Justice and disability: A perspective from political philosophy

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dc.contributor.advisor Wilkinson, M en
dc.contributor.author Dixon, Peter en
dc.date.accessioned 2013-02-03T20:44:28Z en
dc.date.issued 2013 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/19973 en
dc.description Full text is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland only. en
dc.description.abstract The inability to achieve ends is an endemic problem for any human being, yet it is a particularly acute problem for the disabled. Political theory has largely neglected disability in defining a picture of human rationality by reference to their claims and perspectives. My thesis shall argue for a particular way of examining justice for the disabled. In the first chapter I argue that disability is defined by individual’s relation to the social architecture which constructs their experience in society. I shall also argue that disability is defined by reference to the experience of inabilities which are due to mental or physical impairments. Disability is defined by reference to the experience of these kinds of disadvantage. In the second chapter I argue that we should attempt to treat the claims of disability in a way that is consistent with the equal consideration of all. I show that we can reconceptualise the social contract to accommodate the claims of the disabled in a manner which is reasonable for all. I also argue that disabled individuals’ equal standing in society should be conceived of in terms of midfare or advantage. The disabled should also ideally have equal access to these goods. In the third chapter I argue that the heterogeneous currency of equality that I propose will need to bypass the lack of substitutability between different kinds of goods. I argue that the lack of substitutability does not entail a lack of comparison. Hence I argue that because we can compare goods this means that we can look to the extent that disabled individuals’ absolute access to those goods. Indeed there is a prima facie case to suggest that the disabled lack access to these goods and as such are worthy of compensatory measures. In the absence of indicators which show a low absolute level of access to goods we can appeal to a modified conception of deliberative democracy in order to ascertain whether the disabled constitute the worst off. We can ascertain the level of advantage that the disabled experience in the absence of absolute indicators by appealing to a deliberative democratic procedure which is informed by measurements of all categories of advantage. en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartof Masters Thesis - University of Auckland en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights Restricted Item. Available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland. en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.rights.uri http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/nz/ en
dc.title Justice and disability: A perspective from political philosophy en
dc.type Thesis en
thesis.degree.grantor The University of Auckland en
thesis.degree.level Masters en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The Author en
pubs.elements-id 372844 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2013-02-04 en
dc.identifier.wikidata Q112899890


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