Health Insurance in the Presence of Physician Price Discrimination

Show simple item record Vaithianathan, Rhema en 2006-11-30T20:53:37Z en 2006-11-30T20:53:37Z en 1998 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 182 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We model equilibrium in the health insurance market, when a monopolistic physician price discriminates on the basis of coinsurance rates. The physician extracts surplus created in the insurance market, leading to some consumers remaining uninsured. This 'hold-up' problem is solved if the physician and insurer integrate or enter a price agreement prior to writing the insurance contract. Both approaches improve insurer and physician profitability, and restore complete insurance market coverage. This paper therefore explains both partial insurance market coverage and the emergence of various contractual and ownership arrangements in the health insurance industry. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title Health Insurance in the Presence of Physician Price Discrimination en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en
dc.rights.accessrights en Economics en

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