The Mortensen Rule and Efficient Coordination Unemployment

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Show simple item record Julien, Benoit en Kennes, John en King, Ian en 2006-11-30T20:53:45Z en 2006-11-30T20:53:45Z en 2002 en
dc.identifier.citation Department of Economics Working Paper Series 231 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract We study the implementation of constrained-efficient allocations in labour markets where a basic coordination problem leads to an equilibrium matching function. We argue that these allocations can be achieved in equilibrium if wages are determined by ex post bidding. This holds true even in finite sized markets where the equilibrium matching function has decreasing returns to scale where the Hosios rule does not apply to both with and without heterogeneity. This wage determination mechanism is similar to the one proposed by Mortensen (1982) in a different setting. en
dc.format.extent application/pdf en
dc.format.mimetype text en
dc.language.iso en en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Department of Economics Working Paper Series (1997-2006) en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.subject.other Coordination en
dc.subject.other Economics en
dc.title The Mortensen Rule and Efficient Coordination Unemployment en
dc.type Working Paper en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: the author en Economics en

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