Proceedings of the 5\textsuperscript{th} Biannual
\textit{KSAA Conference}

Enlightening Korea:
Converging or Diverging?

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## Contents

Editors’ Notes 4  
Sponsors 6  
Full Papers: KEYNOTE  
The Role of Pungsu (Geomancy) in Korean Culture **Hong-key Yoon** 7  

### PART A: REFEREED PAPERS

#### Social Sciences

**Creation of a Double-Purpose Nuclear Infrastructure and Developing of Nuclear Technologies in the DPRK (1950s – beginning of 1960s)**  
Andrey Kovsh 14  
**Constitutional Reform in the 6th Republic: Nothing but Political Manoeuvring?**  
Heike Hermanns 21  
**Enlightenment in Late Chosŏn Dynasty?**  
Andreas Mueller-Lee 29  
**The Emergence of Early Silla Rulers: A Reexamination of Myths, Genealogies, and Archaeological Findings**  
Chizuko T. Allen 41  
**Australia, the Korean Question and the United Nations 1946–1991**  
John Synott 56  
**The Spoken and Written Word in Korean History: A Preliminary Sketch**  
Gregory Nicholas Evon 67  

#### Humanities

**Post-Burden or New Burden Korean Cinema?: Outside Looking in at the Latest Golden Age, 1996-?**  
Brian Yecies 75  
Ae-Gyung Shim 81  
**Exhibiting Contemporary Korean Art Abroad**  
En Young Ahn 87  
**Remembering or Misremembering? Historicity in Asian American Children’s Fiction Set in Korea at the End of World War II: The Case of So Far from the Bamboo Grove**  
Sung-Ae Lee 96  
**Incentives to choose Australian universities: Why do Korean students choose Australia and how can Australia better meet their needs?**  
Gil-Soo Han 102  

#### Language & Linguistics

**Request Strategies in Korean**  
Yong Ju Rue, Grace Zhang, Kyu Shin 112  
**Epenthetic [i] in Optimality Theory (Revisited)***  
Duk-Soo Park 120  
**Perception of Korean Plosives by L2 Learners of Korean**  
Chong-Woon Kim 126  
**Korean Students’ Study Strategies and their Social Networks**  
Young-A Cho 134  

#### Business & Economics

**Effects of Family Happiness on Expatriate Success**  
Hyun Chang 141
## Social Sciences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dog Meat in Korea: A Legal Analysis</td>
<td>Rakhyun Kim</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Evolution and Policy Context of Youth Policy in the Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Bambarang Shergi Laksmo &amp; Rinaldi Erfan</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth Protection Challenges in Korea</td>
<td>Hendratno &amp; Bambarang Shergi Laksmo</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Buddhist History: Propaganda and Relics in the Independence Struggle of a Monastery, 1850s-1930s</td>
<td>John Jorgensen</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Study on the Change in the Treatment and Understanding of the Visually Impaired in Korea</td>
<td>Jeong Im-soon</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Republican Philosophy &amp; Movement of Cheondogyo</td>
<td>Oh Moon-Hwan</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Study on the Conflict between Republicanism and Monarchism in the Early-20th-Century Korea: Focusing on the Advent and Decline of Monarchism after the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919</td>
<td>Park Hyun-Mo</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Liberation Political Situation and Schism in Democratic Republicanism: Left-Right Ideological Confrontation and Korean National Unification</td>
<td>Chang Myounghag</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Historical Origins of the National Founding Constitution of the Republic of Korea</td>
<td>Suh Hee Kyung</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosŏnjok between China and Korea: the Zhonghua Nationalism, De-territorialised Nationalism, and Transnationalism</td>
<td>Changzoo Song</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Origin and Development of Western Democratic Republicanism: The Dialectic of Democracy and Republicanism from Ancient Athens to the Renaissance Era</td>
<td>Kyung-Hee Kim</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Humanities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Players in Press Freedom</td>
<td>Eun Suk SA</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Web Resources for Korean Studies: Social Sciences</td>
<td>Jung-Sim Kim</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free Web Resources for Korean Studies: Humanities</td>
<td>Hee-sook Shin</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Understanding and Satisfaction on Non-Verbal Communication among Korean Administrators and Thai Employees: A Case Study on Korean Companies in Thailand</td>
<td>Tassanee Thantawanit, Rachanee Vongsumitr &amp; Chanchala Sivamard</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Language & Linguistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A Preliminary Study for an Efficient Learning of Korean Orthography for Korean Children living in the English Speaking Countries.</td>
<td>Inshil Choe Yoon</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An Experimental Study on Focus Structures of English Utterances by Native Speakers and Korean Learners</td>
<td>Kyong-Min Choi, Tae-Yeoub Jang</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conjunctive Forms of Reason</td>
<td>InJung Cho</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Study of Korean ‘kae’ and Thai ‘an’: the Numeral Classifiers for ‘Things’</td>
<td>Puttachart Potibal</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Business & Economics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Competitiveness through Global Production: The Case of Hyundai Motor Company</td>
<td>Chung-Sok Suh, Seung-Ho Kwon &amp; Christopher Wright</td>
<td>322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Enlightening Korea: Converging or Diverging

Currently, Korea is experiencing enormous amount of changes and challenges, and the value of keeping up academically in understanding Korea and its people is greater than ever before. The conference theme *Enlightening Korea: Converging or Diverging* has been chosen to reflect and capture the recent development in Korean studies. The world is changing rapidly, and so is the demand for understanding Korea and its people along with the themes and the nature of Korean studies. Converging trends of global standards are strongly present in many fields of research and development but the nature of continuing changes again introduces new diverging trends and manifestations as perceived by different interest groups.

While Korea was still at the crossroads between hermit-ness and spreading aggressions from surrounding powers, Rabindranath Tagore sent a warm message to ‘Land of Morning Calm’, calling her ‘Light of the Orient’ and wishing her all the best to rise up and to expand its spiritual and intellectual muscles to the world. Two prominent scholars of Korean studies are invited to deliver their keynote speeches. Professor Hong Key-Yoon from Auckland University, New Zealand presents his paper titled ‘The Role of Pungsu (Geomancy) in Korean Culture’ and Professor Ken Wells from Australian National University in Canberra, Australia with a paper titled ‘Time, Place & Language: the impact of Globalisation on Korean Historiography.’

The Korean Studies Association of Australasia (KSAA) was established in 1994 and currently has a membership of some 100 academics and postgraduate students, has been a central forum for academics and researchers in the region to exchange ideas, increase knowledge and network with fellow scholars. The 5th KSAA has attracted scholars from North America, Russia, Korea, New Zealand, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea and Australia. It is pleasing and worth noting that we have increased participation of scholars from Southeast Asian countries. This could be due to Perth’s geographic proximity to Southeast Asian region but more importantly it is attributable to the continued effort made by Korea Australasia Research Centre (KAREC) and KSAA in the development of Korean Studies in Southeast Asia.

The 5th KSAA Conference Proceedings has two sections – Part A for refereed papers and Part B for non-refereed papers. Part A comprises full papers selected after the blind peer review process. Part B comprises the remaining full papers. The Organising Committee would like to thank the reviewers who gave their time and expertise for selecting abstracts and reviewing the full papers anonymously.

The conference proceedings have been organized into four disciplinary areas from 45 full papers received. The Social Sciences section (21 papers), being the largest one, covers a wide range of topics. It includes historical perspectives such as earlier Silla thoughts, conflict between Monarchism and republicanism, Japanese colonial perspective history, history of print culture in Korea, earlier republican thought and characteristics and the issue of the founding Korean Constitutional Law. Also examined are contemporary and emerging issues including treatment of visually impaired persons in Korea, dog meat, constitutional reform, post-1997 East-Asian model of democratization nuclear policy in North Korea, Chosonjok, youth policy and protection challenges, Australia-Korean political history, and democratic republicanism in Korea, as well as introducing some religious perspectives on Buddhism, Confucianism, Chondogyo and knowledge of enlightenment.

The Humanities section (9 papers) introduces many contemporary issues dealing with flourishing Korean cinema and power of Korean cinema, press freedom, usefulness and
availability of web resources for Korean studies, increasing needs of Korean students studying in Australian universities, Korean contemporary arts exhibitions, historicity in Asian American children's fiction, non-verbal communication with Thai employees, and free web sources for Korean studies.

The Language and Linguistics section (11 papers) includes various topics that are important in teaching Korean: perception of Korean plosives, verbal suffixation, gender differences, conjunctive forms of reason, orthography learning, politeness, onomatopoeia, and influence of social network on study strategies. There are also comparative studies between Mandarin Chinese and Korean on request strategies, Korean and Thai on numeral classifier, and focus structures on English utterances.

Finally, The Business and Economics section (2 papers) covers international business issues such as comparative studies between Australia and Korea on expatriate success, and case studies on Hyundai Motor company and Korean companies in Thailand for non-verbal communication are presented. For details, please refer to conference program on Conference website at http://info.dolie.curtin.edu.au/KSAAprogram.cfm.

The editors would like to thank the Korea Foundation, the Academy of Korean Studies and the Australia-Korea Foundation for their generous financial support. We also thank the Korean Education Centre – Korean Consulate in Sydney and Woodside Energy Ltd for their kind support for the conference. The Division of Humanities and Faculty of Education, Social Work and Language Studies of Curtin University of Technology have provided us with both financial and personnel support. We are truly grateful for all the support which has made the conference possible.

Our big thanks go to Ms Samantha Hornby, Conference Secretary for her compiling and editing papers for the proceedings.

Last but not least, we would like to express our sincere thanks to all participants who submitted their full papers with which we have significant contribution to the developments of Korean Studies.

Kyu Suk Shin & Hyun Chang
Curtin University of Technology

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Keynote

The Role of Pungsu (Geomancy) in Korean Culture
한국문화 속에서 풍수지리의 역할

Hong-key Yoon
University of Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract

Pungsu (fengshui in Chinese) is often known as geomancy in the West, and has been understood by some scholars as a superstition, the rudiments of natural science of China or a quasi-religious and pseudo-scientific system. However, it is an ancient Chinese system of divining locations that can not easily be classified or labelled using a Western category. It is not a clear cut superstition, religion or science, but an art comprised of all three. The influence of geomantic ideas on Korean culture is so profound that it has been almost impossible to understand the people-land relationships in Korea without appreciating the nature of geomancy and its role in Korean culture. Ever since this idea was introduced to Korea, it has been an important part of the Korean way of thinking in dealing with the environment. Its impact is clearly visible in Korean settlement landscapes, grave landscapes, the practice of religious beliefs and even in Korean literature and paintings.

Introduction

The Korean term for geomancy is pungsu or pungsuchiri and is derived from the Chinese term, fengshui (風水) which means wind and water. 1 Geomancy in East Asia had been an enigma to many Western scholars, 2 and has been labelled as “a grossly superstitious system”, 3 “the rudiments of natural science of China” 4 or “a quasi-scientific system of China”. 5 However, it is a system that can not easily be classified or labelled using any Western category. Geomancy is not a clear cut superstition, religion or science, but an ancient Chinese system of site selection comprised of all three. Geomancy is defined as “a unique and highly systemised ancient Chinese art of selecting auspicious sites and arranging harmonious structures such as graves, houses and cities on them by evaluating the surrounding landscape and cosmological directions.” 6

Although Pungsu or geomancy is of Chinese origin, ever since this idea was introduced to Korea, it has been an important part of the Korean way of thinking in dealing with the environment. Geomancy has been critically important in understanding the characteristics of traditional Korean culture in an historical context, especially those of Korean’s use of the environment. The aim of this address is to overview and point out the depth and width of geomancy’s role in traditional Korean culture by incorporating and reviewing my previous research. In this paper I will first briefly comment on the nature of geomancy and its origin and diffusion to Korea before discussing the desirable attitude of geomancy researchers and the development of geomantic culture in Korea. The rest of this paper overviews the relationship between Korean religions and geomancy, the impact of geomancy on Korean landscapes and finally the image of nature in geomancy in Korea.

The Nature and the Origin of Geomancy

When a geomancer chooses auspicious sites for a house, grave and other structures, three important factors are considered. They are the surrounding landforms, watercourses and cardinal directions. First and perhaps the most important condition is a landform of horseshoe shaped surrounding hills. The second is that there should be a watercourse in front of the site, although the site itself should not be wet. Thirdly, such a site should face a desirable direction which normally is southward including Southeast and Southwest. A desirable direction is examined by geomancers using a geomantic compass.

1 I will use the terms geomancy and pungsu interchangeably in this paper.
2 For instance, a Western scholar declared as late as in 1970s that “If there is a subject which should have captivated Western sinologists, it is Chinese geomancy”. Jacques Lemoine, “foreword”, in Stephan D.R. Feuchtwang, An Anthropological analysis of Chinese geomancy, (Vientianne: Editions Vithagna, 1974), p. I.
4 Ernest J. Eitel, Feng-Shui or The Rudiments of Natural Science in China (Hongkong: Lane, Crawford & Co., 1873), title page.
When geomancers carried out field surveys on an auspicious site, draft survey results were often recorded in their sketches of the landscape and these drawings were gradually developed as geomancy maps. The main purpose of drawing geomancy maps was to record landforms around an auspicious site. This is why drawings of relief are more accurate near auspicious places and the accuracy diminishes quickly with distance. Geomancy maps have developed an ingenious and rather sophisticated means of topography with clearly recognisable map symbols. I have suggested that the landform expressions in the geomantic maps might have had significant impact on traditional Korean cartography, including the famous Map of Korea, Taedongyojido (Map of the Great Eastern Nation). This art seems to have originated from the Loess Plateau in ancient China. Some prominent scholars, including J.J.M. de Groot, thought that geomancy developed from the ancient Chinese custom of ancestor worship and selecting auspicious grave-sites. However, it is my contention that geomancy first developed from the art of selecting a comfortable dwelling (house) site for living persons, not graves for deceased ancestors. The following analysis of geomantic principles suggests that they are closely related to the location of a comfortable house, especially cave dwellings:

1) The current geomantic term for an auspicious site is hyol (xue:穴) which literally means “cave”. Hyol in geomancy means any auspicious site, not solely a cave. However, originally the Chinese character ‘xue (穴)’ meant earthen cave-dwelling (土室也). according to Shuowen Jiezi (説文解字).11
2) A desirable soil condition in an auspicious site is pure fine yellowish soil which again reflects the soil conditions of the Loess Plateau and the ideal cave dwelling in the region.
3) The shape of ‘the earth mountain’ supports the view that Chinese geomancy originated from the Loess Plateau. In geomancy, mountain shapes are classified into five types: earth, fire, water, wood (tree) and metal. Apart from the earth type, all types are explained by analogy: a tongue of flame like pointed peak is a fire mountain; waves like gentle rolling hills are water mountains; a tall tree like projected mountain is a wood mountain; a metal bell-like dome-shaped hill is a metal mountain. However, the earth mountain cannot be explained by analogy the way these four types are explained. A typical earth mountain has steep slopes with a broad flat top. Why is this so? This type of mountain is the most common in the Loess Plateau, while they are extremely rare in other parts of China or East Asia. I conjecture that the ideal model of the earth type mountain was developed in association with the Loess Plateau’s common shape of hills.
4) A key geomantic principle requires having a watercourse nearby an auspicious site, although the site itself should be dry. This requirement is critically important for a living person’s residence, especially for a cave dwelling, but it is hard to justify for a grave, unless this principle is a carry-over from that of an ideal house site.
5) Hills that act as wind barriers on the northern sides, especially the North-western sides, reflect the desirable conditions of loess cave dwellings in the Loess Plateau where cold wind comes from during the winter.

Based on this analysis I postulated that geomancy was initially developed by the early Chinese cave dwellers in the Loess Plateau as the art of choosing a comfortable house (cave dwelling) site, not gravesites.

The art of geomancy must have been introduced to Korea with the early waves of Chinese cultural contact. The paintings of the four guardian deities during the 5th and 6th century and the crescent shaped hills surrounding the Koguryo capital site, Hwando-song on the Manchurian side of the upper Yalu River can be seen as an indication of the introduction of geomancy into Korea. When the Japanese capital site of Nara was examined in 708AD, the surrounding hills of Nara Basin were assessed in light of four guardian deities and the site was proclaimed a suitable capital site. This Japanese historical event indicates that the terminologies of four guardian deities were clearly used in Japan indicating geomantic landforms surrounding an auspicious site. This Japanese usage suggests that the symbols of four guardian deities in Koguryo tombs may well have geomantic significance. However, the story of removing the Buddhist temple structures in order to make way for a royal tomb of Silla, King Wonsong in 798 AD

7 Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, p.164.
8 Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, p. 171.
10 For a more comprehensive discussion, see Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of fengshui in Korea, pp. 15-32.
12 Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, pp.37-39.
must be a decisively important date for the introduction of geomancy in Korea.\textsuperscript{14} If Koreans thought that it was important to replace a Buddhist structure with a royal tomb for geomantic reasons by 798AD, the art of geomancy must have been introduced into Korea quite some time before this date. After geomancy was introduced into Korea, Master Toson is probably the single most important person in the development of the Korean history of geomancy. He seems to have examined Korean landscapes by applying geomantic principles, and generated various geomantic prophesies for the different parts of Korea. Geomancy originated from China, not Korea. Ever since its introduction, the art played an important role in the development of Korean culture.

A Researcher’s Attitudes of Geomancy

In one of my earlier writings I commented that a researcher of geomancy is comparable to that of a football commentator.\textsuperscript{15} A suitable commentator should not be the person who plays the actual game. The person should be an observer of the game, positioned in a way to give an adequate commentary. A football player in the game may not be a suitable commentator, because the player does not have the opportunity to see the game as a whole as an observer. In the same way, an actual practitioner of geomancy, namely a professional geomancer, may not be a suitable geomancy researcher because the person would not have the opportunity to observe the practice of geomancy as an independent person. Therefore a desirable researcher might be an observer of the practice of geomancy, but not professional geomancer practising the art for fee-paid clients. So in this sense, a researcher of geomancy is different from a professional geomancer who practises geomancy to find an auspicious site.

Pungsu and Korean Religions

Geomancy and Buddhism have a close relationship.\textsuperscript{16} Firstly, some prominent geomancers in Korean history were Buddhist monks and numerous Korean folk tales feature a Buddhist monk as the expert of geomancy. In Korean folklore, these monks often find auspicious sites as rewards for humble peasants who have treated them well. Many monks of the Choson dynasty were in fact geomancer-monks who were experts in geomancy as well as Buddhism. Of course, in the official history of Korea some famous monks such as Master Toson and Master Muhak played important roles in evaluating the Korean landscape by participating in the selection process of capital sites or settlement planning.

Secondly, the close relationship between geomancy and Buddhism is reflected in the locations of Buddhist temples. The Buddhist temples built during traditional Korean society are normally located in geomantically auspicious sites surrounded by background hills with a watercourse in front. The historical legacy can be traced back to the First King of Koryo. He officially decreed that Buddhist temples were to be located so by considering geomantic conditions of Korean landscapes by Master Toson and therefore future kings should not interfere with this arrangement.\textsuperscript{17}

Thirdly, folktales about the practice of geomancy strongly reflect the Buddhist ethical principle of charity. In Korean geomantic folklore, an auspicious site is often given to a charitable person who has helped the needy or suffering.\textsuperscript{18} Since charity to humans, animals, and all living creatures is a key Buddhist principle and classical geomancy texts have not mentioned the need of exercising charity to gain an auspicious site, we consider this as an influence of a Buddhist moral on the art of geomancy. According to folktales, uncharitable or evil persons are unable to find an auspicious site, even if they are standing on the very site. Folktales suggest that uncharitable people will suffer misfortune even if they occupy an auspicious site by harming it somehow. This idea somewhat blurs the logic of geomantic principles being ‘scientific’ principles but strongly reflects the influence of the Buddhist ethical cord.

Geomancy has also maintained close relationship with Confucianism which is echoed in Korean attitudes towards family and society.\textsuperscript{19} A traditional Confucian family structure may be characterised by patriarchal, patrilineal and patrilocal relationships. In the traditional Confucian society of Korea a married woman becomes an integral part of her husband’s family and is entitled to the according privileges and responsibilities, while her relationships with her own family by birth are somewhat severed and alienated. This Confucian ethos is well reflected in a number of Koreans legends. One example is about a girl from

\textsuperscript{15} Hong-key Yoon, “Hankuk pungsuchiri yonguui hoigo wa chonmang (Prospect and Retrospect of Research into Geomancy in Korea)”, \textit{Hankuk Sasangsahak (History of Korean Thought)}, vol. 17 (2001), pp.43-44.
\textsuperscript{16} For a more comprehensive discussion on the relationships between Korean Buddhism and geomancy, see Hong-key Yoon, \textit{The Culture of Fengshui in Korea}, pp. 179-199.
\textsuperscript{17} This information is from the second article of the Ten Injunctions (Hunyosipjo), decreed by the First King of the Koryo dynasty during the summer of 943. Hong-key Yoon, \textit{The Culture of Fengshui in Korea}, p.185.
\textsuperscript{18} Hong-key Yoon, \textit{The Culture of Fengshui in Korea}, pp. 190-196.
\textsuperscript{19} For a more comprehensive discussion on the relationships between Korean Confucianism and geomancy, see Hong-key Yoon, \textit{The Culture of Fengshui in Korea}, pp. 201-214.
the Kim family of Andong district who steals an auspicious grave site prepared for her own father in order to use it for her father in law.\textsuperscript{26} This legend suggest that for a married woman her father in law is more important than her own father by considering her husbands family to be her true family line, no longer belonging to her family of birth.

Another aspect of Confucian ethics is that of treating children as an extension of their parents, because in the Korean Confucian family system an individual may be treated as a building block of the family lineage, rather than as an independent person. Children’s responsibilities towards their parents are of paramount importance. At the same time, parents’ sacrifices for their children are commonplace in Confucian ethics, for having good children means good social security for themselves as well as ensuring future family lineages. This aspect of parental sacrifice for their children as well as the children’s filial piety towards their parents is well reflected in geomancy tales.\textsuperscript{27}

To many Confucian scholars, some knowledge in Korean medicine and Korean geomancy were unavoidable necessities as both were based on the Chinese Yin and Yang and Five Element Theory. However, many rational minded Confucian scholars were against the superstitious practice of geomancy and seriously critiqued the adverse social effect resulting from the practise of geomancy especially as related to grave-sites. The scholars belonging to the Sirhak or Practical Learning School seriously criticised the superstitious aspect of geomancy and Chong Yakyong argued that about half of the crime and assaults resulting in death were due to conflict over auspicious sites in geomancy.\textsuperscript{28} Some well known Confucian scholars during the second half of the Choson dynasty have been associated with geomancy by providing serious criticisms over its practice.\textsuperscript{29}

The relationships between Korean geomancy and Shamanism are also noteworthy. The Shamans often recommended shifting or modifying houses and graves in order to avoid misfortune or cure sickness in the family.\textsuperscript{30} Sometimes Shamans were invited to cure the shortcomings of local geomantic landscapes with kut, or other forms of Shamanistic exorcism. In this way, geomancy maintained close relationships with all three major traditional religions in Korea: Buddhism, Confucianism and Shamanism.

Of course the newly developed religions such as Chondokyo (Tonghak) or Chungsankyo also incorporated some aspect of geomantic evaluations of Korean landscape or prophesies. For instance a sacred canon of Tonghak, Yongdamyusa (龍潭遺詞: Inherited Words from Dragon Lake), expresses a geomantic explanation of the birth and genealogical background of the founder, Choe Chae-u by declaring that they were auspiciously influenced by a key mountain of his hometown.\textsuperscript{31} The leaders of the Tonghak movement, including the famous General Chon Pongjun of the Tonghak peasant army, subscribed to geomancy and were knowledgeable on the art. The successor of the Tonghak founder, Choe Sihyong also took refuge in one of the 10 most auspicious places in Korea, when the movement was under persecution. General Chon Pongjun is said to have moved frequently to geomantically auspicious places.\textsuperscript{32}

Geomancy was also closely related to social upheaval in Korea, the most significant being the well known Myochong’s upheaval during the Koryo dynasty to shift the capital from Kaekyong to Pyonyang by convincing the king with a geomantic plot. However his attempt failed. Geomantic beliefs and geomantic prophecies also provided important cause for the failed attempt of Hong Kyongnae’s rebellion (1811-1812) in Pyongan Province against the central government of the Choson dynasty.

**Pungsu and Korean landscape**

Perhaps the best evidence of the importance of geomancy in Korean culture is reflected in the Korean landscapes of settlements and graves.\textsuperscript{27} Unlike the Western world which has cemeteries, traditionally Koreans had no concept of cemeteries, and made graves wherever they thought was auspicious. Korean mountains and hills are dotted with graves, especially if it is south facing and is enclosed by hills on the northern side. Commoners as well as the royal family of the Choson dynasty have applied geomancy in the selection of the grave sites for their deceased family members. Fighting over auspicious grave sites was a common scene. Koreans’ obsession over geomantically auspicious grave-


\textsuperscript{21} Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, pp.203-206.

\textsuperscript{22} Chong Yakyong, Kukyok Mokmin-simso [Criticisms and Advice on Governing the People, A Modern Korean Translation] (Seoul: Minjok Munhwa Chujinhoe, 1969), vol. 2, 628; Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, p.5.

\textsuperscript{23} Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, pp.209-212.

\textsuperscript{24} Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, p. 180.

\textsuperscript{25} Kim Dukyu, Hankuk Pungsu ui ho wa sil [Truth and False of Korean Geomancy] (Seoul: Tonghaksa, 1995), pp.204-205.

\textsuperscript{26} Kim Dukyu, Hankuk Pungsu ui ho wa sil, pp. 204-209.

\textsuperscript{27} For a further discussion on this topic, see Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of Fengshui in Korea, Chapters 6 & 7.
sites was so serious that even foreign missionaries noted bloody conflicts over grave sites. A Catholic missionary, C. H. Dallet recorded three of such conflicts.28

As one travels through the country, they will find many Korean villages are situated at a foothill with an open field in front and sloping hills behind. Those are typically auspicious sites in geomancy; an agglomerated village in the middle of an open field also normally fulfilled with geomantic criteria justifying the fortune of the settlement. Thus few Korean settlements sites are free from geomantic influences.

Of course all important cities in Korea were located and planned by applying geomantic principles; this is evident in the location of local government offices in the provincial and county level cities and palace sites of the capital city. Geomantic qualities of a local city landscape may be clearly visible, when it is observed by a person who has basic knowledge of geomantic evaluation of local landforms. The geomantic influences on local city sites are also evident in the description of such city landscape in Sinjung Tongguk Yojisungnam (New and Enlarged Edition of Augmented Survey of the Geographical Gazetteer of Korea) of the Choson dynasty. The gazetteer presented every county in Korea with its county administrative centres by indicating its key geomantic landmark, ‘Main Mountain’.29

The influence of geomancy on capital cities is significant as shown in my study on two Korean capital cities, Seoul and Kaesong where royal palaces are located in geomantically auspicious sites.30 The story of the choice of Seoul as the capital in 1394 by applying geomantic ideas is one of the best documented cases among all East Asian capital cities including Beijing, Nanjing, Kyoto and Nara.

The use of geomancy in the iconographical warfare between Japanese colonialism and Korean nationalism

One can document and interpret the fierce iconographical battles between Japanese colonialism and Korean nationalism over Kyongbok Palace, the landscape icon of Korean sovereignty.31 This iconographical warfare was started by the Japanese colonial government who manipulated geomantic ideas in their attempt to place the ‘permanent’ icon of their colonial rule over Korea. The main palace, Kyongbok Palace of the Choson Dynasty was constructed in 1395 on the most geomantically auspicious spot in Seoul. When Japanese colonised Korea, they mutilated the palace by destroying many of its buildings and constructing their Colonial Government Building on the front part of the palace ground. Such an act was a Japanese attempt to psychologically demoralise Koreans by demeaning and replacing the symbol of Korean sovereignty with that of Japanese colonial government. The majestic Japanese colonial icon was constructed in order to encourage Koreans to accept their fate as a Japanese colony and to impress upon Koreans that the new beneficiary of the geomantic fortune of the auspicious palace site was the Japanese colonial government and that of the Korean Kingdom is finished. For the same reasons, after liberation from Japanese colonial rule, the Korean government demolished the Japanese colonial government building to restore the icon of Korean sovereignty, Kyongbok Palace, to its former glory. This iconographical warfare between Japan and Korea was not for geomantic reasons. Both Korea and Japan manipulated geomancy in this iconographical warfare in imposing their landscape icon of government authority. Geomancy certainly provided the cause of and the stage for iconographical warfare between Korean nationalism and Japanese colonialism. This war over the icon was only very recently resolved by 1996, by completely removing Japanese colonial buildings from Kyongbok palace grounds.

Geomantic Images of Nature

The geomantic images of nature are best reflected in geomancy tales of Korea that vividly reflect people’s wishes, motivations of and expectations from the practice of geomancy. Geomantic principles discussed in classical manuals of geomancy also implied certain geomantic images of landscape. I have elsewhere discussed the three key images of nature in geomancy: (a) the magical image, (b) the personified image, and (c) the vulnerable image of nature.32 However, in this paper I would like to add one more (d) unclear boundary between humanity and nature that led to no division between culture and nature.33

In order to point out that these four images of nature in Korean geomancy, I will first summarise two well known legends. According to the Story of a famous Confucian scholar, Song Siyol, his grave was on an

29 Hong-key Yoon, Geomantic Relationships Between Culture and Nature in Korea, p.107.
30 Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of fengshui in Korea, pp. 217-273.
31 The brief discussion here is based on a more comprehensive documentation and explanation of this contested landscape in: Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of fengshui in Korea, pp. 277-307.
auspicious site having a geomantic image of an army general. However, the site has no small landforms symbolising soldiers who can be commanded by the army general. Therefore, the geomantic landscape of the grave lacked the necessary components. In order to make up for these geomantic shortcomings, the descendants of Song Siyol negotiated for market place nearby to move in front of the gravesite. This was done in order that the landform shaped like an army general could command the thousands of “soldiers” who gathered in the market place.

In another story, the Yi Clan of Kosong, informed us that the geomantic image of their ancestor’s gravesite was a reclining cow, and was auspicious so that many good fortunes to the family came about. With the descendants becoming high government officials due to their good fortune, the local villagers were obliged to build and maintain infrastructure including roads, when the descendants returned to the village. When a monk heard of the villagers’ complaints of their toil and hard work, he advised the locals to break a boulder on the front hill of the village, and so the people did. After breaking the boulder, the good fortune known to the Yi family stopped and no other descendants became high government officers. The broken boulder had been geomantically functioning as a trough for the reclining cow (background hill of the gravesite). The geomantic reasoning is that when the cow lost its trough, it would have starved and the good fortune could not be manifested from the site. When the Yi Clan realised what had happened, they put the broken boulder back together, and the landscape once again gave the clan fortunate.

From these two stories, we realise that geomantic landscapes in Korea have been personified as an army general and a reclining cow. The personified geomantic landscapes were considered to be magical beings that could bless people in mysterious ways. In the story we also know that the people can destroy the harmony of geomantic landscapes but at the same time it can be restored. As in the above legends, there is no clear boundary between humanity and nature in geomantic landscapes, for the people gathered in the market place can function as soldiers for the army general (the mountain) to meet geomantic criteria. In this paper, I do not examine the geomantic reasoning behind the above four images of nature, for it is discussed elsewhere, although they are still to be explored further.36

Conclusion

Koreans’ intense interest in geomancy caused many social problems, with crimes committed from fighting over geomantic auspicious sites. It also drained many private and government resources through installing geomantically auspicious structures in excess and maintaining them. Sometimes, in order to keep a royal tomb at an auspicious site, the vast areas surrounding the royal tomb were prohibited from farming and even houses nearby were removed, causing inconvenience to unsuspecting peasant habitants. However these geomantic ideas also had some favourable impacts on the traditional environmental management in Korea by conserving the forest surrounding cities, or taking action to reduce water pollution in streams that go through the Capital City.

The pungsu or geomancy is certainly from a Chinese origin and is not indigenous to Korea; however, ever since this idea was introduced into Korea, it has become an extremely important part in the Korean way of thinking in dealing with the environment. It’s impact is clearly visible in Korean landscapes, as well as Korean religion and other aspects of Korean culture. I wish to reiterate what I have said my book in 1976 that it is almost impossible to appreciate Korean culture adequately without appreciating the role of geomancy in it.

Contact Address
Hong-key Yoon
University of Auckland
Private Bag 92019, Auckland NZ
PH: 64 (9) 373-7599 Extn 8466
EMAIL: hk.yoon@Auckland.ac.nz

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37 Hong-key Yoon, The Culture of fengshui in Korea, pp. 124-126.
38 Hong-key Yoon, Geomantic Relationships Between Culture and Nature in Korea, pp. 143-147.
39 Hong-key Yoon, Geomantic Relationships Between Culture and Nature in Korea, p. 3.
Part A
Refereed Papers
Social Sciences
Creation of a Double-Purpose Nuclear Infrastructure and Developing of Nuclear Technologies in the DPRK (1950s – beginning of 1960s)

Andrey Vladimirovich Kovsh
Saint Petersburg State University, Russia

Abstract
Developing of nuclear infrastructure and producing nuclear weapons take time, especially for developing countries like the DPRK. Therefore, we must analyze the North Koreans' threat perceptions over the past half century and especially on the initial stage to clearly understand their motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons.

The North Korean leadership's political decision to develop a nuclear infrastructure and seek nuclear weapons was not made in a vacuum. Pyongyang confronts a number of external and internal security problems. During the Korean War, North Korea was subjected to nuclear threats by the US. After the War the DPRK formed security alliances with China and the Soviet Union, but the DPRK leaders have been dissatisfied with its alliance partners on several occasions. Some analysts argue that inter-Korean rivalry has also motivated Pyongyang to acquire nuclear technologies.

In sum, there are a number of factors that have motivated North Korea to develop a nuclear infrastructure and seek nuclear weapons. North Korea's opaque government and policymaking process often create difficult challenges for those seeking to understand Pyongyang's motivations; however, a clear understanding of these motivations could be critical if diplomacy is to end North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Lack of information and the secretive nature of the North Korean regime have led many people to conclude that North Korean leader Kim Jong II is a crazy or irrational leader whose miscalculations are likely to lead the Korean Peninsula into a devastating war (Goodman, 2003, 1; Halloran, 2003, 17). There are widespread fears that North Korean brinksmanship could backfire and extinguish any hope for a peaceful resolution of the current nuclear crisis.

However, most Korea specialists believe the North Korean regime is neither irrational nor crazy, but rather has a distorted worldview and warped expectations about how other countries will respond to its actions (Pinkston and Saunders, 2003, 80).

Knowledge of the 20th-century history of Korea is essential to understanding North Korean national interests and goals. Korea was surrounded by major powers, and the peninsula has been subject to numerous invasions over past centuries. Colonialism and war during the 20th century still resonate with policymakers in Pyongyang, and these experiences continue to influence the perceptions of the ruling elite and their supporters. A strong military posture and advanced weapons systems not only help the leadership deal with external threats, but they are also popular among nationalistic citizens who are constantly reminded of the potential external threats to North Korea.

Until the end of World War II in 1945, Korea had remained a single, ethnically and culturally homogenous country for over a thousand years. By 1948, two governments, each claiming sovereignty over the entire peninsula, had been established: the Soviet supported Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north, and the US-backed Republic of Korea in the south (MacDonald, 1992, 53). The national policies of both Koreas have been shaped by the underlying aim of eventual reunification.

The all-encompassing impact on North Korea of the character, personality, life experiences, and thinking of its founder and first leader, Kim Il Sung, is probably unique among modern nations. The past and current history, nature, and direction of the country cannot be understood apart from Kim Il Sung (Buzo, 1999, 1). Kim's perspective on the world and his view of the purpose of political power and the state were defined by his early education in Chinese schools and ideological training in China, his experience as a guerrilla fighter against the Japanese in Manchuria, and his military training and further political education in the Soviet Union during World War II. The wartime Soviet state became the model on which the North Korean regime was created by Kim Il Sung.

As a key element of his ideological models, "militarism" had a defining impact on Kim's thinking in his early formative years. The experience of the Korean War further strengthened this view. Kim, reflecting Maoist strategic thought, saw contradictory elements as driving history. Conflict did not require a solution; it was the solution to political problems. Hence, politics and international relations were processes by which contradictions were resolved through conflict, and the nature of that conflict was zero-sum. Accordingly, to Kim, the purpose of the state, like the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit, was to wage war
effectively. In his view, economic activity produced the means to wage war, education produced soldiers to wage war, and ideology convinced the people of the sociological and historical inevitability of war (Bradner, 2001, 24).

In analyzing the nuclear intentions of the DPRK, one can determine three main factors that brought about and shaped Kim Il Sung's nuclear ambitions. First, the American atomic bombardment of Japan made an indelible impression on 33-year old Kim Il Sung. He and his guerrillas had been fighting the Japanese troops for almost 15 years and yet had lost almost every battle. But the United States dropped two atomic bombs and ostensibly almighty Japan surrendered overnight. These two unrelated facts got connected for Kim Il Sung and he came to admire the atomic bomb, believing in the power of nuclear weapons to overcome even the most formidable foes swiftly (Mansourov, 1995, 28).

The second crucial experience occurred after the Korean War. Initially, Kim II Sung discounted the threat of U.S. military intervention in the Korean civil war. He did not believe that the United States would use an atomic bomb against Korea. However, later, after the Korean war was over and some American war documents were made public in the late 1950-s, he was shocked to discover that the Truman administration did consider very seriously the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the North Korean troops in order to break the North's rapid advance at the beginning (Ibid).

Indeed, soon after beginning of the Korean War, on August 1, 1950, the decision was made to send the 9th Bomb Wing to Guam as an atomic task force. Ten B-29s, loaded with unarmed atomic bombs, set out for the Pacific. On August 5, one of the planes crashed during take off from Fairfield-Suisun Air Force base near San Francisco, killing a dozen people and scattering the mildly radioactive uranium of the bomb's tamper around the airfield. The other planes reached Guam where they went on standby duty. At a press conference on November 30, 1950, President Truman was asked if the United States would consider using the atomic bomb in Korea, and he replied, "There has always been active consideration of its use. I don't want to see it used. It is a terrible weapon, and it should not be used on innocent men, women and children who have nothing to do with this military aggression – that happens when it's used." The statement was very controversial, and drew strong international criticism, even from US allies (Hayes, 1991, 11). British Prime Minister Clement Attlee rushed to Washington to express his concern. Truman reluctantly reassured him that the U.S. had "no intention" of using atomic weapons in Korea except to prevent a "major military disaster" (Truman, H. 1955, 108).

Later, General Douglas MacArthur, one time commander of United Nations armed forces during the Korean War, in a 1954 interview stated that he had wanted to drop "between thirty and fifty atomic bombs" on enemy bases before laying radioactive waste material across the northern edge of North Korea during the war (Ferrell, R. 1994, 59).

So, Kim II Sung realized that the DPRK was on the U.S. “black list” of countries against which it might consider and use nuclear weapons should the need arise. This could well be one of the reasons why Kim Il-sung rushed to sign Alliance Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union and China in 1961, thereby acquiring the protection of their nuclear umbrellas (Mansourov, 1995, 28).

Third, given Pyongyang's threat perception and security needs, North Korea has sought to strengthen its military capabilities by forming security alliances and by allocating a tremendous amount of resources to the military sector, but Kim II Sung had been dissatisfied with its alliance partners on several occasions. For example, even though China and the USSR provided assistance during the Korean War, Kim II Sung desired more support than he received. Kim was disappointed that Stalin did not provide ground forces and other resources to expel the Americans from Korea, and following Soviet acquiescence during the Cuban missile crisis; North Korea quickly implemented an import substitution policy in the arms sector to reduce dependence upon foreign weapons suppliers.

Actually, in the last years of Stalin's life, the specter of World War III never loomed larger or more corporeal than it did in 1950, in connection with Soviet support for North Korea's attempt to gain control over South Korea by military means. In the spring of that year, as Stalin and his foreign policy team decided whether to give the final go-ahead for Kim II Sung's attack on the South, they calculated the likelihood that a Soviet-backed assault on America's client state in Korea might prompt the United States to intervene, expanding the conflict into a global war. In the end, Stalin's fears materialized as the United States did enter the conflict, along with fifteen other states fighting under the United Nations banner. The two pivotal moments in Stalin's decision-making about the war in Korea – the deliberations in early 1950 over whether to launch it and the communications with Beijing in October 1950 over how to avoid its ending in defeat – are therefore particularly important for understanding the Soviet leader's approach to the danger that Cold War tensions might lead to another world war before the Soviet Union was capable of winning it (Weathersby, 2002, 1). The large collection of Korean War documents from the Presidential Archive in Moscow shed considerable light on this formerly obscure decision-making process.

In December 1962, the Central Committee of the Korean Workers Party (KWP) adopted “four policy lines” to: 1) improve political and technical discipline in the military, 2) modernize the military, 3) “arm” all the people with “class conscientiousness and military technology,” and 4) fortify the whole country.
Many analysts argue that inter-Korean rivalry has also motivated Pyongyang to acquire nuclear weapons. It is unclear how North Korea would use a nuclear bomb against South Korea, except for deterrence and/or for coercive diplomacy. Eliminating the South Korean government and reunifying the country on Pyongyang's terms would certainly resolve North Korea's main security problem. North Korea claims to be the sole legitimate government for all the Korean people and all of the territory on the Korean peninsula. According to North Korea's Socialist Constitution, "all state activities shall be conducted under the leadership of the Korean Workers Party, and the North Korean state will complete the revolution based on chuch'e under the leadership of the KWP." The constitution also declares that the North Korean government represents the interests of all the Korean people (The DPRK Socialist Constitution, 1950, 1.). All North Korean government activities are guided by the KWP, which is also committed to revising the status quo on the Korean peninsula. The KWP bylaws state that the party is to "liberate all the people on the peninsula, complete the revolution, and establish communism and chuch'e ideology throughout all of Korean society. Furthermore, the KWP is to "continually strengthen unification solidarity based on chuch'e ideology." (Ldid.)

The basis of early North Korean development closely resembled the Socialist model originated in the Soviet Union. The principal characteristics of this development model are no private ownership, state-directed allocation of factors of production, cultivation of a military-oriented heavy industry, self-sufficiency, and the creation of trade barriers to shelter the economy from foreign influence. Accordingly, articles 20 and 21 of North Korea's Socialist Constitution were rewritten to reflect the new orientation of the economy.

The primary vehicle for wealth in the Soviet development model is a series of state-headed economic programs that systematically allocated factors of production across each sector of the economy, the most prominent example being Stalin's New Economic Plans, implemented in Russia from 1929-1937. Moreover, the division of the Korean Peninsula following the Second World War resulted in around 65% of the heavy industrial capability and infrastructure in the North, but the majority of the population in the largely agrarian South. In an effort to duplicate the NEP in North Korea, Kim II-Sung implemented a series of economic programs that proved tremendously successful during the initial rebuilding period. Prewar levels of output were attained by around 1955 or 1956. In particular, the Three-Year Plan from 1954-1956 and the Five-Year Plan from 1957-1960 were rated as the most successful of all economic plans undertaken by North Korea, as GNP grew at unprecedented annual rates of 17% and 22%, respectively. These growth rates eclipsed the benchmark 13% annual growth rate of the Soviet Union's NEP. Consequently, beginning in the early 1960-s, virtually all of North Korea's resources were directed toward military production. Chuch'e entered all walks of life, most notably the military and the economy. Military expenditure in the 1960-s had risen from 6% of GDP to approximately 30%. Eventually stabilizing at this level in the 1970-s, it effectively neglected other sectors of the economy, creating the basis for future economic failures.

As was the case in Stalinist Russia, North Korea's early economic success was driven by extreme political authority to forcibly motivate workers and consolidate the ownership of resources under state control. Actually a socialist economy is not more efficient than a capitalist one, but the forced incentives of a command economy have a more immediate effect than the implied profit and consumption incentives of a capitalist economy.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) notes two distinct phases in the development of the DPRK's nuclear program – an assisted phase and an indigenous development stage. The first stage commenced with an agreement between the Soviet Union and the DPRK for cooperation in nuclear research in 1956.

But, actually, the first indications of nuclear-related activities in the DPRK stem from reports, dated 1948, that the Soviet Union was conducting surveys of North Korea's monazite mines (Letter from Soviet Ambassador T. Shytkov to I. V. Stalin, 1949, 1). The case is that monazite contains both thorium and uranium-oxide, materials that were part of the Soviet nuclear-energy program (U.S. Army FEC Intelligence Digest 1951, 12). Soon thereafter, North Korea evidently arranged the large-scale export of monazite ore to the USSR in partial payment for military equipment and arms delivered to Pyongyang in 1949 to 1950 (Memorandum from A.A. Gromyko to I.V. Stalin, 1949, 7).

Also, in 1948 the Pyongyang Engineering College was established. In January 1951, the name is changed to "Kim Chaek University of Technology". The school later establishes departments in nuclear engineering, precision machinery, and nuclear electronics. Research academy and graduate schools are established at the university in 1956.

In 1952, when the Chinese People's Volunteers were holding the battle line along the 38th parallel, China sent Dr. Wang Gao Chang to North Korea to search for and collect radioactive materials (Bermudez, 1989, 9). Later this year North Korea establishes the Atomic Energy Research Institute under the Academy of Sciences. The institute begins to conduct research on radioactive isotopes for use in industry, agriculture, and medicine. The institute is placed under the administrative control of the Cabinet's Atomic Energy Bureau in January 1974.
After the Korean War, on February 5, 1955, the Soviet Union and the DPRK signed a five-year agreement on science and technology cooperation, providing for the exchange of technical experiences and data, transfer of technical documentation, exchange of technical specialists, and other forms of technical assistance in all fields of the economy. But a final key for obtaining a nuclear technology by North Korea was the agreement the North signed with Moscow in March 1956 on joint research in nuclear technology for peaceful uses. At the time, North Korea also became one of 11 states to join the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna, 120 kilometers, or 75 miles, north of Moscow on the Volga River (Zhebin, 2000, 28).

In 1956, Pyongyang began sending a new generation of promising scientists and technicians to work and study at Dubna. Many of them filled key positions in the North's nuclear program. This group includes Lee Sung Ki, a Japanese-trained chemist famed for inventing a nylon-like fabric known as Vinalon. He was widely regarded as a towering figure in the North Korean nuclear program, one of the few nuclear scientists with a public profile. He was twice given North Korea's highest honor, the Kim Il Sung Award. In 1965, he was appointed head of the Atomic Energy Research Institute and later headed the Hamhung branch of the Academy of Sciences, which is said to be focused on chemical weapons research and development. He was 91 when he died in 1996 (Greenlees, 2006, 3). The other notable North Korean specialist passed through Dubna was Choi Hak Geun, a physicist who in 1986 became the minister for the atomic energy industry of the DPRK. Yet this might have been a reward for diplomatic work rather than for his contribution to nuclear science. Choi twice attended the general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna in the late 1970-s. Reportedly about 100 North Koreans had passed through the institute since 1956. About five to eight North Koreans attend each year. Many of these scientists were placed in charge of the Scientific Research Center on Atomic Energy in Yongbyon (Dr. Paek Kwan Oh), the Pakch'on branch of the Institute of Atomic Energy (established in 1962), the Yongbyon Radiochemistry Laboratory (Dr. Lee Sang Gun), the Department of Nuclear Physics at the Kim Il Sung University (since 1973) and Departments of Nuclear and Electrical Engineering, of Nuclear Fuel Engineering, and of Atomic Reactor Engineering at the Kim Chaek University of Technology, the Kim Il Sung High Physics Academy in Ryanggang Province (since 1963 also known as the Nuclear Engineering Department at the National Defense College in Hyesan, Ryanggang), Pyongsong Institute of Science (a course in nuclear physics since 1963), and Nanam Branch of the Institute of Atomic Energy in Nangmyeok in Ch'ongjin (since 1965) (Obyedineniyy Institut Yadernykh issledovanii, 1994, 4). Augmented by those trained in China, and possibly also by East German- and Romanian-trained engineers and scientists, and leavened by some who had attended American (for example, Kyong Won Ha, nuclear engineer who worked at Los Alamos National Laboratories in the United States) and Japanese institutes, the North is believed to now field a 3000-man nuclear establishment, including up to 35 Ph.D.'s (Young, 1991, 476).

In addition, over a period of forty years the Soviet Union trained more than 300 North Korean nuclear specialists at various Soviet institutions of higher education such as the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPHI), the Bauman Higher Technical School (Bauman VTU), the Moscow Energy Institute (MEI), and others. All these people constituted the backbone of the DPRK's nuclear establishment and became one of the driving forces in the evolution of the national nuclear program, especially in various joint collaborative projects between their respective institutions and the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna in a number of key areas of theoretical and experimental nuclear research (Kaurov, 2000, 17).

This fact is interesting, because at the end of 1956 the DPRK recalled most of its students from the "fraternal" countries, even though they had not yet completed their studies, but not from the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research at Dubna. Since their experiences abroad made several students critical of North Korean conditions, in 1957-1958 many former students were neither allowed to correspond with foreigners nor appointed to positions worthy of their qualifications. Those who could participate in production often lacked practical experience. Although the leadership did its best to prolong the stay of the foreign specialists, the shortage of skilled labor proved an insuperable obstacle.

On September 7, 1959, the Soviet Union and the DPRK sign a nuclear cooperation treaty whereby the USSR agrees to provide technical assistance in the establishment of a nuclear research center in North Korea. Later this year the DPRK signed an additional protocol with the Soviet Union on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This protocol authorized the transfer of a small research type nuclear reactor and other complex nuclear equipment to Pyongyang (Shabshina, 1963, 179).

When the first generation of the North Korean nuclear specialists completed their term of study and practical training at the Soviet Dubna facility and returned to the DPRK in the early 1960s, the North Korean government decided to build a similar complex for them about 90 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang (Semyonova, 1986, 109). This was the beginning of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex under the auspices of the DPRK Academy of Sciences. The Yongbyon area was designated as a "special district" directly subordinate to the Administrative Council, with access being severely restricted and controlled by the troops of the Ministry of the Public Security (Bermudez, 1993, 6). The Soviet government dispatched thirty Soviet nuclear specialists led by the well-known Soviet nuclear scientist Vladislav Kotlov to assist the DPRK government in establishing the Yongbyon Complex. The USSR
supplied the required Soviet engineering blueprints, nuclear equipment, and nuclear fuel, and contributed the bulk of the 500 million U.S. dollars (in 1962 prices) required to finance the total start-up costs of the Yongbyon core facilities. The construction of the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Complex was completed in October 1964.

Initially, the principal facilities housed at Yongbyon comprised a small Soviet-supplied research reactor, the IRT-2000, designed to conduct basic nuclear research and to produce only small quantities of medical and industrial isotopes, and an adjacent radiochemical laboratory for extracting isotopes from "targets" irradiated in the IRT-2000. The IRT-2000 is a "pool-type" research reactor fuelled by a mixture of fuel elements of 10%, 36% and 80% enriched uranium, moderated and cooled by "light" (i.e. ordinary) water. Construction of the IRT-2000 began in 1963. It became operational in 1965 at a power rating of 2MW(th), which was upgraded to 4MW(th) in 1974, and to 8MW(th) in 1987.

We should empathized here again, that this type of reactors absolutely useless for military goals. Actually, civil nuclear programs focused on the use of radiation in medical, industrial, and agricultural applications are not well known. But the medical profession relies extensively on radiation, particularly from radioactive isotopes, for identifying and treating disease. Radioactive materials are also used extensively to test new drugs and conduct research into cures for diseases. As well, radiation is used in pest control and to increase agricultural output. Radiation is also used to determine plant uptake of water and nutrients from the soil, enabling farmers to reduce over-watering and the over-application of fertilizers. Radioisotopes are used in a wide variety of manufacturing processes to provide measurement, density, and other information; to ensure quality control of processes; and enhance properties, such as hardness, strength, and density of certain materials. The main industrial applications of radiation are based on the penetration and scattering of radioactivity, in particular the property that radiation loses energy as it moves through materials. As a result, industry has developed highly sensitive gauges to measure the thickness and density of many materials and imaging devices to inspect finished goods for weaknesses and flaws. Industry also uses radioactive tracers to observe the velocity of materials flowing through pipes and track leakage in buried pipes (Albright, 2007, 3).

But some analysts argue that ideological and geopolitical confrontation between the DPRK's two great power benefactors, the USSR and PRC, opened room for a diplomatic maneuver by Pyongyang. Indeed, from the Cuban missile crisis to Khrushchev's fall, Soviet-DPRK relations steadily worsened, while Sino-North Korean contacts grew stronger. On 23 October, 1962, one day after the outbreak of the Caribbean crisis, Kim declared that no Communist country had the right to impose its will on others. He probably meant that the Kremlin had subordinated Havana's interests to its own, exposing Cuba to a potential nuclear attack. So, the Yongbyon Complex was born as a product of Kim's skillful manipulation of Moscow's sensitivities and Beijing's excesses in his nascent quest for greater self-reliance and more powerful self-defensive capabilities. In other words, a geopolitical crisis in Northeast Asia created another nuclear opportunity for Kim II Sung in 1959, and he rushed to exploit it to his advantage (Mansourov, 2004, 34).

As mentioned by Mansourov, it is clear that Kim Il Sung was not guided by any economic rationale or energy requirement when he conceived of and commissioned the North Korean nuclear program in the second half of the 1950-s. The underdeveloped agrarian North Korean economy and predominantly rural society had just completed the post-war rehabilitation and only began to embark on the path of industrialization and urbanization. The largely pre-modern country neither needed nor could afford very sophisticated and tremendously expensive nuclear energy for its embryonic economic development and meager public consumption. Instead, from the very beginning, Kim II Sung apparently sought the power of the atom in order to secure the survival of his own regime and to gain more international prestige for his nation (Mansourov, 2004, 35).

Actually, during his lifetime, Kim Il Sung thoroughly repressed consideration of an autonomous nuclear program within the North Korean military. Furthermore, he could not tolerate the decision of even secondary military matters related to the nuclear program without his knowledge and prior approval. He considered the military nuclear program his exclusive concern and guarded it fiercely. Kim II Sung personally controlled the execution of the nuclear program. It is likely that the DPRK's nuclear intentions were never written in any DPRK military regulations or explicitly developed in any of Kim II Sung works on military matters. Therefore, the DPRK's nuclear doctrine may well have been something intangible for the KPA. Hence, precise tasks for the KPA could not be formulated on the basis thereof. Nonetheless, this is not to say that the senior North Korean military officials had no training on what to expect and how to wage war in a nuclear age or about the country's nuclear capabilities. In late 1955, the KPA initiated a series of national level nuclear defense exercises. By 1958, the DPRK, with Soviet assistance, had established the KPA's "Atomic Weapons Training Center" located near Kilchu, on the east coast north of Kimchaek (Bermudez, 1993, 5). Since 1959, as part of their standard curriculum, North Korean graduates of the Soviet General Staff Academy have been exposed to Soviet military thinking on the possibilities and ramifications of the use of nuclear weapons in a future war. Since 1965, as part of their field training, they have been able to witness the organizational and technical changes made in the Soviet Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the nuclear age (Babakov, 1985, 210).
In conclusion we can say, that the North Korean nuclear program is more than fifty years old. Its de facto inception after the establishment of the independent North Korean state in the late 1940-s long precedes international negotiations over the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and formation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime in the mid-1960-s, as well as the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its safeguards regime in the early 1970-s. Noteworthy by international standards is how slow the nuclear program has progressed and how relatively little it has accomplished since its formal initiation in the mid-1950-s. Despite the devotion of considerable national resources to decades worth of nuclear pursuit, North Korea appears to be close to making only several atomic devices of the 1945 vintage. Profound dearth of indigenous expertise in fundamental science and nuclear technology, perennial shortage of financing, and vacillating political will may have hampered a more rapid and successful expansion in the DPRK's nuclear capabilities.

The scientific-experimental infrastructure in the nuclear field was created in the DPRK until the middle of 1960-s with the help of the Soviet Union. At this point, a number of specialized scientific and research institutes continue to operate in the country, including the scientific-research institute at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Complex. The DPRK has the necessary raw material base and network of atomic industry facilities which along with the scientific-research institutes and trained in the Soviet Union scientists make up the country's nuclear complex. Initially the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Complex was created for scientific and research usage, but not for construction of nuclear weapons. But North Korea has never had a peaceful nuclear program. The DPRK's ruling regime has always been dedicated to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and making the DPRK a limited nuclear weapon state in order to guarantee the survival of the regime. From its very inception, the nuclear program was driven primarily by national security considerations, not any economic demands. Its intermittent evolution was much more closely associated with strategic bargaining between North Korea and its allies and the latter's oscillating willingness to share nuclear technology with Pyongyang, than any scientific and technical progress made by the North Korean nuclear establishment.

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**Contact Address**
Andrey Vladimirovich Kovsh
KIMa pr, 30/67
Saint Petersburg 199155 RUSSIA
PH: (+7-812) 350-4069
EMAIL: akovsh@yahoo.com
Constitutional Reform in the 6th Republic: Nothing but Political Manoeuvring?*

Heike Hermanns
Inha University, South Korea

Abstract
In early 2007, President Roh Moo-hyun launched an unsuccessful initiative to revise the constitution of the 6th Republic by proposing the introduction of a two-term presidency. Proposals for constitutional reform have been made throughout the 6th Republic, showing the lack of legitimacy of the document. The debate focuses on the institutional arrangements of political power, in particular the relationship between executive and legislative. The 1987 constitution provides for a parliament with a four-year term and a five-year presidency. The presidency is favoured in the balance of power. However, a president without a parliamentary majority can face an uncooperative National Assembly, stalling the political process. The problem is exasperated by the attitudes of politicians who have not yet fully embraced democratic procedures such as negotiations and compromise. Calls for constitutional change are often made as a political manoeuvre to gain a majority rather than genuine concern about long-term effects. In this paper, I suggest that rather than changing the constitution, political attitudes and actions need to change. Politicians could try to utilise the opportunities of electoral law changes to improve the political system in Korea, an option that is rarely contemplated.

Constitutional Reform in the 6th Republic: Nothing but Political Manoeuvring?
The fight for democracy has dominated Korean politics for more than three decades but when the chance to negotiate a new constitution finally came in 1987, all parties involved in the process were woefully under-prepared. As a result, a new constitution was negotiated in a rush by politicians who focused on short-term interests, in particular their chances of winning the next presidential election. Although the constitution had been agreed on by all parties involved, suggestions for constitutional changes have been continuously voiced over the last twenty years. The institutional arrangement of political power, especially the role of the president and the length of their tenure, are often at the centre of debates on political development. The latest proposal was articulated by President Roh Moo-hyun in January 2007, suggesting a change in the length of the presidential term and adding the option of re-election. The change was to be completed during his tenure, i.e. within one year. As other proposals before, it soon became a victim of party rivalry and was dropped in April 2007, with the potential to be picked up again after the parliamentary elections in 2008.

The discourse centres on the relationship between presidency and National Assembly, and the connection between politicians and citizens, but highlights the general shortcomings of the political process in Korea. The National Assembly remains confrontational and democratic arts of debate, compromise and negotiation are underdeveloped in the political class. The presidency is the ultimate goal for Korean parties, which continue to treat politics as a zero-sum game (winning or losing power). Outside election times, politicians work for their own or party ambition rather than representing citizens’ wishes and preferences. Instead of amending their ways politicians suggest changes to political institutions, in particular the constitution, showing little respect for the basis document of Korean democracy. The political class uses the constitutional debate for short-term political manoeuvring rather than taking a long-term perspective of developing a stable democratic system. This can be seen as an indication that democracy in Korea has not yet fully matured. This paper aims to study the reasons for the continuing debate and the various proposals that have been made over the last decades. It concludes that rather than changing the presidential system, the potential of election law changes should be exploited to modify the political system and to reduce the gap between politicians and citizens, thus ultimately deepening of democracy in Korea.

The role of a constitution
A constitution is the founding document of a state, consisting of set of rules and principles that define the nature and extent of government. The vast majority of constitutions are codified in writing, setting fundamental political principles and establishing the structure, procedures, powers, duties and limitations of a government. A constitution seeks to regulate the relationship between institutions of the

* Draft in early stages, please do not cite without author’s permission. Comments are invited.
state, in particular the relationship between the executive, legislature and the judiciary, thus clarifying the division of power between the three branches of government. A constitution is the most basic law of a territory from which all the other laws and rules are hierarchically derived. Most national constitutions also establish and guarantee certain rights to the people and attempt to define the relationship between individuals and the state. A political system draws its legitimacy from the constitution, so high trust in and respect for the constitution by all actors are an indication for a stable democracy. A constitution remains a worthless piece of paper if it is used as a smoke screen and basic rights are not granted. Many non-democratic countries have a constitution but choose not implement all points, for example when the right of free speech is curtailed or those claiming their rights are persecuted (e.g. in the former Soviet Union, contemporary Zimbabwe).

The legitimacy of the constitution is related to the political and historical circumstances during which the document has been created. Although ancient forms of constitutions such as special codes of written laws can be traced back as far as 2300 BC, the United States Constitution of 1789 is considered to be the first modern constitution. Political philosophers since the Renaissance had provided a sound foundation for the efforts of the creators of the American Constitution who spent a long period of time drafting the document. As mass-based democracy developed in other countries, constitutional debates continued throughout the 19th century. During the upheavals of the 20th century, many countries have adopted new constitutions, without having the luxury of time available in the late 18th and 19th century, but earlier examples were available for study and emulation. The Grundgesetz, the German constitution of 1948, for example, was a reaction to experiences with the Weimar constitution (1919). Seeing the abuse of the powers vested in the president for instance, the founders of the new constitution opted for a parliamentary model with a largely ceremonial president. In the de-colonisation period of the mid-20th century, many newly independent countries modelled their constitution on the example of the colonial rulers, mostly the United Kingdom or France.

In the late 20th century, the ‘third wave of democracy’ rolled across the world and numerous countries changed from authoritarian to democratic governments, in Europe, Latin America, East Asia and in the states of the former Soviet Union. While some countries reverted to (updated) previous versions of their constitution, others created new documents. Oftentimes, the process of constitutional crafting had to be undertaken under time pressure. Additionally, former political actors often still overshadowed the process. In Chile, for example, the military retained some influence on politics during a transitional period.

In many democracies, laws and legislations are changed and updated frequently, but the basis outlines of the constitution are considered to be sacrosanct. While there have been amendments or changes to constitutions in general, there are relatively few examples of fundamental changes in constitutional texts outside times of crisis. Germany and Japan changed constitutions after losing catastrophic wars, while France underwent her last constitutional change during the upheavals of decolonisation in 1958 (the 5th Republic). One example for the longevity of a constitution is the German unification process: in the early 1990s, there was a general consensus that the constitution would be retained, although it was created in 1948 as a provisional document, pending unification. Instead, the relevant paragraphs were amended.

A constitution gives legal consistency and leads to the long-term consolidation of democratic institutions and political activities. In the study of democratisation processes, a number of criteria have been introduced to define a consolidated democracy, including regular and free elections and freedom of expression (e.g. Dahl 1971). A wider definition also includes the habituation to democratic norms and their internalisation in social, institutional and psychological life. Democratic patterns of behaviour and respect for the constitution and the rules of law have to become part of the consciousness of citizens (Linz and Stepan 1996). The majority of the population should be convinced that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern. Lacking this acceptance, regimes might be tempted to change and revise the rules without ever reaching stability (Elster et al 1998). But support for democracy also strongly depends on the political performance of the regime, its delivery on political goods. If citizens are not satisfied with a government’s performance, their support for democracy in general is often found to decline (Diamond 1999).

Korean data suggest that there are short-comings in the democratic consolidation in this regard. As the constitutional debate exemplifies, the political elite fail to show a deep commitment to democracy and the ‘rules of the game’. The population in general also displays a rather distinct lack of commitment to many democratic procedures. Shin Doh Chul for instance concludes that support for democracy is ‘miles wide but only inches deep’ (Shin 1998: 13; 1999; see also other Korea and East Asia Barometer surveys). Many Koreans are more supportive of democracy if they evaluate government performance positively (Park and Shin 2005). The growing political apathy among Koreans (e.g. voter turn out in elections is around 60%) is partly a result of the behaviour of politicians (Shin, Park and Jang 2003). However, democracy relies on efficacious and active citizens and without public interest and debate politicians will continue in their old ways. Devoid of greater initiative by citizens, Koreans will continue to experience politicians making government for the people but not by the people (Shin 1999).
Korean constitutions

The first constitution of the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea) was created in 1948. While the majority of politicians favoured a parliamentary system, a minority centring around Syngman Rhee preferred a presidential system. Rhee argued that a presidential system was more familiar to Koreans, as it resembled the royal government of the Chosun dynasty, and also the American system. Since Rhee was favoured by the American Military Government, his proposal was eventually accepted and a presidential system introduced that allowed a newly-elected President Rhee to become more autocratic and rule like a king (Kang 1992). Since 1948, there have been six constitutions, alternating between authoritarian and democratic governments. Each document was based on the previous one, with sometimes substantial alternations. In 1960, a parliamentary system was introduced but Prime Minister Chang Myon was soon overthrown by a military coup. The parliamentary system was considered to promote political unrest and chaos, although the weak leadership of the Prime Minister and inner-party factionalism were more crucial factors in the demise of the government. From 1961 until 1988, the country was ruled either directly or indirectly by the military. Among the population, demands for democracy had been growing over the years and finally came to fruition in 1987 when the constitution of the 6th Republic was introduced. Since then, however, there has been an on-going debate about the constitution, in particular the presidency. Most recently, it was initiated by President Roh Moo-hyun who in January 2007 suggested a change to a two-term four-year presidency, to be implemented within the following year. With little support from the population and strong opposition from most political parties, Roh dropped the idea in April 2007. The frequent proposals for change and the usually short-time frame suggested for implementation indicate that among Korean politicians, the respect for the ‘rules of the game’ remains underdeveloped. Rather than considering the long-term development of democracy in Korea, politicians concentrate on short-term gains for themselves or their parties. This in turn indicates that democracy in Korea has not yet fully matured but is still consolidating. This conclusion is in line with other analyses on Korean democratisation, such as Shin (1999), Im (2004) and Samuel Kim’s compilation (2003).

There are a number of reasons for the lack of respect for the constitution. These include the rushed negotiation process in 1987 that included a small number of politicians representing only two of the many groups involved in the struggle for democracy (Park 2005). The negotiations were overshadowed by the short-term considerations of the actors, focusing almost exclusively on the upcoming presidential elections and each party’s chances of success. There was little consideration whether the model was suitable for the specific political and cultural circumstances of the country. As a result, the constitution is lacking legitimacy and demands for changes are easily voiced. Rather than providing a framework for politicians, the constitution has become a toy for the ambitions of politicians.

Constitutional Crafting in 1987

During the long years of the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan governments, the calls for democracy were never totally silenced. The Labour movement and students were at the forefront of protests in the streets, often demanding a more equal society, the redistribution of economic gains and equal opportunities for all Koreans. Dissidents like Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam led the political wing of the opposition. For many ordinary Koreans, democracy simply meant ‘anti-government’, an alternative to the current establishment. Beyond the demand for free and fair elections (concentrating on the presidency), the finer details of democracy and its workings were not discussed much. This legacy is continuing to influence the consolidation of democracy negatively. Many Koreans have great expectations of democratic change, favouring social and economic rights such as economic prosperity and equality, rather than political aspects of democracy such as political competition. More than half of Koreans consider economic aspects of democracy more important than the political characteristics important that are generally considered as defining aspects of a democracy (Shin 1999). While the data shows a preference of a maximalist approach to democracy encompassing society and economy as well as politics, the lack of support for political change is disconcerting. The focus on economic roles of the state are also reflected in the nostalgia of the Park Chung-hee era that grew after the 1997 financial crisis (Shin and Rose 1997).

The negotiations for a new constitution started in 1985 when President Chun Doo-hwan indicated that he would step down at the end of his tenure in early 1988. While the pro-democracy demonstrations were largely led by workers and students, their interests were not represented in the negotiations. Instead, established opposition politicians dominated the process. These politicians had learnt their political tools under authoritarian regimes with little exposure to democratic ideals. They took a personalised approach to politics and parties were little more than gatherings of supporters of the leader. Moreover, the government limited the formation of parties by imposing limits on the political freedom of

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40 This is obviously a gross simplification but for reasons of space this cannot be explored further here.

41 Labour strikes focusing on workers rights, welfare, and higher pay continued well into the following months and years.
some politicians and also by restricting the ideological spectrum. As a result, individuals rather than parties dominated the political process in Korea.

After the success in the 1985 National Assembly election, the opposition quickly fragmented into several groups (dominated by their respective leaders Kim Dae-jung and Kim Young-sam). President Chun warned in January 1987, that if no agreement was reached the old constitution would be used to determine the president. The electoral college prescribed in the constitution of the 5th Republic favoured the ruling party, thus limiting the chances of a governmental change. By April 1987, Chun put an end to the constitutional debate and eventually nominated Roh Tae-woo as his successor. In response to this, pro-democracy demonstrations became an almost daily event and threatened to turn into a national crisis. After the opposition rejected an offer for further negotiations, Roh Tae-woo on June 29, 1987 issued a declaration promising a return to democracy, including direct presidential elections. Some sources indicate that the government at the time favoured a change to a parliamentary system but this was rejected by the opposition (Saxer 2003, 49). Following the negative experience with a parliamentary system in 1960, a system with a strong, unifying leader was favoured by many Koreans. As the National Assembly was dominated by the ruling party, the opposition did not support the idea of parliament electing the prime minister who would be at the apex of power. It seems that they did not think beyond the first round of elections (as parliamentary elections were to be held in 1988) or considered the option of changing the electoral system. Roh Tae-woo's offer has also been interpreted as a gamble to retain power, since there was a great likelihood that the opposition would split and send two candidates into the presidential race (Masao 1993). Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung had competed against each other for nomination before (in 1971) but each felt they had to right to stand as opposition candidate.

With the presidential elections scheduled for December 1987, the negotiations for a new constitution came under intense time pressure. As mentioned before, the negotiations involved the ruling camp and the main opposition party in the National Assembly. Other actors with possibly more far-reaching agendas remained excluded. The new constitution was negotiated by the old elites and therefore more evolutionary than revolutionary. By mid-July, each party revealed their draft amendments of the existing constitution and in late July, Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam agreed to continue the debate in a working group of eight people. Four came from the ruling party and four from the opposition, all form Kim Young-sam's camp (Park 2005). Kim Dae-jung and his supporters were not included in the working group. The latter reportedly at that point preferred a presidential system with a maximum of two terms. Furthermore, there was little input from non-governmental organisations or reference to foreign constitutions (Saxer 2003). No in-depth discussion about options and suitability of model for specific Korean circumstances was undertaken. The participants seemed to be mainly concerned with the outcome of the immediate presidential elections to satisfy personal ambitions. Points of contention included voting age and residency requirements. Both parties were hoping to reach an agreement by late August but the negotiations dragged on until late September. On October 12, the National Assembly approved of the new proposal, followed by a national referendum on October 28, 1987, when over 70% of voters supported the ratification of the document.

**Constitution of the 6th Republic**

The new constitution provides for direct presidential elections with a simple majority. While many Koreans preferred direct elections, the failure to introduce a run-off if no candidate achieved a majority of votes was a major oversight that (in all likelihood) cost the opposition victory in the 1987 elections. The opposition thus failed in achieving its main goal, the transfer of power. With no provisions for a vice-president, elections have become a zero-sum game focusing on victory. As international experience shows, the position of a vice-president de-polariises and de-personalises campaigns as the focus is on a team rather than one person (LeDuc, Niemi and Norris 1996). This would be beneficial in a country plagued by regional rivalry such as Korea. The presidential term was reduced from seven years to five and limited to one term. With this provision, it was hoped to avoid lengthy one-man rule as experienced in the past. At the same time, the president lacked the prospect of re-election, which affects policy-making with a long-term perspective. Since they are elected directly, the president cannot be recalled by the National Assembly; tilting the power balance in favour of the presidency. As a result, Korean politics focuses on personalities and is polarised, with the presidency being the ultimate price in the political game.

In the new constitution, the National Assembly remained unicameral, and some proportional representation was retained. The electoral system reverted to single-member constituencies where each representative is elected by a simple majority. International comparison indicates that this would lead to the development of a two-party system (Duverger 1954). This has, however, not happened in Korea, as

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42 If a candidate were to be required to have resided in Korea for five years prior to the election, Kim Dae-jung would have been excluded. This was eventually not included and Kim could stand in the elections.

43 In 1987, the two main opposition leaders hailed from different regions where they had their powerbase, thus paving the way for the regionalisation of party politics that dominated Korean politics for the next twenty years (e.g. Sonn 2003).
regionalism has so far negated this trend, an indicator that voters’ attitudes and preferences are not represented appropriately. The president’s powers regarding emergency decrees and dissolution of parliament were abolished while the National Assembly’s power to oversee the executive branch, on the other hand, was broadened and strengthened. The right to investigate state affairs is one of the important improvements in the position of the National Assembly to the presidency. The appointment of the prime minister has been made dependent on parliamentary approval and parliamentarians can express their disapproval of the prime minister and demand their resignation. However, the president nominates the prime minister and can dismiss them. The prime minister now is allocated more powers but is still dependent on the president.

The division of power as prescribed in the constitution set the stage for the current conflicts in Korean politics. The different length of terms means that in recent years, presidents frequently faced a National Assembly dominated by the opposition party (yosoyadae 여소야대), leading to institutional deadlock and limiting the effectiveness of the presidency. This same arrangement, on the other hand, is part of the division of power between executive and legislative that works well in other countries. In France, a similar arrangement is referred to as cohabitation, and although there are some problems, president and parliament usually find a working arrangement. In Korea, the political climate is less inclined to compromise, leading to a stalemate that needs to be overcome in other ways. Since the president cannot dissolve parliament, several governments tried to convince politicians to cross the floor and vote with the ruling party, disregarding voters’ preferences. Other methods of overcoming the stalemate include the party merger in 1990 when three of the four main parties in the National Assembly merged into one party, and the impeachment procedures in 2004, when the majority parties in the National Assembly unsuccessfully tried to remove the president through legal methods. A new democratic force has arisen in the form of the Constitutional Court that was created in the 1987 constitution. It serves as a powerful instrument of judicial review, fleshing out the constitutional text. The process of appointing judges is institutionalized to ensure the independence of the judiciary. Three of its nine members are appointed from persons nominated by the National Assembly, three from persons selected by the president and three are nominated by the Chief Justice. Over the last twenty years, the Court has increased its profile and made landmark decisions to protect constitutional rights, including in the impeachment of the President in 2004. Its role is likely to expand as Korean politicians are increasingly bringing cases to the Constitutional Court. This ‘judicialisation of politics’ is a sign of immaturity among Korean politicians who through this route avoid engaging in negotiations and compromise (Hahm and Kim 2005, Park 2005). Relying on the Court thus allows politicians to continue to employ outdated methods of political activity rather than enforcing more democratic attitudes and approaches to solving conflicts. Civil society groups and individuals also bring cases to the Court, such as the relocation of the capital and the legality of the family registration system (Hojuje). They hope to initiate changes that politicians have not (yet) addressed adequately in their eyes.

The constitution’s legitimacy suffers for two reasons: it was designed in an exclusionary process and representatives from the old regime had been main actors in the negotiations. As a result, many politicians show little respect for the constitution as legally binding document, and think that it can always be re-negotiated should political expediency require it. Many politicians have not accepted the constitution as one of the ‘rules of the game’, thus falling short of behavioural changes that indicate the consolidation of democracy in Korea. The proposals for constitutional change need to be analysed in this context. None of the proposals bore fruit, though; the constitution has remained unchanged for twenty years, a record for Korea. This, however, is related to the prevailing power constellations rather than for lack of trying. Kim Dae-jung’s election platform in 1997 was a recent suggestion for constitutional change when he promised a change the governmental system to a parliamentarian system as part of his coalition agreement with old enemy Kim Jong-pil. After his election victory, the idea quietly died and the coalition broke up. In 2002, Kim Jong-pil was considering another attempt for the presidency, toying with the promise of a constitutional change to a cabinet system within two years, at the end of which he would have retired (but then did not stand in the election). In 2005, members of the opposition GNP had proposed changes to a cabinet system with a bicameral assembly (Korea Times April 11 2005). The proposal was discarded as a threat to economic recovery (in itself an interesting argument).

In January 2007, Roh Moo-hyun’s proposal was another example of his populist approach to politics that tried to evade due political process by appealing to the people directly. Roh proposed a two-term presidency and simultaneous elections for president and National Assembly. Roh claimed that in 2012, both parliamentary and presidential elections would be held, making it the ideal opportunity to align the election dates. In order to make this possible, the constitutional change would have to be initiated in 2007 in order not to affect the sitting parliament later. Roh also hinted that these changes were only possible every twenty years when the elections took place in the same year. However, this should not (necessarily) be an obstacle for change in the intervening years. The opposition quickly dismissed the

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44 The parties that initiated the impeachment procedures suffered substantial losses in the parliamentary elections following the impeachment. This can be interpreted as a rejection of their actions by citizens.
idea, saying it was political manoeuvring, Roh trying to influence the presidential elections and faltering fortunes of his party. Citizens seemed to agree although there was general support for a change.45 More problematic from a theoretical point of view was Roh’s timing: he wanted to push a substantial change within a few months during the run-up of a presidential election. This is hardly the best time for a profound and meaningful discussion of the potential implications of such changes. In the current political climate of Korea, a referendum on the constitution prior to presidential elections would quickly deteriorate into a contest between candidates that would have negative implications for the quality of discussion. Roh’s timing left little time for public debate, which should precede such changes. In this context, France and New Zealand can serve as examples for different, more considerate approaches to constitutional amendments.

France has a comparable political system with a strong president and a prime minister. In order to change the constitution a referendum is possible but not necessary. Since 1958, there have been 18 changes, and nine of these were put to the population, usually on divisive changes such as the ratification of Maastricht Treaty and the European Constitution. In 2000, the term of the French president was shortened from seven to five years so that presidential elections would be held a few weeks before parliamentary elections. This had been debated throughout the 1990s and the discussion was dominated by consideration of the position of the president and their role in French politics rather than party politics. There was general agreement in the population favouring the change, and both government and opposition parties also supported the idea. In the referendum the change was approved by 70% of the vote but the turn out was extremely low at around 30% (Dolez and Laurent 2001). In New Zealand, the electoral system was changed from a first past the post voting system to a proportional system in 1996. This process started over a decade earlier with the creation of a ‘Royal Commission on the Electoral System’ and the ensuing discussion of its recommendations. Two referendums on the issue were held in 1992 and 1993 and the change implemented from 1996 onwards. While for over 60 years, two parties had dominated parliament and alternated in power, no party has won a clear majority and coalition governments have become the norm since 1996. The number of parliamentary parties has increased to eight, giving a wider range of opinion an outlet and the opportunity to influence government.

In both cases, the debate was prolonged and public, giving many different groups a chance to voice their opinion. A similarly long period for debate would be appropriate in the Korean case to re-evaluate citizens’ expectations and raise awareness of the long-term consequences of constitutional change. However, in the recent proposals the debate was largely dominated by the political elite, at the exclusion of other voices, and with little detailed explanation of the advantages and disadvantages of different models. Public opinion is divided over the issue: polls indicate a division in the support for the presidential system at 45 percent and a parliamentary system with 42.3 percent (Chosun Ilbo, January 10, 2007).

A different avenue for changes in political structure?

The majority of suggestions for change aim at the relationship between the executive and the legislative, giving the latter more influence. Shifting power away from the presidency would de-polarise Korean politics. If representatives and political parties have more influence on the political process, citizens are also more likely to be interested in politics and to become involved in political activities. These are valid arguments for changes in the political structure. However, the established power distribution could be affected without amending the constitution, using its flexibility and adaptability. Changes in the electoral system also impact on the power structure and the conduct of elections, overcoming at least some of the current deficiencies of the Korean political system. The electoral system determines how electoral preferences are articulated as votes and how these votes determine the distribution of governmental authority between political parties. Voter’s political wishes should be represented as accurately as possible in the division of legislative seats. The electoral system also affects the development of political parties. Several changes to the Korean electoral system could be beneficial, including better apportionment of constituencies, multi-member districts and a proportional system. Since 1988, the number and size of constituencies have been changed prior to each round of parliamentary elections, usually to accommodate the growing urbanisation of the country. Despite the changes, mal-apportionment remains a problem. The largest district has substantially more voters than an average sized district, meaning that some areas are far better represented than others. This can be traced back to the Park-era where pro-government rural areas were favoured over anti-government urban areas. The Constitutional Court initiated a change to a ratio of 3:1, meaning that the largest district should be no more than three times as big as the average, but in international comparison this is still quite large and some areas remain overrepresented (Croissant 2001). Further adjustments need to be implemented.

45 “When asked their preference between the current five-year single term or a four-year term renewable once, 64.2 percent of those surveyed chose the latter, more than twice the 33.5 percent who chose the former.” (Chosun Ilbo, January 10, 2007)
Given the regional basis of parties, there is also the temptation of creating constituencies that have clear majorities for one party. This sort of gerrymandering also has to be avoided, ideally by de-politicising the process with a neutral agency.

A more profound electoral change has been introduced in recent local elections (2006). Here, multi-member districts were used for the councils of cities, counties and wards. The literature has identified this system as positive for smaller parties and minority candidates (Carey and Shugart 1995). Korea, however, had different experiences with the system in the past. At national level, two-member districts had last been used in the 1980s when the ruling party hoped to win at least one of the two seats in each constituency, thus guaranteeing its grip on power. In 2006, multi-member districts were introduced in the hope to overcome regional voting and to give minority parties a better chance of representation. At the same time, political parties were allowed to actively support their members in the elections (previously, candidates had stood without party tickets). Since the system provided for open party lists, many candidates from the same party competed for seats, thus giving voters greater choice among candidates. This should make politicians more responsive to voters’ choices. In some cases, however, this had negative effects for the overall outcome as parties sent fewer representatives to a council than their overall share of votes indicated. Nevertheless, compared to a first past the post system, fewer votes are wasted and with the increasing number of candidates, more interests are represented. On the national level, smaller parties such as the Democratic Party (민주당) with its base in Honam and the Democratic Labor Party (민노당) without a regional base would benefit from a system that allows candidates with fewer votes to enter the National Assembly. Multi-member districts often lead to a larger number of parties represented, making it more difficult to find majorities. Coalitions of parties with similar outlooks become more frequent, thus de-polarising the current confrontational political system. Negotiations and compromise would by default become part of necessary behaviour of politicians. The experiences in New Zealand underline these expectations.

A larger share of proportional seats could also lead to similar outcomes. Currently, about ten percent of the seats in assemblies at all levels are allocated in accordance to the share of votes cast for each party (since 2004, prior to that, a different system applied that favoured the most successful party). The overall number of votes is thus more important than the concentration of voters in certain constituencies. This favours the development of parties with a national rather than a regional base. Mentally, politics becomes less of a zero-sum game: parties do not win or lose but gain more or less representation. Proportional systems usually increase the number of parties represented in parliament, which in turn increases the likelihood of coalition governments. This would inevitably lead to a change in political behaviour that would increase the chances of democratic consolidation in Korea. Currently, proportional lists are used one of the main avenues to achieve greater female representations, as 50% of all seats on lists have to be allocated to women, but their impact could be quite different if the number of seats were to be increased.

In conclusion

All these changes in the electoral system would impact on the relationship between political branches and also between politicians and citizens. Different parliamentary majorities and better representation of societal interests would bring changes to political outcomes that in turn influence political actors. The latter need to adapt their behaviour to democratic rules, including respect for democratic institutions and also realise that they serve and represent the people. The obstacle for democratic consolidation in Korea is not the constitution but the way it is respected and interpreted. The constitution, does not need to be amended for the deepening of democracy but should be regarded as the basic foundation of Korean democracy. However, the debate about the constitution is likely to remain on the agenda and be discussed again in 2008 if majorities in the National Assembly will be favourable. In order for the debate to be fruitful and inclusive, preferably with a long-term outlook, other actors beyond politicians need to join the discourse to take the debate beyond political manoeuvring. Citizens, academics, specialists on law, and civil society have to overcome their apathy and actively engage to deepen democratic beliefs in Korea. The growing sophistication and influence of civil society on Korean politics should have positive effects on democratic consolidation. This is important for future progress. A mature democracy in South Korea with a governmental system that is supported unquestionably by the majority of citizens and politicians places South Korea in a much better position to face the future challenges of creating a unified Korea.

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46 In one constituency for example one party won over 45% of the votes but only one of three seats, as the votes were split evenly across candidates. A more detailed statistical analysis is hindered by the overwhelming victory of the GNP (한나라당); Hermanns 2006.
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Contact address:
Heike Hermanns
Dept of Political Science, Inha University,
253 Yonghyundong, Namgu, Incheon, 402-751,
South Korea
PH: +82 10 9411 2901
EMAIL: hdhermanns@yahoo.com
Enlightenment in Late Chosón Dynasty?
On the Change of Landscapes of Knowledge

Andreas Mueller-Lee
Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Seoul National University, Korea

Abstract

The subject of this paper are leishu (in Korean: yusŏ) and related historical sources, pre-modern storages of knowledge as encyclopaedias, different types of handbooks and specialised collections. Its aim is to employ these works - which are used as reference works but have only to a lesser extent been exploited scientifically - for an examination of the pre-modern history of knowledge in order to contribute to the field of the intellectual history of late Chosón Dynasty. Changes of knowledge are illustrated with the example of geography, a field marked by the reception of western knowledge and also influenced by the downfall of Ming Dynasty and the loss of the traditional centre of the world to the Barbarians.

Exordium

Enlightenment is a well defined and clear concept and a natural reference point in the Western world with regard to its reference to philosophy and its accent on maturity, emancipation and the individual, but for more group-oriented cultures as in East Asia it can be understood as thoroughly segregating. Its moral component, the connection between the knowledge, ‘knowledge in order to’, and the separated individual may be a reason for this different understanding, but there is general agreement that knowledge, ‘knowledge about’, is an important basis for all enlightening undertakings. Deprived of its moral component and understood as a spreading of new knowledge or a new arrangement of existing knowledge, enlightenment is something very common to all cultures and much older than the European Enlightenment. In East Asia such a change took place during the late Chosón Dynasty, caused not only by new knowledge from the West and the rapid increase in military power of several European nations and their colonial ambitions, but also by the loss of the Chinese territory and culture to the Barbarians from the North and in the Korean case by the necessity for reorientation in the East Asian world.

Speaking about pre-modern Korea or China merely means the so-called literati of the nations who - up to the early 20th century - were the only class of acting subjects and the only class that can be examined through the documents it left. From the viewpoint of the Jesuits enlightenment was necessary to make people believe in the true God, whereas the literati were much more interested in the integration of Europe’s superior astronomical knowledge into the East Asian epistems and in its consequences for cosmology, calendar and geography. This has already been proven for the field of philosophy, especially for the so-called sirhak-movement, but not with regard to a broader spreading of knowledge. This was probably because of the simple reason that is still hard to from a significant material basis and before the age of digital exploitation of pre-modern texts this research could have been conducted only with an unacceptable difficulty.

Suitable sources for a broad examination of the changes of knowledge can only be found in the pre-modern storages of knowledge such as encyclopaedias, different types of handbooks and specialised collections, or leishu (yusŏ in Korean) in traditional terms and related sources, because these sources only provide a broad view on pre-modern encyclopaedic knowledge. In Korea, however, not only the own yusŏ circulated and it is thus also necessary to consider the development of Chinese leishu and their circulation in Korea appropriately. The choice of this sort of texts was influenced by the importance of encyclopaedias in Europe as well and whether this comparison is admissible or not still has to be verified. Indeed, the assumption that encyclopaedic works are mirrors of knowledge of their time is rather self-evident, but in contrast to Europe the literati were the only group of recipients of these works and their uses as reference works for candidates of the examinations may have been invented in imitation of the importance of Western encyclopaedias. In fact, especially in the Korean case it is not known how and by whom these works were used and for what purpose.47

47 In Korea and China pre-modern encyclopaedic works were preserved in large number, but it was only in Taiwan that they enjoyed broad scientific attention. In Korea only some articles on yusŏ were published in the fields of Chinese studies and library science, which mainly deal with the question of the introduction of Chinese works to Korea or the publications of Chinese and Korean works in Korea, but do not deal with their historical position. See for instance: Kim Young-son [Yŏngsŏn] 金永善, “Chungguk yusŏ-ŭi Han’guk chŏllae-wa suyong-e kwanhan yŏn’gu 中國類書與韓國傳來與受容之關係 研究 A Study on the Importing and Reception of Chinese Yuso (類書)”, Sŏjihak yŏn’gu 書誌學研究 26 (2003): 85-112. For Chinese leishu see: Zhang Dihua 張滌華, Leishu liubie 類書類書
Commonly the *leishu* are defined as encyclopaedic works and thus distinguished from all kinds of collections. But in the Western sense of the word only a part of the *leishu* are encyclopaedias. Above all the term *lei*, which can be translated as category or class, was used only to arrange different types of materials thematically, like older European encyclopaedias did, but as ‘encyclopaedia’ is an exclusive term for knowledge storages on all or a wide range of knowledge in the West, often with a scientific standard, it is not possible to conclude that all *leishu* are encyclopaedias. The same organizing principle was also used in reference works, handbooks and collections, and *leishu* thus should not be translated as ‘encyclopaedia’ or ‘classified books’ but as ‘taxonomy of the writings (exploited in a *leishu*)’.

Changes of knowledge will illustrated with the example of geography, a field marked by the reception of western knowledge, introduced by the Jesuits, and also influenced by the downfall of Ming Dynasty and the loss of the traditional centre of the world to the Barbarians. But geographical knowledge had a long tradition as dynastic and stately knowledge and its change can be demonstrated clearly when compared to its traditional forms. Other fields of knowledge as astronomy and cosmology are very important as well, but as this paper is only a first attempt, their examinations will be conducted at a later date.

**Chinese Encyclopaedic Works on Geography**

The pre-modern encyclopaedic tradition did not start with works that are explicitly encyclopaedic or universal, but with Chinese official histories, which do not only contain the so-called ‘treatises’ (*zhuti*志) and ‘records’ (*zhuan*傳). The treatises deal with several features of one dynasty and they commonly contain a retrospective geographical outline, too. The records on the other hand are mainly devoted to individuals and are thus regarded as biographies, but they commonly contain presentations of directly bordering and also more distant countries as well. The materials that formed the basis especially for the treatises of the early histories cannot be identified anymore, but since the 14th century the so-called ‘True Records’ (*shilu*實錄; *sillok* in Korean) of emperors and kings had been preserved in China and Korea. These documents were mainly used for the compilation of the annals, but the example of the *True Records of the Great King Sejong*, [with the posthumous title] *Changhŏn* (*Sejong Changhŏn Taewang sillok 世宗莊憲大王*) shows that geographical presentations could be added as well.48

The oldest completely preserved encyclopaedic works date from Tang-Dynasty, but the names of some other lost works are still known. Among these works especially the so-called ‘handbooks for government’ (*zhengshu*政書), as for instance the “Comprehensive Documents” (*Tongdian*通典) by Du You 杜佑 (735-812) contain geographical sections compiled on the basis of the official histories, but general geographical overviews as for instance the “Records of Commanderies and Districts of [the reign period] Yuanhe [i.e. 806-820]” (*Yuanhe junxian zhi 元和郡縣志*) by Li Jifu 李吉甫 (758-814) were more up-to-date, probably because they were written on the basis of unpublished official geographical material on provinces and districts, documents with a relation to the defence of the boarders or maps.

The first comprehensive view on all knowledge available is “For Imperial Perusal [Compiled in the Reign Period] Taiping [i.e. 976-984]” (*Taiping yulan 太平御覽*) with a length of 1.000 fascicles, finished in 982. During the reign of the same Emperor Taizong 太宗 (r. 976-997), the compilation of systematic or encyclopaedic collections on several parts of knowledge – in some cases made by the very same scholars – indicate that in the eyes of these scholars the tradition of writings could not be cope with in a single encyclopaedia. These works are specialised in literature, especially in storytelling as the “Extensive

Gleanings of [the reign period] Taiping (Taiping guangji 太平廣記) as well as in poetry and prose as the “Finest Flowers of the Preserve of Letters” (Wenyuan yinghua 文苑英華), and in government as the “Tortoise Shells for Divining from the Imperial Archives” (Cefu yuangui 帝府元龜). All these works have a length of 1.000 fascicles. During the end of Song-Dynasty a new general geographical work, the “Overview of the Splendour of the Territory” (Fangyu shenglan 方舆勝覽), was compiled by Zhu Mu 祝穆, and during the following Yuan-Dynasty Yin Shifu 隱時夫 made the encyclopaedic “Collection of Pearls on Rhymes” (Yunfu qunyu 調府群玉). During the following centuries Chinese and Korean scholars adhered to the structures of knowledge and the patterns given in these works for revisions of the existing encyclopaedias or even new compilations. But this does not mean that especially the monumental works were readable or useful for an overview of knowledge, and furthermore a copy of them must have cost enormous sums of money. Chinese encyclopaedic works thus have met the same limitations as European encyclopaedias did centuries later, and it may have been more compact works as the “Sea of Jades” (Yuhai 玉海) by Wang Yinglin 王應麟 (1223-1296) or the “Taxonomic Collection of Matters and Writings of Ancient and Modern Times” (Gujin shiwen leiju 古今事實文獻聚) by the same Zhu Mu of late Song-Dynasty that were actually used by the scholars.

Two further projects of the early 15th and the early 18th century are outstanding within the circle of encyclopaedias, and both of them illustrate the problem of arrangement of knowledge and other characteristics of leishu. In both projects, but especially in the “Canon of [the reign period] Yongle [i.e. 1402-1424]” (Yongle dadian 永樂大典), which was finished in 1408 and had a length of more than 22.000 fascicles, quotations from the original sources have been included extensively and this may have influenced readability and handling. It can be assumed that large projects like this were preceded by the making of an extensive (and national) inventory, which may have shown that a lot of older publications were kept in small numbers only. In a leishu, a short quotation and the name of such a source would not have been very useful for an interested reader (or user) and thus these works are explicitly of documentary value as well. This characteristic makes the leishu similar to collections, which are known to be arranged in an encyclopaedic manner or like the “Complete Writings in Four Division” (Siku quanshu 四庫全書)49, published between 1772 and 1784 with a length of more than 36.000 fascicles. In fact, these works are libraries, and even in the pre-modern period, large leishu may have been treated not only as storages of knowledge but also as libraries of knowledge.

Another characteristic of the Yongle dadian is its phonetic arrangement50, a principle that was only used for rhyme dictionaries in China. The reason for the choice of this principle is presumably the quick access to an entry, which also led to the alphabetical order in European encyclopaedias, but at the price of losing the visible coverage of thematic field. Although Yongle dadian was arranged thematically within the entries the taxonomic principle was overall violated and the encyclopaediac system was waived. But the Yongle dadian was never printed and only a small number of fascicles of the original and its three handwritten copies51 were preserved. Obviously, the compilers of the other project, the “Complete Collection of Maps and Writings of Ancient and Modern Times” (Gujin tushu jicheng 古今圖書集成), which was finished in 1725 and had a length of 10.000 fascicles, considered once more the questions of arrangement, handling and the possibility of its publication, and interestingly enough, they decided to return to the taxonomic principle. But in contrast to earlier leishu they introduced a further level in its structure: the so-called ‘registers’ (bian 範) divide the overall structure into six parts, the former ‘divisions’ of knowledge (bu 部) are renamed as ‘canons’ (dian 典), the former normal entries are renamed as ‘divisions’ and within these divisions the material is arranged according to its types (fenlei 分類).

In scientific sources especially the large leishu are analysed, but it should be pointed out that these could not have circulated in large numbers for the simple reason of their high price. The question of their uses is not answered either; due to their length they cannot have been useful for the preparation of an examination, neither do they contain the knowledge necessary for an official. They only exploited all the knowledge that was contained in a defined list of sources. Additionally, all the large leishu were influenced by political interest as they were official publications and aimed at the representation of a dynasty. On the other hand, the leishu of early Song-Dynasty were all compiled under the reign of Emperor Taizong, who not only used this project to unite the country by grouping the scholars, which had been scattered across several earlier dynasties, but produced his own legitimacy as the ruler by engaging and binding great scholars, because he succeeded his brother under unclear circumstances. He shared the very same problem with Ming-Emperor Yongle (r. 1402-1422), who ascended the throne by deposing

49 These divisions are the classics (jing 經), the histories (shi 史), the masters (zi 子) and the miscellaneous writings (ji 集).
50 See: Winter, 29.
51 See: Winter, 30.
his own nephew during a civil war.\textsuperscript{52} The same context also applies to Manchu-Emperor Yongzheng (r. 1723-1735), whose succession is connected with an intrigue, but he was also a foreigner who qualified himself culturally by patronizing a large Chinese scholarly project. With regard to knowledge in general and geographical knowledge in particular a growing interest in geography cannot be deduced from the expansion of geographical parts of \textit{leishu} or of the geographical overviews in the same way as historical interest cannot be deduced from the countless histories in East Asia. These works summarized what might represent the dynasty and what it was allowed to know, and censorship or influence on the list of sources to be exploited cannot be excluded. Once printed, these works were of course read or used, but a broad study or an intellectual demand for them cannot be deduced only from their production.

\textbf{Encyclopaedic Works on Geography in Korea}

The earliest geographical records can be found in the official \textquotedblleft Grand Scribe’s Records on the [Korean] Three Kingdoms\textquotedblright{} (\textit{Samguk sagi} 三國史記) and the \textit{History of Koryò-Dynasty} (\textit{Koryô-sa} 高麗史), which followed the Chinese patterns of official historiography.\textsuperscript{53} With the exception of \textit{Samguk sagi}, which was finished in 1145, Korean official publications date from Chosôn-Dynasty, but it is inappropriate to jump to the conclusion that Korea was a ‘delayed culture’ or had a lack of identity. Instead it is possible that Koryô-Dynasty simply did not represent or legitimize themselves by compiling books. In this context it has been less considered that only some years before \textit{Samguk sagi} was finished the Song-Dynasty fled to the South from the Jurchen and that Koryô had to reorientate their foreign policy with regard to their northern border. Thus, the first Korean official history probably shows a new self-image in the direction of the Song-Dynasty, but it was also addressed to the northern Barbarians as the history presented Koryô as a part of the civilized world. The encyclopaedic works \textit{Cefu yuangui}, \textit{Taiping yulan} and \textit{Yuhai} had already reached Korea during Koryô-Dynasty and until early Chosôn-Dynasty nearly all \textit{leishu}, with exception of the \textit{Yongle dadian}, reached Korea as donations or purchases.\textsuperscript{54} It can be assumed that voluminous works only found a limited number of readers within the circle of officials in the capital, because there are no references to handwritten copies or printings, which were expensive and could not have been realized without help from the authorities. But there are references to the reproduction of two less voluminous works, a preface from 1436 to the rhyme dictionary \textit{Yunfu qunyu} by Yin Shifu\textsuperscript{55} and an official note from 1493 on the reprinting of the encyclopaedia \textit{Gujin shiwen leiju} by Zhu Mu.\textsuperscript{56} Both works were reprinted several times in the further course of Chosôn-Dynasty\textsuperscript{57}, but the fact that only these works have been read by a larger circle of scholars can also be explained by practical considerations like costs or user-friendliness. Furthermore, both works were comparatively up-to-date, and especially the \textit{Gujin shiwen leiju} with its Yuan-Dynasty supplements was - in this aspect - superior to the famous \textit{Yuhai}. A rhyme dictionary for composing poems and an encyclopaedia, which exploited the basic Chinese writings, were surely more useful to expectant and older scholars than handbooks for government or geographical compendiums.

Documents on these two Chinese works, which can help to assess its erstwhile importance, are only available to a lesser extent. Since there are two Korean works that used them as a model, it can be concluded that they had nevertheless been important. In 1589 Kwôn Munhae 权文海 (1534-1591) finished his rhyme dictionary \textit{Collection of Pearls on Rhymes of the Great East [i.e. Korea]} (\textit{Taedong unbu kun’ok 東圃}, which follows the Chinese original in terms of the order of rhymes. There is no statement by the

\textsuperscript{52} For this relation of both compilation projects and a historical comment on it made by Qing-Emperor Qianlong 乾隆 (r. 1735-1796) see: Johannes L. Kurz, “The Politics of Collecting Knowledge: Song Taizong’s Compilations Projects”, \textit{T’oung Pao} 87 (2001): 311.

\textsuperscript{53} See: Kim Pusik et. al., \textit{Samguk sagi}, 34-37 [http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr]. See also: Ch’ong Inji et. al., \textit{Koryô-sa}, 56-58 [http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr]. See further a translation index for both works via: http://www.kripia.co.kr/.

\textsuperscript{54} See: Kim Young-son, 87-96.

\textsuperscript{55} See the \textit{Preface to Collection of Pearls on Rhymes} (\textit{Unbu kun’ok-pal 關府群玉跋}) by Nam Sumun 南秀文 (1408-1442) in: idem, \textit{Kyongjae sŏnsoa yugo 敬齋先生遺稿} 1, 14b. [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 9, 47f]. See also: Tong-munson 103, 24a [http://www.minchu.or.kr/].

\textsuperscript{56} See: No Sasin 虚思愼 et. al., \textit{Sŏngjong Kangjong Taewang sillok 成宗康靖大王實錄} 282, 20a [Chosôn wangi sillok 12, 405]. The printing types of some older printings of \textit{Yunfu qunyu} preserved in the archives of Kyujanggak, Ch’longgak and the National Library indicate that they were printed during the reign of King Sŏngjong (r. 1469-1494). Kim Young-son also dates a printing of \textit{Yuhai} as belonging to the era of King Chungjong (r. 1506-1544) by its printing type, but without further explanation. Some fascicles of \textit{Yuhai} preserved in the National Library list these types in the catalogue, but there is no reference to the reproduction of \textit{Yuhai} in historical sources. See: idem, 99.

\textsuperscript{57} See for instance the catalogue of Kyujanggak via: http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr.

\textsuperscript{58} See: Kwôn Munhae, \textit{Ch’ogun sŏnsoaeng-jip 草韻先生筆 nyŏnbo,} 18a. [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 42, 287] For his lexicon see: idem, \textit{Taedong unbu kun’ok} (Seoul: Asea munhwa-sa, 1976).
t'onggam contained in the collections of writings of the scholars as well as in that by Kwŏn Munhae published in the 19th century, but especially during the reign of King Sŏngjong (reg. 1469-1494). These are the code of law “Great Statues for Healing the People” (Kyŏngguk taejong 經國大典) finished in 1470, the collection of prose “Anthology of Literature of the East [i.e. Korea]” (Tong-munsŏn 東文濤) finished in 1478, the “Overview of the Splendour of the [Territory of the] Eastern Country” (Tongguk [yŏji] sŏngnam 東國[曆地]勝覽) finished in 1481 and the history “Comprehensive Mirror for [Aid in Government of] the Eastern Country” (Tongguk [chach’i] tonggam 東國[資治]通鑑). These works on several parts of the Korean tradition of writings were mostly compiled by committees under the supervision of Sŏ Kōjong (1420-1488) and No Sasin (1427-1498) or were at least advised by them. It is not only the number of people employed to work on these projects that shows parallels with the monumental compilation projects of Song- and Ming-Dynasty, but also the desire of representation and the problems of the legitimacy of their patrons. The illegitimate

59 These scholars are Chŏng Ku (1543-1630) and Kim Sŏngil (1538-1593), like Kwŏn Munhae himself disciples of Yi Hwang (1501-1570). See: Kwŏn Munhae, Ch’ogang sŏnsaeng-jip 草瀨先生集 nyŏnbo, 18b and 20a. [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan, 42, 287f]


61 In the dictionary the preface by Kim Ŭngjo follows a preface of 1798 by Chŏng Pŏmjŏ (丁範祖). The prefaces of earlier editions usually did not rank first, but in this case it cannot be concluded that there must have been an older edition because the collection of writings of Kim Ŭngjo, which also contains this preface, appeared in 1776 and thus it is possible that it was unknown. Furthermore, Kim Ŭngjo was a disciple of Yu Sŏnyo (1542-1607), who was himself a disciple of Yi Hwang, which means that Kim Ŭngjo could have been the scholar who pushed the publication of the dictionary and wrote the preface in the course of an examination or revision. Both prefaces are contained in the collections of the scholars as well as in that by Kwŏn Munhae published in the 19th century. See: idem, Ch’ogang sŏnsaeng-jip purok 附錄, 11b and 12b [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan, 42, 352]. See also: Kim Ŭngjo, Haksa sŏnsaeng munjip 鶴沙先生文集 5, 50a [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan, 91, 113]. See further: Chŏng Pŏmjŏ, Haemya sŏnsaeng munjip 海左 20, 24a [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 293, 403].

62 See: Kim Yuk, Yuwŏn ch’ongbo Yuwŏn ch’ongbo-sŏ 序, 2a [Han’guk munhŏn yŏn’gu-so 韓國學文獻研究所 ed.: Yuwŏn ch’ongbo (Seoul: Asea munhwa-sa, 1980), 3]. See also: Kim Yuk, Ch’onggok sŏnsaeng yugo 潛谷先生遺稿 9, 8b [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 86, 168].

63 See the ‘directions to the reader’ (pŏnnye 凡例) in: Kim Yuk, Yuwŏn ch’ongbo [mongok 目錄], 10b [Han’guk munhŏn yŏn’gu-so ed. 7].

64 The titles mentioned in the preface are the ‘Categorized Collection of Literary Writing’ (Yiwen leiju 裔文類聚) with a length of 100 fascicles by Ouyang Xun 歐陽詢 (557-641), the ‘Book Case of Taxonomies [of the Writings] from Tang-Dynasty’ (Tanglehan 唐類函) with a length of 200 fascicles by Yu Anqi 俞安期 of Ming-Dynasty, the ‘Records from [Mt.] Tianzhong’ (Tianzhongji 天中記) with a length of 60 fascicles by Chen Yaowen 陳耀文 (m. 1543-1550), the ‘Arranged Examination from the Hall on the Hill’ (Shantang sikao 山堂肆考) with a length of 240 fascicles by Peng Dayi 彭大翼 of Ming-Dynasty and the Yunju qunyu. See: Kim Yuk, Yuwŏn ch’ongbo Yuwŏn ch’ongbo-sŏ, 2a [Han’guk munhŏn yŏn’gu-so ed. 3]. See further: Kim Yuk, Ch’onggok sŏnsaeng yugo 9, 8b [Han’guk munjip ch’onggan 86, 168].

65 See Kim Yuk, Yuwŏn ch’ongbo [name of the part illegible] [Han’guk munhŏn yŏn’gu-so ed., 1086].

66 Introductory remarks, translations with index as well as facsímiles of Tong-munsŏn and Tongguk yŏji sŏngnam are available via: http://www.minchu.or.kr. For Kyŏngguk taejong and Tongguk t’onggamm see: http://www.dbpia.co.kr.
King Sejo (1455-1468) was already conspicuous with regard to the compilation projects he patronized (which also included Buddhist texts), and even the beginning of the compilation of Tongguk tonggam in 1458 went back to his reign. King Sŏngjong, Sejo’s grandson, likewise had to prove himself as a legitimate ruler and these projects undoubtedly contributed to the stability of government and dynasty. But even decades after Sejo had died there still was growing unrest because of the question of legitimacy among the scholars, and under the next king an indirect criticism of Sejo’s usurpation of the throne became the occasion of the literati purge of 1498 (mu sa hwa) (戊午上禍).

Besides the “True Records of King Sejong” mentioned above and the revisions of Tongguk sungnam in 1485 and 1530, geography was only once more the object of an official compilation, of the “Extensive Examination of Documents of the Eastern Country” (Tongguk munhôn pigo 東國文獻備考), a government handbook with a length of 100 fascicles. The printing that circulates today, which contains 250 fascicles, dates from 1908 and contains the addition ‘Expanded’ (chăngbo 增補) in the title. A problem of legitimacy or a desire of representation were not the reason for this project, but there could have been a connection to the publication of the Chinese Gujin tushu jicheng in 1725, about which King Yŏngjo 英祖 (r. 1724-1776) had been informed since 173667, and the absence of the revision of the older leishu, especially the government handbooks from Song- and Ming-Dynasty. These revisions suddenly appeared together in 1787 followed by the geographical compendium Daqing yitongzhi 大清一統志 two years later.

All these encyclopaedias and collections follow Chinese models with regard to their titles and structures68, and it can be assumed that they supplemented the tradition of Korean writings to the Chinese, which did not contain Korean works. Samguk sagi and Koryŏ-sa as well reached the courts of Song- and Ming-Dynasty69 and probably achieved this purpose, but all other works are not mentioned in the digital collections of Chinese histories and encyclopaedias.70

The relations between the other encyclopaedic works are largely uninvestigated. Structurally they do not follow Chinese models directly, and some of these works can be understood as specialized encyclopaedias on subjects such as architecture, agriculture, medicine and the like. Among these works only those with a part on geography are considered. Only the “Taxonomical Discourses by Chibong” (Chibong yusŏl 芝峯類說) i.e. Yi Sugwang 李叔光 (1563-1628) with a length of twenty fascicles and the “New Writings to Serve [the Great; i.e. China]” (Kosa sinsŏ 散事新書) by Sŏ Myŏng'ŭng (1716-1787) were published. Chibong yusŏl contains a preface by its author from 1614 and was basically finished at that time, but no further dates or records of its printings can be found.71 Kosa sinsŏ with a length of fifteen fascicles is based partially on an older handbook on the official relations with China, the “Collection of important [facts] to serve [the Great]” (Kosa ch’waryo 散事撮要).72 According to the date of the preface by its author, 1771, it followed shortly after the printing of the Munhvŏng pigo, in which Sŏ Myŏng'ŭng participated as well, but no further dates or records of its printings can be found either.

A characterization of Chibong yusŏl is much more complicated and can be found only through a study of the entire work, because there is no structural indication to any Chinese model and neither in the

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67 See the entry from 9 to 11 a.m. (sasi 巳時) of the 19th day of the 4th month of the 12th year of the reign of King Yŏngjo (1736) in the “Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat” (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記) via: http://swj.history.go.kr. A facsimile is available via: http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr.
68 Tongguk yŏi sungnam follows the general geographical compilation Fangyu shenglan by Zhu Mu, Tong-munson follows the “Anthology of Literatures” (Wenxuan 文選) by Xiao Tong 蕭統 (501-531), an early Chinese collection of prose, Tongguk tonggam follows the “Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government” (Zhihtongjian 資治通鑑) by Sima Guang 司馬光 (1019-1086), a chronological history of China, and Munhŏng pigo finally follows the “Extensive Examination of Documents” (Wenxian tongkao 文獻通考) by Ma Duanlin 馬端臨 (d. 1325), an important handbook for government. Only Kyŏngguk taejŏn does not follow a single Chinese compilation.
69 Samguk sagi is contained in the catalogue of writings of the “Official History of Song-Dynasty” (Songshi 宋史) and is also mentioned in Yuhat. See: Tuо Tuо 窦鶴 et. al., Songshi 203 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1977), 5123. See: Wang Yinglin, Yuhat 46, 6b [digital edition of Sikuquanshu]. Koryŏ-sa is mentioned in the “Continuation of the Extensive Examination of Documents” (Xu Wenxian tongkao 竭) by Wang Qi 王圻 (m. 1565-1614). See: idem, Xu wenxian tongkao 166, 5a [digital edition of Sikuquanshu].
70 See the index of the digital edition of Sikuquanshu. See also the index of Gujin tushu jicheng via: http://134.208.10.127/book/index.htm (Dongwue daxue 東吳大學, Taiwan).
71 Even the scholars at the court during the 18th century did not know about any circumstances. See the entry from 7 to 9 a.m. (chinsi 辰時) of the 9th day of the 7th month of the 45th year of the reign of King Yŏngjo (1769) in the “Daily Records of the Royal Secretariat” (Sŭngjŏngwŏn ilgi 承政院日記) via: http://swj.history.go.kr. A facsimile is available via: http://e-kyujanggak.snu.ac.kr.
72 This handbook was first published in 1554. See further: Kim Ch’iu 金致雨, “Kosa ch’waryo-ŭi p’anjong-go 散事撮要의 版種考 A Study on the Editions of Kosachalyo”, Han’guk pibullia hakhoe-ji 1 (1972): 123-141.
preface by Yi Sugwang nor in the undated one by Kim Hyŏnsŏng 金玄成 (1542-1621) references to the function or aim of this work and its place in the tradition of writings are given. The publication of this work is probably connected with the decline of Ming-Dynasty, which Yi Sugwang might have seen clearly during his embassies to China in the years 1590, 1597 and 1611. The assumption of a political and representative function of this work may make evident why a Korean scholar suddenly endeavored to compile an encyclopaedia of the Chinese and the Korean traditions of writings, explicitly saying that it is not a supplement to Chinese works in the field. Only two years after Yi Sugwang had finished his work the Ming-Dynasty asked the Korean court for military aid and in terms of foreign policy Korea found itself in a situation very close to that of the mid 12th century, so Yi Sugwang effort's might have been helpful to the dynasty's reorientation, although it must be stated that Chibong yusŏl was not an ordered work, does not contain a note of the submission to the court and was not published by the authorities. Nevertheless it is today known as the first work to list names and short descriptions of a number of countries not only in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East. Furthermore, in the Korean context it is the earliest document that mentioned the Jesuit missionaries in China and gave some details of their understanding of heaven and earth as well as a short description of the Christian doctrine. With regard to geography and cosmology Chibong yusŏl is thus a document of enlightenment, but in his preface Yi Sugwang reticently stated that he was simply noting one thing or another in his work. Quite the contrary of this is provided in the preface by Kim Hyŏnsŏng who writes that the effect of this work can be compared with 'a deaf person who got three ears and a blind person who got four eyes' or with 'the (Buddhist) cedar of awaking coming to the West'.

The euphoria in these words may also be interpreted as an indication that there was little access to the earlier Chinese encyclopaedias in Korea, which was stated by Kim Yuk in the preface to his encyclopaedia three decades later.

Among the unpublished works especially the "Trifling Talks of Sŏngho" (Sŏngho sašol 星湖僿說), i.e. Yi Ik 李滉 (1681-1763), should be mentioned as well. Sŏngho sašol was revised and prepared for printing by a disciple of Yi Ik, a handwritten copy of it was preserved in the Royal archive and it was used extensively by Yi Kyuigung 李圭景 (b. 1788) who compiled another unpublished encyclopaedic work, the "Scattered Manuscripts of Glosses and Comments of Oju" (Oju yŏnmun changjŏn san'go 五洲衍文長箋散稿), but the question of functions and uses of other unpublished works remains completely unanswered.

There are not only no Documents on the uses of encyclopaedias in the case of unpublished works, but also little information on published works. Documents on encyclopaedias that can be found in the official historical documents and the representative collections of writings by the scholars (munjip 文集) are almost entirely prefaces to encyclopaedias, and given the dimensions of digitalized materials this cannot be regarded as coincidence. Interestingly enough, the prefaces contained in different versions of unofficial encyclopaedic works are mainly not part of the munjip, but these collection do contain a wide range of prefaces to other works, and thus a general disregard of prefaces cannot be assumed. The special disregard of prefaces to unofficial encyclopaedic works may be interpreted as a lesser reputation of encyclopaedias, and this is the contrary of the usual positive image of encyclopaedias as useful reference works. One can muse about the fact that encyclopaedias are mostly based on basic sources of Chinese tradition, which every scholar should have known by heart, so that no one ought to be in need of a reference work on them. Thus, it might have been a blow to one's reputation to admit that they were useful. Today the printed works still exist in numbers between ten or twenty copies and some manuscripts each, but this is not enough to conclude that they had once been circulated in large numbers. It is an interesting detail that beside the official printings also Chibong yusŏl and Yuwŏn ch'ŏn'go have been reprinted several times, which can be seen from the fact the preserved copies differ with regard of the prefaces contained, the arrangement of prefaces and the table of contents or the print space of the table of contents, and although there are no other documents, the printing blocks might have been slightly altered or newly carved.

It still cannot be decided until when these works lost their (assumed) function as the basis of general and geographical knowledge, because we do know of any encyclopaedia of the late 19th century, which can be analyzed in regard to its reference to earlier works. The manuscripts of encyclopaedias of the 18th and early 19th century indicate that especially Chibong yusŏl and Yuwŏn ch'ŏn'go still structured the knowledge of that time. Works as Sŏngho sašol or Oju yŏnmun changjŏn san'go show an

73 See: Yi Sugwang, Chibong yusŏl Chibong yusŏl-sŏ. See the digitalized version via: http://www.krpia.co.kr/. See further the translation by Nam Mansŏng 南晚星 with index and facsimile (but without the preface by Kim Hyŏnsŏng) via: http://www.minchu.or.kr/.

74 The following prefaces are not contained in the representative munjip of its writers: the ‘Preface to the ‘Taxonomical Discourses by Chibong’” (Chibong yusŏl-sŏ) by Yi Sugwang himself and Kim Hyŏnsŏng, the ‘Preface to the newly cut ‘Collection of Treasures from the Garden of Taxonomical [Writings]’” (Sin’gak yuwŏn ch’ŏn’go-sŏ 新刻) by Yi Sik 李植 (1584-1647) and the ‘Preface to the ‘New Writings to Serve [the Great; i.e. China]’” (Kosa sinsŏ-sŏ 敘事新書序) by Sŏ Myŏng’ŭng. Only the preface to Yuwŏn ch’ŏn’go by Kim Yuk, the preface of the unpublished Sŏngho sašol by Yi Ik and the prefaces to Taedong unbu kun’ok are contained in munjip.
encyclopaedic structure, but under single entries they do not contain references to their basic meanings and uses as can be expected, but discussions of specific features belonging to the field of these entries. These later works were obviously not intended as an independent reference work, but as a supplement and completion of the printed encyclopaedias using newly available sources. On the one hand it is thus wrong to conclude a kind of intellectual stagnation – which never existed – on the basis of the continuous printings of older publications and a lack of revised or new publications, but the absence of publications of the encyclopaedic supplements on the other hand may have prevented the spreading of knowledge, which had been further developed and differentiated.

**Forms and Contents of Geographical Knowledge**

The forms and contents that determined geographical knowledge in Korea before the 14th century cannot be identified anymore. There may not only have been geographical compendiums, handbooks for government, official histories and encyclopaedias from China, but possibly also geomantic or other genuinely Korean concepts. And it cannot be established with any certainty, either, to what extent the already mentioned Chinese works or the Korean works which followed their models were used and shaped the knowledge on geography from the 15th century onwards. The following observations are thus based only on three indications, which seem to allow the assumption that these works have been used continuously: firstly, a number of differing printings of the Korean works, secondly a lesser reputation of the unofficial encyclopaedic works which may have prevented the incorporation of comments into the scholar’s collection of writings, and thirdly, the mention of these works (or their sources as in the case of Yuwŏn ch’ŏngbo) in later encyclopaedias as Sŏngho sasŏl and Oju yŏnmun changjŏn san’go, which indicates a certain importance of Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam and Chibong yusŏl.

The Korean and Chinese works, which impart geographical knowledge, are of three types and show similar structures. The first type is a catalogue of the national geography that can be found in official histories and geographical compendiums. Its highest structural level consisted of equal-ranking administrative districts like capitals and provinces, and the level below of prefectures and districts. Structurally, the capitals, prefectures and districts belong to the same level, because the provinces simply serve to bundle the immeasurable number of districts and prefectures. Depending on the function of these works they contained lists of features, which had to be completed for every geographical unit. In the first place this is the history of the name of the unit, followed by lists of incorporated commanderies and villages, neighbouring units and distances, basic geographical features as hills, rivers and the like, but also human-made features such as schools, fortresses, ‘signal fire places’ et cetera. Others categories listed are those of outstanding people such as filial daughters and sons or famous scholar as well as famous native products. The so-called ‘Local Records’ (üpchi 興志), which have been preserved in large numbers from the 2nd half of Chosŏn-Dynasty, are compiled according to the same principle.

Handbooks for government and related sources can also be described as catalogues of national geography⁷⁵, but here the highest structural level under the term ‘territory’ is a taxonomical one: i.e. the entry ‘territory’ is subdivided into historical boarders, histories of place names of commanderies and districts as well as hills, rivers, defence structures and palaces. Below this level the materials are arranged according to administrative districts. The structure of handbooks and compendiums is thus similar, only their levels of structure are interchanged. Furthermore, the handbooks are less voluminous, probably because they are interested only in geographical features of importance for government and defence. It should be added that the structure used in geographical compendiums, handbooks and ‘local records’ did not develop any further until the 20th century.

Structurally much more interesting are the encyclopaedias and their highest geographical level, the ‘principles’ (i 理) or the ‘way’ (to 道) of the earth. Under this term Gujin shiwen leijju contains the unanimated features of the earth: mountains, seas, rivers, wells, springs and the like, but interestingly enough, there is no formal difference between general categories and sub- categories, as for instance there is no general category ‘mountains’ and the names of major Chinese mountains are on the same level as earth, seas and rivers. One of the supplements to Gujin shiwen leijju considers the animated features of the earth, the ‘places of living’ (kŏch 5 居處), and under this general category all those sub-

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⁷⁵ The introductory remarks of the ‘Examination of the Territory’ (yŏji-go 延地考) only mention Simguk sagi and Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam as reference points. See: Hong Ponghan 洪鳳漢 et al., Tongguk munpŏn pigo 6, 1b. A copy is preserved in the National Library (Shelfmark: 한국 31-20) and available via: http://www.nl.go.kr. The same text is also contained in the edition of 1908. See: Pak Yongdae 朴容大, Ch’angbo munpŏn pigo 增補文獻備考 13, 1b [Myŏngmundang, Tongguk munpŏn pigo, 4th ed. (Seoul: Myŏngmundang, 2000), 173]. Kosa sinsŏ only mentions Tongguk yŏji sŭngnam in its ‘directions to the reader’ (pŏnmye). See: Sŏ Myŏng’ŭng Kosa sinsŏ Kosa sinsŏ pŏnmye, 1b. Copies available via internet are preserved in the National Library (Shelfmarks: 각 031-39 and 양산 각 031-24). See also a facsimile and its digital index via: http://yoksa.ac.kr (Academy of Korean Studies).
categories can be found, which were contained in the geographical compendiums. Yi Sugwang follows the
distinction between unanimated and animated earth and introduces the categories ‘principles of earth’
(chiri 地理) and ‘countries’ (cheoguk 諸國) for them. Under these general categories he only offers seven
sub-categories each (in Gujin shiwen leiju it is forty each), for chiri these are: the term earth itself,
mountains, (fresh-)waters, seas, islands, wells and fields. In comparison with other encyclopaedias he did
not collect a wide range of geographic categories, and this formal concentration, which can be found in the
division of countries as well, indicates a new and widely independent structure of knowledge – but only in
regard to an encyclopaedic overall-view as records on foreign countries were incorporated into official
histories and even Yuhai or handbooks for government sometimes mention the surrounding countries.
The category ‘countries’ in Chibong yusol and especially the sub-categories ‘our country’ (pon’guk 本國)
and ‘foreign countries’ (oeguk 外國) are actually contradictory because within a taxonomic structure
territorial sub-categories can only be used within a geographic general category, but even in China the
formal distinctions were not that accurate until the 17th century. Furthermore, encyclopaedias basically
exploit other sources, but in the sub-category of foreign countries Yi Sugwang himself is the major source.
Finally, Yi Sugwang did not go so far as to define the relation between Korea and China because China
was not considered in the geographical categories and thus seems to have been (still) neither domestic
nor foreign.

