Abstract:
This exploratory paper will survey a schematic commonality between some very different kinds of situation. In each kind of situation it is possible to raise questions of the rationality of belief, or of action, or of the rightness of actions of diverse kinds, where rightness may relate teleologically to the optimal achievement of a desired result, or to the moral rightness of an action. Broadly, in these diverse cases, we may wish to optimize our chances of arriving at truth, succeeding in our actions, or doing the right thing. Characterizations of rational choice of belief or action, or of suitable rules – of inference, of weighing probabilities, of achieving an end, or of morality – are important parts of many philosophical attempts to say how human cognitive powers may best be employed to achieve such optimization. But there are other human powers or capacities which also deserve to be called, broadly speaking, “cognitive”, but which are neither part of “rationality” as often understood, nor exercises in choosing, formulating or following rules.
