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Foreign Policy Tensions and Positions on the National Interest

Political Positioning and Policy Formation in Japan with Regard to Security Arrangements with the United States, Restrictions on the Use of Force, and Memories of War

Bryce Wakefield

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Studies, The University of Auckland, 2011
Abstract

During the ugly dispute from October 2009 to May 2010 between the United States and Japan over the relocation of a US base within Japanese territory, two things became clear. First, Japan’s new ruling party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) was a very different breed than the more conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) with which the Americans were used to dealing. Second, this difference was not fully appreciated by American policymakers until shortly before the August 2009 election that swept the LDP from power.

With Japanese politics more fluid than in previous years, there is a need to develop better frameworks for understanding Japanese thought on foreign policy, even among non-mainstream groups. This thesis attempts to do so in a way that may shed light on similar debates elsewhere. The framework presented here is derived from notions at the core of mainstream international relations theories. It determines three tensions in foreign policy debates which can be used to define six ‘positions on the national interest’ – that is, six irreconcilable views on what is ‘good’ for a particular state in its international affairs. While these six positions are assumed to be present across all modern states, debate and competition between proponents of the different positions within states accounts for varying foreign policies and, in certain circumstances, national identity.

While the fundamental underlying foreign policy tensions are static, they are also infused with particular meaning in each state. Within Japan’s foreign policy discourse, security arrangements with the United States, restrictions on the use of force and interpretations of war reflect the foreign policy tensions which undergird debates on the national interest and, thus, the formation of policy. For historical reasons, these tensions are particularly acute in Japan, which makes the country an archetypical case for the framework. It is also something of a hard case: recent scholarship on Japan’s foreign policy assumes that structural shifts in the international system are important in explaining recent Japanese state behaviour. However, the assumptions of this model cast doubt on even the existence of an international system, let alone Japan’s response to changes within it.
Acknowledgements

In the course of writing this thesis I have incurred many debts.

I am especially grateful for the guidance and encouragement offered to me by my primary supervisor Jian Yang, who in many ways is emblematic of the congeniality and professionalism of the Department of Political Studies at the University of Auckland. I am also indebted to Stephen Hoadley, whose advice as both co-supervisor of this project and overseer of most of my teaching tasks at the university was invaluable. Others at the department, both instructors and fellow students past and present, were also extremely supportive. I would especially like to thank Joe Atkinson, Meg Bates, Guy Charlton, Gavan Ellis, Patrick Hine, Anita Lacey, Raymond Miller, Edwin de Ronde, Peter Skilling and Jacqui True. In the early stages of this thesis the advice of Shogo Suzuki, temporarily based at the department, was particularly helpful.

I am also especially grateful for the advice and assistance of others at the university. Rumi Sakamoto of the School of Asian Studies always offered incisive and thoughtful advice mixed with unparalleled enthusiasm. Matthew Allen at the Department of History was likewise always willing to offer (de)constructive criticism. Chie Emslie at the university library went out of her way to provide new and useful research tools. And it is no exaggeration to say that this would have been a very different thesis were it not for my friendship, conversation and occasional collaboration with Matthew Penney.

I am also indebted to those in Japan who have supported me throughout the course of writing this thesis, first and foremost to Matsui Etsuko and Tōjirō, and Fujita Takeshi and Saeko for their unending generosity. I have particularly valued the advice, assistance and friendship of Chiba Miwa, Robert Eldridge, Ikeuchi Satoshi, Kawashima Shin, Mark Meli, Miyaoka Isao, Muraoka Takako, Okamoto Nobuko, Takahashi Eisuke and Yamaoka Michio. Special thanks also go to Roy Berman, Chris Gunson, Joe Jones and Adam Richards for keeping things interesting.

For the past two years I have also had the pleasure of the support and friendship of a number of colleagues and scholars, some already mentioned above, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. In particular, Kuniko Ashizawa, Sheldon Garon, Michael Kugelman, Sue and Mark Levenstein, James Person,
Janet Spikes and Gregor Young. Others in Washington who have helped me formulate my thoughts include Llewelyn Hughes and Andrew Oros. I am also deeply grateful to Robert Hathaway for his patience with this project.

Back in New Zealand, thanks go to Helen Taber for moral support as well as meals and accommodation. On financial matters, I am grateful to the New Zealand Asian Studies Society and the Asia New Zealand Foundation, which funded one of my research trips to Japan. Seldom should one owe so many pints of Guinness as I do now to Paul Vincent, who offered valuable advice for getting through the process of writing a PhD thesis, particularly towards the end.

Finally, my biggest thanks go to my parents, Carol and Brian Wakefield, for supporting me no matter what I do, to Alex for being there, and to Celia for urging me forward.
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A9A</td>
<td>Article 9 Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anpo</td>
<td>Mutual Security Treaty with the United States (<em>anzen hoshō jōyaku</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASDF</td>
<td>Air Self Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BMD</td>
<td>Ballistic Missile Defence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLB</td>
<td>Cabinet Legislative Bureau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPJ</td>
<td>Democratic Party of Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Diet records (post-1947 constitution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSP</td>
<td>Democratic Socialist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEC</td>
<td>Far Eastern Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Information Intelligence Section (of the US occupation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GATT</td>
<td>General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HC</td>
<td>House of Councilors (upper house of the Japanese Diet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HR</td>
<td>House of Representatives (lower house of the Japanese Diet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDR</td>
<td>Imperial Diet records (pre-1947 constitution)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCP</td>
<td>Japan Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDA</td>
<td>Japan Defense Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDP</td>
<td>Liberal Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GHQ</td>
<td>General Headquarters (of the US occupation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNP</td>
<td>gross national product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Government Section (of the US occupation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSDF</td>
<td>Ground Self Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Liberal Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MITI</td>
<td>Ministry of International Trade and Industry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSA</td>
<td>Mutual Security Assistance (agreement)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSDF</td>
<td>Maritime Self Defense Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPG</td>
<td>National Defense Program Guidelines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDPO</td>
<td>National Defense Program Outline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFP</td>
<td>New Frontier Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NHK</td>
<td>Japan Broadcasting Corporation (<em>nippon hōsō kyōkai</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKO</td>
<td>peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D</td>
<td>research and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIMPAC</td>
<td>The Rim of the Pacific exercises</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCAP</td>
<td>Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Self Defense Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDP</td>
<td>Social Democratic Party</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPJ</td>
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I have attempted to maintain historically accurate terminology. For example, arrangements between the United States and Japan stemming from the treaties signed in 1951 and 1960 are only referred to as an ‘alliance’ when they relate to events from the 1980s, when the term became more or less acceptable in Japanese public discourse. For relevant occasions earlier than that time, I generally use another term such as ‘security relationship’.

Unless otherwise specifically stated, all translations are my own.
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Introduction

The victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in Japan’s August 2009 general elections did not come as a shock to most observers. Although the LDP had held the government almost continuously for more than half a century, since 2006 three ineffective and unpopular LDP prime ministers had successively eroded voter support for the government in a nation mired in economic turmoil and whose public had grown ever more jaded by regular revelations about the incompetence and corruption of the nation’s politicians and bureaucrats.

While many overseas applauded the change of leadership in Tokyo, most Japan watchers in Washington were less than enthusiastic about the potentially anti-American position of the new government. Prior to the election, for example, the Christian Science Monitor and the web version of the New York Times published translated excerpts of an article by DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio (2009a, 2009b) which decried globalisation and the ‘U.S.-led… fundamentalist pursuit of capitalism’ that apparently accompanied it. In his article, and during his time as prime minister, Hatoyama also advocated the formation of an East Asian Community, an international grouping that seemingly did not include the United States, Japan’s only formal ally.

More worryingly for Washington was the statement in the DPJ’s manifesto that the party would ‘propose revisions’ (kaitei o teiki shi) to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which provided the basic regulatory framework for the American military presence in Japan, and ‘head towards a reconsideration’ (mi’naoshi no hōkō de nozomu) of a bilateral agreement regarding the controversial US marine base in Futenma on the island prefecture of Okinawa (DPJ 2009). The agreement, which was only formally finalised earlier that year, stated that to relieve the burden on the people of Okinawa caused by the base, around 8,000 of the approximately 18,000 Americans stationed on Okinawa would be moved to Guam,1 while the base would be transferred to a more remote location within Okinawa. The year before the election, however, Hatoyama noted

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1 The figure of 18,000 represents what the United States claims is the full strength of the marines in Okinawa. The Okinawa prefectural government estimates the actual figure is around 12,000 (Y. Yoshida 2010).
in the Diet that ‘One could expect transferral out of the prefecture at the very least’, raising expectations on Okinawa about the intentions of the DPJ (Ryūkyū shinpō 2010).

In the October after the new government came to power, bilateral tensions over the base issue came to a head, with US Secretary Robert Gates announcing bluntly on a visit to Tokyo that there would be no transfer of marines without an implementation of the original base relocation agreement (Hongo 2009). Gates’ statement elicited a terse reaction from Tokyo about the need for both the Japanese government and Washington to listen to the will of Japanese voters (Japan Times 23 October 2009). Analysts in Washington, however, praised Gates’ ‘Tokyo smackdown’ (Green 2009), noting that the DPJ’s vague stance on Futenma would only strengthen public opposition on Okinawa towards the presence of the US marine base. Hatoyama was ‘letting the DPJ leadership play with firecrackers in a room full of dynamite,’ and ‘[l]etting the alliance drift posed [a] greater risk’ than being blunt. As such commentators noted, Gates understood that a tough message from a senior US official would turn the media and more staunchly pro-American political forces in Japan against Hatoyama.

Indeed, because Hatoyama had not clearly enunciated his preferences on Futenma before the election, let alone built a consensus around them, he was placed in the position of scrambling to find an alternative to the relocation of the base within Okinawa while those within Japan who were concerned about damage to Japan’s relationship with the United States criticised him vehemently. Ultimately, the new prime minister was unsuccessful in convincing local leaders and populations in other prefectures to take on some of the burden associated with the bases. As conservative Washington-based security expert Bruce Klingner (2010) noted, Hatoyama was ‘Like a child who played with matches and then begged others to put out the fire.’ The prime minister’s popularity – relatively high after the election – dropped sharply after the onset of the Futenma crisis. In late May 2010, Hatoyama accepted there was no other choice but to implement the original plan for relocation, causing the DPJ’s coalition partner, the Social Democratic Party, to walk out of the ruling coalition. Hatoyama promptly resigned in early June ending what was a particularly bitter period of relations between Washington and Tokyo.

Perhaps more interesting than the events described above, however, was that Washington had plenty of warning before 2009 that the DPJ envisioned an alternative
direction for Japanese foreign policy. As Okada Katsuya, minister of foreign affairs in the Hatoyama government, pointed out after Gates’ initial confrontation in Tokyo, the DPJ had consistently opposed the plan to relocate the Futenma base to another part of Okinawa (*Japan Times* 23 October 2009). Moreover, the DPJ had called for more latitude to disagree with the United States on important matters of foreign and security policy, denouncing Prime Minister Koizumi Junichirō’s support for the US-led coalition’s 2003 invasion of Iraq and his decision to send the nation’s Self Defense Forces (SDF) partly to assist coalition forces in the country (*Japan Times* 29 July 2004). The DPJ had also criticised the dispatch of the SDF to refuel international military efforts in Afghanistan once it was revealed that some of the fuel offered by Japan could have been used by ships engaged in the Iraq War (R. Yoshida 2007). This was not a party offering unqualified support for US global military efforts.

Yet, even though the possibility of a 2009 DPJ victory in the House of Representatives had been apparent since at least 2006, when the DPJ won the election for the less powerful House of Councilors, the United States did little to prepare for the advent of a new government, or to engage members of the DPJ in order to convince them prior to the election of the importance of the bilateral alliance, or even to estimate the extent to which the DPJ was committed to its own promises. Indeed, by 2010 even longtime ‘managers’ of the US-Japan alliance candidly admitted that their pre-Hatoyama approach to Japan had been guided more by wishful thinking than by serious analysis of the Japanese domestic situation. Speaking at a seminar on US-Japan relations for the Washington Japan policy cognoscenti, where surprise at the direction of the DPJ was evident among most of the speakers, Richard Armitage, a former deputy secretary of state in the Bush Administration who has focused intently on Japan issues throughout his career, noted:

> All of us in this room, I believe, almost without exception are somewhat guilty for the situation we now find ourselves in. All of us, I think, weren’t realising that the Minshu Party [i.e. the DPJ] and most of us in this room actually speak a different language... We didn’t pick up on this. We didn’t catch it. We didn’t get it. We all read the manifesto before the election. We understood what was in it. I think all of us at least on the American side were shocked to find that a political party might actually do what they said in their platform. I mean it would be such a surprise here if our politicians did that (Armitage 2010).
It is clear that key members of the DPJ had a very different conceptualisation of what lay in Japan’s interests than politicians like Koizumi with whom Armitage and others had generally dealt. Yet sifting through and determining different positions on the national interest within national conversations on foreign policy should be a priority for both political operators and analysts dealing with foreign nations. Indeed, Hatoyama’s progressive internationalist position was completely in line with a strand of Japanese thought on the national interest that, while long ignored in Japan, could at least be identified and understood on its own terms. Hatoyama was bound to adopt a different position than those who came before him.

**General approach**

Given the confusion that the DPJ caused US alliance managers, there is clearly a need to develop better frameworks for understanding different positions on the national interest in domestic politics abroad, not merely for American observers. This thesis attempts to do so. It examines public discourse in Japan to categorise different individuals involved in Japanese foreign and security policy debates. It also demonstrates the effect that interaction between political groups representing these different categories has on the creation of policy.

It also establishes a general model that can be used elsewhere, based on assumptions inherent to mainstream International Relations (IR) theory. After reviewing the literature and introducing some of the meta-theoretical assumptions that drive mainstream IR theory, it establishes a deductive framework that incorporates those assumptions. The framework outlines three cleavages or ‘tensions’ in foreign policy debates in the public sphere that are inherent to the construction of the modern state. These tensions are derived from concepts about the state – that it is sovereign, that it is an administrative authority and that it represents a society – used to drive each of the three mainstream IR theories – realism, liberalism and constructivism. With reference to those tensions it is possible to describe six ‘positions on the national interest’ as categories into which individuals can be placed within the context of domestic debates on foreign policy.
The term ‘national interest’, however, is used here with caution. The approach assumes that there are no objective national interests, and that a set of mutually incompatible notions of what is ‘good’ for the nation structures political debates that lead to foreign policy implementation.

Because this thesis develops its own framework for analysis, it is appropriate to examine in detail how the framework applies to a single national case study before moving on to a more comparative approach. It therefore considers Japanese public discourse on tensions, national interests and security policymaking, leaving the comparative study for further research. Japan is a representative case for such analysis. While this theoretical framework may be applicable to all nation states, the tensions that define positions on the national interest have been particularly acute in Japan. This is due to a perception held by many within the country that the fundamental concepts that drive Japan’s relations with the outside world – its security arrangement with the United States; restrictions on the use of force as defined by its constitution; and a sense that Japan’s experience during the Second World War has created a unique national subject – were ‘imposed’ or sometimes, in the case of the last of these three concepts, ‘suppressed’ during the 15 years after the war. This thesis explains why these concepts are controversial, but takes no position on the question of whether such an imposition actually occurred.

After examining the tensions and thereafter identifying six positions on the national interest, it is possible to assess the historical record to demonstrate how different types of interaction between groups based on the positions can affect policy outcomes. Policy ‘resilience’, that is, the longevity of particular policies and their ability to withstand political challenges, is used as a dependent variable in the chapters 5—7 to test the efficacy of various power arrangements between categories established in earlier chapters. Nevertheless, a normative analysis of policy content is not the goal of this thesis. Rather, the thesis explains how controversy and debate on foreign policy shapes views on the national interest and how interaction between those with different views structures policy formation.
Outline

The analysis in this thesis is built around four questions. What are the differing views on the national interest in Japan? How do differing views on the national interest within Japan affect the formation of foreign policy? Is there a general model which can help differentiate and explain views on the national interest, not only in Japanese discourse, but in all modern nation states? What relation, if any, would this model have to IR theory?

Chapters 1 and 2 deal with the last two of these questions first. Chapter 1 reviews the post-Second World War IR literature on Japanese foreign policy, focusing in particular on what prominent theorists and their critics have had to say about Japanese behaviour. It seems apparent that to convey any meaning about the nature of the state system, IR theory must make specific predictions about the foreign and security policies of particular states. Yet serious ‘structural’ IR scholars, particularly those who subscribe to material theories of interstate behaviour, have downplayed analysis of policymaking in their research. Rationality as it is understood by most structural theorists suggests that state reaction to external stimuli is all that matters in IR and that policy is either irrelevant or should be treated merely as something with which to test theories about the nature of the international system. For others, the internal processes and identities that give a particular state meaning in the eyes of its citizens drive its behaviour. However, the latter ‘unit-level’ theories are not particularly adept at dealing with shifts in state behaviour. To set the scene for chapter 2, the first chapter also identifies the basic assumptions and flaws inherent in each of the main paradigms of IR theory.

Chapter 2 establishes an original approach to examining national interests incorporating concepts closely connected to those main paradigms. The approach contends that basic assumptions of each of the three main paradigms of IR (namely realism, liberalism and [unit-level] constructivism) are reflections of domestic cleavages or foreign policy ‘tensions’ that arise from an orthodox understanding of the nation state. These tensions manifest themselves as competition between supporters and opponents of, respectively: bilateralism; administrative restrictions on the use of force; and national exceptionalism. The chapter constructs a model based on these tensions that can then be used to identify six different ‘positions on the national interest’ within discourse on
security policy. As is noted at the beginning of the chapter, accounts of Japanese foreign policy are replete with ‘categorical’ models that outline different ‘groups’ within national debates over such policy. However, these models are inductive: they simply take the groups as observed and explain the effect of group interaction on (only) Japanese policy. The argument presented here therefore contributes to existing literature by providing a deductive and therefore generalisable explanation for the existence of different positions on the national interest. It also uses more precisely defined categories of positions on the national interest than existing models.

Chapters 3 and 4 apply the model to the particular national case of Japan. Chapter 3 covers the period from 1945 to the revision of Japan’s security treaty with the United States in 1960. It focuses on the way security policy during this period infused the three tensions described in chapter 2 with meanings particular to Japan. Tensions over bilateralism, administrative restrictions on the use of force, and national exceptionalism were usually conducted within the contexts of, respectively: the US-Japan relationship; Japan’s war-renouncing constitution; and war memory. Where an individual stands in relation to these tensions determines how their position on the national interest is formed.

Chapter 4 goes into some detail describing each of the six positions on the national interest in the Japanese context. These positions (in no order of importance) are: 1) realism (genjitsushugi), which stresses the importance of international stability and maintenance of international balances of power; 2) pro-American nationalism (shinbei minzokushugi), which emphasises the importance of Japan’s prestige amongst ‘fellow’ great powers, particularly the United States; 3) pure nationalism (junsei minzokushugi), which emphasises the importance of the Japanese people’s pride in their own nation; 4) radical pacifism, which emphasises neutrality as a concept derived from Japan’s unique wartime experience; 5) progressivism (shinposhugi), which emphasises the importance of multilateral international cooperation and order and the role of Japan as a responsible global citizen; and 6) mercantilism (jūshōshugi) which emphasises the importance of internal stability for the purposes of economic growth. The labels for all of these terms originate from various descriptions of stances on security policy in Japanese sources.

Chapters 5–7 outline three distinct periods in Japanese foreign policymaking in light of different approaches taken to defence and security policy across time. They
assume that the main goal of groups and individuals representing positions on the national interest within a state is to establish their political dominance by capturing the government and institutionalising their own policies in light of how they view their national interests. However, even in government it is seldom possible to dominate the discourse on security policy. This means that dominant groups will sometimes search for stable compromises, giving rise to different political arrangements between groups across time.

It is therefore possible to test the effects of these different political arrangements on policy creation and resilience. Chapter 5 surveys policy implementation in Japan from 1960 to 1982, when mercantilism became the dominant foreign policy position after the controversy surrounding the ratification of the security treaty with the United States pushed pro-American nationalists out of power; chapter 6 examines the period from 1982 to 1995, when initial pro-American nationalist challenges to mainstream public policy discourse gave way to efforts by pro-American nationalists and progressives to establish peacekeeping as a central component of Japan’s foreign policy approach; and chapter 7 examines the period from 1995 to 2009, when initial cooperation between progressives and pro-American nationalists gave way to an aggressive pro-American nationalist agenda.

**Methodology**

The methodology employed in this thesis differs somewhat across its sections depending on their emphasis. The events described in chapter 3, for example, have already been well covered by other authors but the chapter does structure these events and uses primary sources – mostly documents from the allied occupation’s General Headquarters (GHQ) and the Japanese government of the time. However, because relevant qualitative data from Japan’s surrender after the Second World War to the security treaty revision in 1960 – and particularly from the allied occupation period of 1945 to 1952 – is already well known, the chapter relies on a fair amount of secondary source material.

On the other hand, chapter 4 adopts a broad and qualitative methodological approach to categorising and describing the positions on the national interest in Japan. It
identifies and classifies individuals active in the foreign policy debate according to their political statements and actions in the public sphere regarding the US-Japan security relationship, the constitution of Japan, and war memory. By assessing the opinions of those active in foreign and security policy debates on these issues, it is possible to ‘place’ these subjects within the framework of positions on the national interest.

How these individuals form their opinions, however, lies outside the scope of this study. People may advocate for a position because they genuinely believe in it, or they may claim to believe in it because doing so enhances their political standing. In both cases, they move the discourse forward by attempting to persuade their colleagues and constituents that their argument for what is ‘good’ for the state – their position on the national interest – is correct. Their position is deemed important here, not why they hold it.

The model therefore assumes that political statements and actions on the public record are relevant to an assessment of the six positions. However, the types of sources are not held to be consistently informative for an analysis of each of the six positions. For example, Japanese governments since the Second World War have been influenced by some positions more than others. Government politicians enjoy a platform from which to influence policy and views on the national interest, but they are more likely to do so by their actions and speeches rather than by published opinion pieces, although they author these as well. Conversely, proponents of positions not represented by the government are more likely to publish their work in opinion articles, newspapers, and even popular texts such as manga. As an example of how this affects the methodological approach here, in the area of war memory, official commemorations and apologies for the war are examined to define certain positions, while popular writings about the war are used to elucidate certain others. To fully explore the six positions, it is necessary to adopt a degree of flexibility and foster a comprehensive understanding of complex movements in Japanese society that straddles boundaries of strict positive science and empiricism, similar to what David Williams (1996, xxvi) calls in his book on research methods in Japanese studies ‘open political science’.

Moreover, while outlining the logic of the different positions on the national interest, chapter 4 does not offer a chronological narrative that outlines their historical
development. Groups and individuals may indeed change their minds about what they advocate as the national interest. However, because the model outlined above assumes that foreign policy tensions and the positions they define inherently flow from a static definition of the state, the positions are, for our purposes, static as well. While the details between time periods may be different, the model assumes that the broad themes and concerns that motivate, for example, pro-American nationalists today are roughly the same as those that motivated them in the 1960s and in the succeeding decades. There is therefore almost no need to pay attention to chronological context when assessing the basic arguments of individuals with a common position on the national interest.

In contrast, chapters 5–7 are arranged in (rough) chronological order. However, they are also not intended to present a straight ‘historical’ narrative about Japanese foreign policy. Rather they serve as case studies that show how different methods of foreign policymaking affect the nature and resilience of both governments and policy. ‘Policy resilience’ – the longevity of a policy and its ability to resist assertions that it should be changed – is a dependent variable in this study used to test the effectiveness of governance patterns, the independent variable that differs across the three periods. As noted below, the working hypothesis is that policymaking systems based on concession and accommodation between groups produce more resilient policy and sustainable government than those implemented by ‘strong leaders’ who pay little attention to the positions that others advocate.

Because the three final chapters deal with official government policy, however, the methodological approach used there is more selective that of the preceding chapters. Whereas chapter 4 allows for a large number of popular views to enter the analysis, chapters 5 – 7 focus on government reports, official statements and policies, most notably as they apply to the array of restrictions on the use of force that Japan has built up around its military. From time to time arguments in the public sphere to show reaction to official policy and the long term effect of policy are examined, but these examinations are tightly bound within the limited frame as defined by a particular policy initiative.
Terminology

*Positions on the national interest*

As already noted, this thesis assumes that objective national interests do not exist. It makes similar claims to constructivist arguments which acknowledge that the interests and behaviour they explain are themselves dependent on a subjective sense of identity. Nevertheless, constructivist scholarship normally allows for a much looser discussion of the roles and norms which constitute the identities of its agents than is the case here. The model used in this thesis argues that human individuals (the only locus of agency of which we can be certain) are bound to choose one of six ‘positions on the national interest’ when they advocate particular security policies. These positions are predetermined according to the model already outlined above and discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

*‘Policy resilience’ and ‘regulatory norms’*

The final three chapters of this thesis test the effectiveness of governing arrangements by focusing on the ‘resilience’ of the policies that those arrangements generate. As noted above, policy resilience refers to the ability of policies to withstand both the test of time and attempts to change them. It is something akin to the term ‘norms’ in unit-level constructivist analysis of state behaviour. Just as constructivists are interested in how norms become ‘institutionalised’, this thesis attempts to determine how policy becomes ‘resilient’.

However, this thesis avoids the use of the word ‘norms’ when it applies to policy, because it does not have the descriptive power to differentiate between more specific concepts. Constructivist scholars distinguish between ‘regulatory’ and ‘constitutive’ norms, the former of which can describe, among other things, informal cultural ‘rules’. However, it should be clear that in debates on the national interest the immediate goal of individuals is to create not just norms but *policy* – clear rules created specifically by governments and held to be binding on successive governments until rescinded. What
this thesis would define as a policy (e.g. Japan’s ban on overseas weapons sales), a position (e.g. radical pacifism), or the source of tension (e.g. bilateralism as manifested in the US-Japan alliance) have all been described as ‘norms’ elsewhere. Yet they are assumed to have distinct functions in this thesis.

Constitutive norms, which speak to notions of identity (the notion of Japan as a ‘pacifist state’, for example, or of the LDP as a ‘conservative’ party, and, implicitly, the roles that those two characterisations entail) are similar to the concept of a ‘position’ on the national interest. However, the model presented here determines positions on the national interest by reference to only three static tensions over policy. Most normative definitions of, say, pacifism or conservatism would find such a framework too restrictive. Therefore, any association between positions and constitutive norms in this sense is probably best avoided.

The existence and relevance of norms are not completely rejected in this study – indeed, the nation state itself is viewed as a ‘cluster of norms’ that gives rise to the three tensions, and thus drives the entire theoretical discussion. In that sense, the ontological standpoint of this thesis is ultimately constructivist. Also, the literature review in chapter 1 does discuss the use of norms in IR theory, and chapter 2 recognises a normative national narrative (see below). However, in the analytical chapters the term will be avoided where possible for the sake of clarity.

‘National identity’

A term which is used in this thesis, but with extreme caution, is ‘national identity’. The depiction of a nation as its local linguistic and artistic traditions, historical interpretations of nationhood and political culture all intertwined to make one organic whole militates against the notion of policy competition based on domestic difference. Advocates for the different positions on the national interest, particularly those who believe that policy should be influenced by conceptualisations of a unique national experience, often do argue that their position constitutes their nation’s ‘true’ national identity. In a Japanese context, those whom I have labelled herein as ‘pure nationalists’, for example, assert that the ‘progressive literati’ (shinpoteki bunkajin) as well as those I have labelled here
‘radical pacifists’ are ‘anti-Japan-ists’ (hannichi-ka) or ‘anti-Japan Japanese’ (hannichiteki nihonjin) (Tanizawa 1995, 14-56), implying that pure nationalism is the one position that ‘truly’ represents the Japanese. But when there are five other positions in the national discourse – including progressives and pacifists – with their own claim to represent what is good for the nation, such an assertion is unconvincing.

However, it is true that individuals dominant in policy debates do invoke narratives about general national tendencies. This thesis argues that they do so for utilitarian reasons, either because it makes their position more credible, or because they wish to downplay differences between their position and the position of a group with which, for practical reasons, they are attempting to reach some kind of accommodation. Repeated over time, these narratives do become institutionalised as a method for understanding what constitutes appropriate policy within a national context, and may outlast the political arrangements they were established to serve. At this point, the narrative begins to take on the same meaning as what many describe as national identity.

It is important, though, not to reify particular national identities. As is noted in chapter 1, analyses which centre on national identity as an explanation for the selection of policies are often at a loss to explain significant change in policy direction and generally invoke factors external to their approaches to deal with such change. Scholars of national identity tend to point out that national identity is often contested (Fowler and Lambert 2006, 26), but this is sometimes merely a convenient explanation to deal with domestic differences when such differences are raised. To have any real meaning, studies which invoke the notion of a contested national identity must also be able to acknowledge that citizens who disagree with dominant narratives about the role of the state actually have a chance at changing the mainstream narrative and institutionalising their own conceptualisation of national identity in its place. As noted below, this thesis regards national identity as considerably more unstable than most other approaches that use the term, and allows political shifts on a domestic level to explain change to a greater extent than those approaches.
Arguments

In addition to formulating an original model to examine positions on the national interest, this thesis makes three arguments about the formation of security policy in Japan, and by extension, in other states.

First, shifts in the way domestic groups arrange themselves are often a greater determinant of change in the overall direction of a state’s foreign policy than shifts that occur in the international system, or pressure from foreign states, or even foreign threats. In a Japanese context this statement should be fairly provocative, as numerous studies start with the very notion that Japan’s more active participation in multilateral overseas missions was the result of its failure, despite immense international pressure, to make a significant human commitment to the international coalition assembled to roll back Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. However, analyses which rely on events like the subsequent Gulf War or the end of the Cold War to emphasise ‘turning points’ or ‘crossroads’ in Japan’s domestic discourse on security fail to note that Japan had already embarked on a foreign policy course which may have eventually led to the same outcome.

While international events no doubt accentuate and accelerate policy processes, they are better seen as proximate causes – not the deep causes that drive the overall direction of foreign and security policy. Indeed, there have been numerous significant events in the international sphere – China’s testing of an atomic weapon in 1964; calls for peacekeeping contributions to Lebanon in the 1950s and to the Congo in the 1960s; and the Iran hostages crisis of 1979 and 1980, for example – where Japanese governments came under pressure to change their foreign policies. In these cases, they instead acted to strengthen the status quo. Certainly, requests from allies and the international community and strategic changes abroad have the tendency to stir domestic debate about a particular foreign policy issue. However, domestic political arrangements can channel this debate to induce change which cannot be predicted from a simple reading of international structural shifts. Indeed, debates at a domestic level about changes in international circumstances may even act to strengthen an existing policy agenda.

Second, because they are based on static tensions, none of the six different positions on the national interest can be mutually reconciled through rational debate. The
respective proponents of the six positions are all potential rivals attempting to establish a position of dominance within the political discourse in order to propound their preferred policies. However, individuals and groups can temporarily suppress their rivalry and even forge longstanding relationships of mutual compromise if their policy goals are partially met on an ongoing basis. When they do this, policymaking becomes a stable and repetitive process. Moreover, such compromise tends to preserve the dominant group’s position. As already noted, this is the point when the dominant group may craft a national narrative in order to downplay the differences between itself and the group or groups with which it is cooperating to maintain its dominant position. The longer that narrative holds, that is, the more successful the dominant group is at maintaining this regular pattern, the more the narrative will come to be seen as national identity.

Third, a dominant group that attempts to reconcile its position with lesser groups is more likely to create resilient policies and remain dominant longer than a group that after achieving dominance exhibits ‘strong leadership’ by implementing policy regardless of the concerns of others. While ‘strong leaders’ may be personally popular, their policies may well not outlast their period of political activity, particularly if they challenge long-standing national identity claims. Those who instead of ignoring national identity point out the narrative’s inconsistencies, reconcile some of their own beliefs about policy with its fundamental tenets and launch a campaign of persuasion specifically about the benefits of this ‘revised’ national identity are more likely to implement long-term, if somewhat incremental, change. Forthright leaders who ignore the longstanding mainstream narratives are less successful in the long run in establishing resilient policies. A considered approach to existing national narratives is more likely to change them.

Thus, in highlighting the importance of domestic tensions and the positions that they carve out within policy discourse, and explaining the effect this has on policy creation, the central argument in this thesis is that the mainstream theories we use to explain international politics are little more than the reflections of inherently irreconcilable normative assertions about foreign policy that arise from variant interpretations of the construction of the modern nation state itself. Before discussing these assertions, however, it is necessary to review how IR theory relates to the subject matter at hand.
Chapter 1: IR theory and Japanese state behaviour

For much of the last two decades, Japan has been a testing ground for International Relations (IR) theories. Its reputation as an economic power in the 1980s and early 1990s, its constitutionally mandated pacifism, its role as an alliance partner with the United States and public attitudes towards defence and security informed by the lessons of cataclysmic defeat in war have all combined to provide researchers with a rich case study that at times has acted contrary to what orthodox explanations of state behaviour have predicted. The challenge of analysing and predicting Japan’s position in the world has revealed weaknesses within each of the three major paradigms of IR theories, but less theoretical studies and work attempting to blend the paradigms have arguably had little success in convincing IR scholars that such eclectic and synthetic approaches can be generalised.

This chapter reviews how theorists working within each of the three main paradigms of IR scholarship have approached Japan, and how scholars of Japanese security have adapted those paradigms. Given that most of the serious theoretical work on IR is conducted in English, and usually in the United States, it is thus also a reflection on how the outside world, or scholarly American opinion, conceives of Japan’s international position. Thoughts on Japan do not arise in a vacuum, and thus the chapter pays particular attention to the historical development of the theories themselves. Moreover, within the context of each paradigm, this chapter introduces principles of theory construction important to the approach of this thesis as outlined in chapter 2.

Realism

‘Classical’ realism, the framework for understanding international politics introduced in the 1930s by such scholars as Hans Morgenthau as a challenge to Wilsonian liberal idealism of the previous decade, can be seen as correctly predicting that rising powers such as Japan and Germany would reject international institutions established after the First World War. That nation states would accept indefinitely the rule of a common sovereign authority is, after all, the most foreign notion to realist conceptualisations of international politics.
However, Japan did not hold much relevance for realist scholars and security analysts during the Cold War, after it was incorporated into the Western alliance. Realist literature at the time often consisted of cautionary interpretations of history and state behaviour intended to demonstrate how wise individual leadership and domestic institutions, as well as attention to the balance of power, could maintain order and stability (Lebow 2003, 258-261). Japan, which had adopted a low stance in foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s, seemingly had nothing to offer in this regard. During this time, policy analysts in the United States, informed by realist views on the world, were largely content with Japan’s role as an ally in their overall strategy of containing the Soviet Union. As long as Japan’s behaviour remained constant or it was not seen as a potential threat, either to American security or the stability of the world order, realists and security analysts in the United States and elsewhere had little to say about Japanese foreign policy (Katzenstein 2007, 1).

After the end of the Cold War, however, realists began to predict a more active role for Japan and its military in international politics, and some even entertained the idea that Japan would attempt to develop fully independent military capabilities in spite of its restraint in the decades following the Second World War. Kenneth M. Waltz made specific predictions about Japan in a 1993 article that ‘gained wide attention among experts in the field’ and was deemed highly likely to influence the thoughts of scholars, policymakers and bureaucrats (Kamiya 1995, 5, Waltz 1993). Indeed, Waltz’s argument on realist approaches to the international system after the Cold War, reiterated in 2000, was bound to generate interest (Waltz 2000). With his *Theory of International Politics* (1979), Waltz had established himself as a primary figure dedicated to promoting a ‘scientific’ turn in the study of IR focused on a new type of realism.

**Neo-realism: hard core and auxiliary hypotheses**

Using models of theory formulation developed for the natural sciences by Imre Lakatos, Waltz saw realism as a group of related theories – what Lakatos called a ‘scientific research program’, or, more commonly, a ‘paradigm’ – stemming from one or a few fundamental premises, or a ‘hard core’. The core assumptions of realism are usually held to stem from state sovereignty. Thus, states, as the primary actors in global politics, exist
in an anarchic system fraught with tension and incomplete information, in which conflict inevitably arises due to the lack of a common international authority to adjudicate disputes, prompting them to prioritise survival and seek security above all else.

Following Lakatos, varying realist theories of IR can be further differentiated by ‘a protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses’. While these hypotheses should not contradict or invalidate the preferences in the hard core, they should be guided by a ‘positive heuristic’, that is, they should be able to uncover and predict ‘novel facts’ that are ‘improbable or impossible in light of previous knowledge’ (Lakatos 1970, 118). If new theories are generated that do not predict novel facts, but simply protect the assumptions at the core of the research program in light of new knowledge that would otherwise contradict those assumptions, the program is held to be degenerative, and thus should be superseded by another (Lakatos 1970, 118, 132-134). Waltz and others believe that a parsimonious adherence to the hard core of realism with few auxiliary hypotheses constitutes superior theory construction.

‘Neo-realists’, such as Waltz, Robert Gilpin and John J. Mearsheimer have thus discarded hypotheses about human nature, the internal ordering of states, leadership ability or the yearning for prestige – which classical realists deem important – in explanations of state behaviour. The few auxiliary hypotheses that neo-realists do condone instead concern the nature of power and relative capabilities of states. Neo-realists generally believe that state power ‘refers simply to the military, economic, and technological capabilities of states’ (Gilpin 1981, 13), and that weaker states generally ‘balance’ against stronger or rising states in order to survive. Balancing consists either of building up internal capabilities or creating alliances with others to oppose a common threat (Waltz 1979, 116-128). Neo-realism holds that anarchy and the distribution of power between states are thus the chief organising principles of the international system.

**Japan and neo-realism**

Despite their focus on structure, however, neo-realists often make predictions about the behaviour of particular great powers through their assertion that states will balance rising or hegemonic powers. Neo-realists thus greeted the end of the Cold War with predictions that new great powers would rise to replace the Soviet Union and balance the
predominant power of the United States (Betts 1993-94, Layne 1993, Mearscheimer 2001). Many scholars pointed to Japan as a possible contender for the role of balancer (Vogel 1989), and Waltz even focused on Japan ‘as being by population and product the next [great power] in line’ (Waltz 1993, 55). To explain why Japan had not ‘emerged’ earlier, neo-realist analysis held that Japan’s post-war relationship with the United States, where the former depended on the latter for its security, had rendered Japan ‘semi-sovereign’ – curtailed in its ability to conduct foreign policy independently (Mearscheimer 2001, 382, Duffield, et al. 1999, 175). While the threat of the Soviet Union remained constant, Japan saw the relationship with the United States as worth the price of independence, because the American desire to contain the Soviets, in part by maintaining military bases on the Japanese archipelago, effectively guaranteed Japan’s defence throughout the Cold War.

However, neo-realists could point to a growing body of academic literature and opinion during the 1990s that was increasingly doubtful of US willingness to deter external – and particularly ‘partial’ – threats to Japan’s security (Kamiya 1995, 6). With no Soviet threat to deter, many scholars predicted a withdrawal or significant reduction of US forces from the Asia-Pacific, and indeed some American policy analysts implored the Clinton administration to bring exactly that about, questioning the strategic efficiency of US deployments abroad, and particularly in Japan (O’Hanlon 2001, Carpenter 2002). Moreover, Japanese suspicions about the depth of US commitment intensified in 1998, after what was perceived as the initially nonchalant American reaction to the undeclared North Korean launch of a test missile that passed over Japan (Sugawara 2000). Neo-realists therefore believed that Japan would ultimately see the benefits of an independent military posture that would enable it to protect its interests and provide a degree of certainty over questions of national security in light of waning commitments from its larger ally (Duffield, et al. 1999, 176).

In addition to securing Japan against threats that might arise due to a waning American presence, military independence would also enable Japan to resist potentially harmful US foreign policy decisions. According to neo-realists, America’s hegemonic position allowed it ‘to follow its fancy, it’s free to act on its whims. Since there are very minor, very weak external constraints, everything [in the international system] depends
on [US] internal politics’ (Waltz 2003). Neo-realists harshly criticised US interventions in international disputes and the expansion of NATO during the early 1990s as symptomatic of irresponsible use of American power by a liberal US administration (Waltz 2000, 18-27), and similarly, many prominent neo-realists castigated the Bush administration’s 2003 decision to wage war on Iraq (Mearsheimer and Walt 2003, Lehrman 2002). Some scholars believed that the careless use of American power coupled with a Japan beholden to its alliance partner for security would exacerbate the already heightened Japanese fear of entanglement in ‘American’ conflicts (Margerison 2003). Such a view framed the US-Japan alliance as a burden on Japan rather than merely a Cold War anachronism, and reinforced realist arguments that Japan would pursue a more independent military role.

Bilateral economic friction between Japan and the United States was also a sign for some neo-realists that Japan would seek independent military capabilities. During the 1980s, Japan’s ballooning trade surplus with the United States was a constant source of friction, while Japan’s companies effectively cornered world markets for certain products with military applications, such as memory chips. Moreover, American analysts believed that protectionist deals to allow Japanese companies to adapt US military aircraft when more efficient American options existed ‘had substantially enhanced Japanese commercial aviation capabilities at the expense of the United States’ (Friedman and Lebard 1991, 370). Americans viewed Japan’s economic power with suspicion, and even fear, at a time when Japan’s economy looked set to supersede their own. Before the effects of the Japanese economic crises of the 1990s were apparent, Waltz cited data projecting that Japan’s per capita GDP would equate to more than 150 percent that of the United States by 2010, and polls showing that ‘52 percent of Americans thought the economic power of Japan was a greater threat than the military power of the Soviet Union’ (Waltz 1993, 60). Waltz thus claimed that public opinion would force the US government to apply pressure on Japan to reform its protectionist trading practices. This in turn would incite a backlash in Japan and ‘internal inhibitions about becoming a great power [would likely] turn into public criticisms of the government for not taking its proper place in the world’ (Waltz 1993, 66). Furthermore, economic development would bring with it an increasing demand for resources and encourage the Japanese to expand
their financial interests overseas. Christopher Layne also noted that Japan’s increasing financial strength would therefore prompt it to ‘exploit advantageous technological, economic, and fiscal asymmetries to advance its strategic interests; and … become a much more assertive actor geopolitically’ (Layne 1993, 42).

Even if Japan were reluctant to counter American hegemony, neo-realists believed it was unlikely that other states would decline to do so. Japan’s sluggish and even negative economic growth during the 1990s and beyond forced neo-realist scholars to reconsider their predictions, and focus instead on China as the next inevitable great power. By 2000, for example, Waltz (2000, 32) believed that China would achieve such a status without any effort whatsoever, as long as its government retained adequate control and the nation remained unified. Due to its proximity, China’s emergence would have obvious consequences for Japan, which, still acting on the basis that it could not trust the US commitment to protect its interests, would act to ensure its ability to balance China on its own. In a neo-realist worldview, Japan does not have much of a choice: Whether it was to balance against a hegemonic United States after the 1990s or against a rising China in an unanticipated future, it had to pursue the development of a robust and independent military.

As well as robust conventional capabilities, realists have long predicted that Japan, having experienced firsthand the fruits of successful deterrence under the American nuclear umbrella during the Cold War, will need to develop a nuclear deterrent if it is to replace the American security guarantee with an independent military. Since the late 1970s realist scholars have predicted that Japan would move to acquire nuclear weapons, and such predictions gained increasing weight in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, Waltz (1993, 66-67) believed that the public criticism he identified would prompt Japan ultimately to do so. Many scholars now believe that Japan is already a ‘virtual’ nuclear power, maintaining stocks of weapons grade plutonium, originally imported from Europe and refined (Layne 1993, 38), so as to be easily converted for weapons use should the need for independent deterrence arise (Campbell and Sunohara 2004, 243). Japan’s Monju fast-breeder reactor produces an extremely pure weapons-grade plutonium by-product, thus potentially enabling Japan to produce smaller warheads for intercontinental ballistic and cruise missiles and reducing the testing required to ensure the warheads’
effectiveness. Meanwhile, some scholars see Japan’s ostensibly civilian H2 (from 2001, the H2A) Rocket program as a cover for the development of a delivery vehicle (Harrison 1996, 18-24).  

When interpreting international politics through the lens of a theory that at least until fairly recently has considered the future development of robust and independent Japanese military capabilities as given, neo-realists therefore have tended to interpret any military activity on the part of Japan as a step on the path to such robust militarisation. Deployments of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) abroad from 1992, albeit on peace and reconstruction missions, Japan’s apparent nuclear intentions and other military developments such as the Japanese government’s decision to participate in missile defence programs, are thus raised in realist discourse to show that Japan is emerging from its post-Second World War ‘semi-sovereign’ slumber (Atanassova-Cornelis 2005).

**Japan and critiques of neo-realism**

Despite their bold assumptions, however, many neo-realist arguments do not bear scrutiny, even by their own criteria of theoretical success. Foremost among these criteria is the positivist notion that theories of IR must be predictive to be useful. Neo-realist structural predictions, however, tend towards the ambiguous; the undetermined nature of neo-realism ensures it can ‘foresee’ any number of radically different occurrences in a post hoc fashion. While neo-realists would argue that their theory only claims to identify a range of possible outcomes, that range is so broad to cast doubt on its usefulness as a predictive theory. Also, for all that neo-realists claim that their theory is more valuable than alternatives because it generates simple and clearly testable hypotheses, this parsimony often actually renders neo-realism unfalsifiable, or at best, throws serious doubt on the ability to make predictions that are particularly enlightening about the international order. These criticisms can certainly be applied to the incorporation of Japan as a case study into neo-realist arguments.

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1 Litigation had kept the Monju reactor closed since a sodium leak caused a fire in the facility in 1995. However, a 2005 Supreme Court ruling allowed the plant to recommence operations following the improvement of safety measures. Monju was reopened in 2010. Japan’s other fast breeder reactor (Joyo) first reached criticality in 1977, increasing its output from 50MW to 75MW in 1979. In 1994 Joyo’s design was altered and the reactor no longer produces weapons-grade plutonium.
Firstly, many critics of neo-realism are unsatisfied with the generous timeframe neo-realists allow for their predictions’ fruition. Neo-realists do concede that, for example, cultural variables may explain a ‘lag between structural change and alterations in state behaviour’ (Duffield, et al. 1999, 166), but nevertheless that ‘realist theory is better at saying what will happen rather than when it will happen’ (Waltz 2000, 27). Ultimately, then, neo-realists believe that materialist structural imperatives will dictate state behaviour, even if they take some time. When asked in 1999 why Japan had not emerged as a great power at the end of the Cold War, Michael C. Desch, for example, noted that ‘viewed historically, strategic reorientations have taken far longer’ (Duffield, et al. 1999, 176), although he did not articulate when Japan would conform to realist prescriptions.

Other scholars have castigated realists for such an approach to prediction. Citing the political upheaval of the 1868 Meiji Restoration – Japan’s move towards modernization – and Japan’s subsequent colonial adventures as ‘a remarkable example of governmental response to European and American encroachment’, David C. Kang (2003, 63-64), for example, notes that Asian nations have reacted swiftly to external stimuli in the past. He implies that there is no reason that Japan should react any less swiftly to supposed structural imperatives at the end of the Cold War and concludes that ‘In the absence of a specific time-frame, the “just-wait” response is unfalsifiable’ (Kang 2003, 63). John S. Duffield also cites problems with ‘just wait’ theorising, viewing realist predictions of Japan’s emergence as a nuclear-armed great power as problematic, containing ‘no indication of just how long we must wait to be able to draw definite theoretical conclusions’. Even if realists claim their theory is accurate over long periods of time, this poses ‘serious questions about its utility’ (Duffield, et al. 1999, 159).

In addition to problems in determining when its predictions will occur, neo-realism faces severe limitations in determining what will happen. While neo-realist predictions state that Japan will seek and ultimately achieve great power status, as seen above, a neo-realist analysis based solely on power distribution cannot predict whether Japan will ‘bandwagon’ with China to balance against the United States or preserve its alliance with the United States and balance against China (Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, 112). In addition, neo-realism faces similar problems in predicting the behaviour of other states in
the Asia-Pacific. Is South Korea, for example, likely to balance against Japan’s regionally predominant naval forces or with Japan against China’s stronger ground forces? (Cha 2000, 111, Katzenstein and Okawara 2004, 112). At its core, and certainly in its Waltzian form, neo-realist is agnostic on such questions, and the inability to distinguish between balancing options leads critics to the conclusion that the broad neo-realist prediction that ‘states will balance’ raises questions over whether such ‘predictions’ are useful in anything but hindsight. As Katzenstein and Okawara (2004, 113) note, ‘realist theory points to omnipresent balancing, but tells us little about the direction of that balancing’.

If ‘omnipresent balancing’ is one of only a few criteria for theoretical progress, then neo-realist are free to modify their predictions about particular state behaviour easily over time, whilst remaining true to their forecasts about structure. Even though ‘strategic reorientations’ evolve slowly, it took less than a decade for Waltz to change his mind about the rise of Japan and posit China as the next challenger to the United States (Waltz 2003, 1993, 2000). Even if neo-realism proves accurate in predicting broad shifts in the structure of the international system, such under-specification does not tell us much about the behaviour of specific states. Waltz would likely accept such criticism, noting that systemic theories such as his can only identify a range of possible outcomes (Waltz 1979, 70). Such a counter argument might be acceptable if neo-realist confined themselves to making predictions about the general structure of the international system and stayed out of the business of predicting the behaviour of particular units. But as just shown, realists’ theoretical commitments lead them to make predictions about the behaviour of specific states that then must be adjusted when they fail to eventuate.

One must question the utility of neo-realism when its proponents abandon specific predictions in order to preserve the core assumptions of the theory, and this applies doubly to ‘hard cases’ like Japan that have had the economic wherewithal to expand their strategic reach, but have traditionally ‘chosen’ not to do so. Waltz might argue that he has solved this problem by pointing to the behaviour of ‘weak states’ under his theory. While his theory is focused on the behaviour of major powers, Waltz argues that weak states with fewer options will tend to bandwagon (Waltz 1979, 113). This, however, simply gives rise to a number of new questions, primarily concerning the definition of a weak state. Is Japan, with its large industrial capacity and its defence budget, which compared
to its GDP is small, but compared to total defence expenditure of other nations is ranked among the highest in the world, a weak state? Some analysts do not think so (J. M. Lind 2004). But even if it were, the question above remains the same. If Japan is a ‘weak state’, with whom will it bandwagon? And against whom will it balance?

Some reformulations of neo-realism that attempt to account for problems with balancing have resulted in interesting conclusions. Stephen Walt refined Waltzian notions of balancing by arguing that states balance not against power but against other states they view as threats (Walt 1987, 263-265). In doing so, however, he invokes the role of ideas rather than material capabilities as a significant hypothesis in his ‘realist’ framework. Japanese and American fears of an emergent China, for example, may well outweigh any suspicion the two allies harbour towards one another, no matter what their relative capabilities might be. Indeed, Waltz’s (1993, 60-66) references to opinion polls on American perceptions of Japan and his qualitative surveys of views within the Japanese bureaucracy seem to indicate that he has accepted threat perception and other ‘internal’ factors as, at the least, relevant testable variables, although he would probably claim they are more dependent on structural orientations than causes in themselves.

Nevertheless, determining what constitutes a ‘threat’ to a given state surely presupposes knowledge of how members of that state view others, and Walt thus concedes considerable ground to other theories that prioritise ideational factors rather than take the structure of the international system into account. While Walt’s auxiliary hypothesis does not directly contradict the main assumptions of realism, Jeffrey Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999, 36) argue that the construction of threat is hardly unique to realism and is a feature of almost all IR paradigms. Walt (1998, 43) certainly acknowledges that realism does not explain everything in international life, and that foreign policy practitioners should take constructivist and liberal approaches into account to explain international phenomena. He does however claim that ‘realism remains the most compelling general framework for understanding international relations’. This suggests that his thinking is in line with Desch and others discussed below, who see ideational theories as perhaps explaining time lags in rational predictions.

More seriously, perhaps, is that in the attempt to reconcile their theory with the empirical record, neo-realists often redefine the ‘nature’ of states within the international
system whose behaviour does not accord with neo-realist prescriptions. The ad hoc
classification of Japan as a ‘semi-sovereign power’ is an example of such a redefinition
that deserves careful attention. What is semi-sovereignty? David Williams (2006) quotes
Carl Schmitt’s formulation that the locus of a state’s sovereignty lies with that actor or
institution who would override constitutional restrictions in times of crisis to restore order.
Only such an actor can ensure that the constitutional framework, although violated, can
continue. According to Williams, only America has ‘will and the might to ward off’ and
punish an attack on Japan from, for example, North Korea. In the event of such an attack
then, ‘attention would focus on Japan’s true sovereign: the American president’ (54).
Indeed, in Japan’s case, for Williams, ‘the whole constitutional business is a fantastic
exercise in total trust of the hegemon’. Nevertheless, he notes that semi-sovereignty
explains Japanese similarity to other states in the system, not difference: ‘Hobbes called it
the “Leviathan”. Today we call it “American Empire”. Who is to say that only the
Japanese have yielded to it?’ (60).

Well, the structural realist for one. Williams, working outside the realist research
program, has the luxury of pondering the implications of semi-sovereignty, and it is a
concept that other practitioners in the field of IR, foreign policy and strategy have
adapted to their own explanations (Katzenstein 1987, Selden 1997, 312, Ikenberry 2006,
96-99, Lind 2006, 114). But this the neo-realist must not do, as it violates hard core
assumptions about sovereignty. Under the usual neo-realist conceptions of the
international system, a political entity is either a state defined by its sovereign authority,
or it is something else, and therefore merely peripheral to calculations of the power
balance. Indeed, in its original international law context, semi-sovereignty was
synonymous with dependency or foreign rule (Davis 1898, 32), and this should also be
the case for theories derived from the realist hard core. If Japan is not defined by
sovereignty, then it is not a state according to realists, who should thus barely bother with
its existence at all.

This might explain neo-realist neglect of Japan for much of the Cold War.
However, simply defining Japan during this period as semi-sovereign merely invites
obvious questions and comparisons. First, even before the emergence of the American
hegemony that Williams describes, Japan was no more or less semi-sovereign than other
aligned states that relied on the great powers for their protection. Japan hosted US military bases in exchange for security guarantees, but so did many other nations. Despite Japanese anti-nuclear policies, the United States almost certainly stored nuclear weapons within Japanese territory and transferred nuclear weapons through Japanese waters (Morrison 1985, 23), but it engaged in similar activities in the territory of other allied nations with similar policies (Kristensen 1992). Japan’s ruling party was propped up by funds supplied by the US Central Intelligence Agency (C. Johnson 1995, Japan Times 20 July 2006), but so were conservative and anti-communist parties elsewhere (Washington Times 17 September 2009, Hedley 2007, 125). With one minor exception, Japan did not send its forces overseas to maintain its influence or uphold the international order during the Cold War, but often overlooked is the fact that this type of restraint was typical of the majority of the world’s nation states (Bukh 2007, 11). Labelling Japan semi-sovereign on the basis of its Cold War security dependence on the United States thus tars the entire Western alliance, not to mention the satellite states of the Soviet Union, somewhat more justifiably, with the same brush. However, neo-realists, and others who seek to test neo-realist theory, only use the term in reference to Japan and Germany during the Cold War (Deudney and Ikenberry 1999, 125, Mearscheimer 2001, 382).

Second, there is plenty of historical evidence to show that much of Japan’s foreign policy was formulated more at the domestic level than as a response to US pressure. From 1960, the Ikeda government consciously chose to adopt a low stance (teishisei) internationally while it concentrated on policies aimed to double the income of its citizens, but this was a choice that Japan made while the United States was urging it to increase its military budget, so as to take up more of the military burden that Soviet containment entailed. Indeed, the only time Japan did send forces abroad during the Cold War was when it deployed 20 minesweepers off the Korean peninsula in 1950 (Funabashi 1997, 454). This occurred when Japan was under the occupation of the United States, and had therefore technically lost its sovereignty. After the occupation, with its sovereignty restored, Japan could and did resist American entreaties to spend more on

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2 This also stands as the only time after the Second World War that a Japanese serviceman has been killed in an overseas theatre. Nakatani Sakatarō, a cook, died when one of the ships hit a mine. Eighteen others were injured in the explosion. The incident was kept secret and only in 1979 was Nakatani decorated posthumously (Funabashi 1997, 454).
defence. The notion of semi-sovereignty does not fit well with a nation that can seemingly determine its own course on issues where decision makers in Washington, DC – apparently the ‘real’ locus of sovereignty in Japan’s case – disagree.

Indeed, other arguments put forward by some realists, even those committed to the hypothesis of Japan’s semi-sovereignty give the impression that Japan may not be as vulnerable – and therefore presumably not as dependent on American power – as is often assumed. Mearschheimer, who uses semi-sovereignty to explain Japanese passivity in the international system (2001, 382), also incorporates into his neo-realist theory what he calls ‘the stopping power of water’; an auxiliary hypothesis which claims that insular states are ‘much less vulnerable to invasion than continental states’ (2001, 126-128). To demonstrate his point, Mearschheimer focuses on the resilience of Britain and the United States to invasion. While he does not explore the implications for Japan of this hypothesis too deeply, Mearschheimer does note that Japan is another obvious example of an insular state (126). Thus, Japan on one hand is presumably almost impenetrable to foreign threats, and yet on the other was so dependent on the United States to provide for its defence for half a century that it was relegated to a semi-sovereign status. It is difficult to see how Mearschheimer would address this contradiction.

And finally, Kang notes that labelling the second largest economy in the world ‘semi-sovereign’ does not excuse realists from explaining why, in a world where state action is largely determined by materialist imperatives, such an economic power would choose not to emerge as a militarily great power once economic development had gathered apace (Kang 2003, 18-19). By the late 1960s Japan had both the material power to greatly enlarge its conventional military itself or to purchase materiel from elsewhere. By the same time it had developed the resources available to produce nuclear warheads, which raises questions as to why Japan would choose to remain only a ‘virtual’ nuclear power. In fact, from the 1970s the Japanese government did augment its conventional forces considerably, but while doing so it worked in close consultation with the United States, and it took great pains to ensure that its force structure remained that of a non-belligerent defensive state. At the same time the Japanese government placed clear limits on defence spending. Certainly Japan has constitutional restrictions on the use of force, but given that realists believe that all states, as ‘like units’, are supposed to strive for
independence and the wherewithal to defend the national interest, they must ask themselves why Japan, as a nation state capable of independent action, tolerated such a situation for so long, and thus why there has not already been a greater domestic call for constitutional revision. This again suggests that factors other than pure power politics tempered Japanese thinking on foreign policy during and after the Cold War, despite the neo-realist assumption that the anarchical structure of the international system would encourage power maximisation. Japan is therefore only ‘semi-sovereign’ insofar as it exercised its sovereign ‘choice’ to be so, and it is up to analysts of its foreign policy to explain why this is so.

As such, the advantages that neo-realism claims to offer analysis of the international system, and thus the behaviour of state actors within that system, are unsatisfying. Parsimony, supposedly neo-realism’s greatest strength, is actually its biggest weakness. Neo-realism’s inability to offer specific predictions and its ability to offer a range of predictions so wide as to prove unfalsifiable, make a mockery of its proponents’ insistence in its standing as a group of ‘scientific’ theories. Indeed, as we have seen with their predictions about Japan, neo-realist emphasis on parsimony leads to an exaggeration of ‘trends’ like economic growth that are not necessarily assured. Neo-realist predictions of a rising Japan were dashed by the end of the 1990s. Moreover, neo-realists did not predict what other scholars actually did: that it would be during a period of poor national economic performance during the late 1990s and early 2000s that Japanese leaders would begin to pay more attention to their nation’s defence posture. As it stands, neo-realism is not a particularly useful theory for research on national behaviour. And to supplement its failings with ad hoc hypotheses about the special nature of stand-out states renders it degenerative, and suggests the need to look elsewhere.

**Liberalism**

**Liberalism: Hard core and auxiliary hypotheses**

Despite realism’s traditional place as the dominant theory of IR, Japan has, since the end of the Second World War, more often been analysed from within the liberal paradigm. The hard core assumption of liberalism is that sustained cooperation, and therefore peace,
is possible between states. Liberals also hold that peace arises from the mutually beneficial activities of free human agents and that therefore ‘Promoting freedom will produce peace’ (Doyle 1986, 1152). Liberal theories also emphasise the rule of law on both domestic and international levels and the utility of institutions. Unlike realism, liberalism assumes that anarchy in the international system can be ‘managed’ according to mutually established rules between states.

The liberal paradigm can be further differentiated by auxiliary hypotheses. Robert Keohane (1992) has identified three broad strands of the liberal paradigm: 1) republican (or democratic) liberalism, which argues that states with a democratically elected legislature balancing the executive are more peaceful, or at least are more peaceful towards other democratic republics; 2) commercial liberalism, which argues that commercial exchange and interdependence can increase to a point where the cost for a state and individuals in going to war outweighs the benefits that are accrued from free exchange; and 3) regulatory liberalism, where states understand the importance of international institutions in regulating the international system and settle disputes without conflict. These three ‘theories’ of liberalism are seen as complementary: indeed Immanuel Kant’s early formulation of liberal theory saw regulatory and commercial liberalism and the peace that they would ensure as the natural outgrowth of free republics (Kant 2003, 12-15).

**Japan and liberal modernisation theory**

During the Cold War, decolonisation and the emergence of Third World nations as potentially destabilising elements in US containment strategy led American strategic planners to focus on the development of nations beyond their borders. In the absence of a body of literature to address particular problems within each of these newly relevant societies, American planners turned to ‘modernisation theory’, a generalising approach designed to transform ‘traditional’ societies into modern nation states, the boundaries of which were assumed to be coterminous (Tipps 1973). While there were a number of different approaches to modernisation theory, they were united by a common thread: modernisation was ‘a type of social change which is both transformational in its impact and progressive in its effects’ (Tipps 1973, 202). As noted by Inayatullah and Blaney
(2004) modernisation theory was thus the manifestation in policy terms of democratic liberalism. The traditional societies of East Asia and elsewhere could be industrialised and transformed into modern nation states, where the political and economic organising principles would be democracy and liberal international trade. If international liberalism provided the structural basis by which state and non-state actors would give rise to cooperative and perpetual peace, modernisation theory was the logical overlapping policy process by which this would be achieved.

Early views on Japanese development corresponded roughly with the liberal modernisers’ thesis. Although the early phase of the post-war Allied Occupation of Japan occurred before modernisation theory captured imaginations in the foreign policy community in Washington during the 1950s and 1960s, it was nevertheless characterised by the attempts of General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan and particularly the staff of his Government Section (GS) to remake the Japanese nation as a model of democracy. These efforts are described in detail in chapter 3 and there is no need to do so here, save to say that GS officers in the early phase on the occupation were ‘New Dealers’, driven by liberal ideology and a mission to reform Japan. Using comparative methodologies, a hallmark of modernisation theory, the GS staff also penned a new constitution for Japan identifying and working into the text a number of fundamental rights common to most liberal constitutions overseas, as well as a number of rights, such as gender equality, which the occupiers believed represented the best liberal ‘traditions’. The centrepiece of the document was Article 9, which banned the threat and use of force in international disputes and the maintenance of armed forces.

However, with tensions between the Soviet Union and the United States rising, and with the prospect that China could be ‘lost’ to communism becoming very real from 1948, conservatives in the United States became increasingly convinced that the occupation’s liberal reforms had been the work of “MacArthur’s “radical reformers” and “crackpots”… attempting to destroy big business in Japan and impose a form of Socialism on the country’ (Takemae 2002, 337-339). With industrial action rife, Japan’s economy was faltering just as American policymakers were urging that the Soviet Union be ‘contained’ by the nations on its periphery friendly to the United States. Internally, industrial conflict would need to be controlled by force. As MacArthur lost much of the
control over occupation policy that he had established in the early phase of the occupation, visiting American officials implemented the basic tenets of a free-market economy – monetary control of inflation and fiscal conservatism to balance the national budget.

The plan for the region, meanwhile, was that an economically and, if possible, militarily strong Japan was needed to serve as a source of investment, an importer of raw materials and an exporter of light mechanical goods for the nations of South East Asia, which themselves would be transformed into modern states capable of resisting the flow of communism. From an American perspective, an incipient sense of realism tinged strategies to rebuild Japan’s economic strength as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. American officials proclaimed that they had to get ‘Japan back into… old Co-prosperity Sphere’. US State Department Director of Policy Planning George Kennan noted that there was the problem of how the Japanese were ‘going to get along unless they again re-open some sort of Empire to the South’ (Schaller 1997, 20). However, despite the language of empire, Japanese leadership in the region was to be a purely commercial enterprise. Japan’s favoured method of ensuring its influence and regional stability was the establishment of a regional partnership of states constructed around a liberal internationalist trade and investment policy.

After the occupation, modernisation theory continued to be promoted vigorously in Japan, most notably, and somewhat didactically, by Edwin O. Reischauer, a leading light in post-war American scholarship on Japan and US ambassador in Tokyo from 1961-1966. As Roger H. Brown (2005, 121) notes, the degree to which Japan had achieved the ‘goal’ of resembling the United States was a central feature of the ‘dialogue’ that Reischauer attempted to establish with Japan after riots in Tokyo accompanied the ratification of a renegotiated security treaty with the United States. This ‘dialogue’ was motivated by Reischauer’s belief that in Japan there was a ‘crying need for people to have our ideology’ (Brown 2005, 109), and that Japanese discussion of its place in the world was tainted by the ideology of often Marxist academics who were critical of Japan’s relations with the United States, but who did not live in the world of ‘ordinary practical people’ (Reischauer and Hayashi 1961, 208, Brown 2005, 123). According to Takeshi Matsuda (2007, 249-250), Reischauer’s efforts to change Japanese thinking were
accompanied by a massive cultural offensive on the part of the US government and philanthropic organisations, and included generous grants and scholarships that created an academic dependency on American institutions. Most Japanese academics in the field of American studies either supported the US embassy in its activities in Japan or refrained from ‘criticizing U.S. foreign policy even if they did not necessarily agree with it’ (Matsuda 2007, 250). Similarly, apart from ‘left-wing critics who viewed modernization theory as mere ideological cover for American imperialism, most other intellectuals either adopted an uneasy stance towards its possible utility or embraced it’ (Brown 2005, 120).

Meanwhile, Reischauer’s approach to Japanese modernisation, which was reiterated in Western academic circles by figures such as Marius Jansen, John W. Hall and Ronald Dore, as well as Reischauer himself, portrayed Japan’s own historical experience as conducive to convergence towards the international modern ideal. Japan was the first Asian state to modernise, and as such could serve as a model to the decolonised nations of Asia as to how to conduct their own projects of modernisation. Similar to MacArthur’s well-intentioned, but extremely patronising, comments to Congress in 1951 that according to the ‘standards of modern civilisation’, Japan was ‘like a boy of twelve as compared to our development of 45 years’ (U.S. Congress, Senate 1951, 312), Reischauer in particular continued to stress that Japan’s maturity as a nation state needed to be measured against the West, and preferably the United States. In his later academic writings, he had no doubt, however, that the Japanese would be up to the task of successfully assimilating themselves into the liberal international (Western) world order, given that their own, unique history pointed in that direction anyway (1977, 408-421).

