius with Brutus in order to downplay the obvious collaboration between the liberators. See also \textit{Phil}. 10.25.1 n.

\textsuperscript{53} Frisch 1946: 194; Holmes 1931: 205-6; the embassy was to demand Antonius’ cessation of hostilities against D. Brutus, to allow access to the latter, to evacuate Cisalpine Gaul, and to place himself at the disposition of the senate and people of Rome (\textit{Phil}. 6.4-5; 7.26).
Cicero delivered *Philippic* 8, condemning both Antonius’ counter-proposals and the senate’s continued reluctance to pronounce Antonius a *hostis*. *Philippic* 10 followed soon after. The meeting of the senate after the receipt of Brutus’ despatch was much to Cicero’s surprise (*cum hodierno die senatum te habiturum non arbitaremur: *Phil.* 10.1) and may indicate that the senate met immediately after the meetings of the third and fourth. The argument, however, is not strong and we have no correlating evidence to support such close delivery of *Philippic* 10. The dating of *Philippic* 8 does at least provide the earliest possible date at which *Philippic* 10 was delivered. Dissemination of the speech followed hurriedly after its delivery. A letter from Cicero to Brutus makes clear that the oration was forwarded to Brutus quickly in order to reach him at Dyracchium by April, where he was able to compose a letter to Cicero in reply (the letter, *Ad Brut.* 2.3).54

Events in the east were to take an unexpected turn when, at the end of February or early March, news was brought to Rome that Dolabella had put to death Trebonius, one of the assassins of Caesar and current governor of Asia. Dolabella, leaving Rome before the end of his consulship (sometime around November 44), arrived at Smyrna on his way through to Syria where he informed Trebonius of his intention to pass through the province of Asia. Trebonius refused him entry into Smyrna, but allowed Dolabella to buy provisions for his troops. A guard was sent by Trebonius to track Dolabella’s movement away from Smyrna, but during the course of the night Dolabella ambushed them, returned to Smyrna, captured the sleeping Trebonius and put him to death.55 According to Appian and Dio, Trebonius was put to death immediately, but Cicero, within *Philippic* 11, tells of a protracted torture and violent death.56 The senate was outraged at news of Trebonius’ death, and in a rare show of unanimity, immediately declared Dolabella a *hostis*.57 On the following day,
the senate met to discuss candidates for the command against him.\textsuperscript{58} The debate forms the occasion when Cicero delivered \textit{Philippic} 11, where he proposed that Cassius be granted the commission of pursuing Dolabella, and that he do so with an \textit{imperium maius}, a command that mirrored that of Brutus in \textit{Philippic} 10. The senate, not swayed by Cicero’s argument, rejected his proposal and voted instead to commission the consuls to draw lots for the provinces of Syria and Asia upon completion of their campaign at Mutina.\textsuperscript{59} Little was known of Cassius’ activities when Cicero delivered \textit{Philippic} 11; it was only rumoured that he was in Syria, where he had honed his martial qualities when serving under Crassus in the latter’s failed Parthian campaign.\textsuperscript{60} Irrespective of the senate’s resolution, Cassius had already moved against Dolabella, and was raising forces from among the eastern allies in the interests of the liberators.\textsuperscript{61}

The precise dating of \textit{Philippic} 11, like 10, is indeterminate. We know that Antonius was made aware that the senate had decreed Dolabella \textit{a hostis}; he was indignant, expressing his condemnation of the decree in a letter, to which Cicero responds in \textit{Philippic} 13, delivered on 20 March.\textsuperscript{62} An allowance of around 12 days must be made for the letter to have reached Antonius at Mutina, and for Antonius to have composed a letter to Hirtius and Octavian that was returned to Rome by 20 March (since the trip took about six days).\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Philippic} 11 cannot then have been delivered after about 7 March. Just as Cicero had informed Brutus of his delivery of \textit{Philippic} 10, so he informed Cassius in a letter, dated some time to early March, that he had proposed him for the command against Dolabella (the letter, \textit{Fam.} 12.7).

Shackleton Bailey places the letter at the end of February: ‘Written shortly after the delivery of the Eleventh Philippic, which can be placed about 6-7 March’.\textsuperscript{64}

\textsuperscript{58} Liv. \textit{Per}. 119; Vell. \textit{Pat.} 2.69.1; App. 3.26; Dio 47.29.1-3.
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Fam.} 12.14.4; Dio 47.29.
\textsuperscript{60} Cassius appears for the first time in 53, as a notable military commander when he led the remnants of the army back to Syria where he continued to organise the defence of the province against the Parthian threat (see \textit{Phil.} 11.35.1 n.). In 49, as tribune, he supported Pompey, commanding the Syrian fleet. Confirmation that Cassius was in the process of acting against Dolabella arrived only in mid-April when a despatch arrived from L. Cornelius Lentulus, quaestor to Trebonius in 44, outlining the situation in the east (\textit{Ad Brut.} 2.2.3).
\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Fam.} 12.7.2; 12.11.1; 12.14.4.
\textsuperscript{62} Phil. 13.23.
\textsuperscript{63} It took six days for the letter \textit{Fam.} 11.6 to reach Mutina from Rome, since Cicero was sure to be exact regarding the length of time the letter took to reach him: \textit{Lupus noster cum Romam sexto die Mutina venisse} (\textit{Fam.} 11.6.1).
\textsuperscript{64} Shackleton Bailey 1977: 506; T-P Vol. 6: 59; Frisch 1946: 225-336; cf. \textit{Ad Brut.} 4.2: \textit{de Cassio laetor et rei publicae gratulor, mihi etiam qui repugnante et irascente Pansa sententiam dixerim ut Dolabellam bello Cassius persequeretur, et quidem audacter dicerem sine nostro senatus consulta iam }
Dolabella remained in Asia for the winter, was defeated by Tillius Cimber, with the aid of Deiotarus, sometime in early spring, but managed to cross to Tarsus shortly after where he was pursued. He moved through Cilicia into Syria, where he encamped at Laodicea, was subsequently defeated, and died at the hands of his personal guard. With Dolabella’s defeat, Cassius gained control of the eastern provinces, their legions and resources. When news finally confirmed Cassius’ activities in early April it shocked some members of the senate. Thus we have this sudden and unexpected development of events, in which the war with Antonius was proceeding successfully in the east, in effect, promoting Cicero’s designs at Rome. The setback of his failure to have Cassius promoted, encouraged his opponents to pursue further negotiations with Antonius. The two speeches, delivered within weeks of each other, mark something of a highpoint for Cicero. Brutus was legitimized in his command in Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum, and Cassius, despite Cicero’s failure to have his appointment senatorially sanctioned, was in the process of securing the provinces of the east. The east was now in the hands of Brutus and

---

65 Phil. 11.6; 11.25; Fam. 12.12.1; Ad Brut. 2.3.5; 2.4.3; App. 4.60; Dio 47.29.3.
66 Fam. 12.13.4; 12.14.4; 12.15.7; Liv. Per. 121; Vell. Pat. 2.69.2; App. 4.62; Dio 47.30.2. Confirmed news of Dolabella’s defeat probably only reached Rome in August 43, after the motion declaring Dolabella a hostis was repealed (App. 3.95).
67 Cicero writes that some senators collapsed at the news: quas statim cum recitavissem, cecedit Servilius, complures praeterea (Ad Brut. 2.2.3).
68 Cassius was in the process of securing control of 13 legions in the east, and combined with those of Brutus, the liberators would possess some 21 legions, an imposing and confrontational presence (Brunt 1971: 486). However, the considerable influence the liberators could now exert created further anxieties within an already fractious senate. We have traces of those anxieties at Rome; Antonius liked to depict the resurgence of a Pompeian party, and played upon the insecurities that such a movement implied. The designation of a Pompeian party retained much of its emotive force, despite the implausibility of such a cohesive political entity in so changeable a political climate. The mileage Antonius was making in advertising vengeance against the liberators, and the Pompeianus senatus (Phil. 13.28; 38; 45) may well have prompted Octavian to pursue a similar message in securing popular support. Octavian was not yet circulating his intention to punish the tyrannicides, although rumours may have begun circulating that he intended upon revenge (App. 3.40: ‘the colonized soldiers were incensed against Antonius for neglecting to avenge the murder of Caesar and said that they would assist him [i.e. Octavian] to do so if they could’). Oppius tried to reassure Cicero of Octavian’s intent and assured him that Octavian would show himself friendly towards the liberators (Att. 16.15.3). This did little to placate Cicero’s distrust of the coterie surrounding Octavian and the policy that was being disseminated from their camp: ‘they threaten death to our friends’ (‘ita multi circumstant, qui quidem nostris mortem minitantur’: Att. 14.12 of April 22, 44; cf. Dio 45.12.2). Pansa supported the promotion of Brutus, an act that undermined Antonius’ depiction of a faction, but Pansa grew increasingly anxious regarding the intentions of the liberators, particularly when he observed the number of volunteers joining Brutus in Athens (Ad Brut. 2.4.2; cf. Fam. 11.3; Phil. 11.24.5). The preparation of a fleet also triggered some anxiety in Hirtius, who had begun to fear the tyrannicides, although Cicero suggested that ulterior motives lay behind Hirtius’ feigned anxieties (Att. 15.6.1).
69 Cicero was reluctantly inclined to support another embassy to Antonius, but later recanted in Philippic 12; see Hall 2008 for Cicero’s persuasive strategy.
Cassius, Plancus and Lepidus held Further Gaul and professed allegiance to the senate, while Hirtius and Pansa were raising armies in order to lift the siege of D. Brutus who was holding out against Antonius at Mutina.
2. The inclusion of *Philippics* 10 and 11 within the *Philippic* corpus

Cicero’s aim of raising and co-ordinating opposition against Antonius holds the *Philippic* corpus together, binding it by thematic and political design. Yet there are irregularities in Cicero’s motivation to publish the various speeches, since the speeches trace his, often *ad hoc*, responses to the ever changing developments in the conflict. Over the following section I want to emphasize the communicative aspects that motivated Cicero to include *Philippics* 10 and 11 within the *Philippic* corpus.

In the case of *Philippics* 10 and 11, Cicero’s eagerness to communicate his intentions to a distant audience underlines his motivation in publishing the speeches. The two speeches are similar in purpose (they seek to authorise Brutus and Cassius to act against C. Antonius and Dolabella respectively), but dissimilar in outcome (only the command for Brutus was granted by the senate). On one hand we have Cicero’s successful proposal for Brutus in *Philippic* 10; on the other, we have Cicero’s ostensible failure to have his proposal in *Philippic* 11 passed, despite the similarity of the circumstances and of the proposals. Moreover, Cicero knew that he was unlikely to have his proposal in *Philippic* 11 passed, particularly in light of contemporaneous sentiment; Pansa vehemently opposed the command, as we learn from his resistance to Cicero in the *contio* following the senate meeting. Yet Cicero nonetheless circulated the oration because he judged that a greater value might be derived from its publication.

We know that Cicero intended his collection of speeches, delivered against Antonius, to be known as his ‘*Philippics*’, and that these were modelled on the speeches delivered by Demosthenes against Philip of Macedon. We also know that the extant *Philippics* are not a complete collection of the ‘anti-Antonian’ speeches delivered during this period, but rather a selection from a larger body of speeches delivered between 44 and 43 BC. As to whether the speeches were assembled after

---

70 *Fam*. 12.7.1; see also p. 21 below.
71 *iam concedo ut vel Philippici vocentur, quod tu quadam epistula iocans scripsisti* (*Ad Brut*. 2.3.4); *cf. haec ad te oratio perferetur, quoniam te video delectari Philippicis nostris* (*Ad Brut*. 2.2.6); see Manuwald (2003: 65-90 and 2008) for excellent discussions on the collection and composition of a ‘*Philippic*’ corpus (*cf. Stroh* 1983: 35-50; Schäublin 1988: 60-61; Kelly 2008: 22-23 suggests a larger and more inclusive collection of speeches).
72 During the last eighteen months of his life, the period of the *Philippic* corpus and up to the time of his death in December 43, Cicero delivered twenty deliberative speeches, of which we have evidence for 15 published: the fourteen *Philippic* orations and the fragmentary *In P. Servilium Isauricum*. A
Cicero’s death, with regard of Cicero’s original compositional intentions, is the subject of recent scholarship; but in the case of Philippiques 10 and 11, we have explicit evidence that Cicero intended these speeches to be incorporated within his collection, and that they were in fact quickly included within the corpus.\(^73\) Both speeches were passed on to Brutus in quick succession; by the Kalends of April, only six weeks after the delivery of Philippic 10, Brutus was in possession of a copy of the oration while in camp at Dyrrachium, and by mid-April Cicero was ready to send a copy of Philippic 11.\(^74\) We therefore have two distinct publication dates, evidence that the two speeches were not originally conceived as a pairing.

Natural groupings of the speeches occur where Cicero addresses particular events or developments in the political situation. These groupings have been fairly consistently identified by modern scholars, since they usually revolve around specific events or issues. In this regard, Manuwald’s study of the Philippic corpus provides an important overview of the approaches taken by modern scholars, as she assesses a number of structural models that place the orations within the collection as a whole.\(^75\) She notes that the orations have been consistently subdivided according to the

---

\(^73\) Manuwald 2008: 65-90. Ancient evidence is problematic. The fourth century AD grammatian Arusianus Messius quotes from the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Philippiques (Gramatici Latini 7: 467.15-7; Kelly 2008: 22). Seneca the Elder refers to the speeches as Orationes in Antonium (Suas. 6.15), which suggests a thematic grouping of speeches, but not necessarily the ‘Philippiques’; while Aulus Gellius (1.22.17; 6.11.3; 13.1.1; 13.22.6) refers to the collection that he knew as the Antonianae. Manuwald has called into question not only the place of these additional orations within the corpus, but has also raised the question of the composition of the collection as a whole. It remains unclear whether the so-called Philippiques 16 and 17 were ever intended as part of the Philippique corpus, or were separate speeches that merely included Cicero’s invective against Antonius. Regarding Philippiques 10 and 11, the correspondence between Cicero and Brutus is clear: legi orationes duas tuas [sc. Philippiques 5 and 10], quaram altera Kal. Ian. usus es, altera de litteris meis, quae habita est abs te contra Calculum. nunc scilicet hoc expectas dum eas laudem. nescio animi an ingeni tui maior in his libellis laus continetur; iam concedo ut vel Philippici vocentur, quod tu quadam epistula iocans scriptisti (Ad Brut. 2.3.4); the inclusion of Philippic 11 is similarly established: haec ad te oratio [Phil. 11] perfetur, quoniam te video delectari Philippiques nostris (Ad Brut. 2.4.2). That Cicero conceived of the speeches as a collection is evident in a letter from Marcus Brutus in which Brutus approved the appellation of ‘Philippici’ to the body of speeches, grouped by design (Ad Brut. 2.3.4). The plurals Philippique and Philippiques, used by both Cicero and Brutus, indicate a collection of speeches, thereby establishing the implicit comparison with Demosthenes. The degree to which Cicero imitated Demosthenes has been discussed in numerous places (but see in particular Manuwald 2007: 129-38; Wooten 1986; Stroh 1982; Dugan 2005: 214-26).

\(^74\) Ad Brut. 2.3.4 concerning Philippic 10. In the case of Philippiques 10 and 11, publication followed quickly from the date of their delivery, indicating a limited period of time in which to make revision. Quick publicaition of the first Philippic set the tempo for the remainder of the speeches. Cassius applauded Cicero’s decision to oppose Antonius on 2 September (Fam. 12.2.1), the date of Cicero’s first Philippic. Cassius’ letter, written towards the end of September, allows for only a brief window in which Cicero might make revision of his speech before dissemination. For a discussion on the speed with which Cicero published his orations see McDermott 1972; cf. Kelly 2008: 29-38.

\(^75\) Manuwald 2007: 85.
circumstances of their delivery. Manuwald takes Stroh’s lead by pairing *Philippics* 3 and 4 as the beginning of the *Philippic* corpus, in which Cicero laid down a policy with the aim of isolating Antonius by repeatedly depicting him as a *hostis*.\(^{76}\)

Additionally, from *Philippic* 3, Cicero employed what has been termed a ‘disjunctive mode’; the presentation of mutually exclusive antitheses such as ‘war and peace’, and ‘slavery and freedom’.\(^{77}\) These dichotomies are repeated throughout the remainder of the collection, and form a programmatic design, distinct from *Philippics* 1 and 2. Manuwald conceptualises the subsequent speeches, *Philippics* 5 to 9, as a group, because of their focus upon negotiations with Antonius and the return of the ill-fated embassy in early February 43. The failed negotiations end with *Philippic* 9 and Cicero’s eulogy of Servius Sulpicius Rufus, who, as one of three envoys sent to negotiate with Antonius, died en route. *Philippic* 10 is the first speech following the failure of the embassy to Antonius, and is followed quickly after by *Philippic* 11.\(^{78}\)

*Philippics* 10 and 11 have regularly been paired in scholarship and the pairing is immediately apparent, as the focus moves away from Italy and the immediate conflict with Antonius, to the eastern provinces where Brutus and Cassius were seeking to take control of their vast resources before they should fall into the hands of Antonius and his lieutenants.\(^{79}\) The two speeches deal with the new situation and mark a new development in the conflict against Antonius. The scope of the conflict now takes on much broader geographical and political dimensions and, as a result, the conflict with Antonius is accelerated, as the position of the liberators emerges from what had been a marginalised political stance, to one of financial and military strength. *Philippics* 12, 13 and 14 return to events in Italy, possible negotiations, and the immediate conflict with Antonius at Mutina.

A different approach was taken by Wooten, who viewed the *Philippics* through their Demosthenic model, focusing on comparable stylistic aspects.\(^{80}\) Wooten grouped *Philippics* 8, 9, 10 and 11 together, justifying their unity by referring to a

\(^{76}\) Manuwald 2007: 79.
\(^{77}\) The phrase, with regard to the *Philippics*, was coined by Wooten 1986: 58-86; Hall 2003: 284. Manuwald (2007: 75-9) pointed to this dichotomy as a feature of the *Philippic* corpus and used it to support the argument that the *Philippic* corpus has its real beginning at *Philippic* 3. This disjunctive mode is a repeated rhetorical construction within the orations: there is never a third compromise.
\(^{78}\) Hall 2002: 275-79.
‘narrative technique’ that characterised the range of his selection.\(^8\) His approach is valuable, but his subdivision of the speeches depends on an almost arbitrary partition, because he never really justified the grouping. Rather, he made observations regarding a narrative technique that applied to the *Philippics* in general, but drawing illustration exclusively from the range of his selection. Wooten was right to emphasize the fundamental role that narrative plays in *Philippics* 10 and 11. He was able to show how Cicero manipulated the narrative in order to reveal the motivations behind the actions of his protagonists. Yet narrative also functions by allowing Cicero to communicate his own ideas concerning the situation, both to his immediate audience and then, through the publication of the speeches, to a secondary, broader political audience.

The dissemination of the speeches allowed Cicero to emphasize his own constitutional basis through the inclusion of the formal senatorial proposals within the orations, and these serve to reinforce the appearance of constitutional procedure.\(^8\) Eight of the eleven *Philippic* speeches delivered within the senate contain formal proposals (*Phil.* 3; 5; 8; 9; 10; 11; 13; 14), although not all were approved by the senate.\(^8\) The proposals nonetheless advertise a consistent and sustained policy.\(^8\) The formal proposal within *Philippic* 11 allowed Cicero to communicate his viewpoint of the situation, despite its apparent failure within the senatorial context. The proposal, far from having a stylistic objective, in light of the proposal’s formulaic phrasing, is a formal gesture. It displays Cicero as a constitutional and republican figurehead, working within the traditional Roman political system against one who seeks to overthrow the *res publica*.\(^8\) Cicero’s decision to include the formal proposals therefore has an informative function for those beyond the immediacy of the senatorial context; they convey a mirage of legitimacy. Cicero consequently took much care not to publically undermine the senate’s procedure or decision-making process, and so undermine his own political manoeuvrings. He could refer to the senatorial endorsement of the actions of D. Brutus and Octavian, and point to

---

\(^8\) But what Wooten particularly identified was Cicero’s ability to vary his style, to shift from a complex periodic structure, to a plain, unadorned style that complemented a prominent narrative technique.
\(^8\) This also explains in part Cicero’s concern with his role as augur and his criticisms of Antonius’ violations of correct augury (cf. *Phil.* 2.6; 2.80–89; 3.9; 5.7–11; 12.12; 13.5).
\(^8\) Cicero’s proposals in *Philippic* 5 were only partially adopted, while the proposal in *Philippic* 11 was discarded outright.
\(^8\) Hall 2002: 280.
\(^8\) Harries 2005: 220.
senatorial approval as an evident form of legitimacy since any act passed by the senate thereby obstructed any opposition that Antonius or his supporters might voice. Cicero was not in a legally dominant position; he had no monopoly on legal legitimacy (to which the *Philippics* testify); for this reason Cicero played upon the appearance of constitutional legitimacy by consistently identifying himself with correct and formal procedure.  

Cicero’s failure to have his proposal passed in *Philippic* 11 is more indicative of the difficulties that he faced in convincing his audience to support his advocacy of Cassius. Nonetheless, there was evident mileage to be made from the speech’s dissemination, and Cicero was yet able to turn this failure into something beneficial; he could continue to present Cassius’ actions as being undertaken in the interests of the common good, and to show that Cassius’ actions could be placed within the greater collaborative effort of opposing Antonius. Nor were Cassius’ actions without precedent, as the senate’s endorsement of the actions of D. Brutus and Octavian had shown towards the end of 44 and beginning of 43. Each had acted ‘*privato consilio*’, but each had had their respective initiatives approved by the senate. The repeated obstacle that Cicero faced was to give some sort of approval to privately initiated actions, which were often legally questionable. This was perhaps not so striking an objection as it appears. Cicero had argued that the protection of the *res publica* was the supreme good (*Leg.* 3.8), and consequently argued that in such times, it was necessity and not legal precedent that dictated a means to an end. What Cicero’s opponents did object to, however, was the increasingly powerful position of the liberators, which Cicero is forced to confront within *Philippics* 10 and 11. Antonius’ opposition to the liberators is indicative of the feeling directed against the liberators. He would refer to the impending conflict with the liberators as one between ‘*partes*’,

---

86 A successful proposal was usually identified by the names of the author and the presiding magistrate, so both the proposer and magistrate became openly identified with the motion. Verbatim copies of successful proposals were stored in the aerarium and were available for consultation. Cicero had recourse to consult the *consula* of 146 for information regarding a magistrate in that year, and Asconius was reliant on the *acta* for confirming both dates and persons (*Atr.* 13.33.3; *Asc.* *Scauro* 19). That individuals wished to be connected with particular proposals is evident enough. There might be a rush to propose a motion and have the proposer’s name recorded in connection with a particular proposal. Octavian appears as something of a beneficiary in this regard, with several senior senators wishing to appear closely aligned. At the meeting on the Kalends of January, a busy period of debate given that it was the first day of the year, a number of proposals were made over several days. Octavian’s stepfather L. Marcius Philippus proposed a gilt statue; Servius Sulpicius Rufus proposed that Octavian be able to stand for office before legal age, while P. Servilius followed this with a proposal that Octavian be allowed to stand for office ten years before the legal requirement, despite legislation intended for prevention of such things (*Ad Brut.* 1.15.7-8; Vell. Pat. 2.61).

87 See also *Phil.* 10.6.14 n.
identifying himself and his companions as Caesarians (Phil. 13.46), and his opponents as belonging to the ‘partis’ of Pompey (Phil. 13.48). Cicero countered this objection by pointing to the collaboration of Caesar’s adopted son with the two Caesarian consuls and the liberators. Yet Cicero’s audience did not fully buy into his argument; rather it patently hesitated in empowering Cassius.

In an attempt to allay any anxieties regarding the intentions of the liberators, Cicero could illustrate that Brutus and Cassius were more than willing to work within the constitutional framework once they were integrated within its structures. If adopted, a senatorial decree outlined the parameters of the command and induced the recipients towards a particular course of action. As Hall notes: ‘By bestowing official recognition upon their achievements Cicero tries to induce them to work within the constitutional framework rather than against it.’ Such was Cicero’s reasoning behind his promotion of Octavian. Cicero’s heroic portrayal of Octavian within the Philippics is almost entirely absent from Cicero’s private correspondence, in which Cicero clearly reveals his intention of removing Octavian from a position of authority once the conflict with Antonius was brought to a conclusion. Cicero’s use of honorific decrees as a means by which the senate might bind powerful individuals to the state was apologetically articulated to Brutus: D. Bruto decrevi honores, decrevi L. Planco. praeclara illa quidem ingenia quae gloria invitantur; sed senatus etiam sapiens qui, qua quemque re putat, modo honesta, ad rem publicam iuvandam posse adduci, hac utitur (Ad Brut. 1.15.9). Additionally, Cicero may also have hoped that, by granting commands to Brutus and Cassius, he might encourage those who were yet to determine where their loyalties lay to support the senatorial position, instead of Antonius (Pollio, for example, prevaricated, but later sided with Antonius and Lepidus).

However, in addition to the public aspect of a written oration circulated among the political elite, there survives the very private correspondence that is not always compatible with Cicero’s public posturing. These letters, both to and from Cicero, reveal more direct, and legally objectionable, appeals. Cicero’s willingness to circumvent constitutional forms is a repeated feature within the extant

88 Antonius would reproach Cicero as the ‘dux’ of this movement within the senate (Phil. 13.30).
89 Hall 2002: 296.
90 Phil. 5.45-46; 53; 13.22; 14.6.
91 Att. 15.12.2; 15.16.9; 16.14.1; Fam. 11.20.1.
92 Fam. 10.32; 10.33; App. 3.46.
correspondence, and this ultimately undermines (for the modern reader) Cicero’s appeals to a constitutional basis, where legal principle is being subordinated to short-term expediency. A number of examples can be adduced to illustrate the point. In his correspondence with Cassius, Cicero makes clear that he wanted returns for his advocacy. To Cassius he wrote: ‘I hope you will redeem the pledge I gave in the senate, at some length of discourse, and at the contio.’ Cicero’s subsequent failure to promote Cassius to a position of legal privilege may have slowed Cicero’s immediate objectives, but not his opposition to Antonius. He expected Cassius to take control of the forces in the east, regardless of the legalities of such an act, in much the same way as he had prompted Plancus in May 43; then Cicero had urged Plancus to either ignore or to pre-empt directives from the senate: tu, quamquam consilio non eges, vel abundas potius, tamen hoc animo esse debes ut nihil hoc reacias neve in rebus tam subitis tamque angustis a senatu consilium petendum putes, ipse tibi sis senatus; quocumque te ratio rei publicae ducet, sequare; cures ut ante factum aliquid a te egregium audiamus quam futurum putarimus. illud tibi promitto, quicquid erit a te factum, id senatum non modo ut fideliter sed etiam ut sapienter factum comprobaturum (Fam. 10.16.2).

Cicero could repeatedly undercut the senate’s decisions by urging D. Brutus to disregard any of the senate’s decrees that might impede his opposition to Antonius: quamobrem ad omnia ita paratus, ita animatus debes esse, non ut nihil facias nisi iussus, sed ut ea geras, quae ab omnibus summa cum admiratione laudentur (Fam. 11.7). Cicero could be critical of the senatorial position, and its collective failure to support his own programme. However, he could not openly dismiss its consulta, because the senatorial process was the only process through which Cicero could work to achieve his ends.

Brutus responded to Cicero by urging him to pursue legal avenues (Ad Brut. 1.4a.2: quam tu non solum bene sentiendo sed etiam prudenter tueri debes), but had little difficulty in accepting the command advocated in Philippic 10. The extraordinary nature of the command, proposed in Philippic 10, jarred with Brutus’

---

93 Fam. 12.7.2: quod autem et in senatu pluribus verbis dissersui et dixi in contione, in eo velim fidem meam liberes.
94 Cicero was well aware of the limited resources available to him as a privatus. To Cornificius he described his fight with Antonius as a war of words against arms: nos hic cum homine gladiatore omnium nequissimo, collega nostro, Antonio, bellum gerimus, sed non pari condicione, contra arma verbis (Fam. 12.22.1).
own advice to Cicero to work within traditional structures. Antonius too noted the inconsistency of the senate’s actions in appointing Brutus and (eventually) Cassius, and appealed to Hirtius as a wronged magistrate: *Macedoniam munitis exercitibus ... Africam comisistis Varo bis capto ... in Syriam Cassium misistis* (Phil. 13.30). Cicero did little to discourage the irregularity of the liberators’ actions in relation to the traditional function of Rome’s magistrates, although the irregularity was less objectionable in the case of Brutus and Cassius, because Cicero could present them as responding to an *ad hoc* situation in the fight against Antonius. The senate, however, was less convinced, and it was only much later on 27 April, well after the last of the *Philippics* were delivered, that the Antonians were declared ‘*hostes*’, and Cassius instructed to pursue Dolabella.

When forwarding the written speech, Cicero often included explanatory material that gives detail concerning aspects of the oration, or he included material that described the circumstances of delivery. For example, Cicero wrote to Cassius to justify his delivery of *Philippic 11* since he knew the speech would offend Pansa, and probably others within the senate. Pansa did, in fact, take offence at the oration, as Servilia feared, but the publication of the speech illustrated Cicero’s readiness to offend Pansa if it furthered his own interests. Cicero wrote of his motivation: ‘In fact Pansa told the *contio* that your mother and brother had been against my making this motion. But their complaints did not move me, I was thinking of other things; I was supporting the *res publica*, which I have always done, and your *dignitas* and your glory’. Following the delivery of the *Eleventh Philippic* Cicero went before the people and addressed a *contio* with a summary of the speech he had delivered in the senate. That he did so was a point he emphasized to Cassius. To Cassius Cicero wrote that he had won such support that his proposal would have been accepted, had not Pansa vehemently opposed the command. The popular support which Cicero claimed for Cassius is not attested elsewhere and was probably exaggerated.

---

95 Cicero had been cautious when discussing the extent of Brutus’ command and avoided any odious associations with *regnum* that might have been linked with an extraordinary command. Brutus himself was very conscious to avoid the link and repeatedly deferred to the senate as the executive body of state (*Ad Brut*. 2.3.1-2).

96 *Ad Brut*. 1.3a; 1.5; *Fam*. 12.10.1; Vell. Pat. 2.64.3; Liv. *Per*. 119.

97 *in contione quidem Pansa dixit matrem quoque tuam et fratrem illam a me sententiam noluisse dici; sed me haec non movebant, alia valebant: favebam et rei publicae, cui semper favi, et dignitati ac gloriae tuae* (*Fam*. 12.7.1).

98 *Fam*. 12.7.1; see also *Phil*. 11.23.5.

the support Cicero claimed contradicts his acknowledgement of the strength of those who sympathized with Antonius’ cause. Furthermore, the presence of the liberators was objectionable to the people and may have run counter to the overall strategy within the *Philippics* of emphasizing unanimity against Antonius. Various factors have been suggested that may have prevented Cicero from publishing the speech delivered at the *contio*. Crawford suggests that his primary audience was the senate, but this is only one possible reason for Cicero’s decision not to publish.\(^{100}\) Crawford is right to suggest that failure to publish this speech may have derived from the unpopularity of its content; but it can also be explained by the lack of any further benefit deriving from its publication. Cicero’s decision to include *Philippics* 10 and 11 within the *Philippic* corpus makes clear Cicero’s association with Brutus and Cassius by communicating clearly defined political ties. These ties would not have been furthered by the publication of the speech delivered before the *contio*.\(^{101}\)

In reference to *Philippics* 10 and 11, Cicero did not elaborate upon the reasoning behind his decision to include the two speeches, but he was sure to inform his correspondents of his actions on their behalf.\(^{102}\) This emphasis upon his own actions illustrates a very keen desire to inform his correspondents of his advocacy and to give form to his political design. Cicero’s correspondents could also anticipate support for their cause within the senate. D. Brutus, for example, implored Cicero to support his actions in Gaul (prior to Antonius’ blockade of Mutina), when he led a campaign against mountain tribes in order to battle-harden his troops.\(^{103}\) To Q. Cornificius, the governor of Africa, Cicero explained that one of his motivations in delivering *Philippic* 3 was his commitment to their friendship. He proposed that the current governors retain their respective provinces, and in explaining his motivation to Cornificius, Cicero wrote of two objectives: *hoc ego cum rei publicae causa censui tum, mehercule, in primis retinendae dignitatis tuae.*\(^{104}\)

Regarding *Philippic* 10, Cicero was evidently keen to have Brutus informed of the content of the speech as soon as possible, and he was obviously pleased to have had the approval of Brutus for his oration and advocacy.\(^{105}\) In this oration Cicero

\(^{100}\) Cassius’ mother had opposed Cicero’s decision to speak on behalf of Cassius and this may have influenced his decision to let the matter drop: Crawford 1984: 251.

\(^{101}\) *Fam.* 10.28.2; 11.6a.2; 12.24.2; *Ad Brut.* 1.3.3; 2.5.5.

\(^{102}\) *Ad Brut.* 2.3.4; 2.4.2.

\(^{103}\) *Fam.* 11.4.1-2.

\(^{104}\) *Fam.* 12.22a; cf. 12.7.1 in which a similar motivation is presented to Cassius.

\(^{105}\) *Ad Brut.* 2.4.2.
could eulogize Brutus for his actions, but in private he would berate Brutus for a less than aggressive stance in the current situation, urging him to more vigorous opposition to the Antonii.\textsuperscript{106} This divergence of policy accounts for Cicero’s selective approach when deciding which orations to forward to Brutus, since curiously, Brutus did not receive copies of \textit{Philippics} 3, 4, 7, 8, and 9; presumably they indicated a position that was not entirely compatible with Brutus’ intentions and therefore best left uncommunicated.\textsuperscript{107}

The selection sent to Brutus appears to have been determined by practical considerations. \textit{Philippic} 5 contained an attack on Antonius, and was perhaps meant to encourage a more effective response from Brutus. As noted by Settle, the oration contained complementary material regarding Lepidus, the brother-in-law of Brutus, which may well have pleased him.\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Philippic} 10 was forwarded with minimal delay. But only after Brutus confirmed his approval of \textit{Philippics} 5 and 10, did Cicero decide to forward \textit{Philippic} 11, although opportunities to do so earlier were available. \textit{Philippic} 11 was, of course, of interest to Brutus since the fates of he and Cassius were entwined and their coordinated efforts to secure the east were shown to have practical benefits at Rome, by illustrating the widespread and unprompted resistance to Antonius and his satellites.\textsuperscript{109} And, significantly, \textit{Philippic} 11 illustrated a continuation of Cicero’s support for the liberators.\textsuperscript{110}

Divergent policies concerning the current situation give rise to perceptible anxieties that can be traced within the correspondence. Cicero’s honouring of individuals had provoked a sharp rebuke from Brutus, who urged Cicero to show restraint in his honorific proposals, so as not to undermine the traditional form of government.\textsuperscript{111} And this may indicate, in part, Cicero’s hesitance regarding Brutus’ response to \textit{Philippics} 10 and 11, since Cicero was advocating commissions that were beyond the regular system of honours. Cicero had to allow for Brutus’ self-proclaimed

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ad Brut.} 2.3.2; 2.4.3; 2.5.1.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ad Brut.} 2.3.4; cf. Dyek 1996: 518; 541; 619-ff.
\textsuperscript{108} Settle 1962: 283-5.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ad Brut.} 2.3.3.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Phil.} 11.27; cf. \textit{Fam.} 12.6.2; \textit{Ad Brut.} 2.1.3. Cicero linked the two men as the last refuge of the republic (\textit{Fam.} 12.6.2; \textit{Ad Brut.} 2.1.3).
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ad Brut.} 1.4a.2; Cicero received blunt criticism from Brutus for his promotion of Octavian outside the regular \textit{cursus honorum} (cf. \textit{Ad Brut.} 1.6.2-3; 1.15.9; cf. 1.18). Cicero consequently avoided attracting further criticism from Brutus by omitting reference in his letters to any doubts he harboured concerning honorific decrees in which he was involved. Absent from his correspondence are the doubts he fostered regarding the young Caesar, despite the fulsome praise Octavian received at \textit{Phil.} 5.23; 5.28; 5.53.
policy of referring decisions and procedure to the state, while at the same time encouraging Brutus to act independently of senatorial resolution. Lack of communication and difference in strategy hindered what might have been a more collaborative relationship. For example, the senate received a despatch from Brutus on 13 April, containing two letters from Brutus and his captive, C. Antonius. Brutus allowed Antonius to address the senate with his title of proconsul, by virtue of his appointment to Macedonia, despite the fact that his appointment had been annulled in December. Nonetheless, Brutus allowed C. Antonius to retain his ornaments of office, an indication of Brutus’ willingness to entertain the possibility of reconciliation, but a reconciliation that was incompatible with Cicero’s counsels.\footnote{Cicero and L. Sestius considered calling the despatch a forgery because it expressed too lenient an attitude toward the Antonii (Ad Brut. 2.5).}

There are, of course, other motivations in Cicero’s desire to publish his Philippics and these have been variously emphasized. The deliberative form of the speeches allowed Cicero to assert his claim to his role as statesman, suggested as early as 59, when Cicero explicitly mentioned Demosthenes as a model when he published his consular orations. Cicero liked the comparison and baldly expressed his emulation of Demosthenes as both a political and literary model.\footnote{Att. 2.1.3.} Stroh argued that Cicero’s primary motive was to provide exempla to a generation of younger orators; the speeches might outline a particular political context which promoted the orator, but this was subordinated to the pedagogical function of the speech.\footnote{Stroh 1975: 31-54.} Settle sees the publication of the speeches foremost as literary works, although he does not push the argument in regard to the Philippic corpus, focusing primarily on the publication of Cicero’s speeches in general.\footnote{Settle 1962: 46-54; cf. comments by Brunt 1988: 47-49.} He noted, like Stroh, that Cicero professed his intention to write up his speeches for a younger generation of Roman orators, but considered Cicero’s reading audience as comprising a much broader range of readers than his immediate political class, including future generations.\footnote{Settle 1962: 48-9; Brut. 324; Cicero writes of a didactic purpose in the dissemination of his orations as early as 60 BC: Att. 2.1.3; 4.2.2; Brut. 123.} Dyck, in similar vein, particularly emphasizes a didactic purpose in the publication of Cicero’s later works. He views the circulation of Cicero’s speeches as an attempt to influence a
younger political generation.\textsuperscript{117} This is reflected in the dedication of his later works to the leading members of the younger generation, in response to what Cicero perceived as a waning influence.\textsuperscript{118} Steel gives much emphasis to the role the orations play as ‘self-conscious artefacts’ within the political context.\textsuperscript{119} However, Cicero’s primary aim is not to present the speeches as brilliant in \textit{inventio, dispositio} and \textit{elocutio}, nor to win public acclaim or attention, but to rally forces against the renegade Antonius. Neither a literary, nor a posthumous, reputation takes fully into account the political turmoil; yet neither is incompatible with the motivations in Cicero’s decision to circulate \textit{Philippics} 10 and 11. Several motives may be working together, but the political imperative of urging Brutus and Cassius to action forms the more compelling reason behind the publication of the speeches.

Cicero aims to communicate the notion of collective senatorial support for the actions of Brutus and Cassius to those commanders who were beyond the immediate context of senatorial debate. However, a tension is evident in Cicero’s portrayal of what was, in fact, a divided and factionalized senate. The actions of Brutus and Cassius were ultimately approved because they contributed to the cause of the senate and people of Rome. The \textit{Tenth} laid the foundations for a new period of activity, and the \textit{Eleventh}, despite Cicero’s failure, was quickly incorporated within the corpus as a natural extension of Cicero’s policy. The sequence provided a one-sided view of the debate, a bias that might otherwise be compromised through the publication of the \textit{acta}, and other third party informants. Syme noted the impression Cicero sought to convey through the publication of his intentions: ‘Swift, confident and convincing, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[117] \textit{Att.} 2.1.3; 4.2.2; \textit{Brut.} 122-3. The \textit{Brutus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, Orator, De Finibus, Tusculanae Disputationes} and the \textit{De Natura Deorum} were dedicated to Brutus; \textit{De Fato} was dedicated to Hirtius and the \textit{Topica} to C. Trebatius Testa.
\item[118] This was almost certainly influenced by the recent Atticist debate regarding oratorical style, which Cicero rejected as overly rigid. Atticism was a movement that rejected verbose rhetoric, favouring instead pure, simple and elegant Latin (regarding Atticism see Douglas 1955; Wisse 1995; 2002: 364-368). The beginnings of the Atticist movement seem to belong to the middle of the first century BC, an assignation given by Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Dion. Hal. \textit{The Ancient Orators} 1.1). The movement, we learn from Cicero, Quintilian and Tacitus, centred on the young and gifted C. Licinius Calvus; other members of this movement are difficult to identify, although attempts have been made to do so. The only other individual we can tentatively attach to the Atticist movement is Brutus (for the association of Brutus with the Atticist movement see Clark 1953: 80). The term ‘Asianism’, by contrast, has even less claim to a definitive school of thought. It was characterized by a full style of rhetoric, derived from the rhetoricians of Asia Minor, but was used more as a polemical catchword to identify those who did not adhere to the style imposed by the Atticists’ narrowly defined models. It is evident that Cicero was a target for these criticisms; it is this criticism that brings Atticism to life. Cicero was disparaged for his inflated and luxuriant style (Tac. \textit{Dial.} 18), called bombastic, redundant, given to excessive repetition and effeminate in his rhythm (Quint. 12.10.12); in short he was anything but Attic.
\item[119] Steel 2005: 145; and also Vasaly 2003: 90-92, particularly in relation to the \textit{Actio Secunda in Verrem}.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Philippics carry the impression that their valiant author stood in sole control of the policy of the State.” These were stand-alone statements, political pamphlets; but taken together they advertised a consistent policy, a consistency to which Cicero himself could refer.

The publication of these political speeches, together with their proposals, is therefore influenced by factors other than success or failure in the senate. The building and encouragement of political friendships and the consolidation of already existing associations or friendships; similarly, the speeches allowed Cicero to further define his political alliances while illustrating a continuity and development of his policy. Cicero made sure that he was identified with Brutus and Cassius in the current situation, regardless of the outcome of the debate and regardless of the sensibilities he offended. Cicero showed Brutus and Cassius as acting in coordination, despite the awkward failure to pass his proposal in the case of the latter. He was able to communicate the situation according to his assessment of the situation. Brutus for instance was reliant on Cicero as a source of information for the period of his absence. This reliance boded well for things to come, and Cicero was right to feel confident about the policy he had been advocating. In hindsight it was apparent to Cicero that his opposition to Antonius was beginning to bear fruit, at least in practical terms, if not always via legal and traditional means. Cassius’ success in the east, together with Brutus’ control of the Balkans, pointed to a powerful and cohesive ‘republican’ movement, but one that required further and sustained coordination. Cicero advertised his political programme via the publication of his speeches and hoped that Brutus and Cassius might be influenced in a way that furthered Cicero’s ambitions for the res publica.

---

120 Syme 1939: 146; see also Evans 2008: 80-81 who noted more the unconvincing aspects of the orations when placed within historical context.
121 Cicero could repeatedly refer to the beginning of his opposition to Antonius as the day on which he laid the foundations of the res publica (Fam. 12.25.2; 10.28.2; 10.28.2; Phil. 4.1; 5.30; 6.2; 14.20).
122 Ad Brut. 2.3.1; 1.13.2.
3. Praise and blame within *Philippics* 10 and 11

By the middle of the first century BC, Greek rhetorical models were well established at Rome and adapted within the Roman system of rhetorical theory. One such model was the division of oratory into three types (the *genera dicendi*) in accordance with the circumstance of delivery, namely the *genus iudicale*, *deliberativum*, and *demonstrativum*. The division went back to Aristotle, and was subsequently discussed in some detail by Roman theorists, but with a somewhat uneven focus. According to this differentiation, *Philippics* 10 and 11 were deliberative orations, delivered before the senate with the aim of persuading this body to appoint Brutus and Cassius to powerful military commands in the eastern provinces.

Cicero approaches *Philippics* 10 and 11 in strikingly dissimilar ways, despite the similarity of the proposals contained within each oration. Cicero utilizes praise within *Philippic* 10 in his advocacy of Brutus, while abuse of Cicero’s opponents is to the forefront in his advocacy for Cassius within *Philippic* 11. This approach is influenced by the altered context in which Cicero delivered the two orations. The appointment of Brutus to Macedonia had the backing of Pansa, who indicated his support at the outset of the senatorial meeting (see Phil. 10.1.1 n.). However, the indications that Cassius was in the process of winning the provinces of the Far East deterred Pansa from giving his support to Cassius, compelling Cicero to alter the focus of *Philippic* 11. Cicero argues for the appointment of Brutus within 10, but against the proposals that were delivered before his turn to speak in *Philippic* 11. This approach reflects Quintilian’s two-part discussion of persuading and dissuading respectively: *officiis constat suadendi ac dissuadendi* (Quint. 3.8.6).

Discussion of judicial and deliberative oratory clearly dominates Roman rhetorical theory, since judicial and deliberative oratory had a very public and practical role at Rome. The judicial oration was delivered before a judge or jury in either defence or prosecution; the deliberative was delivered before a body assembled for the purpose of examining the reasons for and against a particular course of action. The final division, the epideictic, was the oratory of display, delivered before an

---

123 Cicero himself credited Aristotle with the threefold division of the *genera dicendi* (*Inv. Rhet*. 1.7; *De Orat*. 2.43; cf. *Quint*. 2.21.23).
audience fixed in the role of observer.\textsuperscript{124} This gave rise to the perceived impracticality of such oratory and provoked negative associations with rhetoricians at Rome, who overtly associated the genre with Greek ceremonial speeches.\textsuperscript{125} However, both deliberative and judicial oratory leaned heavily upon elements of epideictic, utilizing praise and blame extensively, particularly when character played a formative role in the construction of argument.\textsuperscript{126}

Praise and blame are among the principal topics of epideictic oratory, and both are key features of \textit{Philippics} 10 and 11, forming essential components of Cicero’s persuasive strategy. The use of invective, particularly, features within the \textit{Philippic} corpus because it helps shape an extra-legal response by excluding Antonius from a free and functioning \textit{res publica}. Corbeill noted that 'By the first century B.C.E., invective has become such an expected practice that Cicero can call personal attacks on a defendant a “kind of law of the prosecution” (\textit{lex ... quaedam accusatoria: Mur. 11}).'\textsuperscript{127} Praise occupies a much less prominent place within Roman oratory. Cicero himself noted that Romans were not particularly inclined to employ praise (\textit{nos laudationibus non ita multum uti soleremus: De Orat. 2.341}), suggesting the use of praise was more typically a Greek form of oratory.\textsuperscript{128} Yet, despite its neglect within our extant rhetorical treatises, praise was a traditional form of oratorical practice consisting of recognisable and formulaic platforms.\textsuperscript{129} Its most recognisable form was revered as traditional and honorific in the specifically Roman \textit{laudatio funebris}. Cicero, as rhetorical theorist, was largely unconcerned to impose a too clearly demarcated division between the three \textit{genera dicendi}. In the \textit{De Oratore}, however, Cicero places the epideictic within a specifically Roman context, elevating its place

\textsuperscript{124} \textit{De Orat.} 2.50. Within the discussion, the interlocutor M. Antonius pointedly neglected epideixis in his appraisal of the \textit{genera dicendi}, claiming its function was less necessary than either the deliberative or judicial genres.

\textsuperscript{125} Arist. \textit{Rhet.} 1358b2-6; Dugan (2005: 26-29) discusses the cultural anxieties of adapting the Greek divisions of oratory within the Roman world of public speaking.

\textsuperscript{126} \textit{Rhet. Her.} 3.15: \textit{et si separatim haec causa minus saepe tractatur, at in iudicialibus et in deliberativis causis saepe magna partis versantur laudis aut vituperationis. quare in hoc quoque causae genere nonnihil industriæ consumendum putemus}. The \textit{De Oratore} is clear on the use of praise and blame within orations: \textit{atque his locis et laudandi et vituperandi saepe nobis est utendum in omni genere causarum}. (\textit{De Orat.} 2.349); cf. \textit{Orat.} 36; Webb 2001: 290; Albrecht 2003: 18-27.

\textsuperscript{127} Corbeill 2002: 202.

\textsuperscript{128} \textit{De Orat.} 2.342; Quint. 3.7.1-2.

\textsuperscript{129} \textit{De Orat.} 2.182: \textit{valet igitur multum ad vincendum probare mores et instituta et facta et vitam eorum, qui agent causas, et eorum, pro quibus, et item improbari adversariorum, animosque eorum, apud quos agetur, conciliari quam maxime ad benevolentiam cum erga oratorem tum erga illum, pro quo dictet orator}. 
within the forms of oratory. Cicero introduced an argument in which he forced one of his interlocutors, M. Antonius, to confront the form of the laudatio funebris. M. Antonius’ very public-minded conception of the function of oratory is compelled to acknowledge the form of the laudatio and to concede, albeit tacitly, that the laudatio too played a role in public life. Within Philippic 10, Cicero utilizes aspects of its form, because he is not attempting to persuade the senate to a particular line of policy, but is using praise instead as a form of advocacy and reinforcement of a view already expressed. There is a common vocabulary employed in orations of praise and as such this vocabulary alerts the audience to certain stock themes. The Rhetorica Ad Herennium groups the sources of praise into three groups, according to physical attributes bestowed by nature (such as speed and strength), attributes of the animus (prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo and modestia), and those things external to the person (genus, educatio, potestas, gloria, civitas and amicitia). Importantly, these are the virtues of Roman republican life, attributes of the boni who uphold the common good.

**Praise within Philippic 10**

Philippic 10 predominantly utilizes praise for its persuasive ends, while Philippic 11 employs extensive passages of invective to attack the supporters of Antonius and to illustrate the nature of the threat the republic faces. In regards to Philippic 10, the presiding consul Pansa had already spoken in favour of supporting Brutus’ position, and so Cicero could tailor his argument to a receptive audience. Accordingly, Cicero attempts to strengthen the resolve of Pansa’s decision and to reinforce the senate’s already conducive attitude.

---

130 In the De Oratore he showed little interest in following the tripartite classification to the point where one of his interlocutors, the orator M. Antonius (grandfather of M. Antonius, cos. 44), is scathing of rhetorical rules that too rigidly fixed the orator within the genres of oratory (De Orat. 2.78-84; 2.333; Orat. 37).
131 The number of qualities of the last category is relatively small, although a number of synonymous terms give the impression of a much larger range (Kaster 2005: 8).
132 The opposite of these virtues are similarly commonplace features within orations: audacia, crudelitas, impudicitia, amentia, and libido (insolence, cruelty, shamelessness, madness and lust), each applicable in the characterisation of Antonius.
133 Praise is a language that sets forth greatness of virtue (Arist. Rhet. 1.9.33).
134 In rhetorical theory a deliberative speech borders on the epideictic when the orator knows of his audience’s intention (Lausberg § 63; cf. Albrecht 2003: 172).
The republican cause as espoused by Cicero was suddenly in a militarily stronger position, with Brutus in the process of gaining control of the legions in the Greek east. However, when Cicero delivered *Philippic* 11 he faced a hostile audience, anxious about the strength of what Antonius had referred to as the resurgence of the Pompeian party. The changing context compelled Cicero to approach the two speeches in markedly different ways.

The inclusion of a passage of praise within *Philippic* 10 has a persuasive function by establishing the credentials of Brutus for command. Praise functions by providing character evidence for the probity of Brutus’ conduct and his predisposition for senatorial leadership along conservative lines. Character depiction is emphatic from the outset within *Philippic* 10 and the argument of probability related to it. That Cicero chooses to emphasize Brutus’ civil qualities over his martial is a striking feature of the encomium, and designed to play down the threat posed by Brutus’ occupation of the Balkan provinces and their legions; Brutus is a *praestantissimus civis* (*Phil*. 10.1), motivated by a desire for a free and functioning *res publica* (as opposed to being motivated by personal gain, characteristic of Antonius and his supporters) and, as such, fulfils the criteria for leading the state against its internal enemies.

The legal position of Brutus was precarious, with the opposition to his appointment more varied and forceful because of his involvement in the assassination of Caesar. Epideictic elements are therefore placed here with an emphatic purpose; they are incorporated to convey Brutus’ willingness to subordinate himself to the *res publica* and its institutions. Cicero freely concedes that Brutus had been acting of his own volition, but Cicero presents those actions as having been undertaken for the good of the *res publica*. The *res publica* plays a prominent role within *Philippic* 10. The frequency of occurrence of the term is comparable with the other *Philippiics*, but nowhere is the *res publica* so closely associated with a particular individual.

To undermine the character and pedigree of Brutus by means of invective was evidently not the most constructive approach for Brutus’ political opponents. His ancestral connections were firmly rooted in the very beginnings of the *res publica*, a

---

136 Cicero, in the *Pro Marcello*, similarly emphasized the *res publica* but its evocation in that speech functions quite differently. In the *Pro Marcello* Cicero sought to integrate Caesar into the *res publica* by establishing a hierarchical relationship in which Caesar was subordinate to the *res publica* (*satis, si ita vis fortasse naturae, addo etiam, si placet, gloriae: at, quod maximum est, patriae certe parum*: *Marc*. 24; Albrecht 2003: 165).
connection that Brutus had cultivated, allowing Cicero to make reference to his familial tradition. The expectation of virtuous conduct by Brutus is established through the presentation of an inherited character derived from Brutus’ prestigious lineage. Cicero, when referring to Brutus’ ancestral connections, had ample material from which to draw. Stress upon the *divina atque immortalis laus Bruti*, despite the negative connotations that Caesar's assassination might conjure, was deliberate and inevitably evocative of L. Brutus and the role of the Bruti in the history of the Roman Republic. The ancestral connection features on the periphery of Cicero’s argument but is integral in bringing into focus the position of Brutus within the family continuum. \[137\] Philippic 10 utilizes this connection by continuously linking Brutus with the formation and continuance of the free *res publica*. Consequently, there is no indication of any attempts to ‘de-Romanize’ Brutus through personal invective, or at least, there is no indication of any such abuse within any contemporary source material. Even the assassination of Caesar could be presented as being based upon a principled adherence to the traditions of liberty.\[140\] The deed itself is only mentioned through a *praeteritio*, focusing on Brutus and without mention of Caesar by name.\[141\]

The depiction of Brutus’ motives is only part of Cicero’s persuasive strategy. Cicero uses the laudation of Brutus to divert attention away from the legal aspect of the debate to a moral one. Calenus’ argument was likely to have been focused upon the illegality of Brutus’ seizure of the Greek provinces, which in any other circumstances was a renegade and criminal act.\[142\] This is only indirectly addressed within the oration, as Cicero describes Brutus’ actions as being guided, not by legality, but by expediency. This diversionary aspect is complemented by precedent

\[137\] The inclusion of *exempla* drawn from a mythological and historical past, as suggested by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.36; 3.16.3), is incorporated within the speech.

\[138\] According to Plutarch (*Brut.* 9.5-6), Brutus was encouraged to the assassination by anonymous notes attached to the statue of L. Brutus, which urged him to pursue the example of his eponymous ancestor and overthrow Caesar's tyranny.

\[139\] Quint. 5.10.23-4: *eo porro sunt genus, nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque credantur, et nonnumquam ad honeste turpiterque vivendum inde causae fluunt.* A similar emphasis is evident in Cicero’s praise of D. Brutus where emphasis is again on the family continuum (*Phil.* 3.8): *O civem natum rei publicae, memorem sui nominis imitatore maiorum.*

\[140\] Reference to the liberty of the Roman people and its aversion to slavery is repeated throughout the oration (*Phil.* 10.16; 10.18-19; 10.20). The argument for an essentially constant character is typical of the defence (Hands 1974: 314). The presentation of a constant character creates the assumption that Brutus, having lived honourably in the past, will therefore act honourably in the future.

\[141\] *Phil.* 10.7.5: *ac de hac quidem divina atque immortalis laude Bruti silebo, quae gratissima memoria omnium civium inclusa nondum publica auctoritate testata est;* cf. *Phil.* 11.35.6.

\[142\] See below *Phil.* 10.6.16 n.
established in the earlier *Philippic* orations. On his own initiative D. Brutus had refused to submit to the authority of Antonius, and withdrew to Mutina where he prepared for a siege; while Octavian had deflected legionary support from Antonius to himself and therefore to the cause of the *res publica*. Praise from Cicero was forthcoming; votes of thanks were awarded to D. Brutus and Octavian for their parts in resisting Antonius.\(^{143}\) Cicero is thus able to establish an implied continuity between these actions and those of Brutus in the current situation.

An extended narrative, from *Phil.* 10.6.15-15, complements the characterisation of Brutus within *Philippic* 10. Narrative provides a means by which Cicero can present a type of persona that was consistent with both the character and traditions of Brutus’ family. But this is not a fully developed linear sequence of events; rather, a sequence interspersed with digressionary material that supplements the unfolding storyline. Narrative is essential for providing a proof for the appointment of Brutus. The chronological sequence of Cicero’s narrative was evidently less important than illustrating the motives behind Brutus’ actions.\(^{144}\) A simple narrative would have the effect of repetition and so is avoided. The *narratio* reiterates the sequence of recent events, which was unnecessary, given that the senate was being collectively informed by Brutus’ despatch. However, this is exactly what Cicero wishes to emphasize. A narration of recent events allows the omission of details from Brutus’ life that were likely to be less palatable to Cicero’s senatorial audience. Brutus’ previous involvement in the Pompeian camp is a peripheral detail, not conducive to the context, and so left out.

A plain style, characteristic of narrative, gives way to striking metaphor and complex phrasing more consistent with a language of praise.\(^{145}\) The use of *amplificatio* (amplification) and *comparatio* (comparison) is given prominent place and constructed within a tone that is elevated, sombre, and consistent with Cicero’s encomiastic portrait of Brutus.\(^ {146}\)

---

\(^{143}\) *Phil.* 3.8-11. The proposal was carried and Cicero underlined his success in a speech before the people.

\(^{144}\) Wooten 1983: 141.

\(^{145}\) Especially through *Phil.* 10.14; Albrecht 2003: 192-4.

\(^{146}\) On *amplificatio* and *comparatio* see Arist. *Rhet.* 3.14; *Rhet. Her.* 3.10; 3.13; *Orat.* 37; 42; 62-65; 207; Quint. 2.4.20; 3.7.
Invective within *Philippic 11*

*Philippic* 10 is notable for its use of praise of Brutus, in contrast to the illegal and often burlesque portrayal of Antonius and his followers. In *Philippic* 11 Cicero returns to the sustained denigration of Antonius via a denunciation of Antonius’ consular colleague Dolabella, laying special emphasis upon the latter’s cruelty, his violation of *fides*, his banditry and anger; all qualities inimical to political stability.\(^\text{147}\) Having established this potent vignette of Dolabella’s opportunistic and sadistic character, one evocatively brought to life in a passage characterised by its narrative immediacy, Cicero returns to Antonius himself, and some of his more well-known companions of vice, individuals familiar to the audience of the *Philippics* via numerous reference throughout the corpus.\(^\text{148}\)

Work on the *Philippics* has generally focused on invective, due to the impassioned abuse that is prevalent throughout. The popularity of *Philippic* 2, in particular, is derived in many ways from its vivid and persistent mockery of Antonius. *Ad hominem* attacks of this type have been identified as conventional forms of invective, malleable and variously employed through oratory of the Late Republic. Craig, following Nisbet and Süß, developed a set of *loci* that a Roman audience might expect to hear in a vituperative oration.\(^\text{149}\) Corbeill developed these *loci* further, by focusing not on the catalogue of the types of accusations, but upon the context in which they were delivered and the construction and violation of social mores.\(^\text{150}\) In relation to Dolabella, Cicero’s focus is narrow but compelling. The opening of the speech concentrates immediately upon the depravity of Dolabella’s actions and the torture of a patriot, C. Trebonius, the governor of Asia.\(^\text{151}\) To act without delay against Dolabella has become the imperative in order to prevent him from committing further atrocities. Narrative again plays a formative role in establishing the basis on which to build Cicero’s argument. Antonius is implicated in the actions of Dolabella; he will

---

\(^{147}\) *Phil.* 11.2.1-10.5.

\(^{148}\) *Phil.* 11.11.1-14.10.

\(^{149}\) Süß 1975: 245-62; Nisbet 1961: 192-97: Merrill (1975) traces earlier examples of invective *loci* in order to illustrate the continuity of themes; Craig 2004: 190-192; and generally Corbeill 1996. The *loci* within the *Philippic* corpus become evident in repeated themes: Antonius’ drunkenness, his debauchery, his sexual licence, his effeminacy, his inept oratorical ability, increasingly cruel behaviour towards Roman citizens, his rapaciousness and his aspiration to *regnum* or a *dominatio*.

\(^{150}\) Corbeill 1997.

\(^{151}\) *Phil.* 11.1-5.16.
act in the same way.\footnote{Phil. 11.2.5: ergo id quod fecit Dolabella in quo potuit multis idem minatur Antonius; cf. Phil. 11.6.7-12.} But Antonius is the more dangerous opponent because of his greater potential for destruction and because of his proximity to Rome, his criminally destructive traits and the type of men he has gathered around him. The contempt with which Cicero treats Antonius’ followers allows Cicero to illustrate the types of individuals that associate with Antonius and to accumulate contemptible qualities that complement the characterisation of Antonius and further illustrate the dangers posed by their collective banditry.\footnote{For example, the designation of Nucula and Lento as a mime and writer of tragedy respectively allows Cicero to illustrate the typical company Antonius keeps (see Phil.11.13.2 n.). In this way Cicero can accumulate negative characteristics without directly assigning them to Antonius.}

This denigration of Dolabella and his associates, and the way it reflects upon Antonius, thus provides a link with the remaining \textit{Philippic} corpus, although the details contained within \textit{Philippic} 11 have only a tangential relation to Antonius. As such, the \textit{Eleventh} is not strictly an \textit{in Antonium} oration, dealing as it does with the command against Dolabella. Despite this, the \textit{Eleventh} contains a sustained attack on Antonius, his followers and policy, which provides its thematic link with the remaining orations. Common themes are reiterated: cruelty (§§2; 6-10); \textit{parricida}, treasonous or sacriligeous behaviour (§1; 6); distribution of property for personal benefit (§12; 14); rapacity (§4); banditry §§4; 14); and madness (§2; 6). These underlining characteristics establish the motivation that compels Antonius and his followers to act, and so Cicero can reiterate the need for assertive and immediate resistance. The subjects of Cicero’s denigration within \textit{Philippic} 11 are not treated with the ridicule that characterises the Antonius of \textit{Philippic} 2, but are treated as a more menacing threat. The mood of \textit{Philippic} 11 is consequently more urgent, more pressing in its objectives because of the level of opposition that Cicero faced, and because of Cicero’s decision to draw attention to the actions of Dolabella and Antonius rather than those of Cassius.\footnote{Anxieties concerning opposition are expressed at Fam. 12.11.1.}

Having established the character type that threatens Rome and her allies through a passage characterised by its vituperative vigour, Cicero turns to the \textit{confirmatio} of his oration. Epideictic elements have established the context most suited to introducing the next component of Cicero’s argument. Two other proposals were delivered prior to Cicero’s proposal. Firstly, Calenus proposed a command for the consuls against Dolabella, but only when the consuls had brought their campaign
against Antonius to a conclusion. Cicero opposed the proposal because it allowed a potentially dangerous delay. Calenus is not mentioned by name, but routinely opened debate during the period of the Philippics, and was surely the likely sponsor of the proposal. L. Caesar proposed P. Servilius, a privatus, to undertake the commission against Dolabella. Cicero opposed this, arguing that it was inappropriate to appoint a non-magistrate when the traditional structures of the res publica were entirely adequate to meet the dangers of the current situation. Additionally, if the senate were to appoint a private citizen it would introduce the dangerous precedent of allowing individuals to appeal for appointment via popular means within the august body of the senate. Only midway through the speech, after the sequence of events in the east has been established, is Cassius introduced into the debate. This allows Cicero to establish a context in which Cassius’ appointment appears the most appropriate strategy in the current circumstances. His late introduction within the speech prompted Frisch to suggest that Philippic 11 was perhaps the merging of two speeches, the earlier speech delivered on the first day of debate and the speech delivered on the second day of debate. He argued that ‘the speech preserved by Cicero enters into the whole of Dolabella’s crime in such great detail that it must have had the effect of mere repetition if he had spoken the day before as well. The explanation may of course be that when publishing them Cicero merged the two speeches into one; for the first part does not deal with the matter under debate’. There is, however, no evidence that Cicero delivered two separate speeches. Frisch did concede that the political context may have determined the structure of the oration, and he was no doubt correct in the latter assumption. Cicero’s approach was tempered by an awareness of a hostile audience, and so he formulated his proposal only after he had established arguments against the earlier two proposals, which he attempted to dissuade the senate from accepting. Cicero faced the glaring reality that the liberators now potentially commanded some twenty-one legions in the east (although the exact numbers were as yet unknown), a disproportionate power in relation to both Antonius and to the senate’s own reserves.

With Philippic 11 Cicero was confronting a difficult political situation. There had been opposition to the appointment of Brutus, but when news of Cassius’ successes reached Rome, that opposition hardened against the increasingly powerful position of the liberators. Cicero’s focus, therefore, shifts from praising Cassius, to

156 Frisch 1946: 227-8.
challenging the arguments of his opponents. Cicero was not aided by Cassius’ brusque personality that attracted suspicion and fear from among his contemporaries. Plutarch and Velleius Paterculus both suggest that Cassius had urged the assassination of Antonius and Lepidus in addition to Caesar, which would have detracted from the morality of the deed and the policy of the res publica restored.\footnote{Plut. Brut. 20; Ant. 13; Vell. Pat. 2.58.2; also mentioned at App. 2.114; Brutus had counselled against Antonius’ murder which Cicero repeatedly decried as childish and ill-conceived (Att. 15.20.2; 14.14.2; Fam. 10.28.1; 12.4.1; Ad Brut. 2.5.2; Phil. 2.34; 1.22). Even Brutus expressed some reservation about the most opportune time to inform the senate of Cassius’ acquisitions in the east (Ad Brut. 2.3.3; Fam. 12.7.1).} To present the character of Cassius in a positive light appears a difficult proposition. So, instead of using praise to affirm the command of Cassius, Cicero employs an argument of expediency by focusing upon the immediate threat of Dolabella and the cruelty he is about to unleash.\footnote{Phil. 11.6-7.}

Cicero deals with the confirmatio in two parts, yet neither part focuses specifically on the moral character of Cassius alone. Firstly, Cicero establishes an argument that emphasizes the advantage or usefulness to be derived from Cassius’ appointment. Security is the primary advantage against the immediate threat posed by Dolabella.\footnote{The advantage to be derived from what was theoretically considered ‘safe’ (‘tuta’) or from a consideration of what was ‘honourable’ (‘honestas’) was compatible with the precepts established at Rhet. Her. 3.7. In a deliberative oration these might contradict each other. On honestas see De Orat. 2.82.335; Part. 24.83; Off. 3.2.9ff. Honour and advantage are co-ordinate aims (Inv. Rhet. 2.51.156), while at De Oratore 2.82.335, Antonius (the orator and grandfather of M. Antonius of the Philippics) considers the situation where advantage opposes honestas; cf. Off. 3.2.9 for the Stoic view in which there could be no conflict between honestas and utilitas. Utilitas becomes the sole aim in Part. 83 (but honestas provides a double proof if it can be shown that that which provides security is coincident with that which is honourable).} Cicero uses an argument of advantage by illustrating the means by which the res publica can preserve its safety and liberty.\footnote{Inv. Rhet. 2.173. Deiotarus, Bassus, Bibulus and other commanders and resources are shown to be prepared for the forthcoming conflict, a further inducement to support Cassius in the immediate conflict (Phil. 11.32-6).} Cassius emerges as the most capable commander available to pursue this end: he was in the region and had forces at his immediate disposal; he was renowned as a general by virtue of his role in the withdrawal from Carrhae after Crassus’ failed Parthian campaign, and in his subsequent service again in the east as prefect of Pompey’s Syrian fleet in 49.\footnote{Caes. B Civ. 3.5.3; see Phil. 11.34.4 n.} Not only does Cassius provide security for the res publica but, as a peripheral benefit, he provides security for Rome’s allies in the Balkans. Where Cicero discusses the morality of Cassius’ actions, he does so by linking him with his primary moral
exemplum, Brutus. Just as Antony and Dolabella are paired in the opening passages of *Philippic* 11, so later are Brutus and Cassius: *essent tali virtute, auctoritate, nobilitate summi viri* (these are great men, men of such ability, prestige, and birth: *Phil. 11.27*). Cassius was closely identified with Brutus, as both the instigator and co-leader of the conspiracy against Caesar, and Cicero draws upon this association through the speech. Their connection was well known and Cicero plays upon that connection in his advocacy of Cassius. Cicero can repeatedly refer to Brutus, whose position had been confirmed by the senate on the day on which he had delivered *Philippic* 10, and to which Cicero could now refer through its subsequent dissemination. Having established Brutus as a fair representative of republican principle, Cicero continues to link Cassius with his acknowledged moral compatriot.

This moral rhetoric characterising Brutus and Cassius is shaped by Cicero through the justifications employed within the two speeches. Cassius and Brutus are shown to be adhering to a higher law and to be governed by an innate and considered approach in placing the *res publica* above any individual. Cicero justifies the actions of Brutus and Cassius as being in accordance with what is lawful and just, because each had acted for the general advantage of the *res publica*. They had acted perhaps not in accordance with man’s law but in accordance with reason and nature. Cicero sought to empower Brutus to defend the *res publica* without recourse to legal precedent; but, as in the *De Lege Manilia*, he had argued that new legal precedents

---

162 Antony and Dolabella are similarly paralleled by their actions, but these are actions contrary to law (*Phil. 11.4*): *in Galliam invasit Antonius, in Asiam Dolabella, in alienum uterque provinciam* (Antonius has invaded Gaul, Dolabella [has invaded] Asia, each of them another man’s province).

163 Brutus and Cassius were the urban and peregrine praetors for the year, and related by marriage. Cassius married Junia Tertia, the daughter of Servilia, and so half-sister of Brutus.

164 *Phil. 11.26.–7; 11.36.*

165 This characterisation was formative in subsequent years. Cremutius Cordus, on trial in AD 25 for *maiestas*, praised Brutus and Cassius, calling the latter the ‘last of the Romans’; and he was not the only one to sympathise with their ideals, claiming that many others saw a virtue in their actions and that ‘no one named them without honour’ (*nemo sine honore nominavit*: Tac. Ann. 4.34). Livy called them ‘remarkable men’ (*‘insignis viros’*), and Asinius Pollio (Tac. Ann. 4.34-5) even referred to the ‘outstanding memory of those men’ (*‘egregiam eorumdem memoriam’*). Tacitus (Ann. 1.2) remarked on the two personalities, attributing to them traditional values: *Bruto et Cassio caesis nulla iam publica arma*. The arms of Sextus Pompey and Antonius, by contrast, were *privata arma* (Rawson 1986: 101-19). Rawson (1992: 462) returned to the theme remarking on the two traditions regarding Caesar’s killers: ‘Either they were sacrilegious parricides, forgetful of private obligations, of the oath of loyalty all senators had sworn, and of Caesar’s title of “Father of the Fatherland”, his sacrosanctity and his divine honours; or they were tyrannicides, “liberators”, as Cicero loved to call them who had placed their sacred duty to their country before private ties, demi-gods or even gods’.

166 *Phil. 11.28.*
could be set to meet the needs of changing circumstances. Arguments within the speech are constructed using a language of praise, to such an extent that Philippics 10 and 11 have helped shape the tradition surrounding Brutus and Cassius, their respective motivations in the assassination of Caesar, and their consequent leanings toward philosophic and martial valour.

The climax, building to Cicero’s proposal within Philippic 11, emphasizes the moral pre-eminence of Brutus and, in turn, Cassius. In this way, Philippic 11 leans upon Philippic 10, building on the moral emphasis that Cicero had established in Philippic 10. Philippic 11 therefore assumes knowledge of Philippic 10 and shows that the published speeches are a textual continuity, and not just records of spoken performances, isolated from each other. We can trace back further in the Philippic collection to find Cicero developing justification of opposition to Antonius along similar lines. In Philippic 3 Cicero justified the actions of D. Brutus and Octavian by claiming both had used their forces to prevent Antonius from marching on Rome and carrying out a massacre. Cicero advised granting Octavian imperium in order to defend the res publica, and considered that he had, in effect, already begun the task. Octavian was the salvation of the res publica. Cicero’s justification of Cassius in the Eleventh echoes the language used of Octavian and D. Brutus in the Third. Octavian’s actions were a model of vigour in contrast to a reticent and inactive senate and he was rewarded for doing so through Cicero’s agency. Cicero celebrated the successes of D. Brutus and Octavian and marked the occasion as the point at which he laid down the foundations for peace. Philippics 10 and 11 are extensions of this policy, of retrospective endorsement of independent actions, presented as a continuation of this policy.

Philippic 10 fits rhetorically and strategically within the sequence of orations. Brutus intervened in the province of Macedonia in order to deprive C. Antonius of his Macedonian command. His actions elicited due praise from Cicero, who delivered a panegyric before the senate in the Tenth Philippic. Cicero approved of Brutus’ intervention because it deprived the Antonians of a foothold on the Balkan peninsula,

---

167 Cic. Leg. Man. 60.
168 See Rawson (1986) for the tradition surrounding their respective, and posthumous, reputations.
169 Phil. 5.23; 5.43.
170 Phil. 6.2.1; A similar approach was taken in Cicero’s support of the lex Manilia: ‘we have to look to situations, not procedures’, a nuanced acknowledgement of legal ambiguity.
and secured for the senatorial government a stronghold for further activities.\textsuperscript{171} The \textit{Eleventh} appears to describe a development of the situation in the eastern provinces which creates an advantage for the liberators. The two orations reveal the spontaneity of resistance to Antonius’ ambitions, a theme which Cicero uses to portray consensus across the empire. The more Cicero could emphasize unanimity, the more he could present a unity to those beyond the immediate political scene, whether or not that unanimity was as real as Cicero presented. This could only be achieved by aligning Caesar’s murderers, what Antonius called the ‘Pompeian party’, with Caesar’s son and other ex-Caesarians or neutrals within the senate.\textsuperscript{172} For this reason, we see an emphasis within the \textit{Philippics} on concord of the people and senate, of \textit{omnes ordines}, of the \textit{municipia, coloniae, cuncta Italia} and of the armies and generals. \textit{Philippics} 10 and 11 present one side of the debate, but a side Cicero wished to communicate by forwarding the orations to Brutus and Cassius.

A comparison of the two speeches shows a similar proposal, but the structure of each speech is determined by the consideration of an altered senatorial context. The context is reflected in the more restrained tone of \textit{Philippic} 10 which marks a difference with the strident denigration of Antonius’ cause that characterises much of the \textit{Philippic} corpus. Denigration of Antonius re-emerges in the \textit{Eleventh Philippic} as Cicero is compelled to pursue a more vigorous and overtly persuasive denunciation of Dolabella and, in turn, Antonius. Thus, the similarity of the proposals belies the markedly dissimilar approaches in Cicero’s persuasive strategy.

\textsuperscript{171} \textit{Phil.} 10.4.
\textsuperscript{172} Cicero is careful to play down any Pompeian associations, since Antonius was making mileage out of them: cf. \textit{Phil.} 13.46; and Welch (2002) for Antonius’ strategy of countering Cicero’s advocacy of Brutus and Cassius by emphasizing the resurgence of a Pompeian party.
**Introduction to Philippic 10**

A traditional analysis of a deliberative oration was largely modelled upon the analysis of forensic oratory. The structure of a deliberative speech is comparable with an oration before a jury, as each shared characteristics for winning the goodwill of the audience (Quint. 3.8.6). We do not know whether the debate in which Cicero delivered *Philippic 10* was given free rein (as is indicated in the formula *dic M. Tullius de re publica: De Orat. 2.260; cf. Fam. 7.1.4*), or whether Pansa established a limited scope for the debate. Calenus spoke against officially sanctioning the appointment of Brutus, opposing Pansa’s support of the appointment. This situation is indicative of the *ad hoc* nature of senatorial debate and so Cicero’s construction of his speech avoids several conventions of the partitions of speech as traditionally composed. The number and variety of these parts were well-disputed topics among the rhetoricians of antiquity, but there was, however, some consensus on the variety of approaches that determined the inclusion or omission of parts. By Cicero’s time the prevailing trend was that a speech contained the six-part arrangement of *exordium*, *narratio*, *partitio*, *confirmatio*, *reprehensio* and *conclusio*. To this arrangement rhetoricians sometimes added a *digressio* between the *reprehensio* and the *conclusio*. In *Philippic 10* there are some notable deviations from this structure. There is a brief introductory passage in which Cicero adds his assent to the presiding consul’s position, followed by a brief *digressio* and then an extended *argumentatio* which includes both the *confirmatio* and *refutatio*. The rhetorical organisation here relies on narrative to hold together the *confirmatio* and *refutatio*; see pp. 81-82 below). This subdivision of the speech is somewhat arbitrary; on this point it is important to stress that Cicero does not strictly adhere to the general principles of rhetorical precept to give structure to the speech. There is a great deal of overlapping through the different parts of the speech; passages of transition and the frequent use of digressive detail are incorporated within the speech. This analysis therefore is not a definitive means of viewing the speech but is intended to provide one rhetorical

---

173 *Inv. Rhet.* 1.19; *Rhet. Her.* 1.4 (here the author terms the *partitio* a *divisio* and the *reprehensio* a *confutatio* without any discernible difference in function); Cicero’s later work the *De Orat.* 2.80-81 similarly provides a six-part division. The *Pro Lege Manilia* provides the clearest example of Cicero’s adherence to this six-part division.

174 *Inv. Rhet.* 1.97; *De Orat.* 2.80; see *Phil.* 10.7 n.
framework with which to analyse the speech. The speech may be divided as follows:\textsuperscript{175}

**STRUCTURE**

I. *Exordium* (§§1-2.6).
   i. Pleasure at news of Brutus securing Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum and approval for Pansa’s support of Brutus’ actions (§1-1.7).
   ii. Cicero’s intention to reply to Calenus’ opposition (§2.1-2.6).

II. *Digressio*: A direct address to Calenus and a request to lay aside their differences and support Brutus (§§3.1-6.14).

III. *Confirmatio*: Outline of the current situation and praise of Brutus’ conduct (§§7.1-14.13).
   i. Brutus’ domestic conduct and his withdrawal for the public interest (§§7.1-9.2).
   ii. Brutus foils C. Antonius’ attempts at seizing Greece, Illyricum and Macedonia (§§9.3-14.13).

IV. *Refutatio*: The response to Calenus’ argument that the legions will not support an assassin of Caesar (§§15.1-22.10).
   i. The current situation proves the flaw of Calenus’ objections (§§15.1-17.12).
   ii. The argument for legionary reluctance is a pretence, attributable to fear and cowardice (§§17.13-18.10).
   iii. Slavery is not to be endured (§§19.1-19.7).
   v. The legions are amassing themselves against Antonius (§21.1-21.7).
   vi. Final character sketch of those supporting Antonius (§§21.8-22.10).

V. *Peroratio*: Renewed call to support M. Brutus (§§23.1-24.8).
   i. *Conquestio* (§23.1-23.8). Brutus has done everything in his power to support the *actoritas senatus* and the *libertas populi Romani*.
   ii. *Enumeratio* (§§23.8-24.8). A summary of the support Brutus has received since his arrival in the east.

\textsuperscript{175} Compare the simpler structural plan given by M-R: 97.

i. Senatorial recognition for Brutus’ actions.

ii. That Brutus protect the provinces of Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece.

iii. Command of the armies of the three provinces.

iv. Right to raise money for the prosecution of the war.

v. Requisition of grain.

vi. Forces to be kept as close as possible to Italy.

vii. Recognition for the actions of Q. Hortensius.

viii. Hortensius to continue to hold Macedonia until a successor is appointed.
According to rhetorical precept, a deliberative oration did not require the more formalised exordium of a forensic oration (so Quint. 3.8.6). It nonetheless shared a regular outline consistent with forensic oratory. Our rhetorical sources are consistent in affirming that the principal cause for including an exordium was in order to render the audience pliant, attentive and receptive, benevoli, attenti, and dociles (Inv. Rhet. 1.21; Rhet. Her. 1.6-7; Quint. 4.1.5; Lausberg §§ 266-279; on the exordium in general see Cerutti 2005; Berry 1996: 125-7; Prill 1986: 93-109). This was achieved through two types of exordium: the principium and the insinuatio. The insinuatio required a cautious approach for winning the audience through dissimulation and obscurity when the cause was difficult and the audience hostile. Cicero’s approach here, however, is to present his cause through the use of the principium. Both approaches aimed at achieving the same vantage, but the principium allowed Cicero to exploit a number of positive qualities that were readily identifiable in Brutus, hinted at in the exordium and developed through the main body of the speech. Cicero’s strategy, for the speech as a whole, is to present Brutus’ position as both honourable and advantageous, an approach that could not be employed through arguments of insinuation. At Inv. Rhet. 1.20 Cicero identified five broad categories (genera causarum) on which to base an exordium and outlined the necessary qualities required for its success. The exordium for this occasion in Philippic 10 most closely conforms to the honourable (honestum), one in which the cause should be advocated by all good men (Rhet. Her. 1.5; Inv. Rhet. 1.20-21; Quint. 4.1.40-41). The lack of a more comprehensive exordium is consistent with Cicero’s approach for such a causa, wherein the cause itself is enough to win the approval of the audience.

Cicero recommended that the exordium of an oration be drawn from its inmost parts: ex ipsis visceribus (De Orat. 2.318); a recommendation that is at variance with the exordium of Philippic 10. There is little to be gleaned from the exordium in relation to the direction or content of the speech, as Cicero is at first more concerned to thank Pansa for his readiness in summoning the senate. Pansa had recited the despatch to the senate and made a proposal with which Cicero concurred, a proposal
that elicits fulsome gratitude. The demonstrative thanks to Pansa forms the key component of the *exordium* and creates a two-fold effect: Cicero is at once able to align his own position with that of the consul and thus create a seemingly unified front, and in the process alienate his political opposition.

Attentiveness (*attentio*) and receptiveness (*docilitas*) are achieved by emphasizing the importance of the occasion. Cicero makes emphatic the immediacy with which the senate was summoned; the occasion was so important that Pansa unexpectedly convened the senate in order to hear Brutus’ newly arrived despatch from the east, a despatch, moreover, that would have far reaching consequences for the *res publica* (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.23). Benevolencia, however, was consistently shown as being drawn from four possible sources: from one’s own side of the argument (*ab nostra*), from the position of one’s opponents (*ab adversariorum nostrorum*), from the position of the audience (*ab auditorum persona*) or from the matter itself (*ab rebus ipsis*): *De Orat.* 2.321; *Inv. Rhet.* 1.22; *Quint.* 4.1.40-41; *Rhet. Her.* 1.8; *Arist. Rh.* 3.14; Lausberg §§274-9. The *exordium* in *Philippic 10* draws from the *ab auditorum persona* by offering thanks to Pansa on behalf of the senators present for convening the senate, and from the *ab adversariorum nostrorum* by obliquely denigrating the motives of Calenus, who, though unnamed, is clearly the object of derision at the conclusion of the *exordium*.

As regard to the style of the *exordium* Cicero is insistent on the view that it should avoid rhetorical brilliance which gave the impression of a studied composition: *splendoris et festivitatis et concinnitudinis minimum, propterea quod ex his suspicio quaedam apparationis atque artificiosae diligentiae nascitur* (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.25). This was, however, a stylistic concern for a deliberative speech as a whole. The fact that stylistic virtuosity was to be avoided is conveniently illustrated in Cicero’s later derision of Calenus, in the *refutatio*, for Calenus’ use of a premeditated speech (*Phil.* 10.6.4). It was necessary that the style of the *exordium* be appropriately dignified in tone (*De Orat.* 2.320). The tone was to be measured, conveying a sense of *dignitas*, and achieved through the use of axiomatic assertions and the evocation of *gravitas* (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.25). Cicero’s *exordium* closes with the *sententia* expounding on the key Roman concept of *virtus*, which at the same time attributes to Calenus motivation that is at odds with Rome’s traditions.

The length of *exordia* is not strictly determined by our rhetoricians, though as a general rule the *exordium* should not be overly long, but in proportion to the oration
as a whole (Inv. Rhet. 1.26; Rhet. Her. 1.11; De Orat. 2.320). Quintilian (4.1.34-6) states that the *exordium* should be a proposition and not an exposition, and that it should be brief and lucid in order that it stir the attention of the audience. The *exordium* of Philippic 10 is brief, consisting of two sections, comparable in length with the *exordia* of the remaining *Philippics*, but not characteristic for speeches over the length of Cicero’s career. In part, this is determined by the senate’s awareness of events making the inclusion of a preamble to the oration unnecessary. Additionally, the *auctoritas* and force of character with which Cicero as a senior consular could address the senate, his urgent and demanding advocacy for decisive military action against Antonius through the delivery of a series of impassioned speeches, will have rendered *exordia* less necessary in winning the attention of his audience, given that the senate was attuned to his extreme position.

The confidence with which Cicero addresses Calenus belies the division within the senate. The tone of relief with which Cicero addresses the senate indicates that many senators were receptive to the events that had transpired, but by no means was that receptiveness universal. Pansa was supportive and appears to have spoken in favour of granting Brutus the command (cf. Phil. 10.2.2). However, Calenus, the consular called upon to speak first, came prepared to argue that Brutus’s position was intolerable and that the forces he had raised should be removed from his command.

(§1-1.7) Pleasure at news of Brutus securing Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum and approval for Pansa’s support of Brutus’ actions.

10.1.1 *maximas tibi, Pansa, gratias omnes et habere et agere debemus qui, cum hodierno die senatum te habiturum non arbitramur, ut M. Bruti, praestantissimi civis, litteras accepisti, ne minimam quidem moram interposuisti quin quam primum maximo gaudio et gratulatione frueremur.* Cicero opens the speech by clearly signalling his approval of the presiding consul’s decision to convene the senate at the unexpected receipt of Brutus’ despatch. The first sentence is complex with a high degree of subordination that slowly reveals the reason for the summoning of the senate. The level of subordination allows Cicero to convey a relaxed tone, reflecting Cicero’s renewed confidence at the news of Brutus’ successes

---

176 Johnson 1971; see the subsequent reviews by Winterbottom 1974: 70-1; Clarke 1972: 100; Watson 1971: 134.
in the east. Cicero begins by directly addressing the presiding consul, Pansa, on behalf of the audience (cf. Cicero’s similar approach at Phil. 8.1). The address to Pansa forms the figure of apostrophe where the orator turns from the audience to address a single person, a figure that is at variance with rhetorical precept (Lausberg §§ 762-765). According to Quintilian (4.1.63-69), apostrophe was to be avoided in the *exordium*, since it was imperative for the orator to win the attention and favour of his entire audience. Nonetheless, Cicero begins by concurring with the presiding consul Pansa, since Pansa voiced his approval of Brutus’ actions (cf. Phil. 10.2.2; 10.3.3). Cicero addresses Pansa as one speaking on behalf of the senators present (emphasized through the repeated use of first person plural verbs), and thus his own opinion is presented as that of the senate.  

**Pansa:** C. Vibius Pansa Caetronianus (*RE* 9; *MRR* 2: 334), the consul and presiding magistrate. Pansa served as *tribunus plebis* in 51 (*MRR* 2: 241); he was praetor in 48 (*MRR* 2: 274); and was provincial governor of Bithynia and Pontus in the following year (*MRR* 2: 299); he served, after Brutus, as governor of Cisalpine Gaul (*MRR* 2: 310); and was appointed consul, together with A. Hirtius (*RE* 2; *MRR* 2: 334; see also *Phil*. 10.15.4 n.) according to Caesar’s *acta* (*MRR* 2: 334). The two consuls play leading roles in the events of early 43 leading to the battles around Mutina in mid-April, where both died from injuries sustained in the fighting. Both had served under Caesar, but following Caesar’s death, pursued a policy that has been characterized as one of neutrality, because of their perceived willingness to entertain compromise (Rawson 1992b: 473ff; Syme 1939: 99-100). In the current context Cicero is effusive in his praise for Pansa, but in private he was less enthusiastic. Cicero was initially inclined to distrust Pansa (*Att*. 15.22; 16.1.4; cf. Dio 46.35.6), although his friendly relations with Pansa tended to fluctuate. Hirtius too was a source of caution for Cicero, despite a long friendship, probably in consequence of his Caesarian sympathies (*Att*. 15.6.1). The actions of the consuls, after assuming the consulship, largely dispelled Cicero’s mistrust and they are subsequently described as *consules egregii* (*Fam*. 10.28.3). Even so, Cicero was inclined to criticize, particularly in regards to Pansa’s failure to pursue a more aggressive policy against Antonius (*Ad Brut.* 2.1). Their relationship again became strained when Pansa frustrated Cicero’s attempts to have Cassius appointed to command against Dolabella following *Philippic* 11 (*Ad Brut.* 2.4.2).  

