Social Justice without Dividing: Mapping collective social intent within the capabilities space

Nasir Khan

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Centre for Development Studies

University of Auckland

2011

To my late father

For showing the path of possibilities within the impossibilities

Contents

Acknowledgements

ABSTRACT

Modern development approaches are often seen as reflective of the social realities of the developed, and not sufficiently sensitive to those of developing world. Sen's capabilities approach to development has also attracted one such criticism. The capabilities approach thrives on the informational comprehensiveness of its framework, primarily to capture a disaggregated account of people's wellbeing. Commendable for acquiring a true measure of people's entitlement deficit, such an approach is fundamentally based on notions of distributive social justice which raises concern for its operationalization in collective social setups of the type prevailing predominantly in the developing countries.

Social embeddedness in the latter type of social setups makes individuals inseparable parts of various social collectivities. Both individuals and a considerable, if not the entire, part of their wellbeing remains inseparably entrenched within the collectivities. Distributive social justice approaches, on the other hand, need individuals as separate units of analyses. Herein rests the inconsistency which this study primarily examines.

The thesis shows that Sen's approach suffers a crucial insufficiency in capturing the soul of collective intent which is essentially irreducible. The insufficiency creeps in because of Sen's identity dependent positioning of individuals with respect to their perception of social good in a social space. It is seen as catering only to the individualistic social setups of the developed world. To make good the deficiency, the thesis proposes that along with its process and opportunity aspects, the capabilities space should also contain formative aspect of freedoms, to enable it to capture wellbeing both in individualistic and collectivist social setups. Beyond this identification, the study highlights the manner in which the formative aspect of freedoms could be integrated into the capabilities matrix. Towards this end, the study proposes a methodology based on the conceptual frameworks of structural and social network analyses. An affiliation network is devised to map formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space. This methodological framework is then operationalized in the empirical setting provided by Pakistani social structure to see how the formative aspect of freedoms gives greater context to the collective intent of a social structure within the capabilities space.

Key words: Social Justice, capabilities approach, collective intent, formative aspect of freedoms, social structure

LIST OF TABLES USED

LIST OF FIGURES USED

CHAPTER ONE: A PRESTATEMENT

THE MAIN ARGUMENT AND THE BACKGROUND

The role of social justice in people's welfare matrix could be hardly overemphasized. At the same time, paradigms of social justice evince considerable variance across geographical, temporal and spatial locations. Therefore when a development project targets the enhancement of wellbeing, it should strive for the achievement of its objectives in conformity with the prevailing frameworks of social justice in a society. It must find ways of utilizing existing frameworks of social justice and avoid undermining, overriding or disrupting them in any way; not the least replacing them. That is the only way a development project could avoid the stamp of parochialism and alienability.

In its foremost and its simplest, the thesis tests the capabilities approach to development advanced by Nobel Laureate Amartya Kumar Sen on this premise. Sen accords considerable space to the social context of people's capabilities development. Informational pluralism in his approach captures the social aspects of people's lives and wellbeing attached thereto. Therefore, in his freedoms centred approach, he advocates for providing opportunities to people to enable them to live a life as they wish to live, in their capacities as responsible citizen.

Yet, the informational stretch of Sen's approach concurrently targets the obtainment of a disaggregated account of wellbeing to assess how each and every individual fares in the overall welfare distribution within a social setup. While the strategy is commendable for acquiring a true picture of the social inequalities, nevertheless, it is disaggregative at its core: necessitating the availability of individuals as discrete units of analysis. Its theoretical framework is therefore based on notions derived from distributive justice (Arnesan, 2006; Reed, 2008, p. 14). Most importantly, the strategy presumes individuals as the pursuers of social good; either from the point of their own or someone else's wellbeing, in their capacities as isolated individuals.

This presumption about the availability of individuals is fulfilled in some social setups: most manifestly in developed societies of the west; but there are social setups: more pronounced in the developing societies of the east, where isolated individuals are often rarities than norms. Propelled by socio-political and economic exigencies; the psychological, attitudinal, and behavioural compositions of individuals in the latter type of societies weave them in

impregnable collective bonds, making exclusive focus on solitary individuals a near impossibility (Bell, 2009, pp. 96, 97; Blau, 1975b, p. 229; Crothers, 1996, p. 4; Derné, 1992, 1994; Gore, 1993, 1997; Granovetter, 1992, pp. 58-63; Hogg & Abrams, 2007, pp. 340, 341; W. A. Jackson, 2005; López & Scott, 2000, pp. 45-50; Taylor, 1997, pp. 127-145; K. D. Williams, Harkins, & Karau, 2007, pp. 289, 290).

This demand for segregated individuals as units of analysis is at odds with the collective conscience of a social structure which weaves individuals in various relational structures. These are structures which people inescapably face as part of the social space which they occupy. People might have a choice over their educational and professional careers, and to various degrees in the selection of their religious and spiritual leanings, but there are roles scripted for them which do not afford a choice (Derné, 1992, 1994, 1995, 2009). They are daughters, mothers, sons, and fathers and in these capacities, extensions of distinct lineages; they are Westerners or Easterners; they are possessed with discrete linguistic differentials; they belong to different cultures; they are tribal, villagers or city-dwellers; they have distinct skin colours. None of these roles are acquired through the exercise of unregimented discretional faculties.

The mechanics of these encoded constructs compromise an individual's pristine sovereignty in at least two ways. They define behavioural and attitudinal preferences in accordance with the dictates of their own frames of reference. And the perseverance of such programmed predilections over a period of time generates further patterns and sub-patterns which create a plexus of relational bonds around individuals (Archer, 1995, pp. 89, 90; Blau, 1975a, p. 3). Human development approaches based on distributive justice have to scale both these constructs to a get a true and comprehensive measure of the prevailing inequalities (Severine Deneulin, 2008, pp. 115-120). To the extent that the individual is weaned out of these constructs: as is apparently the case in the western social set ups; distributive social justice provides a truthful picture of the welfare distribution. On the other hand, the more thickly these constructs shroud the individual: which is seemingly an eastern social reality; the more mired the measure of wellbeing and inequality obtained by a distributivist approach.

Thus while informational extension of the capabilities approach seems perfectly workable in individualist societies, its operationalization in the collectivist social setup raises concerns for its incompatibility with the irreducible nature of the collective intent. The apparent chasm between the operational requirements of the distributive justice and dictates of the collectivist

societies is serious enough to convince quite a few scholars (Gore: 1993, Gore: 1997, Jackson: 2005, Deneulin 2008: p 105-124 among others) of the incompatibility of the two, proclaiming the insufficiency of the distributive social justice paradigms like the capabilities approach capture wellbeing in collectivist societies.

This argument receives strength from the manner in which the concept of distributive justice has seen its development in the western societies. As discussion in chapter two would show, trajectories in the evolution of the distributive justice have traversed through the political, social and economic development in the developed societies of the west. These developments have considerably disencumbered individuals from their social embeddedness. No wonder then if the character of the modern distributive justice framework is more closely affined with the western social set up than its eastern counterpart. Whereas this also contains some explanation for the difficulties faced by the western style development project in the developing world, more than that, it underlines the problems in pursuing the goals of distributive justice in collectivist social structures of the east.

This tells the context of the study, though not its whole province. On his side, Sen dismisses the criticism about the incompatibility of his approach with collective intent by pointing towards the social context of capabilities development which he provides in his approach. From the proverbial onset, he has been arguing against economic notions which do not see individuals other than self-centred utility maximizers. His conception of agency therefore gives proper space to an individual's other-regarding, along with her/his self-regarding, perceptions of wellbeing. This, he argues, accounts for the social embeddedness which is the fountainhead of collective intent in a social structure. The question is, how far it does so?

The issue is far from settled. Critics, drawing on the distributive foundations of the capabilities approach, point towards its methodological atomism and its inconsistency with the irreducible nature of collective intent in a social structure. They, however, do not go far enough to show that how Sen's social context of capabilities development, procedurally and conceptually, fails to capture the irreducible nature of the collective intent. Protagonists, Sen included, allude towards the social context of capabilities approach to belie the criticism, without elaborating on the operational mechanics of how an essentially distributivist framework caters to the irreducibility of collective intent.

The theoretical space left uncovered by the two sides is where the actual axis of this study lies. But it will be fallacious to see the territory of the study restricted to unsnarling a

theoretical controversy. Both the study and the issue carry importance beyond their purely theoretical relevance. Adjunct and at stake are some serious and unavoidable contours of the problem related to the approach of a development project towards the existing fabric of social justice in a society. The range and dimensions of these angles are both critically crucial and disparately diverse.

First there is the question about the distinctive features of the distributive justice framework in the developed societies, and the manner in which it acquired such features as part of its socio-political and economic systems in its overall edifice of social justice. Answering the question is essential to know why distributive social justice is more relevant to the social setups obtaining in the developed societies of the west. Second, it needs to be seen that how does Sen uses informational pluralism in his approach to scale the barriers between the individualistic demands of distributive justice and collective intent emerging from people's social embeddedness. Third and most important from the point of view of this study, collective intent of a social structure has to be rationalized along with its irreducibility to justify the need for looking beyond the distributive social justice.

This is the backdrop in which this thesis examines the basic question of whether the functionality of the capabilities approach is restricted only to the individualistic social set ups, as alleged by some recent studies; or whether, despite its essentially distributive framework, the capabilities approach is also workable in collective social structures, as Sen claims. The aim is to see how far the informational extension of the capabilities approach makes it generically applicable to both individualistic and collectivist social setups, and to explore both the reason and the remedy if it is found as falling short of doing so.

THE SCHEME

To do so, this study builds an assumption and a proposal. The assumption relates to the tremendous advantage contained in the capabilities approach for offering a comprehensive framework of people's welfare evaluation, much broader than any of the other approaches towards human development and social uplift. True to the sense of an assumption, this thesis only underlines this advantage of the capabilities approach and therefore does not explore, analyze or contest it anywhere in any sense. It is shown how and where the capabilities approach scores an improvement over the other frameworks. Thus, wherever there is criticism on the approach in this study, it is purely from the angle of its compatibility with the

collective intent and not from the point of view of questioning its usefulness as a development framework.

This last point also indicates the proposal that is worked upon. The proposal hinges on a two-fold premise. First, it is argued that distributive justice evolved as a social justice framework in the socio-political and economic circumstances which unfolded in developed societies of the west. Therefore it bears some distinctive features which it has acquired during this process. In this sense, it is presented as the social strategy of the developed societies, for which appropriate institutional apparatus exists there. Second, collective intent sustained by social embeddedness in eastern social setups is presented as their part of the social strategy which, likewise, sustains on the veritable non-existence of formal institutional setups of the type prevailing in the west. It is further shown that institutional machinery for social justice in developing societies is proxied by various collectivities within its social structure, such as family, kinship, ethnicity and the like. As will be shown through the course of this study, these constructs constitute undeniable social realities, more so in the societies of eastern and developing countries. Therefore the predicated proposal suggests that if a development project cannot deny the existence of these structures, it has to respond to them. In this backdrop, the main hypothesis that this study examines emerges as under;

"How could a development project based on essentially distributive justice framework like the capabilities approach be pursued in a social space where collective intent sustaining a social structure would not allow the reducibility of its constituting units?"

In examining this hypothesis, the thesis shows that despite its emphasis on the social context of the people's living, the freedoms centred capabilities approach suffers a crucial deficiency in capturing welfare rooted in collective social setups. To make it equally relevant to both individualist and collectivist social setups, the study proposes the augmentation of the capabilities matrix with the formative aspect of freedoms. Without the formative aspect of freedoms, the capabilities approach is seen as relevant only to individualistic social setups, where individuals are distinguishable as distinct and discrete units of analyses. Wherever the social embeddedness of individuals does not allow them such a luxury, the capabilities approach falls short of achieving its main target of a comprehensive measure of people's wellbeing. This is the aspect of freedoms which the capabilities aspect ignores despite seeing people's wellbeing in their freedom to live the kind of lives they want to live, and this is the

aspect of their capabilities which loads them with freedom to pursue wellbeing either as an individual or as an inseparable part of a social collectivity.

These inferences are derived by studying the stated hypothesis in three parts. The first part of the study caters to the need for grounding distributive social justice in its historical, theoretical and conceptual perspective and situating the capabilities approach within this development. Of the two chapters in this part, the first traces the evolution of distributive social justice in the west, from its ancient roots to its modern form. Historical paraphrasing in the chapter is carried out to obtain information on two crucial variables: identifying the factors responsible for changing the outlook of the distributive justice; and delineating the distinctive features of the modern distributive justice in the west. This is done to provide muscles to the argument taken up in the latter chapters that as the social realities prevailing in the east and west have resulted from following a an entirely dissimilar course of socio-political and economic circumstances, any social justice approach based on the social justice notions derived from one might not be suitable for the other.

Chapter three, which is second chapter of the first part, explains the conceptual basis of the capabilities approach and shows how and where it provides an improvement over the prevailing paradigms of human development and social uplift. Within the capabilities approach, the chapter specifically focuses on delineating the agency aspect of people's capabilities, which Sen uses as tool to contextualize social space in the capabilities matrix. The chapter endeavours to show that despite its individualistic constitution based on distributive notions, the individualism which the capabilities approach uses has a hue and character of its own. With the help of its three manifestations in relative deprivations, adaptive preferences and counterfactuality it shows the manner in which Sen's individualist strategy targets interpersonal comparisons to capture a true measure of the welfare distribution in a social setup.

The second part of the thesis rationalizes the collective intent of a social structure and its irreducible nature. The only but detailed chapter in this part aims to demarcate a path for the study amidst a number of issues. First, it aims to show that individualistic and collectivist living patterns are two offshoots of the social strategy which people adopt, or have to adopt, to respond to the social space which they occupy. It shows that the former educes from the latter when a society articulates a social strategy on the basis of a more refined division of labour, and engineers the required institutional arrangement for the implementation of such a

strategy. This at the same time means that in societies where such articulations have not taken place, collectivist social strategy is the norm which governs people's lives.

But the mere sequestering of social setups on the basis of adopted social strategy does not serve the purpose of analyzing whether a distributive justice approach is relevant to collectivist social structures. Much deeper elucidation is needed more specifically to answer such questions as: what unit should qualify as a collective within a social space in terms of the irreducibility of collective intent; within such a collective, what role is vouchsafed for an individual; and what explains the survival of the collective social structures as venues of social strategy. These are the second set of issues that the chapter addresses. Here, such structural collectivities as family, kinship, ethnicity, caste, local community and the like are presented as embodiments of people's collective social strategy against the holistic and atomist approaches which accord all potency to either the individual agency or the pre-existing structures.

The third issue taken up by the chapter relates to the instantiation of the collective intent of social structure to provide empirical evidence of both its existence and outreach. This is the empirical evidence of what has thenceforth been argued in conceptual and theoretical terms.

With this contextualization of the collective intent of social structure in people's lives, the study enters into the third and last part where hypotheses are tested and inferences derived. This is the part where the thesis presents its main contribution, the formative aspect of freedoms, as a complement to the universality of the capabilities approach. Of the three chapters in this part, chapter five states the hypotheses stemming from the question about the capacity of the capabilities approach to cater to both individualistic and collective social setups. It diagnoses the root of capabilities approach's deficiency to provide a framework for sufficiently capturing wellbeing in collectivist social structures. The chapter presents the formative aspect of freedoms as a means to make up for this shortfall and exemplify the manner in which it does so.

Chapters six and seven complete the incorporation of the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space with empirical illustration of its integration into the capabilities space. The two chapters typify a realization that the true worth of the formative aspects of freedoms could be realized only when the method of its integration into the capabilities space is demonstrated and its empirical testing is carried out in a real world situation. Therefore chapter six commences with highlighting the procedural imperatives of mapping the

formative aspect of freedoms into the mainstream capabilities space. Based on these notions, a method of mapping the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space is suggested, drawing on the theoretical concepts of structural and social network analysis. An affiliation network consisting of the structural components of the capabilities space and social structure is created; various features and steps involved in the construction of the affiliation network are highlighted; and the underlying concept borrowed from structural analysis explained as a methodological scheme for the desired mapping. Pakistani social structure is chosen for empirical analyses owing to its arguably collectivist social setup, and the relevance of this selection highlighted.

Empirical analyses are performed in chapter seven. This chapter gives details of the type of variables used; the nature and the manner of the data collected; and a description of the analytical scheme, before presenting results and their brief interpretations. The thesis ends with a small chapter summarizing various aspects of the problems taken up by the study and the derived results; and building linkages with and offering suggestions for future studies.

CONTRIBUTION

The contributions made by the study are discernable both from the main argument and the hypothesis examined. The study underscores the need for according due space to the adopted systems of social justice and its institutions of every society in a development initiative. Both the distributive social justice of developed societies and collective social structure of the developing world are seen as part of the social strategy of the respective denizens which a development project must find ways to work with. The study identifies the differential within the social justice systems in the two types of social setups and underlines the need for a development project to provide for a scheme of responding towards both with uniformity and consistency.

Within these broad outlines, the study takes forward the debate surrounding the alleged incompatibility of capabilities approach with collective social structure by identifying the minutia of this inconsistency within the functional schema of Sen's framework. This scores an improvement, both by virtue of its specifications and details, over the arguments put forward by both the critics and protagonists of the capabilities approach.

But the most important contribution of the study remains the identification of the formative aspect of freedoms as a vehicle of giving both universality and context specificity to the

capabilities approach. Without the formative aspect of freedoms, Sen's freedoms-centred approach remains shorn of affording people with freedom to pursue wellbeing either in their individual or collective capacities, in accordance with their preferences. Sen's agential dimensions of capabilities are seen as insufficient to afford this freedom. Thus the formative aspect of freedoms gives the type of dexterity to capabilities approach which makes it relevant to both individualist and collectivist social setups.

Beyond this fundamental contribution, the study also realizes the complications emerging from adding another dimension of intangibility to the already abstruse framework of the capabilities approach. It therefore suggests a manner of mapping the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities approach. The suggested method would not only contribute towards the integration of the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities mainframe, but would also add into the research that is currently conducted on the operationalization of the capabilities approach.

Lastly, the empirical results obtained from the operationalization of the devised method within the Pakistani social structure highlights both the relevance of the formative aspect of freedoms and the need for studying Pakistani development problems in the context of its social structure. Among the cornucopia of research on Pakistan development problems despite its immense human, factor and material endowments; the social structure perspective stands out for its veritable neglect. The explanations offered by the empirical analyses not only underscore the need for affording proper space to the prevailing paradigm of social justice in a social space but also underlines the repercussions of ignoring this aspect in the case of Pakistan. This demarcates a path for future studies on this aspect, which will help in giving a proper direction to the development efforts in that country.

In the end, what the thesis underscores is the need for a realization that in any development project, focus should be on social justice rather than distributive social justice. If the prevailing paradigm of social justice in a social system is compatible with a distributivist agenda, there is no harm in pursuing it. But where the existing structure of social justice system does not allow for pursuing such an agenda, the development project should look for modifying its structural and implementation framework, rather aiming to change the composition of social justice in a society in favour of distributive social justice.

PART ONE

A THEORETICAL PROLOGUE: DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE, CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND METHODOLOGICAL INDIVIDUALISM

CHAPTER TWO: THE PRELUDE: EXPLORING THE ROOTS OF DISTRIBUTIVE SOCIAL JUSTICE

SOME CLAIMS AND CLARIFICATIONS

This chapter serves more than an introductory, historical prologue to the capabilities approach: the latest visage of the distributive justice framework. While historical prefacing obviously helps in painting a proper perspective, this chapter purports to achieve more: it aims to substantiate an instigating and preordained proposal of this study. The proposal suggests that in their current form, distributive social justice approaches, like the capabilities approach, are more closely affined with the western[1] social setups. It is an instigating premise because it triggers the debate that if distributive social justice has emerged in the socio-economic and political events that shaped the history of the west then it might not necessarily concur with the realities of the east, where socio-political and economic developments have followed a different course. It is preordained because without such a premise, the endeavour to test the compatibility of an essentially distributive justice framework like the capabilities approach with collective eastern social setups becomes meaningless. Explicit in the adduced proposal is a demand for sorting out social setups in east and west on the basis of prevailing systems of social justice and welfare distribution. Historical annotation offers a good ploy for such a collation. This is what explains the historical anthologizing of this chapter.

The adopted method for accomplishing the stated objective of this chapter, therefore, traces the historical grounding of distributive justice framework in the west to gain a two-way vantage ground for the study. First, history of distributive justice in the west unravels factors which shaped the prevailing outlook in its socio-political constitution. As this historical narrative would illustrate, the evolution of distributive social justice perceptions to its current form is inseparably linked with socio-political and economic developments in the west. In this there is a good ploy to gain an insight into the nature of socio-political and economic circumstances where distributive social justice is workable.

Second, historical backdropping unravels the distinctive features which distributive social justice gained in acquiring its modern outlook. This is of greater importance from the point of view of this study as it furnishes a set of variables for testing the extent to which other social setups are compatible with distributive form of social justice. Incidentally, the thesis will use

---

[1] By western, reference is made here to the developed world, in particular countries with a developed market based economies and liberal democratic political setups.

these distinctive features latter in the study for testing the compatibility of the capabilities approach with the collective social structures.

This is what entailed an examination of the germination, evolution and fructification of the distributive social justice in the west. This also suggests that this sojourn will inevitably wade through the philosophical postulates of the major theorists. But as a point of clarification it is pointed out that expectations of a profound theoretical explanation of these philosophies will remain unfulfilled: this, in order to retain focus on the two-fold objectives of this chapter. Therefore, the extent to which history, development and philosophy of the distributive justice is traced; it is strictly limited to highlighting how the distributive justice approach acquired its exclusivity to the western social setups and laying bare the factors which facilitated this adaptation process. To that end, the chapter purports to address a threefold question: what were the factors which accommodated distributive justice in the west; how this accommodation took place in terms of the adjustments which the western social setups underwent; and what distinctive features did the prevailing distributive justice system in the west acquire during the process?

2.1: The 'Social-Personal' Dichotomy: social justice in ancient and medieval times

If humans are inseparable from the social environment in which they live, social justice is the contrivance which enables them to live in that environment with minimum possible commotion. In this sense, social justice could justifiably compete for contemporariness with the human desire to live an organized life. It is therefore hardly surprising if Morvaridi finds the idea of justice in the philosophies of many ancient civilizations, *'from the Greeks and the Romans through to the Persians and Chinese'* (Morvaridi, 2008, p. 33). Or if from Hammurabi's code down to the Christian and Islamic traditions, Micheline Ishay recounts the provisions for regulating social and economic relations within a society (Ishay, 2004, pp. 35-40). As Ishay underscores, adequate provisions existed in the ancient Babylonian, Hebrew, Greek, Hindu, Buddhist, and Confucian societies for establishing social, economic and political justice. For instance, Plato considered justice a fundamental virtue consisting in the right ordering of the soul to keep passions under the control of reason (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 10).

But understanding of distributive social justice in ancient times was different from its modern variants (Fleischacker, 2004; Freeman, 2007; Morvaridi, 2008; Roemer, 1996). For instance,

Samuel Fleischacker believes that the concept of distributive justice mainly fructified within the twentieth century when it transcended the Aristotelian meritocratic logic of *'giving what a person deserves'* to a wholesale need fulfilment. Morvaridi on the other hand believes that the liberal social contract theory of Lock, Rousseau, Mills and Kant, by encapsulating the dynamism of Enlightenment into a shift from the shackles of traditions to rationality and free enquiry, laid the foundation of rights as equality (Morvaridi, 2008, pp. 33, 34). Thus whereas Fleischacker's contention mainly stems from his belief that distributive justice was given its modern form by Rawlsian formulations, there is evidence to believe that the actual process of a change in the perceptions about distributive social justice predates the twentieth century, and has much to do with the developments of the three centuries preceding it.

Ancient notions of social justice revolved around the idea of relationship between the various classes of society, whereas righteousness and uprightness were considered private virtues (Adelson, 1995, pp. 26,27). For the Greeks, social justice was not a legal concept and, along with courage, self-control and wisdom, remained one of the four cardinal virtues which encompassed moral goodness. And since such goodness could characterize either the individual or society, it was both a social as well as an individual virtue (Adelson, 1995, p. 29). Thus a clear division between law and social justice, particularly with regards to poor relief, marked the Greek polity. Poverty relief and need fulfilment for the lower classes remained outside the state-enforceable justice system and operated within the personal sphere of individuals: reliant on their virtuosity, kind heartedness and concern for the underprivileged.

The term 'distributive justice' is itself Aristotelian although he has used it with entirely different connotations. He used it to distinguish it from corrective justice by which he understood a legal dispensation for the punishment of crimes; whereas distributive justice to him meant a merit-based apportioning system of rewards and political offices (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 19). It is however in Plato's legal proposals for governing the *'new colonies'* that the earliest ideals of distributive justice are traceable. Plato avowedly formulated these proposals for the purpose that *'our people should be supremely happy'* (Isbister, 2001, p. 57). In his proposals, Plato advocated that in the new setups each person should be provided an equal lot of minimum size and equal opportunity. Mindful of the fact that given the variance in their personal characteristics, different people will utilize their opportunities differently resulting in a movement above or below the initial equality line, he recommended condoning such movement but not beyond four times of the initial lot. Plato considered drawing such a line

essential because, as he argued, the ensuing social disparities from larger inequalities could lead to jealousy, crime, strife and conflict. He therefore suggested that anything above four times of the initial lot should be forfeited in favour of the state (Isbister, 2001, pp. 57, 58).

Manifest in Plato's proposals are the earliest notions of redistribution of wealth although it is contentious whether his main concern with these proposal was the maintenance of political order and peace or the establishment of an egalitarian welfare arrangement at the grassroots. Nevertheless, in targeting the supreme happiness of the people, his proposals contained a fundamental contra-distinction to the formulations which were to come later from Aristotle. Aristotle considered Platonic precedence for the good of society over the good of individuals unjustifiable (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 8). John M. Alexander, who is also convinced of the fact that Aristotle was critical of the Platonic concept of justice (Alexander, 2008, pp. 134-140), argues that the difference between the two rests in Platonic encapsulation of justice in relationship with oneself against the Aristotelian argument for justice among the separate individuals of society. Aristotle envisioned individuals as active participants in the affairs of community whose role was confined by Plato to a relationship within their own self i.e. within the different parts of their souls. Plato, therefore, envisaged justice as the internal hierarchical ordering of the society, much in line with his hierarchal conception among the different parts of the soul, where everybody (farmers, soldiers, merchants, philosophers) performed their own functions (Alexander, 2008, p. 134; Lowry, 1995, pp. 9, 10).

Although Plato does not suggest that all human beings deserve an equal share of material goods, what he does suggest and what Aristotle denies, is the fact that *'communal ownership of goods might help temper people's material desires, prevent political corruption, and create bond of friendship'* (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 20). It is for this reason that Fleischacker considers Plato a *'more reasonable ancestor'* to the modern calls for social and economic justice. In Republic, mentions Fleischacker, Plato argues for communal property for the ruling class on the grounds that private property brings dissentions and focuses more on one's selfish desires, against concerns for the community. Plato also considers the eradication of inequalities across classes as a precondition for the existence of a good society (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 42).

In Plato's insistence on the hierarchal social ordering in line with the internal hierarchy of soul and Aristotle's preference for appreciation of the separate worth of each individual lie some of the earliest manifestations of the individualism-collectivism dissidence. However the

social, political and economic landscape of the times prevented the debate from taking the shape of a full blown controversy. Social hierarchies based on segregation of classes prevailed with poor (slaves) relegated to the abyss and considered outside the sphere of justice. The social and political topography based on this division provided a more fertile soil for the fructification of Aristotelian perceptions of justice, which also explains why his influence remained dominant over social justice perception in the ancient and medieval times.

It is for this sway that it held over ancient and medieval socio-political systems that Aristotelian justice perceptions warrant description in some detail. In its broader sense, Aristotelian system of social justice pertains to political constitutions and judicial decisions (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 19) and accordingly contains a fundamental proposal for equating justice with lawfulness (Alexander, 2008, p. 135). His narrow conceptualization of justice, on the other hand, is geared towards the identification of *'appropriate norms, criteria and guidelines'* that would govern a just and fair distribution of goods among the citizens (Alexander, 2008, p. 137). In this sense justice is classified into three branches: corrective justice, distributive justice and commercial reciprocity. As mentioned above, corrective justice spans the administration of punishment for various wrongs committed against the state or society whereas distributive justice pertains to the allocation of various offices and rewards on the basis of the merit evinced by individuals. Commercial reciprocity relates to ensuring fairness in trade and commercial transactions.

To decide matters within the ambit of corrective justice, Aristotle proposes the principle of arithmetic equality, whereas for the matters related to distributive justice, he suggests proportional[2] equality (Alexander, 2008, pp. 137,138). With the corrective justice, Aristotle's main concern remains the rectification of the wrong done in any transaction, and so he considers it essential to treat the two parties equal in order to examine whether or not the accused is guilty of the wrong he is accused of. To him,

> ...it makes no difference whether a good man has defrauded a bad man or vice versa....all that the law considers is the difference caused by the injury; and it treats the parties as equals, only asking whether one has committed and the other suffered an injustice, or whether one has inflicted and the other suffered a hurt (Aristotle as quoted by Alexander, 2008, p. 138).

---

[2] The famous Aristotelian maxim that equals should be treated equally, and unequals unequally, in *proportion* to the relevant similarities and differences (Moulin, 2003, p. 21).

For distributive justice, Aristotle proposes proportionate or geometric equality as here, the question relates to how the potential recipients of various goods compare with each other (Alexander, 2008; Rescher, 2002). Therefore for Aristotle, merit (*kat'axian*) is the appropriate criterion for distribution of goods, specially such goods as public offices and positions of power and honour. Moved by such meritocratic considerations, Aristotle did not consider slaves, women and menial labourers like craftsmen and farmers eligible for citizenship (Alexander, 2008, p. 126). For him considerations such as those for need fulfilment of the poor must not come in the way of the dispensation of distributive justice (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 5)

This tradition of treating social justice mainly as personal and individual virtue outside the legally enforceable justice endured with the Romans. For instance, Roman Philosopher Cicero, echoing Aristotelian views, not only differentiated beneficence[3] from justice but also argued for the subordination of former to the latter. Fiercely opposed to redistribution of property including agrarian laws, his case for constraining beneficence by justice was rooted in his concern for ruling out all forms of property rights violation. Similarly, Thomas Aquinas also supported the Aristotelian distinction between corrective and distributive justice. Hugo Grotius, who transformed the natural law traditions in the beginning of the seventeen century, introduced his own distinction between the *'expletive'* and *'attributive'* justice: with the former covering legal rights and therefore enforceable by law while the latter, placed beyond the legal precincts and encompassing all human virtues like generosity, compassion and foresight in matters of government (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 21, 22).

All this has convinced Morvaridi to pontificate that the chain of command during the Roman period ascribed rights through birth and citizenship, interpretations of which have lived down to present times in cultural and religious forms, like the Indian caste system (Morvaridi, 2008, p. 33). A distinctive feature of this hierarchical social classification was the element of permanence attached to the various strata within the social classification. This persistence was fed and sustained by the religious hollow in which the social division was held and which prevented any movement across a person's acquired social positioning. Accordingly, while the short term measures of poor relief remained confined to the personal domains of mercy, charity and benevolence; the long term enterprise of poverty eradication was considered no less than a sacrilege, an interference in the works of eternity and therefore

---

[3] By beneficence Cicero understood material need fulfilment of the needy.

worthy of sternest scorn. Those living in abject poverty were considered predestined for such a life. As summarised by Fleischacker, *'the premodern church saw assistance to the poor as an obligation of charity or mercy and not as act of justice, not as something to which the needy had the right'* (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 49).

Position in the medieval times hardly underwent any cogent change. As Adelson has noted, *'men of middle ages, with a fully developed hierarchical concept of society, were completely incapable of arriving at a concept of social justice'* and therefore, *'in a word, social justice was as foreign to the middle ages as it was to the classical world'* (Adelson, 1995, p. 31). As late as the seventeenth century, Pufendorf was distinguishing between perfect and imperfect rights on the basis of their legal enforceability. His imperfect rights were a form of particular justice, associated with attributive justice and enforced by humans; whereas imperfect rights embodied universal justice with a quasi-legal structure and enforced by the will of God[4] (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 23, 24).

The narrative henceforth is indicative of the fact that before social justice acquired its modern form in the west, a perceptible distinction between the personal virtues and social and political justice marked its legal and socio-political landscape. The spectrum of Justice, and in particular distributive justice, was singularly restricted to property rights and the assignment of various political offices. This system of social justice dichotomized the social and political fabric in two ways. There was a cross-sectional bifurcation with legally enforceable rights vested in one section of the society and the other divested of it completely. And perpetuating this was a systemic divide which extended legal cover to some kind of rights and placed the other beyond it. While the first created inequalities, the second reinforced them. Inequalities were not just tolerated; they were sanctified with a consecrated hollow decreed by divinity and as such placed beyond the intrusion of ordinary mortals. The established social justice framework sustained a socio-political system which conferred rights more in exclusivity than inclusivity: particularizing legal authenticity for certain rights arising in specific segments of society, leaving the rest at the mercy of personal virtues and individual fortitude.

---

[4] Imperfect rights were further elaborated by Hutcheson who described them as claims which are made on the charitable aids of others. This distinction between the perfect and imperfect rights was advanced still further by Smith who connected perfect rights to commutative justice and imperfect rights to distributive justice. For details please see (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 26, 27).

2.2: WINDS OF CHANGE: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE

Barry (2005: p 27) points out that the prevailing belief systems in almost all societies are the creation of those in the position of power. He therefore believes that Enlightenment and the Marxist socialism provided two systematic critiques to the status quo surrounding the social and distributive justice. As Ishay points out, insinuations of such a challenge to the prevailing dogmas of justice are evident in John Locke's Letter concerning Toleration where he stressed the individual rather than the state's right for selection of religion. He pleaded that *'Political society'* is instituted for no other end but to secure every man's possession of life and therefore the care of each man's soul must be left with him because '*the things of heaven'* neither *'does belong to the commonwealth nor can be subjected to it'* (Ishay, 2004, p. 78). The rise of the Protestant influence, *'by asserting individual responsibility in matters of salvation and seeking happiness on earth'*, also promoted reliance on individual choice and rights (Ishay, 2004, p. 70). Scientific discoveries and the emergence of industrialization provided further fillip to the winds of change already in the air. And to all this, the emergence of mercantilism and capitalism provided the rallying space for breaking existing forms of social stratification woven across a feudalistic social structure, by opening up new ventures for private ownership and providing opportunities for expanding them.

But the very nature of these invasive changes called for the codification of a new social contract before the new ownership and entrepreneurial arrangements unleash its own forms of exploitative cartelization. It is probably because of such a threat that Freeman believes that the idea of distributive justice to assess the distribution of wealth and property has evolved out of the socialist critique of the capitalism (Freeman, 2007, p. 263). Marx, the most radical critic of the inequalities between the rich and poor, considered the separation of economic distribution from production a mistake. He argued for the distribution of land, tools and other capital goods before the distribution of food, clothing and shelter, on the grounds that the balance of power in a society is determined far more by the distribution of these factors of production than by the distribution of consumer goods (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 96, 97)

With Marx, however, a watershed is reached in the evolution of distributive justice for his preference of communal rather than individual ownership. Marx was opposed to the supposition that humans are first and foremost individuals rather than members of a social group and therefore never approved of the ideas which considered individual rights as the foundation of justice. For these reasons he saw the eighteenth century French and American

declaration of rights as founded on the notion of considering individual as the ultimate ideal, and this to him was destined to end up in the separation of man from man (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 98, 99).

These Marxian postulates are significant in their own right within the evolution of social justice perceptions in the west, but the prevailing facade of social justice in the west has very little emblem of what Marx proposed. In that sense, further discussion of Marxian formulations will be tangential to the endeavour of eking out the distinctive features of western social justice system. Thus, reverting back to the factors which played crucial role in redefining the distributive justice in the west, Ishay counts *'the Reformation, the inception of science, the rise of mercantilism, consolidation of the nation-state, maritime expeditions, and the emergence of a revolutionary middle class'*, among such factors. To this, she latter adds, colonization, the rise of money markets, specialization of labour and urbanization, and attributes all this to the rise of an autonomous middle class- the bourgeoisie (Ishay, 2004, pp. 71, 72). This resulted in a *'new universal discourse of rights'* which was *'committed to reason and individual free choice, to scientific planning and the rules of law, to contractual agreement and economic interdependence'* (Ishay, 2004, p. 69).

These developments shook the old forms of social justice rooted in social stratification and orbiting around the position of right-exclusivity and merit, and instigated a new social justice equilibrium mainly pivoted on distributive equality. Brian Barry notices the earliest manifestations of this change in the concept of *'just price'*, which to him is the '*closest*' to the contemporary concept of social justice for two reasons: it guards against the coercive bargains and ensures voluntary exchange by both parties (Barry, 2005, p. 4). Barry, however, concedes that it operated only at the margins of the social system and draws the fair conclusion that the modern concept of social justice was born out of the *'throes of early industrialization in France and Britain in the 1840s'*, when the social justice of the institutions was revolutionized from the margins to the core[5].

---

[5] Fleischacker however traces the origins of a change in the approach towards justice and poor relief to a little earlier time. He sees the state as at least nominally wrestling control over poor relief from the church as early as the middle of the sixteenth century. But he also concedes that such efforts of the state in countries like Sweden, the Netherlands and England were more directed towards bringing the church within the sway of the state than a genuine effort for transforming the approach towards poor relief or re-conceptualization of the prevailing paradigms of justice (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 50, 51).

In true sense, therefore the developments in the eighteenth century could be seen as the harbinger of a transformation both in approach towards the poor and concomitantly, distributive justice. Recounting these developments, Fleischacker proclaims that it was this '*change in attitude, accompanied by a series of scientific and political developments*' that revealed the possibility of the eradication of poverty, '*out of which the modern notion of distributive justice was born*' (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 54).

Fleischacker's is the most authentic work[6] on the evolution of distributive justice in the west and the socio-political and economic developments which transformed its shape. Therefore, it is used here as the main source for ascertaining the events which reshaped distributive social justice in the west. Fleischacker points towards the fact that by the end of the eighteenth century, one could see Immanuel Kant promoting everyone's right to achieve social position by talent, industry and luck. Kant, the staunch protagonist of the property rights, is at the same time considered the first '*major thinker*' who argued explicitly for state's responsibility to take care of the poor (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 68). Though he never said that the state was required by justice to provide for the poor (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 75), Kant considered state-provisions for the poor more morally advantageous than the private charities because of the possibility of moral corruption attached with the latter (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 71). Kant explained his notions of public justice in terms of '*protective justice*', '*commutative justice*' and '*distributive justice*'. To him, protective justice provided the forms of law, commutative justice its content and distributive justice gave the mechanism by which the law was actually applied (Kant, 1991, p. 121 cited by Fleischacker, 2004, p. 69). Kant proclaimed, more clearly and explicitly than his predecessors, the equal worth of all human beings which stood at the core of his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant, 1959, pp. 428-435 cited by Fleischacker, 2004, p. 73).

But it will be naive to believe that all this change was taking place without opposition. At the same time as the idea of distributive justice witnessed its growth in the west, opposition to the notions of equal rights for all also brewed. Joseph Townsend, drawing inspiration from Mandeville's ideas about the good in hunger and the '*utility of poverty*' to keep the poor people motivated; argued for the abolition of the poor laws. His views were shared by others

---

[6] As Vaughan (2008, p. 3)has noted, '*Samuel Fleischacker's A Short History of Distributive Justice makes a significant contribution to renewed philosophical analysis about Western philosophy's treatment of distributive justice*'.

like Patrick Colquhoun, Thomas Malthus and Edmund Burk (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 83-85)[7]. Herbert Spencer considered the father of sociology and the originator of the term *'survival of fittest'*, vehemently argued against the state programmes for poor relief. He was staunch promoter of the property rights and argued against distributive justice (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 84-93).

Comte de Saint-Simon and his follower, Auguste Comte laid the foundations of scientific ethics with *'positivism'*, which called into question all sorts of moral talks, including that of justice. They put emphasis on the adoration of science and scientific enquiry and the subjugation of every other mode of thinking to these two (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 94-95). Fleischacker even questions the contribution of Rousseau towards the promotion of distributive justice and a radically democratic government to control both the economy and the society. He argues that Rousseau's actual contribution to distributive justice rests in arousing an attitude of suspicion towards commercial society by drawing attention towards its costs, for the poor in particular; and pointing out that a solution of these problems rests in politics and not in religion which might tend to persuade the sufferer to bear the hardships (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 56). He points out that Rousseau was never averse to private property holding, did not propose the abolition of property or wealth inequalities and in his *Discourse on Political Economy*, considered the right of property as the *'most sacred of the rights of citizenship, and even more important in some respects than liberty itself'* (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 58, 59). Fleischacker therefore holds that though Rousseau was worried about the inequality in the society, his concern bore much resemblance to those of Plato and Aristotle: worrying more about the impact of the poverty and inequality on politics than the hardships they carried for an individual's private life (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 59).

This shows that although there was a greater unanimity among the Enlightenment theorist with regards to the state responsibility for providing and protecting social justice, a discernable difference of opinion obtained over the position of poverty eradication and poor relief within this responsibility. Considerable disagreement existed on approaching poverty either as a personal predicament afflicting the individual or as a social malady maligning the entire political and governmental dispensation. Fleischacker points out that it was Smith who for the first time pointed towards the impact of poverty on an individual's private life, rather than its impact on the lives of people as citizens (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 62). In doing so,

---

[7] This despite the fact that Townsend, Colquhoun, Malthus and Burk were all the product of Enlightenment (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 84).

Smith's made two important contributions. First, his *Wealth of Nations* contained the redistributionist recommendations which provided a mechanism for distribution. He prescribed three ways for the redistribution of wealth: direct transfer of property from rich to poor, taxing the rich higher than the poor, and targeting the tax revenues for the uplift of the poor. Second and more important, he changed the picture of and approach towards poor. As Fleischacker mentions, *'Smith's picture of the poor helped to bring about the modern notions of distributive justice'* (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 67). Before Smith, concern about the poverty revolved around controlling the vice and criminality of the lower classes. The poor were considered inferior creatures, destined to occupy the bottom of the social hierarchy ordained by religion. Those in the higher realms of the society were believed to have a duty for helping the poor but only to the extent of providing relief and not lifting the poor from their inferior positions. Smith presented a dignified picture of the poor, as people with the same latent talents as everyone else, someone who could make their decisions with the same responsibility as their social superiors; painting them with the similar intelligence, virtues, ambitions and interests as anyone else (Fleischacker, 2004, pp. 62-66).

Trudging through all these vicissitudes, the form that the modern form of distributive justice has acquired is described by Iris Marrion Young in the following words;

> The distributive paradigm defines social justice as the morally proper distribution of social benefits and burdens among society's members. Paramount among these are wealth, income and other material resources. The distributive definition of justice often includes, however, noon-material social goods such as rights, opportunity, power and self-respect (Young, 1990, p. 16 cited by Reed, 2008, p. 14)

2.3: ASPECT OF MODERN DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF RAWLS

From this historical scaffolding, utilitarianism, welfarism and liberalism have been deliberately left out. This has been done because their underlining ideas are more relevant to the discussion on the capabilities approach. They are therefore discussed while elaborating the framework of capabilities approach in the next chapter. With this background to the evolution of distributive justice in west, we are now in a position to draw inference about its two crucial aspects targeted by this chapter. For the first aspect, the factors responsible for demolishing the aura of class-exclusivity and right-specificity around the distributive justice

in the west, these could be grouped into three broad categories: Reformation and the postulates of the Enlightenment thinkers, the rise of industrialization and capitalism, and the waves of civil revolutions which transformed the old political, legal, economic and eventually the social setups. Enlightenment scholars, in breaking with the Aristotelian traditions of selective justice and partiality in claims to social and political goods, effectively removed the societal stratification in people's access to justice. Capitalism, industrialization and related scientific discoveries in facilitating the acquisition and holding of private property, knocked down the system which allowed property ownership only through genealogical inheritance. And the by-product of these developments, revolutionary civil movements helped in making this new distributive justice a permanent bastion not only of the legal lexicons, but also of the socio-political and economic systems at large.

The prevalent distributive justice framework in the west hinges on its historical roots derived from these three fundamental factors. The most important aspect of this transformation is the fact that it took poverty alleviation from its perennial dependence on personal virtues and mercies of a particular class(es) of people and made it a mandatory responsibility of the state. That is how distributive justice in its the modern form revolves around an intersection between the state and individual and *'calls on the states to guarantee that property is distributed throughout society so that everyone is supplied with a certain level of material means'* (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 4).

The second emergent aspect from our historical narrative, pertaining to the distinctive features of the modern distributive justice, is of greater significance to this study. It provides us with a comparability tool for weighing up eastern and western social setups in terms of their compatibility with distributive justice. While Freeman more generally identifies modern distributive justice with the moral standards for assessing the distribution of rights to income and wealth within an economic system (Freeman, 2007, p. 263) Moulin enumerates four principles of compensation, reward, exogenous rights and fitness on which such distribution must take place[8] (Moulin, 2003, p. 21). While these explains the general outlook of the modern distributive justice, a more precise description of its essential features is contained in

---

[8] Moulin derives these principles from the 'canonical story' of four children's claim to a flute. Of the four children, the first laid a claim on the basis of having fewer toys than the other three (compensation), the second on the basis of her/his hard work in cleaning the flute (reward), the third on the basis that her/his father owned the flute (Moulin) and the fourth on the basis that she/he knew how to play the flute (fitness). Moulin also suggests that the story goes back to Plato.

the following five points, which Fleischacker (2004, p. 7) considers as the minimum premise of the modern distributive justice within the general meaning of justice;

1. Not just societies or human species as whole, but each and every individual have certain rights and protections

2. As a part of these rights and protections, each individual is due a share of material goods

3. Justification to such a system of rights and protections could be provided rationally and 'in purely secular terms'

4. Distribution of these rights and protections is practicable and not superficial

5. The state itself is the guarantor of the distribution and not the private individuals or organizations

Notably the first two of these five points reflect a concern for the empowerment of individual against the structural and situational constraints. This can therefore be designated as the *'individualistic'* feature of the distributive justice. Kolm (1996, p. 26) also emphasize this individualistic character of the modern distributive justice by pointing out that distributive justice is essentially the *'central problem'* of *'individualistic social ethics'* where *'the relevant choices are among states such that certain persons prefer one and other persons prefer the other'*. The third point encompasses a proposal for a right based system springing from rational freedom of choice, unhindered by emotional commitments. This can be identified as the feature of *'free choice'*. The last two points are steeped in pure social contractarian traditions, designating the state as both the purveyor and the guarantor. These two points can accordingly be defined as the *'state guarantees'* feature of the modern distributive justice framework. Based on this classification, the three essential features of the prevailing distributive justice social justice framework in the west could be delineated as individualism, free choice and state guarantees.

This is the story of how the framework of distributive social justice acquired its modern face in the west. But before this chapter is concluded, a passing reference to the system of distributive justice promoted by John Rawls is presented for its two-fold relevance to the subject. First, Rawls was the first to present a coherent, systematic framework of distributive

justice. Before him, though utilitarianism, welfare economics and various social choice theories did promote the goals of distributive justice, as a framework it remained only a contingent element within the overall philosophies underlying these approaches. This also explains the scathing criticism about their insufficiencies that these welfare frameworks have attracted from the proponent of distributive justice like Rawls, Sen and others. It is for his landmark contribution to forwarding a theory of justice that Nozick believes that political philosophers now must either work with Rawls or explain why not[9] (Nozick, 1975, p. 183 cited by Fleischacker, 2004, p. 116).

Second, notwithstanding their subsequent parting of ways mainly on the type of information to be included in their respective versions of distributive justice and the manner of how to include it, Rawls work serves- in many respects- as an antecedent to Amartya Sen's capabilities approach. Sen has himself conceded this at more than one point[10]. At least in their fundamentals, their unison in disparaging the aggregative approach of utilitarianism, there is hardly anything to choose between the two approaches. Rawls social justice framework, therefore, provides the link between the earliest forms of modern distributive justice systems such as utilitarianism and welfarism and the capabilities approach.

Rawls system of social justice is basically a search for the best combination of political, social and economic institutions which, while ensuring the basic liberties of each person, also honours the claims of democratic equality at the same time (Lehning, 2009, pp. 16, 17). Equal moral worth of the individuals in a social system is fundamental to this idea which is non-negotiable even for the sake of the greatest good of the society as whole, if such an arrangement undermines individual wellbeing in any conceivable way. This is the fundamental premise of Rawl's rejection of the utilitarian maximization principle.

Rawls theory of social justice is a variant of social contractarian traditions (Bojer, 2003, p. 37). In his *a theory of Justice* he obligates each society with a duty to set up its economic and legal institutions so as to make the least advantaged of its members better off than they would have been under a social arrangements based on any other distribution principle (Freeman, 2007, p. 259). For Rawls, the basic institutions that constitute the structure of the society

---

[9] Fleischacker also points to the significance of the works of Rawls by pointing out that, *'only when John Rawls began developing his theory of justice in the 1950s and '60s did philosophers and political theorists began to take seriously the individual right to well-being that Babeuf has proclaimed in 1796'*(Fleischacker, 2004, p. 83).

[10] For more on this aspect of the two distributive justice frameworks developed by Rawls and Sen, please see (Sen, 2009, pp. 52-74) and (Sen, 2010, pp. 240-249).

make social cooperation possible (Freeman 2007: p 267). His perspective on society is a reflection of Kantian notions of people's desire to treat each other not only as means but also as end in themselves (Lehning, 2009, p. 19).

Lehning (2009, pp. 19, 20) believes that as the subject of social justice, Rawls focuses almost entirely on society, which he sees as a cooperative venture for the mutual advantage between reasonable and rational individuals. This social cooperation defines the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens and Rawls principles of justice are geared towards defining such an appropriate distribution. Rawls prescribes the following two essential conditions for any such distribution to meet the ends of justice;

a. Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all.

b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

(Rawls, 1993, p. 291 as cited by Sen, 2009, pp. 59)

The first of these two is Rawl's *liberal* principle and the second his *difference* principle. With his liberal principle, Rawls differentiates human rights from *'liberal basic liberties'*. Liberal basic liberties are needed by a society to be *'reasonably just'*, but human rights are *'special class of urgent rights'* which are essential for any system of social cooperation (Rawls, 1993, pp. 68, 79 as cited by Freeman, 2007, pp. 298, 299). Thus, whereas liberal basic liberties serve as the necessary condition for a just social setup, it is only human rights which provide a sufficient criterion for evaluating individual wellbeing.

