Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric

Show simple item record Armantier, O en Sbai, Erwann en 2012-02-23T00:24:33Z en 2006 en
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Applied Econometrics 21(6):745-779 2006 en
dc.identifier.issn 1099-1255 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract The structural parameters of a share-auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty, are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. A counter-factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform-price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auctions’ participants. en
dc.publisher John Wiley & Sons Ltd. en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of Applied Econometrics en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from: en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1002/jae.875 en
pubs.issue 6 en
pubs.begin-page 745 en
pubs.volume 21 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: John Wiley & Sons Ltd. en
pubs.end-page 779 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 98463 en Business and Economics en Economics en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2010-09-01 en

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