**gratias:** The deliberate slowing of the sentence is also indicated by the pleonastic phrasing of *habere et agere gratias debemus* (*agere* being the more standard expression, while *agere et habere gratias* is
a characteristic usage of Cicero; cf. e.g. Phil. 1.15.8: *primum maximas gratias et ago et habeo Pisoni*; Off. 2.69: *nimirum enim inops ille, si bonus est vir, etiam si referre gratiam non potest, habere certe potest*).  **hodierno die**: The oration contains only vague references to time and we have a lack of corroborating evidence with which to locate its time of delivery (see introduction pp. 10-11). The repetition of *hodierno die* in the Catilinarian speeches emphasizes the immediacy of the threat (*Cat*. 4.19.1; 4.19.4; 4.19.10); the frequency with which the phrase is used in the *Philippics* shares the same urgency, but its use here is illustrative of the *ad hoc* nature of senatorial oratory given with which the senate was summoned (*Phil*. 3.5; 3.28; 4.7; 4.16; 5.45; 6.3; 6.16). It was not necessary to advertise the agenda of the senatorial meeting beforehand, although in the instance of *Philippic* 10, there was little opportunity given the rapidity with which the senate was convoked. The senate could be summoned with little or no notification, with the effect that such a summons could be manipulated for personal advantage (*Att*. 10.4.9; Liv. 39.4.8). It was expected that senators lived in proximity to the senate and therefore were available should the senate be summoned (Lintott 1999: 72–75), but only on certain occasions was attendance required for a quorum (see *Phil*. 10.3.3 n.).  **M. Bruti**: Marcus Iunius Brutus, although his official name was Q. Servilius Caepio Brutus following his adoption by his maternal uncle, Q. Servilius Caepio (*RE* 53; *MRR* 2: 321; c. 85-42 BC). Details of Brutus’ career are imprecise for the most part, until the formation of the conspiracy where Brutus finds prominence as its moral figurehead. He served as quaestor in 53 in Cilicia under his father-in-law Appius Claudius Pulcher, following his refusal to serve as legate to Caesar in Gaul (*MRR* 2: 229); in 46 he served as governor of Gallia Cisalpina (*MRR* 2: 301); but comes to prominence as urban praetor in 45, in which year he co-led the conspiracy against Caesar. He shared in the leadership of the conspiracy with the peregrine praetor, C. Cassius Longinus, who initiated the conspiracy (on the conspiracy see Sedley 1997; Wistrand 1981). The year 59 is notable for the first reference to Brutus’ adoptive nomenclature, Q. Caepio Brutus, following Brutus’ formal adoption by Q. Servilius Caepio some time prior to this year (for his adoption see Münzer 1963: 309; cf. Syme 1958: 176; Clarke 1981: 157). In common usage, however, he continued to be called M. Brutus. The nomenclature M. Iunius Brutus appears on coinage, attesting the continued usage of his more familiar name (*Crawford* 1974: 433, 506-508). Brutus was prominent in a variety of circles and owed his predominance over Cassius to his literary and
philosophical interests. Brutus’ philosophical works included an often cited De Virtute, a De Patientia, a De Dictatura Cn. Pompeii (Quint. 9.3.95) and a treatise in Greek, ‘On Proper Conduct’ (Sen. Ep. 95.45), while an active interest in jurisprudence elicited a dedication from Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (Pompon. D. 1.2.244).  

**litterae:** Usually plural, but sometimes singular (cf. Ov. Ep. 6.9; Mart. 10.73.1). The senate could traditionally be summoned on receipt of *litterae* should the information contained be significant (*Ad Brut. 2.3; Liv. 35.6-7*). Brutus had marched on the city of Apollonia, which C. Antonius had fortified in preparation for Brutus’ siege. It was at this point that Brutus sent his despatch to the senate in which he described his activities in the Greek east. Pansa received the letter (*accipisti*) and convened the senate for the following day in order to consider its contents. The despatch was subsequently read to the senate (*nam tuae litterae, quae recitatae in senatu sunt: Ad Brut. 2.5.2; cf. Caes. B Civ. 1.1.1*), and the senators called to give their *sententiae* on a course of action.

Brutus evidently now felt confident in relating details which to this point had been covertly concealed. Cicero mentions that the letter contained an account of the valour and industry of the soldiers including mention of Cicero’s son (*Ad Brut. 2.5*), but we know it contained details regarding the provincial support Brutus had received in the Balkan provinces. Q. Hortensius, the governor of Macedonia (praetor in 45; *RE* 8; *MRR* 2: 306), had been complicit in handing over his province to Brutus (*Phil.* 10.11; 10.13; 10.24; 10.26; cf. Dio 47.21.4-5; Plut. *Brut.* 25.2). The intentions of P. Vatinius, the governor of Illyricum and an ex-Caesarian, are unclear as to whether he intended supporting C. Antonius or Brutus in the impending conflict (cos. 47, pr. 55; *MRR* 2: 286; on P. Vatinius see *Phil.* 10.6.14 below). In any case, Vatinius was denied the chance to take a stance when his three legions took advantage of his falling ill, to side with Brutus (Dio 47.21.6; Plut. *Brut.* 25-26).  

**ne minimam … gaudio et gratulatione frueremur:** The verb draws to a close the first sentence in which the central character of the speech is emotively introduced. Pansa had evidently recited Brutus’ despatch to the senate in giving approval to Brutus’ actions.  

**gratulatione** is usually reserved for public events (L-S 2), as opposed to *gaudio* which expresses a more personal joy. *Gratulatio* is often used in conjunction with *supplicatio* and, because it is used in a public sense, Cicero can emphasize that its contents will affect the people as a whole. *Gratias* is recalled from the start of the sentence.
1.5 cum factum tuum gratum omnibus debet esse, tum vero oratio qua recitatis litteris usus es. The use of *debet* echoes the *debemus* in the preceding sentence and immediately establishes a sense of obligation towards the consul. Cicero’s words of thanks also recall his encouragement of Pansa (at *Phil*. 7.5-7; 7.27) to fulfil the responsibilities of his office and to pursue a principled policy of opposition to Antonius, a policy which now appears partially fulfilled.

1.6 declarasti enim verum esse id quod ego semper sensi, neminem alterius qui suae confideret virtuti invidere. ‘no one who is confident of his own *virtus* need envy the *virtus* of another’. The axiom is rounded off with a heavy clausula of molossus + double trochee to lend gravity to the statement. The statement jars with Pansa’s later opposition to the appointment of Cassius to a command in the east (see *Phil*. 11.23.5 n.). Pansa was in favour of negotiating a role for Brutus in the strengthening of republican interests, but later vehemently opposed the appointment of Cassius to a similar command (*Fam*. 4.4.2; 12.7.1; 12.25.1; *Ad Brut*. 1.10; 2.4; 5.2; Dio 46.36.2).

Cicero introduces *virtus* within the *exordium* of the speech foreshadowing its pre-eminence in his argumentation for the appointment of Brutus. Mackendrick (1995: 14) is right in emphasising that *virtus* ‘may carry either a moral or a practical connotation’; but both nuances are employed in Cicero’s characterisation of Brutus. Brutus could be associated with moral *virtus* given the philosophical renown with which he was endowed and his hitherto lack of any distinguishing martial achievements. The martial *virtus* of Brutus in this context, however, is dependent upon the forces of which he has taken command (see *Phil*. 10.7. n.) and on the protection he now provides Rome (*Phil*. 10.8). Much greater emphasis lies on Brutus’ qualities of *patientia*, *moderatio*, and his willingness to defer and subordinate his actions to the *consilium* of the senate. Brutus’ adherence to and identification with the idea of the *res publica* forms the central focus of the speech and it is reiterated throughout.

(§2.1-2.6) Cicero’s intention to reply to Calenus’ opposition.

Section 2 of the *exordium* indicates the direction of Cicero’s argument, and outlines the content of the oration. Cicero explicitly states that he will speak on behalf of Brutus and, in doing so, establishes a position antithetical to that taken by Calenus.
Cicero does not reveal, however, the content of his speech in a systematic way. Nor does Cicero clearly articulate at this stage the points with which he either agrees or disagrees with Calenus. He does, however, say that the points of disagreement are innumerable and that they necessitate a reply, a reply in which Cicero is compelled to address Calenus’ *sententia* before he delivers the main part of his speech, the *confirmatio* for the appointment of Brutus.

### 2.1 itaque mihi qui plurimis officiis sum cum Bruto et maxima familiaritate coniunctus minus multa de illo dicenda sunt.

The opening establishes the connection between Cicero and Brutus by emphasizing the claim to friendship; cf. the similar public assertion of friendship at *Phil.* 6.1: *homo et multis officiis mihi et summa familiaritate coniunctus* (referring to P. Apuleius; cf. *Phil.* 14.16; cf. *Balb.* 1: *si auctoritates patronorum in iudiciis valent, ab amplissimis viris L. Corneli causa defensa est; si usus, a peritissimis; si ingenia, ab eloquentissimis; si studia, ab amicissimis et cum beneficiis cum L. Cornelio tum maxima familiaritate coniunctis*).

On account of this friendship, Cicero had determined to speak on behalf of Brutus. His intention had been to do so immediately, had not the *sententia* of Calenus prompted him to delay his comments until after he had commented on the latter’s motion. *familiaritate*: *Familiaritas* is a type of *amicitia* that connotes a degree of intimacy through regular social interactions (see Hellegouarc’h 1972: 68–76). The phrasing of *familiaritate* with *coniunctus* adds an additional layer to the politically one-dimensional notion of *amicitia*, forming the basis on which the obligations which constitute *officia* are founded, while *officium* is principally understood as ‘beneficial acts’ or ‘services’ done for someone (*OLD* 1).

The friendship between Cicero and Brutus began in the fifties through the encouragement and facilitation of Atticus (*Att.* 2.24.2; 5.17.6). The two men were keen correspondents whose political and philosophical interests provided the mainstay of their friendship. As early as 55 Cicero held high hopes for Brutus regarding his political future: *laetor virtute et officio cum tuorum necessariorum, meorum amicissimorum, tum alterius [sc. Pompeii] omnium saeculorum et gentium principis, alterius [sc. Bruti] iam pridem iuventutis, celeriter, ut spero, civitatis* (*Fam.* 3.11.3). Cicero’s private correspondence, though not always of an intimate nature, reveals a high regard for his young protégé, and more so in the immediate aftermath of the assassination: *semper amavi, ut scis, M. Brutum propter eius summum ingenium,*
suavissimos mores, singularem probitatem atque constantiam; tamen Idibus Martis tantum accessit ad amorem ut mirarer locum fuisse augendi in eo quod mihi iam pridem cumulatum etiam videbatur (Fam. 9.14.5); nor was Cicero alone in marking out Brutus as a leading figure among Rome’s younger generation of leaders. Caesar and Pompey too were impressed with Brutus’ abilities (Bauman 1985: 14; Rawson 1985: 209). Apart from some letters of recommendation found in the *Epistulae ad Familiares*, 26 letters remain that attest to the friendship, falling in the period of March to July 43. The collection does however contain two apocryphal letters (for a discussion of the collection see Shackleton Bailey 1980: 10-14). The collection is no doubt atypical of the larger body of correspondence that existed between the two men, since the extant collection is focused narrowly upon the immediate political context in the wake of Caesar's assassination.

Cicero cultivated his friendship with Brutus, particularly through 46 and 45, by dedicating a number of literary works to the younger man: the *Brutus, Paradoxa Stoicorum*, and *Orator* were dedicated in 46 to Brutus and the *De Finibus, Tusculanae Disputationes*, and *De Natura Deorum* in 45. Brutus reciprocated with the dedication to Cicero of his philosophical treatise, the *De Virtute* (Tusc. 1.1; 5.21; Hendrickson 1939). Welch writes of Brutus as a protégé of Cicero whom Cicero encouraged for his pursuit of oratorical distinction and his role within a free *res publica* (Welch 1998: 245-6; cf. Clarke 1981: 22-33). The relationship was well known and provides a tacit context in which the speech functions. On Brutus’ intellectualism and the courting of an intellectual relationship with Cicero see *Orat*. 34; *Brut*. 4; 22; *Fam*. 13.10.2: *in hoc studio nostro, quo etiam nunc maxime delectamur*; cf. Rawson 1985: 58. The cultivation of the friendship may be seen in a wider context through these years as Cicero built a series of diverse relationships with a number of Rome’s leading younger men. Dio noted Cicero’s influence among them, and invents a speech that includes criticism of Cicero’s overbearing relations with the younger generation: ‘this is why you are always inciting the younger men against their elders and leading those who trust you, even in the slightest degrees, into dangers, and then deserting them’ (Dio 46.3.8). The courting of Rome’s younger political generation was widely recognized, through Cicero’s literary dedications. Trebatius Testa received the dedication of the *Topica* (*Fam*. 15.19.2), and Hirtius the *De Fato* (*Fat*. 1.2; and see introduction p. 25 n.116).
The connection between Brutus and Cicero was well enough known that Antonius could implicate Cicero in the assassination by claiming that Brutus, with his assassin’s dagger held high, had called upon Cicero by name: *at quem ad modum me coarguerit homo acutus, recordamini. 'Caesare interfector', inquit, 'statim cruentum alte extollens Brutus pugionem Ciceronem nominatim exclamavit atque ei recuperatam libertatem est gratulatus'* (Phil. 2.12.1-3; Dio 44.20.4 writes that the conspirators en masse did so in the forum; see Horsfall 1974: 191-199). It was a connection to which Cicero willingly submitted, although his involvement was only as a spectator of the deed: *laetitiam quam oculis cepi iusto interitu tyranni* (Att. 14.14.4). *minus multa … dicenda sunt:* Cicero implies his intention of speaking on behalf of Brutus.

2.2 *quas enim ipse mihi partis sumpseram, eas praecipit oratio tua.* Cicero makes the initial claim that he is speaking from a sense of duty and that in praising Brutus he will, in effect, illustrate his character and predisposition for virtuous conduct. Cicero’s strategy is to align himself with both Pansa and Brutus and, by doing so, to marginalize his opposition. *sumpseram:* An aggressive verb often used in a martial sense (cf. Phil. 10.26). It establishes a tone for the extended use of military metaphors over the following sections.

2.3 *sed mihi, patres conscripti, necessitatem attulit paulo plura dicendi sententia eius qui rogatus est ante me; a quo ita saepe dissentio ut iam verear ne, id quod fieri minime debet, minuere amicitiam nostram videatur perpetua dissensio.* *patres conscripti:* Literally ‘enrolled fathers’. A conventional term of address for the senators present: see Ogilvie (1965: 236) for the term’s origins; cf. comments by Dyck 2008: 74. *paulo plura dicendi:* Cicero underplays the significance of what he is about to relate given that the *paulo plura* constitutes a significant portion of the speech. *qui rogatus est ante me:* Cicero was not the first called upon to speak. Cicero here deems it necessary to respond to the *sententia* given by the first speaker, Q. Fufius Calenus, who had repeatedly advocated a policy that differed from Cicero’s own provocative advocacy for war (Phil. 8.11-19; 11.15; Att. 15.4.1). Calenus was an ex-Caesarian who had served as a legate in Gaul under Caesar from 51 (Caes. B Civ. 1.87; 3.26; MRR 2: 244) and then in Spain in 49 (MRR 2: 567; RE 10). In 48 he was given command (*pro praetore*) in Achaea before holding the consulship in 47. Calenus has been fairly consistently characterised as Antonius’ foremost supporter within the senate (cf. e.g. Syme 1939: 165; Frisch 1946: 199).
**rogatus**: Leading members of the senate each gave his *consilium*, but the *princeps* spoke with the greatest *auctoritas* (Balsdon 1960: 43). The *princeps* was followed by the *consulares*, the most senior men of the state and as such the ‘*auctores publici consilii*’ (*Fam*. 12.2.3). *Phil*. 5.1 confirms Calenus as the first speaker: *sic me perturbisset eius sententia qui primus rogatus est* (cf. *Phil*. 8.11; 10.3). P. Servilius Isauricus (*RE* 67; *MRR* 2: 272; consul in 48 and 41) had also spoken before Cicero on several occasions (*Phil*. 7.27; 9.1; 9.3; 14.11), yet Servilius’ position in this debate is not attested. The consuls might open senatorial debate or might call upon a consular to do so. It was customary thereafter for the same consular to open debates for the remainder of the year (Suet. *Iul*. 21). By Cicero’s time the practice of nominating a *princeps senatus* was not rigidly followed, and had fallen somewhat into disuse (Gell. 14.7.9; Dion. Hal. 7.47.1; cf. the examples provided by Caesar in Gell. 4.10.5; cf. Suet. *Iul*. 21.2).

Cicero expresses his indignation at Calenus for his opposition to Brutus. To some degree the use of feigned surprise provides a spur for Cicero to speak on, and he is careful to stress the spontaneity with which he speaks. Cicero’s intention of rebutting Calenus was perhaps anticipated given a history of antagonism between them in regard to policy regarding the Antonii, and by the very public connections with which Cicero was linked to Brutus. Yet instead of a vociferous attack on Calenus, the tone is restrained to suit the current context in which Calenus had already, to some extent, been marginalised by Pansa’s decision to endorse the actions of Brutus. **amicitiam**: *Amicitia* can refer to relationships of various kinds. The claim to friendship with Calenus is a Ciceronian convention that allows Cicero to make a frank and open appeal to their friendship (Craig 1981: 31-37). As opposed to the closeness implied by the *maxima familiaritate* of the connection with Brutus at 10.2.1 above, the *amicitia* with Calenus is perhaps not so much ironic, as a polite invention. Such invention allows Cicero to characterize himself favourably; his disagreements with Calenus are not (he implies) automatic or irrational. The relationship between the two men could hardly be described as one bound by *amicitia* (*Att*. 9.5.1). Antagonism had existed since the assassination of Caesar, indicated in a letter to Cicero in which Calenus had asked for a resumption of friendly relations (*Att*. 15.4.2 written on 22 May, 44). Cicero was clearly not inclined to reciprocate and treated Calenus as the object of ridicule, both in public and in private correspondence. Nor were relations cordial preceding the events of 44. Calenus was a *levissimus*
tribunus plebis in 61 (Att. 1.14.1; MRR 2: 180), who had introduced a law that proved advantageous to Clodius in the latter’s defence in the Bona Dea scandal (Phil. 8.16).

**Digressio I (§§ 3.1-6.14)**

The following sections are not strictly a part of the exordium, as Cicero turns from the immediate debate to denounce his political opponent, Calenus. The passage is digressive, although digressive material bears a direct relation to the confirmatio that follows. Cicero makes an attack, not on Calenus’ policies, but upon Calenus himself. The function of a digressio, as a formal unit of a speech, was to excite the emotions of the audience through the addition of a tangential component to the argument: haec vel ad odium vel ad misericodiam vel omnino ad animos iudicum movendos (Part. 128; cf. Quint. 3.9.4). Our rhetoricians have relatively little to say regarding the character and construction of a digressio within an oration and consequently the lack of a formal structure accounts for the largely neglected instruction for its use within the rhetorical handbooks. Despite the fact that Cicero did not class the digressio as a necessary part of an oration at all (nobis autem non placuit hanc partem in numerum reponi: Inv. Rhet. 1.97), the digressio was nonetheless ‘sufficiently widespread in his speeches for it to rank as a major device in his oratorical repertoire’ (Davies 1968: 305: cf. Inv. Rhet. 1.97; De Orat. 2.80; 2.311-2; Part. 128; Brut. 82; Quint. 3.9.4; 4.3; see Canter 1931: 352-3 for a catalogue of digressiones, although his catalogue is by no means exhaustive).

Although there was no consensus as to its place within a speech some rhetoricians added a digressio to its formal parts (Inv. Rhet. 1.97; Quint. 3.1.1). Hermagoras (Inv 1.97) is said to have preferred a digressio before the peroratio and established it as a rule. Cicero’s use of digressiones however shows a great deal more varied application. Within the De Oratore Cicero has Antonius state that the digressio may be placed after the narratio or before the conclusio, or wherever its effect could be most strongly felt and as such could occur wherever the context could be assisted by its inclusion (De Orat. 2.312).

The tone of the digressio here within Philippic 10 is tempered and its style is bare, despite Quintilian’s description of an embellished and ornate part of speech (Quint. 4.3.2), yet its inclusion nonetheless functions ornandi aut augendi causa (De
Orat. 2.80; cf. firmamenta ad fidem posita aut per se diluenda aut obscuranda aut digressionibus obruenda: Part. 15). A digressio could contain praise or censure in promoting one’s own argument (Inv. Rhet. 1.97), and Cicero uses the digression in the current context to censure Calenus, in order to undermine his position and influence within the senate. When Brutus received a copy of the oration he noted the vituperative nature of its content: legi orationes duas tuas, quarum altera Kal. Ian. usus es, altera de litteris meis, quae habita est abs te contra Calenum (Ad Brut. 2.3.4). Cicero is aggressive despite his initially measured tone. The opening of the digressio is charged with a number of short rhetorical questions; the language is martial with a series of military metaphors through the section and these are used to reflect upon Cicero’s own bellicose stance. The cola forming the interrogatives gradually lengthen while Cicero dwells over the condition of peace and dignitas. Only towards the end of the digressio, with its transition to the confirmatio, does Cicero allow himself to vent his feelings of indignation (Phil. 10.6-7).

Cicero evidently regarded this passage as digressive, justifying its inclusion at §2: necessitatem attulit paulo plura dicendi sententia eius qui rogatus est ante me. Cicero is quick to align himself with the consul, making the contrast with Calenus more striking, and thereby justifying the digression’s inclusion at this point within the speech. Cicero’s method of responding to the remarks made by an opponent features significantly within the Philippics; its most notable use is at Phil. 13.22-48 where Cicero reads and discusses Antonius’ letter to the senate. In the current situation Cicero does not quote directly Calenus’ arguments, but paraphrases Calenus’ points of opposition. Cicero’s responses disrupt the context of Calenus’ statements in a way that supports Cicero’s own argument.

(§§3.1-6.14) A direct address to Calenus and a request to lay aside their differences and support Brutus.

Calenus is a dissenting voice within the senate. He has consistently been in disagreement, not only with the consul Pansa over policy regarding the Antonii, but with the body of the senate as a whole. Calenus’ policy has been guided by irrationality and is consequently unsupported by anyone within the senate. Let the dictates of his own dignitas and concern for the res publica be his guiding principles. D. Brutus is besieged by M. Antonius for which Calenus shows no concern and
Calenus now proposes the removal of the forces at M. Brutus’ disposal despite the collective support of the senate and people for the Bruti. Calenus has a son, so let the Bruti be models for imitation rather than the Antonii.

3.1 quae est enim ista tua ratio, Calene, quae mens, ut numquam post Kalendas Ianuarias idem sensoris quod is qui te sententiam primum rogat, numquam tam frequens senatus fuerit ut unus aliquis sententiam tuam secutus sit? The tone is immediately condescending, given Cicero’s focus on Calenus’ failure to influence senatorial opinion. tua ratio refers to a more rational state of mind, while mens suggests a mental or moral balance (OLD 5; cf. Cat. 2.25.16: postremo copia cum egestate, bona ratio cum perdita, mens sana cum amentia, bona denique spes cum omnium rerum desperatione configit). The sequence is given emphasis with the anaphora quae. Calene: It was conventional to use a praenomen and cognomen in a formal setting (cf. e.g. Phil. 5.41 where the praenomen, nomen and cognomen are all used in the formal wording of Cicero’s proposal). Adams (1978: 146) argues that these conventions are less strictly adhered to in the Philippics and that the use of single names, normally taken as markers of condescension, or paradoxically, familiarity, reflects the political discord which ‘justified a disregard of polite observances’. This goes some way towards explaining Cicero’s derisory use of Calenus’ cognomen alone. The omission of the praenomen is not unusual in passages of denigration and coupled with Cicero’s ongoing disagreement with Calenus the use of the cognomen can be seen as a mark of condescension. When Cicero refers to Calenus, the repetition of the cognomen in its vocative form is a marker of emphasis and occurs in passages of heightened emotion and in passages where a quickened tempo is particularly felt (Phil. 8.12.1; 8.15.9; 8.19.1; 10.6.1). Dickey (2002: 51; cf. additional comments: 52-53) provides some statistical data that supports Adam’s conclusions. She notes that ‘men attached to the opposing side, whether the actual opponent under attack or his advocates and supporters, receive double names only 18% of the time. Men not belonging to the opposition, however, are double-named 64% of the time in address’. The praenomen is nowhere attested of Catiline in the Catilinarian speeches and occurs within the Philippics only in passages of restrained argument. The use of the praenomen in formal wording of proposals is however formulaic. The praenomen and cognomen are used of Brutus where Brutus’ prominence is especially felt. Similarly, at Phil. 11.15, when Cicero assents to
Calenus’ proposal he uses the more polite and formal, Q. Fufius. **Kalendas**

**Januarias**: The first of January was the date on which the two consuls-designate, Hirtius and Pansa, took office. It was customary for the consuls to convene the senate on the day they took office at the Temple of Jupiter Optimus Maximus on the Capitol (see Willems 1883, 2: 159 with references). The meeting was anticipated as early as July 44 (Att. 16.1.4) as an opportunity to challenge Antonius’ political dominance (Att. 16.7.2; 15.25; Fam. 10.5). After debate in the senate following 1 January when the consuls took office, both Hirtius and Pansa were charged with raising levies in order to lift the siege of D. Brutus at Mutina. Hirtius set out in January, taking overall command of his own levies and those raised by Octavian, leaving Pansa to preside at Rome for a brief period before he too set out for Mutina in February (Phil. 7.12; 8.5-6). **is qui**: The *is* refers to Pansa who addressed the senate concerning Brutus’ despatch, and who subsequently called for the *sententiae* of the senate’s senior members. Cicero depicts a difference of opinion between the consul and first speaker, which thus provides a reference point for Cicero’s argument. Pansa had married Calenus’ daughter cementing their political cooperation. Pansa’s connection with Antonius was more ambiguous. Before their turn of office Cicero had been critical of the consuls-designate and believed them to be susceptible to unwanted influence: *et maxime de consulibus designatis, quos ego penitus novi libidinum et languoris effeminatissimi animi plenos; qui nisi a gubernaculis recesserint, maximum ab universo naufragio periculum est. incredibile est, quae ego illos sciam oppositis Gallorum castris in aestivis fecisse, quos ille latro, nisi aliquid firmius fuerit, societate vitiorum deleniet* (Fam. 16.27.1; cf. Att. 16.1.4). There had been no declared enmity between Antonius and Pansa, despite Antonius’ intimidatory actions from July through November. Consequently, Cicero was uncertain about Pansa’s allegiance: *inimicum Antonio? quando aut cur? quousque ludemur?* (Att. 15.22.1). **frequens senatus**: In a technical sense a ‘*frequens senatus*’ could be summoned by the consuls for which a quorum was required for the resolution of senatorial decrees (Fam. 8.5.3; 8.13.2; 10.12.3; Mur. 51; Cat. 50; Hirtius BG 8.53). By the end of the Late Republic a quorum was required for only three types of business and possibly a fourth: dispensations for individual senators, *supplicationes*, the conduct of elections and the appointment of consular provinces (Bonnefond-Coudry 1989: 401-413; Lacey 1986: 167; Balsdon 1957: 19-20; Mommsen StR 3: 989f.; Willems 1878: vol. 2: 165-171). More frequently the term was used to describe a ‘well-attended senatorial meeting’.
Yet attendance at the senate varied (Mommsen StR. 3: 988f.). The occasion of Phil. 10 required no quorum given that the senate was required only to give advice to the presiding consul. The consul could do so in two ways: firstly, through the use of the *quaestio simplex* where a single point was debated; or secondly through the *quaestio coniuncta* in which several elements of the same debate were discussed (Quint. 3.8.18). **ut unus aliquis sententiam tuam secutus sit?:** Cicero undermines Calenus’ authority by suggesting that Calenus had consistently failed to find support from those within the senate. What follows is a series of rhetorical questions that leads Cicero’s argument away from the discussion at hand. Brevity of statement over the following section is not to be taken as a characteristic of a bare and simple oratory, but as a technique for creating momentum and preparing the audience for a more elaborate refutation of policy and ideas. The juxtaposition of *frequens* with *unus aliquis* contributes to Cicero’s method of isolating Calenus.

**3.4 cur semper tui dissimilis defendis? cur cum te et vita et fortuna tua ad otium, ad dignitatem invitet, ea probas, ea decernis, ea sentis quae sint inimica et otio communi et dignitati tuae?** **cur** establishes an expectation that is not resolved until after the temporal clause and this is given emphasis by its positioning. An anaphoric construction beginning with *ea* is followed by a verb in the second person: *ea probas, ea decernis, ea sentis.* The verbs of the tricolon, though not strictly synonymous, are closely related and thus provide an accumulative idea of ‘counsel’, consistent with the role of the senators and the setting of the debate. **vita** can refer to ‘the manner and circumstances of life’ (*OLD* 7), indicated by its pairing with *fortuna*, while *fortuna* itself can be taken as referring to one’s social position or rank. *Fortuna* may appear a potential insult here as it relies **otium:** The earliest use of *otium* as a political phrase appears in the year of Cicero’s consulship, but it may have been used as a phrase before Cicero (Wirszubski 1954: 5-6). It thereafter becomes linked with civil calm and the maintenance of the political order. Enemies of the *otium* were categorised as enemies of the *res publica* (*Sest.* 15.9: *multo acrius oti et communis salutis inimici*; cf. *Dom.* 12.16; *Att.* 14.2.3). In public life *otium* was ‘freedom from enemies’ (*‘otium ab hostibus*”: Wirszubski 1954: 1-13) and necessarily involved an active role in guiding the state (see Laidlaw 1968: 42-52; Wirszubski 1961: 1-13; Balsdon 1960). **dignitatem:** *D: et ad dignitatem.* King (1878: 230) suggests that the asyndeton is preferable as it creates the figure *correctio* where the motive of personal leisure is replaced by the more appropriate senatorial virtue of
dignitas. Dignitas denotes ‘standing’ within the res publica as conferred by office (TLL 5/1.1138.38). Calenus had held the highest office of state, the consulship, placing him amongst the most senior members of the state, the consulares. See Syme (1939: 164) for a catalogue of the consulares in the year 44-43.

3.6 nam ut superiora omittam, hoc certe quod mihi maximam admirationem movet non tacebo. An example of occultatio (as opposed to praeteritio at §7.5) in which the speaker declares his intention of not speaking on a particular subject, but only because it may not stand up to close scrutiny. Cicero passes over previous offences but his assertion that he must speak in the current context lends emphasis to his refutation of Calenus’ sententia (see Usher 1965 for a catalogue of the occurrence of occultatio in Cicero’s speeches). superiora: A collective reference to the sententiae given by Calenus since the beginning of the year. Calenus had advocated a policy that sought a peaceful resolution, but a resolution Cicero defined as servitude: servitutem pacem vocas (Phil. 8.11). Cicero likely refers to the recent debate at which Philippic 8 was delivered, since Philippic 8 was only delivered just before Philippic 10 on 4 February. The reiteration of a public dissensio evokes their recent differences. Cicero was explicit, within Philippic 8, regarding their points of difference: parva est enim mihi tecum aut parva de re dissensio? ego huic faveo, tu illi? immo vero ego D. Bruto faveo, tu M. Antonio: ego conserviri coloniam Populi Romani cupio, tu expugnari studes. an hoc negare potes qui omnis moras interponas quibus infirmetur Brutus, melior fiat Antonius? (Phil. 8.17). maximam admirationem refers to Cicero’s astonishment at Calenus’ continual antagonism towards the liberators. This provides a transition to the refutation of Calenus’ proposal.

4.1 quod est tibi cum Brutis bellum? cur eos quos omnes paene venerari debemus solus oppugnas? Bruti: The plural refers to both D. Iunius Brutus Albinus (RE 55a, Suppl. 5.369-85) and Marcus Brutus. D. and M. Brutus are paired within the Philippic corpus because of their prominent involvement in the conspiracy (Phil. 2.26; 2.30; 2.32; 2.107.3), and because they shared descent from an eponymous ancestor, L. Brutus, the first consul of Rome and expeller of the Tarquins (RE 46a; MRR 1: 1). The role and actions of L. Iunius Brutus were elaborated from as early as the fourth century from what appear to have been a collection ‘of folktales around the central aetiological myth of the cognomen of L. Iunius Brutus’ (Ogilvie 1965: 216ff.). The expulsion of the Tarquins and the establishment of the res publica provided a powerful parallel between Brutus and Rome’s early political traditions. Whatever the
story’s historical authenticity, the material provided a rich source for multiple retellings or elaborations (references to versions as told by Fabius Pictor and the tragedian Accius are found in Sest. 123; Liv. 1.57; Dion. Hal. 4.64-74; Val. Max. 7.3.2; Brut. 53). The sons of L. Junius Brutus were implicated in a plot to restore the Tarquins, were tried and put to death leaving no lineal offspring (Liv. 2.2-5; 4.15.3; Dio 44.12; Dion. Hal. 5.18; see MRR 1: 1-2 for a list of references). Despite the problematic nature of the Junian ancestry, many accepted Brutus’ ancestry as genuine (App. 2.112; Plut. Brut. 9; Lacey 1986: 17).

The Bruti are not mentioned individually within Philippics 1 and 2, but are linked in the plural (Phil. 2.30; 2.107). D. Brutus had the greater prominence through Philippics 3-14 following his appointment as governor of Cisalpine Gaul and his occupation of the fortified town of Mutina. He continued to play a significant role through the end of 44 and into 43 by refusing to submit to the authority of Antonius, leading to the battles at Forum Gallorum and Mutina from April 14 to 19, 43 BC (Ov. Fast. 4.625-628; cf. Fam. 10.30; 33.3-4; Ad Brut. 1.3a). D. Brutus was marked out for high honours by Caesar serving under him as legate as early as 56 BC where he appears as prefect of Caesar’s fleet against the Veneti (Caes. BG 3.11). He appears as the probable candidate for the praetorship in 45, and was consul-designate for 42 through Caesar’s appointment (MRR 2: 217; and esp. 328 for numerous references). His appointment as proconsul of Cisalpine in 44 was similarly by appointment of Caesar (Vell. Pat. 2.60: idem provinciam D. Bruto designato consuli decretam Galiam occupare statuit; Suet. Aug. 10.2; App 2.124; 3.2) and he was included, much to the abhorrence of Nicolaus of Damascus, among Caesar’s heirs (Nic. Dam. 19-26; Vell. Pat. 2.56; 2.60). On account of the favour shown him by Caesar, D. Brutus was particularly vilified for his involvement in the conspiracy.

bellum: The evocation of a metaphorical bellum marks an additional line of argument. Calenus’ actions, instead of supporting a united senate, support a state of divisiveness and of civil war. Military metaphors occupy the following sentences and establish a ‘disjunctive position’ for Calenus. By emphasizing Calenus’ belligerent and divisive position Cicero seeks to isolate his sententia. cur ... oppugas?: Oppugnare is ‘to attack’ or ‘besiege’. The military metaphor is continued and given prominence with the final position. Cicero uses the martial imagery because it jars with the current context, by suggesting that Calenus is misdirecting his energies. Cicero is able to express a sense of distress at Calenus’ position which he emphasizes through the accumulation of
rhetorical questions, expressed through a series of antitheses that follow. This solitary position of Calenus is expressed in both word order and in the person and number of the verb. An antithesis between *omnes* and *solus* is created with an emphasis upon isolating Calenus with the second person singular, *solus oppugnas.*

4.2 *alterum circumseideri non moleste fers, alterum tua sententia spolias eis copiis quas ipse suo labore et periculo ad rei publicae, non ad suum praesidium per se nullo adiuvante confecit.* *alterum circumseideri:* Sc. D. Brutus, who was currently being besieged by Antonius at Mutina. In early April, D. Brutus left Rome for his province of Cisalpine Gaul to which he had been appointed by Caesar. By mid-April Antonius and Dolabella received the provinces of Macedonia and Syria respectively, but the allocations were inadequate for the consolidation of their political and military positions and so Antonius decided upon a reallocation (*Att.* 14.9.3; Dio 45.9.3; 20.3; App. 3.7). By June, rumours were circulating that Antonius intended on relinquishing Macedonia in exchange for Cisalpine and Transalpine Gaul while retaining the Macedonian legions (*Att.* 14.14.4). Antonius’ proposal was poorly received and the senate was inadequately attended to pass the decree. Undismayed Antonius turned to the people and caused to be passed the *lex de permutatione provinciarum*, transferring his command to the martial provinces of Gaul and extending his command for a period of five years in violation of Caesar’s *acta*, which had limited the tenure of proconsular commands to a period of two years (*Phil.* 1.19; Liv. *Per.* 117; App. 3.27; Dio 43.25.3; Polverini 1964; Rice Holmes 1928: 192ff; Sternkopf 1912: 349-360). The transferral brought him into direct conflict with D. Brutus who refused to surrender his province and subsequently claimed deference to the senate. He occupied the fortified town of Mutina which Antonius was forced to assault (for the siege of Mutina see *MRR* 2: 342-347; Huzar 1978: 101-9). *alterum tua sententia spolias:* The corresponding *alterum* refers to M. Brutus, but clearly the two Bruti are to be considered together. The second sentence receives more attention and is marked by a more elaborate construction given that M. Brutus becomes the focus within the speech. Cicero’s placing of the two together forms a pattern through this *Philippic* but the construction of the sentence clearly indicates the leading protagonist. *tua sententia* provides verification of Calenus’ proposal in the senate. *spolias* has a martial flavour and is able to carry the military metaphor further, although there is a legal implication of depriving someone of his possessions (cf. *Ad Brut.* 5.2.14: *erat expectatio reliquiarum Antoni, quem equitatu legionibusque magna*
ex parte spoliaras). Cicero tells us that Calenus had sought the removal of legions from Brutus’ command, raising the problem of the veterans’ allegiance to an assassin of Caesar (so Frisch 1946: 217, but see Phil. 10.15.2 n.). **suo labore et periculo…**

**praesidium** form two phrases in asyndeton. Brutus did provide a counter to Antonius and once Cassius had taken control of the far eastern provinces the liberators controlled the east from Illyricum to Egypt. **praesidium** becomes a recurrent metaphor in Cicero’s description of Brutus as a *praesidium* for the *res publica* (cf. Phil. 10.9.11-12; 10.17.11; 10.17.11; 10.24.3; Att. 15.11.7). The metaphor begins as early as Phil. 2.113: *habet populus Romanus ad quos gubernacula rei publicae deferat: qui ubicumque terrarum sunt, ibi omne est rei publicae praesidium vel potius ipsa res publica.* A similar sentiment was expressed to Brutus in June 44: *nihil esse iam reliqui quod ageremus nisi ut salvus esset; in eo etiam ipsi rei publicae esse praesidium* (Att. 15.11.1). Praesidium is also used of Octavian and the forces at his disposal: *atque omne praesidium esset, in puero qui a cervicibus nostris avertisset Antonium* (Ad Brut. 1.15.7). **non ad suum ipse praesidium:** The phrasing may well be a response to the accusation that Brutus was raising a private army for his own use. Cicero is emphatic in denying the charge. The *ipse suo* follows the introduction of the relative clause in which there are two sets of pairs. The first pairing, *suo labore et periculo,* are attributive to Brutus, while the second, *ad rei publicae non ad suum praesidium* both qualifies Brutus’ conduct and expresses his deference to the *res publica.* Præsidium both continues the military metaphor and foreshadows a more literal meaning which Cicero reveals at Phil. 10.9.4. The metaphorical and literal *praesidium* characterises Brutus’ conduct as opposed to Calenus’ attempt at weakening Brutus’ position. **se nullo adiuvante:** Cicero has presented both Calenus and Brutus as acting alone, but one for the harmony of the state and the other divisively. **adiuvante:** ‘to give aid to’ (L-S) as opposed to *auxiliaris* which requires aid to be given because a person or thing is in a position of weakness (cf. Phil. 10.26: Q. Hortensi pro consule opera et virtute vehementer rem publicam adiutam omniaque eius consilia cum consiliis Q. Caepionis Bruti).

### 4.5 qui est iste tuus sensus, quae cogitatio, Brutos ut non probes, Antonios probes; quos omnes carissimos habent, tu oderis, quos acerbissime ceteri oderunt, tu constantissime diligas?

Cicero continues to develop a series of antitheses through parallelism of structure, but the contrast moves from Calenus and M. Brutus to the Bruti, both Marcus and Decimus, and all three Antonii brothers.
sensus: Iste intensifies tuus sensus while the introduction of Calenus’ sententia is emphasized with a second synonymous phrase quae cogitatio.  **Antonios:** Cicero considered the Antonii as one and the same in their aims (*Ad Brut. 1.4: quod scribis mihi trium Antoniorum unam atque eandem causam esse*), and attacked them collectively on a number of occasions (*Phil. 3.32; 13.2.15; 13.4.3; 13.49.5*); Cassius was of similar view in his regard to the Antonii (*Fam. 12.14.1*). The Antonii brothers were in a politically prominent position in 44. M. Antonius was Caesar’s *magister equitum* and consul at the time of the latter’s death. He quickly secured Caesar’s Macedonian army, and then in June secured the Gallic provinces by means of plebiscite for a period of five years. C. Antonius (*RE 20; MRR 2: 319*) was praetor in 44, celebrating the *Ludi Apollinares* in Brutus’ name and, in the provincial allocations as determined on the senate meeting on 28 November, he was allotted Macedonia (see *Phil. 10.9* below). L. Antonius (*RE 23; MRR 2: 323*), the youngest of the brothers, was tribune of the plebs in this year (see *Phil. 10.10.6* n). In mid-June M. Antonius and Dolabella carried a bill that commissioned a board of seven to divide Campanian and Leontine land to Rome’s veterans and needy citizens. L. Antonius was appointed as its chairman (*Att. 15.19.2; 15.20; Phil. 5.21; 8.26; 11.6; 12.23; Dio 45.9.1*). The law was subsequently annulled on 4 January on the grounds that it was passed through violence and in contravention of the Licinian and Aebutian laws which prohibited the sponsor of an extraordinary office, or his relatives, from being the recipient of that office (*Phil. 2.6: Leg. Agr. 2.21: Licinia est lex et altera Aebutia, quae non modo eum qui tulerit de aliqua curatone ac potestate sed etiam conlegas eius, cognatos, adfinis excipit, ne eis ea potestas curatiove mandetur;* cf. *Phil. 2.6; 11.13; Dom. 51; Lintott 1999: 135; Denniston 1926: 94*).

The use of antithesis continues to bring out the dissimilarity between Calenus and his political opponents and this is accentuated through anaphora of *quos* and *tu*. The two opposing views are placed in contrast with each other over two parallel phrases and the asyndetic phrasing allows the juxtaposition of the two opposing views to be emphasized. The shift between second person singular and third person plural is notable as Cicero seeks to emphasize the singularity of Calenus and the collective of the senate.

4.7  amplissimae tibi fortunae sunt, summus honoris gradus, filius, ut et audio et spero, natus ad laudem, cui cum rei publicae causa faveo tum etiam tua.

**filius:** Q. Fufius Calenus (*RE 11*), son of the Calenus involved in the *Philippic*
speeches: this is the only mention of Calenus’ son from the period. In 47 he served
with his father in Greece where a statue of him was placed at Olympia alongside that
of his father (IVO 330); and he appears once more in 40, shortly after his father’s
death, where he is involved in handing over the province of Gaul together with eleven
legions to Octavian. Thereafter he slips from notice (App. 5.214; Dio 48.20.3).

natus: The idea that someone is ‘born for the republic’ is used of Brutus (Phil. 10.14),
D. Brutus (Phil. 4.9) and Octavian (Phil. 3.5; 13.46) within the Philippics. Here the
use of the idiomatic phrasing functions as a device anticipating the praise of M.
Brutus and his illustrious line. laudem: Laus was inherited from one’s ancestors:
pater (the father of Ser. Sulpicius (cos. 51)) enim fuit equestri loco, avus nulla inlustra
laude celebratus (Mur. 16; cf. Off. 1.116; Hellegouarc’h: 1963: 365). As a formulaic
phrase Ramsey (2003: 149) cites the epitaph of Cn. Cornelius Scipio Hispanus (pr.
139) as the earliest example of this type: ut sibi me esse creatum laetentur. Compare
the negative counterpart in Cicero’s description of M. Antonius: quid illa taetrius
belua, quid immanius? qui ad eam videtur causam natus, ne omnium mortalium
turpissimus esset M. Antonius (Phil. 10.22; a similar expression is used at Phil. 13.32:
rei publicae natus hostis Antonius). cum … tum: The co-ordinating conjunctions
echo Cicero’s depiction of Brutus’ deference to the res publica first and then to his
protection for the res publica stated at Phil. 10.4 above. The audience’s attention is
made to linger by slowing the tempo, particularly through the use of temporal clauses.

5.1 quaero igitur, eum Brutine simile malis an Antoni; ac permitto ut de
tribus Antoniiis eligas quem velis. The question is an example of the figure
aitiologia (exquisitio, subiectio), with which Cicero forms a question and then replies
to that question. Its effect was felt to enliven the line of thought through a mock
dialogue (Lausberg §§771-775). Again an antithesis forms the central feature, of
which only one alternative is acceptable. Brutine occupies the first position and first
alternative while Antoni occupies the final position of the clause in order to accentuate
the antithesis. ac permitto… velis extends the antithesis through the use of parenthesis
and introduces de tribus Antoniiis.

A recurrent theme within invective involves the denigration of an opponent’s
family, by means of emphasizing a turpitudo generis. This included charges of
shameful origin or parentage (Quint. 3.7.19; Merill 1975: 195-98; Süss 1910: 245-62);
Antonius taunted Octavian with the meanness of his birth (ignobilitatem) drawing
attention to his parents and grandparents, recalled by Cicero, in an extended passage
at *Phil.* 3.15. When an individual’s origin was beyond repute, as in the case of the Antonii, failure to live up to the *exempla* of one’s ancestors was a source of reproach. For example, M. Antonius was attacked for failing to live up to the *exemplum* of his grandfather, M. Antonius the orator, who was lauded within Cicero’s writings and whom Cicero consequently contrasts with his grandson (*Brut.* 138-43). By living up to the standard of one’s ancestors, continuity was established for the following generation. Against Verres, Cicero could suggest that a character type had been inherited by the son (*similitudo generis*) of which he could not rid himself (*Ver.* 2.3.159: *tune, cum te ac tuam vitam nosses, in Siciliam tecum grandem praetextatum filium ducebas, ut, etiamsi natura puerum a paternis vitiis atque a generis similitudine abduceret, consuetudo tamen eum et disciplina degenerare non sineret?). In a play on the theme Cicero allows Calenus to consider alternative paths for his son.

5.2 “di meliora!” inquies. cur igitur non eis faves, eos laudas quorum similem tuum filium esse vis? simul enim et rei publicae consules et propones illi exempla ad imitandum. *faves*: The use of *faves* echoes Cicero’s use of *cui* (*sc.* *filius*) *cum rei publicae causa faveo* at *Phil.* 10.3.5 above. The use of *similem* and *simul* reiterate an idea of cohesion, with continuity in sound. *consules*: Shackleton Bailey’s (1986) translation ‘you will serve’ suits the context well. Calenus will serve both the interests of the *res publica* and the interests of his son by holding up the Bruti as models *ad imitandum*. *exempla ad imitandum*: The *exempla* of the Bruti had often been used as a stimulus to action. In 91, L. Licinius Crassus had attacked M. Iunius Brutus for failing to live up to the *exempla* of his ancestors (*De Orat.* 2.225; Flower 1996: 152). However, Brutus was insistent in his connection to his ancestors and was drawing attention to his ancestry as early as 59 (*Att.* 2.24). He advertised his connections to the tyrannicides L. Iunius Brutus and C. Servilius Ahala in 54 when he was moneyer at Rome, and was consequently linked with a perceived movement against Pompey in 54. Brutus’ behaviour appears as ‘a pattern of consistent opposition to Pompey’s real or supposed intentions of achieving sole rule’ (Crawford 1974: 455). Brutus himself was urged on to Caesar’s assassination by the example of his eponymous ancestor and by the example of Ahala on his mother’s side (*Plut. Brut.* 9; Dugan 2001: 3; Wallace-Hadrill 1997: 8). Plutarch relates that Brutus was incited to the conspiracy against Caesar by his fellow citizens who urged him to follow the example of his ancestors: ‘Brutus was exhorted and incited to the undertaking by many arguments from his companions, and by many utterances and writings from his fellow citizens. For
instance, on the statue of his ancestor, the Brutus who overthrew the power of the kings, there was written: “O that we had you now, Brutus!” and “O that Brutus were alive!” Besides, the praetorial tribunal of Brutus himself was daily found covered with such writings as these: “Brutus, are you asleep?” and “you are not really Brutus” (Plut. Brut. 9.5-7).

5.5 hoc vero, Q. Fufi, cupio sine offensione nostrae amicitiae sic tecum ut a te dissentiens senator queri: ita enim dixisti et quidem de scripto - nam te inopia verbi lapsum putarem - litteras Bruti recte et ordine scriptas videri. quid est aliud librarium Bruti laudare, non Brutum? The use of humour indicates a more confident position for Cicero following Antonius’ failure to secure the eastern provinces. The use of humour also indicates Cicero’s unwillingness to enter into a violent argument with Calenus, and thereby exhibit anger or vindictiveness (which Cicero suggested avoiding: Off. 1.88; 1.136). Humour and irony function within the political debate as a means of persuasion (Albrecht 2003: 64-5). Cicero’s mockery of Calenus’ oration is primarily used to illustrate that Calenus is wanting in reason and judgement (cf. Cicero’s attack against Clodius in which Cicero openly stated that he was attacking the man and not the oration: respondebo hominis furiosi non orationi: Dom. 3; Merrill 1975: 191). This is reiterated through Calenus’ failure to match the consilium of the consul due to his agitated mind, and again at Phil. 10.6.6 where Cicero condescendingly suggests that Calenus collige te placaque animum... et mitiga. Absent are the strident appeals to action which necessitated an ad hominem attack. Cicero’s refutatio is aimed at presenting Calenus’ failure to subscribe to traditional Roman values but this is conveyed obliquely through the less personally offensive attack on Calenus’ oration. In his private correspondence Cicero had been critical of the consular’s actions and his personal motivation in events (Fam.12.4.1; 10.28.3). vero is ironic (OLD 3b) and intensifies the dissensio because their disagreement was ongoing. sine offensione nostrae amicitiae: Cicero disapproves of Calenus’ conduct, but concedes that they can maintain their friendship, despite Cicero’s now personal abuse. On amicitia in general see Brunt 1988: 351-81; Epstein 1987: 121f. inopia: An oration characterised by inopia was to be avoided as it gave the impression of an impoverished or meagre style (Brut. 55; 202; Tusc. 2.1.3). Cicero had criticised Calenus’ style before as decidedly clumsy ‘sane insulse’ (Att. 15.4.1; 16.10). litteras … laudare, non Brutum?: ‘for you said, and even from a script – the letters of Brutus appeared “nicely and well written”. Isn’t that praising the
secretary of Brutus and not Brutus?’ Cicero uses a form of wit known as *dicacitas*: a response to a remark made by an adversary which attempts to break down the opponent’s argument while winning the audience’s *benevolentia* through derisory humour (*De Orat.* 2.218-22; 236; *Orat.* 87). Cicero deliberately misinterprets Calenus’ statement that the document itself was written *recte et ordine*, as referring to the secretary or the style of the secretary of Brutus rather than the content of the letters. Calenus, it seems, had meant to refer to Brutus’ actions in deferring to the senate. *recte et ordine*: A formulaic phrase usually made in relation to the *res publica* (cf. Phil. 3.58; 5.36), but here referring to the written form of the letter. *Recte* is to have written ‘correctly, without error’ (*OLD* 4b). *Ordine*: ‘To put together a document in proper form’ (*OLD* s. v. *ordior* 4a).

6.1 *usum in re publica, Calene, magnum iam habere et debes et potes.*

_Cicero appeals to Calenus to put his experience to the advantage of the *res publica*, but immediately undermines his appeal through further derisory comments regarding Calenus’ oration. Cicero suggests Calenus’ experience counts for little since he is apparently unable to recollect any of the *consulta senatus* that would prove of value in delivering his own proposal. *consulito*: Consulta of the senate were common and date back to the beginning of the *res publica* with the first recorded notice of a *consultum* preserved by Livy and referring to the expulsion of the Tarquins (Liv. 2.2.11). A *consultum* was, in theory, advice given to the presiding magistrate by the assembled *patres conscripti*, and these touched upon all aspects of public and private life. The presiding magistrate would convene the senate, introduce a motion (*relatio*) and ask the senators for their advice (*sententiae*) in response to the *relatio*. When the *sententiae* were heard the magistrate called for a vote (Taylor 1969: 529-582). These *consulta*, though not legally binding, had the effect of law, and by the time of the empire, had the full force of law (Gai. *Inst.* 1.4; Jolowicz 1952: 372-4). The *senatus consult* were then deposited in the state archives, the *aerarium Saturni* (Joseph. *A.J.* 14.10.10; on the procedure of passing and storing *consulta* see Sherk 1969: 4-20). *sunt enim innumerabilia*: The parenthetic insertion delays the expectation of Cicero’s interrogative, while lingering over the absurdity of Calenus’ inability to apply his experience to the delivery of his own oration._
6.4 quod verbum tibi non excidit, ut saepe fit, fortuito: scriptum, meditatum, cogitatum attulisti. The tempo of Cicero’s attack slows as Cicero lingers over mockery of Calenus’ speech. Cicero’s attack on Calenus’ oratory conforms to a conventional *locus* in the language of invective. The depiction of an opponent as an inept speaker was a popular theme of invective for Cicero and criticism of Calenus’ oratory features alongside the more vitriolic abuse of the oratory of Antonius within the *Philippics*. Its use as a *locus* of invective before Cicero is scant (but see Merrill 1975: 29; 94-5; 183-195 for its development as a *locus*). Calenus appeared with a prepared speech which Cicero emphasizes through the tripling *scriptum, meditatum, cogitatum* (compare the negative effect of the pairing at Phil. 2.85: *meditatum et cogitatum scelus*). It is certainly plausible, as Frisch (1946: 217) noted, that Calenus and Pansa met on the day the despatch was received in order to discuss the information it contained. Pansa and Calenus were related by marriage (see Phil. 10.6.6 n.) and Pansa honoured Calenus with the first place of speaking within the senatorial debates. Yet despite their close connection they were not aligned in policy, a disparity that Cicero is keen to exploit. It was common enough to prepare a speech beforehand and for speechwriters to be employed for its preparation (Brut. 316; Suet. Rhet. 3; Harris 1989: 223). Yet giving the impression of a prepared speech was a vice to be avoided. In describing the oratorical technique of M. Antonius (cos. 99), Cicero could praise his care in avoiding the impression of a premeditated speech: *nulla meditationis suspicio; imparatus semper aggredi ad dicendum videbatur, sed ita erat paratus ut iudices illo dicente non numquam viderentur non satis parati ad cavendum fuisse* (Brut. 139-40). Similarly, oratorical practice formed a part of the orator’s regime. Cicero was active in his practice, declaiming into his old age, and as late as April 44 was instructing the consuls-designate in oratory (Att. 14.12.2; Suet. Rhet. 1.13). Antonius too was given to practice and Suetonius records that Antonius took time even at Mutina to declaim (Suet. Rhet. 1). The dependence on a prepared speech, however, or the reliance on a speechwriter, could form the subject of lampoon. Antonius had in his employ the rhetor, Sex. Clodius, to assist him in his response to Cicero’s first *Philippic* (Phil. 2.43). Cicero inverts the depiction of such diligence by claiming that Antonius’ declamatory practice was merely to aid his drinking by working up a thirst: *tot dies in aliena villa declamasti? quamquam tu quidem, ut tui familiarissimi dictitant, vini exhalandi, non ingeni acuendi causa declamitas* (Phil 2.42). At Phil. 2.18 Cicero gives free rein to criticism of the speech which Antonius
delivered in response to Cicero’s first *Philippic*: *tam autem erat excors, ut tota in oratione tua tecum ipse pugnares, non modo non cohaerentia inter se diceres, sed maxime disiuncta atque contraria, ut non tanta nec quanta tibi tecum esset contentio*; cf. the increasingly vitriolic criticism at *Phil.* 2.42. The anecdote finds greater elaboration at *Phil.* 5.19-20 where Cicero describes Antonius as provoking his thirst by declaiming for seventeen days after which he attended the senate and ‘vomited a speech from his shameful mouth’: *ipse interea septemdecim dies de me in Tiburtino Scipionis declamitavit sitim quaerens; haec enim ei causa esse declamandi solet. cum is dies, quo me adesse iussersen, venisset, tum vero agmine quadrato in aedem Concordiae venit atque in me apsentem orationem ex ore impurissimo evomuit.* The repetition and sustained criticism of Antonius’ oratory has the added effect of contrasting Antonius with his eponymous grandfather M. Antonius (cos. 99), Rome’s most celebrated orator (*De Orat.* 2.47.195-50.203; and especially *Brut.* 138-143). Whether this negative comparison was as clear as Cicero suggests is difficult to determine, given Cicero’s repeated and pervasive abuse of Antonius’ oratory. Augustus too could mock Antonius for a literary style that was both of ‘poor taste and inconsistent’ (*malum et inconstans*) and identified him with *Asiaticorum oratorum inanis sententiis verborum volubilitas* (*Suet.* Aug. 86; Leeman 1963: 219). Yet Antonius’ oratory was not consistently maligned: for which see Huzar 1982 on the literary efforts of M. Antonius. Referring to Antonius’ oration on 17 March to the senate, Cicero was complimentary: *praecella tum oratio M. Antoni* (*Phil.* 1.1 and compare the similarly complimentary remarks at *Phil.* 1.8; 1.31). But by *Phil.* 2.86 Cicero had changed tack following Antonius’ increasingly reactionary mood and his condemnation of Antonius’ oratory thereafter was acerbic. Plutarch (*Ant.* 40.5) similarly records Antonius’ persuasive skills and accords him a quality that is largely untouched by Cicero’s oratorical comments, his hortatory speech as a general; although Pelling (1988: 120) suggests there is no evidence that Plutarch knew of Antonius’ speeches at first hand. *excidit:* ‘to fall out involuntarily’ (L-S IIA). The analogy is visually evocative of clumsiness, picking up from *lapsum* at *Phil.* 10.5.7.

### 6.5  hanc tibi consuetudinem plerisque in rebus obtrectandi si qui detraxerit, quid tibi quod sibi quisque velit non relinquetur?

The use of humour gives way to a sharper rebuke. The application of *consuetudo* to Calenus differentiates his actions from those of the *boni*. See note on *boni* at *Phil.* 10.6.6 below. *consuetudinem* is applied in an individual sense to Calenus, as in ‘habit’ (*OLD* 1b),
yet there is an implicitly contrastive element with the *consuetudo of the boni* in a collective sense *(OLD 2)*, implying the habit of an individual versus the collective practice of society. *obtrectandi*: ‘to criticize from motives of envy’; this reference is in contrast to Cicero’s praise of Pansa at *Phil. 10.1.5*, where Cicero suggests Pansa is not motivated by a sense of envy.

6.6 *quam ob rem collige teplacaque animum istum aliquando et mitiga: audi viros bonos quibus multis uteris; loquare cum sapientissimo homine, genero tuo, saepius quam ipse tecum: tum denique amplissimi honoris nomen obtinebis.*

Having isolated Calenus from those present in the senate and the customs of the *boni*, Cicero separates different aspects of Calenus’ argument. An authoritative and condescending statement continues with a grouping of imperatives in which Cicero requests Calenus to *collige, placa* and *mitiga*. The tripling of verbs picks up on the *mens* at *Phil. 10.3.1* above, and represents the continuation of the idea of a *mens* lacking rationality. Synonymia is repeatedly used in this section dealing with Calenus as it suits Cicero to linger over certain details of ridicule. *collige* is condescending *(cf. Caec. 37: de te, Caecili, iam mehercule hoc extra hanc contentionem certamenque nostrum familiariter tecum loquar, tu ipse quem ad modum existimes vide etiam atque etiam, et tu te collige, et qui sis et quid facere possis considera).*

**bonos**: The *boni* is a political term, notably found in the plural, and used as a political antithesis to the *improbi et audaces* *(cf. Phil. 14.7).* The term was notoriously dependent upon the individual’s viewpoint. As Wirszubski notes ‘in Cicero’s writings – our principal contemporary source of information about the political phraseology of the late Republican period – *boni* is often used as a generic term for the supporters and defenders of what Cicero regarded or interpreted as *populi Romani libertas, senatus auctoritas, hic rei publicae status, cum dignitate otium* and the like’ *(Wirszubski 1961: 13-14).* **genero tuo**: Pansa was married to Calenus’ daughter *(Phil. 8.19).* Shackleton Bailey *(1986: 251)*, following the *RE* reference, mistakenly names Calenus as the son-in-law. By the shift from the plural *viros honos* to the singular, *hominem*, Cicero implicitly identifies Pansa among the *boni*. **amplissimi honoris nomen obtinebis**: The phrasing usually refers to the consulship *(cf. Red. Sen. 10: nomen ipsum consulatus, splendorem illius honoris; Sul. 81.2; Phil. 14.25: *honoris nomen amplissimi)*, but Cicero seems to be referring to the more general status of a consular, leading the senate in his role as an experienced advisor. The reference does however allude to the title of *princeps senatus*, since Calenus had been
called upon to speak first within the debate. The title was applied to the most prominent senator of the time (*Dom. 66: Cn. Pompeium, quem omnium iudicio longe principem esse civitatis videbatur; Har. Resp. 46*); Cicero was applying the term to Caesar in 46 (*Fam. 9.17.3*), and by 44 Cicero was using the term of himself in leading the opposition to Antonius (*Fam. 12.24.2: ego tamen, ut primum occasio data est meo pristino more rem publicam defendendi, me principem senatui populoque Romano professus sum, nec postea quam suscepi casuam libertatis, minimum tempus amisi tuendae salutis libertatisque communis*).

6.11 an vero hoc pro nihil putas, in quo equidem pro amicitia tuam vicem dolere soleo, efferri hoc foras et ad populi Romani auris pervenire, ei qui primus sententiam dixerit neminem adsensum? quod etiam hodie futurum arbitror. an is not ironic in this context nor is Cicero’s repeated mention of amicitia. tuam vicem: ‘on your account’. dolere soleo: The political differences between Cicero and Calenus are an ongoing source of grievance for Cicero. The reasons for their differences are no longer personal, but of a public concern. ei qui … adsensum?: Calenus’ actions are characterized as having strayed from acceptable behaviour and, as a result, Calenus has no support among the attending senators. Adsensum is a collective judgement of the senators present, under the guidance of Cicero, and anticipates the following section in which Cicero elaborates on Calenus’ sententia.

6.14 legiones abducis a Bruto, quas? This indicates a crucial detail of Calenus’ proposal. Calenus evidently proposed the removal of those legions under Brutus’ command. Frisch (1946: 217) took the inference from Cicero’s speech that unwillingness of the legions was the defining argument within Calenus’ proposal (cf. the similar comments by Hall 2002: 278). There is an emphasis on the role the legions play through *Philippic* 10, with the attention drawn to the soldiery again at *Phil.* 10.15-18. However, the emphasis upon legionary support within the *Philippics* is probably disproportionately emphasized and consequently Cicero presents a misleading focus in the debate. We have little evidence for the unwillingness of the legionaries to serve under an assassin of Caesar despite the amount of attention Cicero devotes to refuting the idea. The unwillingness of the legions to support Brutus proved specious when M. Brutus assumed and maintained control of the Greek provinces together with their legions, as D. Brutus had in December 44 and as Cassius would later in the month. Veteran allegiance appears fickle, irrespective of Caesarian sympathy. There had been concern regarding the intentions of the veterans almost
continually since Caesar’s death. Cicero and Hirtius had expressed concern for their own safety and for the safety of the conspirators while in Rome in 44 (Att. 14.13; 14.22; Phil. 1.6), while the liberators too voiced their protest against the growing numbers of veterans in the city whom they watched nervously (Fam. 11.2; 11.3).

Similarly, once Brutus held C. Antonius captive after the seizure of Apollonia, Brutus feared that C. Antonius might attempt an insurrection if he was released, presumably by appealing to Caesarian sensibilities. At the same time Brutus feared harm would come to C. Antonius without his protection (Ad Brut. 2.3.2). The cause of his fear is left uncommunicated. **legiones:** This discursive passage on legionary support provides a transition to a passage praising the virtues of Brutus. Cicero, in May, estimated, probably correctly, the number of legions under Brutus’ command at five (Ad Brut. 1.2), not counting the two legions being levied from among the Macedonians and the troops that had been under C. Antonius’ command. These additions would subsequently form the basis of a legion after their capitulation to Brutus. By the time Brutus crossed to Asia in 42, he had acquired eight legions. Six legions were of Italian stock and to these two vernacular legions were augmented. The six Italian legions were initially of depleted number but continued to swell through the period. **abducis:** The more probable line of attack for Calenus would have been to argue against the legality of Brutus’ actions, a line of argument that was found attractive in the later anti-Ciceronian invectives (Gowing 1992; 238; Millar 1956: 54; Haupt 1884: 687-91). However, Cicero’s obfuscation is tailored to avoid a legal argument and he moves quickly away from the legal issues that were probably raised in Calenus’ objections. Legal observance forms a significant feature within the fictitious speech against Cicero that Dio attributes to Calenus (46.1-28). Appian too was keen to illustrate a series of opposing arguments, notably Piso’s response to Cicero, in which he outlined his determination to adhere to Rome’s laws (App. 3.50).

We seem to have the remnants of an anti-Ciceronian tradition preserved within the speeches given to Cicero’s opponents by Appian and Dio. Their defence of the legality of Antonius’ actions probably borrows from the arguments made against Cicero within the deliberative debates through 43 (see Gowing 1992: 235-239 for a comparison between the two groups of speeches in Appian and Dio). There was a range of sources from which Dio and Appian could have drawn. Asinius Pollio emerges as a hostile opponent to Cicero, raising charges that were so outrageous that he was reluctant to include them within his later history of the period (Sen. Suas.
6.15); the *Invectiva in Ciceronem* has been shown to have been a source and, in similar vein the *Suasoriae* (Haupt 1884: 689-90; Millar 1964: 54-55); Antonius’ speech to which *Philippic* 2 responds provided another probable source for Dio’s speech (Gabba 1957: 321), but perhaps the most likely source for the legalistic opposition to Cicero’s advocacy were Antonius’ anti-Ciceronian ‘*Philippics*’ to which Plutarch refers (Plut. *Cic.* 41.6). Both Dio and Appian illustrate aspects of a political and legal counterposition as they reflect upon the complex political situation (see Appian’s catalogue of arguments through Piso’s speech at 3.50; and Calenus’ speech in Dio 46.1-28. Millar’s (1956: 54-55) view was that Dio had access to the *Philippics* but did not rely on them for historical accuracy.

6.14  *nempe* eas quas ille a C. Antoni scelere avertit et ad rem publicam sua auctoritate traduxit. The sentence confirms a key point raised by Calenus; Brutus had raised an army without senatorial authority (Frisch 1946: 217; Raubitschek 1957: 10). *nempe* is used to concede a fact: ‘yes he certainly did’. Cicero confirms Calenus’ contention that Brutus had raised legions on his own authority, but that he had done so for the sake of the *res publica*, and in doing so prevented C. Antonius from acquiring the means for crime (*scelus C. Antoni*). Brutus had seized control of three provinces and with it control of the legions, in contravention of the directive given by the senate that governors were to hold onto their respective provinces until such time as new governors were appointed (*Phil.* 3.37-9). The difficulty which Calenus faced was the recent recognition of the actions of D. Brutus and Octavian and the legitimization of their conduct, which would provide precedent for the appointment of Brutus in the current circumstances: *hunc igitur qui Gallia prohibet, privato praevertim consilio, iudicat verissimeque iudicat non esse consulem. faciendum est igitur nobis, patres conscripti, ut D. Bruti privatum consilium auctoritate publica comprobemus* (*Phil.* 3.12). *scelere*: C. Antonius is guilty of criminal behaviour, while Brutus acts in accordance with his own *auctoritas*, and in doing so he acts the interests of the *res publica*. *Scelere* provides the contrast with the *auctoritas* of Brutus. *sua auctoritate*: Calenus appears to have questioned the grounds on which Brutus derived his authority given that Brutus had acted in direct contravention of the senate’s directives by failing to assume the responsibilities of his governorship of Crete (Brutus’ governorship of Crete is attested at *Phil.* 2.97; Dio 47.21.1; Plut. *Brut.* 19.3; App. 3.8). Not only had Brutus failed to assume his responsibilities as governor of Crete, but he had entered into another’s *provincia*.
Velleius Paterculus draws particular attention to the illegality of the tyrannicides’ actions: *Bruto Cassioque provinciae, quam iam ipsi sine ullo senatus consulto occupaverant* [sc. *Brutus et Cassius*], *decretae* (2.62.3). Brutus had been in violation of legislation, established from the beginning of the first century BC, that sought to limit the arbitrary ambitions of provincial governors. A *lex Porcia* passed in 101 is preserved as an inscription found at Cnidos outlining the limitations on praetors’ incursions beyond their geographical confines (Cnidos 3A in Hassall 1974: 207). The law prohibited a praetor from passing beyond his *provincia* without authority from either the senate or people (Lintott 1981: 54; Richardson 1992: 578-80; Bauman 1967: 68-87; see Hassell 1974 for the various meanings of a *provincia* in his discussion of the Cnidos text). Yet the law allowed for a magistrate to act beyond the confines of his *provincia* if those actions were undertaken *causa rei publicae* (Cnidos 3A; Crawford 1996: 249-50). Further reforms under Sulla were necessitated redefining the role of the praetor by codifying into a single law the various *consulta* and practices that had evolved around the praetorial office (Brennan 2000: 398-400). In 89, M’. Aquilius (cos. 101; *RE* 11; *MRR* 1: 570), acting on his own initiative, incited the eastern kings of Cappadocia and Bithynia to assist in an attack he led against Mithridates when the Italian Social War was as yet unresolved (Liv. *Per.* 77; App. 17; 19; *MRR* 2: 43). L. Licinius Murena (*RE* 122; *MRR* 2: 64) invaded Pontus in 83 initiating a war with Mithridates in violation of Sulla’s agreement and without senatorial authority. After some initial success he suffered a series of setbacks which required the intervention of an emissary of Sulla to secure a safe withdrawal (App. *Mith.* 64-6; *Mur.* 11; Magie 1950: 1.243-5).

Perhaps more telling in the arguments available to Calenus was the series of laws which Cicero identified as the *leges Cornelia de maiestate* and *Iulia de repetundis* (*Pis.* 50) in which Cicero sought to demonstrate the illegal acts of Gabinius. The system of provincial government had been open to abuse and measures undertaken by both Sulla and later Caesar sought to curb the arbitrary actions of individuals. In 55, A. Gabinius left his province of Syria for Egypt where he restored the Egyptian king to the throne, an act for which he was prosecuted on his return to Rome for *maiestas*. Cicero castigated Gabinius for leaving the confines of his *provincia* and for waging war on his own initiative (*bellum sua sponte gerere*) in violation of a *lex Iulia* (*Pis.* 50; for Gabinius’ motivations see Sanford 1939: 85-88). It is certainly tempting to think that had Cicero been arguing against the appointment of
Brutus and Cassius he would have pursued an argument that revolved around the illegality of their actions as he did when he argued against Piso: *ut ad senatum tantis de rebus gestis litteras mittat? hic si mentis esset suae, nisi poenas patriae disque immortalibus eae quae gravissimae sunt furore atque insania penderet, ausus esset – mitto exire de provincia, educere exercitum, bellum sua sponte gerere, in regnum iniussu populi Romani aut senatus accedere, quae cum plurimae leges veteres, tum lex Cornelia maiestatis, Iulia de pecuniis repetundis planissime vetat? sed haec omitto; ille si non acerrime fureret, auderet, quam provinciam P. Lentulus, amicissimus huic ordini, cum et auctoritate senatus et sorte haberet, interposita religione sine ulla dubitatione deposuisse, eam sibi adsciscere, cum, etiam si religio non impediret, mos maiorum tamen et exempla et gravissimae legum poenae vetarent?* (Pis. 51; but see Nisbet 1961: 172-80 who establishes a context for Piso’s actions); cf. the emphasis on the illegality of Gabinius’ actions at Dio 39.56: ‘He went to Egypt, although the law forbade a commander to leave his province or make war of his own accord and although the People had forbidden the restoration of Ptolemy’.

The purpose of the *leges Corneliae* has been the subject of conjecture. Brennan sees them as a Sullan initiative to stabilize the legal functions of the praetors in response to magisterial abuses (Brennan 2000: 396-400; cf. Cloud 1994: 519-520). Lintott (1993: 26-27) views the law as a preventative measure designed to stop a magistrate interfering in the province of another.

The provision that a magistrate act *causa rei publicae* gave scope for actions that were difficult to define. Cicero avoids direct reference to the phrasing *causa rei publicae* within *Philippic* 10. The phrasing has been subordinated to a broader strategy of assimilating Brutus with the *res publica* itself (cf. *Att.* 15.11). The occurrence of *sua auctoritate* and the sometimes almost synonymous terms *sua sponte* and *privato consilio* had traditionally reflected an almost renegade type of behaviour, but Cicero inverts that characterisation to illustrate actions for the benefit and protection of the *res publica*. Within the *Philippics* we see a shift away from these negative depictions and to a situation where acting on one’s own initiative is taken as a marker of justifiable pre-emptive action. The phrasing *sua sponte* is used in a less formal context as opposed to *sua auctoritate*, which attributes a degree of formality and reflects the official position of Brutus (cf. *Phil.* 3.5.1: *qua peste* [sc. Antonius] *rem publicam privato consilio – neque enim fieri potuit aliter – Caesar liberavit: qui nisi in hac re publica natus esset, rem publicam scelere Antoni nullam haberemus*; cf.
Phil. 3.7.3: faciendum est igitur nobis, patres conscripti, ut ea quae sua sponte clarissimus adolescens atque omnium praestantissimus gessit et gerit, haec auctoritate nostra comprobentur). The phrases sua auctoritate, sua sponte and to a lesser degree privato consilio reflect a policy of acting on one's own initiative. Striking is Augustus’ use of the phrasing in the opening of his Res Gestae: annos unde viginti natus exercitum privato consilio et privata impensa comparavi, per quem rem publicam a dominatione factionis oppressam in libertatem vindicavi (Res Gestae 1). Octavian had been acting on his own initiative in raising legions and his acts were lately affirmed at the meeting of the senate on 20 December, 44. The ratification of his acts however was not without opposition. Calenus came prepared to argue that Octavian be declared a hostis, presumably on the grounds that Octavian was acting against a consul (Phil. 3.8; 13.19). The phrase sua sponte is used to describe Pompey raising an army and Woodman (1983: 128) suggests that ‘Cicero intended to draw the parallel between the two men’. That may be so, but sua sponte is also used to describe the actions of D. and M. Brutus where the only parallel is in the phrasing. Cicero had encouraged D. Brutus to act without waiting for directives and in contravention of those directives should they be contrary to his own position. He had written to D. Brutus with an exhortation that Brutus prevent Antony from his intended purpose (Fam. 11.5; App. 3.27). Again on 19 December Cicero urged Brutus more openly to act on his own initiative (Fam. 11.7): caput autem est hoc, quod te diligentissime percipere et meminisse volam, ut ne in libertate et salute populi Romani conservanda auctoritatem senatus exspectes nondum liberi, ne et tuum factum condemnes (nullo enim publico consilio rem publicam liberavisti).

6.16 rursus igitur vis nudatum illum atque solum a re publica relegatum videre. The language is emotive as Cicero refers to the absence of Brutus. rursus: ‘A second time’ alluding to the withdrawal of both Brutus and Cassius from Rome in April 44 when their safety could not be assured (cf. Phil. 2.13). nudatum: The use of nudatum relates to Brutus’ praetorial duties of which he was, in effect, stripped when he left Rome and to the senate’s continual reluctance to support him. On 5 June 44, the senate exempted Brutus and Cassius from Rome on the pretext of a grain commission, an extraordinary appointment, while assuring them of provincial appointments for the following year (Att. 15.9). The senate had conferred the minor provinces of Crete and Cyrenaica on Brutus and Cassius respectively, at the instigation of Antonius. Crete and Cyrenaica were normally administered by a single
governor. Its subdivision therefore further denigrated the standing of Brutus and Cassius (Ramsey 2003: 304; on the allocation of provinces to Brutus and Cassius see MRR 2: 320; 321-2; Rice Holmes 1928: 196-7; Rawson 1992b: 475). In June the allocation was used as a pretext for their withdrawal. Velleius goes further and, instead of illustrating an environment that was dangerous for the assassins, depicts their withdrawal as an excuse to raise an army: *quippe M. Brutus et C. Cassius, nunc metuentes arma Antonii, nunc ad augendam eius invidiam simulantes se metuere, testati edictis liberenter se vel in perpetuo exilio victuros dum res publica constaret concordia, nec ulam belli civilis praebituros materiam, plurimum sibi honoris, esse in conscientia facti sui, profecti urbe atque Italia intento ac pari animo sine auctoritate publica provincias exercitusque occupaverant et ubicunque ipsi essent, praetextentes esse rem publicam;* Vell. Pat. 62.3-4; cf. the similar interpretation at Liv. Per. 118: *sub praetexto rei publicae.*

**Confirmatio (§§ 7.1-14.13)**

The *confirmatio* is defined by Cicero as follows: *confirmatio est, per quam argumentando nostrae causae fidem et auctoritatem et firmamentum adiungit oratio* (*Inv. Rhet. 1.34*); its counterpart, the *refutatio*, is the response to the series of arguments put forward by an opposing speaker. A similarly broad, though supplementary, definition is provided in the *Rhet. Her. 1.4: confirmatio est nostrorum argumentorum exposicio cum adseverazione* (*Inv. Rhet. 1.4*). The two parts are closely linked, given they both address considerations regarding the most advantageous course of action. Consequently, the *confirmatio* and *refutatio* are grouped together under the *argumentatio*. Aristotle did not favour a distinction between the *confirmatio* and *refutatio*, preferring to take the two under a single part of speech (Arist. Rh. 2.26; 3.17). However, our later rhetoricians are more or less uniform in treating the division as separate parts (*Inv. Rhet. 1.78; Quint. 3.9.5 pr. 5; 5.1.1-5.12.23*).

The arrangement of *Philippic* 10 adheres closely to a number of precepts outlined at *De Orat.* 2.334. There is a two-part structure to the *confirmatio*: a laudatory passage of Brutus (§§7-10) followed by a section in which the tangible benefits of appointing Brutus to command are made evident (§§10-19). This two part division mirrors a concern within an oration to illustrate both the *dignitas* of the orator
and the *utilitas* of a particular course of action (*De Orat*. 2.334; Enos 1988: 51-3). In
the laudation of Brutus, Cicero looks first to emphasize the *dignitas* of Brutus and in
doing so he is able to illustrate the advantages to be derived from his conduct. Cicero
concedes, however, that *dignitas* was often compelled to give way to *utilitas* when
there was contention between alternative *sententiae*. That which provided the greater
benefit was then a determining factor.

The *confirmatio* was, according to Quintilian, the only part of speech that was
essential in any oration (Quint. 5. *pr*. 5). The greatest variety of argument is found in
the *confirmatio* given the variety of *causaes*. Cicero employs a number of arguments in
his advocacy for Brutus. The *confirmatio* begins with an *argumentum ex vita*, a
practice encouraged at *Inv. Rhet*. 2.35: *defensor autem primum, si poterit, debet*
*vitam eius qui insimulabitur quam honestissimam demonstrare. id factet, si ostendet*
*aquia eius nota et communia officia* (cf. *Rhet. Her*. 2.5; Quint. 7.2.28-35; May 1988:
74-76; Lausberg §§204-6). It was not difficult to present Brutus in a favourable light.
His prominence among Rome’s leading men was pronounced; his pardon from Caesar
and his subsequent elevation to the urban praetorship marked him out for a political
future.

The use of character was an important structure on which to plead a case:
one’s feelings are won over by a man’s *dignitas*, *res gestae* and *existimatio* (*De Orat*.
2.182). Both the life and family of Brutus were avenues that Cicero could exploit in
his characterisation of Brutus. The opening section of the *confirmatio* underlines the
unique contribution of Brutus and his ancestry within the history of Rome drawing
attention in particular to the first consul. At *De Orat*. 2.335-336 Cicero encouraged
the use of familial *exempla* in providing proof: *qui ad dignitatem impellit, maiorum*
*exempla, quae erant vel cum periculo gloriosa, conliget, posteritatis immortalem*
*memoriam augebit, utilitatem ex laude nasci defendet semperque eam cum dignitate*
*esse coniunctam*. But it was not enough to illustrate character alone; Cicero calls to
mind the Junian *imagines* to press home the point of his ancestry with the figurative
imagery at *Phil*. 10.8. The Junian *gens* was an ancient family, as old as the *res publica*
itself, and as such provides a platform on which Cicero can base his argument. Cicero
was able to illustrate the *res gestae* of the Junian ancestry and to show Brutus as a
direct inheritor of this familial tradition. The parade of Junian ancestry and the use of
metaphorical *imagines* evoke the stylistically unique form of the Roman eulogy,
couching Cicero’s argument in tradition. The style of a Roman *laudatio* should have
the brevity of a testimony and this forms the method of Cicero’s approach: nostrae laudationes quibus in foro utimur aut testimonii brevitatem habent nudam atque inornatam aut scribuntur ad funebrem contionem (De Orat. 2.341; Flower 1996: 143-5).

This emphasis on the Junian gens forms a central theme within Philippic 10 and shows Brutus to be not only the inheritor and continuator of Junian history, but also the direct inheritor of a number of intrinsically Roman traits, qualities on which the res publica has been established and will again be established with the destruction of the Antonii. The connection of Brutus with the res publica is affirmed, particularly through §14, where Brutus is openly identified with the res publica itself through the gradual construction of a metonymy. Cicero further exploits the illustrious Junian gens by urging Calenus to use the Bruti as a model of exemplary conduct (Phil. 10.4-5).

The use of maiores as exempla allows Cicero to emphasize Brutus’ social status. However, Cicero does not rest his case on the Junian laurels but draws upon topical events to illustrate this continuity between Brutus and his ancestors. This appears an uncomplicated approach for Cicero as Brutus had been advertising his connections with the tyrant slayers within his own family from as early as 59 BC (see Phil. 10.5.2). At De Orat. 3.346 Cicero writes that the highest praise is reserved for brave men who have performed deeds with great peril but without reward: gratissima autem laus eorum factorum habetur, quae suscepta videntur a viris fortibus sine emolumento ac praemio; quae vero etiam cum labore ac periculo ipsorum, haec habent uberrimam copiam ad laudandum. Cicero had much material to draw from in presenting Brutus in a positive light. The difficulty was of course to present the assassination of Caesar in as positive a light as possible, and to a degree Cicero is successful by avoiding direct reference to the murder. Explicit reference to the assassination is rarely made within the Philippics as Cicero prefers to depict it generically as the overthrowing of a tyranny as opposed to personalising the tyrant (reiterated within the digressio at §19 where the character of the Roman people is described as never being able to endure tyranny). Our attention is not allowed to linger over the assassination as Cicero is more interested, certainly in the interests of his proposition, to bring to light Brutus’ current actions.

The argument that Brutus had only acted for the benefit of the res publica is reinforced through his aversion to civil war; a precarious subject given that he was in
the process of securing the military and financial resources of the east. Brutus and Cassius had gone to some lengths to advertise their aversion to civil war and the senate was well aware of the edicts the liberators had published to that effect (see §8.5). Cicero therefore illustrates Brutus’ actions as being pre-empted by the actions of C. Antonius, whose criminal actions have provided the spur for Brutus to act. Cicero is able to turn the illegal and threatening actions of Brutus into a virtue through an emphasis on patientia (§7.8). Brutus’ patientia is repeatedly mentioned, and then subsumed under the broader concept of virtus (§§7.8; 9.2; 14.15; 23.9; cf. patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio (Inv. Rhet. 2.136-64).

Other commonplace themes of praise, as they relate to the context are made clear. Distinction is conferred by office and Cicero is aided here by Brutus being the praetor urbane, the most prestigious of the praetorships (§8). Through §§7-10 Cicero is certainly more the laudator than advocatus which he hints at in the opening of the speech. A patronus spoke on behalf of his cliens, an avenue that brings into play the role of rhetorical ethos in the formulation of an argument. In claiming that Brutus acted in the interest of the res publica, Cicero can corroborate his own role as a patriot while lending consular authority to Brutus’ actions. By claiming Pansa’s support he draws Pansa into the collective and again at §15.1 Cicero includes Octavian in the forces aligned against Antonius in order to consolidate the weight of republican support. There is less need for Cicero to impose himself on the proceedings; Cicero can in fact distance himself from his ‘client’ and can speak about him rather than for him.

The style of the sections that deal with praise of Brutus is in keeping with the style advocated by our rhetorical handbooks. Section 7 of the confirmatio, for example, is ostentatiously laudatory and illustrates features that are identified with a laudatory style. The phrasing is more ornate and the structures more elaborate by means of anaphora and synonymia (deserueritis et prodideritis ... ornabitis, cui favebitis?: §7.2). The rhythm is smoother, demonstrating a contrast with the staccato, short sentences and rhetorical questions that characterised the preceding diatribe against Calenus. Repetition and climax are used to linger over the virtues that Cicero wishes to underline (e.g. tantam patientiam ... tantam moderationem, tantam in iuriuia tranquillitatem et modestiam: §7.7). Alliteration and polytonic repetition abound (e.g. §7.8-9: cumque concursu contidiano and cum praetor urbane esset,
urbe caruit). Antithesis is used both within sentence structures (e.g. *absens iudicio bonorum defensus esse maluit quam praesens manu*: §7.12), and between thematic and stylistic concerns such as the contrast between the praise of this section and the invective of §§ 3-6. On the style of praise see *Orat.* 37-38; 65; Albrecht 2003; Gotoff 1979: 32-78; Leeman 1963: 91-136; and for its association with Roman eulogy see Dugan 2001; Flower 1996: 128-36.

The second division of the *confirmatio* deals with the immediacy of the events and the advantages derived from Brutus’ conduct. These are enumerated through a narrative style argument. But this is not a narrative that involves a sequence of events (these were already known through the contents of the despatch); rather the narrative involves a series of isolated episodes that illustrate the respective qualities of the protagonists. Section 11 is devoted to detailing Antonius’ crossing to Greece. His criminal actions are enumerated and his vices brought to the fore. The detail is specific although entirely tendentious (*si enim C. Antonius quod animo intenderat perficere potuisset*: §9.5); C. Antonius will give himself over to the worst vices of provincial administration and will then turn against the Roman people itself: *ad direptionem pestemque sociorum tu quaecumque iret, omnia vastaret, diriperet, auferret, exercitu populi Romani contra ipsum populum Romanum uteretur* (§12.7). Here Brutus is reintroduced as a foil to C. Antonius’ conduct, exculpating any of Brutus’ own questionable actions: *alter ad evertendam rem publicam ... alter ad conservandam.*


§§7.1-9.2 Brutus’ domestic conduct and his withdrawal for the public interest.

7.1 *vos autem, patres conscripti, si M. Brutum deserueritis et prodideritis, quem tandem civem umquam ornabitis, cui favebitis? patres conscripti* introduces the figure of speech known as apostrophe, where the speaker turns from

---

*177* The senate had abrogated the law granting the transfer of provinces and instructed the incumbent governors to retain their positions until new governors should be appointed, a plausible and compelling argument that Calenus is likely to have used against Brutus (*Phil.* 3.38; *App.* 3.49; *Fam.* 12.22a).
Calenus to address the senate as a group (Quint. 4.1.63-69; Lausberg §§ 762-765). The passage is heavy with moral indignation as Cicero turns his address to the senate, a device frequently employed in the *Philippics* to elicit an emotional appeal.

**deserueritis et prodideritis:** Cf. the similarly emotive language and verbal echoes at *Phil.* 11.22: *Bruto ... ut relictó, deserto, prodito.* Two sets of verbal parallels within this emotionally charged section feature within the sentence. *civem* is a loaded term with a number of implications. It signifies, firstly, the status of a free person as opposed to the condition of slavery, an antithesis that forms a theme throughout the *Philippics*, and which is particularly relevant to *Philippic* 10 and its evocation of the Bruti and their role in freeing the *res publica* from tyranny and pretenders. Secondly, it establishes Brutus’ position in relation to the state: cf. *qui autem rei publicae sit hostis eum civem esse nullo modo posse* (Cat. 4.10). Brutus is *natus rei publicae*, while Antonius is beyond the confines of the *res publica*, a non-Roman who *civile bellum optavit, eum detestabilem civem rei publicae natum iudico* (*Phil.* 13.1).

