Contemporary Virtue-Ethical Accounts of Right Action

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dc.contributor.advisor Pettigrove, G en
dc.contributor.advisor Swanton, C en
dc.contributor.advisor Hursthouse, R en Smith, Nicholas en 2015-01-07T00:39:58Z en 2014 en
dc.identifier.citation 2014 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description.abstract A longstanding objection to contemporary virtue ethics is that it cannot adequately account for the rightness of action. Promising to silence this objection, a variety of accounts of right action have been developed and defended by virtue ethicists in recent years. This thesis examines both the nature of virtue ethics and the adequacy of virtue-ethical accounts of right action. Focusing on the three most prominent virtue-ethical accounts of right action – Michael Slote’s agent-based account, Rosalind Hursthouse’s qualified-agent account, and Christine Swanton’s target-centered account – it argues that a modified version of the targetcentered account is most plausible. en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartof PhD Thesis - University of Auckland en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Contemporary Virtue-Ethical Accounts of Right Action en
dc.type Thesis en The University of Auckland en Doctoral en PhD en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The Author en
pubs.elements-id 471879 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2015-01-07 en

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