Patent Licensing with Spillovers

Show simple item record Aoki, Reiko en Tauman, Yair en 2006-11-30T20:53:21Z en 2006-11-30T20:53:21Z en 1998 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 181 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract The purpose of this paper is to study the effect of spillover on extent of licensing when cost reducing innovation is introduced and licensed to a number of oligopolistic firms. We characterize the equilibrium number of licenses that are sold through an auction. An increase in the number of licenses has two effects. First, it increases the competition between the licensees. Second, due to spillover, the non-licensees become more efficient contributing to even more competition. We find that despite these effects, a patentee of a significant innovation will sell more licenses when there is spillover than without spillover thereby inducing even more competition. In this case, consumer surplus will be greater with spillover. However, if the innovation is less significant, then the patentee will sell less licenses with spillover thereby restrict competition. In this case the market price will be higher and the consumer surplus will be smaller. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title Patent Licensing with Spillovers en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights en Economics en

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