Within this post-war narrative that stressed positive aspects of Japan’s earlier modernisation from the 1860s onwards, ‘when it came to the period of 1931 to 1945, the years of authoritarianism and war, there was a curious void’ (Garon 1994, 348). A thin treatment of how authoritarianism related to post-war Japanese power structures permeated even works which treated the 1930s and early 1940s in greater detail. The war was a ‘dark valley’, where
liberal-minded men in politics, the services, education, literature and, art found themselves, after 1931, treading a path increasingly beset with dangers from the twin forces of reaction and revolution, expressed in violence none the less more menacing for being intermittent and on occasion haphazard. This violence had two aspects – unchecked aggression abroad and murderous conspiracy at home (Storry 1970, 182).

Because liberals saw little in Japan’s period of authoritarianism that resembled their conceptions of linear societal development, they externalized it, claiming that it was the fault of immature domestic institutions that were ill-suited to international turbulence. According to Reischauer (1970, 183-184), Japan’s wartime experience was not a consequence of its modernisation, but ‘a much broader but inchoate reaction to the liberal trends of the twenties’ stirred up by a nationalist minority. Japan’s early modern advances from the late 19th century to the 1920s, while laudable, did not result in a political system either flexible or strong enough to withstand the irrational resistance that the onset of progress itself provoked. What was needed was a continuation and deepening of Japan’s modernisation project and more ‘liberal minded men in politics’ to prevent the recurrence of such temporary setbacks as the Second World War.

Japan and critiques of modernization theory

With the post-Vietnam crisis of confidence in the United States, and the emergence of anti-democratic strongmen at the helm of developing Asian, African and South American economies, modernisation theory saw its critics grow during the 1970s (Huntingdon 2006, 5). Indeed, critiques of the theory are many. Its mechanistic view of the world, for example, opens up a paradox: modernisation theory, while ‘presuming human commonality, resorts also to the claim that commonality must be created’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 95). The preference for turning states into rational, liberal ‘like units’ which progress towards a ‘world culture’ or ‘great singular event’ (Inayatullah and Blaney 2004, 99) means that social and cultural difference is posited as the enemy of a future, peaceful world order and must be either displaced by enlightened modern rationalism or explained away to bring tradition in line with modern rationality upon which all states should eventually converge. Critical scholars claim that modernisation theory is an urge by modern societies to replicate their own identity elsewhere (Gilman
2003, 12), a charge that some modernisation and development theorists have as good as acknowledged (Binder 1971, 12).

Consequent to this growing criticism, Japan’s wartime history began to be rewritten as scholars focused on the ‘modern’ origins of war. Despite Japanese economic success and relative democratic stability, scholars of Japan began to re-examine the links between modernisation, liberal democratic society and peace, focusing on the period of war that their academic predecessors had explained as ‘separate’ from modern Japanese experience. From the mid-1970s, critical historians were first to take up the challenge of re-examining Japan in light of the problems of modernisation theory. John W. Dower (1975) in particular provided a devastating critique of modernisation theory as it applied to Japan, redefining the theory as a powerful ideological Cold War weapon rather than a statement about empirical reality. Realists like George Kennen, who had seen economic integration as part of a Cold War containment strategy, would hardly have disagreed.

America’s trade deficits, rising inflation, and the seeming threat of economic competition from Japan during the 1980s prompted a range of US, European and Australian observers to reconsider Japan’s contemporary foreign and domestic policy in different ways. This new school of thought, which drew its inspiration from Chalmers Johnson – most notably his seminal work MITI and the Japanese Miracle (1982) – rejected the assumptions of liberal modernisation theory outright, positing that while the adoption of an American-style open economy might be a possible option for Japanese governments, there was nothing inherently natural about a world where ‘the U.S. must always serve as Japan’s mentor, or that the American-style system is the ideal toward which the rest of the world must’ progress. Indeed, the problem, according to the revisionists, of the West’s approach to Japan, ‘most pronounced in America, is that its policies have been based on the inaccurate (and condescending) assumption that Japan will inevitably “evolve” toward a consumer-driven, individualist system much like America’s’ (Fallows, et al. 1990). Seizing on the paucity of policy research in the academic field of Japanese studies, the revisionists sought to explain Japanese economic success in terms of its difference to the United States, rather than as a mission to strive towards Western norms of modernity.
Revisionists held that instead of the open economy that the modernisers claimed typified Japan, the political, bureaucratic and business elites in Tokyo, using pre-war models of economic organisation, had constructed a highly organised and nationally guided economic machine that was taking advantage of low-cost capital provided by the government and protection in the domestic market to develop indigenous industries. Japan’s companies would then cooperate, using such mechanisms as predatory pricing arrangements, to compete vigorously with American and other manufacturers for share in markets overseas. If this was truly how the Japanese economy was organised, then it was ‘by nature adversarial and predatory. The problem was that the unrestrained growth of the Japanese economy would wreck the liberal world trading order and make in its wake the US security alliance untenable’ (Horvat 2000, 6). Many revisionists thus saw Japanese economic practices as a potentially destabilising force in international politics, at odds with the predictions of liberalism.

During the 1980s, revisionism offered one of the few novel and critical perspectives on Japanese foreign policy at a time when policymakers in Washington and the American media harboured grave concerns about their nation’s trade deficit with Japan and the global position of the United States in general. As a result, the differences between Japanese and American trade policy noted by the revisionists were interpreted in a sinister light. When it came to bilateral relations, negative images of Japan certainly dominated the American media during the 1980s and early 1990s. News stories spoke of Japanese acquisitions in the United States as though they were crimes, and images of feudalism and war were popular metaphors used to describe Japanese trade practices. According to one anthropologist working for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time, the ‘entire American imagery of Japan is a metaphor that links World War II, specifically Pearl Harbor to present-day [Japanese] commerce’ (Horvat 2000, 3). On defence policy, Japan was constantly accused of taking a ‘free ride’ on US beneficence, by refusing to spend more on its own defence while American troops protected Japan under bilateral defence arrangements.

The late 1980s and early 1990s marked a low point in the post-war US-Japan relationship, and revisionism was often blamed for aggravating, or even causing, friction between the two nations. This blame was, perhaps, not undeserved in some cases.
Because scholars of politics and foreign policy had paid scant attention to Japan until that
time, it was hard to distinguish careful experts with extensive experience observing the
Japanese political machine from commentators who had picked up on Japan because it
was the newest ‘big thing’. The quality of critical writings on Japanese policy during this
time varied greatly. Poor research that essentialised ‘Japan’ as a ‘mysterious “System”’
with no locus of real responsibility was often placed in the same category as the
thoughtful, nuanced and critical accounts distinguishing policy debates from other
aspects of life in Japan (Cumings 1999, 66-69). Interestingly, this American audience’s
inability to distinguish between works of quality and less reliable popular pieces on Japan
was partly the result of a backfired exercise by employees of lobbying institutions in the
United States with links to the Japanese government who ‘aimed to discredit those most
effective critics by lumping them together with the people who weren’t informed and
who as critics were an embarrassment to everybody else’ (Judis 1992, 39).³

Despite the sensitivity of the Japanese government to their activities, serious
revisionist scholars and journalists did not necessarily label ‘Japan’s economic approach’
as ““fair” or unfair” (Fallows, et al. 1990), but highlighted significant differences in
Japanese political and economic organisation, and suggested that the United States and
liberal analysts of foreign policy needed to take these differences into account when
considering US relations with Japan:

The ones being ‘tough’ and ‘arrogant’ toward Japan are not revisionists but those
who believe Japan can be forced to abandon economic structures that have served
it very well. The inexorable logic of current negotiating policy is what leads the
United States and Europe toward Japan-bashing, since it commits outsiders to
demand repeatedly that Japan change its ways (Fallows, et al. 1990).

Other scholars, while they rejected modernisation theory, also saw revisionism,
particularly the variant that emphasised that the entire economy was under the control of
a non-responsive web of relationships that had no locus of responsibility, as peculiarly

³ The quote is from Robert C. Angel, who was a lobbyist for a Japanese government think-tank in
Washington during the rise of revisionism. In an attempt to frame those who criticised Japan as merely
prejudiced, Angel also searched for a term similar to ‘anti-Semitism’, which he saw as a useful rhetorical
device used by the pro-Israel lobby in Washington. Angel, according to his own account, coined the term
‘Japan bashing’, which was picked up by the Japanese media, and then spread into English from there
(Judis 1992).
simplistic (Cumings 1999, 66-69). Establishing a synthesis between the liberal or modernist thesis and the revisionist antithesis, some authors argued that Japanese economic thought was neither moving towards supposedly ‘universalist’ notions of the free market, nor exclusively following a ‘plan-rational’ model. The approach of the Japanese government was instead to apply a range of approaches at different times in different sectors and among different firms. Japan engaged in ‘strategic pragmatism’ utilising ‘a wider spectrum of economic theories competing with each other in Western dogmatic discourse than did leading Western economies, and more particularly the US, Germany and France’ (M. Schmiegelow 2003, 79). Moreover, the bureaucratic elites that existed in Japan and that, according to revisionists, guided the economy towards the long-term attainment of established national goals were present in European nations as well. Japan was not necessarily uniquely predatory in this sense, nor were state prescriptions coercive. The state led a nevertheless autonomous private sector by providing guidance and incentives, rather than regulation.

According to this view, the mix of economic models reflecting Japan’s own strategic priorities might well be unique, but the specific application of each model was not. By the 1980s, Washington was preaching – if not always following its own advice – that reliance on the free market always resulted in equitable solutions to economic problems. For those who saw theoretical pluralism where others saw a Japanese ‘system’, US economic prescriptions represented the dogmatic rigidity of a single theory. According to these pluralists, the task of scholars after the collapse of the Japanese economy from 1989 should have been to identify the specific policies and mix thereof that brought about the most damage, in order to learn specific lessons. It should not have been to re-evaluate and critique a protectionist and uniquely Japanese system that failed. Indeed, before the crash, those who saw the Japanese economy in ‘eclectic’ terms thought that the emulation of its successes in specific areas

by an increasing number of non-Japanese international actors, superpowers included, will broaden the distribution of economic and technological resources, increase the level of global welfare, and also change the level of strategic, if not necessarily military, components of power in the international system’ (Schmiegelow and Schmiegelow 1990, 588).
The notion that Japan adopted a broad range of responses to economic and other policy problems led scholars such as Kent Calder (1998) to the conclusion that Japan was a ‘reactive’ state. The vertical arrangement of ministries, each with their own range of solutions to problems, meant that there were no political actors with the authority to formulate overall state strategy. While strategic pragmatism might well have been a successful strategy in meeting narrowly defined goals, the substitution of a coherent set of values to guide policy at the national level with an eclectic mix of policy responses meant that policy change could only come as the result of external pressure. Certainly the dominance of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) allowed for some state-level coordination of industrial policy (Calder 1998, 528-529), but its power over the Japan Defence Agency led to a reactive defence policy that took second place to economic considerations. A multi-member district electoral system also made the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), in power almost exclusively from 1955, extremely sensitive to regional interests, and encouraged an extreme form of pragmatism, also to the detriment of ‘national’ issues that normally entailed strategic planning, such as defence and foreign affairs (Calder 1998, 531). The successful stewardship of the Japanese economy by ministries and the LDP thus discouraged an emphasis on defence. Japan might have been a model for smaller states to emulate, but hardly presented a viable model for nations with a more proactive foreign policy, such as the United States or France. The notion of Japan as a reactive state thus is a rejection of universal models, both in that there was little evidence that Japan was converging towards such a ‘natural’ system, and that it could be not held to be a universal model in its own right.

**Neo- and commercial liberalism and their critiques in a Japanese context**

These critiques of liberalism applied to Japan, however, emerged at a time when the theoretical understandings of liberalism in IR in general were undergoing a significant revision. Until the 1980s, most liberals assumed that the world remained one underpinned by age-old security dilemmas that the spread of universal liberal norms could help alleviate, and eventually eliminate. In contrast, and partly in response to the emergence of Waltz’s new ‘structural’ theory, liberal IR theorists attempted to develop a theory that was just as parsimonious, and therefore supposedly as powerful, as neo-realism in
generating predictions about global currents. These ‘neo-liberals’ claimed that peace was not only the result of a diffusion of liberal norms overseen by liberal institutions, but the manifestation of self-interest in a world where the utility of military power was increasingly limited. Even before Waltz declared the need for parsimony, Keohane and Nye (1977) had offered a structural explanation based on the liberal assumption that non-state linkages and the complexity of transnational relationships highly circumscribed the utility of military power. As per realist ontological assumptions, states such as Germany and Japan were self-interested, but nevertheless managed to use a broad array of non-military methods to achieve their goals in a complex international environment. Under this neo-liberal model, states could not only achieve their goals while restricting the use of external force, they would indeed need to learn how to do so in order to thrive.

Japan played a significant role in Richard Rosecrance’s The Rise of the Trading State (1987), which argued that realism held explanatory power until the end of the Second World War, but that the logic of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War rendered war between the major powers unthinkable. Rosecrance singled out Japan as a nation ahead of others in understanding that ‘if nuclear war can be ruled out, economic processes will progressively act to reshape the international world’ (Rosecrance 1987, 218). The United States and the Soviet Union would do the heavy lifting militarily by maintaining their nuclear arsenals, but the balance of power would presumably be stable. Traditional concepts of power politics would cease to have any explanatory power in most forms of state interaction and commercial liberalism would be more useful in explaining events in the sphere of international politics. As the world’s nations increasingly understood the lesson that territorial expansion was too costly in the post-Second World War international environment, ‘one would have reached the “Japanese period” in world politics…’ (Rosecrance 1987, 20).

This thesis was not without its problems. According to Rosecrance, Japanese investment in American and European ventures from the 1970s gave other nations some stake in the Japanese economy, but barriers to foreign investment meant that ‘few multinationals have a major commitment to the Japanese market’ (Rosecrance 1987, 148). Economic policymakers in Washington and European capitals were therefore unconcerned with economic fluctuations in Tokyo: ‘In her own self interest, Japan will
almost certainly have to open her capital market and economy to foreign penetration if she wishes to enjoy corresponding access to economies of other nations’ (Rosecrance 1987, 148). With his emphasis on the need for similarity across economies, Rosecrance had thus reached a similar conclusion to the modernisation theorists. However, it was a conclusion that required him to contradict his own terminological preferences. That is, it is difficult to see why the arrival of a “Japanese period” in world politics would require Japan to compromise its own long-standing economic policies – presumably part of what it meant to be Japan – in order to fall in line behind a rational ordering of the global economy.

Rosecrance’s theory also required the important caveat that a world system working on neo-liberal terms was one that would be undergirded by awesome and indiscriminate military power in the hands of a few relatively responsible and eternally balanced superpowers. According to this view, Japan’s thriving economy was the product of its reliance on American determination to guarantee the global peace, and more specifically, Japanese security. This was an implicit recognition that the complaints of some policymakers in the United States about Japan’s free riding were justified.

However, while the notion that Japan has taken a ‘free’ or even a ‘cheap’ ride on US military arrangements has been a powerful rhetorical device for those who would like to see Japan spend more on its military, it is questionable as an interpretation of Japanese strategy. Johnson (1982, 15-17) has argued convincingly that proponents of the free-ride thesis have either failed to prove their case or stated it too simplistically. First, proponents of the thesis argue that Japan’s lack of a large military spending to GDP ratio contributed greatly to Japan’s growth as an economic power. Yet, during the period of high-speed growth, precisely the period when Japan was being accused of its free ride, and when capital formation exceeded 30 per cent of GDP, higher defence expenditures would have had negligible effects on growth, as evidenced by South Korean and Taiwanese defence expenditures. Second, while Japan did have ready access to an open export market in the United States and stood to gain from a stable international trading order promoted by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in whose formation it had played no part, an inordinate amount of its economic growth was due to government policies that stimulated domestic demand for
indigenous products. This had little to do with guaranteed overseas markets or with reliance on international institutions. Third, Johnson claims that the ‘free ride’ thesis is just too simplistic when it comes to explaining Japan’s import policies. Certainly, Japan had preferential, and cheap, access to US technology and intellectual property, but that does not explain why the government, or more specifically, MITI, which had final power of approval over all technology transfers, chose to implement the policies that it did.

Indeed, Johnson’s last point is extremely salient to questions of defence policy. Japan’s growth rate from the 1960s to the 1980s certainly created the impression that low defence budgets allowed for economic success. Indeed, even today, support in Japan for military expansion is said to be ‘tempered by a democratic politics that continues to prefer butter to guns’ (Katzenstein 2007, 19). However, the notion that the Japanese government diverted military spending to the civilian economy as an efficiency measure is suspect at best, as it relies on an artificial distinction in developed nations between the civilian and military economies. Certainly, the diversion of military spending to the civilian economy is an advantage when the state’s primary economic goal, as it was in Japan during the 1940s and 1950s, is to rebuild and revitalise civilian infrastructure. However, for developed nations, a thriving and protected military sector is not only an important source of stimulus in its own right, it provides important technologies that can then be adapted for the civilian economy, increasing productivity.

This is certainly the way American post-war planners viewed military spending after the Second World War. National Security Council Report 68 (NSC 68), the 1950 classified document that served as a ‘blueprint’ for America’s Cold War strategy, emphasised one of the most important lessons that the United States learned from the Second World War: ‘The American economy, when it operates at a level approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than civilian consumption while simultaneously providing a high standard of living.’ Indeed, the consumption that such ‘military Keynesianism’ entailed would power the civilian economy. In Mario Del Pero’s words, ‘Guns and butter were not incompatible; they were, in fact, complementary and interdependent’ (Del Pero 2010, 24).

In the United States research and development (R&D) is also an important part of military spending, not merely because it enhances the effectiveness of the military, but
because it yields important civilian spin-offs. Throughout the 1970s to the 1990s, Japan’s non-defence R&D/GDP ratio was much larger than the United States, but its total R&D/GDP only caught up to the United States in the late 1980s when military research was included in the calculations (J. M. Johnson 1997a, 8). Japan’s preferential access to the US economy did mean that it reaped the rewards of some of the American technological advances, but the advantages Japanese companies had over their American rivals in this area had more to do with planning than savings on the country’s defence budget. The proportion of R&D in Japan funded by the government was actually low compared to other industrialised countries (J. M. Johnson 1997b). Instead, Japanese corporations engaged in both research and manufacturing, therefore keeping new technologies to themselves. Small American entrepreneurs, meanwhile sold their technology to multiple buyers (Florida and Kenney 1990, 237-238, 242-243), including Japanese concerns, thereby losing national advantage.

In fact, the logic of military Keynesianism was not lost on many of Japan’s economic managers, who understood only too well the role of the state in guiding the economy. The stimulatory effect of foreign wars on the national economy was seared on to the minds of Japanese mercantilists by their experience during the Korean War. The Japanese provision of war materiel to the United Nations army fighting on the peninsula provided a much-needed boost to post-war economic recovery in Japan. As Katzenstein and Okawara (1991) note, MITI emerged victorious in battles with the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) during this time. JDA representatives argued that defence considerations should guide procurement and development policy while MITI held that military development should be directed to areas where there would be the greatest benefit to the civilian economy through technological spin-offs. Indeed, for a state committed to a mercantilist policy, the expansion of the military sector in order to stimulate the economy in this fashion would only have been an only too natural step to take.

Yet from the 1960s, the Japanese government made no attempt to amend the war-renouncing constitution, and in 1976 even announced a formal cap on military spending at 1 per cent of GDP and, perhaps more significantly, a total ban on military exports. This was not the result of giving up on military spending in order to invest public funds in productive projects. Indeed, from the 1970s, many of the public works that the
government funded were extremely wasteful. It was giving up military spending despite the possibilities that it presented for economic development. This could not have had much to do with an economic ‘free ride’.

Indeed, some analysts have viewed American accusations of a Japanese ‘free ride’ with a large dose of scepticism. Kataoka Tesuya (1985), for one, has argued that Americans do not want real Japanese rearmament, but ‘defence cooperation’, where Japan pledges to buy weapons from the United States. As Johnson notes, the ‘so-called free ride on defence only occurred to Americans as they thought about trade issues’ (1994, 267-268). Certainly, redirecting state funds towards defence would have improved the trade imbalance with the United States had Japan committed to buying only American weapons, but in the event of such a significant reorganisation of fiscal priorities to lift the defence budget, it is likely that MITI would have pushed for indigenous military development. Indeed, perhaps the last thing that Americans with an interest in their own defence industry would want is a Japan that could manufacture its own weapons and act as a competitor in arms sales and spin-off technologies, a point that was driven home, as noted in chapter 4, by American negotiators when they applied pressure on the Japanese government to successfully halt a Japanese plan to produce an indigenous air fighter in the 1980s.

The Japanese government’s development policies defy other liberal explanations of war and peace. As outlined above, most theories of international liberalism posit that economies organised around the principle of state regulation and intervention are not likely to be as peaceful as those that put free-market principles, albeit regulated through international institutions, into practice. Whether stated in terms of the diffusion of norms that encourage a regulatory approach to conflict, or in terms of greater interdependence raising the cost of war, open markets and free commerce are supposed to lead to a stable international society. Indeed, not only are closed economies supposed to lead to state development of the military sector, they are also supposed to hinder the economic interdependence which apparently prevents war.

Contrary to these predictions, however, Japanese government members, such as Miyazawa Kiichi who studied and advocated Keynesianism and other theories whose economic philosophy ran counter to classical liberal notions of open national markets (G.
Clark 2007) are among the most strident and stubborn defenders of the restrictions against the use of force in Japan. In fact, those Japanese leaders like Nakasone Yasuhiro and Koizumi Jun’ichirō, who have favoured free-market reform, have been the most hawkish members of the Japanese political elite. Not only do economic explanations fail to explain Japan’s low defence spending as a percentage of GDP, a commitment to the free-market as a policy agenda does not necessarily act as a restraint on planning for war as liberals would probably assume.

Liberalism has thus been tested on Japan, and assumptions of convergence between Japan and the West have heavily influenced readings of Japanese national interests. Post-war US foreign policy practitioners believed that modernisation would bring Japan’s internal political and economic arrangements in line with rational international norms, while neo-liberals who emphasised that commerce and free markets would guide the international system towards peaceful exchange aimed to explain what the West could learn from Japanese economic success. However, modernisation theory was susceptible to revisionist criticisms that posited Japanese capitalism, and therefore foreign policy, as fundamentally different, and illiberal, constructs compared to capitalism in the United States and elsewhere in the Western world. It is difficult, meanwhile to see how liberal notions that Japan was a clever but peaceful manipulator of global financial institutions and American largesse did not hold when examined closely. This was later confirmed after the effects of slow growth in the 1990s became apparent to observers of Japan. Not many analysts talk of a coming ‘Japanese period’ in world affairs now.

**Constructivism**

As the revisionist critique points out, one of the largest failings of realist and liberal research programs is often their inability to seriously consider difference between states as important. The materialist assumption that units, in this case, states, fundamentally strive for, or can and should have, the same interests, whether formulated in terms of power or prosperity, assumes that their inner workings are either, in the case of neorealism, irrelevant, or, in the case of liberalism, can and should be made fundamentally similar. In either case, theories such as neo-liberalism and neo-realism focus on systemic
competition or cooperation at the level of dealings between states. Even in the form of modernisation theory, the goal of liberal politics is to bring all units in line. Domestic peculiarities are not considered interesting, and local culture or tradition may even be considered undesirable. Indeed, a commitment by neo-realist and neo-liberal scholars to focus on parsimonious explanations that did not supplement the hard core of their theories with too many auxiliary hypotheses about the domestic make-up of states virtually banished national culture from ‘serious’ debates in IR during the 1980s. This led many scholars to criticise such mainstream approaches at the end of the Cold War after realists and liberals, blinkered by the assumptions of their competing theories, failed to consider peculiarities in the case of the Soviet Union that led to its downfall.

Similarly, but less noticed, was a retreat by both neo-liberals and neo-realists from research on Japan in the late 1990s. As shown by Waltz’s assumptions about a rising Japan after the Cold War and the liberal focus on Japan as the type of state that would be successful in an interdependent world, the failure to predict successfully a Japan that was apparently economically and politically stagnant by the end of the millennium led scholars to abandon the nation as one of their archetypical case studies. As Cumings (1999) noted with his comments on revisionism, when Japan was ‘rising’ it attracted much scholarly attention. After the mid-1990s, when sluggish and even negative growth in Japan created the impression of a stagnant ‘falling’ power, attention turned elsewhere.

This failure to deal with failure is as unfortunate as it is understandable. As Jeff Kingston (2004, 1-4) has pointed out, aspects of Japanese society underwent dramatic change during the 1990s and beyond, and provided an empirically rich – if often somewhat tragic – arena for research on politics and society. It is a shame that with the realist predilection for choosing the next great power and the liberal mission to identify peaceful wealthy states whose existence would substantiate success within a global trading order, realists and liberals did not allow Japan’s failure to ‘rise’ in the 1990s to inform their theoretical assumptions during this time.

In any case, dissatisfaction with stale debates between neo-realists and neo-liberals and the failure of the two paradigms to predict the fall of the Soviet Union led some scholars of IR to develop new frameworks for understanding foreign policy and international interaction. Constructivism, a research program that focuses on ideas in
international life, emerged in the 1990s as the main challenger to neo-realism and neo-liberalism, spurred in part by the inability of these theories to explain the effect that cultural difference has on policy.

**Constructivism’s ‘hard core’**

While constructivists generally see Lakatosian methods as unsuitable for developing theories which attempt to deal with complexity rather than externalise it, there is nevertheless a set of assumptions common to constructivist research. Firstly, ‘to the extent that structures can be said to shape the behaviour of social and political actors, be they individuals or states, constructivists hold that normative or ideational structures are just as important as material structures’ which neo-liberals and neo-realists hold as important (Reus-Smit 2001, 216). Secondly, agents’ identities constitute their interests, that is, what an actor wants or needs depends greatly on how that actor perceives itself – or what roles that actor expects to play – within a society or a system. This in turn influences the agent’s behaviour and, if that agent is a state, or a stakeholder within a state, policy. Constructivists thus focus on the formation and effect of social ‘norms’ derived from a commonly constructed identity as determinants of action. Finally, agents and the structures within which they operate are held to be mutually constitutive. The identity of the agent, whether it be an individual or a state, has an effect on the nature of social norms, and vice versa. The ideational structures that condition agents’ identities are also reinforced – or challenged – by a process of interaction over time. ‘The core idea of constructivism’ is thus ‘the need to recognize the world as a social construction, mutually constituted through shared meanings and intersubjective understandings’ (Dannreuther 2007 p. 39).

As with realism and liberalism, there are several variants of constructivism. With the exception of Alexander Wendt’s *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999), most constructivists describe constructivism as an ‘approach’ or an ‘analytical framework’ rather than a ‘theory’ or a ‘paradigm’ of IR (Reus-Smit 2001, 222). Constructivists do not necessarily see prediction, at least of long-term trends, as the goal of their research, and therefore do not see it either as driving their agenda or as a criterion for success, as per Lakatos. Nevertheless, clustered around the ‘core’ idea of constructivism are three broad
clusters of research. ‘Unit-level’ constructivists privilege domestic-level norms, institutions and national identity as their object of analysis. ‘Systemic’ constructivists privilege the ideational structure of the international system as the source of national identity. Meanwhile, ‘holistic’ constructivists offer a more nuanced view of international norms than their systemic colleagues, dispensing with the conceptual divide between domestic and international politics and often taking as their object the formation of norms about the nature of the state as an abstract concept and state behaviour throughout history.

**Systemic constructivism**

When engaging constructivism, many IR scholars turn to Wendt’s body of work. However, a detailed review of systemic constructivism in the context of Japan is not appropriate here, as there have not been any major studies that apply Wendt’s theory to the formulation of Japanese norms related to national security. The reason for this is fairly simple: Like neo-realism, Wendt’s theory concerns the structure of international politics. Unlike neo-realism, however, Wendt makes no claims about the behaviour of particular units within the international system. Wendt is interested in the changes in the very nature of anarchy and makes few causal claims about the behaviour of states, save how interaction between them may change the nature of international society itself. While states do have a degree of agency, they are socialised to act in certain ways, and thus anarchy is conditioned by their common culture (Wendt 1992). Thus, the foreign policy of particular states is hardly Wendt’s concern, and while his analysis of different types of anarchy may be used to describe the nature of the international system that Japan finds itself in, or to debate whether the US-Japan alliance exists because the two parties have common interests or whether it is a ‘security community’ because they share a common democratic identity (Wendt 1999, 299-300), Wendt’s theory would reveal very little about other sources of foreign and security policy. Wendt is most useful here for the light he sheds on the definition of the state, as shown in chapter 2, and for the implications his theory has on work that has already been conducted on Japanese strategic thinking, as explained below.
Unit-level constructivist studies have covered Japanese foreign policy in greater detail. During the 1990s, there were two major attempts to examine the construction of national identity in Japan. Peter J. Katzenstein’s major work on Japanese security, *Cultural Norms and National Security* (1996), is described as ‘emblematic’ of the unit-level constructivist approach (Reus-Smit 2001, 220). According to Katzenstein, Japanese security norms were formed in the process of the implementation of an economic policy originally devised to unite a nation divided after the Second World War. Furthermore, ‘Japanese policymakers welcomed the free trade of Pax Americana as the only way to reduce their vulnerability’ in a hostile world (Katzenstein 1996, 113).

Up until this point Katzenstein’s analysis deviates little from neo-liberal presumptions about the origins of foreign policy. Indeed, liberals would not have a problem with Katzenstein’s assertion that ‘thin’ ‘regulative norms’ help coordinate political conflicts, both between and within states. However, Katzenstein departs from the liberal paradigm by stating that the interests of actors cannot be understood without the ‘constitutive norms’ that ‘shape political conflicts over identity’ (Katzenstein 1996, ix, 18-19). An agent acts according to the regulative norms because there is an understanding that adhering to a particular norm, although it may result in short-term loss for the agent, nevertheless adds to an order that they have an interest in preserving. They act according to the constitutive norms because they believe it is their role to do so. While regulatory norms define the method by which an agent may obtain its objective, constitutive norms help define what that objective (or interest) is.

For example, Katzenstein argues that the focus on economic policy in Japan after the war has worked to institutionalise a strong collective identity within Japanese society, but this identity has left the Japanese unconcerned with domestic policies that have negative overseas consequences. He therefore compares and examines norms related to both internal and external security, showing that although the Japanese police strove to use non-violent measures to arrest or expel Japanese terrorists in the 1970s, the public and police were largely unconcerned with terrorism once its perpetrators were outside Japan. While internal security practices – that is, largely, but not exclusively, policing –
have often focused on prevention and have been highly intrusive, external security has traditionally been kept at arm’s length in Japan, and it is believed that most foreign threats can be addressed through a combination of economic and political, rather than military, means (Katzenstein 1996, 113-115, 121-130). Also, in contrast to domestic conflict in Japan, which is minimised though a non-litigious process emphasising the good of the collective over that of the individual, Katzenstein notes that external military commitment is avoided by highly legalistic means such as employing a strict interpretation of Japan’s constitution to preclude overseas deployment for the purposes of collective defence. Thus, Katzenstein’s Japanese belong to a Grotian collective that emphasises safety in all aspects of life at home, but avoids entanglement in the issues of the outside world (Katzenstein 1996, 189-190). Military action and other ‘hard’ external security efforts would only enmesh Japan in conflicts and areas of cooperation that it would rather keep at bay.

Katzenstein often compares Germany’s security policy to Japan’s and devotes a chapter to the comparison (1996, 153-190). It is a comparison that Thomas U. Berger (1998) treats more systematically. Whereas Katzenstein focuses on social and legal norms, Berger’s study is committed to what he terms a model of political-military culture. He argues that ‘antimilitarism’ is a product of Japan’s negative collective memories of war emphasised by the United States in the early occupation period (Berger 1998, 25-32) and nurtured by the Japanese themselves ‘under the aegis of a benevolent U.S. hegemon during the 1950s and 1960s’ (Berger 1993, 120). Like Katzenstein he sees the 1960 consensus – that Japan would keep a low profile militarily while rebuilding its economy – as important, but he also views this consensus as aiding in the institutionalisation of already existent post-war antimilitarist norms – not creating a cultural mindset in its own right (Berger 1998, 198-201). Although it was those on the ‘left’ of Japanese politics who strongly espoused anti-militarism, and a neutral foreign policy, they were ‘placed at a disadvantage by the enormous benefits that were to be gained from an alliance with the United States, including the return of sovereignty’ after the occupation (Berger 1998, 199). Those on the ‘right’, who aimed to rewrite the constitution, rebuild the military, and foster a culture of respect for pre-war institutions such as the imperial family, were ‘crippled by a prevailing mood of war wariness’ (Berger 1998, 200). For this reason,
according to Berger, moderate views on defence prevailed, but were informed by a ‘culture of antimilitarism’.

Berger’s outline of the causal relationship between security identity and foreign policy behaviour offers a solid explanation for Japan’s passivity during the Cold War. But his study, along with that of Katzenstein, highlights a major problem for unit-level constructivists: Their approach does not offer an internal mechanism to deal with change. Both studies hold that Japan’s culture of anti-militarism was constructed, and both stress that Grotian norms or ‘antimilitarist’ culture have become institutionalised so that they now heavily influence security decisions in Japan. However, they do not explain how a reconstruction of identity might take place. After becoming institutionalised antimilitarism has become static, and it is difficult to see how Japanese conceptions of identity might be challenged without reference to exogenous factors.

Even important changes in the structure of the international system do not seem to be compelling enough to shift Japanese views on security. Both Berger and Katzenstein understand that the political establishment in Japan took note of international changes during the Cold War, such as détente, the US approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and the onset of the ‘second’ Cold War with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, but at every turn these events are depicted as reinforcing Japan’s anti-militarist culture. Meanwhile, both scholars depict the first dispatch of the SDF overseas after the Cold War as a relatively minor event, noting that the mission was focused on reconstruction, that the SDF was subject to restrictions on their ability to engage in combat (Katzenstein 1996, 126-128), and that the policy led to even more stasis due to domestic political battles (Berger 1998, 177-186). When Katzenstein and Berger define ‘continuity’ in security policy so broadly, they therefore stack the odds to favour the explanatory power of their own theories. As Bukh (2007) notes, for both the ‘yardstick for measuring change is unclear but it seems that nothing short of full-scale invasion of a neighboring country conducted by the SDF would account for change in policy’.

However, even though he counts on the strength of Japan’s anti-militarist culture to render defence policy fairly stable, Berger does allow for the possibility of change, but only by bringing realist and liberal notions of structure back in. Berger insists that his focus on the ideational structure does not invalidate realist and liberal theories’
explanatory power per se, it merely highlights that different questions require different approaches. His study:

...does not imply a rejection of the claims made by either neorealists or neoliberal theorists concerning the nature of the international system as a whole. Rather, an approach which combines investigations of domestic as well as international political factors enables analysts to construct more powerful explanatory models of foreign policy and allows them to arrive at better predictions of individual state behaviour (Berger 1998, 203).

This suggests that Berger is leaving open the possibility that identity merely acts to delay what neo-realists or neo-liberals see as inevitable. Indeed, while the prominent realist scholars discussed above believe that behaviour dictated by internal state identity may produce ‘lags’ in the time a state takes to conform to predicted behaviour, those same scholars still insist on the inevitability of realist conceptions of structure.

Many constructivists find such synthetic approaches unsatisfying, because of their relegation of state identity formation to the first step of a two-step process. That is, state identity is somehow constructed independently of the international system and then let loose in an arena of states with their own, often conflicting, identities. Some constructivists hold that such analysis contradicts the constructivist ontological assumption that agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Indeed, a ‘third group of “holistic” constructivists have discarded the dichotomy between the international and the domestic and tried to bring them together into a unified analytical perspective that treats the internal and the external as two faces of a single social and political order’ (Reus-Smit 2002, 495).

**Japan and holistic constructivism**

While isolating a given state in order to determine how its identity is constructed may be a valid course for research, holistic constructivism posits that in fact there is no ‘step’ between the formation of state identity and interaction in an international system, because the ‘cultures’ of both the state and the international system are tightly bound. Unlike the unit-level studies mentioned, such an approach presents the possibility for a focus on how international norms affect foreign policy. While in a given period of history the
international system may dictate that the goal of states is to maximise their wealth or their
security, this is a product of the diffusion of what might be termed ‘norms of rationality’
at the time. However, that does not mean criteria for legitimate state action that do not
conform to liberal or realist expectations are inconceivable. States may challenge the
prevailing normative arrangements in international society, convincing others to adopt
culture and practices that they deem more in line with their own interests as determined
by their identity claims. Changes in international norms ‘socialize states to want different
things and to behave differently in order to obtain them…. They enable states to change
their own rules of interstate conduct’ (I. Clark 2005, 14). 4 International culture, then, is
affected and affects state culture and thus behaviour.

Despite his focus on Japan, this is a world view that Katzenstein endorses when he
notes that because ‘international norms of state behaviour are often shaped by leading
international powers, it is important to understand how the Japanese construe security’
(Katzenstein 1996, 6). Nevertheless, his conceptualisation of Japan as a ‘Groatsian’ state
leads him to the conclusion that Japan has had relatively little impact on international
norms of state behaviour in general, and no impact on international norms related to
security (Katzenstein 1996, 82), a justification of his unit-level approach. However,
Katzenstein notes that while Japan has not fully developed an identity as an active
participant in international society, it nevertheless has an interest in being seen as an
internationally responsible actor, and therefore, in ‘doing what others expect of a country
whose international stature [until the mid-1990s was] rapidly growing’ (Katzenstein 1996,
82). Similarly, Ronald Dore (1986, 245) has made the observation that in Japan there is
‘very little underlying internationalism, in the sense of identification with the
international community, with humankind as a whole, that is, rather than in the sense of
“good neighbour” punctiliousness about international obligations – which the Japanese
have in good measure’. According to this view, then, internationalism is for Japan a
regulatory, not a constitutive, norm. Japan sees the ‘value’ of internationalism, but has

4 With his discussion of aspects of state legitimacy (see pp.15-17), Clark is probably more a scholar of the
‘English School’ of IR than a constructivist. However, it is his writings on how international legitimacy
norms affect state conduct (see pp. 14-15) that are of interest here. Constructivists and scholars of the
English School have often seen each other as ‘having complementary projects at the “social vanguard” of
the field’ of IR, despite Reus-Smit’s advice to ‘treat both schools as bounded fields of debate’ (Reus-Smit
2002, 2).
not yet internalised it.

There is ample literature on the creation of norms at the international level, but if Katzenstein and Dore are correct, what is important for Japanese foreign policy priorities is that these norms affect domestic conceptualisations of appropriate state behaviour, not the notion that Japan is involved in their creation. In step with this line of thinking, Hugo Dobson (2003) has argued that changing international norms emphasising the value of state participation in humanitarian missions under the auspices of the United Nations during the 1990s played into decision-making processes in Japan that were already guided by a domestic ‘taxonomy of norms’. International norms in turn provided a platform for a political minority to push internationalism to enhance its own domestic standing within Japan. As Dobson notes, the notion that the United Nations played a core role in Japanese foreign policy was stated as a fundamental principle of many governments in Japan after the war. In a foreign policy discourse that was fraught with tension, ‘UN internationalism’ was a rhetorical goal that most Japanese governments could support, precisely because the international organisation’s activities were limited by tension between the Cold War superpowers. When the United Nations assumed a more active role in the beginning of the 1990s, domestic political actors, most prominently the well-known politician Ozawa Ichirō, were able to emphasise emerging international norms that stressed peacekeeping as a responsible state activity to put pressure on the government to pass laws sanctioning the international despatch of the

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5 While not directly related to Japanese security, Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis’ (1996) example of how the administration of US President George H. W. Bush handled the 1991 Persian Gulf War illustrates how states structure international society and vice versa. Stressing the need for collective action, Bush took the unilateral action of dispatching American troops to the Persian Gulf in August 1990 in response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Bush’s unilateral action raised the concern of a Congress he perceived as particularly obstructionist (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 416-418), and which insisted on gaining a United Nations Security Council mandate to constrain the president’s powers. Bush sent his Secretary of State, James Baker, to several foreign capitals to garner support for such a resolution, and eventually, in November, the United States managed to negotiate Security Council Resolution 678, approving the use of ‘all necessary means’ to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. While many members of Congress were opposed to the use of force against Iraq, Bush’s ability to gain an international mandate for rolling back the invasion made it difficult for them to vote against endorsing the operation (Cortell and Davies 1996, 464-470). The success of the Gulf War highlighted the role of the United Nations in the aftermath of the Cold War, and was arguably a key factor in the more activist role the organisation played in peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention missions during the early 1990s. Bush also saw a UN resolution as a necessary condition for US involvement in humanitarian intervention in Somalia in 1992 (Glanville 2005). Thus domestic constraints on the US president strengthened the United Nations as an international institution and the success of the Gulf War strengthened multilateral action as a criterion for legitimate future intervention.
SDF (Dobson 2003, 39-48). Thus, Ozawa was able to use international norms to change understandings of long-standing domestic norms and strengthen a minority position in the domestic political discourse.

The literature on the interaction of norms at the international and domestic levels has provided an answer to criticisms that unit-level surveys of Japanese foreign policy behaviour are effectively static. By positing an explanation of international society which is at once normative and structural, holistic constructivism can help overcome the inability of Katzenstein’s and Berger’s unit-level models to explain cultural change without an exogenous mechanism, such as reliance on a neo-realist or neo-liberal concept of structure. Where Katzenstein and Berger see stasis in foreign policy, and therefore interpret Japan’s peacekeeping missions abroad in the 1990s as a continuation of the restraint that has long dominated Japanese foreign policy, Dobson can account for these missions in a normative framework that confirms they constitute significant change, a notion with which most observers of the deployments would agree.

However, Dobson’s explanation of a domestic ‘taxonomy’ of norms is still unsatisfying, given that he sees anti-militarism, ‘US bilateralism’, ‘east Asianism’, and UN internationalism all as domestic ‘norms’ that have led to the specific policy mix defining Japan’s peacekeeping operations (Dobson 2003, 34-41). Although the constructivist literature is often careful to note that ‘norms’ are always contested, in this case, these categories tend to paper over more than they reveal. During the late 1950s to 1960 and again in the late 1960s and early 1970s, for example, Japan’s security treaty with the United States and the Japanese government’s support of the United States in the Vietnam War evoked massive and sustained protest (Havens 1987), making the notion of the bilateral arrangements as a widely-held norm, at least during that time, highly questionable.

Indeed, even when Japanese share particular ideals such as anti-militarism they have shown difficulty in maintaining a united front. Explicitly anti-militarist groups – socialists and communists – could not settle their ideological differences and even battled each other on the streets and campuses of Japan during the late 1960s. Many of their disagreements were on the appropriate way to view the war and on the appropriate reasons for supporting the anti-militarist cause (Kersten 2009). Anti-militarism could
divide as well as unite.

Furthermore, given the mix of domestic norms that Dobson highlights (and there is no indication that they are exhaustive), their potentially broad definitions entail their ability to conflict with one another, so one is able to construe any number of possible responses to international events or the development of norms at the international level. For example, the Koizumi administration’s steadfast expression of support for the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 could be seen as a manifestation of Japan’s commitment to the norm of US bilateralism. It could also be interpreted as a rejection of UN internationalism, given that a number of states rejected Washington’s claim that it had exhausted all avenues of multilateral diplomacy before the invasion. But then, had Japan not participated, the reverse explanation would hold true. If a panoply of norms can explain any situation, it must be asked, then, whether a focus on domestic norms has much explanatory power at all. If it does not, then perhaps a more ‘structural’ enunciation of constructivism, such as Wendt’s social theory, which relies only on normative change at the international level, may be more appropriate.

**Realism and liberalism as ‘strategic culture’**

It is in light of the three ‘major’ paradigms of IR that we should evaluate new work on Japanese foreign policy and national interests. Perhaps somewhat strangely, various prominent scholars who usually focus on the empirical study of Japanese domestic politics and society turned to the realist paradigm for explanations around the time when neo-realists were giving up on Japan as a potentially ‘rising’ power. However, these new interpretations were influenced by more ‘classical’ forms of realism, with their emphasis on such factors as domestic institutions, popular opinion and leadership prowess as variables influencing Japan’s leaders’ ability to craft a foreign policy that would lead to enhanced security, stability, prestige and influence for their nation. Certainly this new focus on classical forms of the realist paradigm took into account Japan’s position in the international system to explain Japanese foreign policy, but these new interpretations cast their net much wider than neo-realist approaches in search of causation.

To some extent, these new approaches highlight deep continuities in the way Japan interacts with the world. Michael J. Green (2003), for example, acknowledges a
strand of post-war passivity and a strong sense of continuity in Japan’s current foreign policy: ‘On issues of fundamental interest to the United States, Japan remains deferential and cautious’; ‘normative and institutional constraints on the use of force remain strong’; and ‘Japanese foreign policy continues to rely primarily on economic tools for power and influence’ (Green 2003, 4-5). Richard J. Samuels (2007), meanwhile, views Japanese ‘realism’ as a constant feature of its foreign policy since the nation’s modernisation. Focusing on the concept of ‘grand strategy’, Samuels (2007, 6) notes that exogenous change does spur ‘lengthy periods of active, often highly divisive’ ideological debates within Japan, but also that Japanese foreign policy has been driven by a series of three long-standing consensuses. The last consensus, arrived at after the Cold War, framed economic power of more use to Japan given that the nation was already defended by the United States. Japan became a ‘cheap riding’ nation devoted to ‘mercantile realism.’

Despite minor differences in interpretation of the causes of Japan’s post-war defence posture, both Samuels and Green claim that a fundamental reassessment of Japanese foreign policymaking is underway. As phenomena that contribute to their explanation of an evolving Japanese defence and security policy, both cite internal political changes such as the collapse of the post-war political system, which for almost four decades after 1955 encouraged stable conservative rule by the LDP at the same time as it radicalised the SPJ, turning it into a ‘party of permanent opposition’ (mennen yatō). Contrary to the neo-realists’ tendency to link Japan’s economic growth to its potential military might, both Samuels and Green see economic weakness, coupled with strategic uncertainty in Asia, as fuelling calls for the nation to develop a more active foreign policy (Green 2003, 20-22). Green views ‘trends’ – growing attention by Japanese leaders to the balance of power and less emotionalism and idealism in Japanese conceptualisations of international affairs, heightened sensitivity to security, and a new focus on Asia in a more fluid foreign policy process geared towards greater autonomy (Green 2003, 6-8) – as a fundamental shift in the way Japan sees the world: a rejection of normative constraints on the use of military power and a growing but ‘reluctant realism.’ For Samuels, who believes that Japan ‘consistently has been pragmatic on the world stage’ (Samuels 2007, 6), these shifts are simply a confirmation of Japan’s enduring realism. The current period will, Samuels predicts, mark a transition from ‘mercantile realism’ to a ‘Goldilocks
consensus’ that will allow Japan to hedge on major security problems. Most notably, Japan will increasingly attempt to find ways to avoid too much dependence on the United States, while aiming to manage potential long-term threats from China.

One feature common to both of these studies is their use of a wide variety of causal factors to explain change in Japanese strategic thinking since the 1990s. Alongside the structural change in the international system with the end of the Cold War, a delinquent North Korea, a rising China, economic malaise, and shifts in the relative strength of parties that Green sees as important, Samuels also factors into his analysis an ageing population, generational change, ideological shifts within the LDP, institutional changes in domestic civilian agencies with a security role, and most importantly, pressure from the United States, as determinants of policy adjustment (Samuels 2007, 63-85).

However, some of these ‘variables’ do not tell us much about change in Japan’s strategy. As already noted, pressure from the United States for Japan to take more responsibility for its security has been more or less a feature of bilateral relations since the 1950s. Institutional changes in domestic agencies, such as an increase in the role of the Japanese Coast Guard in national defence, meanwhile, are dependent on Japan’s strategic calculations rather than a cause of them. Ideological changes within the LDP are also more likely a reaction to changing circumstances than a source of change. Moreover, it is difficult to see, given the range of possible independent variables offered by Samuels and Green, why any one variable might not provide a better, more powerful explanation of foreign policy when viewed in isolation. The ability to eliminate irrelevant, or at best, distracting, causes is precisely the reason why ‘parsimonious’ theories like neo-realism were developed in the first place.

Indeed, both authors inadvertently suggest that other approaches are more effective than the undetermined version of realism that they offer. Whatever the status of the ‘changes’ they cite, the very notion of Green’s ‘reluctant’ realism and Samuels’ view of Japan’s shift from ‘mercantile realism’ is as much a confirmation that culture or institutions have driven Japan’s past behaviour as it is an explanation of Japanese considerations of power politics.

For example, Samuels’ reliance on ‘cheap-riding’ to explain Japan’s post-war security strategy is identical to the neo-liberal arguments that stress Japan’s self-
interested reliance on existing institutions and international security arrangements that they did little to establish. Samuels notes that one of the possibilities raised by Japan’s strategic thinkers is a proactive push for the construction of new institutions in Asia to ensure China’s stable rise, placating Beijing by helping it to achieve prosperity, while at the same time reassuring Washington so that American security guarantees remain in place (Samuels 2007, 201). If it could be made to work, this might be a pragmatic solution to the position that Japan finds itself in, but the preference for institution-building makes it an entirely liberal one. And given that Samuels is unclear about the trajectory of Japanese foreign policy, further behaviour that corresponds to liberal explanations cannot be ruled out. It is difficult to see, therefore, why ‘realism’ is an explanation of Japanese behaviour at all.

In noting that post-war ‘norms’ of passivity have begun to erode, moreover, Green has essentially declared that commonly held ideas are indeed important determinants of state behaviour. Green seems to believe that ‘normative constraints’ (Green 2003, 5, 24) can be present at one time and then absent at another, but what is important is that he does see them as capable of having an effect on state action. Unlike those neo-realists who see norms as merely explaining ‘lags’ in the development of a foreign policy, Green, with his reference to multiple ‘variables’, effectively insists that structural imperatives inherent in the international system are only a partial cause of state behaviour. This raises the possibility that a normative theory which can explain the changes in Japanese behaviour that Green observes in his empirical survey would be stronger than an explanation that relies on norms here and the distribution of power there. Certainly, Green’s study may well be correct in terms of a description of Japan’s current behaviour. But this does not, on close inspection, necessarily lead to the conclusion that power is ontologically superior to ideas as the driving force behind foreign policy simply because Japan is beginning to act as though this is the case.

Instead, Green’s ‘reluctant realism’ has been read as a confirmation of Wendt’s assumption that anarchy can be structured to follow different types of logic, and that states will through interaction with other states be socialised to act differently (Kliman 2006, 157-158). As already noted, ‘realist culture’ can be incorporated into holistic forms of constructivism. Wendt’s theory also specifically notes that even though a state may be
socialised into a hostile ‘culture of anarchy’ (Wendt 1999, 259-266), such a development does not rule out further socialisation into different, more cooperative international cultures when prevailing ideas change. There is, according to Wendt, more than one culture of anarchy. His theory also does not rule out agency on the part of a given state inclined to act differently than the prevailing international culture. As Green himself admits with his focus on ‘reluctance’, despite Japan’s location in a potentially hostile region, it is far from fully ‘internalizing’ (Wendt 1999, 266-278) ‘realism’ or what Wendt would call the all-against-all ‘logic of Hobbesian anarchy’ (Wendt 1999, 264-266).

Depending on how perceptions are measured, Japan is also probably quite far from seeing the world through the logic of what Wendt calls ‘Lockean’ anarchy – where states respect each other’s sovereignty, but not much else. However, such ‘reluctance’ to become ‘realist’ can be explained without reference to internal shifts within Japanese politics. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, Japan has cultivated deep and lasting relationships with nations that share a less pessimistic view of the world order, both inside and outside its region. If Wendt is right, and interaction with other states is the basis for identity formation, Japan’s desire to be perceived by these nations as a responsible, or even vanguard, member of a peaceful ‘Kantian’ international society should place significant restraints on its drift towards the politics of raw power.

There have been other attempts to explain Japanese ‘realism’ by placing it within a cultural context. Indeed, even Samuels (2007, 6) understands that what he sees as Japan’s ‘realism’ is generated by a ‘“strategic culture”’ and a ‘national identity in which vulnerability (fuan) has long been a central feature’, an admission which further complicates the theoretical basis of his narrative. Historian Kenneth B. Pyle (2007) has more explicitly outlined an account of Japan’s ‘realist’ national strategic culture. Pyle claims that as a vulnerable island nation on the cusp of a continent dominated by powerful nations, Japan has developed a sense of uncertainty that has led its leaders to adopt a pragmatic realism towards international events. Despite its reliance on Japan’s geographic features and his insistence on Japan’s enduring ‘realism’, central to Pyle’s thesis are the various ‘norms and values’ that have organised the international system over time. ‘[C]onstructed’ by dominant powers, these norms and values were ‘woven into an ideology that served to legitimate the authority they exercised’ (Pyle 2007, 29). This
hardly suits a theory of realism as usually formulated, where strong states exercise authority by virtue of power rather than by legitimacy claims.

Pyle also lists five separate ‘international orders’ since the collapse of the Sino-centric world and the onset of modernisation in Asia, yet interestingly he considers only one of these ‘orders’ – during the 1930s – to have been structured by ‘anarchy’. It was this ‘anarchy’ which ‘enticed Japan into attempting to create its own East Asian order’ (Pyle 2007, 28). This is not a trivial point, as Pyle seems to have rejected that the international system has been subject to the fundamental ordering principle of realism for most of modern history. It is only when the norms and values of the international system dictate a dog-eat-dog world – again, what Wendt would call ‘Hobbesian anarchy’ – does Japan behave as a structural realist maintains it does. However, holistic constructivists would have no problem with the notion of a temporary international structure governed by the norm of self-help, provided the international system can be ordered differently at different times. Pyle thinks that such a reordering is not only possible, but that it has indeed occurred, which places him in a different paradigm than the realists.

In fact, Pyle cites directly from the constructivist playbook at times. When considering Japan’s swift modernisation from the 1860s, Pyle notes that ‘despite the strong pull of systemic pressures on nations, there is nothing fixed, determined, or inevitable about the courses they choose’, a plea for considering agency over structure, it would seem. He then asks ‘What was it that drove the Japanese with such relentless determination?’

The usual answer is “nationalism.” But nationalism is very nearly a universal phenomenon in the international state system. Without it a state cannot exist. To say that Japan was motivated by nationalism leaves unexplained the distinctive complex of ideas, norms and values that constituted this people’s extraordinary motivation. It says nothing about how Japan conceived its national purpose and mission, its formulation of the national interest, after it entered the international system. “Anarchy,” in the memorable words of Alexander Wendt, “is what states make of it.” Although universal ideals and abstract principles were relatively weak in Japan, shared ideas of national identity and the Japanese social construction of the world they had entered were powerful determinants of international behaviour (Pyle 2007, 99-100).

Indeed. But a particular social construction of the world as a determinant of foreign
policy is not somehow unique to Japan. It is also certainly not a realist conception of interest creation, and by ruling out ‘universal ideals and abstract principles’ Pyle has rejected conventional expressions of liberalism as inapplicable to Japan as well.

Consistent with their primary role as specialists on Japan, the authors of these studies are more interested in using theory to shed light on past and emerging Japanese patterns of policymaking than in using Japanese behaviour to validate theories about the international system. While their studies are interesting in themselves as empirical works on Japanese security and foreign policy, they are less so as a model of analysis for those who are interested in what Japan can teach us about the experience of others. As such, the ‘realism’ presented in these works stands as a framework for analysis rather than a theory. However, neither Pyle, Samuels, nor Green make the case as to why considerations that prioritise power constitute a better framework for analysing policy than those that emphasise the role of institutions or national culture. Indeed, their tendency to liberally cross paradigmatic boundaries tends to point out the weakness of any one paradigm – especially realism – on its own at the same time as it suggests that more structured approaches to eclecticism are necessary to derive general understandings about foreign policy from the study of Japan.

**Analytical eclecticism**

As a historian whose major concern is explaining Japan, Pyle may not be aware of the ‘paradigm wars’ (Levy 2007, 177, Elman and Elman 2003, 40) that have dominated the study of IR theory. In contrast, Katzenstein’s later work, often in collaboration with others, clearly demonstrates a deliberate attempt to cross the strict paradigmatic boundaries that IR theorists draw between their paradigms and the assumptions of their research programs. The tendency to view the world in terms of a body of evidence whose purpose is to prove the analytical strength of one ‘research program’ over another has yielded a range of ever more sophisticated theories with which to analyse IR. However, the tendency of individual IR theorists to over-emphasise the efficacy of their own meta-theoretical commitments has seen them neglect the messiness which constitutes what Katzenstein and Sil see as the real stuff of international politics:
At the cost of sacrificing the complexity that policymakers and other actors encounter in the real world, problems are frequently sliced into narrow puzzles to suit the agenda of a given research tradition. As a result, whatever progress might be claimed by proponents of particular research traditions, there is little consensus on what progress if any has been achieved by the field as a whole (2004, 4).

As an example, Katzenstein notes how realists, who often claim that their theory is the most appropriate for explaining matters of security (note the extensive body of literature on US grand strategy, for example) have scarcely dealt with the phenomenon of terrorism, an obvious lacuna in a post 9/11 world, and of particular relevance Katzenstein’s own work on Japan.

Unlike many IR theorists, Katzenstein and his collaborators avoid positing the inability of a theory to detect a particular feature of international life as a ‘failure’ that vindicates other approaches. Rather, they reject views that either do not allow for the communication or interaction between different paradigms, or those that posit research programs in constant competition with one another. Instead, Katzenstein and Sil (2004, 8) prefer an approach that explores how different ‘research traditions’, a term – borrowed from Larry Lauden – which does not imply mutual paradigmatic exclusion or competition, and might be brought to bear on particular problems. Much as prominent scholars in both the realist and liberal traditions have recognised that policy practitioners working on real problems should consider different theories and levels of analysis in their work, Katzenstein and his collaborators advocate bringing such a practical approach, which he terms analytical eclecticism, into the academic field of IR.

Fig 1.1. Research traditions and points of convergence (Katzenstein & Sil 2004, 8)
However, this does not mean that an eclectic approach might mix the three traditions of the field freely, what Kang (2003, 59) has derided as including ‘a touch of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism’ in a single research agenda. While noting that analytical eclecticism should be open to a consideration of research traditions in other fields, within IR research Katzenstein does favour exploring specific points of convergence between theories to solve a given problem. This can be illustrated by considering each research tradition as the side of a triangle, where ‘some variants of these traditions converge with one or the other research tradition’s ontology, epistemology, methodology or normative orientations’, as at A, B, or C in Figure 1.1. ‘The field of international relations thus encompasses both the practises of normal science working around shared core assumptions as well as the possibility of eclectic theorising’ (Katzenstein and Sil 2004, 8-9), in addition to explanations and predictions that stay within the bounds of one paradigm.

It is worth emphasising here that any given point of convergence only occurs between two research traditions, but it is unlikely that they will be compatible with a third, particularly when observing state action across time. Katzenstein (2007, 9), for example, ‘rejects the attempt, evident in Samuels’s [and Green’s] book, to create a synthetic explanation that subsumes all other accounts into one master narrative’. Meanwhile, he insists that his analytical eclecticism not adopt Pyle’s ‘sweeping historical analysis [which] encounters numerous contradictions and paradoxes’. Instead, Katzenstein advocates crossing the boundaries of the various paradigms to solve particular problems. Constructivism and realism, for example, can be woven together to give an account that acknowledges constant balancing and bandwagoning, but focuses on cultural norms to determine their direction in specific cases. To illustrate this, Katzenstein and Okawara cite a number of studies that predict that Asian states will follow the patterns they followed as pre-modern tributary nations to bandwagon with a rising China. Convergence between liberalism and constructivism, meanwhile, would be most obvious in the analysis of international institutions, which states may use to maximise absolute gains, but which will also help to transmit meanings and build a collective identity. Finally, the confidence that the US-Japan alliance gives Japan in engaging with China on an economic level can be grounds for using both liberal and realist approaches to examine
the relationship between the three countries (Katzenstein and Okawara 2001/02, 177-182).

Predictably, criticism of analytical eclecticism has focused on its failings as a scientific course of enquiry. Firstly, while Katzenstein’s approach has led to subtle comparative explanations of state responses to international phenomena such as terrorism, ‘in lieu of a method to combine approaches or to assess the relative weights of variables, analytical eclecticism falls prey to the criticism of being an “everything-but-the-kitchen-sink” or ad hoc approach to theory building’ (Aggarwal and Koo 2007, 365). Indeed, even assuming that all three major IR paradigms are to be seen potentially equally as valuable in elucidating different problems in international life, Katzenstein does not explain why these paradigms in particular are special. Logically, then, his eclecticism also should be open to other approaches, for example, dependency theory, which sees social class as important in international politics. Some scholars believe that A. F. K Organski’s (1958) power transition theory departs significantly enough from the hard core of realism to make it a distinct paradigm (DiCicco and Levy 2003, 113). If this is so, does Katzenstein have to give it equal billing alongside the other three theories? What about postmodern approaches? Katzenstein seems to have no answer as to why his ‘triangular’ model of convergence is superior to an even more inclusive and pluralistic approach to IR.

Secondly, while Katzenstein has provided detailed and intelligent analysis of individual cases, ‘it is hard to see how they follow a framework or how an analytical eclectic approach can provide us with means to achieve greater knowledge cumulation’ (Aggarwal and Koo 2007, 365). His work thus sometimes falls in line behind Green’s and Samuels’ as being more an explanation of Japanese behaviour than an exposition of a working model for others to emulate, although it is a far more modest approach in that it limits itself to specific problems. Nevertheless, Green and Samuels, while they do use insights drawn from IR theory, also state that they are engaged in a fundamentally empirical endeavour to explain Japanese foreign and security policy. Katzenstein nuanced empirical analysis on Japan, on the other hand, is designed to demonstrate a model that he insists is of use elsewhere. In this regard, Samuels and Green have successfully met their objectives. The jury is still out on analytical eclecticism.
Conclusion

Japan has proved a hard case for IR theorists. Problems with the *ad hoc* defences some neo-realists use to explain Japanese peculiarity and the unfalsifiable hypotheses which follow from their insistence on parsimony render neo-realism problematic as a model for analysis of Japan in particular, and as a broader theory in general. Meanwhile, liberal approaches used by policymakers during the Cold War were revealed to be inadequate to the challenge of explaining difference between Japanese and American assumptions about modernisation. Unit-level constructivist studies of Japan that allow for more complexity in their analysis nevertheless rely on conceptualizations of culture that do not allow much room for change in defence and security policy, even though to most observers such change is apparent. Meanwhile, studies which take Japanese security and foreign policy as their point of departure, and studies that start with assumptions about the confluence between international and domestic norms, often do not generate hypotheses that may be applied elsewhere. Because of these problems, Katzenstein’s call for a more eclectic approach to theory is welcome, but theorists will find his insistence that his approach should not be used for ‘grand narratives’, and his failure to explain his selection of salient research traditions, unsatisfying.

The question for those who believe an eclectic approach to IR theory would be useful in explaining the formation of national interest and foreign policies of particular states is to show *how* the particular paradigms they emphasise – whether they be the three ‘major’ paradigms in the study of IR or not – are important. At the same time, they must show how an eclectic approach can generate models that can be used elsewhere.
Chapter 2: Tensions, positions and policy formation

Categorical approaches to Japanese security and foreign policy

Domestic positions in post-war debates on Japanese security, and in politics in general, when they are not presented as blanket ‘norms’ that guide ‘national’ behaviour as a whole, are usually depicted as a contest between two diametrically opposed groups, with positions on the pacifist ‘left’ and more militarist ‘right’ clearly staked out and their protagonists well defined. The left is painted as a conglomeration of forces including unions, teachers, academics, women’s associations, peace groups and members of the Communist and Socialist parties in the Diet (Yamamoto 2006, 25-32, Seraphim 2006, 86-155, Duke 1973, Stockwin 1968). In contrast, the ‘right’ is shown as comprising members of conservative elites in politics and business, those active in the defence establishment, and select intellectuals and members of the public calling for the loosening of the constitutional restrictions on the use of force and a less ‘masochistic’ view of history that honours the wartime sacrifices of ordinary Japanese (Seraphim 2006, 35-85, Morris 1960, 116-120, O. Watanabe 2002, 418-450).

Within this schema, the post-war government, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the bureaucracy are depicted in one of two ways. Mostly, and especially when viewed by actors often associated with the ‘left’ of Japanese politics, they are depicted as inhabiting a space on the ‘right’ of the political spectrum, in loose association with private groups who would revise the constitution and instil a sense of nationalism in public discourse to make it easier for them to pursue an agenda which includes expansion of the roles and duties of the SDF. The vertical power structures inherent in the post-war bureaucracy, meanwhile, have often been described as an extension of the wartime system of control (Morris 1960, 116). Standing in the way of the LDP and the bureaucratic elites was the Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ) and the various workers and civil service unions (Ötake 1999, 5). The Japan Teachers Union (Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai, or Nikkyōso), for example, viewed the post-war Japanese bureaucracy as ‘a continuation of wartime militarism, and opposed the Ministry of Education over its system of textbook approval, curricula decision, and teacher employment’, through which
it would attempt to stifle discussion of the war in classrooms (Seraphim 2006, 9). The ‘right’ is usually also depicted as universally supporting Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States, with the ‘left’ denouncing the relationship as support for America’s imperial ambitions.

In other accounts, moderates are depicted as controlling Japan’s post-war governmental structure for much of the period from the end of the war to the 1990s, playing off extremists on the left against those on the right (Pyle 2007, 232). Here, parties do not matter as much as ideological positioning – within the Diet the ‘right’ is depicted as inhabiting political factions within the LDP that seek to overturn the constitution, and, again, instil a sense of patriotism by censoring textbooks. Meanwhile, politicians in other, more mainstream, factions of the LDP joined with pacifists in the SPJ to thwart constitutional revision and more muscular foreign policy. The mainstream, according to this view, could also raise the spectre of populist pacifism advocated by the opposition SPJ and Japan Communist Party (JCP) to stave off demands by the United States and Japanese rightists for robust Japanese rearmament. Japan’s mainstream conservatives in the LDP and the bureaucracy, in most of these depictions rational actors all, thus steered Japan towards a path of economic reconstruction and a role in the international system as a wealthy ‘middle power’ (Soeya 2005, 62).

Both such depictions of Japanese security debates therefore arrange Japan’s post-war political forces on a spectrum from left to right, with the major point of political cleavage – what Ōtake Hideo (1999) calls the ‘axis of political opposition’ – related to security issues in general. High growth and low income disparity, achieved through cooperation on economic policy between the left and the right meant that ‘In contrast to cases like the United States, in Japan economic policy did not constitute the issue that separated conservatives from progressives.’ Instead, ‘cleavage on defence issues, which historically formed the main axis of opposition, arose in the 1950s, and by the 1960s was systematized into a strictly conservative-progressive construction of opposition (hokaku kōzō), continuing to regulate Japanese politics for about 40 years after that’ (Ōtake 1999, 5).

