Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners

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dc.contributor.author Elkind, E en
dc.contributor.author Faliszewski, P en
dc.contributor.author Slinko, Arkadii en
dc.date.accessioned 2012-05-07T01:40:32Z en
dc.date.issued 2011 en
dc.identifier.citation Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 42:529-573 2011 en
dc.identifier.issn 1076-9757 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/17779 en
dc.description.abstract We consider the problem of manipulating elections by cloning candidates. In our model, a manipulator can replace each candidate c by several clones, i.e., new candidates that are so similar to c that each voter simply replaces c in his vote with a block of these new candidates, ranked consecutively. The outcome of the resulting election may then depend on the number of clones as well as on how each voter orders the clones within the block. We formalize what it means for a cloning manipulation to be successful (which turns out to be a surprisingly delicate issue), and, for a number of common voting rules, characterize the preference profiles for which a successful cloning manipulation exists. We also consider the model where there is a cost associated with producing each clone, and study the complexity of finding a minimum-cost cloning manipulation. Finally, we compare cloning with two related problems: the problem of control by adding candidates and the problem of possible (co)winners when new alternatives can join. en
dc.publisher Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from: http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/1076-9757/ en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.title Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners en
dc.type Journal Article en
pubs.begin-page 529 en
pubs.volume 42 en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence en
pubs.end-page 573 en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 241860 en
pubs.org-id Science en
pubs.org-id Mathematics en
pubs.arxiv-id 1401.4602 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2011-11-19 en


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