Yuwŏn ch’ongbo, however, does not contain any category on foreign countries and structurally it
cannot be seen as very concise as it has forty-two sub-categories. In comparison to Chibong yusol it may
therefore be regarded as conservative, but this cannot be justified, neither in regard to its form nor to its
contents. Yuwŏn ch’ongbo is explicitly an encyclopaedia in the traditional sense, it is constructed
expansively and did not ask the question which elements of the writings should be chosen, but how the
knowledge contained in these writings could be represented in a broad way. Kim Yuk succeeded in further
developing the older structure of knowledge consequently, for instance by combining the geographical
divisions and by differentiating between general categories and sub-categories. This cannot be taken for
granted even in the 17th century as the Tzianzhongji 天中記 by Chen Yaowen (m: 1543-1550) and
other works show, but he may have followed Shantang sikao 山堂肆考 by Peng Dayi 彭大翼 from late
Ming-dynasty in some cases. With a length of forty-seven fascicles Yuwŏn ch’ongbo is much smaller than
Shantang sikao (240 fascicles) or Gujin tushu jicheng (10.000 fascicles), but the sources used he
mentions have a length of 770 fascicles in sum and were not insignificant. It is therefore possible that the
sheer volume of materials may have forced Kim Yuk to improve the structure of knowledge in his work, as
it was the case in the large Chinese compilation projects. The formal concentration was also achieved by
limiting the sources to the categories of the ‘classics’ (kyeong 經), ‘histories’ (sa 史) and ‘masters’ (cha 子),
and rejecting the ‘collections’ (jip 集)76. This seems to have been a useful and effective criterion because
the collections are an important part of the writings and have been considered in encyclopaedias as Gujin
shiwen leiju. The lack of Korean sources, which makes this work look conservative from today’s
perspective, is thus only a concomitant phenomenon and does not show a lack of interest in their own
tradition. Beside these differences with regard to the structure and the use of sources Chibong yusol und
Yuwŏn ch’ongbo have one point in common: both works make some use of the principle of catalogues,
known from the compendiums and handbooks, especially for some elements of national geography like
important mountains, rivers or seas.

With regard to the contents the different types of stores of geographical knowledge are equipped in
different ways. The entries of handbooks sometimes do not yield much more than the head word itself.
Kosa sinsŏ for instance only lists distances to other places, mountains, rivers and local products, and in
the compendiums commentaries can be found, too. Entries only expand if the historical dimension is
considered, especially in the case of the history of place names or cultural imprints of a place by
scholars living there or texts written about this place. The encyclopaedias are focused on the written
tradition to a greater extent. Yuwŏn ch’ongbo for instance does not give any commentaries or other
materials like maps, which are contained in Tongguk yŏji sŏngnam for each province and became a basic
part of later local records. In encyclopaedias geography is thus described mainly by passages from the
sources used. Under the sub-category ‘earth’ Yuwŏn ch’ongbo cites more than twenty sources77, whereas
Chibong yusol only cites five (and among these one is used as a commentary)78, and can hardly be
understood as an encyclopaedic overall-view. Furthermore, Chibong yusol gives commentaries and thus
included the view on knowledge not only by the choice of sources. In contrast to Chibong yusol the
broad use of sources is relatively unsuspicious because the limitation of the sources was not used to
prefer special currents of thoughts.

76 See the ‘directions to the reader’ (pǒmnye) in: Kim Yuk, Yuwŏn ch’ongbo [mongkong 目錄], 10b [Han’gukhak
muhnŏn yŏn’gu-so ed., 7].
77 See: Kim Yuk, Yuwŏn ch’ongbo 5, 1aff [Han’gukhak munhŏn yŏn’gu-so ed., 92ff].
78 See: Yi Sugwang, Chibong yusol 2, 1aff. See the digitalized version via: http://www.minchu.or.kr.
A closer inspection of the chiri-division in Chibong yusŏl shows that all four entries belong to the Daoist current. The first entry cites the Daoist Yu Yan 余琰 from Yuan-Dynasty, it seems to have served as a connection with the previous division on heaven and to have been introductory in character.79 The second entry is taken from “Treatise on Curiosities” (Bowuzhi 博物志) by Zhang Hua 張華 (230-300) and states that famous mountains assist the earth, that stones are its bones, rivers its (blood) vessels, grasses its hair and that the soil is its flesh80, and thus seems to liken its to a living body. The next entry is from the Daoist collection “Master of Huainan” (Huaianzi 淮南子) and states that the earth has latitudes and longitudes81, and the last entry by Shao Yong 邵雍 (1011-1077) speaks about a pole of heat in the south and a pole of coldness in the north.82 What these entries had meant in this order can hardly be reconstructed, but from a modern background latitude and longitude, two poles as well as the earth’s body-likeness give rise to the assumption that Yi Sugwang aimed at the idea of the earth as a globe. But Yi Sugwang had no modern background and the sources themselves indicate the model of a ‘canopy heaven’ (gaitian 蓋天) alone and are not much interested in the earth or its form.83 The earth was commonly thought of as flat and in the Daoist context or in encyclopaedias like Guijn shiwen leiju it is not equipped with only two poles (but four or eight — Shao Yong used two poles only to localize yin and yang on earth), and even a preference of only East-West- or North-South-lines cannot be found as diagonal lines are mentioned as well. It is not necessary to immerse oneself deeply into the world of Daoist thought because in the centuries after Yi Sugwang the theory of the globe does appear in the literati’s collections of writing as well as in encyclopaedias works. In this case the reference-based “Demonstration on the Globe” (Chigu pyŏnyŏng-sŏl 地球辯證) in Oju yŏmnun changjŏn san’go, which contains a list of foreign countries as well, is of special interest.84 This discussion begins with the theoretical statement that the principle of the globe is completely contained in the “Gnomon of the Zhou Dynasty and Classic of Computation” (Zhoubi suanjing 周髀算經) from Han-Dynasty. This text is known as the theoretical basis fort he gaitian-theory, and in the 19th century only the mention of the name of this text seems to have been enough to explain this theory because nothing else is stated. The statement that the Zhoubi contains the theory of the globe stands in obvious contradiction to the traditional view of the flat earth, but this text seems to have been forgotten until the 17th century. Since it was reprinted in 1603 Zhoubi was considered again, especially in connection with the theory that the modern astronomical knowledge from the West actually originated in the China, was introduced to the West while it was forgotten in China, and was then reintroduced to China again.85 A new ‘non-native’ theory was thus integrated into the Chinese culture as a forgotten native theory, exactly at the time Yi Sugwang saw the declining Ming-Dynasty. Yi Sugwang states in Chibong yusŏl that he saw a European celestial map and that he also saw a world map annotated by the Jesuits86 with latitudes and longitudes which he then brought to Korea.87 Probably Yi Sugwang was also confronted with the Chinese reactions to these theories and thus chose Daoist writings for his encyclopaedic sections on the earth in order to embed his reports about the West and its religion into the theory of the globe. The euphoria in the preface by Kim Hyŏnsŏng may also be understood in this context.

After Yi Sugwang and Yi Ik, Yi Kyugyŏng could lean on a new Chinese encyclopaedia, the “Compilation of Illustrations and Books” (Tushu-pian 塗書篇) by Zhang Huang 張潢 (1527-1608), for his treatment of the same question. His book could not have been known to Yi Sugwang because its preface dates from 1613 and it could thus have printed in this year or later. Yuwŏn chŏngbo, however, does not speak about the globe, but the applied sources that are connected with this view can be found in Chinese encyclopaedias as well and they have not even been left out by Kim Yuk.

79 See: Yu Yan, Xishang futan 席上簿談 shang 上, 13b [digital edition of Sikuquanshu].
80 See: Zhang Hua, Bowuzhi 1, 5a [digital edition of Sikuquanshu].
81 See: Liu An 馨安 ed., Huaianzi 4, 7a [digital edition of Sikuquanshu].
82 See: Shao Yong, Huangji jingshishu 皇極經世書 14, 6b [digital edition of Sikuquanshu].
84 See: Yi Kyugyŏng, Oju yŏmnun changjŏn san’go 28, [15b]. See the digitalized version via: http://www.minchu.or.kr/. A Translation is still not available.
86 This “Map of all Countries on Earth” (Konyô man’guk chŏndo 坤輿萬國全圖) was drawn in 1602, but only a later Korean copy from 1708 still exists. See: http://www.history.go.kr/.
87 See: Yi Sugwang, Chibong yusŏl 1, 3a and 2, 34b. See the digitalized version via: http://www.minchu.or.kr/. See also: No Chŏnsik, 140.
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Since the 17th century geographical knowledge about Korea and China was confronted with the question of the shape of the earth and the presentations of distant countries — and the accumulation of knowledge is partly connected with this development. But it should be taken into consideration as well that the structural developments may have been influenced by this change of knowledge as well, whereas influences on the local records and handbooks for government cannot be found. Furthermore, the encyclopaedias differ from other geographical works with regard to their reference to sources, and on the one hand this was a blessing as it made the introduction of new knowledge possible, but on the other hand it resulted in the slow acquisition of new knowledge since Korea hardly had any direct access to this new knowledge and was in need of published sources in literary Chinese for its discussion.

Knowledge about the earth grew during the next two centuries, and Yi Ik as well as Yi Kyugyŏng already discussed questions like for example those of the size of the earth or its rotation. These works were not published during the next centuries and could thus not supplement Chibong yusŏl or Yuwŏn ch'ŏn'gbo, and with regard to the history of knowledge Korea increasingly fell behind China. But there does not seem to be any political connection that prevented their publication, and on the contrary, in the middle of the 17th century the theory of the globe seems to have been adopted broadly. In his entry "[On] the Globe" (chigü 地球), Yi Ik states an opponent of this theory, the official Kim Sijin 金始振 (1618-1667), a scholar with an interest in mathematics, and an advocate of it, Nam Kŭkwan 南克寬 (1689-1714). These dates already indicate that their cannot have been any real debate at all. The content of this imaginary debate does not concern the globe either. Unfortunately, only the "Discussion on the discussion of calendars by 2nd rank-official Kim [Sijin]" (Kim ch'amp'an yŏkpŏp-pyŏn pyŏn 金參列脣法辨辨) has been preserved but its title already shows that it discussed the calendar and thus questions of the heaven instead the earth. The text itself indicates that the theory of the globe was only an attendant phenomenon of a new theory of heaven, which provoked the so-called shixian 時象-calendar, used by the Chinese court since the middle of the 17th century and adopted in Korea in 1667. In the writings of An Chŏngbok 安鼎福 (1712-1791), a disciple of Yi Ik, a reference to the sacrosanct Zhu Xi (1130-1200) can be found, who compares the shape of the earth with a yeast dumpling or a steamed loaf of bread (mantou 馒頭)91, so the theory of the globe was no longer certified by Daoist writings only. This is, of course, the very same pattern used by the Chinese to incorporate the globe into their world picture, but what exactly does this mean? Is it only the arrogant reaction of a culture that imagined itself as the only one under heaven and thus identified a superior theory with Daoist speculations, i.e. it rejects this theory by its distortion? Or may it be a relativistic point of view showing their skills at interpretation, which indicates points of contact or even produces them? Or should this comparison with writings of their own tradition taken seriously, because it allegorizes knowledge and makes even it understandable? The modus of acquisition the modern reader insists on probably says more about the reader than about the history of knowledge as it was surely not a single modus and all three forms are in the same way patterns of integration but of different contexts.

The rejection of new knowledge finally aimed at the preservation of the Chinese holistic world view, which regrettably was not buried by the scholars themselves because the Western gunboats were faster. The advocating of new knowledge was, on the other hand, not only a question of politics and factions, but because it was Kim Yuk, compiler of the Yuwŏn ch'ŏn'gbo, highest statesman and member of the conservative Westerner's faction, the introduction of the shixian-calendar was ascribed to.92

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88 See: Yi Ik, Sŏngho sosŏl 2, 53a. See the translation with index and facsimile via: http://www.minchu.or.kr/. The same text is also contained in: An Chŏngbok 安鼎福: Sŏngho sosŏl yusŏn 類選 1ha 下, [1a] [An Chŏngbok, Sŏngho sosŏl yusŏn (Seoul: Myŏngmun-dang, 1982), 36].

89 See: Nam Kŭkwan, Mongye-jip 夢喩集 kŏn 乾 [i.e. “1”], 16b [Han'guk munjip ch'onggan 209, 298].


91 See: An Chŏngbok, Manmul yuch'wŏl 物務集 [without fascicles and folio] [Yi Usŏng 李佑成 ed., Sunam chŏnjip 順庵全集 4 (Seoul: Yŏgang ch'ulp'ansa, 1984), 52]. For Zhu Xi see: idem, Zhuzi yulei 朱子語錄 86, 16a [digital edition of Sikuquanshu]. Decades later, Chŏng Yag'yon 丁若鍾 (1761-1836) used this comparison in his "Examination [Question] on Geography" (Chiri-ch'aek 地理策), a lecture or examination for King Chŏngjo (r. 1776-1800). See: idem, Yŏyu dang chŏnsŏ ceul-chip 與稻堂全書第一集 8, 2a [Han'guk munjip ch'onggan 281, 160].

92 See: Yi Pyŏngmo 李秉模 et al., Chŏnjong Taewang sillok 正宗大王實錄 33, 36b [Chosŏn wangjo sillok 46, 248].
Contact Address
Andreas Mueller-Lee
Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies, Seoul National University
San 56-1, Sillim-dong, Gwanak-gu
Seoul, 151-742 Republic of Korea
PH: -82-2-880-4037
EMAIL: andreas.mueller-lee@rub.de
The Emergence of Early Silla Rulers: A Reexamination of Myths, Genealogies, and Archaeological Findings

Chizuko T. Allen
University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA.

Abstract
A standard history book upholds that the early state of Silla appeared in the southwestern corner of the Korean peninsula in the first century B.C., and its throne was taken by the Pak and Sŏk clans until the hereditary rule by the Kim clan was established in the mid fourth century. However, a close look at the progenitor legends and genealogical information in the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa suggests that the Sŏk clan, who possessed northern traditions and advanced metallurgy, was the last to migrate to Kyŏngju, the heart of Silla. The Sŏk soon occupied the rulership of the emerging state, through intermarriage with the Pak. Recent revisions of early Silla chronologies place the political rise of the Sŏk in the first half of the fourth century, and this coincides with the time when the stone-piled wooden chamber tombs with unique northern features emerged in Kyŏngju. Although Korean archaeologists seek to link the tombs to the Kim rulers, the initial construction of these tombs was possibly inspired by the Sŏk. The characteristics of the tombs and other information point to the northeastern peninsula as their possible place of origin.

Scholars consider Kim Naemul (traditional reign dates: 356-402) to be the first historically reliable ruler of Silla, identifying him as the one who sent an envoy to the Former Qin (351-394) court in X’ian, China, in 382. However, the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa, compiled in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Korea, record sixteen preceding Silla monarchs: seven from the Pak clan, eight from the Sŏk clan, and one from the Kim clan. According to their chronologies, the first ruler Pak Hyŏkkŏse founded Silla in 57 B.C. Although not corroborated by Chinese histories or archaeology, many scholars continue to use this date for the beginning of the Silla kingdom, the cultural late bloomer that unified the peninsula in the seventh century.

The purpose of this paper is double fold. It introduces a way to revise early Silla dates, recently presented by a Korean historian to resolve the chronological contradictions. It also attempts to answer questions surrounding the emergence of the Sŏk clan through a fresh look at the legendary accounts conveyed in the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa as well as archaeological studies based on recent findings.

Problems in Early Silla Chronology
Many scholars have difficulties accepting the early beginning of the Silla state as well as the long reigns of its rulers recorded in the Samguk sagi (Yi Ki-dong 2003, 9-12). Also, archaeologists feel that Silla’s state formation actually took place in the fourth century as they see Kyŏngju artifacts indistinguishable from their counterparts in the general southeastern region through the third century (Barnes 2004, 36).

It is possible that the compiler of the Samguk sagi selected for the inauguration of Silla the auspicious Kapcha year 57 B.C. that predated the founding of Koguryŏ and Paekche, the two peninsular states that Silla destroyed in the seventh century (Barnes 2001, 4). At the same time, the compiler was aware that the Chinese reference to a Silla ruler’s envoy sent to the Former Qin court in 382, and he believed this ruler to be Naemul. Once these two dates were set, he was compelled to fill the space of over four centuries in between.

At first glance, the lengths of Silla’s early reigns seem commonplace. Excluding the sixty years for the first ruler Hyŏkkŏse, the longest reigns before Naemul’s are forty-six, thirty-four, thirty-three, thirty-two, and thirty years for Hŭlhæ, Naehae, and Yuri, P’asa, and Adalla. The remaining reigns range from twenty-three to twelve years. The average length of the reigns by the first seventeen rulers is twenty-seven years, a time period close to a generation. A good look at their genealogies, however, reveals that these years are unusually long.

The early Silla rulership was usually not passed on from father to son, but among brothers, cousins, and sometimes in-laws in each generation before moving on to the next generation. After Hŏkkŏse’s son and successor Namhae, his son Yuri and son-in-law T’alhae became rulers, and, in the next generation, Yuri’s two sons succeeded at different times. In the following generation Yuri’s two grandsons (cousins) as well as T’alhae’s grandson Pŏhyu ascended to the throne. After Pŏhyu, the throne was monopolized by the Sŏk. Skipping a generation, Pŏhyu’s three grandsons became rulers, and then two of their male offspring and a son-in-law succeeded them. In sum, at least two men and often
three in each generation took the throne. This should result in the average reign of approximately ten years.

The average reign of twenty-seven years is too long even for paternal successions. Much later in the dynasty, the royal successions from the twenty-ninth king Myeong (r. 654-661) through the thirty-second Hyoso (r. 792-702) took place directly from father to son. Still, their average reign lasted for only twelve years. Although it may be the intent of the Samguk sagi to give the impression that Silla rulership was a lifetime position, the existence of multiple rulers in each generation suggests otherwise. The ruler kept the position for a limited time, perhaps in their prime, and passed it on to another qualified man.

The extension of the reign years resulted in unusually long lives for many individuals. For instance, Ilson, the seventh ruler, was the son of Yuri, the third ruler who died in the year 57. According to the Samguk sagi, Ilsong reigned from 134 to 154 after his uncle-in-law Tallhae, his brother Pasa, and Pasas son Chima did. Although Ilsongs birth year is not mentioned, it had to be before the death of his father. Thus, he lived for a minimum of ninety-seven years. Even a longer life is attributed to Tallhae and his grandson Polhyu, the ninth ruler. Tallhae was born in 19 B.C. and died in 80, thus at the age of ninety-nine. Polhyu, who must have been born by Tallhaes death in 80, sat on the throne from 184 to 195; his age at death had to be at least one hundred and fifteen. Long lives are prevalent in later generations also. According to the Samguk sagi, King Naehaes son Uro died in 249, after serving for three kings: his own father, and his cousins Chobun and Chomhae. At the time of Uros death, his son Huhae was a young child, but he later reigned from 310 to 356. Therefore, his life spanned at least for one hundred and seven years from 249 to 356. Michu reigned till his death in 284 and had two daughters, Poban and Aeryu. Their husbands, Naemul and Silson (traditional reign dates: 402-417), lived till the early fifth century. This means that the two women possibly lived from the late third century to the early fifth century.

Reconstruction through the Genealogies

Seeing the unusually long life spans, some scholars speculated that the early historians left out some individuals that actually constituted additional generations (Yi Chong-uk 1982, attachment). But, why would they eliminate some and fill the gap with the artificially extended lives of others? Looking at the painstaking details of genealogical accounts, it is difficult to imagine that there were important figures and generations totally forgotten or omitted. Other scholars suspect that Silla actually had two or three concurrent rulers due to its confederation of tribes, and the compilers artificially linked the parallel lines of individuals in a linear fashion. This theory fails to explain the problem of unusually long lives given to many individuals.

The unusually extended reign years indicate that the compilers of the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa did not fabricate imaginary figures to fill the time, but attempted to fit the given list of rulers in the time frame. The extended lives and reigns in fact testify to their respect for the known individuals and genealogies. Their mention of differing records and relationships also support their efforts to preserve traditions.

We can follow the basic genealogies described in the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa and still find reasonable dates for this early period. Kang Chong-hun (2000, 28-47) calculated approximate years for early key figures, using the dates of King Chi Jung (r. 500-513) as a reliable starting point. Two factors help his calculations to be fairly accurate. First, the ruling group’s repeated inbreeding created a close network of key individuals that can be cross referenced easily. Second, the inclusion of many Sok women, who married many Sok and Kim rulers, leads to fewer errors as women’s reproductive years are better defined than men’s. Kang traces back by simply giving each generation twenty to thirty years. As Chi Jung is said to have been born in 437, his mother Choseang was probably born in the 400s or 410s, and, if so, her father King Nulchi was possibly born in the 380s (trad. r. 402-417). This places the birth year of Nulchi’s mother Poban no earlier than 350. Poban was Naemul’s queen and the daughter of Michu and Kwangmyong, and the latter, in turn, was the daughter of King Chobun. The birth years of Kwangmyong should be around 320, and, if so, her father Chobun was born around 300. Thus, Chobun and two other kings in the same generation group, his brother Chomhae and cousin Naehae, were probably active in the first half of the fourth century. Based on Chobun’s tentative birth year of 300, we can assume dates for many other individuals. For instance, Huhae was born between Chobun’s daughter Are and Naehae’s son Uro, his birth can be around 350 and the beginning of his reign around 370. Polhyu, Chobun’s grandfather, was possibly born about 240 or 250 and was active till the end of the third or possibly the early fourth century. Then, the four Pak rulers preceding Polhyu were active from the middle to the second half of the third century.

Furthermore, Polhyu’s grandfather Tallhae, if a historical figure, may have been born at the end of the second century and active in the first half of the third century. Then, the time of Hyokkose, or the first ruler, may have been early in the third century. In sum, the revised dates suggest that almost all the Pak rulers and Sok Tallhae appeared in the third century, and the succeeding Sok kings beginning with Polhyu emerged in the first half of the fourth century. Kim Michu and the last three Sok rulers reigned in the mid fourth century. Naemul probably reigned from as late as 370 or 380 till the early fifth century.

The above reconstruction was obtained by following the genealogy of the key Sok men and
women prior to the time of Naemul. The genealogy of the Kim family before Mich’u, by contrast, is neither lucid nor useful. Both the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa accounts relate that during the reign of T’alhae, the progenitor of the Kim clan, Alchi, arrived in Kyŏngju, as discussed below. For the next five generations, little is mentioned of the Kim clan except for the marriages of its women to Kings P’asa and Chima as well as T’alhae’s son Kuch’u. According to the Samguk sagi, Alchi’s fifth generation descendant Kudo worked for Pŏlhyu as a general, and Kudo’s daughter Okmo married Pŏlhyu’s son Koljŏng. If indeed Alchi arrived as an infant during T’alhae’s reign and Kudo and Pŏlhyu are contemporaries, six generations of the Kim clan from Alchi through Kudo and two generations of the Sŏk clan, that is, T’alhae’s son Kuch’u and grandson Pŏlhyu, covered the same time period. This is not possible. If Kudo and Pŏlhyu indeed belonged to the same generation, Alchi must have predated T’alhae by a few generations. It is likely that oral historians and early writers linked T’alhae’s and Alchi to legitimate the later transfer of power between the two clans. Kim women’s marriages to early figures, such as P’asa and Kuch’u, also suggest that the Kim clan must have arrived earlier than the records indicate.

Progenitor Myths

Besides the genealogical information, the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa provide legendary accounts concerning the emergence of the three progenitors. The stories had been handed down orally until they were recorded and eventually included in the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa. We should take a serious look at them because we now know that the time of the Silla progenitors was not in the first century, B.C. but probably as late as in the third century.

But, how is it possible to obtain valid information from legends and myths? We must first understand that many myths are not fabricated fairy tales, but the tools that early people used to perpetuate their important information. Elizabeth W. Barber and Paul T. Barber (2004) have shown that valid information can be extracted from the “myth” using the following governing principles. First, orally transmitted stories are often compressed and truncated, due to the limitations of human memory. The stories that remained in the oral pipeline for a long time, therefore, can get further distilled. Second, analogies and explanations often get blended with actual events and come to obfuscate the stories. Our task, therefore, is to separate analogies from actual occurrences. Third, dates, if given in the stories, are usually inaccurate as there was no absolute time marker available in illiterate society. Likewise, the order of events may be inaccurate due to the lack of a time marker and resultant confusion. Finally, the attributes and actions of a group may be represented by those of a single individual, often the leader of the group. The travel of an individual, for instance, may signify the transfer of power between the two clans.

The accounts in the Samguk sagi and Samguk yusa relate the appearance of three Silla progenitors in Kyŏngju, the center of Silla, as follows. First, there were villages led by chiefs who had descended from heaven. One day, a kneeling horse led one of the chiefs to a large egg, from which a little boy, Hyŏkkŏ, emerged. He grew up to be the first ruler of Silla and married Aroyong, a woman born of a dragon but possessed chicken beaks. He took the last name Pak because his egg had the shape of a gourd, which was pronounced “pak.” Second, during the reign of Hyŏkkŏs or his son Namhae, Sŏk T’alhae also appeared from an egg. This egg was laid by the queen of Tabana, a country hundreds of miles northeast of Wa (J. Wa), or present-day Japan, but the displeased king placed it in a box on a boat and let it drift on the sea. After bypassing the state of Kumgwang Kaya in present-day Kimhae on the southern coast, the box arrived at Ajinp’o. An old fisherwoman found T’alhae, slaves, and treasures from the boat. He was later married to Aro (or Ahyo), Namhae’s daughter. T’alhae succeeded Aro’s brother Yuri as the ruler of Silla, and he took the last name Sŏk, taking the left-hand half of the Chinese character for magpie, the bird that had landed on his boat. Finally, during T’alhae’s reign, a golden box was found hanging from a tree in the woods of Kyŏngju, where a rooster clucked. A little boy, Alchi, appeared out of the box, and he was taken to the palace by T’alhae. Although Alchi was asked to take the throne, he never did. Later, his sixth generation descendant Mich’u married King Sŏk Chobun’s daughter Kwangmyong and became the first Silla ruler descending from Achi. The last name Kim, written in the Chinese character for gold, derives from the golden box that Alchi came from.

Of the stories of the three progenitors, the stories of Hyŏkkŏs and Alchi share close similarities. They each came as a young child out of either an egg or a box found outside of the village, and animals, a horse and a cock, signified the arrival of the special child. There is a hint that the egg and the box arrived from a distant place; they may have come with the horse or descended from heaven on to the tree. The true identity of Hyŏkkŏ and Alchi, is concealed under the egg and the box. The stories relate their exceptional qualities that made even animals rejoice, but no specifics are mentioned. The stories are told from the angle of those who witnessed their sudden appearance, and these individuals possibly represent the arrival of groups of people.

Although T’alhae also appeared out of an egg, the rest of his story bears few similarities with the other stories. His birthplace is specified as Tabana, hundreds of miles northeast of Wa, though there actually is no place known by this name. His egg in a box drifted at sea and almost stopped at Kumgwang Kaya in present-day Kimhae on the southern coast. It, however, continued drifting and finally arrived at present-day Yongil Bay near Pohang, a short distance north of Kyŏngju. Little T’alhae was raised by an
old fisherwoman, and later married a royal princess and became king of Silla.

Since more details in the story indicate a shorter time period in oral transmission, we can surmise that the event that gave rise to the story of T’alhae took place more recently than the events that developed into the stories about Hyŏkkôse and Alchi. Thus, despite the chronological order of Hyŏkkôse, T’alhae, and Alchi, given in the *Samguk sagi* and *Samguk yusa*, it is possible that the groups represented by Hyŏkkôse and Alchi emerged in Kyŏngju before the arrival of the group represented by T’alhae. The order of arrivals was probably adjusted by later historians who knew that the Silla throne had been taken first by Hyŏkkôse’s descendants, second by T’alhae’s, and finally by Alchi’s.

If the sudden appearance of Hyŏkkôse and Alchi is a vague echo of migrations, T’alhae’s relocation by boat, together with his slaves and treasures, clearly expresses the arrival of a group by sea. Their arrival in Kimhae and eventual landing on the shore near Kyŏngju depict the final portion of their journey, but their starting point of T’abana is not identifiable. Because of the mention of Wae, some Japanese scholars in the past linked T’alhae’s birthplace to the Japanese islands (Hosaka 2000, 163-164). This, however, is a futile attempt; the name Wae was mentioned probably due to frequent arrivals of Japanese vassals across the East Sea in later years. The account simply points out the general direction of northeast for T’alhae’s homeland.

Additional anecdotal accounts in the *Samguk yusa* give further clues to the origin of T’alhae and his group. He revealed that he had descended from a blacksmith when he took over a house that had belonged to an aristocrat in Kyŏngju. The name T’alhae may be related to “tal,” the archaic Korean word for smithing. If so, the last name Sŏk may have come from iron (soi in contemporary Korean) because the character for the magpie was pronounced as si or se in Old Korean (Mun 1983, 6; Yi Pyŏng-do 1983, 27). The idea of smith-king is not unique in T’alhae’s story, but often found in old legends from Asian nomads, such as Xiongnu and Mongols (Ch’ŏn 1989, 282-283). Also, T’alhae used a rhyton, an animal horn made into a cup, to drink water. It is known that the rhyton was widely used by nomadic peoples across the Eurasian continent. Additionally, he went up a mountain and built a mound of piled stones, reminiscent of the stone-piled tombs discussed below. In sum, the group represented by T’alhae had advanced metallurgy and northern cultural traits.

The *Samguk sagi* account mentions that the boat was not welcomed by Kimhae people. The *Samguk yusa* relates in a separate episode that T’alhae challenged the Kaya king Suro but made a retreat due to Suro’s superior magic. It is possible that the group sailed from the Yellow Sea to the southern peninsula and, then northward to Ulsan/P’ohang. But, if they came down along the eastern peninsula coast, did they not find other harbors besides Kimhae?

If they originated in the northeast and sailed southward along the East Sea coast, as the story indicates, how did they reach Kimhae first? It is possible that the group drifted down to Kimhae due to the collision of the cold and warm currents. The cold North Korea Current flowing southward and the East Korea Warm Current flowing northward collide around 36-38 degrees N. in the East Sea (Hydrography and currents n.d.). This means that a boat gliding on the cold current along the eastern coast of the peninsula can be diverted to the open sea before reaching P’ohang, drift to the southern coast, and then catch the warm current to sail back northward to P’ohang.

At this point, it may be useful to refer to the *Sui shu*, written in seventh-century China, as it refers to the two possible origins of Silla’s ruling class. It mentions that the Silla king originally came from Paekche by way of sea. It also relates that Silla was built by those who had fled Koguryŏ to its southern neighbor Okcho, when the former was attacked by the Chinese Wei dynasty (220-265) in 245. Although there is no way of verifying this information, it is important to know that both Koguryŏ and Paekche were thought to have contributed to the foundation of Silla.

The Korean historians Ch’ŏn Kwan-u and Yi Man-yol consider T’alhae to be the king that the *Sui shu* says had originally sailed from Paekche, and they speculate that he had come from the Han River region. We should, however, pay attention to the other migration, the Koguryŏ people’s move that the Chinese historian recorded with more details. The time of T’alhae and his grandson Pŏhyu in the third century roughly corresponds to the time when the Koguryŏ people were compelled to migrate. They may have chosen to sail southward along the East Sea coast, instead of marching through unknown peoples and territories on land.

**Archaeological Studies**

Based on the above analysis of the genealogies and legendary accounts in the *Samguk sagi* and the *Samguk yusa*, we can hypothesize that T’alhae’s group originated in a northern region and moved to Kyŏngju via the access points to the East Sea, such as P’ohang. Their initial arrival in the region was no earlier than the third century, and they dominated the existing ruling class later in the century through intermarriage and advanced metallurgy. But, do archaeological findings in and around Kyŏngju support this hypothesis?

Until recently, many scholars assumed that the southeastern corner of the Korean peninsula had developed slowly by receiving cultural influence from the Chinese commanderies of Lelang and Taifang located in northeastern Korea until 313. Scholars also assumed that Koguryŏ’s invasion of southern
Korea in the year 400 newly introduced northern cultures to the region. However, recent archaeological findings reveal the presence of northern cultural influence in the southeastern region at least by the first half of the fourth century (Barnes 2004, 34; Yi Hyun-hae 2001, 257).

The most important manifestation of the northern culture in early Silla is in the tomb style. As in the rest of the southeastern part of the peninsula, Kyongju had pit-style wooden coffin tombs till the first century and wooden chamber tombs through the third century. Then, sometime in the first half of the fourth century, Kyongju saw the construction of a unique burial style for its ruling class, commonly called the stone-piled wooden chamber tombs. They are mound tombs of 20 meters to 120 meters in diameter, and under the mounds are large piles of stones covering wooden chambers, which in turn contain coffins and burial goods. The construction of these tombs lasted from the fourth century till the early six century while the earlier wooden chamber tombs and its successor, pit-style stone chamber tombs, concurrently existed apparently for the lower class.

A few such tombs were excavated by Japanese archaeologists in the 1920s, and more by Korean scholars in the 1970s, yielding gold crowns and jewelry, many iron weapons, and horse equipment. Prewar Japanese scholars viewed these tombs as a hybrid of Chinese wooden chamber tombs transmitted from Lelang and stone-piling tradition from Bronze-age dolmens. Many Korean scholars in recent decades, however, regard the tomb style as a result of cultural impact from the north. Some of them think that the southward movements of nomadic peoples following the fall of the Chinese Han (202 B.C.-220) and Wei dynasties may have reached as far as Kyongju.

Tomb styles do not drastically change unless a new group of people settle in (Kim Ki-ung 1980, 134; Yi Chong-sun 1996, 8; Kang In-gu 1984, 179). Although until recently Western scholars generally turned away from population movements as explanations for cultural changes (Chapman 1997), it may be reasonable to hypothesize the inflow of foreign peoples when new burial styles suddenly appear (Barnes 2004, 35).

Korean scholars have proposed the possible homeland of the stone-piled tomb builders. The archaeologist Choe Pyong-hyon (1991a, 151-152) sees strong similarities between the Silla tombs and Central Asian kurgans, for instance, built in Pazyryk near the Chinese-Russian borders. He speculates that a group of nomadic Asians moved all the way to Kyongju and dominated existing population by the first half of the fourth century. Similarly, the anthropologist Kim Pyong-mo (1998, 167-168) thinks that this early Silla culture originated from the gold-rich Altai Mountains region in Central Asia and compares the gold crowns unearthed from the tombs in Kyongju to Siberian shaman hats. Yi Chong-sun (1996, 8-9) agrees with the theory of central Asian origins and speculates a population movement from the Ordos region in northwestern China all the way to Kyongju through northwestern Korea.

Kang In-gu agrees that the stone-piled tombs originated in the north but not all the way from central Asia. He points out important structural differences including the thickness of the soil on the top--huge amount in the case of the Silla tombs and a thin layer in the case of kurgans-- besides the gap of a few centuries and thousands of miles between the two tomb groups. According to him, the prototype of the Silla tombs can be found in the stone-piled wooden chamber tombs constructed by early Koguryo along the Yalu River. The tombs that developed from this prototype are located in northeastern Korea, near the Han River, and even in southern Korea of a Kayo site, although they, unlike the Silla tombs, have no earthen mounds on top of the stones. He thus suggests Koguryo influence but does not discuss population movements (Kang In-gu 1984, 112-161).

It has been reported that stone-surrounded wood chamber tombs were recently unearthed near Ulsan, the port just southeast of Kyongju (Barnes 2004, 22). These tombs, products of the late third century, may be the precursor of Kyongju’s stone-piled tombs. Migrants carrying northern culture from Koguryo may have first reached Ulsan by sea and built their tombs. After resetting in Kyongju and becoming its rulers, their royal tombs may have added indigenous elements such as earthen mounds. The Korean scholars often link the stone-piled wooden chamber tombs to the Kim rulers. Trusting the Samguk sagi’s Silla chronologies, Choe attributes the pit-style wooden chamber tombs of the late second century to the Sok rulers and the emergence of the stone-piled tombs to Kim Naemul’s reign (Choe 1991b, 69). Kim Pyong-mo (1998, 165-168) agrees and thinks that the name Kim (gold) and the progenitor Alchi, possibly a variant form for altai (gold in Altaic languages) are appropriate for their origin in the Altai Mountains region. However, as discussed in the above, the more realistic dates for Naemul’s reign are from the late fourth to early fifth centuries, and those for his relative Mich’u’s in the mid fourth century. The first appearance of the stone-piled tombs in the middle of the first half of the fourth century corresponds to the time of the Sok rulers, i.e., Pohyu and his descendants.

Conclusion
A close look at the royal genealogies conveyed in the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa suggests that the earliest Silla rulers emerged as late as the third century, instead of the first centuries B.C./A.D. Further, their legendary accounts provide important clues as to how the Silla ruling clans, particularly the Sok, emerged in Kyongju. I hypothesize that the Sok migrated from northeastern Korea to the Ulsan/Pohyang area on the East Sea coast, and moved on to Kyongju by the end of the third century.
Though not a large group, they were accepted by the existing ruling clans and soon came to dominate them, owing to their advanced technology, particularly in metallurgy, as well as intermarriage. The appearance of the unique stone-piled wooden chamber mound tombs with rich burial goods have led many to think that those buried were new settlers with nomadic traditions and gold fixation. Although Korean archaeologists have linked the builders of the tombs to the Kim rulers, the chronology of the tombs beginning in the early part of the fourth century fits better with the emergence of the Sŏk clan. The culture that entered Kyŏngju in the third century blossomed by the fourth century, blending with the local traditions. The succeeding centuries saw the further development of this unique Silla culture, fostered by the Kim clan who established themselves as the cultural and political heir.

Notes
1. The early Silla rulers were called by varying titles, such as Kŏsŏkan, Ch'ach'aung, Isagŭm, and Maripkan, before being called king (Wang) beginning in the sixth century. The changing indigenous titles may imply the transformation of the rulership as Silla grew in size and power. This paper does not separate the early Silla rulers based on their titles.

2. Many scholars have pointed out the unusually long lives and reigns. See Imanishi (1933, 10-13) and Yi Ki-dong (1985, 189-190).

3. Beginning in the 1960s, Kim Ch'ŏl-chun (1975, 102-108) made an attempt to reconstruct the chronologies of early Silla kings as he was fully aware that the beginning of Silla should not be as early as the Samguk sagi records. He treated early Silla as a confederation of clans and suspected the clans had retained respective lines of chiefs. He thus considered some rulers in the same generation, such as Pak Yuri and Sŏk T'alhae, to be contemporaneous clan chiefs, and concluded that later historians had added extra reigns by placing them as successive rulers. According to his reconstruction, the confederation of the clans was first formed around the middle of the second century. Sŏn Sŏk-yŏl (2001, 44-57) recently adopted Kim's idea of contemporaneous chiefs and argued that the Pak and Sŏk rulers coexisted in the third to the mid fourth centuries and the Sok and Kim rulers from the mid fourth to the early fifth centuries. According to his reconstruction, the progenitors first appeared early in the third century. His revised dates are thus similar to those by Kang Chong-hun, discussed below.

4. The Samguk sagi even acknowledges that there were conflicting records. For instance, although it introduces Islŏng as Yuri's son, it also mentions the possibility that he was a grandson.

5. The following stories were taken from both the Samguk sagi and the Samguk yusa. There are differing details between the two. For instance, according to the Samguk sagi, Sŏk T'alhae appeared during Hyŏkkŏse's reign while, according to the Samguk yusa, it was during Namhae's reign. Also, the Samguk yusa relates Sŏk T'alhae's confrontation with Suro in Kimhae under the section on the state of Karak in Book Two.

6. Yi Pyŏng-do thinks Ajinp'o was Yŏngil Bay, by present-day P'ohang (1983, 26).

7. The explanations of the surnames appear to be later insertions since the Chinese-modeled names were not used in Silla till the sixth century (Sasse 2000, 230). However, the progenitor myths and identity of the clans can go further back.

8. Kim Pyŏng-mo (1988) points out that stories of egg birth are often found in South and Southeast Asia while stories of heavenly descent are common in north Asia. Silla seems to combine both traditions.

9. Scholars have expressed similar views. According to James Grayson (2000), the story of T'alhae is legendary while the stories of Hyŏkkŏse and Alchi are mythic. Kim Ch'ŏl-chun (1975, 75) thought, based on the stories, that T'alhae's group had arrived from a remote place much after the arrival of Hyŏkkŏse and Alchi's groups.


11. Decades ago, Hamada Kōsaku (1932, 35-36), a prewar Japanese archaeologist, studied the Silla gold crowns and pointed out their possible ties with north Asian counterparts. Kim Wŏl-lyong (1976, 53) also discussed the artifacts' northern connections.
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Contact Address
Chizuko Allen
University of Hawaii at Manoa
School of Hawaiian, Asian & Pacific Studies
2825 S. King Street #2104
Honolulu, HI 96826
USA
PH: (808) 956-2210
FAX: (808) 956-6345EMAIL: chizuko@hawaii.edu
**The Independent and Democratic Republicanism in the Late 19th Century**

Dongsoo Lee  
Kyung Hee University, Korea

**Abstract**  
In spite of the successful industrialization and democratization, the Korean society has still suffered significant social conflicts. To escape from this situation, it should be taken into account that republicanism along with democracy is the founding idea of Korea. Republicanism does not oppose to, but has tensions with democracy. While the latter pursues the realization of the popular sovereignty and the direct rule of the people, the former emphasizes social integration and juridical deliberation, and wants to remove the danger of the democratic tyranny. At the end of the 19th century, the enlightened Korean reformists tried to build a self-generated republican state. Their republican themes shown in The Independent (Dongnip sinmun) were social integration, the communication between the government and people, and the rule by law. Meanwhile, The Independent had also limits such as the lack of power distribution for the people, the ignorance of the method for integration, and the confusion of the rule by law with the rule of law. However, it has no doubt that The Independent gives us an important insight for reconstructing the Korean society after democratization.

**I. Introduction**  
Korean society has experienced significant political and economic advancements unprecedented in the world, thanks to the democratization that took place in Korea starting from the 1960s. However, conflicts and confusions aggravate as diverse interests clash whereas democracy is yet to consolidate its position in Korea. Conflict among diverse interests, clash of ideologies, conflict between generations and regional conflicts inhibit the advancement of democracy in Korea. This aggravation of conflicts and ensuing division ultimately weaken the sense of belonging for Koreans, and cause identity crisis. The key to resolving these issues is to consolidate constitutionalism, which is the culmination of the integration in the modern age. In other words, it is necessary to establish the sense of nation and identity that everyone in the society agrees to, and to factor these into the constitution in order to solve social problems. From this respect, we need to reflect on the significance of the ‘democratic republic’ that is defined as the identity of Korea on our constitution’s Sub Clause 1 of Clause 1. The concept of ‘democratic republic’ is the basic principle that has been agreed upon as the foundation of the constitutionalism that includes various constitutions adopted by different regimes. During the last 60 years, Korea has experienced the nation’s establishment, industrialization and democratization, people’s sovereignty, which is the foundation of democracy is somewhat realized. However, the concept of ‘republicanism,’ included in the constitution, is not defined clearly yet.

Of course, democracy and republicanism are not entirely different concepts. However, there is a subtle difference between the two. Only when we pay attention to this difference can we understand why different societies in the history used these two concepts as if they are opposites. The modern society is characterized by the development of the democracy, and in fact, democracy’s main goal is to guarantee individuals’ rights and to strengthen these rights into power. In other words, democracy is the system that seeks to distribute the power that can become arbitrary so that the rights of the people in general can be protected. Therefore, it is based on the principles of ‘division of power’ and ‘majority rule.’ However, republicanism takes an interest on how social integration should be carried out amidst this separation, and the republic is defined as “the group of citizens who live under a common law, devoid of king and slaves.” According to Viroli, the primary interest of democracy is the realization of the people’s sovereignty and thus tends to emphasize direct democratic elements even more while republicanism, although based on the people’s sovereignty, seeks to eliminate the risk factors of the ‘democratic dictatorship’ through mediums such as system of representation, system of examination by judicature, constitutionalism and so forth. Moreover, democracy focuses on the direct exertion of power by the people or at least restraint of the political power through democratic control while republicanism upholds integration of the people and establishment of interactivity.

These republican characteristics were indeed what the pioneers of the enlightenment group who planned for a new modern nation-state system by reforming the Joseon dynasty during the late 19th century already had in mind. In particular, the political system that was envisioned by the advocates of enlightenment resembles self-generated republican democracy more so than liberal democracy. Here,

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Republican democracy refers to the democracy that is focused on republicanism. Moreover, self-generated republican democracy refers to the political system whereby citizens are brought into the political space while recognizing monarchy. In particular, it integrates the people into the public realm, organizing discussion forum for the people to open up the channel of communication and to ultimately establish a ruling system based on the rule by law.

Some belittles the theory on the constitutional monarchy suggested by the advocates of enlightenment as the rule by law that recognizes magistrate, which means that it advocates the monarchy of the old era. There is the aspect of devaluation in the sense that their movement to establish assembly too opposes the lower house while claiming to establish merely the upper house. Although criticism on this limitation is appropriate, we should not underestimate their republican democratic reform type of effort. At the time, the situation at the Joseon dynasty did not resemble that of the Western society in the modern age. Moreover, it is necessary to factor in that they pursued path-dependent reforms since the conditions of Joseon dynasty was the given.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the theoretical aspect of modern nation-state building unfolded by the advocates of enlightenment with special focus on The Independent (Dongnip sinmun) with this sense of awareness deriving from the self-generated republican democratic perspective and to identify significance and limitations.

II. Theoretical Review of the Republican Democracy

No one can question the justification for democracy as a political ideology and a political system. In general, democracy is defined as the rule by the people. In other words, democracy is the system whereby most of the people act as the dominating factor. According to Claude Lefort, however, there is a double meaning to this phrase, "rule by the people." Specifically, power amidst democracy derives from the people (rule by the people), but that power is no one's (nobody rules). Democracy is characterized by the duality of the 'rule by the people' and 'void of domination.'

Accordingly, defining democracy simply as the rule by the people or majority rule is a misinterpretation of the spirit of democracy. What is important about democracy is not its format of democratic regime but the fact that it seeks non-domination which means that no one is ruled by anyone, and freedom.

In reality, however, non-domination is an output, more so than the proprietary process. In other words, it is impossible to form a political system of non-domination where no one rules. In fact, ruling is inevitable during the process of reaching non-domination. However, this ruling should be expressed in non-domination format or lead to non-domination at the end. Democratic regime is the system that was established according to these principles. Here, democratic regime refers to the political system where majority rule is allowed, yet the ruling should pursue non-domination and freedom, which are the spirits of democracy.

However, democratic regime as a system of majority rule causes numerous problems since it is yet another form of ruling. For the majority rule, the principle of decision by the majority acts as the principle of ruling. In this case, dictatorship by many follows although not dictatorship by the minority. However, his type of dictatorship may be diluted as people sometimes belong to the majority while they can also belong to the minority during the process of applying the majority rule. If and when a society is divided into very heterogynous and minorities due to the racial, ethnic, religious, and ideological differences, permanent ruling of the minority by the majority may result in all fronts. As J. S. Mill warned early on, dictatorship of the majority leads to the result of neglecting the people who belong to the minority, much more so than the dictatorship of the minority. At this time, the people who belong to the minority tend to take decisive action to stage organized and violent resistance even at the expense of false accusation that they are anti-democratic in order to end the dictatorship of the majority, and this is the key reason that disputes do not cease under the democratic regimes.

Liberal democrats of the modern age are those who reacted most sensitively to this problem affecting democratic regime. They think that just as democracy developed to guarantee the rights of the many even under the dictatorship of the minority, the rights of the few should be guaranteed under the dictatorship of the majority as well. Accordingly, the rule of law that protects the freedom of the minorities and small government for the minimization of the dictatorship of the majority based on the legislation of the basic rights needed by the minorities to lead their life is considered democratic regime's most important factor.

However, this type of liberal problem-solving method faces a major weakness. That is, when the focus is on guaranteeing individuals' freedom and rights, it is likely that less attention will be paid to the
joint affairs of the members of the society, and there is a tendency for focusing on the private realm away from the public realm, which threatens even the democratic regime itself. In a society ruled by many, the majority itself becomes anonymous. Even when people belong to the group of the many, individuals tend to focus merely on safeguarding their rights, considering themselves as the ruled as individuals since they delegated their authority to the government. This passive attitude eventually impedes vitalization of a society’s public realm.

These days, there is a tendency to emphasize democratic elements in the face of this situation. Here, republican democracy refers to the expansion of social integration ability and the establishment of social identity not by emphasizing the majority rule through election, a principle of the democratic regime, nor with the primary focus on securing as much power and freedom possible by the individuals as in the case of liberal democracy. Instead, republican democracy induces members of the society from various tiers to participate, taking an interest in the public matters, reinforces communication in all dimensions of the society, and induces the few who are delegated with the authority to rule based on the law instead of ruling arbitrarily.

For example, Hannah Arendt focuses on the classical republican democracy while considering the democracy in ancient Athens as an ideal. Arendt thinks that the modern society emphasizes the private realm excessively. Emphasis on the in-born basic rights of the human beings, as claimed by liberals, sounds convincing, she claims, yet the issue at hand is how to realize these basic rights in the society, and this is not obtained simply by emphasizing the rights of the individuals. In fact, the people of the modern age try to base the rights of individuals on the concept of universality, and tend to justify their private realm with that universality. On the other hand, the effort of social democracy to correct this issue excludes the individuals’ privacy on the contrary while simply trying to control the entire society.

Moreover, the act of voting which takes place in an election, is referred to as the flower of democracy, but is limiting in the sense of linking the personal issues of the voters, the people, with the issues faced by the entire community in a significant manner. That is, individuals merely consider individual freedom, which is enjoyed with their non-political and personal freedom through the act of voting, while the political opinion that is manifested in their votes merely stops at limiting the authority of the government when there is risk of infringing upon their individual freedom. In other words, there is a low possibility that the citizens’ political opinion that considers the interest of the entire community will be expressed.

Therefore, Arendt upholds the democracy in the ancient Athens. To Arendt, the ancient Athens shares many of the republican democracy’s characteristics, which offers the opportunity to form a common world among the people who hold different opinions while everyone speaks out their opinions to persuade others at the discussion forums. The mere act of voting and the lack of the opportunity to present opinions through the discussions reinforce the negative perception of the people as unreliable and volatile individuals. A society comprised of these types of individuals cannot realize democracy. In fact, although discussion and decision on key issues were made at the assembly (ekklesia) and the courts (dikasteria) where all citizens gathered together in the ancient Athens, specific functions were delegated to a handful administrators who were chosen by lottery and election, with significant power and authority delegated to them. From this respect, this system can be referred to as the rule of the minority on behalf of the majority. However, all members could participate without distinguishing who is the minority and who is the majority since actual discussions were carried out with the participation of all citizens in the assembly and courts, and all people were already participating as a candidate for administrator position through the lottery system, a random selection process. Moreover, everyone enjoyed the ‘the equality of possibility’ since anyone could become the administrator. Given these facts, a sense of community was formed and it was possible to overcome the dichotomy of the ruling and the ruled.

III. The Independent and Republican Democracy

Normally, there are contradictory views on The Independent (Dongnip sinmun). Some emphasize the positive aspect, claiming that Dongnip sinmun contributed to the modernization of Korea by advocating nation-state building and constitutional monarchy, representing the political opinion of the bourgeois and by claiming reform and nationalism. It is credited as the first civilian newspaper that spoke on behalf of the enlightenment camp that opposed King Gojong and the conservative. Meanwhile, some claim that Dongnip sinmun was one of the rare mediums that raised awareness on the imperialism, and that it also

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96 Manin integrates the characteristics of democracy in the ancient Athens as the ‘principle of possibility’ and the ‘principle of superiority.’ Here, the ‘principle of possibility’ refers to opening up the possibility for anyone to become the ruler through the system of lottery in order to increase the sense of affiliation between the ruler and the ruled. Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
was anti-democratic, showcasing the limited social status of the liberals. According to the critics, what *Dongnip sinmun* pursued is not the modern nation-state, but the conservative reform that merely complements the hierarchical discrimination and the incumbent political system of the time.

My view, however, is that *Dongnip sinmun* certainly pursued modern nation-state building. Of course, there is a debate on whether the reformers targeted democratic regime of the modern age. Despite the fact that they were well informed and deeply influenced by the Western liberalism and democracy, they did not pursue democracy in a full-fledged manner after the monarchy was abolished. However, it is evident that they had democracy in mind as they pursued establishment of assembly although limited to upper house, and pursued a nation based on the rule by law that safeguards the rights and the freedom of the people. In particular, they cast away the traditional ruling method through the constitutional monarchy system while recognizing the existence of the king, who has been the power and the center of the nation, in order to make an independent nation that recently managed to escape from the influence of China.

In particular, it is my view that the democracy that they targeted is more like the republican democracy. Although they in part advocated rights and freedom, they pursued the integration of the people by reducing the gap between the ruling and the ruled during the Joseon dynasty for the sake of independence and modernization. That seems to mean that they emphasized the perspective of the republicanism even more that upheld community, more so than pursuing after the Western type of liberal democracy that purports to establish democratic regime, while advocating individuals’ rights and interests and while emphasizing suffrage rights. Precisely because of this point, claims made by the *Dongnip sinmun* from the liberal democracy perspective may appear rather lacking. Moreover, the republican democratic element of *Dongnip sinmun* that I wish to emphasize is different from the Western republican democracy examined above because there are many aspects that are difficult to define as republican democracy. However, what I would like to claim is that examining *Dongnip sinmun* from the republican democracy perspective is helpful to better understand the intention of the newspaper and to better assess its significance. Of course, numerous limitations of *Dongnip sinmun* are disclosed even from the republican democracy perspective, which I will address later on. Here, I will organize the characteristics of *Dongnip sinmun* from the republican democracy perspective.

The foremost interest of *Dongnip sinmun* was to transform the Joseon dynasty into an independent modern nation by the integration of the people. In other words, *Dongnip sinmun*’s basic position was that the Joseon dynasty needed to be born again into a modern nation, both politically and socially, in order to become an independent nation that would be never again subjugated to the external powers, especially since it managed to free itself from the Chinese influence after the Sino-Japanese War. Towards this end, the newspaper claimed that this sovereignty is possible only when the republican ideology of integrating the people is realized. Aiming at the establishment of an independent, modern nation, *Dongnip sinmun* suggested integrating all the people by ensuring effective communication between them, and by creating a structure of ruling based on the rule by law. Let’s us examine each of these in order.

First of all, *Dongnip sinmun* defines the Joseon dynasty as the nation that is at the initial stage of genuine sovereignty. Until then, the Joseon dynasty did not know, “what the independence and autonomy are since it was a tributary nation to another nation” (May 18, 1897). Only after the Reform of 1894, the Joseon dynasty finally began to walk on the path of becoming a truly independent nation although it had to rely on other nations. Accordingly, independence as referred to by *Dongnip sinmun* refers to the independence from China. Meanwhile, the term “independence” embraces yet another meaning; emphasis on the active identity and the spirit of self-sustenance of the people in the Joseon dynasty people. “Independence means not relying on others” (Aug. 5, 1897), and the members of the modern nation have to become independent themselves, driven by their own will. Accordingly, the term “independence” refers to the duality; active independence of the people and the passive independence of the nation.

In order to become an independent nation, each individual should be able to become independent, and the nation should be able to integrate these individuals. While *Dongnip sinmun* referred to the freedom and equality as the “rights that the people can assume” (Mar. 9, 1897), it sought to awaken them to become aware of their rights. However, they still lacked the culture and the mindset of citizenry. They lacked the ability to become independent individuals with the sense of ownership.

Accordingly, what was most urgently called for was to educate and enlighten the people to change the customs. Moreover, to integrate the enlightened and independent individuals into the nation-state, the people who lived in the Joseon dynasty should develop the sense that they are one in the nation-state despite gender, age and social and economic status, and this is possible only when the society’s communication structure is conducted effectively. As the Western history demonstrates, formation of a

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In this paper, the excerpts from *Dongnip sinmun* are shown including the dates.
modern nation always takes place along with the change in communication. In this respect, the fact that *Dongnip sinmun* selected Hangeul (the Korean alphabet) as the sole language to publish the newspaper is like creating an immense structure of common communication in the Joseon dynasty. In other words, *Dongnip sinmun* only used Hangeul that anyone can read, to make the common people into citizens, and played the role of gathering the members of the nation-state. Therefore, *Dongnip sinmun*’s selection of Hangeul does not stop at ‘discovering the Korean language,’ but leads to the ‘discovery of the people’ and ‘development of a modern nation.’

However, publishing newspaper in Korean alone does not guarantee integration of the people. Only when discussion forums, which is the inherent role of a newspaper, is realized properly, can all the members of the society carry on actual communication, which in turn will realize the goal of integrating the people. *Dongnip sinmun* was well aware of this fact, and defined its role as that of providing the forum for exchanging public opinion (Apr. 7, 1896).

Moreover, what is even more important is that this forum for exchanging public opinion goes beyond the level whereby the professionals in the news and media and the intellectuals monopolize to deliver one-sided messages for enlightenment to the ordinary people. Instead, this forum enabled the forum for exchanging public opinion of the ordinary people to voice out their opinion in person. *Dongnip sinmun* in fact posted up the opinion of the ordinary people, and played an important role in forming the forum for exchanging public opinion among the ordinary people (Nov. 9, 1898).

Formation of this forum for exchanging public opinion played a definite role in transforming the people. The expression, the “citizens” appeared very often in *Dongnip sinmun* along with the “people.” This term defines the ordinary members of the society differently from the way they were described at the time. In other words, *Dongnip sinmun* upgraded the common people to the citizens’ level.

Meanwhile, *Dongnip sinmun* emphasized the rule by law, as an essential element for integrating the nation-state and for forming independent, modern nation. Above all, *Dongnip sinmun* perceived that the politics in the Joseon dynasty faced a serious problem: The government officials focused on arbitrary ruling by abusing their power and authority. In other words, the politics in the Joseon dynasty was characterized as "unlawful government of the Joseon dynasty, poor people of the Joseon dynasty" (Mar. 16, 1897). In particular, the government officials of the Joseon dynasty were depicted as lowly people devoid of dignity. They tended to emphasize their authority by stating their social position, take away the others’ rights, and neglect the laws as they like. Accordingly, the nation can only stand up tall when these government officials ensure the public order of the law as rapidly as possible, and govern the people with the law while applying the law strictly to themselves first.

The law should be applied fairly to the officials and ordinary people alike. Anyone who breaks the law should be subjected to due punishment. However, *Dongnip sinmun* tends to incite excessive reliance on the law, and manifests some form of law-is-everything attitude. In other words, the law should be made favorably for the people, but no matter how “good” a law may be, it is inevitable that some might find it inconvenient. Accordingly, the role of the officials is to actively execute the law even when some complain of inconvenience. That is, according to the newspaper, “the government has to make laws so that numerous people will benefit from them, and yet even when a law in question may harm 50 people and even when the 50 people will complain, the government must make and execute it for the sake of 100 people” (Nov. 7, 1896). Accordingly, it lays down the framework for the rule by law that emphasizes the strict application and governance by the law.

### IV. Conclusion

In the above sections, we examined the significance of republican democracy, which was the main theme and characteristics of *Dongnip sinmun*. The findings can be summarized as follows: First, spirit of democracy does not stop merely at establishing the rule by the people and the majority, and in protecting the individuals’ freedom, rights and interests. Instead, its goal is to realize integration of people into community under the law, through appropriate participation and communication. Second, the significance of *Dongnip sinmun* becomes clearer when it is examined from the republican democracy point of view, in particular, from the self-generated republican democracy perspective factored in at the time, and from this historical point of view for the sake of the Joseon dynasty’s independence. Third, the republican characteristics of *Dongnip sinmun* can be defined by the following three concepts: social integration achieved by turning common people into members of the nation-state and uniting them, communication between the government and people for the sake of integration, and rule by law that

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98 Anderson claims that the mass printing and distribution of the publications in the modern ages contributed significantly to the formation of the modern state. In this respect, the citizens do not form a natural form of community based on blood relations or regional ties. Instead, the community that they form is the ‘imagined community’ based on cultural ties. From Anderson’s viewpoint, the fact that *Dongnip sinmun* used the Korean language to establish and circulate the newspaper, a medium for communication in the modern era demonstrates that it played a definite role in the formation of a modern nation. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflection on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983).
entails enacting laws to guarantee freedom and equality for all people.

These concerns of Dongnip sinmun and the republican democratic prescription were proposed after much strenuous efforts, factoring in the situation of the time. Because there are simply too many advantages of this idea, this paper does not discuss these advantages any more. Instead, this section examines a number of problems.

First, the ‘perception on the nation-state’ that Dongnip sinmun proposed for the integration of the nation-state can be understood sufficiently. However, there are some lacking aspects when perceived from the standard of the modern West and the standards of today. In my opinion, the integration of the nation-state claimed by Dongnip sinmun focuses merely on gathering together people. In fact, it does not uphold reinforcement of the individuals’ active and potential ability. In other words, it did not choose the path of forming a nation-state or the citizenry by transforming people into individuals. It focuses on the nation-state alone as the members who are gathered in the nation. However, this type of collection is not so much the genuine form of integration. It may easily fall into the rank of inclusion into the nation. In this case, there is a risk that the nation-state’s capability cannot be exerted fully.

Moreover, the formation of ‘nation-state’ that does not undergo the stage of ‘individualism’ runs the risk of diluting the concept of ‘democracy’ that emphasizes the sovereignty and power of the individuals. As pointed out previously, ‘democracy’ refers to the ‘rule by the people.’ Accordingly, all the people assume the rights as the main party, and the power to realize them, which in turn lays down the foundation for separation the national power and to block dictatorship. However, Dongnip sinmun addresses the freedom and rights of the people, yet it is silent when it comes to their power. This point clearly demonstrates the difference in the republicanism tendencies shown on the history of republican democracy development process in the West and on Dongnip sinmun. In the case of the West, formation of the ‘individuals’ was prioritized over the ‘nation-state.’ Amidst this process, republicanism issues were emphasized only after the ‘democratic’ initiative, which is the power separation, was realized first. On the other hand, Dongnip sinmun neglected the question of ‘democracy’ while the transformation took place from the perception of the nation that was traditionally comprised of ‘people’ to the ‘nation-state.’

Second, Dongnip sinmun proposes the education and enlightenment for the people as a strategy to bring out the behavior of the nation-state. Although this is a very important virtue, it is lacking when it comes to leading the people to act like the members of a nation-state. In other words, educating them on the ethics of nation-state does not make them members of the nation-state. Instead, motivating the people to actively pursue enlightenment so that they consider themselves the main party of the nation-state through performative experience is needed. In other words, the awareness of the people of the nation comes from the ‘exercising action’ more so than the ‘education for enlightenment.’ This is the reason that the republican democracy upholds participation.

Third, emphasis on the rule by law that Dongnip sinmun presented remains to be regretful despite the fact that it is a very important contribution. If the problem of the rule by law found in Dongnip sinmun is summarized in one phrase, it is confusing between ‘the rule by law as the domination by the law’ and ‘the rule of law as the governing of the law.’ Dongnip sinmun identified the law as the norm for protecting the rights of the people and for treating them equally and thus assumed that it contains the characteristics of social promise. This type of awareness towards the law was certainly advanced for the time. However, Dongnip sinmun held onto a contrary position when it came to the application of the law. Prior to discussing this problem, let’s examine Arendt’s view of the law.

Arendt advocates the law based on the human relations and that which is made by the human beings as the law that should serve as the basis of the rule of law that can bring about social integration to the people of a nation instead of the natural law of the transcendental origin. Nomos in ancient Greece refers to the custom-like and artificial characteristics of the law. Moreover, the original meaning of lex in ancient Rome is ‘intimate connection’ or relationship. In other words, it refers to that something that connects two objects or partners that gather due to external environment. Both nomos and lex assumed that the law signifies the relationship and agreement between different people.

Accordingly, what is most important in the law is not the contents of the law, but the question of agreement on the enact process and agreement on the law. Arendt considered the US constitution as the law with the most elements of republicanism. Here, the most important clause is the ‘We hold’ part that is known to show more than any other part that the people of the nation support the agreement. The moment this phrase is said, it is a given that we agreed to the authority of the constitution, and thus, accept the domination based on the constitution for freedom, not as a mere domination.

When seen in this view of law, Dongnip sinmun’s rule by law appears to have neglected the participation and support or the voluntary obedience by the people by emphasizing merely the strict application of the law and domination despite the fact that it had the hint to understand the law from the social contract philosophy perspective. Accordingly, the rule by law that is claimed by Dongnip sinmun is more of formality when it comes to the domination by the law, and lacks the element of actual domination of the law, resulting from voluntary obedience to the law.
Despite this problem, however, the significance of Dongnip sinmun examined from the perspective of self-generated republican democracy is clear. In particular, authenticity of the nation-building based on the modern republican democracy, embraced by Dongnip sinmun is recognized in full, and the idea itself continues to hold ground even to this day. However, it is needless to mention that the limitations pointed above should be complemented and made more sophisticated from the modern perspective.

References
The Independent (Dongnip sinmun).

Contact Address
Dongsoo Lee
The Graduate School of NGO Studies, Kyung Hee University
1 Hoeki-dong, Dongdaemoon-gu, Seoul, 130-701, Korea
PH: +82-2-961-9407 (O)
EMAIL: dslee@khu.ac.kr
Australia, the Korean Question and the United Nations 1946–1991

John Synott
Queensland University of Technology, Australia

Abstract
This paper represents an initial attempt to track and analyse one previously unrecognised feature of the political history of the relationship between Korea and Australia, and that is the role played by Australia as a member of the United Nations Organization in respect to the so-called Korea question. Drawing on source documents from both the UN and the Australian Archives (which have only recently been available) this paper examines the changing positions of Australia as the Korea question developed in the UN General Assembly, from the beginnings of the UN Organization until the time when both Koreas were admitted in 1991. The paper identifies these various positions as responses to changing domestic and international politics and their impacts on Australian foreign policy as enacted around the Korea question in the UN.

Introduction
This paper represents an initial attempt to track and analyse one previously unrecognised feature of the political history of the relationship between Korea and Australia, and that is the role played by Australia as a member of the United Nations Organization in respect to the so-called Korea Question in the UN. In his recent edited collection of resolutions pertaining to Korea adopted by the principal organs of the United Nations, In Seop Chung (2002, p.v) noted that the term Korea Question may refer to all issues that have any relation with Korea at the UN, ‘even though until 1976 the title ‘Korea question’ had been used to refer to the actual agenda of the General Assembly’ (2002,v). Unpacking this notion more specifically, at the 112th plenary meeting of the General Assembly, 14 November 1947, the ‘Korea Question’ was defined as the question concerned with the ‘freedom and independence’ of Korea. All debates, resolutions, and actions taken by the UN in respect to Korea over the subsequent 44 years hinged around this central issue of the freedom and independence of Korea.

Nevertheless, the deliberations at the UN over the Korea Question were characterised by a second element—that the Korea Question ‘is primarily a matter for the Korean people’ and that ‘this question cannot be correctly and fairly resolved without the participation of representatives of the indigenous population’ (Chung, 2002, p.1). However, the participation required of Korea in dealing with the issue of its freedom and independence was not possible due to the fact that no government from Korea was a member of the United Nations until 1991. Thus, for over four decades the Korea Question, being the first major international crisis to come before the UN after its inauguration, was conducted in a vacuum, in which the participation of the subject of the question—the Korean people—was not possible.

Given the absence of the Korean voice in UN deliberations regarding the Korea Question, the voices and roles of other UN members in respect to this question take on a particular significance, for it was other nations and not Korea itself, which determined the way in which the Korea Question unfolded and was addressed in the UN. The Korea Question had a special resonance, moreover, for it was, ultimately about more than just Korea itself, but was a question—perhaps the question—around which international politics revolved in the re-making of the world community of nations in the period after World War II; it was, in essence, a central question in the international construction of the Cold War. A review of the debates, documents, resolutions and actions within the UN regarding the Korea Question reveals the expressions, positioning, and political manoeuvres of the various nation-actor members of the United Nations.

This paper is concerned with the role played by the nation of Australia in the UN in respect to the Korea Question. The emergence of the Korea Question caught Australia at a particularly important time of its own political unfolding after World War II. Whereas prior to the war the political, economic and cultural orientations of Australia had been strongly towards the colonial home of England, the war and its aftermath had begun a shift in those spheres towards other arenas, particularly the United States of America, and economically towards Asia. Australia had strong bi-lateral trade agreements in place with Japan from the 1930s, selling mineral resources to Japan, so much so that the Prime Minister Robert (Bob) Menzies was lampooned as ‘Pig-Iron’ Bob during the war, because the iron ore that Australia sold to Japan was returning as ‘pig iron’ in bombs dropped on Northern Australia.

For the purposes of clarity in this paper the term Korea Question will be regarded as a formal term, thus capitalized throughout.
The role that Australia was to adopt in respect to the Korea Question in the UN challenged and brought forth the international identity and regional orientation that Australia was seeking to establish at that time. An analysis of Australia’s participation in the Korea Question thus provides insights into the Australian political process at an important time of its development, particularly in respect to its international context. The sometimes subtle changes of participation by Australia in the period under review from the late 1940s until the admission of both Koreas to UN membership in 1991 reflect an interesting insight into Australian foreign policy and the role of the UN in the dialectics of international state relations.

Moreover, given the close economic, cultural and political ties between Australia and South Korea today, and the regional role to which Australia aspires as a ‘middle power’ and broker in regional disputes and crises, including an aspiration for some diplomatic function in the regular crises involving North Korea, an examination of its track record in this area is of some meaning.

Certainly, aspects of the Korean Question also influenced the political situation and also the conduct of government in Australia. For instance, some of the data on which this paper is based comes from the Cabinet Records, which are the records of discussion and decisions of the inner sanctum of powerful government ministers in Australia. It was noted (Knott, 2006/URL) that the practice of the Secretary to the Prime Minister, Mr Allen Stanley Brown, to take notes of discussions in Cabinet meetings only began during the Korean War. Knott commented that the outbreak of the war ‘is likely to have been the catalyst’ for the recording of such notes, following the practice used in meetings of the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council in WWII. The practice of maintaining Cabinet records has continued to the present, and represents one of the most important archival documentary sources on the inner workings of the Australian political system. An understanding of formulation of the Australian position has only been available in the past few years, for the Cabinet Notebooks of the Menzies government of the early 1950s remained classified for a period of fifty years. An examination of these documents provides understanding of the broader conceptual and ideological policies behind Australian government decisions through this period.

This paper will now proceed to review Australia’s context in the United Nations system and its role in the Korea Question.

**Australia, Japan and Korea before World War II**

Prior to 1901 Australia was a colony of England indirectly under English rule with a system of self-governance. At the beginning of the twentieth century, exactly at that period when Korea was collapsing under Japan’s expansion, Australia became an independent nation with its own constitution, military forces and national system. Its economy was heavily dependent on England as a destination of exports of the mainstay products of wool and wheat. Even moreso, its political culture and sense of identity were pure-bred English and proudly so. Australia was a highly class-structured society with English descendents in the elite groups and the third-generation descendents of the predominantly Irish convict ancestors as the working classes. Two features of Australian political leadership at the time of Federation are particularly relevant to this discussion. The first of these was the indubitable belief in the British Empire and Australia's role and identity as a figurative ‘child’ of the Old Country. Even as late as 1942, in his wartime speech to American people, Labour Party Prime Minister John Curtin declared: 'We Australians, with New Zealand, represent Great Britain here in the Pacific – we are her sons and on us the responsibility falls' (Curtin, in Evatt, 1945, p.44). The other relevant feature was the active hostility towards ‘Asiatics’ particularly of the Chinese variety, who were coming to Australia in increasing numbers through the gold rushes after 1850 and after the USA passed an exclusion act in 1892. As the numbers of young Chinese immigrant workers swelled in this period, the so-called Father of Federation, and venerated nationalist, Sir Henry Parkes, while Premier of New South Wales in 1884, proposed legislation that would tax Chinese immigrants one hundred pounds each (a vast sum for the times) and limit intake of Chinese to Australia to one person for each three hundred tons of shipping [enforced at 500 tons in 1888] (Roberts, 1935). Parkes announced that ‘nor for her Majesty's ships of war, nor for Her Majesty’s representatives nor for the Secretary of State do we intend to turn aside from our purpose, which is to terminate the landing of Chinese on these shores forever’ (quoted in Roberts, 1935, p.11).

In a climate of hostility and non-contact physical appearance and skin colour were the recognised features of ‘Them’ and without a doubt, were Australians aware of a separate culture of Koreans, they would be treated as Chinese. Indeed the notion of the ‘yellow peril’ extended to anyone ‘oriental’. With federation in 1901 came the introduction of the Immigration Restriction Act (No 17 of 1901) which set up mechanisms for arbitrary exclusion of those seeking entry, implementing the White Australia policy. Interestingly the act was amended in 1905 to allow the entry of Japanese and Indian merchants, students and visitors and, in 1912, Chinese merchants. Economic pragmatism slipped through public antipathy.

Apart from one brief romance to transplant a section of Japanese feudal society to the Northern Territory in 1877 (Clunies-Ross, 1935) the formative period of the Australia–Japan relationship can be framed within, firstly, the growing economic relationship as Japan developed industrially and sought Australian resources; and, secondly, a political relationship shaped by Australia’s subservient worship of
Britain and related, transferred sense of awe at the might of Imperial Japan. Japan played its diplomatic cards extremely well to the West as it became a full member of the imperial club (some 87% of the known world territories were under colonial rule from nations in Europe or USA just prior to WWI). Japan’s expanding territory, modernity and industrial success stood out in Asia and contrasted with China’s fragmentation and backwardness. From this perspective, the abiding respect for empire, Australia fully recognised the boundaries of Japanese territory, including especially its territories to the west on the Asian mainland – i.e. Korea.

At the same time the White Australia policy was a major cause of discord between the two nations. It was not that Japan society was interested in emigration and they had restricted the number of people moving to the US via Hawaii. Rather the Japanese government was outraged that they could be included in the groups of undesirables to be permitted into Australia. They objected that, according to historian Roberts writing soon afterwards, ‘the ultimate policy that was adopted made no discrimination between Japanese and the “kanakas, negroes, Pacific Islanders, Indians and other eastern peoples” with whom they objected to be placed’ (Roberts, 1935, p.23). The upshot was a cultural turning away, indifference and mutual ignorance between Japanese and Australian societies. Australians were truly disinterested and oblivious to the Japanese repressive colonialism in Korea, and it is pertinent to recall in this context that Australian society and government were themselves colonizers over Indigenous Australians and throughout the country massacres still were perpetrated and Aboriginal people were under the control of the Protectorates, excluded without citizenship rights and considered to be a dying race of people. Colonization. Racist hate. Australians practised these as a matter of natural values. They had no incentives to question the legitimate right of Japan as the ruler of Korea.

The Anglo-Japan treaty that was concluded in 1902 only served to further legitimise Japan in Australian eyes. This treaty, according to Roberts ‘placed the seal on Japan’s modernization; it admitted her to the ranks of the Great Powers; it brought her within the orbit of the western world’ (1935, p.25). This treaty, Article 1, recognised that Japan ‘is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea’ and in the treaty Britain and Japan pledged to support and mutually protect each other’s interests (Roberts, 1935, p.25). Obviously this treaty had a strong impact on Australia. The British treaty with Japan could only confirm the status of Japan. While the Australian government stuck with the White Australia policy, it had no doubt that Japan was an imperial power and had no interest in the issue of Japanese sovereignty on the Asian mainland. Only when, after WWI when Japan occupied the Pacific islands vacated by the defeated Germans, did the Australian government protest against the Japanese expansion, because they were getting too close.

Economic relations grew rapidly with the rising standards of living in Japan, such that by the 1930s Australia supplied over 70% of Japan’s wheat and over 80% of Japan’s wool, representing over 20% of Australian wool exports. Relations were largely restricted to trade and certainly there were no concerns over matters of ethnocide in Korea (Clunies-Ross, 1935).

The shock of Japanese treachery and betrayal in attacking Pearl Harbour only served to confirm the racist hostilities towards the people and societies of Asia. Then after three years of the Pacific War in which many thousands of Australians died at the hands of the Japanese enemy there was only triumph at the victory. There were no sympathies for Japanese people who were the mass victims of the nuclear bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nor were there any considerations for the Korean people. The process of restoration of Japan and the trading wealth it represented to Australia were priorities, however. The restoration of the Japanese social and bureaucratic system in Korea was supported without question and the only concerns were ones of governance of Korea, now that the Japanese empire had been dismantled. And this issue of the governmental authority in Korea was to be settled by the new international community of nations in which Australia was a member – the United Nations.

The Emergence of the Korea Question in the United Nations

Australia had been a member of the League of Nations and in the Inter-Allied Declaration (London declaration) June 12, 1941; Australia was one of the fourteen nations that declared ‘The only true basis of enduring peace is the willing cooperation of free peoples in a world in which, relieved of the menace of aggression, all may enjoy economic security’ (in Sachs 1990, 7). The 3-power Cairo conference (1943) (involving Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang) announced a commitment to the independence of Korea (Quinones, 2003, p.98). Subsequent meetings at Dumbarton Oaks (21 Aug-28 Sept., 1944) and Yalta (Feb. 8, 1945) proposed an international trusteeship temporarily to rule Korea and laid the grounds for the establishment of a new world body of nations.

Formation of the UN Organization took place at the San Francisco United Nations Conference on International Organization April 25-June 26, 1945, with 50 member states represented, including Australia. The Australian representative was Dr. H.V. Evatt, Minister of External Affairs, who made a significant impact on the conference and the UN Charter by insisting on the rights of small states as against the hegemonic power of the large and powerful nations, particularly USA, United Kingdom and Soviet Union (Hudson, 1993). An application for admission by the provisional Korean government was denied.
Similarly at the Berlin Conference (July 22, 1945) an application from Syngman Rhee asking for diplomatic recognition for the Korean provisional government also was ignored. It was clear that the political fate of Korea was to be determined by the victorious great powers. At the subsequent Potsdam Conference of July 26, 1945, agreement was reached on the boundary of USSR & USA military operations in Korea, north and south of the 41st parallel. The Soviet Union declared war on Japan August 8, two days after Hiroshima, permitting them to move into Japanese territory on the peninsula and four days later they occupied the north, following the strategy set out in the Potsdam agreement. On surrender, August 15, Truman shifted the boundary to the 38th parallel. Japanese troops to the north surrendered to the Russians, those to the south to the Americans when they arrived on Sept 8.

In December, 1945, foreign ministers of UK, USA & USSR agreed to a ‘temporary trusteeship’ of the Korean peninsula. The Bi-lateral Joint Commission between USA and the USSR met in Seoul from March, 1946, until August, 1947, without being able to reach agreement on plans for a unified Korea. In September, 1947, the USA submitted the problem to the United Nations. From the outset the issue was mobilised as a point of contention between USSR and USA. In the General Assembly debate the USSR claimed that the arrangements for Korea had been already determined under previous agreements and it was illegal for the US to present the motion to the UN. However the issue remained with the UN and it was clear that the fate of Korea would be determined by UN processes.

Australia and the Korean Question Prior to the Korean War: the Evatt Doctrine for Small States

At the San Francisco conference Australia’s External Affairs minister Herbert V. Evatt made a significant input to the formulation of the Charter of the UN. In particular he led the debate to restrict in the Security Council the veto power of the Big 5, e.g. on the veto to place items on the Security Council agenda. Evatt was seen as leading the small and medium sized nations (Hudson, 1993). Dr Evatt was a leading member of the Labour Party government in Australia, and he took Labour principles of representing the workers and less powerful minority groups into the world forum. He regarded the success of the new organisation in achieving lasting world peace hinged upon its right to pursue economic and social justice as well as military security, as in the opening statement he made on behalf of the Australian Delegation:

In our view the success of the Conference will be measured by one test. Will it bring into existence an organisation which will give to the peoples of the world a reasonable assurance of security from war and reasonable prospect of international action to secure social justice and economic advancement? (quoted in Watt, 1967, p.83).

Evatt adopted a particular role to promote the rights and interests of small nations in the world forum and he carried his role into a range of UN activities. Thus Evatt’s served on the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, from which his role in 1945 as Chairman of the Policy Committee of the Far-Eastern Advisory Committee, set up in Washington to deal with questions of post-war policy in relation to Japan, became the initial engagement of Australia with the Korean Question. He was to lead the Australian delegation to the United Nations from 1946–48 and in 1948 he was elected president of the General Assembly of the UN. Thus Evatt was an influential voice in the UN in the period leading up to the elections that brought Syngman Rhee to power.

In his approach to the Korea question, Evatt certainly expressed his support for the recognition of the rights of small states. Not surprisingly, then, the initial period of the Korean question can be identified as a period of active Australian engagement and support for the process to introduce Korea as an independent democratic state. The Korean issue was a focal point for the Australian international advocacy on the rights of small states as the basis of international security (Watt, 1967).

This was the first time that Australia engaged with the issues of the Korean Question in any formal way and they were prompt in becoming actively involved. In the absence of Korean participation, the UN established the UN Temporary Commission on Korea with 10-nation membership, including Australia. The role of the Commission was to organise the process of the establishment of the Korean nation-state, integrating those parts of the country under Soviet control with those under US control south of the 38 parallel. This Commission had a very short brief and much to do, specifically the organising and supervision of a general election on the basis of adult suffrage within six months. The Commission’s responsibilities included that, after the formation of the new Korean government, the Commission would ‘facilitate and expedite’ such matters as the formation of national security forces and the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

The plan was for the members of the Temporary Commission to work in Korea supervising the elections. However, the Soviet Union blocked their entry in the occupied areas in North Korea. Subsequently, the elections were held in the South (on May 10, 1948) and the Government of the
Republic of Korea was inaugurated on August 15, 1948. Less than one month later the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea was proclaimed in the North, with Kim Il Sung as leader.

While the UN acknowledged that the Temporary Commission had fulfilled its warrant as much as was practicable, the debate in the General Assembly (GA) during Sept.-Dec. 1948 turned to the new problem that had been created – one could say partly by them—in the existence now of a divided nation.

The extent to which Australia had thrust itself into the conflict politics of the Korea question can be gauged by the draft resolution submitted by the USSR to the GA, in which it alleged that the activities of the Temporary Commission resulted in the election taking place in conditions of ‘police constraint and repression’ (quoted in Chung, 2002, 15). Moreover this resolution charged the Temporary Commission with an explicit agenda to divide Korea and suppress democracy ‘contrary to the principles and purposes of the United Nations’ (ibid). The Russian reaction can be interpreted as a response to the very activist role played by the UN Temporary Commission, with Australia being one its most active members.

Chung (2002, 13) noted that a 3-power draft resolution was the trigger towards the formation of a new commission, and the nations that proposed this draft resolution were China (nationalist) the USA and Australia. It appears that Australia had decided to set a political priority on the issue of Korea and was seeking to build its presence and reputation as a constructive force on the side of democracy and the West. Despite the opposition of the USSR and its allies, a new Commission was established—the Commission on Korea—with just seven nations, and once again Australia was prominent. This commission was entrusted with a more complex set of tasks than the previous commission, being to: ‘lend its good offices to bring about the unification of Korea; to seek to ‘remove the barriers to economic, social and other friendly intercourse’ between the two new Koreas; and to observe the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea [195 (III) of the 187th Plenary, 12 December, 1948; in Chung, 2002, p. 10–12]. From the perspective of the present time we can see that all aspects of this mission were doomed, in that none of them were achieved. The new commission was to be based in Korea and was to travel to Korea to ‘consult and observe’ around the country.

In January, 1949, the application by ROK for UN membership was blocked by veto of USSR at the Security Council. The Security Council submitted a report to the Ad Hoc Political Committee of the GA in which Australia was active in supporting the Korean application.

The UN Commission on Korea duly established its office in Seoul and held its first meeting in February, 1949.

Thus the earliest period of the Korean question in the UN can be recognised as a period when Australia – from a previous history of ignorance about and indifference to Korea – emerged as a nation heavily involved in the Korea question as a consequence of its ambitious thrust onto the world stage through the United Nations and the particular doctrines of small states propounded by its high-profile UN representative.

### A Shift from the Support for Small States to Endorsement of Super-powers

In 1949 the Australian political landscape changed considerably when the Labour government in which Evatt was a member was defeated in elections and the newly-formed conservative Liberal party under Robert Menzies came into power. The international support for small states gave way to a policy towards re-alignment with the great powers particularly seeking their umbrella against what was now regarded as the expanding spectre of international communism. Menzies’ foreign policy pre-occupation was with protecting Australia’s security which he regarded as vulnerable and isolated. In the UN the Australian role changed accordingly. While it remained active in the Korea question, frequently sponsoring resolutions calling for the independence of Korea, it now accepted the fact of division between an anti-communist south and the communist DPRK and was one of the more prominent nations of what was now becoming the Western bloc that voted against draft resolutions in support of North Korean membership in the UN, submitted by the emerging pro-communist bloc.

Thus in the two years from the 1948 elections in Korea, the Cold War was established in the UN around the Korea question, and Australia was an active and leading voice establishing the ideological boundaries. Whereas Evatt’s thesis had been one that advocated the equal rights of small powers to great ones, the Menzies doctrine was one of falling in behind the dominant western powers as they led the fight against communism. Rather than asserting an independent foreign policy for Australia, Menzies was more concerned to protect Australia by re-inventing alliances with the Mother Country, Britain, to which Menzies was particularly attached, and also with the new Pacific power of the USA.

### Australia at the UN during the Korean War

Australia’s reaction to the outbreak of war demonstrated the approach of the national government to international crises.

When the Korean War erupted on June 25, 1950, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling on North Korea to withdraw, and when that did not happen the US President Truman ordered US military forces to defend the southern part of Korea. The Security Council promptly passed a resolution
calling on members to provide military support. The circumstances of Australia’s commitment provide an interesting insight into Australian foreign policy at that time.

The recently released 1950 Cabinet Notebooks recorded the discussion among government ministers as they responded to the crisis. They observed that Korea ‘represented only one phase of Russian aggression’, with another major front closer to home in Malaya, so initially limited the size of Australia commitment to the UN action to two warships and an air force squadron. The Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies decided against ground troop involvement, then left for an overseas trip to Britain and the USA. Even as the situation in Korea deteriorated and the acting PM sent cables to Menzies advising that ‘we may lose an opportunity of cementing friendship with the United States which may not easily present itself again’, Menzies held firm against troop commitment. He was of the view that England was not committing troops, so Australia should follow that line. However, after he left London for New York aboard the liner Queen Mary, Britain did decide to commit troops and informed the Australian government in Canberra that they were about to make an announcement to that effect. Without consulting the PM, and one hour before Britain made their statement, Australia’s chief ministers rushed to announce that troops were being sent to Korea. Disgruntled at the insubordination, Menzies found out just before his boat arrived in New York, but was swept up in a wave of American approval, invited to the White House and to address both Houses of Congress. Official historian Hancock commented that Menzies ‘brazenly told Congress that he expected British and Australian troops to be joining Australians and Americans in fighting the communists in Korea, (Hancock, website). The subsequent Australian involvement on land, sea and air in the Korean War was substantial, with 1584 casualties (339 killed, 1216 wounded and 29 prisoners of war).

As the war developed Australia sought to build on its growing role as a close US ally and international middle power by taking on further UN responsibilities. For instance Chung (2002, p.34) identifies the formation in 1950 of the Collective Measures Committee, comprising fourteen members, including Australia, whose role was to collect information from member states and report on how to organise a UN armed force to carry out UN actions in support of its Charter, in the context of the Korean crisis.

Further, a commission was established urgently through the General Assembly as a result of a proposal by eight members, including Australia. The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was established on October 7, 1950, with a seven nations membership, including Australia. The mandate extended beyond the previous UN Commission to Korea to now include: relief & rehabilitation; to bring about a ‘unified, independent and democratic government for all Korea’ (Chung, 2002, p. 24); and to advise the UN command on social and economic aspects.

UNCURK lasted until 1973. The UN document list indicates that Australia was a consistently active nation in submitting proposals regarding Korea during this period in the GA. For each proposal submitted by Australia and the anti-communist allies there were as many counter proposals submitted by USSR and its allies. As the conflict persisted on the peninsula the debate in the UN divided along ideological lines, and Australia was one of the most prominent protagonists from the West group of nations.

Thus the period during and after the Korean War saw a continued active Australian involvement in the Korean question in the UN, but the motives had changed from the earlier independent vision of world security and strong, independent small states– which challenged the hegemony of the dominant powers–into a policy of endorsing, representing and seeking to be closely associated with the Cold War policy of the USA. Compounding its own pro-British xenophobia and racist antipathy towards Asia, particularly the ‘yellow peril’ of China, and fearful of its own security under the expansion of communism across Asia, Australia used its role in the Korean question to assert its anti-communist doctrine and further cement its relationship with the USA. The signing of a formal security agreement between Australia, New Zealand and the United states, the ANZUS Treaty, which came into effect in April, 1952 had been made possible because of Australia’s ‘military aid readily and swiftly given’ in the Korean war. However, I have noted above the somewhat contrived circumstances whereby the decision was made. One would have to argue that there was no particular interest in the welfare of Korea during this period, except to the extent that the Korea question served to promote Australia interests to the US. Confirming this thesis, events and the sacrifice of Australian lives in the Korean War were quickly forgotten from public memory as Australia enjoyed the benefits of post WWII economic, population and social growth during the 1950s, such that the Korean conflict has become known as ‘the forgotten war’ (McCormack, ). It was a time of television, motor cars and family values. Events in far away Asian societies were of little concern so long as government maintained the wall against communism.
The Malaise of Australian Foreign Policy in the Cold War

The foreign policy position that emerged after the Korean War continued into the next decade. In the UN, Australia maintained a consistent advocacy for the ROK and an endorsement for the UN position in the three key areas:

- that the bulk of UN troops had been withdrawn from Korea and the rest (US troops) would follow when the UN conditions for a lasting settlement had been fulfilled. In fact, while the troops from other nations had been withdrawn, the US had consolidated its base in Korea, including nuclear weapons, and had further strengthened its military capacity in Japan, aimed at the communist states on the Asian mainland;
- that the UN had the authority to resolve the Korea question;
- that the goal of the Korea Question was to achieve, through peaceful means, a unified, independent and democratic Korea

[from 1.53 of the 1280th Plenary meeting, Dec 13, 1963; document available in Chung, 2003, pp.152−153].

Australia also consistently voted in favour of draft resolutions to invite to the UN debates on the Korea question a representative of the Republic of Korea and conditional invitations to a representative of DPRK. Typically South Korea accepted such invites. North Korea rejected the authority of the UN to deal with the Korea question. In fact North Korea, strategically, had become more politically active in the UN during this period. Consulting Chung’s (2002) compilation of ‘related document lists’ to items on the Korea Question, research indicates that in the early debates on the Korea question after the war, the related documents submitted were entirely from western allies and the first submissions from North Korea were through the USSR delegates. Just as Australia and other nations were responding around the Korea question according to their national positions, the USSR acted on behalf of its alliance with North Korea. Thus, it vetoed the ROK application for membership, through correspondence from President Syngman Rhee to the Secretary-General, at the 709th Plenary meeting on October 25, 1957. From the other side, the first sign of a direct correspondence from the DPRK government to the UN is October 3, 1957, when it sent a cablegram—perhaps a sign of haste—requesting participation in the debate over the Korea Question. It’s next cablegram was a year later on October 28, 1958, announcing the withdrawal of all Chinese troops from the north and requesting the complete withdrawal of US forces from the south.

The events of the 973rd meeting in 1958 reveal the way the Korea Question was mobilised as a major Cold War struggle in the UN and the positions of major actors, including Australia. The annual report of UNKRA was, as usual, the trigger for the debate over the Korea question. The large powers of the USA and USSR dominated the early discussions, with USSR focussing on the issue of representation of North Korea. North Korean correspondence was tabled. The USSR was busy, representing China as well as North Korea in these discussions. A draft resolution for North Korean representation was presented by the USSR and lost in the vote. A counter resolution by the US for South Korean participation was passed. Then Australia and a host of western allies submitted a further resolution confirming the details of the US position. A counter amendment by India to also invite a representative from North Korea was lost in the vote. Therefore, it was decided to invite a representative of the ROK to participate in the discussion of the Korea question, without the right to vote (Chung, 2000, p.135).

The document list for following years show North Korea increasingly submitting correspondences directly to the UN without using its inter-mediary, the USSR, and making comments on UN affairs, particularly UNKRA reports. In these respects the DPRK legitimated the UN by engaging with its issues and processes, while at the same time holding to its initial policy that the Korea Question was not the legitimate business of the UN. In the 15th session of the UN, in December, 1961, the General Assembly reversed its previous decision and passed a resolution to invite North Korea to participate in the UN discussion, conditional upon it accepting the right and authority of the UN to determine the Korean question. Australia was one of the 15 powers that put this resolution forward. In rejecting this invitation North Korea responded that a conditional invitation was ‘unjustified and contrary to the principles of the UN.’

The Australian position on the Korean Question in the UN, representing national foreign policy had reached the position described by analyst Watt:

*Looking at the period 1956–60, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that policy had become stereotyped, that it proceeded along familiar routes and was simply continuing or repeating earlier initiatives without devising new techniques or discovering fresh possibilities.* Prof Gordon Greenwood, President of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, quoted in Watt, 1970, p.303).
1966-1972 The Stalemate Period

By the mid-1960s the UN had grown considerably in membership (127 members by 1970) and had entered a period of complexity in which the 'in-built majority of inexperienced, weak, racially sensitive states' (Hudson, 1974, p.206) plus a number of tiny states which, however had the same voting powers as the powerful nations, dominated proceedings. Hudson describes the workings of the GA thus:

Annual sessions of the General Assembly had come to resemble well-rehearsed drill movements: long, turgid plenary speeches for home consumption, predictable agenda wrangles, predictable and annually repetitious committee debates on largely predictable draft resolutions (Hudson, 1974, p.207).

No question before the United Nations through this period more fitted this description than the annual round of resolutions on the Korean Question. During this period Australia became less engaged with UN issues. Australia had widened its international diplomacy network of embassies, and was thereby less reliant on contact with other nations at the UN. Moreover, Australia had raised its top foreign policy priority to ongoing strengthening of the American alliance, while relegating engagement with the UN body to that of a lesser concern. Its foreign policies issues were on such matters as Vietnam, and the withdrawal of Britain from Asia – connected issues that pushed Australia closer to the USA, as the guarantor of security. Also connected to a lower profile were Australia’s resistance to the Republic of China occupying the seat held by Taiwan and criticism of Australia’s colonial role in managing the trusteeship of Papua New Guinea.

The principal debates in the General Assembly involving the Korea Question revolved around the following matters: the annual reports of UNCURK on the social, economic, and political developments in Korea; resolutions proposing to invite representatives from either South Korea or North Korea to the UN to take part in discussions on the Korean Question, without the right to vote. As considered above in the case of North Korea this participation was conditional that the DPRK first ‘unequivocally accepts the competence and authority of the United nations within the terms of the Charter to take action on the Korean question’ (doc from the Chung p155), seeing that ROK had previously done so and continued to affirm its support for the UN process. However, Kim Il Sung’s government continued to reject the right of the UN to consider and take action on the Korean Question. Moreover, a group of communist nations led by the USSR and including, from Asia, Cambodia and Mongolia, repeatedly made proposals for the dissolution of UNCURK and, indeed, that the UN remove the Korean Question from its agenda altogether. These proposals were rejected by the majority on nations in the General Assembly.

This annual round of proposals, counter proposals and replies from South and North Korea were conducted along Cold War divisions. Australia submitted regularly to the proposals in support of the ROK position and spoke in support to the resolutions in the General Assembly, while voting against the proposals from the communist camp. While there were few discussions in Australia over policy regarding Korea, as other issues such as Vietnam dominated discussions, the ideological blockade against North Korea was part of the Cold War and the defence of the ‘free world’ against communism. The adopted position on the Korea Question had by now developed over two decades and was seen, like the Berlin Wall, as one of the intractable aspects in the war against communism. The Korean Question had become part of a broader national policy whose strategy was directed in concert with the USA rather than the UN. That policy had been articulated by Richard Nixon before he became US President in 1969 as one of ‘protecting’ the independence of various Asian nations against the expansion of Red China, and North Korea was regarded as a strong ally of China.

In the UN the Australian government had once been a champion for the voices of the ‘small nations’ – when it had been an ambitious one out of a much smaller number – when it still believed in the superiority of Whiteness and its affinity in language, institutions and values with the UK and USA. Now it was a fading voice amid an assertive clamour from what was the new international movement of non-aligned nations, that at the Bandung, Indonesia conference in 1955 had identified themselves as the Third World. Thus during this period Australia pulled away from the UN, but, due to its Cold war position, and since South Korea was an ally in the war in Vietnam, Australia recognised that it had a role in supporting South Korea in the UN and was consistent in doing so.

Australia’s New Internationalism and Impacts on the Korea Question 1972–1975

The period of the early 1970s brought radical changes to Australian defence and foreign policies with a new independent and internationalist perspective. The most active period of this time was between 1972–75 when a reformist Labour party government came to power, but the trend was under way from the beginning of the decade. The strategic doctrine on which Australia’s defence policies were formulated changed from forward defence to more localised defence of the Australian mainland.
This period brought a resurgence of Australia’s commitment to the UN and engagement with UN issues including the Korea Question. Two factors that generated this were the vote in October, 1971, supported by Australia, to allow the People’s Republic of China to take the China seat in the UN, thereby excluding Taiwan, and the process set in place for full independence of Papua New Guinea in 1972, over which Australia had been strongly criticised in the UN for its colonial trusteeship. The removal of these barriers enabled Australia to remove itself from contentious issues that had obstructed its role as a UN member.

The election of the Labour party government under the visionary Gough Whitlam, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the words of historian Claire Clark ‘heralded a significant change in policy attitudes to the United Nations and to a whole range of issues under debate in its forums’ (Clarke, 1980, p.127). One aspect of this was a more assertive independent role that was willing to take a different position to that of the USA.

The period 1971–75 in the UN saw the admission of a number of states previously denied membership – Peoples Republic of China, East and West Germany, Bangla-Desh and Cambodia. Debates on membership of the two Koreas were attenuated during the 1971 and 1972 sessions due to the apparent progress of bi-lateral talks between the two Koreas. On July, 1972, the two Koreas announced a joint communication espousing three agreed principles of re-unification, the first of which was that unification should be achieved without external imposition or interference. On June 23, 1973 President Park announced that South Korea would not oppose North Korean participation in international organizations including the UN, where both Koreas could be separately represented. On the same day, Kim Il Sung announced a five-point peaceful unification program, including that North and South Korea should have a joint entry in the UN as the Federal Republic of Koryo.

Though still very divergent in details, these proposals for a peaceful re-unification were received positively by the UN. As a support for this process, and also acknowledging its failure to effectively resolve the Korean Question after some 23 years of existence, UNCURK was dissolved by consensus at the 2181st meeting of the General Assembly on November 28, 1973. Australia, which had been a member of UNCURK since its inception in 1950 was one of the co-sponsors for the resolution to dissolve UNCURK. This proposal originally contained a further recommendation that the Security Council would dissolve the UN Command over foreign troops in Korea. A counter proposal by communist-aligned nations called for the withdrawal of all foreign (i.e. US troops from Korea). Since neither proposal was going to be accepted Australia was one of the nations active in negotiating a consensus resolution, which was the one finally adopted, dissolving UNCURK and calling for continued dialogue between South and North Korea (Clark, 1980). In this role Australia, consistent with its new foreign policy agenda, played the role of an active, independent, broker in seeking a positive development in respect to the Korea question.

In late 1975 events at the UN pertaining to the situation of the UN Command role in Korea coincided with a major political crisis in Australia, perhaps the most explosive time in modern Australian history when the Labour Whitlam government was dismissed by the Governor-General on November 11 of that year. The UN proposal from the USA, with agreement from South Korea through its Permanent Observer to the UN, was to a reduction of direct UN command and that the UN flag be only flown over ‘facilities directly associated with the implementation of the Armistice Agreement’. This effectively meant UN troops would continue to police the DMZ, while the US bases would identify themselves as such. The counter proposals from 43 states supporting the North Korean position was for the dissolution of the UN command and the withdrawal of all foreign troops under the UN flag, that is all US soldiers. In the initial vote on these draft resolutions, in the First Committee Australia voted for the proposal as supported by South Korea, while abstaining from the vote on the North Korean draft resolution.

Before the vote came to plenary of the General Assembly, events in Australia saw the Labour government sacked and a caretaker Liberal government installed, with a commitment to continue Labour policies until the coming election. However they reversed their position and voted against the pro-North Korea vote in the UN General Assembly vote on November 18. Historian Clarke (1980, p.134) claims the decision to abstain in the First Committee vote, in spite of earlier intentions to vote in favour of the pro-NK resolution, was taken personally by the Prime Minister because he would not ‘encourage’ a return to earlier rigid positions prior to 1973, but wanted to support a consensus approach by the two Koreas.

However, in doing so, Australia went against US wishes, such that the final act of the Whitlam government in the UN was one of defiance of the US line on the Korea Question. So concerned was the caretaker government over this split with the USA that they then reversed the Labour decision and voted against the pro-North Korean proposal when it came before the plenary session. The action certainly must be seen in the light of US–Australian relations, for the relationship between Australia and North Korea was in poor shape, with North Korea withdrawing its diplomatic staff from Canberra on October 30 and expelling Australian staff from Pyongyang on November 6. Once again the Korean Question in the UN was a focus on Australian national politics and its broader foreign policy relations, especially with the USA.
Admission of Two Koreas to the UN

Cheong In Seop (2002, p.204) observed that one of the consequences of the successful Seoul Olympics was that diplomatic relations between South Korea and both the USSR and China ‘improved dramatically’, such that they appeared likely to no longer use their veto powers in the security Council to prevent South Korean application for UN membership. With China’s growing world economic presence and the role that President Gorbachev was playing in bringing the Soviet Empire to an end, so the trends were certainly in favour of the success of a South Korean admission to the UN. Consequently on May 27, 1991, the DPRK announced its agreement to separate membership of the two Koreas. Both states made separate applications and on September 17, 1991, both Koreas were admitted to their UN seats. Forty-four years of diplomatic struggle without representation, but through their allies was at an end. Australia, which had engaged with the Korean Question through the changing prism of its internal politics and foreign policy was one of the 143 nations that sponsored the resolution.

Conclusion

This preliminary review of the patterns of Australian engagement with the Korean Question at the United Nations shows a consistent support for South Korea in proposals of resolutions, voting on resolutions and activities in agencies and committees of the UN that were involved in aspects of the issues of Korea independence, democratization, reunification and participation in the United Nations. Certainly one would have to conclude that Australia has been a persistent friend and supporter of South Korea in dealing with these issues during those decades when South Korea did not have representation in the UN and its fate was determined by the actions of other nations who were members. Similarly the Australian position on North Korea was predominantly one of opposition to its wishes, but the records show that from the early 1970s Australia began to establish a role as broker in search of consensus positions –which is basically a role that current Australian foreign policy seeks to play in contemporary issues such as that of North Korean nuclear weapons. Without doubt there were strong ideological positions that framed the Australian responses. The cabinet Documents show the descent of the Australian government into Cold War paranoia. When PM Menzies returned from London in September 1950 he was under the belief that it would take three years before the Soviet Union was in a position to go to war against the West. He believed that the Korean War was a prelude to an inevitable World War III. He established a three-year defence program on March 2, 1951, under the belief that Australia had only three years to prepare for a world war and this view framed most international and domestic policy decisions during the following years. It influenced opposition by the country Party leader John Mckewen to the push for a forty hour working week, because he considered that Australians could not possibly prepare for worldwar by only working 40 hours a week. In 1950 the government had introduced the Communist Party Dissolution Act, which set out to seize the assets of the communist party and to declare individuals as communists. Once so ‘declared,’ these persons would be unable to work for the Commonwealth, to hold office in a trade union, and unable to work in certain industries. Yet on March 6, 1951 the High Court decided the Act was unconstitutional. Menzies then found an economic trigger for a double dissolution of parliament and called an election for 28 April, 1951. He identified the Korean War and the communist threat as the main issues of the election, which he won and then introduced a referendum to strengthen the commonwealth government powers over the states to combat communism. The referendum was lost. But the ideological and policy patterns of the subsequent decades were firmly in place.

In conclusion, the analysis in this paper of the Australian role in the UN has also uncovered the changing positions of Australia in respect to the Korea Question, as responses to changes in domestic politics in Australia, such as government under different parties, the impacts of important individuals especially Evatt, Menzies and Whitlam and, most significantly, changes in foreign policy as Australia adopted new perspectives that benefited Australia in response to changing international contexts. This analysis suggests that rather than any particular concern or relationship with Korea, such as historical or cultural ties, the Australian engagement with the Korean Question in the UN through this period was pragmatic and self-interested, such that Australia sought to exploit the circumstances of Korea’s exclusion from the UN to benefit its own international identity and influence as a middle power, and also to shore up local political interests.

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**Contact Address**
John Synott
Queensland University of Technology, Australia
Brisbane Qld 4001
PH: 07 31384725
FAX: 07 3138 4719
EMAIL: j.synott@qut.edu.au
The Spoken and Written Word in Korean History: A Preliminary Sketch

Gregory Nicholas Evon
The University of New South Wales, Australia

Abstract
Research by King (1997; 1998), Schmid (2000, 91-94; 2002, 64-72, 257-260) and Yu Cho (2002) has emphasized the massive cultural change in Korea in the 20th century marked by the abandonment of Literary Chinese (hereafter, Literary Sinitic) in favour of the Korean vernacular for writing. As is clear in their work, evolving conceptions of language and writing played a pivotal role in the formation of 20th century Korean nationalism, in the sense of pride in the Korean language (specifically han’gul, the vernacular script) and the recognition that the adoption of the written vernacular was crucial to socio-political change. This paper pursues a broadly similar line of enquiry but focuses on the historical background against which 20th century conceptions of language and writing in Korea were situated. Here I draw explicitly on the work of Ong (1967; 1982/1991) and implicitly on Goody (1987) to examine the questions of hyangga and Buddhism, thereby illustrating the impact of Literary Sinitic on the conception of language and of the relationship between speech and writing in Korea prior to the 20th century.

Introduction: Words as Events, Words as Things
Prior to the 20th century in Korea knowledge of Sino-Korean/literary Chinese [hereafter, Literary Sinitic, per Mair 1994] was the basic educational requirement for attaining government office. On this point, Korea and China were similar, though with one important difference: with the early exceptions of men such as Pak Inbom, Ch’oe Kwangnyu, Ch’oe Sŏngu (all fl. late 9th century) and most notably, Ch’oe Ch’iwŏn (858-c.910), knowledge of vernacular Chinese was irrelevant to the career prospects of those who could hold office. And in the cases of Pak and the three Ch’oes, it was relevant only because they lived and worked in Tang China.

Although the precise process by which Literary Sinitic was adopted in Korea remains vague, it is nevertheless clear that Literary Sinitic was adopted by what Ong would call a “primary oral culture”—that is, a culture that did not know writing—and furthermore, that by the seventh century at the absolute latest, it is impossible to speak of Korea in general as a primary oral culture (Ong 1991, 5-6, 11, 31-77). To be sure, very few people could read and write Literary Sinitic. But the idea of writing was known, and it affected people’s lives, either directly or indirectly, by concentrating power among those who could read and write.

This basic distinction held true until the 20th century: a tiny minority of the population could read and write, but the vast majority of people knew of writing—a situation analogous to the fact I know of flying but cannot fly a plane. Ong’s other categories of residual and secondary orality, however, have a less clear-cut application in the case of Korea (and China, too), where the sheer difficulty of Literary Sinitic marked a sharp divide between the literate few and the illiterate majority. It thus seems reasonable to see Literary Sinitic cultural spheres as distinct from those with alphabetic (e.g., Greek from ca. 8th century BCE) or quasi-alphabetic scripts (e.g., roughly the 7th century CE) (for dates, see Threatte 1996, 271; Goewrlitz 1996, 491). That is to say, although Korea as a whole was not a primary oral culture, the everyday life of the vast majority of its people for whom natural speech existed wholly apart from writing operated in a fashion that closely resembled primary orality.

This distinction between natural speech and writing in Literary Sinitic provides a valuable clue to the importance of Chinese poetry in Korea as indicated in the early and continued importation of “rhyime books” into Korea (Chŏng 2002, 25-28) and one that is counterintuitive. Although it is commonplace to think of poetry as the apex of the literary arts, the fact that poetry rhymes also makes it a suitable starting point for memorisation. Poetry is a mnemonic device. And to all appearances, in both China and Korea education began with the recitation of texts in Literary Sinitic. On this point, the Chinese had little or no advantage over Koreans since both were memorising texts written in Literary Sinitic, an artificial language usable only for writing which was at the outset meaningless to the students.

By the 12th century we detect poetry serving this double role as a means and ends in the biography of Yi Kyyubo (1168-1241). Yi’s ability to compose verse at the age of ten demonstrated his general abilities in Literary Sinitic, and by the age of thirteen or so he was practicing impromptu poetic composition. Yi did not demonstrate his potential, however, by writing a petition or any of the other literary genres which he would later employ in his working career, nor did he amuse himself in private with any form of writing but poetry. His skill in poetry as a youngster indicated his abilities to others, later provided him with a means for professional advancement, and ultimately was what he staked his reputation on.

A similar if far more dramatic example is found in the biography of Kim Sisup (1435-1493) by Yi I (i.e., Yulgok 1536-1584). Yi I writes that Kim learned to write on his own by the time he was eight months
old, could read before he could speak, and at the age of three was composing poetry. Only after that, at the age of five, did he master two of the core Confucian texts (Yi and H6 1995, 278). There is no doubt much exaggeration at work here, but the value of Yi’s account does not depend on its believability. Instead, its principal value is that it is thoroughly wrong from the points of view of nature and science in reversing the relationship among speech, reading and writing. It therefore brings into sharp relief the degree to which orality among the literate was subordinated to writing and moreover, experienced thus.

In this respect, Yi’s account is not unique, however. By the middle of the 18th century in the West precisely the same reversal is commonplace in the belief that “writing ‘causes’ reading and reading causes oral speech” (Ong 1967, 64-65). The paradox is that whereas this sequence is verifiably wrong and unnatural, for those immersed in writing this sequence is nevertheless conceived as natural. This is the hallmark of a chirographic culture. In effect, the psychic demands of learning to write make what is entirely natural seem unnatural, and vice versa.

The central point is that by the 12th century writing poetry was firmly entrenched in the cultural grammar of Korea’s elite, and it provided a framework for judging people and their abilities. But poetry’s status and functions operated in an area between orality and writing. On one hand, the commonplace definition of poetry (Ch. shi; SK. si) emphasised its oral origins in the classic formulation that “poetry speaks intention.” On the other, the preservation of poetry required writing. As a consequence, Yi Kyubo, for instance, might chant a poem—as did poets before and after him—but he also would later record that in writing. Only writing provided any chance for transmission and preservation. For Yi, poetry was thus largely a matter of ink and paper, though the oral foundations of poetry remained as a concept.

It is unclear precisely when poets in China came to conceive of poetry chiefly as a written medium. But during the eighth century at the latest poetry (i.e. shi) was becoming a medium of expression reliant on writing and self-consciously conceived as thus. This chirographic (i.e., “handwriting”) control over poetry, however, went well beyond writing for transmission and preservation. This is clearly evident through Wang Changling (698-757?) in two respects.

First, Wang explicitly described poetry as taking shape in the poet’s mind and then written down—not as something taking shape in the poet’s mind and then orally articulated (Bodman 1978, 371). Second and less obvious is the fact that during the Tang, a new trend in poetics was taking shape under influence of Sanskrit chanting as practised by Central Asian Buddhist monks. As discussed further below, this led to an acute sensitivity to sound and in turn, the formation of regulated verse/ modern style poetry which stipulated exacting rules for versification, both tonal and structural.

Notwithstanding this marked oral/aural component, regulated verse/modern style poetry was artificial. Sound—that is, tones—were crucial to a poem in that style, but the entire framework for understanding those sounds required complicated classifications made possible only through writing, specifically the classification of Chinese characters according to their rhyme and tonal categories. To be sure, one could master the structures and produce a proper modern style poem at great speed. Indeed, Yi Kyubo was distinguished by his ability to do just that. But this ability was disconnected from human speech and spoken words in any meaningful sense. Orality itself was vestigial at best and often entirely irrelevant.

Although the power of the written word is its durability, the spoken word has immediate power. This characteristic is of course explicitly recognised in the dictum “poetry speaks intention.” In this formulation, poetry does not write one’s intention. And barring physical defect, human experience with language commences with sound and remains auditory and oral even after one learns to write. Speech possesses a power and utility apart from writing, however, even in a chirographic culture where speech is conceptually subordinated to writing and experienced thus as in the examples cited above. If Yi Kyubo, Kim Sisüp, Yi I or Wang Changling were in a dangerous situation and required help—for instance, had fallen into a well—their natural reaction would be to call out for help. And a nearby illiterate peasant could respond. Speech is natural, immediate, and requires no formal education. It is moreover buttressed by extra-linguistic clues as to meaning—context, visual clues (e.g., winks, smiles, averted gazes, etc.) and auditory clues such as tone of voice—that writing cannot match.

Writing by contrast is unnatural and must be acquired through learning. In the case of a written language radically divorced from speech such as Literary Sinitic, this process is time-intensive and moreover, is so to an even far greater degree than in an alphabetic language. Abraham Lincoln, for instance, could become an autodidact due to the alphabet. In the context of Literary Sinitic, a Lincoln is an impossibility.

The reason for this contains a paradox. That is, the sharp division between the vernacular (i.e., any of the topolects of Chinese or vernacular Korean) and the written (Literary Sinitic) meant that the acquisition of reading and writing was an intensely oral-driven process: such learning required oral explanation by a teacher and memorisation by a student, not only in terms of how to pronounce and write characters themselves, but their meanings as verbally explained by the teacher (Rawski 1979, 2-3, 51-52). In effect, a student’s mother tongue was no help in learning to read—much less mastering the written language—beyond the necessary role it played in explanation of the text. In this context, natural speech was in service of the written word and moreover, the word written in a foreign language.
Mastery of Literary Sinitic meant that—to borrow Ong’s helpful distinction—the conception of the relationship between words as oral/aural events (i.e. produced as sound) and words as things (i.e. written down to be read) swung decidedly in favour of the latter at the micro and macro-levels, both synchronically and diachronically, and in terms of the experience of individuals and the elite culture as a whole.

**Oral and Written: The Question of Hyangga**

The use of Chinese characters to approximate speech in “country [i.e., Korean] songs” (hyangga) from Silla and Koryŏ clearly demonstrates that at least some Koreans wanted to record oral songs, that is, to write down spoken, or sung, words. And significantly, hyangga roughly parallel the context and dates of early written vernacular Chinese, specifically the use of the vernacular in Buddhist contexts during the Tang and Song dynasties. However, in the Korean context, the fact that some Chinese characters were used as rebuses (i.e., to designate a pure Korean vernacular word with a meaning similar or somehow related to that of the Chinese character) and others as phonograms (i.e., solely for their sound values) to approximate Korean vernacular words and grammatical particles (notably for topics and direct objects) obscures as much as it illuminates. There are two reasons for this. (The general framework for the following points is influenced by Goody [1987], especially “Oral composition and oral transmission: the case of the Vedas” [110-122].)

First, hyangga themselves are tremendously complex in terms of how they are written, mixing Literary Sinitic with Chinese characters used as both rebuses and phonograms. The first line from the “Song of Sŏdong” (Sŏdong yo) suffices to make the point: 善花公主主隱. The first four characters are straightforward Literary Sinitic meaning Princess Sŏnhwa: 善花 [Sŏnhwa = a name] 公主 [kongju = royal princess]. The final two characters (i.e., 主隱) contain the hyangga “vernacular” elements with 主 serving as a rebus for the vernacular honorific suffix nim. That is to say, the Sino-Korean pronunciation (chuju) is entirely irrelevant. The meaning is what matters, and although this meaning is related to Literary Sinitic (i.e., Ch. zhū: lord, sovereign, master, etc.), it is used here to designate nim, a pure Korean word. By contrast, the final character of the phrase (i.e., 隱) is a phonogram, pronounced in Sino-Korean as ŭn. Here the meaning of 隱 is entirely irrelevant. It is used solely for sound, to designate the Korean vernacular topic particle ăn used after a preceding word (i.e., a topic) that ends with a consonant. Since the line is otherwise hard to understand and nim unlike chuju ends with a consonant, the line therefore is therefore commonly read as Sŏnhwa kongjunimŭn (“as for Princess Sŏnhwa”).

This is an easy example, however, and as can be surmised, the interpretation of hyangga is tremendously complex at the basic linguistic level (e.g., see Lee 2003, 66-83, esp., 69 and 80n27). As a consequence, it is impossible to regard them as vernacular in the full sense. They are rather Literary Sinitic with Korean vernacular elements, that is to say, a hybrid writing so that only one who knew Korean and also understood Literary Sinitic could have read, recited, written and understood them. This is made clear in the work of Buzo and Prince (1993) on the Kyunyŏ-jŏn, a biography of the Buddhist monk Kyunyŏ (923-973), which contains eleven hyangga (see 89-129 for lucid examples of the exegetical schema needed to understand hyangga).

Second, there are only twenty-five extant examples of hyangga, with the remaining fourteen found in Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms) by the Buddhist monk Iryŏn (1206-1289). The fact that what remains is found in texts suggests that hyangga might have been essentially a written form. We know from the Samguk sagi (Records of the Three Kingdoms) by Kim Pusik (1075-1151), for instance, that examples of hyangga were collected in the Samaeunok in the late ninth century with the help—yet again—of a Buddhist monk, Taegu (Kim 1997, 1/429), but what was in that collection is unknown since it has been lost. At the very least, hyangga relied on writing for transmission. This is not to suggest, however, that hyangga had no relationship to speech, oral performance or recitation. As seen in the brief example above, it clearly did. But it is by no means clear that hyangga originated in oral performance as opposed to written composition for oral performance. This is the all-important distinction. If it was primarily an oral form, reliance on texts would not be the primary consideration. Indeed, the loss of a single collection in the fullest sense—that is, a single copy/manuscript of a single title—would not be the great loss that it, in fact, is.

Moreover, if the admittedly problematic issue of transmission leaves room to argue that hyangga was fundamentally an oral form, the content of the extant hyangga persuasively indicates the exact opposite. Of the twenty-five extant hyangga, twenty deal with Buddhist themes (Lee 1981, 17) to a greater or lesser extent. The eleven songs in the Kyunyŏ-jŏn, for instance, all deal with Buddhism intensively and are indebted to Buddhist texts. Though intended for singing and therefore conceived as songs (i.e., ka/ga, as in hyangga), these eleven hyangga were nevertheless products of the written word in the fullest measure, that is, not merely transmitted by writing but more important, rooted in texts and most likely, created through writing.

Lee inadvertently makes a similar point. While emphasising “orality, the vibrant relation between poet and audience and between poetry and music,” as characteristic of hyangga, he also emphasises “the difference between poetry written in Chinese and Korean songs written in the vernacular” [emphasis
between the word as a thing in writing and as an event in sound. The same is true in
know, the one with the broken front tooth…he can pull this drunken idiot out of the well!" We need not
fallen, we might enlist the help of others: "Does anyone have a rope? And where is that big guy…you
have rehearsed these sentences, nor ever have said them before, nor ever say them again.
We were, for example, to hear cries for "help" coming out of a well into which a drunken Yi Kyubo had
albeit in a different fashion. And the difference is significant.

Samguk yusa
those by Kyunyŏ
in the songs in
postscript to the eleven songs explicitly reminds us (Buzo and Prince 1993, 49-50). Here we arrive at an
understanding of the distinction between words as oral (alive, spoken with breath and as spirit) and written
writing, but he appears to have done so with the ultimate objective that these songs be sung. As words on
a page, they are inert. Sung out loud, however, they can edify, effect salvation and cure the sick—as the
letter kills, but the Spirit gives life."

The hyangga in Kyunyŏ-jŏn thus draw attention to the tension between writing and orality—that is,
between the word as a thing in writing and as an event in sound. The same is true in the Samguk yusa,
albeit in a different fashion. And the difference is significant.