Rawl's difference principle, on the other hand, measures a social arrangement by the primacy it accords to the needs of its least advantaged members of society, which is measured in terms of the possession of what he calls the *'primary goods'*. Primary goods are possession which every rational person desires such as income, wealth, basic liberties, freedom of movement and choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions and responsibility and social basis of self respect (Osmani, 2009, p. 22).

To sum up, Freeman believes that the sense in which Rawls uses the term distributive justice is the arrangement which designates *'moral standards for assessing ongoing methods of distribution of rights to income and wealth that are implicit in any economic system'* (Freeman, 2007, p. 263). By this conceptualization, the mere provisioning for the basic needs of the people is not, by itself, a principle of distributive justice because it establishes no claims within the ongoing system of economic production and exchange. Rather than this, the principle of *'restrictive utility'* is more aligned with the principle of distributive justice because by this a society first provides for the fulfilment of the basic needs of every individual and once that end is achieved, the economy is so designed as to distribute income and wealth in a manner which maximizes utility (Freeman, 2007, p. 264). This for the present provides the broad outlines of Rawlsian perceptions of distributive justice to which we will return in the next chapter for further discussion in its relation to the capabilities approach.

CONCLUSION

The prevailing shape of distributive justice in the west bears a marked similarity to the trajectories of its social and political developments. In its present emphasis on a state-guaranteed individual freedom of choice, it exhibits a perceptible contrast to a class-exclusive, right-specific social justice system with limited enforceability which obtained in the ancient and medieval times. No surprise if the two demonstrate a discernible degree of compatibility. But how would such a distributive justice framework fare in social setups where the conduits of social and political developments have followed a different course? This is the question that will be principally addressed by this thesis in subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER THREE: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND ITS METHODOLOGICAL ATOMISM

In preceding chapter, we saw how social, economic and political developments in the west codified distributive justice principles into its legal, economic and socio-political systems. Along with the circumstances which contributed to its development, the chapter also highlighted the salient features underlining the modern distributive justice approaches. The underlying derivatives of the capabilities approach are also based on distributive social justice (Arnesan, 2006; Hinton, 2006; Reed, 2008).

This chapter describes the capabilities approach, which as the latest countenance of distributive justice, provides theoretical framework for this study. But it has to be noted that in referring to the capabilities approach as a framework of distributive justice, no claim is made to present it as a complete theory of justice. Sen (Sen, 2004) has himself argued against ascribing any such status to his approach[11]. It is therefore clarified that wherever reference is made to the capabilities approach as a distributive justice framework in this study, it is more in the sense of seeing it as a system of morally judicious distribution of goods and resources in a social setup, rather than a theory of justice.

A trite vernacular descriptive of the approach is provided by Ananya Mukherjee Reed (2008, pp. 10, 11), who considers its core idea to comprise universalism; a liberalist and pluralist notion of state; priority of individual freedom; formal equality; emphasis on individual agency; and a vision of liberal capitalism as a context in which opportunity and freedom are generated and individual human agency thrive. However, at work underneath this manifest facade is Sen's robust conceptual framework, understanding of which is essential to grasp the full significance of the approach. The chapter is mandated to accomplish this end. It explains the positioning of capabilities approach within the overall distributive justice perceptions, gives an account of its theoretical fundamentals, outlines some of the issues related to its operationalization and highlights the type of deprivations which it targets in any system of distribution of labour and privileges. The description is, therefore, divided into three parts: the standpoint, the synopsis and the specifications.

The standpoint contains the basic proposal: why the capabilities approach; what shortcomings Sen deciphers in contemporary approaches to social justice; how are these shortfalls construed to affect the universality of a social justice paradigm; and what alternatives the

---

[11] For details on Sen's argument please see (Sen, 2004)

capabilities approach deliberates. The synopsis describes the adumbrated alternative: it gives the conceptual and theoretical rudiments, elucidates the key components, and positions their interrelationship within the overall ideational configuration to spell out contours of empirical applications. This part is itself divided into two sub-parts: one outlining the conceptual ingredients and the other, explaining the empirical gradient[12]. The third part, specifications, caters to the specific requirements of this study and is therefore the extension of the framework to the case taken up by the current study. It explains individualism in its exclusivity as Sen uses it for his framework. Sen's quest for informational profundity has led to drawing exceptions not only to the aggregative approaches of GDP per capita and utilitarianism, but also to the essentially distributive frameworks of Rawls, Nozick and Dworkin. It is for this reason that the form of individualism that Sen has used for his capabilities approach is significantly different from the one used in other distributive justice frameworks. The third part, accordingly, flaunts an exposé of the novelties of Senian individualism, and demonstrates its manifestation in terms of Sen's three indices of people's deprivations: relative deprivations, adaptive preferences and counterfactuality.

3.1 THE STANDPOINT: MAKING SENSE OF THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

Reed (2008, p. 20) points out that the difference in the response of Human development approaches and the traditional development approaches towards institutions is that the former considers institutions as the enablers of the human development whereas the latter considers the development of the institutions itself as development. The capabilities approach falls in the former.

> Social arrangements, involving many institutions (the state, the market, the
> legal system, political parties, the media, public interest groups, and public
> discussion forums, among others) are investigated in terms of their
> contribution to enhancing and guaranteeing the substantive freedoms of
> individuals, seen as active agents of change, rather than passive recipients of
> dispensed benefits (Sen, 2000, pp. xii, xiii).

---

[12] The capabilities approach runs short of a compact model, and in that sense does not possess a discrete operationalization schema. Its conceptual framework, however, outlines certain mechanisms for the operation of various components of the capabilities space. This section explains these operational motifs without entangling into defining a concrete operational framework for the capabilities approach, a task which is not only far beyond the scope of this study, but the pursuit of which will go against the generic character which Sen has not only foreseen but in fact vehemently preserved in the face of an all out onslaught.

At the basis of the capabilities approach are Sen's perceptions about human diversity (Reed, 2008, p. 17; Sen, 2000, p. 70) which lay down a multidimensional roadmap for desires, choices, perceptions and preferences. The cosmos of human desires, and resultant sufferings springing from unrealized wants, has convinced Sen of the indispensability of a vast informational space which could encompass all their variegated profiles. From this, a critique of the contemporary evaluative frameworks, felt wanting in capturing all this diversity, is all but natural.

His capability approach therefore contains a fundamental proposal for broadening the informational space in proportionality to the melange of human desires, wants and sufferings. Though no actual extent of this informational immensity is specified, the general rule is: the greater the need for freedoms, the larger the informational space required; or conversely, the broader the informational amplitude, the closer the approximation of freedoms.

Informational pluralism is Sen's main plank, both in its negativity to censure the prevailing paradigms of social justice; and its positivity to justify and explain his own approach[13]. It is this informational comprehensiveness, which to him, counts as the crucial determinant to differentiate between people's true and compromised wellbeing; of which, the latter he equates with *'small mercies'*.

> The hopeless destitute desiring merely to survive, the landless labourer concentrating his efforts on securing the next meal, the round-the-clock domestic servant seeking a few hours of respite, the subjugated housewife struggling for a little individuality, may all have learned to keep their desires in line with their respective predicaments. Their deprivations are gagged and muffled in the interpersonal metric of desire fulfilment. In some lives small mercies have to count big (Sen, 1985b, p. 191)

An inescapable aspect of this informational enrichment is Sen's instigation of the ethical discourse in economics. His *On ethics and economics* underscores the need for an intimate interrelationship between ethics and economics to load socio-economic decision making with a corpus of normative and moral justifications (Sen, 1987a). So overwhelming is the anxiety for such a normative compendium to the socio-economic system of production and exchange in Sen's work that it has convinced Christopher Morris to proclaim that Sen's entire work

---

[13] Christopher Morris dubs the approach as the one marked by *'informational enrichment'* (Morris, 2010a, p. 5)

relates to the subject of *'ethics and economics'* (Morris, 2010b, p. 40). Sen does not agree with the separation of ethics and economics, argued by some (like Lionel Robbins) on the grounds that economics deals with ascertainable facts while ethics with valuations and obligations (Robbins, 1937, pp. 148, 149 cited by Morris 2010B, p. 41); and by others (like George Stigler), who sees humans as essentially self interested maximizers (Morris, 2010b, p. 42).

To cope with the exigencies of both human diversity and an ethics-oriented evaluation of wellbeing at the same time, Sen calls for an informational pluralism of which he sees little scope either in the simple income and resource-based GDP per capita assessments, the poverty-line estimates, or the disciplines of utilitarian and welfarian economics. Approaches based purely on optimum social allocation and social choice theory- Paretian optimality and Arrowian impossibility- are considered only gingerly touching on an intricacy which calls for greater theoretical deftness and methodological dexterity. But that by no means constitute the entire ambit of perceived informational vastness. In fact the extent of Sen's envisioned informational enormousness is so broad that even the normative approaches of Rawls, Dworkin and Nozick are considered deficient to cover its full range.

Income based wellbeing assessment approaches, income and GDP growth per capita, Sen finds deficient for at least two informational deficiencies *viz* the inappropriateness of the space of income to reflect all contours of human welfare and, within the income space itself, the inadequacy of the specific measures used to cater to the diversity of the concept of human welfare. For income as measure of welfare, Sen's is not prepared to grant more than an instrumental importance. Though he does not rule out the role of income from the welfare matrix of an individual, he reduces it from an end in itself to mere means to an end. Sen argues for going beyond the income space and asks for understanding the importance of not only direct wellbeing deficit (in its different manifestation such as poverty, inequality and the like) but also indirect welfare lag such as relative deprivation[14](Sen, 1976, 2000).

Sen's disenchantment with the utilitarian and welfarian economics is incited mainly by a three-fold limitation. First, he is at fault with its *'distributional indifference'* which results in

---

[14] The situation where a person living in an affluent society may be better off compared to those living in poorer societies, but suffers a high relative capability derivation *vis-à-vis* the affluent members of her/his own society. The concept is described in some detail below.

a supine preoccupation with the maximization of utility and an absolute neglect of the distribution of the maximized sum total[15]. Sen notes;

> Bentham's concern-and that of utilitarianism in general-was with the **total utility** of a community. This was irrespective of the distribution of that total, and in this there is an informational limitation of considerable ethical and political importance. For example, a person who is unlucky enough to have a uniformly lower capability to generate enjoyment and utility out of income (say, because of a handicap) would also be given, in the utilitarian ideal world, a lower share of a given total. This is a consequence of the single-minded pursuit of maximizing the sum-total of utilities… (Sen, 1999 emphasis and parenthesis in original).

Second, he assails its total reliance on utility and abandon of non-utility information which attaches no importance to the claims of rights and freedoms[16]. Crocker and Robeyns note that the non-utility information missed by the utilitarianism not only includes people's additional physical needs resulting from disabilities, but also social and moral principles like human rights and gender equity (Crocker & Robeyns, 2010, p. 66). Third, Sen disapproves of utilitarianist's disregard for the possible *'adaptation and mental conditioning'* resulting from mental adjustment to adverse circumstances[17] while concentrating exclusively on people's happiness and satisfaction (Sen, 2000, pp. 62, 63).

To help understand Sen's disquiet with utilitarianism, Osmani (2009, pp. 16-18) considers it useful to factorize utilitarianism into the three components of consequentialism, welfarism and sum-ranking. He therefore avers that Sen's system of social evaluation raises three distinct inter-related issues with utilitarianism: the appropriate space of outcomes in the evaluation of consequences, accounting for both consequential and non-consequential concerns in the process of evaluation and the employment of the principle of aggregation.

---

[15] As Broom (1991, p. 70) mentions, *'utilitarians value only the total of good, regardless of whom it comes to'*. Broom describes that utilitarianism is based on the principle that *'one alternative is at least as good as another if and only if it has at least as great a total of people's good'*.

[16] As Sen puts it, *'it is sensible enough to take note of happiness, but we do not want to be happy slaves or delirious vassals* (Sen, 2000, p. 62).

[17] This Sen describes as a condition where, *'mental metric of pleasure or desire is just too malleable to be a firm guide to deprivation and disadvantage'* (Sen, 2000, p. 63). This aspect is discussed below in some detail under the topic of adaptive preferences.

Against Pareto's optimality[18] and Arrowian paradox (Arrow's general possibility theorem)[19], Sen has this to say;

> The attempt to base welfare economics on Pareto efficiency did not go beyond using utility data, even though it invoked utility in a particularly impoverished form (without interpersonal comparability and without cardinality). Arrow's "impossibility theorem" can be seen as being precipitated by the informational lacuna resulting from the simultaneous (1) exclusion of non-utility information, and (2) use of utility information in a particularly limited form (without interpersonal comparability) (Sen, 2002a, p. 8 footnote 6, parenthesis in original).

Considerable appreciation is vouchsafed by Sen for Rawlsian theory of social justice, yet he finds the use of primary goods for interpersonal comparisons incapable of fully accounting for the full range of human diversity (Sen, 1990, 1997). He considers primary goods as suffering from a *'fetishist handicap'*, concentrating entirely on goods and paying no attention to what these goods could do to people (Sen, 1982, pp. 367, 368). The argument is that due to the inherent diversity in human nature, different people need different goods for reaching the same level of well-being, or alternatively, the same goods produce different levels of wellbeing for different people. *'The right amount of food to enable one person to labour effectively may be insufficient for a second person and too much for a third'* (Crocker & Robeyns, 2010, p. 66). Sen believes that Rawlsian theory fails to account for such diversity.

> Sen's point is that Rawls's primary goods, including the good of negative freedom, should be viewed as means to a positive freedom that permits the choice of various ways of living and diverse conceptions of ultimate ends. Whatever conception of the good life is offered, it is better- due to individual variability- to operate in the space of positive freedom or capability than of that of primary goods (Crocker, 1992).

---

[18]According to the Pareto principle, a social state B is superior to social state A if in moving from A to B gives more utility to at least one person (Osmani, 2009, p. 18). This simply means making someone better off without making someone else worse off. Osmani mentions that according to Sen, the welfarist principle contained in this condition does not permit respect for even the minimal personal liberty that allows a person to make decisions in matters that affect no one but herself. For more on Sen's critique of Pareto principle, please see (Sen, 1970, 1983a)

[19] For Arrow's general possibility theorem and its discussion by Sen, please see (Sen, 1977b, 1979, 1995, 1999).

Sen's line of departure from Rawls, however, is not restricted to the primary goods-capabilities disequilibrium. Referencing his points of disagreement with Rawls, Sen himself counts Rawls insistence on 'just institutions' rather than 'just societies'; and Rawls 'nation-by-nation' approach in formulating the demands of fairness, which concentrates fairness within a functioning state without linking it directly to the fairness at the global level, as some of the other points of their disagreement (Sen, 2010, p. 243).

But strictly within the sphere germane to this study[20], Sen's disagreement with Rawls rests in their views about '*what is a just society*'. This is a question related to the appropriateness of what Sen terms as the *transcendental institutionalism* of Rawls and his own *realization-focused comparison* (Sen, 2009, pp. 1-27; 2010, pp. 243-246). Sen considers Rawlsian approach as the continuation of the contractarian tradition set by Hobbes and followed in various ways by thinkers like Rousseau. To Sen, the Rawlsian approach restricts itself to identifying perfectly just social arrangements[21]. Against this Sen promotes a *'comparative'* approach which must concentrate on *'ranking'* alternative social arrangements. He argues that the mere identification of a perfectly just society might fell short of both the requirement of informational sufficiency to identify injustice and the practical applicability to implement social justice. Against a complete ordering of identifying one perfect social arrangement which supersedes all other, Sen argues for a partial ranking of the different distribution of capabilities in a social system to arrive at their comparative advantage (Sen, 2010, p. 244). This Sen considers essential for enhancing justice rather than trying to jump straight into what is considered perfectly just. Sen argues;

> As it happens, I do not think myself that basing "principles of justice"
> exclusively on the choice of just institutions (rather than providing guidance
> to comparative assessment of alternative social arrangements that actually
> emerge) is a good way of proceeding in the theory of justice...(Sen, 2010, p.
> 249: emphasis and parenthesis in original)

Sen rejects other normative resource-based theories such as Dworkin's equality of resources and Robert Nozick's right-based libertarian approaches, for the same reasons. To the

---

[20] For More on Sen's differences with Rawls such as Rawl's 'original position' and 'difference principle' please see (Sen, 2009, pp. 52-74, 260-263)

[21] Freeman also points out that Rawls has been criticised for going astray by limiting the difference principle to the basic structure of the society, making the membership of a particular society a precondition for the assessment of the claims of distributive justice (Freeman, 2007, p. 261)

Dworkinian case for equality of resources by virtue of providing insurance opportunities to people to guard them against the vagaries of *'brute luck'* (Sen, 2000, p. 306 footnote 30), Sen raises the objection that some of the sources of capabilities disadvantage is not personal features like disabilities, but relational and environmental features against which the Dworkinian guarantees might not work[22] (Sen, 2009, p. 266). Pierik & Robeyns (Pierik & Robeyns, 2007) identify three main areas of disagreement between Sen and Dworkin. First, they believe that equality of resources is of ideal-theoretical nature while capability approach is not; second, Dworkins framework is seen as incapable to account for inequalities generated by people's social endowments, which the capability approach can sufficiently do: and third, Dworkin is argued to have excluded morally relevant inequalities, which Sen have included in his approach, though it is argued that he (Sen) has erred in the opposite direction by not excluding morally irrelevant inequalities.

Nozick's right-based libertarian approach, Sen considers a *'consequent-independent theory of political priority'* which is *'afflicted by considerable indifference to the substantive freedoms that people end up having'* (Sen, 2000, p. 66). He instantiates his arguments by pointing out that even gigantic famines could occur without violating anyone's libertarian rights. Additionally, Sen also considers Nozick's framework incapable of capturing such deprivations as adaptive preferences.

Description provided in the above lines outlines the rationale for Sen's parting of ways with contemporary social justice approaches. It represents the theoretical grounding of Sen's freedom centred capabilities approach within the larger debate surrounding the position of human wellbeing in a social justice framework. This by no means exhausts either the controversy surrounding the topic or the justifications provided by Sen for his framework. The mushroom growth which the subject of social justice and the role of wellbeing and welfare within its parameters witnessed in the latter half of the last century has thrown out many useful theoretical contributions in the field[23]. Sen's justifications in support of his approach are equally copious. Short of recounting all this cornucopia, what these lines suggest is the fact that the capability approach scores considerable departure from the other

---

[22] For the intriguing yet enthralling debate of Dworkin's argument about the ambiguity of Sen's capabilities approach, and his claim that depending upon the way this ambiguity is resolved, the capabilities approach boils down to his equality of sources and Sen's counter argument, please see (Dworkin, 2000, 2002; Kaufman, 2006c, pp. 125-127; Pierik & Robeyns, 2007; Sen, 2009, pp. 264-268; A. Williams, 2002).

[23] Among such contributions, one might count Thomas Nagel's egalitarian liberalism, Michael Walzer's communitarian framework, Richard Arneson's equality of opportunity and Gerald Cohen's equality of access to resources.

evaluative approaches of wellbeing, both traditional economic and modern justice-based socio-psychological, mainly on the issue of informational pluralism which Sen deems essential to capture the entire range of human diversity.

3.2 THE SYNOPSIS: UNDERSTANDING THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH

3.2.1 THE LARGER PICTURE

Sen's reprimand is both logical and convincing but what alternative does he provide? It was noted above that information pluralism serves both as offensive tool for castigating rival approaches and as a defensive shield for providing justifications for Sen's own framework. But this leaves open the question of how Sen uses this informational enhancement in his approach to make good the deficiencies which he cites in other approaches. To find an answer to this, it has to be understood that the capabilities approach calls for enhanced information to broaden the scope of freedoms[24] for each individual. Sen's system of social justice is, therefore, pivoted around freedom expansion[25] for every individual to enable her/him to live a life as she/he values. As Robeyns puts it;

> The core characteristic of the capability approach is its focus on what people are effectively able to do and to be, that is, on their capabilities. This contrasts with philosophical approaches that concentrate on people's happiness or desire-fulfilment, or on income, expenditures, or consumption (Robeyns, 2005).

Freedom in Sen's approach encompasses a very broad canvass and is not restricted to any specific aspect(s) of people's lives. It is the freedom to choose from the alternative combinations of social or material goods; it is the freedom of how to choose between these alternative combinations; it is the freedom to consume the selection or to defer its use to a future date; and it is the freedom to go all over again and make fresh selections. This is the

---

[24] As mentioned by Crocker & Robeyns (2010, p. 70), freedoms refer to presence of real and not merely formal or legal opportunities, which are available to people.

[25] For the core position that freedoms occupy in Sen's framework, one tends to consider it erroneous to give it the nomenclature of capability approach. This aspect has also been highlighted by David Crocker who considers it 'regrettable' that Sen's framework is called "capabilities approach" despite the importance of the concept of freedoms in Sen's social ethic. Crocker believes that functionings are more important for Sen in some contexts than capabilities, but *'since both well-being freedom and agency freedom are normatively important'*, the approach is rightly referred to by Sen as a "freedom centred" approach' (Crocker, 2006, p. 156).

spectrum of freedoms, which as Sen's recommends, must be made available to every member of a society without any conditionality[26], in order for it to qualify as just and viable.

But Sen's freedoms perspective in the context of imbuing people with the capacity to live a life as they choose is not restricted to their actual achievements. Important as they are in their own right for providing an index of people's wellbeing, achievements are nevertheless considered insufficient as they are related to a person's acquired state of wellbeing. They remain deficient in capturing the full scale of human welfare until they incorporate wellbeing states to which a person aspires as a sensible human being. Sen considers this essential in order to assess the capacity of an individual as active pursuer of wellbeing who commands control over the things she/he values rather than a passive recipient of the dispensed benefits. He avers;

> The information pluralism of the functioning approach to wellbeing has to be further extended if we shift attention from the person's actual functionings to his or her capability to function. A person's capability set can be defined as the set of functioning vectors within his or her reach. In examining the well-being aspect of a person, attention can legitimately be paid to the capability set of the person and not just to the chosen functioning vector. This has the effect of taking note of the positive freedoms in a general sense (the freedom "to do this or "to be that") that a person has (Sen, 1985b, p. 200 parenthesis in original).

For Sen, therefore, the ideal of social justice lay in the availability of informational pluralism on the various aspects of people's lives to highlight their wellbeing states, and the provisioning of a scheme of distribution which endows everyone with freedom to pursue her/his wellbeing unimpeded by personal, situational or structural constraints. This is the broader vision of his framework. A more profound insight into this scheme demands understanding of both the elementary gears of its analytical machinery and their operational mechanics within the framework. To that end, the following two sections explain, correspondingly, the nature of the theoretical components of the capabilities approach and the technical minutiae of their functionality to engender the type of freedoms foreseen by Sen.

---

[26] Sen does not permit such conditionalities as imposed by the Rawl's difference principle.

3.2.2 COMPONENTS OF CAPABILITIES MATRIX

The innards of Sen's framework for the actualization of freedoms distension are pivoted around the apparatus of human capabilities. Highlighting their role in freedoms enhancement and their nature, Alexander Kaufman points out that;

> Capabilities are the person's freedom to be or do certain fundamentally important things. A persons quality of life, Sen argues, is a function of what the person is able to be (e.g. well or poorly nourished) and do (e.g. perform more or less meaningful work) (Kaufman, 2006a, p. 2 parenthesis in original).

The composition of the capabilities itself is determined by functionings and entitlements. Functionings are the various states of being or doing relevant to the assessment of a person's wellbeing (Sen, 1985b, p. 10 cited by Kaufman 2006a, p. 2). Various combinations of functionings which a person is able to achieve are termed as capabilities (Sen, 1993a, p. 40). Prendergast considers capabilities as the set of functionings vectors within a person's reach, which depends on the command over goods and the set of utilization functions available (Prendergast, 2005). It is the various combinations of simultaneously attainable functionings that defines the capabilities set of an individual and which, according to Sen, represents a person's freedom to live one type of life or another (Sen, 1992, p. 40 cited by Kaufman 2006a, p. 2). Sen equates capabilities with the kind of substantive freedom which enables the achievement of alternative combinations of functionings. To give an example of, and elaborate the distinction between functionings and capabilities, Sen mentions that a wealthy person possesses the capability to be well nourished as well as to starve (due to fasting, for instance). If the latter alternative is chosen, functioning of the rich person may be identical to the person who is starving out of poverty, but their capability sets remain essentially distinct (Sen, 1985a; 2000, p. 75). Kuklys provides a picture of the functionings and capabilities in their relation to the standard welfare measures in the following words;

> In its most basic form the capability approach conceptualises welfare as standard of living, and measures it as **functionings**. Functionings are defined as the achieved states of being and activities of an individual, e.g. being healthy, being well-sheltered, moving about freely, or being well-nourished. Welfare measurement in the functioning space takes into account the presence of non-market goods and services in an economy, home

production, and adjusts for non-monetary constraints in decision making, because functionings are **outcome-based** (as opposed to resource based) welfare measures (Kuklys, 2005, p. 5 emphasis in original).

Entitlements are the *'alternative commodity bundles'* which a person commands, *'using the totality of rights and opportunities that he or she possesses'*, and they facilitate the acquisition of capabilities (Nafziger, 2006).

Functionings, entitlements and capabilities lay down the conceptual framework for Sen's freedom centred social justice system. They provide the fulcrum of his wellbeing notions. More importantly, they provide a broader informational space for the assessment of welfare, in terms of human advantage or prosperity, than the other frameworks of human development. But a true realization of the Sen's freedom perception remains shorn without a description of his agency aspects of freedoms. As David Crocker describes them, agency and well-beings are conceived by Sen as two distinguishable but linked aspects of human life, deserving respect on the part of individuals and institutions (Crocker, 2006, p. 156). Without undermining its intrinsic importance for informational pluralism, agency aspect carries special credence for this study because of its direct correlation with the social commitment of individuals. It brings into the freedoms matrix, aspects of individual lives as members of a social system. It is for this reason that the agency aspect of freedoms is described at some length in the following lines.

The agency aspect provides the third tier of a person's freedoms, beyond the achieved and aspired states of wellbeing. It encompasses aspects of a person's life as socially conscience citizen who might have goals other than her/his own wellbeing (Osmani, 2009, pp. 20, 21). Sen considers wellbeing achievement and wellbeing freedom as a freedom of rather particular type which concentrate on a person's functionings vectors and the benefit accruing from the corresponding wellbeing achievements. Against this, the agency aspect of freedom refers to the person's freedom to do and achieve whatever goals or values she/he considers important. Thus, *'agency freedom is a freedom to achieve whatever the person, as a responsible agent, decides he or she should achieve'* (Sen, 1985a).

Agency has been characterized by Kabeer (1999 cited by Reed, 2008, p.20) as the ability to define one's goals and act upon them, even in the face of opposition, in a manner that brings about a transformation from disempowerment to empowerment. In this sense, agency is designated by a two-fold command: one cognitive which articulates intention, goals and

commitments, and the other operative which symbolizes the exercise and implementation of the cut out aims and goals. Insofar as the suggestion of command contained within this notion of agency remains ensconced within an individual, Sen's conceptualization of the term does not offer any fundamental departure. Sen also envisions an agent as someone who *'acts and brings about change, and whose achievements can be judged in terms of her own values and objectives'* (Sen, 2000, p. 19), and accordingly his suggestion also advances a proposal for command in terms of its cognitive and operative dimensions.

But he sports significant hereticism from this conception of agency when he observes that the wires of this command do not sprout only from within an individual. Although he does not discount an individual's internal reserve of agential command, he complements it with an external reservoir which he considers an essential component of a person's overall agential edifice. This external stream is extended to human agency by the institutional arrangement[27] of a social setup in which a person lives.

> There is a deep complementarity between individual agency and social arrangements. It is important to give simultaneous recognition to the centrality of individual freedom *and* to the force of social influence on the extent and reach of individual freedom. To counter the problems that we face, we have to see individual freedom as a social commitment (Sen, 2000, p. xii, italics in original)

Thus, the manner in which Sen articulates agency in his approach, it takes the filament of empowerment and control beyond (but by no means, out) of the individual to account for supra-individual factors. The significance of this external, supra-individual source of individual agency is illustrated with an example given by Sen.

Sen asks us to suppose the case of a person, say Green, who has fallen unconscious due to some accident. Doctors are pondering over two treatments, say A and B. A is less costly but B is associated with some experiments on animals which is disapproved totally by Green. Now if a friend of Green, in awareness of his preferences, asks the doctors to use treatment A, the injured person is in effect given effective power, although Green is not actually exercising that power (Sen, 1985a). Here Green's freedom is incremented by the action of his friend although no active agency was exercised by Green in this augmentation.

---

[27] Both formal and informal

Based on these internal and external levers of command, Sen bifurcates agency freedom into *instrumental agency success* and *realized agency success*. In instrumental agency success, a person exercises procedural control for the achievement of the things she/he values (Sen, 1985a; 1992, p. 58). Here the wires of control are entirely with the individual who acts as an instrument of change. On the other hand, in realized agency success, wellbeing is actualized for individuals by virtue of effective control which is not actually exercised by them. Realized agency success supplements conventional agency perceptions with a crucial determinant of people's freedoms. It is the aspect of agency where the vortex of control is located outside the individual, more obviously but not necessarily, within the social space occupied by her/him.

Realized agency success fructified by virtue of effective control occupies importance in the capability matrix because it accounts for situations where people, for some reasons, do not possess procedural control. In a social setup, the role of institutions (both state and social) in providing environmental cleanliness, protection from epidemics and pestilence, and even security against street crimes are some of the illustrations of realized agency success which are seen by Sen as the directions from which people's agency freedom could be enhanced by infusing effective rather than procedural control. Or as Crocker & Robeyns (2010, p. 77) put it; infants, severely mentally disabled individuals, and very old people can gain capability for healthy functionings by this aspect of agency freedom, even though they make very few decisions by themselves and are dependent on others for care.

At this point, it is essential to rid Sen's re-conceptualization of agency, in terms of realized and instrumental agency success, of an expected and apparent puzzlement. This is related to the sum total of welfare produced and its distribution in a social setup. If every individual is to be equipped with agency accruing not only from within herself/himself but part of it also arising from without; what would be the source of the total required agency in a society? In this sense, Sen's agency perceptions are apparently fraught with a two way complication: one purely mathematical and the other ethical.

From a mathematician, concentration of wellbeing in an individual both from the realized and instrumental agency success induces a computational error. To illustrate, suppose a closed system with 10 individuals enjoying a certain amount of wellbeing all of which is produced within the system and nothing coming from without. Let us assume that 70 per cent of the each individual's wellbeing is accruing from the instrumental agency success and the balance

30 per cent from realized agency success. Now if every individual is enjoying, say, 100 units of wellbeing, the system needs a total of 1000 units of wellbeing. But the actual wellbeing produced by the system is 700, which is the wellbeing generated by the instrumental agency success. This raises question about the source of the balance 300 units of wellbeing to ensure the type of wellbeing prescribed by Sen.

On the ethical side, Sen's agency perceptions spawn the question of individual responsibility as responsible citizens. The concentration of the entire agency freedom for the enhancement of individual wellbeing is akin to considering humans as irresponsible beasts shorn of any social responsibility. Sen's solution for a way out this predicament is his distinction between wellbeing freedom and agency freedom.

> In responding to this issue, the important thing to recognize is that the well-being aspect and the agency aspect of persons have dissimilar roles in moral accounting. They invite attention in *disparate* ways. At the risk of oversimplification it can be said that the well-being aspect of a person is important in assessing a person's *advantage*, whereas the agency aspect is important in assessing what a person can do in line with his or her conception of *the good*. The ability to do more good need not be to the person's advantage (Sen, 1985a italics in original).

The distinction and interplay between the wellbeing freedom and agency freedom is well explained by Sen's example of person enjoying sandwich for a lunch on the bank of river Avon (Sen, 1985a). Sen supposes a situation (take this as situation α) where a person (say X) watches a drowning person (say Y) 'far away'. In situation α, X can do little to save Y. Sen then takes another situation (call it β), where Y was drowning right in front of X. Sen argues that in position β, the agency of X increases because he can now save Y (presuming that X wants to do so), but X's wellbeing actually reduces, both in its achievement and freedom aspects, because of forsaking the enjoyment of his sandwich. X's wellbeing achievement is reduced because of giving up eating sandwich and her/his wellbeing freedom is compromised because this new opportunity to save Y actually reduced her/his freedom to enjoy an uninterrupted lunch. Sen points out that since X's agency freedom also includes her/his own wellbeing freedom, in that sense even X's agency freedom is compromised in situation β. But if X actually values saving the drowning person more than enjoying lunch, then there is a net

gain in terms of the agency freedom. Sen concludes from this example that in terms of the ranking of alternative opportunities, agency and wellbeing might yield contradicting results.

> Whereas well-being freedom is freedom to achieve something in particular, viz., well-being, the idea of agency freedom is more general, since it is not tied to any one type of aim. Agency freedom is freedom to achieve whatever the person, as a responsible agent, decides he or she should achieve. That **open conditionality** makes the nature of agency freedom quite different from that of well-being freedom, which concentrates on a particular type of objective and judges opportunities correspondingly (Sen, 1985b, p. 204 emphasis in original).

This is what explains the total distribution of wellbeing in a social system. As evident from this example, a person's freedoms in terms of the things she/he values in life may not be entirely restricted to wellbeing achievement. There may be benefits accruing to a person from the free exercise of agency which might be reducing her/his wellbeing achievement, but incrementing wellbeing freedoms as the above example suggests.

It will be useful to conclude this section with a recounting of the dual dimensions in which Sen perceives both his wellbeing and agency aspects of freedoms. Achievement aspect of wellbeing signifies the actually acquired space of functionings whereas the freedom aspect implies the available wellbeing to a person over which she/he exercises command, though ultimately, through her/his free choice, she/he may or may not opt to partake of this well-being. The freedom aspect of the well-being, therefore gives a dual command, in not only empowering an individual over the functionings space but also imparting the power to choose whether to avail the wellbeing or not.

> For responsible adults, the concept of "well-being freedom" has a clear relevance in judging the opportunities a person has for pursuing his or her own advantage. The supplementation of well-being by well-being freedom, in the case of responsible adults, involves a refinement in the assessment of the well-being aspect of a person. But well-being freedom is only a specific type of freedom, and it cannot reflect the person's over-all freedom as an agent; we have to turn to the notion of agency freedom in that context (Sen, 1985a emphasis in original).

Similarly, agency achievement *'refers to the realization of goals and values she has reasons to pursue'* and agency freedom characterizes *'one's freedom to bring about the achievements one values and which one attempts to produce'* (Sen, 1992, p. 56). Various aspects of wellbeing and achievements are summarized in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Aspects of Wellbeing and Achievements in the Capabilities space

	Achievement Aspect	**Freedom Aspect**
Well-beings	Acquired (Exercised) functionings space	Command over (or access to) a functionings space, whether exercised or not
Agency	Acquired (Exercised) capacity for a functionings space	Command over (or access to) the capacity for a functionings space, whether exercised or not

Source: Author's contribution

A depiction of the manner in which these aspects work towards the enhancement of a person's freedoms is provided in figure 3.1 below. At the centre of the figure is the octagon of people's freedoms with its two aspects of wellbeing and agency presented as triangles on its two sides. Both wellbeing and agency have their achievement and freedoms aspects, reflected by the two ovals above and below the freedoms octagon. Functionings, capabilities, agency achievement and agency freedoms are depicted as four aspects of people's freedoms, emerging from the different combinations of triangles and ovals in the figure. For instance, the achievement aspect of wellbeing connotes functionings whereas its freedoms aspect counts as capabilities.

Figure 3.1: Components of Capabilities Space and their Interrelations in Freedoms Matrix

Source: Author's contributions

3.2.3 THE MECHANICS OF CAPABILITIES OPERATION

The manner in which various facets of people's wellbeing are addressed in the capabilities approach raises some key questions. How does this system of freedom enhancement work? What is the interrelation between the various components of the capabilities space? When Sen talks about substantive freedoms and broad informational space, how does various components of his framework ensure their achievement? This section purports to obtain answers to these questions.

It was noted above that the machinery of functionings, capabilities, entitlements and agency delineate the freedoms space for Sen's approach. The freedoms matrix of a person is determined by the positioning and interplay of these components within that space. It spreads out a broader spectrum for the assessment of individual wellbeing, by addressing not only the acquired but also the welfare levels to which one aspires as a free agent of her/his choices and preferences. This, to Robeyns, encapsulates a *'broad normative framework'* to assess *'individual wellbeing and social arrangements, the design of policies, and proposals about social change in society'* (Robeyns, 2005).

In this system, the presence of an impediment- social, political, economic or any other- is seen as truncating the space of freedoms. This might either be in the shape of stunting the functioning itself, or tapering off the capabilities space by placing barriers in the exercise of

the acquired functionings. In his preface to *Development as Freedom*, Sen describes development as the *'removal of various types of unfreedoms that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency'*. But freedom is not seen merely as an end of the development process: *'freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are among its principal means'* (Sen, 2000, p. 10). One can, therefore, perceive capabilities as the **space of available choices, both exercised and potential, which enables to live a life as one values, according to the characteristics and circumstances possessed**.

For the realization of these capabilities, Sen calls for providing individuals with two distinct aspects of freedoms: *opportunity aspect* and *process aspect*.[28] Sen (2002a, p. 11) argues that distinction between these two aspects is *'quite central'* to acquire a proper understanding of his freedoms conceptualization. Additionally, Sen (2000, p. 291) argues that actual difference between his freedom centred development and the traditional growth oriented development is in fact linked with these two aspects of freedoms.

As Sen describes it, opportunity aspect of freedom is concerned with the real opportunity to achieve things that a person values, independent of the process involved for the achievement to take place. This aspect of freedoms is primarily related to people's ability to achieve (Sen, 2002a, p. 585). Sen believes that in assessing freedoms, attention has to be paid to the actual opportunities available to people to achieve things which they value (Sen, 2002a, p. 10). The process aspect, on the other hand is concerned with the process of free decision by an individual (Sen, 1993b). It relates to the freedoms in the process itself (Sen, 2002a, p. 10) and concerns autonomous choice, *'having the levers of control in one's own hands'* (Sen, 2002a, p. 506). Sen believes that even forcing a person to choose what she/he would have chosen anyway also constitute a violation of the process aspect freedoms, because here, no freedom over the process is available, although outcome may be in accordance with preference of the individual concerned[29] (Sen, 2004).

---

[28] Proper appreciation of these two aspects of freedoms is pivotal to this study because, as would be noted, the whole debate surrounding the universal applicability of the capabilities approach and in particular its compatibility with the collective intent boils down to the fact that whether these two aspects of freedoms furnish sufficient space for living a life of one's choice as sensible individual.

[29] The example of a person who is shunned of the office for some mistake, although he himself also wanted to take a break from his office work, is presented by Sen as a case of this type of unfreedoms where a person loses control over the process, notwithstanding the outcome which might well be in accordance with her/his preference.

Process aspect of freedoms is sub-divided by Sen into *personal process concern* which relates to an individual's own way of making choices and *system process concern*, pertaining to people's opinion about social institutions and rules of social behaviour (Sen, 2002a, p. 624). Though opportunity and process aspects highlight two distinct domains of freedoms, Sen does not rule out the possibility of overlap between the two (Sen, 2002a, pp. 585,586 & 623, 624).

Opportunity and process aspects could be seen as two dimensions for articulating freedoms. They define the capabilities set of an individual as a tool for freedoms enhancement. Wiebke Kuklys considers capabilities set as an essentially augmented budget set which accounts for the non-market goods and services in the resource constraints and gives due consideration to the interpersonal heterogeneity through the conversion factor (Kuklys, 2005, p. 76). However, the understanding that this study has got about the operational functionality within the capabilities set differs somewhat from the one proposed by Kuklys. In particular, Kuklys account is considered as missing two crucial features of the operation within the capabilities space.

The first of these relates to the separation of the resource constraint from the resources itself. Resource constraint works essentially within the space of people's acquired circumstances in different shapes: in the imbalance in financial conditions, in access disparities, in factors such as social inclusion and exclusions, and more generally in their preparedness to avail the resources. This, therefore, is a space unto itself, distinct and separate from the space of resources. This study identifies this space as the space of *'personal circumstances'*.

The second facet missing from Kuklys description pertains to the interface between the three emerging spaces of personal circumstances (or Kuklys's resource constraint), resources and conversion factor. The space of resources not only impacts the spaces of both personal circumstances and conversion factor, but also gets influenced by the circumstances prevailing in the two spaces. In this way the space of resources plays as a crucial link between the two spaces. Together, the interplay between the three spaces give shape to the three dimensional matrix of the capabilities space.

The actual process of how this happens is empathized below with a simple example of evaluating the availability of employment opportunities in a social system. The example not only highlights the operational mechanics of the functional components of the capabilities

space, but also shows the advantage which Sen's approach scores over other evaluative schema, due to its informational pluralism.

Availability of employment opportunities in a social system serves a crucial indicator of people's wellbeing. A traditional, utilitarian-welfarist approach would evaluate such wellbeing in terms of the sum total of employment opportunities produced and provided in a social setup: the greater the number of opportunities the larger the net-sum of people's wellbeing. For the capabilities approach, however, this constitutes merely the fulfilment of the demands of the space of resources. A libertarian Nozickian mutation to this archetype, on the other hand, would add the factor of people's free and unimpeded access to employment opportunities (access) but this according to Sen (2002a, p. 512), caters only to the process aspect of freedoms. Even a Rawlsian adaptation would concentrate exclusively on people's fitness in terms of their qualifications for employment (personal circumstances) to level off any situational or personal handicap suffered by any member of the social collectivity[30]. This, although it addresses part of the process aspect of freedoms, still falls short of loading people with complete command to convert the available employment opportunities into useful functionings.

While each one of these approaches contributes towards the enhancement of people's wellbeing in terms of employment opportunities in their own right, it is the capabilities approach which provides a compact scheme of availing them for people's freedoms enhancement. In doing so it first takes into account people's *'personal circumstances'*, which can be seen as people's existing conditions or their preparedness to avail the employment opportunities. Personal circumstances could not only include people's educational qualifications, their aptitudes, professional skills and physical levels but its space could be conceived as broad enough to incorporate the impact of various social, spiritual and environmental factors which determine both their preferences and proficiencies for employment[31]. The space of resources is set only in accordance with the exigencies and dictates of the space of personal circumstances[32]. At this stage, Sen's framework bears close

---

[30] To obliterate the *'lottery effect'*, by which a person born and raised in unfavourable circumstances might not possess the qualifications required to compete for the available employment opportunities.

[31] To this extent, the space of personal circumstances bears similarity to Rawl's difference principle in taking account of people's initial endowments.

[32] This is where Sen highlights a crucial aspect of the famous Bengal famine of 1942, by pointing out to the fact that people were dying in front of the warehouses full of grains, because of their severe handicap in the space of personal circumstances.

proximity with the Rawlsian system, who also accords due weight to people's prevailing circumstances in assessing the distribution of social and material objects.

But in Sen's approach, accounting for the space of personal circumstance and proportionate provisioning in the space of resources do not complete the freedoms space for the desired capabilities, unless it is complemented by the space of 'conversion factor' which adds the crucial element of enablement to avail opportunities in accordance with the prevailing personal circumstances. Catering to the demands of process freedoms, the space of conversion factor provides command over the process; authorizing individuals to avail the opportunities or defer their use to a future date. In our example of employment opportunities, the space of conversion factor incorporates such factors as the removal of various impediments in the free access to employment opportunities, or the removal of any other hindrance which may hamper a person's command over them once they are accessed. To exemplify various such eventualities, a person's conversion factor would be dented if free access to the employment opportunities is handicapped either through political interference or any preference for some people or class of people during the selection procedure[33]. Their conversion factor would still be handicapped even if they suffer some kind of barrier in getting information about these employment opportunities.

The three spaces of personal circumstances, resources and conversion factor define the capabilities set for the operation of Sen's freedom enhancement stratagem. Entitlements within these three spaces equip people with freedom both in its opportunity and process aspects. An illustration of this is provided in figure 3.2. In this figure, the ovals signify the three essential components of the capabilities matrix while the rectangles stand for the acquired welfare levels (freedoms) at given instances.

---

[33] An example of this is the quota system in recruitments. This contraption to safeguard the interest of the backward communities has seen gross misuse primarily because it erroneously addresses people's handicap in terms of situational, physical and even temperamental differential in the space of conversion factor. The capabilities approach addresses this differential in its proper place, within the space of personal circumstance.

Figure 3.2: Functionality within the Capabilities Space Illustrated

Source: Author's contribution

In summary, the objective of freedoms expansion is realized within a three dimensional space of a person's capabilities matrix. The space of personal circumstances takes care of physical, psychological and intellectual conditions together with such exogenous determinants as the societal or environmental influences; the space of resources accounts for the availability of commodities (education, nutrition, health, employment etc.); while the space of conversion factor affords the enabling capacity and ensures the elimination of various impediments in exercising command over the space of resources.

In this scheme, availability of the resources according to the personal circumstances of a person imparts her/him with choices, both exercised and potential. Once a person acquires access to resources according to her/his personal characteristics, she/he has complete freedom whether or not to convert those choices into actual functionings. In both cases, complete command is maintained over the space of resources, which are potential choices in the former case and exercised choices in the latter. The conversion factor for converting potential choices into exercised choices completes the capabilities set.

3.3 THE SPECIFICATIONS- OPERATIONAL PECULIARITIES

This third and last part of the chapter has been specifically included to pull the description of the capabilities approach to its aspects addressed in this study: the nature and goals of its distributive framework, the distinctive outlook which Sen's innovative notions of agency has

given to the individualism of an essentially distributivist approach, and its manner and use by Sen to target a morally just distribution of welfare in a social setup. Henceforth, our discussion of Sen's framework of social justice has been one of showering praise and hurling applause, extolling its accomplishments and eulogize the breadth of its vision, for the vantage ground it has notched up over contemporary schema of social justice. This is the esteem in which it is generally held for at least theoretically outscoring its contemporary frameworks in unveiling newer dimensions of social equity and human deprivations.

The flip side is also not less frequented, albeit by a harangue stirred up mainly by questions related to its operational dynamics. At the proverbial outset, scepticism has surrounded its empirical validity given a heavy reliance on such intangibles as freedoms, agency and capabilities[34]. Sen's unyielding rebuff to convert his theoretical framework into a compact model might have safeguarded its generality, but it has also added consternations about its functional utility[35]. He has also fanatically refused to budge a millimetre from his rebuttal to endorse a minimum set of basic capabilities *a la* Nussbaum[36]. Even his incursions into the meta-ethical philosophy have backfired at places, inciting deprecations from a variety of disciplines: philosophy, sociology, psychology to name a few. The culpability of disregarding irreducible collective intent is one, but by no means the only, of such denigrations.

The litany of chastisement competes with the interest which the approach has kindled in terms of amplitude. However, this study is primarily concerned with seeing as to how the capabilities approach responds to the welfare rooted in the collective living patterns of individuals. Therefore indulging in the other controversies could only be at the cost of embracing a tangent from the continuum. To avoid one, three particular notions: relative deprivation, adaptive preferences and counterfactuality, are picked here which Sen has predominantly used in his approach for highlighting the type of entitlement deficits that his approach targets within the wellbeing distribution across a social setup. They are selected primarily to show how and what type of entitlement deficits the capabilities approach aims to identify and address in a society. As description of these notions would show,

---

[34] This at the same time counts both as a quality and quandary of the capabilities approach. From an angle, it points towards the intangibility and inoperability of the approach, but viewed from another gradient, it underscores the volume of interest that it has attracted. For more on this aspect please see (Sugden, 1993).

[35] For Details please see (Alkire, 2002, pp. 28-30; Sen, 1993a, p. 47; 2005).

[36] Nussbaum's authoritative proclamation in this context that *"Sen cannot avoid committing himself to a core list of fundamental capabilities……"* (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 57) receives the seal of authenticity from Richard Arneson whose endorsement comes with the avowal that *"Martha Nussbaum extension of Sen's capability approach is of paramount importance. She decisively grasps the nettle that Sen's writings gingerly touch"* (Arnesan, 2006, p. 22). Please also see (Qizilbash, 1996) for further details.

notwithstanding the expansive measure of wellbeing distribution which these notions are able to acquire, they also gather an aura of immense subjectivity. Because of this subjectivity, there always remains the possibility of what might count as deprivation on the litmus of the capabilities approach, might well be people's genuine social strategy in the particular circumstances prevailing in a social space. In succeeding chapters, more specifically in chapter five, it will be shown that how augmenting the capabilities space with its formative aspect automatically takes care of this susceptibility of the capabilities approach, by differentiating actual entitlement deficit from people's genuinely adopted social strategy.

However, before taking up the three issues, it will be useful to grasp the manner in which Sen has used individualism in his approach. This is essential because in the dissonance pertaining to the extension of a distributivist social justice framework like the capabilities approach to collective social setups, individualism stands out as the key sticking point. In his own right, Sen's gives due appreciation to the social context of people's lives in his approach, despite its distributive foundations. His agential dimensions of capabilities are specifically geared towards the realization of this end. All this necessitates a proper understanding of the sense in which Sen has used individualism in his approach, both in its use and targeted results. Therefore, Sen's individualism[37] is dilated upon below as a vehicle of his informational pluralism for freedoms expansion, before taking up the three specific issues mentioned above. While the exact positioning of individualism in its conceptual relationship to collectivism and its relevance in the overall social justice debate are discussed in the next chapter, the purpose here is to highlight how, and what kind of, individualism is necessitated by the type of social justice envisaged by Sen; how is it used and what sort of results it produces for his framework.

3.3.1: INDIVIDUALISM, DISAGGREGATION AND INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS IN SEN'S APPROACH

Remaining within the bounds of pragmatism, it has to be conceded that as the most recent visage of distributive social justice, capabilities approach could hardly divest itself of espousing individualist functional agenda to assess distributional equity of various social goods. To that extent, the individualism of capability approach hardly needs any explanation.

---

[37] Reed (2008, p. 22) notes that given the normative premise of the capabilities approach, its primary goal is the development of individual agency.

In fact, it would have needed considerable justification had it not used individualism as its operational tool. It is however the peculiar use of individualism as a vehicle of Sen's informational pluralism that needs some elaboration. Therefore, it is not the use but the specifications of its use and the resultant informational outreach that needs understanding.

