dc.contributor.advisor |
Mulgan, T |
en |
dc.contributor.author |
Rennes, Leif |
en |
dc.date.accessioned |
2015-01-07T01:54:29Z |
en |
dc.date.issued |
2013 |
en |
dc.identifier.citation |
2013 |
en |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2292/23974 |
en |
dc.description |
Full text is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland only. |
en |
dc.description.abstract |
Plato’s Euthyphro dilemma serves as a useful tool to draw a dividing line through theistic metaethical positions. On the one hand, a theist might embrace the existence moral standards which derive their truth independently of god. On the other hand, they might take the position that any truth that can be attributed to moral standards will inevitably be derived from the very existence of god himself. Consequently, theists who take these positions tend to assert god as a moral entity to varying degrees, the latter more so than the former. Regardless of the degree to which theists assert god in moral discourse, they do so to a higher degree than their rival secular ethicists, who essentially leave god out of the moral picture altogether. It appears unavoidable then that no matter which metaethical position the theist takes, they inevitably assert more entities into moral discourse than secularists do. Where rival moral theories are concerned then, the application of Ockham’s Razor should tip the scales in favour of the moral positions which assert the fewer number of entities, and thus require the least number of assumptions. The focus of this thesis, then, is to investigate the assumptions required for both theistic and secular moral positions and demonstrate that a correct application of Ockham’s razor should favour moral theories which fall under the secular banner, as opposed to theistic theories which assert more entities, and thus require more assumptions. |
en |
dc.publisher |
ResearchSpace@Auckland |
en |
dc.relation.ispartof |
Masters Thesis - University of Auckland |
en |
dc.rights |
Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. |
en |
dc.rights |
Restricted Item. Available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland. |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/docs/uoa-docs/rights.htm |
en |
dc.rights.uri |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/nz/ |
en |
dc.title |
Multiplying Entities Beyond Necessity: The Euthyphro Dilemma, God, Morality and Ockham’s Razor. |
en |
dc.type |
Thesis |
en |
thesis.degree.grantor |
The University of Auckland |
en |
thesis.degree.level |
Masters |
en |
dc.rights.holder |
Copyright: The Author |
en |
pubs.elements-id |
471893 |
en |
pubs.record-created-at-source-date |
2015-01-07 |
en |
dc.identifier.wikidata |
Q112901343 |
|