Equalizing Opportunities Globally: Objections, Justifications, and the Way Forward

Abstract

How inclusive the scope of justice is, what we take the unit of moral concern to be, and what principles we think are globally relevant are pressing questions in light of the world in which we currently live. Our answers to each of these questions heavily bear on the life chances of literally billions of people who suffer and die every year unnecessarily. Over one billion people still live in abject poverty and survive on less that $1 a day, and at least ten million children die each year before they reach the age of five. These are shocking figures when we take into account that almost all of these children are from poor communities - in short, millions of children die every year simply because of where they are born. It is clear that this is a source of severe injustice for persons who are not lucky enough to have been born into western societies. This thesis concerns itself with this injustice, and attempts to answer each of these questions with the goal of motivating real world change. I argue that the scope of justice is global, that the unit of moral concern should be persons, and that at least one justified global principle is a principle of equal opportunities. I survey some of the strongest arguments against this principle; examine two recent formulations of the ideal; as well as some of the recent objections and problems leveled against it. I claim that the principle is justified on the grounds that it satisfies the conditions of a realistic utopia, and that it remains sensitive to global cultural diversity and choice. In closing, I tentatively suggest ways of formulating realistically utopian accounts of global justice; however, my main objective is to contribute to the debate which has global justice as its aim, and to justify our obligations to others based on a global principle of equal opportunities.