Individualism, as the term connotes, is the focus on individual constituents as discrete units of analysis in an investigation or experiment. Gould and Kolb (1964 cited by Triandis, 1995, p. 6) identify individualism with a belief about the individual as an end in itself which realizes the self and cultivates judgement, in the face of social pressures which propel him in acquiescing. Triandis himself defines individualism in the following manner;

> A preliminary definition of *individualism* is a social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves as independent of collectives; are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs, rights, and the contracts they have established with others; give priority to their personal goals over the goals of the others; and emphasize rational analysis of the advantages and disadvantages associated with others (Triandis, 1995, p. 2 italics in original)

Hofstede differentiates individualism from collectivism in the following words;

> *Individualism* pertains to societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. *Collectivism* as its opposite pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive ingroups, which throughout people's lifetimes continue to protect them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (G. Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005, p. 51 italics in original)

The immediately discernable picture of individualism emerging from the above explications is one of disjointed individuals, loaded with intent and authority, and armed with the verve and vivacity to pursue their objectives undaunted by social compulsions. This is the sense in which individualism is taken here, before articulating a proper grounding for it within the debate surrounding individualism and collectivism in the next chapter. With this connotation, the role that individualism plays in serving as tool of informational pluralism to achieve the end of distributional equity in Sen's approach is highlighted below.

In the first place, Sen's individualism does not segregate individuals from their social context. This is evident from the manner in which Sen formulates agential dimensions of capabilities. Social aspects of people's lives are considered as the depositories of wellbeing to a significant expanse. Examples quoted above evidently demonstrate this fact. Second, in asking for providing people with opportunities to live a life of their own choice, Sen does not consider them as self-centred utility maximizers. Wellbeing is perceived not only in self-regarding enterprises, but a considerable extent of it is also contemplated in ventures which are other regarding[38]. Third, Sen does not consider individual wellbeing as springing from a person's own efforts. The very concept of other regarding pursuits of wellbeing provides for a pool of welfare from which individuals could generally benefit in their collective capacities. Individuals are, therefore, seen as both contributing towards and benefitting from the social pool of welfare.

All this is suggestive of the paramount position which Sen accords to people's social embeddedness in his approach. But at the same time, it also raises the question that if Sen's approach is driven so much by social aspect of people's lives, what necessitates an overwhelming reliance on individualism. Answer to this lie in the almost exclusive precedence that acquiring a disaggregated account of wellbeing holds in Sen's approach. In aggregation Sen fears an information loss of the worst kind: this because, aggregation swathes human diversity and blankets distributional inequity. Sen's zeal for informational vastness is conjured up by this concern, and accordingly, his diatribe against other approaches, utilitarianism in particular, spawns from this deficiency. As Comim (2008, p. 169) puts it, the capabilities approach takes human diversity as an empirical fact and uses it as a crucially important assumption in criticizing utilitarian and Rawlsian approaches.

To account for this human diversity, interpersonal comparison is the general formula which the capabilities approach uses to ascertain strands of disequilibria in the distribution of social privileges and obligations. In this role, interpersonal comparisons cover a broad range of diverse facets within the capabilities set of an individual. It measures individual perceptions of utility; it estimates the availability of utility to each person; it assesses the capacity variance in the wellbeing derived from the same amount of utility; it weighs up individual utility functions in and across social system(s); it approximates the differential in utility requirement across individuals and the list stretches on. In short, interpersonal comparisons

---

[38] The manner in which the capabilities approach envisages wellbeing in other regarding pursuits is elaborated further in chapter five.

serve as the way out for Sen from the aggregative mystification and in this sense forms the fulcrum of Sen's endeavour for evaluating individual wellbeing. This is what also explains both the need and nature of individualism in Sen's approach.

3.3.2: THREE MANIFESTATIONS OF SEN'S INFORMATIONAL PLURALISM

With this understanding of individualism as a tool of informational pluralism in the capabilities approach, let us now return to the three issues to which reference was made above. One reason for choosing these three forms of social disequilibria amidst the hydra-headed distributional asymmetry in a social system, outside the justifications already provided, is the opportunity which they afford for explaining the operational specificities of the capabilities matrix. Taking on each of these strands, an effort is made here to show how informational pluralism, with particular emphasis on interpersonal comparison, is used in Sen's approach to unearth wellbeing asymmetry across a social system. Each of these strands is evaluated in the three spaces, personal circumstances, resources and conversion factor within the capabilities space[39] to show what explanation Sen's approach provides. As the three spaces define the empirical framework of the capabilities approach, an analysis across them would show the type of distributive dimensions targeted by the capabilities approach within its overall conception of social justice and equity.

Let us take the case of *relative deprivation* first. References to relative deprivation existed in the development literature well before the introduction of capabilities approach, and Sen (2009, p. 266) has himself noted that it was discussed by Adam Smith in his *Wealth of Nations*. It is however in its identification and categorization as specific unfreedoms that the significance of Sen's approach lies. In the way Sen describe them[40], relative deprivations typically means a condition of *'being relatively poor in a rich country'* although *'one's absolute income is high in terms of world standards'* (Sen, 2000, p. 89). Sen has often given the example of the African American and the various deprivations suffered by them even in a developed society like the US to exemplify this wellbeing deficit (Sen, 1983b).

A capabilities analysis within the three spaces of the capabilities set shows that relative deprivation are redolent of a circumcised space of conversion factor. It typifies a situation

---

[39]Disaggregation across these three spaces also reflects Sen's concern for obtaining a disaggregated account of people's wellbeing within any distribution of economic or social goods.

[40] Relative derivations, as subject, have been researched even beyond the way Sen has used it for differentiating between the income poverty and capability poverty. It has attracted some interest in the recent years within the subject area of social exclusion, and in particular its importance has incremented in a globalized world which has provided more vistas for a comparison of the prevailing social conditions in different part of the globe. For more on the subject, please see (Papadopoulos & Tsakloglou, 2008; Runciman, 1966; Townsend, 1979).

where there is no dearth of resources in a social system, and in terms of access to these resources, peoples circumstances do not offer any significant imbalances in terms of social, legal, or economic disparities. However, the gap in people's capacities to convert resources into useful functioning is sizeable. This gap restrains command over converting available resources into personal advantage. This, therefore, is typical case of unfreedoms suffered in its process aspect.

The second notion used by the capabilities approach to highlight social inequalities is *adaptive preferences*[41]. Adaptive preferences or *habituated preferences* as Kaufman (2006b, pp. 73, 74) calls it, or as Hinton (2006, p. 109) dubs it, *deformed preferences* signifies an adaptation and mental conditioning (Sen, 2000, p. 62) where people adjust their desires and preferences in accordance with their circumstances in order to make life more bearable in adverse circumstances. The situation faced '*skews deliberations away from the subordinate'* (Kamsler, 2006, p. 203), and subjects the mental metric to adapt to *'subjective deprivations brought about by persistent deprivations'* (Sen, 2000, p. 67).

But within the capabilities matrix, adaptive preferences are patented by an idiosyncratic oddity which propels inverse preference ordering. Against the desired course of the functioning vector mentioned in figure 3.2, where a two-way interrelationship between the spaces of personal circumstances and resources ensures freedoms maximization, there is only one-way manoeuvrability with only the space of resources influencing the space of personal circumstances. And due to the scarcity in the space of resources, this influence induces shrinkage in the space of personal circumstances, which translates into truncation of preferences and manifests as adaptive preferences. Therefore what is really seen as a handicap within the space of personal circumstances by other approaches, is explained by constraints within the space of resources in the capabilities framework.

The third notion, counterfactuality, does not connote an entitlement deficit *per se* as the other two. According to the Oxford dictionary, counterfactual means *'relating to or expressing what has not happened or is not the case'*[42] As a determinant of the third strand of social

---

[41] Elster (1982, p. 226) describes five essential features of adaptive preferences, which *'enables to locate it on the map of mind'.* He mentions that it differs from learning because it is reversible; from commitment because it is the effect and not the cause of the restricted feasible set; from manipulation because of their indigenousness; from character planning because of the causality attached to them; and from wishful thinking because of the evaluation of the situation and not the perception of it.

[42] As per Oxford online dictionary available at the following link, accessed on 29/November/ 2010, http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0184330#m_en_gb0184330

asymmetry within the capabilities space, counterfactuality is used in the capabilities framework to assess wellbeing independent of a person's existing circumstances. Sen calls a counterfactual choice as the one which *'one would have chosen if one had the choice'* (Sen, 1992, p. 67), and therefore avers that counterfactuality *'contrasts what is observed with what allegedly would be observable if something else were different'* (Sen, 1982, p. 359)[43].

Sen explains the notion of counterfactuality with the example of a proof reader who proof reads a book for an author. He mentions that the proof reader does not take away the freedom of the author to print the book in the manner in which the author wants it to be published. In this case, though the actual control is in the hand of the proof reader, but he is counterfactually doing what the author would have done. Clarifying it still further, he cites the example of people's desire to live in an epidemic-free environment. Here again, while people would desire to live in an environment free of disease, the wires of that choice are actually in the control of those who control the epidemic. Despite this loss of control, people's freedoms remain unaffected (Sen, 1992, pp. 64, 65).

Within the freedom matrix, counterfactuality is endemic to the space of personal circumstances. It shows that how functionality within the space of personal circumstances could affect the overall social justice fabric of a society. The concept of counterfactuality makes it possible to assess the extent of people's freedoms in ideal circumstances. In the capabilities approach, Sen uses it as a device for making comparison between people's acquired level of wellbeing with what could have been acquired in a morally just system of distribution.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we saw the rationale of the capabilities approach which it derived from informational deficiency in contemporary social justice frameworks. We also noted that Sen's answer to this informational insufficiency rests in broadening the scope of freedoms for individuals. Such freedoms expansion takes place within the capabilities space of an individual for which functionings, entitlements and agency proffer the instrumental gadgetry. We also noted how these components operate within the capabilities matrix to actualize freedoms expansions. Though Sen's obdurate refusal to convert his framework into a concrete operational plan has couched it in tremendous subjectivity, nevertheless its broad

---

[43] Comim (2008, p. 173) mentions that capabilities in this sense are actually the expressions of the degree of opportunities open to an individual, not merely the realization of these opportunities and choices.

functional parameters are discernable both from the targets and scope of the capabilities approach. Lastly, we saw some of the emergent aspects of freedoms expansions from the capabilities framework with explanations provided by analysis within the three spaces of the capabilities matrix.

Aspects of Sen's framework are both diverse and numerous. Those discussed in this chapter are just a few fundamentals. Many more would be explained in the course of this study at their appropriate places. However, a deeper insight into his scheme of freedoms demands a broader study, both of the work and the criticism it is has attracted.

PART TWO

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND COLLECTIVE INTENT

CHAPTER 4: SOCIAL SPACE AND RELATIONAL STRUCTURES OF COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITIES

In the space covered thus far, distributive social justice was seen in its relevance to the western socio-political and economic setups, and the ground broken by capabilities approach was delineated within the distributive social justice. The shape of social justice derived on the underlying notions of modern distributive justice and the capabilities justice could be described as: *'bona fide wellbeing captured through a pluralistic informational eclecticism equitably distributed across the members of a social space'*. This, in simple terms is both the form and mechanism of welfare distribution based on the philosophy of capabilities approach. Noticeably, this perception of social justice is buttressed by four props: distributive justice, informational pluralism and social space. Of the four, some understanding of the distributive justice was provided by chapter two, while chapter three acquainted us with informational pluralism and a legitimate wellbeing. The fourth component, social space, remains to be contextualized to complete the understanding of the proposal.

But understanding of social space in people's lives requires much greater amplitude of lucidity than other conceptual notions contained in this study for a variety of reasons. First, dimensions of social space in people's lives are both abstruse and arcane. The enigma and equivocation surrounding the issue is only rivalled by the human nature itself. Social context is viewed both as a boon and bane of an individual's life, depending on the manner in which it is construed. In its capacity as providing a social strategy to deal with nature, and even beyond that: affording opportunities for psychological and spiritual comforting, advantage contained in the social aspect of human lives is undeniable. At the same time, the qualifications and compulsions which an individual has to countenance to partake of these advantages are not less obvious. Second, a still larger question relates to the ascertainment of the outreach of the social space in an individual's life. This in fact is the question on which depends not only the complexity arising from its dual role, both enabling and constraining, but also the space which needs to be reserved for the social context of people's lives in a development project. Related to this outreach is the notion of collective intent, for which this study is exploring a mapping within the capabilities space. Third, there are issues surrounding the form and frame of reference of the social context itself: whether it operates uniformly across different geographical, temporal and spatial locations; or whether variation across these factors also imbues difference in individual perceptions. This is essential to see whether

and how much distributive social justice is relevant to social setups elsewhere, particularly in the perspective of its evolution in the western socio-political and economic landscape.

All this entails a broader examination of the social aspect of people's lives. In particular, amidst the macrocosm of the nebula that the social space is, there are questions which occupy unavoidable significance for the domain of this study: how real is the difference in the influence of social context in people's lives at different places; how has that difference emerged; what role does the social context play in places where its influences is more pronounced; how and within what circumference the social context plays this role in such circumstances; and most importantly, what equation prevails between the social context and individual agency. Evidently, the questions posed above are not only numerous but also interrelated. This explains the inclusion of this solitary but lengthy chapter in this second part of this study.

The chapter aims to find an answer to these questions in six parts. The first part explains social cognition, and in that sense, primarily addresses the question: how do people respond to their social environment. This voyaging across the cognitive and volitional foundations of human preferences, desires and behaviours is considered essential to gain an insight into the nature and manner of human living in a social space. The second part takes up societal differentiation resulting from variation in people's cognitive development. The question tackled here is that how ebullience in social cognition induces volitional diversity and how this translates into societal asymmetry. From this asymmetry, the third part picks up collective intent and attempts to provide authenticity to its theoretical and contextual complex. This part builds a case for the authentication of collective intent by highlighting two crucial distinctions: (a) between the investigative approaches of pure sciences and sociology and (b) between holistic and individualistic approaches and the related topic of primacy between structure and agency. In the fourth part, Margaret Archer's morphogenetic approach is presented as way out of the holism-individualism and structure-agency quagmire, which also provides an attestation for the existence of collective intent within the relational collectivities in a social structure. The last two sections of the chapter are vouchsafed for giving context to social structure in people's lives. The first explains its theoretical foundation while the second extends empirical instantiation to this description by drawing on the findings of various field studies.

4.1: SOCIAL COGNITION AS A SCHEME OF SOCIAL RESPONSIVENESS

Skinner (1953, pp. 297, 298) defines a social behaviour as the behaviour of two or more people with respect to one another or in concert towards a common environment and argues that social behaviour arises because one organism is important to another as part of its environment. Pointing towards the importance of social environment in people's lives, Marx also argues that such apparently private acts like eating, drinking, and procreating could be genuinely human functions only if they are integrated into all other human activity and such activity is carried out in a social way, not just for one's own biological needs. From this he infers that the senses of the social person are different from a non-social one, and therefore if one remains stuck in one's own individual self, she/he fails to achieve both the highest form of art and the best empirical science (Fleischacker, 2004, p. 101). Tonnies points towards the inalienability of a person from her/his social environment by pointing out that everything which is 'real' is organic' and in this sense parts must be seen in conjunction with *'the whole material world, which governs their nature and movements'* (Tönnies, 2001, pp. 19, 20). In the sense provided by these arguments, individuals must be seen as forming inseparable bond with their social environments. Without a social context, their actions, motives and desires are only partially meaningful, if not entirely meaningless.

In a social space, individuals countenance two kinds of interactions: interpersonal relationships with other individuals and an attitude towards inanimate social objects. The two types of interactions are not necessarily independent. Social and environmental factors define contours of interpersonal relationships and interpersonal relations determine the tone of a social setup. Both these interaction types originate from an individual social cognition. It will therefore be more appropriate to start the contextualization of social space in people's lives with a portrayal of an individual's social cognition, both in its formation and operation[44].

Leary (2005, p. 85) describes social cognition as a *'process by which people perceive, draw inferences about, and think about other individuals and social groups'*. Oskamp & Schultz refer to it as a *'thought process about people and social situations'* and include in it the ways in which people *'gather information, organize it, and interpret it'* (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, p. 6). Fisk & Taylor consider it *'the study of how people make sense of other people and themselves'* (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 1). More generally, social cognition is the

---

[44] An immensely vast and highly researched discipline as social cognition is, this part is strictly confined to serve as a preamble to describing the role of collectives in human lives and their response towards it.

understanding of the physical and psychological environment in which individuals live, and the people occupying it.

Oskamp & Schultz consider perception as the first stage in social cognition by which people receive and organize sensory information about people or social situations (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, p. 19). The process of social cognition commences with positioning of the 'self' in relation to the social environment. Kasser cites Ryan (1995) to define 'self' as the integrative centre of the organism, *the set of psychological process that is attempting to make experience whole, to feel authenticity behinds its behaviours, and to grow'* (Kasser, 2002, p. 125). This centrality, however, does not mean unmitigated authority. For instance, Kasser mentions that values sometimes emerge and reflect the self and sometimes they emerge and reflect coercive processes. He cites Rogers (1964) to point out that individuals often give up their own internal locus of evaluation in order to acquire the love and affection of others, and thus hold values that are based on other than what would facilitate the actualization of the true self. Kasser further cites Rokeach (1973) to point towards the three motivational functions of values: those for self-actualization, those for adjusting to the societal demands and group pressures and those for satisfying the ego (Kasser, 2002, p. 128).

The point relating to the forsaking of internal locus of evaluation by a person carry special significance in understanding how people form perception of social goods. Kasser's and Roger's findings have been proved, at least in the case of the eastern societies, by the empirical research carried out by Derné to which reference is made in the last part o   f this chapter. This is the spore, the corpuscle from which the entire protoplasm of collective intent grows and against which Sen's articulations of people's social perceptions will be mainly tested in subsequent chapters.

For the present, we revert to social cognition which, by now, could be taken as a guide to understand how people act and react in a social environment. As an index of human response system to social stimuli, various theoretical models have used social cognition to provide explanation for human action in a social space. For instance, Azjen & Fishbein's theory of reasoned action addresses behaviours which are under volitional control (Ajzen, 1985, pp. 35, 36). It provides explanations and predictions for the social behaviour on the assumption that people's behavioural intentions follow *'reasonably'* from their *'belief about performing behaviour'* (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005, p. 193). Social cognition furnishes information on the factor of belief for this theory which argues that people act on the basis of their beliefs and

available information and in this process a person's behavioural intentions are the best predictors of how that person will behave (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, p. 103). It divides motivational belief behind the behavioural intentions into two categories, one behavioural and the other normative. Behavioural belief is based on a person's attitude towards performing the behaviour, while the normative beliefs are the person's subjective norms which influence the behaviour (Madden, Ellen, & Ajzen, 1992).

While some involvement of the social stimuli could be hardly ruled out in the behavioural belief, normative belief owes its entire existence to the social cognition gained in a social space. It ascribes reason to people's behaviour in psychological historicity which they derive from their social environment: in living together, in deriving common meaning from social influences and developing similarity in their responses to social impulses. In addition to the factors included in the theory of reasoned action, the theory of planned action adds the important element of compliance with *'important referents'* in explaining behavioural motivation (Ajzen, 1985, p. 36). This factor of *'perceived behavioural control'* provides explanation for differentiating between the natural and rational volition which will be discussed shortly. For the present, it suffices to mention that the postulates of Fishbein and Ajzen in respect of people's behavioural motivations accord considerable currency, almost equivalent to people's endogenous stimuli, to the impulsion which they internalize from their social environments. Figure 4.1 shows how the two theories explain the emergence of behaviour from the interplay of people's own attitudes and the influence sopped up from social space.

Figure 4.1: Path Models for Theories of Reasoned and Planned Action

Source: adopted from (Madden, et al., 1992, p. 4)

Ajzen & Fishbein (2005, p. 194) highlight the importance of the fact that behavioural, normative and control beliefs about the performance of a given belief are influenced significantly by a wide variety of cultural, personal and situational factors, including *inter alia* individualist and collectivist orientations. To this, Triandis's model of interpretive behaviour adds the factors of habit and facilitating conditions. Triandis model considers that within various degrees of voluntary behaviour, there may be factors such as habits and facilitating conditions which influence behaviour (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, p. 103). Both habit and facilitating conditions are behavioural orientations which people derive in their repeated interaction with a social environment. In this sense, even what is termed as voluntary behaviour could hardly be seen as under a person's ultimate and exclusive volitional control.

While the theories of reasoned and planned actions provide general information on the way internal volitions are associated with, and influenced by, social cognition; Fritz Heider's attribution theory contains more specific reference to the recurrent humdrum events in people's lives. Heider's articulation of external attributes is significant for social cognition in acquiring a fit for the everyday occurrences within the overall set of perceptions. His theory of causal inference is based on people's naive psychology i.e. their everyday thinking about events and making sense about the world. Individual's, he argues, necessarily develop causal notions about the events and behaviours in order to understand, predict and control the world around them. He distinguishes between internal attribution where the cause of the individual action is personal disposition such as being friendly, thrifty, reclusive, extrovert; and external attribution where the cause of the individual action is factors outside the person like good luck, or favourable and unfavourable circumstances. Heider therefore proposes that in ascribing causality to people's actions, both personal characteristics and situational factors should be taken into account (Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, pp. 31, 32).

As a final point in this explanation about the process of social cognition, it is essential to emphasize the heterogeneity and variety of the manner in which social influence shapes people's perceptions of social good within different social environments. For instance, Lutz draws attention to the ethnopsychological knowledge systems which are the cultural variations that play a key part in shaping difference in psyche (Lutz, 1988 cited by Derne 2009: p 129). Similarly, Schweder believes that the transformation of human psyche resulting from cultural traditions and social practices culminates less in psychic unity for humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion (Shweder, 1991, p. 73 cited by Derne 2009: p 128).

In summation, social cognition emerges as a three stage human response system to social and material environment. The first stage internalizes social stimuli through sensory interaction with the social environment. In the second phase, these impulsions are processed by a bimodal mental disposition: one endogenous consisting of personal mental tendencies and the other, exogenous comprising historically acquired mental propensities from the social environment. The last phase unleashes the resultant responses, which bear imprints of both endogenous complexions and social influences.

Of this three stage human survival strategy in a social space, the second phase of processing the social stimuli is of significance in the context of this study. The bimodal mental

disposition in this phase could be considered as two distinct mental portfolios which emerge as a result of people interaction with the social environment. Of these two mental portfolios one could be termed the socio-historic and the other the contemporaneous-personal. Socio-historic portfolio represents a mental disposition where the locus of decision is based on the social perceptions derived over a period of time such as norms, customs and traditions. This disposition is exogenous, is more collective in nature and therefore operates and results in a shared social space. The contemporaneous-personal mental portfolio connotes a mental tendency located within the individual her/himself. These are purely personal responses to social stimuli, unmitigated by social or historical factors and therefore are endogenous to people possessing them. Different combinations of these two portfolios result in the emergence of a plurality of social responses, depending on the density and drive of the constituting portfolios. For instance, a strong socio-historic portfolio which overwhelms the contemporaneous-personal portfolio will result in predominantly collectivist tendencies and vice versa. A depiction of these processes is provided in Figure 4.2 below.

4.2: EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL COGNITION AND RESULTANT SOCIETAL DIFFERENTIATION

The interplay of the two mental portfolios ensues a mobility in the cognitive processes which ensures their constant evolution[45]. Context to this intrinsic effervescence of social cognition is provided by Ferdinand Tonnies's theory of social evolution and societal classification. The manner in which Tonnies explains social evolution in terms of the social cognition carries threefold importance for the argument taken up by this study. In the first place, for Tonnies societal differentiation emerges from people's cognitive development across time (Cahnman, 1973, pp. 8, 9). This historicity also resonates in the historical evolution of distributive social justice spotlighted in the second chapter. As stressed there, political and socio-economic developments were seen to have played a crucial role in giving the prevailing face to distributive justice in the west. Tonnies's approach towards pointing out societal variance also takes the same historical route, and this reconnects us well with the line of argument initiated there. Second, Tonnies's classifies social setups on the basis of the underlying relational patterns derived from the emotional and cognitive underpinnings of their

---

[45] The only perceptible way in which the process of social cognition could be considered static is a situation where a perfect and stable equilibrium exists in the second phase between the endogenous and exogenous dispositions. Only in this case, the possibility of both the evolution of social cognition and the resultant societal differentiation could be ruled out; and only here the resultant stereotypical preferences ushered in by monotonous social cognition could be captured by virtue of a uniform, one-dimensional social justice framework. But such a possibility is more mechanical than real in the presence of a dynamic psychological content possessed by humans.

members.[46]. This provides a good tool for sorting different social structures on the basis of the relational patterns and resulting division of labour of the respective people. Third, and as will be observed during the course of this chapter, there are traces of what Tonnies proposed in the works of the latter theorists. This provides good prospects of benefitting from a wider spectrum of theoretical postulates on the same topic.

Tonnies demarcates human volition into two categories: *Wesenwille* and *Kurwille*. *Wesenwille* is the natural, organic and essential will which includes an element of thought whereas *Kurwille* involves calculation, arbitrary freedom and rational choice and is merely a part of the thought process (Tönnies, 2001, p. 95). In the former, organisms contained in the forebrain when stimulated cause the psychological activities that we interpret as thoughts, whereas the latter is the product of the thought itself, resulting from the agency of the author. Both these wills result in human action (Tönnies, 2001, pp. 95, 96).

Based on his distinction between the two types of volition, Tonnies (2001, pp. 17, 18) brings about a distinction between, what he terms, a community and a society. A community, *Gemeinschaft*, to him is based on the *Wesenwille* which grows out of people's relationships and the resultant social bonds in real organic life. On the other hand, he considers society, *Gesellschaft*, as a purely mechanical construct, existing in mind, for which the *Kurwille* serves as the foundation. His idea of *Gemeinschaft* is based on the precept that in the original or natural state, there is complete unity of human wills (Tönnies, 2001, p. 22), whereas in *Gesellschaft*, he sees people living detachedly (Tönnies, 2001, p. 52).

> In *Gemeinschaft* they stay together in spite of everything that separates
> them; in *Gesellschaft* they remain separate in spite of everything that unite
> them (Tönnies, 2001, p. 52).

Pappenheim explains that relationship in *Gesellschaft* is contractual in nature, established deliberately by individuals who realize that the pursuit of their interest is not possible individually. In *Gemeinschaft* which works as a social unit, however, memberships is involuntary as it does not come into being through the deliberate design of its members (Pappenheim, 1959, p. 66). Pappenheim mentions that in *Gesellschaft,* individual participate

---

[46]Although appreciating Tonnies's contribution towards combining psychology and sociology *'in an original way'* in connecting the change from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, Pappenheim argues against describing Tonnies explanations as an attempt to reduce social process and structures to psychological ones. For more detail on this aspect, please see (Pappenheim, 1959, pp. 76, 77).

not as a whole person but with a part thereof such as membership in a taxpayers association or ownership in a stock company, where only part of the person as a taxpayer or a shareholder is involved, leaving out other qualities like family backgrounds or friendships. Against this, in *Gemeinschaft,* the purist manifestation of which is provided by relationships within a family, involvement of the people is with their whole person (Pappenheim, 1959, pp. 66, 67). Tonnies argues that society has historically moved from an age of *Gemeinschaft* to an age of *Gesellschaft* through a transition process begun during the Renaissance and facilitated by the Industrial Revolution.

Figure 4.2: Factors and Stages in the Process of Social Cognition

Source: Author's contribution

Apart from providing explanation about the process of social differentiation, these postulates by Tonnies carry importance for studying the time-sequence of societal classification. His temporal interpretation of the movement from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* provides a good harness for the consecution of the various stages of human cognitive development. Such syndication in terms of phases of human volitional development affords an opportunity to decipher the distinctive features of people's social cognition transpiring from the prevailing

social circumstances and the stage of their social development. Possessed with the *Wesenwille*, an individual is seen at a stage of cognitive development where her/his will is inseparable from the other members of society. From this, individuals gradually move to *Kurwille* which results from the volitional sequestration set forth by a stage of cognitive development where people now have different perceptions of social good. All this takes place in a time series. This temporal seriality makes societal classifications amenable to demarcation on the basis of prevailing perceptions of social good in a given social setup at a particular juncture of its socio-political and economic development. Herein lay the foremost significance of Tonnies's postulates for this study. It provides a justification for assessing collective social setups of developing countries on the basis of the distinctive features of distributive social justice identified in the second chapter.

However, Tonnies's analyses have one important failing. He does not ponder the reasons for transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. Content with his classificatory pronouncements, he does not explore into the causes of societal transformation (Cahnman, 1973, p. 2). Therefore, to discover as to what sets this process of societal transition in motion, one has to look elsewhere. Some explanation for this transition is provided by the three phases of cognitive development mentioned above. Within that framework, the transition is explained on the equation obtaining between the endogenous and exogenous impulses of processing social influence which exists in the second phase of cognitive processes. Of the two mental portfolios at work in this phase of cognitive processing; the prevalence of socio-historic, exogenous impulses is obvious in *Wesenwille*; whereas the contemporaneous-personal, endogenous impulses hold sway in the *Kurwille*.

At a particular tract of time and space, the equation obtaining between the *Wesenwille* and the *Kurwille* could only be disturbed by a compositional change between the two mental portfolios. Such a transition is always one-directional; from the predominance of socio-historic to contemporaneous-personal, and is explained by the increased maturity of the cognitive processing. This maturity is acquired due to the increased contact with social environment which, as mentioned, includes both animated and unanimated social objects. Due to this increased contact, the contemporaneous-personal component gains in strength, reducing its dependence on the socio-historic component. The greater this capitulation of the socio-historic component to the contemporaneous-personal, the larger the prevalence of the *Kurwille*; and equivalently the bigger the shrinking of the *Wesenwille*!

This explanation about the volitional transformation finds support from Baldwin's illustration of three distinct modes of collective life: the *instinctive*, the *spontaneous* and the *reflective*. Social interactions he describes as stereotypical, fixed and not progressive in the instinctive mode. They are explained on the biological principles of selection and inheritance, are biological reactions in their functions, restrict the emergence of any authentic social experience and are therefore not social in any true sense. His characterization of the learning in the spontaneous mode is based on trial and error and persistent imitation; producing social interaction on the basis of behaviour learned through experience. Here the acquired modes of collective action exhibit social transmission rather than physical heredity and social interactions are limited by their conservative link to the collective pressure i.e. learning of individuals is limited to tradition. Within a group, individuals learn the same things *'and what they learn is the body of useful actions already established in the collective life of the group'* (Baldwin, 1911, p. 43 cited by Muller et al 2008: p 3). It is only in the reflective mode that individuals make intentional and voluntary cooperation for the pursuits of intelligent ends, and this is what in real sense Baldwin terms as social (Baldwin, 1911, p. 46 quoted by Muller et al 2008: p 3).

Baldwin's observations might be contested as to which of his three stages provide a true manifestation of social life, particularly in the context of this study, but his portrayal of the transition in cognitive processes fills the void left by Tonnies's inability to engineer plausible explanations for the causes of transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. Baldwin considered these different modes of social life as genetically related, representing development in actual social association and organization where the relations established through instinct are reconstructed into intentional and voluntary relations with successive development.

A good link between Tonnies social evolution and Baldwin's exegeses about how that evolution materializes is provided by Pettit's distinction between the *common mind* and *economic mind*. Pettit believes that economic mind is "distinctively" self-regarding which contrasts with the common mind. The common mind is reflected in the common sense view point in which the ordinary folk manage their affairs most of the time without adverting in their own self-interests. They make decisions on the basis of what is required of them under cultural framing of situations in which they are located. Pettit however does not rule out the presence of the economic mind even in such situations which is always *'ready to affect what*

people do, in the event that any of the alarm bells of self-interest ring' (Pettit, 2002, p. 237)[47].

Pettit's articulation of the functionality of common and economic minds bears close resemblance to Tonnies's volitional classification between *Wesenwille* and *Kurwille*. The collective pattern of life in the *Gemeinschaft* makes its pragmatic abode in the silhouette of the common mind provided by Pettit. A motif of similar approximation is evidenced by the similitude between economic mind and *Gesellschaft*. But Pettit's explanations are more profound for the reason that it also provides insights into the manner in which transitions takes place in volitional patterns. What makes this possible for Pettit is the dynamism and autonomy which he allows to human volition even at the stage of common mind where it remains subsumed within the collective intentionality of the group with which individuals are aligned. Even in such a subsumed state, volition is seen to retain its potency- always ready to convert into economic mind at the *'ringing of the bell'* of self interest[48].

At this point, it will be proper to take a pause and re-link this argument with what has been explained in the last two chapters. Since identifying the distinctive features of the modern distributive justice framework there, the capabilities approach has been shown to present its *apotheosis par excellence* aiming to apprehend a fulsome picture of people's wellbeing with a larger information stretch to enable people to live lives of their own choices. It has also been shown that Tonnies's societal classification between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* based on the volitional differential between *Wesenwille* and *Kurwille* underscores dissimilitude in social cognition across societies. On the basis of their approximation to either *Gemeinschaft* or *Gesellschaft*, social cognition takes two distinct roots. The prevalence of the *Wesenwille* in the *Gemeinschaft* aligns it more closely with the traditional, collectivist societies. The same is done for the modern, capitalist societies by the sway of *Kurwille* in *Gesellschaft*[49]. Given the specific shape of the social cognitive processes across these two divergent paths, an asymmetry or even an antithesis between the wellbeing perceptions

---

[47] Pettit believes that economic explanation to the motivation and rationality behind the human behaviour conforms to the profile of what he calls *homo economicus*. He envisions this as based on two sets of assumptions: a content-centred assumption about the sort of things desired and a process-centred assumption regarding the way these desires are issued in action (Pettit, 2002, pp. 222, 223).

[48] This also provides an indication of the processes involved in the volitional shift from *Wesenwille* to *Kurwille* of which very little is found in the works of Tonnies.

[49] It is important to note here that despite this clear distinction between the *Gemeinschaft* and the *Gesellschaft*, Tonnies nowhere argues for reverting back to the former, because he sees no point in reliving forms of life which has lost meaning in the temporal movement of history. Such a reverse movement he considers pregnant with portentous consequences which might result in the creation of *'artificial facades'* and *'empty forms'* (Pappenheim, 1959, pp. 68, 69)

should not come as a surprise.

For the capabilities approach, this means a variable perception about the life as one likes to live in different social setups. To his credit, Sen acknowledges this variation in including in his wellbeing perceptions the type of life to which an individual aspires as a responsible citizen. This is specifically discernable in his explanation of the difference between the instrumental agency success and realized agency success and his conceptualization of the procedural and effective control.

But does this malleability and complaisance of Sen's approach go far enough to conciliate the dictates of both the *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*? Inasmuch as *Gesellschaft* is concerned, no question of contraposition arises as his perceptions about human diversity, interpersonal comparison and resultant informational pluralism are all compatible with *Kurwille*. At this stage, individuals in possession of volitional control are the authors of their actions, in their individual capacities. Not only are separate individuals and their actions in that capacity available, but their perceptions are discernable even where part of their self is involved. The capabilities approach encounters hardly any obstacle in getting an *entrée* into the last bit of societal unit to expand its informational lattice.

Can the same be said about *Gemeinschaft* as well? Does *Wesenwille* exude the kind of plasticity which is commensurate with the informational stretch of the capabilities space and its instrumental gadgetry based primarily on the notion of interpersonal comparisons? But this is one angle from which commonality of intentions of the sort prevailing in collective life patterns could be seen *vis-a-vis* a distributive social justice approach. There is still another dimension to this equation which asks whether the informational stretch of the freedoms-centred capabilities approach muster sufficient outreach to capture wellbeing perceptions in collectivist social setups. This, in essence is the overall hypothesis of this study, and that is the reason why the continuum of the argument was broken to gain a link with the main argument. Understandably, it will be premature to stamp a verdict on the issue many dimensions of which still remains to be highlighted. Therefore avoiding any precipitate dogmatism, collective intent is studied in further details to cleanse it of any cabalistic esotericism and acquire a degree of candour and clarity, before exploring answers to the above questions.

4.3: AUTHENTICATING COLLECTIVE INTENT

Tonnies's interpretations of the societal classification draw a manifest divide between the societies on the basis of the volitional development of their members. If the social setups of the developed countries are taken as the most advanced and articulate form of division of labour as in *Gesellschaft*, it would mean that social setups where such articulation has not taken place approximate to the *Gemeinschaft* to a variable degree and extent. This is indicative of a societal differential purely on the basis of the adopted social strategy: whether it is individualist or collectivist.

But the mere identification of this divide does not provide sufficient grounds for looking beyond distributive social justice as a framework of human and social uplift, unless collective intent itself is provided authenticity. In fact, the search for a fit between the collective intent and the capabilities approach must commence with such a validation to see how real the demand for such a fit is. Both for the sake of this authentication and acquiring reason for exploring the fit, it is important to know what gives rise to collective responses; what are the underlining rationales and processes; what sustains them and what explains their evolution. Beyond these fundamental questions, there is also the crucial question about the elucidation of the functionality of collective intent in comparison to the individual-centred processes.

One does not have to look far to spot the rationale and justifications for the existence of collective intent. Some pointers towards this could be observed in Skinner's and Marx's views about people's social compositions at the very start. Further evidence is provided by Pettit who believes that individuals are not entirely free-standing in a social setup and they depend on one another *'for the possession of some property that is central to the human being'* (Pettit, 2002, p. 117). Therefore for him, social motivation is directly related not only to the type of property but also the meaning of the dependence itself. This is because of the fact that Pettit believes that even for the enjoyment of some of their innate properties, people need the presence of others; they cannot be enjoyed in isolation. Pettit supports his contention with the postulate of Bradley that, *'I am myself by sharing with others, by including in my essence relations to them, the relations of the social state'* (Bradley, 1876 p. 173 cited by Pettit, 2002, p 119). It is for this reason that Pettit also supports the contention of Charles Taylor (Taylor, 1985, p. 191) that living in society is an essential condition for the development of the rationality, and becoming a '*moral agent*', a *'fully responsible'* and *'autonomous being'*; and that outside the society, our *'distinctively human capacities'* could

not develop (Pettit, 2002, pp. 119, 120). Pettit therefore warns against the extension of the economic supposition of rational behaviour to all the human activities, for it (economic supposition) may be relevant to some areas of human exchange, most conspicuously in the area of market behaviour, but it does not apply across a broad range of human interactions.

> I do not call on you in the name of what is just to your personal advantage; did I do so, that could be a serious insult. I call on you in the name of your commitment to certain ideals, your memberships of certain groups, your attachment to certain people. I call on you, more generally, under the assumption that like me you understand and endorse the language of loyalty and fair play, kindness and politeness, honesty and straight talking (Pettit, 2002, p. 229).

To the inseparable bond between an individual and her/his social environment, these arguments add the immensely crucial element of social reason which takes collective intent from a mere coincidental coming together of individuals to a more rewarding life strategy in a social space. This factor of social reason is also at the core of Raimo Tuomela's explanations about behaviour and intentionality in a group. Tuomela argues that collective intentionality is based on a solid social reason and it is this social reason that gives shape and pattern to the social space. Tuomela elucidates his argument with the example of several people opening umbrellas at the same time when it starts raining to underscore the point that *'what makes collective action social, thus, is that the agents must be socially connected in the right way'* (Tuomela, 2002, p. 82). Such a social connectedness in the right way, for him, forms the basis of a social reason. Having a reason means having a suitable attitude (want or belief) towards the reason. That reason must enter and be processed by an individual's intentional cognitive system to be motivational and action-guiding (Tuomela, 2002, p. 82). Tuomela believes that doing something repeatedly for a shared social reason qualifies as social practice whereas the mere repeated doing of something does not fulfil the criterion of a social practice (Tuomela, 2002, p. 92). It is for this reason that Tuomela (2002, pp. 119, 120) considers pure work practices as purely instrumental practices and does not count them among social practices.

A social reason, therefore, accords authenticity to people's motivations and corresponding actions in a social space. But does it provide a pedestal for explaining collective intentionalities in a social space. Tuomela answers this question in affirmative by

differentiating between, what he terms, as *'I-mode'* and *'we-mode'* intentionalities. Tuomela (2002, pp. 35, 36) differentiates we-mode belief from I-mode as follows;

> A we-mode belief, expressible by "We, as a group, believe that p," requires that the group in question is *collectively committed* to upholding its mutual belief or at least to keeping members informed about whether it is or can be upheld. This contrasts with mutual belief in aggregative individual mode involving only purely private *commitments* to the belief in question (Tuomela, 2002, pp. 35, 36 italics in original).

A collective social is, therefore, an action performed in the 'we-attitude', for a social reason. For an individual X, with an attitude $ATT_{(p)}$, Tumela (2002, p. 23) mentions that we-attitude is the strongest when,

a) X has $ATT_{(p)}$
b) Believes that others in the group have $ATT_{(p)}$
c) Believes that others in the group believe that it is mutually believed that members have $ATT_{(p)}$ [50]

Based on his distinction between the We-mode and I-mode behaviour, Tuomela ascribes meaning to various social concepts such as values, norms, customs and social practices. Tuomela (2002, p. 121) considers *'recurrently performed collective social action'* to be the central notion of a social practice. Such repeated activity is performed because of a social reason on the basis of a shared we-attitude which excludes strategic reasoning. Thus a social practice is the repetition of the collective action (Tuomela, 2002, p. 41) and customs represents a special case of social actions which has a historicity attached to it (Tuomela, 2002, pp. 12, 13). Tuomela (2002, p. 12) considers social practices as conceptually dependent on shared we-attitudes and collective intentionalities. To him, social institutions are special kinds of ordered pairs of social practices which have two key elements- norms and collective activity. Norms confer a special symbolic or social status on the activity. Social institutions are collectively- but not necessarily intentionally- made devices for creating order in human community (society) and helping people satisfy their basic needs such as food and shelter, sexual relations and reproduction, sociality and social power (Tuomela, 2002, pp. 156, 157).

---

[50] Tuomela (2002, p. 29) explains that it can also take the alternative form where a participant does not have the belief that the other believes that he will not perform his part.

Elsewhere, Tuomela (2007, pp. 10-16) avers that the depersonalization that occurs in social groups is part of the basic structure of the group life and is not a mere contingent feature of the groups. He considers social institutions in their core to be the norms systems, obeyed in accordance with the relevant social practices. Therefore, permanent social structures such as the state and its administrative apparatus, education and business systems and the structure of the society are dependent upon the underlying social practices observed by the society.

In providing authenticity to the claim about the existence of collective intent, these accounts of the manner in which social cognition evolves across temporal and physical space throws out three notable points from the point of view this study. First, collective intentionalities form antecedents to the individualistic patterns in a social space. Or stated differently, individualism itself grows out of the collective intentionalities. Pettit and Baldwin's explanations provide an index of how this transition takes place. Significant within these arguments is the fact that subsuming of volition within a collectivity does not amount to volitional morbidity. Had this been the case, there would be no societal evolution from collectivist societies to the individualistic.

Second, social reason constitutes an essential constituent of the collective intent which gives it meaning beyond the arbitrary and fortuitous coming together of random individuals. This point is again closely linked with the volitional vivacity mentioned in the first point. Social reason therefore works as a rudder which not only propels but also gives shape and direction to a social strategy. Individualist and collectivist social setups could therefore be seen as resulting from different forms of social reasons which govern the interrelationships of people at different social spaces. Third, collective intent is distinct from the mere aggregation of the individual intentionalities held in their private capacities. In this sense, collective intentionality needs to be seen as a unit unto itself, rather than a hunk of the intentionalities in a social space. On the strength of the above explanations, it can be reasonably argued that collective intent is so densely visible in the social space in which people live that its existence becomes synonymous with the social space itself.

4.3.1: IRREDUCIBILITY OF COLLECTIVE INTENT

But while the presence of collective intent across a social space hardly remains a contested notion, its form certainly does. The question that whether or not collective intent is reducible to its constituents has remained as contentious as the obviousness of collective intent in a

social space. Reason for this is its bearing on an analytical approach: whether to take units of a social collectivity as discrete entities, or consider them as inseparably conjoined agglomerates. To acquire clarity on its form and the scandal surrounding its irreducibility or otherwise, collective intent is examined in the backdrop of two crucial theoretical constructs. First the elemental difference between the nature of a scientific and sociological approaches is highlighted. This differentiation is essential to underscore the error of judgement that could ensue from seeking purely scientific explanations for an essentially socio-psychological phenomenon. As a predominant part of such a canard sprouts from the treatment of the parts in a whole, the next construct elaborates the relationship of parts with, and inside, a collective in a sociological approach. Both these constructs have remained dominant themes in the contentions about the form and nature of the collective intent.

But before taking up the assignment, it is pertinent to mention by way of clarification that in a sense, both the insufficiency of scientific methodology in obtaining inference about the whole from the sum of the properties of the parts and the inseparability of the individuals from their social environment are mutually reinforcing. It is the perpetually interminable connection of the individuals with social collectivities which makes the information obtained from parts deficient in covering all aspects of a social collectivity, and the deficiency itself is induced by the inseparability of the parts within a social collectivity.

4.3.2: Difference between a scientific and sociological approach

Distinction between a scientific and sociological enquiry rests primarily in their respective units of analyses: one examining social objects bristling with perceptive emotional effervescence and the other, azoic substances bereft of psychological content. Reference to this methodological distinction between sociological observations of human life patterns from purely scientific experiments is also manifest in Tonnies's thought who underscores the need for differentiating the approach towards the understanding of human relations from the methodology for assessment and evaluation of other scientific phenomena. He posits that human relationships in terms of race, nation and tribe should be looked at from a sociological rather than a biological angle. This for him is essential because we have to see human relationships *'either as living entities, or conversely as artificially constructed one'* (Tönnies, 2001, p. 21).

A broader and much detailed explanations for the peculiarities of scientific and sociological

investigations are offered by Spranger's distinction between what he terms as *psychology of elements* and *structural psychology* (Spranger, 1928, pp. 3-21). Spranger calls for differentiating psychology of the natural science, which he calls the psychology of elements, from structural psychology by which he means the science of human spirits. He mentions that the psychology of elements, in imitation of the methods used in all natural sciences, considers only so many classes of conscience elements as are necessary and sufficient to build up the total process of individual conscience (Spranger, 1928, p. 9). He therefore cautions with a forewarning;

> .....the mere synthesis of psychic elements can never create the totality of a soul whose meaningful complex is related to the entire mental world. On the contrary, the significant is primary. Analysis, however, merely differentiates its elements which do not in the least give the fundamental reason for the insight of the whole (Spranger, 1928, p. 11).

Spranger first points out to the breadth of medium in which a sociological experience takes place as compared to the scientific experimentation. Because of this grander canvas, no individual experiences all that is valuable, and much that is experienced is actually valueless; this gives rise to the question of *'critical-objectivity'* or *'genuine values'*. This also contrasts the scientific experiment where the entire project consists of valuable parts and procedures, included towards the realization of specific results. Spranger considers it absolutely impossible to construct a complete mental world from elements on the scientific principle of constructing a mechanism out of material parts. To instantiate his point, Spranger gives the example of a machine and its parts;

> A machine, for instance, may be said to be meaningful because all its partial achievements work together for a total effect which somehow has value. An organism is meaningful insofar as its functions tend toward the preservation of its existence in given environmental conditions, since its preservation may be considered valuable for itself. But most significant of all is the psychic life of an individual because an individual experiences within itself the valuable or valueless significance of its total action and the relations of its partial functions (Spranger, 1928, p. 12)

The reason for this distinction is Spranger's (1928, pp. 5, 6) belief that the whole nature is

never present to our senses at any particular time and therefore what we experience at any one particular instance is not the whole reality. Just as the context of the nature is much greater than our limited sensory capacities, so is the individual's mental world only partially present in her/his immediate experience or achievement.

Muzafer Sherif (1967, pp. 55-60) also points towards this partial functionality of human vision in people's relationships with their social environment. It is for this reason that he uses the term *'part of culture'* instead of *'culture'*, arguing that during a life course, an individual is seldom confronted with the whole of the culture. *'His acquaintance with the culture is confined to his experience'* (Mazafer Sherif, 1967, p. 56). He therefore believes that the study of cultural influences should not be confined only to the interpersonal relations; there are parts of material cultural which also works as stimulus factors. Among this, he refers to the impacts of furniture, dwellings, playgrounds, and means of transportation, communication and technological products. In support of his argument, Sherif points towards the views of Sapir (Sapir & Mandelbaum, 1985 c1949, pp. 317, 318) who avers that every profound change in a civilization, with specific reference to the economic base, tends to set forth an unsettling and readjustment of cultural values, which is resisted by the old cultural forms. The result is a corrective process in some situations and a *'spiritual disharmony'* in others. Therefore, when we talk of social-individual bond, it is a relationship which, in addition to the interpersonal relationships of people living in a collectivity, also encompasses various supra-individual relational factors such as those alluded by Sherif[51].

Sherif's indication towards the existence of supra-interpersonal factors in social and cultural patterning exposes a very crucial informational insufficiency of a distributive social justice approach which mainly focuses on interpersonal comparisons. It ascribes people with a property which though originates from, and sustains on, the psycho-emotional confluence of individuals with one another and with the environment in which they co-exists; the individual is not the location at which this property exists; and because no person holds this property individually, it cannot be captured through a framework which focuses on the individual. This property originates, nurtures and survives on shared perceptions and collective responses. A distributive justice framework, arguably, suffers an intrinsic incompleteness if it does not provide for both the understanding and accommodating of this property which ties

---

[51] Sherif, however, concedes that material culture seldom affects social relations singlehandedly, and its impact has to be considered in conjunction with other motivational directions and goals of the people involved.

the individual to the social environment, both in terms of inter, and supra-personal relationships. However, since the capabilities approach uses the agential aspects of people's capabilities to give context to the social space in which people live, it will be both interesting and important to see how it responds to this property when such comparisons are made in the succeeding chapters.

Returning to Spranger, despite pointing towards the partial mental structures of the individuals in a social space, he nevertheless points out that they still derive their meaning from the total mental structure of which they are a part. This is the essence of his structural psychology. The collective mind develops not only from the achievements of these partial structures, but also from their coordination which results in trans-subjective precipitation. In cases where these achievements are based on definite rules, such as norms, there emerge *'overindividual configurations'* which are shared and experienced by all those who could place themselves in such a situation. Ultimately, a mental world develops *'in overindividual sense'*, above the *'limited and fortuitous individuals'*, which grows, changes and even disintegrates as the time passes (Spranger, 1928, p. 17). Psychology of elements could compete with this methodology only if it is able to investigate in every single case, '*the last distinguishable content in relation to the partial structures'* and the total structure beyond that[52] (Spranger, 1928, p. 17). From this, Spranger derives the following inference;

> Our comparison of the two kinds of psychology consciously emphasizes the points of extreme difference. To the question of whether there is any possible agreement or mediate steps between them we must answer that the different points of view which are determined by the different intended objects cannot be abolished; but that we can adjust the difference in the formation of concepts and methods. Physiological psychology which expressly investigates the relation of the physical to the anatomical and physiological facts can never coincide with a psychology which investigates the physical in its relation to mind. But the method which is based upon an analogy of atomic and mechanical theory can be improved upon (Spranger, 1928, p. 18)

Spranger (Spranger, 1928, pp. 18, 19) believes that by the interweaving of subjective mental functions, an *'overindividual meaning-complex'*, *'an objective mental configuration'* is

---

[52] In the next chapter, it is seen as to how far the capabilities approach fulfils this requirement.

created. The soul as mental structure complex is capable of creating *'overindividual meaning constellations'*. On the contrary, physical elements remain bound to the individual. Therefore psychology of elements deals only with the phenomena which can be directly experienced by the *'introspecting individual'*. Another individual can only communicate with such an introspecting individual by first creating something objective, to which the other individual corresponds by *'emphatic'* relation. The structure of this act may be based on *'interweaving of ideas, feelings and desires'*. Thus a common meaning is created and it is creating and experiencing of this common meaning by virtue of which *'the individual soul reaches into overindividual mentality'* (Spranger, 1928, p. 19).