Both of these types of explanation, then, posit ‘a construction of strong mutual distrust’ within the Japanese body politic over issues related to national security. What
differs between the two representations of Japan’s national security debates is therefore the strictness by which the left and the right are divided into distinct ‘camps’ (jin’ei) and whether there is any space between political extremes where ‘conservative mainstream’ (hoshu honryū) political actors can exercise control. Views of different actors on these various issues, then, are diametrically bound by a narrative among ‘progressive’ observers that view all other actors with different positions as constituting ‘conservative’ forces. That is, the political stance of individuals or groups can be determined by whether they belong to either the ‘left’ or the ‘right’, or alternately, the degree to which they adhere to either political extreme. According to Ōtake (1999, 4), for example, ‘the most appropriate policy matters which determined the conservative-progressive yardstick were security issues, the imperial system, labour strikes and the issue of constitutional revision’. Positions on these issues are seen as falling on either side of a diametric political conflict. For example, Ōtake explains that strikers often ‘cried out slogans about, in particular, protecting the constitution’ which along with socialist ideology was a method they would use to ‘reform the system’ characterised by conservative elites seeking constitutional change. Thus strikes, like everything else, were tightly bound to ‘issues of security’ including constitutional change. For Ōtake, they were less well defined by a cleavage on economic issues. Even Samuels, who acknowledges the existence of a more diverse discourse on security, arranges this discourse on a uni-dimensional spectrum at times (2007, 14, 31), and Berger sees political forces during the Cold War in terms of left, right and centre ‘subcultures’ (1998, 55-86).

However, uni-dimensional representations along a given spectrum are ill-suited to the complexity of views related to issues such as security in post-war Japan. Firstly, they ignore the voices and opinions of those that do not quite fit the arrangement of political views on a single line from ‘strong conservative’ to ‘strong progressive’. It was, and is, possible to hold perfectly coherent views about different aspects of ‘security issues’ that fall variously yet simultaneously into ‘camps’ normally arranged on opposite sides of such a spectrum. Many like the novelist Mishima Yukio and literary and social critics Hayashi Fusao and Etō Jun, for example, denied Japan’s responsibility for war crimes, a seemingly ‘rightist’ position, while showing either deep ambivalence or outright hostility towards the US-Japan security relationship, which on a uni-dimensional spectrum was
normally an indicator of ‘leftist’ beliefs. Such ‘alternative’ views did not fare well in
Japan’s post-war political environment; indeed they were often either stifled, ignored or
associated with either the opposite ‘conservative’ or ‘progressive’ camp by their
detractors, but they are important in and of themselves to show that alternatives did exist
to the depiction of discourse on security in Japan as a dichotomy, or as an arrangement of
points along a spectrum. Even within the conservative or mainstream centrist ‘camps’
outlined in such models there was significant divergence on issues such as rearmament.

Secondly, the conservative-progressive dichotomy is only useful in explaining
discourse on security up to the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. While some scholars
have focused on ‘norms’ of antimilitarism which have ostensibly provided a degree of
continuity to Japan’s post-Cold War security arrangements, far more commentators and
authors have dealt with what they see as shifting arrangements on Japanese security in
other ways. Several scholars have noted a slow breakdown of the consensus over
economics and the emergence, starting in the 1970s, of another ‘axis of opposition’
representing divergence between those who advocate for a classical free market economy
and those who advocate for state-led economic systems (Ōtake 1999, 45-46). The
volatility of the Japanese economy, with recession in the early 1970s followed by
recovery, and from 1985 an economic ‘bubble’ sparked by a devaluation of the yen and
fuelled by rampant speculation in the real estate market meant that economic issues
became more salient, to the point that security issues were afforded less attention.
According to this view, during Japan’s economic ‘lost decade’ of the 1990s security
issues became even less salient, to the point where the ‘right’ could implement its
preferred defence policies without significant controversy. Understandably, with its focus
on shifting political tension rather than on security as such, this is an argument favoured
by those who seek to explain change in the political sphere in general.

Conversely, if the goal is to explain Japanese national security in particular,
scholars and analysts have generally attempted to show how shocks and problems
external to Japanese policymaking on security, such as the Gulf War or an aging
population, pushed Japanese policymakers in new directions at the beginning of the
1990s (Pyle 2007, 260). While the left has been weakened by such events, security
discourse is still imagined on a uni-dimensional spectrum, or as two sides of an axis.
Commentators in America and elsewhere see a more active Japanese role as the ‘normalisation’ of the nation – ‘its emergence from the constraints placed on it after World War II and its resumption of a more normal geopolitical and security posture’ (Ikenberry 2010, 8). Exactly what course Japan is ‘resuming’ or what constitutes ‘normal’, however, is seldom well defined in such commentary. Meanwhile, a more proactive Japanese foreign policy is viewed from the ‘left’ of the Japanese political spectrum as a ‘shift to the right’ (ukeika) in public opinion (Takano 2006, 15). In both cases, Japan’s more active role in the world is depicted as a step away from its post-war pacifism and as an uncomplicated sally in a single possible ‘opposite’ direction. As argued here, both of these presumptions are problematic.

While they are sometimes arranged on a political spectrum, explaining the formation of Japanese security discourse in more than two (usually four) ‘groups’ or ‘views’ (henceforth, ‘categories’) has been another standard approach in the English-language literature on Japan since the 1980s (Mochizuki 1998, 26-42, 1983-84, Pyle 1982, 242-260, Samuels 2007, 117-131). It is a slightly more complex way of explaining Japanese security discourse than a progressive-conservative split, and is similar to models on studies of American foreign policy that emphasis strong ‘traditions’ within a given polity over time (Mead 2002). Keiko Hirata offers a detailed summary of the different categories of Japanese security and adds concise terms of her own for them (see Table 2.1).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pyle (Cold War era)</th>
<th>Mochizuki (Cold War era)</th>
<th>Samuels (post-Cold War)</th>
<th>Hirata (post-Cold War)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progressives</td>
<td>Unarmed Neutralists</td>
<td>Pacifists</td>
<td>Pacifists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercantilists</td>
<td>Political Realists</td>
<td>Middle Power</td>
<td>Mercantilists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Internationalists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Realists</td>
<td>Military Realists</td>
<td>Normal Nation-alists</td>
<td>Normalists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Nationalists</td>
<td>Japanese Gaullists</td>
<td>Neo-autonomists</td>
<td>Nationalists</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
While scholars have branded these categories in different ways, the descriptions of the various groups’ motivations have remained remarkably static. Even if policies change, these categories persist to ensure that there is significant difference within public opinion.
on security policy within Japan. To use Hirata’s (2008, 128) terms, ‘pacifists’ aim for a ‘pacifist state that promotes world peace’; ‘mercantilists’ for an economic power that makes financial contributions to international society; ‘normalists’ for a state that exercises military and economic power in the world, while making military contributions to international society; and ‘nationalists’ for a ‘militarily strong “assertive” state; a state that takes pride in its history, culture, and traditions’. Further, Samuel’s approach divides the categories with two axes representing, respectively, views on relations with the United States, and views on the use of force. Hirata offers a different model, featuring a split between ‘autonomism’ and ‘internationalism’ in place of Samuels’ axis on US-Japan relations, however the categories these axes delineate are fundamentally similar (Figure 2.1)

There are a number of problems with the categorical models presented thus far. First, like arguments that see Japanese society divided by a single axis, they appear as a snapshot in time. There is no ‘process element’ internal to the model that explains policy change. The distribution of power and influence among the categories is often presented as at the mercy of external occurrences such as shifting demographics and political events outside Japan (Mochizuki 1998, 43-44, Samuels 2007, 63-85). As a survey of Japanese national security discourse such formulations may stand, but as a theory that incorporates its own explanation for change they are insufficient. Like conceptions of Japanese society that arrange groups on a left-to-right political spectrum, some exogenous influence has to act in order to shift the ‘balance of power’ (Samuels 2007, 112) between the categories.

Second, in Samuels’ model, the categories are organised on the basis of support for or resistance to existing Japanese policies, namely the alliance relationship with the United States and the constitutional ban on the use of force to settle disputes between states. McCormack (2002, 154-155) clearly shares this view, seeing post-war security policy as a futile attempt to ‘integrate the peace system (the constitution) with the war system (the security treaty)’. However, the treaty with the United States and the constitution are subject to change, no matter how unlikely that change may seem. Constitutional revision is certainly conceivable, and alliances have been dissolved in the past. It is therefore unclear whether the eventual elimination of particular sources of tension in Japanese society over national security issues would cause the categories to
disappear or whether there are deeper, more permanent, cleavages at work. Samuels claims that ways of thinking about security have been fairly consistent throughout Japan’s entire modern period (Samuels 2007, 109), but then offers his readers his model, based, it seems, only on Japan’s post-war security arrangements. Indeed, although he claims that the categories in his model are ‘four nominal choices based on [Japan’s] enduring values’ (192), he elsewhere explicitly notes that the axes that divide them are only those of the last 50 years (13).

Third, the models discussed thus far are presented as uniquely applicable to post-war Japan, with its bilateral security alliance with the United States and its constitutional restrictions on the use of force. Indeed even if they are a reflection of more persistent Japanese security concerns, it is hard to see if there is anything to learn here for scholars interested in applying lessons from Japan to other cases. This is not so much a problem for the authors mentioned above – their models are crafted precisely to describe the limited case of Japanese national security discourse. But if a model or theory exists that can describe or explain security discourse in other, or all, states in the international system in similar terms, Japan-specific models would be superfluous. Hirata tries to imbue her model with more abstraction, and therefore more permanence, by focusing on the concepts of ‘autonomy’ and ‘internationalism’, but thus conflates Japan’s activities in the US-Japan alliance, an important aspect of Japan’s security arrangements, with internationalism, which then can have a number of meanings, some contradictory. For example, how does ‘internationalism’ reconcile preferences for bilateral security arrangements over multilateral ones, and vice versa?

Finally, as noted by Pyle, who first applied this categorical model to Japan, ‘many well-known Japanese will not fit neatly into these categories’ (Pyle 1982). Discourse on historical memory is particularly problematic, even though all of the authors mentioned in Table 2.1 nevertheless see history, or at least competing Japanese views on history as relevant (Samuels 2007, 113-115, K. Hirata 2008, 135, Mochizuki 1998, 26-42). Nationalists, neo-autonomists and like categories, are especially depicted as attracted to ‘revisionist’ views of history. Figures assigned to this category, such as Ishihara Shintarō, the bombastic governor of Tokyo, and Kobayashi Yoshinori, the manga artist who takes on shocking topics normally associated with the ‘right’, certainly hold controversial
views on historical events. They do indeed variously claim that the massacre of Chinese civilians at the hands of Japanese soldiers at Nanjing in 1937 was fiction, that Japan’s colonisation of Taiwan and Korea and its invasion of China were justified, and that Japanese politicians should show their respect for the Japanese war dead at Yasukuni Shrine in central Tokyo, viewed by many as a symbol of Japan’s wartime aggression (Y. Kobayashi 2001, 203-252, Japan Times 6 August 2005, Y. Kobayashi 1998, 151-194). However, the importance of history is particularly problematic for the models that delineate the groups according to two axes. Very little explanation is given as to why opposition to relations with the United States and restrictions on the use of force equate to the assertion of revisionist views of history. Indeed, Samuels and Hirata admit that other discursive groups, specifically the ‘normalist’ position, are divided over history issues (K. Hirata 2008, 135, Samuels 2007, 125-126). Perceptions of history, then, seen by these authors as an important factor in security discourse, nevertheless work independently of their models.

To deal with the problems thrown up by existing models, the rest of this chapter establishes a new ‘categorical’ model which will in subsequent chapters be used to explain debate on Japanese foreign policy. Unlike earlier works, however, this new model starts with the clear assumption that such categories as it establishes can be generalised: they are neither unique to Japan, nor a result of Japan’s unique ‘enduring values’. The assumption here is that the model is applicable to all modern nation states, or at least those whose internal legal structures allow substantive policy discussion in the public sphere. This is not to deny that the categorical models presented so far are valid ways of describing certain aspects of foreign policy behaviour in Japan: indeed many aspects of these models are incorporated in the new model.

The following sections outline how assumptions about the very nature of the modern nation state, as a form of social organisation or ‘institution’, generate three different tensions, which in turn generate six different discursive ‘positions’ determining how conceptions of the ‘national interest’ are conceived and replicated. Two further ‘non-positions’, also defined by the tensions inherent in the modern nation state are then briefly reviewed. While they are tangentially relevant to implementation of foreign policy, the existence of such non-positions does not actively shape debate about national interests,
and while they will be mentioned, they are not part of the main focus of this study. After
describing the role of national identity within this model, the chapter ends by outlining
how the model will subsequently be applied to Japan.

**Tensions**

To explore whether the models presented by Samuels, Hirata and others are a reflection
of something more permanent and universal than a description of foreign policy
preferences in post-war Japan, nothing less than an examination of general notions of the
state itself will do. The first argument presented here is that the various shared
understandings of national interests at the state level and the appropriate or ‘natural’
courses of action in foreign policy in order to achieve them, as well as the theories that
define these concepts, have arisen from the very existence of the state itself. This is
something that, for example, structural realists would probably not deny. In fact, the
assumptions central to realism – that states comprise an anarchic international system
fraught with tension and incomplete information, leading to inevitable interstate conflict
and security seeking behaviour to satisfy the urge to survive – are all corollaries of the
sovereignty by which realists define states.

But states are not defined as such merely by their sovereignty. According to Max
Weber’s (2009, 4) definition, a state consists of a ‘human community that claims the
monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a determined area’ (emphasis in
original), and it is usually this territorial monopoly over the use of force that realists see
as the source of the state’s sovereign authority. However, by invoking legitimacy, Weber
implies that there is some sort of internal method to determine what is legitimate, usually
by means of what he terms a legal-rational authority (*legal-rationale Herrschaft*),
characterised by the execution of leaders’ decisions by a bureaucracy according to the
rule of law. Domestic management of the use of force and adherence to legal restrictions
in its application is therefore as integral to the state as sovereignty. Moreover, it is
arguably the case that without the ability to set legitimate limitations on the armed forces,
the state as a sovereign entity would implode – it would become a ‘failed state’, that is,
not really a state at all. Both sovereignty and the ability to legitimately control and
administer the use of force, meanwhile, would essentially be meaningless without an aspect of the state that is often simply assumed: a society – a population whose members are aware that the common rules and norms of their particular state differentiates them from other individuals, or what Weber referred to as a ‘human community’ ("menschlicher Gemeinschaft"). According to Weber, then, sovereignty, administration and society are all necessary conditions for modern nation statehood, and none is – and no two are – sufficient (for a similar argument, see Hansen 2002, 26).

Nevertheless, constructivists would note that the state is itself first and foremost a social construction. It is only through inter-subjective understandings of what constitutes an ideal type of state that particular states exist at all. Contrary to the views of postmodern scholars, however, the state is not simply a name used to describe a type of organisation whose character is either constantly in transition or defined subjectively. States are imagined, but they do exist. As Wendt (1991, 220-221) points out, one of the fundamental ways that individuals notice the state’s existence is through the laws and rules do have very real and particular effects on them, for example the authority the state gives to official agents to undertake otherwise forbidden activity. Also, states can be distinguished from other forms of social and political organisation, such as transnational ethnic groupings such as the Kurds, or federal units like the ‘states’ of the United States of America and provinces of Canada, or dependencies that have the formal right to declare statehood but do not, such as the Cook Islands. These alternative forms of administrative and social order stand as examples to show that the state can be distinguished from other social forms and thus may be considered ‘real’ at least insofar as it is not simply a definition of any given ‘political unit’.

Although the ‘existence’ of the state is not in question, the state is not a ‘natural’ phenomenon. Barry Buzan (2002, 50) notes that the state can be ‘understood as tribe’, a manifestation of an inherent human tendency to group together. Hoffman sees this view as ‘eccentric’ but it is one shared by other realists including Robert Gilpin (1986, 305). However, as Buzan (2002, 59) himself notes, even realists are given to ‘a certain amount of selective raiding’ when it comes to examining the historical record and finding social forms that match what they conceive of as a ‘state’. The rule of nomadic communities or of communities whose territory outside their village walls is porous and contested – what
we normally think of when we use the word ‘tribe’ – simply cannot be equated to the territorial sovereignty of the modern nation state. As historian Charles S. Maier (2011) notes, such ‘nomadic’, as well as ‘imperial’ forms of territorial organisation stand in contrast to the modern nation state which is distinct from the other two forms in that its ‘regulatory space’ and ‘social space’ are coterminous with ‘territorial space’.

Hendrik Spruyt (1994), meanwhile, has shown that there was nothing particularly inevitable about the rise of the modern nation state in the first place. His analysis of different forms that may have arisen its place shows that when we talk about the modern state, we are discussing a specific historically contingent social order, not merely the tendency of human beings to form groups or ‘societies’. Weber is also quite explicit that the ideal of legal-rational authority that is a characteristic of the nation state is a distinctly modern phenomenon with its roots in the West (de Sousa Santos 2002, 41). This is not the place for a discussion of how the nation state came to be. However, for the purposes of the argument outlined here, it should be enough to note that particular consequences can be derived from the distinct construction of the nation state.

Weber’s definition of a state as sovereign, administrative, and social is similar to Wendt’s description of the state as structure, actor, and society (1991, 201-214). Wendt has unpacked all of these terms in detail, and there is thus no need to do so further here. However, what is worth noting is that Wendt departs somewhat from Weber when he notes that the definition of a state is ‘fuzzy’, where no element is essential, but where the various components tend to group in ‘homeostatic clusters’ (202). Indeed, the possibility of alternative social orders to the state means that alternatives can also be suggested for each of the three major criteria that collectively ‘define’ the state. Because the state, unlike many other forms of social organisation, is compulsory – that is, nation states now cover the entire habitable territory of the planet, meaning location within one is not self selecting – there is a tendency for individuals to resist some aspects of its construction, even if they may accept others. Individuals and groups that are uncomfortable with the notion of states as final, sovereign actors can stress alternatives to state sovereignty while maintaining that the other definitions of the state hold, for example. While none of these aspects outlined here that define the state should be ignored in order to build ever more
parsimonious theories, the state’s ‘fuzziness’ does allow different actors to place different emphasis on what they see as the ‘true’ form of the state.

Importantly for the purposes of this study, it therefore follows that if notions about the appropriate nature of state action are based on an emphasis of one or the other orthodox criteria of the state, ‘orthodox assertions’ about how the state should conduct its affairs may be challenged. Notions about how the state should conduct its business that stem from an emphasis on sovereignty, for example, at the expense of the other criteria of the state, are subject to challenge, as are notions that stem from either a focus on the administrative or social criteria of the state. These notions about ‘correct’ behaviour are therefore always met by ‘counter-assertions’ which give rise to a set of three different tensions common to all modern nation states.

Orthodox foreign policy assertions

All three of the major research programs of IR theory, and thus the normative suppositions that drive discourse on foreign policy, are derived from different emphases on the assumptions that lie at the ‘core’ of the state. By downplaying certain fundamental attributes of the state, and emphasising others, one can begin to construct a number of equally valid explanations of how states operate. Emphasis on the components of, respectively, 1) sovereignty, 2) administration over the use of force, and 3) society, are the origin of the key distinguishing assertions or Lakatosian ‘hard cores’ of, respectively, 1) realism, 2) liberalism and 3) unit-level constructivism in IR. These hard cores, as discussed in chapter one, are 1) primacy of states in an anarchical international system where conflict is likely, 2) the possibility of sustained and systemic cooperation between states through regulation, and 3) the notion that mutually constituted unique identities inform interests. Moreover specific normative assertions about the conduct of foreign policy can be derived from each of the cores, which manifest themselves as preferences in policy formation on 1) bilateral modes of foreign policy, 2) administrative domestic restrictions on the use of force, and 3) the notion that a unique culture or history should inform national interests (See Table 2.2).
First, the hard core of realism, that is, the primacy of states in an anarchical, and potentially dangerous international system, is virtually synonymous with the notion that states are defined solely by their territorial sovereignty. The idea that the state can agree to be bound externally and permanently by the rules of some other form of organisation makes a mockery of the notion of state sovereignty. Certainly, some realists acknowledge that states engaged in international cooperative engagements may choose to refrain from exercising the sovereign right to administrate their own affairs when they perceive it not to be in their interest, but according to such a view, states still maintain that right and can reassert it (Wendt 1991, 208). That there can be no actor more authoritative than the state leads to a conception of the international system as beset by anarchy, the ‘organising principle’ of realism.

Table 2.2. IR research programs and orthodox assertions of foreign policy as originating from the state

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria of statehood</th>
<th>Hard core ideas</th>
<th>Research Prog.</th>
<th>Orthodox assertions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sovereignty</td>
<td>Primacy of states in anarchy where conflict is likely</td>
<td>Realism</td>
<td>Bilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>Possibility of sustained inter-state cooperation</td>
<td>Liberalism</td>
<td>Domestic restrictions on the use of force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Society</td>
<td>Constructed state identities shape national interest</td>
<td>(Unit-level) Constructivism</td>
<td>National exceptionalism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Realist conceptions of the international system inherently lead to a preference for bilateral arrangements in foreign policy. Multilateral agreements are more difficult to manage and may imply the establishment of international institutions whose ‘rules’ may hold a claim to regulating the system, but according to a realist ontology, these rules are nothing more than a convenience to states that have the sovereign authority to act as they please within the confines of international balance of power. Also, unilateral action that conflicts with the interests of other states is to be avoided, if possible. Excessive unilateral action by one state will provoke balancing action on the part of others, ultimately resulting in a balance of power unfavourable to the state that asserted itself unilaterally. Indeed, while some have greeted US dominance over the international
system as a new ‘realist’ balance of power, others argue that ‘hegemonic stability theory’ is a departure from the hard core of realism (DiCicco and Levy 2003, 111). Thus, realists eschew multilateralism or excessive unilateralism in foreign policy in favour of bilateral agreements where possible. Bilateralism is an important ‘component of realism’ (Tow 2001, 5).

Second, the hard core of liberalism – the notion that states can cooperate in a sustained and systemic fashion – emerges from the claim that it is the legitimate monopoly on violence embedded in an institutional-legal order that defines the state. If it is solely the state which can sanction the use of force on behalf of its agents – usually here the police and the military within its territory (Jachtenfuchs 2005, 38-39) – the right and capability to use force are also withdrawn from non-state actors, except in certain sanctioned circumstances such as individual self-defence. It is therefore only the state that is capable of defending its interests abroad with the use of force. There are exceptions to this rule – private security firms fulfilling security roles normally associated with the military, for example. But these occur with the sanction of the state, they are relatively minor in terms of the security functions they perform compared to military operations, and they are extremely controversial.

The principle of *legitimacy* means that the state claims to exercise force on behalf of those it governs, a claim which may not be true in particular cases, but one which state decision makers nevertheless almost universally maintain. This claim would therefore imply that, at least in states that allow publics a role in the decision making process, there are restrictions on the use of force emanating from the consent of the governed, or at least from those who engage in debate on foreign policy. Indeed, controversies surrounding the use of mercenaries by democratic governments arise precisely because such figures are less accountable to the public than government operatives (Scahill 2008, 139), suggesting that the proper place on restrictions on the use of force is within the state’s administrative apparatus. Restrictions on power cannot simply be dictated by the distribution of power within the international system, as realists would have it. It is from domestic restrictions, managed through a domestic legal-institutional order, that cooperation with other states is made possible. An emphasis on sustained cooperation with other states, the liberal hard
core, leads to advocacy for restrictions on the use of state force that emanate from the domestic order.

Third, the notion that each state is based on a particular society yields the hard core of unit-level constructivism in IR: that mutually constituted national identities structure state interests. States would not exist without societies, and state governments almost invariably claim to act upon their behalf. The ‘conceptual requirements’ for a society are, in the case of the state, a territorially delineated group of people that has a ‘shared knowledge that induces them to follow most of the rules of their society most of the time’. (Wendt 1991, 209) While many societies have not required states, states *always* require societies, and complex state-societies codify their ‘rules’ as laws. Laws thus originate in the rules of a society, but also replicate the rules for that society, ensuring its continuance (Wendt 1991, 210). Members of all societies also see theirs as unique, because without this sense of uniqueness, or ‘identity’, there is nothing separating them from the members of other societies. Such group identities are ‘based first and foremost on things like language, culture, religion, and ethnicity’ (Wendt 1991, 209-210).

While the concept of the state is a social construction at one level, as we have seen, ‘unit-level’ constructivists bracket their analysis so that at another level they can focus on the social construction of the identity of a particular state. Unit-level constructivists refrain from problematising the state in order to focus on descriptions of the identity of particular states. National exceptionalism, or emphasis on the state’s historical or cultural uniqueness, and insistence on the defence of national values and narratives are a reflection of the notion of the state as a society. While particular individuals or groups within the state may disagree on what constitutes legitimate national history or culture, those same individuals may well agree with the basic point that such historical or cultural formulations of state identity should influence policymaking on national security.

Collectively, then, the three ‘orthodox foreign policy assertions’ that arise from the construction of the modern nation state stress 1) bilateral modes of foreign policy, 2) restrictions on the use of force, and 3) national exceptionalism. These can be seen as policy preferences arising from different notions about the ‘nature’ of the state.
Counter-assertions

Because the state is one possible way to order society out of the countless others that have existed, do exist, and can conceivably exist, foreign policy assertions based on its core notions always encounter resistance. If other forms of social organisation are possible, then advocates for these alternative forms will always object to prescriptions of foreign policy derived from the notion of conceptualisations of statehood that do not match their own world view. An emphasis on more than one orthodox foreign policy assertion may generate more than one of these alternative ‘counter-assertions’.

Bilateralism, domestic administrative restrictions on the use of force, and the notion of national exceptionalism, as foreign policy assertions, thus each breed their own resistance. Tensions can be represented as contests, or as three separate dialectics, held between orthodox foreign policy assertions and their alternatives. This in itself is enough to understand that there are three tensions that form out of emphasis on each of the orthodox assertions of foreign policy and the search for alternatives to each of those assertions.

Nevertheless, some further explanation is required, to avoid falling into the trap of representing these tensions as merely the same old inter-paradigmatical clashes that occur frequently between the three main research programs of IR. Indeed, challenges to a particular research program of IR have almost always been framed in terms of fundamental claims made by another research program in the same field. For example, liberalism is often presented as the ‘opposite’ of realism, and ideational notions of the state are often presented as an ‘opposite’ to both ‘material’ or ‘rational’ theories. As Katzenstein and Sil (2004, 16-20) imply with their eclectic model of convergence, however, there is nothing actually incompatible between any two of the assumptions at the core of constructivism, liberalism or realism, even though it is impossible to combine the three theories coherently. The cores of two given research programs (the primacy of states and the possibility of cooperation; the primacy of states and a focus on identities, or a focus on identities and the possibility of cooperation) do not necessarily conflict with one another.

The source of disagreement between theories comes from elsewhere: from the protective belt of auxiliary hypotheses that surround the hard core of a given paradigm.
Within liberalism for example, neo-liberal institutionalism adds to the core assumption of the possibility of sustained and systemic cooperation between states the notion that it is international regulatory institutions that will and should bind states to international decisions. This is different to, say, theories about democratic peace or republican liberalism, which add to the hard core of liberalism the notion that democratic publics are more pacifistic than rulers, at least towards other democracies. These additions to the core are the real source of disagreement between theories of IR drawn from different paradigms.

This translates to assertions about foreign policy as well. Challenges to the orthodox foreign policy assertions do not arise from the other orthodox assertions of foreign policy (bilateralism can be compatible with restrictions on the use of force; bilateralism can be compatible with the notion that state identity informs policy; the notion that state identity informs policy can be compatible with restrictions on the use of force). However, hypotheses in the ‘protective belt’ of other research programs may be incompatible. For example, a preference for bilateral solutions to foreign policy problems may well be compatible with the permanent liberal preference for internal restrictions on the use of force, but it is not compatible with the occasional liberal preference for multilateral internationalism, the latter being merely part of a ‘protective belt’ of liberalism, while the former is derived from its core. A ‘liberal’ emphasis on internal ‘restrictions on the use of force’ does not necessarily challenge a ‘realist’ emphasis on ‘bilateralism’ per se, but a ‘liberal’ assumption like ‘multilateralism’ most certainly does.

An orthodox foreign policy assertion, moreover, can be challenged by more than one counter-assertion. As already noted, an emphasis on bilateralism may be subject to challenge by both those who favour multilateralism and those who favour go-it-alone approaches to state interaction like neutralism, isolationism or a unilateral quest for hegemony. Challenges to an understanding of a particular nation state as possessing a unique set of rules or values based on a common history or culturally constructed society may come from internationalists or modernisers who see tradition as either counter to the worldly state that they wish to create or something that might be used to convince people that their history has inclined them towards convergence with other modern states anyway. Alternately, an understanding of a particular nation state as possessing a unique
set of rules or values based on a common history may be challenged by conceptualisations of more ‘rational’ forms of pride in the nation, that is, pride based solely on the nation’s pecking order in terms of military power or material wellbeing, formed without a sense of cultural or historical uniqueness. A number of counter-assertions may be offered to challenge an orthodox foreign policy assertion.

**Positions on the national interest**

Discourse on foreign policy stems from tensions between three orthodox assertions and the counter-assertions their imposition on a population generate. Because convergence between the various orthodox foreign policy assertions is possible, moreover, both the orthodox assertions and counter-assertions interact in ways that simultaneously condition particular views on foreign policy. This can be represented by drawing a circle to represent discourse on foreign policy within a given state and dividing it by three straight lines that pass through the centre at equidistant angles to each other (see Figure 2.2). Each line represents the cleavage between emphasis on a particular orthodox foreign policy assertion (+) and the counter-assertions it generates (−). The spaces between the lines represent six different lenses – analogous to the categories outlined above – through which to view foreign policy conducted by a modern state. Henceforth, these will be referred to as *positions on the national interest*, or simply ‘positions’.

Positions structure views on the national interest. Usually, constructivist studies assume that it is norms and institutions, and the overarching ‘national identity’ of which they are a component, that determine national interests; that is, what a particular state ‘wants’ is predicated on how the society mutually constitutive of that state identifies itself (constitutive norms) and the historical rules that otherwise govern state behaviour (regulatory norms) (Katzenstein, 18-19). Such studies might identify the various positions outlined here as a ‘taxonomy’ of different norms that structure state interests (Dobson 2003). Indeed, insofar as positions arise from contested assumptions inherent in the construction of the ‘institution’ known as ‘the state’ it is understandable that they might be seen as normative entities.
However, there is a difference between norms and positions. Positions assume a domestic structure based on tensions derived from orthodox definitions of the state that is not usually necessary for the construction of norms. Individuals may change their positions, but assuming that the conditions that define statehood remain static – which they must in the study of a particular state’s national interests and foreign policy – the range of new positions that an individual might adopt is limited. Moreover, insofar as the state and its tensions are bracketed from analysis, positions are ontologically prior to the construction of a given individual’s identity. For the purposes of the analysis here they are pre-social. Individuals therefore generally ‘fall into’ or ‘are attracted’ to a particular position because of their own political motivations, or because the position can be aligned with other
aspects of their identity. Thereafter, however, positions will help to define that individual’s identity and therefore the way they perceive the national interest and argue about foreign policy. These ‘advocates’ of particular positions will each give their position strength when they argue for its dominance as the lens through which the state determines foreign policy.

As argued in greater detail later, competition and cooperation between advocates of particular positions on the national interest leads to the formation of narratives which claim to represent the identity of the state. They help actors define their interests in more narrow ways than the broader positions outlined here, and are less reliant on an argument generated from the structure of the state. They are usually created by discursive attempts to highlight commonalities when advocates of a particular dominant position attempt to reach out to advocates of weaker position in order to prevent challengers from arising. Advocates of dominant positions may therefore ‘play down’ differences between their position and others, thus generating new narratives about the appropriate nature of foreign policy. These narratives then become difficult for challengers to the status quo to overcome, and therefore help to provide stability in policymaking. Nevertheless, narratives are always subject to change. This is clearly not the case with positions, which exist as long as there is a state.

The six positions on the national interest are as follows (starting from the top position on Figure 2.2 and moving clockwise).

1. Neo-mercantilism

   Orthodox assertions: 1) Bilateralism is the primary mode of relations; 2) Administrative restrictions on use of external force.

   Counter-assertion: Rational objectives and strategies drive policy.

Neo-mercantilism is a position that places an emphasis on bilateral modes of foreign policy and advocates restrictions on the use of force in foreign relations. The goal of a neo-mercantilist foreign policy is for the state to accumulate wealth through rational
transactions that do not tie it to multilateral institutions where its action might be constrained. However, its advocates do not seek to augment their state’s military power, seeing the maintenance of robust national forces for overseas operations as a distraction from the goal of wealth creation. Because neo-mercantilists believe the national interest is to foster mutually beneficial and sustained bilateral trade relations, identity politics that bring the state into conflict with others and notions of national uniqueness are avoided. Moreover, mercantilists see internal social and stability as a clear prerequisite for achieving their economic goals, meaning that identity politics on a domestic level should also be avoided.

2. Neo-liberal institutionalism

Orthodox assertion: Administrative restrictions on use of external force.

Counter-assertions: 1) Multilateralism is the primary mode of relations; 2) Rational objectives and strategies drive policy.

Neo-liberal institutionalism is a position that emphasises restrictions on the use of force in foreign relations. The goal of a neo-liberal institutionalist foreign policy is for the state to achieve peace and prosperity by strengthening multinational international organisations which regulate against conflict and structure the terms of international trade in the state’s favour. The state should not seek military power to achieve these goals, in fact, the accumulation of excessive military power might lead to regional security dilemmas which would run counter to foreign policy objectives. However, a modest military should be maintained for the purpose of collectively upholding the international order with other states, but the acquisition of military forces should be predicated on the regulation of conflict through multilateral institutions. Because neo-liberals view the national interest in terms of forming sustained and mutually beneficial multilateral relationships with others, identity politics that bring the state into conflict with others and notions of national uniqueness should be avoided. Indeed, foreign policy arguments based on notions of commonality or potential commonality among states are key to neo-liberal internationalism.
3. **Neutralism**

**Orthodox assertions:**
1) Administrative restrictions on use of external force;
2) Unique historical identity drives foreign policy.

**Counter-assertion:** Neutralism is the primary mode of relations.

Neutralism is a position that holds that it is always in the national interest to keep the state out of ‘entangling alliances’, distant wars, and, if possible, war of any kind. The quest for national military power is seen as destabilising, and therefore restrictions on the use of force are seen as desirable. The quest for a neutral foreign policy is predicated on notions of national uniqueness that may arise from conceptions of a common national history or a primordial sense of the nation, including historically or culturally informed views about the relationship between history or culture and geography.

4. **Romanticism**

**Orthodox assertion:** Unique historical identity drives foreign policy.

**Counter-assertions:**
1) Few administrative restrictions on external use of force;
2) Unilateralism is the primary mode of relations.

Romanticism is a position that emphasises an understanding of foreign policy informed by a sense of national exceptionalism. It is usually accompanied by a strong aversion to universalist notions of morality and a prescription that individuals instead take pride in their nation, to which they are intrinsically bound. Its advocates believe that the national interest lies either; in remaining a completely independent, but adequately armed, actor in the international system; in developing relationships with others that recognise the cultural superiority of the state in question; or, in extreme cases if the state has an abundance of capabilities, moving toward establishing its hegemony over the international system. Advocates believe that the right to use external force is the unrestricted prerogative of the state, and indeed must be used when national integrity and honour is at stake.
5. Classical Realism

Orthodox assertions: 1) Unique historical identity drives foreign policy  
2) Bilateralism is primary mode of relations

Counter-assertion: Few administrative restraints on external use of force

Classical realism is a position that places an emphasis on bilateral modes of foreign policy and whose advocates argue against restrictions on the use of force. Advocates may see claims of unique and positive social identity as a tool to augment power by unifying the members of the state. However, the concept of a unique and positive social identity also shapes interests. Classical realists believe that it is right to augment the international influence of the state so that what they see as their proud national culture might be recognised as equal to the great cultures of the world. To take its place as a leader among nations, they argue that their state must prove that it can manage the world order alongside other proud states. Entering into equal alliances with powerful states is therefore considered a source of prestige, as it denotes that the state is recognised by others for its role as commensurate to its own cultural greatness. Powerful military capabilities to play an active role in alliances are therefore desirable, not only for the sake of ‘balance of power’ politics, but also to exude a sense of international leadership. The only international constraints on the expansion of state power are the limits that other, more powerful, states will impose. The only legitimate domestic constraints on state power are the material capability of the state and the willpower of its leaders and population.

6. Defensive Realism

Orthodox assertion: Bilateralism is the primary mode of relations.

Counter-assertions: 1) Few administrative restraints on external use of force; 
2) Rational objectives and strategies drive policy.

Defensive realism is a position that places an emphasis on bilateral modes of foreign policy and whose advocates argue against administrative restrictions on the use of force. However, unlike classical realism, the state does not attempt to gain power to augment its
national prestige or to assert its own unique identity. Instead, the maintenance of security for the state and its citizens in an ever-hostile world is considered the primary national interest. If augmenting its power would result in arms races with rivals and heighten tensions in its region, or other situations which would make it less secure, the state should find other methods of securing itself. It may therefore enter into alliances and engage in balance of power politics. If there is no threat, the state will not augment its power.

**The illusion of strategy and theory**

It is important to understand that these positions on the national interest are not an articulation of the various strands of IR theory. So far, while they may individually represent assumptions about how the world works, collectively they say nothing about the structure of the international system and the interaction of states. Some of them are tagged with the familiar nomenclature of theories in the field, precisely because the argument here is that much IR theory is nothing more than imaginings of how the international system works based on positions which appear at the sub-state level. Each position thus represents at once an conceptualisation of what is ‘good’ for the state, a prescription for viewing the world and the intentions of others, and a framework upon which to build coherent proposal for a national strategy – positions determine what interests are legitimate, but also broadly prescribe legitimate methods of mobilizing what are seen as national resources to achieve them.

However, truly ‘grand’ strategy – the notion that states rationally identify their objectives based on the structural arrangements of the international system and then implement long-standing plans to mobilise their resources in the most effective way possible to achieve these objectives – is an illusion. As Betts argues, even narrower formulations of strategy are ‘usually difficult and risky’ (R. K. Betts 2000). Competition between advocates of the various positions at the domestic level means that foreign policy is often, if not always, only temporarily stable. Political actors place more importance on winning domestic fights than they do over planning their external strategy, and even when they do agree that foreign policy is important, they often do not agree on
its appropriate formulation. Politics do not stop at the water’s edge, and states do not have permanent interests.

Indeed, it is only successful competition on the domestic level that allows one political group to implement any comprehensive foreign policy strategy at all. While the actions of a state may be analysed in hindsight as the result of purely ‘rational’ or ‘strategic’ choices, this is because within pluralistic ‘groups’ such as states, and particularly democratic states, a number of different ways to order priorities – an important component of rational behaviour – exist at once (R. K. Betts 2000, 40-41). To depict ‘successful’ state behaviour as ‘rational’, one only needs to go back in time and cherry-pick those rational arguments presented in favour of it, while ignoring those often equally rational arguments against it. Selective raiding is again instrumental in allowing reality to conform to theory.

What actually motivates particular individuals to adopt the positions on the national interest that they do will be largely outside the scope of this study, but, to paraphrase Robert W. Cox (1981, 128): Positions on the national interest are often ‘for someone and for some purpose’ (emphasis in original). Individuals are often attracted to a position on the national interest because it helps them retain their status or is congruent with their other political goals. These individual political goals may or may not be intrinsically connected to a position on the national interest, but proponents of a particular position may have felt compelled to adopt it to advance their political standing. Cox might say that it is no surprise, for example, that foreign policy advisors to governments often subscribe to realist notions of the international system, with assumptions about state power guiding rational principles, because these elites have, for their own selfish reasons, little desire to see theories that acknowledge ‘popular’ conceptions of the national interest play a role in policy because it would be to admit some degree of public input into affairs policymakers see as ‘theirs’. Alternately, perhaps such individuals do genuinely believe that realist theory helps them to make sensible decisions about foreign policy. In either case, as they make their assertions about foreign policy, these ‘realists’ replicate notions of the world that accord with the position they take, thus helping to reinforce the particular position in domestic political discourse.
These views on the ‘natural’ behaviour of states, whatever position on the national interest they constitute often rely on a monist view of the international system, that is, one where all states are seen as ‘like-units’ that ‘think’ the same or similar ‘thoughts’ on foreign policy as those which proponents of a particular foreign policy position advocate for their state. The way in which you see the motives and behaviour of other states often depends on what you believe is in the best interests of your own state.

This is particularly true for proponents of ‘material’ theories who argue that all states structure their objectives in fundamentally similar ways and who downplay the role of identity in international politics. Defensive realists would argue, for example, based on a monist concept of state construction (state sovereignty) that states are predisposed to ordering their preferences to acquire ‘just enough’ military power to provide for their security, an assumption that has clear implications for how they see the structure of the international system (Kydd 2005, 16-18). Neoliberal institutionalists might argue that all states will eventually see that it is in their best interests to eschew conflict to work primarily through international organisations to achieve their individual national interests (Leonard 2005, 66).

However, those who rely on identity to drive their theories of interstate relations can be guilty of monism as well, sometimes arguing that pride in the uniqueness of the state is actually reflective of a desire by all nations to gain respect for their own unique culture and history (Niebuhr and Lovin 1996, 211). Indeed, as the Japanese political scientist Maruyama Masao (1963, 2) has noted ‘The fact that modern States are known as “nation-states” suggests that their nationalism is no fortuitous aspect of these countries but rather their fundamental attribute’.

That may be so, but sovereignty and administrative order are the fundamental attributes of the state as well. The notion that all states adopt one fundamentally similar foreign policy objective based on commonly accessible understandings of the international order is false. States are to some degree ‘like units’: bilateralism, administrative restrictions on the use of force, and the uniqueness of society are all necessary conditions of the modern state, and generate tensions that structure positions on the national interest in similar ways across all states. These tensions cannot be overcome
as long as the modern state exists, and give rise to roughly similar positions across different states on the appropriate nature of foreign policy.

But different foreign or national security policies between states do exist. They are the result of contests between different groups advocating for particular positions on the national interest. Positions may be roughly analogous across states, but the distribution of power within national discussions on foreign policy, that is, among positions, accounts for difference in foreign policy. Domestic power struggles and variant interpretations of external events will also give these tensions a particular ‘thrust’. As argued below, complex competition between advocates of the positions structures foreign policy, particularly security policy, often in unpredictable ways.

Non-positions

There are two other possible ways that the orthodox assertions and counter-assertions might categorise the perceptions of individuals, but it is difficult to define these two categories as ‘positions’ or even ‘views’ on the national interest or foreign policy. Unlike individuals grouped according to the other six positions, these two categories do not offer a view on the national interest, and therefore have no normative prescriptions for foreign policy. There are two such non-positions: one which accepts, and another which rejects, all orthodox assertions. While they may not be politically neutral or apathetic in other areas, people who hold to the non-positions generally have little intention of entering and influencing debates in the public space about the appropriate role for the state in international affairs. For that reason, they are mentioned only in passing here. They are not applied in the analysis of the following chapters.

Acceptance of all orthodox assertions

The first non-position refers to a stance usually held by a vast majority of the general public in many developed states. These individuals have no problem accepting all orthodox assertions simultaneously. Because the official agents of the state usually advocate a certain degree of official socialisation to have its citizens accept the premises
of the state, individuals often receive both overt and subtle messages about how the state either achieved its independence or came to be as a sovereign and inviolate unit; about the notion that the armed forces and the police are legitimate authorities that maintain order through the law; and about how history or culture makes their state-bound society – that is, their nation – both unique and special. These lessons are essential to the modern project of ensuring loyalty to the state, and they are reinforced in everyday discourse through a range of channels such as the broadcast and print media, ‘patriotic’ advertising, classroom education, and through populist politics (Billig 1995, 6).

As a grand narrative that is useful for crafting a foreign policy or national security strategy, a comprehensive synthesis of these messages, is, however, impossible, for the very reason that I have argued lies behind Katzenstein’s arguments about convergence. Accepting all three assertions therefore means engaging in a type of cognitive dissonance. Nobody who thinks long and hard about synthesising the three orthodox assumptions to yield prescriptions about foreign policy or national interests can do so. Therefore, this non-position is largely attractive to those who do not spend a significant amount of time engaged in debates on foreign policy or national security. Issues in their daily lives or political issues on other topics take precedence in their discussions. Particular individuals, in fact a majority in most states at certain times, wax lyrical about how the decision making of their state should be true to its ‘core personality’, advocate level-headed notions of bilateralism defining the state’s interests, and yet call for their state to consistently engage in greater international cooperation with other nations, all at the same time. But only those who do think long and hard about foreign policy can advocate such a non-position. An intelligent foreign policy argument cannot be sustained on such a basis.

This is not to argue for an elitist model of foreign policymaking, however. First, not all those interested in foreign policy debates need to be confined to policy elites. Citizens may be able to engage forcefully in foreign policy debates through protest, NGO activity, and more recently, through more spontaneously coordinated grassroots movements based on ease of access to interactive media. While it may be the case that most who hold to the non-positions in foreign policy debates belong to the general population, it does not follow that informed debate on foreign policy cannot come from popular sources. Second, in democracies especially, but elsewhere as well, it is often
precisely those who are not interested in foreign policy that advocates of the various positions on the national interest are trying to attract to their ‘cause’. Barring the use of force to crush dissent, elites can solicit the support of the uninterested by offering them incentives in other areas more relevant to their lives. Alternately actors engaged in debates on the national interest can attempt to persuade those who are, at least for the moment, apathetic about such matters. Persuasion tends to be more sustainable, as it means that the persuaded do not withdraw their support for a particular position once benefits in other areas are withdrawn.

**Rejection of all orthodox assertions**

The second non-position rejects all orthodox assertions, because it finds state-based assertions an inappropriate lens through which to view transnational problems or views the state itself as the cause of insecurity, or, as often is the case, both. This accounts for the many post-modern approaches to IR and security issues that attempt to deconstruct IR theory and the concept of the state in order to show that both are a method of preserving power relationships between individuals. It also accounts for advocates of non-traditional approaches who have left the state behind in their definitions of ‘security’, preferring to use the term outside of a state context to analyse a range of issues, from the roles and treatment of women in war, to the implications of natural disasters on impoverished communities, and child warfare. While research on security issues that does not focus on the state has invigorated the study of IR, providing much of the more interesting work in the field over recent decades, by its very nature it has little to do with explaining the formulation of the national interest and foreign policy, save to deconstruct those terms.

The central focus for academics and advocates of individuals and non-state-based communities is to identify problems, often, as they see it, caused by states, and alleviate human suffering. When such advocates petition governments to intervene, however, they usually do so by stressing the effects such issues might have on national security, and recommend or describe particular positions on the national interest, usually liberal institutionalism, to solve ‘international’ or ‘transnational’ problems. At that point, they cease to be advocates or narrators of a ‘non-position’ and are subsumed by one of the
positions on the national interest. Katzenstein’s (2003, 1993) work on how Germany and Japan have dealt with terrorism is illustrative here. While he claims that orthodox theories of foreign policy have neglected terrorism as a ‘non-traditional’ security issue because threats do not originate from states, his is not an exploration of terrorism as a problem per se, but of particular state responses to terrorism. Katzenstein’s articles outline the policies that particular states have applied to the transnational problem of terrorism in light of domestic thinking about security. He does not explore the motivations, discourse, or physical methods terrorists themselves deploy in their assault on the state: this latter approach would be an example of a ‘non-position’.

Indeed, terrorism or violence against the state is itself perhaps the ultimate rejection of all of its orthodox assertions. This is not to imply that rejection of all orthodox assertions inherently and exclusively leads to violence – adherents of the six positions on the national interest outlined above can use violent methods to attempt to achieve power or otherwise advance their aims. But such violence is usually violence against other members involved in discourse on the national interest, not a challenge to the legitimacy of the state per se. The actions of terrorists and criminals who reject any formulation of foreign policy precisely because they see the state as illegitimate or do not otherwise care for its logical assumptions may have a significant impact on foreign policy, but they do not contribute discursively to its formation. The ability to engage in discourse on the national interest requires a commitment to emphasise, and therefore view as legitimate, at least certain aspects of how the concept of the state is constructed. The six positions on the national interest may yield various understandings on how to deal with terrorism – violent acts on the part of individuals and groups which are designed to challenge the authority of the state – but the terrorist acts themselves fall well outside discourse on foreign policy, even if a minority of those formally defined as citizens are attracted to the cause.
Policy formation and narratives

*Dominance, and compromise and competition between positions*

Because of the tensions that are inherent in the construction of the state, foreign policy is the result of constant contest between proponents of the different positions on the national interest. Because proponents of one position never agree entirely with proponents of another, in theory competition between all is feasible all the time. Indeed, the ultimate goal of those interested in foreign policy is to achieve a level of dominance from which they can implement the policy agenda that reflects their position. Therefore, competition between proponents of all positions would seem to be a given. In fact, however, proponents of different positions will form uneasy alliances with the proponents of others on a domestic level. While proponents of any two positions can never agree totally, it is possible to define policies that allow either to be satisfied with the status quo, to live with it as the best option available, or to make tradeoffs where proponents of the dominant position allow others space in the foreign policy-making process as long as this does not challenge the domestic balance of power.

Not everybody in foreign policy debates will be satisfied, and those who are excluded from the policy-making process, or who simply reject the dominance of others, will continue challenge the policy arrangements until it is their position that determines policy. This does not mean that aggressive challengers are always successful in displacing the dominant position. They may well succeed in their efforts to remove the dominant actors. But the social disruption caused by overly aggressive efforts to change the way foreign policy is made may have the effect of weakening the challenger by turning others, most importantly those with no interest in foreign policy, against them, causing them to fail and opening the field for one of the other positions to achieve dominance in place of the challenged.
National narratives and national identity

It is here where narratives about the nation come into play. Constructivist studies usually place norms in a prominent position within their frameworks for understanding IR, and because the model of assertions, counter-assertions and positions on the national interest is based on the social construction of the state as an ideal type, the norms associated with the state are constantly in the background here too. However, viewing the various positions outlined above as a distribution of norms or taxonomy of norms would be a mistake, as the positions are pre-social. That is, they are defined by tensions that exist prior to their proponents’ specific arguments in favour of them. A normative national narrative is, however, a part of how the state operates. Such narratives are built up by proponents of dominant positions who repeat foreign policy practices and messages over time, resulting in the idea that a given practice is ‘natural’, and unlike the positions on the national interest, narratives are particular to the experience of a given state.

National narratives are generally formed when proponents of the dominant position and proponents of another position have come to a compromise on foreign policy. Narratives are then constructed, normally by the proponents of the dominant position, to maintain the status quo by playing down their differences with others. Supporters of the ‘non-dominant’ positions may need to be persuaded by supporters of the dominant position, but such persuasion is possible. Repetition of a narrative of commonality, although it may initially be for the purpose of persuading others, will reinforce the notion of the prevailing general approach to foreign policy. It will stake its claim as ‘national identity’, that is, a statement about what kind of community the nation is. At this point, the narrative will enter the popular culture as well as policy debates, and over time will in a sense become the de facto position of those who are not particularly interested in issues of foreign policy. Note, however, that these markers of national identity are not necessarily informed by a sense of a common historical bond, or for that matter any national uniqueness. They do not constitute the same sense of identity which is propounded by the classical realist, romantic and isolationist positions outlined above. And they are also always challenged by those active in foreign policy debates who are not satisfied with the status quo.
While such narratives explain a certain degree of consistency, they are therefore not permanent. They are, however, convenient markers of an identity which is comfortable to most people in periods of change. That is, when the dominance of a given position or an alliance between positions is weakened by challengers within the foreign policy discourse, and change in the power structure between positions seems almost inevitable, those that wish to establish their position as the dominant one will be more successful in implementing policy if they can argue that their particular position best represents a reinterpretation of the existing national identity. This is how proponents of aspiring dominant positions will convince the general public that their cause is legitimate, and in time they will be able to modify the narrative that constitutes national identity to suit their own preferences. Those who do not at least address national identity while trying to establish dominance will find the going harder, and those who overtly reject the narratives established by others will probably fail. If not, their policies may not outlast their time in office.

Conclusion

The state as an ideal type thus manifests the conditions necessary for its existence in the real world as a set of three inherent tensions. These tensions, and the positions on the national interest they generate, are in theory identical for each nation state. However, the distribution of power amongst proponents of each position on a domestic level will determine to implementation of various policy choices, whereas those positions, including the dominant one, that favour the status quo will determine the enunciation of national identity claims in the form of a narrative. While dominant positions are continuously challenged, and will eventually fall to such competition, the narrative remains in order to be shaped by those that come later. Change to identity, then, comes from within.

Change to national identity is also usually incremental rather than sudden. This is not to say that large international events are completely irrelevant to the formation of new foreign policy positions, but it is more useful to conceive of these events as *proximate causes* – often referred to as “‘occasions” for specific outcomes rather than “causes”’
(Gerring 2001, 141) – not events direct deep change in the domestic order in themselves. New foreign policies are generally caused not by structural shifts in the international system – indeed the theory outlined here renders even the existence of systemic state interaction, rather than a series of events between states, questionable – but by shifts between positions already underway at the domestic level. Certainly, such shifts can be accelerated by occurrences abroad which focus attention onto a specific issue area and identify it as a locus of debate between positions. However, this debate must be filtered through domestic arrangements and thus the policy responses that its outcomes entail cannot be predicted merely by observing international shifts or pivotal global events. This will become clear as the tensions, positions, and interaction between positions inherent in Japanese foreign policy are outlined in the following chapters.

State behaviour is the result of competition and cooperation within the state between proponents of positions constituted by the tensions inherent to the ideal type of the modern nation state. Ultimately, national interests are what the state makes of them.
Chapter 3: Structuring tensions – the occupation and beyond

The tensions that underlie Japanese thinking on the national interest were particularly acute in the decades after the Second World War, when they were being shaped and moulded by the experience of defeat, occupation and Japan’s ‘re-emergence’ as a newly independent nation. A unique set of circumstances shaped policy in Japan during the post-war occupation and the years immediately afterwards when many Japanese struggled to define what ‘independence’ in a world of emerging Cold War rivalries actually implied. As controversial literary critic Katō Norihiro (1997, 46) notes, ‘to understand this period we normally use the concepts of conservative versus progressive (hoshu tai shinpo), constitutional revision versus constitutional protection (kaiken to goken), and realism versus idealism (genjitsushugi tai risōshugi)’. He also notes that many who had described Japan’s postwar ‘condition’ before him viewed these terms as structured on either side of a dichotomous debate.

However, according to Katō it is impossible to sensibly ‘discuss the essence of the period known as the “post-war” using these concepts’. This is because debates over constitutional revision and ‘realism versus idealism’ in international affairs, in Katō’s interpretation, merely bob on the surface of the waters of a deeper debate on Japan’s identity, or ‘personality’ (jinkaku) which he sees ‘split’ over questions of how Japan’s conduct in the war is interpreted. He thus places himself in stark contrast to those, described in the previous chapter, who view historical issues as secondary to ‘rational’ debates over the capacity of the state to use force and the place of the state within the international system.

While Katō’s interpretation of Japan’s post-war identity dilemma is different to that presented here, he has nevertheless clearly identified the three major assertions that define post-war Japanese tensions on the national interest: 1) Japan’s ‘realist’ bilateral relationship with the United States; 2) strong administrative restrictions on the use of force, symbolised by Japan’s ‘peace constitution’; and 3) conceptions of a unique national identity in Japan, particularly in relation to the nation’s history of war in Asia and the Pacific. These post-war concepts are Japanese variants of general tensions described in the previous chapter, arising from the nature of the state itself. This chapter
reviews the shape of those tensions as informed by the policies and practices devised and implemented during post-war occupation and the years immediately thereafter. The form that the tensions took during this time still constitutes the basic shape of tensions in Japan’s discourse on the national interest.

The nature of the US-led occupation of Japan

Many commentators envisage the post-war occupation from 1945 until April 1952 as a time when the Japanese government had little control over the destiny of their nation. While this is not a particularly accurate view, the occupation was formally conducted by the ‘Allied Powers’, with troops from the British Commonwealth, namely Australia, India, New Zealand and the United Kingdom serving in areas away from the capital and a seven-nation Allied Council advising the occupation’s General Headquarters (GHQ). There was also an 11-, and later 13-nation Far Eastern Commission (FEC) in theory directing operations from Washington. However, real control of allied occupation policy was exercised by American military officials led by the US General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), who was based in Tokyo. In the early stages of the occupation SCAP (this abbreviation can refer to both the person and the occupation authorities in general, the former sense is employed here) saw Japan almost as his own personal fiefdom, at least in terms of how he viewed his relations with officials in Washington (Schaller 1997, 16). No matter how many ‘Allied’ organs were established, occupation policy was largely an American affair, at least as far as non-Japanese actors were concerned.

In the early stages of the occupation, MacArthur, well known in the United States as a conservative, oversaw the extremely liberal reforms in Japan detailed in guidelines from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945), even though he was also allowed a great deal of latitude to implement occupation policy according to his own preferences (Moore 1998, 90). MacArthur’s autonomy from Washington during the early occupation period was testimony not only to the relatively low strategic priority US thinkers placed on Japan until 1948; the general’s reputation as a war hero, and the fact that he was on record stating that he would not turn down the Republican Party nomination for the 1948
election if it were offered to him also meant that he had significant political clout in the United States. Despite tense relations between SCAP and the then US President Harry Truman, officials in Washington often left the general to his own devices. While he had a reputation for conservatism, SCAP therefore came to see the many liberal reforms implemented by the occupation as connected to his own legacy (Lowe 1997, 12, Kataoka 1991, 57).

However, there is no contradiction between the general’s personal conservatism and his support for the liberal occupation policies. MacArthur was charged with ensuring that Japan would not be a threat to the United States and its allies after independence, and the early reforms prioritised the dissolution of economic and militarist elites, the ‘purge’ of self-serving conservative ‘politicians’ from positions of responsibility in government and industry, the ‘promotion’ of ‘rational’ bureaucrats to political circles, and even, during the early occupation, the encouragement of labour unions, communists and socialists. It also attempted to bring about the elimination of nativist sources of nationalism – what the Americans often referred to as Japanese ‘feudalism’ – by the creation of a new national narrative of peace, the encouragement of a policy of national neutralism, and the guarantee of rights, freedoms, and equality by means of a new constitution, Article 9 of which would renounce war and reject the use of force as a means of settling international disputes. Each of these ‘liberal’ measures was a component of the overall American plan to defang its former enemy.

MacArthur was aided in this endeavour by US officials who had served in government under US President Franklin D. Roosevelt before his death in April 1945, and who were ideologically committed to the liberal ‘New Deal’ policies for which Roosevelt had stood. From 1945 to 1949, officials in the Government Section (GS) of GHQ saw post-war Japan almost in terms of a liberal social experiment, and were motivated by their own ideological reasons for implementing MacArthur’s agenda. Further, there were virtually no experts steeped in the culture, language and history of Japan among them, and most engaged in barely any interaction with the ‘native population’ (Boyle 1993, 317, G. K. Goodman 1968, 40). MacArthur himself only rarely talked to ‘knowledgeable non-elitist’ Western scholars of Japan, such as the liberal Canadian diplomat scholar E. H. Norman, but even then, ‘most of his “conversations”
tended to end up as monologues’ delivered by the general (Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II 1999, 223). To the extent that there were few restraints from Washington or preconceived notions about cultural constraints, GHQ, and officials in GS in particular, regarded Japan as a blank canvas on which to paint their new social order.

However, MacArthur’s political influence in Washington waned after he made a poor showing in the 1948 Wisconsin Republican primary elections and his liberal reforms in Japan came under criticism by the anti-communist demagogue, Senator Joseph McCarthy (Schaller 1997, 15). Thereafter, directives from Washington carried more weight in the forging of occupation policy, and within GHQ the more conservative information intelligence section (G2) began to dominate over GS. The occupation’s conservative direction was all but confirmed after Chinese Communist forces declared the formation of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. Many policymakers in Washington, if they had not done so already, now perceived Japan as a crucial component of an emerging strategy to contain communism. When North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea, this only confirmed their suspicions about the spread of the red menace. (Large 1992, 155).

Japan’s position, whether its politicians and inhabitants liked it or not, was now on the front lines of the confrontation between the forces of communism and the free world. This had a stark effect on the way policymakers in Washington saw the occupation. Occupation forces began to suppress potential ‘communist’ activity, and organised labour was an early and clear target of this change in policy. Although SCAP had cancelled a major strike as early as 1947, this had been to prevent economic disruption from threatening the liberal reforms. In general up until the reverse course, union activity was encouraged. However, by June 1950, even before the outbreak of the Korean War, the National Police Headquarters had placed a ban on all demonstrations and public gatherings (shūkai) as part of efforts ordered by GHQ to suppress communist forces. These efforts also saw GHQ order a purge of leading Communist Party committee members (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 473). In July, a ‘National Police Reserve’ (NPR) was established to crack down on the forces of internal disorder. To bolster conservative forces in Japan, many A-class war crimes suspects were released from jail without trial in
late 1948, and from 1951 conservatives were ‘depurged’ after ‘Red Purges’ targeting suspected communists in positions of responsibility expanded to industry, education and the civil service (Japanese Cabinet 1950). Japan’s leaders also came to the conclusion, under the circumstances, that their nation’s integration into a defence relationship with the United States would result in Washington granting Japan its formal independence (Miyazawa 2007, 21-24). The latter half of the occupation was the reverse of the former in many ways.

Inconsistencies in occupation policy between the early liberal period and the onset of the Cold War in Asia exacerbated tensions in Japan. In order to resist the formation of the NPR, the socialists and communists – the latter initially denouncing the ‘pacifist’ constitution as a dangerous document that left Japan defenceless (Dower 1999, 395) – became the new champions of the post-war ‘peace’ constitution, which stipulated that ‘air, sea, and land forces shall never be maintained’. Former political elites, depurged after the reverse course, bridled against the rule of the ‘bureaucrats-turned-politicians’ (G. L. Curtis 1988, 7), who they thought were unworthy of leading Japan, and appealed to nationalist populism in order to bolster their position. The bureaucrats-turned-politicians meanwhile, partly cooperating with the occupation forces and partly resisting them, attempted to fend off their erstwhile political rulers, at the same time as they agitated, suppressed, and even occasionally mildly encouraged the ‘left’ to shore up their power against the occupation forces. The early liberal period of the occupation emboldened certain political actors, while the reverse course encouraged their rivals, leading to multi-directional struggles for dominance that would define politics in Japan for decades to come (Kataoka 1991, 69).

The observation that the occupation deepened tensions and exacerbated rivalries is not, however, to make the facile suggestion that these deep rifts in the Japanese political world are ‘America’s fault’ or even, as is occasionally implied by Japanese authors writing in popular media, that the occupation was a plan carefully coordinated by ‘America’ from the start to forge Japanese dependence on Washington throughout the post-war period (Y. Kobayashi 1998, 49-51). Such suggestions would stem from an essentialist view of the United States, and deny the different and complex views within America and GHQ on how to deal with Japan. Indeed, the policies that individual
Americans wished to promote coincided with their perception of the US national interest – a concept itself subject to pluralistic interpretation. Occupation policy was heavily influenced by contests between different discursive positions in the United States, which may have made it seem erratic to Japanese who might have expected a more ‘rational’ American process.

More importantly, a view of the United States as all-powerful would also exaggerate the level of control that the Americans maintained over the occupation. While the Japanese government was formally subordinate to SCAP, occupation policy was to be executed through its offices (Shibata 2005, 60, Joint Chiefs of Staff 1945). In reality, the Japanese side would often be in a position to outmanoeuvre GHQ, relying on linguistic barriers to full American control and GHQ’s ignorance of existing Japanese bureaucratic structures to achieve their goals. As Johnson (1982, 177) notes, this meant that in bureaucratic battles ‘SCAP was not so much “supreme” as a major player on a national chessboard, sometimes the queen, but more often merely the pawn’. Indeed, at times Japanese bureaucrats were extremely powerful players, arguably even more so than they would be after Japan regained its independence (Johnson 1982, 176). For the duration of the occupation SCAP, GHQ, and even some individuals in Washington should therefore best be seen as part of a temporary domestic Japanese constitutional structure along with multiple other players. They could not assume that the Japanese government was above trying to take advantage of situations when it could, or that it would carry out SCAP’s orders precisely when this did not coincide with the government’s own interests.

Nevertheless, the post-war view that the occupation forces and the United States in general had complete control over the occupation, the image of GHQ as a foreign occupier, the methods it used to implement policy, and most of all, the policy direction of the early occupation juxtaposed to that of the reverse course all served to deepen tensions over the fundamental choices of state policy in Japan. Indeed, the reforms implemented during the occupation continue to be an irritant for many within the Japanese political elite. The broad tensions which already divided discourse on foreign policy in Japan were thus deepened and infused with particular meaning during the occupation.
Domestic restrictions on the use of force: the constitution

The most immediate reform the occupation authorities instituted was a policy of disarmament, including the abolition of the Japanese military and the decommissioning of imperial Japanese soldiers. This was followed in 1947 by the promulgation of the peace constitution initially drafted by officials in GS. The need for GHQ to author a new constitution became apparent to GS head Courtney Whitney when details of a draft constitution being prepared by Minister of State Matsumoto Jōji were leaked to the press (Mainichi Shinbun 1 February 1946). Whitney considered the Matsumoto draft ‘extremely conservative in character’ (Whitney 1946c, 40), and after an investigation concluding that SCAP held the authority to initiate constitutional reform if he so desired, GS set about preparing its own draft according to a brief outline supplied by MacArthur (Whitney 1946b, GHQ internal document 1946).

In addition to renouncing war, the new constitution relegated the emperor to the position of mere ‘symbol of the unity of the people’, rather than that of a divine ruler as under the old constitution, and guaranteed a raft of rights and civil liberties previously unseen in Japan, a reflection of the fact that it was drafted by idealistic GS officials during a hasty eight-day session. Working under time constraints and with virtually no instructions from SCAP on how to arrange Japan’s organs of state (GHQ internal document 1946), the GS committee imported into their draft what they saw as the best traditions from the constitutions of other nations. They also favourably considered at least one proposal for a new constitution floated by a private group of ‘liberals’ in Japan (Whitney 1946a, 26-39). On February 13, 1946, Whitney then presented this draft to Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshida Shigeru and Matsumoto. The latter had earlier submitted his own proposal to GHQ officials for their review, and Whitney mentioned that SCAP considered the conservative Matsumoto draft ‘wholly unacceptable’. Both Japanese ministers, and later the rest of the Japanese Cabinet, were completely taken by surprise by this new development (Kades, Rowell and Hussey 1946).
The ‘forced constitution’ thesis

One of the more common criticisms of the post-war constitution is thus that it is a foreign instrument forced upon the Japanese nation, a view that has come to be known as the ‘pushed’ or ‘forced constitution thesis’ (oshitsuke kenpō ron). The first major political actor to air this view after the occupation was Matsumoto, who in 1954 revealed that Whitney told him that the other allied powers were pushing to see the emperor deposed and tried as a war criminal (Maki 1980, 69). According to Matsumoto, SCAP and GHQ officials understood only too well the commitment of the conservatives in the Japanese government to their emperor, and that they would have no choice but to accept the draft if it was a matter of his life or death. Indeed, Whitney did inform Matsumoto and Yoshida that the Allied Council was moving towards trying the emperor as a war criminal, and that Japanese acceptance of the GHQ draft would render him ‘practically unassailable’ (Kades, Rowell and Hussey 1946, 327-328). However, this was probably more a statement of fact than a threat. The constitution was presented to the two ministers as a perhaps unpleasant option for the government, but an option nonetheless (Kades, Rowell and Hussey 1946, 328).

