Abstract:
This thesis addresses some important issues in corporate governance using
data from Chinese stock markets. The thesis starts with a summary of relevant
research in the area of corporate governance. Next, I describe the historic
development of corporate governance in China and the corporate governance
framework that is currently in place. These two introductory chapters are followed by
my empirical research, which comprises three chapters.
First, I analyse share price reactions and top-management turnover around
announcements of negotiated block transfers between different State-ownership
structures for a sample of State-controlled firms that are publicly traded on Chinese
stock exchanges. I find that changes in firm value and CEO turnover are much greater
when a government agency (GA) transfers a block of shares of a listed firm to a statecontrolled
enterprise with a private joint venture partner (LPSOE) rather than to a
solely state owned enterprise (SSOE).
Second, using a sample of listed firms that issued debt guarantees to their large
shareholders, I analyse the relation between firm- and ownership characteristics and
the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders.
I also analyse and validate the assumed relationship between ‘tunnelling’ and several
financial measures of expropriation suggested in the literature. I find that, in a weak
legal environment such as China, the issuance of related guarantees is more likely at
firms with large private blockholders than at firms with the State as the largest
blockholder, and that related guarantees are more likely at larger firms and firms with
a single controlling blockholder. I also find that firms that issued related loan
guarantees have significantly lower industry-adjusted measures of Tobin’s Q, profitability, and dividend yields and have significantly higher leverage. This
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that tunnelling by controlling shareholders
can be very costly to minority shareholders. I find no evidence of higher bid ask
spreads for firms that issued related guarantees.
Finally, I study the monitoring role of blockholders in China as an alternative
mechanism of corporate governance that might result in reduced expropriation of firm
assets by the controlling blockholder. I find that non-controlling block holders
contribute to firm value only when their ultimate owners are different from the
controlling blockholder in terms of the public/private distinction. I attribute this result
to the potential conflict of interests between controlling and non-controlling block
holders in this case, reducing the opportunities to tunnel and improving monitoring of
management. I also provide evidence of a substantial valuation discount if there are
clear signals that suggest collusion between blockholders.