Whereas the entirety of the hyangga in Kyunyŏ-jŏn are explicitly Buddhist, nine of the fourteen in
Samguk yusa are, but these nine do not appear to be as indebted to the Buddhist textual tradition as
those by Kyunyŏ. Although they employ Buddhist metaphors, for instance, the overt didacticism as found
in the songs in Kyunyŏ-jŏn is blunted. Instead, they operate in a Buddhist worldview but appear much like
simple prayers and responses to actual problems. In this respect, they blend well with the other five non-
Buddhist hyangga, and what distinguishes these Buddhist and non-Buddhist hyangga alike in Samguk
yusa from those in the Kyunyŏ-jŏn can be reduced to two elements. First, those in Samguk yusa are
integrated into the narrative, though some more fluidly than others. Second, some of these hyangga in
Iryŏn's narrative are presented as not constructed first by writing for later recitation (à la Kyunyŏ-jŏn).

Instead, these hyangga are presented as if they were made up extemporaneously and sung in
real time. This characteristic is most marked in the hyangga in the sections on Chŏ'ŏng (fl. late ninth
century Silla) and a Buddhist priest, Yongjae (fl. late eighth century Silla). Iryŏn does not represent
Ch’ŏng and Priest Yongjae as composers in the sense of Kyunyŏ, and he merely records their songs
which he integrates into his narrative. Iryŏn’s use of hyangga in this fashion underscores song as an oral
phenomenon, the power of which resides in its immediacy as a verbal response in a certain situation.

Ch’ŏng returns home late one night to find his lovely wife in bed with a demon disguised as a
man. And he responds by “singing a song and dancing” (Iryŏn 1997, 1/270). Ch’ŏng does not write his
song, He sings it on the spot. Moreover, he dances as he sings. And his words are effective. The demon
is so impressed by this song that he surrenders. As narrated by Iryŏn, Ch’ŏng’s song is close to the
orality of human speech in a fundamental respect: it is an immediate response to an unexpected event. If
we were, for example, to hear cries for “help” coming out of a well into which a drunken Yi Kyubo had
fallen, we might enlist the help of others: “Does anyone have a rope? And where is that big guy…you
know, the one with the broken front tooth…he can pull this drunken idiot out of the well!" We need not
have rehearsed these sentences, nor ever have said them before, nor ever say them again.

In the section on Priest Yongjae, Iryŏn explicitly writes that the Buddhist priest was “good at
hyangga” (善鄕歌) (Iryŏn 1997, 2/399). And as in the section on Ch’ŏng, Iryŏn’s depiction of Yongjae and
his hyangga emphasises orality far more than any of the hyangga by Kyunyŏ. Yongjae sings in
response to circumstance, and his song like Ch’ŏng’s has the power to affect others, in this case a band
of bandits and would-be murderers. Thus Yongjae saves himself in the corporeal sense and also saves
the outlaws in the spiritual sense. And he accomplishes this through voiced words, not written
compositions.

This is not to suggest that all the hyangga in Samguk yusa emphasise orality to the same degree.
They do not. And in the section on Sinch’ung, it is clear that Sinch’ung writes a hyangga (Iryŏn 1997,
2/392 [Sino-Korean]). This is unequivocally a written composition, and Sinch’ung’s hyangga derives its
power from the fact that it is written: without writing he could not have conveyed his message to the king.

A paradox that faces us is one faced also by both Iryŏn and Kyunyŏ, namely, the reliance on
writing to convey the sense of the spoken as spoken, of the song as sung. But in the case of Iryŏn and
Kyunyŏ, there is an added complexity insofar as the oral/vernacular elements of the hyangga they
recorded or composed are situated in what are otherwise exclusively Literary Sinitic texts. Ultimately, what
is remarkable is not that there are only twenty five extant hyangga, but rather that there are any at all.

Buddhism and the Word

The most persuasive argument as to why so few hyangga have survived is simply that there were
very few to begin with. This is not surprising given the commitment in terms of time and energy required
to master Literary Sinitic and insofar as Koreans had no way of writing their language to capture it as sound
apart from the unwieldy use of Chinese characters as rebus and phonograms as outlined above. This is
supported by the range of dates for extant *hyangga*, from the ninth through the thirteenth centuries, and as Chang has noted, the abandonment of *hyangga* in Koryŏ reflected the increasing importance of Literary Sinitic in the consciousness of the ruling elite (Chang 2004, 635). Leading up to the fifteenth century—when the Korean alphabet for recording the vernacular was invented—educated Koreans became habituated to Literary Sinitic and the written word as wholly unrelated to speech, something amply illustrated in the biography of Kim Sisŏp as well as in the fact that the script for the vernacular was so little used.

Yet it is also clear that at least some did recognise a tension between speech and writing, and moreover, that this recognition was somehow related to Buddhism. Indeed, each of the three collections containing *hyangga* were directly connected to Buddhists: the *hyangga* composed by Kyunyŏ, those transmitted by Iryŏn, and those collected by Taegu for the now lost *Samdaemok*. Korea was far from unique in this respect, however. Instead, this connection between Buddhists and efforts at approximating oral words through writing (no matter how cumbersome or incomplete) had clear parallels in China, Central Asia, and elsewhere. The primary focus thus is Buddhism and Buddhists in general—not Korean Buddhism and Korean Buddhists specifically. Moreover, the main distinction in the Chinese and Korean cases was, as indicated previously, between spoken vernaculars (i.e. various toponyms and dialects) and written Literary Sinitic which, as Mair (1994) has summarised, is “unsayable.”

In describing it thus, Mair gains brevity at the risk of being misunderstood, and this point needs to be clarified for my purpose here. He is not suggesting that one cannot say or read out loud a text in Literary Sinitic. One certainly can—assuming that one knows the pronunciations of the Chinese logographs or characters in question. And as discussed above, oral recitation and memorisation were central features of training in Literary Sinitic. It is not that Literary Sinitic is “unsayable.” It is instead that it is only comprehensible when said if the hearer has prior knowledge of the written words being indicated by the orally articulated sounds—that is, can connect it to something seen. Sound in and of itself is insufficient to carry meaning, in contrast to a vernacular which can operate without any writing at all.

As a consequence, Ong’s discussion of the “sight-sound split” in relation to “Learned Latin” is illuminating both for what it explains and what it does not (1982/1991, 112-116). Whereas Latin as a spoken language and as a mother tongue evolved naturally into various Latin-derived vernaculars that were mutually incomprehensible, Learned Latin was a “chirographically controlled” language in that it was spoken only by those who could read and write it. The split was between the various Latin-derived vernaculars (i.e. sound), on the one hand, and Learned Latin as a written language (i.e. sight), on the other. Thus by the time that Learned Latin was the medium of intellectual exchange in Medieval Europe, it was nobody’s mother tongue, though it was “sayable.”

Like Learned Latin, Literary Sinitic was also chirographically controlled, but unlike Learned Latin there is no indication that it ever was anyone’s mother tongue or “sayable” in the sense that Learned Latin was. In the case of Literary Sinitic, however, the “sight-sound split” existed at an even deeper level precisely due to a script that at best approximated sound (i.e. pictophonetic) far less efficiently than any alphabet or syllabary with all their admitted shortcomings, a point recognised by Liu Xianting (1648-1695) in his phonological research (Elman 1984, 216) and of course, in the adoption of Roman Alphabet for Pinyin by the People’s Republic of China.

What is clear is that Buddhism and Buddhists played a remarkable role on behalf of written vernacular languages in general and in the Chinese case specifically, through the introduction of vernacular elements into writing that sharply distinguished Buddhist texts from those in Literary Sinitic. This can be attributed to many things, and as Mair’s research demonstrates, a key element was the pervasive general notion, anchored in Buddhist teachings, that the spoken word was the proper means for propagating the faith (1994, 714, 721-723).

It is at the basic level of sound—as opposed to language per se—that Buddhism and Buddhists had perhaps the greatest impact, however (Mair 1994, 718). Previous work by Mair and Mei (1991) has underscored the degree to which Chinese regulated verse was indebted to Buddhism, specifically Buddhist chanting and psalmody, which by the fifth century had led to experiments that would finally culminate in regulated verse. Although regulated verse cannot be viewed in any sense as natural language—that it is to say, it was a written form and was “unsayable” in the sense outlined above—the process by which it was created nevertheless reflected the recognition of language as an oral/aural phenomenon rooted in sound. In part, this recognition was a consequence of the various types of oral performances and recitations introduced by the Buddhist missionaries. But it was also a consequence of the need to transcribe (rather than translate) foreign words and expressions into the Chinese script, and this need arose from the sense of the sounds as sacred. In this, script was secondary, and indeed, was subordinated to the word as sound (e.g. Boston transcribed as 菩提頓 [Boshidun], that is, as a phonogram).

Whereas Mair and Mei (1991, esp. 383-384) approached this point in relation to the adaptation of Sanskrit meter for Chinese prosody—something done as a mark of religious devotion by Chinese Buddhists—Mair subsequently put the point much more sharply, noting that the “sacred singing and chanting” that arrived with Buddhism “raised the consciousness of some Chinese that the simple sounds
of language were just as essential as their elaborate and exalted script, if not more so” (1994, 719). In viewing these two related but slightly different points through Ong, however, I would say that Buddhism fostered a sense of words as events as opposed to things, and moreover, that this emphasis—as much as anything else—distinguished Buddhism from the broader, pre-existing culture that supported and was supported by Literary Sinitic, a culture in which words necessarily were things. On this point, Zen provides a useful point of contrast that further illuminates hyangga as discussed above.

As noted above, the chirographic basis of scholarship tends to result in a marked chirographic bias through which oral/aural language (i.e. words as events, as auditory phenomena) is erroneously depicted in terms of writing (i.e. words as things, as visual phenomena). It is therefore significant to find similar difficulties in the commonly-cited classical descriptions of Zen as a teaching which: (1) “is transmitted from mind to mind”; (2) “separate transmission outside the scriptures”; and (3) “does not establish written words” (不立文字). Summarising these, Buswell, for instance, has noted Zen “claimed that its dissemination occurred through direct spiritual experience, not the indirect medium of the spoken or written word” (1989, 7). Elsewhere he like many others has indicated the paradox of Zen producing massive amounts of written materials while describing itself as a teaching that “did not rely on words and letters” (1987, 345). Similarly, de Bary has written that Zen “likes to style itself as…’not dependent on words and phrases’” (1969, 208).

In this context, the chirographic bias leads to a significant distortion since Zen singled out “written words” (文字) as opposed to spoken words. By contrast, Mair’s focus on the tension between speech and writing allows him to put this in a more nuanced light: “Even the Zen masters, whose words are ironically preserved in written vernacular (perhaps one should say, especially the Zen masters), insist on such notions as ‘transmission from mind to mind’…and ‘nonestablishment of written words’…which disparage the efficacy of language, especially in its written form, to convey essential truths [emphasis added]” (1994, 713-714).

The distinction between writing and speech is critical here, and it seems quite likely—if by no means provable—that the preservation of the words of Zen masters in the written vernacular is not really ironic and that the massive corpus of Zen writings is therefore not so extreme a paradox as so often emphasised. Instead, I would argue that it is far more reasonable to see the three descriptions of Zen cited above as wary of language’s “ability to convey essential truths” precisely because such wariness is central to human experience and is therefore articulated in religion. Neither written nor spoken language is the same as direct experience, and yet a culture that knows writing relies on writing for transmission, thus setting up a necessary paradox.

Each of the above three descriptions of Zen emphasises oral/aural communication over writing, however. This is explicit in the third description and is also evident in the second (i.e. “a separate transmission outside the scriptures,” that is, beyond what is written). Yet it is also seems implicit in the first description, though this is difficult to apprehend from a chirographic-oriented (specifically, print-oriented) culture. Here Ong is particularly helpful, for through his explanation of fundamental differences between communication or transmission in oral/aural and chirographic cultures, it becomes clear that “transmitted from mind to mind” can be a fair characterisation of how teachings are transmitted orally/aurally. Indeed, the defining characteristics of Zen anchored it in oral/aural contexts. However one describes meditation on verbal riddles (i.e. kōan) and its purpose, such meditation deals with words as sounds. And even taken to extremes in which words are no longer recognisable as words—for example, shouts and smacking trainees with sticks, etc.—the Zen tradition privileged the immediacy of oral/aural contexts which are characterised by direct communication between people even without verbal exchange (e.g. the stories about Mahākāśyapa and Vimalakīrti).

A clear exception to this is found in the Treatise on the Tongueless Realm by Muyōm (801-888), a Korean monk who lived during late Silla, and this exception effectively proves the rule. As Buswell’s treatment of Muyōm makes clear, Treatise was a product of the controversy between the scholastic/textual schools of Buddhism—which were oriented towards the written word—and Zen, particularly its conception of “mind-to-mind transmission.” In Muyōm this is without any recognisable human communication whatsoever—verbal or otherwise—and he thus pushes ideas central to Zen to their breaking point. Here the notion of “mind-to-mind transmission” is reduced to an absurdity. Without question Muyōm is trapped in an obvious paradox, explaining in words that the profoundest teachings of Buddhism cannot be communicated (i.e. by words spoken or written, physical gestures, etc.). In this respect, he represents an extreme version of the often-emphasised paradox found in Zen, that is, its use of written words to deny the value of written words. But what is most significant here is the structure of his explanation in the question-answer format, that is, as dialogue. Muyōm is by no means unique in adopting this approach, but through it he implicitly underscores that for him communication properly occurs in the immediate context of human interaction, as dialogue (Buswell 1983, 13, 187n40).

This goes far in explaining Muyōm’s radical denial of speech and all communication possible in human contexts for transmitting Buddhism: Because he conceives of words primarily as events as opposed to things, the tongue is still rather than the hand. This point is counterintuitive, and it leads to others that are as counterintuitive and equally illuminating. Here I will emphasise two.
First, the fact that scholarship is built on written words tends to make us acutely attuned to the paradox of so much writing in a tradition emphasising that it “does not establish written words.” However, the paradoxes in Muyŏm and Zen more generally can be seen as consequences of writing in largely oral/aural contexts. What is easily overlooked is the fact that in ninth century Silla and in Zen in its formative stages, writing operated in contexts which were highly oral/aural by modern standards. That is to say, the principal means of communication was speech, and it seems quite likely that the sense of words as events was heightened through writing not only because Literary Sinitic was hard to learn but because everything associated with writing was labour-intensive and time-consuming. By contrast, writing presented the greatest possibility of transmission of what was taught and learned in oral/aural contexts, something of the utmost importance to Zen polemicists keen on securing the fortunes of their school against its scholastic/text-oriented detractors.

Second, these questions bear comparison with Plato’s (and his depiction of Socrates’) famously inconsistent attitudes towards language, banning the poets who represented the old oral/aural culture from his ideal republic, on the one hand, while on the other exhibiting deep scepticism towards writing. Ong concludes that this inconsistency in Plato was a reflection of the restructuring of human consciousness wrought by writing in a predominantly oral/aural culture. In effect, the old oral/aural culture—which necessarily required constant verbal repetition of knowledge lest it be lost—was being displaced by writing which allowed for new ideas and systematic ways of thinking. Based on Havelock’s Preface to Plato, Ong further emphasises that “Plato’s philosophically analytic thought...including his critique of writing, was possible only because the effects that writing was beginning to have on mental processes” but also adds that “Plato of course was not at all fully aware of the unconscious forces at work in his psyche to produce [his] reaction, or overreaction” to the “old oral, mobile, warm, personally interactive lifeworld of oral culture (represented by the poets, whom he did not allow in his Republic)” (1982/1991, 80-81; see also 23-24).

Over time, however, writing becomes naturalised because it is internalised, and thus the flight of Homer’s “winged words” is no longer conceived as power inherent in speech but rather the evanescence and inevitable loss of spoken words, as in the often-quoted Latin saying that “spoken words fly, written words remain” (verba volant, scripta manent). For those accustomed to writing, writing has the power of endurance rather than the stillness of death.

Two additional significant issues, however, bear heavily on our attempts to understand the tension in Muyŏm’s conception of the word. On this point we are fortunate because extant biographical sources provide valuable clues as to how he experienced language, both spoken and written (Yi 1993, 91-92). First, it is said that he was able to memorise Chinese characters through sight with such speed that he was called the “child prodigy East of the Sea [i.e. in Korea].” We can assume that this focus on visual memorisation—albeit most likely somewhat exaggerated—occurred after he had learned to speak his native language, and there is in his biography nothing as strange as what is found in Kim Sisŭp’s. To the contrary, visual memorisation is of the utmost importance in learning Literary Sinitic, and it makes sense that this is emphasised in his biography. Second, in 821 he travelled to Tang China where he studied for the next twenty-four years, before returning to Korea in 845. Since we must assume that Muyŏm learned to speak a Chinese vernacular (or vernaculars), he clearly was engaged with language intensely at the oral level and would have been conscious of language as an oral phenomenon much more than Yi Kyubo, Kim Sisŭp or others who spoke only Korean and wrote only in Literary Sinitic, that is to say, the vast majority of literate Koreans until the 20th century.

Conclusion

By the time that the Korean alphabet was created in the mid fifteenth century, the sense that writing was utterly disconnected from speech had become pervasive in the minds of the vast majority of the educated elite. For them, words were things rather than events, and their education fostered this sense. In the flurry of activity that accompanied the shift to the written vernacular at the turn of the twentieth century, however, han’gŭl also proved to have a sting in its tail inasmuch as its orthographic structure was remarkably ill-suited to mechanical print. Thus precisely at the moment when universal literacy became a matter of socio-political necessity and when the technological means for the quick dissemination of ideas existed, han’gŭl’s manifold strengths also posed a serious problem. The origins of that problem as well as the reactions to it, however, were themselves consequences of the impact of Literary Sinitic on pervasive conceptions of the word among the literate as outlined above. An evaluation of these questions requires an accurate understanding of the nature of Korea’s achievement in printing, however, and these questions must be left for another occasion.

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Contact Address
Gregory Evon
Department of Japanese and Korean Studies,
School of Languages and Linguistics
UNSW Sydney NSW 2052
PH: 02 9385 2492
EMAIL: g.evon@unsw.edu.au
Post-Burden or New Burden Korean Cinema?: Outside Looking in at the Latest Golden Age, 1996-?

Brian Yecies
University of Wollongong, Australia

Abstract
This work-in-progress examines the paradoxical nature of what I call Korea’s “post-burden” cinema – a present-day film industry that has survived Japanese colonialism, American occupation, civil war, prolonged dictatorship, rapid industrialization, economic crisis and severe censorship. For nearly a century filmmakers have learned and practised their trade under these challenging social, political, cultural, economic and industrial constraints, and outlived them. This paper uses a case study of The President's Last Bang to illustrate the divergent freedoms that have enabled representative commercial, art-house, independent and animation filmmakers to transcend national and cultural borders by telling previously-forbidden stories and breathing a universal but distinctive Korean-ness into their narratives and characters. Yet, although it backfired, the startling censorship in 2005 of Im Sang-soo’s The President's Last Bang points to a new set of burdens confronting the national film industry’s future.

Post-Burden Cinema
Recent flourishing scholarship concerning the rising success of the contemporary South Korean cinema has attempted to (re)inscribe Korea’s film history into a history of national cinemas plagued with gaping holes. Studies in English such as Lee and Choe (1998), Lee (2000), James and Kim (2002), Kim (2002), Min, Joo and Kwak (2003), Kim (2004), McHugh and Abelmann (2005), Shin and Stringer (2005), Yi (2005), Yecies (2005), Jin (2006), Kim and An (2006) and Yecies (2007) provide fresh understandings of this cinema boom – from both Korean and Western perspectives. Other studies such as Yim (2002) focus on the complex relationships between cultural identity and cultural policy, while Shim (2006), among others, examines the global phenomenon of Hallyu: the Korean wave. These groundbreaking studies familiarize us with how at home and across parts of the globe the South Korean (hereafter Korean) cinema has experienced unprecedented growth or what Chris Berry (2002) calls a “full service cinema”, which embraces “a full range of modes of production and consumption”.

Since the late 1990s, Korea has gained global recognition for excellence in the realms of implementing film policy, developing creative industries, protecting culture and experimenting with film genres and narrative conventions – all of which have helped filmmakers to breathe a universal understanding into their narratives and characters while maintaining a clear Korean sentiment. Undoubtedly significant support from the government – namely through the Ministry of Culture and Tourism – and the expansion of the Korean Film Council (KOFIC, previously known as the Korean Motion Picture Promotion Corporation) has played a crucial role in promoting commercial and art-house films, developing training programs and production facilities, and increasing the public’s film and media literacy. Of course, the easing of restrictive film policy, restructuring of the entertainment monopolies controlled by the chaebols (major family-run conglomerates), rise of new industry investment (venture capital) heralded by major vertically-integrated companies such as CJ Entertainment, Mediaplex, Lotte Cinema and Cinema Service, proliferation of cinema venues, boom of domestic and international commercial and film festival audiences (and fans), protection (at least until the halving in July 2006) of the Screen Quota System, and emergence of an army of on-site workers willing to work extremely long hours for low wages – you know, for the love of production – congruently and/or subsequently also have made a significant contribution to the past decade’s consistent growth. Combined, these factors have impacted on the revitalization of the national film industry and newfound popularity of Korean films at home and abroad. The government in 2007 has earmarked an unprecedented $690 million US Dollars ($640 billion KRW) over the next five years to help make Korea one of the top filmmaking nations in the world. To me this goal harks back to the Kim Dae-jung government’s Cyber Korea 21 (1999-2002) program, which aimed to make Korea a knowledge-based society and Koreans the best computer users in the world. Mind you, the Korean cinema is about to enter a whole new era too. The Roh Moo-hyun government’s new filmmaking initiative, if successful, will make Korea one of the most advanced digitally-equipped film and media industries in the world. This is no small task. Yet, there is still much to learn about the hurdles the film industry has to overcome in order to expand and continue reaching domestic and international achievements and accolades in the wonderful days ahead.

This work-in-progress examines the paradoxical nature of what I call Korea’s “post-burden” cinema – a present-day film industry that has survived Japanese colonialism, American occupation, civil...
war, prolonged dictatorship, rapid industrialization, economic crisis and (supposedly) severe censorship. For nearly a century filmmakers have learned and practised their trade under these challenging social, political, cultural, economic and industrial constraints. This paper uses a case study of the “historical-fictitious” film The President’s Last Bang to illustrate the divergent freedoms that have enabled representative commercial, art-house, independent and animation filmmakers to transcend national and cultural borders by telling previously forbidden stories and breathing a universal but distinctive Koreaness into their narratives and characters. Although it backfired, the startling censorship in 2005 of Im Sang-soo’s The President’s Last Bang points to one of the many new burdens confronting the national film industry’s future, including cannibalistic competition among domestic films, loss of lucrative pre-sales to Japanese distributors, exploitative labor practices, and yes, a residual form of censorship evidenced by the experiences of Im Sang-soo and others.

The President’s Last Bang (2005) is perhaps one of South Korea’s most controversial commercial entertainment feature films ever made. Can I ask how many people in the audience have seen the film? The opening credits’ English subtitles (on the 2005 DVD version) say it is based on a true story. In one interview, Director Im is quoted as saying that the story was his personal, truthful account of the events of that night (or at least part of it), which he based on his own thorough research of the incident (Bertolin 2005).100 The story imagines what authoritarian President Park Chung-hee’s last night on earth (26 October 1979) might have been like before he was assassinated by Kim Jae-kyu, the Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). The film brings the audience on an intense journey as KCIA Chief Kim (masterfully played by Baek Yun-shik) decides that “tonight is the night” to off the president – in the name of “democracy”. For the first half of the film we are brought intimately close to KCIA Chief Agent Ju (Han Suk-kyu) and KCIA Agent Colonel Min (Kim Eung-soo) as they decide to follow Director Kim’s plans (to kill the President at a small dinner banquet) and to prepare their loyal men for the assassination’s aftermath, which almost certainly will lead to their deaths. A fierce, bloody gun battle ensues between President Park’s bodyguards and KCIA agents after shots are fired and President Park’s blood is splattered at the banquet dinner table. The second half of the film portrays the resulting chaos among Park’s military ranks as they jockey for position and attempt to keep some semblance of authority and order.

It is highly recommend you see The President’s Last Bang, if you have not done so already, because it offers an intriguing perspective on the Park Chung-hee era (and my brief description does not do the film justice). The Kino Video DVD (North American) version prominently displays the following quote from Premiere film critic Glenn Kenny: “A nasty, profane, and utterly bracing black comedy”. Kenny compares The President’s Last Bang to Stanley Kubrick’s renowned and ultimate political spoof Dr. Strangelove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964). Alternatively, Darcy Paquet’s (2005) review on Koreanfilm.org acutely observes that Im’s film offers a lesson about how history is made, or rather changed, as characters Kim, Ju and Min strive to change the fate of Korea’s political and thus social and cultural history, which is no laughing matter. I share Paquet’s reading of the film and, like him, applaud Im’s daring approach to such a controversial issue and political legacy – especially concerning the film’s numerous innuendos about President Park’s fondness for the Japanese colonial period. The collaboration question is alive today.

On 31 January 2005, only three days before the film’s scheduled public release, the Seoul Central Court mandated that the film be censored. This move was prompted by litigation filed by Park Ji-man, the son of the late President Park. According to one media report on Dong-a.com (January 31, 2005), Park Ji-man argued the inclusion of footage of actual protest marches and of President Park’s funeral ceremony in the opening and closing credits blurred the boundaries between fact and fiction.101 For Im and producer MK Pictures, the final choice was to cut or be cut from publicly screening the film (or at least pay approximately $30,000 USD in fines for each and every time the pre-censored version of the film was commercially screened in cinemas or on TV). The filmmakers were intimidated and were left with no choice but to acquiesce to the court’s decision; they immediately appealed the verdict.

What aroused such a draconian reaction in an era of newfound freedom of expression? After all, the Constitutional Court decided in October 1996 that it was unconstitutional for the government’s appointed review committee (the Performance Ethics Committee) to censor a film by cutting it. Was it the English title’s risqué double-entendre use of “bang” to mean “sexual intercourse”? Was the story’s semblance of call girls willing to give President Park – in the words of one of the characters – “what he wanted” and “what made him happy” problematical for South Korea’s national security? Was the film’s excessive use of guns, violence, vulgar language and the gory splattering of the President’s blood potentially harmful to minors in the audience? Did the opening scene of bikini-clad women exposing their

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100 For another fascinating interview, see: Crawford, J. 2005. Shoot to Kill: Im Sang-soo Gets Down and Dirty With Politics in ‘The President’s Last Bang’: World Cinema coverage presented by San Francisco Film Society. indieWIRE.com (October 12, 2005) http://www.indiewire.com/people/2005/10/ shoot_to_kill_i.html (accessed May 2, 2007).

supple breasts offend Korean culture and taste? Was it the depiction of students, democracy leaders and other alleged communist sympathizers being humiliated and brutalized in the KCIA torture chambers? Or simply put, was director Im’s deconstruction or perceived dishonoring of Park’s mythical aura too audacious in light of the high profile political position Park’s daughter Park Geun-hye occupies today (at the time of writing) as chairwoman of the centre-right opposition party, that is, the One-Nation Party in Korea?

Though the narrative elements described above probably created hullabaloo for many people particularly for those who hold the memory of Park dear to their hearts – the major controversy surrounding The President’s Last Bang was fuelled by what was snipped from the film. Im was ordered to delete nearly four minutes of documentary footage because of Park Ji-man’s litigation. Despite the hacking, Im’s visually-stunning film was invited as an official selection to the Cannes, New York, Toronto and Telluride film festivals, which became international opportunities to protest his censorship. The completed film simply contained black screen time where the deleted scenes initially would have appeared.

Anecdotally it seems all of the fuss promoted the film in unimaginable ways, making the censorship, that is, the repression of a politically-charged and “taboo” script, backfire. According to an article on Pressian.com, a political news website based in Seoul, Kim Ha-yeong reported (February 1, 2005) that members of the Korean Motion Picture Association (KMPA) and Director’s CUT (young directors group) were outraged by the court’s brutal suppression of freedom of expression. The backlash was intensified in print and by word-of-mouth across the globe by reporters, critics, academics, industry people and cinephiles who homed in on the international declaration of protest symbolized by the black screen time in place of the cut scenes. Published news stories, interviews and film reviews divulged details about the censorship case, thus adding fuel to Im Sang-soo’s reputation as some kind of cine-agent provocateur. Although The President’s Last Bang did not make it into the top ten highest box office-grossing Korean films in 2005, it along with Im’s other revered films, has helped him become widely-recognized as one of the so-called new Korean cinema’s maverick filmmakers. Had the court fully-agreed with Park Ji-man’s plea to ban the film entirely, the contemporary Korean cinema would not be blessed with one of its most provocative films, which the Seoul Central Court believed audiences would not interpret as a story based on true events. For the Court, The President’s Last Bang was a fictional spoof lampooning Kwak Kyung-taek’s Friend (2001). One might wonder here if they had seen the film at all.

MK Pictures appealed the Court’s decision, and in August 2006 they were successful at overturning the ruling. The deleted documentary footage was restored, but MK Pictures was forced to pay Park Ji-man about $106,000USD for slandering his father’s character (Paquet 2006). This punitive damage is hardly comparable to the hurdle producers had to overcome in January 2005 when their co-distributor, CJ Entertainment, withdrew their distribution commitments and venture capital (about 20% of the total budget). The ramifications surrounding the film and its court case evidently spooked CJ Entertainment.

The case of The President’s Last Bang is significant in the overall context of the roaring success of South Korea’s recent commercial entertainment cinema because it encapsulates the paradoxical nature of what I have labeled Korea’s “post-burden” cinema. The treatment of The President’s Last Bang questions whether or not the Korean cinema is really free from censorship. Well, it seems it is not. As Park (2002) observes, government censorship still exists because the appropriate laws have yet to be modified. Herein lies the paradox. In terms of film policy, the Producers Registration System (PRS), which Aegyung Shim discusses in detail in her paper “Lessons from the Past: Cinema of Perseverance Under Park Chung Hee, 1961-1970”, was abolished by laws made in 1984 and enacted in 1985. Before 1985 only licensed producers could make films. After 1985, production limitations were relaxed, though Im (2006) states that films with overt communist ideology or anti-government themes were still prohibited from being produced and/or screened. Interestingly, erotic films were permitted partly due to liberalizing attitudes about sex – hence the long-standing incidence of rape scenes and “hostess” genre films in the Korean cinema. In 1988 after Roh Tae Woo was elected president, script censorship was eliminated (from the production stage). Around this time, filmmakers enjoyed newborn freedoms of expression, that is, they were able to engage with stories that fueled social debates as a result of the government’s larger wave of laissez-faire attitudes towards political and social commentary in the media. A “new wave” of feature filmmakers such as Park Kwang-su, Chang Sun-woo, Lee Chang-ho, Bae Chang-ho, and Park Jong-won attracted international attention with films that told previously-prohibited stories. Flash-forward several years, and Kim Hyeong-jun, the co-producer of Silmido (2003), declares on BBC News’ BBC.CO.UK (October 24, 2003) that it is precisely the liberalization of censorship that has enabled his film – a factual account kept

102 http://www.pressian.com/scripts/section/article.asp?article_num=30050201094815&sl_menu=%B9%AE%C8%AD (accessed May 1, 2007).
103 Im’s filmmography, which is rife with confronting issues of sexuality, infidelity and youth street life, also includes: Girls’ Night Out (1998), Tears (2000), A Good Lawyer’s Wife (2003), The Old Garden (2006), and A Good Woman in Paris (in production in 2007).
According to Paquet's overview of censorship 1995-2002, other high-profile instances of censorship cases include: Yu-min Kim's Yellow Hair (1999), which contained a ménage à trois sex scene; Jang Sun-Woo's Lies (1999), which initially portrayed vulgar conversations between two high school girls as well as a scene involving the sexual excitement of pee; and Park Jin-pyo's semi-documentary film about a 70-something couple having sex and performing fellatio in Too Young To Die (2002). These films were either forced to cut "objectionable" scenes, blur naughty bits, and/or were initially banned from public screening. Let us also remember the case of human rights activist Suh Joon-shik, who in November 1997 was arrested for "violating" the Law on Records and Video Tapes and Korea's National Security Law after he failed to submit human rights film festival entries for direct government censorship before the public festival screenings. Amnesty International, which covered his complex story in 1998 on their website advocated for Suh Joon-shik's indictment to be removed. In early 1998 Suh was eventually released on bail and he has since played a leadership role in the SARANGBANG Group for Human Rights organization. His case demonstrates that direct government intervention in alleged pro-communist film-related issues was observable for much longer than conventional Korean film histories tell us. There are other cases of foreign films having had to be cut before being approved by the ratings board, but there is too little time in this paper to delve any deeper.

Apart from the affliction of censorship, additional concerns such as the internal cannibalism of market share among domestic films, loss of lucrative pre-sales to Japanese distributors, and exploitative labor practices still loom large. First, Bong Joon-ho's The Host (2006) throttled the domestic market when exhibitors agreed to screen it on an unprecedented number of screens, choking off a plurality of opportunities for a majority of the 100-plus commercial features made in the same year. Needless to say, filmmakers whose films were devoured by The Host were unimpressed. The film was so popular among Korean audiences that it broke all historical box office records by surpassing the $13 million mark of nationwide admissions. Although The Host and King and the Clown (2005) helped lead the industry to a never-before-seen local market share of 60%, the domination of The Host on domestic screens incident prompted Ms. An Cheong-sook, Chairperson of the Korean Film Council (KOFIC), to publish an editorial lauding the importance of a diversity of commercial/popular and artistic Korean films. Second, the Korean film industry has begun to witness a decline in lucrative pre-sales to Japanese distributors, who in 2005 committed about $60 million US dollars to select Korean productions. Between 2003 and 2005 Japanese distributors such as Nikkatsu and Shochiku (two of the oldest major Japanese studios/vertically integrated film companies) were fronting as much as $3-$8 million US dollars for the exhibition rights of individual Korean films. In turn, Korean producers used this precious cash infusion to complete their films. In spite of this trend, in 2006 the same Japanese distributors backed off to a mere total $10 million US dollars in pre-sales among all their Korean films because it became too difficult to recoup their investment from Japanese audiences. In short, the popularity of Korean films in Japan is fading. Korean films with big budgets are definitely starting to feel the pinch.

Third, exploitative (bordering on illegal) labor practices still loom large. The fact is that over the past decade the film boom in Korea and the glamour of the cinema have attracted people from across all fields who were willing to work for relatively next to nothing just to be on a set or in an editing room – not to mention the mushrooming number of university graduates from domestic and international institutions looking for work. The industry, including all of Korea's copious film festivals, has been plagued with unfair/irregular/unequal wages, including an absence of a minimum wage and proper overtime pay.

106 See “The Host and Time...Two Faces of Korean Film.” Editorial by An Cheong-sook. Korean Film Observatory No. 19 (Autumn 2006): 5. Kim Ki-duk’s Time (2005) provided an extreme comparison to The Host because Kim’s decision not to distribute Time in Korea made a clear protest statement about the lack of status and recognition of the independent and art film (or at least his films) in Korea. Seoul-based art film distributor/importer and (small) exhibitor SPONGE’s last-minute decision to pick up Time is the sole reason this Kim Ki-duk film was publicly screened in Korea at all.
unreasonable (extremely long) working hours, limited medical/health and retirement benefits, etc. It is hard to believe what some people are willing to go through to be a part of the Korean cinema. Finally, it is worth mentioning that illegal downloading and weakening secondary markets (DVD/video sales, TV, cable/pay-TV, and foreign sales) are also exacerbating the new burdens facing the industry.

Concluding Thoughts
As many of us may know, the film industry in Korea has begun to adopt business models of the Hollywood enterprise, such as high concept, big budget, special effects and marketing campaigns (spin-offs, tie-ins, merchandizing, licensing, taglines, product placement and online supplementation) in order to survive and resist Hollywood’s global dominance. These new strategies undoubtedly have been implemented in tandem with the impressive growth and international recognition of the Korean cinema. Fascinating as this may be, the Korean film industry has yet to catch up with the same regularized labor practices used for years by the US and other countries’ film industries. The challenges facing Korea’s film industry raise difficult questions about the new set of burdens that must be championed before a new decade of growth can be achieved.

This time and these issues are pivotal because they will dictate the future direction of the whole of the Korean film industry. Will the film industry continue to become more like Hollywood with its long-term and glorious history? Or, will the Korean cinema fade into the ranks of other popular national cinemas, joining the likes of Japan (1960s), Hong Kong (1970s) and China (1980s)? I don’t profess to have all the answers, but at least there is an identifiable need for filmmakers, activists, policy-makers and scholars to re-think this post-burden era as part of a larger continuum of burdens and problems worth solving. If Korea can overcome this test then the Korean cinema can truly become a post-burden cinema. Perhaps there is still time for discussion and thoughtful reflection.

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108 KOFIC reported that on April 18, 2007 some progress had been achieved in relation to these critical labor-management issues. However, the efficacy of continuing negotiations remains to be seen. See: Lee Young-jin. “Labor-Management Agreement Finalized.” Korean Film Observatory No. 22 (Cannes Edition 2007): 5-6.


**Contact Address**

Brian Yecies
University of Wollongong
Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia
PH: (61-2)-4221-4076
FAX: (61-2)-4221-5341
EMAIL: byecies@uow.edu.au

Ae-Gyung Shim
University of New South Wales, Australia

Abstract
The expansion of the contemporary South Korean cinema in both local and international contexts has raised fascinating research questions about its success factors. The unexpected but heralded box office out-performance of the Korean blockbuster Shiri (1999) over the Hollywood blockbuster Titanic (1998) has been recounted as a key example of the successful building of Korean national cinema. Yet, as every golden age eventually comes to an end, Korea’s contemporary film industry in 2007 is also showing some signs of falling prey to flat growth. In retrospect, in the 1960s the Korean film industry also experienced a golden rise. My paper explores the dark side of this growth as it particularly concerns a market environment interfered-with by conflicting censorship and commercial agendas. At the same time, this paper illustrates the survival strategies directors used to outwit censorship regulations and commercial market constraints. Without the persevering contributions from notable directors, Korea’s golden age in the 1960s would have ended much sooner than expected.

Cinema of Perseverance
The contemporary growth of South Korea’s film industry over the past decade is no longer a surprise. The Korean Cinema has attracted audiences with highly-competitive local films armed with intriguing narratives, popular stars, high quality production values and comfortable viewing experiences through multiplex cinemas. In 2006 the industry celebrated the remarkable attainment of 60.6% of the local market share – at the expense of Hollywood and a few other countries’ films. Yet, as every golden age eventually comes to an end, so too is the bubble growth surrounding the contemporary Korean film industry showing signs of winding down, as it did in the late 1960s.

More than 50 years ago, the Korean cinema experienced a similar type of market expansion and development campaign that was supported by a growing number of audiences, cinemas and subsequent domestic productions. It was a time called the Golden Age of Korean Cinema.109 The success of the so-called New Korean Cinema since the late 1990s has presented an opportunity to reflect upon this unique history. Despite recent important scholarship about Korean film history, few scholars have addressed the side of the industry that was plagued by restrictive censorship and commercial pursuits in the 1960s.

This paper is part of a larger project that analyzes key survival strategies popular directors used to overcome political and commercial hurdles which eventually led to an industry slump. Director Lee Man-hee is selected as a case study because his survival story demonstrates the level of sacrifice directors undertook in order to continue making films. Looking back, it is a wonder that some of Lee’s films could be made at all. Of course, under today’s newfound freedoms of expression, they could easily be made. Films such as Shiri (1999), Silmido (2003) and The President’s Last Bang (2005) are a case in point. But the production environment in the 1960s was not so friendly for directors. Lee’s commitment to filmmaking is one example that shows how an individual director prolonged the golden age of Korean cinema, not by surrendering his artistic vision, but by brining it to life. Without the contributions from persevering directors such as Lee, Korea’s golden age in the 1960s would have ended much sooner than expected. What caused the golden age in the 1960s to end and the dark age to begin leaves us with valuable lessons from which we can learn.

Production Cartel and Erection of Censorship
The military junta launched the first Motion Picture Law (hereafter MPL) in 1962 and brought radical changes to the film industry. First, it created the Producer Registration System (hereafter PRS), which became a cartel that enhanced the authority of government licensed producers and weakened the status of directors. From this point onwards only “registered” producers had the rights to make films (unlike in the late 1950s when directors established production companies with ease). Registered producers now controlled the entire filmmaking process. And, schmoozing with producers and impressing them with box office hits became one of the only ways for directors to find continuous work. Producers prioritized productivity and box office figures over directors’ creativity and artistic features. Directors who did not cater to audience trends soon were forgotten by producers. Under this harsh production

109 Before the Golden Age of Korean Cinema in the 1960s, there was the golden age of silent films. It covers the period, 1926-1934, which began with Na Un-gyu’s Arirang and ends with Korea’s first talkie Chunhyang-jeon in 1935.
environment, directors had to fight to practice their craft. The film industry was being stifled by production practices much like those used in confectionery factories that used workers as parts of giant assembly lines.

Second, came the systemization of censorship. The government saw directors playing a central role in the frontlines of a national propaganda campaign. Censorship regulations aimed to control directors’ creativity and then tame them as technicians on an assembly line. In order to achieve this goal, the Ministry of Public Information supervised the entire censorship process. Apart from MPL regulations, anti-communist laws and obscenity laws were also applied to the film industry. Since 1965 criminal prosecutors took part in the censorship process and investigated directors such as Lee Man-hee. The production process became more restrictive than ever before. This was not a unique phenomenon witnessed in Korea alone, since state control censorship was also rife in other countries such as in the authoritarian and communist regimes found in parts of Latin America and Eastern Europe. However, Korea’s case is very different from this larger global context because the rules governing a market economy were still pursued despite strong government intervention. Unlike other sectors of society such as the manufacture of textiles and electrical appliances managed by the Park regime’s Five Year Economic Plan, local and foreign films competed with each other in order to attract more audience, that is, to get across “good” national propaganda (anti-communist) to the largest possible audience.

The Park government pursued censorship as a way of strengthening and legitimizing its (illegally obtained) political power. For instance, the Constitution was changed in order to build and justify the full application of censorship. Figure 1 shows the censorship process established in the late 1960s.

As Park Ji-yeon (2001, 202) observes, the development of the censorship took place in two stages. Soft and arbitrary censorship ruled the early 1960s and harder and more detailed content regulations occurred in the late 1960s. Changes in censorship values coincided with the Park regime’s larger endeavors to intensify its rule of the media while extending its political power. Nationalist and anti-communist ideologies were extensively propagated in the mid-1960s after the Park government firmly established its political power.

Soft and arbitrary censorship decisions were a combination of a censor’s whim and terms of reference from the anti-communist and obscenity (criminal) laws. These major principles recruited from outside of the industry were used to suppress anti-government activities and pro-communist acts. The traditional Confucian and patriarchal family system was also highly praised, and any vulgar expressions of

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The initial censorship process, according to the MPL, announced in January 1962 required the submission of a production report, listing film title and names of producer and crew members (screen writer, director, cinematographer, etc.) and a screenplay. They were examined by censors before issuing a permit. Sometimes censors sent the report back to the producer with suggestions for revision/deletion of problematic scenes. Upon the film’s completion, the producer applied for a screening permit to the MPI. Censors watched the completed film and cut scenes that violated censorship regulations. Once the film was released, its screening could be suspended any time for bearing a potential threat to public safety and customs.
sexuality on the screen were not allowed. Upon violation, the prosecutor’s office “interrogated” directors – sometimes by strong words and other times by fist.

Director Lee Man-hee and Yu Hyun-mok became two of the first victims brought to trial in 1965 for violating these laws. Complaints against their treatment and detainment – in the name of freedom of expression – were made to the government by members of the film community. They were deeply upset by the matter and probably feared they too could be arrested and interrogated by the prosecutor’s office. However, according to my archive research, the government did not respond to any of these complaints. The incident simply signaled the beginning of a more scrutinizing censorship regime.

Korea’s involvement in the Cold War played a critical role in the government’s perceived need to strengthen film censorship. Scare tactics were used to control film industry people. Evidently they were a group to be feared because some of their liberal ideas failed to gel with the government’s ideas about how an industrialized film industry should operate. In 1969 the prosecutor’s office arrested three other renowned directors for violating the obscenity law. Apparently the following films of theirs aroused sexual desire and violated social and moral codes: Park Jong-ho’s Woman in the Wall (Byol Sol-ui Yeoja), Shin Sang-ok’s Eunuch (Naeshi) and Lee Hyung-pyo’s Your Name Is Woman (Neo-ui Irum-mun Yeoja). Considering the level of respect these directors had attained, their arrests were a shock to the film community. Ironically, these films already had passed complete film censorship. The investigation was based on previously-cut film scenes collected from the censorship office, which were never destined to be seen by the public (Y.J. Lee 2002). The film community was outraged because they believed the Park regime constructed these cases in order to prevent future trouble from the film industry. They were fully aware they were being oppressed and were not happy about it. Nevertheless, there was little they could do, or at least so they believed. One director proved that something could be done.

Lee Man-hee: Genre Experimenter and Anti-communism Lubricator

Lee Man-hee is one such director that Park’s censorship regime failed to control. He stands out because his films outlived the military regime. Their recent re-discovery immediately has led to the celebration of their artistic achievement. Yet, conventional wisdom surrounding Lee and his works overlooks a unique tactic he used to survive censorship as well as market pressures. Like other directors of the period, Lee was a struggling artist under military authority. Directors who could not find work were forced to leave the industry. According to a survey conducted by Yonghwa Segye movie magazine (June 1963, 48), there were a total of 125 film directors, but not all were employed. There was an oversupply of directors and their workloads varied depending on their talent and level of recognition. Storytelling and stylistic abilities as well as completing films on time impacted on one’s popularity from both an audience and a producer perspective. Those who were too slow and/or did not entertain audiences quickly enough disappeared and were forced to look for new careers outside the film industry. Some even committed suicide.111

Lee Man-hee (1931-1975) made his debut in 1961, and is best known as a master war filmmaker and father of actress Lee Hye-yeong. He began receiving critical acclaim with the huge success of his fourth film Marines Who Never Returned (Dora-oji Anneun Haebyeong, 1963), which was a big budget anti-communist Korean War film that promoted marine bravado. During production, Lee received unprecedented in-kind support from the Ministry of Defense and Marine Corps. As a result, the film contained a realistic portrayal of battle scenes and thus provided audiences with an entertaining spectacle. The film also received special censorship treatment; not a single scene was cut. It attracted 227,800 patrons in Seoul and won numerous domestic film awards. Lee’s talent was recognized by both audiences and the government. Lee’s future seemed to be brighter than ever and other war films followed.112 Lee faithfully served the Park regime by directing high quality anti-communist films that dealt with the Korean War, international spies and the Vietnam War. Director Im Kwon-taek once said that only a few directors made war films in the 1960s: Lee was one of the best (Jeong 2003, 253).

Yet, as much as Lee is known as a master war filmmaker, he is also known as director of other genres such as thriller and action films. His third film Dial 112 (Dial 112reul Doleora, 1962) was praised for its well-made thriller structure.113 Successful films such as a sophisticated medical thriller The Devil’s Stairway (Maui Gyedan, 1964) and an action film set on a moving train Miracle (Gijeok, 1967) distinctively exemplify Lee’s ability to transcend film genre boundaries. In fact, Lee’s filmmography

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112 The list includes: The Soldiers of YMS 504 (1963), Seven Female POWs (1965) (aka. Returned Female Soldiers), A Hero without Serial Number (1966), Legend of Ssang seek (1967), A Spotted Man (1967), Living In the Sky (1968), The Traveling Road (1968), Bridge over Golboi River (1970), 04:00-1950 (1972) and The Wild Flowers In the Battle Field (1974).

113 His first two films, Kaleidoscope (Jumadeung, 1961) and A Disobedient Son (Bulhyoja, 1961), were melodramas which did not match well with Lee’s directorial taste on films.
includes all kinds of genre including melodrama, comedy, historical drama, literary adaptation and mystery. In other words, Lee should be referred to as a director of all genres, and one who enjoyed experimenting with new things. Contemporary directors such as Kim Jee-woon, Bong Jun-ho, and Park Chan-wook share this commonality with Lee.

With this diversity in mind, Lee’s anti-communist films might not represent the common government propaganda film. In all of his anti-communist films, Lee attempted to explore the human condition through war. A binary view of South and North Korea as good vs. evil was hardly the main theme of his films, as was the case in other main-stream anti-communist films. For example, Lee’s most representative film Marines Who Never Returned shows the miserable situation Koreans faced during the Korean War. War orphans, superior treatment of US GIs over Korean soldiers and endless human sacrifice in a battle created a comprehensive understanding of the ugliness of war. Lee’s attempts to recreate anti-communist films in his own way were not always appreciated by the Park regime. An infamous censorship case occurred in 1965 with Seven Female POWs, hindering Lee’s continuing attempt to craft anti-communist films in his own style.

In February 1965 director Lee was arrested by the prosecutor’s office for violating the Anti-communist law A.4.1., for praising North Korea. Lee’s arrest was the first case in which the anti-communist law was applied to the art field, thus raising huge concerns among the art community. Seven Female POWs highlights humane relationships between a North Korean officer and seven POWs – South Korean female nurses. Unlike a stereotypical description of an ugly and evil North Korean officer, the North Korean officer in Lee’s film is a handsome, brave young man full of compassion. He kills Chinese soldiers in order to save the nurses from being raped. Ultimately, this incident leads him to defect to South Korea where the nurses save his life and help him find “freedom”. Though the film ultimately promoted South Korea as a “better place to be”, this message was apparently misunderstood by the prosecutor’s office. Shin Dong-a (February 1965, 356) reported the prosecutor’s office claimed this film to be pro-communist because: 1) nurses saluted the North Korean Officer, 2) a South Korean soldier was described as being weak and 3) soldiers despised yanggongju (a prostitute dealing with foreigners, mainly US GIs). The Korean Film Directors’ Society (KMDS – Hanguk Gamdok Hyopho) defended the case by emphasizing Lee’s anti-communist filmmaking record as represented by Marines Who Never Returned (1962). However, the refutation of the KMDS was hardly recognized by the prosecutor’s office. The case was resolved with Lee serving a jail sentence. As for the film, approximately 40 minutes of the original film was cut. After being re-edited, it was released under a new title, Returned Female Soldiers (Doraon Yeogun), with only a 50-minute running time. Understandably, the film failed at the box office and its producer Choi Dong-gwon went bankrupt (Park 2005, 431). Today, one might say that a little bit of Seven Female POWs lives on in films such as Joint Security Area (Park Chan-wook, 2000).

Lee’s struggle with censorship was in a way expected. Lee enjoyed making war films (but not necessarily anti-communist films) because he could experiment with new techniques without budget concerns. In doing so, Lee directed “good quality” anti-communist films, but they were not up to the government’s expectation. Veteran costume designer Lee Hae-yun remembers how much Lee wished to make a film with a cool North Korean officer. Later, she designed and made stylish uniforms for North Korean soldiers for Seven Female POWs (Lee 2002, 131). However, the Park regime despised the positive portrayal of North Korean officers. Physical and emotional distress eventually frustrated Lee, but it did not stop him from making more anti-communist films. He needed to survive.

Lee directed another anti-communist film called A Hero without Serial Number in 1966 in order to prove his loyalty to the government. The main character in this film was a North Korean officer, who was forced to kill his father. Suffering from the guilt, he decided to help his brother, a resistance leader, by giving him top military secrets. From an anti-communist perspective, this film had it all, including Lee’s signature approach to the human condition story – though it was concealed by the portrayal of brutal communists. In 1966 this film received the Best Anti-communist Film Award from the Grand Bell Awards, Korea’s top film industry recognition event. Lee’s “loyalty” to the regime had been recognized. For Lee, survival meant making films, not for personal tastes but for securing his future as a director in an industry bound by censorship constraints.

114 Other cultural fields, such as literature, were also hit by the anti-communist law. Before long, in July 1965, novelist Nam Jeong-hyun was arrested. It was because his short novel Land of Excretions (Bunji) was published in North Korea’s official organ – Unification Front (Tongil Jeonseon) – in May 1965. Though it happened without his consent, Nam was sentenced and served seven years of imprisonment. See Yu, S.H, J.H. Kang and S.U. Kwon. 2001. Munhak (Literature). In Korean Modern Art History III: 1960s (Hanguk Hyundae Yesulsa Taegye III: 1960nyondae), edited by Y.M. Lee. Seoul: Sigoungsa. 94-97.

115 The KMDS also refuted the prosecutor’s criticism: 1) nurses saluting to the North Korean officer in the beginning was because they were forced to. Their second salute to him at the end of the film was to show their gratitude; 2) a weak South Korean soldier/driver was used for comic relief and that was Ku Bong-seo, [popular] comedian, who was cast for the role; 3) the talk about the yanggongju did not mean to disgrace the US army and was only one of the common topics the North Korean officer and nurses had.
Between 1966 and 1970, Lee directed twenty-four films and during this time his inclination towards different genres increased. Lee’s experimental techniques and styles continued while directing these other films. For example, in *Late Autumn* Lee employed a montage and minimum use of dialogue in order to accentuate the visual images. *Homebound* and *Holiday* conveyed critical commentary on Korean society through symbolic images. Unfortunately, only one of these films (*Homebound*) exists today.

**Concluding Thoughts**

What did anti-communist filmmaking mean to director Lee Man-hee? In the beginning, he accepted this as a rare opportunity to access big budget war spectacle films, which were simply one of his favorite genres. As mentioned above, *Marines Who Never Returned* (1963) was produced with massive support from the government and it passed censorship without a scratch. Yet, the censorship case of *Seven Female POWs* (1965) taught Lee a new lesson: anti-communist films were meant to be propaganda – not art. Nevertheless, he used his input on anti-communist films to lubricate the gears behind the Korean cinema, and by working within the government’s nationalistic agenda, negotiated a space for him to practise his craft. Lee’s other genre films benefited greatly from his surmounting experience with anti-communist film.

Because the decade of the 1960s was saddled by growing censorship pressures and commercial pursuits, Lee Man-hee and a few others like him had a difficult time making personal films. Towards the late 1960s the mass production of quota quickies satisfied demands from producers and helped them escape negative censorship attention. The quest for new stories and plots as well as genre concoctions disappeared as the grinding sounds of the assembly lines echoed throughout the production industry. Over 200 films were produced in 1968. Compare this to the 49 Korean films produced in 1999 and 87 in 2005 (though these were much bigger commercial entertainment projects and budgets than from 1968, and they took a lot longer to produce, too). Yet, in 1968 the overall quality of films declined. In the eyes of most critics, the quota quickies that poured into the film market failed to attract and entertain audiences. Once-successful melodrama plots were reproduced with the hope of attracting new audiences to the cinema. Censorship was seen as a threat to the survival of the film industry because it stifled creativity and diversity. Directors who survived the 1960s unknowingly had prepared themselves for the coming of a dark age.

Lee Man-hee’s case shows how directors attempted to find ways to craft their artistry within an assembly line approach to developing a robust national film industry. A director’s name value was often used as a bargaining chip in negotiations for the next film project, projecting a unique amateur quality apart from the government’s agenda and producers’ commercial interests. Yet, directors developed fears toward Park’s censorship policy and its day-to-day operation. As a result, in the late 1960s, the overall quality of films declined because genre diversity decreased, and new stylistic and narrative techniques were left behind. In 1968 director Kim Su-yong criticized the censorship officers, “You cut my fingers! Remember that our consciousness and blood runs through our films!” (Kim 2005, 67). Kim’s criticism expressed a general but real fear of losing creativity. Efforts to prolong the industry’s growth had reached a limit. When the Park regime’s media control was firmly shaped in the late-1960s, it became harder for filmmakers such as Lee Man-hee to articulate their artistry. Everybody was silenced in the fearful wake of a draconian and harsh censorship regime. Censorship is different today, as Brian Yecies discusses in his paper, “Post-Burden or New Burden Korean Cinema?: Outside Looking in at the Latest Golden Age, 1996-?”. In any case, if care is not taken to uphold diversity (more so than quality) among all types of Korean films and filmmakers, including commercial, independent, art house, animation and documentary films, then the contemporary Korean film industry too could be exposed to risks of a new (another) dark age.

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Contact address
Ae-Gyung Shim
University of New South Wales
Sydney NSW 2052
PH: 02-4284-6054
EMAIL: milldukie@yahoo.co.kr
Exhibiting Contemporary Korean Art Abroad

En Young Ahn
The Australian National University, Australia

Abstract
This paper will examine the representation of 20th and 21st century Korean art in the Western dominated international art world through an analysis of postliberation South Korean modern and contemporary art exhibitions held overseas from the late 1950s to the early 2000s. This analysis will reveal a dynamic relationship between internal and external identity constructions of Korean art. On one hand, overseas Korean art exhibitions have altered the foreign preconceptions about the uniqueness or Koreanness of contemporary Korean art. On the other hand, the foreign receptions of the ‘Korean’ qualities of modern and contemporary Korean art, in turn, have influenced the domestic constructions of ‘contemporary’ and ‘Korean’ identity of postliberation South Korean art.

National identity and overseas art exhibitions
In the post-Second World War era, nationalism or national identity has been an important political and cultural issue for Korea, a formerly colonial and still divided country. Despite the existence of two Koreas and of over 6.6 million ‘overseas Koreans’ (the Overseas Koreans Foundation 2005) in more than 150 different countries, the people of the Republic of Korea have ‘imagined’ (Anderson 1983, 15-16) ‘Korea’ (Hanguk) as a being unified and linguistically, racially and culturally homogenous nation. During the military regimes of Park Chung Hee (1961 to 1979) and his successors (1980 to 1992), especially, a persuasive view of an ideologically crafted, ethno-nationalism (minjokjuŭi) and homogenous national identity (tanil minjok) led many South Koreans to suppress their class, gender and individual differences in the name of national solidarity.

Recently, in a democratically matured South Korea, national identity has re-emerged as a prominent issue in the nation’s ambitious new self-projecting of itself as the ‘Hub of Asia’. In the new millennium, the Republic of Korea is trying to assert its cultural leadership or hegemony in ‘Asia’, a rapidly emerging trans-national unity in countering the dominance of the globalised West – within which the Korean mapping of Asia has dramatically expanded from a narrow realm of Tongyang or East-Asia consisting only Korea, China and Japan, to a larger speculative unity including other previously unfamiliar parts of Asia such as South Asia.

As if it were unnecessary to repeat some of the already well-known arguments on nationalism and national identity (for example, Gellner 1983 and Hobbsawm 1990), the recent Korean historical experiences clearly indicate that national identity is not a fixed or monolithic but a shared concept that is constantly being reconstructed according to different historical circumstances, demands and interests. A question here is how to trace a history of national identity. To explore that question, this paper attempts to chart the ongoing modifications of South Korean constructions of national identity as they are reflected in the major overseas modern and contemporary Korean art exhibitions of the post-Second World War period, through a number of case studies. There are at least two rationales for this research method.

First, a number of the historical studies of international exhibitions (for example, Anderson 1983; Auerbach 1999; Greenhalgh 1988 and Rydell 1993) have illustrated that international exhibitions have been a powerful medium of influence and mode of communication in establishing the specifically configured national identity and prestige of a country internationally. The origin of international exhibitions starting with the Great Exhibition of 1851 in London was, after all, closely linked to the formation of the modern concepts of nationalism and nation identity in nineteenth century Europe. Art exhibitions, thanks to the general public goodwill towards art, believing in an intrinsic value of art that is free from the realm of politics, have proven to be particularly effective in disseminating the self-projected national image and identity abroad, while softening political propaganda tones. We can recall here the significant research on the international promotion of American art during the cold war (for example that of Guilbaut 1983 and McDonald 1999), which demonstrated how American abstract expressionist art exhibitions which circulated in Europe in the 1950s played an important role in reinventing the USA’s image as the new cultural leader of the Western civilisation in the post war era.

Second, an analysis of the shifting parameters of the domestically shared Korean national identity reflected in the changing international representations of the national specificity and identity of Korean art displayed through overseas art exhibitions would allow us to shed light on the dynamic interactions between internal and external identity constructions. On one hand, exhibiting a nation’s visual art abroad is one of the most visible means for affirming the validity of the domestically constructed national identity
internationally. On the other hand, critical overseas receptions of the exhibition prompt revisions of the domestically perceived national identity.

To highlight the significance of the relationship between national identity and art exhibitions, my case studies focus on the important postwar Korean art exhibitions sent abroad under official auspices. The reason for this is that any publicly sponsored major exhibitions of Korean art naturally had to, or at least had to appear to, respond to the political agendas of the government or the public expectations, for example those promoting the national image abroad. Irrespective of particular curatorial intentions, exhibitions with the official government imprimatur were often viewed overseas as being representative of Korean national art.

**Overseas Korean art exhibitions from 1945 to the 1990s: art of ‘the People of the White’**

Even though there were a small number of publicly supported overseas Korean contemporary art exhibitions held from 1945 to the 1980s, according to my study of the last five decades of Korean overseas exhibitions suggests that none of these pre-1990s’ exhibitions were consciously and strategically organised to represent ‘Korean’ art to the public of the designated country\(^5\). This is mainly because the pre-1990s’ overseas Korean art exhibitions were not curated by professionally trained curators, but usually by fellow artists, critics or the advisory committee on art to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and occasionally by overseas embassy staff or personnel of the Ministry of Culture. It was not until the late 1980s with the establishment of curatorial department at the National Museum of Contemporary Art (NMCA) in 1986 that the profession of curator became well known in Korea. Given the apparent absence of appropriate curatorial expertise required for any major overseas art exhibitions of national importance, even when the pre-1990s overseas Korean exhibitions were conceived with strong nationalistic aspirations, the exhibitions were incapable of articulating coherently their intended national aims.

Another reason for the absence of any noteworthy publicly sponsored overseas exhibitions prior to the 1990s is that it was only around the 1988 Summer Olympics that the state’s systematic supports for overseas exhibition began. If the government sought to enhance national confidence and pride through hosting big international events like the Olympics, various Korean art communities rigorously argued for similar gains through visual arts programs. From the 1990s on the government and public recognition of the potential benefits of overseas Korean art exhibitions has increased along side of the growth of the nation’s desire to advance its geo-political prominence and its cultural reputation to the levels held by those prestigious Western countries. This is exemplified in a symbiotic relationship between the surge of publicly supported overseas Korean art exhibitions in the 1990s and the burgeoning of the state-initiated new discourse of ‘Segyehwa’ or ‘globalisation’ launched in the early 1990s. Segyehwa spells out a Korean nationalistic aspiration for an economical and cultural readership in an increasingly decentralised yet interconnected global world.

Notwithstanding the virtual absence of the significant overseas Korean art exhibitions in the postwar period of 1945 to the 1980s, I must mention two exhibitions, *Contemporary Korean Painting of 1957 and Korea, five artists, five Hinsek (WHITE)* [sic] of 1975. The exhibition *Contemporary Korean Painting* was held at the World House Galleries in New York, from 22 March to 25 February in 1958. This exhibition included 62 contemporary works of oil and traditional ink paintings, and prints by over 30 artists. The World House Galleries, the exhibition’s organiser, commissioned Ellen P. Conant, an American modern Japanese art expert, to select works. Conant’s selection criteria were ‘modern’ and ‘original’ Korean works ‘executed within last 10 years’ (quoted from Chung 2005, 26)\(^6\). In spite of its commercial purpose, this exhibition received both American and Korean government assistance, because it presented itself as a complimentary event to the much publicised *Masterpieces of Korean Art* exhibition. *Masterpieces of Korean Art* travelled through eight cities across America from December 1957 to June 1959 and received considerable American public attention.

Despite its primarily commercial nature, the exhibition *Contemporary Korean Painting* (ills. 1 to 3) deserves special attention because it was historically and symbolically the first exposure of postliberation contemporary South Korean art in New York, the most prestigious international art centre. Sadly, unlike the antique exhibition of *Masterpieces of Korean Art*, this contemporary show received very little mention in the press. Further, the only art magazine reviews (Tyler 1958, 12-3 and Munsterberg 1958, 59) exemplified the New York art world’s Eurocentric preoccupations and its ignorance of Korean art by referring the exhibited works as imitations of Surrealist, Cubist or Expressionist works, or those of the *École de Paris*\(^7\).

Before its actual showing in New York, *Contemporary Korean Painting* sparked domestic debates about which artists and works should represent Korean art\(^8\). A Korean newspaper reported that some Korean artists argued that ‘the selection by a non-Korean could not be representative of Korean art’. Behind these Korean debates about the selection criteria for an important overseas exhibition, there were certain rivalries between artists and art groups competing for the prestige and potential economic gains attending inclusion in this exhibition (suggested in Chung 2005, 27). It should be noted that unlike nowadays, in the period after the liberation and the early years of the post-Korean War, an opportunity to exhibit abroad was very rare for many Korean artists. My study of the last five decades of the publicly
supported major Korean overseas exhibitions suggests that artists’ economic rivalry and status anxiety have been an influential factor in the selections both by Korean and non-Korean organisers for many prestigious major Korean overseas art exhibitions. An important consequence of this fact (which I believe is not unique to Korea) is that these selections in turn have influenced to a degree both the domestic and international definitions of Korean modern or contemporary art.

*Korea, five artists, five Hinsek (WHITE)* which was held at the Tokyo Gallery in Tokyo, from 6 to 24 May 1975 was also a commercial exhibition. Yet it is perhaps the most historically important overseas exhibition of Korean contemporary art held in the postliberation period from 1945 to the late 1980s. This exhibition triggered the widespread popularity of the whitish, monochrome minimalist abstract painting style (*Ill. 4*) in Korea which lasted until the 1980s. In other words, the exhibition was in fact the origin of what was later claimed by a number of influential Korean art critics to be a genuinely indigenous contemporary art movement, called *Tansaekchu* or ‘Monochromism’, despite its discernable foreign influences, such as the elements of American Colour field painting, Minimalism and the Japanese *monoha*. For example, in elaborating his claim for the uniqueness of Monochromism in an international context, the prominent Korean art critic Lee Yil (1997, 123 & 127) attempted to interpret the distinctive use of white colour by key Monochromists who he called ‘the artists of the 1970s’ as a peculiarly ‘Korean’ phenomenon.

However, according to the critic Lee (1988, 3), not Koreans but Japanese – particularly the owner of the Tokyo Gallery, Yamamoto Takasi who organised the *Korea, five artists* exhibition and the Japanese art critic Nakahara Yusuke, who together with the critic Lee, was involved in the selection of the five exhibiting Korean artists and who has often written reviews of Korean exhibitions in Japan – were the first to notice or claim that what was special or exclusively Korean about the predominant whitish or monochrome palette of the Korean minimalist paintings of the 1970s10. It has been suggested by several Korean critics (for example, Suh 1995 sec. 3, par. 6-7) that both Yamamoto and Nakahara had a special interest in *punch’ŏng* or white Chosŏn porcelain and this interest was related to their Japanese liking for whitish, monochrome contemporary Korean paintings 11.

Recently, some Korean scholars (for example, Yi 2004) have argued that the Korean articulations of the distinctiveness of Monochromism reproduced the colonial knowledge of Korea initially produced by the Japanese connoisseur and Koreanist Yanagi Muneyoshi (1889-1961) 12. In his book *Korea and its art* of 1922, Yanagi formulated the national differences of Chinese, Japanese and Korean art, by claiming that Chinese art was characterised by stable forms, signifying power; Japanese art, by bright colours, signifying optimism; and Korean art, by thin, long curved lines, signifying sorrow, pathos and loneliness 13. Generally speaking, it was with Monochromism that postliberation South Korean art began to make itself known internationally, starting in Japan and more precisely in the *Korea, five artists* exhibition. Therefore, this exhibition was the original point of the international dissemination of the reductive characterisation of the cultural and national specificity and identity of modern and contemporary Korean art, mediated via the colonial and postcolonial Japanese Orientalist perceptions of Korea, its people, culture and art. Despite this fact, many prominent Korean art critics (for example, Oh Kwang Su 1997, 54-77) who promoted the selected group of Monochromists (such as those whom the critic Lee called ‘the artists of the 1970s’) domestically and internationally argued that the evolution of Monochromism was guided by a nationalistic search for a truly *Korean* contemporary art14. Subsequently, in the next example of overseas Korean art exhibitions, we shall see how other foreign critics and curators have repeated more or less the same Japanese and Koreans’ own Orientalist descriptions of the uniqueness of contemporary Korean art.

The recurrent inclusions of Monochromist works by a certain group of Korean artists in various Korean art exhibitions held abroad in the period of the 1970s to early 1990s affirmed the international approval of Monochromism and this in turn reaffirmed the domestic approval of these exhibited artists and their hegemony in the Korean art world. Through this circular legitimating process, the particular representation of Korean culture and art which had been disseminated through the past overseas exhibitions of the works of ‘chauvinistic’ (nearly all of its proponents were men) Monochromism, in effect, reinforced the internationally and domestically perceived homogeneity of the Korean national identity.

It is important to point out that there was a certain complicity between the advocacy of Monochromism as the representative of contemporary Korean art and the military regimes’ reconstruction of the unified and homogeneous notion of Korean national identity, which served to legitimate the junta and to mobilise the populace in a series of the state-planned cultural and economic projects. I am not suggesting here that the advocates and practitioners of Monochromism were knowingly complicit in the state-led constructions of homogenous Korean identity. Monochromism itself (*Ills. 4 and 5*) was essentially free of content, and also of any reference to the material world outside art. Were, then, the nationalistic interpretations of Monochromism arbitrary?

White colours in Korea have been used to signify an essential national character of Korea, its people, culture and art. Koreans have often called themselves ‘paek-ui minjok’, meaning ‘the people of the white’. This characterisation of Koreans, in fact, was again first made by Yanagi. Based on his observations of the commoner’s white dress and white Chosŏn porcelain made in his visit to Korea during
the colonial period of 1914 to 1924, Yanagi claimed that the Korean liking for white colour was undeniably the ‘Chosŏn’ (Korean) taste and, further, the most conspicuous feature of Korean art. There have been numerous postcolonial Korean criticisms (for example, You et al. 1997, 23) of Yanagi’s work as an example of the negative and undesirable influences of Japanese colonialism on Korean art and scholarship. Yet, the state narratives on Korean history and identity, as well as Korean literature, have continued unreflectingly to use the stereotyped homogeneous characterisation of diverse Koreans as ‘the people of the white’.

**Overseas Korean exhibitions in the 1990s: out of the Hermit Kingdom to the World**

If in the 1970s to 1980s, some overseas exhibitions of Monochromist works appeared to have promoted the homogenous national identity of Koreans nationally and internationally, this was perhaps a response to an urgent national need to re-establish some semblance of a unified Korean identity in the wake of the traumatic colonial experience of thirty-five years of Japanese rule that attempted to erase the national and cultural identity of Koreans. My proposition is supported by the nationalistic, often patriotic, claims of many prominent Korean art critics (for examples, Lee and Oh) about the uniqueness of contemporary Korean art and their concomitant defensiveness about the criticisms of prevalent foreign (equated with Western) influences on Korean art. I argue that Monochromism was singled out from various art forms in the 1970s to 1980s and was given an official approval by the nation’s prominent art critics, because the neatly coherent image of ‘Koreanness’ evoked by Monochromist works had an effect of the strengthening of national unity.

From the early 1990s on, South Koreans who were empowered by the nation’s self-esteem and confidence newly gained from the recent political stability and economic achievements began to move away from the previous obsession with national identity. Before the 1990s Koreans were so obsessed with Korea that they had hardly any interest in the rest of the world. But, by the early 1990s, Korea was ready to engage actively with other cultures and nations, abandoning the insularity of its parochial perspectives. This is manifested in the government’s *Segyehwa* or globalisation campaign, launched by the first civilian government of Kim Young Sam after more than three decades of military regimes. To show how Koreans’ awareness of the phenomenon of globalisation and their new domestic political circumstances of the 1990s influenced their constructions of national identity in this period, I will discuss two contrasting exhibitions from this period. They are *Working with Nature: Traditional thought in contemporary art from Korea of 1992 and Across the Pacific: contemporary Korean and Korean American art of 1993.*

*Working with Nature: Traditional thought in contemporary art from Korea* was co-organised by the National Museum of Contemporary Art, Korea and the Tate Gallery Liverpool in which it was held from 8 April to 21 June 1992. This exhibition included six artists, Chung Chang-Sup (*Ill. 5*), Lee Kang So (*Ill. 6*), Lee Ufan, Kim Tschang-Yeul, Park Seo Bo (*Ill. 4*) and Yun Hyung Keun (*Ill. 7*) who are all male. In his catalogue essay (1992, 9), the co-curator Lewis Biggs sought to explain the key differences of Korean contemporary art from the varieties of art practiced globally, in the following ways. According to him, all of the exhibiting Korean artists worked in monochrome, although only three of them (Chung, Park and Yun) were specifically identified with the Korean Monochrome movement. In his view, the monochromatic tendency in Korea was derived from the fact that the basis of East Asian art is *line* not *colour* (italicised emphases are by Biggs). Further, he generalised a major difference between Western and Korean arts by claiming that in Korea, unlike in the West, the artist is not considered as a differentiated ego with a unique message, but a medium for communal experience. Therefore, originality is of no great value in Korean art tradition. Biggs’ explanation strikingly echoed the generalisation of the national characters of Korean art by Yanagi (1922 and 1976) who saw the distinctiveness of Korean art in its absence of colour and prominence of line, and the selflessness of its creators.

Biggs’ generalisation of Korean art also echoed the critic Lee Yil and his essay, ‘On Working with Nature’, printed in the same catalogue (pages 14 to 16). Lee’s essay basically summarised his previous defence of the originality of Korean Monochromism against the growing domestic criticisms of its alleged Western and Japanese influences. According to Lee, the fundamental and peripheral difference between the Orient and the West is the difference in approach to nature, and Korean Monochrome painting illustrated the typical Oriental viewpoints of nature, exemplified by the Taoist notion of ‘void’, or ‘harmony with nature’. In short, Lee linked the uniqueness of Monochromism to its apparently inherent Oriental qualities, subsequently to its ‘Koreanness’ and ultimately to its originality.

Unfortunately, the emphasis on Korean artists’ supposedly inherited native traditions and their ‘typically Oriental’ or Korean sensibilities which were used by Biggs and Lee are still used in the selection criteria of Korean artists and their works for various Korean overseas and other international exhibitions. This has had an effect of generating foreigners’ stereo-typical expectations about the resilient influences of ancient Korean traditions on the continuously evolving diverse contemporary works of Korean artists.

*Across the Pacific: contemporary Korean and Korean American art* was organised by the Queens Museum of Art in cooperation with SEORO Korean Cultural Network, a Korean American group based in Queens. The exhibition was held at the Queens from 15 Oct. 1993 to 9 Jan. 1994. It was divided into two...
parts. The part which was organised by Queens Museum curator Jane Farver (1993, 89) focused the work of eleven Korean American and Korean Canadians who appeared to be struggling with the ambiguities of their bi-cultural identities (ills. 8 and 9). The other part, which was curated by the Korean art critic and independent curator Lee Young Chul (1993, 15-17), represented a survey of twelve Korean artists associated with the Minjoong or People’s Art (Illi. 10). The Minjoong Art was a politically engaged nationalist (minjok) and populist (minjoong) art which emerged in Korea during the 1980s’ democratisation protest movement against the military dictatorship.

If the Working with Nature exhibition exemplifies Korea’s insecurity about self-identity and its concomitant desire to reaffirm the Koreaness of contemporary Korean culture and art in the wake of the homogenising forces and impacts of globalisation, the Across the Pacific exhibition that included the Korean-American and expatriate works raised questions about such a presumed Koreaness. Until the early 1990s in postliberation South Korea, these questions were confined to a notion of authenticity that had been problematically tied to an origin and in most cases to a nation.

In order to present a coherent exhibition narrative, the Working with Nature which included the Korean-born Japanese artist Lee Ufan (Ill. 11), did not explore the meaningful relationships between his bi-national identity and his complex roles in the cross-cultural transactions between postcolonial Japan and Korea. When South Koreans are proud of his Korean identity, because of his internationally acclaimed fame as a founder and a spokesman of Monoha, one of the most important postwar Japanese avant-garde movements, Lee is seen to be an exemplar of a Korean influence on Japanese art. At another times, his influences on Korean art transmitted via his friendships with key Monochromists have been criticised as manifestations of ‘Waesaekju-iü’ or ‘Japan-ism’ (Ryu and Chöng 2001, 69). Lee’s trans-national artistic career prompts a question about the previous domestic definitions of Korean identity which had been based on conventional and essentialist notions of national identity, within which the conceptualisations of national identity were tied to a specific place, time and collective ethnic experience. This question seemed to be posed by the curatorial rationale of the Across the Pacific exhibition that focused on works of Korean and Korean-American artists dealing with the political themes of ethnic, cultural and sexual identity. Rather than giving a coherent answer to the question, as an American reviewer (Cotter 1993) noted, the exhibition prompted a diversity of answers. In contrast to Working with Nature, this exhibition, as observed by another American reviewer (Heartney 1994), seemed to acknowledge the fact that questions about national and cultural identity have become complicated by the current globalisation processes which have increasingly blurred the internal and external boundaries of a nation and culture.

Overseas Korean art exhibitions in the 2000s and the ‘Dynamic Korea: Hub of Asia’

Most of the overseas Korean art exhibitions from 1945 to the mid 2000s were held in the USA and Japan. For instance, according to the 2005 annual statistics for the visual arts sector published by the Arts Council Korea (Yi 2006, table 3), Korean art exhibitions held in the USA and Japan represented almost the half of the total overseas Korean art exhibitions. Since the launch of the Roh Moo Hyun government’s new national image campaign, ‘Dynamic Korea: Hub of Asia’, the country’s cultural exchanges with Asian countries, especially the previously overlooked South Asian and Southeast Asian countries, have surged. However, Asian countries other than Japan and China have not yet been chosen as popular destinations for national and other major public art institution-organised or publicly sponsored major Korean art exhibitions. Nonetheless, in last two or three years, independent cross-cultural curatorial initiatives (by Korean curators, bi- or trans-national curators of Korean heritage or jointly with foreign curators) have been taken in diversifying and expanding the exhibition destination countries. In my view, these changing exhibition target countries mirror three notable major shifts in the ongoing reconstructions of Korean national identity during the last five decades of the postliberation era.

First, in entering the modern world, colonial Korea was Orientalised by the imperialist Japanese Orientalist discourse of ‘Pan Asianism’ that projected Korea as Japan’s Orient (tōyō) or People’s Art vis-à-vis itself as the modern metropolitan centre/Self. The terms, ‘Other’ and ‘Self’, here refer to Lacan’s identity formation theory (1968) in which Lacan juxtaposed his concept of ‘Schema L’ with Hegel’s master/slave dialectics (1977, 113-9). Until very recently postliberation South Koreans usually imagined the world as a triad of Korea, China and Japan that constituted the imaginary transnational realm called Tongyang or the ‘Orient’, and the rest of the world which they vaguely called Sōyang or the ‘West’. This notion of Tongyang, a Korean adoption of the imperialist Japanese construct of Sōyō or the Orient (Tanaka 1993), has limited the 20th Korean mapping of the world.

Second, postcolonial and divided Korea’s identity crisis and its concomitant reconstructions of a unified Self vis-à-vis the West as its monolithic Other have self-Orientalised Korea. For example, the nation’s prominent art critics, who had been well aware of the prevailing nationalistic anxiety about the pre-emption of unique Korean artistic traditions by tempting Western influences, tried to defend Korean artists’ appropriations of Western elements by delineating the Koreaness of modern and contemporary Korean art vis-à-vis the totalising difference of Western arts (which in fact were often equated with a particular strain of postwar American avant-garde arts). However, such Koreaness is always already infiltrated by the West. A fear of the convergence of cultural difference to the homogeneouness of largely
American dominated global culture yielded further self-Orientalisation within which some Korean critics sought to reassert the authenticity of contemporary Korean art by self-exoticising selected ethnic and cultural characteristics as Koreanness.

Third, in the new millennium, with a new international, outward-looking mindset, the constituents of Korea’s Other have become gradually diversified, beyond the old narrow Tongyang or the undifferentiated West. Further, as the phenomenon of Hallyu or ‘Korean wave’ illustrates, Korea now no longer sees itself as a passive recipient of advanced cultural products of the metropolitan West, but as an active cultural exporter to Asian regions and even to the Western centres. Yet, the Korean wave has not penetrated into the field of Western high culture, for example, contemporary fine arts.

It also seems that the current revised construction of national identity has not been yet reflected in publicly sponsored major overseas Korean art exhibitions in the early and mid 2000s. For example, in representing Korean contemporary art and its uniqueness, one of the most publicised publicly supported overseas Korean art exhibitions in 2000 to 2006, Leaning Forward, Looking Back: Eight Contemporary Artists from Korea deployed again the overused hegemonic dichotomy of the Orient/Korea versus the West. Like many major overseas exhibitions in the last five decades, this exhibition chose its target audience as America, the country which postcolonial Koreans have frequently equated with the West. I argue that the concentration of overseas Korean art exhibitions on the USA has had an effect of reifying the West as Korea’s indomitable Other, thereby continuously allowing the West to be the point of reference for Korea’s self-identity construction.

The Leaning Forward, Looking Back exhibition was jointly organised by the National Museum of Contemporary Art of Korea and the Asian Art Museum in San Francisco as a complementary presentation to Goryeo Dynasty: Korea’s Age of Enlightenment, 918 to 1392, which was the Asian Art Museum’s special inaugural event in its new home. Both the exhibitions were held from 18 October 2003 to 11 January 2004. According to the NMCA curator Kang Seung Wan in her catalogue essay (2003, 12 and 13) for the Leaning Forward, Looking Back exhibition, the eight artists in their 40s and 50s were chosen from Korea’s ‘most celebrated and established’ artists, and they were also selected for both their substantial influences over the currents of the domestic art and their international contributions to contemporary art that is ‘currently in process’.

However, Leaning Forward, Looking Back did not appear to have successfully translated the Korean curator’s stated curatorial rationale for its American audience. For example, a former Arts Editor for Asian Week (Gach n.d.) claimed that the exhibition, in fact, ‘spotlighted’ the Korean works which reflected ‘a unitary national tradition’. Similarly, the Korean artists’ conscious ties to enduring Korean traditions seemed to have attracted more attention from a New York Times art critic (Cotter 2003) than other interesting and contemporary qualities of the exhibited works. Furthermore, the works of Leaning Forward, Looking Back, according to the American co-curator Jeff Kelly in his catalogue essay (2003, 40), were not only about Korea but of it. Kelly’s essay (pages 42 and 62) summed up the exhibition as ‘not an expression of the global vanguard in the arts’, but of ‘some of Korea’s most thoughtful contemporary artists’ who were ‘making tangible contact with the Korean past’ through their works. In his view, these Korean artists who shared a sense of urgency to make contact with the past were in contrast to Americans who tend to reinvent themselves over and over in the name of innovation.

Irrespective of the original exhibition intentions, both the Korean and American curator’s essays seems to urge the American audience to spot Koreanness in the exhibiting Korean artists’ uses of Korean pigments (Ill. 12); traditional Korean landscape painting (Ill. 13); Hanji or traditional Korean paper (Ill. 14), peculiarly Korean perception of the universe (Ill. 15); ‘the ancient Eastern theories on the structure of the universe’ (Ill. 16) and Hanok or traditional Korean house (Ill. 17).

Leaning Forward, Looking Back, according to the Asian Art Museum director E. J. Sano in her forward to the catalogue, was presented in a way as part of the celebration of the centenary of Korean immigration to America. In 1903, the first Korean immigrants to the United States arrived in Hawaii. Today, more than 1 million Korean Americans live throughout the States, representing one of its largest Asian-American populations. In focusing on the commitment of the exhibiting Korean artists to their homeland and its past which is ‘an exotic realm for most Americans’ (Kelly 2003, 62), the exhibition seems to have missed an opportunity to shed light on the Korean contribution to the shaping of richly diverse American culture and art, and vice versa.

Conclusion

As shown through my examination of the above examples of overseas Korean modern and contemporary art exhibitions, the domestically shared notions of the Korean nation and its identity and uniqueness or Koreanness were not innate or tied to the homeland, but have always been subjected to continual revising through the nation’s ongoing cross-cultural discourses with its ever shifting Other or counterparts, and the world. On the one hand, the overseas art exhibitions have provided Korea with a viable opportunity to promote its self-configured national images abroad, or to revise its undesirable international images. On the other hand, certain overseas responses to ‘Koreanness’ or the Korean images presented by Korean art exhibitions have often altered the domestic constructions of national
identity. Further, the emergence and proliferation of bi- and trans-national Korean artists who think and perform their Korean identity in different ways from the Koreans at home disturbed the domestically shared definitions of Koreanness and Korean identity.

A fear of the obliteration of cultural difference by the current homogenising forces of globalisation has generated an urgent need for Korean art community to reassert the distinctive identity of Korean culture and art. But, the focus on the theme of national identity or Koreanness appears to have prevented many major publicly supported overseas Korean art exhibitions from presenting contemporary Korean art that was also an expression of diverse, creative individual artists. Further, the selection criteria for overseas exhibitions based on the particular definitions of national identity or Koreanness have belied the rich diversity of contemporary Korean art.

As observed by many foreign reviewers of overseas Korean modern and contemporary art exhibitions, and also stated by many Korean authors of these exhibition catalogues and other related publications, Koreans appear to have obsessively emphasised the uniqueness of their nation, history, culture and art. But, one might ask a question. Which nation’s culture and art are not unique? What is important here is how to convince the peoples of other countries about the self-perceived uniqueness of Korean culture and art. To do so, a comparative analysis of the internal and external perceptions of Korean art is required.

My research on overseas Korean art exhibitions of the postwar period was in fact originally designed as part of a larger cross-cultural and collaborative research project between Australian and Korean researchers, which is largely funded by the Australian Government’s major academic research funding body, the Australian Research Council. The outcomes of this collaborative project are hopefully to be used in the development of a new exhibition model for translating and exhibiting the richness, complexity and vibrancy of postliberation Korean art in an accessible yet sophisticated way for culturally unfamiliar non-Korean audiences, while avoiding stereotypical or Korea-centric representations of Koreanness or Orientalist representations of the exotic ‘Other’. An awareness of the complex issues in interpreting, translating and representing other cultures – which had already been extensively discussed in the West (for example Karp and Lavine 1991) and with which in recent years, curators and other museum and public art gallery professionals, especially in the West, have become much more familiar – was central to the Australian initiated, cross-cultural and collaborative research project. Unfortunately, the argued need for such a conscious cross-cultural collaboration has, so far, failed to find a Korean partner. One of the most disappointing Korean responses was a worrisome assertion that “We, Koreans, know our art best”.

In recent years, Western interest in contemporary Asian arts has increased and this growth seems to be accelerated by the West’s recognition of the rising economic power of many Asian countries such as China and Korea. Yet, as Vishakha N. Desai who, as the then director of the Asia Society Galleries in the 1990s to early 2000s (now the President of the Society) initiated many contemporary Asian art exhibitions in America and elsewhere, has pointed out (1995, 170) – although this was almost a decade ago, her points are in my view still valid, Westerners’ Orientalist approaches to non-Western art persist in the viewing of contemporary Asian arts. This meant, according to Desai, that any analysis of contemporary Asian art works which may not fit the idea of ‘authentic otherness’ are considered suspect and not very ‘good’ or at best ‘derivative’ of Western idioms.

Desai also argued (page 174) that ‘the challenge for the art community in the West is to explore and understand contemporary Asian art fully on its own terms, going beyond superficial comparisons with Western works’. That challenge, I argue, needs to be grounded on a comparative framework which will allow, for example a future organiser of a major overseas contemporary Korean art exhibition, to scrutinise both the prevalent ‘international’ (the term which is still perceived, particularly by Koreans and other non-Westerners to mean ‘Western’) and the domestic or Korean perceptions of contemporary Korean art. At the same time, as the prominent Thai art critic and curator Apian Posyananda pointed out (2000, 12), an inter-regional comparative examination of the conceptions and receptions of ‘contemporary’ and ‘Asian’ art also needs to be taken into consideration.

References

I would like to acknowledge that this essay is written as part of my 3-year research (2005-7) for a major touring exhibition of post-Second World War Korean art in the Asia Pacific region which was supported under Australian Research Council’s Linkage Projects funding scheme (LP0560898). I have used the McCune-Reischauer system, except for some Korean names. I have used the English spellings of the name by which a Korean artist, art critic or curator is internationally known. Korean and Japanese names are written with the family name first.


List of Illustrations
1. Chang Ucchin, A Tree and Bird, 1957, Oil on canvas, 40.5 x 27.5 cm, Private
2. Kim Byŏng Ki, Street Trees, 1956, Oil on canvas, 125.5 x 96 cm, National Museum of Contemporary Art, Korea, Kwach’on
4. PARK Seo Bo, Écriture, No 41-75, Pencil and oil on canvas, 130 x 162 cm, the artist
5. Chung Chang Sup, Take No 90911, 1990, Fibre on canvas, 243.5 x 122 cm, the artist
6. Lee Kang So, Untitled-91180, 1991, Oil on canvas, 162.1 x 130.3 cm, the artist
7. Yun Hyoung Keun, Burnt Umber 91, 1991, Oil on linen, 220 x 181 cm, the artist
8. Min Yong Soon, Ritual Labor of a Mechanical Bride, 1993, Mixed media with audio tape, 68 x 24 x 24 inches, unknown
9. Jin Mee Yoon, Screens, 1992, Wood, photographic mylar, fabric, cotton and framed texts, 60 x 60.5 inches each, unknown
10. Kim Bong Joon, Strike April 15, 1989, Watercolour on paper, 48 x 20 inches, the artist
11. Lee Ufan, 1981, From Line 81014, Stone pigment and oil on canvas, 130 x 162 cm, the artist
12. Jung Jong Mee, 2001, Five Colour Landscape, Ramie, vegetable and mineral dyes, seaweed and soybean oil on paper, 167 x 135 cm, National Museum of Contemporary art, Korea, Kwach’on
13. Whang In-Kie, 2000, Digital Oriental Landscape 000-003, Silicon on aluminium plate, 180 x 540, the artist
14. Lee Jung Jin, Pagodas 98-08, 1998, Photo emulsion on Korean paper, 66 x 188, the artist
15. Kim Hong Ju, Untitled, 2002, Acrylic on canvas, 162 x 130 cm, the artist
17. U Sun Ok, Hanok Project Seoul, 2000, Installation at the Art Sonje Center

Contact Address
En Young Ahn
The Australian National University
Canberra ACT Australia
PH: (02) 6125 1382
FAX: (02) 6125 4490
EMAIL: enyoung.ahn@anu.edu.au
Remembering or Misremembering? Historicity in Asian American Children’s Fiction Set in Korea at the End of World War II: The Case of So Far from the Bamboo Grove

Sung-Ae Lee
Macquarie University, Australia

Abstract
A recent controversy for the Korean community in the USA centres on the use in schools of Yoko Kawashima Watkins’s semi-autobiographical So Far from the Bamboo Grove (1986), a novel focused on the flight of Japanese settler families to Japan after the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation at the end of WWII. Taught in a literary and historical vacuum under the thematic umbrella of “courage and survival,” the novel has been impugned as an example of “perpetrator as victim” representation. A biographical artifact grounded in displacement and violence positions itself very specifically as a medium between the “witness” and readers because of its assumed high “truth value” as an authentication of suffering, and this may elide issues of historicity. Diverse interpretative communities may thus read the novel in incompatible ways.

To read elements of the novel in relation to the concept of crimes against humanity explains in part the depiction of the protagonist as a victim (an aspect further illuminated by comparison with historical fictions presenting a Korean point of view). In a work which is both memoir and historical fiction, the production of effects through discourse (for example, achronological juxtapositions of events) proves to be a more significant ground for controversy than questions of historical “fact.”

The focus of this paper is the relationship between memory and history in the controversy that has occurred in some USA school districts, spilling over into numerous websites, over So Far from the Bamboo Grove, the first volume of Yoko Kawashima Watkins’s semi-autobiography, published in 1986. The book had been regularly studied in upper primary schools since its publication, characteristically as part of units dealing with survival or refugees and migration. In asking why the book might be deemed controversial, after years of relative obscurity, we need to consider the processes of contextualisation: in offering one kind of context for the novel — a kind of humanistic positioning within a metanarrative of survival against the odds — pedagogical practice appears to have erased other kinds of context, notably history and international relations. Thus the only substantial scholarly account of So Far from the Bamboo Grove, Rocío G. Davis’s discussion in the survey “Asian American Autobiography for Children: Critical Paradigms and Creative Practice” (2006), connects the novel to the most common theme in children’s literature, character development and maturation: “In the narration of these events, the reader witnesses a profound change in Yoko. From a spoiled youngest child, she develops into a strong, resilient girl who places family above all and endeavors to rise above the poverty and rejection experienced in Japan” (191). Davis also remarks, in a footnote, that Watkins’s strategy depends on her positioning of herself as an eleven-year-old child narrator, unaware of the larger political context of events and hence focusing on her personal story of survival. Japan’s imperialist policies in Korea and its consequences are thus elided. It is precisely this elision, however, which has made the book controversial.

As Davis’s commentary reminds us, So Far from the Bamboo Grove is both autobiography (author and narrator have the same name) and a work of fiction. In historical fiction events which happened, or plausibly may have happened, are given narrative forms which are the same as, or derive from, the conventions of fiction, and thus questions of veracity may become very problematic. It may therefore become more important to consider the manner in which an event or incident is represented (the narrative discourse) than to speculate about its veracity. The story of eleven-year-old Yoko Kawashima — displaced, on the run, pursued, struggling to survive — is formed as much by the conventions of escape and pursuit narratives as by historical events. In this context, Korean-American historical novels set in the same period of history will offer some points of contrast for my discussion: Sook Nyul Choi’s Year of Impossible Goodbyes (1991); Richard E. Kim’s Lost Names: Scenes from a Korean Boyhood (1970); and When My Name Was Keoko (2002), by USA born Korean American Linda Sue Park. Park’s novel is not a survivor’s memoir, but a piece of researched creative writing in a recognized genre of another kind. Like Watkins’s novel, however, Park’s novel seems to contain errors of fact, and thereby raises the question of

116 My discussion will make only passing comment on website debates, which could be a study in themselves: they are characteristically ideologically driven, intemperate, and poorly informed. People posting on these sites, usually behind net pseudonyms, show little understanding of either fiction or historiography.
how important material error might be, and how far we need to weigh these possibilities in relation to
genre. As Christopher Ricks (1996: 303) argues, the claims inherent in a genre are a factor in assessing
the importance of historical or material accuracy in literary works. Readers are apt to expect greater
authenticity from a first-person memoir than a multiply focalised work of fiction. Ricks makes the further
important point that a novel, for example, may include an obvious error of fact which is irritating to readers
who ‘know better’ and which might be simply corrected in a subsequent edition of the work, but has much
deeper implications if ‘it is a critical matter of a matter of fact, and one the correction of which would entail
the entire rewriting of the book’ (307). There are several errors pertaining to Korean language and culture
in When My Name Was Keoko, such as the use of sool, ‘liquor,’ where the intended term is soju, ‘Korean
sake’: expert sub-editing might have eliminated these, and correction in a subsequent edition would simply
erase a blemish. Attribution of proto-feminist attitudes and aspirations to the main female character, ten-
year-old Sun-hee, may be more substantive, as a possible breach of historical probability, albeit gender
inaccuracies are a common tendency in children’s historical fiction, but to have imagined this differently
would not entail “the entire rewriting of the book.”

Some apparent factual errors in So Far from the Bamboo Grove are of similar minor consequence
— for example, Chapter 1 identifies the catalyst for the precipitous midnight flight of Yoko’s family as the
Russian invasion of Korea (“The Russians are landing” (21),117 but dates this as July 29, 1945, thirteen
days before the actual invasion on August 11. The departure date given is important if the family’s
eighteen-day journey is to end in Seoul on August 16, the day after Japan’s surrender, so it might be best
to regard the error as an historical inaccuracy produced as a result of awkward plot management.
Readers who notice it may find it annoying, and hostile critics might regard it as a deconstructive thread
to pull, but it is finally without interpretative or ideological significance. Some other disputed matters, however,
do seem to be of a different order. To a great extent the problem seems to lie with the author’s naïve
approach to the genre and the book’s reception in the public domain: her numerous public appearances
and visits to schools over two decades have functioned to authenticate the book’s contents as an eye-

On the other hand, many of the book’s detractors on websites betray only a cursory knowledge of
the text itself, are voicing in-principle or simply anti-Japanese attitudes, or focus on particular incidents
recounted in the book and react to them out of context. A better approach, I suggest, is to examine
contemporary reception of a narrative which has been shaped by the Cold War as much as by memories
of what might have happened to the author thirty years before she began writing the book. In particular,
reception of such a book in the twenty-first century is apt to be influenced by a sharpened awareness of
the complex, and even interchangeable roles of victim and perpetrator in acts of violence, and by the
somewhat clearer definitions of “crimes against humanity” which emerged in the first half of the 1990s
from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (deGuzman 2000:
343). Finally, the construction of Japan as victim of World War II, adduced as an effect of
So Far from the Bamboo Grove by numerous of the book’s detractors, is a defensible reading. Throughout the novel and
its sequel, My Brother, My Sister, and I (1994), Yoko’s subjectivity is consistently constructed in terms of
victimhood. While it would be absurd and unjust to disallow the suffering of people displaced and
 orphaned as a consequence of their homeland’s military aggression, ambiguity of perception becomes an
issue insofar as Yoko stands for the condition of defeated Japan, and her situation severs historical
consciousness of and responsibility for the causes and conditions of the Japanese occupation of Korea,
Manchuria, and beyond.

Watkins’s seemingly artless prose is offset by continual disruptions of chronology or focus topic, a
strategy that has considerable thematic effect. The opening chapter of the novel begins and ends with
Yoko, her mother, and her sister, Ko, fleeing their home. From that moment it moves back in time “some
weeks” (3) to recount how Yoko was severely beaten during a raid on their house by Japanese military
police in search of metal, moves further back to some indeterminate periods, and then locates an
extended sequence in April [sic], 1945, at the time of the firebombing of Tokyo (March 10, 1945).
Juxtaposed with news of the firebombing is the account of a concert given by Yoko’s school for wounded
soldiers (10). The sequence encapsulates the impact of point of view on reader positioning and the
ambivalence readers must deal with: the wounded soldiers are victims of war, and deserving of
compassion: war is terrible and cruel, and one of the attractions of the book for classroom use is this
perception, but contextually the chapter’s achronological catalogue of suffering constructs and sustains
the view of Japanese as victims. The suffering of Yoko and her family, which is genuine and undeserved,

117 Page references are from 1986 Birch Tree edition.
thereby functions implicitly as a metonym for Japanese suffering under war. This, I suggest, is what actually prompts hostility to the book.

For an interpretative community reading the novel as a narrative of survival, and viewing its narrator as a victim of circumstance, such a representation finds a supporting analogy in the literature of guilt about the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II — see, for younger readers, Ken Mochizuki and Dom Lee, Baseball Saved Us (1995); Yoshiko Uchida, The Bracelet (1996); Eve Bunting and Chris K. Soentpiet, So Far from the Sea (1998). McGraw Hill’s Glencoe Literature Library Study Guide for So Far from the Bamboo Grove, designed to be used in conjunction with their 2000 edition of the novel and the “Related Readings” printed therein, includes a unit of work that invites explicit comparison: “Making Connections: “As the racial animosities on the West Coast grew, the distinction between enemy soldiers and Japanese American citizens was lost” [Gingold]. What do you think Craig Gingold means by this statement? How does it relate to the way Japanese people in Korea — like Yoko’s family — were treated?” (25). Similarly, a unit of work on texts about and from the former Yugoslavia includes the instruction, “Select a passage from So Far from the Bamboo Grove that might be included with these readings. Explain why you chose that particular passage” (28).

A potential problem with positioning the novel within such a thematic, pedagogic context is that it constructs a particular kind of framework within which the novel is to be read — a narrative of individuals who are deprived of some basic human rights and become victims of crimes against humanity. This reading context then in turn highlights the extent to which a reader response framework such as constructed by this Study Guide, which strives to enable readers “to live through some moment of feeling, to enter into some human personality, or to participate imaginatively in some situation or event” (Rosenblatt 2005 [1956]: 62-63), may constitute an historically uninformed reading. Significantly, this is the kind of reading embraced by Yoko Kawashima Watkins herself, in that in responding to criticism of So Far from the Bamboo Grove she privileges memory of her feelings about her childhood experiences over historical knowledge.

An effect has been to polarise attitudes toward So Far from the Bamboo Grove into two interpretative communities, according to the subject position of the reader. On the one hand, educators looking for anti-war literature or texts that are multicultural or culturally plural situate the text thematically. On the other hand, a symptomatic Korean American position is to situate the novel historically, stressing its temporal setting at the end of half a century of oppressive Japanese colonisation of Korea. From this latter perspective, if the victim-protagonist of the novel can function as a metonym for Japan as victim of World War II, she can also function as a metonym for Japan as victimiser. Such a possibility becomes clearer if the novel is recontextualised and read alongside Sook Nyul Choi’s semi-autobiographical Year of Impossible Goodbyes (1991), written in response to reading So Far from the Bamboo Grove, or the historical fictions of Richard E. Kim or Linda Sue Park.

There are thus two important interrelated issues which are central to this controversy: first, what are the narrative and ideological strategies which constitute the protagonist of the novel as victim? And second, how far can historical fiction depart from historiography in the representation of culturally and politically sensitive material?

Hostile critics of the book have generally sought to attack it through a crude deconstructive method: two or three details in the text can be challenged as materially or historically contrary to fact, and these then constitute threads which, when pulled, unravel the whole text. The argument needs to be subtler than this, however, since it is immediately weakened by the riposte that the memoir genre may blend with historical fiction to allow some characters and events to be real, and others to be fictive. The claim to authenticity lies principally in the authoritative status attributed to life writing, especially autobiography, in which first person narrative voice implies that what is recorded is an authentic, “true” account. John Paul Eakin takes this still further when he argues that the concept of narrative identity “assumes that narrative is not merely a literary form but a mode of phenomenological and cognitive self-experience. To speak of narrative identity is to conceptualize narrative as not merely about identity but rather in some profound way a constituent part of identity, specifically of the extended self that is expressed in self-narrations” (2001: 114-115). Since So Far from the Bamboo Grove is an Entwicklungsroman, a novel depicting the development of an adolescent character, an argument that Watkins has misrepresented biographical and historical truth thus implies that she has also misconstrued her own subjectivity.

The representation of Yoko as a victim who endures and overcomes her hardships depends on three key actions attributed to Koreans, the ethnic others of this narrative: expulsion of Yoko from her home, and its subsequent despoothing; pursuit by a hostile force seeking to take her life; and recurrent threat of sexual assault. The effect of these threats is affirmed both by the narrator’s eye-witness account and by their conformity with the core elements officially constituting crimes against humanity: the existence, during a time of military conflict, of a widespread or systematic attack (displacement, internment, murder, rape) against a targeted civilian population (see deGuzman 2000: 337). Whether this is historically accurate is subject to question, but narratively it attributes victim status to Yoko and her family. In contrast, narratives written from a Korean perspective, such as Year of Impossible Goodbyes and
especially When my Name was Keoko also depict a range of crimes against humanity, but now attributed to the Japanese occupation forces.

Yoko, especially through the depiction of her mother, expresses a strong attachment to their place of habitation, symbolised by the eponymous — and entirely fictive — bamboo grove. Bamboo does not grow at that latitude in Korea, but signifies rather a re-imagining of Korean landscape as Japan. It is further indicative of the absence of any sense of a split cultural identity in the children of colonisers. Incidents during which members of the family pose as Koreans are clever performances, enacting the practices of an observed culture, but to no extent interiorised — as, for example, when Ko, Yoko’s sister, speaking “in her perfect Korean” fools a Korean farmer into thinking she is a Korean fleeing the Japanese and is rewarded with a generous supply of food (71–72). Koreans, in contrast, characteristically speak “poor Japanese” (53), a point implicitly contradicted by narratives told from a Korean point of view which report the mandatory use of Japanese by Koreans, and the interdiction on uses of their own language (Impossible Goodbyes, 66; Keoko, 24; Lost Names, 72).

The opening paragraph of the novel lays the terms for victimage, as, at midnight Yoko’s family flee “our home in its bamboo grove, our friends, and our town, Nanam, in Northern Korea” (1). Nevertheless, the unaddressed contradiction between ‘bamboo grove’ and ‘Northern Korea,’ once recognised, signals how the possessive our hovers between different senses of ownership and habitation. The positioning of the narrator is defined more closely on the next page: “Though we lived in northeastern Korea, we were Japanese. My country, Japan, which I had never seen, had been fighting America and Britain for four years” (2). This utterance can also be picked apart to reveal a particular narratorial positioning: the speaker is Japanese in an alien land, in which, it is implied, she had been born, a situation emphasised by “my country” and the reiteration in “Japanese…Japan.” Subsequently the novel will depict Yoko’s mother as dissociating herself from Japanese military practices, including the attack on Pearl Harbor (17), and depict Japanese civilians as victims of Japanese military brutality, but these representations serve to imply the victim status of the everyday Japanese family. At this point, the neutral formulation “My country … had been fighting America and Britain for four years” in offering an uninformed child perspective (even though the narration is retrospective past tense) has the potential to position Japan as victim as the field of war draws closer. The language accords with a tendency in some Japanese historiography to favour such neutral descriptors (Giamo 2003: 708). Hence the next paragraph begins, “The shadow of war had been creeping across our peaceful village for months” (2). War is something that has happened to the Japanese. While analysis of discourse in this way is more difficult than contesting historical materialities, it has a greater potential to show that if there is a “problem” with the novel, it is a problem embedded at discourse level.

A second example where the novel’s historicity has also been impugned is the identification of Yoko’s pursuers and persecutors as members of the Korean “Anti-Japanese Communist Army” (first introduced on page 9): “The Koreans were part of the Japanese empire but they hated the Japanese and were not happy about the war.” Historically, as historian Carter Eckert commented in a careful intervention in the controversy over the novel, “There was no organized ‘Anti-Japanese Communist Army’ of Korean soldiers, except for Kim Il Sung (later the leader of North Korea) and his guerrilla partisans in Manchuria, but they did not arrive in Korea until early September 1945, long after the events described in the book. … simply to portray Korean communists in 1945 as endemically evil is not only empirically incorrect; it removes Korean communism from the larger historical context that explains its anti-Japanese stance and its appeal to many Koreans” (Boston Globe, December 16, 2006). The novel is thus on shaky historical ground, but again the language used seems to appeal to the ideology of a particular interpretative community in its appropriation of a Cold War anti-communist stance and rhetoric. There are also major elisions in causality here, both in the assumption that Korea belonged to Japan and in the understatement “were not happy about.” Utterances like this are easily interpreted as anti-Korean, especially since this is a first person “autobiography.”

Once introduced, this demonised “Anti-Japanese Communist Army” becomes the primary source of suffering, and a negative attitude toward it is built up by frequent repetition. It is depicted as searching specifically for Yoko’s family in order to kill them because of the “work for Japanese interests in Manchuria” performed by their husband and father, Yoshio Kawashima (21). The novel does not specify this work any further, and it has become another focus for controversy. Regardless of the truth of this matter — and Watkins herself either does not know or will not say — the text pivots on an improbability: that a non-existent army, at a time when the Japanese military still held firm control in Korea, dedicated its resources to the pursuit of the female relatives of an official. In terms of the narrative discourse, however, the scenario links the situation to a conventional structure: a narrative of victimhood and pursuit. The hospital train Yoko’s family travel on is bombed, and a search made for them (38–40): the structure implies that their presence was the motive for the bombing. Shortly afterwards (48–49) they are apprehended by “three soldiers in Korean Communist uniforms” intent on “having fun” with Yoko’s sister, Ko, but the rape is averted by a fortuitous bomb dropped from a plane.

In a parallel chain of events, “Korean Communist soldiers” carry out a massacre of workers in the munitions factory where Hideyo is working (52–53), one of “a good group [of students], working hard for
their country." This is a highly worked fictive scene, narrated from Hideyo’s point of view from where he is hiding in a box. But is it an atrocity, as represented, or a military operation against an occupying army? What is the precise spatial reference of “their country”? When Hideyo and two other survivors return to his house they find it ransacked: “Makoto surveyed the desolation before them. ‘The Korean Communist troops have been here,’ he said.” (57). The Korean looters are also uncouth and ignorant, scattering a collection of classical records on the floor, and leaving behind a sewing machine, “Probably because they did not know how to use it.” Finally, as he traverses the country Hideyo witnesses the murder of a group of refugees by “Korean Communist soldiers” who lie in wait for escapees following the railway track and strip the bodies, including any teeth with gold fillings (95-96). When a quarrel over the spoils breaks out, the leader simply shoots one of the soldiers dead. The reiteration of malice, brutality and stupidity in this sequence of events is constructing a contrast between perpetrators and victims by exploiting anti-communist sentiments readily accessible in the climate of the 1980s.

The third principal motif in the construction of victimhood involves several references to Korean men raping Japanese girls (49, 82, 86, 87, 88): the problem in all such instances is the (over-)specification, “Korean,” and the symbolic implication that such pervasive sexual depravity is a sign of a society’s collapse into anarchy. While these references are compacted within a small section of the novel, their juxtaposition with the Kawashimas’ final escape from Korea renders them as the epitome of the topsy-turvy, chaotic world Korea is becoming as it overthrows and drives out its proper rulers. This perspective reaches its pinnacle on page 87, where Korean celebration of independence is perceived as a joyless orgy of rape, from which Ko narrowly escapes because her breasts are tightly bound and she is dressed as a boy:

That day was a nightmare. Drunken Koreans, celebrating their independence, were all around us. One who swayed back and forth demanded of Ko, “Are you a boy or a girl?”

“A boy,” she answered.

“You sound like a girl. Let me feel.”

“Go ahead,” Ko said.

How I prayed someone would come to rescue us. No one was trying to help young women, for they knew that if they made the Koreans even angrier they might burn down this warehouse and the people in it. The Koreans were free of the Japanese Empire. The drunken man put his large hand on Ko’s chest. “Flat,” he said. “Boys are no fun.”

The group of men left us but they staggered among the people, hunting maidens for their pleasure, and whenever they found one they dragged her outside. Women’s shrieks echoed.

The word set developed in association with Korean has irrationality, predatoriness and threat as its node: “nightmare, swayed back and forth, demanded, drunken, angrier, burn down, large hand, fun, staggered, their pleasure, dragged.” This set of terms pervades the segment. Syntactically, however, the utterances of the second paragraph are disconnected, so that readers must infer relationships. The first two sentences are firmly linked by cohesive ties — ‘someone’/‘no one’ and ‘rescue’/‘help’ — whereas the third sentence, “The Koreans were free of the Japanese Empire,” seems obtrusive. Once it is linked back to “celebrating their independence,” however, it becomes evident that the sequence is structured by countering independence and rape. People who have protested against the book have objected to what has been claimed as a sustained depiction of Koreans as rapists, but this analysis suggests another way to think about the issue. On the one hand, the incidents are clustered, not endemic; on the other, they are quite plausible, since rape has been, and remains, both a weapon and a reward in war zones. Rather than arguing about the material reality or fictiveness of the motif, readers will do better to consider its effect in this counterpointed structure. The incident anticipates what at a later time (that is, the Rome Conference of June 1998) will be included amongst crimes against humanity:

Article VII:
1. For the purpose of this Statute, “crimes against humanity” means any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack: ...
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution…
(deGuzman: 352)

What many readers now see as the absent historical context is the much more sustained crime against humanity (“sexual slavery, enforced prostitution”) committed by the Japanese Empire against many thousands of young Korean women (amongst others) during World War II. Both Year of Impossible Goodbyes and When My Name Was Keoko describe the forcible abduction of young women — factory workers and schoolgirls — to be employed as ‘comfort women,’ sex slaves to the military, and never to be heard of again (see discussion of the latter example in Stephens 2006: 137-42). Given that Japan has still failed to give adequate recognition to the women who survived this systematic abuse, the depiction of
Koreans sexually abusing Japanese women in *So Far from the Bamboo Grove* has been susceptible to interpretation as an erasure of the “comfort women” issue.

In historical fiction, as John Stephens has argued, “Actual historicity [is] less important than the need for the novel’s structure to be informed by cause-and-effect processes, and hence to make sense in a thematic or symbolic way. It follows, then, that any element which is taken from historical reality — character, place, or event — will be changed insomuch as it becomes an existent within a narrative discourse. Its function within an enclosed pattern of causation will thus change its meaning, nature, and ontological status” (1992: 207). These aspects of narrative discourse, in conjunction with Watkins’s strategy of thematic juxtaposition, unfold the problem of this novel. They enable one interpretative community to share a reader subject position which emphasises the novel’s anti-war elements, its implicit promotion of peace, and its potential for use in units of classroom work about multiculturalism. But it also invites a reading position which emphasises its lack of a local historical context, its possible implications of social superiority, and its propensity to draw its villains from the erstwhile colonised people. The possessive pronoun in “our home in its bamboo grove, our friends, and our town” thus immediately grounds the novel in irreconcilable meanings.

**References**


**Contact Address**

Sung-Ae Lee
Macquarie University NSW 2109
Australia

PH: (02) 9868 6809

FAX: (02) 9850 6593

EMAIL: slee@humn.mq.edu.au
Incentives to choose Australian universities: Why do Korean students choose Australia and how can Australia better meet their needs?

Gil-Soo Han
Monash University, Malaysia

Abstract
The number of Korean students in Australia has significantly increased since the 1990s when Australian institutions began aggressively recruiting fee-paying students from overseas: filling about 25% of enrollment at Australian universities in 2006. In 2005, Korean students made up the third largest group of new overseas students in Australia. In-depth interviews and questionnaire survey with a small number of Korean students (n=29) at Australian universities and graduates, and the parents of school students in Victoria reveal the following factors for choosing Australia. Key reasons include: relatively cheaper tuition; the image of safe country; the image of clean and green environment; migrating opportunity; high standard of education; and good prospect of finding jobs in Korea after the completion of their studies. However, Australian universities may better recruit and retain Korean students with better publicity. Australian universities need better meet the needs of potential students from Korea. The participants wanted to have more opportunities to obtain scholarships. Despite rigorous marketing strategies, the majority of Korean students are least informed of Australian universities and relevant agents need improve their publicity strategies. Alumni associations also have roles for better publicity.

Introduction
Tertiary education sectors have closely geared up to ‘the tidal wave of marketization, corporatization, commercialization and privatization’ or the process of ‘academic capitalism’ or ‘academic capitalization’ (Slaughter and Leslie 1997; Mok and Welch 2003: xi, 14). In participating in the global trend, Australian universities have gradually taken up ‘a financially driven and free-market ideology, whereby education policy change and governance mode have been significantly shaped by market principles and practices’ (p. x). One of the obvious reactions to the trend from universities around the world is the effort to recruit foreign students or higher fee-paying students (Slaughter and Leslie 1997: 8).

The movement of students has steadily increased, with more students from developing countries pursuing tertiary studies in OECD countries. However, the range of countries in which students are pursuing their studies has diversified. For example, a significant number of students from around the world choose to study in China, Japan and India. Australia and New Zealand have become much more popular choices for students from around the world in general (see Table 1) and for Korean students in particular in the last ten years (see Table 2).

Table 1: Overseas students studying in New Zealand and Australia

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Table 2: Number of Korean students studying in Australian institutions

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<td>4,413</td>
<td>4,559</td>
<td>5,026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELICOS</td>
<td>6,999</td>
<td>9,612</td>
<td>10,230</td>
<td>11,296</td>
<td>13,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (Non-Award Courses, Enabling courses)</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18,700</td>
<td>22,195</td>
<td>23,816</td>
<td>26,319</td>
<td>31,257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Australian Government, Australian Educational International,

South Korea has been one of Australia’s most important trading partners for more than a decade, and Australia enjoys dealing with Korea as an important source of overseas students in Australian institutions. In 2006, following China (90,287) and India (39,166), Korea supplied the third largest number of overseas students to Australian institutions with 31,257 students. Cultural, educational and trading links between the
two nations have reached a peak around the 2000s. Koreans have come to see Australia as a desirable and safe place for higher studies and emigration. However, students in Korea are yet to be convinced that Australia is one of the best places for tertiary education in the global context. It seems unclear whether Australia has capitalised on the strength of the quality of its higher education. Australia has indeed largely neglected Korean students’ ‘fever for education’ (Selth 1988), and is thus missing out on many potential students who might have chosen to come to Australia had they been better informed of the quality of Australian education and life.

This study attempts to amend this serious oversight. The study will achieve this task by critically analyzing the factors that have inhibited and facilitated Korean students’ coming to Australian institutions to undertake their studies and then looking for future employment opportunities in the globalized world.

A valuable and relevant study was undertaken as a Master of Arts thesis 8 years ago (Armitage 1999). However, that study strictly focused on English language students in Australia and is now quite outdated. There is no guarantee that those English language students will later enter an Australian university to undertake higher studies. However, if they become well informed about Australian universities prior to coming to Australia, it is likely that a good proportion of them will undertake both English language and tertiary studies in Australia.

**Literature review**

There are three key relevant areas of literature. First, how should we understand the phenomenon of ‘studying abroad’, especially in the English medium, in the global context? It would be worth questioning whether individuals make proactive decisions because they wish to maximise their chances for future employment and success in the globalising world or whether individuals are not only facilitated by the services available now, but also strongly encouraged by the changing and increasingly competitive world. Second, studies of non-English speaking migrants have largely been centred on ‘adult’ migrants rather than a younger population. This is also true with the body of past studies of the Korean-Australian community. Young people’s adjustment to a new life and educational environment in a foreign land needs to be conceptualized. In particular, Australian educators’ tendency to impose ‘Australian – or Western – ways’ in the classroom, such as ‘open interaction’ or ‘the strongly advocated equal relations’ between educators and students may need to be reconsidered. The point is not to privilege one culture against another, but to see the ways in which they can accommodate each other. Third, it has become urgent task to re-conceptualize education as an export item. If education is to develop as an export item in the global market, Australian institutions should make the opportunity of education accessible and attractive enough for overseas students to choose Australian universities over other destinations. In addition to the pre-existing competitive environment, the Bologna Summit 2006, which may streamline higher education offerings from around 4,000 European universities, may require that Australian universities continue to reform.

**Structural adjustment and education, leading more Korean students to go abroad**: Tertiary education sectors have undoubtedly transformed their operations in terms of their internationalisation, their recruitment of foreign students and their main sources of income. There are three broad views regarding the extent to which the influence of the globalisation of education has penetrated tertiary education sectors in different nations (Mok, Yoon et al. 2003: 17). First, an increasing number of scholars argue that structural adjustment occurred to tertiary educations sectors as a result of globalisation of education (Reimers 1991 ; Arnove 1997). Second, there is not enough evidence across the world that nation states are increasingly less able to control their education systems. Instead, Green (1999: 56) rightly argues that many nation states still maintain tight control over two areas: education and training. The third and synthesised view is that different nation states have adopted wide-ranging approaches and mixed ways to cope with the impact of globalisation (Dale 1999; Mok, Yoon et al. 2003: 17). For example, Malaysia maintains its own tertiary education institutions with gradual effort helping them to be internationally competitive enough with their qualities of teaching and research. Such institutions are largely funded by the governments. However, Malaysia not only maintains a strong private tertiary education sector, but has also invited some foreign universities to open up Malaysian campuses. However, the latter move has been controversial for Korean tertiary education institutions and union organisations for more than the past two decades. To date, there is no foreign university campus in Korea, to which Korean public has access.

Universities in South Korea have introduced numerous policies in order to increase their competitiveness in the international education market especially since the Asian economic crisis in 1997. The Korean government’s “Brain Korea 21” has recruited a significant number of Korean expatriates. Research and development expenses have also increased significantly (from 0.4% of GDP in 1975 to 1.9% in 1990). The ability to lecture in a foreign language is an important requirement for potential academics. Academics’ research productivity has become critical in their applications for promotion and tenure. More generally, one of the most important graduate attributes has been English language
proficiency. This has led to the explosive growth of English language institutions which employ native English speakers, and a prevailing view is that English is best learned in English speaking countries. Consequently, a large number of Korean students choose to study overseas, enrolling at primary, secondary and tertiary institutions.

Kwak (2001) points out that Korean elites were found to lack problem solving abilities in the post-Asian crisis period. The university entrance examination system was partly blamed for undermining the quality of the entire education system (OECD 2000: 62; Park 2000: 1666; Kwak 2001; Mok, Yoon et al. 2003). In this context, some of the best performing students choose to undertake tertiary education abroad. It is debatable whether students go abroad mainly because they are dissatisfied with the factors that influence education in Korea or because they hope to pursue a perceivably better quality of education and hence, better employment opportunities.

Conceptual framework: Korean students choosing to study in Australia

Sociologically speaking with reference to agent (individual) and structure (social) debate, there are two broad reasons why individual Korean students choose to study abroad, i.e., Australia in the context of this study: individual and social/environmental needs. Moreover, individual reasons may be categorised into two further reasons (cf. Mark Priestley cited in Bhaskar and Danermark 2006). Firstly, there are individual idealistic reasons e.g., pursuit of scholarly knowledge and individual achievement, and secondly, individual materialistic reasons. Whether individuals pursue idealistic or materialistic needs, those needs are not generated in social or economic vacuum, but often reflect prevalent values of the broader society. From a society’s viewpoint, there is a need to produce an adequate number of professionals, which necessarily involves both ideal needs in pursuit of common goods and material needs of the society to sustain as a material entity. Thirdly, since the systematic opening of tertiary education to overseas students in the late 1980s, Australian universities in close cooperation with the Australian government have marketed themselves aggressively overseas. This marketing effort overseas has been accelerated by a gradual and continuing decrease in the proportion of government funding for universities. In addition to economic benefit, Australian universities reap cultural or other intrinsic values by the presence of overseas students in various study programs. Fourthly, employers in Korea value, and are in search of, graduate with international exposure. Such graduates bring in attributes which are highly useful in the world of globalization. These four dimensions may be displayed in the grid as shown in Diagram 1. This paper attempts to illustrate the research findings around the factors in the grid.