**7.3 nisi forte eos qui diadem imposuerint conservandos, eos qui regnum omnino sustulerint deserendos putatis.** *diadema:* Cicero alludes to the controversial event of the Lupercalia in February 44, at which Antonius offered Caesar the diadem, a white ribbon used as a symbol of kingship among the Hellenistic kings (Val. Max. 1.6.13; *Div.* 1.119; *Phil.* 2. 84-5; cf. Dio 44.6.1; 45.30.2; Suet. *Iul.* 79.2.6; Weinstock 1971: 333). The episode at the Lupercalia was to provide Cicero with a potent weapon of lampoon throughout the *Philippics* (*Phil.* 2.84; 2.87; 3.12; 3.17; 13.41; see Weinstock 1971: 332-333 for a detailed summary of the event). The incident is recounted by Cicero on a number of occasions with the most detailed account of the event at *Phil.* 2.84-87, which appears as the prototype for subsequent retellings (Pelling 1988: 144ff.; cf. App. 2.109; Dio 44.11; Plut. *Ant.* 12; *Caes.* 61; Nic. Dam. 71-5). The common elements between the various accounts, aside from the diadem, are the various symbols of kingship displayed by Caesar, and Caesar’s (real or feigned) aspiration for kingship.

The offering of the diadem clearly caused offence and appears as something of a catalyst for the formation of the conspiracy (Plut. *Ant.* 12-13). Cicero was to make significant mileage out of the event in his depiction of Antonius (cf. *Phil.* 3.12.10; 5.38.5; Suet. *Iul.* 76.1). The crowd at the Lupercalia was said to have groaned when the diadem was offered and our sources write in general of the crowd’s displeasure at the offer, and their pleasure in Caesar’s refusal. Whether Caesar wished to be
regarded as a king by the Roman people has proved controversial since antiquity. Both ancient accounts and modern scholarship have debated whether the proffering of the diadem was a real attempt to offer kingship, or an artifice in which Caesar publicly renounced the offer of kingship (Weinstock 1971: 333-339; Pelling 1988: 145f; Rawson 1975: 148-159; Balsdon 1958: 83ff). Cicero’s version of the event contained within the *Philippics*, however, is much less interested in Caesar’s dynastic ambitions and focuses instead on Antonius’ involvement. The argument that Caesar was testing just how far he could go in establishing a tyranny had been used in the justification for plots against Caesar by lending credence to the idea that Caesar himself was seeking *regnum*. Plutarch (*Caes*. 61) has Caesar as the instigator of an experiment in which he seeks to ascertain how far the Roman people were willing to have a king. In his *Life of Antonius*, Plutarch shifts the emphasis, illustrating that Antonius’ gesture of offering the diadem gave a plausible, though unintentional, pretext for the formation of the conspiracy (*Plut. Ant*. 12).

The festival of the Lupercalia was a fertility festival celebrated on 15 February, presided over by *magister* of the Luperci. Traditionally two colleges comprised the Luperci, the Fabiani and the Quinctili, but to these were added the Luperci Julii with Antonius as its *magister*: Dio 45.30.2; 44.6.2; Scullard 1981: 76. Cicero paints the Lupercalia as an event artificially devised by Antonius; an emphasis that suits Cicero’s purpose to blacken Antonius’ involvement as far as he is able rather than question Caesar’s motives in the affair. The image of the diadem is used in two ways in Cicero’s denunciation of Antonius: first, Antonius is depicted as willing to make Caesar his master, thereby revealing his own wholly un-Roman character; secondly, and paradoxically, the gesture of offering kingship was to measure how far the Roman people were willing to endure tyranny should Antonius impose one of his own design: *tu ergo unus, scelerate, inventus es, qui cum auctor regni esse eumque, quem collegam habebas, dominum habere velles, idem temptares, quid populus Romanus ferre et pati posset* (*Phil*. 2.85). In Cicero’s account of the event, Antonius has become the chief instigator whose act is a *meditatum et cogitatum scelus* (*Phil*. 2.85) as opposed to Caesar who wins applause for his refusal (but see also Stevenson 2008: 105: ‘it is very tempting to conclude that Cicero’s presentation of the Lupercalia episode is largely a product of the fundamental antithesis he sets up between himself and Caesar/ Antony in the text.’). Caesar is no longer the architect of tyrannical ambition, but the passive recipient of an unwanted gesture. *imposuerint:*
There is a very visual evocation with the placing of the diadem, which is continually paired within the *Philippics*, with some form of *imponere* (cf. Phil. 3.12: *nec vero M. Antonium consulem post Lupercalia debuistis putare: quo enim ille die, populo Romano inspectante, nudus, unctus, ebrius est contionatus et id egit ut conlegae diadema imponeret, eo die se non modo consulatu sed etiam libertate abdicavit*). The *ornamentum* of a *diadema* makes a tacit contrast with the *ornamenta* of glorious achievements by those who were acting for the sake of the *res publica*. Cicero had been developing a language that was to be attractive in the Late Republic and which is felt strongly through the period of the *Philippics*, a policy based on affection and esteem as a mechanism of persuasive force: *atque in has clades incidimus - redeundum est enim ad propositum - dum metui quam cari esse et diligi malumus* (*Off*. 2.29; reiterated at Phil 1.35; see Hall 2003: 294-298 on the function of praise and honorific decrees).

At Rome the evocation of the diadem carried negative connotations and was linked with charges of tyrannical behaviour, forming a topos of invective: *septimus locus est, quo ostendimus taetrum facinus, crudele, nefarium, tyrannicum esse: quod genus injuria mulierum, aut earum rerum aliquid, quarum rerum causa bella suscipiuntur et cum hostibus de vita dimicatur* (*Rhet.* Her. 2.49); and Cicero: *septimus locus est, per quem indignamur, quod taetrum, crudele, nefarium, tyrannicum factum esse dicamus per vim manum opulentiam; quae res ab legibus et ab aequabili iure remotissima sit* (*Inv.* Rhet. 1.102). Such charges of tyrannical behaviour necessarily implied the disregard of fellow citizens, a prominent feature of Cicero’s characterisation of Antonius and one which Cicero is careful to place in counterpoint to the actions of Brutus. Accusations of aspiring to kingship were clearly dangerous and a powerful charge, easily applied to individuals whose actions could be considered contrary to the *res publica*. Certainly the image of the diadem had been topical in the first century BC and had been used as a motif in the censure of Ti. Gracchus and Pompey (see Rawson 1975: 156-157). The topos, however, does not have to apply to actual attempts at revolution, but can apply as well to cruel and illegal acts in general (Merrill 1950: 50). And so Antonius can be described as acting in a tyrannical manner unique in Roman history (*Phil*. 5.17). On three separate occasions there were apparent attempts to identify Caesar as a king. In January, the tribunes C. Epidius Marullus and L. Caesetius Flavus removed a diadem from a statue of Caesar displayed on the rostra and caused the man responsible to be imprisoned.
On 26 January, about the same time as the statue incident, Caesar was acclaimed *rex* by the people, a title that Caesar refused claiming ‘he was not *rex*, but Caesar’ (Dio 44.10; App. 2.108; Suet. *Iul*. 79.2; Plut. *Caes*. 61.8). The tribunes, Marullus and Flavus, were again involved, arresting the first person to have made the acclamation; the arrest proved offensive to Caesar, whose retaliatory speech in the senate caused them to be deprived of their tribunician powers (Vell. Pat. 2.68.4). The event of the Lupercalia had also been connected with a Sibylline oracle that stated Parthia could only be conquered by a king. That the rumour was in circulation is shown by Cicero’s awareness and subsequent denunciation (*Div. 2.110*; Suet. *Iul*. 79.3). *regnum:* According to Wirzubski (1950: 5) ‘*regnum* was the opposite of *libertas*’; cf. Cowan 2009: 148. Wirzubski goes further and details the antithesis between the two forms, an antithesis that mirrors Cicero’s own characterisation. The fact that it was a Brutus who had restored *libertas* to the *res publica* is used, not only as a threat and provocation for Brutus to act, but as a context against which the charges of aspiring to a tyranny are measured.

7.5 *ac de hac quidem divina atque immortal* 
*laude Bruti silebo quae*

*gratissima memoria omnium civium inclusa nondum publica auctoritate testata est.* The phrasing, despite forming a *praeteritio,* has an emphatic and potent political charge. *Divina virtus* is used in the description of D. Brutus’ actions as a tyrannicide at *Ad Brut.* 1.15.7; and of Octavian at *Phil.* 3.3; 3.19. Tyrell and Purser are right to dismiss the irony, preferring to read the description of D. Brutus’ actions as meritorious: ‘It is hard to believe, Ruete (p. 113) and Schmidt (Jahrb. 1889. p. 184), that this is ironical’ (T-P 6: 305). Indeed it is not. Gods belong to the tradition of tyrannicide. Homage is paid to Zeus in his function as liberator: Herod. 3.142; Dio 11.71.2; the cult of Zeus Eleutheros at Syracuse and Samos honoured liberation from tyranny: Paus. 9.2.5; Strabo 9.2.31; a cult to Jupiter Libertas was dedicated by Ti. Gracchus, a counterpart to Zeus Eleutheros (Liv. 24.16.6-19; Fears 1981: 863-75).

*nondum ... testata est:* The main verb is delayed allowing Cicero to construct a *praeteritio* (Lausberg §§882-886). Lingering over the details of Caesar’s assassination would be unfavourable to Cicero’s cause. Consequently, Caesar is not mentioned by name; rather mention is made of a tradition of tyrannicide, a tradition with divine associations: *res enim a te gesta memorabilis et paene caelestis repellit omnis reprehensiones* (*Ad Brut.* 2.5.2; cf. *Mil.* 80: *Graeci homines deorum honores tribuunt eis viris qui tyrannos necaverunt - quae ego vidi Athenis, quae in aliis urribus*
Graeciae! quas res divinas talibus institutas viris, quos cantus, quae carmina! prope ad immortalitatis et religionem et memoriam consecrarent. **nondum**: Cicero’s persuasive aim is to have official recognition conferred on Brutus by the senate (cf. *Phil*. 5.35). His emphasis on *auctoritas* imbues the proceedings with a sense of legitimacy. *Nondum* implies inevitability and that in the fullness of time Brutus’ actions will be acknowledged. It was obvious to Cicero that Brutus was acting in the interests of the *res publica*; he can thus assert the superiority of his own policy.

**publica auctoritate**: *Publica auctoritas* is a metonymy which serves as verification of fact (L-S II G2). The phrasing echoes and develops Cicero’s discussion of Brutus’ *auctoritas* at *Phil*. 10.6.14 above. Yet here the phrasing has moved the source of the *auctoritas* from the specific (the senate) to the state (*publica*). Cicero thus begins associating Brutus with the *res publica* itself, an association that becomes more prominent over the following sections. By comparison, the reception the liberators received in Greece was very public. In Athens, Brutus and Cassius were praised in public decrees and their statues were placed alongside those of Aristogeiton and Harmodius, the slayers of the tyrant Hipparchus (*Plut.* Brut. 24; *Dio* 47.20.4; *Paus.* 1.8.5; Raubitschek 1957: 5; 1959: 15-21). Aristogeiton and Harmodius enjoyed adulation for the killing of Hipparchus, a political assassination that had subsequently been interwoven with Rome’s political history through the synchronous expulsion of the Tarquins (for the slaying of Hipparchus see *Herod.* 5.55; on the synchronicity of the assassination of Hipparchus with the expulsion of the Tarquins see Gell. 17.21.4; Ogilvie 1965: 194-96; Merrill 1975: 26-28).

7.7 **tantamne patientiam, di boni, tantam moderationem, tantam in iniuria tranquillitatem et modestiam!** The tripartite anaphora in asyndeton intensifies the qualities of Brutus, and the climactic doubling (*tranquillitatem et modestiam*) concludes the final clause in the favoured dactyl and double trochee. *Patientia*, *moderatio*, *tranquillitas* and *modestia* are virtues of restraint and self-control, prominent from early Latin. The use of anaphora, the appeal to the gods, the exclamatory statements, and the broadening of individual interests to include the *res publica* itself convey a tone in keeping with epideictic oratory (Albrecht 2003: 15).

**patientiam** is a response to external things, a virtue when it instils in people the ability to endure the elements, the heat and cold, and more importantly within this context, the ability to endure injustice and insult (*iniuria*). *Patientia* is defined at *Inv. Rhet.* 2.163 as: *fortitudo est considerata periculorum susceptio et laborum perpessio.*
eius partes magnificentia, fidentia, patientia, perseverantia… patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio. At Part. Or. 77 Cicero’s discussion defines patientia further: nam quae venientibus malis obstat fortitudo, quae quod iam adest tolerat et perfert patientia nominatur. quae autem haec uno genere complectitur, magnitudo animi dicitur. Aggressive patientia is linked by Val. Max. (3.3) with fortitudo in his catalogue of exempla. It carries a martial implication within this context, yet it is more than a military quality; it is a trait of the maiores, something Cicero can imply in parading exempla, not just of Brutus’ Junian ancestry but also of the history of the res publica itself. Patientia also plays a topical function. Brutus had written a work, the De Patientia, and although nothing survives of the text, we could assume that the work has an intertextual function within this speech, parading Brutus’ claims to this moral tradition (see Hendrickson 1939 for a discussion of the text; Dawes 2008: 270). Cicero’s emphasis on patientia implies reference points to which the audience is directed throughout the speech. inuria is used broadly in the sense of unjust conduct and injurious treatment; its opposite is ius (OLD 1). The invocation of a legal context reflects Cicero’s concern to portray the image of a wronged magistrate. Kaster (2002: 135) makes the observation that ‘patientia is the quality in being the recipient, not the generator, of action or experience’. In this case the inuria suffered by Brutus is suffered for the sake of the res publica. tranquillitatem: ‘calmness of mind’ (L-S II; cf. Tusc. 4.5.10). modestiam: Modestia is treated fairly broadly in the current context. It is treated as a near synonym with temperantia, which Cicero had defined as: temperantia est rationis in libidinem atque in alios non rectos impetus animi firma et moderata dominatio (Inv. Rhet. 2.164). Modestia and temperantia were treated as synonyms as early as Plautus (Mer. 54), and treated as a near synonym by Cicero at Off. 1.93: temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur; cf. Tusc. 3.16; Hellegouarc’h 1972: 263-265. Control of the passions is particularly relevant to Cicero’s characterisation of Brutus in the current context; Brutus’ actions are not a reactionary response to C. Antonius, but a reasoned reply in the face of continual injustices. Temperantia was also a characteristic of the imperator; as a virtue it was applied to Pompey and his outstanding claim for holding imperium against Mithridates. It involved a moral fortitude in resisting the lures of avarice (Leg. Man. 40), and as such, the characterisation provides an implicit contrast with C. Antonius, who is mocked by Cicero for lingering in Italy in order to take
possession of unclaimed inheritances before making for Macedonia (see Phil. 10.10.7-11.7 below). Temperantia was also a virtue of the praetor and the judicial role of the praetor at Rome. It is evident that Cicero implies this judicial quality as he makes a transition to the duties of Brutus as urban praetor in the following section. A digressionary section on Brutus’ conduct as a praetor follows in what is an ethical narrative explicating Brutus’s conduct.

7.8 qui cum praetor urbanus esset, urbe caruit, ius non dixit, cum omne ius rei publicae recuperavisset, cumque concursu contidiano bonorum omnium qui admirabilis ad eum fieri solebat praesidioque Italiae cunctae saeptus posset esse, absens iudicio bonorum defensus esse maluit quam praesens manu; ...

D: urbanus: V urbis. Magnaldi (2004: 206) prefers urbis... urbe based on the effectiveness of the polyptoton, but her preference requires the audience to subordinate Cicero’s deliberate emphasis upon Brutus’ judicial role as urban praetor to the word figure. praetor urbanus: Brutus was praetor urbanus for the year and, although he was required to remain in Rome for the duration of his praetorship, was compelled to leave for his own safety (Att. 1.13.5; 15.1). Antonius had caused to pass a privilegium allowing Brutus to absent himself from Rome (cur M. Brutus referente te legibus est solutus, si ab urbe plus quam decem dies afuisset?: Phil. 2.31), presumably in early April given Cicero’s approval of Antonius’ actions at Att. 14.6.1 (cf. Ramsey 2001: 261; Denniston 1926: 116).

Caesar had been responsible for the appointment of Brutus as praetor urbanus, the most prestigious of the praetorial offices, and for his nomination to the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul in 46, despite Brutus siding with Pompey in the civil war (Plut. Brut. 7; MRR 2: 301). Brutus was evidently marked out for a prominent political future. Under Sulla the number of praetors had been raised to eight and the offices determined by lot. Two were allotted the civil courts (presided over by the urban and peregrine praetors) and the remaining distributed over the various quaestiones (Frier 1985: 47f). It was observed that the urban praetorship provided political advantage for a praetor aspiring to the consulship, with a greater proportion of ex-urban praetors going on to hold the consulship (see Brennan 2000: 99; 103-4; 125 for a collation of the evidence). Plutarch (Brut. 7) writes that the position of praetor urbanus was contested by both Cassius and Brutus, but this emphasis follows a tradition in which Brutus lays the stronger claim to a moral justification for the assassination of a tyrant and consequently his pursuit of justice (cf. Plut. Caes. 57; 62;
Vell. Pat. 2.58.1; *MRR* 2: 321; Appian incorporates the story to illustrate Caesar’s favour for Brutus: App. 2.112; 4.57; Dio 44.12.3; 44.15.4). *ius non dixit*: A formulaic phrase used of the praetor’s activity in determining law (cf. *Fam.* 13.14.1). The higher magistrates had the power to issue edicts within their sphere of jurisdiction. The most conspicuous edicts however were those of the urban and peregrine praetors, derived from their control of the law courts by virtue of their office: *sed amplissimum ius est in edictis duorum praetorum, urbani et peregrini* (*Gai. Inst.* 1.6). Upon entering office the urban praetor issued an edict in which he determined which actions were to be brought before the courts for the duration of the praetor’s term of office. The judgement was thereafter determined by a separate judge, appointed by the urban praetor, who implemented the urban praetor’s formula in the second part of the trial. Increasingly the praetors’ edicts were renewed each year and grew to a substantial body of law (Watson 1970: 21-23; Frier 1985: 50; on the praetor’s edict see Watson 1974: 31-62). However, the urban praetor need not be an expert in law, nor was expertise in law necessarily a path for advancement (*Mur.* 23). Ideal praetorian qualities centred on other values, values to which Brutus could subscribe (*Verr.* 2.5.38; cf. *Flac.* 6; 100; *Mur.* 23; *Planc.* 62; Brennan 2000: 449-453; see the comments of Frier 1985: 72-73). By lingering over the catchphrases associated with the position of the *praetor urbanus* Cicero can place in relief the qualities which Brutus possessed for the execution of his duties. The characterisation endured; Plutarch (*Brut.* 14) has Brutus administering justice in court with due care on the morning of the assassination. *recuperavisset* refers back to the assassination of Caesar and the restoration of the magistrates’ right in determining cases as opposed to Caesar’s control of the courts. *concursu cotidiano*: Accessibility (*facilitas*) was a necessary characteristic for a praetor: *adiungenda etiam est facilites in audiendo* (*Q. Fr.* 1.1.21; cf. *Fam.* 13.58). But this was denied Brutus when he was forced to leave Rome. *Cotidiano* is also suggestive of Brutus’ assiduous application in the fulfilment of his duties. Shackleton Bailey suggests that Cicero refers here to Brutus’ supporters whom he had gathered from the *municipia* and whom he later dismissed as part of a compromised measure (see *Phil.* 10.8.5 n.; *Fam.* 11.2). But that is unlikely given the context here is one of describing Brutus’ qualifications in the discharge of his duties. *bonorum omnium* is used in a general sense, rather than the more narrowly defined ‘legal council’ (*consilium*) which Brutus would be entitled to as urban praetor. Brutus surrounds himself by the ‘boni’ in contrast to Antonius’ *latrocinium*. *praesens*
manu: We are meant to think of Antonius and his armed followers at Rome, with whom Brutus is implicitly contrasted. Appian refers to a bodyguard at 3.5; these were drawn primarily from the soldiers with whom Antonius had served under Caesar and were said to number six thousand. Antonius professed concern for the liberators, but recanted when faced with the liberators’ protestation at his raising of an army (Fam. 11.3). The use of an armed bodyguard was a characteristic feature of the tyrant (Arist. Rhet. 1357b), and was exploited in Cicero’s depiction of Antonius, particularly after his use of an armed force in Rome following Caesar’s death (Phil. 1.27; 2.19; 2.112). These isolated references feature on a broader level; themes of invective employed in the denunciation of Antonius are used to supplement the characterisation of a tyrant.

7.12 qui ne Apollinaris quidem ludos pro sua populique Romani dignitate apparatos praesens fecit, ne quam viam patefaceret sceleratissimorum hominum audaciae. Brutus, as urban praetor, was required to preside over the Apollinarian games held from 6-13 July, but was deterred from returning by the presence of Antonius’ armed followers (Att. 15.11.2; 15.12.1; CIL 12: 321). The Apollinarian Games were established in 212 (in the wake of the disaster at Cannae in 216) in accordance with the prophecies of the seer, Marcianus, who urged the institution of the games in return for the protection of Apollo (Liv. 25.12). The games were traditionally presided over by the urban praetor and were recognizably a highlight and feature of the praetor’s term of office (Mur. 37-41 for the advantages that accrued from the giving of games and also the comments by Flower 2006: 324-6; Frier 1985: 47). The absence of the urban praetor was unusual and denied Brutus the chance to reassert himself in a public way. He considered a return but, noting the futility of the attempt, refrained. Nor was Cicero inclined to return despite Brutus’ plea that he attend the games (Att. 15.26.1). Brutus’ duties as urban praetor subsequently fell to his praetorial colleague C. Antonius, who presided over the games, but under Brutus’ patronage. Brutus was lavish in the preparation and continued to issue orders regarding the event’s supervision (sexe scripturam aiebat ut... proscriberent: Att. 16.4.1; Shackleton Bailey 1967: 287; and the lavish cost: Plut. Brut. 21.3). Notable among C. Antonius’ first actions was his insistence on retaining the appellation ‘Iulius’ for the month of Quintilis in his public notices for the event (App. 3.23). In 44, M. Antonius, as consul, passed at least two laws honouring Caesar: one law provided for a day to be dedicated in the ludi Romani to Caesar; while the second renamed the month of Quintilis to Iulius (Winniczuk 1947: 427-429). After the Ides
of March that appellation was ignored. C. Antonius’ subsequent insistence on using ‘Iulius’ came as a surprise to Cicero who considered its usage shameful (Att. 16.1; Suet. Iul. 76). The use of ‘Iulius’ by C. Antonius was presumably for popular support that might mitigate any popularity that would accrue in response to Brutus’ lavish display. Brutus, too, was distressed when he heard the games were to be held on the Nones of ‘July’ despite his patronage: *quam ille [sc. Brutus] doluit Nonis Iuliis! mirifice est conturbatus* (Att. 16.4.1).

Brutus had made provision for the performance of a play at the games. He had hoped to stage the *Brutus*, a historical reenactment of the deeds of his ancestor, by the Latin poet and playwright Accius (RE 20; 176 – c. 86 BC). The occasion would have linked the expulsion of Tarquinius with the killing of Caesar, thereby placing recent events within a political and traditional context. However, C. Antonius substituted the performance of the *Brutus* for the *Tereus*, thereby frustrating Brutus’ attempts at winning popular support (see Warmington 1936: 542 for a catalogue of fragments from the ‘Tereus’ and a reconstruction of its plot and Ribbeck 1968: 577-93 on the *Tereus* and *Brutus* respectively; cf. Flower 1995: 170-90). There was a practice of using plays for political purposes on public occasions in order to respond to and inform public opinion. The audience of Cicero’s day could find a public outlet for topical events and these could be manufactured according to context (for this particular occasion see Hine 1988: 2; Coulter 1940: 468-470; cf. Phil. 1.36). At the *ludi Apollinares* in 59 BC the tragic actor, Diphilus incited popular demonstrations against Pompey when he recited lines from a tragedy which had the effect of deriding Pompey for his involvement with Caesar and Crassus (Att. 2.19.3. And in 57, Accius’ *Eurysaces* was staged with the intention of winning support for Cicero’s recall: Sest. 58).

Brutus was unaware of the substitution, believing the ‘Brutus’ had been performed (Att. 16.5.1). He had hoped the play would induce a feeling of gratification among the people who might press for his recall and that of Cassius. The games were certainly lavish; Cicero writes of their success, claiming support for Brutus was drawn from all levels of society: *cum a summis, mediis, infimis, cum denique ab universis* (Phil. 1.37), but that support had no tangible benefits: *mihi autem laetiora sunt eo plus stomachi et molestiae est populum Romanum manus suas non in defendenda re publica sed in plaudendo consumere* (Att. 16.2.3). This may well be an exaggeration, as Vanderbroeck claims (1987: 77-78), but Cicero, noting the games’ success, feared
that M. Antonius would be forced to react to such popular support (Att. 16.2 written on July 11; cf. App. 3.24). Appian (3.23-4), however, writes of a claque employed by Octavian to stifle cries for a recall of Brutus (cf. Plut. Brut. 21). For the use of antiphony from claqués see Cameron 1960: 159 and Vanderbroeck 1987: 77-78.

8.1 quamquam qui umquam aut ludi aut dies laetiores fuerunt quam cum in singulis versibus populus Romanus maximo clamore et plausu Bruti memoriam prosequebatur? singulis versibus refer to verses chanted by the mob (cf. Phil. 1.36; Hine 1988: 2). Roman audiences were alert to topical allusions and the games provided a venue at which public opinion could be expressed or manipulated. These could be spontaneous improvisations, as were the verses sung of Caesar (Suet. Iul. 49; 51), or drawn from popular dramas in topical contexts. For similar examples see Suet. Aug. 53; 68; Tib. 45; Galb. 13; cf. the comments by Jocelyn 1981: 145-148; Wiseman 1985: 37.

8.4 corpus aberat liberatoris, libertatis memoria aderat: in qua Bruti imago cerni videbatur. liberatoris, libertatis: The polyptonic repetition of liberatoris, libertatis in chiastic arrangement calls special attention to the word. The repetition also forms the figure of anadiplosis, in which the last word in a word group is reduplicated at the beginning of a following phrase for the purpose of emphatic reinforcement (Lausberg §§ 616-621). The liberatoris, libertatis pairing alludes to the assassination of Caesar. The killing of a tyrant, when relating to both L. Brutus and M. Brutus, was for the sake of liberty. The reference is clearly to M. Brutus, but the ambiguity could equally apply to L. Brutus, the founder of the res publica. The use of imago develops the ambiguity further. The use of imago calls to mind Rome’s use of ancestral masks, the waxen images of Rome’s distinguished maiores. The pairing of imago and memoria is linked by Cicero at Amic. 102: nemo umquam animo aut spe maiora suscipiet, qui sibi non illius memoriam atque imaginem proponendam putet.

8.5 at hunc eis ipsis ludorum diebus videbam in instructe adulescentis, <M.> Luculli, propinquui sui, nihil nisi de pace et concordia civium cogitantem. Luculli: The identity of this particular Lucullus remains speculative (perhaps RE 13). Clark suggested a Gnaeus Lucullus, but this was refuted by Shackleton Bailey who preferred Marcus, given the prominence of the friendship between a M. Lucullus and Brutus through the period: ‘Clark’s Cn. should be extruded from the OCT’ (Shackleton Bailey 1967: 244-5). His emendation is prompted by what he argues is the incorrect substitution of Cn. Lucceius for Lucullus
in the MSS at *Att. 16.1a.1*. Shackleton Bailey’s emendation is good. M. Lucullus was known to Atticus and had property on the island of Nesis in the Bay of Naples (*Att. 13.6; 14.20.1*), and the falsely identified M. Luccieus of *Att. 16.1a.1* appears again on intimate terms with Brutus conveying news to Cicero of Brutus’ activities while Brutus awaited news of the Apollinarian games (*Att. 16.5.3*).  

**de pace et concordia civium cogitantem:** *Pax* and *concordia* are inherent qualities associated with a free and functioning *res publica*. The association with *libertas* is clearly evident within this passage, as Cicero has emphatically associated Brutus with *libertas* in the preceding sentence. *Concordia* follows as a consequence of *libertas*. But *pax* and *concordia* could not be associated with events of recent years, and so the association with the actions of Brutus is in stark contrast with Antonius, in particular, who is identified with *discordia*, and so civil war (*Phil. 7.23; 7.25; 8.8*). The identification of *pax, concordia* and *libertas* allows Cicero to invoke these qualities as justification for the appointment of Brutus, in much the same way he had evoked the qualities of *fides, humanitas, innocentia, temperantia* and *dignitas* in his advocacy of Pompey in the *De Lege Manilia* (*Leg. Man. 13.36–16.46*; Fears 1981: 882). *Pax* and *concordia* are concomitant blessings for the *res publica*, which are dependent upon Brutus for their fruition.

Cicero generally avoids reference to civil war unless he refers to the actions of Antonius and his followers. Brutus, by contrast, is characterised as doing all he can to avoid civil war. In private, Cicero was much less complimentary; in May, Cicero wrote to Brutus commending his desire to avoid civil war, but ultimately condemning the fruitlessness of his desire to avoid it: *scribis enim acrius prohibenda bella civilia esse quam in superatos iracundiam exercendam. vehementer a te, Brute, dissentio nec clementiae tuae concedo, sed salutaris severitas vincit inanem speciem clementiae* (*Ad Brut. 1.2a.2*). The phrasing echoes *Off. 1.35: suscipienda... bella... sunt ut sine iniuria in pace vivatur*. Dio (47.20.3) and Nicolaus (31) wrongly ascribe the departure of Brutus and Cassius to fear of Octavian’s legions.

Before their departure from Italy the tyrannicides made known their intention of avoiding any cause for civil war, communicating their intentions through a number of *edicta*, supplemented with private correspondence among Rome’s leading persons with the intention of influencing public opinion: *neque solum edicto sed etiam litteris id fecerimus* (*Fam. 11.2.1*). The success of the liberators’ policy is evident in Cicero’s oblique reference; cf. also the aversion to civil war that Otho associated with Brutus
and Cassius at Suet. Oth. 10.1. The departure of Brutus and Cassius from Italy was, however, variously referred to as a departure into exile (Att. 14.19.1). D. Brutus revealed his pessimism regarding a forced exile as early as April 43: *si melior casus fuerit, revertemur Romam; si mediocris, in exsilio vivemus; si pessimus, ad novissima auxilia descendemus* (Fam. 11.1.3). M. Brutus too was gloomy about returning to Rome when he informed Cicero that he was considering exile (Att. 14.19.1: *ille exsilium meditari*; cf. Att. 14.18.4: *nec enim Bruto meo exsilium, ut scribit ipse meditant; video quid prodesse possim*). There is, however, a counter-tradition that charges the liberators with renewing the civil wars (so Vell. Pat. 2.62.3); the triumviral edict, following the *lex Pedia*, charged the tyrannicides with seizing public money and seeking reinforcements from Rome’s enemies to be used against Roman citizens (App. 4.8; Jos. AJ 19.184). Aware of the information being disseminated from the liberators, Velleius summarized the edicts issued by Cassius and Brutus, a summary that reflected the liberators’ declared intentions of avoiding civil war: *testati edictis libenter se vel in perpetuo exilio victuros, dum rei publicae constaret concordia, nec ullam belli civilis praebitos materiam, plurimum sibi honoris esse in conscientia facti sui* (Vell. Pat. 2.62.3; see Woodman 1983: 115 for his note on Velleius’ sources). However, the descent into civil war led Velleius to conclude, probably correctly, that their protestations against giving cause for civil war formed a policy of dissimulation. Their acts of seizing provinces after they had declared their willingness to enter into exile provided Velleius with the proof of their deception. However, Velleius’ assessment was made in retrospect and only after the tyrannicides had acquired the legions of the east. The tyrannicides could not have predicted the extent of their success whatever their contingency plans (but not so Drum 2008). They had no forces other than the fleets they had equipped and nor were they aware of the spontaneity with which volunteers would join, although evidently Antonius was genuinely concerned, accusing the tyrannicides of soliciting troops (Fam. 11.3).

8.7 eundem vidi postea Veliae, cedentem Italia ne qua oreretur belli civilis causa propter se. An interview took place at Velia on Cicero’s return journey to Rome from southern Italy, where he was to cross to Greece (Att. 16.7.5; for the reasons for Cicero’s return see Phil. 10.9.1 n.). Brutus had been lingering south of Rome for some time before he finally determined to leave Italy, but hearing of Cicero’s arrival at Velia he immediately set out to meet him. This final meeting at Velia can be placed in a series of meetings between Brutus and Cicero from April
through to July 44. The meetings are fairly indicative of the almost *ad hoc* planning of the liberators through the period (not according to Drum 2008, who argues for a well-formulated plan of consolidating the liberators’ resources after Caesar’s death). At his final meeting with Brutus at Velia Cicero gives no indication of a plan preceding Brutus’ departure. Indeed, Brutus appeared undecided as to what course of action he would take (*Fam.* 15.11). More telling was Brutus’ continual prevarication in regards to his departure; a prevarication that reveals a very real desire to return to Rome. In the interim a contingency plan was being developed about which we have little information. At Lanuvium, on 6 June, Cicero met with Brutus, Cassius, Porcia, Tertulla (the wives of Brutus and Cassius respectively) and Servilia (Brutus’ mother) for consultation (*Att.* 15.11); at Nesis, a month later on 8 July, Cicero met with Brutus (*Att.* 16.1); and then this final meeting at Velia with Brutus, on or about 17 August, which was to be the last time the two would meet. On each occasion Brutus conveyed his enthusiasm for returning to Rome, but following repeated rebuffs by Cicero he determined that the senatorial meeting of 1 August would be the final date at which he would either leave Italy or return to Rome. After the failure to reach any compromise following that meeting Brutus set out from Velia for the East (*Phil.* 1.9; *App.* 3.40; Dio 45.12.2).

8.8 *o spectaculum illud non modo hominibus sed undis ipsis et litoribus luctuosum!* The emotive effect is striking as Cicero personifies the waves and shores. *spectaculum* with the sense of ‘exposed to the sight of all’ (*OLD* 1; cf. *Ver.* 2.5.100). *litoribus*: The phrasing is poetic; it is used to imply the country bounded by a coast: *non haec tibi litora suasit* [sc. Apollo] (*Verg.* *Aen.* 3.161). The waves and shores are attributed an emotive presence.

8.9 *cedere e patria servatorem eius, manere in patria perditores!* The antithesis between the *e patria* and *in patria* is made more striking by its asyndetic construction. It does not suit to emphasize the collectivity of the conspirators’ actions; instead Cicero prefers to have Brutus on the stage alone.

8.10 *Cassi classis paucis post diebus consequebatur, ut me puderet, patres conscripti, in eam urbem redire ex qua illi> abirent.* *Cassi*: C. Cassius Longinus (see *Phil.* 11.26.3 n.). The dating of Cassius’ departure is less clear. Brutus and Cassius had been collecting ships in Antium (*Att.* 15.12.1), although the final disposition of the fleets at the time of their departure was of limited size. Already in June, Brutus was inclined to take up his proconsular duties in Crete and seems to have
been preparing his fleet for this purpose (*Att*. 15.9; 15.12.1). Cicero considered a joint voyage with Brutus in order to avoid piracy but believed the fleet would constitute little more than a fleet of *minuta navigia* (*Att*. 16.1.3). He was surprised to find the fleet better prepared than he was led to believe (*Att*. 16.4.4; cf. Cicero’s similar disparagement of Cassius’ fleet: *Att*. 16.2.4). Cassius was enraged by the corn commission, calling it an insult (*egone ut beneficium accepissem contumeliam?*: *Att*. 15.11.1). He was determined to refuse the command, but nonetheless used the parameters of the commission to raise a fleet. In June Cassius had determined to set out for Greece, though Cicero declines to elaborate further on his ultimate intentions, perhaps because he was not in Cassius’ confidence. Cassius certainly appeared more determined to withdraw from Italy, but this may reflect a lack of contrary evidence. The date of Cassius’ departure has prompted speculation. Groebe (1899-1929 I: 431; 4. 34) placed Cassius’ departure at the same time as Brutus, though Holmes (1928: 45), and more tentatively Shackleton Bailey (1977: 481), are inclined to place Cassius’ departure later in October. Cicero’s letter of *Att*. 16.6 places Brutus at Nesis and Cassius at Puteoli where Cassius may well have lingered before setting out, leaving October as a possible departure date. Our only evidence to the contrary is this passage in which Cicero indicates an almost simultaneous departure. Yet here, Cicero’s interest is in establishing a unity of purpose between the two men, and what appears likely is that Cicero lacked information regarding Cassius’ whereabouts. *ut me puderet* refers to Cicero’s sense of self doubt about leaving Italy in August 44.

Here in *Philippic* 10, Cicero’s purported sense of shame arises from returning to Rome at precisely the time the liberators were leaving. At *Philippic* 1.7, however, Cicero gives two reasons for his return. Firstly, Cicero was spurred to return upon rumours that a compromise was imminent. News was conveyed to Cicero that the senate was to be summoned on 1 August at which the liberators would be present, and that at this meeting Antonius was to give up the provinces of Gaul, and submit to the authority of the senate. However, admission of compromise is avoided in the current context, so as not to undermine Cicero’s insistent promotion of war. Secondly, news followed that the senate had not met, but Cicero was nonetheless encouraged by Piso who had provided the sole resistance by speaking out against Antonius.

Cicero’s private correspondence reveals a deeper sense of anxiety at the impression he left when he had set out from Rome. He had evidently been criticised by Brutus and Atticus among others, for withdrawing from political involvement at a
time when his presence could be most felt; the former described Cicero’s departure as a desertion of the *res publica* at a time when the state was in dire need (*Att.* 16.7.5). Cicero had expressed his reluctance to leave Rome from the outset and would later regret his departure with a sense of embarrassment, to which Cicero seems to allude here (*puderet me*). He was increasingly concerned about criticism of his departure (*Att.* 15.25; 16.2.4) and was subsequently at pains to justify his departure. Despite Cicero’s lack of enthusiasm about leaving, he was initially supported by Atticus who had made some arrangements for his trip (*Att.* 15.19.1; 16.7.5; 16.5.4). Cicero’s reaction at *Att.* 16.7 was in response to Atticus’ demand for justification of his conduct, despite Atticus’ initial approval: *bene igitur tu qui εὐθανασίαν, bene!* *relinquere patriam!* Cicero subsequently hesitated in asking Atticus for advice after hearing criticism of his departure (*Att.* 15.25; 15.26.3; 15.27.2). Cicero’s reluctance to leave forms a familiar theme through the letters of July, but his anxiety about leaving was justified by concerns for his safety: *prorsus non mihi videor esse tutus. sin tu aliter sentis, velim ad me scribas. domi enim manere, si recte possum, multo malo* (*Att.* 15.18.2). Cicero certainly appeared sensitive to the criticism regarding his departure, particularly after expressing his own disappointment at Brutus’ departure (*Ad Brut.* 1.15.6). Brutus too, aware of Cicero’s sensitivity to this criticism, held back from accusing Cicero of deserting the *res publica*, despite the fact that Brutus and Atticus had discussed the matter, drawing negative conclusions regarding Cicero’s temperament.

Cicero’s anxiety was allayed after his decision to return: *se autem laetari quod effugissem duas maximas vituperationes, unam, quam itinere faciendo me intellegebam suscipere, desperationis ac relictionis rei publicae (flentes mecum vulgo querebantur quibus de meo celeri reditu non probabam), alteram, de qua Brutus et qui una erant (multi autem erant) laetabantur quod eam vituperationem effugissem, me existimari ad Olympia. hoc vero nihil turpius quovis rei publicae tempore, sed ἀναπολόγησον. ego vero austro gratias miras qui me a tanta infamia averterit* (*Att.* 16.7.5).

**9.1 sed quo consilio redierim initio audisti, post estis experti.** ‘You heard in the beginning my reasons for returning, later you were able to see it proven true’.

Cicero turns to a justification of why he decided to return to Rome in August 44. Cicero had made arrangements to leave Italy, deciding upon Greece where his son was studying (*Att* 16.7.5). This was in part necessitated by the unease with which he
regarded Antonius’ veterans who were gathering at Rome under Antonius’ leadership (Att. 14.13; Phil. 1.6; cf. Att. 14.22). Cicero intended on returning to Rome by the Kalends of January when the new consuls would summon the senate, a point of time at which he felt he could be most effective (Att. 16.7; cf. 15.25). *initio:* The phrasing from *Philippic* 1 is recalled here (*Phil. 1.7: exposui, patres conscripti, profectionis consilium; nunc reversionis, quae plus admirationis habet, breviter exponam*), and, as noted by Manuwald (2008: 54: n. 22), poses a problem as to what Cicero refers. One possibility is that *initio* is a reference to the ‘beginning’ of the *Philippics*, that is, *Philippic* 1, where Cicero had given an account of his decision to return to Rome after setting out for Greece in August, 44. If so, it is major evidence that Cicero conceived of a collection of at least fourteen speeches beginning with *Philippic* 1 (on the structure and organisation of the *Philippic* corpus see Manuwald 2008; 2007: 65-90). The second and more likely possibility is that *initio* is a not a precise point in time, or text, to which Cicero refers, but rather a temporal contrast with *post* to follow (so Manuwald 2008: 54 n. 22). Surely, Cicero is thus referring, not to the first speech within the *Philippic* sequence, but rather to the sequence of his own actions when returning to Rome.

Cicero set out from Pompeii for southern Italy on 17 July after debating his best point of departure. His initial plan was to leave from Brundisium but he decided on the longer route from Pompeii in case he should happen across Antonius’ Macedonian legions en route to Italy (Att. 15.21.3; 16.4.4; 16.3.6). He was to travel to the Leucopetra promontory on the toe of Italy and transfer to a cargo ship which would convey him to Patras (Att. 16.6.1; 16.7.1). On 6 August Cicero set out for Greece but was blown back by a southerly wind to Leucopetra where he was forced to wait for a more favourable wind. While there, some citizens from Rhegium, recently returned from Rome, brought news that Antonius was willing to come to some compromise with the liberators and that the senate had been summoned for 1 August at the insistence of the liberators. From *Philippic* 1.8 we know that the meeting was to be a plenary session (*senatum frequentem fore*). A quorum was required for three types of action (see *Phil. 10.3.1* n.) of which two were on the agenda for this meeting. There was a rumour that Antonius was to relinquish his provinces (*remissis provinciis Gallis: Phil. 1.8*) and that the liberators were to be granted an exemption from the grain commission and a return to Rome (*nostri Romam redirent: Att. 16.7.1*).
Cicero set about returning almost immediately, pleased at the liberators’ reassertion of their political authority and the news that Antonius was willing to relinquish his Gallic command and enter into a possible compromise. This forms Cicero’s justification for returning at Phil. 1.7-8 (cf. Att. 16.7.1-2; cf. Plut. Cic. 43.4). Modern scholars have subsequently emphasized Antonius’ conciliatory overtures towards the liberators, overtures that were necessitated by the need for a counter-measure to Octavian’s increasing popular support (cf. Pelling 1988: 158; Syme 1939: 117; Holmes 1928: 21-3). The rumour that Antonius intended to return the Gallic provinces proved specious (see Ramsey 2001 who has convincingly argued against any such tilt towards compromise by Antonius). And the reports of reconciliation proved delusory, after news was brought that the only senator to speak against the actions of Antonius was L. Calpurnius Piso, Caesar’s father-in-law (Phil. 1.10; 14-15). Antonius was clearly not inclined to give any role in Rome to the liberators, and his threatening edict of August 1 or 2 is indicative of this (Fam. 11.3).

Cicero set out for Rome from Leucopetra on about 7 August after a copy of Brutus and Cassius’ edict requesting senatorial attendance was delivered to him. He reached Velia on 17 August after a relatively slow trip following adverse sailing conditions (Att. 16.7.5; Denniston 1926: 77). Brutus had been situated at the mouth of the river of Hales, three miles north of Velia and having heard of Cicero’s arrival, straight away set out to meet him. post estis experti: Thereafter Cicero becomes the self-styled conservator rei publicae (Phil. 2.51; Vat. 7).


Cicero shifts from his narrative of Brutus’ recent activities and turns towards a moral characterisation of Brutus and C. Antonius. There is a frequent shift in person as Cicero contrasts C. Antonius with Brutus and their respective motivations in order to qualify Brutus for his appointment. Narrative continues to play a formative role, but the narrative is not so much used to describe a sequence of events through this section, but to contrast behaviour and motivation. Both C. Antonius and Brutus were attempting to secure the forces at Illyricum, and both were acting unconstitutionally through the acquisition of provincial resources. However, Cicero’s aim is to legitimize the actions of Brutus, so his portrayal of Brutus is to suggest his actions are in keeping
with the best interests of the *res publica*. Consequently, through the following sections, Cicero is consistent in aligning Brutus with the *res publica*, reaching a climax at *Phil.* 10.14 where Cicero openly identifies Brutus with the *res publica* itself through the elaborate construction of a metonymy. This characterisation is intended to colour the audience’s response to the following details, as it will influence the reader’s sense of the respective motivations of Brutus and C. Antonius.

9.3 *exspectatum igitur tempus a Bruto est. nam quoad vos omnia pati vidit, usus est ipse incredibili patientia: postea quam vos ad libertatem sensit erectos, praesidia vestrae libertati paravit.* This is perhaps meant to recall the original Brutus who bided his time before openly coming out against Tarquin (see Liv. 1.58-60). *patientia:* On Brutus’ *patientia* see *Phil.* 10.7.7 n. *postea quam:* Referring to Brutus’ actions for which we have a relative paucity of evidence. The reference is vague but inferred from his subsequent actions. Brutus appears to have acted in response to the senate’s directive of 20 December, that is, the annulment of Antonius’ provincial allocations and its instruction that current governors were to retain control of their respective provinces (*Phil.* 3.24-6). Brutus is shown as modelling his behaviour on the initiatives of D. Brutus and Octavian whose private initiatives were confirmed by the senate (*Phil.* 3.37-39). This also characterises the senate as acting out of a desire for *libertas.* *praesidia vestrae libertati paravit:* The phrasing of this statement echoes language used to describe Brutus elsewhere (cf. *nihil esse iam reliqui quod geremus nisi ut salvus esse*<sup>t</sup>; *in eo etiam ipsi rei publicae esse praesidium* (*Att.* 15.11.1 written in the first week or so of June 44); *quod idem in M. Bruto facere debetis, a quo insperatum et repentinum rei publicae praesidium legionum, equitatus, auxiliorum magnae et firmeae copiae comparatae sunt* (*Phil.* 10.24; cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.1.3).

9.5 *at cui pesti quantaeque restitit! si enim C. Antonius quod animo intenderat perficere putuisset – autem putuisset nisi eius sceleri virtus M. Bruti obstitisset, Macedoniam, Illyricum, Graeciam perditissemus; ...]* *quod animo intenderat:* Cicero suggests that C. Antonius intended to appropriate these provinces for illegal purposes. This is largely an assumption on Cicero’s part, but is used as the basis of the following argument. The conclusion drawn by Cicero is constructed around the presentation of Brutus as reacting to C. Antonius’ actions.
C. Antonius had been allotted the province of Macedonia at the meeting of the senate held on 28 November (Phil. 3.26). On 20 December, the senate received a despatch from D. Brutus in which he asserted that he would hold on to the province of Gaul, and in so doing he would act for the benefit of the res publica: hoc vero recens edictum D. Bruti... pollicetur enim se provinciam Galliam retenturum (Phil. 3.8; Fam. 11.6a). M. Brutus’ actions, although unauthorised, were consistent with the senate’s attempts to relieve D. Brutus from siege. The senate approved D. Brutus’ initiative, and urged all governors in their respective provinces to continue in their capacities until new governors were appointed.

The appointment of C. Antonius late in the year suggests an ad hoc initiative, designed to further consolidate the Antonian position. C. Antonius set out for Macedonia under the pretext that the province was to be secured against the incursions of the Getae (App. 3.25), but the coordination with which M. and C. Antonius were acting and the speed with which C. Antonius set out for his province indicates that securing the legionary forces was of primary concern. Asinius Pollio recognized the importance of control over the legions: video tali tempore multo magis legionibus opus esse quam provinciis, quae praesertim recuperari nullo negotio possunt (Fam. 10.31.6).

Plutarch notes that Brutus only acted when news reached him of Antonius’ imminent arrival at Apollonia (Plut. Brut. 25). C. Antonius was subsequently stifled in his purpose by the sudden arrival of Brutus and his forces; C. Antonius moved north attempting to secure, by force, strategic points in the area of Byllis, but was himself forced to withdraw to the fortified position of Apollonia where he was soon besieged (Dio 47.21). sceleri is not merely ‘illegality’ but ‘criminality’ or ‘villainy’ (OLD 2). C. Antonius was certainly familiar with the disposition of the Balkan provinces having served in Illyricum in 49 as legate to Caesar, who entrusted him with the defence of the region. He fared badly and was captured by the Pompeian forces (Caes. B Civ. 3.4.2; 10.5; 67.5; Liv. Per. 110, Suet. Iul. 36; App. 2.41; 2.47; Dio 41.40; 42.11.1; MRR 2: 266).

9.8 esset vel receptaculum pulso Antonio vel agger oppugnandae Italiae Graecia: quae quidem nunc M. Bruti imperio, auctoritate, copiis non instructa solum sed etiam ornata tendit dexteram Italiae suumque ei praesidium pollicetur. If Antonius had secured those provinces he would secure either a base for attacking Italy, or a refuge for the fleeing enemies of the state. Cicero presents two
alternatives, neither of which is acceptable. The description of Antonius using Greece as a platform for an assault on Italy alludes to a repeated threat to Rome’s safety within our historiographical tradition. The motivation for undertaking war against a possible threat was first realised with the arrival of Pyrrhus (Polyb. 1.6.6; 1.13.4-50), and this had left its mark in the justification of war with the Greek east. More recently, Caesar’s depiction of Pompey and his ‘barbarian horde’ attacking from the east proved a tool that Caesar could employ at B Civ. 3.95. Repetition of praesidium gives emphasis to the assertion. The argument founders on the fact that Antonius would not be declared a hostis until April 27 (Ad Brut. 1.3).

Emphasizing the legality of Brutus’ position by virtue of his command in Crete (cf. Phil. 10.3 below). tendit dexteram Italiae: Graecia is personified, holding out a hand to assist Italy, also personified, as on a coin image.

9.11 quod qui ab illo abducit exercitum, et respectum pulcherrimum et praesidium firmissimum adimit rei publicae. The doubling of nouns and adjectives in an abab pattern, and the use of superlatives and rhyming endings draws particular attention to the role and value of Brutus and his army in the east.

respectum is used figuratively to refer to the area which a fighting person may look back to for refuge (cf. Phil. 11.26.6). Cicero recognizes the geographical separation of Brutus from those already fighting in Italy. qui refers back to Calenus who had proposed that the authority of Brutus be removed (cf. Phil. 10.4).

10.1 equidem cupio haec quam primum Antonium audire, ut intellegat non D. Brutum quem vallo circumsedeat, sed se ipsum obsideri. The description is a paradox: the besieger is the besieged. This also shifts the perspective to an empire wide view (as opposed to a narrower focus on Mutina). A levy was being raised throughout Italy and was preparing to march north. Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece were in the hands of Brutus, while rumours were circulating of Cassius’ control of the Far East.

10.2 tria tenet oppida to<to> in orbe terrarum; habet inimicissimam Galliam; eos etiam quibus confidebat alienissimos, Transpadanos; Italia omnis infesta est; exterae nationes a prima ora Graeciae usque ad Aegyptum optimorum et fortissimorum civium imperiis et praesidiis tenetur. Cicero repeatedly wrote that the outcome of the war depended upon D. Brutus, but was relieved to hear of the strength of the positions of Brutus and Cassius and the support they provided the forces in Italy (Fam. 12.5.1: magnis subsidiis fulta res publica est; cf. Fam. 11.5;
11.7). Having elaborated on the strategic significance for the control of Greece, Cicero turns his attention to M. Antonius (cf. Phil. 3.32). This shift between characters is indicative of the frequent change in subject between the Antonii and Brutus through the section. **tria ... oppida:** The *tria oppida* are named at Fam. 12.5: *praeter Bononiam, Regium Lepidi, Parmam totam Galliam tenebamus studiosissimam rei publicae* (‘except for Bononia, Regium Lepidi and Parma, we hold all Gaul most eagerly attached to the *res publica*’). Antonius garrisoned Bononia, a town lying fifty kilometres to the south of Mutina along the Via Aemilia. Regium Lepidi and Parma, two towns to the north and lying within fifty kilometres of Mutina, similarly lay along the Via Aemilia. They are not named here because the anonymous ‘*tria oppida*’ minimizes their significance. *Orbe terrarum* is an exaggerated term, used to contrast the smallness of the *tria oppida*. Sibilance of the phrasing is noteworthy.

**Transpadanos:** Cicero implies that Antonius had grounds for anticipating support from the Transpadani. Antonius had acquired the province through the *lex tribunicia de provinciis*; but the Transpadani, Cicero asserts, were hostile to Antonius. Before the civil war, Caesar’s attempt at enfranchising the Transpadani had been stifled by the senate. An earlier attempt by M. Licinius Crassus had similarly been curtailed by Q. Lutatius Catulus (*Balb. 50; Dio 37.9.3*). But in 49 the Transpadani were granted citizenship, and this may account for Cicero considering the Transpadani as a potential source of support for the Caesarian Antonius (*Dio 41.36; cf. FIRA i.20.13*). Cicero could be making oblique reference to the legion that formed the core of Antonius’ legions, the Alaudae. Caesar had raised the Alaudae legion at his own expense sometime after 54, but it was not made legal until after citizenship had been extended to the Transpadani (*Yavetz 1983: 66-70*). It was composed of Transalpine Gauls and given the Gallic name for the crested lark, *alauda* (*Plin. HN 11.121*). Antonius led the *legio Alaudae* to Rome in November (*Att. 16.8.2*). Shackleton Bailey’s suggestion (1977: 505) that the Transpadani were clients of Brutus is tenuous, despite suggesting the connection could be linked with Brutus’ governorship of Cisalpine Gaul. There is one instance where the Transpadani are referred to as clients of Cassius; however, the reference is obscure and the inference lost (*Fam. 12.5: tuos etiam clientis Transpadanos mirifice coniunctos cum causa habeabamus*).

**exterae nationes ... ad Aegyptum optimorum:** The wording is almost identical to a passage written by Cicero to Cassius and dated to around 13 February, 43: *a prima enim ora Graeciae usque ad Aegyptum optimorum civium imperiis muniti erimus et*
copiis (Fam. 12.5.1). The similar content of the letter to the phrasing here in Philippic 10 may indicate close composition in time, although there is no evidence for which was composed first. There is greater elaboration of the tria oppida in the letter, because Cicero can assume the senate had already been made aware of Antonius’ placements. Note again the doubling of superlative adjectives and nouns (optimorum ... praesidiis) and rhyming endings (-orum ... –orum; -iis ... –iis) in connection with Brutus’ control of the east.

10.6 erat ei spes una in C. Antonio, qui duorum fratrum aetatibus medius interiectus viti<s cum utroque certabat. M. Antonius was the eldest of the three brothers. His birth date is confirmed by an issue of coin showing his age to be 41 when he became a triumvir, fixing the year of his birth at 83 BC, and placing him below the minimum age for the consulship: obverse: III VIR R P C; reverse: ANTONI IMP A(nno) XLI (referring to his age): Sydenham 1952: 189; cf. Grueber 1970: 396. His cursus honorum was unusual in that he did not hold the praetorship before the consulship. The date of his quaestorship, however, coincides with the age qualification for that office and supports his date of birth as 83 (see the comments by Sumner 1971: 363-64; Linderski 1974; MRR 2: 236). C. Antonio: Caius Antonius (RE 20; MRR 2: 319) was praetor in 44 and assumed duties as praetor urbanus following Brutus’ departure from Rome. He received the province of Macedonia at the senatorial meeting of 28 November, 44, and almost immediately set out to take up his commission. Brutus captured C. Antonius at Apollonia and held him as captive until the end of 43-2 where he was executed after the formation of the triumvirate. For L. Antonius see Phil. 10.21.8 n. At Fam. 2.18.2 Cicero anticipates that the three Antonii would hold the tribunate over three successive years, indicating birthdates from 83-81 BC. M. Antonius was tribune in 49, C. Antonius does not appear to have held the tribunate at all, while L. Antonius held the tribunate, not in 47 as Cicero had expected, but in 44 (MRR 2: 323).

10.7 is tamquam extruderetur a senatu in Macedoniam et non contra prohiberetur proficisci, ita cucurrit. There is a heavy use of irony that inverts the actions of C. Antonius. On 20 December, the provincial allotments of 28 November were repealed and current governors were instructed to await new appointments from the senate (Phil. 7.3). C. Antonius had set out for Macedonia shortly after the conferral of provinces at the night sitting of the senate on the 28th and arrived at Dyrrachium in early January (Holmes 1926: 192ff). We can assume that Dyrrachium
was chosen because there were troops stationed there and because Vatinius would be complicit in the handover of the province. Vatinius’ troops were in winter quarters, divided between Apollonia and Dyrrachium through 44-43 (Botermann 1968: 206). Presumably C. Antonius had agents there, who were able to provide a refuge. The provinces were nominally determined by lot, but Cicero intimated manipulation of the allocations in addition to the illegality of senatorial business being conducted at night (Phil. 3.23-4; cf. Dio 45.9.4; 45.10.6).

11.1 quae tempestas, di immortales, quae flamma, quae vastitas, quae pestis Graeciae, nisi incredibilis ac divina virtus furentis hominis conatum atque audaciam compressisset! The tone becomes heightened as Cicero erupts with an emotive appeal to the gods (cf. Leg. Man. 3.14; 36.1; Phil. 13.19), which Cicero exaggerates to an almost cosmic threat of storm, flame, devastation and plague. The doubled adjectives of incredibilis ac divina contrast with doubled nouns in the following clause furentis hominis conatum atque audaciam. At Cat. 2.25.9, Cicero gives the antithesis of furo as constantia in a catalogue of virtues in contention with vices. conatum: An attempted blow or thrust (OLD 2; cf. Phil. 10.24).

audaciam: Audacia and audax are favourite terms of abuse for Cicero, referring to violent and outrageous conduct attributable to an individual (Wirszubski 1961: 12-22). These terms of abuse are intended to be antithetical to the fortitudo of Brutus. Audacia is prompted by selfish ends and not for communal advantage; its opposite is fortitudo (verum etiam animus paratus ad periculum, si sua cupiditate, non utilitate communi impellitur, audaciae potius nomen habeat, quam fortitudinis (Off. 1.62). It is a product of avaritia (cf. Rosc. 75; 87-88; Verr. 2.1.87; Cael. 13), and as such links with the following condemnation of Antonius’ greed. Fortitudo is required for the resistance of audacia (Badian 1975: 72-74; Kaster 2002: 134-5).

11.3 quae celeritas illa Bruti, quae cura, quae virtus! Another exclamation follows with anaphora in a tricolon. A series of positive abstract qualities are attributed to Brutus, with the emphasis falling on virtus, emphasized by its final position. A molossus occurs over quae virtus giving a heavy emphasis to the climax. Cf. the similar wording and chiastic construction of Octavian’s obstruction of Antonius at Phil. 3.5.3-7: sic enim perspicio, sic iudico, nisi unus adulescens illius furentis impetus crudelissimosque conatus cohibuisset, rem publicam funditus interituram fuisset. celeritas is also the quality of the general and here is stressed in deliberate contrast to C. Antonius (the same is attributed repeatedly to Pompey at Leg.
Man. 22.8; 29.6; 30.4; 34.1; 40.3). North (1966: 177), when reviewing celeritas as applied to Pompey, writes that ‘CELERITAS when on campaign is accounted for by the fact that he is not detained by avaritia, libido, delectatio’. Cicero could also divide martial virtus into constituent parts, as when he referred to the virtutes imperatoriae which included celeritas, fortitudo, industria and consilium (Leg. Man. 29); these are similarly applied to Brutus. It illustrates the benefits derived from swift and emphatic action. Cicero describes a sudden and rapid movement of Brutus, although Cicero could not have had much real insight into the actual movements and intentions of Brutus at the time.

11.4 etsi ne C. quidem Antoni celeritas contemnenda est, quam nisi in via caducae hereditates retardassent, volasse eum, non iter fecisse diceres. The contrast between the celeritas of Brutus and that of C. Antonius is given shape through a mythic allusion. caducae hereditates: Property ‘that is not, or cannot be, taken up by the heir or the legatee and consequently falls to the treasury’ (OLD 10). Shackleton Bailey (1986: 257) writes ‘but we are surely meant to think of Atalanta, who lost her race because she stopped to pick up the golden apples thrown by her competitor’. Atalanta was famed for her speed and, having been warned that a husband would bring her harm, vowed that she would never marry unless beaten in a footrace. A suitor, Hippomenes, aided by Venus, cast down three golden apples delaying Atalanta while she retrieved them and allowing Hippomenes to win the race (Ov. Met. 10.570; Apollod. 3.9.2). Cicero suggests that C. Antonius lingered in Italy before setting out for his province (as assigned on 28 November: Phil. 3.24), in order to receive any unclaimed inheritances that came his way.

11.6 alios ad negotium publicum ire cum cupimus, vix solemus extrudere: hunc retinentes extrusimus. Cicero sarcastically suggests the decree requiring incumbent governors to retain their respective provinces had the effect of hastening C. Antonius’ departure. negotium: ‘The fact of being occupied, work, business’ (OLD 1). Cicero alludes to the idea that C. Antonius’ private motivations included the occupation of Illyria. Vatinius was the governor of Illyria but the extent of his authority has been questioned by Botermann, particularly after his seditious actions following the death of Caesar (Dio 47.21; see Botermann 1968: 204-207 for a detailed catalogue of the soldiers stationed in the Balkan region). extrusimus is the reading provided by Clark. Shackleton Bailey provides the emendation of elusi sumus, which has been subject to rightful criticism (Shackleton Bailey 1979: 285; cf. Magnaldi
2004: 212; M-R reject *elusi sumus* and print *extrusimus*); while *exclusimus* is the reading of the MS *D*. The polytonic *extrusimus* picks up the *extrudere* of the preceding clause. The phrase is ironic: ‘by trying to hold him back, we thrust out’.

11.8  at quid ei cum Apollonia, quid cum Dyrrachio, quid cum Illyrico, quid cum P. Vatini imperatoris exercitu?  The cola are parallel and climactic with the focal point falling upon *exercitu*, and hence C. Antonius’ purpose. The repetition of ‘*quid*’ calls into question the motivation of C. Antonius, particularly when framed as a series of rhetorical questions.  **Apollonia:** Apollonia and Dyrrachium were the chief coastal ports of the Balkan seaboard and were the usual crossing points to Brundisium, because the infrastructure there was able to accommodate the large numbers of legionaries. Both city ports fed the *via Ignatia* which, in turn, provided the link to Asia Minor in the east, south into Macedonia and Greece, or north and east into Illyria and Thrace (Hammond 1974: 184-194). The strategic importance was primary. Cicero in 56 regarded the *via Ignatia* as a military road (*Prov. Cons.* 2), and Brutus himself retired to Dyrrachium after campaigning against C. Antonius (*Ad Brut.* 1.2.2; 2.8).  **P. Vatini imperatoris:** P. Vatinius (cos. with Q. Fufius Calenus in 47) was a Caesarian legate operating throughout the Adriatic from 48 to his consulship (*MRR* 2: 291). He continued to serve as proconsul into 42 and in this year celebrated a triumph on July 31. Vatinius, formerly a political adversary of Cicero, had been responsible for the legislation allowing Caesar command of Gaul for five years, where he in turn served as legate in 58–56, before returning to Rome in 55 when he became praetor through the assistance of Pompey and Crassus (*Liv. Per.* 105; Val. Max. 7.5.6; *Plut. Cat. Min.* 42; *Pomp.* 52).

11.9  succedebat, ut ipse dicebat, Hortensio. certi fines Macedoriae, certa condicio, certus, si modo erat ullus, exercitus: cum Illyrico vero et cum Vatini legionibus quid erat Antonio?  C. Antonius was to succeed Hortensius as governor of Macedonia by virtue of appointment on 28 November (*Phil.* 3.26; 7.3; *Plut. Brut.* 25.2; Dio 47.21.4-7; Manuwald 2006: 167-80; 2003: 416-7). However, Antonius’ provincial allocations were annulled on 20 December (*Phil.* 3.37-9), and C. Antonius recalled to Rome (*Phil.* 7.3). Hortensius, the governor of Macedonia, handed his province to Brutus without regard for the senatorial directive that required current governors to retain their respective provinces. Vatinius, the governor of Illyricum transferred his authority over to Brutus, but only after Brutus intercepted the intended transfer of soldiers to C. Antonius who was then making his way to Apollonia (*Plut.*
Brut. 26.20). **dicebat**: C. Antonius recognized that his claims were to Macedonia alone and not to Illyricum. He was already precluded from taking up his appointment by the directive from the senate that the current governors should maintain their respective positions until new governors were appointed by the senate. This provided a legal basis for Brutus’ actions. **Hortensio**: Q. Hortensius Hortalus (pr. 45; MRR 2: 328) was son of the orator and governor of Macedonia since 44. Hortensius served on Caesar's staff in the civil war (Caes. B Civ. 1.8.1), but sympathized with Brutus’ cause, in part due to their close familial relationship (see introduction p. 9 n. 46). Hortensius’ sister was married to Brutus’ adopted father (Servilia’s brother; for his relation to Brutus see Münzer 1963: 309). An inscription from Delos links the two men unambiguously (IdD 1622), describing Hortensius as the uncle of Brutus, to be honoured for the benefactions that Brutus had given both Athens and Delos. His was an old republican name and his contribution to the republican cause added credence and respectability. The events leading up to this transferral of command shed light on the coordination with which the transfer of command was undertaken. While at Athens Brutus entered into negotiations with nearby governors and presumably he had made arrangements for mutual support from Hortensius in this period (so Heitland 1909: 396). Hortensius had been serving in the region and was intimate with its dispositions, an invaluable asset that must have facilitated the levy of the two vernacular legions (Phil. 10.13). Dio presents a rather truncated account of the transfer (Dio 47.21). He depicts Hortensius as about to relinquish his province upon the arrival of C. Antonius in accordance with the provincial allocations of 28 November. But upon Brutus’ arrival he quickly went over to Brutus (cf. Plut. Brut. 25). This seems to ignore the complicity which Brutus required of Hortensius in his moves to combine Macedonia and Greece to which Dio had already referred. This fits the chronology of events, given the narrow time frame between Brutus’ decision to raise an armed force, and his subsequent arrival in Illyria and besieging of C. Antonius. Hortensius was executed after Philippi, having aligned himself with the conspirators in 44-43 (Plut. Ant. 22). **condicio**: ‘Legal position or status’ (OLD 7).

12.1 *at ne Bruto quidem*: id enim fortasse quispiam improbus dixerit.

Cicero names no one specifically; the objector is anonymous but a senator is implied. Cicero alludes to the difficulties and criticisms with which he was faced regarding the forfeiture of C. Antonius’ right to hold the province. **improbus**: To be labelled an *improbus* was to be called an opponent of the *boni*: *et enim mihi ipsi accidit ut cum...*
The boni are the upholders and defenders of the res publica: populi Romani libertas, senatus auctoritas, his rei publicae status, cum dignitate otium (Wirszubski 1961: 13; Hellegouarc’h 1972: 528-30). The term improbi is usually applied, by Cicero, to the supporters of Antonius (e.g. Phil. 6.16; 7.3). At Phil. 14.7, however, Cicero reproached the senate for applying the term of improbus to Antonius, when Cicero considered the term ‘hostis’ more appropriate because of the escalation of the military conflict.

12.2 omnes legiones, omnes copiae quae ubique sunt rei publicae sunt: nec enim eae legiones quae M. Antonium reliquerunt Antoni potius quam rei publicae fuisset dicentur. The res publica is generally the ‘body politic’, with a particular association with Rome itself. But it can also be defined as a ‘free state’, that is, the state in which all citizens participate and one that is the opposite of tyranny (Sest. 71; Phil. 2.113). The idea of a res publica, distinct from the geographical confines of Rome itself, was articulated at Phil. 2.113, and applied to one embodying republican principles: habet populus Romanus ad quos gubernacula rei publicae deferat: qui ubicumque terrarum sunt, ibi omne est rei publicae praesidium vel potius ipsa res publica. This distinction is echoed here and developed into a metonymy around Brutus and the republicans in the east. The res publica and the adherence to the traditions of the res publica, are the crux upon which Cicero’s argument stands despite the conflict this inevitably raised with legality. Ramsey (2003: 328) suggests the source of the statement at Phil. 2.113 was derived from the edict published by Brutus and Cassius before they left Italy (Fam. 11.2).

That the res publica could consist of a place that was not necessarily Rome, was an idea that was in circulation before Cicero had delivered Philippic 10, and may well have been prompted by Brutus’ own philosophical writings. In Cicero’s words, the central theme of Brutus’ De Virtute was that virtue was sufficient for happiness, a mode of thought defying geographical locality (cf. Tusc. 5.1: virtutem ad beate vivendum se ipsa esse contentam). Hendrickson (1939) reconstructs Brutus’ De Virtute on the basis of its central theme being that happiness is attainable through virtue. Exile is not defined by geographical locality, but rather, exile is a moral state (cf. Sedley 1997: 51). We again find the sentiment expressed in a letter from Brutus to Cicero when he was reconciling himself to exile: mihique esse iudicabo Romam ubicumque liberum esse licebit (Ad Brut. 1.16.8). Sedley (1997: 51) goes so far as to
call this a trademark of Brutus’ philosophy. The authenticity of the letter has been challenged (see Shackleton Bailey 1980: 10-14 for a summary of the argument). However, if the letter is apocryphal the forger illustrates a close awareness of Brutus’ philosophical position on this point. The res publica defies locality and a definitive meaning, and the focus in defining the res publica, thereafter, becomes moral rather than constitutional.

The phrasing here echoes the trope in a letter from Cicero to Cassius written on May 3, 44: finem nullam facio, mihi crede, Cassi, de te et Bruto nostro, id est de tota re publica, cogitandi (Fam. 12.1.1). This trope appealed to Velleius Paterculus too, but he inverts the motivations behind the liberators to suggest dissimulation:

profeci [sc. Brutus et Cassius] urbe atque Italia, intento ac pari animo sine auctoritate publica provincias exercitusque occupaverant et, ubicumque ipsi essent, praetextentes esse rem publicam, pecunias etiam, quae ex transmarinis provinciis Romam ab quaestoribus deportabantur, a volentibus acceperant (Vell. Pat. 2.62.3).

12.4 omne enim et exercitus et imperi ius amittit is qui eo imperio et exercitu rem publicam oppugnat. The accusation of taking up arms contra patriam becomes more prominent in the Philippics than in any of Cicero’s other works, indicative of the immediacy of the threat from Antonius. The phrasing is used variously through the Philippics (Phil. 2.72; 8.8; 11.1; 13.14; 13.16; 13.39) to describe the actions of the Antonii. Cicero, through the device of an imaginary speech of Antonius to Caesar, had retrospectively accused Antonius of claiming responsibility for the civil war of 49 BC at Phil. 2.72: ego arma contra consules imperatoresque populi Romani, contra senatum populumque Romanum, contra deos patrios arasque et focos, contra patriam tuli. Later references mark a development from hypothetical accusations to direct charges (e.g. Phil. 13.14: quid autem turpius aut foedius aut quod minus debeat quam contra senatum, contra cives, contra patriam exercitum ducere). For similar accusations of acting against the patria see Cat. 2.27; Sull. 58.7 (nefarium bellum); Sall. Cat. 33.1.2; Att. 9.10.3; Fam. 10.23.6; Amic. 36.3; 42.14. exercitus et imperi: The chiastic arrangement of exercitus and imperium around is qui draws attention to the nominative. The characterisation of Antonius in taking up arms against the patria is integral to isolating the ambiguous position of Antonius and consolidating the position of the anti-Antonians within the senate.

12.5 quod si ipsa res publica iudicaret aut si omne ius decretis eius statueretur, Antonione an Bruto legiones populi Romani adiudicaret? ‘If the Res Publica
itself should judge or if every right should be determined by its decrees’.

The *res publica* is personified and treated as the adjudicator. Cicero’s own view is thus presented as being that of the *res publica*. **Antonione**: I.e. C. Antonius.

**adijudicaret?**: The question sets up the following *ratiocinatio*, a process by which a conclusion is reached through calm reasoning. The technique of providing two alternatives is what Wooten called the ‘disjunctive mode’ (Wooten 1986: 58-86): two stark alternatives are presented here, but they are mutually exclusive alternatives of which only one outcome is desirable. Should C. Antonius gain power, the situation for both Rome’s allies, and then for Rome itself, would be one of a struggle for survival.

12.7 *alter advolarat subito ad direptionem pestemque sociorum ut, quacumque iret, omnia vastaret, diriperet, auferret, exercitu populi Romani contra ipsum populum Romanum uteretur; alter eam legem sibi statuerat, ut, quocumque venisset, lux venisse quaedam et spes salutis videretur. denique alter ad evertendam rem publicam prae sidia quaer ebat, alter ad conservandam.*  

C. Antonius went east with the intention, according to Plutarch (*Brut.* 25), of joining forces with Vatinius in Epidamnus and Apollonia, although Cicero infers a desire for plunder.  **vastaret, diriperet, auferret**: Synonymia in asyndeton creates a sense of urgency. There is repetition of the vocabulary from *Phil.* 10.11.2 above, in the description of Antonius, but here there is greater elaboration with the tripling of verbs. There is also an internal repetition of vocabulary with the polyptoton *direptionem* and *diriperet*. The final and most emphatic paradox is placed last; Antonius will use an army of the Roman people against Roman people.

The tempo now slows while Cicero dwells on the characterisation of Brutus and the construction of a metonymy between Brutus and the *res publica* (see *Phil.* 10.14.1 n.). The vocabulary of legal language echoes the personification of the *res publica* (as above).  **statuerat** is used in the sense of ‘established in law’, but also carries the connotation of ‘considered’ (*OLD* 13b); there is the polyptonic repetition of *statueretur* from *Phil.* 10.12.5. The speech as a whole pays attention to both legal technicality and to *lex* as moral authority. The speech is, at this point, developing into an encomiastic justification for granting command to Brutus and so moves away from being historical to character-driven in the justification of appointing Brutus to command.  **lux**: Metaphorical *lux*: ‘the light of hope, succour, deliverance’ (*OLD* 11). There is contrast between the *iret* used to describe the potential movement of Antonius and the qualifying *venisset* of Brutus. The *lux ... quaedam* allows Cicero to
linger over the metaphor. At *Fam.* 12.5.3 Cicero adds a geographical dimension to the metaphor with reference to the sun rising: *nunc autem opto ut ab istis Orientis partibus virtutis tuae lumen eluceat*. Cicero was the first to apply *lux* to an individual (*Cat.* 2.24; Dyck 1996: 578; see Welch 2005: 328-9 for the development of the *lux* metaphor). This metaphor subsequently proved attractive (e.g. *Hor.* *Sat.* 1.7.24: *solem Asiae Brutum apellat, stellasque salubris appellat comites*). The antithesis of *evertendam* and *conservandam* concludes the series of contrasts.

12.8 *nec vero nos hoc magis videbamus quam ipsi milites a quibus tanta in iudicando prudentia non erat postulanda.* Emphasis on the spontaneous resistance of the legions was proof of C. Antonius’s criminality. Those soldiers who were prepared to side with Brutus are lauded for their exemplary conduct.

13.1 *cum septem cohortibus esse Apolloniae scribit Antonium, qui iam aut captus est – quod di duint! – aut certe homo verecundus in Macedoniam non accedit ne contra senatus consultum fecisse videatur.* Brutus is the subject of *scribit*, and so Cicero is referring directly to the details included within Brutus’ despatch to the senate. Ker, in the older Loeb edition, mistranslates this as ‘seven legions’. Brutus had written that seven cohorts were stationed in Apollonia. The remaining cohorts of that legion were presumably stationed at Dyrachium (cf. *Plut.* *Brut.* 25). By the time Brutus sent his despatch to Rome, C. Antonius was being besieged at Apollonia and the city was not yet taken, although it would fall by mid-March. Brutus thereafter held Antonius in custody until he ordered his execution in late 42 in reprisal for the proscriptions undertaken by the Triumvirs. For the interim, Brutus held C. Antonius in detention allowing him to retain the insignia of his office indicating a willingness to hold him in the hope of using him as a possible lever in negotiations with M. Antonius should the occasion arise (*Ad Brut.* 2.5.3-4; 1.2.3 and 1.2.3a; *Plut.* *Brut.* 26; App. 3.79; Dio 47.22-24). *duint*: An archaic interjection. Archaisms, though they may serve to elevate style, are largely neglected in favour of a more immediate invigorating language within the orations (Albrecht 2003: 12; 27), although here Cicero is establishing a context of tradition against which C. Antonius is acting in an untraditional manner. *homo verecundus*: A man characterised by an ‘attitude of restraint’. The phrasing is heavily ironic given the haste with which C. Antonius set out for Macedonia and Cicero’s ironic imputation to Antonius of a concern for legality. Entering into the province of Illyricum, so as to avoid entering into Macedonia (allotted to C. Antonius on 28 November), conveys a sense of
absurdity to his conduct. *videatur* in the passive is frequently used in a legal context (*OLD* 22).

13.4 *dilectus habitus in Macedonia est summo Q. Hortensi studio et industria; cuius animum egregium dignumque ipso et maioribus eius ex Bruti litteris perspicere potuistis.* Brutus’ letter evidently contained information on the transfer of command from Hortensius to Brutus, and the actions that Hortensius had undertaken leading to the transfer. There is strong praise for Hortensius, both for his *virtus* and for living up to the *exempla* of his ancestors. Cicero obscures any suggestion that the liberators may have had a preconceived notion to occupy strategic provinces and rather suggests a spontaneous levy. This was more likely to have been in response to the liberators’ instruction that sympathizers were to begin fortifying towns from mid-44 (App. 3.6; Drum 2008: 91; Syme 1939: 171; see comments by Botermann 1968: 89, n. 6; 94). *dilectus:* Hortensius was complicit in the actions of Brutus although, as governor of Macedonia, he had no legionary forces available to him. However, he was in a position to raise a levy. Additionally, the significance of his transfer lies in his political support and the accumulative legitimacy which he conferred on Brutus by handing his province over. Plutarch (*Brut.* 25) merely stated that Hortensius handed his province over to Brutus, while Dio (47.21.4-5) writes that it was only after Antonius’ arrival that Hortensius transferred the command. Drum has argued for a more active role in events given the cohesion with which Brutus and Hortensius acted. He emphasizes the familial aspect citing Hortensius’ relation to Brutus by marriage, a connection that established strong links between the two families (Drum 2008: 85).

13.6 *legio quam L. Piso ducebat, legatus Antoni, Ciceroni se filio meo tradidit.* Caesar had six legions stationed in Macedonia, in preparation for his Parthian campaign: Antonius ordered four back to Italy, two of which defected to Octavian. One of the Macedonian legions was taken to Syria with Dolabella, leaving one legion in the region under the command of Piso (App. 3.25; *Phil.* 11.4.16; *MRR* 2: 352). Botermann (1968: 209) suggests the legion subsequently captured from C. Antonius was a contingent drawn from the Illyrian legions and was, in fact, the legion taken from Piso (cf. App. 3.79). Brunt (1971: 486) was less convinced that the troops under Piso were the same as those captured from C. Antonius, attributing correctly the confusion to Appian’s account. Appian inflates the figure to one legion, which is surely suspicious but, if correct, included the cohorts stationed in Apollonia and also
any forces that C. Antonius may have brought with him, and which subsequently provided the basis of a legion (Phil. 10.13; App. 3.79). Cicero, our only extant contemporary source, gives (at most) only seven cohorts under the command of C. Antonius, distinguishing between these seven cohorts and the legion commanded by Piso, and reiterates his certainty of the size of Brutus’ army at Phil. 11.27.  

L. Piso: L. Calpurnius Piso (RE 73a, Supp. 3: 230; MRR 2: 352). Little is known of this particular Piso. He evidently commanded a legion under C. Antonius.  

Ciceroni se filio meo: Cicero’s son passed up his studies in Athens to serve with Brutus under whom he was much employed (Plut. Brut. 26). Piso subsequently surrendered his legion to him (cf. Plut. Brut. 25). Following Philippi M. Cicero the younger joined Sex. Pompeius; afterwards, escaping the proscriptions, he was appointed by Octavian as consul suffect in 30 (App. 4.51). When news reached Rome of M. Antonius’ failure at Actium, Cicero the younger ‘announced it to the people and affixed the news to the rostra where formerly his father’s head had been exhibited’ (App. 4.51; of his hatred for Antonius see Plin. HN. 14.147).

13.7 equitatus qui in Syriam ducetur bipertito alter eum quaestorem a quo ducetur reliquit in Thessaliæ sesque ad Brutum contulit, alterum in Macedonia Cn. Domitius, adulescens summa virtute, gravitate, constantia a legato Syriaco abduxit. A contingent of cavalry, divided into two parts, was intercepted while on its way to Dolabella. According to Plutarch (Brut. 25.1) one of the two divisions was led by Cinna and was induced to desert to Brutus (cf. Dio 47.21; Phil. 10.13; 11.27; MRR 2: 327). The identity of this Cinna remains speculative (‘perhaps L. Cornelius Cinna who became suffect consul in 32’: so Shackleton Bailey 1986: 259 n. 16 following MRR 2: 417).  

Cn. Domitius: The second of the two commanders is named as Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (consul in 32), a kinsman and officer of Brutus, who aided in the gathering of the latter’s fleet. Sometime late in 44, or early 43, Domitius induced this contingent of Dolabella’s cavalry to join Brutus (cf. his role at Ad Brut. 1.19.2; 1.22.1; Botermann 1968: 204-211). He was later in command of fifty ships and a legion in 42, and joined Staius Murcus in harassing the triumvirs’ supply line through the Adriatic (App. 4.86; Vell. Pat. 2.72.3; MRR 2: 365; Carlsen 2006: 70). He was much praised by Cicero who includes him among the chief conspirators (Phil. 2.27; 2.30), but his complicity in the assassination has been called into question (cf. App. 5.62; Syme 1986: 156). He nonetheless sympathised and was consequently outlawed according to the Lex Pedia (Vell. Pat 2.69.5). Domitius was
reconciled with Antonius in 40 BC and pardoned (Vell. Pat. 2.76.2; App. 5.50; Dio 48.29.2). His son, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus (consul in 16), was the grandfather of Nero through marriage to Octavian’s niece, Antonia (Syme 1939: 378; 423).

**ducebatur ... abduxit**: Repetition of near synonymous verbs, although *abduxit* is more ‘to entice away’ (*OLD* 3) and can convey moral associations. **summa virtute, gravitate, constantia**: Cicero was fond of the tripling of these virtues (cf. Dom. 1.39.7; Balb. 1.13.11; Phil. 3.13.2). The number of superlatives becomes concentrated through the following brief section and is to be understood with the modifier *summa*. **Summa virtute, gravitate, constantia** echoes the language used of Brutus.

13.10 **P. autem Vatinius qui et antea iure laudatus a vobis et hoc tempore merito laudandus est aperuit Dyrrachi portas Bruto et exercitum tradidit.** Of the five legions Brutus controlled, three were acquired from P. Vatinius, the current governor of Illyricum (Vell. Pat. 2.69; App. 3.75; Dio 47.21). According to Dio (47.21), P. Vatinius was quartered in Dyrrachium with three depleted legions and was prepared to resist the approach of Brutus. Botermann (1968: 206) noted that Vatinius’ legions were distributed between Apollonia and Dyrrachium in winter quarters and therefore did not pass over to Brutus en bloc, being divided between the two towns. In any case, his troops capitulated quickly. Vatinius had resisted the overtures of C. Antonius for his three legions and appears to have wavered in his support for Brutus, adhering to the *senatus consultum* requiring governors to retain their authority within their respective provinces until new governors were appointed (*Phil*. 3.38; App. 3.49; *Fam*. 12.22a). But the legions soon deserted Vatinius, going over to Brutus without a fight (Dio 47.21; Vell. Pat. 2.69). However, here at *Phil*. 10.13, Vatinius is depicted as voluntarily handing his legions over, an action that Cicero praises. Brutus appears to have concealed the truth about the real status of Vatinius’ reluctance and must have given that impression within his despatch, since Cicero does not refer to legionary desertion in this speech. We only know of the despatch through *Philippic* 10, and since the senate was aware of its content, Cicero cannot have fabricated the assertion. Dio (47.21.6) writes that Vatinius had a chronic illness that gave cause for the legions’ desertion, but the answer seemingly lies more in the events of the months leading up to Brutus’ arrival. Prior to Brutus’ arrival, his agents had been active amongst the legions and the inducements offered were enough to secure the support of the legions despite Brutus’ role in the conspiracy (App. 4.75). Vatinius’ capacity as a commander had also been impugned after suffering a number of setbacks in Illyricum.
Caesar appointed him to Illyricum with three legions and a strong contingent of cavalry, but he failed to hold the Illyrians in check; when Vatinius attempted to use force in compelling tribute, he was attacked, losing five cohorts and withdrawing to Epidamnus for safety (App. Illy. 13.38; Plut. Brut. 25).

14.1 tenet igitur res publica Macedoniam, tenet Illyricum, tuetur Graeciam:
nostrae sunt legiones, nostra levis armatura, noster equitatus, maximeque noster
est Brutus semperque noster, cum sua excellentissima virtute rei publicae natus
tum fato quodam paterni maternique nominis. Having established the
forces available to M. Brutus in the Greek east, and the willingness of the regional
commanders to support Brutus, Cicero shifts his focus to Brutus himself. The
phrasing marks this shift in subject and is enhanced by a correlating elevation in style
as Cicero develops a laudatory passage on Brutus. There is a shift away from naming
individuals within a narrative to a broader and highly rhetorical passage that digresses
from the events taking place in the east. The paragraph forms an encomium, drawing
together a number of features that Cicero has raised regarding the standing of Brutus.

tenet igitur res publica: Schofield (1995: 68) comments on the res publica’s
‘extraordinary capacity to attract metaphors’; an instance of this is conveyed
throughout the following section, where Cicero not only develops the personification
of the res publica, but figuratively presents Brutus as the embodiment of the res
publica itself. Brutus can be so closely associated with the res publica that ‘Brutus’
can be substituted for the ‘res publica’. Tenet, despite forming the complement with
res publica, anticipates or suggests Brutus as the subject of the sentence. Brutus can
be substituted in place of the res publica and Cicero deliberately blurs the distinction
between the two to the point where a metonymy is formed. This identification with
the state is continued through the passage. The res publica and its synonymy with
Brutus are equated through Brutus’ military presence in Macedonia. The passage is
further developed with the ornamental repetition of tenet. The anaphora of tenet
introduces the first two phrases, while tuetur (a variation in the sequence) governs the
third. Greater emphasis is given to the last verb in the form of a gradatio (see
Albrecht 2003: 167 on gradatio and amplificatio in laudatory orations; Lausberg §§
402-3). Tuetur is subtly more emotive, more specifically protective in its connotations
(OLD 3); the phrasing is echoed at Phil. 10.23.4. This incrementation is subtle but if
we substitute ‘Brutus’ for ‘res publica’ the verbs, emphasised by their repetition and
their placement in the first position, share a subject that is understood in two senses.
The effect is to blur the distinction between the *res publica* and Brutus, thereby creating a blending of the two. The *res publica* can be, and is, described in human and emotive terms. Brutus, in turn, can be defined as made up of the *res publica*’s physical and traditional components. The identification of Brutus with the *res publica* is a variation on Cicero’s tendency to identify himself with it in a number of *post reditum* speeches (cf. May 1971: 311). Macedonian ... Illyricum ... Graeciam: The asyndetic tripling is effective in describing the entire coastal line opposite Italy. Control of the Balkan coast would prevent any crossing from Greece. Antonius had been using the port of Dyrrachium in transferring his legions from Greece to Brundisium and consequently the port cities of Dyrrachium and Apollonia form the areas around which most of the fighting between C. Antonius and Brutus took place.