Aside from legal arguments based on interpretations of international treaties and conventions, proponents of the forced constitution thesis also claim that the document’s promulgation was the product of GHQ manipulation. According to this view, the process by which the constitution was adopted was a direct contradiction of the Potsdam Declaration, which outlined the allies’ conditions for surrender. Article 12 of the

1 The ‘legal argument’ for the forced constitution thesis tends not to have as large an impact on public discourse, which is what is considered here. Nevertheless, it runs approximately as follows: Article 43 of the 1907 Annex to the Geneva Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land signed at the Hague stipulates that occupiers must respect ‘unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country’ they are occupying. Proponents of the forced constitution thesis argue that this means that an occupying power cannot act to change those laws significantly. Opponents argue that Japan was no longer at war, so the treaty does not apply. Proponents counter that the state of war between Japan and the United States lasted until the San Francisco Peace Treaty was signed in 1951. In any case, legal arguments for the forced constitution thesis are dependent on arguments based on the facts. If the new constitution was adopted according to a process in standing with the Japanese constitutional arrangements, then the legal argument fails because the occupation forces are respecting the laws of the country. The existence of ‘force’ as a political concept must be shown before it is possible to consider the issue on legal grounds. The constitution was subject to both public and private Diet debates and a vote in the Diet, and, in keeping with the Meiji Constitution of 1890, it was the emperor that proclaimed it as the new basic law, so the legal argument is not altogether solid.
declaration stated that ‘a peacefully inclined and responsible government’ would be
established ‘in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. Because
the constitution was drafted in secret by American officials and then discussed under
occupation conditions allowing GHQ to censor any information about the document’s
origins, the proponents of the thesis argue that the Japanese public was under the false
impression that the government had authored the draft. In addition, the voices of many of
those who would have opposed the constitution had been removed from political
discourse by the occupation purges, implying that GHQ exercised an even greater degree
of information control than mere censorship would allow. There are also arguments that
neither the Diet nor the secret Japanese subcommittee assigned to review the constitution
would have been able to amend the draft in any way that would have caused SCAP or his
officials concern (Koyama 2006, 46-50).

The forced constitution thesis and the government

However, the forced constitution thesis is not altogether watertight. The charge of
American coercion to accept the constitution ignores the process by which the document
was adopted, debated and revised. The notion that the Matsumoto draft, for example,
represented the actual position of the government – or for that matter ‘Japanese opinion’
as a whole – is simply false. The publication of the draft in the Mainichi Shinbun elicited
a negative response from the public, and around the time the draft was submitted to GHQ,
Chief Cabinet Secretary Narahashi Wataru declared that the draft did not represent the
work of the Cabinet, implying instead that it was simply the work of one of its members
(Whitney 1946c). Matsumoto’s draft was almost a carbon copy of the Meiji Constitution
that had served as modern Japan’s basic law from 1889, and was prepared ‘within a state
of psychological exclusion (sakoku shinri jōtai), blind to international movements’ (A.
Watanabe 2001, 56). It was therefore an unrealistic proposition and even some of
Matsumoto’s closest supporters were not willing to defend it. Indeed, the members of the
Cabinet continued to furiously debate Matsumoto’s ‘private draft’ (shian) even after they
received the GHQ document, and only decided to adopt the former as their ‘official’
position so as to be in a better place to negotiate concessions (T. Irie 1991a, 80-81, Kades and Hussey 1946, 404-410).

Moreover, though the GHQ draft was written solely by staffers in GS, and dramatically presented to the Japanese side without warning, the drafters based many of their efforts on private Japanese proposals for a new constitution (T. Konishi 2006, 3-18), and there were ‘major Japanese contributions’ to the drafting of the final version of the constitution (Beer and Maki 2002, 84-87). Many historians, along with Takayanagi Kenzō, the chair of a commission established after the occupation to examine the origins of the constitution, came to view the document as a ‘collaborative’ effort (Beer and Maki 2002, 77, Dower 1999, 616, n. 45). American officials even thought that the Japanese would make more adjustments to the draft before its promulgation, showing that they maintained a flexible position on amendment (Kades 1989).

Staying with Article 9 alone, there is some evidence that Prime Minister Shidehara Kijirō proposed the idea of making the renunciation of war a permanent national policy to MacArthur, and in later statements certainly did not view the constitution as ‘forced’ (Hirose 2003, 213). However, the record on this point is not clear. Despite Shidehara’s own account in 1951, and studies since then claiming that he suggested to MacArthur that the peace clause be inserted into the constitution (Schlichtmann 1995), the documentary record of the origins of the peace clause starts with the note that SCAP passed to GS instructing them that ‘No armed forces will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force’ (GHQ internal document 1946). No matter what Shidehara’s personal convictions were, it is unclear that the idea for Article 9 rests with him, and he certainly was not its ‘author’.

What is clearer, however, are the instructions received by government members deliberating the peace clause. There were few if any restrictions on opinions expressed during Diet debates on the constitution. When asked whether deliberation on the constitution was even necessary, given that the occupation forces might simply reject any changes by Japanese officials, Ashida Hitoshi, chair of the Diet subcommittee convened behind closed doors to consider Article 9, instructed committee members to express ‘their own true intent’ (jibuntachi no shin’i) in their deliberations and produce a draft which reflected ‘the will of the people’ (kokumin no ikō), rather than surmising what the
‘external conditions’ (soto no jōken) – a reference to possible opposition from GHQ – might dictate later (IDR, HR, Imperial Constitution Revision Committee, S90, 4, 29/7/46, 6).

The subcommittee also made perhaps the most significant amendment to the GHQ draft of the constitution, adding clauses to Article 9 that allowed subsequent governments to argue that Japan may possess armed forces for the purpose of self-defence. The major clauses that the subcommittee added are underlined in the following official English translation of Article 9:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

(2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized (amendments shown in IDR, House of Peers, Plenary Session, 90, 23, 26/8/1946, 2).

During the subcommittee deliberations Ashida stated that his reason for adding the clause was simply to underscore the new commitment of the Japanese people to pacifism:

Actually I wanted to write in both [paragraphs] about the desire for peace, but I wrote ‘in order to achieve the goals of the preceding paragraph’ because I don’t like repetition. That is, both [the renunciation of war and the non-maintenance of force] come from the Japanese people’s thoughts of hope for peace. [The phrase] ‘the preceding paragraph’ has no more [meaning] than that (IDR, HR, Imperial Constitution Revision Committee, 90, 7, 1/8/46, 12).

If anything, and as he repeatedly stated during the deliberations, Ashida’s goal was to rhetorically bolster the guarantees that Japan would never maintain ‘air, land, and sea forces.’ Later, Kanamori Tokujirō, an important government spokesman, would declare unequivocally in the closed deliberations that the second paragraph meant that Japan would renounce its right of self-defence, even though that right was guaranteed by the charter of the newly formed United Nations (Dower 1999, 396).

Nevertheless, as members on the FEC (1946, 18-19, 27-48) noted, the amendment was ‘very bad drafting and not very good translation’. The Japanese-language version could be interpreted to allow Japan to build up its forces and use them in situations which

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2 These were not the only changes to the article, though the others were mostly stylistic.
it could claim were not, technically speaking, war. However, the FEC did not insist that Article 9 be revised, requesting instead that the constitution stipulate elsewhere that ‘Ministers of State must be civilians’, thereby denying the possibility of military rule. The Japanese government accepted this stipulation and would later use it to argue that a defence force could be maintained – in other words, the constitutional stipulation that non-civilians were barred from entering Cabinet implied that some sort of military organisation was constitutionally sanctioned. As predicted by the FEC, the government and conservative scholars – in the absence of the public transcription of the subcommittee’s deliberations, which would remain classified for decades – would also claim that the Ashida amendment itself allowed for the maintenance of defence forces (Inoki 1989, 71). Nevertheless, despite the FEC’s qualms, its members did not ask for the amendment to be withdrawn. This shows that the committee was capable of making important changes to the draft and that there was little or no ‘American hand’ in the proceedings on Article 9 after the draft constitution was presented to the Japanese government. The final version of the war-renouncing article penned by the subcommittee was that ultimately delivered to the Diet for approval.

*The forced constitution thesis and public discourse*

It is also questionable that censorship and the purges had any significant effect on public discourse about Article 9. Arguments that the constitutional process was flawed because the public did not know the true intent of SCAP’s involvements, and that no political opponents could point this out, are fairly weak. Indeed, ‘few Japanese were deceived by the myth that it was their Government and not the Occupation who were initiating the reforms’ (Morris 1960, 20). Presented with a radically different ‘government’ draft soon after the publication of the unpopular Matsumoto draft, the vast majority of the attentive Japanese public would have realised that the second draft was the result of GHQ intervention. Discussion on the constitution’s origins was hardly absent from public discourse, despite the complaints of detractors who claim the occupation censorship manifested itself as a completely closed public sphere. Indeed, writing in an article the month Japan regained its formal independence, Kyoto University professor Inoki
Masamichi (1952, 5) noted that the ‘question of who authored the new constitution has been debated both quietly and loudly since the draft was released’.

Moreover, Inoki (1952, 5), himself no supporter of the constitutional restrictions on the use of force, maintained that ‘the peace constitution would never have been enacted were it not for the welling mood of international solidarity (hōhai taru kokusai-rentaishugi no fun‘iki) [that existed] among the Japanese people’. For many Japanese the end of the war marked, however temporarily, an opportunity to establish a new faith in universalist principles of hopes for peace. In other words, the constitution represented the will of the Japanese people at the time of its enactment, a fact that transcended debates about authorship. Indeed, in his meeting with Yoshida and Matsumoto, Whitney expressly noted that the government could either choose to present the GHQ draft to the public as their own work, or have it put before the public by the occupation authorities (Kades, Rowell and Hussey 1946, 328). It was the government of Japan that chose the former option, nervous about the electoral consequences if they rejected the GHQ draft (Dower 1999, 377). However, if GHQ could use Japanese public opinion as leverage, this only weakens the claim that the document was a product of American arrogance ‘forced’ on Japan in general, rather than on the Japanese government or certain ministers in particular. Indeed, ‘Attempts to blame the pacifism of the new constitution on the self-intoxication (jiko tōsui) of the victors are at the least one-sided, insofar as they forget the self-intoxication of the losers’ (Inoki 1952, 5).

**Lingering tension**

Nevertheless, the appearance of coercion on the part of the occupation forces made proponents of revision resolute from the very beginning to revise the constitution, and in particular the restrictions on the use of force in Article 9. Matsumoto was incensed that the occupation forces rejected his draft, and did ‘everything in his power’ to ‘interpose legalistic obstacles to the adoption of the “Democratic Plan”’ (Memorandum for the Chief, Government Section 1962). Some nationalists in Japan continue to view the post-war constitution as an unwarranted imposition on the Japanese people over the Matsumoto draft or the Meiji Constitution, which they see as positive alternatives.
reflecting the true will of the people at the time (Watanabe and Kobayashi 2001, 49-53, 58-61, Koyama 2006, 38).

Calls for formal revision of the constitution – a process undertaken by a two-thirds majority vote in both of Japan’s parliamentary chambers and a majority in a public referendum – began before the end of the occupation and have continued in waves (O. Watanabe 2002). These calls are joined by a slender number of commentators who see the constitution as an illegitimate document that can be declared null and void by a simple vote in the Diet (Koyama 2006). Because constitutional revision has been a highly charged issue since the 1950s, however, its provisions have proved too politically controversial to alter. Indeed, it was only in 2007 that the government passed legislation stipulating the correct procedure for a national referendum on revision (Ito 2007).

Nevertheless, GHQ’s involvement in the drafting of the constitution is still a source of some controversy. For example, in response to a March 2010 poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shinbun, roughly one-third of the 43 per cent of Japanese who favoured revising the constitution stated that they did so ‘because it is a constitution that was forced [or ‘pushed’] upon us by the United States’ (amerika ni oshitsukerareta kenpō dakara) (Yomiuri Shinbun March 2010).

Indeed, those who would simply not accept the new constitution formed an important constituency for nationalists with political aspirations. Although purged from participating in politics during the occupation, Kishi Nobusuke, former munitions minister and future prime minister, nevertheless made his voice heard through the clandestine support of an advocacy group, the Japan Renewal League (nihon saiken renmei), which he essentially established after his release from prison on war crimes charges. It was Kishi who convinced other members to place constitutional revision on the league’s agenda. Once the league ceased its operations after unsuccessfully contesting the 1952 general election as a political party, Kishi began to plan his re-entry into politics through Yoshida’s Liberal Party (Hara 1995, 150-151). When he announced his bid for election in 1954, Kishi counted among his immediate supporters cultural figures like literary critic Hayashi Fusao, who would later attack the constitution stridently in his writings for emasculating the nation by restricting its ability to protect itself (Banno 1997, 147, Kurzman 1960, 274). Thus, when Kishi was elected to the Diet and named chair of a
commission on constitutional revision in 1954, a former Australian minister to Japan wrote ‘It is not hard to detect the general direction in which he seeks to revise the constitution.’ (Ball 1954)

Ironically, however, it was Washington that called loudest for rearmament after pursuing the reverse course, and it was MacArthur who, because he viewed the constitution as one of his own personal achievements, resisted those calls during the late 1940s. The general told members of the US administration on a visit to Tokyo that, aside from making the United States seem hypocritical to many Japanese, rearmament would alienate many Asian nations still suspicious of Japanese motives after the war. He also argued that Japan could not afford the cost of rearmament, and that the Japanese people were against it. MacArthur’s initial reluctance for Japan to rearm would set the stage for future resistance by the Japanese government on the issue. As Kataoka (1991, 54) notes, after the occupation moderates in Japan would return to the same arguments again and again to resist American calls for greater Japanese defence spending.

Once the Korean War erupted in 1950, and MacArthur’s political fortunes waned, GHQ provided few barriers to the creation of armed forces. Yoshida Shigeru, Japanese prime minister from May 1946 to May 1947, and again from October 1948 to December 1954, saw light rearmament as both inevitable and desirable, even before the outbreak of war across the Sea of Japan (T. Irie 1991b). However, given the precarious state of the Japanese economy, Yoshida was reluctant to commit to a large expensive force. After an initial force of 50,000 troops was established, Yoshida resisted American attempts to enlarge of the force to 300,000 troops and negotiated instead a force of 75,000 to keep the peace in Japan in the absence of US occupation troops sent to the peninsula (Matsuda 2007, 44).

Serious resistance to rearmament came mostly from union members who (rightly) saw the establishment of the NPR as a move by Yoshida to quash union activity in Japan during the Korean War, but they also saw the reserve as a quasi-military formed at the insistence of the United States (Duke 1973, 97). The removal from December 1949 to November 1950 of approximately 27,000 suspected communists from administrative and educational positions only served to highlight occupation policy as highly partisan (Hirata and Dower n.d.), a view reinforced once conservatives were later depurged.
Friction between the Japanese ‘left’ and the American occupation forces was also enflamed by Yoshida. While at times the prime minister openly antagonised members of the Socialist and Communist Parties, he nevertheless encouraged them to demonstrate against the formation of the NPR, so as to lend weight to his negotiations to whittle down American demands for greater troop strength. The prime minister thus shifted much of the blame for the formation of the NPR onto the occupation authorities, further exacerbating tensions between the socialist and communist opposition parties and the United States (Berger 1998, 84).

Moreover, when the occupation authorities and the Japanese government began their coordinated efforts to crack down on these forces, it resulted in the criticism that GHQ’s new policies were a betrayal of the principles of democracy and restrictions on the military that were at the heart of the early occupation period and the constitution itself. The drives to recruit Japanese for the NPR were particularly disturbing for union members, although the Japanese government was not completely insensitive to the potentially militaristic image the NPR generated. As popular ‘left-wing’ historian Fujiwara Akira, writing in 1989, noted:

In order to play to the conceit (tatemae) that this was not an army but a police force, the police administered the search for candidates and also selected them, avoiding from the beginning former members of the military. [However t]he assembled force members moved into the barracks that the American military vacated during their deployment to Korea, were supplied with American military weapons, uniforms and such, and received training from American military personnel. Their first appearance was as the American military’s support force, whose duty was to maintain internal stability, indeed, in other words, to suppress mass demonstrations (A. Fujiwara 1989, 108).

In order to resist such ‘reactionary’ forces, the political groups claiming to represent the working class maintained that the NPR and, later, their successor organisation the Self Defense Forces (SDF), were an unconstitutional flaunting of the ban on ‘war potential’. Protecting the liberal reforms of the constitution in the Diet, and in particular focusing on Article 9 to argue that the forces were illegal, became raisons d’être of the communist and socialist parties.
Bilateralism: the US-Japan relationship

A preference for bilateral relationships with distant global powers has been a significant factor in Japanese foreign policy most of the time since Japan defeated China in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Hugo Dobson (2004, 165) considers bilateralism a ‘norm’ of Japanese foreign policy, ‘internalised and taken to an extreme, resulting in the hard-nosed realist policy of repeated alignment and bandwagoning with the most powerful state in the international system’. This preference for bilateralism led to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (1902-23), the Tripartite pact (1940-1945), which for Japan’s purposes was focused on the relationship with Germany, and the US-Japan security relationship. Dobson sees Japan’s emphasis on its bilateral relations with the United States as sometimes dominating even its discussions in multilateral forums such as in meetings between the Group of 7/8 industrialised nations (Dobson 2004, 165-166).

Rather than viewing the US-Japan relationship as a ‘norm’3 or, as realists might frame it, an ‘option’ that ‘Japan’ as a rational actor has understood serves its interests well, it is more useful to view bilateralism and the post-war US-Japan relationship in particular as one side of a tension that has divided debate on Japanese security. This is not to deny that as policy, the formal security relationship between the United States and Japan yielded significant benefits. Indeed, the relationship afforded Japan protection while it engaged in post-war economic reconstruction, and became a key factor in its ability to achieve high growth in the 1960s. Also, as so-called ‘alliance managers’ in Washington are all too quick to point out, polls now consistently show that the Japanese public overwhelmingly approves of the relationship in general (W. Konishi 2010).

However, it is impossible to also deny that the relationship was, at times, highly controversial. There have always been groups that have emphasised unilateral or multilateral forms of foreign policy as an alternative to the bilateral relationship with the United States. Despite the positive public showing for the alliance in general, moreover, there are many who would like to see the form of the alliance change, and who have been dissatisfied with a prioritisation of interests that sees Tokyo place smooth bilateral

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3 Discussing Japan’s position within the G7 and G8, Dobson (2004) describes two other ‘norms,’ namely, internationalism and East Asianism, which might otherwise be phrased as a focus on international cooperation and Dobson’s interpretation of a specific national/historical ‘culture’.
relations with Washington above other priorities such as basing considerations and Japan’s relationships with other states in the region (W. Konishi 2010). In addition to outright contempt for the alliance, then, there are those who, while they do not challenge the existence of bilateral arrangements in general, call for a different emphasis in Japanese foreign policy.

Tensions between advocacy for the bilateral relationship and advocacy for different directions in Japanese foreign policy were only aggravated by the reverse course and events that occurred afterwards. A preference for neutralism, the most popular counter-assertion to the Cold War orthodoxy of US-Japan bilateralism, predates the formal US-Japan security relationship and was even promoted by members of GHQ, in particular SCAP himself, before the 1950 Korean War. MacArthur, protective of Japan’s ‘peace constitution’, envisioned a future for Japan as a lightly armed neutral nation, and insisted to his colleagues that ‘the Japanese are relying on the advanced spirituality of the world to protect them against undue aggression’ (Nishi 1982, 268). In late 1948, he defended his view against the more hawkish US Department of Defense, stressing that ‘Complete and guaranteed neutrality is the ideal post-treaty status for Japan’. SCAP saw a ‘quasi-military alliance’ between Japan and the United States as harmful to America’s moral position, and urged his counterparts in Washington to leave Japan as a neutral nation, and his statements often indicated that he believed Japan should remain unarmed, or armed only lightly. However, even MacArthur was quick to recognise that such neutrality would be subject to guarantees from the United States and thought that the United States should act in ways so that Japan would not fall ‘economically and psychologically’ under Soviet influence (Nishi 1982, 269-270). Most Japanese also ‘aspired to at least nominal neutrality’ (Schaller 1997, 26) and statements by MacArthur bolstered this aspiration.

If anything, members of the Japanese government were not enthralled by the particular conception of neutrality that MacArthur continued to emphasise. Yoshida, eager to restore Japan’s sovereignty, was mindful that Washington’s more hawkish officials would not permit an end to the occupation without a promise from the Japanese side that US bases established on Japanese soil after the Second World War could remain there. The prime minister thus proposed a deal where the bases could stay, but where
Japan would remain formally neutral (Schaller 1997, 30). In mid-1950 Yoshida went behind SCAP’s back, dispatching his political lieutenants, including Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, to Washington to secretly make the offer while they were supposedly on a trip observing American economic practice (Miyazawa 2007, 18-25).

When he found out about the offer, MacArthur was incensed. However, his anger more reflected his dissatisfaction that Yoshida had presumed he could negotiate occupation policy with Washington than his complete disagreement with the policy position of the Japanese prime minister. In any case, the general’s political influence had already waned. After Yoshida and his aides made a few formal gestures to restore their ‘status as the occupied’ (Miyazawa 2007, 29), SCAP noted his support for the prime minister’s plan in principle, and even ‘proposed diluting the concept of “neutrality” with a small self-defense force’ (Schaller 1997, 30). Even so, on the eve of the delegation’s visit to Washington, MacArthur was still so impressed with his notion of Japanese neutrality that he was quoted by the American media as saying that Japan should become a type of ‘Switzerland of the Far East’ and should remain neutral in any future wars (Herzog 1995, 218).

Even before officials in Washington began to assert their authority more strongly over occupation policy, however, American strategic planners, particularly in the US Department of Defense, came to regard neutralism with suspicion, if not outright hostility. In 1948, two Pentagon fact-finding missions to Tokyo reported that any early peace treaty would be inadvisable, precisely because a neutral, unarmed Japan would lead to a ‘natural accommodation’ between Tokyo and a communist Chinese state. In the event of war, moreover, an unarmed Japan would not be able to serve as an ally to the United States against communist forces (Schaller 1997, 28).

After the reverse course, therefore, it was clear that Washington would not allow Japan to regain its formal independence without an arrangement that saw Japan affirmed as a US ally in the struggle against communism. Neutralism became a concept inimical to the way American interests were coming to be formulated, and provided a useful political position for opponents of US plans in Japan. With the establishment of the NPR as a proxy for US soldiers who had been sent to fight in Korea, and the GHQ crackdown on leftists already causing them unease, the socialists and communists seized on the
neutralism that MacArthur had popularised. Initially, at least, neutralism was ‘a specifically anti-American weapon’ (Stockwin 1968, 94) for these parties, used to resist the government’s desire to cooperate with the United States. However, nationalists and conservative politicians who remained purged also bridled against what they saw as Japan’s subservience towards the United States (Kataoka 1991, 5, Itoh 2003, 131).

While protesters called for a neutral and ‘comprehensive peace’ with all of Japan’s wartime foes, it was Washington that controlled the peacemaking process and did so on its own terms. The peace treaty that would lead to Japan’s independence, signed in 1951 by 48 nations, would be accompanied by a bilateral security treaty with the United States, which gave Washington unfettered access to Japanese territory for its military bases. A separate agreement signed later outlined ‘exceptional territorial rights for US soldiers in Japan’, and was ‘more inequitable than any other bilateral arrangement that the United States entered into in the post-war period’ (Dower 1999, 553). America’s interests were protected in other ways as well. The peace treaty did not return Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty, and the strategically important island territory was ‘consigned as a major U.S. nuclear base to indefinite neo-colonial control’ (Dower 1999, 552).

Cold War tensions were highlighted by who signed the peace treaty, and who did not. Because the settlement would obviously draw Japan into the US orbit, communist nations refused to participate in the 1951 San Francisco conference that brought the signatories together. Due to resistance from the United Kingdom, which had recognised the PRC in 1950, the American organisers of the conference invited neither the Nationalist Chinese government which, based in Taiwan, claimed to be the legitimate government of all China, nor that of the PRC (Roy 2003, 129). However, no sooner than the peace treaty was signed than members of the US Senate threatened not to ratify it unless Japan signed a separate peace treaty with the Chinese Nationalists, whom the US recognised as the legitimate government of the Republic of China. When Yoshida prevaricated, eager to preserve the possibility of trade with the massive mainland Chinese market, he elicited fierce protests from the US Congress, and in the end was cajoled into recognising Taiwan by US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and congressional representatives. It was later revealed that a letter Yoshida signed to reassure Congress
that he had no intention of signing a treaty with mainland China was authored by Dulles (Calder 2009, 36).

While the peace treaty with the Nationalists, which Japan signed just weeks after gaining independence, was a shock to business owners in Japan who wanted to benefit from trade with the mainland, growing public resentment towards the United States and the Japanese government was more strongly represented by protests over the decision to keep US bases in Japan. Crime and prostitution around bases became serious political issues, while the requisitioning of private land for the American military resulted in large-scale public demonstrations (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 518, 569). Even moderate conservatives, who supported the agreement with the United States, harboured serious doubts about its implementation. Writing in 1956, Miyazawa Kiichi (2007, 60-61), a young member of the House of Representatives, bristled against ‘the Occupation mentality that seemed to pervade [US] forces’ stationed in Japan. Miyazawa also feared that Washington’s often blithe treatment of the post-occupation Japanese government, coupled with public sensitivity concerning the bases would lead to a ‘nationalist’ and ‘anti-American’ backlash.

Miyazawa was right to be worried. The lifting of occupation censorship allowed the press to freely report on US military accidents in Japan, particularly aircraft crashes. Many of the crashes involved large-scale damage. In February 1952, for example, a B-29 aircraft crashed in Saitama prefecture destroying seven farm houses and damaging 50, and instantly killing four people. On June 30, 1959, part of a US Air Force jet fell to the ground in Miyamori Elementary School killing 21 and wounding 100. Many of the reports were extremely brutal, and did not paint the American base authorities in a particularly positive light. On August 2, 1957, an American aircraft that took off from Mito Airfield in Ibaragi prefecture hit a 24-year-old man and his 63-year-old mother as they were riding together on the same bicycle, killing the woman instantly by slicing her in half. The man later died of internal bleeding. Although the local authorities claimed the pilot was recklessly performing stunts, base authorities maintained that it was an accident performed in the line of duty and charges against the pilot were dropped. Accidents did not always involve Japanese, but were nevertheless often gruesome. In June 1953, for
example, an American transport crashed directly after take-off, instantly killing 129 American soldiers (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 503, 600, 630).

Meanwhile, a September 1955 challenge to plans for the extension of a runway into the Tokyo suburb of Sunakawa (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 518, 569) threatened to undermine the entire security agreement between Japan and the United States. Protestors who entered the nearby base to oppose the runway extension were charged with trespassing under a bilateral agreement regulating criminal activity on the bases, but were acquitted in March 1959 in the Tokyo District Court. Judge Date Akio ruled that the ‘stationing of US military forces contravenes the renunciation of war in Article 9 of the Constitution’, and that therefore that both the agreement, and the security treaty in general, were unconstitutional (Kakyū saibansho keiji hanreishū 1995, 431-433, Yara 2010, 95). Nevertheless, Date’s ruling was overturned by the Supreme Court later that year, which stated that the constitutionality of the bilateral alliance was a ‘political question’ over which courts could not rule. In discussing the merits, however, the justices noted that the Security Treaty was constitutional on the grounds that arrangements for the self-defence of Japan were not to be considered the possession of ‘war potential’. It also found that only forces over which Japan had command and control could ever be considered as such (Yara 2010, 95, Saikō saibansho keiji hanrei shū 1995, 434-435). Date’s overturned ruling was essentially an argument for neutrality, and while it was not binding, the Supreme Court’s discussion was both a confirmation of the validity of bilateralism, and of the constitutionality of the SDF.

While for many Japanese the bases were a source of resentment towards the United States, for others, the economic structures that supported the base community provided a valuable source of income and compensation from the government for requisitioned land in a time when few employment options were available. In protests starting in 1952 against the installation of a base in the fishing village of Uchinada, which became iconic in the struggle against the bases in general, opponents of the base maintained that ‘the issue of compensation was decisive in the suppression of the protest movement, forcing enough of the people to eventually cease violent protest in return for financial gain’. Indeed by 1957, many residents in Uchinada began to plead for the bases to stay so as to preserve their employment opportunities (Kersten 2006, 313, 317). Such
dependence on the bases was not limited to the economic realm. Inoki (1956, 31) believed that a ‘psychology of dependence’ (*izonshin*) on the United States pervaded all levels of society, and was also the product of a massive influx of American culture, as well as the fact that Japan was dependent on the United States for its defence. Moreover, as in local communities like Uchinada (Kersten 2006, 313), dependence on the United States served to *internalise* tensions within Japan, causing a ‘severe division in the national discourse…. Because the group dependent on the United States turns against the group which is anti-American, and the group which is anti-American turns against the pro-American group, the divergence in the recognition of relations with the United States eventually assumes an aspect of latent civil disorder’ (Inoki 1956, 32). According to Inoki, the tendency of base opponents to ignore how dependence on the United States was dictated by strategic realities meant that opposition between pro-US and anti-US forces was akin to a chain reaction that would sustain itself indefinitely.

Washington was not completely insensitive to the intrusion of the bases into Japanese life. In the late 1950s, the Eisenhower Administration began to radically restructure troop deployments in Japan by removing all US ground forces and transferring US Marines stationed on mainland Japan to Okinawa, which was still a virtual US protectorate. Of course, this would create problems for the population on Okinawa – protests in the 1960s and a spontaneous seven-hour riot near the town of Koza, since renamed Okinawa City, in September 1970 would put pressure on the both American and Japanese governments to expedite the reversion of the island territory to Japan – but the removal of the bases would provide relief for most mainland Japanese, and air bases would be moved to more remote locations. Interestingly, Eisenhower allowed Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke to take credit for eliciting this ‘concession’ from the United States, showing that he realised the bases were a political problem for the prime minister. Nevertheless, drawing down American ground troops deployed overseas was a central feature of the Eisenhower administration’s ‘New Look’ global strategy, which aimed to deter the Soviet Union with the threat of ‘massive retaliation’ with air power and atomic weaponry (Perret 1999, 464, Yara 2010, 91-92). The decision to remove ground troops, while it addressed Japanese concerns, was still a policy tailored specifically to a formulation of larger US interests.
Despite the troop withdrawals and economic benefits bases brought to local communities, the resentment of many Japanese towards the security arrangements continued to seethe throughout the decade, exploding in 1960 into the largest public demonstrations ever held in the nation. The occasion for the protests was the ratification of a revised ‘Mutual Security Treaty’, (anzenhoshōjōyaku or ‘Anpo’ for short) with the United States. Negotiated by the Kishi government and signed in Washington by the prime minister himself, the treaty eliminated many of the inequalities that the original 1951 treaty had imposed on Japan. In particular, Washington would now have to formally gain Tokyo’s approval before realigning its bases in Japan, a major concession to the Japanese government. However, the treaty reconfirmed Japan’s position as a post-war bilateral US ally for at least the next decade, and it was this extension of the security arrangements, and thus the presence of the bases, which proved so controversial. Facing fierce resistance from socialist and communist members, Kishi could only ratify the treaty by having members of these opposition parties escorted out of the Diet for impeding the legislative process. Protests outside the Diet leading up to the ratification, meanwhile, meant that Kishi could not guarantee order and had to rescind an invitation to Eisenhower to visit Tokyo for the ratification. Eisenhower’s visit would have stood as a symbol of US-Japan friendship. Instead Kishi, disgraced both in the eyes of the United States and his countrymen, stepped down as prime minister and was replaced by Ikeda Hayato.

The protests that in part led to Kishi’s resignation included a broad swathe of Japanese society. Certainly, union leaders and student activists attempted to storm the Diet. Despite the radical core of the protest movement, however, the millions who took to the streets represented a broad section of Japanese society. Seventy-five per cent of the University of Tokyo signed petitions demanding that the Diet be dissolved and new elections be held. Thousands of students from Tokyo’s normally moderate Christian universities attended the protests, as did other non-radicalised students, housewives and actresses. Meanwhile, across the country, Sōhyō, the giant federation of trade unions, organised a strike of five and a half million workers (Apter and Sawa 1984, 120). Anger against the bases and the extension of the security treaty which guaranteed their continued presence was a mainstream affair, and represented a number of interests.
This meant that once the protests had subsided, most mainstream protestors found little attraction in the slogans and the doctrinaire Marxist messages of the core of the protest movement. More radical elements within Japanese society continued to protest against the US-Japan security relationship, picking up popular support for particular causes such as opposition to the Vietnam War and renewal of the security treaty in 1970. However, with much of the burden of the bases transferred to Okinawa, a territory which was still subject to American censorship and control, the base presence was becoming almost invisible to most mainland Japanese. Aside from during the most tense days of the Vietnam War when Japan’s support for US operations served to provoke questions in the minds of large sectors of the Japanese population about the bilateral treaty framework, support for the US-Japan relationship grew. However, this only meant that the voices of the communists and radicalised socialists would become more strident, drowning out other voices in the debate on the national interest that questioned Japan’s relationship with the United States.

**Historical exceptionalism: war memory**

Occupation policy also exacerbated a third tension in Japan: that between a ‘rational’ conception of national interest – that Japan should be subject to the same motivations in its foreign policy as other states – and one that sees Japan’s interests as structured by its own historically and culturally unique identity. The tension might be summarised as a tension between the interests of the official and rational ‘state’, and the informal and primordial ‘society’ or ‘nation’. This, however, is not as straightforward as it sounds. There are numerous ways of determining what constitutes both the ‘normal’ behaviour of states and what a given ‘particular’ national identity entails.

In any case, occupation policy was at least partly more consistent in this area than in relation to the other tensions. Throughout the occupation, SCAP and GHQ, aided by the Japanese government, ensured that professional bureaucrats who had distanced themselves from the wartime regime were given a prominent role in government, while Japan’s wartime political leaders would be excluded from positions of leadership. While this policy would soften towards the end of the occupation, the occupation always
preferred ‘rational’ former bureaucrats over ‘irrational’ former politicians as the class that should lead Japan. The latter, or so many in the occupation probably believed, were more likely to base arguments of the national interest on grand notions of a unified Japanese society, just as they had during the war.

In January 1946, SCAP had ordered the purge of ‘undesirable personnel’ from positions of power in politics, the bureaucracy and industry (SCAPIN 550 1946), handing much of the control of the purges over to the government and giving them broad discretion to identify the ‘purgees’, which in the end numbered between 210,000 and 260,000 (Itoh 2003, 80). While the ostensible target of the purges was Japan’s wartime ‘militarists’, occupation officials were often later unsure about, and even regretted, some of the targets of the policy. The occupation’s most famous purgee, Hatoyama Ichirō, a minister in the wartime Cabinet of Tanaka Giichi, was purged on May 4, 1946, hours before he was due to be named prime minister. While Hatoyama was certainly critical of the occupation, his status as a militarist in the wartime government was based on passages from a book that was probably ghost-written for him, his role as the chief-secretary to a military-dominated Cabinet whose meetings he was not permitted to attend, and his militaristic campaign speeches, produced under orders from the Cabinet (Itoh 2003, 80-81). His purge cleared the way for Yoshida Shigeru, whom the occupation authorities trusted as a former foreign ministry official with pro-Anglo-American tendencies, to assume the office.

The view of the occupation forces that leaders from the bureaucracy were better for Japan than wartime politicians essentially ignored the role that bureaucratic structures played in wartime Japan. For example, SCAP showed little, if any, concern when his officials discovered that in the last days of the war that the Munitions Ministry, itself the product of wartime bureaucratic centralisation, had been slightly reorganised and renamed the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) (Johnson 1982, 172-173). Yoshida, however, was more cautious than SCAP about the links between ministries like the MCI and the wartime regime and placed his trusted colleagues from the foreign ministry in key positions within the government and the bureaucracy. While MCI remained under the influence of the foreign ministry until the mid-1950s, it retained most
of its responsibilities and was renamed the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in 1949.

Yoshida was a bureaucrat before he was a politician, and with career politicians purged from public life, his lieutenant, Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, led an effort to intensify bureaucratic control over the Japanese economy while eschewing the cultural nationalism that the wartime political elites used to bring the Japanese populace on board with their schemes. With help from US procurement orders for the Korean War, government grew as Ikeda implemented his policies geared towards state-guided production of heavy industrial products. Without resistance from SCAP and the pre-war ‘politicians’ MCI attained ever more control. While post-occupation Japan was renowned for its bureaucratic coordination, it was actually during the occupation that government control of the economy was tightest. According to the historian Hata Ikuhito, ‘never has the bureaucracy exercised greater authority than it did during the occupation’ (Johnson 1982, 176).

Unionists, communists and socialists in Japan were extremely suspicious of bureaucratic centralisation, particularly in the education and industrial sectors, and conservative politicians who had been purged after the war also felt that they had been the victim of political manoeuvring, and were uncomfortable with the technocratic system that Yoshida and Ikeda were building. Hatoyama and his colleagues, such as Kishi, thus grew eager to roll back many of the occupation reforms. However, under the occupation they were powerless to move. It was only in 1951 that occupation authorities ordered the ‘depurge’ of conservatives, which would occur in three waves up until the end of the occupation. By the time Japan regained its independence, 1,012 of a total of 3,422 purged war criminals had been depurged, and they were joined by virtually all of the 160,000 career military personnel and veterans’ league leaders that were still excluded from public life (Kinoshita 1953, 244 n. 3). With the end of the occupation the remaining purgees had their political rights restored.

As a former minister of munitions during the war, Kishi was not averse to the notion of a strong bureaucracy, and in many ways, the views of the depurgees differed little from Yoshida and the bureaucratic elite that assisted the occupation forces in running Japan. However, with the occupation growing unpopular towards its end, and
with the government following the occupation lead in downplaying Japan’s history and traditions, the depurgees were handed a dissatisfied constituency. Many of the former political elite were convinced that their wartime actions could be justified, and that the rational course that Japan had embarked upon dishonoured Japan’s traditions. They saw imported ‘foreign’ concepts such as individualism through the post-war constitution and rationalisation through the exalted status of ‘bureaucrats-turned-politicians’ as ill-suited to Japan. Even if a few were not necessarily nationalists themselves, they emphasised populist nationalism grounded in a vision of Japan’s past as unique to differentiate themselves from Ikeda’s plans for a rational, ahistorical technocracy (Kume 2000, 82).

The changes that the occupation made to education policy and the way the Allied Powers assigned guilt to those Japanese responsible for the war were two ‘spotlight’ issues that incurred the wrath of the new, and some not-so-new, nationalists. Early during the occupation period, GHQ’s education division temporarily banned the teaching of history, geography and moral education (shūshin) in schools, only to revive all but the last of these once relevant textbooks had been purged of ‘content that glorified Japanese imperialism, posed mythology as historical fact, and eulogized emperors and fanatic heroes who sacrificed everything for the imperial household and Japan’s “sacred” mission abroad’. (Wray 1991, 462) On October 22, 1945, SCAP announced that educators and students would be informed about ‘the part played by militaristic leaders, their active collaborators, and those who by passive acquiescence committed the nation to war with the inevitable result of defeat, distress and the present deplorable state of the Japanese people’ (Nishi 1982, 165).

These reforms were aimed primarily at establishing a ‘rational’ system of education in Japan that discouraged blind loyalty to the state. The centrepiece of the reforms was the 1947 Fundamental Law on Education. This replaced the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education in sketching out the aims and values of education policy and stressed the ‘universal’ goals of personal development and the creation of individuals who would ‘love truth and justice, esteem individual value, respect labor and have a deep sense of responsibility, and be imbued with the independent spirit, as builders of peaceful state and society’. The law also mentioned that it was crafted in the spirit of the new constitution and expressly stated that the public schools under its proscription would
refrain from engaging in political education. Nowhere was the role of history or Japan’s special national identity mentioned in the law. In contrast, the pre-1945 rescript, which was read out aloud before all important school events, stressed the service of all students to the state and to the emperor, mentioned the fundamental unity of the Japanese state through filial piety, and ‘the glory of the fundamental character of our Empire’. It could not have been more different from the rational new law.

SCAP also encouraged students and teachers to engage in free debate and ‘evaluate critically and intelligently the content of instruction’, a message Japanese students in particular took to heart. In September 1945, students of Mito High School organised Japan’s first post-war strike, demanding that their authoritarian principal step down. The strike was quashed by the Ministry of Education after 35 days, but led the ministry to urge principals who had supported military doctrines to resign. Further strikes continued, with protestors all the while stressing the replacement of an authoritarian and militaristic order in schools with one that allowed for egalitarianism, liberalism, and critical thinking in the social sciences. At every stage, these ‘student demands reflected American propaganda for democracy’, and thus the Ministry of Education often found it difficult to resist the demands of striking students and teachers particularly when they protested against militarism in the education system (Nishi 1982, 166-169).

What lessons existed about the futility of the Japanese war effort, however, constituted attempts to legitimate the new rational project upon which Japan had embarked. GHQ was not necessarily attempting to create a national subject out of a common war memory, and in the early years of the occupation educational professionals were not necessarily interested in such a project either. Indeed, teachers unions were initially more concerned about improving the material wellbeing of their members in the deprivation that followed the war. They generally approved of the rational reforms implemented in schools, including the new legal framework, and thus had no reason to protest on the issue of what was taught in schools. Ironically, however, with procurement orders providing a valuable boost to the Japanese incomes, it was only after the onset of the Korean War that unions felt that their teachers were economically secure enough to switch their attention to protecting the pacifist orientation of the curriculum. It was only
in 1950 that ‘the issue of peace became for the first time a major concern of Nikkyōso’, the major teachers’ union (Duke 1973, 96-97).

After the reverse course, the classroom thus served as an important platform for more politically pointed narratives of peace. From Japan’s modernisation in 1868 to the end of the war, teachers were an important component of the regimentation and socialisation of young boys into a culture of militarism. Not only did teachers recruit soldiers from the ranks of their pupils, but they also personally trained them from the age of eight until middle school, when regular army officers took over this responsibility (Daugherty 2002, 19). With the onset of war on the Korean peninsula, teachers thus began to interpret present conflicts through the prism of their own past experiences. Coordinated by the Japan Teachers Union, Japan’s post-war teachers were adamant that they would never again resume the role of recruiters. The title adopted at the major national teachers’ conference of 1951 was ‘Never send our pupils to the battlefield again’ a slogan that was coined by a teacher at the meeting and repeated often at protests throughout the decade (Hook 1996, 187, Seraphim 2006, 87). A result of SCAP’s rational reforms of education therefore was that teachers would take the seemingly universal aspirations for peace in the Fundamental Law and infuse them with historical meaning derived from their own unique experience.

Japan’s liberal education system, and the Fundamental Law on Education in particular, were targeted by the post-war nationalists as requiring reform. The nationalists saw the Fundamental Law as particularly pernicious, as it institutionalised a culture of rationalism that paid little heed to what they saw as Japan’s traditional cultural mores while allowing those who prioritised what the nationalists saw as a ‘masochistic view’ of Japanese history to inject this perspective into the curriculum. Conservative nationalists thus long wished to replace references to the cultivation of the individual and clarify clauses relating to political neutrality so that teachers could not impart their brand of history (Ball 1954). It was not until 2006, however, when the government led by nationalist Abe Shinzō succeeded in revising the law, inserting clauses stressing ‘love of country’, ‘public spirit’, and ‘tradition’ (Onishi 2006).

The Fundamental Law was by no means the only initiative to which the nationalists objected. Particularly grating were efforts by the occupation to discredit those
it truly deemed as militarists. One of the occupation’s key initiatives in this regard was the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, or the Tokyo war crimes trials. The Tokyo trials were not the only occasion when Japanese war criminals faced justice. Throughout Asia and the Pacific, thousands of Japanese troops left abroad after the war were tried, and several thousand were executed or imprisoned when found guilty of war crimes (Conway-Lanz 2006, 16). However, the Tokyo trials constituted the centrepiece in the post-war process of judicial reckoning, and introduced new concepts related to war crimes imported fresh from Germany, where they had been used for the first time to try those responsible for war crimes in Europe. In addition to trying individuals accused of crimes during the conduct of war and crimes against humanity, the German and Japanese identified war criminals who had committed ‘crimes against peace,’ that is, planning and executing war, actions often previously regarded as the prerogative of the state. Of those found guilty of these crimes, seven were executed, and 18 were sentenced to incarceration, 16 of those for life.

Their trial was far from perfect. The retroactive nature of ‘crimes against peace’ and the Hollywoodesque setting of the trials (Trotter 1990, 82) reinforced suspicions that the tribunal was more an organ of victors’ justice than a competent judicial body, a concern not only emphasised later by nationalist critics of the trials, but shared by occupation officials and international officers on the court alike. The chief American defence attorney and five of his colleagues resigned in the opening days of the trials, arguing that they were not given enough time to prepare their case (Dower 1999, 462). Both the justice and prosecutor from New Zealand made two attempts to resign, privately noting that members of the court were incompetent, but their government would not accept their resignations (Trotter 1990, 82-83). While the court’s charter established that only a simple majority was necessary to convict, three of the 11 justices – from France, India and the Netherlands – refused to accept the majority ruling. The chief justice and another member of the bench who had ruled in the majority also wrote scathing criticisms of the court procedure and judgments in their final reports. MacArthur, meanwhile, found the entire process absurd, and his chief of intelligence, General Charles Willoughby denounced the trial as ‘the worst hypocrisy in recorded history.’ (Dower 1999, 451)
One aspect of the trial that bothered some of the prosecutors, justices and generals was that the American lead prosecutors approached the case as if the war had been the result of a conspiracy, an argument modelled on those put forward during the Nuremberg trials. While this had been an appropriate case to argue in Germany, it was less so in Japan, where during the war ‘Japan’s leaders engaged in ad hoc responses to what they perceived as threats to their nation’s security’. (Dower 1999, 463) Indeed, the only individual close to decisions of national policy from 1928 to 1945, the period covered by the trials, was Emperor Hirohito, who had been explicitly exonerated from war crimes. Many US State Department and occupation officials had believed that removing the emperor from office would cause such a psychological shock to the Japanese people as to make the nation ungovernable. For the sake of the occupation, it was all the better to retain him and reinvent him as a committed democrat, a notion reinforced by American anthropological studies that recycled wartime propaganda about the centrality of the emperor to Japanese society and presented it as social fact. However, this decision was hardly useful to prosecutors attempting to prove a case of conspiracy on the part of the Japanese political leadership.

While the trials were politically necessary and, according to most of the prosecuting nations, justified under international law, they deepened divisions already apparent in Japanese politics, and ‘the contradictions between judicial idealism and plain victor’s justice provided fertile soil for the growth of a postwar neonationalism’. (Dower 1999, 444) As Hirata notes, views on the Tokyo trials constitute one of the major issues that still causes disagreement within the Japanese political establishment (K. Hirata 2008, 134-135).

Those traditionally seen on the ‘left’ of Japanese politics accept the trials fully. However, there are a significant number of Japanese on the ‘right’ who disagree with the narrative of a Japanese conspiracy to commit war established by the trials. Even many who admit that Japan was an aggressor during the 1930s and 1940s disagree with the trials on procedural grounds, particularly due to concerns about retroactive justice. According to many more nationalistic politicians, authors and legal scholars, the conspiracy narrative, which they label the ‘Tokyo Trial view of history’, was not only incorrect, it actually ‘created and proliferated’ the view that Japan’s wars were
aggressive rather than defensive (Futamura 2008, 94-95, emphasis in original). Japan, according to this view, waged a war of self defence, and the trials were thus merely the propaganda of the nation’s new post-war masters.

The goal for many of these ‘historical revisionists’ is thus to exonerate Japan from a vision of its own past that they believe has been forced upon it, a vision that is not of its own making and one that has led Japan to engage in excessive ‘kowtow diplomacy’ (狗的外交). The term was originally applied to the granting of trade concessions to the United States in the 1980s (Itō 1980, 322-323), but is now used to refer to government accommodation of diplomatic demands from China and other Asian nations, and often in connection to apologies on issues relating to the war and official interpretations of history (Yoshida 2000, 87). Instead of being ‘slandered’ as war criminals, these nationalists believe that Japan’s war dead should be honoured as heroes who gave their lives for their nation, and that such apology sullies that memory. Their interpretation of history is often indulged, for political purposes, by many within Japan’s political elite who acknowledge that Japan really was a wartime aggressor but still believe the trials created a focus on Japan’s crimes and have instituted a ‘masochistic view of history’. For these politicians, an acceptance of Japan’s wartime activities, pride in some of its colonial and wartime achievements, and even the exoneration of Japanese war criminals, are ways for the Japanese to ‘move on’ while still recognising the wartime sacrifice of many of their countrymen. They also believe that it is crucial for Japan to construct a proud narrative of its past, so that it can stand alongside other great powers that do the same.

Conclusion

In itself, the occupation was not the source of tension between different groups in post-war Japanese foreign policy. Disagreement on the correct role of the nation between, respectively, proponents of bilateralism, administrative restrictions on the use of force, a uniquely and historically constituted basis for foreign policy and their opponents are the source of tension in any given nation state. Although pre-war tensions are not the scope of this study, such tensions existed before the occupation, and they remain today.
However, the policies chosen by the occupation forces and by the officials of the Japanese government that implemented them influenced the specific character of each tension in post-war Japan. In Japan the major clashes over foreign policy would concern the security arrangements with the United States, Article 9 of the constitution and otherwise questions surrounding the maintenance of force, and the place of war memory in a modern rational society. It is not a question of one of these tensions being ‘prior’ to any of the others. In that sense, Katō’s view, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that tensions over the security treaty or the peace constitution are secondary to debates about war memory, is incorrect. Each of these tensions is as important as the other. And together these three tensions overlap to provide a framework to identify specific positions within policy debates in Japan.
Chapter 4: Positions on the national interest in Japan

The bilateral relationship with the United States, restrictions on the use of force and an assertion of a common historical experience only accessible to members of the Japanese nation give rise to the salient tensions that shape the various discursive positions on the national interest. As outlined in the model in chapter 2, the presumption here is that within any given modern nation state there are always six such positions. This chapter outlines those six positions within a Japanese context. It assigns a name to each position that is derived from the writings of Japanese scholars, and introduces them briefly in turn. The chapter then makes a few methodological points, before going into a more detailed analysis of each position, introducing, the primary proponents of the debate and how their words and actions constitute each position.

These six positions, in no particular order of importance, are as follows:

1.) Realism (genjitsushugi) is in part derived from American concepts of foreign policy in the writings of such scholars as Kōsaka Masataka mostly from the 1960s. Before that, however, realists were already attempting to craft policy within the defence establishment, in secret. Realists advocate cautious planning for defence of the nation and maintenance of the international balance of power as the primary national interest. Its proponents see debates about national history as either a distraction or as irrelevant to this objective, believe that Japan’s military capabilities should be determined by external threat rather than subject to constitutional restrictions, and they see alliance relations with the United States as the most sensible method of securing regional stability.

2.) Pro-American Nationalism (shinbei minzokushugi) asserts that Japan’s primary interest lies in achieving influence in the international system equal to that of the United States and other great powers. Far from perceiving the United States as a rival in this endeavour, however, pro-American nationalists view their larger ally as an enabler, emphasising calls from the United States for Japan to take a more active role in international politics. Pro-American nationalists are particularly resentful of Japan’s constitutional restrictions on
the use of force and attempt to erode such restrictions where possible, while also calling for constitutional revision. In addition to the restrictions that the constitution places on Japan’s strategic options, the pro-American nationalists believe that the peace constitution, through its status as part of the legacy of wartime defeat, precludes a sense of pride in the Japanese nation. Indeed, pro-American nationalists consider constitutional revision an important, but not exclusive, impediment to the revival of positive historical narratives about the Japanese nation, which they see as important in fostering the national pride of a great power.

3.) Pure Nationalism (junsei minzokushugi) sees foreign influence on Japanese foreign policy as particularly pernicious and holds that complete independence constitutes the national interest of Japan. Pure nationalists are tightly bound to the concept of a Japanese nation based on exclusionary and positive historical commonalities, although they may acknowledge that such nationalism is a social construct necessary to achieving their goal of autonomy, and not a naturally occurring ‘primordial’ force. Whatever their view on the nature and origins of nationalism, pure nationalists see modern universal notions of individual rights as having a deleterious effect on society. They view the United States in particular as the proponent of these modern values; the US-Japan strategic relationship as an instrument of Japanese subordination to American interests; and the peace clause of the constitution as a reinforcement of the notion that Japan must be held forever responsible for its wartime past. Pure nationalists repudiate almost any sense of Japanese guilt for the war as a method used by foreign powers, including the United States, to place Japan in a diplomatically inferior position. Narratives that paint Japan’s wartime actions in a positive light are thus seen as a method of attaining independence.

4.) Radical Pacifism also holds a sense of the historically constructed and unique nation important to conceptualisations of the national interest. However, radical pacifists believe that the national interest lies in preventing the Japanese government, and even the Japanese people as a whole, from
reverting to militarism. Unlike the pure nationalists, therefore, radical-pacifist emphasis on the importance of fostering national identity derives from the notion that all Japanese must assume responsibility for Japan’s wartime past. Because military cooperation with the United States represents an avenue by which Japanese might rediscover militarist tendencies, radical pacifists oppose the treaty relationship with the United States. To radical pacifists, the relationship also represents support for a world order structured around military might, not peaceful relations with all other nations, which the radicals see as both achievable and desirable. Radical pacifists are therefore the strongest supporters of a strict interpretation of constitutional restrictions on the use of force. Not only should such restrictions limit Japanese belligerency, they limit the level of bilateral military cooperation between Japan and other powers such as the United States. The supposition that cooperation on defence with other nations leads towards a revival of militarism has prompted radical pacifists to advocate a policy of unarmed neutrality.

5.) Progressivism (shinposhugi) posits that international politics can and should be governed according to the rule of law, and often advocates the strengthening of international institutions such as the United Nations by Japan’s active participation in their activities. Progressives’ advocacy of the rule of law also applies on a domestic level, where they call for the improvement of democratic practice in Japan, which they believe has sometimes been subverted by the government, often to protect good relations with the United States. While they do not always oppose Japan’s bilateral security cooperation with the United States, they insist that multilateral international cooperation must take precedence over the bilateral relationship. Also, while progressives are not necessarily wedded to the current Japanese constitution, they usually advocate restrictions on the use of force, framed in terms of a sovereign commitment to work within multilateral institutions.

6.) Mercantilism (jūshōshugi) holds that the government’s primary role is to secure domestic stability, usually gained by promoting the economic wellbeing of the populace. National economic growth is a priority and
accordingly, stable trade relations with neighbours are key national objectives. Mercantilists also see the bilateral relationship with the United States as useful in maintaining regional stability. They view the relationship as valuable because its presence means that Japan is not placed under pressure to provide robust defences of its own. Mercantilists find this reduced incentive to rearm useful, not so much because US protection offsets indigenous Japanese spending on the military as is commonly assumed, but because indigenous rearmament would prove more controversial than the traditional post-war policy of maintaining the presence of relatively unobtrusive US bases on Japanese soil. While approving of the bilateral relationship, mercantilists nevertheless see the constitution as a useful brake, allowing them to resist American and pro-American nationalist calls for robust rearmament, and when in government they have instituted extra brakes of their own. While their personal statements often show that they do harbour feelings of contrition for Japan’s wartime exploits, mercantilists tend to avoid discussion of Japan’s past so as to avoid backlash from nationalistic elements of Japanese society, be they on the traditional ‘right’ or ‘left’. Because mercantilists held the balance of power in Japanese foreign policy discourse from 1960 to the beginning of the 1980s, their unwillingness to propound an ‘official’ view of history has left war memory in Japan highly contested between other groups.

It is important to remember that, despite the difference in nomenclature, each of the six positions correspond to those outlined in chapter two (see figure 4.1). That is, they are derived from the tensions internal to the nation state. The relative support for each position within Japanese foreign policy debates and the alliances which may form between proponents of each position may change over time. However, as ideological constructs in themselves, they nevertheless remain fairly static, and chronological narratives demonstrating the development of each position are largely unnecessary. Each position can be regarded as similar to a particular and stable ‘tradition’ rather than an evolving ‘culture’. The rest of this chapter therefore outlines each position by introducing its most forthright proponents since the end of the war and exploring themes revealed by
their political statements on the public record, whether they be in the form of published opinion articles in journals and newspapers, speeches, Diet statements, or popular books and magazines, with little regard to chronological order. The point is to search for commonalities across time rather than to be bound by a linear narrative.

Figure 4.1: Tensions and positions in Japan’s foreign policy discourse

Also, to describe the way Japanese proponents of each position argue their case, it is, to some extent, impossible to hold methods static across positions. While opinions on the national interest can be gauged from debate within the ‘public sphere’ in general, the
particular types of sources used to determine the opinions of foreign policy actors must sometimes vary across positions. This is because of the simple fact that some positions have held more influence over the thinking of the political elites since the Second World War than others. Government politicians enjoy a platform from which to influence policy, but are more likely to do so by their actions and speeches rather than by published opinion pieces, although they author these as well. Conversely, the challenges offered by proponents of positions not represented by the government are more likely to appear in published opinion articles and newspapers, and are often easier to interpret than politicians’ statements: while government politicians must sometimes make concessions to positions they do not favour, those out of power are often free to adhere to principle, and have more to gain by arguing their positions in the public sphere in an attempt to influence public opinion. In order to present each position in detail, it is therefore necessary to cast a wide but discerning net over sources of debate on the national interest.

Nevertheless, in focusing on each of the three tensions of foreign policy in outlining the various positions, there are certain long-standing debates and issues that allow observers to determine a given individual’s discursive position. Statements of support or otherwise for the US-Japan bilateral relationship are fairly straightforward. Support or otherwise for revision of Article 9, however, is a little more complicated, as a stance favouring revision may not necessarily be one that eschews the importance of voluntary domestic restraints of the use of force. Here a certain amount of interpretation is necessary. Perhaps the most difficult tension in foreign policy debates to identify is that created by the assertion of a historically constructed national essence. However, even here, there are certain indicators that reveal how those active within foreign policy debates perceive historical identity. How such individuals respond, for example, to calls for Japan, as a nation, to apologise for the campaign of violence it waged against its Asian and Pacific neighbours during the Second World War tells us much about their conceptualisation of history and its relation to the nation state. Whether commemorations for the war are placed in a broader historical narrative of the times also demonstrates whether politicians or commentators regard actual historical occurrences as important to the construction of a national identity. It is in this light that much of the subsequent descriptions of arguments for each position will proceed.
**Realism**

Within Japanese discourse on the national interest, realists see maintenance of the international balance of power as their primary objective. Their priorities lie in preserving external stability. To attain this goal during the Cold War they worked to institutionalise many of the security arrangements upon which Japan came to rely informally after 1960. One major project of the realists throughout the Cold War was to continually assess Japanese military capabilities and clarify particular issues – such as the role of the Self Defense Forces (SDF) in contingencies and the status of Okinawa – left unresolved at the end of the occupation. Realist thinkers and policy planners conducted prudent assessments of Japan’s military capabilities and advocated the slow augmentation of national military power to meet external threats and maintain the balance of power within East Asia. Realists as defined here have favoured increases in military spending, but only insofar as the regional military balance is preserved. They are not interested in maximising power for its own sake, but see power as a means to meet security objectives.

The priority that realists place on external security means that many officers in the SDF, the organ mostly charged with the defence of Japan’s borders, adopted the realist position. The controversy surrounding military issues after the war meant, however, that SDF members have been kept away from the policy-making process. While this has normally been framed in terms of ‘too much’ (Dixon 1999, 162) or ‘strict’ (Yamaguchi 2001, 35) civilian control, it is actually the case that throughout the post-war period Japan has had few or no systems of civilian control as they are usually understood elsewhere (Vagts 1959, 418, Buck 1976, 151). The refusal of opposition parties to agree to the constitutionality of the armed forces, for example, has meant that the Diet has avoided playing a role in SDF oversight or in the construction of bureaucratic institutions specifically for regulating the military. Instead, until 2006 the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) acted as the primary conduit between the SDF and the outside world. However, laws passed from 1952 barred uniformed officers and even people who had previously worked in the SDF and its predecessors from employment in a managerial capacity within the JDA. This stipulation made the JDA overly bureaucratic and reluctant to include the advice of experienced SDF officers when it came to policy formation. It also
‘was a reason for the growth of friction between uniformed officers (yunifōmu) and administrators (naikyoku)’. Moreover, the agency, under the authority of the prime minister’s office, was primarily staffed with temporary transfers from other ministries, meaning that it became an arena for bureaucratic rivalry (Bōei kenkyūkai 1996, 22-24) rather than serving as a conduit through which the SDF could make its voice known to the government. There has thus been little realist input into public debates on security and foreign policy from SDF officers until recently.

Because of their inability to prepare the public by outlining their thoughts on strategy in Diet testimony or through other official organs, SDF officers have become the centre of controversy when their deliberations on security, often conducted in secret, reach the public arena. In 1965, for example, Okada Haruo, a Socialist Diet member, discovered that high ranking members of the SDF had been engaged in drawing up secret contingency plans named the ‘Three Arrows Studies’ (mitsuya kenkyū), to deal with the hypothetical outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula. The studies included plans to deal with communist agitation in Japan (Mitsuya kenkyū 1963, 484-485), and, on the eve of the Vietnam War, revived Socialist anxiety about the SDF as an organ of public order (DR, S48, HR, Budget 10, 10/2/65, 1-4). The revelation of the plans and the subsequent outcry from the opposition forced Prime Minister Satō Eisaku to declare that all such future contingency planning would be made public and subject to Diet approval. Against Satō’s better judgement – the prime minister thought that the contingency planning was justified – the declaration effectively quashed any new studies for the next decade.

Later, in July 1978, Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) General Kurisu Hirōmi noted publically that he would take extra-constitutional measures to defend Japan if necessary in times of crisis (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 1050). Kurisu’s was a ‘realist’ position which, if always controversial, has long been established elsewhere as an argument in legal theory on crisis management (Gross and Aoláin 2006, 110-169). Nevertheless it caused significant outcry in Japan, prompting Kurisu’s resignation. The controversy surrounding such cases has generally meant that for most of time since 1945, SDF members have been reluctant to communicate their ‘realist’ views to the government or directly to the public.
Controversy has also meant that there were also relatively few politicians who adopted the realist line after Yoshida Shigeru withdrew from politics. Yoshida was the quintessential realist, despite the fact that he has been ascribed a different legacy or ‘doctrine’ that prioritised economic growth over security planning, a doctrine that Yoshida specifically denied was his (Pyle 2004). Certainly, during early debates on the constitution he threw his support completely behind restrictions on the use of force and resisted American pressure for Japan’s rearmament. However, this was only a temporary position while Japan rebuilt its infrastructure after the war. He later supported light rearmament and stated clearly that more robust rearmament should occur after Japan’s economic reconstruction (S. Yoshida 1961, 146). According to Igarashi (1985), Yoshida ‘analyzed Japanese interests from the perspective of power politics, and re-emerged as the proponent of a “traditional diplomacy” involving strategic alliances and balance of power politics’. Nevertheless, his advocacy for prudent but significant reinforcement of Japan’s military capabilities after his time as prime minister was largely ignored, at least in public discourse. Until fairly recently, Satō Eisaku, one of Yoshida’s closest lieutenants, was the only other prime minister committed to the realist position.

However, some politicians have more recently rediscovered realism, although they are still relatively few in number. Former JDA Director-General and Defence Minister Ishiba Shigeru and former Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) President Maehara Seiji, while they may disagree on certain policy choices, prefer to view international politics through the lens of rational and prudent calculations of security costs and benefits that need not include discussions of common ‘values’ with other nations (Maehara, Bōeichō kara bōeishō e: nani ga nihon no bōei ni kaketeiru no ka 2000, Ishiba 2005, 205, Kuroi 2005). Asō Tarō, Yoshida’s grandson and prime minister from September 2008 to September 2009, meanwhile, was labelled as someone who would take a nationalistic approach to security issues. However, his writings before taking office and his stance as prime minister often supported the more prudent realist line (Asō 2008, 186, Japan Times 29 October 2008). Whatever nationalist views he held, he did not significantly bring them to bear on foreign policy during his short term.1

1 It appears that there are more realists in the DPJ than Maehara. After Hatoyama Yukio resigned as prime minister in 2009, he was replaced by Kan Naoto, who had something of a reputation as a ‘leftist’ due to his
Despite the relative paucity of realists on the post-war Japanese political scene, there have been those in the academic world willing to argue the realist position. Nagai Yōnosuke (1966) mapped out Japan’s ‘restraints and options’ in the 1960s. Most well known amongst realist scholars in Japan were Kōsaka Masataka (1963) and Inoki Masamichi (1956). Kōsaka (1964) in particular focused on Yoshida Shigeru as a historical figure and is partly responsible for relabeling Yoshida a mercantilist, although he preferred to see Yoshida as a realist who understood the practical benefits of Japanese restraint than one who saw economic growth as his primary or only goal. During the 1980s, Sase Masamori (1980), an extremely forthright realist scholar at the National Defense University argued forcefully for a Japanese foreign policy based on principles of power and restraint.

Indeed, realists are driven by cold calculations of the international balance of power. Thus, they do not necessarily think Japan should be bound by constitutional or other administrative restrictions on the use of force. Yoshida saw the constitution as something that should eventually be discarded after gaining the understanding of the public about the need for rearmament (S. Yoshida 1961, 146). Sase (1980) saw the constitution as a tool used by politicians and bureaucrats to justify budgetary restraint when it came to defence spending (223), a practice that he believed hurt Japan’s interests by causing friction in the relationship with the United States at a crucial juncture of the Cold War (228-229). During a 2005 newspaper interview, Maehara noted Article 9, Section 2 of the constitution, which bans air land and sea forces, ‘is inconsistent with the role of the SDF. You can’t defend your country unarmed. You need a force with real capabilities. We should eliminate (sakujo) Article 9, section 2’. Maehara also advocated that Japan revise the constitution to assert the nation’s right to collective self-defence, which, as noted in the following chapter, is banned under current interpretations of Article 9 (Yomiuri Shinbun 22 September 2005). Ishiba has clearly stated his belief that the laws and regulations surrounding the SDF are overly strict to the extent that ‘if they
follow the law, the SDF cannot fight at all’ a situation he views as absurd (Ishiba and Kiyotani 2006, 18).

Despite an insistence on prudent rearmament of Japan’s defence capabilities, realists hold that cooperation with the United States where possible constitutes the best method of enhancing Japan’s security and maintaining the balance of power in East Asia, despite the tensions that existed around the alliance domestically. However, realists are clear that the bilateral relationship is one based purely on shared interests, not necessarily ‘common values’. Yoshida once maintained that it would be better to see him as part of ‘a clique that put Britain and America to use’ (ei-bei riyō ha) in the service of Japan’s national interests than to see him as part of a ‘pro Anglo-American group’ (shin-eibei ha) (J. W. Dower 1993). Ishiba (2005, 48) sees ‘goodwill’ (zen’i) as absolutely irrelevant in the relationship between the United States and Japan; both parties come to agreements based instead on their ‘interests’ (rieki). Sase similarly believed that ‘The bond between the United States and Japan is not an “obligation.” It is above all a relationship of “necessity” for Japan. Therefore, the necessity of avoiding tensions in US-Japan relations must be placed before… all else’ (Sase 1980). Asō, putting it a different way, notes that ‘if you can’t protect yourself by your own power, even little kids know that it makes sense to be friends with the best fighter’ (Penney n.d.).

