Auction Beats Posted Prices in a Small Market

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Show simple item record Julien, Benoit en Kennes, John en King, Ian en 2006-11-30T20:53:24Z en 2006-11-30T20:53:24Z en 2002 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 226 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract In a model with two buyers and sellers we consider the choice of sales mechanism from three possibilities: posted prices, and auctions with and without reserve prices. With homogenous goods, sellers expected revenues are highest when both sellers auction with reserve prices 33% higher than if posting prices and 100% higher than if auctioning without reserve prices. When sellers can choose their mechanism before choosing prices, both sellers auction with a reserve price in the dominant strategy equilibrium. With heterogenous goods, the equilibrium with posted prices is inefficient (Montgomery (1991)) but the equilibria with both types of auctions are efficient. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.other Coordination en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title Auction Beats Posted Prices in a Small Market en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights en Economics en

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