Abstract:
Derek Parfit’s challenges to conceptions of intergenerational justice and moral obligations to future generations have posed enduring philosophical problems. This thesis considers whether Amartya Sen’s Capabilities Approach can provide an adequate account of our obligations to future generations in light of these challenges. I argue that, though limited in some ways, the Capabilities Approach shows much promise, and can be developed into a reasonably robust account of intergenerational justice. This requires engagement with a set of separate but inter-related questions. In order to establish this account, I systematically analyse the theoretical foundations of the Capabilities Approach, and argue that Amartya Sen does provide a fuller account of the foundations of social justice than he is often given credit for. Furthermore, I argue that, despite his objections, transcendental theorising ought to remain one of the relevant foci of justice. This work culminates in an exploration of the ethical challenges faced in intergenerational justice, and how Sen’s work might interact with these.