For Spranger, therefore, the methodology of pure sciences is not possessed with enough versatility to capture *'over-individual mental constellations'*. A somewhat similar argument is also offered by Margaret Archer who believes that people and their own emergent properties preclude the simulation of the laboratory conditions. Laboratory conditions, she argues, demand a closure that is dependent on two conditions: one extrinsic and the other intrinsic. Extrinsically, laboratory closure demands that no new emergent properties develop outside the system that could unpredictably interfere with its own emergent properties. Intrinsically, laboratory conditions demand that there should be no change in the entities possessing the causal powers in order to achieve consistency. She therefore believes that for an adequate explanation of the social phenomenon, there is a need to differentiate the properties of people from the properties of structure i.e. (a) to identify the emergent structure (b) to differentiate the causal powers of the structure from the emergent powers of the people, and (c) to offer explanations for the resulting outcomes (Archer, 1995, p. 70).

Spranger and Archer's arguments are important for understanding the context of difference between the approaches of pure sciences and sociology. But the distinction does not end here. Sociological phenomena do not find proper explanation on the approaches applied to other living organism also. Reason for this is the intrinsic dissimilarity of human life form from those of other species. Muller et al. equate this irreducibility of the social life to biological life with '*any genuinely psychological contribution to the explanation of human social life'*, pointing out that the idea is not new, and can be traced back to such influential scholars as Lev Vygotsky, John Dewey, George Herbert Mead and James Mark Baldwin (Muller, Carpendale, Budwig, & Sokol, 2008, p. 2).

Some of Baldwin's points of view have already been mentioned in relation to the explanation

which he offered for societal transition. In the context of distinction between the living patterns of other biological organisms and the social coexistence of humans, Baldwin (1911, p. 31) advances the same yardstick on which Spranger differentiates between the psychology of elements and structural psychology: the existence of a psychological relation or human bond between the humans which he considers irreducible to biological conditions. Baumeister, however, offers a different explanation for the incongruity between the human form of living and those of other species. For him the contraposition rests in the manner in which human species are able to use culture as *'biological strategy'*, of which other organisms are not capable. Baumeister defines culture as *'an information based-system that enables people to live and work together in organized fashion to satisfy their biological and social needs'* (Baumeister, 2008, p. 75). He thinks that social networks encompass all the means through which culture confers its advantage. For him, language symbolizes one of such enabling contrivances which people employ for sharing information and making decisions in groups. In this way, a social group, rather than individual mind, becomes the depository of knowledge. People derive their benefits from such storehouse of accumulated knowledge, drawing on the lessons and solutions bequeathed by people who are long dead, or live at far off abodes. This also facilitates the accumulation of a collective body of knowledge across many generations. The whole process is emblematic of a progress which is alien to other species. Baumeister believes that human beings differ from other animals to the extent to which they use meaning to guide action and a culture accumulates by invoking meaning.

Another dimension to the distinction between the form of life between the humans and other species is provided by George Herbert Mead who mentions that what distinguishes the former from the latter is its ability to take the perspective of another person on one's self, which psychologists consider the foundation of language, thinking and personhood (Mead, 1934 cited by Muller et al 2008: p 3). Termed as the *reciprocity of perspective* by Plessner (Plessner, 1983, p. 332 cited by Muller et al 2008: p 34) this is the foundation on which language is built[53].

This discussion underlines the fact the psychological constitutions of the people living in a social collectivity emit aspects of behaviour which cannot be captured by a scientific methodology churned out to deal with inanimate objects or non-human organisms. This

---

[53] In Tomasello's (1999) terminology, such a *'role reversal learning'* is essential for getting an understanding of a symbol in its proper conventional sense.

psychological content imbues humans with creating meanings of which other forms of living and unanimated scientific objects are not capable. Reason for this lay in the fact that the coming together of people in a social space is different from the yoking of other organisms or the coalescing of inanimate objects.

4.3.3: RELATIONSHIP OF THE PARTS WITH WHOLE

Analysis of scientific and sociological approaches showed that distinction between the two is primarily contained in two factors. First the psychological content of humans which gives the capacity to raise *'over individual mental constellations'* and second, in this capacity, human are different even from other living organisms. This brings into the forefront the question about the causes of this distinction. From the description given above, two primary reasons could be discerned: one, the nature of the unit of analysis and two, the relationship of the units among themselves. Description of the types of units dealt with by both the two approaches was given in the above section. The relational aspect is discussed here. Seemingly, relationship among the units takes two directions in a system: relationship of the units among themselves and the relationship of the units with the whole. But for the convenience of this study, both these directions are considered as flushing into the same stream. Relationship among the units is considered inseparable from their relations with the whole. Therefore, while discussing various systemic relational patterns between the parts and the whole, relationships within the units are presumed to merge into relationship between the part and the whole.

This second construct, therefore, pertains to the contextualization of this whole-part relational paradigm within the collective intent[54]. The whole-part fracas has two aspects: the scrimmage about the supremacy between holism and reductionism, and the rumpus about the primacy between the structure and agency. Though some discussion of these two aspects is too obvious to be avoided, getting enmeshed in the technicalities of the two aspects would amount to catching a tangent from the continuum. For this reason, the two dimensions are taken up together. In doing so, structure is equated with the holistic thought and agency is paralleled with the individualist point of view. While there may disagreement on this

---

[54] Tonnies believes that relationship of the parts with and within the whole is the pivot of the distinction between the sociological study of human species and the other scientific enquiries. He holds that *'objective observation teaches us no less plainly that the whole is not merely the sum of its parts; on the contrary, the parts are dependent on and conditioned by the whole, so that the whole itself possesses intrinsic reality and substance'* (Tönnies, 2001, p. 21).

parallelism, it is considered sufficient to allow for the utilization of the meaning and scope of the two concepts in advancing the main argument without tangling up in the intricate debate about the appropriateness of one approach over the other. This is also the reason why rather than highlighting the technical angles of the two aspects, their description is restricted to the extent to which they provide clarity on the form and composition of the collective intent within a social structure. Another point of advantage in constructing this parallelism is the convenience of cross referencing from either of the two dimensions to highlight the nature of collective intent within a social collectivity.

Continuing our discussion of the previous section about the distinction between the analytical approach applicable to human form of living and those of other animate and inanimate objects, Kaspersen (2000, p. 9) believes that in terms of the units and their relationship in a social space, the principal opposition is between two schools. The functionalist school originally developed by Emile Durkheim holds that a society consists something more than the sum of all the individual actions[55]. Against this, the school of thought believing in the action theory propounded mainly by Max Weber sees society as the sum total of the individuals and their actions. Karl Marx is seen as occupying the intermediate position between these two orientations. Kaspersen mentions that the controversy between the two schools relates not so much to whether society could be studied in the same manner as nature, but to the extent to which it could be studied so. The disagreement props up when society becomes the object of study itself[56].

In his functionalist views about the society, Durkheim derives inspiration from Auguste Comte and Herbert Spencer and believes that society needs to be understood as an independent thing, *sui generis* (Kaspersen, 2000, p. 15). The approach of the functionalist school towards social processes is marked by social holism which is often equated with the idea that information about the whole could not be sufficiently acquired from its constituting parts. That is the basic premise underneath which there exists a set of complex set of assumptions. For instance, Philips identifies holism with five interrelated ideas;

---

[55] For a detailed discussion about the Durkheim's views about how real social facts are, how they constrain individuals, and how are they irreducible to psychological facts without a remainder, please see (Hund, 1982).

[56] The same conflict is also the subject matter of Giddens *New Rules of Sociological Methods* (1976) and *Studies in Social and Political Theory* (1977) (Kaspersen, 2000, pp. 10, 11). Giddens is critical of Durkheim's functionalism because of its static view of society and the deterministic character which reduces actors to mere puppets of the circumstances. According to Giddens, Durkheim conflates physical constraints with social constraints (Kaspersen, 2000, pp. 17-20) .

1. Analytical approaches typified by the physic-chemical sciences are inadequate when applied to cases like biological organism, society, or even reality as whole.
2. 'The whole is more than the sum of its parts.'
3. 'The whole determines the nature of its parts.'
4. 'The parts cannot be understood if considered in isolation from the whole.'
5. 'The parts are dynamically interrelated or interdependent.'

(Phillips, 1976, p. 6)

In explaining holism, Philips (1976, p. 8) refers to F.H. Bradley theory of internal relations according which in any three entities, say A, B and C, first a relationship is only possible within some whole which embraces them, and second, these entities would change if the relationship itself is changed. Bradley suggests that when A enters into a relationships with either B or C, it acquires some property or characteristic p by virtue of their relation, and A would no longer be the same without p or "not-A". Bradley's 2nd point has been further clarified by McTaggart (1921) by pointing out that in case any part of the nature of A goes, the nature of A goes as a whole (Phillips, 1976, p. 9). Further elaboration is provided by Angyal (1941 cited by Philips, 1976, p. 48) who mentions that when single objects, a, b, c, and d are bound together in an aggregate; they participate in it as object a, object b, object c and object d. However, when the whole is constituted by the utilization of these objects, the parts of the resulting whole are α, β, γ, δ and not a, b, c, d. (Phillips, 1976, p. 48).

This is the soul of holism as promoted by the functionalist school. Reductionism or individualism[57] provides an antithesis to this which holds that every system is the result of a particular configuration of the constituent parts (Phillips, 1976, p. 38). Some introductory definitions have already been provided for individualism in the preceding chapter. Its technical aspects and relevance to this study are highlighted here. Jacek Szmatka (1989) mentions two forms of methodological individualism. One is the stern form, which Szmatka associates with J.W.N. Watkins (Watkins, 1952a, 1952b; 1959 as cited by Szmatka 1989) and calls it the *sensu stricto*. The other, more lenient, variant is presented by Karl Popper (Popper, 1945; 1957 as cited by Szmatka 1989) in his situational individualism. In the *sensu stricto*

---

[57]Without going into the fine terminological distinction between reductionism, individualism, and atomism as these terms are used elsewhere, and without involving ourselves in the inter-disciplinary variation of these terms in scientific and sociological studies, all these terms are used here interchangeably denoting a meaning in stark contrast to holism and collectivism which, as matter of symmetry, are also taken as analogous.

individualism of Watkins, social world is seen as divided into two causally connected parts, one consisting of social totalities and the other of individual human beings. Watkins believes that since it is the individuals who really exist, the relation between the whole and the parts is *'unidirectional'* in the sense that social totalities own their properties because of the parts constituting them: they are nothing else than the product of the individuals and their actions. In short, social totalities are invariably reducible to individuals and their actions (Szmatka, 1989).

Popper's situational individualism considers social entities as abstract models constructed for the interpretation of *'certain abstract relations between people'* (Szmatka, 1989). Though Popper argues that all social phenomena and particularly the functioning of all social institutions must be understood as always emerging from the decisions, actions, attitudes etc. of individuals; he nevertheless concedes that social totalities have some emergent properties which could not be predicted or derived from the behaviours of individuals (Szmatka, 1989).

Popper does not acquiesce in the notion that concrete social situations are fraught with more complication than concrete physical situations. This is the basis of his rationality principle where he ascribes rationality to social situations (Hedstrom, Swedberg, & Udehn, 1998). For him, as social totalities possess *'emergent properties'* in comparison to the individuals composing these totalities, laws about totalities are reducible to laws about particular individuals only partially and not totally (Szmatka, 1989). Popper argues for situational analysis as an alternative to what he terms as *'psychologism'*. He believes that in order to properly understand social action, what we need is an understanding of the situation in which social action takes place rather than a detailed knowledge of the mental states of individuals. This is because of the limited explanation provided by the *'psychological'* part of individual action and the larger determination for it contained in the *'logic of the situation'*(Popper, 1945, p. 90 cited by Hedstrom et al., 1998).

Popper's alternative to psychologism is *institutionalism*. To him, no action can be fully explained by motives alone, without any reference to the *'social environment, to social institutions and their working'* (Popper, 1945, p. 86 cited by Hedstrom et al., 1998). His idea of institutionalism is based on the notion that social institutions embody all the realities of social world, and therefore determine the social character of our environment. His perception of institutions is broad enough to include such varied elements as a grocers shop, a university, a police force or a law; and even a church, a state and a marriage. However, he does not

suggest that institutions also act. Instead, he argues that it is the individual who acts, but within and for the institutions (Hedstrom, et al., 1998).

Situational analysis, therefore, for Popper constitutes the appropriate approach for any social explanation. In situational analysis, an analytical model of the social situation, termed *'typical situation model'* by Popper, is created which comprises people's decision making environment and their aims and beliefs. Situational analysis takes place in explaining how hypothetical actors would act in situations contained in the hypothetical situational model, thus working out what sort of actions are implicit in a social situation (Popper, 1994, p. 168 cited by Hedstrom et al., 1998).

Popper's approach highlights a milder version of individualism. Though Popper himself refers to his approach as *'methodological individualism'* and there is no denying the fact that the tone of his argument is manifestly reductionist than collectivist, Popper's situational analysis offers a compromise position for bridging the gap between a purely individualist and holist approach. Evidence of this is provided by the close affinity of Popper's argument with that of a social collectivist, Maurice Mandelbaum whose *'societal facts'* bears close similarity with Popper's situational analysis. Mandelbaum explains his notion of societal facts as under;

> My aim is to show that one cannot understand the actions of human beings as members of a society unless one assumes that there is a group of facts which I shall term "societal facts" which are as ultimate as are those facts which are "psychological" in character. In speaking of "societal facts" I refer to any facts concerning the forms of organization present in a society. In speaking of "psychological facts" I refer to any facts concerning the thoughts and the actions of specific human beings (Mandelbaum, 1955).

What could be seen here is that Mandelbaum, despite his insistence on psychological facts, is talking in terms of societal facts almost of the same things that Poppers is advancing as situational factors. This is in stark contrast to Durkheim who assails methodological individualism by pointing out that individualism fails because society is not just an extension of individuals and that it possesses supra-individual powers by which it exerts pressures on individuals.

In reasoning thus, it can be established just as easily that organic phenomenon may be explained by inorganic phenomenon. It is very certain that there are in the living cell only molecules of crude matter. But these molecules are in contact with one another, and this association is the cause of the new phenomena which characterize life, the very germ of which cannot possibly be found in any of the separate elements. A whole is not identical with the sum of its parts. It is something different, and its properties differ from its component parts (Durkheim, 1964, p. 101 quoted by Phillips, 1976, p. 39).

With this background of the debate surrounding the whole-part relationship, the question faced now is whether to take society as the mere collection of the individuals or something more than this. This indeed is difficult question because problem with this whole-part debate and its two underlying themes in holism-individualism and structure-agency is that it is very hard to settle for one line of argument without taking sides. Supporting the point of view of either school could only be at the cost of negating the tremendous redemption worked out for their case by the other. Amidst all this controversy, this study is faced with plucking some sense from somewhere which could give reason to the existence of collective intent and its irreducibility in the presence of human volitional autonomy.

4.4: A Way out of the Impasse: Margaret Archer's Morphogenetic Approach

Such an avenue is provided by Margaret Archer and her *'morphogenetic'* views of social change. The arguments expounded by Margaret Archer are presented here at length for their twofold relevance to this study. First, in reaching her own inference about the primacy of agency and structure and the associated social change, she also scrutinizes the arguments advanced by the collectivist and individualist schools on the one side and the structure-agency protagonists on the other. The line of action in reaching her conclusion is not very different from this study, and therefore recounting her approach also extends clarity to a number of issues explored in the preceding lines. Second, she introduces the factor of time as a crucial variable in seeking a compromise between the two extremes. This again provides a good foil for the historicity in which this study approaches the societal distinction and their compatibility with distributive justice.

Archer (1995, p. 33) believes that the individualist case suffers from an *'upwards conflation"* because it considers structure as inert and dependent element. On the other hand, the

collectivist case, she argues, is blotched with a *'downwards conflation'* for its subordination or neglect of agency. Archer believes that an intrinsic Monadism characterizes both ontological individualism and collectivism which is responsible for these shortcomings. The former inflates the individual with anything which it considers social whereas the latter bundles personal properties- thought, convictions, feelings- into collectivities as *'the collective conscience'* (Archer, 1995, p. 38).

To the individualist perception of Luke that the relevant features of a social context are built into individuals, she puts a two-fold question. First, she questions the practicability of distinguishing an individual burdened with so much inalienable features of social and cultural reality; and second, she doubts the possibility of disaggregating a social context in such a way that role relationships are reduced to purely interpersonal relations. She therefore thinks that this social ontology is nothing more than *'bundling complex and diffuse social relations into the individual as predicates of people'* (Archer, 1995, pp. 37, 38). Similarly, to the individualist claims about the individual as the ultimate constituent of social reality, she raises the objection that if reductionism and emergence is possible, why one should not go beyond the individual for further reduction (Archer, 1995, p. 41).

Archer believes that the individualist stand could only be vindicated if social context is considered epiphenomenal by considering all forces of constraints and enablement as other people and reducing the environmental effects to interpersonal relations[58]. But she sees little logic in such an approach because, as she instantiates, when we examine kinship structures we do not merely investigate how a group of people intermarry, transmit property or carry obligations towards others, but in fact we examine the rules which govern these relationships (Archer, 1995, pp. 42, 43).

> Once again the fact that roles are necessarily activity-dependent is insufficient to deny them the independent capacity to structure individuals' activities. In social analysis we often are and have to be less concerned with interpersonal relations than with the endurance of *im*personal role relationships (Archer, 1995, p. 43 italics in original).

She therefore avers that the individualist case is built upon an excessive reliance on the

---

[58] This argument is similar to the one offered by Muzafer Sherif in the context of supra-individual cultural factors mentioned above.

present, based on a belief that if social context exists as it is today, it is because of individual's predilection towards retaining it. The absence of acknowledging structural constraints and enablements tends to increasingly push the individualists into more and more reliance on the present and the denial of the past in providing rules and guidelines for structuring social life and thus deprive them of any causal efficacy (Archer, 1995, pp. 43, 44). If dispositions can never be considered dependent, then what the individualist claim to be the result of the independent elementary attitudes must simultaneously be considered incapable of influencing the actions of tomorrow's agents (Archer, 1995, p. 86).

Archer's argument about the reliance of the individualist on the present provides a crucial explanation for its close affinity with the evolution of distributive justice approaches as discussed in the second chapter. Her views also support the explanations provided above for Tonnies's transition from *Wesenwille* to *Kurwille*. As argued above, the transformation is materialized by the ascendency of the contemporaneous-personal portfolio over the socio-historic portfolio in the second phase of cognitive development. The predominantly individualistic outlook of the *Gemeinschaft* in the presence of *Kurwille* provides currency to this argument.

Returning to Archer, her disapproval of collectivism is based on her belief that whilst it defends the methodological indispensability of *'structural factors'*, it advances no overall conception of social structure ontologically. *'What accounted for this is that Collectivists were simultaneously haunted by Holism and hamstrung by Empiricism'* (Archer, 1995, p. 46). She argues that instead of articulating a robust counter-concept of social structure, the collectivists cautiously indicate points at which some aspect of the society is necessary to explain their points of view and thrive only on the sins of commission of individualists when they provide them with pretexts which negate society (Archer, 1995, p. 47).

Archer sums up here castigation of individualism and collectivism in the following words.

> Yet the concepts on offer from Individualism and Collectivism were
> fundamentally unsatisfactory. Individualism supplied an unacceptable
> atomistic concept of the individual, shorn of any relationship with the
> social context yet inexplicably bulging with social attributes; a conception
> of social structure as mere aggregate of individual activities whose every
> tendency was the responsibility of the current actors, plus the unworkable

method of reduction as the mean of linking 'structure and agency'. On the other hand, Collectivists proffered a fragmented conception of structure, defined residually as that which defied reduction, an equally fragmented concept of agency represented by individuals plus their social context, and they refrained from specifying the processes linking the two together. Insofar as working social theorists took Individualist concepts on board, this served to perpetuate the fallacy of upward conflation in social theorizing. If they drew upon Collectivism instead, then the missing two-way link between structure and agency continued to foster the equally fallacious form of downwards conflation in social theory (Archer, 1995, p. 58).

She argues further that the fundamental drawback in the downwards or upwards conflations is that they make either the agency or the structure inert, precluding the two-way interactions between the two. Consequently the dependent element is deprived of the capacity to influence the determining element. Therefore, in acknowledging the interplay between structure and agency, she proposes to predicate a degree of autonomy and independence to each of them (Archer 1995: p 80). Archer believes that accounting for variable social outcomes is only possible through analysing the processes by which structure and agency shape and re-shape one another over time. She argues for an approach which is capable of *'linking'* structure and agency rather than *'sinking'* one into the other (Archer, 1995, pp. 64, 65)

> The central argument is that structure and agency can only be linked with by examining the *interplay between them over time*, and that without the proper incorporation of time the problem of structure and agency can never be satisfactorily resolved (Archer, 1995, p. 65 italics in original).

She therefore argues for the temporal distinction between the structure and agency and asks for appreciating the fact that structures are not only irreducible to people *'they pre-exist them'*. She does not see people as puppets of the structures primarily because of their emergent properties (Archer 1995: p 71) [59] . Archer identifies her approach with

---

[59] This argument of her stem from her conviction about the inadequacy of the simulation of scientific laboratory experiments for sociological explanations to which reference has already been made.

'morphogenesis'[60] because it captures both the possibility of radical and unpredictable re-shaping and at the same time provides a genesis of this re-shaping through the interplay between the structure and agency. However, she argues that a temporal evaluation is the only adequate way for assessment of this process because of their *'temporal separability and an outcome which can only be explained by means of analytical dualism'* (Archer, 1995, p. 75) as it '*accords full significance to the time-scale through which structure and agency themselves **emerge, intertwine** and **redefine** one another'* (Archer, 1995, p. 70 emphasis in original) .

Archer's morphogenetic analysis accords time a central place in social theory incorporated as sequential tracts and phases rather than treating it simply as a medium through which events take place. It works in terms of the three cycles composed of (a) structural conditioning (b) social interactions and (c) structural elaboration (Archer, 1995, p. 89). Archer's portrayal of this process is provided in Figure 4.3 below. This approach maintains that structure and action operate over different time periods implying that *'structure necessarily predates the actions which transform it; and that structural elaboration necessarily post-dates those actions'* (Archer, 1995, p. 76). In structural conditioning, systemic properties are seen as the results of past actions, which, when elaborated over a time, exert causal influence on subsequent interactions. Past actions therefore have their effect on actors as facilitating or constraining influences, which are not attributable or reducible to the practices of other agents. Social interactions are however seen as structurally conditioned but not as structurally determined, because agents also possess their irreducible emergent powers. Ultimately, the resultant structural elaboration is interpreted largely as the unintended consequences. This modification of the previous structural properties and the introduction of the new ones are seen as the outcome of different goals pursued simultaneously by different groups. The resultant conflicts and concessions by different groups, in fact, give rise to the unintended consequences (Archer, 1995, pp. 89-91).

---

[60]According to the Encarta online dictionary the term *morphogenesis* means the origin and development of an organism or of a part of one, as it grows from embryo to adult.
(http://encarta.msn.com/dictionary_1861631273/morphogenesis.html accessed on 30/Nov./2010)

Figure 4.3: Archer's Morphogenetic Sequence[61]

Structure

T^1

Interaction

T^2 T^3

Structural elaboration

T^4

Source: Adopted from (Archer, 1995, p. 76)

From her morphogenetic analysis, Archer concludes that human interactions at any given time give rise to structures. These interactions may be unintended, unwanted and unacknowledged and as such they are activity-dependent but irreducible to current practices. In this way these *'pre-existents'* enable us to construe the environment of contemporary action. Archer characterize this as an *'objective influence which conditions action patterns and supplies agents with strategic directional guidance'* (Archer, 1995, p. 196 italics in original). Archer (1995, p. 198) calls for respecting the *'powers of the people'* which imbues them with *'intentionality'*, and their capacities to *'entertain projects and design strategies'*. She argues that it is the compatibilities or incompatibilities of such *'projects'* of the people and the generative powers of the *'parts'* which makes up an environment. Such an environment, then, exerts its enabling and constraining influence on the people. It is, however, only the specific relationship of the specific project of a particular agent in a

[61] Archer points out that methodological individualism claims that action alone, (b), constitute necessary and sufficient conditions for the explanation of (c). Therefore they think that (a) can be eradicated. The holists, on the other hand, promote a movement straight from (a) to (c). The morphogenetic approach does not deny that social interaction is the ultimate source of complex phenomenon: it simply maintains that because this causal chain unravels over time and each anterior action sequence was itself structurally conditioned, it must be acknowledged that (c) cannot be deduced from (b) alone. Thus it has to be realized that agent's activities are necessary but not sufficient conditions of structural change. To account for the occurrence structural elaboration (c), interactional analysis (b) is therefore essential, but inadequate unless undertaken in conjunction with (a), the study of the structural conditioning (Archer, 1995, pp. 90, 91).

specific position which allows us to label a conditional influence as enablement or constraint.

> The generative powers of the 'parts' and the 'people' are both necessary conditions for the development in question, but only together do they supply sufficient conditions for the accomplishment of the project. To omit reference to material and ideational conditions is to endorse agents who can will any outcome regardless of their circumstances. To make no mention of agential projects pretends to explain outcomes in the absence of efficient causation. A non-reified account of structural and cultural conditioning thus *requires* an active agent in order to mediate the process (Archer, 1995, p. 199 italics in original).

Archer's case for according time a special status in a social theory has been recounted in detail to show how it suggests a way out of the individualist-holist debate on one side and the controversy about the primacy of structure or agency on the other. Archer's views might not count as the final word and there can essentially be many other dimensions from which this debate could be analyzed. However, from the point of view of this study, her approach adds two important transversals to the debate about social space in people's lives. First, she not only ascribes dynamism to both individuals and structures, but also underscores the indispensability of simultaneity in their interaction to materialize social change. In this, Archer's views about the duality of person and social space resonates Mark Granovetter's views about people's social embeddedness. To Granovetter, people,

> ... do not behave or decide as atoms outside a social context, nor do they adhere slavishly to a script written for them by the particular intersection of social categories that they happen to occupy. Their attempts at purposive action are instead embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations (Granovetter, 1985).

But without belittling the relevance of this transversal to this study, it is the second transversal which is of foremost significance. This is her description of the three phases of structural conditioning, social interactions and structural elaboration; and her providing for a scheme of their materialization in which time plays the central role. Both the factors of centrality of time and her three-phasal process are of foremost importance to this study. In fact they form the foundation, the theoretical reference point, on which this thesis advances

its argument about the emergence of the differential in perceptions of social good across different social settings. This thesis argues that such a differential emerged because the process of social cognition went through different trajectories of socio-political and economic circumstances at different temporal, geographical and spatial locations. Because of these variable trajectories, the processes of structural conditioning entailed different social interactions which produced different structural elaborations. Of these, one set was described in the second chapter, where distributive social justice was seen as the structural elaboration emerging out of people's social interactions and this was made possible by their structural conditioning with their social environment.

The manner of the realization of this structural elaboration finds interesting explanations on the processes underlying social cognition as described in this chapter. Revisiting the three factors responsible for giving distributive social justice its modern face identified in the second chapter: Reformation and postulates of Enlightenment thinkers, the rise of industrialization and capitalism and civil revolutions, in the perspective of social cognition evolution and Archer's tri-phasal explanations; vivid parallels could be discerned. First, Reformation and the postulates of Enlightenment thinkers could be seen as the result of the structural conditioning witnesses by the western social setups. In this process, the contemporaneous-personal mental portfolio began to assert itself against the prevalence of socio-historical mental portfolios which prevailed during the ancient and medieval times. This disturbed the existing balance of people's social cognition resulting in new forms of social interactions. These new forms of social interactions resulted in the rise of industrialization and capitalism, which was reflective of manifest ascendency of the contemporaneous-personal mental portfolio over the socio-historical. It was due to this dominance of the former which produced a transformation in the existing forms of social justice framework. The emerging forms of social interaction found themselves incompatible with existing structures, resulting in social revolutions asking for a new socio-political and economic order which could usher in a new paradigm of social justice. This was a new form the structure-agency interplay in the presence of people's emergent powers, which ensued newer structural elaboration. The resultant structural elaboration produced the adoption of distributive form of social justice as people's social strategy.

Thus, distributive social justice could be seen as the denouement of a social strategy resulting from the particular structural elaboration which took place in the west. This also means that

that a different form of structural elaboration, resulting from a different version of social interaction and structural conditioning, will produce a different social strategy elsewhere. On justifications provided by this argument, collective intent of a social structure is presented in the next section as people's social strategy ensued by the structural elaborations which took place in the majority of the developing countries of the east.

4.5: SOCIAL STRUCTURE: RELATIONAL PATENTING BY VOLITIONAL SYNTHESIS

Before presenting collective social structures as the other form of structural elaboration resulting from people's social interactions, let us first assign meaning to the term 'structure' itself. Elaborating on the context in which the term structure has been used in sociology, Homans (1975, pp. 53-55) points to its three characteristics. First, sociologists use the term to refer to those aspects of social behaviour which are considered relatively enduring and persistent; second, by 'structural' reference is made to those phenomenon which are more fundamental; and third, structure is considered something more than a mere aggregation, something which though can be divided into parts; parts are, nonetheless, interdependent so that a change in some parts would automatically mean a change in some other.

Alexander Wendt (1999, p. 171) believes that the idea of social structure constituting agents goes back to Rousseau and Hegel. For Herbert Spencer both organisms and societies are composed of structures which have survival values and which performs various functions such as circulating nutriments and acting as centres of command (Phillips, 1976, p. 80). Immanuel Kant is convinced that all experiences are at least partially structured by pre-existing beliefs and presuppositions that people entertain about the world (Watier, 2008, p. 100). Leach points towards the Freudian assumption that the manifest discourse of the patient with his psychoanalyst contains unconscious structures which are symptomatic of patient's neurosis (Leach, 1981, pp. 29, 30). Leach considers this as the foundation of the assumptions which takes structures manifest in culture as projections of unconscious structures in the human mind.

It is for this reason that Homans and Coleman argue that as social structures are rooted in the psychological processes of individual behaviour, therefore understanding of the social structure must start with the psychological explanation of the individuals who are engaged in social relations (Blau, 1975a, p. 15). Bourdieu (1992, pp. 7-18 cited by Derné, 2009, p. 137) considers social structure to have a double existence- existing not only in the material world

of institutions but also internalized in the conduct, thought, feelings and judgement. He therefore argues that exposure to a particular social structure instils dispositions in individuals which internalize the necessities of social environments.

It is these structures which are the repositories of what Taylor calls *'irreducibly social goods'*[62] (Taylor, 1997, pp. 127-145). Nurtured by the perceptions engraved in the collective psychologies within each structure of a society, such goods indivisibly pool the behaviours, attitudes, priorities and, in the ultimate analysis, the choices and preferences of its members. Shared perceptions and collective psychologies subsume personal roles of the members of the structural collectivities and confer on them impersonal roles which are their redefined identities within a social collectivity. A community, as articulated by Tonnies, provides the functional frame of reference for these collective goods in which individuals interact with their impersonal roles.

A social structure is thus composed of these relational structures and shows *'population distributions among social positions along various lines- positions that affect people's role relations and social interactions'* (Blau, 1975b, p. 221). *'The central impact of social structure, we have seen, is that we inhabit a social world, not just of culture, but of relations between positions that is already set up for us'* (Parker, Mars, Ransome, & Stanworth, 2003, p. 141).

Putting relationships at the core, Radcliffe-Brown reckons that a social structure is formed when the actions of different individuals are connected through relations and the sum total of all the social relationships of the individuals at a given time characterizes a social structure (López & Scott, 2000, pp. 45, 46). Warriner (1981, pp. 179, 180) considers social structure *inter alia* as the demographic distribution of persons in physical space. Among its utilities, he points towards its relevance for describing the contextual and situational factors in individual behaviours. In such a use, structure takes the form of categorical identities that affect and channel her/his functionings and interactions.

The imprints of these structures become visible in a social space which is created by the clear sense of common identity of its people (Bar-Tal, 2000, p. xvi), and which proffers operational space for the correlative entrenchment to which Granovettor alludes. When this social

---

[62] Neither the phenomenon nor the phraseology is, however, newly invented by Taylor. For instance, Simmel has mentioned the same phenomenon as "*conscience collective*" (López & Scott, 2000, p. 45).

coexistence is sustained for a prolonged time span, it sets off the process of structural conditioning, as elucidated by Archer, which engenders structures depicting discernable patterns, regularities and configurations within a society (Blau, 1975a, p. 3). These structures explain the distribution of the elements or relationships along some dimension or dimensions and situate the behaviour, location, or relationships of its members in a social system (Bell, 2009, pp. 96, 97). The social interactions which emerge during this process are grounded within the functional space provided by these structures. Social interactions within these structures determine the form of social strategy as part of the structural elaboration which takes place across the time. The social structure perspective provides an alternative to the view which considers cultural values and norms as symmetrically distributed across a social space[63]. Such deterministic views reduce the role of individuals to mere marionettes of their respective cultural systems[64]. Additionally, stereotypical cultural descriptions also gloss over many complexities, more specifically in divided societies[65] (D. Sinha & Tripathi, 1994, p. 124). Against this, the social structure point of view accords proper role to people's potentialities, as argued by Archer, in shaping and giving direction to the structures within a social space.

A description of the existence and outreach of these structures of relational confluence is given in George Simmel's essay, *Die Kreuzung Kreise* (Blau, 1994, pp. 22, 23). Simmel emphasizes that in the modern societies, crosscutting social circles are rooted in people's multigroup affiliations. Family relationships, kinships ties, ethnic bonds, caste affiliations, and even voluntary social groupings are embodiments of such structures which along with the individual itself encompass the society. On the corollary of Tonnies's and Pettit's societal classifications, social set ups of the majority of the developing countries provide a more vivid manifestation of the existence and functionality of these structures of relational confluence. On that analogy, this greater prevalence in the developing societies is explained by the fact

---

[63]Parker et. al. (2003, p. 147) opines that perfectly integrated societies are thought of by utopian thinkers while practical social thought acknowledges that perfectly integrated structures are not generally possible. On this corollary, the idea of social structure provides an alternative to the two radical extremes of isolated individuals and cultural determinism. The underlying idea sustains on the notion that social setups are composed of relational structures, evolved over time from people's behavioural stereotyping. As Parker et. al. argues, within a social structure the manner in which positions are related is a powerful conditioning force in human life and given the essentially social nature of humans, location of the position within any social organization is unavoidable (Parker, et al., 2003, pp. 141, 142).

[64]As Parker et. Al. Argues, we must remember that social structuring aims at the conditioning rather than determining action (Parker, et al., 2003, p. 149).

[65]As an instance of such broad cultural determinism, Sinha & Tripathi mention that Hofstede (1980) originally predicted that India would occupy a very low point on the individualist scale. Instead, India scored 48 against 91 for the United States and 12 for Venezuela. Despite this, Hofstede characterized it as a collectivist society.

that neoclassical tendencies have not made deep inroads there for a variety of reasons, which could have ushered in a transformation towards the *Gesellschaft* or economic mind where the adoption of distributive social justice would not have been a problem.

In that sense, social setups of developing countries could be thought of as presenting pictures of *Gemeinschaft* or common minds, with variable intensity of the *Wesenwille* but marked by the same confluence of intentions which is the basis of social embeddedness. Among the realities feeding this perpetuation, the veritable non-existence of a state operated social justice system could be cited as the most vivid explanation[66]. Social structure proxy this absence by playing a dual role- both enabling and constraining- filling the void of the absence of a state-operated social justice system on the one hand and acting as an agency constraint on the other. To grasp the real significance of this dual role, one could view these relational structures as reservoirs where the members of a social system invest their personal roles (choices and actions). These reservoirs of structural collectivities act as constraints by restraining the choices and actions of the members with certain qualifications. At the same time, they ensure a return in the form of extending certain essential social services to its members which are otherwise not available in these societies, mainly because of the absence of state-operated social justice system. The postulates of Sherif (1966, pp. 2, 17) provides currency to this argument about this reservoir effect who believes that individuals come into contact with one another for the satisfaction of their basic needs. Cultural products such as social values and customs are the products of this contact. He terms all such criteria of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contacts of the individuals as *'social norms'* (Muzafer Sherif, 1966, p. 16).

But it will be erroneous to restrict the role of these structural collectivities solely to proxying the state in terms of ensuring social benefits to their members. Both the range and proliferation of its jurisdiction is much broader. These structural collectivities as repositories of years of social and cultural symbols are the sights of spiritual harmony for their members. This in itself is wellbeing of no small embrace. Other such forms of wellbeing embedded in these structural collectivities are not much farther from notice; but only require impartial reflection.

---

[66] No doubt the most prominent, this is just one among the myriad of the explanations. Other such explanations could be found in the colonial legacy which left almost no indigenous institutional setups, westernization in the name of modernization and the like. The focus here, however, is to provide a manifestation of the problem and not to explore its underlying causes.

To sum up this social structure perspective, it could be mentioned that collective group intent binds individuals into relationships which are the building blocks of the social structures. The existence of these structural collectivities is explained by the psychological content which differentiates human form of life from other species. The resultant social cognition from this psychological content is the primary reason for the distinction between the form, intensity and outreach of the social structure. On this demarcation, social structure plays a dual role in the particular settings of the developing countries. Though it places certain constraints on individual activity, it also fills the void of the absence of a state-operated social security provisions.

This is how collective intent within a social structure is conceptualized and this is where its frame of reference lies. What this perspective provides as the distinctive feature of a social structure is the relational context which subsumes the personal roles of the members, redefining them in impersonal identities. It is necessary to understand that the nature of these identities is irreducibly collective. They operate at the level of the collectivity rather than the individual. Though collective group identities do not divest members of their volitional autonomy, their individual agencies are used towards the realization of the group objectives and structural elaboration. The former is the source of immediate wellbeing for its members and the latter, of future benefits by making the process of evolution and temporal updating a possibility. This web of submerged role positions poses portentous obstacles in the application of any project based on purely distributive principles. As seen in preceding chapters, distributive social justice concepts place strong reliance on interpersonal comparison, which is completely lost within the interplay of this relational labyrinth. Therefore, to achieve a fit between the two incompatibles, considerable methodological improvisation is needed to be made.

4.6: COLLECTIVE WILL INSTANTIATED: THE PRACTICE AND THE PREMISE

By now sufficient contextualization has been provided for the manner in which social structure exists and operates in people's lives within a social set up. What remains is the corroboration of this conceptual profusion with some practical instances of the interaction of social structure in people's lives, to highlight the outreach of its functionality and the potency of its regimentation. In this last section of the chapter, some instances are cited from the studies conducted on the existence, operation and significance of social structure to give practical relevance to what has so far been explained in purely theoretical terms. The aim is

not just the signification, but also the elaboration of the manner in which collective relational structures interact in people's lives.

To begin with, Sinha & Tripathi (1994, pp. 128, 129) have mentioned, on the strength of the arguments put forward by Roland (1984), J.B.P. Sinha (1982) and Ramanujan (1990), that although values occupy a high place in the cognitive-emotional structure of an average Indian, they seem to be conditioned by the *'exigencies of the situation'*. They argue that it is because of this that enormous number of culturally dissimilar people; living with their distinct cultural identities has co-existed in India than merged. For them, explanation for this rests in the fact that the Indian Psyche is contextual rather than textual, i.e. they behave according to the situation. Unlike the west where right and wrong are distinguished as per the context, in India the relational context of roles determine the propriety of the actions[67]. *"Correct behaviour is much more oriented towards what is expected in specific contexts of a variety of roles and relationships, rather than any unchanging norm for all situations"*, (Roland, 1984, p. 174 quoted by Sinha & Tripathi, 1994, p. 129). Therefore, drawing on the arguments put forward by Roland (1984) and J.B.P. Sinha (1982), Sinha & Tripathi conclude that instead of a single set of values and norms, there in fact exists two opposite sets of values and norms: one prevailing at the in-group level and the other at the out-group level. The in-group values and norms are marked by shared sets of needs, beliefs, and goals. However the interactional patterns with the out-group are completely different which connotes a sense of competition and antagonism.

In a different social context, Yu & Yang (1994, pp. 240-242) have made reference to Confucian philosophy which entails that a person's life is only a link in her/his family lineage and that such an individual is the continuation of her/his ancestors, a reason which also applies to that person's offspring. Yu & Yang mention that action takes place in an environment of already existing institutions and practices, which have their own relatively autonomous properties for conditioning action. People have to work within the framework of an already arranged social world. Actors are positioned within these institutions and practices which condition their interests, particularly their attitudes to change. These are the sort of relations which figures in the analysis of the integration of social systems and the nature of

---

[67]To Louis Dumont, India and Indians are socially characterized by (a) a unique religious social collective caste system, in contrast to the individual in the West, (b) a synchronic ahistorical traditions as against the diachronic, modern West and (c) a uniquely encompassing ritual status as opposed to the triumph of the economic man in the modern west (Khare, 2006, pp. 12, 13).

structural conditioning or constraint (Yu & Yang, 1994, p. 150).

In a case study conducted by Simon Harragin, (reported in Harragin, 2004, pp. 308-324; Rao & Walton, 2004, pp. 3-6) it is shown that how ignoring wellbeing perceptions at the level of kinship and social structure prevented relief operation in the case of a famine in Sudan from producing the desired results. The study reported that *Operation Lifeline Sudan*, a relief operation to tackle the devastating food shortage in the Sudanese famine of 1998 failed to intervene in an effective manner to pre-empt the famine. Among the causes of this failure, Harragin also counted a lack of understanding on the part of the aid workers for the local cultures. One such instance was a case where what the aid workers took for corruption and hoarding by the local chiefs and military, was actually the local norm of the food distribution. Harragin noted that these leaders were appropriating food in order to distribute it equally among their kin group and the members of the kin. The targeted vulnerable members of the kin were willing to participate in this scheme. Harragin has quoted the case of an old lady who would go to a secret location designated by the chief and deposit her share of food, which was given to her by the aid workers in her individual capacity, in a collective pot to be redistributed among all, instead of consuming her food alone. From this, Harragin has drawn the inference that the kinship groups with common grandparents held ownership of key economic resources in southern Sudan. It was unlikely for a person to approach someone outside the kinship group even in the case of a famine. Therefore it was essential that these kinship groups received the share which they deserved in a relief operation, before finding out family members with the greatest of needs.

But by far, of foremost importance are the studies of Indian socio-cultural settings conducted by Steve Derné with focus on   life within the family of middle class Indians   . Derné interviewed between 1986 and 1987, *'forty-nine upper caste, middle class Hindu men, mostly from merchant families ranging in age from their teens to their seventies, who lived and worked in Banaras, India'* on the issues of joint family systems, arranged marriages, restriction on women outside their homes and family interaction within the household (Derné, 2009, p. 128). Derné explains that just like many other societies which emphasize the sociocentric pole of human social life, these Indians discovered their *'true selves'* not in personal, inner experiences but in meeting social and institutional expectations (Derné, 1992; 1995 cited by Derne, 2009, p 128). He mentions that because the men he interviewed focused on maintaining relationships within a joint family and *'de-emphasized the individual'*, they

wanted love to follow from the duty rather than the specialness of the beloved (Derné, 2009, p. 128). In one of the cases, the Hindi movies hero and heroines were described to him by a respondent as exemplary because their love for each other did not minimize their love for the whole society. On the other hand the villain in the movies was described as abominable because his lust for the heroin was for her fleshy body only (Derné, 2009, p. 129).

Derné believes that although it is subjectively based on the internal state of mind , well-being is shaped by cultural orientations. Based on his study of the Indian men, he mentions that because of the sociocentric orientation rooted in joint family systems and an economic structure that limits economic independence, wellbeing is entrenched within and nourished by group support. In this perspective, he suggests that it is the social structure, and not the cultural or psychological orientations, that basically set the standards of wellbeing. He therefore argues that a social change that transforms culture without a corresponding change in the social structure is a threat to the well-being.

Derné, therefore, argues that despite differences in conceptualization, there are two general frameworks for understanding action: one focusing on sources within the individual and the other focusing on social whole (Derné, 1995 as quoted by Derné 2009: p. 129). On the strength of the arguments put forward by Sudhir Kakar, (1981, p. 137) that sizing up a situation for oneself and proceeding to act upon one's momentary judgement can entail enormous cultural and personal risks, Derné (2009, p. 130) suggests that social orientations shape standards of well-being and therefore in societies like India, outside an individual's personal considerations, well-being relates significantly with social expectations.

Granting the fact that , in all societies , forces both internal and external to individuals influence their action , Derné makes the significant observation that what varies across the cultures is whether one understanding or the other is culturally elaborated and accordingly which influence is more easily recognizable ; individual volition or group control . In this regard, Derné (2009: p 131) appreciates Jankowiak's (2009) point of view about the undermining of the wellbeing when people's control over environment is stunted, but warns against the assumption that all humans have a physical need to feel in control of their environment. In contrast, he argues, that in sociocentric societies, people experience wellbeing when guided by others, and may feel a loss of it when left to rely on their individual selves to control the situation. A legitimate action is therefore the one guided by the social group to which an individual belongs. In this regards he cites Roland (1988, pp.

252, 253) who has reported that the central concern of his Indian patients was that how their behaviour was regarded by others. Roland (1988, p. 36) is further cited to mention that these patients mostly relied on the active support, respect and involvement of their superiors and felt uneasy without it . Derné notes that the unease at being separated from their joint family as reported by Kakar and Roland is common among the Indian male. *'Rather than providing a sense of well-being, being forced to act on one's own is profoundly disturbing'* (Derné, 2009, p. 132).

Derné concedes the fact that many men seem to experience a loss of wellbeing in cases where their own desires confront them with the social pressures. But he argues that in such situations, most of them adopt the strategy of altering their actions to conform to social demands rather than taking a collision course with established structural norms[68]. Derné also observes that many Indian couples spend the early years of their marriage in families headed by their parents or brothers because the joint family system gives them a sense of security (Derné 2009: p 136). This focus on family support follows from the economic structure in which they live. As emphasized by Kakar (1981, p. 121) lack of government programs of unemployment compensation and the absence of old age security makes family the key to social security. Discerning a fit between the social structure and the cultural and psychological orientations , Derné agrees with the observation of Ann Swidler that , *'not shared indoctrination, but shared life-structuring institutions create the basis of a common culture'*[69] (Swidler, 2001, p. 176 quoted by Derne, 2009, p. 135). He explains that because the people whom he interviewed found well-being in being guided by others, they wanted to live in joint families and did not press for individual freedoms. He further mentions that in more stable times, people experience well-being because there develops a fit between their cultural and psychological orientations and the social structures in which they live.

From his studies, Derné concludes that a felt sense of wellbeing depends on the wellbeing of others and this is only possible so long as each person's life does not harm other people's wellbeing and the natural processes on which life depends. *'...the basis of well-being tends to be rooted in structural arrangements and cultural understandings'* (Derné 2009: p 143). Derné concludes his observations with the following remarks which carry considerable explanations for the arguments offered about the worth of structural collectivities in people's

---

[68] This is a typical case which in Sen's approach qualifies for adaptive preferences, whereas Derne describes it as people's contrivance for optimization of wellbeing in a given social setups.

[69] This contrasts Sen's identity perceptions which are discussed at length in the next chapter.

lives within this chapter;

> ...well-being is threatened when social changes disrupt the fit between the cultural understandings, structural arrangements, and psychological wants that are the basis of well-being...................It is correct to suggest that well-being arises from a fit between a person's aspirations and a person's accomplishments; but we must recognize that aspirations are shaped by macro-level cultural ideas, while the possibility of achievement is shaped by macro-level social structures. Because a fit often develops between cultural ideas and structural possibilities, feelings of well-being are common. But when social change transforms cultural understandings without transforming structural realities or transforms structures without a simultaneous transformation in cultural priorities, dissatisfactions is likely (Derné, 2009, p. 143).

CONCLUSION

This contextualization of the social space within an individual life was instated with the exposition of the social cognition which provided understanding about the process of people's social perceptions formation. Social perception was then seen in its historical evolution from *Wesenwille* to *Kurwille* which highlighted the societal differential as noted between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. As the subject matter of this study, collective intent prevailing in the *Gemeinschaft* was then rationalized on the two constructs of distinction between scientific and sociological methodology and the relational patterns of the parts with and within a sociological whole. Archer's morphogenetic approach was seen as the way out of collectivist-individualist and structure-agency conundrum, which also revealed the importance of structural realities in a social space. On the diagonals drawn from these articulations, the theoretical grounding and functionality of a social structure was emphasized in people's lives in their capacities as occupants of a social space. This was reinforced with some illustrations from the empirical studies of the social structure in the social setups of the east, where the prevailing socio-political and economic circumstances make the existence of such structures a more pressing reality than its western counterpart.

This detailed backdropping of the social structure in people's lives was undertaken to underscore some key points which provide foundation for this study. First, it points towards

the essentially dynamic and perennially transitive nature of the process of social cognition. This transitivity produces societal differentiation meaning thereby that based on the nature of the social cognition and resulting social perceptions of its people, different social systems adopt different social strategies for achieving social justice. Therefore individualistic and collective intents represent two essentially distinct sets of social perceptions.

Second, such contradistinction demands a context specific social justice system. Particularly, a concept of social justice, such as the distributive social justice which, as has been observed, was grown out of the societal evolution in the west may prove non-commensurate with both the cognitive development, and social realities of the east. This disharmony springs from distributive social justice focus on individuals and interpersonal comparisons which is not possible in the face of the irreducibility of the collective intent in a social structure.

Third, and perhaps most important, constraints and enablements of the social structure in the east should not be considered as an unnecessary evil, in need of immediate transformation. Such a labelling of the eastern social structure would not only undermine an institution of considerable wellbeing, but at the same time might well result in the psychological dislocation of the people. This necessitates exploring a solution based on the principle of working with, rather than against the social structure prevailing in the east. The possibility of such solution is explored in the third part of this thesis.

