Down to the Filter: Tobacco Control and the Case of the New Zealand Smoke-free Environments Act 1990-2011

Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the New Zealand Smoke-free Environments Act 1990 and its 2011 Amendment, the Smoke-free Environments (Controls and Enforcement) Amendment Act. New Zealand is argued to be a unique case for the study of tobacco control, building upon Studlar's argument that it was very advanced for a non-federal state. The main focus is on the development of this particular tobacco control policy, and seeks to explain why the policy was created. The historical institutionalist approach forms the theoretical framework employed. This framework emphasises the importance of past policy work as well as stressing the importance of normative and ideological institutional constraints upon policy creation. This thesis argues that the development and creation of the Smoke-free Environments Act 1990 is characterised by elements of Kingdon's multiple stream framework, Studlar's 'moralistic populism', punctuated equilibrium and critical juncture theory as well as the concept of the policy entrepreneur. Studlar's 'leapfrogging' argument was analysed in an attempt to apply it to the country level of analysis. The findings discovered that Studlar's 'leapfrogging' model would be difficult to apply to the nation state level. The ultimate explanatory factor in regards to both pieces of legislation was a combination of factors. The historical institutionalist approach ensured that important historical policy experiences were analysed. Also important were the concepts of policy entrepreneurship, the power of ideas and the punctuated equilibrium model. A framing analysis of select committee submissions from both 1990 and 2011 is included, as it gives important insight into the relationship between policy and institutional effects at the time of the legislation. The 2011 Amendment represents an important case for the historical institutionalist approach - what changed, institutionally, between 1990 and 2011? The 2011 legislation featured a markedly different institutional framework compared to that of 1990. A rising level of 'moralistic populism', combined with institutional change caused by the actors behind the original legislation, were responsible for the institutional changes that occurred between the two points of legislation.