Open and Closed: An Ockhamist Account of the Open Future

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dc.contributor.advisor Mckeown-Green, J en
dc.contributor.advisor Bishop, J en
dc.contributor.advisor Girard, P en Lewis, David en 2016-11-10T00:41:18Z en 2016 en
dc.identifier.uri en
dc.description Full text is available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland only. en
dc.description.abstract The openness of the future is one of a number of common sense but metaphysically opaque intuitions people have about time. The common sense view takes it that at least some things are such that it is possible they might or might not occur in the future. It seems to be the case now that the future is not yet fully settled. The past on the other hand seems fully settled and determinate. Common sense is generally committed to a package view: the open future and the closed past. This thesis is concerned with providing a metaphysical theory of the open future: of what the unsettledness of the future consists of. I defend the Ochkamist open future. The theory is Ockhamist insofar as it holds to the notion of a true or actual future. I claim nomic indeterminism is sufficient for the unsettledness of the open future. Furthermore I argue Ockhamism says nothing about the closed past. Against Ockhamism I discuss three competing views of the open future: No futurism, Ontic Vagueness, and Branching Concretism. They are broadly characterised as claiming something stronger over and above nomic indeterminism. The idea they pose is that the future must not fully be determinate; that is to say it is indeterminate what the actual future is. I argue that the theoretical costs of these theories are too high or that they simply fail to capture the openness intuition. en
dc.publisher ResearchSpace@Auckland en
dc.relation.ispartof Masters Thesis - University of Auckland en
dc.relation.isreferencedby UoA99264888706402091 en
dc.rights Items in ResearchSpace are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated. Previously published items are made available in accordance with the copyright policy of the publisher. en
dc.rights Restricted Item. Available to authenticated members of The University of Auckland. en
dc.rights.uri en
dc.title Open and Closed: An Ockhamist Account of the Open Future en
dc.type Thesis en Philosophy en The University of Auckland en Masters en
dc.rights.holder Copyright: The author en
pubs.elements-id 545694 en
pubs.record-created-at-source-date 2016-11-10 en

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