PART THREE

FORMATIVE ASPECT OF FREEDOMS: ITS NEED, ROLE AND INTEGRATION INTO THE CAPABILITIES SPACE

CHAPTER 5: EMPHASIZING THE FORMATION ASPECT OF FREEDOMS

In the ambience in which social structure was articulated in people's lives in the last chapter, let us revisit the social justice perceptions noted in the preceding chapter: *'bona fide wellbeing captured through a pluralistic informational eclecticism equitably distributed across the members of a social space'*. With the contextualization of the social space in people's lives, conceptual grounding for its four components stands achieved. Based on what has so far been mentioned in this thesis, a development project based on these wellbeing perceptions will find itself confronted by at least two sets of unavoidable practical propositions: one, western social setups of the type described in the second chapter where the socio-political and economic development over the course of its history has made distributive social justice the adopted social strategy of its people; and two, collective social setups of the developing societies where a different trajectory of socio-political and economic events has made collective intent of a social structure as the survival strategy of its members. To claim a generic universality, the development project must show sufficient ingenuity to capture perceptions of social good in both social setups. This is essential, because people's ideals of wellbeing are inseparably based on their perception of social good. Therefore, without capturing perceptions of social good in each of the above social setups, any development project will risk the importation of welfare notions which could at least be alien, if not completely contradictory, to the prevailing ideals of wellbeing in a social space.

Insofar as *bona fide* wellbeing is associated with interpersonal comparisons; informational pluralism is geared towards segregating individuals on the basis of each person's share of welfare; and all this is seen achievable in the presence of valid state guarantees, the development project causes no confutation with first type of social setups. But, a similar kind of approach towards the second type of social setups incites issues of more than theoretical relevance. It unleashes a barrage of cagey mystification pivoted around the issue of a person's positioning within the social collectivity to which she/he belongs. The catechism, therefore, boils down into a solitary inquest about the consonance between the form of the development project and the realities obtaining in a social space. Such realities present patterns of stark dissimilarities in the two types of social setups mentioned above. Therefore, the social justice frameworks in the collectivist social setups of developing countries could hardly be based on principles of distributive social justice. Of the three distinctive features of distributive justice: interpersonal comparisons, free choice and state guarantees, the first two

are manifestly sequestering and hardly evince prospects of a concord with type of volitional confluence prevailing within collective social structures. The third distinctive feature of state guarantees calls for a direct contractarian relationship between a state and its citizenry. First it asks for a welfare state, and second it bypasses the intermediate structures. The former does not exist in the developing societies; the latter does not take into account the realities prevailing there.

What all this calls for is the fact that a development framework must have the flexibility and adaptability to both capture and work with notions of wellbeing prevailing in both the individualist and collectivist social setups. From the kaleidoscope of psychedelic diversity about the issue of people's social perceptions and the appropriate form of a social justice framework, this is the concern out of which this study has grown. Sen's framework, despite its distributive foundations, claims to accord due space to people's social inclinations, primarily with its agential aspect of capabilities. A social structure of the type prevailing in the eastern and developing countries, on the other hand, is built around people's relational coalescence. This relational coupling is made possible by the volitional integration culminating into collective intent. In its core, it is irreducible to its constituting units. With respect to a project based on distributive principles, it raises the question;

"How could a development project based on essentially distributive justice framework like the capabilities approach be pursued in a social space where collective intent sustaining a social structure would not allow the reducibility of its constituting units?"

This, as the broader picture in which this study is grounded, defines the main premise. The aim is to see how far the capabilities approach, in its current form, is equally relevant to the collectivist social setups: and how could it be made so if it is found deficient in catering to the demands of collective intent. The study views any divarication between the capabilities approach and collective social structures as portentous, no less for the former than for the latter. For an eclectically generic wellbeing project like the one based on the theoretical foundations derived from capabilities approach, such incongruity amounts to abandoning the developing societies[70]. For the eastern social setups, it means failure to benefit from all the good promised by a freedom centred approach.

The basic premise of the study is tested with the help of three hypotheses. It begins with an

---

[70] Ironically, this will serve a purpose exactly inverse to the one for which Sen has promoted his approach.

examination of theoretical foundations of the capabilities approach to see that how much space it accords to the collective intent of a social structure. For this, the hypothesis framed is stated as under;

"In its current form, is the framework for welfare assessment provided by the capabilities approach broad enough to capture wellbeing in the irreducible collective intent of a social structure along with the one in individualistic social setting?"

Based on the result of this hypothesis, the study wants to dig deeper into the issue. It wants to see that if the capabilities approach caters equally to the collectivist social setups, as it does to the individualist ones, how it achieves this end given its distributive foundations. Alternatively, if the capabilities approach is found wanting in exhibiting this dexterity, the study wants to see where does the deficiency exist and how could it be made good. For this, the second hypothesis which this study tests is formulated as under;

"If yes how; and if no, how can the capabilities approach evince the type of dexterity which makes it equally relevant to both the individualist and collective social setups?

Whatever inference is derived from the testing of the two hypotheses; both their relevance and validity calls for empirical validation. Apropos this dimension, the study tests a third hypothesis which is related to the empirical validity of the derived inferences. For this, the case of Pakistani social structure is selected as an empirical setting for its predominantly collective outlook. The third hypothesis is therefore formulated like this;

"What, if any, explanations do the capabilities approach offer for the influence of social structure on people's capabilities development in Pakistan?"

The accumulated inference which the thesis wants to test on the basis of these three hypotheses goes like this;

"Whether and how[71] could a development project based on the capabilities approach, with its distributive orientations, be pursued in a social structure predominated by collective intent; and what, if any, results the proposed operational framework would produce in the context of Pakistani social structure?"

---

[71] In formulating this question, 'how' is used intentionally instead of 'can' to signify that the adequacy of pursuing such project in a social structure is not questioned, and the proficiency of the capabilities approach is taken as a given.

This then is the problem in the context of what has been explained in the preceding chapters. This chapter focuses on providing redemption to the stated problem, analyzing the context of the problem in the light of what has been mentioned in the preceding chapters, exploring a solution and providing justification for the proposed solution. The divisions of the chapter correspond to this pattern. After stating the problem here, the next section gives sustenance to its theoretical and conceptual foundations. From that point onwards, analyses are carried until inferences are drawn on the stated hypotheses. Explanations for the inference drawn are then spelled out. Finally, a solution is presented in the light of the transpired reasons, and the chapter ends with an illustration of the promise contained in the foreseen solution.

5.1: TESTING THE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH AND THE COLLECTIVE INTENT

Social context of people's capabilities development in their capacities as responsible citizens is a key feature of Sen's information pluralism. The appurtenance of agential capacities and the implements of opportunity and process aspects of freedoms within the capabilities space sports considerable concern for the catalyst of social inducement. It will, therefore, not be in defiance of veracity if it is claimed that the accoutrements of capabilities approach respond to the exigencies of the social and environmental factors more scientifically than other social justice approaches.

Yet, a question which betrays this logic is whether the informational stretch of the capabilities approach musters sufficient outreach to capture all that is social in people's lives. Could it be said that informational pluralism of the capabilities approach sufficiently covers people's social compositions, without retaining the patent of any specific social setup? Hardly any room would be left for a controversy, and as its latest visage, the capabilities approach would achieve a perfect fit for distributive justice within people's social milieu, only if this question is answered in affirmative. But could it be?

The two spaces of personal circumstances and conversion factor respond more effusively to the social realities, but do social realities exhaust within these two spaces? What about the forces which shape and reshape social realities in the first place? Opportunity and process aspects of freedoms encapsulate people's real and not just instrumental freedoms, but does that consume the entire freedoms domain in a social space? How would one explain the freedom of a person who freely chooses not to be free? Wellbeing positioning at the levels to

which people aspire, not just what they achieve is nothing but commendable, but does that exhaust the whole echelon of wellbeing? How to explain the impulsions that spurs people's aspiration towards those higher levels of wellbeing in the first place? Interpersonal comparison is an effective tool to account for human diversity, but is diversity all what humans exude? What about a populace who associate their wellbeing with a psychosomatic similitude rather than sorting individuals on the basis of their innate diversity? The problem is rooted essentially in promoting wellbeing notions based on distributive social justice perceptions in collectivist social setups. Therefore for its proper assessment, the realities of collective social structure have to be evaluated against the three distinctive features of distributive social justice ascertained in the second chapter: individualism, free choice and state guarantees, to see the merit of pursuing such goals.

For the first of these three features, individualism and its concomitant: interpersonal comparisons, it has already been noted that both in theory and operation, individualism and collectivism are dimensions no less apart than the two poles of the globe. From the description in the last chapter, collective intent serves as the building block of the relational context in a social structure. It would, therefore, not allow for disaggregation. In fact disaggregation is equivalent to the disruption of the type of psychological synergy which sustains a social structure. On this premise, the question about the consonance between individualism and collective intent is probably the easiest to answer[72]. In fact the gulf between the two is so large that the question does not confine itself to incompatibility. A looming culpability points towards the potentiality of contradiction. It would therefore be fair to say that the dimension of incongruity is so huge that that it does not leave any room for a compromise.

Recourse therefore has to be made to the other features of distributive justice to explore the possibility of a solution to the problem of a communion between welfare notions derived from distributive social justice and collective intent of a social structure. Of these, state guarantees are taken up first. Here, before one explores the method of its guarantying by the state; a question of foremost significance relates to the very nature and form of what it is intended to be guaranteed. This is the question which asks that whose conception of social good it would

---

[72] On this issue, authors like Gore, Jackson, Evans and Deneulin are of the opinion that the capabilities approach, in its present form, is not compatible with the collective intent. For details on the basis of their contention please see (Severine Deneulin, 2008, pp. 105-124; Gore, 1993, 1997; W. A. Jackson, 2005). To their criticism, Alkire (Alkire, 2008) has responded by highlighting the 'prospective' and 'evaluative' role of the capabilities approach. However she has failed to answer the question that what mechanism does the capabilities approach contain to capture the collective intent without disrupting it.

be for which the state would be providing guarantees. Two sets of possibilities transpire in response to this question. The state leaves the discretion of forming a conception of wellbeing entirely to people, but provides an effective arrangement for the implementation of such a conception of wellbeing. Or, the state codifies a minimum level of wellbeing which is guaranteed to all the individuals.

The first of these two forms of the state guarantees requires an effective implementation mechanism by the state. But on that count, the realities of the kind of societies where collective social structures predominates hardly score any compatibility with the factor of state guarantees. The weak and non-representative state systems in such societies could hardly be seen as capable of playing such a role of judicious implementing arbiter[73]. In highlighting the role of the reservoir effect of the relational collectivities in the eastern social setups in the preceding chapter, this malady was the foremost concern. Therefore, without repeating all the arguments presented there, it could be easily inferred how much the state could be trusted in providing such a system of non-partisan enforcement for the perception of social good formed at the level of individual. In fact, people's strong reliance on relational collectivities in eastern social setups could be seen as a corollary of the failure of the state to discharge its responsibilities in this domain.

The second form of state guarantees in the form of defining and ensuring a minimum level of wellbeing by the state to its people reflects a paternalistic framework of social justice. Buckley (2009, p. 6) defines paternalism as state's[74] interference in people's choices to make them better off. Gerald Dworkin takes paternalism as the interference in a person's liberty of action justified by the reasons of welfare, goodness, happiness and the like. Ruger (2010, p. 156) also points towards a libertarian variant of paternalism which considers that individuals sometimes do not make rational decisions as a neoclassical theory would predict. Therefore it argues for policies and programmes to install the capacities in people to make rational choices in self-interest.

---

[73] A weak and generally corrupt formal institutional setup is not pointed out here purely on the point of saving cumbersomeness, because these are syndromes which are too obvious and discussed so often in different researches to merit a repetition here.

[74] From the welfare point of view, the meaning of the state reduces essentially to 'welfare state': a truly representative body of its people which could address their wellbeing concerns. The question is that how many of the states in the developing countries pass this criterion? So if the capabilities approach cannot wash itself clean of the charge of paternalism, then it provides further currency to the argument that distributive justice remains the property of the developed society, where the distributing authority, the welfare state, is moved solely by welfarist concerns of its people to which people's fate, in deciding what constitutes a social good, could be delegated.

As for the efficacy of paternalism, there are arguments both on its utility and otherwise. But of significance is Arneson's (1997, p. 85) suggestion that it is pure luck as to who gains and who loses in paternalism. Arneson argues that in paternalism, concern for welfare overrides the judgement of an individual regarding what is best for her/him and accordingly, the better an individual's own judgement, the greater the chances that paternalistic restrictions would have adverse repercussions for her/him. Arneson (1997, p. 86), however, also does not agree with the utilitarian argument based on Mills suggestion that every feasible paternalistic social rule lowers welfare on the balance and everyone is better off in situations of no paternalism. He believes that a ban on paternalism takes away from the have-nots and gives it to the haves. This because, as Arneson argues, left unrestrained in self-regarding matters, more able agents are more likely to make better selections while less able agents are likely to settle for the less valuable options. For Arneson, paternalism removes these less valuable options from the selection list of the less able agents.

Where does Sen's approach stand with regards to paternalism? From a point of view, his taxonomy of relative deprivation, adaptive preferences and counterfactuality could, to a significant extent, be seen as reflection of the paternalistic notions. In classifying them as wellbeing-deficits, the noticeable concern is what is best for people, irrespective of the good in welfare choices made by the individuals concerned. Couldn't it then be said that in targeting people's freedom to live the best possible life, the approach is effectively taking away their freedom to decide what is best for them? If this is true then Sen's approach suffers from a certain degree paternalism, despite Sen's own (1987b, pp. 32, 33); and Deneulin's (Séverine Deneulin, 2002) and Robeyns's (Robeyns, 2006) claims to the contrary[75].

The question about the paternalism in Sen's freedoms centred framework is intrinsically attached to the broader question of who decides the form, extent and method of wellbeing in the capabilities approach. In the context of picture of the state in the developing countries provided above, it would in all certainty be the last forum to which one would like to assign this task. Therefore, to save his wellbeing framework from a negative form of paternalism in the collective social set ups, it could be safely said that Sen must not leave the decision about the form of wellbeing to the state.

---

[75]The contentions of all the three are based on the argument that in providing for the freedoms aspects of both wellbeing and agency, the capabilities approach has effectively taken care of concerns for paternalism. It is argued that in leaving the question of the life to which an individual aspires as a responsible citizen to the individual, she/he is afforded sufficient freedom to form her/his conception of good.

On this inference, though the question of who decides on the wellbeing still remains to be answered, what has already been settled is the fact that both form of state guarantees become discredited in the societies where collective intent prevails. Thus with this repugnancy between the collective intent of a social structure and two of the three distinctive features, individualism and state guarantees, of the modern distributive justice framework; the only option left is to check the last feature, free choice for any possible correspondence. Interestingly, answer to the unresolved question about the discretion on the form, extent and method of wellbeing is also ancillary to the denouement that emerges from the equation between the free choice and collective intent. The third distinctive feature of the modern distributive justice is therefore examined here as the dernier resort to find a fit between the collective intent and the capabilities approach.

Free choice has remained a subject of tremendous controversy both in social theory and philosophy, not to speak of its variegated dimensions in economic and political theory. But purely from the optique of this study, free choice could be taken as a command which equips a person with two kinds of freedoms. First, it loads a person with freedom to form a perception of good, which in the context of the relation of the present study to a person's social space, becomes the freedom to form a perception of social good. Second, it leverages a person with freedom to position her/himself with regards to such perception of social good. It therefore needs to be seen how Sen responds to people's social compositions in terms of these two components of free choice.

Freedom to form perception of social good is rooted in people's attitudes as a derivative of the psychological content on which human form of life was distinguished from other species in the preceding chapter. Therefore to muster some clarity on the issue of people's perceptions about social good, the domain of attitudes has to be navigated, howsoever briefly. The need for this is explained by the simple reason that no adequate appreciation of people's perception of social good could be made without an understanding of the concept and role of the attitudes in human lives[76].

Attitude constructs are considered indispensable for understanding why we think, feel, do

---

[76]This is particularly true because the various motors and products enumerated in these hypotheses have a strong correlation with the process of human desires, beliefs and their self-theories which play a crucial role in giving them an insight about the goods and bads of social life.

things, evaluate events around us as positive or negative; how do we internalise things and how such internalization impacts our behaviour (Fazio & Olson, 2007, p. 123). Albarracin et al. (2005, p. 3) emphasize the evaluative role of attitudes in such matters as reacting to environmental influences, loving and protecting kin, selecting leaders, making decisions about spending resources, planning for future or reaching a self-perception. Visser and Cooper (2007, p. 198) cite Gordon Allport's (1935) suggestion that attitudes powerfully influence perceptions, cognition and behaviour, profoundly shaping people's interactions with the social world. While elaborating the importance of the study of attitudes, Oskamp & Schultz (2005, pp. 4, 5) point out that attitudes could be considered the cause of a person's behaviour and a single attitude (such as love for one's family) could summarize many different behaviours. They further argue that attitudes help in explaining the consistency of a person's behaviour. The concept of attitude is more neutral and acceptable as it bridges the controversy between the heredity and the environment as both instinct and learning are involved in the formation of the attitudes. And finally Fisk & Taylor (1991, p. 463) opine that attitudes have been given a *'star status'* in social explanation of human behaviour, both by common people and experts.

A more formal and comprehensive definition of the attitudes is provided by Gordon Allport in the following words;

> An attitude is a mental and neural state of readiness, organized through experience, exerting directive or dynamic influence upon the individual's response to all objects and situations with which it is related (Allport, 1935 quoted by Triandis, 1971, p. 2)

Triandis (1971, p. 2) himself defines attitude as *'an idea charged with emotion which predisposes a class of actions to a particular class of social situations'*. Eagly & Chaiken (1993, p. 1 cited by Albarracin et al. 2005, p. 4) consider attitude as a psychological tendency which is expressed by evaluating an entity with a degree of favour or disfavour. Triandis ascribes three[77] essential features to attitudes: the cognitive component which is a categorical idea inferred from consistent responses to various stimuli within human thinking, the affective component which is the idea charged by emotional responses and the behavioural component which is the *'predisposition to action'* (Triandis, 1971, p. 3).

---

[77] This tri-componential view about the attitudes is consistent with the frameworks of attitudes provided by Katz & Stotland (1959) and Rosenberg & Hovland (1960). For details please see Albarracin et al. (2005, p. 5), Fazio & Olson (2007, p. 124) and Fisk & Taylor (1991, p. 463).

Muzafer Sherif's social judgement approach highlights the processes underlying the operation of attitudes (C. W. Sherif, Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965; Muzafer Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961cited by Oskamp & Schultz, 2005, pp. 105-110). His idea of social judgement is based on the notion that the processes by which people make judgements about the social objects are both cognitive and affective, involving both the evaluation and categorization of different objects. This description of attitudes gives a general idea about people's internal locus of evaluation in their responses to the human and material environment of their survival. People's attitudes give them a scale for forming a perception of social good. In this backdrop, let's see how Sen's framework approaches people's perception of a social good.

Sen points towards three aspects of an individual's perception of social good. These three aspects, which Sen calls *'privateness of individual orderings'* are: (a) *self-centred welfare*, where a person's welfare depends only on his own consumption (b) *self-welfare goal*, where a person's only concern is the maximization of his own welfare and (c) *self-goal choice*, where each act of an individual is immediately guided by the pursuit of that person's own goal. Sen considers all these three aspects as independent of one another. Therefore any violation of one aspect does not necessarily violate other aspects also. For instance, he argues, that considerations such as those of social justice objectives while violating the axiom of self-welfare goal do not violate the other two axioms of self-centred and self-goal choice (Sen, 2002a, p. 214).

Sen argues that the choices and behaviours of people may be constrained or influenced by goals other than one's own or by the rules of conduct, resulting in the violation of self-goal choice. But the choices of self-centred welfare and self-welfare goal still remain available to her/him (Sen, 2002a, p. 214). In illustrating the significance of this point, Sen makes reference to his own distinction between sympathy and commitment (Sen, 1977a). He mentions that whereas sympathy violates the axiom of self-centred welfare in getting affected by the conditions of others, commitment does not do so in so much as it reflects a breaking of the tight link between the individual welfare and choice of action, where it might suffer a loss of self-welfare goal or possibly also the self-goal choice (Sen, 2002a, p. 214).

Articulation of wellbeing perception within such a broad matrix, arguably takes individuals to a higher plane of freedom, much above the level where wellbeing is seen only in terms of pure material considerations. But of added significance to this study is the extent to which this perception of social good accommodates the collective intent of a social structure. Sen feels

convinced that with this articulation of perception of social good, sufficient room is created for the pursuit of not only purely personal but also the goals of other individuals. Thus, with every person pursuing goals which are both self- and other-regarding, a web of overlapping and, at times, interlocking, intentionalities and action is created which for Sen fulfils the demands of shared intentionalities.

In all fairness, it has to be conceded that in forming a perception of social good, consideration which are not just self-regarding but also constitute a fair degree of other regarding choices, sufficiently incorporates collective intent. It bears similarity to assuming the perspective of other on oneself which, as may be recalled, was promoted by George Herbert Mead and Mozafer Sharif as one of the underlying themes on which collective intent in a social structure sustains. Therefore, on the point of perception of social good, hardly any inconsistency could be observed between the collective intent and the capabilities approach.

From this it could be safely inferred that by virtue of his articulation of people's perception of social good in his capabilities approach, Sen has obtained a perfect fit between the collective intent and modern distributive justice. It could therefore be said that by the manner in which Sen has used individualism in his approach, he has afforded space for people to form a common perception of social good which is the cornerstone of collective intent. Despite an essentially disaggregating framework necessitated by the need for interpersonal comparison, Sen has not lost sight of the duality which marks people's capacity in formation of the perception of social good. This is the duality which relates to an individual's personal perceptions as well as gaining an insight into perceptions of social good of other individuals with which she/he shares a social space.

Having passed the test posed by the first component of free will, Sen's framework proves that it extends sufficient dexterity in incorporating a perception of social good which tackles the problem of the irreducibility of the collective intent effectively. This brings into play the second component of free choice: a person's positioning with respect to her/his perception of social good. In positioning themselves with respect to their perception of social good, people's self theories and beliefs play a central role. Dweck & Molden (2008) explain how people's self theories have a bearing on their perception of free will and moral responsibility. Sketching the origins of the conceptualization of the human agency, Dweck & Molden (2008, p. 46) trace back the belief in the human agency to Bacon, Descartes and even Rousseau who wrote about people's capacities for self-perfection.

Sen's answer to a person's positioning with respect to her/his perception of social good lay in his conception of identity. For Sen, it is the assumed (or dominant) identity, in the multitude of identities that a person possesses which determines her/his positioning with respect to the perception of social good. Sen therefore sketches socially motivated perception of good and a person's social positioning with respect to it in the following words;

> The problem relates closely to that of the "identity" of a person, that is, how the person sees himself or herself. We all have many identities, and being "just me" is not the only way to see ourselves. Community, nationality, class, race, sex, union, membership, the fellowship of apologists, revolutionary solidarity, and so on, all provide identities that can be, depending on the context, crucial to our view of ourselves, and thus to the way we view our welfare, goals, or behavioral obligations.
>
> A person's concept of his own welfare can be influenced by the position of others in ways that may go well beyond "sympathizing" with others and may actually involve identifying with them. Similarly, in arriving at goals, a person's sense of identity may well be quite central. And, perhaps most important in the context of the present discussion, the pursuit of the private goals may well be compromised by consideration of the goals of others in the group with whom the person has some sense of identity (Sen, 2002a, p. 215).

Similar views are offered by Sen elsewhere in pointing out to the fact that a person's citizenship, residence, geographic origin, class, politics, profession, employment, food habits, sports interests, taste in music, social commitments etc. make her/him member of various groups, each one bestowing a distinct identity (Sen, 2006, p. 5). Sen's point of view has been further clarified by Appiah (2009, p. 478) who explains that for an act of solidarity, which Sen's presupposes for identity, an individual A behaves with his fellow Xes as Xes, for the reason that they are fellow Xes. There is the double intentionality where not only he conceives

himself as X, but also behaves towards other Xes as Xes. This means that for avoiding an identity that you do not recognize, you must conceive yourself in certain way[78].

For Sen, therefore, the question of a person's positioning with respect to her/his perception of social good is reduced to her/his identity or identities as the case may be. Within a social space, a person is seen as the accumulator of multiple identities and it is the supremacy and ascendency of an identity at a particular time and within a particular space which provides her/him with an index for the conception of social good[79]. From a vantage point, this social positioning of a person on the basis of assumed identity appears sufficient to solve the problem of incorporating the sort of collective intent observed in a social structure. After all, isn't it the assumption of various identities, as member of a family, kinship, ethnicity or caste which forms the basis of the pooling of intentions? In forming common perceptions of social good, aren't we thinking, choosing and acting on the basis of identifying ourselves with members of our families, kinships and other collectivities, of which we consider ourselves members? Or to state it somewhat differently, isn't it different people's common identity which gives rise to common perception of social good? And isn't it this common perception of social good which is all that counts as collective intent?

So should we say that with his conceptualization of social good and by positioning a person in a social space with his conception of identity, Sen has solved the problem of the extension of the distributive justice to the collectivist social setups? That is at least how Sen has conceived the problem and its solution, and there can be very little doubt that Sen has come very close to solving the problem. But before answering this question in affirmative, let's take cognizance of an important distinction ensconced within the ontology of aggregation and sharing. Aggregation is the mere summing of the individual units. In it, the individual existence of unit remains intact. In fact, each individual unit is identifiable in terms of its contribution. In sharing on the other hand individual units lose their independent existence. It is the collectivity which matters. In purely scientific jargon, the unit of analysis shifts from the individual to the collectivity.

This distinction gets support from Rovane's (1998, p. 138) explanation about her perspective

---

[78]Appiah considers Sen's social positioning of people as *'fundamentally'* methodological individualistic, because his (Sen's) ultimate units of concern are *'human beings, or persons'* rather than *'family lines, tribes, ethnic, or religious communities, nations, or states'* (Appiah, 2009) page 476.

[79]For a detailed description of how these multiple identities work and how they define individual roles, positions, responses and more importantly a conception of good, please see (Sen, 2006).

of common ends which she explains as follows;

> In joint activities groups of persons deliberate and act together for the sake
> of common ends. And unlike agency-regarding relations and rational
> influence, these activities do not require that persons project themselves all
> the way in to another person's own rational point of view so as to take up
> that person's perspective. These activities require rather that persons
> project themselves into a rational space that is generated by the ends which
> they hold in common-a space where their distinct rational points of view
> overlap. When persons project themselves into this common rational
> space, they can reason and act together from the perspective of this
> common ends. The point about projection, as it applies to and holds of
> joint activities, leads this into this point about *a perspective of common
> ends* (italics in original).

Given this crucial differentiation between an aggregated view of people's social positioning and shared intentionalities in a joint social action, could it still be said that Sen's identity-based social positioning provides an appropriate framework to respond to both? Unfortunately, it is here that Sen's identity-based social positioning evinces a manifest tilt, both in intent and purpose, towards aggregation and away from the shared perceptions. His social positioning of a person on the basis of assumed identity does not go far enough to shun the individualistic colour which has already been seen as incompatible with the collective intent of a social structure. In reforming this individualistic tendency of the distributive justice, though Sen has attempted to incorporate social collectivities by virtue of conception of social good contained in the self-goal choice and defining the position of people with respect to it on the basis of their identities, the frame of reference essentially remains individualistic.

On this corollary, Sen's social positioning of people in a collectivity on the basis of their identity, with each one of them forming her/his own perception of social good in that capacity, does not fulfil the criterion laid down for collective intent in the previous chapter[80]. The essential difference is that inside the collectivity in a social structure, each person does not form a perception of social good on the basis of her/his assumed identity, but participates in the perception of social good formed at the level of collectivity. This perception of social

---

[80] In fact this serves as the rationale why social structure and the prevailing collective intent were described in detail in the preceding chapter.

good defined at the level of collectivity is entirely different from Sen's self-goal choice, be it self or other-regarding. For the simple reasons that it accommodates concern for other people, a perception of social goods which is formed and operates at the individual level cannot become a substitute to the perception of good which is formed and operates at the level of a collectivity. And for that matter the aggregation of the social perceptions formed at the individual level could never become equivalent to the type of shared perceptions prevailing in a social structure.

This insufficiency of Sen's self-goal choice to reflect shared intentions has been discussed at length by Hans Bernhard Schmid (2009, pp. 119-130). Referring to the concepts of *'mineness'* and *'ownness'* in continental philosophy, Schmid argues that just as one cannot die the death of others, one cannot pursue other people's goal without making those goals one's own. On these grounds, Schmid questions Sen's social positioning of a person on the basis of identity in the following words;

> In some passages, Sen seems to suggest a reading according to which the agent identifies himself so thoroughly with another person that the goals he pursues are no longer his own goals. The assumption that one can pursue other people's goals without making them one's own, however, flies in the face of our understanding of agency as analyzed above; taken in this sense, identification amounts to some paradoxical self-elimination. If the object of identification is taken to be some other person, any attempt to go beyond self-goal choice by means of identification amounts to nothing but the futile attempt to stop being oneself by taking on somebody else's identity ....In this self-eliminative sense, identification with others is simply self-defeating. The harder one tries to get rid of one's own identity by identifying with somebody else, the more it becomes apparent that it is all about oneself trying to be another, and not another (Schmid, 2009, p. 125).

Schmid elucidates this point further by making reference to the following fact;

> The point seems to be that in committed action, the goals in question are not individual goals, but shared goals. If the scandal of the self-goal choice assumption is that it implies too narrow a conception of goals, this is not because it excludes some form of altruism, but because it wrongfully limits

goals to individual goals, thereby banning shared goals from the picture. What is needed in order to correct the shortcomings of the self-goal choice assumption is not an account of other-goal choice, but an account of the pursuit of shared goals, or of collective agency (Schmid, 2009, p. 126).

Schmid therefore concludes that;

From a non-reductivist perspective such as the one I just have taken, this is not surprising, but simply reflects the ontological structure of participative intentions or participative goals. In the sense of the "we-derivativeness" of participatory intentions and goals, togetherness is irreducible; or, to use Sen's term of the "privateness" of goals: shared goals are not simply combinations of private goals. There is a difference between goals that individuals just somehow happen to have in common, on the one hand, and goals which individuals have individually only because they have this goal in common, on the other. An account of agency that is unable to see beyond the limits of self-goal choice cannot account for the latter kind of goals, i.e., the case of genuinely shared agency (Schmid, 2009, p. 128 Emphasis in original).

This failure to differentiate between the collective perception of social goods in a social structure and the aggregation of individual perceptions of social good has also led to an inverted account of the role which an identity plays in a social structure. In a social structure it is the shared perception about a social good which determines the social positioning of the members of a collectivity in terms of their identities and not the assumed identity of people which gives them a perception of social good. To appreciate this point, it must be noted that in forming a perception of social good on the basis of their assumed identities, a person becomes the ultimate arbiter of the social good. In this sense, the aggregation of the social perceptions of good reached at the individual levels of the members of the collectivity might or might not be in accordance with the perception which has bestowed the identity in the first place. This is because every person interiorizes the identity of the collectivity in accordance with her/his own locus of understanding and estimation.

To dismantle the complexity of this point, it is clarified with an example. Assuming three individuals in a social space, A, B, C, acquire identities X, Y and Z. Now to acquire collective

intent from the manner in which Sen approaches it, it is sufficient that the three individuals have similar identities i.e. X=Y=Z. But it has to be noted that despite this common identities, the three individuals will retain both their cognitive dynamism and psychological diversity. These two factors will perennially pose a threat to the common identity. In case any of the three individuals forsake or choose to act against this common identity, there will be a complete disruption of the collective intent. This is because the collective intent is sustained by the act of volitional confluence of the individuals. This could hardly offer a valid explanation for the centuries and millennia through which structures of collectivity have survived in the eastern social setups. The manner in which collective intent and structures of collectivity operate is the complete obverse of this arrangement. There, a common identity, say I^C, prevails at the level of collectivity in which the individuals participate. On the strength of the explanations provided by Archer, this common identity is antecedent to individuals like her pre-existent structures. This also not only provides for raising Spranger's over-individual mental constellations, but also affords for Archer's social interactions and structural elaboration. Sen's arrangement does not provide for any of these two possibilities.

This is point has also been emphasized by Schmid, in his argument about dissimilitude within an aggregated and shared account of social good;

> The relation between shared goals and individual contributive goals (i.e., between shared goals and self-goal choice) is a normative one. This, however, points against a constitutive relation between individual contributions and shared goals of the kind at work in reductivist accounts of collective agency. Normativity entails contingency. That I should choose my contributive goal in our collective project presupposes the possibility that I decide not to contribute to the attainment of our shared goal. The possibility (perhaps more than the fact) of dissidence, as well as of other kinds of failures to do one's part, is an essential part of shared agency. It is what makes the relation between shared goals and individual choices normative. And again, an account that is limited to self-goal choice seems to be blind to the fact that some self-goal choices normatively depend on shared goals. In short, the self-goal choice assumption is incompatible with a non reductivist account of collective agency (Schmid, 2009, p. 129 parenthesis in original).

What all this reveal is the fact that an aggregation of the perceptions of social goods formed at the individual level could neither amount to, nor serve the purpose of collective intent. In case of the capabilities approach, this means that it is his positioning of the individuals with respect to their perception of social good and not in perception of social good *per se*, in which Sen has primarily adopted an individualistic approach which, as has already been mentioned, is incompatible with the collective intent of the social structure.

But before deriving our inference on this part of the hypothesis contained in the study design, it is necessary both on the onus of interest and impartiality to note what does Sen say in this context. Sen response to such castigations is contained in his *Response to Commentaries* (Sen, 2002b). There Sen associates methodological individualism with some theories which essentially detach an individual from her/his social surroundings. He therefore insists that for the simple reason that his approach takes proper cognizance of, and affords sufficient room for, the manner in which social setups influences a person's thinking, the question of individualism does not arise. But at the same time, he warns against the erasing of the individual from the social scene which, to him, might result in *'mechanical social aggregation'.* He thus stresses, on the strength of the Marxian logic, the essentiality of avoiding the *'reestablishing of the 'society' as a an abstraction vis-a-vis the individual'* (Sen, 2002b). Thus, he concludes;

> I believe the warning here, against seeing someone merely as a member of a group to which he or she belongs, is particularly important in the present intellectual climate of identifying individuals as belonging to one social category to the exclusion of all others ("nothing more is seen in them"), such as being a Muslim or a Christian, an Arab or a Jew, a Hutu or a Tutsi, or a member of Western civilization (whether or not it clashes with other civilizations). Individual human beings with their various plural identities, multiple affiliations, and diverse associations are quintessentially social creatures with different types of societal interactions, but their thoughts, choices, and actions are critically important parts of the society in which these individuals live (Sen, 2002b, p. 81).

In postulating thus, Sen seems to be entertaining an erroneous predilection towards a belief that people's shared perceptions of social good come into clash with their capacities to assume

multiple identities. Reverting to a point already emphasized, here again what is discernibly inducing this error is an inverted account of people's identity with respect to their perception of social good. This is now clarified here in detail to underscore not only the crucial discrepancy between Sen's approach and the manner in which people's positioning takes place in collective perception of social good; but also to underline the fact that how the discrepancy impacts the overall wellbeing in social space marked by collective intent.

Based on his apprehension about the *'erasing'* of the individual from the social scene and the *'reestablishment of the society as an abstraction'*, what Sen's provides is a framework where an individual assumes an identity first and then on the basis of this assumed identity, forms a perception of social good. To make this process compatible with collective living patterns, he conflates these acquired identities with other-regarding perception of social good, or the assumption of other people's perspective of social goods on oneself. In any case, the event of identity assumptions precedes the formation of a perception of social good.

But what actually takes place in collective intent of various social collectivities is a complete antilogy to this. There a perception of social good prevails at the level of various collectivities in which individuals gain memberships by virtue of sharing that perception. This membership bestows an identity on individuals, which determines both their positioning with respect to the perception of social good as well as their social positioning. Through such a process, an individual could assume more than one identity, by sharing as many perceptions of social good in different domains as she/he likes, so long as consistency is maintained so that no two domains of shared perception contradict each other[81]. The question which emerges here is that where does the question of *'erasing'* the individual from a social scene, or the reestablishment of the society as an abstract arise in this process of the formation of individual's shared perceptions of social good and where does this process work against the assumption of multiple identities by an individual. This, in fact is the point on which Sen's framework wrongly approaches shared perception in the social structure and this is where the capabilities approach is crucially deficient with respect to the wellbeing contained in collective intent of social structure.

To find reason for this deficiency in Sen's approach, one has to revisit the explanations put

---

[81] This requirement of excluding a contradiction between different shared perceptions is essential to rule out schizophrenic eventualities. For all surety, Sen's positions on such exclusion would not be any different, even within his identity-based perception of social good.

forward in the last chapter about the cognitive dynamism and Archer's temporal structural elaboration. This is essential to avoid an expected misconception. The view about an individual's participation in an already existing perception of social good at the level of various collectivities might create an impression that what is promoted here is a static view of the perception of social good at the level of collectivities, in which membership means a virtual surrender of volitional autonomy[82]. Such a canard is countermanded both on the strength of cognitive dynamism alluded in the last chapter and the explanation provided by Margaret Archer in her morphogenetic approach. First, the very incidence of the evolution of the individualistic societies like *Gesellschaft* from the collective communities of the *Gemeinschaft* underscores the presence of cognitive volatility, rather than a volitional morbidity, in the latter. This is explainable even on the principles applicable to purely scientific experiments which rule out the possibility of life resulting from dead objects. Even otherwise, the process of evolution is unexplainable from dormant objects.

But more specific and far more pertinent evidence in terms of volitional autonomy and cognitive dynamism in the process of social positioning with regards to shared perception is provided by Archer's standpoint. In her three stage process of structural elaboration, Archer specifically underscores the essentiality of the pre-existence of structure, which in this case could be equated with shared perceptions of social good. From this essential postulation, she proceeds to show how structural elaborations take place over the space of time due to the interplay of structure and a dynamic individual agency. This is exactly how the process of social positioning of people inside a collectivity, on the basis of their common perception of social good, takes place in collective social structures.

On the basis of all that have been noted in the context of the people's positioning with respect to their perceptions of social good, inference about the first hypothesis of this study results in a rejection. Thus, to the question, *"In its current form, is the framework for welfare assessment provided by the capabilities approach broad enough to capture wellbeing in the irreducible collective intent of a social structure along with the one in individualistic social setting?",* the answer from this study is a negative finding.

---

[82] In fact that is exactly the notion which prevails in the west about the collective intent in the eastern social set ups. From another angle, Sen's identification of the wellbeing deficits in terms of adaptive preferences and counterfactuality is, to a large extent, induced by such a view. That is the reason which necessitated this clarification here.

5.2: THE ESSENCE OF FREEDOM

Despite going the whole hog in contextualization of the social context in people's lives, the inconsistencies of the capabilities approach with collective intent of a social structure is not just unfortunate. It raises a two-fold question as to whether freedom as conceptualized by Sen in his capabilities approach is too ambitious or whether it suffers a crucial informational insufficiency. The former sense of the question may been seen as looking at the informational pluralism of the capabilities approach as going too far in accessing information on the wellbeing of a person: intruding even into those precincts of an individual's life which are sacrosanct in the social space in which she/he lives. This, in fact, is the dimensions from which the compatibility of the capabilities approach with the collective intent has been examined in the various studies conducted on the subject. In the latter sense, the informational stretch may be seen as falling short of capturing an aspect of freedom spawning from the social positioning of a person within her/his social milieu, and this is the approach adopted by this thesis towards the issue. In this sense, this thesis scores a major departure from the manner in which other studies have seen the ability of the capabilities approach to capture collective intent of a social structure. This thesis considers the issue as pivoted around the question of what is freedom *per se*: what epitomizes a person's fulsome and consummate incarnation of freedom, particularly, in a social space. It is believed that the actual positioning of Sen's freedoms centred capabilities approach with regards to the collective intent of a social structure could be determined only if the true nature and extent of people's freedoms in a social space is fully specified.

A common perception of freedom catalyzes from the absence of constraints. This is in fact the meaning from which Sen also derives his capabilities approach. His development perceptions prescribe the removal of various kinds of unfreedoms which constrain people in the realization of the type of lives which they aspire to live. But freedoms, particularly in a social context connotes much more. From the point of view of knowing a person's real freedom to position herself/himself with regards to her/his perception of social good, more importantly in a collective social space, it is imperative to discover the true essence of freedom itself.

Of freedoms, Robert Kane (2005, pp. 163-174) underscores five different forms. Although Kane calls them its five forms, the manner in which he has classified them, they could be effectively termed as five incremental stages of freedoms. Kane terms the first three of these

freedoms as compatibilist[83] and the last two, non-compatibilist freedoms. The first of Kane's five forms is his *'freedom of self-realization'*, referencing an absence of external constraints to give power or ability to do what a person wants or wills to do. Kane associates this freedom with classical compatibilists and explains that it is freedom of self realization because it presupposes the absence of an impediment outside the will of a person such as putting someone in jail or holding a gun to someone's head, various kinds of incapacities, duress, lack of opportunity, political oppression and the like. This is the freedom which ensures that people get what they want. The problem which Kane observes with this kind of freedoms is that it does not account for the fact that people's wants might be conditioned by circumstances. In the vernacular of the capabilities approach, freedom of self-realization fails to account for such malaise as adaptive preferences. At best, this form of freedoms could square up with utilitarian or resource-centred approaches of welfare, which as have been observed, fail to pass the Senian litmus. In more technical terms, this form of freedoms merely fulfils the conditions of the opportunity aspect of freedom in a restricted sense, and does no more. Thus Sen's framework of freedoms could be seen as promising more than what is contained in the freedom for self-realization.

Kane's second kind of freedoms is the *'freedom of reflective self control'*. To the freedom of self realization, this adds the power of understanding and reflectively evaluating reasons and motives for wants which direct action. To elucidate on this kind of freedom, Kane gives the example of Frankfurt's unwilling addict (Frankfurt, 2003). Though such a person is fully capable of reflecting on her/his desires, she/he is still not able to resist desire. Here the unwilling addict possesses the control of self realization as no external agency is constraining her/his choices, but lacks the freedom of reflective self control. In freedom of reflective self control, the higher order desires control and guides the lower order desires. A variant of such higher order desires could be the prevailing values and norms in a social set up.

To the question whether this freedom of rational or reflective self control could be counted as freedom in the first place, Kane refers to Plato who argues that it is in fact a freedom from becoming slave to one's own desires and fancies. Referring to Frankfurt (2003), Kane argues that this kind of freedom is perfectly in line with determinism because a person under self-control does not require alternate possibilities. In fact to do otherwise would be to do against

---

[83] Kane (2005, p. 12) explains compatibilism as the view which holds that there is no conflict between determinism and free will, and associates it with some ancient philosophers like the stoics and more particularly with Hobbes, Locke, Hume and John Stuart Mill.

what self-control and rationality demands.

The freedom of reflective self control comes closer to the Sen's ideal. It contains a much broader proposal for the realization of people's capabilities. Not only does it cover the opportunity aspect of freedom, but to a significant extent, also incorporate the process aspect of freedoms as in this, a person also enjoys command over the conception, rather than the mere pursuit of good. But this command is hampered by crucial disconnection between the space of personal circumstances and the conversion factor. Such connectivity is provided by the exercise of one's agential capacities in Sen's framework, which takes wellbeing beyond the domain of functioning alone. What is missing is a control over the process to convert or not to convert the acquired functionings into useful outcomes. Such a control is acquired in a person's agential capacities. In the case of unwilling addict also, had he possessed such a control, there would have been no question of converting the acquired potential functioning of indulging in drugs into actual functionings of partaking them. Therefore the freedom of reflective self control could be equated with Sen's wellbeing freedom but fails to encompass the agential aspects of Sen's freedom paradigm. This is symptomatic of an ineffective and diminutive process aspect of freedoms.

The third form of freedom mentioned by Kane is the *'freedom of self-perfection'*. This is the freedom where a person is equipped with the power to understand and differentiate right reasons from the wrong. Illustrating this kind of freedom, Kane cites Susan Wolf's (2002) example of Jojo, a person who has been brought up as child in an atmosphere of authoritarianism and debauchery by his ruler father, the Senior Jo. Reared in such an environment, Jojo grows up to become an even greater debauch than his father. About the argument of the extent to which Jojo could be held responsible for his actions, Wolf exonerates him on the plea that he lacked the ability to know right from wrong because of his corrupted upbringing. Jojo, in this case, is seen as lacking the freedom of self-perfection. This underscores the need that for doing right thing for right reason, a person must have the freedom of self-perfection to cultivate the capacity of differentiating right from wrong.

How Sen's ideal of freedom fares with the freedom of self perfection? As one would see, the freedom of self perfection is strongly rooted in a person's past. To the Wolf's example of Jojo's upbringing by his tyrant father, one could add the argument forwarded by Freud and early behaviourists that parents determine the future of their children (Myer, 2008, p. 37). But this past conditioning might not restrict itself to the influence of parents. Such influences

could also be imbided from the entire social setting in which a person is brought up. Myer signifies this with the statement that, *'if people living under the Taliban were to switch places for a few moments with their counterparts on a French Riviera beach, each would be instantly mindful of the determining power of culture'* (Myer, 2008, p. 37).

The notion of agency freedom and Sen's agential conception of a person in the capacity of a responsible citizen measures up nicely with the idea contained within the freedom of self perfection. It incorporates the notion of responsibilities as well reasonableness in a social space. Additionally, it encompasses a fuller and more consummate sense of process aspect of freedom, because an individual possessed with self-reflective freedom not only endowed with the power to avail freedom, but also exercise control over the process of freedom itself, whether or not to convert the acquired potential functioning into actual functioning. Therefore, Sen's framework of freedoms provides a sufficient finesse to cover this dimension of people's freedoms. For instance, in pointing towards counterfactuality, he does respond to the demands of this aspect of freedoms. Counterfactuality allows for placing a person in different perspective in assessing her/his freedoms. This gives people leverage, both over the opportunity and process aspect of freedoms, but of much higher order. Jojo's case finds an almost perfect explanation within Sen's notion of counterfactuality. His freedom dimensions changes almost entirely, when placed within a counterfactual position, outside the kind of circumstances which he experienced under his father.

5.3: Formative Aspect of Freedom

Sen's framework of freedoms adequately fulfils the criteria laid down by Kane's first three forms of freedoms which, as mentioned, represent compatiblist version of freedoms. This leaves us with the last two forms of freedoms: *freedom of self determination* and *freedom of self formation*. Kane terms these last two forms of freedoms as incompatibilist or libertarian freedoms. One of these two is the freedom of self-determination which is equated with the power or ability to act on one's own free will: a will that a person is herself/himself ultimately responsible of forming. In contradiction to the freedom of self reflection, here one enjoys freedom to act on the basis of free-will, a will that has not suffered any conditioning as in the Jojo's case. Kane however believes that freedom of self-determination presupposes a freedom of another kind: the freedom of self formation which gives a person the power to form one's own will over which she/he has plural control and which is not influenced by any past

settings[84]. Differentiating between the freedom of self determination and freedom of self formation, Kane argues that not all self determining acts are self forming, whereas all self forming actions are self determining.

For the convenience of advancing this discussion and for the infinitesimally miniscule distinction between them, let us term these two forms of freedoms under one nomenclature and call them the formative aspect of freedoms. In simplest of terms, this aspect of freedoms could be called the making or shaping or defining of the freedom itself. The primary function of formative aspect of freedom is to give a person command over the type of freedom that she/he wants. It has to be seen how much Sen's framework of freedoms afford this freedom to a person, more so in her/his capacity as member of a social collectivity.

The first notable point in this context is that, as seen above, in loading people with freedoms with its opportunity and process aspects, Sen's framework goes as far as the freedom of self perfection. That is where freedom as articulated in his approach reaches its consummation. This equivalently means that the formative aspect of freedoms, which deals with framing a notion of freedom itself, remains beyond the domain of freedoms covered by Sen in his approach. From the point of view of this study, this is an argument of centre-most importance, as it underscores the need for augmenting the capabilities space with formative aspect of freedoms arises.

It is the absence of the formative aspect of freedoms which has led to an erroneous assumption of situating individuals with respect to their perception of social good on the basis of their assumed identities. What is suggested here is that making people's positioning with respect to their perception of social good identity-dependent does not leave them with the freedom to form a shared perception of social good. It does not load them with freedom to decide on the form of freedoms itself. An identity-dependent perception of social good does not leave individuals with this freedom because both the choice of the perception of social good and her/his positioning are preconditioned by the identity which she/he has already assumed. Only in the presence of the formative aspect of freedoms, this preconditioning is removed and the individual is equipped with a dual command to form a perception of social good and place herself/himself with respect to it in a social space.

---

[84] This bears close affinity to Searle's *'secondary desires'* which are desires generated by some prior desire independent reason. For detail, please see (Searle, 2001, p. 168).

All this ultimately means is that Sen's framework of freedoms falls short of loading people with adequate freedoms in terms of its formative aspect to choose between the identity-dependent perception of social good, which patently leads to individualistic notions of agency; or to settle for a making the identity dependent upon a shared perception of social good, which is the soul of collective intent[85]. On reaching this conclusion, inference can now be drawn on the second hypotheses of this study which was stated at the beginning of this chapter as: *"If yes how; and if no, how can the capabilities approach evince the type of dexterity which makes it possible to accommodate collective intent within an essentially distributive framework?"* For the conditional part in this hypothesis, these analyses have already established that despite toning down the individualistic outlook of the modern distributive justice, Sen's freedom approach remains deficient in providing a framework which could capture both the collective and individualistic intents with equal facility. This insufficiency is explained now by the absence of the formative aspect of freedoms in his freedoms centred capabilities approach. Therefore, the inference drawn from the analyses of the second hypothesis informs us that in order to possess the dexterity to capture both the collective and individualistic intent in forming a conception of people's wellbeing, the capabilities space needs to be augmented with formative aspect of freedoms, along with its two other dimensions contained in opportunity and process aspects. The primary purpose served by the formative aspect of freedoms is to locate the fact as to whether people want to pursue their perception of social good in individual, collective or any other perceptible form. The manner in which the formative aspect of freedoms complements the capabilities space is provided in figure 5.1.

It might seem somewhat paradigmatic to besmirch a freedom-centred approach with overlooking an essential aspect of people's freedom. Therefore to emphasize the real significance of what the capabilities approach fails to capture without it and what it adds to the scope of the capabilities approach, the role of the formative aspect is highlighted below, both in its relation and comparison to the other two aspects of freedoms in the capabilities space.