Diagram 1: Typological diagram: various reasons why Korean students chose Australian universities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideal</th>
<th>Social</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friends in Australia</td>
<td>Agents’ recommendation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friends’ recommendation</td>
<td>Clean &amp; green environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ease of visa processing</td>
<td>Chosen subject well-known/ developed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High standard of education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheaper tuition</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Availability of P/T work</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration plan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarship opportunities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better prospect to find jobs in Korea</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In designing data collection instruments, the following methodological issues were considered. Specific critical realist questions included the following (cf. Sayer 1992: 104; Sayer 2000; Danermark, Ekstrom et al. 2001: 47):

1. What are the ways in which the influencing factors (as given in Diagram) interact with each other and contribute to the phenomenon under investigation?
2. What are the fundamental conditions under which Korean students choose to go abroad and/or choose Australian universities in particular, both at the personal and contextual levels?
3. What properties must exist to deter or attract Korean students to Australian universities?

Critical realism argues that social reality has ontological depth and consists of domains of actual, empirical and real. That is, an actual phenomenon of Korean students choosing Australian universities produces various perceived or empirically experienced views, which can be further explained by relevant

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119 This redescription and recontextualisation of the study subject is a process of abduction.
social structural or real underpinning factors. This is essentially an attempt to identify relevant socio-economic, personal and structural factors; redescribe and recontextualise the central question under study; and identify causal mechanism that explains the phenomenon under question.

Using a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview schedule, the researchers have attempted to answer the questions mentioned above. Interview schedule and questionnaire included questions on the Korean students’ academic and non-academic reasons of choosing Australia; their views on why some of their friends have chosen the universities other than Australian; their study-related and general life experiences in Australia.

The data collected from respondents were analysed using SPSS and interview data thematically coded and analysed, according to the principles of grounded theory method (Strauss and Corbin 1990; Lubrosky 1994).

Methods

Study participants for the broader research project related to this paper included: secondary students, university students, recent university graduates (who made up a total of 29), 5 university students in a focus group discussions; 27 Gireogi Eomma (goose mothers) or mothers of school children in 5 focus group discussion; 16 Sunday school teachers (both male and female) in 2 different focus group discussions; and 2 male ministers of Korean churches in Melbourne. All the participants were 18 years old or older. Monash University Human Ethics Committee approved the study.

This paper is a specific analysis of the 29 secondary students, university students, recent university graduates, with reference to why Korean students choose to study in Australian universities. A trained research assistant with a Master’s degree in education carried out the interviews with the 29 participants between July 2005 and January 2006, using a semi-structured interview schedule and a survey questionnaire.\(^\text{119}\)

The participants included 6 females and 23 males; and their ages varied from 18 to 43. Their current involvement in studies at the time of interviews is presented in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1st year University</th>
<th>2nd year University</th>
<th>3rd year University</th>
<th>Final year University</th>
<th>Graduated or Post graduate studies</th>
<th>In total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Findings

What influenced their decision to choose Australia? A notable proportion of the study participants or more than half of them often have their families or relatives who studied in, or emigrated to, Australia. For example, a parent may have a friend whose children have studied in Australian universities. The parents with potential overseas students tend to be easily influenced by positive experiences of the children of their friends. This kind of readily available information on the experience of studying in Australia tends to encourage those acquaintants to choose Australia. However, the recommendations from relatives and friends were relatively less significant factors than ‘cheaper tuition fee’ and ‘safe country with little crime’, and ‘ease of visa processing’ (see Table 4.1).

Education fever still hard to control especially in the era of globalization It has become a matter of course for many Korean students to spend six to twelve months or complete a degree in an English speaking country mainly to equip them with English language proficiency in the era of globalisation. Nearly all Korean conglomerates and multinational companies operating in Korea have given a priority to English language proficiency in recruiting new staff members. During the 1970s and 80s, English proficiency was judged often by written English ability through TOEFL or TOEIC scores. However, once a good number of those who studied overseas returned home in the era of globalisation, Korean industries have particularly benefited from their ability to dialogue internationally, in the process of establishing trade partners all over the world. Korean industries are no longer satisfied with ‘superficial’ or ‘unusable’ language ability. This has raised the industries’ expectation of good English language standards. In the early 1990s, there was a well accepted belief that any university students who are serious about future employment have to spend six to twelve months overseas to be proficient with English.

Parents or older generations have closely observed these changes in the last few decades. It is often the parents who take initiatives seeking information on studying overseas and sending their children overseas. Mothers move overseas with their school aged children for the purpose of quality international

\(^{119}\) Other dimensions such as the students’ adjustment to Australian educational environments and Korean migrant churches’ support for Korean overseas students will be discussed elsewhere.
education particularly in English medium. This group of mothers is known as *Gireogi Eomma* or Goose Mother. More than sixteen thousand primary and high school students (16,446) left Korea for their studies abroad in 2004 (10,132 in 2002; 10,498 in 2003) (HankyorehNews 2006). Parents of potential university students also actively seek information on studying overseas and attend International Education Fairs that are held regularly around large cities in Korea. In these contexts of Korean society, those parents who can afford their children’s education overseas will actively participate in their children’s decision making to study abroad.

Korean society in general is an extremely competitive society, including employment opportunities for those who are seeking their first jobs. This is reflected on the ways in which university students spend their time and primary and secondary school students spend their time for entrance exams. This put primary and secondary school students under enormous stress, which leads a large number of students to wishing to study overseas. All the parents in their thirties and forties tend to accept readily that the level of pressure that the students have to go through far exceeds the level that those parents had experienced as students. Thus, those who can afford often choose to pursue studies overseas. For example, according to BJ Lee, an interviewee:

‘I came to Australia by myself in 1995 and enrolled myself as Year 9 student. Korean education put me under high stress and I requested for my parents’ permission to study abroad. I had considered going to the United States, but Australia offered me added advantage with safety and I liked the kinds of extra curriculum activities at the Australian school.’

**Australia as a safe and clean environment** Korean parents’ perception of Australia is that it offers a safe and clean environment. This is consistent with the findings of past studies (Kwon and Park 2000). Korean parents in general are protective of their children in the sense that children stay with parents until the children get married. It is safe to assume that Korean parents perceive European and American societies to be more risky, and therefore reluctant to expose their school or university students there, although some undergraduate and postgraduate students make purpose driven decision on their study destinations rather than choosing a safe and clean environment – See Table 4.1. For example, the 1992 Los Angeles civil riots might have caused an added concern of many Korean parents over their children’s safety should they choose to study in an American university.

Some of other important non-academic reasons why Korean students choose Australia include Cheaper tuition and living expense and **Australia as a safe country with little crime** (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). This is consistent with the findings of a past study of comparative costs (Bass 2006: 14; IDP.Education.Australia n.d.).

**Table 4.1: What are the important non-academic reasons that you chose Australia?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cheaper tuition fee and living expense</th>
<th>Safe country with little crime</th>
<th>Relatives in Australia</th>
<th>Friends in Australia</th>
<th>Agents’ recommendation</th>
<th>Friends’ recommendation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N: Valid</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Scale:** 1: Strongly disagree; 2: Moderately disagree; 3: Slightly disagree; 4: Slightly agree; 5: Moderately agree; 6: Strongly agree

**Table 4.2: What are the important non-academic reasons that you chose Australia?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Clean and green environment</th>
<th>Availability of part time work</th>
<th>Ease of visa processing</th>
<th>Good image</th>
<th>Migrating to Australian in the near future</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N: Valid</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>4.52</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>4a</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4a</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Difficulties obtaining visas to enter North America

Korean students have found it relatively difficult to obtain visas to enter North America or Britain. Following the trials to obtain visas to these two destinations, some have successfully entered Australia (e.g., Kim) – See Table 4.2.

A good chance of emigrating to Australia after tertiary studies

Korean students see a good chance of emigrating to Australia upon the completion of their studies as the Australian Government tends to value overseas students who have undertaken their studies in Australia. Those students who have completed a course in demand by market are often successful obtaining permanent residency soon after the completion of their studies. However, they are often not able to secure an employment following their studies due to lack of work experience. These students don’t seem able to overcome completely the difficulties that NESB professionals face when looking for employment opportunities. Some of the study participants mentioned that they tend to look for job opportunities in Korea.

Advantages and potential disadvantages that Korean graduates from Australian institutions will face

Australian university degrees are not highly reputable in Korea mainly because of lack of awareness of its quality in Korea in comparison with the degrees from North America in particular (M. Cho & S. Kim). Most study participants have perceived that ‘Australian degrees are inferior to American degrees, but superior to Korean degrees.’ (J. Kim) However, some students (S. Kim) are hoping that the graduates of some Australian universities with better reputation may be able to overcome the potential disadvantages caused by lack of awareness of its quality and popularity.

Despite being aware of this prevalent perception, a small number of Korean students chose to study in Australia and hope to return to Korea as ‘experts on Australia’ in their interested areas. For example, a former music lecturer from a Korean university, currently undertaking postgraduate studies, believes that his expert knowledge in Australian music will make a significant contribution to the music department of his university in Korea.

A small number of students have deliberately chosen Australian universities because of particular reputation of potential supervisors or Department/School from Australian universities. This group of students maintains high opinion of their chosen universities and feels confident of how they will fare with their career prospects when returning to Korea. They do not see that Australian university graduates would have advantages when looking for employment in Korea. Nor do they think that they will have any disadvantages (H. Lee and K. Ha, W. Lee). These students are often recipients of research scholarships which they could not get offered by North American universities, which seems to prove partially against the popular notion that Australian universities offer relatively less scholarship opportunities.

The varying degrees of study-related reasons, why they chose Australia, collected through the interviews are also indicated through the questionnaire survey as shown in Table 5.
Table 5: What are the study-related reasons that you chose Australia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>N: Valid</th>
<th>Missing</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Sum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High standard of education</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.31</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More opportunities for scholarship</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.93</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools and degrees are well known</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better prospect to find jobs in Korea in the future</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.90</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having relatives/friends there</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chosen subject area is well developed</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 1: Strongly disagree; 2: Moderately disagree; 3: Slightly disagree; 4: Slightly agree; 5: Moderately agree; 6: Strongly agree

What needs to be done if Australian institutions would like to maintain their edge as preferred destinations for Korean students

In the era of globalised world, there are increasingly more choices of countries and universities for Korean students. Most universities from OECD countries are making serious effort recruiting overseas students. Korean students’ level of satisfaction with their learning outcomes and life experiences in Australia are likely to influence potential overseas students’ decision to choose Australia as a preferred destination. In spite of the high level of financial benefits that Australian higher education has been enjoying for the last ten years, Australia has not fully explored a range of potentially useful services for overseas students. For example, there is a pervasive belief within the Australian university sector that only those who are proficient enough with English language should come and join tertiary studies. However, even those who have met their English language requirements require support in some areas including how to overcome cultural barriers in interacting with local populations. This is an old suggestion, still requiring attention (Barker, Child et al. 1991; Charmers and Volet 1997; Lee, Koeske et al. 2004). It is important to continue to encourage students to be independent in their ability to learn, however, a blind approach of ‘swim or sink’ needs be reconsidered.

‘Despite its relatively high standard of tertiary education, it is not well known in Korea. Australian universities may need to invest in promoting their qualities in Korea.’ (see HCheong).

Postgraduate students thought that there are limited opportunities for scholarships:

‘Rather than being preoccupied by advertising school to other countries, it would be better for school to promote education quality such as by offering more scholarships to the students with talent and potential.’
(S.Kim)

Whether Australian universities offer little opportunities for scholarships may be open to debate. Those students who have been unsuccessful earning a scholarship may think that not enough of them are made available.

Many study participants have suggested that effective promotion of Australian universities in Korea will significantly improve their reputation and encourage more Korean students to enroll at Australian universities. This needs to be done effectively especially when considering a relatively small number of students (less than 20% of the UG and PG students or recent graduates) who have chosen Australian universities primarily for their high quality education. Other study participants suggested that promotional marketing will make little difference because those who are serious enough about going abroad will have good access to information through the internet. These are also indicated in the analysis of data collected by the questionnaire survey, enquiring why they think some of their friends choose the USA, Canada, or the UK see (Table 6).
Table 6: Why do you think some of your friends choose the USA, Canada or the UK for their study rather than Australia?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High standard of education</th>
<th>More opportunities for scholarship</th>
<th>Schools and degrees are well known</th>
<th>Better prospect to find jobs in Korea in the future</th>
<th>Having relatives/friends there</th>
<th>Chosen subject area is well developed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N: Valid</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.72</td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3**</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sum</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Scale: 1: Strongly disagree; 2: Moderately disagree; 3: Slightly disagree; 4: Slightly agree; 5: Moderately agree; 6: Strongly agree

The provision of adequate services for students seeking accommodation and purchasing a motor vehicle would greatly facilitate the process and increase the level of satisfaction for the students (H.Yi). This also creates an immensely positive impression about the university and studying abroad. They pointed out that some academic advices (e.g., English language services) are somewhat superficial rather than practical and directly useful. For example, several students felt that English language instructors could be more eager or enthusiastic with their interactions with their students. Although this is not a ‘clear cut’ area, this may require further thoughts.

Curriculum and further understanding of foreign cultures: Nearly all the participating students thought that Australian lecturers are fairly understanding of the students and sympathetic to foreign students. However, the students felt that their Australian lecturers are not always cognizant of diverse cultures that overseas students bring to Australia. For example, a computer science student with no understanding of cricket had to work with a software programme of cricket without an adequate explanation of the sports game.

Encouraging students to ask questions: In the initial period of their studies in Australian universities, Korean students lack the confidence of conversing with their peers and lecturers, and they are often not prepared to ask questions freely or seek individual advice. If individual lecturers help the students overcome these barriers, there would likely to be higher level of student satisfaction and learning outcomes. It is unlikely that the lecturers and tutors do not allow consultation opportunities, but that students (especially new ones) do not feel confident enough to knock on the doors of the lecturers even though the students have questions to ask.

Similarly, Korean and perhaps many Asian students are often reluctant to complain about their learning experiences, ranging from difficulties of industrial placement, discriminatory lecturers or peer students, lack of information for job opportunities, and insufficient language support. A participant informed us that when some of his friends complained to the university for a number of reasons, they ended up being known as trouble makers. There is a question as to how these individual cases of complaints may be addressed. However, it would be valuable to actively promote the opportunities for grievances, which may yield to satisfactory resolution of most complaints raised.

A notable number of participants who completed their undergraduate studies with a high degree of satisfaction mentioned the importance of their networks with peers for the purpose of study and friendship. However, one postgraduate student wished that there were more interactions with his peers.

Policy implications: Data analysis clearly suggests that alumni associations could be mobilized to promote the choice of Australian universities and the agents might need to adopt better strategies. Australian universities may also need to consider the effect of scholarships and how they can best utilise them to recruit high quality students.

Discussion

Advantages and potential disadvantages: Although many students have complained of the lack of recognition of Australian degrees by Korean public and industries, whether this is true or not is open to debate. Although such perception is indeed pervasive, how Australian graduates have fared in Korean industries in comparison with the graduates from North America and Britain is completely unknown. This perceived lack of recognition of Australian degrees may be exacerbated by a significant proportion of Korean students end up emigrating to Australia rather than returning to Korea to prove their abilities. It may be true that it will require some more years before Australian universities are better recognised than they are now. It may be also true that students are overly concerned about their future, pinpointing the
lack of recognition rather than paying more attention to equipping themselves with necessary knowledge and skills.

**Good chance of migrating** The primary purpose of the small number of those undertaking higher degrees may not be that they use their studies as their vehicle to emigrate to Australia. Instead, they often have serious interest in academic research, but like many other Korean professionals, they have aspirations to emigrate to Australia. Recent research findings (Bass 2006)(Macnamara 2006) and media reports pointed out that many Indian students’ key reason to study in Australian universities is to enable themselves to qualify to be permanent migrants in Australia. Thus, they select the courses that work towards their favour and choose the city campuses of regional universities charging relatively low cost. There are two sides of the same coin. On one hand, it is surprising that this ‘strategy’ to emigrate to a country has caused an alarm and has been blamed and that the universities offering such vehicle are also blamed. It is only to be expected that the student agents will best utilise the available opportunities to achieve their personal aspirations. On the other hand, if the students are essentially ‘migrants’ in terms of their central interest and worries and take little interest in studying in the university except passing the course, fundamental roles of the university may be negatively affected. For example, it is unfortunate if some universities have to keep on adjusting what courses are in demand in a relatively short term by overseas students with specific plan to emigrate to Australia.

**Concluding remarks**

Apparently, overseas students have long been considered to be ‘the geese that lay golden eggs.’ This approach would not be a sustainable method to fund Australian universities in the long run. Unless the universities deal with the students’ academic achievement and welfare during and after their studies, the value of ‘hosting’ overseas students will rapidly decrease. We are informed by media and other sources that most Australian universities seem more conscious of overseas students’ personal, social and academic needs and provide required services. However, the participating students point out that the services provided are not generally helpful (M.Cho) and others are not even aware of the availability of student services for overseas students (H.Cheong). Probably, the students are not aware of how to use the available services and those student services may need to be more approachable.

Overseas students certainly make a significant financial contribution to Australian society in general and universities in particular. However, this is only a small and immediate benefit Australia might be enjoying. Just as post-war immigrants to Australia have enriched its life and standing in international order, the presence of foreign students offers many intrinsic values to the teaching and learning environments of Australia. Further, how the graduates of Australian universities will contribute to the betterment of Australia in the future world, whereby knowledge may be considered relatively more important than wealth or power, does not seem well appreciated.

Despite the high standard of Australian higher education, Korean students are often unaware of it prior to their arrival in Australia. How Australia can capitalise on its standard of higher education as well as on other factors such as its safe, clean environment and relatively low cost of living poses challenges for Australian higher education institutions which are seeking evermore overseas students. Moreover, it would be a pity to regard overseas students as a mere source of financial benefit. The potential contribution that these students can make to Australian society, irrespective of whether or not they emigrate to Australia, is tremendous in the increasingly globalising world. The provision of adequate support for cultural adjustment and scholarships would be invaluable for increasing student satisfaction and continuing to develop the reputation of Australian universities internationally.

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**Contact Address**

Gil-Soo Han  
Monash University Malaysia  
No. 2, Jalan Kolej, Bandar Sunway  
46150 Petaling Jaya, Selangor MALAYSIA  
PH: 603-5636-0600 ext 3502  
FAX: 603-5635-8640  
EMAIL: han.gil.soo@artsci.monash.edu.my
Abstract

This study examines the speech act of request in Korean. The methodology adapts the principles used by the Cross-Cultural Speech Act Realization Project (CCSARP, Blum-Kulka et al, 1989), but a slightly modified version of its coding system is used in order to suit the Korean language. Data has been collected in a workplace setting, through video-taping of role-plays. In the recording of the role-plays, three role-play scenarios were performed by Korean participants who were working at medium-sized companies with white-collar environments.

The study shows that Korean request strategies are chosen primarily according to power status, the higher the power status of the addressee, the more indirect request strategy is preferred. Korean speakers appear to be more indirect to the addressees who are superiors and equal work members than to juniors. Another discovery, hardly explored in previous studies, is that hints are used extensively in this study and corresponding to the level of power ranks as well: the lower power rank of the addressee, the less preference of strong hint is displayed.

1. Introduction

This study is to investigate the patterns of request speech acts produced by native speakers of Korean under the variables of social factors. The formation of request speech acts will be conducted, in doing so prototypical request patterns may be developed through variations on the speech acts of native speakers. This study will explore the characteristics of request speech acts regarding direct/indirect strategies. The data used in this study is obtained from role-plays by Korean native speakers. This study intends to answer the following questions:

1. How do native speakers of Korean realize the speech act of requests with regards to the level of directness of the request utterances?
2. How do the social variables, such as power and distance, affect the performance of requests?

2. Previous studies

CCSARP was developed in an attempt to investigate the speech acts of request and apology from eight language groups: American English, Australian English, British English, Canadian French, German, Danish, Russian, and Hebrew (Blum-Kulka and Olshtain 1984). The CCSARP focuses on exploring universal pragmatic principles across a range of languages and cultures, by making comparisons between native and non-native speakers. The framework of the CCSARP contains a scale of nine levels, as a coding scheme for the analysis of intralingual, situational, as well as cross-linguistic variations in in/directness. The level of directness is discussed at three main levels: direct, conventionally indirect, and non-conventionally indirect (hints). The data were collected by means of Discourse Completion Tests (DCT) consisting of short descriptions of sixteen situations including variables of social distance and dominance to elicit written speech acts.

There have been a number of studies, which examine Korean request speech acts. Suh (1999) conducted a DCT to compare request strategies in English used by Korean learners of English as a second language (KESL) and English native speakers (ENS) with regard to social and psychological variables. Suh focused on identifying the differences between the two groups and amongst the advanced level and intermediate level of KESL. The data were collected using a questionnaire with 12 different situations based on social status and intimacy, and the informants were asked to select one out of six request strategies which were listed on the questionnaire.

It was found that ENS preferred to use conventionally indirect strategy like ‘Can you …?’ more than KESL, whereas imperatives (being a direct strategy) were used more by KESL. In both socially and psychologically distant situations, there was no significant difference in making requests between two groups. In socially distant but psychologically close relationships, both groups used less polite strategies than in the first situation, and again a significant difference among them was not seen. Both employed less
polite strategies in a socially and psychologically close relationship. In psychologically very distant relationships, request strategies used by two groups were most polite.

Kim (1994) studied requests cross-culturally between Korean and English. The data were gathered using questionnaires. The participants of 296 Korean students and 299 American students participated in the study. They were similar in terms of age and academic major. The results showed that the Koreans considered the direct statement as the least effective way of making requests, while the Americans perceived it as the most effective strategy.

Koo (2001) investigated two speech acts, request and apology in Korean, by Korean native speakers (KNS) and American learners of Korean language (AKFL). The author collected spoken data using DCT with ten situations of request and apology each, corresponding to variables of age, social dominance, and power relationship. The informants were asked to produce a request after reading a short description of each situation. The coding scheme used in the CCSARP was employed in the study. The study finds that AKFL learners were more direct in making requests than KNS. The verbosity was seen in KNS, with longer utterances with more supportive moves.

This study will concentrate on investigating request strategies produced by native speakers of Korean, and more importantly using role-play data in a work place setting. It is expected that the outcomes of this study can provide intriguing insights coming from work-place data, to the study of Korean request strategies.

3. Methodology
The method of data collection adopts the principles used by the CCSARP, but a modified version of its coding scheme has been developed to suit the different linguistic characteristics of Korean language. Role-play, in strictly speaking role-enactment, is used in this study. McDonough (1981, p. 80) proposes the method of role-enactment. He argues that role-play is realized where the subjects respond by acting a role in the given situations as if they are actually in that particular situation. This allows researchers to obtain spoken data that is as natural as possible.

A workplace setting was chosen in the data collection for this study, because the speech act of requests appears in a high frequency in the workplace, where people often need to give directions to each other. The data collection was conducted in Korea in the environment of medium-sized white-collar companies.

A pilot study was conducted: two role-play scenarios were tested out. Through the pilot study, technical drawbacks in recordings were modified. The pilot study of role-plays revealed that there were some misunderstandings about the request scenarios. In the main recordings, the researcher still used the same original request scenarios, but the participants received sufficient explanation about the scenarios before they began, and the recording went smoothly.

3.1 Subjects
The subjects were chosen from workplaces in Daejeon, Korea. They consisted of twelve office workers for the recording of role-plays, two pairs of female/female and male/male subjects for each of the three role-play situations. The data was to examine the impact of social variables including power and distance on the performance of requests.

3.2 The design of role-play scenarios
In order to examine the effect of social variables on the realization of the speech act of requesting, three request situations for role-plays were designed, in which situations varied with respect to social variables of power and distance. In this study, the variables of power include three levels: +Power (the addressee has a higher power status than the speaker), =Power (the interlocutors have parallel status), -Power (the addressee has a lower power status than the speaker). Moreover, in this study the variable of social distance, +D (the interlocutors do not know each other) was considered. Three scenarios are as follows:

Situation 1: [+P, +D]
Imagine that: You are being interviewed for a promotion by your department head. You do not know this person, because s/he has been on leave due to illness and you have worked for the company for less than six months. During the interview, the interviewer is not satisfied with your documentation, and asks you to provide more information together with an additional reference letter from one of your previous employers. The interviewer wants to make a decision tomorrow because s/he is leaving to attend a conference the day after tomorrow, so s/he asks you to submit the additional information by tomorrow. However, you would like to extend the due date to give your former employer and yourself more time to prepare. Now you ask her/him to give you more time.
Situation 2: \([-P, +D]\)
Imagine that: You are a department head conducting promotion interviews in your company. The addressee is one of the candidates coming for a promotion interview. You do not know him/her, because you have just come back from leave and the addressee began his/her job after you went on leave. During the interview, you are not happy with his/her documentation, you want more documentation and an additional reference letter from one of his/her previous employers. Because you want to make a decision tomorrow as you are leaving to attend a conference the day after tomorrow, you request her/him to submit the additional information by tomorrow. You know this probably won’t be enough time for the addressee and his/her former employer to prepare the required documentation. Nevertheless, you ask him/her to submit the documentation by tomorrow.

Situation 3: \([=P, +D]\)
Imagine that: You have a colleague, whom you do not know, because s/he has just joined the company. You need to photocopy a lot of documents for a meeting, and only have 15 minutes before the meeting starts. However, when you get to the photocopier, the addressee you have not met before is using the photocopier and s/he has many documents to finish too, and needs them for a meeting which also starts soon. Now you ask the addressee whether or not you can interrupt and do your photocopying first.

3.3 Procedure of video-taping of role-plays
After the participants agreed to be recorded, they were given detailed explanations as to how to perform the role-play, which took approximately five minutes. The request scenarios were translated into Korean. Each scenario had two pairs of subjects performing in it; each pair consisting of two participants of the same sex. The recording session of the role-play took between a maximum of five minutes and a minimum of thirty seconds.

3.4 Data analysis process
After the data were gathered, request utterances were classified and coded, using the coding system of the CCSARP. Identification of request sequences made use of the CCSARP definition, which has been widely used in the study of request speech act. The current analysis is based mainly on the manual coding scheme of the CCSARP, but revised by deleting categories that were inapplicable in Korean, and adding new appropriate categories developed by Byon (2001), Fukushima (1996), Sifianou (1992), Van Mulken (1996), and the researcher herself.
Table 1: Coding system for directness level of head acts (main request acts)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directness level</th>
<th>Strategies</th>
<th>Descriptions and examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level 1: Direct strategies (Impositives)</td>
<td>Mood derivable</td>
<td>Imperatives are the grammatical form of the utterances of this type. For example, Kuccok yenlakche-lul namky-e-cwu-e-yo. ‘Leave your address.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Want statement</td>
<td>The speaker conveys the illocutionary intent by asserting a particular want, desire, or wish. For example, Dahay yenlakche-lul com al-ko sip-sup-ni-ta. ‘I want to know Dahay’s address.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 2: Conventionally indirect strategies</td>
<td>Suggestory formula</td>
<td>The speaker conveys the illocutionary intent that is phrased as a suggestion that usually interests both of the interactants. For example, Hyuka-lul com yenki-ha-myen ette-Ikka-yo? ‘How about postponing your holiday?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Query preparatory</td>
<td>The utterance of this strategy contains preparatory conditions referring to asking the hearer’s ability, willingness, permission, possibility, or convenience to perform an act. For example, Cikum nokum hay cwu-I swu iss-e? ‘Can you record that right now?’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 3: Non-conventionally indirect strategies (Hints)</td>
<td>Strong hint</td>
<td>The speaker conveys the illocutionary intent by referring to partially relevant statements of the request act. For example, Way nam-uy mwulken-ul manci-ko kulay? ‘Why do you touch my things without asking me?’ (Clue: The speaker intends to ask the addressee not to take his books.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Data and discussion
This section discusses the data in terms of head act strategies with respect to the three individual situations. In addition, the impact of the social variables, such as power and distance, on the choice of request strategies will also be examined.

4.1 General examination of request strategies in role-plays
Korean speakers made use of five types of head acts in their requests throughout all situations: mood derivable-imperative, want statement, suggestory formula, query preparatory, and strong hint.

Korean speakers treated query preparatory as the most favoured manner in making their requests throughout all situations, and its rate of occurrence was twice as much as mood derivable which was considered as the second preferred formula. In terms of the use of query preparatory, it is clearly displayed that Korean speakers often utilized this formula in the form of questions by asking the addressees’ permission or availability to perform potential requests, with the use of -an/toy-ikk-ya-yo? ‘Would it be possible/could you/can’t I…?’ It seems that Korean speakers also preferred diverse types of direct head acts, such as mood derivable and want statement. For example:

(4.1) 복사기 제가 먼저 쓰도 될까요?
Poksaeki cey-ka mence sse-to toy-Ikka-yo?
‘Can I use the photocopy machine first?’ (Query preparatory) (S3)

(4.2) 자료수집을 해야 되니까, 시간을 좀 더 주세요.
Calyo swucip-ul hay-ya toy-nikka, sikan-ul com te cwu-sey-yo.
‘I need to prepare the documentation, so please give me more time.’ (Mood derivable) (S1)

(4.3) 뭐 시간이 되는데로 (0.4) 제출을 해줬으면 좋겠습니다.
Mwe sikan-i toy-nun-teylo (0.4) ceychwul-ul hay-cwu-ess-u-myen coh-keyss-sup-ni-ta.
‘So, it would be good if you can submit it when you have time.’ (Want statement) (S2)

With respect to strong hint, Korean speakers expressed their illocutionary intention in the forms of questions or incomplete sentences, and its preference was very high. This suspects that Korean speakers also convey the illocutionary intent by expressing it in an implicit way at times. For example:

(4.4) 저도 복사 좀 하리라고 하는데, 많이 바쁘신가요?
   Ce-to poksa com ha-lye-ko ha-nun-tey, manh-i pappu-si-n-ka-yo?
   ‘I also need to make some copies, have you got a lot to do?’ (Strong hint) (S3)

Korean speakers displayed their strong preference on using strong hint. The majority of strong hint was realized in the form of a question by mentioning partial elements of a request in a way in which the speaker gives grounding comments of the illocutionary act of the request.

4.2 Data discussion based on individual situations

Korean speakers were prone to use query preparatory (75%) as the most appropriate way to realize requests in the situation in which the addressees had a higher power rank and the interlocutors did not know each other. The next preferred formula of head acts for Korean speakers was mood derivable by using imperative (25%). For example,

(4.5) 조금만 시간을 더 주시면 안될까요?
     Cokum-man sikan-ul te cwu-si-myen an-toy-lkka-yo?
     ‘Could you give me more time?’ (Query preparatory) (S1)

As shown in (4.5), Korean speakers employed a head act of query preparatory in the form of -an-toy-ikkka-yo? (Can (can’t)/ May I …?) in the realization of requests with an unfamiliar superior. It was done by asking about the possibility of whether or not the speaker could be given more time to organize the required documentation. Korean speakers also utilized mood derivable-imperative, such as calyo swucip-ul hay-ia toy-nikka, sikan-ul com te cwu-si-eyo. (자료 수집을 해야 되니까, 시간을 좀 더 주세요. ‘Please give me a bit more time, because I need to collect data’). The speaker demanded postponement of the due date for submission. Even though the speaker chooses the form of conveying the request is in a direct way, there are a number of items which deliver polite tone of the request. That is to say that by using this mood derivable statement the speaker applied verbal ending marker -a/eyo (-아/-어요 ‘informal polite level’) and understater com ( 좀 ‘a little’). These lexical modifications play a role to increase the level of politeness.

As compared to the Situation 1, Korean speakers placed more variance in the choice of head act strategies in Situation 2, when requests were made towards the addressees who were unfamiliar junior work members. The most frequently used formula was mood derivable-imperative (43%), as in Kukel tasi hanpen cakseng-hay-se com nayil-kkaci cechwul-hay cwu-sey-yo. (그걸 다시 한번 작성해서 좀 내일까지 제출해 주세요. ‘Please reformat this, and submit it again by tomorrow.’). In addition to the use of mood derivable-imperative, there were four more additional head act strategies use by Korean speakers: want statement, suggestory formula, query preparatory and strong hint, 14% each.

In the realization of requests with unfamiliar juniors, Korean speakers employed various direct strategies. Korean speakers displayed a significantly low preference on the application of conventionally indirect strategy in Situation 2, rather a solid trend toward the choice of diverse head act strategies with an emphasis on direct strategy. This outcome could be explained by the supposition that Korean speakers who are superiors might not be indirect in the choice of head act strategies.

In the Situation 3 in which the request is demanded towards the addressee who is unfamiliar equals, the use of query preparatory played a significant role as the most favoured for Korean speakers (67%), and the high frequent use of strong hints (33%). For example:

(4.6) 저도 복사 좀 하리라고 하는데, 많이 바쁘신가요?
     Ce-to poksa com ha-lye-ko ha-nun-tey, manh-i pappu-si-n-ka-yo?
     ‘I also need to make some copies, have you got a lot to do?’ (Strong hint) (S3)

As for the requests made towards unfamiliar equals (S3), Koreans were prone to utilizing conventionally indirect head acts in role-plays. The speakers preferred to use the most polite strategy (Blum-Kulka & Olshtain 1987), conventionally indirect head acts.
Blum-Kulka and Olshtain (1984) find that situational variables of age, social status, intimacy, or sex determine the choice of politeness strategies, and its influence in selecting strategies amongst directness and indirectness differ from culture to culture.

This study shows that indeed there are different trends in choosing a variety of request strategies corresponding to different combinations of social variables of power and distance. When the interlocutors do not know each other, the data displays a strong trend of employing conventionally indirect head acts in role-plays, except for the situation where the request is made towards junior work members.

The analysis demonstrates that there was a relatively low preference for conventionally indirect strategy, when requests were claimed towards juniors, instead there were many direct head acts employed by the participants who hold higher power status than the addressees. This may indicate that the speaker who is in a higher power position tends to give a direction to the addressee in overt or precise way. It could also be assumed that Korean speakers who are in a position of superiors might not be sensitive about choosing request strategies. This reveals that the social variable of power could be a dominant factor in the realization of requests.

Moreover, Korean speakers showed a tendency to utilize hints when the addressees had either a lower or the same power position, but more preference is seen in the latter situation. That is to say the speaker and the addressee used more strong hints when they have an equal power status, and fewer strong hints when the addressee had a lower power status.

All in all, it seems Korean speakers switched their approach from conventionally indirect to direct strategy towards junior members, even though the interlocutors did not know each other. This indicates that the choice of head acts is affected by power status rather than familiarity in Korean to a great extent.

5. Conclusions

The current study has been conducted to investigate request strategies used by Korean speakers in role-plays. It must be emphasized that the data from which the conclusions are drawn is workplace role-play data, because data of different kinds may indicate a different pattern of language behaviour.

Korean request strategies are mainly based on power status. For Koreans, the higher the power status of the addressee, the more indirect request strategy is preferred. The Korean would use direct (and probably less polite) strategies to the addressees unfamiliar to them, particularly to the juniors. This study also shows that Korean speakers used hints corresponding to the level of power ranks: the higher power rank of the addressee, the more preference of strong hint is displayed.

In general, the speakers opt for conventionally indirect request strategies throughout all three situations, but in the situation in which the request is made towards the juniors there is its relatively lower preference. It is suspected that while the conventionally indirect strategy might be a universal method of making requests towards the addressees regardless of the level of power position, for Koreans the use of conventionally indirect head acts is in relation to the power status.

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Contact Address
Curtin University of Technology
GPO Box U1987
Perth WA 6845

Grace Zhang
PH: 9266 3478
EMAIL: g.zhang@curtin.edu.au

Kyu Shin
PH: 9266 2385
EMAIL: k.shin@curtin.edu.au

Yong Ju Rue
EMAIL: yongju.rue@student.curtin.edu.au
Epenthetic [i] in Optimality Theory (Revisited)*

Duk-Soo Park
The University of Sydney

Abstract
In this paper, the [i]-zero alternation across the verb/adjective stem boundary in Korean is described as an i-Epenthesis phenomenon within the framework of Optimality Theory. Here, I claim that the function of the epenthetic vowel [i] is to block two regressive weakening processes, Obstruent-Nasalisation and Alveolar Stop-Spirantisation, so as to maintain the morpheme identity of stem. This fact can be well explained by Optimality Theory, using a pair of ranked Faithfulness constraints.

1. Data
In Korean, there is an alternation between [i] and zero in the verbal/adjectival suffixation—[i] appears between a stem-final consonant and a suffix which begins with a nasal, /l/ or /s/, with some exceptions of the indicative attentive (hereafter the interrogative), -ni or -nya, and the familiar subjunctive assertive (FSA) -se ‘let’s’ (see (1b)). These suffixes include -myen ‘if’, -n ‘present tense noun-modifying adjective ender, -n ‘past tense noun-modifying verb ender’, the sequential -ni’s’, -nik’a ‘because’, -l ‘prospective modifying ender’, -lo ‘to’, -lye ‘in order to’, the directional -lo ‘towards’, and -si ‘Subject Honorific (SH).’

Here, the function of the euphonic vowel [i] is obviously to break up consonant clusters across a stem boundary, but it is limited to the suffixes beginning with a nasal, /l/ or /s/. Notice that no such alternation appears before a suffix which begins with a stop, such as the declarative/dictionary ending -ta, the conjunctive -ko ‘and’, or the imperative -ci as in (1c):

(1a)/mak˚/ ‘block’ /ka˚/ ‘go’
[maŋi] ‘(something someone) blocked’ [kaŋi] ‘(someone) who went’
[magimyen] ‘if (one) blocks’ [kaŋmyen] ‘if (one) goes’
[maŋinik’a] ‘because (one) blocks’ [kaŋnik’a] ‘because (one) goes’
[magii] ‘(something) to block’ [kal] ‘(someone) to go’
[magiiye] ‘in order to block’ [kaŋye] ‘in order to go’
[magiši] ‘block + SH’ [kaši] ‘go + SH’

(1b)*[maŋin], [maŋni] ‘Do you block?’ [kaŋi] ‘Do you go?’
*[magise], [makše] ‘Let’s block.’ [kaše] ‘Let’s go.’

(1c)[mak˚t’a] ‘block (dictionary form)’ [ka˚] ‘go (dictionary form)’
[mak˚k’o] ‘(someone) blocks and’ [ka˚g] ‘(someone) goes and’
[mak˚c’ianayo] ‘(one) does not block’ [kaši] ‘(one) does not go’

In Generative Phonology, when there is an alternation between some sound and nothing in the phonetic representation, there can be two logically possible solutions—the insertion rule or the deletion rule of that sound. For the given fact, the i-Deletion solution has been preferred by many linguists (e.g., Kim-Renaud (1974, 61), Kim-Renaud (1982, 475), Ahn (1985, 206)), mainly due to the fact it works well without counterexamples, while the i-Epenthesis solution produces counterexamples: For the i-Deletion account, all the suffixes which show the alternation (of [i]-zero) begin with /i/ in their underlying representations, which can be deleted by i-Deletion after a stem which ends in a vowel. Of course, in this approach, the underlying forms of those interrogative endings which do not show the alternation are without /i/. Instead of operational stipulation, the i-Deletion solution relies heavily on the underlying representations. This does not explain why such alternation between [i] and zero occurs before a certain group of suffixes at all. For the i-Deletion account, it is a mere accident that such suffixes have a vowel /i/ in their underlying representations.

On the other hand, having a rule which inserts a vowel, [i], between a consonant-ending stem and a suffix beginning with a nasal, /l/ or /s/, the i-Epenthesis solution not only produces counterexamples with the interrogative endings and the familiar subjunctive assertive -se, but more seriously it has a problem of having an unnatural environment with a suffix which begins with /m/, /n/, /l/ or /s/. Nasals and a lateral,

*I use the following phonetic symbols instead of IPA for the transcription of Korean: [Cʰ] for an aspirated stop, [C’] for a tensed consonant, [C˚] for an unreleased stop, [j] for a voiced palatal stop, [s] for a palatalized [s], [f] for a flap. I also use the McCune-Reischauer Romanisation System for the sources of data and references.

120 This will be discussed in detail soon.
/nya/ and a fricative, /s/, do not form a natural class in Generative Phonology. So, the exceptional treatment of the interrogative ending and the incorporation of the Subject Honorific -si (not FSA -se) made the rule very unnatural (cf. Kim 1984, 81).

In this paper, despite all those problems in the descriptions in Generative Phonology, I will argue for i-Epenthesis within a new framework called Optimality Theory (hereafter OT). Here I claim that the function of the epenthetic vowel [i] is to block two regressive weakening/assimilation processes (Obstruent-Nasalisation and Alveolar Stop-Spirantisation), across a stem boundary before a non-terminal suffix, so as to keep the morpheme identity of the stem. This phenomenon will be described and explained by OT using a pair of ranked Faithfulness constraints.

2. Diachronic Evidence and Free Variation

There are some pieces of diachronic evidence in favour of i-Epenthesis. In Middle Korean texts written in the 16th-18th century, we found the interrogative endings ini and inya:

(2a) syel.0.ni <syelp+i-ni (Sunch’on Kim’s tomb, ôngan 36)

(2b) olhyinya ‘Is it correct?’ (Oryunjônbi ônhae 4:24b)
yohinya ‘Is it good?’ (Oryunjônbi ônhae 5:8a)
kat’Anya123 ‘Are these the same?’ (Sipkusaryak ônhae 2:114b)
insAnyap sìnya ‘Do you have it or not?’ (Nogólde ônhae sang 28b)
apsAnya ‘Don’t you have it?’ (Nogólde ônhae sang 32b)
nop’inya ‘Is it high?’ (Sipkusaryak ônhae 1:32a)

In fact, similar to these writings of Middle Korean, after a stem which ends in an aspirated consonant, we can still observe the epenthetic vowel [i] in natural/casual speech with these interrogative endings in contemporary Korean:

(3) /olh- / [olinya], [olinito]~? [ollya], [oll] ‘Is it correct?’
/cish- / [cini], [coini]~[connya], [conn] ‘Is this good?’
/kat’- / [k textbox\textsuperscript{⊥}nya][kat’ni]~[kannya], [kanni] ‘Are they the same?’
/silh- / [silinya], [silinito]~? [sillya], [sill] ‘Do you dislike it?’
/nop’-/ / [nop’inya], [nop’ni]~[nomnya], [nomni] ‘Is it high?’

The i-Deletion account may not have anything to say about this free variation at all, unless it has a separate i-Epenthesis for this particular environment. Notice also that for many people the pronunciations with i-geminate (eg, [ollya], [šillya]) by n-Lateralisation are less preferred than the ones with the epenthetic [i].

I claim, then, that i-Epenthesis in the interrogative endings in Middle Korean has been partially eroded by another competing force—perhaps the force to avoid homophony. While phonologists tend to be reluctant to accept the avoidance of homophone as a cause for a phonological change, there are many cases where the avoidance of homophone is the only cause for some phonological rules. In Korean, for instance, Umlaut saves the potential homophones of ‘to be hugged’ and ‘to throw something at someone,’ and by Vowel Devoicing we can distinguish ‘a big house’ from ‘an uncle’s house’.

(4) /ankita/à[angida] ‘embrace+passive+declarative’
/ankita/à[angida]à[æŋida] ‘embrace+causative+declarative’

/k\textsuperscript{n}in sampa/à[k\textsuperscript{θ}njip]à[k\textsuperscript{n}njip]124 ‘a big house’
/k\textsuperscript{n}inchepi/à[k\textsuperscript{θ}njip] ‘an uncle’s house’

In fact, we have not only the interrogative -ni but also the interrogative in Kyöngsang dialect, -na, which also has its homophonc morpheme -na ‘even, although’ in the standard Korean. However, using the avoidance of homophone as the cause for going in another direction is a bit problematic here because avoiding a homophone with -ni ‘as’, the interrogative -ni creates more homophones within the interrogative

121 In OT, there is no rule component at all though.
122 The data are from Park (2004). According to Park (2004, 85), (2a) is from a letter in colloquial language found in the tomb of a Sunch’on Kim, written in the 16th century, and all in (2b) are from the literatures written in the 17th-18th century.
123 ‘A’ transcribes a Middle Korean vowel called araea.
124 Here, a dot below a vowel indicates that that vowel is devoiced.
expressions: eg, /is-ni/→[inni] ‘Do you connect?’, /is’-ni/→[inni] ‘Do you have?’; [ic-ni/→[inni] ‘Do you forget?’ etc.

The distinction of “terminal” vs “non-terminal” suffixes works better here. Notice that the interrogative endings are terminal suffixes, while the sequential -ni’as’ is a non-terminal suffix. Likewise, the subject honorific suffix -si is a non-terminal suffix, while the familiar subjunctive assertive -se ‘let’s’ is a terminal suffix.125

3. Description in Optimality Theory

OT (Prince and Smolensky, 1993), like other models of linguistics, proposes an input and an output and a relation between the two. In OT, instead of having phonological rule component, which transforms an input form into an intermediate or an output form, only a set of violable constraints (CON) exist. These constraints are ranked, and the evaluation (EVAL) component selects one which violates lower ranking constraints than others as the optimal output from all potential outputs generated by Generator (GEN).

There are basically two Faithfulness constraints in the theory. They are MAX and DEP:

(5) Faithfulness constraints:

MAX: Every segment/feature of the input has an identical correspondent in the output.
DEP: Every segment/feature of the input has an identical correspondent in the input.

This i-Epenthesis phenomenon presented above can be described in OT using a pair of Faithfulness constraints ranked in the order of No Stem Weakening (NSW), which is a weaker version of MAX, and a subset of DEP, Faithfulness of vowel (FAITH). NSW and FAITH can defined like below:

(6) NSW: No Stem-final consonant can be weakened in terms of consonant strength hierarchy126 before a non-terminal suffix.

FAITH: A vowel in the output has its correspondent in the input. (No vowel can be added/inserted.)

In other words, here I maintain that [i] gets inserted across the stem boundary in order to avoid the destruction of the stem identity127 by a regressive assimilation, namely Obstruent-Nasalisation before a suffix beginning with a nasal (or a lateral)128, and Alveolar Stop-Spirantisation by /s/.129 Notice that in the framework of Generative Phonology, it was impossible to explain why i-Epenthesis occurs before a suffix beginning with a nasal (or a lateral) and a fricative, /s/. The OT analysis solves this conspiracy problem, which was an unexplained matter in the descriptions in Generative Phonology.130

For a consonant-ending stem, as illustrated in Tableau131 (7) and (8), the epenthetic vowel [i] is well predicted when NSW outranks FAITH. Unless there is an epenthetic vowel, [i], Obstruent-Nasalisation might have destroyed the stem identity.

(7) NSW>>FAITHV>>IDENTIO

125 Such distinctions between different domain sizes are not uncommon. Mohanan (1993) suggests that constraints tend to hold more strongly of smaller domains than of larger domains (Pulleyblank 1997, 71). Pulleyblank (1997, 70-1) also shows that in Zoque the place assimilation applies outside stem, while it does not within stem. So the stem-restricted constraint must be ranked above the unrestricted constraint.

126 Consonant Strength hierarchy is in the order of Stops-Affricates-Fricatives-Nasals-Lateral-Glides.

127 Obstruent-Nasalisation and Alveolar Stop-Spirantisation are allowed beyond the stem boundary. They apply across a compound boundary or a noun and a particle boundary: eg, /i+mom/→[i’mom]→[innom]→[immom] ‘gum’, /i+sok/→[it’sok]→[iss’ok] ‘inside of a tooth’, /Cæk-man/→[Cæk’man]→[Cæŋman] ‘only book’.

128 In Korean, syllable-initial /l/ becomes [n] and this may cause Obstruent-Nasalisation as well.

129 In Korean, an unreleased alveolar stop [t’] becomes [s] before /s/.

130 In explaining merits of OT, Hays (1997-4) says that the phonotactic targets of a language, previously the miraculous results of a set of rules conspiring together, are now the material of grammar itself.

131 In the tableau, a pointing index finger (‘>’) next to an output means that it is the optimal output, and an asterisk (*) indicates a violation of a constraint in that column, and an exclamation mark after an asterisk (!) means it is a fatal error, because it is the violation of a higher ranked constraint. Shading indicates that the violations of lower ranking constraints become irrelevant since a higher constraint is violated. Here, IDENTIO is Input-Output Identity, which says that an input and its output should be identical in terms of a certain feature. Here I am using IDENTIO for the applications of any other phonological rules, such as Intervocalic Voicing, Tensification, and Obstruent-Nasalisation before a terminal suffix, h-Deletion, I-Flapping, n-Lateralisation, etc.
As for the blockage of Spirantisation, because of the fact that other than labial and velar stops are neutralized to an unreleased alveolar stop [t˚] at the end of a syllable (by Syllable-Final Neutralisation), without an inserted vowel [i] in between, we would have ended up with many homophonic expressions by the process of weakening (ie, [t˚]→[s]): eg, /is˚-seyo/ or /ic-seyo/→[it˚s’eyp]→[iss˚eyo]; /kac-seyo/ or /kat˚-seyo/→[kat˚s’eyo]→[kass˚eyo], as illustrated in (8a) and (8b):

(8)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/kat˚-seyo/</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✗ kat˚iseyo</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kass˚eyo</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/kac-seyo/</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✗ kajiseyo</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kass˚eyo</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the problematic one in a transformational account, the interrogative -ni or -nya, as illustrated in (9b), the theory predicts that the optimal output will be the one which underwent Obstruent-Nasalisation (here the violation of IDENTIO), since the constraint NSW applies only before non-terminal suffixes.

(9a)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/mak-ni/ ‘as’</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✗ magini</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mañni</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(9b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/mak-ni/ ‘Q’</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>magini</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mañni</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/mak-se/ ‘FSA’</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>magise</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗ mak˚s’e</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/anc-se/ ‘FSA’</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>anjise</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>!</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗ ans˚e</td>
<td>*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interrogative expressions with the stems which end with an aspirated consonant can be illustrated by the following Tableau (10). If we keep the ranking of NSW>>FAITH V>>IDENTIO, the prediction of the theory would be different from the fact: While the theory predicts the outputs with Obstruent-Nasalisation or n-Lateralisation as the optimal outputs (indicated by ✗), the other candidates which violate FAITH V by i-Epenthesis (indicated by ✓) are also accepted pronunciations in casual speech.

(10) NSW>>FAITH V>>IDENTIO

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/kati-ni/ ‘Q’</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ kati˚ni</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗ kati˚hi</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>/olh-ni/ ‘Q’</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>FAITH V</th>
<th>IDENTIO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓ olﬁni</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>✗ olﬁli</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
treated as free variation, the two constraints, FAITHV and IDENTIO, should not be ranked. The violation of FAITHV should not be fatal, but optionally violable at least in casual speech. No ranking between the two constraints is represented by the dotted line in Tableau (11). Then both outputs become the optimal outputs in casual speech:

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
/\text{kat}^-\text{-ni}/'Q' & \text{NSW} & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\hline
\text{kat}^-\text{ini} & * & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\text{kanni} & \text{DE} & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
/\text{olh}^-\text{ni}/'Q' & \text{DE} & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\text{olfini} & * & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\text{oll}^- & \text{DE} & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
/\text{coh}^-\text{-ni}/'Q' & \text{DE} & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\text{cofini} & * & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\text{conni} & \text{DE} & \text{FAITHV} & \text{IDENTIO} \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

form the Maginot line between the two main forces—a more general stem faithfulness constraint, which does not exclude the terminal suffixes, and the avoidance of homophony, which lead to the exclusion of the terminal suffixes from NSW. Perhaps, in Middle Korean, NSW was held strongly even before the terminal suffixes like the interrogative endings (see (2b)). Then, perhaps from the 19th century on the terminal suffixes have been excluded from NSW (see (9b)), but for aspirated-consonant ending stems free variation still exists in contemporary Korean, resisting ironing effects on morpheme identity by potential application of phonological rules like Syllable-Final Neutralisation, followed by n-Lateralisation and Obstruent-Nasalisation.

4. Summary and Conclusion

The alternation between [i] and zero across the stem boundary in Korean can be well described and explained by a set of phonological constraints ranked in the order of NSW and FAITHV. I also claim that the alternation is an i-Epenthesis phenomenon, partially eroded by the avoidance of homophony which has lead to the exclusion of terminal suffixes. The violation of a lower ranked constraint FaithV (by i-Epenthesis) makes the stem maintain its identity, blocking potential weakening processes—Obstruent-Nasalisation and Alveolar Stop-Spirantisation.

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Contact Address
Duk-Soo Park
Department of Korean Studies
School of Languages and Cultures
The University of Sydney
NSW 2006 Australia
PH: 02 9351 3581
FAX: 02 9351-2319
EMAIL: duk-soo.park@usyd.edu.au
Perception of Korean Plosives by L2 Learners of Korean

Chong-Woon Kim
Griffith University, Australia

Abstract
Korean plosives have a rather uncommon three-way contrast (i.e. normal, tense and aspirated) and this apparently causes some initial learning difficulty for many L2 learners of Korean both in perception and production. The primary aim of the present study is to confirm empirically that the problem is real and to describe systematically the nature of the difficulty involving the Korean plosives using experimental data (identification test on Korean plosives presented in a CV carrier frame). The subject group includes both non-native and native speaker of Korean. The non-native subject group comprises mainly of Chinese and Japanese L1 speakers. The results from the identification experiment provide concrete evidence for the apparent difficulty for the L2 learners of Korean regarding the Korean plosives. On the basis of the results from recent studies in first language acquisition and language learning impaired children, a number of promising avenues in tackling the L2 speech sounds acquisition were sketched.

1. Introduction
Even a cursory classroom observation of the Korean speech production by students with different L1 background reveals, in addition to the readily perceivable prosody related problems, a variety of clearly noticeable and recurring pronunciation problems with regard to a number of Korean sounds. These problems are observed not just from a beginners group but sometimes across the whole range including the intermediate level students with two or three years of formal learning of Korean. One of the most serious among them, from a pedagogical point of view, seems to be the ones involving the Korean plosive sounds. The problematic nature of these Korean sounds for the students is also confirmed by frequent anecdotal remarks by students complaining how difficult they are and the never ending request to pronounce them repeatedly. The errors involving Korean stops are well beyond the level of acceptable foreign accent and actually threaten intelligibility (e.g. contrast between /tal/ ’moon’, /t*al/ ’daughter’ and /t^al/ ’mask’), thereby creating a serious pedagogical problem. A precursor to any attempt to find a solution (e.g. more satisfactory training mechanism) is being able to identify more clearly and systematically the nature of the difficulty involving the perception and production of the Korean sounds by the L2 learners.

The main purpose of this paper, then, is to examine and describe more systematically this apparent difficulty involving Korean plosives for the L2 learners of Korean. It can be regarded as a first step toward a more comprehensive response in which the exact nature of the problem can be studied in more detail and possibly establish the groundwork upon which we can generate an effective pedagogical solution. In order to address the above objective, identification experiments were conducted to collect performance data from a group of L2 learners of Korean. The experiment generates information on how well learners categorize or identify the target sounds in L2. The patterns of identification and misidentification reflect the primary performance of learners accommodating a new sound system.

A brief description on Korean plosive sounds is given first and a number of hypotheses are put forward in this section. The methodology section describes in detail the subject groups and the experiment setting. The next section analyses the data and presents discussion of the results obtained. In the conclusion some suggestions are made in terms of future research direction, particularly in relation to the development of a more effective training mechanism for L2 learners.

1.1 Korean Plosives
It is probably not an overstatement to say that no other area of the Korean language has received more attention than the Korean stop sounds in linguistics. Since the work of Kim (1965) where the tensity feature was proposed as an additional feature independent of the voicing and aspiration for the classification of stop sounds, there has been a steady flow of research on Korean stops. Most of the earlier works were based on detailed articulatory and acoustic studies (Kim 1965, 1970, Hardcastle 1973, Han and Weitzman 1970). In these and more recent studies (M. R. Kim 1994, Cho and Keating 2001, Park 2002), it was generally agreed that the Korean stop sound system has three series of underlying voiceless plosives (i.e., tense /p*, t*, k*/, lax or normal /p, t, k/ and aspirated /p^h, t^h, k^h/).

This generally accepted view is not without problems. In their study Kim and Duanmu (2004) pointed out that the system is problematic from a view point of phonological theory because it overgenerates stop sounds so far unattested in world languages (e.g. voiced and voiceless tense aspirated). Kim and Duanmu (ibid) suggested an alternative system which contains voiceless aspirated, voiceless unaspirated
and voiced (which becomes devoiced at the word initial position) so as to avoid the inclusion of the problematic tenseness feature. Although quite important it may be, the main issue is to come up with the most plausible phonological explanation. Far more important and immediate for the L2 learning of the Korean stops would be the precise characterization of acoustic and perceptual cues that enables the native Korean speakers successfully contrast these sounds.

All Korean plosives are voiceless pulmonic egressives, at least on acoustic and articulatory evidence, and a number of acoustic cues differentiate them. Voice onset time (VOT) was regarded as the most notable acoustic cue (Lisker and Abramson 1964) but work by Kim (1965, 1970), Hardcastle (1973) and Han and Weitzman (1970) put some doubt on whether it is the primary acoustic cue because of the VOT overlap. These and other subsequent studies (Hombert 1978, Cho 1996) put forward the view that F0 value at the stop release provide supplementary cues for the Korean laryngeal contrast whereby aspirated has the highest F0 values followed by tense and plain series. In other words, L2 learners of Korean need to perceive VOT and F0 contrast, among other things, to successfully distinguish the Korean stop series. Consequently one would assume that an effective training material of the Korean stop sounds for L2 learners should facilitate selective attention to these acoustic cues in someway so as to heighten the perceptual awareness of them by the learners.

1.2 Hypotheses

There were two main subject groups. Group I comprises L2 learners while Group II has only native Korean subjects and functions as a control group. It is expected that the identification experiment results would show a ceiling/near ceiling performance by Group II and a substantially lower performance level from Group I (Hypothesis 1 and 2). Additional predictions were generated on the basis that there were more than one L1 in the first subject group. Utilizing the perspective of L1 transfer effect on L2 performance provided by the classic Contrastive Analysis Hypothesis (CAH), a stop phoneme inventory table was generated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Voicing</th>
<th>Bilabial</th>
<th>Dental/Alveolar</th>
<th>Velar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>/p/ /pʰ/ /pʰ/</td>
<td>/t/ /tʰ/ /tʰ/</td>
<td>/k/ /kʰ/ /kʰ/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>/p/ /pʰ/</td>
<td>/t/ /tʰ/</td>
<td>/k/ /kʰ/</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>/b/ /p/</td>
<td>/d/ /t/</td>
<td>/g/ /k/</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A quick comparison of the inventory of stops in the above table would yield the following predictions within the traditional CAH framework with regard to the identification function. CHN subjects would have difficulty with the tense series stop sounds but would perform well with the normal and aspirated stops (Hypothesis 3). On the other hand, JPN subjects would have problems in identifying the aspirated and tense series stops while normal ones should not cause any trouble (Hypothesis 4). Finally, for both CHN and JPN subjects, tense stops would be the most difficult ones to identify since there is no L1 counterpart (Hypothesis 5). CAH would not be able to predict any varying tendency in the degree of difficulty in identifying these sounds on the basis of place of articulation since all of them utilize the three places.

2. Methodology

2.1 Subjects

The non-native Korean subjects (Group I) were from four different L1 groups. They are Australian English (henceforth AE), Indonesian (INDN), Japanese (JPN) and Mandarin Chinese (CHN). Among the native Korean speaker group (Group II), two subjects were in their twenties and the other three were in their forties. The non-native Korean was composed of first year Korean major undergraduate students without any prior in-country training or experience. The experiment was conducted near the end of the 2nd semester where all Group I subjects had 115 hours of formal training in Korean and were quite confident with the reading and writing of the Korean orthography. For this group of subjects, one would not expect a large variation in their L2 experience since the main source of their L2 exposure has been more or less limited to their lecturers, tutors and the audio resources made by the same teachers. All Group I subjects were asked to volunteer for the experiments and a small amount of course credit was given to those who participated. Because the subjects who participated in the experiments were volunteers, there was no control over the balance of number in each language groups or their subgroups (e.g. AE had only 1 and INDN, 2 subjects). This presents a less than ideal situation for statistical analysis and interpretation. None of the subjects in both groups reported any hearing or speech problems.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CHN</th>
<th>JPN</th>
<th>INDN</th>
<th>AE</th>
<th>KOR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.2 Stimuli

It is conventional in experimental works on cross-language speech perception (Werker and Logan, 1985; Polka, 1995) to select the best and most similar tokens for L2 target. The recording of stimuli was initially done in stereo on a DAT recorder (SONY TCD-D80 using ECM900 microphone) at 16 bit 48 Khz. It was then encoded as a PCM mono wave format file at 16 bit 22 Khz. A native Korean speaker made 10 tokens for each of the 9 Korean plosives in CV carrier frame where the vowel is /a/. The recordings were then evaluated for their prototypicality by two other native Korean speakers using a 10 point scale where a score of 10 stands for the best representation of the target sound. Virtually all of the tokens received the score of 10 and a few 9. Three tokens for each target sound were then selected using the following procedure. Firstly, from the 10 tokens for each sound the first and the last tokens were discarded because of the time needed for the speaker to adapt to the citation reading environment and the typical intonation contour change involved in the final token of a citation reading list. In the remaining 8 tokens, there are always more than two tokens with the best possible score of 10.

In order to select the final three tokens, additional selection criteria of stimulus length and amplitude were utilized. This was motivated in order not to confound consonant quality with the length of the stimulus and the amplitude difference. The point is that length or amplitude of a stimulus can be very salient features for listeners. To do that, all those tokens with the score of 10 were measured for their length and compared for their amplitude using Sound File System software. Three tokens for each target sound with the most similar length and amplitude were then finally selected for the perception experiment. The total number of stimuli for the perception test was 27 (i.e. 9 plosives x 3 tokens). A screen shot of wave and broadband spectrogram for /ka/ is given in picture 1.

2.3 Experiment

The main purpose of the identification experiment was to elicit listener categorization of stimuli with respect to L2 phonological categories. The experiment contained 18 trials (9 plosives, run twice) that were arranged in a pseudo random order. In each trial three tokens of a plosive were heard. The inter stimulus interval (ISI) was half a second. Subjects made their responses by circling a chosen L2 keyword from a series of word lists that were given on the response sheet. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was 3 seconds. All of the pre-recorded stimuli were delivered binaurally through a pair of loud speakers at a comfortable listening level. The experiment contained a series of familiarization trials. Subjects were
reminded prior to each experiment that they should complete all trials and make a guess if they were uncertain about their choice.

3. Results and Analysis

In order to test Hypothesis 1 (that the experiment results would show a ceiling/near ceiling performance by Group II) and Hypothesis 2 (that a substantially lower performance level would be observed from Group I), percentage correct values were generated from the raw data (table 2).

Table 3. Percentage Correct for Place and Manner (Group II in bracket)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labial</th>
<th>Alveolar</th>
<th>Velar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>58 (90)</td>
<td>50 (100)</td>
<td>42 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aspirated</td>
<td>74 (100)</td>
<td>45 (100)</td>
<td>63 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tense</td>
<td>63 (100)</td>
<td>58 (100)</td>
<td>63 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in Table 3 clearly support the predictions made in Hypothesis 1 and 2. The Group II data shows a ceiling level performance while there was some variation depending on the particular stop sound. The performance level of Group I was substantially below Group II. In order to examine the within group variation level, CHN, JPN and KOR subjects performance results were tabulated for average score and standard deviation (INDN and AE data were discarded due to small number of subjects). The results are shown in Table 4. In addition a box-and whisker plot was also generated (Picture 2).

Table 4. Average Score and Standard Deviation for KOR, CHN and JPN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>KOR</th>
<th>CHN</th>
<th>JPN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.83</td>
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</table>

Picture 2. Box and Whisker Plot of CHN, JPN and KOR

The box and whisker plot shows that JPN and CHN have more variability while Korean has virtually no variability (i.e. no box and short whisker). It also shows that CHN data was left-skewed by a small number of outliers. These findings clearly indicate that native Korean speakers have no problem at all while L2 learners in general have serious problems in identifying Korean plosive sounds.

In order to examine whether there is a varying degree of difficulty for different sounds, percentage correct scores for each plosive were arranged as in Table 5. The results show that the most difficult sound is /k/, followed by /ɾ/ and /ɾ/ . The easiest sound to identify is /p/ with 74% correct. This is much higher than /k/, /ɾ/ and /ɾ/ but is still no where near the native Korean group performance. However, it seems that there is no clearly observable pattern.
Table 5. Rank Ordered Degree of Difficulty for Korean Plosives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Manner</th>
<th>% Correct (KOR)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More Difficult</td>
<td>Velar</td>
<td>Normal k</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alveolar</td>
<td>Aspirated tʰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alveolar</td>
<td>Normal t</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labial</td>
<td>Normal p</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alveolar</td>
<td>Tense tʰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Labial</td>
<td>Tense pʰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Velar</td>
<td>Aspirated kʰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Velar</td>
<td>Tense kʰ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less Difficult</td>
<td>Labial</td>
<td>Aspirated pʰ</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Identification Experiment Percentage Correct for Place

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>Labial</th>
<th>Alveolar</th>
<th>Velar</th>
<th>Whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>65.0</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>56.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Identification Experiment Percentage Correct for Manner

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Aspirated</th>
<th>Tense</th>
<th>Whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group I</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>61.4</td>
<td>56.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group II</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to remove the possible confounding effect of Place and Manner in Table 5, two additional tables were generated to separate Place (Table 6) and Manner (Table 7). The results in Table 6 indicate that labial sounds are easier to identify than alveolar and velar. In terms of manner of articulation, tense plosives are easier than aspirated and normal series. It is not clear, given that none of L1s of Group I have tense plosives in their consonant inventory, why Korean tense series got the higher score for correct identification. One would normally expect, within the classical CAH framework, that the reverse would be the case. A possible explanation may come from the Speech Learning Model (SLM) by Flege.

Flege’s SLM, although not specifically affiliated with any of the general perception theories, seeks to identify the extent to which non-native contrasts share acoustic and/or articulatory cues with native distinctions and whether such overlap predicts ease of acquisition of perceptual and productive ability with L2 sounds. SLM is an extended and refined version of Flege’s (1987) perceptual equivalence classification theory. This theory postulates that a new phonetic category can be established for an L2 sound which differs phonetically from the closest L1 sound but the formation of a new phonetic category will be blocked if an L2 sound is not sufficiently different from an L1 sound.

In his earlier study Flege (1987), using data from English learners of French, claimed support for the theory where an L2 sound which is perceived as new will be learned by the L2 learner where as the learning of an L2 sound which is perceived as similar to an existing L1 sound may be prevented by the equivalence classification mechanism. The study reported that the productions of French /y/ (a new sound) by English speakers of French with varying degree of French experience, except for the least experienced group, were in closely approximated forms. On the other hand the productions of the French /u/, which would be a similar sound for English speakers, were, regardless of the amount of French experience, significantly different from the native French norm. In other words, it may be the case that Korean tense series are perceived as a new phone where there is a no clear L1 counterpart and as such more successfully accommodated into the L2 learner’s interlanguage and as such better identified than the other series which have their counterparts in the L1s of Group I subjects.

In order to test the remaining CAH based hypothesis (i.e. Hypothesis 3, 4 and 5), CHN and JPN data were filtered through from the raw data. The resulting figures are given in Table 8. Hypothesis 3 stated that CHN subjects would have difficulty with the tense series stop sounds but would perform well with the normal and aspirated stops. This is only partially supported by the results. Indeed CHN has a very low score of 41% correct for tense series which is below the chance of level performance. The problem is that the worst one is in fact the normal series which, according the Hypothesis 3, should have been easier.

Table 8. Identification Percentage Correct for Manner by JPN, CHN and KOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>L1</th>
<th>Normal</th>
<th>Aspirated</th>
<th>Tense</th>
<th>Whole</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JPN</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>90.0</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>53.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHN</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>73.0</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>54.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOR</td>
<td>96.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>98.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the Hypothesis 4, JPN subjects would have problems in identifying the aspirated and tense series stops while normal ones should not cause any trouble. Again we have mixed results where the normal series was better identified than the tense series but not as good as the aspirated series. One can push the SLM-based argument for both hypotheses, arguing that the tense series for CHN and the aspirated series for JPN are new phones for each L1 group which are being accommodated as a phoneme category in the developing interlanguage. The difference between the score (i.e. 90% for JPN and 41% for CHN) could be explained in terms of how advanced these phones are in the process of being established as a new phone. The low score obtained for normal series by CHN (i.e. 27%) can be attributed to the possible treatment of this sound as similar phones by the CHN subjects, hence being prevented by the perceptual equivalence classification. However, SLM-based explanation does not seem to provide a plausible answer for why the tense series (which should be a new phone) causes the worst identification performance for JPN. Clearly, these are all highly speculative and would require further data especially in terms of how these Korean plosives are categorized as similar, identical or new phones by each L1 group.

The last hypothesis stated that for both CHN and JPN subjects, tense stops would be the most difficult ones to identify since there is no L1 counterpart. The results for JPN in Table 8 clearly support this hypothesis but not so with CHN. To summarize, the experiment results fully supported the first two hypotheses. However, those predictions put forward by the hypotheses based on the classic CAH framework were only partially supported by the experiment data. Finally, in order to examine whether there is any marked trend in the error types, an error matrix (i.e. misidentification) table was generated for Group I subjects. The results are in Table 9 and one of the most noticeable trends is the misidentification of aspirated series as normal series. Regardless of the place of articulation, this particular pattern of misidentification scores a much higher level of error than any other type. It is not clear why this is the case while Group II subjects (native Korean) never made this type of error. In terms of voicing lag there is some overlap in the case of tense and normal series but there is no overlap between aspirated and tense ones (Lisker and Abramson, 1964). It is obvious that the current data do not provide enough insight and further empirical research is clearly required to answer this question.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9. Percent of Misidentification by Group I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ta &gt; t' a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pa &gt; p' a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ka &gt; k' a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Conclusion

The results from the identification experiment provide some concrete evidence for the apparent difficulty for the L2 learners of Korean regarding the Korean plosive sounds. The first two hypotheses were fully supported by the data. However, there was only marginal support for the other three hypotheses. No doubt there is a clear need for more varied types of experiment data such as the discrimination performance experiment utilizing AXB format to characterise more precisely the nature and the magnitude of the problem. However, near chance performance by the Group I subject in the identification test clearly indicate that the L2 learner of Korean does have serious problem in correctly identifying the Korean plosive sounds. A crucial pedagogical question is whether the problem requires an active intervention or not. Should we let the learners gradually overcome the problem in their own way as they progress through the more advanced courses? One of the main problems with this approach is that, as the results from present study indicate, there is no clear evidence of improvement. The experiment was done near the end of the first year course and the results, with roughly a chance level performance, clearly suggests that there was either minimal or no improvement. Another problem with this approach is that the learners’ exposure to the Korean plosive sounds is bound to be biased. The main textbook (Learning Korean, New Directions) used by the subjects, who participated in the experiment, was analysed using a manual counting to generate a frequency of occurrence table for all the syllables which have an obstruent sound at the onset position. The result from the analysis is given in Table 10 and it shows that there is a severe bias toward the normal series plosive sounds. The natural discourse that the learners may have with native Korean speakers (e.g. with language partners) and other types of language input such as the internet media would be similarly skewed, if not more severely. To be able to contrast the three types of Korean plosives more successfully, one would require a more balanced amount of exposure to these contrasting sounds. In that respect, the first approach clearly fails to address this issue.
An alternative approach would involve a direct intervention whereby the learners are artificially exposed to the target speech sounds in a systematic and balanced way so as to encourage the development of perceptual awareness of the contrast. The exact nature of the training material and the pedagogical apparatus would need a more precise characterization of the learning problem than what has been described in this paper. However, it is possible to contemplate the general characteristics of such training material on the basis of what has been researched in the developmental and experimental psychology and other related disciplines.

More recent studies conducted in first language acquisition and on language learning impaired children may shed some light on a number of promising avenues in tackling the L2 speech sounds acquisition problems. The studies on motherese (Ferguson 1977, Snow 1972) showed that this speech style is preferred by infant over adult speech and the exaggerated prosodic cues and over-articulation assists infants in discriminating speech sounds. Also in motherses, echoing of the same word by different style (i.e. multiple exemplars) is quite common. The work by Lively et al (1994) showed that the use of multiple exemplars can be an effective training mechanism for L2 sound acquisition. Given these findings, the training material for the Korean stop sounds should contain multiple exemplars which not only differ in speech stimuli facilitated substantial improvement for the LLI children. One possible area of research that problems. The studies on motherese (Ferguson 1977, Snow 1972) showed that this speech style is preferred by infant over adult speech and the exaggerated prosodic cues and over-articulation assists infants in discriminating speech sounds. Also in motherses, echoing of the same word by different style (i.e. multiple exemplars) is quite common. The work by Lively et al (1994) showed that the use of multiple exemplars can be an effective training mechanism for L2 sound acquisition. Given these findings, the training material for the Korean stop sounds should contain multiple exemplars which not only differ in voice quality (e.g. male and female) but also in the vowel types that follow the stop sounds since F0 and formant transitions are an important part of the perceptual cues for plosive sounds.

Research work on language learning impaired (LLI) children by Tallal et al. (1996) and Merzenich et al (1996) showed that the use of artificially modified (i.e. speech rate and amplitude modification) speech stimuli facilitated substantial improvement for the LLI children. One possible area of research that can potentially have serious implications for the generation of effective training material is the use of ‘text to speech’ (TTS) in L2 speech learning. The use of speech a synthesizer can provide an effective way of generating training stimuli utilising the findings from motherese and LLI research because it allows much easier ways of manipulating the speech rate and amplitude as well as slicing and mixing the resulting speech sounds to highlight important acoustic and perceptual cues. How effective the computer generated synthetic speech stimuli can be in ameliorating the difficulties in L2 speech learning is an empirical question awaiting further research. A follow up study has been started by the author to complement the findings in this study (i.e. using data from discrimination experiment). Concurrently another research work is being undertaken using a computer generated Korean plosive training stimuli to test the effectiveness of TTS.

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### Table 10. Frequency of obstruents at the syllable initial position in LKND

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<th></th>
<th>U1</th>
<th>U2</th>
<th>U3</th>
<th>U4</th>
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<th>U6</th>
<th>U7</th>
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**Contact Address**

Chong-Woon Kim  
School of Languages and Linguistics  
Faculty of Arts, Griffith University, Nathan, QLD 4152  
PH: 07-3875-5132  
FAX: 07-3875-6766  
EMAIL: c.kim@griffith.edu.au
Korean Students’ Study Strategies and their Social networks

Young-A Cho
Monash University, Australia

Abstract
Many previous studies on the problems of Asian international students in an English education system suggested that the network of international students from the South-East Asian region tends to consist of a homogeneous group of students with similar background and educational experiences, and portrayed this type of networks often negatively causing much concern for many educators. However, the findings of this study on how Korean international students utilise social networks as a study strategy in a new academic community suggest that Korean students’ social networks with other Asian international students are in fact a good strategy for successful completion of their study and a pathway to an improved institutional membership. Another finding is that close co-national peer networks have multiple functions, which include providing academic support as well as meeting students’ social needs. Furthermore, Korean students engage in cross-cultural encounters and achieve intercultural learning through the interaction with Korean Australians or other Asian students.

Introduction
The number of international students studying in Australia has increased significantly over past ten years. In particular, there has been a large growth of students from Asian countries among which Korea is the third after India and China in the number of students. Korean students are studying overseas in increasing numbers, as an immediate consequence of the Korean government’s advocacy of globalization as well as Koreans’ long obsession with education. In the past, most Korean students studying abroad tended to do their undergraduate degree in a Korean university first and then go to the USA for a postgraduate study. The pattern of Koreans studying overseas has however changed in recent years. There has been a big increase in the number of students going abroad to study an undergraduate degree, including exchange students. The USA is still the preferred destination but countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand have managed to obtain a small but significant increase in the number of students from Korea.

Although the number of Korean students studying in Australian tertiary institutions has increased considerably over the past 10 years, there has not been much research on the Korean students’ experience of studying in Australia. This area has only two studies so far: Choi (1997) and Armitage (1999). Choi (1997) investigated the problems that Korean students experienced studying at universities in Victoria in 1992 and 1993, and Armitage (1999) focused on Korean students at English language centers in Melbourne in 1997. Choi (1997) argued that the students’ difficulties derived not only from their lack of language proficiency and study skills but also from Australian teachers and peers’ lack of understanding of these problems in the educational context. In contrast, Armitage (1999) claimed that one major factor affecting the adjustment of Koreans to living and studying in Australia was their insufficient preparation prior to their departure from Korea, so they did not develop a fundamental understanding of Australian culture and society. While their findings are valuable, neither Choi (1997) nor Armitage (1999) investigated students’ problems in detail, in particular in relation to their educational experiences and their social networks.

As mentioned above, very little research has been published on Korean students, but many studies have been undertaken on the problems of Asian international students in English academic communities (Ballad and Clancy 1997; Spack 1997; Zamel 1995). As Chalmers and Volet (1997) noted, international students especially from the South-East Asian region are often portrayed negatively and their study network which consists of a homogeneous group of students with similar background and educational experiences has concerned many researchers.

Most of their concerns are related to student’s acquisition of academic literacy, well-being and intercultural learning. International students’ acquisition of academic literacy depends on their relationships with other members of academic communities (Braine 2002). Therefore, international students’ social contact is considered as an important factor for their successful adjustment into a new academic community. Their limited social contact with host nationals is related to adjustment problem, as international students are frustrated about their isolation (Trice 2004; Zimmerman 1995) and this also prevents students from being exposed to cross-cultural encounter which ultimately results in intercultural learning (Volet and Ang, 1998; Volet 2001). These concerns have been supported by the results from

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other studies such as Klineberg and Hull 1979; Perrucci and Hu 1995. According to these studies, international students’ frequent contact with host national students increases their satisfaction with academic experiences. They are also less likely to experience anxiety, depression and alienation, leading to better adjustment to a life in a host country (Surdam and Collins 1984 cited in Trice 2004).

It is quite valuable to international students to have social interaction with host national students who enjoy full membership of the community as core members of the community (Wegner 1998). International students, however, experience difficulties in accessing host national peer groups and accordingly they remain as outsiders to the new academic community (Deem and Brehony 2000). International students’ limited interaction with host national students has been explained by differences in their cultural and linguistic backgrounds (Bochner et al. 1977; McKinlay et al. 1996; Treloar et al., 2000; Ward and Kennedy 1993). Bochner et al. (1977) argued that cultural distance determines the international students’ ability and willingness to interact with host nationals, although they generally want to interact with them. The least integrated groups with host nationals are Korean students along with Taiwanese, and Southeast Asian students, according to Redmond and Bumyi’s (1993) research which examined social integration of international students in an American university.

Findings of these studies provide insights into the socio-cultural adaptation of international students to a new academic community, but there have been few empirical studies on how Korean students form their social networks in the Australian academic context. In order to understand the dynamics of Asian student’s network formation, it is essential to investigate the peer networks of Korean international students.

As Gareis (2000) urged more research into the process of intercultural friendship formation, findings of culture-specific elements in Korean students’ network formation will contribute to the better understanding of the role which the peer network plays and of the range of its influence.

This study therefore investigates the experience of Korean international students at Australian universities, especially focussing on their use of social networks as a study strategy. The aim of this research is to examine these students’ interaction with others and the role of the social networks in the new academic community. Given that students have diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, it can be assumed that the goals of their study and type of study, financial and family situation and accessibility to host national peer group affect the international students’ social integration. Therefore, the dynamic nature of their social networks should be looked at in this context.

This study will use the functional model of friendship networks suggested by Bochner et al. (1977) as its base model and modify it based on the new findings. According to them, international students’ networks mainly comprise the following three networks (Bochner et al. 1977, 277):

1. co-national network whose function is to affirm and express the culture of origin;
2. network with host nationals, whose function is the instrumental facilitation of academic and professional aspirations; and
3. multi-national network whose main function is recreational.

To investigate how Korean international students in Australia utilise social networks as a study strategy, this study addresses two principal questions:

1. What are the characteristics of the social networks of Korean international students in Australia?
2. What networks do Korean international students utilise to facilitate their study?

The Study

The data for this study were collected in 2000 and 2005 from Korean international undergraduate and postgraduate students and graduates (aged 22-30 years) of various faculties at tertiary institutions in Melbourne, Australia.

- Subjects

The 2000 study had 16 Korean international students (aged 22-30 years) studying in different faculties at the undergraduate level at Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. Of 16 Korean students, 6 were female and 10 were male.

In 2005, 26 Korean international students (aged 22-43 years) participated in the study, including postgraduate students and graduates from universities in Melbourne. Of 26 Korean students, there were 5 females and 21 males, and 19 undergraduates and 7 graduates or post-graduates.

These Korean students fall into mainly three main categories:
a) Exchange students enrolled at their home Korean universities but studying at Monash University for one or two semesters. They have already done two or three years of their four-year bachelor degree in Korea.
b) International students who were enrolled in a full undergraduate degree course. Some students attended secondary school in Korea prior to their entry to Monash University and studied at the tertiary level in Korea, either partially or fully completing a four-year bachelor degree. Others completed a two- or three-year diploma equivalent at a vocational college.
c) Graduate students who completed their undergraduate degree in Australia and were working in Australia at the time of this investigation and postgraduate students who were doing a postgraduate studies on scholarship. They also had some work experience in Korea and came to Australia with family.

It should also be noted that there is a distinctive difference in academic background between the international students and the exchange ones in this study. Because of the requirement of the exchange program, exchange students achieved a high TOFEL score and all of them were majoring in English Language and Literature in their home university. In contrast, the Korean international students had a wide variety of academic backgrounds, but their ultimate goal of studying in Australian universities was to improve their English in order to obtain a better job.

- Data collection method and analytical procedures

This study employed a combination of questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. The students were given an open-ended questionnaire to complete at the beginning of August in 2000. In total, 30 questionnaires were distributed to Korean students via the Korean Students Association. In addition, semi-structured interviews ranging from 30 to 105 minutes in length were conducted by the author in Korean with two female students and four male students.

In 2005, the data have been collected from 26 subjects by using the same method employed in 2000. The language used in the questionnaire was English, but participants had a choice of answering either in English or Korean. The semi-structured interviews ranging from 30 to 60 minutes in length were conducted by a research assistant. Interviews were conducted in Korean and recorded on MP3 player. The interviews were used to clarify the information provided in the questionnaire and also obtain more detailed information. Subsequent to these interviews there were also follow-up email or telephone correspondences when more information relating to the research questions was needed.

The information collected through these interviews included (1) students’ perceptions about the differences of educational systems between Korean and Australian universities; (2) their main difficulties in studying at Australian universities; and (3) their study strategies and social networks.

Findings

Many researches reported that international students have difficulties in coping with academic matters, such as assessment, examination and adapting to different learning or teaching styles. These difficulties are also shared by Korean international students, who naturally assumed that they needed to conduct analysis of difficulties and implement appropriate adjustments to complete the academic sojourn successfully.

Although various strategies were employed by different students, there were common strategies found among Korean international students: self-reliant adjustments, problem minimisation and social-reliant adjustments.

First, self-reliant adjustment strategies include listening to lecture tapes, utilizing library resources, previewing and reviewing of classes, re-writing of a draft several times, and using dictionaries. The following is an example of a student’s comment which clearly shows the employment of various self-reliant adjustment strategies: “If I don’t prepare, I can’t participate in tutorials or have difficulties in understanding other students’ words … I read books in a subject reading list and prepare some answers to tutorial questions … I prepare questions to ask in class in advance and memorize some phrases or expressions from the books in the reading list to ask questions in tutorials…”

The second type of strategy is problem minimisation such as avoiding certain subjects which require oral presentations or which the students or other students have previously failed. Alternatively, these students may avoid teachers who have a reputation of harsh marking.

The third type of strategy is social-reliant adjustments which utilizing their social networks. When Korean students encountered certain difficulties related to their study, the first strategy which they used to tackle the issues is self-reliant adjustment strategies. However if self-reliant adjustment strategies did not lead to success, social-reliant adjustments were often employed to resolve the problems. Particularly when they had problem with their major academic works such as essays and examinations, which directly affect their academic results, they attempted to utilise all accessible sources.
For example, an international student consulted with a lecturer to get a help in selecting relevant articles to read. He reported that he did know how and where he would start, so he requested help from a lecturer, who assisted him with this task.

- Characteristics of Social Networks of Korean Students

The social networks of Korean students will be analysed by using the three types of international students’ networks suggested by Bochner et al. (1977): co-national networks, bi-cultural networks and multicultural networks.

Co-national Networks: Korean students’ co-national networks are formed mostly through Korean churches and a Korean students’ club at universities. The most common social interaction outside the classroom occurs over coffee or food. This setting mainly serves to share academic or socio-cultural difficulties with their co-nationals. The success of their study and adjustment to a new community is their common concern and the problems which they face are well understood within the same socio-cultural values system. A student explained that he felt more comfortable to ask Korean Australian students for help at the club than other Australian students. This type of ‘primary, monocultural network’ can provide a setting in which ethnic and cultural values are shared (Bochner et al. 1977).

The function of Korean students’ co-national networks however goes beyond Bochner et al.’s ‘affirming and expressing the culture of origin.’ This network serves for exchanging or obtaining all kinds of information useful for their sojourn in Australia including academic matters. For example, there seems to be a tendency for students to get some advice for selecting suitable study subjects from those who have already studied the subjects. A student reported that he avoided the subject which failed many international students. His rationale of employing this strategy was that in spite of studying hard, the chance of failing that subject is high.

With respect to interaction outside the class, Korean students have contact with co-national students who belong to the same religious community. There are several Korean Christian churches in Melbourne and most Korean students go to church whether or not they are committed Christians, especially at the beginning stage of their sojourn in Australia.

The reasons for going to church are various. There are some committed Christians who attend public worship regularly, but even non-Christian students go to church to interact with Koreans and get some information needed to adjust successfully to a life in a new country. In particular, Korean churches that provide free lunch on Sundays attract non-Christian international students, who enjoy the opportunity of having Korean food along with conversations with their co-national fellows.

Another distinctive reason of going to church is related to their family members. A student reported that she wanted to go to Australian church to improve her English and interact with Australians. However, her mother did not speak English, so she had to go to Korean church for her mother. A similar reason is also found in the case of a postgraduate student who came to Australia with his family. He reported that he goes to church to help his son maintain the Korean language. When he observed his son’s Korean deteriorating, he decided that the best way of rectifying the problem was to go to Korean church.

Bi-cultural Networks: As many previous studies suggested, Korean international students also tend to have minimal contact with host national students. Bi-cultural networks do not formed easily. It could only happen when Korean students have extroverted personality or when Australians have a strong interest in another culture.

As Ward et al. (2004) argued, extroversion had a significant relationship with socio-cultural adaptation. A good example of this is an international student who figured out that the good students are those who sit at the front of lecture theatres and identified them as his potential sources of support. He approached them and introduced himself as an international student, and told them frankly that he needed their help.

Another good example is an Australian female student who highly regarded a Korean student’s multi-language skills and made a friend with a Korean student. This Korean student reported that she had the feeling of being perceived as stupid due to her poor English before. However when she was appraised about her strong points such as her skill in other languages, she gained her self-esteem back and became more positive.

Scarcity of bi-cultural networks is caused by the lack of beneficial factors. When the host national students see a benefit of having international students as a friend, the chance of forming this network is high. A typical example is a language exchange study. Korean students posted messages seeking an exchange partner on the bulletin board of the Korean department web site. Students found this network very useful, since not only could they receive help from Australian students in terms of their study but also they could experience the culture and life of Australian university students.

This type of bi-cultural network mentioned above is desirable in a sense that it provides reciprocal benefits. They appreciate each other, which helps the network last longer. In contrast, bi-cultural networks which were formed by lectures in class for a group project do not seem to last as long as the former type.
The use of group work seems to be linked to the function of developing teamwork skills, which is directly related to their future job. Furthermore, group work is commonly employed as a means of promoting student-centred learning, collaborative learning, and intercultural understanding.

The characteristics of group work and its linkage to assessment often produce delicate issues such as fairness in the allocation of work and group cohesion. When there are one or more members who do not cooperate willingly, their group performance is affected. Differences in their priorities between Australian and international students are an important factor in their participation in the group work. A student reported that some Australian students did not participate in the group work at all or some just wanted to divide up the work to be done separately and later simply combine the individual efforts for submission. He thought that while Korean students place a high priority on study, since failing subjects have direct consequences on their finance and visa status, most Australian students do not face similar consequences if their assessment results are not good and also since most have work commitments. They have only a limited time to meet with the group.

There are, conversely, some students who positively viewed working in diverse groups. Although it required more effort initially than working individually, some international Korean students discovered that working with Australian students provided a valuable experience for them to get familiar with learning styles of Australian students.

**Multicultural Networks**: Multicultural networks are mostly formed among students who attended the same classes. The various networks are very much dependent on the individual character of each student as well as the subjects in which they are enrolled. There is a tendency for Korean students to form peer networks with Asian Australian students or Asian international students with good English proficiencies. For example, a Korean international student reported that he often studied together with a Singaporean student who was studying the Korean language. He felt more comfortable with her than Australian students as they have much in common and they could help each other. The Singaporean student helped the Korean student with his English and, in return, he helped her with Korean. This network seems to provide a setting in which cultural values and mutual benefits are shared.

As mentioned above, this type of network is often portrayed negatively and has caused much concern for many educators and researchers. Korean students, however, utilize these networks to complete their study successfully and use it as a pathway to an improved institutional membership. Korean international students can also acquire socio-cultural norms of Australians by networking with Korean Australians or other Asian Australians. Furthermore, networking with other international students provides opportunities to engage in cross-cultural encounter, ultimately leading to intercultural learning.

According to Bochner (Bochner et al. 1977), the network whose function is the instrumental facilitation of academic and professional aspirations is with host nationals. However, international Korean students utilize multicultural networks to fulfill the instrumental facilitation of academic and professional aspirations.

Another interesting finding of this study is that a crucial factor that contributes to the active participation of international Korean students in cross-cultural is the size of the group as well as the percentage of international students in a group. Korean international students are perceived as very passive in participating in discussion, but they showed more active participation in a less intimidating environment where the majority of group members are international students or the number of students in a group is small.

A student reported that Australian students sometimes are a minority in certain subjects such as engineering or business and so he did not feel embarrassed about his broken English, played an active participation in the class. Another student commented that when Australian students are minority in their class, they tend to have a strong bond among themselves.

The findings of this study show that all three types of networks help Korean international students with academic matters. Therefore, to explain Korean international students’ social networks in current Australian context, the functional model of friendship networks suggested by Bocher et al. (1977) should be modified as shown in Figure 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-nationals Networks</td>
<td>Being formed mostly through a Korean church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and Korean students’ club at the university.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bi-cultural Networks</td>
<td>Significant effort needed for them to be</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>formed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multicultural Networks</td>
<td>Being formed mostly with other Asian students</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with a good English proficiency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Functions

- **Co-nationals Networks**: Sharing information on academic or socio-cultural difficulties.
- **Bi-cultural Networks**: Assisting with academic matters, promoting intercultural understanding.
- **Multicultural Networks**: Assisting with academic matters, promoting intercultural understanding.

Figure 1: Characteristics and Function of Social Networks of Korean International Students

### Conclusion

This study has explored the experience of Korean international students at Australian universities, especially focussing on the social networks as a study strategy. The paper has examined these students’ interaction with others and a role of the social networks in the new academic discourse community.

In terms of the functions of the peer networks, it became apparent that all three types of social networks played a significant role in facilitating Korean international students’ academic and socio-cultural adjustments. Another finding is that close co-national peer networks have multiple functions, which includes providing academic support as well as meeting students’ social needs. It should be emphasised that when international students place a high priority on studying over creating social networks with Australians, the social network they form tend to provide strong academic support as well as to be mutually beneficial whether it is with host national peers or not.

A third finding is that social networks with other Asian international students, which are often portrayed negatively and have caused many concerns to Australian educators, are in fact a good strategy for successful completion of their study and a pathway to an improved institutional membership. Furthermore, Korean students engage in cross-cultural encounters and achieve intercultural learning through the interaction with Korean Australians or other Asian students.

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**Contact Address**

Young-A Cho  
Monash University - Clayton Campus  
Victoria 3800 Australia  
PH: 03 9905 2226  
FAX: 03 9905 5437  
EMAIL: Younga.Cho@arts.monash.edu.au
Effects of Family Happiness on Expatriate Success

Hyun Chang
Curtin University of Technology, Australia

Abstract
The major focus of this study is on the importance of family stability and adaptability for successful expatriate assignments and particularly addresses five important issues of family and spouse in understanding expatriate success: attractions for an international assignment, family happiness with international assignment, concerns on international assignments, reasons for recall from international assignments, and expatriate performance. Two expatriate groups were targeted for analysis, Australian expatriates and their families in Korea and Korean expatriates and their families in Australia. The findings of this study indicate that there are clear differences between the two groups. Overall, Korean expatriates regard family issues as attractions for international assignment and work-related issues for major reasons of failure. On the contrary, Australian expatriates regard family issues low for attractions and family adjustment factors as reasons for high premature recalls. Korean expatriates and their family members engage in international assignment and cross-cultural adjustment much more successfully than Australian expatriates and their family members. Clearly, expatriates themselves adapt much better than their children, with their spouses with least adaptable. Early organisation intervention and continuous support is vital to ensure family members are treated as core stakeholders of expatriate process for the entire cycle of pre-departure, after-arrival and repatriation.

Introduction
International assignments are vital for business success in this fast globalising world and the success of expatriates is critical to many organizations operating internationally. The deployment of expatriates often includes their partners and children, and there is a growing recognition that the adaptation of expatriate families, especially spouses, plays a crucial role in achieving successful international assignments for organizations. However, management support has typically been directed toward increasing the effectiveness of expatriates’ business performance, and most organisations do not bring spouse and children into the overall schema of understanding expatriate success. As the result, cross-cultural adjustment tends to be a lot more difficult for spouses and children than adjustment of expatriate themselves (Naumann 1992), whose view is also supported by Black, Gregersen, and Mendenhall (1992). There is an alarming rate of expatriate failures, and family and spouse issues are regarded as major reasons for such failures and therefore organisations should treat spouse and family factors as major issues in preparation and support for international assignments (Punnett 1997 and Adler 1997).

This study addresses the importance of family stability and adaptability in expatriate success, by looking into five relevant issues (attractions for an international assignment, family happiness with international assignment, concerns on international assignments, reasons for recall from international assignments) influencing expatriate performance. Australian and Korean managers were selected as the two subject groups for this research to represent both the West and the East, on the grounds that Australia as a Western society and Korea as an Eastern society well exemplify cross-cultural differences and expatriate challenges. The Australian and Korean target populations represent the West working in the East and the East working in the West. The target population, from which the Australian and Korean samples were drawn for detailed investigation, was the total number of expatriates of the two communities. The questionnaire for research addressed major 25 research topics, but this paper focuses only on the importance of understanding the role of family dimension in achieving expatriate success, therefore only five issues are analysed here. Descriptive statistics are employed to highlight cross-cultural differences between Australian and Korean expatriate groups.

Literature Review
It is alarming to note that 83 percent of reporting companies experience expatriate failure, and 86 percent attribute failure to candidate selection and the inability to adapt to host cultures, and yet only 26 percent of expatriate candidates are provided cross-cultural communication preparation (McFarland 2006). Overall, most executives agree losses are substantial, according to Jack and Stage (2005), affecting up to
40 percent of all expatriate assignments. There are many reasons why expatriates fail in their assignments, but more prominent among them are personal and family-related issues. Expatriates are not happy in their assignment, Harris and Moran (2000) reported, mainly for reasons related to spouse and family. In these circumstances, their organizations usually reluctantly agree to the premature return and the personal unhappiness often leads to a serious decline in managerial productivity. Equally important for attention is the need for a paired approach to apply cross-cultural and comparative analysis between the home country and the target country, for example Australians in Korea and Korean in Australia, in order to compare their differences.

Family and spouse issues are major concerns as reported also by Harvey (1995) for U.S. multinationals in their international operations. Family cohesion is an important factor in achieving successful international assignments (James and Hunsley 1995; Copeland and Norell 2002; Caligiuri, et al 1998). Particularly, Harvey and Buckley (1998) argued that there is a growing need for a social support system for expatriate couples. Black (1988) also emphasized family and spouse adjustment as the most important non-work variable in international work adjustment. Black’s study focused on U.S. expatriates, but there is no reason to believe that Black’s observation is not applicable to other expatriate groupings. Reinforcing Black’s point, Tung (1981) reported that U.S. executives believe that the main reason for the expatriate failure is a spouse’s inability to cope with the demands of the new environment.

Family factor was included in an extensive conceptual framework made by Black et al. (1991), as a non-work variable in explaining the importance of finding out cross-cultural adjustment, while Tung (1981 and 1982) specifically emphasised the importance of family stability and adaptability in expatriate success. Such views were further supported by many (James and Hunsley 1995; Harvey and Buckley 1998; Caligiuri et al 1998; Ali et al 2003), including an extensive research conducted by Adler (1997) on 1129 graduating MBA students which found that inadequate educational facilities for children, spouse unwilling to move and career concerns by spouse were viewed as negative influences on international assignment. While conceptual links between family relationship and (a) cross-cultural adjustment, and (b) expatriate performance have been emphasised by many, little empirical research on east-west comparisons are conducted to highlight their relationships.

In general, many international organisations fail to clearly define expatriate success since it is often difficult to determine what constitutes success in overseas ventures. Overall, it can be said that expatriate success is closely associated with performance management, training, organizational support, willingness to relocate and strength of the relationship between the expatriate and the firm (Erbacher et al 2006), but its shortcomings were criticised by Goby et al (2002) who reported that there is a discrepancy on the perceptions between expatriates themselves and the human resource directors of the multinational corporations.

Therefore, expatriate success should also consider expatriates’ subjective assessment of their performance and their family’s adjustment, rather than mainly relying on the objective assessment conducted by their human resources manager back at home. Although expatriate success and overseas business success are closely linked to each other, it is necessary to treat two areas independently in order to accurately understand and achieve expatriate success in the cycle of pre-departure, after-arrival and repatriation. Human development of expatriates, infrastructure building by organisations, and the support and happiness of family should all be viewed holistically as major factors in order to ensure long-term success in achieving both organisational and personal goals.

**Research Methodology and Results**

As discussed in the literature review, this research focused on 5 important issues to address such short falls in understanding important relationship between family happiness and expatriate success:

1. attractions for an international assignment (Issue 1);
2. family happiness with international assignment (Issue 2);
3. concerns on international assignments (Issue 3);
4. reasons for recall from international assignments (Issue 4); and
5. expatriate performance (Issue 5).

The research questionnaires were sent to the entire target population of 138 expatriates in Korean expatriates in Australia and Australian expatriates in Korea. Twenty-eight Australian expatriates and fifty-two Korean expatriates responded, achieving overall 64.5 percent response rate.

There were many interesting differences between the two groups in terms of general background. Korean expatriates were all males (100%), almost entirely married (98.1%) and others in de-facto relationship (3.9%), more in middle aged group (41 to 45 years old), all of their wives and children staying with them (100%), and mostly with tertiary qualifications (98.1%). However, Australian expatriates had two female expatriates (8%), much younger expatriates with more evenly distributed in age, lower level of marriage (72%), much less spouse (77.3%) and children (66.7%) staying with them, and a much lower level of tertiary qualifications (80%) than Koreans.

The results for such five issues and the performances of two expatriate groups are explained as follows.
**Issue 1: Attractions for an International Assignment**

Respondents were asked to rank eight reasons for taking up an international assignment in the order of importance. ‘Personal growth’ and ‘job challenge’ were the two most important reasons for taking up international assignment for Korean expatriates, and ‘job challenge’, ‘career advancement’ and ‘personal growth’ for Australian expatriates, which are all work-related reasons. However, ‘spouse and family’, and ‘cross-cultural experience’ are regarded much less important, although the Korean group treats them more important, especially ‘spouse and children’. Three reasons that show wide gaps are ‘career advancement’ (five gaps), ‘financial reward’ (four gaps), ‘spouse and family’ (three gaps). ‘Spouse and family’ was, as highlighted in the table, is a lot more important reason for Korean group (3rd) than Australians (6th). In general, good location and cross-cultural experience are ranked low by both groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Personal Growth</td>
<td>1. Job Challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Job Challenge</td>
<td>2. Career advancement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Spouse and Family</td>
<td>3. Personal Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Cross-Cultural Experience</td>
<td>5. Quality and Satisfaction of Life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Good Location</td>
<td>6. Spouse and Family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Career advancement</td>
<td>7. Cross-Cultural Experience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Issue 2: Family Happiness with International Assignment**

Two questions were asked in order to determine the level of family relationship in relation to international assignment. First question was (*How happy were you, your partner and your relatives with your current overseas assignment?*), to rate from 1 = Extremely unhappy to 5 = Extremely happy. Table 2 shows that the overall reaction was all reasonably happy being close to ‘4 = happy’ in all categories. Relatives of the two groups were not as happy as much as expatriates and their spouses on overseas assignment, although Korean relatives felt only marginally happier than Australian relatives. The response from expatriates and their spouses show a mixed pattern between the two groups. Overall, Australian expatriates felt happier than Korean expatriates by a mean difference of 0.23, but Korean spouses felt far happier by mean 0.42 for overseas assignments than Australian spouses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of Happiness with your assignment</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Myself</td>
<td>3.88</td>
<td>4.11</td>
<td>3.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My spouse</td>
<td>3.84</td>
<td>3.42</td>
<td>3.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My relatives</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>3.53</td>
<td>3.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Issue 3: Concerns on International Assignments**

Expatriates were asked, first of all, to rate the degree of importance on areas of concern using a 5-point scales from 1 = ‘not at all important’ to 5 = ‘extremely important’ on eight aspects of international assignment, and then they were asked to rank them in the order of importance to indicate how important these concerns are for them in taking up international assignment. In terms of mean scores from 5-point scales, Korean expatriates had high concerns on ‘children’s education and welfare (mean 3.39),’ ‘repatriation (mean 3.22)’ and ‘length of appointment (mean 2.74),’ quite differently to Australian expatriates who showed their concerns that their overseas jobs might turn out to be ‘unchallenging (mean 3.20),’ ‘inadequately rewarded (mean 3.12)’ or ‘not good for career advancement (mean 3.16).’

Korean expatriates have ranked ‘repatriation issues (i)’ and ‘children’s education and welfare (l)’ as the top two major concerns, followed by ‘length of appointment (g)’ and ‘disruption to home country life (a)’ as the next two, at the cost of other organizational issues (b, c, d), ‘spouse (h)’ and ‘quality of life (e)’. In the case of Australian expatriates, more work-related issues ranked more important, for example, ‘not
good career advancement (d)’ as the most important, ‘unchallenging job (b)’ the 3rd, ‘inadequate financial reward (c)’ 4th, while ranking ‘children’s education and welfare (f)’ and ‘reluctant spouse (h)’ as 2nd and 7th respectively, and contrary to Koreans, repatriation issues (i) 9th and length of appointment (g) ranked 8th as the least important concern (Table 3). Two minor shifts are found between the two measurements, where ‘children’s education’ becoming less important than repatriation issues for Koreans, but ‘not good career advancement’ became more important for Australians, both of which are all work-related concerns (Table 3).

### Table 3: Important Concerns Ranked

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area of Concern</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Interval</td>
<td>Ordinal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disruption to Home Country Life</td>
<td>Rank 4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  2.35</td>
<td>4.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unchallenging Job</td>
<td>Rank 6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  2.24</td>
<td>5.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate Financial Reward</td>
<td>Rank 8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  2.12</td>
<td>6.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Good Career advancement</td>
<td>Rank 5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  2.25</td>
<td>5.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unpleasant Life Abroad</td>
<td>Rank 9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  1.84</td>
<td>6.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children’s Education &amp; Welfare</td>
<td>Rank 1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  3.39</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Length of Appointment</td>
<td>Rank 3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  2.74</td>
<td>4.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reluctant Spouse</td>
<td>Rank 7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  2.12</td>
<td>6.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repatriation Issues</td>
<td>Rank 2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean  3.22</td>
<td>2.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Issue 4: Reasons for Recall from International Assignments

Every year, some managers may have to be recalled to their home country or have their employment terminated because of their inability to function effectively in a foreign environment. First of all, respondents were asked to indicate how often are recalls (in their company and other companies they are familiar with) attributable to each of seven reasons on 6-point scales (Table 4). Then, they were also asked to indicate, in one of eight interval scales, what percentage of overseas personnel, in their opinion, have to be recalled to their home country or dismissed because of inability to function effectively in a foreign assignment (Table 5).

Overall indications are these reasons are much less attributable to recalls for Koreans (3.15) than Australians (4.03), and Australian expatriates believed strongly that reasons for recall attributed to a mean score of 4.03 than Koreans (3.156) did on six listed reasons. In terms of group differences, spouse adjustment showed the widest gap of mean difference by 1.02 (higher on Australians), followed by family-related problems (0.65 higher on Australians), managers inability to adapt (0.61 higher on Australians), manager’s personality (0.56 higher on Australians), all of the top four significant differences are higher on Australian side (Table 4).

The two reasons, as highlighted, that Korean expatriates rated relatively higher than Australians are all work-related, manager’s inability (6 percent higher) and lack of motivation (17.4 percent higher). The other four reasons, as highlighted, except others, that Australian expatriates regarded highly were in significant margins that failures were either personality or family related reasons for adjustment.
Table 4: Reasons for Recall from International Assignments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons for Recall</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Australian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Inability of the manager to cope with the larger responsibilities posed by the overseas work</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>4.10</td>
<td>Koreans Higher By 6% 3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Lack of motivation to work overseas</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>Koreans Higher By 17.4% 2.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Manager's personality or emotional maturity</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.56</td>
<td>Australians Higher By 13.6% 4.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Manager's inability to adapt to a different physical or cultural environment</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.83</td>
<td>Australians Higher By 35.7% 4.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 The inability of the manager's spouse to adjust to a different cultural or physical environment</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.50</td>
<td>Australians Higher By 44.7% 4.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Other family-related problems</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>Australians Higher By 35.2% 4.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Others</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td>Australians Higher By 9.4% 6.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Mean Score (out of 5)</td>
<td>3.156</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows the extent to which expatriates were actually recalled to the home base for reasons of being either ineffective or unsuccessful. Results show that 80.9 percent of the Korean expatriates indicated that recalls were made in the range of up to 5 percent, and 91.5 percent of Korean respondents think that the recall rate was less than 10 percent range. In contrast, however, Australian expatriates indicated a broader and also a higher rate of failure recalls with 91.7 percent of the respondents agreeing up to 15 percent of recall. In the case of the overall community, both communities showed very close results, where Koreans (71.8 percent) being slightly higher than Australians (71.5 percent) for up to 10 percent range. But, in terms of higher range (between 11 – 15 percent), Australians (25 percent) showed much higher rate of recalls than Koreans (13 percent).

Table 5: Rate of Expatriates’ Recall

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rate of Recall</th>
<th>Korean Managers</th>
<th>Australian Managers</th>
<th>Total Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Your Company</td>
<td>Community General</td>
<td>Your Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 0 - 5%</td>
<td>80.9%</td>
<td>34.8%</td>
<td>54.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N = 38</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 6 - 10%</td>
<td>10.6%</td>
<td>37.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 11 - 15%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 16 - 19%</td>
<td></td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 20 - 39%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 40 - 59%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between 60 - 80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over 80%</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cases</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Issue 5: Expatriate Performance**

Respondents were asked to rate (out of 100) their own performance and adaptations on themselves and their own family, as well as on the overall expatriate community where they were assigned to. The results in Table 6 indicate that Korean expatriates rated higher in all eight categories for performance or adaptation on themselves, their family members and their expatriate community than Australians.

Table 6 shows that in terms of performance, both groups rated their own performances higher than those of others. Importantly, Korean expatriates themselves (95.21 percent) regarded their own performances by 16.49 percent higher than Australian expatriate themselves (78.72 percent). Similarly, as shown in No. 2 row, they assessed other Korean expatriates’ performances (93.07 percent) also much higher by 15.47 percent than other Australian expatriates (77.60 percent).

In all six levels of adaptations (No. 3 to No. 8), Korean expatriates and their families performed better than their Australian counterparts. More significant leads by Korean expatriates and families were especially in your own adaptation (No.3) by 15.58 percent, followed by your own children (9.04 percent), overall spouse adaptation (9.79 percent), and overall children’s adaptation (8.28 percent). There were much less gaps between the two groups, showing overall expatriates’ adaptation by 5.07 percent, and your spouse adaptation by 4.76 percent. Group average on spouse adaptation was worse than their children’s adaptation for Korean (78.16 percent vs. 83.22 percent) and Australians (70.89 percent vs. 74.56 percent). On average, expatriate themselves (93.92 percent) adapted better than own children (84.52 percent), who are better than your spouse (79 percent).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Performance Areas</th>
<th>Korean</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Australian</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Performance (yourself)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>95.21</td>
<td>Koreans by 16.49%</td>
<td>78.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>52</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Performance (the expatriate community)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>93.07</td>
<td>Koreans by 15.47%</td>
<td>77.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>46</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Adapting to environment (yourself)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>99.18</td>
<td>Koreans by 15.98%</td>
<td>83.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Adapting to environment (the expatriate community)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>79.27</td>
<td>Koreans by 5.07%</td>
<td>74.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Adapting to environment (your spouse)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>80.29</td>
<td>Koreans by 4.76%</td>
<td>75.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Adapting to environment (spouses of the community)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>76.04</td>
<td>Koreans by 9.79%</td>
<td>66.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Adapting to environment (your own children)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>86.35</td>
<td>Koreans by 9.04%</td>
<td>77.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Adapting to environment (children of the community)</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>80.10</td>
<td>Koreans by 8.28%</td>
<td>71.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>48</td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Research Discussions**

Clearly there are some important differences in Australian and Korean expatriate groups in terms of five issues investigated. In terms of attractions for taking up international assignment, the environmental factors seemed to score higher for Koreans than Australians, where ‘spouse and family’ can benefit from ‘quality and satisfaction of life’ and ‘cross-cultural experiences’ in ‘good location’ are regarded important attractions for international assignment, but ‘career advancement (d)’ and ‘financial reward (c)’ were less important for Koreans. On the other hand, Australians clearly focused more on ‘career advancement (d)’ and ‘financial reward (c)’, rather than family and environmental issues, which are in contrast to Korean counterparts. Factors such as quality of life and cross-cultural experience for spouse and family were of low importance for Australians with ‘good location (b)’ and ‘cross-cultural experience (f)’ as the least concerns for them, but personal opportunities and performances were favourable.

Overall Australian expatriates felt happier than Korean expatriates, but Korean spouses felt far happier for overseas assignments than Australian spouses. In terms of concerns for international assignments, the top four concerns for both groups remained all within the same range, including ‘children’s issues’ becoming more important (from 4th to 2nd) and ‘not good career advancement’ changing from 2nd to 1st. Two work-related issues, ‘unchallenging job (from 1st to 3rd)’ and ‘inadequate financial reward (3rd to 4th)’ became less important. Koreans regarded work-related issues as the major reasons for
recall. In contrast, Australians regarded family and personal adjustment factors for such recalls higher in margin than Koreans. Therefore, it may be said that Korean expatriates tend to sacrifice their personal feelings and family issues for organizational issues, which they believe are important decisions that determines either a success or a failure.

Overall, Korean expatriates in Australia in general performed very high at 93.07 percent, by 15.47 percent higher than Australian expatriates in Korea at 77.60 percent. However, in terms of recall rates, Australian expatriates indicated only marginally higher rate recall. In all six levels of adaptations, Korean expatriates performed better than their Australian counterparts. More significant leads were made by Korean expatriates especially in ‘your adaptation’ higher by 15.98 percent. Clearly, group averages indicate that spouse adaptation was the worst. Overall, in both categories of ‘you’ and ‘others’, children adapted better than spouse, but expatriates outperformed spouse or children in terms of cross-cultural adaptation.

Failure rates proved to be much less than what was argued by McFarland (2006), who talked about 83 percent, or Jack and Stage (2005) who mentioned failure rate being up to 40 percent. Of course, such figures are somewhat contentious and practically difficult to substantiate in real terms. Recall rates are only one of the many reasons possible for expatriate failure, and therefore it is not fair to compare overall failure rate and recall rate. However, recall being the most obvious reason for failure, the findings indicate that the failure rate may not be that high as they argue. However, the findings on family and spouse factors support strongly the views by Naumann (1992) and (Black, Gregersen, and Mendenhall 1992) that cross-cultural adjustment for spouse and children tends to be much less supported and more difficult than expatriates, and children tend to adapt more than adults.

Possible explanations why Korean expatriates are better performing than Australian expatriates in such a significant margin could come from the facts, as indicated by the findings of this research, that they are all married, they consider family and spouse, and cross-cultural experience important in taking up their international assignments, they are more concerned about children's education and welfare, they have much less concerns on various reasons for recall including spouse and family-related problems. The findings suggest that both groups feel reasonably happy with international assignment and also regard it challenging and important for their personal growth. However, there are clearly different patterns that failures of international assignment are more attributed to work-related reasons, but it was either personality or family-related reasons for Australian expatriates. These differences are indeed cross-cultural differences and therefore any expatriate success and cross-cultural adjustment will have to be interpreted with cautions, if they are without cross-cultural considerations.

Conclusion

Overall, organizational support is crucial in determining expatriate success since the major reason for high failure rate is the lack of comprehensive expatriate support program to meet challenges of working and living in another country. Expatriate success should achieve coercive and harmonious cooperation amongst stakeholders, rather than just looking from financial, marketing or organisational perspectives. Expatriate success may therefore be measured by subjective assessment by expatriates and families themselves in terms of personal development, wellbeing and happiness rather than objective assessment of meeting sales figures, market developments or organisational objectives. Hence, human-centred strategy can be adopted for expatriates to draw their maximum potential in performing their jobs, and workplace could then be an environment for expatriates to enhance their enjoyment in life, to find happiness in working with others and to look forward to going back next day, and a place from which they can bring positive, happy and productive influences to their families rather than carrying their stress and emotional baggage with them in returning home. Organisations would have to invest resources to provide adequate pre-departure training, adopt a support policy to reduce culture shock after arrival, update necessary development and training opportunities, not only for expatriate themselves but also for all family members. Happiness and mutual supports are important success ingredients for both expatriates and their families to achieve maximum potential in international assignments.

Limitations of this Study

This study is specifically designed to compare Australian and Korean expatriates and their families with issues important to international assignments, so the findings may not necessarily apply to other countries. This research used targeted samples, Australian expatriates in Korea and Korean expatriates in Australia, for cross-cultural analysis, and therefore future research can be strengthened by a more diverse set of countries so that multivariate statistical techniques can be employed for analysing considerably complex nature of expatriate process. This research addressed only part of the comprehensive research framework that was designed and a further analysis would be necessary to identify relationships.
between various factors in pre-departure and after-arrival dimensions in relation to personal, family, organisational and environmental issues.

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Contact Address
Hyun Chang
Curtin University of Technology
GPO Box U1987
Perth WA 6845
PH: 9266 7079
FAX: 9266 2547
EMAIL: h.chang@curtin.edu.au
Part B
Non-refereed Papers
Social Sciences

Dog Meat in Korea: A Legal Analysis

Rakhyun Kim
The University of Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract
This paper explores the dog meat debate in Korea from a legal perspective. It examines the legal statuses of dogs and dog meat and the legal protection for dogs which is provided under the current and forthcoming legislative frameworks. The paper highlights that dogs in Korea are currently caught in the conflict over their socio-legal status as companion and livestock animals and thus occupy a peculiar place in legal and social realms.

Introduction
Dog meat is the fourth most consumed meat in the Republic of Korea (“Korea”) after pork, beef, and chicken. Around two million dogs are slaughtered for food each year, and sold through over twenty thousand restaurants, mostly in the form of stew commonly known as bosintang. According to a recent survey, 61.7 percent of the total population have had dog meat at least once in their lives. Among those, the frequency of consuming dog meat is on average 4.6 times a year. Dog meat is a big industry, estimated at two billion US dollars.

The practice of eating dog meat has historically been and remains to be a widespread social phenomenon in Korea, one that is culturally defended by the absolute majority of Koreans. According to a voluntary online questionnaire survey, 43 percent say “although I do not eat dog meat, I think there is no need to eradicate it” followed closely by 42 percent of the participants who say “I eat dog meat and there is no need to eradicate it”. The overwhelming majority, 85 percent, thus, support dog meat, irrespective of their eating habits, while the remaining 15 percent – 11 percent of which do not eat dog meat and 4 percent of which eat dog meat – think it should be gone. This is where Korea is at today in terms of public opinion and attitudes towards dog meat.

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134 Ibid 40-41. The number of dogs slaughtered for food each year is estimated to be 2,051,290. It is calculated based on average frequency of consumption per year (4.6 times) and an average serving quantity (300 grams).

135 An estimate by the dog meat industry. According to a report issued during an inspection of the administration conducted by the National Assembly in 1998, there are 6,484 registered dog meat restaurants.


137 Bosintang, also transliterated as boshintang, poshintang, and posintang, literally means invigorating stew. It is a relatively new name for dog stew introduced in the 1940s to avoid negative stigmatised names such as gaejang, gaejang-guk, gaetang, gujang. Just before the 1988 Seoul Olympics, other more benign, euphemistic names were once again attributed to it, such as yeongyang-tang and sacheol-tang literally meaning nutritious stew and four-seasons stew respectively.

138 Cho and Shim, supra n 2, 39. The total number of samples is 1,025.

139 Ibid 40. A 64.1 percent majority, however, consumes dog meat less than or equal to three times a year.

Yet there is no clear law governing matters relating to dog meat. While there is no explicit recognition of dog meat as legitimate food and of dogs as animals fit for human consumption, neither is there a clear ban on sale or slaughter of dogs for food. In the midst of legal uncertainty, the processing of dog meat has gone underground with no official guidelines to guarantee hygiene and animal welfare. The legislative and policy options are deadlocked, with the government caught between the imperative of animal protection lobbied by both national and international animal protectionists, and deeply embedded traditional food custom defended by the mainstream society. In this context, animal welfare issues have been dismissed as the lowest priority. The current Animal Protection Act 1991 is a law on paper only. Although the Animal Protection Amendment Act 2006, which recently passed the National Assembly is a step forward, it is nevertheless only a small step and its implications for the use of dog meat remain largely questionable. Dog meat continues to be a headache for law and policy makers.

Against this backdrop, this paper examines dog meat in Korea from a socio-legal perspective. As there has been no academic analysis on law relating to dog meat, this paper is exploratory and the overall objective is to initiate academic discussion in the area. Agreeing with Korean animal protectionists who say that the abolition of the canine-eating practice is the first and crucial step that needs to be made to protect animal welfare in Korea, this paper focuses on the question of how Korea can move towards a dog-meat-free society where the welfare of dogs is safeguarded.

The Legal Statuses of Dogs and Dog Meat

This section examines the legal statuses of dogs and dog meat in Korea, focusing on questions of legality. Firstly, how is a dog legally classified under Korean law? In legal terms, animals in Korea are either “domestic animals” under the Livestock Act 1963 (“LA”), “livestock” under the Livestock Processing Act 1962 (“LPA”), “wild animals” under the Wild Animals and Plants Protection Act 2004), or they fall into the general category of “animal” under the Animal Protection Act 1991 (“APA”). Dogs are included in the category of domestic animal as determined by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (“MAF”)’s Ministerial Ordinance for LA, but not in the list of livestock under LPA, which is the principal statute governing hygienic slaughtering of livestock and processing of meat (note that LPA is not a humane slaughter statute).

Back in the 1970s, however, dogs were legally classified as livestock. In August 1975, MAF included dog in the legal definition of livestock under the Ministerial Ordinance of LPA (then the Livestock Hygienic Treatment Act). Indeed, a butcher caught selling uninspected dog meat was actually prosecuted and sentenced to a fine of 50,000 won (US$ 50). Nevertheless, in June 1978, dog was deleted from the list of livestock.

Secondly, is it then legal to raise and slaughter dogs for food? This is a tricky question. The short answer would be that dog meat is neither legal nor illegal. Put differently, there is no specific law governing slaughter of dogs, and therefore it sits outside the reach of the law. The exclusion of dog from the list of livestock means that there is no explicit recognition of dogs as meat source or livestock, but neither does it ban raising and slaughtering dogs for food. Furthermore, it means that there are no hygiene standards, no safety regulations, no housing standards, no wastewater discharge regulation, and no provisions for humane slaughter. The only relevant regulations are provided by the current animal protection law, APA, which, as will be discussed later, is incompetent and only imposes a broad and ineffective prohibition on an act of beating and slaughtering an animal without a rational reason. So it is not illegal to raise and slaughter dogs as long as it does not violate APA.

Thirdly, is dog meat legally food? Yes, it is. Although there is no explicit recognition of dog meat as food or meat, generally speaking, the Korea Food and Drug Administration (KFDA) under the Ministry of Health and Welfare (“MOHW”) recognises, in accordance with the Food Sanitation Act 1962 (“FSA”), any edible product except for drugs as food. In a 1996 case against a person charged for selling dog meat

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142 Article 2(1) of the Ministerial Ordinance of LA.


144 FSA Article 2(1).
without declaration, a Seoul District Court judge, referring to Article 7 of the Presidential Decree of FSA (as amended in 1995) stating the scope of meat – “flesh, internal organs, tail, [etcetera] edible parts of a beast produced for food”\textsuperscript{145} – ruled that dog meat is food as “it is widely eaten” notwithstanding the fact that MOHW does not explicitly recognise dog meat as a consumable meat.\textsuperscript{146} Furthermore, in similar cases relating to sale of gaesoju or “dog tonic drink”, which is made by boiling oriental medicinal herbs with a dog, the Supreme Court repeatedly ruled that it is not medicine as defined by the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act 1953,\textsuperscript{147} and is, therefore, food.\textsuperscript{148}

The legal recognition of dog meat as food while there is no recognition of dog as livestock creates a big uncertainty and complicates the situation. For instance, claiming that it is not a violation of higher law even if a local government permits the establishment of a dog breeding facility (because dog meat is legally food under FSA), on 26 November 1996, North Jeju District announced its plan to establish a slaughter dog breeding facility. It actually obtained a land use permit for the facility from MAF, which later explained that it issued the permit regardless of what kind of dog is going to be raised there because a dog is legally classified as “domestic animal” and that means it requires no separate licence to breed. Nonetheless, pressured by animal protectionists, North Jeju cancelled its plan in December.