**nostrae ... Brutus semperque noster:** A catalogue is developed culminating with the emphasis on Brutus, marking a nuanced application of the metonymy: *nostrae sunt legiones, nostra levis armatura, noster equitatus, maximeque noster est Brutus semperque noster* (‘the legions are ours, so are the light-armed units and the cavalry, and most of all Brutus is ours, always ours’). Brutus emerges as an integral component of the *res publica*, as integral as each of the military components. Moreover, each component is shared by all members of the state as emphasized by the possessive *noster*: ‘We’ share in these parts (integral to the state). And in the ideological climax of the sentence, ‘we’ share in the *virtus* of Brutus. Brutus was in control of the armies of the Balkans and men were rallying around him. D. Brutus too had an army and was resisting M. Antonius at Mutina, so eulogizing the name ‘Brutus’ serves a double purpose for Cicero (cf. Phil. 3.9). cum sua excellentissima virtute: Martial *virtus* is pre-eminent and something which Cicero concedes as traditionally Roman (*rei militaris virtus praestat ceteris omnibus*: Mur. 22). There are characteristics, however, that Cicero uses to supplement Brutus’ martial quality and these are implied through the speech. *Virtus*, as applied to Brutus, is not limited to martial valour, but incorporates an ethical excellence (for the use of *virtus* in an ethical sense and its development within the Late Republic see North 1966; McDonnell 2006: 320-55). For example, *consilium* as a feature of ethical excellence features prominently throughout *Philippic* 10, particularly when coupled with *actum* (*Phil.* 10.20.8; 10.23.2; 10.23.10; 10.25.4; 10.26.10), and is the mark of pre-eminent *virtus* (cf. Cat. 3.14: *primum mihi gratiae verbis amplissimis aguntur, quod virtute, consilio, providentia mea res publica maximis periculis sit liberata;
natus: Cicero has in mind Brutus’ ancestry when he evokes Brutus’ birth. The application of *natus* is not isolated to M. Brutus alone. A similar emphasis is evident in Cicero’s praise of D. Brutus where emphasis is again on the family continuum: *O civem natum rei publicae, memorem sui nominis imitatoremsque maiorum* (*Phil. 3.8*). The ancestral connection features on the periphery of Cicero’s argument but is integral in bringing into focus the position of M. Brutus within the family tradition. Emphasis upon the inheritance of familial traits was a standard literary motif (e.g., *Quint. 5.10.23-4: eo porro sunt genus, nam similes parentibus ac maioribus suis plerumque creduntur, et nonnumquam ad honeste turpiterque vivendum inde causae fluunt; and Har. 6: etenim ut P. ille Scipio natus mihi videtur ad interitum exitiumque Carthaginis, qui illam a multis imperatoribus obsessam, oppugnatam, labefactam, paene captam aliquando quasi fatali adventu solus evertit, sic T. Annius ad illam pestem comprimendam, extinguendam, funditus delendam natus esse videtur et quasi divino munere donatus rei publicae*).

14.6 ab hoc igitur viro quisquam bellum timet qui, ante quam nos id coacti suscepimus, in pace iacere quam in bello vigere maluit? Antonius had been provocative in his denunciation of Brutus and Cassius and had emphasized the threatening nature of the liberators’ intentions. In a letter to Antonius, dated to August 4, 44, Brutus and Cassius provide Antonius’ catalogue of protests levelled against them (*Fam. 11.3.2: nam de dilectibus habitis et pecuniis imperatis, exercitibus sollicitatis et nuntiis trans mare missis quod te questum esse negas, nos quidem tibi credimus optimo animo te fecisse sed tamen neque agnoscimus quicquam eorum*).

_igitur_ resumes Cicero’s line of thought regarding legionary allegiance from *Phil. 10.6.15*. Calenus sought to restrict the command given to Brutus, stating that the soldiers would be reluctant to fight for an assassin of Caesar. _quisquam_: By implication, _quisquam_ refers to Antonius’ supporters within the senate, with particular reference to Calenus whom Cicero had identified as the principal opponent of Brutus’ command at *Phil. 10.3.1* above. _id ... suscepimus_: Sc. the war with Antonius. The past tense is used to indicate that war already existed, despite the senate’s continued reluctance to confirm this. _in pace ... maluit_: *In pace iacere* forms an antithesis with *in bello vigere* in an *abab* pattern. Brutus’ own civic duties were preferred to a pre-eminence in war, particularly in light of his willingness to fulfil his praetorial duties (see *Phil. 10.7.8* n.). Cicero has already established Brutus’ martial qualities in order to present Brutus as the most capable representative of the *res publica*, but by
continually underplaying Brutus’ martial ambitions, Cicero attempts to allay accusations of hostile intent directed against the liberators. *vigere*: ‘Pre-eminently successful’ (*OLD* 2), but see Shackleton Bailey (1986: 259 n. 18) who suggests ‘something like “riding high”’.

14.7 *quamquam ille quidem numquam iacuit neque hoc cadere verbum in tantam virtutis praestantiam potest.* A life of indolence was regarded as contrary to human nature (so for example Sall. *BC* 2-3), and so Cicero qualifies his previous statement on Brutus’ inactivity through the figure of *correctio*, a figure in which a word or phrase is considered unsuitable and is immediately improved (see Lausberg § 784 on *correctio*).

14.9 *erat enim in desiderio civitatis, in ore, in sermone omnium; tantum autem aberat a bello ut, cum cupiditate libertatis Italia arderet, defuerit civium studiis potius quam eos in armorum discrimen abduceret.* Having established Brutus’ defensive imperative and his adherence to traditionally republican forms, Cicero turns to the purported support the liberators derived from the populace. *desiderio*: ‘A desire (for something lost or absent)’ (*OLD* 1). *in ore*: The phrase has an idiomatic meaning of ‘consensus’, or similar (L-S 1; cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.5 in which Cicero writes of the universal applause when news reached the senate that Brutus had secured an army in Greece: *qui ille nuntius, quae illae litterae, quae laetitia senatus, quae alacritas civitatis erat!*). *cum cupiditate libertatis Italia arderet*: *Italia* is personified and used to indicate a collective opposition to Antonius. That there was such collective opposition is indicated by the current levy throughout Italy in preparation for the imminent war with him. The emphasis on the individuality of Brutus is tempered by Cicero’s rhetoric that stresses collectivity and recognises Brutus as a liberator from tyranny. The allusion is potentially evocative of the assassination of Caesar, but Cicero is careful to show Brutus’ deference to the *res publica* and can thus avoid personalising the murder. Cicero had encountered difficulties in justifying the assassination of Caesar while attempting not to alienate himself from other Caesarians (Craig 1993: 151-153). Cicero thus avoids evoking the image of Caesar as an autocrat, while implying that Brutus, who had been unable to endure the tyranny under Caesar, would in no way endure a tyranny under Antony. *armorum*: Not just reference to civil conflict, but ‘arms as an instrument of policy’ (*OLD* 4). Cicero hints at another aspect of the general situation: the willingness of Brutus and Cassius to waive their
rights as praetors in exchange for concord (Vell. Pat. 2.62; Fam. 11.3.1). Thereby Cicero establishes the idea that the liberators preferred peace to (civil) war.

14.12 *itaque illi ipsi si qui sunt qui tarditatem Bruti reprehendent tamen idem moderationem patientiamque mirantur.* The criticism of Brutus’ *tarditatem* refers to his slowness in taking up arms, picking up on *defuerit civium studiis* in the previous statement. That Brutus had taken up arms at all provided Calenus with the argument that Brutus’ actions were unconstitutional, particularly given that the senate was left uninformed of Brutus’ intentions. Thus Calenus could present Brutus’ actions as making preparations for civil war, evident in the *refutatio* that follows. At *Ad Brut.* 1.2.1 Cicero commended Brutus for waiting at Dyrrachium with his troops. Yet, Cicero was not wholly consistent. By mid-June Cicero was appealing to Brutus (with urgency) to return to Rome with his army, lamenting the slowness with which he was acting, a slowness that Cicero had characterised within *Philippic* 10 as *patientia* (*Ad Brut.* 1.10.1). The appeal to Brutus to return forms a recurrent theme throughout the remaining correspondence with Brutus.

*Refutatio* (§§15.1 – 18.10)

The *refutatio* was that part of speech in which the orator attempted to weaken or disprove the *confirmatio* of his opponent, and together the two parts form the *argumentatio* of an oration (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.78; see pp. 78-82 above on the *confirmatio*). Cicero had argued in the *De Partitione Oratoria* that the success of the *refutatio* depended on refuting an opponent’s *sententia* by dealing with his arguments point by point (*Part.* 44; cf. *Inv. Rhet.* 1.78; *De Orat.* 2.331). It characteristically contained a greater degree of spontaneity and improvisation because of the immediate need to refute any opposing arguments and to illustrate why a particular course of action was undesirable. This is particularly relevant in *Philippic* 10, as Cicero spoke after Calenus in the sequence of debate. Similarly, the degree of preparation was curtailed by the improvisational nature required in one’s response.

Cicero’s *refutatio* is comparatively short in comparison with the *confirmatio*. More attention is given to proving the advantage and usefulness of Cicero’s own proposal than in showing Calenus’ proposal as being to the disadvantage of the *res publica*. Such an emphasis means that the *refutatio*, and in fact the speech as a whole,
contains little direct evidence for the line of argument Calenus pursued, and we are left to reconstruct possible objections through the content of the confirmatio. As Frisch noted, ‘it does not appear from Cicero’s refutation from which legal basis Calenus argued’. The structure of the refutatio accounts for this. Cicero’s general principle was to begin and end the refutatio with his strongest arguments, hiding the weaker points within this framework (Orat. 50; De Orat. 2.314). The structure of the refutatio here revolves around the central point of Calenus’ motion, that Brutus should be stripped of his command, and so Cicero disproportionately emphasizes aspects that undermine Calenus’ argument. The repeated emphasis upon Calenus’ poorly conceived sententia indicates that Cicero did not follow the order in which Calenus’ points were raised, preferring instead to illustrate generally the impracticality of Calenus’ advocacy. He thus avoids the recommended procedure of refuting an opponent’s points one by one. Cicero’s central concern is to refute the suggestion that the veterans would be unwilling to support an assassin of Caesar. But whether this was Calenus’ chief point of argument is unclear. Veteran allegiance is an argument to which Cicero repeatedly refers because the argument was easy to refute, by noting the ease with which Brutus had acquired the legions of the Balkans.

This question of veteran allegiance is carried through to §18. Cicero uses two arguments to refute the idea. Firstly, that there is no difference between Brutus’ army and the armies of Hirtius, Pansa, D. Brutus and Octavian. This justification is illustrated by the fact that D. Brutus, a leading conspirator, was being relieved at Mutina by republican forces led by the consuls and by Caesar’s heir, Octavian, and this was proof enough of the fallibility of Calenus’ sententia. The presentation is consistent with Cicero’s attempts at collapsing the distinction, employed elsewhere, between rigid Caesarian and Pompeian allegiances (cf. Phil. 13.42; cf. Welch 2002).

The refutatio concludes with the actions of the liberators themselves and their willingness to restore the benefits conferred upon the veterans in keeping with Caesar’s very own acta. Cicero argues that to have the senate’s resolutions determined by the veterans would be shameful and a form of slavery. Cicero’s tone is indignant at the suggestion and in order to illustrate the absurdity of the notion Cicero digresses on Rome’s traditional unwillingness to endure slavery, a digression which

---

178 Frisch 1946: 217.
179 Note the recurrence of the argument at Phil. 11.39.
provides a transition to the peroratio. For the refutatio in general see: Inv. Rhet. 1.78-96; Part. 44-51; Rhet. Her. 1.4; De Orat. 2.331; Quint. 3.9.5; 5.13.1-60.

(§§ 15.1-17.12) The current situation proves the flaw of Calenus’ objection

Cicero sets about refuting the argument of the legions’ unwillingness to support one of Caesar’s assassins. He argues that there is no difference between Brutus’ army and the armies under Hirtius, Pansa, D. Brutus and Octavian. These four armies are taking up the cause of liberty and are in the process of relieving D. Brutus, a co-conspirator, and his army from siege.

15.1  sed iam video quae loquantur; neque enim id occulte faciunt.  The phrasing draws attention to Cicero’s exaggerated sense of indignation through litotes. loquantur ... faciunt: The identity of those who say this is left non-specific. Cicero could anticipate possible objections from those who spoke after him and so pre-empts this by referring to any objections that might follow. The phrasing picks up on the illi ipsi from Phil. 10.14.14 and is not a response to an interjection, but rather Cicero uses the phrasing to inform the audience of others’ views (cf. similar rhetorical strategies at Phil. 7.3; 12.25). Rumours had been circulating that Octavian was espousing a hostile policy targeted against the liberators. Of concern were the rumours emanating from Octavian’s camp: ita multi circumstant, qui quidem nostris moritem minitantur (Att. 14.12.2 of April 22, 44; cf. Dio 45.12.2). Cicero was aware of the ambivalence of Octavian’s views, but regarded him as being unduly influenced by those who were attaching themselves to his cause. This ambivalence may have influenced Cicero in not identifying explicitly the illi ipsi.

15.2  timere se dicunt quo modo ferant veterani exercitum Brutum habere.  Cicero’s central concern in his refutatio is to refute the claim that the veterans would be unwilling to support an assassin of Caesar (repeated through Phil. 10.15-22). Frisch (1946: 217) writes ‘we can see the real difficulty against which Calenus must have warned them, viz. the aversion of the veterans to M. Brutus commanding an army, as the very name of M. Brutus was detested by the veterans’. There is evidence of some aversion to the liberators, but this has been overemphasized in our historical tradition. The spectacular success of Brutus in securing the legions of the east proves the assertion mistaken. Calenus must have alluded to the legions’ unwillingness to
follow an assassin of Caesar, although the more likely approach would have been to question the legality of Brutus’ actions (see Phil. 10.6.14 n.). Calenus’ speech at Dio 46.1-28 sheds some light through an emphasis upon legal claims. Dio makes no mention that the legions were hostile to the liberators because of a personal aversion, an argument which Cicero spends much of his speech in refuting (see comments by Millar 1961: 11-22; 1964: 52-54; Gowing 1992: 237-39). Calenus’ argument regarding the unwillingness of the legions to support a tyrannicide was perhaps not as compelling as Cicero suggests. On the contrary, Brutus’ army seems to have been well disposed towards its commander (Ad Brut. 1.2a.1: te benevolentiam exercitus equitumque expertum vehementer gaudeo). Nor did Brutus consider the question of legionary allegiance a determining factor when he requested aid from Cicero in acquiring reinforcements (Ad Brut. 2.3.5). Rather, Brutus recognized that the compelling motivation among the legionaries was monetary reward. He and Cassius were aware of the inducements being made by others to secure the allegiance of veterans, and protested: nam illud valde leve est ac nugatorium, ea re denuntiatum esse veterani quod de commodis eorum mense Iunio laturus esses (cf. Fam. 11.2.3; Phil. 1.6: veterani qui appellabantur, quibus hic ordo diligentissime caverat, non ad conservationem earum rerum quas habebant, sed ad spem novarum praedarum incitabantur). At Fam. 12.23.2 Cicero wrote of Antonius acquiring the support of the soldiers through largesse: ‘he intends to buy their goodwill’. Nor was Antonius alone in pecuniary inducement; at Att. 16.8.1 Cicero writes of Octavian winning the veterans at Casilinum and Calatia over to his views, ‘and no wonder since he gives them 500 denarii apiece’; cf. App. 3.40: ‘he first brought over those of Calatia and next those of Casilinum, two towns situated on either side of Capua, giving 500 drachmas to each man’. veterani: Shackleton Bailey (1986: 7 n. 12) has suggested that Cicero was critical of the appellation of veterani to Caesar’s soldiers alone, as opposed to all those in long service. That differentiation is not made here, as Cicero only deals with the veterans as a collective. However, Cicero identifies the veterani in particular as the source of disruption, and not any of the new recruits, because the veterani had a vested interest in land reform at the imminent end to their service (cf. Phil. 10.18.1 below). This emphasis, on the veterani, belies the greater number of new recruits enlisted by both sides in the conflict at Mutina (below Phil. 10.15.4).

15.4 quasi vero quicquam intersit inter A. Hirti, C. Pansae, D. Bruti, C. Caesaris et hunc exercitum M. Bruti. A. Hirti: Aulus Hirtius (RE 2). Hirtius was
praetor in 46 (MRR 2: 295); provincial governor of Gallia Narbonensis (MRR 2: 295); and was appointed consul for 43 according to Caesar’s *acta* (MRR 2: 334-336). He died from his wounds shortly after the battle of Mutina on 21 April. Cicero catalogues the forces available, through a descending hierarchy according to magisterial position, beginning with the consuls, the consul-designate, through to the newly legitimised position of Octavian. **A. Hirti ... exercitum M. Bruti:** By conflating the various armies Cicero refutes any suggestion of an ideological difference within the soldiery. The four armies that were to face Antonius at Mutina consisted of thirteen legions, a mixture of both veteran and new recruits, not all of which were actively engaged in the battles around Mutina. The phrasing is used for cumulative effect. Soon after the senate meeting on 1 January, the senate decreed that the consuls were to conduct a levy throughout all Italy, military exemptions were to be withdrawn and the consuls were to proceed north against Antonius (*Fam. 11.8.2; Phil. 7.4; 7.11; 7.13; Dio 46.29.5*). The consuls levied five legions, four of which were active at Mutina; the fifth, constituted a *legio urbana* and remained at Rome (*Fam. 10.30.1; App. 3.91; Brunt 1971: 481*). Four legions were with D. Brutus within Mutina. Of these, only one was a veteran legion, one was of two years service, and two were newly formed in anticipation of Antonius’ arrival. The new recruits were regarded by D. Brutus as being of questionable worth (*tironibus egentissimis*: *Fam. 11.19.1; cf. 10.3.3; App. 3.49; Botermann 1968: 71-2*). Octavian, when he arrived in Cisalpine Gaul, had five legions. These were immediately placed under Hirtius’ command when the latter arrived in January (App 3.65). The pick of these were the two Macedonian legions, the Martian and Fourth. Two more were under strength, drawn from the newly settled Gallic veterans of the Seventh and Eighth legions, who had been allocated land in the Campanian area (*Att. 16.8.1-2; Phil. 11.37; App. 3.40; Dio 45.12.2; How 1966: 546-550; Holmes 1928: 50*). The complement for the Seventh and Eighth was insufficient for legionary designation and required supplements of new recruits; Brunt (1971: 319; 481) has suggested that these supplements were considerable given that the Seventh and Eighth legions were settled primarily in transmarine colonies. To these may be added a fifth legion of new recruits (App. 3.47), and Octavian’s praetorian cohort, a bodyguard garnered from the Campanian veterans. The evident value of the new recruits was in their sheer numbers.

15.5 nam si quattuor exercitus ei de quibus dixi propterea laudantur quod pro populi Romani libertate arma ceperunt, quid est cur hic M. Bruti exercitus non
in eadem causa reponatur? D: ponatur; V: reponatur justified by Shackleton Bailey (1986) for its superior rhythm (a cretic + trochee): ponatur ‘numero minus bono’. Reponatur is also accepted by M-R. Magnaldi (2004: 220) questioned the unreliable criterion of clausula as a textual determinant and cites as a comparable example the occurrence of ponat for deponat at Phil. 5.3. However, I have accepted Shackleton Bailey’s emendation since it conveys the sense of ‘resting upon, or dependent upon’ (OLD 11b), consistent with Cicero’s assertion that the senate and people relied on the Bruti for the continuance of a free res publica. Similarly the prefix conveys a sense of repetition associated with Cicero’s portrayal of the familial line of the Bruti.

pro populi ... arma ceperunt: An antithesis is developed between Brutus taking up arms for the liberty of the res publica and Antonius who takes up arms against the res publica (cf. Phil. 8.33 in reference to the followers of Antonius: senatum existimaturum eum contra rem publicam fecisse). Land and money were the most compelling incentives for legionary support, although this is left unsaid throughout the oration because it fails to support Cicero’s ideological presentation of veteran allegiance (for the financial concerns of legionary commanders see Fam. 11.42.2; 12.30.4; Ad Brut. 2.3; Frisch 1946: 238-9). In July of 43, Cicero wrote of his dismay at the expense of the legions, claiming ‘impendent autem infiniti sumptus cum in hos exercitus quibus nunc defendimur tum vero in tuum’ (Ad Brut. 1.18.5). Brutus had little difficulty in securing the support of his legions, but it came at a cost (altera [pecunia] quo magis est necessaria, neque meo exercitui magis quam reliquorum, hoc magis doleo Asiam nos amisisse: Ad Brut. 2.3.5).

15.6 at enim veteranis suspectum nomen est M. Bruti? magisne quam Decimi? equidem non arbitror. D. Brutus had detractors, of which he was aware (sed, ut scribis, habes obtrectatores: Fam. 11.14.2; cf. 11.10.1; 11.11.2). Following Mutina, he mistakenly urged confidence in his armies and those of Plancus and Octavian (Fam. 11.23; 11.24). Plancus wrote to the magistrates, senate and people, professing the allegiance of his soldiery to the state: legiones habeo quinque sub signis et sua fide virtuteque rei publicae coniunctissimas et nostra liberalitate nobis obsequentes (Fam. 10.8.6). Yet within a month the Fourth and Martian legions were refusing to acknowledge D. Brutus as their commander, and Octavian was refusing to comply with the senate’s resolution that the armies, formerly under Hirtius and Pansa, be transferred to Decimus’ command (Fam. 11.19.1; App. 3.74; 3.76; Dio 46.40.1); and, irrevocably at Fam. 11.14.2: sed ut ad rem redeam, legionem Martiam et quartam...
negant qui illas norunt utta condicione ad te posse perduci. It is true that the soldiers under Octavian were refusing to go over to D. Brutus following Mutina, but according to Decimus they were also refusing to obey Octavian (Fam. 11.10.4). This indicates, not an ideological aversion, but an antipathy towards internecine conflict. **equidem** is emphatic, when used, as here, with the first person.

15.8 *etsi est enim Brutorum commune factum et laudis societas aqua*, Decimo tamen eo iratiores erant ei qui id factum dolebant quo minus ab eo rem illam dicebant fieri debuisse. Cicero places D. and M. Brutus together because of their shared involvement in the conspiracy and their descent from their eponymous ancestor, the first consul of Rome, L. Iunius Brutus (cf. Phil. 10.4-5). **Brutorum commune factum**: A deed shared by the Bruti. **societas**: A ‘partnership’, an association for a common purpose (*OLD* 1). Our sources are fairly uniform in treating Brutus and Cassius as the leaders of the conspiracy (App. 2.111; Plut. Brut. 13.3-11); only Nicolaus of Damascus (§19) attributes to D. Brutus a leading role. Reference to the tyrannicide is expressed through the depiction of an equal share in the deed and through equal praise of the deed, although Cicero avoids explicit mention of the assassination. Cicero responds with the assertion that of all the conspirators D. Brutus would bear the greater animosity because of his intimacy with Caesar, a view shared by Appian (2.111): ‘among the conspirators also was Decimus Brutus Albinus, one of Caesar’s dearest friends’). D. Brutus owed his position and honours to Caesar; he had served almost continuously under Caesar as a legate in Gaul, followed by the command of the fleet at Massilia in 49 (*MRR* 2: 267); he was consul-designate for the year 42 and was among Caesar’s secondary heirs: *nominavit Decimum Brutum etiam in secundis heredibus* (Suet. Jul. 83). A similar accusation was levelled against both Cassius and Brutus due to the clemency shown them by Caesar: ‘one ought to hate the man who plotted against him. I make this statement with a particular purpose: Marcus Brutus Caepio, who afterwards killed him, was not only captured by him but also spared’ (Dio 42.13.5; cf. comments by Gowing 1992: 165).

15.10 *quid ergo agunt nunc tot exercitus nisi ut obsidione Brutus liberetur? qui autem hos exercitus ducunt?* Two rhetorical questions switch the focus from D. Brutus to present events, while retaining the association of *libertas* with the Bruti. The change in the line of argument is indicated by Cicero’s decision to answer the second of his questions by moving away from any focus upon the assassination of Caesar. **autem** is adversative introducing a new line of argument. The phrasing is economical,
as Cicero establishes his argument through a series of reasoned conclusions (the figure of *ratiocinatio*). The repeated question and response, in addition to refuting individual points, gradually intensifies Cicero’s argument. The previous *quattuor exercitus* is now *tot exercitus* as Cicero collapses any distinction between the armies.

15.12 *ei, credo, qui C. Caesaris acta everti, qui causam veteranorum prodi volunt.*  
[res] acta[s] was retained by Shackleton Bailey, but is to be expunged from the text, as a gloss by a later hand but transmitted through *VD*, and emended by Pluylgers (1862: 55).  
*C. Caesaris acta:* On 17 March, in the temple of Tellus, a compromise was negotiated that recognized the validity of Caesar’s *acta*, including both those published and those yet to be published. These latter *acta* were, according to Antonius, intended at the time of Caesar’s death (*Phil.* 1.16-24; 2.100; App. 2.135). At the same time an amnesty was granted to Caesar’s assassins; an unusual solution that assured the liberators of their positions in accordance with Caesar’s nominations (*Phil.* 2.89-90; Plut. *Brut.* 19.1; Vell. Pat. 2.58.2-4; Dio 44.34.1; App. 2.122; Pelling 1988: 155). Antonius thus achieved a compromise of which Cicero approved for *concordiae causa* (*Phil.* 1.23; cf. 1.16; cf. App. 1.135). Antonius passed significant legislation following the Ides, by virtue of his possession of the *acta* of Caesar, but accusations quickly arose that he and his companions were profiteering from claims that were fraudulently ascribed to Caesar’s memoranda.  
*censam veteranorum:*  
The argument begins to move from the collective support for D. Brutus to the legislative abuses of Antonius’ consulship. The phrasing here is ironic, since the various commanders of the armies, sent to relieve D. Brutus, were clearly not at odds with Caesar’s veterans; rather they were intent upon upholding Caesar’s original *acta*. This refers in part to Caesar’s settlement programme in Campania which had begun with Caesar’s *lex agraria* of 59, and which was incomplete at the time of his death (Suet. *Iul.* 81.1; see *Phil.* 11.13.2 n. for the problem of land allocation for the veterans). However, *causam* is broader than this. It alludes to the settlement programme, but does not state it specifically. That leaves open the idea that the motive of the veterans is loyalty, and not self-interest. By leaving open the inference of *causam*, Cicero suppresses the veterans’ mercenary interest in land.

16.1 *si ipse viveret C. Caesar, acrius, credo, acta sua defenderet quam vir fortissimus defendit Hirtius, aut amicior causae quisquam inveniri potest quam filius!*  
Hirtius, an adjutant and admirer of Caesar, had distanced himself from Antonius’ machinations in the months following Caesar’s death. He remained aloof
until his term of office as consul began on 1 January 43, a position confirmed by Caesar’s *acta*. The focus on Hirtius and Octavian alone, and not Pansa, is because both Hirtius and Octavian were already marching north to Mutina. Pansa, the presiding magistrate of this meeting, did not set out until later in the month. *acta ... causae*: Alluding to the *causa veteranorum* of above. The *acta* and *causae* are fused here to convey a single idea. The Fourth and Martian legions were to receive the rewards in money and land that were promised them by Octavian (*Phil. 5.53-4*); thus the actions of Octavian could be shown as advantageous to the soldiers’ cause, although he was only adhering to the spirit of Caesar’s *acta* and not to any official authority. *fortissimus* is an attribute of Hirtius, while Octavian has the lesser attribute *amicior causae*. This hierarchical arrangement reflects the seniority of the former and Cicero’s assessment of the importance of Hirtius’ command.

16.3 *at horum alter nondum ex longinquitate gravissimi morbi recreatus quicquid habuit virium, id in eorum libertatem defendendam contulit quorum votis iudicavit se a morte revocatum; alter virtutis robore firmior quam aetatis cum istis ipsi veteranis ad D. Brutum liberandum est prefectus.*  

*ex longinquitate gravissimi morbi*: Hirtius had been suffering from an ongoing illness from which he never recovered (*Phil. 1.37; 7.12; 8.5; 14.4; *Fam. 12.22.2*). Its severity did not prevent him from fighting at Mutina. Nothing is known of any prayers (*votis*) for Hirtius’ recovery, although they were perhaps similar to those made for the recovery of Pompey (*Tusc. Disp. 1.86; Plut. *Pomp. 57*). *Votis* could refer to prayers to the gods for the granting of a favour (*OLD 2*), or merely a desire (*OLD 3*). The text does not supply the context. *virtutis robore*: A comparison is made between the youth of Octavian and the *virtus* of Hirtius proven by his ability to endure hardship. The presentation of Octavian’s youth is downplayed through the metaphor of *robur* which is used both in the idea of strength and as ‘a characteristic of mature years’ (*OLD 5b*). Octavian makes up the physical vigour Hirtius lacks. Between them they have *virtus* and *robur*. *cum ... D. Brutum liberandum*: The phrasing is emphatic as Cicero lingers over the demonstratives (*istis ipsi*) and the collocation of *veteranis ad D. Brutum*.

16.7 *ergo illi certissimi idemque acerrimi Caesaris actorum patroni pro D. Bruti salute bellum gerunt, quos veterani sequuntur; de libertate enim populi Romani, non de suis commodis armis decernendum vident.* Cicero plays on the name Brutus. He implies the name Brutus is not viewed with suspicion since the
whole Mutina campaign is in defence of a Brutus. The narrative is being developed around individuals appointed according to Caesar's acta. These legitimately appointed individuals provide the impetus for the veterans to follow. The veterans are now the subject of vident. Cicero elevates the motives of the veterans from self-interest (suis commodis) to public service (libertate populi Romani). ergo resumes the train of argument concerning the actions of Hirtius and Octavian. Caesaris actorum: Cicero repeatedly accused Antonius of violating Caesar’s original acts (Phil. 5.8; for a collection of the sources see MRR 2: 315-16). The veterans lend their support for less specific reasons, but ostensibly for the safety of D. Brutus and, by inference, for the Roman people.

17.1 quid est igitur cur eis qui D. Brutum omnibus opibus conservatum velint M. Bruti sit suspectus exercitus? This is the first of a series of three rhetorical questions through which Cicero illustrates the absurdity of his opposition’s objections. There is some indication of a perceived threat regarding the plans of the liberators but this is not refuted in any detail within Cicero’s oration despite the anxieties that Antonius would fuel regarding the liberators’ intentions (cf. Antonius’ comments at Phil. 13.25-6). This was not helped by the liberators’ failure to inform the senate of their intentions in the east. Despite this failure, Brutus and Cassius were careful to avoid offending republican sensibilities through a very public campaign advertising their desire to avoid civil war (Fam. 11.2; see introduction p. 6).

17.3 an vero, si quid esset quod a M. Bruto timendum videretur, Pansa id non videret, aut, si videret, non laboraret? So Pansa is added to Hirtius and Octavian as implicitly not suspecting Brutus of any ulterior motives. However, in private, Pansa would soon express some hesitation about the growing strength of the liberators:
tantum enim abest ut Pansa de exercitu suo aut dilectu tibi aliquid tribuat ut etiam moleste ferat tam multos ad te ire voluntarios ... autem multi suspicantur, quod ne te quidem nimis firmum esse velit (Ad Brut. 2.4.4).

17.4 quis aut sapientior ad coniecturam rerum futurarum aut ad propulsandum metum diligentior? The last rhetorical question continues to praise Pansa, with a hyperbolic devotion in protecting the state. Chiasmus completes the symmetry of the isocolon. The two comparatives (sapientior and diligentior) frame the two purpose clauses.

17.6 atqui huius animum erga M. Brutum studiumque vidistis. Pansa had approved of Brutus’ actions and had indicated his support for Brutus’ actions in the
opening of the debate (cf. Phil. 10.1.1 above). animum: ‘Feelings towards others’ (OLD 9c) becomes studium, stronger in sense than animum.

17.7 praecipit oratone sua quid decernere nos de M. Bruto, quid sentire oporteret, tantumque afuit ut periculosum rei publicae M. Bruti putaret exercitum ut in eo firmissimum rei publicae praesidium et gravissimum poneret. Cicero returns to the fact of Pansa’s support for Brutus’ actions and acknowledges Pansa’s own preferred response as being beneficial to the res publica. Pansa provided the direction which Cicero supports through an emphasis upon necessity. Cicero’s assertion provides a summary of Pansa’s opening address. Firstly, Pansa had indicated his support for Brutus to command and had advised the senate to follow this particular course of action, expressed through a verb of obligation (opporteret) and two dependent infinitives. Secondly, the phrasing indicates that Pansa had advocated the command despite concerns of a perceived threat to the res publica, picking up on a line of argument at Phil. 10.17.1 above. During a session of the senate, the presiding magistrate introduced the subject for debate (the relatio), accompanied by an explanation or discussion regarding the direction he wished the debate to take (see pp. 159-161 below). Cicero reiterates Pansa’s relatio in order to reaffirm his support of Pansa’s point of view. Cicero had little command over the current debate, or in fact, any of the debates within the senate throughout the period of the Philippics; he was never called on to speak first. Cicero is therefore constantly either responding or giving support to the presiding magistrate, or another consular who spoke before him. In the current debate, Cicero is affirming his support of Pansa’s relatio (for Cicero’s less than dominant place within the debate see Evans 2008: 78-81). decernere becomes sentire, which forms a more emphatic assertion. periculosum ...

praesidium: Cicero creates an antithesis between the terms, expressed through alliteration. The two superlatives (firmissimum and gravissimum) frame the rei publicae praesidium with rhyming polysyllabic words of identical rhythm.

17.9 scilicet hoc Pansa aut non videt – hebeti enim ingenio est – aut neglegit: quae enim Caesar egit, ea rata esse non curat: de quibus confirmandis et sanciendis legem comitiis centuriatis ex auctoritate nostra laturus est. scilicet ...

... aut neglegit: The phrasing is heavily ironic. de quibus confirmandis ... laturus est: Antonius’ legislative abuses form a recurrent point of attack through the Philippics as Cicero had argued that the people were not bound by laws passed in violence and against the auspices (Phil. 12.12: senatus consulta falsa delata ab eo
iudicavimus: num ea vera possimus iudicare? leges statuimus per vim et contra auspicia latas eisque nec populum nec plebem teneri: num eas restitui posse censetis?; cf. Phil. 5.10; 5.21; 6.14; 11.13; Asc. Pro Corn. 69c). Cicero’s introductory remarks, concerning Caesar’s acta as a whole, are without any detail of specific law or violation. It was not Cicero’s intention to cover familiar ground or to provide the legal principle behind the annulment in this context, but rather to politicize the legal and augural terminology in order to illustrate Antonius’ disregard of the auspices and to illustrate Pansa’s actions in his guidance of the state. Cicero presented the grounds for annulment as a series of violations of legal procedure, although the specific grounds for annulment are rather confused in Cicero’s account of Antonius’ abuses, particularly through Philippic 5 where Cicero proposed the annulment of Antonius’ legislation.

The lex Antonia agraria and the lex de provinciis consularibus, concerning the establishment of a commission for land distribution and provincial allocation, passed in early June, had been rushed and irregular, violating the Lex Caecilia and Didia of 98 and 62 respectively by the failure to post the bill three days before summoning the assembly: ubi Lex Caecilia et Didia, ubi promulgatio trinum nundinum? (Phil. 5.8; Ramsey 2002: 123; Ogilvie 1965: 459-60). The legislation had been passed at night, an action which, according to Varro, rendered any statute invalid (Gell. 14.7.8; cf. Phil. 3.26). Arms had been used to intimidate the electoral process (Phil. 1.25; 2.19; 2.108-9; Polverini 1964: 241-8, 248 with n. 41; Lintott 1968: 132-48). And thunder had been heard rendering the meeting null, as it violated the auspices (Phil. 5.7: hic omnem Italiam moderato homini, L. Antonio, dividendam dedit. quid? hanc legem populus Romanus accepit, quid? per auspicia ferri potuit? silet augur verecundus sine collegis de auspiciis. quamquam illa auspicia non egent interpretatione; iove enim tonante cum populo agi non esse fas quis ignorant?). A lex passed in violation of the auspices was a lex passed in fault (lex vitio lata: see Linderski 1986: 2204 for the term). The violations allowed for the abrogation of Antonius’ legislation because legislation passed in vitio was not binding upon the Roman people (iis legibus populum non teneri). Vitium could result from a simple mistake, but Cicero’s emphasis is explicit in highlighting a much more significant threat, namely the total disregard of law and contempt for the auspices. This reflects a greater concern to illustrate the consistency of Antonius’ legislative violations in order to undermine any legal basis to Antonius’ claims. The lex agraria was abolished on the motion of L.
Caesar during the first days of January (Phil. 6.14). A more general annulment of Antonius’ laws occurred some time shortly before delivery of Philippic 10 in early February (Phil. 5.10; 5.16; 5.21; 6.14-15; 11.13; 12.11-12; 13.5; 13.31; 13.5; 13.37; 14.5; Manuwald 2007: 627-8; 799-800; Novielli 2001: 70; Rawson 1992b: 481; Lintott 1999: 135; 1968: 147-8; Heikkilä 1993: 141-142; Burkhardt 1988: 233; Linderski 1986: 2162-8; Frisch 1946: 184; 210-211; Syme 1939: 168; T. Rice Holmes 1928: 45-46; Sternkopf 1912: 146-151). \textit{sanciendis:} Used specifically in enacting a law (\textit{OLD} 2). \textit{laturus est:} The need thus arose to pass Caesar’s legislation anew, in accordance with Caesar’s original intentions, and through correct procedure in order that the \textit{acta} be binding upon the people. Among Antonius’ statutes were the \textit{lex Antonia de actis Caesaris confirmandis}, the abolition of the dictatorship with the \textit{dictatura in perpetuum tollenda}, a third panel of jurors comprising centurions without property qualification, and an appeal court for those facing convictions \textit{de vi} and \textit{de maiestate}. To these were added the measures which Antonius claimed were derived from Caesar’s unpublished memoranda: the recall of exiles, the enfranchisement of Sicily; restoration to the Galatian king, Deiotarus, of lands which had been taken from him by Caesar, the lifting of the \textit{vectigalia} from Crete and placing an end to its provincial status (see \textit{MRR} 2: 316 for a list of the principal sources). These, it was said, were brought about through huge bribes (Att. 12.12.1; Phil. 2.95). Even more controversial was Antonius’ reallocation to himself of the province of Cisalpine Gaul, on 1 June, a province allocated to D. Brutus according to Caesarian designation and so a violation of the compromise reached on 17 March (\textit{Fam.} 11.1; 12.1.1; \textit{Att.} 14.13.2; 15.4.1; Vell. Pat. 2.60.5; Suet. Aug. 10.2; App. 2.113; 2.124; 3.6). The manipulation of Caesar’s \textit{acta} prompted a senatorial enquiry, in June 44, charged with investigating Caesar’s memoranda (\textit{Fam.} 11.20; 11.21; Lacey 1986: 13). Possibly the commission was set up to frustrate, or at least impede Antonius from passing any further fraudulent legislation. The precise terms of reference for the commission are, however, unknown and this has prompted much speculation. Frisch (1946: 184) saw the establishment of the commission as a response to the dispossession of land belonging to wealthy land owners (cf. Phil. 6.14). Rice Holmes (1928: 212) and T-P (6: 241) viewed the commission as appointed for reviewing land allocation, while Shackleton Bailey has widened the possible terms of reference for the commission arguing that land relocation was not the primary sphere for investigation, but rather
only one possible component of the investigation into Caesar's *acta* (*Fam.* 11.20.1; 11.21.5; Shackleton Bailey 1977: 541).

Pansa's renewal of Caesar's legislation was yet to be brought before the assembly. Pansa was to re-propose provisions of the land reform through the curiate assembly, in accordance with Caesar's *acta*, in order to rectify the illegitimate passage of Antonius’ legislation (Frisch 1946: 184). We know that Pansa annulled Antonius’ veteran settlement and set provisions for a new settlement programme before Cicero’s delivery of *Philippic* 13, delivered on March 20 (*Phil.* 13.31). The details of this new settlement programme reaffirming Caesar's *acta* are not clear. Pansa’s law reconfirmed land distribution for the veteran soldiers, but only for those who fought on the side of the senate at Mutina and its surrounds (*Phil.* 7.10; 11.37). Generally, Cicero does not choose to depict those soldiers serving with Antonius as being led astray, but rather they are abettors and companions to his crime and consequently disqualified from receiving their entitlements (cf. *Ad Brut.* 9.3.5). Their departure with Antonius from Rome provided an opportunity for Cicero to disenfranchise them rhetorically and thus deny them a share in any land settlement. Those who followed Antonius were not to be regarded as citizens of Rome and consequently they disqualified themselves from obtaining any such allocations.

(§§17.13-18.10) The argument for legionary reluctance is a pretence, attributable to fear and cowardice.

Cicero approaches a contentious subject, a subject that appears as Calenus’ central argument. Cicero maintains that the legions must be abettors of liberty, and Calenus must stop using them as a pretext in hampering resistance to servitude under Antonius. The veterans have taken up arms, excited by the desire for liberty. Cicero states that should the veterans attempt to determine senatorial policy then death would be preferable. All Italy is desirous of liberty (§19). Cicero passes on to a passage of praise for Rome’s unwillingness to bear servitude of any sort (§20). The tempo of the speech builds as Cicero begins to enumerate the forces rising in opposition to Antonius. The Fourth and Martian legions have followed Octavian’s lead in resisting Antonius, while the armies of Hirtius and Pansa are likewise ready to meet Antonius (§21). Concordant with the increase in tempo is the accumulation of rhetorical
questions, and these are amassed, not to provide information or lead the argument in a particular direction, but to express amazement and anger at Antonius’ outrages.

17.13 *desinant igitur aut ei qui non timent simulare se timere et prospicere rei publicae, aut ei qui omnia verentur nimia esse timidi, ne illorum simulatio, horum obsit ignavia.* ‘Let those who are not afraid stop pretending they are, and pretending that they care for the *res publica*, or those who are overly timid cease to be so, lest the insincerity of the former, or the cowardice of the latter hinder everything’. The ‘fear’ is of the veterans’ displeasure. Cicero hints this fear is either pretence for political reasons, or unnecessary panic. The assertion picks up on the argument introduced at *Phil.* 10.15.2 regarding the veterans’ opposition to the liberators (*timere se dicunt*), yet here the dissimulation of those raising the objection is no longer hinted at, but explicitly stated. The phrasing is repeated in Cicero’s criticism of the senate’s failure to pursue a more active strategy following D. Brutus’ relief from siege and suggests dissimulation. Those within the senate who were prepared to pursue a more active resistance to Antonius were attributed a more heroic characterisation: *senatus autem, mi Brute, fortis est et habet fortis duces. itaque moleste ferebat se a te, quem omnium quicumque fuissent fortissimum iudicaret, timidum atque ignavum iudicari* (*Fam.* 11.18.1).

18.1 *quae malum! est ista ratio semper optimis causis veteranorum nomen opponere?* Calenus again took this line of argument at the meeting at which Cicero delivered *Philippic* 11 (*Phil.* 11.37-39), and may have been articulating genuine concerns regarding veteran sympathies. The reference clearly indicates the topicality of the veterans’ concerns which Cicero continually diminishes.

18.2 *quorum etiam si amplecterer virtutem, ut facio, tamen, si essent adrogantes, non possem ferre fastidium.* Cicero has shifted the focus away from Calenus to the attitude of the veterans by contrasting the *virtus* and *fastidium* of the veterans here. *fastidium*: Cf. *Agr.* 1.20 where *fastidium* is used synonymously with *superbia*.

18.4 *at nos conantis servitutis vincla rumpere impediet si quis veteranos nolle dixerit?* Cicero’s argument shifts here from a) the veterans are not hostile to Brutus to b) it is up to the senate, not the veterans to decide policy. The shift from first person singular to plural is noteworthy, and used as an indignant exhortation for a collective
response to the demands of the veterans. *quis* implies Calenus. The passage is marked by an increasingly emotive tone.

18.5 *non sunt enim, credo, innumerabiles qui pro communi libertate arma capiant! nemo est praeter veteranos milites vir qui ad servitutem propulsandam ingenuo dolore excitetur!* ‘there is no man, except the veteran soldiers, who is roused by a free-born anguish for throwing off servitude!’ The phrasing is ironic; it expresses the opposite of Cicero’s view. *innumerabiles*: In contrast to Calenus’ argument, Cicero enthusiastically reported that large numbers were voluntarily enlisting, motivated by their desire for liberty and the desire to resist servitude: *non dilectus necessitate sed voluntariis studiis se ad rem publicam contulerunt* (Phil. 11.24; cf. *Fam.* 11.8.2; *Ad Brut.* 2.4.4). *pro communi libertate*: Cf. *Phil.* 10.15.6 above; *Rab.* *Perd.* 27.5. *veteranos*: A non-specific reference to the veterans, but Cicero could point to the Fourth and Martian legions who first defied Antonius: *quae [sc. legio Martia] cum hostem populi Romani Antonium iudicasset, comes esse eius amentiae noluit: reliquit consulem; quod profecto non fecisset, si eum consulem iudicasset quem nihil aliud agere, nihil moliri nisi caedem civium atque interitum civitatis videret* (*Phil.* 3.6).

18.7 *potest igitur stare res publica freta veteranis sine magno subsidio iuventutis!* The *res publica* is personified and so Cicero can attribute his own view to the *res publica* itself. *iuventutis*: Cicero downplays the importance of the veterans, by pointing to the newly recruited soldiers in the senatorial armies. The *veterani* were now not the only defenders of *libertas*. The *iuvenes* were men of military age and specifically the new recruits. Cicero is playing on the opposite meanings of *veterani* and *iuvenes* in his catalogue of those about to engage with Antonius. The new recruits however played little role in the battles at Mutina. The four legions of new recruits under Pansa were left to guard their camp, some 25 kilometres southeast along the *via Aemilia*. Two of these legions were summoned only after the battle had begun (*Fam.* 10.30.3). They were no match for the veterans (*App.* 3.67). For an eyewitness account of the battle see Galba’s letter to Cicero (*Fam.* 10.30), and for a modern account see Frisch 1946: 267-277.

18.8 *quos quidem vos libertatis adiutores complecti debitis: servitutis auctores sequi non debitis.* Cicero implies that should the senate be compelled to follow the dictates of the veterans it would be the same as being compelled by any tyrant. Cicero’s exhortatory tone shifts to the second person as he addresses the senate as a
whole. debetis: The homoeoteleuton of debetis reinforces the idea of necessity over two antithetical statements. Cicero will illustrate the support the Fourth and Martian legions have provided to the res publica over the following section.

(§§19.1-19.7) Slavery is not to be endured.

As Cicero draws his speech to a close he concludes with an emotive climax on Rome’s tradition of resistance to tyranny. The intensification in tone marks a change in style. The sentence length, over the following section is longer than the preceding sections, irony is no longer employed and word play is now avoided. Moral indignation is notable as Cicero’s themes have become increasingly elevated and placed within the broader context of Rome’s history.

19.1 postremo - erumpat enim aliquando vera et me digna vox - si veteranorum nutu mentes huius ordinis gubernantur omniaque ad eorum voluntatem nostra dicta facta referuntur, optanda mors est, quae civibus Romanis semper fuit servitute potior. postremo introduces a final comment on Rome's inability to tolerate tyranny of any sort. The emphasis on servitude and the Roman abhorrence of political servitude has been made explicit through the repeated reference to the exemplum of Brutus, and then broadened to reflect a national character trait of all Romans. Cicero personalizes the idea in himself as speaker (me). This character trait is most clearly expressed by Brutus and he provides the ideological impetus towards resisting Antonius. There is an implicit comparison between the legitimate and authoritative leadership of the senate, particularly by its senior members, and that of the capricious dominance of the veterans. erumpat...

vox: The phrasing pretends to be a spontaneous outburst. mentes: Used in the sense of ‘intentions’ (OLD 7). gubernantur: The metaphor dates back to Greek poetry (see Page 1955: 182 for references), but is particularly liked by Cicero who uses it extensively. A gubernaculum was the steering-oar of a ship, used in a figurative sense to illustrate “the helm of “the ship of state” (OLD 1b). optanda mors est: The emotive climax is achieved through Cicero’s assertion that he would prefer death to servitude. The phrasing is dramatic, elevating the conflict to a life and death struggle, an argument that is used elsewhere within the Philippics (cf. Phil. 2.119; 8.29). Death is unavoidable, while the struggle for libertas, despite its hardships, distinguishes
Rome from all other nations. The language recalls the characterisation of Hirtius (from Phil. 10.16.3 above) who, despite the seriousness of his illness, seeks to defend libertas. Cicero’s contemplation of death was very much in mind through this period as a response to the political situation (cf. Att. 14.19.1; 14.21.3; see also Shackleton Bailey 1967: 235).

19.4 omnis est misera servitus; sed fuerit quaedam necessaria: ecquodnam principium ponetis libertatis capessendae? The evocation of Caesar, not explicit, but increasingly clear in the following sentence, serves as a reminder of Brutus’ role in the tyrannicide (cf. Phil. 3.29). misera is emotive in sense as opposed to specifically social or financial (OLD 2: ‘attended by misery’). quaedam necessaria: An allusion to Caesar’s dictatorship. Cicero was not involved in the conspiracy but was one of its staunchest supporters in the year following Caesar’s death. He was not alone in seeing his political freedom curtailed by Caesar and was vocal in calling for an end to any remnants of servitude. The phrasing is perhaps in gentle imitation of Brutus’ speech delivered against Pompey: quale apud Brutum de dictatura Cn. Pompei: XCV. "praestat enim nemini imperare quam alicui servire: sine illo enim vivere honeste licet, cum hoc vivendi nulla condicio est" (Quint. 9.3.95).

Cicero avoids naming Caesar in order to avoid any direct judgement of Caesar’s autocratic position. The focus is not Caesar, but Antonius. Similarly, Cicero omits mention of Caesar in order to avoid any ambiguity with Octavian (called ‘Caesar’ throughout), whose involvement in the resistance to Antonius is notable in the following section. principium ponetis: Cicero is appealing for assertive action, that is, a declaration of war against Antonius.

19.5 an, cum illum necessarium et fatalem paene casum non tulerimus, hunc feremus voluntarium? an introduces the second alternative question, a suggested answer to the first. necessarium implies an autocracy that was unassailable. fatalem paene casum: The similar phrasing at Phil. 6.19 is used within the same context of Caesar’s dominance. The use of fatalem casum avoids attributing a role to anyone who may have assisted Caesar in his monopoly of office, and describes Caesar’s autocratic position as one determined by causes external to the current situation, in contrast to Antonius’ aspirations to a tyranny which was yet able to be thwarted. non tulerimus: An allusion to the assassination itself.
(§§19.8-20.14) Exhortation to the recovery of freedom.

Following Cicero’s impassioned refusal to submit to the will of the legions and so a form of slavery, Cicero turns to an exhortation to the recovery of freedom. The language structure becomes increasingly complex as Cicero appeals to an elevated and traditional set of Roman values.

19.8 tota Italia desiderio libertatis exarsit; servire diutius non potest civitas; serius populo Romano hunc vestitum atque arma dedimus quam ab eo flagitati sumus. The tone is impassioned. The colourful language (exarsit), the chiastic arrangement and the personification of Italia invigorate the tone with a sense of collectivity in the response against Antonius. tota Italia: The phrasing of tota Italia is used repeatedly to emphasise the collective (cf. e.g. Phil. 3.32: Italia tota ad libertatem recuperandam excitata; cf. Phil. 4.9; 6.18; 13.39). It is an exaggeration that allows Cicero to play up the rhetoric of consensus by avoiding reference to a specific body. desiderio libertatis exarsit: This phrase echoes the last two words of Philippic 4 (ad spem libertatis exarsimus), a particularly emotive call to arms. Cicero was fond of the metaphor, applying it in a number of contexts (cf. Phil. 12.7; 11.3). populo Romano: As distinct from tota Italia, as Cicero focuses his call to arms upon his immediate audience. vestitum refers to the sagum or military cloak. The saga was a woollen cloak used most frequently by soldiers (L-S 1). Metaphorically the saga was a sign of war to be worn also by those not going into battle. Cicero usually prefers to use saga as an indicator of his resistance to Antonius (Phil. 5.31; 6.2; 6.9; 6.16; 7.21; 12.16). Consulares were exempt from wearing a sagum, so when Cicero specifically mentions that he also wears the sagum he gives emphasis to the perils directed against the state and his willingness to face them (Phil. 8.32). Vestitum is used both literally and metaphorically. The doubling of vestitum and arma is synonymia given that sagum is the garment implied. flagitati is used to describe Cicero’s own impulse at Phil. 5.11.

20.1 magna quidem nos spe et prope explorata libertatis causam suscepimus; sed ut concedam incertos exitus esse belli Martemque communem, tamen pro libertate vitae periculo decertandum est. Libertas is stressed, but its acquisition necessarily involves the risk of death. Verbal use moves from first person plural (suscepimus), to first person singular (concedam) to the impersonal gerundive
(decertandum). Through the shift in person Cicero subordinates individual interests to the interests of the res publica. The phrasing recalls Cicero’s praise of Ser. Sulpicius Rufus for his involvement on the embassy to M. Antonius; despite ill health Rufus set out because he preferred to serve the res publica even if it cost him his life: ceteri qui in legatione mortem obierunt ad incertum vitae periculum sineullo mortis metu profecti sunt: Ser. Sulpicius cum aliqua perveniendi ad M. Antonium spe profectus est, nulla revertendi (Phil. 9.2). Martemque communem is proverbial (Shackleton Bailey 1986: 263 n. 21; cf. Hom. ll. 18.309; Verr. 2.5.132; Mil. 56; Fam. 6.4.1; Liv. 5.12.1; Sen. Dial. 3.12.5).

20.3 non enim in spiritu vita est, sed ea nulla est omnino servienti. Cicero implicitly defines life as libertas. Cf. Marc. 28.1: nec vero haec tua vita ducenda est quae corpore et spiritu continetur: illa, inquam, illa vita est tua quae vigebit memoria saeculorum omnium, quam posteritas alet, quam ipsa aeternitas semper tuebitur.

20.4 omnes nationes servitatem ferre possunt, nostra civitas non potest, nec ullam aliquam ob causam nisi quod illae laborem doloremque fugiunt, quibus ut careant omnia perpeti possunt, nos ita a maioribus instituti atque imbuti sumus ut omnia consilia atque facta ad dignitatem et ad virtutem referremus. A contrast between omnes nationes and nostra civitas is set up in order to motivate Cicero’s senatorial audience. The broadest categories of mankind (omnes nationes) give way in the final clause to personal qualities implicit within the character of the Roman people. Rome’s unwillingness to endure slavery forms a reiteration of an argument at Phil. 6.19: aliae nationes servitatem pati possunt, populi Romani est propria libertas. The preference of death to servitude is a repeated call to arms (cf. Phil. 2.113-14; 3.29; 3.34-36; 7.14; 8.29; 11.24-25; 12.2; 13.7); and coincident with Off. 1.81: sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servitutiturpitudinique anteponenda. Servitutem includes the sense of political servitude (OLD 2; cf. Liv. 8.4.2). Laborem doloremque: A frequent pairing, prevalent within Cicero’s philosophical writings. At Tusc. 2.35 they are defined and their relationship clarified: sunt finitima omnino, sed tamen differunt aliquid. labor est functio quaedam vel animi vel corporis gravioris operis et muneris, dolor autem motus asper in corpore, alienus a sensibus. Together these characterise fortitudo (cf. Tusc. 5.41; Off. 3.117). At Fin. 1.24 there is greater political significance as all labor and dolor are endured for the sake of the res publica: sed ut omittam pericula, labores, dolorem etiam, quem optimus quisque pro patria et pro suis suscipit. Nos
... a maioribus instituti atque imbuti: Cicero uses Rome's past to support his argument, since the mos maiorum is specifically Roman. The actions of Brutus and his ancestors are again suggested. By broadening the scope of the individual in order to relate it to a much broader perspective Cicero implicitly justifies tyrant slaying. The idea of instituti a maioribus is not exclusively applied to Rome, but only Rome was unaccustomed to political servitude. Cicero gained some mileage in laying claim to the Roman refusal to accept servitude, particularly when Brutus was involved. At Off. 1.116 Cicero noted that ancestral pre-eminence in a particular field provided a spur for future progeny to pursue the same field. The use of the first person plural is inclusive of all senators and readers. consilia atque facta ad dignitatem et ad virtutem referremus: The phrasing forms a type of parison in an aabb pattern. The doubling of near-synonymous words is done for grand effect: instituit/ imbuti, consilia/ facta, ad dignitatem/ ad virtutem. Dignitas and virtus here are implicitly identified with libertas. Cicero was not alone in feeling that his own dignitas had been mocked by Caesar and that his role within the state, his honores and vitae statum, had been deprived when he lost his place within a free res publica (Fam. 10.4.1; Att. 9.6a; 9.9.3; Brunt 1986: 15-16).

20.8 ita praecella est recuperatio libertatis ut ne mors quidem sit in repetenda libertate fugienda. Cf. the end of Philippic 2 where Cicero also claimed that he placed the freedom of the republic before his own life; cf. Phil. 11.19.1 n.

20.10 quod si immortalitas consequeretur praesentis periculi fugam, tamen eo magis [ea] fugienda videretur quo diuturnior servitus esset. The language rises to a dramatic crescendo. Ker notes that this alludes to Hom. ll. 12.322. Cicero’s point is that immortality has no value unless accompanied by libertas. It is easier to meet the peril now than to allow it to develop and impose the types of conditions that were experienced under Caesar.

20.12 cum vero dies et noctes omnia nos undique fata circumstent, non est viri minimeque Romani dubitare eum spiritum quem naturae debeat patriae reddere. The sentiment is expressed in hyperbole: ‘not even a man, let alone a Roman man’. cum vero introduces an expected objection to a Roman’s willingness to endure tyranny. The particles allow a climax to build. fata: ‘day and night we are faced with all manner of ruin’, and not ‘all manner of chances surround us’ (Ker’s translation). Fata is used as a metonym for something far more menacing, ‘destruction, ruin’ (OLD 6). spiritum recalls non in spiritu vita est from §20.2
above. **quem naturae debeat patriae reddere:** Cf. the phrasing at *Rep.* 1.4: *adiunguntur pericula vitae, turpisque ab his formido mortis fortibus viris opponitur, quibus magis id miserum videri solet, natura se consumi et senectute, quam sibi dari tempus, ut possint eam vitam, quae tamen esset reddenda naturae, pro patria potissimum reddere.* Cicero uses the language of debt and repayment to express a moral obligation to the *patria.*

(§21.1-21.7) The legions are amassing themselves against Antonius.

Having established a context of resisting any attempt at servitude, Cicero turns from his excursus on the Roman character back to a narrative of events.

### 21.1 concurritur undique ad commune incendium restinguendum; veterani qui primi Caesaris auctoritatem secuti conatum Antoni reppulerunt; post eiusdem furorem Martia legio fregit, Quarta adflixit.

The fire metaphor is again picked up from *Phil.* 10.11.1 above. Alliteration of ‘c’ produces a rushing effect before pausing and lingering over the heavy clausula at *incendium restinguendum.*

**veterani ... primi:** Cicero now distinguishes the *veterani* from the Martian and Fourth legions, in order to illustrate a clear sequence of events. Octavian had begun agitating for support and had success in attracting considerable support from among Caesar’s veterans in Campania (*Att.* 16.8.1; 16.11.6; *Phil.* 3.3; 4.1-3; 5.23; Vell. Pat. 2.61.1; *Liv.* *Per.* 117; App. 3.40; Dio. 45.12). The phrasing is a repetition from *Phil.* 10.11.1 above. **Caesaris auctoritatem secuti:** On 9 October, Antonius set off for Brundisium to meet the four Macedonian legions which he intended to consolidate his position. Upon arrival he found that agents from Octavian had been tampering with the legions’ loyalty through pecuniary inducement (*App.* 3.40; Antonius’ counter offers merely provoked laughter among the soldiers for the poverty of his largesse). Antonius responded to the fractious troops by having his military tribunes draw up a list of the seditious centurions whom he then executed at Brundisium; while at Suessa, executions were carried out against those accused of attempting his assassination (*Att.* 16.8; *Phil.* 3.10; 4.4; 5.22; 13.18; *App.* 3.43; Dio 45.13.2; 45.35.3; Manuwald 2007: 358-9). Without Octavian’s intervention in soliciting the support of the Martian and Fourth legions Antonius would have returned to Rome with the intention of purging his political opponents, or so Cicero extrapolates from Antonius’ executions at
Brundisium and Suessa. conatum: Conatum, in a pejorative sense, is usually in the plural (OLD), but in the current context Cicero refers specifically to Antonius’ plan to return to Rome and suppress his political opposition (Fam. 12.23.2). This plan of Antonius is one that Cicero enjoyed retelling with rhetorical embellishment (Phil. 3.10; 4.4; 5.23; 13.18). We might expect that this fear of Antonius returning at the head of his legions was exaggerated, but Hirtius too had expressed caution, warning Cicero that he feared Antonius’ designs regarding any who were not Caesarian (Att. 15.5.2-3). fregit and adflixit are used emotively to refer to the defections of the Fourth and Martian legions in November, and their refusal to follow Antonius’ march on Rome. Cicero claimed the actions of the Fourth and Martian legions, who had mutinied and allied themselves with Octavian, had broken Antonius’ resolve to return to Rome in order to eliminate his political opponents. In private Cicero was less effusive: veteranos qui <sunt> Casilini et Calatiae perduxit [sc. Octavianus] ad suam sententiam. nec mirum, quingenos denarios dat (Att. 16.8.1). The dating of the desertion of the Martian and Fourth legions is unclear. Antonius had returned to Rome by mid-November 44 summoning a meeting of the senate for 24 November, but when news was brought of further insurrection he postponed the meeting until 28 November. The Martian legion had been ordered to march to Cisalpine Gaul but defected to Octavian and occupied the town of Alba Fucens in the heart of Samnium (Phil. 3.38). On 28 November news was brought of a second defection, that of the Fourth legion (Phil. 3.14; 3.39; 4.5-6; 5.4; 6.3; 10.21; 11.20; 12.8; 14.27; Vell. Pat. 2.61; App. 3.185; Dio 45.13.3). Antonius hurried through his legislation determining the allocation of provinces before he left for Cisalpine Gaul, omitting his earlier intention of having Octavian declared a public enemy. furorem: Furorem, here, is grammatically parallel with conatum. As the veterans ended Antonius’ conatum, the Martian and Fourth broke his furorem. Furor consists of an irrational, wild behaviour and is repeatedly used to describe Antonius’ actions (Phil. 3.3; 3.18; 4.3; 5.37; 6.4; cf. Cat. 1.1; Pis. 16; Ver. 2.5.153). Contrasted with the furorem of Antonius is Brutus’ patientia, a considered undertaking of the tasks before him. Furor could be depicted as a temporary affliction as suggested at Pis. 46 and Rosc. Am. 68, but Cicero’s presentation of Antonius’ furor (and amentia, used synonymously: Phil. 2.42; 3.2; 3.6; 5.37) is both consistent and constant. Furor was associated with discordia and was often considered to come about through the agitation of a demagogue. It was a characteristic of Clodius (Mil. 3.12; 27.8; 77.3) and of Catiline (Cat. 1.1; 3.4; 4.6); at
Cat. 2.25, furor is treated as the antithesis to constantia (hinc constantia, illinc furor; cf. Hellegouarc’h 1972: 136-7). Cicero’s depiction of Antonius’ furor is more consistently applied, reflecting insanity and the means through which he commands his soldiers. The characterisation depicts Antonius’ soldiers as obeying him more out of fear than respect (Phil. 3.6; a characterisation emphasized particularly by Appian: App. 3.53; Gowing 1992: 235). The twelve tables forbade any who was furosus from holding property: \textit{qui ita sit adfectus, eum dominum esse rerum suarum vetant duodecim tabulae; itaque non est scriptum 'si insanus', sed 'si furosus escit'} (Tusc. 3.11). By law a man who was furosus was prohibited from participating in legal acts, and so Cicero applies a pseudo-legal phrasing in his denunciation of Antonius (at Tusc. 3.11 furo is defined as a caecitas mentis; Buckland 1963: 186: Lacey 1986: 219). The language is aggressive; the more cautionary characterisation of the legions’ defection from Antonius (they defended the auctoritas of the senate and the freedom of the Roman people at Phil. 3.39) is now replaced by a confrontational resistance. Having won official authorisation for their actions, Cicero can now parade their actions in a more aggressive light. **Martia:** The Martian legion’s numeric designation is unknown. Cicero’s preoccupation with the title ‘Martia’ reveals a further strategy of which Keppie (1983: 30) notes ‘we may see an attempt to build up the reputation of one of Octavian’s legions to serve as the senatorial counterpoint to the Alaudae, now the mainstay of Antony’s army’.

\textbf{21.3} sic a suis legionibus condemnatus irruptit in Galliam, quam sibi armis animisque infestam inimicamque cognovit. Antonius’ ill-conceived actions are characterised by furor, established above. **suis legionibus:** Reiterates the legions’ mutiny from Antonius. However, two of the Macedonian legions, the Second and the Thirty-fifth, and the recently settled Fifth (the Alaudae) remained with Antonius. **condemnatus:** A pseudo-legal phrasing (cf. Phil. 3.6: quae [sc. legio Martia] cum hostem populi Romani Antonium iudicasset, comes esse eius amentiae noluit; cf. Phil. 4.5). The chronological sequence is compressed, with the intention of illustrating a collective response to Antonius’ actions rather than providing a too linear narrative of recent events. **irruptit:** An emotive expression: ‘to throw oneself with hostile intent’ (OLD 2; also used in the sense ‘to violate’: L-S IIB ); the phrasing is similarly used of Dolabella entering into Asia at Phil. 11.4.7. At the end of November Antonius marched north to relieve D. Brutus of his province of Cisalpine Gaul. Brutus refused to hand over his province and withdrew to the fortified city of Mutina where he was
immediately besieged by Antonius. It was not until Cicero proposed the recognition of Brutus’ actions in Philippic 3, delivered on 20 December, and the senate’s subsequent ratification of those actions, that Brutus’ actions were given official backing.  

... inimicamque: The doubling of armis animisque and infestam inimicamque allows Cicero to linger over the emotive personification of Gallia.

21.5 hunc A. Hirti, C. Caesaris exercitus insecuti sunt; post Pansae dilectus urbem totamque Italiam erexit; unus omnium est hostis. Antonius continues to be singled out as the opponent against whom all others are acting. The asyndetic phrasing creates a sense of immediacy.  

dilectus: It is unclear when the formal levy was decreed, but by mid-January the levy had begun (Phil. 5.31; 7.13; Fam. 11.8.2; 12.5.2). For the meaning of the term dilectus and the process of voluntary enlistment see Brunt 1971: 635-38. Cicero reported voluntary enlistment against Antonius on a large scale in response to the threat he posed (Fam. 11.8.2; Phil. 11.24; Ad Brut. 2.4.4).  

unus omnium est hostis: The phrasing is emphatic and illustrates that Cicero’s attack was foremost a denunciation of person. Cicero had been applying the term ‘hostis’ to Antonius since Philippic 3, and then throughout the remaining speeches. Antonius is no longer the hostis domesticus, used to describe an internal threat (cf. Cat. 3.22; 28 and Flac. 95), but the ‘enemy of all’. Cicero brings this into focus before cataloguing Antonius’ followers.

(§§21.8-22.10) Final character sketch of those supporting Antonius.

Cicero moves his focus from the republican forces to M. Antonius, and now to those associated with him, beginning with his brother Lucius. The catalogue moves at pace as Cicero progresses through a series of vignettes illustrating the character type of Antonius’ supporters.

21.8 quamquam habet secum L. fratrem, carissimum populo Romano civem, cuius desiderium ferre diutius civitas non potest. L. fratrem: L. Antonius was tribune in 44 and consul in 41 (MRR 2: 332; 370). He was appointed to lead a commission of seven with the purpose of carrying through M. Antonius’ programme of land redistribution, as part of the lex Antonia agraria of June (see Phil. 10.4.5 n. and 10.15.12 n.). Cicero was to accuse the commission of a partisan appropriation and distribution of public land and an intention of making ample provision for itself. L.
Antonius is singled out, through a descending order of hierarchy, for his involvement by virtue of his role of chairman of the commission. carissimum populo Romano: The phrasing is intended to echo the sarcasm with which Cicero had previously described Lucius’ acceptance of an equestrian statue dedicated to him bearing the inscription ‘quinque et triginta tribus patrono’. We are told of several statues erected in honour of L. Antonius; one was dedicated on behalf of the thirty-five tribes (Phil. 6.12: populi Romani igitur est patronus Lucius; all Roman citizens were members of one of the tribes, so the paraphrase is used here). A second statue was furnished by the state on behalf of the equestrian order (Phil. 6.13); and a third on behalf of the temple of Janus (Phil. 6.15; 7.16-17; cf. Nicolet 1985: 799-832). For what reasons these statues were erected is not addressed, but Cicero implies the erection of the statue was absurd because Lucius did not deserve any such support (cf. Phil. 6.12; 13.26).

22.1 quid illa taeptius belua, quid immanius? qui ob eam causam natus videtur ne omnium mortalium, turpissimus esset M. Antonius. belua forms a recurrent form of abuse through the Philippics (Phil. 6.4: nec vero de illo (M. Antonius) sicut de homine aliquot debemus, sed ut de importunissima belua cogitare). Belua is used as a term of political abuse whereas the synonym bestia refers to an animal distinct from man (see Cossarini 1981: 123-134 and May 1996: 143-53 for the use of the metaphor in political contexts; on bestia imagery see also Lévy 1998: 139-157).

22.2 est una Trebellius, qui iam cum tabulis novisredi<i>t in gratiam, <est> T. Plancus et ceteri pares, qui id pugnant, id agunt ut contra rem publicam restituti esse videantur. Having established a hostile tone, Cicero moves through a catalogue of Antonius’ companions. Trebellius: L. Trebellius (Fides), as tribune in 47, opposed Dolabella’s economic programme which called for a remission of debts (MRR 2: 287); his agnomen drops from Cicero’s references, although at Phil. 6.11 Cicero refers sarcastically to Trebellius’ use of ‘Fides’ because of the term’s use in a moral and legal context. Trebellius’ opposition to Dolabella in 47 brought about the intervention of M. Antonius, Caesar’s Master of Horse, to restore order following rioting in favour of Dolabella’s reforms (Liv. Per. 113; Dio 42.29-33). Trebellius’ opposition to debt remission is in marked contrast to the current context in which Trebellius is depicted as a bankrupt or insolvent in need of debt remission (Phil. 6.10-12; 13.26). tabulis novis: ‘New account-books’ by which one’s debts were abolished in whole or in part (cf. Phil. 6.4; 6.11; 11.15; Att. 5.21.13; 14.21.4; Off. 2.23.84; Caes. BCiv. 3.1; 3.21; Sall. Cat. 21). in gratiam: ‘Has gained favour’.
T. Plancus: T. Munatius Plancus Bursa (RE 32; MRR 2: 354), served with Antonius in the battles around Mutina (Dio 46.38.3). Plancus had been prosecuted by Cicero in 52 and convicted for his involvement in the riots following the death of Clodius (Dio 40.55.4), and sent into exile (Fam. 7.2.2). He had been a supporter of Caesar from as early as 52 and served subsequently with Antonius (Watkins 1997: 52-70).

22.6 et sollicitant homines imperitos Saxae et Cafones, ipsi rustici atque agrestes, qui hanc rem publicam nec viderunt umquam nec videre constitutam volunt, qui non Caesaris, sed Antoni acta defendunt, quos avertit agri Campani infinita possessio; cuius eos non pudere demiror, cum videant se mimos et mimas habere vicinos. sollicitant homines imperitos: Both Saxa and Cafo (see note below) appear to have been actively recruiting in Campania, a major recruiting ground for both Antonius and Octavian. Sollicitant is used in reference to ‘recruitment’, but Cicero uses a word with the sense of ‘inciting revolt, or insurrection’ (OLD 5b). In April 44, Antonius refounded the colony of Casilinum with the remnants of the Eighth legion, instructing its members to remain at arms, an act that Cicero considered an impetus towards war (Att. 14.21.2). At the same time Antonius visited Samnium with an eye on the veteran settlements there (Att. 14.20.3; Keppie 1983: 52). The soldiers in the veteran settlements were to provide Antonius with the core of a personal bodyguard, numbering six thousand, when Antonius returned to Rome in June (Matijević 2006:379 suggests these were not ex-legionaries, as Cicero claims, but rather a gathering of clients for the passing of Antonius’ leges). Botermann (1968: 74) suggests that the unwillingness of the Seventh and Eighth legions, later to fight Antonius, may stem in part from these earlier interactions. The region was also fruitful for Octavian. Veterans flocked to him as he made his way from Brundisium to Rome, clamouring for revenge for Caesar (App. 3.11-12; Nic. Dam. F130). Cicero repeatedly refers with derision to Decidius Saxa and his colleague Cafo (usually together), because of their involvement in the commission for veteran settlement.

Saxae et Cafones: The naming of Saxa and Cafo has been corrupted in the MSS. V: Saxas et Cafones; Muretus: Saxa et Cafo, whose emendation is followed by Fedeli and Shackleton Bailey; Naugierius: Saxae et Cafones. There is ample evidence to show that Cicero liked to use the plural of their names to illustrate a type of person with whom Antonius was associated (cf. Phil. 8.9.3; 11.37.11; cf. a similarly derisive reference to Tebassos, Scaevas, Fangones at Att. 14.10.2). Yet the context is not specific, rather inferred, as Saxa and Cafo had been subject to Cicero’s invective
already throughout the *Philippics* (*Phil.* 5.7; 5.20; 7.17; 13.37; cf. *Dio* 45.9). Cicero’s reference is to their notoriety as *divisores Italiae*, and their roles within the septemvirate and the distribution of land among veteran soldiers. **Saxae**: L. Decidius Saxa (*RE* 4), a Celtiberian granted the tribunate by Caesar for 44 (*Phil.* 11.12). Saxa is referred to as a *metator castrorum*, ‘one who measures camps’, experience and practice that would be utilized in his role on the board of seven (*Phil.* 11.12; Syme 1937: 135-36). He had served under Caesar and later, as a partisan of Antonius, he secured encampments around Philippi (*Dio* 47.35-36); he would die in Antonius’ failed campaign against the Parthians (*Liv.* *Per.* 127; *Dio* 48.24.3). **Cafones**: Cafo is absent from *RE* and only mentioned in connection with Saxa (*Phil.* 8.9; 8.26; 11.37; 12.20; 13.2; Syme 1937). Cafo thereafter drops from record. **rustici atque agrestes** are used pejoratively, not merely of peasant stock, but typifying coarseness and a lack of civility, and as such, form a target of abuse. The emphasis upon their nomenclature may, as Syme (1937: 128; 133) suggests, be used in a demeaning sense to emphasize their non-Roman origin (for the ignominy of birth as a topos of invective see Merrill 1975: 195-98). **Antoni acta**: The agrarian law and the distribution of provinces in June and November respectively. The *acta* of Antonius had been abrogated, while those of Caesar were to be revalidated (cf. *Phil.* 10.17.9 n.; *Phil.* 13.31). **infinita possessio** marks an unexpected shift in subject. The Cafones and Saxae become the passive objects of their own greed. **mimos et mimas**: A *mimus* was associated with *licentia*, and so the description is typical of the company Antonius keeps. Antonius is often shown as being in the intimate company of mimes throughout the *Philippics* (*Phil.* 2.58; 2.62; 2.69; 2.101; 8.26; 11.13.5; cf. *Phil.* 13.24.10; Jocelyn 1984). At *Phil.* 2.101, Cicero similarly relates how mimes were settled on Campanian land as reward for their companionship: *mimos dico et mimas, patres conscripti, in agro Campano collocatos.*

**Peroratio** (§§ 23.1-24.8)

The *peroratio* (*conclusio*) formed the terminus of the oration in accordance with the formal divisions of the speech (*Rhet.* *Her.* 1.4; 2.47; *Inv. Rhet.* 2.47-50; *Part.* 52-7; Quint. 6.1-55; Lausberg §§236-40; 431). The purpose of the *peroratio* within a deliberative speech, like that of a judicial speech, was to reiterate the most important
and compelling arguments from within the oration and to attempt a final emotional appeal in persuading the audience (Rhet. Her. 3.1-10). Consequently, the peroratio of a deliberative speech followed the same principles as those of a judicial: conclusionibus fere similibus in his et in iudicialibus causis uti solemus, nisi quod his maxime conducit quam plurima rerum ante gestarum exempla proferre (Rhet. Her. 3.9). A summary of events was required and a review of compelling arguments in order to concentrate the audience upon the orator’s focus within the oration, and to draw the audience’s attention to the utilitas, the ‘usefulness’ or ‘advantage’, to be derived from the situation. Brutus’ seizure of the Greek provinces and their resources in defence of the res publica established the scheme for Cicero’s subsequent arrangement.

Cicero took especial pride in his delivery of perorationes, asserting that it was within the peroratio that he outshone his rivals: perorationem mihi tamen omnes relinquebant in quo ut viderer excellere non ingenio sed dolore assequebar (Orat. 130). When more than one speaker was involved in a forensic case, Cicero was invariably chosen to deliver the peroration because of his ability to deliver an elevated and emotionally charged conclusion: qui cum partiretur tecum [sc. Hortensium] - saepe enim interfui – perorandi locum, ubi plurimum pollet oratio, semper tibi relinquebat (Brut. 190).

The peroratio was considered to consist of two parts: the factual (enumeratio/recapitulatio) and the emotional (amplificatio), and together these constituted the elevated and persuasive climax (Quint. 6.1.1: eius duplex ratio est, posita aut in rebus aut in affectibus; Part. 52: nam est divisa in duas partes, amplificationem et enumerationem). At Inv. Rhet. 1.97, Cicero subdivides the amplificatio into a further two parts in order to specify two separate approaches, thus providing three possible divisions within a peroratio: haec habet partes tres: enumerationem, indignationem, conquestionem (cf. Rhet. Her. 2.37). The indignatio is not an approach that Cicero pursued within the peroration of Philippic 10. Its aim, to inflame the audience against the opposing party (Inv. Rhet. 1.100), is subordinated to a two-fold division with an especial emphasis on the conquestio and enumeratio in that order.

The conquestio was a deliberate attempt to sway the audience through an appeal to the emotions (Inv. Rhet. 1.106: conquestio est oratio auditorium misericordiam captans) through the evocation of injustice and misfortune. The capturing of an audience’s compassion could be obtained through a number of loci
communes (Inv. Rhet. 1.106-109; Quint. 5.10.23; Lausberg §376). Of specific relevance is the fourth locus outlined at Inv. Rhet. 1.107: quartus, per quem res turpes et humiles illiberales proferuntur et indigna esse aetate, genere, fortuna pristina, honore beneficiis quae passi perpessurive sint. It was a prerequisite that the conquiestio be brief in order to avoid repetition of arguments, a necessity if the empathy of the audience was to be held (for brevity as a virtue within a peroratio see Inv. Rhet. 1.100-109; Rhet. Her. 2.50; Part. 57; Quint. 6.1.27; Kellogg 1907: 301-310). The brevity of the conquiestio in Philippic 10 may also indicate a lesser need to appeal to the audience’s emotions, presumably based on the senate’s likely approval of Brutus’ position as indicated by Pansa’s support at the beginning of the oration (Phil. 10.1.1 n).

The enumeratio (§§23.8-24.8), forms the more significant component of the peroratio to Philippic 10. It is defined as follows: enumeratio est per quam res disperse diffuse dictae unum in locum coguntur et reminiscendi causa unum sub aspectum subiciuntur (Inv. Rhet. 1.98); enumeratio est per quam colligimus et commonemus quibus de rebus verba fecerimus (Rhet. Her. 2.47). Cicero focuses upon the conquiestio before moving onto the enumeratio (or recapitulatio), an inversion of the usual order (cf. Inv. Rhet. 1.97). The purpose of the enumeratio is to refresh the audience’s memory of the most important arguments contained within the speech: commune autem praeceptum hoc datur ad enumerationem, ut ex una quaque argumentatione, quoniam tota iterum dici non potest, id eligatur quod erit gravissimum, et unum quidque quam brevissime transeatur, ut memoria, non oratio renovata videatur (Part. 1.100; Part. 59-60; De Orat. 1.17.75; Lausberg §§433-434). More detail within our rhetorical handbooks is given to the enumeratio as a successful means of attack for the prosecution within a judicial speech, but here enumeratio illustrates, by example, the characterisation of Brutus that Cicero has been careful to develop.

The enumeratio, like the conquiestio, draws heavily on the presentation of Brutus’ patientia, but places it within a more loosely structured timeframe. Cicero recapitulates a number of points that he had raised through the speech: Brutus’ patientia is repeated, and his intention of doing only those things that will benefit the res publica is the foremost assertion. The enumeratio is perhaps not as fully developed as we might expect but Cicero’s central line of argument is simple and direct. He chooses to repeat his claim that Brutus has raised an army for the
preservation and care of the res publica. Cicero illustrates that it was only upon
provocation that Brutus was finally compelled to act; a reiteration of the argument
developed through §§ 7-9 above. And he only did so in order to counteract the illegal
aspirations of C. Antonius and M. Antonius in turn (§§9-10 above). The suddenness
with which Brutus had finally acted is presented as proof of Brutus’ reluctance to
prove civil war and as an argument to allay any fears concerning the strength of his
now powerful position. In making this argument Cicero responds directly to Calenus’
challenge to the appointment of Brutus (§§15-18). Calenus used the argument that the
legions would be unwilling to support Brutus, but this argument appears weak in the
face of subsequent events. Cicero passes over Calenus’ objections preferring instead
to review his own argument. Addressing Calenus’ objections appears a less
compelling argument than proving the advantages to be derived from Brutus’ actions.
The unwillingness of the legions to follow the liberators was the principal line of
attack, as presented by Cicero, against giving Brutus the command, an argument
refuted by Cicero who subsequently accuses Calenus of using the legions as a pretext
for concealing his real motivation in opposing Brutus. That motivation is not
articulated within the speech, but Calenus’ Antonian sympathies were well known and
it is to these that Cicero alludes.

The conquestio (§23.1-23.8) emphasizes Brutus’ patientia and his initial
reluctance to instigate any civil conflict. This contrasts with the actions of Antonius’
agents in the preceding sections (§§21.8-22.10) and allows for the reintroduction of
Brutus as a traditional and republican stalwart. Brutus was compelled to leave Rome
despite the fact that he had only ever acted in the interests of the res publica, in
accordance with the traditions of Rome and in the manner of his ancestors. This
adheres to a commonplace theme within a peroration by illustrating the lengths to
which Brutus has endured adversities: si animum nostrum fortem, patientem
incommodorum ostendemus futurum (Rhet. Her. 2.50); cf. Inv. Rhet. 1.109: sextus
decimus, per quem animum nostrum in alios misericordem esse ostendimus et tamen
amplum et excelsum et patientem incommodorum esse et futurum esse, si quid
acciderit, demonstramus. The repetition of patientia through the speech is striking and
its reiteration within the peroration is a clear indicator that this formed an important
justification and argument for Cicero (§§7.5; 9.2; 14.10; 23.5). Brutus’ willingness to
endure adversity was an aspect of his character that Cicero was pushing hard to
promote. It was a virtue that Cicero had been actively appropriating for Brutus, a
virtue specific to Brutus and an association that Brutus may well have been cultivating himself (see Phil. 10.23.2). The enumeratio concludes with mention of the contributions from Hortensius and Apuleius, who provide independent and supplementary support to Brutus’ actions. With this perspective in view Cicero raises the precedents of Octavian and D. Brutus and the recognition they received for similar acts of resistance. Reference to Octavian and Decimus, however, is kept to a minimum as Cicero chooses to focus on future developments in the immediate conflict. The collocation, however, of a Brutus and a Caesar has a further effect of presenting a united front between an assassin of Caesar and Caesar’s heir against the Antonii and again illustrates the absurdity of Calenus’ proposal.

Elevated themes are what Cicero is most concerned to evoke. Reiteration of Brutus’ aims for restoring the auctoritatem senatus, libertatem populi Romani are given weight through ornate sentence structure, and the rhetorically loaded language reflect this: hic, si usquam, totos eloquentiae aperire fontes licet (Quint. 6.1.51).

Conquestio (§23.1-23.8). Brutus has done everything in his power to support the auctoritas senatus and the libertas populi Romani.

23.1 ad has pestis opprimendas cur moleste feramus quod M. Bruti accessit exercitus? immoderati, credo, hominis et turbulent! Hendiadys provides emphasis, as Cicero is able to linger over turbulent, coinciding with a heavy rhythm of a double trochee. The phrasing is heavily ironic. feramus ... credo: The first person singular verb follows very quickly from the first person plural. Cicero’s assessment of the situation is then shown to be consistent with that of the senate. turbulent has negative political associations and was associated particularly with the tribunate as an office that provoked sedition (Brut. 103; Hellegouarc’h 1972: 531-532); turbulentus is used specifically of an individual who provokes civil disorder (cf. Sest. 104; Rab. Perd. 33: turbulenti homines atque novarum rerum cupidi).

23.2 videte ne nimium paene patientis. Cicero reiterates a central theme from within the speech, namely Brutus’ patientia, a deliberate and cumulative point of reference (Phil. 10.7.8; 10.9.2; 10.14.15; 10.23.9; see Fears 1981: 877-889 for the attribution of particular virtues to specific men; cf. McDonnell 2006: 293-300). Brutus had voluntarily undertaken hardship and this is paraded through the repeated allusion to patientia (Inv. Rhet. 2.163: patientia est honestatis aut utilitatis causa rerum
arduarum ac difficilium voluntaria ac diuturna perpessio). This emphasis allows Cicero to counter the accusations that Brutus had acted illegally when he seized the Balkan provinces, and to depict Brutus as having been forced into his actions (cf. Phil. 10.12.12-10.14.13). The voluntary nature of his willingness to endure hardships is a choice that Brutus has made, but now Brutus is compelled to act; thus linking consilium and factum. Rather than depicting an aggressive and illegal seizure of a province, Cicero depicts Brutus as having acted only upon provocation. Brutus’ active involvement in preventing C. Antonius and his associates from their destructive designs touches on the martial qualities required to counter that threat: ‘fortitudo is that which confronts oncoming evils; that which endures and withstands coming evils is called patientia. These are embraced by one name, magnitudo animi’ (Part. 77: nam quae venientibus malis obstat fortitudo, quae quod iam adest tolerat et perfert patientia nominatur. quae autem haec uno genere complectitur, magnitudo animi dicitur).

Cicero had successfully applied patientia as a martial virtue to Pompey, a successful military commander (Leg. Man. 29), but Brutus lacked the more familiar applicability of a martial virtus, so easily applied in the presentations of Pompey. Cicero’s evocation of Brutus’ patientia involves an endurance of hardship (in Brutus’ case this was political hardship and the loss of political involvement), while at the same time Cicero is able to play on patientia as an implied martial quality. However, a manifestation of Brutus’ virtus involved the preparation of forces for the preservation of the res publica. Cicero passes over what he sees as the limitations of patientia; he would later criticise Brutus for his lack of action and failure to lead his army back to Rome (see Ad Brut. 1.12.2; 1.14.2). Brutus took no offence but Cicero would subsequently berate Brutus for his passivity over the coming months. Patientia is used negatively of the Roman people (in the sense of ‘passivity’) at Phil. 2.116.16: attulerat [Caesar] iam liberae civitati partim patientia consuetudinem serviendi: see Kaster 1997: 133-144 for patientia as a negative quality.

23.3 etsi in illius viri consiliis atque factis nihil nec nimium nec parum umquam fuit. An overtly martial virtus is applied to Brutus at Phil. 10.9.6; 10.11.3, complimented by the attributes of consilia and facta. For consilium as an attribute of the general, see Leg. Man. 29.6. For the pairing of consilium and factum see Phil. 2.53.7; 5.50.10; 14.8.7.
23.4 omnis voluntas M. Bruti, patres conscripti, omnis cogitatio, tota mens auctoritatem senatus, libertatem populi Romani intuetur: haec habet proposita, haec tueri vult. The passage proceeds rapidly through the use of asyndeton as Cicero recounts Brutus’ actions. These actions are treated generally, as Cicero is more concerned to concentrate on the considerations behind Brutus’ actions in order to marry factum with consilium. The sentence forms a paraphrase in which Brutus is made the dependent genitive to allow these nouns to take centre stage. voluntas: ‘disposition to choose, the state of wanting to do something, will’ (OLD 1a). Voluntas is an emphatic component in the characterisation of Brutus. It implies determination in resisting Antonius. cogitatio is near synonymous with voluntas. mens: The gradatio falls on mens but each term is an aspect of prudentia, thus reinforcing the characterisation. The terms are aspects of prudentia, one of the four virtues analogous to proving that an action is honourable (honestum), consistent in depicting the parallelism between factum and consilium from above. auctoritatem ... libertatem: The libertas populi and the auctoritas senatus share a co-dependency and are constituent ingredients for Cicero’s conception of the res publica. The phrasing is particularly emphatic within Cicero’s Philippic corpus and forms a central component in Cicero’s opposition to Antonius (Phil. 3.8.5; 3.37.9; 3.39.6; 4.5.11; 4.8.9; 5.34.8; 5.53.3; 5.53.14; 13.33.19; 13.47.7; Hellegouarc’h 1972: 542-565). Libertas is a key word within the Philippics and is particularly applicable to Brutus and the role of the Bruti within Roman history (Phil. 2.25; 10.25 and connected to his ancestors beyond the immediate context at Brut. 331).

23.6 temptavit quid patientia perficere posset: nihil cum proficeret, vi contra vim experiendum putavit. Patientia now gives way to a more active opposition, albeit through a considered response to events in the east. Cf. the phrasing at Fam. 12.3.1 (to Cassius): sed ne mihi quidem ipsi reperio quid faciendum sit. quid enim est contra vim sine vi fieri pos; cf. the phrasing used at Sest. 39; 88; Dom. 63.9.

Enumeratio (§§23.8-24.8). A summary of the support Brutus has received since his arrival in the east.