From the description of the capabilities space provided in the third chapter, it could be

---

[85]Individualistic and collectivistic are the two apparent notions of agency, but other conceivable forms are not ruled out. In fact, what the formative aspect of freedoms ensures is a complete freedom in terms of choosing between these two notions, going for a third or even discovering an entirely novel notion of agency for functionality within a social space.

recalled that Sen highlights two essential aspects of freedoms: opportunity aspect and process aspect. These two aspects of freedoms are promised to an individual by the operation of the three spaces of personal circumstances, resources and conversion factors as mentioned in figure 3.2. In that figure, the capabilities set of a person commenced with the space of personal circumstances which fell under the domain of opportunity aspect of freedoms. The spaces of resources and conversion factors were set in accordance with a person's personal circumstances. In such an arrangement, the initial point for the articulation of people's freedoms was the space of personal circumstances. Nothing was provided to encompass freedom before and on the space of personal circumstances itself. This reflected a typical case of Sen's identity-centred positioning of a person with respect to her/his conception of social good. At the level of the space of personal circumstances, the freedom of each individual was severely and individually focused in terms of the command exercised over the spaces of resources and choices. The opportunity and process aspects of freedoms provide an index of this command.

What this arrangement essentially misses is an important aspect of freedoms which precedes the space of personal circumstances and in that sense, also the opportunity aspect of freedoms. It is the freedom of the individuals to decide on the form in which they want their freedoms to be pursued: in individual capacity, in collective manner with an inseparable collective intent or any other manner in which the individuals concerned deem fit. This is the freedom which comes before the opportunity aspect of freedoms and the space of personal circumstances; this is the freedom which the capabilities space ignores; and this is the freedom which the formative aspect of freedoms provides. Its articulation into the capabilities space transforms the functionality of the capabilities space mentioned in figure 3.2 to the one depicted in figure 5.1 given below.

Figure 5.1: Functionality within the Augmented Capabilities Space

Source: Author's contribution

The formative aspect of freedom encapsulates the freedom of self-determination and the freedom of self-formation. Possessed with these two freedoms, a person is seen in command of not only her/his wellbeing, but also the form, nature and composition of wellbeing itself. This means a conception of wellbeing, not necessarily exclusive of material wellbeing, but essentially something above it[86]. Therefore, the point from where a realization of this formative aspect commences is the fact that it is not wellbeing *per se* but people's freedom in forming their perception of wellbeing which raise them to the ultimate ideal of freedoms.

As final observation on the role of the formative aspect of freedoms within the capabilities space, let us search for the reason of its omission from the Sen's framework. The most probable reason for the capabilities approach's inability to effectively incorporate the formative aspect of people's freedoms in its framework appears to the perception of freedoms which is prevalent in the developed societies of the west. Without entangling ourselves in the perception of social good prevailing in the eastern and western social set ups, at least this

---

[86] Reference to this form of freedoms is also found in Aristotelian views who considered factors such as health and wealth as instrumental goods for the realization of wellbeing and not wellbeing *per se* (Heil, 2009, p. 90). Aristotle therefore believed that their sole pursuit could be harmful, materially and morally, if people place a higher value on them than living an honourable life. He therefore considered wellbeing to be the highest goal of the human activity, which is sought for its own sake only, towards which all intentional and reasoned practices should be ultimately directed- i.e. well-being is complete in itself and should not be sought for the achievement of something else (Heil, 2009, p. 90).

much could be safely said that the manner in which these perceptions operate in the two social setups is entirely different. In the west, armed with state guarantees and a robust social security system, an individual can appropriate a distinct space of wellbeing. In this appropriation of the wellbeing space, her/his assumed identity only works as a facilitating variable. Contrary to this, in the eastern social systems such an appropriation is not possible for individuals, mainly because of the absence of state guarantees and a social welfare system. In such a situation, the assumptions of identity for forming a perception of social good contradict the shared perceptions prevailing in the social structure, which proxy the dual role of the state mentioned above. Thus, on parallel to North (2005, pp. 2-7) who considers the evolution of the institutions to be the result of the human desire to control their environment and reduce uncertainty, it could be said that what is termed as unfreedoms on the scale of perceptions prevailing in one social setting might well be people's strategies to deal with the prevailing circumstances of uncertainty in the other. The reservoir effect mentioned in the preceding chapter provides a perfect personification of this phenomenon. In that case, the integration of perception manifests a strategy to effectively deal both with the level of development and weak state institutions in the eastern social setups. And in this sense, the integration of perceptions is required to be seen as an act of volitional autonomy, not its surrender[87].

Therefore, what the capabilities approach, as an eclectically generic framework for the evaluation of wellbeing must do is to provide ample space for capturing both collectivist and individualist strategies for dealing with social environment. The incorporation of the formative aspect of freedoms imbues the capabilities space to offer such an omneity and ubiquity in capturing an index of people's wellbeing.

5.4: THE PROMISE OF FORMATIVE ASPECT OF FREEDOM

In this last section of the chapter, some theoretical demonstrations are provided of the manner in which the augmentation of the capabilities space by the proposed formative aspect of freedoms could help in solving the problem of mapping the collective intent within the capabilities space. This is done with the help of the three forms of wellbeing deficits identified by the capabilities approach in a social setup as discussed in the third chapter: adaptive

---

[87] Another point which proves the volitional autonomy and dynamism is the emergence of *Gesellschaft* from the *Gemeinschaft* itself. Even on purely scientific analogy, such an emergence presupposes dynamism in volition at the *Gemeinschaft* because the emergence something dynamic from a morbid force is not explained in scientific terms.

preferences, relative deprivation and counterfactuality. It is shown here that how the formative aspect of freedoms makes up for the insufficiency of the capabilities space by showing that what is essentially counted as wellbeing deficits by the capabilities approach by looking at it from a purely distributive social justice angle, might well be valuable functionings in the collectivist social setups.

The case of adaptive preferences is taken up first. The question of adaptation of preferences arises if a person is considered to have set her/his preferences below an acceptable level of wellbeing. But the question of who sets this acceptable level of wellbeing again brings into light the factor of paternalism. It betrays a situation where people's preferences are ranked in accordance with different social ordering, taking one ranking as an ideal with which other preference ordering are compared. In such cases, judgment on both the ideal ranking and the relative positioning of the prevailing ranking in a social setup remains with an outside agency. This essentially places the locus of a person's positioning with regards to the perception of social beyond the individual. An individual's own preference ranking for a particular kind of social ordering is thus stifled in favour of an exogenous perception of social good. The ultimate wellbeing of the individual, thus, remains contingent not only on how good this exogenous perception social good is, but also how far it matches the individual's own preference ranking.

With the formative aspect of freedoms, possibility of any such eventuality is effectively forestalled. By leveraging people on both the formation of perception of social good as well her/his positioning with regards to it, the question of taking one social ordering as an ideal with which all other are compared[88], does not arise. Additionally, as in the formative aspect of freedoms people hold the dual control of both forming a perception of social good and positioning themselves with regards to it, the question of adaptation of preferences is conveniently ruled out. Possessed with the command over forming a perception of social good, the possibly of paternalism is effectively culled. And with the freedom to position oneself with regards to such a perception of social good, any eventuality of adaptation of preferences is forestalled.

---

[88] Interestingly, taking one standard of wellbeing as an ideal with which others are compared to test whether or not they suffer adaptability amounts to the same kind of *transcendental institutionalism* on which Sen primarily differs with Rawls on the question of what constitutes a just society. For details please see chapter three above.

The problem of relative deprivation is essentially a question of wellbeing deficit related to people's social positioning. This is a problem of stratified societies, where wellbeing remains entrenched within the lines drawn across the societal canvas. In such situations, considerable difference prevails in the form and extent of wellbeing available to people in different strata of the same social system. Thus, whereas the overall level of freedoms in a social system might be quite high, this might be accessible to the people of a particular stratum (or strata), and outside the reach of many other people. Those to whom this level of freedoms is not available are considered deprived relative to those who are enjoying a higher level of freedoms in their own stratum of social a setup. Thus, what is discernable is the fact that the problem of relative deprivation arises essentially from assessing two different social strata on the basis of a single perception of social good. Social stratification means the existence of different perceptions of social good and a variance in people's positioning with respect to it across the lines of demarcation. Relativity could only arise if people's wellbeing evaluation is based on a single scale without realizing this differential. This single yardstick is invariably the perception of social good prevailing in the higher strata of social setup. What remains a potent threat in this arrangement is the fact that to what extent this perception of social good is acceptable and in accordance with the perception of social good prevailing in what is considered as a relatively deprived social group. It is because of such a threat that the doors of importation of alien perception of social good remain ajar.

The formative aspect of freedoms gets around this blemish by affording an opportunity to evaluate wellbeing in each stratum of a social setup on the basis of its own conception of the social good. Thus the problem of deprivation gets emancipated from relativity and is addressed in a context specific approach. This ensures a tangible form of development with local precision rather than an abstraction to approximate to a level and form of wellbeing that is both alien, unattainable and for the most part, even not wanted.

The third entitlement deficit of counterfactuality does not remain an entitlement deficit at all, in the presence of formative aspect of freedoms. Counterfactuality relates to looking at a person's wellbeing in different, counterfactual circumstances. Thus, what might appear to be an entitlement in one social circumstance might well count as an entitlement deficit in the other! In the presence of the formative aspect of freedoms, no need of counterfactuality arises because people are allowed to not only form their perception of social good but also to position themselves with regards to it. This renders counterfactuality meaningless for the

simple reason that people's situational frame of reference for wellbeing is also of their own choice.

CONCLUSION

When we talk about the freedoms to *'live a life as one values'*, it must start with the freedoms available to people on the form and nature of the freedoms with which they live their lives; make its way through people's capacities to internalize such freedoms for the actualization of the chosen life patterns and complete its course with freedoms to translate such capacities into actual achievements if people so desire, or otherwise keep them pending. The three domains of freedoms can be called the formative freedoms, the opportunity freedoms and the process freedoms.

The analyses in this chapter showed that the capabilities approach effectively provides the last two freedoms but conveniently ignores the first. That is why it fails to capture wellbeing perceptions attached to an irreducible collective intent of the social structure in the east. The augmentation of the capabilities space by the formative aspect of freedoms provides an opportunity to shun the individualistic patent and cater to the realities of both the individualistic and collectivist social set ups with equal facility.

The deficiency of the capabilities approach arises from its articulation of people's perception of social good on the basis of their assumed identities in a social space. The aggregation of such perceptions could not be equated with the shared perception of social good which contains the soul of collective intent. Individual perceptions of social good defined by people's assumed identities and shared perceptions of social good arising out of people's memberships in a shared identity at the level of a collectivity constitute two different social realities. A generic wellbeing framework must provide for accommodating both these prototypes. In its present form, the capabilities approach only captures perceptions of social good emerging from identity based, individualistic social positioning. The formative aspect of freedoms is therefore presented as a complement to this shortcoming. It imbues the capabilities space with a universality which makes it equally relevant to both the individualist and collective social setups.

CHAPTER 6: INTEGRATING THE FORMATIVE ASPECT IN THE CAPABILITIES SPACE

Formative aspect of freedoms imparts context specificity to the capabilities matrix by giving people the freedom to position themselves with respect to their perception of social good. In this capacity people exercise agency not only over their conception of social good but also over positioning themselves with respect to it. With such a freedom to position themselves with respect to their perceptions of social good, ample space is provisioned for the individuals to pursue wellbeing in an individualistic or collectivistic, or any other perceptible form. Formative aspect of freedoms is therefore essential to save the capabilities approach from gaining an imprint only of individualist societies. Herein lay the real significance of the formative aspect of freedoms. This is the promise that it holds at the theoretical and conceptual level.

However, at the more practical level of integrating it into capabilities space, formative aspect throws up the challenge of adding one more dimension of intangibility to the existing multidimensionality of the capabilities framework. Approaches to integrating this formative aspect into the capabilities space must have to deal with this added dimensionality to the existing multiple intangibility of the capabilities approach.

From the position of this research, the identification of the formative aspect of freedoms as an avenue to capture the collective intent within the capabilities space remains its most salient contribution. But at the same time, it is felt that this contribution will remain insufficient without pointing towards the possible avenues by which the formative aspect could be integrated into the capabilities space.

The inclusion of these last two chapters in the thesis reflects such a feeling. This chapter charts out a method for mapping the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space and the next chapter provides for the practical demonstration of the designed method within an empirical setting. Social structure in Pakistan is chosen as a station of empirical analyses for its collective social makeup. This will show the practicality of the formative aspect and at the same time will demonstrate how the formative aspect of freedoms could be used within the capabilities space to capture both the individualistic and collective intent. While both the form and method of mapping of the formative aspect of freedoms may vary according to the nature and context of the study, the illustration provided here will add clarity to the manner in which it could benefit the freedoms centred capabilities approach.

It is, however, essential to point out that this is primarily a demonstration to offer some suggestions about the manner in which formative aspect of freedoms could be used to map the collective intent into the capabilities space. It does not lay any claim to be the final solution and in no way might be considered as an equivalent to a methodological model in the sense in which such models are normally understood. From this note of clarification, it would therefore be absolutely fair to presume that further research could not only unveil better avenues of integrating it into the capabilities space, but could also unravel arenas of its more salubrious utilization.

This chapter starts with a statement about the challenges faced and the assumption made to overcome these challenges. This would not only highlight the difficulties faced in accomplishing the task, but also pinpoint some essential and at the same time inviolable requirements of both the capabilities approach and the collective intent of social structure in any scheme of mapping. In the section following this, structural analysis is presented as a means which caters to such requirement: promising to safeguard both the theoretical soundness of the capabilities approach and the pristine integrity of the collective intent within a social structure. The next section showcases an operational strategy in terms of social network analysis. Among the variety of possibilities offered by the social network analysis, affiliation networks are selected and its conceptual concurrence with the desired mapping highlighted. The final section depicts the relevance of Pakistani social structure as empirical setting for testing the devised operational strategy.

6.1: A Statement about the Challenges Faced and Assumptions Made

The scheme of mapping is initiated with a word of caution which forewarns that adding an increment of superjacent informational extension to the surreally intangible components of the capabilities space must entail considerable methodological improvisation. Even in circumstances where people's perception of social good and their positioning with respect to it are based on individualistic patterns, the arduousness of the task is no less colossal. However, in case such notions are based on collectivist predilections, the complexity faced becomes both gargantuan as well as labyrinthine. In such cases, any methodological scheme for the integration of formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities matrix must indemnify at least two variables: the irreducibility of the collective intent and the information pluralism of the capabilities approach. If collective intent becomes meaningless without its irreducibility, the capabilities approach loses its form without its informational pluralism.

If the contraposition cannot be eliminated: it has to be, at least, tamed. Therefore a method for the reconciliation of the antipathetically pugnacious has to be carved out. Another challenge is thrown up by the demand of the universality of the capabilities approach. As emphasized in the third chapter, Sen's adamant refusal to approbate a list of universally applicable basic capabilities stemmed from his insistence to retain the generality of his approach. This asks for devising a methodology which is free from parochialism and which fully caters to the diversity in people's perceptions as members of different social spaces.

Keeping within the theoretical limitations of the collective intent and the capabilities approach, such challenges are met with carving out a few important assumptions. First it is presumed, based on the discussion of collective social structures in chapter four, that though collective intent within the social structure cannot be reduced to the level of individuals; it could be captured at the level of various collective components which constitute the respective social structure. These components are none else than the very relational collectivities at which the collective intent prevails such as family, kinship, tribe, caste, ethnicity and the like. As seen in that chapter, these structures of collective define the frame of reference for the irreducibility of collective intent.

Two purposes are served by this assumption. First, a tangible operational space is created for the intended mapping of the collective intent. Without such an operational space, the irreducibility of collective intent is shrouded in an aura of mystification, which affords little space for any operationalization. Second, even for the collective intent, it gives various collectivities greater context specificity in the foreseen mapping. By locating the relative strength of different collectivities inside a social structure, it affords the possibility of calculating the relative importance of various collectivities in the wellbeing matrix of an individual. In this sense the identification of the collective intent at the level of these structural collectivities facilitate in fathoming the comparative intensity of various forms of collective intent in social structure.

The second assumption relates to the preservation of the informational pluralism of the capabilities approach. Here it is assumed that the three spaces of personal circumstances, resources and conversion factor provide sufficient information on the capabilities set of people. Or to phrase this somewhat differently, sufficient dimensions of wellbeing is covered by these three spaces to provide information on the capabilities set of an individual.

These two assumptions furnish two sets of variables: one consisting of the various collecitvities at which collective intent prevails such as family, kinship, tribe, caste, local community and the like; and the other comprising the three structural components of the capabilities space i.e the three spaces of personal circumstances (PC), resources (Re) and conversion factor (CF). In the presence of these two sets of variables, the task of integrating the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space reduces to finding a method of intersection between these two sets of variables.

Possibility for such an intersection is discerned in the conceptual framework of structural analysis which has gained increasing popularity within social research in recent years. Robert Merton considers structural analyses as a way out of the plurality of conflicting theoretical paradigms in sociology (Merton, 1975, pp. 22-52). Without discounting the suitability of the other possibilities, the selection of the method of structural analysis for demonstrating as to how the formative aspect of freedoms could be integrated into the capabilities space is made for its two-fold utility. First, structural analysis does not entail reducibility to individual components which fares well with safeguarding the irreducibility of the collective intent. Second, its analytical scheme of focusing on the relational patterns between the structures of collectivity fulfils the requirement of the intersection of the two sets of variables mentioned above. These efficacies and the real worth of the structural analysis for the present study is explained in the next section where a brief annotation of the structural analysis is given for the manner in which it is applied in sociological research and the extent to which it could be effectively utilized for the desired mapping in this study.

6.2: A Structural Analytic Approach and Mapping through the Social Network Analysis

A perfect example of the method and utility of the structural analysis is contained in the Arthur Koestler's parable of two Swiss watchmakers, *Mekhos* and *Bios* narrated in his book, *the Ghost in the Machine* (Koestler, 1967, pp. 44-58). Both Mekhos and Bios made watches from a thousand parts and the watches made by both of them were also in equal demand. But the methods adopted by the two watchmakers for making their watches were entirely distinct. Mekhos used to make watches from bits and pieces, like making a picture form a mosaic. Therefore, if interrupted in his work, Mekhos had to restart all over again, from the first bit. Against this, Bios would first make sub-assemblies of about ten parts, holding each of such sub-assemblies as independent parts. From these sub-assemblies, he would latter make the

whole watch. Accordingly, if disturbed in making his watches, Bios would not have to restart from the first bit. He would restart from the sub-assembly during which the disturbance has occurred.

Koestler argues that the method of Bios had two advantages over Mekhos's. First, Mekhos's watches took inordinately longer than Bios in making, and second, Bios watches were far better in quality in terms of maintenance, repairs and resistance to damage. With the passage of time, the difference in the methods employed by the two watchmakers started showing its impact on their business, with the end result that the inadequacy of Mekhos's method forced him to close his shop and take the job of a mechanic with Bios. On parallel drawn from this parable, Koestler concludes that organism and societies are multi-levelled branches of semi-autonomous sub-wholes which themselves branch into further sub-wholes of lower order and so the process carries on. For such intermediate entities, he uses the term '*Holon*' which function as self-contained whole in relation to their subordinates in the hierarchy. He argues that hierarchies are '*dissectible*' to their constituent branches, and the Holons form the nodes on these branches. A fixed set of rules govern the Holons, and the rules of conduct of social Holon are irreducible to the rules of conduct of their respective members[89].

The notion underlying the sociological structural analysis bears close affinity to both the parable and principle emphasized by Koestler. The basic scheme is based on an idea of analyzing social systems in terms of the networks of linked behavioural relationships. It is a fundamental shift in analytic perspective - away from seeing aggregated sets of individuals as the units of analysis and towards seeing structures of linked relationships as the fundamental objects of study. The most important intellectual tool of structural analysis is contained in the idea that a social structure could be presented as network consisting of a set of nodes and a set of ties connecting these nodes[90] (Richardson & Wellman, 1985). Berkowitz (1988, pp. 480, 481) suggests that structural analysis proposes a very different way of looking at things. Its underlying assumption recognizes the existence of relationships among the elementary parts

---

[89] From this Koestler argues for a replacement of atomistic theories by a conception of hierarchical systems. He explains such a hierarchical system with his concept of '*holons*'. A holon, he argues, is '*janus-faced*'. Seen from a point of view '*below*' it in the system, it is self-contained whole; but from a vantage point '*above*' it in the hierarchy, it is a dependent part. He argues that a complex whole could be dissected into its composite holons of the second and third order, and so on, but it could not be reduced to the sum of its parts. Neither could the properties of the whole be predicted from those of the parts.

[90] Richardson and Wellman explain that the nodes may be persons, groups, corporate entities, clusters of ties or other institutions

of social systems which constrains their interaction with one another, instead of assuming that classes or other categories of actors are real in themselves.

Structural analysis considers the flow of resources within the ties of a social structure as *"relations of control, dependency and cooperation"* (Richardson & Wellman, 1985). Elsewhere (1988, p. 20) Wellman describes structural analysis as a *'comprehensive paradigmatic way of taking social structure seriously by studying directly how patterns of ties allocate resources in a social system'.* He therefore describes it as a *'distinctive form of social inquiry'* to which intellectual unity is provided by five paradigmatic characteristics;

1. Behaviour in structural analysis is interpreted in terms of structural constraints on activity rather the inner forces within individuals (units)
2. Rather than sorting units into categories of their inner attributes, structural analysis focuses on relationships between the units,
3. It takes into account patterned relationships by virtue of joint memberships of units,
4. Structure is considered as a network composed of many networks which may or may not be partitioned into discrete groups,
5. Relational patterns are studied directly as a concomitant to the mainstream statistical methods which for most part require independent units of analysis

The underlying philosophy behind the structural analysis carries significance for the present study in more than one ways. This significance is elaborated first in the context of studying the impact of social structure, particularly in relation to the irreducibility of the collective intent[91]. In the first place, structural analysis interprets behaviour in terms of structural constraints on activity rather than the inner forces within units that guides behaviours in voluntaristic push towards desired goals. This characteristic is akin to the irreducible nature of the collective intent within a social structure. Structural constraints on activity incorporate the spirit of collective intent without reducing it to individual components. Second the analysis focuses on the relationships among the units rather than sorting the units on the basis of their inner attributes. Understandably, such a focus on the relationships rather than the constitution

---

[91] The properties of the social network analysis mentioned here are based on the discussions by Barry Wellman. For details please see (Wellman, 1988, p. 20)

of the units is essential to analyse the product of the collective intent rather than the collective intent itself. This is important because in studying the influence of social structure, this study focuses on the collective intent *per se* without enmeshing itself into the study of the collective intent- its composition and its internal dynamics. Third, the structural analytical technique deals directly with the patterned/relational nature of social structure in order to supplement the mainstream statistical methods which ask for independent units of analysis. This supplementary role also accords well with the way this study envisages the impact of the social structure on capabilities development. While studying the implications of the social collectivities for the capabilities development, this study does not ignore or undermine the role of an individual as an independent unit of analysis for the welfare rooted in individual action. It, however, believes that welfare at the individual level does not encompass all the welfare within a social system. The aim, therefore, is to supplement the welfare at the individual level with the welfare rooted in the collective intent to obtain a comprehensive measure of all the welfare within a social system[92].

The underlying philosophy contained within these characteristics fares well with collective intent of a social structure. In focusing away from the inner attributes of the individuals and sorting them out into categories of their collective attributes, structural analysis provides a non-reductionist framework. Analysis based on patterned relationships in joint memberships of units affords a scheme of the collective intent obtaining at the various levels of social collectivities.

So much for the appropriateness of a structural analytic approach for studying the influence of social structure, what remains to be seen is that how this framework addresses the requirement of informational depth of the capabilities approach. The first point to note, however, in any scheme of application about the capabilities approach is that this requirement has to be fulfilled within the ambit of the challenge posed by the intrinsic intangibility of the variables which characterize its theoretical framework.

In this regards, previous studies have adopted a variety of methods to overcome this challenge[93]. Among all these attempts to operationalize the capabilities approach, this study has found the method of the de-construction of the capabilities space into its constituting

---

[92] This is precisely related to the Jackson three-layered approach for capturing the comprehensiveness of the capabilities at the level of a social structure. Please see (B. Jackson, 2005) for further details.

[93] For such efforts on the operationalization of capabilities approach and the issues and difficulties involved, please see (Comim, 2008; Robeyns, 2006)

components as the most appropriate for two specific reasons. Deconstruction of the capabilities matrix into its structural components creates room for mapping an additional component, like the formative aspect in the current case, on the one hand; and on the other, various situational exigencies could be easily accommodated within the decomposed structural parameters. Thus a structural approach of deconstructing the capabilities space into its components also fares well with the two-fold requirement of the capabilities approach.

With this pledge of the structural analysis for the design of analytical framework, next step in the desired mapping is the finding of a method for the intersection of the two sets of variables contained in the structural components of the capabilities space and social structure. A possibility for this intersection is detected in the concept of social network analysis. Social network analysis are used in social sciences to observe correspondibility between individuals or groups of individuals and various sociological phenomenon such as membership in a group, participation in an event, responses towards various social events and likewise. Knoke & Yang defines social network as a structure of a set composed of actors, some of whose members are connected by a set of one or more relations (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 8). A social network is described as the collection of social or interpersonal relationships linking individuals in a social structure. According to Wasserman, the *"social network perspective encompasses theories, models, and applications that are expressed in terms of relational concepts or processes"* (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 4). To Wasserman, the following basic features differentiate social network analysis from other research approaches;

- Various units are treated as interdependent rather than autonomous[94] players.
- Ties among the units are treated as channels for the transfer of resources.
- Various networks models with their focus on individuals approach the concerned network's structural environment as providing opportunities for or constraints on individual action.
- Structure is conceptualized as the lasting patterns of relations among units.

---

[94] This should not be taken as contradicting the argument of this study about people's volitional autonomy even within a collectivity. Units taken here are the respective structural components of capabilities space and collective intent and social structure, and not individuals.

The principle of interdependency among the units rather than treating them as autonomous players on the one hand and the philosophy of considering ties among the units as channels for the transfer of resources on the other, provide a perfect scheme for achieving a mapping between the two sets of variables of the capabilities space and the social structure. The first of these two principles indemnifies the mutually contingent interrelationships between the two sets of variable while the second measures the comparative change as to how changes in one set of variables impacts the other set.

Knoke & Yang (2008, pp. 4-8) contrast social network analysis with individualistic studies, by mentioning that it takes into account the relational connections of individuals with other individuals. They emphasize that central to the theoretical and methodological agenda of network analysis is identifying, measuring, and testing hypotheses about the structural forms and substantive contents of relations among actors. This distinctive structural-relational emphasis sets social network analysis apart from the individualistic, variable-centric traditions still dominating most social sciences today.

Knoke & Yang further underscore the importance of the social network analysis by highlighting its three underlying assumptions. First, they are more important in understanding behaviours than such attributes as age, gender, values and ideology because these attributes remain constant across many social contexts. Second, social network analysis unveils a theoretical mechanism to see how relations affect social entities by channelling information and resources to specific structural locations and observe how networks generate shared identities and promote shared norms and values. Third, social network analysis sees structural relationships as a dynamic process. Without denying the fitness of the first two assumptions for this study, the third assumption is of special relevance because it does not view networks as static structures. Rather than this, they are seen as continually transforming entities. This continuous transformation is consistent with both the cognitive evolution underlined by Tonnies and Archer's three phase notions of social change.

Social network analysis therefore provides a suitable platform for mapping collective intent captured through the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space. The real value of this analytical platform lay in the fact that the social network analysis provides a way outside the methodological atomism which enables the evaluation of collective capabilities. This is because social network analysis focuses on the relationships and their end-products in a social structure, rather than the units constituting a collectivity. In social network analysis,

'the relationship between the pair of units is a property of the pair and not inherently a characteristic of the individual unit' (Wasserman & Faust, 1994, p. 8). Such a quality is essential to preserve the harmony between the components of the social structure in any mapping within the capabilities space.

Therefore, a deconstruction of both the capabilities space and social structure into their respective structural components on the theoretical corollary borrowed from the structural analysis; and a mapping of these two sets of structural components on the conceptual foundations provided by social network analysis, complete the methodological design for the integration of formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space.

6.2.1: THE SCHEME OF AFFILIATION NETWORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE ANALYSIS

What still remains to be ascertained is an analytical scheme for carrying out analysis within the formulated methodological design. The question here relates to the analytical tool with which the interrelationships among the two sets of structural components could be examined within the methodological designed created from the structural components of the capabilities space and social structure. The nature of such an analytical tool itself is contingent upon the pivotal question about what is actually examined, or in more scientific jargon, 'what is to be the unit of analyses'. From the point of intended mapping, such unit of analyses could be nothing else than the 'relationship' between the two sets of structural components. Therefore, we must look for analytical gadgetry that meets the requirements of analyzing the relationships within the designed methodological design.

Fortunately social network analysis also uses relationships as its basic unit of analysis. There is, however, one crucial difference in this conceptual analogy for which necessary adjustment has to be made. Rather than a direct one-to-one connectivity between the nodes or connectivity between groups of nodes as in social network analysis, our analyses focus on the indirect link between the components of the capabilities space as reinforced by the components of the social structure. A contraption is, therefore, required to cover up the deviation.

From the figure 3.2, it could be noted that an index of the capabilities development could be obtained by examining as to how strongly the components of the capabilities space are linked with each other to complete the capabilities set. The stronger their connectivity, the richer the

capabilities set and vice versa. Mapping the components of the social structure within such an interaction, then, requires whether they contribute towards the strengthening or weakening of the interaction among the components of the capabilities space.

Within the broader framework of the social network analysis, a conceptual congruence to this requirement is noted in the theoretical scheme of affiliation network analysis. An affiliation network is a two-node network consisting of two entities-Actors and Events (Faust, 2005, p. 119). Analyses within the affiliation networks examine how Actors and Events are simultaneously interrelated (Knoke & Yang, 2008, p. 103). Katherine Faust distinguishes between social ties in a membership relations as in an affiliation networks from ordinary social network analysis by pointing out that the former links individuals to collectivities whereas the later links individuals with one another (Faust, 2005, p. 119). As used in the social network analyses, an affiliation network studies collective social participation among sets of Actors to bring into fore social relations among them rather than simply linking various pairs of individuals. Actors could be individuals or group of individuals; Events are larger collectivities in which Actors have memberships. There are no direct linkages between Actors and they are only linked to one another by virtue of their common membership of various Events. Similarly, there is no direct connection between Events which are only tied by virtue of their joint membership of various Actors. The following figure gives an idea of the structural composition of an affiliation network.

Figure 6.1: Bipartite Graph of Affiliation Networks

Source: adopted from (Faust, 1997)

In the above figure n_i's represent various Actors and m_i's various collectivities called Events. Actors are members (subsets) of Events and it is the joint membership of any two or more Actors within Event(s) which establishes their connectivity. The indirect relationship between Actors through their memberships of Events provides an adequate analytical framework for mapping the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space. Accordingly, by designing an affiliation network with the components of the capabilities space as Actors and those of social structure as Events, a very useful analytical tool could be developed for the desired analysis.

The methodological scheme of affiliation networks contains some very interesting and important techniques for analyzing various dimensions of relationships between Actors and Events[95]. These techniques could be exploited to explore various dimensions of the influence of collective intent of a social structure on capabilities development. These analytical tools provide a generous space for the various types of analysis that a study might intend to perform on the correlations between the set of Actors and Event.

Of the hosts of such analytical tools, correspondence analysis and bipartite graphs are chosen here to assess relationship between the components of capabilities space and the social structures. Correspondence analysis is a mathematical technique for assessing the degree of association among two or more sets of variables. Faust (2005) describes correspondence analysis as a scaling approach for studying relationships between variables in a two-way array[96]. Bipartite graph is a geometric display of the relationship between Actors and Events in an affiliation network. According to Wasserman & Faust (1994, pp. 299, 300), affiliation networks can be represented by means of a bipartite graph in which Actors and events are represented as nodes, and assigning Actors to one subset of nodes and Events to the other. Further discription of the manner in which correspondence analysis and bipartite graphs are used in this study is given in the next chapter.

---

[95] For instance, the concepts of the centrality, density, closeness and betweenness provide for analyzing relationships between Actors and Events from various angles. For details on these and such other techniques, please see (Faust, 1997; Faust, Willert, Rowlee, & Skvoretz, 2002; Knoke & Yang, 2008; Wasserman & Faust, 1994).

[96] For details on the concept and method of correspondence analysis please see (Greenacre, 1984, 2007; Nooy, 2003; Wasserman & Faust, 1994)

6.3: Methodological Framework Explained

The objective of achieving a mapping for the collective group intent within the capabilities space is, therefore, well served by designing an affiliation network and selecting an appropriate technique for analyzing the relational context between Actors and Event within the affiliation network. In the created affiliation network, the strength of association among the Actors by virtue of their joint memberships in the Event could be examined to see how the capabilities set of the individuals is completed through such an association. The idea is based on the assumption that a stronger association among Actors imparted by Events would signify an exhaustive and enriched capabilities set. To demonstrate that how this designed analytical framework achieves the objectives of this study, a run through of the methodology is provided here.

Reconnecting ourselves with figure 5.1, it could be recalled that ovals in the figure represented the structural components of the capabilities space while rectangles depicted the acquired welfare levels at a particular instance. Such a configuration meant that the acquired welfare levels encounter different aspects of the individual lives as one moved from left to right. At least three factors- personal circumstances, resources and conversion factor- were seen as playing a pivotal role in completing the capabilities space in a person's movement from initial conditions to the desired level of functionings. In this scheme, the strength of interconnectivity of these components provided an index of the completion of the capabilities set of an individual. These three components of the capabilities space are therefore taken as Actors among whom interactions would be examined by virtue of the structural components of the social structure.

Figure 6.2: Relational Patterns in Social Structure

Source: Author's contribution

Next we turn to the components of the social structure. Figure 6.2 given below depicts the interplay of various relational structures in a social structure. In the figure, each X represents an individual and her/his capabilities set. Circles represent various collectivities within the social structure. The number of X's within a circle show the individuals who are embedded in a social collectivity by virtue of their shared perceptions with other members of the same group. Together these various collectivities define the entire social structure. It can also be noted that there are certain isolated X's which do not belong to any collectivity. They represent cases which do not approximate to the irreducibly social goods and denote instances where methodological atomism is workable for welfare assessment.

Some significant points in the above interrelationship between the capabilities space and the structural components of the social structure are highlighted below.

- Along with an individual, her/his capabilities set is also subsumed in the relationships formed through collective group intent. Therefore in trying to assess capabilities embedded in such a set up, the structural collectivity to which an individual belongs and the impact of such collectivity on capabilities set also need to be taken into account.

- An individual could become member of more than one structural collectivity and in such cases her/his capabilities set is influenced by more than one collectivity through the overlap. Accordingly, not only all strains of the overlap over the capabilities space but the comparative strengths (pulls) of various collectivities also need to be evaluated.

- Collective group intent may subsume the whole capabilities set or only part of it. In this perspective we have to assess the domain and range of the influence of each structural collectivity and try to find out what components of the capabilities space it is actually influencing.

These are just few dimensions from which structural collectivities of a social structure could influence people's capabilities sets. Many other dimensions could emerge on detailed scrutiny.

What is now needed is the integration of the components of the social structure and the capabilities space. This end is achieved by designing an affiliation network where the components of the capabilities space are chosen as Actors and those of the social structure, as Events. Therefore, if components of the capabilities space are classified as personal circumstances, resources/choices and conversion factor and these are labelled as Actors; and likewise, components of social structure are categorized as family affiliations, kinship relationships, ethnic bonds, caste identities and other affiliations (denoted as local community) and these are marked as Events; an affiliation network of the sort given in Figure 6.3 emerges.

Figure 6.3: Affiliation Network of the Structural Components of Capabilities Space and Social Structure

Source: Author's contribution

In this affiliation network, it will be observed as to how Actors are associated with each other through their joint memberships in Events. An Actor's association with another Actor through

joint membership of the two in an Event or Events would reflect the embeddedness of the components of capabilities space within the collective intents of the social structure. The above figure provides an indication of this relationship. The tools of correspondence analysis and bipartite graphs would be used to discover various aspects of this relationship.

6.4: THE RELEVANCE OF THE EMPIRICAL SETTING PROVIDED BY THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN

Among the developing countries Pakistan presents a unique case of development experience. Commencement of development planning followed hot on the heels of the creation of the country; much ahead of most of the developing countries. Many times since then, it exhibited promise of sustained growth, which however resulted in little good for the people. Its strategic location has contributed to fulfil the much-needed capital requirements of a developing economy with substantial inflows of foreign assistance. In terms of factor endowments, it possesses one of the best canal systems for its irrigation needs. In communication system, which is a crucial factor in a globalized world, Mobile subscribes exceeds 100 Million as of October 2010, according to the figures of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA). Total mobile phone density as of the same period stands at 64.2 per cent[97]. The flow of information is supplemented by a vibrant media. A modern motorway cuts across the length of the country. In the presence of these facts, an abysmal low social sector indicators beggar description.

Researchers have tried to identify the causes of the failure of the development process to usher in a sustained change in a variety of related phenomena. From its ethnic divide, to elite domination, to military-bureaucratic indulgence, to socio-cultural and religious reasons, to its geographical location and foreign interventions, to low savings and capital formation, colonial legacy and its position vis-à-vis its stronger and larger Indian neighbour-efforts have been made to unravel the enigma[98]. That Pakistan's developmental problems persist despite all the above factor endowments and that Pakistan still seeks a viable explanation into its developmental woes despite a multitude of favourable circumstances warrant looking somewhere else for alternative explanations.

---

[97] Figures as available on the webpage
http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=269&Itemid=599
accessed on 29/11/2010

[98] For a detailed elaboration on the role played by these factors please see, (Ali, 2002; Burki, 1972, 1976; Griffin & Khan, 1972; Jahan, 1972; Levin, 1974; G. F. Papanek, 1967; Sayeed, 1967; Vakil, 1950; Weeks, 1964; Ziring, 1971)

Social structure perspective has been the most neglected, if not altogether ignored, in all these researches. Extended joint family systems, kinship relationships, various ethnic and linguistic cohorts and family lineages reflect considerable influence of collective aspects of living, not to speak of the various congregations in the name of religious sects and class-divides[99]. Notwithstanding this predominantly communal living structure, various development models have seen developments either in terms of the adequacy of the governmental policies or their impacts on human development, without assessing the impact of the social structure on development itself. Even where efforts have been made to correlate development with the social structure, the main aim has been to look at the impact of development on social structure rather than the inverse.

The social structure of Pakistan, therefore, depicts a typical case of social embeddedness which provides an adequate experimental setting for evaluating the role of formative aspect of freedoms in capturing the influence of social structure on people's capabilities in a predominantly collectivist social setup. At the same time, an analysis of the influence of its social structure on the capabilities development of its people could also unearth some valuable explanations for development failure in Pakistan, which previous studies have failed to highlight. This explains the rationale of selecting Pakistani social structure as empirical setting for the present study.

CONCLUSION

Augmentation of capabilities space with formative aspect of freedoms though momentous for capturing the collective intent; is nevertheless incomplete without an illustration of its integration into the capabilities matrix. Additionally, such a demonstration is also needed to underscore both the complexities involved in the process and the inviolable conditionalities of both the collective intent and capabilities approach which must not be compromised in any such scheme of integration.

The philosophy underlying the structural analysis offers sufficient scope for materializing the desired mapping. However given the sacrosanct preconditions of both the collective intent and capabilities space; such a scheme of mapping demands some important improvisations.

---

[99] In fact Muhiuddin (c2007, p. 247) points out that, *"A 1980 study (Weston, 1992, p. 161)of more than 100,000 IBM employees around the world found that Pakistan is one of the most family-oriented countries in the world".*

Social network analysis, and within that, the concept of affiliation network make these improvisations possible.

Thus, an affiliation network defined by the components of capabilities approach as Actors and those of the social structure as Events is seen as a methodological design of considerable utility for the desired integration of formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space. To demonstrate the functionality of this methodological scheme, Pakistani social structure presents a viable empirical setting, both for its collective social setup and its unexplained development problems; for which studying the impact of its social structure on people's capabilities development is expected to offer valuable explanations.

CHAPTER 7: EMPIRICIZING THE FORMATIVE ASPECT OF FREEDOMS

This chapter undertakes to carry out the empirical analysis; therefore saving ourselves the labour of providing justifications, a more direct description of the format of the chapter is given. Analyses commence with the portrayal of the methods used. The main architecture of the methodological edifice was provided in the preceding chapter. Here, it is briefly abridged to proffer connections with the collected data and append a description of the analytical tools. A rundown on the collected data is then given in the second part to portray its relevance and the manner in which it is used in the analyses. The third part unrolls the results and the last part gives interpretations of these results.

7.1: THE VARIABLES

The intended analyses require a set of basic capabilities which could serve as an index of people's wellbeing. Within this set of basic capabilities, two sets of variables are needed on each capability to map collective intent of a social structure into the capabilities space: one containing the structural components of the capabilities space and the other consisting of the structures of collectivities in the Pakistani social structure. Out of these variables, the structural components of the capabilities space have already been identified in terms of personal circumstances (PC), resources (Re) and conversion factor (CF). This reduces the task to racking up the set of basic capabilities and resolving the variables for the structural components of the social structure in Pakistan on each capability within this set. The rationale and the method of selection for these variables are given below.

7.1.1: SELECTION OF BASIC CAPABILITIES

For studying the impact of social structure on the capabilities development in Pakistan, five basic capabilities were selected in education, health, financial conditions, security and participation. Apart from Sen's general preference for the selection of basic capabilities in accordance with the exigencies of both the circumstances and nature of the study; the list of basic capabilities drawn by Nussbaum, referenced as Appendix A, served as reference for this selection. Reference was also drawn from the five 'instrumental' freedoms which Sen had suggested in terms of political freedoms; economic facilities; social opportunities; transparency guarantees and protective security (Sen, 2000, pp. 38-40). Further justifications

for the selection of these basic capabilities were found in the situational quirks and streaks of Pakistan's developmental problem seen in the context of its social structure.

Education in the sense of imparting awareness plays a key role in giving a person an understanding of the world around her/him and positioning herself/himself within it. It also has a direct bearing on the capabilities at number four and six in Nussbaum's list of capabilities i.e. *'senses, imagination, thought'* and *'practical reason'* respectively. In the context of Pakistan, however, education carries added significance. Pakistan's low literacy rate[100] is often seen in the light low education outlay in Federal budgets, inadequate education system, lack of educational resources, and absence of institutional support. Without denying the contribution of these factors, a factor of commonality in all these causes is their predominantly resource-based orientations. While that might itself contain considerable explanations, the very fact that education entitlement deficit persists calls for at least triangulating and at best augmenting them with explanations beyond resources and people's access to them[101]. The impact of its collectivist social structure on people's capabilities development provides one such constituency. Explanation for Pakistan's educational problems beyond the purely resource-based and income-centred causes are expected to highlight not only the relevance and validity of the formative aspect of freedoms, but also unravel some hidden causes of Pakistan's low social capital in terms of educational endowments.

Health influences a person's capabilities in many important ways. Most of these dimensions are too well known to merit recounting, but a particular aspect of person's health lay in its crosscutting influence on a person's conception of good life. It is probably for this reason that in Nussbaum's list the very first two, *life* and *bodily health*, are directly related to a person's health. Additionally, reference towards health could also be observed in some of the other basic capabilities such as *play and practical reason* and *emotions*. In case of Pakistan, health equals education in terms of development lag[102]. Therefore, for reasons very similar to those

---

[100] Even as per the official figures, adult literacy rate was 52% as of 2006-07 ("Pakistan Social & Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM)," 2006-07).

[101] More than cogent reasons contain in such facts as high drop outs, gender-disparity, local-urban divide which ask for explanations beyond the availability of and access to resources.

[102] According to Word Health Organization report available on http://www.who.int/countries/pak/en/ accessed on 30/Nov/2010, in Pakistan as of 2006, life expectancy at birth was 62 year for male and 63 years for females, probability of dying under five years was 97 per 1000 live births.

for education, the significance of studying health capabilities in the backdrop of its social structure could not be denied.

For financial conditions as a basic capability, it is essential to note an important distinction before the justifications of its selection are provided. Financial conditions though comprises but does not solely mean income. Income as index of capabilities has received the most scathing of the Sen's wrath, yet he has never proscribed it from a person's capabilities matrix. However, instead of taking income as a capability *per se*, income is considered in the capabilities matrix as cutting across all the capabilities. It is in this sense that its instrumental importance is underscored by Sen. Thus, although income is not considered to constitute the entire ambit of financial conditions, its importance for the realization of wellbeing is not denied. For this reason, while income forms a subset of the basic capability of financial conditions, its role is understood in the restricted sense of the instrumentality assigned to it in the capabilities approach. Other than this, hardly any explanation is needed for the inclusion of financial conditions in the list of basic capabilities in the presence of the abysmally low social indicators and widespread poverty in Pakistan.

A feeling of wholesome accomplishment attached to participation as against exclusion- in social, political or any other sense- makes it, *ab initio*, one of the most cherished human capabilities. It is therefore both hardly surprising and perfect sensible if participation as a basic capability could be pervasively noted at number five, *emotions* and Number ten, *political control over one's environment*, in Nussbaum's list. Its importance is felt more in places where its paucity makes it a veritable *bonne bouche*- an ambrosia available to the select few. On that count, Pakistani socio-political scene presents an almost peerless case of the prevalence of perfect partiality in affording people with participative propriety. Almost half of its post-independence history has witnessed non-representative military regimes. Even the spells of intermittent democracy were cast in considerable doubts about their true representativeness. Outside the political landscape, an extremely stratified society thrives on exclusion than equitable participation. In these terms, the malaise pervades across almost all spheres of life. In employment opportunities, in education, in health facilities, in socialization; even in marriages and ceremonies, participation entails qualifications. This reason could hardly be excelled by any other capability in the context of Pakistani social structure.

About the last capability included in list, security, the least said the better within the context of Pakistan. The precarious security situation in Pakistan is too obvious to need any reference. In a situation where people see an air of insecurity all around them in various forms, the role of social structure in influencing people's capabilities to secure themselves against various threats, immediate and foreseen, could be expected to contain some very useful information. Further credence to the inclusion of security as a basic capability is provided by its parallel with the capability of *bodily integrity*, obtaining at number three in the Nussbaum list.

7.1.2: STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE IN PAKISTAN

The designed structural analyses are carried out within these five basic capabilities. Therefore, the next step is the selection of the structural components of the social structure in Pakistan. For this, five cross-cutting and predominantly conspicuous structural components identified in the Pakistani social structure are: family, kinship, ethnicity, caste and local community. Description and boundary conditions for these five structural components are given below.

Family has remained, and continues to remain, the most visible and dominant relational structure in the Pakistani society. The general significance of the family ties in South Asian societies, of which Pakistan is a historical, geographical and cultural part, is evident from the findings of Steve Derne in his studies of the Indian male, which were catalogued in the fourth chapter. Further evidence is provided by Aitezaz Ahsan's portrayal of a typical Pakistani as *'family man with liberal outlook'* (Ahsan, 1996, p. 339). He mentions that family is the gift of the agrarian mode of production which has remained the dominant means of subsistence from the prehistoric times in the areas constituting the present day Pakistan;

> The environment of the family gives to the character of the Indus person (a Pakistani) a certain civilized softness. Bonds between the members of a family are strong. Responsibility and care for ageing parents and grandparents is the normal trait of the Indus family. There is no abandonment even in times of economic stress and penury (Ahsan, 1996, p. 339 parenthesis added).

But the concept of family in Pakistani social set up is marked by both fluidity and viscosity. For the most part, the terminology implies a much thicker social unit than the one understood in terms of the nuclear family revolving around the husband, wife and their children. This creates some problem for drawing boundary conditions for including family as a variable in a social research. To give an idea of its spread, family ties could transcend both time and geographical partitioning and are observable even across generations and distance. The problem has been handled differently by different studies. However, true to the nature of the present study, the limits of this variable are set purely in terms of relational context. Accordingly, a family is defined as constituting husband, wife, their children; and the mother, father, sisters and brothers of the two spouses. In this way it is differentiated from its close overlapping variables of kinship, ethnicity and caste.

Kinship defines the second structural component for the Pakistani social system. To differentiate kinship from family, boundary conditions are defined to contain all those blood relationships which are not included in the family. Thus kinship encompasses all the blood ties other than those which are marked as family ties. Though in this respect, a kinship tie occupies a position of much less centrality in comparison to family, this should not be taken to assign superfluity to the explanations contained in the kinship ties. Many important aspects of a person's capabilities set; intermarriages, occupational choices, and gender positioning are settled at the platform of kinship. In most cases families has to acquiesce in such social grounding decided at the level of kinship without asserting its independence.

The role of kinship in Pakistani society could be gauged from Peter Blood's (1995, p. 101) observations who mentions that kinship (*biradari*) has traditionally served the role of combined mutual aid society and welfare agency, *'arranging loans to members, assisting in finding employment, and contributing to the dowries of poorer families'*. He also points out that the tie between a sister and brother is strong. The sister looks to her brother in case of widowed early or divorced. Similarly, he points out that little romanticism is involved in marriages which are (pre)arranged and both husbands and wives act like the representatives of their respective families within a kinship.

Ethnicity identifies the third strand of relational structure in Pakistan. Qadeer (2006, p. 189) mentions that ethnicity, along with family and kinship are forms of structures which define an individual's place in the society and inform her/his belief and behaviours. The robustness of ethnicity around the Pakistani social structure could be gauged from the fact that a number of

studies have considered it as directly rivalling, and mostly conquering the ideational foundations of Pakistan which its founding fathers laid on Islam. Further credence to the claim about such a significance of the ethnic relational structure is provided by partition of Bangladesh from Pakistan on the grounds of purely ethnic differences[103]. In the presence of such glaring realities, relational structures based on ethnicities hardly needs any further justification for its inclusion as one of the prominent structural component of Pakistani social structure.

The fourth relational structure within Pakistani social system is provided by Caste affiliations. Caste affiliations represent purely geographical imprints in Pakistani society, which have been inherited in the larger social milieu of South Asian subcontinent. Despite the presence of clear Islamic injunctions prohibiting all forms of social classifications with the sole exception of piety, the perseverance of the social stratification in the name various castes speaks of the strong geographical influence in the cultural grounding of Pakistani society. A robust caste system existed in the Indian subcontinent at the time when Muslims entered it. True to its historical tendency of acquiring local hues in its coexistence with other cultures, caste system is the more prominent local imprint that Muslims imbibed from the Indian socio-cultural milieu. Therefore, a caste system has entered the Pakistan socio-political polity where relational structures are raised on the basis of local lineages such as Rajputs, Khattaks, Yousafzais, Gujjars, Rinds, Raeesanis etc. but these are also reinforced by such religious connotations as Syeds, Sunnis, Shias, Barelvis, Devebandis etc[104], not to speak of their numerous sub-streams. Therefore, as it exists today, castes represent a potent structural demarcation in the social landscape of Pakistan.

