Abstract:
David Miller offers us a sophisticated account of how we can reconcile global obligations and duties to co‐nationals. In this article I focus on four weaknesses with his account such as the following two. First, there remains considerable unclarity about the strength of the positive duties we have to non‐nationals and how these measure up relative to other positive duties, such as the ones Miller believes we have to co‐nationals to implement civil, political, or social rights. Second, just how responsibilities for enacting our global commitments will be assigned still needs further development. A unifying theme of my criticisms concerns Miller’s account of how we are to mediate responsibilities to fellow‐nationals and the partiality we may defensibly show co‐nationals. In the final section I sketch an alternative way of conceptualizing our duties to fellow‐nationals and duties to non‐nationals, which can give more systematic advice about the partiality we may defensibly show co‐nationals.