Fourthly, given that dog meat is food, is it then legal to sell dog meat? This is another question without a definitive answer. Although dog meat is food, and thus restaurants selling dog meat are subject to food sanitation regulations, whether it is recognised as legitimate food for sale is a different question.

The first attempt to restrict the sale of dog meat was initiated in January 1983, when the central government, fearing negative publicity that dog meat would have on the 1988 Seoul Olympics, announced its initiative to ban dog meat sales in urban areas (allowing the continued sale in rural areas), particularly targeting tourist sites.\textsuperscript{149} Shortly after, the government ministries began to take action: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested a prohibition of slaughtering dogs for food; MAF ordered to the suppression of breeding slaughter dogs; and the Ministry of Health and Society began to crack down on the restaurants serving dog meat. On 21 February 1984, Seoul City had issued Regulation No. 94, outlawing the sale of dog meat in Seoul City by classifying dog meat as disgusting food. However, these regulations instituted for international publicity during the period running up to the 1988 Seoul Olympics were not backed by a long-term commitment. Hence ended up as a mere scrap of paper once the Olympics were over.

Nevertheless, shortly after on 8 June 1984, the ban on sale of dog meat, or more specifically bosintang and gaesoju, was formally institutionalised when the Ministry of Health (now the Ministry of Health and Welfare) classified those along with numerous others as disgusting foods (or “unseemly food” or “foods deemed unsightly”) in the Operational Rule relating to the Ministerial Ordinance of the Food Sanitation Act 1962,\textsuperscript{150} and prohibited the sale of disgusting foods. If caught for selling such food (at a registered restaurant), the owner gets a warning on the first offence, a week-long suspension on the second offence, a fifteen-day suspension on the third offence, and finally on the fourth offence the licence for the restaurant gets revoked. The provision banning the sale of disgusting food survived a series of amendments until today,\textsuperscript{151} but there has never been an occasion where this administrative regulation was enforced.

Part of the reason for such an ineffective enforcement is the fact that the enforcement responsibility lies at the local level, as well as the lack of long-term political commitment to the ban. The local governments have been ignorant of the responsibility and reluctant to interfere with such a widespread

\textsuperscript{145} Article 7(5)Na(1) of the Presidential Decree of FSA.
\textsuperscript{146} Seoul Central District Court, 20 November 1996. If it was judged otherwise – if dog meat is not food – the butcher would have been discharged without a conviction because there would be nothing to prevent a person from selling dog meat. Nevertheless, Judge Park Seong-Cheol reduced the penalty from 5,000,000 won to 3,000,000 stating that, “taking into account that most dog meat wholesalers are operating without a licence and the defendant cannot be solely blamed upon”. See also, Reuters. (1997). “McDog’ Restaurant Chain Challenges McDonald’s.” Retrieved 6 January 2007, from http://www.mcspotlight.org/media/press/reuters_8jun97.html.
\textsuperscript{147} Supreme Court, 1987 Do 1443. See also, (2004). “Supreme Court Rules Gaesoju as Not Medicine.” Retrieved 22 December 2006.
\textsuperscript{148} Cho and Shim, supra n 2, 10.
\textsuperscript{149} The definition of disgusting food includes bosintang, gaesoju, snake soup, earthworm soup, maggot soup, and other foods that provoke disgust in citizens.
\textsuperscript{150} In a series of amendments, the provision moved around the Ministerial Ordinance of FSA a few times. First it moved to Articles 21 and 22 of Annex 10 by an amendment dated 28 March 1987, then it moved to Annex 13 by an amendment dated 30 November 1989. Finally, it moved to Article 5 by an amendment dated 31 August 1995.
and socially accepted “cultural” practice. So the sale of dog meat is technically illegal, but nevertheless continues in mainstream society.

Fifthly, is it legal to eat dog meat? Yes, it is legal. Korea has no prohibition on the consumption of dog meat. Slaughtering, cooking, and eating dog meat for other than commercial purpose is legal, as long as you do not commit an offence of cruelty under APA.

To sum up, a dog is legally a domestic animal but not livestock, therefore, there is no regulation over slaughtering and processing of dogs for food, except under the general anticruelty provision of APA. Dog meat is food that requires the seller to obtain a licence as with any other food product and also to be treated in accordance with FSA. However, the legality is contested that dog meat is legally classified as disgusting food, and thus prohibited from sale. Thus, under the current legal framework, at best, only restaurant owners can be punished because only an act of selling is regulated, and there is no effective way to prevent slaughtering of dogs and the dog meat trade.

The legal uncertainty over dog meat has caused inter-ministerial tension between MAF, responsible for the legal protection of dogs and MOHW, responsible for food regulations. In 1996, MOHW blamed MAF for the unregulated dog meat industry by highlighting that MAF is the one responsible to regulate slaughter, distribution, and sale of domestic animals. In response, MAF stated that MOHW assumes the responsibility for its reluctance to control dog meat with its FSA, pointing out that clearly dog meat is classified as disgusting food and thus cannot be cooked and sold in accordance with Article 42 of the Ministerial Ordinance of FSA, while dog is not classified as livestock, hence no legal restriction is in place to regulate matters such as its use and methods of slaughter. However, MOHW argues, in response to a series of complaints from the animal protectionists, that it is very difficult to say dog meat sale is illegal. It goes further, denying the existence of the legal provision which determines dog meat as disgusting food, and thus insists that there is no legal ground to regulate dog meat. MOHW urges for a clearer legal provision in relation to dog meat based on social consensus.

Amidst the legal uncertainty, the dog meat industry stays intact in Korea. The number of registered bosintang restaurants numbered 6,484 in 1998, and the government estimates that there are well over 20,000 counting those unregistered. In April 1997, the first dog meat franchise was established. In August 2001, there was an attempt to produce a genetically modified “super slaughter dog”. In April 2002, an online shopping mall specialising in trading dog meat was set up (but soon closed down after pressure from various organisations). In July 2002, a pre-cooked microwave bosintang was first introduced. In August 2002, the first dog meat buffet opened.

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155 Kim, M.-S.


158 Ibid 15. The research was led by Professor Hum-Dai Park at Daegu University.


161 The price was 22,000 won (US$ 22) per person. Kim, supra n 20.
Recently in November 2006, an advertisement recruiting potential franchisors for a *bosintang* restaurant franchise was published in a national newspaper (Fig. 3). It states: “declaring the popularisation of invigorating meal [dog meat] market which is over one trillion won [one billion US dollars] a year”. This advertisement was immediately met by widespread public condemnation. The conflict between an age-old dog meat culture and growing resistance, this is where Korea is at today.

### The Legal Protection of Dogs in Korea: Today and Tomorrow

In the legal context discussed above, the legal protection of dogs is only provided by the general provisions of APA. Fifteen years into APA, the Amendment Act 2006 was passed on 22 December 2006 and will be effective in a year’s time. This section discusses the current Animal Protection Act 1991 by employing some dog cruelty case examples which illustrate how ineffective APA is to prevent animal cruelty. Then it discusses what is in the Amendment Act 2006, paying particular attention to possible implications the amendment may have for the dog meat industry.

The Animal Protection Act enacted in 1991 is the first piece of Korean legislation aimed at protecting animals from cruelty. The “animal” is narrowly defined as specifically meaning cattle, horses, swine, dogs, cats, rabbits, poultry, ducks, goats, sheep, deer, fox, minks, and some others picked at discretion of MAF. This short, two-page-long statute is overly general and its provisions are too vague to be effective and enforceable. It is a mere paper-law, full of rhetoric, devised for international publicity. Take the following anticruelty provision in the Act:

**Article 6 (Prevention of Animal Cruelty, etc)**

1. No person shall kill an animal without a rational reason, in a cruel manner, or in a way which provokes disgust.
2. No person shall inflict pain or injury to an animal without a rational reason.
3. An owner or a manager of an animal shall not abandon an animal without a rational reason.

The Korean legislature employed the notion of “without a rational reason” as an analogy to the notion of “unnecessary” or “unjustifiable” that is common in anticruelty statutes. However, what exactly is a rational reason? Article 6 is, as admitted by the government, too abstract to be effectively enforceable. In fact, on one occasion the court ruled that punishment is not possible under this provision due to its vagueness.

To add to the unenforceability of the anticruelty provision, the maximum available penalty is set to a bare minimum. The maximum penalty for an offence against Article 6 is a fine upon conviction of, or an infringement fee of, not exceeding 200,000 won (US$ 200), or detention for an unspecified length of time, which occurred only once recently in the fifteen years’ history of APA. Because the penalty is at a similar level to a minor offence, an animal cruelty offence under APA is, at best, proceeded against summarily without prosecution. On top of this ridiculously low penalty available to the court, there is no legal ground yet for temporary seizure, let alone forfeiture. Hence, animal protectionists are often compelled to pay the

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165 Article 1 of the Punishment of Minor Offences Act 1954.
owner who committed an animal cruelty offence more money than the fine to persuade him or her to give up the animal under ill-treatment. 168

What is more, offences against Article 6 are the only punishable offences under APA. Article 5 for basic welfare requirements such as clean water and food, 167 and Article 8 for humane slaughter are not enforceable. 168 In other words, there is no punishment for causing or allowing physical pain or suffering by omission or neglect; even if one does not feed and water his or her animal; does not provide a medical treatment to an ill or injured animal under care; or inflict pain and suffering when slaughtering an animal.

The first animal cruelty case sentenced under APA emerged ten years into the enactment in November 2001. 169 In this case called "Jaebomi incident" (named after a kid who reported the case to an animal protection group), a drunken man cruelly kicked and beat his own pet dog. A District Court judge convicted him of an offence of cruelty under APA and fined him 100,000 won (US$ 100), 170 which is half the maximum available penalty. Later an animal protection group paid the owner three times the fine and persuaded him to give up the dog. 171

In February 2002, a teacher who threw a stray dog out of a window resulting in death was reported by his class students to an animal protection group, which in turn reported to the police. The teacher said he was unaware that such an act is a criminal offence of cruelty. Worrying that a criminal conviction could jeopardise his teaching career, he persuaded the police officer to file the case as a minor offence and was later fined 100,000 won (US$ 100) without conviction under the Punishment of Minor Offences Act 1954. 172

In May 2004, a drunken man invaded a dairy shop at night and cruelly beat up three dogs leaving one dead and the other two seriously injured. Because the offence was done against another person's dog (property), the offence was dealt as malicious mischief under the Punishment of Violence and Etcetera Act 1961 173 and the Crimes Act 1953. 174 The offender was fined 1,500,000 won (US$ 1,500). 175 Perhaps because an additional fine under APA was virtually dismissible, APA was not applied in this case.

Fifteen years into APA, the first case emerged where a person committed an offence against Article 6 was sentenced to detention. In August 2006, a person who witnessed the cruelty taking place filmed the scene and uploaded the video clip on the Internet, which then circulated through popular Web portals, provoking a public outcry. A District Court judge, in a summary trial, sentenced the offender to a two-day detention stating that the degree of cruelty was so extreme that it was judged to disgust an average person. 176

Strikingly, there is no case where a malicious dog breeder was charged and convicted under APA. This is in fact not surprising given what the Act entails. APA establishes no housing standards for animals. Furthermore, because allowing physical pain or suffering by omission or neglect is not an offence of cruelty under the current animal protection regime, there is no binding regulation on how dogs are to be kept and fed. 177 No dog breeder obeys Article 5 of APA listing the most basic breeding and management conditions for animals (adequate food, water, exercise, rest, and sleep, etc). 178 It is sadly a common

168 Email from Mun-Su Kim to Rak-Hyun Kim, 30 November 2006.
169 APA Article 5 (Proper Care and Management): (1) Efforts shall be made by an owner or a manager of an animal to ensure that the animal is properly fed and watered, and to provide it with adequate exercise, rest, and sleep. (2) When an animal is ill or injured, its owner or manager shall provide the animal with a prompt treatment and take other necessary measures. (3) When caring for a wild animal or transporting an animal to another cage, its owner or manager shall endeavour to take necessary measures to enable the animal to adapt to the new environment.
170 APA Article 8 (methods of slaughter): When it is inevitable to kill an animal, the slaughter needs to be conducted so that the least amount of pain is inflicted.
167 Ibid.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid.
173 Articles 2(1) and 2(2) of the Punishment of Violence and Etcetera Act 1961.
174 Article 366 of the Crimes Act 1953.
175 Kim, supra n 22.
practice for dog breeders to provide dirty food and water to cut down the cost and inject antibiotics to keep them alive.\(^1\) In some extreme cases, dog meat is fed to dogs.\(^2\) Given that a fully grown slaughter dog is sold for less than 100,000 won (US$ 100), it is not difficult to guess how much would be spent while raising the dog for between six to twelve months. When dogs are worth more dead than alive, there is a limit to which their welfare can be guaranteed. The following observation posted on a Web site well summarises typical slaughter dog breeding facility conditions.

What the staff of SeoulSearching.com did not like about this dog farm were the conditions by which the dogs were kept. Frankly the place was a nasty, stinking mess. Dogs were in hot, dirty and cramped conditions. Fecal matter and urine were running away from the facility. Flies were everywhere. The dogs smelled bad. They were in poor condition with little or no food, and dirty water. We saw piles of dog fecal matter next to freezers that contained butchered dogs, and other areas that were used for cooking dogs. We saw refrigerated trucks used to transport dog meat to various markets and restaurants. We saw dogs being killed, and dogs barking and crying as other dogs near them were being killed by very slow and primitive means.

Such horrifying breeding conditions recently came under the media spotlight, and once again fuelled the controversy over dog meat.\(^3\) One particular case where a breeder neglected the basic needs of about one hundred dogs was broadcasted on two major national television channels,\(^4\) which led to a public outcry.


Those dogs raised under awful, cramped conditions are being slaughtered inhumanely with nothing done to prevent them from suffering. The most common method of slaughter is by hanging, in which case the dog is said to suffer for about ten minutes before death.\(^5\) The other common method of slaughtering dogs is by electrocution, in which case the dog dies after two or three minutes of suffering.\(^6\) All those often take place regardless of whether or not other dogs are watching.\(^7\) Once killed, most dogs are skinned and their bodies browned using a blow torch.

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\(^1\) KARA, supra n 45.  
\(^5\) Innocent Dogs in "Dog Hell", Incheon Jangsu-dong Dog Farm Incident. Seven Days, SBS.  
\(^6\) A testimony from a dog butcher/slaughterer. SBS, supra n 1.  
\(^7\) Ibid.  
\(^8\) Nam, supra n 48.  
Would the Amendment Act 2006 be able to do anything about this depressing situation? Let us now take a look into the future of legal protection of Korea’s animals.

After fifteen years with APA, the Animal Protection Amendment Act 2006 ("APAA") was passed on 22 December 2006, at the 262\textsuperscript{nd} plenary session of the National Assembly, and is scheduled to be enacted a year later. The Amendment Act is an amalgamation of six “partial” Amendment Bills submitted since late 2005, five proposed by members of the National Assembly and one proposed by MAF.\footnote{Bill No. 3017 submitted by Lee Myeong-Gyu on 21 October 2005; Bill No. 4210 submitted by Lee Gye-Gyeong on 7 April 2006; Bill No. 4245 submitted by Lee Yeong-Ho on 12 April 2006; Bill No. 4721 submitted by Shim Jae-Cheol on 17 August 2006; Bill No. 4837 submitted by MAF on 4 September 2006; Bill No. 5313 submitted by Gong Seong-Jin on 9 November 2006. Gong’s Bill was drafted in consultation with animal protectionists. Each of those six was brought up for discussion and laid before the Agriculture, Forestry, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Committee on 27 November 2006, which was then referred to the Bill Review Committee (which produced the Report on Six Animal Protection Partial Amendment Bills). The Bill Review Committee modified some provisions and referred it back to the Agriculture, Forestry, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Committee, where it was decided that the six bills be made into one “full (alternative)” Amendment Bill and be submitted to a plenary session of the National Assembly.} The purposes of the amendment are stated as: to strengthen duties of the state and local governments in regard to animal protection; to provide legal ground for the system of registering companion animals; and to complement relevant provisions to increase enforceability against cruelty on animals.\footnote{Animal Protection Amendment Bill 2006 (Bill No. 5778), 2.} While the legislation avoids tackling the dog meat controversy, there are some potential implications for the dog meat industry.

The legal status of dogs will remain unchanged as the Amendment Act retains the original definition of animals and adopts no new terms such as a companion or pet animal. However, it introduces an animal registration system, whereby pets are required to be registered with MAF. Concerns were raised as this in the Korean context would effectively reinforce the dual perception that most people hold, distinguishing between registered pet dogs and unregistered slaughter dogs, thereby further justifying dog meat.

The main anticruelty provisions are listed under Article 7. While there is no ban on slaughtering of dogs for food, “an act of killing in a cruel way such as hanging”\footnote{APAA Article 7(1)(1).} and “an act of killing in an open area such as on the street or in front of other animals of the same kind watching”\footnote{APAA Article 7(1)(2).} are explicitly prohibited under Article 7(1). Note that, as mentioned, these are the common methods by which dogs are slaughtered for food. If effectively implemented, most dogs will instead be electrocuted to death, which too involves suffering.

Further prohibited acts are listed under Article 7(2): “an act of inflicting pain or injuring with a tool or a drug”\footnote{APAA Article 7(2)(1).}, “an act of damaging a live animal’s body, or extracting body fluids, or installing equipments for extracting body fluids”\footnote{APAA Article 7(2)(2).}, and “an act of inflicting pain or injuring an animal for the purpose of gambling, advertising, entertaining, or enticing”.\footnote{APAA Article 7(2)(3).} Exemptions to those are to be determined by MAF, and some examples of such situations are, respectively: “for the purpose of prevention or treatment of illness”; “for treatment of illness or experiments involving an animal”; and “traditional folk games”.

The Amendment Act replaces the concept of “without a rational reason” with yet another all-encompassing notion – “without a justifiable excuse”. Accordingly, “an act of killing without a justifiable excuse”\footnote{APAA Article 7(1)(3).} and “an act of inflicting pain or injury without a justifiable excuse”\footnote{APAA Article 7(2)(4).} are generally prohibited. In other words, killing, inflicting pain, or injuring an animal without a justifiable excuse are unjustified or unnecessary slaughter or suffering. Instead of further specifying this overarching principle, the legislature gave MAF the discretionary power to determine specific cases when it is not “unjustifiable”, i.e. instances when slaughtering or infliction of suffering may justifiably take place. Some examples of such instances are provided in the Act itself, as being, when there is a need for disposal by a veterinarian, or an animal poses threat to a person’s life, body, or property. It will be interesting to see if MAF will include a provision in the Ordinance permitting slaughtering of any animal for food as a justifiable excuse for killing. If it does not, and the government and judiciary continue to look on with folded arms, slaughtering of dogs for food will be implicitly legitimised as justifiable excuse to kill dogs.
Furthermore, although the notion of “unnecessary suffering” is judged not unconstitutionally vague in the US context,\(^{197}\) it may well be too vague to enforce in the Korean context because Korea is not ready and willing to prevent and penalise all possible cases where unnecessary or unjustified suffering might take place. Unless an active debate takes place among the social arena before the Amendment Act takes effect at the end of 2007, enforcement of APA will continue to have unresolved difficulties.

The Amendment Act does not make omission to act to prevent unnecessary suffering a punishable offence. In other words, even if one allows suffering of an animal, s/he is not guilty. However, draft Amendment Bills did include a provision stating that, without a justifiable excuse, the owner “shall not abandon or neglect an animal to suffer from hunger or illness”,\(^{198}\) backed by an infringement fee penalty. In spite of its limited scope – it only prevents prolonged suffering from hunger and illness – the recognition of omission as well as commission as part of an offence of cruelty was a significant step forward. Disappointingly, however, the second half of the provision was deleted when the final draft was submitted to the National Assembly. The first half of the provision on abandonment, which was in APA from its inception, remains without a clear definition for what constitutes an act of abandonment, which in turn leaves its enforceability in question.\(^{199}\) Additionally, the penalty for an act of abandonment is still too low – an infringement fee not exceeding 500,000 won (US$ 500).\(^{200}\)

Another problem area which casts doubt on efficacy of the law is the penalty provision. If a person commits an offence against Articles 7(1) or 7(2), the person may be liable to the highest penalty available under the Amendment Act, which is a fine of up to 5,000,000 won (US$ 5,000).\(^ {201}\) Such a penalty is inadequate. Despite three Amendment Bills put forward by Lee, Gong, and MAF\(^{202}\) which set the maximum penalty for an offence of animal cruelty as imprisonment for six months, the Bill Review Committee insisted on lowering the penalty to 2,000,000 won (US$ 2,000) with no jail term with excuses that: public awareness toward animal protection and animal cruelty is not as high as in other more advanced countries; the ground for securing effectiveness of law is to raise the consciousness of an average member of society; the priority should be on strengthening the social consensus; enforcement and penalties are to be supplementary for securing legal effectiveness; and the regulatory effectiveness may actually degrade if the penalty is too high. Although it may well be true that raising the maximum penalty alone does not necessarily help,\(^ {203}\) to erase the jail term penalty provision and to increase the maximum fine only as far as US$ 5,000 is certainly not a step forward. The still low and lenient penalty leaves a big question mark whether APA will provide any deterrent effect in the years to come.

However, there are vital developments to the Korean animal protection law. One positive aspect is the introduction of a breeder licence system, whereby a person who is intending to produce, import, or sell animals needs to obtain a licence from the local government.\(^ {204}\) Until now, there was no such licence required to breed slaughter dogs, and nothing could be done to the breeder who maltreats dogs because there was no legal ground to seize or penalise him or her. In the coming years, if the breeder violates anticruelty provisions (Articles 7(1) and 7(2)) by ill-treating an animal under his or her care, s/he will get the business licence revoked. Furthermore, the Amendment Act obliges those people to obey the rules listed in the Ministerial Ordinance (not determined yet),\(^ {205}\) and also to be equipped with necessary resources for animal protection and hygiene.\(^ {206}\) If violated, the licence may also be revoked or suspended for six months.\(^ {207}\) Also, importantly, on top of such legal punishments, the offender may be required to


\(^{198}\) Clause 7(4) of the Animal Protection Amendment Bill proposed by the Agriculture, Forestry, Maritime Affairs and Fisheries Committee in November 2006.

\(^{199}\) Curnutt, supra n 65, 75. Three-quarters of the US states outlaw abandoning a protected animal, but their statutes usually do not define the term. Delaware’s explanation of “abandonment” is representative of those that do: “completely forsaking or deserting an animal originally under one’s custody without making reasonable arrangements for the custody of that animal to be assumed by another person.” In Korea, some local governments have established city regulations to control abandoned animals: for example, Seoul City Regulation No. 2900 (1992); Busan City Regulation No. 3672 (2000); Daegu City Regulation No. 3511 (2001).

\(^{200}\) APAA Article 26(1)(1).

\(^{201}\) APAA Article 25(1).

\(^{202}\) See supra n 56.


\(^{204}\) APAA Article 15. Also a person intending to operate a funeral service business requires a similar kind of licence.

\(^{205}\) APAA Article 16.

\(^{206}\) APAA Article 15(3).

\(^{207}\) APAA Article 21(2).
attend courses on animal protection and public hygiene. Otherwise, s/he may be liable to an infringement fee not exceeding 500,000 won (US$ 500). Such legal obligations on breeders, importers, and retailers and punishment by suspending or revoking their licence would have positive implications on the conditions in which slaughter dogs are reared. However, Articles 7(1) and 7(2), as explained, are restricted in scope and limited in effect, and because it is yet unknown what Ministerial rules are going to be imposed on them, one can only hope for the best.

Secondly, the enforcement regime for APA has been significantly improved. Under the 1991 legal framework, the police have been the sole law enforcement. As apparent in the cases briefly discussed, however, the police often overlook an offence of animal cruelty as a minor offence, especially because the penalty is virtually dismissible and also, perhaps more importantly, they are not adequately trained for the task. The Amendment Act mitigates the problem by adding a provision to train and operate animal protection inspectors as law enforcement officers, similar to SPCA inspectors. There are two kinds: animal protection inspectors and animal protection honorary inspector. The former is more of an administrative post, appointed among public servants, while the latter is a person with good knowledge and experience with animal protection, and is to be appointed through nomination by recognised non-governmental organisations, to inspect animal cruelty and rescue and protect animals being ill-treated.

However, unlike the original Act, which only required actions of the police, the amended Act requires government action, through the prosecutor’s office. Prosecutors, however, as individual humans, may or may not be motivated to act on behalf of animals, or dogs in this case, especially if they themselves partake in eating dogs. This may be one of the most serious shortcomings.

Probably the single most significant development in the animal law regime is that the animal protection inspectors are granted the right to confiscate or seize an animal under ill-treatment. The absence of provision for the immediate removal of an animal from its abusive environment has been the most pervasive and serious deficiency of APA. Thanks to the amendment, if a person refuses, interferes with, or evades an inspector’s order to surrender the animal in possession, s/he may be liable to pay an infringement fee of up to 500,000 won (US$ 500).

Nevertheless, the government was cautious and reluctant to recognise the right to seize an animal as it invades property rights. For that reason, the Bill Review Committee had suggested that the wording be modified from “shall” in Gong’s Bill to “may”. So, animal protection inspectors may seize an animal under ill-treatment and separate it from the person who is ill-treating the animal, or may also, when deemed necessary, take the animal to an animal protection agency or a veterinarian for treatment.

The real positive impact of this seizure provision is still dubious as its wording is not only rendered soft but also strikingly vague – there is no legal definition for ill-treatment in APA. Taking into account that it is a fundamental tenet of a liberal democratic society like Korea that a person should be left alone to enjoy their possessions with the minimum interference from the state, if the threshold for seizure is too vague, it in turn leaves the effectiveness of the amendment in question.

Now, let us go back to the earlier question: would the amendment be able to prevent ill-treatment of slaughter dogs? As evidenced throughout the foregoing analysis, the amendment will most likely fall short of securing even the most basic welfare needs of dogs reared at breeders. The animal protectionists’ assessment too is that it will bring about few positive implications. However, more importantly than it may seem, the amendment will send out a bold message to the public, that inflicting pain or injury to an animal, even if it is of one’s own, is an indictable criminal offence.

The Politics of Dog Meat

During the run-up to the 2002 Korea-Japan Soccer World Cup, many Korean lawmakers, disgusted by what are seen as ignorant condemnations from the West, have been pushing to regulate, or to put it...
differently, legalise, the industry. At the heart of the debate stands Kim Hong-Sin, then a Member of the National Assembly: “some foreigners, because of their lack of cultural understanding, have gone so far as to insult the Korean people over eating dogs”. Highlighting that non-regulation of slaughter dogs has led to unhygienic, dreadful breeding conditions, he argued that the government must not be sidetracked by some foreigners who have a biased point of view, but rather prioritise health of people who consume dog meat. He also pointed out that classifying dogs as livestock so as to regulate their welfare under LPA would actually enhance their welfare – a point which might depressingly be true and also one which neatly summarises how useless APA is. Nonetheless, his two legalisation attempts made in August and December 1999 in which he proposed a Livestock Processing Amendment Bill to add certain slaughter dog breeds in the definition of livestock, were both turned down by MAF.

These legalisation attempts marked the rise of animal activism in Korea. Animal protectionists have launched anti-dog meat campaigns by highlighting that regulation of dog meat is a double-edged sword – once dogs are classified as livestock there is no turning back from the factory farming of dogs. The first attempt was made in November 1999, in response to Kim Hong-Sin’s proposal, with a Bill proposing a ban on slaughtering dogs and cats for food and medicinal use drafted by the Korea Animal Protection Society (KAPS). Later in 2004, the coalition of animal protection groups issued their model version of what an amendment bill should entail, which takes a similar approach to the 1999 Bill but includes a separate definition for “companion animal”.

The government too knows that legalisation of dog meat is going over the top and no government department wants to take on such an unpopular and troublesome task. It faces a policy deadlock: on the one hand you have a strong opposition from animal protectionists, but on the other hand, a widespread acceptance of dog meat and a virtually unregulated two billion US dollar industry.

Compelled to “do something about it”, the government has been seeking to break the policy deadlock. While leaning towards regulating the industry, it strategically emphasises hygiene and wastewater problems of dog breeders, to justify the position of the government – why it has no other policy option but to regulate the industry. Finally, on 9 March 2005, the government announced its proposal to hygienically control dog meat while maintaining the status quo legal status of dogs – i.e., without classifying dogs as livestock under LPA. Its plan is to amend a MAF’s administrative regulation on inspecting animals which are not livestock but raised and consumed by humans (currently they are ostriches, badgers, and nutrias), to include dogs so that they can be hygienically slaughtered and


218 Ibid.

219 Cho, supra n 11.

220 Ibid.


222 KARA, supra n 25, 13.


228 MAF Ordinance No. 1441 (2003); LPA Article 40-2.
This approach – establishing a legal basis to regulate dog meat industry – in effect, recognises dog meat as legitimate food and slaughter dogs as edible livestock. This policy option is perceived as easier to implement and more acceptable as it requires no amendment to law but only to an administrative regulation.

The government indeed has public support. In a survey conducted by the Korean Association for Policy Studies, only 25.1 percent support banning dog meat while 74.9 percent oppose the ban. The majority, 58.4 percent picked hygiene as the first policy priority, above the animal protection (30.9 percent), followed by the environment (8.0 percent). Also in a voluntary online questionnaire survey on dog meat, 73 percent say they support legalising dog meat while the remaining 27 percent oppose it. In yet another similar survey, 80 percent oppose banning dog meat whereas only 20 percent support the ban.

The public polls lead us to another question – whether outlawing dog meat can actually take place without changing the minds of the public. In principle, law can lead public opinion: the legal and social realms are inextricably connected, and laws are themselves highly influential in forming people’s moral perspectives. However, in practice, without a considerable degree of social progress, legal development is unlikely to take place. In fact, while the law follows the development of sentiment within society, yet it seldom leads that sentiment. Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that individuals may be certain in their own minds but the law has to reflect a moral consensus. In other words, the law has to take into account different aims, such as public health and animal welfare, which are not necessarily compatible. Therefore, until a larger segment of society accepts that the consumption of dog meat is something that can be given up by the society, which is not yet observed in Korea, legal changes will necessarily be limited. Realistically, dog meat is not going to be banned under law without a social consensus first being

Currently, legitimate methods of slaughter for ostriches are electrocution, carbon dioxide anesthetisation, and exsanguination; and for badgers and nutrias are bashing, electrocution, shooting, stabbing, carbon dioxide anesthetisation, and exsanguination. Annex 1 of MAF Ordinance No. 1441 (2003).

Biopsy and autopsy inspections are required. During a biopsy, for example, an inspector examines posture, behaviour, nutritive conditions, respiratory conditions, skins, fur, and also when deemed necessary, pulse, body temperature, eyelids, nasal cavity, oral cavity, and anus. Ibid.


161
reached. In this sense, the biggest legal challenge for the society is to reach a moral consensus in relation to dog meat. After all, it is society which needs to consider a particular activity to be illegitimate.

Conclusion
Caught in the conflict over their status as companion and livestock animals, dogs in Korea occupy a peculiar place in legal and social realms. Many Koreans, especially from older generations, are still unable to understand what sets dogs apart from other livestock animals. They see the campaign against dog meat as a cultural imperialist threat.

Indeed, despite mounting pressures from animal protectionists within and abroad, Korea’s virtually unregulated dog meat industry remains intact. With lack of political commitment, the ban on sale of dog meat imposed in the early 1980s was never enforced. APA, entailing the only legal provisions to protect the welfare of slaughter dogs, is a law on paper only. Trapped in the dog meat controversy, the animal protection regime has been unable to undergo any significant legal development. The Amendment Act 2006, the first amendment to APA since 1991, is unlikely to produce any substantial improvement of manners and conditions in which slaughter dogs are reared and slaughtered. Meanwhile, the government plans to regulate the dog meat industry by classifying dogs as “animals which are not livestock but nevertheless eaten” alongside ostriches, badgers, and nutrias. Animal protectionists fight back, but with no public support.

The analysis from a socio-legal perspective has revealed that legal changes strengthening animal protection law will only come when the dog meat controversy is resolved, which in turn requires socio-cultural internalisation of the norm against consumption of dog meat. The main barrier to genuine social acceptance of the norm is how eating of dog meat is socially defined as being part of culture and how the debate is framed as a clash between cultures in Korea. Only when they are redefined and reframed, will legal measures to ban dog meat and improve the welfare standards of animals follow. Legal and social challenges are closely interrelated. One will not be resolved without the other.

Contact Address
Rakhyun Kim
The University of Auckland
Auckland 1142, New Zealand
PH: +64-212200814
EMAIL: rkim011@ec.auckland.ac
The Evolution and Policy Context of Youth Policy in the Republic of Korea

Bambang Shergi Laksmono & Rinaldi Erfan
University of Indonesia, Indonesia

Abstract
This article looks into the nature of youth policy in the Republic of Korea, looking broadly into and embraces the essential elements, the evolution and the institutional establishments that were development for its implementation. Youth policy is perceived critical in the sustainability of the economy and is being considered as one of the determining factor in the future of the country’s capacity to win global competition. The essence of youth policy basically covers youth protection and youth development and includes the importance of its national implementation structure. This article also explores various forms of international treaties that impinge on the national social development agenda that relates to youth affairs in the country.

1. Youth Policy, Youth Protection and Youth Development
There are a number of ways to gain entry into youth issues. For the purpose of this study, youth policy is related to the formulation of, the content and the implementation of public policies related to the life youth. Because of its political authority, government policies are seen as the important guiding instrument that deserves critical analysis into its core and overriding values. The presence of government policies and the existence of laws will provide an important avenue to understand the concerns and priorities over time. Bogenschneider and Gross. (2004) defined youth policy as the development, enactment, and implementation of a law, rule, code, or judicial decision targeted toward young people, aged 10 to 24, on topics such as child welfare, education, employment and training, family support, juvenile justice, and the welfare system.

According to International Council of Youth Policy, the term “Youth policy” implies the policy that is drafted by the government in cooperation with youth organizations and adopted by the Parliament or Ministerial Council or Head of a country, which clearly determines the place and role of youth in society, as well as the responsibility of society and public institutions towards youth. In order to cope with those problems and obstacles faced by the youth, and also in order to create constructive environment for them to be a future leader of the nation, every nation needs a relevant and dynamic youth policy.

In the context of youth policy in the Republic of Korea, looking to a comprehensive perspective in the youth policy decision making, the ideal of the process of the making youth policy is the government as a decision maker have its responsibility to take the service of youth as citizen. But, in the process later, the government are should be able to synergy its main responsibility to serve its citizen with both domestic and international affair. Therefore the policy outputs are wide comprehensively in perspective looking for young people and synergy with both government domestic and international affair. The explanation above can be described in diagram below.
From the diagram above, youth policy should be developed and directed based on the needs of the youth, such as education and long term learning process, employment, social protection and the equal opportunity in every field. More than that, in every level of community, youth policy should address the interests of the youth and involves them in social life, economics, politics and culture in the scope of a nation.

Youth policy should also be able to create an environment consists young people who can develop as human being which are needed by the community for their own prosperity in the future. Therefore, youth policy is expected to coordinate the regulation and the long term plan on the youth policy itself which will effect to the youth development as a member of society directly or indirectly.

If all the aspects above are already fulfilled, the society will create youth which is categorized as follows:

1. Autonomous: Able to make a decision and control themselves independently in social life and become an important part in the community.
2. Supportive: Be sensitive to each other, and act with and for themselves, and sharing to each other.
3. Responsible: Be responsible for everything they do, have a strong commitment and discipline.
4. Committed: Able to respect a value and act based on the value they committed to.

Pittman (1995) stated that a good process of youth development should have 6 basic principles. They are as follows:

1. The purpose should be more than just prevention, it means when prevention and rehabilitation on youth problems become crucial, the purpose of youth development should be more than that. This is to help the development for all youths, mentally and physically; competent in school, work place, and in the community; self-confidence, have a strong character and keep in touch with family and peer group.
2. The process should be long-lasting, comprehensive and involving the youth. We must realize that the process of improvement does not always run quickly. We should treat youth as human beings.
who have various needs and wants, do not describe them by looking at their personality or certain circumstances.

3. The strategy (treatment, intervention, services, or program) must start from the basic. Youth needs health care, good schools, safety places to spare their times and transportation. Besides that, they also need maintenance in relationship and opportunities to try some new regulations and help one another.

4. Youth Development should happen in everywhere. Youth development is not just a responsibility of one organization. Schools, family, work places, environment, community organizations, and government agencies should together be involved. The commitment to involve adolescents (parents, neighbors, teachers, community informal leaders) is the key factor in the successful of a youth development approach.

5. There should be a mission, not just coordination. All stake holders in youth development should have a commitment to the same purpose and create a rational action to achieve that purpose. They must work together to achieve it.

Youth protection is more specific than youth policy. The task of youth protection is, in one hand, to protect young people from dangers to their physical, mental and emotional development and in the other hand to promote their readiness and ability to take responsibility for themselves. Youth protection laws therefore provide a legal framework for parents, guardians and young people, within which specific agreements (e.g. how long young people may stay out, holidays, visits to public houses, bars and attending events, the consumption of tobacco and alcohol) can be negotiated.

2. The Challenge of Youth Protection and Development in Korea

Youth represents a specific age group, basically those of early teens. There are different official age definitions, adapting to different perspectives and interest of a country. This age group, broadly ranging from early teen to early twenties, undergoes very specific physical and psychological changes. They experience significant broadening of views, needs and expectations which is their journey to maturity. Teenagers are dynamic and full of potentials. In this transitory period, teenagers develop their personal identity; begin to develop relationship with the opposite sex and in many instances being dangerously exposed to various external influences. While the majority of teenager might succeed in their critical transitory phases, some might get involved into trouble situation. There certainly are rebellious moments, emotional conflicts, within families and sometimes with the law. These specific features of the sensitive age period add to the needs of very careful approaches to optimize their potentialities.

From an official point of view, the youth group of a nation is definitely a critical asset of a nation’s future. In demographic terms, they form the strategic labor as well as the intellectual potential for a country’s sustainability in future. Social policy, seen as an area of public respond for healthy societal growth, is substantially concerned with deliberate policy intervention towards achieving an ideal youth situation. Within the purpose of youth development, any responsible government has to deal with a number of different pressures. From the perspective of the right’s approach, youth should be guaranteed all their rights, enabling them to develop as much positive modalities as possible. Young people in all countries are both a major human resource for development and key agents for social change, economic development and technological innovation. Their view of the world, energies and vision are essential for the continuing development of the societies in which they live. The government however, also calculates all of its public provision on the basis of citizenship rights. Any kind of public investment should in return benefits the society as a whole. An economic feasibility could well be a major determining factor for an augmentation for youth policy. It is at the end, a country’s future survivability is at stake. From a government interventionist view, youth policy is essential, in filling the gap where the family responsibilities have subsided and to catch up with the fast moving youth sometimes unexpected turns.

Over the past several decades, a number of countries have initiated the design and implementation of national policies and strategies focused on youth. However, many countries do not have specific structures in place for its effective implementation and for the necessary youth participation. Neither have they successfully managed to mainstream youth concerns, as the issues relating to young people fall across a variety of policy areas such as education, health or juvenile delinquency. In this context, the government has a multiple task of coordinating various sector ministries to cater the needs of youth as individual member of the society but also to play the role the way the government want them. Youth policy is expected to meet the needs for their normal course towards biological maturity, psychological stability and young people social-cultural values.

Youth policy of any nature has its specific challenges. It is almost undeniable that the socio-economic as well political challenges of the last 10 years, probably has been the most complex for most part of the world, as national and global situation have changed dramatically. This is also true for the people of Korea. First, The globe has now turned into one borderless and complex inter-related entity.
Each country will need to maneuver strategically on the basis of its own strength. The Republic Korea, having robust and sustained economic growth, has its own challenges for its youth population. Open to the road to modernity, the Korean teenagers and the rest of the young generation eventually become the crucial foundation of the nation’s industrial competitive edge. With this regard, the Korean Government of the Republic of Korea has determined to produce youth policies that not only to develop young people in the Nation’s industrial competitive edge, but also to protect them against harmful influences of physical objects, information and other materials.

It is worthwhile to look at the statistics for one moment. As of July 1, 2004, the total population of Korea is 48,082,163 and the population density is 482.7 people/ km2. The male population is 24,228,209 and the female population is 23,853,954, the gender ratio is 100: 101.6 (female: male). The youth population (aged 9~24) which is 23.3% of the whole population, consists of 5,892,480 males and 5,325,965 females, adding up to 11,218,445. The gender ratio of female to male is 100: 110.6. From 1960 to 1980 the percentage of the youth population (aged 9~24) has continuously increased from 31.8% (7,957,000) to 36.8% (14,015,000) reaching its highest in 1980, but by 2001 it had decreased to 24.1% (11,420,000). It is projected that the percentage of youth will continually decrease to 20.8% (10,336,000) in 2010 and by 2030 it will reach 14.6% (7,338,000). (Korea National Statistical Office, 2005). The statistics provided describes that by the proportion, eventually the youth segment will decrease. Would this imply youth policy as less important? Korea has to survive greater independency rate, meaning to survive with less number of productive age in the future. What would this population decrease mean in terms of youth policy? At this research stage, it is impossible to get a verified perspective on how demography will effect the formulation of youth policy as such. However, the government of Korea definitely is concerned about the quality of its young generation, their productivity and the overall quality for their appropriate role in the country’s national development.

3. Gradual Changes in Youth Policy and Domestic Affairs

Youth issues are important part in Korean national development. Since the formation of the country, the Korean government considered that youth is a strategic component in its development scheme. The governments had set up and build the infrastructure they need to prepare youth for globalization, where they will have to compete fiercely in worldwide market. The Korean government for example, had launched a campaign which introduced the idea of youth as the “Hero of Today” as the new set of policy deliberation The Korean national project, known as the BK21, is another the ambitious plan introduced in the country (Kim, 2001). There are a number of observation can be made to substantive changes within youth policy in Korea. Observations can be made particularly into development of laws; in terms of typology, period of its enactment and the institutions formed to implement the policies.

It is acknowledged that gaining a comprehensive view of social policy within a country definitely is not a simple task. It is necessary to follow the pertaining debates that are linked to the formation of various laws and regulations. At least, this study is able to track the evolution of some of the critical policies related directly to youth affairs. To respond to the changing environment and to meet with future challenges, the government of Korean formulated youth policies that include youth participation policy, youth welfare policy as well as youth protection policy. The nature of youth policy, basic principles of youth development, and youth policy issues are regulated on the basis of the country’s Youth Basic Law which will be described in the following section.

3.1. The National Youth Policy

The 21st Century is expected to be a turning point for Korean Civilization. As such, with the existing policy goals and strategies would have its limits in endowing the young generation with the qualities needed as a democratic citizen of the 21st century.

Youth policies at the national level have been implemented on the basis of the Government’s five-year youth development plans. The first Five- years Youth Development Plan was established in 1993 (1993-1997), the second plan of 1998 (1998-2002) is followed by the third plan of 2003 (2003- 2007). It is also important to underline the difference in the policy basic outlook. Looking into its basic ingredients and philosophy, youth policy in Korea forms three different stages as follows: (Office of The president Republic of Korea, 2003).

Youth protection stage, policy have been focused in creating an environment conducive for the prevention of juvenile delinquency and focusing on guiding and protecting the youth.

2nd Stage: 1998 – 2002
Youth Support stage, policy have been focused on nurturing the youth into democratic citizens, engaging the youth in voluntary activities, teaching them self-discipline and fostering qualities needed as a future member of society.

3rd Stage: 2003 – 2007
Youth as the hero of today, the main concern is in the reposition of the youth as a member of society and helping them find their interests and develop their potential, getting teens involved in community activities and help them play their part in a society.

Policy approaches of Stage 4 of 5-Year-Development Plan for Youth Support are the systematic steps in taken by the Government of Korea to achieve the goals of youth development relevant for the challenges of the highly competitive world. There are substantial shift that emanated over the decades. Embedded in this strategy, several basic principles have been adopted, namely in the shift from protection and guidance to independence, from provision to unify, systemic and integrated policy and finally, from division system to comprehend coincide with changing environment of youth policies.

The current National Youth Policy was implemented through the National Youth Commission from its inception in May, 2005 and reformed the Vision and Perspectives of the Newly Integrated Youth Policy. In the unified Youth Policy, youth is regarded as a core period in life in which a young person matures into an adult. The Green Growing approach has been adopted and officially launched as the new vision of National Youth Policy.

In order to accomplish the Green Growing policy, the following policy principles have been formulated as follows:

- A policy that pursues the safety and happiness of the young;
- A policy that provides dreams, hopes, challenges and chances;
- A policy that involves youths, parents, and local community.

3.1. A. The Youth Charter and Law
In the range year 1989 – 2005, Korean government has made a big step in youth policy. Not only amending previous law, but also made several law related to youth. It is important to see how youth laws evolved in the country, particularly looking into the typology and time dimension. From 1989 – 2005, Korean government has made a big step in youth policy. The Government not only amending previous laws, but also made several new laws related to youth. These are several laws which were produced from 1989 – 2005:

- Youth Development Law (1987)
- Youth Charter (Enacted: 1990; revised Oct 5th 1998)
- Youth Basic Law (first enacted: 1991; revised: 1993)
- Youth Protection Law (July 1st, 1997)
- Youth Juvenile Sex Protection Law (July, 2000)
- Youth Activity Promotion Law (Feb, 9th 2004)
- Youth Welfare Support Law (Feb, 9th 2004)

3.1. B. The National Youth Organization
To respond the demand on the implementation of the law and regulation of youth, the Korean government also has attempted to unify institutions that enable them to integrate and formulate more effective youth policies and youth integrated service system. The list above is describing the historical time frame of youth organization.

- Youth Protection Measures Committee (1964)
- Youth Bureau (1987)
- Council of Youth Related Agency (July 1st 1989)
- The Office of Coordination of Youth Policy (1991)
- Korea Institute for Youth Development (Jan, 1st 1993)
- The Korean Youth Counseling Institute (1993)
- Youth Protection Committee
- Youth Committee for Youth Development (1998)
- Korea Youth Service Center (2005)
- National Youth Commission (May 2nd 2005)
3.1. The Youth Development Fund

Funds for promoting National youth policies are largely classified in the government budget, local transferred money, and youth development fund. The government fund is the budget needed by the central government to conduct its work for youth development. The local transferred fund is money supplied to local governments by the central government to finance the creation of youth facilities, support study rooms, etc. Aside from the governmental budget and local transferred funds, the central government establishes youth development fund to invest in youth policies.

The youth development fund was established in 1987 on the basis of the Youth Development Law in order to secure the funds for the stable and continuous support of youth development work that can contribute to the development of well rounded individuals. According to the revised Youth Basic Law of February of 2004, to give stable support, the Youth Development Project has made a target of five trillion won fund raising. The raised amount of money of the Youth Development Fund by the end of 2004 is 3,305 billion won. If necessary, local governments can develop their own youth development funds. The Youth Development Fund is composed of money donated by the government, cash, goods, and property donated by parties other than the government, profits generated by the operation of the fund, and other profits prescribed under the Presidential Decree. It is used to support activities, construct and operate facilities, train leaders, and support activities of youth organizations, cares for poor youths, exchange, etc. (http://youth.go.kr/eng/emb/emb04100.asp).

3.2. National Culture Identity

One of more characteristics of Korean traditional culture which has been long and continuous exist was Korea as a unified country. The Koreans have reminded remarkably homogeneous and have been termed “Han Minjok” (meaning “Korea nation”). This characteristic has become an essential basis for Korean Nationalism and did in reaction to foreign imperialism and occupation during the late 19th and 20th century.

Beside the nationalism, Korean people were also had influence from the Confucianism, the Chosun dynasty emphasized humanity, ethical morality, and spiritual self-cultivation. Confucius, whose name is a Latin form of the way he was known in Chinese, which was “Gong Fuzi,” literally “Master Gong,” taught that people are not created equal and do not become equal throughout their lives. Rather, when they are born they are weak and need parents. When they are in school they are bigger or smaller or older or younger by age than other students. When they marry, wives are subordinate. With friends they have mutual duties and obligations. And as citizens they are subject to the authority of the government, king, or emperor.

The issue of national cultural identity first arose from the sense of cultural discontinuity between Korean culture and contemporary culture, remaining the influence of Japanese colonialism (1910 – 1945), the divided Korea (1945 – present), The Korean War (1950 - 1953). Rapid modernization and the apparently indiscriminate incursion of western culture. In the Japanese colonialism, the Japanese occupation has deprived Koreans of their chance to modernizing themselves beyond traditional characteristics. Moreover, the division of territory which made by Japanese colonial government for at least 55 years has growing the difference and heterogeneity in the whole areas of society, including language and culture and arts.

The divided Korea since 1945 made the different ideology between North Korea and South Korea. The North Korea was dominated by the communism and socialism ideology, while South Korea founded on the basis of democracy and capitalism. In the North Korea, the literature and art were based on the North Korean brand of socialism called “Juche Thought” (meaning “self reliance”) and it used to legitimating the Party's thought. In this respect, North Korea continued to close it door toward art based on capitalism and western democracy.

Western culture has start permeate Korean society since the late 19th century and spread rapidly after the Korean War of 1950. Moreover, the process of modernization since 1960 which based on capitalism and consumerism seems has swept the country and indeed affected the way of life of South Korean.

Confucianism, therefore, is a living system of values in Korea, and whether or not it is a “religion” is less important than the fact that Koreans understand its precepts as a guide for their own lives. Indeed, it fits well with other religions. Christian churches, for example, are run very much according to Confucian rules governing mutual expectations and obligations among members, and between members and their religious leaders.

From the describe of Confucian as a way of Korean life and the issue of national cultural identity above, the making of youth related policy are urged to take by the government both for establishing the national culture heritage from the rapid of global information and culture, developing the young citizen themselves in the virtue, harmony, faithfulness, propriety, righteousness and loyalty and protecting young citizen as a moral morality of Korean young citizen.
3.3. The Welfare for Young Citizen

Based on the Newly Unified Youth Policy, national youth policies are largely categorized as:

- **The construction of a social safety net for youths in crisis**
  The main idea of this task is to build a crisis solving system of shelters and support system in cooperation with local community organizations. It also support youth at crisis who are engaged in advancing in society as a successful social member, and provides realistic services that match the crisis being experienced.

- **The ensuring various activity opportunities**
  To develop the capacity needed for digital and global information society of the 21st century, and to execute the five days a week school policy. Enlarging youth opportunities through 3I (Information, Infrastructure and Incentive) movement, giving the various chances for such activities and the three elements of youth activities (facilities, programs, and leaders) and keep professional, specialize, and elevation in promoting policies in order to create a continuous demand.

- **The promotion of rights for youth participation**
  It reflects various policies that enhance the rights and youth participation which come together to form a basic foundation so that young people may participate in all areas related to youth.

- **The improvement of the environment for the young**
  It is a basic responsibility for the nation and society to form the safe and healthy environment for the youth to grow in. Solutions for negative effects on the youth such as bad effects of media, the increasing of pleasure seeking industry, the low-age smokers, and the exposure to child and youth sex crimes are being reflected on youth policies.

  From the National youth policies describe above, seems that Korean government presented 2 major activities. They are protecting and developing youth. The government takes the protecting activities in order to protect vulnerable youth who may fall into the crisis and to protect youth in crisis. For youth who still can solve their crisis, the government takes as support agent to develop youth in advancing their ability and capacity as the need of digital and global information society. The government takes this role as a service center provider (enabler), supporting facilities and infrastructure (supporter) and also legislator by producing and promoting youth related policies.

4. International Affair Consideration

4.1. International Treaties

There are several international conventions which Korean Government had ratified. From the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, there are several international conventions which are ratified by the government of Republic of Korea such as:

- The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination CERD (Jan 04th 1979)
- The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Woman – CEDAW (Jan 26th 1985)
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – CESCR (July 10th 1990)
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR (July 10th 1990)
- The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPRP1 (July 10th 1990)
- The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or punishment – CAT (Feb 08th 1995)
- The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Right of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict – CRCOPAC (Sept 06th 2000)

5. Analysis: Towards an Integrated and Holistic View of Youth Policy

It is important at this stage to provide a comprehensive view of all the laws and policies related to youth development and protection in Korea. The landscape will include the variety of both domestic and international affairs of Korean Government. The relevant government’s political-will, national cultural identity and social welfare responsibilities are several points of view of the Korean government domestic affairs.

From explanation above, the Korean Government domestic affairs related to youth, show us how
Korean government try to service youth as its citizen in 2 ways. There are to service youth because of their right as a citizen to be service by the government and to service youth in order to synergy and accelerate government vision in the development of Korean young person.

The Korean government needs to accomplish Korean young people rights, because both as a state responsibility in serve its citizen and also because the international treaty which are the state ratified. In the youth charter, there are several rights and responsibilities of youth. And also, from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, there are also several International Human Rights Treaties which Korean Government been ratified. This mean that Korean Government have some obligation to fulfill young people rights, yet because it conducted in the Korean Law related to the youth, and also because the implementation of the international treaties which government been ratified.

The Progress of International Human Rights Treaties of the Republic of Korea

- The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Right of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict – CRCOPAC (Sept 06th 2000)
- The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or punishment – CAT (Feb 08th 1995)
- The Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPROP1 (July 10th 1990)
- The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – CCPR (July 10th 1990)
- The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – CESCR (July 10th 1990)
- CEDAW (Jan 26th 1985)
- CERD (Jan 04th 1979)

Source: Laksmono, et. al., 2007
From the youth rights and responsibilities in Korea, the Korean Government also has its consideration in the development of Korean young persons. Every Nations in all over the world are indeed having their vision and mission to develop their citizen. In the Korean Government context, the vision and mission above constructed in the ministerial structure, unification of youth policy and also in the youth development plan. It also supported with government fund as youth development fund.

The Evolution of Youth Laws in the Republic of Korea

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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Law</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Youth Charter (Enacted: 1990; revised Oct 5th 1998)</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Youth Protection Law (July 1st, 1997)</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Youth Welfare Support Law (Feb, 9th 2004)</td>
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Source: Laksmono, et. al., 2007

It also needs to look the international affair points of view. International treaty and globalization are several perceptions which cannot leave behind as the considerations in the policy making process. It is necessary to get a complete list of both domestic and international laws and policies related to young person to know the broad spectrum of critical national and international issues they all deal with. The above sections had provided descriptions that served the purpose of depicting in details of the breadth of issues these laws took account. A great deal of information can be derived looking first into the range of issues covered in order to complete the youth person’s need. Second, it is worthwhile also to see the sequence and timing of the launching of laws and policies, looking from the country’s political and economic development. Third, inter-variable connection description will allow a comprehensive understanding of how laws and policies contribute to a broader strategic national objective of resilience, competitiveness and citizenship responsibility.

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**Contact Address**

Bambang Shergi Laksmono  
University of Indonesia  
Kampus Baru UI Depok, West Java  
Indonesia 16424  
PH: (62-21) 7872823  
FAX: (62-21) 7872820  
EMAIL: bshergi@yahoo.com

Rinaldi Erfan  
University of Indonesia  
Kampus Baru UI Depok, West Java  
Indonesia 16424  
PH: (62-21) 7270006  
FAX: (62-21) 7872820  
EMAIL: erfankessos@yahoo.com
Youth Protection Challenges in Korea

Hendratno and Bambang Shergi Laksmono
University of Indonesia, Indonesia

Abstract

Youth protection is growing to be an important subject as it address measures intended to curb negative influences that surrounds both the physical as well as mental aspects of youth's process towards full maturity. The possible threats come from youth's interaction within the family, with peers and various groups in their community. As the term implies, youth protection would involve the specific threatening elements that constructed by the state. The government of Korea identifies drugs and narcotics use, harmful information, HIV infection and tobacco use as examples of elements that need to be restricted and controlled. From a broad perspective, the government of Korea controls the macro environment while continue to empower and expect the family stay intact in guarding the safe process of towards adulthood.

Introduction

This article intends to gain an understanding into the way the government of Korea handles youth matters, particularly those related with youth protection. Today, any government would face enormous task of creating the healthy passage that youth will pass through in their transition. All the efforts to shape youth’s future are geared towards achieving the ultimate goal should be the creation of youth population that have all the positive qualities that meet the complex challenges of the world today and in the future. Although not all will be dealt in detail in this study, but there are three basic questions that relate to this issue, first what area and to what extend does youth related problems exist in Korea. Second, in what areas does the government get itself involved and third, how does the state define its role in relation to the roles of the family with regard to youth issues. The study question into how, in what areas and how far does the government get involved into youth matters that traditionally have been the authority of the family. Many other questions will follow; do families, being conformed to the traditions of Confucianism, continue to be the dominant caring institution? Does the government empower the families, and in what ways? How does youth issue take form and being responded as one of the agenda of social policy in Korea? Would the growing economic affluence made an impact on youth behavior? Are there any interesting trends of youth behavior that is observable? Indeed there are many aspects that can further be explored. All these are important questions, because they all pertain to how, ultimately, a growing nation constructs and ensures a healthy development of youth, so critical to the survivability of a human resource and technology based economy of a country such as Korea.

The frame of thought and the drive behind this study partly stemmed from the inspiring discussion about the knotty issues related to safe upbringing of children, which is relevant to families and also in the wider forum of changing society. In the book *Contesting Childhood* (Wyness, 2000), many critical dimensions related to the upbringing process of children in the UK were brought up, particularly on the question of authority. Whose authority and to what extend childhood protection should belongs to the state? In the book, Wyness had poised on the following points: first, parents as the key agents lose their authority over their children because they cannot compete with the debilitating and totalizing influence of the state. Second, the fact that the state is both the source of, and the partial solution to, the problem of childhood is largely a product of an inflexible and overt dichotomous model of family-state relations. The problem of childhood thus rests on series of oppositional elements that sets children against the state. In principle, childhood is seen as a crucial matter not only to the family but also of the state. No one, either the government or the family, could overlook the importance of critical phases of a growing child.

Childhood and the issue of youth welfare are similar in the fact that they both have to undergo the process of (and sometimes to endure the growing pains) physical and psychological transition. It is true that childhood and youth growing processes have similarities that they involve the family and the state authority. However, it is not appropriate to simply to imply totally childhood to the situation of adolescence. Youth has specific situation, as it involves sexuality and expectations for societal roles. Youth, which comes in different stages of maturity, involve different emotional maturity. Reaching puberty age and adolescence may involve craze and craves of some trendy (market –driven) materials. There are things associated with popular idols and pop culture. The search for self-identity and testing a relationship will continue for a long span of time. There are many critical times when a teenager might some psychological stresses and need professional help. Some teenagers might be caught in some forms of addiction, for example to tobacco, drugs or alcoholics. Unwanted pregnancy, AIDS and sexually transmitted diseases are also known to inflict some youths. In smaller number and proportion of the youth population, some
forms of delinquency take the form of truancy, violence gang-fights and sexual offences. Youth are also prone to harmful information. Definitely, youth are contested between more groups in the society. Peer groups, the parents, partners and the state themselves have an interest in them.

It is worthwhile at this point to mention about the relation of the market with youth issues. Let's not forget that the market and the industry of various goods and services also haunt them. From many angles and especially because of their number and spending behavior, youth are easy target and seen as the most lucrative and the most sought after market segment. Consumption is one particular issue that needs to be discussed further. Basically, there is infinite wants among people and there is always the temptation to over consume. Modern societies, and definitely Korea is one good example, have ample of options and the capacity to purchase. Corrigan (1997, p10) delineates that a point common to modern production and consumption lies in the fact that they both represent breaks with tradition. Traditional consumption is quite fixed: there are a finite number of needs to be filled and the only wants and desires anyone might have would relate quite directly to this narrow sphere. He “further asserted that the modern pleasure seeker, then, can find pleasure in almost anything... necessary in the world of consumer goods to appear as the hedonistic playground we make it to be today and that pleasure is tied to emotions, search for pleasure in any or all experiences.” Corrigan, 1997 p 10 and 16

In respect to the above discussions, the critical issue concerns with the creation of healthy environment or youth to grow and mature. In a broad perspective, this will be the area of policy studies and particularly of social policy. Recognizing the roles of the government and also of the family, it is still problematic to get the right weigh or scale of government intervention. In what areas does youth protection is crucial and in which has less priority for the government of Korea. There is a fundamental question on how does the government define its responsibility? This is critical especially with the growing perspective that youth are supposedly socially competent actors. However, many governments of today continued to be challenged that policy should continue to be the mean of moral rescue, being active in the current declining role of the families.

Looking at the above background, it is pertinent to explore the relevance of the above concerns with the existing and future conditions of Korea. The following sub section will attempt to map the existing youth related regulations and laws in Korea. This will be the entry point to further explore the issues pertaining to the philosophy and nature of youth policy in the dynamic growth the nation of Korea.

Below is the analytical framework to where we can see the relation among the components in youth issues in Korea.

### Analytical Framework

[Laksmono, et al, 2007]

**Youth problems, government and family involvement on youth issues**

Youth problem is quite similar with adult problem in some ways, but different in the way they cope with it. Some youths face their problem by enabling their own ability and capacity to solve it. But sometimes they do it wrong, so that is why they still need help from professional. Misguided and lack of
knowledge on how to cope with problems among the youths making them possible to find their own solution. Commonly, youth problem in Korea is quite the same with youth problem in another country. From some literatures we find in Korean mass and electronic media, youth always deal with drugs, narcotics, HIV/AIDS, tobacco, unwanted pregnancy, STDs, self identity and schools. These problems are not only youth responsible to be solved, but also involving government, as a state institution, and family as smallest institution in the neighborhood. Both institutions can play their part to protect youth form any dangerous situation.

Government has an important role to play to protect youth from this prone situation. Indeed, they have to be able to design some regulations and laws to protect and to guide youth during their growing process. As youth protection issues becomes an alert for the government, a set of regulations and laws must be uphold to carry on this youth issues. Infrastructures, programs, facilities must be provided to the needs of the youth, so they can play their role safety in society. In order to achieve their goals to protect youth in Korea, some state institutions have been set up. So far, government intervention areas are limited to the policy, regulation, program, and infrastructure, but they can not interfere in personal change behavior.

Thus, family as the leading institution plays its own role to play this part. Because children's live are centered initially within their families, the family environment becomes the primary agent of socialization. Since each family is made up of different individuals in a different setting, each family environment is unique. The environments can differ in many ways. A family is a primary group. This entails “People who are intimate and have frequent face-to-face contact with one another, have norms (that is, expectations regarding how members in the groups should behave) in common, and share mutually enduring and extensive influences” (barker, 1991, p.181). Therefore, family can build the strong character for their children hop to behave and how to act. But another problem will follow, because family can not control and protect their children 24 hours, due to the children have their own outside-activities that can not be controlled by the family.

Since the families provide an immediate, intimate social environment for children as they grow and develop, however, families do not exist in a vacuum. They are in constant interaction with numerous other systems permeating the macro social environment. Families can only provide care giving and nurturance to the extent that other macro systems in the environment provide support. These macro systems, which include communities and organizations, are in turn directly impacted by the social forces surging and driving daily life (Zastrow, p.147).

On the other hand, there is a boundary and difference between the government and family role regarding to the development and protection of youth. The area of intervention is clear, while government plays in the macro system, the family does the same in the micro system.

Korean families, with its traditional philosophy, which is Confucianism, now is being asked on how those families can keep and nurture the Confucianism taught in the families to be socialized to their children. The fact that the problems that youth in Korea are facing nowadays is far from Confucianism. It can be the influence of the western culture or just because the Korean people have gradually lefted the Confucianism behind. The Confucianism taught which had been derived from their ancestors, is the most valuable philosophy way of live in Korea. It is the task and responsible of Korean government to empower the family to plant the Confucianism spirit backs to the heart of their children.

The form of youth issues in Korea can be divided into 2 categories. They are youth development and youth protection issues. In this study, we try to focus on youth protection issues. Youth protection issues are one of the agenda of the social policy in Korea. Youth as the easy target to the harmful and dangerous exploitation or violence is indeed need a protection from the government, so that is why Korean government needs to protect and control the youth. Many regulations and laws were set up specifically to address this issues regarding with many problems that are faced by youth such as narcotics, HIV/AIDS, STDs, sexual exploitation, delinquency, tobacco and unwanted pregnancy.

Along with the rapid economic growth, Korea becomes one the biggest developing country in the region. This rapid growth changes the Korean way of life. These changes occur due to the influence of the globalization and new trends of behavioral changes of Youth way of life. The cultural exchange program and the rapid economic growth may become one of the factors. Problems such as narcotic abuse, HIV/AIDS, STDs, tobacco are the impact of these changes. It is undeniable that the changes experiencing by Korean youth need to be realized by the government and the community. New trends of the way of life, behavioral changes and consumerism behavior among the youth in Korea are also part of the youth protection issues that the government has to deal with in order to provide protection to them.

Youth Protection Issues in the Republic of Korea

Youth Protection Law was set up on 1st July 1997. Its purpose is to protect youth from hazardous environment. The main content of this law cover the regulations and punishments against the media that is dangerous to the youth, drugs, dangerous business websites, etc.
The Juvenile Sex Protection Law was firstly implemented on 1st July 2000. This law provides protection to the juveniles (person under 19 years old) from sex offenders. This law also consist the punishment for those who do the sex trading to the juveniles, the punishment for those who produce and/or distribute sex through media materials including youth, or punishment for sexual offenders. This law also provides rehabilitation and protection for sexual offended youth.

There are some issues that related to the youth protection in Korea as it was mentioned on Youth Protection Law. They are youth protection against HIV/AIDS, drugs and tobacco.

HIV/AIDS in the Republic of Korea

The first case of HIV in Korea was found on 1985. Meanwhile AIDS case appeared 2 years later on 1987. In December 2004, it was reported that HIV cases increased up to 3,153 cases (KCDC, 2005). Meanwhile, AIDS cases of “new AIDS diagnoses” and “AIDS-related death” was around 1100 cases. (Republic of Korea: Current Status and Future Projection of the Spread of HIV/AIDS. Shin Surin. Page 156-157) www.jcie.org/fgjipdf/rok.pdf

Compared to the other countries, the HIV/AIDS prevalence in Korea is lower. Surin noted that even thought the prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Korea was low, (less than 0.1% on 2004) Korean people should be cautious and beware of HIV/AIDS. (Republic of Korea: Current Status and Future Projection of the Spread of HIV/AIDS. Shin Surin. Page 156) www.jcie.org/fgjipdf/rok.pdf

In 2004, it was reported that 614 persons in Korea were infected by HIV. The main transmission type of HIV were sexual contact (98.1%), followed by blood transfusion (1.6 %), and vertical transmission (from mother to child in prenatal period) (0.2 %), and Injection Drug Usage (0.1 %). (Republic of Korea: Current Status and Future Projection of the Spread of HIV/AIDS. Shin Surin. Page 157) www.jcie.org/fgjipdf/rok.pdf

Looking at the age group, around 0.4% people with HIV/AIDS were 0-9 years old, 1.7 % were 10-19 years old, 26.0 % were 20-29 years old, 34.8 % were 30-39 years old, 21.7 % were 40-49 years old, 10.8 % were 50-59 years old, and 4.6 % were above 60 years old. (Republic of Korea: Current Status and Future Projection of the Spread of HIV/AIDS. Shin Surin. Page 158) www.jcie.org/fgjipdf/rok.pdf

At the beginning of HIV/AIDS epidemic, the prime policy from the government was to find the HIV positive individual and registered them, so that the government can control everybody who got infected by HIV/AIDS. Korean government expenses huge budget for this purpose. Some experts thought that this early interventional policy on HIV/AIDS was a mistake.

In 1990, Korea changed that policy. The focus was to provide health protection (medical care) and support those people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). Besides that, Korean government set up HIV/AIDS prevention programs for the community in order to minimize the impact of HIV/AIDS.

Korean government has set up National AIDs Committee (NAC) on March 1987 under the Law of AIDS (AIDS Prevention Act). This committee formulated proposal of AIDs prevention activity as well as health and welfare for people living with HIV/AIDS. The proposal was submitted to the National Assembly to be reviewed and approved before NAC put it on the process of approving the proposal.

The AIDS Law in 1987 provides legal basic for AIDs prevention activities that are made by NAC. This regulation shows the responsibility of the Korean government both in local and national level to protect discriminated people and respect the privacy of people living with HIV/AIDS. This regulation also gives authority to the government for asking those people living with HIV/AIDS to register themselves to the public health center as well as report their status and health condition, and provide them with protected care facilities. This regulation banned PLWHA working in certain places such as pubs, massage parlors, and red light district.

Tobacco in Republic of Korea

Korea has a long history of tobacco use. In the not too distant past, it was common for soldiers to receive part of their wages as tobacco. The military service that Koreans are obliged to do is still regarded as one of the prime recruiting grounds for new smokers.

Cigarettes were first introduced to the Republic Korea in the 1930s. In the late 1980s, Korea opened its market to foreign tobacco firms. Cigarette consumption rose dramatically alongside increased advertising. In a single year after the ban against American tobacco was lifted, smoking among Korean teenagers rose from 18% to 30%; among female teens it rose about five-fold, from 1.6% to 8.7%. Foreign cigarettes have controlled 25% of the market in 2002. (World Health Organization, Regional office for the western pacific, fact sheet) http://www.wpro.who.int/media_centre/fact_sheets/fs_20020528.htm

In order to control the tobacco, Korea government has taken steps such as bans and restricts tobacco in some ways.
Tobacco bans in South Korea:

1. Sales to minors.
2. Vending machines.
3. Smoking in health care facilities.
4. Smoking on buses.
5. Smoking on trains.
6. Smoking on domestic air flights.

Tobacco restrictions in South Korea:

1. Advertising in certain media.
2. Advertising to certain audiences.
3. Smoking in government building (include worksites).
4. Smoking in private worksites.
5. Smoking in educational facilities.
6. Smoking in other public places.


Drugs Control Policy in the Republic of Korea

Korea is one of the transit countries for drugs distribution and smuggling. This drug free zone country became one of the reasons for the international drugs syndicate to smuggle drugs through Korea and after that deliver and distribute the drugs to another targeted countries. Pusan, the second largest harbor in Southeast Asia is an attractive location to divert illegal drug exchange from drugs productive countries.

In order to actively prevent the illicit drug trade and its abuse, former and present governments have been focusing on the four goals. They are as follows:

1. Eradication of Illicit Drug Supply
2. Drastic reduction in Demand for Drugs.
3. Raising Public Awareness about Drug Problem.
4. Enhancing International Cooperation.

(Drug Control Policy in Korea, 2004, By Byung In Cho at the International Center for Criminal La Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, page 12)

These goals are believed as the effective and useful way in controlling drugs abuse and drugs supply. To complete these goals, Korean government has derived sub goals and objectives from each goal to be implemented by government agencies and non-government agencies.

From these goals above, the second goal is directly related to youth protection issue, which is “drastic reduction in demand for drugs”. This goal is derived into sub goals, as follows:

- Preventing youth access to drugs.
- Carrying out a pan-governmental, comprehensive policy for treatment and rehabilitation of drug-addicts.

The relevant government ministries have taken steps to have youths correctly informed about drugs through school or social education and policies. Expert counselors and educators and actively developed preventive programs that persuading youth to avoid drugs all together, have trained. Actions have also been taken to spread public awareness about the dangers of drug abuse by the cooperation with the press, sports celebrities and entertainment industry, which highly influences youth.

The ministry of Health and Welfare and Korea and Drug Administration have taken positive action for the provision of treatment and rehabilitation facilities for youth caught in the act of inhaling adhesive, thinner or other harmful chemical materials, and actively encourage and support counseling activities on the part of civilian groups. Judicial action for drug-addicts has also been made flexible in order to promote the social integration of drug abuse offenders. And government has provided assistance to help drug-addicts to return to normal life, positively utilizing systems like suspended indictment on condition of compulsory treatment and care and protection for treatment.
Discussion

As many generations of young people have come and gone, and as each decade has witnessed the emergence of a new cohort of young people between the ages of 15 and 24, youth issues have remained a prime concern for many policymakers. Many of the basic aspects of the transitional phase of life known as youth have remained the same; education, health, entry into the world of work, family formation, and productive and responsible citizenship are still among the highest priorities for young people. It is also true, however, that the world in which young people are now making their transition into adulthood is quite different from that of ten years ago. Few foresaw the enormous impact that rapid globalization, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the explosive growth of information and communication technology (ICT), and other recent developments would have on young people's daily lives.

Confucianism also plays important part in Korean people lives. Confucianism is a value system that seeks to bring harmony to the lives of people in communities, the family, the village, and the state. It is more than a mere set of rules for daily living. It also recognizes behavioral norms and morals and distinctions between right and wrong, and associated these norms with a transcendental moral order in a way that approaches the religious. The philosophy of Confucianism teaches Korean how to deal with all problems in life. As the way of life for Korean people, Confucianism had been taught and implemented in every aspect of life. Looking at the Korean situation today, many youth face the problems that are far from Confucianism taught. It is the responsibility of the government and family to put the youth back on track again within the Confucianism spirit.

The way Korean government handles youth issues, especially youth protection issues is one of the ways to prepare a new young generation who can meet the challenges of the world today and in the future. Regulations, laws, programs, even policies are made to achieve this ultimate goals from the government. But as mentioned before, formulating, establishing and setting up the policy in the macro system scale can only involve the government. It is the responsibility of the family who can play in the micro system scale to get involve in the youth protection issues.

Economic growth is another aspect that can influences the youth issues in Korea. Consumerism, behavioral change pattern as the impact of globalization, narcotics abuse, HIV/AIDS, delinquency, unwanted pregnancy and other problems in youth protection issues are just small part of the bigger problems that we can explore further in the daily life of youth and need more to be discussed.

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**Contact Address**

Bambang Shergi Laksmono  
University of Indonesia  
Kampus Baru UI Depok, West Java  
Indonesia 16424  
PH: (62-21) 7872823  
FAX: (62-21) 7872820  
EMAIL: bshergi@yahoo.com

Hendratno Laksmono  
University of Indonesia  
Kampus Baru UI Depok, West Java  
Indonesia 16424  
PH: (62-21) 7270006  
FAX: (62-21) 7872820  
EMAIL: nike_crenshaw@yahoo.com
Local Buddhist History: Propaganda and Relics in the independence struggle of a monastery, 1850s-1930s

John Jorgensen
Griffith University, Australia

Abstract

Korean Buddhism needs to be studied at the national, regional and local levels, and their interrelationships clarified. This is a study of how Ssanggye Monastery tried to preserve its independence in the face of natural disasters, monastic rivalries and colonial interventions.

The monastery, associated with Hui-neng (d. 713), the founder of Ch’an, in an 887 stele written by Ch’oe Chiwŏn, is not mentioned again until 1549 and then again in 1854, when it was destroyed by a landslide. It used the association with Hui-neng to finance the rebuilding. In 1914, a propaganda campaign asserted that a relic of Hui-neng existed in the monastery and had started emitting miraculous lights. It relied on a text written in 1103 by Kakhun, actually the author of the 1215 Haedong Kosŏngjŏn. I conclude that Ssanggye monks were attacking Yi Hoegwang, for Yi was pro-Japanese, had discovered Kakhun’s text and was abbot of Haein Monastery, which the Japanese authorities had made overlord of Ssanggye Monastery, and was accused of betraying Korean Ch’an. The two monasteries remained in conflict to the 1920s, and so the relic campaign was to show the Buddha’s approval of Ssanggye Monastery and disapproval of Haein Monastery and its traitorous abbot.

Korean Buddhism needs to be studied at the ‘national,’ regional and local levels and the interrelationships clarified. This is a local study of how Ssanggye Monastery near Hadong tried to preserve its independence in the face of natural disasters, monastic rivalries and colonial interventions. The inherent nationalism and propaganda of these ‘histories’ of Ssanggye Sa illustrate the care needed in reading monastic gazetteers and their value for examining their national agendas, as well as local issues.

Ssanggye Sa allegedly possesses the cranium crown (uṣṇīṣa) of Hui-neng (trad. d. 713), the founder of all surviving Ch’an lineages, which was supposedly stolen from Ts’ao-ch’i in Kuang-tung in 723 by a Silla agent. Ssanggye Sa was founded by Hyeso in 830. The 887 stele written for Hyeso (773/4-850) by Ch’oe Chiwŏn, which stands in the Ssanggye Sa courtyard, states that Hyeso erected a portrait hall for Hui-neng there after he rebuilt Ssanggye Monastery. Hyeso claimed a lineage descent from Hui-neng (Jorgensen 2005, 339-344, stele translated, 705-720).

Ssanggye Sa largely drops out of history until 1549, when Sŏsan Hyujjong (1520-1604) wrote about the reconstruction of the monastery, which had been likely razed by the invading Japanese, by Pyŏk’am Kaksŏng (1575-1660), another of the monk resistance army (Yi Chŏng 1993, 10; Chŏng 1995, charyo 3, 18; Araki 1993, 273). Again the record is silent until 1854, when the monastery suffered huge losses in natural disasters (Chŏng 1995, charyo 3, 38). To finance its reconstruction it began a propaganda campaign through a ‘history’ of a printing of Hui-neng’s Platform Sutra, basing itself in part on the Hyeso stele (Pak 1989, 189, reproduced text 8-5; Chŏng 1995, 299). In 1864 a seven-storied stupa was erected there by Yongdam, which according to modern traditions contains the Hui-neng relic. This is likely a new fabrication. In 1884, Kak’an (1820-1896) visited this shrine.

A series of texts produced in Korea between 1864 at the earliest and 1918 tell a story fabricated from elements of the 887 stele for Hyeso and the Ching-te ch’uan-teng lu of 1004, plus some entries from the Samguk yusa, that a Kim Taebi stole the uṣṇīṣa of Hui-neng on behalf of Sanbŏp, a monk devoted to the Platform Sutra, who persuaded the nun Pŏpjŏng, the widow of Kim Yusin, to fund the ‘translation’ (theft of a relic). Taebi brought the uṣṇīṣa back to Silla in 723, and Sanbŏp took it to Mt Chiri where he built a stupa for the relic and founded Hwagae Hermitage, which Hyeso rebuilt as Ssanggye Monastery in 830 (summarised from Kwŏn Sangno’s text as given in Chŏng 1989, 327-329; Chŏng 1995, text, 327-330, Kor. trans. 331-349).

The texts that tell this story are the Chiri San Ssanggye Sa ki, probably translated from a mixed Chinese and Korean by Nukariya Kaiten into Japanese (Nukariya 1930). It seems to be identical to the Ssanggye Sa yaks’a (Brief history of Ssanggye Monastery), recopied in 1918 and which likely dates to after 1910 (Chung Muhwon 1987). The second is the Sŏnjong Yukjo Taesa chŏngsang tongnae yŏn’gi (History of the Coming to the East of the Uṣṇīṣa of the Master, the Sixth Patriarch of the Ch’an School), which exists in two copies; one owned by Kwŏn Sangno, and the other, with a slight variation in the title, Sŏnjong Ch’e Yukjo Hyenŭng Taesa tusang tongnae yŏn’gi, is found in a compilation called the Ch’u’yo myŏnggi, a copy made during 1915, probably in Ssanggye Monastery (Chŏng 1995, 294, 324). This compilation is said to be by Sŏlu Yuhyŏng (1824-1889), who also wrote a Sansa yakcho in 1864, which has an entry on Kim Taebi (HPC 10: 689a, 678a, 686b7-11). The Ch’u’yo myŏnggi text appears to be a
faulty copy, for it contains obvious errors when compared to the Kwŏn Sangno text (Cf. Chŏng 1995, 328 note 14, note 20-21 [21-22 in text], 329 note 30 [31], 330 note 36).

Therefore, a series of texts, two of which are dated 1915 and 1918 respectively, all supposedly copies of a script allegedly composed by Kakhun in 1103 on the basis of an ancient manuscript left by Sanbŏp, were written about Ssanggye Monastery and the stolen head or upogŏ of Hui-neng. The authors of this fiction are argued to have been Yi Nŭnghwai or Yuhŭng (Jeong 2005, 165-166), but I have my doubts.

Other evidence indicates that this record was a fairly recent composition. The connection between the Portrait Hall of the Sixth Patriarch erected by Hyeso at Ssanggye Monastery and the attempted theft of the ch'ŏngsang of Hui-neng as recorded in the Ch'ing-te ch'uan-teng lu (1004) and the Te-i and Tsung-pao versions of the Platform Sutra (1291 and 1290) was not made until at least after the Te-i Platform Sutra was published in 1290 and received in Korea in 1298, because the texts say Sanbŏp only thought of stealing the head after reading the extract of the Platform Sutra (Chŏng 1995, 315; Pak 1989, 175, 171). In fact, the link was probably not made until after 1549, for the famous So'nsan Hyujŏng (1520-1604) does not mention this in his lengthy “Record of the Reconstruction of Ssanggye Monastery”(Chung 1987, 82-83; Chŏng 1995, 300). Nor is the relic mentioned in the earliest commentaries, the Sasan pim'yŏng, on Ch'oe Chi'wŏn's epitaph for Hyeso (Yi Nŭnghwai 1918, 1: 95; cf. Chŏng 1995, 300).

In addition, the Ssanggye Sa yaksa has a note about the Treasure Stupa of the Chŏngsang of the Sixth Patriarch, which states, “This stone casket stores the reliquary, so in the fourth month of the third year of the T'ung-chih reign of Emperor Mu-tsung of Ch'ing (1864), Yongdam constructed a seven-story stupa” (Chŏng 1989, 338; Chŏng 1995, charyo 3, 31-32, charyo 3, 32). This is undoubtedly the stupa that remains today in the P'alsang Hall (also known as the Kŭm or Golden Hall) of Ssanggye Monastery, for the extant stupa has seven stories (Kamata 1980, 82-83; Araki 1993). According to the tradition of the monastery, this stupa is the ch'ŏngsang was brought by Yongdam from the nearby Mog'ap Monastery, and so was reused. The stupa itself stands about three metres in height and is made of four blocks of stone. From the traces of gold colour on it, it may have originally been gilded. In the rear of the first storey, a nine by four centimetre hole was drilled, which tradition claims was where the top of Hui-neng’s skull was placed to avoid decay. Now, if one feels in the hole, there seems to be paper or cloth there, and it is said that a copy of the Platform Sutra was inserted there (Araki 1993, 272-274; and personal observation). The earliest date for the Stupa of the Chŏngsang of the Sixth Patriarch would appear to be 1864, but as this is only mentioned in the Ssanggye Sa yaksa, even this is open to doubt.

There is a mention, however, of a visit to the stupa of Ch’i’ngam (Hyeso) and “the Stupa of the Sixth Patriarch” in 1844 by Kak’an (1820-1896), in his self-introduction contained in his Tongsa yǒ’dŏn (HPC 10: 1048a12-15). But this stupa may have only honoured a portrait of Hui-neng. Again, in 1864, “Yuhyŏng” mentions the “complete head,” and appears to suggest that Kim Taebi brought it back and placed it in the stupa. If the text appended to his Sansa yakcho was by his hand, this would make it the original or Ur-text. But several contradictions militate against this. Firstly, the other two manuscript copies of the Sansa yakcho do not have this appended. Secondly, the title uses the term tusang, “image of the head,” possibly another term for a portrait or a bust. Thirdly, the words starting the title, Hogyuk Por’gyŏng, probably derive from Po’gyŏng Monastery in Kyŏngsang Pukdo. Naeyŏng San. The monastery was restored by an abbot who died in 1916 (Kwŏn 1965/1979, I: 498; Chŏsen Sŏtoku naimbuk chih’ŏkyoku 1911, I: 376). This Sŏn monastery was therefore presumably considered a protector of Buddhism. All of this suggests that the text may have been written somewhere other than where Yuhyŏng resided.

The use of Hogyuk Por’gyŏng at the commencement of the text may therefore be as a result of a confusion between the Golden Hall (Kŭmdang) of Po’gyŏng Monastery and that of Ssanggye Monastery, which was supposedly built by Sanbŏp in 723 for the relic of Hui-neng. All of this suggests that the yŏng’gi text appended to the manuscript copy of the Sansa yakcho is not from the time of Yuhyŏng, and neither of these texts (Sansa yakcho and yŏng’gi) are mentioned in the biographies of Yuhyŏng such as that by Kak’an, or in modern catalogues (HPC: 10: 1060a17-21; Yi Chŏng1993, 217; Tongguk Taehakkyo Pulgyo munhwŏn yŏng’guso1976, 234; Nukariya 1930, 537; Yi Nŭnghwai 1918, I: 604-605). However, the mention of the “complete head” being brought by Kim Taebi in the Sansa yakcho of 1864, if genuine, suggests that interest had been heightened in this topic after the 1854 disaster at Ssanggye Monastery and the subsequent “rescue” of the Te-i Platform Sutra and its protection (chin, to guard, but also to ward off evil influences) and use as a protective talisman at that monastery.

All of the extant copies of the Platform Sutra in Korea are in the Te-i version, which has appended to it the record of Kim Taebi’s botched attempt to steal Hui-neng’s head. Koreans overwhelmingly favoured this version of the Platform Sutra from the time it was introduced to Korea in 1298 because of these references (Pak 1989, 159, 171, 175-177; cf. Yi Kŏnhŭi 1999, 465, 472). As all of this seemed to be corroborated by the Ching-te ch’uan-teng lu, Te-i’s source, the tale must have been a magnet for monks attempting to restore the prosperity of Ssanggye Monastery. They only had to look at the stele for Hyeso by Ch’oe Chi’wŏn standing in the courtyard, with its mention of the ruins of Sanbŏp’s hermitage and Hyeso’s construction of a portrait hall of the Sixth Patriarch, to have made a connection with the recently
acquired blocks of the Te-i *Platform Sutra*. Such circumstances were conducive to the leap of faith that overcame the assertion in the *Platform Sutra* that Kim Taebi had failed to bring back the head or cranial protuberance of Hui-neng’s mummy. This may have prompted Yongdam in 1864 to create the current stupa, which was placed in the Golden Hall. This may have originally been a stupa for Hui-neng, which contained a portrait, but it must have collapsed, and this is why Yongdam built one on a smaller scale (Chōng 1995, *charyo* 3, 31-32; Araki 1997, 272). Thus, we can speculate that there was a campaign to promote Ssanggye Monastery through the alleged possession of a relic of Hui-neng dating from after 1854. This seems to have continued for a decade or more, but then everything falls into silence as the political, economic and religious conditions in Korea deteriorated in the late Yi Dynasty.

However, the movement did begin around 1914. Certainly a movement did begin around 1914 to promote the relic stupa of Ssanggye Monastery, probably building on Yuhŭng’s remarks. In 1914, under the name of Chi’udang Kūg’i’n, the monk Ye’un Hye’gŭn, who was connected to Sŏn’am Monastery on Mt Chogye in South Cholla Province, and was a student under Kyŏngbung Ik’un (1836-1915) in the seventh generation from Yongdam Cho’g’wan (1700-1762), and an active publisher of some ninety plus articles, wrote a *Yuko chŏngsang t’ap panggwang non* (On the emission of light from the Stupa of the Usṣiśa of the Sixth Patriarch) for the magazine *Haedong Pulbo*, issue 15, of March 1914 (Yi Nŭnghwga 1918, 3: 138-139; Chŏn 1989, 334; lineages from Kyŏng’u’n Hyŏngjun 1978, 364a, 187b). It is sure then that around 1914 there was a movement to promote the *chŏngsang* stupa, in concert with stress on the relics of the Buddha at Mt Odae (Chŏn 1989, 340 note 83) that had the support of important Korean scholars such as Yi Nŭnghwga, who wrote on this topic in 1918. Some even claimed that the stupa dates back to 739, which is definitely in error (Song 1973, 2: 75, but see Choi 1990, 272-277).

All this activity may have had a political dimension, for it occurred at a critical period in Korean Buddhist history created by the division in domestic Buddhist circles induced by the incursion of Japanese Buddhism and the subsequent Japanese colonial occupation. There is an indication of this in the text that was recorded by Kwŏn Sangno, in the most developed form of the legend.

The claim that this text was written by Kakhun in 1103 on the basis of an ancient manuscript left by Sanbŏp has led Chŏng Muhwan to suspect that it is a forgery, for the only Kakhun known to history was the author of a hagiographical collection, the *Haedong Kosūng chŏn*, which was commissioned by the king in 1215. Moreover, as a friend of the illustrious Yi Kyubo (1168-1241), Kakhun could not have lived in 1103 (Tongguk Taehakkyo Pulgyo munhwa yŏn’gu so 1976, 120-121; cf. Lee 1969, 1; Chŏng 1995, 303-305). Chŏn Posam thinks the Kwŏn text (yŏn’gi) was the basis for the other texts (Chŏn 1989, 331-332, 341).

However, it contains elements not seen in any of the supposedly later texts such as the *Ssanggye Sa yaksya* and the *Yuko chŏngsang t’ap panggwang non*. For example, it includes details of Sanbŏp’s origins and those of Kyŏujŏng. It states that Sanbŏp read an otherwise unknown *Extract of the Platform Sutra*, gives his vow, and details the excursions to spy out the reliquary in Shao-chou, the ominous light, discussions with Taebi, the funeral of Chang Ching-man’s parents and the opportunity it gave the plotters, the return trip, Sanbŏp’s dream, the lion guides, names of Sanbŏp’s pupils and the manuscript left by Sanbŏp. So numerous are these previously unsighted elements that considerable invention was required to create them. An item such as the light coming from the stupa may have been suggested for example by the later editions of the *Platform Sutra* (Komazawa Daigaku 1978, 231), but this occurred for only two or three days after Hui-neng’s death. The omen of the night light pointing east revealed to Sanbŏp the head of Hui-neng back to 739, which is definitely in error (Song 1973, 2: 75, but see Choi 1990, 272-277).

This seems to have continued for a decade or more, but then everything falls into silence as the political, economic and religious conditions in Korea deteriorated in the late Yi Dynasty.

Chŏng Muhwan therefore concludes that the *History* (yŏn’gi) was written and attributed to Kakhun only after the discovery made by Yi Hoegwang (1840-1933) sometime just before 1914, of the manuscript of the *Haedong Kosūng chŏn* (For Yi Hoegwang’s discovery, see Lee 1969, 2-3, esp. note 8). It was only from that time that Kakhun became notable enough for anyone to attribute other texts to him, although he had reported to have been a considerable poet. The suggestion is that the author wrote the *History* around the time of Yi Nŭnghwga’s publication of *Chosŏn Pulgyo t’ongsa* in 1918 in order to reinforce the authority of the *Ssanggye Sa Yukjo chŏngsang t’ap panggwang non*, which conflated the stories from the *Samguk yusa* of Chajang bringing the Buddha’s bone relic to Silla with the mentions in the epiphath for Hyeso and entries in the *Platform Sutra* (Chung 1987, 82-83). Moreover, the assertion that the *History* itself was found among texts from Ch’ilbul Hermitage, an affiliated hermitage a few kilometres up the mountain from Ssanggye Sa, suggests that these related texts were part of the invention of a tradition in a propaganda campaign on behalf of Ssanggye Monastery.

Kakhun’s name may have been chosen because he recorded that Anham (or Anhong) was a bodhisattva who sailed to China from Silla in 601 and brought a number of Indian and Khotanese monks to Kyŏngju. After the monks translated a text at Hwangnyong Monastery, they returned. Called an Eastern Sage, Anhong was seen as the master who also compiled a book of propitication. After he died in 640, he was seen sitting on the waves sailing westward by an envoy from China. In a stele
obituary for him, he is called a bodhisattva who went to China (Lee 1969, 82-88). In this way, the suggestion is that Silla was especially qualified, and even sent a bodhisattva to China (Cf. Yi Kŏnhŭi (1999), 490). In the Samguk yusa, a text by Anhong is made to predict that a queen (Sŏndŏk) would erect a nine-storey stupa in Hwangnyong Monastery to protect the state of Silla from its neighbours (Yi Kŏnhŭi 1999, 390). This stupa was seen to be a core symbol of the Buddhist protection of Silla as a special Buddhist country. It is probably not a coincidence also that Sinhaeng, one of the founders of Sŏn in Silla, was listed in a stele as a distant descendant of a brother of Anhong (Yi Kŏnhŭi 1999, 396). Thus Kakhun could be used to support a “patriotic” Sŏn that appropriated Hui-neng’s chŏngsang as a concrete symbol of its orthodoxy.

The selection of the name of Kakhun for the author of the History must be tied to the career of Yi Hoegwang and the discovery of the Haedong Kosŏng chŏn. The manuscript of the latter was not widely distributed at first, possibly being initially circulated in manuscript copies by the Chosŏn Kwangmun hoe, which was founded in 1910. In fact, nothing is known of the publication data. It remained a rare text through 1914 because Asami Rentarō said that his manuscript copy was obtained at the Hallam Sŏrim in that year. Asami was a collector of rare books, so it is likely that the Haedong Kosŏng chŏn was not in public circulation until it was first published in print in 1917.

The Chosŏn Kwangmun hoe’s text was thus probably only a manuscript copy circulated among members (Lee 1969, 2-3; Chang 1991, 14-18). Therefore, if the author of the History was inspired to write his text due his knowledge of the discovery of the Haedong Kosŏng chŏn, he probably would have had to have been a member of the Chosŏn Kwangmun hoe or an associate. Otherwise the History was not written until after 1917.

Yi Hoegwang was a controversial figure. The abbot of Haein Sa, one the largest and most famed monasteries in Korea, Yi Hoegwang was concerned to revitalise Korean Buddhism by following the model and an associate of the ultranationalist Japanese Gen’yōsha (Black Ocean Society), they took on the Sotō Zen Sect monk, Takeda Noriyuki (?) as an advisor. Then in October 1910, just after the Japanese annexation of Korea, Yi Hoegwang went to Japan as head of the Wŏnjong to negotiate an agreement of “union” with the Sotō Sect, or if that failed, with the Rinzai Sect.

The Sotō Sect leaders agreed to the proposition, and a seven-point compact on union was signed. But it appears that Yi had not properly consulted his colleagues on the terms of the agreement and had exceeded his authority, for on his return home some leading monks such as Han Yong’un and Pak Han’yong accused him of selling out Korean Buddhism to Japan’s Sotō Sect. They charged Yi with “changing the patriarchs,” for Korean Sŏn since the time of Taego Po’u (1301-1382) had been solidly of the rival Imje lineage (Japanese, Rinzai) lineage. In 1911 these monks from Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang provinces decided to form an Imjejong or Southern Party in opposition to the Northern Party made up of Wŏnjong and Sotō that was lead by Yi Hoegwang. Ssanggye Monastery was one of the main centres of the Southern Party (Yu 1975, 1163-1165; Kang and Pak 1980, 15, 35, 41, 43-45; Takahashi 1925, 921-925).

For example, in June 1911, the Chosŏn Buddhist Youth Association was founded at Ssanggye Monastery with fifty-nine monks from the monasteries of Kyŏngsang and Chŏlla provinces in attendance. This was one of the forerunners of the national Buddhist Youth Association established in 1920 to overcome the Japanese colonial administration’s policy towards monasteries (Kim 1996,192-195). Again, in June 1912, over a hundred monks representing the Imjejong held their second meeting there under the leadership of Kim Kyŏng’un (i.e. Wŏn’gi, 1852-1936) of Sŏn’am Monastery, a student of Ik’un and hence in a lineage from Yuhŭng, and the famous reformer and poet, Han Yong’un (Yi Chong 1993, 203-204, 119-121; Kim 1996, 76-77).237

237 Kyŏngbun Ik’un (1836-1915), born in Sunchŏn, became a monk under Hammyŏng T’aesŏn (1824-1902) at Sŏn’am Monastery. In 1854 he studied the Avatamsaka Sūtra under Sŏldu Yuhŭng, and later taught at Wŏnhyo Monastery in Kwangju. He had several hundred pupils at his lectures. He was called “the old tiger of the Doctrinal School.” See Yi Chong 1993, 243-244. His chief disciple was Kyŏng’un Wŏn’gi (1852-1936), who was known as
Another event complicated matters, with the Government-General (Sōtokufu), the colonial arm of the Japanese government newly established in Korea, promulgating laws in June 1911 governing the monasteries. It then established thirty primary temples (honzan) under abbots approved by the Government-General. Aimed at unifying the disputants, with a probable bias towards the pro-Japanese party, this brought Korean Buddhism under strict colonial government supervision. The first monastic laws recognised, not surprisingly, were those drawn up by the monastery of Yi Hoegwang, Haein Sa, in 1912 (Takahashi 1925, 928-929; Yu 1975, 1165-1166; Kang and Pak 1980, 60).

This brought problems for Ssanggye Monastery. Not only was it a leading monastery of the “opposition” Imjejong, but also in 1911 the monasteries’ law made it a branch temple under the control of Haein Monastery. The monks of Ssanggye Monastery were predominantly members of the Pyöklam lineage of Sŏn, while those of Haein Monastery were of the Sŏsan lineage. Naturally, the monks of Ssanggye Monastery were displeased and they appealed the ruling, but failed. There were many disputes, but eventually the Sŏsan lineage gained hegemony (Takahashi 1925, 761). Later, for example, in 1921, the monks of Ssanggye Monastery appealed a decision by Haein Monastery to cut down the forest lands of the monastery to fund a proselytization centre in Seoul. They protested against this on the grounds of the poverty of their monastery, mentioning in passing their inclusion under Haein Monastery as a subordinate temple (Tong-A Ilbo, 12th September 1921, in Han’guk Pulgyo kŭn.hyŏndaesa yŏn’guhoe, comp.1995, 1: 75).

This suggests that the advent of texts concerning the relic stupa of the Sixth Patriarch at Ssanggye Monastery was implicated in these disputes. Thus the monks of Ssanggye Monastery were attempting to elevate the status of their monastery so as to claim the right to be a primary temple (honzan). Certainly all these related texts tend to push Korea’s claim to be a Buddhistically superior country, and to be superior in Sŏn/Zen in particular. Thus Japanese Zen could be outclassed via a superior claim to possess the relics of the founder of all Southern Ch’an, including both Sŏtō and Rinzai, the Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng. However, once the dispute at Ssanggye Monastery had been extinguished through the dominance of Haein Monastery, such texts could be given or shown to Sŏtō adherents like Nukariya Kaiten, perhaps to revive their fortunes.

Moreover, the attribution of the History to Kakhun could be a case of Ssanggye Sa monks using the new prestige Yi Hoegwang had given to the hagiographer Kakhun against Yi Hoegwang, or at least his Haein Monastery heirs. Thus Yi’s own “protege” or “discovery” provided proof of the superiority of Ssanggye Monastery. That is why these texts seem to have appeared in the interval between 1910 and 1918, when Ssanggye Monastery dissatisfaction was at its peak. These texts only resurfaced around 1930-1931 when the controversy had died down and they were no longer provocative. Thus the Yukjo chŏn̄gsang t’ap panggwang non was published in 1914. Yi Nûnghwâ wrote articles on the relics of the Buddha and patriarchs in 1916-1917, and his Chosŏn Pulgyo t’ôngsa, which quotes these tales, was published in 1918. The Ssanggye Sa yaksas were re(?)copied in 1918, but was given to Araki in 1930. Nukariya’s book appeared in 1930, and articles on the Mt Odae relics by Kwŏn Sangno and Yi Kwangsu appeared in 1931.

These texts were all part of a “relics’ war.” For example, when Anagārika Dharmapāla (1864-1953), the great Ceylonese propagator of Buddhism, came to Seoul (Kejô) in August 1913, he brought a relic, a saṅga bead of the Buddha. Dharmapāla, a layman, “was an ardent advocate of relic devotion and Buddhist pilgrimage.” (Trainor 1997, 15-16). This was despite his Buddhist revivalism being a form of “Protestant Buddhism.” He felt the neglect of pilgrimage and relic worship demonstrated the decline of Buddhism, and so to counter this, he encouraged the veneration of relics, something that brought him into conflict with his European mentors and provoked his great sympathy for Buddhism under colonialism (Obeyesekere 1976, 238-239, 242). Yet he was also staunchly pro-Japanese and would have travelled to Seoul with Japanese government approval, not to Asian colonialism. Curiously then, on the occasion of the relic’s installation in Kakhwang Monastery, Seoul in December 1914, Yi Nûnghwâ wrote a poem playing on the common element in the names of Dharmapāla and Bodhidharma, the semi-legendary founder of Chinese Ch’an, to homologise the two (Yi Nûnghwâ 1918 3: 1016-1017). Yi Nûnghwâ was not an unbiased observer in this war, but a participant, and he left his own account of these and associated events (Yi Nûnghwâ 1918, 1: 620-623; 3: 935ff., esp. 939; 3: 946-947; 3: 964-965).

Therefore, Chŏng Sŏngbon detects the hand or influence of Yi Nûnghwâ in the production of the History (yŏn’g’i), and the author of all the texts was certainly nationalistic (Chŏng 1995, 307). Much of the

an enthusiastic lecturer. In 1911, he became the provisional head official of the Imjejong. In 1917, he was made the head (kyojŏng) of the SŏnKyo Yangjong Kyomuwŏn 拓教圖宗教務院. Yi Chŏng 1993, 203-204.

The representative of the Korean side was Kim Kûmdam of Yujŏn Monastery because this monastery had supposedly been visited by the 53rd Buddha of India to initiate the Period of Resemblance of the Dharma in Korea. Kûmdam was also the head of the the Conference of the Thirty Honzan. The relic went to Yi Hoegwang first, according to Han’guk Pulgyo kŭn.hyŏndaesa yŏn’guhoe, comp. 1995, 1: 621. This relic was worshipped on at least one other occasion at this monastery according to the Chosŏn Ilbo in 1923, see,1: 615.

184
evidence though points to the shadowy figure of the monk Ye’un Hye’gún, surnamed Ch’oe. Firstly, he was the author of the Yukjo chŏngsang t’ap panggwang non, which was published in Haedong Pulbo in 1914. Secondly, he wrote the preface to Yi Nŭngwha’s Chosŏn Pulgyo tongsa in 1918. Thirdly, he claimed descent from Ch’oe Ch’iwŏn, the author of Hyeso’s stele. Fourthly, he began his monastic career at Sŏn’am Monastery and followed Ik’un, although this is not attested elsewhere. Fifthly, all the materials of the three texts (the yŏn’gi, the panggwang non and the yaksar) are closely interrelated (Yi Nŭngwha 1918, 3: 138-139, I, preface: Chŏn 1989, 334; Chŏng 1995, 300-301, 309-310). The discipleship under Ik’un (1836-1915), who taught at Sŏn’am Monastery, would have brought Hye’gún into contact with the works of Yuhyang, for Ik’un had studied under this monk. Moreover, Ik’un’s chief disciple, Kyŏng’un Wŏngi (1852-1936), an enthusiastic lecturer who had involvement in the dissemination of the Sasan pimyyŏng, commentaries on Ch’oe Chi’wŏn’s steles, was one of the main figures in the resistance to Yi Hoegwang’s plans, and was a chief officer in the Imjejong from 1911. Like Yi Nŭngwha, Hye’gún seems to have been a prolific author and he was made the compiler (p’yŏnjip) of the Haedong Pulbo, despite the journal having been founded under the aegis of Yi Hoegwang (Im 1993, 1: 120).

The nationalism and defensiveness about the relics are obvious in the texts. At first glance it might appear that the story of a Korean, Kim Taebi, stealing a relic was a slight on Korean Buddhists. Rather, Kim Taebi was seen as a hero, for just like the Indian kingdoms that tried to obtain part of the Buddha’s cremated remains, he was enhancing the prestige of Hui-neng’s relics by appropriating them. He symbolised the Korean success in gaining a potent rallying point for the nascent Sŏn movement that was struggling against the state-supported doctrinal schools of the Silla capital, Kyŏngju. These royally-sanctioned schools had relics enough of their own, such as the statue trinity that came to Hwangnyong Monastery from Ašoka and which became the palladium of the Silla state, or the šarīra (relics) of the Buddha that Chajang supposedly brought from Mt Wu-t’ai in China (Yi Pyŏngdo 1980, 101-103). The theft of a relic was not really an indictment of the thief. The relic, Hui-neng, had to give his consent to be moved (Cf. Geary 1978, 133, 137), as can be seen in the dream instructions of the relic in the story. Kim Taebi could be seen as acting on behalf of his Korean Sŏn community and as a truly pious man whose sole aim was to venerate the relic and spread Hui-neng’s Ch’an (Cf. Geary 1978, 139-140). Sanbŏp is even depicted as being prepared to enter hell to provide an object of veneration and blessing for his country. Indeed, according to T’ang Buddhist accounts, the threats to damage Hui-neng’s relics, and even Hui-neng himself while he was alive, were orchestrated by “Northern Ch’an.” (Komazawa Daigaiku 1978, 496; Jorgensen 2005, 177-178, 227, 322-325 passim). The parallels with the Imjejong or Southern Party versus the Wŏnjong or Northern Party disputes in the teens of the last century cannot have escaped the notice of knowledgeable readers of these accounts.

The nationalistic strains are heightened by introducing so eminent a person as Pŏpjŏng, a royal relative and widow of a national hero. Her late husband, Kim Yusin, a member not coincidentally of the Kaya royal lineage and hence a probable descendant of King Suro (Lee, Ki-baik 1984, 74), was a leader of Silla forces against the enemy armies of Paekche and Koguryŏ, and later even Silla’s erstwhile ally, T’ang China (Lee, Ki-baik 1984, 66). Nationalist credentials such as these, plus the evident parallels between Silla, which had been threatened by a Chinese colonial hegemony, and contemporary Korea, which was actually occupied by Japan, would have been of use to the Buddhist independence struggle against the Japanese and their domestic allies. Thus, based on the Samguk yusa, both Yi Nŭngwha and Nukariya Kaiten date the tonsure of Kim Yusin’s widow to 712, stating that she was surnamed Kim and that the king gave her an income of a thousand sŏk of grain per annum (Nukariya 1930, 68, based on Samguk sagi, ch. 43, 439).

The defensive attitude appears where Yi Nŭngwha notes that the stupa is said to emit light, but people dare not dig up the relic to resolve their doubts because they wished to avoid damaging the stupa and the abuse of non-believers (Yi Nŭngwha 1918, 1: 95). Similarly, the History dwells on the relic warning Sanbŏp not to display the relic and on the secrecy surrounding the whole affair. Even the monk Hye’gún, writing about the light shed by the relic-stupa, says that it occurs when people are asleep and is rarely seen by people up close. Such protectiveness and pride in a relic is not unusual, for P. Geary writes of medieval Europe that “[p]ossession of stolen relics came to be regarded as a mark of prestige in itself.” (Geary 1978, 160). This guardedness undoubtedly arose out of an unease that the fraud would be detected, and the damage that could be done to the nationalistic aims of the Southern Party or Imjejong partisans.

From the above, it is clear that monastic gazetteers and histories of monasteries cannot be read simply at face value in all cases. They, or at least parts of them, had hidden agendas, often with national implications. What may at first appear to be merely statements of regional differences and interests are often disguises for lineage disputes or divergences over doctrine or organisation. Yet the regional dimension should not be ignored, for it is a useful part of the national jigsaw, and may be useful in detecting national trends not observable elsewhere.
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Contact Address
John Jorgensen
Griffith University
Gold Coast Campus
PMB 50 Gold Coast Mail Centre
Queensland 9726
PH: 07 5552 8740
FAX: 07 5552 8634
EMAIL: j.jorgensen@griffith.edu.au
A Study on the Change in the Treatment and Understanding of the Visually Impaired in Korea

Jeong Im-soon
Hyegwang Special School, Korea

Abstract

When looking up the legal term for the visually impaired in Korea, it is defined as says 'who has a visual impairment.' Time ago people belittled them by calling them 'cheongmaenggwani,' or 'nunbyungshin (It means, "does not smart and does not discriminate things perfectly.").' an eye-deformed people.

On the other hand, there was a few discrimination against them in the old Korea. We can see proof of it on the terms used for them. There are some ranks terms like 'sogyung', 'bongsa' in Korea. They mean certain names of official. And 'dangju', one of the words for the visually impaired in Korea, meaning priests who managed officiates.

We can also find more proof concerning special treatment to the visually impaired in Korea. They were exempt from taxation, servitude, and public labor. Instead of receiving punishment, they gave clothing. And they were not put to death, either. High ranked officials like ministers did not belittled them. They treated them as an intermediary class. They took 'myunggwahak,' the official position alloted for the visually impaired only. Korean government also run 'myungtongshi,' an organization for the visually impaired people. At that time, there were rich people who had visual impairment and owned slaves.

But, at the end of the Chosun Dynasty (the period name of Korea in the past), their privileged status and riches were challenged by the public, and even provoked antipathy. Terms in relation to privileged officials of the visually impaired changed belittled, and just for the visually impaired people group.

Thus, in this study, I did a research on the change in the treatment and understanding of the visually impaired in Korea.

I. Introduction

The disabled exist in every country. But not every country treats them well. Generally the conception of the disabled is negative compared with the normal. This is the reason why the social status of the disabled is low and they could not be treated well.

Some countries may regard them as same as the normal, but this situation is only in advanced countries which have a good welfare system. In most of countries that do not have such a welfare system, the life of the disabled is miserable and they are treated unfairly bad.

Especially the blind is in worse condition than any other disabled. It is impossible for them to study and learn something without aids and even keep them steady. It means that they can it live unless someone helps them.

Hence, it is desperately need that aid should be given and experts which help the blind study and learn some academic course or skill.

Therefore, countries that have poor revenues for social welfare make the blind live from begging. As a result, the blind fall into a worse life.

We can easily find this situation in developing countries. But it is remarkable that even in Europe, where the disable is teated as same as the normal, they had not been treated equally as the normal. In 12th century Europe, beggars or patients who did not have some place to live were ridiculed as the blind. It shows that the blind were despised by the people.

We can find that conception and treatment of the disable has improved in recent times even in Europe, and cultural welfare like today’s started not very long time before. Thus, this essay will analyze the transition in the treatment and conception for the disable. However, we will only refer to the blind.

II. Treatment and Perception for blind in the Middle Ages of Korea

2.1 Treatment for blind in the Middle Ages of Korea

After the XIV century, Korea was under the Joseon Dynasty. At this time family were charging for caring the blind, but not wholly charged. There were some welfare system by the 'Hwarinwor' and the 'Jaesaengwon' which were in government branch. People were rewarded when ever they cared for the disable members of a family well and sometimes they were punished for maltreatment of the disable.

During the Joseon Dynasty, the blind were encouraged to have jobs as 'divination', 'sutra chanting', 'musical performance' and the government made policies for this encouragement.
This way, the blind could have diverse jobs and economic wealth as much as the normal. Moreover the
government made the government office and the official ranks for the blind to help them had a better life.

- The government office and official ranks for the blind in the Joseon Dynasty

  a. The government office for the blind
     Seoungwan: 'Myeonggwahak' teaching
        (Myeonggwahak is the study which teaches prophecy.)

  b. The official ranks for the blind
     i) Sogyeong: 'Jong 4pum'
        (8th official post grade)
     ii) Bongsagyowi: 'Jong 5pum'
         (10th official post grade)
     iii) Bongsa: 'Jong 8pum'
          (16th official post grade)
     iv) Bubongsa: 'Jeong 9pum'
          (17th official post grade)
     v) Chambong: 'Jong 9pum'
          (18th official post grade)

  Thus, in the Middle Ages of Korea had government services only for the blind and this was the
  chance of welfare for the blind. And such government services were higher ranked than general offices.
  This is not all. There was 'Myeongtongs!', which is a group of the blind founded by the government,
  and they were undertaken ceremonies like 'Giuje: a shamanist service to pray for rain' held by the
  government.
  On the other hand, the government instructed them in the performance of musical instruments
  such as a divination as trading jobs. At that time there was 'Gwanseupdogwan', institute for music, was
  run.
  This was the academic institute for the blind and they attended this and learn music there. After
  graduation, the blind were employed as a bureaucrat were in charged of playing music during national
  ceremonies. It shows that there was a welfare system for blind in the Middle Ages of Korea by the
  government.

2.2 Perception for blind in the Middle Ages of Korea

  In order to worship when the king comes out the royal palace in the Joseon Dynasty period, the
  arranged visually impaired did seeing off and also meeting the king. Therefore, the social phase of the
  visually impaired were high. And though it is a minister but he did not talk roughly to the visually impaired.
  So the visually impaired were treated as an intermediate class.
  And the visually impaired respected each other. So they call the elder with `Jangnim' (blind)' but this is a
  title of respect in 'Maengcheong(Visually impaired private organization)'. The respect for the visually
  impaired becomes known even from these occupation.
  Namely, the blanket responsible person of sacrificial rite always became the visually impaired. The person
  in charge of was called sacrificial rites 'Dangju'. The position was high and it was respected.
  Therefore, in the medieval times the visually impaired were the object of respect. So when naming
  these people, `Nim' as a meaning of respect after the name of these government post or duty.
  Thus, to medieval time of Korea the social identity of the visually impaired were high averagely.
  Also, they received material support from the government and they were rich even materially.
  Thereupon, the visually impaired were not Contempt or contemptuous treatment objects, they were the
  object of respect.

III. Treatment and recognition of the visually impaired in Korea today
3.1. The treatment of the visually impaired in Korea today

In medieval times the visually impaired were educated in a professional technique at the educational institution operated by the nation. And the visually impaired were appointed in the official posts designated for only them. And they accomplished the task which becomes the glory which is seeing off and meeting the king. Also, they kept the duty which is ‘Dangju’ that is important. Therefore, the social identity of the visually impaired was same or higher about the common person. And they were enough even materially.

But the condition of the visually impaired collapsed slowly at the end of the Joseon Dynasty period. Because the common people envied the privilege of the visually impaired. So the Confucian scholars criticized the sacrificial rites of the visually impaired. Also they asserted abolition of government posts and government offices for the visually impaired. Finally, the sacrificial rites of the visually impaired were all abolished by 1745. Not only, the orchestra performance of the visually impaired was abolished as well. The orchestra performance resurrected only again in the middle of the XVII century. Finally, the visually impaired lost official posts and professional occupations. Consequently, the visually impaired started to live with the private art of divination or begging. Thus, the treatment of the visually impaired slumped with jealousy of the common people and it was gradually deteriorated.

Then ‘Yu Giljun’ introduced the special education of the foreign nation from “Seoyugeonmun” in 1895. Due to this, the people again had an interest against the visually impaired. And ‘R. S. Hall’ supplied the New York Hangul(Korean alphabet) braille from ‘Pyeongyang’ in 1898. Also, ‘Bak Duseong’ made ‘Hunmaengjeongeum’ at 1926. It is a ‘Hangul’(Korean alphabet) braille of today.


The government or the civilian found the visually impaired school and that school is located every districts and cities from Korea today. And a settlement house for their welfare is founded in the entire country. Also the infrastructures for the visually impaired(Guiding Block, Sound traffic signal, Phonetic guidance instrument, Braille of various facility, etc) are established. And the braille was indicated in general products. Besides, the government when an enterprise hires the visually impaired, gives the benefit of tax to the business owner.

3.2. A visually impaired recognition of Korea today

In the Modern Times, the words ‘Sogyeong’, ‘Bongsa’, ‘Chambong’, ‘Dangju’, ‘Jangnim’ had the meaning of contempt with the downfall of the social status of the blind. This can still be found at the present time.

Therefore, Korean government made a new word ‘Sigakjangaein’ substituting the ‘Sogyeong’, ‘Bongsa’, ‘Chambong’, ‘Dangju’, ‘Jangnim’. The word ‘Sigakjangaein’, which was made in the 1970’s, does not have a despising meaning at all. This word has decreased the negative conception of the blind.

Also the blind participate in legislature, devoting to education as president or vice-president of a special school, and they carry out a job for collecting, conserving and offering information as of a library administrator. For all these conducts, social recognition of the blind is change for the better.

However, such blind people who work in higher ranks are not very plentiful, so the conception of the blind still does not achieve as much as in the Middle Age’s. But we can expect such people to increase in number and I believe they will get the social status that they had.

IV. Concluding remarks

There is a difference between the Middle Age’s and the Modern Age’s in treating the blind. In the Middle Ages the blind could get some good jobs for them and learn and be trained in special skills, so they prospered by working as civil servants.

And the government made some group for the blind to raise their social status to participate in the welfare of the blind. Also, they were treated as the middle class. It was a consideration for the blind. The government gave a the whole responsibility of seeing off and reception for King to give prestige. The blind could join national ceremonies and in some of them they could be the chief of ceremonies. It proves that conception and treatment for the blind were very polite and special.
However, by the end of the Middle Ages, their social status went down and people changed their respect for the blind into disdain. But in Modern Times, the blind can get good social status and some of them get higher ranked jobs because of the resuscitation of the blind conception. And many products and public service changed to respect the blind. Moreover, schools for the blind and welfare centers public and private service are found and they contribute to the welfare of the blind. Hence, we can anticipate the whole change in the conception of the blind and their great leap.

**Heading**

The visually impaired, special treatment, official position, the Chosun Dynasty, the Middle Ages of Korea, the academic institute for the blind, braille

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**Contact Address**

Jeong Im-Soon
576 Hyegwang Special School Sipjeong-dong
Bupeong-gu Incheon City
South Korea
PH: 011-448-7896, 032-522-8345
FAX: 032-516-2516
EMAIL: sunvim1@hanmail.net
Democratic Republican Philosophy and Movement of Cheondogyo

Oh Moon-Hwan
Kyunghhee University, Korea

Abstract

3·1 independent movement from the Japanese imperialism was led by Chondogyo with the cooperation of Christian and Buddhism. 3·1 movement is generally appreciated as the origin of Korean democratic republic movement in many sense. We hardly understand Korean democratic republicanism without understanding of Chondogyo's idea and practices. By analysing their concepts on political subject and a few of political movements, I argue that the Korean democratic republicanism starts from Donghak and Chondogyo.

Do Chondogyo have the idea of people's sovereignty, in other words, the democratic thought of political subject? According to Chondogyo Human being is equal to God, the true subject of whole universe. And the true realization is the realization that the 'I' myself is really the subject of the whole universe. From this religio-philosophical idea came out the democratic idea and citizenship that 'I' myself is the real subject of political community and active participation in the politics. Chondogyo suggested the parliament opening, grass-roots autonomy movements, bottom-up peoples' modernizing movements, and the 3·1 independent movement.

Do Chondogyo have any idea of republican polity? According to Chondogyo everything of this universe is internally related one. As only one universal force is operating in every entities, not only "I and You is a family", but also "I and It is also a one family". In social and political movement this kind of view was practiced as the networking movement for the national integration and liberation regardless of religious faiths and ideologies. 3·1 independent movement was a model case. All over the Korean peninsula people protest against the for the Korean Independence peacefully. And on that day there was a news that there will be held a people's gathering in the central plaza of Seoul for a new democratic republican Korea. At least 3 blueprints for building a new Korean democratic republican state were declared.

From 3·1 movement the democratic republic became the main currents of Korean independent movements history. By the influence of this movement the Korean provisional government founded in Shanghai of China. Even though this resistance movement was not enough to get the emancipation from the imperialism, the people's consciousness was awokened as the subject of the political community and as the subject of the national liberation movement.

I. Introduction

Democratic republicanism as a political body is understood to be brought up by the New People's Society (Sinminhoe) in earnest in the late Yi Dynasty and discussed in the “Declaration of the Grand Solidarity of Korean People” (Daedong dangyeol seon eon). However, the political philosophy underpinning the democratic republic had already been created before that. In particular, the March First Independence Movement of 1919 played as a watershed for the arising of democratic republicanism, which was also shown in the preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea. Considering that as much as eight provisional governments had been declared including the exiled Korean government in Shanghai since then, the March First Movement was thought to be a decisive turning point for the democratic republic regime. To understand the philosophy of the democratic republicanism of the March First Independent Movement, we need to study the history of Cheondogyo (Religion of the Heavenly Way) and its political ideology.

This article aims to analyze the philosophy and practices of Cheondogyo on the basis of democratic republicanism. For this aim, this research firstly analyzed the political subject of Cheondogyo. Cheondogyo designated people as the actual political subject since the March First Independence Movement. And it was the political philosophy of Cheondogyo that enabled people to come to the fore in the Korean history as a actual subject of a nation. Various concepts of Cheondogyo such as ‘jacheon jagak’ (self-awareness that one is the lord of heaven), ‘jasim jabae’ (bow to the heart of oneself), and ‘jasim jagyeong’ (respect to the heart of oneself) will be examined based on personality, community spirit, rationality and virtue, the major concepts of the modern political philosophy. This work will help to understand that Cheondogyo presented an original modern political subject and a political order unlike the liberalistic democracy or people's democracy.
The second task of this research is to analyze the political participation or political movement led by Cheondogyo in the context of democratic republicanism movement. The direct and indirect participation of people in a political process as a political subject has been one of the core themes in the democratic republicanism. Since 1904, Cheondogyo has brought the democratic republicanism into action through a series of movements like the appeal to establish a congress, movement to establish a citizen assembly called minhoe, the March First Independence Movement, and the June 10 Independence Demonstration of 1926. Those independence movements will be analyzed from a point of view of the democratic republicanism. When it comes to political philosophy, Cheondogyo’s democratic republicanism goes back to before the Donghak Peasant War of 1894. However, this paper will focus on Cheondogyo for the purpose of discussion.

II. Democratic Republicanism of Cheondogyo

1. Political Subject of ‘Gonggaein’ (Public Individual)

   Development of individuality is one of the indications of modernity. Individuality has been secured by the liberation and independence from the divine totalitarian order. According to the modern liberals, the liberalized individuals thought a political society formed through transaction, compromise, contract and consent among the independent individuals. Here, a law is the mechanism to coordinate the interactions of the independent individuals. Therefore, autonomy can be secured only by the rule of law and the law settles a variety of conflicts among individuals. However, this liberalistic idea has been criticized by communitarians who claim that the people can directly actualize the general will and morality. Anyway modernity in the west had begun with the liberal political thoughts.

