dc.contributor.author |
Armantier, O |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Sbai, Erwann |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2012-02-23T00:24:33Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2006 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
Journal of Applied Econometrics 21(6):745-779 2006 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
1099-1255 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/11691 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
The structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty, are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. A counter-factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auctions’ participants. |
en |
dc.publisher |
John Wiley & Sons Ltd. |
en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Journal of Applied Econometrics |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from: http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0883-7252/ |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.title |
Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric |
en |
dc.type |
Journal Article |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1002/jae.875 |
en |
pubs.issue |
6 |
en |
pubs.begin-page |
745 |
en |
pubs.volume |
21 |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. |
en |
pubs.end-page |
779 |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Article |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
98463 |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Business and Economics |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Economics |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2010-09-01 |
en |