Cause, Chance, Determinism and Counterfactuals in History

Abstract

My basic aim in this thesis is to undermine scepticism towards a causal approach to historiography. Scepticism about causal explanations in history is the result of inadequate understanding of what causal knowledge involves and how it may be provided. I identify where failures of philosophical understanding generate such scepticism, and then attempt to correct some of those failures. Post-modern approaches to history hold that common philosophical accounts of causation seem inapplicable to the kinds of explanation appropriate in history. My response is to show that Lewis’s counterfactual theory of causation fits well with the way historians make causal claims. Historical explanations must deal with accidental happenings, chance events, and free human action; post-modern historians claim that causal explanation in history cannot account for the occurrence of these. My reply involves identifying notions of accidentality, chance and freedom, which are consistent with causal explanations. The previous claim is sometimes supported by holding that causation presupposes determinism. I respond to this in two steps: I first explore the senses in which determinism may be presupposed by causal explanations in the natural sciences, and then consider arguments against historical determinism, showing that they fall short. Finally, I consider whether the construction of counterfactual thought experiments may be a useful tool in the provision of causal explanations in history. I argue that counterfactual thinking plays a limited role in history, and that it is compatible with both, determinism and indeterminism. Key-words: causation, explanation, chance, determinism, historical counterfactuals.