Abstract:
In 2005, India’s Special Economic Zones Bill was passed amidst a wider push for economic liberalisation and growth. The new Special Economic Zones Act specifically provided for the establishment of spatially bounded “economic enclaves” to be governed by a separate legal and regulatory framework. While proponents have lauded this move, citing the growth and employment generating potential of Special Economic Zones (SEZs), others have been more critical. Specifically, detractors have voiced concern that these “enclaves of excellence” do not deliver their professed benefits, cause harm through land acquisition and undermine democratic accountability. If India’s SEZ scheme does undermine accountability, then this has potentially significant implications for the quality of India’s democracy. However, it is not obvious that this is so. In light of cases, such as Goa, where popular agitation led to the cancellation of its entire SEZ programme, it seems we are presented with a very varied picture. As a result, this thesis asks: why have some citizens been able to exact accountability for special economic zone related grievances whilst others have not? In order to answer this, I investigate five SEZs, combining within-case and cross-case analysis in an effort to identify factors which may explain this variance. Significantly, this thesis has facilitated the creation of new theory, finding that the state machinery often serves as a “broker of accountability,” determining who successfully exacts accountability and who does not. I argue that this poses a direct challenge to notions of democratic accountability which are commonly couched in the language of citizen empowerment and popular control.
