Abstract:
Unlike most coalition studies, which are primarily concerned with the major parties, this article focuses on the costs of coalition for small parties. As the experiences of a number of countries demonstrate, the costs of coalition are unevenly shared, with major parties generally incurring low costs and small parties high costs. This article will focus on the impact of coalitions on New Zealand’s small parliamentary parties by considering whether the benefits of increased representation and influence under a proportional voting system have outweighed the costs. In particular, it will look at the implications of joining a coalition for a small party’s internal stability and votes. In exploring the risks that are associated with the various governing arrangements, it will propose a framework consisting of three variables: bargaining power; ability to make decisions based on the party’s future success; and proximity to government. Attention will be paid to the various cost-reduction strategies, including accepting portfolios whilst remaining outside government. Finally, the article will ask whether public criticism of a small party’s coalition utility and efficacy are particular features of countries with long two-party traditions
