Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under IC behaviour

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dc.contributor.author Wilson, Mark en
dc.contributor.author Pritchard, Geoffrey en
dc.date.accessioned 2012-03-13T18:54:49Z en
dc.date.accessioned 2013-11-13T03:11:50Z en
dc.date.issued 2009 en
dc.identifier.citation Mathematical Social Sciences 58(1):35-57 2009 en
dc.identifier.issn 0165-4896 en
dc.identifier.uri http://hdl.handle.net/2292/21089 en
dc.description.abstract We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under impartial culture voter behaviour.We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters who must be recruited to form a manipulating coalition. It is shown that the manipulation problem may be well approximated by a very simple linear program in two variables. This permits a comparative analysis of the asymptotic (large-population) manipulability of the various rules. It is seen that the manipulation resistance of positional rules with 5 or 6 (or more) candidates is quite different from the more commonly analyzed three- and four-candidate cases. en
dc.publisher Elsevier en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Mathematical Social Sciences en
dc.relation.replaces http://hdl.handle.net/2292/14163 en
dc.relation.replaces 2292/14163 en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from http://www.sherpa.ac.uk/romeo/issn/0165-4896/ en
dc.rights.uri https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm en
dc.title Asymptotics of the minimum manipulating coalition size for positional voting rules under IC behaviour en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.004 en
pubs.issue 1 en
pubs.begin-page 35 en
pubs.volume 58 en
pubs.end-page 57 en
dc.rights.accessrights http://purl.org/eprint/accessRights/RestrictedAccess en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 86028 en
pubs.org-id Science en
pubs.org-id School of Computer Science en
pubs.org-id Statistics en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2010-09-01 en


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