Abstract:
The implications of categorising income as "personal services income" and the actual meaning of this term have been marked with uncertainty. The Commissioner of Taxation has long asserted that "personal services income" inherently may not be derived by an entity other than the person whose exertions produce the income. In Liedig v FCT (1994) 28 ATR 141, however, Hill J held that in the absence of a specific legislative provision, there was no basis for the Commissioner's doctrine. The specific legislative measures Hill J required were put in place through the New Business Tax System (Alienation of Personal Services Income) Act 2000. In certain circumstances this Act prevents interposed entities from deriving personal services income. Such payments are attributed instead to the individual who performs the services. It will also be seen, however, that these provisions do not apply to entities that are conducting a "personal services business". It is submitted that the combined effect of, inter alia, the Act's definition of "personal services income" and "personal services business" is to give the Act a narrower scope than the Commissioner's personal services doctrine. Moreover, it will be submitted that the statutory definition of personal services income also suffers from the same flaws that Hill J identified as relevant to the Commissioner's personal services doctrine.