True to their prudent stance and their reluctance to talk about values or a unique historical culture in the formulation of the national interest, realists have generally avoided discussion of Japan’s war legacy. When they do discuss the legacy of war, realists prefer to address it in the abstract language of power, denying that there can be any such concept as justice – and therefore responsibility – in war. While, for example, Ishiba (2005, 39) notes that the Tokyo War Crimes trials were a ‘one-sided’ dispensation of victors’ justice, he sees this as the perfectly natural consequence of a clash between two powers, each with their own sense of right and wrong – ‘there has never been such a thing as a “just war,”’ – and the bare fact that ‘if you win, you rule’ (kateba kangun) dictates post-war conceptualisations of ‘justice’. Ishiba does not agree with others in Japan who insist that the trials were ‘unfair’ (fukōhei). They were simply a reflection of a power-driven international environment where questions of fairness are irrelevant.
The reluctance to discuss questions of peace and war outside of a context of power has made it difficult for realist leaders to confront issues related to Japan’s wartime experience, especially when those issues involve domestic political controversy. Yoshida’s ‘history’ of modern Japan, while covering the events of the century starting in the 1860s, skips over the war as if it were a detour on Japan’s road to emergence as a post-war power (S. Yoshida 1999). Asō Tarō’s term as prime minister, meanwhile, saw opposition members question him about thousands of foreign prisoners forced to work in the Asō family mines during the war. Asō responded that ‘No facts have been confirmed’ and played down the issue, denying the Japanese media an opportunity to turn it into a significant controversy (Hongo, Aso: What POW servitude? 2008). Realists are careful not to fall into discussion of the war with colleagues who attempt to encourage it.

Indeed, the realists’ reluctance to discuss politicised issues related to war memory extends to Japan’s own war victims. The mainstream conservative political elite would not approach the issue of memorialising the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the 1950s and 1960s while the subject of nuclear weapons remained a contentious political issue. In 1952 and 1953, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru attended the August 6 ceremony in memory of the bombings in Hiroshima (Ubuki 2009), but prime ministerial attendance at the ceremony stopped after the JSP adopted nuclear disarmament as a ‘pacifist’ cause (DR: S39, HR, Budget 5, 7/10/61, 25; DR: S47, HC, Budget 2, 8/12/64, 2). Ironically, it was the Vietnam War that paved the way for a resumption of prime ministerial visits. As the focus of the ‘peace movement’ turned elsewhere, Hiroshima became a ‘sanitised’ symbol of a universal movement for nuclear disarmament with few other political messages. As numerous interpretive studies and reports have shown, until the 1990s the Hiroshima museum and monuments depicted the death and destruction delivered by the bomb with very little historical context, and no explanation of Japan’s wartime aggression (Giamo 2003, 704, Yoneyama 1995, 502, Weisman 1990). This ‘removal’ of Hiroshima from the deeper historical narrative of Japan’s wartime allowed Satō to resume attendance at the Hiroshima ceremonies in August 1971, setting the precedent for prime ministerial visits every year since.

However, Satō’s visit did not symbolise a new-found idealism on the part of the ‘realist’ prime minister. As explained further in the next chapter, it came only after he
had decided that a nuclear option for Japan was too politically contentious, and probably strategically unjustified. Satō’s decision to cultivate a domestic anti-nuclear identity by, in part, sanctioning Hiroshima as an official location of Japanese commemoration was made only once he had established that such an identity would not restrict Japan’s strategic choices in the medium term. Moreover, in June, the prime minister had finalised negotiations with the United States on the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty. With the opposition parties and many in the public suspecting – correctly – that Satō cut a deal to guarantee entry for US nuclear weapons into Japanese territory, the prime minister’s visit was designed to strengthen his anti-nuclear credentials (Kim 1973, 1029-1030). Satō’s visit to Hiroshima was made only after the memorial was delinked from its historical context and was used as a crutch to gain support for his stance on the relationship with the United States, and only after he had explicitly ensured that it would not restrict Japan’s imaginable military options. Satō viewed Hiroshima like a true realist.

Thus, in seeking to ensure Japan’s safety from external threats, realists insist that 1) domestic considerations should not restrict the ability of the state to use force to defend itself; 2) an appreciation for the US-Japan alliance as an institution is also necessary in the defence of Japan; 3) potentially controversial history issues should be avoided. Realists have generally adopted a low profile in foreign policy debates, but have come to be somewhat more vocal in recent years. Nevertheless, they are still a minority in discourse on foreign policy in Japan.

**Pro-American Nationalism**

After the occupation, wartime career politicians who had been removed from political life by the purges evidently found few barriers to re-entry into their former profession: in the 1952 general election, the first after the occupation ended, 42 per cent of Diet seats went to former occupation purgees (Schaller 1997, 63). Kishi Nobusuke stands as the most obvious example of a purged war crimes suspect re-entering public life, but he was joined by figures like Fujiyama Aiichirō, the wartime industrialist purged during the occupation who provided Kishi with financial backing and later emerged as his choice for foreign minister. Such figures formed the post-war basis for a political school of thought whose
proponents have included Fukuda Takeo, prime minister from 1976 to 1978, Nakasone Yasuhiro, the youngest member in the Kishi Cabinet and prime minister from 1982 to 1987, Abe Shintarō, Nakasone’s foreign minister and Kishi’s son-in-law, Koizumi Jun’ichirō, an acolyte of Fukuda and prime minister from 2001 to 2006, Abe Shinzō, Kishi’s grandson, Shintarō’s son and Koizumi’s immediate successor as prime minister from 2006 to 2007, as well as scores of other conservative politicians.

The primary goal of the pro-American nationalists is to recreate Japan as a military and cultural great power. The means by which they hope to achieve this goal is revision of the post-war constitution, which they see as having sapped Japan of its strength as a nation, and, in conjunction with various other occupation-era initiatives, such as education reform and the Tokyo trials, as having created a narrative of Japan as a nation from which its own population cannot derive any pride. With the United States promoting greater rearmament by Japan, they view Japan’s role as an ally with Washington as a key ingredient in this enterprise. According to Kishi, Japan’s priorities needed to lie with:

revision of our Constitution, especially the part that forbids the establishment of defense forces. We must also promote economic relations with the Asian countries and maintain close friendship with the United States, Great Britain and other free nations…. and raise our moral standards through reform of our education system (quoted in Kurzman 1960, 290).

The pro-American nationalists have been remarkably consistent in linking the constitution to issues of national morality. In 2004, at a speech at a conservative Washington-based think-tank, Abe Shinzō (2004, 6) noted that ‘By revising the Constitution, Japan must firmly re-establish the framework of the nation and create new structures and values in the Japanese political system’. Not only does the constitution restrict the use of force, according to the pro-American nationalists it restricts the full actualisation of an independent national identity for Japan.

The nationalists played a major role in the formation of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the most influential informal institution in post-war Japanese politics, which they intended to use as a vehicle to achieve their key goal of constitutional revision. While the party was formed in 1955 under Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichirō to block a
Socialist Party that had itself reunited after splitting in two, Kishi had in any case been working for years to form a new party to oppose Yoshida’s pragmatism, which he regarded as a form of servility towards the United States.

That the nationalists had a major role in establishing the LDP is reflected in its founding statement, which notes that the party’s mission is in part to ‘survey autonomous revision (jishuteki kaisei) of the present constitution, and re-examine the various occupation regulations’. In particular, the drafters of the statement hoped to ‘prepare defensive armaments (jieigunbi) commensurate with national power and conditions under a system of collective self-defence, and provide for the withdrawal of stationed foreign forces’. The heading for the section on constitutional revision and rearmament is ‘Maintenance of an Independent State System’ (dokuritsu kokka taisei no seibi), exactly the same wording as the corresponding section of the 1952 policy platform of the Japan Renewal League, the occupation era research group that Kishi helped found in order to promote his political views behind the scenes (LDP 1955, 413-414, Hara 1995, 151).

Forced into the ‘anti-mainstream’ of the party after the controversy over the security treaty with the United States led to Kishi’s resignation, nationalists within the party have nevertheless continued to stress constitutional reform. Efforts within the Diet are coordinated by the Parliamentarians’ Alliance for the Establishment of an Autonomous Constitution (jishu kenpō seitei giin dōmei), first chaired by Hirose Hisatada, another occupation-era purgee, four months before the foundation of the LDP. The alliance is hardly bashful about its purposes, and is often somewhat more forthright than most pro-American nationalist individuals. In 2010 its website claimed that one of its central goals is to change the Japanese constitution from that of ‘a constitution of a colony to the constitution of a truly independent country!’ (Atarashii kenpō o tsukuru kokumin kaigi 2010). The alliance draws its members from various parties and positions, but it has always been centred on the LDP.

In May 1969, the alliance’s activities received a boost when Kishi chaired the first meeting of the National Congress for the Establishment of an Autonomous Constitution (jishu kenpō settei kokumin kaigi), a private organisation which provides support to
parliamentary efforts to change the constitution through scholarly activities and debate.\(^2\) The following year, the LDP announced that it would consider plans for constitutional revision, but proponents of revision had little success in putting the issue on the Diet agenda during the following decade (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 848, 989, 1090). Only in 1985 did the party, under Nakasone, reconfirm that ‘the establishment of an autonomous constitution has been a principle of the party (tōze) since its foundation’ (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 1190). Throughout this time, the congress has continued its work, holding annual meetings since 1974 in one of the buildings which houses the official offices of Diet representatives. By 2008, when the congress made a declaration to oppose grassroots efforts to protect Article 9, Nakasone was its chair (Shin kenpō seitei giin dōmei 2008). In addition to the meetings in the Diet representatives’ offices, the congress also holds its general meeting on May 5 (Constitution Day).

Despite such efforts, however, constitutional revision proved elusive after the Socialists won 33 per cent of the seats in the House of Representatives in 1958. Nationalists in the Diet thus focused much of their energy on achieving their other goals (Z. Tanaka 2005, 50-51, Ishikawa 2004, 85). During the 1950s, they primarily aimed at a reassessment of the treaty relationship with the United States. Many Japanese nationalists were uncomfortable about the latitude that the treaty arrangements afforded American forces in Japan and signalled their latent anti-Americanism by supporting the Hatoyama government’s 1956 recognition of the Soviet Union, a move intended to demonstrate Japan’s independence from Washington. However, most nationalists would later support Kishi’s policy of gaining equality through revision of the security treaty, meaning that they would thenceforth have a stake in defending the relationship with the United States. Indeed, the fierce protests by socialists and communists, whom the nationalists vehemently hated, at the core of the protest movement against the treaty revision arguably made the bond between the United States and those that supported Kishi stronger.

\(^2\) In 2007 both the Parliamentarian’s Alliance and the National Council changed the goal in their name to ‘for the Establishment of a New Constitution’ (Atarashii kenpō o tsukuru kokumin kaigi: Shin kenpō seitei giin dōmei), implicit recognition that the term ‘autonomous constitution’ was an unpopular phrase associated with an overly nationalist position.
One of the human manifestations of this bond is the willingness of pro-American nationalist leaders to see the relationship with Washington as a personal responsibility. Unlike other Japanese leaders, who have often preferred to work either through formal diplomatic machinery or through pro-Japan lobbyists in the United States, pro-American nationalists have understood only too well that close personal relationships help them to gain access in Washington, when needed. The archetypical example of this ‘personalising’ of the US-Japan relationship is the ‘nickname basis’ relationship between Nakasone (“Yasu”) and Ronald Reagan (“Ron”) in the 1980s. Kishi’s easy manner with Eisenhower, both on and off the golf course serves as another. While there were important relationships between other Japanese prime ministers and US presidents – the often tense relationship between Satō and Richard Nixon, for example – none of the more mainstream conservatives ever attempted to emulate the familiarity that pro-American nationalist leaders felt they could exhibit towards their US counterparts.

Nor were these friendships cultivated at only the summit, or even ministerial, level. Shiina Motoo, for example, an LDP politician who never held a Cabinet post, formed a host of relationships within the American administration from the 1980s and 1990s. Shiina’s former intern, Michael J. Green, would later become US National Security Council Asian Affairs Director in the George W. Bush administration, and would call Shiina on September 11, 2001 for advice on how to coordinate a US-Japan response to the terror attacks that occurred that day (Green 2007). Through his contacts in Tokyo, Green, a Japan specialist then ‘propped up the “honeymoon relationship between Bush and [Prime Minister] Koizumi” from below’ (Sunohara 2006, 7-8). The relationship between the two leaders would become almost as close as that between Nakasone and Reagan, and both pro-American nationalists in Japan and ‘alliance managers’ in Washington would boast that the period signified the ‘golden age’ of US-Japan relations (Abe 2005, 2, U.S. Department of State 2004), although other experts warned that relationships on a working level were being neglected during Koizumi’s term (Johnston 2009, 2006).

Occasionally, the closeness between the United States and the pro-American nationalists has led to both minor and significant breaches in diplomatic protocol. Kishi, for example, insisted on signing the 1960 mutual security treaty in person, even though
his foreign policy advisers were opposed to the move because the signatory on the American side was not the president, but the secretary of state (Nishi 1982, xxxii). Some Japanese felt that with the issue widely discussed in their national media, Kishi’s presence at the head of the delegation degraded Japan’s status. According to one Diet member, ‘there was an impression among the people that this would be somewhat shameful conduct’ (chotto shūtai) (DR, S33, Foreign Affairs, 26, 26/12/59, 1-2). The prime minister’s detractors viewed Kishi’s attendance at the signing as an act of sycophancy, and when word of Kishi’s departure to Washington under the cover of night was leaked to protestors, they turned out in force at Tokyo International Airport to protest (Mainichi Shinbun 2010, Nishi 1982, xxxii).

It was under Kishi’s government, meanwhile, that the US Central Intelligence Agency started funnelling secret funds to the LDP ‘to provide a few key pro-American and conservative politicians with covert limited financial support and electoral advice’ (Japan Times 20 July 2006). Protocols have been relaxed more recently as well. Journalist Sunohara Tsuyoshi reported that even before Abe Shinzō became prime minister, Green shared with him a restricted NSC telephone number for use only by an extremely limited number of important individuals, an act Sunohara believes Abe should have rejected as ‘a clear “breach of the rules” according to the protocol of US-Japan diplomatic authorities’. According to Sunohara, ‘Abe, however, ignored procedure, and took Green as a steadfast and broad personal “direct pipe” of communications between the White House and the prime minister’s office’ (Sunohara 2006, 8).

Despite their closeness to the United States, pro-American nationalists have worked to cultivate a sense of historical national identity particular to Japan. Often the nationalistic measures they undertake are cosmetic, as when the Fukuda Cabinet sponsored legislation to officially recognise the gengō system of counting years from the time the sitting emperor was installed (Fujiwara 1989, 267). Nakasone placed special emphasis on changing the curricula in schools in order to promote a sense of ‘internationalism’ (kokusaika). However, what he meant by the term was that Japanese students should take pride in their own history and culture so that Japan could stand strong among other nations. Nakasone’s policy of encouraging more effective English language education in Japan’s schools, for example, was primarily intended to transmit
Japanese values to the world, not ‘international’ values to Japan (Kubota 2001, 23-24). In 2006, the Abe Cabinet succeeded in revising the 1947 Fundamental Law of Education replacing clauses on individualism with those stressing ‘love of country’, ‘public spirit’, and ‘tradition’ (Onishi 2006).

In themselves, these changes over the years have been innocuous – indeed, the LDP’s coalition partners insisted that Abe’s new Fundamental Law also contain clauses related to internationalism and peace – but they have consistently caused concern among critics of a ‘move to the right’ (ukeika) in Japanese politics (A. Fujiwara 1989, 266, Shimizu 2008, 19). Moreover, the fact that the pro-American nationalists prioritise such symbolic measures demonstrates that they see the construction of a historically based and unique national identity as important.

Less innocuous is the pro-American nationalists’ more specific view of Japan’s wartime role in Asia and the Pacific, in particular how they see Japan’s war criminals and how they commemorate the war. As an A-class war crimes suspect awaiting trial, Kishi wrote about ‘the righteousness of the Imperial army’ (miikusa),³ and thought the Allies’ decision to charge him as a war criminal a ‘complete error’ on their part (Hara 1995, 121-122). Nakasone has also said that he also does not agree with the rulings of the Tokyo War Crimes trials. Abe Shinzō is more willing to debate their legal standing, seeing them as a piece of legal sophistry to show that Japan accepts its guilt to an international audience, but that they have little relevance in a domestic setting (Abe and Okazaki 2004, 149).

The relationship between the war dead, war criminals and war commemoration is a pertinent one for the pro-American nationalists, with Yasukuni Shrine, a site established in central Tokyo to honour those who had died in the name of the emperor during wartime, serving as a focal point for discussions on war memory in Japan. After the war, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the administrative organ charged with awarding war pensions, provided lists of the war dead upon the Shrine’s request. During the 1950s and 1960s the Ministry and Shrine authorities also discussed the propriety of enshrining war criminals at the shrine, reaching a decision in 1969 that A-class war criminals were ‘able

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³ The word ‘miikusa’ is archaic, and found in the Man’yōshū, an eighth century Japanese classic anthology of poems.
to be honoured' (*Japan Times* 29 March 2007). In 1978, 14 such figures were enshrined in secret at Yasukuni. In 2006 it was revealed that this act apparently caused the emperor ‘trouble’ (*fukaikan*) and led to his decision not to visit the Shrine thereafter (*Nihon Keizai Shinbun* 7 July 2006).

It is not surprising then, that the shrine is widely seen in China and Korea, as well as by many in Japan, as a symbol of Japan’s past militarism. In 1985 Beijing protested Nakasone’s visit to the Shrine on August 15 of that year, when he signed the Shrine’s register as prime minister (*Takenaka 2007*). Almost all post-war Japanese prime ministers before Nakasone had visited Yasukuni, but since 1975 had explicitly stated that they did so in a ‘private capacity’ (*Okazaki 2005*). Beijing strongly protested Nakasone’s actions, which gave an official veneer to the Shrine, and Nakasone cancelled future visits.

However, Nakasone has since stated that he does not view those enshrined at Yasukuni to be criminals. His subsequent call to remove the 14 names from the register of the Shrine therefore did not reflect contrition on Nakasone’s part, but an attempt to restore Yasukuni’s status as rightful historical site of mourning where politicians could go without causing controversy. ‘The important thing’ said Nakasone ‘is to pass down the nation’s spiritual tradition’ (*Kajimoto 2005*).

The next prime minister to visit was the pro-American nationalist Hashimoto Ryūtarō, who before becoming the national leader in 1996 visited the Shrine often as chairman of the Izokukai. While Hashimoto claimed that his visit as prime minister was a personal affair, it nevertheless resulted in protests from Beijing (*Hasegawa and Togo 2008, 130-131*).

Prime Minister Koizumi’s determined annual visits to the Shrine between 2001 and 2006 thus prompted widespread protests in China and South Korea. Koizumi mostly visited on days other than August 15, and did note that ‘the present peace and prosperity of Japan are founded on the priceless sacrifices made by many people who lost their lives in war’ (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002*), but this statement was more ambiguous than it was conciliatory, and might even be interpreted as an exculpatory statement dismissing bad conduct by Japanese during conflict in Asia. Not surprisingly, Koizumi’s visits also led to strong official protests from Seoul and Korea, as well as the refusal by Koizumi’s Chinese counterparts to meet with the prime minister until he promised not to visit the
Shrine. Koizumi never backed down, visiting the Shrine on August 15 in his final year of office, and demonstrating the importance of historical symbolism and national pride to pro-American nationalists.

However, the determination of the nationalists to glorify Japanese history often conflicts with their preference to strengthen the US-Japan alliance, and in such circumstances, the alliance has always taken precedence. Despite their insistence that pride in Japanese history, including the efforts of Japanese soldiers during wartime, forms the basis for a positive national identity, pro-American nationalist leaders have, somewhat counter-intuitively, often been the first official actors to attempt to address outstanding international problems caused by issues related to war memory. Indeed, because of their preoccupation with their own nation’s history, pro-American nationalists have understood more than other Japanese leaders the importance of historical symbolism to other nations. Nevertheless, their exhibitions of apologetic behaviour towards others are often undertaken more in order to curry favour with the United States than to apologise sincerely to Japan’s victims. Appearing apologetic to weaker neighbours sometimes demonstrates to Washington that Tokyo is a responsible nation, and has allowed Japan greater diplomatic room to negotiate within the bilateral relationship. However, because of this, the apologetic symbolism often carries mixed messages; the pro-American nationalists will adopt stances that appear contrite to overseas audiences, while denying their actions stand as apologies when they are at home.

Such apologetic displays began almost immediately after Kishi came to power as prime minister. In May 1957, Kishi embarked on wide-ranging visits to Taiwan and South East Asia, followed by further visits to South East Asia, Australia and New Zealand in November 1957. These visits were carefully orchestrated to gain media attention and show the United States that Japan could be a trusted partner amongst the non-communist nations in the region. Kishi, capitalising on the newfound goodwill between Japan and its neighbours, was then able to convince Washington that it could be afforded a longer leash, thus building the basis for treaty revision. To this end, translations of the prime minister’s statements to leaders in foreign nations were painstakingly prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to have the most emotional impact in English (Rix 1999, 33); the statements went largely unnoticed in
Tokyo. As Diet member Fujita Yukihisa (2006a), who has taken a special interest in Japan’s record of apology, points out, the prime minister’s official statements in Japanese contained almost no mention of apology and the press briefings conducted by ministry spokespersons largely glossed over the prime minister’s actual remarks. Back home, Kishi himself revealed little about his references to the war, so the Japanese public was not fully informed of the impact his visit had in each country (Fujita 2006b).

This was a clear case of one message for those outside Japan and another message for domestic consumption.

A similar scenario played out in 1965, when Shiina Etsusaburō (Motoo’s father) travelled to South Korea as foreign minister to help normalise relations with South Korea. US officials were keen to forge solidarity in the non-communist world and thus prodded Shiina to offer South Korea some words of contrition for Japan’s colonisation of the Korean peninsula. Apologies to South Korea posed particular domestic problems for Japanese politicians, with nationalists believing that Japan had nothing to apologise for and socialists reluctant to apologise to a regime which they regarded at best as reactionary, and which they believed did not represent the entirety of the Korean people. In his 1963 publication Dōwa to Seiji (Fairytales and Politics) Shiina referred to Japan’s occupation of Korea as ‘glorious’ (Wakamiya 1999, 240). Despite serving in the Satō Cabinet, Shiina was a nationalist who found it difficult to apologise to the South Koreans.

Nevertheless, with the assistance of foreign ministry bureaucrats, Shiina wrote his own official statement on the plane to Seoul and on disembarking at Kimpo airport stated that ‘The unhappy period (fukōna kikan) in the long history of the two countries was a seriously regretful circumstance (makoto ni ikan na shidai) and something to deeply reflect (fukaku hansei) upon’ (Kiroku Shiina Etsusaburō 1982, 52). The foreign minister’s gesture apparently satisfied both his Korean interlocutors and American observers of the normalisation process, while it was unclear that words such as ‘regret’ and ‘reflect’ – which have since been used often by Japanese politicians on apology missions – expressed genuine apology. An authorised chronicle of Shiina’s career later claimed that his words were specifically formulated so as not to imply Japan’s responsibility for its wartime actions (Kiroku Shiina Etsusaburō 1982, 52). The statement
was instead designed partly to please Americans, and closely resembled a formulation that US Ambassador to Japan Edwin O. Reischauer had suggested to the minister as a way of helping ‘assuage Korean feelings without irritating [the] Japanese public’ (U.S. Department of State 2000, 778). One American official, pleased with the result, noted after the apology that the minister ‘came as close as a Japanese can to apologizing for Japan’s past sins’ (U.S. Department of State 2000, 784).

The pattern of placating Asian neighbours to please Washington was a fairly common one among pro-American nationalist leaders. In 1982, for example, Nakasone became the first post-war prime minister to visit South Korea, where he and President Chun Doo-Hwan held talks and engaged in a raucous drinking session afterwards. However, the talks, and the Japanese offer of aid to South Korea that went with them came after prodding from American officials eager to see a ‘united front’ between Washington’s two Northeast Asian allies (Cha 2000, 193). Nakasone understood this dynamic only too well, and even the American press described his trip to Seoul – and the ‘hard-drinking Oriental stag party’ – as a tactic to gain Washington’s attention and approval (Russell, Reingold and Chang 1983).

Indeed, the same dynamic may have been at play in Nakasone’s decision to stop his visits to Yasukuni. The day before his final visit to the shrine in 1985, the Asahi Shinbun (14 August 1985) reported expressions of concern from Washington, and during its military build-up and strengthening of ties with Japan in the context of the late Cold War, speculation emerged that Washington was wary about Nakasone’s actions irritating Beijing (S. Tanaka 2001). Indeed, Nakasone later argued that his decision to no longer visit the shrine as prime minister was largely based on reasons of diplomacy rather than personal conviction (Kajimoto 2005). Also, Green has suggested that Koizumi’s successor as prime minister, Abe Shinzō decided against going to Yasukuni because ‘the Japanese government could sense that there was growing unease in Washington about the state of relations between China and Japan’ (Onishi 2006). In other words, assuaging Beijing over Yasukuni was at least partly about assuaging Washington.

The complicated dynamic that exists between the pro-American nationalists preference for a foreign policy based on the US-Japan relationship nevertheless serves to demonstrate the basic parameters of the pro-American discursive position on the national
interest: 1) that the construction of a truly ‘national’ identity based in an interpretation of Japan’s unique history is necessary for Japan to function well on the international stage; 2) that a close working relationship with the United States, and in particular, with its officials, is necessary for Japan to negotiate greater latitude within the bilateral relationship. Pro-American nationalists also believe that Japan needs to capitalise on its increased room to move with Washington by 3) promoting policies whereby it may, if necessary, exercise its right to use force in international affairs, thereby returning to its position as an international political power.

**Pure Nationalism**

Vocal pro- and anti-US nationalist groups closely associated with organised crime were a common fixture in Japanese cities from the end of the war. However despite their activities, including the often overt intimidation of communists and other ‘left-wing’ groups, it is doubtful whether they had much of an impact on discourse on the national interest (Morris 1960). Soon after the controversy surrounding the revision of the security treaty, however, a literary and scholarly movement arose devoted to resurrecting a sense of national identity based squarely in affirming Japan’s wartime actions and rejecting the ‘warped’ or ‘impure’ reconstruction of Japanese constitutional arrangements foisted upon Japan by its American occupiers. Its members have included scholars and critics who, like the pro-American nationalists, see neither domestic restrictions on the use of force overseas nor apology and contrition for Japan’s role during the war as necessary in domestic debates on the national interest. Nevertheless, pure nationalists are disturbed by what they see as the pro-American nationalists’ sycophancy towards Washington, blaming Japanese societal ills on ‘westernisation’, particularly after the war. Pure nationalists claim that the United States is primarily to blame for robbing the Japanese nation of its spirit or essence.

Although their arguments were never accepted in the mainstream of political discourse, pure nationalists can, like the pro-American nationalists, be linked to one another not only by the stance they adopted. Literary and social critic Hayashi Fusao is a major figure in the early development of pure nationalist thought. A pre-war Marxist
schor, wartime government sycophant and vocal supporter of Kishi during the early 1950s, he dramatically distanced himself from the pro-Americans after the signing of the security treaty with his 1964 work *An Affirmation of the Great East Asian War*, which also stunned his former socialist colleagues. Mishima Yukio, the post-war novelist who committed ritual suicide in 1970 after failing to rouse the SDF to stage a *coup d’état*, was an acolyte of Hayashi. In the closing pages of his *Affirmation*, Hayashi (1985, 210-212) also praises two younger scholars: Etō Jun, a literary critic, who, after studying in the United States in the mid-1960s, became a fierce detractor of Japan’s dependence on that country; and Nishio Kanji, an educationalist who has written at length of his admiration for Mishima (Nishio 2008). Kobayashi Yoshinori, the *manga* artist, whose works from the 1990s take the format of a series of illustrated ‘lectures’ delivered with a ‘point’ at the end of each chapter, is best regarded as a type of pamphleteer for the ideas of these authors and quotes them liberally in his work. Fujioka Nobukatsu, a scholar of German literature, is a founding member of the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform or ‘Tsukurukai’, which from 1996 has attempted to instil a sense of patriotism through the teaching of positive Japanese wartime narratives in school history education. Kobayashi and Nishio were also founding members of the Tsukurukai. Ishihara Shintarō, the bombastic governor of Tokyo and former national politician, was once a close contemporary and friend of Mishima and a literary superstar in his own right. In 2010 Ishihara supported the formation of the Sunrise Party (*tachiagare nippon*) led by pure nationalist Hiranuma Takeo. Ishihara chose the name for the party (*Asahi Shinbun* 4 April 2007), which directly translated means ‘Rise Up, Japan’, a term used by Mishima during his coup attempt and subsequently often cited by nationalists.

The pure nationalists often depict post-war Japan as a state that is no longer grounded in its own society, one that has had its own unique traditions replaced by an ill-suited individualistic and rational order. Many of their works focus on various forms of a dichotomy or division between ‘tradition’ and ‘rationality’, or between the ‘public’ and the ‘individual’, and emphasise the value of the former of each pair over that of the latter. Hayashi valued what he called ‘national essentialism’ (*kokusuishugi*), that is, the association of the state with unique values, as a ‘reaction’ to rational ‘enlightenment’ values brought to Japan from the West (often referred to as *bunmeikaika*, or ‘civilisation
and enlightenment’) (Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 137). He also stresses that he sees his work as a writer as performing a kind of service to the ‘public’ (ōyake) for the purpose of bolstering the nation (kuni) (Hayashi 1985, 212). Kobayashi has taken the dichotomy of the ‘public’ (ōyake) and the ‘individual’ (ko) as a major theme in many of his works, noting that the two have become separated in Japanese life to the point that ordinary Japanese ‘have no public spirit’, a situation that must be rectified (Kobayashi 1998, 52). This theme has also been taken up by the Tsukurukai, which in addition to its history books, has published a ‘civics textbook’ (kōmin kyōkasho – literally ‘people’s textbook’ or ‘public textbook’ [Yagi 2006, Nishibe 2001]). According to Nishibe Susumu (2000), editor of the first edition and a leading Tsukurukai member, the textbook assumes a ‘latent consciousness in Japan that desires history’, and is a response to the ‘mistaken direction’ (machigatta hōkō) of ‘modern’ (kindai/modan) education which ‘beginning with the political, hammers out a priori theses of fundamental human rights, democracy and pacifism’, values all associated with the ‘planning’ (sekkeishugi) of society by intellectuals.

Pure nationalists see evidence of this ‘mistaken’ modernism in an obsession with material wealth in Japan from the 1960s onwards. Writing during Japan’s economic high-growth period, Hayashi (1985, 205), for example, noted that:

The mere revitalisation of industry, trade, roads and taxes will not revitalise Japan. The present circumstances, where our prime minister is referred to as a transistor radio salesman, and yet, like a broken radio has remained silent, are unbearable. The time has come to raise up the pillar of the spirit of the people (kokumin no seishin no hashira) and wave the flag of our soul (tamashii).

In a published conversation, Hayashi and Mishima (1966, 132-138) saw this materialism and the ‘emptying’ of Japan’s national spirit as the result of Westernisation (seiyōka) that left its traditions devalued and its scholarly community dominated by sycophants to Western political and cultural theories: ‘Simply stated, Japan’s intellectuals have

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4 General Charles de Gaulle offered this unflattering comparison about Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato, demonstrating the role that the consumer electronics industry played in Japan’s economic recovery after the war, as well as, perhaps, ‘the West’s amused contempt for Japan’s modest success’ (Partner 1999, 206) by the 1960s.
absolutely no knowledge of the history and culture of their own nation’ (Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 79). Etō, meanwhile, believed that in prosperous, post-war Japan:

All of those who otherwise might have become soldiers, men of letters, or might have chosen another course, became ordinary working adults (shakaijin). Their devotion to economic activity which defines them as contributing members of society (shakai ningen) has meant, therefore, that the Japanese have been deprived of ways of self expression (Etō 1998, 95).

Indeed, Etō was often urged to abandon his pursuit of identity and simply accept Japan’s post-war prosperity for the peace and freedom that it brought (Sherif 2002, 120). However, pure nationalists could not bear to be silent about the ‘spiritual emptiness’ (seishinteki kūdō) that also accompanied ‘material prosperity’ (busshitsuteki han’ei) in a nation focused on economic growth (Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 135).

It is nevertheless individualism and the rationalisation and bureaucratisation of Japanese society in pursuit of coordinated efforts to raise growth that pure nationalists believe causes an emptiness of spirit in Japan, not growth or wealth per se. Mishima, once a Ministry of Finance (MOF) bureaucrat himself, held a different view than that contained in Etō’s later work, noting that Japan’s post-war growth had little to do with the rational economic regulation (hōsokusei) designed by economists in MITI, the MOF or GHQ, and instead claimed it was the result of the underlying spirit of Japanese servicemen returning to the domestic workforce (Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 78). Indeed, writing at the end of Japan’s recessionary decade of the 1990s, Kobayashi (1998, 8, 100-101) continued to single out high incidences of crime, violent attacks on teachers by students, bureaucratic malfeasance, prostitution and ‘compensated companionship’ (enjo kōsai), as just some factors of the decay that was associated with a surfeit of individualism, and a lack of traditional thinking that emphasises the public good. Others link the rational values of the constitution – including women’s equality and the weakening of the imperial system – to the destruction of traditional paternalistic authority structures of the state which were ultimately centred on the emperor (Etō 1993), and thus see the construction of a ‘rational’ Japanese state after the Second World War as a psychological ‘emasculcation’ or a ‘feminisation’ (joseika) (T. Muramatsu 1964, Hayashi

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5 That is, older men paying school-age girls for ‘dates’, where sexual relations were usually presumed, a phenomenon that gained much media attention in Japan during the late 1990s.
In any case, the consistency of pure nationalist arguments, as well as their derivation from general concerns about a historical ‘loss’ (sōshitsu) (Etō 1993, Sherif 2002) of national character means that nationalist emphasis on moral decay is independent of economic context.

According to pure nationalists then, Japan suffers from a deficit of traditional identity that has left it without a moral compass. This is similar to the distaste that pro-American nationalists feel for the post-war social order, but it is expressed more strongly. Their contempt for post-war Japan’s rational values is framed partly as the result of a national silence in the wake of Japan’s defeat and disgrace in war – an inability to narrate the national history which has left the telling of Japanese story up to others. Quoting historian and philosopher Ueyama Shunpei, Hayashi believed that

the Japanese have only been taught, successively, the “historical view of the Pacific War” from an American perspective, the “historical view of the war of imperialism” from a Soviet perspective and the “historical view of the anti-Japanese war” from a Chinese perspective... Isn’t it time to build a “view of history of the Great East Asian War?” (Hayashi 1985, 17).

Likewise, the Tsukurukai’s prospectus states that the group’s goal is to reject the ‘contemporary texts that accept at face value the propaganda of former enemy nations’ and to create a textbook that allows ‘children to have confidence and responsibility as Japanese’ (Atarashii rekishi kyōkasho o tsukurukai 1997). Fujioka, one of the leaders of the Tsukurukai, almost channels Hayashi when he notes that ‘textbooks on modern Japanese history are written to reflect the combined perspectives of the Asian nations’ hatred of Japan, the national interests of the Western Allies, and of Russia’ (Kersten 1999, 198, Tawara 1997, 2), and that ‘Japanese people do not have to be shackled to a view of their own nation’s history that has its origins in the national interests of foreign countries’ (Kersten 1999, 198, Fujioka 1996b, 2).

While they denounce the influence of ‘the West’ (ōbei) and foreign nations elsewhere on Japanese debates of the national interest, the pure nationalists save most of their vehemence for the United States. In part, this is because they view America as the source of the nationalist dogma they find so distasteful. For example, in contrast to his

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6 ‘Great East Asian War’ (daitōasensō) was a term used in wartime Japan. The occupation replaced the term ‘Great East Asian War’ in official use with the term ‘Pacific War’.
highly stylised views of Europe (and Israel), which he sees as a collection of nations grounded in a sense of the ‘public’ (ōyake) and ‘historical continuity’ (rekishiteki keizokusei), that might even serve as models for Japan (Kobayashi 1998, 348-349), Kobayashi views the United States – along with post-revolution China and the former Soviet Union – as an ‘artificial nation’ (jinkō kokka), a product of ‘modern rationalism’ (kindai riseishugi) (2007, 197-198). Etō Jun, meanwhile, saw the United States as an ahistorical political construct intent on expanding and assimilating other nations into its rational order (Etō and Homma 1991). Formal association with such a nation runs counter to the pure nationalists’ lead project of reviving a national identity based on concepts of unique history and culture.

Mostly, however, pure nationalists blame the United States for actively draining Japan of its national identity after the war. Faced with encroaching European powers from the 1840s, Japan’s leaders learned from the West, internalising Western philosophy and technology in order to strengthen the nation and stave off colonisation by Western powers. Throughout this process of adoption, however, Hayashi believed that Japan retained its ‘core personality’ (kakushin seikaku) or unique identity, just as it did in pre-modern times when it integrated Chinese classical forms into its culture (Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 132, 136). In contrast, pure nationalists see the occupation era, with its purges, re-education efforts and information control, as an American campaign to eliminate Japanese national identity so as to more easily mould the nation into an ‘American dependency’ (amerika no zokkoku) (Etō 1989, Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 74, 135). Worse, Kobayashi (1998, 183-194, 2001, 151-172) asserts that the occupation’s brainwashing (sennō) program has led to a dearth in critical thinking in Japan and thus also the easy acceptance of ‘false’ narratives about Japan’s war guilt propagated by pro-Chinese and pro-Korean agents in Japan after the occupation, through organs such as the Asahi Shinbun, a major daily newspaper associated with the ‘left’. Etō’s more scholarly work also targets the occupation, arguing that American ‘censorship and propaganda’ became institutionalised in Japan’s domestic media and education systems, leading to a nation that could not formulate its own sense of identity even after the occupation (Etō 1989, 298, 1998, 104). Hayashi somewhat immodestly believed that in such an environment, only the publication of his Affirmation marked a re-emergence of ‘free
thought’ in Japan, 20 years after the occupation forces arrived to suppress it (Hayashi and Mishima 1966, 82). Etō (1986) was less optimistic, noting that the struggle to articulate a national identity under American subservience meant that the war between America and Japan remained unfinished.

For many pure nationalists the most insidious American instrument of Japan’s oppression is the constitution, which both enshrines the rational social order, robbing Japan of its ‘true’ soul, and ensures that Japan remains a pliant ally of the United States by acting as the legal basis for restrictions on the use of force. Etō was clear about what he saw as the source of Japanese subordination to the United States:

US occupation policy towards Japan was certainly always aimed at snuffing out the ‘incomparable’ (banpō muhi) Japanese Empire, and creating a mediocre Japanese nation. But ironically, the occupation gave birth to an ‘incomparable’ Japan in a completely different sense. Of course, this is the Japan deprived of the ‘right of belligerency’ (kōsenken) by Article 9 of the constitution and forced to maintain a fiction about its defence that would have no currency among nations of the world (Etō 1980, 61).

According to Etō, the American decision to have Japan renounce the ‘right of belligerency’ in its constitution resulted in a ‘restriction of Japan’s inherent sovereignty’ (nihon no koyū no shuken e no kōsoku) (Etō 1980, 58). Claims that Japan was a peaceful nation stood in contrast to its complete reliance on one of the world’s largest military powers for its defence, meaning it could play only a passive role in defending world peace. The claim that Japan would strive to achieve diplomatic solutions to international problems was complicated by the fact that:

Restrictions on sovereignty naturally constrain diplomatic options. How on earth can today’s Japan successfully avoid uncertain wars by moving its pieces on the board, skilfully using all means available to it, when its hands are tied? A restoration of Japan’s ‘right of belligerency’ would not mean a return to the ‘path of war’ but simply a ‘restoration of sovereignty’ (Etō 1980, 62).

Without the full ability to use force, that is, assert its sovereignty, Japan does not exercise full agency as a state, so its claims to be keeping the peace ring hollow. With sovereignty restored, Japan might well ‘renew every effort to preserve peace as a fundamental policy
chosen according to its own will’. But it would do so as a free nation without the ‘restrictions of the forced constitution’ (Etō 1980, 62).

Likewise, Etō believed that under a new, independent constitution, Japan could be free of the ‘forced partnership’ with the United States, but this would not necessarily entail an end to formal US-Japan relations. Instead, if Tokyo so chose, Japan could become a ‘free partner’ in an ‘alliance of sovereign nations’ along with the United States (Etō 1980, 63). Etō thus signalled that constitutional revision might allow him to revise his generally oppositionist stance to US-Japan cooperation. In this regard he was later deeply disappointed by ever closer cooperation between Tokyo and Washington in the late 1990s without revisions to the constitution. By drawing closer to America without achieving true independence, Japan was, according to Etō, destined to suffer a ‘second defeat’, submitting itself to another ‘occupation’, whereby it would be impossible to formulate an independent Japanese identity. Worse, by suffocating Japan in America’s embrace, pro-American nationalists like Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō ensured that any future attempt at constitutional revision would likely produce a document that was as equally servile to US interests, and, therefore, as equally ‘forced’ (Etō 1998).

If Etō’s writings are any indication, a perception that Japan is compromising its sovereignty by moving ever closer to the United States might be a factor in the emergence of more strident nationalist voices in the late 1990s, a common focus of Western scholarship and media commentary on Japanese nationalism in public discourse during that time and beyond. Indeed, Kobayashi has been consistently critical of the United States and the alliance during this time. The second volume in his well-known Sensōron (On War) trilogy begins with a graphic depiction of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and notes that post-9/11 terrorism represents the onset of a 21st century ‘identity war’ by those fighting to maintain some sense of tradition against the onslaught of the rational forces of globalisation. In this light, he places the Japanese people in the same position as those in the Middle East that he sees as subjugated by American power. While he does not condone the violence, Kobayashi sees the events of 9/11 and their aftermath as representing the same friction between traditional identity and the universal rationality represented by ‘Americanisation’. He advocates restarting the discussion on Japan’s post-war ‘loss’ (sōshitsu) (Y. Kobayashi 2001, 9-31) of identity.
In order to forge a sense of national unity, most pure nationalists believe that Japanese people should be proud of their wartime history rather than submit to foreign versions which posit pre-war Japan as an ‘evil’ nation. To recover a sense of what it means to be Japanese, the pure nationalists have often sought ‘to recall high points [about the war] that would aid in redeeming the defeated nation’ (Sherif 2002, 122). As Kobayashi puts it, the pure nationalists want to ‘offer “honour” as a “narrative”’ (‘meiyo’ o ‘monogatari’ to ageru) by which the Japanese can build a sense of national identity by remembering their fallen in a positive light (Kobayashi 1998, 280). Etō (1980), for example, attempted to draw attention to heroic narratives about the war that were suppressed by occupation authorities. Authors such as Nishio have published popular historical works that paint Japanese wartime soldiers and civilians in a positive light while ignoring altogether more controversial episodes such as the brutal massacre by Japanese imperial forces of Chinese soldiers and civilians during the 1937 Japanese invasion of the Chinese capital of Nanjing (Nishio 1999). Kobayashi has adopted ‘positive’ imagery from time to time as well, departing from his illustrated ‘lectures’ to depict straight narratives of Japanese wartime heroism (Y. Kobayashi 1998, 210-270, 2001, 462-471, 2003, 255-300). Within this context, monuments to the war dead loom large, and it is for this reason that members of memorial associations like the Izokukai have been attracted to the rhetoric of the pure nationalists. Pure nationalists see Yasukuni, in particular, as an irrevocable symbol of the war dead, and are particularly scathing of prime ministers, like Nakasone, who refused to attend so as not to upset Japan’s neighbours – or Washington. Remembering the war dead in a positive light is seen as one method of again fostering pride in the nation.

Another method of restoring a sense of positive pride in the nation is to remember the war effort as a whole in a positive light, casting Japanese wartime policy as an attempt to free the Asian continent from European colonisation, a theme common to almost all of the pure nationalists’ works. This is the main point of Hayashi’s Affirmation, which describes the ‘Greater Asian 100 Year War’ (daia hyakunen sensō) – lasting from Western encroachment into areas around Japan in the 1840s to the emperor’s announcement of Japan’s surrender – as the result of Japanese resistance to large, impersonal historical forces for which individual nations cannot be held responsible.
From this perspective, the Tokyo War Crimes trials are seen as ‘nonsense’ (Hayashi 1985, 204), nothing more than a fiction established to bolster American propaganda efforts against Japan. Pure nationalists see their work as to counter these efforts with Japanese perspectives of the war effort. The ‘New History Textbook’ (*atarashii rekishi kyōkasho*) which was published by the Tsukurukai and approved for use in schools in 2001 and 2006, for example, devotes an entire section to Japan’s apparently positive wartime relations with those Asian nations which had previously suffered under the yoke of European imperialism, while devoting only a sentence in a section on the Sino-Japanese war to deal with the Nanjing massacre (Nishio et. al. 2001, 280-282, 270). The virtue of Japan’s anti-colonial wars, a theme pushed by wartime propaganda has thus filtered down to post-war pure nationalists.

It is outright denial of Japan’s war crimes by pure nationalists which has prompted much overseas criticism of the ability of ‘the Japanese’ to come to terms with their wartime past (Kambayashi 2007). Indeed, ‘Japanese nationalism’ is virtually synonymous with denial of Japan’s wartime atrocities in some media outlets overseas (Collins 2005, Miyazaki 2005). However, it is important to note that while most who engage in outright and consistent denial of crimes such as the Rape of Nanjing and the sexual enslavement of comfort women in Korea and beyond by the Imperial Army fall into the general rubric of ‘pure nationalist’ established here, not all pure nationalists deny Japan’s wartime acts of repression, nor do deniers of, say, the Rape of Nanjing deny all the war crimes of imperial Japan. Etō (1974, 194-195), for example, was fairly frank about the repressive nature of the pre-war Japan. It is his yearning for a national identity that makes him eager to celebrate the past, not the desire to see a historically accurate mainstream appreciation of what that past entailed. Kobayashi (2007 118-120), meanwhile, has acknowledged the purely evil nature of the excruciating experiments carried out on human subjects in China by the notorious Unit 731 of the Imperial Army, although he does note that the numbers of victims claimed by the Chinese is often inconsistent. Pure nationalists are selective in their denials, the focus of which can change over time.

The emphasis on different aspects of the war within the pure nationalist camp at different times occurs because denials are generally the use of history as a response to
contemporary events. Most of the outright denials of specific historical atrocities such as the Nanjing Massacre and the forced prostitution of Korean and other women have been made since the 1990s, as a reaction to efforts in Japan to apologise for their nation’s war crimes. This is because democratisation of South Korea in the 1990s effectively quashed the concerns of socialists in Japan about apologising to governments in Seoul, removing a major political obstacle to apologies. It also encouraged Japan’s former victims, now free to speak out after being silenced by their own governments which, like Japanese leaders, often sought to maintain the impression of non-communist solidarity in Asia. Subsequent increasing use of apologetic language by Japanese officials, and overseas pressure for unequivocal signs of contrition from Japan, provoked a backlash of increasing shrillness among pure nationalists.

Their criticism is not necessarily a call for the accurate representation of history – among such deniers, Higashi-Nakano Shudo (2005), a professor who has meticulously analysed evidence for the Nanjing Massacre in order to deny it, is one of only a few trained pure nationalist historians (Askew n.d.) – but rather an attempt to defend the honour of Japan’s fallen soldiers, thereby creating a basis for national pride. Many prominent nationalists claim that atrocities committed at the hands of the Japanese are nothing more than a ‘frame up’ (detchi-age) by nations in the region who aim to weaken Japan by forcing it to adopt an apologetic stance, a major theme of Kobayashi’s work. Ishihara, for example, denied the idea of a ‘Holocaust’ at Nanjing, claiming that it is ‘a story made up by the Chinese. It has tarnished the image of Japan, but it is a lie’ (Ishihara 1990, 63). The members of the Tsukurukai came together during the 1990s to challenge the ‘masochistic’ view of history taught in Japanese schools. In 1997, meanwhile, the publication of Iris Chang’s journalistic work, The Rape of Nanjing, introduced many readers in the West to the massacre. However, the book, fraught with ‘errors and inaccuracies, became an opportune target for the revisionists in their campaign to deny the massacre and to arouse ethnic nationalism among their audience’ (T. Yoshida 2006, 146).7 Perhaps most startlingly, as late as 2008, ASDF General Tamogami Toshio shocked the nation by penning an essay denying Japan’s war crimes, and forwarding the

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7 Yoshida (2006, 143-148) has outlined in detail Japanese denials of the Nanjing Massacre during the 1990s.
thesis that Japan’s wars constituted resistance to colonisation rather than aggression (Tamogami 2008).

Does such stridency constitute a ‘rise’ in Japanese nationalism from the 1990s, even one that may affect Japan’s security policy? Commentators should be cautious about saying so,8 for three reasons. Firstly, as the works of authors such as Hayashi, Etō, Mishima and Nishio, among others, show, such ‘pure’ nationalism has been an endemic part of post-war Japanese discourse on issues of war memory, the constitution, and relations with the United States at least since the early 1960s, and prior to the 1990s overseas authors also sometimes warned that ‘rising nationalism’ would lead to imminent and robust Japanese rearmament (Axelbank 1972). More recent denials of atrocities committed by the imperial military are a backlash by nationalists against specific acts of contrition, and probably represent a switch of focus more than a sudden increase in their ranks.

Indeed, the first book of Kobayashi’s Sensōron trilogy – billed as a bestseller – sold 650,000 copies in total national sales at a time when popular digest manga titles sold around 6 million copies per week (Schodt 1996, 90). Moreover, he has been unable to match the sales of the first book in the trilogy with the second and third ones. The Tsukurukai has similarly had problems promoting their message. It reached the ‘milestone’ of selling its books to 1 per cent of the nation’s high schools only in 2010, not before breaking with its original publisher, moderating its message to suit mainstream tastes and falling prey to a campaign of non-compliance by local teachers’ groups (Sankei Shinbun 22 June 2010).

Secondly, while ‘rising nationalism’ often accompanies predictions of a more militaristic Japan, pure nationalists have often served to embarrass pro-American nationalist leaders who advocate policies of robust rearmament. Numerous Japanese Cabinet ministers have been forced to resign after issuing statements or acting in ways that glorify Japan’s role in the war. In 1986, for example, Nakasone’s minister of education, Fujio Masayuki, appalled by the prime minister’s decision to cancel a visit to Yasukuni, mentioned in an interview with the monthly opinion journal Bungei Shunjū that Korea, through its own weakness, was in effect partly responsible for its annexation

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8 Although they are not. See Penney & Wakefield, 2009.
by Japan in 1910 (Fujio 1986). The article left Nakasone scrambling to patch up relations with South Korea, and ultimately Fujio was dismissed from his Cabinet, after refusing to resign. Tamogami’s sudden emergence as a pure nationalist within the SDF likewise embarrassed the political establishment and led to his swift demotion and ultimately to his decision to retire. Over the years numerous politicians have been forced to resign once they have overtly stated that pure nationalist views should dictate policy. Their views have always been seen as incongruent with mainstream government opinion in post-war Japan.

Finally, strident forms of pure nationalism have presented themselves in the post-war period without significant effect on defence or foreign policy discourse. The most embarrassing, and most violent betrayal of a pro-American nationalist by a pure nationalist must be Mishima’s failed coup and subsequent ritual suicide at the Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF) Headquarters at Ichigaya in 1970. As JDA Director-General, Nakasone had granted Mishima’s private paramilitary group, the ‘Shield Society’ (tate no kai), the unusual privilege of using SDF facilities to train with the forces. If Nakasone’s reasons for supporting Mishima were to revive a sense of nationalism in the armed forces, he failed spectacularly in this regard. Shortly before taking his own life, Mishima admonished the SDF for their weakness and urged them to ‘rise up’ in rebellion, but received only jeers of derision from the SDF members assembled below the balcony where he stood. Standing on the balcony, Mishima screamed what could be taken as the essential motto of pure nationalism:

Japan is utterly obsessed with economic prosperity, and has finally fallen into emptiness, so politics is nothing but conspiracies and power games. This is Japan. The Self Defense Forces, if anything, should possess the spirit of Japan…. If the Japanese do not rise up here and now, if the SDF does not rise up, there will be no such thing as constitutional revision! You men will forever be nothing more than an American army!

Like more recent forms of pure nationalism, Mishima’s words and actions temporarily diverted the attention of the nation, but his suicide showed the failure of his ideas to gain currency. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from his attempted coup, his ‘speech’ nevertheless encapsulated the ideas of 1) a proud national identity linked to martial prowess corrupted by the materialistic comforts of rational modernity, as well as 2) a
disdain for the restrictions on the use of force embodied by the constitution, and 3) resistance to Japan’s perceived subordination to the United States.

**Radical Pacifism**

For a nation often described as ‘conservative’ and ‘conformist’, post-war Japan has seen a surprising number of radicals active in academia and politics (Conrad 2010, 15, Sugiyama 2003, 206). This is not, however, to imply that ‘leftists’ or ‘Marxists’ in Japan have been a unified force during the post-war. Members of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), for example, were radicalised during the early 1950s, but then around the middle of the decade adopted a more ‘progressive’ position. Conversely, the post-war SPJ showed signs of becoming a somewhat moderate social democratic party and then radicalised throughout the 1950s leading the right wing faction to split, reunify, and then in 1960 split again for good from the party and form the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The JCP, the DSP, and other ‘progressives’ in academic circles often joined ‘radical pacifists’ – intellectuals, union members, members of the SPJ and a broad range of radical groups – to protest the Anpo treaty ratification, the nuclear weapons policies of the superpowers, the Vietnam War, and the treaty’s automatic extension in 1970. The progressives and radical pacifists agreed that independence from the United States and resistance to rearmament lay in Japan’s national interests. However, in contrast to the universal, internationalist values of the progressives outlined in the following section of this chapter, the SPJ and associated groups emphasised Japan’s exceptional ‘national’ experience during the Second World War as the basis for its pacifism.

Post-war radical pacifists were heavily influenced by members of the Rōnōha (worker-peasant faction) – a loose grouping of pre-war Marxists that challenged the pre-war JCP in 1927 over doctrinal differences. The Rōnōha believed that Japan, as an advanced capitalist society, was ripe for socialist revolution, in contrast to the JCP’s interpretation of Marx’s dialectical materialism, which held that revolution would be delayed until Japan could be fully democratised (Beckmann and Ōkubo 1969, 130-137, Conrad 2010, 55-57). Post-war socialists would carry on this tradition viewing progressives as naive at best for believing that ‘democracy’ could ever be anything more
than a cover for American imperialism, as well as for the activities of ‘monopoly capitalists’ and other reactionary forces within Japan (Olson 1978, 341, T. Yoshimoto, Gisei no shūen 1962a, Oguma 2002, 569, 563-568). The Rōnōha also held that the revolutionary vanguard advocated by the communists was unnecessary. Instead, working classes and peasants would be drawn together into a ‘united front’ that would realise its potential in overthrowing the oppression of the capitalist system (Curtis 1988, 135). This would be similar to a post-war socialist emphasis on the ‘nation’ or ‘masses’ infused with their own potentially radical values, as opposed to the conservative ‘government’ or universalist pretensions of the capitalist ‘state’.

The Rōnōha interpretation of Japanese history was thus similar to Leon Trotsky’s notion of a ‘permanent revolution’. According to Trotsky, ‘countries with a belated bourgeois development’ could attain permanent ‘democracy and national emancipation’ only through a ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ achieved by means of an ‘alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry’ (Trotsky 1969, 276-277, emphasis in original). However, Trotsky’s works themselves did not garner a significant following in Japan until after the war (Alexander 1991, 599), and in particular pre-war socialism in Japan was an indigenous interpretation of Marxism that differed from Trotskyism in significant areas. For example, Trotsky generally saw nationalism as an impediment to his goal of a universal socialist revolution, whereas both wartime and post-war Japanese socialists – even those who saw themselves as Trotskyites – viewed nationalism as both a moral force and a means to awaken the proletariat to its own plight.9 In contrast, according to Japanese socialists, ‘the revolutions that needed to sweep Japanese society once and for all out of feudalism and toward a post-capitalist form of politics and social organization would be articulated in terms of the criteria of the ethnic nation’ (Gayle 2003, 25).

9 ‘Trotsky’s rejection of nationalism as a unifying force for society is iterated in his essay ‘Nationalism and Economic Life’ (1934), which featured in the American Council on Foreign Relations journal Foreign Affairs. It is important to note, however, that Trotsky did view nationalism as ‘still capable of playing a progressive role in the colonial countries of the East’ (402). While it is clear from his writings that Trotsky viewed Japan as a developed ‘capitalist’ society rather than a colonial one (401), the radical pacifist view that Japan was in need of a ‘people’s’ revolution was clearly in line with the notion of nationalism as a potentially liberating force. Trotsky himself did not write much about Japan, but passing comments reflect his own observation that Japan’s rapid modernisation in the late 19th century was ‘not a “bourgeois revolution,” as some historians say, but a bureaucratic attempt to buy off such a revolution’ (Sparticist 2004).
Pre-war Rōnōha members would play a prominent role in maintaining and promoting their ideas in post-war Japanese discourse. The scholars and writers Yamakawa Hitoshi, Arahata Kanson and Suzuki Mosaburō, all pre-war Rōnōha members, would be crucial actors in the formation of the post-war SPJ (Stockwin 1968, 23). Suzuki would also play a significant part in the downfall of socialist Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu, who attempted to moderate the party’s stance by cooperating with ‘reactionaries’ in the post-war Democratic Party to form his government (Fujiwara 1989, 74-76). Suzuki would become chairman of the SPJ in 1951, steering it ever more towards his own Rōnōha principles until the party split in 1960. He took responsibility for the split by resigning, but would continue to be influential within the SPJ until his retirement in 1967. Asanuma Inejirō, a Diet member in the pre-war Rōnōtō (Labourers and Workers Party) was also a key member of the post-war SPJ in the decades after the war, becoming its leader in 1960, only to be assassinated that same year by a fanatical pure nationalist.

However, while the pre-war Rōnōha intellectuals prepared ground in the SPJ for radical pacifism, they were not the only individuals who appealed to the common identity of the ‘masses’ (taishū). A group of Trotskyists, dissatisfied with both the JCP’s attempts to moderate its stance after its radicalism of the early 1950s and the party’s support for the Soviet Union’s 1956 invasion of Hungary, walked out of the party altogether to form the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (nihon kakumeiteki kyōsanshugisha dōmei, or JRCL). Thereafter the JRCL infiltrated the SPJ, adding to the radicalism of that party (Alexander 1991). In 1958, a similar organisation, the Communist League (kyōsanshugisha dōmei) or ‘Bund’ (bunto), was also formed. The Bund established control over the All-Japan Federation of Student Autonomous Associations, abbreviated in Japanese as ‘Zengakuren’, a union which played a central role in coordinating the Anpo protests (Terada 2003, 82). Zengakuren was also active during the Tokyo University riots of 1968-69, when radical pacifist students fought against communist peers and rebelled violently against what they saw as the shallow progressivism of their instructors and fellow students (Kersten 2009). The organisation was also prominent in Vietnam War-era protests.

Central to radical pacifist philosophy in the 1960s and beyond were the writings of literary critics and poets such as Yoshimoto Taka’aki, whose calls for Japanese
‘autonomy’ (jiritsu) from the United States served as a particular source of inspiration for members of Zengakuren as they protested the security arrangements with the United States (Olson 1978, 341, 351).

Radical pacifist writers also sought to construct a sense of nationalism that lay in the hands of the Japanese people rather than Japanese officialdom. Indeed, many of the historical narratives put forward by the radicals were self-consciously constructed in order to create a narrative of ‘national’ resistance to modernism. Yoshimoto, for example, stressed that Japanese society needed to develop a type of ‘mass nationalism’ (taishū nashonarizumu) to deal with the challenges modernism had presented. Indeed, like the pure nationalist writers, Yoshimoto envisioned his mass nationalism as standing in opposition to universalistic conceptualisations of community, whether manifested in terms of capitalism or internationalism:

Postwar nationalism of the masses ... by being robbed at its base in the rural villages by the capitalist system, was turned into apathy as far as ideas were concerned. Mass nationalism since [the] Meiji [restoration, i.e., Japan’s late 19th century modernization.] has lost any concept of itself; the nation in actuality no longer exists. Therefore there can be no fusion of mass nationalism with the capitalist state as desired by modernist intellectuals such as Ueyama Shumpei; nor can there be any absorption of mass nationalism into the internationalism of intellectuals following on the breakup of Stalinism since Stalin’s death. Just as before, mass nationalism in Japan is the reverse side of the mirror of Japanese capitalism, which exists with the Imperial family living like a ghost in its shadow. Mass nationalism shows its own mirror to the ruling class, with its passion for peep shows and its respect for the directors of companies and its vague yearnings and feelings for nature and its symbols of popularity. The way to naturalize this mass nationalism politically is to drive the capitalist class itself into a corner and push it over the edge, and in the realm of ideas, the masses themselves, be [sic] deepening their living thought and making it more independent, will cause themselves to become more separate. Then both images will be turned upside down: the image of the citizens’ (shimin) unification according to the nationalism as defined by postwar intellectuals, and the image of false socialism as defined by the postwar “internationalists.” This idea can be called “independence”; but it is not a matter of name but of reality. To walk without compromise will be long and difficult (Yoshimoto 1968, 107, transl. Olson 1978).

While the radical pacifists were appalled by the Stalinism of the Soviet Union and other communist states, they were nevertheless impressed by the national identity politics in communist China, as well as the nominally Marxist nationalist movements in other post-
war Asian nations (Gayle 2003, 15, 42-43, 102) as forms of resistance to ‘Western’ imperialism. In contrast to European societies, where scholars like Jean-Paul Sartre were cited as saying too much had been conceded to the process of modernisation, and thus Europeans were forced to either choose sides within the Cold War or sit ignored on the sidelines of history, Japanese scholars like Yoshimoto (1962b, 482-483) believed that Japan retained the sense of a bucolic ‘idyll’ (*bokka*) rooted firmly in nature, around which a specific nationalism could be built to resist the recruitment of Japan into the bipolar order.

An interpretation of the Second World War war as a unique ‘national’ disaster was a central feature of mass nationalism, and also explained why radical pacifists held progressives in contempt. Like the radicals, many progressive intellectuals had served in the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during the war. While progressives explained that the ‘state had deceived the people in war-time [and] intellectuals had been unable to resist the apparatus of police terror and blind patriotism’ (Kersten 2005, 9), the radicals pointed out that the lack of resistance by even those Japanese who despised the wartime regime was as good as collaboration. Radicals such as Yoshimoto were especially disgusted by progressive intellectual methods designed to isolate the wartime period as an object of inquiry so as to determine what drove academics to participate in authoritarianism even though they knew it was ‘wrong’. To Yoshimoto (1969, 165, cited in Kersten 2005, 9) this was little more than an elitist evasion of responsibility.

More galling for the radical pacifists, however, was that communists who often had been jailed during the war attempted to assert leadership over post-war intellectual and political efforts to resist Japan’s conservative elites, without understanding the need to construct an anti-war identity accessible to all Japanese. Their incarceration may have made them temporary martyrs to the communist cause, but their self-righteousness also made it harder for ordinary Japanese to identify with their experience, a state to which communist leaders seemed oblivious (Kersten 2004, 506-507). Occupation policy, moreover, made this lack of reflection much easier. The identification and prosecution of specific war criminals, as well as the implementation of a ‘progressive’ agenda designed supposedly to eliminate ‘feudalism’ from the Japanese polity during the early occupation, allowed the progressives to absolve themselves of any responsibility for Japanese
repression, as well as Japan’s wars and colonisation, by placing all the blame for the war on those found ‘officially’ guilty (Conrad 2010, 185).

Of course, radical pacifists believed that the war criminals who had been found guilty were indeed responsible for Japan’s aggression and, along with others accused, deserved whatever punishment they received. However, scholars like Yoshimoto and Shimizu Ikutarō ultimately held that the ‘people’ of Japan, presumably the entire population, were to some extent responsible for the war. Radical pacifists were disturbed by the progressive assertion that the authoritarian wartime government had oppressed farmers and workers, forcing the former, in particular, to serve as soldiers. Indeed, whether it was to gain status or wealth, or simply to leave the boredom of a rural existence, many farmers, the radicals pointed out, had their own reasons for taking up arms, and often did so willingly. Accordingly, radical pacifists believed that all Japanese needed to engage in extensive self-criticism in order to comprehend the monstrosity of their behaviour as a nation. That some such as Shimuzu advocated villagers refocus on the worth of their particular agrarian communities did not detract from their view that the shame for the war was national. Indeed, according to the radicals, villagers were to be at the forefront of a Japanese national movement promoting peace (Kersten 2006, 310).

Such efforts were also bolstered by attempts to teach post-war generations about the evils of wartime Japan, thus transcending the concerns of a particular generation and turning the radical pacifism into a truly ‘national’ concept. The Wadatsumikai, a society named after a 1950 collection of letters from students who had fought and died in the war (Kike wadatsumi no koe: nihon senbotsu gakusei no shuki 1995), was formed the same year by members of the wartime generation largely to remember fallen comrades. By the middle of the decade ‘Wadatsumikai’ s original message of commemoration and mourning became all but irrelevant to students mobilizing against administrative hierarchies’ (Seraphim 2006, 172). This was only compounded by the fact that many students of the 1960s saw their seniors in the university faculty – many of whom were the founding members of Wadatsumikai – as progressives attempting to transform war memory into an intellectual pursuit removed from the everyday concerns of the people.
Literary critic Odagiri Hideo saw this problem clearly, and in the preface of the 1959 edition of the collection of letters that was the inspiration for the Wadatsumikai, Odagiri sounded a call to use war memory in contemporary and national contexts:

So far nobody has thoroughly analyzed the recent war, or has shown evidence of really understanding its relevance, for that matter. Rather than merely dealing with each individual’s personal memories, we urgently need to excavate the whole nation’s general experience of the war. That way, the memory of the war can transcend the so-called generation gap and become something truly societal. [...] Precisely because they have no personal wartime experience today’s younger generation has the unique opportunity to raise the war experience to the level of an ideology – and is indeed required to do so (transl. Seraphim 2006, 174).

Other older radicals had also come to the same conclusion. Yoshimoto’s views on the use of war memory were the same as Odagiri, and his works were often read by younger members eager to oppose the conservative forces willing to drive Japan deeper into a military partnership with the United States.

Indeed, the outbreak of the Korean War and the formation of the National Police Reserve in 1950 only convinced the radical pacifists as a whole that they had been correct in their opposition to the SDF and Japan’s alliance with the United States (Stockwin 1968, 40-41). Since then, aside from a period of reform in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the SPJ has been consistent in repudiating both the alliance and the SDF. Indeed, the alliance and the SDF were almost seen as one and the same (A. Fujiwara 1989, 108). Certainly SPJ opposition to the SDF was a result of the unpleasant memories that the socialists and others had of the NPR as a strike-busting organisation, but also a way of ‘preventing rearmament on behalf of the United States’ (Sakisaka 1951, Stockwin 1968, 15).

Ironically, it had been US officials and Japanese conservatives, by writing and promulgating Article 9 of the constitution, who gave radicals the legal means by which to resist calls from the United States and Japan’s conservative leadership to integrate the nation into the international bipolar order. In the first few years of the occupation, the SPJ paid scant attention to the peace clause, but with Washington’s re-estimation of Japan’s strategic importance after the revolution in China, members of the stronger left faction of the SPJ had little desire to see their nation reinvented as an anti-communist bastion for
the United States. The party would therefore adopt unarmed neutralism as part of its policy platform in December 1949 (Stockwin 1968, 31).

