Meekness and 'moral' anger

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Show simple item record Pettigrove, Glen en 2014-11-25T23:51:34Z en 2012-01 en
dc.identifier.citation Ethics, 2012, 122 (2), pp. 341 - 370 en
dc.identifier.issn 0014-1704 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract If asked to generate a list of virtues, most people would not include meekness. So it is surprising that Hume deems it not only a virtue, but one whose "tendency to the good of society no one can doubt of." After explaining what Hume and his contemporaries meant by ‘meekness’, the essay proceeds to argue that meekness is a virtue we, too, should endorse. en
dc.relation.ispartofseries Ethics en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. Details obtained from en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Meekness and 'moral' anger en
dc.type Journal Article en
dc.identifier.doi 10.1086/663230 en
pubs.issue 2 en
pubs.begin-page 341 en
pubs.volume 122 en
dc.description.version AM - Accepted Manuscript en
pubs.end-page 370 en
dc.rights.accessrights en
pubs.subtype Article en
pubs.elements-id 340943 en
dc.identifier.eissn 1539-297X en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2012-08-24 en

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