Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game

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dc.contributor.author Chaudhuri, Ananish en
dc.contributor.author Khan, Sarah en
dc.contributor.author Lakshmiratan, Aishwarya en
dc.contributor.author Py, Anne-Laure en
dc.contributor.author Shah, Lisa en
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-30T20:53:26Z en
dc.date.available 2006-11-30T20:53:26Z en
dc.date.issued 2003 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 247 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/160 en
dc.description.abstract We use a two-person extensive form bargaining game to examine individual's trusting and reciprocal behavior and how those relate to their scores on a trust survey. In keeping with prior research, we find that the 'self-interested' outcome is rejected by a majority of individuals. People who score high on the trust survey are both trusting and are also trustworthy, in that they reciprocate others' trust. But, people with low trust scores often exhibit trust but are not trustworthy. These 'inconsistent trusters' seem to be interested in exploiting the trust and trustworthiness of others in increasing their own payoff. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.subject.other Trust en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title Trust and Trustworthiness in a Sequential Bargaining Game en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess en
pubs.org-id Economics en


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