Aside from using the constitution as a legal and rhetorical tool to resist the SDF and the alliance, there is an element of the nationalistic in radical support for Article 9. Socialists presented unarmed neutralism as a ‘unique contribution which Japan could present to the world’ (Stockwin 1968, 15), which highlighted a conceptualisation of a unique Japan in contrast to a world that should learn something from this uniqueness, a cultural property that others could admire. Indeed, as late as 2006 cultural anthropologist Nakazawa Shin’ichi and well-known comedian Ōta Hikari (Ōta and Nakazawa 2006) penned a best-selling paperback outlining the case for making Article 9 a ‘world heritage’ (sekai isan) item. This popular evocation of the peace constitution as something unique and valuable in a hostile world still carries weight today.

The pacifism inherent in Article 9 is also seen by many as a source of mass nationalism in Japan, that is, one that allows ‘true’ Japanese to juxtapose themselves to the modernity of the state. For example, Shimada Masahiko, an author who describes himself as ‘left-wing’ (sayoku) and more recently as an ‘anti-citizen’ (hikokumin) (Shimada 2000), portrays ‘advocating antimilitarism and denouncing the sins of the state’ as ‘enterprises that generate sentiment for the nation’ (Shimada 2003, 204). Brian McVeigh (2003, 207-210) refers to this type of discourse on the Japan’s ‘unique’ need to repent for its wartime atrocities as ‘peace nationalism’, or part of what Shimada (2003) refers to as a ‘Prescription for a patriotic left-wing Japan’. Indeed, such mass nationalism allowed for cooperation across the political milieu. As J.A.A. Stockwin (1968, 16) noted in the late 1960s,

Where socialists were campaigning against American bases in Japan, or American administration of Okinawa, or the creeping rearmament of Japan which was being conducted in the spirit if not the letter of the Constitution, or revision (seen as perpetuation) of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan of 8 September, 1951, then Marxists, pacifists and nationalists could sit together quite comfortably on the same platform.

Article 9 and the call for the whole nation to repent for the war were not the only forms of ‘mass nationalism’ related to the war. The radical pacifists would also attempt to seize on symbols of national suffering that they perhaps believed only the Japanese could
understand. In 1952, after occupation censorship had been lifted, the Asahi Gurafu, a photo journal, published disturbing images of the aftermath of the bombing of Hiroshima, eliciting widespread disgust amongst Japanese readers, who had never seen the effects of the blast depicted in such detail. Shortly afterwards, in 1954, the crew of the Japanese fishing vessel Lucky Dragon (Fukuryū-maru) was irradiated by an explosion when it floated into an American nuclear weapons testing zone. The incident evoked significant popular anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, and the same year a campaign to eliminate all nuclear weapons organised by housewives collected almost 30 million signatures (Orr 2002, 385).

Anti-nuclear sentiment was therefore a popular force which the radical pacifists found they could harness to resist American power, and it also had the advantage of being supported by a narrative of ‘national’ uniqueness built around the sufferings of the Japanese, as the only ‘people’ to have experienced atomic attacks. Moreover, the failure of the JCP-led anti-nuclear organisation Gensuikyō to condemn the Soviet Union for its 1961 test of its first atomic bomb or for its tests the following year, or for Beijing’s refusal to sign the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty, prompted socialist groups to split from the organisation in 1965 and form Gensuikin, an alternative ‘truly’ anti-nuclear group. Gensuikin cultivated its identity as independent from the great powers throughout the Cold War (Gensuikin 1998, O. Fujiwara 2010, 86, Mainichi Shinbun 28 July 1980). LDP and DSP-led groups also split from Gensuikyō in 1961 to form the Kakkin Kaigi,10 their own group, but given their support for the US treaty arrangements, they were in much the same position as the communists in Gensuikyō (O. Fujiwara 2010, 86). The more conservative parties therefore avoided discussion of nuclear weapons in the context of war memory until Satō’s 1971 visit to Hiroshima. During the 1950s and 1960s, when nuclear issues remained too contentious for the government to handle, the radical pacifists were therefore left to construct their own national narrative around Hiroshima.

As already noted, one of the reasons that Satō could visit Hiroshima was Vietnam had come to dominate the discourse on war and peace. Not only the radical

10 ‘Gensuikyō’ is the Japanese abbreviation for the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (gensuibaku kinshi nihon kyōkaigi), ‘Gensuikin’ for the Japan Congress against A- and H-Bombs (gensuibaku kinshi nihon kokumin kaigi), and ‘Kakkin kaigi’ for the National Council for Peace and Against Nuclear Weapons (kaku heiki kinshi heiwa kensetsu kokumin kaigi).
pacifists, but many other Japanese began to view the Vietnam War through the frame of Japan’s own history, not least because Japan was complicit in the new war: not only did Satō lend his political support to the United States, he gave the green light for US bombing sorties from Okinawa. According to the radicals, here was an example of Japan repeating the mistakes of its past by supporting the United States in its ill-conceived quest to dominate Asia (Havens 1987, 5-6, Avenell 2010, 118, Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan 1945-2005 2006, 207-210). The radical pacifists claimed that Japan should – as a nation uniquely qualified to understand the suffering inflicted by modern imperialist powers – resist US ‘imperialism’ and cleave to the restrictions on the use of force contained in Japan’s own constitution (Havens 1987, 45-46). This meant opposing the government, violently, if necessary. Public demonstrations that turned into violent uprisings by groups like Zengakuren and the Anti-war Youth Committee (hansen seinei iinkai, or Hansen), the latter formed in 1965 to protest the Vietnam War and the treaty of peace with South Korea, contrasted with much larger, and more peaceful broad-based groups of protesters that either organised independently or were mobilised by the JCP. Indeed, after one particularly violent radical protest by 8,000 members of Zengakuren and Hansen, the communists protesting on the same day denounced the radicals as ‘fascist-style Trotskyites’ (Havens 1987, 176-177).

The consistently hard line taken by the SPJ on Vietnam, however, turned off voters (Havens 1987, 45). Throughout the 1970s support for the SPJ dwindled, encouraging the party to reform its stance, a possibility partly because Trotskyist SPJ members broke away from the party in the 1970s to re-establish the JRCL (Alexander 1991, 600), which subsequently factionalised and turned against itself. In 1983, SPJ Chairman Ishibashi Masashi began to signal a compromise in the party’s views on the SDF by introducing the confusing doctrine that the forces were unconstitutional, but that they were nevertheless established by a legal process (iken-gōhōron), meaning that their existence bore some degree of legitimacy (Kyūyama 1984).

From 1986, the SPJ chose Doi Takako, an extremely charismatic leader who had little time for party doctrine, and the share of the party’s Diet representation increased. Nevertheless, Doi’s opposition to the 1990 Gulf War exposed rifts within the party and the party’s poor showing in local elections prompted Doi’s resignation, and her
replacement by Tanabe Makoto, a ‘right wing’ socialist reformer (Purinton 1992, 170). The decision in 1994 to form a coalition with the LDP and formally accept the SDF and the security treaty with the United States, incensed many of its voters who subsequently abandoned the party, causing its near collapse. The party has since reverted to its core pacifist principles of 1) opposing the treaty arrangements with the United States and 2) adhering to a strict definition of Article 9 of the constitution that entails opposition to the SDF. It also maintains 3) the notion of a unique pacifist Japan. However, with the mostly progressive DPJ emerging in the late 1990s to form a credible alternative to Japan’s conservative leadership, support for the SPJ, which in the 1950s was represented by as much as a third of the vote in general elections, has remained under 10 per cent.

**Progressivism**

Indeed, through the DPJ ‘progressives’ have come to replace radical pacifists as the most important actors on what is usually called the ‘left’ of the Japanese political spectrum. Progressives, who maintain a ‘modernist’ outlook on Japanese national discourse, claim to be dedicated to the institutionalization of an equitable political system based on universal notions of democracy and individual subjectivity. While they understand the need for Japan to be contrite towards its neighbours for its wartime actions, they distance themselves from Japan’s war crimes and do not hold themselves personally accountable for Japan’s historical mistakes. Indeed, they support the creation of more fully developed multilateral ties to their Asian neighbours, viewing the national interest in terms of integrating Japan into a universalistic, multilateral and modern international order. While they can emphasise the importance of the US-Japan alliance when diplomacy calls for it, they remain deeply ambivalent about the relationship with the United States, and some are openly hostile towards it.

Progressivism did not take root in mainstream post-war Japanese politics. Before the rise of the DPJ, the JCP was the most tightly organised political institution within the progressive milieu. This is not to say that all progressives were communists, but in the early post-war period, even non-communist progressives were heavily influenced by the Kōzaha (lecture-faction) school, a Marxist perspective on modern Japanese history.
stemming from the 1930 group publication *Lectures on the History of Japanese Capitalism*. Közaha Marxism held that the overthrow of Japan’s warlords in the late 19th century constituted not so much a bourgeois revolution as a transition from feudalism to an absolutist system. Following the prescriptions of historical materialism, most JCP members therefore held that what was needed in Japan was a ‘two-stage revolution’ (*nidankai kakumei*). During the occupation, Japan had been almost jolted from an authoritarian system to a democratic one, but the bourgeois revolution, which Marx predicted as a precursor to socialist revolution, was incomplete.

The JCP claimed that they were therefore intent on perfecting bourgeois democracy before they ‘progressed’ further (Conrad 2010, 27). Although other parties avoided the JCP because of its reputation as an anti-system party with a revolutionary doctrine, it seems to be the case that the JCP was not as committed to the idea of revolution as the SPJ. In 1947, before the party’s brief period of radicalisation and the directive from SCAP outlawing communist activity, both of which soured subsequent relations with the United States, the JCP attempted to create an image of itself as a ‘lovable party’ that could work within democratic structures, a stance to which it had returned by 1955. By the 1960s it had dropped any support from China and the Soviet Union, which had earlier pressed the party to take a more radical line (Hrebenar 2000, 254-258).

Much later, the JCP underwent even more moderation, although it is still considered a black sheep within the Diet. Certainly, the JCP opposed Article 9 in the early days of the occupation, but after realising that the article could be used to resist ‘American imperialism’ and the SDF, which it saw as state organs of domestic oppression, the party became a firm supporter of the constitution. However, such a utilitarian approach to the constitution only throws into question their deep ideological commitment to Article 9. Indeed, the JCP has softened its stance on the SDF somewhat. While the party still views the forces as unconstitutional, at its 2000 conference it announced that the existing forces could be used for emergency disaster relief and even in the case of ‘imminent and unjust violation of sovereignty’ (JCP 2004) until such time as international circumstances – presumably world peace under international communist federation – allow them to be phased out.
The party’s stance on the SDF has not been the only change. In 2004, the JCP’s policy platform even explicitly dropped its long-standing opposition to capitalism and the emperor system, the overthrow of both being previously deemed essential for the completion of a bourgeois revolution. Instead, the party affirmed that it would work within democratic and constitutional constraints to oppose the relationship with the US and promote ‘European-style capitalism’ (yōropa no shihonshugi). While it noted that socialism was still a distant goal of the party, the platform explicitly stated that ‘the revolution that Japanese society needs now is not a socialist one’ (JCP 2004). The quest for the first stage of the two-stage revolution is seemingly never-ending.

The JCP’s recent platform has brought the party closer to other progressives who, while influenced by the kōzaha school, never found Marxism or the JCP’s revolutionary doctrine particularly attractive. While many academics and other writers, and more than a few politicians, agreed with the JCP’s conclusion that post-war democracy in Japan had not reached its full potential, they were more than happy to forego the notion of a revolutionary second step towards socialism. In the optimistic early post-war years, a broad progressive coalition of individuals from academia and industry who did not necessarily share the JCP’s views on the appropriate fate of the emperor or on the deleterious influence of ‘monopoly capital’ on Japan’s post-war society, banded together to support common projects, starting with an effort to pressure the Japanese government to negotiate a comprehensive peace with its wartime enemies.

Central to the discussion on the peace treaty was the Peace Problems Discussion Group (heiwa mondai danwa kai), whose formation was inspired by the ‘UNESCO Statement’ penned by individuals on either side of the Iron Curtain, outlining the causes of war and published in the liberal journal Sekai in 1949 (Ward 2006, 175). The group also actively sought the membership of a broad range of scholars, among both radical pacifists and other members of Japanese society. Maruyama Masao, the Tokyo University political scientist, apart from writing landmark articles on the nature of Japanese wartime authoritarianism, was a key member of the group, as was poet Tsurumi Shunsuke. The 1960 security treaty protests also encouraged Tsurumi and schoolteacher Kobayashi Tomi to form the Voiceless Voices Society (koe naki no koe no kai) as a mainstream movement to show that those opposed to the security treaty were not merely
radicals. The society was also a direct predecessor to the Citizens Federation for Peace in Vietnam (Betonamu ni heiwa o! shimin rengō, hereafter ‘Beheiren’), the group established to oppose the Vietnam War, which was led by literary critic Oda Makoto (Havens 1987, 55). Beheiren offered Japanese from all backgrounds a liberal and peaceful alternative to the anti-JCP radical groups that also protested the war, often violently.

The repudiation of socialism by non-communist progressive groups and attempts to make the position acceptable among a mainstream audience meant that politicians and commentators usually seen as ‘conservative’ could also later experiment with progressive ideas. Key figures within the right wing of the SPJ, and after 1960, when the party split, the DSP, would espouse a progressive line. Moreover, old-school mercantilist politicians struggling for ideological space in the politically turbulent 1990s began to band together with others on a progressive platform when their old position lost popularity. For example, between 1995 and 1998, Ozawa Ichirō, once a scion of the LDP, led the New Frontier Party (NFP), a group formed in part from the remnants of the former DSP. In 2003, when Ozawa’s New Party merged with the DPJ, he and his followers joined other progressives like Hatoyama Yukio and Okada Katsuya, who had both left the LDP around the same time as Ozawa, and after traversing through various progressive groupings in the volatile party politics of the late 1990s, founded an earlier version of the DPJ in 1998.

The commonalities between ‘old’ and ‘new’ progressives are particularly evident in the way they approach the question of responsibility for the war. Despite their misgivings about Japan’s pre-war authoritarianism, both Maruyama (1963, 127) and Ozawa (1993, 26-32) have praised the Meiji-era oligarchs (Meiji genrō), that is, Japan’s modernisers of the late 19th century, as highly competent leaders in their own time.11

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11 Some might find it quite provocative to compare ‘old’ progressives like Maruyama and ‘new’ progressives like Ozawa – the former was a leading light in the post-war progressive intellectual tradition, the latter is a machine politician. However, there are distinct similarities in the writings of the two, particularly in how they view the wartime leadership and modern notions of subjectivity, and as already noted, the motivations of individuals falls outside the bounds of this study. As noted in chapters 6 and 7, Ozawa’s internationalist arguments have had a profound effect on security discourse in Japan. From the standpoint of the debate then, it is not altogether important whether he actually believes his arguments, or whether he uses them for sheer political advantage.
However, Maruyama also criticised the undemocratic system the oligarchs put in place as incapable of producing meritocratic, and therefore competent, leadership, therefore unable to halt the war (Maruyama 1963, 125-128, 227-232), a state of affairs Maruyama refers to as a ‘system of irresponsibility’. The same interpretation that an ‘absence of political leadership ultimately allowed the military’s recklessness’ dominates Ozawa’s writing about the Second World War (Ozawa, Nihon kaizō keikaku 1993, 21). While the lesson that socialists drew from the war is an extreme distrust in government and an appeal to the Japanese ‘nation’ to resist all form of authority, Maruyama and Ozawa instead insisted that authority per se was not pernicious. On the contrary, writing four decades apart, both claimed a lack of responsible leadership was the cause of Japanese aggression.

Despite their assertion that Japan was sucked into war because none of its leaders were willing to take responsibility, progressives place blame for the war firmly on wartime ‘militarists’ whose incompetence resulted in aggressive movements outward. The placing of responsibility onto a select group of criminals demonstrates the progressive tendency to view pre-war and wartime Japan from a distance. In other words, progressives see history as a ‘case study’ – a specific application of universal rules and (often negative) examples – rather than a historical continuity between individuals on which to build a Japanese national identity.

Somewhat counter-intuitively, the ability to distinguish between national and individual responsibility for the war arose from the fact that early post-war progressives tended to be of the wartime generation that had firsthand experience with it, and some had even been drafted into the military. They therefore understood that the complexities of the authoritarian regime and the individual compromises that they had had to make under it to survive meant that they were less likely to see it as a ‘common’ experience. Despite being drafted into the army and witnessing Hiroshima firsthand, Maruyama, for example, maintained that his personal experience under the wartime regime had absolutely no effect on his thinking about Japanese society (Kersten 2010). While they certainly analysed the regime, early progressives at least proclaimed that unlike the next generation they felt under no obligation to craft a national narrative linking the past to the
present. ‘Is the post-war generation (sengo-ha) qualified’ progressive scholars asked themselves, even ‘to debate contemporary history?’ (Suzuki 1962, 54).

As well as their varied and complex individual experience during the war, the progressives’ ability to analyse wartime Japan so coldly was also partly due to the historical materialism that influenced Kōzaha thinking. Marx’s prediction that regime failure was inherent to authoritarian systems meant that many progressives saw Japan’s revolutionary transition from authoritarianism to democracy as inevitable. Thus, the fact that Japan’s democratic constitution was hand-delivered by the United States, a power that early progressives came to see as imperialistic and authoritarian, hardly caused them any concern. Legal scholar Kobayashi Naoki, writing in 1962, claimed that the Potsdam Declaration that Japan accepted upon surrender was the expression of a historical and universal ‘high obligation to actively move in the direction of democracy’. According to Kobayashi:

the establishment of a democratic framework must not be thought of as a change that was forced onto the essense of the nation (kokutai), or as inevitable because of physical force applied from outside, rather as a point where, whether early or late, it converged with inescapable and universal historical trends, that is to say is was an historical inevitability. This is because dynastic legitimacy based on divine right and bloodline myths has almost faded away in modern constitutions, and rule by the people (by either democracy or communism [minshu naishi jinminshugi]) can now be an effective and meaningful legitimising reason (seitôsei riyū) for the development of the state as well as the lives of its citizens. (N. Kobayashi 1962, 4, emphasis in original).

In the eyes of the progressives, August 1945 thus marked the beginning of a foreordained, but incomplete, transition – Kobayashi called it ‘a revolution from the side’ (yoko kara no kakumei) – from feudalism to democracy, where citizens could exercise individual conscience rather than subjecting themselves to the will of the primordial nation.

Indeed, when progressives like Maruyama referenced the Second World War, it was usually to insist that individuals should act with the full force of their rational and subjective faculties to prevent future government transgressions. Rather than rely on some historically derived code of conduct accessible only to Japanese through their historical experience, it was the responsibility of citizens in a rationally ordered state to use their own good judgement in actively criticising state policy when they believed it
was wrong. According to Maruyama, political scientists themselves could not avoid infusing their work with their own opinions:

To close one’s eyes to that inescapable fact and to pose as an isolated observer of the drama is also harmful; for to do so often serves to spread a whatever-wins-is-right type of opportunism in the name of ‘impartial observation’. If a person professes to be a mere spectator of the all-out political struggle among the various types of Weltanschauungen, he shows himself by that very fact to be unqualified as a political scientist (Maruyama 1963, 239).

An emphasis on ‘subjectivity’ was also evident in the way groups like Beheiren organised, relying on the proactive and voluntary participation of individuals and groups to join their protests against Japan’s involvement in militarism, rather than mobilising a stable membership in the style of a union. Beheiren leader Oda Makoto often preached a message of subjectivity, and believed in ‘100 percent freedom for the individual’ (Havens 1987, 57-63). Indeed, progressives generally believed that individual subjectivity was a trait that the modern, rational state should cultivate in all its citizens. Ozawa would take up this theme, criticising the Japanese education system in the early 1990s, even though it was receiving international recognition for the achievements of its students in maths and science. Ozawa (1993, 255) noted that Japanese education did not seek to nurture the ‘buds of subjectivity and autonomy’ that lay within each of its pupils, and argued that the lack of individual subjectivity is one reason that real ‘democracy has not taken root’ in post-war Japan.

Progressive thinkers believed that once individuals were engaged in the political process, they would naturally press for the fulfilment of the promise of real post-war democracy. During the 1960s, progressives thus viewed the Anpo protests as a success even though they had failed to stop the Kishi administration from ratifying the revised security treaty with the United States. The protests showed that broad sections of the Japanese populace were resisting the institutionalisation of Japan’s role on the side of the United States during the Cold War, as well as opposing the undemocratic methods the government used to secure ratification. As Suzuki Tadashi noted in 1962, ‘democracy as a process has probably been hollowed out during these past 17 years. Nevertheless, as a philosophy it has not been diminished, and it is continuously fulfilled by feelings of resistance to the reactionary turn (handōka)’ (Suzuki 1962).
Despite their optimism directly after the protests, into the 1960s and beyond progressives increasingly felt disillusioned, as many Japanese, enticed by the material benefits of the government’s high growth policy, turned away from progressive forms of participatory democracy. Ozawa (1993, 251) and other recent writers have echoed the disappointment with mainstream Japan:

In post-war Japan, which supposedly adopted an American-style democratic system, the people have nevertheless been robbed of their freedom. Albeit partly as a consequence of the continuance of the wartime bureaucracy, the people themselves have not met the conditions for achieving democracy.

From his own writings at least, Ozawa can thus be seen as a progressive in the sense that he sees the inability of ‘the people themselves’ to reject the groupthink cultivated during their militant past. Indeed, as leader of the DPJ, he would later rail against attempts to legislate that ‘patriotism’ (aikokushin) be taught in schools (I. Ozawa 2006, 185-187). To progressives then, ‘progress’ means achieving a society based on notions of individual subjectivity and modern, universal and democratic values, not necessarily one based on common understandings of the past.

Despite their emphasis on subjectivity, there is a sense that ‘new’ progressives differ from ‘old’ progressives in their willingness to dispatch the SDF overseas, and figures like Ozawa (2002) and Hatoyama (2010) have even advocated constitutional revision. In 2007 Ozawa went further, stating that he believed that the SDF could take part in combat missions in Afghanistan (I. Ozawa 2007). However, Ozawa believes that overseas deployment and even combat are permitted by Article 9 as it is written and that they do ‘not touch on the constitution at all’ if they are permitted by a UN resolution (I. Ozawa 2007, 151). He thus simply wants Article 9 to more clearly reflect what he sees as the current constitutional position. He also does not advocate an erosion of the use of force restrictions when it came to other activities. Indeed, in his proposal for constitutional change, Ozawa advocated leaving the existing wording of Article 9 untouched and merely adding provisions outlining the existence of the SDF for defensive purposes and the ability of the SDF to ‘take the lead in participating in international peacekeeping activities’ (I. Ozawa 2002, 263). Hatoyama’s 2010 ‘draft constitution’ makes similar proposals, but would also explicitly permit the ‘delegation of partial
sovereignty [of the Japanese state] to international organisations’. It is clear that Hatoyama has in mind for Asia a type of multilateral community modelled on European Union integration when he explains that in addition to security roles, ‘sovereign rights, such as the right to print currency should be partially surrendered to international organisations in order to realise an Asian Economic Community’ (Hatoyama 2010).

Moreover, while new progressives were willing to offer words of support for the US-Japan alliance during the 1990s (Ozawa and Tahara 1998, 69-71), their later disgust with what they saw as US unilateralism, and particularly the assumption that Japan should follow the American lead on issues like the 2003 Iraq War (Japan Times 2 February 2007), suggests that their earlier ‘pro-American’ stance was due to the US pursuit of internationalist policies at the time. This was not the first time progressive actors in Japan had seen the United States in a positive light when they believed that US policy accorded with their own position – as shown when communists and moderate socialists welcomed the United States during the early occupation period. It is clear Ozawa and many other DPJ members prefer a conceptualisation of the US-Japan defence arrangements that enhances multilateral and internationalist policies, a position that negates the strict bilateralism of positions considered ‘mainstream’ throughout the Cold War. If progressives deem the US-Japan alliance as a beneficial component of Japanese foreign policy, it is usually as a supplement to a greater internationalist strategy.

Furthermore, the commitment of even the most stridently protective ‘old’ progressives to the constitutional restrictions on the use of force is questionable. Before the 1990s moderate socialists and other progressives also argued that Japan needed to take a flexible approach towards the constitution when it came to the United Nations, noting that Japan might well have to send military or quasi-military forces on overseas missions in order to discharge its responsibilities as a member of the international community, however, this was not a particularly new position. In the 1950s, some influential figures in the DSP like Seki Yoshihiko (1950) clearly viewed membership in the United Nations as more important than Japan’s constitutional commitments not to maintain armed forces. While he held that Article 9 should remain unchanged if possible, Seki nevertheless believed that if the constitution ‘became an obstacle to entry into United Nations’ there would be no option but to revise it (Seki 2000, 179-80).
Because progressives were not particularly visible on the political stage in the decades after the occupation, moreover, some of their number may have been ‘categorised’ incorrectly in conceptual frameworks that dealt with the political spectrum. Ueyama Shunpei, the Kyoto University philosopher, has been branded a ‘nationalist’ and associated with Hayashi Fusao (Gluck 1993, 84, Ienaga 1979)\(^\text{12}\) for writing about the inevitability of the ‘Greater East Asian War’ in the 1960s and castigating those who saw the ‘evil’ of Japan’s pre-war and the ‘good’ of its post-war in such black-and-white terms (Ueyama 1964). However, Ueyama also wrote essays that called for Japan to prioritise United Nations commitments over strict interpretations of the constitution, while advocating distance from the United States (Ueyama 1980). Even in his earlier, supposedly nationalist work, although he discussed Article 9, Ueyama did not call for outright constitutional revision. In fact, he noted that the optimistic post-war moves by the United States and the allies to create an effective post-war international order and the ‘first attempt to institutionalise the international state’ (\textit{kokusai-kokka}) in Japan was a commendable goal, and the constitutional renunciation of war was ‘nothing but the logical deduction from such a new conception of the state’ (Iida 2002, 139). In fact, at one stage during his earlier work, Ueyama – who Yoshimoto noted in a quote earlier in this chapter as being a ‘modernist intellectual’ (Yoshimoto 1968, 107, transl. Olson 1978) – even thought that Japan’s aggression in the Second World War stemmed from the lack of an ‘effective international organ’ (Kisaka 1983, 252) to regulate conflict. This was certainly a fatalistic line of reasoning, but it was one that accepts both the possibility and the value of administrative relations between states. Clearly then, there were some scholars who prioritised ‘orthodox’ participation with the United Nations over strict constitutional restraints long before Ozawa and others popularised the issue.

Progressives have been fairly consistent in their call for a rational society to overcome the tendency towards the ‘irrational nationalism’ of the past. In their search for 1) rational and universal principles with which to determine policy, they have therefore settled on internationalism. This was evident in the progressives’ call for a comprehensive peace, and their 2) resistance to the bilateral alliance with the United States insofar as the latter rejected the internationalism they espoused. Implicit in the

\(^\text{12}\) Indeed, as noted above, Hayashi cites Ueyama favourably.
progressives’ internationalism, moreover, is the notion that 3) the SDF should operate under clear restrictions, even if progressives do not necessarily view those restrictions as synonymous with the exact text of Article 9 of the current constitution.

**Mercantilism**

From the 1960s to the 1980s, bureaucrats-turned-politicians who had been favoured by the occupation purges established their dominance over the Japanese government. After Kishi Nobusuke’s unseemly ratification of the Anpo treaty and the social unrest that accompanied it, the bureaucratic factions of the LDP seized their opportunity, replacing Kishi with Ikeda Hayato, who as finance minister under Yoshida had laid the groundwork for an economic policy favouring state-guided production of heavy industrial products. Ikeda’s ‘low stance’ (*tei shisei*) in foreign policy and a focus on economic development would set the political tone for decades to come. While Ikeda’s realist successor, Satō Eisaku, and pro-American nationalists like Fukuda Takeo would occasionally hold the office of prime minister, most of Japan’s post-1960 leaders and Cabinet members would originate in the ‘mainstream’ factions of the LDP, and together with their supporters in academia, the bureaucracy and business would become known as the ‘conservative mainstream’ (*hoshu honryū*).

Domestic stability was the key goal of the conservative mainstream and mercantilism was the position most suited to achieve it. The Anpo protests, as well as later protests over the Vietnam War, convinced politicians in the mainstream factions of the LDP that domestic stability was essential to their sustained rule of Japan. To forge a sense of social unity they focused on national economic wellbeing, avoiding divisive discussion about historical issues outstanding after the war. They also instituted legal and material restrictions on the armed forces, citing the costs that Japan would incur if it sought status as a military great power, but they were more concerned with the domestic division that rearmament would elicit. Their low stance in foreign policy, however, meant that they were reliant on the United States to provide Japan’s security through the security treaty framework. While the mainstream conservatives were eager to separate international political problems from their overseas trading relationships, it was never
possible for Tokyo to treat Washington the same way it did its other international partners. Mainstream conservative governments were therefore flexible when it came to demands from Washington for trade concessions, despite the reputation from the 1970s of both Japanese companies and their Japanese government representatives as ruthless trade competitors.

The mercantilists’ view of pre-war Japanese history held that Japan’s modernisation had proceeded along a steady course from the mid-19th century until the political confusion of the great depression of the 1920s and 1930s led to a revival of militarism and ‘feudalism’ in Japan. This view of history was reinforced by the US occupation forces’ similar interpretation of Japan’s past behaviour. However, conservatives believed that Japan, back on its ‘correct’ course after the Second World War, could serve as both a leader and a development model for other Asian nations. Similar to the progressives – not to mention post-war occupation officials and Western historians – the conservative mainstream laid the blame for the war on ‘militarists’ whose ‘feudal’ values had driven Japan’s modernisation project into a ‘dark valley’ (*kurai tanima*). While Japan’s new modernisers might have felt regretful about Japan’s crimes, they did not, in general, regard the war or its consequences as events for which they were personally responsible.

Regardless of their personal feelings then, mercantilists would avoid apologies to other nations for Japan’s war crimes and, when called to define Japan’s position on questions of history, generally answered with ambiguities. Japan’s oft-cited ‘historical amnesia’ and inability to apologise is in part the result of weak leadership by Japan’s post-war leaders. In order to avoid offending nationalists or radicals, the mainstream conservatives refused to ‘hammer out positions’ on war responsibility (Takahashi 2010, 187), and avoided discussing the war in anything but general terms. Instead, they would ‘abandon any explanation as to what kind of war Japan’s past war was. Because of this, no official picture of the past war was formed, and it amounted to a “war which could not be placed” (*ichizukerarenai sensō*)’ (Akazawa 2003). The lack of an ‘official’ war narrative meant that contests over history would only grow more entrenched and could not indefinitely be kept at bay. In the 1990s when the government began to formulate an official position condemning Japan’s war crimes, nationalists protested all the more
vehemently (Haar 2001, 195). However, for much of the post-war period, mainstream LDP leaders dealt with the controversy surrounding their nation’s war memory debate by simply refusing to engage with it.

Indeed, in the period of mercantilist dominance which began with Kishi’s resignation as prime minister and ended when Nakasone came to power in 1982, only one Japanese prime minister offered an apology to foreign nations for Japan’s wartime behaviour. Tanaka Kakuei, Satō’s mercantilist successor, did apologise during negotiations to restore diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1972, but this was neither planned by the Japanese delegation nor expected by Beijing. It was offered as a way of making amends after Tanaka, carried away by the moment at a Chinese state banquet held in his honour, expressed his personal regret for the ‘trouble’ (meiwaku) that Japan had caused China during the Second World War. The Chinese delegation believed this term was so weak as to be an insult to the Chinese people and insisted that a stronger apology be included in the joint communiqué between the two nations (Dokyumento nitchū fukkō 1972, 51). Apology diplomacy, then, was not a forte of the mainstream conservatives. Indeed, their preference for avoiding historical debates ironically meant that pro-American nationalists would more often strike a contrite pose towards foreign nations, if only to serve their goal of currying favour with the United States.

Within Japan, mainstream conservatives did observe official commemorations for Japan’s war dead, but here too they were careful to avoid doing so in ways that courted controversy. For example, they were initially relatively sanguine about offering their respects at Yasukuni Shrine on the anniversary of the end of the war. Every post-war Japanese prime minister with the exception of Hatoyama Ichirō and Ishibashi Tanzan visited the Shrine. But the mainstream LDP prime ministers who visited after the

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13 A literal translation of the official apology reads: ‘The Japanese side is keenly aware (tsūkan shi) of the responsibility for the significant harm (jūdai na songai) that Japan caused (ataeta) the Chinese people in the past, and deeply reflects [upon these actions] (fukaku hansei suru) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1972). There is some debate among commentators writing in English (although not much in Japanese) over whether the term ‘hansei’ constitutes a ‘true’ apology (Desmond 1995, May 2007, 81). Whatever the meaning of ‘hansei’, what is more important is that the 1972 joint statement between China and Japan explicitly recognises that Japan was responsible for (ataeta – ‘caused’ or ‘brought’) suffering among the people of a foreign nation, unlike other statements by, for example, Kishi and Shiina. Interestingly, the Chinese position, noted by Premier Zhou Enlai, was that the Japanese people had been the victims of militarists during the war (Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan 1945-2005 2006, 190), a vindication of the mainstream conservative view of history.
mercantilists had established their dominance in 1960 were following precedent: not to visit the Shrine would be to make a political point, something they hoped to avoid. Only in the 1970s, after the 1968 enshrinement of war criminals at Yasukuni politicised shrine visits, did Prime Minister Miki Takeo change the mainstream stance on the visit somewhat, by stating that he was visiting in a ‘private’, not ‘official’, capacity (Breen 2008, 27). Miki’s statement, typically ambiguous, was designed to please nationalists who demanded that the prime minister visit the Shrine and pacifists who were angered at prime ministerial recognition of an icon of Japan’s past wars.

Mercantilists were on safer ground with other forms of commemoration for Japan’s war dead, particularly those that did not require signs of contrition towards other nations. For example, like Satō, mercantilist prime ministers had no problem visiting Hiroshima once nuclear disarmament ceased to be a ‘political’ issue. But there were other ways of commemorating Japan’s war dead in a fashion that was mostly disconnected from discussions of Japan’s national historical debt. On August 15, 1963, for example, the Ikeda administration, bowing to pressure from nationalists, held official commemorations for Japan’s war victims at Tokyo’s Hibiya Public Hall. The following year the government commemorations were held at Yasukuni before they were transferred in 1965 to the Nippon Budōkan, a secular martial arts facility, where they have been held annually since. The ceremony is one of simple reflection, and both condemnation and justification for Japan’s war crimes are unwelcome.

The ambiguity of the ceremony at the Budōkan is reflected in the way it deals – or rather does not deal – with Japan’s aggression towards foreign nations. According to the prime minister’s office, ‘foreigners are not worshipped’ (gaikokujin wa matsutteinai) as part of the war dead at the ceremony (2006b). Since the 1980s, government representatives have included a brief mention of the foreign war dead in their speeches, however, explicit mention of Japanese wartime aggression is discouraged. Focus on the foreign dead without discussion of Japan’s war responsibility would have invited criticism from pacifists that the government was attempting to avoid culpability for the war. However admission of aggression enrages nationalists. For example, when Speaker of the House of Representatives Kōno Yōhei mentioned during his 2008 speech an ‘expression of heartfelt sympathy’ (kokoro kara no o-mimai) for foreign victims whose
‘human rights were violated by the inhuman conduct’ of the Japanese military, Abiru Rui (2008), the political analyst for the Sankei Shinbun, a pro-American nationalist newspaper, castigated him for ‘rubbing the feelings of the bereaved the wrong way by forcefully stating Japan’s aggression (nihon no kagai) at a ceremony for mourning the Japanese war dead’. Abiru’s commentary shows the thinking of the nationalists that if politicians do not glorify Japan’s war dead, they should at least detach Japan’s wartime experience from its broader historical context. Mainstream conservatives have indeed generally adopted the latter course.

Also, seeking to avoid controversy, mercantilists have typically been mute on whether convicted and accused war criminals are among the victims commemorated at the ceremony, and in the past left room for interpretations favouring an inclusion of the criminals. The White Chrysanthemum Commemoration Society (shiragiku izokukai), a now-defunct group formed to specifically mourn war criminals was invited to the ceremony on at least one occasion, but their attendance was not publicised widely. In 2002 the Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare responded to questions about the status of war criminals at the ceremony by noting that ‘those kind of people’ (sō iu katagata) are included in a comprehensive definition of the war dead (Prime Minister's Office 2006a). Nevertheless, the prime minister’s office admits that unlike Yasukuni, ‘names are not specified’ (namae wa tokutei shiteinai) at the ceremony, rendering the commemoration sufficiently ‘ambiguous’ (bakuzen) so as not to cause offense (Prime Minister's Office 2006b). Nevertheless, the inclusion of war criminals in the ceremony still tends to be overlooked even by progressive politicians who cite the enshrinement of Yasukuni as controversial, but continue to pay their respects at the Budōkan (Asahi Shinbun 16 August 2010).

The mercantilists avoid discussion of war responsibility because they believe it detracts from the serious work of unifying the nation by rational, economic means. This desire to avoid controversy is not something confined to the realm of war memory. Because issues related to the defence of Japan were also a source of fierce debate, mainstream conservative leaders were also extremely cautious about loosening restrictions on the use of force, and preferred to see the potential of the SDF rise only gradually, and within strict limitations. To counter arguments for more robust armed
forces, mainstream conservatives would often argue that increased defence spending would divert funds from the civilian economy, but their intent was to avoid the division that such policies would render the Japanese body politic, thereby maintaining their hold on power. The mercantilists therefore shunned attempts to recreate Japan as a militarily ‘strong’ state, stressed pride in the nation’s peaceful economic achievements, and attempted to bring economic solutions to bear on both domestic and international political problems.

As shown in the next chapter, the mainstream conservatives’ tendency to compromise or create ambiguities around contentious issues like history and the status of the armed forces meant that Japan’s post-war mercantilism constituted more a series of reactions by mainstream conservatives to the moves of radical and nationalist actors within Japan than an actual strategy. Japanese political scientists would therefore be slow to map out the mercantilist position as a specific ‘doctrine’ of foreign policy. Only by the mid-1970s were writers – including some realists – consistently promoting the position as a prudent option for Japan. In 1975, Kōsaka Masataka recognised in hindsight that Japan’s mercantilist policies had been successful. Kōsaka drew on American liberal scholar Joseph Nye’s theory of ‘complex interdependence’ in the international system to explain and validate Japan’s mercantilist foreign policy, advocating a ‘generally self-centered pacifism with restrictions stemming from the wisdom of experience’ (Kōsaka 1975, 126, 138). In 1980, Matsuoka Hideo wrote that for Japan it was ‘smart to miss the war bus’ (sensō e no basu wa nori okureru no ga kenmei), maintaining at least cordial relations with nations upon whom it depended for provision of resources, even if this conflicted with the strategic interests of Japan’s ally (Matsuoka 1980, 112-114).

But these scholars were clear that theirs was a rational assessment of external circumstances, and did not rely on national peculiarities. The ‘experience’ upon which Kōsaka argued that Japan should base its ‘pacifism’ was that of peaceful trading powers of the past such as Holland and Venice, not Japan’s own bleak modern history (Kōsaka 1975, 118-124). Likewise, Matsuoka believed that restrictions on the use of force were useful for Japan as a trading state regardless of its own constitutional arrangements (Matsuoka 1980, 114). Indeed, for most mainstream conservatives, constitutional restrictions on the use of force served as a useful legal brake that helped reinforce a low-
stance foreign policy, rather than something at the heart of the nation’s historical identity. The need for restrictions was grounded in what the mainstream conservatives viewed as contemporary (post-war) circumstances. Speaking in 1980, Miyazawa Kiichi, who had been a stalwart mainstream conservative since the end of the occupation, noted that Japan should:

while protecting Article 9 of the current constitution, use [Japan’s] existence as a militarily small nation as a weapon in reverse, by deepening relations with other countries through economic and technical cooperation, and thereby also planning for its security. This is what Japan has done all the way through the post-war, and we cannot do anything else. Doing anything else would be frightening (cited in Sase 1980, 222).

Miyazawa was sometimes given to hyperbole, warning on several occasions that revising Article 9 would open the door to robust and even nuclear armament that would be a drag on the nation’s economy (Miyazawa 1991, 55, Harrison 1996, 17-18, 33). Nevertheless, these ‘economic’ arguments were grounded in what mainstream conservatives claimed was Japan’s present circumstances. Their reluctance to rearm had little to do with a conceptualisation of history.

As noted in chapter 1, the focus on wealth creation by successive mainstream Japanese governments, coupled with a reluctance to commit to more robust defences, led Washington to complain about Japan’s ‘free ride’ on US defence arrangements. Such complaints only increased in the 1970s after the emergence of Japan’s economy as one of the world’s strongest turned the country into a political target in the US for those concerned about unfair trade practices. While complaints about Japanese trading practices often reflected American protectionist desires or American concerns about the competitiveness of the US economy, the mainstream conservatives, committed to a policy of restraint in foreign policy, did little in terms of defence policy to assuage US public opinion. Indeed, as noted in chapter 5, in 1980 a report commissioned by the government stated that Japan would need to take more of an interest in international security issues in future, but nevertheless noted that it should focus on ‘comprehensive’,

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14 Japanese leaders have often warned that Japan is ‘capable’ of producing nuclear weapons, which is sometimes misinterpreted as their advocacy for such a stance, rather than as a warning that nationalism should not dictate policy and as an appeal for calm decision making (Wakefield and Penney 2008).
that is, economic and political, solutions to problems. This was not the increased burden-sharing of military roles that many in Washington would have preferred. Japan would remain formally reliant on the US military for security, but would seek alternatives to military force for its own security initiatives.

Certainly, ‘dependency on the United States in security affairs… permitted [the Japanese government’s] concentration on commerce’ (Pyle 1987, 243), but it also meant that Tokyo was extremely sensitive to US opinion on commercial issues and ultimately remarkably flexible when faced with US demands, a reputation for rigidity notwithstanding. For example, after a great deal of hesitance from ministry officials, Japan eventually capitulated to US President Richard Nixon after the latter, playing to a domestic constituency in the Southern United States, demanded that quotas be imposed on Japanese textile exports (Nakamura 2005, 36). Nixon played hardball, rejecting a MITI-brokered offer of voluntary export restraints (VER) on Japanese producers, threatening US unilateral trade restrictions (Sumida 2001, 466), and at one point, secretly invoked the return of Japanese sovereignty to Okinawa as a diplomatic card in the negotiations (Time Magazine 1971).  

This was not the only Japanese capitulation to arguably unfair pressure from the United States. In 1981, after the oil shocks of the previous decade stimulated demand in the United States for highly efficient Japanese cars, the US Congress threatened Japan with sanctions to protect the ailing US auto industry. The Japanese government, under mainstream conservative leadership responded positively to entreaties from the Reagan administration to impose a VER on Japanese automobiles in order to allow American 

15 While Nixon later said to Japanese Prime Minister Satō Eisaku that he “fully understood the prime minister’s position of preferring not to give the impression that Okinawa and textiles were tied together” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1969), the president had Henry Kissinger, his foreign policy adviser, approach Wakaizumi Kei, Satō’s assistant, with just such a proposal (Nakamura 2005, 36).

16 While the Carter administration had suggested Japan restrict its imports, unlike the Reagan administration, it never formally requested such a move (Maswood 1989, 195-196). Japan applied the restrictions in Reagan’s first year in office. Not all ministries were in favour of the restrictions. While MOFA was against export restraint, MITI, which had greater power in areas concerning industry, favoured it (Maswood 1989, 79-80).
automakers to retool (Maswood 1989, 195), despite some resistance from Japanese automakers and from within MOFA. The market distortions caused by the restrictions raised costs for the American consumer, and American auto companies never invested in the retooling process to the extent to which they were expected (Schlosstein 1984, 23), but that does not invalidate Japan’s eventual willingness to comply to American demands. Indeed, Okuno-Fujiwara (1991, 288-290) notes that it was precisely an ingrained tendency of (mainstream) LDP governments to avoid conflict that enabled Japan to tolerate the VER and raise the cost of Japanese goods for would-be American consumers.

From the 1980s, American unease with the state of the US domestic economy seemed to invite sometimes irrational demands on Japan. In 1984 American charges that Japan was dumping memory chips on the international market to lower costs and deny market access to American competitors led the Japanese government to apply another VER. The charges were never proven by any General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) panel, or indeed by the US Trade Commission (Baldwin 1994, 137). In fact, the European Economic Community and Canada complained that the agreement that Japan and the United States reached to prevent Japan from selling its products cheaply in third markets was inconsistent with the principles of free trade under the GATT (GATT 1988, 16). Moreover, despite American claims that Japan was blocking competition, market entry was relatively easy in the memory chip industries – as opposed to other semiconductor industries – where companies needed to retool at the beginning of every (fairly frequent) product cycle, and were thus often starting from a base where they were vulnerable to new competitors. Indeed, Japanese semiconductor manufacturers were taken aback when American demand increased the following year and Japan was again accused of market manipulation because prices were too high (Baldwin 1994, 134-135). Nevertheless, Japan’s capitulation to US demands was all the more important in this case: Japan controlled 90 per cent of the market in semiconductors and the notion that a foreign power might control a product that was integral to the production of high-tech weaponry, including the US Energy Department’s nuclear weapons program, was simply unacceptable to Washington (Zeng 2003).

Indeed, perhaps the most vociferous US criticism of Japanese trade practices – and therefore the area where mainstream conservatives believe Japan should capitulate
the quickest – has occurred at the nexus of defence and trade. Since the occupation, Washington has often urged Japan to lift its defence spending, and US complaints became stronger after trade imbalances in the 1970s and 1980s favoured Japan. American critics noted that at a time when the United States was spending some 7-10 per cent of GDP on its military, in part to defend Japan, Tokyo was investing its ‘savings’ on defence in domestic industries which were then out-competing American firms (Clapp and Halperin 1974, 204).

The weakness of this ‘free rider’ argument has already been noted in chapter 1, and it is clear that American negotiators knew only too well that military and civilian economies are not as separate as the argument assumes. In the 1980s, when the Japanese government cautiously announced that it would start work on an indigenous jet fighter with some American systems, it met with pressure from United States officials to engage instead in joint development based on a US airframe (Rubinstein 1999, 271-273). Japan was accused of attempting to create a fighter in order to reap the benefits that spin-offs would provide to the civilian economy, a practice hardly unknown to Americans. The Japanese government, led by MITI and the MOF again relented, opting for collaboration with the United States on the project, only to face further accusations that it was now trying to benefit by gaining access to sensitive US technology. The US contractors then pressured the Japanese government into renegotiating their original deal to protect technology transfers. Again, Tokyo gave in to US demands, although not without some resentment on the part of its ministries and Japanese industry towards American negotiators. According to Michael Blaker ‘Japan had embarked on the FSX negotiations hoping to assert its independence, but eventually found itself chiefly concerned with figuring out what could be offered to the United States’ (Blaker 2002).

In the 1960s and 1970s, Tokyo’s sensitivity to American complaints on trade issues was more a consequence of its constant pursuit of a low stance on foreign policy in the wake of the Anpo protests and upheavals that accompanied the Vietnam War, rather than a deliberate political strategy. In fact, conservative mainstream politicians often shied away from discussion of foreign affairs in anything but general terms, particularly after the controversy that accompanied the Vietnam War. The book outlining the political vision of Tanaka Kakuei (1972, 22-24, 70-73, 93-94), prime minister between 1972 and
1974 and an important kingmaker until the 1980s, devotes only six of its 225 pages to international events, and these are largely devoted to explaining the general international trade situation.\(^\text{17}\) While Japan’s leaders did pay close attention to overseas markets, the international political effects of Japanese trade practices and its government-guided economic models did not weigh too heavily on their minds.

Only from the mid-1970s did academics, politicians and bureaucrats begin to seriously argue in public that Japan needed to formulate more sophisticated ways of dealing with Washington. US criticism prompted by Japan’s reluctance to place sanctions on Iran, for example, prompted Matsuoka Hideo’s (1980) argument that Japan would simply have to weather bilateral friction while Tokyo protected its global economic interests. Senior MITI bureaucrat Amaya Naohiro (1980, 232) argued that while he personally preferred the realist approach to foreign policy, domestic constraints meant that the development of Japan’s military potential was out of the question, and Japan would have to adopt the mercantilist course. To fully achieve its goals as a trading state, however, Amaya believed that Japan would need to hone diplomatic skills in order to placate Washington when trade friction arose.

Indeed, to some extent events were overtaking such analysis. By the 1980s, commentators in Japan and the United States alike began to notice an upsurge in lobbyists, often Americans of Japanese descent, whose job it was to manage relations the United States. The activities of these ‘Men Who Make US-Japan Diplomacy Their Meal Ticket’ (nihon gaikō o kuimono ni shita otokotachi) were described with disdain by journalist Komori Yoshihisa as extending even so far as writing speeches for the Japanese ambassador, and the number of Washington-based lobbyists working for Japanese concerns outnumbered those registered to any other foreign interests at the time (Komori 1980). While the sheer number of those working for Japan may have acted to confirm some American suspicions that the Japanese were ruthless actors seeking to gain advantage wherever they could, it nevertheless demonstrates the importance the mercantilists placed on Japan’s image in Washington.

Even where trade was not a direct concern, the economics-first orientation of the mainstream conservatives has meant that they have sometimes offered financial solutions

\(^{17}\) The number of pages and paragraphs is taken from the English-language version of the book.
to bilateral defence problems. Article XXIV of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed between Japan and the United States as an adjunct to the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security obliges Japan to ‘furnish… without cost the United States… all facilities and areas and rights of way’ and to pay rent to titleholders of the land. However, Japanese financial support for the American presence has increased far beyond the bounds of this narrow agreement, largely because of American requests for extra funding for the bases. In 1978, JDA Director-General Kanemaru Shin, a key figure among Japan’s mainstream conservatives, announced that Japan would extend assistance to the United States to help maintain their bases in Japan. In the Diet Kanemaru claimed that the contribution was a proactive measure by Japan, noting that at a time when inflation in Japan and the strength of the yen relative to the dollar were pushing up American costs, that it was ‘acceptable to have some kind of sympathy’ (omoiyari to iu mono ga atte mo iii) towards the American position (DR, S84, HR, Cabinet 22, 6/6/78, 11).18 However, Kanemaru’s announcement came amid communication from Washington to Tokyo that the United States was unable to bear the cost of American bases on Japanese territory in the wake of the Vietnam War (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 353-354, C. Johnson 2004, 54-55).

Whether the initial ‘sympathy budget’, as financial support for US bases came to be known in Japan, was a response to American demands or not, by 2001 the United States had increased its requests for ‘Host Nation Support’ every year since 1978 (C. Johnson 2004, 55). What started out as a relatively modest, informal funding program of 6.2 billion yen to cover the welfare of Japanese workers on American bases in addition to

18 The terminology around these arrangements can be confusing. Kanemaru’s repeated references in the Diet to a position of ‘sympathy’ (omoiyari) for the US position meant that the contributions were labelled a ‘sympathy budget’ (omoiyari yosan) by the opposition, the term that is now used widely to refer to all costs – including those that Japan is obligated to meet under the SOFA arrangements – paid by Japan for the bases. Meanwhile, the United States uses ‘Host Nation Support’, (and never ‘sympathy budget’) to refer to all base-related costs. The Japanese MOFA, however, does not include SOFA-related costs when it uses the term ‘Host Nation Support’. The Japanese term used by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) for only those costs stemming from Kanemaru’s original offer translates as ‘Stationing Expenses for the US Forces, Japan’ (zainichi beigun chūryū keihi futan). When referring to these costs combined with Japan’s SOFA-related obligations, the MOD uses the phrase ‘Expenses Associated with the Stationing of the US Forces, Japan’ (zainichi beigun no chūryū ni kanren suru keihi) (MOD 2009). The DPJ, which campaigned to cut the special budget, often used the term ‘sympathy budget’ to note their disapproval of the costs. After the Futenma base crisis mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, however, a certain degree of fence-mending was required. In February 2011 the realist foreign minister Seiji Maehara declared that ‘sympathy budget’ should no longer be used and the official Japanese name of the funds would also be host nation support (hosuto neeshon sapōto) (Asahi Shinbun 22 January 2011).
Japan’s SOFA commitments expanded to cover labour, utilities and facility transferral costs, with funding peaking at 282 billion yen in 1997. Since then Japan has negotiated to lower these costs, and in 2009 budgeted for ‘only’ 192.8 billion yen (some US$2 billion) of Host Nation Support (MOD 2009). However, this is in addition to a similar amount (173.9 billion yen) that is paid as part of Japan’s SOFA commitments to supply land for bases to the US armed forces. In 2003, Japan paid more by far than any other US ally to host US bases and offset 74.5 per cent of their operating costs (US Department of Defense 2004). Indeed, Calder (2009, 4) has noted that the rough total of US$4 billion of Japanese contributions to the bases ‘contributes to U.S. military preeminence’ and notes that this in itself should be viewed as a reason to maintain the US-Japan alliance.

Thus, the ‘conservative policy line… emphasized economics and cooperation with the United States within the framework of the present constitution…’ (M. Muramatsu 1987, 311), while downplaying contentious issues such as war memory. Mercantilists sought to maintain 1) a low political stance among nations in the world as Japan focused on both developing its own economy and seeking economic solutions to international problems while avoiding contentious debates at home; 2) restrictions on the role of the SDF, particularly in terms of the use of force; and 3) good relations with the United States, in both the security and trade dimensions.

**Conclusion**

The tensions arising from Japan’s bilateral relationship with the United States, strict constitutional constraints on the use of force, and a sense of the Japanese nation as historically bound to unique memories of war have provided a framework for specific discursive positions on the national interest in Japan. Throughout Japan’s post-war history, realism, pro-American nationalism, pure nationalism, radical pacifism, progressivism, and mercantilism have all been clearly discernable positions each with its distinct conceptualisations of appropriate national goals for Japan. Certainly people are not consistent all of the time, and not all proponents of a given position will cleave to it consistently. Politicians and other pragmatists are always aware of the need to persuade others by temporarily catering to proponents of positions different to theirs. Moreover,
some individuals have changed their positions completely as time goes by, often aided by the fact that all positions have some aspect or other in common. But equivocation or change on the part of a given individual only highlights the fact that each position does have its own internal logic derived from where it stands relative to the three tensions and irreconcilable to all other positions. The fundamental irreconcilability of these logics, moreover, makes life more interesting for foreign policy analysts who want to incorporate public discourses into their approach. Indeed, it is the differences between these positions, and the debate that this difference generates which help drive and shape the creation of foreign policy.
Chapter 5: Mercantilist dominance and security policy 1960-1982

Positions on the national interest are derived from tensions on foreign policy which in turn are derived from the very nature of the modern state as sovereign, administrative and social. However, it is the particular arrangements, agreements and methods of exercising leadership between proponents of those positions on a domestic level that account for foreign policy and the behaviour of particular states. This and the following two chapters survey domestic interaction between groups representing different positions on the national interest in relation to security policy in Japan from 1960 to 2009. They focus in particular on the creation of political restrictions on the use of force and how those restrictions have been established and then either redefined or challenged over time. While the chapters proceed in a roughly chronological fashion, they try not to offer a simple narrative of random political dynamics and how they affect policy. Rather they compare different Japanese approaches to policymaking across time, paying attention to how groups in Japan representing the different positions have viewed restrictions on the use of force.

Defence framework and restrictions to 1982

Because of the acute tensions in Japanese discourse on security, it took some three decades after the end of the war for a formal framework defining Japan’s defence and security policies to evolve. The major domestic pieces of legislation and policy documents that outline Japan’s defence posture were: the ‘two defence laws’ (bōei nihō) (1954), that is, the Japan Defense Agency Establishment Law and the SDF Law (jieitaihō), Article 88 of which provides that the SDF may use force to defend the nation against an external attack and is ‘the sole provision in the Japanese legal system which explicitly permits the SDF to use force’ (Shibata 2002, 212); the National Defense Policy Outline (1976), the first official document to outline a strategic vision for Japan; the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (1978) which outlined training and contingency planning between the two nations; and the so-called Inoki report (1980) which outlined a doctrine of comprehensive security – a policy stance that considered
economic, social, environmental and other non-traditional threats as potentially as serious as conventional military threats. In addition to these public documents were secret reports of feasibility studies on nuclear deterrence delivered to the government in 1968 and 1970. These reports formed the basis of Japan’s stance on nuclear weapons.

Over the same period, Japanese governments established several clear official restraints on Japanese military activity. These restraints usually came in the form of official declarations ruling out certain activities, and were reaffirmed by successive governments as policy. They respectively prohibited: the overseas dispatch of the SDF (1954); the militarisation of space (1969); the possession or production of nuclear weapons, or their introduction into Japanese territory (1969); arms exports to communist nations or nations involved in warfare or under a United Nations arms embargo (1968); later extended to all nations (1976); defence budgets of more than 1 per cent of gross national product (GNP) (1976); and Japan’s participation in collective self-defence efforts (1981).

In addition, it was assumed from 1954, with the creation of the SDF, that Article 9 of the constitution allowed the government to use only the ‘minimum necessary force for self-defence’ (hitsuyō saishō gendo) against either an invasion attempt or sudden aggression. This assumption was confirmed in 1972 by the director of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), the organ which issues advice to the government on the limits of constitutional authority (Mitsuishi 2005, 52-53). The term ‘minimum necessary force for self-defence’, in other words the degree to which the SDF may maintain readiness, has no fixed meaning and is presumably dependent on enemy capabilities. Throughout the 1960s, however, Japanese governments stressed that Japan had no ‘hypothetical enemy nations’ (kasōtekikoku) (DR: S55, HC, Budget 19, 25/5/67, 13; HR, Cabinet 46, 10/8/69, 6), so it was difficult to surmise what that level of readiness should be. Nevertheless, it remained the official doctrine for calculating force strength and the prohibition on collective self-defence stems from this interpretation, something also confirmed by the CLB in 1981.

The other restrictions are not derived directly from an interpretation of the constitution. For example, before the 1990s, government officials, including prime ministers, noted that the SDF could be sent overseas for police action ‘which fell within
the bounds of Article 9’ (DR, S38, Plenary 9, 24/2/1961). At different times from the establishment of the SDF to the 1990s, Diet members also often noted that the SDF would be able to serve in a United Nations army under unified command, or in individual peacekeeping missions that did not entail the use of force (DR, S63, HC, Cabinet 17, 12/5/70, 39). In order to emphasise the principle of civilian control, moreover, they noted that such missions would necessitate revision of the SDF Law, but by doing so implied – indeed often stressed – that such operations would be in line with the constitution (DR, S38, HC Plenary 9, 24/2/61, 3-5).

The fact that many of these restrictions do not emanate from a strict legal interpretation of Japan’s constitution has meant that from time to time the restrictions have been softened or lifted altogether. Exceptions to the arms export restriction were made as early as 1983 to allow export of weapons-related technology to the United States, and again in 2004 to allow joint-development on ballistic missile defence (BMD). The CLB even noted that a policy of limited nuclear deterrence would not strictly be unconstitutional. Nevertheless, over time, most of the restrictions introduced above were seen by many Japanese as an extension of Japan’s constitution and its role as a peaceful nation, and they have therefore been difficult for to reverse. Where they have been reversed, moreover, new restrictions have been put in their place. As described below, for example, strict restrictions on SDF activity accompanied the decision to send the forces on peacekeeping missions in the 1990s. Debate over security issues, meanwhile, sheds light on competition and cooperation among the proponents of different groups during the different phases of Japanese foreign policymaking.

**Mercantilist dominance and the three-step process**

The first major restraint was put in place almost simultaneously with the two defence laws and a Military Security Assistance (MSA) agreement that Japan had negotiated with the United States. The agreement contained a pledge by Japan to ‘take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense’ (1954, Article VIII). Coming so soon after the controversy over the ‘partial’ peace treaty, the press, intellectuals, SPJ and JCP roundly condemned the government for accepting the terms of the MSA (Schaller
One pressing point for the SPJ was whether the SDF, which in its previous guises had been cast as a domestic security force, could be sent overseas. National Safety Agency Director Kimura Tokutarō faced a number of questions in the Diet about Japan’s possible rearmament but consistently held the government’s position that the SDF would stay within Japanese territory (DR, S19: HC, Budget 8, 9/3/1954, 23; HR, Plenary 18, 11/3/54, 6; HR, Budget 24, 17/3/54, 14; HC, Plenary 20, 18/3/54, 10; HR, Plenary 18, 1/4/54, 10; HR, Cabinet 24, 12/4/54, 12; HC, Cabinet 38, 19/5/54, 13; HC, Cabinet 45, 27/5/54, 10). In June the issue was partly neutralised when the House of Councilors approved a resolution ruling out the overseas dispatch of the SDF. The government, represented by Kimura, vowed to respect the resolution (DR, S19, HC, Plenary 57, 2/6/54, 38).

In contrast, much of Japan’s security policy during the period of mercantilist dominance between 1960 and 1982 occurred as the result of a three-step process – 1) a nationalist move, followed by 2) a mercantilist manoeuvre, and ending with 3) a declaration of limits – used to avoid a repeat of the tension and instability provoked by the security treaty revision in 1960. First, prominent nationalists, normally within the LDP, would launch an attack on the political status quo by proposing muscular foreign policies designed to strengthen Japan and make it more influential on the world stage. Second, the leaders of mercantilist governments, hoping to protect their low stance on foreign policy issues, would outmanoeuvre the nationalists by selecting realists to present arguments in line with their own preference for a low stance on foreign policy. Realists were often just as concerned as mercantilists about nationalist statements about policy, mainly because of the effect more muscular nationalist policies might have on the regional balance of power. The result was often an elucidation and affirmation of existent but previously unstated policy. Such elucidations served to prevent nationalists from implementing their own agenda, but mercantilist and realist discussion of defence policy usually worried progressives and, more importantly, radicals. In order to reassure these last two groups that the government’s clarifications were not a revival of militarism, the prime minister would take the third step of issuing declarations ensuring the public that certain activity was off-limits.
This pattern of implementation was the result of domestic politics. While mercantilists were the most influential players in government during this time, they were extremely careful to avoid any public dissonance that might spell an end to their dominance of the system. Nationalists could be contained as long as they stayed within the LDP, and as long as mainstream opinion within the party favoured the mercantilist low stance in foreign policy. However, radicals were less predictable, and as evidenced by the security treaty revision protests of 1960, presented a potential source of dangerous instability. Japan’s leaders would therefore attempt to address pacifist concerns when enunciating security policy. The three-step process was thus the result of mercantilist concerns about maintaining internal stability by also playing to the preferences of others when implementing their economic growth strategies.

Figure 5.1. The three-step process of security policymaking in Japan (1960-1982)

This three-step process was supplemented by a general narrative of peace offered by the mercantilists as their vision of the national identity. However, this narrative was forged with domestic political concerns in mind. From 1960 to 1980, leaders of mercantilist governments emphasised the importance of economic development and prosperity to both international and domestic peace and stability in an attempt to forge common ground with pacifists (DR: S40, HC Foreign/Commerce Committee Rengō Investigation 1, 20/4/62, 4; S58 HR, Plenary 3 68, 30/1/68, 6-11; S50, HC, Plenary 5, 16/10/65). At the same time, so as not to offend either nationalists or pacifists, mercantilists mostly left war
memory out of this narrative. An abhorrence of war – not the war in particular, but war in general – and the notion of Japan as a ‘peace state’ thus became integral to the national narrative, and Article 9 of the constitution came to be closely associated with that narrative.

Indeed, the notion of a general ‘Japanese pacifism’ or ‘antimilitarism’ was never anything so simple as an instant reaction to the experience of Japanese during the Second World War. Polls in 1949 to 1950 showed that 70 per cent of Japanese favoured developing independent defences for their nation (Seidensticker 1951, 120). Certainly there were those in Japanese society immediately after the war committed to a pacifist ‘position’ on foreign policy. But the mainstream narrative of Japan as a ‘peace nation’ developed afterwards did not necessarily carry the same emphasis on war memory that the pacifists enunciated.

Be that as it may, the narrative of peace only served to strengthen support for the policies implemented by way of the government’s three-step process. This process occurred in four ‘rounds’.

**Round 1: Nuclear weapons**

The three-step process first clearly appeared in debate on nuclear weapons in the 1960s. Despite significant anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, discussion of the military utility of nuclear weapons was not unknown in the 1950s and 1960s. In May 1957, less than two weeks after the government issued an official ‘unified view’ (tōitsu kenkai) that ‘offensive’ (kōgekiteki) nuclear weapons were unconstitutional, recently selected Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi argued that Japan could maintain a nuclear deterrent for self-defence purposes (Mainichi Chronicle 1989, 597). The prime minister’s words sparked more condemnation than debate. Nevertheless, they were heeded by other nationalists. In 1964, after the PRC tested its first nuclear weapon, nationalist LDP members, notably pro-American nationalists Fukuda Takeo and Nakasone Yasuhiro, with pure nationalist Ishihara Shintarō, began to call for more discussion on the topic of an indigenous deterrent, Fukuda advocating that more moderate members of the LDP drop their ‘nuclear allergy’ (Campbell and Sunohara 2004, 222-225). Such comments troubled anti-
nuclear campaigners in Japan, as well as realist officials in both Washington and Tokyo, concerned that a Japanese nuclear deterrent might upset the balance of power and harm non-proliferation efforts.

Although privately sympathetic to the notion of a Japanese nuclear weapon to balance China’s capabilities (Campbell and Sunohara 2004, 222), Prime Minister Satō (a realist leader at the helm of a mercantilist government) was aware of the political risks that a pacifist backlash to such a policy could pose. He therefore commissioned two secret reports, one in 1968 and another in 1970 (Asahi Shinbun 13 November 1994). The first report presented a solely mercantilist argument, noting that the expense of an independent nuclear deterrent would be too high for Japan. In the interim, MOFA authored another secret document recommending that the government join global non-proliferation efforts, but that it nevertheless maintain the technological capacity to develop a nuclear deterrent should the need arise (Asahi Shinbun 29 November 2010). The 1970 report commissioned by Satō all but ruled out such a course, noting that a Japanese nuclear program would likely produce only ‘half-pie (chūto-hanpa) nuclear armaments’ that would be useless for the purposes of nuclear deterrence given that Japan’s large urban concentrations and lack of strategic depth made a counter strike against a nuclear attack unfeasible. The report also concluded that a Japanese nuclear deterrent would simply enrage Japan’s neighbours and provide few security benefits in the process. Included was a snub to the nationalists, which stated that ‘Even if prestige is enhanced and nationalism is satisfied, new and stronger restrictions [on Japan due to the reaction of other nations] would mean that this effect will never be permanent’ (Asahi Shinbun 13 November 1994).

Satō’s manoeuvre therefore brought realists into the policymaking process at the same time as it excluded nationalists. However, radical pacifists and progressives were still concerned that the government was uncommitted to a non-nuclear weapons policy and also that Satō would allow Americans to bring nuclear weapons into US bases on Okinawa once the islands had been returned to Japanese sovereignty. Satō did assure them that the islands would be returned ‘without nuclear weapons, equal to the mainland’ (kaku nuki hondo nami), but the pacifists were right to be worried about his intentions. Satō’s lack of commitment to the anti-nuclear cause, despite his manoeuvring to exclude
his nationalist opponents from the policymaking process, is demonstrated by a secret 1969 agreement he signed with then President Nixon to be subsequently passed down by senior MOFA officials. The pact guaranteed that the United States would be able to bring nuclear weapons into Japan in an emergency, provided that Washington consulted first with the Japanese government (Asahi Shinbun 3 March 2010).

