The Existent Actual And The Merely Possible

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dc.contributor.advisor Robinson, D en
dc.contributor.advisor Kroon, F en Kishore, Ankit en 2015-08-02T21:07:53Z en 2015 en
dc.identifier.citation 2015 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description Full text is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland only. en
dc.description.abstract A contemporary debate in the metaphysics of modality is one between Actualism and Possibilism. Actualism is the thesis that everything which exists is actual. Possibilism, in contrast is the view that there are some things which exist which are not actual. A parallel debate in metaphysics is about the nature of existence. While there are some that claim that there are some things which don’t exist but to which we might still predicate properties, others take existence to be conceptually prior to the predication of properties. The former view of existence is known as Meinongianism. Possibilism and Meinongianism are structurally similar – and both in turn are structurally similar to the view known as New Actualism. New Actualism, with Linsky and Zalta as its primary advocates, came about in order to get around some problems the actualist faces. The actualist is unable to give an analysis of some of our ordinary modal beliefs, such as the possibility that there might have existed something entirely different than anything found in the actual world (a possible alien being) or that there might have been possible people who don’t actually exist (like my possible but non-existent brother). Furthermore, Linsky and Zalta seek to make the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic compatible with Actualism, noting that it is a simpler and more elegant logic and with fewer problems than competing Kripke models. In order to do this, Linsky and Zalta posit what they call contingently nonconcrete objects. I will provide reasons for why New Actualism needs a Meinongian ontological framework. Upon doing this, I will try and situate contingently nonconcrete objects within a Neo-Meinongian framework. Noting that the most apt Neo-Meinongian strategy to situate contingently nonconcrete objects is one which I contend to be assuming possibilism, I claim that the New Actualist who accepts contingently nonconcrete objects is forced to be a possibilist. Furthermore, for reasons to do with ontological parsimony and logical simplicity, I claim that Possibilism is a better theory than Actualism, especially in light of the failure of New Actualism. en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartof Masters Thesis - University of Auckland en
dc.relation.isreferencedby UoA99264788612802091 en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights Restricted Item. Available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland. en
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dc.rights.uri en
dc.title The Existent Actual And The Merely Possible en
dc.type Thesis en Philosophy en The University of Auckland en Masters en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The Author en
pubs.elements-id 492828 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2015-08-03 en

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