23.8 cui quidem, patres conscripti, vos idem hoc tempore tribuere debetis quod a. d. XIII Kalendas Ianuarias D. Bruto C. Caesari me auctore tribuistis: quorum privatum de re publica consilium et factum auctoritate vestra est comprobatum
There is a summary of events in which Cicero reviews his own role in the meeting of 20 December before again focusing upon Brutus’ actions. The cluster of pronouns emphasizes the lead Cicero took against Antonius in *Philippic 3*, and the support he received on that occasion. Cicero applauded the actions of both D. Brutus and Octavian in his delivery of *Philippic 3*, and proposed that their initiatives be granted senatorial approval (*Phil. 3.37-8*). In addition to senatorial recognition Cicero proposed that D. Brutus continue to command in Gaul, by virtue of his governorship, and that all other governors remain in their respective provinces until new governors were appointed by the senate (*Phil. 3.37; 7.3*). Thus his successful advocacy of D. Brutus and Octavian is shown to have been confirmed by the will of the senate. Two reasons for the appointment of Brutus follow, both of which are marked by a verb of necessity: firstly, the actions of D. Brutus and Octavian, in opposing Antonius, had been retrospectively approved by the senate (only two months earlier), and so provide a precedent for the acknowledgment of M. Brutus in the current context. Secondly, Brutus’ own actions commend themselves. *idem*: I.e. senatorial recognition of Brutus’ resistance to C. Antonius’ attempts at securing the province of Macedonia. *quod* picks up on *idem* as Cicero uses precedent to justify Brutus’ command. The commendation of Brutus here is thus an extension of Cicero’s earlier policy by virtue of the similarity of his actions. *a. d. XIII Kalendas*: On 20 December the newly appointed tribunes convened the senate in order to discuss security for the meeting of the senate scheduled for 1 January, 43 (*Phil. 3.13; Manuwald 2007: 298*). Yet the meeting on 20 December took on broader significance when a despatch was received from D. Brutus in which Decimus detailed his refusal to hand over his province of Gallia Citerior to Antonius, and that he intended to hold the province on behalf of the senate and people of Rome (*Phil. 3.8; 3.37-8; 4.8; 5.28; Fam. 11.6a*). *C. Caesari*: The use of the cognomen is deliberately pointed in this context, illustrating Octavian’s appeal to any with Caesarian sympathies. Cicero wants to shift focus away from a ‘Pompeian versus Caesarian’ struggle, to a struggle between the forces of the senate and Antonius. Octavian was not formally adopted until August 43, when his adoption was ratified through a *lex curiata* (*Flor. 2.15.1-3; App. 3.11.37-38; Dio 45.5.3-4; Toher 2004: 183*). He had, however, been using his adoptive name from April 44, because of his dependence upon it for the support of Caesar’s veterans. Throughout the *Philippics* Cicero calls Octavian ‘Caesar’ as it provides evidence that Antonius’ professed Caesarian loyalty was used as a pretext
for Antonius’ ruinous political programme; while Octavian, through his deference to the senate, signified a genuine concern for the *res publica*. The use of ‘Caesar’, in the context of defending Caesar’s *acta*, is intended to consolidate all opposition to Antonius, both Caesarian and non-Caesarian, regardless of Antonius’ professed Caesarian sensibilities. *me auctore:* Cicero could subsequently illustrate the success with which he had supported D. Brutus and Octavian against Antonius by referring to the day on which he praised them in their opposition to Antonius (*Fam.* 12.22a.1). It was on 20 December that Cicero claimed to have laid the foundations of a restored republic: *ieci fundamenta rei publicae* (*Fam.* 12.25.2; 10.28.2; *Phil.* 4.1; 5.30; 6.2; 14.20). That had been a period of optimism for Cicero and he was proud of the role that he had taken in leading the senate in opposition to Antonius, particularly now that that policy was beginning to coalesce with a growing body of support.

As the speech draws to a conclusion the phrasing becomes more elaborate as Cicero shifts away from his attack against the Antonian forces. Brutus again becomes the focal point. The central concern of *Philippic* 10 is to have the actions of Brutus approved by the senate (*auctoritate senatus*; cf. *Phil.* 10.7.7 above). The more actions Cicero can refer to as having been sanctioned by the senate, the more he can present a uniform and consistent front. And in so doing Cicero urges the senate to a particular policy of supporting all those who oppose Antonius. This constitutes a final emphasis in Cicero’s argument, and a transition to the *sententia* to follow. Cicero uses the precedents of D. Brutus and Octavian to illustrate the spontaneity with which they had acted against Antonius and the subsequent approval of those actions by the senate.

24.1 *quod idem in M. Bruto facere debitis, a quo insperatum et repentinum rei publicae praesidium legionum, equitatus, auxiliorum magnae et firmae copiae comparatae sunt.* The second of Cicero’s reasons for commending and appointing Brutus serves to sum up briefly arguments raised through the speech. There is a summary of recent events in which Cicero repeats key points: the suddenness with which Brutus acted (*Phil.* 10.11.4), Brutus’ willingness to protect the *res publica* (*Phil.* 10.4.6; 10.9.9; 10.9.17), the preparation of his forces (*Phil.* 10.12.4), and the repeated metaphor of Brutus as *praesidium* (*Phil.* 10.4.7; 10.9.11; 10.9.12; 10.17.11). *in M. Bruto:* ‘in the case of’ (*OLD* 42). *insperatum et repentinum:* The suddenness of Brutus’ actions is used to depict the spontaneity with which republican commanders were acting against Antonius. The emphasis on the ‘unhoped for’ and ‘sudden’ intervention implies a criticism of the senate’s policy of negotiation with
Antonius (Ad Brut. 2.1.1). copiae: Brutus has become involved in resisting the Antonii on his own initiative and had added himself to the growing body of republican support.

24.4 adiungendus est Q. Hortensius qui, cum Macedoniam obtineret, adiutorem se Bruto ad comparerum exercitum fidissimum et constantissimum praebuit. Hortensius’ involvement was essential for Brutus’ success (Phil. 10.11.8-10.13.5 above). The involvement of Hortensius, the current governor of Macedonia, lends weight to Brutus’ actions by indicating the support Brutus derived from the provinces. The fact that new recruits were entering into the service of Brutus, in addition to the provincial commanders, was indicative of the widespread resistance to one of the Antonii. The superlatives (fidissimum and constantissimum) together with the rhyming –um endings make Hortensius’ contribution emphatic.

24.6 nam de M. Apuleio separatim censeo referendum, cui testis est per litteras M. Brutus, eum principem fuisse ad conatum exercitus comparandi. Cicero intended a separate proposal for M. Apuleius, because he considered his actions as worthy of a separate motion. At Phil. 13.50.10 Cicero gives his reasoning for a separate proposal commending the actions of Sex. Pompeius: hoc vel coniungi cum hoc senatus consulta licet vel seiiungi potest separatimque perscribi, ut proprio senatus consulta Pompeius conlaudatus esse videatur. A similar motivation is no doubt applicable here, but perhaps also to curry favour with Brutus. The decree was passed as we know by a reference from Antonius at Phil. 13.16.32: Apuleiana pecunia Brutum subornastis. M. Apuleio: M. Apuleius (RE 13), was quaestor in 45 and proquaestor in Asia in 44 (MRR 2: 308; 327); he is perhaps identified with the consul of 20 BC (so Shackleton Bailey 1980: 243). Trebonius had been instructed to begin fortifying towns in the liberators’ interests from mid-44 which involved the complicity of Apuleius who was serving as proquaestor on his staff (App. 3.6; Syme 1939: 171: MRR 2: 326). In late 44, Apuleius turned over public money to Brutus at Carystus on the island of Euboea in Boeotia, an amount totalling 16 000 talents according to Appian (4.75; 3.63; cf. Phil. 13.50; Plut. Brut. 23.3-24.3; App. 3.63; 4.74; 5.5; Dio 47.32.4; MRR 2: 327), but probably not troops as Appian earlier asserted (see comments by Botermann 1968: 89, n. 6; 94; Broughton 1938: 582-5). The money may have been acquired for the purpose of purchasing grain, but was subsequently used for preparing Brutus’ forces (so Raubitschek 1957: 8; Botermann 1968: 94 conjectures that Brutus required the sum and even more to match the
bounties offered by Octavian and Antonius). This transfer of money was not so much an ‘interception’ of resources (as Raubitschek maintains, probably following Plut. *Brut.* 24.3; 1957: 8), but a willing transfer, as Brutus described in his despatch. Apuleius was warmly commended by Brutus who encouraged Cicero to support his candidature for an Augurate (*Ad Brut.* 1.7.2). Brutus’ letter contained a positive report of Apuleius’ actions; their relationship appears on close terms (cf. Brutus’ later praise for Apuleius: ‘sed Apuleius in sua epistula celebrabitur’ *Ad Brut.* 1.7.2). **exercitus comparandi**: The heavy clausula of a double trochee marks the end of the oration in terms of the *propositio* and *argumentatio*.

**Sententia** (§§25-26)

The *Philippic* speeches are unique within Cicero’s corpus in that they contain formal proposals (*sententiae*) as part of the complete published oration. This is perhaps surprising given that senatorial orations, with proposals included, touched on and regulated numerous aspects of public and private life and were routinely delivered throughout the year. One reason why this type of speech was not usually published has to do with the rather formulaic and styleless form of the proposal.\(^{180}\) In his rhetorical treatises, Cicero does not touch on the style of the proposal itself, because it was subject to a fairly consistent presentation and Cicero, like our other rhetorical sources, is more concerned to illustrate, within a deliberative speech, the means by which the success of the speech was achieved.\(^{181}\) We do not have enough material to assess the variations that may have occurred within a proposal and our knowledge of Cicero as a composer of official documents is limited, but there are some observations that can be made. There are obvious similarities between extant *senatus consulta* and the proposals of the *Philippics*. The form of the proposal contains a number of archaic and formulaic constructions, long habituated and readily identifiable to a Roman audience.\(^{182}\) We can identify within the proposals of the *Philippics* a preponderance of

\(^{180}\) Deliberative speeches, together with their proposals are found within the histories of Sallust and Livy, despite the fact that the speech and proposal do not meld easily. A verbatim inclusion was certainly possible given that decrees of the senate were stored in the *aerarium* and were available for consultation, but this was avoided for stylistic effect.

\(^{181}\) Although he could be critical if wording allowed for ambiguity: cf. *Att.* 3.20.

\(^{182}\) There is a parody of the formula within Plautus’ *Rudens* (1269-80), a clear indication that the vocabulary was both antique and familiar to the audience to the extent that it could be identified within comedy.
ablative, an artificial and legalistic construction which reflects the formulaic and non-literary nature of the proposal although attributing a sense of solemnity. The proposals generally consist of short clauses, adjectives are relatively rare, and there is little periodic structuring as nothing is meant to surprise or allow for ambiguity. There is a high degree of repetition and these are limited to certain formulae. For example, the use of Q. Caepio Brutus together with his status, pro consule, is repeated some five times over one section, an awkward and inelegant replication. There are, in addition, a number of repeated phrases that occur elsewhere within the Philippics. These are not formally prescriptive, but their repetition within the context of a proposal is notable.

When used in relation to senatorial practice, the word sententia is used in two senses; it could refer to either a speech delivered in the senate (cf. e.g. Phil. 1.3; 3.37; 5.5; 5.18), or it might refer specifically to the formal proposal within the oration itself (cf. e.g. Phil. 5.23: cum senatum vocasset adhibuissetque consularem qui sua sententia C. Caesarem hostem iudicaret; Phil. 7.23; OLD 5; Hellegouarc’h 1972: 119; Crawford 1984: 16-19). At Phil. 9.3 Cicero differentiates between the oration and the proposal itself to which he refers specifically as a sententia: quibus a te (Pansa) dictis nihil praeter sententiam dicerem, nisi P. Servilio, clarissimo viro, respondendum putarem. The sententiae, such as we have them in the Philippics, are subject to a series of formulae and these are rhetorical markers which identify that the speaker is delivering his formal proposal. The proposal followed a specific form and was subject to little variation given its formulaic parameters. The prescript usually identified the presiding magistrate, the subject for debate as introduced by the magistrate (the relatio), and invariably concluded with the verb censeo followed by a series of dependent clauses that constituted the proposal proper. This transitional device is a common feature within all the Philippic speeches that contain proposals (Phil. 3.37; 5.36; 5.40; 5.45; 5.53; 8.33; 9.48; 11.29; 13.49; 14.36). The phrasing provides a transition to the decree proper, which follows construed as an ut (uti) clause or as an accusative with infinitive construction. There could be a number of proposals contained within a single oration, but the proposal itself characteristically tended to be short and succinctly expressed. There might be a slight blurring between proposal and

---

183 This type of construction is a characteristic feature of Caesar’s Commentarii and his affectation of a formulaic and non-literary Latin: Leeman 1963: 176.
184 Other than its use as a rhetorical term.
argumentation as in the *Fifth Philippic* where five separate proposals are made, but the characteristic patterns of the proposal are of such similar nature that the proposal itself is demarcated by the form and tone.

There was certainly some freedom in the way a senator could respond in the course of senatorial debate; he need not limit himself to opining on matters placed before him, but could range over whatever he felt necessary regarding the *res publica* (cf. e.g. *Phil*. 3.37: *sententiaeque de summa re publica libere dici possint*). He was free to digress on any subject he wished to promote as long as he supported the proposal of someone who had spoken before him. *Philippic 7* provides an example: the speech opens with a response to the *rogatio* of the presiding magistrate, Pansa, and to the *rogatio* of a tribune who had addressed the senate with the intention of consulting on matters relating to the Appian Way, the Mint, and the Luperci. Disregarding these matters almost entirely, Cicero took the opportunity to reiterate his own views that peace with Antonius would be both dishonourable and dangerous. Cicero’s digressive response is made from section one through to the twenty-seventh and final section of the speech, at which point Cicero concludes his oration, giving his assent to the proposal made by P. Servilius with the formulaic phrase ‘on the business before us, I agree with P. Servilius’ (*quibus de rebus refers, P. Servilio adsentior*).186

A senator’s *sententia* in the course of the debate was in response to the presiding magistrate’s consultation on a particular matter.187 The presiding magistrate introduced the subject for debate, the *relatio*, accompanied by an explanation or discussion regarding the direction he wished the debate to take. This introduction of the debate was expressed by the phrase *verba facere*, to which senators were expected to reply, in response to a direct request (*rogatio*) from the presiding magistrate with their opinion (*sententia*) on the matter. A decree could be passed in two ways. If there was consensus, the decree was passed without a debate, that is, without any *sententiae* from the senators. Such was the vote to abolish the dictatorship after Caesar’s death.188 But if the matter was disputed the magistrate would go on and ask those

---

185 Gell. 4.10.8: *erat enim ius senatori, ut sententiam rogatus diceret ante quicquid vellet aliae rei et quoad vellet.*
186 The formula with which the speaker gave his assent to someone who had spoken before him; Mommsen *StR* 3: 979 n.3. Likewise the freedom to digress is apparent at *Phil*. 1.1: 3.13.
187 For procedure of senatorial debate see Talbert 1984; Bonnefond-Coudry 1989: 499-514. Examples of the process are described by Cicero at *Q. Fr.* 2.3; 2.6.
188 *Phil*. 1.3.
present to give their *sententiae*. The senator’s response in the course of the debate might include a proposal for a particular course of action, or alternatively the senator might indicate his assent or disapproval verbally with an opinion already expressed, a type of response expected from senior senators, or his assent by siding with a favoured senator, the likely means by which a junior senator might express his opinion.\(^{189}\) This would anticipate the final vote on a proposal which was between the proposal and its negative as determined by the presiding magistrate.

The structure of the speech leading up to the proposal is what we would expect. *Philippic* 10 follows the established form consisting of *exordium*, *argumentatio*, and the emotional *peroratio*, but the speech also functions as a long explanatory preamble to the proposal itself. The proposal, usually placed at the speech’s conclusion, is the goal towards which the orator strives and thus forms the climax of the oration. But this climax is stifled by the staid structure of the proposal and its legal and formulaic parameters. This certainly affects the rhetorical flow of the speech. The proposal does not lend itself to embellishment, although Cicero, of course, is able to impart some rhetorical flourishes which colour the reading or drive home the key points of his speech. We have a number of synonymous repetitions which do not appear to feature within other extant examples of decrees. The use of synonymia certainly allows Cicero to amplify his cause by lingering over the details of his protagonists’ actions. But Cicero is nonetheless concerned to replicate the conventional form of the proposal. The proposer did not have time to pause and reflect on his speech, to allow its effect to be felt, but had to deliver the proposal immediately as part of the speech. For this reason the proposals generally occur at the end of the oration where a diminishing rhetorical effect could least be felt. Yet the proposal could be made anywhere within the speech, as the proposal at *Phil*. 11.29 seems to indicate, but this was generally avoided in preference for the proposal following the *peroratio*. In *Philippic* 11 Cicero delivers what appears as the *peroratio* (*Phil*. 11.28) and then the proposal (*Phil*. 11.29-31), only to add on another emotionally charged attempt at swaying the senate (*Phil*. 11.32-40). The proposer too might have to improvise the proposal, but if he was familiar with the language, as the

\(^{189}\) Taylor 1969. A senator might re-enter the debate and change his view as D. Iunius Silanus did in the Catilinarian debate or he might re-enter the debate and reiterate his view, as Cicero appears to have done in the *Fourth Catilinarian* (*Sall. Cat*. 50.4).
leading speakers of the senate were, he could draw on a number of formulaic expressions around which he might construct his wording.

Scholars have generally assumed that Brutus’ command was approved following Pansa’s promotion of Brutus and Cicero’s subsequent advocacy, and that this command was an *imperium maius*.\(^{190}\) Woodman (1983: 133), however, has argued against the idea that the senate sanctioned Brutus’ authority based on the paucity of evidence: ‘there is very little concrete evidence for the earlier ratification of Brutus’ command apart from App. BC 3.63 and Dio 47.22.1-2’. In support of his argument Woodman suggests that both the commands granted to Brutus and Cassius were confirmed following Mutina, citing as evidence Velleius Paternicus’ repeated assertion of a simultaneous conferral of *imperium* after these battles: *profecti urbe atque Italia, intento ac pari animo sine auctoritate publica provincias exercitusque occupaverant et, ubicumque ipsi essent, praetexentes esse rem publicam, pecunias etiam, quae ex transmarinis provinciis Romam ab quaestoribus deportabantur, a volentibus acceperant. quae omnia senatus decretis comprensa et comprobata sunt*… (2.62); and again with a greater emphasis on the coincidence in time: *quem senatus paene totus adhuc e Pompeianis constans partibus post Antonii a Mutina fugam eodem illo tempore quo Bruto Cassioque transmarinas provincias decreverat* (2.73).

To accept Velleius’ assertion of a single conferral of *imperium* is to ignore a significant number of references within Cicero’s own writings which, though never providing a definitive assertion of Brutus’ command, nonetheless provide a cumulative body of evidence to support it.\(^{191}\) Cicero himself provides the most compelling evidence, most notably in the retrospective acknowledgement of Brutus’ command at *Phil*. 11.26: *quis igitur is est? aut M. Brutus aut C. Cassius aut uterque decernerem plane sicut multa ‘in consulibus, alterum ambosve,’ ni Brutum colligassemus in Graecia et eius auxilium ad Italiam vergere quam ad Asiam maluissemus, non ut ex ea acie respectum haberemus, sed ut ipsa acies subsidium haberet etiam transmarinum*. Cicero acknowledges that Brutus has been bound to

\(^{190}\) On the approval of the command see Frisch 1946: 222; Rice-Holmes 1928: 45 n.5; Syme 1939: 172; more tentatively Hall 2002: 278. And on the extent of the command, see Grant 1946: 33-36; 411-423; Last 1947: 162; Ehrenberg 1953. We do not know to what degree a proposal reflected the final resolution of the senate. Bonnefond-Coudry (1989: 570-73) argues that decrees were kept close to the original proposal.

\(^{191}\) Cf. evidence supporting the successful application of command for Brutus: *Phil*. 11.25-7, 36; 13.30, 32; *Fam*. 12.5.2
Greece (colligassemus), although there is no unequivocal acknowledgement of a senatorial decree.

On the Kalends of April Brutus wrote of his receipt of Philippic 10 and of his approval of the oration (Ad Brut. 2.3.5). There is no reference to his command, or its nature, as we might have assumed had the command been denied. Rather the letter contains further logistical demands regarding his provincial needs. Woodman (1983: 133) closes his argument by stating that Cicero did not refer to the success of the Tenth Philippic in his advocacy of Cassius in the Eleventh precisely because Cicero had not been successful in his proposal. Woodman’s argument, however, is an argument ex silentio, based on the absence of references. Such arguments are notoriously weak. By referring to prior example Cicero may well have pursued a line of argument based on precedent, but this was not necessarily an argument that Cicero wished to pursue. Similarly, the confirmation of Octavian with the title pro praetore, following Cicero’s successful proposal from Philippic 5, is only briefly mentioned at Phil. 10.23.10 despite the precedent which Octavian provided. The emphasis in Cicero’s argument lies elsewhere. Instead of referring to precedent Cicero illustrates Octavian’s initiative in repulsing the designs of Antonius (privatum de re publica consilium et factum: Phil. 10.23.10 above). D. Brutus too was honoured by the senate for his taking action on his own initiative (Phil. 5.37.9: nondum interposita auctoritate vestra, suo consilio atque iudico). Cicero’s immediate rhetorical strategy is to illustrate the spontaneity with which various military commanders were reacting against Antonius and his injurious actions, and to have those actions approved by the senate. There is a consistent rhetorical strategy being employed in which individuals are honoured for acting in the interests of the res publica and this finds its culmination in Cicero’s advocacy of Cassius (Phil. 11.28: ut omnia quae rei publicae salutaria essent legitma et iusta haberentur).

In Philippic 10 Cicero proposed a wide-ranging power and one without a temporal limit; it was, however, restricted by a defined geographical sphere, namely Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece. Now whether this had any practicable limitations is doubtful, as Brutus had been acting on his own initiative in any case and the conferral of command would have been retrospective. But Cicero later advocated an additional rider to Brutus’ command in order to match that of Cassius; an imperium maius over all transmarinae provinciae from ‘Greece to Egypt’ (Fam. 12.5.1; Liv. Per. 122). Velleius (2.62.2) may simply have conflated the two proposals; cf. Appian (4.58) who
says that Illyricum was added to the command of Brutus; but this assertion is to be treated cautiously because of its contradiction with App. 3.63.

On April 27, following receipt of the news from Mutina, P. Servilius proposed that Cassius be confirmed in his position against Dolabella (Ad Brut. 1.5.1). This is the decree to which Velleius refers, but Cicero added a provision to the proposal that advocated Brutus being given command against Dolabella if Brutus considered the action in the interests of the res publica (Ad Brut. 1.5.1: decrevi hoc amplius, ut tu, si arbitrarere utile exque re publica esse, persequere bello Dolabellam). Velleius was correct to have identified a simultaneous decree but he missed the earlier ratification of Brutus’ more limited command, or perhaps the earlier command was of less interest in relation to the later and more extraordinary imperium conferred after Mutina. In Cicero’s letter to Brutus, dated to 5 May, Cicero relates the senate’s extended instruction that Brutus move east against Dolabella should he need to do so, in effect redefining his imperium to allow Brutus to move beyond his more limited provincia. It is clearly an additional prerogative rather than a newly formulated instruction. Velleius may have been referring to this extension as opposed to the initial proposal. Appian and Dio fail to provide any clear indication either way. Dio (47.22.1-2) is explicit in confirming the date of Philippic 10 as the date on which Brutus was granted imperium in Greece and Macedonia, but this contradicts an earlier statement in which the commands for both Cassius and Brutus were granted only after Mutina (Dio 46.40.3). Appian’s (3.77-79) detail for this period is limited to two chapters and is contradictory (cf. App. 3.63; 4.58). Consequently, Woodman’s case that Philippic 10 was unsuccessful in having Brutus’ command legitimized is far from compelling.

The first part of Cicero’s proposal within Philippic 10 seeks recognition for Brutus’ actions in securing the Balkan Peninsula and so establishes the conditions for the conferral of imperium to follow. It forms a reiteration of Brutus’ past and present actions and a call for the senate to validate his actions through an honorific decree. Cicero has discussed a number of services which Brutus has done for the res publica through the course of the speech. Despite the fact that the assassination of Caesar is a significant contribution, no mention is made of this in the final proposal. Cicero had touched upon the need for the assassination to be publicly acknowledged (cf. Phil. 10.7), but he does not linger over such volatile sentiment. The second part of Cicero’s proposal, and the most significant, seeks confirmation of Brutus in his capacity as
proconsul, giving him the right to command and raise forces and to utilise the resources available to him in the Greek east. Lastly, a twofold sub-proposal advocates the acknowledgement of Hortensius’ actions in supporting Brutus and a reaffirmation of the senate’s decision to retain present governors in their respective provinces. There are three distinct sub-proposals within the one sententia, although all are interrelated, as opposed to the series of individual proposals at, for instance, Phil. 5.36-53.

(25.1-26.7) Brutus’ actions are to be commended by the senate as rightfully and patriotically done; that Brutus continues to undertake care for Macedonia, Illyricum and Graecia; that he has the right to acquire resources for the prosecution of the war.

25.1  quae cum ita sunt, quod C. Pansa consul verba fecit de litteris quae a Q. Caepione Bruto pro consule adlatae et in hoc ordine recitatae sunt, de ea re ita censeo: ...] The phrasing marks the conclusion of the speech and the beginning of the proposal proper (cf. Phil. 5.52; 11.40; 13.50; Cat. 4.23.1; Mur. 86; Dom. 142). The phrasing, together with other indicators contained within the prescript, provide an identifiable transition to the proposal. Once the senate had been summoned the presiding magistrate brought before it the particular item or items that were to be discussed. He would begin by making a speech that might briefly outline the subject for discussion, or he might make a longer and more complete speech as Cicero had done in the Catilinarian speeches in order to state his own views and the direction he wished the senate to follow. This discussion of the debate formed the relatio and gave the presiding magistrate the power to set the agenda, a powerful privilege of office.

C. Pansa: The presiding magistrate is referred to by name and his office is identified. The resulting senatus consultum is usually identified by the author and the presiding magistrate so both the proposer and magistrate became openly identified with the successful motion. There might be a rush to propose a motion and have the proposer’s name recorded in connection with a particular proposal. Cicero, however uncomfortable he might have felt about raising the youth to a position of influence, proposed that Octavian be granted imperium pro praetore with the right of speaking among the ex-praetors; Cicero, heavily criticized by Brutus for elevating Octavian, was subsequently outbid by an unknown source who proposed that Octavian speak among the consulars (Ad Brut. 1.15.4-13; RG 1.3f; Frisch 1946: 180). verba fecit de litteris: This introduction of the debate was expressed through the formulaic
phrase ‘has made words’ (‘quod verba fecit’). The formula ‘verba fecit’ identifies the theme or subject of the debate. In this case the consultation of the senate was made concerning the despatch from Brutus (‘de litteris’) which related his seizure of Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum. The meeting was summoned specifically for the recitation of the despatch (see Phil. 10.1.1). Letters, or forms of communication, addressed to the senate were normally the first item to be heard at a senatorial meeting, but as in this case, the letters could provide the sole reason for the summoning of the senate (cf. Phil. 10.1.2; Caes. B Civ. 1.1).

**a Q. Caepione Bruto pro consule:** Brutus is given his full name together with his most prestigious office. The use of Brutus’ formal name reflects the formality of the procedure, given that Brutus continued to be known by his pre-adoptive name. Q. Caepio Brutus appears to have been in usage without the gentilicium ‘Servilius’. It has been argued that the gentilicium was dropped altogether (cf. the anonymous De Praenominibus 2: quin etiam quaedam cognomina in nomen versa sunt, ut Caepio, namque hoc in Bruto nominis locum obtinuit; RRC 2.514-518; Raubitschek 1957: 17-21). However, Raubitschek has argued for the restoration of the name Servilius to the inscription on the honorific statue gifted to Brutus at Athens and placed alongside those of the liberators, Harmodius and Aristogeiton (Raubitschek 1957b: 18; cf. Shackleton Bailey 1976: 129-131). At Fam. 7.21.1 the name is shortened to simply Q. Caepio. In any case, Brutus continued to be known as M. Brutus and not M. Iunius Brutus (he continued to use ‘M. Brutus’ in his own letter headings in Ad Brutum Epistulae). In formal settings, as in the wording of this proposal, the praenomen, nomen and cognomen were used. However, within the Philippics conventions of naming are less rigid and the use of single names is recurrent and viewed as part of an impassioned and determined persuasive method (Adams 1978: 146).

**pro consule:** The title of pro consule was by virtue of his appointment to the governorship of Crete (Phil. 2.97; Plut. Brut. 19; App. 3.8; 3.12; 3.16; 3.35; 4.57; Rice-Holmes 1928: 196; Raubitschek 1957: 4). His office is emphasized and by implication his right to act beyond his provincia, a prerogative for a provincial governor when the situation was considered rei publicae causa. The emphasis allows Cicero to develop Brutus’ adherence to the traditions of the res publica (see Phil. 10.12.2; 10.14.9). Woodman (1983: 133 n.1) argued that ‘It cannot be inferred from imperium legitimum at 11.26 that Brutus’ command had been legalised since the phrase is explicitly applicable also to Cassius, whose Syrian command was a priori illegal. Cicero is pulling a fast one: the phrase
refers to their legitimate commands in Crete and Cyrenaica respectively’. However, Cicero’s dissembling of relevant detail does not hide the nature of Brutus’ power. Scholars have accepted that Cicero was applying the proconsular imperium to Brutus by virtue of his command in Crete, an acknowledgement that was surely identifiable to Cicero’s audience regardless of whether Cicero chose to discuss his formally designated provincia or not. Obviously Cicero chose not to pursue a difficult line of argument and so avoided any legal detail that might hinder his advocacy. There is, however, a tacit acknowledgement of Brutus’ command of which Brutus himself was in no doubt. de ea re ita censeo: The prescript was concluded with the verb censeo which introduces the proposal and which governs the series of dependent clauses that constitute the proposal proper. The dependent clauses of the decree proper are construed with an ut clause, or with an accusative and infinitive construction. The formulaic opening of the proposal proper is the most characteristic feature of our extant proposals and is a clear indicator that the proposal is about to be made. Cicero’s proposal is comprised of three separate items although the wording of the proposal would require only one vote (cf. Phil. 5.33 where Cicero clearly differentiates between five separate decrees which would then require five separate votes). The honorific recognition of Brutus’ actions is expressed via a number of formulaic phrases.

25.3 cum Q. Caepionis Bruti pro consule opera, consilio, industria, virtute difficillimo rei publicae tempore provincia Macedonia et Illyricum et cuncta Graecia et legiones, exercitus, equitatus, in consulum, senatus populeque Romani potestate sint, id Q. Caepionem Brutum pro consule bene et e re publica pro sua maiorumque suorum dignitate consuetudineque rei publicae bene gerendae fecisse; eam rem senatori populeque Romano gratam esse et fore; ...]: There is a long causal cum clause in which Cicero outlines, in general terms, Brutus’ actions since arriving in Greece and the reasons for senatorial approval. There is no chronological specification and this may reflect a general lack of detailed information regarding Brutus’ actions. More specific news would continue to filter in (cf. Ad Brut. 1.2.1). The singular eam rem refers to the actions of Brutus in their entirety (cf. Phil. 3.39). opera, consilio, industria, virtute: The asyndetic catalogue emphasizes the effort with which Brutus has been acting. This repetition is not strictly formulaic, but a sequence of which Cicero was fond (cf. the phrasing used of Hortensius at Phil. 10.26; of Octavian at Phil. 3.38: cumque opera, virtute, consilio C. Caesaris; cf. Phil.
of the legions at *Phil.* 3.39; 5.37). These are martial qualities, particularly in connection with *virtus* which forms the climax in the sequence. The constituent components of this catalogue also form recurrent threads through the speech (for *opera* see *Phil.* 10.26.8; for *consilium* see *Phil.* 10.8.11; 10.20.8; 10.23.3; 10.23.10; for *industria* see *Phil.* 10.13.4; and particularly for *virtus* because of its capacity to be applied in numerous contexts see *Phil.* 10.1.7; 10.9.5; 10.11.2; 10.11.4; 10.13.9; 10.14.4; 10.14.8; 10.16.6; 10.18.5; 10.20.8; 10.26.9. On *virtus* and its martial connections see also McDonnell 2006: 93-5. *difficilimo rei publicae tempore:* The phrasing serves to remind the audience of the necessity of Brutus’ actions in preventing C. Antonius from securing a foothold on the Balkan peninsula.

**Macedonia et Illyricum et cuncta Graecia:** From 146 Achaia was governed through the Macedonian governors, while some cities retained their free status (Lintott 1993: 24; Gruen 1984: 434). In 46, Achaia and Macedonia were demarcated as separate provinces; the former had been governed by the Macedonian governor until the province of Achaia was established, coinciding with Caesar’s veteran resettlement programme and the refounding of Corinth as its administrative centre. In 46, Ser. Sulpicius was appointed (probably) proconsul by Caesar’s designation (*Fam.* 6.6.10; 4.4.2; *MRR* 2: 299) and was replaced by M. Acilius Caninus until after 45 (*Fam.* 7.30.3; *MRR* 2: 326). The distinction between the two provinces fell into disregard following Caesar’s death and the province was not reorganised again until 27 (Engles 1990: 19-24). *Graecia:* The province of Achaia, although Cicero’s emphasis is upon the region as opposed to the province, because the province did not include Epirus or Akarnania (cf. *Fam.* 6.6.10; 7.3.3; see Paus. 7.16.10 for the naming of the province; on the status of Epirus and Akarnania see Hutton 2005: 54-64; cf. the comments by Oliver 1982: 147-153). *legiones, exercitus, equitatus:* Shackleton Bailey reads *auxilia* for *exercitus* based on the repetition of the phrasing at *Phil.* 10.24.1. The change seems unnecessarily conjectural. *consulum:* The phrasing appears as an assurance of Brutus’ deference to the consuls. Yet Hirtius and Pansa were otherwise engaged with their campaign at Mutina. Cicero’s proposal for Cassius in *Philippic* 11 by contrast consisted of a *maius imperium* that anticipated Cassius entering into other provinces to prosecute his campaign against Dolabella. Cassius’ command matched that of the consuls, while the earlier command proposed for Brutus was clearly subordinated to the consuls. *potestate:* This was yet to be
acknowledged by the senate despite Cicero’s depiction of Brutus having incorporated these forces into the *potestas* of the senate and people and of the consuls. This emphasis masks the illegality of Brutus’ actions, whatever Brutus’ intentions.  

**pro sua maiorumque suorum dignitate consuetudineque**: Reference to Brutus’ ancestors is a repeated point of allusion for Cicero through the speech (see *Phil.* 10.14.1).  

*Consuetudineque* contains an unusual enclitic given the irregular rhythm: short *e* + *que* (so King 1878: 242), and so a possible corruption.  

**esse et fore**: Recognition for both current actions and for those in the future. Brutus had been acting on his own initiative and so Cicero alludes to the actions that Brutus would continue to undertake, perhaps without senatorial authority. Brutus was acting regardless of any appointment, and would no doubt have continued to act with or without senatorial action. By conferring a legitimate status Cicero can use the appointment to bind Brutus to a role as determined by the senate.

26.1 *utique Q. Caepio Brutus pro consule provinciam Macedoniam, Illyricum cunctamque Graeciam tueatur, defendat, custodiat incoluemque conservet, eique exercitu quem ipse constituit, comparavit praesit, pecuniamque ad rem militarem, si qua opus sit, quae publica sit et exigi possit, utatur, exigatur pecuniasque a quibus videatur ad rem militarem mutuas sumat, frumentumque imperet, operamque det ut cum suis copiis quam proxime Italiam sit.* This was evidently an *imperium maius*, but the terminology was not articulated until Cicero proposed a similar command for Cassius at *Phil.* 11.26. The *imperium* that Cicero advocated for Brutus was to be greater than that of the governors of Illyricum and Macedonia in that the proconsular *imperium* of Hortensius was subordinated to that of Brutus, but this merely reflected the situation as it stood and Hortensius’ willing acceptance of Brutus’ leadership. Hortensius’ command was subordinated to Brutus so there was no clash of *imperia* requiring a *maius imperium* (regarding the *imperium*, see the comments by Ehrenberg 1953: 117; Grant 1946: 33). There was certainly some ambiguity surrounding Vatinius as there is no mention of his position here within the proposal. The difficulty may arise from the hesitant transfer of command, noted by Appian, but presented in a positive light at *Phil.* 10.13.10 above. It was an *imperium maius* but not an *imperium infinitum*, that is, an *imperium* that would have permitted Brutus to go beyond his *provincia* (cf. *Verr.* 2.2.8; 3.213; Ehrenberg 1953: 117).  

**utique** introduces the second of the proposals construed with the subjunctive, in marked contrast with the accusative and infinitive constructions which characterise
the first and third parts of the proposals. This proposal forms the most significant component of Cicero’s *sententia* empowering Brutus with the right of recruitment and providing for his army. **provinciam ... tueatur, defendat, custodiat incolumem conservet**: The asyndetic cola are largely synonymous terms, but echo language used earlier in the oration (cf. *Phil.* 10.14 above where Brutus has been described in the indicative as already holding Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece). *Provincia* is used in broad terms as opposed to a specifically geographical unit, limiting his authority to any one of Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece. **constituit, comparavit**: The indicative is used in contrast to the subjunctive isocola above to describe factual events. The phrasing, in contrast to the synonymia, above is used to give definition to Brutus’ actions. **pecuniasque a quibus**: In this instance, Cicero is proposing that Brutus draw from the resources available to him in the east, a prerogative of a proconsul and fitting in with provincial practice (cf. Plut. *Pomp.* 25.6 where Pompey had been given the right of drawing from provincial treasuries and from the *societates* of the tax collectors under the *lex Gabinia*). The provision of his army is newly introduced to the speech, but the provision could well be expected within the context of provincial allocation. Despite this, the financial resources available to Brutus were not enough and he appealed to Cicero to request the monies and forces required to meet the increasing expenses of his army: *duabus rebus egemus, Cicero, pecunia et supplemento; quarum altera potest abs te expediri ut aliqua pars militum istinc mittatur nobis vel secreto consilio adversus Pansam vel actione in senatu* (*Ad Brut.* 2.3.5). Cicero replied that he was unable to do so, because of Pansa’s reluctance (*Ad Brut.* 2.4.4). Subsequent to the allocation of a province a vote of supplies was decreed for the consular provinces in order to meet the provision of a governor’s expenses, known as *ornare provinciam* (*Att.* 3.24.1; 4.17.1; *Prov. Cons.* 28; *Balb.* 61; Balsdon 1937: 8-9; Jones 1950). Money was available to the commander through the *societates* of the *publicani* who provided the financial resources through a form of credit. **quam proxime Italian sit**: The occupation of Macedonia, Greece and Illyricum was in order to prevent the region from being used as either a refuge for the Antonii should Antonius and his brother Lucius withdraw from Italy, or as a platform from which to attack Italy (cf. *Phil.* 10.14.1). This was equally relevant to Brutus, who, if the republican cause should suffer a reverse, would be in a position to recover the loss. Cicero made repeated appeals to Brutus to bring his army back to Italy (*Ad Brut.* 1.9.3; 1.10.1; 1.14.2; and more emphatically at 1.15.12; 1.18.1).
cumque ex litteris Q. Caepionis Bruti pro consule intellectum sit, Q. Hortensi pro consule opera et virtute vehementer rem publicam adiutam omniaque eius consilia cum consiliis Q. Caepionis Bruti pro consule coniuncta fuisset, eamque rem magno usui rei publicae fuisset, Q. Hortensium pro consule recte et ordine exque re publica fecisset, senatuique placere Q. Hortensium pro consule cum quæstore proved quæstore et legatis suis provinciam Macedoniam obtinere quoad ei ex senatus consulto successum sit. The remainder of the proposal relates to Q. Hortensius and his role as governor of Macedonia. Hortensius’ actions in aiding the res publica are to be commended. He is to retain his status as proconsul of Macedonia until a new successor is appointed by the senate. consilia: Usually in the singular, but Cicero wants to illustrate the multiple reasons for their actions against C. Antonius. The proposal legitimizes Hortensius’ complicity in handing over his province to Brutus, as opposed to C. Antonius, the allotted governor of Macedonia, although the proposal does not identify the level of complicity, or the duration of their collusion (see introduction p. 9). At Phil. 3.38 Cicero proposed that present governors retain their respective provinces until new governors were appointed (Fam. 12.22a.1; 12.25.2). recte et ordine exque re publica: The expression is formulaic in expressing actions as having been done well (cf. Phil. 3.38; 5.36, and in relation to a written text cf. Phil. 10.5 above). The form exque occurs in official language (cf. Quinct. 28). senatuique placere: Again the phrasing is a characteristic feature common to other proposals within the Philippics (cf. Phil. 3.39; 5.43). The phrasing here was included in the final form of the decree as placed in the Aerarium and is typical of an official and formulaic language (Fam. 8.8.5). quoad… successum sit: The phrasing reiterates the decree passed on 20 December requiring current governors to remain in possession of their respective provinces, until new governors could be appointed. The phrasing is almost identical with that of Cicero’s original proposal at Phil. 3.38 where Cicero proposed the abrogation of Antonius’ provincial allocations (senatum ad summam rem publicam pertinere arbitrari a D. Bruto et L. Planco ... itemque a ceteris qui provincias obtinenter obtineri ex lege Iulia quoad ex senatus consulto cuique eorum successum sit; App. 3.49; Fam. 12.22a; see Phil. 10.17.9). Cicero’s reference is to his successful motion, and its final place within the proposal reinforces the legitimacy by reference to precedent. There is no indication that the senate was preparing for a reallocation of provincial duties. Cicero has reiterated the senate’s decision that current governors retain their
respective provinces. The validity of this decision is however undermined by Brutus’ appointment.
Introduction to Philippic 11

Philippic 11 was delivered on the second day of debate following the receipt of news of the death of Trebonius at the hands of Dolabella. We do not know, however, how much Cicero took part in the first day’s deliberation, beyond giving his assent to Calenus’ proposal that Dolabella be declared a hostis (Phil. 11.15.5). The debate of the preceding day may account for a less than complete exordium within Philippic 11, since the audience was well aware of events that had transpired.

Cicero carefully establishes the conflict in the opening lines of the speech by juxtaposing the personalities of the key figures involved. Dolabella and Antonius are clearly denigrated by consistent and repeated characterisation, by comparison with negative exempla from Rome’s past, and by association with others equally despicable. Cicero defines the forthcoming struggle as a conflict against capita nata ... taeterrima et spurcissima and geminum in scelere par, invisiitatum, inauditum, ferum, barbarum. At stake is the free functioning of the res publica, where its leading citizens play a role in guiding the state: qui libere de re publica sensimus, qui dignas nobis sententias diximus, qui populum Romanum liberum esse voluimus. In creating a contrast between the central figures under discussion within the debate, Cicero establishes a context into which he can later introduce Cassius as a foil to Dolabella, and in turn, Antonius. Antonius is given a central role, despite his rather limited involvement in the circumstances of the east, but his inclusion establishes the nature of the threat the res publica faces. The emphasis on an opportunistic and barbaric conflict with Dolabella is established within the exordium. This emphasis upon barbarity allows Cicero to establish a sense of urgency which will compel the senate to act, particularly when Dolabella’s actions are paralleled with Antonius’ intended actions. Cicero will advocate urgent action, long prepared by narrative and argumentation when he belatedly introduces Cassius into the speech at §29. The late introduction of Cassius to the speech presents him as the most likely and practical source of resistance to Dolabella.

Cassius’ late, and seemingly unrelated introduction into the speech led Frisch (1946: 228) to suggest tentatively that Cicero may well have spoken on the first day of debate, and subsequently melded two speeches into one ‘for the first part does not
deal with the matter under debate’. Frisch identified a significant structural problem with the belated introduction of Cassius within the speech. Yet Cicero’s approach to the speech reflects the very real difficulty he faced in having Cassius promoted, and the more likely reason behind the oration’s structure was the significant political opposition to the appointment of Cassius. Both Calenus and L. Julius Caesar had spoken before Cicero and advocated alternative commands against Dolabella (*Phil*. 11.17-21); and we know that Pansa opposed Cassius’ appointment; he reiterated his opposition before a *contio* following the meeting of the senate (*Fam*. 12.7.1). This political opposition has a conspicuous effect on the way Cicero presents his argument and consequently dictates the approach Cicero employs in the construction of his speech. No mention is made of Cassius within the *exordium*, despite the fact that the command for Cassius was the ultimate purpose of the speech. Cassius was already gathering support in the east against Dolabella and was acting on his own initiative. He would probably continue to operate thus for some time, given the distance involved and the cumbersome delays in the relaying of information. But the more support Cassius could muster in the east, the more he could dispense with the necessity of senatorial support, particularly when the resources of the *res publica* were employed in opposition to Antonius at Mutina.

**STRUCTURE**

I. *Exordium*: Outline of the current situation (§§1-3.8).
   i. A lament for Trebonius (§1-1.4).
   ii. The partnership between Dolabella and Antonius (§3.1-3.8).
   iii. The criminality of Dolabella’s actions (4.1-3.1).

II. *Narratio*:
   i. The account of Trebonius’ murder at the hands of Dolabella (§§3.9-10.5).
   ii. A comparison of the character of Dolabella with that of Antonius, and a catalogue of their adherents (§§10.6-14.12).

III. *Refutatio* (§§15.1-25.8).
   i. An endorsement of Calenus’ proposal to declare Dolabella a *hostis* (§15.1-15.9).
   ii. Refutation of the two previous proposals:
a. L. Caesar’s proposal for Servilius is opposed on two grounds:
   i. Precedents are raised to illustrate incongruity with tradition
   ii. It was inappropriate for a *privatus* to be appointed against
        Dolabella ($§$19.1-20.16).

b. Calenus’ proposal that the consuls take command is similarly
   opposed on two grounds:
   i. The siege at Mutina demands the consuls’ attention
      ($§$20.16-24.16).
   ii. Delay is detrimental to the current situation ($§$25.1-25.8).

IV. *Confirmatio* I: Cassius is introduced and the general situation outlined. Cassius
   is advocated since he has an army in the region ($§$26.1-26.18).

V. *Peroratio*: Cassius acts in accordance with natural law, and thus in accordance
   with the will of the gods ($§$27.1-28.9).

VI. *Sententia* ($§$29.1-31.12). Cicero proposes that:
   i. Cassius be granted command in Syria.
   ii. Right of command over legions in neighbouring provinces.
   iii. Right to raise and requisition requirements for the war.
   iv. The grant should be recognised as a *maius imperium*.
   v. The senate’s right to honour eastern kings who come to the aid of
      Cassius.
   vi. Consuls to address the issue of the eastern command upon completion
       of their campaign at Mutina.
   vii. Present governors to retain their respective provinces until new
        governors are appointed.

VII. *Confirmatio* II ($§$32.1-38.6).
   i. There are resources available to Cassius in the east ($§$32.1-35.9).
   ii. Cassius is a deserving recipient of the command ($§$35.1-36.10).
   iii. That offence may be given to the veterans is a fallacy ($§$37.1-38.6).

VIII. *Peroratio* II ($§$ 38.7-39.11).
   i. The senate is not beholden to the veterans ($§$38.7-38.9).
   ii. There is a new generation of legionaries who are fighting a war for all
       nations ($§$39.1-39.11).
Our rhetorical handbooks discuss two approaches to the *exordium*: the *insinuatio* and the *principium*. The *insinuatio* required a cautious approach to winning the audience by means of obscuring the orator’s argument when the cause was difficult to present and the audience hostile (cf. *Phil.* 10.1 above; *Rhet. Her.* 1.6; 1.11; *Inv. Rhet.* 1.20; Quint. 4.1.42). The *principium*, by contrast, contained a direct appeal for the audience’s favour, because the audience was already, to some extent, predisposed to the cause. Cicero employs the *insinuatio* in his approach to *Philippic* 11, by avoiding any reference to Cassius. Rather, attentiveness and receptiveness are initially attained by an emotive narration of Trebonius’ fate at the hands of Dolabella. Cicero establishes a setting in which he can focus on the characterisation of Dolabella, a characterisation that allows Cicero to draw out the issues involved in the current situation, before introducing Antonius as Dolabella’s counterpart; together they form a pairing whose intention is to crush a free *res publica*.

Cicero’s approach to *Philippic* 11 is in marked contrast to the proposal of Brutus to command in Greece, which forms the subject of the *Tenth*. His success (and support of Brutus) was to be tempered by his failure to convince the senate of Cassius’ right to command, despite the similarities by which Brutus and Cassius acquired their military resources. Constancy of character was a central feature in the characterisation of Brutus in *Philippic* 10. Brutus’ philosophic sympathies could be highlighted in order to support this characterisation. However, the presentation of Cassius’ character was evidently more difficult given Cicero’s apparent avoidance in *Philippic* 11 of sustained character portrayal. The pairing of the two men was natural: brothers-in-law, conspicuous by the primacy of their praetorial offices, and co-leaders of the conspiracy against Caesar. The approach to each speech however is contrastive, the *Tenth Philippic* commencing by means of *principium* and the *Eleventh* commencing by means of the *insinuatio*.

In regard to style, Cicero’s narrative approach largely departs from the precept that the *exordium* should avoid stylistic splendour: *splendoris et festivitatis et concinnitudinis minimum, propterea quod ex his suspicio quaedam apparationis*
atque artificiosae diligentiae nascitur, quae maxime orationi fidem, oratori adimit auctoritatem (Inv. Rhet. 1.25). The context and dramatisation of Trebonius’ death excluded festivitas and splendor, but the balanced pairing of words and the extended use of antithesis, together with the periodic sentence structure of the opening are characteristic of concinnitas.

The exordium of Philippic 11 poses some difficulty due to its nonconformity to the principles of the exordium as defined by our rhetorical treatises (for which see Phil. 10.1). There are no introductory comments regarding the content and direction of the speech, and no clear outline of the themes to be developed through the course of its delivery. Despite this apparent inconsistency with rhetorical precept, the exordium nonetheless cultivates a prejudice against Cicero’s opponents through the character delineation of Dolabella and Antonius, in contrast to Trebonius and to those who desire a free res publica. By beginning in this way Cicero establishes the urgency required to meet the nature of the threat posed by the two men. The opening of Philippic 11 establishes Trebonius’ relation to the state. Cicero then emphasizes his own personal relationship with Trebonius. The contrast between the viri boni and their adversaries is explicitly conveyed. Trebonius’ death, of course, left an opening for command in the east and consequently his death establishes a broader context for Cicero’s argument. On the exordium in general see Philippic 10.1 above.

(§1.1-1.4) A lament for Trebonius.

11.1.1 magno in dolore, patres conscripti, vel maerore potius, quem ex crudeli et miserabili morte C. Treboni, optimi civis moderatissimique hominis, accepimus, inest tamen aliquid quod rei publicae profuturum putem. The speech begins with an immediate reference to the death of Trebonius, news of which was discussed on the preceding day’s debate. The structure of the sentence concludes on a forward-looking note, underlined with alliteration (quod rei publicae profuturum putem). The murder seems to have been committed about the middle of January, since the senate declared Dolabella a hostis by the beginning of March (Fam. 12.15.2; Liv. Per. 119; 121; App. 3.61; 4.58). magno in dolore… vel maerore potius: Dolore and maerore are closely synonymous, but dolor is characterised by a more impasioned expression of distressed sorrow, whereas maeror is ‘mourning’. Dolor is not used to
convey the sense of a response to an injustice suffered, because news of the outrage had been mitigated by the discussion of the first day of debate (OLD 3; Gotoff 1993: 13). The rephrasing (from *dolore* to *maerore*) is an example of *correctio*, an improvement of a remark in which Cicero tempers his initial outrage with a more considered and rational response to Trebonius’ death. This will support the characterisation of Trebonius’ Stoic endurance of the tortures that follow within the narrative.

**C. Treboni:** C. Trebonius (RE 6) was consul suffect in 45; *MRR* 2: 330. Trebonius was a conspicuous member of the conspiracy by virtue of his seniority and by his long serving attachment to Caesar. His role in the assassination was to lead Antonius aside, and keep him in conversation while the remaining conspirators dealt the death blows to the Dictator (*Phil.* 2.34; *Fam.* 10.28.1; App. 2.117; Dio 44.19; Plutarch mistakenly attributes this role to D. Brutus at *Caes.* 66.4, but corrects his error at *Brut.* 17.2; for which see Pelling 1979: 79). Trebonius was a *homo novus*, the son of an *eques* who served as legate to Caesar in Gaul and who was marked out for future success (*Caes.* BG 7.81.6; Syme 1939: 94). As tribune in 55, Trebonius proposed the law granting five-year proconsular commands to Crassus and Pompey (*Liv.* Per. 105; Vell. Pat. 2.46.2; *MRR* 2: 217), and in 45 he was rewarded for his continual support for Caesar with his appointment as consul suffect. He was nominated thereafter to the proconsulship of Asia where he set out almost immediately after Caesar’s death (App. 3.2; *Fam.* 12.13.3; Frisch 1946: 64). Antonius expressed an undisguised pleasure at hearing the news of Trebonius’ death in his letter to Hirtius and Octavian, claiming that he was justly slain for his involvement in the assassination of Caesar: *cognita morte C. Treboni non plus gavisus sum, quam dolui ... dedisse poenas sceleratum cineri atque ossibus clarissimi viri et apparuisse numen deorum intra finem anni vertentis at iam soluto supplicio parricidii aut impendente laetandum est* (*Phil.* 13.22.10-14). **moderatissimique**: The quality of ‘self-control’ in Trebonius will be contrasted with the characterisation of Dolabella and Antonius to follow. The doubling of nouns and adjectives (*dolore ... maerore*, *crudele ... miserabile*, *optimi ... moderatissimique*) in the first sentence is noteworthy, as Cicero lingers over his lament for Trebonius. **accepimus**: The senate was summoned after news reached Rome of Dolabella’s murder of Trebonius. The senate’s response was to declare Dolabella a *hostis* at Calenus’ instigation (*Phil.* 11.15.6). We do not know whether Cicero spoke on the preceding day at any length and there is no indication, within this speech, that he did so. The discussion was continued into the second day in
order to determine what provisions were to be made regarding Dolabella; during this
debate Cicero delivered *Philippic* 11.

($\S$1.4-3.1) The partnership between Dolabella and Antonius.

1.4 *perspeximus enim quanta in eis qui contra patriam scelerata arma ceperunt inesset immanitas.* The phrasing of taking up arms against the *patria* is frequently used within the *Philippics* to criticize Antonius and his supporters (*Phil.* 2.53; 2.72; 8.8; 13.14; 13.16; 13.39). *perspeximus*: First person plural verbs emphasize the collectivity of the senate and their subsequent condemnation of Dolabella. *contra patriam*: As opposed to those taking up arms *liberandam rem publicam* (cf. *Phil.* 11.39). *scelerata arma*: A thematic feature within the speech is the presentation of Antonius and Dolabella as criminals who intended a general slaughter (cf. *Phil.* 3.33). *immanitas*: ‘Savage character’ (*OLD* 1). *Immanitas* is not personalised in this context but an abstract trait that dehumanises the enemy (cf. *Phil.* 5.37). The depiction of the murder of Roman citizens was reserved for Cicero’s chief political enemies. He had accused both Verres (*Ver.* 1.45) and Clodius (*Asc.* 84.7) of such murders, and repeatedly Antonius, who threatened whole towns with tortures and crucifixions (*Phil.* 13.21; 14.8). For cruel and unusual punishment as a *locus* for invective within Cicero’s works see Merrill 1975: 169-82.

1.5 *nam duo haec capita nata sunt post homines natos taeterrima et spurcissima, Dolabella et Antonius: quorum alter effecit quod optarat, de altero patefactum est quid cogitaret.* Dolabella and Antonius are paired together for the first time; a device we find recurrent in Cicero’s *Eleventh Philippic* and used in counterpoint to the pairing of Brutus and Cassius who reflect correct Roman conduct (cf. *Phil.* 11.28.2). The pairing is reinforced through the doubling of superlatives (*taeterrima et spurcissima*). *capita nata sunt*: The wording forms the word figure of synecdoche (where the whole of something is signified by one of its parts). *Caput* has legal connotations; it is a term that denotes ‘one’s life as forfeit for various offences’ (*OLD* 5). *Dolabella*: P. Cornelius Dolabella was consul suffect, according to Caesar’s designation for 44 (*RE* 141; *MRR* 2: 317). The Dolabellae were an old patrician family with a consul attested as early as 283 (*MRR* 1: 188). Resurgence in the family’s political fortunes, coinciding with the rise of Sulla, witnessed a consulship and praetorship held simultaneously in 81, from which time the family
comes into prominence (MRR 2: 74; 76; see Gruen 1966 for the rise of the Dolabellae; on the career of Dolabella see T-P. 4: xcv-ci; Treggiari 2007: 92-99). Dolabella first comes to notice in 51 when he was appointed to the quindecemviri sacris faciendis, unexpectedly defeating the Pompeian consul for 49, L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus for the position (Fam. 8.4.1). In 50, Dolabella was married to Cicero’s daughter, Tullia, which poses some problem for Cicero, who is forced to confront his former relationship with Dolabella (for the marriage and Cicero’s personal relationship with Dolabella see Phil. 11.10.1 n.). In 49, Dolabella appears on Caesar’s staff as a legate in the civil war, serving without particular distinction (MRR 2: 267). He lost a fleet off Illyricum to the Pompeian commanders Octavius and Libo (Dio 41.40.1; Suet. Iul. 36), but this failed to dent the confidence of Caesar, who was complicit in Dolabella’s election to the tribunate. After his return to Italy from the civil wars, Dolabella imitated the model of Clodius and effected an adoption into a plebeian family in order to stand for the tribunate, an office he held in 47. Cicero was to write of Dolabella’s tribunate with embarrassment and regret (Att. 11.12.4; 11.14.2; 11.15.3; Shackleton Bailey 1976: 29ff; for his tribunate see MRR 2: 287). Even worse, there was rumour that Dolabella was to erect a statue of Clodius: audimus enim de statua Clodi. generumne nostrum potissimum vel hoc vel tabulas novas? (Att. 11.23.3). There is no other evidence that such a statue was ever raised, but Dolabella’s adoption into a plebeian family, coupled with his demagogic political programme, signalled imitation of Cicero’s rival Clodius (Tatum 1999: 242). References to the adoptive nomenclature are few and uncertain; regardless, he continued to be known as P. Cornelius Dolabella; for the three known examples of the adoptive nomenclature see Shackleton Bailey 1976: 29-32; 112. Caesar found his personality and aptitude attractive (Att 16.9.3: Dolabella tuo nihil scito mihi [sc. Caesari] esse iucundius. hanc adeo habebo gratiam illi; neque enim aliter facere poterit. tanta eius humanitas, is sensus, ea in me est benevolentia), and would use him to negotiate with Cicero in the divisive conflict with Pompey. Dolabella acted as an intermediary between Cicero and Caesar, despite Cicero’s disappointment at Dolabella’s decision to join Caesar (Fam. 16.12.5). In 48, he wrote to Cicero urging him to join Caesar’s camp (very likely on Caesar’s instruction: Fam. 9.9; Shackleton Bailey 1977: 498), or failing that, to retire from the conflict altogether. And later in the year it was through Dolabella that Caesar informed Cicero that he was free to return to Rome (Att. 11.7.2).
Dolabella was marked out for prominence; Caesar allowed him to rise through the *cursus honorum* to the consulship without having held either the praetorship or quaestorship. In 44 he was nominated to the consulship by Caesar, who intended Dolabella to succeed him following his departure for Parthia. He was perhaps thirty or thirty-one at the time of his appointment (Sumner 1971: 364; Syme 1980: 432-3; Gelzer 1968: 309 has Dolabella under thirty in the year of his consulship). The year 44 signalled a prominent deviation from the *lex Annalis*, with both Antonius and Dolabella marked out for the consulship despite being below minimum age and without either having held the praetorship (Sumner 1971b: 363-5). What is perhaps surprising is the lack of attention this receives within contemporary sources. It may well be that under Caesar the senate was becoming increasingly habituated to passing such decrees. At *Phil*. 5.46, Cicero himself made the proposal that L. Egnatuleius be permitted to stand for office without holding the prerequisite office: *ob eam causam placere uti L. Egnatuleio triennio ante legitimum tempus magistratus petere, capere, gerere liceat* (*Phil*. 5.46). Sumner makes the observation: ‘This is presented quite casually, not as any startling innovation’ (Sumner 1971b: 370-1). However, Cicero makes the point that such an action was a prerogative of the senate, an honour to be acknowledged by senatorial decree and not to be determined by the partisans of Antonius.

On 1 January 44, Antonius interceded in the election in an attempt to prevent Dolabella from gaining office. For what reasons we do not know; some personal animosity perhaps arose from Dolabella’s popular agitation in 47 while Antonius was Master of Horse at Rome in Caesar's absence (see *Phil*. 11.2.2 n.). The matter was to be discussed in the senate on 15 March, and so unresolved at the time of the Dictator’s death (*Phil*. 2.79-90; 88). Immediately following the assassination, Dolabella appeared in the trappings of a consul, ready to assume the position made vacant by Caesar’s assassination (*Phil*. 2.79-84; Vell. Pat. 2.58.3; Plut. *Ant*. 11.2; App. 2.122; Dio 43.51.8). He appeared with the liberators, pretending to share in the conspiracy (App. 2.122), no doubt in the hope of gaining leverage with the liberators to secure his position against the recently hostile Antonius. His position was in fact ratified at the meeting of 17 March when Caesar’s designations were validated (*Phil*. 1.31; 2.79; 82-3; 3.9; 5.9; Plut. *Ant*. 11.2-3; Dio 43.51.8; 44.22.1; App. 2.122; 3.35; Vell. Pat. 2.58.3). Dolabella initially proved himself antipathetic towards pro-Caesarian demonstrators following Caesar’s death. He suppressed demonstrations in the city...
which were directed against the assassins (Suet. *Jul.* 85; *Fam.* 12.1.1; *Att.* 14.15.1; App. 3.7-9), and demolished a column which had been set up to honour Caesar by Amatius, a populist agitator, who claimed kinship with Caesar. Dolabella’s suppression of his activities elicited enthusiastic praise from both Cicero and Atticus. Atticus went so far as to claim that Dolabella’s actions constituted an *aristeia* (*Att.* 14.15.1; 14.16.2; *Fam.* 12.1.1; *Phil.* 1.5; 1.30); while Cicero claimed a share in his policy (*Fam.* 9.14.1; *Att.* 16.15.1).

By May, however, Dolabella was in collusion with Antônio and relations with Cicero were beginning to sour (cf. *Att.* 14.18.1 written May 9). Cicero was nonetheless appointed to Dolabella’s staff, an appointment that allowed Cicero to absent himself from Italy; an eventuality that never transpired (*Att.* 15.11.4; 14.13.4; 14.22.2; Plut. *Cic.* 43). By September Cicero was accusing Antônio of soliciting Dolabella’s support through bribery (*Phil.* 2.79; 107), but it was not until November that Cicero became openly hostile to Dolabella. He accused both Dolabella and Antônio of embezzling funds contained within the Temple of Ops, an amount totalling 700 million sesterces, which had been marked out for Caesar’s Parthian campaign (*Att.* 14.18.1; and more openly at *Att.* 16.15.1-2). According to Nicolaus of Damascus (28.110) the treasury was emptied within two months of Caesar’s death.

After presiding over the meeting of 2 September (*Phil.* 1.27) Dolabella set out for his province. He was at Formiae in late October, but thereafter disappears from the sources while in transit. By the year’s end, or early January, Dolabella had entered Asia, under the pretext of making his way to the province of Syria (App. 3.24-6; *Ad Brut.* 1.11.1). He informed Trebonius of his intention to pass through to Ephesus where he would disembark by sea. Trebonius made arrangements to provide for Dolabella and his army but denied him entry to Smyrna. But during the following night Dolabella turned back, took Smyrna by surprise and put Trebonius to death (cf. *Phil.* 12.21; 12.25; 13.22; 14.8; *Fam.* 12.12.1; *Ad Brut.* 2.3.1; *Liv. Per.* 119; *Vell. Pat.* 2.69.1; App. 3.26; Frisch 1946: 223-224).

1.7  **L. Cinna crudelis, C. Marius in iracundia perseverans, L. Sulla vehemens; neque ullius horum in ulciscendo acerbitas progressa ultra mortem est; quae tamen poena in civis nimis crudelis putabatur.**  Precedents are named with whom Dolabella and Antônio are unfavourably compared. Cinna, Marius and Sulla had each led violent purges against their political opponents at Rome, and are used repeatedly as examples of tyranny throughout the *Philippics* (*Phil.* 2.108; 5.17;
8.7; 13.1; 14.23). Dolabella and Antonius are added to this infamous list. **L. Cinna:** L. Cornelius Cinna was consul from 87-84 (RE 106; MRR 2: 45-6; 53). **C. Marius:** C. Marius was seven times consul in 107, from 104–100 and finally in 86 (MRR 1: 550-1; 558; 562; 567; 570-1; 574; 2: 53). **L. Sulla:** L. Cornelius Sulla was consul in 88 and 80 (RE 392; MRR 2: 39-40; 79). Cicero passes over Sulla’s outrageous treatment of Cicero’s own relative, Marius Gratidianus (Shackleton Bailey 1986: 271 n.1; Leg. 2.56-57; V. Max. 9.2.1). The characterization of Cinna, Marius and Sulla is restrained in this context in order to emphasize the following condemnation of Dolabella and Antonius. The main clause is delayed but more importantly these precedents will support the following premise and provide a link to the following line of thought.

2.1 **ecce tibi geminum in scelere par, invisitatum, inauditum, ferum, barbarum.** An emotively charged catalogue in which the words become increasingly negative. **ecce** is dramatic; it conjures a visual image. **invisitatum:** An uncommon word and despite the consensus of the MSS Vbnsv (which give invisitatum) it is to be preferred given the sense of the pairing; cf. similar contextual coupling at Liv. 4.33: inaudita ante id tempus invisitataque; and 5.37: invisitato atque inauditu hoste. The conjecture elicited the same confusion at Off. 3.38: corpus homini mortui vidit magnitudine invisitata (cf. comments by Dyck 1996: 541; Marc. 1.4).

2.2 **itaque quorum summum quondam inter ipsos odium bellumque memoriae, eodem postea singulari inter se consensu et amore devinxit improbissimae naturae et turpissimae vitae similitudo.** Cicero lingers over the relationship between Antonius and Dolabella through the doubling of words. The **odium bellumque** contrasts with **consensu et amore**, implying that the temperaments of Dolabella and Antonius are easily shifted. Their past differences have been resolved through the similarity of their nature, similarly expressed through the doubling of **improbissimae naturae et turpissimae vitae.** **itaque:** The conjunction is inferred from **geminum in scelere par** above. **inter ipsos odium bellumque memoriae:** Cicero could point to a number of quarrels between the two men. The most recent was Antonius’ attempted obstruction of Dolabella’s election to the consulship (cf. Phil. 2.79: qua in re quanta fuerit uterque vestrum perfidia in Dolabellam, quis ignorat?). On Antonius’ attempt see Phil. 2.79-82; 2.88; 3.9; 5.9; Plut. Ant. 11.2-3. As augur, Antonius declared the election of Dolabella in violation of the auspices, an obstruction Cicero alleged had been long premeditated (Phil. 2.83).
Caesar’s death prevented any resolution to Antonius’ opposition despite Caesar’s intention to discuss the issue at the meeting on the Ides of March (Phil. 2.88). There had been enmity between Antonius and Dolabella from 47, the year of Dolabella’s tribunate, when Dolabella led a campaign for the cancellation of debts and a reduction of rents (Att. 11.12.3). Antonius violently suppressed the rioting in Caesar’s absence (Dio 42.29-33; Liv. Per. 113; MRR 2: 287). That enmity was exacerbated when Antonius, on the Kalends of January 44, alleged that Dolabella had seduced his wife (Phil. 2.99; Plut. Ant. 10). Yet by the end of May, coinciding with Antonius’ return from Campania, Dolabella and Antonius were acting in concert.

2.5 ergo id quod fecit Dolabella in quo potuit multis idem minatur Antonius. Dolabella provides the model which Antonius’ actions were certain to replicate, but on a more imposing scale. ergo denotes a necessary consequence: Dolabella’s cruel murder of Trebonius is a wake up call for the senate, which must guard against Antonius’ intentions (also Wooten 1986: 144).

2.6 sed ille cum procul esset a consulibus exercitibusque nostris neque dum senatum cum populo Romano conspirasse sensisset, fretus Antoni copiis ea scelera susceptit quae Romae iam suscepta arbitrabatur a socio furoris sui. A narrative of Dolabella’s actions follows, in which Cicero illustrates what Antonius himself will do given the opportunity. cum: Dolabella entered Asia in early January, before the senate sent armies north to Mutina to relieve D. Brutus. iam suscepta: Denotes the completion of an action prior to Dolabella’s actions. Cicero suggests that Dolabella would have expected Antonius to have marched on Rome, and purge their political opponents, as part of a preconceived plan between the two. Antonius’ march, however, had been halted by the desertions of the Martian and Fourth legions to Octavian. furoris sui: Antonius’ psychology was earlier referred to as a furor in connection with his intention to march on Rome (cf. Phil. 10.21.1 n.).

(§3.1-3.8) The criminality of Dolabella’s actions.

3.1 quid ergo hunc aliud moliri, quid optare censetis aut quam omnino causam esse belli? hunc aliud: Cicero shifts the focus to Antonius. The questions are left unanswered, nor does Cicero specifically detail Antonius’ motivations. He does, however, illustrate the consequences should Antonius carry out his intentions.
omnino causam esse belli?: Similarly, Cicero shifts the focus of the conflict with Dolabella in the east, to the war with Antonius in Italy.

3.2 omnis, qui libere de re publica sensimus, qui dignas nobis sententias diximus, qui populum Romanum liberum esse voluimus, statuit ille quidem non inimicos, sed hostis: maiora tamen in nos quam in hostem supplicia meditatur: mortem naturae poenam putat esse, iracundiae tormenta atque cruciatum.

Cicero shifts from second to first person verbs in order to emphasize the shared attitude of the Roman people and senate. omnis is omitted by D. but suits the context and provides the subject of the isocola that follow. Roman virtues, given expression through the tricola, are contrasted with Antonius’ concentrated desire for punishment. dignas nobis sententias diximus: Cicero is referring to a characteristic of senatorial debate, namely freedom of speech. inimicos, sed hostis: An example of correctio, where Cicero makes emphatic the nature and threat of the enemy with whom the senate must deal. However, Antonius was not yet declared a hostis; only after the Philippics were Antonius and his followers declared hostes (Ad Brut. 1.3a; 1.5; Fam. 12.10.1; Vell. Pat. 2.64.3; Liv. Per. 119). Cicero nonetheless treats Antonius as such by his continual comparison with Dolabella. maiora tamen … cruciatum.: ‘and now he is meditating on punishments of death, harsher for us than for an enemy: he thinks death is what we owe to nature, but torments and torture are what we owe to his anger’: thus Cicero builds on the association of Antonius with furor from above. Hyperbaton delays supplicia (‘punishments’) from maiora until after in nos quam in hostem for dramatic effect, which is emphasized by the quickened rhythm. There is a shift from first person plural to the third person singular in order to isolate Antonius syntactically. mortem naturae poenam: Cf. Mil. 101.3 where Milo does not consider death to be a punishment: [Milo] exsilium ibi esse putat ubi virtuti non sit locus; mortem naturae finem esse, non poenam; cf. Cat. 4.7.12; Scau. 5.2.

3.7 qualis igitur hostis habendus est is a quo victore, si cruciatus absit, mors in benefici parte numeretur? Cicero continues to treat Antonius as a hostis. In doing so Cicero introduces a subtext that justifies actions against Antonius. The use of a rhetorical question allows Cicero to use a paradox: death as beneficium.
The virtues of the narratio are typically listed as brevity, clarity and accuracy: *ut brevis, ut dilucida, ut veri similis sit; quae quoniam fieri oportere scimus*, *quamadmodum faciamus, cognoscendum est* (Rhet. Her. 1.14); *brevis, lucida, veri similis* (Quint. 4.2.31; cf. Inv. Rhet. 1.28; De Orat. 2.80; Orat. 122). The narrative that follows (through to §10.6) is far from brief. Obfuscation and clarity are intermixed within *Philippic* 11 depending on whether particular issues are drawn to the audience’s attention or when the audience needs to be distracted; these are in turn dependent upon the issues that Cicero wishes to emphasize. Within *Philippic* 11, the two are inseparably linked. The narrative functions beyond a simple recitation of events (*narratio simplex*), but rather works as an effective persuasive tool through which Cicero seeks to illustrate the threat of Dolabella against the backdrop of recent events (*narratio ornata*).

Aristotle had said that narrative is inappropriate and unnecessary within a deliberative speech (Rhet. 3.13.3). Quintilian (4.2.31), following this premise, defines the narratio as: *narratio est rei factae aut ut factae utilis ad persuadendum expositio, vel – ut Apollodorus finit – oratio docens auditorum quid in controversia sit; cf. Inv. Rhet. 1.27: narratio est rerum gestarum aut ut gestarum expositio*. Narrative here, however, is the formative component of Cicero’s argument, in that it prepares the ground for the introduction of Cassius and Cicero’s proposal that Cassius take action against Dolabella. Wooten (1986: 111) recognized that *Philippics Eight, Nine, Ten* and *Eleven* were less dependent on an obviously organized structure. This is certainly true for *Philippic* 11, given that Cassius, as the antagonist to Dolabella’s designs, is held back from the narrative until the narrative has established Dolabella as an enemy of the state. Wooten (1986: 153) notes: ‘One therefore sees in these four speeches how Cicero uses style and narration to give clarity, vividness, and “presence” to his oratory. In many ways, the immediacy of these speeches is their most compelling quality, and Cicero’s adroit use of style and narration accounts most for their directness’. Wooten successfully illustrates the means by which Cicero sought to have Cassius granted command, but he fails to acknowledge or to illustrate the difficulties which Cicero was at the same time attempting to counter. The introduction of Cassius into the narrative, and the acknowledgment of his recent actions, was evidently not a
sufficiently effective device for persuasion. Consequently, characterisation of Cassius plays a less formative role in Cicero’s advocacy. The narrative of *Philippic* 10, by comparison, is frequently interrupted by the character development of its chief protagonist, Brutus. Cicero embeds the narrative with proofs for Brutus’ appointment; a method in contrast to the one employed here. Rather than focusing on the actions of Cassius himself to provide the most convincing proof for his appointment, Cicero uses narrative to condemn the actions of Dolabella and, in turn, Antonius. This repetitive link between Dolabella and Antonius reverberates throughout the speech, and the more Cicero can associate the two together, the more he can compel the senate to act accordingly. By repeatedly reintroducing Antonius into his argument Cicero prejudices his audience against him despite his lack of involvement in the immediate situation. And, by reinforcing the unanimity within the senate in declaring Dolabella an enemy, Cicero reinforces the need to act against Antonius.

The general narrative of events, including Dolabella’s departure for his province of Asia, and the assassination of Trebonius, was already known to his audience from the preceding day’s debate, so Cicero needs to imbue his narrative with a liveliness that avoids repetition. The use of enargeia, the effect of making events seem as present as possible, is used to achieve a dramatic and emotional appeal (for an overview of enargeia in the historiographic and rhetorical tradition see Feldherr 1998: 4-12; cf. Wooten 1983: 145; Hall 2003: 283-5). Liveliness is difficult to achieve through a simple narration of events, so Cicero frequently interrupts his narrative to provide an exegetical interpretation of events. On the general use of narrative technique see Wooten 1986: 111-153; Johnson 1967; McClintock 1975.

(§§3.9-10.6) The account of Trebonius’ murder at the hands of Dolabella.

### 3.9 *quam ob rem, patres conscripti, quamquam hortatore non egetis - ipsi enim vestra sponte exarsistis ad libertatis recuperandae cupiditatem - tamen eo maiore animo studioque libertatem defendite quo maiora proposita victis supplicia servitutis videtis.quam ob rem, patres conscripti*:

Cicero turns to address and engage the senators in the second person. The phrasing is slightly ambiguous but the transition to an imperative, asserting the need to resist slavery, provides the link with the brief exposition on the characteristics of a free *res publica* at *Phil.* 11.3.2 above. The thematic antithesis of slavery and *libertas* is invoked. The
phrasing provides a bridge to the narrative where a description of Dolabella’s actions illustrates the necessity and urgency required for defeating him. *enim vestra sponte*: See *Phil*. 10.6.14. *exarsistis*: The phrasing recalls the last words of *Philippic 4: ad spem libertatis exarsimus*.

4.1 **in Galliam invasit Antonius, in Asiam Dolabella, in alienam uterque provinciam.** Because the audience was aware of the details regarding Dolabella’s murder of Trebonius, Cicero introduces this parallel in the narrative in order to amplify the nature of the threat posed by Antonius. **Galliam ... Asiam**: Gallia and Asia had been allocated by Caesar to D. Brutus and Trebonius respectively, the provinces to which both set out quickly following Caesar’s assassination (Vell. Pat. 2.60.5; Suet. *Aug.* 10.2; App. 3.2; Plut. *Brut.* 19.2; *MRR* 2: 328; 330). **invasit**: The key idea is emphasized by the asyndetic narrative. In April 44, Syria and Macedonia were assigned to Dolabella and Antonius respectively by means of a plebiscite (*Att.* 14.9.3; App. 3.7-8; 3.12; 3.24; 5.57; Dio 45.15.2; 47.29.1). This mutually beneficial arrangement secured the political association between Antonius and Dolabella, which Cicero can employ to emphasize any parallelism between the two men. Later in June, Antonius secured the Gallic provinces (in exchange for Macedonia) by way of a plebiscite. Both he and Dolabella were confirmed in their commands for a period of five years, an act that Cicero claimed was in violation of Caesar’s *lex Iulia de provinciis* (probably passed in 46: *MRR* 2: 294; *Phil*. 1.19; 1.25). Antonius’ entry into Gallia therefore violated the *lex Porcia*, although Cicero could argue that a consul’s *imperium* was greater than any *imperium* of a governor (cf. *Phil*. 11.30.12; *Phil*. 10.6.14 n.).

4.2 **alteri se Brutus obiecit impetumque furentis atque omnia divexare ac diripere cupidissis vitae suae periculo colligavit, progressu arcuit, a reditu refrenavit obsideri se passus ex utraque parte constrinxit Antonium. alter in Asiam inrupit.** The asyndetic passage summarizes events in Italy before Cicero turns his attention to Dolabella in the east. D. Brutus had acted on his own initiative in opposing Antonius and so Cicero establishes a parallel context with Cassius’ actions in the east. Brutus is in the nominative, and so Brutus being besieged is turned into an active strategic move.

4.6 **cur? si ut in Syriam, <cur terra? sin ut ad Zmyrnam>, patebat via et certa neque longa; quid opus fuit cum legione?** The text has been corrupted and no satisfactory emendation has been made. Sternkopf (1912) suggested: *sin ut*
Zmyrnam post longa. Shackleton Bailey (1982: 225-6) inserts cur terra to make the sense complete, by illustrating the absurdity of any scrupulous motivation on the part of Dolabella. Why did Dolabella enter into Asia by land if he was on route to Syria? And why did he approach Trebonius at Smyrna with a legion? The answer was, of course, to kill Trebonius. Zmyrnam: Smyrna was one of the chief cities of Asia, although not the capital of the province. It was one of the principal ports of Asia about 70 kms north of Ephesus. Trebonius took precautions against Dolabella, for reasons we can only surmise, but presumably in collusion with the liberators (Drum 2008: 84), and prevented him from entry into both Smyrna and Pergamum (App. 3.26). Asia was without a legionary garrison, but Trebonius had evidently been active in fortifying towns in the liberators’ interests from mid-44 (App. 3.6; 3.26; Syme 1939: 171: MRR 2: 326; see comments by Botermann 1968: 89, n. 6; 94). Dolabella’s unexpected appearance with an armed force appeared intimidating and Trebonius, so it appears, read his intentions well. Trebonius nonetheless made arrangements for the provisioning of Dolabella’s troops on their march to Ephesus, from where Dolabella averred he would depart (App. 3.26).

4.7 praemisso Marso nescio quo Octavio, scelerato latrone atque egenti, qui popularetur agros, vexaret urbis, non ad spem constituendae rei familiaris, quam tenere eum posse negant qui norunt – mihi enim hic senator ignotus est – sed ad praesentem pastum mendicitatis suae, consecutus est Dolabella. Marso nescio quo: M. Octavius Marsus (RE 71), a senator on the staff of Dolabella. The opening is demeaning to Marsus, since Cicero denies him any status by denying any knowledge of him (cf. Deiot. 23: nescioquem Caecilium; Dom. 81: Anagnino nescio cui Menullae). latrone: A latro was a bandit or outlaw. With the figurative use of latro Cicero begins to build the characterisation of Marsus and Dolabella. Both men have taken up arms against the patria (cf. Phil. 11.1.4: contra patriam arma ceperunt), and consequently both men were beyond the confines of the law and therefore without civil rights. Legal rights were denied to latrones that would otherwise be available to criminal defendants (Dig. 5.1.61). Shaw (1984: 6) notes that latrocinium is an ‘umbrella term’, under which all forms of violent opposition to the state are categorized. He writes: ‘once bandits had been defined as men who stood in a peculiar relation to the state, the label latro was available to be pasted on any “de-stated person”’ (1984: 6). This political weapon of invective is recurrent in Cicero (in reference to Dolabella: Fam. 10.24.3; 12.15.2-7, 12.b25b.6; Ad Brut. 14.9.2; 16.1; and
applied to Antonius: *Fam.* 10.5.3; 10.6.1; 10.14.1; 10.23.3; 12.2.2; 12.25b.6; *Phil.* 3.7.16; 14.3.8. *Cat.* 1.13.21; 10.27; 2.7.16; *Mil.* 17.21.55; to Clodius: *Att.* 4.3.3; *Ad Quint.* 2.1.3; 2.2.3; and to Caesar: *Att.* 7.18.12; 14.10.1-2). Latrocinium necessarily involved a threat against social order, not only to Rome, as Cicero emphasized, but also to Gaul and Asia. On *latrocinium* see also Riggsby 2004: 169-170.

It was Cicero’s aim to place Antonius and Dolabella beyond the confines of citizenship. Their non-Roman status is continually being re-emphasized in order to justify war, and it is through the interchange of *latro* and *hostis* that Cicero achieves this. The use of *latro* and *hostis*, in relation to Dolabella’s status, is used to reiterate the broad nature of the threat (*Phil.* 11.7.5; 10.9; 13.1; 13.16; 13.19; 13.20; 14.8; 14.10; 14.14; 14.21; 14.27), in such a way that Cicero can advocate a full scale *bellum*, rather than the narrower *bellum civile* or *tumultum* (cf. *Phil.* 8.2-4 on Cicero’s argument against declaring a *tumultum*). *mihi … ignotus est*: The phrasing forms a parenthesis that further denigrates Marsus (on ignominious birth as a topos of invective see Quint. 3.7.19; Merill 1975: 195-98; Süss 1910: 245-62). *consecutus est Dolabella*: The periodic structure of the sentence unfolds the sequence of events and ends dramatically with Dolabella in the final position.

5.1 *nulla suspicione belli – quis enim id putaret? – secutae collocutiones familiarissimae cum Trebonio complexusque summae benevolentiae falsi indices exstiterunt in amore simulato; dexterae, quae fidei testes esse sole[baj]nt, sunt perfidia et scelere violatae: nocturnus introitus Zmyrnam quasi in hostium urbem, quae est fidissimorum antiquissimorumque sociorum; oppressus Trebonius, si ut ab eo qui aperte hostis esset, incautus; si ut ab eo qui civis etiam tum speciem haberet, miser.* The use of asyndeton in this passage is accompanied by its past tense indicative verbs to underline the immediacy and factuality of recent events. Cicero allows the narration to unfold, with the final emphasis concluding the sentence with the description of Trebonius as *miser*. The structure echoes the previous sentence where Dolabella occupies the final prominent position. The pledges of faith (*complexusque summae benevolentiae*) gave Dolabella the delusive appearance of a *civis* (a term also intended to reflect upon Trebonius as an *optimi civis moderatissimique*; cf. *Phil.* 11.10). The narrative moves from the broader image of the city (*urbem*) to the specific, Trebonius.

*Zmyrnam … hostium urbem*: Smyrna was associated with its resistance to Mithridates and its fidelity to Rome (Magie 1950: 76-7; 225). *miser*: In the sense of ‘pitiable’.
5.9  **ex quo nimimum documentum nos capere Fortuna voluit quid esset victis extimescendum.**  Dolabella has illustrated the type of behaviour and actions of which he is capable. Fortuna is personified, and guides the state.

5.10  **consularem hominem consulari imperio provinciam Asiam obtinentem Samiario exsuli tradidit: interificere captum statim noluit, ne nimis, credo, in victoria liberalis videretur.**  This section begins the narrative of C. Trebonius’ death. Having established his central characters, Cicero proceeds to narrate, with attention to graphic detail, the final moments, or rather days, of Trebonius’ death at the hands of Dolabella. Cicero’s use of rhetorical enargeia in the narrative of Trebonius’ death is used to create a visual vividness with the intention of rousing the audience’s sense of indignation. For *indignatio* as a device of the orator in rousing the emotion of the audience see *Inv* 1.100; Quint. 2.2.26; Lausberg §§433; 438 and for enargeia see Lausberg §§810-814 and p. 187 above. By lingering over the account of Trebonius’ death Cicero gives the account a personalised and emotive tone. The phrasing is less clipped than the foregoing narrative as Cicero stresses the state-sanctioned authority of Trebonius.  **Samiario exsuli:** The only mention of this figure is here in *Philippic* 11. His name perhaps indicates his origin from Samos (so King 1878: 250), a detail consistent with Cicero’s catalogue of non-Romans who are seen to support Antonius (see *Phil*. 11.12.4 n.). *Exsules*, associated with *hostes*, are a commonplace within invective (cf. *Mur*. 61.15; *Ver*. 2.4.30; 2.5.12). The phrasing resonates with Cicero’s consistent reference to Antonius’ restoration of exiles through the abuse of Caesar’s unpublished *acta* (cf. *Phil*. 1.3; 2.91; 3.30; 5.11; 7.15).

5.12  **cum verborum contumeliis optimum virum incesto ore lacerasset, tum verberibus ac tormentis quaestionem habuit pecuniae publicae, idque per biduum.**  The vivid descriptions and graphic verbs create a compelling and emotive argument and a rapid narrative that does not dwell for long on one point. The simplicity of the indicative verb supplements the action, while the swift pace of the narrative is achieved through hypotaxis. The central idea is expressed in the opening clauses rather than resolving the thought through a periodic structure.  **quaestionem:** A *quaestio* was an examination by torture (L-S II.2). Presumably Dolabella made demands for the public money that Trebonius was misdirecting for the liberators’ use.  **pecuniae publicae:** Trebonius was collecting money and fortifying towns in the interests of the liberators (see *Phil*. 10.24.5 n.). Appian (4.10) writes that Apuleius had handed over to Brutus 16 000 talents, which he had collected.
from the tribute of Asia. Cassius also ordered the other peoples of Asia to pay ten years’ tribute (App 4.9; cf. Phil. 11.30.5 n.).

5.14 post cervicibus fractis caput abscidit, idque adfixum gestari iussit in pilo; reliquum corpus tractum atque laniatum abiecit in mare. We are meant to think of Dolabella’s actions as barbaric, through Cicero’s graphic attention to detail. The final clause contains more variation, with the pairing tractum atque laniatum. The physical outrages are accentuated, but serve to build up the denigration of Dolabella who lacks all moral and rational qualities; Cicero depicts him also by contrast with the characterisation of Trebonius. Appian (3.26) was more preoccupied with presenting the death of Trebonius as a just end for his involvement in Caesar’s assassination. He emphasizes Trebonius’ guilt for his involvement in the conspiracy and includes no mention of Samiarius, or of a two-day torture, and so avoids any unseemly behaviour on the part of Dolabella, preferring to focus on the just deserts of Trebonius. Dio (47.30) similarly noted the disdain with which Trebonius’ head was treated.

6.1 cum hoc hoste bellandum est [a] cuius taeterrima crudelitate omnis barbaria superata est. hoc hoste: Sc. Dolabella. Following the graphic depiction of Trebonius’ death, Cicero interrupts his narrative with a section in which he summarises Dolabella’s character. Dolabella is not depicted in isolation, however, but is constantly portrayed in connection with his colleague Antonius. The section is similarly characterised by a fast pace; this is achieved by a series of rhetorical questions which direct the audience to the nature of Rome’s enemies. The transition from the preceding section is smooth and the audience is given little time to dwell on the points raised before Cicero returns to his narrative at §7. taeterrima is an echo from the exordium, and is used in each instance with barbaria in order to augment the savagery implied. There is a paradox here, playing on the idea that civilised Romans are more barbarous than the barbarians. barbaria: Reference to barbarism is used repeatedly through the Philippics and always in connection with crudelitas (cf. Phil. 5.37; 13.18; 14.8.).

6.2 quid loquar de caede civium Romanorum, de direptione fanorum? de caede civium: There is little direct evidence regarding either murder or plunder. However, there is some reference to Dolabella’s cruelty (Fam. 12.14.5) and vaguely to other criminal activity (Fam. 12.15.4). de direptione fanorum?: Accusations of pillaging shrines and temples are regularly attributed to individuals within passages of invective and are linked with the moral attributes of audacia, avaritia, and cupiditas
in addition to the implicit impiety of the action (Verres too was accused of enjoying the plunder of sacred property: *Ver.* 1.46; 2.1.7; 2.2.18; cf. *Cat.* 1.18; 2.20; *Phil.* 2.62; see also Merrill 1975: 153-68).

