Corporate Political Spending Information Disclosure Regime: Economic Consequences and Future Development

Abstract

This thesis seeks a better understanding of corporate participation in political processes and its role as well as potential in promoting corporate performance and reshaping political environment from the perspective of potential legislative interference – disclosure-based regulation on corporate political spending that requires this topic-specific information. Through theoretical and empirical explorations across disciplines, this thesis aims at forming a systematic anatomy of corporate political spending, bringing together facts and further rationales in an orderly arrangement. These results are intended to provide legislatures with more grounds for regulating corporate political participation. At the same time, the thesis is intended to raise awareness of deficiencies in corporate governance guidelines on political participation and expenditures. Accordingly, these findings shed light on objectives and corresponding instruments of future disclosure-based policy through a focus on corporate political spending and the formulation of guidelines for corporate governance of political participation and disclosure. To achieve these objectives, the thesis begins by illustrating the upsurge of corporate political spending and the regulatory gaps in both public policy and corporate governance level. In addition, questions on the basis of this information concerning corporate political spending are addressed to provide the fundamental background. Based on the initial expository investigation, this thesis further investigates current practices of public policies on corporate public participations and disclosure, as well as existing corporate governance managerial guidelines on political spending and voluntary disclosure. Deepening the examination of rationales for corporate political participation and voluntary disclosure of this information, a theoretical analysis has been conducted to further unveil the mechanism of corporate political behaviour. It is followed by an empirical examination of responses from participants of entity markets to information on the possible passage of mandatory regulation on corporate political spending, as well as information regarding the political connection itself, on individual country cases. The thesis, therefore, contributes substantively to policy debate on the introduction of transparency into corporate political expenditures, a debate which will help shape future policymaking about the interaction between private and public sectors. The outcome of this research will, among other studies, add theoretical and empirical support for rulemaking decisions on corporate political participation.