Coordination via Polling in Plurality Voting Games under Inertia

Show simple item record Reyhani, R en Wilson, Mark en Khazaei, J en
dc.coverage.spatial Krakow en 2013-11-29T00:12:55Z en 2012 en
dc.identifier.citation COMSOC 2012, Krakow, 11 Sep 2012 - 13 Sep 2012. 12 pages. 2012 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We discuss a new model for strategic voting in plurality elections under uncertainty. In particular, we introduce the concept of inertia to capture players’ uncertainty about poll accuracy. We use a sequence of pre-election polls as a source of partial information. Under some behavioural assumptions, we show how this sequence can help agents to coordinate on an equilibrium outcome. We study the model analytically under some special distributions of inertia, and present some simulation results for more general distributions. Some special cases of our model yield a voting rule closely related to the Instant Runoff voting rule and give insight into the political science principle known as Duverger’s law. Our results show that the type of equilibrium and the speed of convergence to equilibrium depend strongly on the distribution of inertia and the preferences of agents. en
dc.relation.ispartof COMSOC 2012 en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Coordination via Polling in Plurality Voting Games under Inertia en
dc.type Conference Item en en
pubs.finish-date 2012-09-13 en
pubs.publication-status Published en
pubs.start-date 2012-09-11 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Proceedings en
pubs.elements-id 365704 en Science en School of Computer Science en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2012-11-29 en

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