Ideology, Asymmetric Information, and Campaign Contributions to Politicians

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dc.contributor.author Boyce, John en
dc.date.accessioned 2006-11-30T20:53:29Z en
dc.date.available 2006-11-30T20:53:29Z en
dc.date.issued 1998 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 177 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/165 en
dc.description.abstract This paper considers a model of interest group competition to influence policy outcomes when politicians and some interest groups hold private information about the polic y preferences (ideology) of politicians. Politicians cannot credibly reveal their ideology to others because all politician types prefer more campaign contributions to fewer. However, informed interest groups do convey some information about politician_s type by their contributions. If an uninformed group is a friend (it prefers moving the given policy in the same direction as the informed group), the informed group will truthfully reveal whether or not the politician is receptive to contributions. However, if the uninformed group is an enemy (it prefers a policy movement in the opposite direction), with the same signal the informed group only partially reveals whether the politician is receptive to contributions from its enemies. Empirical evidence is presented that supports the hypothesis that political action committee contributions are informative as well as persuasive. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title Ideology, Asymmetric Information, and Campaign Contributions to Politicians en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/OpenAccess en
pubs.org-id Economics en


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