Neutrality in British Concession Ports 1856-1895

Abstract

In the ‘long’ nineteenth century (1815-1914), neutrality was connected to Britain's traditional realms of power and international influence, namely through naval warfare and sea-borne trade. The Declaration of Paris, issued in 1856, was a milestone treaty that determined neutral and belligerent behaviour both at sea and on land. Regulating neutrality was one way in which Great Britain could maintain the principle that wars should not interfere with international commerce and finance in the Victorian era. Neutrality was one of the key tools used by Britain to sustain its foreign-policy objectives and deal with international situations when they occurred. One region where neutrality came to have particular importance for the maintenance of Britain's interests after 1856 were its concessions in China, including Hong Kong, Shanghai, Canton and other treaty ports. After two Opium Wars (the first in 1839-42, the second in 1856-60), China was forced to open more treaty ports for trade and lease out more territory as concession territories to the European powers, including Britain. From the British perspective, it marked the widening of the empire of ‘free trade’ that dominated its imperial programme across the century. In the second half of the nineteenth century, Britain maintained neutrality in the civil wars raging in China, such as the Taiping Rebellion (1850-64), as well as conflicts fought in China by other imperial powers like the Sino-French War (1884-85) and Sino-Japanese War (1894-95). Neutrality was a key diplomatic strategy developed to preserve the balance of power, help to protect Britain’s control over its concessions and trade networks, and allow some flexibility in terms of free trade and security. Neutrality was a beneficial component for the maintenance of Britain's economic and imperial interests in China and the Far East at the time.