6.3 *quis est qui pro rerum atrocitate deplorare tantas calamitates queat? pro* in the sense of ‘in proportion to’ (*L*-S 6). The phrasing allows Cicero to accumulate unspecific detail, as a transition device to his next point. The rhetorical question and language of grief are evocative of tragic drama.

6.4 *et nunc tota Asia vagatur, volitat ut rex; nos alio bello distineri putat: quasi vero non idem unumque bellum sit contra hoc iugum impiorum nefarium.* Cicero continually develops the parallels between Dolabella and Antonius which he had established at *Phil.* 11.2 above, but here Dolabella is the model for Antonius’ assumed behaviour. *vagatur, volitat:* Cicero was not alone in his fondness for the alliterative pairing (cf. the metaphor used of the beast at *Rhet.* *Her.* 4.51.6: *sicut e cavea leo missus aut aliqua taeterrima belua soluta ex catenis, volitabit et vagabitur in foro, acuens dentes in unius cuiusque fortunas, in omnes amicos atque inimicos, notos atque ignotos incursitans, aliorum famam depeculans, aliorum caput obpugnans, aliorum domum <et> omnem familiam perfringens, rem publicam funditus labefactans; cf. *Rep.* 1.26.10). *putat:* Cicero attributes to Dolabella a false line of thinking. *iugum:* The ‘yoke’, a metaphorical symbol of bondage. Dolabella as ‘king’ is a simile, playing on the negative connotations of *rex* and Asia. The placing of Trebonius’ head on a spike is a barbarous act and the consequent depiction of Dolabella parading as a king compounds the characterisation. *nefarium* sustains the impiety of Dolabella’s actions.

6.7 *imaginem M. Antoni crudelitatis in Dolabella cernitis: ex hoc illa efficta est; ab hoc Dolabellae scelerum praecepta sunt tradita.* The designation of Dolabella as a public enemy was a success for Cicero, coalescing the senate into an undivided body; but it is important for Cicero to emphasize the greater threat from Antonius, who was yet to be declared a *hostis*. Cicero gained some mileage from this method of comparing Dolabella to Antonius. At *Phil.* 14.8 Cicero claimed Dolabella took advice from Antonius on the brutality to be used against Trebonius: *Dolabellae ferum et immane facinus, quod nulla barbaria posset agnoscre, id suo consilio factum esse testatur.* *imaginem … efficta:* The metaphor is of portrait sculpture; one subject is the model for the other (cf. *Phil.* 10.8.5). It looks ahead to the visual appeal (*ponite ante oculos*) in the following section.
6.8 num leniorem quam in Asia Dolabella fuit in Italia, si liceat, fore putatis
Antonium? Cicero assumes that Antonius has the greater potential for destruction;
Antonius merely needs the opportunity. *Leniorem* taken with *Antonium* forms the
figure of hyperbaton, the emphasis falling on Antonius in the final position, with
Cicero’s favoured double cretic.

6.10 mihi quidem et illae pervenisse videtur quoad progredi potuerit feri
hominis amentia, neque Antonius ullius supplici adhibendi, si potestatem habeat,
ullam esse partem relicturus. The comparison conveys a sense of calm reasoning
and is achieved via a complex sentence structure. *Amentia* is mental aberration that
leads to *audacia* (cf. Rosc. 66; Ver. 2.1.6). *ille*: Sc. Dolabella. *feri hominis*
*amentia*: Cicero continues the associations established with *barbaria* above, but this
is now supplemented with the images of madness and of the wild animal.

7.1 ponite igitur ante oculos, patres conscripti, miseram illam quidem et
flebilem speciem, sed ad incitandos nostros animos necessarium: nocturnum
impetum in urbem Asiae clarissimam, irruptionem armatorum in Treboni
domum, cum miser ille prius latronum gladios videret quam quae res esset
audisset furentis introitum Dolabellae, vocem impuram atque os illud infame,
vincula, verbera, eucleum, tortorem carnificemque Samiarium: quae tulisse illum
fortiter et patienter ferunt. Muretus suggested the phrasing is in imitation of
Aeschines *Ctes.* 76.1 (King 1878: 251 n. 4). The imperative, to place an action before
one’s eyes, is emphatic, particularly in the opening sections of the speech, reflecting
Cicero’s narrative and visually engaging approach. This approach is used repeatedly
throughout *Philippic* 11 by conjuring up an image via a form of ecphrasis in which the
scene unfolds almost cinematically. The vocabulary and metaphor used are visually
evocative and are prevalent in this section as Cicero attempts to convey a sense of
immediacy to his narrative. *ante oculos* is used to initiate participation of the
audience as eyewitnesses to the crime. *In oculis* can be used proverbially to denote
affection (Manuwald 2007: 781), and so the phrasing can be read as bitterly ironic.

*urbem Asiae clarissimam*: Sc. Smyrna (cf. *Phil.* 11.4.1 n.). According to Strabo
(14.35), of the cities of Asia Minor, Smyrna was the most beautiful of all. *cum*
miser … videret: The narrative is focalised here through the perceptions of
Trebonius. There follows a usage of synonymy when describing the scene as *miseram
illum quidem et flebilem speciem*. An asyndetic narrative is taken up, but the series of
actions is linear. The speed with which the actions are recounted gives the audience,
as they gave Trebonius, little time to respond to the unexpected sequence of events. For the events see Phil. 11.1.5. **vocem impuram atque os illud infame**: The phrasing forms an *abab* patterned isocolon (cf. Phil. 10.20.5 n.). The arrangement focuses on the visceral sense of revulsion at his ‘foul voice and disgraceful mouth’ (cf. the similar phrasing at Phil. 2.68; Sest. 118). **vincla**: The contraction of *vinculum* to *vincla* adds to the pace of the catalogue. Cicero lingers over the catalogue of instruments of torture with the emphasis falling upon Samiarius. The non-Latinate origin of Samiarius is used to evoke the *barbaria* above. **eculeum**: The *eculeus* was a device of torture, most likely some type of rack (cf. Mil. 57; Fin. 5.84 *torquatur eculeo*; Sen. Ep. 67.4; 71.21: *iacere in eculeo*). The synonymia of *tortorem carnificemque* unambiguously defines Samiarius and the range of his activities. **ferunt** refers non-specifically to those bearing rumours of Trebonius’ death to Rome.

7.7 **magna laus meoque iudicio omnium maxima.** An example of *correctio* in which *magna* is immediately replaced with the more appropriate *maxima*, in reference to the ability of Trebonius to endure his tortures. Additionally the phrasing forms a hyperbole that leads to the following philosophic *sententia*.

7.8 **est enim sapientis, quicquid homini accidere possit, id praemeditari ferendum modice esse, si evenerit.** The episode presents Trebonius as the passive recipient of Dolabella’s aggression. The generalised third person present tense forms a *sententia* (cf. Tusc. 3.30). This is not merely a theoretical *sententia*, but one that has the example of Trebonius to match its precept. As such Cicero seeks to attribute to Trebonius a social and moral authority. **sapientis**: Trebonius is equated with the sage, who is able to to bear the vicissitudes of fortune, an echo of Phil. 11.5.12 above. The characterisation is antithetical to that of Dolabella, who is referred to as *amens* (Phil. 11.7.10), who rages like a wild beast (Phil. 11.6.4) and surpasses all in barbarity (Phil. 11.6.2).

7.10 **maioris omnino est consili providere ne quid tale accidat, animi non minoris fortiter ferre [si evenerit].** *si evenerit* was deleted in Clark, given the repetition from the preceding sentence (Clark 1918: 197). The expansion of the philosophical reflection breaks the line of thought before Cicero contrasts the virtues of Trebonius with the vices of Dolabella in the following sentence. Prepared with foreknowledge, the Stoic sage is ready for all things, including death and torture (cf. Tusc. 3.29; Sen. Ep. 76.33). The following sentence provides the contrasting image against which Trebonius’ actions are placed.
8.1 ac Dolabella quidem tam fuit immemor humanitatis – quamquam eius numquam particeps fu[er]it – ut suam insatiabilem crudelitatem exercerit non solum in vivo, sed etiam in mortuuo, atque in eius corpore lacerando atque vexando, cum animum satiare non posset, oculos paverit suos. The swift change in focus emphasizes the contrasting personalities. The constant shift between characters provides two distinct perspectives of the protagonists. The remainder of the sentence is given to illustrating the premise of Dolabella’s cruelty. humanitatis: ‘A gentle or humane conduct towards others’ L-S IIA, and also in this context, the ‘mental cultivation befitting a man’ L-S IIB. Dolabella is not merely ‘forgetful’ of humanitas, but ‘unmindful’ of his human condition. Parallel structure is a feature here, with the doubling of synonyms lacerando atque vexando, antithesis of vivo and mortuo, and satiare non posset and paverit.

paverit: ‘To feed’. The verb is usually used in relation to pasture animals, but is used here figuratively of Dolabella who attempts to satisfy his insatiable hunger for cruelty. Cicero visualises the scene in order to draw attention to the physicality of Dolabella’s hunger.

8.5 O multo miserior Dolabella quam ille quem tu miserrimum esse voluisti! The characterisation inverts the role of Dolabella; it is not Trebonius who suffers, but Dolabella. Cicero turns from his audience and feigns an address to Dolabella, an example of the figure apostrophe. The effect is to create immediacy within the narration. Cicero explains his statement by returning to a discussion, placed within a philosophical framework, on the nature of suffering. There is notable wordplay of the comparative and superlative in alliteration (muito miserior ... miserrimum).

8.6 ‘dolores Trebonius pertulit magnos’. Clark, Fedeli and Shackleton Bailey punctuate the sentence with quotation marks, in order to indicate the figure of aetiology, in which the orator makes a statement and comments on its significance. The figure allows Cicero to expand upon, in general and abstract terms, Trebonius’ virtue in the face of such cruelty. Cicero’s use of question and comment is more extensive throughout Phil. 13.22, where it is clearly signposted (eas dum recito dumque de singulis sententiis breviter disputo, velim, patres conscripti, at adhuc fecistis, me attente audiatis).

8.6 multi ex morbi gravitate maiores, quos tamen non miserios, sed laboriosos solemus dicere. Cicero sets about establishing an argument in which he portrays Trebonius as being able to bear his hardships, because he has fortitude of mind, a trait
associated with the Stoic sage, which Cicero suggests is typically Roman. **multi … maiores**: The verb ‘pertulerunt’ or similar is required for sense in the first clause. The terminology employed in the description of Trebonius’ suffering is mirrored within a Stoic framework, as outlined at *Tusc.* 2.35: *interest aliquid inter laborem et dolorem.*

sunt finitima omnino, sed tamen differt aliquid. labor est functio quaedam vel animi vel corporis gravioris operis et muneris, dolor autem motus asper in corpore alienus a sensibus. haec duo Graeci illi, quorum copiosior est lingua quam nostra, uno nomine appellant. itaque industrios homines illi studiosos vel potius amantis doloris appellant, nos commodius laboriosos; aliud est enim laborare, aliud dolere.

8.7 ‘longus fuit dolor’. bidui, at compluribus annorum saepe multorum. nec vero graviora sunt carnificum cruciamenta quam interdum tormenta morborum. The second and final instance of aetiolgia within the oration. The use of comparative adjectives, together with the alliterative *carnificum cruciamenta,* pushes the statement towards hyperbole.

9.1 **alia sunt, alia, inquam, o perditissimi homines et amentissimi, muito miseriora.** Physical punishments are not the worst pains to be endured. Cicero alludes to Dolabella’s own sufferings since Dolabella is unable to participate in a free Roman community. Cicero exploits the trope that ‘the oppressor is the oppressed’ - a manipulative convention that inverts Dolabella’s role in Trebonius’ death. The addressee was initially Dolabella alone, but Cicero now broadens the audience to include Dolabella’s companions and adherents, before narrowing the focus again to Dolabella and to his moral opposite, Trebonius. **o perditissimi … amentissimi:** Assonance and heavy syllables over *perditissimi … amentissimi* emphasize the characterisation of those given to irrational and cruel impulse.

9.2 **nam quo maior vis est animi quam corporis, hoc sunt graviora ea quae concipiuntur animo quam illa quae corpore. miserior igitur qui suscipit in se scelus quam is qui alterius facinus subire cogitetur.** This provides a transition to the exemplum of Regulus, with whom Cicero wishes to compare Trebonius in the following sentence. The *animus* and *corpus* antithesis, and philosophical and logical tone are retained. The *exemplum* of Regulus justifies the somewhat strained argument regarding Trebonius’ forebearance of his tortures. **miserior:** Recalls *Phil.* 11.5.6 where Trebonius is pitiable (*miser*). **igitur** expresses a syllogistic conclusion to the preceding sentence.
9.5 cruciat us est a Dolabella Trebonius: et quidem a Carthaginiensibus

Regulus. Regulus: M. Atilius Regulus (cos. 256; RE 51; MRR 1: 200; 209-10), commanded an army during the First Punic War but was defeated and captured at the battle of Tunes in 255 and died in captivity (so Poly. 1.31-36; Walbank 1957: ad loc.). Cicero inherited a more elaborate tradition in which Regulus returned to Rome in order to negotiate an exchange of Carthaginian prisoners on the condition that, should negotiations fail, he was bound by oath to return to Carthage. Instead of negotiating a settlement advantageous to the Carthaginians, Regulus advised the senate against any agreement and returned to Carthage to his subsequent torture and death. Cicero was particularly fond of the exemplum of Regulus, citing the episode in numerous passages (Parad. 2.16; Pis. 43.5; Fin. 5.83.2; Off. 3.97-9; Senec. 75; cf. also Liv. Per. 17; Val. Max. 1.1.14. On Regulus see Mix 1970; Dyck 1996: 619-30).

The details of the episode are consistent, yet there are different emphases that Cicero applies in different contexts. At De Officiis 3.97-9 the emphasis regarding Regulus is placed upon the subordination of his own interests to those of the state in keeping fides; that is, Regulus’ willingness to keep his oath despite the chance to return to a normal life at Rome (cf. Sest. 127). At De Senectute 75 Cicero places Regulus’ death within a catalogue of those who have died noble deaths, with a lesser emphasis on keeping fides with an enemy (see Powell 1988: 249-50). However, the more frequent emphasis is on illustrating the Stoic doctrine that virtue alone is sufficient for happiness (Parad. 2.16; Tusc. 5.14; Fin. 2.65; 5,82; 5.88). At De Finibus 5.83.2 Regulus is linked with the Stoics because of his endurance of the tortures he suffered at the hands of the Carthaginians and to illustrate the Stoic idea that the wise man is unaffected by capture or punishment (cf. Pis. 43.5).

The episode of Regulus’ torture and death is typically detached from its historical context, with more importance attached to the illustration of an ethical virtue and the function it played as a model of ideal behaviour (Quint. 12.2.30; cf. Poly. 6.53-5. On the use of exempla see Roller 2004: 1-56; Chaplin 2000; Mayer 1991: 141-69; 170-6; Maslakov 1984: 437-96). The connections with the presentation of Trebonius are notable. Cicero largely passes over what had been the consistently prominent feature of Regulus’ fides, preferring instead to illustrate, by analogy, Trebonius’ ability to endure torture at the hands of a cruel enemy. Having established a context of cruelty, Cicero can dramatize Trebonius’ death within an identifiable setting. The analogy also places Dolabella within a context distinguished by the role
of cruelty. Cicero certainly alludes to the ability of Trebonius to bear his torture bravely; but Cicero is also sure to depict Dolabella as more cruel than what had become proverbially known as ‘Punic cruelty’. **cruciatus**: Regulus’ torture, according to Cicero, involved being strapped to a machine, having his eyelids cut off and then left to die (*Pis. 44*).

9.6 *qua re cum crudelissimi Poeni iudicati sint in hoste, quid in cive de* Dolabella iudicandum est? an vero hoc conferendum est aut dubitandum uter miserior sit, isne cuius mortem senatus populusque Romanus ulcisci cupit, an is qui cunctis senatus sententiis hostis est iudicatus? an vero: The form of the argument is a syllogism (cf. *Top.* 56; Quint. 5.10.1; Wooten 1986: 85-6). The two questions in sequence provide two premises of which only one has a plausible outcome. **miserior**: The sentence concludes Cicero’s argument (from §§8 and 9 above) regarding whether the perpetrator of cruelty is more *miser* than the victim. **isne ... is**: The first pronoun refers to Trebonius, while the second refers to Dolabella. **hostis est iudicatus**: For the declaration of Dolabella as a *hostis* see *Phil.* 11.15.1. The phrasing is repeated throughout the *Philippics*, although it is only ever applied officially to Dolabella (cf. *Phil.* 11.29; 13.23; 13.39).

9.9 *nam ceteris quidem vitae partibus quis est qui possit sine Treboni maxima contumelia conferre vitam Treboni cum Dolabellae?* The rhetorical question sets up a direct comparison of the characters of Trebonius and Dolabella.

9.11 *alterius consilium, ingenium, humanitatem, innocentiam, magnitudinem animi in patria liberanda quis ignorat?* Prescriptive qualities of the citizen describe the life of Trebonius in an uninterrupted sequence of virtues; Dolabella’s life, with Cicero’s emphasis upon a cruel and a libidinous nature will be shown as its antithesis. The catalogue that follows includes terms that bear a close resemblance to each other and are qualities subsumed beneath the climactic *magnitudinem animi*. A similar catalogue is used of Octavian at *Phil.* 5.23. **consilium** is the capacity for sound and reasoned judgement; it is used in a similar context to describe L. Brutus and his preparations for expelling the Tarquins (*Parad.* 1.12.1: *Brutum si qui roget, quid egerit in patria liberanda, si quis item reliquos eiusdem consilii socios, quid spectaverint, quid secuti sint, num quis existat, cui voluptas, cui divitiae, cui denique praeter officium fortis et magni viri quicquam aliud propositionem fuisse videatur*?). **ingenium**: Like *consilium*, *ingenium* implies the ability of the possessor to make sound judgments. *Ingenium* is used in the sense of ‘mental powers, intellect’ (cf. *OLD*
4a). The context usually refines the definition, given its broad semantic range. It is similarly used to describe Pansa’s assessment of Brutus’ intentions when Brutus had taken control of the Greek east (Phil. 10.17). **humanitatem**: Humanitas is used as a quality distinguishing man from beast, which suits the general context of Cicero’s discussion, but in this catalogue *humanitas* has a more specific quality: humane character, as opposed to the bestial violence and cruelty characterised in Dolabella. Cicero treats *humanitas* as the opposite of barbarity (cf. Q. Fr. 1.1.27; see also Hellegouarc’h 1963: 267-71; cf. Off. 1.62 for the antithesis between barbarous ferocity and fortitude tempered by justice and the subsequent appeal to *humanitas*).

**innocentiam**: The virtue of *innocentia* is not immediately out of place within the catalogue, a catalogue that dilates on the qualities of a *civis*. *Innocentia* is the quality of a provincial governor (Leg. Man. 36) and linked with *integritas* (Phil. 3.25; Caec. 27). However, *innocentia* in this context conveys, in addition, a legal and moral sense: ‘innocent of any wrong doing’ (see Hellegouarc’h 1963: 283). It identifies the fact that Cicero throughout this episode has presented no justification for Dolabella’s rage.

**magnitudinem animi** forms the climax of the catalogue, under which each of the preceding virtues are subsumed. *Magnitudo animi* involves an understanding that is devoid of selfish influence and is a constant factor in both good and evil fortune. It is attributed to Ser. Sulpicius Rufus (Phil. 9.9), who undertook a commission to Antonius despite his failing health. Trebonius’ role in the assassination of Caesar involved the subordination of his own interests, seemingly assured through the favour shown him by Caesar, to the greater good of the *res publica*. This is made the focus of the following question. For *magnitudo animi* see Lind 1979: 19-22; Dyck 1996: 182-238; Hellegouarc’h (1963: 291) emphasizes the term’s Stoic associations, applicable in this context, which provides a quick transition to the following statement regarding Trebonius’ role in the tyrannicide. The association of *magnitudo animi* with *consilium* gives weight to the cognitive aspect of a considered resistance to servitude. Cicero also applied the term *magnitudo animi* to his own resistance to Catiline (Sull. 14; Fam. 5.7.3), to that of Milo to Clodius (Sest. 85; Mil. 70), and to that of Pansa to Antonius (Phil. 7.7; 12.2). **in patria liberandia quis ignorant?**: The reference is an indirect allusion to Caesar’s assassination. For Trebonius’ role in the assassination see Phil. 11.1.1.

9.13 *alteri a puero pro deliciis crudelitas fuit*; *deinde ea libidinum turpitudo ut in hoc sit semper ipse laetatus, quod ea faceret quae sibi obici ne ab inimico*
quidem possent verecundo. alteri: Refers to Dolabella. deinde: When following a puero, deinde expresses causal force. Cicero implicitly contrasts Dolabella’s crudelitas and turpitude with Trebonius’ qualities listed above. Significantly, crudelitas was associated with regnum; the context is supplied from the preceding sentence, where Cicero refers to the tyrannicide of Caesar (cf. Dunkle 1967: 151-71). Regnum is not exclusively ‘kingship’, but can also imply excessive power. Dolabella’s vices (crudelitas, libidum turpitude) are grounded in the physical world while Trebonius’ are from the mental sphere. obici: In this sense obici is used to express grounds for condemnation (OLD 10; cf. Phil. 2.47). ab inimico ... verecundo: Cicero says nothing specific, but hints at an immorality so bad it is unmentionable.

10.1 et hic, di immortales, aliquando fuit meus! Cicero now confronts what was the embarrassing fact of Dolabella’s marriage to his daughter Tullia. Frisch (1946: 227) suggested that Calenus took delight in having Cicero’s former son-in-law a hostis, and concluded: ‘This probably explains why he did not speak the preceding day beyond perhaps having briefly supported Calenus’s proposal’. Cicero is now compelled to provide a justification for his former relationship with Dolabella. Evidently Cicero had been aware of a possible match with Dolabella, but his subsequent involvement in the marriage was minimal because of his absence on proconsular duties in Cilicia (cf. Fam. 3.10.5; 6.11; 3.12.2-3; Att. 6.6.1; see Treggiari 2007: 83-99 for a reconstruction of the marriage arrangements). Cicero made known his preference for the ‘noble, able and self-controlled’ Ti. Claudius Nero (Fam. 13.64.2), the future husband to Livia Drusilla and father of the emperor Tiberius; but by the time his preference was conveyed to Rome, Tullia and Dolabella were already celebrating their engagement (Fam. 3.13; Fam. 2.15; Att. 6.6; Shackleton Bailey 1968: 244).

Dolabella had become a suitor to Tullia sometime in early 50 following separation from his wife Fabia, who left him shortly before his engagement to Tullia. Fabia was perhaps encouraged by his willingness to court Tullia (suggested by Treggiari 2007: 92), and by Dolabella’s repeated infidelities, which had gained some notoriety and become something of an open scandal (Phil. 2.99). However, news of the engagement coincided with news of Dolabella’s intention to prosecute Cicero’s rapacious predecessor in Cilicia, Ap. Claudius Pulcher, the eldest brother of Clodius, on a charge de maiestate (Fam. 8.6.2). Caelius wrote to Cicero to discourage the
match until the prosecution had been concluded, so as to avoid any implied complicity in the prosecution (Fam. 2.13.1-2; 3.10.5). In April Appius wrote of his acquittal, much to the relief of Cicero who was now free from the politically awkward situation of his soon to be son-in-law prosecuting an influential friend. Only now was Cicero able to commend the marriage, albeit with tentative approval: *ego vero velim mihi Tulliaeque meae, sicut tu amicissime et suavissime optas, prospere evenire ea quae me insciente facta sunt a meis* (Fam. 3.12.2).

By June 49, Dolabella and Tullia were married (Fam. 3.12.3). Caelius wrote with effusive praise of the marriage, but primarily to placate any concerns that Cicero may have harboured regarding the Dolabella’s suitability: *gratulor tibi adfinitatem viri me dius fidius optimi; nam hoc ego de illo existimo. cetera porro, quibus adhuc ille sibi parum utilis fuit, et aetate iam sunt decussa et consuetudine atque auctoritate tua, pudore Tulliae, si qua restabunt, confido celeriter sublatum iri. non est enim pugnax in vitis neque hebes ad id quod melius sit intellegendum. deinde, quod maximum est, ego illum vale do amo* (Fam. 8.13). Caesar too congratulated Cicero on the match and expressed his warm regard for Dolabella, describing his company as *iucundus* and praising his *humanitas* and *benevolentia* (Att. 9.16.3). The marriage itself was short-lived, ending in divorce perhaps as late as 46. Cicero and Dolabella remained on cordial terms despite on-going quarrels, both public and private.

10.2 *occulta enim erant vitia non inquirenti.* Dolabella’s ability to disguise his character has been hinted at in *Phil.* 11.5.6, where Cicero noted Dolabella’s deception of Trebonius. Dolabella’s ability to dissimulate is a characterisation to which Cicero returns here, and which Cicero uses to disassociate himself from Dolabella. Knowledge of Dolabella’s vices would have implied Cicero’s forbearance or complicity in his son-in-law’s activities. However, Cicero’s claim that he was ignorant of Dolabella’s misdemeanours is in striking contrast with his private correspondence (cf. comments by Lintott 2008: 341 n.13). Cicero was well aware of his delinquencies, citing examples to Atticus as grounds for divorce in July 47: *vel tabularum novarum nomine vel nocturnarum expugnationum vel Metellae vel omnium malorum* (Att. 11.23.3). Cicero began communicating his intention of divorcing Tullia from Dolabella, not only on political grounds but on the grounds of Dolabella’s open infidelities (Att. 11.23.3; Phil. 2.99; Plut. Ant. 10). There had been no public break in the relationship between Cicero and Dolabella and so Cicero can claim that Dolabella’s vices were, in fact, unknown to him. Despite the dissolution of the
marriage and the private difficulties regarding the recovery of Tullia’s dowry, Cicero maintained cordial relations with his former son-in-law.

10.3 neque nunc fortasse alienus ab eo essem, nisi ille bonis, nisi moenibus patriae, nisi huic urbi, nisi dis penatibus, nisi aris et focis omnium nostrum, nisi denique naturae et humanitati inventus esset inimicus. fortasse: This latest action of Dolabella was the catalyst for severing the relationship. Fortasse is ironic given the catalogue that follows. nisi: The anaphora nisi introduces a catalogue that defines Rome, firstly through its physical form, then through the depiction of the state as bound by common and mutual advantage, and by shared values. This is an association from which Dolabella is removed. A tone of contempt is affected through repeated sibilance. naturae et humanitati … inimicus: The phrasing introduces an argument framed within the language of Stoic natural law. The world, governed by the law of nature, is dependent upon civic friendship for the advantage of all citizens. Dolabella has shown himself to be beyond the boundaries of the community of gods and men, and so he is not bound by civic friendship and the mutual advantage that derives from such conduct. Natura is the power which determines the character of human beings, while humanitas has a more general application than that which was applied at Phil. 11.9.14 above. In the current context humanitas is specific to Rome (as specific to a people; cf. Val. Max. 5.1). Together the pairing stresses the community, and specifically, the Roman community under threat. This final statement provides closure to this section. Cicero will now turn to the threat posed by Antonius, by illustrating the desperate nature of his followers.

(§§ 10.6-14.12) A comparison of the character of Dolabella with that of Antonius, and a catalogue of their adherents.

These sections, dealing with Antony’s supporters in Italy, are only tangentially relevant to Cicero’s purpose of having Cassius appointed to command against Dolabella in the east. However, their inclusion within the oration reinforces the characterisation of Dolabella and the threat that he poses. This excursus on the types of character within Antony’s camp occupies a significant proportion of the speech. Only at §15 does Cicero return to the condemnation of Dolabella and the senate’s resolution of declaring him a hostis. The inclusion of a character-based catalogue is tendentious but is nonetheless conducive to Cicero’s overall presentation of a
programmatic ‘us’ and ‘them’ division. The threat of Dolabella serves as a precursive warning against Antonius, a greater and more sinister threat to the salus publica. Antonius is accompanied by able (but depraved) lieutenants, a disparate group whose vices Cicero will illustrate over the following sections. Having stated that Antonius will perpetrate greater cruelties if given the chance (§9), Cicero dilates upon Antonius’ most prominent lieutenants, those already marked out by notoriety.

A number of conventional themes of invective and negative stereotyping are drawn upon to denigrate the character of Antonius’ supporters. However, Cicero was faced with the difficulty that a number of these same supporters had held prominent magistracies and military positions. Cicero’s strategy then is to illustrate vices and, where possible, to illustrate particular violations of public office or civic duty in order to undermine their legitimacy. In Cicero’s depiction of Antonius’ colleagues, public office becomes a vehicle for self-serving motivations, for the opportunity of plunder, for the exercise of cruel and unusual punishments and for the wanton abuse of power. A similar rhetorical strategy is employed at Philippic 6.10-15, where Cicero digresses on the character of Antonius’ followers (cf. Phil. 12.20; 13.2-3). Here we see a continuation in the catalogue of Antonius’ followers, of whom Dolabella is shown as the most prominent, given his recent actions and the declaration of his status as an enemy of the res publica.

Characterisation of Antonius’ followers becomes increasingly emphatic throughout the later Philippics, as Cicero can illustrate with greater urgency the threat posed, given the desperation of the recent fighting. The following section is notable for its amplification of vices by means of complementary or contrastive pairings. The linear structure of Cicero’s preceding narrative gives way to paratactic phrasing and repetition. The paratactic phrasing is arranged primarily for the purpose of creating parallel structures and not as a means of developing an argument within the sentence structure. The repetition allows for a cumulative effect (geminatio or conduplicatio: Rhet. Her. 4.38; De Orat. 3.207).

10.6 a quo admoniti diligentius et vigilantius caveamus Antonium. etenim Dolabella non ita multos secum habuit notos atque insignis latrones: at videtis quos et quam multos habeat Antonius. diligentius et vigilantius form a pairing of near synonymous adverbs, which contrast with the pairing of notos atque insignis. The statement reiterates the pairing of Dolabella and Antonius from the exordium.
The name of Antonius is in an emphatic position at the end, anticipating the prominence of his involvement throughout the following sections. The position allows for a transition in the focus of the speech away from Dolabella to a catalogue of those within the Antonian camp. Cicero gives little information on the legates of Dolabella; Cicero’s appointment as legate on Dolabella’s staff in mid-44 is well documented, but the appointment was a pretext for leaving Italy for Greece (and not for Syria as an active member on Dolabella’s staff: Att. 15.11.4; 14.13.4; 14.22.2; Plu. Cic. 43).

Cicero had no intention of joining Dolabella and there is consequently a lack of interest from Cicero in Dolabella’s other legates (MRR 2: 331). We know of the legates Sex. Marius and C. Titius (Fam. 12.14; 12.15; MRR 2: 344) who jointly commanded a fleet, but fled from Lentulus Spinther upon the latter’s arrival at Lycia (Fam. 12.15.5); but of them nothing more is known. A. Allienus was compelled to surrender the four legions he had brought from Egypt to Dolabella (Fam. 12.11.1; 12.12.1; App. 3.78; 4.59-61). Greater detail is attached to the legates under Antonius given their prominence and proximity.

10.8 primum Lucium fratrem: quam facem, di immortales, quod facinus, quod scelus, quem gurgitem, quam voraginem! L. Antonius features significantly within the Philippics in connection with his role as chairman of a commission that was established for a redistribution of land in Italy (see Phil. 11.13.2; 5.7; 5.20; 7.17; 13.37). facem … facinus forms a paronomasia in which a word echo is implied despite the distinctly different meanings between the two (De Orat. 2.256; Quint. 9.3.66). Clusters of pairings mark out the passage, cretic clausulae predominate for an emphatic and repeated rhythm, despite Cicero’s preference for variety of rhythm in short clauses (Lacey 1986: 31). facem: A ‘firebrand’, used figuratively to denote a person or thing that starts mischief or rouses passions (OLD 8). The fax, facinus and scelus allude to the position of Lucius as a septemvir. Synonymia without connectives force the point. voraginem: The metonym of vorago with Charybdis is idiomatic (cf. De Orat. 3.163; at Phil. 2.67 Antonius is worse than any Charybdis). Facinus and scelus are near synonymous terms, while gurgito and vorago are commonly linked in a figurative sense to describe an unquenchable appetite (cf. Ver. 3.23; Sest. 111) in order to illustrate Lucius’ unlimited desires.

10.10 quid eum non sorbere animo, quid non haurire cogitatione, cuius sanguinem non bibere censetis, in cuius possessiones atque fortunas non impudentissimos oculos spe et mente defigere? The description of an unsatisfied
lust for plunder is portrayed through the metaphor of drinking. The metaphor was not new. Piso and Gabinius drained the wealth of Syria to fulfil their *gurges libidinum* (*Sest.* 93-4; cf. *Pis.* 41). The characterisation of an unquenchable desire for property is sustained through this section, in which Cicerocatalogues the lusts of Antonius’ followers. Cicero’s description of Lucius’ unquenchable desire for the possessions of others is reworked through the more familiar imagery of Antonius’ drinking habits (cf. *Phil.* 2.69). The verbal repetition of near synonyms (*sorbere ... haurire ... bibere*) reflects the characterisation of Antonius continually drinking to excess rather than being occupied by his *officia* (cf. *Phil.* 2.63). The importance of *officia* is prominent through the following sections as Cicero remarks upon the various offices of Antonius’ adherents. Like Dolabella, who is unable to quench his cruelty, Lucius is unable to satisfy his desire for material rewards (cf. the similar characterisation of Verres at *Ver.* 5.27; 5.63; and Catiline at *Cat.* 2.10). Internal motivations are made emphatic through synonymous repetition (*animo ... cogitatione ... spe et mente*).

Lucius, as chairman of the *septemviri*, is characterised as intoxicated by his desire for the possessions of others. Those lusts are outside the bounds of self-control and lead to an insensible and fixated mind. Lucius’ state of mind refuses to obey reason, an idea articulated at *Off.* 1.101: *duplex est enim vis animorum atque naturae: ὑπερβαθεν ... una pars in appetitu posita est, quae hominem huc et illuc rapit, altera in ratione, quae docet et explanat, quid faciendum fugiendumque sit. ita fit, ut ratio praesit, appetitus obtinperet.*

11.1 *quid Censorinum? qui se verbo praetorem esse urbanum cupere dicebat, re certe noluit.*  *quid Censorinum?*: Understand the verbs of the previous sentence. The mock dialogue with several questions and answers is included to enliven the thought, forming the figure of *subiectio* (Lausberg §§ 771-75). The sense of indignation is continued by means of further rhetorical questions.  *Censorinum*: L. Marcius Censorinus was praetor in 43 (*RE* 48; *MRR* 2: 338-9).  *praetorem esse ... noluit.*: ‘in word he said he wanted to be urban praetor but, in deed, he had no such intention’. Censorinus was in fact a praetor in 43, but not *praetor urbanus*: M. Caecilius Cornutus is named as *praetor urbanus* for 43 (cf. *Fam.* 10.16.1; *Phil.* 14.37; *Fam.* 10.12.3; Val. Max. 5.2.10; *MRR* 2: 338). The *praetor urbanus* was forbidden to leave Rome for the duration of his office, an impediment that Censorinus would have ignored when he left to join Antonius. This, in effect, would violate the conditions of the office (see *Phil.* 10.7.12). The accusation was an easy one to make, since it
concerned an event that did not take place. We know nothing of Censorinus’ candidature. Cicero sarcastically implies that Censorinus wanted to stand for the praetorship but had every intention of leaving Rome and joining Antonius and the hoped for rewards of plunder (cf. *Phil.* 13.2; 13.26). Censorinus did in fact leave Rome during the year of his praetorship to join Antonius, but he was unencumbered by the urban praetor’s limitation. He was subsequently declared a public enemy with Antonius (*Ad Brut.* 1.3a; 5.1; App. 3.63; Dio 46.39.3). During the period of the proscriptions Censorinus took possession of Cicero’s house on the Palatine (*Vell. Pat.* 2.14.3). His continued support of Antonius facilitated his rise to the consulship for 39 (*MRR* 2: 338).

11.3 quid Bestiam? *qui consulatum in Bruti locum se petere profitetur.* The language recalls the electoral process (*profitetur*: *OLD* 2b; and *petere*: *OLD* 9) and so appears as an outrage of senatorial procedures. Bestiam: L. Calpurnius Bestia (*RE* 24-25). Debate exists for the identification of L. Calpurnius Bestia, tribune of the plebs for 62 and a member of the Catilinarian conspiracy, with this L. Calpurnius Bestia who sought the praetorship for 47. Syme (1955: 134; 1964: 132-3) and Broughton (*MRR* 3: 46; see also Austin 1960: 154-7) identify the two as one. However, more recent debate inclines toward two distinct individuals (Gruen 1971: 67-9; Crawford 1984: 143-49; and the comments by Tatum 1999: 209). The unlikelihood that Bestia, the tribune for 62, a member of the Catilinarian conspiracy, according to Sallust (*Cat.* 17.3; 43.1; App. 2.3), and a fierce critic of Cicero’s consulship (*Sull.* 31; *Sest.* 11), would reappear agitating for Cicero’s return from exile in 57, suggests two distinct persons. Positive identification remains inconclusive. Bestia is a third associate of Antonius, after L. Antonius and Censorinus. qui ... *profitetur.* ‘He has declared himself for the consulship in place of Brutus’. This would violate Caesar’s *acta*, agreed upon together with the amnesty granted the liberators on March 17, 44. The magistrates for 44 were nominated in advance (Dio 43.51.2-6; Syme 1939: 95; Gelzer 1968: 309) and perhaps too, those for 43 (Dio 43.51.3). There were irregularities to the *cursus honorum* in recent years, when Caesar was able to determine the office holders by virtue of his control of the elections (Sumner 1971b: 370-1; Wiseman 1971). D. Brutus was consul-designate for 42, together with L. Munatius Plancus, through Caesar’s appointment (*Vell. Pat.* 2.63; *MRR* 2: 217; 328). It is unclear whether Caesar’s magisterial designations extended to 41. If there were no arrangements for 41, elections would again be required (*Att.* 14.6.2; Dio 43.51.2-6;}
Nic. Dam. 77). Accordingly, Bestia’s electoral ambition places him in likely contention with M. Brutus, since D. Brutus had been assured the consulship in 42. That Bestia sought the consulship is not otherwise attested.

11.4 atque hoc quidem detestabile omen avertat Iuppiter! quam absurdum autem, qui praeator fieri non potuerit, petere eum consulatum! nisi forte damnationem pro praetura putat. Bestia had stood unsuccessfully for the praetorship in 57 and again in 56, but was prosecuted in both years de ambitu (Cael. 16; 56; 76; 78; Gruen 1971: 67-9). He was acquitted in the first trial but convicted in the second and sent into exile. Bestia, consequently, never held the praetorship, a normal prerequisite office for the consulship (App. 1.100; Astin 1958; Badian 1964; Sumner 1973: 6-10). damnationem: A ‘conviction’. Following his exile in 56, Bestia then reappears on Antonius’ staff. His recall violated the jury’s verdict, because it was not achieved by legitimate means. The confirmation of Caesar’s acta allowed for the recall of Bestia among other exiles, but his was a recall that was derided by Cicero as fraudulent (see Phil. 10.17.9).

11.6 alter Caesar Vopiscus ille summo ingenio, summa potentia, qui ex aedilitate consulatum petit, solvatur legibus: quamquam leges eum non tenent propter eximiam, credo, dignitatem! The only precedent that Bestia could draw upon for an attempt at the consulship, without having held a prerequisite office, was the failed example of Caesar Vopiscus. Caesar Vopiscus … petit: C. Julius L. f. Caesar Strabo Vopiscus (RE 135; MRR 2: 26). Vopiscus, curule aedile in 90 BC, stood for the consulship despite violating the lex Villia annalis. His election was subsequently obstructed by the tribunes. On Caesar Vopiscus see Brut. 305; Varro Rust. 1.7.10; Plin. NH. 17.32; Asc. 25c and Marshall 1985 ad loc. for an account of events. solvatur legibus: ‘let him be absolved from our laws’; an exemption possible only in the form of a senatorial decree. Regardless, Vopiscus was prepared to violate any law. credo is again ironic.

11.9 at hic me defendente quinquiens absolutus est: sexta palma urbana etiam in gladiatore difficilis. sed haec iudicum culpa, non mea est. ego defendi fide optima: illi debuerunt clarissimum et praestantissimum senatorem in civitate retinere. The most well-known of Bestia’s trials, from references in the Pro Caelio, is the trial on 11 February 56, at which Cicero defended him on a charge de ambitu (Q. Fr. 2.3.6). Reference is made to the charge against Bestia in 57, but of the earlier trials Philippic 11 is our only evidence. Bestia was convicted on the sixth
occasion for offences when seeking the praetorship in 47 (cf. Cael. 26), and went into exile until recalled in 44 (App. 3.13; Gruen 1971: 69). Cicero had evidently expended much effort in defending Bestia, whom he described at Cael. 26 as meus necessarius, in return for Bestia’s efforts in agitating for Cicero’s recall (Q. Fr. 2.3.6: dixi pro Bestia de ambitu apud praetorem Cn. Domitium in foro medio maximo conventu incidique in eum locum in dicendo, cum Sestius multis in templo Castoris vulneribus acceptis), a fact that Cicero downplays in the current context. palma: The palma was awarded for victory in the games at Rome. Cicero compares his own attempt at defending Bestia with that of a gladiator, who must contend repeatedly under the most trying circumstances. clarissimum ... senatorem: The phrasing is heavily ironic. retenere has a fairly elastic usage but, in this context, is used sarcastically, i.e. ‘they (the jury) should have prevented Bestia from leaving Rome’.

11.12 qui tamen nunc nihil aliud agere videtur nisi ut intellegamus illos quorum res iudicatas irritas fecimus bene et e re publica iudicavisse. Bestia’s recent actions in support of Antonius prove that the jurors who exiled him were right (and those responsible for his recall were wrong to allow it). The res publica is personified as an adjudicator, allowing Cicero to attribute the jury’s decision to the res publica.

12.1 neque hoc in hoc uno est: sunt alii in isdem castris honeste condemnati, turpiter restituti. quod horum consilium qui omnibus bonis hostes sunt nisi crudelissimum putatis fore? Bestia was among several recalled from exile according to Antony’s fraudulent adherence to Caesar’s acta (Att. 14.13A.2). Cicero was in no doubt about the illegitimacy of the claim (Att. 14.13.6: quam dissolute, quam turpiter quamque ita perniciose). Our extant correspondence gives primacy to the recall of Sex. Cloelius, scriba to Clodius, exiled in the wake of the rioting following Clodius’ death, but he was only one of a number (Att. 14.13.6; 14.13A.2; 14.13B.3; 14.14.2; 14.19.2; Tatum 1999: 115 and n.6). honeste ... restituti: The juries’ decisions were honourably reached; while the restorations were now shameful to those same juries and to the res publica. The shift to third person plural allows Cicero to expand upon the followers of Antonius in the passage that follows.

12.4 accedit Saxa nescio quis, quem nobis Caesar ex ultima Celtiberia tribunum plebis dedit, castrorum antea metator, nunc, ut sperat, urbis: a qua cum sit alienus, suo capiti salvis nobis omenetur. Saxa: L. Decidius Saxa (see Phil. 10.22.6). Saxa appears to have been a centurion along with Cafo, before 43 BC, and is likely to have been included on the septemvirate, in part, because of his
experience as surveyor (Phil. 8.26; 13.37; Dio 45.9). **ultima Celtiberia:** Ethnic diversity is a feature of the catalogue of Antonius’ followers. The effect is to illustrate their non-Roman origin and to invalidate any right to command or feature within a specifically Roman state. The emphasis upon *ultima Celtiberia* allows a more stark contrast with the *tribunum plebis* that follows. Syme (1937:132-3) has rightly questioned Cicero’s assertion of Celtiberian origins and suggests a misrepresentation of Saxa’s civic status.

12.6 **cum hoc veteranus Cafo, quo neminem veterani peius oderunt.** There is a play on the word ‘veteranus’ that forms a paradox: the veterans detest the veteran. The veterans were to be the beneficiaries of the settlement programme (for which see Phil. 11.13.2), but were deprived of their allocations because of Cafo’s self-serving interests. **Cafo:** See Phil. 10.22.6. He is mentioned repeatedly in connection with the septemvirate (Phil. 8.9; 8.26; 10.22.6; 11.37.7; 12.20).

12.7 **his quasi praeter dotem quam in civilibus malis acceperant agrum Campanum est largitus Antonius, ut haberent reliquorum nutriculas praediorum. quibus utinam contenti esset! ferremus, etsi tolerabile non erat, sed quidvis patiendum fuit ut hoc taeterrimum bellum non haberemus.** **his** refers to both Saxa and Cafo. **dotem:** The language is of a domestic scene, and deliberately inappropriate to the context. Cicero usually treats Saxa and Cafo together as at Phil. 10.22 and 11.37. Hence they are treated as a married couple (*dotem*). Antonius gives them a ‘dowry’ as if they are married. They are provided with wet nurses (*Campanum agrum*), and other properties (*reliquorum ...praediorum*) for their children. **nutriculas** is used in a transferred sense as something that ‘fosters’ or ‘promotes’ (*OLD* 1b; cf. Vat. 2.4: *Gellius nutricula seditiosorum omnium*), but also refers to a ‘wet nurse’. The thematic emphasis upon Antonius’ companions being bought with grants of land is reiterated (on allocations of land in Campania see Phil. 2.43; 2.101; 8.25-26). **quibus utinam contenti esset!:** The exclamation indicates Cicero as suddenly being overcome with emotion. **ferremus, etsi tolerabile non erat:** Forms a complex paradox of being able to bear that which is unbearable.

13.1 **quid? illa castrorum M. Antoni lumina, nonne ante oculos proponitis?** The ironic use of *lumina* is repeated (cf. *lumen* metaphor at Phil. 10.12.10 n.). **ante oculos proponitis:** The phrasing invites the audience to visualise the scene.

13.2 **primum duos conlegas Antoniorum et Dolabellae, Nuculam et Lentonem, Italiae divisores lege ea quam senatus per vim latam iudicavit; quorum alter**
**commentatus est mimos, alter egit tragoediam.**  **Nuculam**: Nucula has no attested nomen (*RE* 1; *MRR* 2: 332-3). He is usually mentioned together with Caesennius Lento (below), his colleague on the septimvirate for the implementation of the *lex Antonia agraria* (*Phil*. 6.14; 8.26; 12.20; 13.2; 13.26; 13.37). We have no reference to Nucula holding any other office.  **Lentonen**: Caesennius Lento (*RE* 6; *MRR* 2: 332-3). Lento is first mentioned in 45 as an officer in Spain under Caesar. He reappears as a member of Antonius’ septemvirate (*MRR* 2: 311; cf. Garton 1972: 246).

**divisores**: The term can apply to a person employed to bribe electors (L-S B2), and so carries negative connotations (cf. *Verr*. 1.22; *Planc*. 19.48).  **lege ea**: The *lex Antonia agraria*. In June 44, Antonius and Dolabella established a board of seven (a septemvirate) to distribute land to veterans and the poor of Rome as part of the *lex Antonia agraria* (*Att*. 15.19.2; *Phil*. 5.2; 8.26; 12.23; Brunt 1971: 324-326; Sternkopf 1912: 146-151). The allocations, as determined by the board of seven, feature as a significant point of attack for Cicero within the *Philippics* due to the commission’s disregard of private ownership. Cicero claimed the commission was exploiting the land confiscations at the expense of the veterans and that Antonius was rewarding his partisans with such land (*Phil*. 2.43; 2.101; 5.20-2). The problem of land allocation for the veterans had been ongoing. The veteran settlement programme was to be recompense for the veterans’ support of Caesar. It is clear that there were Caesarian veterans who had been promised allotments, but who were not yet in possession of their allocations (App. 2.119). Twenty thousand allotments were created in Campania for veteran settlement, but settlement was slow due to the difficulty of finding available land and Caesar’s insistence that he would make no unjust confiscations (Suet. *Iul*. 20.3; Vell. Pat. 2.44.4; *MRR* 2: 187-88; Brunt 1971: 312). Appian (2.94) noted that Caesar had explicitly mentioned that Sulla was an *exemplum* he would not follow and that his Gallic legions would be assigned land, not from the present Italian landholders, but from public land, his own private holdings and from new purchases. Allocations were delayed when the land that was confiscated from the Pompeians at the close of the civil war, intended for Caesar’s settlement programme, was sold, since Caesar was under financial strain. Regardless, accusations of unjust confiscation were topical and subsequently used as a motivation for Caesar’s assassination (Brunt 1971: 322; cf. App. 2.120; 140; *Off*. 1.21; 2.83-5). The problem was still unresolved in 45, when Caesar was compelled to put up consecrated land for auction (Dio 43.47).
Antonius was left with the continuance of this difficult settlement programme after Caesar’s death.

Antonius took an active part in the process of veteran settlement, but handled the process poorly with his settlement programme in Campania meeting strong resistance. In April he made an attempt to found a new colony at Capua, the location of an already established colony, after Cicero advised against the settlement claiming it was unlawful to found a colony where one already existed (Att. 14.17.2). Antonius persevered but was expelled, together with his colonists. The episode was subsequently used by Cicero to illustrate Antonius’ mishandling of the situation and to illustrate the criminality of Antonius’ land allotment (Phil. 2.100; 12.7; 13.31). Capua and its surrounds subsequently proved a rich recruiting ground for Octavian and may well reflect the hostility felt towards Antonius (Ramsey 2002: 309). The liberators too were advertising their policy of veteran settlement. They were generous and deferential toward the veterans, promising that their allocations would be forthcoming. Brutus, addressing the people on 17 March, assured the veterans they would keep their land allocations and would receive rewards for service (App. 2.139-140; the speech is mentioned at Att. 15.1a; App. 3.5; Nic. Dam. 101). Moreover, in an attempt to win favour, the liberators carried a motion that allowed the veterans to sell their plots, an act that Caesar had forbidden (App. 3.2).

The commission of seven was chaired by Antonius’ brother, Lucius, who was given charge to hasten Caesar’s scheme for veteran and citizen settlement. The exact scope of the commission is unclear; perhaps it was no more than an extension of Caesar’s settlement programme (Sternköpf 1912: 147; MRR 2: 322-323). The catalogue of Antonius’ followers, contained within this passage, is exclusively drawn from this commission, and thus the commission is the focal point of attack. What follows is a catalogue of plunder of personal and public property. Indeed there is little differentiation between public and personal property, since Lucius is not discerning in the source of his plunder. The annulment of the lex agraria, and the commission’s prerogatives, allows Cicero to illustrate the motivations of its board and its fundamentally destructive purpose. Cicero laid special emphasis in the De Officiis (1.25) on the protection of private property, outlining legitimate means of acquisition. The illegitimacy of the commission’s acquisitions undermined the fabric of the res publica by the confiscation and redistribution of private land (Off. 1.21; 2.73; 2.79). Lucius’ land purchase was at the cost of private ownership, violating a law of human
society (*Off*. 1.22: *violabit ius humanae societatis*). Wood makes the point emphatically: ‘Cicero is the first important social and political thinker to affirm unequivocally that the basic purpose of the state is the protection of private property’ (1988: 132). Cicero has already stated that Dolabella possessed a nature that was inimical to *humanitas et natura* (*Phil*. 11.10.6 above), and so Cicero picks up the reference and redirects it towards a tangible effect on Antonius’ polity. *per vim latam*: The septemvirate, established for the redistribution of land in accordance with the *lex Antonia agraria*, was abolished in early January 43 since it was passed through violence (*Phil*. 6.14; see also *Phil*. 10.17.9). We know that when the senate annulled the *lex agraria*, the veteran plots were not at issue; rather, it was the fact that the law was carried by violence and in violation of the auspices (and so against the *lex Caecilia Didia* of 98). A law passed in violation of the auspices could not be considered as binding upon the people (De Libero 1992: 88-90; Lintott 1999: 61-3; 1968 132-48). The remainder of Antonius’ laws were abolished shortly before *Philippic* 10 was delivered. Those which were deemed sound were passed anew before Pansa’s departure for Mutina (*Phil*. 12.11-12; 13.5; 13.26; 13.31; 13.37; Novielli 2001: 70). *quorum alter commentatus est mimos, alter egit tragoediam*: Cicero attacks Antonius and Dolabella by way of associating them with the disreputable profession of actors (cf. *Phil*. 2.101). *mimos*: Antonius is shown as being in the intimate company of mimes throughout the *Philippics*. Mimes were associated with *licentia* and thus are typical of the company Antonius keeps (cf. *Phil*. 13.24.10; cf. 2.58; 2.62; 2.69; 8.26; 10.22; Quint. 3.6.18; Jocelyn 1984). At *Phil*. 2.101 mimes were settled on Campanian land by Antonius as reward for their companionship. Nucula and Lento are placed together with this disreputable profession and are similarly awarded land for their collegiality with Antonius.

### 13.5 *quid dicam de Apulo Domitio? cuius modo bona proscripta vidi. tanta procuratorum est negligentia.*

Nothing is known of this Domitius. Shackleton Bailey notes Apulus could be a cognomen (1986: 279 n. 12); otherwise he translates the phrase as ‘Domitius the Apulian’. The adjectival *Apulo* is likely since it is consistent with the ethnic diversity conveyed through the passage. *modo*: Just how long ago this was is left vague. *bona proscripta*: *Proscripta* are notices announcing the sale of goods. *tanta ... negligentia* is ironic. The implication is that Domitius was bankrupt.
13.6 at hic nuper sororis filio infudit venenum, non dedit. sed non possunt non prodige vivere qui nostra bona sperant, cum effundant sua. Cicero ‘seems to be suggesting that Domitius forced the poison down his victim’s throat’; so Shackleton Bailey (1986: 387), citing the example at Dig. 29.5.1.19 to illustrate forced poisoning and subsequent condemnation: *si venenum per vim infusum sit.* infudit ...

**effundant**: The topicality of the inference is lost, but Cicero extends the theme with repetition and change in number from third person singular (*infudit*) to plural (*effundant*), in order to extend the homicidal trait to all Antonius’ followers. The polyptonic from *infudit* to *effundant* marks a shift from the specific to a more general characterisation of wastefulness, particularly when the septemvirate was responsible for the distribution of land at the expense of their rightful owners. sed non possunt non prodige vivere is affirmation by negation (litotes), emphasizing prodigious expense.

13.8 vidi etiam P. Deci auctionem, clarissimi viri, qui maiorum exempla persequens pro alio se aere devovit. emptor tamen in ea auctione inventus est nemo. Cicero plays upon the language of an auction in order to place the subjects of his ridicule in the context of buying and selling. **P. Deci**: Publius Decius (*RE* 10; *MRR* 2: 353). Decius was a legate of Antonius, later captured by Octavian at Mutina and then released as a gesture of good will (App. 3.80). **qui ... devovit**: Cicero refers ironically to the exemplary stories of P. Decius Mus (*RE* 15) and his son (*RE* 16) respectively, because they were often cited as models of patriotic self-sacrifice. The exemplary story of self-sacrifice is retold in a number of Ciceronian passages (*Rab. Post. 2*; *Dom. 64*; *Sest. 48*). Their inclusion within *Philippic* 11 is to illustrate the moral incongruity of the familial line by contrast with the P. Decius here (*Rab. Post. 2.11: familia laus*). P. Decius Mus (*RE* 15), as consul in 340, devoted himself for the success of his army against the Latins at Veseris in Campania (Liv. 8.6-11). His son, P. Decius Mus, consul in 312, 308, 297 and 295, following the example of his father, similarly devoted himself against a combined force of Samnites and Gauls (Liv. 10.26-30; *MRR* 1: 135; Oakley 1998: 477-86; for the ritual of ‘*devotio*’ see Versnel 1976; 1980). Cicero’s joke hinges on the ritual of the *devotio*; instead of offering himself up for the sake of the *res publica*, this latest descendant of the Decii offered himself up for auction, but with no takers.

13.10 hominem ridiculum, qui se †exercere† ex aere alieno putet posse, cum vendat aliena! **hominem ridiculum**: A mocking exclamation (cf. *Ver. 2.1.121*;
Att. 10.3a.2). †exercere†: exercere has prompted a number of speculations without satisfactory resolution: V: exercere; Fedeli: exserere se essere: D: se exire aere. Decius seems to think that he can clear his debts by putting up for sale other people’s property. Cicero’s characterisation of Decius thus shows why Decius was involved with the septemvirate.

14.1 nam quid ego de Trebellio dicam? quem ultae videntur furiae debitorum; vindicis enim novarum tabularum novam tabulam vidimus. de Trebellio: L. Trebellius (Fides) (RE 4; MRR 2: 287; 322), tribune of the plebs in 47, and aedile in 44. The agnomen, attributed by Cicero (Phil. 6.11), is otherwise unattested (but see comments by Manuwald 2007 ad loc.). In 47 Trebellius opposed his tribunician colleague Dolabella for the latter’s attempt at a remission of debts. The agitation for the remission of debts and support for Dolabella from among the plebs led to the intervention of Antonius as magister equitum with an armed force who prevented the passage of the law (Att. 11.23.3; Dio 42.29-32; Plut. Ant. 8-9; Liv. Per. 113). Cicero suggests that Trebellius had offended the debtors of 47 by opposing a remission of debts, but was later forced to post a nova tabula (an ‘auction catalogue’: OLD 4b; cf. Cat. 2.8) because he had fallen into debt himself. vindicis: Vindex in the current context has a double meaning. A vindex was one who, upon a creditor seizing a debtor, procures the latter’s release by himself assuming liability for any claim (OLD 1). Here vindex is used also in the general sense of an ‘avenger’, by its paradoxical relation to furiae.

14.3 quid de T. Planco? quem praestantissimus civis, Aquila, Pollentia expulit, et quidem crure fracto: quod utinam illi ante accidisset, ne hic redire potuisset!

quid de: The phrasing and rhetorical question is repeated from §14.1 above on Trebellius. T. Planco: T. Munatius Plancus Bursa (RE 32; MRR 2: 235), tribune of the plebs in 52. He served under Antonius around Mutina but was driven from Pollentia by Pontius Aquila (Phil. 13.27; cf. Dio 46.38.3). Cicero successfully prosecuted Plancus de vi in late 52 for his part in the riots following Clodius’ death and had him exiled (Fam. 7.2.2; 8.1.4; Dio 40.55.4; Alexander 1990: 159). Like Bestia he profited from Antonius’ recall of exiles. Aquila: Pontius Aquila (no attested praenomen; MRR 2: 308) was tribune of the plebs in 45 and subsequently joined the conspiracy against Caesar. His conspicuous animosity towards Caesar is recorded at Suet. Caes. 78. In 43 Aquila was legate to D. Brutus operating near Pollentia where he expelled Plancus Bursa (Dio 46.38.3). He provided for the
maintenance of Decimus’ troops from his own fortune (Fam. 11.10.5; Dio 46.40.2). He was killed in the first battle at Mutina and was awarded posthumous honours at Cicero’s request (Ad Brut. 1.15.8). **crure fracto**: A broken leg would have hindered Plancus from returning to Rome, a desirable outcome. The phrase was also proverbial for punishment by crucifixion, and so marks Plancus out as deserving of such punishment (cf. Cicero’s comment at Phil. 13.27: *in hoc Planco proverbi loco dicitur, perire eum non posse, nisi ei crura fracta essent*). For crucifixion, the breaking of legs was used to ensure a person’s death (NT. John 19.31; see also M-R: 150 n. 17).

14.5 **lumen et decus illius exercitus paene praeterii**, T. Annium Cimbrum, Lysidici filium, Lysidicum ipsum Graeco verbo, quoniam omnia iura dissolvit, nisi forte iure Germanum Cimber occidit. See Phil. 10.12.7 on the positive application of the *lumen* and *lux* metaphor. The use of the metaphor here is heavily sarcastic. **paene praeterii**: Cicero feigns to mention Cimber as an afterthought. In fact, he is carefully placed as the climax of the list as worst and most criminal of all: a brother murderer. **T. Annium Cimbrum**: T. Annius Cimber (RE 37; MRR 2: 319) was a praetor for 44 and, as indicated by Cicero (Phil. 3.26), may have shared in Antonius’ provincial assignments in the meeting of the senate on 28 November (Frisch 1946: 154). Possibly of Greek origin (*Lysidici filium*); he is called ‘Philadelpus’ at Phil. 13.28 (cf. Wiseman 1971: 24; no. 29; and comments by Manuwald 2007: 418). **Lysidicum ipsum Graeco verbo**: *Graeco verbo* can be understood with reference to a ‘Greek phrase’ (*verbum*: OLD 10); Manutius urged deletion of the phrase, supported by Powell 1988: 39. Lysidicus is derived from the Greek λύω, to loosen, and δίκη, justice and so provides a pun that Cicero elucidates for his audience. The inclusion of *Graeco verbo* is warranted by Cicero’s deliberate attempt to direct the audience to the literal meaning of Lysidicus and to emphasize the non-Roman origins of the catalogue of Antonius’ followers. ** nisi ... occidit**: This last catalogue of Antonius’ followers contains two further puns (noted by Quintilian at 8.3.29). *Germanum* means both ‘German’ and ‘brother’; the Cimbri were also a German tribe. Cicero makes allusion to Cimber’s supposed murder of his brother (Phil. 13.12; Mil. 82).

14.7 **cum hanc et huius generis copiam tantam habeat Antonius, quod scelus omittet, cum Dolabella tantis se obstrinxerit parricidiis nequaquam pari latronum manu et copia?** Cicero concludes his catalogue of Antonius’ followers by a comparison of Antonius and Dolabella. The central point is made emphatically at
the beginning of the sentence, where Cicero emphasizes the collective threat of Antonius’ band of outlaws. The catalogue illustrates a narrow focus regarding the motivations of these individuals. This focus, however, allows Cicero to present them as not nearly as bad as Dolabella or Antonius. **hanc … tantam:** The doubling allows Cicero to linger over the forces available, within a *cum* clause implying causality. Sarcasm and irony give way to emphasis on the violent threat of Antonius’ intentions, as Cicero shifts his focus to the immediate debate. This coincides with the line of argument moving back from the minor characters to Antonius and Dolabella. **parricidiis:** The term picks up Cimber as guilty of murder of a family member. It applies to all the followers of Antonius and Dolabella as ‘treasonous’, another sense of the word (see Wilson 2008: 331-332). **latronum manu et copia?:** Manus and *copia* are near synonymous terms. A *manus* is an irregular force or gang (*OLD* 22b; cf. *Phil*. 6.3: *cum latronum manu in Galliam inruperit*), while *copia* is more generally ‘troops’. The doubling of near synonymous terms emphasizes the military threat and the unprincipled and violent nature of a marauding enemy (cf. the doubling of *manus* and *copia* at *Dom.* 61.1).

**Refutatio (§§15.1-25.8)**

The following sections form the *refutatio*, the part of a speech in which the orator responded to his opponent’s *sententia* with the aim of breaking down the central arguments (*Inv. Rhet.* 1.78; *De Orat.* 2.331-338; Quint. 5.1-5.12). The *refutatio* within *Philippic* 11 is structured around the sequential response to the two proposals made before Cicero’s own speech, by Calenus and L. Caesar respectively. The *refutatio* is largely devoid of emotional appeal, consistent with the precepts outlined by Quintilian (5.13.2). Only at §21 does Cicero build towards an emotional climax, as he dilates upon the actions of the enemies of the state, before returning to the calm introduction of his proposal.

After the catalogue of the character-type of the men involved in the current conflict, Cicero turns to the immediate issue regarding the command to be taken against Dolabella. On the day preceding the delivery of *Philippic* 11, Calenus proposed that Dolabella be declared a *hostis* for the murder of Trebonius and for his renegade acts in the east. The debate resumed on the following day and the discussion
turned to the question of who was to lead the republic’s forces against Dolabella. Two proposals were delivered before Cicero rose to deliver *Philippic* 11, which Cicero addresses in his *refutatio*. By addressing the two preceding proposals Cicero adheres to his own principle of responding to each of his opponents’ arguments one by one in order to loosen the foundations of their case (*Part. 44: accidere autem oportet singula: sic universa frangentur*). Cicero begins his response focusing firstly upon the proposal made by L. Caesar, who proposed a command for a P. Servilius, an experienced consular and Trebonius’ predecessor in Asia (*Phil. 11.16; 11.21*). Although a senior consular, Servilius held no public magistracy and was therefore a *privatus*, a point which Cicero uses as grounds for opposition. Cicero opposes an extraordinary command for Servilius on two grounds: firstly, it was incongruous with Roman tradition, and secondly, it was inappropriate for a *privatus* to be appointed against Dolabella. Cicero then opposes Calenus’ proposal for granting command to the consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, but only after they had relieved D. Brutus at Mutina (*Phil. 11.16; 11.21*). Such a command, Cicero argues, necessarily involves a delay that may prove detrimental to the Senate’s long term aims.

Normally the *refutatio* followed the *confirmatio* but within *Philippic* 11 we have a rather pronounced deviation from the standard model, with the *refutatio* taking precedence (*Inv. Rhet. 1.19; Rhet. Her. 1.4; De Orat. 1.143*). The deviation here signals the unusual situation in which Cicero found himself, a situation in which he advocated a command that he knew to be unpopular, the grant of *imperium maius* to Cassius. Cicero therefore delayed his proposal until after he had given his reasons for opposing the *sententiae* of Calenus and Caesar. The arrangement allowed Cicero to delay any prejudice felt towards Cassius until Cicero had established a context that would prove conducive to his proposal. Only after his proposal does Cicero deliver the *confirmatio*, a unique example within our extant sample of deliberative speeches.

The *refutatio* could not be prepared to the same degree as the other parts of speech, dependent as it was upon an opponent’s argument and the orator’s *ad hoc* response in the course of senatorial debate. This accounts for what appears as an impulsive reaction, and selective response, to the proposals of Calenus and Caesar. Taken together with the quick publication of the speech, the disjointed structure of the speech indicates minimal revision.
An endorsement of Calenus’ proposal to declare Dolabella a *hostis*.

The following passage provides a transition from approval of Calenus’ proposal to declare Dolabella a *hostis*, to the repudiation of the proposals by Calenus and L. Caesar. There is an accompanying change of tone as Cicero’s series of puns gives way to the austere tone with which he endorsed Calenus’ proposal.

15.1 *quapropter, ut invitus saepe dissensi a Q. Fufio, ita sum eiusmodiae libenter adsensus: ex quo iudicare debitis me non cum homine solere, sed cum causa dissidere.* It is unclear who spoke first in the day’s debate. In any case, Calenus took the lead in proposing that Dolabella be declared a *hostis*. *sententiae ... adsensus:* The proposal was duly carried with the support of Cicero. *Q.* omitted in V. but see Adams (1978: 155) who provides convincing grounds for its inclusion. Cicero was fulsome in his assent, despite the awkward recognition of his relationship with Dolabella through Dolabella’s marriage to Tullia (see Phil. 11.10.1). *me non cum homine solere, sed cum causa dissidere:* Cicero and Calenus were not on good terms; their inimical relationship was long standing (Calenus is possibly identified as the person whom Cicero calls ‘mihi inimicissius’ (Att. 11.8.2; see Shackleton Bailey 1966: 277). Cicero’s comments in his correspondence were indeed personal and the animosity throughout the *Philippics* was to become very public (cf. Phil. 5.1; 8.11-19; cf. 10.3-6; and again at Phil. 12.3-4; 12.18; Att. 15.4.1; 16.11.1). However, Cicero’s comment is not just about Calenus, but about characterising Cicero himself. He wants to deny that his usual opposition to Calenus is ‘personal’.

15.4 *itaque non adsentior solum sed etiam gratias ago Fufio: dixit enim severam, gravem, re publica dignam sententiam: iudicavit hostem Dolabellam; bona censuit publice possidenda.* The debate regarding the status of Dolabella, and the subsequent command against him, lasted for two days. Calenus delivered the proposal to declare Dolabella a *hostis* on the first day. The language of praise is restrained; the clauses are short and arranged paratactically before Cicero moves quickly to his next point. *adsentior* (with dative of person) is the formulaic consent a senator might give in response to a *sententia* already delivered (Phil. 5.1; Att. 7.3.5; 7.7.7). Cicero appears not to have spoken at any length on the preceding day, as we find no reference here to any speech; merely that he willingly approves of having Dolabella declared a *hostis* (Phil. 11.15.2: *ita sum eiusmodiae liberter adsensus*).
dixit … re publica dignam sententiam: The senate was now summoned for a second day of debate in order to discuss events in general terms (*de re publica*) as opposed to a specific topic (cf. Phil. 7.1). The phrasing is formulaic (cf. Phil. 8.2; *cum ita dixit, aliam sententiam ... re publica dignam*; Red. In Sen. 8: *sententiam de salute mea se et re publica dignam dicere*), and Calenus is only mentioned once by name, diminishing the prominent role that he had played on the preceding day.  

hostem Dolabellam: Justinian’s *Digesta* (50.16.118) defines *hostes* as ‘those who have declared war on us or on whom we have declared war; all the rest are *latrones* or *praedones*’ (*hostes hi sunt, qui nobis aut quibus nos publice bellum decrevimus: ceteri ‘latrones’ aut ‘praedones’ sunt*). On *hostis* and its application see Jal 1963.  

publice: Adv. ‘as a concern of the state, in the name of the state’ (*OLD* 1).

15.5 quo cum addi nihil potuisset (quid enim atrocious potuit, quid severius decernere?), dixit tamen, si quis eorum, qui post se rogati essent, graviorem sententiam dixisset, in eam se iturum. quam severitatem quis potest non laudare? Cicero praises Calenus, somewhat disingenuously.  

post se rogati: After the subject of debate was introduced, the presiding magistrate would then address each senator and demand that he speak on the matter before them, called the *rogatio*. There was an established order of speaking, but this was subject to variation. The presiding magistrate addressed his question to the *consulares* in order, beginning with the *princeps senatus* (in Cicero’s time an honorary position determined by the consul) and so on through each successive grade: the ex-praetors, praetors and so on (Gell. 4.10.2; 14.7.9).  

se iturum: Senators used their feet to vote by crossing the floor to join a senator whose *sententia* they supported (cf. *pedibus in hanc sententiam itum est*: Sen. *Apol.* 11.6; Gell. 3.14; Taylor 1969).

(*§§16.1-18.14*) The command for Servilius is opposed because it is incongruous with Roman tradition.

Precedents are raised to illustrate the incongruous appointment of a *privatus*. As evidence Cicero draws attention to the wars against Antiochus, Pyrrhus, and Philip, then to the Achaean, and Third Punic Wars, and to the senate’s appointment of appropriately qualified commanders for these commands. The commands, Cicero argues, were granted to elected commanders, and not *privati*. Cicero introduces a second, although less compelling, component to his argument: an additional command
to be granted to the consuls might arouse suspicion, and give cause for envy among those within the senate who were able to undertake the appointment. Cicero concludes his opposition by suggesting the appointment would delay the conflict and temper the ardour of the eastern armies, particularly when the east is willing and prepared for the conflict.

16.1 nunc, quoniam hostis est iudicatus Dolabella, bello est persequundus. Cicero’s statement is short and emphatic, identifying the purpose of the senate meeting. This passage is a transition point from the character sketches of Antonius’ followers to the question of who should conduct the war against Dolabella, coinciding with the shift in tense to the present and future. Dolabella comes strongly back into focus with a summary of the forces available to him and an outline of his temperament.

16.2 neque enim quiescit; habet legionem, habet fugitivos, habet sceleratam impiorum manum; est ipse confidens, impotens, gladiatorio generi mortis addictus. quam ob rem, quoniam Dolabella hesterno die hoste decreto bellum gerendum est, imperator est deligendus. Cicero, following the catalogue of resources available to Dolabella, then illustrates Dolabella’s state of mind as a continuation of his characterisation at Phil. 11.6.10. The description is aggressively presented through three short clauses, each introduced by the anaphora habet and arranged in a climactic tricolon. neque enim quiescit: Quies is an absence of violence or aggression (OLD 4). The phrase forms an example of litotes, whereby Cicero emphatically states Dolabella’s intentions by denying the opposite. The assertion is elaborated by parallel structures in the following clauses. Urgency is created with a number of short emphatic clauses, while repetition of the forces available to Dolabella (from Phil. 11.14.9) reinforces the characterisation of Dolabella as an opportunistic bandit. On the status of Dolabella’s soldiers see Phil. 11.29.2. The present tense renders the events as immediately threatening. legionem: When Dolabella set out for the province of Syria in September 44, he passed through Macedonia and took from there one legion of Caesar’s army (App. 3.8; Dio 47.29.1; cf. Phil. 11.4). There is limited evidence concerning those who accompanied Dolabella east. The junior senator, M. Octavius Marsus (RE 71), mentioned at Phil. 11.4, preceded Dolabella with a legion to Syria. A. Allienus (RE 1), mentioned at
Phil. 11.29.2 and 11.32.6, was a legate under Dolabella, but was compelled to give up his legions to Cassius in Palestine (App. 3.78; 4.59). Sex. Marius (RE 27) and C. Titius were legati preparing ships for Dolabella but who then fled upon the arrival of P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther, propraetor in Asia. confidens: ‘Overconfident, daring’. impotens: ‘Lacking in self-control, violent’ (OLD 3); used with qualities of violent temperament (cf. Deiot. 32.7; Part. 112.6). addictus: Addictus has a notion of punishment (cf. Off. 3.45; TLL 1/1.575.33-68): ‘condemned to a gladiatorial type of death’. hesterno die is used in place of the adverb heri. It is used at Phil. 1.16 and 2.110, but had not recurred since Cat. 2.6.3. bellum gerendum: The phrasing occurs nine times in the Philippics, a proportionately high frequency in comparison with Cicero’s remaining speeches, reflecting the urgency with which he was advocating war.

16.5 duae dictae sunt sententiae, quarum neutram probo: alteram, quia semper, nisi cum est necesse, periculosam arbitror; alteram, quia alienam his temporibus existimo. Cicero identifies the two sententiae to which he will reply and which give the refutatio its structure. alteram: L. Caesar delivered the first sententia (see Phil. 11.19.1), proposing that the military command against Dolabella be given to P. Servilius. Cicero opposed Caesar’s proposal on the grounds that it was inappropriate to grant a command to someone who was not in his magisterial year or promagisterial term of office, someone who was, in effect, a private citizen (privatus). Privati had been appointed in times of necessity, which Cicero illustrates in the series of examples that follow. periculosam: Because of the associations with autocratic power that follows irregular appointments. Cicero suggests that the threat posed by Dolabella is able to be met through the regular appointment of a magistrate or promagistrate. Cicero does not yet articulate that he has Cassius in mind. To prove the inappropriateness of employing a privatus in the current situation, Cicero introduces a series of historical exempla to illustrate the institutionalised norm of employing existing magistrates. Cicero is seeking to illustrate that extraordinary commands were only granted under exceptional circumstances. But compare Cicero’s earlier justification for the command for Pompeius at Leg. Man. 60 where he affirms the practicality of the Roman people in war and their willingness to innovate when the occasion demanded: non dicam hoc loco maiores nostros semper in pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati paruisse, semper ad novos casus temporum novorum consiliorum rationes accommodasse. alteram: Calenus delivered the second
proposal, advocating the consuls for the command against Dolabella, but only after D. Brutus had been relieved at Mutina. Cicero will argue that the occasion demanded an immediate response, that a delay would inevitably allow Dolabella to consolidate his own position for the benefit of Antonius.

17.1 nam extraordinarium imperium populare atque ventosum est, minime nostrae gravitates, minime huius ordinis. What follows is a rather puzzling account that takes full advantage of the ambiguities surrounding the term imperium extraordinarium. Cicero himself does not define extraordinarium imperium here; rather he provides reasons for not granting such an honour in the current circumstances through referral to a number of precedents. There is a frequent shift in focus in Cicero’s discussion of the honour, as he avoids focusing on any one particular aspect of the command which might lead to the undermining of his own argument. extraordinary imperium: Cicero’s discussion of extraordinarium imperium is not one of classification, rather one in which only vague characteristics are identified; thus it is not a technical term, rather an umbrella term used to describe commands that were beyond the regular system of magistracies. The use of the term imperium extraordinarium is in fact relatively rare, because it merely implies a position of ‘special privilege’ (OLD 2), and so can be applied to a broad range of honours that fell outside the regular system of honours (for the development of extraordinaria imperia see Jashemski 1950; Boak 1983; Gruen 1974: 534-43; Ridley 1981). We have to go back to 56 and the delivery of the Pro Sestio before we find a similar occurrence (Sest. 60: extraordinarias potestates; cf. Dom. 18; Leg. Agr. 2.8; Caes. B Civ. 1.32.2). There was evidently an aversion to the use of the phrase due to negative associations. Brutus railed against Cicero’s strategy of granting irregular honours and emphatically objected to any imperia extraordinaria and potentia supra leges (Ad Brut. 1.17.6). Yet, not surprisingly, he expressed no objection to the promotion of Cassius. populare atque ventosum est: The terms are used to discredit L. Caesar’s proposal from the outset by attributing to them a demagogic character. Cicero’s initial objection is to the granting of commands via populist appeals because of the fickle and arbitrary nature of such appointments. Allowing the senate to determine the appointment of a magistrate by way of popularity, Cicero argues, would have the effect of introducing electioneering within the senate.

17.2 bello Antiochino magno et gravi, cum L. Scipioni provincia Asia obvenisset, parumque in eo putaretur esse animi, parum roboris, senatusque ad
collegam eius, C. Laelium, illius Sapientis patrem, negotium deferret, surrexit P. Africanus, frater maius L. Scipionis, et illam ignominiam a familia deprecatus est, dixitque et in fratre suo summam virtutem esse sumnumque consilium neque se ei legatum, id actatis iisque rebus gestis, defuturum. The anecdote is expressed in one lengthy complex sentence. The *exempla* that follow illustrate the success of the senatorial tradition of appointing commanders to theatres of war through sortition, and that any novel appointments will run counter to the tradition that had proved so successful in the most trying wars of Rome’s past. However, Cicero’s *exempla* are selective, since *imperia extraordinaria* were granted repeatedly during the Second Punic War. Rome simply did not have enough magistrates for all its theatres. *bello Antiochino*: Cicero immediately draws attention to the contentious debate regarding the appointment of L. Scipio to the war against Antiochus III of Pergamum (the war lasted from 192-188). L. Cornelius Scipio (*RE* 337; *MRR* 1: 356) and C. Laelius (*RE* 2; *MRR* 1: 356) were consuls in 190 and a debate ensued regarding the appointment of who was to be granted command. According to Cicero, L. Scipio was about to be conferred with the province of Asia when the senate wavered, since L. Scipio was considered to lack the necessary martial valour. Livy, by contrast, was more concerned to illustrate the apprehension within the senate at the prospect of Scipionic dominance, and to develop the dramatic tension between Africanus and Hannibal in the impending conflict, than to illustrate constitutional arguments (Liv. 37.1-10; on the episode in Livy see Walsh 1992: 121-3; Briscoe 1972; Balsdon 1972: 22ff). The appointment of L. Scipio would nonetheless allow Africanus to assume the de facto command as legate and avoid the creation of a special command since Laelius seems content to have deferred to the Scipiones. Livy noted that the decision was referred to the senate on the suggestion of Laelius, who held much sway within the senate. Livy (37.8) remarked on the unusual nature of Laelius’ suggestion to defer the decision to the senate, given the senate’s normative reliance on sortition to determine provincial allocation, and went so far as to attribute the referral to some forgotten precedent: *cum res aut nova aut vetustate exemplorum memoriae iam exoletae relata expectatione certaminis senatum erexisset, P. Scipio dixit, si L. Scipioni fratri suo provinciam Graeciam decrevissent, se ei legatum iturum.* Within *Philippic* 11, Cicero has the senate prefer Laelius to command and only after Scipio’s intervention in defence of his brother did the senate resolve to send Lucius (similarly Val. Max. 5.5.1). The subsequent success of L. Scipio proved the
viability of the system to which Cicero refers. Cicero uses the episode to illustrate the inappropriate decision of the senate to veer away from its regular method of appointment. He argues against the appointment of a privatus, because it was unnecessary and opened up the possibility for abuse among his senatorial colleagues. Reliance on tradition, such as sortition and prorogation of existing commands, averted ambitions that challenged the balance of power among the senate’s members.

**animi**: In the sense of ‘courage, spirit’ (cf. *Fam.* 5.2.8; 5.6.14).

17.8 _quod cum ab eo esset dictum, nihil est de Scipionis provincia commutatum; nec plus extraordinarium imperium ad id bellum quaesitum quam duobus antea maximis Punicis bellis quae a consulibus aut a dictatoribus gesta et confecta sunt, quam Pyrrhi, quam Philippi, quam post Achaico bello, quam Punico terto; ad quod populus Romanus ita sibi ipse delegit idoneum ducem, P. Scipionem, ut eum tamen bellum gerere consulem vellet._ The conflict between the consuls need never have arisen had the senate resolved the issue by traditional means. The appointment and subsequent success of L. Scipio illustrated the merits of the system and so provides a precedent for the current situation. Cicero’s initial example is chronologically distant, but together with the following examples illustrates a consistency and adherence to the *mores maiorum*. The _exempla_ begin in the third century BC and proceed through subsequent conflicts, before turning to Pompey’s numerous _extraordinaria imperia_ in the 70s. The catalogue of Rome’s conflicts is almost identical with the catalogue found at *Leg. Man.* 14, illustrating the predominance of these particular conflicts within the Roman mindset (*maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt*). _duobus antea maximis Punicis bellis:_ To C. Lutatius Catulus, consul for 241 (*MRR* 1: 219), fell the prestige of defeating a Carthaginian fleet off the Aegates Islands, in effect bringing the First Punic War to a close. Africanus was consul in 205, but had his command extended yearly until the defeat of Hannibal at Zama in 202, and the conclusion of terms of peace in the Second Punic War. _Pyrrhi:_ Pyrrhus, king of Epirus (319-272 BC). The war lasted from 280-275 (*App. Samn.* 7.3; Oros. 4.1.4) and was conducted by a succession of consuls (*MRR* 2: 190-5). _Philippi:_ Philip V of Macedonia came into conflict with Rome through the First (214-205) and Second (200-197) Macedonian wars. The war was brought to an end by the consul of 198, T. Quinctius Flamininus (*MRR* 1: 334). _Achaico bello:_ The Achaean War was brought to an end by L. Mummius (cos. 146; *MRR* 1.465) in the year of his consulship. The
League’s defeat resulted in a reduction of Greek autonomy. *populus Romanus ... delegit:* After returning to Rome to stand for the aedileship, Scipio Aemilianus was absolved from the laws that imposed age restrictions upon all holders of the consulship (since he was not yet of legal age), and was elected as consul by the people (cf. *Phil.* 5.47–48; *Liv.* Per. 50; Vell. Pat. 1.12.3; Val. Max. 8.15.4). The *populus Romanus* is singled in the nominative for special emphasis, thereby exonerating the senate from Scipio Aemilianus’ appointment. *Imperatores* like Africanus and Aemilianus received *imperium* through popular votes (and so circumventing the senate). Cicero wants to avoid mention of this, or at least of its implications.

**18.1 cum Aristonico bellum gerendum fuit P. Licinio L. Valerio consulibus.**

P. Licinus Dives Crassus Mucianus (*RE* 72; *MRR* 1: 500) and L. Valerius Flaccus (*RE* 175; *MRR* 1: 500), consuls for 131, were to conduct the war against Aristonicus, a claimant to the throne of Pergamum (*MRR* 1: 500; *Liv.* Per. 59; Strabo 14.1.38). *Aristonico:* Aristonicus attempted to gain control of the region, which Attalus III had bequeathed to Rome upon his death in 133 (*Liv.* Per. 58; Plut. Ti. Gracch. 14). Rome was slow in taking possession of Pergamum, which allowed Aristonicus to take control of the area. In 131, preparations began in earnest for the conflict, but only after an initial clash between the consuls concerning who would command.

**18.2 rogatus est populus quem id bellum gerere placeret. Crassus consul, pontifex maximus, Flaco collegae, flami Martiali, multam dixit, si a sacris discessisset: quam multam populus remisit; pontifici tamen flaminem parere iusset.** It is likely that Valerius Flaccus received the province of Asia by sortition, given the ensuing feud (so Brennan 2000: 233), but was challenged by his colleague, the consul Licinius Crassus. Crassus, as *pontifex maximus*, forbade his junior pontifical colleague, the *flamen Martialis*, from taking the command and leaving his religious duties in Rome (*Liv.* Per. 59). Crassus went so far as to threaten Flaccus with a fine should he abandon his duties (Linderski 1986: 2218–9 cites other examples of the disciplinary power of the *pontifex maximus*; cf. Brennan 2000: 348 n. 82). However, no *pontifex maximus* had ever left Italy to campaign, an impediment that led to an impasse. Recourse was made to the people to resolve the issue and the people decided to uphold the decision of the *pontifex maximus* (*Liv.* Per. 59; Strabo 14.1.38; Val. Max. 8.7.6; Quint. 11.2.50).

**18.6 sed ne tum quidem populus Romanus ad privatum detulit bellum, quamquam erat Africanus qui anno ante de Numantinis triumpharat; qui, cum**
longe omnis belli gloria et virtute superaret, duas tamen tribus solas tuit. The dispute sets up a context into which Cicero can introduce Scipio Aemilianus, who proposed himself for the command despite being a privatus. Aemilianus’ pre-eminent status as a military leader was ensured after he had triumphed in the previous year for his victories in Numantia, and for his victories over Carthage in 146. His appointment would resolve the impasse between the consuls, but despite his military pre-eminence, he secured only two votes of the 35 tribes for the command against Aristonicus (Astin 1967: 234; Mattingly 1985: 117). His failure to win appointment through popular support can be seen in light of the suppression of Ti. Gracchus and Aemilianus’ support of the senate in doing so. ad privatum: The objection, Cicero suggests, was due to the fact of Aemilianus’ status as privatus. Cicero argues against employing Servilius against Dolabella on the grounds that Servilius was not a currently serving magistrate or promagistrate. Cicero presents the use of privati as an abnormality, drawing from exempla in the Middle Republic to illustrate that holders of imperium derived their authority by virtue of holding office. There was ample provision within the provinces to provide a commander against Dolabella without the need to appoint a privatus from Rome. Imperium in the Middle Republic, from which Cicero takes his initial exempla, was nearly always preceded by a magistracy. The position of a promagistrate, however, was quite different. A consul or praetor was allowed to continue to exercise his duties by a prorogation of his imperium by decree of the senate. He was appointed to a provincia, usually determined by sortition, in which he exercised imperium in place of a magistrate (proconsule or propraetore) for the duration of his employment.

There is, however, little evidence to support Cicero’s assertion that the employment of privati was traditionally avoided, or that advocacy of privati evoked particular opposition per se. The use of privati was not without precedent; ample examples could be drawn from a number of contexts, particularly from the Middle Republic. The employment of privati provided an avenue by which experienced or competent commanders could be assigned tasks which required experience, usually when an insufficient number of promagistrates required supplement. The Second Punic War provides ample illustration (e.g. Liv. 25.18; 18.43; 26.2; 26.18; Brennan 2000: 234). The insufficient number of available commanders was remedied with an increase in praetors and quaestors in 197, and through the institutionalization of prorogation as a necessary measure to meet the needs of an increased number of
provinciae (Badian 1979: 793). Subsequently the practice of using privati fell into abeyance until the emergence of Marius and his command against Mithridates in 88.

18.9 ita populus Romanus consuli potius Crasso quam privato Africano bellum gerendum dedit. The justification for not appointing Africanus is signposted with the attributive ‘privato’. The dispute between the consuls was deferred to the tribal assembly, which resolved to uphold the objection of the pontifex maximus and send Crassus against Aristonicus. In the following year, Crassus was captured and killed by the forces of Aristonicus (see MRR 1: 503 for references).