The four relational structures of family, kinship, ethnicity and caste share a certain degree of conceptual camaraderie. All bestow memberships on their adherents without allowing for any voluntaristic enfranchisement to the contrary; the relational structures of all are strongly entrenched in historicity which determines both the intensity of its pressures on its members and their roles within the structures; and all are marked by an element of heredity. A relational type antithetical to this is provided by local community where memberships are acquired in a manner antipathetic to the above. Despite this atypical pattern, local community

---

[103] For references to this role of ethnicity in Pakistan, please see (Burki, 1972; H. Papanek, 1972; Rahim, 1973; Stephan R. Lewis, 1969; Stephen R. Lewis & Guisinger, 1968; Tariq, 2000; Wilcox, 1970)

[104] For further details on the role of caste structures in Pakistan, please see (Hamza Alavi, 1989; Hasnain, 2006; Hussain, 1979; Ikram & Spear, 1955)

provides relational structures of proximate potency to the above four structures in terms of influence on the people's capabilities. Therefore local community is selected both for this compositional diversity and structural similitude. The concept of *hujra* and *panchayat* in rural and membership of various clubs, voluntary organizations and societies in the urban areas are examples of the outreach of the local community in people's lives. These act like informal institutional setup which plays crucial role in providing participative opportunities, settlement of disputes, need identification and exploring avenues for its fulfilment etc.

With the selection of the structural components of Pakistani social structure, identification of variables is complete. But before embarking on analyses, a couple of important clarifications are essential to remove some anticipated disquiet. It is admitted that there can be omissions and more pressing cases could be made for some of the other basic capabilities, as well as the structural components of the Pakistani social structure. Without arguing against such possibilities, it is pointed out that it will make more sense if these variables are seen in conjunction with the guidelines set by Sen and the work done by Nussbaum and others in giving a concrete shape to Sen's prescriptions. Further signification to the identified variables is given by the development problems in Pakistan which have rarely been seen within the contingencies of Pakistani social structure. The selected variables are expected to make a far better sense if seen in this perspective. Having said this, religion is a variable the exclusion which must not go without explanation. Religion's role in raising structures of attitudinal and preferential commonalities does not warrant any explication, more specifically in traditional societies like Pakistan. That makes a case for its almost automatic selection in any research conducted on the factors of collective intent.

Why religion was not included in the structural components of the Pakistani social structure is explained by a number of factors. First, religion plays a role of considerably larger dimensions to be seen as a structural component of the social structure. This is more than true in the case of Pakistan, a country created in the name of religion[105]. Accordingly, its operational frame of reference as a cross-cutting national identity, or even on a much larger canvas of global Muslim community, is entirely different from the other components of the social structure. This contrasts with the type of structural components of social structure undertaken by this study. In fact rather than constituting a component itself, religion's

---

[105] The potency of religious corollaries in people's attitudinal framework could be found in the manner in which religion has been exploited in the ongoing conflict in Pakistan.

influence is pervasive across all the components of social structure in Pakistan. Second, as corollary to the first reason, though the selected relational structures are not formed on religious lines; it does not mean that religion does not play any role in forming the perceptions of social good on the level of these collectivities. In this sense, an index of religious influence in the formation of perception of social good and people's positioning with regards to it, is captured to a greater degree by examining the influence of these structures of collectivity. Third, this influence of the religion is also almost uniformly distributed across the identified structural components of Pakistani social structure as Islam is professed by 97 percent of its people. Fourth, without prejudice to the above but also most important, the form of religion itself is a subject of great controversy in Pakistani society. Glossing over the many sectarian and sub-sectarian divides to define a unanimously applicable conception of religion, like the other structures within the social setup, is beyond the scope of this illustrative analysis of the manner in which collective intent could be mapped into the capabilities space.

7.2: THE COLLECTED DATA

It is a statement more of fact than fondness that the project undertaken required specifically collected data. First the methodological framework developed for analyses encompasses entirely new parameters and discovering secondary data which could measure up with these parameters was highly improbable. Second, without discounting the explanations provided with regards to the role of the social structure in people's capabilities development in Pakistan, the primary aim of these analyses was to demonstrate the operationalization of the devised framework for mapping the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space. This did not offer the kind of improvisations and adjustments to accommodate secondary data within the analytical design. Collection of a subject and context specific primary data, therefore, remained the only alternative.

To obtain data on the variables a questionnaire, reproduced as Appendix-B, was designed which contained two parts: one to capture the influence factor of the social structure and the other, its enabling and constraining role. Selection of a survey questionnaire was partly made because of the nature of quantitative analysis within affiliation networks and partly to keep the sample size large enough to capture the diversity within the experimental setting. In all, the questionnaire contained 41 questions; 32 in the first part and 9 in the second. The first 8 questions in the first part gathered basic information like age, education, mother tongue etc.

The rest of the 24 questions were divided to collect information on five basic capabilities in accordance with the weights assigned to them in the study. On a similar note, the 9 questions in the enabling/constraining part collected information on the three capabilities of education, health and financial conditions. This diminution from five basic capabilities to three in the enabling and constraining part was made purely because of the time and material constraints. Thus while the influence part of the study was seen across the five capabilities of education, health, financial conditions, participation and security; the enabling and constraining part was analysed within the first three. This also shows that more weightage was given to the first three capabilities in the set of basic capabilities chosen for the study.

Data on the questionnaires was collected through a field survey, conducted in November 2009-February 2010. In consideration of the motley of diverse, and at times conflicting, features of social structure in Pakistan, special care was taken to make the sample as representative as possible. For this, a technique of multistage stratified random sampling was adopted, with necessary adjustments to cover up situational complications. The technique involved drawing transversals across each factor of diversity. First of such diversities was the extent to which tribal patterns was reflected in the social structure across the country. On this basis, a broad diagonal was discerned which demarcated the two provinces of Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa (KPK, henceforth) and Baluchistan as retaining the tribal strands whereas the two provinces of Punjab and Sindh were observed to reflect social setups predominated by non-tribal living patterns. Accordingly, from the two provinces of KPK and Baluchistan where tribal social patterns predominated, KPK was included in the sample. The province of Punjab was selected for the same reasons from the set of provinces with non-tribal social systems. Four districts were thus selected from the sampled population, two from each of the two provinces in the selected provinces.

Another factor of diversity was the urban-rural divide. The urban-rural divide carries importance in the context of the social structure in Pakistan because the prevailing social conditions across this divide present stark contrasts, verging at times on contradiction. With such a pronounced state of variation, any results obtained within the urban social structure could hardly be termed as reflecting people's perceptions of social good in the rural areas. To cover up this diversity, each of the four selected districts was further divided into their urban and rural components for the selection of sample, obtaining a total of 8 strata. In selecting sample points within each of the stratum, as much randomized was ensured as possible. Some

of the more conspicuous diversities which were tried to be covered with proportionality in allocation were the gender, age, occupation and education.

Questionnaires were thus administered to a sample size of 160, selected on the basis of 20 from each stratum. Of these 109 were retrieved. 108 of the retrieved questionnaires were ultimately included in the data, with a solitary rejection based on the incomplete information. Of the questionnaire which could not be retrieved, it was ensured that no factor of diversity as discussed above is missed out. Replications were therefore carried out wherever and whenever required so that the acquired sample is made as representative as possible. This is how a data bank was procured for this study.

7.3: THE ANALYTICAL SCHEME

Analyses on the data were performed conjointly on the two aspects of influence and enabling/constraining role of the social structure. Reason for this was the fact that enabling/constraining role was investigated as extension of the overall influence. The influence part was analyzed by assessing the degree of association between Actors and Events. For analyzing the degree of association among Actors, the questionnaire acquired information about the various affiliations of a person and the manner in which she/he ranked them within her/his capabilities space, the influence of the collectivities in formation of her/his choices, and the space available to her/him within the social structure to pursue her/his preferences etc. For deeper information on the relationship between the components of social structure and those of capabilities space, correspondence analyses were then carried out to assess the degree of association between them. The null hypothesis of independence between the two sets of components was tested against the alternative hypothesis of association between them. Further avenues of the influence of social structure and the comparative role of various collectivities on the relevant space of the capabilities matrix were analyzed by the bipartite graphs as described below.

7.3.1: THE RAW SCORES

Table 7.1 gives a description of the combined raw scores across all the five sets of capabilities. A general idea about the strength of the relational composition of the Pakistani social structure and its bearing on the components of the capabilities space could be gained

from this. This also gives an idea about the relative importance of the various components of the social structure *vis-a-vis* the corresponding component of the capabilities space.

Table 7.1: Description of the Variables

		Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Community
PC	Education	5.196262	1.711538	0.529412	0.596154	0.692308
	Financial Conditions	5.148148	2.019231	0.932039	0.75	0.92233
	Health	5.657407	2.820755	1.780952	1.679245	2.047619
	Participation	3.961905	1.885714	0.764706	0.865385	1.067961
	Security	6.72381	4.171429	2.568627	2.509804	2.49019608
Resources	Education	7.490741	3.411215	1.528302	1.161905	1.4190476
	Financial Conditions	5.759259	2.2	0.631068	0.653846	0.72115385
	Health	6.12963	3.37037	1.666667	1.466667	1.933962
	Participation	4.132075	2.176471	0.950495	0.932039	1.333333
	Security	7.037736	4.514286	1.60396	1.294118	1.666667
CF	Education	6.962264	2.54902	0.64	0.732673	1.009901
	Financial Conditions	5.546296	1.980952	0.718447	0.692308	0.828571
	Health	6.542056	2.561905	1.07767	1.076923	1.205882
	Participation	6.12963	2	1.728155	1.695238	0.873786
	Security	5.25	3.61165	3.269231	3.019231	3.087379

7.4: THE RESULTS

To calculate the overall influence of the social structure on the capabilities space, correspondence analyses are carried out on each of the five basic capabilities separately. For this, Table 7.1 is broken down to five corresponding tables, one for each of the five basic capabilities. For each of these, raw scores are first displayed in an Affiliation Matrix. The components of the social structure are designated as Actors and Actors scores are displayed

along the vertical (y-axis). The Event scores, depicting the components of the capabilities space are stacked along the horizontal (x-axis). These affiliation matrices are then converted into a Pseudo-Contingency matrices drawing on the concept borrowed from Faust (2005) and Carroll et. al. (1986). Correspondence analyses are performed on the Pseudo-Contingency table using the chi-square test of association. Null hypothesis of independence between the rows and columns is tested against the alternative hypothesis of relationship between them. Independence between rows and columns would, understandably, amount to no or negligible influence of the social structure on the capabilities of the people.

Whereas the influence part analyses examine association across the horizontal path by measuring the degree and dimensions of association, the enabling/ constraining part analyzes aspects of relationships across the vertical path for scaling the impact of association on Actors. For this a succession of bipartite graphs are presented, with the gradual elimination of the weaker ties to give an idea of the comparative strengths of relational structures. For the software used, correspondence results are acquired by using XLSTAT on the data arranged across simple Excel spreadsheets. Bipartite graphs are computed by using UCINET 6 and its visualization tool, the NetDraw.

7.4.1: Education

Table 7.2: Affiliation Matrix of Education Scores

Actors	Events				
	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm.
PC	5.196262	1.711538	0.529412	0.596154	0.692308
Re	7.490741	3.411215	1.528302	1.161905	1.419048
CF	6.962264	2.54902	0.64	0.732673	1.009901

Table 7.3: Pseudo-Contingency Matrix for Education Scores

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm	PC	Re	CF
PC	5.196262	1.711538	0.529412	0.596154	0.692308	0	0	0
Re	7.490741	3.411215	1.528302	1.161905	1.419048	0	0	0
CF	6.962264	2.54902	0.64	0.732673	1.009901	0	0	0
Family	0	0	0	0	0	5.196262	7.490741	6.962264
Kinship	0	0	0	0	0	1.711538	3.411215	2.54902
Ethnicity	0	0	0	0	0	0.529412	1.528302	0.64
Caste	0	0	0	0	0	0.596154	1.161905	0.732673
Loc. Comm	0	0	0	0	0	0.692308	1.419048	1.009901

Table7.4: Correspondence Analyses results for Education

Chi-square (Observed value)	72.989
Chi-square (Critical value)	66.339
DF	49
p-value	0.015
alpha	0.05
Total Inertia	1.027

Test Results

H_0: The rows and the columns of the table are independent

H_a: There is a link between the rows and the columns of the table

As the computed p-value is lower than the significance level alpha=0.05, one should reject the null hypothesis H_0, and accept the alternative hypothesis H_a

The risk to reject the null hypothesis H_0 while it is true is lower than 1.47%.

Correspondence Analyses reveal the existence of association between the social structure and people's education capabilities. This shows that ignoring the impact of social structure and concentrating on the development of people's educational capabilities in their individual capacities is fraught with a two-way insufficiency. First, it ignores the perception of social good formed at the level of various collectivities in the social structure. Any education project without the incorporation of shared perceptions of the members of various collectivities about education as social good would run the danger of both alienability and contradiction. Second, education itself is deprived of playing the role of imparting a sense of making informed choices among the people. That because any endeavour on the part of education to introduce people to newer ideas would be equated with the cultural invasion.

With this general idea about the influence of social structure on people's capabilities development, let us now turn to the more specific analyses of assessing the comparative influence of each component of social structure on educational capabilities. This is done by drawing the bipartite graphs of the affiliation scores between the Actors and Events. Recalling from the last chapter, direct interlink between the components of the capabilities space is not of interest here. The influence of each of the components of social structure on the capabilities development is seen in terms of a dual extent: first, how closely they are connected with each component of the capabilities space, and second, what is the strength of the link which they are able to make between the three components of the capabilities space.

Figure 7.1: Bipartite Graph of Education Scores

Figure 7.1 displays the bipartite graph of for education capabilities. This shows that all the components of the social structure, to variable degrees, are not only linked with the components of the capabilities space, but they also play their roles in the completion of the capability set of an individual. This result is therefore consistent with the one produced by the correspondence analyses. The degree of this influence, however, differs as evidenced by the width of the lines connecting various components. To get an idea of the comparative roles of various components of the social structure, gradual elimination of the weaker ties is carried out. This not only shows the comparative vitality of the various structures of collecitvities, but also reveals the respective spaces of the capabilities matrix with which these collectivities are linked.

At the elimination of the weaker ties with affiliation score less than 1.00 (which roughly corresponds to less than 10% importance attached by people in real terms), bipartite graph of the Figure 7.2 is obtained. It shows that although all the components of the social structure are still impacting the capabilities space, only family and kinship influence the whole capabilities space. At this level, the role of the caste and ethnicity is only important within the

space of resources, while local community not only influences the space of resources but also impacts the conversion of resources into functionings by its connectivity with the conversion factor.

Figure 7.2: Bipartite Graph for Education Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 1.0

Further elimination of the weaker ties, below the tie strength of 2.00, gives the bipartite graph of figure 7.3. This reduces the influence of the social structure to only family and kinship. While family still exercise complete influence on the capabilities set, kinship only influences the availability of resources and conversion factor. Raising the bar of elimination to 3.0 gives the bipartite graph of Figure 7.4, where the role of kinship reduces to its influence only on the space of resources, while family's influence still remains potent over the entire capabilities space, which it retains even above the level of 5.0.

Figure 7.3: Bipartite Graph for Education Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 2.0

Figure 7.4: Bipartite Graph for Education Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 3.0

Enabling/Constraining Role of Social Structure on Education Capabilities

Table 7.5: Affiliation Matrix of Enabling and Constraining Scores for Education

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm
PC	0.849057	0.605769	0.427184	0.411765	0.457143
Re	1	0.780952	0.580952	0.590476	0.644231
CF	-0.52336	-0.19231	0.048077	0.114286	0.056604

The enabling or constraining impact of the social structure on the capabilities development is calculated in terms of whether the overall enabling/constraining score are in positive or negative. Needless to mention that a positive score signifies enabling and a negative score, constraining influence. From table 7.4, it could be observed that the impact of all the components of the social structure on education capabilities is seen as positive save the negative impact of family and kinship within the spaces of conversion factor. This strong enabling impact of the various collectivities is indicative, more than anything else, of the social support which they provide to their members. While this forceful enabling role of the social structure undoubtedly points towards affording people with an alternative to the governmental support; it will be erroneous to restrict interpretation to only this, too obvious, conclusion.

Of particular significance is the overall strong enabling influence of the social structure in the spaces of personal circumstances and resources. This means that both in terms of educational resources and people's access to them, positivity attached by people to these social collectivities is strong enough to convince a development intervention to find a way of working with them. Any inclination towards ignoring this enabling role would be equivalent to wasting a viable pool of existing support. Greater still would be the loss in case of contradicting this enabling role.

More interesting explanations are however in store within the constraining influence of family and kinship on the space of conversion factors. Viewed in conjunction with the enabling role of the family and kinship within the spaces of personal circumstances and resources, this means that while family and kinship provide endowments in terms of educational resources and access to them, it places certain qualifications for the manner in which these are converted into valuable functionings. Within the Pakistani social structure, these qualifications are not far to look for. Among the most prominent of such qualifications are the general outlook towards co-gendered education systems, approach towards the educational curricula, apprehensions regarding the use of education as a tool of cultural and religious proselytization and the like. For any development intervention targeting the enhancement of educational capabilities, therefore, it is essential to take into account these factors in order to fare more positively with the people.

7.4.2: HEALTH

Table 7.6 gives the Affiliation matrix of health scores, whereas Table 7.7 presents its Pseudo-Contingency matrix. The computed Chi-square results are summarized in Table 7.8.

Table 7.6: Affiliation Matrix of Health Scores

		Events				
		Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm.
Actors	PC	5.657407	2.820755	1.780952	1.679245	2.047619
	Re	6.12963	3.37037	1.666667	1.466667	1.933962
	CF	6.542056	2.561905	1.07767	1.076923	1.205882

Table 7.7: Pseudo-Contingency Matrix for Health Scores

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm	PC	Re	CF
PC	5.657407	2.820755	1.780952	1.679245	2.047619	0	0	0
Re	6.12963	3.37037	1.666667	1.466667	1.933962	0	0	0
CF	6.542056	2.561905	1.07767	1.076923	1.205882	0	0	0
Family	0	0	0	0	0	5.657407	6.12963	6.542056
Kinship	0	0	0	0	0	2.820755	3.37037	2.561905
Ethnicity	0	0	0	0	0	1.780952	1.666667	1.07767
Caste	0	0	0	0	0	1.679245	1.466667	1.076923
Loc. Comm	0	0	0	0	0	2.047619	1.933962	1.205882

Table 7.8: Correspondence Analyses Results for Health

Chi-square (Observed value)	**84.416**
Chi-square (Critical value)	**66.339**
DF	**49**
p-value	0.001
alpha	0.05
Total Inertia	1.029

Test Results

H$_0$: The rows and the columns of the table are independent.

H$_a$: There is a link between the rows and the columns of the table.

As the computed p-value is lower than the significance level alpha=0.05, one should reject the null hypothesis H$_0$, and accept the alternative hypothesis H$_a$

The risk to reject the null hypothesis H$_0$ while it is true is lower than 0.12%.

As with the education, health capabilities depict significant interrelationship with the social structure. A significantly higher Chi-square and lower p-value than the ones computed for education are suggestive of even stronger influence of the social structure on the health capabilities.

For the comparative effect of the components of the social structure, bipartite graph for health capabilities is shown in Figure 7.5. Consistent with the results of the correspondence analyses, bipartite graph depicts much stronger ties of Events with Actors- with every tie exceeding 1.00 in strength.

Figure 7.5: Bipartite Graph of Health Scores

In consideration of the strong influence of the social structure on the health capabilities, the process of weaker tie elimination is initiated with the elimination of the ties with strength less than 2.00. This gives us the bipartite graph depicted in figure 7.6, which shows that at this level, caste and ethnic ties do not influence the capabilities space, whereas the influence of the local community is reduced to the space of personal circumstances. However, family and kinship ties still influence all the three spaces of the people's capabilities sets.

At further elimination of the weaker ties below the strength of 3.0, kinship continues to influence the space of resources, while family remains a significant social structure which continues to influence all the three spaces of people's capabilities set, even beyond the tie strength of 5.00.

Figure 7.6: Bipartite Graph for Health Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 2.0

Figure 7.7: Bipartite Graph for Health Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 3.0

Table 7.9: Affiliation Matrix of Enabling and Constraining Scores for Health

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm
PC	0.88785	0.653846	0.451923	0.4711538	0.47115385
Re	0.971429	0.825243	0.708738	0.6699029	0.67647059
CF	0.811321	0.740385	0.586538	0.5865385	0.57281553

Enabling/Constraining Role of Social Structure on Health Capabilities

In table 7.9, the positive scores for all the components of the social structure speak of the tremendous enabling role which various collectivities play in people's health capabilities. For

a development project aiming to build people's health capabilities, this suggests a combination of three interrelated facts.

One: people's perceptions of a healthy life are inseparable from the one prevailing at the level of these collectivities, therefore health and healthy life must be understood in terms of its conception prevailing at the level of these collectivities. This also suggests that for introduction of the new health concepts, first an acceptable attitude must be cultivated at the level of these structural collectivities. In the end, if such acceptability is seen as impossible, it will be more useful to seek for acceptable alternatives rather than palming a health project off on unwilling recipients.

Two: it is indicated that in provisioning of resources and making allocations, the equilibrium achieved by these structural collectivities in terms of individual shares should not be disregarded. Here it must be realized that this does not amount to leaving the individual at the mercy of the collectivity. Instead, what this means is according due importance to a system of distribution in which people themselves see considerable advantage.

Three: it also suggests that a development project must use the type of resources which does not clash with collective attitudes about treatments and the use of health facilities. To illustrate this point, the promotion of the sexual health care on the lines prevalent in the west has repulsed than attracted attention of the general people in Pakistan in the past. This was not because people did not see prevention from sexually transmitted diseases as social good, but the manner in which these methods were promoted was seen as an infringement to the general perceptions which prohibited the publicity about the sex related issues in certain ways.

7.4.3: FINANCIAL CONDITIONS

Affiliation matrix for the financial conditions is presented in the Table 7.10, followed by the Pseudo-Contingency Matrix and the Chi-square results of the correspondence analyses in Tables 7.11 and 7.12.

Table 7.10: Affiliation Scores for Financial Conditions

		Events				
		Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm.
Actors	PC	5.148148	2.019231	0.932039	0.75	0.92233
	Re	5.759259	2.2	0.631068	0.653846	0.721154
	CF	5.546296	1.980952	0.718447	0.692308	0.828571

Table 7.11: Pseudo-Contingency Matrix for Financial Conditions Scores

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm	PC	Re	CF
PC	5.148148	2.019231	0.932039	0.75	0.92233	0	0	0
Re	5.759259	2.2	0.631068	0.653846	0.721154	0	0	0
CF	5.546296	1.980952	0.718447	0.692308	0.828571	0	0	0
Family	0	0	0	0	0	5.148148	5.759259	5.546296
Kinship	0	0	0	0	0	2.019231	2.2	1.980952
Ethnicity	0	0	0	0	0	0.932039	0.631068	0.718447
Caste	0	0	0	0	0	0.75	0.653846	0.692308
Loc. Comm	0	0	0	0	0	0.92233	0.721154	0.828571

Table 7.12: Correspondence Analyses Results for Financial Conditions

Chi-square (Observed value)	59.567
Chi-square (Critical value)	66.339
DF	49
p-value	0.143
alpha	0.05
Total inertia:	1.009

Test Results:

H0: The rows and the columns of the table are independent.

Ha: There is a link between the rows and the columns of the table.

As the computed p-value is greater than the significance level alpha=0.05, one cannot reject the null hypothesis H0.

The risk to reject the null hypothesis H0 while it is true is lower than 14.34%.

Results show that the capabilities set of financial conditions is not significantly influenced by the social structure, or equivalently it could be said that as whole, people's capabilities for earning income are not significantly tied to their relational structure within the society. Of the three basic capabilities that have so far been tested for the influence of social structure, financial conditions is the first which has shown an overall independence between the components of social structure and capabilities space. It must however be noted that despite this, both the computed chi-square and p-value are quite close to the critical region. In fact testing at $\alpha= 0.20$, results in the rejection of the null hypotheses about the independence of the row and columns of the Pseudo-Contingency table.

More appropriate explanations are however offered by the bipartite graphs. As Figure 7.8 shows, although all the components of the social structure are tied with the components of the capabilities space, the strength of the ties are quite weak. Even the tie strength of family with the three capabilities spaces is not as strong as in the case of education and health. This shows that Pakistani people asserts a higher degree of individuality within the sphere of financial conditions where the relational bond are not as thick as education and health.

Figure 7.8: Bipartite Graph for Financial Conditions Scores

A notable point in the influence of the social structure on the financial conditions, as gathered from the bipartite graphs, is a mesh of extremely weak and significantly high ties at the same time. Though all the components of social structure show some influence on the components of the capabilities space, a significant number of ties have a very weak strength of less than 1.0. Therefore a more appropriate picture of the influence of the social structure on the financial conditions emerges once these weaker ties are eliminated. As the bipartite graph in Figure 7.9 shows, elimination of the weaker ties of strength 1.0 or less restrict the influence

of the social structure on the financial conditions to kinship and family only. Both these component of social structure impacts the entire capabilities set of an individual albeit to a variable extent. This explains that unlike education and health where people's perception were influenced by a multiplicity of relational structures in a social space, in case of financial conditions such influence is only aligned closely with the ties of family and kinship. However, it is observable that even within this concentration; the strength of the ties is not as strong as those of education and health.

Figure 7.9: Bipartite Graph for Financial Conditions with Tie-Strength Greater than 1.0

Elimination beyond this level, deleting ties weaker than 2.0 (Figure 7.10) retains the influence of the kinship on the spaces of personal circumstances and resources. The influence of the family over all the three capabilities spaces remains even above the ties of strength 5.0.

Table 7.13: Affiliation Matrix of Enabling/Constraining Scores for Financial Conditions

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm
PC	0.745283	0.553398	0.343137	0.300971	0.320388
Re	0.896226	0.759615	0.576923	0.586538	0.621359
CF	-0.56075	-0.2381	0.019048	0.085714	0.037736

Enabling/Constrainig Role of Social Structure on Financial Conditions

An indication of the fact that how better or worse off a person is with this level of social embeddedness in terms of the capabilities related to her/his financial conditions, is provided by its enabling/constraining role. The scores of the enabling and constraining impact of various social collectivities on income earning capabilities are given in Table 7.13. As influence of the social collectivities other than family and kinship on financial conditions is not significant, the enabling and constraining scores of only these two social collectivities are discussed here.

A discernable trend in the enabling and constraining scores is the negative values associated with both the family and the kinship within the space of conversion factor, symbolizing a constraining role. Another pattern is the higher positive value for space of resources than the personal circumstances. Of these, the prevalence of the positive values is discussed first. Higher positive values suggest that people consider the relational bonds of family and kinship highly enabling in the pursuit of livelihoods. This provides a very good commentary on the very weak financial and market institutions of Pakistan which fail to provide similar guarantees and support as in the developed economies of the west. Accordingly, people's reliance on the informal institutions of family and kinship get stronger as an alternative forum of such facilitation. An example of this is provided by the tremendous size and scale of the informal economy in the country. Transactions in the informal economy take place mostly on the personal guarantees provided on the strength of a person's relational associations such as

belonging to a certain family and kinship group. Another manifestation of the strong positive role which people assign to the structural collectivities is the extremely low tax to GDP ratio. Foremost among the causes of this low tax to GDP ratio is the undocumented business transactions. Again, such transactions take place within the ambit of the guarantees and mechanism provided by the relational structures. This adverse role of the social structure for the official economy is explained by the negative perceptions of government carried by the people. Recalling the role of the social structure as a proxy to the official social welfare, the manner in which financial transactions circle around the relational structures provides a perfect manifestation of this phenomenon.

On the other hand, the constraining role of the social collectivities in the space of conversion factor is reflective of what was termed as the reservoir effect in the fourth chapter. These constraints are the sort of qualifications which the social structure imposes on its members, primarily to safeguard the entire mechanism from disruption. Thus the manner in which all this works is a system where structural collectivities provide resources and facilitate access to them; and at the same time prescribe certain preconditions for their use. These preconditions are again laid down by the social collectivities. This is the kind of unwritten constitution that governs people's capabilities in terms of their financial conditions in the social structure of Pakistan.

7.4.4: PARTICIPATION

In offering interpretation for the scores on education, health and capabilities related to financial circumstances, an effort was made to underscore the significance of the formative aspect of freedoms in people's capabilities set. Without repeating the prologue, the same line of argument is now extended to briefly explain the basic capabilities of participation and security. No enabling and constraining data was included in the survey design on these two capabilities due to resource constraints.

Table 7.14: Affiliation Matrix for Participation Scores

		Events				
		Family	**Kinship**	**Ethnicity**	**Caste**	**Loc. Comm.**
Actors	**PC**	3.961905	1.885714	0.764706	0.865385	1.067961
	Re	4.132075	2.176471	0.950495	0.932039	1.333333
	CF	6.12963	2	1.728155	1.695238	0.873786

Table 7.15: Pseudo-Contingency Matrix for Participation Scores

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm	PC	Re	CF
PC	3.961905	1.885714	0.764706	0.865385	1.067961	0	0	0
Re	4.132075	2.176471	0.950495	0.932039	1.333333	0	0	0
CF	6.12963	2	1.728155	1.695238	0.873786	0	0	0
Family	0	0	0	0	0	3.961905	4.132075	6.12963
Kinship	0	0	0	0	0	1.885714	2.176471	2
Ethnicity	0	0	0	0	0	0.764706	0.950495	1.728155
Caste	0	0	0	0	0	0.865385	0.932039	1.695238
Loc. Comm	0	0	0	0	0	1.067961	1.333333	0.873786

Table 7.16: Correspondence Analysis Results for Participation

Chi-square (Observed value)	63.758
Chi-square (Critical value)	66.339
DF	49
p-value	0.077
alpha	0.05
Total Inertia	1.045

Test Interpretation:

H_0: The rows and the columns of the table are independent.

H_a: There is a link between the rows and the columns of the table.

As the computed p-value is greater than the significance level alpha=0.05, one cannot reject the null hypothesis H_0.

The risk to reject the null hypothesis H_0 while it is true is lower than 7.65%.

The Affiliation matrix for the participation and correspondence analysis on the Pseudo-Contingency matrix reveals no significant association between the rows and columns at α=0.05. But the Chi-square value is high enough and the alternative hypothesis of association between the rows and the columns is acceptable at α=0.10. In other words the association between Events and Actors is lesser than education and health capabilities, but greater than financial circumstances.

The bipartite graph in Figure 7.11 explains this in terms of the weaker ties of the components of the capabilities space with family and kinship than in the case of education and health, and comparatively stronger ties with the other three components of the social structure. Even the

elimination of the tie with strength less than 1.00 retains a significant amount of influence of all the components of social structure over the participation capabilities. At this level, caste and ethnicity continues to exert influence on people's participative perceptions within the space of conversion factor. But a larger control is exercised by the local community whose influence is felt significantly over the two spaces of personal circumstances and resources. Family and kinship continues to influence the whole set of capabilities space. At the level below this, beyond the ties with strength 2.0, it is only the family as a unit of social structure which influences all the three spaces of capabilities set, while the influence of kinship is now restricted to the spaces of resources. Other components of social structure do not matter in terms of their influence at this level.

Figure 7.11: Bipartite Graph for Participation Scores

Figure 7.12: Bipartite Graph for Participation Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 1.0

Figure 7.13: Bipartite Graph for Participation Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 2.0

Among the capabilities which have so far been analyzed, the components of the capabilities space for participation evince the greatest spread across the components of social structure, a fact which is also reflected from the highest value of inertia at 1.045. This is not only understandable but to a certain extent, expected. The very nature of participation underscores socialization along a broader social plan and inculcation of greater influences from a wider social canvas. With this breadth of vision, the dilution of some of the otherwise more strongly entrenched relational structures such as family and kinship is not entirely surprising.

While the implication of these results are too obvious in the light of the interpretations already provided, one clarification is essential to forestall any misconceptions which could accrue from the weaker ties of ethnicity and caste with the spaces of personal circumstances and resources. In Pakistani social structure, ethnicity and caste generally play a strong role in such participative capabilities as casting votes, participating in social and cultural events, acquiring memberships of social groups, and marriages and ceremonies. However, the results create an impression that these two relational collectivities in terms of influencing people's participative capabilities are not only weak but their influence is concentrated almost entirely within the space of conversion factor. This gives an indication that participative resources and people's access to them remain, for the most part, independent of their social positioning on the basis of their caste and ethnic affiliations. But rather than signifying a weak influence of these two relational collectivities, this is reflective of the manner in which ethnicities and caste system operate in Pakistani social structure. They do not influence participative resources and people's access to them, but place pre-conditions and qualifications in the manner in which they are to be utilized. The concentration of the influence of these collectivities within the space of conversion factor confirms the existence of such qualifications and conditionalities which these two collectivities impose on their memberships in terms of ethnic codes and caste norms.

7.4.5: SECURITY

Table 7.17: Affiliation Matrix for Security Scores

	Events				
	Family	**Kinship**	**Ethnicity**	**Caste**	**Loc. Comm.**
PC	6.72381	4.171429	2.568627	2.509804	2.490196
Re	7.037736	4.514286	1.60396	1.294118	1.666667
CF	5.25	3.61165	3.269231	3.019231	3.087379

(Actors)

Table 7.18: Pseudo-Contingency Matrix for Security Scores

	Family	Kinship	Ethnicity	Caste	Loc. Comm	PC	Re	CF
PC	6.72381	4.171429	2.568627	2.509804	2.490196	0	0	0
Re	7.037736	4.514286	1.60396	1.294118	1.666667	0	0	0
CF	5.25	3.61165	3.269231	3.019231	3.087379	0	0	0
Family	0	0	0	0	0	6.72381	7.037736	5.25
Kinship	0	0	0	0	0	4.171429	4.514286	3.61165
Ethnicity	0	0	0	0	0	2.568627	1.60396	3.269231
Caste	0	0	0	0	0	2.509804	1.294118	3.019231
Loc. Comm	0	0	0	0	0	2.490196	1.666667	3.087379

Table 7.19: Correspondence Analyses Results for Security

Chi-square (Observed value)	113.360
Chi-square (Critical value)	66.339
DF	49
p-value	0.0001
Alpha	0.05
Total Inertia	1.073

Test Results:

H_0: The rows and the columns of the table are independent.

H_a: There is a link between the rows and the columns of the table.

As the computed p-value is lower than the significance level alpha=0.05, one should reject the null hypothesis H_0, and accept the alternative hypothesis H_a

The risk to reject the null hypothesis H0 while it is true is lower than 0.01%.

Among the five basic capabilities, by far the strongest association among the components of social structure and capabilities is evinced within security. Along with this strong association, a highest inertia of 1.073 is indicative of the largest spread within the scores for the influence of social structure on people's security capabilities.

By now sufficient interpretational patterning has developed to warrant any detailed explanations for identifying the emergent trends in the security results. Therefore only as much interpretation is offered which is essential beyond the explanations already provided. Outside the proxy role of the social structure in the presence of the state's inability to discharge its obligations in providing security guarantees to its people, the strongest influence

of the social structure on security capabilities coupled with the largest spread of this influence across the collectivities is indicative of what could be termed as the *'group inclusiveness'* syndrome. What is suggested by group inclusiveness is the fact that people associate their security with gaining memberships of as many relational structures as possible. This is adopted as a form of strategy to forestall *'group exclusiveness'* which could expose a person to considerable risk in the kind of uncertainty presently prevailing in Pakistan.

This is the biggest explanation contained within the results for the influence of social structure on people's security capabilities in Pakistan. An idea about the comparative importance of the various relational structures and their association with the various components of the capabilities space could be acquired from the Figures 7.14 to 7.17 below.

Figure 7.14: Bipartite Graph for Security Scores

Figure 7.15: Bipartite Graph for Security Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 2.0

Figure 7.16: Bipartite Graph for Security Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 3.0

Figure 7.17: Bipartite Graph for Security Showing Tie-Strength Greater than 4.0

A conspicuous aspect of the bipartite graphs for security capabilities is the fact that even at the level of ties of strength 3.0 and above, all five structural collectivities are exerting influence in at least one of the three components of the capabilities space. Another facet perceptible by its perspicuity is the concentration of the influence of various collectivities within the space of conversion factor. This explains the fact that though in terms of availability of resources and people's access to them, people do assert their individual agency to some degree but for converting these resources into valuable functions, they link their wellbeing with the various collectivities of which they are members. In other words, it means that relational collectivities make it possible for people to convert the already available security resources to their advantage.

CONCLUSION

Empirical analyses carried out in this chapter point towards the indispensability of the formative aspect of freedoms for the capabilities matrix. Apart from its general importance in providing explanations for the impact of social structure on people's capabilities development in Pakistan, it unravels some very pertinent and inescapable aspects of people's lives in collective social structures. This underscores the fact that without accounting for people's

social positioning with regards to their perception of social good, any development project will be bypassing some very crucial aspect of people's wellbeing in collective social structures like Pakistan.

The type of insufficiencies brought into fore by this little exercise highlights just a few dimensions of the overall informational loss that could ensue from ignoring the formative aspect of freedoms. More than anything else, the formative aspect of freedoms plays the important role of giving the capabilities space context specificity. The need for such context specificity increases even further in the case of a universally generic development paradigm as the capabilities approach. In the absence of this context specificity, the capabilities approach in its current form only caters to the need of the individualistic social setups with distributive social justice as the adopted social strategy. To enlarge its scope to social setups which have embraced a different social strategy; it has to incorporate this formative aspect within its framework.

In the end, it has to be pointed out that the analyses carried out and the inferences derived in this chapter, provide an answer to the third and final hypothesis taken up by this thesis, which was stated as: *"What, if any, explanations do the capabilities approach offer for the influence of social structure on people's capabilities development in Pakistan?"*

CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The prevailing social justice system in a social arrangement is like oxygen to its people. Invisible yet it is life sustaining. Tamper with it and occupants of a social space start to feel suffocated. A development project might promise heaven, but as long as it clashes with the supply line of this oxygen, it will fail to find favour with people.

The thesis took up the question of the approach of a development project towards the existing framework of social justice in a society and tested the capabilities approach on this premise. In doing so it was shown that emergence of the modern form of distributive social justice was inseparably linked with the socio-political and economic development in the west. As a corollary of the above statement, distributive form of social justice was seen as the source of life sustaining breathing space to people in these societies. While references to this fact existed in literature, what this thesis contributed was to mark out distributive form of social justice as a social strategy more pertinent to the developed world, both in its specifications and the availability of an institutional apparatus for its implementation. This was done by highlighting two key aspects of the distributive justice framework. First the evolution of distributive justice in the west was traced to show that it was inseparably linked with the socio-political and economic development in the west. Second, and as a concomitant to this, three distinctive features of distributive features: individualism, state guarantees and free choice, were identified as tools to test the relevance of this form of social justice to social arrangements elsewhere. While development literature is replete with issues of cultural determinism, cultural relativism, indigenization, local participation and local ownership; references to the historical factors which made these issues relevant is scant and details scattered. The manner in which trajectory of evolution of distributive justice has been described in its correlation with the unfolding socio-political and economic developments in the west, and the identification of its distinctive features in the process provides a valuable tool to both development theorists and practitioners in situating the role and direction of a development project within a system of social justice.

Capabilities approach was then presented as an extension of the development paradigms which are based on notions of distributive social justice. In doing so, the thesis made three important contributions which other studies have either missed completely or touched only gingerly. First it was shown that capabilities approach has emerged out of Sen's concern for deficiencies in the prevailing approaches to human and social development, which he saw as

not going far enough in capturing a comprehensive measure of people's wellbeing. In that sense, it was argued that rather than promoting an entirely new framework for welfare assessment, what Sen was advocating with his capabilities approach was a refined, sophisticated and more effective version of the prevailing welfare schema, over which it scored an obvious and manifest advantage mainly because of its informational vastness. Thus in terms of the use of a paradigm, Sen was shown to be using an approach similar to the one which has grown and fructified in the west on the lines of distributive justice, but giving it greater context specificity with his informational pluralism. Here, the originality of the contribution which this study made lies in actually delineating, both in its conceptual and operational dimensions, the distributive nature of the capabilities approach. It took the debate surrounding the distributive roots of the capabilities approach beyond the realm of conjecture and situated it in its proper theoretical perspective.

Second, the informational stretch of Sen's framework and in particular, his agential aspects of capabilities development were highlighted to show that how and to what extent they cater to people's social embeddedness. It was shown that despite an essentially distributivist outlook, Sen's use of informational pluralism gives greater context to a person's social space in her/his welfare matrix. His agential dimensions were shown to principally address concerns for exploring possibilities to enable an individual to live a life as responsible citizen. The study demonstrated that Sen's claim about taking due cognizance of the collective aspects of people's lives rested primarily on his provisions of not only a person's self-regarding but also other-regarding perceptions of wellbeing in his approach. This was shown as the machinery which Sen considered sufficient to account for people's social embeddedness in a social space.

The third and most important aspect of Sen's approach highlighted by the study was elucidation of the type of individualism that he uses in his approach. This thesis noted that the studies conducted so far has either stamped or rejected the label of individualism on the capabilities approach. Realizing the need for first understanding the nature of individualism, alleged or real, in Sen's approach before taking forward the debate of its compatibility with collective intent of a social structure, the nature of Sen's individualism was illustrated with the manner in which he uses the three factors of relative deprivation, adaptive preferences and counterfactuality in his approach. It was shown that with all these three, Sen's main concern remained the obtainment of a measure of interpersonal comparison within the overall welfare distribution in a social set up. With this, the distributivist core of the capabilities

approach was highlighted and it was further emphasized that even its informational vastness primarily showcased a vertical extension, ensuring a fuller measure of welfare at the level of individual. This obtained a perfect fit for the capabilities approach with the social setups where individuals could be demarcated as discrete units of analyses. The question of horizontal spread: to accommodate different perceptions of wellbeing emerging from both the individualistic and collectivist social set ups remained unresolved.

In the second part of the study, collective intent of a social structure was established as an undeniable reality of the social fabric in the developing world. In this connection the existing literature on the subject was found wanting on delineating some essential facets of people's social embeddedness, which this study addressed. First, it was noted that collectivist and individualist social setups were hardly seen in their historical context to know what necessitated two separate and irreconcilable forms of people's social strategy. Second, it was noted that though the irreducibility of collective intent had often been argued, the mechanics of such indivisibility was seldom investigated. In particular, the need and benefits contingent upon the irreducibility, which also explains its survival, was seldom looked into. Third, it was observed that the protagonists of both individualism and collectivism, while contributing admirably towards the debate, had also woven the issue in considerable controversy. This called for digging out an approach which could point a way out of the gridlock. Fourth and last, collective intent itself needed instantiation, to take its relevance beyond purely theoretical parlance. Not only its existence but also its functionality and the nature of wellbeing consorted to it needed verification with empirical evidence.

These issues surrounding the collective intent of relational collectivities and its outreach in people's lives were addressed in chapter four. This was done by highlighting the process of social cognition as the fountainhead of people's response system towards their social environment and therefore the genesis of their social strategy. It was shown that the process of social cognition was a process dynamic in its form, evolutionary in its nature and transformatory in its results. This virulence was shown to produce dispersion in social perceptions on the basis of the variance in people's geographical, spatial and temporal locations. The resultant differential in people's social cognition was argued to form the basis of societal differentiation. Tonnies postulates were presented to show how the natural, organic and essential will, *Wesenwille* is transformed into arbitrary and rational will, the *Kurwille*, when people discover a different social strategy in terms of a more definite division of labour for surviving in a social space. It was highlighted that how this evolution transforms

a community, the *Gemeinschaft*, where social strategy is based on *Wesenwille*, into a society, the *Gemeinschaft,* where *Kurwille* works as a social response system. While this represented *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft* as two undeniable social realities, it also established the fact the latter grew out of the former, when people devised a more defined conception of division of labour as part of their social strategy. In this development, the socio-economic and political processes across historical time tracts played pivotal role. Further than this, it also underscored the fact that for a social justice approach to claim universality; it needs to show sufficient dexterity to capture people's perceptions of wellbeing in both *Gesellschaft* and *Gemeinschaft*. The capabilities approach sported an unquestionable congruence with *Gesellschaft*, but its reliance on disaggregation and interpersonal comparison were couched in individualistic undertones, which needed to be tested for a correlation with the *Gemeinschaft*.

This societal classification on the basis of the prevalent perception of social good carries signal importance because it spotlights social realities for a development project other than the one to which distributive form of social justice applies. But of still greater significance is the authenticity which the study provided to the collective intent. Here, the contribution of the study needs to be seen from three distinct angles. First it underscored the distinct functional mechanism and compositional dynamics of human existence from other species: both animate and inanimate, to establish the fact that collective human intent is a separate and compositionally tangent entity, which could not be worked back from the mere aggregation of its constituting units on the scientific principles applicable to other species. Reason for this was found in the differential which existed between the analytical schema required for explaining human beings as social species and the one for analyzing other animate and inanimate objects. The thesis conceptually demonstrated that the differential was induced by the psychological content possessed by human species which was capable of producing meaning in the over-individual mental complexes. These over-individual mental complexes sustained, and provided operational frame of reference to, the collective intent. Moreover, the process of creating meaning in over-individual mental complexes was found both irreducible as well as irreversible. Irreversibility meant that a latter and advanced stage of cognitive development could not be rolled back to an earlier and less developed stage. Irreducibility, as a by-product of this principle, ordained that collective intent was not only something more than the mere sum-total of the individual parts, but its disintegration effectively meant its destruction. Thus it was shown that although individualist social setups were the more developed form of collectivist social setups, collective intent could not be obtained by a

simple aggregation of the welfare assessed at the individual level. In pure scientific jargon this meant that a scientific reversibility could not produce collective intent from rolling back individual intent to its collectivist form by a method of aggregation.

Second angle of authenticity was provided to the collective intent by situating its locus within the equation existing between an individual and her/his social space. Here, the thesis endeavoured to remove the mist which had obfuscated this equation within the debates surrounding individualism and collectivism on one side and the primacy between structure and agency on the other. As determinants of the space occupied by the pre-existing social structures in people's lives and the circumference it allowed for individual manoeuvrability, the two issues were seen as holding the key to defining the ultimate equation between the individual and her/his social setup in a social space. At the same time, a thick mesh of multifarious and multidimensional, but at the same conceptually relevant, interpretations was noted to have shrouded this equation between the individual agency and the potency of existing structures in a mire of impassable incertitude. To resolve the conundrum, the thesis used the morphogenetic approach to social change presented by Margaret Archer, which called for an alternative to solitary reliance either on the individual agency or the existing structures. Archer saw this possible in according time its proper place in the equation between structure and agency. Although she believed in the temporal pre-existence of structures, she saw these structures as conditioning rather than determining action. This allowed for the structural elaboration in a social setup through interactions among individuals. In these interactions, time was seen as a critical determining factor rather than simply acting as a medium through which events took place.

Archer's articulation of time as crucial determining factor and the resultant structural elaboration also provided authenticity to the historicity in which this study approached the evolution of people's social strategies in different social spaces. This also meant distinct functional spaces for the social interactions and exercise of agency in different temporal, geographic and spatial settings. On this count, the study saw various relational structures in eastern social setup; such as family, kinship, tribe, caste, ethnicity, work group and local community, as the purveyors of this functional space. The role of these structural collectivities was seen of greater significance in the socio-political setups of the developing countries. There, in terms of the conditioning role defined for structure by Archer, these structural collectivities were noted to be playing a dual role, both enabling and constraining. Due to this larger role, an ineluctable need was felt for according these structural

collectivities their due space in a development strategy. Along with, and reinforced by such a role, these structural collectivities were seen as possessed with some fundamental properties, of which the irreducibility of the collective intent at the level of various collectivities was considered of central importance for this study.

Third angle of authenticity to collective intent was provided by giving its empirical instantiation. Through practical instances quoted from various studies, it was shown that collective intent carry practical relevance beyond its purely theoretical value. This not only demonstrated the outreach of collective intent in social setups of the developing societies; but at the same time also illustrated the manner of their operation and the space they occupy within the overall welfare distribution in such societies.

This was how the study built its case around the need for a development project to accommodate the prevailing social justice mechanism while pursuing its objectives. From this, it was inferred that to avoid parochial labelling, the capabilities approach must show that it possessed a dexterity within its conceptual framework to capture perception of social good prevailing in both the individualist and collectivist social setups. On this score, Sen was found to have used the informational stretch of his approach in giving greater context to people's collective living patterns and social perceptions at the level of these collectivities. It was observed that his approach scored crucial advantage over the rationalistic and maximalist schools in seeing and assessing human wellbeing in a broader evaluative space and from multidimensional angles. Thus, Sen was shown to have come very close to solving the problem of capturing the collective intent of social structure with an essentially distributive framework.

But this thesis noted that for decisively settling the issue of its compatibility with collective intent, the capabilities approach must fulfil a two-fold requirement. First it was to provide a scheme for capturing the manner in which perceptions of social good was formed in collective living patterns and second, it was to account for the manner in which people positioned themselves with respect to such perception of social good in collectivist social setups. In the studies conducted so far on the issue, there has been a clear and an almost exclusive predilection towards focusing on the formation of perception of social good in collective social structures. The operational part of the collective intent, which deals with the social positioning of individuals on the basis of shared social perceptions, has remained ignored. This identification of the factor of people's positioning with respect to their

perceptions of social good as measure of the compatibility of the capabilities approach with collective intent also stands out as one of original contribution of this study. This provided a parameter which ultimately worked as a decisive benchmark on the issue.

On testing Sen's framework on the two requirements, capabilities approach scored a perfect fit with the collective intent by seeing a person's overall welfare as composed not only of the vector of her/his personal wellbeing but also of those sharing a social space with her/him. A scheme which accounted not only for people's self-regarding but also other-regarding perceptions of social good was considered as sufficiently capturing the manner in which perceptions of social goods were formed in collectivist social set ups. On the second condition, however, Sen's positioning of individuals on the bases of their assumed identities was found both insufficient and incapable of capturing the type of collective intent to which this study had alluded. It was observed that such positioning on the basis of people's assumed identities left aggregation as the only possible avenue for capturing collective intent of a social structure. Aggregation however, as it was shown, could neither substitute nor approximate the collective intent. Thus, the study showed that while Sen's approach was better placed in comparison to the other frameworks of social justice in accommodating collective intent; still there remained daylight between the capabilities approach and the collective intent of a social structure.

