The problem of rationality: an historicist approach for philosophy of education

Abstract

This thesis in philosophy of education is to be read as an exercise in interpretation as much as a philosophical argument. Structurally, it comprises three parts. The first relates to the interpretation of a mainstream philosophical tradition, and is designed to provide the necessary historical background and context for understanding analytic philosophy of education. The second deals with analytic philosophy of education in terms of its methodological limitations, and compares and contrasts three contemporary theories of knowledge in education. The third and final section is an attempt to advocate a Wittgensteinian-inspired research programme in philosophy of education which both draws on existing aspects of analytic philosophy of education, and which remains consistent with wider developments in philosophy, hermeneutics and social theory. The main theme running through each of the three sections is an argument and interpretation of two epistemic notions of rationality . I am concerned to present an analytic philosophy and its recent sibling tradition in education as attempts to set up, a priori, an absolute and a historical notion of rationality. My aim is to understand the philosophical motivation behind this view and to examine its intellectual underpinnings. I argue against this conception of rationality by reference to an Hegelian interpretation of the later Wittgenstein, which, then, becomes the basis for the new research programme I advocate in philosophy of education.