   The modern concepts such as ‘jaju’ (autonomy) was explained based on the specific argument style of Cheondogyo. For example, Cheondogyo emphasized a liberal mind as the foundation of a self-determined human being, as was reflected in its saying, “Unmovable heart(mind) is the independently self-existing being. Heart is the one that freely operates jasim (one’s heart).” In this argument, the universal and objective concepts such as cheonmyeong (God’s will), cheolli (natural law), and cheonseong (one’s innate character) seem to turn into being individual and subjective. This is the self-progressing process of sicheonju (bearing the heavenly lord), which means the universal truth is embodied within the subject.

   The discovery of identity and autonomy leads to a rejection against heteronomy and dependence as its saying, “Don’t rely on others. To my heart, I bow and thus saints exist here. I am the lord of heaven thus they should not rely on others. A human being is the one and each one cannot stand door." Totally different from Descartes in its way, though, Cheondogyo laid a profound foundation for the modern religious philosophy in that it searched for the reference point within oneself. Here, the subject is identified with the absolute and sublime metaphysical heavens, different from the Western modern one.

   Cheondogyo is aware of identity; however, the identity is not limited only to individuality. Jasim (my mind) or jaju (autonomy) is the results of subjectivization or individualization of universal and objective principle, which is very different from liberation or independence from universality or objectivity. When explaining in the style of Cheondogyo, cheonsim (the divine will) directly refers to jasim. Jasim is neither independent nor liberated from cheonseonm. The next phrase clearly points out this explanation. “There is a heart called the heaven among the human heart. In spite of numerous human beings, the heaven is the only one. The heaven in the heart of human is neither dignitary nor lowly. Human beings are the heavens, thus they should not rely on others. A human being is the one and each one cannot stand door.” In summary, the heaven exists in the deepest part of individual existence and the heaven is the only one; it is neither high nor low. There is no door. Universality lies in the core of individuality.

   The concepts of jasim (my mind), jaju (autonomy) and jayu (liberty) were somewhat far from the actual reality, though discussed in the context of religious philosophy and Simhak (Study of the Mind). Jayu (liberty) was symbolized by the sublime of a mind in the concept of ‘samsimgwar’ (view of three minds) expounded in Muche beopgyeong (Book of Formless Law), which is the most representative writing of Uiam.

   Here, liberty is understood as a mental state that enables to do as its will. Liberty is not the one in the actual political society generally accepted today but the liberal mental state in the context of the “Study of the Mind” of the Orient. In other words, the liberty comes from the unity with the universal truth such as cheonmyeong (God’s will), cheonseong (one’s innate character), and cheolli (natural law). Therefore, the liberty accepted in Cheondogyo is distinct from the liberty based on the individual right raised by liberal democracy. On the contrary, the liberty of Cheondogyo reminds us of the unity with universality spoken of by communitarians. General will of Rousseau, ethical citizen of Kant who abides by the categorical imperative, absolute reason or reason of the state of Hegel, or individuality realizing the Marxian class consciousness may have a chance to communicate with jacheon jagak (self-awareness that one is the Lord of Heaven) or jasim jagak (self-awareness of one’s own mind) of Cheondogyo.

   As being the subject who religiously attends upon the God in Cheondogyo, “I” is recognized as a subject who determines the survival of a state in a political aspect. Oh Sang-jun called this personality
'gong gaein' (public individual) and argued this personality should keep, publish and implement 'contribution to public interest, public virtue, public affair, public use, public share and public law' for the religion and the state. ‘Public individual’ can be called a republic individual. The political subject of Cheondogyo is a public citizen, totally unrelated to the liberal individual, communitarian class or universal consciousness, or the nationalistic universality. Donghak(Eastern Learning) called this person ‘an existence attending upon the God,’ which is also expressed as a ‘republic individual’ from the aspect of political philosophy. This individual holds commonality. The commonality here is not a community or national commonality but an expanded and deepened cosmetic or spiritual existence.

The political subject of Cheondogyo shares the characteristics of communitarianism and republicanism as it is a communicating subject focusing on common good. However, the commonality is not in the grip of limitedness such as human’s will, thinking moral law, stateness and class-mind. As ‘innaecheon’ assumes that a human being is an undefined limitless existence like the heaven, we need to pay attention to the fact that he (she) cannot be confined by any finitude. The public good or community spirit has the universal characteristics of cosmos rather than the relativity imprisoned by a specific period or a society.

2. Republicanism Based on the Concept of ‘Donggwil Ilche’ (Returning to the ultimate One)

The rule of law is an important political process for liberal democracy as it is regarded as a result of fair contract and consensus. However, republicanism put the virtue or moral assembly of citizen before reason. And communicative public opinion is more than emphasized than the rational rule of law. Definitely, republicanism focuses on harmony and balance among various classes more than a strong initiative of people.

Uiam has already thought the republic as an ideal political entity in 1900s while he stayed in Japan. The republic shown in Myeonggijeon (Disclosing the truth) has a strong nature of democracy as the people of the republic states are expressed as the subjects or the head rather than the objects or slaves. However, the politics whose subjects are the people is still understood as a consensus politics that adjusts to the voice of the people. But, it is not unclear whether a monarch is the one of the parties to make a consensus.

The understanding of the state shown in Chodeung gyoyuk (Elementary Education), authored by Oh Sang-jun who was famous as a theorist, shows a clear definition of nature of democratic republicanism. “Republic political entity is defined as what organizes a consensus body joined by the entire people and exercises the sovereign power in the national assembly.” Republicanism is understood as a political entity based on the national consensus, which clearly differs from the democratic national polity where a majority of the people has the sovereignty. ‘National consensus,’ here, seems not to include the monarch. Thus, the political view of Cheondogyo seems to have progressed from monarchism to republicanism.

‘I’ in Cheondogyo is understood as ‘the main body of a state’ as well as a subject of the cosmos. Cheondogyo said ‘A state is my community life,’ and ‘the national responsibility and my responsibility are important,’ and considered the politics as affairs of the general people not of the monarch or political elites.” This showcases Cheondogyo had the nature of democratic republicanism. It is interesting that Cheondogyo put more emphasis on ‘my’ patriotism rather than territory or the people as components of a state. Cheondogyo considered the relationship between a state and me to be inseparable from each other, which obviously shows it regard a state as a nation-state.

However, the people as a subject of a state are different from the citizen of the social contract philosophers. The republican and communitarian thinking that a state is ‘my main body’ is completely different from the understanding of a state as a result of ‘my contract.’ Identifying the state with me has more communitarian character than contractual nature.

In this thought, a national consciousness cannot but being emphasized because an individual consciousness can be expanded to the nation. This thought can also be spread to the extent that ‘national consciousness’ exists before a nation. The U.S. could be a classic example. The U.S. people think they could establish the nation after the victory over the Great Britain, mainly thanks to the national consciousness. However, Vietnamese should give away their nation to France because they did not have any strong national consciousness based on patriotism. Now, the destiny of a nation is dependent on the patriotism. Cheondogyo argued, “Seeing the current state of our country, the true duty of the people is encapsulated into patriotism.” However, this position is difficult to regard as a nationalistic patriotism because a subject is not lost by the nationalism. On the contrary, the nation relies on a personal patriotism. Seemingly, it is also difficult to regard this as a nature of liberal democracy. This kind of patriotism should be understood in the context of the philosophy of Donghak(Eastern Learning) or Cheondogyo.

In Cheondogyo the period before Suwun was understood to be governed by the ‘despotic heaven’ (jeonjecheon), ‘despotic land’ (jeonjeji), and despotic men (jeonjei), and the era after Suwun became the one of liberal heaven (jayucheon), liberal land (jayuji) and liberal men (jayuin). The monopoly of universality by the invisible Absolute was considered ‘despotism,’ while the equal possession of the
universality by the visible multitude was considered liberty. Like the concept of ‘harmony of God and human being,’ the politics is ‘manin gonghwa(Republic of Peoples),’ which means politics is not the monopoly of a specific absolute monarch or a minority of elites. In other words, republicanism was understood as a political expansion of the awareness that all the existences embrace the universality of the heaven in side them.

Yaroe Yi Don-hwa, a representative theorist of Cheondogyo in 1920s, posted a long series of writing titled “Sinangseong-gwa sahoeseong” (Faith and Sociality) four times starting Nov. 1918 to Feb. 1919 before the March 1st Independence Movement arose. He seems to plan the March Movement before writing this. Yaroe analyzed ‘faith and sociality’ in detail, citing the words of Uiam Shon Byung-Hee, ‘Faith and sociality are the two instincts of human beings and the extreme purpose of a religion is to encourage people to train these two and to exercise the great spirit of innaecheon.’ These words does not include that sociality is to be realized, which means the March 1st Independence Movement is the implementation of sociality, the instinct of human beings. Here, the embodiment of the sociality refers to independence and the recovery of the political. Therefore, we can analogize that Cheondogyo regards the March 1st Independence Movement as a recovery of sociality, the instinct of human beings and an active exercise of republicanism.

III. Democratic Republican Movement of Cheondogyo

1. Minhoe (Citizen Assembly) Movement and Democratic Republicanism

Citizen Assembly Movement in 1904

The movement to establish a citizen assembly (minhoe) started in 1904 aiming at the modernization of the nation. While the confrontation between Russia and Japan was exacerbated around the Korean Peninsular and Manchuria, Uiam required the government to assemble all the people’s power by ‘establishing’ a citizen assembly. ‘Citizen assembly,’ here, seems to be a place to integrate the people’s power rather than an organization like a congress representing individual rights. Though congress is basically the heart of a democratic regime, Uiam seemed to be mindful of a republic regime. In other words, ‘citizen assembly’ was a kind of means to harmonize the people and to preserve the nation.

The ‘citizen assembly movement’ of Cheondogyo had a nationalistic character that preserves a country and awakens people; however, it did not intend to coordinate the conflicting individual rights, interests and concerns. It also had a democratic character as it sought for the enhancement of the people’s power for the self-support of the nation. Nevertheless, the strongest character of the citizen assembly movement lied in the republican revolution for the national independence based on the people’s power. Uiam, who did not receive any answer from the government to the request for establishing a citizen assembly, decided to establish an autonomous citizen assembly in April 1904 and called Bak In-ho and Hong Byeong-gi to Japan to order the followers to organize it. Then, in Sept. and Oct. 1904, he initiated a movement to separate from the topknot and white clothes, which had been the symbols of tradition, across the nation. The movement is also called ‘Gapjin Innovation Movement.’ On Oct. 9, 1904, he held a grand rally with a catchphrase of ‘Four Missions,’ which was joined by about 200,000 from more than 360 counties across the nation.

The central aims of this movement were to protect the public welfare and the national power through the enhancement of people’s power, which were clearly reflected in the following phrase. “To gain the self-support at will of the people is the long-range design to preserve a nation, to protect the human being and to conserve the lands. Thus the people should be awakened and trained to support themselves.” Here, the people’s power was accepted as the national power. The citizen assembly movement had the democratic character as it promoted enhance the autonomy of villages. This self-government movement had its deep root in the age of Donghak(Eastern Learning). The framework and orientation of the citizen assembly movement had already been reviewed in the writings titled “Junbisidae” (The Era of Preparation written by Uiam), whose appendix also touched a plan of village autonomy to improve the people’s power. The citizen assembly movement became possibly the groundwork of the March 1st Independence Movement.

All-out People’s Movement in 1920s

In 1920s, the citizen assembly movement was revived to fight against the stifling and oppressing Japanese imperialism since the March 1st Independence Movement in 1919. The initiative of the movement was taken by the Cheondogyo Youth Association (Cheondogyo Cheongnyeonhoe). The young leaders who had experienced the Japanese civilization or graduated from Boseong College operated by Cheondogyo were inspired by the scientific ideas of the Enlightenment and emphasized the
Every sector of the movement was led by the Youth Association (1920), Boys’ Association (Sonyeohoe) (1921), Student’s Association (Haksanchoe) (1924), Women’s Association (Naesudan) (1924), Korean Farmer’s Society (Joseon Nongminsa) (19) and Korean Workers’ Society (Joseon Nodongsa) as the umbrella groups of the Youth Party of Cheondogyo. They had more than 8,000 members in more than 200 branches in its heyday. People’s movement of this period was regarded as the “New Democracy” by the Young Friends Party (Cheongwoodang). New Democracy was interpreted with an interesting concept such as ‘Pan-Human Nationalism,’ i.e., Nationalism of Universal Humanism. In other words, it was a nationalistic movement based on universal humanism. This movement seems to place more importance on communities’ rights than individual rights.

Such a republican orientation was represented by the term ‘All-out Movement,’ in 1920s. All-out Movement came from a theory that the movement of Cheondogyo spoke for the entire nation rather than specific groups or classes. This term might be a measure to protect the individuality of Cheondogyo under the left-right dichotomy situation. The practical movement, however, was limited within the border of Cheondogyo, though it intended to represent the whole members. In other words, the movement had the republican character but did not overcome the limitation of a partial sector in reality.

The theory of the All-out Movement was backed up by the theory of Yaroe, called ‘Jigi Irwonnon.’ According to this theory, the entire cosmos as well as a human society is one harmonized community governed by a single energy. This theory laid the foundation for Cheondogyo to encourage the left-right integration and gave a philosophical basis for the future unification movement after the independence from Japan.

The self-government movement in 1920s has been criticized as it allegedly accepted the colonial regime. In fact, this movement was expanded to the national one from a locality (in 1904) and this procedural progress was unavoidably regarded as anti-nationalism under the colonial rule. Moreover, the self-government movement and national independence movement came into conflict within the Cheondogyo circle. The national independence movement has continuously developed through various accidents such as Osimdang (My Mind Party) plot, June 10 Independence Demonstration of 1926, establishment of Singanho (New Trunk Society), and the plot to destroy the Japanese imperialism (known as ‘myeoro gido’) in the nation and the movements carried out overseas, such as those by Joseon Revolutionary Party (Joseon Hyeongmyeongdang) and Goryeo Revolutionary Party (Goryeo Hyeongmyeongdang). However, these movement could not go forward a great nation-wide independence progress such as the March 1 Independence Movement. The major reasons included the more coercive rule of the Japanese imperialism and the internal split within the independence circle as well. As a result, the citizen assembly movement in 1920s could not realize the all-out political movement though it had the same orientation with the March 1st Independence Movement.

2. March 1st Independence Movement and Republic Democracy

Composite Integration and Spirit of Republicanism

Cheondogyo led the March 1st Independence Movement, which has been the high point in the history of the Korean independence attempts. “Cheondogyo circle played a crucial role in kicking off the March Movement, selecting national representatives, printing and distributing the “Declaration of Independence,” financing the rebellion, motivating followers, and publishing and circulating the Dongnip sinmun (The Independent).”

Unlike the citizen assembly movement, the revolt in March raised the question of legitimacy of power across the board. It denounced the coercive politics of the Japanese imperialism and advocated national self-determination. Through this grand revolt, the general will of the whole nation was expressed across the nation. Historically, the March First Movement succeeded to Boeun Assembly aiming at expelling the Japanese and Westerners and the nationalistic spirit of the 2nd Donghak Peasant War against the invasion of the Japanese troop. Through this movement, the whole communities’ general will to gain national self-independence erupted peacefully and revolutionarily.

We could see the move to republican integration in the March First Movement. It started by the ‘religious integration,’ led by Cheondogyo followed by Christianity and Buddhism and showed the integration of religion and sociality called ‘gyojeong ssangjeor’ as well. In addition, we can discover that the spirit of National Self-determination of Wilson, which was explicit in the “Declaration of Independence,” is communicating with the idea of ‘national self-independence’ propounded by the leaders of Donghak(Eastern Learning). In this way, the March First Movement is compositely integrated by a variety of fragmentations. In particular, the republican integration is well seen in the Three Items of Agreement. Three Items of Agreement showing ‘gaining popularity, unification, and no violence’ was already established in the planning process of the March First Movement, according to Choe Rin who played as a major role of contact point for the thirty-three Representatives of the People. The three principles aimed to integrate the opinions of the entire nation. They also showed the argument that only the republican integration could give the justifiable legitimacy of the national independence. Then, what is the
basic spirit to make the republican integration possible?
Cheondogyo’s move toward republican integration could be found in its perspective of cosmos, represented by ‘donggwii illi,’ which means that the cooperation and solidarity among the human beings are the morals they should comply with as well as the actual things of existence because all things in nature are in the same line of energy. In other words, the religious philosophy that sees the cosmos as a ‘creature of the grand ultimate energy’ built up the republican community movement.

Conception of a Republican Provisional Government

The March First Movement began with the declaration of the provisional government. In other words, the March First Movement appeared almost concurrently with the design of the new republic. This means the Cheondogyo circle systematically planned to construct a new republic state regarding the March Movement as a starting point. The framework of the Provisional Government was published in the second and third edition of Joseon dongnip sinmun as follows; “According to the provisional government organization planning, they will hold a national meeting, organize a provisional government and select a provisional president” (in second edition). “13 representatives from 13 provinces each will be selected and Joseon Independence Grand Meeting will be held in Jongno, Gyeongseong, on March 6, 11:00 AM” (in third edition).

Yi Jong-il and Yi Jong-rin created and designed the newspaper that reported the announcement of the provisional government. Yi Jong-il was the president of Boseongsa that was responsible for the printing and distribution of the “Declaration of Independence” and Yi Jong-rin was a senior official of Cheondogyo, editing Cheondogyohoe wolbo (Cheondogyo monthly magazine). Thus, the government organization plan, presidential election, and Joseon Independence Grand Meeting were the new plans of Cheondogyo to construction a new state. Moreover, it designed the cabinet members such as Shon Byeong-hui (as President), Oh Se-chang (as Vice President), Yi Seung-man (as Prime Minister and other important leaders of Cheondogyo such as Oh Se-chang, Gwon Dong-jin and Choe Rin who were the masterminds of the March First Independence Movement.

Uiam was recommended as the new republic head of the Noryeong Provisional Government established by the Korean National Assembly (Daehan Gungmin Uihoe) located in Russia and of the Joseon Democratic Provisional Government established by the Joseon Independent Party Association (Joseon Jajudang Yeonhaphoe). The two provisional governments seem to be somewhat related to Cheondogyo and the new draft to constructing the republic seems to be deliberately discussed and prepared.

Most notable thing is “Act on Foundation of Joseon Democratic Provisional Government.” This concrete and systematic master plan for a new state is composed of 12 chapters, articles and additional clauses. It specifies the procedure to compose the constitution drafting committee to design the constitution, national assembly act and election law for national assembly, and mentioned the nullification of ‘Treaty of Annexation with Japan,’ new draft treaty, local autonomy system, mandatory education, nationalization of major industry, and the principle of equal property. Professor Go Jeong-hyu presumed that this documentation was retained by the Cheondogyo circle and was authored by Gyeongam Yi Gwan (1860-1928), a Confucian graduating from Boseong School, writing about the doctrines of Cheondogyo and composing some anthologies.

The Cheondogyo circle was likely to plan to construction a new republic when starting the March First Independence Movement. However, unlike the optimistic expectation of the independence activists, Wilson’s National Self-Determination only belonged to the winning nations and Joseon was still far away from dependence.

After arrested for mastering the March First Movement, Uiam argued in a court that ‘Democratic Entity’ should be the regime of a new state after independence. The three provisional government plans made by Cheondogyo were also republican regimes, designating Shon Byeong-hui as the president of Cheondogyo (jeongdoryeong). ‘Minguk’ (Republic) included in the name of the provisional government clearly shows Cheondogyo sought the democratic republic. In this regard, thus, the political entity and the political philosophy can be said to originate from Cheondogyo.

The citizen assembly movement and the March First Movement were the most important opportunities for Cheondogyo to take part in politics. The citizen assembly movement, starting from 1904, had the character of democratic movement by the modern citizens while the March First Movement had the nationalistic character seeking for the independence, expanding the initiatives of the citizens of Cheondogyo to the whole people. However, the democratic movement in 1904 was democratic republican that puts more importance on the entire community than the liberal individual. The March First Movement in 1919 also had the strong character of republicanism that emphasized the independence of the national community, rather than in favor of liberalistic or working-class rights. These are based on the unique unification philosophy called ‘donggwii ilche(Returning to the One Universal Entity)’ since the foundation of Donghak(Eastern Learning). However, on the contrary to the strong progress to integration, the oppression of the Japanese imperialism got harder and harder. Moreover, the left-right split within
Cheondogyo as well as the whole independence activists, and the conflicts between the conservative modernization line and the nationalistic independence line was also widened.

IV. Conclusion

In the above, I have examined the philosophy and the practices of the democratic republicanism by analyzing the ‘new political subject’ and ‘political movements’ presented by Cheondogyo. The findings are summarized as follows.

First, the political subject of Cheondogyo has the nature of republic democracy. The republic and democratic political subject refers to the individual who is the universal communitarian and who is far from the liberalistic individual, socialist proletarian, or nationalistic people. The presented political subject is represented by the concept of ‘gong gaein’ (public individual). ‘Gong gaein’ also can be translated as ‘a citizen who internalizes universality, community spirit and commonality,’ or ‘a mature citizen who can consider the common good unlike an isolated individual.’

Second, while the rule of law emphasizes the liberal democratic procedure that can expand the common good by keeping the contractual relationship between individuals more rigorously and fairly, while the republicanism of Cheondogyo reiterated ‘cheonin gonghwa,’ which is an ideal state where the religiousness and sociality are implemented. Here, ‘religiousness’ is a spiritual existence in that all the creatures revere ‘the lord of heaven’ inside them and ‘sociality’ is a universal communal existence where all of them is communicating with one energy of cosmos. If the heaven and the human being reach to the full-fledged harmony, the harmony among all men can be achieved. Here, we can see an original and specific republican philosophy of our own different from the Western republicanism.

Third, the political ideology of the democratic republicanism was realized through a series of practical movements. The citizen assembly movement has the democratic nature while the one led by Cheondogyo was beyond just the realization of the people’s sovereignty because citizen assembly movement was strongly motivated by the intent and consideration of republicans to stimulate and strengthen the nationalistic community. The citizen assembly movement emphasized the national modernization in 1904 and the national integration in 1920, all of which were on the basis of the republican consideration that the national independence should be achieved through the unification of the entire people.

Fourth, the March First Independence Movement totally expressed the communitarian republicanism of the nation and led to the earnest democratic republicanism as shown in the provisional government frameworks. The March First Movement targeted at the republic democracy for the national community rather than that the utilitarian liberal democracy or socialistic communitarianism realized through proletarian revolution. The grand Movement was the response to the historic request that legitimacy should stand up for the existence of the national community. And the nationalistic democratic republicanism had its political philosophical root in the religious philosophy such as ‘honwon ilgi’ or ‘donggwi ilche’ as well as came from the historical need.

Finally, the political philosophy of democratic republicanism of Cheondogyo is explicitly distinct from the discourse of the democratic republicanism in the Western context. For example, the viewpoint of human beings as the subjects revering heaven within themselves, which had been the transcendental Absolute, or putting ‘cheondo’ (heavenly way) over politics is totally original, which cannot be explained by the republic democracy of the Western. Thus, this could give a wise insight to overcome the weak points of the Western democracy or republicanism. However, this context has not been attended earnestly and remains as the future research target.

Notes


2 Yun Dae-won, “Hanmal ilje chogi jeongcheron-ui non ui gwajeong-gwa minju gonghwaje-ui suyong” (Discussion of Political Entity and Acceptance of Democratic Republic Regime in the Late Joseon Dynasty and the Early Period of Japanese Colonial Rule), Jungguk hyeondaesa yeongu (Studies on Chinese Modern History) 12: p. 73.

34 See *Cheondogyo yaks* (Brief History of Cheondogyo) (Seoul: Cheondogyo Headquarters Publication, 2006), pp. 3-2.
38) Yi Don-hwa, op. cit., p.
40) For more information on the provisional government plan of Cheondogyo, see Yi Hyeon-hui, *Daehan minguk imsi jeongbusa* (History of the Korean Provisional Government) (Seoul: Jimmundang, 1982) pp. 54-56.
42 Refer to 姜 德 相, 『現代史資料』(朝鮮) (東京: 書房), pp. 9-2; and 金 正明 編, 『朝鮮獨立運動』II (民族主義運動編) (東京: 原書房), pp. 13-.

**Contact Address**

Moon Hwan Oh
Kyung Hee University
1 Hoeki-dong, Dongdaemoon-gu, Seoul, 130-701, Korea
PH: +82-11-349-2593
EMAIL: ohmh@paran.com
A Study on the Conflict between Republicanism and Monarchism in the Early-20th-Century Korea:

*Focusing on the Advent and Decline of Monarchism after the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919*

Park Hyun-Mo  
Academy of Korean Studies, Korea

**Abstract**

Monarchy was one of the most favorable political systems when Korean leaders discussed their country’s future government after the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919. Korea remained a monarchy for almost 1900 years—from the establishment of the Silla dynasty in 57 BC to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1905. A group of Korean intellectuals, for example, the members of the Daedongdan (Union of Great Unity), asserted, “The form of a new government should be a monarchy like Joseon.” However, the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai, China, proclaimed “Republic of Korea” on April 4th, 1919.

The debate and conflict between the monarchists and republicans were continued in Korea until the end of the 1920s. The monarchists insisted on keeping the era name “Dangun,” which originated from the Korean Founding Father while the republicans adopted the country name “Republic of Korea”. The monarchists tried to bring the Prince Yi Gang from Seoul to Shanghai on November 9th, 1919. Although the attempt was frustrated, being detected by the Japanese police, they aimed to, by way of enthroning Prince Yi Gang as head of the Provisional Government in Shanghai, “unite all independence movement groups.” Koreans’ support for monarchy, however, was weakened after this incident. Republicanism became, on the contrary, the more favorite form of government among people within as well as outside the country.

In conclusion, although monarchy was defeated in the hegemony competition in the early 20th-century Korea, it was still considered as an alternative political system. That is why the monarchy restoration movement in Korea should be given its proper place in the history of Korean politics.

I. Introduction

The monarchy, which had been sustained for almost 1900 years—from the establishment of the Silla dynasty in 57 BC to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1905—ceased to exist in the history of Korea in the early 20th century. The cessation of monarchy in Korea, however, did not result from the choice of Korean people, but was forced by the Japanese imperialism. This fact can be seen as one of the reasons why the activities were undertaken to restore the Great Han Empire (Dae Han Jae Guk), which Japan had forcibly annexed in 1905, after the March 1st Independence Movement of 1919.

For example, a meeting of the National Convention Preparatory Committee (Gukmin Daehoe Junbi Wiwonhoe) was held in March of that year and a group of Confucian intellectuals claimed for the restoration of the Great Han Empire, stating as follows: “Since we lost our country by the name of the Great Han Empire, we would rather adhere to the empire system than adopt a presidential system of government.” Beside this, members of the Korean People’s Union of Great Unity (Joseon Minjok Daedongdan; hereafter, Union of Great Unity) planned to establish a provisional government—known as the Hanseong Provisional Government—in the capital Hansong as a counterpart of the Provisional Government in Shanghai and even planned the escape of Yi Gang (Prince Uichin, 1877-1955), fourth son of Emperor Gojong, to China for the purpose of putting him up as the new emperor of Korea (November 1919).

While on the other, in April of that year, the Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai declared “Korea is a democratic republic” (Article 1, *Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Korea*, 11 April 1919). Yi Dong-nyeong, who was elected the first chairman of the Provisional Assembly, said, “This is the best moment in my life. We have been committing ourselves to the independence movement not for the restoration of monarchy. We are conducting this assembly with a sense of duty that we should establish democracy in our country in keeping with the worldwide trend,” emphasizing that the purpose of their independence movement is to establish a democratic system in their own country, not to restore the monarchy.

Independence movement groups at home, like the National Convention (Gukmin Daehoe) and the Union of Great Unity, advocated monarchy as the preferable system of a new government to be
II. Debate on Republicanism versus Monarchy during the Period of Monarchy

1. Concept of Republicanism in the Joseon Period

It was in Gwanghaegun ilgi (Daily Records of King Gwanghaegun, 14/02/17) that the term “republic” appeared for the first time in the history of Korea. King Gwanghaegun ordered Yi I-cheom, one of the subjects who had helped Gwanghaegun take the throne, to cooperate with Bak Seung-jong and Yu Hui-bun, who were also merit subjects, and on this occasion Yi used the word “republic.” Hearing this, a Confucian Scholar named Han Gye criticized Yi I-cheom’s use of the term “republican,” saying, “Yi I-cheom dared to use the word ‘republic’ in his memorial to the Throne.” According to Han, the term originally referred to the vacancy of the Throne, originating from King Li of the Zhou dynasty, China, who was forced to flee from his palace to Zhi city due to the people’s revolt against the king’s tyranny. Han insisted, “This proves that Yi is considering the Royal Court as his own, not as that of His Royal Highness” (Gwanghaegun ilgi, 14/08/10). That is, Han understood “republican politics” as meaning arbitrary administration by some powerful persons in the absence of royal authority.6

In this way, the term “republic” had been tabooed for quite a long time in Joseon and was not earnestly discussed until the governing systems of the West began to be known to Joseon scholars. Choe Han-gi had ever explained in detail about the parliamentary system of England and the democratic system of the United States in his Jigu jeonyo (Descriptions of the Nations of the World, 1857). Choe wrote about the structure and function of the English parliament as follows: “There is a Parliament in the country’s capital city. The Parliament is divided into two chambers. On one side is the House of Lords; on the other is the House of Commons. The House of Lords is made up of titled aristocrats and religious dignitaries while the House of Commons consists of men of learning and talents who were recommended and selected by the common people. (…) Not only England but many countries in Europe are operating this system.”7

In the book, Choe Han-gi also mentioned the position of President. Calling the President of the United States ‘daechongnyeong’ (Chief Commander), Choe explained the structural principles of the presidential democratic system and the president’s main duties and responsibilities as follows:

“They founded the United States and took Washington in Columbia County as its capital in 1789. They put up one president instead of a monarch and had the president take overall control of the nation’s military affairs, criminal affairs, taxation, and administration. (…) The term of the president is four years, and when the term is over, the former president is supposed to be replaced by a new president. (…) A president can never keep the position of president until his death nor transmit it to his offspring.”8

Although the American concept of presidency, which could not be kept until death nor transmitted by hereditary succession, was introduced to Korea in the mid-19th century, it did not seem to create a great sensation in the country, because it amounted to no more than introducing one of the various governing systems of foreign countries in an individual perspective.

2. Discussions about Constitutional Monarchy after the Port-Opening Period

It was 30 years later that the concept of republic became, for the first time having introduced by Choe, formally known to Korea. The Hanseong Ten Daily (Hanseong sunbo) dated the 3rd day of the first lunar month of 1884 published an editorial titled “Constitutional Government of the United States.” Its gist
Reform Edict

and people'. It was with the outbreak of the Coup of 1884 that an attempt to transform the absolute monarchy into a constitutional monarchy was made. Such attempt is revealed in Articles 13 and 14 of the matters of palace administration from matters of state administration (Articles 4) or the reduction of the royal household’s expenses (Article 8). Most of the articles focused on cutting down the king’s rights. However, their attempt to reduce the king’s rights was frustrated as the Reform cabinet collapsed the Agwan Pacheon Incident (the king’s removal to the Russian legation) in the following year. The new pro-

constitutional representative monarchy.

recognized that absolute monarchy was a fragile system in which national sovereignty could be deprived president.”

hereditary. When a president’s term comes to an end, he is supposed to be replaced by another

reasoning was that in an autocratic monarchy, which was not a constitutional state, the protectorate treaty could acquire legal validity only with the sanction of the monarch and agreement of the cabinet.

Having recognized these intrinsic flaws inherent in the autocratic monarchy, Korean reformist
intellectuals called for the reform of the system by holding street speeches and demonstrations, while upholding a constitutional monarchy. Their political movement got into its stride from March 1898 and finally led to the collapse of the pro-Russian cabinet on October 12 of the same year. They also formed a reformist cabinet led by Bak Jeong-yang and Min Yeong-hwan while submitting the Six Proposals (Heonui yukjo) to Emperor Gojong. Emperor Gojong accepted the proposals and restructured the Privy Council, which had been created as an advisory body within the Cabinet in 1895, as a semi-elective assembly on October 29, 1898. However, in this process, conservative officials such as Jo Byeongsik and Yu Gi-hwan alleged that the members of the Independence Club were planning to abolish the monarchy and establish a republic in Korea, thus causing the government to abolish the Privy Council, an archetype of Korean-style parliamentary, and to dissolve the Independence Club.\(^{15}\)

In some way, the attempt to establish a republic in an absolute monarchy like Joseon was such a dangerous idea that it could not but be frustrated. Probably that is why Yu Gil-jun (1856-1914) supported a constitutional monarchy despite being aware of the existence of a republic. According to Yu, the political systems of each country can be categorized as follows: 1) a polity in which the monarch wields arbitrary power (arbitrary monarchy); 2) a polity in which the monarch holds despotic power (absolute monarchy); 3) a polity governed by the aristocrats (aristocracy); 4) a polity in which both monarch and people engage in politics (constitutional monarchy); and 5) a polity governed by the people (democratic republic). Joseon at that time fell under the category of number 2, but Yu preferred the constitutional monarchy (category of number 4) the most. He mentioned the reason as follows: "In a constitutional monarchy, a monarch one person cannot make arbitrary decision regarding legal or administrative matters but decisions are first made by the ministers after discussion among themselves and then put into practice by order of the monarch. (…) As a whole, the ministers are the ones who became government officials on the recommendation of people and are supposed to administrate state affairs as representatives of the people, who are masters of the country." Yu also insisted, "Only when the monarch's power is limited to a certain extent, he cannot go beyond the barrier of the law and thus can deal with even most trivial matters in a manner very impartial to common people."\(^{16}\)

Among the members of the Independence Club, there were some proponents of a republic. Some younger members such as Yi Geon-ho, Choe Jeong-deok, and Rhee Seungman began to advocate republicanism, taking a lead in holding the Convocation of Ten Thousand People (Manmin Gongdonghoe). Their ideas won greatest support among young students, in particular, the students of the Baejae School.\(^{17}\) Nevertheless, the older ranks of the Club thought that the younger ranks’ advocacy of a republic was somewhat dangerous and decided to ban the mention of a republic at the Convocation of Officials and the Citizenry (Gwanmin Gongdonghoe), which was to be held in Jongno, downtown of Seoul, for six consecutive days from October 28 through November 2, 1898. This stance is well expressed in the first article of the stipulations of the Meeting, which says, "All words and deeds that are disrespectful to the Emperor and the Imperial Household are strictly prohibited and any kind of speech that advocates democracy or republicanism is also banned."\(^{18}\)

It was not until Gojong passed away in 1919 and the Provisional Government of Korea was established in the same year that establishment of a republic was officially discussed and stipulated again. Seo Jae-pil declared in April 1919 as follows: "Korea had existed as an independent kingdom until 1905 (…) and established a provisional government in March 1919. This provisional government was established in the form of a republic and its governing ideology is democracy."\(^{19}\) Given this, the following questions need to be addressed: Were there any efforts to restore the Great Han Empire, which was ruined by the Japanese imperialism in 1905?\(^{20}\), and what did the leaders of the provisional government have in mind when they declared it as a democratic republic? These questions will be examined and discussed in the next chapter.

\*III. Debate on the Republicanism versus Monarchy around the March 1st Movement

1. Monarchy Restoration Movement in Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces of Siberia

In the \textit{Annals of Joseon Dynasty} (Joseon wangjo sillok, known also as the \textit{Veritable Records of the Joseon Dynasty}), the expression of “restoration of monarchy” (bokbyeok) appears 5 times, being used in two meanings. First, its literary meaning is "dethroned king’s getting back to the throne,"\(^{21}\) exemplifying the case in which Ming Emperor Yingzong who had been captured by the Monologs and had his throne taken by his brother Zhu Qiyu regained his throne after being released from the Mongols.\(^{22}\) Another meaning refers to the case in which the king begins to govern in person after having other persons take care of the state affairs. The \textit{Annals} mentioned, as the example of this, the case of King Myeongjong who began his direct rule after putting an end to the regency by his queen mother.\(^{23}\) In other words, "bokbyeok" means the case in which a certain monarch gets back his throne, or the case in which a political system, which was managed in a different way for a while, returns to its original monarch system.\(^{24}\)

Given this, the righteous army, which rose up in resistance to the dethronement of Emperor Gojong and the dissolution of the Joseon armies in 1907 and waged a “pro-monarch” righteous armies’
war, can be considered as a “bokbyeok” force. For example, the righteous army led by Im Byeong-chan from 1912 to 1914, based in Jeonju, is a typical example of the “bokbyeok” force. Nevertheless, the Japanese army’s “great conquest operations” drove righteous armies out to the overseas regions, such as West Jeandao and the Maritime Provinces of Siberia, where the righteous armies continued their struggle to restore the monarchy.25

There was another obstacle the righteous army leaders had to overcome, other than the Japanese army. It was the voice of the advocates of a republic, which began to be heard around the time when the first Convocation of Ten Thousand People was held at Jongno in 1898 and gained force with the Japanese annexation of Korea. Those who were disappointed with the role of Emperor Gojong while going through the failure of the Convocation of Ten Thousand People and the Japanese annexation of Korea hoped for the establishment of a monarchy instead of a return to the autocratic monarchy. Especially, the overthrow of the Chinese monarchy—following the revolutionary process from the Chinese Revolution (October 10, 1911), through the establishment of a Chinese provisional government (January 1, 1912), to the abdication of Qing Emperor as a result from the negotiation between Sun Wen and Yuan Shikai (in 1912)—gave a great shock to the leaders of the righteous armies who struggled to restore the monarchy with the mindset of “defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy” (wijeong cheoksa) while leading the independence movement in China.

The Korean Independence Army, which had expressed support for the restoration of monarchy, suffered internal conflict in the process of its reorganization into the headquarters of the Korean Restoration Army. The old members of the Korean Independence Army preferred monarchy and used the era name “Dangi” in their declarations and statements. On the contrary, the young members emphasized the solidarity with the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai and insisted on using the era name “Minguk.” The confrontation between the two groups became more intense, resulting in their split into Giwon Independence Group, led by its old members like Bak Jangho and Jeon Deokwon, and Minguk Independence Group, led by its younger members such as Jo Byeongjun and Shin Uhyeon.26

Before then, Yu Inseok, who had been leading the righteous army in the Maritime Provinces of Siberia, began to criticize the republican movement as the monarchy restoration movement began to decline with the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912. He insisted that the monarchy system, despite the many evils therein, was much better than an election-based system, which might invite foreign forces to meddle in the nation’s internal affairs and could not help to protect the nation from the foreign threats. He also said that the monarchy, which was advantageous for national integration and political stability, was the best form of governing that would enable to ward off the foreign invasion. He advocated for the introduction of the universal conscription system along with modern Western weapons to preserve the military independence of the nation.27

The restoration movement was also active in southern Manchuria. In spring of 1923, Jeon Deok-won, who had been leading the Korean Council of the Righteous Armies (Daehan Tonguibu) in southern Manchuria, seceded from the Council and organized the Justice Corps (Uigunbu) and even came into a bloody conflict with the Council.28

Regrettably, discord between the two leaders of the Justice Corps, Yang Gi-tak and Jeon Deok-won, led to a split in the organization. Jeon Deok-won, who had served as a commander of the righteous army as well as the military adviser of the Korean Independence Corps, was a Confucian advocating the restoration of monarchy and thus came into conflict with the patriots overtaken by new trends. Jeon Deok-won organized the Justice Corps along with Kim Pyeong-sik and waged a bloody confrontation with the Korean Council of the Righteous Armies.29

These advocates of monarchy believed that as long as the Great Han Empire was taken by force to the restoration groups, the Justice Corps, which had belonged to the restoration groups, was incorporated into the Army Council in Manchuria of Korean Provisional Government (Daehan Minguk Imsi
2. Monarchy Restoration Movement inside the Country

Around the time of the March First Independence Movement, activities to restore the monarchy were also carried out within the country. One example of such is the establishment of the Union of Great Unity. The Union of Great Unity, as mentioned above, adopted the era name “Geonguk”, instead of that of “Minguk”, when writing statements and declarations of the Hanseong Provisional Government. The Union of Great Unity, led by Jeon Hyeop and Cheo Ik-hwan, carried out the independence movement for the purpose of restoring the Great Han Empire, and eventually attempted to bring Prince Uichin, son of Emperor Gojong, to Shanghai.33

The attempt was made in order to have Prince Uichin participate in a Peace Conference or a League and inform the international community that Korean people were carrying out a fierce struggle for independence against the Japanese imperialism.34 Although Prince Uichin was arrested while trying to escape into Shanghai, this attempt symbolized the strategy adopted by the advocates of the restoration of monarchy. As a matter of fact, there was inevitably a difference of ideas between the people inside the country and those outside regarding the country’s independence. It was for the purpose of creating an occasion to integrate those two that Kim Ga-jin, head of the Union of Great Unity, led this attempt. Although he thought that Prince Uichin was somewhat insufficient to be a head of the monarchy restoration group, he didn’t have any other choice than to select Prince Uichin since King Sunjong stayed at the Changdeokgung Palace and the Crown Prince, Yi Eun, was away in Japan.35

They believed that if Prince Uichin took refuge in the Korean Provisional Government and united the various factions within the Korean Provisional Government, they would be able to effectively carry out struggles against the Japanese imperialists. Recognizing that the most effective propaganda method in struggling against the Japanese imperialism is to have the Royal Family join the Provisional Government of Korea, the independence movement leaders secretly pushed forward the plan to bring Prince Uichin to Shanghai. Until then, Prince Uichin had been leading a kind of bohemian life without engaging in politics just like the princes of the past and the Japanese imperialists were also considering Prince Uichin no more than a vagabond. Kim Chun-gi, Prince Uichin’s brother-in-law, reflected on the case of Daewongun, who disguised himself as a vagabond before he came into power, and tried to send Prince Uichin to Shanghai in order to put him up as head of the Provisional Government.36 However, Prince Uichin was arrested in the train bound for Shanghai, thus backfiring the Union of Great Unity’s attempt to unite “the comrades in Jilin, to say nothing of the members of the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai.”37 According to Jeon Hyeop, who planned this attempt, “the Union of Great Unity did not agree with the platform of the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai.” Jeon also insisted that the Union had a plan to establish an organization for the independence of Korea, after sending Prince Uichin to Shanghai. This organization was to be led by Kim Ga-jin and Yi Gang, with the aim of establishing a monarchy, not a republic. According to Jang Ji-yeong, who was asked by the Union of Great Unity to draft the Declaration of Independence in summer of 1919, Jeon Hyeop insisted on having a king as head of state, saying, “Provisional Government of Korea has now been established in Shanghai. Since our country has been a monarchy for a very long period of time, it is almost impossible to unite our people by electing a president as head of government. That is why I feel we should have a king, (...) If we bring one of the sons of Emperor Gojong to Shanghai and put him up as head of the provisional government, popular feeling will move with us. Let’s be aware of this and turn the Provisional Government of Korea into a royal government.”38

This idea was not only articulated by the Union of Great Unity. Prince Uichin, who consented to cooperate with the plan after some hesitation, turned to have a strong faith in the idea of ‘restoration of monarchy.’ He planned to establish a refugee government of the Great Han Empire after taking asylum in Shanghai. His mind is revealed in his following comment: “My royal clan exceptionally has been acting as Master of Joseon for almost 500 years (...) I from now on have to render support in the field of diplomacy while staying abroad.”39

The proponents of restoration, including Prince Uichin, insisted, “Presently, most of the Joseon people think that 500-year-long Joseon dynasty collapsed without being guilty” and believed they had to restore a monarchy. According to them, “While few people consent to the idea of a republic or that of a president, which is held by the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai, many people support the restoration of Joseon dynasty.”40 Given this, it seemed that confrontation and conflict between the advocates of restoration and the advocates of a republic was inevitable. The idea of “installing a king as head of the nation” “for the purpose of restoring the Joseon dynasty” could not be compatible with the democratic idea that “the people are the sovereign”41 and “the officers of government are the servants of the people.”

In conclusion, as the leaders of the plan to take Prince Uichin to Shanghai were arrested following the breakdown of the plan, while republicanism emerged as a global trend, as exemplified in the
IV. Conclusion

As examined so far, after the collapse of the Joseon dynasty, the movement to restore the monarchy was waged within the country as well as in Manchuria and the Maritime Provinces of Siberia around the March 1st Independence Movement. Given this, we should not assume that all sorts of attempts to restore the monarchy were discontinued with the declaration of the Constitution of the Provisional Government. Such an assumption is not only a far cry from fact but falls into the error of considering the restoration movement to be anachronistic. As Yu In-seok insisted, the monarchy restoration movement that was carried out in Korea in the early 20th century was not just an attempt to restore the old monarchy, but involved determining which system of governance would be more effective for fending off foreign influence and stabilizing the domestic political situation and mapping out proper strategies. And it was also linked with the debate over what a good governance system ought to be, which was deep-rooted in the history of Korean political thoughts. This debate can be briefly sketched as follows.

First, arguments for the restoration of monarchy have been expressed in various forms or in different terms throughout the Korean history. For example, in the early Joseon period King Sejo criticized the system of consultation between King and the three High State Councillors of the State Council, which allowed for the discretion of the subjects, saying, “How on earth is it possible that the state affairs are reported to the subjects, not to King? Does that severely contradict the principle that people are supposed to obey the orders issued by only one person? If I do as you all insist, state authority would fall in the wrong hands.” The principle that “the orders should be issued by only one person,” which had also been asserted by King Taejong prior to King Sejo, aimed at the unification of the state command system as well as the strengthening of royal power. And it was in the same context that King Jeongjo said in the late Joseon period, “Isn’t it said in Shujing that ‘the monarch alone establishes the measure’? (…) Just as [all those appending facilities like] the hinges of a door, a doorpost, a door latch, and the side posts of a door can be put on their right places only after the ridge of the house has been constructed, and just as millions of stars can revolve only if the North Star is placed at the right spot, so is the case with establishing the monarchical measure (hwanggeuk)” (Jeongjo sillok, 24/06/16), emphasizing the monarch-centered state administration. All these considered, the debate between the constitutional monarchy, which the Independence Club advocated at the time of the Convocation of Ten Thousand People, and the absolute monarchy supported by Emperor Gojong, or the debate between monarchism and republicanism, which has been examined in this paper, can be seen as an extension of the antagonism between the “monistic system” and “pluralistic system”.

Second, just as republicans’ assertion and movement, which were concretized in the Provisional Constitution, has gained historical significance, the monarchy restoration movement should be given its proper place in the sanctuary of History. In particular, only because Choe Ik-hwan and Jeon Hyeop had once been members of the pro-Japanese organization, Iljinhoe (Advancement Society), even their activities for the national independence, including their activities as members of the Union of Great Unity, have been neglected till now in the history of Korea. Nevertheless, if their activities aimed to achieve national independence and reform by establishing a royal dictatorship in the form of an absolute monarchy, their standpoint should be placed upon a strict reevaluation in terms of historical progress. While the movement to establish a parliament, led by the Independence Club, has been estimated as a progressive one, the movement to strengthen the Emperor’s power, propelled by Emperor Gojong and Iljinhoe, has often been denounced as conservative or reactionary. However, given that the argument that Japanese imperialists confidentially supported the Independence Club and the Convocation of Ten Thousand People, the absolute monarchy supported by Emperor Gojong, or the debate between monarchism and republicanism, which has been examined in this paper, can be seen as an extension of the antagonism between the “monistic system” and “pluralistic system”.

Lastly, the causes for the failure of the monarchy restoration movement can be divided into two categories. The first concerns the problem whether the restoration of monarchy could indeed stabilize the politics of the country and help to protect the country against the foreign influence, as the proponents of monarchy restoration had insisted. As pointed out above, the card of the “sanction of the monarch,” which Ito Hirobumi presented to Emperor Gojong as a precondition for the conclusion of the treaty, served to expose the logical defects of the restoration movement. The other concerns exterior factors such as the continuing frustrating attitude of authority like Emperor Gojong and Sunjong, and changes in the situation.

establishment of a republic in China, the proponents of restoration began to lose influence within the country. In particular, even the Union of Great Unity accepted socialism, as can be seen in the fact that such an expression as “realization of socialism,” which had not been found in its Declaration of Establishment published on April 3, 1919, appeared in the “provisional regulations” issued in September of the same year, while the influence of the proponents of restoration dropped sharply. Moreover, some of the early members of the Union of Great Unity, like Choe Ik-hwan and Gwon Tae-seok, and the student movement leaders began to engage themselves in socialist movement after being released from prison, taking part in organizing the Seoul Youth Association.42
surrounding the country, for example, the fall of monarchy in China. These factors need to be examined in a critical perspective and thus will be addressed in a future study.

References

*Dongnip sinmun* (The Independent).

*Gu hanguk gwanbo* (The Official Gazette of Korean Government).

*Hanseong sunbo* (Hanseong Ten Daily).


**Notes**

4) Kim Seok-yeong (1978), "Introduction."
6) In connection with this, Min Sim criticized Han Gye for maliciously distorting what Yi I-cheom said, and took another example of a “republic”. That is, Han insisted that although Yi I-cheom used the word “republic” to signify the subjects’ will for realizing the politics of harmony and cooperation for the king’s sake, Min shrewdly distorted Han’s intention by taking the case of King Li of Zhou as an example (*Gwanghaegun ilgi*, 14/08/11). Given these facts, the term “republic” seemed to be considered at that time as an ambivalent word that referred to either a good case (as exemplified by King Xuan of Zhou) or a bad case (as exemplified by King Li of Zhou).
8) Ibid., pp. 8-9.
9) *Hanseong sunbo* (Hanseong Ten Daily) 10 (3 January 1884).
11) *Gu hanguk gwanbo* (The Official Gazette of Korean Government), no. 1 (12 December 1894); *Gojong sillok* (Annals of Emperor Gojong) 31/12/12 (the year of Gabin).
13) *Dongnip sinmun* (The Independent) (15 December 1898).
18) *Dongnip sinmun* (The Independent) 3.128 (1 November 1898).
20) The argument that the Great Han Empire ended with the Protectorate Treaty of 1905 is based on the following rationales: Although the treaty stated, "The Government of Japan shall undertake to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Korea" (Article 5), 1) Korea was deprived of all diplomatic maneuvering (Article 1); and 2) the Japanese Resident General of Korea took even the domestic sovereign power into his own hands (Article 2).


22) *Sejo sillok* (Annals of King Sejo) 03/06/03 (the year of Eulmi).

23) *Myeongjong sillok* (Annals of King Myeongjong) 08/07/12 (the year of Byeongsin); 04/08/19 (the year of Byeongsin); 04/08/26 (the year of Gyejae); *Gwanghaegun ilgi* (Daily Records of King Gwanghaegun) 04/09/18 (the year of Giyu).

24) Yi Hyeon-ju defines "bokbyeok" as "a return to the old system or autocratic monarchy." Citing Prof. Jo Dong-geol's words, "If the attempt to return to the old system aims at a constitutional monarchy, not an autocratic monarchy, it can be referred to as the concept of 'bohwang.'" Yi insists that "bokbyeok" is a more general concept including "bohwang" (defending the Emperor). Yi Hyeon-ju (1999), p. 63n.


27) Yu In-seok (1973).


For reference, here is the family tree of Emperor Gojong:

Emperor Gojong — Empress Myeongseong → one son (King Sunjong, 1874-1926)

- Princess Consort Sunheon → one son (Yi Eun [Yeongchin-wang], 1897-1970)
- Lady Yi → one son (Yi Seon [Wanhwa-gun or Wanchin-wang], 1868-1880)
- Lady Jang → one son (Yi Jang [Uihwa-gun or Uichin-wang], 1877-1955)
- Lady Jeong → one son (Yi U, 1912-1945)
- Lady Yang → one daughter (Lady Deokhye [Deokhye Ongju], 1921-1989)


38) Jang Ji-yeong (1974), p. 204. For more information on the independence movement of Jang Ji-yeong, who was a pupil of the pioneering Korean language scholar Ju Si-Gyeong, refer to Yi Hyeon-ju (1997).


41) *Dongnip sinmun* (16 November 1898).

42) Yi Hyeon-ju (2003), p. 128. Dr. Yi brings up the Confucian concept of "Great Unity" as a factor that would enable the encounter of the two seemingly opposing ideas of monarchy restoration and socialism. Citing Confucius’ saying, "When the Great Way prevails, the world belongs to all," which appears in the "Liun"
chapter of *Liji* (Book of Rites), he views this idea as being connected with the socialist concept of the ideal society. He also insists that Kang Youwei of China must have been an advocate of a constitutional monarchy, given that he said, "When peace reigns over the land, all humans are equal and all borders disappear" in his *Daitongshu* (Book of Great Unity) (translated by Yi Seong-ae as *Daedongseo* [Seoul: Mineumsa, 1991], p. 510), and in this sense not at all surprising that the advocates of the restoration of monarchy transformed themselves into socialists (See Yi Hyeon-ju [2003], pp. 129-133).

43) Sejo sillok 07/06/23 (the year of Imjin).


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**Contact Address**

Hyunmo Park  
The Academy of Korean Studies  
50 Unjung-dong, Bundang-gu, Seongnam-si,  
Kyeonggi-do,463-791, Republic of Korea  
PH: 82-11-243-4414  
FAX: 82-31-708-5281  
EMAIL:hyunmo@aks.ac.kr
Post-Liberation Political Situation and Schism in Democratic Republicanism: 
Left-Right Ideological Confrontation and Korean National Unification

Chang Myounghag
Kyung Hee University, Korea

Abstract

This article examines more systematically the ideas of the important political powers in Korea from 1945 to 1948 since the liberation of Korea. In this 3 years the political situation in Korea was in the vortex of political struggles, which have wanted to realize their own political ideas in the Korean state-building. In short, the important political powers which have struggled for the leadership to establish a newly emerging nation in Korea can be classified as follows; firstly, the liberal and conservative political powers, which want to keep to the vested right, secondly the socialist group which want to realize the proletariat revolution, and thirdly the political group which seeks to a coalition between left and right, in order to build a united nation-state in Korea. These political powers hold in common about the ideas of democracy and republicanism, but in detail they have different consciousness about the understanding of democracy and republicanism, so that the struggle for the political initiative represent the political situation in all its nakedness since the liberation Korea's.

I. Introduction

Liberation on August 15, 1945 from the grip of Japanese imperialist imposed on Korean people a very important task of creating a new nation. In the “post-liberation political situation,” that spanned from right after the liberation from the Japanese colonial rule to the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948, efforts to establish national identity of Korea were made from various perspectives, and at the same time struggles over hegemony accelerated during this period.

For starters, left-wing Korean nationalists were those who were at the forefront of political situation right after Korea’s liberation. However, as anti-trusteeship movement developed, and the U.S. and Soviet Union moved towards the brink of a Cold War system from the end of 1945 to 1946, the political situation after the Korean peninsula’s liberation was whirled into antagonism between pro-communism and anti-communism. The Cold War system at the same time gradually perpetuated the south and north division at the 38th parallel, where ideologies and politics confront. When the second round of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission meeting collapsed in July 1947, the right wing began to emerge as a dominant political power in southern Korea, while the left wing became so in northern Korea. The division of Korean peninsula became irreversible at this point of time, and in the end resulted in the establishment of independent, separate governments each in the North and the South, and subsequently in the fixation of Korea’s division.

This research focuses on Kim Gu and his followers’ Korean Provisional Government in Shanghai, and Korean Independence Party, Rhee Syngman’s “Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence” and Korean Democratic Party (KDP), and Yeo Un-hyeong’s “Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence,” and Bak Heon-yeong’s Communist Party of Korea (former entity of “South Korean Worker’s Party”).

In this thesis, various nation building efforts will be reorganized systematically by analyzing statements and various political opinions inherent in nation building ideologies the aforementioned activists upheld as well as by analyzing major newspapers published after the liberation. To this end, discourses that changed in close relation with political activities of real-life political groups will be rearranged in detail. At the same time, nation building ideologies that major political groups pursued in the post-liberation period will be systematically readdressed from democratic and republican perspectives.

II. Disruption and Consolidation of Political Groups in the Post-Liberation Period

The biggest task that accompanied Korea’s liberation was, needless to say, the building of a new nation, which called for a consolidation of political groups before anything else was done. The real post-liberation political situation, however, did not converge towards the realization of such national task, but moved rather in the opposite direction. In reality, the political groups were largely divided into a leftist socialism group and rightist liberals or conservatives, and incessant conflicts and struggles among these groups acted as a huge stumbling block to achieving the important task of nation building in the post-liberation period.

The The Provisional Government of Korea, in Shanghai and Chongqing, which Kim Gu was leading was established in accordance with the theory of “new democratic nation,” which was based on Jo So-ang’s principle, which advocated equalities in the three fields of politics, education and economy. The equality principle pursued “democratic republicanism” that was based on nationalism, not on a dictatorship by an individual or a class. It pursued a democratic political system that was based on the people’s basic rights and local autonomy. It also supported the idea of nationalizing the land and backbone industries. Japanese and collaborationist Koreans had occupied, and advocated equality in economic system as well as education. Externally, the principle highlighted the importance of equality among nations.

The ideology of Kim Gu, the premier of the Provisional Government of Korea, is well summarized in “A word for our compatriots,” he announced on September 3, 1945 in commemoration of liberation. The document in essence emphasizes 1) a close relation with the coalition, 2) the democratic convention of leaders that collects Korean nationals’ mind, and 3) all problems, domestic or foreign, to be handled by the Provisional Government of Korea until an interim government is established. Without question, the declaration had thin chances of realization due to occupation policy by the U.S. and Soviet Union. However, Kim Gu’s efforts aimed at establishing a self-reliant unified nation took detailed shape through various political activities he conducted after his return to Korea. Kim Gu’s ideology, consistently expressed in his anti-trusteeship movements and unification movements, is nationalism, that is, Korean people stands before anything else. He said, “Philosophy changes just as political and economic theories are ephemeral. However, the pedigree of a people is permanent.” He also emphasized, “We should never forget that the so-called left and right wing of today is nothing more than a temporary tempest on a sea of everlasting pedigree.” Also, according to his ideology, nibbling away one’s own people’s self esteem mirrors one’s dependence on foreign powers, which is a cause for a ruined nation. It was in this sense that Kim Gu criticized communist groups who once mocked at those who admiringly said “Chengzhu’s fart smells good” but later with the same mouth and tongue says Lenin’s fart smells sweet.” He solely dedicated himself to achieving a complete state of “self-reliant independence” and to establishing an independent nation.

After the liberation of Korea, Kim Gu returned to the nation in the capacity of an individual, and immediately began to consolidate various political groups. A trusteeship determined at the Moscow Conference, held on December 27, 1945, turned the post-liberation political situation into a political whirlwind of pro-trusteeship and anti-trusteeship movements. For Kim Gu, the people’s rights to self-reliance were not something that can be conceded or compromised. He organized a “Committee for Total National Mobilization against Trusteeship,” and launched a nation-wide national anti-trusteeship movement. On January 7, 1946, five representatives from Korean People's Republic (KPR), Communist Party, Korean Democratic Party (KDP), and National Party were gathered together to discuss coalition issue in full force. However, with the change of political situation, Choson Communist Party shifted its stance to pro-trusteeship, while Rhee Syngman and Kim Seongsu declared abandonment of coalition with the left wing.

The collapse of two rounds of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission meeting prompted the U.S. to transfer Korea-related issues into the hands of the United Nations (U.N.). With this, the establishment of a separate government, which is far from building a self-reliant unified nation, began to take shape. As Korea-related issues were transferred to the U.N. and Korea’s partition became visible, domestic political groups split up clearly into two groups of pros and cons. Although the centrists suggested North-South talks as a last resort for unification, Rhee Syngman and KDP, Communist Party of Korea and North Korea remained aloof to the idea.

However, Kim Gu and the Korean Independence Party, in the provisional central executive committee held in October 1947, formed a North-South Representative Conference, and passed a resolution on the withdrawal of both U.S. and Soviet Union armies, dismantlement of the 38th parallel, and implementation of unified election for the North and the South. Kim Gu, sensing a division is to be forced upon Koreans, opposed the establishment of separate governments and devoted himself to unification movements. Needless to say, his activities ran into fierce criticism by the USMGIK, Rhee Syngman and KDP. The transfer of Korea issue to the U.N., as a result, jeopardized orthodoxy itself that Kim Gu and his

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242 Highlights of the outcome of the Moscow Conference, held during December 16-27, 1945 are as follows. First, trusteeship shall last five years for the maximum. Second, a provisional Korean democratic government will be established and put under a trusteeship of the U.S., Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. Third, to discuss the construction of a provisional government, representatives of both U.S. and Soviet Union forces stationed on the Korean peninsula should open U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission meeting within two weeks.
fellows at the Provisional Government of Korea had, because it rendered Kim Gu’s idea meaningless. Kim Gu had pursued to establish Korean people’s self reliance and political consolidation based on the legal tradition of the Provisional Government of Korea.


In the post-liberation political situation where hot debates over nation building were taking place, Rhee Syngman tried to find the identity of a new nation in western democracy, that is, a democratic republicanism. Accordingly, he adamantly denied the Soviet Union-inspired people’s democracy in the communist world. His political color is well expressed in his anti-Soviet Union or anti-communist movements. His preference to western democratic political system is clearly portrayed in his clarification on his stance below.

Rhee Syngman, who preferred western democracy, U.S. style democracy in particular, insisted, “the U.S. and Soviet Union both has made it a goal to establish a democratic, independent government in Korea. Here, the noun ‘democracy’ carries two kinds of different political system, one asserted by Soviet Union and another one that is implemented by the U.S. Therefore, if a political system is set up without distinguishing these two, Korea will inevitably suffer governmental disruption and domestic confusion.”

Rhee Syngman’s stance on post-liberation political situation is most clearly expressed in issues such as trusteeship and establishment of separate government. In the “resolution of Central Council for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence sent to four nations,” Rhee Syngman underlined that a trusteeship is what is needed for people with no capacity for self-reliant independence, but that since Korean people already have such capacity to the full, a trusteeship is not needed at all. On top of that, he also emphasized that behind the trusteeship suggested by the U.S. and Soviet Union was vicious propaganda by the collapsed imperial Japan, which means the implementation of the trusteeship corresponds to another state of colonialism. Through a broadcasting aired on December 26, before the decision by the Moscow Conference reached Korea, he had already made it clear that “if any government forces a trusteeship ignoring our determination, we, 30million Korean people, would rather fight to death for independence than accept it.”

The USMGIK, at initial stage, refused Rhee Syngman’s argument for a separate government. It was rather pushing ahead with Right-Left Wing Coalition movement between Kim Gyu-sik and Yeo Un-hyeong in full swing from May 22, 1946. In spite of that, Rhee Syngman stood by his argument. In June, he opened a national representative council of National Assembly for the Promotion of Korean Independence, and he assumed the chairmanship, trying to establish a preparatory organization for a separate government. As this gradually deepened discord with the USMGIK, Rhee Syngman fled to the U.S. to conduct diplomacy. It was Korean Democratic Party (KDP) that supported Rhee’s argument for a separate government. KDP focused on relieving discord between the USMGIK and Rhee Syngman. Accurately reading the development of international political situation, Rhee Syngman decided a construction of a unified, independent nation is not feasible, and thus stuck to an establishment of a separate government. For him, a separate government in the South alone was the next best measure that mirrored the inevitability and urgency of building a sovereign, independent nation.

3. **Yeo Un-hyeong and People’s Republic, and People’s Party of Korea**

Yeo Un-hyeong basically pursued establishment of a class-less society. However, he did not advocate Marxism, and maintained a certain distance from socialisms such as class struggle or proletarian revolution, because the pressing issue for him was establishing a self-reliant unified nation.

Ideological struggles, which caused disruption and conflict instead of national consolidation, only resulted in the contraction of independence movement’s capacity for national liberation. Yeo Un-hyeong emphasized the need for coalition or a grand unity in achieving a common goal of establishing a unified nation based on mutual admission of both parties’ existence. Against the backdrop, Yeo Un-hyeong (pen name: Mongyang) formed the National Foundation League, a secret organization that consisted of three central divisions (foreign affairs, state affairs, and treasury) in August 1944. When the Korean peninsula was liberated on August 15, 1945, he proceeds with an official procedure, establishing Committee for the

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244 Yang Ujeong, comp., “Victory of independence movement by Rhee Syngman” (Association for the Promotion of Independence Spirit, 1941), p. 162.

245 Dong-A Ilbo (28 December 1945).

Preparation of Korean Independence, which was responsible for maintaining security and order until a new nation and government was built as well as preparing for it.

Hoping for the U.S. Army’s station on the Korean peninsula, Yeo Un-hyeong declared People’s Republic on September 6, before the U.S. decided to station in Korea, with a view to accelerate the establishment of an independent nation. In a unique political vacancy created after the liberation, the People’s Republic took in charge of politics and security and orders within the South as a de facto governing body247. As he declared the People’s Republic, he emphasized, “Revolutionist can organize a government first, and then get approval from the people. People’s Republic is a contingency plan conceived in the face of abrupt changes. People’s Republic and government can exist as it is on the people’s consent.” In other words, the construction of a “republic” based on the people’s consent was what Yeo Un-hyeong pursued, and at the core of that goal was a nation in the form of democratic republic based on people’s sovereignty. Following the announcement, the people’s committee was formed in each of 145 cities and counties in South Korea and about 70 cities and counties in North Korea by the end of 1945.

However, Yeo Un-hyeong had smaller room to maneuver, as communists gradually began to take hegemony within People’s Republic in early November 1945. This prompted Yeo to hurriedly create on November 12 People’s Party of Korea, which carried on the spirit of National Foundation League. As he created the People’s Party of Korea, Yeo Un-hyeong pursued the establishment of a “genuine” democratic nation that is based on the people’s consent. Yeo Un-hyeong’s political view developed into that of a new dimension in conjunction with changes in international political situation surrounding the Korean peninsula. The first round of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission held in Mar 1946 also collapsed as the Soviet Union and USMGIK confronted seriously on the issue of whether to consult the anti-trusteeship group or not. The collapse hurled the future of the Korean peninsula into a foggy situation that rendered any forecasts impossible. Moreover, on June 3, 1946, Rhee Syngman realistically accepted Korea’s division into North and South (his so-called “Jeong eup comment”). Foreseeing a division of the Korean peninsula, Yeo Un-hyeong was firmly convinced that only Right-Left Wing Coalition is the key to building a self-reliant, democratic, and unified nation. With Yeo’s intermediation, the left and right wing groups produced “seven principles for coalition”, which include the establishment of provisional government, reopening of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission, land reformation that reflects the leftists’ stance, and exclusion of pro-Japanese groups. Through this, Yeo tried to form a left-right coalition government based on national partnership.

4. Bak Heon-yeong’s Communist Party of Korea and the Democratic National Front

In September 1945, which was after the liberation, Bak Heon-yeong, who reestablished the Communist Party of Korea, played a key role in the Socialist Movement under Japanese rule, such as in the formation of the Communist Party of Korea. He was a representative figure among those who adhered to the socialist revolution line based on Orthodox Marxism. At the time of the reestablishment of Communist Party of Korea, Bak Heon-yeong’s faction eliminated key figures of the Jangan group, such as Jang Ik-hwan, Yi Yeong, and Jeong Baek, through struggles within the party. At the same time, through struggles without the party, they began to seize hegemony within Yeo Un-hyeong’s People’s Republic, which was pushed forward right after the liberation.

However, when the Communist Party of Korea came to dominate the Central Committee of The People’s Republic right after the liberation, the Yeo Un-hyeong faction and Bak Heon-yeong’s Communist Party of Korea began to be pitted against each other.249 How did the Communist Party of Korea, which seized hegemony through struggles within and without the party, under Bak Heon-yeong's leadership, evaluate the political situation after the liberation, and what kind of plans did it have for building up the nation in the political situation after the liberation? First, the evaluation on the state of affairs immediately after the liberation is clearly manifest in the “The Current State of Affairs and Our Duty,” or the “These of August (20 August 1945).” Bak Heon-yeong, who believed Marx-Leninism to be the most progressive ideology and even absolute truth, asserted that he was the rightful successor to Communist Party of Korea. Bak Heon-yeong judged the state of affairs in the early stages of the political situation after the liberation in light of the international state of affairs. To begin with, he believed the significance of the Second World War to lie in the annihilation of international fascism and the victory of progressive democracy and socialism.

Thus, Bak Heon-yeong concluded that the most urgent matter to take care of after the liberation was first, to do away with the remnants of the Japanese rule, and second, to resolve the issue of land. Meanwhile, with the rupture of US-USSR Joint Commission in May 1946, the USSR and Kim Il-sung of North Korea shifted the blame of the rupture onto the United States and Kim Gu, Rhee Syngman, and others. Triggered by this, North Korea quickly pushed forward with the implementation of socialist ideology and policies. In addition, they set forth “the doctrine of a democratic base,” establishing North Korea as the base for socialism. In response to North Korea’s socialism and doctrine of a democratic base, South Korea convened an “emergency national convention (1 February 1946)” of the rightist camp. In a counter movement, the leftist camp chose a new strategy called the “Democratic National Front (15~16 February 1946).”

This “new strategy” was proposed for the sake of tackling the rupture of US-USSR Joint Commission, the defensive position of the Communist Party of Korea, the oppression of the U.S. military government, and the terrorist attacks by the right wing. On 27 July, the Democratic National Front came to propose “the five principles of left and right wing cooperation,” which included the acceptance of the decision by the Moscow conference, land reformation according to the principle of free seizure and distribution, and the complete exclusion of pro-Japanese traitors.

III. The Left-Right Dissolution in the Political Situation after the Liberation in the Press

Foreign power was not the only party responsible for the separation of the Korean peninsula; much of the blame lies on those within the nation. This can be affirmed through an analysis of the drift of arguments in the newspapers that sprang up one after another after the liberation. The newspapers in the political situation after the liberation can be categorized into three major parts as follows.

1) Liberal: Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, Hanseong Ilbo
2) Progressive: Joseon Inminbo (Joseon People's Newspaper), Jungang Sinmun, Dongnip Sinbo (Independent Newspaper)
3) Communist: Haebang Ilbo, Cheongnyeon Haebang Ilbo, Noryeok Inmin

The essence of the main argument of each newspaper can be summed up as follows.

1. Liberal Press

The liberalist press stressed Western liberal democracy, opposed trusteeship, and expressed dissatisfaction to U.S. policies, but when the U.S. changed their policies for the establishment of an independent government, it fully declared anti-Soviet, pro-Americanism. They defied the USSR, saying that the trusteeship plan had been forced upon by the USSR, and developed the anti-trusteeship movement into an anti-Soviet, anti-Communist movement. They denounced the pro-trusteeship power as followers of the USSR, and determined them to be an obstruction to independence, and anti-nationalists. With the anti-trusteeship movement, they emphasized the leftists as anti-nationalists, and the rightists as nationalists. Regarding the two ruptures of US-USSR Joint Commission, Dong-a Ilbo in particular came to ardently advocate the inevitability of establishing a unitary government.

Meanwhile, Chosun Ilbo supported the South-North negotiations promoted by Kim Gu, Kim Gyu-sik, and others. However, Dong-a Ilbo denounced them as Soviet worshipers. Also, regarding the national unification front, Chosun Ilbo strongly asserted that unification of the South and the North was just as urgent as unification within South Korea alone. Hence, Dong-a Ilbo supported the unification front centering around the national convention led by Rhee Syngman and Kim Gu, but was passive regarding the dissolution of the pro-Japanese. Dong-a Ilbo denounced communist and progressive democratic national fronts as auxiliary organs to the South Korea Labor Party, and criticized their activities. On the contrary, Chosun Ilbo adhered to the principle of excluding pro-Japanese national traitors while acknowledging the activities and effectiveness of Democratic National Front.

2. Progressive Press

In relation to the issue of establishing an autonomous, independent nation, these newspapers turned anti-American when prospects for trusteeship became uncertain. However, they did not instigate a violent

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251 Seoul Shinmun (28 July 1946).
resistant movement. Initially, they showed a reserved attitude about trusteeship, but then turned pro-
trusteeship. In other words, they came to feel that a strategic acceptance of trusteeship was in order, if
they were to prevent the South and the North from being permanently divided, and to organize a united,
independent government. However, they were strongly opposed to establishing an independent
government for South Korea alone.

In the early phase of the U.S. military government, these newspapers, watching the leftist-rightist
cooparation movement, urged that the two wings avoid extremism and make compromises. When
conservative powers responded negatively to this demand, however, the papers began to vehemently
criticize Rhee Syngman and Kim Gu as fascists, and the Korean Democratic Party as a political party that
had pro-Japanese military jaebeol and reactionary capitalists and landowners as its founding class.
Furthermore, when cooperation between the left and right wings became difficult, the newspapers urged a
unified front movement centering around the leftist democratic national front. They roughly classified the
basic lineages of democracy into the Communist Party, the New Democratic Party, and "the People's
Party," and stressed a unified front movement centering around the three. By and large, these
newspapers hoped that Yeo Un-hyeong's "the People's Party" would be the central point of the merge of
the three parties.

3. Communist Newspapers or the Bulletin of the Communist Party

Communist newspapers inclined towards the People's Democracy of Eastern Europe. However, taking
into consideration the special circumstances of the political situation after the liberation, it sought, for the
time being, solidarity with the progressive faction. As a strategy to that end, they took upon themselves the
banner of "progressive democracy. "The broad outline of the position stated by these newspapers for
establishing an independent nation is as follows.

In the early phase of the U.S. military government, they designated the United States as a
democratic power, emphasizing the importance of cooperation between the left and the right wings. When
conflict surrounding trusteeship intensified, however, they turned anti-American. They actively supported
trusteeship, and claimed that trusteeship was the only international principle guaranteeing national
liberation and independence. When the political situation shifted in the direction of establishing an
independent government, they stressed the urgency of a unified front movement, emphasizing the leading
role of the democratic national front, composed of a political party representing the working masses and
social organizations. They also argued that the key role in a united front should be taken on by Communist
Party of Korea. They denounced Rhee Syngman, Kim Gu, and others as fascists, and considered Kim
Seong-su's Korean Democratic Party powers to be pro-Japanese, and stated that they should indisputably
be excluded from the establishment of a new nation.

From an economic perspective, these newspapers were advocating the land reformation that
was under implementation in North Korea. Haebang Ilbo advocated the land reformation that the North
had executed. Because they supported the reformation policies of North Korea, when the U.S.
government proposed a measure for raising independent farmers by selling Japanese-owned land to
farmers, they criticized them for trying to maintain the existing relationship between landowners and
renters.

IV. Conclusion

The establishment of an independent nation was not an easy problem to tackle, since the
liberation of the Korean Peninsula that accompanied the collapse of the Japanese rule was brought about by
the US-USSR allied powers. Even under the limited condition of liberation by allied powers, the political
powers in Korea contended with one another to determine the direction of establishing an independent
nation, or in other words, a national identity. The overall evaluation would be as follows.

First, the liberalist right wing powers centered around Rhee Syngman and the Korean
Democratic Party launched the anti-trusteeship movement. And they gave up on the possibility of
establishing a unified nation early on while the US-USSR Joint Commission was under way, and promoted
the establishment of an independent government. The national identity they aimed for was a system of
"republic founded on liberal democracy." Second, the Communist Party of Korea, with Bak Heon-yong as
the leader, asserted a "people's democratic republicanism" against the establishment of such a national
system by the right wing. The proletariat-oriented people's democratic republicanism adopted by the
USSR and Eastern Europe was the model for the Communist Party of Korea that followed the ideology of
international communism, and their followers. Such conflict surrounding republicanism came from the two
opposing ideologies that dominated the conflict in the political situation after the liberation. Third, the
national identity sought after by the moderate powers that aimed for a unified government through
cooperation between the left and the right wings was, in the case of the moderate left wing, republicanism
based on people's democracy, and in the case of the moderate right wing, a republic based on liberalism.
The left and right wing powers that launched the independence movement in resistance to the Japanese colonial rule commonly sought sovereign independence and also shared democratic and republican ideologies, but in the political situation after the liberation, the differences in the interpretation or the method of understanding by the left and right wing powers on these two ideas were expressed in the form of conflict and struggle surrounding political control throughout the period. This period after the liberation, accompanied by changes in international circumstances due to intensification of the Cold War, led to aggravation, to the point of a dichotomous struggle between pro-communism and anti-communism, or in other words, an ideological conflict. The intensification of the Cold War provided an opportunity for the right wing power in the South, and the left wing power in the North, to monopolize superior political position, or in other words, power. And both the South and the North ended up establishing independent governments, and the separation of the Korean Peninsula became permanent.

Contact Address
Myounghag Chang
The NGO International Institute, Kyung Hee University
1 Hoekidong, Dongdaemoon-gu, Seoul, 130-701, Korea
PH: +82-2-961-0293 (O)
EMAIL: changmh27@hanmail.net
Abstract

This paper intends to examine the historical origins of the National Founding Constitution (NFC) of ROK. It will specifically trace the understanding of ‘democratic republicanism’ experienced through three political events in modern Korea, that is, the 1898 Convocation of Ten Thousand People (CTP), the March First Independence Movement (IM) and establishment of the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) of 1919. These events influenced the enactment of the NFC, ideologically or substantively. The creation of the NFC and its articles were examined through these historical experiences. Therefore, this study will show the continuity of the ideas, principles, and general framework of the NFC: First, the democratic republican movements of Korea originated from the CTP. Secondly, King Kojong’s abdication in 1907 signified the end of the constitutional monarchy. Thirdly, Korean understood the democratic republicanism clearly after 1917, famous Korean patriots declared Declaration of the Grand Solidarity of Korean People. Fourthly, the IM negated both imperialism and monarchism. These ideals were brought into to the KPG. The KPG constitution was a reservoir where these glorious democratic and popular heritages of the late 19th and early 20th century were contained and the nationwide consent on the social contract of democratic republicanism was finalized by the KPG Constitution. Lastly, this paper tries to prove that the KPG Constitution is the prototype of the NFC.

I. Introduction

In Korean history, it was the Korean Provisional Government (KPG), established on April 11, 1919, that stipulated, instead of merely declaring, the democratic republic system in the constitution for the first time. Therefore, it is presumed that the general social consensus on the democratic republic must have been forged around the time when the March First Independence Movement of 1919 (IM) arose and the provisional government was established, not as late as after the nation’s liberation in 1945. If so, how the article on the democratic republic in the constitution of the KPG came to exist? This paper is to research what kinds of changes and developments the concept of democratic republic have undergone from the time when the Convocation of Ten Thousand People (CTP, ManminGongdonghoe) adopted the “Six Items of Resolutions Presented to the Throne” (SIR, Huhnyyukjo) in 1898 until the constitution of the KPG upheld the democratic republic system.

This paper also has the purpose of reviewing biased viewpoints on the NFC. It said that the ideology of the NFC arose automatically following the demise of the Great Han Empire and introduction of American military rule (Han Tae-yeon 1988, 41). It means that the Constitutional order of modern Korea did not come out of Korean people’s political efforts or experiences. This viewpoint rises following question: Could the consensus on the principle of the “republic” and “liberal democracy” simply and automatically result from the demise of the Great Han Empire and American trusteeship? In addition, all the constitutional drafts made by various Korean social groups after 1946, regardless of their ‘left or right’ political inclination, had the key principles of modern constitutionalism such as “democratic republic,” “democratic sovereignty” and “division of powers.” Could they form a social consensus on the key principles without supposition of the self-evident righteousness of the principles? Researches into the long historical evolution of the Korean constitution may suggest the answer to these questions (Park Myung Lim 2003, 115).

II. Six Items of Resolutions Presented to the Throne in 1898 and the First Korean Constitution, Daehanguk gukje of 1899


One of the greatest changes that the NFC in 1948 brought to the Korean politics is that it introduced the notion that the national sovereignty resides in people and people have the right to make a political decision. Numerous examples of people’s interests in the doctrine of democratic sovereignty and republicanism are found in Hanseong sunbo and Hanseong jubo. But it was not until the CTP was held in 1898 that such interests developed into a political ideology, touching off people’s zealous political engagement.
The CTP was a totally new political movement to form a social consensus and represent it in the
governance of state affairs, quite different from the traditional ways of making people’s voices heard such
as collective complaints and popular riots. The CTP showed a sign of budding republicanism, in that it
discussed the community’s political affairs on the basis of people’s awareness of self-governing principle.
Such a movement could not be explained without supposing people’s solidarity with political community
(Michael Sandal 1996, 5-6). Therefore, the convocation was the attempt of people to assume the political
leadership. It tried to reform the political system with “popular engagement” in politics, going further than
the enlightenment campaign of Dongnip sinmun (The Independent), which sought to put the tyrannical
government under the control of laws.

The activities of Convocation show the process how the diverse political views, such as the SIR
and the “National Assembly constituting program,” proposed by the Independence Club (Dongnip Hyeophoe),
converge into a political consensus. For four days from October 28 to October 31, 1898, the
Independence Club held the Joint Convocation of Officials and Common People to proclaim the
Jungchuwon (Privy Council) reform program on which it agreed with the government. The joint
convocation, though it did not serve as a regular official function, served as a people’s congress for direct
democracy wherein people could make a decision on the government agenda in the presence of the
government officials, who were supposed to give their signatures on the decisions of the assembly for the
king’s endorsement of them. For example, the government officials, members of the Independence Club
and the public, who had led the joint convocation, adopted the SIR on October 29, 1898 and King Gojong
accepted them by promulgating the Five Royal Edicts. The resolutions adopted at the conference are as
follows: 1) That both officials and people shall determine not rely on any foreign aid but to do their best
to strengthen and uphold the Imperial prerogatives. 2) That all documents pertaining to foreign loans, the
hiring of foreign soldiers, (…) shall be signed and stamped by all the Ministers of State and the President
of the Privy Council. (…) 6) That existing laws and regulations shall be faithfully enforced. (Dongnip
sinmun, 178, November 1, 1898)

The SIR upheld imperial monarchy as its basic principle. But, its underlying purpose was to check
the imperial power and put it under the pubic control. What it called for was the rule of law, not the king’s
arbitrary rule, and consultation with people on political affairs. Accordingly, the principle of ‘politics through
deliberation between the monarch and people’ (gunmin gongchi) was nothing other than constitutional
monarchism. The republic system generally stands against the monarchism, but the politics through
deliberation between the monarch and people wherein the king consults people on political affairs can be
seen as a budding republicanism.

After all, people’s proposals were materialized on November 26, 1898. King Gojong gave
audience to 200 representatives of people and put the proposals into effect by issuing a royal edict. As
Han Gyu-seol said at the time, “the event of the government officials consulting people was the first ever
in the 500 yeas of Joseon history” (Jeong kyo 2004, 248-249). Kim Hong-woo called it the first modern
constitution of Korea as it was the “first contract drawn up and signed by the king and people in the
Joseon history.”

2. Absolute Monarchy in the Constitution of the Great Han Empire: Renege on Public Control of
Monarchy and Gunmin Gongchi

King Gojong disbanded the Independence Club and the CTP, trying to restore the absolute
monarchy. Therefore, the Constitution of the Great Han Empire (CGHE), promulgated in August 1899,
serves as a declaration of national sovereignty, but it had no other cause than empowering the absolute
monarch. As known well, the constitution’s key feature was its indefinite guarantee of the monarch without
recognition of people’s rights, representative democracy and division of powers. T

The gist of the
constitution is that it would never allow infringement of the monarch’s rights. Firstly, it manifested the
absolute power of the monarch, translating the tyranny of the monarch into modern official terms.
Concretely, it stipulated that the acts of infringing upon the monarch should be punished and spelled out
the monarch’s unbridled power to exercise general control over the legislative, judiciary and
administration; to command the army and navy; to legislate and revise laws; to pardon prisoners and
restore their civil rights; to have jurisdiction over the administrative units; to appoint and dismiss
government officials; to make pacts and peace treaties with foreign countries and declare war; and to
dispatch national envoys.

Secondly, the constitution meant abolition of the cabinet-led political system those who led the
Reform of 1894 pushed for, a reversion from the politics through deliberation between the king and
ministers to the absolute monarchy. In real politics, the cabinet ministers could not have the power to put
brakes on the autocracy of the monarch. King Gojong relegated the power of the Uijeongbu to his
praetorian organ, Department of the Royal Household and also delegated the authority to take care of the
national finance to Naejangwon, the royal budgetary office.

Thirdly, the constitution ran counter to the political cause of the Joint Convocation of Officials and
Common People, which pushed for transformation of the Joongchuwon into an upper house of the parliament and the politics through deliberation between the king and people. In 1899, King Gojong rejected the reform of the Privy Council and issued an edict to install the Law Correction Office, instead, which later legislated to the CGHE. This proves that King Gojong refused to accept the demand of people for establishment of a parliament.

In short, the promulgation of the CGHE ended up with brushing aside the call of people to protect civil rights and put the king’s power under public control, which was represented by the SIR in 1898. It also resulted in invalidation of the first social contract between the monarch and people in Korean history.

III. Changes in Public Perceptions about the “Monarch” and “Nation” around the Time of King Gojong’s Abdication: The Moves from “Check” Monarchy to “Deny” Monarchism and Rise of Representative Democracy

After 1905, King Gojong lost all of his actual power. With the abdication in 1907, his political power completely came to an end. It was what those who sought to check the absolute monarchy power desired, but at the price of the national sovereignty. It was a dilemmatic situation in which civil rights and the national sovereignty clash. The civil right activists turned more radical politically, with the loss of the national sovereignty becoming fait accompli.

In 1898, to call for a democratic republic was a risky act, but after the Protectorate Treaty of 1905, the pursuit of a democratic republic by the Korea Self-Strengthening Society, the Society for the Study of Constitutional Government (SSCG, Heonjeong Yeonguhoe) and the Korea Association were no more risky, as the monarchy power, which could earlier disband the CTP, now ceased to exist with the abdication. In addition, the growing perception of republicanism, recognition of politics as a public domain and the movement to put politics under the Constitutional order have grown too strong to be ignored. The new political situation dealt a great impact upon the civil rights movement, with moderate reformists giving up their pursuit of the Constitutional monarchy. They abandoned their earlier hopes for the ‘politics through deliberation between the monarch and people’ and pushed for a separation of the state from the monarch and political system without a monarch, instead. This move of the civil rights activists indicates their efforts to adapt themselves to the Japanese protectorate order to the end of their political engagement.

In May, 1905, the SSCG, organized by Yi Jun, Yang Han-muk, and others, extensively expounded on the constitutional government in their publication, The Gist of the Constitutional Government (GCG, Heonjeong youi). On the assumption that “the state is not owned by a monarch but by people’s community,” the publication expounds on the relationship between the nation and monarch, and the government and people.253 Firstly, it argues for separation of the royal court from the nation, saying that the monarch cannot personally own, though reign, the nation and the fate of the royal court cannot affect the nation. Secondly, the monarch differs from the state. Therefore, the government is operated by the king, but responsible to people, at the same time, so the king can only appoint government officials, not interfere with their rights as public servants. Thirdly, as the king represents the state in the international community, he maintains the diplomatic sovereignty, but jointly with the members of the parliament. Fourth, the publication expounds on the rights and obligations of people on the premises that people have inalienable God-given rights. In short, the GCG suggests the constitutional monarchy as best way of transforming the state and government into a public institution, while maintaining the monarchy. It was taking after the example of the British case. It was designed to have state affairs governed by the constitution, not by the will of the monarch, in its admittance of the monarchy system.

The Gist separates the state and government from the monarch and advocates people’s rights as the inalienable one beyond the realm of politics. It almost adopted the general principles of republicanism, holding the view that politics is not monarch’s own but people’s affairs. The SSCG recognized the monarch and monarchy power as a reality and tried to put limits on them in the principle of upholding human rights as God-given rights.

The article of Kim Seong-hui, a member of the Korean Association (Daehan Hyeophoe), “People Are Responsible for Political Party Affairs,” published after King Gong’s abdication in 1907, shows a more progressive view than the GCG. Kim’s article developed the Constitutional order of separating the state and government from the monarch into a more concrete political system, which presupposes the “representative government” and “political parties.”

While the GCG tried to put limits on the power of monarchy after approving of it, Kim’s article hardly mentioned about the monarch, thus giving the impression that it ruled out the monarchy system against the backdrop of King Gojong’s abdication. In the article, Kim characterized the Constitutional government more as the representative government than a monarch. Based on the argument, Kim proposed that the power of the monarch and people should be checked by the constitution. Kim went on

253 Hyeon Chae (1907), Yunyeon simdok seokui, vol. 2, 31-43. They are also carried on various papers, including the Hwangseong sinmun (Imperial Capital News) and the Daehan jaganghoe wolbo (Korea Self-Strengthening Society Monthly) 3 (25 September 1906).
to suggest a “nation state” where people, not the monarch, assume political responsibility, citing the responsible Cabinet-government of advanced countries as the example. Kim also defined political parties as the indispensable institution to “assume political responsibility for people and guarantee people’s engagement in politics.” While Kim’s emphasis on the role of constitution was aimed to check the monarch’s power, the emphasis on political parties was designed to check the government and permit the majority of the parliament to form and take over the government. Kim went on to say, “The existence of political parties is the precondition of the constitutional government, which, in turn, becomes the basis of the nation. Therefore, the existence of political parties is the very beginning of the constitutional government, which is the foundation of the nation.” This meant that political party was the key institution for the constitutional and parliamentary politics.

Kim’s such perception was representing his realistic judgment on the nation’s condition as a Japanese protectorate and people’s political consciousness at that time. The Korean Association believed that it could introduce parliamentary politics into the nation and become a leading group in the future parliament. The association had been maintaining anti-Japanese line, but in its cause of political engagement, it chose a flexible position in 1909, alternating between compromise with and fight against the pro-Japanese cabinet of Yi Wan-yong and Iljinhoe (Suh, Young-hee, 2005, 381-383).

IV. The March First Movement and Korean Provisional Government: Official Manifestation of Democratic Republic

1. Declaration of the Nation as a Democratic Republic before March First Movement: The Declaration of Great Unity and the Proclamation of Korean Independence

In 1915, the New Korean Revolutionary Party (NKRP, Sinhan Hyeongmyeongdang), led by Shin Gyu-sik, Bak Eun-sik, attempted to set up a government in exile by enthroning the Korean king. They were those who have been engaging in independence movement in Russia and Chinese Manchuria, after the Japanese annexation of Korea. Before fleeing to Russia and Chinese Manchuria, they used to commit themselves to civil rights and enlightenment movement. Noting that Germany and China, deemed allies for Korea, uphold the monarchy system, the New Korea Revolutionary Party attempted to enthrone King Gojong as head of the government in exile after patching up their intra-partisan ideological differences. But their plan was aborted due to local political affairs, and as the First World War turned out to be the victory of the Allied Forces and defeat of Germany, Korean independence movement started to take a turn for a new international relationship. As the United States took a leading role in the international community, and the pro-independence group noted the importance of diplomacy, in particular, the monarch restoration movement, which has been waning since 1917, was vanquished after all.

To correspond to the situation home and abroad, 14 figures, including Shin Gyu-sik, Jo So-ang and Bak Eun-sik from the NKRP turned toward the republicanism by announcing the Declaration of Great Unity in July 1917. The main two points of the declaration, known to be drafted by Jo So-ang are as follows: First, the abdication of King Sunjong should be accepted as people’s takeover of his power, in that his abdication meant that he gave up his power only, not the national sovereignty, as sovereign power rests with people. As opposed to the civil rights activists who claimed national sovereignty to be God-given rights, they held that “the national sovereignty belongs to people.” Secondly, they suggested establishment of a “preliminary unitary organization” to set up a provisional government organization to push for the nation’s independence. In short, the Declaration of Great Unity pursued not only independence from Japan, but also establishment of a government for national sovereignty, that is, a democratic republic. Therefore, it was a declaration of the end to the monarch restoration movement. It was realized by the establishment of the KPG in 1919.

Meanwhile, 39 pro-independence fighters, including Jo So-ang and Shin Gyu-sik issued the Proclamation of Korean Independence in Jilin, China, in early February 1919. The proclamation was ideologically succeeding the Declaration of National Unity. The two declared independence of the nation from Japan and pursued establishment of a nation state of the modern democratic republic which can realize the national sovereignty and equality in civil rights. They were also almost identical in their declaration of the Japanese annexation of Korea null and void and their logical ground for national sovereignty and independence. However, taken overall, the Proclamation is more advanced than the Declaration, as the former upholds the republicanism, pursues peace and emphasizes equal rights in socio-political economy (Kim So-jin 1998, 75). This point of view of the Proclamation is maintained in the IM.

2. The Anti-monarchism of the March First Movement and Democratic Republic System of the Korean Provisional Government

The democratic republic system of the KPG meant a political realization of the IM. The manifesto of the KPG, issued 40 days after the movement, made it clear that the IM helped the participants in the movement to patch up differences and forge a national unity. Meanwhile, the KPG organized a legislature with representatives of 13 provinces, with the provisional legislature organizing the government. How the provisional government understood the IM is represented by the general provisions of the Platform of National Foundation proclaimed in November 1941.

Platform of National Foundation

5. The declaration of national independence (…) is the original source of the bloody struggle of the March First Independence Movement, and the Provisional National Assembly organized by representatives of 13 provinces on April 11, 1919 founded the ROK, established the provisional government and proclaimed the provisional charter of 10 articles. It was the first step to overthrow the foreign country’s tyranny, destroy the 5,000-year old crust of monarchy and abolish the social class system by establishing a new democracy (The National Assembly, ed. 1974, 21).

The KPG was a political ‘product’ of the IM the ‘interpreter’ of political meanings of the movement, at the same time. Interpretation transforms the political experiences into a meaning, wherein ‘incidents’ turn into a ‘history’ and develop ‘principles.’ The KPG understood the movement as one calling for independence. The movement had two-folded meaning of independence, that is, denial of the rule by foreign and domestic tyrants, and demand for self-rule. The KPG regarded people and nation as the only holder of sovereign power.

The Platform of National Foundation denounced imperialism and monarchism, proposed an independent republic, denied social class system and supported a democratic system based on equality of all. In that perspective, public enemies of the Korean people were inside the nation. The IM and KPG brought a fundamental change in the Korean politics by denouncing all the public enemies and clearly suggested a vision for the Korea’s modern politics for the upcoming 100 years. The Provisional Charter of the KPG, proclaimed on April 11, 1919, expressed the vision as follows:

Article 1: The ROK shall be a democratic republic.
Article 2: The ROK shall be governed by the KPG based on the decision of the Provisional Assembly.
Article 3: People of the ROK shall have no social class and be equal in gender and social status.
Article 4: People of the ROK shall enjoy freedom of religion, the press, publication, assembly, association, correspondence, and moving as well as personal liberty and property ownership…

(The National Assembly Library, ed. 1974, 3)

As seen above, there were many other groups home and abroad than the KPG that upheld the democratic republic, equality of people, and freedom at that time. The People’s Congregation of Hanseong Government, held on April 23, 1919, declared that it adopted a representative democracy with people’s freedom, rights, and obligations spelled out.

3. The Constitution of KPG: The Origin of the National Founding Constitution

The KPG was not the successor of the Great Han Empire. The establishment of modern republican political system was a long, difficult and tricky process, with such turbulent incidents as the reversion toward the CGHE, King Gojong’s plan to set up a government in exile in 1910 and 1915, and the Incident of the Union of Great Unity intervening in the process.

After all, the KPG defined the state as a republic, not a monarchy, in accordance with the declaration of IM of 1919 that said, “Korea is an independent state and the Korean people are free” and stipulated people’s rights and obligations in the Constitution based on the doctrine of democratic sovereignty, equality and freedom. It also adopted the principle of separation of the government into three branches: provisional president (the administration), provisional legislative, and the judiciary in its provisional constitution in September 1919. It took a long, tricky process since the CTP of 1898 to form a social consensus on the democratic republic. It was the constitution of KPG of 1919 that officially formulated the consensus.

Meanwhile, the KPG maintained the constitutional order through five times of revision of the
constitution until its return to home in November 1945. The fact that the government in exile revised the constitution indicates that it was aware of the constitution’s role in validating its legitimacy. If the provisional government had been a mere independence group overseas, it would not have had to maintain the constitutional order through the revisions.

The constitution of the KPG contains the original features of the NFC of 1948. The common traits of the constitution of the KPG and NFC are as follows: Firstly, the constitution of the KPG shows the original features of the NFC in its framework and terms. As seen in the comparison of the two, they are almost identical in their framework, both composed of the same parts—preamble, general provisions, rights and obligations of people, the legislature, the administration, the judiciary, economy, treasury and finance, constitutional amendment and additional articles.

Comparison of the Constitution of the KPG (September 1919 and April 1944) with National Founding Constitution (July 1948)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Provisional Charter of Korea (September 11, 1919)</th>
<th>Provisional Charter of Korea (April 22, 1944)</th>
<th>The National Founding Constitution (July 12, 1948)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Preamble</td>
<td>Succeeds the Provisional Charter (April 11, 1919) 8 chapters/ 58 articles</td>
<td>Succeeds March First Independence spirit 7 chapters/ 62 articles</td>
<td>Succeeds March First Independence Movement 10 chapters/ 103 articles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General Provisions</td>
<td>Chapter 1 (Article 1) Popular sovereignty</td>
<td>Chapter 1 (Article 4) Democratic republic (Article 1) Popular sovereignty (Article 4)</td>
<td>Chapter 1 (Articles 1-7) Democratic republic (Article 1) Popular sovereignty (Article 4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Rights and Obligations</td>
<td>Chapter 2 (Articles 1-10) Equality/ religious freedom/ ownership of property/ farming rights---</td>
<td>Chapter 2 (Articles 5-8) Freedom of press, publication, assembly, association, and strike/ guarantee of property ownership...</td>
<td>Chapter 2 (Articles 8-30) Equality, personal liberty, freedom to move, rights to privacy in communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislature</td>
<td>Chapter 4: Provisional Legislature (Articles 18-34)</td>
<td>Chapter 3: Provisional Legislature (Articles 9-28)</td>
<td>Chapter 3: National Assembly (Articles 31-50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>3rd Provisional President (Articles 11-17) Chapter 5: State Department (Articles 35-41)</td>
<td>4th Provisional Government (Articles 29-44) Chairman system</td>
<td>4th Government (Articles 51-75) Presidential system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judiciary</td>
<td>Chapter 6: Court of Justice (Articles 42-47)</td>
<td>Chapter 5: Courthouse (Articles 45-56)</td>
<td>Chapter 5: The Court of Justice (Articles 76-83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 6 (Articles 84-89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treasury and Finance</td>
<td>Chapter 7: Finance (Articles 48-54)</td>
<td>Chapter 6: The Treasury (Articles 57-60)</td>
<td>Chapter 7: The Finance (Articles 90-95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local Autonomy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter 8: Local Autonomy (Articles 96-97)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Secondly, the two succeed the independence spirit of the IM, commonly setting up such basic principles as democratic republic, popular sovereignty, protection of human rights and division of powers. In short, liberty, equality and democracy of the IM of 1919 were the basic principle of the KPG and national foundation. They were also the intrinsic principles of the NFC. Third, the definitions of democratic republic and popular sovereignty have undergone changes throughout the constitutions from the Provisional Charter of April, 1919 to the NFC of July, 1948. It was the Provisional Charter of Korea, promulgated on April 11, 1919 that most clearly defined democratic republic in the constitution in the
Korean history. In addition, the Provisional Charter of Korea of 1925, the Provisional Charter of Korea of 1927 and the Provisional Korean Constitution “defined Korea as a democratic republic” uniformly in their first articles.

**The Changes of the Articles on Democratic Republic and Popular Sovereignty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title of the Constitutional Draft</th>
<th>Year of Legislation</th>
<th>Definition of Democratic Republic and Popular Sovereignty</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Charter of Korea</td>
<td>April 11, 1919</td>
<td>Article 1: The ROK shall be a democratic republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 2: The ROK shall be governed by the provisional government, based on the decision of the provisional National Assembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Constitution of Korea</td>
<td>1st Amendment on September 11, 1919</td>
<td>Article 1: The ROK shall be established by Korean people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 2: The sovereignty of the ROK rests with all of Korean people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Charter of Korea</td>
<td>2nd Amendment on April 7, 1925</td>
<td>Article 1: The ROK shall be a democratic republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 2: The ROK shall be governed by the provisional government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 3: Independence fighters shall represent all the people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Covenant of Korea</td>
<td>3rd Amendment on March 5, 1927</td>
<td>Article 1: The ROK shall be a democratic republic, and the national sovereignty rests with people.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Covenant of Korea</td>
<td>4th Amendment on October 9, 1940</td>
<td>Article 1: The sovereignty rests with the people, but it shall be confined to independence fighters until independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional Charter of Korea</td>
<td>5th Amendment on April 22, 1944</td>
<td>Article 1: The ROK shall be a democratic republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 4: The sovereignty rests with all of the people, but it shall be confined to independence fighters until independence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constitution of the ROK</td>
<td>July 12, 1948</td>
<td>Article 1: The ROK shall be a democratic republic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Article 2: The sovereignty of the ROK shall reside in the people, and all state authority shall emanate from the people.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Meanwhile, the second clause of the Constitution of KPG proclaimed that “the national sovereignty shall rest with all of the Korean people.” As the national sovereignty presupposed equality of people, the basic rights provided by the constitution of the KPG is more based on the equalitarian principle than on liberty. Therefore, any infringement on the equalitarian principle, even though it may be for liberty, is subject to restriction by the state. The Explanatory Notes on Platforms of the Korea Independence Party gives following explanation about the principle: Liberty is not guaranteed all the time. The state can intervene in the behaviors offending the public morals, instigating crimes, interfering with the public peace and order, and violating public interests, as they transgress the equalitarian principle (Chu Heon-su, ed., 1972, 146).

The confrontation over how to politically interpret the IM was absorbed into the discourses on a democratic republic and people’s sovereignty, and it culminated in the Clause 1 of the NFC of 1948. The clause defining the nation as a democratic republic was maintained as the constitutional and political principle for 30 years since April 1919. For this reason, there was no dispute as to proclaiming the nation as a democratic republic during the legislative work from 1945 to 1948.

**IV. Conclusion**

To search for the origin of the NFC, this article conducted a research on three political incidents—the CTP of 1898, the IM of 1919 and establishment of the KPG—and a review of the constitutions and covenants born out of these historical incidents. The NFC and its preceding constitutions and covenants show continuity in their ideas, principles and frameworks. First, the CTP was a new political movement trying to form a social consensus through people's assembly. It was the origin of the Korean political movement for reform, in which people engaged in politics to push for a democratic republic. The SIR in 1898, adopted by the Convocation suggested a basic principle of ‘politics through deliberation between
the monarch and people.’ Second, the abdication of King Gojong exercised a great influence on Korean people’s perception of the Constitutional order and political system. The loss of the monarch by the abdication provided a ground, which produced various discourses on the constitutional principle of democratic republic and constitutional system. Such political environment also helped people to perceive politics as public affairs, which cannot be privatized, pursue a constitutional order for politics as public affairs and push for representative democracy to safeguard the constitutional order. Third, people’s new political consciousness after the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 took more concrete shape with the ‘Declaration of National Unity’ issued in 1917, as the declaration put an end to monarchy restoration movement and officially chose to uphold a democratic republic. The declaration also made the meaning of the national sovereignty more manifest to the end of restoring national independence. The declaration’s ideal was realized by the establishment of KPG in 1919. Fourth, the ideals and ideology of the IM were translated by the provisional government into the guiding principles of the nation. The broad social consensus on democratic republic was formed after a long and tricky process since the CTP of 1898. All of the basic principles of the provisional government’s constitution such as respect of the spirit of the IM, democratic republic, people’s sovereign power, guarantee of human rights, and separation of the three branches of the government were written into the NFC, and its framework and terms served as origin of the NFC.

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The Independent (Dongnipsinmun), Daehanmeilshinbo, Dahanhyephoehoebo(The Korean Association Monthly), Hanseong sunbo (Hanseong Ten-Daily), Hanseong jubo (Hanseong Weekly), Hwangseong sinmun

Contact Address
Suh, Hee Kyung,
Institute of State Governance, Yonsei University
# 212 Miwoo Hall 134 Shinchon-dong, Seodaemun-gu, Seoul 120-749, South Korea
PH:82-2-2123-6639
FAX: 82-2-393-8616
E-mail: suhheekyung@yonsei.ac.kr
Chosŏnjok between China and Korea: the Zhonghua nationalism, de-territorialised nationalism, and transnationalism

Changzoo Song
University of Auckland, New Zealand

Abstract
The two million Chosŏnjok, ethnic Koreans in the northeastern periphery of China, are the descendants of those Koreans who migrated to Manchuria between the late nineteenth and mid-twentieth century. They have maintained their Korean culture and traditions. In the 1980s when the Cold War eased and China adopted open policy, many of them went to South Korea to work, taking advantage of the employment opportunities there. Moving back and forth between China and South Korea, many of them lead a highly transnational lifestyle. As an important minority group residing in the borderland between China and the Korean peninsula, Korean Chinese gained much attention from Chinese government, which worries about its national minorities. China’s ‘Zhonghua minzu’ ideology intends to keep the loyalties of its national minorities for the Great Zhonghua Family, and Chosŏnjok’s possible connection with their ethnic homeland became a concern. Meanwhile, with its strong ethnic nationalism, South Korean society aspires to extend its national consciousness to its overseas population including Korean Chinese. This ‘de-territorialised nationalism’ has been evident in the last two decades and it clashes with China’s Zhonghua nationalism of China, making the status of Chosŏnjok further complicated and precarious. This paper analyses the clashes of the two ideologies over the Chosŏnjok, who have become very much transnational. It also looks at how these Korean Chinese have reacted and coped with between the two nation-states.

I. Introduction: Chosŏnjok between China and Korea
The Chosŏnjok (Chaoxianzu in Chinese) today are the descendants of the Koreans who migrated from the Korean peninsula to Manchuria between the late nineteenth century and early 1940s. Though they have lived with the dominant Han people and Manchus, these Korean Chinese have maintained their cultural traditions, which was helped by their forming ethnic communities along the rivers and streams for rice-cultivation (while Han Chinese settled higher lands.) As A.D. Smith (1986) maintains, people’s identities are based on their perceived differences from other groups, and in the case of the Korean Chinese, Korean Chinese’s differences from Han Chinese and Manchus in language and ethnic traditions helped them maintain their Korean identity. In addition, Chinese authority’s strict assimilation policy before the 1930s alienated these Koreans from mainstream Han Chinese even though later they shared same goal of resisting the Japanese, and their relationship was not always amicable.
After the establishment of the New China by the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, like other ethnic minorities in China, these Koreans were accepted as legal citizens of China and were incorporated into Chinese society. In addition, as they participated in the China’s nation-building process through their anti-Japanese struggles and pro-Communist activities, Korean Chinese also developed political loyalty to the People’s Republic of China. There were times when Korean Chinese were forced to assimilate, especially during the Cultural Revolution, to the dominant Han culture, they managed to maintain their cultural traditions and language. After Deng’s reign and China’s Reform policy, the life of ethnic minorities in China generally improved, and the same was true for Korean Chinese with their high educational and economic level. This helped them to develop their political identity as Chinese citizens and loyalty to the Zhonghua nation as Chosŏnjok, China’s Korean minority. Thus, naturally they came to have a hybrid (or dual) identity both as Korean and Chinese.
However, in the late 1980s situations changed, a decade after China’s Open Policy, when China’s socio-economic environment changed. First of all, with the increasing gap between the southeastern coastal regions and the rest of China, particularly northeastern periphery where Korean Chinese are concentrated, was clearly felt by the late 1980s. This made Korean Chinese in northeast China feel a sense of relative decline in their socio-economic status within China. In addition, the newly emerged South Korea, which Korean Chinese could not visit so far for more than four decades, offered them employment opportunity with its wage substantially higher than in China. As more and more Korean Chinese traveled to South Korea, their long forgotten ethnic homeland which positively impressed them with its economic prosperity, the Korean side of their identity revived.
As Korean Chinese move back and forth between China and South Korea, leading a transnational life style, they gained close attention from the Chinese government as well as South Korea. As an important minority group residing in the borderland between China and the Korean peninsula, Korean
Chinese gained much attention from Chinese government, which worries about its national minorities. China’s ‘Zhonghua minzu’ ideology intends to keep the loyalties of its national minorities for the Great Zhonghua Family, and Chosŏnjk’s possible connection with their ethnic homeland became a concern. Meanwhile, with its strong ethnic nationalism, South Korean society aspires to extend its national consciousness to its overseas population including Korean Chinese. This ‘de-territorialised nationalism’ has been evident in the last two decades and it clashes with China’s Zhonghua nationalism of China, making the status of Chosŏnjk further complicated and precarious.

Regarding ethnic identities, there are basically two theories: primordialism and constructivism. The primordialists insist that ethnic/national identities are basically inherited through generations (cf. Smith 1986; Geertz 1993 [1973]). Constructivists, meanwhile, believe that identities are very much a social construction (cf. Hall 1996; Laitin 1998). In Korea people subscribe primordial notion of identity, backed by its ethnic nationalism, in which Koreans believe that the Korean nation is ethnically homogeneous and they consider that identity is basically inherited from parents. Therefore, nationality is very much based on the principle of jus sanguinis in Korea. Based on ethnic nationalism, South Korean society extends its national consciousness to its overseas population (chaeoe tongpo), which is ‘de-territorialised nationalism.’ China takes a similar stance and primordialism is the main idea among the dominant Han Chinese even though as an officially multinational country, China’s nationality law adopts both the principle of jus sanguinis as well as the principle of jus soli. China’s Zhonghua minzu (Zhonghua nation that is composed of fifty-six different national groups) ideology intends to keep the loyalties of its national minorities for the ‘Great Zhonghua Family.’

These two ideologies, China’s Zhonghua nationalism and Korea’s de-territorialized nationalism have been clashing over Chosŏnjk in the 1990s as Chosŏnjk moved back and forth between China and South Korea, and South Korean visited their co-ethnics in China. The clash ushered in some serious diplomatic scuffles between the two countries and it even brought up age-old issues of territorial and historical disputes between the two nations as seen in the case of China’s Northeastern Project. Chosŏnjk, precariously situated in the middle of the two forces, seriously reflected on their national identity/identities and their relationship with the two countries, China and their ethnic homeland, Korea. This paper analyses: (1) the clashes of the two nationalist projects over the loyalty of Chosŏnjk; and (2) how Chosŏnjk have reacted/replied to their precarious situation.

Within the study of nationalism, countries such as China, Korea and Japan are a special case in the sense that they have long pre-colonial histories and very high level of political and cultural homogeneities. This is different from many other Asian countries which do not have long pre-colonial history and homogeneity. According to A. D. Smith (1986), nationalism draws on the pre-existing history of the ‘group’, and it attempts to fashion this history into a sense of common identity and shared history. Here the state plays a pivotal role in making its people feel the nation sacred and emotional (love, loyalty, sacrifice, respect, fear) by using ‘ideal signifier’ such as ‘fatherland’ (Balibar 1991, 95). We will see how these two nation-states, which have been building their nations from the post-WWII decolonization, have endeavored to integrate peoples like Korean Chinese. Seeing how China and Korea have dealt with such an ethnic minority, and how Chosŏnjk people have reacted/answered to such nationalist projects in this globalizing world are an important and stimulating matter.

II. Chosŏnjk as a member of the Zhonghua Family
China’s policies toward ethnic minorities

Today more than ninety-two per cent of Chinese population is Han nationality257 while the other fifty-five ethnic minorities compose only about eight per cent of the total population (Pang 2000, 138). China has a long history of dealing with foreigners and non-Han ethnic minorities, and the dominant Han nationality have successfully assimilated and absorbed many peoples. After the collapse of the Ching dynasty in 1911, China’s revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen pursued the ‘Great Han Nationalism,’ considering China basically Han nation and not recognizing special rights of the ethnic/racial minorities in the country. Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government inherited this policy. The Chinese Communist Party, however, pursued a much more idealistic and international policy. The Party recognized China’s various ethnic minorities and their rights. It even guaranteed the freedom of separation of any ethnic groups even though this policy was abandoned soon after its establishment of the People’s Republic of China. The Party’s progressive ethnic minority policy was reflected in the People’s Republic of China’s Principle for the Enactment of Autonomous Regions for National Minorities (1952). The policy supported equality of nationalities, unity of nationalities, policy of autonomy, respect for national language and letters, respect for national customs and practices, freedom of religion. This policy, however, did not last long and especially during the political turmoil of the late 1950s and the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) a radical assimilation policy was imposed on ethnic minorities. Minority cultures were considered as local nationalism and were ruthlessly destroyed.

256 For the ethnic nationalism of Korea, refer to Shin 2006.
257 In China minzu means an ethnic group, and in English it is translated as ‘nationality.’
This was not an exception for the case of the Korean minority in northeastern China, and Korean Chinese were forced to give up their culture and traditions. Instead, they were forced to adopt the dominant Han language and culture. Such a radical policy was abandoned after Deng Xiaoping’s Reform Policy in the end of the 1970s, and Korean Chinese, like other ethnic minorities, were allowed to revive their culture and language.

Late-1980s: new changes

During the Cold War China recognized North Korea as the only legitimate Korean state while it considered South Korea as an illegitimate political entity. In this circumstance, the ethnic Koreans of China could maintain contact only with North Koreans while they were totally disconnected from South Koreans. It changed only in the 1980s when the Cold War eased and when China opened itself to the outside world. By the mid-1980s, Korean Chinese came to have a more realistic view of South Korea, particularly its economic prosperity in contrast to the poverty and ideological rigidity of North Korea. This changed the formerly negative perceptions of Korean Chinese toward South Korea and in the mid-1980s ‘blood is thicker than water’ was a popular saying among Korean Chinese when they thought of South Koreans (Hŏ 2001b, pp. 456). They began to visit South Korea and many of them stayed there as migrant workers. The numbers of Korean Chinese in South Korea grew considerably after the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between South Korea and China in 1992. Familiar with both Chinese and Korean cultures, Korean Chinese easily function in South Korea and they lead a transnational lifestyle, moving back and forth between China and South Korea.

This ethnic return migration of Korean Chinese to South Korea was facilitated by the macro-economic and socio-political conditions of China and South Korea in the last two decades. The relative economic backwardness in peripheral northeast China, where ethnic Koreans are concentrated, made Korean Chinese turn to the employment opportunities in South Korea, where there was a demand for unskilled workers. Many of Korean Chinese experienced relative socio-economic status declining in post-reform China in regard to their Han Chinese neighbours (Chŏng 2000, 93). The economic status decline is accompanied by gradual political alienation of Korean Chinese within the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture and in many other Korean villages, where ethnic Koreans lost the majority status due to increasing number of Han Chinese migrants (Table 2 Changes of Korean Population percentage in the Yanbian Autonomous Region).

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of ethnic Koreans</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>48.3%</td>
<td>40.54%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


From the early days of migration to Manchuria, Korean and Chinese settlers formed separate communities because of their different agricultural backgrounds. Being used to wet-rice cultivation, Korean migrants settled mostly in lowlands, along rivers (Chŏn 1991, 80). Chinese settlers, meanwhile, most of whom came from impoverished Shandong Province, chose higher lands as they were used to dry-land crops. Forming their own ethnic communities, Korean settlers maintained the same lifestyle as they used to lead in Korea. They also kept close contacts with their motherland and they were fed by continuous flows of migrants from Korea until the mid-1940s. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, ethnic Koreans received the same citizenship rights and lands as Chinese. More than eighty per cent of ethnic Koreans in Manchuria were farmers and most of them were engaged in rice growing before the 1980s (Hŏ 2001a, 265). As rice is a higher-value crop in northeast China, Koreans used to enjoy a better life than their Chinese neighbours (To 1992, 169; Chŏng 2000; Kim 2003, 110) with the highest educational rate among all ethnic groups in China (Lee 1986; Hoffmann 1986; Chŏng 2000).

By the mid-1980s, however, Korean Chinese began to feel that their socio-economic status was declining in comparison with that of Han Chinese. In large part, this was because of the unbalanced development of China between urban and rural areas after the Reforms. In addition, in rural northeast China, the economic status of ethnic Koreans declined in relation to that of Han Chinese due to Koreans’ sticking to rice-growing while their Chinese neighbours diversified their economic activities by growing commercial crops and running small businesses (Chŏng 2000, 93). Thus, in some cases, the living standard of Han Chinese exceeded that of ethnic Koreans in the 1990s as ‘the Korean “field economy” was slower in development than the “hill economy” of Han Chinese’ (Ryang 2001, 155).

In addition, through the 1980s and 90s, ethnic Koreans in China also felt that their political status within their own communities weakened. Though Korean Chinese enjoyed equal rights with the dominant
Han Chinese, politically they were totally dominated by Han Chinese.\footnote{China allegedly has a generous policy towards its national minorities, but, in reality, minority nationalities in China are economically marginalized and they have been politically and culturally oppressed. For China’s national minority questions, refer to Rossabi (2204) and Galdney (2004).} This was particularly true during the 1960s and 1970s when ethnic minorities suffered greatly under the ultra leftist movements such as the Great Leap Forward Movement and the Cultural Revolution. My informants told me that (though the Chinese government is relatively generous to ethnic minorities) any political movements of ethnic Koreans are always closely scrutinized by the government and ethnic Koreans are not given real power even within their autonomous local governments.\footnote{My interview with Korean Chinese workers in Ansan, Korea in November 2004.} For example, in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Region, though Governorship is always given to ethnic Koreans, the Party Secretary, who has real power, has always been Han Chinese. This is accompanied by the low fertility rate among Korean Chinese – the lowest among all ethnic groups in China – and rising Han Chinese nationalism. Therefore, ethnic Koreans in China today believe that they are ‘relatively low in economic status and they are outside of mainstream Chinese society, which is dominated by people of the Han nationality’ (Kim 2003, 110-11).

This perceived fear of Han Chinese domination and their own political weakness frustrated Korean Chinese in the 1980s and 90s. According to Ted Gurr (1970), frustration is felt by a minority group when the group feels a ‘relative sense of deprivation’ even when things are improving. This was the case of ethnic Koreans in northeast China through the 1980s and 1990s. When they felt frustrated about not having any political channel to express it, however, Korean Chinese looked outside to their motherland. In fact, as an ethnic minority who have their motherland right across the border, Korean Chinese have been historically very much ‘transnational.’ As a ‘border people’, Korean Chinese tended to look for opportunities across the borders especially in times of difficulties (Kim 2001a, 25). During the political upheavals in China in the 1960s and 1970s a few thousand Korean Chinese escaped to North Korea (Hồ 2001a, 259). Since the late 1980s tens of thousands of Korean Chinese went to Russia as street peddlers.\footnote{Currently there are more than 30,000 Korean Chinese peddlers in Russia (cf. Kim 2004).}

In addition, Korean Chinese were experiencing general decline of their culture in the rapidly changing China after the Reform policy. For example, Korean language was declining among Korean Chinese while more Korean Chinese opt to learn Chinese language. Inter-racial marriages among Korean Chinese and Han Chinese was also increasing, which is an indication of the decline of ethnic Korean identity. This ‘Sinicization’ of Korean Chinese community became a serious concern among Chosŏnjok intellectuals as well as South Korean nationalists.

After the Reform/Opening, there was a need for changes in nationality the past policy due to the many changes in domestic and international environment. They included the unbalanced economic development among different regions of China, increased mobility of ethnic minorities within China, and the changes of nationality consciousness among national minorities in China due to the influence of globalization. The 1982 Law on Autonomous Regions for Minority Nationalities, was based on the 1952 People’s Republic of China’s Principle for the Enactment of Autonomous Regions for National Minorities, and it supported equality of nationalities, unity of nationalities, policy of autonomy, respect for national language and letters, respect for national customs and practices, freedom of religion. It defined the Zonghua nation – the nation formed as the Great Family of fatherland which is based on the Han majority. China’s policy since then has been a mild assimilation policy. Today China’s policy towards its ethnic minorities is a policy of assimilation (Choi 2001). Such a gradual assimilation was carried out by the various state apparatus such as school. If we borrow Balibar’s term, China has been creating a ‘fictive ethnicity’ (Balibar 1991) of Zhonghua nation, and the Zhonghua nationalism is a ‘boundary-removing’ (Barth 1969) project among the many different ethnic groups within China.\footnote{Meanwhile, China’s policy toward overseas Chinese shows dramatic changes after Mao era. Mao disregarded overseas Chinese, but Deng sought active engagement policy with overseas Chinese. Deng established various government offices in many levels to deal with overseas Chinese, initiating Chinese version of de-territorialized nationalism.}

However, as China adopts open policy and gets more globalised, Korean Chinese became even more transnational, especially by creating/reviving their networks with their ethnic homeland.

### III. Korea’s ethnic and de-territorialized nationalism

**Ethnic nationalism in Korea**

If China’s Zhonghua nationalism is a ‘boundary-removing’ project, South Korea’s ethnic nationalism is a boundary-consolidating project. The term ‘ethnic nationalism’ is used by Anthony Smith, by which he
indicates non-Western concepts of nationalism opposed to Western views of a nation defined by its geographical territory. According to him, nations are based on pre-existing ethnicities, and they emphasise elements such as genealogy, populism, customs and nativism (Smith 1986, 137). Smith’s concept explains the case of Korean nationalism, which is based on their belief in common ancestral lineage. This biological imagination is backed by other facts that Koreans have a long history as a political unit, and they have unique language and writing system. The ‘Overseas Koreans Foundation Act (1997),’ on which the Overseas Koreans Foundation, a state organization that supports overseas Koreans, defines overseas Koreans as ‘anyone living overseas, regardless of their nationality, that have Korean blood lines.’ Reflecting this, the nationality law of Korea is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*. Thus, when Koreans imagine the nation, it includes those who reside outside of the political boundaries, including North Koreans and all the other ‘Koreans.’ This is so-called ‘de-territorialized’ nationalism. According to many scholars, governments, Confronted with the apparent threat of increased emigration, have responded by creating ‘deterritorialized nation-states’ (Glick Schiller 1997, 160-61; Guarnizo 1997, 305, 309). Now governments encompass not only those who live within their territorial borders but also those who have migrated abroad, and they attempt to expand their political influence beyond their borders in order to retain some control over their citizens overseas and ensure their continuing loyalty (Tsuda 2004, 257).