Nevertheless, in public Satō’s government sought to assuage anti-nuclear sentiment, adopting a policy on the peaceful use of space in 1969 that was much more restrictive than that of the United States or the Soviet Union (Oros 2008, 129). This ensured that the nation would not be involved in a strategic missile arms race. In 1969 the government also declared as official policy the ‘Three Non-Nuclear Principles’ – that Japan would not possess or produce nuclear weapons or allow their introduction into its territory. However, the principles were accompanied by a declaration that, in the absence of global nuclear disarmament, the existence of the principles was dependent on guarantees of US extended deterrence. In 1970 the government also signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), obligating Japan to remain anti-nuclear and submit its civilian nuclear programs to regular inspections by international observers, although this would not be ratified until 1976. While in public the government claimed that its refusal to ratify the treaty for six years was due to a desire to see nuclear powers take concrete steps towards disarmament as stipulated under the treaty, documents released in 2008 show that ‘the government in reality wanted to avoid upsetting hawkish elements in the LDP who advocated arming Japan with nuclear weapons’ (Japan Times 22 December 2008).

Although Satō won the Nobel Peace Prize for his commitment to the anti-nuclear cause, there was nevertheless more than a hint of realism in his moves: Washington was eager to shore up the non-proliferation regime after the Soviet Union and China had tested their own weapons, and commentators at the time noted that ‘Sato almost certainly used the treaty signing as a quid pro quo in his negotiations with President Nixon at the White House in November over the question of Okinawa’ (Griffin 1970, 184). Moreover, because the US Navy insists on a policy of not disclosing which ships in its fleet carry nuclear weapons, Japanese and American governments have worked around the constraints inherent in the policy. An unspoken agreement where Japan opted to trust its
ally to observe its laws, and Washington did not consider ‘transit’ of nuclear weapons as
amounting to their ‘introduction’ into Japanese territory allowed Japan to turn a blind eye
to official US policy. Nuclear weapons were almost certainly brought into Japanese ports
and harbours aboard American warships (Kelly and Reingold 1983).

Nevertheless, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles have acted as a strong normative
restriction on any move by Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, and have been confirmed
by successive governments since they were first announced. On the rare occasion that
politicians have advocated a nuclear deterrent for Japan or have talked about the strategic
effects of nuclear weapons, they have usually been castigated in the media, and highly-
ranked politicians, including JDA Deputy Director-General Nishimura Shingo in 1999,
have been forced to resign for committing such a transgression (Wakefield and Penney
2008, 545).

Indeed, even after North Korea’s apparently successful test of a nuclear weapon
in October 2006, it was difficult for politicians to suggest changing the principles to
allow greater cooperation with the United States. Days after the test, LDP Policy Chief
Nakagawa Shōichi suggested that Japan ‘discuss’ softening the principle banning
introduction of weapons. Many in the media and the public condemned his suggestion,
and the government reiterated its official commitment to the principles (Asahi Shinbun
15 October 2006). Meanwhile other politicians, such as the realist Ishiba Shigeru noted that
Japan should engage in discussion on the three nuclear principles precisely to reconfirm
that the nuclear ban was indeed in the best interests of Japan (Ōshita 2006).

Before the DPJ’s victory in the 2009 general election, moreover, statements by
former senior MOFA officials acknowledging the existence of Satō’s pact with Nixon
piqued public interest in nuclear issues. In July 2009 DPJ leader Hatoyama Yukio noted
that the revelations should spur Japan to revise the ban on introducing nuclear weapons,
bringing stated policy in line with fact (NHK 2009). Hatoyama’s statement elicited fierce
criticism from the media and the public, prompting him to quickly confirm his party’s
commitment to the principles. During the election campaign, Hatoyama even briefly
claimed that his government would consider suggestions to make the principles law
(Yomiuri Shinbun 9 October 2009). In March the following year, the DPJ government
officially acknowledged the existence of Satō’s pact but again reconfirmed the Three
Non-Nuclear Principles, essentially declaring the pact invalid (Sankei Shinbun 9 March 2010).

In the long run, then, the three principles themselves quashed Satō’s attempts to construct ‘realist’ workarounds and still stand as perhaps the strongest constraint on a specific type of military activity formulated during the era of mercantilist dominance.

**Round 2: Basic defence power, arms export restrictions, and defence spending limitations**

Satō’s method of using realists to advocate a low stance in foreign policy while reassuring radicals and progressives was also used by other politicians, most notably Miki Takeo, prime minister from December 1974 to December 1976. Miki also responded to nationalist challenges by establishing ‘studies’ to build consensus around the status quo and then issuing declarative policy statements to calm popular and radical pacifist sentiment. In particular, Miki was to prove instrumental in blocking a significant defence build-up advocated by Nakasone, who by 1970 had worked his way through the political ranks to become JDA director general.

In 1971 Nakasone issued the fourth five-year defence plan for 1972-1977. Nakasone’s plan proposed a doubling of the defence budget and the procurement of a range of new weapons systems to provide Japan with an ‘autonomous defence’, a long-time goal of the nationalists. Satō, who was in favour of the plan, attempted to counter SPJ criticism in the Diet by noting that it did not change Japan’s role as a peaceful nation with constitutional constraints (DR, HR, Plenary 7, 16/2/71), but could not quell opposition concern, or ambivalence within his own party, even as Japan’s National Security Council voted to approve the plan (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 330).

Indeed, with the development of growing ties between Washington and Beijing, mercantilists were loath to consider an increase in defence spending that might scuttle warmer relations, mutual diplomatic recognition and, more importantly, increased trade between Japan and the PRC. Miki criticised the plan in the national defence council, and he and Tanaka Kakuei moved quietly against Nakasone once Tanaka succeeded Satō as prime minister in July 1972. Although Tanaka’s Cabinet approved the basic outline of the
plan, the prime minister quickly ordered his new JDA director general, Masuhara Keikichi, to conduct ‘research clarifying the limits of peacetime defence forces’ (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 330). In February 1973, Tanaka attempted to steer a plan through the Diet that would strictly limit defence spending, restrict SDF personnel and equipment numbers and constrain the SDF to certain peacetime functions. However, the prime minister had to withdraw the plan on February 12, due to opposition concerns that it was an attempt to ‘conduct arbitrary constitutional interpretation’ to legitimise the existence of the SDF (DR, S71, HR, Budget 8/2/73, 7). In the interim, Tanaka called the CLB director, Yoshikuni Ichirō, to conduct research affirming that the constitution only allowed Japan to use ‘minimum necessary force’ to defend itself.

As prime minister from 1975, Miki had even more reason to avoid the public controversy that Nakasone’s plan would have brought. In addition to his ‘dovish’ reputation on defence issues, Miki was put in place by senior party managers as a ‘clean’ reformer after Tanaka was brought down by a bribery scandal, and attempted to reform Japan’s political economy by introducing anti-monopoly laws and welfare provisions, making himself several political enemies in the process. He also later incurred Tanaka’s wrath by initiating formal judicial proceedings against his old boss (Fujiwara 1989, 261). Avoiding public protest over defence issues was therefore crucial to Miki’s ability to survive other political challenges. Although Miki probably personally adhered to mercantilist principles, maintaining a ‘low-stance’ in foreign policy was also a matter of domestic political necessity for the embattled prime minister.

Miki had realist allies within the JDA who saw Nakasone’s forthright plans for national defence as potentially disruptive to the regional balance of power. Nakasone’s report had prompted a response from Kubo Takuya, director of the agency’s defence policy bureau, in an internal agency report written under the pseudonym ‘KB’. Kubo emphasised cooperation with the United States, but also noted that the possibility of Japan’s involvement in conflict was highly unlikely, and that Japan should opt for a small, well-trained ‘basic defence power’ (kibanteki bōeiryoku) (Kubo 1971). It is important to note Kubo’s realism: he did not formulate his position out of regard for constitutional restraint, but noted external restraints imposed by Japan’s international situation.
During his term as prime minister from 1974 to 1976, Miki seized on Kubo’s work, using realist arguments to achieve mercantilist goals of playing down controversy. Miki had his JDA director-general Sakata Michita appoint Kubo as agency vice-minister, where he could promote his plan (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 331). Since 1971 Kubo had produced several new documents in addition to his original ‘KB’ proposal and these were collated and used as the basis for a new ‘Basic Framework for Defense’. This time, in order to forge a consensus around Kubo’s ideas, Sakata established an official study group consisting of private sector academics which essentially recommended Kubo’s plan and allowed the government to promote it to the public as an independent study (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 331). The government then used the study as the basis for its policy design.

The result was the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), the first systemic overview of Japan’s security policy since the end of the Second World War, which noted that ‘within the bounds that the constitution allows’, Japanese defence capabilities should aim ‘to prevent an invasion of Japan and eliminate any such aggression should it occur, together with the US-Japan Security Agreement’ (JDA 1976, 599). Nevertheless, the NDPO outlined only moderate defensive capabilities for Japan and also focused on the SDF’s emergency domestic reconstruction roles. While it did not specifically rule out regional security efforts, or any other types of overseas deployment, it did not articulate them. The strong support for robust defences outlined in the Nakasone plan was dropped and the NDPO helped to institutionalise the concept of a purely defensive Japanese security structure reliant on the United States. Again, mercantilists as the dominant group had used realist arguments to both achieve their policy goals and shut nationalists out of the decision-making process.

The institutionalisation of the concept of ‘basic defence capability’ in the NDPO – more a clarification of the status quo than a new defence policy – meant that successive governments would, moreover, remain committed to limited Japanese defences for decades to come. To avoid controversy amid international change, subsequent revisions of the NDPO in 1995 and of the renamed (in English) 2004 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) reconfirmed the basic defence capability concept as a cornerstone of Japan’s national defence strategy. While the latter did mention the possibility that future
defence forces would deal with ‘new threats and other situations’ (aratana kyōi ya tayōna jitai) (JDA 2004), it did not replace the guiding principle of Japanese strategy.

Only in the NDPG of December 2010 did ‘dynamic defence capability’ (dōteki bōeiryoku) replace basic defence capability as the key concept defining Japanese strategy, implying greater responsiveness to changes in the international security environment and a move away from a defence policy created to deal with Cold War threats (Yomiuri Shinbun 18 December 2010). The concept of ‘dynamic defence’ is designed as a transition from Japan’s old focus on a ‘small scale invasion’ by the Soviet Union as its primary threat to balancing Chinese military modernisation by rearranging Japan’s forces to focus on the nation’s south-western maritime territory, responding to potential North Korean threats, and monitoring Russia’s military activity (Prime Minister's Office 2010, 3).

While some critics, particularly in China, have seen the dynamic defence concept as a radical departure from Japan’s post-war strategic thinking (Mainichi Shinbun 17 December 2010), it is not clear that such is the case. However, there is little reason to doubt that the new concept – a rather measured ‘response’ to China’s growing power and North Korea’s nuclear provocation – is more than a formal enunciation of policy shifts that had been slowly occurring for the last ten years anyway. That it took the Japanese government two decades to alter its fundamental defence policy principles to reflect post-Cold War concerns speaks more to the caution inherent in Japan’s security discourse than the emergence of a new ‘hawkishness’.

Moreover, while the government may have replaced the fundamental principle guiding Japanese defence policy, important restrictions introduced to complement the 1976 NDPO remain intact. After affirming the 1976 NDPO, Miki reassured pacifists, who opposed any moves to outline and clarify Japan’s defence policy as an institutionalisation of rearmament. In November of that year, just after the SPJ made an unsuccessful attempt to bring down the government with a no-confidence vote, Miki announced that Japan’s defence budget would not exceed 1 per cent of GNP. JDA Director-General Sakata resisted this move, arguing that defence policy would eventually need to rise to adjust to international circumstances. However, Miki’s finance minister
Ōhira Masayoshi argued that economic growth would allow for corresponding defence budget increases (Keddell 1993, 57).

While Miki implied that the limit would be only temporary, the prime minister himself drew a clear line for pacifist critics. The limit has become institutionalised as a conceptual tripwire: while pacifists argued that Japan should not engage in defence spending at all, at least with the 1 per cent barrier they had a definition offered by the government itself as to what constitutes robust spending on defence. Only the Nakasone government has attempted to breach the limit, and had only mixed results (see next chapter).

Moreover, the limit has also served to link realist priorities of maintaining the SDF to mercantilist priorities of promoting economic growth (Tsuchiyama 2000, 144). Indeed, even in periods of sluggish growth, economic priorities still have a tendency to pre-empt more forthright security initiatives. In 2010, officials in the Ministry of Finance challenged MOD proposals to maintain SDF troop levels. Partly due to MOF concerns about the budget, the 2010 NDPG actually outlined a reduction in the troop strength of the SDF from 154,000 to 147,000 members. There was also a sharp reduction (from 600 to 400) in the number of GSDF tanks; only a modest increase in the strength of Japan’s maritime forces; and, of course, a reduced defence budget. Former MOD officials criticised these cuts to no avail (Sankei Shinbun 20 December 2010).

However, the 1 per cent limit was not Miki’s only initiative to assuage pacifists. In the same year he announced the limit, he also extended Satō’s arms export ban, thereby shutting down an issue that had been controversial for some years. In February 1972 fights broke out between workers at Sony plants in Japan when it was discovered that company technology had been used to guide American smart bombs to their targets in Vietnam, and over the next few years the media pressured the government to ban arms exports (Havens 1987, 99-100). In February 1976, Miki announced that in addition to Satō’s three arms-export principles prohibiting arms exports to communist nations, belligerents in an ongoing war and nations under UN arms embargoes, ‘The export of arms to other areas… shall be restrained in line with the spirit of the Constitution and the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law’ (Oros 2008, 206).
Miki’s wording – the use of the verb ‘restrain’ rather than ‘prohibit’ – left room for modest modification. Indeed, ‘in order to ensure the effective operation of the Japan-United States security arrangements, the Government of Japan paved the way for the transfer of the military technologies to the United States as an exception to the Three Principles’ in 1983 (MOFA n.d.). The government also announced in 2004 that it would further soften the ban to allow US-Japan joint development on BMD projects, stating however that it would maintain ‘strict control’ over items exported for this purpose.

However, the arms-export ban has continued to serve as a significant constraint on military production in Japan, and pacifist opposition has prevented the ban from being lifted outright. In 2010, for example, an attempt was made to relax the export restrictions to allow Japan to take part in international defence production projects similar to that of the F-15 Joint Strike Fighter developed by the United States and nine of its other allies (MOD, Bōei seisan/gijitsu kiban oyobi buki yushutsu sangensoku nado ni tsuite 2010). However, the attempt was abandoned for the time being because the DPJ needed the support of the SDP, which was against a relaxation of the restrictions, to ensure the passage of the following year’s budget (Sankei Shinbun 6 December 2010). This shows that domestic compromise is still a major restraint on change in many of the policies that were institutionalised during the Miki administration.

However, a future relaxation of the ban is still a distinct possibility, particularly in areas where the ban affects cooperation with the United States. In January 2010 MOD sources told the Asahi Shinbun that talks regarding the joint development of BMD software collapsed because of US reluctance to agree to the stipulation, under the doctrine of strict control, that future sales of the software would need prior approval by the Japanese government (Asahi Shinbun 31 December 2010). The US cancellation of the software program will give the DPJ cover to quietly examine softening the ban to allow third-party purchases and therefore greater cooperation with the United States – the party’s original position anyway. However, the exact shape of future policy will likely depend on a number of domestic factors, specifically the degree to which the government must rely on the SDP and the degree to which realists like Maehara Seiji and Kitazawa Toshimi, respectively foreign minister and defence minister as of the beginning of 2011, dominate discussions within the government on defence issues. Whatever the
government’s decision on this issue of the sales ban, it will likely not move forward without serious consultation and even compromise with other domestic groups.

**Round 3: Comprehensive security**

The third instance of the three-step defence policy implementation process during the period of mercantilist dominance occurred between 1978 and 1980. After the NDPO was implemented, pro-American nationalists within the LDP argued that the outline assumed a role for the United States in cooperation with the SDF in the defence of Japan, even though US officials had not been involved in drafting the document. Pro-American nationalists therefore argued for the need to consult more closely with the United States on the new security clarifications contained in the NDPO. Fukuda Takeo – who replaced Miki after a brutal campaign by most factions in the LDP to oust him – agreed to a set of guidelines with the United States which was instituted by November 1978.

The guidelines laid out for the first time ‘a posture for cooperation between the Self-Defense Forces and U.S. Forces in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics’ (Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee 1978, 2). The guidelines also clearly mandated joint training exercises for the first time, and thus officially changed the relationship between the SDF and the American military, defining US and Japanese military cooperation under normal circumstances, during a direct attack on Japan, and during situations in Asia that affected Japan’s security.

Pacifists were naturally critical of the 1978 guidelines. According to the opinion journal *Sekai* (2001, 114), which usually approaches international affairs from a pacifist perspective, the guidelines changed the nature of the security relationship between the United States and Japan from a simple agreement on bases to a ‘system under which Japan and the US could jointly engage in military activities’. Despite this significant step, however, the text of the guidelines focused specifically on outlining measures to be taken in an armed attack on Japan. Aside from that, Japan and the United States were to ‘consult’ on ‘situations in the Far East’ that affected Japan’s security, as to the appropriate facilitative assistance Japan could provide US forces. The text however ‘left undefined both the extent to which Japan would provide logistical support and whether
the U.S. military would have access to Japan’s Self-Defense Forces and civilian facilities’ (Katzenstein 2001/2, 170). While there was the potential for creative interpretation on the part of the government to extend the scope of the SDF’s activities to cooperate in regional contingencies, there was little motivation to do so.

Indeed, mercantilists within the government had a stake in reiterating their ‘low stance’ as the Japanese official line. Some JDA officials, as well as hawkish officials in MOFA began to see the new parameters established by the guidelines, in addition to American assertions of a Soviet military build-up in the Western Pacific, as a way to establish a voice within foreign policy debates (Nakamura 1988, 94). Meanwhile, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 confirmed for some the dangers of Soviet expansionism. The same year the Marine Self Defense Forces (MSDF) first joined US military forces and other regional members of the Western alliance in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercises, a series of military drills aimed at responding to threats in the region. As the traditional stewards of the US-Japan relationship, MOFA officials also saw the increased military training and SDF participation in the RIMPAC exercises as a threat to their authority. The new activism on the part of the JDA particularly worried the mercantilist Minister of Foreign Affairs Sonoda Sunao, who continued to stress economics and ‘peace diplomacy’ in foreign affairs. Moreover, with the future of the US position in Asia uncertain after the Vietnam War, Fukuda’s successor as prime minister, Ōhira Masayoshi, a ‘dovish’ mercantilist in the mould of Miki, feared further requests from the United States for Japanese military cooperation now that the SDF and the US forces had a framework to engage one another (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 357-358).

To deal with these challenges to the status quo, Ōhira appointed prominent realist scholar Inoki Masamichi to prepare a report outlining the government’s position. The report of the Comprehensive Security Research Group (sōgō anzen hoshō kenkyū gurūpu), which was delivered to acting prime minister Itō Masayoshi in July 1980 after Ōhira died in office, stressed the multidimensional nature of threats to national security. The group maintained that military responses to problems such as natural disasters, poverty and environmental hazards were not always appropriate, even though these issues adversely affected international security. The scholars noted that Japan could help to maintain
regional peace and stability by financially assisting civilian efforts to keep the peace and grow regional economies. The group did recommend that Japan should increase its defence spending by 20 per cent, bringing the defence budget to 1.1 per cent of GNP, hardly a massive breach of the 1 per cent limit (Sōgō anzen hoshō kenkyū gurūpu 1980). However, the administration of Suzuki Zenkō, Ōhira’s successor, did not act upon this recommendation and the 1 per cent ceiling remained intact.

The Inoki report reframed Japan’s investment and development efforts abroad as contributions to national and regional security and confirmed mercantilist statements of military restraint. Unlike other policy initiatives described above, the group’s report set no clear limits. However it downplayed the utility of using force in situations linked to security. Comprehensive security ‘treated various types of global contributions as interchangeable, and thus implicitly acknowledged that foreign aid could be seen in a burden-sharing context’ (Pharr 1994, 161) within the alliance. Indeed, the report effectively lent weight to efforts to shore up the mercantilist status quo. The message that economic prosperity was the foundation for international peace was one that mercantilist leaders had been stressing for years (Loutfi 1973, 48-49).

Comprehensive security has proved to be a resilient concept within Japanese security discourse. Even the more ‘hawkish’ Nakasone administration, when establishing the National Security Council as the premier Japanese organisation dealing with security affairs ensured that the new organisation’s roles extended to responses to non-military emergencies such as earthquakes and other natural disasters. Moreover, MOFA’s Diplomatic Bluebook stressed the term ‘comprehensive security’ throughout the 1990s as an integral part of Japan’s foreign policy (Capie and Evans 2007, 67). In 2010, for political reasons explained in chapter 7, the Hatoyama government withdrew MSDF ships from the Indian Ocean where they had been refuelling international ships involved in conflict in Afghanistan. In order to smooth over bilateral relations, Hatoyama pledged US$5 billion to reconstruction and policing efforts over five years, making it the second biggest donor to aid efforts in Afghanistan (Alabaster 2009). The notion that financial contributions can take the place of military contributions to security is still strong in Japan.
Moreover, Japan has been promoting similar concepts overseas. At the beginning of the new millenium, the Japanese government initiated the Commission on Human Security, an international effort co-chaired by well-known Japanese citizen Ogata Sadako, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, to popularise the concept of ‘human security’ on the global stage (Commission on Human Security 2002-2003). Some scholars argue that the concept of human security is simply a new term for comprehensive security (Capie and Evans 2007, 137). Indeed, human security, like comprehensive security stressed the multifaceted nature of international threats to individuals, and even argued that traditional national security policies based on the maintenance of military force could also be a cause of those threats (Ogata 2003). The MOFA Diplomatic Bluebook replaced ‘comprehensive security’ with the new term in 2004, labelling it the ‘fundamental principle’ of Japan’s overseas development assistance charter (Capie and Evans 2007, 67).

Although the Inoki report is recognised as an important component of international literature on these new approaches to security, it was written within specific domestic circumstances and aimed at protecting mercantilist goals by co-opting realists active in the security debate in Japan and having them produce literature conducive to mercantilist aims. Its authors probably never dreamed that comprehensive security should come to replace Japan’s commitments to future international missions. However, mercantilists certainly would not have been surprised at the results of the report: Inoki had outlined similar ideas in his book Security Considered (anzen o kangaeru), published in 1977. Discussing Nakasone’s plan as JDA director-general to expand Japan’s military capabilities earlier in the decade, Inoki wrote that:

With the development of thermonuclear weaponry after the Second World War, the role that military power plays in the realm of security has declined. Even in terms of our own nation’s defence, increasing our defensive power as outlined in the fourth defence plan would therefore be retrogressive (jidai gyakkō). It is not by these methods, but by non-military methods, that is to say diplomatic methods, that we should plan for our security, and especially at times like the present, it is an anachronism (jidai sakugo) to strengthen military forces that have no role to play (Inoki, Anzen o kangaeru 1977, 227).
Writing during this period Kōsaka Masataka, another prominent realist scholar on the report’s committee, had focused on the nexus between trade, economic wellbeing and stability in his work as well (Kōsaka 1975). It is not so much that these intellectuals had given in to mercantilist thinking. Unlike the mercantilists who saw domestic stability as essential to economic growth, realists still prioritised external stability as the primary national interest. It is, however, the case that, given the relatively stable international environment, the views of the realists and the mercantilists converged. Realists were concerned that increased Japanese military spending might simply be wasteful and thus erode the ultimate power of the state, or worse, upset regional power balances. In any case, the views of these intellectuals were therefore well known before the government selected them to give their advice.

**Round 4: Collective self-defence**

The fourth and final example of the three-step process originated with MOFA in 1980. After Sonoda left his post as minister of foreign affairs the previous year, MOFA abandoned its turf war with the JDA and adopted a more hawkish position. In 1980 the ministry commissioned a report designed to advocate a greater role for the SDF. According to the report, in a security environment that was growing more tense after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet expansion in the pacific, Japan would have to rely on a ‘three pillared’ security strategy consisting of: (1) stronger defence forces to maintain the balance of power and deter threats; (2) a strengthening of the US-Japan alliance to improve operations and credibility; and (3) ‘the development of an active diplomacy in order to strengthen global security and the free world (じゆうしゅぎじんえい).’ As part of the third ‘pillar’, the report cited a need ‘to investigate in future the dispatch of SDF members’ on UN peacekeeping missions; it also noted, however, that this touched on issues such as the 1954 SDF Law which were ‘not MOFA’s jurisdiction’ (Mainichi Shinbun 28 July 1980). While perhaps driven more by a sense of realism than nationalism, the effect of this report was the same as the nationalist moves. It was a direct affront to a government that preferred a low stance in foreign affairs.
The report also had the potential to irritate pacifist opinion and was ultimately criticised by the SPJ. The press response was also extremely negative, emphasising the mainstream narratives of peace-through-economics long prevalent in public discourse. The *Mainichi Shinbun* (28 July 1980), for example, criticised the findings of the report for overemphasising the diplomatic utility of armed force and downplaying ‘contributions towards regional stability using antimilitaristic and constructive aspects such as economic cooperation’. In an editorial the following day the newspaper claimed that the report had ‘forgotten “diplomacy”’. The editorial also noted that with the presence of the SDF, Japan already had a military component to its security strategy and implored MOFA to ‘return to the basics of “a peaceful diplomacy without military force”’. Although the Administrative Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Takashima Masuo chaired the committee with members from each of the ministry’s offices, even MOFA officially distanced itself from the work of the committee (*Mainichi Shinbun* 28 July 1980).

Nevertheless, the MOFA report coupled with increasing activism on the part of the SDF continued to stoke fears in Japan that the nation was being drawn into ever greater security cooperation with the United States. Critics worried that the United States might use the doctrine of collective self-defence as outlined by the UN Charter to ask Japan to come to its aid during wartime. In 1981, therefore, the government had the CLB issue an interpretation on collective self-defence. The bureau announced that while Japan might have the right under the UN Charter to participate in collective self-defence efforts, such action was expressly prohibited under the constitution, as it involved the use of force to attempt to settle international disputes.

The CLB interpretation was really a foregone conclusion. In fact, the constitutional prohibition on collective self-defence was something that had long been assumed anyway. Indeed, it is hard to see how Japan, which may not use force to settle international disputes, could come to the aid of another nation under attack from the forces of a third nation. While there is some leeway for Japan to protect foreign forces that are acting in the direct defence of Japan, or to engage enemy combatants that are not acting under the authority of a state, entering into a dispute between two states is a direct violation of the ban on force to settle international conflicts. Because collective self-defence is thus clearly banned by any honest reading of Article 9, the 1981 CLB
statement can be seen as a reiteration of a long-standing policy designed to deliver the point home to nationalists and to assuage pacifists.

The inability to engage in collective self-defence efforts has been a bugbear of pro-American nationalists in Japan because, they believe, it prohibits them from achieving their goal of achieving equal status to other great powers in international society, especially the United States. Even despite the existence of a formal treaty arrangement, Washington will never regard Japan as a fully committed alliance partner if American troops may use whatever force necessary to defend Japan’s territory and personnel without a mutual commitment from Japan to do the same for America. The ban on collective self-defence thus keeps Japan, in the eyes of the pro-American nationalists, from reaching its full potential as an ally.

In April 2007, therefore, pro-American nationalist Prime Minister Abe Shinzō convened a blue ribbon panel to examine the question of collective self-defence. The commission examined four possible conflict scenarios. Those scenarios were: an MSDF response to an attack on the US ships in international waters; Japan’s use of anti-ballistic missile technology to shoot down missiles aimed at the United States; the use of force in peacekeeping operations; and rear area support in UN missions. The commission found that there were significant restrictions on Japanese activity in each of these scenarios, which would make defending Japan difficult in an increasingly hostile post-Cold War environment. In light of the fact that it was difficult to revise Article 9, the report therefore recommended that Japan reinterpret the constitution to allow collective self-defence (Anzen hoshō no hōteki kiban no saikōchiku ni kan suru kondankai: hōkokusho 2008).

Few were surprised at the findings of the commission. The 13 members of the panel, led by former diplomat Yanai Shunji and dominated by defence ‘hawks’, were selected with the conclusion already determined. Indeed, as Craig Martin (2008) notes, the leap from a sober and sensible assessment of regional threats to ‘reinterpreting’ the constitution was one that contained no legal reasoning whatsoever. The commission’s members, only one of whom was a constitutional lawyer, had essentially recommended that Japan ignore its own constitution to improve relations with the United States and allow Japan to better defend itself. The strategic assessments of the panel may have been
sound. However, in the absence of legal reasoning that demonstrated how such an interpretation might be possible, the only avenue to allow collective self-defence was *revision*, not ‘reinterpretation’ of the constitution (Martin 2008). Indeed, it is precisely because they believe an interpretation of Article 9 that will allow collective self-defence is impossible that more honest politicians, like prominent DPJ member Maehara Seiji, have advocated constitutional revision (*Yomiuri Shinbun* 22 September 2005). The Yanai report can therefore best be regarded as a poorly reasoned hit-piece aimed at Article 9. The possible controversy that would have accompanied government acceptance of the findings of the Yanai Commission led Abe’s successor as prime minister, Fukuda Yasuo, to quietly bury the report (Martin 2008).

**Mercantilist dominance in perspective**

The three-step process drove policy on security during the period of conservative dominance from 1960 to 1980 (see Table 5.1). Whether it was the mercantilist response to nationalist nuclear ambitions, Nakasone’s attempts to greatly increase the budget and capabilities of the SDF and the JDA, or the implementation of guidelines which clarified the areas of cooperation with the United States, the mercantilist response was the same: bring realists into the policy process by having them draft policy that only confirmed mercantilist preferences, and then follow this move with declarations to the general public designed to placate radicals. In this way, the mercantilists ensured not only the resilience of their policies, but also their own dominance for more than two decades.

However, this system could only last for so long. The pure nationalists’ masochistic narrative of persecution at the hands of both foreigners and Japan’s own self-serving political elites makes it difficult to believe that they could ever expect to govern at a time of high growth and confidence in Japan. Indeed, in a perverse way the pure nationalists seemed to revel in their exclusion because it confirmed their own persecution at the hands of their domestic opponents, a central part of their identity. However, the persistent challenges by pro-American nationalists show that they were not content with their exclusion from the creation of effective foreign policy. By the 1980s mercantilist weakness due to persistent revelations of bribery and other forms of corruption was clear,
as was the fact that the most stalwart group of post-war mercantilists within the LDP centred on the Tanaka faction turned in on itself. By 1982, Tanaka, after becoming disaffected with mercantilist colleagues such as Miki, supported the selection of Nakasone as prime minister, marking the beginning of a 13-year phase that would see the steady rise of the pro-American nationalists. However pro-American nationalist dominance would wait for the time being, while progressives emerged as a force in post-war Japanese foreign policymaking for the first time.

Table 5.1. Defence policy formation in Japan 1960-1982

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nationalist move</th>
<th>Mercantilist manoeuvre</th>
<th>Declaration of limits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968-1970</td>
<td>Calls for nuclear debate (Fukuda) or independent nuclear deterrent (Ishihara)</td>
<td>Satō commissions secret nuclear weapons studies</td>
<td>No weaponisation of space; Three Non-nuclear Principles; Japan signs NPT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971-1976</td>
<td>Nakasone releases fourth defence plan</td>
<td>Miki positions Kubo for National Defence Program Outline</td>
<td>Expansion of weapons exports ban; 1 per cent GNP ceiling on defence budget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978-1980</td>
<td>Fukuda: Japan-US defence guidelines outline areas of military cooperation</td>
<td>Ōhira commissions Inoki report on comprehensive security</td>
<td>Non-military contributions to security to offset need for greater military contributions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>Hawkish (realist?) MOFA report recommends enhanced defences</td>
<td>Fears about entrapment in US wars lead Suzuki to request CLB interpretation</td>
<td>CLB interprets collective defence to be unconstitutional (reiteration of status quo)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 6: Creation of an internationalist narrative 1982-1995

It is no exaggeration to say that most debates on security in post-war Japan were initiated by domestic pressure from nationalists who wanted Japan to take a more muscular approach to foreign policy. Yet at every turn between 1960 and 1982, whether it was on calls for debate on a nuclear deterrent, Nakasone’s fourth defence plan, the implementation of the 1978 guidelines or calls for increased military activity, pro-American nationalist plans were quashed, or in the case of the guidelines, countered with an emphasis on a foreign policy that downplayed the efficacy of military contributions. This led to a large amount of frustration on the part of the pro-American nationalists, who were eager to take advantage of the scandal and confusion within the mercantilist factions of the LDP in the late 1970s and 1980s in order to promote their own agenda.

By 1982 then, when Nakasone assumed the post of prime minister, pro-American nationalists were more than ready to assail the restrictions on security and military participation with the United States that had been built up over the post-war period. Nevertheless, Nakasone’s hawkishness was met with little enthusiasm by a public, media and bureaucracy convinced by a narrative institutionalised over the course of two decades that promoted peace through economic power and emphasised restrictions on the use of force.

Pro-American nationalists initially sought to challenge the restrictions directly, but public resistance made them modify their stance to emphasise international peacekeeping efforts as a possible way to break down the restriction on deployment overseas, and therefore as an attempt to expand the scope of the SDF’s activities. In doing so, however, they would encourage progressives, who had previously played a negligible role in the foreign policy debate, to assert their position. They would also make progressive internationalism an attractive position for some ambitious former mercantilists in search of a political direction after their position had been exhausted and discredited by the scandal and fierce political battles from the 1970s. These ‘new’ progressives would later be instrumental in carrying the debate on peacekeeping forward.

The dispatch of Japanese peacekeepers was clearly established as both a progressive and pro-American nationalist foreign policy goal during the 1980s. The
government and associated groups commissioned a number of reports attempting to persuade the public that Japan should consider sending the SDF overseas. Although these were largely rejected, the new progressives waged a protracted public debate to shore up SDF engagement in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO) after Japan’s almost purely financial contribution to the 1990 Persian Gulf War. In doing so, they helped reshape Japan’s national narrative of peace to incorporate progressive, universalist notions of international cooperation. By 1992, the SDF was deployed on the ground in PKO in Cambodia and by the middle of the decade the government was moving to make peacekeeping a primary focus of its foreign policy.

**Forthright challenges to the restrictions**

Nakasone began challenging mainstream restrictions on the use of force almost immediately after he became prime minister in 1982. The previous year, Suzuki, Nakasone’s ‘dovish’ predecessor, made what he later claimed was a non-binding pledge to the United States to protect Japan’s sea-lanes out to 1,000 nautical miles at the prompting of the Reagan administration. It is ‘almost certain that Prime Minister Suzuki himself did not adequately understand the agreement with the United States on sea lanes’ (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001, 367), and Suzuki probably viewed his pledge in terms of notions of comprehensive security and protection of the means of trade. Nakasone, however, saw all too clearly that the sea-lane agreement effectively enabled Japan to actively assist the United States in its policy of containing the Soviet Pacific fleet by allowing for increased monitoring over the fleet’s approaches to its base in Vladivostok through the straits surrounding Japan. Where Suzuki had equivocated, Nakasone was explicit: he promised that Japan would exercise ‘full control of four straits that go through the Japanese islands so that there should be no passage of Soviet submarines and other naval activities’ (Graham 2006, 143).

Nakasone’s reaffirmation of Suzuki’s pledge was part of an agenda based more on the prime minister’s desire to see Japan gain ‘membership of the Western nations’ than it was a strategy based on a prudent assessment of threat (Graham 2006, 143). It was ‘only by extending the utmost commitment to the United States and western interest, he
calculated, that Japan could elevate its position in the world’ (Inoguchi 2004). Indeed, by 1983, Japan’s Diplomatic Bluebook listed ‘Foreign Policy as “a Member of the West”’ first among ‘Japan’s Basic Positions’, ahead of its ‘Diplomacy Grounded on the Asia-Pacific Region’ and its commitment to ‘Broad-Based and Multi-Faceted Diplomacy’ (MOFA 1983). Nakasone, unlike former Japanese prime ministers also had no qualms about referring to the relationship between the United States and Japan as an ‘alliance’. Indeed, with his commitment to sea-lane defence, he was willing to demonstrate it with concrete measures.

However, Nakasone’s attention to Japan’s defence arrangements was often more about style than substance. As discussed in Chapter 4, Nakasone wowed the Reagan administration with his reference to Japan as America’s unsinkable aircraft carrier and his celebration of anti-communist solidarity with the South Korean government. However, at home his ability to change the parameters of the defence debate was far from absolute. Progressives such as the academic Ogata Sadako were highly sceptical of the narrative of a Soviet threat, perceiving the Soviet Union to be inherently too weak to flaunt its power in the Pacific (Kelly and Reingold 1983).

Moreover, an attempt by Nakasone to challenge the 1 per cent of GDP limit on defence spending met with only mixed success. The prime minister saw the limit as symbolic of an attitude of humiliation after the war, not to mention a reminder of his own failure to earlier execute his fourth defence plan, and was determined to push defence spending over it. At one stage Nakasone even considered calling an election over the issue, but was dissuaded by party elders nervous that such a move would cost the party too many seats (Berger 1998, 139-142). Moreover, Nakasone’s attack on the 1 per cent limit only mollified public resistance against him.

In response to such opposition, Nakasone dropped his rhetoric on the limit, and later would even claim that he was ‘making an effort’ to stay within the restrictions (DR, S101, HC, Finance 22, 26/6/84, 26). Only after he was perceived as focusing his efforts elsewhere, did he eventually manage to raise defence spending beyond the limit. Nevertheless, this was only in 1987, the last year of his term, and he only managed to raise spending to 1.013 per cent, well below the increase even the Inoki report on comprehensive security had recommended (See Chapter 5).
spending was at 1.004 per cent of GNP. In 1989 it dropped back below the 1 per cent mark, where it has stayed ever since (Hook, et al. 2005, 138). Nakasone’s initially bombastic approach irritated some realistic JDA officials, who believed that he could have broken through the barrier earlier if he had toned down his rhetoric on defence in the first place (Berger 1998, 139-142). This was an important lesson for the pro-American nationalists and in the years that followed they probed the boundaries of the defence debate in more circumspect ways.

**Testing the restrictions with peacekeeping**

Although their 1980 report on strengthening the SDF had been rejected, Nakasone’s hawkishness on defence issues encouraged MOFA to continue to raise the prospect of participation in UN operations as a way of testing limits on SDF deployment. In mid-September 1983, the Research Group on Strengthening UN Peacekeeping Functions submitted a proposal to the government consisting of two parts entitled ‘The Role That Japan Should Play’. The report suggested that Japan engage in a seven-step process that would culminate in the deployment of Japanese troops abroad in peacekeeping missions to the UN. The report advocated that Japan participate over time in: (1) financial and material assistance; (2) election monitoring operations; (3) medical relief operations; (4) communications and transport; (5) policing operations; (6) logistics operations; and finally (7) patrols and observation as part of a peacekeeping force. The fifth, sixth and seventh steps of this process would be undertaken by SDF members and would thus require a revision of the SDF Law. Although the research group that issued the report was officially a private organisation, it made little secret of its connections to MOFA. It was chaired by Nakasone’s foreign minister, Abe Shintarō (Kishi’s son-in-law and Abe Shinzō’s father), and consisted of seven experts including one of Japan’s former UN ambassadors. Abe noted that he intended to present the proposal to Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar when visiting the UN early in October. The foreign minister, however, did mention that he would present the proposal as the initiative of private Japanese citizens, not the official view of the government (*Mainichi Shinbun* 19 September 1983).
Without clear official sanction from the government, the 1983 report was largely ignored by the media and in the Diet. In the Diet’s Budget Committee, Kōmeitō member Masaki Yoshiake did joust with Abe and Nakasone in an attempt to force them to admit that the proposal would be seen by the UN as Japan’s official position. This only made Nakasone stress that his government did not even ‘harbour the thought that it would open the way to changing the current SDF law or to cooperation in a UN Army and SDF cooperation’ in peacekeeping forces and that the report was a private opinion (DR, S100, HR, Budget 1, 19/9/83, 32). Perhaps anticipating that it would face further criticism after submitting the document to the UN, MOFA later announced that Abe would submit only the first part of the report, which proposed general policies for strengthening UN peacekeeping overall. Claiming that the second part, which contained the steps for Japan’s participation, was intended for domestic discussion, MOFA then deleted any reference to a Japanese role in peacekeeping activities in the submission to the UN (Mainichi Shinbun 22 September 1983). The report generated little significant interest after that.

Nevertheless, there were other signs that the Japanese government saw UN peacekeeping as a way to test the restriction that the SDF should not be sent overseas. During a trip to Japan in 1982, Pérez de Cuéllar openly requested that Japan contribute to potential UN operations that would occur if Namibia gained its independence from South Africa (New York Times 15 August 1982). The 1980 MOFA report on the SDF that had garnered so much negative media reaction had already mentioned Namibia as a possible ‘first case’ for Japanese civilian deployments serving under the UN, but this time the request for Japanese participation had come from the UN itself, not an organ of the Japanese government. Japanese Foreign Minister Sakurauchi Yoshio responded that Japan would consider sending ‘personnel’ (yōin) to monitor elections in Nambia once the state gained its independence, a statement which left the composition of a proposed Japanese dispatch abroad ambiguous but resulted in very little criticism in the press.

Similar to its view on comprehensive security, the mercantilist view during the post-war period was that financial contributions to the UN could ‘offset’ Japan’s refusal to send troops and other personnel abroad on PKO. However, by the 1980s, this line of reasoning was no longer effective. By 1983, Japan’s assessed contributions to the United
Nations comprised 10.32 per cent of the organisation’s regular budget, making Japan the second largest contributor behind the United States (Ogata 1987, 959). Japan’s contributions were especially notable as they came at a time when Soviet contributions to the world body had been decreasing for years and the US Congress was reluctant to pay the full extent of Washington’s mandated fees until the UN had implemented major organisational reforms to give large contributors more power in its deliberations (MOFA 1987). However, UN reforms meant that the organisation expected greater financial contributions from its members anyway, meaning that Japan’s increased contributions were expected by the world body. Moreover, Japan’s new position as the second largest contributor meant that it could no longer advance up the rankings of contributing nations (Sciolino 1987).

With the mercantilists’ weakened politically after scandals and leadership challenges, with the pro-American nationalists no longer contained, and with the marginal political returns of Japan’s financial contributions to the UN diminishing, mercantilists could no longer fend off pro-American nationalists by co-opting other positions. They therefore began to see more active contributions to the UN as a possible concession to nationalist efforts to break down post-war constraints on the SDF. Soon after forming his Cabinet at the end of 1987, Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru – who had deposed Tanaka at the head of his ‘mainstream’ faction in a particularly brutal political battle – therefore announced that as an advanced and developed nation, Japan would ‘positively influence’ UN operations ‘in contributions to world peace and the resolution of international conflicts’ (DR, S111, HR, Plenary 1, 27/11/87, 2).

Takeshita’s ability to deliver on this statement was aided by two international factors. In December 1988, the UN accepted a declaration that Japan had worked on with other member nations since 1984. Aimed at clarifying and strengthening the Secretary General’s role in identifying and investigating international disputes, the declaration also noted that the Security Council should consider establishing ‘appropriate forms of United Nations presence, including observers and peace-keeping operations’ in order to prevent or avoid the deterioration of a dispute or international situation (United Nations General Assembly 1988). The year 1989 also saw the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, an end to the Iran-Iraq War, and an agreement signed by South Africa that would finally
lead to Namibian independence. The UN’s more active role in dispute resolution coupled with an increase in volatile international situations saw the total number of active PKO double from five to ten between 1989 and 1990, with the number of personnel required on peacekeeping missions rising by roughly 60 per cent between 1988 and 1989. There was now both ‘a new demand, and a new enthusiasm for peacekeeping operations’ (UN Chronicle 1990) and a call for nations to provide more human resources to peacekeeping missions.

Nevertheless, Japanese responses to appeals from the UN for greater involvement in international situations were initially very tentative. Japan sent one unarmed civilian observer to the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan and one further observer to UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, both border observation missions, in 1988. However, with Namibian independence imminent in 1989, the Japanese government was finally in a position to honour the promise Sakurauchi had made to Pérez de Cuéllar eight years before. Twenty-seven Japanese civilians served as monitors in Namibia’s first election. The following year, Japan also sent six election monitors to Nicaragua (Dobson 2003, 56). Of the five new UN PKO initiated in the 1980s, Japan sent personnel to four. While these were modest beginnings, Japan was moving towards more comprehensive international cooperation through the United Nations.

The Gulf War and resistance to overseas deployment

Key figures within the government were therefore primed to view Iraq’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War starting in January the following year as a perfect opportunity for Japan to make a meaningful international contribution. However, proponents of an expanded international role for Japan were to be quickly disappointed. On August 27, Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki announced that a UN Peace Cooperation bill would outline Japan’s human and material contribution to the multinational coalition formed to repel Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait. Prepared by MOFA over August and September, the original version of the bill did not envisage a commitment of troops from Japan, angering Diet members such as LDP Secretary General Ozawa Ichirō and chairman of the party’s General Council Nishioka Takeo, who favoured sending the SDF
overseas (Inoguchi 1991, 258, Seki, Ochiai and Suginō 2004, 27-28). Ozawa attempted to justify the deployment of the SDF on the grounds that participation in the Gulf War efforts constituted ‘collective security’ which was acceptable under the constitution, not ‘collective defence’, which, according to the 1981 CLB interpretation, was not. The staff of the CLB did not see the distinction and rejected Ozawa’s proposal, leaving Kaifu to search for a compromise (Samuels 2004).

In October, the prime minister announced in his opening speech to a special Diet Session that a new bill would call for ‘the cooperation and participation of public servants such as the SDF’ under the aegis of a new organisation. This new organisation would effectively transform SDF members into its own staff, sidestepping the 1954 SDF Law and the resolution against overseas deployment, which only applied to SDF members in their own right. Nevertheless ‘under the framework of the constitution, threats by force or the use of force’ by Japanese troops would not be sanctioned by the proposed legislation (DR, S119: HR, Plenary 1, 12/10/90, 2). The bill was an overt piece of legal sophistry which allowed for de facto SDF participation but it was just short of the de jure overseas deployment of the SDF that Ozawa had advocated.

By allowing SDF members to be dispatched under the aegis of a different organisation, however, the new bill was stronger than Kaifu’s original proposal and it drew fierce criticism from the opposition. SPJ leader Doi Takako claimed that the UN Peace Cooperation bill was ‘a makeshift technique’ devised by the government to ‘dress the SDF in the exquisite clothes of a peace cooperation force’ (DR, S119: HR, Plenary 2, 16/10/90, 1). Meanwhile, JCP members criticised Kaifu for discrepancies between his August 27 statement and the content of the new bill, claiming that American officials had put pressure on the Japanese government to authorise SDF deployments in the bill (DR, S119: HR, Special Committee on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 3, 25/10/90, 28).

The public sided with the opposition: 23,000 people staged a demonstration in Tokyo the day the bill was submitted to the Diet and polls meanwhile revealed that more than two-thirds of respondents opposed the government’s stance (Inoguchi 1991, 258). The government backed down and the bill was dropped in November. Debate on the issue was then sidelined until January the following year, when the multinational forces
launched their attack on the Iraqi military. However, once the war began, the Japanese government was keen to avoid any further criticism that its efforts were inadequate and pledged US$9 billion on top of their existing contributions to coalition expenses. In all, the Japanese government paid US$13 billion, about one third of the cost of the efforts. After the hostilities, the government also managed to send minesweepers to the Gulf, claiming that they were there not as part of the war effort, but to ensure that international shipping, including Japan’s oil transporters, were safe (Seki, Ochiai and Suginō 2004, 33-39).

Nevertheless, the Gulf War elicited an overdue debate about the legitimacy of peacekeeping. Quick to establish their position were die-hard mercantilists who continued to express familiar arguments against military activity. In September 1991, Miyazawa Kiichi argued that Japan’s choice was between preserving the status quo or revising the constitution and becoming a ‘military great power’ (gunji taikoku) (Miyazawa 1991, 50). On this point, Miyazawa held very little back, claiming even that constitutional revision to allow overseas deployment of the SDF might even lead to conscription or the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a ‘cheap’ deterrence option (Miyazawa 1991, 55-56).

Miyazawa also claimed that constitutional revision would threaten Japan’s relationship with the United States. He pointed to low levels of trust towards Japan in America and studies that even predicted future conflict between the two nations as demonstrating that even Washington had no desire to see a militarily forthright Japan (Miyazawa 1991, 50, 56). Other mercantilist leaders, like Okamoto Yukio (1992, 159), a rising star in MOFA who resigned over the government’s handling of its response to the Gulf War, believed that participation in the SDF might act as a potential catalyst for constitutional revision without thorough debate, a step which Okamoto saw as an overreaction (tsuno o tamete, ushi o korosu – lit. ‘Killing a cow while [attempting to] straighten its horns’). Miyazawa (1991, 55) too saw any move to revise the constitution resulting from the deployments as a potential ‘wedge’ through Japanese society that Japan could not easily afford. As always, stability was the goal of the mercantilists.

However, Miyazawa and Okamoto had something of a point about peacekeeping as a wedge issue. During legislative debate after the Gulf War on Japan’s potential new
international role, left-wing Diet members engaged in tried and tested methods to prevent the passage of legislation enabling SDF involvement in peacekeeping missions. SPJ members called for a dissolution of the Diet, and resorted to ‘cow-walking tactics’ (gyūho sakusen), a kind of filibuster where opposition members walk as slowly as possible to the Diet rostrum to cast votes so as to impede the passage of bills, particularly when the government is attempting to force them through. They then boycotted the final vote and tendered their resignations in protest on June 15, 1992, when the PKO legislation was passed (Mainichi Shinbun 18 June 1992). In the past, the socialists often successfully used such tactics (Soshiorosu 1992, 115-116) because the mercantilists’ desire to avoid controversy made placating the pacifists a priority. It was no surprise then that the JSP continued these tactics when protesting the new legislation even after it was heavily criticised in the popular media (Soshiorosu 1992). However, the level of obstructionism during the proceedings on the PKO vote was unprecedented (Mainichi Shinbun 16 June 1992).

Changing the narrative

While in the past SPJ members could claim some moral high ground because their actions were designed to protect the constitution against those who sought to revise it, mercantilist arguments and pacifist protests based on the value of the constitution had little effect on the thinking of those who had embraced progressivism after discarding their prior mercantilist positions. Instead of treating the constitution with contempt like the nationalists, progressives such as Ozawa countered mercantilist and pacifist arguments by stressing that Japan’s constitution and its traditional focus on pacifism in foreign policy obligated Japan to cooperate in UN military activities overseas.

In 1992, for example, Ozawa headed an LDP committee established to review Japan’s stance on peacekeeping. The committee underscored the constitution as the ultimate source of domestic authority on the use of force, noting that ‘the pacifism of the constitution of Japan was the point of departure’ for any discussion about Japan’s international security (LDP 1992, 138). However, the committee held that multilateral deployments were in line with, and indeed assumed under, the constitution. The preamble
of the constitution states that Japan, and indeed all nations, should refrain from giving ‘undivided attention to their own matters while ignoring others’\(^1\) and acknowledges ‘universal laws’ of ‘political morality’ to which all states must adhere in order to ‘sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations’.\(^2\) For the committee, this was as clear a declaration as any that sovereignty was subject to restrictions that obligated states to engage peacefully with the international community.

At the same time as dismissing the mercantilists, the progressives sought to dismiss the radical notion that only through an internalisation of war memory and unarmed neutrality could Japan avoid the mistakes of the past. For progressives, the Second World War was an object lesson, not something to consistently relive. The war in Asia and the Pacific had been a product of Japanese unilateralism. Japan had withdrawn ‘from the League of Nations, renounced international cooperation, unfurled the “righteousness” of Japan alone and finally entered into a reckless war’ (LDP 1992, 132). It was Japan’s disregard for multilateral efforts to bring about peace and its unilateral course of adventurism on the Asian continent during the late 1930s that led the nation to defeat and disaster. Japan’s failed military adventures should thus have resulted in a rejection of unilateralism in Japanese foreign policy. However, while Japan ‘painfully felt its own responsibility and, standing under the weight of its own regret, has been able to walk the path of a peace state’, after the war it had nevertheless embraced ‘unilateral pacifism’, a ‘passive (jūdōteki), negative (shōkyokuteki) attitude, unconcerned with the safety and peace of other countries’ (LDP 1992, 132). According to the Ozawa committee, focusing on the uniqueness of Japan’s experience in war in order to condemn active participation in the international community was an inappropriate position to take given Japan’s former unilateralism and belligerency.

Calls for participation in international peacekeeping efforts were not, moreover, a mere reinterpretation of the constitution to bring it in line with modern international practice, but a reaffirmation of its ‘spirit’ as originally intended (LDP 1992, 139).

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1 This is my direct translation of part of the preamble of *The Constitution of Japan*. While there is an ‘official’ English translation of the constitution, it has no legal standing in Japan. It is therefore appropriate to use a direct translation of the Japanese version when the official translation may distort analysis. The official English translation states that the Japanese people ‘believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone’, which does not carry quite the same meaning.

2 *The Constitution of Japan*, preamble. This time the official English version is not significantly different from the Japanese, so it has been used here.
According to the Ozawa report, the principles embodied within the constitution, written directly after the war to ensure the nation would never be a danger to international society, were a call for greater international cooperation on the part of Japan, not less. In place of Japan’s ‘negative, passive’ and ‘unilateral pacifism’, the report declared that Japan would need to adopt an ‘active functional pacifism’ in line with the Constitution’s true spirit. Ozawa believed that this meant active cooperation with the UN:

> If Japan is indeed searching for peace, free [international] exchange and global stability, it should positively make efforts so that the UN can function… The UN Charter and the Constitution of Japan are two sides of the same coin (hyōri ittai) (Ozawa and Eda 1992, 35).

According to the Ozawa report, then, the constitution had correctly identified the importance of Japan’s cooperation with the international community as the first lesson to be drawn from Japan’s wartime experience, even if successive post-war governments had chosen to ignore it. The constitution, meanwhile, expressed Japan’s participation in a universal order, not a plea for pacifist isolation based on conceptions of Japanese historical exceptionalism.

With Ozawa leading the debate on peacekeeping during the 1990s, the government, led from November 1991 by a reluctant Miyazawa, came under pressure from progressives in the ruling party while continuing to fend off criticism from radicals that calls for increased participation in PKO were a cover for a more muscular defence policy. Indeed, sometimes the pacifists had a point. While some pro-American nationalists, such as Nakanishi Terumasa, a professor from Shizuoka Prefectural University (now based at Kyoto University), did join the debate in favour of greater SDF participation in overseas missions (Nakanishi 1992), in general they remained relatively quiet, in part because the progressives were making the case for loosening restrictions on the SDF for them.

Realists, meanwhile, were relatively unconcerned about the issue: SDF members were probably excited about the prospect of actual missions in the field, but peacekeeping would not necessarily be a destabilising factor in relations with regional actors. While China, South Korea and Singapore expressed reservations about the dispatch of Japanese military forces onto the Asian continent, the prospect of Japanese involvement in PKO
missions was supported by other states in the region, and China even sounded out the idea of combined China-Japan operations in a regional PKO force (George Mulgan 1995, 1112-1114). Cornered on all sides, and unable to convince the realists to advocate a low stance as they had done in the past, Miyazawa’s government had little choice but to consider a PKO Law enabling the SDF to serve on missions overseas.

At the same time as Ozawa and other progressives were establishing the case as to why the government *should* allow peacekeeping, a legal debate on whether the government *could* allow peacekeeping under the constitution was also underway. While the 1954 resolution which ruled out overseas deployment had no standing in law per se, it had become a corollary of Article 9 of the constitution in the eyes of many Japanese. During the 1950s and 1960s, calls for Japan’s participation in UN PKO missions to Lebanon and the Congo had sparked debate which was simply shut down when the government, fearing radical retaliation, ruled such missions out, reaffirming the 1954 resolution (Dobson 2003, 52). Japan had therefore never had a thorough debate on the extent to which the SDF could participate in PKO. The legal argument needed to be made that overseas dispatch of the SDF was in line with the constitution.

Soon after the Ozawa report was released, the mainstream opinion journal *Chūō Kōron* invited legal scholars, among other academics and ‘commentators’ (*hyōronka*), to review its contents. While legal scholars acknowledged the longstanding interpretation that collective self-defence efforts were unconstitutional, there was some disagreement over the ban on overseas deployment. The lead essay, written by Obuki Yoshisa (1992), a law professor at Chiba University, drew from the positivist traditions of legal theorist Hans Kelsen and asked ‘where is such a thing written in the constitution?’

Quite a lot of Japanese do not understand that what the constitution renounces is the ‘use of force’ as a means of settling of international disputes, in other words only that ‘use of force’ which is used to break down opposition and gain advantage in a war of interest between our nation Japan (*waga nihonkoku*) and another country (emphasis in original) (Obuki 1992, 52).

Obuki pointed out that the use of force in defence of the nation was not the only or even the most important function of the SDF. Within Japan the SDF had been used for a number of uncontroversial activities, as important as providing relief after natural
disasters and as mundane as helping to transport snow to the Sapporo Snow Festival each year (Obuki 1992, 50-51).

The SDF was therefore trained to undertake ‘civilian’ tasks in addition to its responsibility to provide for the nation’s defence, and there was no reason to assume that the reconstruction and relief efforts associated with international peacekeeping could not be viewed as civilian duties. Indeed, as the SDF had been involved in such tasks at home, ‘it would be the logical organisation to undertake missions’ such as PKO (Obuki 1992, 51). Other scholars and commentators contributing to the discussion on the Ozawa committee noted that there was a need to clarify the peacekeeping role of the SDF with either legislation or an amendment attached to Article 9 (Yamaguchi 1992), but agreed that dispatching the SDF overseas was not itself unconstitutional (Yamaguchi 1992, Nishimura 1992, 80-81). Even if some disagreed with Ozawa in places, the question whether or not the SDF should be allowed to take part in PKO and what role it should play in such operations was seen by many as ‘very much a domestic issue that does not interfere with the constitution’ (Hamada 1992, 78).

Indeed, emphasising the disaster relief efforts of the SDF also had the potential to be popular. Cabinet public opinion polls between the late 1960s and 1990 consistently showed that around 75 per cent of Japanese saw ‘disaster relief operations’ as the SDF’s most useful function. In contrast, those who thought that the SDF had been useful in either ‘Ensuring the safety of the nation (deterrence of foreign invasion)’ or ‘maintaining the public order (chian) of the nation’ had never exceeded 9 per cent, even though most respondents believed that the SDF had been established specifically for national defence and a fifth of them were of the opinion that it had been established for domestic security purposes (Cabinet Office 1965, 1967, 1969, 1972, 1975, 1978, 1981, 1984, 1987, 1990).

There was also very little opposition in the LDP to the prospect of hypothetical SDF deployments that did not use force. Even Miyazawa at one point stated that there was nothing in the constitution that prevented the SDF from internationalising its role as a disaster relief organisation by going overseas to help in police or disaster situations. However, there were clearly constitutional limits circumscribing SDF activities abroad. The SDF was not, according to Miyazawa (1991, 51), to kill or use force at all. Justice Minister Gotôda Masaharu, while he could see some scope for the SDF in PKO, also
mentioned that he saw no difference between use of force in the execution of duty and the use of weapons for the purposes of self-defence (Gotōda and Uchida 1991). He believed that SDF members sent overseas should either have no right to self-defence or such a right should be tightly regulated. It also needed to be made clear that for any such mission, the Diet, as ‘supreme organ of state authority’, would exercise strict ‘civilian control’ over SDF members (Gotōda and Uchida 1991, 73-74). Finally, the SDF could only be sent to nations where the government had explicitly requested assistance. They could not be forced upon foreign nations like a ‘wife who had forced her husband into marriage’ (oshikake nyōbō) (Gotōda and Uchida 1991, 74).

This interpretation of what was possible under the constitution would be highly influential when Miyazawa’s government formulated the PKO Law. The 1992 law contained five principles which determined the government’s ability to dispatch the SDF on peacekeeping missions. These five principles were that: 1) a ceasefire must be reached between all parties; 2) all parties to the conflict must give their consent to Japan’s presence; 3) the UN mission must be carried out completely impartially; 4) Japanese personnel must withdraw if the above three conditions are not met; 5) Japanese personnel can only use firearms to protect themselves or those under their protection (Yomiuri Shinbun 12 February 2010).

The PKO Law was followed quickly by the first ever deployment of SDF peacekeepers overseas, to Cambodia in 1992. Some commentators raised doubts before the deployment as to whether the SDF was prepared for the challenges the mission would entail (Magami 1992), emphasised the difficulties that Cambodia’s history of despotism presented to the successful completion of the UN mission (Magami 1993), and even accused the Japanese government of downplaying the propensity for violence to erupt in the country so as to more easily authorise the deployment (Hashida 1992, 162). However, the ultimate completion of the mission reassured ordinary Japanese about the ability of the SDF to operate peacefully overseas, and played into a progressive narrative about the nation’s new international role. This narrative was bolstered by the fact that it was a Japanese citizen, Akashi Yasushi, who as an international civil servant oversaw the peace talks and 1993 elections in Cambodia. Akashi also wrote opinion pieces and published his records of UN missions in Cambodia and later Bosnia in major Japanese opinion
journals, consistently advocating a more active role for Japan in peacekeeping (Akashi 1994, 1996, 2000).

**The Higuchi report**

The justification for excessive restraint that informed mercantilist views on PKO missions was now an anachronism. In 1993, already damaged by the debate surrounding overseas deployment, Miyazawa’s government fell to a vote of no confidence after failing to introduce legislation on political reform. Ozawa and his factional colleague Hata Tsutomu led a group of lawmakers out of the LDP to form a coalition government made up of other former members of the LDP, the JSP, and former SDP party members. This gave the new progressives the opportunity to interact and develop their ideas with others who had long held the progressive line, particularly those formerly in the DSP. It also allowed for a comprehensive review on foreign policy. In February 1994, Hosokawa Morihiro, the prime minister in the coalition government, commissioned a private body, the Advisory Group on Defense Issues (*bōei mondai kondankai*) to be chaired by Higuchi Kotarō, head of Asahi Breweries, to map out a new international strategy for Japan.

The Higuchi report was a remarkable document. The first section laid out the group’s vision. It was written without the advice or intervention of the bureaucracy, and was drafted explicitly to outline a progressive post-LDP defence policy. It therefore preferred sweeping idealism to the careful detail of a government report. According to the report,

> it should be emphasized anew that one of the major pillars of Japan’s security policy is to contribute positively to strengthening the U.N. functions for international peace, including further improvement of peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, such contribution is important in the sense that Japan’s firm commitment to such an international trend regarding security problems will strengthen its role befitting its international position. The closer the world moves to the realization of the ideal held up in the U.N. Charter of a world without wars, the better it will become for nations such as Japan, which aspires for a true peace in the original sense of the word. Therefore it is extremely important to Japan’s national interest to make the utmost efforts toward this goal (Cronin and Green 1994, 37, translation presumably by Green).
Despite its internationalist focus, however, the Higuchi report did not ignore ‘pragmatic’ aspects of Japan’s foreign relations. Indeed, Hosokawa wanted to tightly restrict the SDF and to introduce more complete measures to support international disarmament and did not believe the report to be idealistic enough (Funabashi 1997, 264). The report located multilateral efforts such as peacekeeping, along with the US-Japan alliance and independent defence efforts, as only one of three pillars undergirding Japan’s security policy.

However the emphasis on a shift towards multilateralism and international cooperation away from Japan’s traditional emphasis on the bilateral alliance was clear. As Funabashi Yōichi notes (Funabashi 1997, 264), the Higuchi report was complementary with the early Clinton administration’s ‘assertive multilateralism’. However, the report placed the alliance with the United States in a context where it would be central to Japan’s multilateral efforts but would not dominate them. In Tokyo it seemed like a progressive agenda on foreign policy had finally arrived.

**Pro-American nationalist/progressive accommodation in perspective**

The period from 1982 to 1995 differed markedly from the long period of mercantilist dominance that came before it, and not only in terms of the policies proposed. Interaction between political groups was fundamentally different during this new period as well. The initial interest of the pro-American nationalists in peacekeeping as a method of challenging restrictions on the use of force encouraged progressives, who had become convinced of the benefits of peacekeeping as part of their internationalist agenda. Because pro-American nationalists had been chastened from earlier attempts to challenge restrictions on the use of force, they were largely absent from debate on sending peacekeepers abroad after the Cold War. Realists and pro-American nationalists instead tacitly supported the general progressive argument that the SDF should be more active, while mercantilists were discredited and pacifists failed to develop sensible defences to new arguments about the relationship between the constitution and peacekeeping. Progressives, although a minority, were thus the loudest and most convincing voices in
public discourse during this time and were able to adapt the well-established narrative about Japan as a peace state to serve their purpose.

Competition between the different proponents of the national discourse had thus resulted in a situation where one group was not necessarily dominant in terms of its political representation, but nevertheless controlled the argument over the appropriate direction of foreign policy. As discussed in the next chapter, while public opinion polls show that progressive arguments have worked their way into Japan’s national narrative, their position was an inherently unstable one. Despite their earlier enthusiasm for peacekeeping as a means for challenging restrictions on sending troops overseas, by 1995 pro-American nationalists were concerned that the progressives had gone too far with their rhetoric. The Higuchi report in particular worried pro-American nationalists, who now believed that Japan’s new internationalism was detracting attention from the US-Japan alliance and Japan’s potential role as a more traditional power player in world politics.
Chapter 7: The rise and fall of pro-American nationalism 1995-2009

Despite the optimism of the Higuchi report discussed in the previous chapter, progressivism was not to be the dominant position in Japan’s foreign policy discourse. Before the report was delivered to the government, Prime Minister Hosokawa was forced to resign in 1994 due to scandal. Hosokawa was replaced on April 28 by Hata Tsutomu, a former LDP member and leader of the Japan Renewal Party, but the coalition collapsed on June 30 when the JSP, unsatisfied with the power-sharing arrangement, walked out and formed a coalition with the LDP and New Party Sakigake, a progressive party. The new government under the SPJ’s Murayama Tomiichi grabbed headlines not only because the LDP and the JSP were seen as unlikely bedfellows and because Murayama was only the second socialist prime minister in Japan’s history, but also because the JSP was portrayed as quickly jettisoning its stance that the SDF and the US-Japan alliance were unconstitutional.

However, as noted in chapter 4, the JSP had in fact been undergoing moderate reform even before it coalesced with the LDP. Further, with Murayama seen as jettisoning his party’s long-standing policies on defence and security, the prime minister generally avoided talking about such topics (Funabashi 1997, 298). In any case, a new electoral system implemented under the Murayama government reduced the JSP’s numbers greatly at the 1996 election and made it less of a concern to the LDP in policymaking. After the election, the coalition remained in place, but the LDP installed its own prime minister, Hashimoto Ryūtarō.

