Abstract:
Good governance has been core to development policy since the 1990s; however, a mixed record of success has resulted in significant debate on the possibility and value of this core emphasis. This thesis contributes to this debate by using the case of Cambodia‘s decentralisation and deconcentration reforms to show the difficult and complex relations between good governance reforms and existing patterns of governance, described here as neopatrimonial. Using a historical institutional lens, field interviews with sub-national officials from one Cambodian province, and other key stakeholders familiar with these reforms, were analysed to understand the context, historical process, and consequences of Cambodia‘s reforms of governance at commune and district levels. The findings show that the reforms have not rolled out as donors and reformers had intended as limited opportunities are provided for sub-national administrations to improve their institutional capacity and to be more responsive and accountable to the people. Different aspects of the reforms were adopted, changed, ignored, or rejected by both central and local government elites and donors as they grappled with deeply embedded and powerfully informal social, political, and cultural dynamics at all levels. This has led to the current situation of complexities, layering, and a hybrid situation where neopatrimonial practices persist in the face of democracy. One of the major weaknesses with the reforms is the failure to engage the informal arrangements (neopatrimonialism and Leninist system), which are in fact the dominant governance practices in Cambodia. To be more effective, good governance reforms in Cambodia, as well as in other neopatrimonial countries, must be implemented in more practical ways which take into consideration the local context, including its complex institutional layers and strong persistence of local practices.