De-territorialized nationalism

In regard to dealing with overseas ‘brothers’, many Koreans have been critical about their government on its lack of clear and supportive policies toward overseas Koreans. While this might be true, however, in the past South Korean government valued emigration for various reasons. In the 1960s and 1970s South Korean government sought for ways to send Koreans overseas both to mitigate the domestic population pressure and to earn foreign currency. For example, people were encouraged to settle in Latin American countries in the 1960s as agricultural settlers. In addition, the government also initiated the migration of miners and nurses to West Germany in the 1960s and onward. Later in the 1970s South Korean government also encouraged Korean workers to work in Middle East for construction projects. Through the 1970s the remittances sent to Korea by Korean emigrants in the US, Japan, West Germany, and Middle East became a very important source for Korea’s economic development. However, it was not just the remittances that the government wanted from Korean emigrants. It was also the new knowledge, technology, and skills that these migrants brought home. Overseas Korean scientists and engineers were encouraged to return home so that they would contribute to the economic and social development of Korea.

Overseas Koreans gained even greater attention after the mid-1980s. This time, it was more than remittances and new knowledge for economic development. It was for much longer-term national interests. First of all, South Korea economy, competing in global market, saw overseas Koreans as a resource after the mid-1980s. South Korean government and society recognized the multi-faceted benefits from the existence of their co-ethnics throughout the world. Secondly, the number (as well as wealth) of overseas Koreans became substantial by the late 1980s, exceeding five million, especially when the Korean Chinese and Soviet Koreans emerged as an important part of overseas Koreans as the Cold War eased. Thirdly, South Korea found that overseas Koreans are important for its foreign policy and inter-Korean relations. With these reasons, serious attention was paid to overseas Koreans both by the government and civil society in the 1990s. In their nationalist discourse South Koreans extended their nationalistic imaginations toward overseas Korean communities. Behind this was somewhat stagnant economy of South Korea since the mid-1990s and the serious financial crisis of 1997. After the remarkable speed of economic growth in the four decades since the 1960s South Korean economy shows slower growth by the early 1990s. In addition, the 1997 financial crisis and all the grim social scenes caused by the crisis – increased unemployment and suicides – robbed South Koreans of their confidence. In addition, the rise of other Asian economies, particularly China, brought a sense of fear to South Koreans if they will be left out. This was the time when they looked for help from overseas Korean communities, and Korean diasporic communities in the First World countries – US, Japan, and Western Europe – were encouraged to invest in their ethnic homeland.

While most of South Koreans have been using the term Chosŏnjok to indicate the Chinese Koreans, recently some people insist that they should be called Chaejung tongpo on the basis that Koreans call Korean Americans Chaemi tongpo and Korean Japanese Chaeil tongpo so that Chinese Koreans would not feel discriminated. They claim that this is especially because ethnic Koreans in China are the descendants of those independence fighters during the colonial period (cf. Im 1998, 342).

Since the late 1980s there have been rising interests on overseas Koreans in South Korean media, academia, and government. It was the time when South Koreans felt confident about their country’s economic power and also the time when the Communist bloc collapsed. Many scholars and

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262 Some Korean scholars are critical about the government’s neglect of overseas Koreans, calling it a “3 No” policy (indifference, lack of understanding, and lack of policy) or ‘abandonment policy.’ (cf. Lee 2002).
journalists have repeatedly claimed that overseas Koreans are an essential part of the Korean nation and the nation should realize that overseas Koreans are very important resource or asset for the nation’s future especially in the globalizing world. China and the former Soviet Union were suddenly opened to South Koreans and the ethnic Koreans of these countries were virtually ‘discovered.’ Before the 1980s the major focus has been on Korean communities in Japan and the United States. With the thawing of the Cold War regime in the 1980s and the subsequent opening of diplomatic relationship with China and the Soviet Union there has been an increasing numbers of scholarly research and journalistic reports on the Korean communities in China and the Soviet Union. Almost all of this research and the reports have been carried out in the principle of ‘pan-Korean’ or ‘de-territorialized’ nationalism as Appadurai (1996) and Clifford (1994) calls.

The official size of overseas Koreans grew suddenly in the early 1990s as the South Korean government incorporated hitherto not included Korean Chinese (two million) and the Soviet Koreans (half million). They also changed the name of overseas Koreans from ‘haeoe kyopo’ (ethnic Koreans overseas) to ‘chaeeoe dongpo’ (Koreans living outside of Korea). In a sense the “imagined community” of the Korean nation expanded to China and the former Soviet Union in the 1990s, and the ethnic Koreans of China and Uzbekistan came to be considered as an important part of the Korean nation. In particular, ethnic Korean women of these countries gained particular attention from South Korean males who have difficulties in finding their marriage partners in South Korea.

As mentioned, South Korean intellectuals claimed that overseas Koreans are an important ‘asset’ for the nation. A researcher at the Samsung Economy Institute claims:

There live two million Koreans in China, eight hundred thousand in Japan, and one and half million in the U.S. The size of the overseas Korean population is almost five million, including those who are not identified or registered... The fact that overseas Koreans are concentrated in the four super powers, which are our neighbouring countries, is a great advantage for our global policy. We, together with those overseas brothers, must form a ‘Pan-Korean Economic and Cultural Community,’ and let these overseas Koreans act as intermediaries between their host countries and us to develop bilateral relationships (Ku 1995, 177-178).

Such a notion that overseas Koreans would be beneficial for South Korea was not confined only among nationalist intellectuals. Business leaders also claimed the same. Chŏng Chu-yŏng, founder of Hyundai Group, claimed:

We can outdo the Japanese in developing the Siberian resources because we have many advantages compared to them. One of our advantages is that there are many Koreans on Sakhalin, and they speak Korean. Secondly, we can utilize those Chinese Koreans in Manchuria for our projects in Siberia... Working with the people who share the same language with us is much easier than working with the people whose languages are different from ours (Chŏng 1997, 141-2).

Certainly, this was even more emphasized during the late 1990s financial crisis in South Korea. People openly insist that overseas Koreans should help their motherland, and an official says:

Overseas Jews behind Israel’s influence in global politics and economy. Israel is not the only example. The remarkable economic development of China would not have been possible without the support of the fifty million overseas Chinese... Now is the time when our country needs the patriotism both from the domestic Koreans and overseas brothers.... There cannot be any difference between domestic Koreans and overseas Koreans since any crisis of our country will be the crisis of our nation (Kim 1998, 3).

The message was clear: all the ‘children’ of Korean nation – overseas Koreans – should help their “motherland” in crisis. Through the nationalist discourse, domestic Koreans have utilized overseas Koreans to provide themselves with hope when the former were in dire situation, viewing the latter as a source for help. As Basch, Glick Shiller and Szanton Balnc (1994, 3) writes, “often through the use of symbols, language and political rituals, migrants and political leaders in the country of origin are engaged in constructing an ideology that envisions migrants as loyal citizens of their ancestral nation-state.”

In addition, South Korean government and civil society have talked about the overseas Koreans’ role in national and international projects: national unification, turning Korea into the hub of northeast Asia, and benefiting from good relationship with its neighbours. The Overseas Koreans Foundation, for example, has organised various programs including the Overseas Korean Business Network, which it started in 2001. South Korean government promotes Korean culture by supporting overseas Korean communities with Korean books, Korean language teaching personnel, and various cultural programs that are designed to promote Korean identity among overseas Koreans. However, it was not just the government, but also civic organizations, intellectuals, and businessmen who cultivate de-
territorialized nationalism. Particularly for Korean Chinese, South Korean civil society did a lot in the early 1990s. For example, Doosan, one of conglomerates, provided Korean Chinese community with Korean books. Other organizations also supported Korean Chinese community in China with language schools, books, and electronic materials.

Overseas Koreans, following the de-territorialised nationalist projects of their homeland, have supported the policy. They are well organised in their host countries and they maintain close relationship with their homeland. Like other diasporic communities in today’s world, Korean diasporas themselves are connected and organized globally, forming ‘transnational migrant circuit’ and constituting a single community spread across a variety of sites (Rouse 1991, 14). In this ‘diaspora nationalism’ (Hobsbawm 1990), diasporic communities try to maintain and reinforce nationalist feelings.

However, such an ethnic nationalism and de-territorialized nationalism did not seem to be successful at least for Korean Chinese. As indicated above, Korean Chinese reinforced their Chinese identity (political identity) after their experiences of working in South Korea. Chinese official ideology of Zhonghua nationalism also played an important role here.

IV. The Clashes of the two nationalisms over Chosŏnjok

Then, how these two nationalist projects of China and Korea conflicted over Chosŏnjok? Though there have not been any serious clashes between China and Korea regarding Chosŏnjok, there have been series of political scuffles between the two nation-states since the early 1990s.

The 1999 ‘Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans’

The apparent clash between China and South Korea over Chosŏnjok occurred when the South Korean ‘Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans’ (1999), which purported to give many rights to overseas Koreans, especially the rights to enter the country and own property freely. The law was initiated with the special order of then President Kim Dae Jung, who wanted to solve the long-time problem of dual nationality questions of overseas Koreans as well as to encourage overseas Korean investments in Korea after the 1997 financial crisis. Before this law was promulgated, however, Chinese government strongly protested South Korean government regarding the law’s giving special status to overseas Koreans, which includes China’s Korean minority. Form Chinese government’s perspective, such a law could destabilize Korean Chinese community in China especially when so many Korean Chinese were eager to go to South Korea, their ethnic homeland, where they can have much better economic opportunities than in China’s northeastern periphery. Therefore, the original draft of the law intended to give various rights to overseas Koreans, almost equal to Korean citizens, including the rights to visit Korea freely, to vote, to run for governmental positions and so on. The Korean Chinese migrant workers in South Korea as well as nationalistic civil organizations gave a strong support to the draft.

However, with the intervention of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade that was seriously concerned about possible diplomatic conflicts with China (and Russia), the draft was revised. Before the draft was revised, it defined overseas Koreans as anyone who have Korean ancestry, but now the new version, promulgated in 1999, restricted the definition of overseas Koreans to the people and their descendants who left South Korea after 1948, when the South Korean government was established. This automatically excluded Korean Chinese (and Soviet Koreans), whose ancestors left Korea before 1948. When this law was announced in 1999, there were, for good reasons, strong protests and criticisms from Korean Chinese and nationalistic civil organizations. They claimed that the law violates the Constitution of Korea and brought the case to the Constitutional Court. Eventually, in 2001 the Constitutional Court of Korea decaled the law unconstitutional on the basis that the law was excluding Korean Chinese and others from the status of overseas Koreans with no reason. The Court ordered the Korean government to revise the law by the end of 2003.

The Ministry of Justice, however, continuously restricted the entry visas for Korean Chinese workers, and frustrated Korean Chinese migrant workers, many of whom were staying in South Korea illegally, and civil organizations launched a nation-wide protest. In this protest, a serious challenge to China’s political claim over Korean Chinese was made when several hundred of Korean Chinese participated in the ‘Nationality Desertion Movement,’ initiated by the Chosŏnjok Church in Seoul. About five hundred of Korean Chinese migrant workers in South Korea participated in the ‘Nationality Recovery Movement’, which soon developed into ‘Nationality Renouncement Movement’. This was to press the South Korean government to allow them to stay and work in South Korea legally as the South Korean government tried to deport all the illegal foreign workers out of the country. In their extreme behavior Korean Chinese workers threw their Chinese passports, declaring themselves as ‘stateless’. This was because ‘stateless’ people can stay in South Korea until the cases are resolved.
Chinese government reacted to this incident immediately and made it clear that this was an unlawful action. Chinese government was also aware of the situation that those Korean Chinese did not really intend to give up their Chinese citizenship, but it was only to demand South Korean government their right to stay and work in South Korea. As mentioned above, before the 1999 law was promulgated Chinese government expressed its concerns over the possible impacts of such a law on Korean Chinese. In 2001 December Chinese Ambassador to Korea, Li Bin, warned that if South Korea revises the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans so that it includes Korean Chinese to the definition of overseas Koreans, the relationship between the two countries would deteriorate. According to the Radio Free Asia (2001.12.05), Li also added that though Korean Chinese are ethnically Koreans, they are Chinese nationals, and they are a member of the ‘Great Zhonghua Family’, which is composed of fifty-six nationalities. On January 17, 2002 the Foreign Ministry of China also declared: “China is a multi-racial country, and Korean Chinese are a member of the Zhonghua Family, and they are Chinese citizens. China is very clear about this, and it wishes South Korea will deal with the case correctly.” [2002. 1.17 china.com.cn].

In 2002 China refused visas to South Korean legislators, who wanted to carry out a survey regarding the rights of Korean Chinese for the revision of the Law on the Status of Overseas Koreans. According to the Korean Times (January 18, 2002), Chinese government eventually allowed them to visit China with a condition that the Korean legislators would not visit Shenyang and Yanji, the two cities where the biggest Korean Chinese populations are concentrated. Again, Chinese Ambassador to Korea, Li Bin, repeated that Korean Chinese are the citizens of China and Korea should consider this:

Under international law, Korea has no jurisdiction over our citizens of Korean ethnicity, either under personal or take territorial principle. We hope that Korea will take this point into consideration when it reviews the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (Chosun Daily, December 27, 2002).

Chinese government also strengthened its control of Korean Chinese community in China. It also raised the Northeastern Project. China has been very careful about any possible nationalist movements of Korean Chinese and South Korean influence on them ever since the 1990s. Chinese government was particularly concerned about nationalistic expressions of South Korean visitors in China’s Korean community. According to some people in the early 1990s Korean books donated to Korean Chinese community by a South Korean private company was stored at a warehouse without being distributed to local Koreans (Choi 2000, 393). Chinese government made the administrative rights of the Mt. Paektu (Zhangbaishan in Chinese), which used to belong to the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture, transferred to the Jilin Provincial Government in 2006. My Korean Chinese informants in Yanbian told me that they feel the Chinese government’s control over Korean community in Yanbian and elsewhere has become tighter after 2004. A Chinese Korean government official says: “In 1994 when the South Korean Prime Minister Lee Hong-gu was visiting China, he once mentioned this to his counterpart, Li Peng. Li Peng said: ‘Chinese Koreans are Chinese citizens and they are one of the minorities of China. South Korean government should not interfere with this. Since then the central government sent official letter to local governments to reinforce nationality education for Chinese Koreans.... If South Korea changes the law (and allow Chinese Koreans freely visit South Korea, Chinese Koreans will experience similar discrimination in China as they were discriminated by South Koreans in South Korea.... Most of the Chinese Korean intellectuals feel the sense of crisis on the effects of the ‘Korean fever’ that hit China” (Chosun Daily, Dec. 18, 2001). Some others insist that Chinese Koreans will not stay in South Korea illegally once they can visit South Korea freely (Chosun Daily, Dec. 18, 2001).

As discriminated, alienated, and frustrated minority in their ancestral homeland Chinese Koreans engaged their own discursive struggle to recover their rights to return to their ancestral homeland. Many Chinese Koreans claim that they are discriminated both in China and Korea. In China their identity card carries the label of ‘Chosonjok.’ They emphasize the fact that they were treated harshly in China: before the Revolution by Chinese landlords and during the Cultural Revolution by radicals. One Chinese Korean man states: “I left my hometown of Sunchon in Korea in 1944, and first returned to Korea in 1994. During the Cultural Revolution I was treated as a spy of South Korea, and now here in Korea I’m treated as a foreigner” (Chosun Daily August 23, 1999). This seemingly opportunistic attitude show their transnational character and their effort to utilize their transnational status to maximize their chance for survival.

Meanwhile the nationalist activists in South Korea claimed that the great majority of South Koreans were against the 1999 Act, showing a survey result (conducted in November 2003) in which 77.4% South Koreans believed that the law should be revised so that it can include Korean Chinese and others as Overseas Koreans. 264

263 According to the Chinese Embassy in Korea, Chinese nationality can be abandoned only through individual application, not by a collective action as it was the case in South Korea ( ).
264 Refer to the Chaoe Tongpo Shinmun (Overseas Koreans News Paper), November 2003.
Following South Korean nationalists, Korean Chinese in Korea began to claim that they were the descendents of those independent fighters, and thus they have historical rights to return to South Korea as colonial diaspora. Korean Chinese frequently refer to colonial history when they claim their rights to return to South Korea. They say that they are the colonial diaspora that fought for national independence. Using the South Korean nationalist historiography of the anti-Japanism, Korean Chinese utilize the fact that they are the descendents of those independence fighters. Certainly Korean Chinese and official Chinese historiography emphasizes the friendly relationship between Korean Chinese and Chinese people in their struggle against the Japanese imperialists and anti-revolutionary forces in Manchuria. Though they also share the history of “helping Korea against the American imperialists” during the “Korean War,” Korean Chinese do not emphasize this much as it would not be a good strategy. Thus they use history selectively. This is a powerful weapon as South Korean historians have always emphasized the Korean struggles against Japanese colonialists. As a matter of fact the legitimacy of South Korea against the North Korea is very much based on the fact that it was South Korea which inherited the Interim Government of Korea established in Shanghai in 1919 after the March 1st Movement in Korea. The Interim Government was internally divided and it was only in name after the 1930s. Nonetheless, in its competition in the context of the Cold War South Korea stressed its legitimacy from the fact that it inherited the Interim Government while North Korea very much abolished that part of the history while emphasizing the exploits of Kim II Sung, the founder of North Korea.

Verhovec 1999, 450).

History, nevertheless, poses complexity to Korean Chinese’ status in China. Differently from other minorities in China, ethnic Koreans achieved their status as an official minority through their efforts to be loyal to the Han-dominated Chinese society. Though many ethnic Koreans migrated to Manchuria during the Ching Dynasty and were recognized as the subjects of Ching, many others migrated to Manchuria after it fell into Japan’s colony in the early 1930s. In a sense, ethnic Koreans in China, regardless of Koreans’ claiming Manchuria as their ancestral territories, were not originally residing there but they were migrants from outside during the Japanese colonial period. This posed rather complicated psychological uneasiness after the collapse of Japanese Empire. Almost half of ethnic Koreans returned to Korea after the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945, but more than 1.1 million ethnic Koreans chose to stay due to the post-War complexities in the Korean peninsula and consequent division of the nation and then the Korean War.

Such uneasiness is expressed by Korean Chinese intellectuals. Ethnic Korean historian Ch’ŏng Shin-ch’ŏl mentions about the overly active political activities of ethnic Koreans during the Cultural Revolution and the political turmoil during communist China:

“Chinese Koreans always tended to go too much in political movements in modern China. It might be that Chinese Koreans were pure in their class consciousness as they had come from Korea as a class with no property. Have they been actively participating in the road of the Chinese Communist Party, which had given them citizenship and lands? It might have been their desperate effort to escape from the sense of inferiority originated from the fact that their life depended on the mercy of the majority group. In any case, Chinese Koreans were much more active and sensitive than any other ethnic groups in China in political movements and that is why they were more severely damaged by those political movements than other ethnic groups.” (Ch’ŏng 2000, 58).

Those Korean Chinese who participated in the rally (the Nationality Recovery Movement) claim that they were simply late in returning to their ethnic homeland due to the hectic situation in Manchuria and Korea right after the collapse of the Japanese Empire in 1945. South Korean human rights activists also utilize the logic, and Reverend Seo Kyeong-seok of the Seoul Korean Chinese Church claims that “these Chinese Koreans are the people who could not return to their homeland after the liberation due to the turmoil in China with the establishment of communist government and the lack of formal diplomatic relationship between South Korea and China” (Chosun Daily July 11, 2001). In this regard the history is also utilized.

The problem revived in November 2002 when South Korean Constitutional Court’s declared the Act unconstitutional due to its unreasonable exclusion of Korean Chinese and others from the definition of overseas Koreans. Eventually in March 2004 when the law was revised, and Korean Chinese were included as overseas Koreans. However, free entry of Korean Chinese to South Korea was continuously restricted, now through administrative measures. 265

This naturally made Korean Chinese realize that ethnic homeland is not where they can belong. They also have another homeland, China, their legal homeland. In a sense, they have two homelands not just one. Such notions of homeland highlight de-centered attachments and multiple allegiances (cf. Vertovec 1999, 450).

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265 The restrictions of Korean Chinese entry visa to South Korea was resolved a certain degree through the new Work Permit scheme in 2007.
V. Chosŏnjk's reflections on their identity/ies and transnational life

How did Chosŏnjk react to this ideological war between China and Korea over themselves? One needs to understand that Korean Chinese have developed a dual or hybrid identity both as Chinese and Korean. As they have a hybrid identity, they could be ‘Korean’ in China (especially when they are recognized as a positive ethnic minority or when they are oppressed by the dominant group) and ‘Chinese’ in Korea especially when they are accepted as Koreans by their co-ethnics (cf. Song 2006). In addition, their life style became highly transnational, moving back and forth between China and South Korea.

As many scholars point out, today in this globalizing world, the economic success and social status of ethnic minorities does not depend on rapid acculturation and entrance into mainstream circles of the host society any longer. In stead, the frequent movements and the subsequent development of the transnational social fields, paved a way for the alternative adaptation path for ethnic minorities. As a result, successful life as an ethnic minority or migrant does not so much depends on abandoning their culture and language in order to embrace those of the host society, rather it ‘depends on sustaining their social networks across the national borders’ (Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999, 229).

In any case, the experiences of discrimination, alienation and many shattered ‘Korean Dream’ in South Korea not only made Korean Chinese return migrants critical about South Korea, but it also provided them with opportunities to reflect on the meaning of ‘homeland’ and their being ‘Korean.’ Such reflections on ethnic homeland and identity were intense in the mid-1990s when Korean Chinese intellectuals published several books and articles on the issues. Some of the prominent ones were Chae-guk Kim ([1996]1998), Pan-ryong Chŏng (1996), and Kang-il Kim (2001) and Myŏng-chŏl Hŏ (2001a). In most of the discussions on their ‘homeland’ Korean Chinese distinguished the ethnic homeland, where their ethnic group originated, and the adopted homeland of China where they were raised/parented. Between these two homelands, Korean Chinese prioritized the Chinese ‘parenting/adopted’ homeland after their disappointing experience in South Korea.

Kim ([1996] 1998) uses the metaphor of ‘biological mother’ (Korea, to which Korean Chinese owe the ‘love of giving birth,’ naajun chŏng) and ‘parenting mother’ (China, to which they owe the ‘love of parenting,’ kiwŏjun chŏng). Claiming that the ‘love of parenting’ is greater than the ‘love of giving birth,’ Kim ([1996] 1998, 203) suggests that China is the country which Korean Chinese should eventually rely on while South Korea is only a place where they can be guests. Such rhetoric of China as the ‘parenting mother’ for Korean Chinese is not uncommon in Korean Chinese discourse. A Korean Chinese newspaper Hŭngnyonggang Daily states in its editorial (12 September, 1995) that Korean Chinese should not betray the ‘love of parenting’ they received from China.

In a similar vein, Chŏng (1996) stresses the importance of the adopted homeland (China) over native homeland (Korea) by using the thesis of a ‘married daughter’ in which Korean Chinese are likened to a Korean daughter who married to a Chinese man. According to Chŏng, such a daughter should first serve her husband and his parents and learn the ways of her husband’s family. Reminding the Korean tradition, he advises that the Korean daughter should keep a certain distance from her own Korean family. Chŏng (1996, 271-2) even warns Korean Chinese, as immigrant minority in China, should not threaten China by establishing strong ties with their ethnic homeland. This thesis of ‘married daughter’ reveals the dormant fear of Korean Chinese for the counteraction from the dominant Han Chinese should they try to deepen their ties with ethnic homeland.

While criticizing the assimilationist stances of Chŏng, Kim (2001, pp.4-6) asserts that Korean Chinese should be proud of their transnational character, and should take advantage of their being both ‘Korean’ and ‘Chinese’ while not forgetting that they are citizens of China. Meanwhile, Hŏ (2001b) points out that the discriminatory treatments Korean Chinese had in South Korea forced the former to strengthen their identity of ‘Chinese’ (Hŏ 2001b, 466). Five of my informants agreed with it while three others said that they still feel they are both Koreans and Chinese. In the novel Flower of Wind mentioned above, another Korean Chinese returnee In-gyu gives his final words to his good friend Jiha, urging him to leave South Korea and return to their ‘homeland’:

I sincerely beg you to return quickly to our homeland, which raised us! Homeland is like your clothes. Homeland is the place that protects you from cold wind and rain. I will put my head toward my homeland when I die (Hŏ 1996, 270).

However, concerned about the possible backlash in China against ethnic Koreans in China, Korean Chinese intellectuals in China expressed their worries about the possible disputes between China and South Korea on the question of Korean Chinese. A Korean Chinese intellectual says:

“Chinese Korean intellectuals who are thoughtful are worried (about South Korea’s possible allowing Chinese Koreans South Korean nationality). We sincerely hope that South Korea would not cross the line with this question….” (Chosun Daily Dec. 18, 2001).
VI. Conclusion

China, though it is very much dominated by the majority Han Chinese, has pursued the Zhonghua nationalism in which the government tries to incorporate all the ethnic minorities within its boundaries to the Great Zhonghua Family. Meanwhile, as a reaction to the increasing number of emigrants and the rising importance of the overseas nationals, Korean society and government have pursued de-territorialized nationalism, in which they try to maintain the loyalty and national consciousness of overseas Koreans. It was almost inevitable that these two nationalist projects by the two nation-states clash over China’s Korean minority especially when these Korean Chinese move back and forth between the two countries, leading a transnational life style.

Meanwhile, Korean Chinese, having lived in the northeastern periphery of China, across the border that connects their ethnic homeland, as a minority with a certain pride, have developed a hybrid identity both as Korean and as Chinese. As they have hybrid identity, they could feel one side of their identity stronger depending on their environment. Though they have developed their strong Chinese identity, they also revived their Korean identity in the late 1980s when they could contact and visit South Korea, their ethnic homeland. Soon, however, when they realized that South Koreans do not accept them as their brothers – as was the case of the 1999 Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans – they strengthened their Chinese identity.

Such identity shifts have been also influenced by the nationalist projects of China and Korea, each of which tries to impose a single identity on Korean Chinese. However, it seems that neither policy has won their hearts yet. Rather, Korean Chinese seem to have realized that they should be transnational rather than choosing just one side.

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Contact Address
Changzoo Song
University of Auckland
Auckland 1142, New Zealand
PH: + (64 9)373 7599 ext.84604
FAX: + (64 9)373 7411
EMAIL: ch.song@auckland.ac.nz
The Origin and Development of Western Democratic Republicanism:
The Dialectic of Democracy and Republicanism from Ancient Athens to the Renaissance Era

Kyung-Hee Kim
Kyung Hee University, Korea

Abstract
If republican democracy had its origin in the experience of the Ancient Athenian democratic regime, as a theory promoting a democratic system with an emphasis on republicanism, or sharing of power by those who constitute the community, then democratic republicanism can be seen as a people-oriented republicanism with an emphasis on a mixed government centered around the people. Thus, republican democracy and democratic republicanism have some elements in common, such as their tendency to avoid monopoly of power, and to promote sharing of power and mixed government. However, they have different aspects, depending on historical experience, and on whom they place more importance—the aristocracy, or the people. An overview of the origin and the developmental process of these theories show that they came about through historical efforts at moderation, aimed at the maintenance and prosperity of a political community—efforts to find balance through republicanism when democracy became excessive and inclined towards domination and monopoly, and to find such balance again by emphasizing democracy, when the aristocracy and the elite showed a tendency to desire excessive, or all, power.

I. Introduction
This paper aims to examine the origin and development of the democratic republicanism that was advanced in the West. The recent interest in Korea in democracy and republicanism has its roots in the contemplation of the circumstances unique to Korea "since democratization." The 70s and 80s in Korea were interspersed with struggles with a dictatorial government, and amid these struggles, democracy was a hope and an ideal, a supreme value not to be questioned upon. After a process of democratization since 1987, however, democracy was no longer a supreme value; it too had begun to be accepted as a multifaceted value that had to be further developed in reality. With the process of democratization, democracy came to be perceived as something that had to be reinforced, and what emerged at this juncture was republicanism. However, although "republicanism" is not at all an unfamiliar concept in Korea, as it appears in the phrase "democratic republic" in Article 1, Clause 1 of the Korean Constitution, the question of what this "republicanism" is brings no lucid answer. We do not have a clear idea of this "republicanism," a concept we probably read about in the papers daily. If a concept is something that is established through historical experience, and if it is something that is changed, accepted, and engraven in memory through the course of history, we must have had no experience of republicanism in our memory, or even if such an experience had occurred in actual history, we must not have made it a part of ourselves by conceptualizing it.

This thesis seeks to describe the experience of the West in conceptualizing and internalizing such a historical experience, and the process of turning the experience into a theory. It also seeks to analyze the origin and the developmental process of the Western ideology of democratic republicanism, from ancient days to the modern era of early Renaissance. In this thesis, republican democracy refers to the theory of mixed government, which emerged in order to offset the tendency of the Athenian democratic regime to turn excessive; republicanism refers to the theory of mixed government that was accepted by Ancient Rome, functioning as a theory based on the analysis of the Roman republican regime. Furthermore, this republicanism will also refer to the republic that was resurrected in the Italian city-states during the Renaissance Era, and to the republicanism quickened therein.

In short, if republican democracy had its origin in the experience of the Ancient Athenian democratic regime, as a theory promoting a democratic system with an emphasis on republicanism, or sharing of power by those who constitute the community, then democratic republicanism can be seen as a people-oriented republicanism with an emphasis on a mixed government centered around the people. Thus, republican democracy and democratic republicanism have some elements in common, such as their tendency to avoid monopoly of power, and to promote sharing of power and mixed government. However, they have different aspects, depending on historical experience, and on whom they place more importance—the aristocracy, or the people. An overview of the origin and the developmental process of these theories show that they came about through historical efforts at moderation, aimed at the maintenance and prosperity of a political community—efforts to find balance through republicanism when democracy became excessive and inclined towards domination and monopoly, and to find such balance again by emphasizing democracy, when the aristocracy and the elite showed a tendency to desire excessive, or all, power.
II. From Democracy to Republicanism
1. The Republican Democracy of Ancient Athens

The Athenian democracy advanced the people's rights, interests, and equality through the reformation of Solon and Kleisthenes. Solon wrote off the excessive debt which had enslaved the people, and by dividing the citizens into four classes according to the properties they owned, he turned the right to take public office, which used to depend on blood relations or family name, into an objective condition—property. Such actions, aimed at controlling the excessive power the wealthy had come to hold, led to the reformation by Kleisthenes. The essence of his reformation was the reorganization of administrative zones. This was a part of an effort to reorganize the existing constitution of people, which was based on blood or regional relations, into one which was made up of people who had feelings of public solidarity based on local constituencies and tribes. Based on such an administrative zone, a system was established in which each zone participated in politics, which contributed to the progress of the Athenian democracy.

What brought about a crucial change in the progress of such a democracy was the war with Persia. By winning this war, and especially by winning the Battle of Salamis, Athens, having become a naval empire with Greek hegemony in hand, grew strong in its naval powers. By recruiting tethes—lower-class citizens—as seamen, instead of having a limited number of heavily armed infantry, the Athenian citizen class expanded rapidly. The lower-class citizens who were allowed into the citizen class in order to maintain the empire's naval forces had only one source of income—the allowance that came through the tributary payment to the empire. Because the empire provided them with a source of living, they sought to lead the Athenian politics by actively participating in the assembly, which was the central organization of the Athenian politics. The members of the assembly were no longer the people of the middle class. They were lower-class citizens whose livelihoods were based on an income earned through military service and war. Unlike the heavily armed infantry citizens who could make independent and rational judgment only for the community in the political arena due to financial independence, the lower-class citizens, who had to make a living through the allowance from the tributary payment to the empire, ran politics solely for their own interests. This led to a rash desire for war, and as a result, Athens was defeated in the war with Sparta, or the Peloponnesian War. The denouncement of demokratia as the kratia (rule) of the demos, or the foolish masses, by Plato and Aristotle, comes from this historical background.

The core value of Athenian democracy, with this kind of a background, is equality. As can be seen in the statement, "A polis is wherever equal citizens gather," equal citizens participated actively in politics through the assembly and the people's tribunal. They were given equal opportunity for participation through lottery and strictly limited terms in office. They were participating citizens with actual power, "alternately ruling and being ruled." Therefore, the Athenian political community could exist only through the unity of the citizens. Such a democracy, centered around a united class of citizens, places restrictions on outsiders, since it considers citizenship a privilege, and leaned towards monopoly and domination. In order to overcome this tendency, Aristotle advocated the theory of mixed government. His theory consisted of combining democracy and oligarchy, seeking a union of the haves and the have-nots. Aristotle, observing the chaos of a political community resulting from a socio-economic divide, tried to combine the democratic and oligarchic methods—for example, the allowance paid to the people when they participate in the assembly or the tribunal, the fine that was imposed on them when they didn't participate, or lottery and election. This encouraged the participation of high-class citizens in politics, and gives a glimpse into the intention of Aristotle, who tried to offset the disadvantages of democracy by having the foolish masses, as seamen, instead of having a limited number of heavily armed infantry, the Athenian citizen class expanded rapidly. The lower-class citizens who were allowed into the citizen class in order to maintain the empire's naval forces had only one source of income—the allowance that came through the tributary payment to the empire. Because the empire provided them with a source of living, they sought to lead the Athenian politics by actively participating in the assembly, which was the central organization of the Athenian politics. The members of the assembly were no longer the people of the middle class. They were lower-class citizens whose livelihoods were based on an income earned through military service and war. Unlike the heavily armed infantry citizens who could make independent and rational judgment only for the community in the political arena due to financial independence, the lower-class citizens, who had to make a living through the allowance from the tributary payment to the empire, ran politics solely for their own interests. This led to a rash desire for war, and as a result, Athens was defeated in the war with Sparta, or the Peloponnesian War. The denouncement of demokratia as the kratia (rule) of the demos, or the foolish masses, by Plato and Aristotle, comes from this historical background.

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gave shape to each system respectively, the theory states that because of these institutions, the Roman political system can be considered a mixed government. It also states that because the Roman political system is a result of the sharing of power and check and balance among these institutions, the system can be seen in different lights, depending on which institution one focuses on. The consul would make it a monarchy; the senatus would make it an aristocracy; and the res publica would make it a democracy. Polybius believed that domestically, such a mixed government would bring about stability through check and balance among institutions and organizations, and internationally, it would bring forth the power to accomplish anything through cooperation and harmony, in the case of a crisis in relationships with other nations.

In other words, Rome was able to build, in such a short period of time, a great empire that no other nation in history was able to build, because it had a mixed government in which existed institutions in charge of different political principles and functions, and through check and balance on these institutions, it was able to create harmony and unity domestically, and create a concentration of power internationally.

2-2. Cicero's Republicanism

To Polybius, the relationship between the different classes and their cooperation were important. The issues of active participation by the citizens and the stipulations on citizenship, which had been essential in the Athenian democracy, was set aside. Also, the efforts by Aristotle to resolve, through his theory of mixed government, the conflict and tension between different social classes - the have-nots, or the aristocracy and the people - were replaced by the balance of power among the institutions that represented them. It was no longer important which class was in rule--what was now important was that each had its own place in the community, and that they all shared power. Republicanism, not democracy, was now in the fore.

As a mixed government, the Roman republican regime was a system in which the advantages of the three government systems were combined in harmony. In a monarchy, it would be difficult for other constituents to speak for their rights and interests, and in an aristocracy, a vast number of people would not be able to possess freedom. On the other hand, in a democracy, equality rules, but such an equality would actually be an inequality which denies the differences in ability and authority (De re publica 1, 27, 43). However, in a democracy, the people have libertas, or liberty, which is important even to animals; and in an aristocracy, the most superior and outstanding figures have consilium, or wisdom; and in a monarchy, the monarch has caritas, or love, which he bestows upon his people as though they were his own children (De re publica 1, 25, 54). The Roman Republicanism was what harmonized and displayed these advantages. And such a mixed government can overcome the aforementioned disadvantages of the three pure political systems--the people's lack of freedom, the excessive equality in a democracy, and the instability of the three pure political systems that rises thereby. Roman Republicanism consisted of the harmonious division and balance of three factors, which are, the potestas, or power, of the administrating officials, the auctoritas, or authority, of the aristocrats, and the sufficient libertas, or liberty, of the people. It was also a system in which stability was guaranteed only through such division and balance.

The essence of a mixed government in Cicero's view, however, is that it is the system best fit for establishing republicanism. As can be seen in his definition of a republic, the core of a republic is "res publica," which concept does not require that the people's interests or benefits be recognized necessarily by the people; it only requires that they be recognized. In other words, res publica is possible in any form of a nation. A mark of res publica can be made through the advantages of each pure political systems previously mentioned--in a monarchy, through the monarch's great caritas for the people; in an aristocracy, through consilium; and in a democracy, through libertas. Of course, it is beyond questioning that a mixed government, with all three factors, is the best system of government. What is important, however, is that this is where the characteristics of republicanism are revealed. What matters is not the form of the government system or rule--in other words, it is more an issue of whether res publica itself becomes a collateral, than an issue of "the subject," or who will achieve res publica. If a government system can guarantee the people's interests and public justice and law, then monarchy, aristocracy, and also democracy, can be a republican regime. However, because a mixed government combining the good factors of these government systems does exist, that is the best system of government, and Rome was the system.

Seen from this perspective, the problem of "democracy" and "republicanism" becomes distinctly separate. Democracy, as is clearly stated in its concept, implies kratia. On the other hand, republicanism is res publica without kratia. The ideology of mixed government, which had emerged in order to prevent monopoly of power and rule by a single class in the society, came to face a turning point with the growth of the Roman republican regime. When the people of the lower class monopolized the government by dominating the assembly, Athens began its descent, and Aristotle's theory of mixed government, which was a result of this failure, was to combine the people of the lower and the high class, and create balance among them. The key issue of the mixed government was adding oligarchic factors to a democracy by recruiting the people of the high class, in order to prevent the tendency of democracy to become extreme. The principle of democracy, by which equal citizens participate by alternately ruling and being ruled, would
be maintained. The purpose was to establish a moderate democracy that controlled extremism by adding oligarchic factors. Roman republicanism, however, was different. Analysing Roman republicanism from a perspective of power which enabled Rome to become a great empire, Polybios saw a mixed government as a government system in which power could be condensed, and stability maintained; Cicero, on the other hand, saw Rome from a perspective of justice rather than power, and saw Roman republicanism as the fourth system of government that was good, one in which the advantages of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy were combined, or, in other words, as a mixed government. Republicanism was not a monarchy in which one person ruled, or an aristocracy in which the minority ruled, or a democracy in which the majority ruled; it was a system without a monopolistic “domination” by a single factor.

3. Democratic Republicanism of Renaissance in the Early Modern Days - Machiavelli

The democratic republicanism that arose in Italy during the Renaissance Era had its roots in the classic literature that enabled the existence of city-states and their own understanding of themselves. Taking advantage of the weakening imperial and papal powers, the city-states of Italy obtained substantial autonomy, and the people, who had grown through economic development, established themselves as a major political power of these city-states. In order to establish their political ideology, the people relied on books on Ancient Roman republican regime, and Politics by the great philosopher Aristotle.

First, they related themselves to Roman traditions, due to the geographic continuity. Thus they called their nation a republic, not a democracy, and sought to interpret and organize it under the example set by Rome. Aristotle’s “Politics,” translated in the latter part of the Middle Ages, provided concepts on the theories on government systems and democracy. In the process of translation, “politia” became “res publica.” In Ancient Rome, res publica had been a criterion by which to determine good politics and community, as a premise that had to be guaranteed by a political community. Now, however, it was also an institutional method to bring about public good by replacing the concept of politia, which meant ruling system, or government system. If to Cicero, good political systems under the concept of res publica were monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and best of all, mixed government, and on the opposite spectrum were tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy, now in Renaissance, res publica was the city-states, or a system of self-government by the people, as opposed to monarchy and tyranny. Now res publica/republica had two meanings--the order of a political community in general, and at the same time, the opposite of monarchy and tyranny, as a self-governing system of the people.

Republica is a word referring to the order of a political community in general, and at the same time, the opposite of monarchy and tyranny, as a self-governing system of the people. If so, what does republica, or a republic, mean to Machiavelli? It means a community organized through the relationship between the aristocracy and the people. Depending on their relationship, it can be a monarchy, or a republic in which freedom is maintained, or an anarchy. In understanding a political community, Machiavelli saw its institutions as factors that controlled the relationship between political powers. In other words, a republica is not a system ruled by one person, but a system in which the citizens rule as a group, but since the citizens are divided into the aristocracy and the people, the nation can become a republic with strong aristocratic tendencies, or a republic with strong democratic tendencies, depending on their relationship of power. However, it could also become a monarchy, when the conflict between these two groups is intensified and support is given to one person in order to exclude one of the powers.

Machiavelli finds the right form of organization or power for such a republic in a mixed government, particularly one which is centered around the people. However, this was not a democratic regime. If a government has to be centered around the people but is not a democracy, it can be called a democratic republic. Machiavelli’s advocacy of a people-centered republic will now be considered through a comparison of monarchy, democracy, and aristocratic republic against one another, and also their comparison to a democratic republic.

In Machiavelli’s view, there are two kinds of systems ruled by one person; one is monarchy, the other tyranny. The criteria for distinguishing the two depend on whether the ruler exercises limited power according to the law. A tyranny is a system in which the tyrant rules solely for his own interests. He tends to rely on violence, since his politics are unjust, turning the people into slaves. On the other hand, a monarchy is a system in which the monarch rules the nation according to the law. As can be seen in the account of the deeds of Romulus, a good monarch must sometimes do things that look evil, in order to bring about public good over his own good, but in the end, he exercises limited power through the law and other systems, instead of building up his own power. In order for such a system to be maintained, a monarchy through election, rather than heredity, is preferred. Heredity cannot guarantee the reemergence of a monarch with faculty and wisdom, and it also corrupts a monarchy.

As can be seen in the example of Romulus or in the discussion of the functions of the French parlamento, or high court, to Machiavelli, a monarchy was not a tyranny with omnipotent power. It was a limited monarchy in which power was constrained by the law, and was shared with other political powers. However, even a limited monarchy, when the right of final decision was held by the monarch, has various limitations. A powerful monarch could emerge and destroy the legal system, and even if a good monarch rises to power, his capacity only lasts as long as his life. Moreover, people tend to get accustomed to one
way of things, and lack the power to deal with changes in time, so a monarchy has remarkably little capacity to handle a crisis. In order to deal skillfully with rapidly changing political situations, a political community has to be flexible, and for it to be flexible, the best way is to have citizens with diverse abilities be in the political territory. In this context, it makes sense to have a mixed form of government.

What, then, is the kind of a republic spoken of here? It is a democratic republic which places emphasis on the people rather than the aristocracy, both of which are parts of the community. On the other hand, a republic which places emphasis on the aristocracy can be called an aristocratic republic. Machiavelli viewed Rome as the historical form of a democratic republic, and Sparta and Venice as an aristocratic republic. First of all, a democratic republic was different from a democracy. A democracy, as demonstrated by Athens, is a nation ruled only by the people. At the core of criticism against a democracy is that governo popolare is not sufficient to bring about stability and progress to a political system. It states that the reason why the Athenian democracy failed was because it “was not harmoniously merged with monarchic or aristocratic power.” As can be seen in the criticism against a democratic government, Machiavelli advocates a republic with the characteristics of a mixed government, not with those of a pure government system. More important, however, was how to organize the factors of the aristocracy and the people, who constitute a republican government.

An aristocratic republic puts limitations on the people's participation, and the aristocrats stand at the center of the politics. In order to limit power to a small number, the government “must not mobilize the people for wars, or like the Spartans, must not open its door to foreigners.” In other words, it must rely on mercenaries or rescue forces instead of raising up their own national army, or maintain inner stability within a community of a limited size by suppressing population increase. Such a community would find legitimacy in a small number of aristocrats having power, and the people being provided with a free and abundant life instead of political power. However, Machiavelli says that such a community will fall helplessly before the inevitable increase.

The reason why the tribune, the right to impeach, and the right to legally indict were praised in talking about the Roman republican government was because they were all systems that mediated between the commoners and the senate, restrained the arrogance of the aristocrats, and protected the people. Only when such laws and systems that put the people first are in place can a free community be organized. Such a free system leads to an increase of population, and opens a way for people to gain honor by participating in public office according to their abilities, not through a private route but through a public route. When poverty is no longer an obstacle in rising to a position or honor, and when talented people are appointed to positions regardless of their backgrounds, more people can participate in the community and serve for the public good, not for their private good. This was the motive power that resulted in the Roman Empire.

To Machiavelli, Rome was a republican government centered around the people, and the essence of this government was freedom. This free government could accumulate power by having a wide range of its citizens serve the community. The essence of this freedom, however, lay in that no one was endowed with the right to rule. As previously explained, being centered around the people means that a balance is created by protecting the people, who are the weak members, since the aristocrats are already at an advantage over the people in terms of property, learning, and so forth. So it does not mean that the authority of the aristocrats are taken away and given to the people, since this can create imbalance of another relationship of power, and result in a form of single-party rule. The government sought for a balance of power between the aristocracy and the people, who were the two pillars of the community. However, this balance is not a stable and peaceful balance. Because the poor and the wealthy, or the people and the aristocracy, have different backgrounds and resources, they are always in a relationship of tension. The key issue is to resolve their disunion, which quickened freedom, in a public arena. When a disunion is unresolved due to the lack of public space for laws and institutions, the result is bloody struggle on the streets and demands by foreign powers for intervention, which leads to the collapse of a republican government and an era of absolute power. What provided such a public arena was the Roman democratic republican regime, which established the tribunal system amid the disunion between the senate and the people.

III. Conclusion

Thus far, we have examined the reflections over the stability and progress of Western political communities, from Ancient Athens to the Renaissance. The essence of the theory of government systems was how to organize a community, in an effort to overcome the experience of chaos and downfall. The conclusion of such reflections is that since a community is organized by a variety of classes, there has to be a political community that can satisfy them all. This is not to say that they should all be given the same thing. Since they have different political, economic, societal, and cultural resources, they cannot all be satisfied in the same way. Because they are different in their possessions, they are called aristocrats or the wealthy, and the people or the poor. A space, or a system, in which their resources can
be put to use must be prepared in the community. Within these systems, they can participate in the community and have their interests represented. In this context, republicanism acknowledges differences, not discrimination. Discrimination means giving more power to a certain group. This leads to domination, and the dominator tends to monopolize power. Monopoly of power leads to chaos and downfall of a community. In order to prevent this, a system of check and balance is necessary. However, this check and balance does not mean an arithmetical balance. It means finding the exact center of weight within the exact definition of a relationship of power. The reason why Machiavelli emphasized the people, even while advocating republicanism, was because he had a firm grasp of this very issue.

Democratic republicanism, in which democracy and republicanism is combined, can be understood well in the series of problems mentioned above. The role of republicanism is to control the tendency of democracy to turn extreme, which can occur when emphasis is placed on equality and participation. On the other hand, republicanism, which attaches importance to check and balance under a constitutional government, can come to tolerate the virtual domination of the aristocracy while acknowledging both the people and the aristocracy, who can create conflict. The role of democracy is to control this tendency towards oligarchy. From this perspective, democratic republicanism seeks to acknowledge the diversity of the different classes that constitute a community, link them to the community through the institutions and the space prepared in the political system, and furthermore, control the risk of arbitrary domination by one class under the law. Therein can freedom, equality, and solidarity within a community be realized. Consciousness of ethics, moral principles, and dispositions, or in short, civic virtue, that they must possess as the owner of a community is one of the essences of democratic republicanism. No matter how good a system is, when the citizens lack the ability to operate the system, it becomes useless. The essence of this civic virtue is to participate in politics not for one's private good, but for the good of the community. Eliminating the tendency towards domination, which can emerge in a democracy, or in other words, eliminating excessive participation and exclusion, and the potential tendency towards arbitrary domination, and realizing the freedom for the citizens to participate under the law as equal sovereigns—simultaneously a ruler and the ruled—is the idea of democratic republicanism.

Currently, the Korean interest in republicanism has also been on the rise. After democratization, in the search for alternatives to various problems that could not be understood nor resolved under the name of democracy, emerged the interest in republicanism. The experience in the Western history proved that "government by the people" was not necessary "government for the people," and one could say that this is where consciousness of republicanism had its roots. The fact, however, is that "government by the people" could not be entrusted to only those who were not "the people," which knowledge also came from the Western experience. Republicanism lies somewhere between "government by the people" and "government for the people." The problem is to find balance between the two, but to find the right balance, not an arithmetical one. Consequently, there is no right answer in republicanism, or in the relationship between democracy and republicanism, since relationships in reality undergo ceaseless changes.

References

Contact Address
Kyung-Hee Kim
Kyung Hee University,
1 Hoeki-dong, Dongdaemoon-gu, Seoul, 130-701, Korea
E-mail: tugend87@hanmail.net
PH: +82-2-961-0293 (O), +82-10-4740-6184 (C)
Players in Press Freedom

Eun Suk SA
The University of Sydney, Australia

Abstract
A basic right in a democratic society is that each member of society enjoys freedom through the free expression of their ideas or their thoughts. However, freedom for all members of the society is only a theoretical state in the current Korean media system especially print media. There are three main players in the Korean media: the state, the media organizations and citizens. The meanings of press freedom differ for each of these groups. Actually the key players in identifying press freedom are the media and citizens because the state has power.

This paper looks at the complex interplay of press freedom that has been perceived by the state, the media organizations, and the general public in Korea, by analysing the tension between the theory of a free press and actual practice. It also analyses the current state of press freedom in Korea and explores the Korean journalists’ perception on freedom of the press.

Introduction
In Korea, the main player in press freedom is the media, which include all members of media organizations or the media themselves. This means media companies, media owners, media managers, media editors and journalists. However, the citizens should be the main player in a democratic society. The traditional approach in examining press freedom has been how to measure the relationship between the state and the media. More recent approaches, however, included the citizen in the relationship. So far the citizens are not considered a player in press freedom. As McQuail pointed out “The main candidates for claiming the right to press freedom, aside from any individual author, are media owners plus outside sources and voices.” McQuail’s point is easily illustrated in the print media industry in Korea. For example, those who make claims for press freedom are not individuals but the media. Newspapers such as the Dong-a Ilbo, the Chosun Ilbo, and the Hwankyungkunsul Ilbo claimed their rights of press freedom to the Constitutional Court in January 2006. Under the Roh Moo-hyun’s government two new media reform laws were passed in January 2005 and these came into effect in July 2005. These are the Law Governing the Guarantee of Freedom and Functions of Newspapers (also known as the Newspaper Law), and the Law Governing Press Arbitration and Damage Relief (also known as the Press Arbitration Law). The Constitutional Court overturned the Laws in June 2006 but most of new laws are in accordance with the constitutional legislations.

The parliament passed the two media reform laws because citizen groups had urged the government and the media organizations to make public order in the newspaper industry. They claimed that several media companies have distorted the market and news stories. One example, some newspaper companies have provided freely the newspapers for few months with gifts such as a bicycle, a gift certificate, and others. Also media owners have abused their power to interfere the editorial section and to control journalists’ position. So the citizen’s groups had asked for fair trade and fair competition from the media companies. However, the media organizations ignored the citizen’s claims.

Also Jang, Ho Soon pointed out that the media companies in Korea have been entrusted by the people to produce truthful fair and reliable news. They have had greater privileges than any other industry. However, the media owners have abused the privilege and also for a long time they have failed as trustees. So citizen groups and the government have tried to limit media ownership and the independence of editorials as reform of the related law. Freedom House a US-based press freedom monitoring organization described about the laws in Korea as follows:

The Newspapers Law requires all newspapers, including those with Internet sites, to register with the government and designates newspapers with a market share of more than 30 percent, or a

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combined total of 60 percent for three dailies, as “dominant market players.” In the event that a dominant player engages in unfair trade practices, it may be subject to a cease-and-desist order or suffer financial penalties.

Moreover, citizen groups and the government have tried to give back freedom of the press from the media owners to the citizens. However, the media owners and the opposition parties have resisted the laws strongly. Further, the Dong-a Ilbo, the Chosun Ilbo, and the Hwankyungkunsul Ilbo challenged its constitutionality through the court system on 19th of January 2006 arguing that they want freedom of the press from their point of view. They claimed that the press freedom of the media owners is based on their capital and their power.

In addition, equating the freedom of media owners with freedom of the press has caused a distortion in concepts of press freedom in Korea. Moreover, the media owners have interfered the news articles and entire processes of news reporting and production.

As suggested earlier the main players in developing or defining press freedom in Korea are the media but the point of view of the citizens should be considered. Therefore, freedom of the press should serve for the general public in the future.

Methodology

The methodology used in this research project is based around the collection of a statistically significant set of empirical material from practicing print media exponents in Korea. The study involves print journalists answering a questionnaire of about 21 questions. It adapted both quantitative and qualitative methods based on in-depth structured a survey made up of a mix of closed and open-ended questions. The target sample includes a range of people working in print media companies. The groups targeted are journalists such as reporters, editors, sub-editors and others. The questionnaire was sent to male and female journalists aged from 20 to 69 years old. There are many differences as well as similarities within this group and no single group exist to represent them. The questionnaire is designed to glean their opinions on the press freedom within contemporary circumstances. The questionnaire was sent to one thousand five hundred and ninety seven (1,597) Korean news journalists in Seoul and provincial areas. Eighty-four journalists (about 5.26%) responded to the survey. They work in thirty-seven different companies, which included 18 newspapers in Seoul and 19 newspapers in provincial areas. The email surveys used the membership database of Korean press companies, which are available through the Korea Press Foundation's online service in 2006.

Journalists’ perspectives

In my study, the Korean journalists in the print media believed that the main player in press freedom should be citizens in a democratic society. This is an interesting finding, which also shows gaps between practice and the journalists’ perspectives about the main players in press freedom. In one question the survey journalists were asked:

**Who do you think has the right to freedom of the press in a democratic society?**

Please select three of the following in order of preference:

1. nation/government/politicians
2. media owners
3. media managers
4. media editors or a group of editors
5. journalists
6. advertisers
7. interest groups
8. civil organizations
9. readers or viewers
10. general public
11. others (please specify)

In my analysis, I grouped these eleven options into five groups: the state, which includes nation, government and politicians, the media made up of media owners, media managers, media editors or a group of editors and journalists, citizens, which include civil organizations, readers or viewers and general public, and advertisers, and interest groups.

The majority of journalists first chose the citizens and also their second choice was the citizens, who should have the right of press freedom then thirdly they chose journalists.

**FIRST PREFERENCE RESULTS**

With journalists’ first preference about 75% of respondents selected citizens as the main players, this includes the general public (59.5%) and readers or viewers (15.5%). The media were selected by 25% of journalists this was made up of journalists (17.9%), media editors or a group of editors (4.8%), media owners (1.2%), and media managers (1.2%).

Of the 75% of respondents, who answered that citizens should be the main players, the following is a statistical breakdown of the group into ten different categories.
• Sections of news in which they work

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sections</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social section</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business section</td>
<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>General report</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sub-editorial section</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political section</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>International/North Korean</td>
<td>4.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Editorial writer</td>
<td>3.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Managing editors or equivalent</td>
<td>2.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Culture section</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports/life</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.2</td>
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- Journalists in the social section (23.8%) were the highest percentage. Next followed the business section (11.9%), general report (9.5%), and sub-editorial section (8.3%). Also minorities were the political, and international/North Korean (each 4.8%), editorial writer (3.6%), managing editors or equivalent, and culture section (each 2.4%). The lowest sections were sports/life, and others (each 1.2%).

• Positions held

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positions held</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy editors or equivalent</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reporters</td>
<td>23.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editors or equivalent</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing editors or equivalent</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Deputy editors or equivalent, and reporters showed the same frequency (23.8%). The next position was editors or equivalent (17.9%). Managing editors or equivalent (8.3%) was the lowest position.

• Types of newspapers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of newspapers</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial-newspapers</td>
<td>39.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul-newspapers</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business newspapers</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Agencies</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>English newspapers</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special newspapers</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Provincial-newspapers (39.3%) were almost double compared to Seoul-newspapers (22.6%). Next followed business newspapers (6%), news agencies (2.4%), and English newspapers (2.4%). Special newspapers, and others (each 1.2%) were the lowest numbers.

• Location of the company they work

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location of the company they work</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial-newspapers</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seoul-newspapers</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Provincial-newspapers (40.5%) were higher than Seoul-newspapers (34.5%).

• Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male journalists</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Male journalists (70.2%) were overwhelmingly higher than female (3.6%), which means that male journalists in Korea dominate the news area in print media.
• **Age group**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age group</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 40 to 49 years old</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 30 to 39 years old</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 50 to 59 years old</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 60 to 69 years old</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 20 to 29 years old</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest age group was from 40 to 49 years old (45.2%), which is more than double the percentage of the second age group from 30 to 39 years old (22.6%). The next smallest groups were from 50 to 59 years old (3.6%), from 60 to 69 years old (1.2%), from 20 to 29 years old (1.2%), and no answer (1.2%).

• **First or subsequent job**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First or subsequent job</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First job</td>
<td>46.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsequent job</td>
<td>27.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The majority of the journalists joined the current company as their first job (46.4%). This figure was much higher than journalists, who worked previously in another newspapers (27.4%).

• **Length of service**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of service</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From 15 to 19 years</td>
<td>34.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 5 to 9 years</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 10 to 14 years</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 20 to 24 years</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From 0 to 4 years</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than 30 years</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The highest length of service group was from 15 to 19 years (34.5%), which is more than double the percentage of the second length of service group from 5 to 9 years (14.3%). The next group was from 10 to 14 years (13.1%), from 20 to 24 years (8.3%), and from 0 to 4 years (2.4%). The lowest number was more than 30 years, and no answer (each 1.2%).

• **Qualifications**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualifications</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bachelors 4 years</td>
<td>40.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters degrees</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctoral degrees</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bachelors 4 years (40.5%) was the highest percentage, next followed Masters degrees (32.1%). The lowest was Doctoral degrees, and no answer (each 1.2%).

• **Major of highest degree**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Major of highest degree</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Media and Communication</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics/Administration &amp; Planning</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economics/Business</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language &amp; Literature</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology/Philosophy/Psychology/History</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No answer</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
• The highest percentage of journalists studied Media and Communication (21.4%) as their major of the highest degree at universities. Next followed Politics/Administration & Planning (14.3%), Economics/Business (13.1%), Language & Literature (11.9%), and Sociology/Philosophy/Psychology/History (8.3%). Also smaller percentages studied others (2.4%), Law, Science, and no answer (each 1.2%).

The highest and lowest percentages selecting citizens as having the primary right to freedom of the press in each of the ten categories mostly correspond with the percentage ratios of the respondents. However, some differences in the percentage ratios of the respondents occur.

With regard to who has the right to freedom of the press, firstly, the same percentage of deputy editors or equivalent, and reporters selected citizens. However, as there was a greater percentage of reporters who responded to the survey, this indicates that the deputy editors or equivalent were more strongly inclined to select citizens than were the reporters.

Secondly, compared to journalists working for Seoul based newspapers lower numbers of journalists, who work for provincial-newspapers, answered the survey. However, a higher percentage of provincial newspaper journalists selected citizens than Seoul newspaper journalists, indicating the provincial newspaper journalists’ stronger inclination towards citizens’ press freedom rights.

Lastly, between journalists, who studied Media and Communication or Politics/Administration & Planning as their major of the highest degree at university, those who studied Media and Communication responded in lower numbers, yet had a higher percentage affirming that citizens should be the main media players. Maybe this is a result of journalists learning more about media in the major of Media and Communication, than in other majors.

SECOND AND THIRD PREFERENCE RESULTS

Journalists chose secondly the citizens as the main players in press freedom as they did for their first preference. Citizens are chosen by 73.8% of respondents, who detail readers or viewers (57.1%), the general public (14.3%) and civil organizations (2.4%). Also 26.2% of journalists selected the media as their second preference, which include journalists (14.3%), media editors or a group of editors (8.3%), media owners (2.4%) and media managers (1.2%).

There is an interesting result about the choice of third preference. Journalists chose various players in press freedom as their third preference. The highest numbers of respondents chose media (about 56%). Their choices of the media include journalists (35.7%), media editors or a group of editors (17.9%) and media managers (2.4%). Next citizens were chosen by journalists (33.3%) as third preference, which includes civil organizations (14.3%), readers or viewers (10.7%) and the general public (8.3%). Thirdly journalists selected as the main players in press freedom the nation/government/politicians (2.4%), advertisers (1.2%), interest groups (1.2%) and others (1.2%, who commented that he/she did not have the third preference). However, 4.8% of respondents had no answer.

Gaps between practice and the journalists’ perspectives

The study shows gaps between practice and the journalists’ perspectives about the main players in press freedom. In practice the main player in press freedom is the media but Korean journalists believe that citizens should be first to have the right of press freedom followed by the media.

Why did the gaps between practice and the journalists’ perspectives exist? Several reasons can be assumed to explain the gaps: discrepancy of the Korean democracy, the ideal thinking of journalists, and limited situation of media as mechanisms of communication.

First reason can be assumed discrepancy of the Korean democracy to explain the gaps between practice and the journalists’ perspectives about the main players in press freedom. Ideally citizens should be the main core players in press freedom in democratic societies. However, in practice the media are core players in press freedom in Korea. Therefore, the gaps illustrate the discrepancy of the Korean democracy.

The second possible reason to explain the gaps is that journalists based their selection or their ideal thinking. The survey asked journalists a general question about main players in democratic societies, not specific to the Korean situation. Therefore, journalists selected ideally citizens as their general choice. Also the gaps connote that journalists felt conflicts by themselves because journalists’ ideas seek for citizens’ rights but practice does not agree with their ideas, which should not be changed in the future as individual hope.

The third reason can be assumed to be the limited situation of media as mechanisms of communication. It is very difficult to activate any individual right of press freedom in practice without working through the media. The media should be served for the public good and for citizens in democratic societies. However, media are owned by individual private owners, who seek profits rather than the public good for citizens in Korea.
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper explored the players in press freedom in Korea. There are some differences in who is understood as the main player in practice and from journalists' perspectives. In practice the main player in press freedom is the media. However, Korean journalists believe that citizens should be first to have the right of press freedom followed by the media.

References

Online source

Contact Address
Eun Suk Sa
The University of Sydney
PGARC
A20 John Woolley Building
Science Road
Sydney NSW 2006
PH: 0422 293 166
EMAIL: suehojoo@yahoo.co.kr
Free Web Resources for Korean Studies: Social Sciences

Jung-Sim Kim
Monash University Library

Abstract

This paper provides useful Web resources for Korean studies scholars, researchers and students in the social sciences. There are many Korean sites available on the Internet where people can obtain full-text articles at no cost. If the researcher uses an appropriate database, then the retrieved information is often of good quality.

Fortunately, many electronic databases on the Internet in Korea are well developed. The one difficulty is that one often needs to know the Korean language in order to use them. The use of Web-based resources can save overseas scholars and librarians' considerable time and money.

In order to use electronic resources that maximize the number of useful articles retrieved from the Web sites, I will explore several Korean Web sites where researchers can obtain information in the social sciences in Korea, and then I will give explanations about how to search those Web sites for social science resources. In order to assist understanding, I will also give several illustrations from Web-based resources.

Introduction

Library services exist for the research and other needs of their users. About a decade ago, before the Web began to be used widely, it was difficult for librarians to provide information, especially for those librarians with small budgets and small collections and those far away from their source countries. Thus, it was difficult to obtain information or materials on Korea from outside the country. But nowadays, the Web makes it easier to provide information and services to users due to the rapid development of information technology and easy access to electronic information. Today, there is much information on the Web about Korea.

In this paper I concentrate on the 300 category of the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC) system—the “social sciences”—including general statistics, political science, economics, law, public administration, social services, education, commerce, communications, transport, and customs, etiquette, folklore. (My colleague, Hee-Sook Shin of Columbia University, will concentrate on the Humanities). This paper focuses on several Web sites that contain information on the social sciences as focused on Korea and provides guidance how to search and find resources from those sites.

Why the Web?

In an early article on effective information for the social science researchers, Choi (1996) notes that traditionally researchers in the social sciences preferred to use monographs and journals. However, even in the early days of the use of the Internet, Choi noted that social science researchers have also begun to use materials obtained online. Another early report also discussed the coverage of such social sciences as anthropology, economics, education, politics, psychology, and sociology (Rho 1996). More recently, free databases on the Web have become available (Jacso 2000; Bates 2005). The Web has become the resource of first choice for many information seekers (Smith 2005). Smith mentions that “…social, political and economic consequences are well documented” (2005, p. 275). The Internet has thus become a popular source of texts (Chris 2005).

Using the Web to find information has both advantages and disadvantages. Let us begin with the disadvantages. Tankard and Royal (2005) note that the Web often does not contain information about particular topics. Ojala (2003) notes that Web sources are often of poor quality. They recommend that scholars and students should not become too dependent on the Web and that they should supplement their Web searches by consulting standard reference works, books, and academic journals in libraries. They also strongly indicate that information on the Web is often superficial or incomplete. In addition, sometimes the quality of Internet access itself is poor, inhibiting research on the Web (Kibirige and DePalo 2001). They also state, “searching digital collections via the Web whereby some of the Web pages have different interfaces will accentuate the problem” (2001, p. 293).

Although there are some disadvantages in using the Web, there are also many benefits. These advantages include saving time to acquire information and finding up-to-date information. The Web offers an opportunity to get immediate access to resources. This is the reason why we use the Web to help academic library users and to give hints to librarians who do not have lots of Korean collections in their universities but who have to deal with topics on Korea.
The rest of this paper will look at specific sites with special relevance to social science researchers on Korea. Some of these sites are already well-known to researchers on Korea. Those unfamiliar with this topic, may wish to refer to my 2005 KSAA paper (Kim 2005) and "AAS Roundtable: Electronic Resources in Korean Studies" [http://www.aasianst.org/absts/2005abst/Korea/k-67.htm] at the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) Meeting in March-April 2005.

**Korean Integrated News Database System (KINDS) ([http://www.kinds.or.kr](http://www.kinds.or.kr))**

This comprehensive online news database service was established in 1990 by the Korea Press Foundation. The database provides full-text articles from 181 media sources including national and local dailies, economic dailies, English-language dailies, internet newspapers, local weekly papers, current magazines, professional magazines, television broadcast news, image (PDF) files of 1960s to 1989 newspapers, and Korean and English version of old newspapers.

Users can simply search articles from top centre of its homepage search bar. Or one can search by clicking each line of the left frame under login information which brings to the search page. This website retrieves most text articles except advertisements, photos, and graphics. The website enables users to change text size to enlarge texts or to make them smaller.

The search page is in Korean, but one can use the English language for keyword search in order to retrieve articles from English-language newspapers.

**Korea Knowledge Portal ([http://www.knowledge.go.kr](http://www.knowledge.go.kr))**

The Korea Agency for Digital Opportunity and Promotion (KADO) has developed and operates the Korea Knowledge Portal. KADO integrates knowledge from many other websites and brings them together
in a convenient form. The search system, developed to provide a stable and active national information service, provides directory service by subject.

From its homepage, there are two ways to search for social science related information. One is drop-down list before the search line on the top centre with selection of material type (all, full-text, image, multimedia, others), choose ‘Social Science’ and type the words you want to find into the search line. It also provides advanced search to retrieve information more easily and quickly. The other search method is from the directory service on the left side of homepage: click the ‘Social Science’ directory to retrieve all resources on social sciences. Then users can modify those results to put their own search keywords within the search line to find their needed information. Users also can retrieve results in three different ways: scraping, brief information with abstracts, and full-text article from the original information provider. The search page is in Korean though there are homepage in both Korean and English.

Research Information Service System (RISS) (http://www.riss4u.net)
The Korean Education and Research Information Service runs RISS, a site that provides users Internet access to union library catalogues, overseas databases, full-text service for journal articles, dissertations from Korean university libraries as well as some articles from databases outside Korea. For the free full-text articles, users have to login as members before opening the window with the free-of-charge icon. (Anyone, including students, can become a member.) If available, users can also obtain information on the contents of journals and books as well as abstracts of articles that can be obtained by paying a fee. RISS is very similar in coverage to the Korea Knowledge Portal site discussed above. It too has two ways to search for social science related information. One is to search the holdings of universities at the top of the screen where one can find Korean articles, overseas articles, dissertations, monographs, journals, and Internet resources. In this section, one can search for information on the holdings of Japanese universities as well. The other search method is to go to ‘Subject Info’ on the left side of homepage and then click ‘Social Science’ to retrieve overseas electronic resources as well as Korean full-text journal articles and dissertations in the social sciences. The Social Sciences category is divided into three sub-categories: 16 detailed subjects in business and economics, two subjects in law, and 20 subjects in other social sciences. Users can sort results by title, author, and year. Users can also create their own library in the RISS site to save results.

The search page is in Korean, but users may use English keywords to search for articles in both English and Korea which use English keywords and/or abstracts.

The National Assembly Library (http://www.nanet.go.kr)
The Digital Library of the National Assembly Library provides a national bibliographical database as well as full-text databases. Users can access information about monographs (include non-book format and seminar materials), dissertations, journal articles, and the Internet resources. Some full-text materials cannot be accessed through the Internet due to the copyright law. These full-text materials can be accessed only at the National Assembly Library or at various university libraries which are members of the Mutual Academic Information Exchange Agreement with the National Assembly Library for cooperative digital library database exchange. (Overseas, the University of Southern California is a member of the Exchange Agreement.)

Users can sort results by title, author, publisher, journal title, and year. Users can also create their own basket in the digital library site to save, print, or download their own results. The Web site enables users to change text size to enlarge texts or to make them smaller, and also to change text color or background color.

The search page is in Korean, but users may use English keywords to search for articles in both English and Korean when the latter use English keywords and/or abstracts.

Korea National Statistical Office (http://www.nso.go.kr)
The Korea National Statistical Office is a central government organization for statistics. It provides the statistical data from the online database system known as the Korean Statistical Information System (KOSIS) (http://kosis.nso.go.kr), which will change to the National Statistical Portal (http://nspportal.stat.go.kr) in July 2007. In KOSIS, there are 18 categorized topics in the national statistics as below:

- Land and Climate
- Population and Household
- National Account and Gross Regional Domestic Product
- Composite Indexes of Business Indicators and Industrial Production
- Employment, Labor and Wages
- Price
- Household income, Expenditure
- Census on basic characteristics of establishments and Business enterprise
- Agriculture, Livestock breeding, Forestry, and Fishing
- Construction, Ports, Housing, and Water supply service
- Wholesale and retail trade, and Service industry
- Transport, Information and Telecommunication
- Energy and Environment
- Health and Social security
- Education, Culture and Science
- Public finance, Money, Banking, Security, and Insurance
- External trade, Foreign exchange, and Balance of payment
- Crime, Safety, Accident, and Calamities
- Public servant, Justice, and Administrative units.

Each of these broad topic categories also has sub-categories. When a user selects a broad topic, related sub-categories are displayed on the screen. Selecting one of these sub-categories by clicking the box shaped icon then shows further detailed divisions within that sub-category.

Users may then select the document icon adjacent to each detailed entry to access the relevant statistics table.
The title of the statistics table is displayed in the upper part of the screen. One can set up the desired statistics by classification, cycle, period, and decimal point, and then one should click the “Search” button. After clicking the Search button, one can then choose from the Long-term, Sort Out, Analysis, Source and Help buttons. These decisions will help the user obtain the statistics he or she requires. The data can then be downloaded in text or excel format.

The search page is in Korean and in English, but the Korean pages provide more information than the English pages.

**KOREA.net** ([http://www.korea.net](http://www.korea.net))

The official English language website for the Republic of Korea is run by the Korean Overseas Information Service (KOIS). The page provides news about Korea, directory, multimedia and other information on Korea. This is one of the most important English (and other non-Korean languages) homepages for those who do not know Korean, but would like to get information on Korea easily.

For social sciences resources, users can simply search in the top centre of homepage search bar or search by clicking each section within the next section down. The ‘News’ section has lots of social science information such as government press releases and reports on Korea’s national affairs, foreign affairs, finance, economy, society as well as foreign reports on Korea. The ‘About Korea’ section also gives information on Korea under such headings as president, government, Korea and the world, biz & economy, society and culture. The ‘Directory’ section provides advanced search for the government publications by central and local government organizations in several languages on Korea’s politics, economy, culture, and society. The ‘Multimedia’ section provides a variety of multimedia materials include e-books, PDF files, sounds, and slides.

The search page is in English, and there are homepages in English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Vietnamese, Russian, Chinese, and Japanese.
KTV 한국정책방송 (http://www.ktv.go.kr)
The National Audio Visual Information Service broadcasts government policies and is run by the Korean Overseas Information Service (KOIS). Users can search recent programs from the basic search box or the advanced search box lines. One can also find archived programs on the internet KTV PDS Web page. The search page is in Korean.

e-Yŏngsang Yŏksagwan e-영상역사관 (http://ehistory.korea.kr/)
The website enables users to search three categories: history in media, Internet media centre, and Internet photo center. Users can search by putting a keyword into search box or by clicking categories of subject, period, or person. Select 'social sciences' from the subject category. Then users can narrow-down their results with publication number, publishing year, title, or contents to find their needed information. The search page is in Korean.

Electronic Gazette 대한민국 전자관보 (http://gwanbo.korea.go.kr/main.jsp)
The government began publishing its gazette in electronic form in October 2000. Users can search by keyword or by date. The paper version is also available on the web, but there is a warning that the computerization of the paper version may have inaccuracies. The Web site enables users to change text size to enlarge texts or to make them smaller. The search page is in Korean.

Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology 한국문화인류학회 (http://www.koanthro.or.kr/index.asp)
This homepage contains tables of contents of workshops and conferences. It also provides a search function to retrieve citations as well as full-text articles. The search page only works through the Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology's homepage. For viewing or downloading full-text articles, which are in PDF file format, the personal computer has to have viewer software. The search page is in Korean.

The Korean Association of International Studies 한국국제정치학회 (http://www.kaisnet.or.kr/)
This homepage contains tables of contents of workshops and conferences. The search function retrieves citations as well as full-text articles. The search button for articles is in centre of the left side of homepage, and it links to the search page with quick search, advanced search, or publication's volume and number search. For viewing or downloading full-text articles, which are in PDF file format, the personal computer has to have viewer software. The search page is in Korean.

The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) (http://english.mofe.go.kr/)
MOFE is responsible for economic and social development policies including taxation, finance, national treasury, state-owned properties, foreign exchange, debt management, external economic cooperation and stabilizing the livelihoods of the Korean people. The search box is on the left side of homepage. Users can also click the advanced search to go to the advanced search page, where they can put a keyword into search line and choose field (among title or title & contents), period of time, and category (news & events, law & policy issues, statistics, interaction avenue, public information, and archives). Users can use both Korean and English.

Other related sites are The Ministry of Planning & Budget (http://www.mpb.go.kr) and The Financial Supervisory Commission (http://www.fsc.go.kr). The search page is in Korean. Homepages are in both Korean and English.

Other Korean economic resources on the Web
Each search engine's directory such as Daum, Naver, Yahoo Korea, and Google provides much information on economics. For example, if you are search from search engine, go to directory > education, learning > social sciences > economics.

The Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea (http://www.moj.go.kr/HP/ENG/index.do)
The search page is in Korean though there are homepages in Korean, English, Chinese, and Japanese.

The Ministry of Government Legislation is responsible for comprehensive management and coordination of the government’s legislative affairs. And it also has the authority to issue authoritative interpretation of laws and regulations, and implements measures to assure the public’s access and participation in legislative process.

The Comprehensive Legal Information Service System is an online database of integrated legislative information and court cases created by the MOLEG in cooperation with the Supreme Court ([http://www.scourt.go.kr](http://www.scourt.go.kr)). It contains huge databases including various legislative acts, regulations, court cases as well as books on jurisprudence. It is searchable through the use of keywords, subject terms, amendment number, title, and case number. The earlier paper version is also available on the web, but there is a warning that the computerization of the paper version may have inaccuracies. The search page is in Korean though there are both Korean and English homepages.


The Korea Legislation Research Institute’s digital library provides free search of legal books and research reports as well as a database of Statutes of the Republic of Korea ([http://elaw.klri.re.kr/indexE.jsp](http://elaw.klri.re.kr/indexE.jsp)). Unfortunately, the full-text of English-language Statutes is only available to KLRI’s fee paying members. The search methods are direct search statutes, alphabetical search, search by field, search by promulgation date, and search by statutory forms. The search page is in both Korean and English.


The search box in English homepage is on the bottom of the left side, but on the Korean homepage the search box is on the top of the left side. Some electronic reports or papers can retrieve from Top menu bar > Defense Policy > Defense Reform 2020, Annual report, Defense white papers. The homepages are in both Korean and English.


The Korea.net site provides users information about most government ministries and independent agencies. This site is useful for those seeking information from other ministries and agencies other than those discussed above. Search Home > About Korea > Government > Executive Branch > Organization Chart.

Conclusion

This paper describes how to get free resources in the social sciences about Korea from several sites. The search services from the most Korean Web sites are in Korean. Most government sites provide their own full-text information as well as viewer programs to view their full-text materials. Some government Web sites warn users to consult the paper version rather than electronic version. Some provide really simple syndication (RSS) service, or search toolbars, or services for users with visual disabilities.

As information on the Web can change fairly rapidly, and some sites redesign their Web pages and even change their URL, users and librarians must remind themselves to check reasonably often to make certain that their information is always up to date. But, in any case, both librarians and scholars desiring to obtain social science materials about Korea are fortunate in having a wide variety of Internet sources available for consultation.

After the Dog Hell. Sisa Magazine 2580, MBC.

Aftermath of Incheon Jangsu-dong Dog Farm Incident - It's Not Yet Over Seven Days, SBS.

Animal Cruelty at Incheon Jangsu-dong Dog Farm. Sisa Magazine 2580, MBC.

Innocent Dogs in "Dog Hell", Incheon Jangsu-dong Dog Farm Incident. Seven Days, SBS.


IDP.Education.Australia (n.d.). Comparative Costs; For Professionals in the Higher Education Sector. Sydney, IDP Education Australia.


Contact Address
Jung-Sim Kim
Monash University
Clayton, VIC. 3800   AUSTRALIA
PH: +61 3 9905 9127
FAX: +61 3 9905 9142
EMAIL: jung.sim.kim@lib.monash.edu.au
Appendix: several homepages and search screen samples

http://www.kinds.or.kr

http://www.knowledge.go.kr

http://www.riss4u.net

http://www.lib.nanet.go.kr/

http://gwanbo.korea.go.kr/
Free Web Resources for Korean Studies: Humanities

Hee-sook Shin
Columbia University

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to provide Korean studies scholars, researchers and students with information on useful electronic resources available on the Web, particularly in the humanities. This includes the most useful academic sites:

1) National Digital Library, a portal that provides bibliographic information and full-text information through the major Korean libraries
2) Korea Knowledge Portal which searches for information and data digitized at each national institute and provides the public with centralized access to these resources.
3) Korean History Online, a search portal for historical materials stored at many information centers and provides links to history websites and full-text data and
4) Korean National Heritage Online, a search portal for cultural materials stored at many information centers and includes a cyber tour of cultural properties, Korea’s world heritage, and so forth.

In order to demonstrate these electronic resources and to encourage greater use of information retrieved from the Internet, the most relevant web-based resources will be described. These are particularly helpful for scholars and students with limited access to Korean materials in their libraries.

Introduction
Electronic resources have been rapidly developing in the last decade and Korean resources are no exception. This paper focuses on free resources available on the web and highlights Korean databases offering full text information. The aim is to provide information on useful electronic resources mainly in the humanities available on the web and will be particularly helpful for Korean studies scholars, researchers and students with limited access to Korean print materials. It focuses on Korean language resources located on the Internet and includes only a few English sites.

Korean collections in Australia
An expanding Korean studies program requires library resources to support teaching and research activities. Korean studies programs have been expanding in Australia and there has been a growing demand for a comprehensive collection of Korean language materials in order to accommodate the growth of Korean studies scholars and students. However, despite the growth of these programs, collections of Korean language materials have been slow to be established. The three major libraries – the National Library of Australia (NLA), Monash University and Sydney University – have a combined collection of only some 40,000 titles, comprising an estimated 85% of the Korean language holdings in Australia (as of 2005)(McKenzie, A. 2005). Although the ANL and Monash libraries have reasonably large collections of monographs, most of these are contemporary materials while primary sources and materials dating prior to the 1970s are seriously lacking. In addition, due to their small budgets, the libraries cannot afford to keep subscribing to commercial databases or major academic journals for their users (Kim, J. S. 2005). Thus, scholars and students, especially those who research the pre-modern period experience difficulty in finding necessary information for their field.

The Internet has revolutionized the way information is collected, offering researchers the means to do their research more cost effectively and efficiently because they have access to resources containing a broad range of bibliographic information, as well as often direct access to research materials. The Internet has thus become a vital component in facilitating research.

Korean Internet resources
With the rapid growth of information technology, the Internet has been able to collect numerous resources and has made an amazing amount of information accessible to the world. Available resources include online databases, library catalogs, journals, dictionaries, encyclopedias, directories, and so on.

In 1999, the Korean government pushed for a national information network and technology infrastructure that would provide public access to many previously unavailable materials. This resulted in the development of numerous digital databases within a short period of time. For example, the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) has initiated the project “IT new deal project” and has developed about 160 databases. Other government organizations have also started similar projects in order to develop databases; and as a result of this trend, about 8,488 databases have been available as of 2005 (Korea Database Promotion Center 2005). Although commercial databases limit access by charging fees, many public databases are free of charge in Korea.
Public databases have been developed by government organizations such as the National Library of Korea, the National Assembly Library, the National Institute of Korean History, etc. Public databases consist not only of materials published prior to 1945, (which are either not covered by copyright law or have expired copyrights) and government publications but also current materials published before 2001 and still under copyright. These databases are available either at no charge or at a low fee.

Useful websites

Many full text databases are available online in Korea. These are highly valuable resources with more information than one might expect and come at no cost to the user. Several years ago, when the NLA surveyed scholars and researchers to better understand the research and information needs of Korean academic studies, over 40% of the respondents had never used Internet resources. These findings point to a low awareness of existing Korean collections and services in Australia (McKenzie, A. 2005). Thus, librarians should review, select, and be responsible for the accessibility of these web resources to their scholars and researcher by instructing them on what resources are available, how to use them and so on. It is impossible to review all the potentially useful web resources here. However, the following resources are of particular use for the Humanities. Moreover, although some sites require registration, most do not.

1. National Digital Library (www.dlibrary.go.kr) is a search portal that provides bibliographic information and full-text information through the seven major Korean libraries including the National Library of Korea (국립도서관), the National Assembly Library of Korea (국회도서관), the Supreme Court Library (법원도서관), the Korean Institute of Science and Technology Information (한국과학기술원정보연구원), the Korean Education and Research Information Service (한국교육학술정보원), the KAIST Digital Science Library (한국과학기술원전자도서관), and the Nongchon Chinhnungch’ŏng Nongŏp Kwahak Tosŏgwŏn (농촌진흥청 농업과학도서관). Individual libraries, of course, can be searched through their respective websites.

The national digital library aims to foster national competitiveness in the area of information services by providing the public with free online access to a searchable database of information resources nationwide. It is hoped that this digital library will serve as a model for information services, thereby enhancing and further developing a national system for information resources. This site provides two search options: basic and advanced with both Korean and English interfaces. The search terms, however, should be rendered in Korean. After selecting a search option, the user then can choose to search full texts or simply bibliographic information. Search results are grouped by material format in bold blue font for each institution in the left column. Users can also see whether the full text is available. To read the full-text information, users will need to download a viewer via the provided link (National Digital Library 2005).
1.1 National Library of Korea (NLK) (www.nl.go.kr), which is the country's main depository library, is a very rich information resource and has approximately 5.7 million titles. The NLK has developed and provides full-text databases, including the following:

- Rare Books (고서) with 91,968 Rare books and unique materials;
- Official Gazettes (관보), totaling 164 titles published between 1894-1910;
- Books Published Before 1997 (단행본) with 136,056 titles including full text of academic and highly valuable monographs published between 1945 and 1997 and held by the NLK;
- Ministry of Culture and Tourism Publications (문화관광부 발간 자료) totaling 630 volumes published by the MCT;
- Newspapers Published Before 1945 (신문), containing 361 Korean newspapers published before 1945;
- Rare Serials (연속간행물), which includes 3,036 Korean serials;
- Doctoral Dissertations on the Humanities (인문과학 분야 박사 학위 논문) with 7,816 doctoral dissertations;
- One Hundred Korean Classics (한국고전백선) which features 615 titles;
- Classic Novels in Hangul (한글판 고전소설) which features 915 titles;
- Japanese Materials Published Before 1945 (일본어 자료) including 65,383 Japanese titles; and
- Foreign Materials on Korea (한국관련 외국어자료) with 10,433 titles.

Other databases include Korean Modern Fictions (신문학대표소설), Old Maps (고지도) and more.

These databases not only provide full-texts and images, but also tables of contents in text format. These databases can be accessed by the public via the NDL and NLK websites free of charge. Materials under copyright (about 40% of the total digitized material) are accessible for a small fee and only if the library has an agreement with NLK and the Korea Reprographic & Transmission Rights Center (KRTRC). The digital library at the NLK site allows users three search options: basic, advanced, and browse. The search can also be limited by publication year. The search results are displayed in blue font on the left hand side of the screen, just like the NDL. After a category is selected, the titles are displayed on the right hand side. To retrieve the full-text, click on the icon in the full text column. The site is only available in Korean (National Library of Korea 2005).

1.2 National Assembly Library (www.nanet.go.kr) also provides full-text services including monographs (단행본), government publications (정부간행물), social science dissertations (사회과학 분야 학위논문), social science journals (사회과학 분야 학술지), seminar papers (세미나 자료), rare books (고서), historical newspapers (폐간 신문), documents on Korea held at overseas libraries (해외 소재 한국 관련 자료), historical treaties and laws, legislations (입법부 발간자료) and much more. Unfortunately,
some of the full-text data is only available at NAL and to affiliated institutions. Most of the full-text databases are in Korean, but materials related to Korea written in foreign languages are also available.

The NAL’s digital library website can be accessed either through a link in the NDL or directly through the NAL website. It provides three types of searches: basic, advanced, and command. The search can also be limited by materials: monographs, journals, dissertations, etc. (National Assembly Library 2003-2007).

2. Korean Knowledge Portal ([www.knowledge.go.kr](http://www.knowledge.go.kr)) is an integrated portal which offers a one-stop search into a nationwide body of data by linking to a number of information centers in eight major fields including culture, oceanography, history, industry, science, education, information technology, and construction. According to its web site, “Korea Knowledge Portal assigns the highest priority to maximizing the sharing and use of national knowledge and information resources while providing an easy-to-use and efficient user-oriented service through the development of more effective search and information management and by providing access to vast amounts of information through the expansion of links to relevant sites.” Full-text data is accessible to the public, but limited to certain materials.

This site offers several options in both basic and advanced search modes. For example, after typing in a keyword, the user may then narrow the search by format—such as images, audio, video, text, etc. When searching by more than one keyword, the default search automatically links the words with “and”. The full-text is displayed with the table of contents.
2.1 Korea Education & Research Information Service (www.riss4u.net) is a centralized information system like the Online Computer Library Center which provides cataloging records with holdings distributed by the RISS member libraries. It also provides full-texts of Korean academic journals and masters’ and doctors’ dissertations. General access to the site is free, but special features such as copyright materials, journal articles and dissertations are restricted to fee-paying members. Registration is required of all users. The site provides Korean and English interfaces. Inter-library loan service is available for accessing full-text articles, but only among member libraries.

This is the homepage of RISS which provides three types of searches: basic, advanced, and command. Users can narrow their search by date and material and search results can be sorted by title, author or publication date. This site also provides a link to Japanese cataloging records (Korea Education & Research Information Service 1998-2007).

2.2 Korean History On-line (www.koreanhistory.or.kr) is a search portal for historical materials stored at various information centers which are developing databases. These include Mooncheongak (경상대학교 문천각), the National Institute of Korean History (국사편찬위원회), Kyujanggak (규장각), Jongyonggak (존경각), the Academy of Korean Studies (한국학중앙연구원), the Korean Classics Research Institute (민족문화추진회), the Korean Studies Advancement Center (한국국학진흥원), and the National Research Institute of Cultural Heritage (국립문화재연구소) to name a few. Korean History On-line provides links to history websites and full-text data in Korean. This integrated portal provides full-text access to many primary resources and rare materials, including Choson wangjo sillok, Sungjongwon ilgi, Ilsongnok, Hanguk munjip chonggan, and various archives concerning democratic movements. Also included are Classical Korean manuscripts, comprehensive collections of Korean classics, bibliographies for the Comprehensive Korean Classics Written Collection, documents on the Korean War and the Vietnam War, historical documents on Japan’s invasion of Korea, and more. This is an excellent place for scholars and students conducting research on pre-modern Korea.
This website provides a variety of search methods such as an integrated basic search, advanced, and chronicle search. A directory search is also available. Search results are displayed by material format. Individual institutions can also be searched through their respective websites for access to their full-text resources (Korean History On-line n.d.).

2.3 Korean National Heritage Online (www.heritage.go.kr), developed by Korea's Cultural Properties Administration, is an excellent search portal for cultural materials stored at various information centers. The site includes a cyber tour of cultural properties, the world heritage of Korea, the national treasure of Korea, a cyberMuseum, and a multimedia folk artifacts gallery. Because this site provides not only documents, but videos, users can view Korean cultural assets and museums via the Internet. The website of the Korean National Heritage Online is available in both English and Korean. The details of each category include:

- World Heritage of Korea contains information on Korean world heritage, such as Changdeokgung, Hwaseong, Seokguram, Bulguksa, Jongmyo, Dolmen Sites, Gyoungju Historic Areas, etc.
- National Treasures of Korea introduces famous national treasures, such as Seoulsungnyemun, Bulguksadabotap, Bulguksasamcheungseoktap, Gyoungjucheomseongdae, etc.
- Memory of The World: includes an introduction to the memory of the world in Korea, such as Hunminjeongeum, Joseonwangjosillok. Photos and descriptions provided.
- Cyber Tour into Cultural Properties introduces typical Korean heritage tour courses by themes.
- Multimedia Folk Artifacts Gallery shows unique Korean folk artifacts in the National Folk Museum of Korea.
- Cyber National Museum of Korea contains abstracts from "Wonderful Cultural Properties of Korea" published by the National Museum of Korea.
This site provides links to over forty museums and historical sites and offers directory browsing, keyword searching, cyber tours, cyber museums, etc. These databases are available to the public (Korean National Heritage Online 2005).

Conclusion

Resources available on the Internet can help fill gaps in any library’s collection and provide vital information. One of the most attractive benefits is that using the Internet is free. It is a remarkable tool that is intuitive and accessible. The Internet is unique and dynamic, constantly changing. Thus, it is important to evaluate web resources carefully in order to ensure the quality of the information offered and that appropriate search terms and methods are used. Gaining access to such databases would be of great help to scholars and students in Australia and New Zealand. Because it is effective and convenient, they should take advantage of this tool to assist them in their research.

References

Contact Address
Hee-Sook Shin
Columbia University
C.V. Starr East Asian Library
310M Kent Hall, Mail code 3901
1140 Amsterdam Ave.
New York, NY 10027
PH: +1-212-854-1507
FAX: +1-212-662-6286
EMAIL: hs2148@columbia.edu
The Understanding and Satisfaction on Non-Verbal Communication among Korean Administrators and Thai Employees: A Case Study on Korean Companies in Thailand

Tassanee Thantawanit, Rachanee Vongsumitr, and Chanchala Sivamard
Burapha University, Thailand

Abstract

Data referred in this research was retrieved from 30 Korean administrators and 135 Thai employees who work in Korean firms. In-depth interview and focus group procedures have been used in collecting data. In addition 160 Thai employees filled out the questionnaires that designed by the researchers for confirmation the result of in-dept interview.

Non-verbal communication among Korean administrators and Thai employees could be divided into seven categories: body language, eye contact, voice, appearance, touch, space and place, and time.

The results of in-depth interview were: Korean administrators realized that Thai employees were too slow. They were polite, kind, and easily smile. Normally they did not take eye contact. They spoke lightly. They dressed tidy and neat but did not have safety concern in using safety wearing. Thai touched only among closed relationship and same sex. They sat separately from Korean in the party. Thai felt that they were observed by Korean since Korean head located their desks on the back row. Punctuality and time utilization were not important for Thai.

Thai employees realized that Korean administrators were too fast, serious looking and anxious act, quick temper, self-confidence. Korean took straight eye contact. They spoke loudly and hard like they were in disputation. They dressed neat and tidy. They touched Thai at head, shoulder, and back for closed relationship and to cheer and encourage working. Korean honored Thai foreman by calling them to Korean’s office when there were some mistakes and some orders. Punctuality and time utilization were very important for Korean administrators.

The most frequently used of non-verbal communication was body language

The results of the survey by questionnaires were: voice, appearance, and time are the first three frequently use of non-verbal communication ways with body language in the fourth. Appearance, and time are the most two satisfaction of Thai employees to non-verbal communication of Korean administrators.

There were three major factors behind their differentiation of non-verbal communication: 1) geographic factors, 2) historical events, and 3) religions, beliefs, and values. Furthermore, the result of this research aligns with studies by Geert Stede on cultural values and how they are reflected in work practices.

It would be useful to conduct pre-training on both Korean and Thai virtues and customs as they exist in the workplace. With each side having a greater understanding of the other’s cultural values and perspectives as they apply to work partnerships, there is a better chance for positive and harmonious workplace relations and more effective work performance.

Communication is an essential activity for the proper functioning of an organization. It plays a vital role in communicating to an organisation’s people the corporate aims and culture defined by management. It can also raise their morale and spirit. Indeed, it would be true to say that efficient communication inevitably leads to efficient and effective corporate performance.

Communication can be either verbal or non-verbal. Generally, verbal communication is regarded as more important because it can be created and understood easily. To a large extent, non-verbal communication is viewed as less significant because, though people use it all time, more effort is required in its expression. Moreover, communication through non-verbal messages may contradict the verbal; true feelings can be conveyed more accurately this way than by using spoken or written language. It expresses the message without having first gone through a process of preparation and amendment. As the proverb goes, “Actions speak louder than words”.

An important factor having a bearing on non-verbal communication is culture. People from different cultures use different methods to communicate non-verbally. If they do not try to understand each other’s meanings, misunderstandings will easily occur. This is because while the sender transmits messages in his or her customary way, the receiver will interpret the messages in a way that is familiar to them.

At the present time a large number of multinational companies are investing and expanding in Thailand. This is the result of government policy and initiatives to attract foreign investment for the good of
the economy. In addition, opportunities are emerging for Thai workers to join international organizations. Among those multinational investments, Korean corporations have invested heavily and increased their size, production base and production volumes. From 2001 to June 2006, new Korean firms setting up in Thailand under BOI invested approximately 20,000 million bath ($US530 million) across 186 projects. Significantly, investment in the first half of 2006 was five times greater than for the corresponding period the previous year. This has led to a situation where there are Thai employees working under the direction of Korean managers. This collaboration has the potential to create misunderstandings or even ill-will between the two—especially when communicating non-verbally—on account of differences in their native tongues and cultural backgrounds. People generally feel comfortable when others use body language that is similar to their own. The context in which this takes place, as well as personality and relationship factors, can also influence the meaning. The quality of communication is better served when one person’s non-verbal language matches the other’s. In the case of non-verbal communication across cultures, there are similarities and differences that lead to a better understanding, greater satisfaction, and higher morale in the workplace. Such positive outcomes are good for the well-being of the company.

Research to gain a better understanding of non-verbal communication between Korean administrators and Thai employees is the key to enhancing both work performance and mutual satisfaction in the workplace. Furthermore, the outcomes can be applied to better prepare Koreans and Thais for the eventuality of their working together. It will encourage positive attitudes and, in turn, positive performance.

Classifications of Non-Verbal Communication

In this research, non-verbal communications are divided into seven categories, as follows:

1. Body Language (http://www2.andrews.edu/~tidwell/bsad560/NonVerbal.html) Includes:
   a) Body Movement
      The movement and position of the person’s body is a key ingredient in sending messages. One sends information by means of physical orientation towards a person (by facing or leaning towards another), emotional statue (by tapping fingers, jiggling coins), and by a desire to control the environment (by moving towards or away from a person).
   b) Posture and Gestures
      Cultural differences give rise to postures and gestures that differ between nations. Examples are bowing (which shows rank in Japan), slouching (rude in most regions of northern Europe), hands in pocket (disrespectful in Turkey), sitting with legs crossed (offensive in Thailand and Turkey), exposing the soles of one’s feet (offensive in Thailand and Saudi Arabia). Even in the United States what is considered acceptable posture is determined by gender.
      Furthermore, some cultures are animated, other restrained. Restrained cultures often feel that animated cultures lack manners and self-control, while animated cultures often feel that restrained cultures lack emotion or interest.
   c) Facial Expressions
      While it can be said that facial expressions are the same, the meanings that attach to them are different. The consensus of opinion is that, regardless of nationality, people use the same facial expressions when smiling, crying, or showing anger, sorrow, or disgust. The intensity, however, varies from culture to culture. Many Asian cultures suppress facial expressions as much as possible. Many Mediterranean (Latino/Arabic) cultures exaggerate grief or sadness, while most American men hide grief or sorrow.

2. Eye Contact
   In some countries eye contact indicates the degree of underlying attention or interest, has the capacity to change attitude or to persuade, regulates interaction, communicates emotion, defines power and status, and has a central role in managing the impressions of others. In some countries people avoid eye contact as a mark of respect. Studies have found that people use their eyes to indicate their level of interest. This can be done through eye contact.

3. Voice
   Characteristics such as tone, pitch, accent, and volume can all give off non-verbal cues. It’s possible to learn about an individual’s personality, mood, and culture from the information carried by their voice.
4. Appearance
All cultures are concerned about how they look, and make judgments based on looks and dress. Cultural standards differ on what type of dress is attractive and what constitutes modesty. Styles of dress are used as symbols of status. A physically attractive person may stand a better chance of being hired for a job, or being given help, than might someone who is less attractive. A good example of clothing as an object of communication is the uniform.

5. Touch
Examples of touching that can be defined as communication include handshakes, holding hands, kissing (cheek, lips, hand), a slap on the back, the “high-five”, a pat on the shoulder, brushing another’s arm, etc. Each of these emits non-verbal messages as to the touching person’s intentions or feelings. They also cause feelings in the receiver, be they positive or negative. Touch is culturally determined, but each culture has a clear concept of what parts of the body may not be touched. The basic message of touch is to affect or control—protect, support, disapprove. Many Asians do not touch the head as this would jeopardize the soul that resides within it. Cultures that have a high degree of emotional restraint (English, German, Scandinavian, Chinese, and Japanese) seldom touch in public; those that encourage the display of emotion (Latino, Middle-Eastern, Jewish) accept frequent touching.

6. Space and Place
Space and place is one aspect of non-verbal communication that has been influenced by culture and psychology. From the perspective of culture, when dealing with someone of a different status a person in high context culture be mindful of personal space and the need to avoid physical contact. Moreover, they will commonly meet in a public place rather than a private one. In psychological terms, less space means a closed relationship or an intrusion into individual privacy.

7. Time
Given the flexibility of time in high context culture, time is open and flexible and the process is more important than the product. On the other hand, low context culture requires that time be highly organized, and the product is more important than the process.

Objectives
1. To study a variety of non-verbal communication among Korean administrators and Thai employees at Korean Companies in Thailand.
2. To study the understanding and satisfaction in non-verbal communication from Korean administrators to Thai employees.
3. To study the understanding and satisfaction in non-verbal communication from Thai employees to Korean administrators.

Research Framework
1. Data Framework
This research studied specifically in 10 Korean companies located in industrial parks in Thailand.

2. Content Framework
This research studied specifically in these contents:
2.1 A variety of non-verbal communication between Korean administrators and Thai employees. It was classified to 7 categories as follows:

1. Body Language
2. Eyes Contact
3. Voice
4. Appearance
5. Touch
6. Space and Place
7. Time

2.2 The understanding and satisfaction in non-verbal communication among
Korean administrators and Thai employees.

Data Source and Population

1. Data referred in this research was retrieved by sampling from Korean firms in Eastern region under BOI (The Thai Board of Investment) for 10 companies locating in industrial parks as follows: 6 companies in Chonburi Province, 3 companies in Chachengsao Province, 1 company in Rayong Province.
2. Performances were 30 Korean administrators and 135 Thai employees. In-depth interview and focus group procedures have been used for collecting data.
3. Sampled 160 Thai employees filled out the questionnaires that designed by the researchers for confirmation the result of in-dept interview.

Research Tool

Two types of tool were employed in this study.
1. The questions for in-dept interview were open-ended concerning emerged non-verbal communication, and understanding and satisfaction towards the non-verbal communication.
2. The questionnaires for Thai employees were created from the non-verbal communication framework.

Data Collection Period

Data referred in this research was retrieved during April-October, 2006.

Research Result

1. The results of interviewing by using in-depth interview and focus group interview showed as followed:
   1.1 Non-verbal communication among Korean administrators and Thai employees could be divided into seven categories: body language, eye contact, voice, appearance, touch, space and place, and time.
   1.2 Non-verbal communication that most frequently used was body language.
   1.3 Details of Non-verbal communication among Korean administrators and Thai employees
      1.3.1 Body Language

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

Korean administrators have formed the opinion that Thai employees go too slowly about their activities, especially work. Although they could move at a faster pace they choose not to alter their behavior. Thai employees also think it acceptable if they do not get their work done. Poor education means those on production lines have slower thought processes and take longer to learn. Thai employees are quick-tempered when it comes to personal issues but not over those related to work. Koreans have tended to think that the Thai personality is kind and polite. Eighteen years ago, in the office, Thai workers kneed down to Korean boss which Koreans were surprised. However, Thais send thing by one hand which is difference from two-hand manner of Korean.

Most Korean administrators admire the Thai greeting; the Wai and saying “Sawasdee”. The Wai is a Thai greeting and sign of respect, expressed by pressing the palms of the hand together at about chest level, and bowing. Koreans also noticed that Thais can smile easily, sometimes without a clear indication of their intended meaning—such as apologizing, being confused, showing happiness, and even after doing something wrong or not understanding the system or the learning process. In addition, sometimes Thais would just nod their head to signify a greeting in the office, and women would smile and move their eyebrows to convey acceptance and understanding. When Koreans did not understand why and how Thais smiled, they used eye contact to search for the meaning. Koreans could not understand the Thai smile since Koreans do not smile much and do not greet or smile at strangers. Apart from smiling, if the Thai employees did not understand lengthy work instructions they would scratch their heads and exclaim loudly. One important thing Koreans have not been able to understand is why Thais do not apologize even when they are in the wrong or when they cannot do as they promised. With company policy stressing routine morning exercise, the Koreans have observed that Thai staff tend to be resistant or participate only half-heartedly.

Thais’ Impressions of Koreans

Thai employees see Korean administrators as going too fast in every activity, wanting work to be done quickly at the expense of neatness, being short-tempered, and eating quickly as well as noisily. For politeness, they personally hand-deliver items to other people. The Korean personality is serious in nature,
with no small talk, and they have an apprehensive demeanor. The Thais felt they were belittled because the Koreans pointed to their waste productions with feet. Thais also have realized that Koreans greet by hitting the shoulder heavily and smiling. Sometimes they did not respond to greetings from Thai workers.

The Koreans took a serious approach to following up on work—with arms crossed they would touch their chins while walking along the production line, making employees feel they were looking to find fault with their work. The Koreans usually have arms crossed in front or behind them when pausing at a point on the production line where a problem has occurred. They might also walk repeatedly in a circle around the assembly line, arms crossed behind them, or resting on their waists when urgent work is required. In addition, the Koreans waste no time in voicing their dissatisfaction, expressing it vehemently, and pointing their finger, throwing things, hitting the table, violently taking things off the Thais, and tearing up paper work. Sometimes they would physically push other Koreans. They have previously kicked chairs or thrown goods on the floor. The signs of a Korean’s displeasure were noisy outbursts, face flushed and tense, perspiration, straight lips, and scornful eye contact. Fortunately their temper subsides quickly and the matter is forgotten. However, some Koreans are polite to their subordinates and never lose their temper even after being reprimanded from the managing director.

The Koreans are of the firm opinion that the Thai employees have a duty to obey orders. The Thais may not always understand instructions given to them. If further clarification is needed they feel they should ask for it while the Koreans are still calm, rather than wait until they have lost their temper. Since Koreans have respect for seniority, those who are younger should stay quiet regardless of whether they are right or wrong. In addition, most of the Koreans have never admired or praised employees with more than a smile. Few Korean women who have worked for a long time in Thailand express their appreciation of their subordinates’ achievements at meetings or through recommendations to other departments.

If the Koreans were not able to communicate effectively with Thai employees, they would always hit themselves.

The social habits of Koreans that Thais have observed include making appreciative comments and small talk when they are in a good mood, acts of kindness, indulging in drink, giving others money, and singing and dancing in their leisure time. The Koreans appear to enjoy and handle their alcohol. They will sit separately from Thai employees and talk only amongst themselves at parties.

1.3.2 Eye Contact

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

The Korean administrators reported Thai employees did not make eye contact with them. Thais would invariably hold their heads down when being reprimanded.

Thais’ Impressions of Koreans

By contrast, Thai employees mentioned that Korean administrators made strong and direct eye contact. They would use such eye contact to express their disapproval, for example, of an employee who was late.

1.3.3 Voice

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

Thai employees came across to the Koreans as being softly-spoken. This could sometimes lead to poor communication. Though yelling “SAFETY” in morning exercise, Thais do not like to do.

Thais’ Impressions of Koreans

The Korean administrators were found by Thai employees to have the habit of talking loudly, even while on the telephone. Some Thais were unable to differentiate an ordinary conversation from an argument. The Koreans’ voices would be even louder whenever they found errors in the work of the Thais. Koreans would scold each other and express dissatisfaction through uttering noises like “shi shi…”.

1.3.4 Appearances

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

To the eyes of the Korean administrators, most Thais were neat and tidy. However, they showed a lack of concern for safety issues—not wearing or using appropriate safety equipment or tools while working, for instance.
Thais’ Impressions of Koreans

Thais similarly assessed their Korean administrators as being neat and tidy in their work attire. What’s more, the Koreans did not appreciate poorly dressed workers or those not in correct uniform, as well as women who were dressed inappropriately, or even a man with a mustache or hair that was too long. However, a few Thais suspected that some of the Koreans did not bathe: they would come straight to work after getting out of bed and may not even change their work clothes.

1.3.5 Touch

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

The Koreans were of the opinion that Thai employees would touch another person of the same sex only if they had a close rapport with that person.

Thai’s Impressions of Koreans

Korean administrators were observed by Thais to touch others by way of patting, or contact with someone’s head or back. Touch in the form of a shoulder embrace occurred only with others of the same sex where there was a comfortable relationship between the two. Touching the shoulder was intended to encourage that person to work. Sometimes Koreans would cheer each other by touching their backs after scolding or rebuking them.

1.3.6 Space and Places

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

Korean administrators noticed that Thai employees allowed space of two to three feet. For those of the same sex, less space between the two would indicate a closer relationship.

Thais’ Impressions of Koreans

Thai employees likewise noticed that Korean administrators would place themselves at a distance of two to three feet. If located in the same room, a Korean boss’s desk would be positioned so as to facilitate supervision of his or her subordinates. The work environment would always be clean and comfortable. For the most part managers and department heads have summoned supervisors from the production lines to receive orders in the office, with a request that subordinates be informed later. If the company is small, Koreans and Thais have shared meals at the same table. At parties Koreans would sit separately from Thais but would ask them to join in by pouring liquor for each other.

1.3.7 Time

Koreans’ Impressions of Thais

Korean administrators have the impression that Thai employees do not place importance on punctuality or the best use of their time while at work, but do so when they are on vacation leave. Company regulations were necessary to achieve punctuality. Koreans have come to realize that Thais typically will not complete work that they have promised. Thais have always stopped working before the official knock-off time. For Koreans, a working day spanning 8:00 to 17:00 means the operation lines start at 8:00 or before and don’t stop until 17:00 or after. Koreans believe that morning exercise refreshes the employees and gives them enough vigor for a full day’s work.

Thais’ Impressions of Koreans

Thai employees look upon the Korean administrators as having taken on positions of great responsibility. This requires them to be punctual and time-efficient so they can achieve company objectives and attend meetings. They work towards set goals even if they require more time than they first estimated. They would arrive at work at their usual (early) hour even if they’d finished late the day before, or entertained late into the night. Thai workers would be expected to arrive early and be well prepared to start work on
time. As far as Thais are concerned, having working hours from 8:00 to 17:00 means arriving at 8:00 and leaving at 17:00.

Thais considered routine morning exercise to be a waste of time.

1.4 More opinions and attitudes of both Korean and Thai sides to each other were as followed:

1.4.1. Korean viewed Thai employees were not well-disciplined, irresponsible, intolerant, in persisted, and unhealthy. They have low corporate royalty. Whereas, Thai employees realized that Koreans are well-disciplined, high responsibility, systematic, neat, persisted, quickly-changed temper, too much severely serious without necessity, and always follow up their work.

1.4.2 Korean viewed Thai employees as kind, heartfelt, friendly, joyful. In contrast, Thai employees realized that Koreans were too serious for their job but they were totally different when they spend their life after work.

1.4.3 Korean viewed Thai employees that they had dignity. However, they were timid and do not ask or mention about work whenever problems occur. They have never apologized for any errors or mistakes. They usually do not express any sign of understanding or not understanding. Koreans need more expression. While, Thai thought that Koreans never admire or praise, but disgrace and seriously blame with loud voice publicly. As a result, Thais are not satisfied with that kind of Korean behaviors; they need more admiration and welcome some suggestions for subordinates.

2. The results of surveying by questionnaire were as followed:

2.1 Frequency of non-verbal communication of Korean administrators (most frequently found to least found):

2.1.1 Most frequency found: voice, appearance, and time

2.1.2 Average frequency found: body language, eyes contact, and space and place

2.1.3 Less frequency found: touch.

2.2 Understanding of Thai employees to non-verbal communication of Korean administrators:

2.2.1 Body language: Thai understands these following body languages in positive ways: smiling, laughing, loud voices, fast walk. In contrast, Thai understands these following body languages in negative ways: hitting table, pushing things, cross arm backwards, putting hands on waists, serious discussion, and no-feeling faces.

2.2.2 Eye contact: Thai understands eye contact avoidance as positive, but angry or aggressive eye contact as negative.

2.2.3 Voice: Thai understands these following uses of voices in positive ways: confident speaking in the meeting, use of light voices, use voice tones expressing feelings. In contrast, Thai understands these following uses of voices in negative ways: ordering or evaluating with loud voices.

2.2.4 Appearance: Thai understands these following uses of appearances in positive ways: dress neatly and follows company rules.

2.2.5 Touch: Thai understands these following uses of touch in positive ways: holding hands, embracing shoulder, touching shoulder or arms. In contrast, touching others’ heads found negative.

2.2.6 Space and Place: Thai understands these following uses of space and place in positive ways: closed standing and sitting, however, blame others’ false in public means negative.

2.2.7 Time: Thai understands these following uses of time in positive ways: punctuality, quick meeting, fast work, and non-assertiveness.

2.3 Satisfaction of Thai employees to non-verbal communication of Korean administrators (most satisfied to least satisfied):

2.3.1 Most satisfied: appearance, and time

2.3.2 Average satisfied: body language, voice, touch, and space and place

2.3.3 Less satisfied: eyes contact.

3. Comparison of the results of interviewing and surveying by questionnaire:

3.1. Frequency of non-verbal communication of Korean administrators: It was found from interviewing that body language was used most frequently, however, information from surveying by questionnaire was found most to least that range from voices, appearances, times, and body languages respectively. Body Language was at forth rank.

3.2 Understanding of Thai employees to non-verbal communication of Korean
administrators: Both approaches are agreeable in body language, eye contact, appearance, touch, space and place, and time. For voice, both approaches are agreeable except disagree on using tones of voices expressing feelings.

3.3 Satisfaction of Thai employees to non-verbal communication of Korean administrators: Both approaches are agreeable in every categories: eye contact, voice, appearance, touch, space and place, and time.

Discussion

1. From data collection about communication in workplace from both sides, both senders and receivers have paid attentions not only in formal orders and contexts but in non-verbal communication as well. Therefore, that action can cause understanding or not understanding and satisfactions or dissatisfactions. Non-verbal communication among Korean administrators and Thai workers is serious to be correctly interpreted and decoded for both sides because it has been rooted in each individual. Cultural anthropologists thought many non-verbal signals are learned by participation in social group (La Barre 1947). Some anthropologists picture non-verbal signs as being organized into grammatical structures, like the words and phrases of speech (Birdwhistell 1970).

2. The consideration on Thai understanding to non-verbal communication of Korean administrators based on Thai values will represent how Thai realizes and understands which their result will agreeable to Thai values except for these follows.

Body Language: for fast walk, Thai seems to understand that it does not relate to unnecessary hurry that is opposite to Thai values and common personality which always do everything slowly. Even Korean has mentioned that Thai walk and work slowly. It might be that more hurried environment due to the changes from rural to city which is high competitive.

Voice: The use of voice in various tones expressing feelings has not been concerned as dishonor to others. Usually, Thai uses light voices and non-expressed feeling. Thai did state that Korean commonly use loud and fierce voices so Thai can not differentiate either normal speaking or disputation. Thai has accepted this circumstance since getting used to it without concerning as dishonor.

Time: It is agreed that punctuality represents highly well-disciplined. However, the acceptance on this non-verbal methods does not result in behavior changes to be more punctual.

3. Non-verbal communication related to power and perceived power. (Varner and Beamer, 2004) Korean expresses power through eye contact since Korean realizes that they are administrators and Thai acknowledges and accepts that power since the consequences of value in hierarchy which is one of the major characteristics of collectivism for both Korea and Thai societies.

4. Culture values dictate who can show anger. The boss may get angry more at the subordinates, but the subordinates is well advised not to react in kind. The interpretation and the display of anger are influenced by culture. One way to show anger is to shout and gesture. Interview result of this research was agreed with the research in Korean companies. That research showed that Korean managers often show anger toward subordinates not only with verbal criticism but also with non-verbal acts of violence—even throwing coffee on a subordinates or causing physical injury. (Varner and Beamer, 2004) It is so difference from what is known of Asian attention to face and harmony. It also shows that people in cultures in the same geographic area may act very differently.

5. Thai were easily smile, sometimes without exact meanings such as embarrass, apology, not understand, happy, even when could not understand work process and did something wrong. Korean did not understand how and why Thai can smile. Koreans consider in inappropriate for adults to smile in public. Smiling at strangers is something the mentally retarded do or children do before they are trained properly. In addition, for Koreans, as for the members of many other cultures in East Asia, as a smile often is an expression not of pleasure but of embarrassment. (Varner and
In the other hands, Korean is serious, quick temper, and closed follow up. Whitley’s study found that Korean managers placed high value on personal forcefulness and aggressiveness and low value on recognition of others. (William Whitely.1980) In contrast, Thai takes that kind of action too much severely serious without necessity. Thai spend time without concerning effective achievement. They are happy to procrastinate for the following day and later. Always talking while working can diminish stress is the acceptable aspect for Thai workers which cause unintentional in working

6.Interview outcomes have agreed to Hofstede’s Culture Dimensions.

6.1 Both Korean and Thai accept in Power Distance (60 and 64) which is slightly higher than average.
This value has been expressed by accepting the inequality, gap of power, the differences in positions, maturity, and economic status in societies. Higher ranked position can demonstrate power over lower ranked ones and express satisfaction or dissatisfaction liberally. In the meantime, subordinates are willing to acknowledge and pursue superiors’ commands as orders. However, there are slightly higher in Thai cultures Power Distance Index than those in Korean’s which results in ignorance, uncontroversial, and smiles. It concerns giving more respectful actions to higher ranked ones.

6.2 Both Korean and Thai are acceptable for low individualism (18 and 20)
This value has been expressed by gathering in groups such as in family, in relatives, in same locals, or in the same nations. The acceptable attitudes and opinions should be majorities in group. The differences will not be approved and there is no self-believed. However, comparing among other countries in Asia, there are below average of acceptance for individualism for both countries. Nevertheless, there is slightly more acceptable for individualism in Thai culture than in another trivially, most Koreans are nationalism, as a result, they are highly proud for ones in the same nation than others from Thailand.

6.3 Both Korean and Thai are acceptable for low Masculinity (39 and 34)
This value expressed by having a low level of differentiation and discrimination between genders. Females are treated equally to males in all aspects of social. The research result from Hofstedede were not agreeable with other researches related to Korean values which mostly identify that they have been influenced by Confucian that males are more importance and more acceptable than females. Therefore, there was sex discrimination. At the workplace, there has been sex discrimination in recruiting new employees, providing benefits and salary and discharging from the work. (Kim, 2000) Women with a middle-school education have a mean income 53.5 percent that of comparable men. The female-to-male wage ratio among college graduates is 76.1 percent. Men earn from 33.6 percent to 46.9 percent more than women with comparable skills. The more education a woman has, the smaller the gap between her earnings and those of her male counterparts. (Monk-Turner E.; Turner C. G., 1988)

In contrast, Korean firms in Thailand recruit employees and appoint responsibilities for work appropriation without considering about genders. Korean administrators who have been in Thailand for awhile have known very well that Thai working women are always well responsible not only house work but office work as well. Now, many Thai men take part in house work responsibility too.

6.4 Korean agree to very high Uncertainty Avoidance (85), while, Thai do accept for slightly above average level (64).
Comparing with average level in Asia at 63, Korean agree to high Uncertainty Avoidance in very high level at 85 and Thai do agree slightly above average at 64. This value can be expressed by low level of tolerance for uncertainty. In an effort to minimize or reduce this level of uncertainty, strict rules, laws, policies, and regulations are adopted and implemented. The ultimate goal of this population is to control everything in order to eliminate or avoid the unexpected.

From interview, the result can be concluded that Korean is very strict to corporate rules and regulations. Korean is serious, fast, high responsible worker. They walk and talk quickly and strike to the points with quickly-changed temper and never mind how much time they have to spend to get work done with closed follow-up. If there is any trouble or any inconvenience, they will not hesitate to complain directly to any related co-workers. These are agreeable with Whitely’s study that Korean managers placed high value on personal forcefulness and aggressiveness and low value on recognition of others. (William Whitely, 1980) In contrast, Thai takes that kind of action too much severely serious without necessity. Thai spend time without concerning effective achievement. They are happy to procrastinate for
the following day and later. Always talking while working can diminish stress is the acceptable aspect for Thai workers which cause unintentional in working.

6.5 Korean gains value in Long-term orientation level much higher than Thai at 75 and 56

This value indicates the country prescribes to the values of long-term commitments and respect for tradition. This is thought to support a strong work ethic where long-term rewards are expected as a result of today’s hard work.

Interview results are agreeable to the study of Geert Hofstede since Korean gain value of long-term commitments and respect for tradition due to the belief in Confucian. He taught to believe in responsible, hard-working, patient, virtue, and moral conducts for future goodness so Korean is moral integrity and hard-working man. From Thai belief, Buddhism philosophy emphasizes that it is very important to presently act well for better future. Also the beliefs in supernatural power convince Thai to expect achieve without putting maximize efforts.

7. Social and cultural factors influence over Korean and Thai non-verbal communication

7.1 Geographical environment
Seventy percent of Korea is mountains. Plain area at the south and west side of the country is the major agriculture. Korean is located in warm zone so the temperature is ranged from (-8) degree Celsius in January to 27 degree Celsius in August. There are four seasons which are spring, summer, autumn, and winter.

Thailand is located in monsoon zone. Eighty percent of Thailand is abundant area for agriculture as always been referred that “There are plenty of fish in river and plenty of rice all over the fields” means Thailand’s wealth of nature. There are three seasons which are winter, summer, and rainy season.

In working, these geographical factors are the major causes of Korean patience, seriousness, ability to fight barriers and disasters. At the same time, Thai always enjoy comfortable lives without enthusiasm and seriousness so they like to smile and to talk while working. Korean did not understand how Thai could smile or never said apology even they were wrong or they could not do as promise.

7.2 Historical Events
Long Korean history took its place at least 2000 years ago, there were fighting and empire foundation until year1238 and Korea was invaded by Mongol. After Mongol period, there were major civilization such as Korean Alphabets in 1446, Political Revolution, and Confucian Beliefs.

Japan invaded Korea in 1910 and took control for 35 years which could be considered as the worst period of time for the Korean. They tried to fight with terrible Japanese administrators without success until Japan was defeated in World War II. In 1945, Korea became independent but separated into North and South Korea.

Thailand has long written history back 800 years ago starting with Sukhothai Kingdom. Thailand started war with Myanmar several times with exchanging win and lose. The two worst defeats were during Ayutthaya Period in year 1569 and 1767. Thai Kings. Warrior Thai Kings could expand kingdom to occupy many cities. There were fighting among various dynasties in the kingdom although they were relatives.

During World War II, Japan used Thailand as war path through Myanmar to occupy India even there were some fights from some areas. At that time, Thailand declared war to England and The United States so Thailand was not destroyed by Japan. But after all, the cooperation through Thai movement under the name of “Free Thai Movement” in western countries rescued Thailand after the war finished.

Due to the factor of historical events, working culture of Korean is patriot, proud to be Korean, ambitious, and serious to win for every competition. As a result, many Korean never often consider others important. Whereas, Thai always feels pride of independence, seldom compete with others, and are able to use situation for their benefits.

7.3 Religions, Beliefs, and Values
Presently, one thirds of the Korean believe in Buddhism, Christ, and no religion equally likely. In addition, it can be assumed that most values were influenced by Confucius such as honor to the elders, strict and responsible to their duties, grateful, hard-working, patient, enjoy to learn and serious workers, virtue, and moral conducts for future goodness. Furthermore, face is very importance in Korea. People gain high consideration to this value.

