dc.contributor.author |
Hazledine, Timothy |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2012-05-31T03:15:37Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2006 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
Economics Letters 93(3):413-420 2006 |
en |
dc.identifier.issn |
0165-1765 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/18833 |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
The standard Cournot–Nash oligopoly model is extended to encompass price discrimination, where firms charge more than one price for the same product based on willingness to pay. In the linear, symmetric case, the average price is not dependent on the extent of price discrimination. |
en |
dc.publisher |
Elsevier B.V. |
en |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
Economics Letters |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0165-1765/ |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.title |
Price Discrimination in Cournot-Nash Oligopoly |
en |
dc.type |
Journal Article |
en |
dc.identifier.doi |
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.06.006 |
en |
pubs.issue |
3 |
en |
pubs.begin-page |
413 |
en |
pubs.volume |
93 |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: Elsevier B.V. |
en |
pubs.end-page |
420 |
en |
dc.rights.accessrights |
http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess |
en |
pubs.subtype |
Article |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
70209 |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Business and Economics |
en |
pubs.org-id |
Economics |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2010-09-01 |
en |