The Maxim Criterion and Randomised Behaviour Reconsidered

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Show simple item record Ryan, Matthew en 2006-11-30T20:53:29Z en 2006-11-30T20:53:29Z en 1999 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 191 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract Mixed strategy equilibria are often regarded as unconvincing behavioral predictions (eg. Stahl (1988)). Furthermore, while many games possess mixed equilibria, explicit randomization is rare in practice. We argue that both problems arise because conventional game theory excludes maximin behavior. By considering a generalization of Nash equilibrium, we prove that there exist plausible equilibria for 2 x 2 games which involve randomized choice. Interestingly, the randomizing player always adopts a maximin strategy. Maximin behavior is therefore crucial to explaining randomization. We also prove that games with randomized equilibria are non-generic, hence unlikely to be observed in practice. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.other Maximum criterion en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title The Maxim Criterion and Randomised Behaviour Reconsidered en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights en Economics en

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