18.10 de Cn. Pompei imperiiis, summi viri atque omnium principis, tribuni plebis turbulenti tulerunt. Cicero turns to the popular element in the rise of Pompey and the obvious examples of his imperia extraordinaria. The reintroduction of the tribunician right to initiate legislation in 70 had important ramifications in respect to the ‘extraordinary’ commands of the last decades of the republic, when two major commands were proposed for Pompey by the newly empowered tribunes. In 67, the tribune Aulus Gabinius carried a law granting Pompey imperium over the Mediterranean and for 50 miles inland. Cicero fails to mention his own support of the bill at the time, published as the Pro Lege Manilia, despite his criticism of tribuni turbulenti. Again, in 66, C. Manilius passed, among several items, a law granting Pompey command against Mithridates (Leg. Man. 62; Liv. Per. 91; Val. Max. 8.15.8; MRR 2: 144-5 for the year 67 and MRR 2: 153; 155 for the year 66). The command was to last three years and the commander was entitled to appoint and delegate praetorian imperia to his own legati. The examples Cicero uses to illustrate his argument are selective, but of course he could not ignore the remarkable nature of Pompey’s own rise as a privatus, which is not addressed here. We have very little evidence to indicate that this grant of imperium elicited particularly strong opposition. Dio (36.33.3-4) noted Catulus’ opposition to Pompey’s appointment as a privatus, equating the position with that of the dictatorship. Yet Catulus’ opposition was against the concentration of power into the hands of one individual rather than the specific appointment of a privatus. The employment of a privatus was unusual and could evoke surprise, as Caesar indicated with his expression of disdain at the senate’s decision to replace him in Gaul with privati (Caes. B Civ. 1.6; 1.85: in se iura magistratuum commutari, ne ex praetura et consulatu, ut semper, sed per paucos probati et electi in provincias mittantur).
18.11 nam Sertorianum bellum a senatu privato datum est quia consules recusabant, cum L. Philippus pro consulis eum se mittere dixit, non pro consule

In the war against Sertorius, the reluctance of the consuls led to the appointment of Pompey. **Sertorianum**: Q. Sertorius, praetor in 83 (RE 3; MRR 2: 63), led resistance to Sulla in Spain, where he was able to resist successive commanders until he was murdered in 72, in effect ending the conflict. The war in Spain had proven difficult and republican reverses were conspicuous. Q. Metellus Pius, appointed proconsul in Spain from 80, had suffered a number of serious reverses (MRR 2: 83), while his colleague M. Domitius Calvinus, proconsul in Nearer Spain, fared worse, falling in battle at Anas (MRR 2: 84). Morale was low and the theatre proved no easy path to glory. Consequently, neither consul for 77 was prepared to accept the command. A debate ensued regarding who was to take the command and, following the proposal of L. Philippus (consul in 91), the senate appointed Pompey, who was of equestrian status at the time.

There was, however, a still greater controversy surrounding the appointment (Val. Max. 8.15.8). Catulus, the consul for 78, following the suppression of Lepidus, ordered Pompey to surrender his army, but Pompey kept his soldiers under arms until granted command **(pro consule)** against Sertorius (Liv. Per. 91; Plut. Pomp. 17.1-4; App. 1.108). In recalling the episode Cicero focuses upon the consuls’ refusal to take Spain as their **provinciae**, despite the fact of Pompey’s recalcitrance. **pro consulis** is a play on words meaning ‘for the consuls’, as opposed to ‘pro consule’ ‘in place of a consul’, the technical term for the magisterial position. The pun is attributed to L. Philippus and appears at Leg. Man. 62.6; Plut. Pomp. 17.4; Oros. 5.23.8. Cicero recognises the irregularity of this type of command, common throughout the Late Republic but chooses not to acknowledge that it had once been a viable alternative in times of stress.

(§§ 19.1-20.16) It is inappropriate for a **privatus** to be appointed against Dolabella.

Having established a series of precedents, Cicero returns to the current situation and addresses the motion of L. Caesar regarding the appointment of Servilius. Cicero offers a second objection to the employment of **privati** on the grounds that the appointment of a **privatus** would have the effect of introducing electioneering into the senate.
19.1 quae igitur haec comitia, aut quam ambitionem constantissimus et gravissimus civis, L. Caesar, in senatu introdixit? clarissimo viro atque innocentissimo decrevit imperium, privato tamen: in quo maximum nobis onus imposuit. ambitionem: A ‘solicitation of votes, canvassing’ (OLD 1A; Pet. 32; 47; Phil. 5.47). It is frequently used in a pejorative sense, with the notion of ‘self-interested motivation’ (for its ambivalence see Hellegouarc’h 1972: 208-10); Sallust uses the term exclusively in the pejorative (for example, Cat. 11.1; 52.22). L. Caesar: L. Iulius Caesar, a relative of Caesar the dictator (see the stemma at RE 10: 183-4; cos. in 64: RE 143; MRR 2: 161), was the brother of Antonius’ mother and so shared a close familial relationship with the Antonii. He had served under Caesar in Gaul (Caes. BG. 7.65.1), but took no conspicuous role in the civil war (Shackleton Bailey 1960: 261). Cicero considered L. Caesar a hindrance within the senate to a more proactive position against Antonius (Phil. 2.14; 8.1; 12.18; Fam. 10.28; 12.2.3; 12.5.2). clarissimo viro … innocentissimo: The doubling of polite superlatives slows the tempo, while the word order emphasizes privato. Clarissimus is reserved for prominent senators and used with some frequency throughout the Philippics. It is an epithet used of meritorious service to the res publica and frequently coupled or contrasted with other adjectives (OLD 6c): it is applied to Hirtius (Phil. 11.24.1), M. Lepidus (Phil. 2.23.10), Sex. Pompeius (Phil. 5.39.12), L. Caesar (Phil. 6.14.6), P. Servilius (Phil. 9.3.4), Cn. Pompeius (Phil. 13.8.1), L. Paulus, Q. Thermus, C. Fannius (Phil. 13.13.2) and Scipio Africanus (Phil. 13.29). viro: Sc. P. Servilius. To this point Servilius is unnamed. By averting mention of Servilius, Cicero avoids personalising the discussion, despite the personal misgivings Cicero held about Servilius. Notwithstanding the praiseworthy language used of Servilius, the relationship between Servilius and Cicero was at times strained. Cicero in no way supported the appointment of Servilius to the command, attested by a letter to Brutus in which Cicero objected to the man in quite disparaging terms (Ad Brut. 2.2.3: ego hic cum homine furioso satis habeo negoti, Servilio; quem tuli diutius quam dignitas mea patiebatur, sed tuli rei publicae causa, ne darem perditis civibus hominem parum sanum illum quidem sed tamen nobilem quo concurrerent).

19.4 adsensus ero, ambitionem induxero in curiam; negaro, videbor suffragio meo, tamquam comitiis, honorem homini amicissimo denegavisse. quod si comitia placet in senatu haberí, petamus, ambiamus, tabella modo detur nobis,
sicut populo data est.  adsensus ero ... negaro: Cicero’s ‘election’ metaphor creates an antithesis in which the issue is structured as a yes or no decision. However, Cicero wants to introduce a third option (i.e. Cassius). Cicero suggests that the proposal of L. Caesar would have the effect of turning his proposal into an electioneering campaign and thereby placing the burden (the onus from above) upon the senators, who would be compelled to support or rebuff a colleague.  petamus (OLD 9) and ambiamus (OLD 3) are near synonyms and apply to the language of an election.  tabella: A voting tablet was used in the comitia, but not the senate. When electing a magistrate the elector wrote down the name of the candidate before submitting his tablet (cf. Planc. 6.16: si populo grata est tabella, quae frontis aperit hominum; Willems 1878: 196 n.8). Cicero’s reference to the tabella is gentle sarcasm: ‘if an election is to be had in the senate, let us apply for the office, let us canvass, let us be given a tabella just as the people are given’.

19.7  cur committis, Caesar, ut aut praestantissimus vir, si tibi non sit adsensum, repulsam tulisse videatur aut unus quisque nostrum praeteritus, si, cum pari dignitate simus, eodem honore digni non putemur?  Cicero now turns to address L. Caesar with a rhetorical question in order to question the practicality of his proposal. Such a proposal as advocated by Caesar, would be divisive on two counts: firstly, by denying support to Servilius it would give the appearance of slighting a worthy colleague; and secondly, the canvas for support within the senate would allow for competition that could be exploited by senators ambitious for irregular commands.  cum pari dignitate: Dignitas in the sense of ‘merit, worth’. Servilius was consul in 48 and so a consular. However, the number of consulares within the senate of 43 was exceedingly slim (Syme 1939: 61-3), and so Cicero cannot refer exclusively to this particular rank, but includes those who were of ‘worth’ (dignitate).

20.1  at enim – nam id exaudio – C. Caesari adulescentulo imperium extraordinarium mea sententia dedi.  at introduces the defence of Cicero’s proposal that Octavian be granted propraetorial imperium at Phil. 5.47, which was in effect an imperium extraordinarium. Octavian was below the minimum age for the propraetorial position, and so obviously a privatus. Cicero did not, however, refer to Octavian’s imperium within Philippic 5 as extraordinarium, but here Cicero invigorates the language of an extraordinarium imperium by calling to mind the exceptional support Octavian had provided the res publica.  exaudio: ‘I hear it
whispered’. Shackleton Bailey translates the sentence as ‘I think I hear a murmur’, phrasing which conveys the immediate sense of the physical difficulty of catching a phrase, as at Att. 4.8a.1: *dic, oro te, clarius; vix enim mihi exaudisse videor*. It might be argued that this is Cicero responding to his audience, assuming the text is a close record of the spoken oration. The phrasing does, however, more likely signify a secondary reason for its inclusion within the speech. Cicero’s place within the sequence of debate allows him to respond to the first two proposals, but he could only anticipate possible objections from speakers to follow who might object to his argument on the grounds that Cicero had proposed an extraordinary command for Octavian on 1 January (*Phil. 5.46-53*). Cicero therefore decides to respond to a likely objection and to pre-empt the most likely argument. Cicero can depict any possible objection as rumour, and so present a more cogent rebuttal before these objections are raised. The phrasing further provides a transition to Cicero’s defence of Octavian by allowing Cicero to refocus his attention on the benefits that Octavian had given the *res publica*. Such benefits can then be applied to Cassius by inference. See Manuwald (2007: 564-565) for Cicero’s strategy of referring to rumour as a way of pre-empting likely objections.  

**mea sententia dedi**: Cicero had proposed that Octavian be granted the status of a propraetor and be allowed to speak among the ex-praetors and so bypass the *cursus honorum*, resulting in a command that was beyond the usual structure of magistracies (*Phil. 5.45-53*). Cicero’s reference is to the successful proposal he had made for the promotion of Octavian, reinforced by the emphasis upon the first person. Octavian benefited from strong support within the senate and so Cicero can allude to the occasion without particular fear of reprisal (Ser. Sulpicius Rufus and L. Marcius Philippus (consul in 56) had proposed an honorary statue, while the consular, P. Servilius Isauricus, had engaged his daughter to Octavian: for the proposal of a statue see *Ad Brut.* 1.12; and for the betrothal to Servilia see Suet. *Aug.* 62).

By referring to the senate’s conferral of *imperium* upon Octavian, and knowing that it was well received, Cicero can establish parallels that will support his forthcoming proposal for Cassius. The more Cicero can establish parallels between Octavian and Cassius, the more Cicero can emphasize continuity of senatorial approval. The appointment of Octavian inevitably raised the precedent of the conferral of *imperium* upon Brutus only weeks before the delivery of this speech, yet Cicero is reluctant to draw attention to Brutus’ appointment. The likely reason for this
was that Brutus’ command had raised anxieties within Italy, and so a command for Cassius would continue to fuel those anxieties because of the close association between the men. Cassius is yet to be named, and so any association with Brutus may have prejudiced Cicero’s audience before he is able to deliver his proposal. Cicero does address concerns regarding his preferment of Brutus and Cassius at Phil. 11.36 below, but avoids the association here, preferring instead to refer to a more popular appointment.

20.3 *ille enim mihi praesidium extraordinarium dederat: cum dico mihi, senatui dico populoque Romano. a quo praesidium res publica, ne cogitatum quidem, tantum habet ut sine eo salva esse non posset, huic extraordinarium imperium non darem?* There is a great deal of movement in subject over the two sentences, from third person to first person to third person and back to first person, as Cicero moves through a series of interlacing relationships. This ends up moving from statement into another rhetorical question. *enim* allows Cicero to maintain the narrative of his defence from the preceding rhetorical question. After illustrating the failings of the proposal of L. Caesar, Cicero moves to the justification of the honours he himself had proposed for Octavian. Cicero had given his support to Octavian; and this, Cicero argues, was on account of the extraordinary protection that Octavian had given, not just to Cicero himself, but to the *res publica: cum dico mihi, senatui dico populoque Romano.* The repetition of *dico* forms the rhetorical figure of *correctio* where Cicero improves his first statement (referring to *mihi*) by amending the initial phrase to include all the Roman people and senate as beneficiaries of Octavian’s protection. *praesidium:* *Extraordinarium imperium* is equated with *extraordinarium praesidium.* The necessity for protection of the *res publica* is a recurrent metaphor describing the actions of M. Brutus throughout *Philippic 10* (*Phil.* 10.9; 10.10; 10.12; 10.17; 10.24). Octavian, too, had provided protection for the state (*praesidium*), and through him safety was acquired for the *res publica.*

20.6 *aut exercitus adimendus aut imperium dandum fuit. quae est enim ratio aut qui potest fieri ut sine imperio teneatur exercitus?* Octavian was in command of an army and so required the conferral of *imperium.* From April to December 44, Octavian, like Pompey before him, was exercising the functions and privileges of an *imperator* without any state sanctioned authority. However, there were no legal grounds on which an individual might assume for himself the right of *imperium.* The statement presenting Octavian as a holder of *imperium* was therefore
legally questionable; in November 44, Calenus came to the senate prepared to declare Octavian a hostis for his act of raising a private army, but relented in the face of Octavian’s supporters (Phil. 3.20; 5.23-4). But, as Octavian was retrospectively granted imperium, Cicero can depict Octavian’s actions as having a certain inevitability, and can subsequently draw the conclusion that Octavian was always acting in the interests of the res publica. ratio: The ‘exercise of reason’ derived as a result of logical argument (OLD 7).

20.8 non igitur, quod ereptum non est, id existimandum est datum. eripuissetis C. Caesari, patres conscripti, imperium, nisi dedissetis. There is an antithetical play on the verbs eripio and do. Cicero continues to argue from retrospection, and caps the series of rhetorical questions by setting up a disjunctive proposition. The senate had been faced with two alternatives in response to the raising of a private army by Octavian: to grant him imperium, or to take it away. There was only one viable outcome if the senate wished to respond swiftly to the threat posed by Antonius, and that was to support and encourage the actions of Octavian.

20.10 milites veterani qui illius auctoritatem, imperium, nomen securi pro re publica arma ceperant volabant sibi ab illo imperari; legio Martia et legio Quarta ita se contulerant ad auctoritatem senatus et rei publicae dignitatem ut deposcerent imperatorem et ducem C. Caesarem. Having asserted Octavian’s value as a praesidium, Cicero proceeds to illustrate why Octavian’s promotion outside the cursus honorum was justified. Cicero absolves Octavian of ambitious or selfish motivations by having the legions initiating the call for Octavian to command. veterani: The veterans, settled in Campania, were enlisting voluntarily, and this was followed by the defections of the Fourth and Martian legions from Antonius. This accumulation of military resources precipitated the senate’s decision to grant Octavian imperium (Phil. 5.28; App. 3.47). Cicero claimed that the defection of the Martian legion from Antonius was based on patriotic grounds; it had refused to be involved in the massacring of citizens. Cicero was, however, under no illusions regarding Octavian’s means of acquisition (Att. 16.8.1: veteranos qui Casilini et Calatiae <sunt> perduxit ad suam sententiam. nec mirum, quingenos denarios dat). Octavian had sent agents to Brundisium to win over Antonius’ soldiers (who had crossed over from Macedonia), and those agents made promises of two thousand sesterces for each soldier (cf. Phil. 3.3.8 where Cicero defines the largess as: effudit patrimonium; cf. App. 3.40; 3.45.13). auctoritatem: Auctoritas in the sense of ‘precedent, example’
(OLD 10). However, auctoritas derives much of its force from the military sphere, though it is not necessarily a military quality; this in effect creates a more complete picture of Octavian by playing upon the differing nuances of the word. nomen: Sc. Caesaris; Octavian derived much of his influence from the use of the name ‘Caesar’ (App. 3.21). Antonius was obstructive about Octavian’s adoption, and would repeatedly denounce Octavian as drawing his support and status solely from the use of the name ‘Caesar’: (Cicero, quoting Antonius) ‘qui omnia nomini debes’ (Phil. 13.25); Cicero had reservations for similar reasons (Att. 16.8.1: vide nomen, vide aetatem), but these concerns were never publicly declared. deposcerent: Cicero argues that the veterans had compelled (deposcerent) Octavian to command them, placing a duty upon the passive Octavian (volabant sibi ab illo imperari), who must lead those who had deserted Antonius for patriotic reasons. A similar argument had been used by Cicero for the appointment of Pompey at Leg. Man. 12.13 (imperatorem a vobis certum deposcere). imperatorem et ducem: Imperator designates the holder of an imperium. Legally, Octavian did not have imperium until the beginning of 43, and so Cicero appropriates the language of an imperator (and in the following sentence the visible symbols). The polyptonic repetition of imperium ... imperari ... imperatorem gives weight to the reality of Octavian’s power, while the repetition of legio supplies emphasis. There is a pleonastic construction of imperatorem et ducem, the objects to which the legions gravitate.

20.14 imperium C. Caesari belli necessitas, fascis senatus dedit. otioso vero et nihil agenti privato, obsecro te, L. Caesar – cum peritissimo homine mihi res est - quando imperium senatus dedit? The wording emphasizes necessitas, and thus an absence of choice in opposing Antonius. At De Orat. 2.336 Cicero had argued that there could be no deliberation if a course of action was imposed by necessity, since there were no alternatives. Cicero is asserting that there was no alternative but to appoint Octavian. By inference, the current situation demands the appointment of someone, who is yet unnamed. fascis: The fasces were the bundles of rods and axes that symbolised the consul’s power of coercitio. They form the visible insignia of a magistrate’s office, together with the lictors who bore them. The consuls had twelve fasces which they alternated between themselves monthly, while praetors, by virtue of their lesser magistracy, had six (Marshall 1984: esp. 127-41). peritissimo: Peritus is used substantively as ‘an expert in the law’ (OLD 1c), but the use of the superlative indicates sarcasm or irony in the phrasing, because Caesar should have known better.
Otioso is used because Servilius had held a prerequisite office; he was consul in 48, but was now without office. Otioso vero et nihil agenti privato are synonymous terms and provide a marked contrast with the necessitas imposed upon Octavian.

quando: The interrogative quando introduces the rhetorical question and in the following sentence Cicero immediately dismisses the question before an answer can be formulated.

(§§ 20.16-24.16) Cicero opposes Calenus’ proposal to grant the consuls the command against Dolabella.

Cicero moves to his refutation of the second proposal, that the consuls be granted command. The proposal is opposed on two grounds: firstly, the siege at Mutina demands the consuls’ attention (§§20.16-24.16); and secondly, delay is detrimental to the current situation (§25.1-25.8). The war with Antonius at Mutina threatens dignity, liberty and life. This is where the consuls should focus their attention. Cicero draws in themes established earlier in the speech: the threat of torture and punishment at the hands of Antonius.

20.17 sed de hoc quidem hactenus, ne refragari homini amicissimo ac de me optime merito videar. etsi quis potest refragari non modo non petenti verum etiam recusanti? de hoc ... hactenus: Cicero draws a close to the first part of the refutation by suggesting that Servilius is, in any case, reluctant to undertake the command. The initial phrasing signals a transition to the second part of Cicero’s refutatio. Cicero is insistent that he will not allow his own objections to Caesar’s proposal to hinder his friendship with Servilius. videar: Cicero acknowledges that Servilius may take offence at his argument, so he addresses the issue through polite deference of their friendship. To make a show of friendship, while criticizing alternative policies, is a recurrent tactic throughout the Philippics that draws attention to a point of difference, but mitigates it by a professed desire to avoid giving offence (cf. Cicero’s assertion that his disagreements with Calenus were not on personal grounds, but based on diverging political views: Phil. 11.15). non modo non petenti verum etiam recusanti?: ‘not only not seeking it, but even refusing it’.

Cicero affirms that Servilius was reluctant to undertake the command. We have no evidence to the contrary. Servilius may well have been prepared to concede to Pansa’s
greater claims, particularly after the proposal endorsing the consuls received numeric support (see decernunt at Phil. 11.22.1). However, it may be, as Frisch has suggested (1946: 227), that Servilius himself was eager for the command and that the frosting of the friendship between Cicero and Servilius was a sudden result of Servilius’ desire to accept the command. Whether Servilius acted in coordination with L. Caesar is unclear; we know nothing of Servilius’ attitude other than Cicero’s suggestion of Servilius’ reluctance.

21.1 illa vero, patres conscripti, aliena consulum dignitate, aliena temporum gravitate sententia est, ut consules Dolabella persequendi causa Asiam et Syriam sortiantur. illa: Sc. Calenus’ proposal at Phil. 11.16.5. The greater and more difficult argument to counter was the proposal to grant command to the consuls. Calenus’ proposal was clearly advantageous to Pansa, and Pansa’s preference for the proposal is evident given the passing of the motion. patres conscripti: Cicero turns from L. Caesar to address the senate as a whole, a technique known as apostrophe (Lausberg §§ 762-765). The effect is to refocus the audience to the introduction of a new line of argument. Calenus proposed that the consuls draw lots for the command against Dolabella, but this is immediately rejected on two grounds: firstly, that the lot is foreign to the dignity of the consuls; and secondly, that it is alien to the gravity of the situation. sortiantur: Calenus had proposed that the consuls draw lots for the provinces of Asia and Syria with a view to pursuing Dolabella. Cicero argues, however, that the gravity of the situation requires urgent address and that the sortition, despite the speed and effectiveness by which it could be implemented, was ill suited to the current situation. Traditionally, the consuls, usually at the beginning of their consular year, determined by a mutual arrangement (comparatio), or by lot (sortitio), the provincia to which each would be assigned in their following year of proconsular office (Balsdon 1962: 139; Liv. 42.31.1; 28.45.9; 30.40.12). Sortition provided for a variety of purposes in the Roman polity (see Stewart 1998: 9-10; Rosenstein 1995: 43-75; Brunt 1988: 443-502). Its use allowed for the dividing of duties without recourse to the senate or populus and without divisive conflict within either of those bodies. Sortition, in theory, tempered an individual’s quest for pre-eminence in the state by removing competition in certain fields. This non-political means of reaching a decision similarly curbed factional politics which could otherwise paralyze effective and prompt action, and removed the need to canvass support (Brunt 1988: 443-502). The sortition in this case would determine who took control of the campaign against
Dolabella; given Hirtius’ absence, sortition was both a convenient recourse and a fair allocation of duty. The issue for Cicero was to illustrate that the provincial command was inappropriate in the current situation. Cicero thus presents the command as being inappropriate to the dignitas of the consuls (by distracting them from a pressing crisis in Italy) to have them plan for future, provincial tasks.

Cicero’s argument only becomes clear when he introduces his own motion at Phil. 11.29 below, where he urged a command for a promagistrate in the region. Special commissions were traditionally created by way of senatorial appointment or tribunician legislation, ostensibly to meet a political or military emergency. The threat of Dolabella’s campaigns in the east is clearly a military emergency, but Cicero has already dismissed the appointment of the consuls. Cicero will argue that an already existing promagistrate was necessary to meet the immediate need, since there were fears that the eastern provinces would be difficult to recover should they be lost to Dolabella; however, those fears, although recognized, were never realised (Ad Brut. 2.3.1: indigno scelere et civem optimum amissimus et provinciae possessione pulsi sumus, quam <neque> recuperare facile est neque minus turpe aut flagitioum erit <si> potest recuperari). The immediacy of the conflict forms an argument for the appointment of Cassius, although this is only articulated once Cicero has illustrated the failings of Calenus’ proposal.

21.3  **dicam cur inutile rei publicae, sed prius quam turpe consulibus sit videte.**

The sentence is a signposting: the advantage to the res publica will be discussed after the issue of whether it would be dishonourable for the consuls to undertake the command is addressed. A deliberative speech is determined by the advantage or usefulness (or unusefulness on this occasion) to be derived from a particular course of action (Rhet. Her. 3.7), a precept to which Cicero makes explicit reference here. The advantage is derived from what is considered as ‘safe’ (tuta), or from a consideration of what is ‘honourable’ (honestas). Honour and advantage are co-ordinate aims (Inv. Rhet. 2.51.156), while at De Oratore 2.82.335 Antonius (the interlocutor) considers the situation where advantage opposes honestas; cf. Off. 3.2.9 for the Stoic view in which there could be no conflict between honestas and utilitas. Utilitas becomes the sole aim in Part. 83, but honestas provides a double proof, if it can be shown that that which provides security is coincident with that which is honourable.  **inutile:**

‘Useful’ to the res publica, because the conflict at Mutina was happening simultaneously with the conflict in the east. The conflict with Antonius required all
the resources of the consuls and the diversion of those resources to the east would be deleterious to this conflict. **turpe:** In the next section, Cicero highlights the degree of emergency in Italy and that, for the sake of honour, the consuls ought to focus their attentions upon this conflict.

21.5 **cum consul designatus obsideatur, cum in eo liberando salus sit posita rei publicae, cum a populo Romano pestiferi cives parricidaeque desciverint, cumque id bellum geramus quo bello de dignitate, de libertate, de vita decernamus, si in potestatem quis Antoni venerit, proposita sint tormenta atque cruciatus, cumque harum rerum omnium decertatio consulibus optimis et fortissimis commissa et commendata sit, Asiae et Syriae mentio fiet, ut aut suspicioni crimen aut invidiae materiam dedisse videamur?**

The longest sentence in *Philippic* 11 accumulates detail in order to illustrate the immediate threat posed by Antonius. The cause of shame from the preceding sentence (**turpe**) is left for the final clause of this complexly structured sentence. There is a frequent shift in subject throughout the sentence, but it is structurally coordinated through the anaphora **cum. Cum** is causal, indicating the main action as deriving from this catalogue of subordinate clauses (G-L §586). **consul designatus:** D. Brutus was designated consul for 42 according to Caesar’s *acta* (*Fam.* 11.1.1; Vell. Pat. 2.60.5; Suet. *Aug.* 10.2; App. 2.124.518; 3.2.4; 3.16.58; Dio 44.14.4). **salus sit posita rei publicae:** The phrasing forms a refrain throughout the period of Antonius’ barricade of D. Brutus (cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.2.2: *est enim spes omnis in Bruto expiendo, de quo vehementer timebamus*). **parricidaeque:** *Parricidae* are those who have betrayed the *res publica*, a crime classed with parricide (the murder of a parent: *OLD* 3b; cf. Phil. 4.5; Wilson 2008: 331-2; see also Stevenson 2008 for paternal imagery in this period. Cicero thus inverts the vocabulary usually used of the tyrannicides and applies it to Antonius, Dolabella, and all those who have deserted the *res publica*. **quo bello:** The relative clause gives emphasis via an unremitting sequence of threats. **de dignitate, de libertate, de vita:** Cicero again characterises Dolabella and Antonius for their wholly un-Roman character by juxtaposition with what is Roman. Dolabella and his army have deserted the state (*desciverint*) and now threaten *dignitas, libertas,* and *vita.* The arrangement is a tricolon with the climactic emphasis falling on life itself. The subordination moves from the abstract to the concrete, with the emphasis upon the last phrase in order to establish the consequences of a failed war against Antonius. **suspicioni crimen aut invidiae materiam:** The phrasing expresses the
same idea in synonymous terms. Pansa is already occupied by a major conflict, and the idea of reserving a second conflict would give cause for envy.

22.1 at vero ita decernunt ‘ut liberato Bruto’: id enim restabat, ut relictó, desértó, prodító. decernunt: The plural points to some consensus on the decision to send the consuls. The question of who might command against Dolabella must have been broached in the preceding day’s debate as a consequence of declaring Dolabella a hostis, but a decision was left for the current day’s discussion. It seems likely that Pansa, as presiding magistrate, would have indicated his own preference for the command, whether privately or not. He may have discussed the issue with Calenus, as he had regarding Brutus’ despatch prior to the meeting of Philippic 10 (Phil. 10.6.4). Pansa’s predilection for the command may well have influenced a number of senators to concur, particularly given his increasingly authoritative influence during the opening months of 43 (Phil. 9.9; 12.2; 12.15; 12.18; 14.5). Decernunt seems to indicate a verbal or physical assent by the senators who might articulate their support of, or physically side with, the speaker whose proposal they supported (see Phil. 11.15.5 n.). relictó, desértó, prodító: The asyndetic phrasing in synonymia stands in contrast to the elaborate organisation of the preceding sentences and conveys an emotional and moving perspective. The three words are in order of increasing pointedness.

22.2 ego vero mentionem omnino provinciarum factam dico alienissímo tempore. Cicero continually defines the situation in terms of its irregularity. The situation is such that the allotment of provinces is not the priority, but that the situation demands an immediate and specific response; and so Cicero now focuses his objections upon the poor timing of the proposal.

22.3 quamvis enim intentus animus tuus sit, C. Pansa, sicut est, ad virum fortissísum et omnium clarissísimum liberandum, tamen rerum natura coget te necessario referre animum aliquando ad Dolabellam persequendum et partem aliquam in Asiam et Syriam derivare curae et cogitationis tuae. Cicero directs his attention back to Pansa. He argues that the situation in the east is an unnecessary distraction, given that the consuls are engaged with the immediate and potentially disastrous conflict with Antonius. quamvis with subjunctive qualifies a verbal idea with the force of ‘however much you may intend’. The effect is to draw attention back to senatorial directives laid down since the beginning of the year; namely, the need to relieve D. Brutus from siege. sicut est is added as a mark of deference. Praise is
made of Pansa for directing his attention to the relief of D. Brutus at Mutina; however, there his attention should remain. Cicero could show sarcasm toward Calenus, but he had to show a great deal more deference to Pansa in order to avoid antagonising the presiding magistrate. Cicero implies that the consuls, having also been given the task of combating Dolabella, will neglect their duty towards D. Brutus because of this unnecessary distraction. **tamen** is adversative, introducing a cautionary note through clauses of increasing length. *Natura* becomes the subject of the following clauses; this foreshadows the increasing role of *natura* (as ‘natural order, law of nature’), within the speech, culminating at *Phil.* 11.28.6. **aliquando**: ‘at some time’. The necessity of war in the east is expressed in parallel structures that are closely synonymous:

*rerum natura cogit*

*te referre animum* + adv. + gerundive

*te derivare* + *partem aliquem curae et cogitationis* + prepositional phrase

**derivare** is used in the sense of ‘diverting’ the attention of Pansa away from what should be a sole focus. Should Pansa allow his attention to be diverted from the issue at hand he would diminish his effectiveness. This diversion is reflected in the divisional pairing of *curae et cogitationis*. **cogitationis** implies a consideration towards some future action, a natural compulsion to care for the state. The sentiment is one of a diplomatic series of concessions to the motivations of Pansa.

22.7 **si autem fieri posset, vel pluris te animos habere vellem quos omnis ad Mutinam intenderes.** The phrasing picks up from the *tuus animus* of Pansa above. The conditional clause is altered in meaning by *vel* which adds an alternative preference (‘would that Pansa had many minds which he could turn to Mutina’). But this preference is unable to be met, and so is a meaningless proposition.

22.8 **quod quoniam fieri non potest, isto t≤e> animo quem habes praestantissimum atque optimum nihil volumus nisi de Bruto cogitare.** *quod*: At the beginning of a sentence *quod* expresses: ‘as regards the fact that’. The unreal condition of the preceding sentence leads Cicero to a statement of fact. **volumus** takes the prolate infinitive and consequently avoids the subjunctive. **cogitare** has an extended meaning: ‘to think about with a view to helping’ (*OLD* 5b).

23.1 **facis tu id quidem et eo maxime incumbis, intellego; duas tamen res, magnas praesertim, non modo agere uno tempore sed ne cogitando quidem explicare quisquam potest.** Cicero mitigates his insistent suggestions with
deference to Pansa’s actions. intellectego is omitted from the manuscripts nsv, see Fraenkel 1968: 191-192. duas tamen res: I.e. the conflict with both Antonius and Dolabella. There are a number of adverbs in these sentences and a periphrastic delay in defining the duas res. Tamen, in the post-positive position, also slows the tempo of the resolution with a meaning something akin to ‘in spite of what has been said’ (OLD 1). magnas praesertim emphasizes the nature of the conflict through a second and more emphatic remark concerning the conflict (correctio).

23.3 incitare et inflammare tuum istuc praestantissimum studium, non ad aliam ulla ex parte curam transferre debemus. Cicero affirms Pansa’s zeal for the current conflict and suggests it is the senator who must make known their counsel to the consul. Consequently, Cicero makes emphatic his own counsel by equating it with that of the senate. istuc: An adverb of direction, but used here to refer to a course of action, supplied by the context. ulla is preferred to the reading of ulla[m] in bns. Shackleton Bailey retains the bracketing of ulla[m], but this is to be deleted. The phrasing of ulla parte keeps the focus upon the conflict at Mutina; cf. Cicero’s use of the construction ulla ex parte at Fin. 2.21.6; Caec. 38.6; Rep. 2.10.11.

23.5 adde istuc sermones hominum, adde suspiciones, adde invidiam. imitare me, quem tu semper laudasti: qui instructam ornatamque a senatu pro vinciam deposui ut incendium patriae omissa omni cogitatione restinguerem. Cicero uses the example of his own consulship and his decision to relinquish his pro-magisterial prerogative of taking a province in 63, and equates the threat of the Catilinarians to the threat posed by Dolabella (Cowan 2008: 145 draws a number of parallels with the Catilinarian speeches and the way Cicero draws attention to his own role in the conflict; see also Evans 2008: 63-75). adde ... adde ... adde: The anaphora introduces three successive clauses, arranged asyndetically, each of which is shorter in length than the preceding. The sequence is clearly structured: sermones give rise to suspiciones which give rise to invidiam. Cicero uses himself as an example of deference to the state, in order to give proof of his patriotism and to serve as a model of action for Pansa to imitate. Within a competitive political system Pansa’s actions would undermine the stability of the res publica by monopolizing significant commands. Pansa had taken particular offence to Cicero’s speech and had vigorously obstructed Cicero’s proposal, as Cicero related to Cassius (Fam. 12.7.1: quae mea sententia in senatu facile valuisset, nisi Pansa vehementer obstitisset). What Cicero did not communicate however was the specific nature of the offence. The failure to
publish the speech delivered before the people (following the delivery of *Philippic* 11) may well stem from the accusation that Pansa was supposedly monopolising provincial commands. Cicero’s line of argument was not compelling on this point, particularly since others in the senate ardently wanted the consuls to take command against Dolabella. Cicero evidently decided not to offend Pansa further by publishing a speech that over-emphasized this particular charge. Cicero gained nothing by publishing the speech, particularly when he wanted to convey an impression of consensus to those commanding armies in the provinces. Cicero does not go so far as to state explicitly that Pansa would manipulate his office for multiple commands, but uses the argument to characterize behaviour inappropriate for members of the senate. Cicero could have drawn attention to Caesar and Antonius, since each had violated the political system by appointing themselves against the traditions of the state in which the highest offices were shared among Rome’s ruling elite. *instructam ornatamque: Ornavit provincias* was a technical term referring to the money, arms, and attendants provided to governors when setting out for their provinces (*Att. 3.24.1; 4.18.2; Liv. 40.36*). *provinciam deposui:* A technical term for ‘resigning a province on appointment’ (*Balsdon 1937: 8*). Macedonia and Cisalpine Gaul were the designated consular provinces for 62 (*Allen 1952: 233ff*). The sortition gave Cicero Macedonia, and Cisalpine Gaul to his colleague C. Antonius, but the designation was short lived. Cicero conceded Macedonia to his consular colleague in exchange for support against Catiline, while Cicero himself received Cisalpine Gaul: *ego provinciam Galliam senatus auctoritate exercitu et pecunia instructam et ornatam, quam cum Antonio commutavi, quod ita existimabam tempora rei publicae ferre, in contione deposui reclamante populo Romano* (*Pis. 5.5*). Cicero later relinquished Cisalpine Gaul altogether, allowing the province to be allotted to one of the praetors, ostensibly to concentrate on the Catilinarian conspiracy (*Fam. 5.2.3; Att. 2.1.3; Pis. 2.5; cf. *Leg. Agr.* 1.26; *Sall. Cat.* 26.4; *Dio 37.33.4; Plut. Cic. 12.4*). *restinguere*m: Cicero retains the fire metaphor from *incitare et inflammare Phil. 11.23.3* above.

23.8 *nemo erit praeter unum me, quicum profecto, si quid interesse tua putasses, pro summa familiaritate nostra communicasses, qui credat te invito provinciam tibi esse decretam.* Cicero suggests that jealousy within the senatorial order would not be misplaced since Pansa would appear to be monopolising provincial duties, despite competent magistrates being available. *pro summa familiaritate nostra communicasses:* Forms a parenthesis to the questionable
judgement of Pansa’s motivations that follows. Cicero insists that Pansa would have communicated his intentions for the sake of their friendship; but, because Pansa has not communicated his intentions, Cicero raises the suspicion of Pansa’s motivations. Cicero’s insistence on Pansa’s self-serving motivations no doubt contributed to Pansa’s anger following Cicero’s oratio. Pansa was incensed and followed Cicero to the contio after the senatorial session and again stressed his objection to Cicero’s position (Fam. 12.7.1). **summa familiaritate:** The phrased is used in a more informal sense. It implies an intimacy and political cooperation.

**23.11 hanc, quaeso, pro tua singulari sapientia reprime famam atque effice ne id quod non curas cupere videare.** Cicero urges Pansa to suppress all suspicion by refusing the command. **videare:** Second person passive present subjunctive. **famam** is used here in the sense of a malicious report, which picks up on the sermones above. **effice** and **ne** together with the subjunctive have the sense of ‘do not allow it’ (*OLD* 3). We have no evidence that anyone, other than Cicero, was critical of Pansa monopolising provincial commands.

**24.1 quod quidem eo vehementius tibi laborandum est quia in eandem cadere suspicicionem conlega, vir clarissimus, non potest.** No such suspicion could fall upon his colleague, Hirtius, since Hirtius had already headed north against Antonius. **quia** with the indicative gives a factual reason. There is no possibility of any suspicion falling upon Hirtius, since he was already engaged on the battlefront. The consuls were commissioned at the beginning of January (but not on the opening days of senatorial debate: so Manuwald 2007: 859) to draw lots in order to determine who was to begin the initial movement north against Antonius, while the other remained in Rome to coordinate efforts there. The initial command against Antonius fell to Hirtius, while Pansa was to remain in Rome to conduct political business until it was right for him to march north (*Phil.* 7.11-13; 8.5-6; 10.16; 10.21; 14.4; *Oros.* 6.18.3; Plut. *Ant.* 17.1; *Cic.* 45.4; *App.* 3.65). Pansa was to remain in Rome for a brief time following the delivery of *Philippic* 11, before he too left for Mutina. On 19 March, Pansa marched north with four legions of recruits and camped at Bononia on the Via Aemilia, twenty miles from the camp of Hirtius and Octavian, who occupied a position opposing Antonius’ camp, perhaps on the other side of the river Scultenna. **vir clarissimus:** See *Phil.* 11.19.7 n.

**24.3 nihil horum scit, nihil suspicatur; bellum gerit, in acie stat, de sanguine et de spiritu decertat; ante provinciam sibi decretam audiet quam potuerit tempus**
ei rei datum suspicari. The alliteration of sibilants is striking, while the sentence returns to the notion of *suspicare* through a ring composition. The sequence of short emphatic sentences is used as statement of fact, and so indicates the immediacy of the current conflict. Vividness gives clarity to the current actions of Hirtius and this makes striking the immediacy of the conflict. Hirtius is preoccupied by a life and death struggle, and this preoccupation is emphasized in order to reinforce Cicero’s argument. Hirtius, as consul, had taken command of Octavian’s army, comprising the two Macedonian legions, the Martian and the Fourth, and two legions of *evocati* made up from Caesar’s settled Seventh and Eighth legions. In addition there was a legion of new recruits (App. 3.47; Botermann 1968: 202-3).

**24.6** vereor ne exercitus quoque nostri, qui non dilectus necessitate, voluntariis studiis se ad rem publicam contulerunt, tardentur animis, si quicquam aliud a nobis nisi de instanti bello cogitatum putabunt. A delay in the war would dilute the resolution of the soldiers for the current conflict, especially if they were to see the senate wavering in its commitment. Cicero objected to any delay that might mitigate the senate’s resolve against Antonius. He had chafed at the delay imposed by the embassy (*Phil*. 5.25-6; 31), prompting him to deliver his *ad hoc* objection in the *Seventh Philippic*. **voluntariis studiis:** From January, a formal levy was decreed and executed (cf. *Phil*. 7.13; 8.6; 10.21; 12.16; 13.5; *Fam*. 11.8.2; 12.5.2. App. 3.65). Octavian, too, was levying an army, in addition to the defection of Antonius’ troops (*Phil*. 3.3; 3.7; 5.23). Cicero is not specifically referring to the recruits raised in Italy, which would preclude the defection of the Fourth and Martian legions and any of the soldiers enlisted by the liberators in the east. His reference is inclusive of the forces available to the *res publica*, and so emphasizes the spontaneity of those rising in resistance to Antonius. The strength of the levy was notable. P. Lentulus Spinther, son of P. Lentulus Spinther (consul in 57), assured Cicero that the forces in the east would crush Dolabella before the consuls ever arrived (*Fam*. 12.14.4). *Studiis* forms an indirect response to Calenus’ assertions that the veterans would be unwilling to follow an assassin of Caesar (see *Phil*. 11.37-9 below). The invocation of the legions is rather used to induce positive and immediate action. Although the status and allegiance of the soldiers is a recurrent theme through *Philippics* 10 and 11, it is not a primary argument within Cicero’s line of reasoning in the current context. By suggesting a levy of soldiers in large numbers, Cicero can emphasize the spontaneous zeal with which troops were enlisting. Cicero infers loyalty to the state as a motivating factor in
the levy of troops. Cicero had praised the actions of the Fourth and Martian legions for their desertion of Antonius, but their desertion was not for the altruism suggested here. Largesse formed a compelling factor in levels of recruitment (App. 3.40).

Plancus, in a letter to the senate, writes of the need to win the loyalty of his soldiers by monetary payments (Fam. 10.8.3: *sed aliquantum nobis temporis et magni labores et multae impensae opus fuerunt ut quae rei publicae bonisque omnibus polliceremur exitu praestaremus neque ad auxilium patriae nudi cum bona voluntate sed cum facultatibus accederemus. confirmandus erat exercitus nobis magnis saepe praemiis sollicitatus, ut ab re publica potius moderata quam ab uno infinita speraret*). Upon the completion of the war the Fourth and Martian legions were to receive a donative and land allotment in Italy, together with any other soldiers who were prepared to desert Antonius. Cicero had proposed that the legionaries and their children be exempt from military service (*militiae vacationem*), although this was not technically applicable to a state of *tumultus*. Further payments were to be made after the war’s completion (Phil. 5.53; App. 3.48; 3.65). *tardentur*: A part of Cicero’s rhetorical strategy was to hasten the conflict with Antonius in case a deleterious compromise was reached (so Rawson 1992b: 482). Cicero had been critical of both consuls, whom he thought were not wholly committed to the conflict and whom he urged to decisive action: *enim consulum non condemnabam quae suspecta vehementer erat; desiderabam non nullis in rebus prudentiam et celeritatem; qua si essent usi, iam pridem rem publicam recuperassemus* (Ad Brut. 2.1.1).

24.9 *quod si provinciae consulibus expetendae videntur, sicut saepe multis clarissimis viris expetitae sunt, reddite prius nobis Brutum, lumen et decus civitatis; qui ita conservandus est ut id signum quod de caelo delapsum Vestae custodiis continetur; quo salvo salvi sumus futuri.* *reddite ... Brutum*: Cicero urges a focused campaign for the relief of D. Brutus, before *provinciae* are found for the consuls, and so turns to the imminent conflict with Antonius. The use of ‘Brutum’ without praenomen stresses the historical connotations. *lumen et decus civitatis*: The words are a doublet of overlapping meaning (*lux*: OLD 10 and *decus*: OLD 3), which are used sarcastically of Antonius’ followers at Phil. 11.14.5. *ut id signum*: The *signum* ‘statue’ (the *Palladium*) was an image of the goddess Athene, preserved within the walls of Troy. The Greek version of the legend was consistent in maintaining that the safety of the Palladium was inextricably linked with the safety of the city of Troy. Its subsequent theft by Odysseus and Diomede precipitated Troy’s
fall (Dion. Hal. 1. 68–9; Virg. and Serv. Aen. 2. 162–79; Sil. Ital. Pun. 13. 36–70; Liv. 5.52.7, 26.27.14). The analogy of the Palladium is equated here with D. Brutus. As long as D. Brutus was preserved the res publica would similarly be preserved against the threat of Antonius. Roman versions complicated the story through an insistence on Aeneas’ role in the preservation of the signum. Aeneas was said to have brought the statue to Lavinium, and from there it was placed in the temple of Vesta under the tutelage of the Vestal Virgins. This required explanation and numerous versions arose to accommodate the discrepancy of its arrival (Ov. Fast. 6.419-60; see Austin 1964: 83-5 for a discussion of the various versions). In 241, the temple was burnt and the pontifex maximus, L. Caecilius Metellus rescued the image at the cost of his eyesight, in order to preserve Rome’s safety (Scaur. 48; cf. Ov. Fast. 6.437). Cicero is not concerned with any details of the story, but in the analogy as it applied to D. Brutus and the emphasis that he placed upon D. Brutus’ safety. quo salvo salvi sumus futuri: ‘In whose safety we shall be safe.’ Cicero had placed great hope in the safety of D. Brutus and saw his relief as vital in the prosecution of the war (Fam. 12.5.1: res se sic habebat ut totius belli omne discrimen in D. Bruto positum videretur; cf. Fam. 12.6.1: Brutus enim Mutinae vix iam sustinebat qui si conservatus erit, vicimus).

24.12 tunc vel in caelum vos, si fieri potuerit, umeris nostris tollemus; provincias certe dignissimas vobis deligemus. nunc quod agitur agamus; agitur autem liberine vivamus an mortem obeamus, quae certe servituti anteponenda est. tunc ... tollemus: ‘we shall bear you on our shoulders to heaven’. in caelum: Cicero reverses in caelum from de caelo at Phil. 11.24.9 above. The parenthetic si clause reiterates Cicero’s main focus of this need to eliminate Antonius and the challenge the fight poses. The phrasing usually refers to bearing a burden on one’s back, but here the burden is wilfully borne as a gesture of honour (cf. Red. Sen. 39.3; Dom. 40.12; Mil. 25.6). provincias: Cicero picks up again on the consuls’ provinciae and affirms that provinces will be found for the consuls in accordance with their dignitas. The reward of desirable provinces for the consuls will be a collective decision, emphasized by the repetition of the first person plural verbs.

Cicero continues to allude to Antonius as the pitch of the speech rises, and the phrasing becomes more emphatic. Cicero concludes his focus upon Antonius by condensing his argument into a fight for liberty. agitur ... agitur: The tricolon of the polyptonic agitur in asyndetic sequence reiterates the need for immediate action. The final polyptoton agitur introduces a sentence in which the result of the impending
conflict will be made evident. The fight against Antonius is made unavoidable, as are the two alternative outcomes. The first of the alternatives involves living freely, while the second involves meeting death in the process of resisting Antonius’ attempts at tyranny. D. Brutus has chosen death over servitude by his refusal to hand over his province to Antonius and so provides a model which the senate might replicate, and make the focal point of its immediate actions. autem marks a transition to an epiphany, a statement, often in the form of an exclamation, that concludes a line of argument, or that makes a summary comment about what has been narrated (Quint. 8.5.11; Lausberg §879). The following statement is not logically linked with the argument, but has a declarative character that is consistent with Cicero’s thematic emphasis on resisting tyranny. liberine … servituti: The contrast between freedom and slavery is a recurrent theme throughout the Philippics; the phrasing forms a general restatement of his view that death is to be preferred to enslavement (cf. Phil. 2.113; 10.19-20; Off. 1.81).

(§§25.1-25.8) Delay is detrimental to the current situation.

Cicero proposes that the appointment of the consuls should only be done after the conflict with Antonius at Mutina has been brought to its conclusion. Cicero argues against the command on the grounds that the current conflict with Dolabella in Asia requires immediate address. Any delay would merely allow Dolabella to strengthen his position. The passage is characterised by rhetorical questions that direct the argument.

25.1 quid si etiam tarditatem adfert ista sententia ad Dolabellam persequestandum? quando enim veniet consul? The focus on the struggle against Antonius, and the uncertainty of that struggle, now shifts to Dolabella in the east. Cicero indicates the impracticality of waiting for the completion of the campaign against Antonius before appointing a commander against Dolabella, given the magnitude of the brewing conflict at Mutina. Such a delay would leave the conflict in the east open-ended, with no sight of relief for those involved. Cicero begins a series of rhetorical questions which redirects the audience to the east.

25.2 an id expectamus quoad ne vestigium quidem Asiae civitatum atque urbi urbium relinquatur? The cities of Asia would adversely suffer as long as a delay
prevented relief from Dolabella’s crimes. The need to oppose Dolabella is insistent and demands an immediate response. Cicero knew of Dolabella’s abuses of the Asian cities, although this appears not to have informed the senate’s decision (cf. the letter from P. Lentulus *Fam.* 12.15.1: *quod quum pertimuisset Dolabella vastataque provincia, correptis vectigalibus, praecipue civibus Romanis omnibus crudelissime denudatis ac divenditis celerius Asia excessisset;* cf. *Ad Brut.* 2.4). *quoad* with the present subjunctive implies expectation when suspense and design are involved (G-L §572).

25.3 *at mittent aliquem de suo numero. valde mihi probari potest, qui paulo ante clarissimo viro privato imperium extra ordinem non dedi!* *at* is adversative referring to a subproposal within Calenus’ motion, which suggested employing legates for the interim. Ker (ad loc.) uses quotation marks to indicate direct speech, but the phrasing may be no more than a paraphrase. *suo numero:* Cicero leaves the phrasing vague because, no doubt, his audience was aware that the appointment of the consuls to the command would require the appointment of *legati* as provisional caretakers. The practice of employing a quaestor or legate to hold *imperium* in proxy of the designated magistrate was not particularly unusual, and so Cicero’s argument is not strong. Consequently, Cicero moves quickly through his argument with frequent shift in subject and number. Shackleton Bailey (1986: 287 n.33) notes that *de suo numero* is usually understood to mean a consular: ‘a quaestor or legate might be sent in advance though such a person would not technically be a *privatus*, but he would be a subordinate with no proper title to such a responsibility’. This implication allows Cicero to reiterate his opposition to granting *imperium* to Servilius, before focusing upon his own proposal at *Phil.* 11.26.3. At the conclusion of the day’s debate, the final form of the senatorial decree included provision for the appointment of *legati* to hold the provinces until the consuls had resolved the conflict with Antonius (*Fam.* 12.14.4-5). *extra ordinem* is in reference to the proposal to grant *imperium* to Servilius.

25.5 *at hominem dignum mittent. num P. Servilio digniorem? at eum quidem civitas non habet. quod ergo ipse nemini putavi dandum, ne a senatu quidem, id ego unius iudicio delatum comprobem?* The rhetorical questions are ironic. Cicero suggests that if *legati* were to be appointed, then why not send Servilius, as has already been proposed? The mock dialogue with several questions and answers is included to enliven the thought, forming the figure of *subiectio* (Lausberg §§ 771-
A series of questions and answers, usually addressed to the opposing party, has the effect of layering an argument in favour of the speaker (Quint. 9.2.12). *id ego unius iudicio delatum comprobem?:* Cicero creates an antithesis between the collectivity of the senate and the promotion of individuals through informal means. However, the series of rhetorical questions leads Cicero, not to an objection to this particular point, but rather to the introduction of his own following proposal.

*Confirmatio I (§§ 26.1-28.1)*

The *confirmatio* of Philippic 11 has two parts: a section that introduces Cassius into the speech and outlines the benefits to be derived from his appointment (§26.1-26.18); and a second section that follows Cicero’s *sententia* proposing Cassius for command (§§32.1-38.6). The first section of the *confirmatio* is somewhat anomalous with rhetorical precept: Cicero had stated that in a deliberative speech nothing is more important than dignitas, and that the deliberative speech aimed for this purpose (*De Orat.* 2.334). Yet here Cicero focuses almost exclusively upon the expediency and practicality of the appointment. There is little variety of argument in his proposal: Cicero establishes Cassius’ motivation (the *salutem libertatemque patriae*); the resources available to him; and his conduct in the east thus far.

The advantages to be derived from Cassius’ conduct are enumerated through a narrative style. Much of the focus is given to Brutus’ successes in the Balkans. The repeated link between Cassius and Brutus allows Cicero to infer that Cassius’ actions are conducted with the *exemplum* of Brutus in mind, and that the senate need not fear the intentions or motivations of Cassius. Compared with Philippic 10, less emphasis is given to the depiction of the character of Cassius. Indeed, more attention is given to enumerating Brutus’ successes in the Balkans, than to Cassius’ activities further east. This was, of course, dictated by the lack of intelligence coming into Rome concerning Cassius’ activities.

Cicero initially moves to appoint both Brutus and Cassius to command against Dolabella (*aut M. Brutus aut C. Cassius aut uterque*). This is a deliberate attempt to divert attention away from Cassius alone. Brutus is a rather odd inclusion at this point, given that he was already occupied in Greece. His inclusion can be justified by Cicero’s decision to link Cassius with the more reputable Brutus, and to use this link
as a means of persuasion (see introduction pp. 36-39). By linking Cassius with Brutus, Cicero is able to establish similar motivation, before narrowing his focus to Cassius alone within his sententia, where Brutus is altogether omitted from the formal wording of the proposal. On the function of the confirmatio within a deliberative oration see pp. 78-82.

(§26.1-26.18) Cassius is introduced and the general situation outlined. Cassius is advocated since he has an army in the region.

26.1 expedito nobis homine et parato, patres conscripti, opus est et eo qui imperium legitimum habeat, qui praeterea auctoritatem, nomen, exercitum, perspectum animum in re publica liberanda. imperium legitimum: Cassius is as yet unnamed, but Cicero clearly has him in mind; Cassius was pro consule by virtue of his provincial allocation of Cyrenaica, although he had shown no inclination to set out for the province assigned to him (see introduction pp. 4-8; Phil. 10.6.16; Phil. 2.97; App. 3.8; Plut. Brut. 19.3; Raubitschek 1957: 4). The following introduction of Cicero’s proposal relates to one person, but Cicero will later introduce both Brutus and Cassius as candidates for the command against Dolabella. The movement away from the refutatio to a preamble to his proposal for the appointment of Cassius, is marked by a direct address to the senators present. auctoritatem: The unnamed person is given a number of attributes in an asyndetic catalogue. Auctoritas is used in the sense of ‘the right of a magistrate to command’, in order to emphasize the legitimacy of a senatorially appointed position, as opposed to auctoritas in a moral sense. nomen in the sense of ‘reputation, esteem’ (OLD 12). The use of nomen can, however, be read also as alluding to Brutus in the following sentence, because Cicero could evoke Brutus’ illustrious ancestry, and the idealistic values associated with his eponymous ancestor. This evocation of Brutus’ ancestry is misleading, because Cicero does not intend to propose Brutus to command; rather, Cicero uses the inclusion of Brutus to divert attention from Cassius alone. Brutus’ proconsular command in the Balkans had been ratified by the senate, and so his status was beyond reproach. exercitum: Similarly, the exercitus could refer to Brutus’ army in the east. There were as yet only rumours about the army of Cassius. Only in mid-April would those rumours be confirmed (Ad Brut. 2.2.3).
Cicero now introduces Brutus and Cassius within the oration. C. Cassius: C. Cassius Longinus (RE 3). This forms the introduction of Cassius into the speech. In 49 Cassius was tribunus plebis (MRR 2: 259); and praetor peregrinus in 44 (MRR 2: 320), when he instigated the conspiracy against Caesar (Liv. Per. 116; Plut. Brut. 6-9; App. 2.113; Sedley 1997; Rawson 1992: 465-467). Cicero initially proposes both Brutus and Cassius for the command, but he soon narrows his proposal to Cassius as sole commander. By implicating Brutus, Cicero draws parallels with the command that he will propose for Cassius. By connecting Brutus to the eastern theatre, Cicero tries to commit the senate to supporting the liberators regardless of whether Brutus moved east against Dolabella or not.

decernerem plane, sicut multa, ‘consules, alter ambove’, ni Brutum colligassemus in Graecia et eius auxilium ad Italiam vergere quam ad Asiam maluissemus; non ut ex [ea] acie respectum haberemus, sed ut ipsa acies subsidium haberet etiam transmarinum. consules, alter ambove: A number of variant readings have been supplied for ‘consules, alter ambove’ due to a corruption of the text: t: consulibus; bsv: alterum; D: ambosve. Shackleton Bailey supplies consules, alter ambove, which is surely correct, and to be preferred over the earlier variants, as the phrasing is consistent with the extant sample of senatorial proposals (cf. Phil. 5.53; 8.33; 9.16; 11.31; 14.38). colligassemus: The verb means to ‘tie to a place, to immobilize’ (OLD 1d). Brutus had been given imperium in Macedonia, Illyricum and Greece as a result of the proposal put forward by Cicero in Philippic 10. His occupation of the Greek provinces provided an additional army to those already fighting in Italy, and perhaps a last resort should the conflict with Antonius fare badly at Mutina: quam ob rem ita te para, Brute, ut intellegas aut, si hoc tempore bene res gesta sit, tibi meliorem rem publicam esse faciendam aut, si quid offensum sit, per te esse eandem recuperandam (Ad Brut. 2.1.3). By inference, Cicero could refer to Pansa’s involvement in the current campaign at Mutina, thus disqualifying Pansa for the conflict against Dolabella, particularly when Brutus could be recalled to Italy for assistance.

praeterea, patres conscripti, M. Brutum retinet etiam nunc C. Antonius, qui tenet Apollonium, magnam urbem et gravem; tenet, opinor, Byllidem, tenet Amantiam, instat Epiro, urget Oricum, habet aliquot cohortis, habet equitatum. The province of Macedonia was originally assigned to Brutus by Caesar’s provisions,
but later reallocated to C. Antonius at the meeting of the senate on 28 November 44 (Phil. 7.3). C. Antonius departed for his province shortly after this date, and arrived at Dyrrachium in January where he was immediately met with resistance. He was defeated and driven south to Apollonia where he was captured by Brutus. The use of a number of independent clauses allows Cicero to emphasize details regarding C. Antonius’ actions since landing in Illyricum. The present indicative creates an expressive rapidity, while the series of phrases in isocola depict the simultaneity of details and the threat posed. Instat and urget are increasingly urgent, while the last clauses, in anaphora and with asyndeton, are added as explanatory matter. For the sequence of events see App. 3.79; Plut. Brut. 25-26; Syme 1939: 171. M. Brutum retinet etiam nunc C. Antonius: C. Antonius was not yet a prisoner, but the situation had changed by the beginning of April (Ad Brut. 2.3.1). 

Oricum: This cluster of named cities falls within easy proximity of each other, some 80 kilometres south of Dyrrachium. The townships mark the boundary between the Greek-speaking peoples of Epirus and the non-Greek speakers of Illyricum to the north. Dyrrachium and Apollonia formed the two principal port cities of the Illyrian coastline, providing hubs through which both commercial and military traffic passed between west and east. Both cities marked entry points to the Via Egnatia, Rome’s main route from west to east (Hammond 1974: 192-194). The Via Egnatia lay opposite the terminus of the Via Appia at Brundisium and so provided a near continuous link to Rome. Cicero stresses the importance of control of the port cities and points to the advantage to be gained from the occupation of Apollonia, although its strategic importance needed no elaboration for Cicero’s senatorial audience.

Apolloniam: Apollonia lay 80 kms to the south of Dyrrachium, just off the Via Egnatia. According to Thucydides (1.26.2), Apollonia was settled by Corinthians c. 600 BC, while Strabo (7.5.8) adds a Corcyran component to the settlement. It flourished as a trading port and attracted Aristotle’s attention as an example of an oligarchy (Arist. Pol. 1290b 11-14). Apollonia had become a centre for further education; its most prominent student was Octavian who was studying there in the lead-up to Caesar’s departure for Parthia (Vell. Pat. 2.59; Suet. Iul. 8). opinor: Cicero acknowledges that he does not have precise and up-to-date information of events in the east. He suggests that Brutus is otherwise occupied by C. Antonius in the Greek east.

Byllidem: Byllis lay 50 kms east of Apollonia along the river Aous.

Amantiam: Amantia occupied an important defensive position to the east of
Apollonia, leading to the hinterland of Epirus. **Epiro**ː Epirus lies to the south of the listed cities, as Cicero visualises the Balkan coastline. **Oricum**ː Oricum was south of Apollonia in the Gulf of Oricum. These areas lie along the coast of the Greek and Macedonian mainland opposite Italy, a fact that allowed Cicero to play up the threat posed by C. Antonius, thus emphasizing the multiple dangers facing the res publica. **Aliquot cohortis**ː According to Phil. 10.6.13 Antonius was in possession of seven cohorts, no match for the legions available to Brutus.

**26.11  hinc si Brutus erit traductus ad aliud bellum, Graeciam certe amiserimus.** est autem etiam de Brundisio atque illa ora Italiae providendum. Cicero begins undermining his own suggestion of allowing Brutus to move east in order to stress the more prominent role for Cassius further east. Brutus now appears as something of a red herring in Cicero’s advocacy, which is made clear in the formal proposal, where mention of Brutus is omitted. Reference to Brutus allows Cicero to draw attention to the senate’s conferral of imperium on Brutus and establishes a parallel framework for the senate to follow. The appointment of Brutus to Asia or Syria, in light of the threat in Italy, would be detrimental to the republican cause, particularly should Brundisium and the shores of Italy be lost. **Ad aliud bellum**ː The conflict against C. Antonius. The phrasing reiterates the separate struggles which occupied various senatorial armies at this time. **Brundisio**ː Brundisium functioned as the chief port in the south east of Italy, providing a point of departure and arrival to and from the east; its importance as a transit port was evident, as Cicero avoided Brundisium when he set out for Greece in August 44 for fear of encountering Antonius’ troops entering Italy (Att. 15.21.3; 16.4.4; 16.3.6).

**26.13  quamquam miror tam diu morari Antonium; solet enim ipse accipere manicas nec diutius obsidionis metum sustinere.** M-R (165 n. 35) comment on the use of ‘manicas’ in this context: ‘the metaphor of donning “gloves” (which were typically worn by women and hindered proper use of one’s hands) sarcastically adds an aspect of effeminacy to his cowardice’. Reference to C. Antonius’ morals is couched in a military metaphor: he will allow himself to be besieged but will not resist for long. Reference to scandalous lust is a recurrent theme of invective against all three Antonii, most emphatically at Phil. 14.9. The joke forms an aside to the more serious matters at hand, and Cicero immediately returns to his argument.

**26.15  quod si confecerit Brutus et intellexerit plus se rei publicae profuturum si Dolabelleam persequatur quam si in Graecia maneat, aget ipse per sese, ut adhuc**
quoque fecit, neque in tot incendiis quibus confestim succurrendum est expectabit senatum. quod si resumes the line of argument from Phil. 11.26.11. per with the reflexive ‘by one’s own efforts’ (OLD 15b). The statement prepares the ground for the more confrontational argument in the following section, the granting of command to Cassius. Cicero was still unsure about the degree of Brutus’ success, so his proposal accommodates alternative eventualities.

The complex sentence is resolved with expectabit senatum, which then provides a transition to the next sentence. That individuals could act, and then await senatorial approval, was contentious at Rome, and efforts were made to regularize or constrain private initiative (see Phil. 10.6.14; cf. Phil. 11.27.1 below). Cicero had previously used the argument of pre-emptive action in relation to Octavian (and then Brutus) only a few weeks earlier. adhuc quoque: The seizure of the provinces of Greece, Macedonia and Illyricum. It provides a signpost for the ensuing argument.

Peroratio (§§27.1-28.9)

The tone of the speech rises in its emotional intensity, and performs a function that closely resembles the rhetorical precepts attributable to the peroratio. The inclusion of an emotionally charged climax at this point is necessitated by the presence of Cicero’s sententia part-way through the speech. The peroratio was usually reserved for the terminus of a speech, because it provided an opportunity for the orator to reiterate his most important and compelling arguments, and to make a final emotional appeal to persuade the audience. The following sections appear as a peroratio since Cicero is presenting a rearticulation of his argument and an appeal to a set of abstract, philosophical considerations; the structure is thus consistent with the rhetorical principle of a peroratio (cf. Rhet. Her. 1.4; Inv. Rhet. 2.47-50; Part. 52; Quint. 6.1; on the peroratio see pp. 148-150). The irregularity of the peroratio in this situation is due to it not forming the end of the oration, but rather a summary of events and the emotional climax prior to the proposal itself. The peroratio was generally

192 M-R (2009: 132) have called §§26-8 a propositio because it provides a brief summary of recent events and because it indicates preliminary reasons for Cicero’s advocacy of Cassius. However, §28 appeals to elevated themes as a consequence of the summary of recent events, and so is not limited by a schematic arrangement of material to be addressed within the proposal to follow. Cicero’s elevated discussion on the lex naturae, and Cassius’ great concern and interest in the res publica, coincides with an emotional and rhetorical appeal on the nature of the Roman constitution, consistent with themes addressed within perorationes (Inv. Rhet. 1.101-3).
considered to consist of two parts: the *enumeratio*, which provided a summary of the most compelling arguments; and the *amplificatio*, an emotive appeal intended to sway the audience. Cicero’s *enumeratio* here outlines the general situation in the east, and the actions that Cassius and Brutus had initiated in their fight against Dolabella and C. Antonius respectively. This is then placed within the broader context of the conflict with Antonius. Both Brutus and Cassius had taken over provinces in order to prevent them falling into the hands of Antonius and his followers. Cicero thus presents his most compelling arguments in order to illustrate the advantage they provide. The brief emotional and rhetorical climax follows (§28), where Cicero seeks to demonstrate that the actions of Cassius are consistent with what Cicero argues is a ‘higher law’, the *lex naturae*. This is structured through the presentation of philosophical argument. Cicero alludes to a legal and ethical basis while largely avoiding legal technicalities. Knowledge of legal technicalities is not the guiding principal of Cicero’s argument, because it was no doubt argued that the actions of Cassius were conducted illegally. Cicero thus avoids legal precision, and a pedantic emphasis on technicalities, in order to focus upon other persuasive proofs (cf. the similar approach at *Mur*. 19-25). Instead Cicero attempts to show Cassius as having acted spontaneously against Dolabella, urged on by his concern for the *res publica*. The successful promotion of Brutus in *Philippic* 10 was used as a precedent for senatorial recognition. His advocacy of Cassius is shown as an extension of this policy, and consistent with the senate’s own initiatives. This advocacy can then be placed within a broader strategy of forming a political and military coalition against Antonius; D. Brutus had had his actions retrospectively sanctioned, thus having the value of his own judgement confirmed (*Phil*. 3.12; 5.3; 5.28); Octavian’s actions were retrospectively approved and his current position legalised (*Phil*. 3.3-5; 5.3; 8.5); and so too Brutus some weeks earlier (*Phil*. 10.23).

The structural position of the *peroratio* within this speech is a deviation from our other extant samples of deliberative speeches. In other respects the oration follows the established form in its use of *exordium*, *argumentatio*, and the enumerative *peroratio*. This is, however, followed by what appears to be a concluding proposal. Cicero evidently felt the need to provide further argumentation for the appointment of Cassius, and this follows the proposal as the *confirmatio*. Emphasis is not given to the motivations and personality of Cassius, whose role within the first half of the speech is subordinated to the greater threats posed by Antonius and Dolabella. Cicero was
thus able to establish a context of immediate threat, into which he can thrust Cassius as the most capable commander to deal with the situation. In doing so, Cicero thus promotes his understanding of the situation and illustrates the usefulness or advantage to be derived from his advocacy.

(§§27.1-28.9) Cassius acts in accordance with natural law, and thus in accordance with the will of the gods.

27.1 nam et Brutus et Cassius multis iam in rebus ipse sibi senatus fuit. In Cicero’s view, both Brutus and Cassius were acting as the senate itself would in similar circumstances. The phrasing shifts Cicero’s own assessment of their actions by equating those actions with the actions of the senate. Cicero diminishes his own advocacy by using senatus as a metonym, to be understood in the sense of ‘consilium’ (cf. Phil. 4.14 where Cicero defines the ‘senate’ as ‘orbis terrae consilium’). This metonymy connects the senate with the broader world and signals spontaneous and broad-based resistance to Dolabella and Antonius. Additionally, the phrasing is intended to resonate with the senate’s endorsement of the independent actions, not only of Brutus, but of D. Brutus and Octavian in turn. This establishes a degree of continuity between the actions of those fighting against Antonius. Cassius’ actions are now presented as an extension of this policy and illustrate the growing consensus between Rome’s commanders in the field and those in Rome itself. The argument requires a context of imminent danger, because any action taken without senatorial approval denies the possibility of properly deliberated policy, as articulated at Rep. 2.15; 2.15-68.

The fact that individuals could show care for the res publica, generated from their own consilium, is not an ad hoc innovation for the speech. Cicero himself had presented the argument when he declared the preservation of the res publica from both Clodius and Catiline by virtue of his own consilium (Dom. 93; Mil. 36; Cat. 3.14; Sul. 33). However, the assessment as to what constituted consilium was arbitrary. In a letter from Cicero to Plancus, written c. 26 May 43, Cicero suggested Plancus act in accordance with his own summation of events (Fam. 10.16.2: tu, quamquam consilio non eges, vel abundas potius, tamen hoc animo esse debes ut nihil huc reicias neve in rebus tam subitis tamque angustis a senatu consilium petendum putes, ipse tibi sis senatus; quocumque te ratio rei publicae ducet, sequare). Cicero is
explicit about what should form the guiding principle of Plancus’ actions; that he should act according to his own assessment of the situation, as long as he was directed by the interests of the *res publica*, and in accordance with Cicero’s assessment of the situation. Similarly, Cicero encouraged D. Brutus to follow the example of Octavian and act on his own initiative (*Fam.* 11.7.2: *caput autem est hoc, quod te diligentissime percpere et meminisse volam, ut ne in libertate et salute populi Romani conservanda auctoritatatem senatus exspectes nondum liberi, ne et tuum factum condemnnes - nullo enim publico consilio rem publicam liberavisti, quo etiam est res illa maior et clarior -, et adulescentem vel puerum potius Caesarem iudices temere fecisse, qui tantam causam publicam privato consilio susceperit, denique homines rusticos, sed fortissimos viros civesque optimos, dementes fuisse iudices, primum milites veteranos, commilitones tuos, deinde legiones Martiam, legiones quartam, quae suum consulem hostem iudicaverunt seque ad salutem rei publicae defendendam contulerunt*). A series of independent actions taken against Antonius could be used to illustrate an argument of consensus, an emphasis Cicero gives in the catalogue of those who have declared Antonius an enemy to the *res publica*, elaborated further in the proposal to follow. Cicero was aware, however, that he was pushing the boundaries with his argument (indicated to Brutus at *Ad. Brut.* 2.4.2: *et quidem audacter dicebam sine nullo senatus consulto iam illud eum [sc. Cassium] bellum gerere*).

The phrasing of using one’s own *consilium* was, paradoxically, the term applied to Antonius and his consultative failure (*Phil.* 4.14: *hic [sc. Antonius] vester hostis vestrar rem publicam oppugnat, ipse habet nullam; senatum, id est orbis terrae consilium, delere gestit, ipse consilium publicum nullum habet*; cf. *Phil.* 3.34). A shared deliberative policy was the foundation of the *res publica* (*Sest.* 137: *cum regum potestatem non tulissent, ita magistratus annuos creaverunt ut consilium senatus rei publicae praeponenter semipernum*); by not doing so, Antonius had divorced himself from involvement in a free and functioning state.

27.2 necesse est enim in tanta conversione et concursatione perturbatarum rerum temporibus potius parere quam moribus. *bns: concursatione; t: concursione; v: conversione;* Shackleton Bailey 1986: *rerum perturbatarum* (cf. *Flac.* 94; *TLL* 4/856.125 ff.). The argument that the current situation necessitated an unusual response was made earlier by Cicero of Pompey’s command at *Leg. Man.* 60: *at enim ne quid novi fiat contra exempla atque instituta maiorum. non dicam hoc loco*
maiores nostros semper in pace consuetudini, in bello utilitati paruisse; semper ad
novos casus temporum novorum consiliorum rationes accommodasse. Here reference
is not made to a specific time, rather it is referring generally to the events of recent
months. **moribus**: Denotes precedent and custom, not ‘what is moral’ (cf. *morem*
below).

27.3 **nec enim nunc primum aut Brutus aut Cassius salutem libertatemque
patriae legem sanctissimam et morem optimum iudicavit.** Cicero’s argument
involves the rejection of man-made law when that law was subverted for private
interest. Cassius had done everything he could in such circumstances: he had drawn
away Dolabella’s cavalry; he had raised legions; he had gone to the aid of another;
and, by his own decision (*sua sententia*), he judged Dolabella a *hostis*, which the
senate, following his example, had similarly done. Cassius is thus depicted as
reflecting the will of the senate, even though his decision-making was independent of
that consultative body. **salutem libertatemque**: The pairing of nouns reminds the
audience of what is at stake for the Roman people (cf. *Fam.* 11.7.2 to D. Brutus
above). Cicero’s champions are routinely depicted as defending the *libertas* of the
*populi Romani* (the phrasing is used of Cn. Domitius and C. Trebonius at *Phil.* 2.27,
and of Lepidus at *Phil.* 5.38). **legem sanctissimam et morem optimum**: Cicero
cannot appeal to public law because of its inadequacy in preventing Antonius from his
corruption of the written law, so Cicero makes recourse to the ‘highest law and best
procedure’, thus anticipating the discussion of the *lex naturae* at *Phil.* 11.28.2. The
*abab* pattern was felt to have greater rhetorical effect than a chiastic arrangement (see
Leeman 1963: 22). **iudicavit** is the reading of *D*; **iudicabit** is preferred by
Shackleton Bailey, although it is unnecessary to adopt Shackleton Bailey’s
emendation in the context. The perfect tense allows allusion to the assassination of
Caesar, particularly given the context of restoring *libertas* to the *populus Romanus*
(*Phil.* 1.13; 2.28; 13.17). Similarly, **iudicavit** allows reference to the departure of
Brutus and Cassius from Rome and Italy for the sake of concord. Their concern for
the *res publica* could be evoked through the familiarity of the audience’s knowledge
of the liberators’ very public willingness to cede some aspect of their official duties
(*concordiae ... causa edictum de suo iure decedere*: *Att.* 16.7.1), and their willingness
to enter into exile, so that the *res publica* could remain safe and in harmony (*Att.*
16.7.1; *Phil.* 1.3.8; Vell. Pat. 2.62.3). Cicero’s emphasis on the liberators’ desire to
preserve the *res publica* is also used as an argument to assuage the anxieties of the audience, trepid at the growing influence of the liberators.

**27.6** *itaque si ad nos nihil referretur de Dolabella persequendo, tamen ego pro decreto putarem cum essent tali virtute, auctoritate, nobilitate summi viri, quorum alterius iam nobis notus esset exercitus, alterius auditus.* *itaque* picks up on the line of thought preceding *necesse est.* Just as Antonius and Dolabella are paired in the opening passages of the *Philippic* 11, so here Brutus and Cassius are paired (*essent tali virtute, auctoritate, nobilitate summi viri*), with the effect of creating a contrastive coupling. By virtue of these qualities, as narrated by Cicero, Brutus and Cassius are empowered to act because they seek the preservation of the *res publica*, while Dolabella and Antonius seek its destruction. *pro decreto:* ‘I should think it as a decree’ (*OLD* 3c); the phrasing is usually used to describe a vote given by a council, but in this instance it is applied to the actions of Brutus and Cassius who act as their own senate (*nam et Brutus et Cassius multis iam in rebus ipse sibi senatus fuit* above at Phil. 11.27.1). The line of thought regarding senatorial directive is picked up in the next sentence. *alterius auditus* is indicative of the lack of intelligence in Rome of events in the east at this time (see Phil. 11.26.15 above).

**27.9** *num igitur Brutus exspectavit decreta nostra, cum studia nosset?* *studia:* A ‘desire’ to resist Antonius.

**27.10** *neque enim est in provinciam suam Cretam profectus: in Macedoniam alienam advolavit; omnia sua putavit quae vos vestra esse velitis; legiones conscripsit novas, except veteres; equitatum ad se abduxit Dolabellae atque eum nondum tanto parricidio oblitum hostem sua sententia iudicavit.* Cicero addresses the legally dubious situation of Brutus having taken control of a province not allocated to him. *provinciam suam Cretam:* On 5 June 44, the senate assured the safety of Brutus and Cassius through the commission of the *curatio frumenti* and by ensuring provincial appointments for the following year (*Att. 15.9.1*). The senate, at the instigation of Antonius, conferred the minor provinces of Crete and Cyrenaica (normally administered by a single governor) to Brutus and Cassius respectively, much to their contempt (*Phil. 2.31; Plut. Brut. 19.1; App. 3.8*). The subdivision further denigrated the standing of the two praetors (*Ramsey 2003: 304; on the allocation of provinces to Brutus and Cassius, see MRR 2: 320; 321-2; Rice Holmes 1928: 196-7; Kniely 1973: 27-30; Rawson 1992b: 475*). In June, the allocation was used as a pretext by Brutus and Cassius for their withdrawal from Rome and Italy.
Velleius (Vell. Pat. 62.3-4) goes further and, instead of illustrating an environment that was dangerous for the assassins, depicts their withdrawal as an excuse to raise an army: *quippe M. Brutus et C. Cassius, nunc metuentes arma Antonii, nunc ad augendam eius invidiam simulantes se metuere, testati edictis liberenter se vel in perpetuo exilio victuros dum res publica constaret concordia, nec ullam belli civilis praebituros materiam, plurimum sibi honoris, esse in conscientia facti sui, profecti urbe atque Italia intento ac pari animo sine auctoritate publica provincias exercitusque occuparuerant et ubicumque ipsi essent, praetexentes esse rem publicam* (cf. similar interpretation at Liv. Per. 118: *sub praetexto rei publicae*). The other praetors did not draw lots for their provincial allocation until November (*Phil. 3.20; 3.24-6*). Frisch (1946: 103-4) suggests the allocation was granted on 5 June, against Sternkopf (1912: 384-5) and Holmes (1928: 196-7), who both prefer the later date of 1 August. Regardless, Crete was allocated by 19 September (*Phil. 2.97*), the fictitious date of *Philippic* 2 and the *terminus ante quem*. On 17 August, Brutus met Cicero at Velia on the Lucanian coast and shortly after set out from Italy (*Att. 16.7.1*). Cassius soon followed, but neither departed for his assigned province. Brutus was soon heard to be at Athens, while rumours circulated of Cassius’ departure for Syria, or Alexandria. **Macedoniam alienam advolavit**: Macedonia was allocated to C. Antonius on 28 November (Dio 45.9.3), so that he might secure the Balkan peninsula for the Antonian cause. The province of Macedonia occupied a strategic position, having served as a deployment area for Pompey’s troops against Caesar, and again for the liberators against Antonius and Octavian before the battle of Philippi. Phrasal repetition ‘in Macedoniam alienam [sc. Brutus] … in alienam provinciam [sc. Cassius]’ and the interweaving of their respective actions create a parallel structure in order to use Brutus as a precedent for Cassius. See *Phil*. 11.28.7 below for the legal status of Brutus’ actions. **advolavit**: Cicero believed the liberators were without plan and lamented their lack of political initiative since Caesar’s assassination. In private he was critical of Brutus’ slow progress after his departure from Italy (*Att. 16.4.4: ille quod parum Brutus properare videtur*; cf. *Att. 16.5.3*), but he was proven wrong by the speed with which the liberators subsequently acted (see the comments by Drum 2008: 91-94 regarding the intentions of the liberators and their degree of foresight). **legiones conscripsit novas, excepit veteres**: Remnants of the Pompeian forces at Pharsalus came over to Brutus and, according to Appian, a further two legions of new recruits were drilled to Italian
standards (Dio 47.21; Plut. Brut. 25; App. 3.79). These actions were conducted without the knowledge of the senate (cf. Phil. 10.6.16).

27.14 nam ni ita esset, quo iure equitatum a consule abduceret? At the end of 44, a contingent of cavalry on its way to Dolabella was intercepted in Thessaly, and handed over to Brutus (Plut. Brut. 25; Dio 47.21; Phil. 10.13; MRR 2: 32). The contingent of cavalry had followed the lead of the Fourth and Martian legions in defecting from Antonius (for which see Phil. 10.21.1 n.). Their defection was demonstrated as evidence for their concern for the res publica, and they were subsequently granted public honours (Phil. 3.6-7). Cicero poses the question in order to provide a response that will absolve Cassius from an illegal action, by comparing him with the senatorially approved actions of Brutus.

28.1 quid? C. Cassius, pari magnitudine animi et consili praeditus, nonne eo ex Italia consilio profectus est ut prohiberet Syria Dolabellam? Cicero applies a retrospective assessment of Cassius’ actions despite no evidence that Cassius had set out for the reasons suggested by Cicero. quid: Understand ‘quid ius?’, inferred from ‘quo iure’ above. Now that Cassius has been introduced into the oration, his name is placed emphatically. Cassius is separated from the main clause by a subordinate clause in which he is endowed with consilium, a quality consistently associated with him, emphasizing his capacity for correct conduct. Cicero’s advocacy of Cassius relies, sequentially, very much on his successful advocacy for Brutus, and so the two are constantly linked. pari continues to parallel the actions of Cassius with Brutus. Cicero’s character sketches establish a pattern to which the actors in his narrative will be expected to conform to. However, Cicero’s argument avoids depicting any complicity between Brutus and Cassius, in case he should arouse any anxieties regarding their intentions (cf. Antonius’ comments at Phil. 13.25-6). In private, Cicero urged Cassius to follow the example of Brutus in securing the resources of the east (Fam. 12.5.1). magnitudine animi: See Phil. 11.9.11 n. nonne ... Dolabellam?: Knowledge of Cassius’ whereabouts was, as yet, unconfirmed, but Cicero’s summation proved correct. Dolabella had been declared a hostis and Cassius was presently acting against him, a fact that illustrates a consistency between Cassius’ consilium and that of the senate.

28.3 qua lege, quo iure? eo quod Iuppiter sanxit, ut omnia quae rei publicae salutaria essent legitima et iusta haberentur. Cicero’s appeal to Jupiter to sanction the appointment of Cassius is not as desperate a justification as it first
appears. Cicero’s proposition assumes that positive law is superseded when in conflict with the Stoic doctrine of a ‘higher law’, the *lex naturae*. According to the Stoics, the rational world is identical with law, nature and god (in Stoic thought, the addition of ‘*naturae*’ as a qualifier was redundant since law was a natural condition in the nature of the world and in the wise man: see the comments by Asmis 2008: 3-4). Jupiter is the commanding force of nature, arising simultaneously with true law: *quaes non tum denique incipit lex esse, cum scripta est, sed tum, cum ortha est; orta autem est simul cum mente divina. quam ob rem lex vera atque princeps apta ad iubendum et ad vetandum ratio est recta summi Iovis* (Leg. 2.10). Cicero’s appeal to Jupiter alludes to ideas shaped through the *De Legibus*, where Cicero equated highest reason (*summa ratio*) with law (*lex*), describing it as a possession of both man and god (cf. Tusc. 1.30; Rep. 2.46). Humans and gods were united by a single cosmic force that is a condition existing in nature. This precondition provides the source of law and justice to humans (*Off*. 3.69), binding them within a natural community by a tie of fellowship (*societas*). This formula finds an uneasy realisation here within *Philippic* 11, because Cicero applies his own interpretation of what constituted *societas*, *ratio* and *lex* to a situation that was particularly divisive. Consequently, Cicero places Cassius’ actions within a broader philosophical understanding of law; easy enough, since the Stoic doctrine of law had no prescriptive power. Acting for the highest good, beyond the confines of *ius civilis*, was justifiable when statutes did little to prevent unlawful actions (*Phil*. 13.6.10; cf. Leg. 1.17: *Atticus: non ergo a praetoris edicto, ut plerique nunc, neque a duodecim tabulis, ut superiores, sed penitus ex intima philosophia hauriendam iuris disciplinam putas?*). Cicero’s advocacy of Cassius placed Cassius at odds with the written law, but Cicero had had success in promoting Brutus in a similar set of circumstances, an argument that Cicero pursues because of that similarity. Cassius was only acting in order to prevent Dolabella from laying waste to the eastern provinces. The latter had been acting in violation of the *lex naturae*, since the *lex naturae* was common to all nations (*Rep*. 1.2; at Tusc. Disp. 1.30 Cicero identifies the *lex naturae* as the *consensio omnium gentium*). *Qua lege, quo iure?:* Lex and ius have an overlapping meaning which Cicero uses to encompass all law. Lex is used generally to encompass both positive and natural law, while ius, although related in meaning to natural law, is somewhat broader, relating to both ‘law’ and ‘what is just’. *Legitima et iusta:* This definition of *lex* and *ius* is distinct from the definition of law as written statute, since it predates any written law or indeed any state (*Leg*. 1.19).
However, in the current context Cicero could allude to the illegitimacy of Antonius’ legislation by illustrating the incompatibility of Antonius’ legislative measures with the state. The legislation passed by Antonius since Caesar’s death was abrogated on the grounds of its unlawful passing (*Phil.* 3.9; 5.10; 6.3; 7.15; 12.12; 13.5). Those laws deemed to have been ‘Caesarian’ were brought before the *comitia centuriata* and passed anew through the *lex Vibia de actis Caesaris confirmandis* (cf. *Phil.* 10.17.9).

28.5 *est enim lex nihil aliud nisi recta et* [*iam*] *a numine deorum tracta ratio, imperans honesta, prohibens contraria.* Shackleton Bailey brackets *iam* in order to create two equally weighted phrases. The intensification of the second phrase (provided by *etiam*) is unnecessary.  

**recta … ratio:** Lex is an orthodox Stoic definition in this context (*Leg.* 1.18-19). The idea owes much to Chrysippus (the third century Stoic philosopher), to whom Cicero closely adheres in this formula: ‘it is not possible to discover any other beginning of justice or any source for it other than that from Zeus and from the universal nature, for then everything of the kind must have its beginning if we are going to have anything to say about good and evil’ (Plut. *Stoic. Rep.* 1035c; on Chrysippus’ contribution to Cicero’s conceptualisation of Stoic thought and the *lex naturae* see Asmis 2008: 11-13). At *Leg.* 1.21 Cicero argued that all nature was governed by *ratio, potestas, mens* and the *numen* of god; but there Cicero avoided extensive discussion of god within Book 1 in preference to an emphasis upon *lex* and *ratio*. Lex (or its near synonym *ratio*) prescribes appropriate actions, and is a guide for the non-wise to participate in virtuous conduct. Law is thus a guide for life and a teacher of appropriate duties (*quasi dux vitae et magistra officiorum*: *Nat.* D. 1.40; cf. SVF 3: 314). The addition of the qualifier ‘*recta*’ further defines *ratio* as a particular attribute of the gods and sages, while *ratio* without the attributive was usually assigned to the conduct of human beings (*Leg.* 1.23; for the distinction between *recta ratio* and *ratio* in the *De Legibus* see Vander Waerdt 1994: 4875; Mitsis 1994: 4829; Inwood 1987: 99-101). The actions of a wise statesman conform to right reason, and are in fact identical with it; they can therefore conflict with the civil law normally in force. The distinction between the *ratio* of sages and other human beings is suppressed in the current context, but nature provided the instinct in resisting Dolabella and Antonius, evinced by the spontaneous resistance of the Bruti, Octavian, Cassius, and others to the political designs of the two outlaws. Cassius’ aims are the protection of human needs and the safeguarding of *societas* between men, needs which are incompatible with the Antonian state. **imperans**
honesta, prohibens contraria: The idea of commanding and forbidding is common to both positive and natural law (Dyck 2004: 109; cf. Leg. 1.18: *lex est ratio summa insita in natura, quae iubet ea, quae facienda sunt, prohibitque contraria*). Justice is shared by all men (a premise laid down at Leg. 1.33), since the non-wise are able to participate through prohibitive and prescriptive injunction (Mitsis 1994: 4842). Cicero had been explicit about the origin of his formula (ND 1.36: *sed careat omni et sensu et figura. Zeno autem, ut iam ad vestros, Balbe, veniam, naturalem legem divinam esse censet, eamque vim obtinere recta imperantem prohibentemque contraria*; cf. Chrysippus (Diog. Laert. 7.128; SVF 2: 76.4-5). The phrasing appears in Chrysippus’ *exordium* of his work ‘On Law’, cited in Justinian’s Digest: ‘law is the king of divine and human affairs. It provides a standard of justice and injustice, prescribing what political animals ought to do and proscribing what they ought not to do’ (Just. Dig. 1.3.2).