Ninety-five percent of the Thai believe in Buddhism, therefore, Buddhist philosophy has been enrooted in Thai society. The Thai believes in good and evil, which are taught in the religions. Anything which is reflected in their lives is the results from the deeds from the past. It is very important to presently act well for better future. They always satisfy to what they receive. They feel respect to the elders, rich,
honored people since they believe that those people accumulate good deeds from their past lives. Moreover, they trust in fate and fortune thus having no enthusiasm but wait for better lives with low attempt. Also the beliefs in supernatural power convince Thai to expect achievement without putting maximized efforts. Like Korea, Thai gain high consideration to face. It was very importance for Thai too. In addition, some researches found that Thai values were as follow: Ego Orientation-Independence, pride and dignity, face-saving, criticism-avoidance, Fun-Pleasure Orientation-easy-going, enjoying life with a happy carelessness, lack of serious commitment, Flexibility and Adjustment Orientation- flexible, nothing so serious, and Smooth Interpersonal Relationship Orientation-smooth, kind, pleasant, non-conflict, interpersonal interactions, non-assertive, polite and humble, relaxing, and pleasant interaction with smiling and friendly manner (Suntaree Komin. 2005). While Korean values were as follow: Kibun-pride, face, mood, or state of mind, Inhwa-harmony, Confucianism-social concerns, obligation towards others, respect for family, elders and authority, loyalty, honor, and filial piety, and Personal Relationships (http://www.communicaid.com/south-korea-business-culture.asp)

As O’Donnall&Cable present in the model of communication (O’Donnall&Cable. 2006) that the sender and receiver have different fields: beliefs, values, norm, attitude, and experience. All of these factors affected communication. Among Korean administrators and Thai employees, these factors caused Korean respected to seniors. In the same way they thought that Thai subordinates should pay respect to them by listening and do what they said. Since they were seniors, they could pressure on Thai employees. In addition, high responsibility caused Korean work hard and being look serious. They did not admire or praise employees at least only smiling. While, Thai wait for better lives with low attempt. Koreans need more expression from Thai and Thai need more admiration and welcome some suggestions for subordinates. In addition, It was difficult for most Thai to say no, so anybody must be cognizant of their non-verbal communication such as watch out for body language and facial expressions, as these will be believed over words. (http://www.kwintessential.co.uk/resources/global-etiquette/thailand-country-profile.html)

**Recommendation**

It is noticed that survey outcomes on personal data for sampling group in training on work procedures in Korean companies, and Korean personalities has been found that only 60.60% was trained: self training/learning for 50.00%, company training for 10.60%, and no training/learning for 39.40%.

As mentioned above about factors influencing non-verbal communication among potential Korean and Thai co-workers, pre-training about Thai virtues and customs in work environments in Thailand should be suggested while Thai workers would rather learn and adjust themselves to Korean working styles. The more understanding on cultural values and influencing factors among Korean and Thai when they are colleagues in workplaces, the better positive relationship and effectiveness in work performance will generate.

Although current cooperation between Korean and Thai leads to better understanding and better adjusted as information provided from interviews. In Korean point of views, working with younger generations is more satisfying since they are able to learn and easily change their attitudes. In the same way, Thai workers think that working with new generation Korean gain better environment. Even though they are all Korean, they are significantly different. The previous generation is too rigid and serious with excessively violent expressions such as scolding and hitting heads’ workers. However, new generation from Korea with well education and long-stay in Thailand can change personalities and working styles for better relieving contradictions.

It is obvious that there is very important to establish educational agency responsible for designing Intercultural Communication, especially concentrating on multi-national communication among various nations in order to satisfy aliens working in many countries. Therefore, the better understanding and satisfactions from colleagues from different cultures will result in collaboration and effectiveness in goal achievement of the firms.

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Abstract

As a preliminary study for developing an efficient instruction method of Korean orthography for overseas Korean children, this article aims to determine their proficiency in Korean spelling. This was achieved through an analysis of the results of a dictation experiment given to Korean children attending a Saturday Korean community school in Auckland, New Zealand, in 2006. Highly frequently misspelt words and fossilised words were identified and several facts related to the factors of the difficulty were found.

1. Introduction

Although orthography is considered to be of concern only in limited areas of accuracy at word level, the accurate orthography of young Korean speakers both in Korea and overseas requires more attention. This is because an increasing number of them use and are exposed to ungrammatical spelling in their communication through internet and text messages. Overseas heritage Korean speakers learning Korean, especially in English speaking countries, have the worst Korean orthography and find this to be one of the most difficult and burdensome areas. Nonetheless, they give the highest priority to improving their orthography and writing skills (Lee, 2005; Choe, 2006).

To help improve their orthography, it is important to find out the words which students more frequently spell incorrectly. It is also helpful to know how the number of these words is being reduced as their Korean proficiency improves. This study is an analysis of the results of a Korean orthography experiment conducted in April and May in 2006 at a Korean community school in Auckland, New Zealand. The aim of the study was to find out the level of their accuracy, the most frequently misspelt words and answers, and the types of words that continue to force errors at higher level classes.

2. Dictation experiment

For the experiment, seventy-five words or parts of words that are frequently used and expected to produce errors. They were selected to cover all consonants which occur in initial position and some which occur in final position, vowels and frequently occurring sound changes such as voicing, syllable-final neutralisation, resyllabification, nasalisation, h-deletion, double consonant reduction, aspiration, lateralisation, n-addition, palatalisation, tensification, y-addition and place assimilation. They were arranged to form familiar phrases, sentences or dialogues.

At the time of the dictation experiment, I read the phrases, sentences and dialogues twice to them. The forty-one participants in the experiment were made up of thirteen fourth year, seven fifth year, eleven sixth year and ten seventh and eighth year students. The numbers of the participants and the items tested are not on a large scale. However, they are valid enough to reveal a general trend.

3. The result of the experiment

3.1 Individual differences

The first visible result of the experiment was the striking difference among individuals. The greatest individual difference was seen in the lowest level class. While a student scored the highest accuracy of 75%, another student scored a mere 3%. Several students scored very low in accuracy. In other classes, only one or two students showed much lower accuracy than the rest of the students: one Year five student achieved 54.7% accuracy; two Year six students, 52% and 48%; one in the highest level class, 54.7%. All of their answers are included in tables 1 to 17.
3.2. An analysis focused on the sound

The answers were classified largely in two groups: words that are pronounced as they are written and words with a part or parts that are pronounced different from how they are written. Tables 1-4 are the analysis of the former and tables 5-17 are the analysis of the latter.

3.2.1 Words that are pronounced as they are written

An analysis of the words with a voiced consonant is shown in table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 4 : 13**</th>
<th>감기</th>
<th>신발</th>
<th>그리고</th>
<th>백그락로</th>
<th>전기</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misspelt</td>
<td>3 감기, 가기.[]***</td>
<td>3 신발, 전체.[]</td>
<td>2 균.[]</td>
<td>2 거.[]</td>
<td>1 기.[]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>37 (90.2)</td>
<td>38 (92.7)</td>
<td>39 (95.1)</td>
<td>39 (95.1)</td>
<td>40 (97.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

* Shown in bold letters are the words or parts of a word that students were asked to write down.

** Number of respondents

*** [ ] means no answer.

The accuracy of the above items, being over 90%, is very high. In casual speech all of items except ‘거’ are also spoken with non-standard pronunciation. In the experiment, however, this is extremely rare: only one wrote ‘감기’ as ‘강기’. There were no distinctive wrong answers, either.

The items in the following four charts do not contain any phonological changes in standard speech. They are grouped according to the vowels: simple vowels and diphthongs. The accuracy of the items with only simple vowels in table 2 varies greatly: while the accuracy of all the items except ‘부처’ is either around or over 80%, that of ‘부처’ is 53.7%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 4 : 13</th>
<th>감기</th>
<th>신발</th>
<th>그리고</th>
<th>백그락로</th>
<th>전기</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misspelt</td>
<td>6 산, 상</td>
<td>7 산</td>
<td>4 공황, 공항</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3 왕 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondents</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>부처 2, 붓이, 붓이</td>
<td>부처</td>
<td>부처</td>
<td>부처</td>
<td>부처</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>37 (90.2)</td>
<td>38 (92.7)</td>
<td>39 (95.1)</td>
<td>39 (95.1)</td>
<td>40 (97.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

* The number indicates the frequency of the wrong answer.
Table 3 shows a significantly different range of accuracy of words or parts of words containingㅏ andㅔ vowels. While the accuracy of 해 in 가야 해 and 축하해 scores over 90%, and 재미 95%, that of 채소 is 63.4%. The reason might be that 채소 is not as frequently used as 재미, which is often heard and read as in the expression 재미있어요.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>재미</th>
<th>재질</th>
<th>가야</th>
<th>채소</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>2 재미 2</td>
<td>7 재질, 해 직, 해</td>
<td>5 재질, 2 해, [ ]</td>
<td>3 해, [ ]2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 재질, 해</td>
<td>2 재질 1 해</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 재질</td>
<td>3 재질, 해 0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8 : 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 재질</td>
<td>2 재질 1 해</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequently misspelt answers 재미 재질 가야 해 채소 [ ] 2

Total number of misspelt words 2 15 12 4 3

Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %) 39 (95.1) 26 (63.4) 29 (70.7) 37 (90.2) 38 (92.7)

Next to 채소, 제일 was the next most commonly misspelt word. While all 27 incorrectly misspelt answers of these two words involve vowel errors, only two answers showed consonant errors. This indicates that the substitution errors of initial consonants of ㅈ with ㅊ and vice versa, which are often cited errors, were very few. The most frequent errors were the substitution of vowel ㅐ for ㅔ and vice versa. Among the fifteen ㅐ errors in 채소, eight had ㅔ substituted. 제일 also shows a high ㅐ and ㅔ substitution error rate: among the twelve incorrect answers eleven of them were substitution errors of ㅐ for ㅔ.

As for 해, which is shown above and in 연락해 in table 12, ㅐ and ㅔ substitution errors are few. Among the other words with the two vowels, the most prominent is 신었네 in table 8. All six of the errors that were produced were substitution errors of ㅐ for ㅔ.

The accuracy of the words containing diphthongs varies greatly; while the accuracy of 화장실, 의자, 아니야 is over 90%, that of 예 and 머칠 is very low at 24.4% and 17.1% respectively. The reason why the accuracy of 화장실 is high in spite of the fact that it has the highest number of syllables seems to be that this is often used in schools.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>예</th>
<th>예쁜</th>
<th>화장실</th>
<th>제자</th>
<th>제요</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>12 예, 에, 예, 예</td>
<td>7 예, 예, 예, 예, 예, 예, 예</td>
<td>2 하장기, 행장지</td>
<td>5 되지 3</td>
<td>되지, 대 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>6 예, 예</td>
<td>1 예, 예</td>
<td>1 화장실</td>
<td>2 되지 2</td>
<td>4 되 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>9 예</td>
<td>9 예, 예, 예, 예</td>
<td>1 화장실</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5 되 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8 : 10</td>
<td>4 예</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 되</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequently misspelt answers 예 26

Total number of misspelt words 31 10 4 7 15

Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %) 10 (24.4) 31 (75.6) 37 (90.2) 34 (82.9) 26 (63.4)
Table 5

Frequently misspelt answers
Number of accurate answers
(Year 4 : 13) "6 5 4 3 2 1"

Frequently misspelt answers
Number of accurate answers
(Year 5 : 7) "6 5 4 3 2 1"

Frequently misspelt answers
Number of accurate answers
(Year 6 : 11) "6 5 4 3 2 1"

* One answer reads 뒤 with 뒤, 뒤 as the final consonants.

Table 6

The pronunciation of most of the misspelt words was the same as that of the correctly spelt words. This indicates that most of the respondents who produced errors could write as they were pronounced.
These kinds of misspelled words include all of the eleven misspelt answers (받, 맘, 맛) for 밥, the eleven misspelt answers (부억, 부 التش) for 부엌, the ten misspelt answers (박, 백) for 밖 and the five misspelt answers (등고) for 등고.

There were nine answers spelt showing the consonant assimilation as in 숙가락(7) and 숙까락(2), which are not accepted as standard pronunciation. This may reveal the students' incorrect pronunciation habits.

3.2.2. Resyllabification

The five words chosen were made up of two nouns and three verbs in conjugated forms. The overall accuracy rate was over 70%: 단어 and 목욕 scored 82.9% and 70.7% respectively while 있어 scored 100%, and 앉으세요 and 덮으세요 70.7%. This indicates no great differences between the accuracy rate of nouns and conjugated verbs.

### Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>단어</th>
<th>목욕</th>
<th>않으세요</th>
<th>덮으세요</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 4: 13</td>
<td>4 다너 3</td>
<td>9 모욕 2, 모겨 2, 못먹 2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5: 7</td>
<td>1 다니 1 모욕</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 안지세, 안지세 안요</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6: 11</td>
<td>2 다니 2</td>
<td>2 모겨, 못먹</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 모겨</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently misspelt answers</td>
<td>다너 6</td>
<td>모욕 3, 모겨 3</td>
<td>안지세 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of misspelt words</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %)</td>
<td>34 (82.9)</td>
<td>28 (68.3)</td>
<td>41 (100)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the seven incorrectly spelt answers for 단어 six were 다니, which has the correct pronunciation. As for 목욕 and 않으세요, there were more misspelt words, reflecting careless pronunciations not accepted as standard such as 모욕(3), 안지세요(3) and 안지세요, than those that have correct pronunciation.

### Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>식물</th>
<th>같은나</th>
<th>남은나</th>
<th>들은나</th>
<th>선염내</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 4: 13</td>
<td>4 식물 2, 전물 2</td>
<td>6 같은나 3, 같은나 2</td>
<td>2 단은나 2</td>
<td>2 들은나, []</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5: 7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 다니</td>
<td>1 들은나</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6: 11</td>
<td>2 식물 2, 같이 2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 선염내</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>1 식물 1, 같이 1</td>
<td>1 단은나</td>
<td>1 들은나</td>
<td>2 선염내, 선염내</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently misspelt answers</td>
<td>식물 5</td>
<td>같이 4</td>
<td>단은나 3</td>
<td>들은나 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of misspelt words</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %)</td>
<td>34 (82.9)</td>
<td>32 (78.0)</td>
<td>37 (90.2)</td>
<td>37 (90.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.2.2.3. Nasalisation

There are two kinds of nasalisation: that of plosives and that of the lateral. The words with plosives are in the table 8 and those with lateral are in the table 9.

### Table 8
The accuracy rate of the above items is quite high, being over 75%. The most frequently misspelt answers of 감니다, 닫는, 들었니, were written as 감니다, 닫는, 들으니, which have the same pronunciation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>정류장</th>
<th>대통령</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of misspelt answers, misspelt forms and their frequency</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>9 정유장 4, 정뉴장 3 9 대통령 2, 대통령용 2, 대통령년</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>3 정유장 2, 정유장 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>4 정유장 3, 정뉴장 1 대통령용</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>1 정유장 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequently misspelt answers</strong></td>
<td>정유장 10, 정뉴장 4 대통령 2, 대통령용 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of misspelt words</strong></td>
<td>17 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of accurate answers</strong> (Accuracy rate %)</td>
<td>24 (58.5) 31 (75.6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 9**

The average accuracy of the words with nasalisation of a lateral sound was lower than that of a plosive. The most frequent misspelling of 정류장 was 정유장 (10), which is also a common pronunciation used by Koreans but is not accepted as a standard pronunciation. 정유장 appeared much more than 정뉴장 (4), which has a standard pronunciation. This also indicates a strong influence of the participants’ speech habits on their spelling.

3.2.2.4. H-deletion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>흔은</th>
<th>많아</th>
<th>싶어요</th>
<th>가지 않아</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of misspelt answers, misspelt forms and their frequency</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>3 조은 2 4 맛아 2만 4 싶어요, 시리요, 저리요, 4 안아 4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>0 0 0 1 안아</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>1 1 0 1 싶어요 2 안아, 잡나</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>0 0 1 싶어요 1 안아</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequently misspelt answers</strong></td>
<td>조은 2 많아 2 싶어요 3 안아 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of misspelt words</strong></td>
<td>4 4 6 8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of accurate answers</strong> (Accuracy rate %)</td>
<td>37 (90.2) 37 (90.2) 35 (85.4) 33 (80.5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 10**

The accuracy of the above words was very high being over 80%. The most frequent misspelling was 안아 (8), which was mostly misspelt as 안아 (7). It is also revealed that almost all participants were able to write correctly the verb endings of 은, 아 and어요.

3.2.2.5. Double consonant reduction
The accuracy of all the following words except 닭 was quite low, ranging from 53.7% to 65.6%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>닭</th>
<th>흙</th>
<th>값</th>
<th>여덟</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of misspelt answers, misspelt forms and their frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>5 달 3, 닭, *</td>
<td>8 흙 7, 흙</td>
<td>10 값 8, 값, []</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>1 **</td>
<td>2 흙 2</td>
<td>2 여덟, 여덟, 닭</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>1 닭</td>
<td>3 값, [] **</td>
<td>4 값 3, 값</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1 흙</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently misspelt answers</td>
<td>닭 3</td>
<td>흙 8</td>
<td>값 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of misspelt words</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %)</td>
<td>54 (82.9)</td>
<td>27 (65.6)</td>
<td>25 (61.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One answer is written as 닭 followed by [길] as the final consonants.
** One answer is written as 닭 followed by [길] as the final consonants.
*** One answer is written as 흙 followed by [길] as the final consonants.

Table 11

The high accuracy of 닭, which is 82.9%, seems to result from the frequent opportunity of coming in contact with the word in daily life. The most visible type of error was spelling the word with a single consonant which has the same sound value as the two consonants in the final position of the words.

3.2.2.6. Aspiration

The accuracy of all the following words except 입학 was over 70%. Most of the misspelt words appeared in the lowest year level.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>읽게</th>
<th>많지</th>
<th>채하</th>
<th>입학</th>
<th>핫국하고언락해</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of misspelt answers, misspelt forms and their frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>9 읽게 3, 읽게 2</td>
<td>5 [],</td>
<td>6 채, 채, []</td>
<td>9 입학 5, []</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12, 읽게, 읽게</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 핫</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>1 읽게,</td>
<td>1 많치</td>
<td>1 채, 채, 채하</td>
<td>3 입학 2, 입학</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>1 읽게</td>
<td>1 많치</td>
<td>1 채, [],</td>
<td>4 입학 2, 입학</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>1 읽게</td>
<td>1 많치</td>
<td>1 채, 채하</td>
<td>1 입학</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequently misspelt answers</td>
<td>읽게 3</td>
<td>많치 5</td>
<td>입학 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of misspelt words</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of accurate answers</td>
<td>29 (70.7)</td>
<td>33 (80.5)</td>
<td>32 (78.0)</td>
<td>24 (58.5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12

Being the lowest in the accuracy, 입학 was misspelt mostly in the way that has the same pronunciation as 입학. All of the misspelt forms of 많치 were either 많치 or 많치, which has the same pronunciation as 많치. However, 핫국하고 was not spelt as 핫국카고, and nor was 언락해 as 언락케. This suggests that in general the respondents could write nouns followed by a particle or conjugated ending of 하다 verb correctly.

3.2.2.7. Lateralisations

Both 일년 and 연락 are frequently used. The accuracy rate of 일년 was nearly twice that of 연락. This seems to be because of the participants’ familiarity with 년.
Number of misspelt answers, misspelt forms and their frequency

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year 4 : 13</th>
<th>5 담료, 담뇨, 담여, 담뇨</th>
<th>13 엄나, 엄략, 엄략</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>1 담료</td>
<td>3 엄략 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4 엄략, 엄략</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2 엄략 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequently misspelt answers: 담료 2, 엄략 17
Total number of misspelt words: 6 22
Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %): 35 (85.4) 19 (46.3)

* 1 년 is grouped as the misspelt word as the participants were instructed to write in the Korean alphabet only without using the Arabian number writing system.

Table 13

3.2.2.8. N-addition

The following three words reveal a variation in the students’ accuracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>담요</th>
<th>끼임</th>
<th>왼일이야</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of misspelt answers, misspelt forms and their frequency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 4 : 13</td>
<td>5 담료, 담뇨</td>
<td>12 끼임 2, 끼임 2, 끼임 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>담여, 담뇨</td>
<td>끼임, 끼임, 끼임</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[, ]</td>
<td>끼임, 끼임</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5 : 7</td>
<td>3 담료 2, 담뇨</td>
<td>2 끼임, 끼임</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6 : 11</td>
<td>2 담료, 담뇨</td>
<td>7 끼임 3, 끼임 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[ ]</td>
<td>끼임, 끼임</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>1 담료</td>
<td>4 끼임 3, 끼임</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Frequently misspelt answers: 담료 5, 담뇨 3, 끼임 4, 끼임 2, 왼일이야 22, 원일이야 8
Total number of misspelt words: 11 25 39
Number of accurate answers (Accuracy rate %): 30 (73.2) 16 (39.0) 2 (4.9)

Table 14

While the accuracy of 담요 was 73.2%, that of 끼임 was much lower and that of 왼일이야 was 7.3%, which is the lowest accuracy rate recorded in this experiment. There were only two participants who wrote 왼일이야 correctly: one in the 4th year and the other in the 7th year. This is a case of fossilisation.

It is clear that the errors in 담요 and 끼임 were caused mainly because of sound changes caused by ㄴ addition. Unlike the cases of these two words, the errors in 왼일이야 were predominantly found in the vowel of the first syllable.
3.2.2.9. Palatalisation

The accuracy of the two words chosen for palatalisation differs greatly.

![Table 15](image)

There were misspellings of the two words even in the highest year. In the case of 붙여, more than half of the participants in the highest year produced errors. More than half of the misspelt forms of 붙여 were pronounced the same as 붙여. Considering 부처 being the most frequently misspelt answer, a majority of those who answered this way could have been confused with 부처, a homonym with 붙여.

3.2.2.10. Tensification

The accuracy of the following words was generally high, ranging from 70% to 87.8%, whether they are native Korean or Sino-Korean, nouns or verbs.

![Table 16](image)

The words that were misspelt most were 그럴게 and 먹을꺼야 and their most frequently misspelt forms were 그럴게(9) and 먹을꺼야(5). As for 그럴게, most errors were produced in the highest level. The reason for this could be that older participants were more exposed to 그럴게 in books published before 1988, when the latest revision of the Korean orthography was announced.

3.2.2.11. Y-addition

The participants were given an experiment sheet in which they had to fill out 기여 and 아니오 twice. While the accuracy of 기여 was very high, that of 아니오 was very low.
A table showing the number of misspelt answers and their frequency:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Misspelt Answers</th>
<th>Misspelt Forms</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Year 4: 13</td>
<td>1 어, 오, 우</td>
<td>12 아니요</td>
<td>12 아니요</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 5: 7</td>
<td>0 어</td>
<td>5 아니요</td>
<td>6 아니요</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year 6: 11</td>
<td>1 어, 오</td>
<td>8 아니요</td>
<td>8 아니요</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yr 7&amp;8: 10</td>
<td>0 어</td>
<td>8 아니요</td>
<td>8 아니요</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17

An examination of the experiment sheets produced by each participant revealed that thirty participants wrote 기어 accurately in both places. The remaining six participants made errors but none of them made the same error. This reveals that the most frequently occurring errors for 기어 were not fossilised.

The revised rules of Korean orthography acknowledge two ways of pronouncing 아니오: [아니오] and [아니요] are confirmed to be standard pronunciation. In terms of spelling, however, only 아니요 is accepted. The result of the experiment showed that thirty-three participants answered 아니요 in the first place while thirty-four answered this way in the second place. Considering that all the misspelt answers were written 아니요 and that all of those but one who had spelt it incorrectly gave 아니요 twice, it is clear that this error is fossilised in almost all of the respondents.

4. Conclusion

The discussion above can be summarised as follows:

1) It is hard to predict the accuracy of a word based on whether a sound change/sound changes occur or not. The accuracy of words whose standard pronunciation is the same as how they are written or have nothing to do with any sound changes except voicing was relatively high. However, the accuracy of the words with vowels [[매일 부치(려면) were low; the accuracy rates for 예 and 먹었 were below 25% and those for 부치다, 채소 and 짜졌 were below 65%.

All the participants answered 있어 and 밥 correctly. Although they include a sound change, their accuracy was highest as they are often used in daily life.

2) The accuracy of words containing vowels and consonants that are expected to produce a high level of errors differs greatly. 재미 and 해 contain a [ㅐ] vowel, which has been reported to be one of the most error producing vowels. 재미 scored an accuracy of 95%, while 해 scored 93%. 있어 contains one of the most error producing consonants but scored an accuracy of 100% in the experiment.

3) The misspelt answers with the highest frequency often counted for about half of the misspelt answers in two thirds of all of the items. Among the 75 items used in the experiment, two items did not produce errors and two other items were repeats. Among the seventy one items, after excluding these four items, 37 items produced a single misspelt form which accounted for over half of the misspelt forms. Another ten items produced misspellings which were nearly half of the misspelt forms. Therefore, in the 66% of the items that produced errors almost half of the participants answered with the same misspelling. If writing the most frequently misspelt forms can be avoided, this will dramatically enhance the overall accuracy of spelling.
4) The misspelt answers were generally produced less in the higher year classes than in the lower year classes. However, there were words that revealed the opposite tendency and also words that produced same level of errors in the higher years as in the lower years.

Words such as 그럴게, 며칠, 왜일이야 produced the most amount of errors in the highest year. In the case of 그럴게 it is thought that the respondents in the highest year were more exposed to 그럴게 in books published before 1988, when the latest revision of the Korean orthography was announced.

In the lowest year classes there were participants who spelt 며칠 correctly. In the highest year classes, however, no one produced the correct answer. Every one except one respondent in the lowest year and in the highest year classes misspelt 왜일이야. The errors were not reduced in the higher year classes.

References


Contact Address

Ishil Yoon
The University of Auckland
Private Bag, 92019 Auckland
New Zealand
PH: 64-9-373-7599 ext) 85736
EMAIL: ic.yoon@auckland.ac.nz
An Experimental Study on Focus Structures of English Utterances by Native Speakers and Korean Learners

Kyoung-Min Choi, Tae-Yeoub Jang
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, Korea

Abstract
In this study, we investigate ways that focus is realized in English utterances produced by native speakers of English and Korean learners. As compared to the previous studies which deal mainly with functional aspects of focus as a part of intonational structure, we attempt to provide more quantitative information on F0 and duration, and discover the extent to which Korean learners distinguish focus types in their English utterance production. On the test sentences designed to be disambiguated by correct focus realization, it is found that, even advanced-level Korean learners, unlike native speakers, hardly employ F0 and duration to clarify the specific meaning of English utterances.
Keywords: F0, focus, stress, pitch accent, broad focus, narrow focus

1. Introduction
Bolinger (1958) states that focus refers to the part of a sentence that is meant to be prominent for semantic reasons. And the semantic notion of focus is suggested to play a crucial role in prosodic phrasing (Gussenhoven 1983; Schmerling 1976; Selkirk 1995).
Although such language universal function of focus has been approved by most researchers, its realisation does not seem to be uniform. In both English and Korean, as Ladd (1996: 197) illustrates, focus is systematically signaled by prosodic structure, but the main observable consequence of differences of prosodic structure is different in each language. It is the presence or absence of pitch accents in English whereas it is the presence or absence of accentual phrase boundaries in Korean.
Due to such difference in focus realisation in the two languages, it is expected that Korean learners of English find difficulty in taking advantage of focus differentiation in their English utterances. Consequently, we attempt in this study to discover the extent to which Korean learners distinguish focus types in their English utterance production as compared to English native speakers. There are a few previous studies, such as Kim (2003) and Um et al. (2001), which have shown that Korean learners are not as capable of distinguishing different focus types. However, their works are restricted in that prosodic control of target utterance tokens are not refined enough as their examination is mainly concentrated on general intonational functions. In the current study, we conducted more detailed quantitative investigation on acoustic cues of focus such as fundamental frequency (F0) and duration.

2. Material and Method
2.1. Reading Materials
Data are collected through following the procedure. Fifteen sentences (5 focus types x 3 sets) of three narrow focus types and two broad focus types are prepared as:

(1) Set 1
[I] ate his cheese cake.   Narrow-Subject (NS)
I [ate] his cheese cake.   Narrow-Verb (NV)
I ate [his cheese cake].   Narrow-Complement (NC)
I [ate his cheese cake].   Broad-VC (B SVC)
[I ate his cheese cake].   Broad-SVC (BVC)

(2) Set 2 (the same bracketing as in (1))
[Teddy] [bought] [a lottery ticket].

(3) Set 3 (the same bracketing as in (1))
[She] [solved] [the math problem].
Speakers are induced to produce each utterance with a specific focus pattern by a preceding priming question. And to examine the F0 and durational pattern of focused phrases, fifteen sentences are divided into five subsets according to their focus position. The dialogues are designed to make five focus types, that is, narrow focus on subject, verb, and complement (especially object) whereas broad focus on verb phrase and on the whole sentence. Each type is named NS, NV, NC, BSVC and BVC, respectively. Each five-sentence set is designed to have the same number of syllables. Comparison pairs of focus characteristics are NS vs BSVC, NV vs BVC and NC vs BVC. Especially, in the case of complement, we consider CSR (Compound Stress Rule) so that F0 could fall on a stressed vowel.

2.2. Recording

Six male speakers, three English native speakers (RR, CK, and SM) and three Korean learners (KIS, LSY, and CJH), participated in the production test. The two native speakers are North Americans, teaching English in a university in Korea. Korean learners are graduate school students majoring in English linguistics. None has any speaking impairments.

The prompt contains all the target sentences and each speaker is asked to read, at the normal rate, contrastive-focus sentences three times mixed in random order. The recordings are performed in a sound-processed booth using an AKG digital microphone and an A-D conversion device (Tascam [F-AE 4000]).

2.3. Measurements

Speech data tokens are analyzed by Praat (v. 4512) for segmentation, labelling and measurement F0 and duration. The peak F0 value of a vowel in a lexically stressed syllable is obtained for each relevant case. As the speech data are phonetically segmented, duration of each target focused word is easily obtained. We only report results of the duration of stressed vowels, assuming that duration of a focused word is appropriately projected in the non-reduced vowel within the word.

3. Result and Discussion

3.1. F0

For all the data by native speakers, the F0 peak of the focused word is consistently found to be significantly higher than that of a neutral word. On the other hand, the F0 peak of the post-focus word is significantly lower.

3.1.1 Native speakers

![Figure 4. Comparison of F0 on NS vs BSVC (speaker RR)](image1)

![Figure 5. Comparison of F0 on NV vs BVC (speaker RR)](image2)
Table 1. Results of significance tests on native speakers’ F0 (*p<0.05, **p<0.01)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speaker</th>
<th>Sentence type</th>
<th>Focus Position</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>V</th>
<th>C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1(RR)</td>
<td>NS vs</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NV vs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NC vs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2(CK)</td>
<td>NS vs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NV vs</td>
<td></td>
<td>*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NC vs</td>
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<tr>
<td>3(SM)</td>
<td>NS vs</td>
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<td>*</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NV vs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>NC vs</td>
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</table>

Figures 1-3 show mean F0 values and their compared graphs of a native speaker’s data. As in Figure 1, the F0 on the subject position with a narrow focus is found to be higher than that in the corresponding broad-focus sentence of the type BSVC which means broad focus falls on the items S, V, and C (i.e., the whole sentence). On the other hand, the F0 values of verb and complement in NS sentences appear to be lower than those of BSVC sentences (p<0.05). This result is a consequence of the speaker’s intention to enhance relative prominence of the focused item. The greatest F0 difference in the case of NS vs. BSVC seems to be associated with the effect of utterance initial strengthening.

Figure 2 shows that F0 of narrow focused verb (NV) is higher than that of broad focused one (BVC, p<0.01), which is another natural phenomenon of speaker’s emphasising the narrow focused word. An interesting thing to be further discussed is the fact that F0 of the verb of the BVC type in Figure 2 quite lower than F0 of the following complement. As the focus domain (BVC) includes the verb in question, F0 is expected to be raised from the verb, which is not happening to the data by two speakers RR and SM as is confirmed in Table 1 where NV-BVC differences are specified as significant. The explanation for this phenomenon is not quite apparent but prediction described in Gussenhoven (1992) might be relevant. He states on the basis of experimental results that vowel de-accenting may take place in the environment of broad focusing where both vowel and complement are located within the focus domain. In brief, the vowel F0 in our BVC data may have undergone such deaccentuation process. However, further evidence from more targeted experimentation is necessary to make more solid conclusion on this issue.

Once the low vowel F0 in the BVC structure is justified, no significant difference in NC-BVC pair is plausible. Note, in Table 1, that no speaker produces the significant F0 differentiation at all.

### 3.1.2 Korean learners

Figure 4-6 show typical examples of Korean learners’ F0 value in each focus type. Again, the values are F0 magnitudes of each relevant position (i.e., S, V and C). Table 2 summarizes the significant test results for each Korean speaker’s comparison pairs.
It is revealed that differences between broad and narrow focus are not as distinct as those in the speech of native speakers. And the difference among three comparisons of focus type is not significant. In addition, Korean learners do not distinguish between five focus types. Especially, the speaker LSY never significantly distinguishes any of the sentence type from other four types. This is an amazing result considering that the contrastive foci have been found to be linguistically effective in the Korean language.
as in English (Oh 1999; Han 2005; Jun and Lee 1998). As stated before, the Korean speakers are majoring in English linguistics at the graduate level. Thus, it is not possible to simply attribute the result to the low proficiency of the speakers.

The reason for Korean learners being unable to utilize focus in their English utterances is not clear immediately but Ladd’s (1996) observation appears to have some relevance. He suggests that although in both Korean and English focus is signaled by prosodic structure, its surface phonetic substantiation is different. English foci are realized in such a way that the constituents preceding and following the focused word tend to be deaccented, while Korean foci are made prominent by when the constituents in the vicinity are dephrased (P.197).

Further analyses on the different behavior of focus in two languages seem necessary.

3.2 Duration

Measured durational values are summarized in Tables 3-5, for native speakers and Korean learners, respectively, followed by significance test results in Tables 5-7. As averaged values can be regarded as relatively less reliable information than F0 due to speech rate variability, the significance table of each comparison pair will be more useful for our discussion.

In general, broad-narrow differences in duration are not as conspicuous as in F0 values, nor as evident as in previous studies such as Cooper et al. (1985) and Eady and Cooper (1986), which show that a focused word in English is 30-40% longer than when it is located in a non-focused position.

However, the tendency that native speakers’ utterances better differentiate focus types than speech spoken by Koreans is shown in Tables 5-7. As in F0, duration difference is more salient between the types NS-BSVC than the others. What is also important is that the F0 results and the durational results, in terms of focus type differentiation, are in general agreement and are looking closely correlated. The key to discover the extent to which duration can be based upon in analysing focus types, the amount of data tokens need to be further increased and appropriate methods of normalising various speech rate need to be employed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Average duration of stressed vowels in focused positions (Native speakers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS vs BSVC</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>NV vs BVC</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4. Average duration of stressed vowels in focused positions (Korean speakers)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus Type</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS vs BSVC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 5. Significant difference between Ns and BSVC (Shaded area: significant difference between two groups, paired t-test)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>focus types</th>
<th>sentence</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>BSVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>BSVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS vs BSVC</td>
<td>set 1</td>
<td>t(16)=2.18</td>
<td>t(16)=0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&lt;0.05*</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set 2</td>
<td>t(16)=-0.46</td>
<td>t(16)=-0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set 3</td>
<td>t(16)=2.38</td>
<td>t(16)=2.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&lt;0.05*</td>
<td>p&lt;0.05*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Significant different between NV and BVC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>focus types</th>
<th>sentence</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NV</td>
<td>BVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NV</td>
<td>BVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NV vs BVC</td>
<td>set 1</td>
<td>t(15)=0.30</td>
<td>t(15)=0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set 2</td>
<td>t(16)=3.65</td>
<td>t(16)=0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&lt;0.01**</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set 3</td>
<td>t(16)=0.00</td>
<td>t(16)=0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Significant different between NC and BVC

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>focus types</th>
<th>sentence</th>
<th>Natives</th>
<th>Koreans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>BVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>NC</td>
<td>BVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC vs BVC</td>
<td>set 1</td>
<td>t(13)=-0.68</td>
<td>t(16)=0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set 2</td>
<td>t(16)=1.30</td>
<td>t(16)=-1.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set 3</td>
<td>t(160)=-2.76</td>
<td>t(16)=1.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>p&lt;0.05*</td>
<td>p&gt;0.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Summary and conclusion

We investigate F0 and duration as acoustic manifestation of focus in utterances produced by native speakers and Korean learners of English, paying special attention to whether there is any differentiated behaviour in different focus domains, namely, broad focus and narrow focus.

Native speakers are found to impose significantly more distinctive F0 and longer duration on focused words than unfocused words. Also, they are more likely to distinguish narrow focus from broad focus in their speech. Korean learners, on the other hand, cannot only manifest the focus domain differences but they are not likely to distinguish between focused words and unfocused words at all in their production. Considering fairly high English proficiency level of those learners, we can conclude that systematic differences in prosodic structure between the two languages are quite severe. This leads to speculations that more organized and efficient methods of teaching prosodic features are to be contrived in order to make English pronunciations by advanced Korean learners of closer to those by native speakers.

References


**Contact Address**
Kyung-Minh Choi & Tae Yeoub Jang
Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
270 Imun-dong, Dongdaemun-gu
Seoul 130-791 Korea
PH: +82 2 2173 3119
FAX: + 82 2 963 8066
EMAIL: agnes@hufs.ac.kr, tae@hufs.ac.kr
Conjunctive Forms of Reason

InJung Cho
Monash University

Abstract
One of the aspects of the Korean language which learners of Korean find difficult is conjunctive forms because Korean has many conjunctive forms for one meaning and their usage conditions are very complicated. The conjunctive forms of cause or reason are not the exception. This study has probed into the four conjunctive forms of cause or reason of the highest frequency -아/어서, -(으)니까, -느라고 and -는 바람에 and proved that they are in complementary distribution, and that this understanding of the mutually exclusive relations of these forms is also essential to understand when to use each form.

1. Introduction
The Korean languages has many conjunctive forms of cause or reason such as -기 때문에, -기에, -때문에, -에서, -는 바람에, -는 토록에, -어서, -느라고, -므로 and their usage conditions are more complicated than their English counterparts such as 'because, since, for, due to, owing to, and so on', causing difficulty for learners of the Korean language(Ahn 2002; Lee 1999). The following examples from Ahn(2002, 162) show some of the typical errors of conjunctive forms of cause or reason produced by learners.

(1) *?도와주셨으니까 고맙습니다.
(2) *?마이클은 시간이 많아서 도와주어라.
(3) *우리는 서로 마음이 맞아서 같이 일하자.
(4) *우리는 내일 또 만나느라고 오늘은 이만 해야지.
(5) *크리스가 예쁜 바람에 좋아졌어요.
(6) *도와주셨어서 고맙습니다.

These errors could be caused by many different factors such as incomplete explanation of the forms in textbooks or grammar books, learners' incomplete or incorrect grasp of the forms, poor explanation of the forms by teachers or any combination of these factors.

Much research has been conducted to find out the usage constraints and the subtle semantic differences between the conjunctive forms of cause or reason. However, this has failed to discover the intricate relations among these forms, largely because it (eg. Jin 2003; Kim 1980; Oh 2003) tended to study each form separately or their study (eg. Kim 1978; Seong 1978; Hong 1996) was semantics-oriented even when more than two forms were studied together.

This paper, therefore, explores the intricate relations of some of these forms by using the concept of 'complementary distribution', which will provide the bird's eye view of the inter-related usage constraints of these forms. The findings of the research will also provide practical information on how to present these forms to learners of Korean.

2. Conjunctive Forms of Cause or Reason: -아/어서, -(으)니까, -느라고 & -는 바람에
This paper will limit its discussion to -아/어서, -(으)니까, -느라고 and -는 바람에, because they are the most frequently used ones(Ahn 2002, 176-177) and they have a clear relationship of complementary distribution. Complementary distribution is the mutually exclusive relationship between sounds or forms whose distributions do not overlap. In other words, when one sound or form occurs in an environment where the other ones never occur, they are in complementary distribution.

2.1 Complementary Distribution by Sentence Type

270 Most Korean textbooks have only very basic grammar explanations(Jin 2003, 369; Oh 2003, 377-378) and Korean grammar books such as Gukripugowon(2005), Ihm et al.(2001), Lee & Lee(2001), Paik(1999) have more information than the textbooks but they rarely provide information which is essential to understand the differences between the forms of similar functions or meanings.
This complementary distribution is reflected in the syntactic environments of the four conjunctive forms of cause or reason which are the focus of this paper. As shown in Table 1, the first complementary distribution exists in sentence types where each form can occur. The forms -아/어서, -느라고, -는 바람에 can occur only in statements while the - (으)니까 form can occur only in suggestions and orders/instructions.

Table 2 Syntactic Environments of Conjunctive Forms of Cause by Sentence Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sentence Type</th>
<th>Statements</th>
<th>Suggestions &amp; Orders/Instructions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conjunctive Forms of Cause or Reason</td>
<td>-아/어서</td>
<td>- (으)니까</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-느라고</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-는 바람에</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These syntactic constraints explain why the above-mentioned examples (2-4) are not grammatical. The sentence type of example (2) is an order/instruction where the - (으)니까 form should be used. The correct expression, therefore, will be (7). The sentence type of example (3) and (4) is a suggestion, which requires the use of the - (으)니까 form. Therefore, we should correct them as shown in (8) and (9) respectively.

(7) 마이클은 시간이 많으니까 도와주어라.  
(8) 우리는 서로 마음이 맞으니까 같이 일하자.  
(9) 우리는 내일 또 만나니까 오늘은 이만 해저자.

This division of the four forms into two groups is also true when we consider whether or not each form can take tense or aspect infixes such as -았/었. The three forms used in statements (-아/어서, -느라고 and -는 바람에) cannot be used together with -았/었, while the - (으)니까 form can be used with them as shown below.

(10) *비가 너무 많이 왔어서 못 왔어요.  
(11) *공부했느라고 잠을 못 잔어요.  
(12) *수업에 늦었는 바람에 선생님한테 혼났어요.

2.2 Complementary Distribution by Verb Type

The three forms used for statements (-아/어서, -느라고 and -는 바람에) are also in complementary distribution. The -아/어서 form can be used with descriptive verbs, the -있다/없다 verbs or the -있다/없다 verbs, while the other forms cannot be used with these verbs as shown below.

(13) 옷이 너무 싸서 하나 샀어요.  
(14) *옷이 너무 싸느라고 하나 샀어요.  
(15) *옷이 너무 싸는 바람에 하나 샀어요.  
(16) 가을이 이어서 날씨가 제법 선선해요.  
(17) *가을이느라고 날씨가 제법 선선해요.  
(18) *가을이 빗바람에 날씨가 제법 선선해요.

These syntactic conditions can be summarized as in Table 2.

Table 3 Syntactic Environments of Conjunctive Forms of Cause by Verb Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb Type</th>
<th>Descriptive Verbs 이다/아니다 Verbs 있다/없다 Verbs</th>
<th>Action Verbs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conjunctive Forms of Cause or Reason</td>
<td>-아/어서</td>
<td>-아/어서</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-느라고</td>
<td>-느라고</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-는 바람에</td>
<td>-는 바람에</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
So far, the syntactic environments for the use of these three forms are quite straightforward. However, when it comes to action verbs, their usage relations become very complicated. The syntactic conditions of these forms will be analyzed in detail one by one.

First, the -아/어서 form can be used with action verbs without much restriction except for the case that the subject of the -아/어서 clause and that of the main clause are the same and the action verbs are used in both of the conjunctive and main clauses as in example (20).

\[(19) \text{눈이 와서 길이 미끄럽다.} \]
\[(20) \text{\*대통령이 될 줄 알았으면 영어를 열심히 공부했을텐데} \]
\[\text{대강 공부해서 영어를 잘 못합니다.} \]

This restriction seems to have arisen from the need to avoid the confusion which can be caused by another usage of the -아/어서 form, the usage that describes the related events in sequence as in examples (21) and (22).

\[(21) \text{학교에 가서 공부했어요.} \]
\[(22) \text{어침에 일어나서 운동을 좀 했어요.} \]

This restriction, however, does not apply when the action verbs in the -아/어서 clause are of passive verbs or meanings as in examples (23)-(25).

\[(23) \text{햇빛을 받아서 유리가 더욱 반짝거린다.} \]
\[(24) \text{제가 감기에 걸려서 벌써 3 주제 일도 못하고 텔레그램 기리고 있네요. (25) 오다가 걸어서 미끄러져서 다리를 좀 다쳤어요.} \]

The example (20), which does not allow the -아/어서 form to be used, becomes acceptable when we replace the -아/어서 form with the -는 바람에 form as in example (26).

\[(26) \text{대통령이 될 줄 알았으면 영어를 열심히 공부했을텐데} \]
\[\text{대강 공부하는 바람에 영어를 잘 못합니다.} \]

Since only the -는 바람에 form, not the -아/어서 form, can be used when the subject of the conjunctive clause and that of the main clause are the same and the action verbs are used in both of the conjunctive and main clauses, these two forms seem to be in complementary distribution.

However, the use of the -는 바람에 form is not restricted to the above-mentioned conditions. It can be used even when the subjects of the conjunctive and the main clauses are different, as long as the -는 바람에 form is attached to action verbs including the verbs of the passive voice or passive meaning as in (27)-(30).

\[(27) \text{버스가 고장나는 바람에 회사에 지각했어요.} \]
\[(28) \text{수미가 늦게 오는 바람에 우리는 10 시 기차를 놓쳤어요.} \]
\[(29) \text{제가 감기가 걸리는 바람에 벌써 3 주제 일도 못하고 텔레그램 기리고 있네요.} \]

In other words, the -아/어서 and the -는 바람에 forms are syntactically not in strict complementary distribution. The problem can however be solved easily when the semantics of the two forms is considered. The -는 바람에 form is usually used when you want to emphasize that the cause is unexpected so that you should not be responsible for what has happened or you want to blame someone or something for what has happened as shown in the examples (27) and (30).

\[(30) \text{버스가 고장나서 회사에 지각했어요.} \]

This informal and emphatic aspect of the -는 바람에 form has led some previous research such as Jin(2003, 317) to suggest that a way of telling the difference between these forms is to classify -는 바람에 as a spoken colloquial form. It is true that the -는 바람에 form is used more often in spoken Korean than in written Korean, but this information is of limited use to the learners of Korean if they do not know that these two forms are not interchangeable in the syntactic conditions mentioned above.
Finally, the -느라고 form can be used only if the subject of the -느라고 clause and that of the main clause are the same\(^{271}\) and the conjunctive clause has an action verb excluding the passive verbs as in (31) and (32).

(31) 속제 하느라고 잠을 많이 못 있습니다.
(32) *감기에 걸리느라고 속제를 못 했어요.

The -느라고 form also has another very distinctive feature that it can be used only when the period of the first action overlaps with that of the second action or situation. For example, in example (31) the first action of ‘studying’ encroached on the time in which the second action of ‘sleeping’ should have occurred. On the other hand, in example (33) the first action of ‘studying English not much’ (대강 공부하느라고) and the second situation of ‘speaking English not well’ (영어를 잘 못합니다) do not overlap in the time frames of their occurrences. Therefore, example (33) does not allow the use of the -느라고 form.

(33) * 대통령이 될 줄 알았으면 영어를 열심히 공부했을텐데 대강 공부하느라고 영어를 잘 못합니다.

The syntactic and semantic environments of the -아/어서, -는 바람에 and -느라고 forms so far discussed can be summarized as in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject Conditions</th>
<th>Different Subjects in the Conjunctive Clause &amp; the Main Clauses</th>
<th>Same Subject in the Conjunctive Clause &amp; the Main Clauses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conjunctive Forms of Cause or Reason</td>
<td>-는 바람에 when you want to emphasize that the cause is unexpected or to blame someone or something for what has happened</td>
<td>-느라고 Only if the first action and the second action or situation overlap in the time frames of their occurrences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otherwise, -아/어서</td>
<td>Otherwise, -는 바람에</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.3 Teaching of the -아/어서, -는 바람에, -느라고 and -으니까 forms

The tables produced so far to discuss the four conjunctive forms of cause or reason can be applied to teach the learners of Korean when to use each form. The following flowchart consists of the three previous tables, showing the bird’s eye view of the syntactic and semantic environments in which each conjunctive form can occur. This table also shows that these four conjunctive forms of cause are in complementary distribution, making easy the explanation of these forms to the learners of Korean.

\(^{271}\) When the -느라고 form is used, the subject should be [+animate] (Cho 1990, 72).
For example, we can easily explain why examples (1-6), which are typical errors produced by learners, are not acceptable. Since we have already demonstrated how to correct errors in examples (2-4) before, we will show how to correct (1), (5) and (6) using the above flowchart. For the ease of discussion, the examples are shown again below.

(1) *도와주셨으니까 고맙습니다.
(5) *크리스가 예쁜 바람에 좋아졌어요.
(6) *도와주셔서 고맙습니다.

First, example (1) is not acceptable because the - (으)니까 form cannot be used in statements. This leaves us the other three forms -아/어서, -느라고, and -는 바람에. Since the verb ‘도와주다’ in the conjunctive clause is an action verb, we look at the action verbs section and we still have three possible choices. The next step, therefore, is to check whether or not the subject of the conjunctive clause and that of the main clause is the same. Since the subjects are different, the forms we can use are the -아/어서 and -는 바람에 forms. These two forms are often interchangeable but, as mentioned above, the -는 바람에 form is usually used when you want to emphasize that the cause is unexpected or to blame someone or something for what has happened. The consideration of this difference between the two forms allows us to exclude the -는 바람에 form, making the -아/어서 form the only possible choice. The
last step will be to attach the -아/어서 form to the stem of verb without a tense or aspect infix between them, producing the correct sentence as in (34). Example (6) also goes through the exactly same procedures as taken for the correction of example (1) resulting in (34).

(34) 도와주셔서 고맙습니다.

Second, example (5) is a statement, which excludes the - (으)니까 form, and its verb in the conjunctive clause is a descriptive verb ‘예쁘다’, which allows only the -아/어서 form to be used. Therefore, example (6) can be corrected as in (35).

(35) ?크리스가 예쁘서 좋아졌어요.
(36) 얼굴이 예쁘서 좋아하게 되었어요.

However, example (35) still does not sound quite natural because of the verb ‘좋아졌어요’ in the main clause. A quick Google search reveals that ‘ 좋아하게 되었어요’ is a preferred expression in place of ‘좋아졌어요’ as in (36). This is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and, therefore, will not be pursued any further.

In addition, the -는 바람에 form seems to cause difficulties to native Korean speakers as well. A Google search brings out many examples of the grammatically incorrect combinations of ‘descriptive verbs + 는 바람에’ and ‘descriptive verbs + 는 바람에’ as in (37-42).

(37) 남편과 아이가 변할아 아프는 바람에... 요즘 배우고 있는 일본어수업과 방수업을... 여진째 때ビジ지 있습니다.
(38) 하있는 기간이 짧아서 남산 바빠는 바람에 자주 얼굴을 보진 못했지만....
(39) 그래도 이니석 아픈 바람에 이번날 바다낚시 계획에 차질이 생겼네...
(40) 새로운 작품을 준비하다가 바쁜 바람에 손을 놓겠습니다.
(41) 일찍 갈아야 하는데 점을 나서는 순간 배가 너무 고른 바람에 들어가서 빠진한계에 뻗하나 먹고 이왕 늦은게 현실 한참 하고 객다가 돋었습니다.
(42) 인형같이 예쁜 바람에 양하다는 느낌은 없지만... 그래도 예쁜 사실이잖아요...;

Although these examples are grammatically incorrect, learners of Korean should be made aware of the fact that these expressions are used by some Koreans. As a matter of fact, the prevalence of some of these expressions seems not to make them sound awkward any more and, as a result, they feel quite acceptable now. However, these combinations are not yet productive enough to make them a general rule. These combinations are restricted to a very few descriptive verbs.

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated how the four conjunctive forms of -아/어서, -는 바람에, -느라고 and - (으)니까 are in complementary distribution, and that this understanding of the mutually exclusive relations of these forms is also essential to understand when to use each form. It should, however, be noted that this study has examined only four conjunctive forms of cause or reason. The better and clearer understanding of all the conjunctive forms of cause or reason requires further study into the forms which have not been discussed in this paper. Notwithstanding its limitations, this study does suggest that the grammatical forms other than the conjunctive ones of cause or reason may also be in complementary distribution. In other words, any attempt to understand the usages of the forms with the same or similar meaning should start from the analysis of syntactic environments where each form can occur.

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Contact Address
InJung Cho
Monash University
Clayton Campus, Victoria 3800
Australia
PH: +61 3 9905 3626
EMAIL: InJung.Cho@arts.monash.edu.au
The Study of Korean ‘kae’ and Thai ‘an’ : the Numeral Classifiers for ‘Things’

Puttachart Potibal, Ph.D.
NECTEC, NSTDA, Thailand Science Park, Thailand.

Abstract

The Korean and Thai languages belong to the different language family according to their morphological characteristics. Whereas the Korean is considered to be under the Altaic family, the Thai is under the Tai family. Korean and Thai are classifier languages where most nouns in Korean and Thai are modified by numeral-classifier combinations. This article is an attempt to study the numeral classifier for ‘things’ in Korean: ‘kae’, with comparison with that in Thai: ‘an’. The contrastive study of the Korean and Thai numeral classifiers will lead us to understand the worldview of the Korean and Thai towards the things.

Key Words: Korean language, Thai language, numeral classifier, contrastive study

Classifier Systems

The languages in the world are distinguished into classifier and non-classifier languages. (Allen, 1977). Numeral classification is a phenomenon commonly found in languages throughout Southeast Asia and East Asia. The numeral classifiers are part of the grammar of most East Asian languages, including Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Malay, Thai, Burmese and Vietnamese, plus the Bengali just to the west of this area. Numeral classifier systems are also found in non-Asian languages as many indigenous languages of the America like Tzeltal, a Mayan language and Tarascan, another Ameridian language.

English is a non-classifier language whereas Korean and Thai are classifier languages. Most nouns in Korean and Thai cannot be directly modified by numerals, but are modified by numeral-classifier combinations. In linguistics, the measure words are words (or morphemes) which are obligatory used in combination with a numeral to indicate the count of nouns. Consequently, they are considered numeral classifiers, and also known as counters, count words, or counting words. They appear in an adjacent position to numerals, demonstratives and/or adjectives, and tend to classify the nouns they modify into some semantic categories.

In English, one must say “ten bus tickets”, but the term ‘jang’ (장) in Korean and the term ‘bai1’ (บี) in Thai are used to count sheets or paper-like material in general. So, ‘ten bus tickets’ would be in Korean and Thai as followings:

a. Korean
beoseu pyo yeol jang (버스표열장)
b. Thai
tua5 rot4-mee1 sip2 bai1 (ตัวรถเมลี้ยบ)

Numeral Classifiers in Korean and Thai

In Korean, numeral classifiers are the subclass of nouns. The main property distinguishing them from prototypical nouns is that they cannot stand alone. Korean has two number systems: the Sino-Korean one based on Chinese (il “one”, i “two”, sam “three”, . . .), and the native system ( han “one”, tu “two”, sey “three”, . . .). In general, Sino-Korean numeral classifiers tend to be used with the Sino-Korean numerals and native numeral classifiers with the native numerals. Some classifiers have two variants: a Sino-Korean form and a native form, e.g. the classifier for people can be either myeong (명) or saram (사람). (Paik and Bond. 2001:141-142)

In Thai, classifier has a significant use in enumerations, where the classifiers follow numerals and precede demonstratives (Noss,1964). The use of classifier in Thai is not limited to the numeral expression but is extended to other expressions such as ordinal, determination, relative pronoun, pronoun, etc. There are 5 types of classifier, i.e. unit classifier which has special relationship with one or more concrete nouns; collective classifier which shows general group or set of mass nouns; metric classifier which occurs in enumerations that modify predicates as well as nouns; frequency classifier which is used to express the frequency of event that occurs; verbal classifier which is derived from a verb and usually used in construction with mass nouns. (Virach, Wantanee, and Surapant. 1995)

Examples of some numeral classifiers in Korean and Thai are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Semantic Class</th>
<th>Korean Classifiers</th>
<th>Thai Classifiers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>house</td>
<td>chae (채)</td>
<td>lang5 (หลัง)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
boats and ships cheok (척) lam1 (لاء)
books gwon (권) lem3 (ليم)
trees geuru (그루) ton3 (تن)
animals mari (마리) tua1 (تاء)
and machinery dae (대) khan1 (كان)
bunches song-i (송이) cheo3 (초)
Some nouns can also function as numeral classifier, for examples:

The classifier ‘kae’ (개) and ‘an’ (アン)

In Korean, there is a classifier ‘kae’ (개) which is a classifier for ‘things’ in general. ‘kae’ is the most frequent used numeral classifier because it can be used for the objects which are difficult to find the specific classifiers. Moreover it can combine quite freely with both Sino-Korean and native Korean numerals. (Paik and Bond. 2001:144). As well as in Thai, there is also a residual classifier ‘an’ (アン) which is a classifier for ‘things’ in general, and also it can be used if we are not sure which specific counting word to use.

Hence, I would like to look for the contrast between ‘kae’ and ‘an’. The table below shows the objects which the residual classifiers ‘kae’ and ‘an’ can be used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>THAI CL.</th>
<th>OBJECTS</th>
<th>KOREAN CL.</th>
<th>개</th>
<th>อน</th>
<th>SHAPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>'ان1'</td>
<td>1. eraser</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>1. CUBIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. eye-glasses</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>2. BODY and LEG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. brush</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>3. LONG-HANDLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. coin</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>4. FLAT-ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>'คลอง3'</td>
<td>1. camera</td>
<td>대</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>LONG-HOLLOW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. telescopes</td>
<td>대</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. microscopes</td>
<td>대</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. pipe</td>
<td>대</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>'كان1'</td>
<td>1. umbrella</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>LONG-HANDLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. bow</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. spoon</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. fork</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. violin</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. fishing rod</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The classifier ‘kae’ (개) and ‘an’ (アン)

In Korean, there is a classifier ‘kae’ (개) which is a classifier for ‘things’ in general. ‘kae’ is the most frequent used numeral classifier because it can be used for the objects which are difficult to find the specific classifiers. Moreover it can combine quite freely with both Sino-Korean and native Korean numerals. (Paik and Bond. 2001:144). As well as in Thai, there is also a residual classifier ‘an’ (アン) which is a classifier for ‘things’ in general, and also it can be used if we are not sure which specific counting word to use.

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<th>개</th>
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<th>SHAPE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>‘ジャーザン3’</td>
<td>1. pencil</td>
<td>자루</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>LONG-no HANDLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. chalk</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. candle</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>‘ لأنه lem3’</td>
<td>1. knife</td>
<td>자루</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>LONG-HANDLE 1,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. scissors</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>LONG-no HANDLE 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. candle</td>
<td></td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>THAI CL.</td>
<td>OBJECTS</td>
<td>KOREAN CL.</td>
<td>개</td>
<td>住址</td>
<td>SHAPE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>ตัน ‘ton3’</td>
<td>1. post</td>
<td>수, 그루</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>LONG-VERTICAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>ลาย ‘saai5’</td>
<td>1. road</td>
<td>선, 노선*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>LONG-WIDE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>เส้น ‘sen3’</td>
<td>1. thread</td>
<td>줄</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>LONG-NARROW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. iron wire, steel, rod</td>
<td>줄</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. hair</td>
<td>줄</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. nerve cells</td>
<td>줄</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>บาน ‘baan1’</td>
<td>1. door</td>
<td>창, 문</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>FLAT with FRAME</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>แผ่น ‘phaen2’</td>
<td>1. paper</td>
<td>장, 판</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>FLAT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. leather</td>
<td>장, 판</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. blackboard</td>
<td>장, 판</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>ใบ ‘bai1’</td>
<td>1. plate</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND in shape-FLAT 1, 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. bowl</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND in shape 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. glass</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. fruit</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. egg</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. box</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>ผล ‘phon5’</td>
<td>1. fruit</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>ผล ‘feong1’</td>
<td>1. egg</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>ลูก ‘luuk3’</td>
<td>1. fruit</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND/NON-ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. ball</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. storm</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. meat-ball</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. box</td>
<td>알*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>ดวง ‘duang1’</td>
<td>1. sun</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. moon</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. star</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. light, light bulb</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. eye</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. stamp</td>
<td>장, 문</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. postage stamp</td>
<td>장</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>หัว ‘hua5’</td>
<td>1. onion</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. cabbage</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>วง ‘wong1’</td>
<td>1 ring</td>
<td>환</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>ROUND-CIRCLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 bangle</td>
<td>환</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 handcuff</td>
<td>환</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>ก้อน ‘keon3’</td>
<td>1. soil</td>
<td>땅어리*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td>BIG SIZE- CUBIC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. rock</td>
<td>땅어리*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. brick</td>
<td>장, 땅어리</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4. soap</td>
<td>장, 땅어리</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. bread</td>
<td>땅어리*</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>เม็ด</td>
<td>1. button</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>SMALL SIZE- CUBIC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above data shows that the Korean residual classifier ‘kae’ can be used for 20 groups of semantic class whereas the Thai ‘an’ can be used for 5 groups plus 2 members from group 18 and 20.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

The perception of shape does vary across languages. Some categories in classifying the objects are more salient than others. Although there is a tendency for languages to classify nouns according to shape, it is often the case that what is round in one language is flat in another, and what is flat in one language is long in another.

The data demonstrates that there are the salient features: long, flat and round. The Korean language pays attention to the features long and flat whereas the features round is neglected except the round-circle shape. The evidence is that there are specific numeral classifiers for most of the objects with features long, flat and round-circle. In Thai language, all features are considered thus the classifier has a special relationship with noun as there are 20 classifiers for 20 different classes of nouns. In studying ‘kae’, it can be used for all semantic classes in this study except for 4 nouns ‘tree, stamp, postage stamp, pill’. Its behavior reflects its real potential to be the residual classifier, which is supposed be able to serve any type of semantic class. The behavior of ‘an’ is quite different from ‘kae’.

The usage of ‘an’ is restricted for only the groups of nouns which primary features are long shape, and most objects are utensils. The classifier ‘an’ cannot used for the objects with features flat and round. It seems that the classification system in Thai is more complicate than in Korean. In Thai, the objects are primarily classified by their shapes, followed by their components, functions, etc. As ‘kae’ is able to be used for 20 semantic classes, I would like to make an assumption that all 20 classes are viewed as ‘things’ or ‘objects’ by the Korean people. Even though there are the nature items like sun, moon, star, they are classified as the same kind of ‘things’.

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Virach Sornlertlamvanich. Another decade of Thai language processing research.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘met4’</th>
<th>2. diamond</th>
<th>정, 알*</th>
<th>BODY and LEG 1,2,3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3. pill</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>HEAD and LEG 4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'tua1'</th>
<th>1. desk</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. chair</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. doll</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. nail</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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Classifier Assignment by Corpus-Based Approach.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/korean_numerals

Contact Address
Puttachart Potibal
NECTEC, Thailand Science Park,
112 Phahonyothin Road, T.Klong Nueng, A.Klong Luang
Pathumthani, Thailand 12120.
PH: 66-86-5535946
FAX: 66-2-3936239
EMAIL: hemapin@yahoo.com
A Comparative study of the semantic association of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words in the Korean language and the construction of English for the Construction of Korean-English translation Ontology

Park, Cheolju
Hansung University

Abstract
The Korean language is the language in which world-wide ‘onomatopoeic’ and ‘mimetic words’ are advanced. Consequently, there is a possibility for accomplishing complete sentence structures with only the subject and onomatopoeic—Mimetic words. The composition of these constructions are not a possibility of what is being sought in English. Namely, this is a characteristic only of the Korean language. Consequently, when these translated from the Korean language onomatopoeic—Mimetic words are into English, the semantic association against these onomatopoeic—Mimetic words of the Korean language must be grasped first. This becomes an important work in Ontology for the construction of Korean-English translations. For example, we can see the semantic association of the onomatopoemia of the Korean language words ‘우르릉 쾅쾅’[ureureung kwangkwang], as it is analyzed below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>semantic association</th>
<th>1. sound : noisy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. situation : pour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. scale : large scale</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It makes a loud noise and pours at a large scale

Consequently, this will be able to express ‘비가 억수같이 내리다[biga eoksugachi naerida]:The rain is pouring down’ with ‘비가 우르릉 쾅쾅’[biga ureureung kwangkwang] in the Korean language.

However, in English ‘우르릉 쾅쾅[ureureung kwangkwang]’ will be translated only as ‘thundering rumbling’ degree. Consequently, ‘비가 우르릉 쾅쾅[biga ureureung kwangkwang]’ is translated literally as ‘rains thundering rumbling.’ But, there is not a descriptive meaning to ‘rains thundering rumbling’ which is ‘The rain makes a loud noise and it pours at a large scale’. Therefore, this is not the right translation. The meaning of ‘비가 우르릉 쾅쾅[biga ureureung kwangkwang]’ is ‘The rain is pouring down’ in the Korean language. Therefore, this must be translated as ‘It rains cats and dogs.’ Thus, this study will analyze the semantic association of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words in the Korean language.

I. Introduction
The Korean language has the most advanced Onomatopoeic and Mimetic words. The difference with other languages is that these are predicative in the Korean language. Thus, it is possible to make complete sentences without the predicates in the Korean language. This is a unique aspect of the Korean language being different from English so it should be observed carefully. The descriptive features of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words in the Korean language are originated in their association meaning. It is speculated that we should understand the association meaning to translate sentences with Onomatopoeic Mimetic words in the Korean language. Hence, this Study is aimed at analyzing Onomatopoeic and Mimetic words of the Korean language and comparing them with sentences in English.

II. Predicative use of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic word
There is a description in the introduction that reveals the meaning of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words in the Korean language. Therefore, it will be possible to complete a sentence with a subject and an Onomatopoeic or a subject and a Mimetic word without a predicate in the Korean language. We will observe these with the Onomatopoeic ‘उचाँग[wajangchang]:crash’, ‘우지끈[uijikkeun]:snap’, ‘핑[ping]:zip’ and the Mimetic words ‘휘청[hwicheong]:flagelliform’, ‘비틀물[biteulbiteul]:reel’, ‘살금살금[salgeumsalgeum]:creep’. First of all, the analyzed meanings of Onomatopoeia words are as follows:
(1) Onomatopoeia
a. 완장창 [wajangchang]: crash
   i) sound: The sound of something breaking on a large scale.
   ii) condition: It breaks at one time.
   iii) scale: One thing which is complete or a big attachment.
   iv) composition meaning: One thing or a big attachment breaks completely at one time.
b. 우지끈 [ujikkeun]: snap
   i) sound: The sound when a pillar is broken.
   ii) condition: A thick pillar gets broken into two pieces at one time.
   iii) composition meaning: A thick pillar does not prop and it gets broken into two pieces at one time.
c. 짹 [ping]: zip
   i) sound: The sound when a small or thin object grazes and passes.
   ii) condition: The brief instant the small or thin object grazes and it passes.
   iii) composition meaning: It is small or the thin object dangerously, it grazes and it passes at a fast speed.

Thus, there is a descriptive characteristic in the meaning of onomatopoeic words. Therefore, it will be possible to express sentences in ② as sentences in ① in the Korean language.

(2) a. 완장창 [wajangchang]: crash

   Subject   Predicative phrase
   ① 학교 유리창이 산산이 부서졌다.  
   [hakgyo yurichangi sansani buseojyeotda]  
   (Smashed glass window of school into pieces.)

   Subject   Onomatopoeia
   ② 학교 유리창이 완장창.  
   [hakgyo yurichangi wajangchang]  
   (Glass window of school crash.)

b. 우지끈 [ujikkeun]: snap

   Subject   Predicative phrase
   ① 통나무가 더 이상 바티지 못 하고 두 동강이로 한 번에 쪽했다.  
   [tongnamuga deo isang beotiji mot tago du donggangiro han beone kkeokkyeotda]  
   (The log did not more prop and it gets broken into two pieces at one time.)

   Subject   Onomatopoeia
   ② 통나무가 우지끈.  
   [tongnamuga ujikkeun]  
   (The log snap.)

c. 짹 [ping]: zip

   Subject   Predicative phrase
   ① 화살이 대단히 빠른 속도로 위험스레 스쳐지나갔다.  
   [hwasari yeogijeogiseo daedanhi ppareun soksoro wiheomsure seuchyeojinagatda]  
   (The arrow dangerously grazed at a very fast speed.)

   Subject   Onomatopoeia
   ② 화살이 짹.  
   [hwasari ping.]  
   (The arrow zip.)

Similarly, in the Korean language there is a descriptive characteristic in Mimetic words. The descriptive characteristic originates from the meaning association of Mimetic words.

(3) a. 외침 [hwicheong]: flagelliform
   i) condition: The object is bent.
   ii) quality of act and attitude: It is warped. It has elasticity.
   iii) composition meaning: It was warped and again straighten up.
Thus, the descriptive meaning of the Korean language will be able to express sentences in ① as sentences in ②.

(4) a. 휘청 [hwicheong]: flagelliform
   Subject Mimetic word
   ① 나무가 이리저리 휘어졌다.
   [namuga irijeori kkeokkeojideunni hwieojyeotda.]
   (The tree is repeatedly bent and it is almost broken off here and there.)

   Subject Mimetic word
   ⇨② 나무가 휘청.
   [namuga hwicheonghwicheong.]
   (The tree flagelliform.)

b. 비틀비틀 [biteulbiteul]: reel
   Subject Mimetic word
   ① 조난자가 다리에 힘도 없이 쓌러지듯이 힘겹게 걸었다.
   [jonanjaga darie himdo eopsi sseureojideunni himgyeopge georeotda.]
   (The victim had no power in his legs so he hardly walked and almost sink down unto the ground.)

   Subject Mimetic word
   ⇨② 조난자 비틀비틀.
   [jonanjaga biteulbiteul.]
   (The victim reel.)

c. 살금살금 [salgeumsalgeum]: creep
   Subject Mimetic word
   ① 고양이가 낮은 자세로 소리 없이 조심스레 걸었다.
   [goyangiga najeun jasero sori eopsi josimseure georeotda.]
   (The cat crouches and advances inch by inch quietly.)

   Subject Mimetic word
   ⇨② 고양이 살금살금.
   [goyangiga salgeumsalgeum.]
   (The cat stealthy.)

Therefore, in the case in which Onomatopoeic or Mimetic words are used in the Korean language and when these are translated into English, they must be translated as in ① and not as in ②. Then, they will be able to deliver the intention well.

III. Figurative usage of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words

Onomatopoeic and Mimetic words in the Korean language have their origin in meaning and the figurative sense that derives from them. We will observe this with the Onomatopoeic ‘부글부글 [bugeulbugeul]: simmer’, ‘땡 [ttaeng]: clang’ and Mimetic words ‘싹둑 [ssakduk]: snip’, ‘후들후들 [hudeulhudeul]: trembling’.

(5) a. 부글부글 [bugeulbugeul]: simmer
   i) sound : The sound when endless bubbles break.
   ii) condition : It boils hard.
   iii) temperature : Hot
   iv) composition meaning : Bubbles are continuously produced when the liquid is hot and it boils.
v) metaphor meaning: Explode with anger
b. [ttaeng]: clang
   i) sound: A sound of a bell
   ii) situation: The bell it rings.
   iii) cause: In order to inform a situation
   iv) composition meaning: In order to inform what kind of situation it makes a sound with the bell.
   v) metaphor meaning: The situation is ended.
c. [ssakduk]: snip
   i) condition: The object is cut.
   ii) cause: In order to take off the part which is unnecessary.
   iii) composition meaning: It cuts the part which is unnecessary and it takes it off.
   iv) metaphor meaning: It removes the part which is not necessary.
d. [hudeulhudeul]: trembling
   i) condition: It trembles severely partly or all over.
   ii) cause: It cannot physically endure it any longer.
   iii) composition meaning: It cannot physically endure and so it trembles severely partly or all over.
   iv) metaphor meaning: It cannot mentally endure it and so it gets angry.

Therefore, '부글부글 [bugeulbugeul]', '땡 [ttaeng]', '싹둑 [ssakduk]', '후들후들 [hudeulhudeul]' do not mean 'boiling sound', 'belling sound', 'The condition which cuts', 'The condition in which a body vibrates' in the following sentences where Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words are used. These respectively mean 'anger', 'ends', 'removals', 'indignations'. Accordingly, these sentences below 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd' must be translated into English as in ②.(Respectively, the sentences in ① are literal translations of 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd'.)

(6) a. 속이 부글부글 [sogi bugeulbugeul].
   ① Bubbling inside.
   ② Indignation swells in mind.
b. 마침내 빙 [machimnae ttaeng].
   ① Finally clang.
   ② It ended finally.
c. 미련 없이 까둑 [miryeon eopsi ssakduk].
   ① Without regret snip.
   ② It is removed without a lingering attachment.
d. 마음이 후들후들 [maeumi hudeulhudeul].
   ① Mind trembling.
   ② He/She resents extremely.

Thus, sometimes Onomatopoeic and Mimetic words are used figuratively in meaning when there is no meaning in the origin and this is the quality of the Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words in the Korean language.

IV. Parenthetic usage of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words

In the Korean language, Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words add contents which are not expressed in sentences in certain circumstances. This is because Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words keep a descriptive characteristic. We will confirm this special characteristic in the Korean language by using the Onomatopoeic ‘칠썩 [cheolsseok]: plash’ and the Mimetic words ‘모락모락 [morangmorak]: thickly’, ‘파릇파릇 [pareutpareut]: verdant.’ Thus, we should analyze first of all the meaning of these words.

(7) a. 칠썩 [cheolsseok]: plash
   i) sound: The sound when a wave bumps.
   ii) situation: The wave breaks.
   iv) composition meaning: The wave bumps into the beach and it breaks.
b. 모락모락 [morangmorak]: thickly
   i) situation: Smoke rises and scatters.
   ii) circumstances: Smoke rises continuously.
   iii) composition meaning: Smoke rises continuously and scatters.
c. 파릇파릇 [pareutpareut]: verdant
   i) shape: Bud of plant
   ii) situation: Buds rise and the color of a field or a tree become green.
iii) composition meaning: The buds of plants rise and a field or tree becomes green.

‘철썩’[cheolsseok], ‘모락모락’[morangmorak], ‘파릇파릇’[pareutpareut] have meaning as in (7); thus, if ‘wave’, ‘smoke’, ‘bud’ are not used in the next sentences ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, these words were added and they were interpreted as in (2). (Sentences in ① respectively are literal translations of ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’.)

(8) a. 바다가 철썩[badaga cheolsseok].
1. The ocean with splashes.
2. The ocean wave with splashes.

b. 곱뚝이 모락모락[gulttugi morangmorak].
1. Chimney rises up in thick clouds.
2. The smoke rises up in thick clouds from the chimney

c. 나뭇가지가 파릇파릇[namutgajiga pareutpareut].
1. Branches green here and there.
2. Green buds of a branch.

‘철썩[cheolsseok]’ is the wave sound when it is not the ocean. ‘모락모락[morangmorak]’ is the shape of the smoke when it is not the chimney. And ‘파릇파릇[pareutpareut]’ is the color of the bud when it is not of the branch. Therefore, the sentences in (8) have been translated into sentences in ②, and that is a faithful translation.

V. Suggestive using of Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words

The Korean language does with Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words it suggests the contents which are not sentences. It is in order for Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words to have a descriptive meaning. It tries to observe this with Onomatopoeic ‘꼬끼오[kkokkio]’, ‘으르렁[eureureong]’ and Mimetic words ‘쨍쨍[jjaengjjaeng]’, ‘꽁꽁[kkongkkong]’.

(9) a. 꼬끼오[kkokkio]: Cock-a-doodle-doo
  b. 으르랭[eureureong]: Growl
  c. 촘촘[jjaengjjaeng]: Blazing
  d. 꽁꽁[kkongkkong]: Frozen hard

‘꼬끼오[kkokkio]’ is the crying sound of chickens and ‘으르랭[eureureong]’ is the threatening sound of a dog. And ‘쨍쨍[jjaengjjaeng]’ talks about the condition when the sun beats down on, ‘꽁꽁[kkongkkong]’ shows the condition when a the body or thing freezes. Therefore, there are no words as ‘Chicken’, ‘dog’, ‘the stinging sun’, ‘low-end temperature’ in the next sentences, Onomatopoeic—Mimetic words suggest these words. (Sentences in ① respectively are literal translations of ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’, ‘d’.)

(10) a. 닭장 속에는 꼬끼오[dakjang sogeneun kkokkio].
  1. Cock-a-doodle-doo in a henhouse.
  2. A hen is in a henhouse.

b. 개집에서는 으르렁[gaejibeseoneun eureureong].
  1. Growling in a doghutch.
  2. A dog is in a doghutch.

c. 창밖은 촘촘[changbakkeun jjaengjjaeng].
  1. Outside the window is the blazing.
  2. Outside the window is hottest sun.

d. 손발이 꽁꽁[sonbari kkongkkong].
  1. Hand and foot is frozen hard.
  2. The temperature is very low.

Therefore, the sentences in (10) have been translated into sentences as ② and not as in ①. That is a faithful translation and the intention is delivered correctly.
VI. Concluding remarks
The Korean language has the most advanced Onomatopoeic and Mimetic words among languages and they have a descriptive meaning. This is why a literal translation could change the original meaning of them or could make an ungrammatical sentence. This is a special characteristic of the Korean Language.

Heading
The Korean language, Onomatopoeic words, Mimetic words, literal translation, Korean-English translations, composition meaning, sound

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Contact Address
Park Cheol-Ju
Hansung University
389 Samsun-dong 2-ga, Sungbuk-gu, Seoul, 136-792, KOREA
PH: 010-6368-2656, 011-448-7896, 032-288-7896
FAX: 032-522-8340
EMAIL: sunvim@unitel.co.kr
Strengthening Competitiveness through Global Production: The Case of Hyundai Motor Company

Chung-Sok Suh
University of New South Wales, Australia

Seung-Ho Kwon
University of New South Wales, Australia

Christopher Wright
University of Sydney, Australia

Abstract
This paper reviews the Hyundai Motor Company’s development of a global production system through a cross-case analysis of the company’s five major overseas production facilities. It argues that in line with a dynamic capabilities theory, the company was able to learn from its early mistakes and develop core competencies in car manufacture, supplier relations and marketing that have enabled it to become one of the world’s most successful auto companies. The paper identifies the strategies which enabled the company to learn from its initial failures in overseas production focusing in particular on the localization of production, the transfer of experienced staff, the codification of previous experience, and the use of aggressive goal-setting.

Introduction
The history of the Korean automotive industry has been a ‘rags to riches’ story. Beginning as a repair industry for vehicles released during the Korean War, the first car assembly plant was established in 1955 with an annual capacity of only 1,500 units. Hyundai Motor Company (HMC) was established in 1967, assembling American designed cars for local consumption. However, by 2005, it had become the sixth largest automobile producer in the world and a major competitor to more established producers such as GM, Ford and Toyota (Treece, 2006).

Considering that at HMC’s inception Korea’s major exports were labor intensive products such as textiles, footwear, soft toys and garments, HMC’s growth has been remarkable. No Korean companies had previous experience of automobile assembly and there were no supporting industries. Nevertheless, within thirty years HMC has become one of the world’s leading automobile manufacturers.

Previous research has sought to explain HMC’s rapid growth and competitiveness by focusing on factors such as government policy, a diligent workforce, executive leadership and organizational learning (Hyun, 1995, 1997; KIET, 1994, 1999; Kim, 1997, 1998; Lee, 1995). However, less attention has been paid to the relationship between the increasing globalization of HMC’s operations over the last twenty years and its international competitiveness (for an exception see Kim & Lee, 2001). The aim of this paper is to examine the globalization process of HMC and demonstrate how this contributed to the company’s competitiveness, with particular attention to the successful establishment of a global production network since the late 1990s. We begin by providing an overview of HMC’s globalization efforts and review potential theoretical explanations. The case of HMC, we argue, departs from conventional stage theories of internationalization, and we suggest a more viable theoretical explanation involves a knowledge-based view of the firm in which the globalization process is an essential contributor to organizational learning and capability building. In the main section of the paper we provide a detailed cross-case comparison of HMC’s five major overseas production centers and review how each operation was established and developed. In particular, we focus on the way in which each operation contributed to HMC’s core competencies in car manufacturing, supplier relations and marketing. In the concluding section, we review the cross-case analysis and analyze how HMC’s attempts to establish viable global production facilities

272 Korean in this paper refers to the Republic of Korea.
273 This includes the market share of Kia, which was merged with HMC after the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
became a valuable learning experience for the company. In particular we stress the importance of learning from past mistakes and how the company was able to operationalize such learning to develop dynamic capabilities and build competitive advantage.

**Growth through Globalization**

When, in 1962, the Korean government launched its first Five-Year Economic Development Plan, it passed the Automobile Industry Protection Law and began to promote the development of an automobile industry. The subsequent expansion of the industry can be divided into four periods: the preparation for local production from 1962 to 1971; the development of its own models from 1972 to 1982; mass production from 1983 to the mid-1990s; and global production from the late 1990s.

With its production of the Ford Cortina in 1968, HMC led the Korean automobile industry. As shown in Table 1, HMC’s subsequent growth was largely due to overseas expansion, the domestic market having been too small. A period of complete knock down (CKD) assembly of an imported model from 1968 till 1971 was followed by a take-off in 1972 of HMC’s own model. Mass production and the globalization that began in 1983 can be classified into the following stages: export through sales agents, from 1983 to 1990; expansion through sales offices from 1990 to 1994; the beginning of overseas production through knock down (KD) assembly, from 1995 to 1998; and the beginning of the relocation of complete production systems overseas, from 1999 (Hyun, 1995: 62-67; Kim & Lee, 2001; Lansbury, Kwon, & Suh, 2006).

**See Table 1**

**Prima facie**, HMC’s progress towards globalization supports the ‘stage theory’ of Johanson and Vahlne (1977; 1990), in which the firm begins with no export activities and then moves through a series of sequential stages involving export via independent representatives, the establishment of overseas sales subsidiaries, and eventually overseas production units. Within this interpretation, experience accumulated through the previous stage is essential for progress to the next stage, and firms enter new foreign markets where the perceived market uncertainty is low, progressively moving to markets with greater ‘psychic distance’ (for example, language, cultural and institutional differences). However, the experience of the Korean automobile companies differ from this model in two ways. First, the increase in exports took place simultaneously with the rapid expansion of domestic sales, when large-scale investments resulted in excess capacity. Second, Korean auto firms’ globalization strategies were not carried out according to cultural proximity or psychic distance. Instead, subsidiaries were established in various parts of the world simultaneously, with different modes of investment in each (Kim & Lee, 2001; Oh, Choi, & Choi, 1998).

Even for market-seeking investment, market size has tended to dominate the choice of location (Suh & Seo, 1998).

Examination of the globalization of HMC reveals three facts: (1) its growth depended on the expansion of international sales; (2) it began to globalize its production before it had developed significant competitive advantages; and (3) it built its competitive advantage through its experiences in international markets. Traditional foreign direct investment (FDI) theories do not fully explain the internationalization of HMC because most regard the competitiveness of the firm as a pre-condition for internationalization. Considering the rapid changes in the competitive advantage and internationalization strategies of HMC, a research framework with a dynamic focus is necessary. As explained above, HMC developed and strengthened its firm-specific competitive advantage through internationalization. While most traditional internationalization theories are silent on the process of the development of firm-specific competitive advantage, a dynamic capabilities perspective which focuses on the way in which organizations learn new skills and competencies and then harness these in new ways (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Grant, 1996; Teece, 1998; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), appears to offer insight into the way in which global production has stimulated competitiveness at HMC. Such a perspective has been demonstrated in the Korean context by Kim (1997; 1998). In his historical study of HMC’s approach to capability building in its domestic production as a means of ‘catching up’ to its global competitors, he stresses how the company acquired migratory knowledge to increase its knowledge base, and then used internally-generated crises (typically ambitious short-term goals) to intensify its learning effort. In this way HMC was able to increase its organizational learning through high absorptive capacity. Kim argues that such crisis construction was central to HMC’s ability to shift from imitation to innovation. In the following study we seek to build on Kim’s earlier analysis of HMC’s pattern of organizational learning and apply it to the more recent experience of the company’s strategy of global production.

In developing the cross-case analysis, we have used a combination of existing secondary literature, company documentation, interviews with senior managers, and field-trips to Korean and overseas production sites. Interviews were conducted with a range of HMC managers who worked in the Corporate Planning Division of the company in strategic planning, international business and human resource functions. In addition interviews were conducted with a range of HMC managers who had worked at the company’s Indian and Chinese plants, as well as overseas production engineering and
human resource managers involved in the planning of the company's new American plant in Alabama. A further important source was a series of interviews with a former President and Vice Chairman who had been involved at a senior level in many of the overseas production ventures, including oversight of the construction of the Chinese factory. The researchers also undertook a series of field-trips to the company's Indian and Korean production facilities to familiarize themselves with the varying nature of production technology used in different factories.

HMC's Development of Overseas Production

Although HMC established many overseas production centers, large scale investments have been made in five countries to date with production plants established in Canada, Turkey, India, China and the USA. In the following section we review the establishment of each of these five production operations, with a focus on how each contributed to the development of dynamic capabilities within HMC.

A Failed Experiment: HMC's Greenfield Plant in Canada

HMC began to export to Canada in the early 1980s. Mounting pressures for restrictions on its growing imports to North America constituted one of the most important factors that led to the establishment of a production plant in Canada (HMC, 1992: 562-563). However, the hasty decision, made in July 1985 within a few months of the announcement of a tariff on Korean-made cars, overlooked the project's potential shortcomings.

HMC invested $382 million Canadian in constructing the plant at Bromont, Quebec between September 1986 and July 1989. HMC had planned to construct only body, paint and assembly shops, but included a press shop, which was completed by the end of 1990. Production at the plant began in January 1989 with a capacity of 100,000 units per annum of the Sonata on a two shift basis (HMC, 1992: 650-653).

HMC selected Bromont because the Quebec state government promised to provide substantial grants, including a 400-acre green-field site for merely $1 Canadian and an interest subsidy for investment amounting to approximately $100 million Canadian for five years. In addition, the government provided training expenses for Canadian employees amounting to $9.4 million Canadian. However, after HMC started production it encountered major problems with the plant's location. It took as long as 23 days to transport CKD parts from Ulsan in Korea to Bromont, 15 days by sea plus 8 days by land. Moreover, most local parts suppliers were 650 kilometers from the plant. Thus, HMC had to incur high logistic expenses, amounting to approximately five per cent of total material costs (HMC, 1992: 651).

As wages in Canada were higher than in Korea, HMC opted for a highly automated manufacturing process, requiring the company to improve its production technology. For example, in the case of the body shop, the automation rate of the Bromont plant was 85 per cent, while that of the Ulsan 2 plant in Korea, producing the same product, was only 64.5 per cent. Because of the high rate of automation, labor productivity at Bromont was 30 to 40 per cent higher than that of Ulsan 2 (Korea Economic Daily, 5 May 1991).

HMC developed the Sonata targeting both its domestic and North American markets. However, given its experience was solely within the small car segment, the company lacked sufficient knowledge of the North American medium passenger car market. Except for a larger engine (3.0 liters as opposed to the smaller 2.4 liter Korean model), the company did not adapt the design of the Sonata for North American customers. As a result, HMC failed to satisfy customers' expectations in areas such as interior design and ride performance. Design and low level product development technology meant that the competitive in quality than the rival Toyota Camry and Honda Accord (interviews with HMC Director, Product Planning Division and HMC General Manager, Planning Office, 27 August 2003).

The company focused on localizing the parts for its Bromont plant to satisfy the minimum requirements of the Canadian Value Added (CVA) and the North American Value Added (NAVA) taxes. In 1989, the company had developed 40 locally-made parts, purchased from 15 suppliers. In 1992, these had risen to 351, procured from 63 suppliers. The localized parts were mainly those with an uncompetitive high price and those vulnerable to damage in transportation from Korea. However, because the main components, such as engines and transmissions, were transported from Ulsan as CKD parts, the parts localization level at Bromont was still lower than the NAVA requirement of 50 per cent. To raise this level HMC decided in 1988 to establish a press shop at Bromont (interview with HMC General Manager, Planning Office, 27 August 2003).

HMC introduced the Sonata in 1989, but declining markets and Japanese manufacturers starting

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274 Under HMC’s CVA agreement with the Canadian government, imported CKD parts from HMC in Korea could be exempt from customs duty if the level of locally-produced parts used at Bromont should reach 16 to 25 per cent in 1989, 17 to 26 per cent in 1990, 18 to 28 per cent in 1991, and 20 to 30 per cent in 1992.

275 According to the NAVA requirements that were introduced through agreement between the US and Canadian government from 1990, HMC was obliged to achieve a 50 per cent local content level in order for the Canadian exports to the U.S. to be exempt from U.S. government tariffs.
local plants in North America, provided stiff competition in the medium passenger car segment. Sales of Toyota’s Camry and Honda’s Accord increased at the same time that demand in the medium passenger car segment continued to decline. Under these conditions, HMC’s promotion drive for the Sonata faced difficulties. Toyota and Honda focused on a consumer preference for high quality and reliability, whereas HMC emphasized price competitiveness. For example, the International Quality Standard (IQS) index for the Sonata in 1989 was, more than twice the industry average for the medium passenger car segment (HMC, 1992: 718-720).

The Sonata produced at Bromont failed to meet HMC’s sales targets, mainly because of its low quality. Although the capacity of the Bromont plant was 100,000 units per annum, production of the Sonata did not exceed 30,000 in 1990 or 1991, and afterwards dropped below 20,000. In 1989, the Sonata failed to achieve its sales target in North American markets, recording sales of merely 14,000 units. In an effort to sustain the Sonata, HMC negotiated with Chrysler to supply Bromont-produced Sonatas badged as Eagles. This also ended in failure and in 1993 Bromont was shut down (HMC, 1992: 654-655).

**A Further Set-Back: The Joint Venture Plant in Turkey**

Despite reservations given the recent failure of the company’s Canadian plant, HMC commenced a joint venture (JV) plant in Turkey in 1993. At the time, Turkey was regarded as a promising market which HMC forecast would expand to over one million units by 2001, if, as it was then believed, Turkey joined the European Union (EU) after 1996, and conformed to EU trade policy, including tariffs and import quotas. HMC also wanted a strategic base in Turkey to make inroads into Asian markets. Turkey had maintained bilateral treaties with its neighbors in the Middle East and a preferential tariff or tariff exemption applied to Turkish exports to these countries (HMC, 1992: 774; Korea Economic Daily, 22 September 1997).

HMC undertook a small-scale investment in local production in Turkey by establishing the Hyundai Assan Otomotiv Sanyai ve Ticaret A.S. (HAOS), a 50:50 joint venture with the Kibar Business Group to construct a local CKD assembly plant. HMC postponed the joint venture twice, after Turkey fell into an economic crisis in 1994, and re-examined the feasibility of the project in May 1995 when the economic crisis continued. Finally, in September 1995, HMC started to construct the assembly plant, but it kept a close watch on Turkish market conditions. HMC and the Kibar Group invested US$22.5 million for paid-up capital, while HAOS invested US$115 million. 276 Between 1995 and 1997, HMC constructed the CKD assembly plant with body, paint and assembly shops to produce the Accent, a small passenger car and the Grace, a minibus. The plant had a capacity of 60,000 units (interview with HMC former CEO and Vice Chairman, 22 August 2003).

As wages were lower in Turkey than in Korea, HMC introduced labor-intensive, hand-operated production technology and used less automated manufacturing processes than in its domestic plants, although, in the processes that most affected product quality, HMC used robots and automated welders. Thus, the automation of HMC’s Turkish plant was only 15 per cent, compared with 98 per cent in the body shop of its Ulsan plant. Consequently, the physical productivity of the Turkish plant was 25 per cent lower than that of Ulsan (interview with HMC General Manager, Planning Office, 27 August 2003).

The use of local parts for the Accent was 34 per cent and that of the Grace 20 per cent. Most of the local parts were bulky items, such as seats, door trims, carpets, and crush pads, and the components requiring an intermediate level of technology, such as radiators, heaters and starter motors. The two Korean parts suppliers, Hanil Ehwa and Mando, established joint ventures with local suppliers in Turkey to supply the joint venture plant. Other Korean suppliers, such as Halla and Poong Jeong, added to the parts localization by reaching technical agreements with local suppliers. However, as the company imported major components, such as engines and transmissions in the form of CKD, HMC’s parts localization level remained relatively low. In order to successfully penetrate the Turkish market, HAOS undertook an aggressive marketing strategy. The Accent was equipped with many standard options such as power windows, central door locking and a fuel filter, so that it could compete with the locally-produced Toyota Corolla (interview with HMC General Manager, Planning Office, 27 August 2003).

However, once again HMC’s foray into offshore production proved problematic. HAOS’s performance in the late 1990s was far from impressive. From an initial capacity of 60,000 units per annum, its total sales were less than 6,000 units in 1996, and only 29,000 units in 1997, of which 22,789 were imported completely built units (CBU), while the others involved CKD production. In 1998, HAOS’s total sales were 32,444 units, of which 26,750 involved CKD production. In 1999, because of the effects of an earthquake, HAOS’s sales declined to 26,698 units. Although they recovered temporarily (to 36,853 units) in 2000, they declined to less than 10,000 in 2001 and 2002 because of stagnant demand. Meanwhile, HAOS’s exports recorded less than 1,000 units and remained stagnant, largely because it was unprofitable to export its CKD units and because HMC’s head office was concerned that the Turkish exports should not undermine its own.

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276 70 million dollars of funds was raised as a debt.
The Beginnings of Success: Greenfield Production in India

In 1995, HMC undertook a third large-scale investment overseas and established a green-field plant in India. After its economic reforms of 1991, India’s annual economic growth rate rose from 1 per cent in 1990 to 6 to 7 per cent in the mid-1990s, and its automobile market increased from 340,000 units in 1990 to 593,000 in 1995. With a promising forecast for the future of the Indian market, HMC decided to construct a local plant in 1996 (Shah, 1996: 2.01; Yoon, 2002: 163-164).

The Indian government’s policy of opening up the economy encouraged HMC to invest there. The government abolished obligatory regulations in parts localization and on the restriction of production capacity regarding inbound foreign investment in the automobile industry. Another important motive for HMC’s investment was the location of India between Asia and Europe, enabling a strategic export base for HMC’s low-priced vehicles to both continents (Ha & Cha, 2002: 133-135; Yoon, 2002: 164).

HMC initially planned to undertake a joint venture for a small-scale plant with a capacity of about 20,000 to 30,000 units per annum, but it later realized that joint venture firms faced difficulties with Indian partners and management. For example, the construction of Ford’s Indian plant was delayed because of a disagreement with its local partner. Thus, HMC decided to establish a 100 per cent-owned subsidiary in India. However, as the maximum limit for a foreign investor’s share permitted by the Indian government was 51 per cent, HMC negotiated with the government to establish an independent subsidiary on the condition that it construct engine and transmission shops and increase its local content rate to 70 per cent. It established Hyundai Motor India (HMI), its own Indian subsidiary, in May 1996 (Shah, 1996: 2.01; Yoon, 2002: 164-165).

HMC invested US$457 million in the construction of its Indian plant, which included production facilities, engine and transmission shops, press, body, paint and assembly shops, and a plastic extrusion unit. R&D facilities, such as a research institute for product performance testing and road test tracks were also constructed. Thus, the plant was self-sufficient and fully-fledged. It produced the Santro in the mini passenger car segment (the premium compact segment in the local market) and the Accent in the small passenger car segment (the entry mid-size segment in the local market). Total production capacity of the plant was 120,000 units per annum, of which 80,000 were for the Santro and 40,000 for the Accent.

HMC considered New Delhi, Calcutta, Mumbai and Chennai for the plant. After elaborate investigations regarding the distance to large-scale consumption markets, the location of local parts suppliers, the nature of the labor force and industrial relations, and utility conditions such as logistics, electric power and industrial water, it chose to locate the plant in Chennai. Even though the location might involve high transport expenses because of the long distance from large-scale consumption centers such as New Delhi, the company expected that this would be offset by the high level of parts localization and the availability of cheap marine or railroad transportation in place of expensive highway trucking. In addition, as no automobile manufacturers were located in the district, HMC expected that it could acquire a higher market share than its competitors in the south of India (Yoon, 2002: 165-166).

While the company utilized some of the idle Canadian production facilities in its new Indian facility, as with Turkey, lower wage costs led HMC to choose labor-intensive production technology and reduce its investment in automation for the Chennai plant. Consequently, the automation rate of the Chennai plant was 20 per cent of that of Ulsan and productivity was only one fourth to one fifth (interview HMC Deputy General Manager Human Resources, 5 July 2004; Yoon, 2002: 168-169).

HMC emphasized two product localization strategies. The first was to convince current customers of the Maruti 800 and the Maruti Zen that they relied on out-of-date technology. HMC made use of up-to-date technology, such as multi-point fuel injection (MPFI) type engines, up-to-date styling, roomy rear seats and a powerful air conditioner, for the Santro (Ha and Cha, 2002: 140-141; Yoon, 2002: 169). The second was to meet the needs and expectations of Indian customers of the Santro by giving it a more dynamic and sporty look. In addition, on the basis of the results of an above 100,000 kilometer road test and market survey, HMC made efforts to take into account climate, road conditions, driving customs and local usage. The engine cooling function and air conditioner were powered up, because the automobile could overheat at midsummer. The company also strengthened the water-resistant function of the model, considering the heavy rainfall and poor drainage facilities in India. HMC also adjusted the suspension with a hard shock absorber (Ha and Cha, 2002: 141-143; Yoon, 2002: 167-168).

Unlike its earlier overseas ventures, HMC also adopted a more proactive parts localization strategy for the Santro and the Accent because of the high tariff on CKD imports. As the Indian parts industry was underdeveloped and comprised small-scale suppliers with out-of-date technical skills, HMC reduced its suppliers to 63 and adopted a single-sourcing strategy to realize economies of scale. In addition, HMC encouraged its domestic suppliers in Korea to establish local subsidiaries in India, especially those that were producing parts that required a high level of technology and quality, or were bulky. Consequently, 13 Korean parts suppliers established joint ventures with Indian suppliers. Furthermore, as the Indian parts suppliers were scattered all over the country, HMC succeeded in

277 A 40 per cent tariff rate was imposed on CKD imports only in the case of CKD plants that achieved a certain level of parts localization. A lower level attracted more than a 40 per cent tariff.
inducing 38 suppliers to relocate to within 50 kilometers of the Chennai plant, supplying nearly 88 per cent of total parts. In order to enhance the quality of its parts, HMC recommended that local suppliers have a technical agreement with foreign suppliers or receive advanced technology from technical experts and designers from the R&D division of HMC. This helped HMC to accomplish 70 per cent parts localization and to build up its own strong supply networks in India (Yoon, 2002: 172-173).

In order to penetrate the Indian market within a short period, HMI first priced its products low, and then raised them when it was confident of market acceptance. For example, to compete with the Maruti Zen, HMI priced the Santro five per cent lower than the Zen. This pricing strategy derived from HMC’s experiences in North American markets and was enabled by its high level of parts localization. Six months after it had launched the Santro, HMI began gradually to raise its price. By contrast, HMI priced the Accent to maximize profits, enabled by rising brand awareness and consumer acceptance gained from the successful launch of the Santro. The price of the Accent was similar or even higher than that of the Esteem, the Accent’s major competitor, demonstrating HMI’s growing confidence that the Accent would top the Esteem in performance and quality (Ha and Cha, 2002: 140-141; Motors Line, July 2001: 21; interview with HMC General Manager, Planning Office, 27 August 2003).

HMI was highly successful in the Indian market. It started to sell the Santro in October 1998, and, six months later had become the second largest manufacturer (next to Maruti) in India. Between 1999 and 2001, HMC’s sales increased from 61,135 units to 82,837 and its market share from 12.7 per cent to 16.2 per cent. With the increase in sales, HMI added a second shift in July 1999 and a third in August 2000. It also enlarged its product line with the Accent in October 1999 and the Sonata in 2001. In 2000, it started to make a profit (6.2 per cent net) and in 2002 remitted a US$25 million profit dividend to HMC headquarters as a result of its 2001 performance (Korea Economic Daily, 27 July 1999; Yoon, 2002: 171). Together with its increase in sales, HMI improved its brand image in India. In January 1999, the Santro was named the ‘Car of the Year’ by the Business Standard, an influential Indian newspaper. In October 1999, the Business Standard chose the Santro as the best brand in India. The Santro was ranked first in an IQS survey of the compact car segment of the Indian market for three consecutive years from 2000 to 2002. The quality of the Accent was assessed to be second in the medium car segment during the same period (Seoul Economic Daily, 4 January 1999; Maeil Business Newspaper, 24 November 2000).

Indeed, the success of the Indian plant strengthened HMI’s role as the regional headquarters for exports to developing countries, including Asia. HMI started exporting in 2000 to Indonesia and Algeria. In 2002, HMI established an export department to export more proactively and exported 8,500 units to Algeria, Morocco, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. In 2003, HMI planned to export 30,000 units to South West Asia and Europe. In addition, HMC started to strengthen the role of HMI as a supply base for core components and low value-added products within its global business structure. In 2003, HMI announced plans to export 50,000 engines and transmissions a year from mid-2004 to HMC’s plants in Korea and to other countries. It also planned to export the Santro to Mexico. (Maeil Business Newspaper, 17 March 2003; Hankyora Sinmun, 24 May 2003).

Extension in Asia: The Joint Venture in China

In 2002, HMC signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the establishment of Beijing-Hyundai Motor, a 50-50 joint venture with Beijing Automotive Holding Company (Lim, 2003: 16, 26 76-77). Following the Chinese government’s relaxation of motor vehicle tax and its new policy of promoting domestic automobile demand, announced in August 2001, China had become the most promising and the largest emerging automobile market of the twenty-first century. In July 2001, the Chinese government announced the ‘Automobile Industry 10-5 Plan.’ The plan required Chinese manufacturers to develop an indigenous automobile industry in cooperation with world-leading automobile manufacturers. HMC saw the opportunity to make inroads into China through a joint venture with the Beijing Automotive Holding Company (BAIC) (Lim, 2003: 58-64). HMC took over the assets of BAIC which had three obvious merits as a large-scale production base. First, as it was located one-hour away from Beijing city with a population of 13 million people, it was accessible to a large-scale market. Second, the traffic infrastructure of Beijing was sufficiently developed to support the transportation of parts and workers living in Beijing city. Third, the company could easily secure a low cost, abundant and high-quality labor force (Motors Line, January 2003: 18).

In the redesign and construction of its Beijing factory, HMC set an extremely tight deadline, which was achieved by working 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, resulting in the plant becoming operational in record time (interview with HMC former CEO and Vice Chairman, 5 July 2004). As in Turkey and India,

The main aims of the new policy were to integrate the assemblers within comprehensive automobile manufacturing industry, to build up indigenous development capabilities, and to secure export competitiveness. This amounted to a change from government-led to market-oriented development and emphasized the growth of independent Chinese automobile manufacturers.
HMC adopted a lower level of production technology in the joint venture plant than in Korean plants. With the ready availability of a low cost Chinese labor force, the company maintained a lower level of automation in the plant to reduce total investment. In the press shop, HMC utilized part of the former plant’s equipment. In the body shop, HMC automated the minimum essential processes and limited automation equipment was introduced in the paint and assembly shops. However, with the expansion of production capacity, HMC was expected to increase the level of automation (Motors Line, January 2003: 18-19).

HMC was determined to meet the tastes of Chinese consumers and market conditions in the manufacture of the Sonata. For the Chinese market it had several design changes: larger rear seat spacing; a choice of five colors; strengthened durability of the engine oil fan; raised ground clearance of 20 millimeters. Due to the low quality of Chinese-refined gasoline, HMC also replaced the fuel injector for the Sonata with an advanced model and modified the engine control unit (ECU) to optimize the engine function (Seoul Economic Daily, 19 November 2003; Motors Line, January 2003: 20).

Building on its experience in India, HMC created a local network of high-quality parts suppliers for the Chinese joint venture. Because the Chinese government applied different tariff rates on imported CBUs and parts, HMC increased the level of parts localization at the joint venture plant to lower manufacturing costs.279 Localized parts comprised bulky items with excessive transportation costs, modular and systemized parts to improve productivity, and items with excessive labor cost when produced in Korea. However, the joint venture plant imported CKD parts, such as simple extrusion parts, electric parts, and small parts, which were cheaper when purchased from Korean domestic suppliers. The Chinese local parts suppliers comprised three groups. First were Korean suppliers who had established new plants with 100 per cent equity or as a joint venture with local Chinese parts suppliers. They supplied more than two thirds of the localized parts. Second were Korean suppliers who had already started local production in China. They supplied tires, cassettes and audios. Third were Chinese local parts suppliers. From this group, the joint venture purchased the parts requiring intermediate technology, such as windows and batteries. Overall, the company had a level of parts localization of 64 per cent by 2003 (Lim, 2003: 71; Hyundai Motor Company News, 30 June 2003). HMC also made efforts to improve the quality of local parts. Suppliers were evaluated on the basis of the availability of permanent die moulds, the application of process controls, quality control and the effectiveness of the supplier’s management.

To further assist HMC’s penetration into the Chinese passenger car market, the company sought to build its distribution network. Its strategy was to build up ‘Sales, Service, Spare Parts, and System’ (4S) dealers. HMC conducted dealer training in marketing, customer satisfaction, and product knowledge. It expanded its dealer networks from Beijing to all other areas of the country. At the commencement of sales of the Sonata in December 2002, HMC had only three dealers in Beijing city, but this had increased to 70 by December 2003. HMC projected it would expand to 180 dealers across China by the end of 2004 (Motors Line, January 2003: 21; Seoul Economic Daily, 1 July 2003; Joongang ilbo, 24 December 2003; interview with HMC Executive Vice President, Marketing Division, 21 August, 2003).

HMC’s Chinese joint venture was highly successful. Expected sales of the Sonata in 2003 were 30,000 units. Halfway through 2003, sales were already 21,000 units with 23,000 secured orders. The Sonata gained a market share of 7 per cent and was fifth among the medium and luxury passenger car segments. Consequently, the joint venture raised its sales target for 2003 from 30,000 to 50,000 units, and achieved 52,000, exceeding its break-even point (Seoul Economic Daily, 8 April 2003; Korea Economic Daily, 17 November 2003). The joint venture also constructed a new engine plant producing 150,000 engines per annum and expanded the body, paint, and assembly shops to produce the Elantra for the upper small car segment. The production capacity of Beijing-Hyundai was projected to reach 200,000 units by 2005 (Seoul Economic Daily, 28 August 2003; Korea Economic Daily, 17 November 2003).

Developing a High-Tech Greenfield Plant in the USA

HMC’s fifth and most recent major overseas production facility was established as a green-field plant in the United States in 2002, primarily to circumvent the anticipated difficulties in trade relations resulting from its increased exports to the American market. Exports to the USA had risen from 90,000 units in 1998 to 346,000 in 2001, due to increased product competitiveness. High value-added exports to the USA had increased from 13.5 to 39.4 per cent in the same period. Of automobile manufacturers whose sales were over 200,000 units per annum in the USA in 2001, only HMC was without a local production base in the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA). Hence, its decision to construct an American plant (HMC, 2002: 4-8; Maeil Business Newspaper, 2 April 2002). In April 2002, HMC announced its decision to build the plant in Montgomery, Alabama with an investment of US$1.06 billion, and a new subsidiary, Hyundai Motor Manufacturing America (HUMA). Construction of the plant commenced in April 2002 and its commercial production began in May 2005 (Ward, 2005). HMC had

279 In 2002, the import tariff rate for CBUs was 50.7 per cent in the case of passenger cars with the engine displacement of more than 3.0 liters and 43.8 per cent in those with less than 3.0 liters. But the import tariff rate for the imported parts was only 23.8 per cent, substantially lower than those of CBUs.
selected four possible locations for the plant: Ohio, Alabama, Kentucky, and Mississippi, and chose Alabama because of the availability of a relatively low-cost, non-union labor force, easy accessibility, sound infrastructure, and the proximity of a port in the South, not to mention US$254.8 million worth of incentives provided by the State of Alabama (HMC, 2002: 17; Chosun Ilbo, 21 April 2002).

The Montgomery plant is fully integrated, with engine, press, body, paint, and assembly shops, and several testing facilities. Producing new versions of the Sonata and Santa Fe models, the plant has a production capacity of 235,000 units per annum assembled on a two shift basis, expanding to 300,000 units per annum on a three shifts basis when a stronghold on the American market is achieved (HMC, 2002: 10-11, 16; Hyundai Motor Company News, 22 April 2002). In the Montgomery plant HMC aims to apply the latest and most advanced production technology, aware that success there is an important indicator of its continuous development, and that wages in Korea have risen to become comparable with those in advanced Western countries. The production flexibility of the body shop was substantially increased to enable the production of four models,280 and the assembly shop can assemble monocoque and frame type models on the same production line. The automation level for the assembly shop in the Montgomery plant began at 15 per cent, 2.4 per cent higher than for HMC’s top plant, Asan, in Korea (interview with HMC former CEO and Vice Chairman, 22 August 2003; HMC, 2002: 16). The productivity of the press shop in Montgomery is anticipated to be 20 per cent higher than that of Asan and on par with the highest in the world. The productivity of the body shop is expected to be 60 per cent higher than that at Asan, while that of the paint shop is anticipated to be eight per cent higher. Productivity in the assembly and engine shops will increase to approximately 50 per cent above that of Asan. Given the sophisticated nature of the production process at the Montgomery plant, HMC established simulation assembly lines in its Korean research and development center as a training centre for key American production workers (Chappell, 2005). Highlighting the ambitious goals of HMC managers for the Montgomery plant, HMC plans to improve manufacturing quality to the level of the Lexus, perceived to be the highest quality model in the world (HMC, 2002: 16; Korea Economic Daily, 15 November 2003).

In order to achieve competitive advantage over the Toyota Camry and Honda Accord, the most popular models in the USA, HMC focused on a product localization strategy which involves improving the adaptability of its new products to the American market (Money Today, 2 April 2002). Thus, it aims to develop the successor models to the Sonata and the Santa Fe in vehicle size and interior design, with new platforms and engines, and with transmissions with higher power and performance.

As has been the case in its more recent overseas plants, HMC also implemented a sophisticated parts localization strategy for Alabama. HMMA expected to procure 320 items of parts from local suppliers, amounting to 34 per cent of the total procurement costs of the Montgomery plant. These parts are selected on the basis that they require high quality or need to satisfy the American product liability (PL) regulations, such as for bumpers, air bags, audios and seat belts. HMMA also expected to procure 410 part items from Korean domestic suppliers who will construct plants in the U.S (Courtenay, 2005). Local parts suppliers will supply mainly modular components requiring large scale investment if produced locally and bulky items requiring expensive logistics costs. Overall, HMC is preparing to reduce its procurement costs, which are substantially higher in the USA than in Korea (Financial News, 26 September 2003).

Because the procurement and wage costs of the Montgomery plant are higher than those of its Korean domestic plants, HMC has had to improve its brand value in order to justify raising the prices of its products from the Montgomery plant. Even though HMC products can successfully compete with advanced manufacturers, HMC cannot fix their price as high as its competitors because of its weaker brand value (interview with HMC Manager, Marketing Division, 21 August 2003; Korea Economic Daily, 2 April 2002). A key strategy in improving the company’s brand image has been a focus since the late-1990s on improved quality, which began in 1998 with the introduction of an unprecedented 10 year/100,000 mile power-train warranty for cars sold in the USA (Krebs, 1998). This represented an example of a self-imposed crisis, forcing company engineers to achieve new standards in engineering and production design (interview with HMC former CEO and Vice Chairman, 5 July 2004). HMC also set itself the goal of dramatically improving its standing in industry quality rankings, which it has achieved with recent quality surveys placing it at the top of volume brand cars and behind only elite brands such as Porsche and Lexus (Rechtin, 2006). Underpinning the dramatic improvement in quality has been HMC’s significant investment in the creation of North American R&D, engineering and design facilities to improve the company’s technical expertise (HMC, 2003: 61; Kim, 1997: 119-124). This is necessary for HMC as a global auto producer as the R&D and technological know-how acquired in the company’s American operations can flow to HMC’s plants in Korea and elsewhere. Hence, through its experiences in India, HMC was able to commence the establishment of a global network with product flows in both directions - between the headquarters and the subsidiaries. Investment in North America is intended to take HMC to the next level of global production in which advanced technological know-how and innovation also flow in both directions.

280 Worldwide automobile manufacturers usually produce two models in their flexible body shops.
Discussion and Conclusion

Having outlined the formation and development of HMC’s five major overseas production facilities, Table 2 provides a comparison of these plants in terms of capacity, technology, product and parts localization, marketing, and performance. As can be seen from Table 2 and from the previous review, the five subsidiaries exhibit significant differences. While all were established with a market seeking motive, the plants in Turkey and India combined these with trade seeking motives. Two plants were established as joint ventures and three were wholly-owned HMC subsidiaries. The first two establishments, in Canada and Turkey, were unsuccessful, but those in India, China and the USA have been highly successful. While there exists no apparent pattern of success due to the motivations for establishing an overseas production plant or the ownership structure of the facility, the case studies indicate that HMC learned from its earlier failures and was able to incorporate these lessons into future sources of competitiveness within a relatively short period of time. From the closure of the Canadian plant, it took only five years for the company to start the operation of the Indian plant, and seven years after this it had begun the operation of a world-class production facility in the United States with quality standards close to world’s best practice.

We suggest there are several reasons for HMC’s transition from failure to success in the creation of a global production network. First, the company’s initial failures provided important learning opportunities in the operation of production facilities in foreign contexts, as well as forcing the development of new competencies in production, supplier relations and marketing. In the case of the Canadian and Turkish experiences, investment decisions were made mainly because of a pragmatic fear of trade frictions and/or a rosy prediction of growing local demand. Importantly in both cases, HMC failed to anticipate changes in local market conditions and appeared unwilling to localize its production to suit local conditions. In addition, the Canadian plant was at the time of its construction, a technologically more advanced plant than HMC’s domestic facilities and therefore represented a significant advance on the company’s previous production experience. Combined with the management of a non-Korean workforce (Lansbury, Kwon, & Suh, 2006), the Canadian experiment appears to have been beyond the company’s existing capabilities (see also Kim & Lee, 2001: 331). While the Turkish plant was a more labor-intensive operation, unfavorable market conditions and low technical competence hindered sales and exports, thereby also limiting the success of this venture.

See Table 2

The turnaround in the company’s globalization strategy began with the construction of the Indian facility, where HMC utilized its experience in more routine labor-intensive, mass production and combined this with a recognition of the need to tailor its offshore production facilities to fit the local context; what HMC termed its ‘glocalization’ strategy (interview with HMC Export Planning Team Manager, 5 July 2004; HMC, 2003: 60). Examination of the localization and marketing strategies of each plant shows that HMC adopted more locally appropriate strategies in India, China and the USA compared with Canada and Turkey. In particular, in the later subsidiaries the localization of the product is attributable to the specific demand conditions of the local markets. Parts localization levels were higher as well, indicating that the supplier networks were adequately developed, incorporating both local suppliers and subsidiaries of Korean suppliers. The Indian plant was the first HMC overseas plant to export to neighboring countries, and eventually to HMC in Korea itself. This success in India contributed significantly to HMC establishing a global network, in which the company not only exported CKDs to subsidiaries, but also increasingly imported from them as well, indicating that a successful transfer of technological know-how from the head office to subsidiaries. Core parts produced in the subsidiary in a less developed country are now fully integrated into HMC’s global production network.

The process of organizational learning also involved the development of formalized procedures and the transfer of experienced staff within HMC’s operations. For example, when the first two plants were established, there was no formal strategy or guidelines for overseas production within HMC. Following the failure of the Canadian and Turkish operations, HMC developed comprehensive internal guidelines and strategies for establishing a foreign plant that contributed to the improved performance of its later establishments. Hence one of the key ways HMC were able to learn from their previous mistakes was through the codification of experience through formal plans and guidelines for offshore production, resulting in explicit knowledge which could guide future action. Added to this, HMC also focused on the internal transfer of staff experienced in the company’s earlier overseas production efforts to its later offshore facilities. Senior managers and production engineers involved in the Canadian and Indian plants went on to apply their experience and learning in the later Chinese and US operations (interviews with HMC former CEO and Vice Chairman, 22 August 2003 & 5 July 2004). In this way, tacit knowledge developed during the company’s earlier overseas production attempts was not lost but incorporated back into the planning process, ensuring mistakes were not repeated. More recently, internal knowledge exchange has extended to the training of American employees within the company’s Korean R&D facilities.

A further aspect of HMC’s learning process that was utilized in globalizing its production
operations, involved the establishment of ambitious benchmarks and goals by senior managers. As noted in the description of the various overseas facilities, this included aggressive construction deadlines, production targets and quality benchmarks. These were reinforced by an overarching corporate goal to become a Top Five global car maker by 2007 (HMC, 2003: 60). As Kim (1998) has argued in relation to HMC’s earlier ‘catching up’ phase, such internally generated ‘crises’ increase the intensity of organizational learning by focusing the attention of all organizational participants on a clearly articulated performance gap and increasing the intensity of effort or organizational learning. As has been highlighted, the use of such internal ‘crises’ has been a key part of reinventing the company towards high quality car production and away from a reputation of low cost products, culminating in the establishment of the company’s most sophisticated production facility in the US utilizing state of the art production methods. The example of the latest American production plant, significant investment in R&D, and success in achieving the number one ranking for quality in volume car brands, suggests that HMC through the globalization of its production network has indeed moved beyond an imitative learning strategy and is now involved in a process of innovative learning (Kim, 1997; 1998).

As the case of HMC highlights, the establishment of global production facilities can provide valuable learning opportunities to enhance a firm’s competitive advantage, by challenging existing capabilities and forcing organizational change and improvement. However, for the development of new capabilities to occur firms need to develop mechanisms which promote organizational learning and the internalization of such global lessons. Harnessing such learning requires practices which promote the sharing of both explicit knowledge of globalization (such as formal policies and guidelines), as well as tacit knowledge (for example the rotation of experienced employees across global operations). Further, such learning processes can be intensified through the generation of aggressive goals and internally generated ‘crises’. Most importantly however, this case suggests that such learning needs to accommodate the relevance of initial mistakes in attempts at establishing a global production network. It is the learning and knowledge that develops from such initial failure which can provide the expertise necessary for future success.
Table 1: Production, Domestic Sales and Exports of HMC (1970 – 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Domestic Sales</th>
<th>Exports</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>Units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4630</td>
<td>4225 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>6989</td>
<td>6966 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>7092</td>
<td>7321 100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>19289</td>
<td>18015 93.3</td>
<td>1042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>104815</td>
<td>80798 77.1</td>
<td>19510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>61239</td>
<td>47903 78.2</td>
<td>16244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>90983</td>
<td>72910 80.1</td>
<td>17543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>140871</td>
<td>88854 63.1</td>
<td>50379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>241000</td>
<td>107000 44.3</td>
<td>120000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>607000</td>
<td>188000 31.0</td>
<td>408000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>647000</td>
<td>237000 36.5</td>
<td>408000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>614000</td>
<td>389000 63.3</td>
<td>215000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>516000 67.0</td>
<td>255000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>996000</td>
<td>653000 65.6</td>
<td>350000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1273000</td>
<td>784000 61.6</td>
<td>495000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1347000</td>
<td>710000 52.7</td>
<td>611000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>899000</td>
<td>324000 36.0</td>
<td>623000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>1307000</td>
<td>571000 43.7</td>
<td>703000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1583000</td>
<td>647000 40.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>1555000</td>
<td>707000 45.5</td>
<td>843000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1758000</td>
<td>770000 43.8</td>
<td>984000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: HMC, 2003*
Table 2: Cross-Case Comparison of HMC’s Five Major Production Plants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Capacity (units p.a.)</strong></td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>60,000</td>
<td>120,000</td>
<td>Initially 50,000. Estimated increase to 1,000,000 by 2010.</td>
<td>Estimated initial production 235,000, later to 300,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type of FDI</strong></td>
<td>Greenfield, wholly owned subsidiary.</td>
<td>Joint venture (Kibar Business Group).</td>
<td>Greenfield, wholly owned subsidiary.</td>
<td>Joint venture (Beijing City).</td>
<td>Greenfield, wholly owned subsidiary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selection of Location</strong></td>
<td>Driven by local government land &amp; subsidies.</td>
<td>Pre-determined.</td>
<td>Based on local parts suppliers, labor force &amp; absence of labor unions.</td>
<td>Pre-determined but optimal location in terms of market, logistics &amp; available labor.</td>
<td>Based on low-cost, high quality labor force, logistics &amp; infrastructure.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>USA</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Product Localization</strong></td>
<td>Low level of product localization, single model (<em>Sonata</em>).</td>
<td>Focus on small cars and minibus lines. No significant modification.</td>
<td>Medium price &amp; high quality focus. Product customization for Indian market.</td>
<td>Modification of specifications given local conditions.</td>
<td>Localization of vehicle size, interior design. Strong emphasis on improved quality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parts Localization</strong></td>
<td>Main components imported from Korea.</td>
<td>Low localization rate.</td>
<td>Facilitated joint ventures of subsidiaries of Korean &amp; local suppliers. Emphasis on quality control.</td>
<td>Strong emphasis on Korea subsidiaries &amp; carefully selected local suppliers (64% localization rate in 2003).</td>
<td>Very high ratio of local supply &amp; Korean subsidiaries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Performance</strong></td>
<td>Failure (low quality, low technology). Low level of product design and precision. High supply costs and unreliable logistics.</td>
<td>Failure given decreasing sales over time. Domestic demand not favorable. Exports limited due to quality problems.</td>
<td>Highly successful. Increasing market share, and profits. Began exporting in 2000 to other developing countries. Becomes a supply base for core components and other parts.</td>
<td>Highly successful. Surpassed the sales target in 2003. By 2004 exceeding the break even point.</td>
<td>Yet to be evaluated, although constructed on time and a belief that it will achieved near best practice standards.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
References


**Contact Address**
Chung-Sok Suh,
The University of New South Wales,
Sydney, NSW, 2052 Australia
PH: (61-2) 9385-4466
FAX: (61-2) 9385-5622
EMAIL: c.suh@unsw.edu.au
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