Abstract:
That we are able to recurrently employ natural language in creative modes is one of its most fundamental properties—seemingly infinite possibilities from finite means. One of the phenomena mentioned frequently in this regard is that of metonymy or transfers of reference and/or meaning, where potentially any lexical item may, in the right context, be used to denote or mean something which is not part of that lexical item’s conventional specification. Classic examples of this are “The ham sandwich left without paying,” and “I’m parked out back.” Traditionally such cases were analysed as transfers of (Fregian) reference, but the more recently dominant position of Nunberg (1995, 2004) claims that the relevant shifts are in the meanings or senses of predicates and head nouns. This approach has since remained essentially undisputed, and important recent work in the field of pragmatics by the likes of Levinson (2000), Recanati (2004, 2010), and Huang (2007/2013) for the most part only mentions Nunberg’s account as the status quo. The papers by Cruse (2004) and Ward (2004) are rare examples of proper critique directed at the theory of meaning transfer, but while these authors may make convincing work of the ‘destructive’ side, their attention then turns to detailing how Nunberg’s ideas cannot be used to capture the particular related phenomenon in which they are interested. Despite the known dissatisfaction with the dominant theory, a significant attempt is yet to be made at proposing a comprehensive alternative. This research provides additional criticism of the standard Nunbergian account, arguing that in order to achieve a more complete description of the data, at least a partial return to reference transfer is required. The architecture for an alternative theory is based on Kripke’s (1977) SEMANTIC REFERENCE VS. SPEAKER’S REFERENCE, set within a modern programme of NEO-GRICEAN PRAGMATICS (Levinson, 2000) and informed by the so-called NEW THEORY OF REFERENCE (Donnellan, 1966, 1970; Kripke, 1972/1980, 1977, 1979; Kaplan, 1977/1989; Abbott, 2010).