This study's next, and by far the most important, contribution was the identification of the formative aspect of freedoms, which was presented as complement to redress this deficiency. The study therefore observed that it was the absence of the formative aspect of freedoms which restricted the relevance of capabilities approach to individualistic social setups. It was shown that in actuality the deficiency crept in from missing a crucial aspect of people's freedoms. In exploring the possibilities of providing people with the freedom to live a life as they desired in their capacities as responsible citizens, the conceptual framework of capabilities approach provided for two dimensions of freedoms: the opportunity and process aspects. The study showed that there was a need for a third dimension of freedoms, the formative aspect, to give freedom to decide on the form of freedom itself. This aspect of freedoms was considered essential to afford people the space to decide about pursuing wellbeing in individualistic, collectivist or any other capacity as they desired. The study noted that only through augmenting the capabilities space with the formative aspect of freedoms, the capabilities approach could achieve the type of context specificity to capture people's intent to pursue their wellbeing in individual, collective or any other capacity.

The formative aspect of freedoms was seen as offering people with greater freedoms in positioning themselves with respect to their perceptions of social good. It gave the capabilities matrix the sort of context specificity which Sen's identity-based positioning could not give. Perception of social good on the basis of a person's assumed identity was seen as essentially individualistic, which could not be aggregated into collective perception of social good. Additionally, the formative aspect of freedoms was seen as affording an opportunity to distinguish genuinely pursued social preferences in collectivist societies, rather than counting them as entitlement deficits on the linear scales of relative deprivation, adaptive preferences and counterfactuality.

But the contribution of the study does not end with the mere identification of the formative aspect of freedoms. Of signal importance are also the thesis suggestions for the method of integration of the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space and the demonstration of its functionality, effectiveness and the type of explanations which it could offer. Towards these ends, the study provided a method of mapping the collective intent through the formative aspect into the capabilities space, and tested this method in the empirical setting of Pakistani social structure. For this, an affiliation network was created consisting of the structural components of capabilities space and social structure, drawing on the principles of structural and social network analyses. For analyses within the affiliation network, correspondence analyses and bipartite graphs were used. The methodological improvisation demonstrated here will not only help in mapping the collective intent into the capabilities space, but will also indicate avenues for dealing with the multiple intangibilities of the capabilities approach.

In the end, the significance of operationalizing the devised methodological design with the Pakistani social structure provides a vista of seeing Pakistani development problems in a different, hitherto ignored, context. Howsoever annotated, the analyses carried out for the impact of its collective social structure on people's capabilities development, provide crucial suggestions for the course of a development project in that country. The significance of these analyses is not restricted to this study, and will help future studies in looking more thoroughly at the problems of Pakistan's low social capital

Some Recommendations for Future Research

In terms of its contribution to the development theory, the study took the debate surrounding the culpability of the capabilities approach in capturing the collective intent of a social

structure forward by locating the fountainhead of this deficiency and presented the formative aspect of freedoms to remove the shortcoming. In terms of development practice, the study provided a method of integrating the formative aspect into the capabilities space and also demonstrated, within the empirical setting provided by social structure in Pakistan, how collective intent could be mapped into the capabilities space with the help of the formative aspect of freedoms.

The course suggested for the capabilities approach would give it a clear direction of working with the realities of eastern social set ups rather than brandishing a strategy which give all the reason to be suspected for working against such them. This is essential in order to utilize the good in the social strategy of eastern communities, which thrives on the collective intent sustained by the various collectivities in its social structure. In this sense, the contributions are expected to facilitate in bridging the gap between the development perceptions prevailing in the east and west.

This, however, neither amounts to nor any claim is laid to suggest that a perfect fit has been achieved for the collective social set ups and a distributive social justice framework like the capabilities approach. Quite to the contrary, what this study has done is to test the validity of an alleged shortfall in the functional matrix of the capabilities approach, locate the source of the shortfall, provide a framework by virtue of which the shortfall could be made good and demonstrate the practicability of the suggested scheme. This larger ground covered by the study in is itself suggestive of the room for further research. In particular, during the course of the research a number of points had to be unwillingly overlooked, solely for the scope and limitation of the study on the one hand, and from the point of avoiding the breaking of the continuum on the other. In the remaining lines left at the disposal of this study, some avenues are highlighted where further research could add considerable advantage to the subject studied.

First, the study had to take the irreducibility of collective intent in absolute terms. That is to say, collective intent was taken as a paradigm as distinct from individual intent. But within this paradigm itself, the strength or weakness of the mesh of the collective intent could itself be of considerable significance. It would therefore be of interest if further research is carried out about how to adopt the formative aspect of freedoms in order to adjust to the relative strength or weakness of the collective intent.

Second, throughout the study, a need was constantly felt for more a refined and articulate scheme of capturing the influence of both the individualist and collective intent within the formative aspect of freedoms. The study could not work out such a scheme because it was primarily focusing on the collective intent and its influence on the capabilities space. But it has to be conceded that no society is either completely individualistic or entirely collectivist. In most of the societies, the social landscape is adorned with hues of both the shades. Labelling a social set up as either individualistic or collectivist on the basis of greater prevalence or majority would certainly ignore the influence of the other, no matter how small be it. Further research could produce more versatile and sophisticated technique to give due effect to the influence of both individualistic and collectivist intent within the capabilities space.

Third, and related to the second, there is a need for exploring further methods of integrating the formative aspect of freedoms into the capabilities space. Theoretically, the formative aspect of freedoms perfectly complements capabilities approach's need for context specificity. But methodologically, this adds another dimension to the existing multidimensionality and intangibility of the capabilities approach. Within the research that is currently being conducted on the operationalization of the capabilities approach, there is a need for the inclusion of this added dimension within the capabilities matrix.

Fourth, various aspects of the influence of social structure in Pakistan on the capabilities approach was presented here purely for demonstration and experimental purposes. But that should not mean the irrelevance of either the exercise or its importance. As already mentioned, the social structure influence is one angle from where Pakistan's development woes are the mostly ignored. On the other hand, isolated studies are in abundance on all the five sets of basic capabilities examined by this study. The integration of those studies with this, and even further examination of the points suggested here could provide some very useful insights in the Pakistan's abysmally low social capital, and could offer a lot of directionality to future development efforts there.

Appendix-I: Martha Nussbaum's List of Basic Capabilities

CENTRAL HUMAN FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES

1. **Life.** Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.

2. **Bodily Health**. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.

3. **Bodily Integrity**. Being able to move freely from place to place; having one's bodily boundaries treated as sovereign, i.e. being able to be secure against assault, including sexual assault, child sexual abuse, and domestic violence; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.

4. **Senses, Imagination, and Thought**. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, and reason – and to do these things in a ''truly human'' way, a way informed and cultivated by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in connection with experiencing and producing self-expressive works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech, and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to search for the ultimate meaning of life in one's own way. Being able to have pleasurable experiences, and to avoid non-necessary pain.

5. **Emotions.** Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional development blighted by overwhelming fear and anxiety, or by traumatic events of abuse or neglect. (Supporting this capability means supporting forms of human association that can be shown to be crucial in their development.)

6. **Practical Reason.** Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of conscience.)

7. **Affiliation.**

A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of assembly and political speech.)

B. Having the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation; being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails, at a minimum, protections against discrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, religion, caste, ethnicity, or national origin. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers.

8. **Other Species**. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.

9. **Play.** Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.

10. **Control over One's Environment**.

A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.

B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), not just formally but in terms of real opportunity; and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure.

Source: (Nussbaum, 2000, pp. 78-80)

APPENDIX-II: THE QUESTION FLOATED FOR DATA COLLECTION

The Questionnaire

Part A: The Influence Part

In this questionnaire you are asked some questions which you have to answer on the basis of your life experiences. As used in this questionnaire, various terms have the following meanings;

- **Family** means Wife, husband, their children, father, mother, brothers and sisters
- **Kinship or kinship group** means other blood relatives than those included in family
- **Ethnicity** or **Ethnic group** means people speaking the same language
- **Race/caste** means the lineage group such as Syed, Rajpoot, Jatt, Khattak, Yousafzai,
- **Local Community** specifically relates to geographical location signifying people living at the same location. It signifies relations beyond the above affiliation such as your friends, colleagues, neighbours and other acquaintances

While recording your responses against these categories, please make it sure that you record your responses against each of these categories in the table appearing with questions

---

1. Which of the following age-groups pertains to you the best? (please tick one)
a) Below 20 years
b) 20-29 years
c) 30-39 years
d) 40-49 years
e) 50-59 years
f) Above 60 years

2. What is the highest level of education that you have acquired? (please tick one)
a) Secondary

b) College level

c) University level

d) Professional

e) Doctorate

3. What is your mother tongue_____

4. What is your religion_____

5. How would you describe the type of community you live in? (please tick one)

a) A big city

b) The suburbs or outskirts of a big city

c) A town or a small city

d) A village

e) A farm or home in the rural area

6. Which of the following categories describes your occupational status the best? (please tick one)

a) Higher professionals/senior managers

b) Associate Professionals/Junior managers

c) Other administrative and clerical workers

d) Business owners

e) Supervisors, technicians and related workers

f) Intermediate workers

g) Other workers

h) unemployed

7. How would you describe your marital status? (please tick one)

Single

Married

Widowed

Divorced

Separated

8. How would you describe your living status? (Please tick any one)

Living single

Living in Nuclear family (husband-wife and children)

Living in joint family (husband-wife-children-parents-brothers-sisters)

Living in kinship (with relationship which also include other blood relations)

Communal living (living with people beyond blood relationships)

9. If a situation suddenly arises, where your current source of income dries up and you immediately need a sum of Rs 500,000/- to find a new source of income. How much assistance would you need from each of the factors mentioned in the following table to arrange the money?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal efforts					
Help of your family					
Help of your kinship group					
Help of your ethnic community					
Help of your race/cast group					
Help of your Local Community					

10. Suppose you have now arranged the required sum of Rs 500,000/-. How much assistance would you now need from each of the factors mentioned in the table to find out suitable alternative source of income with the money?

	More than	About	About	About 10-25%	Less than

	75%	50-75%	25-50%		10%
Your personal initiative					
Help from your family					
Help from your kinship group					
Help from your ethnic group					
Help from your race/caste					
Help from your Local Community					

11. Different people have different reasons for the selection of their educational careers. Given the level of education that you have achieved, how much influence have each of the following factors made in the selection of your education career?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal initiative					
Your family choices/priorities					
Your kinship group priorities					
Your ethnic considerations					
Your race/caste considerations					
Consideration of your Local Community					

12. Like education career, many factors play important part in the selection of people's occupation (income source). In the selection of your occupation, how would you rank the role played by each of the factors mentioned in the following table;

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal initiative					
Your family choices/priorities					
Your kinship group priorities					
Your ethnic considerations					
Your race/caste considerations					
Consideration of your Local Community					

13. Consider the situation where you are presented an attractive business/employment opportunity which requires that you stay for three continuous years abroad (outside your country). How much importance would you give to each of the factors mentioned in the following table in making a decision about the acceptance or rejection of the offer?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal consideration					
Your family commitments					
Your kinship group commitments					
Ethnic consideration					
Caste/Race consideration					
Concern for your Local Community					

14. Opportunities such as access to good educational institutions, freedom to achieve education and the availability of the required finances etc. are important factors in a person's ultimate educational achievements. To what extent the educational   opportunities that you got in your life were influenced by each of the factors mentioned in the following table?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your family					
Your kinship group					
Your Ethnicity group					
Your Race/caste					
Your Local Community					

15. Like educational opportunities, many factors influence the economic opportunities (opportunities to earn income) which determine your income level. To what extent the economic opportunities that you got in your life were affected by each of the factors mentioned in the following table?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your family					
Your kinship					
Your ethnicity					
Your race/caste					

Your Local Community					

16. The acquired education level of a person may or may not match the educational potential that such a person got. Do you believe that your acquired education level justify the education potential that you had? (Please tick one)

Yes	
Know	
Don't know	

17. The economic status that a person achieves may or may not match his actual talent and abilities. Do you believe that your acquired level of economic status justify the abilities that you had? (Please tick one)

Yes	
Know	
Don't know	

18. Consider the situation where you are suddenly hit by a disease about the nature, cause and cure of which you don't know anything. How would you rate the likelihood of taking each of the following actions?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Going straight to a doctor					
Discuss the matter with your family					
Discuss the matter with your kinship					

Discuss the matter with your ethnic community					
Discuss the matter with race/caste members					
Discuss the matter with your local community					

19. In case of a disease, how would you rate the importance of the factors given in the table in arranging a doctor/hospital/medicine (as the case may be)?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal initiative					
Your family					
Your kinship					
Your Ethnicity					
Your Race/caste members					
Your Local Community					

20. Many factors play important role in People's selection of profession/business. In your choice of profession/business, how much importance would you give to each of the factors mentioned in the table?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal priorities, independent of any other					

consideration					
Your family priorities and concerns					
Your kinship group priorities and concerns					
Your ethnicity priorities and concerns					
Your race/caste priorities and concerns					
The priorities/concerns of your Local Community					

21. In casting your vote in an election for any political office, how much importance would you give to each of the factors mentioned in the following table?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal opinion					
Your family opinion					
Your kinship opinion					
Your ethnicity opinion					
Your race/caste opinion					
The opinion of your Local Community					

22. Suppose for some reasons you have to go to a different city and remain away from your family (say your wife and children) for a month. In ensuring the safety of your family, how important would you consider each of the factors given in the table below?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Personal Arrangement made by you					
The support of your kinship group					
The support of your Ethnic Group					
The support of your Race/Caste members					
The support of your Local Community					

23. Suppose you are offered admission in a course by one of the top foreign Institution which is extremely beneficial for your career, but you can not muster finances for the course. How much, in your opinion, each of the factors given in the following table could help in arranging the required finances?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your family					
Your kinship group					
Your ethnicity					
Your race/caste members					
Your Local Community					

24. Suppose you discover a health practice which is extremely useful for you but require considerable changes in your eating and living conditions. How important would you consider the approval of each of the factors given in the following table for the health routine, before adopting it as a practice?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your family					
Your kinship					
Your ethnicity					
Your race/caste					
Your Local Community					

25. In case of an illness, apart from the money needed for the treatment, how much importance each of the factors mentioned in the following table carry for you in ensuring a proper treatment for the illness?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your family support					
The support of your kinship group					
Support from your Ethnic group					
Support from your Race/caste members					

Support from your Local Community					

26. People's decisions about participation in various social and political activities are motivated by a number of factors. Think of the various clubs, political parties, discussion or literary groups, social groups etc. that your remained member (formal or informal) during various instances in your life. To what extent each of the factors mentioned in the following table influenced your decision about the selection of the above?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Your personal choices					
Your family opinion					
Your kinship group's opinion					
Your Ethnicity opinion					
Your Race/caste opinion					
The opinion of your Local Community					

27. Based on your experience of the successful marriages that you have come across, how would you rate the importance of each of the factors given in the following table for a successful marriage?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%

The personal choices of the two spouses					
The priorities of their family					
The priorities of their kinship group					
The consideration of their ethnic group					
The consideration of their race/caste					
The consideration of their Local Communities					

28. If an epidemic breaks out in your society and you know that it is caused by the particular eating habits of the people. To change the eating habits of the people for stopping the spread of the epidemic, how much it would be important to change the factors mentioned in the following table?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Individual eating habits					
The eating habits of their families					
The eating habit of their kinship group					
The eating habits of their ethnic group					
The eating habits of their race/caste					
The eating habits of their Local Communities					

29. People's feeling of security is normally associated with a number of factors. Considering your present level of security, how much change would each of the circumstances mentioned in the following table make to the level of security that you presently enjoy?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Living in a different family					
Living in a different Kinship group					
Living with a different Ethnicity					
Living with a different Cast/Race group					
Living with a different Local Community					

30. Think of a very promising and intelligent child. In the determination of the ultimate educational achievements of such a child, how much role each of the factors mentioned in the table play?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
His family circumstances					
His Kinship circumstances					
His Ethnic background					
The background of his Cast/Race group					
The circumstances of his Local Community					

31. In choosing from two doctors of equal qualifications for getting treatment for a particular disease, how much importance would you give to each of the factors mentioned in the following table?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
Whether the doctor belongs to your family					
Whether the doctor belongs to your kinship group					
Whether the doctor belongs to the same ethnicity as you					
Whether the doctor belongs to the same Race/Caste as you					
Whether the doctor belongs to your own Local Community					

32. Considering the present level of your personal security, to what extent the threats mentioned in the following table could undermine this level of personal security?

	More than 75%	About 50-75%	About 25-50%	About 10-25%	Less than 10%
A security threat to your family					
A security threat to your Kinship group					
A security threat to your Ethnic group					

A security threat to your Caste/Race group					
A security threat to your Local Community					

Part 2: The Enabling and Constraining Part

01. Comparing the level of their educational accomplishments with their educational potential, people give credit (positive or negative) to different factors. Given the level of education that you have been able to achieve and the education potential that you got, what difference would it have made to your educational achievements had you belonged to a;

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of
Different Family					
Different Kinship Group					
Different Ethnic Group					
Different Race/ Caste					
Different Local Community					

02. Similarly, people evaluate the influence of different factors in comparing their achieved income level with what they could have achieved in different circumstances. Comparing the income level that you have been able to achieve, what difference would it have made to your income level had you belonged to a;

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of
Different Family					
Different Kinship Group					

Different Ethnic Group					
Different Race/ Caste					
Different Local Community					

03. Obligations and commitments place various kinds of obstacles in people's lives with respect to their achievements. Considering the various obligations and commitments that you carried in life, how do you generally compare yourself with each of the peoples mentioned in the following table with respect to your educational achievements?

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Consider ably worse of
People from outside your family					
People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

04. Similarly, considering the various obligations and commitments that you carried in your life, how do you generally compare yourself with each of the peoples mentioned in the following table on the basis of your acquired income level?

	Considerab ly better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Consider ably worse of
People from outside your family					

People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

05. Compared to the people given in the following table, how safe you generally feel yourself, from the threat of epidemics and diseases in your life?

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of
People from outside your family					
People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

06. On the basis of the Educational Institutions that you were able to study in, how do you normally compare yourself with each of the people mentioned in the following table?

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of
People from outside your family					

People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

07. On the basis of the income opportunities that you got in your life, how do you generally compare yourself with the each of the people mentioned in the following tables?

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of
People from outside your family					
People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

08. On the basis of the health facilities (doctors, hospitals, medicine etc.) available to you, how do you generally compare yourself to each of the people given in the following table?

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of

People from outside your family					
People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

09. How do you generally compare your general health conditions with each of the peoples given in the following table?

	Considerably better off	Better off	No difference	Worse off	Considerably worse of
People from outside your family					
People from outside your Kinship group					
People from outside your Ethnic Group					
People from outside your Race/ Caste					
People from outside Local Community					

*******End of the questionnaire*******

Many thanks for your time and effort

REFERENCES

Adelson, H. L. (1995). Social justice in the ancient world. In K. D. Irani & M. Silver (Eds.), *Social justice in the ancient world* (pp. 25-38). Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press.

Ahsan, A. (1996). *The Indus Saga and the Making of Pakistan*. Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Ajzen, I. (1985). From intentions to actions: A theory of planned behavior. In J. Kuhl & J. r. Beckmann (Eds.), *Action control : from cognition to behavior* (pp. 11-39). Berlin ; New York: Springer.

Ajzen, I., & Fishbein, M. (2005). The Influence of Attitudes on Behaviour. In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *The handbook of attitudes* (pp. 173-221). Mahwah, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Albarracin, D., Johnson, B. T., Zanna, M. P., & Kumkale, G. T. (2005). Attitudes: Introduction and Scope. In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), *The handbook of attitudes* (pp. 3-19). Mahwah, N.J: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Alexander, J. M. (2008). *Capabilities and social justice : the political philosophy of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum* Aldershot, England; Burlington, Vt Ashgate Pub. Ltd

Ali, I. (2002). The historical lineages of poverty and exclusion in Pakistan. *South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 25*(2), 33-60.

Alkire, S. (2002). *Valuing Freedoms-Sen's Capability Approach and Poverty Reduction*. New York: Oxford University Press, Inc. .

Alkire, S. (2008). Using the capabilities approach: prospective and evaluative analyses. In M. Q. Flavio Comim, Sabina Alkire (Ed.), *The capability approach : concepts, measures and applications* (pp. 26-50). Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology* (pp. 798-884). Worcestor, MA: Clark University Press.

Angyal, A. (1941). *Foundations for a Science of Personality*. New York: The Common Wealth Fund.

Appiah, K. A. (2009). Sen's Identities In K. Basu, S. M. R. Kanbur & A. Sen (Eds.), *Arguments for a better world : Essays in honor of Amartya Sen* (Vol. I, pp. 475-488). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Archer, M. S. (1995). *Realist Social Theory : the Morphogenetic Approach* Cambridge ; New York Cambridge University Press.

Arnesan, R. (2006). Distributive justice and basic capability equlaity: 'Good enough' is not good enough. In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities Equalities- Basic Issues and Problems* (pp. 17-43). London and New York: Routledge.

Arneson, R. J. (1997). Paternalism, Utility, and Fairness. In G. Dworkin (Ed.), *Mill's On liberty critical essays* (pp. 83-114). Lanham, Md. : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Baldwin, J. M. (1911). *The Individual and the Society*. Boston: Durham Press.

Bar-Tal, D. (2000). *Shared beliefs in a society : social psychological analysis*. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.

Barry, B. M. (2005). *Why social justice matters*. Cambridge, U.K.: Polity.

Baumeister, R. F. (2008). Free Will, Consciousness, and Cultural Animal. In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), *Are We Free: Psychology and Free Will* (pp. 65-85). Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press.

Bell, D. C. (2009). *Constructing social theory* Lanham Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Berkowitz, S. D. (1988). Afterword: Toward a formal structural sociology. In B. Wellman & S. D. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Social structures : a network approach* (pp. 477-497). Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York Cambridge University Press, 1988.

Blau, P. M. (1975a). Introduction: Parallels and Contrasts in Structural Inquiries In P. M. Blau (Ed.), *Approaches to the study of social structure* (pp. 1-20). New York: The Free Press.

Blau, P. M. (1975b). Parameters of Social Structure. In P. M. Blau (Ed.), *Approaches to the study of social structure* (pp. 220-253). New York: The Free Press.

Blau, P. M. (1994). *Structural contexts of opportunities* Chicago University of Chicago Press.

Blood, P. (1995). *Pakistan : a country study*. Washington, D.C: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress

Bojer, H. (2003). *Distributional justice : theory and measurement*. London ; New York Routledge.

Bourdieu, P. (1992). *An invitation to reflexive sociology*. Chicago University of Chicago Press.

Bradley, F. H. (1876). *Ethical Studies* (2nd ed.). London: Oxford University Press.

Broom, J. (1991). Utilitarain metaphysics? . In J. Elster, J. E. Roemer & l. h. M. d. s. de (Eds.), *Interpersonal comparisons of well-being* (pp. 70-97). Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Buckley, F. H. (2009). *Fair Governance. Paternalism and Perfectionism*. New York Oxford University Press.

Burki, S. J. (1972). Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic Explanation. *Asian Survey, 12*(3), 201-212.

Burki, S. J. (1976). The DEvelopment of Pakistan Agriculture:An Interdisciplinary Explanation. In R. D. Stevens, H. Alavi & P. J. Bertocci (Eds.), *Rural Development in Bengladesh and Pakistan*. Hawaii: University Press of Hawaii.

Cahnman, W. J. (1973). Introduction. In W. J. Cahnman (Ed.), *Ferdinand Tönnies*. *A new evaluation* (pp. 1-27). Leiden: Brill.

Carroll, J. D., Green, P. E., & Schaffer, C. M. (1986). Interpoint Distance Comparisons in Correspondence Analysis. *Journal of Marketing Research, 23*(3), 271-280.

Comim, F. (2008). Measuring capabilities In F. Comim, M. Qizilbash & S. Alkire (Eds.), *The capability approach : concepts, measures and applications* (pp. 157-200). Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Crocker, D. A. (1992). Functioning and Capability: The Foundations of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic. *Political Theory, 20*(4), 584-612.

Crocker, D. A. (2006). Sen and deliberative democracy. In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 155-197). Abingdon, Oxfordshire ; New York: Routledge.

Crocker, D. A., & Robeyns, I. (2010). Capability and Agency. In C. W. Morris (Ed.), *Amartya Sen* (pp. 60-90). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Crothers, C. (1996). *Social structure* London, New York Routledge.

Deneulin, S. (2002). Perfectionism, Paternalism and Liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum's Capability Approach. *Review of Political Economy, 14*(4), 497-518.

Deneulin, S. (2008). Beyond Individual Freedom and Agency: structures of living together in the capabiliites approach. In F. Comim, M. Qizilbash & S. Alkire (Eds.), *The capability approach : concepts, measures and applications* (pp. 105-124). Cambridge, UK: New York: Cambridge University Press.

Derné, S. (1992). Beyond Institutional and Impulsive Conceptions of Self: Family Structure and the Socially Anchored Real Self. *Ethos, 20*(3), 259-288.

Derné, S. (1994). Hindu Men Talk about Controlling Women: Cultural Ideas as a Tool of the Powerful. *Sociological Perspectives, 37*(2), 203-227.

Derné, S. (1995). *Culture in action : family life, emotion, and male dominance in Banaras, India* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Derné, S. (2009). Well-Being: Lessons from India. In G. Mathews & C. Izquierdo (Eds.), *Pursuits of Happiness : Well-Being in Anthropological Perspective* (pp. 127-146). New York Berghahn Books.

Durkheim, E. (1964). *The rules of sociological method (8th Edition Tr. by Sarah Solovay and John Mueller).* New York: Free Press.

Dweck, C. S., & Molden, D. C. (2008). Self-Theories: the Construction of Free Will. In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), *Are We Free: Psychology and Free Will* (pp. 44-64). Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press.

Dworkin, R. (2000). *Sovereign virtue : the theory and practice of equality*. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press.

Dworkin, R. (2002). Sovereign Virtue revisited. *Ethics, 113*(1), 106–143.

Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. S. (1993). *The psychology of attitudes*. Fort Worth Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Elster, J. (1982). Sour grapes: utilitarianism and the genesis of wants. In A. K. Sen & B. A. O. Williams (Eds.), *Utilitarianism and beyond* (pp. 219-238). Cambridge ; New York Cambridge University Press.

Faust, K. (1997). Centrality in affiliation networks. *Social Networks, 19*(2), 157-191.

Faust, K. (2005). Using Correspondence Analysis for Joint Displays of Affiliation Networks. In P. J. Carrington, J. Scott & S. Wasserman (Eds.), *Models and methods in social network analysis* (pp. 117-146). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Faust, K., Willert, K. E., Rowlee, D. D., & Skvoretz, J. (2002). Scaling and statistical models for affiliation networks: patterns of participation among Soviet politicians during the Brezhnev era. *Social Networks, 24*, 231-259.

Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2007). Attitudes: Foundations, Functions, and Consequences. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of social psychology* (pp. 123-145). London SAGE.

Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). *Social cognition*. New York McGraw-Hill.

Fleischacker, S. (2004). *A short history of distributive justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,.

Frankfurt, H. G. (2003). Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person. In G. Watson (Ed.), *Free Will* (2nd ed., pp. 322-336). Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press.

Freeman, S. R. (2007). *Justice and the social contract : essays on Rawlsian political philosophy*: Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2007.

Giddens, A. (1976). *New rules of sociological method : a positive critique of interpretative sociologies*. London: Hutchinson.

Giddens, A. (1977). *Studies in social and political theory*. London: Hutchinson of London.

Gore, C. (1993). Entitlement relations and 'unruly' social practices: A comment on the work of Amartya Sen. *Journal of Development Studies, 29*(3), 429-460.

Gore, C. (1997). Irreducibly Social Goods and the Informational basis of Amartya Sen's Capabilities Approach. *Journal of International Development, 9*(2), 235-250.

Gould, J., & Kolb, W. I. (1964). *A dictionary of Social Sciences*. Glenco, Ill: Free Press.

Granovetter, M. (1985). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. *The American Journal of Sociology, 91*(3), 481-510.

Granovetter, M. (1992). Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness. In M. Granovetter & R. Swedberg (Eds.), *The Sociology of economic life* (pp. 53-81). Boulder Westview Press.

Greenacre, M. J. (1984). *Theory and application of correspondence analysis*. London :: Academic.

Greenacre, M. J. (2007). *Correspondence Analysis in Practice, Second Edition*. Boca Raton Chapman and Hall/CRC.

Griffin, K., & Khan, A. R. (1972). *Growth and Inequality in Pakistan*: The MacMillan Press Ltd. London and Basingstoke.

Hamza Alavi, J. H. (Ed.). (1989). *South Asia* Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire Macmillan.

Harragin, S. (2004). Relief and an Understanding of Local Knowledge: The Case of Southern Sudan. In M. Walton & V. Rao (Eds.), *Culture and public action* (pp. 307-327). Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press

Hasnain, N. (Ed.). (2006). *Aspects of Islam and Muslim societies* New Delhi Serials Publications.

Hedstrom, P., Swedberg, R., & Udehn, L. (1998). Popper's situational analysis and contemporary sociology. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 28*(3), 339-964.

Heil, D. (2009). EMBODIED SELVES AND SOCIAL SELVES: Aborginal Well-Being in Rural New South Wales, Australia In G. Mathews & C. Izquierdo (Eds.), *Pursuits of happiness : well-being in anthropological perspective* (pp. 88-108). New York Berghahn Books.

Hinton, T. (2006). Capability and gender inequality In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 93-116). Abingdon, Oxfordshire; New York Routledge.

Hofstede, G., & Hofstede, G. J. (2005). *Cultures and organizations : software of the mind* New York McGraw-Hil.

Hofstede, G. H. (1980). *Culture's Consequences : International Differences in Work-related Values*. Beverly Hills, Calif. : Sage Publications.

Hogg, M. A., & Abrams, D. (2007). Intergroup Behavior and Social Identity. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of social psychology* (pp. 335-360). London: SAGE.

Homans, G. C. (1975). What Do We Mean by Social "Structure". In P. M. Blau & A. American Sociological (Eds.), *Approaches to the study of social structure* (pp. 53-65). New York: Free Press.

Hovland, C. I., & Rosenberg, M. J. (1960). Cognitive, Affective and Behavioural Components of Attitudes. In M. J. Rosenberg & C. I. Hovland (Eds.), *Attitude organization and change: an analysis of consistency among attitude components* (pp. 1-14). New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.

Hund, J. (1982). Are Social Facts Real? *The British Journal of Sociology, 33*(2), 270-278.

Hussain, A. (1979). *Elite politics in an ideological state : the case of Pakistan*. Folkestone, Eng.: Dawson.

Ikram, S. M., & Spear, P. (Eds.). (1955). *The cultural heritage of Pakistan* London: Oxford University Press.

Isbister, J. (2001). *Capitalism and Justice : Envisioning social and economic fairness*. Bloomfield, Conn.: Kumarian Press, 2001.

Ishay, M. (2004). *The history of human rights : from ancient times to the globalization era*: Berkeley : University of California Press, c2004.

Jackson, B. (2005). The Conceptual History of Social Justice. *The Political Studies Review, 3*(3), 356–373.

Jackson, W. A. (2005). Capabilities, Culture and Social Structure. *Review of Social Economy, 63*(1), 101-124.

Jahan, R. (1972). *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*: Columbia University Press, New York and London.

Jankowiak, W. (2009). Well-Being, Personal Pathology, and Personal Rejuvenation in a Chinese City, 1981-2005. In G. Mathews & C. Izquierdo (Eds.), *Pursuits of Happiness: Well-Being in Anthropological Perspective* (pp. 147-166). New York: Berghahn Books.

Kabeer, N. (1999). Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women's Empowerment. *Development & Change, 30*(3), 435-464.

Kakar, S. (1981). *The Inner world: A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India.* (2nd ed.). Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Kamsler, V. (2006). Attending to nature: Capabilities and the environment. In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 198-213). Abingdon, Oxfordshire ; New York: Routledge, 2006.

Kane, R. (2005). *A contemporary introduction to free will*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

Kant, I. (1959). *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by L.W. Beck*. New York: Macmillan.

Kant, I. (1991). *The Metaphysics of Morals. Translated by Mary Gregor*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univresity Press.

Kaspersen, L. B. (2000). *Anthony Giddens : an Introduction to a Social Theorist (translated by Steven Sampson)*. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Kasser, T. (2002). Sketches for Sel-Determination Theory of Values. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), *Handbook of self-determination research* (pp. 123-140). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press.

Katz, I., & Stotland, E. (1959). A Preliminary Statement to the Theory of Attitude Structure and Change. In S. Koch (Ed.), *Psychology: a Study of Science* (Vol. 3, pp. 423-475). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Kaufman, A. (2006a). Introduction. In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 1-14). Abingdon, Oxfordshire ; New York Routledge.

Kaufman, A. (2006b). A sufficientarian approach? A note. In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 71-76). Abingdon, Oxfordshire ; New York: Routledge, 2006.

Kaufman, A. (2006c). What goods do to (and for) people. In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 117-129). Abingdon, Oxfordshire ; New York Routledge.

Khare, R. S. (2006). Value Opposition and Hierarchy: Indian Discussion of Louis Dumont's Work. In R. S. Khare (Ed.), *Caste, Hierarchy, and Individualism: Indian Critique of Louis Dumont's Contributions* (pp. 1-35). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Knoke, D., & Yang, S. (2008). *Social network analysis* Los Angeles: Sage Publications.

Koestler, A. (1967). *The Ghost in the Machine*. New York: Macmillan

Kolm, S. C. (1996). *Modern theories of justice*. Cambridge, MA MIT Press.

Kuklys, W. (2005). *Amartya Sen's Capability Approach-Theoretical Insights and Empirical Applications*: Springer, Berlin, New York.

Leach, E. R. (1981). British Social Anthropology and Levi-Straussian Structuralism. In P. M. Blau & R. K. Merton (Eds.), *Continuities in Structural Inquiry* (pp. 27-50). London and Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications.

Leary, M. R. (2005). Interpersonal Cognition and the Quest for Social Acceptance. In M. W. Baldwin (Ed.), *Interpersonal cognition* (pp. 85-102). New York Guilford Press.

Lehning, P. B. (2009). *John Rawls : an introduction*. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levin, S. (1974). The Upper Bourgeoisie from the Muslim Commercial Community of Memons in Pakistan, 1947 to 1971. *Asian Survey, Soviet Scholars View South Asia, 14*(3), 231-243.

López, J., & Scott, J. (2000). *Social structure* Philadelphia, PA Open University Press.

Lowry, S. T. (1995). Social Justice and the Subsistence Economy: From Aristotle to Seventeenth Century Economics. In K. D. Irani & M. Silver (Eds.), *Social justice in the ancient world* (pp. 8-24). Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Lutz, C. A. (1988). *Unnatural Emotions: Everyday Sentiments on a Micronesian Atoll and Their Challenge to Western Theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Madden, T. J., Ellen, P. S., & Ajzen, I. (1992). A Comparison of the Theory of Planned Behavior and the Theory of Reasoned Action. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 18*(1), 3-9. doi: 10.1177/0146167292181001

Mandelbaum, M. (1955). Societal Facts. *The British Journal of Sociology, 6*(4), 305-317.

McTaggart, J. (1921). *The nature of existence* Cambridge, Eng. : Cambridge University Press.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, Self and Society*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Merton, R. K. (1975). Structural Anlysis in Sociology In P. M. Blau (Ed.), *Approaches to the Social Structure* (pp. 21-52). London: The Free Press.

Mohiuddin, Y. N. (c2007). *Pakistan : a global studies handbook* Santa Barbara, Calif: ABC-CLIO.

Morris, C. W. (2010a). Introduction. In C. W. Morris (Ed.), *Amartya Sen* (pp. 1-12). Cambridge ; New York : : Cambridge University Press.

Morris, C. W. (2010b). Ethics and Economics. In C. W. Morris (Ed.), *Amartya Sen* (pp. 40-59). Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Morvaridi, B. (2008). *Social justice and development*: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York : Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

Moulin, H. (2003). *Fair division and collective welfare*: Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, c2003.

Muller, U., Carpendale, J. I. M., Budwig, N., & Sokol, B. (2008). Development Relations between Forms of Social Interaction and Form of Thought. In U. Muller, J. I. M. Carpendale, N. Budwig & B. Sokol (Eds.), *Social Life and Social Knowledge: Toward a Process Account of Development* (pp. 1-16). New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Myer, D. G. (2008). Determined and Free. In J. Baer, J. C. Kaufman & R. F. Baumeister (Eds.), *Are We Free:Psychology and Free Will* (pp. 32-43). Oxford ; New York Oxford University Press.

Nafziger, E. W. (2006). From Seer to Sen *United Nations University/World Institute for Development Economics Research*.

Nooy, W. D. (2003). Fields and networks: correspondence analysis and social network analysis in the framework of field theory. *Poetics, 31*(5-6), 305-327.

North, D. C. (2005). *Understanding the process of economic change* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Nozick, R. (1975). *Anarchy, state, and Utopia*: Oxford : Blackwell, 1975.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). Capabilities as fundamental entitlements : Sen and social justice In A. Kaufman (Ed.), *Capabilities equality : basic issues and problems* (pp. 44-70). Abingdon, Oxfordshire ; New York: Routledge.

Oskamp, S., & Schultz, P. W. (2005). *Attitudes and opinions* (3rd ed.). Mahwah, N.J. : L. Erlbaum Associates.

Osmani, S. R. (2009). The Sen System of Social Evaluation. In K. Basu, S. M. R. Kanbur & A. K. Sen (Eds.), *Arguments for a better world : essays in honor of Amartya Sen* (pp. 15-34). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.

. Pakistan Social & Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM). (2006-07). Islamabad: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan: accessed online at http://www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/fbs/statistics/pslm2006_07/pslm2006_07.html on 30/Nov./2010.

Papadopoulos, F., & Tsakloglou, P. (2008). Social exclusion in the EU: a capability-based approach. In F. Comim, M. Qizilbash & S. Alkire (Eds.), *The capability approach : concepts, measures and applications* (pp. 242-267). Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Papanek, G. F. (1967). *Pakistan's Development- Social Goals and Private Incentives*: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Papanek, H. (1972). Pakistan's Big Businessmen: Muslim Separatism, Entrepreneurship, and Partial Modernization. *Economic Development and Cultural Change, 21*(1), 1-32.

Pappenheim, F. (1959). *The alienation of modern man ; an interpretation based on Marx and Tönnies*. New York, : Monthly Review Press,.

Parker, J., Mars, L., Ransome, P., & Stanworth, H. (2003). *Social Theory: A basic Toolkit*. New York: Palgrave macmillan.

Pettit, P. (2002). *Rules, Reasons, and Norms*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Phillips, D. C. (1976). *Holistic thought in social science* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

Pierik, R., & Robeyns, I. (2007). Resources versus Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory. *Political Studies, 55*(1), 133–152.

Plessner, H. (1983). Der Mensch Als Lebeswesen. In H. Plessner (Ed.), *Gesammelte Schriften: Vol.8: Conditio Humana* (pp. 328-337). Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (Original work published in 1967).

Popper, K. R. (1945). *The open society and its enemies*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Popper, K. R. (1957). *The Poverty of Historicism* London: Routledge

Popper, K. R. (1994). Models, Instruments, and Truth: the status of the rationality principle in the social sciences. In K. R. Popper & M. A. Notturno (Eds.), *The myth of the framework : in defence of science and rationality* (pp. 154-184). London; New York: Routledge.

Prendergast, R. (2005). The concept of freedom and its relation to economic development--a critical appreciation of the work of Amartya Sen. *Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29*(6), 1145-1117.

Qadeer, M. A. (2006). *Pakistan : Social and cultural transformation in a Muslim nation*. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York Routledge.

Qizilbash, M. (1996). Capabilities, well-being and human development: A survey. *Journal of Development Studies, 33*(2), 143 - 162

Rahim, A. M. A. (1973). The Development Strategy of Pakistan: The Case for Revision. *Asian Survey, 13*(6), 577-586.

Ramanujan, A. K. (1990). Is There an Indian Way of Thinking? an Informal Essay. In M. Marriot (Ed.), *India Thought through Hindu Categories* (pp. 41-58). New Delhi: Sage.

Rao, V., & Walton, M. (2004). Culture and Public Action: Relationality, Equality of Agency, and Development In V. Rao & M. Walton (Eds.), *Culture and Public Action* (pp. 3-36). Stanford, California: Stanford University Press

Rawls, J. (1993). *Political liberalism*. New York Columbia University Press, .

Reed, A. M. (2008). *Human development and social power : perspectives from South Asia* New York, NY Routledge.

Rescher, N. (2002). *Fairness : theory & practice of distributive justice*. New Brunswick: NJ Transaction Publishers.

Richardson, R. J., & Wellman, B. (1985). Structural Analysis. *Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 22*(5), 770-793.

Robbins, L. R. B. (1937). *An essay on the nature & significance of economic science*: London : Macmillan and co., limited, 1937.

Robeyns, I. (2005). The capability approach: a theoretical survey. *Journal of Human Development 6*(1), 93-117.

Robeyns, I. (2006). The Capability Approach in Practice. *The Journal of Political Philosophy, 14*(3), 351–376.

Roemer, J. E. (1996). *Theories of distributive justice*: Cambridge, Mass : Harvard University Press, 1996.

Rogers, C. R. (1964). Toward a modern apporach to values: The valuing process in the mature person. *Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology, 68*, 160-167.

Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: Free Press.

Roland, A. (1984). The Self in India and America: Toward a Psychoanalysis of Social and Cultural Contexts. In V. Kovolis (Ed.), *Designs of Selfhood* (pp. 123-130). Cranbury, NJ. : Associated Uniersity Press.

Roland, A. (1988). *In Search of Self in India and Japan:Toward a Cross-Cultural Psychology*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rovane, C. A. (1998). *The bounds of agency an essay in revisionary metaphysics*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.

Ruger, J. P. (2010). *Health and social justice*. Oxford Oxford University Press.

Runciman, W. G. (1966). *Relative deprivation and social justice : a study of attitudes to social inequality in twentieth-century England*. London Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Ryan, R. M. (1995). Psychological Needs and the Facilitation of Integrative Processes. [Article]. *Journal of Personality, 63*(3), 397-427. doi: 10.1111/1467-6494.ep9510042298

Sapir, E., & Mandelbaum, D. G. (Eds.). (1985 c1949). *Selected writings of Edward Sapir in language, culture and personality*. Berkeley University of California Press.

Sayeed, K. B. (1967). *The political system of Pakistan.*: Boston, [Mass.] : Houghton Mifflin.

Schmid, H. B. (2009). *Plural action: essays in philosophy and social science*. Dordrecht: Springer.

Searle, J. R. (2001). *Rationality in action*. Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 2001.

Sen, A. K. (1970). The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal. *The Journal of Political Economy, 78*(1), 152-157.

Sen, A. K. (1976). Poverty: An Ordinal Approach to Measurement. *Econometrica, 44*(2), 219-231.

Sen, A. K. (1977a). Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 6*(4), 317-344.

Sen, A. K. (1977b). On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare Analysis. *Econometrica, 45*(7), 1539-1572.

Sen, A. K. (1979). Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: Or what's wrong with welfare economics. *Economic Journal, 89*(355), 537-558.

Sen, A. K. (1982). Equality of What? In A. K. Sen (Ed.), *Choice, welfare, and measurement* (pp. 353-369). Oxford: Blackwell. *Originally published in 'Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Volume 1' by the University of Utah Press and Cambridge University Press, 1980*.

Sen, A. K. (1983a). Liberty and Social Choice. *The Journal of Philosophy, 80*(1), 5-28.

Sen, A. K. (1983b). Poor, Relatively Speaking. *Oxford Economic Papers, 35*(2), 153-169.

Sen, A. K. (1985a). Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984. *The Journal of Philosophy, 82*(4), 169-221.

Sen, A. K. (1985b). *Commodities and capabilities* Elsevier Science Pub. Co, Amsterdam ; New York

Sen, A. K. (1987a). *On ethics and economics*: B. Blackwell, Oxford, New York:.

Sen, A. K. (1987b). The standard of living: Lecture II, Lives and Capabilities In A. K. Sen, J. Muellbauer & G. Hawthorn (Eds.), *Standard of Living* (pp. 20-38). Cambridge England ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, A. K. (1990). Justice: Means versus Freedoms. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19*(2), 111-121.

Sen, A. K. (1992). *Inequality reexamined*: Russell Sage Foundation ; Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, New York.

Sen, A. K. (1993a). Capability and Well-Being. In M. C. Nussbaum & A. Sen (Eds.), *The Quality of life* (pp. 30-53). Oxford [England] New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. K. (1993b). Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms. *Oxford Economic Papers, 45*(4), 519-541.

Sen, A. K. (1995). Rationality and Social Choice. *The American Economic Review, 85*(1), 1-24.

Sen, A. K. (1997). From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality. *Southern Economic Journal, 64*(2), 383-401.

Sen, A. K. (1999). The Possibility of Social Choice. *The American Economic Review, 89*(3), 349-378.

Sen, A. K. (2000). *Development as Freedom*: Knopf, New York.

Sen, A. K. (2002a). *Rationality and freedom* Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press.

Sen, A. K. (2002b). Response to Commentaries. *Studies in Comparative International Development, 37*(2), 78-86.

Sen, A. K. (2004). Elements of a Theory of Human Rights. *Philosophy and Public Affairs, 32*(4), 315-356.

Sen, A. K. (2005). Human Rights and Capabilities. *Journal of Human Development, 6*(2), 151-166.

Sen, A. K. (2006). *Identity and violence : the illusion of destiny*: W. W. Norton & Co., New York.

Sen, A. K. (2009). *The idea of justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,.

Sen, A. K. (2010). The place of capability in a theory of justice. In H. Brighouse & I. Robeyns (Eds.), *Measuring justice : primary goods and capabilities* (pp. 239-253). Cambridge England ; New York Cambridge University Press.

Sherif, C. W., Sherif, M., & Nebergall, R. E. (1965). *Attitude and attitude change : the social judgment-involvement approach*. Phildelphia Saunders.

Sherif, M. (1966). *The Psychology of Social Norms*. New York: Harper & Row.

Sherif, M. (1967). *Social interaction process and products; selected essays*. Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co.

Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Book Exchange.

Shweder, R. A. (1991). *Thinking Through Cultures: Expeditions in Cultural Psychology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Sinha, D., & Tripathi, R. C. (1994). *Individualism in a Collectivist Culture: A Case of Coexistence of Opposites*. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.-C. Choi & G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and Collectivism : Theory, Method, and Applications* (pp. 123-136). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Sinha, J. B. P. (1982). The Hindu (Indian) Identity. *Dynanamic Psychiatry 3*(4), 148-160.

Skinner, B. F. (1953). *Science and human behavior*. New York: Macmillan.

Spranger, E. (1928). *Types of Men : the Psychology and Ethics of Personality (authorized translation of the fifth German edition by Paul J.W. Pigors).* Halle: Niemeyer.

Stephan R. Lewis, J. (1969). *Economic Policy and Industrial Growth in Pakistan*: The Alden Press, Oxford.

Stephen R. Lewis, J., & Guisinger, S. E. (1968). Measuring Protection in a Developing Country: The Case of Pakistan. *The Journal of Political Economy, 76*(6), 1170-1198.

Sugden, R. (1993). Welfare, Resources, and Capabilities: A Review of Inequality Reexamined. *Journal of Economic Literature, 31*(4), 1947-1962.

Swidler, A. (2001). *Talk of Love : How Culture Matters*. Chicago University of Chicago Press.

Szmatka, J. (1989). HOLISM, INDIVIDUALISM, REDUCTIONISM. *International Sociology, 4*(2), 169-186.

Tariq, A. (2000). Economy, society and the state in Pakistan *Contemporary South Asia, 9*(2), 181-195.

Taylor, C. (1985). *Philosophy and the Human Sciences*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1997). *Philosophical arguments* Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.

Tomasello, M. (1999). *The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition*. Cambidge MA: Harvard University Press.

Tönnies, F. (2001). *Community and civil society; edited by Jose Harris ; translated by Jose Harris and Margaret Hollis*. Cambridge; New York Cambridge University Press.

Townsend, P. (1979). *Poverty in the United Kingdom : a survey of household resources and standards of living*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Triandis, H. C. (1971). *Attitude and attitude change*. New York: Wiley.

Triandis, H. C. (1995). *Individualism And Collectivism (New Directions in Social Psychology)* Boulder, Oxford: Westview Press.

Tuomela, R. (2002). *The philosophy of social practices : a collective acceptance view* New York Cambridge University Press.

Tuomela, R. (2007). *The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Vakil, C. N. (1950). *Economic Consequences of Divided- A study of the Economies of India and Pakistan*: Vora & Co. Publishers Ltd. Bombay.

Vaughan, S. K. (2008). *Poverty, Jusitce, and Western Political Thought*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books/Rowman & Littlefield.

Visser, P. S., & Cooper, J. (2007). Attitude change. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of social psychology* (pp. 197-218). London: SAGE.

Warriner, C. K. (1981). Levels in the study of social structure In P. M. Blau & R. K. Merton (Eds.), *Continuities in Structural Inquiry* (pp. 179-190). London and Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications.

Wasserman, S., & Faust, K. (1994). *Social network analysis : methods and applications* Cambridge ; New York Cambridge University Press.

Watier, P. (2008). Georg Simmel. In R. Stones (Ed.), *Key sociological thinkers* (pp. 90-105). Basingstoke England ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Watkins, J. (1952a). Ideal Types and Historical Explanation. *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3*, 22-43.

Watkins, J. (1952b). The Principle of Methodological Individualism *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3*, 186-189.

Watkins, J. (1959). Historical Explanations in Social Sciences In P. Gardiner (Ed.), *Theories of history : readings from classical and contemporary sources*. New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

Weeks, R. V. (1964). *Pakistan: Birth and growth of a Muslim Nation* Van Nostrand, Princeton

Wellman, B. (1988). Structructural analysis: from metaphor to substance In B. Wellman & S. D. Berkowitz (Eds.), *Social structures : a network approach* (pp. 19-61). Cambridge [Cambridgeshire] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, .

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social theory of international politics*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Weston, M. (1992). *The land and people of Pakistan*. Armonk, N.Y: Harper Collins.

Wilcox, W. (1970). Pakistan in 1969: Once again at the Starting Point. *Asian Survey, A Survey of Asia in 1969: Part II., 10*(2), 73-81.

Williams, A. (2002). Dworkin on Capability. *Ethics, 113*(1), 23-39.

Williams, K. D., Harkins, S. G., & Karau, S. J. (2007). Social Performance. In M. A. Hogg & J. Cooper (Eds.), *The SAGE handbook of social psychology* (pp. 289-311). London: SAGE.

Wolf, S. (2002). Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility In R. Kane (Ed.), *Free Will* (pp. 147-161). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Young, I. M. (1990). *Justice and the politics of difference*. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press.

Yu, A.-B., & Yang, K.-S. (1994). The Nature of Achievement Motivation in Collectivist Societies. In U. Kim, H. C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S.-C. Choi & G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and Collectivism: Theory, Method, and Applications* (pp. 239-250). Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi.

Ziring, L. (1971). *The Ayub Khan Era-Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969*: Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.