The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence

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Show simple item record Boyce, John en Bischak, Diane en 2006-11-30T20:53:34Z en 2006-11-30T20:53:34Z en 1998 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 176 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract This paper considers a model of political two-party competition over multiple policies when each policy is the domain of a particular legislative committee. Each party is composed of members who differ in their ideological preferences over policies but who have similar weightings of the importance of particular policies. Each committee acts to select policies in its own domain, subject to approval by the floor. The parties select committee memberships to maximize the density-weighted joint utility of its members, subject to institutional restrictions on committee compositions. Parties may choose either to accommodate or confront one another in committee assignments. For issues of importance to only one party, accommodation is shown to be the optimal strategy, and the committee appears as a classical preference outlier. For policies important to both parties, confrontation occurs, and the committee membership will be a bipolar preference outlier. Interest group ratings data from the U.S. House of Representatives are utilized to support this theory. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title The Role of Political Parties in the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights en Economics en

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