Indeed, the new makeup of the LDP was a more important development than its coalition with the JSP. By walking out of the LDP in 1993, Hata and Ozawa had not only weakened the largest mainstream faction of the LDP, they changed its ideological mix, making it more ‘hawkish’ by taking progressive reformers with them. After 1994 the same electoral dynamics that weakened the SPJ continued to encourage members to split from the LDP, strengthening the hand of the pro-American nationalists within the party. Over the course of the 1990s and the following decade the pro-American nationalists gained in relative strength within the LDP. None of the six prime ministers from 1996 to 2008 would originate from the mainstream faction that had generated most of Japan’s
post-war prime ministers, and all four from 2000 to 2008 would emanate from the ‘Pure Japan Policy Research Society’ (*shinwa seisaku kai*), the LDP faction that housed the most pro-American nationalists. After 2005, this faction would be the largest in the Diet, and pro-American nationalism arguably became the mainstream within the LDP.

**Reaffirming the alliance**

Pro-American nationalist dominance, of the LDP at least, therefore began with Hashimoto as prime minister. However, even before he was elected prime minister in 1996 and began to implement an alternative policy to the internationalist vision outlined in the Higuchi report, there was a desire among some members of the government to challenge the report’s progressive policy proposals, which also recommended reducing SDF force levels by 30,000 members. More enthusiastic leaders of the Ground Self Defense Forces (GSDF), for example, insisted, using wartime vocabulary, that they would ‘defend [our force level of] 180,000 [SDF members] with all our might. If not, we are prepared to fight to an honourable death (*gyokusai o jisazu*)’ (Funabashi 1997, 264).

Fortunately for pro-American nationalists who opposed the report, they could count on the friendships they had established in Washington to help restore the US-Japan alliance to the forefront of American thinking on security. Michael J. Green and his colleague Patrick Cronin, then researchers at the US National Defense University under Japan expert Ezra Vogel, began circulating a response to the Higuchi report among policymakers in the US Congress that referred to the report’s ‘weakness as a bilateral document’ (Cronin and Green 1994, 10). Although the report had never been anything but an attempt by Japanese scholars, politicians and commentators to assess for themselves Japan’s security needs, Green and Cronin’s language suggests that such self-reliance was precisely what they viewed as problematic. Indeed, the two authors claimed that Japan’s new multilateralism and its enhanced capabilities from greater involvement in peacekeeping operations were a hedge against declining American power. The United States needed to guide Japan along to discourage independent action on the part of its ally:
Because the [Higuchi] report’s emphasis on new multilateral security roles and autonomous capabilities is not necessarily in contradiction with the alliance, the U.S. government should seek to work in tandem with Japan on multilateral security issues. Without a more explicit articulation of how these new roles and missions will be coordinated with the United States, however, the report could have the perverse effect of undermining bilateral security cooperation in the long run (Cronin and Green 1994, 10).

Green and Cronin’s writings created a consensus in Washington policy circles that US policymakers needed to pay more attention to Japan. Through Vogel and other established Asia hands, the two young researchers’ writings influenced the senior Harvard scholar Joseph Nye, then assistant secretary of state for defence affairs.¹ Between October 1994 and April 1996, Tokyo and Washington engaged in a round of intense negotiations, dubbed the ‘Nye Initiative’, which ended with an agreement between the two governments to review the 1978 defence cooperation guidelines allowing more bilateral cooperation with the United States. In February 1995, the U.S. Department of Defense also announced as part of its East Asia Strategic Review (known colloquially as the ‘Nye Report’) that it would continue to maintain 100,000 troops in East Asia as an indication of the importance of the region.

The renewed troop commitment was a surprise to many Japanese who expected that the end of the Cold War would result in troop and base reductions. It was especially shocking to Okinawans, whose prefecture would continue to ‘host’ about one fifth of those troops. In 1995, the abduction and gang rape of a 12-year-old girl by three US servicemen enflamed anti-base sentiment on Okinawa. While the incident was particularly egregious, Okinawans had long been concerned about rape and other crimes committed by US forces stationed on their islands. This rape was particularly explosive not merely because of the details of the incident itself, but because new plans meant that Okinawans had no reason to expect the base burden to be reduced. According to the governor of the Okinawa prefecture, Ota Masahide, ‘The trigger (hikigane) of the anti-Security Treaty protests in Japan today was not the rape of the schoolgirl but the Nye Report itself’ (Asahi Shinbun, November 5, 1995, quoted in Johnson, 1996).

¹ Nye (2004, 143) later confirmed Funabashi Yōichi’s account of the origins of his report, which is similar to that outlined here.
In order to alleviate the base burden on Okinawa, the United States and Japan announced at the end of their strategic review that Marine Corps Air Station Futenma would be closed and its functions transferred to a new location on the island following further negotiations between the two governments. Essentially a military runway and helicopter base in the middle of a city, Futenma is, as noted in 2003 by US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, ‘an accident waiting to happen’ and carries the disturbing reputation of the ‘most dangerous air base in the world’ (Sumida 2010). In 2006, the Koizumi government brokered a deal with the Bush administration, finalised in February 2009, to transfer the base to the other side of the island and remove 8,000 of the Marines stationed on Okinawa to Guam (MOFA 2009). Nevertheless Futenma remains operational and as of early 2011 the move has not yet begun. This is largely because many Okinawans, particularly those in Nago city where the new base will be built fear the noise pollution, environmental damage and damage to the community that a new base might bring. Many are also anxious that a new base would institutionalise further the presence of American troops on the island (Inoue 2007, 157-185).

Viewed from the standpoint of the pro-American nationalists, however, an American reappraisal of security commitments to Asia was hardly an unwelcome development. Indeed, the Higuchi report had already influenced the drafting of a revised NDPO, released in 1995, which focused more on the internationalist roles of the SDF and seemed to downplay international threats. The document did emphasise Japan’s relationship with the United States. Indeed Japanese planners were even granted advance permission to view the Nye Report when preparing the new NDPO to coordinate their message (Funabashi 1997, 297). However, the 1995 NDPO made it clear that the Japanese government was expecting a more benign strategic environment in years to come, with ‘a reduction in the level of military capabilities and [corresponding] changes in the military posture of Japan’s neighbouring countries’ mentioned as a given (MOFA 1995). Although it did mention the fundamental defence capability concept, the new outline cut GSDF member levels by 20,000, and removed ten ships from the MSDF and 300 tanks from the GSDF (MOD n.d., C. Johnson 1996). The NDPO even dropped the text of the 1976 document stating that the SDF would act to counter a ‘limited and small-scale invasion’, instead noting that Japan would engage in ‘appropriate cooperation’ with
the United States to defend Japan in the case of ‘direct aggression’ (MOFA 1995). Although American strategic planners praised cosmetic elements of the new NDPO, such as the number of times the United States was mentioned in the document (Funabashi 1997, 297), more cynical observers believed it was a sign that Japan was less committed to maintaining its own defence (Johnson 1996).

Realists and pro-American nationalists in Japan therefore saw the publication of the Nye Initiative as a way to again make the bilateral relationship with the United States the focus of Japan’s defence policy. Realists in particular had been eager to coordinate more closely with Washington since 1994, when the revelation of a North Korean nuclear program led the United States and North Korea to the brink of war. During that time, the United States requested that Japan activate the alliance in order to provide regional support. However Japan’s focus in negotiations with Washington was its own defence (Hughes 2009, 300). Nevertheless, stymied by a government that was not eager to talk about security arrangements because of alliance sensibilities, realists and pro-American nationalists could not exert significant influence over policy on alliance cooperation until 1996. They therefore were reliant on Americans to keep the issue alive.

Indeed, planners in Washington probably knew that their criticism of the report would be welcomed among their friends in Tokyo.\(^2\) Despite the highly visible agreement on Okinawa, the most notable product of the reassessment of the bilateral relationship sparked by the Higuchi report was the 1997 revised guidelines on US-Japan cooperation (MOFA 1997a, MOFA 1997b). The revised guidelines aimed to ‘create a solid basis for more effective and credible U.S.-Japan cooperation under normal circumstances, in case of an armed attack against Japan, and in situations in areas surrounding Japan’. The first two situations where the guidelines applied – ‘normal circumstances’, and ‘an armed attack against Japan’ – did not represent a significant departure from the 1978 guidelines which had already established limited procedures for joint training and contingency planning in order to protect the Japanese archipelago.

There was much, however that was new. The 1997 guidelines acknowledged US-Japan cooperation in broader international roles – referred to as ‘various types of security

\(^2\) Honda notes that the mid-level JDA bureaucrats who were sent to the National Defense University to study for a year liaised with Green and Cronin about the meaning of the Higuchi report (Sotooka, Honda and Miura 2001).
cooperation’ – that did not fall within a strict definition of previous alliance activity. The inclusion of these roles in the context of the guidelines made it clear that the government viewed such international activities as missions whose inherent value was their support of the bilateral alliance. Indeed, supporters of the guidelines claimed that ‘in a multipolar world, an alliance, especially one that lacks historical and cultural community, needs broad purposes like these’ (Murata 2000, 27). Multilateral engagement was not aimed at cementing Japan’s role as a model global citizen or a civilian power; it served a higher purpose of keeping the alliance relevant.

Because the guidelines were formulated barely a year after the United States and China were involved in a terse standoff in the Taiwan Strait, both Washington and Tokyo were alert to Beijing’s sensibilities about Chinese territorial claims. The wording of the guidelines was thus careful to avoid explicit mention of Taiwan or even use language about the alliance as protecting the security of the ‘Far East’. Instead the 1997 Guidelines explicitly noted that the ‘concept of situations in areas surrounding Japan is not geographical, but focuses on the nature of the situation’ (my translation3), in effect making ‘situations in areas surrounding Japan’ synonymous with ‘situations concerning Japan’ (MOFA 1997a). The intent was to ensure that the guidelines would not be of concern to Beijing unless the latter engaged in provocative behaviour (Green 1998, 75).

However, members of Japan’s political opposition feared that this ambiguous new wording had the potential to expand the scope of the alliance dramatically. First, the term ‘situation’ was nowhere defined, potentially implying Japan and the United States could respond to any event ‘surrounding’ Japan, as long as they could frame it as destabilising. Second, the emphasis on ‘situational’ areas rather than geographical ones unearthed fears that the scope of the alliance was now potentially global (Togo 2010, 83). Third, a stipulation that Japan was to provide ‘rear area support’ – the provision of materials and fuel, the transport of the same plus military personnel, medical services, use of facilities such as ports and airports, communications, and maintenance services for aircraft, vehicles and vessels – for the United States in these cases ‘meant the free use not only of

3 The official English language version of the guidelines (MOFA 1997a) simply states that the concept ‘is not geographic but situational’.
Indeed, in an ‘Official U.S. View’ on the guidelines, Kurt Campbell, deputy assistant secretary of defence for Asia Pacific affairs, showed that US government officials were well aware the guidelines would significantly alter Japan’s post-war security arrangements. According to Campbell (1998, 87) negotiators had ‘aggressively sought to bring a new character to the alliance’: ‘its very nature would have to change’. Domestic Japanese commentators were also aware of the significance of the guidelines: ‘The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty’ opined the Asahi Shinbun’s editorial page on April 18, 1996, after the guidelines were signed ‘has for all intents and purposes been rewritten’ (cited in Johnson 1996).

There was no suggestion, however, that such a broad shift should entail revising the 1960 Security Treaty which defined the formal scope of the alliance. Such a move would have required ratification of a new treaty and opened up the actions of both governments to more scrutiny. Nevertheless, once the two nations had agreed to the guidelines, it was incumbent on Japan to take legislative action to implement them. Indeed, as Campbell (1998, 87) noted after the guidelines were announced, there was a very important ‘in-country’ role for the Japanese. It is not for me to talk about the legislative challenge that lies ahead for Prime Minister Hashimoto’s government. However, the fact of the matter is that for us to realize the full potential of the guidelines, there will need to be some aggressive legislative changes in Japan.

Under previous mercantilist governments, the instruction by a US official to amend Japanese domestic law on security policy might have been interpreted as American pressure and politely resisted by Japanese governments fearful of domestic political repercussions. However, throughout the 1990s new pro-American nationalist governments in Japan were willing and eager to take on the extra responsibilities the guidelines entailed. Moreover, rather than ratify the guidelines as a single, comprehensive treaty revision, they could also continue to cut away at the post-war restrictions on the use of force piece by piece so as not to arouse too much opposition at once.

Indeed, the Hashimoto government showed a certain degree of sensitivity to the difference of opinion on the national interests, not least because Hashimoto’s coalition
arrangements relied on the support of a progressive party. As well as the legislation necessary for the guidelines, the government generally attempted to implement those initiatives that progressives saw as forwarding their own internationalist agenda first. However, Hashimoto could not achieve even this much with his coalition government. Only after the coalition split and a loose alliance between Ozawa Ichirō’s Liberal Party (LP) and the LDP emerged could the government of Obuchi Keizō pass the Regional Contingency Law (shūhen jitai hō) in May 1999. Using the language of the guidelines, the law, and amendments to the SDF Law allows the SDF to provide ‘rear area support’ to the US Forces during ‘situations’ in ‘areas surrounding Japan’ that if left alone could lead to a direct attack on Japan.

To some extent, the government was responding to regional events. In 1998, North Korea had launched a test missile, which flew across Japan to splashdown in the Pacific Ocean, and the government framed Pyongyang as its most immediate international threat. However, policy was structured by domestic arrangements. To play to the LP’s progressive preference for restraints on the use of force, the Obuchi government amended significant parts of the draft Contingency Law before its passage. An original formulation simply to have the government report to the Diet during contingencies was replaced by a stipulation that the government would need Diet approval to act during a contingency, even if this approval could only be granted retrospectively in a time of dire emergency. The government would also have to submit progress reports to the Diet as efforts to deal with the contingency progressed. A portion of the law that allowed for the interdiction of maritime vessels in US-led missions had to be dropped before the LP would accept the law at all (Buszynshi 2004, 67). A law was later passed to permit the MSDF to intercept foreign vessels only under cover of UN sanctions or with permission from the vessel’s flag nation. Along with an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement passed in 1996 (ACSA), which stipulates that Japan and the United States would share food, lodging, transport and fuel during joint training or UN missions, the Regional Contingency Law and the law concerning maritime interdictions clearly show that the LDP understood the internationalism of the LP, prioritised policies that would play to those preferences, and modified their legislation accordingly.
**Going it alone**

Only under the leadership of Koizumi Junichirō, prime minister from 2001 to 2006, would the LDP press ahead with an unabashedly pro-American nationalist agenda. Firstly, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks in Washington, DC and New York, Koizumi and his pro-American nationalist colleagues pursued closer relations and cooperation with the United States. Secondly, throughout his term Koizumi attempted to strip back many of the formal restrictions on the use of force that had been built up in the first three decades after the occupation. Finally, instead of attempting to engage others with serious arguments for his position, Koizumi sought political support by evoking mainstream populism and appealing to everyday emotional symbols of Japanese nationhood peppered with nationalist gestures such as annual visits to Yasukuni Shrine. It was through such nationalist gestures that the prime minister in part managed to distract Japanese voters with political ‘theatre’, and such political showmanship also extended to formal foreign relations. After 2002, Koizumi, probably at the prodding of his eventual successor Shinzō Abe, emphasised North Korea as a convenient threat to encourage support for greater US-Japan cooperation. Koizumi thus convinced ordinary Japanese that he was the strong leader that they desired after a decade of slow and negative growth rates had seen a procession of apparently weak prime ministers falter and then fall from office. However, while Koizumi may have been skilful at creating a temporary support base, his strategy of ignoring the concerns of others eventually created a backlash among proponents of other positions which his less politically astute successors could not manage effectively.

**Security policies under the Koizumi administration**

The Koizumi administration’s response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 was undertaken at a pace previously unseen in Japanese post-war policy on security. Within an hour of the attacks, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Furukawa Teijirō

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4 The person holding this position is essentially the head of the civil service in Japan, who liaises between the prime minister and the bureaucracy.
established a task force made up of members of key ministries and agencies to coordinate a response to the attacks (Shinoda 2007, 134, Samuels 2007, 95). The next morning, Koizumi himself issued a six-point response to the attacks, bypassing the LDP, the Diet, the Cabinet, and the bureaucracy. Some three weeks later, the task force had prepared the first draft of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Bill. The legislation, passed after a lightning session in the Diet, stipulated that the Japanese government would implement ‘Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities, Assistance to Affected People and other necessary measures’ to combat terrorism on the high seas and in areas surrounding Japan. By early November SDF ships were dispatched to the Indian Ocean to supply coalition ships fighting in Afghanistan. While the law stipulated that Japan was not to use force, the dispatch was the first time that the SDF had been deployed overseas as part of an ongoing combat mission (Samuels 2007, 95).

These steps in 2001 were followed by further declarations and action that would position Koizumi as a firm supporter of the Bush administration who was willing to slough off the restrictions of old. In 2003 the Diet passed war contingency legislation outlining for the first time how the SDF would use force against an attack on Japan. The same year the Diet also passed the Iraq Special Measures Law, allowing the SDF to conduct reconstruction efforts after the United States and some of its allies invaded that nation on the assumption that the regime of Saddam Hussein maintained stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons. The law allowed for the dispatch of an Air Self Defense Force team to conduct an advance surveillance mission in Samawah province in December 2003, leading to the dispatch of a GSDF battalion the following month, which would serve on reconstruction and humanitarian missions until July 2006. The ASDF would also serve until December 2008 on airlift missions in support of coalition forces. The dispatch was notable as it came immediately after two Japanese diplomats were shot and killed in the country. However, no SDF members were later harmed in the pursuit of their mission. In 2004, Japan’s arms-export ban was softened further to allow joint US-Japan development of missile defence systems.

These changes were indicative of a desire to remould the bilateral alliance as a whole. In their first statement of 2005 the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, a series of annual ‘2+2’ meetings between the Japanese minister of state for defence and
minister of foreign affairs and their American counterparts established in 2003 to discuss the strategic vision of the alliance, outlined among other roles of the alliance, its ‘global common strategic objectives’ (MOFA 2005). In addition to Japan’s by-now well-developed peacekeeping role, these objectives were deemed to include the reduction and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the prevention of terrorism, and the maintenance of the global energy supply. By the end of Koizumi’s term in 2006, the American and Japanese leaders were referring regularly to the relationship as a ‘U.S.-Japan global alliance’ (sekai no naka no nichibei dōmei)\(^5\) (Nabeshima 2003, MOFA 2006a, MOFA 2006b, Matsuo 2008). This was also a catchphrase for supporters of more intimate and wide-ranging cooperation between the two nations, at least as long as the LDP was in power (Center for Strategic and International Studies 2008).

The DPJ, now the major opposition party, was relatively sanguine about some of the security laws passed by the Koizumi and Abe governments, although it did manage to negotiate compromises. The DPJ approved, in principle, of the 2003 war contingency law, passed to enable the government to act and draft contingency plans in times of war and to exempt the SDF from certain laws – concerning road traffic, construction and medical activities – during an attack on Japan. Koizumi’s successor, Shinzō Abe also enacted a law establishing the Ministry of Defense in 2006. While both these laws were controversial, neither was overtly related to strengthening bilateral ties to the United States, so progressives did not object to their contents. Indeed, the administration and the DPJ negotiated to add clauses protecting constitutionally guaranteed rights to the contingency law (Shimoyachi and Yoshida 2003) and to adopt a resolution calling for strict civilian control on defence issues during debate on the ministry bill (Japan Times 1 December 2006). DPJ support for both laws meant they passed the Diet by an overwhelming majority. It was clear, however, that these laws were of a fundamentally different type to those relating to joint operations with the United States, for which Koizumi could not expect the uncomplicated support of the DPJ.

\(^5\) ‘Global alliance’ is a fairly loose translation of the Japanese, which is literally ‘the US-Japan alliance in the world.’ Sometimes it is translated as ‘the US-Japan alliance in a global context’. Nevertheless, ‘global alliance’ is the official translation used by Japanese agencies.
The power of insensitivity

When assessing his policies on Iraq or on the alliance in general, critics (McCormack 2007, Johnson 2004) have noted Koizumi’s ‘subservience’ to Washington. Certainly, Japan would come under immense pressure to follow the US lead on Afghanistan and Iraq. To this end, key figures in the Bush administration were poised to provide ample encouragement to Japan to do more. In 2000, even before Bush and Koizumi came to power, Richard Armitage, who would become deputy secretary of state in the coming Bush administration, and Joseph Nye would be the lead authors of a major private sector report that reflected hopes that the relationship between the United States and Great Britain could serve as a model for the United States and Japan, and insisted that the 1997 guidelines ‘should be regarded as the floor—not the ceiling for an expanded Japanese role in the transpacific alliance’. Correspondingly the report urged Japan to lift its prohibition on collective self-defence, because it was a ‘constraint on alliance cooperation’ (Armitage, et al. 2001, 3-4). After 9/11, Armitage would become a highly visible figure in Japan, travelling to Tokyo to consult with his counterparts and demanding before the media that Japan place ‘boots on the ground’ in multilateral military operations (Matsumoto 2010). The expression has since become a popular catchphrase among Japanese journalists who use it to describe other instances of American pressure for Japan to participate in military missions (Asahi Shinbun 12 January 2009).

However, notions of a Japan unable to resist the United States belie the degree to which Koizumi’s policies were the result of his commitment to the long-standing assumptions of his predetermined position. They were not the result of pressure, nor were they purely a product of the extraordinary international circumstances in which the Koizumi administration found itself. Both Koizumi’s calls for expanded functions for the SDF and his pro-American position were well formulated before 9/11, even before he had had significant contact with senior US officials as prime minister and when he still thought engaging North Korea was possible. In his first public press conference as prime minister on April 27, 2001, Koizumi broke a taboo by mentioning that despite being permitted under the constitution, the SDF was a ‘military’ (guntai) because of its
defensive functions. Also, after noting that past governments had held to interpretations of the constitution that prohibited collective self-defence, Koizumi stated that he understood:

that it will be extremely difficult to change them. I consider it preferable to revise the constitution so that the use of collective self-defence is thereafter in essence permitted under it. However, even if that is not possible, currently Japan’s most important national interest is to think of ways to sustain good US-Japan relations and to efficiently and functionally administer to the US-Japan Security Treaty… If America is attacked can Japan really just do nothing? (Prime Minister's Office 2001, emphasis added).

Nevertheless, because of the constraints erected around the constitution during the period of mercantilist dominance, Koizumi accepted that reinterpretation of the constitution, was more politically feasible than outright revision during his term.

Another explanation for Koizumi’s forthright policies was that Koizumi was spurred by evolving threats within the region, particularly from North Korea and, in the long term, China. Certainly, throughout his time as prime minister, Japan’s relations with these two Northeast Asian nations would become increasingly strained. Koizumi attempted to engage the North by paying a state visit to Pyongyang in September 2002. However, relations soured when Kim Jong II admitted and apologised for the North Korean abduction of 13 Japanese citizens during the 1970s and 1980s. Kim claimed that most of the abductees were now dead. However, Koizumi revelation sparked domestic demands, not least from Abe, to take a hard-line position against Pyongyang until the Kim regime relented to a thorough investigation by Japanese officials into the abductions. The government placed pressure on North Korea and by the end of Koizumi’s term in 2006, North Korea was conducting missile tests in the Sea of Japan and towards the end of the year Pyongyang had tested a small yield nuclear weapon.

Nevertheless, several commentators have noted the degree to which ‘nationalist politicians’ in the Koizumi administration and not least Koizumi’s chief Cabinet secretary and eventual successor Abe Shinzō attempted to manipulate the threat of North Korea to implement their preferred agenda, including the acquisition of more robust forces and greater cooperation with the United States (Onishi 2006, Williams and Mobrand 2010, 516-521, Hughes 2009). While he notes that Japan is correct to be
concerned about North Korean capabilities, Christopher Hughes, for example, has shown that ‘the actual degree of threat remains limited in the cold light of day’ (Hughes 2009, 311). The accuracy of North Korean missiles is still questionable, and it is unlikely that the North has the technical knowledge to miniaturise a nuclear warhead for missile delivery. Even if Pyongyang could build a deliverable missile, the conventional capabilities of the SDF and, more importantly, US nuclear forces provide an overwhelming deterrent that North Korea simply cannot match. Arguably, the Hashimoto government’s cautious approach to strengthening US-Japan contingency capabilities was an appropriate response to North Korea. However, pro-American nationalists’ cultivation of domestic fear and anger towards North Korea shows that the threat of the North was more a justification for policies that the government was already implementing, rather than a structural spur for ever more robust defence policies (Williams and Mobrand 2010, 519-521). Indeed, Samuels (2010, 395) notes that the high degree to which Japanese nationalist politicians could manipulate the North Korean threat, particularly by focusing on the abductees issue was a product of the fact that Japan’s leaders feel relatively secure in the face of the North Korean nuclear and missile threats and could afford to be less than cautious in their criticism.

Indeed, the cultivation of fear about a North Korean threat was a hallmark of the general approach the Koizumi and Abe administrations took towards domestic politics. Koizumi eschewed the conciliatory style of leadership that had been the hallmark of most of Japan’s leaders after the Second World War, and did not see any need to integrate his own assumptions about the national interest into a pre-existing narrative about the nature and purpose of the state. Instead, Koizumi sought to convince the public merely by stating his own position, using tactics to either isolate those that disagreed with him or force them to support his own policies. Directly after the 9/11 attacks, for example, opinion within the government was divided over the need for a new law to sanction the dispatch of MSDF ships to the Persian Gulf. While some maintained that the Regional Contingency Law passed in 1997 sufficed to authorise the dispatch, others believed that the dispatch was an overly liberal interpretation of the stipulation that Japan engage in activities to protect the security of the Far East. Koizumi’s own private secretary Iijima Isao suggests in his memoir that neither of these ‘legal’ arguments mattered much to the
prime minister. Instead Iijima believes that Koizumi wanted to bring the law to the Diet not to debate its implications, but to broadcast his position simply and clearly to the public (Iijima 2006, 127-128). Indeed, despite fierce resistance, even from within the LDP, the draft Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law passed quickly through the Diet with only a few amendments.

Koizumi’s attitude towards dissenters, even in his own party, was much the same during passage of the legislation concerning deployments to Iraq. Unlike the five PKO principles, which stipulated that Japan needed to acquire the agreement of sovereign states laying claim to the territory in question before the SDF could be deployed, the Iraq Special Measures Law declared that permission from the new ‘Coalition Provisional Authority’ established by the United States and its supporters after the invasion was all that was required. This stipulation was built on the fact that UN Security Council resolution 1483 called on the Authority to ‘promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory’. (Nasu 2004, 63).

Given that the UN had not authorised the use of force against Iraq, and the SDF was potentially joining the efforts of an occupying power still fighting in the country, thereby involving itself in an international dispute, Japan’s deployment was of dubious constitutionality. Indeed, citizens groups brought lawsuits against the government claiming that their constitutional right to live in peace had been violated. While these suits were thrown out because the courts could not find legal standing, in 2008 the Nagoya High Court mentioned in dicta that ‘the integration of the SDF’s air transport activities with the use of force by coalition forces in an international military conflict constituted the use of force by the SDF in violation of Article 9’ (Hamilton 2010, 550).

The government largely ignored the court’s opinion, noting merely that the SDF’s activities took place in non-combat areas, and fell outside of constitutional restrictions on the use of force given that the law strictly ruled out the use of force short of the use of weapons in specific circumstances such as self-defence. However, the idea that combat could be ruled out itself was almost risible. While in the event SDF troops were not involved in hostilities, during the deliberations on the Iraq Special Measures Law opponents of the dispatch noted that it was impossible to ‘divide Iraq into combat zones and non-combat zones’ (DR, S156, HC Special Committee on Armed Attack Situations.
Even Koizumi had to admit that it was a risk sending the forces to ‘a difficult and dangerous mission’ in an area ‘where the combat has not completely ceased’ (Jimbo 2004). In general, however, the government avoided responding to such objections, leaving the public at a loss. In February 2004 an Asahi TV poll showed that only 14 per cent of respondents thought that Koizumi’s explanation of the policy was ‘adequate’, with 63 per cent considering it ‘unsatisfactory’ (Jimbo 2004).

Despite this, Koizumi’s decision to lead from the front was extremely popular in a nation wary of the weak leadership that had characterised the terms of most prime ministers from Miki – in the mid 1970s – onwards. Even some of Koizumi’s fellow pro-American nationalists, like Hashimoto and Obuchi saw the political benefits of conciliation and compromise with potential political adversaries. Koizumi, however, was both willing and able to throw caution to the wind, arguing that the public respected strength. According to Koizumi, ‘People who were once against the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty and UN peace-keeping operations are now in favour of them. The deployment to Iraq will be just the same’ (Eldridge and Midford 2008, 5). Even after he stepped down, Koizumi counselled his colleagues not to ‘worry about public opinion’. He told them to ‘Be insensitive (donkan ni nare) to the immediate situation. The Power of Insensitivity is important’. According to Koizumi ‘Whatever you do, you will be criticised. Don’t worry about each and every [piece of criticism]’ (Asahi Shinbun 20 February 2007). Leading from the front, then, was a crucial attribute of Koizumi’s style and it led him to ignore complaints about foreign policy from those who did not share his views.

This leadership style was not, however, unique to Koizumi. Other notable pro-American nationalist leaders, notably Kishi and Nakasone, had ignored the concerns of others within Japan’s foreign policy discourse. These two figures engendered a political backlash against their own policies while in office when critics of Kishi’s efforts to revise the security treaty and opponents of Nakasone’s attempts to breach the 1 per cent barrier on defence spending felt they had been shut out of the general discourse on the national

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6 The Power of Insensitivity (donkanryoku) was a series of essays by novelist and critic Watanabe Jun’ichi that were serialised in the Japanese edition of Playboy magazine from mid 2005 to late 2006. The book of the same title (2007) that collected these essays had just been published when Koizumi gave his colleagues his advice. After Koizumi’s conversation was reported, the phrase became so popular that it was voted one of the top ten catch phrases in Japan in an annual survey of neologisms (Yūkyan shingo ryūkōgo daishō 2007). The book went on to become a bestseller, perhaps demonstrating Koizumi’s point that the public would follow the lead of strong politicians.
interest. In Kishi’s case, the protests led to his resignation. Nakasone was simply forced to tone down his effort.

However, Koizumi was simply more skilful at dealing with political opposition, and indeed made confrontation part of his political strategy. Whether addressing Chinese and Korean complaints about his visits to Yasukuni, or the hard line his government took against North Korea, Koizumi created the impression that he was standing up to foreign pressure, when often he was provoking it. According to Uchiyama Yū (2007), Koizumi was the ‘pathos prime minister’ (patosu no shushō), appealing to the public’s passion and emotion rather than their logic and reason (‘logos’ – logosu) as others had done. Koizumi also drew clear lines between himself and his domestic rivals on economic policy, calling an election to silence his critics within the LDP, selecting superficially attractive candidates to take their place, and waging a campaign that focused heavily on ability to stand up to them (Asano and Wakefield 2010). These tactics were extremely effective. In the 2005 election the LDP and its coalition partner, the Kōmeitō, together captured a two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. Koizumi left office the following year with a support rate of around 50 per cent, down from his high of around 80 per cent, but still a solid showing (Asahi Shinbun 29 August 2006).

**Backlash: The other five positions**

Despite his short-term electoral gains, however, Koizumi left his successors with an extremely volatile political environment. By ignoring the other positions of the national interest, by not attempting to integrate these positions into a truly national consensus, and by relying instead on empty gestures designed to please the public at large, Koizumi effectively aggravated and mobilised opposition against his pro-American nationalist position amongst many of those who took foreign policy seriously but nevertheless disagreed with him.
\textit{Realists}

Koizumi and Abe both had clear ideas about where they wanted to take Japan. Of the other five positions in Japanese foreign policy discourse outlined in chapter 4, however, only realists supported the Koizumi and Abe administrations’ moves to forge closer alliance relations with the United States. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, realists have increasingly seen the US alliance as useful in balancing Chinese military modernisation and US extended deterrence against both Chinese nuclear forces and as an insurance policy against North Korea developing its own nuclear weapons. Thus, North Korean belligerency in the wake of Koizumi’s visit to Pyongyang, as well as the launch of a North Korean missile over Japan as early as October 1998 meant that realists were willing to support power arrangements with governments that were ready to consider the implementation of programs such as missile defence and greater cooperation with the United States in planning for contingencies.

However, it would be a mistake to say that realism was the defining characteristic of the Koizumi administration. Koizumi welcomed realist support; indeed, the LDP’s most prominent realist, Ishiba Shigeru, served as director-general of the JDA from 2002 to 2004 and minister of defence from 2007 to 2008. However, unlike most of his predecessors, Koizumi did not proactively seek realist consent for his policies.

Indeed, in some cases he ignored their concerns, particularly when it came to his populist or nationalist displays. Realists believed that some of the tactics pro-American nationalists used to appeal to a broader audience actually had the potential to upset international stability. Some realists in the LDP, such as Fukuda Yasuo, Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary from 2000 to 2004, were probably more willing to try talks with Pyongyang than Koizumi or Abe (Jiji Tsūshin 2008). Nevertheless, the sometimes feverish nationalist rhetoric about the abductees and North Korean delinquency in general whipped up by members of the government, particularly Abe, meant that steps towards an accommodation with the North were virtually impossible on a domestic level. Many LDP realists have also expressed displeasure about Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni Shrine, viewing the act as an unnecessary irritant in relations with Japan’s Asian neighbours (Eubank 2006, Sneider 2006, Breer and Watanabe 2001). Koizumi paid them no heed.
Pure Nationalists

Conversely, Koizumi drew criticism from pure nationalists who thought his nationalist gestures did not go far enough. In 2009 a group consisting of Kobayashi Yoshinori, Nishio Kanji and a number of prominent pure nationalist commentators published Ten Traitorous Politicians Who Looked Down on Japan (Nihon o otoshimeta 10 nin no baikoku seijika), a paperback which promptly hit the bestseller lists. The book ranked its contributors’ selection of ten of Japan’s worst traitors – apparently selected from the nation’s entire post-war political community. Koizumi appeared in third place, behind Kōno Yōhei and Maruyama Tomiichi, politicians who had offered significant official apologies for the Imperial Japanese Army’s victimisation of foreigners during the Second World War. During the 1990s, criticising and ‘debunking’ Kōno and Murayama’s apologies became a key goal of the pure nationalists, who sought to ‘educate’ ordinary Japanese through initiatives like the Tsukurukai to regard their national history with a sense of pride. That Koizumi was lined up alongside these major targets of pure nationalist ire shows the level of contempt with which pure nationalists regarded his administration.

The pure nationalists held Koizumi’s sins to be twofold. First, they saw his theatrics as a sign that he was not taking his nationalist gestures seriously. In particular, they thought that Koizumi’s Yasukuni visits should take place on August 15, the anniversary of the emperor’s announcement that Japan had lost the war, and a sacred day for pure nationalists. However, Koizumi visited the shrine on days close to the anniversary, so as to keep his critics guessing about his movements. Ironically, Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni were almost certainly designed to win the favour of a generally pure nationalist group – the Izokukai. However, pure nationalists generally believed that Koizumi’s attempt to ‘flee even as he worshipped (nigemawari nagara sanpai) firmed up a precedent’ (Y. Kobayashi 2009, 20-22) that the shrine was controversial and discouraged future prime ministers from paying their respects there.

Second, the pure nationalists hated what they saw as Koizumi’s sycophantic behaviour towards the United States. For example, most pure nationalists opposed Koizumi’s support for the 2003 Iraq War, seeing the war as an act of colonisation by
Western powers in which Japan was complicit. This perception did not sit well with the nationalist narrative of Japan as an enlightened nation that had attempted to liberate a benighted Asian continent from the ravages of Western imperialism during the Second World War. For example, Nishibe Susumu focused on the rhetoric of both the Bush administration and the Japanese government that the post-war occupation of Iraq would be modelled on the occupation of Japan – which nationalists see as a period of intense subordination to the United States. Nishibe (2010, 178) claimed that Japanese who thought about the occupation as a positive experience that should be emulated elsewhere were ‘shameless,’ and praised those ‘proud Iraqis’ (hokori takaki irakujin) who resisted American transitional rule and viewed the chance of the post-war as a way to re-establish traditional authority as a guiding national principle.

Moreover, pure nationalists believed that the Koizumi administration’s adherence to ‘American’ free-market reforms constituted ‘dangerous thinking that could even destroy the “national essence”’ (kokutai) by stressing individual attainment over group cohesion. These nationalists even viewed what they saw as Japan’s economic, let alone political, subordination to the United States under Koizumi as an insult to those who gave their lives for the country during wartime (Y. Kobayashi, Nihon o otoshimeta 10 nin no baikoku seijika 2009b). Throughout Koizumi’s term as prime minister, pure nationalists like Kobayashi depicted Koizumi and ‘lapdog conservative’ (pochi hoshu) (Y. Kobayashi 2007) commentators taking orders directly from President Bush.

**Pacifists**

Interestingly, pacifist literature protesting the dispatch of the SDF to Iraq also depicted Koizumi as Bush’s willing pet dog (Nihon heiwa iinkai 2003), focusing however on Article 9 as representative of the true essence of Japan. Flyers designed for protests against Japan’s participation in the Iraq War asked whether it was ‘okay to be the sort of Japan’ that went ‘to war dancing to America’s tune’ (amerika iinari de sensō e) (Nihon heiwa iinkai 2003). Pacifist concerns about the invasion of Iraq were reflected in peace

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7 The ‘pochi’ of ‘pochi-hoshu’ (lapdog conservative) or ‘shinbei-pochi’ (pro-American lapdog) is a popular pet name for dogs in Japan.
demonstrations in Tokyo on March 8 and 21, 2003 and were attended, respectively, by 40,000 and 50,000 protestors (Greenpeace Japan 2003). On March 20, 2004 more than 30,000 marched in the city to protest the war’s first anniversary (Zhou 2005).

Koizumi’s response to the protests was typically contemptuous of the involvement of mass opinion in foreign policy matters. From the beginning, the prime minister cautioned the protestors that they should ‘not send the misguided message’ (*ayamatta meseeji o okuranai*) to Iraq that non-compliance with international weapons inspections was a correct course of action (*Shinbun Akahata* 18 February 2003). After opinion polls taken on March 1 and 2, 2003 showed that 84 per cent of Japanese opposed the war (*Mainichi Shinbun* 3 March 2003), Koizumi typically noted in the Diet that ‘there are times when it is wrong to do politics by following public opinion’ (DR, HC, Budget Committee 6, 5/3/03, 3).

With anti-war sentiment dismissed in such a way, pacifists mobilised to institutionalise protest against Japan’s involvement in the war and to defend the peace clause. Soon after the 2004 demonstration, nine esteemed authors, academics and entertainers, including the Nobel Prize-winning author Ōe Kenzaburō, established the Article 9 Association (*kyūjō no kai*, or A9A), aimed at coordinating and assisting independent groups that were against revising Article 9. Barely two years later 5,000 separate support groups had signed up to the A9A, much to the surprise of its founders (*Kyūjō no kai* 2006). As of late 2010, a period with no conspicuous political debate on the constitution in the national discourse, the A9A groups continued to hold regular meetings attended by hundreds of participants in rural areas and thousands in cities to keep anti-revisionist sentiment alive (*Kyūjō no kai* 2010). Whether or not these groups had a significant impact on public opinion is unclear, but according to polling data taken by the *Yomiuri Shinbun*, support for revision of Article 9 dropped every year for four years after the beginning of the Iraq War. In 2008 it stood at a mere 23 per cent, according to an *Asahi Shinbun* (3 May 2008) poll. While the radical pacifist tradition is nowhere near as strong as it was in the 1950s and 1960s, Koizumi’s support for the Iraq War and dispatch of the SDF, coupled with Abe’s nationalist revisionism served somewhat to revive a flagging peace and constitutional protection movement.
While progressives are normally more sanguine than the pacifists about the prospect of constitutional revision, they too reviled Koizumi’s decision to support the American invasion of Iraq and to deploy the SDF to the Gulf nation. This was not because they opposed SDF involvement in international operations per se, but because progressives believed that the United States had gone to war without appropriate UN authorisation. In 2004 DPJ leader Okada Katsuya met with Americans and told them that even though the United States was committed to Iraq, ‘that is not so for the Self-Defense Forces. Given (Japan’s pacifist) Constitution, I am against (the deployment) under the current situation’ (Japan Times 29 July 2004, parentheses in original text). During the campaign for the following year’s general election, the DPJ promised to withdraw troops from Iraq if the party was victorious (Takahara 2005). By that time, however, Koizumi had diverted public attention away from Iraq and towards an internal party battle staged with former LDP members over his economic policies.

Nevertheless, Okada and others in the DPJ continued to stress what they saw as the LDP’s complicity in an illegal war in Iraq. This led them to block legislation authorising the Indian Ocean refuelling mission. The DPJ was comfortable with the multilateral, UN-sanctioned missions in Afghanistan that the Indian Ocean mission officially supported. However, party members strenuously objected when it was revealed that the MSDF had supplied a tanker that had then refuelled the American aircraft carrier, the USS Kittyhawk, on its way to participate in fighting in Iraq (K. Kobayashi 2007).

After forming a majority with likeminded lawmakers in the House of Councilors after the 2007 election for that body, the DPJ therefore rejected the House of Representatives bill required for extension of the mission. The LDP-led government of Fukuda Yasuo was forced to take the rare step of overriding the House of Councilors by pushing through legislation with a two-thirds majority in the more powerful House of Representatives (Japan Times 14 January 2008).

However, forcing the legislation through tarnished the reputation of the LDP, which had been struggling to maintain public support after Koizumi stepped down in 2006. The MSDF was forced to halt its logistics mission between November 2007 and
January 2008 while the legislation was passed, embarrassing the government in the eyes of the United States and other international partners (*Japan Times* 14 January 2008). Certainly the LDP had the constitutional authority to push through the vote. However, it was the first time in 57 years that the House of Representatives, despite such a constitutional prerogative, had overridden the House of Councilors. The spectacle of the government moving to do so simply reinforced the notion that the LDP prioritised American preferences over dialogue, debate and democratic process at home. More respondents to a poll taken at the time of the vote opposed the bill (46.7 per cent) than supported it (38.8 per cent) (*Japan Times* 14 January 2008).

Spurred by their tactical victory in embarrassing the ruling party, the DPJ continued to attack the LDP over the Iraq War in the following years. Okada later expressed his desire to see a full investigation into the circumstances surrounding Japan’s decision to go to war, even stating that he would like to see Koizumi, no longer a politician, give a full account of his actions concerning the war before a Diet committee (*Wall Street Journal* Japan 11 March 2010).

**Mercantilists**

Like the progressives, prominent mercantilists, representing the formerly mainstream factions of the LDP, were extremely critical of Koizumi’s support of the Iraq War. Indeed, debate over Iraq also represented a domestic political battle between Koizumi and mercantilist politicians within the LDP. As the Diet voted on the Iraq legislation, key old-guard members of the party such as former Chief Cabinet Secretary Katō Kōichi and former chief of the LDP’s Policy Affairs Research Committee Kamei Shizuka boycotted the session. In 2007, when the Diet voted to extend the deployment in Iraq, Katō would again launch an attack on the government, noting that it had ‘not taken responsibility for supporting the Iraq War, even though America is coming to acknowledge that it was a mistake’ (*Asahi Shinbun* 21 March 2007). Meanwhile, in 2005, Koizumi would force Kamei and others out of the party because of a dispute over economic policy. Kamei and other old-style mercantilists would form the People’s New Party, a small but important
member of the coalition that formed after the 2009 election when the LDP finally fell from power.

The SDF and the strength of the internationalist narrative

Opinion polls show that mercantilist arguments built up over the post-war period and which stressed the positive relationship between prosperity and peace are still strong. In 2007, 86.5 per cent thought that the constitution had ‘brought about economic development, through lasting peace’ (Yomiuri Shinbun March 2007). As described in the previous chapter, however, this narrative was supplemented during the 1990s by internationalist notions that in order to promote lasting peace, Japan had to take a more active role in multilateral operations sanctioned by the United Nations. Just as others had done in the early 1990s, Koizumi would occasionally make reference to sentences in the preamble of the constitution that suggested peace could only come about with proactive international contributions by all nations. However, unlike the more fulsome considerations of the constitution during the debate on overseas dispatch of the SDF, which often ran for pages in popular opinion journals, Koizumi was highly selective in his short quotes of the constitution’s preamble, and was harshly criticised for it by, for example, Oda Makoto, as well as legal scholars (Japan Times 13 December 2003). More often, as noted above, Koizumi and Abe simply confronted or ignored criticism about their forthright policies, particularly support for the American-led invasion of Iraq. Their lack of engagement with the national narrative forced resistance to their moves which arguably strengthened internationalist notions vis-à-vis Japan’s place in the world.

Indeed, the successful completion of peaceful SDF missions throughout the 1990s, and the fact that progressives consistently argued for contributions to international peacekeeping operations that violated neither the constitution nor the narrative of Japan as a nation committed to international peace meant that progressive notions about the appropriate role of the SDF came to represent mainstream opinion in Japan. In 2006, 62 per cent of Japanese polled by the Asahi saw a constitutional clarification of the SDF as necessary, a majority of whom (64 per cent) preferred leaving Article 9 untouched. Meanwhile, 46 per cent believed the SDF’s duties should include ‘peacekeeping
operations like those in Cambodia’, where Japan had played a leading role in post-conflict disarmament during the 1990s. Only 15 per cent of respondents believed the SDF’s brief should include ‘exercising the use of force in pursuit of the national interest’ (Asahi Shinbun 3 May 2006). A May 2007 poll in the same newspaper revealed that 64 per cent favoured sending the SDF overseas ‘only if it did not use force’, while only 18 per cent preferred rebranding the SDF as a ‘military’ organization (jieigun). If anything, then, an amendment that accords with popular opinion would place clearer limits on the SDF. Moreover, the same poll showed support for constitutional revision dropping 18 percentage points when it was associated with Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s nationalist rhetoric, and support for constitutional reform decreasing more sharply in 2007 than previous years, corresponding to Abe’s time in office (Asahi Shinbun 2 May 2007).

When it comes to dispatch of the SDF, public opinion tends to confirm the progressive position over Koizumi and Abe’s pro-American nationalism.

Indeed, while Koizumi attempted to explain public approval for the work of the SDF in hindsight as a belated endorsement for his decision to dispatch the forces to Iraq, and even his decision to support the war, had been right all along, the record on this point is somewhat more complicated. For example, an Asahi Shinbun poll (28 June 2006) taken the month before the GSDF was withdrawn from Iraq, showed that while 49 per cent of respondents thought that the Iraq deployment had been ‘good’ (yokatta), 55 per cent would oppose any move ‘continue the transport operations of the ASDF and expand the scope of its activities,’ something that had earlier been requested by the Bush Administration (Japan Times 23 February 2006), and which the Japanese government had approved (Japan Times 19 June 2006). Moreover, poll responses by both opponents and supporters of the dispatch revealed that Japanese were torn between their concern for internationalism and their disapproval of the Iraq War. Over 75 per cent of those who thought the dispatch had been ‘good’, did so because they either believed that the troops had made positive contributions to rebuilding Iraq or because the contributions showed Japan’s commitment to ‘international society’ (46 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively). Only 14 per cent of positive responses believed that the deployment had been good because of the positive effect it had on US-Japan relations. Meanwhile, of the 33 per cent that thought the deployments had not been good (yokunakatta), 41 per cent did so
because they disagreed with the Iraq War, and 25 per cent did so because they thought the bilateral relationship with the United States had become too close. Approval for the SDF’s performance in Iraq in hindsight is more complex than, as Koizumi attempted to argue, a straightforward indicator of approval for the war and Japan’s decision to support it. But it does show that the public has become accustomed to roles of the SDF when they are interpreted in an internationalist light.

Indeed, the mainstream acceptance of a peaceful and lawful international role for the SDF has had an interesting effect on how pacifists have come to portray the forces. Prior to the 1990s, pacifists had previously vilified the SDF, often by presenting the organisation as a whole as a faceless instrument of US power (Fujii 1990). However, the strong internationalist narrative, and public acceptance of certain SDF roles, has meant that blanket criticism of the SDF rather than its particular missions is now more difficult. Pacifist works produced during and after the Iraq War by both mainstream and independent publishers therefore attempted to popularise the notion that the SDF was insufficiently equipped to deal with wartime situations. According to these works, the strain of new missions and expectations for the SDF resulted in a high prevalence of suicide, violence, sexual harassment, murder and human rights violations among its members (Miyake 2008, Miyake 2004, T. Sugiyama 2009, Konishi, Watanabe and Takashi 2004), as well as hardship both in the field and at home (Sugiyama 2009, 131-160, Konishi, Watanabe and Takashi 2004, 57-155, Handa 2005). The pacifist authors of these works may well have been successful in transmitting fears about the status of the forces into mainstream opinion. Public opinion polls taken throughout the dispatch showed that opponents of the SDF operations in Iraq were far more concerned about the safety of the forces than about whether the dispatch breached the constitution or was undertaken at the behest of the United States (Ishibashi 2007).

Indeed, it seems that even post-Koizumi LDP governments realised that Koizumi had taken the country a step too far with Iraq and now shared the Japanese public’s reluctance to place the SDF in further danger. Leaked documents from the US Embassy in Wellington, New Zealand show that from late 2007 American officials were attempting to have their friends and allies persuade Japan to let the SDF join reconstruction missions in one of the most peaceful provinces in Afghanistan (Young
2010). Although the files reveal that even some American military officers were sceptical about Japan’s willingness to dispatch the SDF on further overseas missions, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense James Clad ‘urged the [New Zealand Government] to continue to engage with the Japanese’ (*New Zealand Herald* 24 December 2010). By April 2009, however, New Zealand had come to the conclusion that ‘Japan's defense forces hide behind [Government of Japan] constitutional limitations because… Japan’s security forces lack self confidence and worry they may not be able to perform adequately in international security operations’ (*New Zealand Herald* 24 December 2010). Japan’s government had apparently come to understand what its public had thought from the beginning.

**Pro-American nationalist dominance in perspective**

If political leadership is about using political capital to achieve short-term goals while in office, Koizumi Jun’ichirō was without question an extremely skilful prime minister. If it is about achieving long term, resilient policies which can resist political change and act as a platform for others to further promote a given position, then Koizumi’s record is somewhat more mixed. Towards the end of Koizumi’s time as prime minister, even commentators who could see the rationale behind deployments to the Iraq War were scathing of the lack of process that led up to them. According to Handa Shigeru, military affairs correspondent for the *Tōkyō Shinbun*:

> There is the opinion that if it is a just war or if it is in the national interest (*kokueki*) then it is unavoidable. However, when I consider the decision-making process behind the Iraq War deployments and the way they dealt with matters such as how the troops were deployed, I do not feel like giving the current government or ruling party *carte blanche* (Handa 2005, 4).

Indeed, Koizumi’s often blasé dismissals of public opinion and opposing positions created a backlash among those involved in foreign policy debates to the extent that it was extremely hard for his successors to maintain pro-American nationalist dominance. Part of the problem was that Koizumi’s successors may have taken his exhortations not to listen to public opinion when deciding policy as advice that public opinion did not matter at all. In fact, Koizumi was an expert at reading public trends.
While he did not follow public opinion, he knew how to emphasise different issues of public concern to direct attention away from more controversial matters and to reap the corresponding political benefit. His successor Shinzō Abe, however, dispensed with Koizumi’s strategy of manoeuvring swiftly from issue to issue, and outlined the creation of a proud national identity through constitutional revision and education reform at the top of his agenda even before he took office (Abe 2006). Abe’s brief tenure was marred by numerous domestic scandals that he did little to address, instead offering patriotism as a substitute for effective policy. In August 2007, shortly after the LDP had lost the House of Councilors election, senior bureaucrat Sakaya Taichi (2007) bluntly noted that ‘as well as lacking talent, the Abe administration’s sense for the times is poor.’ Sakaya believed that the ‘administration’s most fundamental weakness is its “transformation into Versailles”’ (berusaiyuka), that is, that it had retreated into itself and ‘knew absolutely nothing about the peasants that lived throughout the country’. This palpable disconnect with the public mood, including a miscomprehension or lack of concern with mainstream views on foreign policy, led to the LDP’s defeat in the House of Councilors, which in turn complicated renewal of the Afghan refuelling mission. Abe threatened to resign if the new House of Councilors did not renew the legislation authorising the dispatch of the SDF on its refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean and then, isolated, resigned shortly afterwards anyway.

Abe’s immediate successor as prime minister, Fukuda Yasuo, was a realist who nevertheless understood the need to emphasise internationalist foreign policy themes to placate progressives. Indeed, in November 2007, at Fukuda’s request, he and Ozawa Ichirō met to discuss the formation of a grand coalition between the LDP and the DPJ. However, other progressives in the DPJ rejected this proposal, partly because they had by then tasted political victory and were preparing themselves for the 2009 general election, and partly because a grand coalition would entail acceptance of the LDP’s stance on the Indian Ocean refuelling mission (Suk 2007). After his support was undermined by the controversy surrounding his decision to force the extension of the refuelling mission through the house, Fukuda also stepped down as prime minister barely a year after assuming the post. Tarō Asō, another realist who, like Fukuda, seemed to be more a
caretaker than a leader, took Fukuda’s place before the LDP was swept out of power and replaced by a coalition government led by the DPJ in August 2009.

Far from creating solid foundations for a continuation of pro-American nationalist policies, Koizumi’s ‘strong leadership’ actually undermined a project beginning in the Hashimoto administration to create and sustain policies which signalled a proud, pro-American Japan. Hashimoto and his successor Obuchi had worked with progressives to craft lasting legislation directly concerning the US-Japan alliance, such as the Regional Contingency Law, the SDF Law amendments to allow rear area support, and the ACSA. In contrast, security laws passed with DPJ cooperation under the Koizumi and Abe administrations – those on war contingency planning and the Ministry of Defense – did not so much stem from the guidelines of the 1997 US-Japan guidelines, but concerned Japan’s own defence. Koizumi’s quick passage of the legislation on Iraq shows, however, that when cooperation with the United States was concerned, he was prepared to ignore other positions on the national interest. As evidenced by the difficulty LDP leaders had in renewing the Indian Ocean refuelling mission after 2006, the backlash that Koizumi’s ‘strong leadership’ elicited made it more difficult to pursue the type of relationship with the United States the LDP had favoured since the mid 1990s.
Conclusion

The interplay between domestic arrangements and international forces

The interplay between international circumstances and domestic political arrangements has guided Japanese foreign policy, with independent change in the latter being a more reliable determinant of change in the implementation of policy. Domestic arrangements are the result of competition and compromise between positions on the national interest. The positions, in turn, exist because individuals who have reason to care about foreign policy are divided by static tensions. The tensions are static because they emanate from the construction of Japan as a modern nation state.

International shifts and pivotal global events have mattered, in the sense that they highlighted a particular issue area which then became a locus of debate for competing groups representing different positions. This has usually either resulted in the acceleration of changes that were already underway on a domestic level, or it has prompted groups representing dominant national interest position to reinforce the status quo. Particular individuals and groups did react, often strongly, to international developments, but the existing distribution of ideas, that is, the relative strength of various positions on the national interest, was a more important determinant of the national reaction.

Therefore, domestic reactions to international events have often not conformed to the predictions of theories like neo-realism that rely on changes in the structure of the international system alone to explain change. From 1960 to 1982, for example, nationalists attempted to forge a new, more muscular, state strategy on the back of China’s 1964 nuclear test or US entreaties for Japan to play a larger role in the US-Japan alliance, but at every turn the nationalists were blocked or their policies were subject to new restrictions. Domestic political arrangements trumped a muscular response by Japan that would normally have been predicted by structural realists. Meanwhile, the decision to align closely with the United States after the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington was a foreign policy option that the government already favoured and was set to implement. From 1994, North Korea became a growing security concern for realists and pro-American nationalists in Japan. However, proponents of these positions
had to wait until the domestic conditions allowed them to act, and from 2002 at least, pro-American nationalists arguably exaggerated the level of threat to satisfy their desire to ‘strengthen’ the alliance with the United States. That is, neo-realist – who as noted in Chapter 1 only predicted a more muscular Japan when Japan was ‘rising’ economically – do not have much to add to the conclusions of those who observed the shifting power relationships on a domestic level.

Moreover, as discussed below, arguments which rely on norms at the international level to predict individual state behaviour will fail to explain the resistance of individual states to a given norm if they are blind to domestic arrangements. Even Japan’s deployment of the SDF on peacekeeping operations (PKO) after the 1990 Persian Gulf War, often referred to as a turning point in its post-war foreign policy, did not bring about as striking a change to Japan’s foreign policy trajectory as is usually assumed. Arguments about Japan’s response to the call to join the multinational coalition assembling in the Gulf did accelerate an already existent domestic debate on peacekeeping. However, given that Japan was already sending non-uniformed personnel abroad, it was moving towards greater international involvement anyway. Perhaps more importantly, the PKO that occurred throughout the 1990s did not resemble the multinational coalition under UN authority. That is, the existing domestic debate concerned peacekeeping, not the availability of Japanese troops for internationally-sanctioned combat of the sort that occurred during the Gulf War. If it were solely the Gulf War that, absent existing domestic debate, pushed Japan toward greater international cooperation, the form of that eventual cooperation would have been different. There would have been a greater consideration in Japan as to whether involvement in war-like situations might be necessary in future. As it was, preferences for peacekeeping in non-combat situations became mainstream because debate over the Gulf War was ‘steered’ by liberal internationalists who were already arguing for Japan’s involvement in PKO. Like other international shifts and events, the Gulf War mattered because it highlighted already occurring domestic shifts. International shifts and events do matter, but they do not determine outcomes.
Styles of debate and policy resilience in Japan

There is also a clear relationship between domestic arrangements and policy resilience. Policies established as a result of consensus-based politics legitimised by the establishment of a national narrative are more likely to be resilient. The restrictions introduced between 1960 and 1980 continue strongly to limit certain examples of state behaviour in Japan. This is because they resulted from a broad consensus among realists, mercantilists and pacifists, created by the manoeuvres and reassurance of mostly mercantilist leaders. Mercantilists maintained the stability of the consensus by preventing nationalists and, to a lesser degree, progressives from controversially expanding the role of the SDF too far. In doing so, mercantilists created a narrative of Japan as a peaceful nation, one that solved its problems and contributed to global stability through economic means.

Logical arguments for the adaptation of such a narrative are also likely to lead to resilient security policies. Progressives seized upon the mercantilists’ narrative of peace during the 1990s after mercantilism had been discredited and no other position was dominant in the national discourse on foreign policy. The progressives fastened on the discourse on peace and linked it to their own ideas about international responsibility. By doing so they achieved their goal of raising Japan’s status as a responsible and more active global citizen, symbolised by its peacekeeping efforts throughout the decade and beyond. The notion of SDF participation in international cooperation efforts that do not constitute interstate conflict and which are conducted according to established domestic restrictions and international law is now mostly uncontroversial in mainstream Japanese debates on security.

In contrast, policies established as the result of ‘strong leadership’ which directly challenges the national narrative without engaging it are unlikely to last much longer than the tenure of the leaders that promote them. The Koizumi administration set Japan on a path it had never taken before with its deployments to Iraq without explicit United Nations sanctions, but because of Koizumi’s much-examined ‘top-down’ leadership whereby he either largely ignored dissent or actively stifled it, and the backlash that his policies generated, another trip down that path seems unlikely in the near future.
Forthright assertions about policy are no substitute for reasoned engagement of the public when it comes to the creation of resilient policy. Contrast, for example, either Koizumi’s attempts to use select text of the constitution’s preamble to justify the SDF’s deployment during the Iraq War, or the blatant and unsuccessful attempts of the Yanai commission to change policy on collective self-defence merely by asserting its legitimacy, with the sustained, subtle and reasoned debate of the early 1990s on peacekeeping. It is clear that the latter achieved much more success in shifting the ground on long-standing policy related to the SDF.

*Ron yori shōko*

As described in Chapter 3, the tensions which define positions on the national interest in Japanese foreign policy debates are infused with meanings particular to Japan’s own post-war experience. The position of an individual interested in foreign affairs at a given time can be located handily by their opinions on: the US-Japan bilateral relationship; the constitution – or, more accurately, domestic administrative restrictions on the use of force; and the notion of a truly unique national history generally viewed through the lens of experience during the Second World War.

At the same time, however, these tensions arise from the basic elements of the modern nation state as a sovereign, administrative and social entity. In this regard at least, Japan should be regarded as being as normal as any other nation. Arrangements and conflict between individuals and groups representing different positions on the national interest are a crucial element in understanding Japan’s foreign policy making. But individuals and groups align themselves according to positions pre-determined by the construction of the state. Similar policy debates, accommodation and conflict also influence the foreign policy of all states, albeit with settings adjusted for national ‘flavour’. The hypothesis going forward is that all states are thusly ‘normal in their own way’.

Therefore, the question of whether or not the framework outlined in this thesis can elucidate debates on the national interest and security policy in other nation states should be the subject of further research. Indeed, the framework treats positions on the national
interest as subjective but limited in number. This means that it can be more easily tested against national discourse on foreign and security policy than can assertions of sometimes vague, often essentialist and usually reified national identity claims.

Meanwhile, within the United States especially, where political scientists are increasingly more dogmatic in their adherence to positivist approaches, there have been calls from a group of Asian Studies scholars to view the empiricism of ‘area studies’ as equally scientific, and perhaps more enlightening about actual events (Ellings and Hathaway 2010, Yang 2010). The framework outlined in this thesis allows for research that entails a detailed examination of empirical qualitative data to be structured in a way that can certainly shed light on the experiences of single states, but which is also specific enough in terms of the definition of the six national interest positions to be adapted to a comparative approach in future research. Theory should not be elevated to the level where it supersedes empirical knowledge of the subject matter. The proof of the IR pudding should be in the eating, or, as one Japanese proverb notes: ‘Evidence trumps theory’ (ron yori shōko).

Rethinking systemic approaches

The broader implications of the framework this thesis presents are that scholars should be extremely wary of systemic explanations of international politics. Such explanations present states as like units with usually one ‘hard core’ characteristic which drives state behaviour. Neo-realism, for example, is essentially a recognition of state sovereignty and, in the absence of any other defining features of the state, corollaries of sovereignty such as an anarchical international system. Yet states are not merely defined by absolute territorial sovereignty; nor are they merely defined by administrative legitimacy; nor are they merely defined by the societies that drive them. Because all three of these conditions of statehood are necessary, they are equal in status when it comes to the conceptualisation of the state, and thus they ought to drive state policy in different directions with equal logical force. In attempts to describe state behaviour, there should be no downplaying any two of the conditions so that one can be emphasised to explain behaviour across all states.
This poses a significant question for the study of IR as a whole. If systemic theories should be treated with suspicion because they usually downplay two of the three necessary conditions of statehood in order to emphasise just one, and if international events are proximate causes of deeper domestic policy movements, does this mean that the shape of international politics is always simply the random aggregate of the internally derived behaviour of the world’s states at a given point in time?

Perhaps, but probably not. While this thesis did not delve into the notion of interstate relations as a social phenomenon, there is scope within its framework to suggest that theories of state socialisation, at least, may still be possible.

It might be the case that, for example, at a given time, similar dominant positions are aligned. When such alignment occurs, elites representing dominant positions within states may choose to communicate with similar elites elsewhere in order to create an international narrative about appropriate state behaviour. Like-minded, or rather like-arranged, states can then attempt to internalise this narrative on a domestic level, making policy stances in common with other states more resilient.

This seems to be what happened in the early 1990s when Japan moved towards participation in PKO. Progressives within Japan, already poised to implement internationalist policies including peacekeeping. In addition to domestic arrangements which drove the policy agenda in Japan, however, the early 1990s were characterised by enthusiasm at the international level for peacekeeping. Progressives in Japan and elsewhere rode this enthusiasm, continuing to promote on a domestic level the SDF’s participation in PKO when such operations did not challenge the authority of the UN, and were otherwise in line with international law.

Others have already conducted studies on the relationship between international and domestic ‘norms,’ and have even done so within the context of Japan’s peacekeeping policy (Dobson 2003). However, the conclusions of this thesis, coupled with further, comparative study, may add perspective to these existing explanations. Such accounts generally cannot explain why some states tend to integrate norms within international society with domestic-level norms while others do not. By highlighting the agency of individuals and groups contesting policy within a tightly bound framework, and the presence of dominant positions and particular arrangements between positions, it is easier
to see when the governments of particular states are more likely to participate in international action and when they are not. While the framework presented herein would suggest caution about systemic theories of IR, social theories fit within its prescriptions.

**Hatoyama’s domestic deficit**

Do the conclusions of this thesis hold then, in light of more recent events? At the end of this study, we find ourselves revisiting its beginning.

Shortly after the resignation of Hatoyama Yukio, the prime minister whose vague and ultimately unfulfilled promises to the people of Okinawa that he would transfer the US marine base at Futenma off the island, a number of commentators wrote that the Obama administration had effectively pressured the head of a foreign state to step down (Murphy 2010, Sneider 2010). Indeed, if ever there was a case of US pressure leading to a reversal in stated Japanese policy, this was it. Not only had Hatoyama been embarrassed by a visiting dignitary, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, US leaders, most notably President Barack Obama shortly after ignored the Japanese leader’s entreaties to meet face to face to resolve the issue. The US insisted that if Japan wanted to renegotiate the agreement, it would have to come up with a credible alternative site for the marine base before any high-level meetings would be scheduled. In late 2009, the liberal weekly magazine *Shūkan Asahi* reported that when the Obama administration was not exerting pressure on Japan to honour the agreement to transfer the base, it was stonewalling the nation’s hapless prime minister (Moronaga 2009).

However, the deep cause of Hatoyama’s inability to find a solution to the base issue and thus his resignation barely eight months after his party had won power was not US pressure, intense though it was. Hatoyama had not built up the domestic consensus or constituency for the proposal to remove the base from Okinawa – this was the decisive factor. Like Koizumi, Hatoyama came into office pledging strong leadership. However, after the Futenma debacle unfolded, Japan’s media set upon the prime minister (Yamanaka 2010), while bureaucrats within the defence and foreign affairs ministries, many of whom had invested their time and energy in negotiating the existing base
agreement and simply disagreed with Hatoyama’s position, made life as difficult for the new ruling party as they possibly could (Kyōdō Tsūshin 2011).

Domestic pressure, albeit perhaps skilfully understood and manipulated by Japan watchers in Washington, was therefore the ultimate cause of Hatoyama’s downfall. In early 2011, when reflecting on events, Hatoyama noted that while the US had ‘stood firm’ on its position, ‘[m]ore importantly than the US pressure, the logic (of transferring the base out of the prefecture or out of the country [kokugai kengai]) also did not exist within Japan’s government offices. I could not assert my will strongly enough to face that down’ (Ryūkyū Shinpō 2011). US pressure was a proximate cause, but Hatoyama’s woes had been ordained by deeper resistance from those within the domestic political sphere who saw him as threat to their own national interest positions. His inability to see that he needed to gather domestic support before making promises to the people of Okinawa elicited a strong domestic backlash when the base became a major political issue after the election. While he only had himself to blame for his lack of political acumen, it was his own countrymen who ensured his downfall.
Document collections and chronologies

Citations which refer to ‘Mainichi Chronicle’ in the main text are a reference to:


The following abbreviations are used in the bibliography below.


Diet records and Imperial Diet records are available from *Kokkai kaigiroku kensaku shisutemu*. http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/. Diet citations throughout the main text are abbreviated as follows:

‘Diet records, session 48, House of Representatives, Budget committee No. 16, 2 December 1965, pp. 1-4’; becomes: ‘DR, S48, HR, Budget 16, 2/12/65, 1-4’.

Abbreviations for government ministries and agencies are the same as those found in the list on page v.

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