28.7 huic igitur legi paruit Cassius, cum est in Syriam profectus, alienam provinciam, si homines legibus scriptis uterentur, eis vero oppressis suam legem naturae. Cicero passes over the legal anomalies in presenting an argument where personal assessment of what is best for the *res publica* has priority over legal restrictions. However, Cicero presents his own assessment of Cassius’ actions as objectively correct behaviour via a framework of natural law, which Cicero presupposes is a constant factor. Cicero’s contribution to the Stoic premise is to include all men in nature’s law: all men have the capacity to live in accordance with natural law (*Off. 3.15*; cf. Leg. 1.18.12: *eadem ratio cum est in hominis mente confirmata et perfecta, lex est*), thus providing an alternative boundary within which Cassius’ otherwise illegitimate behaviour can be justified. Cicero turns to Cassius’ adherence to this law of nature, and his summation of events is shown to be consistent with the principles outlined above. It is not Cicero’s aim to define written law here but to illustrate a distinction between the written and a higher law. Cicero had a practical motivation in playing down the importance of written law, given that Cassius was acting beyond his commission and, conversely, that Antonius had held a legitimate position by virtue of the consulship and the conferral of Cisalpine Gaul, a command granted through the assembly. alienam provinciam: The phrasing is legalistic, but Cicero needs to avoid the paradoxical nature of Cassius’ actions, and does so by illustrating the subordination of written law to Cassius’ superior motivations. Cassius had crossed into the province of another, an act prohibited by a series of legislative
measures from early in the first century BC (see Phil. 10.6.14). Dolabella and C. Antonius were also accused of entering provinces not allocated to them (Phil. 11.4.2; cf. Ver. 2.1.73; 2.3.44). However, their actions were presented as a violation of law and attack on the patria: (Phil. 13.6.14) licet autem nemini contra patriam ducere exercitum; si quidem licere id dicimus quod legibus, quod more maiorum institutisque conceditur. neque enim, quod quisque potest, id ei licet, nec, si non obstatur, propterea etiam permittitur. legibus scriptis: Cicero’s definition of law jars with the conventional view as defined by Cicero’s contemporary, the jurist Ateius Capito (Gell. 10.20.2: lex est generale iussum populi aut plebis rogante magistratu). Cicero’s definition relies on the assumption that lex cannot be codified within a set of rules because actions may vary according to particular circumstances (Mitsis 1994: 4829; Vander Waerdt 1994: 4854). The philosophical definition of law employed by Cicero downplays the involvement of the populus, because of the people’s failure to prevent Antonius’ manipulation of Caesar’s acta and the violation of existing law (Phil. 2.109).

Sententia (§§29.1-31.12)

For a general outline of the sententia and its place within an oration see pp. 158-162. Following Cassius’ late introduction into the oration and a brief survey of recent events, Cicero makes his formal proposal. The central component of Cicero’s proposal is the grant of an imperium maius to Cassius, while subordinate aspects of the proposal outline the extent of his imperium and its various provisions. Cicero mentions several individuals in the course of his proposal, listing them in a descending hierarchy. Cassius occupies the first position, followed by mention of Q. Marcius Crispus, L. Staius Murcus, A. Alienus, and the Galatian king and tetrarch, Deiotarus.

Having previously made oblique reference to the commands granted to D. Brutus, Octavian and M. Brutus, Cicero can allude to precedent in his current advocacy of Cassius. This type of claim to legal precedent was intended for a broad audience, an indication that suggests further purposes behind the publication of these texts. Cicero’s support for Cassius is to be seen as an extension of the success he enjoyed in advocating and having legally sanctioned a command for Brutus only
weeks earlier in a similar set of circumstances (alluded to above at Phil. 11.28.6). Despite the failure of the proposal, Cicero nonetheless continues to give the appearance of working through the constitutional organs of state through the emphasis he gives to senatorial practice in this speech, which was thereafter quickly disseminated. Cicero, through repeated claims to the process, is thus able to build the appearance of constitutional legitimacy.

The proposal’s structural position occurs some seven sections before the speech’s conclusion. This creates a deviation from the formal parts of speech by comparison with our extant deliberative speeches, where the proposal usually forms the terminus of the oration. The speech normally functions as a long explanatory preamble to the proposal itself, which usually formed the bookend of a deliberative oration. However, the practical nature of a deliberative speech required the orator to innovate and introduce his sententia at the most opportune moment during the delivery of the speech, or when a series of independent proposals was incorporated within a single oration. The proposal could be made anywhere within the speech, as the proposal of Philippic 11 indicates; but this was generally avoided in preference to the proposal following the peroratio, given that the peroration usually allowed for a transition to the proposal.

Cicero’s objective for the speech is recognition for Cassius’ actions. It was generally acknowledged that Cassius was already acting against Dolabella in the east, and that he was employing Rome’s allies in the process. Particular emphasis is given to the allies because Cicero’s proposal deals with events in the eastern provinces, and so the involvement of the eastern leaders becomes integral to the success of the campaign against Dolabella. That Cassius could draw upon long-time Roman allies allows Cicero to build the appearance of a coalition formed as a consequence of Dolabella’s destructive activities.

The proposal itself is made with elaborate paratactic phrasing and within the subordination Cicero picks up on themes already mentioned throughout the speech.

---

193 Our sample is not large and we have significant variation in the placement of sententiae. Philippic 5 illustrates some variation. There is a series of independent proposals at Phil. 5.34, but Philippic 5 deals with those proposals separately as these were intended to be dealt with on a point by point discussion: the proposal for the SCU (Phil. 5.35); honours for D. Brutus (Phil. 5.38); honours for M. Lepidus (Phil 5.42); honours for Octavian (Phil. 5.52). The proposal for Octavian’s honours follows a similar structure, where the proposal is followed by the reasons why such a proposal should be adopted (Phil. 5.52): honours for L. Egnatuleius (Phil. 5.53); exemptions for the legions. Similarly, Philippic 14 contains a series of honours, each with argumentation.
The sentence structure is complex due to a high degree of subordination, while the clauses are short. The language of the proposal is clear, succinct and repetitive, appropriate to the style of an official document (see Bonnefond-Coudry 1989: 686). A series of individual proposals are made: i) that Cassius be granted command in Syria; ii) that Cassius have the right of command over the legions in neighbouring provinces; iii) that Cassius have the right to raise and requisition requirements for the war; iv) that the command be recognised as a maius imperium; v) that the senate honour the eastern kings who aid Cassius; vi) that the consuls address the issue of the eastern command upon completion of their campaign at Mutina; and vii) that current governors retain their respective provinces until new governors are appointed.

(§§29.1-31.12) A series of proposals are introduced (for the separate proposals see p. 175).

29.1 sed ut ea vestra quoque auctoritate firmetur, <ita> censeo: ...] ita: Ita was added by Shackleton Bailey (1986 ad loc.) because of its formulaic repetition in the introduction of a proposal (cf. e.g. Phil. 3.37.3; 5.46.1; 5.53.1; 8.33.1). censeo: The formulaic opening of the proposal proper, construed with the subjunctive, is usually a verbal cue indicating the proposal itself. Censeo was typically contained within the formula de ea re ita censeo, but is omitted within the foreshortened introduction to this proposal. The senatus consultum was usually named after the author and the presiding magistrate, so both the proposer and magistrate became openly identified with the successful motion. The omission of ‘quod verba fecit’ (or similar) avoids the absurdity of linking Pansa with a proposal to which Pansa was hostile.

29.2 cum P. Dolabella quique eius crudelissimi et taeterrimi facinoris ministri, socii, adiutores fuerunt hostes populi Romani a senatu iudicati sint, cumque senatus P. Dolabellam bello persequendum censuerit, ut is qui omnia deorum hominumque iura novo, inaudito, inexpiabili scelere polluerit nefarioque se patriae parricidio obstrinxerit poenas dis hominibusque meritas debitasque persolvat, (30) senatu placere C. Cassium pro consule provinciam Syriam obtinere, ut qui optimo iure eam provinciam obtinuerit, eum a Q. Marcio Crispo pro consule, L. Staio Murco pro consule, A. Al<1>ieno legato exercitus accipere, eoque ei tradere, cumque eis copiis et si quas praeterea paraverit bello P.
Dolabellam terra marique persequi.  cum P. Dolabella … persequendum censuerit: Two coordinating cum clauses, together with the sequence of verbs, anticipate the main verb by establishing a series of events already familiar to the audience. Such organisation prepares the audience for the important introduction of Cassius and his lieutenants. ministeri, socii, adiutores: These terms are used synonymously in the sense of an ‘accomplice’. Exactly who were included within the formal declaration is unclear. A governor’s cohors amicorum, associates of the governor who held no official status other than to provide counsel for the governor, appears as a likely proposition, since Dio adds that a day was set for Dolabella’s followers to abandon Dolabella, or otherwise be regarded as enemies (Dio 67.29.4). The proposal is vague, and deliberately so in order that the provisions of the command did not hinder its executor. hostes … iudicati sint: Dolabella was declared a hostis in the preceding day’s debate (Phil. 11.15.1; 13.23). cumque continues the sequence of subordinate clauses from above. Two conditions are set out here in a clearly structured argument that leads to Cicero’s conclusion as a consequence: Dolabella and his accomplices have been declared enemies; and, since he is guilty of crime, Cassius is to pursue him in war with the aid provided by the magistrates Marcius Crispus, Staius Murcus, and A. Alienus. nefarioque se patriae parricidio: This pointedly refers to Dolabella’s murder of Trebonius. Embellishment is achieved through this alliterative pairing, on which Cicero was keen (cf. Phil. 2.17; 4.5; Sul. 6; Dom. 134; Vat. 35.4); the phrasing was expressed at Off. 3.83 as the ‘most shameful and most vile murder, that of the fatherland’ (foedissimum et taeterrimum parricidium patriae). The phrasing is immediately evocative of the title ‘pater patriae’ given to Cicero for his handling of the Catilinarian conspiracy (Sest. 121; parens patriae at Pis. 6). The liberators themselves were accused of parricide for the assassination of Caesar, a charge which Cicero was compelled to defend by asserting the opposite (Phil. 2.31: confiteor eos, nisi liberatores populi Romani conservatoresque rei publicae sint, plus quam sicarios, plus quam homicidas, plus etiam quam parricides esse, si quidem est atrocius patriae parentem quam suum occidere; see Stevenson 2008: 106-110 for the emphasis Cicero’s opponents placed on Caesar as pater/parens patriae following his assassination and the milage they were able to make from the paternal and familial conception). The phrasing was used to illustrate traitorous and destructive behaviour (Liv. 28.28; Off. 3.21.83), and is repeatedly used by Cicero as a political term of abuse (cf. Sul. 6; cf. Vat. 35; Planc.
Paradoxically, Cicero used the charge against Antonius, whom he claimed was the real assassin of Caesar (*Phil. 4.5*). Similarly, the Catilinarians were branded *parricidae* by both Cicero (*Cat. 1.29; 2.7; 2.22*), and Sallust (*Cat. 14.3; 31.8; 51.52*). On ‘parricide’ see Wilson 2008: 331-2. **obstrinxerit**: ‘Is guilty of’ (*cf. Sul. 6; Ver. 1.8*). **persolvat**: ‘To suffer’ (*cf. Ad Brut. 13.2.5*).  

**C. Cassium pro consule:** Cassius was *proconsule* by virtue of his praetorship in 44 and subsequent governorship of Cyrenaica. The repetition, although formulaic, allows Cicero to underline the fact that Cassius was not a private citizen. Repetition of praenomen and nomen is similarly formulaic (*cf. Phil. 10.25.1 n.*). The use of C. Cassius without the cognomen ‘Longinus’ is unusual, since the proposal usually contained the full, official name (Adams 1978: 152; *cf. Phil. 10.25.1 n.*). **optimo iure**: This is not a technical term, but is used to emphasize the legitimate condition, or status, of an individual (*TLL 7/ 1.686.51-687.3; *cf. Phil. 5.45*: *sit pro praetor eo iure, quo qui optimo*). Ker translates *optimo iure* with ‘the best title’; Shackleton Bailey’s translation captures the sense more with ‘Cassius shall hold the province of Syria in full status’, with the implication of the magistrate’s accompanying rights and responsibilities. There is a shift in sense from *Phil. 11.28.5* above as Cicero now emphasizes the legitimacy of Cassius’ conduct within a specific context, as opposed to a philosophical and abstract discussion.  

**Q. Marcio Crispo:** Q. Marcius Crispus (*MRR 2*: 295; 309; revised at *MRR 3*: 39; *RE 52*) was praetor some time before 46, possibly as early as 54 (*so MRR 3*: 39). However, his status as proconsul of Bithynia and Pontus in 45 makes the earlier date of his magistracy unlikely. Sumner (1971: 269) raised objections to Crispus ever having held the praetorship, but was challenged by Ryan (1997: 190) based on Velleius Paterculus’ assertion: *et C. Cassius acceptis a Statio Murco et Crispso Marcio, praetoriis viris imperatoribusque, praefervis in Syria legionibus, inclusum Dolabellam, qui praecoccupata Asia in Syriam pervenerat* (*Vell. Pat. 2.69.2*). There is no clear reason why Crispus should be given primacy over Murcus in this sequence, unless he had held the praetorship earlier than the latter. Crispus served under Caesar in Africa before his appointment as proconsul in Bithynia and Pontus (*B. Alex. 77.2; Fam. 12.11.1; App. 4.58*). In 43, he brought his legions north to aid in the suppression of Q. Caecilius Bassus, after which he and Staius Murcus handed them over to Cassius (*Fam. 12.11; Ad Brut. 2.3.3; Vell. Pat. 2.69.2; Dio 47.27.5; Botermann 1968: 103 n. 2*); afterwards Marcius Crispus withdrew from service. According to Dio, this was because of his status as a Caesarian and his unwillingness
to serve with the tyrannicides (Dio 47.28.4). He is perhaps to be identified with Q. Marcius Crispus, consul suffect in 36 (so Syme 1939: 199 n.4).  

**L. Staios Murco**: L. Staius Murcus (*RE* 2; *MRR* 2: 307; Drum 2008: 86-87) appears in our sources in 48 as a Caesarian legate (*Caes. B Civ. 3.15.60*), and again as a legate on Caesar’s African campaign in 46 (*Att. 12.2.1; Caes. B Civ. 3.15-16*). Murcus had associated himself with the liberators, although he had not participated in the assassination itself (App. 2.119). The year of his praetorship was presumed by Broughton to have been 45 ‘inferred from his proconsulate in Syria in 33’ (*MRR* 3: 200). Ryan (1996: 554-6) and Sumner (1971: 361) raised possible objections, but could do no more than determine that Murcus was praetor by 45. In 44, he was sent by Caesar with three legions to suppress Q. Caecilius Bassus who had revolted at Apamea. Defeated, Murcus appealed to Q. Marcius Crispus in Bithynia, who brought three more legions to aid in Bassus’ suppression (*App. 3.77; Vell. Pat. 2.69.2*). Cicero suggests they were acclaimed imperatores, but the reason for the acclamation is unclear (*Fam. 12.11.1: L. Murcium et Q. Crispum imperatores: viri fortes optimique cives; cf. Fam. 12.12.3; Sternkopf 1912: 339-40*). Murcus was reconciled with Bassus and retained in Cassius’ service; he was involved in collecting forces from the east (Joseph. *AJ* 14.280), and given charge of the fleet (Dio 47.28.4-5; Vell. Pat. 47.72.4), a position he held from 43. He continued in this function after Philippi (*App. 5.2*). The legions commanded by Q. Caecilius Bassus (the one legion given him by Caesar and the one vernacular legion he subsequently raised) joined Cassius (*Fam. 12.11; Brunt 1971: 486*).

Together with the four legions of Allienus the total number of legions was raised to twelve; Cassius was thus able to integrate the legions of Bassus with those of the Caesarian commanders.  

**A. Allieno**: A. Allienus had been a legate of Q. Cicero when the latter was proconsul of Asia in 61-58. His political career thereafter was marked by shifting allegiances. He served Caesar in the *Bellum Alexandrinum*, securing Sicily for Caesar’s benefit (*B. Alex. 2.3*). Allienus subsequently served as a legate to Trebonius (so *MRR* 2: 352). Following Trebonius’ death, he served Dolabella, who commissioned him with bringing four Egyptian legions to Syria. Upon arrival in Syria he was compelled to give them to Cassius (*App. 3.78; 4.59; Fam. 12.2*). Allienus is the last individual to be discussed within the sequence of Roman representatives, since his status as legate was inferior to those commanders already mentioned. Mention of Allienus is brief, but he is nonetheless acknowledged because of his refusal to support Dolabella. He disappears thereafter from our sources.
Both forms ‘Allienus’ and ‘Alienus’ are attested, although the former is the normal spelling in inscriptions (Shackleton Bailey 1976: 8). **bello P. Dolabellam terra marique persequì**: The phrasing amounts to a declaration of war (cf. Phil 13.35.4; Liv. 3.11.9).

30.6 **eius belli gerendi causa quibus ei videatur navis, nautas, pecuniam ceteraque quae ad id bellum gerendum pertineant, ut imperandi in Syria, Asia, Bithynia, Ponto ius potestatemque habeat, utique, quamcumque in provinciam eius belli gerendi causa advenerit, ibi maius imperium C. Cassi pro consule sit quam eius erit qui eam provinciam tum obtinebit, cum C. Cassius pro consule in eam provinciam venerit; ...] The proposal contains a formal inclusion of the resources to be made available to Cassius via an asyndetic catalogue. Cicero stipulates no definite limit for the duration of the command, although the phrasing here indicates that he anticipated a somewhat longer conflict than eventuated. Brutus too anticipated a difficult command (Ad Brut. 2.3.1). **navis, nautas, pecuniam ceteraque**: The catalogue defines the range of his provincial command by enumerating the resources to be made available. Provision was made for financing the conflict by whatever means were available. Money would not be forthcoming from the senate, and would be further limited because of the immediate financial requirements in Italy for the conflict with Antonius (cf. the similar situation in which Brutus found himself: quod egere te duabus necessariis rebus scribis, supplemento et pecunia, difficile consilium est. non enim mihi occurrunt facultates quibus uti te posse videam praeter illas quas senatus decrevit, ut pecunias a civitatibus mutuas sumeres. de supplemento autem non video quid fleri posit ... quod iis rebus quae in Italia decernuntur nullas copias nimis magnas esse arbitretur (Ad Brut. 2.4.4; cf. 2.3.5). **Syria, Asia, Bithynia, Ponto**: Asia was the only vacant province following Trebonius’ death. Cicero is not specific about the duration of his mandate, but he is specific about its geographical range. The grant of a *maius imperium* recognized the level of collusion that was already evident. Murcus, an ex-Caesarian, and Crispus had already deferred their commands to Cassius’ authority, and Cassius was now given the right to enter into any subsequent province with an *imperium* that was ‘*maius*’. **ius potestatemque habeat**: ‘Should have jurisdiction and authority’ (cf. Liv. 24.39). Current governors were to retain their authority within their provinces, but Cassius was to assume a greater authority when determining the conflict with Dolabella, defined below as a *maius imperium*. A series of stipulations are made to this end in regard to the extent of his authority. Within the
scope of his power should be the right to take over the armies of Q. Marcius Crispus, L. Staius Murcus, proconsules, and Allienus, a legatus, whose complicity with Cassius is used to illustrate their concern for the res publica. The proposal recognizes the role of provincial magistrates who have already coordinated their efforts with Cassius. quamcumque ... belli gerendi causa advenerit: The phrasing defines the purpose for his command along general terms (cf. Phil. 10.6.14 regarding belli gerendi causa). maius imperium: The maius imperium was not strictly a technical term, but implies an imperium ‘greater’ than the imperium granted to provincial magistrates; that is, an imperium that was maius in relation to that of other proconsuls. The grant of an imperium maius for Cassius could achieve a number of practical advantages. It would avoid any possible conflict of imperium, and thus avoid any delay in the pursuit of war with Dolabella (see the standard definition of a maius imperium in Last (1947), which was a development of Grant’s (1946: 412) discussion of the subordination of imperia to a single imperium). Cicero advocated that Cassius be designated proconsul of Syria and that, should Cassius come into conflict with any other provincial governor, Cassius would hold the greater authority by virtue of his imperium maius. This was an ad hoc solution to a situation that recognized the need for immediate action. Cassius was not in his designated province, and so the command provided a solution to the difficulty a proconsul might encounter when entering into the province of another. A provincial governor was usually only permitted to exercise his imperium within his appointed province, unless commissioned by the senate (Dig. 1.16.1: proconsul ubique quidem proconsularia insignia habet, statim atque urbem egressus est: potestatem autem non exercet nisi in ea provincia sola quae ei decreta est). The restriction most likely harked back to the lex Cornelia maiestatis of Sulla (see Phil. 10.6.14). Dolabella’s actions were difficult to anticipate, but his intention to occupy both Asia and Syria is evident in the sources (Fam. 12.12.2; 12.15.1; Dio 47.29-30; and for his subsequent exactions from Asia: Ad Brut. 2.3.5; 2.4.3; App. 4.60), so the command of Cassius needed to allow for a high degree of flexibility.

A maius imperium had been mooted for Pompey’s cura annonae in 57, but Cicero then considered the command intolerable (Att. 4.1.7; cf. Ehrenberg 1953: 121). The office was threatening; the situation ‘did not warrant the grant to Pompey of all the latent, but potential, powers normally held only by a consul’ (Balsdon 1957: 17). Then, at that time, Cicero suggested that jealousy prevented the proposal from being
adopted, and Cicero again evokes jealousy as a foil to the implementation of Cassius’ command. The extent of the *maius imperium* had parallels within the regular *cursus honorum*, via the dictator’s ‘*ius maioris imperii*’ (Liv. 30.24.3). The dictator’s *imperium* was *maius* in relation to that of the consuls, whose authority was immediately subordinated to the exclusive authority of the higher office (Brennan 2000: 38-41). By comparison, Pansa and Hirtius, as consuls, were to be granted an *imperium* that required no such specification because they held a greater authority that allowed them to enter all provinces (*Att*. 8.15.3: *ipsi consules quibus more maiorum concessum est vel omnes adire provincias*; cf. *Phil*. 4.9: *omnes enim in consulis iure et imperio debent esse provinciae*; Ehrenberg 1953: 115). Consequently, any mandate for Hirtius and Pansa would not require the grant of a *maius imperium*.

The command proposed for Cassius left open the possibility of an extended tenure. The command for Brutus, articulated at *Phil*. 10.25-6, specified the provinces in which Brutus might act. But the intelligence coming in from Greece was first-hand and accurate, and the range of Brutus’ activities could be specified, because he had communicated his intentions to the senate. For Cassius the situation was different. The proposal of a *maius imperium* reflects the lack of information coming in from the east, compelling Cicero to make assumptions based on rumour, until Cassius could inform the senate of his actions (*Fam*. 12.11).

**31.1 regem Deiotarum patrem et regem Deiotarum filium, si, ut multis bellis saepe numero imperium populi Romani iuverint, item C. Cassium pro consule copiis suis opibusque iuvissent, senatui populoque Romano gratum esse facturos.**

**regem Deiotarum:** (*RE* 2) Deiotarus was an old friend of Cicero, and one of the tetrarchs of the Galatian Celts in Asia Minor. Deiotarus was Rome’s most important vassal in the east, whose commitment to a series of Roman commanders ensured a favourable status at Rome. Deiotarus and his son are the last to be acknowledged in Cicero’s catalogue, because of their non-Roman status; but they provide an authority based on their continued service to Rome and her magistrates. In his early career Deiotarus escaped an assassination attempt by Mithridates (Eupator) VI of Pontus in 86 BC. Subsequently he entered into a relationship with Rome which endured, with varied effectiveness, until his death c. 40 BC (*App*. *Mith*. 46; Plut. *De Mul*. *Virt*. 259). He profited from his support of Rome’s involvement in the east, and by the end of his life had brought all Galatia under his control, through his own martial prowess and through the support of his Roman patrons who, via Deiotarus’ agency, were keen to
ensure a strong and stable government (Strabo 12.5.1; on Deiotarus see Mitchell 1933: 27-41; Syme 1995: 127-136). His support for Rome in the past is paraded without political context, so that Cicero can avoid any political issues in the current situation. The emphatic placement of Deiotarus within the proposal is presented as evidence of spontaneous and willing resistance to Dolabella, and Cicero’s anticipation that Cassius would call upon Deiotarus in his fight with Dolabella. In the spring of 43, Deiotarus had supported Tillius Cimber, inflicting a defeat on Dolabella, but thereafter was reluctant to become involved (Ad Brut. 14.3.2). His particular actions on this occasion are unclear. He later refused assistance to Cassius, as did Ariobarzanes, king of Cappadocia. The latter was punished with death for his non-assistance in 42 (App. 4.63; Dio 47.33). Brutus, however, dissuaded Deiotarus from his resistance and the latter entered into an alliance (Dio 47.24.3). The troops Deiotarus supplied at Philippi amounted to five thousand cavalry and a strong contingent of infantry (App. 4.88). regem: In this context the title of rex is honorific, conferred by the senate as a result of long service to Rome (Deiot. 27; multis ille [sc. Deiotarus] quidem gradibus officiorum erga rem publicam nostram ad hoc regium nomen ascendit). It is first attested for the Deiotarii (for the son, see below) in 51, so presumably granted as part of Pompey’s settlement (Div. 2.79: Armeniam a senatu datam; cf. B. Alex. 67-69; Strabo 12.3.13. cf. Syme 1995: 129). The title was reaffirmed by Caesar (Deiot. 36). regem Deiotarum filium: (RE 3) The son had ruled jointly with his father since 51 (Att. 5.17.3). This is the last mention of Deiotarus the son, who disappears from our records. When the elder Deiotarus sent troops to Brutus at Philippi, he entrusted the command to his secretary Amyntas, leading to the conjecture of the son’s death at some point between these dates (Syme 1995: 135; Magie 1950: 1276). ut multis bellis: See Phil. 11.33.5 (cf. Deiot. 36-7: in Cappadocia, Ponto, Cilicia, Syria bella gesserunt). Deiotarus’ fidelity to Rome elicited mention throughout Cicero’s career (Har. Resp. 29; Fam. 15.1.6; 15.2.2; 15.4.5; Att. 6.1.14; Brut. 21). His service to Pompey in the civil war was defended by Cicero before Caesar and used to illustrate his concern for the res publica (Deiot. 12-14). But Deiotarus was later punished by Caesar for his Pompeian support with a diminution of his territorial possessions; he was allowed to retain some territory on account of his age and service to Rome (Alex. B. 67; Deiot. 8; 14; 24; Dio 41.63.1). Caesar gifted the requisitioned territories to Ariobarzanes III of Cappodocia, and the tetrarchy over the Trocmi to Mithridates of Pergamon (Dio 41.63; 42.48).
settlement was short-lived. In 45, Deiotarus approached Caesar seeking the recovery of land which had again become contestable after Mithridates’ death, but there was no resolution before Caesar’s assassination. In the confusion after Caesar’s killing, Deiotarus set about the recovery of his lost territories through conquest (Att. 14.12.1: ‘suo Marte’; cf. Att. 14.19.2). Antonius recognised the recovery of his possessions, but this came at the price of 10 000 000 sesterces, a bribe that drew condemnation from Cicero; not of Deiotarus, but of Antonius (Phil. 2.95; Ramsey 2003: 299; Att. 14.12.1; 14.19.2). His capacity for military action in the current context is emphasized, a marked contrast to Cicero’s recent depiction of Deiotarus in the Pro Rege Deiotaro, delivered in 45, where Cicero is careful to downplay Deiotarus’ military prowess when defending him against charges of attempting to assassinate Caesar (Deiot. 22-24: quibus [sc. copiae] finis suos ab excursionibus et latrociniis tueretur et imperatoribus nostris auxilia mitteret).

31.5 itemque si ceteri reges, tetrarchae dynastaeque fecissent, senatum populumque Romanum eorum offici non immemorem futurum. Cicero catalogues an exotic array of eastern rulers in order to illustrate universal opposition to Dolabella. There was as yet no firm news of the commitment of foreign kings to Cassius’ cause, yet Cicero clearly anticipated commitment from Rome’s client kings who had benefited from Roman involvement in the east. tetrarchae: The title refers to the title of a tribal leadership particular to Galatia. Galatia was occupied from the third century BC by three Celtic tribes; each tribe was subdivided further into four sections (tetrarches), with the leader of each designated a tetrarch (Magie 1950: 373; Darbyshire 1974: 78; Mitchell 1993: 42-58). The Tolistobogii lay to the west bordering on Phrygia Magna; Deiotarus’ ancestral homeland among the Trocmi lay to the east on the northern border of Cappodocia; while the Tectosages lay between the two. The term tetrarches came to imply a minor king under Roman protection, although the term is interchanged with that of rex in the case of Deiotarus. As part of the Pompeian settlement of 63, Pompey simplified the twelve-part rule and designated three tetrarchs, one for each of the tribes, with Deiotarus a major beneficiary. Pompey confirmed Deiotarus in his position as tetrarch over the Tolistobogii and increased Deiotarus’ territory by extending his rule over Galatia (Div. 2.79; cf. B. Alex. 67-69; Mitchell 1993: 33). In addition, Pompey awarded Deiotarus with land formerly held by Mithridates in Pontus, the fertile Gazenlonitis on the southern shores of the Black Sea, as far east as Pharmaceia and Trapezus, and south to Armenia Minor (Strabo
12.3.13; Phil. 2.94). The awarded territories have remained conjectural despite Strabo’s quite specific detail (for which see Mitchell 1993: 31-4; Magie 1950: 1238; Adcock 1937: 15). Through the distractions of the civil war Deiotarus took further possession of Trocmian Galatia (B. Alex. 67.1; 78.3; Strabo 12.5.1). Regardless, Pompey’s grants ensured Deiotarus’ long friendship and service in the civil war (App. 2.71; Dio 41.62.5-63.1; Caes. B Civ. 3.4.3). dynastae: Rulers, referring especially to those in the east (OLD 1). There existed a number of minor dynasts in Asia Minor, rulers of independent city states who employed some form of monarchic rule (see Sullivan 1990:12; 79). The people of Tarsus and the king Tarcondimotus, a Roman client king in Cilicia, were listed among Cassius’ allies (Dio 47.26.2; App. 4.60; Fam. 12.15.7). At Rome, the epithet was used negatively of the first triumvirate to imply tyrannical rule (Att. 2.9.1).

31.7 utique C. Pansa A. Hirtius consules, alter ambove, si eis videretur, re publica recuperata de provinciis consularibus, praetoriis, ad hunc ordinem primo quoque tempore <re>ferant. alter ambove ... videretur: The phrasing is formulaic (cf. Phil. 3.39; 5.53.6; 5.53.21; Rab. Perd. 20.2). The idiom forms an exhortation to the consuls to focus their attention upon recovering the res publica, which implicitly alludes to the more immediate threat of Antonius at Mutina. re publica recuperata: A res publica restored to its former condition (recuperata), in general terms, necessarily involved the removal of aspiring tyrants (cf. Phil. 2.28; Att. 15.13.4). Cicero continues to develop his catalogue by defining the res publica recuperata as comprising the sum of the Roman possessions, with his focus upon the provinces. de provinciis consularibus, praetoriis: The phrasing is a reiteration of the senate’s decree from 20 December (see Phil. 10.23.8 n.). ad hunc ordinem primo quoque tempore <re>ferant: Within the final component of his proposal, Cicero urges the consuls to address the question of provincial allocation at a more appropriate time. This final point is less imperative than the preceding components of the proposal, but its inclusion here allows Cicero to contrast the issues of importance.

31.9 interea provinciae ab eis a quibus obtinentur obtineantur quoad cuique ex senatus consulto successum sit. With this, the formal wording of Cicero’s proposal comes to a conclusion. successum sit: ‘until a succession to each by a senatus consultum’ (cf. similar transitive use at Vell. Pat. 2.69.1: cui suceededat; cf. Phil. 10.26.17-8). Cicero only proposed the temporary appointment of Cassius to the command. A subsequent proposal that was passed at the debate’s conclusion allowed
the consuls to appoint *legati* until the consuls themselves were free to act (*Fam.* 12.14.4).

**Confirmatio II (§§32.1-38.6)**

Cicero now returns to his advocacy for Cassius. The late introduction of Cassius within the oration has so far prevented Cicero from developing arguments in favour of his appointment, so the *sententia* ends and further aspects of the *confirmatio* begin. For the *confirmatio* within a deliberative speech see pp. 78-82 above; for the unusual position of the *confirmatio* within *Philippic* 11 see the introduction pp. 35-38. The *confirmatio* of *Philippic* 11 is in two parts. Firstly, Cicero illustrates the practicality of Cassius’ appointment; Cassius was in the east where armies were flocking to his banner in spontaneous resistance to Dolabella. Secondly, Cicero focuses upon Cassius himself and the willingness of the veterans to follow an assassin of Caesar, a reiteration of the argument used of Brutus at *Phil.* 10.15-19. This focus was intended to disprove such an argument made against the liberators. Cicero now develops his line of reasoning, because the liberators’ position was now stronger since Brutus was in the process of securing the Greek east, while Cassius looked to follow suit in securing the provinces of Asia Minor. Cicero could now emphasize the soldiery as a military body free from Caesarian association and the veterans’ former allegiances. The *confirmatio* ends with Cicero now confidently emphasizing the flourishing armies of the senatorial forces arrayed against their *hostes*.

(§§32.1-35.9) The resources available to Cassius in the east are outlined.

### 32.1 *hoc senatus consulto ardentem inflammabitis et armatum armabitis* Cassium; nec enim animum eius potestis ignorare nec copias. *hoc senatus consulto*: With reference to his *consultum* Cicero now moves from his formal proposal to the reasons why the proposal should be adopted. The participles and word play (*ardentem inflammabitis et armatum armabitis*) draw attention to the reality that Cassius was already undertaking military operations. The absence of legitimate authority, although preferable, would not prevent Cassius from acting for the best interests of the *res publica.*
32.2 animus is est quem videtis; copiae quas audistis <primum legiones quas ducunt Q. Marcius et L. Staius, deinde L. Statius> fortes et constantes viri, qui ne vivo quidem Trebonio Dolabella latrocinium in Syriam penetrare sivissent.

The passage has attracted numerous emendations from textual editors. Fortis et constantis was Ferrarius’ conjecture, but is not found in any of Fedeli’s MSS. The MSS offer little clarity, exacerbated by the absence of V. Clark (1900c: 407) accepted the reading in its current form, but opposition has continued unabated. Shackleton Bailey added (after audistis): <primum legiones quas ducunt Q. Marcius et L. Staius>. This suggestion was no more than a working hypothesis; however, the attraction of Shackleton Bailey’s reading is that it establishes a chronological sequence and thus recognizes the primacy of Marcius Crispus over Staius Murcus throughout Cicero’s narrative. Rhetorically the emendation expands upon the previous statement, by specifying the details of individuals who were prepared to resist Dolabella.

32.6 Al<ienus, familiaris et necessarius meus, post interitum Treboni profecto ne dici quidem se legatum Dolabellae volet. The phrasing indicates the rumour that was beginning to reach Rome of Cassius’ activities, and the corresponding level of conjecture. The plausibility of Cicero’s claims is, however, subordinated to Cicero’s design of depicting a general revolt against Dolabella.

familiaris et necessarius meus: Cicero was full of praise for Allienus’ actions, but Appian writes that Allienus was compelled to give up his forces to Cassius in Palestine (App. 3.78; 4.59-61). There appears little warmth between Cassius and Allienus: Cassius wrote positively of Murcus and Crispus (viri fortes optimique cives: Fam. 12.11.1), yet praise of Allienus was not forthcoming. That Allienus had handed over his legions is acknowledged, but the act is treated with curious indifference (Fam. 12.12.1). On Allienus see Phil. 11.29.2 n.

32.8 est Q. Caecili Bassi, privati illius quidem, sed fortes et praeclari viri, robustus et victor exercitus, (33) Deiotari regis et patris et fili et magnus et nostro more institutus exercitus. There are a number of doublings of terms of praise within this polysyndetic passage, which has the effect of slowing the pace of the passage and lingering over the details of Cicero’s catalogue. Q. Caecili Bassi: Bassus (RE 36) was a Pompeian who fought at Pharsalus, but was subsequently pardoned by Caesar. Upon hearing rumours of Caesar’s losses and death in the African campaign, he led a revolt against the Caesarian Sex. Julius Caesar, a kinsman
of the dictator and governor of Syria (Dio 47.26; Joseph. AJ 14.268; BJ 1.211-16; App. 3.77; 4.58). Following Sex. Caesar’s death in the revolt, Bassus took over the legion stationed there and successfully continued to resist Caesar. Cicero knew little of Bassus at the time (iste nescioque Caecilius Bassus: Fam. 12.18.1), and referred to him disparagingly before Caesar (Deiot. 25: furiosum illum Caecilium; cf. Phil. 11.4.9 above). Cicero now, however, is effusive in his praise of Bassus’ actions, although those actions are left undefined because of Bassus’ antagonistic position towards the Caesarian administration. In the aftermath of Caesar’s assassination Bassus’ sympathies were quickly recognised by D. Brutus, who suggested Bassus could provide a place of refuge for the liberators (Fam. 11.1; cf. App. 3.4). privati: Cicero acknowledges Bassus’ status as a privatus, but qualifies him as fortis et praeclarus, and passes very quickly over Bassus’ awkward position and status. The main priority which Cicero seeks to address is the need to avoid delay in confirming a commander against Dolabella. victor exercitus: The army is victorious because Bassus had been able to resist attempts at overthrowing his position at Apamea. The success of Bassus’ victor exercitus is left undefined, because it involved the defeat of Caesar’s officers, Murcus and Crispus. nostrum more institutus exercitus: A vernacular legion was trained on the Roman model (B. Alex. 34; 68) and formally designated the XXII Deiotariana (after the king) some time after 27 BC (Syme 1933: 19-21). In 50, Deiotarus had been able to furnish as many as 30 cohorts and 2000 cavalry (Att. 6.1.14). These were consolidated into a single legion following the failures of Cn. Domitius Calvinus, a Caesarian commander whom Caesar entrusted with his interests in the east. Together with Deiotarus he had attempted to repel Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, but suffered serious losses in the autumn of 48 (B. Alex. 34; Magie 1950: 408-10). The size and potency of the Galatian legions was downplayed by Cicero at Deiot. 22, yet here the quality of Deiotarus’ forces is given prominence. institutus: In preference to instructus (the reading supplied by King 1878; 267; cf. Suet. Iul. 24.2). exercitus: The use of the word creates the rhetorical feature of homoeoteleuton, where successive clauses end in the same word or phrase. The armies are given emphasis, with the verb in the first position and the emphatic placement of exercitus. The army of Deiotarus is similarly emphasized by its final position and reaches a climax through its increased number of syllables.

33.2 summa in filio spes, summa ingeni indoles, summa virtus. A tricolon in anaphora, with the climax falling upon virtus. Deiotarus’ successor might be of some
interest, given the monarch’s advanced years, but Cicero returns again to the father because of his repeated assistance to Rome.

33.3 *quid de patre dicam? cuius benevolentia in populum Romanum est ipsius aequalis aetati; qui non solum socius imperatorum nostrorum fuit in bellis verum etiam dux copiarum suarum.* Particularly Roman traits are evoked to support Cicero’s assertions of Deiotarus’ devotion to Rome. *aequalis aetati:* ‘is equal to his age’; i.e. ‘lifelong’. Forms an alliterative pairing that attracted metaphorical comparisons (cf. Pliny the Younger who used *aetas* to convey *dignitas*: *duos homines aetate dignitate propemodum aequales*: Ep. 7.20.3). Deiotarus was of advanced age. Plutarch called him an old man when Cato visited him in Asia in 67 (Plut. *Cat.* 15); and in 54, Crassus, who was himself sixty, referred to Deiotarus as a very old man (Plut. *Crass.* 17). Although aged, Deiotarus appeared on the field at Pharsalus (where he had to be lifted into the saddle: *Deiot.* 28), where he commanded 600 Galatian horsemen (Caes. *B Civ.* 3.4.3.4-6). After Caesar’s successes in Egypt, Caesar met Deiotarus in Galatia, where the latter appeared unannounced in Caesar’s camp wearing the garb of the suppliant (*B. Alex.* 67). Deiotarius’ support for Cassius and Brutus was more vacillating than Cicero presumed. Following Philippi, Deiotarus deserted to Antonius and Octavian (Dio 48.33.5). *dux* is used specifically in a military sense: one who executes the office of military leader (*TLL* 5/2320.23-2322.14).

33.5 *quae de illo viro Sulla, quae Murena, quae Servilius, quae Lucullus, quam ornate, quam honorifice, quam graviter saepe in senatu praedicaverunt!* The catalogue is marked by anaphora, to which is added Pompey in the following sentence. The catalogue allows Cicero to place Cassius within a continuum of Rome’s successful commanders in the east. Rome’s long wars with Mithridates VI of Pontus, from 89-63, ensured Deiotarus’ involvement due to his geographical position. All those named campaigned against Mithridates, save Servilius, although the campaigns themselves are not the most important feature of the list. The catalogue avoids asserting any political allegiance; instead, Cicero is intent on showing Deiotarus in the company of Rome’s most illustrious commanders over a long period of time, in order to present him as having always assisted the state (cf. *Deiot.* 37: *ab omnibus est enim is ornatus qui, postea quam in castris esse potuit per aetatem, in Asia, Cappadocia, Ponto, Cilicia, Syria bella gesserunt*). Deiotarus’ political relations with Rome’s politicians is a striking feature of the first century; nor were these relations confined to
the series of commanders listed in Cicero’s catalogue. We know that Deiotarus had contacts with other leading Roman personalities, notably Cato (Plut. Cat. 12; 15; Fam. 15.4); Brutus (Brut. 21; Att. 6.1.4; Tac. Dial. 21); and Clodius (Har. Resp. 28-9); Cicero himself had personal ties with Deiotarus. The two spent much time together during Cicero’s governorship of Cilicia in 51-50, and Deiotarus later took Cicero’s son and nephew into his care while Cicero campaigned (Att. 5.17.3; cf. 5.18.4). Pompey too held Deiotarus in high esteem (see Phil. 11.34.1 below), while Brutus spoke on behalf of Deiotarus (the speech was published as the Pro Deiotaro; it was praised by Cicero at Brut. 21, but Tacitus’ interlocutor, at Dial. 21.6, derided the speech as dull and lifeless) at Nicaea in August 47 (Att. 14.1). Deiotarus’ relationship with those at Rome was so well known that the senate was familiar not just with the king, but with the king’s envoys (Deiot. 41). Sulla: L. Cornelius Sulla Felix (RE 392; MRR 2: 66-7) was consul in 88 and 80. The allegiance of the Galatians passed to Rome in 86, when Mithridates VI murdered the Galatian tetrarchs whom he suspected of treachery following Sulla’s victories against him in Greece. Mithridates installed his satrap, Eumarchus, to garrison Galatia after Sulla had returned to Rome, but Eumarchus was quickly expelled by the surviving tetrarchs (App. Mith. 46). Deiotarus’ involvement with Sulla at this juncture is insufficiently recorded.

Murena: L. Licinius Murena (RE 122; MRR 2: 61; 64) was consul in 62. Murena had served with both Sulla and Lucullus in the east, distinguishing himself under both commanders (Plut. Sul. 17-8; Luc. 15.1; 19.7; App. Mith. 83; Strabo 12.3.14). He was marked out, when appointed on Lucullus’ staff, for his martial qualities (Plut. Luc. 25). Murena subsequently campaigned in Pontus (84-82 BC), campaigning from Galatia for three successive seasons after being encouraged to hostilities by Archelaus, a former Mithridatic general (App. Mith. 85; Mitchell 1993: 3). His third campaign ended in abject failure when he suffered serious losses and was driven back in rout to Phrygia. He was directed by Sulla to desist from any further campaigning and return to Rome where, despite suffering a near total defeat, he was rewarded with a triumph for his initial victories over Pontus (Leg. Man. 8; Mur. 11; 15). Servilius: P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus (RE 93; MRR 2: 82) was consul in 79, and served as proconsul in Cilicia from 78-76. There he reduced the Isaurians, was acclaimed imperator and took the cognomen Isauricus (Vell. Pat. 2.39.2; Val. Max. 8.5.6). See Magie 1950: 287-290 for Servilius’ campaigns, between 78 and 75, in southern Anatolia and into southern Asia. Lucullus: L. Licinius Lucullus (RE 104; MRR 2:
100-101; 106-108) was consul in 74. He served in the east against Mithridates and received logistic and eventually military support from Deiotarus (Liv. Per. 95; 97; 98). Lucullus pushed Eumachus back into Pontus (App. Mith. 75). In 72, Deiotarus assisted in the pursuit of Mithridates by providing 30,000 Galatian carriers for Lucullus’ baggage train (Plut. Luc. 14.1; App. Mith. 78). Lucullus employed Galatian cavalry when crossing over the Taurus mountains in 70 and again in 60 (Plut. Luc. 28.2; Mitchell 1993: 31). At some point during Lucullus’ governorship, Deiotarus defeated an unspecified number of Mithridates’ legates, eliciting significant mention within our sources (Liv. Per. 94: App. Mith. 11.35; 17.59; Plut. Luc. 14.1; Magie 1950: 294; 1176).

34.1 quid de Cn. Pompeio loquar? qui unum Deiotarum in toto orbe terrarum ex animo amicum vereque benevolum, unum fidelem populo Romano iudicavit.

Deiotarus owed his biggest debt to Pompey (for the favour shown to Deiotarus see Phil. 11.31.1 above). Pompey’s role within the Philippics is diminished because of Antonius’ strategy of presenting the current strife as a two party conflict between Pompeians and Caesarians, in order to counter the influence of the liberators and their supporters. Pompey is, however, mentioned, at Phil. 11.18.10, as summus vir atque princeps omnium, but his role is tempered since the extraordinary commands, to which Cicero refers, were bestowed upon him by turbulenti tribuni. Not all shared an aversion to the Caesarian polity, an attitude that was emphasized by Antonius, who insisted on presenting his struggle as a conflict between parties: nam nunc quidem partium contentionem esse dictatat. quarum partium? alteri victi sunt, alteri sunt e mediis C. Caesaris partibus; nisi forte Caesaris partis a Pansa et Hirtio consulibus et a filio C. Caesaris oppugnari putamus. hoc vero bellum non <est> ex dissensione partium, sed ex nefaria spe perditissimorum civium excitatum. Nor was Pompey universally admired, even amongst the conspirators against Caesar (see the comments by Shackleton Bailey 1977: 489). Pompey appears significantly in Philippic 2, but then is absent until Philippic 5, where he re-emerges to compare positively with Octavian, since both Pompey and Octavian commanded armies in their youth (Phil. 5.43-44). Pompey again disappears from the Philippic corpus, only to reappear here within Philippic 11. This seems to be a conspicuous avoidance by Cicero in response to Antonius’ attacks (see Welch 2002 for the reconstruction of Antonius’ argument and Cicero’s counter-strategy). Cicero negates the dichotomy of the conflict between Caesarians and Pompeians by placing Deiotarus within a sequence of Roman military
commanders divorced from the more recent conflict between Caesar and Pompey. Pompey is not the culmination of the sequence, and so his inclusion is incidental to the catalogue of Deiotarus’ contributions to the res publica. **in toto orbe terrarum:** A recurrent phrase in Cicero’s work (*Phil.* 10.10.4; *Ver.* 2.4.99; *Font.* 13.13; *Leg. Agr.* 2.64; *Flac.* 63.4). The statement forms the figure of hyperbole, in which an exaggerated or extravagant statement is used to express strong feeling or produce a strong impression. Its relevance in the current context reflects Cicero’s focus upon the eastern provinces. **ex animo amicum vereque benevolum:** Cicero’s own philosophical position was that friendship must necessarily be subordinated to the good of the res publica (cf. *Amic.* 36; *Off.* 3.43: *at neque contra rem publicam neque contra ius iurandum ac fidem amici causa vir bonus faciet*). Caesar’s death was of topical value regarding state versus friendship, as indicated in a letter from Matius to Cicero: *aiunt enim patriam amicitae praeponendam esse, proinde ac si iam vicerint obitum eius rei publicae fuisse utilem* (*Fam.* 11.28.2). Cicero had argued in the *Pro Deiotaro* that Deiotarus had been compelled by his friendship and intimacy with Pompey to aid him as an ally (*Deiot.* 13). At *Amic.* 36, Cicero framed the question of what were the limits of friendship, a question that was inadequately resolved within that text. He similarly avoids framing a response in this speech, because of the apparent contradiction in Cicero’s assertion that Deiotarus had always brought aid to the res publica.

34.4 **fuimus imperatores ego et M. Bibulus in propinquis finitimisque provinciis: ab eodem rege adiuti sumus et equitatu et pedestribus copis.** Cicero moves finally to his own earlier role in the east in order to illustrate Deiotarus’ support against a possible Parthian invasion. From 51-50, Cicero was the reluctant governor of Cilicia (*Fam.* 3.2.1), the largest province in the Roman East. Cilicia provided the mountain passes linking Syria and Mesopotamia with the west; thus the province occupied a position of strategic importance. Before Cicero arrived to take up his duties, there were rumours of a Parthian threat to the provinces of Syria and Cilicia. Such was the situation that discussions soon involved the possibility of either Pompey or Caesar being given command to meet the danger (*Fam.* 8.10.2). Cicero was nonetheless compelled to confront the reality of the Parthian threat almost immediately upon arrival with only two under-strength legions. The threat dissipated within the year, but Cicero, for the interim, relied heavily upon Deiotarus who was able to supply 30 cohorts and 2000 cavalry, thereby doubling the forces in the
province (Att. 5.18.2; 6.1.14; Fam. 15.1.6; 15.4.5-7). **imperatores**: The term is used as an honorary title, a symbol of military authority, conferred upon a successful general by either his own troops unofficially, or by official recognition by the senate. The successful general bore the title at the end of his name until the end of his magistracy or until a triumph was awarded. The acclamation is first attested in 209 (Polyb. 10.40.2; Liv. 27.19.3), but became a regular feature of the first century BC. Cicero refers to his own acclamation as imperator following his involvement against the Parthians when proconsul of Syria. His fears were somewhat allayed when the incursion appeared in Syria. He marched his forces to Antioch where Cassius was entrenched, but Cassius repelled the Parthians before Cicero arrived. Cicero then ordered attacks on tribesmen in the Amanus mountain range between Syria and Cilicia, for which he received the imperatorial acclamation (Plut. Cic. 36; Att. 5.20.3; Fam. 2.10.3; CIL 1: 527; MRR 2: 243). **M. Bibulus**: M. Calpurnius Bibulus (RE 28; MRR 2: 187-188) was consul in 59. Bibulus was a long-time opponent of Caesar with whom he was consul in 59. He unsuccessfully opposed Caesar’s land distribution (Suet. Iul. 20), and withdrew from his official duties, leaving Caesar to perform his duties as consul on his own. In 49, he sided with Pompey, was placed in charge of the fleet, but died before Dyrrachium (Caes. B Civ. 3.5.4; 3.18.1). In 51 he served as proconsul in Syria (Fam. 15.3.2; Liv. Per. 108; MRR 2: 242). He arrived late to take over his province, which was held by Cassius himself, who was proquaestor at the time in Syria. Bibulus took possession of Syria only after Cassius repulsed the Parthian incursion (Att. 5.16.4; 5.18.1; 5.20.3; App. 5.10; Syr. 51; Vell. Pat. 2.46.4). Cicero was disparaging of Bibulus’ late arrival suggesting that he sought the acclamation for Cassius’ success (Att. 5.20.4). In private Cicero would continue to discredit Bibulus’ slight achievements (Att. 6.5.3; 7.2.6-7; Fam. 2.17.2).

34.5 *secutum est hoc acerbissimum et calamitosissimum civile bellum in quo quid faciendum Deiotaro, quid omnino rectius fuerit dicere non est necesse, praesertim cum contra ac Deiotarus sensit victoria belli iudicarit.* Cicero refers to the conflict between Pompey and Caesar as a ‘civil war’, in contrast to the current war with Antonius and Dolabella, which Cicero repeatedly depicts as a war against latrones and hostes. Sibilance conveys the contempt with which Cicero refers to the civil war between Caesar and Pompey. **rectius**: Not ‘morally right’ (OLD 10) in this context, but ‘right in the circumstances’ (OLD 8). **praesertim ... iudicarit**: ‘Particularly when it was contrary to what Deiotarus realised and what victory of the
war resolved’. *Contra* is used to indicate a logical opposition (*L-S 1 F1*), and this is developed over the two following asyndetic clauses. Deiotarus’ allegiance (firstly to Pompey, and then to Caesar) is not presented as a fickle change of heart, but as a completion of duty to Pompey, his friend and patron. The cause and effect of the civil war are not addressed, but Deiotarus’ honourable conduct within that war. Deiotarus had sided with Pompey in the civil war, accompanying the latter on his flight, but after Pharsalus he asked Caesar for pardon. In the *Pro Deiotaro*, Cicero had argued that Deiotarus had no choice but to support his patron, whereas that claim could not be made of those senators who had supported Caesar (*Deiot. 11-13*). Deiotarus erred in supporting Pompey; but after Pharsalus, with his duty performed, he renounced the Pompeian cause (*Deiot. 13: itaque Pharsalico proelio facto a Pompeio discessit, spem infinitam persequi noluit*).

34.8 *quo in bello si fuit error, communis ei fuit cum senatu; sin recta sententia, ne victa quidem causa vituperanda est.* **error:** The argument dissipates the blame attributable to Deiotarus by comparing his actions with those of the senate. The argument that Deiotarus shared blame with the senate was used at *Deiot. 12-3* to absolve him of his involvement (*ignosce, ignosce, Caesar, si eius viri [sc. Pompeii] auctoritati rex Deiotarus cessit quem nos omnes secuti sumus*). Deiotarus was accustomed to obey the directives of the senate due to their long standing relationship (*et venit vel rogatus ut amicus, vel arcessitus ut socius, vel evocatus ut is, qui senatui parere didicisset*). **sin** introduces a contrasting clause to the one previously expressed: ‘but if his intention was right, even though his cause was defeated, it ought not to be found at fault’. That is to say, he was on the wrong side of the conflict, but his motivation was faultless. Cicero avoids developing the argument along party lines, by laying fault for the war on the senate’s destructive support of Pompey. Cicero moves quickly over his apologia for Deiotarus’ support of Pompey, to the support Cassius could derive from other provincial powers. **sententia:** In this context *sententia* is akin to ‘purpose’ or ‘position’ (*OLD 2*), as opposed to ‘opinion’ or ‘proposal’ (*OLD 3*).

34.10 *ad has copias accedent alii reges, etiam dilectus accedent.* Cicero returns to his main line of argument after his digression on Deiotarus’ motivations. He is accentuating the resources available to Cassius, by the use of *etiam* to introduce an additional clause and by the repetition of *accedent* in order to emphasize a cumulative quality. He clearly had only a limited idea of the resources already available to
Cassius (cf. App. 3.78). In a letter to Cassius dated to early February, Cicero revealed that he did not know Cassius’ whereabouts and whether or not Cassius had, in fact, raised an army (Fam. 12.4). This anxiety was again expressed at Fam. 12.5; cf. Fam. 12.7.

(§§35.1-39) Cassius is a deserving recipient of the command.

The following sections form a justification for the appointment of Cassius to the command. The focus is initially upon Cassius’ military experience, and his ability to prosecute successfully the campaign against Dolabella, particularly in a region in which Cassius had had his greatest successes to date. Cicero then proceeds to discuss what appears to have been a significant line of argument against the appointment of Cassius, namely the veterans’ unwillingness to follow one of the assassins of Caesar. Cicero’s response exaggerates the argument in order to undermine the authority of those who used the legions as an objection. A refutation of this point leads the speech to its conclusion.

35.1 neque vero classes deerunt: tanti Tyrii Cassium faciunt, tantum eius in Syria nomen atque Phoenice est. Cicero justifies Cassius’ right to command in the east by reiterating Cassius’ most conspicuous martial actions. Cassius was quaestor on Crassus’ failed Parthian invasion in 53, and led the retreat to Syria from Carrhae with the remnants of the Roman army. He remained in the province until 51, organising its defence. In 52 he drove back a Parthian incursion, earning a martial reputation which subsequently influenced the level of support that he was now able to derive from the east (see n. at § 35.4 below; Att. 5.21.2; 6.1.14; Dio 40.28.1).

classes: Cassius’ fleet was augmented from the province of Asia and from the islands of the eastern Mediterranean with much opposition from the cities (cf. Fam. 12.13.3). The initial creation of the fleet was probably begun while Cassius and Brutus were still in Italy, and justified by the requirements for the grain commission (cf. Phil. 10.8.5). Cassius demanded ships of Phoenicia, Lycia, Rhodes and Egypt, but was met with refusal (App. 4.60-1). These were later cruelly punished for their non-compliance. The Tyrians, Aradii and Serapians are explicitly mentioned by Appian as supplying ships, influenced by Cassius’ martial repute (App. 4.60-1). The subsequent command of the fleet was entrusted to C. Sextilius Rufus (RE 24; Fam. 12.13.4; MRR
faciunt: As a verb of rating facere takes tanti (G-L §380): ‘the Tyrians have a great regard for Cassius’. The anaphora tanti introduces the second clause with variation of subject within the sentence. nomen is used synonymously with existimatio, or similar (OLD 12).

35.2 paratum habet imperatorem C. Cassium, patres conscripti, res publica contra Dolabella nec paratum solum sed peritum atque fortem. imperatorem is used here to imply a ‘holder of imperium’, as opposed to its technical use at Phil. 11.34.4.

35.4 magnas ille res gessit ante Bibuli, summi viri, adventum, cum Parthorum nobilissimos duces maximas copias fudit Syriamque immani Parthorum impetu liberavit. Cicero is effusive in his praise of Cassius, but cf. Cicero’s earlier depreciation of Cassius’ achievements at Att. 5.21.2. Bibuli: Shortly after Cassius’ successes Bibulus arrived to take over the governorship of Syria (Dio 40.28-29). Bibulus’ late arrival in Syria elicited some scepticism from Cicero regarding his military ability (see Phil. 11.34.4 n.). nobilissimos duces: Pacorus, son of Orodes I of Parthia, was nominally in charge of the Parthian forces (Att. 5.18.1; Dio 40.28.3). Dio writes of two Parthian incursions into Syria. The first was small, and without strong leadership, was easily repelled by Cassius. The second was larger, nominally under the leadership of Pacorus, but led by the commander Osaces who forms the focus for Cicero’s attention within his contemporaneous correspondence concerning the details of the campaign (Att. 5.20.3; Dio 40.28). Lacking success, the Parthians turned elsewhere; and Cassius, in pursuit, laid an ambush and repelled them from Syria altogether. The Parthian general was killed fleeing from Cassius’ forces (Att. 5.20.3). Accompanying Pacorus was Artavasdes, son of Tigranes II and co-regent of Armenia, who had relinquished his alliance with Rome after Carrhae and had married the daughter of Pacorus (Att. 2.4.2). liberavit is a pointed allusion to Cassius as ‘liberator’, a self-styled persona evident on the coin issues of 43 (Crawford 1974: nos. 499; 505).

35.7 maximam eius et singularem laudem praetermitto; cuius enim praedicatio nondum omnibus grata est, hanc memoriae potius quam vocis testimonio conservemus. singularem laudem praetermitto: I.e. the assassination of Caesar. The phrasing forms a praeteritio, the ostensible omission of a key point which Cicero
nonetheless mentions (Lausberg §§882-886). Similar phrasing is found at Phil. 10.7. in relation to Brutus: *ac de hac quidem divina atque immortali laude Bruti silebo quae gratissima memoria omnium civium inclusa nondum publica auctoritate testata est.* Cicero suggests public acknowledgement will be forthcoming at some time in the future. This acknowledges civic duty as the liberators’ underlying motivation, despite the fact that no such acknowledgement was as yet publicly lauded. The catalogue of Cassius’ achievements reaches its climactic point here.

36.1 *animadverti, patres conscripti, exaudivi etiam nimium a me Brutum, nimium Cassium ornari, Cassio vero sententia mea dominatum et principatum dari.* Cicero shifts from a discussion of Cassius alone to include Brutus, his fellow conspirator. At Phil. 11.20.2 Cicero similarly used rhetorical questions in leading and resolving his argument. There Cicero told his audience why he sought honours for Octavian, and then posed a series of questions asking what else he could have done in the same situation. The use of antithesis, in illustrating two mutually exclusive outcomes serves, as here, to define actions that are concordant with the good of the *res publica.* The use of rhetorical questions is essential to Cicero’s method in developing and leading his argument in a direction away from the criticism that he has excessively honoured Brutus and Cassius. The Antonii in this context are beyond the immediate argument, but reintroduced to provide a contrastive set of motivations.

exaudivi: Use of the past tense marks a difference between the present tense *exaudio* and its use as a marker of an interjection at Phil. 11.20.2. Cicero, here, is anticipating possible, even likely, objections from speakers to follow. Cicero’s place within the sequence of debate allows no chance of rebuttal, and so Cicero chooses to make his rebuttal now while he still yet has a chance to articulate a response. Cicero’s proposal would endow the liberators with an immense military force in the east. Cicero therefore decides to respond to a possible objection, and to pre-empt the argument, by establishing reasons for this proposal. Criticism followed the confirmation of Brutus’ command in the Balkans, and this would be exacerbated by Cicero’s current proposal. It is unlikely that Cicero had made known beforehand his intention of speaking in favour of Cassius during the preceding day’s debate because, had Cicero suggested that Cassius take command against Dolabella on the preceding day, he would undercut the impact of the late introduction of Cassius within the speech here. The most likely reason for the inclusion of a response to an unnamed ‘speaker’ is so that Cicero could anticipate any possible objection that might follow his proposal. The
opposing argument was obviously that Brutus and Cassius were being given a position of predominance, using the emotive *dominatum* and *principatum* as a negative political charge; a political privilege that would shift the balance of power away from the senate and towards the two leading anti-Caesarian conspirators. Antonius himself had laid the charge, to which Cicero would again respond at *Phil*. 13.25. *Dominatum* is usually applied to Antonius, whom Cicero repeatedly charges with aspiring to tyranny or *regnum* (*Phil*. 2.35; 3.34; 8.12; 8.13-17; on the use of *dominatum*, its synonyms and application at Rome see Dunkle 1967). The complaint was no doubt increasingly voiced in light of Brutus’ recent appointment to the governorship of Achaea. It was an objection that Calenus had made at *Phil*. 10.4.1, but Cicero now faced the greater challenge of having Cassius granted command, an appointment that would give the liberators control of the immense resources of the east (cf. *Fam*. 12.5.1). *ornari*: Used primarily to describe the furnishing of a general with his troops and supplies, but here figurative use is implied, ‘to honour’ (*OLD* 6). Honours within the *Philippics* are used to encourage and reward those who served the interests of the *res publica*. Brutus had objected to Cicero’s irregular promotion of individuals, particularly to Octavian. Brutus’ sense of frustration at what he perceived as a reckless bestowal of *honores* is palpable: *itaque timeo de consulatu, ne Caesar tuus altius se ascendisse putet decretis tuis, quam inde, si consul factus sit, sit descensurus* (*Ad Brut*. 1.4.4, written on May 10). In the letters over this period Brutus’ criticism of excessive honours for Octavian provides a continual theme. Brutus stressed his concern that the *instrumentum regni* remained and that it would render the death of the tyrant as void of meaning, particularly when that *instrumentum*, the accumulation of *honores* through irregular promotion along the *cursus honorum*, should come so easily to Octavian (*Ad Brut*. 1.4.6). *vero*: Repetition of *vero* through the *confirmatio* reinforces each of Cicero’s individual points.

36.3 quos ego orno? nempe eos qui ipsi sunt *ornamenta rei publicae*. *quid*?
*Ornamentum* is used figuratively, referring to one who adorns the *res publica*; *ornamentum* had been used of Octavian at *Phil*. 3.13.4, as one who was the *ornamentum dignitatis*. *quid*? is used as a transitional device from one thought to the next, establishing the expectation of further enquiry. Additionally, the single word question promotes the impression of spontaneity.
36.4 D. Brutum nonne omnibus sententiis semper ornavi? num igitur reprehenditis? an Antonios potius ornarem, non modo suarum familiarum sed Romani nominis probra atque dedecora? Cicero’s response to the accusations of his hypothetical opponents is to reply through a reproachful interrogation of his interlocutors’ motivations. Cicero thus establishes an argument based upon the construction of a dilemma (cf. Phil. 10.4.5-5.4), by making a comparison between the Bruti and Cassius with Antonius and Dolabella. The rebuttal is far from comprehensive, but Cicero also uses the charge as a transition to the characterisation of Antonius’ followers, despite their irrelevance to the present context. The inclusion of D. Brutus at this point does not follow logically from Cicero’s argument where we might expect M. Brutus within the context. Cassius’ behaviour, in taking possession of provinces designated to others, duplicated the actions of M. Brutus and indicated collusion that Cicero was trying to de-emphasise. Woodman (1983: 132-3) suggests Cicero avoided using M. Brutus as an exemplum because Brutus had not yet been senatorially appointed. But Cicero is trying to downplay the link between the two men because of their alarmingly formidable presence to both Antonians and Caesarians within the senate. D. Brutus was the easier precedent because of his passive role in resisting Antonius, in contrast to M. Brutus’ active pursuit of securing control of the Balkan provinces, provoking reaction from Antonian sympathizers. Cicero suggests that the senators who supported D. Brutus’ resistance were thus committed to a future supporting of Cassius.  

sententiis: Sententia in the sense of an opinion expressed in the senate (OLD 3). Antonios: The three Antonian brothers (cf. Phil. 10.4.5 n.). 

familiarum: On familial exempla see Phil. 10.5.1 n.

36.6 an Censorinum ornem in bello hostem, in pace sectorem? an cetera ex eodem latrocinio naufragia colligam? Censorinum: For Censorinus see Phil. 11.11.1. The repetition of ornem and its variants becomes increasingly sarcastic. sectorem: In this context, sector is a negative term applying to one who buys up confiscated land with a view to financial speculation (Dig. 4.146; OLD 2). Cicero refers to Censorinus as a sector because of his role as one of the septemviri, a commission employed by Antonius for the redistribution of land among Caesar’s veterans (Phil. 11.11.1; 12.20; 12.23; 13.26; 13.37). The term is used repeatedly of Antonius within the Philippics and, at Phil. 2.75, the expression is emphatically linked with the septemviri (te sectorem; cf. Phil. 13.30). By the end of 44 a number of Pompeian properties were in the possession of Antonius’ followers (Phil. 13.10-2).
By the end of 43 Censorinus himself was in possession of Cicero’s Palatine property following the latter’s death (Vell. Pat. 2.14.3). Cicero here alters the focus of the argument by an implicit contrast between Cassius and Antonius. Antonius is a disgrace to the Roman name, his followers are hostes and profiteers (sectores), assembled together in latrocinium. This arrangement leads Cicero away from his defence of Brutus and Cassius to an attack on Antonius and his collaborators.

**naufragia**: The term is used of Caesar’s supporters at Phil. 13.3 in a transferred sense ‘of shattered remains’ (OLD 2b).

36.8  **ego vero istos oti, concordiae, legum, iudiciorum, libertatis inimicos tantum abest ut ornem ut effici non possit quin eos tam oderim quam rem publicam diligo.** Sarcasm gives way to sober description of the res publica and the constituent elements that hold it together. The repetition of ideas in a more complex sentence draws to a conclusion Cicero’s response to his excessive honouring of Brutus and Cassius. Cicero is thus able to define his own position, in relation to both Brutus and Cassius, and to the followers of Antonius.  **oti, concordiae, legum, iudiciorum, libertatis**: The virtues of the Roman political system, equated variously with the state (Phil. 5.41.7; 6.19; cf. Agr. 1.23.7; Mur. 78.4). The catalogue is used for contrast against the community of Antonius’ latrocinium. There is a level of coherence in the ordering of oti, concordiae, legum, iudiciorum, libertatis. Concordia is dependent upon the adherence to leges, and in turn iudicia, which requires obedience to judgements and the authority of the judicial process. The phrasing reinforces the idea of a functioning res publica, but with an especial emphasis on the administration of law. The res publica is stable government, in respect to law and the administration of justice, and this is founded upon free aristocratic debate, the final component of the catalogue. The placement of libertas as the final component in Cicero's catalogue, leads to Cicero's refusal to accept the veterans’ lead in directing the policy of the state. Cicero had equated the will of the veterans with tyranny at Phil. 10.19.1; when law is subjected to the will of a tyrant, there is loss of libertas and death is to be preferred (cf. Off. 2.24). Cicero does not develop that line of argument again, but focuses more upon undermining his political opponents through their lack of leadership.  **ego**: The pronoun has a long separation from its verbs oderim and diligo. The placement makes emphatic Cicero’s own assessment of the situation in contrast to those of his opponents.  **ut effici non possit**: ‘that is not able to be done’.
It is an unusual expression within Cicero’s speeches but recurrent within his more theoretical rhetorical and philosophical works.

(§§37.1-38.6) The argument that offence may be given to the veterans is a fallacy.

37.1 ‘vide,’ inquit ‘ne veteranos offendas’: hoc enim maxime exaudio.

inquit: Cicero returns to his imagined interlocutor (so Shackleton Bailey 1986: 295 n.43). The interlocutor’s objection is an example of aetiologia, a figure in which a difficult problem is raised, and to which the orator then provides the solution. The direct quotation of an unnamed opponent need not imply it was actually said, but it allows Cicero to emphasize the exact wording, to create the sense of an immediate argument to which Cicero can respond. Cicero’s calm response is then crafted to create the impression of a reasoned and capable statesman, an example of ratiocinatio (the exposition of an argument through calm reasoning: Inv. Rhet. 2.5.18; Rhet. Her. 4.16.23; Lausberg §§ 366-372). Calm reasoning increasingly gives way to a tone of indignation, as Cicero censures Antonius’ companions and the veterans who have followed his lead in taking up arms against the state. veteranos: The term veterani itself has been problematic. Shackleton Bailey suggests that the term veterani was at this time applied specifically to Caesar’s veteran soldiers (Shackleton Bailey 1986: 7 n.12; cf. Ramsey 2003: 96). The differentiation is no longer required given the merging of the Pompeian legionaries within Caesar’s ranks. The argument of a soldiery unwilling to follow the leading conspirators appears to have been used against the liberators; but in Cicero’s presentation, the accusation appears as a blanket statement without an immediate context. Fears of veteran agitation had been prevalent since Caesar’s death. Frisch (1946: 217) argued that Calenus, most recently in the meeting of the senate in early February (the day on which the Tenth Philippic was delivered), had raised the problem of veteran allegiance to an assassin of Caesar. Cicero again implies this was the chief point of contention. Cicero’s line of reasoning here is not so much an attack on the veterans, as an attack upon those within the senate who were using veteran allegiance as an argument against the appointment of Cassius. There was evidence that the veterans were being induced, both by Antonius and Octavian, by the prospect of avenging Caesar (App. 3.44; Frisch 1946: 100; Botermann 1968: 49-54). This latter motivation is entirely absent from Cicero’s public utterances. However, in the immediate period following Caesar’s death, Cicero
feared the return of the Gallic and Spanish legions seeking revenge (Att. 14.5.1; 14.6.1). Brutus and Cassius too had written to Antonius over their concern for their personal safety, when in May 44 numbers of veteran soldiers were gathering at Rome (Fam. 11.2.1-2).

37.2  *ego autem veteranos tueri debeo, sed eos quibus sanitas est; certe timere non debeo.*  *autem* provides Cicero with a transition to a tentative assent to his opponent’s objection. The echoing force of the first person pronoun (*ego*) makes emphatic *debeo*, which is placed at the end of successive clauses. By emphasizing the first person pronoun Cicero establishes an implied contrast with his opponents, attributing timidity to them, for fear is a philosophical impediment to political counsel (Off. 1.84). Cicero establishes an implied contrast between his own willingness to face the dangers before him and the nervousness of his political opponents (particularly given Cicero's recent censure of his opponent’s nervousness at Phil. 10.10.1).

37.3  *eos vero veteranos qui pro re publica arma ceperunt secutique sunt C. Caesaris auctorem beneficiorum paternorum, hodieque rem publicam defendunt vitae suae periculo, non tueri solum sed etiam commodis augere debeo.*  *pro re publica*: The *res publica* is used as a metonymy for relieving D. Brutus at Mutina. The phrasing allows Cicero to attribute an ideological motivation to the veterans who are following Octavian.  *auctorem beneficiorum paternorum*: ‘a guarantor of his father’s beneficia’. After the Ides of March, Octavian returned to Italy from Apollonia, where he was stationed with Caesar’s army in preparation for the Parthian campaign. He was met by crowds at Brundisium and accompanied to Rome by veterans, from whom he was able to draw support by appealing to their loyalty to Caesar and by promises of a donative. He appeared before the praetor C. Antonius and declared his acceptance of Caesar's will and his intention to undertake to pay Caesar's legacies, which involved the distribution of 300 sesterces per man (App. 3.14; 3.21-3; Nic. Dam. *Vita Caes.* 41). Antonius interposed, leaving Octavian to undertake to pay Caesar’s legacies from his own resources. Subsequently, Octavian set about selling his property to meet the demands of the legacy (App. 3.39). His actions, to which Cicero alludes, proved popular and a threat to the Antonian polity (for which, see Rawson 1992b: 471-2).  *beneficiorum*: ‘Benefactions, bounties’, but can be broadly understood to mean ‘goodwill’ or ‘favours’. Cicero suggests that those who are following Octavian are motivated by the protection of the *res publica*, as opposed to material reward. However, Cicero makes clear that he ought to reward
their conduct, since they have forgone their own safety for the sake of the *res publica*. He is unclear regarding exactly what the veterans were to receive, but the context implies the rewards promised to the veterans for their long service to Caesar. Cicero’s definition of *beneficia* is explicit at *Phil.* 11.39.8 below (*praemia promissa*).

**hodieque ... defendunt**: The present tense and the use of *hodie* creates a sense of immediacy. Antonius was besieging D. Brutus at Mutina. Cicero touches, by this oblique reference, upon the necessity of concluding the conflict with Antonius.

**37.6 qui autem quiescunt, ut septima, ut octava legio, in magna gloria et laude ponendos puto.** The Seventh and Eighth were Caesarian Gallic *veterani* and due for settlement within Campania (Keppie 2000: 22). Members of the latter were still in Rome preparing to leave for Casilinum before events overtook them (Yavetz 1983: 142; Nic. Dam. 31). We know that Octavian was able to recruit veterans from among the Seventh and Eighth Legions, and that Antonius too had drawn from their number (*Phil.* 2.102; *Att.* 16.8.1; App. 3.40; Dio 45.12.2). The topicality of *quiescunt* is lost. Frisch (1946: 233) argues that their neutrality was worthy of praise. Shackleton Bailey (1986: 295 n. 44) argues to the contrary, suggesting that there is a hint of irony in Cicero’s praise of the Seventh and Eighth legions, ‘in keeping with *non vereor ... delectant* below’. The passage possibly provides an indication of hasty construction.

A written speech requires an avoidance of ambiguity and vagueness, in order to communicate its message to a range of recipients, within a range of contexts. Similarly, the orator must anticipate the time lag between the delivery of the speech and its reception in published form and possible confusion that might arise. Cicero’s allusion here has no clear meaning because he has not supplied the context. Without context the tonal qualities, capable of giving the correct inference, are absent. Nor does any supplementary correspondence provide clarification. Cicero does not elucidate his point; presumably his audience required no instruction as to Cicero’s meaning.

**37.7 comites vero Antoni, qui, postquam beneficia Caesaris comederunt, consulem designatum obsident, huic urbi ferro ignique minitantur, Saxae se et Cafoni tradiderunt ad facinus praedamque natis, num quis est qui tuendos putet?** This characterisation of Antonius’ companions was first mentioned at *Phil.* 11.12.6 above. Cicero returns to it now. The shift in subject contrasts the ideological motivations between the combatants. **beneficia**: In this context Cicero refers to the land allotments granted to the veterans through the agency of the *septemviri* (cf. *Phil.*
The commission notoriously benefited Antonius’ followers, whom Cicero insistently condemned for their greed (*Phil.* 5.20; 5.33; 6.15; 7.17; 8.26; 11.10; 11.13; 11.23; 13.20; 12.20; 13.37; Dio 45.9.1). The veterans serving under Antonius are not subordinate to him in this context, but are companions (*comites*), because Cicero wishes to emphasize the communal banditry of Antonius and his associates. Cicero is concerned to develop characterisation, rather than provide factual proof, in order to arouse an indignant response towards the conclusion of his oration. *comederunt*: ‘squandered on riotous living’. At *Phil.* 2.43; 2.101 Cicero accused Antonius of gifting Campanian land to his colleagues, at the expense of veteran settlement in the region (cf. Keppie 1983: 50). *consulem designatum*: D. Brutus was consul-designate for 42 with L. Munatius Plancus. Caesar’s designations were legalised through the *leges Iuliae de magistratibus creandis* (Dio 43.47; Suet. *Iul.* 41; Yavetz 1983: 109). *huic urbi*: Sc. Rome. Rome is made the next logical step in the ambitions of Antonius and his companions. *ferro ignique*: A fairly common example of synecdoche, a trope where something is signified by the whole or the whole is signified by its part (cf. Sall. *Cat.* 49.4; Lausberg §§572-7). So instead of ‘the threat of being razed and the threat of destruction by a military force’, Cicero uses the more concrete imagery of sword and fire to convey the nature and immediacy of the threat. *Saxae … Cafoni … natis*: For the use of *natis* see *Phil.* 10.4.7 n.

37.11 *ergo aut boni sunt, quos etiam ornare, aut quieti, quos conservare debemus, aut impii, quorum contra furorem bellum et iusta arma cepimus.* *ergo* introduces a statement bridging two rhetorical questions. Cicero introduces a sequence with an emphasis upon the *impii*. The delineation between those prepared to fight against Antonius and those prepared to fight for him is made clear. *boni*: The first category includes those patriots who were preparing to relieve D. Brutus from siege at Mutina. *quieti*: The second group is referred to as ‘neutral’, or ‘calm, free from ambition’ (cf. Vell. *Pat.* 2.117.2), and refers back to the Seventh and Eighth legions. *debecmus*: There is a movement away from the first person singular from the preceding clauses (*debeo*) to the first person plural (*debecmus ... cepimus*) in order to connect senatorial consensus to Cicero’s own viewpoint. There is perhaps an additional reference in Cicero’s phrasing as he attacks the neutrality of those within the senate. Regardless, the neutrals will benefit from Cicero’s policy, if implemented. *impii*: A term with religious overtones, used of traitors and conveying moral condemnation. The term is used to convey betrayal of the *patria*, a point of view
reinforced with the evocation of furorem. Impius has been used before of both Antonius and his followers (cf. Phil. 1.30; 2.1; 3.9; 3.36; 4.2; 6.17; cf. Hellegouarc’h 1972: 530-1). furorem ... arma: bellum and iusta arma are the objects of cepimus and form a doublet of overlapping meaning.

38.1 quorum igitur veteranorum animos ne offendamus veremur? eorum qui D. Brutum obsidione cupiunt liberare? quibus cum Bruti salus cara sit, qui possunt Cassi nomen odisse? A syllogistic argument in three rhetorical questions is used to prove that the first group of veterans is not bound by an ideological aversion to the liberators (cf. similar argument used at Phil. 10.15).

38.4 an eorum qui utrisque armis vacant? non vereor ne acerbus c<u>ivis quisquam istorum sit qui oti delectantur. an ... vacant?: The phrasing is expressed periphrastically and refers to the neutrality of the Seventh and Eighth legions and others mentioned at Phil. 11.37.6.

38.5 tertio vero generi, non militum veteranorum sed importunissimorum hostium, cupio quam acerbissimum dolorem inurere. I.e. the veterans serving under Antonius. Cicero denies the term veterani applies to his third sub-group. Sed introduces an adverative definition of these men; they are not to be counted among the veterani because of their affiliation with Antonius and his band of latrones.

cupio ... inurere: The first person states Cicero’s personal attitude towards Antonius’ followers through a sense of indignation. Inurere is a metaphor of branding with an iron which is strong in emotive effect (cf. Phil. 2.46; 2.117; cf. Tusc. 3.19.9). There is repetition of vocabulary from the preceding statements and the metaphorical inurere (to burn or brand or mark: OLD 3). Cicero’s phrasing becomes personalised (cupio) and the use of the superlative creates a heightened effect. dolorem: Dolorem here is ‘physical pain’ (OLD 1).

Peroratio II (§§38.7-39.11)

For the function of the peroratio within a speech see above pp. 147-149. The following peroratio is more consistent with rhetorical precept than Cicero’s earlier emotional appeal at Phil. 11.27.1-28.9, as the emotional climax here forms the terminus of the oration. The remainder of the speech deals primarily with the argument that the veterans would be unwilling to follow an assassin of Caesar (cf.
Phil. 10.18.1 n.). At Phil. 10.16-18 the argument was very much directed at collapsing the distinction between the armies of the liberators and those of ex-Caesarians. But here, as the speech draws to a conclusion, Cicero shifts his argument from the fallacy of the veterans being unwilling to follow any of the assassins of Caesar, to the emergence of a new soldiery consisting of much more than the veterans to whom Calenus and others had alluded. This shift rises again in tone, as Cicero’s argument reaches a final climax. Cicero continues his strategy of breaking down the distinction, by reasserting senatorial leadership over the Roman armies, and then by focusing upon the new levies and their respective commanders.

(§38.7-38.9) The senate is not beholden to the veterans.

38.7 quamquam, patres conscripti, quousque sententias dicemus veteranorum arbitratu? Cicero’s address to his audience slows the pace in order to stress the veterans’ determining of senatorial policy. This is very much a senatorial address through which Cicero demands more senatorial authority in the circumstances. quousque: Interrogative ‘for how long?’ (L-S 1; cf. famously Cat. 1.1). There is no direct attribution to the veterans of a particular policy, but rather Cicero questions whether the senate should be subject to the arbitrium of the veterans, an arbitrium that is pejoratively expressed through a parallel structure (tantum fastidium/ tanta adrogantia). Cicero is, however, careful not to offend the consul by describing poor leadership; rather he emphasizes the collective responsibility of the senate. Emphasis on collectivity, with the repetition of patres conscripti, and the collective first person, maintains a distribution of responsibility.

38.8 quod eorum tantum fastidium est, quae tanta adrogantia ut ad arbitrium illorum imperatores etiam deligamus? The tone of indignation rises with this second rhetorical question. The direct address to the patres conscripti invites the audience to share in his indignation.

(39.1-39.11) There is a new generation of legionaries who are fighting a war for all nations.

39.1 ego autem – dicendum est enim, patres conscripti, quod sentio – non tam veteranos metuendos nobis arbitror quam quid tirones milites, flos Italiae, quid
novae legiones ad liberandam patriam paratissimae, quid cuncta Italia de vestra gravitate sentiat.

The phrasing of *dicendum est ... quod sentio* gives the impression of forthrightness and sincerity through the trope of ‘frankness permits sincerity’ (cf. Mur. 22.12; Dom. 15.2.25.2; Harusp. 50.14; Sest. 85.13). *Sentio* similarly allows Cicero to make an emphatic differentiation between himself and Calenus and Calenus’ supporters. Cicero emphasizes the newer soldiery in the conflict with Antonius. This was perhaps prompted by the newfound strength of the republican situation in the east and the build up of forces actively engaged in the conflict against Antonius and his adherents. The contrast is striking between the veterans on one hand and the *milites* on the other; not just *milites*, but *tirones milites*, the *flos Italiae*, the *novae legiones paratissimae*. *Tirones* were newly levied soldiers, in contrast to the *veterani*. The term is used ‘quasi-adjectivally’ (*OLD* 1b). The emphasis is not so much on the superiority in the quality of the *tirones*, as in an ideological and newfound numerical superiority.

Metuendos: Calenus had similarly opposed the appointment of Brutus on the grounds that the veterans would refuse to follow an assassin. Cicero had responded by accusing him of simulating fear (cf. Phil. 10.17.13; 11.37.1). In reality, Cicero’s *flos Italiae* were no match for the seasoned veterans. They were described by Appian (App. 3.68) at the battle of Mutina as being stunned at the silent and precise sword work of the veterans. There is a continuation of the flower metaphor, which in turn finds a place in Appian’s description of Mutina. The *flos Italiae* metaphor is used at Phil. 3.13 in relation to the province of Gallia Citerior.

39.5 *nihil enim semper floret; aetas succedit aetati. diu legiones Caesaris viguerunt; nunc vigent Pansae, vigent Hirti, vigent Caesaris fili, vigent Planci; vincunt numero, vincunt aetatibus; nimirum etiam auctoritate vincunt.* Nihil ... aetati: The sentence forms a rhetorical *sententia*. The flower metaphor in *floret* recalls the *flos Italiae* from Phil. 11.39.1. *vigerunt ... vigent ... vincunt*: The complex syntax of the previous line of thought gives way to an asyndetic series of statements marked by short phrasing and a powerful combination of rhetorical devices as the speech draws to a close. The pace of the passage is maintained through a number of short clauses, each introduced by anaphoric ‘*vigent*’, used five times in the sentence. There is a play on sound and meaning with the introduction of the anaphora *vincunt*, which, in this context, is not used in its usual military meaning, but rather in the sense of ‘prevailing over’. The combative aspect is nonetheless strongly linked
and suggests future success to which the *res publica* could look. Cicero juxtaposes the perfect *viguerunt* and the present *vigent*, separated by a use of *nunc* to contrast the past and present. The verbal repetition of *vigent* strikes an emphatic rhythm; *vincunt* is introduced as variation: it is used at the start of two clauses and the end of the last, forming the figure of symploche (the combination of anaphora and epiphora for the sake of underlining Cicero’s main idea: Lausberg §§633-634). Alliteration and repetition maintain the pace of the argument. *Vigent* picks up *floret*, is also applicable to the imagery of natural growth. *Legiones* holds an emphatic position; it is used once in the opening clause and is then understood in each of the consecutive clauses. The distinction between the *veterani* and the *milites* is collapsed in order to devalue the argument of Calenus, and those who shared his view, by presenting the emergence of a soldiery without ties to Caesar. *Pansae ... Hirti ... fili ... Planci*: Genitive with *legiones*. Ker’s translation reads them mistakenly as plurals. *Planci*: L. Munatius Plancus was praetor 45 (*MRR* 2: 307; 313), proconsul of Transalpine Gaul in 44-43, and consul-designate with D. Brutus for 42 (*Phil*. 3.38; *Fam*. 10.1.1; 10.8.1). Shortly after amnesty was extended to the conspirators, of which Plancus spoke in favour (*Plut. Brut*. 19.1), he departed for his province (*Fam*. 15.29). During his time in Gaul Plancus raised new recruits in addition to the three legions already at his disposal (*Shackleton Bailey* 1977: 525; *Phil*. 13.16). In March 43, Plancus advocated peace with Antonius, a proposal rejected by the senate (*Phil*. 13.7-10; 13.49-50; *Fam*. 10.27) and which earned a rebuke from Cicero (*Fam*. 10.6). Despite repeatedly professing allegiance to Cicero’s cause, he nonetheless was reconciled with Antonius and Lepidus sometime in July (*App*. 3.97; *Dio* 46.53.1-2; *Plut. Ant*. 18.4).

39.8 *id enim bellum gerunt quod ab omnibus gentibus comprobatur. itaque his praemia promissa sunt, illis persoluta.* Cicero concludes his division of the soldiery by a return to the soldiers prepared to fight for the *res publica*. *His*: The new troops currently enrolled under Pansa, Hirtius, Octavian and Plancus. *Praemia* is payment for particular service (*OLD* 1), and here Cicero recognizes the financial offers promised the soldiery. In 44, Octavian gave the veterans from Calatia and Casilinum 500 denarii a head (*Att*. 16.8.1; *App*. 3.40), and then 500 more with a further promise of 5000 (*App*. 3.48). The senate’s reluctance to pay the promised amount later proved a motivating factor in the legionaries’ support of Octavian in his march on Rome (*App*. 3.86; 3.88-90). Antonius too used agrarian incentives to encourage loyalty among his own troops (*Phil*. 5.53; 8.25; *Dio* 46.29.3; Ramsey 2003:...
308-9). illis: Caesar’s veterans. In the second clause the demonstratives are inverted in chiastic arrangement, in order to emphasise the contrast.

39.10 fruantur illi suis, persolvantur his quae spopondimus. id enim deos immortalis spero aequissimum iudicare. illis refers to the past tense viguerunt in the previous sentence. his refers to the nunc section in the previous sentence. aequissimum iudicare has quasi legal implications. Aequissimum is similarly used in legal contexts and conveys the idea of something that is ‘most just’. The shift to a vocabulary that incorporates legal structure marks a shift in style to coincide with the final closure of the oration.

40.1 quae cum ita sint, eam quam dixi sententiam vobis, patres conscripti, censeo comprobandum. The wording reflects the formulaic wording of the formal proposal (cf. Phil. 10.25.1 n.).
Bibliography


Carlsen, J. 2006. The Rise and Fall of a Roman Noble Family: The Domitii
Ahenobarbi 196 BC – AD 68. Odense.


———. 2002. ‘The Taxonomy of Patience, or When is "Patientia" not a Virtue?’

*Classical Philology* 97 (2): 133-144.


Classical Quarterly 44 (1): 130-145.


Did Julius Caesar temporarily banish Mark Antony from his inner circle? Classical Quarterly 54 (1): 161-173.


Smith, R. E. 1977. ‘The Use of Force in Passing Legislation in the Late Republic’.

*Athenaeum* 55: 150-173.

Solmsen, F. 1938. ‘Aristotle and Cicero on the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings’.


———. 1980. ‘Destruction, devotio and despair in a situation of anomy’. In Studi in onore di Angelo Brellich promossi dall a Cattedra di Religioni del mondo


Wirszubski, Ch. 1950. Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate. Cambridge.


